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REF ID:A65655 

COMINT _ ... _HARD FACTS IN THE COLD.WAR 

by J .A.Meyer 

Rapid communications are the nervous system of the 

modern super-state, co?1Ilect1ng a strong central control 

with widespread agencies ~nd outposts. Traditionally these communications are sent in code or cipher to protect the information they carry. In the politics of competing natio~e, the timely ~nalys1a and exploitation of.weaknesses 

in these vital communications is an important facet of 

statecraft. 

"Gentlemen do not read other people 1s mail", said 

Henry L. Stimson, then Secretary of State, as he.ciosed down 

./' the secret cryptanalytic section of the State Department. The 

time was 1928, and Stimson, as the new Secretary, was being 

gently introduced to the inner workings of the.Department, 

however, t~e existence of the cryptanalytic section which 

j 

·had been decoding secret fore1gn'd1p1omat1c messages from 

World War I onwards, had been so carefully concealed that 

each new_Secre~tary of State usually learned of it only after 

i. he was in o~fice. 

~~!.'!" A political euphoria and revlb.lsion toward war and intrigue 

following World War I made the position of .the"cryptanalyt1c 

. section somewhat insecure. Successive Secretaries of State 

regarded this espionage f.unct1.on with varied reaatione ranging . "' @'pp roved for Release by NSA on 08-22-2013 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 
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REF ID:A65655 

from shook and dis.approval, or feelings of mora~. conflict at 

trying to pry into the state secrets of brother nations while , ---- ~~""''1 pubi1cly advocating good will --- to businesslike rationa11zat1on 

of this as a neccessary dtplomatic function.~ 

Stimson did not rationalize. Ha took direct action; 

disolved the section, ftx&ixxkex~••~i•x and fired the people, 

a purge intended to restore honor to international politics. . . 

As a result, the head cryptanalyst ·H.O.Yardley, seeing the 

work of more than a decade sudden1y terminated, wrote a book, 

"The mack Chamber", ·in which he revea1ed many incidents o"f the 

World War I code breaking 1n which h~ ha~ taken.part, and in the 

later part of .the book, deecr~bed i~ clinical detail the action 

of the section during the Naval Diaarmenent Conference of 1922, 

in which the u.s. and Japanese governments ha.d negot·ia.ted Japanese 

naval tonnage. To authenticate hie narratlve, Y&:rdl:ey included 

verbatim decipherments of the messages passed.between Tokyo and 

Embassy the i•x&gaxta• in Washington, with a running commentary on the 

way the American statesmen, knowing the instructions and terms 

of reference of the Japanese delegat;on --- bargained sharply to 

reduce the Japanese fleet to the smallest size Tokyo would eta.nd 

for. This Naval Conference was hailed as a·great diplomatic 

success for the u.s. 

Yardley's book, published in 19~9, was so convincing.that 

the Japanese government ,_in an enraged protest, expanded their 

naval power, justifying.this as a mora1 right after the way the . .;!:.,.~" . 

unscrupulous American government~h'B.d t~ic~ed them •. Cryptanalysis, 
REF ID:A65655 

the art of coda breaking, suddenly grew in the public and 

political mind from a distasteful and somewhat sneaky habit, 

not mentioned in the best circles, to a dangeroua political 

weapon--- whic? might boomerang.-tThe ethical and political repercussions of reading other 

people's mail had occurred earlier, in England, during World 

War I, when Capt. R. Hall, Director of Na~al Intelligence for 

the Admiralty, intercepted correspondence from German agents in 

Britain which was being sent to contacts in neutral countries 

through Hie Majesty's mails. Interfering with the ma11 was il~ 

legal, so Hall,. acting largely on his own authority, set up a 

mail reading section, and insulated this activity from other 

branches of the goverillll:ent. 

When his unofficial tampar~ng was discovered, Hall was . . . threatened with trial and prison, bu~ he argued· the practical 

'5 •. 

urgency of the action, and 'the function was lega1ized. 

·Even earlier, in 18 , a secret British organiza~ion 

known as the Office of the l>ecyphe.rer, a code breaking section 

of , was subjected to publicity, and abandonned as 

the scapegoat in an era of publicized pol.i ti cal i.dealiem. 'f 

T Cryptanalysis went underground· in the U.S. after the 

Stimson incident. The u.s.Army Signal Corps had a small section 

which kept tha torch burning during the 1930's, but the existence 

Of this group was not made known through all.branches Of the 

government. Signal Corps· cryptanalysis produced the vital "Magic" 

intelligence of 1941.~ In 1940 Stimson, as Secretary of War, had 

to authorize the ~xpansion of the Signal Corps effort, which he 

did with mixed feelings.~· 

. ::t=: . Wiretapping is another method of intercepting messages, 

publicized but not approved. 
REF ID:A65655 \ 

. ~« t,-,""' ........... -; •. 

