i i i i i i



### OPIN ION No
. 04 -0 8- 00 80 6- CR Ricke SONY , Appellant
v . T h e STA TE of

Te xas, Appellee Fr om the County

Court at L aw No. 4, Be x ar County , Texas Trial Court No. 232446 Honora ble Fr ed Shannon, Judge Pre siding Opinion by : Marialy

n Ba rnar d, J ustice Concurringopinion by : Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice Sitt ing: Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice

Rebec ca Simmons, J ustice Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: November 11, 2009 AFF I RMED A jury found Ricke Sony

g uilty of ra cing on a highw ay under section 545.420 of the Te x as Tr ans po rt a tio n Cod e (“ the Cod e ” ). On a pp e a l, Sony c on te nd s the statut e vio late s his du e pro ces s
and e qu a l pr ote c tio n ri g hts a s g ua ra nte e d by the Un ite d State s and Te xas C on sti tut ion s. Sony a lso contends the trial court err ed in r efusing to: ( 1) g rant his motion for direc ted verdic t; (2) cha rg e the04
- 08
- 00 80 6- CR

- 2- jury on the def

ense of nece ssity ; and (3) supp re ss cer tain pictorial evide nce. We a ffirm the tria l
c ourt ’s jud g me nt. B ACKG ROUND Sony was a rre sted and c harg ed by

information wit h ra ci n g o n a hig hway under se ction 545.420 o f t h e Code. See T EX . T RA N SP . C ODE ANN . § 545.420 (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). The information alleg ed: “RI CKE SONY did then and ther e par ticipate as the driver a

nd operator of a motor vehicle in a

rac e, name ly : the use of one or m o re vehicles in an attempt to outgain and
ou tdi sta nc e ano the r v e hic le .” Se c tio n 5 45 .4 20 of the Cod e pr ov ide s th a t a

pe rs on may

no t pa rt ic ipate in a ra c e and de fi ne s “ ra c e ” a s: [T] he use of

one or more vehicles in a n attempt to: (A) outg ain or outdistance an o ther ve hicle or pr event a nother ve hicle fr om p as s i n g; (B ) ar rive at a g iven destination ahe ad of a nother ve hicle or ve hicles; or (C) test t he phy sical stamina or e nduranc e of a n operator over a

long- distance driving route. Id. § 545.420 (a) (1), ( b)(2)
. At trial, Michae l Mc Fa

rland, the arr esting office r, testified that on October 14, 2007, he wa s trave ling south on Interstate 35 near L oop 1604 in his “ag g ressive driving vehicle,” a silver Crown Victoria ma

rked w ith “ San Antonio Police Depa rtment” in le tters that wer e similar in color to the vehicle. O ffice r McF arla nd told the jury he wa s patrolling the are a for speede rs and a g g ressive drivers. O ffice r McF arla

nd stated he had been trained to spot vehicles that wer e ra cing or eng ag ing in acts of rec kless driving
. Acc ording to Offic er Mc Fa rland, ra cing vehicles do not have to trave l at a c erta in speed, but only have to “ try

to outdist ance one or the other[,] ” an d t h e m aj o rity of the
case s he sees are instances where two vehicles are side by side with one“one trying to out dis tance the other.”04
- 08
- 00 80 6- CR

- 3- Offic er Mc Fa

rland stated that in his rear view mirror, he observe d a re d Mazda RX7 (“the Mazda”) traveling at a high rate of speed in the pa ssing lane . He a lso saw a blue D odg e Ne on (“the Dodg e”) trave ling ve ry

fast in a nother lane behind the Mazda. The posted spe ed limit in t he ar ea w as six ty -five miles p er h our, and O ffice r McF arla nd testified his rada

r dete ctor c locked spe eds “somewhe re in the nine ties when [both cars] we re first coming up passing the strip of [other] vehicles [on the in

