Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A05-1603-CR-562 | November 22, 2016 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Angela N. Sanchez

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Special Asst. to the Henry County 

Public Defender

Wieneke Law Office, LLC

Brooklyn, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

State of Indiana,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Terrence L. Hawkins,

Appellee-Defendant.

November 22, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

33A05-1603-CR-562

Appeal from the Henry Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Mary G. Willis, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

33C01-1007-FB-35

Brown, Judge.
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[1] The State of Indiana appeals the trial court’s order granting a motion to 

suppress filed by Terrence L. Hawkins. The State raises one issue which we 

revise and restate as whether the trial court erred in granting Hawkins’s motion 

to suppress. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Shortly after noon on July 8, 2010, Richmond Police Officer David Glover 

observed a vehicle drive past on Interstate 70 at a high rate of speed. Officer 

Glover initiated a traffic stop and approached the vehicle. Officer Glover spoke 

to the driver, Hawkins, and the front seat passenger, Williams, and detected the 

odor of burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle. He noticed “some marijuana 

shake, small fragments of marijuana on the center console,” and asked Hawkins 

to step out of the vehicle. Transcript at 5. Officer Glover patted down Hawkins 

for weapons, asked him to identify an object in his pocket, and Hawkins 

answered that it was “two Gs,” which is a street term for $2,000.1 Id. at 21.

[3] Officer Glover spoke to the passenger, approached Hawkins again, had 

Hawkins sit in the front seat of the patrol vehicle, and called two other officers 

to the scene because of the odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle as well 

as the odor of alcohol on Hawkins’s breath. Officer Glover ran Hawkins’s 

driver’s license and the information for the passenger and started issuing a 

traffic ticket for speeding. 

 

1 Officer Glover later determined that the amount was $1,862.
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[4] Henry County Sheriff’s Sergeant Jim Goodwin and Hancock County Sheriff’s 

Deputy Nick Ernstes arrived at the scene. Sergeant Goodwin and Deputy 

Ernstes reported to Officer Glover that they could also smell burnt marijuana 

and see a couple of pieces of shake. Deputy Ernstes spoke with Hawkins and 

detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath. Deputy Ernstes then 

spoke with Williams in Hawkins’s vehicle and smelled the odor of burnt 

marijuana coming from inside the car. Deputy Ernstes talked to Williams 

about the smell of marijuana, and Williams stated that he had been smoking 

marijuana at some point. Deputy Ernstes asked Williams to step out of the 

patrol vehicle, and after Williams did so, Deputy Ernstes could see loose green 

particles of marijuana on the floor board where he had been seated.

[5] Deputy Ernstes handcuffed Williams, told him he was not under arrest, and 

read him his rights. Deputy Ernstes asked Williams if he knew there was

marijuana in the car, and Williams said that he “thought there was.” Id. at 38. 

Williams “wasn’t specific in nature in where it was, but he told [Deputy 

Ernstes] he thought it was in there.” Id. Williams admitted “that he had been 

smoking marijuana and that he had . . . had marijuana on the [sic] possession.” 

Id. at 40.

[6] Based upon the odor of burnt marijuana and observing the “shake” or raw 

marijuana, the police then searched the vehicle, and Officer Glover located a 

“blunt package” with two marijuana cigarettes in it in the ash tray of the 

passenger compartment and a set of digital scales in the center console. Id. at 8. 

Hawkins and the passenger were arrested for possession of marijuana, 
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handcuffed, and placed in the patrol vehicles. After the arrest, Sergeant 

Goodwin and Deputy Ernstes then searched the trunk and found a marijuana 

bong inside a sack and two handguns. 

[7] On July 9, 2010, the State charged Hawkins with possession of a firearm by a 

serious violent felon as a class B felony, possession of marijuana as a class A 

misdemeanor, and possession of paraphernalia as a class A misdemeanor. In 

2011, the court issued a bench warrant after Hawkins failed to appear. In 

August 2015, the warrant was served, and the court held a hearing. 

[8] On November 4, 2015, Hawkins filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized 

from his person and property and argued that the stop, detention, search, and 

arrest were without probable cause, a warrant, or valid consent. He argued that 

his arrest, detention, and seizure of his property were in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the 

Indiana Constitution. On January 4, 2016, the court held a hearing on the 

motion. 

