*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
MARIA G. v. COMMISSIONER OF

CHILDREN AND FAMILIES*

(AC 40692)

Alvord, Bright and Bear, Js.

Syllabus

The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking custody

of a minor child, S, from the respondent Commissioner of Children and

Families. In 2009, the petitioner illegally brought S into the United States

using both a fraudulent passport and birth certificate, which falsely

listed the petitioner and her then husband as S’s birth parents. Subsequently, the respondent obtained temporary custody and eventually

placed S in a foster home, and the petitioner filed her habeas petition

seeking to regain custody of S. In response to a motion to dismiss for

lack of standing filed by the respondent, the trial court ordered the

petitioner to offer proof, at a preliminary evidentiary hearing on her

standing, that she was S’s legal guardian. Prior to the hearing, S’s biological mother, M, filed a declaratory action with a Guatemalan court asking

the court to grant custody of S to the petitioner, and the Guatemalan

court, relying on the false birth certificate and a sworn affidavit from

M in which she averred she had conferred to the petitioner legal authority

over S, granted the petitioner parental rights, custody and representation

of S. After the petitioner submitted, inter alia, a copy of the Guatemalan

court’s judgment file as a full exhibit at the evidentiary hearing, the trial

court found that she had established prima facie evidence of her standing

to withstand the motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the respondent filed a

motion for summary judgment, claiming that the Guatemalan court’s

decree was not entitled to recognition because it was based on a false

birth certificate and notice of the proceedings had not been provided.

The trial court granted the respondent’s motion for summary judgment

and rendered judgment dismissing the habeas petition, from which the

petitioner appealed to this court. Held:

1. The petitioner could not prevail on her claim that the same evidence

used by the trial court to rule on the motion to dismiss, namely, the

Guatemalan court’s decree, also established, at the very least, a genuine

issue of material fact that precluded the court from granting the respondent’s motion for summary judgment; the trial court properly concluded

that the Guatemalan court’s judgment, in which it relied on the fraudulently obtained birth certificate and M’s sworn affidavit, was not required

to be enforced as a matter of comity, which is the recognition that one

nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial

acts of another nation, as the petitioner’s claim was premised on the false

birth certificate admittedly instigated and procured by the petitioner

and her former husband with the cooperation of M, who knew the

untruthfulness of its content, and, thus, the enforcement of the Guatemalan court’s decree, based at least in part on the false birth certificate,

was contrary to this state’s public policy of the prevention of fraud as

a matter of law, which prohibited recognition of the Guatemalan decree.

2. The trial court correctly determined that any notice of the Guatemalan

proceedings that was provided to the respondent was insufficient as a

matter of law; given that the Guatemalan declaratory action was not

filed until June 17, 2015, and that a hearing was held the following

day, the respondent could not have been provided with notice of the

proceedings prior to June 17 because the action had not yet been filed,

the petitioner did not dispute that notice to the respondent, as described

by statute (§ 46b-115g [a]), was not provided in the period between the

filing of the proceeding and when the hearing took place one day later,

and if the petitioner knew at a hearing on June 3, 2015, that a petition

for custody and legal guardianship was going to be filed in the Guatemalan court, that filing was not disclosed to the court and the parties and

no documents relating to the planned filing were provided.

Argued November 14, 2018—officially released January 29, 2019

Procedural History
Petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking custody

of a minor child from the respondent Commissioner of

Children and Families, and for other relief, brought to

the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield,

where the matter was transferred to the judicial district

of Stamford-Norwalk; thereafter, the court, Hon. Barbara M. Quinn, judge trial referee, granted the respondent’s motion for summary judgment, denied the

petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, and rendered judgment dismissing the habeas petition; subsequently, the court denied the petitioner’s motion to

reargue and reconsider, and the petitioner appealed to

this court; thereafter, the court, Hon. Barbara M.

Quinn, judge trial referee, denied the petitioner’s

motions to open judgment and for articulation; subsequently, this court granted the petitioner’s motion for

review, but denied the relief requested therein.

Affirmed.

Dana M. Hrelic, with whom were Brendon P. Levesque and, on the brief, Karen L. Dowd, Scott T. Garosshen and Glenn Formica, for the appellant (petitioner).

Michael Besso, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general,

for the appellee (respondent).