te r s tate.]” Offic er Mc Fa

rland testified that eventually both vehicles we re tra

veling side-by -side. As both vehic les acc eler ated, Of fice r McF arla

nd stated that ac cordingto his radar detec tor, their spee ds increa sed from ninety -five miles per hour to over one hundred mil es per hour. When the vehicles ap p roached Of fice r McF arla

nd’s vehicle , the Dodg e g ot behind the Mazda. Offic er Mc Fa

rland testified he activa t ed h i s emerg ency lights whe n the vehicle s passed him, and both car s immediately hit their brea ks and started slowing down. Whil e Of fice r McF arla

nd was not able to catc h the Dodge, which continued south on I nterstate Highw ay 35, he was able to stop the Mazda, which be longe d to Sony . Offic er Mc Fa rland said Sony

admitted h e was speeding , but claimed it was be cause the Dodg e wa s “comingat me, at a rea lly fast pac e.” Offic er Mc Fa rland
arre s t edS o n y

fo r r ac i n g. Offic er Mc Fa

rland testified that after

arr esting Sony , he conduc ted an inventory sear ch of the Mazda. He discove red se vera l products that “looked after[-]market in appea ranc e” and “we re a dded on the ve hicle.” Seve ral picture s of the af ter-ma rket produc ts were admitted into evidence , i n cl u d i n g: (1 ) ap ro gra m m er u s edt o ch an ge t h e s h i f

t i n g p o i n t s ; ( 2 ) a b o o s tm et er o r a m et er

gage
us e d to me a sure or mon ito r the a mou nt of bo os t be ing a dd e d to the e ng ine on hig h p e rf or manc e c ars ; (3) a rada r dete ctor; (4) afte r-mar

ket air f ilters used to incre ase the perf ormanc e of a vehicle; and (5) enlar g ed pipes coming off the ra diator and a

nother pa rt of the e ng ine. Off

icer McF arla nd testified04
- 08
- 00 80 6- CR

- 4- that based on his experienc e in the ag g ressive d ri v i ng unit, most people a rre sted for r acingon the highw ay had additions to their ca

r similar to the ones found on the Mazda. At trial, Sony

admitted he wa s speeding , but he testified he did not believe he w as trave ling
over e ighty -five miles per hour. Sony testified he wa s speedingin order to make the next ex it after he mis se d th e fi rs t on e . So ny a lso te sti fi e d th a t a

blu e Do dg e wa s c omi ng up ve ry fa st b e hin d h im, and he acc eler ated “to g et t he car off me.” On cross-e x amination, Sony stated he did not re alize the Dodg e wa s trave ling a longside him because he wa s “conc entrating on the tr aff ic direc tly in front of [hi m] and t h en l o o k i n g for the exi t.” Sony also explained he wa s in the passing lane be cause he
o v err eac ted to missing his exi t and was in a hurry to find another e x it. Sony also admitted “re asonable people” might have thought he was drivingunsafe ly , but he was not ra cing
. At the close of

the evidenc e, the tria l court re ad the c harg e to the jury . I n rele vant par t, the
c ha rg e state d: 1.

OUR L AW PROVI DES THAT A PERS ON COMMI TS TH E OFF ENSE OF RACI NG ON AHI GHWAY I F TH E P E R SON PARTI CI PATES I N A RACE, THR OU GH T HE USE OF ONE OR MORE VEHI CL ES I N AN AT TEMPT TO OUTGA I N OR OUTDI STANCE ANOTHE R VEHI CL E. 2. THE TERM “PARTI CI PATES I N A R AC E ” INC L UDES PARTI CI PATI NG AS THE DR I VER OR OPERATOR OF A MOTOR VEHI CL E I NVOLVED I

N A RACE.

... “RACI NG” MEA

NS T HE US E OF ONE OR MORE VEHI CL ES I N AN ATTEMPT TO OUT GAI N OR OUTDI STANCE ANOTHE R VEHI CL E.

