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SECURITY INFORMATION 

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msR AT'l'ACX PLANNING PLAN 

Common sense dictates and history has proven that w military 

power anticipating an offensive operation must take certain basic steps 

in preparation for such an action. 1'he twe and scope ot such preparation& wll1 be dependent upon the type and scope of the anticipated 

offensive, whether air, ground, or naval, with additional considerations 

as to the t11>e or terrain, climate, etc, to be encountered and the time 

span of the operation. Certain of these steps will be QoDlllOn to all 

powers, while others will be based upon an individual power's theories 

·on weapon utilization, force deploJllent, etc. .Additionalq, Jll&D1' of 

these steps· will be of such nature as to be most unnecessary and uneconomica1 unless taken in preparation tor actua1 hostilities rather 

than practice maneuvers or ax:e:rcisaa. 

· Provided accurate, timal.7 into:mation can be collected on these 

steps taken by the enamy-, it is logi.ca1 to asstme that this inf'ormation, 

properly applied, can indicate with a relative degree ot accurac;y the 

·time the en-.r will initiate an ottensive.. Flll"ther, it mq actuall.7 

indicate the 11J11.here• ot such action as well as the tJPe ot action being 

"planned. . . . . 

. Thia is the basic :concept tor one phase in the Am-ms/I methodology.in attempting to determine the "When"' of an air attack against the United states. · 

Our approach to this matt .. haa ~,en to ).q out 'llhat, tor t.b.e P-UZ'- . pos~ ot this ;paper, we call the •uam Attack Planning Plan.• 'l'his plan · incorp~rates some of what we consider are t.b.e probable steps the ~et; 

will take prior to the μdtiation.ot hostilities and a time span tor 

each step, based on the •D-m:inas• method ot pianni:ag actions. See 'lab A 

for a list o£ ~e actions accepted and the approxlmate time prior to 

D-1>&7 we believe such acti~ will take place. In selecting these 

actions, our c_riteria WUte: (1) The action be one. the ~must take, 

or probab:b' w.t.11 take, p.rior to initiating hostilities; and (2) Dlere 

must be reasonable assurance th&:t we can gain intomatiqn on the action. 

For the present our plan covers the time .f'ro.m D-l2Q to D-Dq with 

1 June 19$3 as D-Day-. 

Selection ot this particUlar. time span was prompted by our discussions on the :theore-M:cal advantage acend.itg to the Soviet b7 initiating hostilities in the spring or simmer ot 19$3, and supported by a 

let.ter·-written by Doctor E. w. Paxson of the Band Corpo:ration wherein 

he ·states his bel:ie.t, and reasons ~or that belief, that. '19S3 is •the" 

year and J1lD8 19$3 *the• month. (See Tab B) An miditional tactor 

considered was the paper prepared by the Special stuq Group in AFOIN, 

cC1DJDent.1ng on Dr. Paxson•s letter. (See Tab C) · 
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Although our present plan is based on this time span of 1 February 

to 1 June 19.$3, the. span or D-120 to D-Day mq be applied at any point 

in time. 

. '.lhe list of actions is extranel.y .fiexibl~ am may be expanded or 

contracted as more information becomes available. The same is true tor 

the tentative time span assigned to each action. 

· Attached as Tab D is a photograph or the Plan as present~ laid out • 

As is tro.e or most Indications ettorts today, the success or ta:llure 

ot this approach to the problem will, to a large extent, be determined by 

the following factors: 

l• The validity or the actions chosen. 

2. The scope and success or the collection ef'tort devoted to this 

projec~, and most ~ortant of all, 

3. "'lhe etf'ectiveness or the evaluation placed on the information 

collected and subsequent4' applied to the planning plan • 

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REF ID:A39210 

• TENTATIVE .ACTIONS 

.ACTION APPROX TDm SPll 

A. Armed Forces General 

l. Shorten courses at technical schools. D-120 to D-llO 

2. Dlild up Armed Forces to full TO&E ~trength. D-120 to D-60 ~ 3. Recall recently dtmiobilized personnel. D-120 to D-60 ,. 4. Conduct joint exercises at corps or army level. D-120 to D-30 

s. Increase supply of arms to Satellites. D-120 to D-30 

6. Joint conferences of Air,, Gr-ound & Naval Comdr. D-90 to D-~ 

1. Combat readiness in8pection of all units.- D-10 

a. 

9. 

iO. 

B. Air 

11. li.l tharaw SAare aircraft .tram storage. D-120 to D-Day 

12. Complete sitecial training of navigators. D-120 to D-30 

13. Establish fighter defenses in depth along D-30 to D-15 Air ECh 

possible SA.C approach routes. D-60 to D-30 Grd Ee~ 

14. Establish 24-hour schedule at I.RA maintenance 

shops. D-60 to D-Day 

15. Curtail civil air flights in favor of military 

missions. D-60 

16. COMi>lete check and overhau1 or airborne 

·eiectrc>mc equipment. D-50 to D-Day 17. Reassign lliission of Long :Range and Special.Air 

