UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

CAMPANELLA, HERRING, and PENLAND 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Private E1 ISAAC G. AGUIGUI 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20140260 

Headquarters, Fort Stewart 

John T. Rothwell, Military Judge (arraignment) 

Andrew J. Glass, Military Judge (trial) 

Lieutenant Colonel Francisco A. Vila, Staff Judge Advocate (advice) 

Colonel Luis O. Rodriguez, Staff Judge Advocate (recommendation) 

Lieutenant Colonel Peter R. Hayden, Staff Judge Advocate (addendum) 

For Appellant: Captain Patrick J. Scudieri, JA (argued); Colonel Mary J. Bradley, 

JA; Major Christopher D. Coleman, JA; Captain Patrick J. Scudieri, JA (on brief); 

Major Christopher D. Coleman, JA; Captain Cody Cheek, JA (on reply brief). 

For Appellee: Major Steve T. Nam, JA (argued); Colonel Mark H. Sydenham, JA; 

Lieutenant Colonel A. G. Courie III, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Daniel D. Derner, JA; 

Captain Steve T. Nam, JA (on brief); Major Anne C. Hsieh, JA. 

18 November 2016 

---------------------------------- 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

---------------------------------- 

PENLAND, Judge: 

 Appellant’s trial defense team failed to present a sentencing case, thereby 

depriving him of effective assistance of counsel, undermining the reliability of the 

adjudged sentence, and leaving us with little choice but to set it aside and authorize 

a sentence rehearing. The trial defense team also performed deficiently in the 

findings phase of the case; however, under the facts and circumstances, we conclude 

appellant suffered no prejudice as a result. 

 A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

contrary to his pleas, of premeditated murder and intentionally killing an unborn 

child, in violation of Articles 118 and 119a, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 
AGUIGUI–ARMY 20140260 

2

U.S.C. §§ 918, 919a (2006) [hereinafter UCMJ]. The convening authority approved 

the adjudged sentence of a dishonorable discharge, confinement for life without 

eligibility for parole, and forfeiture of all pay and allowances. 

We review this case under Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant assigns two errors, 

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. The first 

merits discussion and relief; the second merits neither. We have considered matters 

personally asserted by appellant under United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 

(C.M.A. 1982); aside from his complaint of ineffective assistance of counsel, they 

lack merit. 

BACKGROUND 

A. Findings 

The case stems from the 17 July 2011 deaths of Sergeant (SGT) DA and her 

unborn child, with whom she was approximately twenty-three weeks pregnant. 

Multiple witnesses testified about SGT DA’s troubled marriage to appellant. Some 

also described appellant’s comments made before her death, indicating his desire to 

kill her and her unborn child.1

 

Appellant spent a few days immediately before 17 July 2011 away from home, 

cavorting with a fellow soldier, Michael Schaefer, and others. Sergeant DA was 

displeased with appellant for leaving her home alone. Appellant told Schaefer he 

could kill SGT DA and get away with it, citing a murder movie, “Pathology,” in 

which medical students devise methods of killing others with no trace of foul play. 

During the road trip, appellant went with Schaefer and another witness, KF, and 

bought a bottle of potassium iodide. Schaefer testified appellant told him he wanted 

the potassium iodide as a salt substitute for SGT DA. However, KF testified either 

appellant or Schaefer told her the potassium iodide could be used to administer a 

lethal injection. 

Appellant returned to his and SGT DA’s quarters on Fort Stewart 17 July 

2011. Later that night, appellant called 911 to report SGT DA was unresponsive. 

Emergency medical personnel responded and finding her unconscious on the floor, 

rushed her to the hospital, where she was soon pronounced dead. Her unborn child 

died with her. 

Criminal Investigation Command (CID) agents spoke with appellant, who said 

he returned to his and SGT DA’s home at 1500 on the day in question. Appellant 

also claimed he and SGT DA engaged in consensual sex in their bedroom, during 

 

1

 For example, appellant told a witness, JV, he could “get rid of” SGT DA and the 

baby and split insurance proceeds with her “if [they] all stayed quiet.” 
AGUIGUI–ARMY 20140260 

3

which she agreed to wear handcuffs and other restraints. Appellant said he then took 

a nap, woke up to an empty bed, and called 911 after finding SGT DA unresponsive 

on a couch in their living room. He also claimed SGT DA had asked him to buy the 

potassium iodide for her, and he implored CID to determine whether it had caused 

her death. 

