{"id":594145,"date":"2004-01-16T12:17:00","date_gmt":"2004-01-16T17:17:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/?p=594145"},"modified":"2024-02-09T16:18:02","modified_gmt":"2024-02-09T21:18:02","slug":"columbia-accident-investigation-board-synopsis","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/history\/columbia-accident-investigation-board-synopsis\/","title":{"rendered":"Columbia Accident Investigation Board Synopsis"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong>By Jennifer Troxell<\/strong><br><strong>NASA History Office<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:42px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p>The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was created to determine the cause of the Columbia accident and to recommend ways to improve the safety of Shuttle flight. The Chair of the Board was retired Navy Admiral Harold W. Gehman Jr. The members of the board were: Rear Admiral Stephen Turcotte, Commander, Naval Safety Center; Maj. General John Barry, Director, Plans and Programs, Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command; Maj. General Kenneth W. Hess, Commander, Air Force Safety Center; Dr. James N. Hallock, Chief, Aviation Safety Division, Department of Transportation Volpe Center; Mr. Steven B. Wallace, Director of Accident Investigation, Federal Aviation Administration; Brig. General Duane Deal, Commander, 21st Space Wing, USAF; Mr. Scott Hubbard, Director, NASA Ames Research Center; Mr. Roger E. Tetrault, Retired Chairman, McDermott International, Inc; Dr. Sheila Widnall, Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems, MIT; Dr. Douglas D. Osheroff, Professor of Physics and Applied Physics, Stanford University; Dr. Sally Ride, Professor of Space Science, University of California at San Diego; and Dr. John Logsdon, Director of the Space Policy Institute, George Washington University.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Board published its report on August 26, 2003. In advance of the final report, several preliminary recommendations as well as a working scenario were published.<\/p>\n\n\n<div id=\"\" class=\"nasa-gb-align-center nasa-button-link padding-y-1 padding-x-0 hds-module wp-block-nasa-blocks-related-link\">\n\t<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/history\/columbia-accident-investigation-board-biographies\/\" target=\"_self\" class=\"button-primary button-primary-md link-external-true\" aria-label=\"Biographies of CAIB Members\">\n\t\t<span class=\"line-height-alt-1\">Biographies of CAIB Members<\/span>\n\t\t<svg viewBox=\"0 0 32 32\" fill=\"none\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\"><circle class=\"button-primary-circle\" cx=\"16\" cy=\"16\" r=\"16\"><\/circle><path d=\"M8 16.956h12.604l-3.844 4.106 1.252 1.338L24 16l-5.988-6.4-1.252 1.338 3.844 4.106H8v1.912z\" class=\"color-spacesuit-white\"><\/path><\/svg>\n\t<\/a>\n\n\t<\/div>\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Preliminary Recommendations<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>In advance of the final report, CAIB made several recommendations to NASA, to assist engineers in updating flight related safety features for the shuttle prior to return to flight. The reference numbers in parentheses, after the recommendation indicate the recommendation numbers listed in the final report. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The first recommendation was that NASA develop an inspection plan to examine the Reinforced Carbon Carbon (RCC) system components (R3.3-1). The RCC system is used on the parts of the orbiter that are subjected to the greatest amount of heat during reentry. These areas include the leading edges of the wings, the area aft of the nose cap, and the area around the forward orbiter\/external tank attachment structure. The Board found that the current techniques that are used to examine the RCC system are incapable of thoroughly assessing the RCC\u2019s structural integrity, its supporting structure, and the attached hardware. The CAIB believed that NASA \u201cshould take advantage of advanced non-destructive inspection technology\u201d to mitigate future risk to the space shuttles and crew.<sup data-fn=\"4bcfd67b-51d9-4e90-8a3a-932a82b71037\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"#footnotes\" id=\"4bcfd67b-51d9-4e90-8a3a-932a82b71037-link\">1<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The second recommendation stated that NASA should amend its existing Memorandum of Agreement with the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) \u201cto make on-orbit imaging for each Shuttle flight a standard requirement (R6.3-2).<sup data-fn=\"24b87591-5938-4016-bec0-43b4c2198a16\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"#footnotes\" id=\"24b87591-5938-4016-bec0-43b4c2198a16-link\">2<\/a><\/sup> The CAIB determined that not every imaging resource the United States government had was utilized in order to assess the damage of the Columbia while still in orbit. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Recommendation three examined repair capability (R6.4-1). The CAIB acknowledged that both during flight and in the investigation following the incident the lack of repair capability was cited as potentially being a factor in decisions that were made during the damage assessment process.<sup data-fn=\"1e15115a-2322-4707-8fea-fc300eca2e26\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"#footnotes\" id=\"1e15115a-2322-4707-8fea-fc300eca2e26-link\">3<\/a><\/sup> The CAIB also suggested that for all future missions to the International Space Station (ISS), NASA develop a method to inspect and conduct emergency repairs to the Thermal Protection System (TPS) tiles and RCC while docked at the ISS and recommended that a \u201ccomprehensive autonomous [\u2026] inspection and repair capability\u201d be developed for Shuttle missions that do not dock at the ISS.<sup data-fn=\"b75f2336-6646-4f00-9f55-26ca980e081b\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"footntoes\" id=\"b75f2336-6646-4f00-9f55-26ca980e081b-link\">4<\/a><\/sup> The CAIB further recommended that TPS inspections be conducted and should be finished early on every mission. The end goal is to develop a \u201cfully autonomous capability for all missions\u201d, in the event \u201cthat an ISS mission does not achieve the necessary orbit, fails to dock successfully, or suffers damage during or after docking.\u201d<sup data-fn=\"1134e60f-9594-4f43-ab10-ccf6ff90e793\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"footnotes\" id=\"1134e60f-9594-4f43-ab10-ccf6ff90e793-link\">5<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Both recommendation four and five address the Shuttle imaging system (R3.4-1, R3.4-2, R3.4-3). The Board found that the \u201clack of high resolution, high speed cameras\u201d compromised the ability of the debris team to assess the impact of the foam debris on Columbia.<sup data-fn=\"6c0c8bc1-7a5c-46b6-9297-14051c58c1dd\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"footnotes\" id=\"6c0c8bc1-7a5c-46b6-9297-14051c58c1dd-link\">6<\/a><\/sup> Currently cameras at Kennedy Space Center and the Eastern Range are incapable of providing the best possible ascent engineering data, according to the CAIB.<sup data-fn=\"d1768428-2ffd-4525-8e1a-08d072ef2aa9\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"#footnotes\" id=\"d1768428-2ffd-4525-8e1a-08d072ef2aa9-link\">7<\/a><\/sup> The CAIB recommended upgrading the imaging system to provide at minimum \u201cthree useful views of the Space Shuttle from liftoff to at least Solid Rocket Booster separation,\u201d and further recommended exploring the use of ships or aircraft to take additional pictures and observations of the shuttle during launch.<sup data-fn=\"4e26bfdc-5d98-4a69-bac6-9721696adf40\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"#footnotes\" id=\"4e26bfdc-5d98-4a69-bac6-9721696adf40-link\">8<\/a><\/sup> Recommendation five specifically examines the External Tank (ET) (R3.4-2) and the Thermal Protection System (TPS) (R3.4-3) imaging systems. The CAIB found that on-board imaging capability is vital to assure that the best on-board images are obtained to provide engineers a better picture of the shuttle\u2019s integrity.<sup data-fn=\"85fbbd84-cc94-41fe-a2c6-de584e4bb39e\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"#footnotes\" id=\"85fbbd84-cc94-41fe-a2c6-de584e4bb39e-link\">9<\/a><\/sup> The CAIB recommended modifying one of the two on-board umbilical cameras in order to \u201cdownlink high-resolution images of the External Tank (ET) after separation,\u201d and further recommended that a similar system be put into place to \u201cdownlink high-resolution images of the underside of the orbiter\u2019s leading edge system and the forward section of the TPS.<sup data-fn=\"1eaef18e-0af5-484e-8a68-13a47e008e80\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"#footnotes\" id=\"1eaef18e-0af5-484e-8a68-13a47e008e80-link\">10<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Organizational Culture<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>The CAIB also investigated communications procedures between NASA engineers and managers. The nature of Shuttle program is complex, given the high level of technology used and the multiple civilians, contractors, and Centers involved, each integral to the success of the program. CAIB found the need to communicate effectively between the individuals and organizations involved in the Shuttle program to be paramount, given the technology, and risk involved.