Mission transport divisions to provide additiona'.!- logistic potent.ial. D-l> 

18. Move Long :Range. ATI:ation aircrllft to staging D-)J to D-20 Grd Ech 

areas. D-2' to D-JS Air Ech 

19. Fill all POL storage tanks at staging areas. D-30 to ~10 

ro. M"ove filler aircraft to staging.areas. D-2.$ to D-lS 

n. Maintenance ·stand-down ot LRA units. D-20 to D-S 

22. Effect an aircraft call sign or communications 

change. ~20'~~~5!"" 23. ·Hove weapons of mass destruction to staging .. I' •• 

. areaip. D-1.$ tp D-10 

24. Maintenance stand•down of PVO units. D-1.$ to D-S 

25. Deploy "'transport aircraft to vicinity ot ~orne troop centers. . D-10 

26. Place all PVO and supporting units on full alert D-10 

'n. Restrict aircrews to LRA bases. n-s 

28. Issue navigational and target materials • D-S to D-2 . 29. 

30. 

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,. ACTION APPROX TIME SPAB 

c. Ground 

33; :Redeploy ground forces for maximum combat 

ettectiveness. ~60 to D-Day 

3h. Full manning of field hospital units. D-60 to D-30 

it JS. Full stocking of Army level depots. D-60 to D-30 

36. Bulk issue _of maps to divisional level. D-40 to D-.30 

Jr. Issue of 3>0 tons,; or more, ot anmunition per 

~ mechanised division. D-10 to D-5 

38. Issue special camouflage clothing to troops. D-10 

39. Issue extra W. ammuni t:iDn to AAA uni ts. D-10 to D-S 

40. Issue gasoline to mechanized divisions in 

11Xcess of $001000 gallons each. D-10 to D-5 

!il. Assemble 1,000 nat cars per division in 

division area!=!• D-1$ to D-10 

42. 

43. 

lsh. 

D. Naval 

45. Install anti-submar:;Lne nets. D-50 to D-30 

46. Restation naval vessels out of land-locked seas. D-30 to D-1$ 47. Position submarines. offshore of u.s.-u.K. D-.30 to D-$ 

46. 

49 • 

.so •. 

51. s2. 

53. 

E • M1scellaneous 

.I $4. IntSnsify intelligence collection. D-120 to D-DIQ'" 

ss. ·Issue external "Peace• propaganda. D-120 to ]}.Day 

56. Issue internal "War" propaganda. D-12> to D .. Dq s1. Increase security on "information going out of 

orbit D-120 to D-Da:y SB. Assign additional :soviet personnel to Satellite 

units. D-120 to D-60 S9. Increase. precautions to prevent detections. D-90 to D-Day 

60. Assume control of communications in Satellites. D-30 

6:).. Increase JIUJliber of air and civil defense 

exercises. D-120 to D-Da:y 

62. llestr:lct eirllian use of' communications. D-60 

63. 

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65. 

66. 

67. 

68. 

69. 

10. 

71. 

72. 

73. 

74. 

15. 

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ACTION APPROX TIME SPAN 

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23 October 19S2 

MEMORANDlH. FD: E. w. Paxson 

WHEN SHOULD STALIN PUSH THE BUTTON? 

It is always to the point to attempt an estimate of the intentions 

of ·an.ll!lqUestioned enemy. I wish to develop here in some detail cer.-

tain-TI.ews on "Soviet intentions that I have held for several years. In 

'lft1' opinion, the Soviet Union should ini ti;&e "World War III in June of 

19S3. This does not 'imply, o'f course, that war in 19S3.is certain. ·It 

is a statement that mid-S3 is the best date from the Soviet p0int of 

view during the period from 1916 to the t-echmlogical and political 

horizons, which may be placed at about 196S • · 

In Jlt7 own defense, I will say that this has been an estimate held 

to firmly. It has not been moved ahead by yearly incranents as time 

has gone on. The view has been continual.J.1' confirmed, and it appears 

to me wise to present it to :you gentlemen at this time because of its 

Ciirect connection wi t.h the developments of' the Study Group BAKER evaluation. I shall dater uplaining this connection until the end of this 

memorandum. 

~ purpose is to attanpt herein a reconstruction of' the reasoning 

and calculations of the Soviet control group. It is worth noting that 

calculation in this sense is one of the primary tenets of Soviet doctrine. 

It will not be necessary- to adduce either Russian persecution psychoses - or to propose that an aging Generalissimo wants ultimate glory and ultimate power during his life. 

Soviet policy has two essential features. Complete control of the 

homeland is of _primary' :l.Jllportance, and the ultimate goal-to dominate 

the- world~is always ~he determinant of beharlor. 

Control at home could be lost under.successful atomic attack by 

the Strategic Air Command of the United states Ur Force. It follows 

that a serious bl-unting of this United States capability is foremost 

in Soviet thinking. This is, in fact, the argwnent which WB have ~ard 

so often about the deterrent power which our strategi~ bombers and 

weapons have exercised from the end of the last war until the present 

time. 

