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Securit, lnfermB:tiee: 

WAR SECRETS IN 

THE ETHER 

Parts I and II 

- By 

Wilhelm F. Flicke 

Translated by 

Ray W. Pettengill 

:NOTICE: Tllis d981i1Hl:8Rt 99RtaiRs iRf8ff.Rati9R afi:eetiRg the R&tiaR&l aeteftse af the 

National Security Agency 

Washington, 25 D. C. 

1953 

)eclassified and aooroved for release bv NSA on 01-29-2014 oursuantto E.O. 13521 
ftl!18'fi710'fEiB 

§8~~~1ty IA£9I".11Vi!.ti9A 

WAR SF.CRETS IN THE ETHER 

Parts I and II 

By 

Wilhelm F. Flieke 

Translated by 

Ray W- Pettengill 

M'O':t'Ie!s !his docttment corl"(,e:iMI il'lferftl!riiioa e:ffeei;ing '4;h:e fl&:'M::e!le:l 

Q9£9AH e£ tl:l.e ijza:t;eEi S:t;"es u:b:t;biR -4;he meen:iag e£ 'bfte El19:pienttge 

nawie, 'fi'ble 18, g.s.e., see+.ionie 793, 79h and !itle 5o, e.s.e., 

See+.ione h-6, J:i;6a and h6b. Ite t1ana11dssio11 w cha zeoelation of its 

eeR:t;e11ts i11 a:Flf" manBeF ·h aR llftati:'4;lieriHEi pereen is pI ehihited bJ law. 

National Security Agency 

Washington 25, D.C. 

1953 

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r 

\ 
·e 

To the Inquisitive Reader: 

The manuscript entitled "Kriegegeh~imniese 1m Aether" come 

· to the attention or American authorities in Germany by accide.nt. 

All rights to the book wore pui~chased tor a curious reason and 

ii<JW, sane five 7ears 'later, the National Security Agency finds 

I 

I 

itaelf' custodian of this property. This translation is iss1J.ed,, 

b7 request, in the belier that the document will interest other 

agencies. 

/ No attempt has been made to verii)" the author's statem1Jnts. 

• Mf. Flicke says that hie manuscript covering "-.he history ot the ftercept service down to World War•II was lost and had to be 

/reconstructe~ largel,y from memory". This reconstruction, in two 

I 

parts, constitutes the present volume. Part III .. bound eepar&L8-

q, covers World War II and was written partl,y,from memo:ry, 

part]J" from notes made under trying conditions. Readers who 

chance to have more adequate information on this or that point 

will, therefore, make due all.owance for any dubious statm1ent. 

This brings up the question ot the author's qualifications 

and b~ckground. Mr. Flicke began his inteW.gence career in the 

"Arendt SerV"ice" during World War I; from 1919 to 19.'.39 he worked 

in what was eventua.l.q known as "OKW/Chi", where he developed the 

evaluation section; in 19.'.39 - apparent]¥ after getting into hot 

water by his opposition to the Nazi Part7 - he was sent to set up' 

\ the first intercept station of OKW/Chi at Tennenlohe, fran there : 

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he writ to Li,bourne,.~ later to Laut as te~cal direr;tor ot 

.·'II', 

~he station!. in Se~r1b_er 1944 he -,ae 'fira.llef'erred to ttFunk:amrehr" 

(radio counterhlw~no~) in Ziru~.t where he bocain.e aoquaint.od. • ' - I 

~t-h th9 ~;t'k againsj- f9:reign ~en~a and ~iaa.ne. Fran the toro- . - . going it is evident that. Mr. Fllcl:te oaw D14nf of the truit&S or p ·~ 

German 9l"J'Ptana.l¥s1s and that he htmeelt partioipated aotive]J" ~ • 1 ,.r I .,t f 

:pi most other aspects o( the 'WQ~k qc, deEJc:riP&a • • '" : : ;_ • I , I 

On~ other tactQ;r,UJq' be 9ons14,red. FU,cko aqa that in 1934 • I I ~ I I 

General Fel;Lgj.ebel.t ~en hert.d o~ the intero~pt service, oommissioned : • - I 

llim to wri~~ a hist~~ or thar "~rtf.!:ce& this ~oou.nts for hia copious 

notes. Po~~ibq one_~ot~ve .fqr <:<Xy-P,l!tting,tqe book was his lo.re1 

~evotion to the memo17 of Fe:p.giebel, who we.is one ot the victims or ~: • • I I I 

the purge toll.owing 2Q Juq.~?44• . . "War ~~rets pi 1fe ~~:r" at~eQ>fta ~~ove.r J.a.rp ••gments ot 