Joshua Michtom, assistant public defender, for the

minor child.
Opinion

BEAR, J. The petitioner, Maria G., appeals from the

trial court’s rendering of summary judgment in favor

of the respondent, the Commissioner of Children and

Families, on the petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus seeking custody of the minor child, Santiago.1 On appeal,

the petitioner claims that the court erroneously failed to

credit a Guatemalan court’s decree, which purportedly

granted her parental guardianship rights over, and custody of, Santiago, when the court concluded that (1)

public policy prohibited recognition of the decree

because it was premised on a false birth certificate,

and (2) the decree was obtained without notice to the

respondent.2 We affirm the judgment of the court.

The following factual and procedural history is relevant to our disposition of this appeal.3 The petitioner

is a citizen of Argentina and a legal resident of the

United States who resides in Stamford, Connecticut.

Shortly after Santiago’s birth in 2009, the petitioner,

utilizing both a birth certificate that falsely listed her,

and her husband at that time, as Santiago’s parents and

a fraudulent United States passport, illegally brought

him into the United States.4 Santiago remained in the

petitioner’s care until October, 2012, when the Superior

Court, Heller, J., granted the respondent’s motion for

an order of temporary custody. In re Santiago G., 318

Conn. 449, 456–57, 121 A.3d 708 (2015). After initially

removing Santiago to a temporary foster home in

November, 2012, the Department of Children and Families (department) placed him in another foster home

in December, 2012, where he remains today. Id., 457.

On November 8, 2013, the petitioner filed a petition

for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to regain custody

of Santiago. The petitioner alleged that the department’s

refusal to release Santiago to her custody violated her

and Santiago’s federal and state constitutional rights to

due process and was contrary to Santiago’s best interest. On July 3, 2014, the respondent filed a motion to

dismiss the petition claiming that the petitioner lacked

standing because she was neither the biological parent

nor a properly declared adoptive parent of Santiago,

and she had not otherwise claimed to be Santiago’s

legal guardian. The petitioner filed an objection to the

motion to dismiss, claiming that on September 19, 2013,

a Guatemalan court had recognized the validity of the

admittedly false birth certificate and, therefore, recognized her as Santiago’s parent. On October 23, 2014,

the court issued a memorandum of decision in which

it found that ‘‘the mere assertion by the petitioner that

she is the legal guardian of the child under [Guatemalan]

law, without more, is insufficient to confer standing.’’

As a result of this finding, the court ordered the petitioner to offer proof, at a preliminary evidentiary hearing on her standing, that she was Santiago’s legal

guardian.
On June 17, 2015, prior to the evidentiary hearing,

Santiago’s biological mother filed a declaratory action

with a Guatemalan court asking the court to grant custody of Santiago to the petitioner. One day later, on June

18, 2015, the Guatemalan court issued a declaratory

judgment granting the petitioner ‘‘parental rights, custody, and representation [of Santiago] . . . .’’ The Guatemalan court relied on the false birth certificate as

well as an affidavit from Santiago’s biological mother

in granting custody of Santiago to the petitioner.

On November 17, 2015, the court held the evidentiary

hearing. During the hearing, the petitioner submitted a

copy of the judgment file from the Guatemalan court

proceedings as a full exhibit and presented testimony

of the Guatemalan attorney who had represented Santiago’s biological mother regarding the Guatemalan

court’s decree. The court subsequently allowed both

parties to file posthearing briefs. The respondent argued

in her brief that the Guatemalan decree did not deserve

recognition by Connecticut courts because (1) the process underlying that decree contained procedural irregularities fatal to recognition, and (2) the substance of

the decree was based on an admittedly false birth certificate.

The court, Colin, J., rendered its decision on February 16, 2016, and found that the petitioner had established prima facie evidence of her standing,5 but noted

that ‘‘[t]he determination that a prima facie case has

been established in denying a motion to dismiss does

not necessarily mean that the court, at the time of the

final hearing on the merits, is required to take as true

the evidence offered by the petitioner at the standing

hearing.’’ On March 7, 2016, the respondent filed a

motion to reargue. The court thereafter granted the

respondent’s motion in part, denied it in part, and reaffirmed its decision on the issue of standing.

