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Leoture on Communication SeCNrl.ty and Signal 

Intelligence ActiT1t1e1 

_ 1. !he Organisation ad frainine; Section he.a been ginn the reaponalbility 

of coordinating the preparation ot a .r~ur (4) hour lectu!'e on Co:mmication 

Security and Signal Intelligenoe Activities. !he course,, or w!rl.ch thia u a 

part. -.111 be preaented initially in t~e Pentagon to a group ot prospective 

1Dstruoton tor the Command and Staf'f College. Later, the same course will be 

presented agail'l, with fln"1' necessary revision., a.t the Co:mmm.d and S-tatt College, 

Fort IA&T8JDrorth, ltanaaa. 

2. With reference to draft ot Leot'..ire on Com:mmicatlon Security and 

SilJIB.1 Intelligence prepared by this orrioe and now in yo•Jr possession, the 

:memorandum for record., subject., "Speech an Si~al Intelligence and Co!l?mU.niC!ltion 

Secnri ty• • dated 19 July 1945, and the 'Brief aa prepared by Captain Campbell 

tor sub!!li•aion to ~SCIB concer:U~ the scope of activities to be discussed in 

the lecture, it ia requested that a reVised lecture be pre:pared a:id au'b?Ditted 

to thia otr~ce by 10 August 1946. 

:.. It ahoald be noted also. that i::. vi$W of General Peabody' 1 co::mumts, 

it ia not only possible, but ~esirabl~. t~~t this lecture be more inclusive 

t.han the lecture aa prepared or1,1.nally by thi• office. 

GEORGE A. BiaIEZl 

Colonel, Sig?ial COrp1 

Deputy Chier, Al.A. 

'Zxteuaicm 498 

As-22 As-14 15 Aug 

1946 

Draft and one carbon cop7 bave been forwarded to 7ou on l::; August 1946. The document 

baa been c1aaa1t1ed !OP SBCI!I! in viev ot the 

1n Paragraph 3 above. f irective 

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VILLIAJI 'I. igDillAB Director ot 

Communicat1ona Research 

Bst 215 

11. '- _! -· 

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' ~ • Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-27-2014 pursuant to E .o. 1352a .- ' : ' 
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REF ID: A 71132 TO!' SECRET tJL'l'!tA 

OUTLINE OF COURSE 

periods of 50 minutes each) 

First Period - - - 50 Minutes 

Estimated 

Time Required 

(Minutes) 

I. "MAGIC" - "The Effect" 

(A recital or about 10 or 12 dramatic incidents and 

cases wherein the results obtained by signal intelligence or communications security played the principal role). 

II.~ "The Cause" - or how it's do~e. 

~t 1. Signal intelligence - the central clue. 'Reason~ ~v for withholding publicity. _ .? ~ 2. Very brief history of cryptography and cryptanalysis, \JY./~~ but going back only to World War I. ~ • 3. How the responsibilities and activities were scattered ~~ ~hrough several agencies after World War I. 

4. Necessity for integration -

" {. a. In respect to cryptanalytic activities. 

b. In respect to cryptographic activities. 

c. In respect to both activities, because of interaction on each other. 

15 

d. Brief statement of how the necessary integration 

was brought about by 6 Sept. 1945 directive. 15 

III. Signal Intelligence Operations - General 

1. I!tro~ Jt ~QQ. .. ~Ofrtva.r 

b. Signal intelligen~e is ~Y one or the several 

kinds of intelligence. l· Comparison of reliability, timeliness, and cost 

of signal intelligence with the same factors in 

the case of other kinds of intelligence. d. Necessity for oacasional checking with information 

from other sources. 

\ 2. Operations involved in obtaining sigD&l intelligence. 

I 

I 

, ' 

I.. 
' 

REF ID:A71132 

Estimated 

Time Re-

(u1re4 Minutes) 

a 

b 

c 

d 

e 

t 

g 

Interception 

Traffic analysis Cryptanalysis 

Translation 

Proces-sing on large scale ("Assembly-line" DeCrJPtion and tr&nslation) Publication 

Evaluation and dissem1nat1on-tne responsibility and function of Intelligence 

"Fusion" or "RegeneratLve" effects or the respective operations - how they,a~ect one another 

~\-~'l:i~~ \ ' Total Minutes 

\ 

I 

--... 