Jirata and ~~c~. On ~~ espi~e ~ide ·1t eittords an interesting 

'I Qhe.ck ~ the "Handb~ ot Sp~esn bi' A. A. Foot.e1 as a revelation of 1 

1 • '\. I 

German 0oppoaition_to N!-tio~ Soc~ it l.aoke ~ ot the drama.tier t• . I . I 

. . ... ! 

qualities ot Giseviua• "To t.be Bitter .End"; nevert.helese, tho reader • • ... :p.• • 

'"' • "' I 

~ grant t.hat it is &;,gnifi<!f.llt. ~ t I • , 

.. . . The 'l'rana;J.ator • 

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TABLE OF CON'fENTS 

To tho Inqul'1itivo Reader 

Tablo of Contents 

Preface [propared for a prospective publisher] 

Form-rord of the Author 

Part I 

The Beginnings or the Intercept Service 

Tannen berg 

The German and Austrian Intercept Sorvice in the 

East at the Boginning of World Wa~ I 

After the Battle of Tanncnberg 

The Intercept Service in the West and th~ 

''Miracle of the Marne" 

Tho Deciphering or Cryptograms 

The Direction Finding Service 

Po]J:ps and Penkalas 

The West 

The Second Half or the War in the East 

The Zimm.ermann Telegra.>us 

The Intercept Service at Sea 

The Italo-Austrian War 

A Second "Zimmermann" 

The "Judgement of God" and its Explanation 

The Intercept Service in the Balkans 

Brest-Litovsk 

Compiegne 

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Pa.go 

iii 

v 

vii 

xi 

1 

7 

24 

27 

41 

48 

53 

56 

61 

80 

85 

l.15 

12.3 

l37 

141 

151 

153 

159 
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Pa.1 t. II 

Page. 

The German Interc€pt Service a.rtor the End of World Wa.r I 163 . . ·• 

'!'he Winiker Ca.se 169 

The Work of the German In~rcept Service '1920 - 1920 175 ' . . The Observation of Maneuvers 191 

" 

The Intercept Service of other European Countries 201 

' Some Remarks on the Technique or the Intercept Service 207 

' 

The Chances for the Intercept Service 211 ,, 

The 11Forschungsaint" 219 ,• 

The Formis Ca~e 233 

The Thilo Case 2.39 

The Development of the German Intercept Service 

&I}.d or its Con:trol Station after January 19.33 247 

The "Intercept Compp.nies" 253 

The Literat~e on the Intercept Service 257 

The Armament of Europe after 1933 as revealed by the 

Intercept Service 261 ' . Hitler and Czechoslovakia 269 I 

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PREFACE 

The nuthor of the book is a ecientiot who over a r~riod or 

twcnty-n:f.nc years had opport.unity to t;ain deep :f nai!jht into .). 

special branch of the secret service of all Europcrui countrico; 

this branch is known as 11intercept service" to only a srn1J.ll rart 

of the public. 

Since the invention of technical means of comnrunic~tions --

such as the telephone, telegraph, and teleprinter -- tho worL~ 

has been spanned by a mighty network -- partly visible, partly 

invisible -- over which messages of all types aro spoe~~d al.m.ost 

without interruption. Since tho invention or radiotel4~gra.pey the 

ether has been filled with radiograms whose content extends to 

all realms or public and private life and gives a reflection of 

human existence on our planet. 

On the other hand, all these radiograms act like a magic 

motor in shaping the life of mankind. Whoever follows this 

exchange of information in the ether (and in part over wii-e lines) 

knows the course or events in the past, present, and near future 

as no one else can and has a chance to look into things in a wa.y 

of which the outsider can have no conception. 

The present book draws on this source. It can ofter only a 

tiny fraction or what that source has yielded in the cour~e or the 

last thirty years. But even this small section will show mankind · 

in what ratefUl fashion the interception of radiotelegraphy and of 

other technical means or communication has influenced the'courae or 

events. 

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~ RES'"f'l{ItDJ.~tf 21 

Th~ contents of this book f8.ll into three periods or time: 

1. The period from the inception of the intercept service 

to the end of World War I; 

2. The period between the two World Wars; 

3. The period from the sununer of 1939 to the end or World 

1 War II. 

P8,ft I is purely historicai in character. It is considered 

here in order to give a basis for an understanding of the intercept . ' 

service, and to assure to the treatment of the material a certain 

degree or completeness. 