<sup data-fn=\"70161702-0fe6-4dc1-9e0b-9df87bf27eb3\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"footnotes\" id=\"70161702-0fe6-4dc1-9e0b-9df87bf27eb3-link\">11<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Pressure to stay on an existing launch schedule and inefficient resources to do so are considered to be contributing factors of the STS-107 accident.<sup data-fn=\"e26710c7-f785-4fd6-9e13-557b79eb50cf\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"#footnotes\" id=\"e26710c7-f785-4fd6-9e13-557b79eb50cf-link\">12<\/a><\/sup> CAIB also found that NASA\u2019s safety program falls short of achieving the level of safety necessary for the shuttle program.<sup data-fn=\"b27b8f8d-5340-4c79-9b12-8331141eff6a\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"#footnotes\" id=\"b27b8f8d-5340-4c79-9b12-8331141eff6a-link\">13<\/a><\/sup> As a result, CAIB recommended that the safety system at NASA be restructured to include an \u201cindependent Technical Engineering Authority that is responsible for technical requirements and waivers to them and will build a disciplined, systematic approach to identifying, analyzing, and controlling hazards throughout the life cycle of the Shuttle System.\u201d<sup data-fn=\"97b6751d-dea8-43bc-a0b0-df8058968941\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"#footnotes\" id=\"97b6751d-dea8-43bc-a0b0-df8058968941-link\">14<\/a><\/sup> CAIB emphasized that the independent authority \u201cshould have no connection to or responsibility for schedule or program cost.\u201d<sup data-fn=\"053ac5f2-6eac-4a1f-997f-93d7b725f8e8\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"#footnotes\" id=\"053ac5f2-6eac-4a1f-997f-93d7b725f8e8-link\">15<\/a><\/sup> A full list of the CAIB\u2019s findings and recommendations related to NASA\u2019s organizational culture are listed in the final report.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Working Scenario<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>The CAIB\/NASA Accident Investigation Team Working Scenario was published July 8, 2003 and posted at on the CAIB website.<sup data-fn=\"d9d0b970-6e65-42aa-9a7b-f651573777cd\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"#footnotes\" id=\"d9d0b970-6e65-42aa-9a7b-f651573777cd-link\">16<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Prior to SRB separation, Columbia\u2019s left wing leading edge suffered a debris impact from the structure that connects the orbiter and the external tank (ET-Y bipod foam ramp), between Reinforced Carbon Carbon (RCC) panels.<sup data-fn=\"a3b7bd6b-c8c9-41df-9bf4-a0fa4e43a9b9\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"#footnotes\" id=\"a3b7bd6b-c8c9-41df-9bf4-a0fa4e43a9b9-link\">17<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>According to the data gathered an unknown object moved away from the Shuttle on flight day 2.<sup data-fn=\"ac788442-2f8f-439d-a5df-1068ccc9c36d\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"#footnotes\" id=\"ac788442-2f8f-439d-a5df-1068ccc9c36d-link\">18<\/a><\/sup> Materials tests were conducted to determine the identity of the object. It was found that of the objects tested, the object could only be a partial \u201cWLE Tee seal, a whole WLE Tee seal, or a partial WLE RCC panel.\u201d<sup data-fn=\"96934e0c-89fc-4720-861e-37199e073bd0\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"#footnotes\" id=\"96934e0c-89fc-4720-861e-37199e073bd0-link\">19<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The damage in the left wing RCC provided a pathway for hot gas to enter the left wing leading edge and support structure during entry. This resulted in significant damage to the left wing and the subsequent loss of vehicle control, leading to aerodynamic breakup.<sup data-fn=\"595c5afc-d806-448e-a2d8-769ee5fc7f34\" class=\"fn\"><a href=\"#footnotes\" id=\"595c5afc-d806-448e-a2d8-769ee5fc7f34-link\">20<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Final Report<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>In addition to the five preliminary recommendations published by the CAIB, there were an additional 23 recommendations in the final report. Preliminary recommendation 5 was split into two separate requirements, one for the external tank images and the other for the orbiter wing images, for a total of 29 recommendations. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The spreadsheet section is primarily organized according to the sections discussed in the CAIB report. The findings have been placed with the recommendations that correspond to them. Some of the findings have been cited more than once. A synopsis to summarize the recommendation(s) and its corresponding findings has also been added. The colors serve only to distinguish between recommendation sections.