Sergeant DA’s autopsy began on 19 July 2011 and included multiple 

consultations with specialized pathologists. The medical examiner noted multiple 

contusions on her body, including contusions “from anterior to posterior surface” on 

each wrist. In the autopsy examination report, dated 3 February 2012, medical 

examiners concluded: “Based on the information provided by investigative/medical 

reports and evidence detected at autopsy, both the cause and manner of death are 

best classified as ‘Undetermined.’” The medical examiner testified manual 

strangulation, including a carotid sleeper hold, was a possible manner of death. 

Another expert pathologist, called by the government, testified that his review of the 

medical evidence pointed to suffocation as the cause of death, but he could not 

exclude other possibilities, such as sudden cardiac arrhythmia. Then, another 

pathology expert testified for the prosecution, offering his conclusion that SGT DA 

died of manual strangulation, with multiple blunt injuries and binding ligatures. 

Appellant offered various explanations for SGT DA’s death. The day after, he 

sent his neighbor, SGT JB, a message that she died of a blood clot in her heart. He 

also told Schaefer soon after that she had died from a blood clot. He told AR that 

the coroner’s report said she had died of a pulmonary embolism. Appellant told 

Private CS another story–SGT DA died as a result of Army medical providers giving 

her incorrect medications, and he had been able to say goodbye to her at the hospital 

after she was revived for about thirty seconds.2

 He gave yet another reason to 

another witness, SC, telling her SGT DA had died in a car accident. 

Around the middle of August 2011, appellant and Schaefer got into an 

argument, culminating when Schaefer asked him to explain what had actually 

happened to SGT DA and how he had gotten all of the money they were in the midst 

of spending on strippers. Appellant told him SGT DA agreed to wear handcuffs and 

engage in sexual intercourse. However, once she was handcuffed appellant put a bag 

over her head and strangled her until she stopped breathing, sexually assaulting and 

sodomizing her in the process. Appellant told Schaefer, “I told you I would get 

away with it.” When Schaefer told appellant he would report him to law 

enforcement, appellant said he would implicate him in the murder and that he was 

“ready to go to prison.” 

The findings phase of appellant’s court-martial included multiple instances of 

objectionable hearsay and descriptions of uncharged misconduct. The most damning 

 

2

 SGT DA never regained consciousness before her death. 
AGUIGUI–ARMY 20140260 

4

hearsay testimony came from SR, who spoke with SGT DA while serving as Fort 

Stewart’s lead victim advocate. Before she began to testify at trial, defense counsel 

objected, “If this witness testifies substantially as she did in the 39(a), we don’t see 

how any of that would be relevant to The Charge and misconduct in this case.” 

After trial counsel offered a theory of relevance, the military judge asked whether 

the witness’s testimony would include hearsay. Trial counsel responded the 

government, indeed, intended to offer hearsay through SR, conceding it was 

inadmissible under Military Rule of Evidence [hereinafter Mil. R. Evid.] 803(4) but 

arguing Mil. R. Evid. 803(3) would allow it. The military judge and defense counsel 

then had the following exchange: 

DC: Your Honor, we would object also on the grounds of 

404(a) that this is basically being used as a propensity 

argument and as for-- 

MJ: Counsel, I am confused by that. He’s not charged 

with sexual assault. 

DC: Right. We believe-- 

MJ: So you are saying that it is propensity, “He’s not a 

bad guy,” so therefore more in 404(b). 

DC: Right. 

MJ: But that’s okay. So you also object under 404(b)? 

DC: Correct, as well as 403 and as for the hearsay, the 

803(3), I believe-- 

MJ: I think that is what you’re saying, right, Counsel, 

803(3)? [asking trial counsel] 

TC: Yes, Your Honor 

DC: I believe that the victim’s existing state of mind 

relates back to the 404(b) that they are trying to use this to 

somehow prove that there is motive, intent, and planning 

to kill the victim as is charged here. Her making a 

restricted sexual assault report doesn’t flow into a murder 

charge. 

