PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 15-1381

_____________

JANE DOE, 

THE VICTIM IN THE “DISNEY 

WORLD GIRL” OR “INTERNET GIRL”

CHILD PORNOGRAPHY SERIES 

formerly known as MASHA ALLEN

v.

ALAN HESKETH; RICHARD CARINO; GEORGE ELIOT 

KABACY; MATTHEW ALAN MANCUSO; DAN W. 

JOACHIM; RANIER GEROW; DOUGLAS MICHAEL 

STUM; RICHARD SCHEIRING; CHARLES LINDAUER; 

JOSEPH MARCUS; WILLIAM GEORGE GAMMON; 

STEPHEN JABBOUR; ALBERT NOAH ABRAMS; 

MAYER FINKELSTEIN, SUED IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL 

CAPACITIES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF A 

CLASS OF PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED

Jane Doe,

 Appellant 

_____________
2

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

(E.D. Pa. No. 2-13-cv-04935)

District Judge: Honorable Stewart Dalzell

Argued: October 28, 2015

_________________

Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SCIRICA and ROTH, Circuit 

Judges.

(Filed: July 5, 2016)

Sidney L. Moore, III, Esq. [ARGUED]

The Moore Law Firm

1201 Peachtree Street

400 Colony Square, Suite 2000

Peachtree, GA 30361

Counsel for Appellant

Stanley W. Greenfield, Esq. [ARGUED]

Greenfield & Kraut

1040 Fifth Avenue

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Counsel for Appellee

_________________

OPINION

__________________
3

GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

Section 2255 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code (also known 

as Masha’s Law) provides a civil right of action in federal 

district court to victims of several federal crimes, including 

sexual exploitation of a child and various child pornography 

offenses. This case requires us to decide whether a restitution 

award for a criminal offense bars a later-filed civil claim by a

victim under § 2255 based on that same offense. Because we 

find that § 2255 permits such a claim, and collateral estoppel 

is not appropriate in this case, we will reverse the District 

Court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint. We 

will also vacate the District Court’s judgment setting aside a

default entered against the defendant and remand for further 

proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff–Appellant Jane Doe (formerly known as 

Masha Allen) was adopted from Russia by Defendant–

Appellee Matthew Alan Mancuso when she was five years 

old. Over the course of the following five years, Mancuso 

sexually abused Doe and documented the abuse in a series of 

photographs and videos. Mancuso copied these media and 

distributed them through chat rooms on the internet in 

exchange for media documenting the sexual abuse of other 

children. Mancuso’s photographs and videos became popular 

among viewers of child pornography and he was 

subsequently arrested after a law enforcement investigation 

identified him as Doe’s abuser. Following his arrest, a

federal grand jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania 

returned a two-count indictment against Mancuso: count one 
4

charged Mancuso with sexual exploitation of a minor in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a); and count two charged 

Mancuso with possession of material depicting the sexual 

exploitation of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2252(a)(4)(B).

Mancuso entered into a plea agreement. He agreed to 

plead guilty to count one of the indictment (sexual 

exploitation) and the government agreed to dismiss count two

(possession of child pornography). In the plea agreement, 

Mancuso made several affirmations that would affect his 

sentence. He “acknowledge[d] his responsibility for the 

conduct charged in Count Two of the Indictment” and 

“stipulate[d] that the conduct charged in that count may be 

considered by . . . the District Court in imposing sentence.” 

J.A. 216a. He also agreed to pay “mandatory restitution” to 

Doe “under the Victim-Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 

§§3663, 3663A and 3664” in the amount of $200,000. J.A. 

216a–217a. 

Pursuant to the plea agreement, the sentencing court

ordered Mancuso to fully fund a trust for the benefit of Doe in 

the amount of $200,000 “pursuant to Title 18, United States 

Code, Sections 2259(a) through 3663, 3663[A] and 3664.”1 

 

1 18 U.S.C. § 3663 codifies the Victim and Witness 

Protection Act (“VWPA”). The VWPA confers discretion 

upon a sentencing court in the award of restitution: “The 

court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense 

under this title . . . may order, in addition to . . . any other 

penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution 

to any victim of such offense . . . .” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3663(a)(1)(A).
5

 

18 U.S.C. § 3663A codifies the Mandatory Victims 

Restitution Act (“MVRA”). The MVRA instructs a 

sentencing court to award mandatory restitution for, inter alia, 

“crime[s] of violence.” Id. § 3663A(c).

18 U.S.C. § 2259 provides for mandatory restitution to

victims of, inter alia, the crimes codified at 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 2251–2252C. It provides: 

Notwithstanding section 3663 or 3663A, and in 

addition to any other civil or criminal penalty 

authorized by law, the court shall order 

restitution for any offense under this chapter. 

. . . The order of restitution under this section 

shall direct the defendant to pay the victim 

(through the appropriate court mechanism) the 

full amount of the victim’s losses as 

determined by the court . . . . [T]he term “full 

amount of the victim’s losses” includes any 

costs incurred by the victim for -- (A) medical 

services relating to physical, psychiatric, or 

psychological care; (B) physical and 

occupational therapy or rehabilitation; (C) 

necessary transportation, temporary housing, 

and child care expenses; (D) lost income; (E) 

attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; 

and (F) any other losses suffered by the victim 

as a proximate result of the offense. . . .

A court may not decline to issue an order under 

this section because of . . . the fact that a victim 

has, or is entitled to, receive compensation for 
6

Sentencing Tr. at 19, United States v. Mancuso, No. 2:03-cr00161-TFM (W.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2004).

B. Procedural History

Ten years after Mancuso’s criminal conviction, on 

August 23, 2013, Doe filed the present civil suit under 18 

U.S.C. § 2255 against a purported class of defendants in the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania. Doe named fourteen purported class 

representative defendants in her complaint, including 

Mancuso, and alleged that each defendant had violated a 

predicate statute under § 2255.2 Doe sought damages against 

 

his or her injuries from the proceeds of 

insurance or any other source.

Id. § 2259(a), (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(4)(B). 

Each of these statutory restitution schemes is governed 

by the procedures set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3664, which 

provides: “In each order of restitution, the court shall order 

restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim’s 

losses as determined by the court and without consideration 

of the economic circumstances of the defendant.” Id.

§ 3664(f)(1)(A).

2 Before filing this appeal, Doe settled with one 

purported class representative defendant who was dismissed 

from the action with prejudice. The District Court dismissed 

all the remaining purported class representative defendants

except Mancuso from the action for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. The District Court did not reach the issue of

class certification.
7

Mancuso for his possession and distribution of child 

pornography depicting her.3

On December 5, 2013, Mancuso was served with 

process, but over the following nine months no counsel 

entered an appearance on his behalf and he did not file a 

responsive pleading. On September 22, 2014, the District 

Court clerk docketed Doe’s application for an entry of default 

against Mancuso. The next day, the clerk entered a default 

against Mancuso for failure to plead or otherwise defend.

Following the entry of default, Mancuso’s attorney

was admitted pro hac vice to the Eastern District of 

 

3

In her First Amended Complaint, Doe erroneously 

alleged that Mancuso pleaded guilty to “possession and 

distribution of child pornography.” J.A. 84a. Count two of 

Mancuso’s indictment charges possession of child 

pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), but that charge

was dismissed by prosecutors pursuant to Mancuso’s plea 

agreement.

On appeal, Doe reiterates that she seeks damages for 

Mancuso’s possession and distribution of child pornography,

but erroneously suggests in her briefing that both possession 

and distribution formed the basis for the charge against 

Mancuso that was dismissed. Appellant Br. at 14–15. 

Mancuso’s indictment does not contain a distribution charge 

and counsel for Doe corrected the erroneous briefing 

statement at oral argument. As we go on to explain, whether 

Doe is seeking damages for Mancuso’s convicted charge, 

dismissed charge, or uncharged conduct is of no import to our 

analysis.
8

Pennsylvania and promptly filed a motion for relief from 

default judgment4and a motion to dismiss for failure to state 

a claim. Mancuso argued that Doe’s civil claim against him

was barred by her prior receipt of restitution in his criminal 

case because the sentencing judge intended to fully 

compensate Doe for both the convicted and dismissed charges

in his indictment. The District Court agreed and, finding that 

Mancuso had a meritorious defense to Doe’s suit, set aside 

the default entered against Mancuso and granted his motion to 

dismiss. This appeal followed.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction over Doe’s civil 

suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction over this 

appeal from the District Court’s judgment dismissing Doe’s 

complaint against Mancuso under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Given 

the unusual procedural posture in this multi-party action, we 

take this opportunity to explain our appellate jurisdiction 

under § 1291.

Doe named fourteen defendants in her complaint, 

including Mancuso. The District Court dismissed one 

defendant with prejudice pursuant to a settlement, and 

 

4 Although Mancuso filed a motion for relief from 

default judgment with the District Court, the District Court 

clerk had only entered a simple default against him. Thus, we 

will construe the District Court’s judgment granting 

Mancuso’s motion for relief from default judgment as a 

vacatur of the default.
9

dismissed all the remaining defendants except Mancuso for 

lack of personal jurisdiction without a designation that the 

dismissals were with or without prejudice. In order to 

examine our appellate jurisdiction, we assume without 

deciding that the dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction

were without prejudice.

Ordinarily, we do not have jurisdiction under 

§ 1291 of an appeal in which any defendant was dismissed 

below by the district court without prejudice. Erie Cty. 

Retirees Ass’n v. Cty. of Erie, 220 F.3d 193, 201 (3d Cir. 

2000). In such a case, the district court’s disposition of the 

case is not deemed sufficiently “final” within the meaning of 

§ 1291 because the plaintiff can re-file her claim against the 

dismissed defendant. However, we have observed an 

exception to this general rule in a situation where a claim 

dismissed without prejudice cannot be re-filed, such as a 

claim for which the statute of limitations has run. Brennan v. 

Kulick, 407 F.3d 603, 606 (3d Cir. 2005). We have also 

observed an exception in a situation where a plaintiff 

renounces any intention to reinstate litigation on a claim 

dismissed without prejudice. Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 

1024, 1031 (3d Cir. 1991). In these cases, the district court’s 

disposition of the case is final because we are satisfied that

the dismissed claims will not be re-filed.

These exceptions fit well within the policies of § 1291, 

which we have observed to be “minimizing the possibility of 

piecemeal appeals, according due deference to trial court 

judges, and promoting the conservation of judicial resources.” 

Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer E., Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 561 

(3d Cir. 1997). If a dismissed claim will not be re-filed, there 

will be no further proceedings in front of the district court 

judge with respect to that claim and thus there is no 
10

possibility of a future piecemeal appeal and the attendant

waste of appellate judicial resources.

In this case, the District Court concluded that it lacked 

personal jurisdiction with respect to the dismissed defendants 

and Doe indicated in supplemental briefing her belief that the 

District Court’s dismissal operates to bar her from reasserting 

the dismissed claims in the District Court. Accordingly, Doe 

has renounced any intention to amend her complaint in the 

District Court with respect to her allegations of jurisdiction in 

Pennsylvania against the dismissed defendants. See 

Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 

434 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that a stipulation by parties filed 

after a notice of appeal rendered an earlier district court order 

“final and appealable”). Doe also indicated at oral argument

an intention to re-file against the dismissed defendants in 

other courts in their home states in new actions. Although 

Doe did not renounce any intention to re-file against the 

dismissed defendants, we see no meaningful distinction to be 

made for purposes of § 1291 between a case where a claim 

will not be re-filed at all and a case where, as here, the 

plaintiff has represented to our satisfaction that she will not 

re-file a claim in the district court at issue.

Our conclusion finds support in our precedent. In 

Beazer East, we held that:

Where the effect of a district court decision is to 

accomplish all that the parties asked the court to 

accomplish, and where the parties agree there 

cannot be—and, by court order, there will not 

be—any further proceedings in the district court 

as part of the same action, the district court’s 
11

decision must be considered final for purposes 

of § 1291. 

124 F.3d at 560. We similarly observed in GFL Advantage 

Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt that “[e]ven dismissals without prejudice 

have been held to be final and appealable if they end [ ][the] 

suit so far as the District Court was concerned . . . .” 272 

F.3d 189, 198 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001) (second and third alterations 

in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Trent 

v. Dial Med. of Fla., Inc., 33 F.3d 217, 220 (3d Cir. 1994)).

5

 

 

5 We recognized an exception to this principle of 

finality in Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 460 F.3d 

470 (3d Cir. 2006) for cases where district court proceedings 

have concluded but may be reinstated in the future such that 

we treat the later action as part of the prior action for 

purposes of determining finality. In Morton, the district court 

had dismissed claims against several defendants without 

prejudice pending the outcome of non-binding alternative 

dispute resolution (“ADR”) and expressly noted that the 

dismissed claims could be re-filed if the ADR failed. Id. at 

478. In finding a lack of appellate jurisdiction, we concluded 

that the district court’s disposition of the case was not final 

because, even though the plaintiff’s potential re-filing against 

the dismissed defendants would technically occur in a 

separate action, any “subsequently-initiated litigation 

effectively will be part of the original action and controversy, 

albeit with a new caption and docket number.” Id. at 479. 

The present case does not fall within the exception in 

Morton. If Doe re-files against the dismissed defendants, the 

new actions will be filed in other courts and so the District 

Court here has “accomplish[ed] all that the parties asked the 
12

Other circuits have endorsed this principle as well. 

See Hope v. Klabal, 457 F.3d 784, 790 (8th Cir. 2006) (“After 

the voluntary dismissal [without prejudice], there was nothing 

left for the district court to resolve, and the suit had ended as 

far as that court was concerned, thereby creating a final 

judgment.”); Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi. v. Equitable 

Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S., 406 F.3d 867, 875 (7th Cir. 

2005) (“[T]he fact ‘[t]hat the dismissal was without prejudice 

to filing another suit does not make the cause unappealable, 

for denial of relief and dismissal of the case ended this suit as 

far as the District Court was concerned.’” (second alteration 

in original) (quoting United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 

336 U.S. 793, 794 n.1 (1949))); De Tie v. Orange Cty., 152 

F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that an order 

dismissing an action without prejudice was final for purposes 

of appeal because “[t]he action . . . [was] over as far as the 

district court [was] concerned”).

In assessing whether we have appellate jurisdiction, 

we give § 1291 a “practical rather than technical 

construction.” Bethel v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 81 F.3d 376, 

381 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting Carr v. Am. Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671, 678 (3d Cir. 

 

court to accomplish.” Id. at 479 (alteration in original) 

(quoting Beazer E., 124 F.3d at 560). Accordingly, there is 

no “potential for the district court to revisit the case,” id. at 

480, and so any later actions filed by Doe in other courts 

cannot fairly be considered part of the present action. If any 

litigation takes place with respect to the dismissed defendants,

it will occur in truly separate actions in other courts.
13

1994)). Here, Doe’s stipulation that she will only re-file the 

dismissed claims in other actions in other courts satisfies us 

that the District Court proceedings in this case are concluded 

and will not be reinstated. See Beazer E., 124 F.3d at 557 

(“[A]n appellate court must determine whether, at the time it 

is examining its jurisdiction, there remain unresolved issues 

to be adjudicated in the district court.”). As such, the policies 

underlying § 1291 are not implicated—there is no risk of

further proceedings on the dismissed claims in front of the 

District Court and thus no risk of this Court hearing 

piecemeal appeals from the District Court proceeding.

6

Thus, we conclude that the District Court’s disposition 

with respect to the dismissed defendants in this action is final 

within the meaning of § 1291 and permits us to hear Doe’s

appeal.7

 

6

In fact, based on the allegations in Doe’s complaint, 

all of the dismissed defendants’ home states appear to be

outside of the Third Circuit and thus any future appellate 

proceedings from the re-filed actions would not take place in

this Court. Denying appellate jurisdiction here would leave 

us in the bizarre situation of waiting for each of Doe’s twelve 

future suits to reach final judgment in other Circuits before 

we hear her present appeal—even though those suits would

have no effect whatsoever on her appeal before this Court. 

This result would serve none of § 1291’s purposes to avoid 

piecemeal appeals, accord deference to the District Court, and 

conserve judicial resources. 

7 Mancuso argues that the District Court’s dismissal of 

Doe’s claim against him cannot be a final order because the 

District Court did not issue a Rule 54(b) certification. Rule 
14

We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 

order dismissing Doe’s complaint for failure to state a claim. 

Rea v. Federated Inv’rs, 627 F.3d 937, 940 (3d Cir. 2010). In 

our review, we accept all factual allegations as true, construe 

the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and 

determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the 

complaint, Doe may be entitled to relief. Id. As a judgment 

setting aside an entry of default is within the District Court’s 

discretion, we review that judgment for abuse of discretion. 

United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d 192, 

194–95 (3d Cir. 1984).

 

54(b) provides: “[W]hen multiple parties are involved, the 

court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, 

but fewer than all, . . . parties only if the court expressly 

determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 54(b).

Rule 54(b), by its own terms, applies only if a district 

court enters final judgment with respect to one defendant, but 

does not enter final judgment with respect to the remaining 

defendants. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 

435 (1956). As we conclude above, we consider the District 

Court’s dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction in this case

to constitute final judgments for § 1291 purposes and thus 

Rule 54(b) is not applicable. See Beazer E., 124 F.3d at 561 

n.8 (“While unresolved claims existed, there were no 

unresolved claims before [the district court] that required 

further district court proceedings. For this reason, Rule 

54(b) certification was unnecessary to allow [the] appeal.”).
15

III. ANALYSIS

We first examine the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 and its 

place in Congress’s remedial scheme for child victims of sex 

crimes. We then address whether collateral estoppel is 

applicable to Doe’s claim.

8

 Finally, we turn to the default 

entered against Mancuso in the court below.

A. Section 2255 and Congress’s Remedial Scheme

In construing a statute, we are guided by the principle 

that “every exercise of statutory interpretation begins with an 

examination of the plain language of the statute.” Rosenberg 

v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2001). When the 

statutory language is unambiguous, our inquiry is complete 

and we ordinarily do not consider statutory purpose or 

legislative history. S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. 

Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 257 (3d Cir. 2013). In such a case, only 

in the “rare circumstances” where a “literal application of the 

statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the 

intentions of its drafters . . . or where the result would be so 

bizarre that Congress could not have intended it” is further 

inquiry warranted. In re Segal, 57 F.3d 342, 346 (3d Cir. 

1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

 

8 On appeal, the parties dispute whether the District 

Court was correct in finding that the sentencing court’s

restitution order compensated Doe for both the convicted and 

dismissed charge in Mancuso’s indictment. Because we find 

that § 2255 permits a victim to bring a suit based on a 

predicate offense even where she has received restitution for 

that offense, we need not reach that issue.
16

The operative provision of § 2255 provides:

Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of 

a violation of section 1589, 1590, 1591, 

2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 

2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title 

and who suffers personal injury as a result of 

such violation, regardless of whether the injury 

occurred while such person was a minor, may 

sue in any appropriate United States District 

Court and shall recover the actual damages such 

person sustains and the cost of the suit, 

including a reasonable attorney’s fee. Any 

person as described in the preceding sentence 

shall be deemed to have sustained damages of 

no less than $150,000 in value.

18 U.S.C. § 2255(a).9 The language of the statute makes 

clear that the civil right of action it provides is available to 

 

9 The civil right of action in § 2255 was first passed in 

1986. Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 

99-500, § 703(a), 100 Stat. 1783, 1783-74 to -75 (1986). It 

was amended in 1998 to cover a wider array of predicate 

crimes. Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 

1998, Pub. L. No. 105-314, § 605, 112 Stat. 2974, 2984

(1998). It was amended again in 2006 (at which time it 

became known as Masha’s Law) to increase minimum 

statutory damages from $50,000 to $150,000 and make clear 

that an adult could bring suit based on a predicate crime that 

took place while she was a minor. Masha’s Law, Pub. L. No. 

109-248, § 707, 120 Stat. 587, 650 (2006). It was amended a 

final time in 2013 to again widen the array of predicate 

crimes and increase the statute of limitations from six years to 
17

“any person” who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation 

of a predicate statute resulting in personal injury.

We faced a similar question of statutory interpretation 

in United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174 (3d 

Cir. 1994). In that case, the federal government had entered 

into a consent decree with a group of defendants involving 

the cleanup of a parcel of land containing hazardous 

materials. Id. at 1178. The government later entered into 

another consent decree with a second group of defendants 

involving the cleanup of that same site. Id. at 1179. The 

trustees of the parcel of land, on behalf of the first group of 

defendants, moved to intervene under CERCLA in the 

government’s second suit. Id. The relevant provision of 

CERCLA provided: 

In any action commenced under this chapter or 

under the Solid Waste Disposal Act in a court 

of the United States, any person may intervene 

as a matter of right when such person claims an 

interest relating to the subject of the action and 

is so situated that the disposition of the action 

may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the 

person’s ability to protect that interest . . . .

Id. at 1180 n.6 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i)).

The government, citing legislative history, contended 

that intervention was limited to persons who sought to raise 

health or environmental concerns. Id. at 1180–81. In 

 

ten years. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 

2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 1212(a), 127 Stat. 54, 143 (2013). 
18

rejecting that limited construction of the statute, we observed 

that the plain language of the intervention provision did not 

so limit or qualify the right to intervene. Id. at 1180. We 

expressed doubt that “Congress would have used the phrase 

‘any person may intervene’ or ‘any action under this chapter’ 

if it had intended to restrict intervention to only those persons 

raising a particular, but unidentified, claim.” Id.

Similarly here, the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 in no way 

limits the availability of the civil right of action to cases in 

which a victim has not been compensated in the past by a 

restitution order. We therefore find the statute to be 

unambiguous for our purposes. Cf. Doe v. Boland, 630 F.3d 

491, 498 (6th Cir. 2011) (rejecting an argument that § 2255 

was not intended to cover an expert witness’s computer-aided 

creation of child pornography images because “the words 

Congress chose [in § 2255] offer no basis for drawing this 

kind of line, and it is not our place to second guess the 

judgment Congress put into law”). 

Looking beyond the text of the statute here to limit the 

statute’s application is not appropriate where allowing a civil 

action under § 2255 to a child victim of a sex crime after her

receipt of criminal restitution cannot fairly be labelled a 

bizarre result. In fact, such a construction of § 2255 is 

consistent with Congress’s remedial scheme for child victims

of sex crimes. The procedures governing the award of 

mandatory restitution under § 2259 provide: “Any amount 

paid to a victim under an order of restitution shall be reduced 

by any amount later recovered as compensatory damages for 

the same loss by the victim in . . . any Federal civil 
19

proceeding . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(2).10 They further 

provide: “A conviction of a defendant for an offense 

involving the act giving rise to an order of restitution shall

estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of 

that offense in any subsequent Federal civil proceeding . . . 

brought by the victim.” Id. § 3664(l). 

With these provisions, Congress not only contemplated 

that a victim who had received restitution could file a 

subsequent civil action, but also provided procedures for that 

very situation. These provisions ensure that a victim will not 

have to re-litigate the conduct forming the basis of a criminal 

conviction in a subsequent civil action and a defendant will 

not be required to pay double damages for the same loss if a 

subsequent civil action is successful. We can conceive of 

 

10 The District Court concluded that several federal 

appellate cases examining § 3664(j)(2) stand for the 

proposition that the restitution laws do not permit double 

recovery by victims. Doe v. Hesketh, 77 F. Supp. 3d 440, 450 

(E.D. Pa. 2015). However, from that simple proposition, the 

District Court erroneously concluded that the MVRA does

not permit victims to bring a civil suit after a restitution award 

has been made. Id.

As Doe correctly observes, § 3664(j)(2) does not 

operate to bar a later-filed civil suit. To the contrary, it 

expressly contemplates such a suit and, by providing a set-off, 

ensures that any duplicative recovery in such a suit does not 

violate the common law principle against double recovery. 

We do not now decide to what extent, if any, the sentencing 

court’s restitution order compensated Doe for the “same 

loss,” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(2), that underlies her civil claim.
20

several reasons for Congress’s determination that a victim 

who has already received restitution should be permitted a 

subsequent civil suit.

Congress may have wanted to give victims a chance to 

prove a higher level of damages than that which a sentencing 

court found during a limited factfinding proceeding as part of 

sentencing.11 A victim’s participation in a sentencing court’s 

determination of restitution is limited to conferring with the 

government, id. § 3664(d)(1), submitting information to a 

probation officer, id. § 3664(d)(2)(A)(vi), or potentially 

providing testimony at the sentencing court’s discretion, id.

§ 3664(d)(4).

12 A subsequent civil action allows a victim to 

fully litigate the question of her damages to achieve 

compensation for the full amount of her damages. And it 

allows a victim the opportunity to prove those damages in 

front of a jury—a procedure that is unavailable in the context 

of criminal restitution in sentencing proceedings, id.

§ 3664(e). See U.S. Const. amend. VII; Curtis v. Loether, 

 

11 The parties dispute whether the sentencing court’s 

restitution order compensated Doe for her full damages. We 

will not resolve this question of fact at this stage of the 

proceedings.

12 The Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”) provides 

victims with additional rights in the restitution process, 

including the right to be “reasonably heard” at sentencing and 

the right to “full and timely restitution.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771. 

However, the CVRA was passed into law on October 30, 

2004, which was over eight months after Mancuso’s 

sentencing. Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 

§ 102(a), 118 Stat. 2260, 2261 (2004). 
21

415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974) (“The Seventh Amendment 

[applies] to actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a 

jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and 

remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the 

ordinary courts of law.”).

The opportunity for a victim to fully litigate the 

question of her damages in a civil action is even more 

important for those victims who choose not to participate in a 

sentencing court’s determination of restitution. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3664(g)(1) (“No victim shall be required to participate in 

any phase of a restitution order.”). By permitting a later civil 

suit, Congress may have wanted to shield victims from 

participating in the criminal sentencing of their victimizers 

while the victims are so close in time to the damaging effects 

of the offense. This concern is particularly acute in child 

pornography cases as victims are children who have often 

suffered horrific abuse and, as such, it may not be desirable to 

have them participate in a sentencing proceeding.13 Section 

2255’s statute of limitations protects such children by 

providing an extension in cases where a “victim is still a 

 

13 Congress’s recognition that the same may be true in 

some civil suits is reflected in § 2255’s statutory damages 

provision, which allows victims to obtain $150,000 in 

compensation without participating in a damages hearing if 

they so choose. See Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 882 (6th 

Cir. 2012) (“The point of a minimum-damages requirement 

[in § 2255] is to allow victims of child pornography to

recover without having to endure potentially damaging 

damages hearings. Were it otherwise, a fresh damages 

hearing might inflict fresh wounds, increasing the child’s 

suffering . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
22

minor when the . . . statute of limitations would otherwise 

have run.” Stephens v. Clash, 796 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 

2015); see 18 U.S.C. § 2255(b).

Civil actions, such as that provided in § 2255, also 

allow a victim to recover additional categories of damages not 

compensable as part of restitution. For example, a civil 

action allows a victim to recover for non-pecuniary damages, 

such as pain and suffering or mental and emotional distress, 

which may not be available under the restitution statutes. See 

United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 192 n.9 (D. Me. 

2009) (expressing doubt that the mandatory restitution 

provision in § 2259 was intended to permit restitution for pain 

and suffering); Melanie Reid & Curtis L. Collier, When Does 

Restitution Become Retribution?, 64 Okla. L. Rev. 653, 661 

& n.31 (2012).

Certainly Congress could not have intended in 

providing a remedy the opposite situation where § 2255 was 

only available to victims who had not previously received 

restitution. Section 2259 provides for mandatory restitution 

to victims of the crimes codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–

2252A, see 18 U.S.C. § 2259(a), which are all predicate 

offenses listed in § 2255 as forming the basis for a civil claim, 

see 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a). If we accept the District Court’s 

conclusion that an award of restitution bars a later-filed claim 

under § 2255, then we would render § 2255 nothing more 

than a “dead letter” with respect to those predicate offenses. 

United States v. Jersey Shore State Bank, 781 F.2d 974, 977 

(3d Cir. 1986).

Nor is our construction of the statute “demonstrably at 

odds with the intentions of its drafters.” In re Segal, 57 F.3d 

at 346 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Taylor v. 
23

Freeland & Kronz, 938 F.2d 420, 424 (3d Cir. 1991)). At 

oral argument, counsel for Mancuso suggested that Congress 

intended § 2255 to be available only to those victims who had 

yet to receive payment in satisfaction of a prior criminal 

restitution award. However, Mancuso has pointed to no 

legislative history or other statutory provisions that evince

such an intent. Moreover, it is unlikely that Congress could 

have reasonably concluded a victim would be more 

successful in obtaining satisfaction of a civil judgment than a 

criminal restitution order. See 18 U.S.C. § 3613A(a)(1)

(permitting a district court to revoke a defendant’s probation 

or term of supervised release, resentence a defendant, hold a

defendant in contempt of court, enter an injunction against a 

defendant, or order a sale of property of a defendant in order 

to obtain compliance with a restitution order).

An examination of the legislative history of § 2255 

does not provide any clear insight into whether Congress 

intended the civil right of action in § 2255 to be available to 

victims who had already received criminal restitution. 

Congressional findings at the time of § 2255’s enactment 

describe a “lack [of] effective remedies under Federal law” 

for “exploitation victims.” Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act 

of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 702(3), 100 Stat. 1783, 1783-

74 (1986). However, these findings were made prior to 

Congress’s enactment of § 2259, which provided mandatory 

restitution for the “full amount of [a] victim’s losses” to

victims of the child pornography predicate offenses listed in 

§ 2255. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1).

Statements by legislators at the time of recent 

amendments to § 2255 similarly do not speak on this 

question, but suggest that the law’s general purpose is to 

provide both compensation to child pornography victims and 
24

a measure of deterrence to possessors and distributors of child 

pornography. See 152 Cong. Rec. H5705-01 (daily ed. July 

25, 2006) (statement of Rep. Gingrey) (“Currently, a person 

who illegally downloads music faces penalties in civil court 

that are three times as harsh as a person who downloads child 

pornography. This horrible inequity was the inspiration 

behind the introduction of Masha’s Law . . . .”); see also 151 

Cong. Rec. S14187-03 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 2005) (statement of 

Sen. Kerry) (“This legislation increases the civil penalties 

recoverable by victims of child sexual exploitation, including 

internet child pornography, to at least $150,000. This 

increased penalty will serve as a deterrent to those who 

disseminate and possess child pornography, as well as a 

means of compensating victims of this terrible abuse.”). We 

are satisfied that our construction of the statute to allow a 

victim who has received criminal restitution to bring a civil 

suit furthers these goals.

We therefore hold that 18 U.S.C. § 2255 permits a 

victim to bring a civil claim for the violation of a predicate 

statute even where that victim has previously received 

criminal restitution for the same violation of that statute for 

her purported full damages.

14

 

14 In reaching this holding, we recognize that the 

“amount paid to [the] victim under [the] order of restitution 

shall be reduced by any amount later recovered as 

compensatory damages for the same loss by the victim” in the 

civil action. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(2).
25

B. Collateral Estoppel15

Collateral estoppel prevents the re-litigation of a 

factual or legal issue that was litigated in an earlier 

proceeding. When examining the preclusive effect of a prior 

federal court determination, we apply federal law principles 

of collateral estoppel. See Paramount Aviation Corp. v. 

Agusta, 178 F.3d 132, 145 (3d Cir. 1999). Collateral estoppel 

is appropriate where: “(1) the identical issue was decided in a 

prior adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the 

merits; (3) the party against whom the bar is asserted was a 

party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and 

(4) the party against whom the bar is asserted had a full and 

fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question.” Del. River 

Port Auth. v. Fraternal Order of Police, 290 F.3d 567, 573 

n.10 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Bd. of Trs. of Trucking Emps. of N. Jersey Welfare 

Fund, Inc. v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 505 (3d Cir. 1992)). As 

Doe was neither a party to Mancuso’s prior criminal 

proceeding nor in privity with a party, and did not have a full 

and fair opportunity to litigate the question of her damages, 

we will not apply collateral estoppel to prevent Doe from 

 

15 Although the District Court did not explicitly 

examine the collateral estoppel effect of the sentencing 

court’s determination of Doe’s losses, we find it desirable to 

examine collateral estoppel in this case since we are uncertain 

as to the legal principle under which the District Court found 

Doe’s claim was barred. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. 

Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 303 n.73 (3d Cir. 2014).
26

litigating the question of her damages based on Mancuso’s 

criminal conduct.16

Since Doe was not a party to Mancuso’s criminal 

sentencing proceeding, collateral estoppel will only be 

appropriate if she was in privity with the government. We 

assess privity under the rubric laid out by the Supreme Court 

in Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008). See Nationwide 

Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. George V. Hamilton, Inc., 571 F.3d 299, 

310–12 (3d Cir. 2009). A nonparty will be found to be in 

privity with a party to a proceeding where:

 

16 With respect to the first factor of the collateral 

estoppel test (identity of issue), collateral estoppel would only 

be appropriate if Doe sought to litigate an issue that was 

previously decided by the sentencing court in Mancuso’s 

criminal proceeding. As we explain supra note 8, the parties 

dispute whether the sentencing court’s restitution order 

compensated Doe for her damages with respect to the charge

against Mancuso that was dismissed. Given our conclusion 

that Doe is not collaterally estopped on other grounds, we do 

not reach this question.

As to the second factor (finality of judgment), the 

sentencing court’s restitution order is sufficiently “final” to be 

accorded preclusive effect because it conclusively determined 

Mancuso’s restitution obligation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(o) 

(“A sentence that imposes an order of restitution is a final 

judgment . . . .”); Henglein v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 

260 F.3d 201, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2001).
27

1) the nonparty agrees to be bound by the 

determination of issues in an action between 

others;

2) a substantive legal relationship—i.e.[,]

traditional privity—exists that binds the 

nonparty;

3) the nonparty was “adequately represented by 

someone with the same interests who [wa]s a 

party”;

4) the nonparty assumes control over the 

litigation in which the judgment is rendered;

5) the nonparty attempts to bring suit as the 

designated representative of someone who was 

a party in the prior litigation; [or],

6) the nonparty falls under a special statutory 

scheme that “expressly foreclos[es] successive 

litigation by nonlitigants.”

Id. at 312–13 (second and fourth alterations in original) 

(quoting Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894–95). Doe is not in privity 

with the government under the two categories of privity 

applicable to this case—category three and category six.

The interests of a victim and the government in a 

restitution determination are not sufficiently similar for a 

finding of privity. A victim’s interest in the context of 

restitution is undoubtedly to achieve the maximum amount of 

compensation for herself permissible under the law. A victim 

such as Doe may be willing to assume the time and cost to 

litigate the full extent of her damages in a trial as Doe has 
28

chosen to do in her civil suit. By contrast, the interests of the 

government in the restitution context are necessarily affected 

by its responsibility to “represent the interest of society as a 

whole.” Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 202–03 (1979); 

see, e.g., Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 186 n.3 (noting an “obvious 

conflict” between the position of two victims and the 

government in briefing before the court with respect to 

whether the mandatory restitution provision in § 2259

contains a proximate cause requirement for compensable 

losses). 

Accordingly, the government has an interest in 

securing a plea agreement that is palatable to the defendant in 

order to avoid a lengthy and costly criminal trial in which it 

may not prevail and an interest in achieving speedy 

punishment for the purpose of deterrence. See Brady v. 

United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970) (“For the State there 

are . . . advantages—the more promptly imposed punishment 

after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the 

objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, 

scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved . . . 

.”). These are not necessarily interests that the victim shares. 

See Nationwide, 571 F.3d at 313 (“Under the ‘adequate 

representation’ exception, the interests of the party and 

nonparty must be squarely aligned . . . .”).

These varied interests are balanced by the government 

as it decides whether to accept a plea agreement with a given 

amount of restitution and render the government necessarily 

less interested in litigating extensively to have Mancuso pay 

the maximum amount of restitution permissible under the 
29

law.17 The effect of these varied interests are particularly 

acute in the present situation as the child victim in this case 

had a limited ability to advocate on her behalf and instead 

relied on a restitution amount that was derived from a plea 

agreement negotiated between Mancuso and the government.

Nor can we find privity based on a conclusion that 18 

U.S.C. § 2255 or the restitution statutes expressly foreclose a 

subsequent civil claim under § 2255 once a victim has 

received criminal restitution. As we explain above, the text 

of § 2255 does not contain any indication that its application 

is limited to those victims who did not previously receive 

restitution. And, far from expressly foreclosing subsequent 

civil claims, the restitution laws expressly contemplate such 

claims. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(2); id. § 3664(l); cf. EEOC v. 

U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 495 (3d Cir. 1990) (“If 

Congress did not believe that the individual’s claim would be 

adequately pressed by the EEOC, it would surely have 

preserved the individual’s right to bring suit either during or 

after the EEOC suit.”).

Under the final factor of the collateral estoppel test, 

Doe did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 

question of her damages in Mancuso’s sentencing proceeding. 

 

17 While the sentencing court had an independent 

statutory obligation under the restitution laws to ensure that 

Doe was fully compensated by the restitution order, see 18 

U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A), the privity inquiry is confined to a 

determination of whether the government had the same 

interest as Doe in litigating the question.
30

During sentencing, the government is the party that advocates 

for its desired level of restitution. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e). 

