~0966. 

USCIB: 29.9/4 

27 September 1954 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

'±'01' S!iSfil'f - a. a. El'lfR .w PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

MEMQRANDPM FOR TEE MEMBERS CF USOIB: 

Subject: 1 .... ____________ ___,f 

Reference: USOIB 29.9/3 dated l7 September 1954• 

1. The enclosure describes./in general the action taken by the 

Executive Secretary subsequent/to the 19th Meeting \of USOIBEO whereat 

the reference and associated matters were considered without arriving 

at unanimous agreement as to/the best course of act:lon. 

2. The CIA, NSA, and State Department Members have now agreed to 

the terms df reference set forth in the enclosure. It is recommended, 

therefore, that these terms of reference be examined \and if not objectionable to ant memrer, that the Department of State be authorized to 

inform Embassy that the meeting requested by thel l 

Intelligence Coordinator will be arranged as soon as practicable. 

3. Owing to the desirability for an early answer to Embassy Rome, 

members are requested to have the office of the Executive Secretary informed of their views in this matter by telephone as soon as practicable. 

Enclosure 

a/s. 

m ~QS'QMEN! Mm I!S ENGT:.eBYRE SeN'H.IN eCJiilJiUffleA'i'iONS IN!BHD:EtENeE 

INPOR:Mfffl:ON MfB Sffldlll BE IJMmiif!iB CH.¥ IH 0IiANHSLS EKPREBS:Ei! PROVIBEB Pffi efMflfr. 

USCIB: 29.9/4 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 01-26-2015 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 

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24 
;; 

• 

l:!OP!:!!::§!SE!jS!!HE~'l~~Y:z:!> Sb,~E~RiSI~ Auv T~€fW-!'ioO 9 .. ·6······~ W 

i~O 3'.3(h)(2) 

f?L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

INTERCEPT BASE RIGHTS IN ITALY 

for a personal briefing.from high leve qua 1e 

gence representatives on matters rel.ated to the u.s.•request ,..• .,..o .... r _ ___., ____ ___. rights vdth particular reference to planned and present iji ... S. 

telligence operations, th9 Ex.ecutive Committee agreed/that it._w..,... ~o~'l""""'I" 

~ble in the interest of preserving the integrit~>or.u.s. /base rights negotiaf;i ons and e::anf t:i.ng all reasonable :ossi·h· u.·.it:!ei1·······.·.o ... f " .. ··bt···· .ainl.ng.· .• • •. d·. es·.···.U-·· .. able·· ..u.s. __ _ to acco.mmodatel _ / !insofar as /practicable\. It is the 

........,o=p=in......,..io=n,,,.......,,o"""f......,.,.,,,.e,,.........,..majority of the EXecu ive Conmdtt.ee that such an• effort could be 

~e a:t~~~f nnd: fan=:: t.n :::dra1n:N;~~~~~!o~./z~./~e d~.rne·t·e~=~~~v;. ~ must be preservea, ana f;'.fiaf; a mJ..!1£3.ry 1ntelligenceirepresentatiVe\Of flagrank 

should be supplied by the NSA to .go to.gather with a. representative .• of comparable 

status, selected by the Directo.r of Qentral.···Intel.lig .• ence •• and .a. .re?fesentative 

from the u.s. Embassy irj lto arrange a briefingiof I .• • •. L bo · to him.more ful the circumstances affecting the u.s. request f'or 

2.. The CIA member of the Executi~ /Conmittee/was not fully in accord with 

the recommendation to call uponl · · · lowing to a feel~ that such 

:representatives woul~ not. be able to.· make the cOtnml..·. · · tments which the ·· ... CIA member 

:t'eels are desired byl / ~·· The DCI has since indicated. his belief 

that we should not be averse to f'!lrther explanations tol I under the 

conditions described above, provided the terms/of reference of such a discussion were to include constructive suggestions calculated to allayl Intelligence fears. / The DCI felt that the terms of reference• should .... b.-e ___ _, 

approved in advance of making/any commitment/to hold such a meet;Lng • 

.3. In view or the foregoing, the terms /or reference1set forth below are 

suggested: 

a. /That arrangements be made through the Department or State for a 

delegation, consisting iof:/ a representative of the Department o.t State (acting 

asl :•\and sponaor·i··· ng .. ··the'bther tlV"o me .. ··m.bers); the .. ··Senior CI···A Re··.presentative in (representing the over-all intelligence interests of the u. s. Governmen ; and a representative of the National Security Agency (representing the 

intelligence interest or the U.S. armed services in connection with the details 

of tbe reguirernents fnd negotiations f .. · .or base riMt.·s and functioru. .. · ng of the .__ __________ __.Jon those bases), ito brier I • lat an early date. 

b. T~/ t the delegation woul···d make the following points clear to .....__ ____ ___, lin the manner indicated: 

(1) The U.S .. feels thatl fhas 

misunderstood the purpose of these intercept 

bases and desires to emphasize that their 

pur19ose -: ie.•c separate and distinct from 

so.mowhat similarL !operations from 

which the U.S. is now receiving the benefit. 

To be covered by 

the CIA Rep. with 

the support of 

the NSA Rep. 

1 With regard to CO~ITNT Ac.ti vi ties, t.!ie i.cOr.1111itments indicated in these terms 

o.£ :r>e:eerence.: are not int~n,d~d 't,6 ci::ceed ·th'] pt'pilffaions Of paragrarb I. of Appendjx 

"P", UK.USA, except insofar as the provision of raw traffic to the I is 

concerned. 

