IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

No. 14697 

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GARFIELD COUNTY 

HIGH SCHOOL, GARFIELD COUNTY, MONTANA, 

*. > . Relator and Respondent, I I, 

2 a 

v. 

L. THOMAS EATON, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM: 

This Court having considered the petition for rehearing 

filed herein by relator and respondent, 

IT IS NOW ORDERED: 

That portion of the petition relating to striking the award 

of attorney fees to appellant and amending the Opinion in this 

respect is granted. The final sentence of the Opinion reading, 

"Damages will also include an amount equal to Eaton's attorney 

fees and costs plus interest from the date of discharge." is hereby 

ordered deleted from the Opinion. 

The petition for rehearing is otherwise denied. 

DATED this /&day of December, 1979. 

.8, %& 

,chief Justice 

Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy did not participate in this decision. 
No. 14697 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1979 

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GARFIELD 

COUNTY HIGHSCHOOL, GARFIELD COUNTY, MONTANA, 

Relator and Respondent, 

L- THOMAS EATON, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

Appeal from: District Court of the First ~udicial ~istrict, 

Honorable M. James Sorte, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Pedersen, Herndon, Harper and Munro, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Smith Law Firm, Helena, Montana 

Cannon and Gillespie, Helena, Montana 

- 

Submitted on briefs: August 1, 1979 

Decided : pleq 1 e 1979 

Filed: , 

-= 
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

 his appeal is from a summary judgment in favor of 

respondents rendered November 21, 1978, by the First Judicial ~istrict Court, County of Lewis and Clark, the Honorable M. James Sorte, presiding. 

The Board of Trustees of Garfield County High School 

(Board), respondents herein, voted to terminate the employment of Thomas Eaton, appellant herein, the principal of the 

high school, on January 11, 1977, effective June 30, 1977. 

The executive director of the Montana School Board Association informed the Board that because Eaton was not notified of his dismissal in writing, the dismissal was void. 

At the same time the Board and Eaton were also informed that 

the 02 endorsement held by Eaton on his teaching certificate 

did not qualify him to be a county high school principal 

under section 75-6112, R.C.M. 1947 (now section 20-4-401, 

MCA) . 

At a special meeting of the Board called the next day, 

Eaton was asked to submit his teacher's certificate for 

inspection. Eaton did so, and it was found that he had an 

02 endorsement. The Board thereupon acted to terminate 

Eaton as county high school principal because he did not 

have an 03 endorsement as required by the statute and therefore could not validly hold the position of county high 

school principal. On June 16, 1977, the Board informed 

Eaton, in writing, he was being immediately dismissed pursuant to section 75-6112, R.C.M. 1947 (now section 20-4-401, 

MCA), because he was not properly certified at the level 

necessary to be a county high school principal. 
The Board further inquired of the State Superintendent 

of Public Instruction whether Eaton was qualified to hold 

the position as county high school principal. On June 17, 

1977, the State Superintendent's office informed the Board 

that Eaton was qualified as a principal. 

Eaton appealed from the Board's decision, and on July 

21, 1977, a hearing was held before the county superintendent of schools. The county superintendent concluded that 

Eaton was qualified to be principal but that his contract 

was effectively terminated on June 30, 1977. The county 

superintendent further held that the Board should make 

compensation to Eaton for the unused sick leave and unused 

annual leave for the contract year ending June 30, 1977. 

Both parties appealed this decision to the State 

Superintendent. On June 19, 1978, the State Superintendent 

found that Eaton had been wrongfully discharged and ordered 

that he be reinstated. 

The Board petitioned the District Court of Lewis and 

Clark County for review of the matter, and both parties 

moved for summary judgment. The Board's motion was granted 

on the basis of the District Court's finding that Eaton was 

not qualified as a principal and that the trustees had the 

power to dismiss him regardless of the unexpired term of his 

contract. From this summary judgment, Eaton appeals. 

Two issues face the Court on appeal: 

1. Whether the District Court erred in concluding that 

section 20-4-401, MCA, allowed the Board to summarily dismiss Eaton. 

2. Whether the District Court erred in not invoking 

the doctrines of waiver and/or estoppel which would bar the 

Board from discharging Eaton. 
This appeal turns on the interpretation of section 20- 

4-401, MCA. Subsection (1) of that section states in pertinent part: 

". . . The trustees of a county high school shall 

employ and appoint a district superintendent, 

except that they may employ and appoint a holder 

of a class 3 teacher certificate with a district 

superintendent endorsement as the county high 

school principal in lieu of a district superintendent. . ." 

The District Court found, and appellant admits, that he 

did not have a district superintendent endorsement on his 

class 03 teacher certificate. The District Court therefore 

found that appellant was not qualified to be a county high 

school principal and held that pursuant to section 20-4- 

401(5), MCA, appellant was to be discharged. 