/_/

. fl .... , 'ii 

Stimeonts a.ction,then,was justf (repeat o:Jan earlier 

,,; •.._, ~. 

pattern; the secret function begun to meet an emergency and 

continued to assist the state in its policies, was condemned 

as a. gesture of ·good faith. The political repercussions of 

Yardley's book were eye opening'.• ~t the ideal pers1sted--·-

wor1d peace must be sousht in mutual trust and respect between 

'1 . nations, not cynical and ruthless opportunism.· Politics or not, 

there ar~ some things that gentlemen do not do.+ 

The Ethics of Informal.Espionage. 

This curious distaste .for reality illustrated above derives 

from the supposition that foreign affa~rs are. carried out by 

bus1nessm~n and gent1a~en,-and that ~hat;~a'::'a~~. which * . • r forbids cheating, can be applied. In.practical terms this means 

t~at espio~age and aggressive ma~hods,of getting intelligence are 

bad form, whereas many activities q'UJ,te like ea.pionage are legal . . . 

and approved, and the i~ormation tbey supply may be used with 

clear conscience. In fact, there is no ·dichotomous separation 

bet~een diplomacy and intelligence, the rules for· both are inexact 

and blurred by outlook.· 

* Von Papen: "What do you think the British would do if one 

of our people made them a comvarable offer?" 

Moyzisch: "I think they d undoubtedly accept it, sir. In 

time of war no nation could afford to turn down such a proposition. In peacetime it would probably be better diplomatic business to do 

the gentlemanly thing and inform the British Ambassador rather than 

get involved with stolen dqcuments. But in time of war, str ••• 11 I 

+ Even the use of codes and ciphers for normal d~plomatic 

communications has been rega~ded with disfavor.1 One Of the im-

'portant advantages of diplomatic recognition of the USSR by the 

u.s. and Canada, was ·the authori'zat1on ot: coded messages. 10 ~- ........ ....-·-..:...· 
REF ID:A65655 

Intell.igence. is an institution as old as politics and war. 

It consists of knowing as much as possible about the opponent, 

his habits, resources and· intentions, a re~sonabie aim in war, 

pol1t1~s, business· or p'ereonal affairs. fhe conventional forms 

. ·- . . are agent intelligence,· informa.t_ion gathered by and from people 1 

wt,l.ich in earl~est t1mea·took t,he form of scout~ng parties, inter_. 

rogation. of prislbners '· and plant!ns spies in the -·eneiny ca.mp.:. ......... 

and communications :tntelligence ( shortened by usag<:J to· comint. ) , 

which, after the invention of signalling a.nd'wrtting, involved 

·1nte~ception and .reading of messages.· 

The gent~ema.nly view of such activities~p is that they violate 

the rules of the game, and while a mi1itar7 organization might, 

as a wartime neccessity , hastily indulge in some of these pract1.ces, no statesman would condone and s'upport them during peaceti_me. 

;·· . Gathering information on· foreign countr~es is a.l+ight as lo~ as ~h:a . . _........ . 

' / 

the methods are above board, simply a matter of being well 1nf'ormed' - . . . . but espionage, pilfering secret ~nform~t1~n, and most especially 

peeking at other pe_ople 1 s corres~ondence are defin1 tely cheating • 

. Actually, ~~ere is an element.of seif deceptio~ in this. 

In the· business ~orld tbe use of.· age~t- intelligence is a ti~e honored 

custlbm whivh has provoked the concept "O()mpaziy Confidential" t.o. ~~ . 

shield new development-a, and made comp·any loyalty an important . ... ~~-/\ ~-~ 

item of rep~tatio~·~Marketing and technical information, rather -~\~......_, ''. 

' ' . ...v':I than military and.political details ·are the target,. but the analogy " . persists. . . An execut1 ve in a ·highly compet·i t.i ve industry would consider 

it of paramount importance to be well informed about the activities 
./ 

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REF ID:A65655 

and plans of his competitors,_not. only from published sources, 

but also from carefully sifted gos~ip and aneddG~ea· gathered in . ~ A.() . . . -h.J,z. ... neutral situations like the golf course, cocktail-bar, and nat- . l'I . 

ional ooni'erencf .. . . While the.executive might not a9tua~ly send spies to wo~k 

for the opponents,, corpor~t1"on·w1vee ~a/useful i1nr? and pro- ··"' 

fessional friendships ce.n often be use·d. for · di·scre~t trading of . . . . . .. •.... . . information •. The :rew:ards for- ~he a.gents are ·_1nd1r~c~. f51fts, 1nvi t .... 

ations·and political favor, all skillfully disguised. For· t really 

.important information, the e~eoutive may attempt t~e master coup· . . . . . . . 

ot bribing a.key man to defect from a rival organization to his 

own, and he might rationalize this polite subversion -~y the argument 

that.the competition was trying at least as hard. 

