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STUDY OF JOINT ORGANIZATIONS 

FOR THE PRODUCTION OF 

COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE 

AND FOR SECURITY OF 

U.S. MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS 

PART B 

COMMUNICATION SECURITY 

27 DEC.1948 

COP.Y Ne 

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PART B 

STUDY OF A JOINT ORGANIZATION FOR THE SECURITY OF U. S. 

MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS 

CONTENTS 

Preface •, . .... -... s • • • • ~ • • .. . .. i 

I Introduction • • • • • • • • • • • • ~ • • l 

II 

III· 

Basic Premises • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • 

Discussion of Various A~r,angemen~s • • • • 

2 

4 

IV Conclusions ,. • • • ~ • • • • •- • •. • • • 13 

v Recommendations • • • • . . .. . . .. 13 

Navy Comment • .. • • • • • • ·~ • • • • •. ·• 15 

Air Force Comment ... • • • • • • ·,. • • , • · 16 . . A11W!Ji CelllAJJI t , , ,c:::::±,9-7;.:;- : -:.--=~.--.;;::;;-;~ 

Appendix "A". .• 'f • . . . • • . • • . • Tab A 

Appendix "B" • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Tab B 

- Appendix ttc". • .. • . • • • • • • • . • Tab c 

Appendix 1tD11 .. • . • . • • • • • . .. • • Tab D 

Appendix "Eu• .J Tab E • • .. • . ' . • ! • • • • • 

Appendix "F" •· • • • • • ... .• • • • • • • Tab F 

Appendix "G" .. '• • • • • • • • • • • • .. Tab G 

Appendix "H" • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Tab. H 

~ppend1x "I"• • • • • • . . . • .. • • • • Tab I 

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Appendix "J". . • • • • • • . • • • • • • Tab" J 

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PREFACE 

- Complete agreement concerning the organization of a joint 

or unified armed forces agency for the production of cryptographic materiel and for communications security was not reached! , 

The ~ifferences in the view of- the Army and Navy members on 

the_ one hand, and of the 'Air Force .. members on the other, are 

basically as follows. The Army and ~avy members recommend the 

organization and procedures set forth ln Part B. The Air Force 

members neither support nor reject Part B, but feel that u-n.til 

a decisio~ as to Part A is known, Part B should not be finally , 

acted upon. It is the recommendation of the whole pommittee, 

therefore, that Part B should be reviewed subsequently. With-

. holding fin.al action on Part B is not l.ntended _to prejudice 

paraller actions already in progress for improving coordination in the overall communications security field. 

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BEC!tt'.:T PART B . · 

STUDY OF A JOINT ORGANIZATION FOR THE SECURITY OF U. S. MILITARY 

COMMUNICATIONS 

I INTRODUCTION 

A. In a letter dated 19 August 1948·,the Secretary of Defense 

directed that a committee comprised of representatives of the 

Army, NavyJ and Air Force consider the question; "Should there · be Joint or unified Cryptographic Sec.uri ty Aqti vi ties of the Army J 

NavyJ and Air Force and.J if so·J What form should they take?" 

B. Cryptogr~phic security is only one phase of the field of 

communication security. A complete consideration.of the problem requires consideration of all aspects of the field, which includes, in addition to cryptogr~phic security, transmission security and physical security. The definition of these elements 

and their relati·onship to the field of commun,lcations are covered 

in Appendix "A" hereto. .; 

C. Relevant legislation, directive~, and basic documents. 

l. The National Security Act of 1947 provides for three 

military departments, each of which has an assigned mission. 

The ac:t states that in enacting this law "It is.the intent of 

Congress---'to provide f~r their authoritative coordination and 

unified direction---but not to merge them. 11 Rele.:vant extracts 

of this act 1 covering the functions or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board are 

attached hereto as Appendix "B. 11 • 

. 2. The Paper Defining the Functions of the Armed Forces 

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff {Key West Agreement) was approved by 'the President on 21 April 1948. It sets forth the common 

functions. of all ·three services and of the Joint.Chiefs of Staff. 

The functions of the departments include th6 provision that each 

service wi~l. determine and proyide the.means of communications 

through.which command is to be exercised. Relevant extraots of 

this paper are attached hereto as Appendix "C." 

3.· By Executive Order of July 3; ·1945 there was created 

the Cryptographic,Security ~oard~ to which are· assigned three· 

funct"ions: . 

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{a) To study and inspect the cryptographic systems and ·related procedures of alr Federal departments and agencies- (less FBI). -

(b) To det.ermine and establish cryptographic security standards and pQlicies. 

{c) To promulgate the necessary directives to implement the foregoing. -

·A copy of this order is attached hereto as Append~x "D. 11 

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staf.f have established the Joint 

Commun1cati-ons-Electronics Committee (formerly JCB) as -its agency for the coordination or all Joint communications matters. Include~ 

within the responsibilities of this committee is that of c.oordi- ~ 

nating Joint communications security matters. The function of 

making recommendations on communications security matters has been. 

assigned to the Joint Security and Cryptographic Panel of the 

Joint Communication-Electronics Committee. Copies of the charters 

of the committee and the panel .are-attached hereto as Appendix·" 11E11 together with a history of' Joint Coord1hat1on in the field ,of · Communications. -

D.· Curr~nt U. S. M111 tary Communications-Security organizations 

are set forth in Appendix "F." 

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E. Previous studies have been conducted on the problem of 

interdepartmental coordination.. (See Ap'!)endix "G"). , 

· F. The results of Joint collaboration in the field of Communication Security are outiined in Appendix "H." 

II BASIC PREMISES 

A. The communication security problems or·the three services, 

while cqommon in many respects, differ according to the operatipnal mission of each of the services! These problems are outlined in 

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B. C'OMMUNICATION SECURITY is closely related to both communi--- cations and +ntelligence. ·In the Navy, communication security is 

considered an integral,part of communicatLons. Therefore, the 

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communicatio~ security orgapization has been made a part.of the 

communications organization, and close Liaison is maintained with 

the Office of Naval Intelligence •. In the Army, the overall responsibility for security· has been given to the Director of In- telligence~ It is established Army policy to consider commun1ca-. 

tion security as merely one type of security, consequently the 

communications security organization has been made a part of the. 

Intelligence Division, with liaison with Signal Corps. The Air 

Force at present depends upon the Army for communication security func·tions. ·Their contemplated organization, however, envisa:ges staff supervision by the Director of Communications, in coordination with the Director of Intelligence, who exercises overall control. All three services.recognize the need for close liaison 

between communication intelligence and commurlicat1o~ security. This is accomplished in the, Army and Nav~ by putting communication 

intelligence and communication security under one head, the Chief 

of N~val Communications in the Navy and the Director of Intelli- - ~ 

. gence in the Army. Air Force plans provide for a single operating organization, directly under the Chief of Staff, to carry out Air 

Force respons1b111 ties in the fields of,.. communication intellige·nce and·communication security. Altho~gh control of this organizatfon will be exercised by the Director of Intelligence, the Director of 

Communications will exercise staff supervision over all matters:,. 

pertaining to cryptography ~nd communications security in coordination with the Director of Intelligence. 

C. All three services recognize the ·need for control of communication security functions at general s"taff level and such control 

prese·ntly exists in each service. - The three services differ irr 

·the location of this control; in the Navy, control is vested in a 

communications organization; in the Army, in an intelligence organ- ization; and in the Air Force, in an intelligence organization·, working very closely with the communications organization. The 

Army recognizes the importance of communication security 1 s re)..ati-~n 

to communications but believes that staff level control is. the more 

important consideration. Army ·communications are not a gen'eral staff function. Therefore the Army is unable to make communication 

sequrity subordinate to communications within the Ar~y. However, 

all three servi·ces agree that any joint or unified c.ommunication, 

security organization must be an integral part of communications 

and yet must have staff level di'rect1ve powers. 

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III DISCUSSION dF VARIOUS ARRA?iGEMENTS 

A. - The ~eqess1ty for joint communication security· activities 

has been presented in the introduction. There-are several possible 

arrangements, including the existing one, through which joint communication security activities. probably.could be accomplished. These are: 

ARRANGEMENT "A. 11 

l. An arrangement whereby each service would be solely responsible for its own communication security. Any matters of join~ 

interest would be settled by means of informal meetings and any 

agreements reached would be implemented individually by.each of 

the services. ' .,. 

(.a} Al though this arrangement was used for many years previous to the activation-of the Joint Comm.unications Board {now the Joint Communications-Electronics Committee) and has certain advantages, it 

is considered to be inadequate to cope with present day requirements and is therefore dismissed without 

further discussion. 

ARRANGEMENT 11B. 11 

2. An arrangement whereby each service would be responsible for its own cryptographic security, but where there would be for- . mally establi-shed body through which mat13ers of joint interest are 

coordinated. Meetings would be-held at regular intervals and de-. 

cis1ons would be reached unanimously before they would be adopteq. These unanimous decisions would be implemented.by directives issued 

within eaGh service. Under- this arrangement each service would 

maintain physical means of developing, producing, distributing an~ 

account-ing for cryptographic aid~.. Each service also would retain 

the power to determine commun1c&tion security doctrine and methods 

for that service. 

{a) This is the arrangement currently in effect with 

the Joint Security and Cryptographic Panel of the 

Joint Communications-Electronics Committee as the 

coordinating agency; except for the fact that the 

Air Force does not.presently have the means of 

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producing and handling its own cryptographic material nor of determining its own cryptographic security methods and doctrine, and that the research and development of cryptographic material 

is within the cognizance of the Re'search Development Board. Its· advantages and disadvantages are 

·discussed below: 

(1 )· Advantages 

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i Each service retains fuil command and administration of its own intra-service communication secur'i_ty organization. It is 

therefore not required to submit to any other service any matters which are nut of 

joint interest. It is also true that intra· 

service action can be effected more expe- ditiously unilaterally ~han by joint action 

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Each service can undertake independent res·earch and development of cryptographic materials and. equipment. required to carry 

out its own assigned mission. 

