UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-1641

WILLIAM G. CLOWDIS, JR.,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

JOEL JEREMY SILVERMAN, M.D.; MCV ASSOCIATED PHYSICIANS, 

d/b/a MCV Physicians; WILLIAM L. HARP, M.D.; JENNIFER L. 

DESCHENES, J.D., M.S.; LORETTA S. HOPSON-BUSH; DEPARTMENT 

OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS, VIRGINIA BOARD OF MEDICINE; THE 

VIRGINIA HEALTH PRACTITIONER’S MONITORING PROGRAM; NATIONAL 

PRACTITIONER DATABASE; VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY; 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY 

HEALTH SYSTEM; AMY STEWART; SANDRA WHITLEY RYALS; RENEE S. 

DIXSON; SHERRY FOSTER, R.N.,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior

District Judge. (3:15-cv-00128-REP)

Submitted: November 10, 2016 Decided: November 22, 2016

Before TRAXLER, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part; vacated in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

William G. Clowdis, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Rodney Kyle Adams, 

LECLAIR RYAN, PC, Richmond, Virginia; Shyrell Antwinique Reed, 

LECLAIR RYAN PC, Charlottesville, Virginia; Erin Laura Barrett, 
2

James Edward Rutkowski, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 

VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia; Elizabeth Wu, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

William G. Clowdis, Jr., appeals the district court’s 

orders granting the Defendants’ motions to dismiss, denying 

Clowdis’s motion for default judgment, and dismissing Defendants 

Ryals and Dixson for failure to effect service. The district 

court granted the Defendants’ motions to dismiss on the basis of 

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which mandates that a 

federal court abstain from exercising jurisdiction and 

interfering in state proceedings under certain circumstance. On 

appeal, Clowdis challenges the Younger abstention on numerous 

grounds and asserts that dismissal of Ryals and Dixson was 

improper. We affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.

With regard to the dismissal of Clowdis’s claims for 

declaratory and injunctive relief, we affirm substantially for 

the reasons stated by the district court. Clowdis v. Silverman, 

No. 3:15-cv-00128-REP (E.D. Va. May 5, 2016). In addition, 

Clowdis asserts that, for several reasons, there is no 

functional state proceeding, rendering Younger abstention 

inappropriate. Clowdis first contends that the Virginia Medical 

Board (“Board”) blocked his state appeal by failing to forward 

the required record to the court. However, in his informal 

brief, Clowdis admits that the Board has now provided his 

record. Thus, Clowdis presents no reason why the state court 

cannot now proceed to rule on his appeal and provide him with 
4

any relief to which he is entitled. Moreover, even assuming 

that the Board’s delay was intentional, Clowdis never requested 

relief from the delay from either the state court or the Board, 

and he does not allege any intentional delay on the part of the 

court. Accordingly, his issue is with the Board rather than the 

state proceeding itself. As such, Clowdis’s argument does not 

show that the state proceeding is not adequate.

We conclude similarly regarding Clowdis’s argument that the 

Board improperly found certain challenges waived by his failure 

to timely appeal. The state court can decide the issue, and a 

disagreement with a legal ruling does not support an argument 

that a state proceeding is nonfunctioning. See Duty Free 

Shop v. Administracion De Terrenos, 889 F.2d 1181, 1183 (1st 

Cir. 1989) (holding that a party who is “already engaged in a 

state proceeding, cannot ordinarily obtain a hearing in federal 

court on its federal claim simply because it believes the state 

will reject the claim on the merits.”). Finally, regarding 

Clowdis’s assertion that the district court’s ruling was 

preclusive to the state proceeding, he is mistaken. The 

district court declined to assert jurisdiction and, thus, by 

definition, the merits were not addressed or ruled upon. In 

fact, the district court explicitly noted that the state court 

should consider the issues in the first instance. 
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Next, Clowdis avers that Younger abstention is 

inappropriate because he does not have a reasonable opportunity 

to raise his Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 

Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), and constitutional claims in state 

court; that some of the Defendants are not parties to the state 

action; and that the Board refused to hear his constitutional 

concerns. However, even if a federal plaintiff cannot raise his 

constitutional claims in state administrative proceedings that 

implicate important state interests, his ability to raise the 

claims during state judicial review of the administrative 

proceedings is sufficient. Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 

332 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton 

Christian Schs., 477 U.S. 619, 629 (1986). Moreover, the 

Younger doctrine is particularly applicable in a case such as 

this where the pending state proceeding may rectify any 

constitutional violations. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 

Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 12 (1987) (noting that Younger abstention 