20 

so 
REF ID : A 71132fOP SEeHE'f Uilr!tA 

Second Period - - - 50 Minutes 

Estimated 

Time Re1uired 

Minutes) : 

IV. Intercept Operations. 

l. 

2. 

J 3. 

4. 

General or 1ntroductory--(Operating data-freq, calls, 

schedules; types ot nets and workings; radio pro- cedures; operators chatter; D/F, RFP, Tina; other 

collateral information). 

Strategic and tactical intercept. (Differences and 

similarities. Difficulties in fixing line of demar-, 

cation between functions and activities at fixed and 

mobile stations). 

Primary bases of and factors in interception efficiency. 

How the ASA Otf icer and the Intelligence Officer can 

be or assistance to each other in this phase. 10 

v. Traffic Analysis 

1. Introductory-an analogy to make clear what it is about. 

2. Techniques. 3. How traffic analysis and cryptanalysis assist and 

affect each other. 

4. The importance of traffic analysis when cryptanalysis is unsuccessful. 

5. The intelligence derivable from traffic analysis--its limitations, dangers, and possibilities. 10 

VI. Cryptanalysis 

\ 

1. 

2. 

'· 4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

Introductort remarks - Progress made in last 25 years. High level {or strategic) vs medium and low-level (or tactical) cryptanalytic operations. Size and nature of organizations required for efficiency. Requirements in regard to space, communications facilities, special machinery, and specialist personnel. Priorities and intercept control. (How priorities are 

determined by the relationships among intelligence, T/A, 

C/A). 

Special role played by rapid communications in successful signal intelligence operations. How. the ASA Officer and the Intell>gence Officer can be 

of mutual assistance in the production and most effective use or signal intelligence. _3_0 __ __ 

Total Minutes 50 
REF ID:A71132 

Third Period - - - 50 Minutes 

'fOP SEleml'f UL!&~ 

Estimated 

Time Re1uired 

Minutes) 

VII. Communications Security-The other of the Siamese Twins. 

1. 

2. 

'· J 4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

la. 

/r?J. 

Introductory: soope, definitions and components of 

communications security. 

Importance of communications security in modern 

signal communications; and a few examples of 1nsecUl'-

ity and their consequences. Communications security is a respponsibility of 

command. 

Responsibilities of Intelligence Officer. 

of ASA Officer. 

Security measures: physical security; cryptographic security-authorized codes and ciphers when properly used give adequate secUl'ity; transmission security. Different levels of security: high-grade; medium.-

grade; low-grade. Modern crypto-mechanisms; their possibilities and limitations; effects of misuse; necessity for indoctrination and training. Problems of plain language transmissions and approved circuits. 

Problems of coordination in Joint and Combined communications. 

Evaluation of our security as seen through TICOM operations. 

Tactical traffic of small units-where most of present- day insecurity arises. 

How the Intelligence Officer can assist. 

VIII. Friendly traffic analysis, cover, and deception. 

\ 1. Effect of our knowledge of T/A techniques on our own 

seaurity. 2. Strategical and tactical T/A. 

3. Cover and deception. 4. Coordination required. 5. Examples of accomplishments. 

40 

10 

Total Minutes 50 

-·-
REF ID:A71132 g:lQP 8ES:RE9? lJL!'RA 

Fourth Period - - - 50 Minutes 

IX. The Army Security Agency 

x. 

1. Functions and responsibilities. 2. How it operates in Z/I. 

3. How it operates in theaters. 

4. How it coordinates and integrates. , 5. Liaison activities. 

Summary, conclusions, and informal discussion 

1. 

2. '· 

4. 

5. 

Emphasis on limitations, pitfalls, and dangers, but 

assurance of value and validity of successful signal intelligence operations. 

The role played by good evaluation and dissemination. 

Necessity for protection of sources of signal intelligence; effects of poor communications security on 

signal intelligence success. 

Security regulations for protection of ultra. \ 

Security regulations for protection of our own 

comm.uni cations. 

Total Minutes 

Estimated 

Time Re-

(uired 

~inutes) 

20 

30 

50