Section 20-4-401(5), MCA, provides: 

"At any time the class 3 teacher certification 

or the endorsement of the certificate of a 

district superintendent or a county high school 

principal that qualifies such person to hold 

such position becomes invalid, the trustees of 

the district or the joint board of trustees 

shall discharge such person as the district 

superintendent or county high school principal 

regardless of the unexpired term of his contract. The trustees shall not compensate him 

under the terms of his contract for any services rendered subsequent to the date of the 

invalidation of his teacher certificate." 

The language of the above statute is clear and unambiguous. Section 20-4-401(1)t MCA, clearly states the 

qualifications necessary to be a county high school principal. Section 20-4-401(5), MCA, provides that if the 

endorsement of the certificate does not qualify the person 

to hold such a position he must be discharged. Appellant's 

certificate did not have the proper endorsement; therefore, 

according to the statute, the Board would normally be required to discharge him. 
The facts of this case, however, present a situation 

not contemplated by the legislature nor dealt with by case 

law.. 

A summary of the pertinent facts follows: 

(1) section 20-4-401, MCA, was first enacted as section 

75-6112, R.C.M. 1947, by section 93, Chapter 5, Laws of 

Montana (1971), and amended in 1973 by Section 1, Chapter 

105, Laws of Montana (1973). 

(2) Eaton was employed under five one-year contracts as 

county high school principal of Garfield County High School 

ending with the school year 1976-1977. 

(3) When Eaton was initially hired by the Board, he 

posssessed a class 3 teachers certificate, Level 11, with an 

02 endorsement (secondary principal) instead of an 03 endorsement (district superintendent) . 

(4) On January 11, 1977, the Board decided to terminate 

Eaton's employment when his fifth contract expired on June 

30, 1977. No reasons for termination were given nor were 

they required by law (section 20-4-401(3), MCA). 

Eaton had actual knowledge of this decision; however, 

he was not notified in writing as required by section 20-4- 

401 (3), MCA. 

(5) Following its January 11, 1977, decision, the Board 

immediately advertised for a new county high school principal and subsequently hired one Robert E. Aumaugher to fill 

the position. The qualifications set forth in the advertisement were identical to those held by Eaton and, in fact, 

Aumaugher possessed only an 02 endorsement on his certificate. 

(6) On June 14, 1977, the parties were informed by the 

~~~cutive Director of the Montana School ~oards ~ssociation 
that the notice of termination given to Eaton was ineffective because it was not in writing. It was at this time 

alsofthat the Board and Eaton were made aware that an 03 

endo~sement, not an 02 endorsement, was required by statute 

to be a county high school principal. 

.(7) The Board then called a special meeting on June 15, 

1977, and asked Eaton to produce his teaching certificate. 

Eaton did so, and it was found to have an 02 endorsement, 

not an 03 endorsement. The Board sent a letter to Eaton 

dated June 16, 1977, stating that pursuant to section 20-4- 

401(5), MCA, Eaton's services were immediately terminated 

because he did not have an 03 endorsement on his certificate. 

The Board also reevaluated Aumaugher but agreed to retain him upon his assurance that he would have the necessary ! 

. . 

quglifications as set forth in section 20-2-401(1), MCA, 

after his studies in July 1977. 

(8) It is interesting to note that an 03 endorsement 

was Eaton's merely for the asking without further study. 

Eaton, in fact, requested that endorsement, and it was 

tendered him by the Superintendent of Public Instruction on 

July 21, 1977. 

The Board's methodology in this matter does not conform 

to the procedure envisioned by the legislature in section 

20-4-401, MCA. It is clear that when the Board's original 

attempt to terminate Eaton went awry, they sought out the 

convenience of section 20-4-401(5), MCA. The Board submits 

that they did not become aware of this statute until June 

14, 1977. This explanation, however, is not sufficient in 

law as the Board has a duty to be aware of the statutes 

governing such matters. 
The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the 

cause is remanded to the District Court with instructions to 

enter judgment for Thomas Eaton for improper discharge and 

compute damages in an amount equal to the amount Eaton would 

have earned in wages and benefits for one year under the 

terms of his contract at the time of his improper discharge. 

Damages will also include an amount equal to Eaton's attorney fees and costs plus interest from the date of discharge. 

We concur: 

0 C-ef Justice WQQX Z 

Wp:;:;ice Daniel J. Shea concurring in part and dissenting 

I concur in the opinion allowing Thomas Eaton one year's 

wages and benefits as damages, but I cannot agree that he is 

entitled, as damages, to recover attorney fees. In the absence of a statute so allowing, or in the absence of court 

a 

opinion clearly setting forth new/element of damages to be 

applied to cases arising under a myriad of circumstances, as 

they normally do, I cannot agree that attorney fees can be 

recovered as part of his damages. 

Justice 

Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, deeming himself disqualified, did 

not participate in this decision.