The facilities of several services can be 

brought to bear separate~y-on the solution. 

of _a single joint problem. Of the several 

solutions which might be so obtained the 

best can be chos~n. · 

Each service can be equipped and ~taff ed tc 

produce certain joint ccyptographic aids 

for all services. Theip personnel can gair experience in the production of these aids, 

and their plants can be properly equipped -for their task .. 

~ No additional high salaried top level administrative personnel are required; Present staffs of the thre.e services can serve ~n the joint body, thus effecting a saving in personnel and funds. ·, · 

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v1 Each service can inform the other service of 

its policies and methods, but _can retain 

within itself informat~on as to specific 

crypto systems. Thus, it.would not be pos- sible for one case of defection to result 

in the loss of all the cryptographic sys- -. tems. of all services. 

vii Since the production facilities of each 

service_ are geographically separated, the 

·problem of dispersal is·already solved. 

tlll Since 'agreements are reached by unanimous 

consent, each service is· fully prepared to 

carry out its part of the agreement.. This 

might not be true in any arrangement in 

which a service could be directed to carry 

out a plan to which it had not given prior 

agreement. 

!1£ Since the joint body is composed of per- . sonnel assigned regular staff duties in 

their respective organizations, the normal 

chain bf command is followed in· reaching ~nd 

implementing agreements. 

~ It would be possible to standardize Joint 

Security policies at the ~ime of their 

adoption, and' to ins~re the1r simU:l taneous 

implementation. 

(2) Disadvantages 

i Under this plan expeditious action on joint 

matters is npt usually effected since time 

is consumed in reaching un~nimous agreement. If joint agreement is not reached, joint action may never be-taken. 

!.!. This plan involves the administration and · operation of three separate organizations each requiring its own reserves of equipment 

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ARRANGEMENT 11 C. " 

and staff of administrative, operating, and 

housekeeping personnel. 

No service is required· to coordinate its 

intra-service actions with any other service. In some instances unilateral action 

might be taken wh~n such should have been a 

matter of joint cognizance. 

!,y There is no requirement to pool abilities 

and efforts in the research and development field • 

.Y. Implem~ntation of Joint agreement is dependent mainly upon joint cooperation, and 

not upon the exercise of authoritative' 

control. 

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3. An arrangement whereby one service would be assigned the 

responsibility and the means of providing cryptographic securi.ty· 

for all services. All other services would-contribute f~nds, per- sonnel and facilities in appropriate amounts. The entire group of 

personnel and facilities might be concentrated under o~e .roo~ or: ·in 

one area or might be physically separated. In any event the entire 

activity would be the responsibility of one service.- This arrang~­

ment is not desired by any service because it would hot meet service needs effectively in practice. 

(a) This arrangement would require certain budgetary changes by legislation. Responsibility for crypto- graphic research and development would be delegated 

to this service subject to the provision of the 

National Security Act concerning the Research Development Board. Such an arrangement would preclude the necessity for the existence o·f the Joint Becuri ty and Cryptographic Panel of the Joint Communication Electronics Committee. A combined panel 

would however still be require~. Its membership would have to be changed as appropriate to the new 

organization. The advantages and disadvantages of 

this arrangement a~e. discussed below: 

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(1) · This arrangement has the following advantages: 

!. Insures a sing+e crypto plan for all 

s·ervices. 

!!. Insures positive integration of the communi, 

cation security equipment.requiremen~s and 

procurement .Plans for all services. 

!1!. Simplifies the control of all the opera- tional details. involved in communication 

security. 

iv_ Centralizes physical facilities ln a single 

area or at least, fewer areas th~n at present, with the result that costs of housekeeping overhead and inpern~l security may be reduced. 

(2) This arrangement has the following disadvantages: 

!. Results in a crypt·ographic plan which might be inadequate to meet the needs· of one or 

both of the other services. 

ii Could result in the implementation of communication security plans which are biased 

in favor of the parent servic·e of the security organization charged with the overall 

responsibility. 

' iii - Precludes any exercise of C·on·t~9l by the oth~r two deRendent services over the security organization of the responsible service. The only recourse of the dependent services w.ould be through their common 

head - the Secretary of Defense. 

!.!. Results in centralization or confinement ·Of 

physical facil1 ties, conseque_ntly 1ncr·easing the hazard of complete security compromise 

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through personnel defection or elimination 

of the entire U •. S. m1li tary security effort 

in a concerted attack. 

ARRANGEMENT "D. 11 

4. An arrangement whereby a separate organization would be 

established for the control and direction of the technical, .produc- tive, and operating facilities ·of the three services and for the , formulation of ~asic communication security·policies. Under· this 

arrangement each service would have a communication security group physically and administratively independent-of the other services 

but producing material and conducting security activities according 

to a coordinated plan developed and supervised by the central directive body. The advantages and disadvantages 'Of this a-rrangement 

are discussed below: · 

(a) · Advantages 

{l) - . This a~rangement has most of the advantages of 

separate se~vice operating organi~at1ons. 

These briefly are: 

1 Flexibility of· utilization of facilities - . including rapid action on intra:....service 

matters. 

ii Offers a variety of experience and technical 

capabilities on operating and research and 

development activities. 

11i Dispersed location of facilit~es. 

iv Service administration.and supervision ot 

facilities and following ·of established 

policies. · · 

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y Development of high'degree of efficiency 

which is mqre possible in a small organiza~ 

tion than a large one. 

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(2) Rapidity of action after agreement has been 

reached is assured since .under this structure 

it is not necessary to submit findings to 

higher authority for approval and promulgation. 

-(3) Standardization at time of formulation and 

simuitaneous adoption and implementation_ of 

basic op~rating security policies. 

(4) Offers economy of procurement by employment of 

single contractual action on the bulk of 

equipment purchased. 

(5) By establishing control over all basic communication security operating policies, assures 

that no service can institute any method or 

communication security policy on an intraservice basis. 

(6) Provides for pooling of research talent and 

eliminates possibility for· du~lication of 

Research and Development projects by super- vision of the research programs of the individual operating agencies. 

(b) D1sagvantages 

(1) This plan involves the administration and 

operation of three separate organizations each 

requiring its own reserves of equipment and 

staff of .administrative, operating, and housekeeping personnel. 

{2) Purely intra-ser~ice policy decisions a~e hampered to the extent necessary to submit the 

action·to the joint_ body for approval. 

(3) Requires that'a body composed of at least' three 

high salaried administrators with appropriate staff be established to meet continuou~ly. 

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(4) No service·could initiate.research on a project 

which had not been assigned ~o it • 

. (5) Competitive s~rvice research, providing different solutions for comparison before acceptance, would not be possible .. 

ARRANGEMENT 11E. 11 

5. An arrangement' whereby an operating organization directed 

by commu~ications and security persopnel-would be established which 

would be completely responsible·for the communication security of 

all services and which would necessarily operate on the same level 

as the present Research Development Board or Munitions Board. It 

would take over the communication se·curi ty. functions and crypto research and development functions of the ASA and CNC. It would have 

directive power bver the services on communic~tion security matters. 

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' (a) This arrangement would require the enactment of new· 

legislation. It would remove any need for the existence of the Joint Security and Cryptographic Panel. Its· ·advantages and disadvantages are dis..:. 

cussed below: 

(1 )- Advantages 

1. A S·ingle operational organization, providing communications security policy and material, 

can accomplish its mission without dupl1~ 

·cated effort and with a- minimum of personnel and facilities. 

ll A s'ingle or'ganization would eliminate the 

necessity for committee action with its 

accompanying delays. The unanimity problem would no longer be present. Single direction would provide identical procedures · throughout the services.· -

ill The establ-1shment of ·.a completely unified 

·organization would permit better concentration of effort on security policies and 

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procedures.. Rather than have thre·e services 

making the same security studies a single organization would be able to engage in a 

greater number of and more extensive 

studies. 

iv Established at a high level, such an organ- ization ·would be able to maintain proper and complete control over all security activities throughout the servic~s. Policies 

would become directives, rather than agreements. Intra-service policies would be the 

same as joi~t policies. · 

y In the field of research and development all 

the capabilities of the three services could 

be utilized toward a common goal. The work 

could be accomplished without duplication or 

overlap. 

!!. Procurement and allocation of cryptographic material could be handled -under a single integrated plan. 

(2) Disadvantages 

i Such an arrangement WQuld require a major change in ·the National Security Act since 

it does result in a merger which ie not the 

"intent of Congress." \ 

ii Difficulty might be enc·ountered in channelizing ~ecurity po~icies and directives from 

this organization into the individ4al. armed: 

services. -

111 The services lose freedom of action in -0ommunication security matters. · · 

iv A single case of defection of an employee could result in complete loss of military security. 

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IV CONCLUSIONS 

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y A procedure or policy satisf~ctory in the 

joint. concept might be L}ef:"L:dent from an 

individual. serv~ce point of view~ . 

A. It is concluded that:· 

1. Communication security is but one part, of overall military security. Communication security is an integral part of military commun+cations and of vital interest to intelligence. This is 

well illustrated in the pi:.'e.sent day need for ultra-rapid and ·secure 

communications - the latter requiring cryptographic devices to be 

incorpor·at"ed directly. into the transmission circuits as far as 

possible. · 

·2. Joi.nt control in the highly complex technical field of 

communication security is neciessary. 

3. · ~he following characteristics of a Joint communication 

security act.ivi ty are considered:nec·essary: 

(a) 

(b) 

Centralized direction; (and) 

Decentralized, but completely coordinated, 

implementation. · 

4. A compromise between arrangement "B" and 11 D" (outlined 

in paragraphs III A.2 and III A:4 above) appears to offer an acceptable solutio~ at this time~ 

V RECOMMENDATIONS 

A. It is recommended that: 

1. A con,, trolling_ body .composed of communi·ca:tion security ~xperts with-a permanent operating staff be established under the 

JCEC; this group to be known as the Joint Communication Security 

Panel a.nd to replace the present Joint Security ·and Cryptographic Panel. 
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2. This panel be given directive authority, subject to revJ,ew by the JCEe, .over Joint· communication secur.t ty mat;'t.srs; it also 

·be· g1 ven review authority over intra-service _.communication secur1 ty 

matters. For the purpose of this study, the review authority of the 

panel consists of requiring each serv~ce to inform the Joint Commun!~ 

cation Security Panel of its intra-service pommunication security plans for the purpose of determining whether such plans have joint 

aspects. · 

3. This panel be given directive authority over production of joint communication security material and review authority' over 

intra-service productive capacity and operatioria. 