Attrition rates inflicted by the usual interceptor and gun and 

rocket defenses are not high enough to insure adequate blU.nting. '!he 

weapon which will inflict completely unacceptable losses on current 

bomber types is the ground-to-air missile. The Wasserfall missile, 
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taken from the Germans at about the X-model stage in 19b.S, has had top 

priority in .5oviet research and development •. Geman scientists and 

engineers originally concerned with the program have been used. Judged 

entirely on the basis or a liberal time scale tor" the development or ~h weapons to the opel"ational readiness point., it is asserted that 

this weapon can be in large-so.ale operational use tor the defense ot 

5aviet cities by mid-19S3. This view is confirmed by the timetable ot 

our Nike missile, which started about 1946 and ltbich has within the past 

quarter been most successtully demonstrated as a complete weapon SY'Stem• 

lie can upect Nike to be a key component ot the United States defense 

network by 1956. 'We repeat that Wassertall was alreaey- in the tlying 

stage by 194'• · In ad.dition to the weapon itself', a well-knit electronics 

network is essential on home defense. From our Ferret operations1 from 

our observations of the improvements in native vacuum tube manutacture1 

and rrom the massive, efficient and synchronized So:viet jamming prograJllS, 

we can inter that the electronic capability will be perfectly adequate 

b7 Did-l9S3. 

It in calculating the outcome of a major war Russia is to see 

success,, in addition to home defense, she must assume the necessity 

or intlicting grievous blows on the United States homeland.. Our war 

production capability has demonstrated. its fantastic efficiency. 

Moreover, a PsYchologica1 response can be expected., based on the ever-

. dormant American predilection toward isolationism. Admitting this, the 

Soviet. Union must not initiate all-out war until her stockpile ot atomic 

weapons is large enough to achieve such damage. I estimate that about 

100 weapons on target in the tml.ted States would reduce our munitions 

production capability to about SO% of its plamed value during the first 

two years of war. Even with 50% wastage in delivery and bmbing errors 

this requires a stockpile or 1$0 weapons. Based on conservative production estimates, this is within the Soviet capability by mid-53, but 

not until that date. 

The arguments above attanpt to explain why major hostilities have 

not occurred between 1945 and today. Minor additional reasons can.be 

given. A primary reason in this categOl"J' iS the success or Soviet. co1d. 

war tactics. In.addition,, the Soviet Union has had to Engage in a massive capital construction pro gram and has had to build up the strength 

and integrity or satellite butter states. 

Turn now to a consideration 0£ the disadvantages seen by the Soviet 

mind in deferment of Worl.d War III past mid-1953. This discussion can 

be divided into three parts by dismissing first the argument that the 

Soviet Union is. getting everything that she wants by cold and lukewarm 

war techniques,, then by considering the position during the period 1954 

to 19561 and finally by estimating military technology f'rom 195"6 on 

through to the 1965 horizon. · .. 

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. Let us address ourselves first to the cold war argument. Even. 

with the-admitted slippages a.Di inef'ficiencies in building NA.1U1 

inilita:ey power ·is developing. As a most pessimistic estimate, NA.'10 

air and ground vis a vis the Soviet formations would be about in the 

ratios respectively of 2 to l am 3 to 1 by mid-19$4. Thus 1 even 

under conventional arms, the Sav:l.et muld be on the margin of doubt as 

to t.Pe success of operations, even though she can keep the war in 

:Korea going through the spring of 19$3, thereby draining Uhited States 

strength ·further at the expense of NATO buildup. But considering the 

increased U'nite6. States stockpile of atomic weapons, it is 1111' expectation that containment is feasible in mid-1954. This I expect to be 

the outcome of the evaluation ~w being coi:iducted by S~ucfT Group BUER. 

· N<>W the Soviet must not be on the margin of doubt. '.lhis is an 

unacceptable calculation {and I assume that the Soviet can calculate 

this outcome as well as the BAKER group. can)' . because action based OD 

such an estimate would be adventurist:Lc. Adventurism, in this sense, 

is a ·cardinal sin to the Soviet elite. In addition to these points, 

the Soviet always expects attack by world capitalism,, since it is invertedly argued that war is essential for the preservation of the 

capii.alistic ~tein·. Consequently, increased NATO strength in the 

period 1954-1956 can be viewed as a serious danger. War in this per-

':lod would be yielding to provocation, a ·second major sin in the Soviet 

code. nelding to provocation means here yi,,elding the initiative to . the enemy and accepting battle on terms of his choosing. I buttreBB 

the 1.mmediately preceding logic with a final remark. In spite of the 

French, it does seem perfectly clear' that Oezman divisions 'Will be 

formed in increased strength during the period 195h-19S6. Fear ot. 

German military might is one of the most outstanding characteristics 

of the Soviet mind. I use 8.11 of the above reasons to suggest that 

the Soviet will not in fact rest content with gains to be achieved bJ' 

cold and lukewarm war techniques. 

In mid-S.3, however, because of the weak NATO forces, including 

our own tactical atomic bcmbing capability, the Soviet could well 

calCul.ate tlildi a qiiick seiz~e of all of Europe, including our 

fianking positions in Scandinarla, in the United Kingdom, in Afr.I.ca 

and in the Near East, would be perfectly- feasible. CCID.bine this with 

the previous ideas that damage to Mother Ba.ssia can be minimized so 

that political control is not lost. ihe physic~ damage done, including Soviet c_asualties, is completely irrele'Vant. Loss of production capability and military stocks is again unimportant if a quick 

seizure of Europe is assumed. 