3
. NOW, I F YO U FI

ND F RO M T HE EVI DENCE B EYOND A REA SON AB L E D OU B T T HA T O N O R A B OU T T HE 14 DA Y O F OC TO B ER, TH A.D., 2007, I

N B EXAR COUNTY, T EXAS, THE DEF ENDAN T, RI CKE SONY, DI D THEN A

ND THERE I

NTENTI ON AL LY AND K NOWI NGL Y PARTI CI PATE AS THE DRI VER OR OPERATOR OF A MOT OR VE H I CL E T O OUTGA I N AND OUTDI STAN C E ANOTH ER VEHI CL E, THEN Y OU WI L LFI ND THE DEF ENDAN T GUI L TY OF THE OF FEN SE OF RACI NG AS CHA RGED I

N THE I NFO RMATI ON.04
- 08
- 00 80 6- CR

- 5- The jury fo u n d Sony

g uilty , and the tria l court sentenc ed him to thirty day s in jail and a $250.00 fine. D U E P R O C ESS C HAL L E NGE I n his first issue, Sony

contends section 545.420 of t he C ode is unconstitutional on it s fac e. Mo re sp e c if

ic a lly , h e argue s th e statut e is v oid fo r v a g ue ne ss in vio latio n of the Du e Pr oc e ss C la us e of the United States a

nd Texas Consti tutions. The State c ounter s t h at S o n y failed to pre serve this iss ue for appea l beca

use Sony did not
a sse rt in t he tr ia l c ourt

that th e statut e wa s f

a c ia lly vo id o r v oid

a s a pp lie d to him
. Whe n c h a ll e n g in g th e c o n s ti tuti o n a li ty o f a s tatute f o r v a g u e n e s s , th e r e ar e two ty pes of challeng es: (1) a

n “as a pplied” cha lleng e, involving whether a statute is unconstitutional as applied to a de fe nd ant’ s p art ic ula

r con du c t, a

nd (2 ) a “ fa c ia l” c ha lle ng e , invo lvi ngwh e the r a statut e is unconstitutional on it s fac e. Fl ue lle n v . S tate , 104 S.W .3d 152, 167 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.). Te xas l aw i s c le ar t

hat an “a s a

pp lie d” c ha lle ng e c ann ot b e ra ise d f or the fi rs t ti me on

a pp e a l. Se e, e. g. , Cu rry

v . S tate , 910 S.W .2d 490, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding a ppellant waive d his c ha lle ng e to s tatut e a s v a g ue a s a pp li ed beca

us e he did

no t sp e c if

ic a lly ob je c t at tr ia l) ; Ga rc ia
v . S tat e , 887 S.W .2d 846, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (holding that defe ndant must object at trial to p re se rv e a s a

pp lie d c ha lle ng e fo r a

pp e a l) ; Fluellen , 1 04 S.W. 3d a t 16 7 ( “ A c on sti tut ion a lity challeng e base d on application to the defe ndant' s case cannot be raised f or the fir st tim e on appe al.”)
. Th e re fo re , in

or de r t o p re se rv e an a s a pp lie d c ha lle ng e for appea l, a n a pp e lla nt m us t sp e c if ic a lly object at tria l that a statute is unconstitutionally vague as a

pplied to him. Se e id
.04
- 08
- 00 80 6- CR

- 6- Mo re ov e r, no w, a

fa c ia l c ha lle ng e c an n o lo ng e r b e ra ise d f or the fi rst ti me on a

pp e a l. Kar e ne v v . S

tate , 281 S.W .3d 428, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Previously , relying on the decision in Ra ab v . S

tate , 7 30 S.W. 2d

75 1, 75 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 87 ), nume ro us int e rm e diate c ourt s h e ld a fa cial cha lleng e could be raised f or the fir st tim e on appe al. See, e .g. , Ba rn e tt v . S tate , 201 S.W .3d 2 3 1 , 2 3 2 (T ex . Ap p . — Fort W orth 200 6 , n o p et
. ) ( “[ A] d ef en d an tm ay

ra i s e aco n s t i tu t i o n al ch al l en ge to t he fa c ia l val idi ty of a statut e fo r the fi rs t ti me on a pp e a l.” ); Ro dr igu e