Part II throws light on the development of the intercept 

service, 1ri European countries, especiallJ" in Germany, and is 

calcula~ed to give many a hint regarding the events leading u~ 

to World War II. 

Part III, the largest section, shows the decisive role or radio 

espionage in all its branches during World War ll. It reduces the 

events at the fronts to a position of secondary importance when 

compared with the invisible, d1namic force or radio espionage in 

this mightiest of all wars. Here for the first time the most secret 

matters of the warring states are brought into the light or publicity. 

This is done in order that the world lilB1' know what went on behind the 

• 

scenes, and so dispel .many an ilJ.usion which might tend to give this 

war a semblance of romanticism. 

In this third section the present work aims to show to the world, 

• 

and in particular to the German people, the incredibl;r frivol""us, casual. 

unscrupulous manner in which Hitler not merely began the war but --

what i~ worse -- continued it contrary to all laws of reason and humanit~ ; 

ai'ter every chance that it might be decided in his favor had long since 

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''"'11:..,. • 1 ~_,;"',.,.' I 

Vo.niohcr.1. 

This book is intended to help eive the pooplos the truth; 

it is intended as a warnine, and so to serve the cause or peace. 

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FOREWORD 

The Second World War has co111e to an end; it ended a~ it necessarily must. An infinite amount can be written about this war, the 

events leading up to it, and about the domination 0£ the National 

Socialist system in Germany and its effects abroad. Many things 

will be eA"Pl.ained eventually; ma.ny will forever remain veiled in 

darkness. This book is intended as a contribution to historical 

research. An attempt will also be made to air many a secret, to 

f'urnish an explanation for some things which seem inexplicable. 

This work is intended to illuminate eventa of the pa.st thirty 

years from a point of view from which this has never yet been done 

and could not be done: namely, :from the point of view of the socalled intercept service, i.e., the interception of radiotelegraphy 

and all other technical means of conununication and the decipherment 

of cryptograms. The book originated in the main during World War II, 

but its beginnings go back much further. Originally it was intended 

to be a "History of the Intercept Service and of Illegal Decipherment .11 The first part, embracing th~ period from 190S to 1939, was 

completed in 1940. It was lost in consequence of the war. Hence, 

only a reconstruction in rough form from memory is possible. 

This work will destroy many an illusion. The period of the 

---- great generals, in whose hands armies became chess pieces, is past. 

In pl.ace ;,,.r armies moved about with happy daring has come the war 

machine which operates with precision. The man at the helm can, 

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guide it, t.o bG sure, well or badly -- according to his abili.ty •· 

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But the operation is so complicated that he is not in a position to 

keep his oye constant~ on all details of the mechanism. He does 

not notice thing§ that have eone wrong until they begin to affect 

the operation as a whole and then it is often too lato. In decisive 

questions he nm.st ro~ on his collaborators and subordinatos, and 

thus he becomes depc;ndent on their skill, their mental ability; their 

perspicacity, their ability to grasp intuitive~ the organic working 

of this vast machinery. If one little wheel in this mechanism fails, 

then the result of his \JOrk becomes questionnblo. On the othor hand, 

these failur~s cen give the helmsman of the opposing aid~ chances of 

decisive impor~ance and ca.~ suddon~ place him in-a po~~t;on where he 

mere~ needs to grasp the opportunity. Whether Su.ccess or. failure 

results, is quite independent of the personality of the eeneral and 

of his merit. The general himself becomes a tiny whcol in the machine. 

This work is intended to serve the truth and hence to serve peace. 

The moro we strip war of its romantic charm and reduce it to a basis 

of fact, the 1r.ore strikingly does its horror appear to us. Along 

with the heroism of the ~oldier we soe the frightful, dostruc~ive 

force of the uar machine of 111nn..,r11 states. And that forces us to 

turn away, ''"'l Lo recognize that uar is not the father ot all things, 

but that it merely destroys uhat is positive and is able to cre;:a.te 

only what is nc.'.;a.tivc. And if, il1 the course of centurico, the 

positive has grown up again and again out of the nflg.1.tii:c, thr;) 

credit is not due to \·m.r but to the cra~tive powers inna.t.e in mankind. 

Advancing thesa p011crs means at the sene time decl~.r:i.ng war on 1·~.::.r • 

.And that happano 1.-h.:n •:c .st.ri-p from it its veil of re .1;:i.ntici::;m aYJ.d the 

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charm of adventure. 