4. This panel prepare.a coor.dinated program of communication 

security.research and development for review and approval by the 

Research and Development Board. · 

5. There be created a new Cryptographic Equipment Panel, 

under. the c·ommi ttee. on Electronics of the Research and Development_ Board, with.equal representation ~rom each service, utilizing the 

best qualified personnel or. t~e three se,rvices as meml;>ers • 

. Note - The formulation a·r this panel is already in 

P.rogress. 

6. The Joint Communication Security Panel prepare a coordinated program for procurement of communication security· equipment 

(including the industrial mobilization planning .necessary to achiev.e 

it) for review.and approval by the Munitions Board. 

?. The Joint Communication .Security Panel insure coordination with the Joint Intelligence Committee and/or the-United States 

Communication Intelligence Board whenever matters within the cognizance of those organizations are considered. 

8. All directive authority exercised by the Joint Communication Security Panel be subject· to review by the JCEC. 

9. The United States Air Force maintain a-communication 

security organization adequate to meet Air Force needs. 

IO. Appendix "J" hereto be adopted as the charter of the 

Joint Communication Security Panel. · 

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NAVY COMMENT 

. The Navy is convinced that the problem of ·Communica-. . . t1on Security is so closely co~cerned with our own military 

commun1cat1ons that to completely divorce the control of 

the one from the other wauld be ext~emely disadvantageous. 

The pr&sent. arrangeqient, with .policy. control exercised by. 

' . the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Communications 

and Electronics Committee should be conttnued but g~eatlf 

strengthened,. Uith this arrangement, cq~unications and 

communication security po11cies are closely integrated 

and the interests of military intelligence in the overall 

secu~ity f1eld are duly considered by·means of intelligence 

rep~esentation on' the Comniunication Security Panel of ·the 

JCEO, and by.norma1·1nternal coordination within each Serv1ce. 

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ADlFORCE 00~ 

The .A;1r Force member~ recogi,..ize the close relationship of Co:mmunica~ 

. tions Security ~ith both Communications and Commur.ications Intelli~ence 

although the members of this Committee have not B"greed on all points, 

they are agreed upon a recommendation for th~ creation of an A1:'Jn.ed Forces 

Communications Int~llige~ce Board (Ar'CIB). Such a board uould be composed 

of roughly equal representation from both Communications aifd Intelligence 

. . agencies. It would appear that this misht be.a convenient body to which 

jurisdiction coULd be ~iven for the control of communications securit~ and 

its proper coordination ni th the other two functions. The:o:e is "also the 

pos.sibility,, :not yet adequately ~iscussed by the. Committee, of requiring 

the Joint CoJIDilllilication-Electronic Committee and the Joint Intellisence · 

Committee jointly to control Communications Security and to coordinate it 

with the other two i'unctions. However, since· neither fact for the fom· 

of AFCIB has yet been determined, it appears impracticable properly to 

. . weigh i~s advanta5es ~ disadvantaGes as a controlling body for Communications Security, aaainst ~hose of the Joint Communications and L'l.ectror.ias 

Committee. '!'his reasori.ing forms the ~sis for the recommendation by" the 

.Air Force members that final action on Part E be withheld pending resolution of Part A. ·. 

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DEFINITION OF 'rnRMS", AND RELJ.,.TION 

. OF CRYPTOGR.t'J'HIC SECURITY TO THE . 

PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATIONS AS A WHOLE 

1. Cryptographic Security is only one phase. of the field 

of Communication· security. A complete consideration of the 

problem requires consideration of all aspects of the field, 

which includes,. in addi ti·on. ,to Cr.yptogra:phic Securi °t?Y., Trans-

.mission Security and Physical Security. These terms are 

defined in Joint publf.cations as follows: 

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a. Communication Security: The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny tq unauthorized persons information of value which might. be derived from communications. 

b. Cryptographic Security: That component of communication security which results from the provision of techni~ 

cally sound crypto systems and their·proper use. 

c. Tran§mission Securi4y: That component of communication security which results from all measures designed to 

protect transmissions from interception and traffic analysis by an enemy. 

d. Physical Security: That component of communication 

security which results from all measures necessary to safeguard classified· communications equipment and material from access 

thereto by unauthorized persons. 

2. Since all comm\inications,;and _especially radio communications, are subject to interception by unauthorized persons,, all measures necessary to prevent disclosure of classified 

informcition to hostile elements must be employed. ·In addition 

to cryptography, ~ome of these measures are: 

(1) Specialized--radio.equipment, 'such as beam 

antennas, Very High Frequencies and Ultra 

High Frequencies. 

(2) Protected landlines. 

(J) Registration of and accounting for documents 

and equipment, 

{4) Infra-~ed transmissions. 

(5) Deception and countermeasures. 

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(6) Monitoring of friendly communication 

circuits for security supervisiono 

(7) Radio Silence. 

' ' 

3. Communications is the means by which command is exercised. Effective command whether intra~service or Join~ requires that commUn.ications be reliable, secure and rapid. Military doctrine requires that the means for communication 

must be immediately available to a.commander, and should be 

under his direct control. · 

~~Yr~jWJf~ -2- APPENDIX "A" 

R'EiS'fRIC'fEB 

... 
' 

. . , ~F ID:A6S~63 .. e . . EXTRACTS FROM "THE !JATIONAL SECURITY ACT ·OF 1947 

Deolarction . .2! Policy · 

:sec• 2. ln eno.cting this legislation, i~.is the intent of. 

Congress to provide a oom.pre:r.i.ensi ve. program for :the future- . ·. 

security ot the United St~tes; ·to provide tor t~G e .. tc.blish- . · ment at.integrated.policies and procedures for ~ho departments, ngenoies nnd functions of the Government-relating to the · national security; to provide.three military deportments for th~ oPQJ"ntion nnd administration of the Arrily', ~he No.v7 (in• ·eluding nnvnl aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Faroe, with their -0ssigned combat nnd ae~ice cam-: ponen~s; to provide for t~eir authoritative coorcllnation and 

unified direction under ci vilinn control but not to r.ierge them.; 

to prov:idu tor the eff~oti~e strat~Sic dir~ction of the armed 

forces and for their. oporction under unified control Elll4·for 

their integration into an efficien~ team.of.land,·nc.vnl, and 

&ir forces. · · . 

. J'()int Chiefs .Q! Staff 

Sec.211. (a) There is horeby estnbli~~~d within·the·Nntionnl · Military Establishment the ;Taint C'1iefs of Btnf':f', which shall 

consi-st of the•Qhiet.9f Staff, United Ste.tea Arm)"; the Chiet of 

Naval Operatipns; the CAiQf of Staff, United Stntes Air.Faroe; 

and the Chief Of Btnf'f to the. Commander in.Chief, if there be 

.one. · 

·(b) Subj"ect to the c.uthorit7 nnd direction ot the · Preside~t nnd the Seor~tnry of Dotense, it s!ic.ii be tho duty. of the Joint Chiefs of .Staff - . (1) to prepcre strategic plans and to provide 

tor ·the strategic direction· of the cil~t&ry .forces; . . . 

(2) · to i>repe.rG. ·joiiit logistic J>~~s ~d to . assign to the military services logistic responsibilities in 

accordance wi~h such plQJt~J · 

· :(3) to estnblish unified cOmma.nds in strc.tegic 

areas .when such unified commands nre in the interest of national . . . seourit7; 

· (4) to formulate policfes tor joint trnining ot . . t:tie militnry forces;·: 

' 

(S) to foraU.lnte policies tor coordinating the 

education of members of the military forces; 

., -1- APPENDIX "B 11 

·. 
REF ID:A65663 

e 

(6) to review major material and pe1·3onnel 

requirements of the military forces, in accordance with 

strategic and logistic plans; and 

(?) to provide United States representation on 

the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 

(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall act as the principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of 

Defense and shall perform such other duties as the President 

and the Secretary of Defense may direct or as may be prescribed 

by law. 

Munitions Board ,. 

Sec. 21J.(a) There is hereby established in the National 

Military Establishment a Munitions Board (hereinafter in this 

section referred to as the "Board"). 

(b) The Board shall be composed of a Chuirmun, who 

shall be the head thereof, end nn Under Secretary or Assistant 

Secretary from each of the three military departments, to be 

designated in each case by the Secretaries of their respective 

departments. The 6huirman shall bo appointed from civilian 

life by the President, by and .• ith the advice a.nd consent of 

the·Sena.te, and shall receive compensction a.t the rate of 

tl4,000 a year. 

(c) It shall be tho duty of the Boo.rd under the direction of the Secretcry of Defense and in support of strategic end logistic plans prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Ste.ff -

(1) to coordinate the appropriate activities 

within the Nc.tionnl Military Estc.blishment with regard to industric.l matters, including the procur~ment, production, and 

distribution plans of the departments and agencies comprising the Establishment; 

(2) to plan for the military aspects of industrial mobilization; 

(3) to recommend assignment of procurement responsibilities among the severnl military services and to 

plan for stnndnrdizntion of specifications nnd for the greatest practicable allocution of purchase authority of technical equipment and comm.on use items on tho basis of single procurement; 

· (4) to prepare estimates of potenticl production, 

procurement, and personnel for use in evQluc.tion of the logistic feasibility of strategic operations; 

-2- APPENDIX "B" 
REF ID: A6566. 

