J-S86031-16

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*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

WILLIAM ALBERSTADT

Appellant No. 632 WDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order April 5, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0001947-2013

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MOULTON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 21, 2016

Appellant, William Alberstadt, appeals from the order entered in the 

Erie County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition filed 

under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm. 

The PCRA court fully set forth the relevant facts and procedural history 

of this case in its opinions. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them.2

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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 

2 Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on August 7, 2015. The court 

appointed counsel, who subsequently filed a motion to withdraw and nomerit letter per Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 

(1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en 

banc). The court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss the 

petition without a hearing on October 20, 2015. On October 29, 2015, 

Appellant secured new counsel, who sought an extension of time to file a 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant raises four issues for our review:

WAS [THERE] A CONFLICT OF INTEREST WHERE [THE 

COURT] FOUND A CONFLICT EXISTED IF APPELLANT 

ENTERED A GUILTY PLEA AFTER COUNSEL ADVISED THE 

COURT THERE WAS A CONFLICT IN THAT THEY ADVISED 

APPELLANT TO ACCEPT THE PLEA BARGAIN AND

APPELLANT DECLARED THAT HE WANTED A JURY TRIAL?

ONCE [THE COURT] RULED THAT THERE WOULD BE A 

CONFLICT OF INTEREST IF APPELLANT ENTERED A GUILTY 

PLEA IF REPRESENTED BY [PLEA] COUNSEL, WAS IT 

IMPROPER FOR ANOTHER JUDGE TO ACCEPT A PLEA IN 

THIS CASE?

DID [PLEA] COUNSEL ABANDON APPELLANT WHEN THEY 

TOLD HIM THAT THEY WOULD NOT REPRESENT HIM IN A 

JURY TRIAL EVEN THOUGH [THE COURT] DENIED THEIR 

MOTION TO WITHDRAW BASED UPON A CONFLICT OF 

INTEREST AND ORDERED THEM TO TRIAL?

DID [PLEA] COUNSEL COERCE APPELLANT TO ENTER A 

PLEA AGAINST HIS FREE WILL?

(Appellant’s Brief at 3). 

Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to 

examining whether the record evidence supports the court’s determination 

and whether the court’s decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. 

Ford, 947 A.2d 1251 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 779, 959 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

supplemental PCRA petition. The court granted the request and new counsel 

filed the supplemental PCRA petition on November 23, 2015. The court held 

a PCRA hearing on March 2, 2016, and ultimately denied PCRA relief on April 

5, 2016. Although the PCRA court opinion filed March 16, 2016 suggests 

Appellant’s supplemental PCRA petition might be construed as a second 

PCRA petition, the record makes clear the current petitions collectively 

constitute Appellant’s first attempt at collateral relief. 
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A.2d 319 (2008). This Court grants great deference to the findings of the 

PCRA court if the record contains any support for those findings. 

Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 

593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 (2007). If the record supports a post-conviction 

court’s credibility determination, it is binding on the appellate court. 

Commonwealth v. Dennis, 609 Pa. 442, 17 A.3d 297 (2011). 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinions of the Honorable William R. 

Cunningham, we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The PCRA court 

opinions comprehensively discuss and properly dispose of the questions 

presented. (See PCRA Court Opinion, filed October 20, 2015, at 2-7; PCRA 

Court Opinion, filed March 16, 2016, at 3-7; PCRA Court Opinion, filed June 

2, 2016, at 1-4) (finding: evidence against Appellant was significant, 

including Victim’s videotaped statement describing Appellant’s sexual acts, 

photographs Appellant took of Victim in suggestive poses, and Appellant’s 

statements to police describing his granddaughter as “saucy looking girl” 

with “cute little body”; when Appellant admitted to counsel that Appellant 

had oral sex with his granddaughter but told counsel he would lie on witness 

stand, Appellant created ethical dilemma for his attorneys, prompting 

attorneys to file motion to withdraw; court ultimately denied motion to 

withdraw and informed counsel that Appellant could testify in narrative form 

to avoid any ethical issues; court’s denial of motion to withdraw in no way 
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precluded possibility of Appellant entering guilty plea at later date; although 

Appellant voiced desire to go to trial during hearing on motion to withdraw, 

material circumstances changed following that hearing; specifically, counsel 

learned after hearing on motion to withdraw that Appellant attempted to 

bribe his son-in-law to make charges disappear (which would have been 

very damaging to Appellant if presented at trial), and Commonwealth 

offered more favorable plea bargain; upon these changed circumstances, 

counsel explained to Appellant benefits of entering guilty plea but left choice 

to Appellant; court engaged in thorough plea colloquy which confirmed 

Appellant’s decision to plead guilty was of his own volition;3 Appellant’s 

attorneys did not abandon Appellant and were prepared to go to trial had 

Appellant made that choice; significantly, Appellant did not seek to withdraw 

plea after sentencing; Appellant’s testimony at PCRA hearing was incredible; 

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3 Given the current state of the law regarding mandatory minimum 

sentencing statutes, we depart from the PCRA court’s references to the 

Commonwealth’s sentencing offer, which contained no mandatory minimum, 

as one ground to assess plea counsels’ effectiveness. On appeal, Appellant 

makes no claim that, but for his fear of a mandatory minimum sentence, he 

would not have pled guilty. Instead, Appellant challenges the guilty plea 

solely on counsels’ alleged threat to abandon him if Appellant decided to go 

to trial. The record belies that contention, however, and makes clear 

Appellant’s decision to plead guilty was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 

Additionally, the record confirms the Commonwealth agreed to seek nolle 

prosequi on nine of the ten charges against Appellant in exchange for his 

guilty plea to one count of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse. As well, 

the Commonwealth had overwhelming evidence against Appellant in this 

case. Thus, counsels’ advice to Appellant to enter a guilty plea was 

reasonable under the circumstances of this case. 
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Appellant failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with 

his guilty plea). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA court’s 

opinions.4

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/21/2016

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4

In its opinion filed June 2, 2016, the PCRA court references a direct appeal 

in this case. The record confirms Appellant did not seek direct review. 

Instead, Appellant timely filed a PCRA petition following sentencing. 
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Circulated 11/10/2016 09:42 AM