J-S68004-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ANTHONY TORRENCE DORSEY,

Appellant No. 1019 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 27, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0004000-2008, CP-02-CR-0005905-

2006

BEFORE: SHOGAN, SOLANO, and STRASSBURGER,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 23, 2016

Appellant, Anthony Torrence Dorsey, appeals from the judgments of 

sentence entered following revocation of his probation. We affirm.

On October 16, 2008, Appellant pled guilty to charges included in two 

criminal informations. At CC-2006-05905, Appellant pled guilty to one count 

of possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”) cocaine and one count of 

possession of drug paraphernalia. At the PWID count, Appellant was 

sentenced to two to four years of incarceration, followed by three years of 

probation. Sentencing Order, 10/16/08, CC-2006-05905, at 1-3. At the 

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*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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possession of drug paraphernalia count, Appellant was sentenced to one 

year of probation, concurrent to probation at the first count. Id. 

At CC-2008-04000, Appellant pled guilty to one count of escape and 

one count of summary criminal mischief. On the escape count, Appellant 

was sentenced to eleven and one-half to twenty-three months of 

incarceration, followed by three years of probation to run concurrently with 

the sentence imposed at CC-2006-05905, plus restitution.1 Sentencing 

Order, 10/16/08, CC-2008-04000, at 1-3. 

A detainer was filed against Appellant at both cases due to a 

subsequent arrest on February 21, 2013. The trial court summarized the 

facts leading to Appellant’s arrest as follows:

On February 21, 2013, Officer Simoni began conducting 

surveillance on Room 323 at a Motel 6 on Banksville Road in the 

City of Pittsburgh. He observed [Appellant] leave the room, 

enter a silver Cadillac, reach under the seat, grab something and 

return to the room only after a few minutes. He observed 

[Appellant] leave the hotel and return numerous times over a 

four-hour period. Sometimes, he would enter another room, 

Room 418, in the motel and return back to Room 323. At some 

point, [Appellant] again got into the Cadillac and began driving 

on Banksville Road. Officer Simoni and his partner conducted a 

traffic stop of [Appellant’s] vehicle. During a search of 

[Appellant’s] person, the officers located two large bundles of 

currency. Small rubber bands were also recovered. Officer 

Simoni indicated that these rubber bands were consistent with 

rubber bands used to package heroin stamp bags. No 

contraband was recovered and [Appellant] was permitted to 

leave the scene.

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1 No further penalty was imposed on the criminal mischief count.
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Detectives returned to the Motel 6 to continue surveillance. 

At approximately 5:45 p.m., [Appellant] returned to the hotel. 

[Appellant] was observed leaving Room 323 for short periods of 

time only to return after a few minutes. At approximately 8:00 

p.m., [Appellant] was observed leaving Room 323 and then 

entering Room 418 of the Motel 6. After a few minutes, another 

person, Jason Porter, was seen entering Room 418. Porter left 

the room after approximately five minutes. After Porter left, 

detectives conducted a traffic stop of the vehicle in which he was 

travelling and they found Porter to be in possession of 

approximately 50 stamp bags of heroin. After becoming aware 

of the heroin found on Porter, Officer Simoni then began to walk 

toward Room 418. As he approached the room, [Appellant] was 

observed exiting Room 418. [Appellant] was detained in the 

hallway and he admitted that he rented Room 323. Another 

detective proceeded to Room 418 and knocked on the door. 

While checking the room the detective observed in plain view 

380 stamp bags, raw heroin, cocaine, scales[,] empty bags and 

packaging materials. Based on this information, a search 

warrant for Room 323 was sought and obtained. Currency in the 

amount of $3,500, 158 stamp bags of heroin and a digital scale 

were recovered from Room 323. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/15, at 2-3. 

This activity constituted the basis for a violation of probation (“VOP”) 

hearing. These circumstances also resulted in subsequent drug charges 

being filed against Appellant at criminal information CC-2013-05582 

(“subsequent charges”). 

In the subsequent charges proceedings, Appellant filed a motion to 

suppress the evidence of drug activity obtained on February 21, 2013. The 

trial court concluded that, based on the four corners of the affidavit, there 

was not probable cause to issue the warrant for the search of Room 323 at 

the Motel 6. Thus, any evidence obtained from Room 323 was suppressed. 

While the trial court granted the motion to suppress evidence seized from 
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Appellant’s motel room, the court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress 

evidence seized from Appellant’s vehicle. The Commonwealth filed an 

appeal from the trial court’s ruling to this Court, and this Court affirmed the 

trial court’s suppression ruling. Commonwealth v. Dorsey, 1180 WDA 

2014, 122 A.3d 453 (Pa. Super. filed May 18, 2015) (unpublished 

memorandum). The Commonwealth subsequently filed a petition for 

allowance of appeal from this Court’s affirmance of the suppression court’s 

ruling. That petition for allowance of appeal was denied on December 31, 

2015. Commonwealth v. Dorsey, 130 A.3d 1286, 216 WAL 2015 (Pa. 

filed December 31, 2015).2

The VOP hearing was held on May 27, 2015. N.T., 5/27/15, at 1-53. 