z v . S tate , 71 S.W .3d 800, 80 2 ( Te x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na 20 02 , no p e t.) (a llo wi ngde fe nd ant t o r a ise fa c ia l c ha lle ng e to v a lid ity of statute for

first time on appea l); Mc Go wan v . S tate , 938 S.W .2d 732, 741 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d) (indicating defe ndant i s not require d to object at trial whe n challeng ing fac ial constitutionalit y of st atute). Rece ntly , the cour t of criminal appe als held “a defe ndant may

not raise f or the first time on appea l a fac ial challeng e to the constitutionalit y of a statute.” Karenev , 281 S.W .3d at 434. Her e, neither

an as a pplied nor a f

acia l challeng e was prese rved for appellate revie w. There is n oth ingin t

he re c or d to e sta

bli shSony

sp e c if ic a lly a sse rt e d at tr ia l th a t th e statut e wa s f a c ia lly vag ue or va g ue as a

pplied to him. W hile Sony sug g ests that his que stioning of Of fice r McF arla

nd reg ardingthe ar

bitrariness of

the enf orce ment of the statute is suffic i ent to prese rve e rror , we disag ree . See T EX . R. A PP . 33.1(a) (1) ( requiringg rounds for obje ction to be made w ith sufficient specific ity

to make trial court awa

re of complaint). Be cause no specific , timely objection was ma de, this iss ue wa s not pr eser

ved for our

revie w. See Karene v , 28 1 S. W.3 d at 43 4; Cur ry , 910 S.W .2d at 496. Acc ording ly , we ove rrule Sony ’s due pr ocess c halleng e. E QU A L P ROT E CT I ON C HA LLENG E As pa rt of his fi rs t is su e , S on y also c on te nd s th a t se c tio n 5 45 .4 20 of the Cod e is unconstitutional because the statute violates the Equa l P ro t ec t i o n Clause of the U nited States and04
- 08
- 00 80 6- CR

- 7- Te xas C on sti tut ion s. Ag a in, no thi ngin t he re c or d s ho ws S on y

a sse rt e d at tr ia l a

vio latio n o f h is equal pr otection rig hts. B eca use Sony failed to make a specific or timely objection at trial on equal protec tion g rounds, the issue was not pre serve d for a ppellate r eview. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1(a)( 1);
see also F

lor es v . S tate , 2 4 5 S. W. 3 d 4 3 2 , 4 3 7 n . 1 4 ( T e x. Cr im
. A p p . 2 0 0 8 ) ( h ig h li g h ti ng that
a pp e lla nt w a ive d eq

ua l pro te c tio n cla im whe n he ne g le c te d to ra ise iss ue a t tr ia l) ; Ste ad ma n v . S tate , 31 S.W .3d 738, 742 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2000, p et
. ref ’d) ( holding c omplaint that sentenc e violated e qual protec tion wa s waived beca use of failure to object at trial). A ccor dingly , we
overr ule Sony ’s equa l protection cha lleng e, and his fir st issue. M OT I ON F OR D I RE CT E D V E RDI CT I n his second issue, Sony

contends the trial court abused its discr etion in de nying his moti on fo r d i r e ct edv er d i ct
. S o n y co n t en d s t h e e v i d en ce wa s l ega l l y i n s u ff i ci en tt o s h o w h e w as ra ci n g, arguing the evidenc e esta blished only

that he wa s speeding
. We reviewa cha lleng e to a tria l court’s de nial of a motion for dire cted ve rdict the same as we would r eview a

challeng e to the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence
. W

ill iam s v . S

tate , 937 S.W .2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). I n deter mining the lega l sufficie ncy of the e vidence , we r eview all the evidence in the l ight most favor able to the verdict to decide whether a rational jury

could have found the essential elements of the offe nse beyond a re asonable doubt. Se e id
. Th e jur y is t he so le judge of the c redibility

of the witnesse s and the wei gh t t o b e given to their testimony
. Moore v

. Sta te , 935 S.W .2d 124, 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The jury may choose to a cce pt or reje ct all or part of the testimony , and we must resolve any conflicts and inc onsistencies in the evide nce in f avor of t he jury ’s verdict. Id. ; J e nn ing s v . S tate , 107 S.W .3d 85, 88 (Tex. App. —San Antonio 2003, no pet.).04
- 08
- 00 80 6- CR