The parties subsequently filed separate motions for

summary judgment. The petitioner argued in her motion

that the court’s previous recognition of prima facie evidence of standing established that there was no genuine

issue of material fact as to the petitioner’s legal right

to custody of Santiago. The respondent argued in her

motion that the Guatemalan court decree was not entitled to recognition because it was based on a false birth

certificate, and notice of the Guatemalan proceedings

had not been provided to the respondent.

On January 12, 2017, the court granted the respondent’s motion for summary judgment, denied the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed

the habeas petition.6

In rendering its decision, the court

applied the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and

Enforcement Act, General Statutes § 46b-115 et seq.

(act), and determined that the Guatemalan court decree

was not entitled to recognition because it was based
on the petitioner’s fraudulent and illegal conduct that

was repugnant to the public policy of this state, it relied

on the false birth certificate, and it was secured without

adequate notice to the respondent. The court, therefore,

concluded that the petitioner could not demonstrate

that she is the biological parent or legal guardian of

Santiago and dismissed the habeas petition. On February 1, 2017, the petitioner filed a motion to reargue,

and the court reaffirmed its decision on June 20, 2017.

See footnote 1 of this opinion. This appeal followed.7

We first set forth the applicable standard of review.

‘‘Our review of the trial court’s decision to grant [a]

motion for summary judgment is plenary. . . . In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the

burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of

fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving

party for summary judgment has the burden of showing

the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material

facts, which, under applicable principles of law, entitle

him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold

the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden

the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear

what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as

to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.

. . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to

the opponent. . . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish

that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents

establishing the existence of such an issue. . . . Once

the moving party has met its burden, however, the

opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Rickel v. Komaromi, 144 Conn. App. 775, 779–80, 73

A.3d 851 (2013).

I

The petitioner claims that the same evidence used

by the court to rule in her favor on the motion to dismiss

also established, at the very least, a genuine issue of

material fact that precluded the court from granting the

respondent’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the petitioner argues that, despite the admittedly

false birth certificate, the Guatemalan court’s decree

created a genuine issue of material fact that she was the

legal guardian or custodian of Santiago. The respondent

claims that the court properly determined that there

was no genuine issue of material fact that the Guatemalan decree was not entitled to recognition, arguing that

the petitioner’s participation in the fraud regarding the

birth certificate made enforcement of the decree repugnant to the public policy of this state.

We first note that the false birth certificate cannot be

the basis for the petitioner’s claim for custody because it
clearly was fraudulent, and the petitioner has conceded

that the birth certificate falsely listed her and her former

husband as Santiago’s biological parents. Moreover, our

Supreme Court determined that the birth certificate has

no legal effect in the United States. See In re Santiago

G., supra, 318 Conn. 471–72 (‘‘[A]lthough [the petitioner] was in possession of a birth certificate naming

her as Santiago’s mother, she ultimately conceded that

that birth certificate was fraudulent. As we previously

have explained, [a] birth certificate is a vital record

that must accurately reflect legal relationships between

parents and children—it does not create those relationships. . . . In sum, it was absolutely correct that Santiago had no legal guardian in the United States, and

neither the parties nor the court was mistaken in this

regard.’’ [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.]).

The crux of the petitioner’s claim, therefore, is that,

despite the previous ruling of our Supreme Court

acknowledging the fraudulent nature of the birth certificate, the Guatemalan court’s decree was entitled to

recognition under the rules of comity, and summary

judgment in favor of the respondent should not have

been rendered because there was a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether the decree was obtained

by fraud.

‘‘[C]omity is a flexible doctrine, the application of

which rests in the discretion of the state where enforcement of a foreign order is sought. . . . The doctrine

traces its roots to the decision of the United States

Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 16 S.

Ct. 139, 40 L. Ed. 95 (1895), which observed that [c]omity

. . . is the recognition which one nation allows within

its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts

of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its

own citizens or of other persons who are under the

protection of its laws. . . . [W]here there has been

opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court

of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon

regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary

appearance of the defendant, and under a system of

jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country

and those of other countries, and there is nothing to

show either prejudice in the court, or in the system

of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason why the

comity of this nation should not allow it full effect,

the merits of the case should not, in an action brought

in this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as

on a new trial or an appeal, upon the mere assertion

of the party that the judgment was erroneous in law or

in fact.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Zitkene v. Zitkus, 140 Conn.