<\/p>\n\n\n<div id=\"\" class=\"nasa-gb-align-center nasa-button-link padding-y-1 padding-x-0 hds-module wp-block-nasa-blocks-related-link\">\n\t<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/remembering-columbia-sts-107\/#caib\" target=\"_blank\" class=\"button-primary button-primary-md link-external-true\" aria-label=\"Download the CAIB Report\">\n\t\t<span class=\"line-height-alt-1\">Download the CAIB Report<\/span>\n\t\t<svg viewBox=\"0 0 32 32\" fill=\"none\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\"><circle class=\"button-primary-circle\" cx=\"16\" cy=\"16\" r=\"16\"><\/circle><path d=\"M8 16.956h12.604l-3.844 4.106 1.252 1.338L24 16l-5.988-6.4-1.252 1.338 3.844 4.106H8v1.912z\" class=\"color-spacesuit-white\"><\/path><\/svg>\n\t<\/a>\n\n\t<\/div>\n\n\n<div style=\"height:59px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"footnotes\">Footnotes<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>[1]\u00a0The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Press Release CAIB PA 21-03, 4-17-03 <http:\/\/www.caib.us\/news\/press_releases> access date: 7-16-03.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>[2] Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>[3]\u00a0The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Press Release CAIB PA 36-03, 6-27-03 <http:\/\/www.caib.us\/news\/press_releases> access date: 7-16-03.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>[4] Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>[5] Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>[6]\u00a0The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Press Release CAIB PA 37-03, 7-1-03 <http:\/\/www.caib.us\/news\/press_releases> access date: 7-16-03.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>[7] Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>[8] Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>[9]\u00a0The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Press Release CAIB PA 38-03, 7-30-03 <http:\/\/www.caib.us\/news\/press_releases>access date: 8-4-03.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>[10] Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>[11] Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Government Printing Office, 2003: 187-189.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>[12] Ibid, 139.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>[13] Ibid, 192.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>[14] Ibid. 193.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>[15] Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>[16] Columbia Accident Investigation Board\/ NASA Accident Investigation Team Working Scenario, 7-8-03, <http:\/\/www.caib.us\/news\/working_scenario\/default.html> access date: 7-16-03.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>[17] Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>[18] Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>[19] Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>[20] Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n<div id=\"\" class=\"hds-topic-cards nasa-gb-align-full maxw-full width-full padding-y-6 padding-x-3 color-mode-dark hds-module hds-module-full wp-block-nasa-blocks-topic-cards\">\t\t<div class=\"grid-container grid-container-block-lg padding-x-0\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"grid-row flex-align-center margin-bottom-3\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"desktop:grid-col-8 margin-bottom-2 desktop:margin-bottom-0\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"label color-carbon-60 margin-bottom-2\">Keep Exploring<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<h2 class=\"heading-36 line-height-sm\">Discover More Topics From NASA<\/h2>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"grid-row grid-gap-2 hds-topic-cards-wrapper\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/history\/\" class=\"mobile:grid-col-12 tablet:grid-col-6 desktop:grid-col-3 topic-card margin-bottom-4 desktop:margin-bottom-0\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"hds-topic-card hds-cover-wrapper cover-hover-zoom bg-carbon-black\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"skrim-overlay skrim-overlay-dark skrim-left mobile-skrim-top padding-3 display-flex flex-align-end flex-justify-start z-200\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p class=\"hds-topic-card-heading heading-29 color-spacesuit-white line-height-sm margin-top-0 margin-bottom-1\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span>NASA History<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<svg viewBox=\"0 0 32 32\" fill=\"none\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\"><circle class=\"color-nasa-red\" cx=\"16\" cy=\"16\" r=\"16\"><\/circle><path d=\"M8 16.956h12.604l-3.844 4.106 1.252 1.338L24 16l-5.988-6.4-1.252 1.338 3.844 4.106H8v1.912z\" class=\"color-spacesuit-white\"><\/path><\/svg>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<figure class=\"hds-media-background  \"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"983\" height=\"1223\" src=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/as11-40-5903_alt2.jpg?w=983\" class=\"attachment-1536x1536 size-1536x1536\" alt=\"\" style=\"transform: scale(1); transform-origin: 50% 50%; object-position: 50% 50%; object-fit: cover;\" block_context=\"nasa-block\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/as11-40-5903_alt2.jpg 983w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/as11-40-5903_alt2.jpg?resize=241,300 241w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/as11-40-5903_alt2.jpg?resize=768,956 768w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/as11-40-5903_alt2.jpg?resize=823,1024 823w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/as11-40-5903_alt2.jpg?resize=322,400 322w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/as11-40-5903_alt2.jpg?resize=482,600 482w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/as11-40-5903_alt2.jpg?resize=723,900 723w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/as11-40-5903_alt2.jpg?resize=965,1200 965w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 983px) 100vw, 983px\" loading=\"eager\" \/><\/figure>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/a>\n\t\t\t\t\t<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/remembering-columbia-sts-107\/\" class=\"mobile:grid-col-12 tablet:grid-col-6 desktop:grid-col-3 topic-card margin-bottom-4 desktop:margin-bottom-0\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"hds-topic-card hds-cover-wrapper cover-hover-zoom bg-carbon-black\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"skrim-overlay skrim-overlay-dark skrim-left mobile-skrim-top padding-3 display-flex flex-align-end flex-justify-start z-200\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p class=\"hds-topic-card-heading heading-29 color-spacesuit-white line-height-sm margin-top-0 margin-bottom-1\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span>Remembering the Columbia STS-107 Mission<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<svg viewBox=\"0 0 32 32\" fill=\"none\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\"><circle class=\"color-nasa-red\" cx=\"16\" cy=\"16\" r=\"16\"><\/circle><path d=\"M8 16.956h12.604l-3.844 4.106 1.252 1.338L24 16l-5.988-6.4-1.252 1.338 3.844 4.106H8v1.912z\" class=\"color-spacesuit-white\"><\/path><\/svg>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<figure class=\"hds-media-background  \"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1920\" height=\"1536\" src=\"https:\/\/images-assets.nasa.gov\/image\/0300309\/0300309~large.jpg?w=1920&h=1536&fit=clip&crop=faces%2Cfocalpoint\" class=\"attachment-1536x1536 size-1536x1536\" alt=\"\" style=\"transform: scale(1); transform-origin: 50% 50%; object-position: 50% 50%; object-fit: cover;\" block_context=\"nasa-block\" srcset=\"https:\/\/images-assets.nasa.gov\/image\/0300309\/0300309~large.jpg?w=1920&h=1536&fit=crop&crop=faces%2Cfocalpoint 1920w, https:\/\/images-assets.nasa.gov\/image\/0300309\/0300309~large.jpg?w=300&h=240&fit=crop&crop=faces%2Cfocalpoint 300w, https:\/\/images-assets.nasa.gov\/image\/0300309\/0300309~large.jpg?w=768&h=614&fit=crop&crop=faces%2Cfocalpoint 768w, https:\/\/images-assets.nasa.gov\/image\/0300309\/0300309~large.jpg?w=1024&h=819&fit=crop&crop=faces%2Cfocalpoint 1024w, https:\/\/images-assets.nasa.gov\/image\/0300309\/0300309~large.jpg?w=1536&h=1229&fit=crop&crop=faces%2Cfocalpoint 1536w, https:\/\/images-assets.nasa.gov\/image\/0300309\/0300309~large.jpg?w=400&h=320&fit=crop&crop=faces%2Cfocalpoint 400w, https:\/\/images-assets.nasa.gov\/image\/0300309\/0300309~large.jpg?w=600&h=480&fit=crop&crop=faces%2Cfocalpoint 600w, https:\/\/images-assets.nasa.gov\/image\/0300309\/0300309~large.jpg?w=900&h=720&fit=crop&crop=faces%2Cfocalpoint 900w, https:\/\/images-assets.nasa.gov\/image\/0300309\/0300309~large.jpg?w=1200&h=960&fit=crop&crop=faces%2Cfocalpoint 1200w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1920px) 100vw, 1920px\" \/><\/figure>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/a>\n\t\t\t\t\t<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/foia\/nasa-e-libraries\/jsc-foia-library\/nasa-columbia-accident-investigation-documents\/\" class=\"mobile:grid-col-12 tablet:grid-col-6 desktop:grid-col-3 topic-card margin-bottom-4 desktop:margin-bottom-0\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"hds-topic-card hds-cover-wrapper cover-hover-zoom bg-carbon-black\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"skrim-overlay skrim-overlay-dark skrim-left mobile-skrim-top padding-3 display-flex flex-align-end flex-justify-start z-200\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p class=\"hds-topic-card-heading heading-29 color-spacesuit-white line-height-sm margin-top-0 margin-bottom-1\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span>STS-107 (Columbia) and Related