- 8- Se c tio n 5 45 .4 20 of the Cod e pr ov ide s th a t “ a pe rs on may no t pa rt ic ipate in a

ny mann e r i n
a ra ce[.]” T EX . T RA N SP . C ODE ANN . § 545.420(a) (1). The jury char g e tra cked the lang uag e of
s ec t i o n 545.420(b)( 2) by

definingrac ing a s “THE U SE OF ON E OR MORE VEHI CL ES I N AN ATTEMPT TO OUT GAI N OR OUTDI STANCE ANOTH ER V EHI CL E.” Id. at § 545.420(b)( 2) Offic er Mc Fa

rland testified Sony ’s Mazda and the Dodg e wer e trave ling ove r ninety miles per hour on I nterstate H ighw ay

35. Acc ording to O ffice r McF arla nd, the vehicles ove rtook other ve hicles on the i nterstate and eventually wer e traveling side-by -side. Of fice r McF arla

nd testified that when the vehicles we re s ide-by -side, they acc eler ated, a

nd Sony ’s spee d incre ased f rom nintey -five to one hundred a nd one mil es p er h o u r. I n addition to this testimony , the State pre sented e vidence that Sony ’s vehicle had seve ral hig h perf ormanc e additions, which a ccor ding to Offic er McFa rland, we re
c omm on ly

a dd e d to e nh anc e a ve hic le ’s ov e ra ll p e rf or manc e . A lth ou g h So ny

te sti fi e d h e sp e d to g et to the next exit and out of the Dodg e’s wa y , we must resolve any

conflicts and inc onsistencies in the t estimony in favor of the jury ’s ver dict. Se e Mo or e , 935 S.W .2d at 126 ; Je nnings , 107 S.W .3d at 88. We hold the State’s evide nce w as suffic ient to allow a rational jury to find Sony

participated in a ra ce, i.e ., was using the Mazda to outga in or out distance the Dodg e. See W illiams , 937 S.W .2d
a t 48 2; see also T EX . T RA N SP . C ODE ANN . § 54 5. 42 0. Ac c or din g ly , the tr ia l c ourt did no t a bu se its discretion in deny

ing Sony ’s motion for direc ted ver dict. Sony ’s sec ond issue is overrule d.

D EFEN SE O F N ECESSI TY Sony next contends the trial court abused i ts discretion in ref using to submit his request for an ins truction on the s tatutory defe nse of necessity . The State c ontends, howeve r, that Sony ’s issue is meritless beca

u s e S o n y d i d n ot offer

any evidenc e to ra ise an infe renc e that his conduc t was immediately

nece ssary

to avoid any

imminent harm. We ag ree .04
- 08
- 00 80 6- CR

- 9- A defendant i s e n ti tl e d

to anin s tr

u c ti o no ne a c h d e f

e n s iv e is s u e r a is e d

b y th e e v id e nce. W alt e rs v . S

tate , 2 47 S.W. 3d

20 4, 20 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ). A de fe nd ant’ s te sti mony a lon e is sufficie nt to raise a defe nsive issue and as a result, to r equire an instruction in the jury char g e. Id.
a t 20 9; Ha

y es v . S tate , 7 28 S.W. 2d 80 4, 80 7 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 82 ). Whe n th e e vid e nc e ra ise s a de fe ns ive iss ue and