Tbis type of espionage is "safe" , it is done informally . . 

and face to face, it is hard to trace and easy to deny, and the 

competitor, even if he knows what is going on1 can never make .. ,

. . . ti . 

a case of tt; or force tQe issue. _However., a ·deliberate a.ct of . . . 

a.ggress1.on, such a raiding ·th:e competitor 1 s locked files, or 

t~pping, his phone; or slitting· open his· maii is r.ather a different 

.. ·I e ' 

story, and besides the illegality and risk of discovery~ .the 

executive·, no matter how ruthless a.nd singl_eminded. he is in trying 

to advance· his organization and his own position, might, aside 

f'r9m th~ ~isk, consider this a contemptib.l~ way o~ doing ~stness. + 

+.In 1933 Jacob Sterngluss, former· GB"ch1ef 1n Afghanistan, 

came to the U.S. as an official of' ·the· Russian· Red Crose •. His spec11c job consisted of organizing the theft of mail from the mailboxes 

of c·erta1n 1nd1v1dua-ls. He arranged contacts with minor employees of Western Qnion, Oo.mmero1a.l Cables,. and RC._,. w1t.h a view to inter- t'L 

cepting telegrams,. cables, -and radiograms in which he was interested. 
REF ID:A6565~ 

So the folkway is established,·the ethics of bUsiness &nd 

personal life, which ac~ept int~rmal·espionage and apparently 

recoil at formal espionage as ~n inv~aion of privacy, are projected into the aims and practices of foreig~ politics.1" 

Honor Among Nations 

The statesman may prefer ~o· avoid formal espionage for 

pract1ca1 as well as ·moral reasons. Politics and the behavior of 

competing nations is infinitely more ·complicated than business . . . 

or games, there ls more at stake, and it is harder to determine . . 

whether a country is winning o~ los1ns since there 1s no simple 

scorecard or account ledger to consult. The mpst important ingredient for analysis of a political situation is information, plent~ful, .. 

timely, and correct. Ignor~nce on·a.nY point is a. dangerous waaknEiss, 

~ Formal espionage is within the rules in competitive sports, particularly football, where the rtμ~s were altered pragmatically 

to legalize existing systems of .espionage. Scouting games is recognized as a fair method of gathering information, but taking movies of the games, except on the home field, is disallowed. 

Pumping squad members for information about injuries is not de 

rigeur, although it is done. Remarkably, the style of play in 

football has changed as a result of commun1cat1ons intelligence. Thirty years ago the offensive team normally lined up at scrimmage, and the quarterback called off a string of numbers which defined 

the play, and the starting s.1gna.1. Shrewd defensive players were 

able, however, to "break" the system, and toward the end of the 

gs.me the defense· could recognize the play, and shift to meet the 

attack. Surprise was eliminated ~d the·9ffense bogged down. 

Systems of encipherment were too cumber·some to use on the field, 

so the "huddle", originally derided as uring a.round the rosy", .was 

developed to simplify and protect the _cqmmunications. 

Diagnosing the play from the sig~ls was not "cheating'''· it 

was "heads up football", because victory was highly ·prized. I! 
REF ID:A65655 

since national policy d~pends.upon what the gover~en~ believes, 

KKixutlmXKlla.QIDB .. 

and naive scruples about methods of gett~ng. informa~ion ~ay 

prove costly fetishes. 

However, quite a lot· ~f information can be gotten through 

informal channels, without. the exertion and anXiety o~ extralegal . . 

a·ctivitias. Formal espi'onage·, buiing infor~at1on 1 .sett~ng up 

spy rings, bribing· defectors, intercepting ma~l and readirig 

secret communications---~ these activities .are ou~side:the rules, . .. . . .· ·. 

outside the law, a~d distasteful to .a good statesman, besides 

whivh thay.are expensive and hazar~ous • 

. Information which is tor sale lEl:rk.may be highly priced, 

and· it must be ve.r1f1ed before 

1cf . 

it can be believed.· A spy ring 

•r' is exceedingly difficμlt ·to ~rganize. Years may be required to screen 

and select people who have· the. rare qualities that might enable . . . , .. t.hem· to fμIiction in an espionage system. A. Foote, in his . . 

"Ha:n.dbo~k for Spies", di.scnisses -in .detail the elaborate and thorough 

work required·to,set·up and operate a single ring in one country. ·, . . 

The administration of the system is difficult once it.is in 

·operation, :the financing. is ~xceadingly tricky since 1ndiv1'dual . · .. 

agents may.have tO·~~spose Of large amounts Of cash without 

detailed accounting; and it ·is difficult to check the loyalties 

of all agents since they must blend into the system they are 

. , ... trying to yenet~at~. Security is a constant threat, .and a few 

leaks' or some bad luck may d'isable a network that nae taken .. . . L' .. years to. construct. Wh~n·a spy ring is ~nravelled, a diplomatic 

rift is certain, no matter how many reassuring lies-are told----
REF ID:A65655 

thus even if the espionage system fails completely, the state1'1 

sman cannot wash his hands of it. As1ae from the disgrace of 

being caught, the project w11.l be r.egard.ed as a flop at home. 

