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2. Dismissal of Determan

In their second assignment of error, Appellants challenge 

the district court’s decision to sustain Determan’s motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim. Specifically, they argue 

that the court erred in its determination that Determan owed no 

duty to Appellants and thus was an improper party to a mandamus action.

[7] To prevail against a motion to dismiss for failure to state 

a claim, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts, accepted as true, 

to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Lindner 

v. Kindig, 285 Neb. 386, 826 N.W.2d 868 (2013). Appellants’ 

claim against Determan rested entirely on the presumption 

that after Determan initiated judicial foreclosure proceedings, 

they were still entitled to redeem their property in the manner 

prescribed by § 77-1824. For the reasons explained above, that 

presumption was erroneous. As a matter of law, once the foreclosure action was pending, Appellants could not redeem their 

property under § 77-1824. As such, Appellants’ claim against 

Determan was not plausible on its face. The district court did 

not err in dismissing the complaint against Determan for failure to state a claim.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the district court which entered summary judgment in favor of the 

Treasurer and sustained Determan’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

Affirmed.

Bruce R. Friedman, appellant, v. 

Susan C. Friedman, appellee.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed May 22, 2015. No. S-14-710.

1. Judgments: Appeal and Error. On a question of law, an appellate court is 

obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the determination reached by the 

court below.
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2. Jurisdiction: Pleadings: Parties. A party will be deemed to have appeared 

generally if, by motion or other form of application to the court, he or she seeks 

to bring its powers into action on any matter other than the question of jurisdiction over that party.

3. Service of Process: Waiver. A general appearance waives any defects in the 

process or notice, the steps preliminary to its issuance, or in the service or 

return thereof.

4. Due Process: Service of Process. A general appearance waives any due process 

objection based on inadequate service of process.

5. Foreign Judgments: Jurisdiction: Collateral Attack. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 25-1587.03 (Reissue 2008) of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 

Act, collateral attacks on a final, foreign judgment are generally limited to claims 

that the judgment was void, such as for lack of jurisdiction over the person or the 

subject matter.

6. Foreign Judgments: Records. If the amount of a foreign judgment cannot be 

ascertained without resorting to facts outside the record of the foreign court, it 

cannot be registered under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.

7. Divorce: Jurisdiction: Equity. District courts in domestic dissolution actions 

retain equitable jurisdiction to determine amounts due under an ambiguous decree.

8. Foreign Judgments. The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act has no 

provision for modification or alteration of a foreign judgment, decree, or order.

9. Judgments: Appeal and Error. Whether a judgment is ambiguous is a question 

of law for which the appellate court has an obligation to reach a conclusion independent from the lower court’s conclusion.

10. Right to Counsel: Effectiveness of Counsel. A pro se litigant will receive the 

same consideration as if he or she had been represented by an attorney, and, 

concurrently, that litigant is held to the same standards as one who is represented 

by counsel.

11. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. Pro se litigants, like any other, 

may not present issues, arguments, and theories for the first time on appeal.

12. Appeal and Error. A lower court cannot commit error in resolving an issue 

never presented and submitted to it for disposition.

13. Rules of the Supreme Court: Appeal and Error. Under Neb. Ct. R. App. P. 

§ 2-109(D)(4) (rev. 2014), a party filing a cross-appeal must set forth a separate 

division of the brief prepared in the same manner and under the same rules as the 

brief of appellant.

Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: J. 

Michael Coffey, Judge. Affirmed.

Bruce R. Friedman, pro se.

Karl Von Oldenburg, of Brumbaugh & Quandahl, P.C., 

L.L.O., for appellee.
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Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, McCormack, 

Miller-Lerman, and Cassel, JJ.

McCormack, J.

NATURE OF CASE

The ex-husband appeals from an order generally overruling 

his objections to garnishment upon a foreign dissolution decree. 

The ex-husband asserts that he was not properly notified of the 

registration of the foreign judgment or of the garnishment, that 

the court should have declared the amount of the foreign judgment to be lower than what was sought by his ex-wife, and that 

the court inadequately addressed the percentage of his wages 

that should be garnished. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On May 7, 2014, Susan Roggentine, also known as Susan C. 

Friedman (Roggentine), filed in the district court for Douglas 

County an affidavit for registration of a foreign judgment. 