[. . . .] 
AGUIGUI–ARMY 20140260 

5

MJ: Here is what we are going to do, Counsel. I’m going 

to ask you to object as the testimony goes along. Then I 

will rule after hearing the testimony. 

[. . . .] 

MJ: Call the witness, Defense Counsel, I think you are 

tracking what I’ve told you, but its [sic] incumbent upon 

you to object to the hearsay as it comes in. 

DC: Yes, Your Honor. 

Once on the stand, SR answered government counsel’s question, “What did 

[SGT DA] specifically tell you?”: 

She said that there had been some verbal abuse early on 

and when she came to see me, there had been physical 

abuse and that sexually he had been coercing her or 

forcing her into having sex with him as well as his friends. 

Defense counsel maintained this testimony was inadmissible under Mil. R. 

Evid. 404(b) and Mil. R. Evid. 403 but made no hearsay objection to it. After SR 

stepped down from the stand, the military judge and defense counsel had the 

following exchange: 

MJ: . . . Now, Counsel, I note that you didn’t object under 

hearsay grounds, I don’t think, to anything. 

DC: No, you are correct, Your Honor.3

MJ: So you have no hearsay objection? 

DC: Correct.4

 

 

3

 Actually, defense counsel had objected on hearsay grounds to SR’s description of 

SGT DA’s questions about her reporting options. The military judge ultimately 

sustained this objection, though apparently deciding it on relevance grounds rather 

than hearsay. 

4

 Relying on United States v. Reynolds, 29 M.J. 105 (C.M.A. 1989), the military 

(continued . . . ) 
AGUIGUI–ARMY 20140260 

6

Multiple government witnesses described appellant’s frequent but uncharged 

misconduct. Defense counsel did not object when: 1) some described appellant’s 

frequent use of illegal drugs, including spice, ecstasy, and cocaine; 2) SC testified 

that she and appellant had an extramarital affair; or 3) JV testified that she 

witnessed a physical altercation between appellant and SGT DA.5 

Aside from the hearsay and uncharged misconduct evidence, trial counsel 

offered, and the military judge admitted, without objection, an exhibit consisting of 

dozens of pages regarding SGT DA’s life insurance policy and proceeds. However, 

nearly twenty of its pages contained plainly irrelevant matters, including suspicions 

about appellant. 

The military judge, with a level of attention to detail that counsel did not 

display, clarified after announcing his findings of guilty: 

In deliberating on findings, the court did not consider 

pages 19 through 37 of Prosecution Exhibit 44, that is, the 

Prudential document. Pages 19 through 37 included 

discussions of other possible charges, suspicions about the 

accused’s possible involvement in crime, alleged 

involvement in other crimes, a media account, and 

administrative and subpoena matters. Those matters are 

not appropriate, not relevant, and are excluded under 

Military Rule of Evidence 403. 

B. Sentencing 

After the government’s sentencing case, the military judge granted defense 

counsel’s request for a brief recess. When the court-martial resumed, the defense 

rested without presenting a sentencing case. The military judge then confirmed 

directly with appellant that he understood his rights to present evidence in 

extenuation and mitigation, including his right to testify or make an unsworn 

statement. He also confirmed appellant had fully discussed his rights with his 

defense counsel. Finally, the military judge asked, “Do you support your counsel’s 

decision not to introduce any evidence in your sentencing case?” Appellant 

 

(. . . continued) 

judge ultimately ruled SR’s testimony was admissible under Mil. R. Evid. 404(b). 

We have no quarrel with this detailed analysis and ruling, which were well within 

the bounds of reasonable discretion. 

5

 On direct examination, JV also described SGT DA’s comments to her about 

appellant’s drug use and excessive spending. Between direct and cross-examination, 

the military judge told defense counsel it was his burden to make hearsay objections. 
AGUIGUI–ARMY 20140260 

7

responded he did and, after closing for deliberations, the court-martial sentenced 

appellant as described above. 