On the other hand, the informati~n gotten throug~ a~proved 

channels may be incomplete. One nation may cheat energetically 

while the other acts "by the rules". Then ·comes a day of reckoning 

when a shocked nation is presented with some convincing evidence 

which it must act on, diplomatic r~ft or no.~• 

Igor Gouzenko, the Russian· code clerk who chose the West in 

1945, provided just such a bitter lesson by his re·velations about 

Russian espionage in Canada. From 1941 onwards, the Soviet had been . . 

considered and treated .as an a:lly and· 11 fr1end_ly". power, and· 

altercations in eastern Europe were.played d~wn on the premise 

that wartime cooperation still existed and must be preserved. 

Belat~dly , the Russian intentions and organization exposed and 

documented, we began·our new role in the uninterrupted idealogical 

war. 

Gouzenkots defection and the chill that followed it did not 

alienate Russia from the West. Their policy was already formed 

and in operation, the West was simply blind to it, partly by 

deliberate optimism, and partly, thro~h lack of information. 

The facts about the Red 'spy network were not availacle through 

normal channels for obvious reasons. Except for Gouzenko's defection, the net might have spread and functioned, unrecognized, 

while the West forced themselves to recur.ring declarations of 

sincerity, friendship, and high principle. ·Tha rules of peace 
7 

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REF ID:A65655 

had changed, the stakes were ·d1f~erent, -not coex~stence but . . . . 

conquest, therefore both sides had· to ~lay d1fferently.1". ·. 

. . 

A post mortem implication of the ·episode is that, while . 

Gouzenko1 s· _defection was a phenomenal· stroke ·Of l]lck, if the 

West had been 1nte~,;t!ested -1n _Russian. com1nt '·· and had cont1n:uously, . . . . .. ' ' • I 

through. the war· and af:terwards, hammered _at the Russian·. codes and 

read some. of the ·)Iles sages t.hat Gouzenko ~as sending_, we might 

have _known about. the espionage ring before his defection--·- or· 

even better, might, from com1nt, have besn able to see the Russian . . . 

plan in 1ts formative peri~d, and done s"omething .to disabl:-e :tt:x . . ·the _net and tbwart the R~d 4esigh before it-had matured. . . Gouzenko 1 s d$fect1on spelled the end of a boom period of 

Soviet :ba•xi:t espionage, unfortun.ately too· late t~ present the 

. . tr'ansfer of much of the vital atomic information and material that 

enabled the USSR ta build ·1ts own·A•bombs, and the true nature.of 

Sovietn aliiance was exposed too late to enable interference 1n . . . .... . 

the annexation of eastern Europe. The history and effect of Red 

espionage and· politias could be different today---~for the •k•• -~i. ~ ,succes.sful .c~yptana.lytic e~fort. -=ta . 

+,It was ·symptomatic of .the political climate of the time 

that Mr. King ( Canadian Prime Minister) not only refus·ea to 

deal with Gouzenk:o and h1s papers but recommended that the young cipher clerk ·return to his embassy. "I thought he should be told," 

Mr. K1iig .reported later to the House of qommons, "to go back to 

.tb.e· ·embassy with _the papa.rs he had in his· possession .... What I 

felt most import~t was to see that nothing should be dona which 

would cause the.Russian Embassy to believe that· Canada had the 

least susp1q1on of anything which. w:as takiriS place there ••• " 

Gouzenk:o did not .follow the advice of the prime minister.at 

'11F !t was not considered gentlemanly ~o spy on allies while 

there were Germans and Japanese to be spied on. 
REF iD:A65655 ·. 

The American Tourist 

The· U.S. , in .considering a. policy of' forma1 espioange·, is 

immediately confronted with a serious fundamentai problem. The 

Soviet is wal1ed off from the rest of the wor1d by its security 

sys~em. Much agent intelligence must take· pla~e 1n bordering . . . aate111te or neutra1 countries in the o~ient, near east, and 

Europe. For a diverse problem like this, the· backbone of a good 

agent system is a supply of people who.can b1end. into a tar~et 

country,. and, like a pickpocket. work undetected and. w.ithout 

- . drawing attention. This implies suitable physical ·appearance, 

perfect command of the language and dia1ect, experience and 

savoir faire in ~dapting to the country,. .}tnow1edge of minutaeOf local politics and history, the ·abilit'y to p1ay a role, and 

a rare quality of mind that makes ail 11

age~t 11• ·~""'"··plus unquestionable loyalty.~ Unfortunately, native born americans who fill ~ . . . . ~ 

this bill . are rather rare. Many americans with suitable foreign ./ . . . ~ 

backgrounds, travel and .. education, are barrad fpom secret work . . . 