According to the affidavit, Roggentine sought to enforce a 

total of $160,458.49 awarded in a Colorado dissolution decree 

against her ex-husband, Bruce R. Friedman. According to the 

affidavit, the award consisted of $145,243.49, plus $15,215 in 

court-awarded attorney fees, for a total of $160,458.49.

A certified copy of the decree, dated October 26, 2011, was 

attached to the affidavit. In the decree, the Colorado court 

ordered that Friedman pay Roggentine $100,000 in the division of assets and deliver to Roggentine described items of 

personal property and the title to specified vehicles. The court 

ordered that Friedman reimburse Roggentine for $45,243.49 

that Friedman induced Roggentine to withdraw from her individual retirement account to pay Friedman’s nondischargeable 

debts. The court awarded spousal maintenance in the amount 

of $2,000 per month for 12 months, but found that Friedman’s 

default on $10,399 in temporary maintenance obligations justified that maintenance be awarded in a lump sum of $34,399. 

The court ordered Friedman to pay $15,215 in attorney fees 

and $850 in costs.

In the conclusion of the order, the Colorado court entered 

judgment in favor of Roggentine in the amount of $34,399, as 
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of November 1, 2011. The court further ordered Friedman to 

pay Roggentine $145,243.49 in cash or certified funds within 

30 days of the court’s order and ordered Friedman to pay the 

balance of attorney fees in the amount of $15,215 and costs of 

$850. Mathematically, these listed sums total $195,707.49. The 

order itself does not purport to set forth a total summation of 

the various amounts awarded.

The affidavit in support of registration of the foreign judgment set forth as Friedman’s last known address the correct 

house number corresponding to the address where he lived, 

but the street number stated 188th Street. Friedman actually 

lived on 118th Street. Accordingly, subsequent to the filing of 

the foreign judgment, the clerk of the court sent notice to the 

incorrect address. The notice was returned as undeliverable.

On June 20, 2014, Roggentine filed an affidavit and praecipe for summons in garnishment after judgment. This listed 

Friedman’s correct address and stated that the amount due 

on the judgment was $160,458.49, plus costs in the amount 

of $101.12, for a total of $160,559.61. The affidavit set forth 

that Friedman was not the head of a family for purposes of the 

percentage of disposable earnings subject to garnishment under 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1558 (Reissue 2008).

Roggentine asked that the summons in garnishment be 

issued by certified mail to Friedman’s employer. Friedman’s 

employer received the summons and order of garnishment in 

aid of execution on June 30, 2014. Although the summons/

garnishment order lists the incorrect 188th Street address for 

Friedman, the certified mail receipts found in the transcript 

appear to show that it was sent to Friedman via certified mail 

to the correct address. The record does not reflect Friedman’s 

receipt of that mailing, however.

On July 11, 2014, Friedman filed in the district court a pro 

se “Ex-Parte Motion to Quash,” “Objection to Registration 

of Foreign Judgment,” and “Objection to Garnishment.” In 

the motion, Friedman alleged that he never received notice 

of the filing of the foreign judgment or of the garnishment 

until notified by his employer’s payroll processor “via regular 
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postal mail” on July 7, 2013. Friedman alleged he was therefore “neglected of his opportunity” to object to the judgment 

Roggentine was attempting to register and to object to the garnishment of his wages.

In the motion, Friedman requested a hearing to challenge the 

allegation that he was not the head of a family for purposes of 

the garnishment calculation. Friedman also asked that the court 

quash the garnishment on the grounds that Roggentine had 

failed to (1) notify the clerk of his proper address when filing 

the foreign judgment, (2) mail the notice of the garnishment by 

certified mail to his correct address, and (3) certify to the court 

that she had complied with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1011 (Cum. 

Supp. 2014).

Friedman received a hearing on his motion on July 18, 

2014. At the hearing, Friedman first complained of the lack of 

notice and proper service of process. He argued in this regard 

that Roggentine could not garnish his wages, because she had 

failed to satisfy the statutory notice requirements. He also indicated his belief that Roggentine had purposefully provided the 

wrong address.

Second, Friedman challenged the amount of the foreign 

judgment that was registered, and which served as the basis 

for the garnishment. Friedman claimed he was obligated to 

pay only $149,000 under the foreign order. However, Friedman 

admitted he had made no payments to Roggentine pursuant 

to that order. Friedman also indicated that the order had been 

affirmed on appeal.