I deliver this book to the public and the critic with the 

assur~ce that al1 things mentioned herein are based on facts. 

Poss:i.bly here and there a name or a rank or a date mq be wrong. 

This is not a vital matter; on:cy the.happenings as such are significant. Most or my nctes had to be made from memory a~er I had 

seen and studied the authentic documents. Moreover. all this was 

done at the constant risk of 1.lr:f' life. 

This work means neither to praise nor to accuse. neither to 

glorify nor to judge. It is intended on~ to aid in finding the 

truth. 

THE AUTHOR 

Swnmer 1945 

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WAR SECRETS· IR THE :&TBIR 

WILHBLM r. FLICD 

1945 

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Xvi 

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• 

PART ONE 

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TJJE DEGINNlNGS OF TI·IT!: INTF..UCEPT SEllVICE 

Tho endeavor to learn what is in the opponent• s mind and to 

draw advantage from it has always been very important in tha 

histo1·y of mankind in peacetime and particularly in wartime. 

During thousands of years only the methods have changed,. In tho 

days when there was no technical medium for conveying thought over 

great distances, the only existing possibility was either to overhear the spoken word or to intercept - or at least have a look at -

messages transmitted in writing. To guard against this latteJ:-

possibility, secret writing was invented. The history of the last 

three tho~sand years is full of examplee of great successes in 

statesmanship or in milit~ry enterprises which were due solely to 

the fact that the statesman or general concerned was able to organize 

cleverly and to maintain for a considerable period of time a method 

of spying on the transmitted thoughts of his opponents. Cleopatra, 

Alexander of Macedonia, Caesar, Napoleon, Metternich, and many 

others owed their successes to the extensive use or this type or 

spying. 

However, the practical possibilities were narrowly limited, 

and great individual cleverness was necessary in this work in order 

to arrive at the goal. 

In the middle of the nineteenth century, when the Morse telegraph came into use, soon follm1ed by the telephone, new technical 

?ossibilities of attack resulted by switching-in and listeningj 

this quickly produced a new situation. The invention and use or 

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radiotelegraphy, with the pessibility of picking up anywhere at 

•111' time the radiations 0£ a transmitter working at any point whatsoever, increased the possibility of interception in a wq hitherto 

undreamed of. The hour when radiotelegraphy was born was also ti1e 

hour of birth of illegal listening-in, i.e., of the so-called 

intercept service. 

There were two countries in Europe in wldch the espionage service had been especially cultivated for centuries: France and 

Austria-Hungary. Consequently, these were the two countries which 

£irst recognized the im~ortance of technical means of intercepting 

conmru.nications and took corresponding action. 

Prior to World War I Austria had several occasions to test 

out this new means of gaining information. 

During the crises which arose in lS.08 between Austria and Italy 

in connection with the annexation by Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina all Italian radio traffic on the continent and at sea was 

intercepted by the Austrians. At that time Austria began regular 

cryptanalytic work, and in this way was able to get valuable insight into Ital.1' 1 s attitude; this proved of great value for Austrian foreign policy. 

In 19111 when war broke out between Italy and Turkey over 

Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, the Austrian intercept service had an 

opportunity for the first time to prove its worth in the military 

as wall as in the political field. Since the Italians h~d set up 

several relay stations for traffic between Roma and Tripoli, uhere 

the first Italicn landings were made, the Austrians h:-.<i z.>. fin::? 

opportuni t.y to intf::rcept all transmissions more th:m onco - nr1 

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therefore very completely. The radiograms with military dispositions 

from t.he homeland, and the reports from the theater of war were all 

intercepted and deciphered so that the course of the operations in 

Libya could be followed day by day by the Austrian intercept service. 

This was the first time in history that the course of military 

operations between two opponents could be followed move by move by 

a neutral third party using technical means at a distance of hundrede of kilometers. 

When the war in Tripoli took an unfavorable turn and Turkey 

lost ite last possession in Africa and therewith its dominant 

position in the Mediterranean, an opportunity was offered the 

nations in the Balkans to shake off Turkish rule. This resulted 

in breaking up Turkey in Europe. The Balkan League, consisting of 

Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro, which had been formed 

meanwhile, declared war on Turkey in October, 1912. The Bulgarians were victorious at Kirk-Kilisse and Lule BurgasJ the Serbians at KumanovoJ the Greeks occupied Salonika. on 3 Decembe"F 

a. truce was made. 