C. Defense Counsel Affidavits 

In response to appellate defense counsel’s brief, which assigned as error 

ineffective assistance of counsel during the findings and sentencing portions of the 

case, government appellate counsel filed a motion to order affidavits from trial 

defense counsel. We granted the motion and ordered the government to obtain 

affidavits from appellant’s two trial defense counsel, Major William J. Cook, III and 

Captain Scott A. Noto, no later than 23 June 2016. On 21 June 2016, we received 

the affidavits, which are virtually identical and state, in pertinent part: 

Throughout our representation of PVT Aguigui, we 

advised him of his rights as an accused, including his right 

to call witnesses on his behalf during pre-sentencing, 

present evidence during pre-sentencing, and make a 

statement on his own behalf. PVT Aguigui did not advise 

us of any potential witnesses for pre-sentencing other than 

those listed on the Witness List filed with the Court. We 

were prepared to call witnesses and put on additional 

evidence during pre-sentencing. However, during a 

recess, PVT Aguigui informed us of his decision to not put 

on any evidence during pre-sentencing. PVT Aguigui’s 

decision was confirmed by the Military Judge on the 

record. 

[. . . .] 

The decision to refrain from objecting to certain hearsay 

statements was a strategic decision. We did not believe 

the evidence presented by the government’s lay witnesses 

was particularly compelling and thus believed that its 

presentation by the government only served to weaken, 

rather than strengthen, its case. We believed the Military 

Judge would give such evidence the little weight it 

deserved. During trial, we objected when we believed it 

was appropriate. 

Likewise, the decision not to challenge the government’s 

evidence of PVT Aguigui’s drug use, partying at strip 

clubs, and similar evidence was a strategic decision. 

Again, we did not consider this evidence particularly 

compelling in light of the issues presented in this case 
AGUIGUI–ARMY 20140260 

8

(particularly, the issues raised by the medical evidence) 

and believed the Military Judge would give such evidence 

the little weight it deserved. During trial, we objected 

when we believed it was appropriate. 

(Internal paragraph numbers omitted.). 

 During oral argument we asked probing questions about the affidavits, which 

depicted, inter alia, a trial defense team who rendered a deficient assessment of the 

findings evidence, were unprepared for the pre-sentencing phase of the case, and 

were unfamiliar with the basic responsibility of defense counsel to decide what 

evidence to present on behalf of an accused. 

 After oral argument, and in a rather uncommon development that, at best, 

demonstrates the initial affidavits were summarily prepared with limited reflection 

on their trial efforts, trial defense counsel prepared additional affidavits to 

“supplement” the original ones. The affidavits tacitly respond to our questions and 

observations at oral argument. On 9 November 2016, appellate government counsel 

moved to attach the supplemental affidavits, without acknowledging passage of the 

ordered 23 June 2016 deadline and without requesting leave to file them out of time 

or offering good cause to do so in contravention of Rule 24.2 of our Internal Rules 

of Practice and Procedure [hereinafter Rules]. Furthermore, oral argument was on 

13 October 2016, rendering any supplemental filings due by 20 October 2016 under 

Rule 16.1(e). After considering and finding persuasive appellate defense counsel’s 

brief in opposition, we denied the motion to attach government exhibits 4 and 5 on 

16 November 2016. 

LAW AND ANALYSIS 

Military accuseds have a Constitutional and codal right to the effective 

assistance of counsel at trial. United States v. Bolkan, 55 M.J. 425, 427 (C.A.A.F. 

2001) (citing U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Art. 27, UCMJ, 10 USC § 827; and United 

States v. MacCulloch, 40 M.J. 236 (C.M.A. 1994)); see also United States v. Gooch, 

69 M.J. 353, 361 (C.A.A.F. 2011). “The right to counsel is probably the paramount 

right in ensuring that the adversarial system functions properly.” Bolkan, 55 M.J. at 

427. We review de novo claims that an appellant did not receive effective assistance 

of counsel. United States v. Mazza, 67 M.J. 470, 474 (C.A.A.F. 2009). 