On this second point, the court—apparently adding up only 

the amounts awarded on the last page of its conclusion—stated 

that the order plainly totaled $160,000. Friedman admitted that 

was “what it says at the bottom of the document.” The court 

responded that because the award was affirmed on appeal, 

“that’s what you’re stuck with.”

Finally, Friedman explained the reasons he ought to be 

considered head of a family for purposes of any garnishment. 

Roggentine’s counsel responded that Roggentine did not object 

to Friedman’s being considered head of a family.
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There was no indication at the hearing that Friedman had as 

of that time received a garnished paycheck. Friedman claims 

in his appellate brief that he had one paycheck garnished on 

July 14, 2014, at the non-head-of-a-family rate of 25 percent.1

Neither party offered any exhibits at the hearing.

On August 5, 2014, the court issued the following order: 

“The Court finds that [Friedman’s] objection to the registration 

of a foreign document and objection to garnishment should be 

overruled and denied. The Court further finds that [Friedman] 

is the head of a household.” That same date, the court issued 

an order for continuing lien, which was sent to Friedman’s 

employer. The order stated that “there is not successful objection to garnishment filed.” The order for continuing lien does 

not specify whether Friedman is head of a family. Friedman 

indicates in his appellate brief that since the August 5 order, his 

paycheck has been garnished at the maximum head-of-family 

rate of 15 percent.2 Friedman appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Friedman assigns that the court erred in (1) denying and 

overruling his objection to the registration of the foreign judgment on the basis that the amount was incorrect, (2) failing to 

enter a declaratory judgment setting forth the correct amount 

of the foreign judgment, (3) overruling and denying his objection to the registration of the foreign judgment on the grounds 

that he was denied notice and due process in relation to the 

registration of the judgment, (4) allowing a garnishment to 

proceed when there was no validly registered judgment, (5) 

overruling and denying his objection to the garnishment and 

not quashing the garnishment for lack of proper service and 

on the grounds that he was denied due process and the right 

to be heard prior to the garnishment of his wages, (6) allowing 

the garnishment at the maximum allowable level, and (7) failing to rectify the initial amount garnished at the “‘not head of 

household’” level.

1 See § 25-1558(1)(a).

2 See § 25-1558(1)(c).
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] On a question of law, an appellate court is obligated to 

reach a conclusion independent of the determination reached 

by the court below.3

ANALYSIS

Notice

Friedman first argues that the garnishment order should 

have been set aside, because Roggentine failed to comply 

with the notice requirements of the statutes governing registration of foreign judgments and garnishments. He relatedly asserts that he was denied due process of law, arguing 

he was denied an opportunity to be heard on the issue of 

registering the Colorado judgment and on the amount of the 

garnishment.

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1587.04 (Reissue 2008), of the Nebraska 

Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act,4 states that at 

the time of the filing of the foreign judgment, the judgment 

creditor or his or her lawyer shall make and file with the clerk 

of the court an affidavit setting forth the name and last-known 

post office address of the judgment debtor. The clerk of the 

court shall thereafter mail notice of the foreign judgment to the 

judgment debtor at the address given.

Section 25-1011(1), of the attachment and garnishment statutes, states that the summons and order of garnishment and 

the interrogatories in duplicate, a notice to judgment debtor 

form, and a request for hearing form shall be served upon the 

garnishee in the manner provided for service of a summons in 

a civil action.

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-516.01(1) (Reissue 2008) pertains 

to service of a summons in a civil action. As relevant here, 

§ 25-516.01(1) states that “[t]he voluntary appearance of the 

party is equivalent to service.” Section 25-516.01(2) elaborates that participation in the proceedings on any issue other 

than the defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the person, 

3 Gammel v. Gammel, 259 Neb. 738, 612 N.W.2d 207 (2000).

4 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1587.01 to 25-1587.09 (Reissue 2008).
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insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of services of process, waives all such issues except as to the objection that 

the party is not amenable to process issued by a court of 

this state.

[2,3] We have summarized that a party will be deemed to 

have appeared generally if, by motion or other form of application to the court, he or she seeks to bring its powers into 

action on any matter other than the question of jurisdiction 

over that party.5 And a general appearance waives any defects 

in the process or notice, the steps preliminary to its issuance, 

or in the service or return thereof.6

In his motion and appearance before the lower court at the 

July 18, 2014, hearing, Friedman did not simply argue that 

Roggentine failed to properly serve him notice of the registration of the judgment and garnishment. He also argued that the 

amount of the garnishment was incorrect.