App. 856, 865–66, 60 A.3d 322 (2013).
‘‘[J]udgments of courts of foreign countries are recognized in the United States because of the comity due

to the courts and judgments of one nation from another.

Such recognition is granted to foreign judgments with

due regard to international duty and convenience, on

the one hand, and to rights of citizens of the United

States and others under the protection of its laws, on

the other hand. This principle is frequently applied in

divorce cases; a decree of divorce granted in one country by a court having jurisdiction to do so will be given

full force and effect in another country by comity . . . .

The principle of comity, however, has several important

exceptions and qualifications. A decree of divorce will

not be recognized by comity where it was obtained by

a procedure which denies due process of law in the

real sense of the term, or was obtained by fraud, or

where the divorce offends the public policy of the state

in which recognition is sought . . . .’’ (Emphasis

added.) Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, 162 Conn. 540, 544–45,

295 A.2d 519 (1972); Zitkene v. Zitkus, supra, 140 Conn.

App. 866.

In addition to the doctrine of comity, the act, as

adopted in § 46b-115ii, provides that ‘‘[a] court of this

state shall treat a foreign child custody determination8

made under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this chapter,

including reasonable notice and opportunity to be

heard to all affected persons, as a child custody determination of another state under sections 46b-115 to 46b115t, inclusive, unless such determination was rendered

under child custody law which violates fundamental

principles of human rights or unless such determination is repugnant to the public policy of this state.’’

(Emphasis added; footnote added.) This court has recognized that the prevention of fraud is an important

public policy. ‘‘The important public policy we identify

is the one against fraud, which is deeply rooted in our

common law . . . .’’ Schmidt v. Yardney Electric

Corp., 4 Conn. App. 69, 74, 492 A.2d 512 (1985); see

also Broome v. Beers, 6 Conn. 198, 210–12 (1826).

The petitioner admitted to investigators from the

department and the United States Department of Homeland Security that she brought Santiago into the country

illegally with a false birth certificate and a fraudulent

passport, and she subsequently pleaded guilty to a federal felony in connection with the fraudulent passport.

In re Santiago G., supra, 318 Conn. 460–61. Additionally, the petitioner does not dispute that the Guatemalan

court relied on the same false birth certificate in issuing

its judgment confirming the petitioner’s parental guardianship rights to Santiago. The trial court also listed

the following undisputed facts set forth in the petition:

‘‘The petitioner is a citizen of Argentina and a legal

resident of the United States . . . . [The] Guatemalan

birth certificate identifies the petitioner and her
estranged husband as the child’s parents. She brought

him to the United States shortly after his birth. . . .

She admitted that she obtained custody of a newborn

that was not legally adopted and that she illegally

brought the child into the United States with a false birth

certificate and a fraudulent United States passport.’’

(Footnote omitted.)

The petitioner, however, presented additional evidence during the summary judgment proceeding that

she had disclosed to the Guatemalan court that she

was not Santiago’s biological mother, and that the birth

certificate was falsified. This included the sworn affidavit of Santiago’s biological mother, as well as DNA evidence confirming that the petitioner was not Santiago’s

biological mother. The respondent, in the summary

judgment proceeding, did not submit any contrary evidence that the petitioner made false representations to

the Guatemalan court about those matters. Construing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner, a factfinder could conclude that by providing

such information to the Guatemalan court, she was

attempting to correct her earlier fraud and have the

Guatemalan court, after considering all of the evidence,

confirm that the birth certificate, despite its factual

flaws, was entitled to legal recognition under Guatemalan law. Because the facts relied upon by the petitioner

regarding the Guatemalan court proceedings are undisputed, the remaining legal issue is whether the Guatemalan decree, like the birth certificate on which it is

based, is void as against Connecticut public policy as

found by the trial court.

The petitioner argues that the respondent failed to

satisfy her burden of proof on summary judgment that

there was no genuine issue of material fact that the

Guatemalan decree was not entitled to recognition

under comity. Specifically, the petitioner argues that

there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

the Guatemalan court could conclude that she still had

parental rights to Santiago, ‘‘despite the initial misrepresentation that she was Santiago’s biological mother.’’9

We conclude, however, that this purported genuine

issue of material fact is in reality a legal question about

the enforcement of the Guatemalan court decree in

Connecticut. On appeal, the petitioner relies on the

Guatemalan court decree to satisfy the legal guardianship requirement of Connecticut law, and asks that we

recognize that decree through the principle of comity.