Documents<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<svg viewBox=\"0 0 32 32\" fill=\"none\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\"><circle class=\"color-nasa-red\" cx=\"16\" cy=\"16\" r=\"16\"><\/circle><path d=\"M8 16.956h12.604l-3.844 4.106 1.252 1.338L24 16l-5.988-6.4-1.252 1.338 3.844 4.106H8v1.912z\" class=\"color-spacesuit-white\"><\/path><\/svg>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<figure class=\"hds-media-background  \"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1536\" height=\"1000\" src=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/03\/s69-40022.jpg?w=1536\" class=\"attachment-1536x1536 size-1536x1536\" alt=\"\" style=\"transform: scale(1); transform-origin: 50% 50%; object-position: 50% 50%; object-fit: cover;\" block_context=\"nasa-block\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/03\/s69-40022.jpg 5752w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/03\/s69-40022.jpg?resize=300,195 300w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/03\/s69-40022.jpg?resize=768,500 768w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/03\/s69-40022.jpg?resize=1024,666 1024w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/03\/s69-40022.jpg?resize=1536,1000 1536w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/03\/s69-40022.jpg?resize=2048,1333 2048w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/03\/s69-40022.jpg?resize=400,260 400w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/03\/s69-40022.jpg?resize=600,390 600w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/03\/s69-40022.jpg?resize=900,586 900w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/03\/s69-40022.jpg?resize=1200,781 1200w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/03\/s69-40022.jpg?resize=2000,1301 2000w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" \/><\/figure>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/a>\n\t\t\t\t\t<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/challenger-sts-51l-accident\/\" class=\"mobile:grid-col-12 tablet:grid-col-6 desktop:grid-col-3 topic-card margin-bottom-4 desktop:margin-bottom-0\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"hds-topic-card hds-cover-wrapper cover-hover-zoom bg-carbon-black\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"skrim-overlay skrim-overlay-dark skrim-left mobile-skrim-top padding-3 display-flex flex-align-end flex-justify-start z-200\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p class=\"hds-topic-card-heading heading-29 color-spacesuit-white line-height-sm margin-top-0 margin-bottom-1\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span>Challenger STS-51L Accident<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<svg viewBox=\"0 0 32 32\" fill=\"none\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\"><circle class=\"color-nasa-red\" cx=\"16\" cy=\"16\" r=\"16\"><\/circle><path d=\"M8 16.956h12.604l-3.844 4.106 1.252 1.338L24 16l-5.988-6.4-1.252 1.338 3.844 4.106H8v1.912z\" class=\"color-spacesuit-white\"><\/path><\/svg>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<figure class=\"hds-media-background  \"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1041\" height=\"693\" src=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/07\/513875main-wreath-cropped.jpg?w=1041\" class=\"attachment-1536x1536 size-1536x1536\" alt=\"\" style=\"transform: scale(1); transform-origin: 50% 50%; object-position: 50% 50%; object-fit: cover;\" block_context=\"nasa-block\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/07\/513875main-wreath-cropped.jpg 1041w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/07\/513875main-wreath-cropped.jpg?resize=300,200 300w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/07\/513875main-wreath-cropped.jpg?resize=768,511 768w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/07\/513875main-wreath-cropped.jpg?resize=1024,682 1024w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/07\/513875main-wreath-cropped.jpg?resize=400,266 400w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/07\/513875main-wreath-cropped.jpg?resize=600,399 600w, https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/07\/513875main-wreath-cropped.jpg?resize=900,599 900w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1041px) 100vw, 1041px\" \/><\/figure>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/a>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By Jennifer TroxellNASA History Office The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was created to determine the cause of the Columbia accident and to recommend ways to improve the safety of Shuttle flight. The Chair of the Board was retired Navy Admiral Harold W. Gehman Jr. The members of the board were: Rear Admiral Stephen Turcotte, Commander, Naval Safety [...]