At the VOP hearing, testimony of Detective Justin Simoni regarding the 

events of February 21, 2013, was introduced, including a description of 

evidence seized from Room 323 of the Motel 6. Id. at 24-27. Appellant 

objected to introduction of this testimony on the basis of the trial court’s 

order granting his suppression motion in the subsequent charges 

proceedings. Id. at 8-10. The probation-revocation court ruled that the 

testimony, though suppressed in the subsequent charges proceedings, was 

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2 With regard to further proceedings on the subsequent charges, the 

Commonwealth’s brief notes that “the public docket for Appellant’s new case 

. . . indicates that he has yet to go to trial.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 13, 

n.4. The Commonwealth also references the fact that the suppression order 

related to evidence seized from Appellant’s motel room and not to evidence 

seized from his vehicle. Id.
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admissible at the VOP hearing. Id. Thus, the VOP court permitted Detective 

Simoni to testify about the events of February 21, 2013. Id. at 13-34. 

Following the hearing, Appellant’s probation was revoked, and he was 

sentenced to three to six years of incarceration at a state correctional 

institution at CC-2006-05905. Sentencing Order, 5/27/15, CC-2006-05905, 

at 1. At docket number CC-2008-04000, Appellant was sentenced to five 

years of probation, to be served consecutively to confinement imposed at 

CC-2006-05905. Sentencing Order, 5/27/15, CC-2008-04000, at 1. No 

post-sentence motions were filed. Appellant timely appealed. Appellant and 

the trial court complied with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence in a 

hearing for violation of probation where that evidence had

previously been suppressed in the prosecution of [Appellant] for 

another offense?

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a 

sentence of total confinement for technical violations of 

probation where [Appellant] had already served a substantial 

period of incarceration and, while incarcerated, he had taken 

steps to change his behavior upon release and developed a plan 

for his continued rehabilitation?

Appellant’s Brief at 6. 

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in 

admitting evidence in the VOP hearing, where that evidence had been 

suppressed in the prosecution of the subsequent charges. Appellant’s Brief 

at 17. Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth delayed the hearing on the 
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violation of probation until after the trial on new charges. Id. at 18. 

Appellant maintains that after he was acquitted, the Commonwealth brought 

an action to revoke Appellant’s probation on the basis of the same facts. Id. 

Appellant contends that this case is analogous to Commonwealth v. 

Brown, 469 A.2d 1371 (Pa. 1983). Id. at 18-19. Appellant asserts that his 

sentence must be vacated and the case returned for a new probation 

violation hearing. Id. at 19. 

“Revocation of a probation sentence is a matter committed to the 

sound discretion of the trial court and that court’s decision will not be 

disturbed on appeal in the absence of an error of law or an abuse of 

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Perreault, 930 A.2d 553, 558 (Pa. Super. 

2007). The Sentencing Code permits a court to revoke an order of probation 

under the following circumstances:

§ 9771. Modification or revocation of order of probation

(a) General rule.--The court may at any time terminate 

continued supervision or lessen or increase the conditions upon 

which an order of probation has been imposed.

(b) Revocation.--The court may revoke an order of probation 

upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of the 

probation. Upon revocation the sentencing alternatives available 

to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of 

initial sentencing, due consideration being given to the time 

spent serving the order of probation.

(c) Limitation on sentence of total confinement.--The court 

shall not impose a sentence of total confinement upon revocation 

unless it finds that:
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(1) the defendant has been convicted of another 

crime; or

(2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is 

likely that he will commit another crime if he is not 

imprisoned; or

(3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the 

authority of the court.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(a)-(c). Whether the probationer, in fact, violated the 

conditions of his probation must be demonstrated by evidence of probative 

value. Commonwealth v. Sims, 770 A.2d 346, 349 (Pa. Super. 2001). 

The Commonwealth bears a lesser burden of proof at a probation revocation 

hearing than it does in a criminal trial. Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 969 

A.2d 1236, 1241 (Pa. Super. 2009). “The Commonwealth establishes a 

probation violation meriting revocation when it shows, by a preponderance 

of the evidence, that the probationer’s conduct violated the terms and 

conditions of his probation, and that probation has proven an ineffective 

rehabilitation tool incapable of deterring probationer from future antisocial 

conduct.” Perreault, 930 A.2d at 558. “[A]n implied condition of any 

sentence of probation is that the defendant will not commit a further 

offense.” Commonwealth v. Infante, 888 A.2d 783, 790 (Pa. 2005).