In Connecticut, a petitioner in a habeas corpus petition for custody of a child, in order to set forth a cognizable claim, must establish that she is the child’s biological

parent, his adoptive parent through a proper adoption,

or his legal guardian through a recognized court procedure. See Weidenbacher v. Duclos, 234 Conn. 51, 62–63,

661 A.2d 988 (1995). In Livaitis, another family law

case, our Supreme Court stated that a foreign decree
‘‘will not be recognized by comity where it was obtained

by a procedure which denies due process of law in the

real sense of the term, or was obtained by fraud, or

where the [decree] offends the public policy of the state

in which recognition is sought, or where the foreign

court lacked jurisdiction.’’ Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, supra,

162 Conn. 545.

In the present case, the trial court stated that our

law does not permit those who engage in fraud to benefit from that fraud, and that the petitioner’s fraudulent

conduct ‘‘attack[ed] the very core of the court’s inherent

integrity.’’ Thus, the court concluded that the Guatemalan decree, having been ‘‘obtained by fraud, or where

[it] offends the public policy of the state in which recognition is sought’’; id.; was not entitled to recognition

under the general rules of comity or under the specific

requirements of the act.

In In re Santiago G., supra, 318 Conn. 474–75, our

Supreme Court reflected upon the unusual factual circumstances of this case and the unfortunate results

that occurred from the choices of the petitioner and

her former husband: ‘‘As a final matter, we must reject

the suggestion of the parties that the highly unusual

facts of this case warranted a disregard of the typical

procedures attendant to a motion to revoke commitment, in favor of some alternative approach more suited

to the circumstances. The problem here is not so much

that the statutory framework is inadequate, but that it

was not designed to accommodate individuals who have

chosen to operate outside of the strictures of the law,

regardless of their reasons. It was because the [biological mother] and [the petitioner] knowingly agreed to

effectuate an illegal international adoption that [the

petitioner] was vulnerable to the cruel act of a vindictive

individual . . . and all of the subsequent occurrences

that that act set in motion. Because [the petitioner]

lacked the status of a legal parent, she also lacked

the constitutional and statutory rights attendant to that

status. Additionally, the illegalities involved in [the petitioner] obtaining Santiago and transporting him, using

a fraudulent passport, to the United States resulted in

significant delay in the discernment of the truth, during

which the interests of Santiago in stability and permanency began to diverge, as it turns out inexorably, from

the interests of the [biological mother] and [the petitioner]. We say this not to chastise or lay blame, but

rather, to explain that the law is ill equipped to save

those who have chosen to disregard it.’’ (Footnote

omitted.)

At the time of its consideration of the summary judgment motions, the court had before it the petitioner’s

admissions and our Supreme Court’s recognition that

the birth certificate relied on by the Guatemalan court

had knowingly been instigated and procured by the

petitioner and her former husband, with the coopera-
tion of the biological mother, who had consented to

them being listed as the biological parents although that

was false. The court did not err in rendering summary

judgment in favor of the respondent, who had met her

burden of establishing the lack of any factual dispute

concerning the invalidity of the Guatemalan court

decree which was admittedly based, at least in part, on

the false birth certificate.10

In the present case, the petitioner merely refers to

the court’s finding after the evidentiary hearing on the

motion to dismiss that there was some factual dispute

as to the propriety of the Guatemalan court decree.

This court has found, however, that ‘‘[i]t is not enough

. . . for the opposing party [to a motion for summary

judgment] merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and,

therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented

to the court under Practice Book § [17-45].’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Rickel v. Komaromi, supra,

144 Conn. App. 780. Moreover, ‘‘[i]t is well recognized

that courts will not lend their assistance to enforce

agreements whose inherent purpose is to violate the

law . . . even to reach what appears to be an equitable

result. . . . Generally, agreements contrary to public

policy, that is, those that negate laws enacted for the

common good, are illegal and therefore unenforceable.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re Santiago G., supra, 318 Conn. 475 n.17.

As our Supreme Court found, ‘‘[the petitioner] and

[Santiago’s biological mother] knowingly agreed to

engage in a subterfuge to evade the strictures of [federal] adoption laws and achieve more expeditiously

their own goals, albeit admirable ones.’’ Id. Our

Supreme Court further recognized that accepting the

wishes of the petitioner and the biological mother as

to who Santiago’s mother should be would be tantamount to enforcing the illegal agreement between them

and would be, therefore, ‘‘contrary to the public policies

underlying the adoption laws of both this country and

of Guatemala.’’ Id.