[9] On February 4, 2016, the court entered an order granting Hawkins’s motion to 

suppress as it related to the evidence seized from the trunk and denied the 

motion as to all other evidence seized. Specifically, the court found that the 

traffic stop was valid and the drug material on the console was in plain sight 

and validly seized and that the search of Hawkins was conducted with consent 

and was valid for both officer safety and as a search incident to arrest. The 

order then states:
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4. . . . . [Hawkins] was handcuffed and placed in the back of the 

police vehicle. The search of the trunk of the vehicle was 

conducted without a warrant and the court finds no exception for 

the trunk of the vehicle due to officer safety. The Court finds that 

the weapons were not in plain sight and were not under the 

control of [Hawkins] or the passenger. The Court finds that there 

is no evidence that the Officer reasonably believed that his safety 

was in jeopardy while waiting for further officers.

5. One exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile 

exception. The State further argues that the “automobile 

exception” permitted the warrantless search of the entire vehicle. 

In Johnson v. State, 766 N.E.2d 426 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), [trans. 

denied,] also involving unlawful possession of a firearm by a 

serious violent felon, the search under the hood of a vehicle 

following a tip that a gun could be found under the hood of the 

vehicle was valid because the threat of harm and loss of evidence 

was significant and the vehicle was readily mobile. However, the 

automobile exception is not without its limitations. Here, there 

was no threat of harm and the threat of loss of evidence was 

insignificant.

6. One exception to the warrant requirement is an inventory 

search of a properly impounded vehicle, Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 

427 (Ind. [1993]). As stated in Edwards v. State, 762 N.E.2d 128 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2002), [aff’d on reh’g, 768 N.E.2d 506, trans. denied,] 

“to show that its actions come within the inventory exception, 

the State must do more than offer the bald allegation of law 

enforcement that the search was conducted as a routine 

inventory” for the trial court to determine if there is an 

evidentiary basis to evaluate whether the inventory search “was 

in conformity with established local law enforcement policy”. 

Although at the hearing, Officer Glover testified to an “inventory 

search” conducted after the arrest and prior to the vehicle being 

towed, this information is not contained within the police report 

where the search is referred to as a “PC search.” [State’s Exhibit 
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1]. No evidence was provided to the Court to establish that this 

was an inventory search pursuant to any established law 

enforcement procedure or protocol. Here, there wasn’t even a 

bald allegation of a local law enforcement policy or its 

compliance.

7. The Court finds that the officer’s testimony that, in his 

training and experience, there may be additional drug evidence in 

the car was accurate. However, that should have prompted 

either an application for a search warrant or strict compliance 

with an established law enforcement protocol on an inventory 

search. The undersigned commends the work of the PACE team 

and recognizes the many improvements made in the process 

since it was initiated nearly six years ago.

8. The Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion on nearly 

identical facts in Rhodes v. State, [50 N.E.3d 378,] (Ind. Ct. App. 

Jan. 19, 2016), which found the inventory search was 

unreasonable because the State did not prove the scope of the 

search complied with official police policy. In Rhodes, the 

testimony was even greater regarding an inventory search than 

was presented here.

9. The Court finds that the warrantless search of the trunk of the 

vehicle without consent and without evidence of the established 

protocols and procedures of a valid inventory search was invalid. 

The seizure of the fruits of the invalid search of the trunk of the 

vehicle, the weapons, were poisoned by the improper search 

without a warrant. The drug material and paraphernalia were 

discovered in plain sight and seizure of these items was valid, 

however, the ends, do not justify the means of discovery of the 

weapons in the trunk of the vehicle.

10. The items in the trunk of the vehicle were not in plain view 

and there is no evidence that there was a concern for officer 
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safety since [Hawkins] had been arrested, handcuffed and placed 

in the police vehicle. The Court finds that there was a basis for 

the stop and brief detention seeking the assistance of the fellow 

PACE officer based upon the strong odor of marijuana, and the 

seizure of the marijuana and paraphernalia was valid, but there 

was no basis for the warrantless search of the trunk of the vehicle 

and it does meet [sic] the automobile exception.

11. The search of the vehicle of the trunk [sic] without a warrant 

and the seizure of the weapons from the trunk without a valid 

warrant was improper and no valid automobile or inventory 

exception existed.

12. The Court finds the evidence seized from the trunk of the 

vehicle without a valid warrant was not within the inventory 

search exception, and the State shall be prohibited from 

introducing any evidence seized from the trunk of [Hawkins’s] 

vehicle without a warrant.

Appellant’s Appendix at 95-97 (underlining and italics omitted).

[10] On February 16, 2016, the State filed a motion to correct error. On March 8, 

2016, the court again found that the evidence seized from the trunk was without 

consent or a valid warrant and was not within the automobile or inventory 

exceptions and denied the State’s motion to correct error. 