by security policies which exclude.pe~ple with for~ign.backa 

grounds·. Foreign nationals can be hired for this work~ but the 

security pr.oblem is very sensitive.. The ave.rage. educated J¥Der1can, . ~ 

with proper intellectu'al and loys1ty qualifications, has an 

unm1st8.keable stamp to his a~eech an~ personality which perman~ 

ent1y disqualifies him for this kind of work. i= 

-...... + Spy rings seldom · succeed. f.or -long, principa~ly because 

'·,they must operate in the opponent '.s territory. Arrests, defections t 

a'B4 d1a1ntegrat1on of painfully constructed nets ~re the norm, 

ana:-......once the counter espionage agents identify a spy, surveillance 

and i:nterrogations can be used km not only to unravel the chain of people~''but also to establish what kind of information, and how 
REF ID:A65655 

. a.'S 

much,- has baen passed over to th~ enemy. By way of contrast, 

comlnt activities may be pereued for decades without the target 

country ever being certain of how far its communications channels 

have been penetrate·d. t• · · 

• During World War II, American spies, · after completing their training in the U.S., were frequently rejected by the 

British SAB at Pemberly, as unsuitable.~r 

In.addition~ merely in coordinating the information 

gathered from AnI. sources, an intimate knowledge of European~ 

mideastern and eastern history and . J>.ol1t1cs and .personalities 

is required to make intelligence out of-a complex of uncertain .... and incomplete details. However, sophist1eated and ~borough 

understanding of history and intel'nat.1onal · politics is n.ot in 

fashion in our teohnologi9al society. A predominant number of good 

minds go into the exact sciences,· $n~ business, and other marketable ch.annals, and considering our re-cent · emergence as a major 

factor in international affairs, and the long exper.ience of our 

allies and opponents, it may be some time before we develop 

a Weltanschaung wb.ich will enable us to meet the competition 

f•\i\'i-.1 . 

in these ,. fields.~ 

By comparison, we are. much better equipped for communications 

intelligence, because of our technology. Oomint begins with in~ 

tercepting signals and messages. Radio signals ca.n be intercepted . . 

by putting a receiving station in the right place, and having · 

an operat~r copy down the meseages. Sending stations, ships, planes 

and submarines can be located by coordinating information from 

severa1 receiving stations. A thorough intercept system requires 

a vast outlay of equipment, and a large organization of people to 
REF ID:A65655 

operate, maintain and administrate the function~ but many of 

the equipments and skills needed. are available in our electronics 

: industry. 

The signals and messages, after they are intercapte~ and 

copied down, are sent to central organizations for analysis, 

where they! are sorted into appropr1at~ classes, according to 

sender, receiver, and other characteristics. Where possible, 

individual messages are read and translated.st 

The work of ".reading" the messages of.ten involves "breaking" 

a code or cipher syste~, and this is the most difficult and . . 

uncertain part of the entire co~1nt effort; and the moat 

~ .. crucial. Howevsr, the task ·of gathering· tbe information,_ the 

intercept phase., ie much simpler and safer t·han ··the correspondins 

process "in agent . 1'" . • . .· . intelligence. The ·intercept operator need ltnow 

nothing about the language or habits of the country ~e. is monitoring, 

his job 1s specialized and can be . quickly +.earned. The analyst 

who tries to "break" the message need not play the role of a 

-foreign national, _cryptanalysis is $n exact science, all be it an 

uncertain onei and scientific mehhods and-brainpower can.be 

used to expedite lt!° 

Encipherment and BKBXBX systems of secret writing were used 

by the ancient Greeks in their political and military affairs, . 

and since that time have recurred.fr~quently in European history~' 

'+-The German.Abwehr used comint methods to penetrate and unravel 

the famous Rote Kapelle ( Red Orchestra ) spy ring in Germany during World War II?"Direction finding techniques were used to isolate 

the houses from which coded messages were being sent. A raid cap- . tured the radio operator and cryptographic materials. With the 

Russian keys known, other Rote Kapelle messages, which up to then 
REF ID:A65655 

had been insoluble, were deciphered, a.nd the information 

contained in them was used to locate Rote Kapelle agents, and 

to verify their confe~sio~ afte~ ~~terrogation.!S 

After the invention of . the ·telegraph and ~lre~ess ,· grea..t vol:• 

umes of official communicat1.ons could be quickly. sent to all parts . . . 

of ~he world. Remot~· activities could ca controlled from a central 

point,. and the modern state an4 i;n1litary sys~em is prof0undly 

dependent upon a continuous flow of commμμi~ations~~~ 

When secrecy in conn;nun1-cat1ons became important;. new· metjrod's 

of enclpherment which could pr.ovide secur1 ty for large numbers 

of mes.sages, were sought. Most qodes a.nd ciphers are "br.oken" by 

arranging and combining evidence from a ~arge . number of messages. 