“In assessing the effectiveness of counsel we apply the standard set forth in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and begin with the presumption 

of competence announced in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984).” 

Gooch, 69 M.J. at 361. To overcome the presumption of competence, the Strickland

standard requires appellant to demonstrate “both (1) that his counsel’s performance 

was deficient, and (2) that this deficiency resulted in prejudice.” United States v. 
AGUIGUI–ARMY 20140260 

9

Green, 68 M.J. 360, 361 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 and 

Mazza, 67 M.J. 474). An appellant is prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance 

where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694; see also United States v. Akbar, 74 M.J. 364, 379 (C.A.A.F. 2015). 

This Constitutional right applies not only to the merits phase of trial, but to 

each critical stage in a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal 

accused may be affected, which includes the sentencing phase of a military courtmartial. United States v. Dobrava, 64 M.J. 503, 505 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2006) 

(citing United States v. Alves, 53 M.J. 286, 289 (C.A.A.F. 2000)). The Rules of 

Professional Conduct for Lawyers applicable to military counsel make it clear an 

attorney shall abide by the client’s decision to testify or not. Army Reg. 27-26, 

Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers, Appx. B. R. 1.2 (Scope of 

Representation)(1 May 1992). And the “decision to make an unsworn statement is 

personal to the accused.” United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 209 (C.A.A.F. 

2004). But strategic and tactical decisions are within the sole discretion of defense 

counsel. Dobrava, 64 M.J. at 506. 

Ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing process can occur when 

counsel fails to introduce evidence that would be of value to the accused in 

presenting a case in extenuation and mitigation. United States v. Boone, 49 M.J. 

187, 196 (C.A.A.F. 1998). Counsel’s failure to present matters in extenuation and 

mitigation during the sentencing phase of trial “raises concerns about a breakdown 

in the adversarial process.” United States v. Weathersby, 48 M.J. 668, 671 (Army 

Ct. Crim. App. 1998). In these situations, the record of trial will likely not include 

the evidence that counsel should have presented, but did not. Boone, 49 M.J. at 197. 

When this happens, there is no record from which we can determine the sentence the 

court-martial would have imposed absent the error. Id. at 198-99; see also United 

States v. Sickels, ARMY 20110110, 2013 CCA LEXIS 563, *7 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 

23 Jul. 2013) (mem. op.) (“Where defense counsel fail to make adequate 

investigation of possible evidence in extenuation and mitigation and fail to present 

any evidence in sentencing at trial, the sentence may be unreliable and may require a 

rehearing on sentence as a result.”). Where “the record does not contain the 

evidence omitted by the constitutional error” an appellant “must have the 

opportunity to make the record that he did not have the opportunity to make because 

of the absence of the guiding hand of counsel.” Boone, 49 M.J. at 198-99. 

A. Findings 

The record shows a defense team who devoted significant effort toward 

contesting, and even offering an alternative explanation for, the forensic medical 

evidence. We are reluctant to question this aspect of defense counsels’ tactics, for 
AGUIGUI–ARMY 20140260 

10

the medical component of this case was indeed significant. However, this was not 

the case’s only component. Instead, the non-forensic component–including 

testimony about appellant’s uncharged misconduct, suspicious and incriminating 

statements, combined with hearsay testimony about SGT DA’s report of appellant’s 

abuse–answered the questions that SGT DA’s autopsy begged. Put another way, no 

reasonable defense counsel would address the non-forensic component as 

indifferently as trial defense counsel did here. 

We have carefully considered trial defense counsels’ affidavits; they offer 

objectively unconvincing explanations for the lack of objections to uncharged 

misconduct and hearsay evidence. Even if we concluded the rationale for not 

objecting to uncharged misconduct evidence was tactically reasonable, we reject as 

unsound their rationale regarding the hearsay evidence: “its presentation by the 

government only served to weaken, rather than strengthen, its case.” This post-trial 

assessment is contradicted by the defense team’s multiple objections to SV’s 

testimony describing SGT DA’s report of appellant’s previous abuse. This 

contradiction begs a rhetorical question: If the defense team believed this evidence 

actually undermined the case against their client, why did they characterize it as 

uncharged misconduct evidence and oppose its admission? Contrary to the affidavits 

provided, the record establishes the trial defense team viewed this evidence, before 

and during trial, as sufficiently inculpatory to resist its admission. However, even 

after what some may view as prompting by the military judge, trial defense counsel 

missed the most fundamental and likely effective objection–hearsay. 