Consider a plausible consequent pattern of events. We are denied 

all peripheral footholds in Europe, a Europe which the Soviet Union is 

integrating irrlio her econo•. Russia continues nuisance atomic attacks 

on the United States Zone of the Interior. Under the strongest pressures from our citizens, all our resources are diverted to the 

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The above are 'lfl3' views and I believe them f'irmly. I have tried to 

·show that 1953 should be consider~ by all odds a most critical year. 

In v.i.ew of its proximity,, I must also indic•te why June of that year is 

nominated. The reasons are partly connected with the timetables discussed above in regard to Soviet offensive and defensive capabilities. 

But technicalJ.71 choosing June minimizes the cover of darkness required 

by our strategic air ccimmand1 and thus minimizes· Soviet airborne electronic requirEll'lents and maximizes the efficiency of conventional ground 

defenses. In the technical realm., maneuver for ground forces., including 

low water levels in the river barriers and maximum light for superior 

Soviet tactical air are present. 

How is all of ·this connected with the Study Group BAKER evaluation? 

First., I believe that our anal~is for mid-195'4 will lead ,to requirements lihi~h will turn out to be feasible ones. Feasibility may., however., 

demand a reduction in the number of weapons allotted to the strategic 

attack (and ! believe an excellent case can be made out for deletions 

• from the target list) and a diversion or· strategic carriers to the tactical role. If this is the outcome of our stuCV-, then it follows., to 

lllJ' mind., that we must at the earliest possible moment attempt to see if 

o'ilr methods could possibly denonstrate containment in mid-53. Here, 

there is no idea of recommending new weapons or trying t.o increase the 

forces which would be in being. Instead the entire question reduces to - a studif of the strategies o~ allocation which would permit contaimnent 

in mid-'3· Tb.is implies that the BAKER study" should immediately continue 

along these lines during ·the first quarter of 195'3 if 8Jl1" contribution is 

to be made to the fighting of a war which1 as I explained in the preceding 

material, seems to me most terrifyingly likely. 

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construction of an impenetrable air defense umbrella. Remanber at this 

point that 100 weapons have already been placed on the war-making and 

capital-making elements of the Am¢can econOJl\V'• Credit1ng us with 

recuperation dur:l.ng the third and fourth years1 we ·now find ourselves · facing an integrated Soviet Earope possessing a total war potentia1 

very mlich in excess of that of the isolated United States. It is 

difficult to see how we could then contemplate offensive. operations at 

inter-continental dista:aces. I suggest that we would quit1 even with 

the prospect of a lat.er World War IV before us. 

Let me turn ·now to the situation obtaining if the Soviet decides 

to delay World 'liar l;II until the post-19.$6 period. A strong reason 

f'or such deferment is the apectation that fusion weapons muld be 

available to Russia in quantit7. Against this must be balanced the 

consideratio~ that the United States al.so has this weapon as well as 

an excellent hcime defense system and has succeeded in building adequate 

HA.TO defense forces. These considerations in themselves are perhaps 

sufficient to demonstrate the undesirability of war in the post-S6 

period to the Soviet Union. But there is a rar stronger line of 

technical argument mich can be given. I now turn to this argument. 

Not onq will both sides have fusion weapons in 19561 but because 

or the continual growth or the stocks of fis~le material it i.s perfectly feasible to contemplate the use of atomic warheads in groundto-air missiles. 1his immediately denies to an attacker saturation or 

cell tactics which in normal air doctrine are employed to. achieve a 

high probability of weapon delivery even in the face of relatively h:1e)l 

attrition levels. If the attack must then be made by singles1 the 

attacking aircraft should be very easy prey tor improved conventiona1 

detenses. 

Later in this decade another technique presents itself. Law-flying 

aircraft or missiles will to a certain extent nullity the value of 

ground-to-air missiles and other conventional. means or·def'ense. But it 

is not at a1l "incredible to coneei ve of neutron generators held aloft · by barrage b'alloons and causing pre-detonation of weapons attempting to 

come through. At this point in· time,, the late .So• s am the ear]\f 60•s,, 

we have probabl7 reached the era of the long~ange,, high ·altitude 

ballistic or glide rocket. Because or the extremely high speeds of 

such weapons, an even higher premium is now placed on the lethal radius 

or the warheads in the def ending ground-to-air missiles. lht1 a 

fortiori.,, a most adequate stockpile of fissile material is at hand. 

It follows that del¢ng war after 1956 leads to the possibility 

of mutual blows exchanged, perhaps inconclusively, on the Russian. and 

.American homelaDds with either a stalemate or the impossibility or 

conventional grolllld operations in Europe because of the threat of the 

tactical use of fusion weapons. Contemplating such a state is then 

once more adventuristic. 

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SSG Meno lo. 239 

·COMMBn'S O?I 

"1llHltl SHOULD STALIN PUSH THE BUTmP 

In an informal psper entitled "When Should Stalin Push the Button?", 

dated 23 October 19.$21 Dr. E.· w. Panon ot RUD stated that. in hia par- aozial opinion, the Soviet; Union Should ird.tiate var 1D June, l9S.3. Fral 

the Soviet; poi:rrt ot vin, he thi!Jks that thia date would be the best t1Jle 

tor attack thrOughout the ent~e period ot l94S-196~. Dr. PBDOn hu 

· held to thia opinion tor aevaral 79ara. He reiterated it at the beginning ot the current 7ea.r which, according to him, ia a moat critical 

date. 