Poe, in "The Gold Bug" , and Yard:J.,ey ,· ."1n "'.rhe Black Chamber" show 

examples of how a cipher system displays chara.cter1stics after . . it has been used enough. For decades ·a.'long battle has been waged 

between cryptographers, to deveiop secure ciphers, and cryptanalysts, 

to find better . methods . and tools. for: break1ng messages. :sS9 

Modern ·cry_ptanalys is is C~"racterized by a large amount Of 

work done ori a· large amount of data,· counting, searching, sorting.,· 

calculation, in.general, information processing. Some parts of 

cryptanalysis require human insight and imagination. -oth~r phases 

can be reduced .to exact logical proceedures.,~ 

·The ·advancing e1ectron1c .technology .1n tt:ie u.a. has evolve.d 

~qu1pment and sk1l~e which .could . be applied to this mechanistic 

pa.rt of cryptanalytic work; .and because ~f the speed .of communications between tbe intercept point and the analytic center~ 

much of the analysis and processing can be done within the 
-- - ---------------

REF ID:A65655 

continental u.s. with great advantages in security and staffing. ~ 

The U.S. resources in industry, technology and scientific 

manpower are greater and more accessible than our resources in 

tr.ained intelligence agents; so any policy of formal espionage 

would have to consider not only our history of political 

inexperience, but also our future. position in the changing 

technological rac~. 

Needle in the Haystack 

lmm~~iately before the Pearl.Harbor.attack ~n 1941, Signal 

Corps cryptanalysts wvre searching for a particular Japanese 

'SI· 

message, "East wind ... ~ ... ra.in11 , which was a ."~attle signal. Although 

they P.ad sufficient "Magic" intelligence to know a war was immanent' 

this message was ( allegedly) never found ·in time. Thie illus• 

tr~tes an important aspect of cryptanalysis •f and comint, the 

element of luck. 

Even where a cipher system has been broken, and messages 

can be read, a. great volume of traffic may have to be laboriously 

processed before a few ·significant items . s• 

are found. In ·other 

cases, critical messages can be isolated before they are solved. 

~he famous Zimmerman telegram of World War I is an example 

of this. Because British Intelligence thought the t.r·ansmission 

of German coded mese~ges within Swedish dipl~mat1c· telegrams was 

especially important, ceir.tain Qf Ew1ng1 s Room ~ colleagues gave 

this traffic their fu11 :attention, and this single message., 

when solved, was the catalyst which brought the u.s. into 

World War I. "' 
REF ID:A65655 

Customarily, because of traditional ~1~ferences between 

military and political groups, a target country may have a 

.,. . number of different cipher systems •. The.opposing cryptanalyst 

. . . must review all th,se . syst~ms and.decide which ones appear 

"breakable", and what kind of information can be derived from 

the m~ssages. Soma . cipher systems are completely unsolveable, 

many are very stubborn .and may be solved only by l~ck or . . 

brilliant 1na1gQ~, o~hers· give up easily but yield p~or returns. 

Bearcp.ing·f'or a"break" into a system is analogous t~. prospecttns:t1 .. e. lo9king in :the. right·places, and reco.gnizing clues. Once 

a sys.tam i11J broken, individual. messages c-an ueually be read by . . . ., ... sufficient straightforward hard w9rk. This p~ase is called .. exploitation, e.nd is a~a+ogous· to· mining operations once a 

rich lode has been discovered. 

Countries change their cipher systema from time to time just 

as they change and· impr_ove. tt?-eir aircraft and other military 

instruments. Because complete 'overhaul is expensive, gradual 

.,., 

mod1f1c·at1on is co~ventional. The cryptanalyst'· reading a system, 

euddebly finds it unreadable. He must quickly determine if it 1s 

radically·new o~ just .slight1y different, and in this reanalysis, 

one of· the moat _·important factor~ is continuity'· a. knowledge of 

the history of tne crypt system. A cryptan~1yst follows changes 

in a cipher system like a broker follows .fl~ctuating stocks., 

or a designer follows fashions, and this .. repeto1,re (frequently.) 

enables him to evaluate a change much more quickly·than the • o I I ' • 

system ~as originally· solved. 

Unfortunately, this detailed knowled!e of cryptographic 
REF ID:A65655 

history can be gotten only by a thorough.and.continuing crypt- . ,., . analytic effort~ Continuity once lost, ·1s hard· t~ i reg~in, like 

losing momentum on an icy hill. 

In peacetime, pol1tical·1n~elligence may ~e more topical·than· 

military" communic.ations, and the military 91phe.r systems may not .. 

be used enough to.provide· much material for.solution or exploit-

. ation. At such t'tmes when greater effort is directed at p~litical 

and d1.p1omatic · communicat·ion channels, .the military links must ... be persistently .studied, even 'if the yield is small," because· the 

continuity is. needed .to dete~t and ~nalyze the u·aual increasing . . . : 

• ·difficulties of the ~yetem •. .. · In time· of war, the volume of military ·com~unications 

changes sharply, many more messages are sent, and under wartime 

·urgency 1 mistakes may b~ made. I:f' mil! tary action d1s.a.ble·s normal 

communications, the wireless may carry an additional burden, and 

sooner or later' a break may 'occur.+ . 

