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[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2606 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2606

    To require an unclassified interagency report on the political 
  influence operations of the Government of the People's Republic of 
   China and the Chinese Communist Party with respect to the United 
                    States, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             August 4, 2021

 Mr. Rubio (for himself and Ms. Cortez Masto) introduced the following 
  bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign 
                               Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To require an unclassified interagency report on the political 
  influence operations of the Government of the People's Republic of 
   China and the Chinese Communist Party with respect to the United 
                    States, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Countering the Chinese Government 
and Communist Party's Political Influence Operations Act''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
                    (C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (D) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
                Pensions of the Senate;
                    (E) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
                    (F) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                Senate;
                    (G) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
                Affairs of the Senate;
                    (H) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
                Representatives;
                    (I) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
                Representatives;
                    (J) the Committee on Education and Labor of the 
                House of Representatives;
                    (K) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives;
                    (L) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
                Representatives;
                    (M) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
                of the House of Representatives; and
                    (N) the Committee on Financial Services of the 
                House of Representatives.
            (2) Political influence operations.--The term ``political 
        influence operations'' means the coordinated and often 
        concealed application of disinformation, press manipulation, 
        economic coercion, targeted investments, corruption, or 
        academic censorship, which are often intended--
                    (A) to coerce and corrupt United States interests, 
                values, institutions, or individuals; and
                    (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, or 
                outcomes in the United States that support the 
                interests of the Government of the People's Republic of 
                China or the Chinese Communist Party.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Government of the People's Republic of China and 
        the Chinese Communist Party employ a wide range of political, 
        informational, and economic measures to influence, coerce, 
        intimidate, and undermine the United States interests and the 
        interests of United States partners and allies.
            (2) The December 2017 National Security Strategy of the 
        United States of America states, ``Although the United States 
        seeks to continue to cooperate with China, China is using 
        economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and 
        implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its 
        political and security agenda.''
            (3) Given the economic strength of the People's Republic of 
        China and the growing apparatus being used to spread its 
        influence globally, efforts to promote its authoritarian ideal 
        pose significant and consequential long-term challenges to 
        United States interests and values.
            (4) The Government of the People's Republic of China and 
        the Chinese Communist Party use overt and covert means to 
        target the political and economic elite, the media and public 
        opinion, civil society and academia, and members of the Chinese 
        diaspora.
            (5) The Government of the People's Republic of China and 
        the Chinese Communist Party employ an array of government 
        entities, friendship and exchange organizations, private 
        entities and businesspeople, and government-funded foundations, 
        think tanks, educational and other projects to carry out 
        political influence operations, which is often referred to as 
        ``United Front work.''
            (6) According to the U.S.-China Economic and Security 
        Review Commission, ``China uses what it calls `United Front' 
        work to co-opt and neutralize sources of potential opposition 
        to the policies and authority of its ruling Chinese Communist 
        Party. . . To carry out its influence activities abroad, the 
        [United Front Work Department] directs `overseas Chinese work,' 
        which seeks to co-opt ethnic Chinese individuals and 
        communities living outside China, while a number of other key 
        affiliated organizations guided by China's broader United Front 
        strategy conduct influence operations targeting foreign actors 
        and states.''
            (7) These political influence operations violate national 
        sovereignty, and as such, are fundamentally different from 
        traditional efforts by countries to shape international policy 
        debates and improve their public image through public diplomacy 
        and strategic communications campaigns.
            (8) The aims of the political influence operations of the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese 
        Communist Party are--
                    (A) to protect the political security of the 
                Chinese Communist Party, or its ability to exercise an 
                absolute monopoly on political power within the 
                People's Republic of China and to increasingly to 
                dominate international politics regarding issues that 
                the Chinese Communist Party deems important;
                    (B) to domestically and globally promote the idea 
                that the Chinese Communist Party's political and 
                economic model is superior to that of democracies;
                    (C) to spread its governance model to other 
                countries and to undermine democracy and free-market 
                economies;
                    (D) to promote the interests of the regime 
                globally;
                    (E) to weaken American alliances and partnerships 
                by creating new divisions between them, or by 
                exacerbating existing ones; and
                    (F) to foment domestic social and political 
                divisions, and to exacerbate existing ones, within 
                democratic countries, including by undermining popular 
                confidence in democracy and its essential institutions.
            (9) The political influence operations of the Government of 
        the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party 
        take advantage of the open and democratic nature of the United 
        States, including--
                    (A) constitutional protections for free speech and 
                a free press; and
                    (B) the desire of some companies or institutions to 
                attract Chinese investment, gain access to Chinese 
                markets, or attain greater global influence.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the political influence operations of the Government of 
        the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party 
        are not ``soft power'' intended to persuade, but ``sharp 
        power'' intended--
                    (A) to penetrate or corrupt democratic countries 
                and undermine democratic institutions and freedoms;
                    (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, laws, and 
                policies favorable to the Government of the People's 
                Republic of China's interest through disinformation, 
                coercion, corruption, and other means;
                    (C) to widen the scope of Chinese authoritarian 
                influence around the world, including--
                            (i) to suppress political opposition to the 
                        Chinese Communist Party; and
                            (ii) to violate the internationally 
                        recognized human and civil rights of both 
                        Chinese and foreign citizens living in 
                        countries around the world; and
                    (D) to undermine the strength of American alliances 
                around the world; and
            (2) the people of the United States need reliable and 
        current information--
                    (A) to identify the key institutions, individuals, 
                entities, and ministries that carry out such 
                operations; and
                    (B) to distinguish between malign political 
                influence operations intended to undermine core 
                American freedoms and democratic institutions, as 
                opposed to legitimate cultural, educational, business, 
                and people-to-people exchanges that may benefit the 
                United States and China.
    (c) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to clearly differentiate between the Chinese people and 
        culture and the Government of the People's Republic of China 
        and the Chinese Communist Party in official statements, media 
        messaging, and policy;
            (2) to clearly differentiate between legal, internationally 
        accepted public diplomacy and strategic communications 
        campaigns and illicit activities to undermine democratic 
        institutions or freedoms;
            (3) to protect United States citizens and legal residents 
        from malign or coercive political influence operations;
            (4) to enhance cooperation and coordination with the United 
        Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Taiwan, 
        Singapore, and the members of the European Union, whose 
        governments and institutions have faced acute pressure from the 
        political influence operations of the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party, and 
        with other allies throughout the world;
            (5) to create strategies to ensure that countries in 
        Africa, the Western Hemisphere, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere 
        are aware of the People's Republic of China's ``sharp power'' 
        tactics, including the Chinese Communist Party's party-to-party 
        training program, which is designed to instill admiration and 
        emulation of Beijing's governance model and weaken democracy in 
        these regions, and provide needed capacity to counter them 
        effectively;
            (6) to implement more advanced transparency requirements 
        concerning collaboration with Chinese actors for media 
        agencies, universities, think tanks, and government officials;
            (7) to use various forums to raise awareness about--
                    (A) the goals and methods of the political 
                influence operations of the Government of the People's 
                Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party; and
                    (B) common patterns and approaches used by Chinese 
                intelligence agencies or related actors;
            (8) to require greater transparency for Confucius 
        Institutes, think tanks, academic programs, and nongovernmental 
        organizations funded primarily by the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party, or 
        by individuals or public or private organizations with a 
        demonstrable affiliation with the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that are 
        operating in the United States to register through the Foreign 
        Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.) or a 
        comparable mechanism;
            (9) to seek ways to increase Chinese language proficiency 
        among mid-career professionals that do not rely on funding 
        linked to the Government of the People's Republic of China;
            (10) to ensure that existing tools are sufficiently 
        screening for the risk of Chinese influence operations; and
            (11) to create more flexible tools, as needed, with the 
        goals of--
                    (A) screening investments from the Government of 
                the People's Republic of China or sources backed by 
                such government to protect against the takeover of 
                United States companies by Chinese state-owned or 
                state-driven entities; and
                    (B) protecting institutions or business sectors 
                critically important to United States national security 
                and the viability of democratic institutions.