A revocation hearing need not “be conducted with the same procedural 

and evidentiary rules as would apply to a trial on the criminal charges 

growing out of the same facts.” Commonwealth v. Kates, 305 A.2d 701, 

710 (Pa. 1973). “In this area of rights of probationers and parolees the 
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controlling factor is not whether the traditional rules of evidence or 

procedure including Fourth and Fifth Amendment exclusionary rules, have 

been strictly observed, but rather whether the probative value of the 

evidence has been affected.” Id., see also Commonwealth v. Holder, 

805 A.2d 499, 504 n.7 (Pa. 2002) (stating that in revocation hearing, 

“probationer ... is not entitled to strict application of the rules of evidence or 

procedure, including the Fourth and Fifth Amendment exclusionary rules”); 

Commonwealth v. Lehman, 851 A.2d 941 (Pa. Super. 2004) (holding that 

in context of probation violation hearings and application of exclusionary 

rule, Pennsylvania Constitution affords no greater protection than does 

federal constitution).

While Appellant fails to specify in his brief the evidence to which he 

objected to having admitted at the VOP hearing, we surmise he is referring 

to the testimony of Detective Simoni that outlined the events of February 

21, 2013, resulting in Appellant’s subsequent arrest and the subsequent 

charges. As noted, the trial court’s ruling suppressed evidence found in 

Room 323 at the motel, but not evidence found in Appellant’s vehicle. This 

Court affirmed that decision, and our Supreme Court denied the 

Commonwealth’s petition for allowance of appeal on that issue. 

We further note that contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the 

Commonwealth did not delay Appellant’s VOP hearing until after the trial on 

the subsequent charges. There is no evidence of record that Appellant was 
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acquitted on the subsequent charges, let alone evidence that the alleged 

acquittal occurred before the VOP hearing.3 As a result, Appellant’s reliance 

on Commonwealth v. Brown, 469 A.2d 1371 (Pa. 1983) is misplaced.4

Instead, in the matter before us, Appellant’s VOP hearing occurred 

before trial on the subsequent charges. While the trial court granted 

Appellant’s suppression motion as to the evidence obtained at the motel in 

the subsequent charges proceeding prior to the VOP hearing, there was no 

final disposition as to those subsequent charges. Accordingly, we find the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Kates, to be analogous to the case before us 

and instructive as to Appellant’s claim. 

In Kates, after the appellant’s conviction for wantonly pointing a 

firearm, aggravated assault, and battery, she was placed on probation. Id.

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3 As noted, in its brief which was filed in this Court on July 21, 2016, the 

Commonwealth asserts that Appellant had not been acquitted of the 

subsequent offenses and had yet to proceed to trial. Commonwealth’s Brief 

at 13, n.4. Moreover, the Commonwealth’s petition for allowance of appeal 

on the suppression issue, following our affirmance of the suppression court’s 

order, was denied by our Supreme Court on December 31, 2015. 

Accordingly, the evidence of record supports the conclusion that Appellant 

had not yet proceeded to trial on the subsequent charges at the time the 

VOP hearing was held on May 27, 2015.

4

In Brown, the appellant was arrested and charged with new criminal 

offenses while serving probation. Id. 469 A.2d at 1372. The trial on the 

new criminal offenses occurred prior to the appellant’s VOP hearing. Id. 

The appellant was acquitted of the new criminal charges. Id. As a result, 

our Supreme Court concluded that the VOP hearing judge was collaterally 

estopped from revoking the appellant’s probation based on charges of which 

the appellant had been acquitted. Id. at 1377-1378. 
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at 703. While on probation, the appellant was again arrested, this time for 

homicide, and a revocation of probation hearing was conducted. Id. At the 

revocation hearing, primarily on the basis of an incriminating statement 

attributed to the appellant, the hearing judge found that the appellant had 

shot and killed Frank Jordan. Id. Her probation was revoked and she was 

sentenced to incarceration. Id. The appellant filed an appeal from that 

judgment of sentence. Id. Subsequent to the revocation of probation, the 

court granted a motion to suppress the statement made by the appellant 

because it violated the mandates of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 

(1966), on the homicide charge.5 Id. 

On appeal from the probation revocation judgment of sentence, the 

appellant first argued that the practice of conducting a probation violation 

hearing prior to the trial for the subsequent offense should be disallowed on 

constitutional and policy considerations. Id. at 706. Our Supreme Court 

held that it is permissible to conduct a revocation hearing before trial on the 

subsequent offense. Id. at 709. 