Discussion

[11] The issue is whether the trial court erred in granting Hawkins’s motion to 

suppress. “In reviewing a trial court’s motion to suppress, we determine 

whether the record discloses ‘substantial evidence of probative value that 

supports the trial court’s decision.’” State v. Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d 1143, 1146 
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(Ind. 2011) (quoting State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 2006)). “We do 

not reweigh the evidence, but consider ‘conflicting evidence most favorably to 

the trial court’s ruling.’” Id. (quoting Quirk, 842 N.E.2d at 340). “When the 

State appeals from a negative judgment, as here, it ‘must show that the trial 

court’s ruling on the suppression motion was contrary to law.’” Id. (quoting 

State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ind. 2008), reh’g denied). “[T]he 

ultimate determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a 

question of law that we consider de novo.” Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 

1001 (Ind. 2014).

[12] The State argues that the search of the trunk was properly performed under the 

automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The State asserts that 

Hawkins admitted that police had probable cause to search his car and that, if 

probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the 

search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object 

of the search. Appellant’s Brief at 14 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 

825 (1982)). The State contends that the automobile exception does not require 

that there be an imminent possibility the vehicle may be driven away. Id. at 15 

(citing State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1286 (Ind. 2010)). It argues that the 

trial court required more of the officers than was demanded by the Fourth 

Amendment by looking for exigent circumstances that endangered the officers 

or risked destruction of evidence, and that the search of the trunk for illegal 

drugs was reasonable under the Indiana Constitution. 
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[13] Hawkins concedes that the State is correct that the odor of burnt marijuana 

gave Officer Glover the authority to search the vehicle for evidence of 

contraband, but argues that once Officer Glover found that evidence, under the 

holdings in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) and Gonser v. State, 843 

N.E.2d 947 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), he was required to terminate the warrantless 

search. Hawkins asserts that the officers had no authority under the automobile 

exception to continue searching the vehicle after they discovered the marijuana. 

He also argues that the search was not reasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of 

the Indiana Constitution. In reply, the State contends that the cases upon 

which Hawkins relies are clearly distinguishable because the object of the 

search in those cases was a specific, readily identifiable, and finite item, not a 

general class of evidence of unknown quantity as in this case.

[14] We focus on the Indiana Constitution as we find it dispositive. Article 1, 

Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall 

not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable 

cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 

describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 

seized.

[15] “Although this language tracks the Fourth Amendment verbatim, we proceed 

somewhat differently when analyzing the language under the Indiana 

Constitution than when considering the same language under the Federal 

Constitution.” Trimble v. State, 842 N.E.2d 798, 803 (Ind. 2006), adhered to on 
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reh’g, 848 N.E.2d 278 (Ind. 2006). “Instead of focusing on the defendant’s 

reasonable expectation of privacy, we focus on the actions of the police officer, 

concluding that the search is legitimate where it is reasonable given the totality 

of the circumstances.” Id. “We will consider the following factors in assessing 

reasonableness: ‘1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a 

violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or 

seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law 

enforcement needs.’” Id. (quoting Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 

2005)).

[16] Based upon the odor of burnt marijuana, the marijuana and blunt cigarettes 

found in the passenger compartment of the vehicle, the set of digital scales in 

the center console, the money found on Hawkins’s person, and Williams’s 

statement that he thought there was marijuana in the car, we conclude that the 

degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation occurred was high.

[17] As for the degree of intrusion, we observe that the Indiana Supreme Court has 

held that “[w]ith respect to automobiles generally, it may safely be said that 

Hoosiers regard their automobiles as private and cannot easily abide their 

uninvited intrusion.” Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 80 (Ind. 1995). The stop 

occurred shortly after noon at a time when prompt access to a magistrate would 

not have been difficult and along Interstate 70 exposing Hawkins to at least 

some public notice and embarrassment. Cf. Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1146, 

1154 (Ind. 2005) (addressing a search that occurred at 1:00 a.m. and holding the 

search occurred at a time when prompt access to a magistrate would be more 
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difficult and stating: “Second, the interior search of the defendant’s personal car 

was likely to impose an intrusion ‘on the citizen’s ordinary activities,’ but we 

recognize that, to a limited extent, the intrusion, at least as to public notice and 

embarrassment, was somewhat lessened because of the hour and place of the 

search”) (internal citation omitted).

[18] With respect to the extent of law enforcement needs, Hawkins and his 

passenger were already under arrest at the point that the trunk was searched

and there was little likelihood that the car would be moved or that the contents 

of the trunk would have been lost to the police. Cf. id. (observing that the 

defendant was present and not under arrest at the time of the interior search and 

free to drive his vehicle away and dispose of the contraband contained within,

and concluding that the warrantless search of the defendant’s vehicle did not 

violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution). Under these 

circumstances, we conclude that the search was unreasonable and violated

Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. 

Conclusion

[19] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s grant of Hawkins’s motion 

to suppress.

[20] Affirmed.

Robb, J., and Mathias, J., concur.