A t• prel:!nd nary words should be said about Dr. Pazaon• a method. 

Dr. Paxson aaaumea that in each militar.Y situation, there are a limited 

number ot dominant factors on 'llhich hinges the decision to tight or' to 

atq hame. .in estimate ot great reliabillt7 can be made by rastr,:l.cting 

the anal.Jae• ·to these k8J" factors rather than t1"11ng to asaeas a multi-· 

tude ot U1D11anageable data. In the past this method hu been applied 

moat ettectiveq. For example, Admira1 Lord Fisher estimated in 1910 

that the Germana would go to war in 1914 and baaed thia eatiate on 

mthing but the data of the completion ot the Xial Canal. In 19391 

[ 

Hi:lilm'' a decision to go to W&Z' aa influenced 'bJ" hia estimate ot when 

the 119atern a1r forces muld acquire strong atrild.Jlg power. Heme, Dr. 

Panon•a method appears sound and will be accepted aa a valid llpPl"OBOh 

.to the problea. 1'he question ia meraqo whether hia facts are right and 

aubatantiata hia ccmcluaion. 

Dr. Pauon•a argament; is bued on the toll.owing po1nta1 

1. The initiation ot hoatilitiaa at dataa subaaquenf, to 19S.3 1IOU1d 

put the Soviet um.on at great risk through the deval.opment. ot American .. 81"11181enta; the •argence·of H"""8apona, the atrengthenlrJg ot HA'l'O, etc. 

!his P.C?in1i will no't be discussed in thia paper. 

2. BJ' mid-l9S.3, the $Jviata will hae an atomic stockpile ade-

\. quate to reduce American mmti t.1.ona production capabili t,. by apprmc:l.-

•teq SO per cent d"Dring the first two 7aars of war. AasUllilJI a SO 

pm'· cant n.stage ot bombs, the Soviets, according to Di-. Pason, muld. 

•need a stockpile ot lSO weapona. tis point also will not be diacusaed 

in detail. 

UndoubtedJ.71 100 bombs on American targets would cause a great 

dea1 of dainage. Bcnr89'er, it ia unlikelJ' that the Soviets, with their 

prof'eaaeci fear of •adventurism.• would rei,. on a m1n1•• swckpile. 

1hq might do ao under strong cmpalaion, but considering the aise ot 
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REF ID:A39210 

the American target system--especially if we include in it SAC and other 

atomic air bases-and considering the Soviet intent to minimize the risk 

in their ultimate "great gamble," it seans more likely that they would 

choose D-Day at a time when their stockpile is more adequate. 

As a guess, the Soviets will tend to consider .$00-11 000 bombs as 

a minimum stockpile they must have before initiating global war. Furthermore, should the Soviets elect to utilize fissionable JDaterials in 

the development of their antiai~crai't defenses in order to betlster the 

doubtful effectiveness or their system,, the availability or suitable 

numbers of nuclear weapons for offensive weapons would be delqed. In 

this connection,, it would be a mistake to consider bombs independently 

from carriers. Without going into details, ·it is at least questionable 

whether the.Soviets would consider that their present TU-4 capability 

is good enough for operations against the u.s. If they were to req on 

submarines, and assuming that they have an operational pulse jet or 

rocket, the dif'ficul ties· of designing an ef'fecti ve missile warhead and 

the coincident penalty in the economica1 use of fissile materials probabq would delq their acquisition of a "sufficient" stockpile. 

3. Dr. Paxson• s third point, which is real.q the crux of the 

argument, is that by mid-.$3, the Soviets will have an air defense system capable of neutralizing the SAC offensive. Converse'.cy-1 according 

·to him, American air defense will become trul.y effective only by 19.$6 

when Nike will be a key component of the u.s. defense network. Hence, 

the Soviets will have in 19$3 a capability to attack the u.s. while 

they also will possess a capability to defend themselves etfectivelyJ 

they could deliver ·their stockpile on u.s. targets,. while SAC could 

no"t deliver the u.s .. stockpile on Russian targets. At later dates,, 

the .American defense ~nci offensive capabilities would increase, and 

while this also wuld be true of the Soviet atomic strength, the war 

would become less of a one-way street and become more of a slugging 

match of mutua1 exhaustion. 

Dr. Pa:son•s estimate ..about the operationa1 availability of 

Wasserfali is based on the-assumption that this missile, or missiles 

or a similar type, "have had top priority in fk>vi.et research and 

development. German scientists and engineers origina1ly concerned. 

with the program have been used." 'While these assertions cannot be 

proved with certaint1',, they undoubted1y are excellent assmrq>tions and 

in the absence or contrary intelligence, should be considered as relevant. Dr. Paxson goes on to say: •Judged entirel.y on the basis of a 

liberal time scale tor the development of such weapons to the operational readiness point, it is asserted that this weapon can be in 

large"".scale operationa1 use for the defense of Soviet cities by 

mid-19.$3.n · 

It is at this point that the argument becomes questionable. Soviet 

ability to undertake research and development and to brl.J.d prototypes in 

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complete security cannot be doubted. But it is an entirely di.ff erent 

matter to assert that a weapon can be put in units and be deployed all 

over the Soviet Union without American intelligence getting even an 

inkling of the event. 