·Then the odds are more r·avorable to tb.e cryptanalyst, pro• 

Viding. he ~as the organization •. speci~l knowledge, material . 

and trained ~ersonnel to· ·rea~t ·swiftly. In ter.m~ of modern warfare, . . . 

much of the com~:n.t .work can be done in t,he 1,l1nterlands ,. 'but a 

lapse of several years to deve1o'p and ~xpand a oomfnt organi.zation 

may be too long' .. 

+ .. On.Et of the hazards of. agent intelligence is that abrupt 

military or police'· aot.1·on may cut their ·lines of. communicat1ons."1' 

Thus the agent syste~ may be gathering· information with no way 

of sending ·it,. Many Red spy rings were overrun. by the German 

military successes in Europe~' The Rote Kapell• in Germany· had 

trouble communicating its vital information to Moscow.!'The 

Swis.s net.work was al.so cut off by arrests of its radio operators.*" 
REF ID:A65655 

· · Even during a limited or expa~ded .m1i1tary action, the 

diplomatic channels cannot be ignored, ·or the political implications 

of the end of the war may 'be misjudge~, at.some cost.· At a time 

of extreme tens.ion or 1nimenent war, . the most urg~ht mission for 

comint mtght be to pick Up a battle signal .. 7111' .... a, like. the 

"East wind• ... -ra.in" of 1941. Ther.e ·is only a · ll!li_m chance that 

suc.h a message ·could be found and solved in time, even if ".the 

crypt systems ~ad . been opened up~ however so muoti prep~ratory :·-; 

communication and direction is needed to get any large military 

project . under way, even. in these days of "push button" warfare J 

1- . that scraps of evidence might· emerge 1n·t1me. Furthermore, the 

position of the West would be a.tro·nger, even where atomic warfare 

agreements existed and· were re.'spected, 1f comint had, over a 

period of time, rave~~· weapon sites,. numbers, and state of 

readiness.mi inside the Soviet-~·-and ·penetrated the Russian 

attitude toward their use. 

The Hard. Facts 

Ra~vedka, Rus.sian intelligence ·and e'spionage, dictates a 

pragmatic ethic for modern Western diplomacy. Containment and 

'the co1d . war depends on.accurate·, reliable 1ntell1genc'e, 1.e •. 

peaceful co~xistanc.e '}'1111 . be much easier to e'xpedite if ~e know 

what is .. really going on inside the Soviet. 'Agent intelligence 

tour1n8 the campaign in Africa, Rommel learned Qf BritisQ 

deployments and logistics through signal intelligence before a 

crucial battle at" · • So · 
REF ID:A65655 

and comint must both be pursued, .since they use complementary 

sources and methods, and a continuing intelligence effort must 

be carried out in spite of.fluctuations 1n the political bar-

+ ometer. The R~seians. ·ha~e - a long lead in experience and organ-

- . ization, and confidence based on success •. iWe must play our best 

cards1 our. wealth, technology and industry, orga~ized ~n the 

right direction, to gain the initiative. 

One cr1 tic al adva.~ta.ge of comint ove-r a:ge~t · intel~igence 

in this struggle is the valldi ty Qf the product.. Agent reports 

= J JI IC under. the best conditions may be unt)!'Ue, half true, or - - . $) . . 

disorganized.- It is difficult to take for~eful acti~n on vague 

information. A soived cryptogram carries' the weight of e~act legal 

evidence, lt is an official communication which defines what 

the organization is really going to do. This is why a single 

message like the Zimmerman telegram, or . St. 

1 occurring 

1n a sea. ·of conflict.ing an?- unproved rumors, testimony and opinions, can be treated. as a hard. fac~, and the history of nations 

turned around it. 

Finally, any · intelligence effort is uncertain and d1ffi~ult, 

years of effort and expense may be in vain, and success may 

d1ssappear overnight, but failure should carry no etigma;. and 

the rewards for winning a.re high. 

* . ... * • 

+ In contrast to the West, the flow of people and inf~rmation 

from Russia 1s meagre and gua~ded. ·aov1et secur1ty measures are 

effective 1n preventing infiltration of agents into Russia. Defectors 

and deserters can provide some currect intelligence, but it is 

rarely high level. The importance of Russian cable and rad~o com¥ 

mun1cations &s a source of intelligence is thereby increased. 
REF ID:A65655 

Bibliography 

Fletcher Pratt, Secret and Urgent(' Blue Ribbon Books,1939) 

W, James, The·E1es of the Navy.(M~thuen & Co, London, 1955) 

D.J.Dall1n, Soviet Espionage- (Yale Univ. Press, 1955) 

O.Heilbrun, The Soviet Secret Services (G.A~len & Unwin,1956) 

W.J.Morgan, Spies and Saboteurs (Victor Gallanez,London,1955) 

M.B1alogusk1, The Petrov Story (W.Heinamann L~d,London,1955) 

L~C.Moyzisch, Operation Cioe~o.CReaders Union .• Wingate,London,52) 

Von Mellenthin, Panzer Attack 

Knute Rockne, Coaching Football 

H.O.Yardley, The Black Chamber 

·H.L.Stimson, Memoirs 

Congress Pearl Harbor Report 

The Secret Post Off ice 

Piease note that in some cases I do not have the books at 

hand, and therefore cannot properly complete the documentation. 
Notes 

. REF ID: A656s's 

1. Yardley, ·'Xhe Black Chamber, I'· 

·2. Yardley,· The Black Chamber, p. 