The appellant also argued that her incriminating statement that had 

been suppressed in the homicide proceeding should not have been admitted 

at the probation revocation hearing. Id. at 711. The Court determined, 

however, that the fact that the appellant’s statement was subsequently ruled 

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5 No appeal was taken from that ruling and the appellant was eventually 

found not guilty of the slaying of Frank Jordan.
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inadmissible in the homicide proceeding because it violated Miranda did not 

preclude it from being presented during her revocation hearing and did not 

form the basis of a denial of due process. Id. at 711. In making this 

determination, the Court provided the following explanation:

At the subsequent trial the issue is whether the elements of the 

offense or offenses charged are present and the burden is upon 

the Commonwealth to establish all of the requisite elements 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The focus of a probation violation 

hearing, even though prompted by a subsequent arrest, is 

whether the conduct of the probationer indicates that the 

probation has proven to be an effective vehicle to accomplish 

rehabilitation and a sufficient deterrent against future antisocial 

conduct. 

Kates, 305 A.2d at 708. 

The Court further stated: 

[No case law] that has come to our attention, requires that a 

revocation hearing be conducted with the same procedural and 

evidentiary rules as would apply to a trial on the criminal 

charges growing out of the same facts. In this area of rights of 

probationers and parolees the controlling factor is not whether 

the traditional rules of evidence or procedure including Fourth 

and Fifth Amendment exclusionary rules, have been strictly 

observed, but rather whether the probative value of the evidence

has been affected. As discussed above, the purpose of the 

revocation hearing is simply to establish to the satisfaction of the 

judge who granted probation that the individual’s conduct 

warrants his continuing as a probationer.

Kates, 305 A.2d at 710. The appellant’s judgment of sentence was 

affirmed. Id. at 711. Thus, the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary 

rules do not apply to probation revocation hearings. Id. at 710; see also 

Holder, 805 A.2d at 504 n.7 (stating that in a revocation hearing, 
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“probationer ... is not entitled to strict application of the rules of evidence or 

procedure, including the Fourth and Fifth Amendment exclusionary rules.”).

In the case before us, as determined by our Supreme Court, there was 

no prohibition to conducting the VOP hearing prior to trial on Appellant’s 

subsequent charges. Additionally, as result of the different standards and 

purposes of the two proceedings, the exclusionary rules did not prohibit 

introduction of evidence at the VOP hearing that was suppressed in the new 

criminal charges proceeding. Thus, in light of the procedural posture of the 

case before us, the VOP hearing court did not err in permitting the testimony 

of Detective Simoni. This is true even if Appellant was later acquitted of the 

subsequent charges that formed the basis for revocation of his probation. 

Kates, 305 A.2d at 703, 711; see also Holder, 805 A.2d at 504 n.8 (“even 

if the probationer is later acquitted of the criminal charges, the factual 

support for the earlier probation revocation is not necessarily removed, and 

the revocation may still stand.”). Appellant’s first claim lacks merit.

In his second claim, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion in imposing a sentence of total confinement for technical violations 

where Appellant had already served a substantial period of incarceration 

and, while incarcerated, had taken steps to change his behavior upon 

release, and developed a plan for his continued rehabilitation. Appellant’s 

Brief at 21. As a result, Appellant contends that his revocation sentences 

must be vacated, and he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. Id. at 22. 
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Appellant’s issue challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.6 

We note that “[t]he right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of 

a sentence is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 

(Pa. Super. 2014). Rather, where an appellant challenges the discretionary 

aspects of a sentence, the appeal should be considered a petition for 

allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. W.H.M. Jr., 932 A.2d 155, 163 

(Pa. Super. 2007).

As we observed in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162 (Pa. 

Super. 2010):

An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a 

four-part test:

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to 

determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely 

notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) 

whether the issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [708]; (3) whether 

appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial 

question that the sentence appealed from is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9781(b).

Id. at 170 (citing Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. 

Super. 2006)). The determination of whether there is a substantial question 

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6

In Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1034 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(en banc), this Court held that our “scope of review in an appeal from a 

revocation sentencing includes discretionary sentencing challenges.” Thus, 

there is no impediment to our review.
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is made on a case-by-case basis, and this Court will grant the appeal only 

when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing 

judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the 

Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie 

the sentencing process. Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912–

913 (Pa. Super. 2000).

Herein, Appellant brought a timely appeal. Additionally, Appellant has 

included a statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) in his brief. 

Fatal to his claim, however, is the fact that Appellant failed to raise 

this challenge at the time of sentencing on the probation revocation, N.T., 

5/27/15, at 1-53, or in a post-sentence motion. Thus, this claim is waived. 

Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 371 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“Issues 

challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be raised in a postsentence motion or by presenting the claim to the trial court during the 

sentencing proceedings. Absent such efforts, an objection to a discretionary 

aspect of a sentence is waived.”). 

Judgments of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/23/2016