Let us see what an operational availability of Wasserfall would 

require in numbers. The Germans worked out several systems of Wasserfall deployment. They calculated the requirements for an area defense 

of Geni&JV' alone, for the area defense of Germ8Jl1' and France, and the 

~~quirements of a point defense of 60 cities. Thq concluded.that 

area defense requires three parallel lines of deployed units at a muimim distance of SO miles between lines, and a maxinrum interval of 

twelve and one-halt miles between each battery of four launching sites 

within each line. Point defenses wou1d require three rings around each 

ci v, or -a total of 11.3 batteries per target. .Since this requirement 

is prohibitive, the Germans were willing to settle for two rings of 2S 

and SO-mile radius, which wuld necessitate .38 batteries per defended . town. 

The German figures are based on accuracy requirements as calculated in 194.3. If the Russians were to achieve better accuracies and 

ranges the number of missiles could be reduced. On the other hand, it 

is probable that the Soviets will be restricted to far lower accuracies, 

not necessarily because their technology would not be advanced. beyond 

the German level of 194.3, but because operational degradations would be 

more significant in Russia than in Ge:nnany. If so, these German .figures liOuld· have to be considered to be conservative. 

The German calculation also was based on the assumption that the 

defense systelll would be based entirely on missiles. The availabilit7 

ot fighters was ignored, although it is conceivable that an existing 

all-weather fighter capability could reduce the requirement for missiles. It is, however, doubtful that this actuall:y would be the case. 

Given the very low kill rates of fighters, there mul~ be no point in 

diluting the missile &78tem with an unproductive fighter capabilit7 • 

Fighters would remain in the gmne as an added reinsurance factor, as a 

mobile detense which could be thrown into the breach, and particular:cy 

for low level de.tense., but the existence of fighters !er se hardly 

would reduce the requirements for an all around missi e s,ystem. 

German calculations are valid for a -speed of' 3.35 miles/hour on 

the part of the attacking bombers. Should the speed of' the attack 

system increase, Wasserfall requirements would go up. 

'l'he geography of' Russia does nQt lend its elf as easily to area · defense as do Germa:qy and' France. For one thing., the . area is much 

-larger. Second, mBDy" of the presumable targets are really' •points• 

in the middle of' nowhere inasmuch as large portions of' the USSR are 

uninhabited. Third, the requirements of llasserfall are such that 

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REF ID:A39210 

railroads are necessary- as an integral part of the logistics system • 

Missile sites would have to.be located close to rail lines; thus1 there 

would presumabq remain maiw gaps in an area defense established on the 

basis of the inadequate Russian railroad system. On the other hand, 

there exist in the Soviet Union certain areas such as Central Russia, _ the Urals1 and the Central Asia industrial towns which .could be defended 

by ~area system. 

It would be necessaey for the .soviets to combine the area and the 

point defense systems. On this basis1 a rough calculation shows that 

the pErimeter of the te?Titories to be defended by an area system is 

about. 61000 miles long. There are1 in addition, about lS cities outside of these areas Which would have to be def ended by a point system. 

Also, the five Ru.ssian cities which contain the most imporliant targets 

would have to be defended. through an additional point systsn even 

though they are situated within the assumed area s;ystem. '!bis means . that· the presumed Rassian defense system would consist or an area with 

a perimeter of 61 000 miles plus 20 point targets. This does not include at least 20 vital air bases and atomic installations requirillg · point defenses. · 

Assuming that the German force requiranents were on the high side_, 

we could reduce the area de.f'ense from a triple to a double line and 

space the missile batteries at 20 rather than 12 1/2 miles. '.ftlis . means.that 600 batteries would be required for the area defense. Reducing the requirement as estimated by the Germans of 38 missile 

ba:tteries per city to .J> batteries1 there woUld be a minimum need for 

600 batteries for point defenses. Allocating arbitrarily .f'ive batteries for 20 key military installations1 there is a requirement of ·100 

batteries. 'l'hus1 the entire ay-stem would need 1,300 batteries. 

Conversely 1 U we assume that the Russians would discard the 

area system as inapplicable tor their purposes and would decide to 

"defend 100 cities with an average of 20 batteries each, the requirement would be 21 !l>O batteries • 

Speakiz:rg in more general terms we can estimate that Soviet air 

defense requirements lie between 11 500 and 21 000 batteries, not 

counting satellite areas and China. 

Fifteen hundred batteries would require 6,ooo missiles tor one 

full salvo. Assuming that there must be a minimum reserve ot at least 

two additional salvos1 we would have a requirement of 181 000 missiles, 

to libich must be added a reserve for mal-functioning missiles of about 

_lQ_per cent1 or a total of 201000 miss11es at the battery sites. 

The Germans calculated that they need 129 officers and enlisted 

men in the T/O ot each battery. ·This wuld mean that1 exclusive of 
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REF ID:A39210 

support organizations and higher staffs, approximately g)01 000 men 

would have to be assigned to the batteries. 