2t. Pratt, Secret and Urgent, p. '249•· 

3. James, The Eyes of the Navy, p~ ?8-42. 

4. The Secret Post Off ice, .iJ. .. . 

5. Pearl Harbor Report, p. 

6. Stimson, Memoirs, p. 

7. Ja~es, The Eyes of the ~avy, p.70 · . . . 8. Moyzisch, ·Operation Cicero, p.~O 

9. · ~ratt, Secret and Urgent, p.191· 

10. Dallin; Soviet Espionage, p.273 

11. ibid. p.110 

12. ibid. p.406 

13. Rockn~., Coaching Foo.tball, p. 

14. Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, p.39 

. ·' 

Daliin, s~viet Espionage, p.485, p.452,, p.449 

15. Heilbrun, The Soviet Secret Services, p.24 

Xltt Da111n, ·Soviet Es"Rionage, ·p.5-14 

· 16. · .. B1~logusk~, The Petrov Story, p .132-133 

" 

Dallin, Soviet Espionage, p.450, p.19-21, p.198~200. 

,. 17. Dall1n, s0v1et_~spionage, p.229-231 

Morgan, Spies and Saboteurs, p.i15 

18. nall1n, Soviet Espionage, p.465 

. 19. 1b1d. p.294-29~, p.303 · .. 

20. ibid. p.289 

Bialogusk1, The Petrov Story,_ p.x111-xv1 
21. 

22. 

23. 

24. 

'REF ID: A65655 

Dall in, Soviet Esplonage, p.471 

ibid. p.290 

ibid. p.254 . 

ibid. p.298 

Pratt, Secret and Urgent, p.233 

Morgan, Spies and Saboteurs, p.14 . . 

26. Moyz1ech, Operation Ci'cero, p •. 203-205 

Dall in,. S?viet Espionage, p .494, _ p .499 

Pratt, Secret and Urp:ent, ·p.~33 · 

.James, The Eyes of tbe Nayy, p.-x11 ... xv1 

Heilbrun, jizjjKJi. 'The ~oviet ·secret .Ser~ices, p.35-3.6 

27~ Ho1lbrun, The Soviet Secret jervices, p.154 · 

2& Dallin, Soviet Espionage, p.v11-v111 

.28. James, The Eyes o~ the Navy, p.2s ... 3~ 

.. 

29. Pratt, Secret and Urgent, p.15•16 

30. ibid. p.83 . 

31. ibid. p.40 ... 

32. Dall1n, Soviet Espionage, p~154-

33. ibid •. p.254 

34 . Pratt, .Secret and Urgent, p.19,0, p.163 

35. James, The.Eyes of the NavYw p.136-154 

36. Pratt, Secret and Ur~ent, p.12 

37. special, see note. · · 

38. Pearl Harbor Reuort . . 

39. James, The Eyes of the Navy, p.30-31 

.Pratt, Se~ret and Urgent, p.80-81 
·.~ 

REF ID:A65655 

40. James, The Eyes of the Navy, p.136-1~4 

41. Pratt, Secret an~ Urgent, p.13 

42 •. 1b1d •. p.239 

43. 1b1d. p.180 

44. ibid. p.184 . 

45. Dallin, Soviet Espionage, p.143-145 

46. ibid. p.245-2~7 

47. ibid~ 'p.216·217" 

48. Heilbrun, The .Soviet Secret Services~· p.24 . . ' 

49~ .ibid. p_.28 

50. Von ~e11enth1n, Panzer Attack; p. 

51. Dallin, Soviet Espionage, p.452.· 

Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, p.54, p.86-99 

52~ special 

· . 

. · 'Note · that in some cases , where I do not have the· books 

at hand, I cannot.supply the page number of the refarence •. 

Speci'al·: 

.37~· I believ~ that 1n.1953, Fletcher Pr~tt wrote and 

article in.Comput~rs and Auto~atio~ (Berkley Ent.) 

des.ling w'-th the application_ of computers· to· 

cryptanalysis. I have never seen.~his article, and 

I am not suro it exists, b~t· a good cross reference 

on Pratt, or a· direct inquiry, migh~ give us a .. valuable source of public domain 11teratur·e. 

52. What I need here,·. for· a filler·~ is a referen-ce to 

a vital piece-of comint, like the Yamamoto.1nc1dsnt, 

which is p.d., and important. Do you know of any?