United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 21-2415

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Reynaldo Sanchez

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Arkansas - Fayetteville

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Submitted: April 11, 2022

Filed: August 15, 2022 

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Before LOKEN, ARNOLD, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

Reynaldo Sanchez pleaded guilty to transportation of child pornography in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(1) and (b)(1). At sentencing, the district court1

determined an advisory guidelines sentencing range of 108 to 135 months in prison,

1The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Arkansas.
considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and imposed a sentence of 96

months imprisonment and 20 years of supervised release. The court imposed seven

special conditions of supervised release including, over Sanchez’s timely objection,

that he “submit to periodic polygraph testing at the discretion of the probation office

as a means to ensure that he is in compliance with the requirements of his supervision

or treatment program.” Sanchez appeals his sentence, presenting as the issue for

review whether the district court abused its discretion in “requiring Mr. Sanchez to

submit to periodic polygraph testing at the discretion of the U.S. Probation Office.” 

We affirm.

I. 

After Homeland Security investigators traced twenty images of child

pornography to Sanchez’s Twitter account, law enforcement conducted a warrant

search of his home in September 2019. A forensic search of his phone uncovered

sixty images of child pornography and two hundred images of child erotica of

children aged five to fifteen years old. Investigators also found chat logs from 2017

and 2019 in which Sanchez requested sexually explicit pictures of females of an

unknown age and described his fantasies of sexual relations with children.

During the warrant search, Sanchez waived his Miranda rights, confirmed the

Twitter account was his, and admitted using Twitter to search for child pornography,

saving images to his phone, and sending images to others. Sanchez said he knew the

search was related to child pornography because agents had previously conducted a

warrant search of his home for child pornography. Paragraph 30 of the Presentence

Investigation Report referred to that statement: “The [earlier] case was referred to the

Washington County Prosecutor’s Office; however, no charges were filed.” 

At sentencing, the district court inquired regarding Paragraph 30. In response,

the government advised that Homeland Security agents conducted a warrant search

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of Sanchez’s home in 2015 based on an IP address that was participating in child

pornography via a peer-to-peer file sharing program. After Sanchez admitted

downloading child pornography of children as young as three to five years, twelve

images and ten videos were found on his device. The case was referred to the county

prosecutor, but the state prosecutor’s office ultimately declined to prosecute. The

district court advised that the 2015 incident “has no impact on the guideline

calculation [but] it’s a relevant [§ 3553(a)] consideration”: 

To the extent one needed a wake-up call that it was wrong to view

images of child pornography, Mr. Sanchez, that was your wake-up call. 

And the Court finds it very disturbing that you would waste a second

chance. The Court is concerned that the only thing that not pursuing

prosecution in 2015 has done is to make you a better perpetrator. I

noticed that the images [here] were only on the phone. I don’t know if

you thought that perhaps if it was on your phone, you couldn’t be traced.

After hearing argument on Sanchez’s objection to the polygraph testing special

condition, the district court explained at length its decision to impose this special

condition. The court referred to a government report explaining why polygraph

testing is recognized as an appropriate tool for sex offender management: 

[T]his Court does not read that report to say that polygraph testing is

appropriate or should be required in every sex offense case. Rather . . .

the condition is recommended to be imposed on sex offenders who, one,

are hands-on sex offenders, or, two, are at risk or have predispositions

towards becoming hands-on offenders in the future. And . . . it certainly

could be appropriate in situations where an offender has been dishonest,

has lied, has taken affirmative measures to conceal or deceive detection

in the past.

The court found Sanchez’s fantasy chatting “very disturbing” because it raises

concern that Sanchez, though not in the past a hands-on offender, “was on a pathway

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towards acting out on his fantasies.” Given that risk of hands-on reoffending, and the

fact “he was not deterred when confronted by law enforcement in 2015,” the court

found that polygraph testing is “an appropriate tool for probation to have in its

arsenal.” 

II.

Our court has published many opinions reviewing challenges to special

conditions of supervised release imposed in sentencing sex offenders. Our standards

for this review are well established. Procedurally, the district court “must conduct an

inquiry on an individualized basis, looking at the specific facts of the defendant’s

criminal history and his particular offenses, and make a particularized showing of the

need for the condition in each case.” United States v. Springston, 650 F.3d 1153,

1156 (8th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up), vacated on other grounds, 566 U.S. 931 (2012). 

“District courts are encouraged to provide an explanation of how the conditions

satisfy the requirements of [18 U.S.C.] § 3583(d), but where the basis for the special

conditions can be discerned from the record, reversal is not required.” United States

v. Simpson, 932 F.3d 1154, 1156 (8th Cir. 2019), cert denied,140 S. Ct. 826 (2020);

see United States v. Smith, 960 F.3d 1107, 1109 (8th Cir. 2020).

When the district court has conducted an appropriate individualized inquiry,

we deferentially review the special condition for abuse of discretion. “District courts

have wide discretion to impose conditions of supervised release so long as they are

reasonably related to (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (2) the

defendant’s history and characteristics; (3) the deterrence of criminal conduct; (4) the

protection of the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (5) the defendant’s

educational, vocational, medicinal, or other correctional needs.” United States v.

Muhlenbruch, 682 F.3d 1096, 1102 (8th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted); see United

States v. Wiedower, 634 F.3d 490, 493 (8th Cir. 2011). Our ad hoc opinion as to the

wisdom of a particular special condition does not outweigh the careful consideration

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of the sentencing judge and the probation officers who will be responsible for

supervising the defendant when he has completed his term of imprisonment. 

