1 Filed 8/13/14 In re L.P. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELL ATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

In re L.P. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. R.J., Defendant and Appellant. E060919 (Super.Ct.No. J246227-29) O P I N I O N

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Sa n Bernardino County. Cheryl C. Kersey, Judge. Affirmed. Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointmen t by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, and Danielle E. Wuchenich, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 I. INTRODUCTION Defendant and appella nt, R.J. (Father), appeals orders terminating parental rights and placing his three children for adoption: L.P., a girl born in September 2012; I.P., a boy born in March 2011; and A. P., a boy born in June 2004. 1 Father claims the court erroneously refused to apply the sibling re lationship exception to adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) 2 We affirm, because substantial evidence shows none of the children shared a significant bond with any of their older half siblings, and the court reasonably conc luded adoption was the best option for the children.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Background The family came to the attention of pl aintiff and respondent, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (C FS), in September 2012 after L.P. and the mother tested positive for methamphetamine when L.P. was born. L.P. was transferred to the neonatal intensive care unit due to respiratory problems a nd withdrawals. The mother admitted using methamphetamine during the pregnancy, incl uding the day before L.P. was born because she thought she was ove rdue and wanted to induce labor. The parents were not married but had lived together for years. The mother was 31 years old and had been using methamphetamine since she was 13 years old. I.P. also

1 The children’s mother did not appeal.

2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.3 tested positive for methamphetamine when he was born in March 2011. 3 A.P. testified negative for drugs when he was born in June 2004, but the mother admitted that one year was the longest period sh e had been sober since junior high school. Father was 41 years old and was reported to be “out of it” and “stumbling” at the hospital when L.P. was born. In addition to the three children he had with the mother, Father had five other children between the ages of 12 and 22 by three other mothers. Father reported having no contact with his older children and poor relationships with their mothers. Each parent had several convictions for possessing and/or being under the influence of controlled substances. Father also had a 2005 conviction for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse/co habitant and a 2008 burglary conviction. Father was on pain medication and collecting state disabilit y payments because he was electrocuted while his “friend” was attempting to steal el ectrical components. Father did not take responsibility for his criminal history, claimi ng he “took the blame fo r someone else.” On October 2, 2012, the children were take n into protective cust ody and placed in foster care. The parents refused to partic ipate in an inpatient treatment program and continued to use methamphetamine. In November 2012, the court sustained jurisdictional allegations based on the parents’ drug use, their criminal histories, and the mother’s related history of anxiety and de pression. (§ 300, subds. (b), (j).) At

3 The parents were offered services in April 2011, including outpatient treatment center referrals, but did not take advantage of them.4 disposition, the children were ordered removed from parental custody (§ 361, subd. (c)), and the parents were offered reuni fication services and visitation. 4 The children were placed w ith the paternal grandparen ts in November 2012, but were removed from that home in April 2013 af ter a driver found I. P. running across the street at an intersection near the home. While the paternal grandmother was changing L.P.’s diaper and the paternal grandfather an d an uncle were also in the home, none of them noticed I.P. had walked out of the “wide open” front door. 5 In May 2013, the court sustained section 387 suppleme ntal petitions and or dered the children removed, based on the paternal grandparents’ failure to provide adequate care and supervision. 6
The children were returned to foster care in April 2013, and in May the court granted CFS’s request to “list” the childre n on Web sites seeking adoptive families for special needs children. I.P. had language de lays and hyperactivity, and required special

4 The parents appealed the November 20 12 dispositional orders, challenging the court’s jurisdictional findings and order rem oving the children from their custody, and claiming inadequate notice was given under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C.A. § 1901 et seq.) and related Californi a law (§§ 224.2, 224.3). This court found the ICWA notices were inadequate and cond itionally reversed the dispositional orders, but rejected the parents’ other claims. ( In re L.P. (Oct. 29, 2013, E057864) [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, CFS ga ve further ICWA notices. The court found they were adequate and reinstated th e dispositional orders.

5 The paternal grandparents had dela yed making medical appointments for the children and had delayed filling A.P.’s asthma and psoriasis medications.