( 5) to deternine relcti ve priori tics cf thG vnri~. 

ous segments of the Llilit~~.ry procurer:::.ent progrnr.is; 

(6) to supervise such subordincte ngencies ns 

a.re or rn.o.y be erected to consider the subject felling witin 

the scope of the Board's responsibilities; 

(?) to oc.ke reco.LJI1Gndctions to regroup, co~bine, 

or dissolve existing intcrservice agencies operating in the 

fields of procurenent, production, end distribution in such 

:mc.nner as to pronote efficiency end economy; 

(8) to rnnintc.in linison with other depa.rtnents 

nnd agencies for the proper correlation of nilitury require~cnts 

with the civilian econony, pnrticulcrly in regard to the procurencnt or disposition of strctegic a.nd criticcl i:u:::.teriQl a.nd 

the na.intena.nce of adequate reserves of such no.teric.l, a.nd to 

I:lnke reconnendntions as to policies in connection therewith; 

( 9) to nsseoble nnd review r.ic.tericl end personnel rcquiren.ents presented by the Joint Chiefs of Sta.ff and those 

presented by the production, procuronent, and distribution 

c.gencies n.ssigned to neet nili tc~ry needs, end to nc.ke reconmenda.-

tions thereon to the Socrotr.ry of Defense; c.nd 

(10) to pcrf0rL such other duties c.s thG Secrctc.ry of Defense r..£.y direct. 

(d) When the Chnirnc.n of the Bourd first uppcinted 

hr.s tecken office, the Joint i-.rny" c.nd Nc.vy Munitions Bvard shnll 

cease to exist nnd a.11 its records and porsonnol sh~ll be trunsferred to the Munitions Bo&rd. 

(e) The Secreta.ry of Defense shc.11 provide the Board 

with such personnel nnd fncili ties c:. s the Secretc;ry I:!.c.y deterninu 

to be required by the Boe.rd. fer the porforr.:..c.nce of its functions., 

Resc~rch £:.ill! Developnent Board 

Sec. 214. (a.) There is hGrcby estnblished in the l~c.tiuno..l 

Mili ta.ry Estc.blishD.ent a. Resecrch c.nd Dovelopncnt Boe.rd (hereinarter· in this section referred to c~s the "Boa.rd 11 ). Tho Boa.rd 

shell be cor.1posed of c. Cha.irnc.n, who shc.11 be the hcc.d therecf, 

nnd two representctivos frcn ec.ch of the Departnents of the 

.A:rny, Navy, and .t.ir Force, to be designated by the Socrcturies 

or their respective Depa.rtnents. The Chc.irnnn shc~ll be c.ppointed 

from civilic..n life by the President., by c.nd with the advice c.nd 

consent of the Sencte, c.nd shell receive conpensa.tion c.t the 

rate of ~14,000 a. year. The purpose of the Boe.rd shall be to 

advise the Secret~ry of Defense c..s to the stctus of scientific 

-3- APPENDIX "B" 
REF ID:A6566. 

research relctive to tho nctionul security, nnd to assist hin 

in assuring adequate provision f cr reser.rch nnd development on 

scientific problens relating to the nr.tionnl security. 

(b) It shell be the duty of the Boc.rd, under the 

direction of the Secretcry of Defense -

(1) to prepare n ccnplete a.nd integrcted progro.o of resecrch nnd developnent for r.rl.litc.ry purposes; 

(2) to advise with regnrd to trends in scientific rese~rch relcting to national security and the· nensures necessary to o.ssure continued and increasing progress; 

{3) to reconnend neasuros of coordination of 

research o.nd developnent onong the ~~litury depcrtnents, and 

allocation CTJ.ong them of responsibilities for specific progro.ras of joint interest; 

(4) to fornulcte policy for the Nc.tionnl Military Esto.blishnent in connection with research c.nd devolopnent natters involving agencies outside the National Militcry Esto.blishc.ent; 

(5) to consider the interaction of research und 

developnent and strategy, cnd'to advise ·the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff in connection therewith; and 

(6) to perfcrr. such other duties ns the Secretnr~ 

of Defense nc.y direct. 

( c) When the Cho.irr:mn of the Boa.rd first l:'.ppointed 

has trken office, the Joint ReseDrch and Developnent Boo.rd shall 

cease to exist and &11 its records and personnel shall be transferred to the Research and Development Boo.rd. 

(d) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Boar~ 

with such personnel and facilities as the Secretcry mc.y determine 

·to be required by the Board for the perfornance of its functions. 

-4- APPENDIX "B" 
REF ID:A65663 

-----------·--

EXTRACTS FRO~t THE PJnR DEFINING 

THE PVNCTIOl~S OF THE .;...RMED FORCES 

AND TH:a! JOINT CHIEFS OF STJJF OF 

21 APRIL 1948 

Section I, paragraph 1: 

"l. There shc.11 be tho r...c.xiilUrl practicable integration 

ot the policies ~nd proceduros of the depc.rtnents end agencies 

ot the nctionnl Military Establishaent. This does not irlply a 

oerging of crEed forces, but does dGtlClnd a consonance and correlation of policies ond procedures throughout the National 

Militc:ey Estcblishment, in order to producG c.n effective, eco- norlic~l, h.."'.l'conious, and businesslike organizc.tion which will 

insure tho :cilitc-.ry security of the United States." 

Section I, paragraph 2: 

"2. ThG functions stc:.ted herein shall be cc.rried out 

in such ~ l!ll::.nnor ~s to cchieve the following: 

(d) Provcntion of unnecasso.ry duplicr.tion or 

overlapping ~.nong thG services, by utilization of the personnel, intelligance, f~cilitios, oquipcont, supplies, end services ot 

any or r.11 SGrvicos in r.11 cc sos where :c:!i·li tc.ry off'acti veness 

end econor.a.y ct resources will thereby be incroC'..sod. n 

Sect ion II, pare.graph B5. - (Car.non functions of tho .Arr.tad Forces}:. 

"5. To·conduct resec.roh, to develop tc.ctics, technique, and organization, end to develop Gnd procure wee.pons, equipnent, end supplies essential to the fulfilllilent of' the functions hereinafter nssignod, each service coordinating with the others in 

all catters or joint concern." 

Section II, pcrcgraph Bl2. 

"12. E&ch service to doterr~ne end provide the LJGc.ns 

ot co!iltlunicctions by which coCi:IC.nd within the service is to bo 

exercised." 

Section III, pnrngraph Bl. - (Functions of the Joint Chiefs ot 

Stnff) • 

"l. To prepc.ro strategic plnns c.nd to provide tor the 

strQtegic direction of the c.r~d forces, tv include the gener~l 

direction of ell cue.bet operations." 

-1- APPENDIX "C" 
REF ID:A65663 

Section III, paragraph B2. 

11 2. To prepare joint logistic plans o.nd to a.ssign 

to the Llilitary services logistic responsibilities in accord~ 

c.nce with such plans." 

Section III, pare.graph B4, 

"4.. To prom.ulgr.te to the indi viduc.l depc.rtnents ot 

the No.tiono.l Milit~ry Establishment· gonerc.l pol_icies c.nd doc_. . trines in order to provide guidance in the preparation ot their 

respective detailed plans." 

Section IV - (Functions of the United States A.rmy). 

. "The United States krmy' includes land combat and service 

forces ~d such aviation and water·tr~nsport as may be organic therein. It is organized, trained, and equipped primarily tor· 

prompt and sustained c.ombat operations on land. Ot the three 

major services, the Army has primary interest in all operat~o~s 

on land, except in those operations otherwise assigned herein." 

Section IV,. paragraph Al. 

"l. To organize, train, and equip -Army forces for the 

conduct of prompt and sustained co~bat operati~ns on land. 

Specifically: 

(a) T°'·defeat enemy land forces. 

(b) To seize, occupy, and defend land areas." 

Section IV, paragraph A3' 

·"J. To organize and equip, in coordination with other 

services, and to provide Army forces for joint amphibious and air~borne operations, and to provide for the training of sueQ 

forces in accordance with policies and doctr~nes of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff." 

Section IV, paragraph Al+. 

"4. To develop, in coordination with the other services,- . tactics, technique, and equipment of inter.est to the Army for \ 

amphibious operations and not provided for in section V, para- graph A4 and paragraph All(c). 11 

. Section IV,. paragraph AS.-

"8 .. · To develop, in coordination with the Navy, the 

-2- APPENDIX "0" 
REF ID:A65663 

-• -. 

Air 7orce, and the Marine Corps the doctrine~, procedures, and 

equipment employed by JJ:'m.'i and Marine forces in air-borne 

operations. The Army shall have primary interest in the deve·1opment of' those air-borne doctrines, procedures, and equipme:p.t which ar.e of' common ·interest _to the .Army and the Marine 

Corps." 

Section IV, paragraph A9. 

"9. To formulate doctrines and procedures for the 

organization, equipping, trainin5, and employment of forces 

operating on land,· at division level and above, including division corps, army and general reserve troops, except that the· 

formulation of doctr~nes and procedures for the organization, equipping, training, and employment of Marine Corps units for 

amphibious operations shall be a function of the Depa~tment 

of the Navy, coordinating as required by paragraph All(c), 

section v. 

Section V - {Functions ot the United StEJtes navy and Marine 

Corps). . . · 

. . "Within the Department of' the Navy assigned forces · include the entire operating forces ot the United States Navy, including naval aviation, and the United States Marine Corps. These forces are organized, trained, and equipped·primarily 

tor prompt and sustained combat operations at sea, and tor 

air and land opGrations incident thereto. Of tho tnree major . servicas, tha ·Navy has primary interest in all oporation·s at 

seo., except in those op~ruti·ons otherwise assigned herein.~ 

Section V, paragraph Al. 

"l. To organize, train, and equip Navy and li1Ja.rine 

Forces·for the conduct of prompt and sustainud combat operaions 

nt sea, including operations ot sea-based aircrnft and their 

land-based naval air components. Specifically: - . . 

(a) To seek· out and destroy enemy ~aval forces 

and to supp~ess enemy sea commerce. 

(b) To ga.in·and mnintain general sea.supremacy. 

(c) To control vital sea areas and to protect vital sea lines or· communication. 

(d) To establish· and maintain local.superiority {incl.uding air) in' an area of naval operations. 

{e) To-saize ·and defend advanced navnl bases· 

and to conduct such land operations as may be essentia.i to the 

-J- APPENDIX "C" 
REF ID:A65663 

' 

prosecution of a naval.campaign." 