In this case, we review a special condition, polygraph testing, that has been in

common use throughout the country. Many of our sister circuits have rejected frontal

attacks on this type of special condition, concluding “that polygraph testing may

serve salutary purposes in the supervised release context.” United States v. Johnson,

446 F.3d 272, 277 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 953 (2006), and cases cited. A

polygraph test may provide an added incentive to be truthful to the probation officer,

which assists supervision and monitoring. Id. Sanchez cites not one case, not even

a dissenting opinion, expressing a contrary view. Our court has frequently upheld

this special condition, including at least one condition virtually identical to the one

here at issue. See Simpson, 932 F.3d at 1156. Indeed, polygraph testing special

conditions have become so common and widely accepted that, in most of our

decisions, the district court did not explain why the condition was appropriate for the

defendant being sentenced, but we could discern the basis for the condition from the

record and affirmed. See, e.g., Smith, 960 F.3d at 1109; Simpson, 932 F.3d at 1156;

United States v. Newell, 915 F.3d 587, 590-91 (8th Cir. 2019); United States v.

Thompson, 888 F.3d 347, 351-52 (8th Cir. 2018). 

Here, the district court did not procedurally err. It conducted a thorough

individualized analysis of the sentence it was imposing. The seven special conditions

of supervised release require that Sanchez (5) “participate in a sex offense-specific

treatment program,” and (6) “submit to periodic polygraph testing . . . to ensure that

he is in compliance with the requirements of his supervision or treatment program.” 

In response to Sanchez’s timely objection, the court carefully explained why the

sentence would include this polygraph testing special condition. Thus, the issue on

appeal is limited to whether the court abused its wide discretion to impose reasonable

special conditions. 

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Sanchez acknowledges our precedents affirming polygraph testing

requirements for child pornography offenders, but distinguishes those cases as

involving polygraph testing imposed as a component of sex-offender treatment, or on

a defendant who was dishonest, deceptive, or uncooperative. By contrast, Sanchez

argues, he is not a hands-on offender, truthfully admitted his illegal activity to law

enforcement, and fully complied with his conditions of pretrial release. Therefore,

he posits, a polygraph testing condition is not reasonably related to the § 3553(a)

factors and involves a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. But

our cases have never limited imposition of polygraph testing to defendants who fall

in the categories he describes. This argument fails to suggest an abuse of discretion. 

Sanchez argues that our court and others have limited the use of polygraph test

results at trial because they can be inaccurate and unreliable. This argument does not

apply. In the supervised release context, “polygraph testing is for treatment, not for

evidence at trial or sentencing.” Smith, 960 F.3d at 1110; see United States v. Lee,

315 F.3d 206, 214 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 858 (2003). 

Sanchez also argues his other conditions of supervised release “were sufficient

to address” the district court’s concern over the likelihood of future hands-on

offenses, making this condition a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably

necessary. But his deprivation focus is faulty. The standard conditions of supervised

release, which the district court imposed here, include obligations that Sanchez report

to the probation officer as instructed and “answer truthfully the questions asked by

the probation officer.” USSG § 5D1.3(c)(1)-(2) and (4). “The additional requirement

that [he] be subject to polygraph testing does not substantially increase the burden on

him.” Lee, 315 F.3d at 214. 

Sanchez further argues the special condition is overbroad because it “would

permit polygraph examination to be used at the discretion of Probation in an attempt

to sniff out potential violations in the ordinary course of its supervision of a

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defendant.” We disagree. The district court expressly stated that polygraph testing

is “not to be used to ensnare people” but is instead “a preventative measure.” Thus,

the court recognized that polygraph questioning should be limited to issues that relate

to “supervision, monitoring, and treatment.” Lee, 315 F.3d at 215. The special

condition explicitly links the probation officer’s discretion to Sanchez’s compliance

with supervision or his treatment program. “Polygraph testing supports the

Sentencing Commission’s policy that sex offenders participate in a program for

treatment and monitoring.” Smith, 960 F.3d at 1110 (citing USSG § 5D1.3(d)(7)(A)). 

Sanchez “has recourse to the district court if he objects to the direction of the

probation office.” Thompson, 888 F.3d at 352. 

Turning to the district court’s reasons for imposing this special condition,

Sanchez argues (i) his fantasy chats do not show he is a predator on a pathway to

acting out those fantasies, and (ii) the district court placed too much emphasis on his

2015 encounter with law enforcement, which “was not serious enough to merit

prosecution or punishment.” But this is simply disagreeing with the district court; it

does not establish abuse of discretion. The court found that chat transcripts quoted

in the PSR graphically describing to others Sanchez’s desire for sexual encounters

with minors “very disturbing” because they persuaded the court “that he is a person

who has predatory thoughts. He is a person who is at risk of committing future

hands-on offenses.” That finding is not unreasonable. See Wiedower, 634 F.3d at

494 (affirming polygraph condition based in part on defendant’s participation in a

“fetish chat room”). Regarding the 2015 incident, it strongly supported imposing this

special condition for the reasons explained by the district court.

III.

Polygraph testing, like other special conditions of supervised release, cannot

be routinely imposed on all sex offenders. As the district court expressly recognized,

it must be warranted by an individualized inquiry into a particular offender’s

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circumstances. See Thompson, 888 F.3d at 351-52. The court carefully made that

inquiry. In light of the widely recognized public benefits of polygraph testing in

treating and managing many sex offenders who are on supervised release, the district

court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that polygraph testing was “an

appropriate tool for probation to have in its arsenal in this case.” 

Sanchez has not met his burden “to establish that a special condition is

unreasonable.” United States v. Deatherage, 682 F.3d 755, 765 (8th Cir. 2012). The

judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

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