the de fe nd ant p ro pe rl y

re qu e sts an in str

uc tio n on that is su e , th e tr ia l c ourt mus t submit t he issue to the jury
. Da rty v . S tate , 994 S.W .2d 215, 218 (Tex. A pp.—San Antonio 1999, pet. re f’d)
. We revie w a trial court’s decision to submit or re fuse to submit an instruction under a n
a b u s e o f d is c retion standar d. Se e id . I n addition, we re view the e vidence offe red in support of a defe nsive issue in the l ight most favor able to the de fense
. Se e Pe nn ing ton v . S tate , 54 S.W .3d 852, 856 (Tex. App.—For

t Worth 2001, pet. ref’d)
. To raise the def

ense of nece ssity , the def

en d ant m ust admit to commi tting the of fense and then offe r nec essi ty

as a justification. Hu bb ar d v . S tate , 1 3 3 S. W. 3 d

7 9 7 , 8 0 1 ( T e x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na 20 04 , p e t. r e f' d) ; Pennington , 54 S.W .3d at 857. Section 9.22 of the Te x as Penal Cod e pr ov ide s: Con du c t is jus tif

ie d if : ( 1 ) t h e a c t o r r e a s o n a

b l y b e l i e v e s t h e c o n d

u c t i s i m m e d i a t e l y n e c e s s ar y to a vo id i mmi ne nt h arm ; (2) the desirability

and urg ency

of avoidingthe har

m clear ly outweig h, acc ording to ordinary

standards of

rea so n ab l en ess, the har

m sought to be preve nted by

the law pr oscribing the conduc t; and (3) a leg islative purpose to exclude the justification claimed f or the c onduct does not otherwise plainly appea r. T EX . P EN A L C ODE A NN . § 9 .2 2 ( Ve rn on 20 03 ). Un de r s e c tio n 9 .2 2( 1) , a de fe nd ant i s r e qu ir e d to prese nt evidence that he re asonably believed a

specific harm wa s immi nent. I d. § 9.22(1); Pennington , 54 S.W .3d at 857. “Rea sonable belief” means a belief that an ordina ry and prude nt man04
- 08
- 00 80 6- CR

- 10- wou l d h o l d i f he wa s in the same cir cumstance s as the ac tor. Id. § 1 .0 7( a )( 42 ); Pennington , 54 S.W .3d at 857. Whether a n acc used’s be lief is rea sonable is a que stion of fac t and is viewed f rom the ac cused’ s standpoint at the time he ac ted. Pennington , 54 S.W .3d at 857. “‘ I mminent’ means
so me thi ngtha

t is imp e nd ing , not pe nd ing ; some thi ng that is on the po int of ha pp e nin g , n ot a

bo ut t o happen.” Id. ; Da rty , 994 S.W .2d at 218. “Ha rm is imminent when there is an emer g ency situation and it is ‘immediately

nece ssary ’ to avoid that har m.” Pennington , 54 S.W .3d at 857. Be cause Sony

admitted speedingand ther efor e, s ufficie ntly admitted to the conduct underlying the char g ed off ense, Sony

satisfied the a dmission element and may offe r the de fense of
nece ssity to justi fy

his conduct. Se e Hu bb ar d , 133 S.W .3d at 801-802 (a llowing a defe nsive ins tr uc tio n w he n d e fe nd ant a dmi tte d at le a st som e pa rt ic ipatio n in the a c tio n und e rl yingthe of fe ns e
c ha rg e d) ; Pen n i n g t on , 54 S.W .3d at 856. B ut, we still must deter mine whether

Sony prese nted evidenc e that he r easona

bly believed his c onduct was ne cessa ry to avoid i mminent harm. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § § 1 .0 7( a )( 42 ), 9. 22 ; Pennington , 54 S.W .3d at 857. S ony admitted he wa s sp e e din g in an e ff

or t to g e t to the ne xt e xit. Altho ug h So ny te sti fi e d h e wa s a c c e le ra

tin g in o rd e r t o g et out of the wa

y of t he fast approa ching Dodg e, he also testified he was obli vious to any car “on [hi m] ,” and he felt “in c ontrol the whole time” a nd was “def

initely safe .” After revie wing the re cord,
we ho ld S on y ’s te sti mony do e s n ot s ho w h e re a so nab ly be lie ve d h e ha d to imm e diate ly sp e e d to preve nt any

imminent harm from occ urring
. See id. A ccordin g ly , w e ov errule S ony ’s third issue.

