United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-2560 

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * 

* 

Vondra D. Alexander, *

* 

Appellant. *

___________ Appeals from the United States

District Court for the

No. 09-2744 Eastern District of Arkansas.

___________

[UNPUBLISHED]

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * 

* 

Sharon L. Alexander, *

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 8, 2010

Filed: March 15, 2010

___________
1

The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.

-2-

Before BYE, ARNOLD, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Sharon and Vondra Alexander appeal the respective 61-month and 43-month

sentences they received for conspiracy to commit bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1344 and 1349. Vondra Alexander argues the district court1

 erred by imposing an

excessive sentence relative to others involved in the case and by failing to consider

mitigating circumstances. Sharon Alexander contends the court erred by failing to

properly weigh factors justifying a variance such as her mental and physical health

and her family responsibilities. We affirm.

The facts underlying this appeal are more fully stated in the Alexanders'

previous appeal, United States v. Alexander, 556 F.3d 890 (8th Cir. 2009). Sharon

and Vondra Alexander, who are sisters, were indicted along with ten others on

multiple charges in connection with stealing and passing stolen checks. Sharon and

Vondra each pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud and the government

moved to dismiss the remaining charges against them. The district court sentenced

Vondra to 63 months of incarceration and Sharon to 87 months of incarceration, each

at the bottom of their respective Guidelines ranges. On appeal, this Court vacated the

sentences and remanded because the district court committed plain error by applying

a presumption of reasonableness to the advisory Guidelines. Alexander, 556 F.3d at

893-894. On remand, the district court gave Vondra and Sharon each a 30 percent

downward variance from the Guidelines, resulting in a sentence of 43 months of

incarceration for Vondra and 61 months of incarceration for Sharon.
-3-

We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the

additional grounds for variances proposed by the Alexanders. United States v.

Zastrow, 534 F.3d 854, 855 (8th Cir. 2008) (setting forth the standard of review). The

district court did not commit any significant procedural error because it properly

calculated the Guidelines ranges and weighed the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a). United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

In Vondra's case, we reject the assertion the district court ignored the facts of the case

in imposing an excessive sentence relative to others and failed to consider mitigating

factors. The court stated it found the disparity among the sentences to be a compelling

factor, and accordingly it granted a 30 percent downward variance for both Vondra

and Sharon. The court justified the remaining disparity in sentences as being a result

of Vondra and Sharon's roles in the offense, their offense levels and criminal histories,

and the enhancements they received. The court also referred to the original sentencing

hearing, at which it considered Vondra's caretaking role in her family as a mitigating

factor. However, the court determined Vondra's caretaking role did not justify an

additional variance. These are precisely the type of defendant-specific determinations

more appropriately suited for the sentencing court, and we find no procedural error in

the court's analysis. United States v. White, 506 F.3d 635, 644 (8th Cir. 2007) ("In

reviewing whether the district court's variance fell outside the range of choice dictated

by the facts of the case, we are mindful of the fact that the sentencing judge has access

to, and greater familiarity with, the individual case and the individual defendant before

him than the Sentencing Commission or the appeals court.").

Similarly, we reject Sharon's argument regarding the district court's improper

weighing of her physical and mental health condition and her family responsibilities.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), courts are required to consider "the history and

characteristics of the defendant," including consideration of a defendant's medical

condition. Id. at 644. We cannot conclude the district court abused its discretion in

weighing Sharon's health condition and family responsibilities. To the contrary, the

court was presented with extensive information including testimony from Sharon and
-4-

her daughter indicating the nature of Sharon's health issues and family responsibilities.

The court acknowledged the genuine nature of Sharon's health problems. See United

States v. Wahlstrom, 588 F.3d 538, 547 (8th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the claim the district

court abused its discretion in weighing the defendant's background where the court

was presented with extensive information and acknowledged the defendant's personal

history). The record indicates the court considered the appropriate factors and

provided adequate justification for granting a 30 percent downward variance. White,

506 F.3d at 648. Giving deference to the district court's determination, we find the

sentences of 43 months of incarceration for Vondra Alexander and 61 months of

incarceration for Sharon Alexander are not unreasonable and are not an abuse of

discretion. Zastrow, 534 F.3d at 856.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________