In light of the fact that the petitioner’s claim is premised upon the false birth certificate admittedly instigated and procured by the petitioner and her former

husband, with the cooperation of the biological mother,

who knew the untruthfulness of its content, we agree

with the trial court that enforcement of the Guatemalan

court’s decree, which is based, at least in part, on the

false birth certificate, is contrary to this state’s public

policy as a matter of law. Accordingly, we conclude

that the trial court, in construing the evidence in a light

most favorable to the petitioner, properly concluded

that the Guatemalan court’s reliance on the fraudulently

obtained birth certificate and Santiago’s biological

mother’s sworn affidavit, in which she avers that she
conferred legal authority to the petitioner over Santiago, did not require its judgment to be enforced as a

matter of comity.

II

Additionally, the petitioner argues that the Guatemalan proceedings were adequately noticed or, at the very

least, there was a genuine issue of material fact that

adequate notice was provided. The petitioner asserts

that, given the respondent’s representations to the trial

court at the June 3, 2015 hearing prior to the evidentiary

hearing on the motion to dismiss,11 it is apparent that

the respondent had actual notice of the Guatemalan

proceedings. The respondent replies that the Guatemalan judgment does not warrant recognition because

there existed no genuine issue of material fact that

adequate notice of the pendency of the Guatemalan

proceedings was not provided.12

As previously discussed, § 46b-115ii treats all foreign

child custody determinations as child custody determinations of another state under §§ 46b-115 to 46b-115t,

inclusive, and, accordingly, affords all parties affected

by a foreign child custody determination ‘‘reasonable

notice and an opportunity to be heard.’’ Section 46b115o (a) provides that ‘‘[b]efore a child custody determination is made under this chapter, notice and an opportunity to be heard in accordance with the standard

established in section 46b-115g shall be given to the

parties, any parent whose parental rights have not been

previously terminated and any person who has physical

custody of the child.’’

Additionally, General Statutes § 46b-115g (a) provides that ‘‘[n]otice required for the exercise of jurisdiction over a person outside this state shall be given in

a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice,

and may be: (1) By personal delivery outside this state

in the manner prescribed for service of process within

this state; (2) in the manner prescribed by the law of

the place in which the service is made for service of

process in that place in an action in any of its courts

of general jurisdiction; (3) any form of mail addressed

to the person to be served and requesting a receipt; or

(4) as directed by the court including publication, if

other means of notification are ineffective.’’ Moreover,

‘‘[t]hese methods are not exclusive. Any method of serving notice may be employed as long as it is given in a

manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice and

meets due process requirements as they exist at the time

of the proceeding.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Hurtado v. Hurtado, 14 Conn. App. 296, 306–307, 541

A.2d 873 (1988).

The petitioner argues that the colloquy between the

respondent and the trial court on June 3, 2015, establishes that, at the very least, a genuine issue of material

fact exists as to whether the respondent was provided
with notice of the Guatemalan proceedings. The Guatemalan declaratory action, however, was not filed until

June 17, 2015, and a hearing was held the next day on

June 18, 2015. The respondent could not have been

provided with notice of the proceedings prior to June

17, 2015, because the action had not yet been filed. If

the petitioner knew on June 3, 2015, that a petition for

custody and legal guardianship was going to be filed

in the Guatemalan court on June 17, 2015, that filing

was not disclosed to the court and the parties at the

preevidentiary hearing, and no documents relating to

the planned filing were provided at such hearing. Moreover, the petitioner does not dispute that notice to the

respondent, as described in § 46b-115g (a), was not

provided in the period between the filing of the proceeding and when the hearing took place one day later. As

such, we conclude that the respondent met her burden

of establishing that there was no genuine issue of material fact that adequate notice was not provided pursuant

to § 46b-115ii.