A D M IS SI BILITY O F P HOT OGR AP HS Finally , Sony contends the trial court abused i ts discretion in admitting seve ral photog raphs of enha nceme nts made to the Mazda. Ac cordingto Sony , the photog raphs wer e irrelevant unde r Texas Rule of Evidence 401, and more prejudicia l tha n probative unde r Texas Rule of Evidenc e 403.04
- 08
- 00 80 6- CR

- 11- Sony contends be cause there is no relationship betwee n evid ence of ve hicle enha nceme nts and
rac ing, the photogr aphs we re use d to imply he wa s rac ing when he w as only speeding
. Th e State fi rs t c on te nd s Sony fa ile d to pr e se rv e the c omp la int that th e ph oto g ra ph s sh ou ld have be en excluded pursua nt to Rul e 403 for

appea l. We ag ree . The recor d ref

lects S ony did not object to the phot og raphs based on Rule 403. Throug hout the conve rsations reg ardingthe admissibilit y of the photog raphs, the tr ial court, a s well as Sony ’s defe nse counse l, discussed the i s s u e s u rr ounding the admissibili ty of the photog raphs in ter ms of rele vance . When the State beg an int roducing the exhibit s, Sony ’s counse l asked if the jur y could be excused. The c ourt specif ically asked, “ Okay . I s the objection rele vance ? ” Sony ’s def ense c ounsel replied, “ Yes.” Upon re quest of t he trial court, Office r McFar land bega n descr ibing the sig nificanc e of e a c h o f t he ph oto g ra

ph s, and a t one po int , Sony ’s c ouns e l sta te d, “ Yo ur Ho no r, my

ob je c tio n is very simple, unless he has re levant knowledg e that that’s an afte r-mar ket i tem then he c an’t testify to that. He has no know ledg e whatsoever if that’s an a fter- marke t item or not.” Ba sed on the re cord b e f o r e u s , S o n y r a i s e d

o n l y a Ru l e 4 0 1 c o mp l a i n tw i t h r e g ar d s t o t h e p h o t o g r a p h s . A c c o r d i n g l y, Sony waived his Rule 403 complaint. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1(a)( 1). Whether a photog raph is admissible under Rule 401 is within t he sound discretion of the trial judge
. Sh uff

ie ld v . S tate , 189 S.W .3d 782, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). T ex as Rule of Evidenc e 401 descr ibes rele vant evidenc e as “evide nce having any tendenc y to make the e x istence of any fac t that is of consequence to the deter mination of the ac tion more or less proba ble than it would be without the evidence .” T EX .R. E V ID . 4 01 ; Sh uff ie ld , 189 S.W .3d at 786-87. Her e, the photog raphs showe d imag e s o f hig h perf ormanc e additions to the Mazda, including the ty pe of eng ine and se vera l after -marke t additions. Office r McF arla nd testified the additions wer e
co m m o n l y added to hig h-per formanc e vehicles owned by rac ers in San Antonio to enhanc e a04
- 08
- 00 80 6- CR

- 12- vehicle’ s overa ll perfor

mance . Ba sed on Offi ce r M cFarla nd’s testimony , the photog raphs we re rele vant to the alleg ed ra cing char g e bec ause the photogr aphs had a tende n cy

to make the d et erm i n at i o nt h at S o n y

wa s ra ci n g m o re o r l es s p ro b ab l e b y s h o wi n g S o n y ’s v e h i c l e h adh i gh perf ormanc e additions commonly used by rac ing ve hicles. See T EX .R. E V ID . 401. Acc ording ly , we hold the tria l court did not abuse its discretion in admitti ng the photog raphs and over rule Sony ’s fourth issue. C ONCL US I ON B a se d o n th e fo re g oin g , w e a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice PUB L I SH