Considenng the novelty or the weapon and the highly technical 

servi.ces required,, a rather intensive training program would have to 

be operated. 1'his program would include practice firings. Although 

a large percentage or these could be done through simulation techniques,, a certain minimum would have to be actual firings. .Assuming 

one such firing per each ten batteries,. there would be lSO training · 

shots and coin~idental destruction of a number of drones. Actua~,, 

we have some knowledge of Soviet missile firings,, but it is believed 

that these were in the nature o£ test rather than practice shots. 

"Th.ere are no indications that Wasaerfall type missiles were used for 

practice. 

'lbe storing of the missiles close to the 'baittery sites will require a rather elaborate supporting system. While in. storage, the 

missiles require continuous .attention. They Dlllst be maintained in 

dry, well-ventilated and heated storage rooms where constant temperatures are necessary. Hence, heating plants must be available to each 

storage area. '.lhe storage bunker for each battery must be large 

enough to hold at least 12 missiles. 

On the basis of German data, it can be calculated that the construction of the storage sites alone will consume close to one .and 

one-half million tons of wrought iron. Tb.ere also is a heavy requirement for reinforced concrete. The Gem.ans calculated concrete 

needs at 800 square meters per battery- and of a thiclmess sui'f;i.cient 

to carry a load of one ton per square meter. There are numerous 

other requirements of substantial dimensions, some of which would be 

difficult -to satisfy,,, especi~ rocket fuels and electronic· g~ar. 

Equipment is needed to transport missiles trom the railhead to 

the storage site and to move them rapidly from the storage site to 

firing points. This requires special trucks, hoists, cranes,,, and· 

similar equipment. The rocket fuels must be carried in special anticorrosive tank cars and stored in corrosion-resistant containers. 

There is a requirement to keep batteries charged while at the site. 

It follows that the sites probabq would have to be serviced by power 

or power relay stations. 

The deplo:vment of these missiles would necessitate fairl.y heavy 

railroad. traffic, which har~ could go entireq unnoticed. Each 

missile is trmsported in one .railroad car and 1 t is probable that 

special cars would be required. Even after the missiles are in place, 

quite a number probab~ will have to be returned to c antral maintenance and repair shops so that, once the system-has been organized, a 

continuous now of rail traffic would be expected to occur. The 

chances are that in areas with poor road facilities,,, special railroad 
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REF ID:A39210 

sidings and spurs would have to be built. The logistic requirements 

would be somewhat reduced it the Soviets were to use solid rather than 

liquid fuels. 

This does not necessarily mean that the Soviets would be unable 

to provide the complicated logistics and procure the necessary materials, but simply marshals support for the contention that American 

intelligence should detect and possibly- identify some indicators if' 

the Russians reall:Y' were in the process of building an operational 

antiaircrar~ rocket system. 

The latest intelligence indicates merely that the Soviets are 

still developing llasserf'all and that they seem to have wrked out a 

usable guidance system. 

Admittedly, we should not be blind ourselves to the oossibilit.y 

of' technological and operational surprise. If' it is conceivable, but 

highly improbable, that by a very astute, al though costq anLL cumbersome system of' camouflage, the Soviets may succeed in overcoming 

these various difficulties. Even so, it would be a mistake to become 

paralyzed with a thought of a fully effective Wasserf'al.l defense. For 

the time being, it must be assumed that the Russian Wasserfall will 

have the same basic defect which -was characteristic of the German 

Wassertall,- its ineffectiv~esa in the so-called "dead &pace" up to 

18,ooo feet. This zone of ine.t~ectiveness proves to be the area where, 

so to speak, the "flank" of Wasserfall can be turned. It also will be 

necessal"J' for the Soviets to protect missile sites against attacks at 

low al"titude. Reg-ardless of the technological"ditficulties of such a 

def enae, this 111eans that the whole wasserfall system must be wllnigh duplicated by a low level defense system protecting W•sserfall 

as well as strategic and other air defense targets. lhe procurement 

of efi'ective air defenses requires the pyr~id.illg of several systems 

upon each other. Hence, even under the worst ~onceivable conditions 

for the u.s., wide gaps will be left open for the prosecution of air 

opportunities within the Soviet Union. 

Revertirig for a moment to the psychology implicit in Dr. Pax:ons•s 

paper, we would have to assume that the highest bolshevik leaders who 

are mt technical men wuld (1) understand the significance of tl}e 

1iasserfall argumentJ and (2).accept the experts• word at face value. 

we also would have to assume that (.3) the eJq>erts llOuld dare, despite 

the hazards of' the Stalinist regime,.to stick their necks out to th,e 

point of claiming full effectiveness for 'Wassel"fall and (4) that the 

test firings would be a 100 per . cent success. This "is all very unlikely. If American test firings are at all indicative of' what could 

happen in the Soviet Union, the chances are that the Wasserfall 

technicians will be highly cautious in their predictions to the Soviet 

elite concerning the effectiveness of this weapon. 

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REF ID:A39210 

In the absence or indicators and other convincing intelligence 

to the contrary, the probable state or Soviet missile-air defense 

developments is summarized ast 

a. The Soviets possibly are nearing the end or. the Wasserrall 

development p el"iod; 

b. Jrasserfall will not be an operational capability during 

19S3, except perhaps in a few locations to which the Soviets ascribe 

particular strategic value; and 

c. It is higll:q doubttul that even if the Soviets were in 

possession of an operational Wasserrall system, they wuld ascribe to 

it a present-day effectiveness of such magnitude that they would be 

willing to discount the threat of 8n American atomic offensive. 