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":34,"featured_media":584627,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"nasa_hds_core_meta_l10n":"en-US","nasa_hds_core_meta_article_editor":"","nasa_hds_core_meta_article_contacts":[],"nasa_hds_core_meta_article_topic":"","nasa_hds_core_meta_linked_locations":[],"nasa_hds_core_meta_article_related_articles":[],"hds_migrate_meta_pr_release_id":"","hds_migrate_meta_pr_release_type":"","nasa_hds_core_meta_location_x":"","nasa_hds_core_meta_location_y":"","nasa_hds_core_meta_gallery_images":[],"footnotes":"[]"},"categories":[2671,3102],"news-tags":[],"internal-terms":[6285,12663,6132],"coauthors":[11764],"parsely":{"version":"1.1.0","meta":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@type":"NewsArticle","headline":"Columbia Accident Investigation Board Synopsis","url":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/history\/columbia-accident-investigation-board-synopsis\/","mainEntityOfPage":{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/history\/columbia-accident-investigation-board-synopsis\/"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/12\/030030816x9.jpg?w=150&h=150&crop=1","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","url":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/12\/030030816x9.jpg"},"articleSection":"NASA History","author":[{"@type":"Person","name":"NASA Communications"}],"creator":["NASA Communications"],"publisher":{"@type":"Organization","name":"NASA","logo":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/themes\/nasa\/assets\/images\/nasa-logo.svg"},"keywords":["Missions","Space Shuttle","STS-107","NASA History"],"dateCreated":"2004-01-16T17:17:00Z","datePublished":"2004-01-16T17:17:00Z","dateModified":"2024-02-09T21:18:02Z"},"rendered":"<meta name=\"parsely-title\" content=\"Columbia Accident Investigation Board Synopsis\" \/>\n<meta name=\"parsely-link\" content=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/history\/columbia-accident-investigation-board-synopsis\/\" \/>\n<meta name=\"parsely-type\" content=\"post\" \/>\n<meta name=\"parsely-image-url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/12\/030030816x9.jpg?w=150&h=150&crop=1\" \/>\n<meta name=\"parsely-pub-date\" content=\"2004-01-16T17:17:00Z\" \/>\n<meta name=\"parsely-section\" content=\"NASA History\" \/>\n<meta name=\"parsely-tags\" content=\"Missions,Space Shuttle,STS-107,NASA History\" \/>\n<meta name=\"parsely-author\" content=\"NASA Communications\" \/>","tracker_url":"https:\/\/cdn.parsely.com\/keys\/nasa.gov\/p.js"},"read_time":8,"time_ago":"20 years","featured_image":{"id":584627,"file":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/12\/030030816x9.jpg","title":"Space Shuttle Projects STS-107","alt":"This is the insignia for the STS-107 mission which is a multidiscipline microgravity and Earth science research mission involving 80-plus International experiments to be performed by a crew of seven during the 16-day mission. The breadth of science conducted on this mission will have widespread benefits to life on Earth. Many of the experiments will be managed by the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama. The first shuttle mission in 2003, the STS-107 mission launched January 16, 2003, for the 28th flight of the Space Shuttle Orbiter Columbia and the 113th flight overall in NASA's Space Shuttle program.","caption":"This is the insignia for the STS-107 mission which is a multidiscipline microgravity and Earth science research mission involving 80-plus International experiments to be performed by a crew of seven during the 16-day mission. The breadth of science conducted on this mission will have widespread benefits to life on Earth. Many of the experiments will be managed by the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama. The first shuttle mission in 2003, the STS-107 mission launched January 16, 2003, for the 28th flight of the Space Shuttle Orbiter Columbia and the 113th flight overall in NASA's Space Shuttle program."},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/594145"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/34"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=594145"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/594145\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":612501,"href":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/594145\/revisions\/612501"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/584627"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=594145"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=594145"},{"taxonomy":"news-tags","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/news-tags?post=594145"},{"taxonomy":"internal-terms","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/internal-terms?post=594145"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=594145"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}