Section V, paragraph A3. 

e· 

"J •. To organize and equip, in coordination with the 

other services, and to proviae naval forces, including naval 

close air-support· forces, for the conduct of joint QDlphibious operations, and to be responsible for the amphibious training of all forces as a.ssignc_d for joint· amphibious operations in 

accordance with the policies nnd doctrines ot the Joint -Chiefs 

of Staff. it 

Section V, paragraph .Al+. ~ 

"4. To develop, in coordination with the other serv~ 

ices, the doctrines,· procedur~s, and equipment of naval forces 

for amphibious operations, ·and the doctrines and procedures · tor joint amphibious operations. 

Section VI - (Functions of the United States .n;ir Force)." . . 

, . . 

"The United States bir Force in'cludes air combat and 

service forces. It·~s o~ganized, trained, and equipped priinari- - ly for prompt and sustained combat operations in the air. Ot . the three major services, the .ti.ir Force has prim.o.ry interest in 

all operations in the air, oxcept in those operations otherwise 

assigned herein. ' 

Section VI, pnragraph Al •. 

"l. To. organize, train ·and 'equip Air Force forces 

tor tho conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations in 

the air. Specif~cally: · 

(a)· To be responsible for defense of ·the United 

Sta.tea a.gainst cir attack in accordcnco with the policies and 

procedures of the Joint.Chiefs of Staff. 

(b) To gain and mc.intain gener~l air supremncy. 

(c} To defeat onemY" air forces. 

(d) To control vital nir areas. 

(e) To estcblish local air superiority except 

·as otherwise a.ssigned horoin." 

Section VI, parag~aph A2. I 

"2. To formulate joint uoctrines and procedures, ih 

ooordination with the other services, for tha defense of.the 

. -4- APPENDIX "C" 
D 

REF ID:A65663 

•• 

United States against air attack, and to provid~ the Air Force 

uni ts, fa.cili ties, and equipm.e~t required therefor." 

Section VI, paragrnph AS • 

• "8. To develop, in coordination with the other services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment for air defense from 

land areas, including the conti~enta.l UniteQ. States." 

Section Vl, paragraph All. . "11. ·To develop, in coordination with tho other sarvices, tactics, technique, and equipm~nt of interest to the Air 

Force for amphibious operations an4 not provided for in section 

V, paragraph A4 and paragraph .Al.l(e)." 

' 

. . 

A supplemant to this agreement dated 21-August 1948 sta~es as follows:-

'!Subj ect to control by high.or uuthori ty, each 

service, in the fields of its primary miss·~ons, must have exclusive responsibility for progrrum;ning and planning, and the 

necessary authority. In the execution.of any mission of the 

armed services, ull.avail~ble resources must be used ~o the 

maximum over-all effectiveness. For this reason, the exclusive 

responsibility und authority in a given field do not imply ·· preclusivo pc.rticipat-ion. In providing for our arme·d forces, 

including the preparation of the c.nnuc.l budget and the· prepnra- . tion of mobilization plans, it is essenti~l to avoid dupl~cation 

and the wastage of resources therefrom. For this reason the 

service having the primary function must determine the requirements, but in determining t~ese requireinents must take into 

account the contributions which may be mnde by forces from other 

services. · 

-5- . APP.ENDIX ".C II 
REF ID:A65663 

OONFIBENTJAt. • e 

GONFIDEN!IAL 

EXECUTIVE ORDER 

-- - - - - - - CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY WITH RESPECT.TO .CERTAIN . . 

COMMUNIC.t .. TIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT 

. By ·virture of' the. authority vest.ad in me by the: Constitution and St.c.tutes as Presid..ant of the United States, and 

as Commander in Chief' of' the Army and Navy of tho United States, . in order to promote the inviolability of' ccrtc.1-n Federal communications which affect the national security and interest and 

in Qrder to promote, through the establishment and enforcement· 

ot high and uniform security standards, .the inviolability of 

the cryptographic systems nnd related procedures utilized to 

maintain the privacy of such communications, it is hereby ordcr-

·-ed as follows: 

l• There is hereby created a Cryptographic Security Boe.rd (hereinafter referred to c.s-the board); consisting of the 

Secretary of Ste.to, .as chcirman of the board, and the Secretarios of Wc.r and the ~avy. The bourd is chnrged with the respon- .. _sibility for the efficient.coordination and supervision or all 

cryptographic systems and related procedures of the Federal 

departments and agencies. The functions of the board shall be, 

with tho requirements of' ncitional security and defense as a 

primc.ry consfderction:' (a) to study the cryptographic systems end related procedures of tho various Federal departments and 

agencies, r.nd make pex:iodiQ inspections and survoys·thereof; (b) to determine end estublish such cryptographic securit~ 

st·andards and policies c.s will achieve the maximum of security 

ot governmental comm.unications;.and (c) to promulgate such 

directives ns mc.y be·nccessery to impleme~t those standards 

and policies. · 

2.- The board·shc.11 establi~h a Cryptographic Security Coordinating Committee, consisting of three members, one appoint-· ed by the Secre~ary of State, one an officer appointed by the 

Secretary of \{ar, nnd one an officer appointed by the Secretary 

ot the Navy. Such other personnel cs my be required to assist 

the board or the conmittGa in the performo.nco of ~heir functions, 

mcy be detailed from those depc.rtments in accordcnce with law. 

The committee shall perform. such of.the functions of the bo~rd 

as the.board shull-direct. ·Tho bocrd shall appoint such other 

committees as mc.y be necessnry to carry ·out its functions. 

Except as otherwise instructed by tho board, committees appoint- ed thereby sho.ll hnve n~ power to :mnke fin£1l di sposi ti on of any 

-1- APPENDIX "D" 

I :A ll 
REF ID:AQ5663 

CO~FIDENTIAE • • 

matter presented to:the~ by the board tor study, but they shall 

express by written.report their t!ndings r.nd recommendations 

to the board via the Cryptographic Security Coordinating Committee. · 

J. The board ~nd the committees shall call tor consultation such representa~ives of other government depc.~tments 

Ellld agencies cs may be deemed advisable in obtaining full knowledge ot the cryptographic mc.tter beipg studied under the pro- visions ot this order, to the and that the needs of all :mny be 

considered Gnd provided tor insofar as possible. Other government c.gencies C'.re directed to cooparnte in providing a.ssi st a.nee 

required by tho board in its cryptographic studios'ond to comply with directives promulgated by or on bGhali' of the board dealing with the use and handling qf·cryptographic ma.terial inside the 

government establishment. 

4. No department or agency shall be re·quired to make 

available to tho ~oard, or to any committee of the board, for 

μse by any other dep~rtment or agency any cryptographic aid or 

device, the restricted or.exclusive use of which it considers 

essential to the· proper discharge of its duties in tha natib~al 

inte~est. Nor shell c.ny de}k~rtment or·cgency be required to· 

disclose to the boc.rd or to any ot its c.ommi ttoes the conten:t s 

of ~ny officiul communication concerning its activities if, in 

tbe opinion of ~he head ~r such department or agency'" the disclosure woulu b ·contrc.ry to tho n['.tional interest. . - . . 

. 5. The provisions of this order shall not c.pply to 

the Federal Burec.u of Inve·stigc.tion of the Depl;ll'tment of .Justice. . . 

6. Th.is order is contidentinl uncl shall not- be filed ~n the Division of the Federal Register of the National Archives,· 

or published in the Federal Register, or be given other publicity, until publication therot hes been expressly authorized by the 

chairman of the boo~d. 

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

July J, 1945. 

(Signed)· HA...~Y S, TRUMAN 

.-2- APP.EUDIX "D" 

0 0 N F I B ]l N 'f I A L 

. SIFIBENTIM 
• 

REF ID:A65663 

llESJlll6TEll r ••• 

REB'fRIO 'fi!ID 

HISTORY.OF JOINT COORDINATION 

IN ·THE FIELD .OF COWJUNIC.:.TIONS J.ND 

PERTINENT CHkR~ERS 

1. Ecrly in 1942 the Washington Communications Committee of 'the interservices Communications Board was established 

for the coordinatipn of Combined (u.s. - British)· communications 

as well as Joint communications. These committee. were later 

redesignated respectively as the Joint Communications Board and 

the Combined Co.mmunicatiQns Board, each of which es~ablished 

committees to deal with communication security matters. The JCB 

is now kriown as the Joint Communications-Electronics Committee. 

Thus, throughout the period since 1942, ev~n prio~ to the estab- li~hm.ent of the Joint Comm.unications-Electro~ics Committee coordination of all communication matters, including communications 

secur.ity has been effected 6n both a Joint and Combined bs.sis. · · The JCEC has establfshed a Joint 3ecurity and Cryptographic Panel • 

&1lll81Ef . . 

-1- APPENDIX "E" 

R. E 0 'f R'I 0 'f HD J 
flESJfllCTED 

• • 

ft E B T ft I e ! E B 

Tab A 

REF ID:A65663 

e· 

CHARTER 

JOmT COMt.lUNIC:~TIONS-ELECTRONICS COlli·llTTEE 

.ORGANIZATIO!l 

• 

1. The Joint Communications-Electronics Committee · (J.C.E.C.) is the agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff charged with cognizance of communications and electronics insofar as 

they pertain to matters for which the Joint Chiefs or- Staff 

are responsible. 

lrmlBERSHIP 

2. ·The Joint Communications-Electronics Committee 

shall consist of: 

a. The Chief Signal Officer or the Army. 

b. The Chief of Naval Communications. 

Force. 

c. The Director of Communications, u. s. Air 

). One or more alternates may be appointed by each 

member. \lhenever a memoer ·of the Joint Communications-Electronics Committee is .unable to attend a meeting, an alternate 

will attend as Deputy with plenary powers. 