[4] Friedman participated in the proceedings on issues other 

than the defenses listed under § 25-516.01(2): lack of jurisdiction over the person, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency 

of services of process. Friedman thus made a general appearance and waived his objections to the statutory provisions 

relating to jurisdiction over his person.7 By making a general 

appearance, Friedman also waived any due process objection 

based on the inadequate service of process.8

Uncertainty of Amount

Friedman alternatively argues that the amount of the 

Colorado judgment was so uncertain as to be unenforceable. 

He argues that such unenforceability opened the door to a 

5 See, Hunt v. Trackwell, 262 Neb. 688, 635 N.W.2d 106 (2001); Glass v. 

Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 248 Neb. 501, 536 N.W.2d 344 (1995); 

McKillip v. Harvey, 80 Neb. 264, 114 N.W. 155 (1907).

6 Harris v. Eberhardt, 215 Neb. 240, 338 N.W.2d 53 (1983).

7 See, Miller v. Steichen, 268 Neb. 328, 682 N.W.2d 702 (2004); Harrold 

v. Spaghetti Tree, Inc., 219 Neb. 139, 362 N.W.2d 44 (1985); Thornton v. 

Thornton, 13 Neb. App. 912, 704 N.W.2d 243 (2005).

8 See, U.S. v. Vacant Land, 15 F.3d 128 (9th Cir. 1993); Nash v. Salter, 

280 Mich. App. 104, 760 N.W.2d 612 (2008); Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. 

Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1985).
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declaratory judgment action in the district court to decide 

the correct amount of the ambiguous Colorado judgment. 

He asserts that his July 11, 2014, filing should have been 

liberally construed as bringing such an action for declaratory 

relief and that the court should have determined the amount 

due was only $149,000. Leaving aside whether a declaratory judgment action was properly pled, we find no merit to 

these arguments.

[5] Under § 25-1587.03, a foreign judgment filed pursuant 

to the Nebraska Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 

Act is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a 

court of this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like 

manner. Collateral attacks on a final, foreign judgment are 

thus generally limited to claims that the judgment was void, 

such as for lack of jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter.9

[6] We indicated in Cockle v. Cockle10 that a foreign 

judgment may be too uncertain to be enforceable under the 

Nebraska Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. 

The foreign judgment at issue in Cockle had awarded a percentage of future receipts, and therefore, the amount of the 

judgment could not be ascertained without resorting to facts 

outside the record of the foreign court.11 We held that the judgment could not be registered.12

Our holding in Cockle is consistent with the general rule of 

law that a judgment must be sufficiently certain in its terms 

to be able to be enforced.13 The judgment must be in such a 

form that a clerk is able to issue an execution upon it which 

an officer will be able to execute without requiring external 

proof and another hearing.14 A judgment for money must 

9 See Deuth v. Ratigan, 256 Neb. 419, 590 N.W.2d 366 (1999). See, also, 

e.g., Harvey v. Harvey, 6 Neb. App. 524, 575 N.W.2d 167 (1998).

10 Cockle v. Cockle, 204 Neb. 88, 281 N.W.2d 392 (1979).

11 Id.

12 Id.

13 See Lenz v. Lenz, 222 Neb. 85, 382 N.W.2d 323 (1986).

14 Id.
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specify with definiteness and certainty the amount for which 

it is rendered.15

[7,8] We have also said that district courts in domestic dissolution actions retain equitable jurisdiction to determine amounts 

due under an ambiguous decree.16 But we have never directly 

addressed whether such jurisdiction can be exercised over a 

foreign decree pursuant to the Nebraska Uniform Enforcement 

of Foreign Judgments Act. We have noted in other contexts 

that the Nebraska Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 

Act has no provision for modification or alteration of a foreign 

judgment, decree, or order.17

[9] We need not decide in this case whether a Nebraska 

court can determine amounts due under an ambiguous foreign 

dissolution decree, because the Colorado judgment was not 

ambiguous. Whether a judgment is ambiguous is a question of 

law for which the appellate court has an obligation to reach a 

conclusion independent from the lower court’s conclusion.18

Although the Colorado order is lengthy, when read carefully, 

it is not susceptible of two or more reasonable but conflicting 

interpretations.19 The fact that Roggentine and the district court 

during the hearing apparently failed to add into their calculations the lump-sum maintenance award does not make the 

judgment ambiguous.

The district court did not err in failing to find the Colorado 

judgment ambiguous and declare the amount due was $149,000. 