We hold the trial defense team was deficient during the findings phase. 

However, considering appellant’s multiple non-hearsay statements about his desire 

to kill SGT DA, his conflicting explanations about her cause of death, and his 

confession to Michael Schaefer, we further hold the deficiency resulted in no 

prejudice to the findings. Appellant has not established a reasonable probability of a 

different verdict had his trial defense counsel performed in a tactically reasonable 

manner. 

B. Sentencing6

An accused is responsible for deciding whether he will make any statement to 

a court-martial. The defense counsel is responsible for deciding whether to present 

witnesses and other evidence during the case, and this responsibility cannot be 

outsourced to an accused or anyone else. The military judge’s well-principled 

intervention in this remarkably incomplete pre-sentencing phase demonstrates he 

 

6

 Appellant’s submissions and trial defense counsels’ affidavits agree on the 

fundamental point regarding the pre-sentencing case: trial defense counsel presented 

no evidence or witnesses. Therefore, an additional DuBay hearing is not necessary 

to decide this appeal. United States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236, 244 (C.A.A.F. 1997). 
AGUIGUI–ARMY 20140260 

11

keenly understood the difference, for after asking appellant whether it was his 

personal decision not to provide a statement, he then asked, “Do you support your 

counsel’s decision not to introduce any evidence in your sentencing case?” 

(Emphasis added). 

On this point, trial defense counsel write identically: “[D]uring a recess, PVT 

Aguigui informed us of his decision to not put on any evidence during presentencing. PVT Aguigui’s decision was confirmed by the Military Judge on the 

record.” This quote warrants particular scrutiny. The second sentence, clearly 

referring to the one before, is incorrect as a matter of fact–the military judge 

pointedly clarified that the decision to present a sentencing case belonged to 

counsel. Beyond this inaccuracy, the quote evinces a continued misunderstanding of 

counsel’s responsibility. Even if we were to strain to interpret the affidavits as 

counsels’ expression that they decided not to present a case, they offer absolutely no 

supporting tactical reason. 

Appellant faced a maximum sentence of life without eligibility for parole, and 

the military judge sentenced him to that punishment after hearing no evidence from 

the defense.7

 Where such a “breakdown”8 of advocacy has occurred, we have no 

confidence in the sentence’s reliability. Weathersby, 48 M.J. at 671; Boone, 49 M.J. 

at 196; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

CONCLUSION 

The findings of guilty are AFFIRMED. 

 

7

 In concluding trial defense counsel were ineffective by failing to present a presentencing case, we decline to address whether they adequately prepared one. 

Appellant’s brief claims trial defense counsel were also deficient in preparing a 

sentencing case. In response to our order for affidavits, counsel perfunctorily 

address this point: “PVT Aguigui did not advise us of any potential witnesses for 

pre-sentencing other than those listed on the Witness List filed with the Court. We 

were prepared to call witnesses and put on additional evidence during presentencing.” (Emphasis added). 

Additionally, Rule for Courts-Martial 1001(f)(2) allows a sentencing authority to 

“consider...[a]ny evidence properly introduced on the merits before findings....” 

(Emphasis added). The military judge here may have considered, for sentencing 

purposes, the uncharged misconduct and hearsay evidence described earlier in this 

decision. 

8 Sickels, 2013 CCA LEXIS 563, at *9. 
AGUIGUI–ARMY 20140260 

12

The sentence is set aside. A rehearing on sentence is authorized, during 

which trial defense counsel may object to the re-sentencing authority’s consideration 

of uncharged misconduct and hearsay evidence that, but for original counsel’s 

deficient performance, would not have been admitted on findings. 

Senior Judge CAMPANELLA and Judge HERRING concur. 

FOR THE COURT: 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES JR. 

 Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: