TBE PO'lER'l'IALITIES OF COMIR'l FOR STRATBGIC WAlmDG 

26 March 1954 ,, plot'/, /, tv-"/ : 

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?ol'&IORANDUl-1 FOR MEMBERS OF TUE Nl\!I'IONAL SECURITY AGENCY BCIEif..1.1IFIC 

ADVISORY DO.ARD 

SUBJECT: The Potentialities of COIIDl'!' for Strategic WBrniD8 - "Mocl1fied Version 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

I P .. L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Ao a result of a request n1..."\de bl' tllel . for copies ot 

the report by the Speoic.l Si;uayGroup, it wo.s deci~d that a :modified 

edition of the origimfrai(J11t be ma.de a.va:f.l.o.ble to thel land 

.11 !subject to approval by USCIB. The following, submitted 

for the comments of the l& Scient:l'.i"ic Advisory Board, is a list 

of the modifications mde to the originn.l re1">ort: 

. Pase l: 

Page 3: 

Page i..: 

Page 5: 

Delete "VIII - ll:lectronics Intelligence (ELIN'!')" • 

Delete "XI - Bibliogra.phy11 • 

Delete 11 (WSEG, ••• Du11 Rer,orts) 11 • 

Replace "The stronges~ exi.'l"ession ot this need is that contained in the Dull Re11ort, "trhich" by "One report, in fact, 11 • 

Delete "thoroughly covered in the Dratfnell Report and in 

other surveys -- an ei"i"ectiveuess". . . 

. Pase 6: Delete "The present Air Defense Comnand program ••• the 

sponsorship of the !AC". 

Page 7: Delete "Instances of this are to ••• the Watch Co:mm:!ttee". 

Page 8: Delete "This procedure is • • • 1952-54' • /];. 11 

Delete f'octnote. 

Page 9: Delete "It further Stl.J?ports • • • all indications intelligence. 11 

Page 15: Under (ii), replace "may be 11 by 11 e.re 11 • 

Pace 19: Delete "3. The evaluation or F..'J .. Ii'JT :Lni"ormtion ••• from detailed 

evaluation." 

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Page 22: Delete 11 (such as those requested ••• Project LUJCOLN)." 

Appendix I, Page 5: Delete. "Organization and function of the Watch 

Con1mfttec " a.nd "Spe.cial ReGea.rch Branch, G-2, 

Department of the Arnzy-"~ 

Appendix II, Page 1: Delete "Weo.pons -- The Joint Atomic Ener.gy 

weapons of this type. 11 

..... 

Appendix III, Page l: Delete 11Some notion of ••• Armed Forces- esti:matea .. 11 

Page 2: Delete entire table entitled "Significance of 

E'lrly Warning". 

Page 3: Delete 11·as recommended by Project LINCOLM. 11 

Appendix !)11 Page l: Delete 11The systems most relevant ••• Air Defense 

C onmia.ncl.. 11 

Delete •t'l'he \:lt>.tch Committee maintains ••• Soviet 

intentions .. n 

Page 3: Delete "In the United Kingdom, ••• and COMD1T 

GO'lll'Ces. If 

Appendix VI, Page l: Replace "more tha.n 95"j,11 by "a. large percentage". 

Appendix VII, Page 3: Delete "For exa.IIU'le, .... of .Soviet intentions." 

Appendix VIJ;I: Delete entire appendix. . . Appendix XIi · Delete entire· ril.ppendi~c. 

It is to be noted that where nurabered paragraphs or appendices have 

been deleted from the original, the subsequent nu.~bering in the r:i.odified 

version ~·1as clm.nged acco1·dincly. 

qJ~~7;.~~~ EAecutive Secret~ry 

NS.~ Scientific Advisory Doard 

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THE PC1.l'ENTIALITIES OF coortt Fm S'l'.RATmIC liTARNING 

'NBA REGISTERED PUBLICATION NUMBER 2-5lt< 

Prepared by 

Special Study Group 

of the 

NBA Scientific Advisory Board 

....... { 

Thie document consists Gt 

66 pages 

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IOI' Bl8RB! PRd!B 

'l'ltB Pa?ENTIALlTIIS m' CCHIIT PCB BmATBJIC VARIIJIJ 

l!I! 

8UlliJAlf'C • • • • • • • •••• ••• • • • • • • • • • • • 3 

Il'IRODUCTIClf • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ' 

IIKl1cBtara • • • • • • • • • • •••• • • • ••• • lO 

Interception • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 11 

Canunicationa • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••• 1J 

Traffic Anal111ta, Low-lavel Co4ea and Cipher•, &1111. 

Plain Text • • • • , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • lit. 

Specinl Intelligence •••••••• • •• • • • • •• 17 

Electronic• Intelligence (ELIJT) • • • • • • • • , • 20 

Research and Development • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 22 

Personnel • • • • • • • • ·• • • • • • • • • • • • • 25 

I - The Spec:ln.l Study Group 

II - The Thrl"n1. 

III - lorth l\JnericRn Continental Alr Dcrenao B;vstoma 

IV - Ind:lcntor Sya1.erna 

V - Cammunicationa 

VI - 'l'raf'fic Analyaia, T.ov-level "'CodP.a a.n4 Ciphers 'Ind 

Plnin Text ' 

VII • Spr.c1o.l Int.ell:! s~m!c 

VIII - reraonnal 

IX - CC»U:l'1T a.a a Courc, ot Advance Wa.rntng in ~orld War IJ nntl I.~,,,. 

Korean Conflict , C'l?"l (r 0"1 50 .::.; ·~ 

X - Blectranioa IDtelligeDCe (ELD'l) ?AS 2 O..":\.· '6l» ·a· rL.=-

f - ·-

NIA "9• JILCms I .M 52 'FOP SE€RE'f FRO'fH 
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THE ParmrIALITIES OF COON'l' F~ STRAT.liXJIC WARNING 

SUMMARY 

This study evaluates Communications Intelligence (C<Jaitr) as a means 

of obtaining strategic warning of SOV'iet intentions to attack the contineptal United States. 

COONT is nov providing substarjtial inf'omation on· Soviet casb11:1.tz: 

to initiate and sustain an attack against the United States. Indition, 

it is probable that OOONT, particularly through Special Intelligence, 

could sive warning of' Soviet intention to mount such an attack. '!'he 

reliability of this strategic warning would increase with the approach 

of the attack, with first ind:lcat:lons possibly appearing four to twelve 

weeks prior to the attack • 

This potentiality can be fUlly realized only with an increase in 

the current level of effort. However, significant improvements can be 

effected by more intensive exploitation of the present C(l(['NT program.. 

It :ls recognized that COONT cannot with certainty provide the 

tactical warning obtainable from an Air Defense Warning System. The 

effectiveness of our Continental Air Defense System will, however, be 

gi:eatly increased if prOV'ided with reliable strategic warning. The 

significance of adequate warning to our surviyal cannot be overestiJJBtedJ 

this :la particularly true with respect to conservation of our retaliat017 

·forces and the preservation of our population. • 

In order to utilize fully the potentialities of C<IUNT as a source 

of strategic warning, it is essential that operational plans ancl evaluation of our Continental Air Defense consider as an integral part the 

impact of the warning COONT can provide. 

Further, to maximize the potentialities ot COON'!' for giving 

strategic warning, it ts necessary that the following ate?s be taken: 

1. Top priority should be accorded to the solution of high-level 

Soviet cryptographic systems and to their exploitation on a timely" basis. 

2. Traffic analysis activities should be expanded and organized 

to give the maximum information obtainable fran the material intercepted. 

In particular, it should be more effectively quantified through the 

development of indices or measures of activities, graphical:cy presented 

to show changes in time. Field personnel should be sUff'icientl.y" indoctrinated, within realistic security limitations, in the details of traffic ... lyais which can be used to develop strategic varlling. 

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3. Personnel policies should be revised to improve the 

selection, training, and retention of skilled personnel, both civilian 

and military, for COMINT activities. Strong reconnnendations should be 

made.to the Services and the Civil Service Commission to effect these 

changes. 

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THE POTENTIALITIES OF COMINT FOR STRATEGIC WARNING 

INTRODJOTION 

During the past few years, the Defense Establishment, and through 

it, the American People have become increasingly aware of the potentialities of the USSR for mounting a direct atomic attack against the US. 

This awareness has resulted in increasing official and popular interest 

in building up an air defense system capable of at least blunting,, if 

not withstanding,, a possible Soviet air attack against the continental US. 

In response to this interest, there has been a succession of high-level 

reports on the air defense problem whose conclusions leave no doubt that 

a surprise atomic attack on the US would result in carnage, devastation, 

psychological shock, and curtailment of our retaliatory ability on a 

scale difficult to estimate,, or even to comprehend in terms of any previous 

experience. 

The degree of success obtained by the enemy in an air attack depends 

sharply on the timeliness of warning received. Accordingly,, the provision 

of early w~rning is the first essential element for an effective air 

defense system. The system in being has, built into it, radar and ground 

observer warning nets which could at best give early warning of less than 

an hour at US perimeter targets. The future systems under consideration,, 

involving radar chains at various northerly latitudes in Alasl-=a,, Canada, 

Greenland, and seaward extensions, may give a dis~ant early warning up to 

four or dx JtrJurs. Some such early warning chains must be developed for 

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tactical purposes, but their greatest use.tulness for deployment and 

neutralizing operations occurs only after hostile action has conmenced. 

Extension or the reliable waming period to two or four days w:>uld provide 

time for the complete deployment of our offensive and defensive forces, 

l!lbich would increase the chance of' turning the ene1Q'1 s operati. on before 

its mission had been accomplished and might even induce the ene1117 to 

abandon the attack (see Appendices II and III). 

Such strategic warning is not obtainable from the early waming 

component or an air defense eyst.em; the previous studies of these systems 

have, perhaps appropriately, been based upon the assumption that no ea?'lier 

warning will be available. For such warning we nwst, therefore, tum to 

other sources of intelligence and most of these previous studies have, ~ 

tact, laid great stress, in terms ot" US readiness 1 on the value ot" inteiligenc~. One report, in tact, considers the pay-off so great as to warrant 

• 

any possible attack on the problem, regardless or its cost in funds and 

manpower. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

The sources of strategic warning can be broken down into overt, 

covert and signals sources. or these. the siY.Dals source -I 

The 

traditional overt and covert sources must be vigorously cultivated in the 

face or the increasing difficulties created by" Soviet security measures, 

but to place' reliance on them as the sole source or timely indicator 

intelligence would be to court disaster. 

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Since the beginning of World War I, the extensive use of radio has 

been an essential pa.rt of military and eoverrunent.al communicatt ons and 

operations. All countries must use radio for oomnunicati on with their 

ships and aircraft. The USSR, because or its great diatnnces, and consequent difficulties of constiucting an adequate system of land lines, uses 

and will continue to use radio tor the transmission of a considerable ,J'OlW. 

of intemal commwrl.cattons. Thus we are given the opportunity to penetrate 

the frontiers and to share the secrets of the Soviet Government. 

The value of Signal Intelligence during Wcr ld War II can scarcely' 

be overestimated. Th~ugh the decrypt.ion of high-level German and 

Japanese messages, we -were able to penetrate the ene~ lines, enter 

ministries and militar,y headquarters, and secu~ advance lmowledge ot 

operational plans. The spectacular effectimess of camnunications 

intelligence has been aptly' epitomized in the following passage tran 

• 

General Marshall's letter of 25 September 1944 to Governor Dewey: 

"The conduct of Gaieral ~~isenhower's ca111>&ign and of all 

operations in the Pacific are closely' related in conception 

and timing to the information we secretly' obtain through these 

intercepted codes. They contribute greatly' to the victory and 

tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the condlct 

of current operations and in looking toward the early termination 

of the •r". 

While these past achievements bring us no firm assurance of corresponding successes in future operations, we do find in them promise that 

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a corresponding ability to decrypt enemy radio messages will result 

in intelligence of inestimable value. Signal Intelligence, above all 

COMINT, is the most' promising source of strategic warning or an impending 

attack on the US; for the complexity of the process of preparing the 

forces for such an attack makes it practically impossible to avoid the 

use of radio comnunications and other electronic signals at all points 

in the process. The interception and timely evaluation of these signals 

will then constitute indicators fot' strategic warning. The evaluation 

of such warning indicators must be made against a background plan, whether 

tacit or explicit; this assumed en~ plan should be based on intelligence 

from all sources, including infonnation on our own operations or on 

operations simula~ing possible enem;y alternatives. 

In accordance with the request of the Director, NSA {see Appendix!)-

this Report of the Special Study Group examines in some detail the • 

present and future potentialities of COMINT as contributing to the 

strategic warning of an impending attack on the US. The Group, conscious 

of its limitations in time and talent, has confined itself primarily to 

a consideration of indicators of a direct air attack on the continental 

US. It is well aware that these indicators are but part of a larger 

system of indicators of impending hostilities against the interests of 

the US, including attacks against its possessions and forces overseas 

or against its allies and other friendly nations. The Group's investigations have in some instances taken it into these matters, and some of its 

findings and recoJID11endations will apply in this broader setting. 

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Similarly, its investigations have taken it into some na. tters beyond the 

purview of the National Secud. ty Agencn because these have in some cases 

a bearing on the better utilization or COMINT in the indicator ptt1blem, 

the Group has thought it appropriate to bring its findings to the 

attention of the Director withiri the frane\\'Ork of this Report. 

The Group has studied the cont.ribution which OOMINT can or could 

make to the waming of an impending attack on the us. Its findings and 

recomnend&.tions on various facets of th is problem are presented in the 

following sections of the Report.. These conclusions are supported by 

the material presented in the Appendices to the Report,·which are 

referenced in the appropriate places. 

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FDIDINGS /\ND RECOMMENDA'l'IONS 

INDICATORS . 

Ref. Appendix IV 

Since the effectiveness ot COMINT as a source or warning depends 

upon the speed and accuracy or the recognition and communication ot that 

warning, the Study Group necessarily included in its survey some investigation ot the present arrangements, within the various US Intelligence 

agencies, for detecting hostile intentions. A detailed assessment ot 

those arrangements would be outside the terms of reference or this Report. , 

The Group has studied the indicators which have been proposed by 

various competent agencies and comna.nds as significant to the strategi~ 

warning ot the initiation or hostilities aeainst the us. Most relevant 

to the present problem of detecting moves associated with a direct air 

attack on tta US is the Indications Board maintained by the Intelligence 

Directorate of Air Defense Conmiand (~DC) at Ent Air Force Base, Colorado 

Springs, Colorado. The evaluation of the intelligence represented by 

this indicator array, as it reflects the state of readiness or intent 

ot the USSR to initiate strategic air hostilities, is made by comparison 

with the steps which must be taken by the enelJ\Y prior to the mowtting ot 

such an attack. 

Behind these efforts is a philosophy which holds that at least some 

ot the steps required before the initiation of hostilities are detectable 

by the processes ot intelligence. The Group believes that, among these 

processes, CX>MINT has the highest warning potential. This finding is. 

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bolstered by the following theoretical arguments: ... 

(i) A military move of ariy appreciable scale requires the 

coordinated action of many persons, usually several hundred thousand. 

(ii) The task of achieving the necessary degree of coordination 

requires that many messages be passed. 

(iii) The sPa.ce over which the coordination is required and the 

time during which the action must be prepared demand the use of radio 

co:mnru.nication for a reasonable fraction of the total connnunication. 

(iv) A reasonable fraction of the radio communic~tion carried 

out in support of the move can be intercepted. 

(v) or the traffic which can be intercepted,, some .fraction 

can be decrypted,, read in plain text, or subjected to exhaustive traffic 

analysis. 

The Group accepts this philosphy. The Group also believes that, the 

inminence of hostilities can appropriately be measured against a postulated enenw plan and that the formulation of ·such a normative plan can be 

greatly assisted by our own operational experience and,, if need be, by 

experimental operations designed to test it. 

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INTERCEPTION 

Ex:pansion of intercept facilities is being undertaken. Geographical 

limitations require that the antenna fields and placement or intercept; 

positions be examined with close regard to highly technical matters rels.ting to propagation phenomena. Therefore, the Natio~l Security Agency 

should augment its scientific and engineering staff with a view to 

assisting the Services in these matters. 

There are many intercept.ion problems which require strong effort in 

research and developnent; reco1mnendations thereon are contained in the 

Section on Research and Development • 

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COMMJNICATIONS 

Ref. Appendix V 

A COD11111nication system, no matter how good, cannot guara1,1tee the 

timeq receipt o:r warning information. A study o:r the present system 

shows tha. t the longest delays in the system arise from hitma.n failure to 

assess a warning signal properl.Y" in the field and . from human slowness in 

carrying papers :rran one basket to another. Improvements a.re needed in 

the training and instruction of conmunications personnel and in operations 

of the entire comnunications network to insure against personnel failures. 

The planned comnmnication system will remove some of the possibilities 

of failure at massage centers and will cut the delays within analysis and 

. evaluation units ver,y considerably. 

Planned electrical communica~ion facilities are adequate for the 

small volume of traffic involved in warning. However, severe ja.mmin8 of 

radio circuits incident to hostilities would probably' render those circuits 

largely inoperable. Alternate radio links and cable facilities are being 

expanded. This will tond to of feet the threat ot jamming. 

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TRAFFIC ANALYSIS, WW-LEVEL CODES AND CIPHERS, AND PLAIN TEXT 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 Ref. Appendix VI 

EO 3:3{h)(2) 

Traffic ana4rsis (T/A) \is a methodology by which OOMINT is derived 

tram the analysis of traffic\volumes, operator chatter, and message 

externals •. The COMINT derived. from T/A is colhted with that recovered 

from low-level codes and ciphera, plain text messages~ and voice conmnmications in an operation known as 11T/A Fusion". Since 1948, w1ten readable 

Traffic analysis and the decoding of low-level traffic have enabled 

us to carey forward and build up intelligence on &wiet air and naval 

Order of Battle even in the absenceJ _________ __ 

Traffic analysis is a source from which some infom.ation can be' 

derived at all times and is veey necessary in supporting C/A work on 

high-level cryptographic systems. It·guides intercept.ion and assists in 

the categorization and ordering of raw traffic and the identificatJ.on of 

cryptographic systems. 

At the tactical level, it ha.s been tinnly' ~stablished by the experience 

ot World War II and Korea that T/A Fusion plays a basic role in close · 

support. or air, sea, and land fighting units. 

Because of the crucial importance of all intorne. tion on Soviet intentions, and our heavy dependence on T/A Fusion at the present time, it is 

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important to organize our T/A Fusion effort so as to provide ma.xi.mum 

infonnation on a timely basis from material now being intercepted. To 

this end, the Group makes the following recommendations: 

1. That the COMINT resulting from T/A Fusion now being used 

as the rnain basis for Air Defense Cormnand indi~ators (see page 10) 

be more effectively quantified through the develo~nt of indices 

or measures of activity of the Soviet Air Force--pa.rticularly, 

the Long R:tnge Air Force and the air defense system--and be 

graphically presented to show chanees in time. 

2. That special intensive end comprehensive studies be rm.de 

of the activities of the Soviet Air 'Forces during periods of large 

scale exercises. 

J. That the T/A Fusion effort in the National Security Agency 

be decentralized to some extent.by establishing T/A units in 

operational areas and providing some T/A support at intercept 

stations, along lines now established by the Air Force Security 

Service. 

4. That a small research group be established to carry out 

research am development on new methods of analysis, including 

adaptation of certain problems to high speed ma.chines. 

We also suggest that the National Security Agency re-examine its 

selection, training, proficiency evaluation, and promotional procedures 

for T/A civilian personnel and that modern psychometric methods be 

explored in connecti~n with personnel selection procedures. Similar 

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procedures should be explored for selection, training, and proficiency 

evaluation ot Service personnel, arrl consideration should be given to 

the establililment of a career service in oormnunica tions intelligence ' . 

in the Air Farce ard A:rnw along lines which now exist in the Navy. 

(See page 25) 

·/ r_. 

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SPECIAL INTl!I.LIGENCE 

RL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EQ 3.3(h)(2) 

Ref. Appendix VII 

"Special Intelligence" is COMINT derived from decryption of highlevel cryptographic systems. Potentially, it is the 100st important and 

the 100st reliable source of indicators of hostile intention. 

puring World War II, Special Intelli.genc.e was the uniq_ue source of 

advance knowledge of the strategic plans of the> enelcy. It was the 

timeliest, most complete, and ioost reliable. source of\intelligence on 

his Order of Battle, intentions, and capabilities. From.the end of the 

war until the summer of 1948, intelligence of the same quality was 

obtained from the used by the Soviet 

Armed Forces. Radio transmission of messages enciphered\in thos.e systems 

has been prohibited since late 1948 •. Other high-grade systems continue, . however, to be passed by radio. In view of (i) past experience rr.ith 

The Group considers that (i) 

· s a matter of the highest priority for obtaining ...._~~~~~~~~---

strategic warning; and (ii) although the problems involved are more 

difficult than those \•hich have been solved in the past, some widely 

used and important cryptographic systems are solvable. They require 

the application, however, of new types of machineri as well a.s additional 

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facilities and personnel. In particulAr, the following matters require 

immed:in.te attention: 

1. Continuity or Er.fort.: Because of the Fesearch character 

or the high-level problems' there has been a tendency to shift personnel 

to other areas promis::l.ng more inunediate results. The P?tentials or this 

source or intelligence are so great that a firm policy should be established to control and regulate the transfer of personnel familiar with 

these problems to other activities. The staff on these problems requires 

augmentation by severa.l top-flight analysts. 

2. Computational Support: In spite or the fact that the 

National Security Agency DB intains an extensive compiting establishment,. 

there is still a lack or computine facilities and skilled progranmers. 

The lack of progranmers is the nnst serious deficiency at the present 

time, and the number or such persons on the NSA Staff mould be inci:eased 

as promptly as practicable. In addition, the possibility or utilizing 

cleared and indoctrinated personnel skilled in the art of programming 

who may be available outside the National Security Agency should be 

investigated. 

3. Electronic Developments: 'The requirements of Special 

Intelligence in connection with high-speed computing devices are unique. 

In view of the difficulty of mintaining a skilled engineering staff at 

the National Security Agency, the possibilities of carrying out electronic developnents outside the Agency should be investigated. It is 

the opinion of the Group that there are many problems in com1ection 

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with the development of general purpose analytic equipment which remain 

to be solved. The complications of 'programming bear witness to the 

fact that the gemral purpose electronic computers are probably not the 

best type of equipment for attacking these problems. Additional highspeed analytic equipment should be developed and made a~ailable as 

needed. 

It appears that the potentials of Special Intelligence, particularly 

with regard to strategic warning, warrant a research and development 

program of mre extensive scope than is presently being carried out by 

the National Security Agency. 

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'fC>i SEC:R.E'f FR'i'fll 

'l'Of 3Eeft:E'P PR9fll 

ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE (Et.INT) 

ELINT-lmowledee l'n8uiting from th@ intereli!ptiefi AiM aMitsis et 

for~ign non-co:nmunications eleotromagni,ic fadiations==~an.Di asia 

along w.i. th other colla tora1 ma. t.eriai in the eval\J.ation or OOKmT 4.nr~rmtion on enemy intention1, but the d.egree et eMrdiMtten. ameng ~he 

Services ar:d with the COMINT effG>rt is a.i present. \mea'fl:S:er&etgiF"I' .tmm 

a waming standpoint. ELXN'i' is l)Qsad. gn the CJtitocrtion, i'ftOEtpt.ien1 and 

analysis of radio signals \',f.1 :I.oh 4o Mt l'ft'1uoe ta 1:1.t~:ral text. lilrINT 

data concem chiefly the enemy' e.lect1onic readiness, but can aloo be 

used to provide Order of Battle inforne.tion arxi can support <DMINT in 

many ways in lotam~ng of an impending attack. Indicat.ions in EI.INT are 

drawn fran sudden changes in the density or signals such as radar which 

I -

may indicate ship, aircraft, or troop movements, and from the presence 

of new or unusual signals. Radio altimeters, IFF, blind bombing, 

navigation, and fire control devices pl'"Oduce sienals of interest. Guided 

missile signals may also be detectable. The Services now maintain EUNT 

facilities in strategically located points around the Soviet perimeter 

and conduct electronic reconnaissance missions with ships and aircraft 

in many areas of .the world. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

To be fully effective, the important ELINT d.-'.lta should be available 

for coordimtion with COMINT within less than one hour, both at field 

levels ~nd in the US. COMINT data should likewise be made available to 

ELINT agencies .for the proper direction of their intercepted efforts. 

This type of continuous coordination has proved very ef.fecti v~ in I .... ___ _. 

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forces, where EUNT, COMINT,, and other intelligence sources are close]¥ 

combined at all levels from field operations to finished intelligence. 

-::LINT facilities are now equipped to report their results by electrical 

comrm.inication; but, as in the case of many other intelligence sources, 

the speed of cormnunica tion depends on the training ~nd instruction of 

• field personnel and on a continuous direction of their efforts to obtain 

the types of info nm. tion which are desired. 

ELINT facilities \\hich are in operation or planned by the Services 

cover most of the usable arena at present. Deficiencies in the ELINT 

program from the warning standpoint are 1 

1. There is inadequate control of ELINT operations. ELINT 

'WOrk within each theater of operations should be centrally directed on 

a basis of adequate, all-source intelligence so that the maximum amount 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 of useful infonm.tion could be received. ~o 3:3{h)(2) 

2. The channels by l-A'lich ELINT information is reported are 

tangled(arxl in many cases too slow for the delivery of short. term warnings. 

· .. ·. · ... ·. · .. ·. ·. · .. 

4. EI.INT equipnent now in use is inadequate in ma.ny respects. 

5. Present ELINT operations do not take advantage of the 

possibilities of "anomlous" propagation mechanism wich can be predicted 

from geography, weather and ionospher~ measurements. 

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RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 

!n addition to the obviously needed research and development 

toward better cryptanalysis and more effective traffic analysis, there 

is a need, for basic research on the theory of communication intelJ.igence 

and for the development of methods and equipments which .will permit the 

most efficient exploitation of the theoretical pote~tial of the field. 

In particular, the entire concept or military; diploma.tic, and 

commercial communication must be examined to reveal those aspects of the 

conununication networks which are most susceptible to cormnunication 

intelligence activities and to relate the value of intelligence gained 

through exploitation of these aspects to the cost of exploitation and to 

the cost to the enemy of security measures which would reduce their 

vulnerability. In brief, our eventual OOMINT activity should be aimed 

at the transmissions which an eneiey ~ subject to our scrutiny in •' 

order to carry out his own operations. In the absence of the general 

theoretical research which is needed, it is possible to conjecture that 

developments along some of the following lines will prove valuable in 

future COI-llNT operations: 

(i) Antenna. systems and integral receiving facilities to 

permit intercept operators to determine the direction of arrival of a 

signal irmnediately at the time of its reception without reliance on a 

separate ~irection finder and intermediate communications system. Multiple 

unit antennas should be considered for this function. 

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(ii) Repeaters, receivers, antenna systems, and technique![' 

to improve the range and quality of coJJD'llUnication signal reception at 

frequencies above 30 me. 

(iii) Equipments for better utilization of immediate action 

voice corranunications, includine better receivers, better audio recording 

machinery, automatic time ree;istering devices, bettor techniqiies of 

receiving and copying this traffic, and, eventually, automatic semantic 

processing equipment for use in traffic analysis and in recovery of 

brevity codes. 

(iv) 

signals. 

(v) 

Equipments for reception of D"Jise modulated communication 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

E03.3(h)(2) 

Equipments for detection and reception or I ... -------

pulse, and frequency dispersal conum.1hlcation systems. 

(vi) Installation and use of propagation measuring equipment to 

permit more efficient direction of intercept. effort. 

(vii) Inverse LORAN, or other position measuring devices to 

produce position data on transmitters. 

(viii) Continued development of demultiplexing,j._ ____ ___,~ 

and precision recordine devices for use in breaking out messages sent 

over multiplex and._l ____ _.lchannels. 

(ix) Continued developnent of fingerprinting devices for 

transmitters and operators, both voice and Morse. 

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borne comnrunications. 1'he ex.tendon of microwave networks within the 

Soviet Union is in pn>eress. Interception of these types of communications presents an extremely complex problem. Studies should be 

initiated to dete:nnine possible methods of solution. 

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Rer. Appendix IX 

Throughout all discussions and briefings in which the Group has 

participated, no single problem has been more widely discussed than 

that of improving the quality and proficiency of personnel now engaged 

in the COMINT effort. The attention of the Group' has been especially 

drawn to personnel: problems reL1ted to three important groups: research 

and development personnel, analytic personnel, and interception personnel. 

The following connnents a.re confined primarily to problems relating to 

these groups. 

The success of the Nation~l Security Aeency in research and development activity needed to keep pace with COMINT requirements will depend 

very lareely on the quality of research and development personnel which . can be engaged in the effort. At the present time, the salary scale at 

NSA is not adequate to compete with industry, nor are the working conditions 

and scientific prestige factors sufficient at NSA to compete with universities. Establishment of more high level positions and opportunities 

for advancement ma.y help correct the situation; but other measures should 

be explored, such as borrowing scientists and engineers from industry 

and universities for limited periods of time. A good pa.rt of the development needs of NSA can probably be met through contracts; but, even so, 

NSA must have a strong core of research and development personnel to do 

the research and to recognize and formulate requirements tor equipnent, 

machines, etc. · 

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The second crucial group of OOMINT personnel are the analysts: 

crypt-analysts and traffic analysts, of NSA and the Services. The 

civilian components of these groups· provide the basic continuity of 

analytic effort. The principal problem facing NSA and the Services as 

far as this group is concerned is that of attracting and recruiting 

highly competent personnel. The Group is of the opinion that NSA would \ 

do well to re-examine its recruitment, selection, training, and proficiency 

evaluation procedures for analysts. In order to attract the interest of 

prospective analysts, the pre:::;ent recruit·ment policy of NSA should be restudied in the light of realistic security limitations. The use of modern 

psychometric method_s in close cooper·ction with lea.ding NSA analysts can be 

expected to improve the selection procedures. The problem of holding good 

analysts de.pends to a large extent on a sound salary and promotion policy. I 

Such a policy will also provide eff ectivc supervisory personnel. The . Group questions whether sa.b.ry and promotion policy in NSA is as favorable 

to a sound development of T/A effort as it is in the case of C/A, especially 

in view of our present heavy dependence on COMINT derived from T/A. 

The third important group of personnel in the COMINT effort are the 

intercept opera.tors, who at present are almost entirely military. The 

ma.in problem conceming this group is that created by the usual enlistment 

and rotation policies. These policies do not permit the intercept 

operator time to build up enough familiarity with the material intercepted at his site to be effective in interpreting and recognizing the 

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'f6P 950R:HF FRO~II 

significance of it. This situation is highly relevant to the problem of 

.Picking up clues of an impendine attack. The Group suggests that, 

partially to meet this difficulty, consideration be given to the 

establishment of a service career in COlIDJT to encourage longer periods 

of service. Such a plan not only would help solve some .of the intercept; 

operator difficulties but also would provide highly. qualified officers 

for supervision. Consideration should also be given to the provis~on 

of some analytic support at the intercept site either by indoctrination 

ot :intercept personnel with rudiments of cryptanalysis and traffic 

analysis 1 or b~r assignment of an analyst to the site. 

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'i'OP 6El0REa' PROtII 

I - THE SPF.CIAL STUDY GROUP 

In its necting of ~l-12 June 1953, the Natibna.l SecU!'ity Agency 

Scientific Advisory Board (NSASAB) discussed the problem of evaluating 

the contribution '-Jtlich COMIN'I' can or could mak~ to the warning of an 

impending attack on·the US. The Board raised the question of whethbr 

the Director, NSA, might ccnsider it desirable to request the Advisory 

Board to inaugurate.a study of this problem. 

In a letter of 26 June 1953 to Professor Stewart S. Cairns, Chairman 

of the. NSASAB, Lieutenant General Ralph J. Canine, Director, NSA, made 

the follCMing statement: 

"My purpcee of writirg you new is to indicate not only that 

I would very much like to ha_v~ the Board underl~e such a study 

·but also that I hope it-could be -initiated. at ~nee ard will 'be · 

glad to }'.Jlace imrnedfa.tely at the disposal of the Board whatever . facilities, personnel and records the Board deems necessary or 

useful for conducting the study and for producing the final report 

thereon as Roon as practicable. 11 

General Canine suggested thJ.t Dr. H. P. Robertson serve as Chairman 

of the Special Study Group. 

The following irrlividuals comprise the membership of the Group: 

*Dr. H. P. Robertson, Professor of Mathematical Physics, 

Calif oniia Institute of Technology, Chairman 

i~Dr. Samuel s. Wilks, Professo.r of Mathematical Statistics, 

Princeton University 

*Dr. Howard T. Engstrom, Vice-~resident, Remington-Rand Corporation 

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II 

'f6P 3E6~ PftO!H 

Dr. Richard C. Raymond, Member, F.lectronice Division, Rand 

Corporation 

*Mr. John C. McPherson, Vice-President, Interna.tional Business 

Machines Corporation 

Mr. M. Dean Post, Staff Ass:!.stant, Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Resev..rch :-ind Dew~lopment 

Mr. Charles S. Weaver, Staff Assistant, Assistant Secretary or 

Defense for Research and Tlevelopnent 

L!bose marlced with an asterisk .1re members of tbe NSASAB.J 

The Group was assister\ by Mr. William F. Friedman, Executive Secretary 

ot the NSASAB, his assistant, l/Lt. Irving T. McDonald, Jr., USAF, and 

Miss Carolyn J. Fax. 

On several occas:i ons, the Group receiv".ld special assistance from · 

the follCMing persons: ,, 

·. 

:. 

.· 'Mr. Ralph L. Clark, CIA . . ' I"!. 

RADM William Gogcins, US'J (Ret.), ERA 

Ca.pt. Wilfred tl. Holmes, USN (Ret.) 

Col. James L. Weeks, USAF, NSA 

Col. Gordon. W. Wildes, USAF, USAiFSS 

In the drafting of the Report, vnl11aa'ble assistance _was rendered the 

Group by Professor s. s. Cairns, Mr. J. Z. Millar, Dr. L. T. E. Thompson, 

all of the NSASAB. 

I AGENDA OF ACTIVITIES OF SPECIAL STUDY GRCUP 

27 Jul.y 1953 

Washington, D. C. 

Assembly of Group for discussion and planning proposed activities 

of Group. 

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'F66' SE€RE'F FRQifll 

2ll July 1953 

Washington, D. C. 

Brletine on role of intPllieence 

in US air detense systems. 

29 Jul.y 1953 

Directorate ot Intelligence, 

Headquarters, USAF 

Brooks Air Force Base, San Antonio, TeX3.s 

Sumnary ot COMINI' ct:.pabili ty 

to provide advance wa.rnine. 

USAFSS OrGanization and Operations 

Traffic Analysis 

USAFSS EI.INT prograM 

Intelligence Rel'fltiremenl:.s and 

Dissemination 

• 

Communic A. ti ons 

Conm10.ndcr, USAFSS 

Deputy Chief of Starr/ 

OperatJ ona, US.AFSS ' 

Analysis Control Division, 

;JSAFSS 

Chter_ Implementation Division, U.~AFSS 

Cl 1 lP. f!,. Citr'rent RcportirJB and 

Requ:ll'"'l!!nents Branch, USAPSS 

Command Coinmunications Office, 

l'SAFSS 

Ent Afr Force a~ :.ie 11 Colorado Springs, Colorado 

Philosophy of intr•lllgericc -requirements for air ncfcnse 

Sunmary or air defense of 

continental US. 

Mission, operations, and 

capabilities of anti-aircra~ 

weapons systems. 

Discussion of: intellj~ence 

indicators eustern 

~~~~c~orate ot Intelligence, 

ADC 

Directorate of Intelligence, 

AnC 

Arll\V Anti-Aircraft Comnand 

Oirector of Intellie~nce, 

AOC 

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• 

• 
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TS II 

31 Jul.v 1953 

Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska 

Discussion of COMINT ard 

collateral intelligence 

Location and identification 

of targets 

Philosophy of intellieence 

requirements for strategic 

operations 

Communications 

l August 1953 

Director of Intelligence, 

SAC 

Target Mate~ials Division, 

Directorate of Intelligence, 

SAC 

Air Estimates Division, 

Directorate of Intelligence, 

SJ\.C 

Director of Canm.unications, 

SAC 

Headquarters, Central Air Defense Force, Kansas City, Missouri 

The role or COMINT in the 

Korean War 

3 August 1953 

.. 

Washington, D. C. 

Commander,· central A.1..r 

Defense Force 

General discussion session of Gra.ip to plan tut~ activities. 

4 August 1953 

Was:1ineton, D. c. 

Discussion of COMJNT CIA 

capabilities and potentialities 

• 

5 August 1953 

Washington, D. C. 

Individual studies by members or the ~roup on specific problems. 

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~91 SE€RE'F FRQifll 

Washington, D. C. 

Disovssion ot 00.fINT activities 

at the US Navy 

Wash.i.J16tPJl, f), C. 

Opera tiona.l Intellisenoe 

Section, Departlllent of the 

Nav 

0'1JWP-Al. diacu1-lon and planniq: e111ion ot Gztoup. 

W4ahington, n. c. 

•. 

General session ot Group for furthe~ studies and preparation or report • 

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II - THE TJIREAT 

The Soviet Union hns at present the capability to launch an effective large scale atomic a:tr attack a.gainst the North American continent 

and, in particulf\1" 1 aguinst all major tarcets with the us, including 

population anu industrial centers and military bases. Th~ magnitude of 

I 

the Soviet threat through 1955 will no+. be governed by their delivery 

systems but rather by the size of their atomic stockpile and, further, 

by that portion of the stockpile which they would alloc~te for use 

against targets in the US. In addition, the magnitude oi' the threat 

would increase if the Sovieto realize their capability oi' developing BW 

agents which might be employed in a large scale air attack against the 

us. 

Delivery Systems 

The Soviet Long Range Air Force has at its disposal approximately 

11 000 medium bombers of the TU-4 type {US B-29) which are capable of 

reaching all targets in the us on a one-way mission from bases in the 

USSR. By 1955, the number of availa.ble TU-4•s will increase to about 

1,100. Further, it is believed that, by 1955, this force will be 

augmented by approximately 18o heavy bombers having twice the range of 

the TU-4. These heavy bombers will most likely be capable of reaching 

nll targets within the US from Soviet bases on a two-way mission carrying atomic weapons. 

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'FO~ SECRE'F II· 

Employment of long range aircraft is the most l:f.kely means at the 

Soviets' disposal of carrying out a ma.as attack on the US. They do 

have the capability of developing guided missiles of the V-1 type carry1ng an ntamic warhea~ and launching them against coastal targets from ~ 

submarines or surface vessels. In considering the Soviet air threat to 

the continental US such a possibility cannot be overlooked. In particula.r, in the case of a surpTise attack, it would appear that they would 

use all the means at their disposal to make the initial strike as devastating as possible. 

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III - NORTH .AMERICAN CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE 

Active defense forces pa.rticipa.ting in the air defense of the North 

American continent include the United States Air Defense Command, the 

Royal Canadian Air Force Air Defense Command, and the Alaskan Air Defense 

Connnand. These forces function as independent commands and not as one 

integrated o.ir defense system. 

Advance warning is the first essential element for an effective 

air defense system. Recent Ad Hoc Committees which studied the continental air defense problem for the National Security Council and the 

Secreto.ry of Defense have noted, without exception, the tremendous value 

of more complete intelligence to provide advance warning and the potential 

impact of such warning on continental defense. 

The Group feels that, if intelligence could effectively and reliably • 

give.a warning of three to six days of an impending attack on our nation, 

the significance would be of tremendous magnitude. In fact, warning of 

this nature would permit mobilization which, if known to the enemy, might 

induce him to cease his preparations for an attack. 

At present, warning is provided by radar and ground observers. The 

United States Air Force is now operating seventy-one radars in the US 

and southern Canada which perform surveillance and control functions. 

The radar network gives about thirty minutes warning for US perimeter 

targets on large aircraft of the B-29 type flying between 10,000 and 

30,000 feet. The ground observers corps is at present the only effective 

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TO II 

means o:r cletecting low flying aircraft (below 5000 feet). However, thus 

fe.r it ho.s n_ot been possible t·o make reliable use of the ground observers. 

Available weapons consist of fighters and antiaircraft artillery. 

At present, Air Defense Command has fifty-three intercepter squadrons 

based in ·the US or which fifteen per cent have all-weather capability. 

Offensive armament for these aircraft consists in fixed forward firing 

aircra.f·t guns. Antiaircraft weapons a.re deployed to assist in the 

defense of twenty-two critical targets in the US. There are a total of 

fifty-seven AAA battalions in place which include fi~y-two gun battalions 

(90 nnn and 120 mm) and five a.utoma·tic weapons battalions (40 mm). 

Our present air defense system has 11 kill probability of between 

zero and fifteen per cent depending upon the pattern of attack. 

Present planned programs are Geared to reach maximum effectiveness 

by the end of 1955· The present radar network will be augmented with 

add~tional equipment to eliminate perimeter gaps •. In addition, an early 

' 

warning line is planned which would extend from Alaska down the Alaskan 

Highway and across Canada approximately at the 54th parallel to the Hudson 

Bay, thence across Quebec to the Atlantic Ocean. Extensions of this 

system.are planned in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans for approximately five hundred miles using picket ships and airborne early warning 

aircraft. In addition, a.n early warning line may be established in the 

far north. By 1955, the air defense weapons system will be greatly improved 

and strengthened. It is planned that the fighter forces will be increased 

to fifty-seven squadrons (25 aircraft per squadron) of all-weather fighters 

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equipped wit.h collision course fired rockets and based in the US. Antiaircra~ point defenses will be greatly strengthened by converting a 

nwnber of the gun ba·l;talions w1 th NIKE guided missiles. By end of 1955, 

a.ntio.ircro.ft defenses will includ.e twenty gun battalions, forty-two 

NIKE battalions, and fourteen Skysweeper automatic weapons battalions 

deployed to e.ssist in the defense of twenty-two critical targets. 

As noted in the statement of the threat (Appendix II), the Soviets 

have the capability of developing -:~l type missiles carrying atomic warheads and launching them from surface veGsels and/ or ·submarines ag:::.inst 

coastal targets. Our most effective means to counter such an attack is 

to locate and destroy the lnunchins vessels. Detection at present is 

accomplished by radar, Sonar, or visuo.l, all of which have definite range 

limitations. A shore-based sound surveillance system is now being evalu• 

ated which will give approximate position data on engine driven vessels 

cruising at normal speed at ranees up to 300 miles. P. network based 

on this type o'f equipment planned to be operational in the 1956-58 

period will greatly increase our capability in countering such an attack. 

With these improvements, minimwn availnble warning time is expected 

to be increased to two hours or more· for perimeter targets, and the 

system as a whole should provide kill probabili'liy of approximately fifty 

per cent under all weather conditions. As an order of magnitude, the 

funding required over the next several years to attain our presently 

planned air defense system will be at the rate of u.pproximately five 

billion per year. Cumulative investment through FY-1960 will be about 

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forty billion. The number of full-time active service personnel will 

increase from approxirno.tely 120,000 at present to approximately 18o,OOO 

by 1957· 

In reviewing our present and planned active air defense systems 

effectiveness in conjunctio~ with intelligence, it can 9nly be concluded that the Soviet threat is increasing to the extent that the 

number. of atomic bombs which they 'Can put on a target by the end of 

1955 will be the same as, or greater than, the number which they could 

effectively deliver today even with the increased air defense capability 

outlined above. 

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'FOi SEERET FRWf 11 

IV - INDICATOR SYSTEMS 

The nature of the threat has been stated in Appendix II, which_ 

describes the area of capability of the USSR. These facts are available 

from examination of intelligence. The all-important unanswered question 

remaining is the time such an attack will be executed. The only means 

of obtaining strategic warning is through intelligence. 

For this purpose, various indi~ator systems have been organized in 

an effort to predict Soviet intentions. 

The Air Defense Command has established an indications system using 

a graphic display to assist in the orderly evaluation of indications of 

hostile air attack on the US. 

The most serious deficiency of all the indicator systems is the 

lack of coordination and exchange of information on a timely basis •• The 

existence of such separate but related efforts, as presently constituted, 

throughout the world involves much duplication of the evaluation effort--

in many cases by people not fully competent and with divergent resul~s. 

Indications efforts as now organized are producing results less reliable 

than the security of the natior requires and the commanders concerned 

deserve. 

The coordination, standardization and systematic inter-relationship 

of this effort would overcome many of the present shortcomings, particularly from the s·tandpoint of the Air Defense Command. It is believed 

that a small group should be created representing the Intelligence 

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TOI SECRET FRCif'II 

'f Ot' BEeffifi' PRER 

Advisory Committee, opera.ting on a full ... time basis (24 hours a day), and 

responsible' for the over-all coordination and direction of related indications systems- More effective utilization of intelligence can be 

achieved only by such central coordination a.nd direction. In particular, 

the following are some C1f the principles which are believed essenti~l: 

. (i) An agreed list of indicators and sub-indicators worldwide in scope. 

(ii) Assignment of indicators for evaluation to specific 

participating agencies or sub-agencies according to primacy of 

interest or competence. 

(iii) Provision to f\ll·nish these same ag~~cies with in~ications 

evaluation on all other indicators which ar6 pertinent to their 

own warning problem but for which they do not have primacy of 

interest or full competence in evaluo.tion, 

{iv} Timely, secure, and dependable communications. 

(v) Stand.o.rdized methodology and display systems, more 

effectively quantified through the development of indices or 

measures of activities, gi·aphically presented -~o show changes in 

time. 

{vi) Formulation of norlllC.tive ene1ny plo.ns against which the 

imminence of hostilities can be meas\ll·ed. 

Additionally, it is particularly important that this group be kept 

informed on military and political maneuvers or the US which could produce 

Soviet reactions that might otherwise be misinterpreted. 

Care must be exercised that our evaluation of indications be focussed 

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on aignificnnt actions which the enemy must take in preparing for particular military opera:tions. For ·this purpose, it will be necessary to 

develop what we consider to be the probable steps the Soviet Union will · 

take prior to the initio.tion of hostili'l.;ies,, nnd a time span for each 

step. An excellent initial step in the development of this kind of 

methodolop;y is contained in the J\DC Intelligence Staff Report, "USSR 

Attack Plo.nning Pla.n." 

The Canadian Government ha.s an active interest in the problem of 

strategic warning or an attack on North America. There is at present 

under preparation, in the Joint Intelligence Bureau, an all-source 

report on a "Surprise Atta.ck on North .America," to which the Communications Research Branch has contributed on the COMINT aspects. Discussion 

with the Director, CRB, has indicated tho.t these conclusions, based upon 

traffic analysis, plain text and presently exploitable codes and ciphers, 

are co~istent with those· .arrived at in this Report. 

Significant improvement of our indications systems can be achieved· 

by closer coordination with both British and Canadian efforts. We 

at~ongly believe that it will not be possible to effect such coordination 

ur.t11 a coherent indications system has been firmly established in the 

us. 

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V - COMMUNICATIONS 

Tilnely warning of impending air attack depends greatly upon rapidr 

accurate communications. 

Rapid electrical communication facilities serve the COMINT organization in three general ways: 

(i) Delivery of intelligence information. 

(ii) Collection of raw intercept material. 

(iii) Intra-station exchange of technical material. 

We are interested in the first two functions. 

The communication process is generally considered to include 

everything betvreen ·the handing of a message to the message center and 

the handing of the message tp the designated recipient~ Thus, the time 

for handling a message includes: encryption, routing, transmission, 

decryption, reproduction and messenger·service. The ala.crity with 

which the process is performed is determined by the precedence set by 

the originator. The highest precedence is assigned to a FLASH message, 

which is handled before all others except those of the same precedence. 

Delivery of Intelligence Information 

An item of intelligence information worthy of FLASH or other high 

precedence designation may originate at any of the following places: 

Intercept stataon 

Field command evaluation group - field analysis group 

Central evaluation group - central analysis group 

At present, such a despatch can be delivered to the most distant addressee 

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• 

within one hour. Where extra-continental circuits are not involved, 

the time may be less than ten minutes. It is the opinion of the Group 

that these·times nre adequate. 

Collection of Raw Intercept Material 

The recovery or the recognition of an important item of intelligence 

information may occur at stations to which raw intercept material is 

transmitted. There are two of these: the field command evaluation 

group - field analysis group and the central evalua·t;ion group - central 

analysis group. At present, all the locally intercepted raw material 

is sent to the allied field group. About twenty per cent is selected 

for electrical transmission to the central group in the us, the remainder , 

being delivered by courier. The field group receives its material in 

about thirty minutes and t~e central analysis group in one to five hours~ 

These times are considered to be adequate. 

Discussion 

We have examined the present communication system used for COMINT 

and have been shown the proposed improvements which are to be ma.de. The 

present channels, both overseas·and continental land lines, seem to be 

fairly adequate for their purpose. Certain contemplated improvements, 

such as autana.tic switching a.nd on-line encryption, will provide more 

expeditious handling of traffic through relay centers. We have not been 

shown any detailed time studies of traffic delays but presume they are 

available. Efforts to route overseas traffic through the best possible 

routes seem to have been made. Two channels on North Atlantic cables 

are now available to the Department of Defense on an immediate c~ll-up 

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basis; and,. in a.ddition, an eight channel trans-Atlantic cable will. be ~ ' 

installed in about two yeara for exclusive use or Defense communications. 

At present, some 245,000 groups per da.y are being handled by electrical 

communications. While this is a creditable performance, some improvements are still to be made. 

Technical Improvements 

Among the technical improvements which are feasible may be included: 

better and f~ster encryption devices, higher transmitting speeds, and 

more efficient utilization of radio frequencies and land line facilities. 

We have been informed that newer and better crY.ptographic techniques 

are contemplated which will provide fast and secure on-line operation. 

Some considerable reduction can be made in the actual transit time 

. of high precedence and of o·t;her traffic by adopting at a future date some 

of the principles and methods now available. Among these may be mentioned 

those reported by the Programs Research Unit of the Johns Hopkins University 

concerning this subject.l These methods which are applicable both to radio 

and land line communication channels propose ~he utilization of the ava~le.ble band wiQ.ths of present communications channels to increase the speeds 

of transmission some ten to forty times those currently in use. 

Methods of determining the most effective radio frequency to use at 

a given time have been published. The back-scatter measurement te~ique 

is. a notable example. The use of this method alone should provide ad.ditional assurance that an early warning meassage will move with the minimum 

l 

PRU145 to DMR 

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delay. Furthermore, it offers the possibility thB.t a frequency can be 

chosen which will be least susceptible to enemy Ja.mndng. A ca~eful 

study of this subject seems to be indicated as a.poosible means of maintain• 

ing the required continuity of overseas camnunications • Study should also 

be given to a method of pooling all available radio frequencies with 

assignments to individual stations on an inunediate basis to meet iono-

• spheric conditions. 

0perational Improvements 

Time studies should be continued with a view to reduction of processing times in message centers. Training programs to implement the indi~ated 

improvements should be pressed vigorously. In particular, the d~livery of 

messages to their recipients should receive careful attention. OUr informs.-

tion is that considerabie time can be saved here •. 

Careful consideration should be given to (i) the matter of delegation 

• of authority to intercept and analysis-evaluation groups to originate 

urgent intelligence messages, (ii) the sort of material for which they 

should watch, and (iii) the addressees to whom the information should be 

sent. Timely warning of enemy attack is more likely to come from units 

nearest to the intercept station. 

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'faP SEORfl'i' F'RorfiI PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

VI - TR.J\FFIC ANALYSIS, L<l-1-LEVEL CODES fLND CIPHERS, AND PLAIN TEXT 

General Hemarks 

Traffic .J\nalysis (T/ A) is a methodology by\.wh:f.ch COMINT is derived 

from the analysis of trafr+c volumes, operator chatter, and message 

externals. The COMINT derived from T/A is collated.with that recovered 

from low-level codes and ciphers, plain text messages, and voice communications in a.n operation known as "T/A Fusion." Since late 1948, we have 

been forced to rely on in:forniation obtained by T/ A. Fusion for almost all 

COMINT on the Soviet .Armed Forces (see Appendix VII). 

COM£NT Now Produced from these Sources 

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of units of the Soviet Long Range Air Force. From the same sources we 

( 

have learned something also about bombing accuracy and aerial gunnery 

effectiveness of certain of the units. 

A variety of items of economic and military intelligence, too 

numerous to list here, is 

plain text messages. 

constantly being produced by T/A and commercial 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3,3(h)(2) 

Finally, it should be emphasized that the experience or World War II 

and of Korea established the tactical necessity of analysis and reading 

of low-level codes and ciphers and plain language transmissions for 

close support of Army, Navy, and Air Force fighting units, irrespective 

of the degree of our cryptanalytic success with high-level systems. Whatever capability the T/A Fusion operation attains in peacetime, it will 

have indispensable value in wartime, when properly deployed. 

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Popsibilities of Improving CQ.IINT from these Sources 

l. Improvipc Sources of Material for T/A: Adequate direction 

finders ln conjunction with intercept operations can save much valuable 

time and allow better evaluation of traffic. Present direction finders 

are often separated by as much as 100 miles fron1 the intercept station and 

the two units not connected with secure lines. These efforts should be 

co-located so that D/F data would be at the intercept operator's hand, 

or intercept and D/F stations should be connected by direct and rapid 

telephone conununication. Alternatively, a secure and rapid connnunication 

service should be provided. Even such meager efforts as obtaining one 

line of direction and transmitting the information promptly to the intercept center would save much intercept time. D/F operations in the field 

are not well coordinated. Better training of officers in D/F is required; 

current training is much too brief for the importance of the subject. 

Similar remarks apply to another important source of supporting 

evidence for T/A, namely, procedures for identification of transmitters 

and operators. ELINT has a potentiality as a source of supporting 

evidence for T/A which is yet to be fully developed and exploited. 

2. Increasing T/A's Contribution to Indicators: At the present 

time, almost all of the information underlying the direct indicators 

of the imminence of war as developed by the Air Defense Command and the 

Air Force Directorate of Intelligence is obtained through T/A Fusion. 

Yet, in the case of some of these indicators, the COMINT is rather coa.rse 

and roughly used. There is a need for doing a better job of quantifying 

some of the information. Thi's is especially true or information concerning 

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the activities of the Sov1.et Long Range Air Force and of the fighter 

defense system. Consideration should be given to the construction of 

mensureo of amount of activity of various typeai These measures or 

indices should be plotted agninst time to show tates of change of activ-

' 

ity, rates of change of build-ups of various kinds, etc. They should 

be constructed by a.nnlysts who hnve intimate kiiowi~dge of the material 

underlying them. 

The possibilities of machine methods in this work deserve careful 

study • 

. 3. · Use of T/A Fusion SOUrces for Construct~n~ ,μttern of Soviet 

- War Maneuvers: It is axiomati~ in military intelliaence that the 

potential enemy's training exercises provide the mg§t important source 

o~ information on his ~bility to use his milit&~y ~~ine. OUr chief 

e.ccess to such in!'onna:tion on the Soviet Armed.. FotS!~i3 is through COMINT. 

I 

It becomes iaportant, tbe:ret"m.-~, to :1.n°tG"'M'tfy Qm.'' i.Jtter~ption o.nd T/ A 

pictur"e as possible. To the extent to ~teb ~ Ji1Er1od or exercises 

COl11,d be uaed as a time to launch an aerifl.l 4tltack aaainst the us; it 

is important to construct an accurate pattern of the behavior of the 

SO"liet Long Rrmge Air Force. This would entail special intensive 

studies based on T/A and low-level traffic. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 .. 3(h)(2) 

4. The Deployment of Analytic Effort: the Pro'blem of Timeliness: 

Here we consider the problem of deriving throueh COMINT a.nd utilizing 

a pre-radar warning of an impending attack against the US during a 

period in which we are .._ ____________________________________ ___, 

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'fQP 11117 Nmf 

The:re a:re th.l'tle diet:l.nct pl:ie.weff to this problem. The tirat pho.se is 

to pick up the clue OI' alua11 or .an impendi~ a.ttack. This depends"on the 

capabilities of our intet'ception aystem--the men and equipment at"the intercept at.at.ions. If the clu!BB are cont:\incd sa~where in intercepted mterial., 

then the Aecond phase ia to recagni~e them at sane stage· in the processing 

of the material. The third phe.10 is to transmit the in!ormo.tion recognized 

as the Clue to those responsible tor the a"lr dc!ense ot thE: US in time to 

take action. 

ThiR is obviom1J.y a prec11.rious chain of events and none but the naive 

· and toolha:rdJ would al.aim th&t th• tipotr would, with 100% certainty, be 

diaaovared, t:rananittect. nnd acted upon in time to tclce ertective action. 

Yet we must be realistic .:ind consider wh.'t pt·actic3l Eteps mie;ht be taken 

to increase the chance or success. Here we conun.ent especially on the 

aspects or the situation concemirig T/A, voice trar:tic, and information . . fran 191-.,-level systna. If the clue is contained in one or several messages 

. intercept..ed at a given site and if the significance of such a clue can be 

recognized by the interceptor or by an analyst, it is obvious that we 

. shml.r\ increase the chance or recognizing it at the intercept station. 

This areues tor the desirabili~7 of assfGning an ano.ljnt or two to each 

intercept- station to work olosely with the intercept operators. Such a 

situation now cx::i.sts at some stations, particular~ in the case or the 

intercept squadrons operated by 1u~35. 

Ir the clue is more di.ftuse and must be sifted from intercepted 

. material from a given geoeraphical arPa, this a~gueo for the establishment. 

ot forward analysis units by geo~r·1phical areas whicn would po?"fonn 
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anal.79ia on intercepted m.teria1 ~ the o.rea, ~.T'corporo.ting into their 

anal.7sia ma·terial. 0.1.r.eady lll'lllft&l"ized by the intercept 1tations, which 

would TMke uae or D/F, RFP, EI.INT, and 0.117 other reltWant data. For 

example,, in the c.11se or AFSS, the 6920th Security Grwp in Japan and the 

6910t.h Security Group in Gennnny perfom such a function~ 

Under such a 919tem ot dip.ploymen~ or an.'llytic eftort, the ma.in tunotian 

ol the Hea.dqwi.rtP.rs anaq&is units wall.d be to carey out doepo:r &n&lJd.1 

and develop COMINT or mot"e long range vo.luc. In order to build u.p and 

maintain an adequ:1te nnd sensitive 'baclct~round. for analysts against which 

to interpret intercepted material at t.he intercept ond. area level1, th41x-e 

would hBve to be a conntant feedback or COMlNT reports as well •• !'eporta 

baaed on collateral intelligence. 3ome rotR.tion of personnel through the 

97stem wculd be neces&~TJ' to keep it 11einsit.ive. 

' I • 

In wartime,, a deploym.Fnl:. of an.ri.lytic errort Al.one the lines indicated 

above would form thn basis or a tactico.l cc:MINT syst.En to support the theater 

conmanctere. The necessity for n deploymP.nt or this type has beE"n cleat"q 

inlicated b.1' the experience ot Wol"ld War II and Korea. 

. . ) 

5. Research :ln Connection with the TLA Fusion Erfort1 At the ~esBl!t 

time, almost all T/A Fusion et.fort anr1. thinkinS·is directed toward pro-

.duction. ot material. tD meet. CC11Sumer req11irements. -Not encugh at-tention 

is devoted to research and development ot new 111.Pthcrl.s of Mlr."\lysis ineluding 

turther atuey- ot the possibilit.ies of hifh speed ma.chines for handling some 

ot the problems. 'lhe NSI\ )f()Uld do WAll to f''!t up o. small reseor:i.rch group 

whooe membel"s have competence to imrest.igr ... te new approaclieff in v.al"if)Us 

fields relevant to the problP.111.. 
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6. The Personnel Problem: The "!Uality of ·the COMINT effort ba.11Jed 

on sourcos discussed in this Appendix depend.a heav~ on the effectiveness or interception and the co~petence'of th~ analysts., The problems 

or i~proving procedures for the selection, training, and proficiency . ., 

evaluation of. such personnel a.nd r~lnted personnel problems are discussed 

in Apperdix IX. 

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T<ii SECRET F¥II 

VII - SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE .PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Special Intelligence is CCMINT resulting :from\euccessf'ul cryptanalyti? 

attack on high-grade cryptographic systems. Its val-ue during World War II 

can scarcely be overestimated. Through the decryption\of German and 

Japanese messages, we were able to penetrate the enemy lines and enter the 

Headquarters of High Commands, Army Groupe, Fleets, and AiX' Forces. On a 

strategic level, Special Intelligence was the unique source of advance 

knowledge of the enemy's plans f'or both offensive and defensive operations. 

It was the timeliest, most complete, and most reliable source of intelligence 

on his Order of Battle, intentions, and capabilities (see Appendi]t X). 

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Meanwhile, the reading of a small number of mesa&l@I enciphered in 

systems used throughout the higher echelons of the Sovi@t Armed Forces 

promised a rich yield ot strategic intelligence, if the poipt of 1'111 

solution, on a large-scale, current basis could be achiev4!4, Up to August 

1948, the solution or only, a limited number of messages •noi~hered in one 

of those systems bad provided us with such items as 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

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Appendix VI)~ Those sources are not alone capable of providing an unequivocal 

vC'Dii:ag that tbe USSB intends to initiate hostilities, but they can contribute 

indicators to an intelligence picture constructed:t'rom all available sources 

(aee Appendix IV). PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

CCMINT which includes Special Intelligence has considerable 

. potentialities as a source of warning of hostile intent. The capabilities 

of the lower-level CCMINT sources, particularly traffic analysis, would 

also increase in direct proportion to the availability of supporting evidence 

d~rived from the content of decrypted messages. 

The potentialities of Special Intelligence are so great tbat the 

difficulties involved in obtaining it can scarcely"be considered a deterrent 

factor. Nor should the benefits which it could reasonably promise be discounted on the grounds that it would not have the demonstrable capability 

ot furnishing specific warning that hostilities were about to be initiated. 

Such a guarantee is beyond the power or any Ca.lINT organization, which 

reads the messages originated by a foreign nation but does not write them. 

With that exception, however -- a limitation which applies to CO.\IINT 

not only in its present condition but also in a hypothetical state in which 

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intercept facilities were vii"tually unlimited and cryptanalytic success 

was complete -- it can be stated that the capability of COONT to provide 

we.rning ot i:mm.inent hostilities is directly proportionate to the volume 

and currency 

the time when the decision to attack is made to the pel'iod.1mmediately 

preceding D Day. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

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'FCV SEERE'F FJli'FII 

VIII • PERSONNEL 

General Remarks 

In the various discussions and briefings which the Study Group 

has had concerning the present COMI:NT effort, the most universally' 

mentioned problem is that of improving the quality and proficiency of 

personnel. The success of any organization depends critically on its 

personnel. In the case of NSA--and the military Services--a number of 

factors which limit the effectiveness of certain key groups of personnel 

has ~een brought to the attention of the Group. 

Here we describe briefly some of the problems now faced primarily 

in connection with three crucial groups of NSA personnel, namely, highlevel reasearch and development personnel, analytical personnel, and 

interception personnel. We shall also make sane camnents and suggestions 

concerning supervisory personnel! • 

Research and Development Personnel 

At the present time, there is seriousneed for fUrther research and 

development activity in NSA. The success of such a program will depend 

almost entirely on the quality of research and development personnel. 

A good part of this activity can be contracted out to private 

organizations; but, even for this effort to be successful, it is 

necessary that NSA itself have a highly competent group to recognize 

NSA's needs and to translate them into requirements which can be used 

by private firms as a basis for research and d~velopment. NBA he.a lost 

a considerable number of men of this type and is finding it almost 

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~~~9saib~~ to c~~et~ ~1th indμstry in filling the vacancies created, 

AQt ~o ~en~ion recruiting such men to expand the p~search and development staff. This situation calls for a re-exam:f.R§.tion of salary·sce.les 

for research and development personnel. It ia a~aQ ~uggested that 

explorations be made to determine the extent tQ whi~h scientists a.nd 

engineers f'r?ll univers~ties and industrial laboratories could be usetu1ly borrcwed for l;l.mi1ied periods of time. 

One of' the bas~c diff1cult~es in attract1DSi a.pd retaining top-flight 

scientific personnel is the problem Qf providing recognition for their 

contributions, ~9t measured purely in status and salary advances, but 

in terms of scientific prestige. At the present time, the only possib·ility for such recognition is through scientlf~c contributions almost 

wholly unrelated to their research in the COMIJft field. This sets a 

double standard of achievement which very few persons can meet. '!be . Group has no solution to offer concerning this dilemma. The least that 

can be done is to consider extra premiums in teTID.s of working cond.itions 

and financial inducement for good men to enter the field. 

Ana1ysts 

The second key group of CO.MINT personnel consists of the analysts: 

the cryptana.lysts, and the traffic analysts. The main core of this group 

is canprised of more than 1100 civilians, but it also contains a large 

complement of service personnel. The civilian members provide the basic 

continuity of the analytic effort, although there is considerable turnover. The turnover is even greater for the service personnel be~ause 

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of rotation policy a~d relatively short terms of service for most militar1 personnel. 

There is a great variation in the quality of personnel in these two 

groups of analysts. Considerable difference of opiriion exists as to 

what type of person at recruitment will make a good analyst and what 

type will not. It is generally agreed, however, that, once a good 

analyst is selected, his proficiency steadiJ.1 improves with experience. 

In view of this situation, and since there is a continuing recruitment 

program to keep analytic personnel up to strength, it is extremely 

important to establish sound selection and ~raining procedures. Modern 

,psychometric methods applied in close consultation with leading ESA 

analysts can be expected to aid materially in improving selection 

procedures. It is not sUfficient, however, for such procedures merely 

to be applied to some candidates. They must pe applied to candid.ates 

from the most promising sources. This in turn ~alls for a re-examination 

of NBA policy for giving the potentially good candidate same notion, within 

realistic security limitations, of what cryptanalysis and traffic analysis 

are and how important in terms of national security. Only then will NSA 

attract the pote~tially best candidates actually to became candidates 

/ 

far selection. In ma.king these suggestions, the Group is thinking 

primarily or civilian analysts, but the principles are no less applicable 

to military personnel. 

Another important aspect of the problem of recruiting and holding 

good analysts relates to salary and promotion pol..i.cy. At present, there 

seems to be some disparity in this respect between cryptanalysis and 

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traffic analysis. We raise the question whether salary e.nd promotion 

policy is as favorable to strong development of T/A capability in NSA 

as i"t is in the case of C/A, especially in view of our present heavy 

dependence on T/A. 

A final aspect is the supporting services available to the analysts, 

particularly the machine sections which do the extensive machine processing. The personnel in these sections have a routine but highly responsible 

task and the efficient performance of the work depends on skilful leadership and ingenuity in planning the use of the machinery to best advantage. 

Steps should be taken to make this work attractive by expanding the 

opportunities for advanced training and promotion in the area. 

Intercept Qperators 

The third large group of personnel in the COMINT effort are &he intercept operators, who, at present, are almost entirely military. The greatest 

problem there is that created by the usual enlistment and rotation policies • . The potential value of an intercept operator increases with experience at 

a particular intercept location. The more familiar the operator becomes 

with the material he intercepts the more expert he can becane in the 

preliminary interpretation of it. It is widely recognized that the 

problem of building up and maintaining a reasonable amount of know-how 

for interpreting material o.t the intercept site is of basic importance 

with respect to early warning. Part of the solution of the problem, as 

far as it can be dealt with, is probably to be found in the.establishment 

of a service career for military personnel in COMINT. A service man with 

interception experience at one site can be expected to capitalize rapidly 

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on this experience when placed at another site. Another possibility for 

improving our interpretation capability at the intercept site, in some 

cases at lea.st, is to indoctrinate intercept opera.tors in the rudiments 

of cryptanalysis and traffic analysis or to supply an analyst for the 

site to work in close collaboration with the operator. In sites where 

voice intercept can be taken, the importance of knowledge of the Russian 

language is obvious. 

There are well-recognized difficulties in using civilian experts at 

intercept sites or in theaters of operation. On the other hand, World 

Wnr II experiences in opero.tions research, μse of radar, and other fi•:?lds 

are full of instances where these difficulties were overcome. 

We also point out that profitable return can be expected from the 

use of modern psychometric methods in the selection and proficiency 

evaluation of intercept operators. 

Supervisory Personnel 

Finally, we wish to make some connnents concerning the selection of 

supervisory personnel, especially those in the immediate supervisory 

capacity. It is axiomatic in good personnel management that immediate 

supervisors of any technical activities should themselves have expert 

knowledge of the activity they supervise. The best way of obtaining 

such supervisors is by advancement of properly qualified individuals 

from within the groups themselves. This principle, however, is more 

• easily applied to the civilian component of a group than to the military 

personnel. In the case of military personnel, with rotation policy as 

it now exists, the Group believes the best approach to the supervisory 

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!el' a~ SECRET FR 

pro\,lem lies in the e::rt.nblishincnl. or u co.reer fj1?rvicc in COMINT in the 

/\rmy a.nd A."lr Forc.;e a.10118 lines. o.lref!.d.y developed in the ?Javy. 

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'fOr S!lCI:tt:'f ffi6'fU 

IX - COMnrr AS A SOURCE OF .l\DVANCE WARNING IN 

WORLD WJ\R II AND TIIE KOREAN CONFLICT 

During World Wa.r II, and again during the conflict in Korea, COMINT 

was the timeliest, most complete, and most reliable source of intelligence on the Order of Battle, intentions, and capabilities.of the 

enemy. It was the unique source of reliable advance knowledge of his 

plans for both offensive and defensive operations. The following examples 

have been selected from among innumerable instances which illustrate the 

COMINT capability to provide advance warning of impending enemy opera- · 

tions, on both strategic and tactical levels, and the advantages which 

may be derived from the receipt of such warning. 

World War II - The German Atta.ck on the USSR: 

During the first three months of 1941, Special Intelligence1 indicated 

a general eastward movement of German air and ground forces which enabled 

British Intelligence to estimate with increasing certainty that the concentrations wbich were taking place were to be directed against the USSR. 

By the end of March, sufficient information was available from deciphered 

German messages to suggest that (i) preparations were being made to 

intimidate the Soviet Union by assembling an armored striking force on 

the Russo-Polish frontier, and (ii) those preparations might lead to 

the outbreak of war. 

Special Intelligence then revealed the deflection of the striking 

forces to the Balkans for the conquest of Yugoslavia and its subsequent 

1 - COMINT derivea i~omdecryption of high-level cryptographic systems. 

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withdrawal, after a month's participation in the campaign, and redeployment together with an air corps, to its previous destination in south 

roland. By 31 May, little doubt remained that the Germans intended to 

initiate hostilities and not merely to intimidate their erstwhile ally. 

In an estimate of 7 June 1941, the British COMINT organization predicted 

"a very large scale campaign against Russia, with the main frcm of attack 

in Poland and East Prussia," and stated that the German forces would be 

ready to begin the operation soon after 16 June. 

An estimate of 16 June summarized the COMINT information received 

during the preceding nine days and conclude4: " ••• it is probable that 

the German Air Force will be ready to strike as from 19 June onwards." 

German messages of 19 June, which were available to COMINT recipients 

on the following day, ma.de it clear that the period immediately preceding 

D Day had been reached. 

Thus, COM:LNT provided (i) a general warni.ng several months in 

advance of the attack and (ii) as the date of invasion grew nearer, 

increasingly specific information which enabled intelligence personnel 

to estimate the scope of the intended campaign, the areas of concentration, 

and the approximate date on which the frontier crossing would take place. 

For the British strategic planners, that advance intelligence was 

invaluable. In view of the weakness of their military forces, it was 

not possible to prepare for the defense of every vulnerable point which 

• the enemy might choose to attack. Reliable intelligence on the enemy's 

intentions was vital, therefore, to the continued existence or the 

British nation. Ca.tINT supplied that intelligence and, incidentally, 

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gave the Prime Minister a period of several weeks to consider the policy 

which he announced. at 9 P.M. on 22 June 1941 tha.t Britain would give 

"whatever help" she could to the Soviet Union. 

Korea: 

The CCMINT contribution in Korea during the p~riod November 1950-

July 1951 is summarized in a citation for the 1st R~dio Squadron, Mobile, 

dated 11 October 1951. That citation includes mention of the following 

"specific accomplishments, considered of extraordinary value to the 

mission of the UN Forces in Korea and in at least two cases to the vital 

interests of the United s~.;ates": 

(i) advance notification that the enemy was aware of UN plans 

td attack Anju and Chinampo, as well as his plans for countermeasuresj 

{ii) advance warning of the enemy's intent to bomb American 

troops on Hill 872 near Tuk Sonj 

(iii) advance warning of the exact times and intentions of the 

enemy air attack on Sinmido Island on 19 June 1951 which resulted in 

severe reverses for the enemy; and 

(iv) advance information on the times a.nd places of intended 

attacks during the evacuation of the Ham Hung beachhead • 

. More recently, COMINT provided warning that, during the final stages 

of the armistice negotiations, the Chinese Communists were preparing an 

offensive against tAe UN Forces. It is too early to establish the reasons 

for cancellation or postponement of that attack, but UN countermeasures--

ma.de possible by the advance knowledge of enemy intentions--may well 

• 

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have caused the Conununista to decide that sufficient military advantage 

to wo.rrant disruption of the armistice negotiations was no longer 

assured. 

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X - ELECTRONICS INTEI.I.IGENCE (ELIM) 

The Army ELINT Program 

1. Gene1·al Remarks: The Department of the Army maintains ELINT 

stations in Europe, t.he Far Eaa·t, and Ala.aka.. These stations cover the 

frequency range of 15 kilocycles to 12,500 megacycles and are primarily 

designed to concentrate on radar-type signals. A 24-hour watch is maintained, and three ma.in indicators have been established as a basis :for 

FIASH reporting. These are (i) any indications o:f radar build-up, 

(iiLany indication that known or identified enemy signals appear ·to be 

unusually close to the stations, and (iii) unusual signal activity which 

the \lperator may feel to be cause for a.la.rm. 

2. Intercept Locations: 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Alaska - Base a.t Nome, mobile s"t.a.tiona a·t Gambell on St. I.awrence 

Island, mobile·station at Tin ~ity, Cape Prince of Wales. 

Two mobiles working on pulses; base stationvorks on VOA 

jamming signals. 

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/// 

The above effort includes 10·12 ·teams. About 16 teams will be overseas 

in the next year. There are not a.t present sufficient/personnel in these 

teams to sustain a 24-bour operation for longer tha.Jl'a limited emergency 

time. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

3. Reporting: Logs from intercept stations are routinely sent by 

mail twice a month, sustaining a delay of approximately 3-4 weeks. Duplicate 

copies are sent to the Electronic Warfare Center (~~C) at Fort Monmouth, Air 

Technical Intelligence Center (ATIC), Naval Research Iaboratory (NRL), and 

the A.rmy-Nav:r Electronic Evaluation Group (ANEEG). ANEEG retains end files, 

as well as evaluates, these reports. 

Each team under EWC has a one-time pa.d for FIASH reporting. A code 

word alerts EWC that F'!ASH traffic is 1.mder way. EWC then alerts the Monmoutl'\ cryptanalysis peraormel who decode the message. Sig-Op-5 in Washington 

is then alerted, which in turn alerts G-2 and ANEEG. The message is then 

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received by G-2, evaluated, and transmitted to appropriate personpel within 

the space of a few minutes. Current arrangements are such that a FIASH 

message can be transmitted to the Washington area in approximately 35 

minutes frcm the time of intercept. 

4. Coordi.nation: The JEIC (Joint Electronic Intelligence. Center) in 

FECOM receives the FLASH message simultaneously with other addressees and 

alerts other service electronic countermeasures activities in1he theater 

(the word "Joint" means Army-Navy only--no Air Force participation). In 

Europe, the Army Electronic Intelligence Center performs similar functions, 

again without Air Force participation. ASA stations a.re also alerted, and 

arrangements are being made for ASA to alert the Amy teams on a reciprocal 

basis. Tb.is is the only contact between field agencies. 

Nan Etm Program 

1. General: The Naval effort is directed more toward. acquisition of 

strategic· technicai data than toward warning indicators. Naval craft look 

tor the unusual and examine the capability of any kind of radar signal 

\ 

encountered. Surface ships are able to approach certain areas in a more 

leisurely fashion than is possible by other means. Frequency coverage is 

from 916 kilocycles to 10, 750 megacycles. , ~ 8-hour watch is maintained, I 

and indicators ·are similar to those of the Army. Usually, one or two 

submarines are under special control. They do not have full teams aboard. 

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2. Intercept Locations.: 

I Airborne ....__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--' 

team based in the PhilippinesJ 

Middle East - Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean area has one 

EO 3.3(h)(2) team available for visits CINCNEIM ~orces make; 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 three other teams in varying places around the 

Mediterranean, depending upon deployment of 

forces. These operate around the Aegean Sea and 

occasionally in the Adriatic, and with the Sixth 

Fleet. Airborne operations are based at Port 

Lyautey in French Morocco and operate to cover Black 

Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. 

3. Reporting: Airborne teams report through Top Secret channels With 

priority rating to CNO as the prime addressee, with others on the list. 

Message time varies from 1 to 4 hours. Reports a.re received at the Navy 

~curity Station in Washington and given to ANEEG. Ship teams report in 

similar :fashion, if the report is sufficiently important, but the data are 

usually ~uf:ficiently routine to be sent by secret dispatch. Land based 

teams have one-time pads in concjunction with the Army, and their reports 

go both to Army and to CNO. Routine reports come a.t intervals of about two 

weeks by mail, although emergency channels are available for reporting. 

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4. Coordination: COM.m'l' of'ficers at ASA collate Ravy intercept report• 

· vi th other intelligence and send the final report to OBI. There ia a 24-hour 

duty wtch in Washington. Field Co.MINT personnel are alerted in advance ot 

Bavy maneuvers. These data are coordinated with the British in routine 

exchange. There is also a field exchange between the Air Force and the 

1'a"17, with certain exceptions auch as magnetic tape recordings of the USAF. 

1bere are two evaluation units in the field. 

Air Force ELDT Program 

1. General: Frequency coverage is from slightly leas than 30 

kiloc,clea to 10,750 megac,cles on an 8-hour watch basis (for ground teams). 

Indicators are similar to those of the A1'lllY' and Havy but more limited. 'lhe 

primary effort is directed toward locating enemy.stations; secondary effort 

is toward ~~rminins technical characteristica of the radiating station. 

'lhe Air Force also monitors Soviet IDRAlf radiations. 

2. Intercept locations: PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

E03,3(h)(2) 

United States - Rine ground staticna as all integral part of Air 

Defense Comancl a.round the perim&ters of the us. 

Black Sea - I I one more 

expected b7 Rovember 1953. One mobile station along 

south shore of Black Sea. 

Airborne teams operate out of. England. ibey cover the area around 

Franz Josef land eve17 tbfee months or so and, more frequently, the Berents 

Sea, Marm.nsk area, Baltic, and Black Seas. Additional airborne teams cover 

Far Eastern coast areas. 

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... 

3·· ReP2£!iiy: SAO.tield. Qp1ra~1 c~·tlallh ine11apa traa field . . . . . 

operat:l.ou 1D 2·3 _boar• to.(~) theater· Keadquartera, (1,1.) ·local lavy anct 

. · ~ leaclca'UZ'tera,· Sid (1.:1.1) MC Bea4quartera. Air Poree penoiaN1 •'-te . . 

· ·that tbe t:IM. Ot caiwnn1cat10D deJ*d• CD a.._,.]illwic ~~t1ou im4 . . . . . 

•atlOD tbat a· •~hour ts. lliabt be a ftpre to lhoot at. It baa been 

•' 

atatect tilat 30..tmate nJOl'tilll waal4 'be poaaible it the re~tll wre . . . . ;. 

~c:teatl.J' .woag. . . 

~. Ooodilat:lon: 'Rlaw data an not p'ND to tlae Air Poree~ the Arrq 

·. SD tbe ft.eltl, 'bn tbe A:tsi Perie ,Pft• nab· data to tbe Anti, Vitb tbe 

uce;t;l• ot •llllft:l.o t.18 ree~ 11bt.cll are 1eDt to Wl'iabt l'i•l4 tor . . 

..i,.11 M4, mueb latel', to ARID. 'DI•~ nccmlinp cmtain bi&blT u1etul 

lata, ..a, to lie fllll7 etteetlw, '11oalA· be m.48 a•ila'ble to a sroup IUCh . . 

· u to ·cmn!de J.111Sn4ua1 •mce PN3uli••· ...... . . 

. . A~a ~ ._I aot &pplU' ~ 'be at.p'9 'ie·ia wit.la CCllD'! at . . . . 

~•14· in.11. . Ali ~-· lllOult· bav. olo9e31' ooordi•ted. CCllil'l mi . . . . . . . . 

... . . ~ ant..SU..1 119 ft•l4 mdtl - 'up '° tile Jd.pept lnel1, ...... all .. . . . . . . " . 

..moe mm aotS.T!.'1•1 aboD14 '9 oloae~ ·cOOl'tiD&.tecl at a central place 

.· ~tbsD ~· --- _.., ........ . . . : . \, 

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NSA Form 781-ClOS 1 Jul 52