6 Both the mother and the paternal grandmother a ppealed the May 14, 2013, order removing the children from the paternal grandparents, and th e appeal was assigned case No. E058648. This court di smissed the paternal grandmother’s appeal because she was not a party and dismissed the mother’s appeal because it was abandoned.5 care and supervision. In his evaluation, I.P. was described as a “very hyperactive, uncooperative, almost ‘wild’ ch ild” with “piercing screams” and frequent tantrums. A.P. received poor to failing grades in third gr ade, was being assessed for attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and required a lo t of support at home and at school. L.P. was being assessed for special needs. The parents’ services were terminated in June 2013. During a March 7 visit, the mother appeared to be under the influence, used profanity in front of the children, and was inappropriate with A.P., calling him name s and telling him “you suck.” A.P. was crying and the mother continued to yell at hi m. The social worker ended the visit, the mother called the social worker “a piece of shit,” and security was called. The mother’s visits were suspended on March 27, and were never reinstated. Meanwhile, Father continued with his crim inal lifestyle. In December 2012, he picked up another conviction for possessing a controlled substance and was placed on formal probation. In Febr uary 2013, when he was still on probation, Father was convicted of burglary and vand alism and sentenced to two years in prison. Father was released from custody early, in September 2013, and resumed supervised visits with the children. Father did not vis it the children while incarcerated , but visits before and after his incarceration were consis tent, and he was appropriate with the children.
B. The Section 366.26 Hearing By October 2013, th e children were in separate fo ster care homes and CFS had yet to locate an adoptive pl acement for all three of them. Th e children had b een in multiple6 foster placements since October 2012. Still, I.P. was making “great progress”; he was able to be redirected; he no longer cried ex cessively; and he was ha ppy and affectionate. L.P. was being treated for developmental dela ys in gross motor skills, receptive language, and expressive language. She presented as “a happy child” who made good eye contact. A.P. was developmentally on target for his ag e and had an Individual Education Plan for a special learning disability. A.P. was frie ndly and articulate, affectionate toward his younger siblings, and engaged easily with adu lts. A.P. was receiving weekly therapy to address his feelings related to dome stic violence between his parents. In November 2013, CFS located an out- of-state, adoptive placement for all three children. I.P. and L.P. were still too young to understand adoption, but A.P. told the social worker he wanted an adoptive fam ily “with a mom and dad, a Dalmation puppy, and his siblings.” The adoptive parents had cared for many foster children and had adopted four special needs child ren. Their adopted children were born drug exposed and came to their home with aggressive behavior s and developmental delays which had since been resolved. At the section 366.26 heari ng on April 1, 2014, Father and his 19-year-old son Jacob testified. According to Father, Jacob regularly saw the childre n before they were detained in October 2012, a nd one of his older daughters, Alexandra, saw the children twice weekly. Thereafter, Jacob and Alexan dra saw the children “a few times.” They sometimes accompanied Father on his visits with the children , and they often visited the children in the paternal grandparents’ home. Jacob and A.P. were “i nto video games.”7 Jacob testified he lived across the street from Father, the moth er, and the children before October 2012, when th e children were detained, and during that time he saw the children five days each week. He would “han g out” “all day” with A.P. and I.P., help A.P. with his homework, and play video an d other games with th e boys. When the children were placed with the paternal gran dparents, Jacob visited them once or twice each week. After the child ren were returned to foster care, Jacob was able to visit them a few times by accompanying his Fa ther on visits. He loved the children; they were his “blood,” and he wanted to take them to sporting events and see them grow up. At the conclusion of the hearing, the cour t terminated parental rights and selected adoption as the children’s perman ent plan. The court rejected Father’s request to place the children in a guardianship based on the pa rental benefit exception to adoption, and each parent’s request to apply the sibling relationship excep tion. The court indicated it was clearly in the best interests of the children to be adopted, and there was no compelling reason to apply either exception. Father’s visits ha d not progressed beyond supervised, and the children’s older half sibl ings had never lived with them. Father appealed.
III. DISCUSSION Father claims the court erroneously re fused to apply the sibling relationship exception to the adoption prefer ence. We find no error.8 A. Applicable Law At a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court determines a permanent plan of care for a dependent child. ( In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 50.) Permanent plans include adoption, guardianship, and long-term foster care. ( In re
S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App. 4th 289, 296.) “Adoption, wh ere possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature.” ( In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.Ap p.4th 567, 573.) Adoption involves terminating the legal ri ghts of the child’s natural parents, but guardianship and long-term foster care leave parental rights intact. ( In re Autumn H.,

supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 574.) “‘Guardianship, while a mo re stable placement than foster care, is not irrevocable and thus falls short of the se cure and permanent future the Legislature had in mind for the dependent child.’ [Citation.]” ( In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) “Adoption must be selected as the perm anent plan for an adoptable child and parental rights terminated unless the court fi nds ‘a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimen tal to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: [¶] . . . [¶] (v) There wo uld be substantial inte rference with a child’s sibling relationship . . . .’ (§ 366.26, su bd. (c)(1)(B).) ‘[T]he bur den is on the party seeking to establish the ex istence of one of the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) exceptions to produce that evidence.’ [Citation.]” ( In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314.)9 “The sibling relationship exception applie s where the juvenile court finds that ‘substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship’ is a ‘compelling reason’ to conclude that adoption would be detrimental to the child. In making this determination, the court should take into consideration ‘the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, wh ether the child was raised w ith a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoi ng contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s lo ng-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through ad option.’ (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)” ( In re Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1317.) The mere existence of a sibling relations hip is not enough to apply the exception; the relationship must be “sufficiently significan t” to cause detriment upon its termination; otherwise, there is no “substantial interfere nce” with the sibling relationship. ( In re
L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942 , 952 [“Many siblings have a relationship with each other, but would not suffer detriment if that relationship ended”].) “Moreover, even if a sibling relationship exis ts that is so strong that its severance would cause the child detriment, the court then weighs the benefit to the child of continuing the sibling relati onship against the benefit to the child adoption would provide.” ( In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th

. at pp. 952-953.)10 B. Standard of Review Appellate courts have traditi onally applied either the subs tantial evidence test or the abuse of discretion test in considering ch allenges to juvenile c ourt determinations of whether one or more of the statutory excep tions to adoption preference applies. ( In re
Scott B. (2010) 188 Cal.App. 4th 452, 469.) There is little , if any, practical difference between the two. ( Ibid. ) As explained in In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 13 39: “‘[E]valuating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion is similar to analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for the ruling. . . . Broad deference must be shown to the trial judge. The reviewing court should interfere only “‘if [it] find[s] that . . . no judge could reasonably have made the order that he di d.’ . . .”’ [Citations.]” ( Id. at p. 1351.) More recently, courts have applied a comp osite standard of review, recognizing that the determination whether an adoption exception applies entails both factual and discretionary determinations. ( In re Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1314-1315 [substantial evidence standard applies to court’s factual determination whether a beneficial relationship exists , and abuse of discretion st andard applies to court’s discretionary determination whether there is a compelling reason to apply the exception]; accord, In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.Ap p.4th 614, 621-622; In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 530-531.)11 C. A nalysis Father argues the children sh ared a close relationship with their older half siblings, including 19-year-old Jacob, and the loss of those sibling relationships was a compelling reason not to place the children for adoption and terminate Father’s parental rights. Father’s claim is unavailing because substa ntial evidence shows the children did not share a significant bond or relati onship with any of their older half siblings, and the court reasonably concluded the child ren would benefit more fro m being adopted than from being deprived of a permanent, adoptive home for the sake of continuing their insignificant relationships with their older half siblings. As the court acknowledged, the children had never lived with their older half siblings; they shared no significant common experiences; and they shared no close or strong bonds. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) I.P. and L.P. were toddlers and barely knew any of their older half sibli ngs. Even A.P., who was eight years old when detained, did not share a significant emotional attachment to Jacob, even though Jacob used to “hang out” with him, help him with his homework, and play video games w ith him. A.P. was close to I.P. and L.P., and told the social worker he wanted to be adopted. In sum, the court reasonably determined there was no compelling reason to apply the sibling relationship exception. Father argues Jacob shared a significant relati onship with the children and suggests severing that relati onship would be detrimental to Jacob , but that is not a reason to apply the exception. Though a sibling’s re lationship with an adoptive child “might be12 relevant as indirect evidence of the e ffect the adoption may have on the adoptive child. . . . [T]he ultimate question is whether adoptio n would be detr imental to the adoptive child, not someone else.” ( In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 55.) And here, the court reasonably concluded that seve ring the children’s relationships with their older half siblings would not be detrimental to them. ( In re D.M. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 283, 293 [substantial evidence supported cour t’s determination that terminating sibling relationship would not be su fficiently detrimental to ad optive children to preclude termination of parental rights]; In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4t h 1011, 1019 [same]; cf. In re Naomi P. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 808, 811, 8 24 [on appeal by social services agency, substantial ev idence supported court’s determin ation that sibling relationship exception did apply ].) IV. DISPOSITION The April 1, 2014, orders terminating parental rights and placing the children for adoption are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

KING J.

We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J. HOLLENHORST J.