III

In sum, the petitioner has not established that there

is any genuine issue of material fact that the court

erroneously failed to accept and apply a Guatemalan

court’s decree, purportedly granting her parental guardianship rights over, and custody of, Santiago, on the

grounds set forth in her appeal, i.e., that the court erroneously concluded that (1) public policy prohibited recognition of a decree premised on a false birth certificate,

and (2) the decree was obtained without proper notice

to the respondent. The court properly ruled as a matter

of law that such decree was against the public policy

of, and not entitled to be enforced in, Connecticut. The

court also correctly determined that any notice of the

Guatemalan proceedings that was provided to the

respondent was insufficient as a matter of law.

Because we conclude that there was no genuine issue

of material fact that the Guatemalan decree was not

entitled to recognition in Connecticut, and that the

respondent was entitled to summary judgment as a

matter of law, we conclude that the trial court properly

granted the respondent’s motion for summary judgment

and dismissed the petitioner’s habeas corpus petition.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the Appellate Court.

1 Both parties have at times referred to the trial court’s rendering of

summary judgment as premised on the petitioner’s lack of standing to bring

the habeas petition. The trial court, however, did not make reference to

any standing issue in its memorandum of decision. In its memorandum of

decision on the petitioner’s motion to reargue her motion for summary

judgment, the court set forth that it previously had concluded that the

petitioner’s prima facie claim of standing could not form a basis for the
finding, without more, that a 2015 Guatemalan decree conclusively awarded

custody to her and must be recognized. In that memorandum, the court also

rejected the petitioner’s claim under the Hague Convention first mentioned

in her motion for summary judgment.

The court’s conclusion in its memorandum of decision rendering summary

judgment was as follows: ‘‘If neither the birth certificate nor the 2015 decree

purporting to award the petitioner parental guardianship and custody can

be legally recognized, the crux of the habeas claim cannot be proven. If the

gravamen of a habeas petition is that the petitioner must establish that she

is the parent or the legal guardian of the child she seeks, then [Maria G.]

cannot establish her claim under any set of facts she has brought forth. The

respondent has demonstrated through counteraffidavits, other submissions,

and the law a legally sufficient defense to this action. Summary judgment

in favor of the defendant is properly granted if the defendant in its motion

raises at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar the plaintiff’s

claim and involves no triable issue of fact. . . . The court finds that there

remains no triable issue of fact and the petitioner’s request for relief therefore

fails.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) The court,

accordingly, dismissed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

2 The petitioner’s table of contents in her brief before this court includes

the following: ‘‘I. Where the trial court previously found that the evidence

established that the 2015 Guatemalan proceedings were proper at an evidentiary hearing on that very issue, the trial court erred in then discrediting

that evidence at summary judgment and holding that they were indisputably

improper. A. Comity generally requires recognition of foreign court proceedings. B. As a matter of law, the 2015 Guatemalan judgment was not obtained

by fraud or, at the very least, there was a genuine issue of material fact on

that issue. C. As a matter of law, the 2015 Guatemalan court proceedings

were adequately noticed or, at the very least, there was a genuine issue of

material fact on that issue.’’

3 A thorough factual and procedural background of the proceedings concerning Santiago is provided in In re Santiago G., 154 Conn. App. 835, 108

A.3d 1184, aff’d, 318 Conn. 449, 121 A.3d 708 (2015), and In re Santiago G.,

325 Conn. 221, 157 A.3d 60 (2017). In In re Santiago G., supra, 154 Conn. App.

861, this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Santiago’s

biological mother’s motion to revoke the commitment of her minor child

to the respondent. Our Supreme Court affirmed that decision in In re Santiago G., supra, 318 Conn. 449, 475, 121 A.3d 708 (2015). The petitioner had

filed a motion to intervene in those proceedings, which the trial court denied.

Id., 457 n.4. In In re Santiago G., supra, 325 Conn. 223, 236, the petitioner

appealed from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion to intervene

as of right and permissively, and our Supreme Court dismissed that appeal

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

In the present case, the trial court stated that ‘‘[m]any of the underlying

facts in this matter are not in dispute; rather, it is the legal import of the

uncontested crucial facts and documents which are at issue in both [summary judgment] motions.’’

4 On April 16, 2013, the petitioner pleaded guilty to a federal felony in

connection with her bringing Santiago into the country illegally with forged

documents and, as part of her sentence, she was to be deported to Argentina.

In re Santiago G., 318 Conn. 449, 460–61, 121 A.3d 708 (2015).