Likewise, to the extent Friedman attempts to make a separate 

argument that the Colorado judgment is unenforceable because 

it cannot be executed without external proof and another hearing, we find no merit to this argument.

15 Id.

16 See, Wilson v. Wilson, 19 Neb. App. 103, 803 N.W.2d 520 (2011); Strunk 

v. Chromy-Strunk, 270 Neb. 917, 708 N.W.2d 821 (2006).

17 See, Marshall v. Marshall, 240 Neb. 322, 482 N.W.2d 1 (1992); Riedy v. 

Riedy, 222 Neb. 310, 383 N.W.2d 742 (1986).

18 See Boyle v. Boyle, 12 Neb. App. 681, 684 N.W.2d 49 (2004).

19 See id.
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Head of Household/Maximum

Garnishment

Lastly, Friedman argues that the lower court erred in setting the garnishment at the maximum statutory allowable level 

when his personal circumstances justified a more moderate 

garnishment. Furthermore, he argues that the court should have 

returned to him the amount of the garnishment that occurred at 

a non-head-of-a-family calculation in the paycheck he received 

a few days before the hearing.

Neither of these issues were properly presented to the lower 

court. Friedman never asked the court to remedy the garnishment that had already occurred under the erroneous determination that he was not head of a family, and he never suggested 

to the district court that the garnishment should be calculated 

differently for any reason other than the fact that he was head 

of a family.

[10-12] A pro se litigant will receive the same consideration 

as if he or she had been represented by an attorney,20 and, concurrently, that litigant is held to the same standards as one who 

is represented by counsel.21 Pro se litigants, like any other, may 

not present issues, arguments, and theories for the first time 

on appeal.22 A lower court cannot commit error in resolving an 

issue never presented and submitted to it for disposition.23

We reject Friedman’s claim that he failed to present these 

issues because the district court did not allow him to. Besides 

having the freedom to amend his motion, at one point at the 

hearing when Friedman asked the court if he could “add a 

couple of other things,” the court responded, “Go ahead” and 

20 Martin v. Martin, 188 Neb. 393, 197 N.W.2d 388 (1972).

21 See Pope-Gonzalez v. Husker Concrete, 21 Neb. App. 575, 842 N.W.2d 

135 (2013).

22 See, Simmons v. Precast Haulers, 288 Neb. 480, 849 N.W.2d 117 (2014); 

Bedore v. Ranch Oil Co., 282 Neb. 553, 805 N.W.2d 68 (2011). See, 

also, Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324 (11th 

Cir. 2004); Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2004); Wolfe Elec., Inc. 

v. Duckworth, 293 Kan. 375, 266 P.3d 516 (2011); State v. McCall, 754 

N.W.2d 868 (Iowa App. 2008).

23 See Linda N. v. William N., 289 Neb. 607, 856 N.W.2d 436 (2014).
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“say whatever you want.” While Friedman may have felt discouraged by the court’s attitude toward his arguments, there is 

no evidence in the record that he was precluded from presenting to the court any theory or evidence he wished to present.

The district court did not err in failing to award the 

alleged improperly calculated garnishment or in failing to 

consider factors other than Friedman’s head-of-household status, because Friedman did not present those issues to the district court.

Cross-Appeal

Roggentine sets forth in her brief a “Cross Assignment of 

Error,” asking that we correct the lower court’s order to reflect 

the correct amount of the Colorado judgment, $195,707.49. 

Roggentine concedes that neither Roggentine’s affidavit for 

registration of foreign judgment nor her affidavit and praecipe 

for summons in garnishment sets forth the correct amount of 

the Colorado judgment and that she did not raise this issue in 

the hearing below.

[13] Under Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-109(D)(4) (rev. 2014), a 

party filing a cross-appeal must set forth a separate division of 

the brief prepared in the same manner and under the same rules 

as the brief of appellant.24 Thus, the cross-appeal section must 

set forth a separate title page, a table of contents, a statement of 

the case, assigned errors, propositions of law, and a statement 

of facts.25

There is no designation of a cross-appeal on the cover 

of Roggentine’s brief, nor is a cross-appeal set forth in a 

separate division of the brief as required by our court rules. 

Therefore, we do not consider the merits of Roggentine’s purported cross-appeal.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court.

Affirmed.

24 See Vokal v. Nebraska Acct. & Disclosure Comm., 276 Neb. 988, 759 

N.W.2d 75 (2009).

25 Id.