SEC. 4. STRATEGY TO COUNTER ``SHARP POWER'' POLITICAL INFLUENCE 
              OPERATIONS AND TO PROTECT UNITED STATES CITIZENS.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, in coordination with all relevant Federal agencies, 
shall develop a long-term strategy--
            (1) to carry out the policy set forth in section 3(c);
            (2) to effectively counter the ``sharp power'' political 
        influence operations of the Chinese Communist Party globally 
        and in the United States;
            (3) to ensure that United States citizens, particularly 
        Chinese Americans and members of the Chinese, Uyghur, 
        Mongolian, Korean, Taiwanese, and Tibetan diaspora who are 
        often the victims and primary targets of malign political 
        influence operations, are protected;
            (4) to ensure that--
                    (A) the United States Government strategy to 
                protect the communities described in paragraph (3) is 
                clearly communicated by relevant Federal officials; and
                    (B) secure outlets are created for reporting on 
                intimidation and surveillance;
            (5) to ensure that Chinese nationals who are legally 
        studying, living, or working temporarily in the United States 
        know that intimidation or surveillance by the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party is 
        an unacceptable invasion of their rights while they reside in 
        the United States;
            (6) to provide secure outlets for reporting on intimidation 
        and surveillance; and
            (7) to identify new tools or authorities necessary to 
        implement this strategy.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, 
or an appropriate high-ranking official, shall--
            (1) submit an unclassified report, which may include a 
        classified annex, containing the strategy required under 
        subsection (a) to the appropriate congressional committees; or
            (2) describe the strategy required under subsection (a) 
        through unclassified testimony before the Committee on Foreign 
        Relations of the Senate or the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
        the House of Representatives.

SEC. 5. REPORT ON THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT 
              OF CHINA AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA.

    (a) In General.--Because it is important for United States 
policymakers and the American people to be informed about the influence 
operations described in section 3, not later than 270 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National 
Intelligence, and in consultation with the heads of relevant Federal 
departments and agencies, shall submit an unclassified report, which 
may include a classified annex, to the appropriate congressional 
committees that describes the political influence operations of the 
Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist 
Party affecting the United States and select allies and partners, 
including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, 
and Japan, including efforts--
            (1) to exert influence over United States governmental or 
        nongovernmental institutions or individuals, or government 
        officials among United States allies and partners;
            (2) to coerce or threaten United States citizens or legal 
        permanent residents or their families and associates living in 
        China or elsewhere;
            (3) to undermine democratic institutions and the freedoms 
        of speech, expression, the press, association, assembly, 
        religion, or academic thought;
            (4) to otherwise suppress information in public fora, in 
        the United States and abroad; or
            (5) to develop or obtain property, facilities, 
        infrastructure, business entities, or other assets for use in 
        facilitating the activities described in paragraphs (1) through 
        (4).
    (b) Contents.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
include recommendations for the President and Congress relating to--
            (1) the need for additional resources or authorities to 
        counter political influence operations in the United States 
        directed by the Government of the People's Republic of China 
        and the Chinese Communist Party, including operations carried 
        out in concert with allies;
            (2) whether a permanent office to monitor and respond to 
        political influence operations of the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party 
        should be established within the Department of State or within 
        the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and
            (3) whether regular public reports on the political 
        influence operations of the Government of the People's Republic 
        of China and the Chinese Communist Party are needed to inform 
        Congress and the American people of the scale and scope of such 
        operations.
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