J-S63029-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

KINYATTA HOUSTON,

Appellant No. 455 EDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order January 22, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0401601-1990

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 23, 2016

Appellant, Kinyatta Houston, proceeding pro se, appeals from the 

January 22, 2016 order dismissing his petition for habeas corpus/writ of 

coram nobis. We affirm. 

The PCRA court recounted the procedural history and rendered its 

decision on the instant petition, as follows:

On January 3, 1991, [Appellant] entered into a guilty plea 

before the Honorable Carolyn Temin to two counts of Aggravated 

Assault, two counts of Criminal Conspiracy, and one count of 

Theft by Unlawful Taking. [Appellant] was sentenced to an 

aggregate term of imprisonment of two to five years. No direct 

appeal was filed.

On March 11, 2015, [Appellant] filed the instant petition. 

After conducting an extensive and exhaustive review of these 

____________________________________________

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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filings, the record and applicable case law, this [c]ourt found that 

[Appellant] was no longer subject to a sentence for the 

conviction. Therefore, this [c]ourt did not have jurisdiction to 

consider [Appellant’s] [Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)] 

petition.

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/22/16, at 1.

The PCRA court explained:

Eligibility for relief under the PCRA is governed by 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543, which provides in pertinent part:

(a) General rule.-To be eligible for relief under this 

subchapter, the petitioner must plead and prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence all of the following:

(1) That the petitioner has been convicted of a crime under 

the laws of this Commonwealth and is:

(i) currently serving a sentence of 

imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime;

(ii) awaiting execution of a sentence of death for the 

crime; or

(iii) serving a sentence which must expire before the 

person may commence serving the disputed sentence. 

(Emphas[e]s added).

Upon review, the record reveals that [Appellant] is not 

currently subject to a sentence for the instant conviction. The 

instant petition was filed on March 11, 2015, which is almost 20 

years after [Appellant] finished serving his sentence. Therefore, 

pursuant to the plain language of the statute, [Appellant] is not 

eligible for relief.

[Appellant] argues that he filed a Writ of Coram Nobis and 

should not be subject to the dictates of the Post Conviction Relief 

Act. This position is contrary to the language of the PCRA, which 

explicitly states that “[t]he action established in this subchapter 

shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and 

encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for 

the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect,

including habeas corpus and coram nobis.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542.
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For the above reasons, [Appellant’s] claims are meritless, 

and his arguments do not warrant any grant of relief from this 

court, and the petition is therefore denied due to lack of 

standing.

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/22/16, at 2 (emphasis in original). 

Appellant raises seven issues for review:

1. Whether Judge Minehart erred in dismissing 

Appellant’s Writ of Habeas Corpus Petition?

2. Whether the Writ of Habeas Corpus exist[s] where 

there is no remedy under Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)?

 3. Whether Appellant was charged with an aggravated 

assault in the 1990 incident?

4. Whether Appellant can plea to a charge in which he 

was never formally charged?

5. Whether Appellant’s Constitutional Rights [were] 

violated?

6. Whether a court has authority to leave in place a 

conviction or sentence that violates a substantive Rule?

7. Whether a court may deny a controlling right asserted 

under the Constitution?

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

“In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA

court’s determinations are supported by the record and are free of legal 

error.” Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 603 (Pa. 2013) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 259 (Pa. 2011)).

Because our jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant’s petition is 

at question, we address that issue ab initio. Having done so, we conclude 

that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. 
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Descardes, 136 A.3d 493 (Pa. 2016), is dispositive. Therein, the High 

Court stated:

[T]his Court has consistently held that, pursuant to the plain 

language of Section 9542, where a claim is cognizable under the 

PCRA, the PCRA is the only method of obtaining collateral 

review. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 622 Pa. 318, 80 A.3d 

754, 770 (2013) (“The PCRA at Section 9542 subsumes the 

remedies of habeas corpus and coram nobis.”). 

Descardes, 136 A.3d at 501 (some citations omitted). The Court 

reemphasized that “where a petitioner’s claim is cognizable under the PCRA, 

the PCRA is the only method of obtaining collateral review.” Id. at 503.

The allegations included in the instant petition for habeas corpus/writ 

of coram nobis can be summarized as follows: 1) Appellant’s guilty plea for 

aggravated assault was unlawful because he was not charged with 

aggravated assault and did not commit this offense; 2) the guilty plea was 

unconstitutional because it was without factual basis; 3) Appellant’s federal 

due process rights were violated when he pled guilty to an uncharged 

offense, and 4) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to accept the plea. Petition 

for State Habeas Relief/Writ of Coram Nobis, 3/11/15, at 1–4. 1

Each of Appellant’s allegations is cognizable under the PCRA. 

Regarding the lawfulness of Appellant’s guilty plea, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543 

(a)(2)(iii) provides that one is eligible for collateral relief if a preponderance 

____________________________________________

1

 We note that the record certified on appeal indicates that Appellant was 

charged with aggravated assault.
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of the evidence proves that the conviction or sentence resulted from “a plea 

of guilty unlawfully induced where the circumstances made it likely that the 

inducement caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner is 

innocent.” Additionally, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(i), affording PCRA relief 

when a conviction or sentence resulted from a constitutional violation, 

subsumes Appellant’s claims that his guilty plea was unconstitutional and 

that his due process rights were violated. Finally, PCRA relief is available 

when the conviction or sentence resulted from “a proceeding in a tribunal 

without jurisdiction.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(viii). Therefore, as 

Appellant’s claims are cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA court correctly 

adjudicated his petition under the PCRA. 

One of the tenets concerning eligibility for relief under the PCRA is that 

the petitioner is “currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or 

parole for the crime.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i). The PCRA court found 

that the instant petition was filed almost twenty years after Appellant 

finished serving his sentence. This finding is aptly supported by the record. 

Therefore, the PCRA court properly dismissed the petition for lack of 

jurisdiction. See Descardes, 136 A.3d at 503 (where claim was cognizable 

under the PCRA, petition should be dismissed when petitioner was no longer 

incarcerated). 

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/23/2016