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(2) The request for these sites is in no 

way intended to impugn the ciuantity or quality 

of the inf' or ma tion c r e I'. • i ved 

from the tlu:'ough 

the CIA, or o re uco e co a ora ion now 

existing 

contrary, 

between 

it is hoped 

those 

that 

services. 

the CIA ~ col• 

laboration can be expanded ·along severa lines 

which the competent technical people can discuss 

at a later date as required.. 

(3) The I lreq uested are 

primarily for military purposes, and for war 

insurance of operational intelligence in direc1;-

support or U,S. military operations in Europe.l.· 

It is U.Sc opinion that the bases\ requested will 

materialtv en00nce the ;·.llied potent·. ial in war 

and that_ ~'lill understand that we 

cannot 1va.it until war is upo. n us :o··.· .... e· .. stablish these facilities. .tr! _ lindica.tes 

he fears that the facilities may e directed 

against! lhe should be given reassuran. ce : 

that th~ u • ..:s. will not I \. I ...__~~~~~~~~----~~~~----'~ 

l4) ln order to .ma.intain the<indispensable 

security of such u.s .. military instal.latiblll!J, 

it is obvious that these stations must. be kept 

under U.S. control and guard. I. Jpersonnel 

would not have free access to these stations.nor 

would there be any direct U .s .j I col.;J.aboration in their operations. ?lfevertheles:s, ip. 

order to avoid placing political capital into 

Conununist hands, it is expected that visits <>f.\ 

inspection and courtesy will be arranged under 

conditions which would not expose the detailed 

workings or these installations. 

To be covered by 

the CIA Rep., with 

the support of the 

NSA Rep. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

'.l'o be covered by 

the NSA Rep. with 

the support of the 

CIA Rep. 

To be covered by 

the NSA Rep. with 

the support of the 

CIA Rep. 

'~o 3.3(h)(2) 

f?L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

l If the question has not been raised before it cart\\.be anticipated 

by the delegation that at this point dll ask what 

specific targets are to be covered by e ;s..a.; ....... ...._...._ __ ~~~~~~~~__, 

Which a.re not already being covered by the ervices. The 

NSA Representative should be prepared to dea in feneral terms with 

this query, stressing the .military aspects of' the_ I 

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0 3.3(h)(2) 

L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

's reaction is essentially negative, or t}JS.tifurthe.r pursuit of 

~~~ ... t=-t:.;:e::=r.........,va.=·=1=1.......,......,.:i:pe the existing cordial r~.l.ation$bips /of Cl:A 

services, they/are to wJ..thd.rmT ~/ indi¢ating "-rT--"T"'T"-r-~ ..... l ............ be discussed/further irf .the u.s, a.nd. that 

------- s views will be presented to> the/ pertinent /author:tties. 

2 i. In its past and··· present dealin···· .. ·.·.·.••~ ~)'b lr--J.·/ .·/ .. · .Ln .. ·/ t.· elli.•.· ge .. ·•· •.. n. ce Services, the United States has not provided .t i i ~ COMINT information beyond statements that the materia ~ i.y-as o /high quality and .that we 

desired its con:·t·· inuation. In al.l./·ca··· .·/ ~e.· s/ the .·s· •ta····tem···ents·· .. ·/~ .. "t b~ontsed ·on material provided by the I //I services. To offer the • • •. more 

than this is a distinct departure/from previous United Sta es practice. 

ii. The bulk of the material is received frotn. three sources: 

'l'he 

delivecy of Ar.mt material .only/ isi channeJ.ed /throu or 

ldirec!~p~~s=n~~i;::;es~~~t~di~ a!r:: m::e:i:T ':r~~ ;;~~d respective ser · / · / i believed l:5 · :e-~ e 5a is ~ evidence .available to us that is aware/ of the details of the type,s or 

the quantity of message._,_ _________ ,...,.... __________ _ 

but it is thought that he is only generally a"Ware that such an arrange-

:~;r:is;~~vi:i:di~Y d~~!fitelv informetin :Nll detail, however, of the 

iii. In view of theilong-established policy of the United States in dealing 

with ·· / · · infor.mB.tion was to be provided 

by t e o may not request the products 

of the proposed e ms ed to him; thus, the initial 

promise of/expa o c ation should confirm the intention 

......u..&...-.;ji;..(..ll;:........11.s. to .continue the support and subsequent expansion of the 

ntell,igence Services in the form of material assistance. Unless ,.._ ___ .....___...., s ecifically requestq l or it appears that the 

_________ will be needed to obtain I I's acquiescence to the __. 

proffer should be made. 

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fEO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

however, I I doos r I it ±s suggested delegation query him as to tne type desl..I"ed and if appropriate, 

t e·r w· lin ness to cce e to his wishes if' sU.ch material can 

By . foll0tiving such an. approach, 

in the somewhat/ di:fficUl.t position 

o=-----~_._~--~~~-.-~~--_,_.~hichthey = 

v. As a final negotiating maneuver, that is, if' I // • ~oes not 

himself make ~ tand if ~ars that the proffer of' 

traffic will be 0£ assistance in obtainingL___Js acqfescele to the 

bases, it is suggested that the delegation indicate to hat certain 

traffic of' interest to him and his service might be provided by the 

U.S. installations and that he then be queried as to what types of 

.material would be of interest to him. 

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