4. Turning to the u.s., it is apparent that, technologica.l.q, 

American air defenses artt approximately in the same situation which 

we impute to the 'Russians. The NIKE missile was test flown, and while 

it could be easily jammed from the target aircraft, the U.S • .lI'm7 

asserts that the operational model will be far less n:j ammable. n 

(1iassertall1 s susceptibility to jamning also would be debate~ hotly. 

In any event, it is not a foregone conclusion that an operational 

wasserf all ~annot at least in the first period of its existence be 

handled quite comfortably witli our ECM--assuming fair intelligence 

on frequencies.) 

As presently scheduled, and disregarding any cut-backs, the 

first NIKE missile units would become operational b;y Decanber 19S'.3, 

which date is subject to possible further changes. NIKE has a 

speed of 1.2 to 2.S' Mach, and reaches an altitude of 60,ooo feet. 

1he N"a:vy.1 s TERRIER m&11 become operational by July 19S4, and while 

designed primarily for use from ships, it also could be employed 

from the ground. TERRim will have a speed of 1.8 Mach and a ceiling o:f u0,000 feet. The air-to-air FALCON of the USAF is estiJRated 

to become operational bT M&11 19SS'. It will develop a speed of ,3.0 

to 1.2* Mach and its altitude will depend on the altitude of the 

mottler ship. In June. l9S6,, the f:lrst BOMABC unit will become 

operational,, to be followed in Decanber 19S7 by the Navy's TALOS. 

It is believed that this latter date does not refer' to the missile 

as such, but to the atomic warhead which it is designed to carr,y. 

In a pinch, it should be possible to "employ MATADOR for antiaircrit't use •. MA TA.DOR is going into production at the rate of ten. a 

month and is scheduled to become operationally usable by July 19S3. 

•FALCON reaches its highest velocity shortly after firing, and decelel"ates gradu.ally to two-fifths of its original speed • 

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REF ID:A39210 

~e plazmed output; in case of mobilization is 540 a month with single 

shift production. If it were necessary to use MATADOR temporarily 

for antiaircraft purposes, production could be upped by triple shifts 

to about 1, 200 pm' month. MATAOOR 1 S accuracy is not good enough for 

antiaircraft purposes but to a degree, this deficiency might be overcome through the use of atomic warheads. 

It should not be forgotten that conventional antiaircraft artillery has made rather considm'able progress since the end of the war 

and that the fighter defense system, including all-weather fightel's1 

has been matm'ially increased since the Korean war. 'Whethm' or not 

we are highly conscious of our deficiencies, the signii'icant question 

is "How does the·u.s. air defense system look to the Soviets?" The;y 

hardly wi.ll be in_clined to write it off as ineffectual. 

The point is that during 1953, the Soviets w:> uld not have aJ\V"thi.Dg 

like a free passage to the target, provided, of course, our equipment 

would have been deployed in time. Furthermore, from 1954 onward, U.S. 

air defenses will incorporate increasingly more gr<?und-to-air mtssiles. 

It the above estimate 0£ the Russian timetable is aI\,VWhere near accu- · rate, it would follow that the Russians should gain a Wasserfall capability approximately at the same time when the U.S. acquires a con;. 

siderably stronger defense posture through NIKE,. ~ FAL<X>N,. and 

t:OMA'RC. Unless the Soviet atomic program is increased to very J1D1Ch 

higher levels, the U.S. should obtain a decisive defmse advantage from 

1957/1958 onward. At that time, surface-to-air :missiles with atomic 

warheads will become available. 

If by 19.S.S or so 1 the Soviets acquire a· strong Wasserf all system, 

they may make it far. more difficult for our bonbers to reach their 

targets. Hoirevm', by April 195'.S, an operational air-to-ground missile, 

RASCAL, ·becomes available. RA.SC'.L has a ~ange of 100 miles, which . would allow our bombers to atta-ck targets from outside the range of 

Wasserf"all point def'enses. There is no intelligence on a similar 

RusSian weapon which could be used against the u.s., although the Germans developed BS-293, FI-1400, and other air-to-ground weapons. On the 

other "hand, the Soviets might be able to launch fighters from large mother ships as an intermediary te~hnique. 

The conclusion is that the current period still must be considered 

critical in th~ sense that it current American programs are carried . through, Soviet opportunities for a successful air war will progressively decline until a n~ technological cycle emerges. M::td-1953 indeed would be one of the last dates where the Soviets could risk an 

air war against the u.s. But such a choice would be the "least bad" 

and certainly not a favorable choice. For the time being, indications . 

8 
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REF ID:A39210 

are that Soviet air dei"enses are based exclusively or predominantly on 

fighters and conventional antiaircraft guns. SUch a defense system will 

not prove effective enough to turn back the SAC offensive. 

s/t/ 

9 

CHARLES Y. BANFILL 

Brig. General, USAF 

Chief 1 ~ecial Study Grou.p 

"Directorate of Intelligence 
REF ID:A39210 

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