FuNCTIONS 

4. The Joint CoIDlQWlications-~lectronics Committee 

is responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to: 

a. Establish joint military policies and plans for communications anij electronics systems. 

b. 'Establish operational characteristics for 

communications and electronics'· systems and equipments. which 

may operate interservice. Review and.whenever practicable reco.mmend consolidation of .military characteristics for communications and electronics systems and equipment for the 

Armed Services. · . ~ · 

. · c. Make recommendations to appropriate agencies regarding-research and develop.m.ent·or communications and 

electronics systems and equipments. 

-2- .A..."TJP.ENDIX "E'' 

R E O 'f RIO 'f ED 

·BYRIOTED· 
REF ID :.A65663 . 

BTRIBTED. •• e · lt E ~ 'f ft I 0 ~ E B· 

d. Based on the Joint Chiefs or Staff strategic 

concepts, consider major requirements of the several services 

and unified commands for communications and electronics equipment, and recomm.en4 priority of use of av~~lable quantities. 

e. Determine· and allocate to each of the .armed 

Services, responsibilities in connection with the installation 

and operation of joint· communications and electronics· systems, 

equipments and .facilities~· 

t. Estabiish joint communications and electr.onics 

methods and procedures. · · 

. g·.. Recommend ·to appropriate agenoies the allocation of existing and planned civil communications facilities 

and systems required by the Armed Services and formulate policy 

and type agreements wi~h commercial communication companies. 

h. · Plan military telecommunication frequency . requiremants. bl.locate and coo~dinate use of emission fre-· 

quencics for all military· squipio.ent •. Have cognizance in the . mo.ttor of· preventing glectromo.gnetic interference to' all lflili- t~ry communications and Glactronics systems and equipments. 

5. Tho members of th~ Joint· Comm.unication~-Electronlcs Committee ~ho.11 serve as the United States members .of the Combined Communications ~oard. 

PROCEWRE 

6. Tho Joint Communications-Electronics Committee 

.sha11: 

. aa. Have the Senior member present act as chairman 

nt colDllrl: ttee meetings. If all members should be absent~ .the 

senior alte~~ate member present will preside. Otherwi~e . estaplish its own rules. of procedure within the established , policies of the Joint Chiefs .of Staff. 

b,_. Forward to the appropriate agen~ies for imple- mentation without reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff its 

agr,eed decisions, except those concerning matters of major pollcy which will re.quire approvul of .",,he c!oint Chlefs of Staff. - · · 

c, Form panels from personnel _of.the Army, the 

Navy, and the .J..ir Force, as required to assist in the perform-· 

unce or its duties. The members of permanent panGls will also 

constitute the U.S. membership on the panels.of the Combined 

Communicctions Board. · 

-3 ... APPENDIX "E" 

ft E 
REF ID:A65663 

• 

'tia i lbifl Cb e 

?. The Joint Communications-Electronics Committee· 

is authorized to ~equest all Joint Chiefs of Staff, service, 

and governmental agencies and_ activities.for intormntion and 

assistance which may be required in connecti·on with its 

functions and reciprocally, will furnish information and assistance as appropriate to such cgencias. · . 

8. The Joint Communications-Electronics Cominittee, 

if unnbla to reach agreement -..1i thin a. ·reasonable length of 

time, will submit to thG Director ot the Joint Staff .tor submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a. report 1ndicat·ing wherein the members diso.gr~e. · . 

. Tab J3 CHARTER OF SECURITY i.ND CRYPTOGRkl=HIC P1.NEL -

(Membership - · 8) 

a. Make recommendations regarding the fabrication, 

employment, distribution and procurement of joint cryptographic 

systems an~ equipmont. 

b, Formulate communication security pol-icies in the 

toilowing.aspects: 

Q 

(l).Physica.l security of publications, documents, 

equipment and messages. 

(2) Transmission security. 

(3) Cryptographic security. 

(4) Tho interrelc.tion of opert~tionul t.nd communication security. 

' (5.) Training cctivities. 

c. Ma.ke recommond~tions for thd improvement or with-

-drnwal from use of cryptographic systems end equipment us neces-· 

sary for the mo.intenonce of security. 

-4- APPENDIX "E" 

R li: ST RIO 'i' EE> 
REF ID:A65663 

SECRET 

SESR:B'i' • • 

CqRREUT U. S. MILITARY . COMMUNICATIOHS SECURITY ORGANIZATION 

. 1. The U. S. Army - The Army Security Agency is A" field 

activity or the Intelligence Division, Gener~l Staff, U. s. 

Army. The mission of the agency is twofold in that it includes both communication intelligence and communication security. ·In this study.only the Communication Security function is considered. It is subdivided as follows: · · 

a. Research and Development of cryptographic prin~ 

ciples and material. Al·l research and development, both Communication Intelligence and Communication Security is carried 

on by the Research and Development Dlvision at Headquarters, Army Security Agency. The Branches w1th1n Research ~nd Devel~ 

opment Division which concern themselves with communications 

security pro~lcms Pore as follows: 

(1) 

(2J 

(3) 

'. 

Cryptologic Branch - basic cryptologic resea:rch. 

Elect~o-Mechanical Branch - Design and 

development of security equipment for 

telegraph, teletype, authentication and 

identification communications. 

Ciphon,y and Cifax Branch - Design and 

development of security equipment for . telephone and facsimile communications. 

b. All functions involved in the production and usage of U. S. Army and U. S. Air Force crypto material are car~ 

ried out by Security Division. These fupct1ons are subdivided 

as follows: . · · . . · 

8ECRE'P 

(1) Compilation, production, stora·ge, accounting and distribution of crypto material 

i.s performed by Material 'Branch. 

(2) Maintenance of ·crypto equipment and the. 

development and promulgation of maintenance policies and procedures is per- formed by Maintenance Branch. 

(3) Policies for the employment and proce~ures 

for the operation and protection of .crypto- graphic m~terial are formulated an~ pro- mulgated by the Methods Branch. This Branch 

also performs continuing cryl>tana~ysis and 

·APPENDIX "F" 
, 

-SEGRt. 

· OEiCfli!!'f 

REF ID:A65663 

• • 

critical P-Xam1nat1on of procedures on U.S. 

mill"tary cryptographic mater1Al ·for the 

purpose of maintaining a proper evaluation 

of the security of botp. 

(4} Long range ple.nning pertRin~ng to the requirements for and employment of crypto- graphic material is conducted by the Technical Staff. 

(5) In addition to the· cryptographic func- ti~ns· 9utllned above, Rnnlysis of monitored j;raffic· for trRnsmi·sslon secur1 ty violations is conducted by ~rotecti~e Branch 

to determine the degree of ·field compliance with and the suitability of trnnsmission security procedures •. This branch 

also formul~tes policies and methods for 

conducting radio deception Rnd countermeasures programs. 

- c. · All budget estimRtes Rnd justifications are pre- p~red by Ar~y Security Agency P.nd inciud~d in the bu~et of 

the signal Corps. The Research and Development program is 

app:roved by the Research and Development Group, Logistics . Division, GenRral StRff, U.S. Army, and P.fter consolidRtion 

with the oyerPll ~eseA.rch Pnd D~velopment progrRm of ·the 

.Army,· by the _Research and Development Board. . . 

Army Security Agency procurement ls cRrried on 

by the Signal Corps, wl'iicll in turn coordinates.its ov·ere.11 

procurement program witp the Munitions BoRrd • .. 2 •. The u.s. N~vy - u.~. NAVY Regulations direct thRt 

ell coaes ~nd clphArs and stgnPl publ1c~t1ons ~hAll bn pro- duced by the Chief of NPVAl O·P.eI'F1t-1ons •. They Al so pJ"ovide · for the distrlbutiOQ of all registered publications by the 

Registered FublicA.tio·ns SF>ctlon. In order to meet the. requirements of these Regulations· the follo~ing communications 

security or.gan1zat1on has been established under the Chief 

of Naval Coil1mun1cP.t1ons. 

a. Research ls performed by the Cryptographic research section (0P-204D). This section d~termtnes crypto- graPhic principles of U.S. NA.val Cryptographic ai~s 8nd 

produces labpratory models of Rny new machines or devices 

resulting from its research. 

b. Engineering Development is CPrried out by the N~val Coqe ~nd Signal Laborptory. This l~boratory completes 

SEiCRE'f 

APPENDIX 11 F11 
. , 

REF ID:A65663 

SECRET • -

engin~eri'ng on equipment and designs, overhauls and also manufF.lc!tur~s in i t·a own shops a considerable portion of the 

cryptogra'Oh1c maobines and·devices used in the U.S. NRvy. 

c. Production of cryptographic devices ~nd machine a is a function of the Bureau of Ships (Code 948). The 

Bureau.lets oommerciRl contrP.cts for such equipment or 

assigns pr.oject orders for their menufacture to the Naval 

Code and Signal LRboratory. Requirffments for production 

are estRbl1shed by the Chief of NP.val Commun1~Rtions • .. . d. The NPvy 1 s cryp~ogrpphic reseprch Rnd'develop...· 

ment program, and the allocP.tion of funds to support the ~rogrRm is submi~ted to, ~nd receives approval of the ReseArch 

and Development Board. The NFvy cryptographic procurement 

program and the allocation of funds to carry it out Are aPproved by the Munitions Bonrd • 

. e. Production ot printed crypto documents is per- formed for the N~vy in the Cryptographic Aids SP.ction (Op... 204Y) under the Chief of Navel Communicat\ons in the office 

of the Chief of Naval OperRtions. Field cryptographic reproduction offices, such.Rs the one at Pearl H~or, reproduce cryptographic aids for their areas from copy:furnlshed by Op-204Y. Funds for operation of Op-204Y are allocated 

from Navy Department contingent funds. Funds for Field reproduction offices are0 allocated by the Bureau of Yar4a and 

Docks ~o the District Commandnnts. 

f. Compilation of Key lists and code vocabularies, 

the preparation of wiring diagrams and operating ins~t~~tlons 

is also a function.of Op-204Y. Field reproduction ot~ices 

are not equipped to perform any of these functions. 