5 Specifically, the court found the following facts sufficient to establish

standing: ‘‘(1) [T]he now adult biological mother of the child has formally

requested through the Guatemalan court that the petitioner have custody

of her child; (2) a family court in Guatemala granted that request in [June,

2015]; (3) the child was raised in Stamford, Connecticut by the habeas

petitioner from the child’s birth in [2009] until [the department] removed

the child from the petitioner’s custody in October, 2012; and (4) the juvenile

court on September 9, 2013, noted that ‘[the petitioner] is the only mother that

[Santiago] has known, and she is unquestionably his psychological mother.’ ’’

6 The court subsequently filed a corrected memorandum of decision on

January 26, 2017, to address several minor errors, leaving the substance of

its decision intact.

7 On August 4, 2017, during the pendency of this appeal, the petitioner

filed a motion for articulation, requesting that the trial court articulate

whether it found that she lacked standing to bring the habeas petition,

and, if so, that the court state the factual and legal basis for its holding.

Additionally, on October 20, 2017, the petitioner filed a motion to open

the judgment.

On March 15, 2018, the trial court denied the petitioner’s motion to open
judgment. On March 16, 2018, the trial court denied the motion for articulation, concluding that ‘‘[t]he interpretation of the decision and the logical

conclusions to be drawn from it are within the purview of the appellant

and need not be provided by the court.’’ The petitioner subsequently filed

a motion for review of the trial court’s decision, and this court granted the

motion for review but denied the requested relief.

8 General Statutes § 46b-115hh provides in relevant part that ‘‘ ‘[f]oreign

child custody determination’ means any judgment, decree or other order of

a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction of a foreign state providing

for legal custody, physical custody or visitation with respect to a child. . . .’’

9 The petitioner alleged in her petition that Santiago is her legal child.

She, however, has not disputed that she is not Santiago’s biological mother,

and she has relied at various stages of this continuing litigation on the

support of the biological mother.

10 Our Supreme Court has noted the mischief that could occur because

of a false birth certificate: ‘‘We also reject the claim of the plaintiff and the

child’s attorney that the child’s birth certificate conclusively established

that the plaintiff is her mother. One does not gain parental status by virtue

of false information on a birth certificate. See Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz,

[180 Conn. 114, 120, 429 A.2d 833 (1980)] (‘[i]f a stepfather could acquire

parental rights through the simple expedient of changing his stepchild’s

birth certificate, all sorts of mischief could result’).’’ Doe v. Doe, 244 Conn.

403, 446, 710 A.2d 1297 (1998).

11 Specifically, the petitioner directs this court to the following colloquy

that occurred between the respondent and the court at the June 3, 2015

hearing:

‘‘[The Respondent]: [W]ithin the past week, and this is not a representation

from [the petitioner’s counsel], there is a pending court matter in Guatemala by which they anticipate a judge in Guatemala . . . is considering

and might very well grant an order in Guatemala in effect validating or

ratifying the custodial placement of the child with [the petitioner].

‘‘If that were true and if that were to come to pass, I would anticipate

that the department would withdraw its standing objection so at least we

would get past that and the court would be able to consider the merits.

‘‘I can’t represent to the court what the department’s ultimate position

would be, but since we are only at the standing stage, if [the petitioner’s

counsel] were to make those representations to the court and in fact he led

me to believe he’d actually be asking for a . . . continuance to attempt to

secure confirmation of this new order from Guatemala . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

When the court asked the respondent what action to take while waiting

for the petitioner’s counsel to ask for a continuance of the evidentiary

hearing, the respondent stated that it ‘‘would not also be adverse to the

court on its own sua sponte issuing a continuance pending a report from

[the petitioner’s counsel] about the status of this purported new Guatemalan

order . . . which might very well lead to the department withdrawing its

standing objection.’’ (Emphasis added.) The court then replied that the

future ‘‘evidentiary hearing may also involve the issue of what if any recognition this court should give to any order entered by the court in Guatemala

and how such an order if it exists is impacted by any other orders concerning

custody . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

After the court decided it would leave it to either of the parties to request

a continuance date, the respondent stated: ‘‘I would rather not . . . ask for

a necessary date because I think [the petitioner’s counsel] would like the

opportunity to work out the details from Guatemala and I don’t know

while he is hopeful that will happen soon . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

12 The respondent first raised the notice argument in her objection to the

petitioner’s motion for summary judgment.