“‘offers the opportunity for narrowing constructions that might 

obviate the constitutional problem and intelligently mediate 

federal constitutional concerns and state interests’” (quoting 

Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 429–30 (1979))). Because Clowdis 

may raise constitutional and discrimination challenges to the 

suspension of his license in his state appeal, Younger

abstention was proper on Clowdis’s claims that the Board’s 
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suspension of his medical license violated his constitutional 

and federal rights and his related request for injunctive and 

declaratory relief on these issues. See Phillips v. Virginia 

Bd. of Med., 749 F. Supp. 715, 723-24 (E.D. Va. 1990); see also

Lebbos v. Judges of Superior Court, 883 F.2d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 

1989) (holding that opportunity to raise federal contentions as 

defenses is sufficient). Moreover, the fact that the parties 

are not identical does not change this conclusion, given the 

fact that all of the claims are intertwined. See Cedar Rapids 

Cellular Tel., L.P. v. Miller, 280 F.3d 874, 882 (8th Cir. 2002) 

(noting that corporation cannot avoid Younger by having 

subsidiaries sue in federal court when federal relief could 

obstruct enforcement of any state court remedy); Spargo v. N.Y. 

State Com’n on Jud. Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 81–84 (2d Cir. 2003) 

(finding that Younger applies to persons not parties in state 

proceeding when right asserted is purely derivative of rights of 

defendant in state proceeding).

However, Clowdis also sought damages for the alleged 

violation of his constitutional rights, as well as damages for 

the alleged violations of the ADA and the RA. If damages are 

not available in the state proceeding, a stay is appropriate to 
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avoid the running of the statute of limitations.1 See

Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 730 (1996) 

(“[W]e have permitted federal courts applying abstention 

principles in damages actions to enter a stay, but we have not 

permitted them to dismiss the action altogether”). Here, the 

Defendants do not appear to dispute that ADA/RA relief would not 

be available during the state proceeding, but the district court 

did not address the issue. The distinction between damage and 

other claims for relief was also not addressed. Thus, “the 

proper course of action in the face of such uncertainty is for 

the District Court to retain jurisdiction and stay the damages 

claims pending the outcome of the state litigation. If 

[Clowdis] does not present [his] damages claims in the state 

proceeding, or if they are presented and disallowed in that 

forum, the claims may then be litigated in the District Court.” 

Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 

414 (3d Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal of 

Clowdis’s claims for damages and remand with instructions to 

stay adjudication until the state proceeding is concluded.2

 1 We note that Appellees assert that Clowdis’s current 

claims are already barred by the statute of limitations. We do 

not decide this issue.

2 We recognize that the state court rulings may have 

preclusive effect on Clowdis’s remaining federal claims.
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Finally, Clowdis challenges the failure to enter default 

judgment against Ryals and Dixson and the dismissal of these 

defendants for failure to serve. For the reasons discussed by 

the district court, we conclude that default judgment was 

properly denied. As far as the dismissal of these parties, 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), if a plaintiff is not diligent and 

fails to serve the complaint in a timely manner, the case shall 

be dismissed without prejudice. The “without prejudice” 

condition permits a plaintiff to refile the complaint as if it 

had never been filed. Thus, Clowdis is free to refile and 

properly serve these Defendants. While Clowdis asserts that he 

was entitled to rely on the Attorney General’s appearance, the 

record does not contain proof of service against Ryals or

Dixson, as it does for the other Defendants, and both Ryals and 

Dixson stated that they had never been served in their response 

to Clowdis’s motion for default judgment. Thus, Clowdis was on 

notice of his failure to perfect service, and we affirm the 

dismissal of these Defendants.

For the foregoing reasons,3 we affirm the district court’s 

order dismissing Clowdis’s claims for injunctive and declaratory 

 3 In addition, we decline to address whether the district 

court failed to properly liberally construe Clowdis’s pro se 

filings, as we find the construction of the filings would not 

have altered the district court’s rulings. In addition, Clowdis 

has requested the protection of the “mailbox rule,” with regard 

(Continued)
9

relief. However, we vacate the dismissal of his claims for 

damages and remand with instructions to stay these claims until 

resolution of Clowdis’s state appeal. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;

VACATED IN PART

 

to certain district court filings. However, Clowdis is not a 

prisoner, and thus, the mailbox rule is inapplicable.