g Distribution Rnd Accounting. Qf Registered Pub-,: 

lications lwhich includes cryptogrRphic aids) for the NR~Y ls a·function of the Registered PublicRt1on System. This 

system includes the Registered Publ1cat1on Section (Op-204R) in Washington, and 22 Registered: Publication Issuing Offices. loc~ted thro~ghout the world. -

h. Communications Securit~ rulP.s are formulated in ~he Communicetion Security Sect1on0P-204K). This section 

s.uperv1ses ·the operation of thP. NAvy.t s communication security activities in Washington and in the field, and also 

determines through its cryptRnAlytic ~nd trRfflc Analysis· subsections, when compromise of Nnvy cryptographic systems has occurrP.d ·or is likely. to occur. · 

3. · The U.S. ·Air Force - The Depe.rtment of the Air 

Force is engageq 1n those routine communication security act1vit1es organicelly AssociRted with the operl't;lon of its 

-ssSRET. - APPENDIX "F" - 3 -

SEBRET 

... 

l". 
REF ID:A65663 

• • 

SECRET 

SEGRS'f 

commun1cat1one; Vnlike the Army and the N~vy, the USAF 

"does not h~ve "71th1n its present orgnnizRtiona+ structure, 

any single agency.responsible for directing and coordinating all phas~s of communication security. However the Departments cir'the· Army and the Air Force nre cur~ently negotiating ~n ~greement concerning the tr~nsfer of respon- s1bil1 tiee for c~rtBin communications sacurity ~ctiv1ties 

to .the USAF. It the E1greemen·t is concluded in its present 

terms;.: tne USAF will 9stablieh A security Agency comp~.rable 

to tliOse/presently found w1 thin the Army end the Nl'lvy. 

·' 

SEGRE'!' 

I 

I 

0 

. . 

- 4 I""' 

(IJ 

APPENlJIX II F11 

SEORET 
CO~f~DEMTIM. •• 

GONFIBEifWIAL 

REF ID:A65663 

PREVIOUS AND CURRENT 

STUDIES .AUD PROPOSALS 

• 

·1. On 23 September 1944 the Joint Co.mmun1cetions Board 

reported to the Joint nhiefs Of Staff on the findinga Of an . Ad Hoc Committee which had investignted cryptographic s~curity 

activities of several departments nnd agencies of the government. The report recommended the establishment within the 

Joint Chiefs or· Staff of a permanent cryptographic security board which would have cognizance.over the.cryptogr~phic activities of all government activities. 

2. A~ Ad_ Hoc Committee on the Security of Communications 

was established on 20 June 1945 by the Joint Communications 

Board for the purpose of. study:lng the. Becuri ty of U., 8. IntraService and.Joint Communications. (J.C.B. 174/10/D of 20 

June 1945). This committee considered the following joint and intra-service aspects of ·their problem: 

a. Education. 

b. Terminology Rnd Nqmenclature. 

c. Physical Security.· 

d. Transmission Security. 

e. Cryptographic Procedures. 

3. Correspondence on Research and Development. 

On 5 February 1947 Admiral Nimitz (then Chief of Naval 

Qperatiens) proposed in a Memorandum to General Eisenhower 

(then ·chief of Staff, U. B. -Armyl that an existing informal. 

Joint Committee to exch~nge technical information in regard to· 

the Resea~ch and Development of crypto~equipment be forma~ized 

through-their Joint approval.· ·On 23 July 1948, the Army pro- posed that the research and development qf crypto-equipment be 

placed under the cognizance o~ the Research and Development Board •. On 13 August 1948, the. Navy indicated-that it did not 

concur in Research and Development Board ~cgnizance over crypto- equipment and prcposed that the charter of the Joint Security .and Cryptographic Panel (JCEC)_be broadened.to include the making of recommendations regarding the r.esearch and development "of crypto-equipments. The Army has recently reaffirmed its 

position regarding Research and Development Board cognizance 

over this subject, but decided not tc press the matter over 

Navy objectione. However the Navy. later concurred with the 

Army vie~ in the establishment of a Cryptographic Equipment Panel under the Electronics Committee of the Research and Pevelopment Board. Thie matter has been coordinated with the· 

Air Force. · 

COlli'Il>EN'f'IAL ~O~FIDENTIAl. APPENDIX 11 G11 
REF ID:A65663 

• e 

llESflllGJED 

~8'1'RI G'lEJ) ':RESULTS OF JOINT COLLABORATION IN 

THE FIELD OF COMMUNICATION SECURITY 

l~ As a reault of collaboration in the eommun1cations 

field. basic. doctrine and procedure~ for Joint lommun1cat1ons have been adopted and published as a series of ~Joint 

Communications Instructions. This se~1es has been adoptoa · ·for intra-service as well as Joint ·use. (See TAB A hereto). 

Communication Security has been cov~red in detail in one bf the publications of this series - JANAP 122 11 Communication. 

Security." 0 

2. The services have collaborated closely on ·t.he contracting and procurement of major items of jGint cryptographic equipment. Contract~ for crypto-equipment originally intended for one service's use have been expanded t~ provide for 

the needs of another service when it.became et'1..dent that the 

equipment had Joint application. However, ,joint procurement 

has not been· mandatory. 

3. Each Joint cryptographic document is now p~oducea 

either by the Army Security Ag~ncy or the N~vy for all 

three services. · 

4. In addition to col~aborat1on in productiqn and procurement of cryptographic m~teri~ls for the National Military-. Established, both the Army and Navy haye frequently collaborated in the supply of such materials to other U.S. Government D~partments and Agencies and to Allies of the Un1te4 

States. ,. 

•tISTRIGTEB APPENDIX "H11 

~. 
BJRIGJEBItEs'i'Rie'f~ 

JANAP 

120 

121 

i22 

123 

124 

125 

126 

12? 

129 

129 

130 

131 

REF ID:A65663 

• •• 

LIST OF EXISTING JOINT PUBLICATIONS 

Long Title 

Joint Communication Instructions - Forward 

Join' communication Instructions 

Part -I - General 

Joint Communication Instructions 

Part II - Security 

Joint Communication Instructions 

Part III - General Procedure 

Joint Communication Instructions 

Part IV - Radio Telegraph Pr~cedure 

Joint Communication Instructions 

Part V - fuidi·o Telenhone Procedure. 

Joint CGmmunication Instructions 

Part VI - Teletypewriter Procedure 

Joint Communication "Instructions 

Part VII - Tape Relay Procedure 

Joint vommunication Instructions 

Par't VIII -.Facsimile Procedure 

Joint Communication Instructions 

Part IX - Visual Procedur-e 

Joint Communicatipn Instructions 

Part·x - Direction Finding Procedure 

Joint Communication Instructions _ 

Appendix I - Joint Operating Signals 

-~ - IUIBIBJED TAB 11A11 to APPENDIX 11H11 
fl ,• 

-· 

JAN.AP 

132 

133 

143 

150 

151 

152 

153 

154 

Ri3B'i'RIG':PED 

REF ID:A65663 

• e 

-Long Ti tie· 

Joint Communication Instructions 

Appendix II - Abbreviations . . ~oint Communication.Instructions 

Appendix III - Definitions and Termlnology 

·communication· Security 

Joint Recognition and Identifi~ation 

Instructions - General 

Joint Recognition· and Identification 

Instructions - Air Force. 

Joint Recognition and Identification 

Instruction~ - Ground Forces 

Joint Recognition and Identification 

Instructions - Surface Forces 

Join~ Recognition and "Identification-. 

Instructions - Harbor Defense 

TAB 11A11 TO .APPENDIX 11 H11 
SECRET 

BEORE'l' 

REF ID:A65663 

er 

COMMUNICATION SECURITY PROBLEMS 

OF THE THREE SERVICES 

.· 

1. The Naval Commun1cat1on Service. 

a. rour principal ·types of CC\Dlmun1cat1ons are required by "the Navy: ' . 

(l} Between and among the Navy Department, Naval 

District. Commandants, all Naval Stations and 

the Commanders of Naval operating forces 

ashore and afloat·. 

(2) Between and among ships and aircraft at sea. 

(3) Between ships and aircraft at sea and Coastal 

Stations. 

(4} .Communications for Mercha~t ships. 

b. In meeting· these requirements certa1n·bae1c character1st1cs or Naval Forces must be taken into consideration;· 

Some of these character1st1cs are: 

(1) The Navy ls a mobile force, most units of 

which operate for extended periods .. out of 

_physical contact with the shore establishment and over large distances • ... (2} .Because of this fact it is not generally pos- sible to interconn~ct Naval units by means 

·of land.lines. Most Naval communications are 

dependent upon rad.lo. I 

(3} Secure communications must be maintained not 

only among.higher echelons of command, but 

also down to smaller units, including patrol craft and harbor craft. Such ·craft are not· 

equipped or staffed to install and maintain 

complex radio equipment, and must therefore 

depend pr1nc1pally upon volce equipment for 

·local co1Iimunicat1ons and manually operated C. W. equipment for longer range communications. 

(4} The Naval Cryptographic ylan must be designed 

to meet the security requirements of all echelons and must also suit the 11mitat1ons of 

APPE!ND"lX 11 ! 11 
SECRET 

liECRET 

REF ID:A65663 

• e 

smaller uni ts. It must,· in brief, seek to 

accomplish the following purposes: 

(a) Minimize the effects' of capture or.compromise. Loss of the entire allowanqe of a smaller unit should not prevent 

secure .. communications among higher echelons. This is the principle of isolation. of damage. 

(b) Meet requirements of special situations 

with special purpose systems· (for ex- · ·ample: call sign ciphers, authentica- ~ors and signal books) • · 

( o) · Provide f·or privacy '°'i thin the higher echelons of command •. 

c. Naval cryptosystems, in order to meet the fore-· 

going requirements and charaoteristic·s of Naval communications 

are organized, distributed and used in accordance with the 

following plan: 

.. 

(1) Cryptochannels - The basic unit for crypto- graphic communications· is known as a crypto- channel. Any flag, ship or station in a 

given channel can communicate with any other 

command in that channel. 