As Doe was not a party to the prior criminal sentencing 

proceeding, she had a limited opportunity to influence the 

process. As we explain above, Doe’s participation in the 

restitution process was limited by § 3664 to conferring with 

the government, providing information to a probation officer 

as to the extent of her losses, or providing testimony to the 

sentencing court only if the sentencing court determined that 

such testimony was warranted. See United States v. Brown, 

744 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he victim is not a party 

to a sentencing hearing and therefore has only a limited 

ability to influence the outcome. The victim cannot control 

the presentation of evidence during . . . the sentencing hearing 

and is not even guaranteed the right to testify about the extent 

of his losses.”). There were no other provisions of the 

restitution statutes that permitted Doe to influence the 

sentencing court’s restitution decision. See United States v. 

Stoerr, 695 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2012).

We remain mindful of the fact that, at its core, 

collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine. See Jean 

Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 

244, 255 (3d Cir. 2006). Thus, in addition to the four-factor 

test for collateral estoppel, we recognize the equitable 

exceptions to the general rule of collateral estoppel codified 

in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. Nat’l R.R. 

Passenger Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 288 F.3d 519, 

525 (3d Cir. 2002). Relevant for our purposes is the equitable 

exception that applies where “[t]he party against whom 

preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of law, have 

obtained review of the judgment in the initial action.” 

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28. In this case, Doe 
31

was not able to obtain appellate review because she was not a 

party to the criminal proceeding during which Mancuso was 

ordered to pay restitution.18 See Stoerr, 695 F.3d at 276–277; 

Brown, 744 F.2d at 910. Despite the fact that Doe may have 

believed, as she argues here, that the restitution award of 

$200,000 did not compensate her for her full losses, she was 

not permitted to appeal the sentencing court’s award to this 

Court and thus cannot be bound by its determination.

Under the facts of this case, where the interests of Doe 

and the government were not squarely aligned, she had a

limited ability to participate in the determination of her 

restitution in front of the sentencing court, and she had no 

 

18 We have on one occasion allowed a purported 

victim to directly appeal a restitution order, but without an 

examination of the purported victim’s standing to appeal. See 

United States v. Kones, 77 F.3d 66 (3d Cir. 1996). We later 

disavowed our assumption of jurisdiction in that decision, 

noting that a “‘drive-by jurisdictional ruling[],’ in which 

jurisdiction ‘ha[s] been assumed by the parties, and . . . 

assumed without discussion by the [c]ourt,’ does not create 

binding precedent.” Stoerr, 695 F.3d at 277 n.5 (alterations 

in original) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 

523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)).

The CVRA accorded crime victims the right to petition 

the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus based on a 

denial of the right to be reasonably heard at sentencing or a

denial of the right to full restitution. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3771(d)(3). However, as noted supra note 12, the 

sentencing court’s restitution order pre-dated the passage of 

the CVRA.
32

ability to seek appellate review of that determination, we are 

of the firm belief that the application of collateral estoppel 

would simply be inequitable and would offend the “deeprooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own 

day in court.”

19 Nationwide, 571 F.3d at 314 (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 

517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)). For these reasons, and because 

the collateral estoppel test and exception set forth above 

counsel against the application of the doctrine, we will not 

apply collateral estoppel to bar Doe’s claim.

 

19 Moreover, we are particularly loath to apply 

collateral estoppel to disrupt Congress’s remedial scheme 

where Congress has expressly provided for estoppel with 

respect to one aspect of a later-filed civil claim, but declined 

to provide for estoppel with respect to a victim’s damages. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(l) (“A conviction of a defendant for an 

offense involving the act giving rise to an order of restitution 

shall estop the defendant from denying the essential 

allegations of that offense in any subsequent Federal civil 

proceeding . . . brought by the victim.”); cf. Taylor, 553 U.S. 

at 903 (“Congress’ provision for FOIA suits with no statutory 

constraint on successive actions counsels against judicial 

imposition of constraints through extraordinary application of 

the common law of preclusion.”). “The courts should not jam 

judicially created doctrines such as res judicata into the gears 

of Congress’ carefully crafted statutory machinery.” United 

States v. Barnette, 10 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1994).
33

C. Relief from Entry of Default

A judgment setting aside the entry of default is within 

a district court’s discretion, $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 

F.2d at 194–95, and may only be made “for good cause,” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 55(c). In exercising that discretion and 

determining whether “good cause” exists, we have instructed 

district courts to consider the following factors: “(1) whether 

the plaintiff will be prejudiced; (2) whether the defendant has 

a meritorious defense; [and] (3) whether the default was the 

result of the defendant’s culpable conduct.” $55,518.05 in 

U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d at 195. 

The District Court rested its judgment setting aside the 

entry of default against Mancuso solely on the finding that 

Mancuso had a meritorious defense—specifically, that the 

prior criminal restitution award barred Doe’s present civil 

claim. The District Court did not address whether Doe would 

be prejudiced by a vacatur of default or whether the default 

was the result of Mancuso’s culpable conduct. Given that we 

find Doe’s claim is not barred by the prior criminal restitution

award, and the District Court made no additional findings 

with respect to its vacatur of default for us to review, we will 

vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand to the 

District Court for consideration anew of whether there is 

“good cause” for setting aside the default entered against 

Mancuso.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the 

judgment of the District Court dismissing Doe’s complaint

against Mancuso, vacate the judgment of the District Court 
34

setting aside the default entered against Mancuso, and remand 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.