(2) Division into Classes - In order to provide the feature· of isolation of damage, crypt9- . channels are organized by echelons of com- . mand ~nd types of vessels or stations in-to 

seven classes, afloat and ashore. · .The highest echelon, class 7, is limited to commanders in chief. The lowest, class 1, consists of motor torpedo boats, minor shore 

activities and smaller craft .of· the local 

'Naval defense forces. Higher classea hold 

·the publications of all lower classes. 

(3) Segregation by waters - Cryptochannels are 

segregated on a g~ograph1cal basis .into 

three areas: . Atlantic, Pacific and Worldwide. · · 

d. For Merchant shi"Ds a sertes of strip ciphers and 

running key ciphers have been produced. These are separate from normal Naval Cryptochannels. 

B!:CftE'I' - 2 - APPENDIX 11 ] 11 

· -~~CHET 
REF IO:A65f)63 

• 

SEG1,a.:1 

SEORE'P 

2. The U. S. Army has a two-fold mission involv~ng strategic and tactical defen·s1ve and dffensive land operations. The communication means (and consequently the communicatiop secur1 ty._means) required to· direct combat· operation~, effect 

supply, and achieve· coordinated stP"atcgic planning ·are different for each. 

a. · The direction of tactical combat operations requires medium-range, semi-fixed, point-to-point circuits (ra-. dio and landline teletype and C. W. circuits) and short range, highly ~obile point-to-point, point-to-vehicle, vehicle-to-· 

vehicle, and some air to ground circuits ·(landline teletype and C. W. and voice radio circuits). The semi-fixed circuits 

carry traffic.of high classification and require cryptographic· equipment and procedures which provide long term security and 

perm! t rapid,. dir~ct, and flexible intra-command communications. 

The mobile circui t·a carry traffic usually of medium classification and require cryptographic equipment and procedures which 

provide relatively short-term .security and are practicable for 

use in vehicles, light planes, or .one-man carry. Upon occasion,. 

both types.of circuits must communicete with Air Force and - Navy operational uni ts. 

b .. The administration and supplying of land combat 

and service elements requires long-range fixed and semi-fixed 

point-to-point circuits (usually teletype and C. W. radio and 

landl1ne teletype· circuits) •. These circuits carry -traffic of 

high' classification and requi~e cryptographic security equipment and procedures which provide long term security and permit 

communication With departmental and tactical organizations • 

• c. The achievement of coordinated strategic planning requires long-range, fixed, point-to-point circuits (usually . radio teletype circuits). These· circuits carry traffic of-the 

highest classification and require cryptographic equipment and 

procedures which provide excep-tionally long-term security and 

permit 1ntercommunicability with major commanda of all three 

services. 

d. In addition to the communication security pr.oblems imposed by the divergent types of ~ommun1cations listed.above, th~re are such special problems as the provision of security equipment for milrtary attaches, communication intelligence · ~nits, U. B. Army transports, various non-military agencies of 

the government, and m111tary services. of certai~ foreign nations. 

e, Finally, the development of militarily practicable f acsim1le television· and pulse-coqe modul~ted equipment requires 

BBCRE'f APPENDIX "! 11 
• I REF ID: A65663 

. e • 

·. -SEORET 

-OEGRET 

the development of special security equipment in order that 

these ne~ communications means may be used for handling · classified· information. 

3. Air Force. 

a. The primary mi-ssiQn of opposing the enemy with 

"our air potential has been assigned to the USAF. This m.iesion 

has be~n divided into several major phases with responsibili- ties charged as follo~s: · 

(l) 

(2) 

(4) 

'Bombardment of strategic targets is the re- · sponsibili ty of the Strate'gic Air Command. 

The support and protection of ground elemente 

is the ·responsibility of the Tactical Air 

Command. · · 

The air· defense ·of the C'ontinental Uni te.d 

States is the respon~ibility of the Air 

Defense Command. 

The transport mission is the ·responsibility of th!3 Milt tary Air Transport Service. 

b. In order to execute the phase of the USAF mission 

for Which it is responsible, each of these commands is dep~ndent upon numerous and varied t'ypes of cbmmuni_cations; 

(1) The Strategic Air Command requires long ra·nge radio teletype, CW and voice, communicatiQns 

in order to control the deployment.·of large 

masses of aircraft engaged in tra~s-hemisph~ric 

operations. 

(2) In order to move masses of troops and ground equipment, well coordinnted air coverage must 

be furnished if ground forces are to be pro- tected from .enem~ air forces.to which they 

may be exposed. ·In order to effect this 

coordination of air-ground cooperation the 

Tact!cal Air Command must plape extensive 

reliance on short range, rapid voice communi- cations~ · · · 

(3) In effecting air surveillance over targets· in 

the United States, the Air Defense Command 

employs a complex system of early radio warning nets linked by voice and teletype-com-

- 4 - APPENl>IX "I" 

, SECRET 
-SECHET 

SEC:RgT 

REF ID:A65663 

e 

. mμnications required 'fo~ the plotting of 

timely intercept of attacking enemy air 

units and guided missiles. The keynote of 

these communications must be utmost speed and reliability11 

(4) The Military Air Transport ·Service, 1n discharging its responsibilities for supporting all of the services with air lift to bases 

throughout the world is d~pendent upop a 

vast net of linking communications for the 

rapid flow 9f·logisticAl data, fiight information, and the collection and dissemination of weather forecE1sts neces.sary for · its operations as well ·as those of other · air force units. 

c. The intelligence availRble to this s~rvice as regards the efforts which the Axis Nations exerted during th~ 

last war on all types of Air Force commun!catiQ.Jls poignantly illustrates the vulnerability. of air. communications to hostile 

intrusion. The Japanese ss well ~s the GermRns enjoyed sin~ 

gular success in exploit~ng Air Force co~mun1cations which 

were especially productive of intelligence bec~use of the 4ir 

Force requirement for transmitting much interrelateq information over path point-to-point communicat~on and air-ground communication channels. · 

d. While the U. S. Air Force is intensely aware of 

the ahortcomipgs in its communications which make. them interesting targets for hostile intercept organizations, it has.not 

been possible in the short time since the end of Worl4 War II 

to produce radically improved equipments to replace those upon which it relied for. security of our oommunica~ions during the 

war. ~resently existing crypto machines, although possess~ng· 

considerable inherent security, are not geared to the speed of 

operation which ·must be provided. 'High-echelon mam~al or.yptodevices do .not mee:~ the :req~irement for cryptogrE\phed communications -over USAF radio teletype circuits~ The tra~smission 

of weather mape by facsimile cannot be protected as yet with 

efficient secure crypto elements. Adequate method~ of meeting. the voice securit~ requiremeQts of the USAF have not been achieved. Da~ge~ouo amounts of air order of battle information 

would be available in .the event of war by the.traffic an~lysis 

of channels .carrying flight movement messeges, even witpout regard to th~ security of any present ·type cryptosystems which 

might be employed. 

BEGR:S't' - 6 - ~PENPlX 11.I" 

SEBRET 
REF ID:A65663 

• dfllGTED 

- . -

-RSB'i'RI GTED 

PROPOSED CHARTm 

P"OR THE JOINT COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY PANEL 

(Membershi~ 9, three from each service) 

1. ·Formulate Joi~t, and review 1ntra-serv1c,e, communication security policies in the following asp~cts: 

a. Physical security. 

b. Transmission s'~uri~y • 

. 

c. Cryptographic se curl ty. _ 

d. The. interrelation of oper'ational and communication ·eP.curity. 

e. The interrelation of ~ommun1cat1on security and 

communication·1ntelligence. 

r. Communication oover plans. 

g. ,Training activities. 

2. Subject to the review of the· JCEC, dire.ct the fabrication, distribution and employment of joint co~unication 

- . security documents, systems' and equipments. ·Review and make 

recommendations ~egarding the same aspec~s of intra-service 

communication security documents, systems, and equipment~ 

For the purpose of this .charter, review by the panel means 

that each service 1~ requifed to inform the pan~l of its intra_. 

service commun1c~t1ons ·eeouri ty pl·r.ons for th~.· purpose or detEft'm1n1ng whe.ther such plane hA.ve Joint 'aspect.a •. 

' 

-i-

~1·"~Mlt~ APPENDIX "J" 
REF ID.:A65663 

• •• RESJRICTED 

ftESTlU C'l'ED 

3. 'Make recommendations for the improvement or, subject 

to the approval of the JCEC, direct the wlthdrawal from.use-of 

~ryptographic syst~ms and equipment as may be dictatea by 

. security requirements. 

4. Pr,epare for review and approval by the Research 

and Development Board, a CQord1nated program for research and 

development of u. S. Military communication security equiPm~nt, and when approved take action to implement this program. 

5. Prepare for review .fllld approval by th~ Munitions 

Board, ~ coordinated program, including industrial mobflization planning, for the procurement of U. s. Military communication security ~quipment, and when approved take Action to· 

implement this program. 

6.. Insure coordim~tion w1 th the Jo~_nt Intelligence Committee whenever policy considerPtions Rre involved affect1ng 

mperational security. 

?. Insure ·coordination with the United.States Communication Intelligence Board whenever policy considerations 

!3-re involve~ affecting communicRtion. intel;ligence. 

8. \1hen no.chP.~e in Joint Communications or Joint 

Intelligence policy is involved, the .Chai~man will p:escribe 

-

appropriate Pction to implewent unanimous'Pruiel decisions con~ 

earning Joint communication security And/or cryp~ogreph!c 

:Ri:SWRIG'PSD 

RESTRICTED APPJ!:NDIX 11 J 11 
REF ID:A65663 

• at tiIHl~IL3 matters under cognizance of this P.anel, in accordance with 

this charter, and will promptly furnish each of the Heads et 

the Communications and Intelligence br~ches ot the three 

Services with a copy ot all directiv~s thus issued - for im- , 

plementation by each Service. 

9. The Chairmanship of this Panel shall be rot~ted once 

annually among the three .Serv~ces in the.order of· Service 

seniority, with the Head of the Communications or Intelligence 

branch, as appropriate 1n each service, nominating the person 

to be Cha1rm~n from amQng its members on the Panel. 

RES'fRIC'i'Ef) - 25'-

.APPENDIX "J 11