For the Danube Monarchy the course and outcome of the 

military actions and of the entire development in the Balkan~ 

were of interest. Therefore, Austria followed the radio ~raf:tf~ 

with close attention and again had opportunity to make succes~-

tul use of this new means of gaining information, this time, 

to be sure~ working to some extent with Italy. Austria and 

Italy put through the formation of an independent Albania. ]n' 

the preliminary Peace of London, 30 May 1913, turkey ceded to 

the allies all territory west of the Enos - Midia Line. 

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But a quarrel arose among the allies respecting the conquered 

territories. The Balkan League broke up. Jn bloody battles the 

Bulgarians lfere driven out of Macedonia by the Greeks and Serbs. 

Romania and even TUrkey, which won back Adrianople under Enver 

pascha, took the field against Bulgaria. A redistribution ot terri tor;r took place in the Balkans9 And once more Austria had the 

keenest interest in following the course ot diplomatic and m:ili tary events in this area. For the fourth time within .five years 

Austria had a chance to get practice in j.nterception and in cryptanalysis. At the peace conferences of Bucharest and Constantinople 

the new map of the Balkans was drawn. 

Prior to World War I France had less occasion to engage in 

radio interception, but it watched all wire lines leading into 

foreign countries and particularly the exchange of foreign diplomatic telegrams passing over these lines. In the French Foreign Ministry· there was a cryptanalytic section which worked with 

good success on the solution of the secret writings used by 

foreign governments and their representatives. For instance, 

even before the outbreak of World War I the French had sol~ed the 

cryptographic system in which messages were exchanged between the 

Foreign O££ice in Berlin and the German Ambassador in Paris. 

When the long telegram containing the declaration of war on France 

was transmitted to the German Ambassador by the Foreign Office 

in Berlin, the French first deciphered the dispatch and, after 

they had taken cognizance of the content, so garbled irrportant 

passaees in the orieinal that the Gerrr~n Ambassador could at first 

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1113.ke nothing out of the telegram he received. Only after divers 

inquiries was he able to get matters straight. In this way tho 

French gained valuable time. 

In the Deuxi~me Bureau of the French General Staff there 

was, even before World War I, a desk charged with following all 

foreign radio traffic (especially German and Italian)t in order to 

have an idea or the normal radio situation and or the changes occurring in case of military complications. The use ot radiotelegraphy in the armies ot Europe had even then assumed considerable 

proportions and would probably increase considerably in any coming 

war. But this raised the question of the extent to wrhich it would 

be possible to gain insight into the situation on the eneJJG' side 

by observing his radio traffic. A prerequisite was to watch this 

traffic in peacetime, to recognize the types of traffic, the use 

ot ciphers, and an,y methods of camouflage, and by so doing to 

maintain contact, so to speak. 

These' chances and possibilities had been recognized both in 

France and in Austria before the beginning 'of World War I. And 

both countries had JIJ8.de preparations in time. As in the French 

- Deuxi&me Bureau, there was in Vienna in the Evidenzbuero a desk 

for watching foreign army radio traffic, while in the Foreign 

Ministry in Vienna and in Paris, bureaus had already been set 

up which w~re engaged in the decipherment ot the cryptograms which I 

were customary in the diplomatic correspondence ot·other states. 

In Germany to be sure, the General staff thought or such 

possibilities, but down to the outbreak ot World War I had under·• 

taken practically nothing. Even in the Foreign Office nothing 

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had been done in this direction which was worthy ot mention. In 

England at the Foreign Office the decipher111ent of cryptograms had 

been attempted some years before the beginning of World War I, 

and good results had been achieved. In Russia, on the other hand,, 

no attention had been paid to this matter. 

This then was the situation respecting, the intercept service 

and C:rYJ>tanal.7sis at the beginning of WorldjWar I. At that time 

people did not suspect the proportions which interception would 

assume during the course of this struggle • 

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.. 
TANNENBERG 

Heavy, glooll\Y, the towers or the Tannenberg MonUMent once 

towered against the sky of East Prussia. Grand and powerful stood 

behind them in those days the spirit of General Hindenburg, a 

symbol, as it were, of a force which :nru.st necessarily wreck 8.111'--

thing that endeavored to attack it. The Battle of Tannenberg had 

become, since 1914, a symbol for the German people. MUch has 

been writtenaid spoken about this battle, but only little about the 

decisive factor i~ this mighty action. Tannenberg - a symbol& 

Even for one who knowsl For it was at the same time a symbol or 

the ease with which small causes can unloose great effects, ot the 

rapidity with which a great success can be achieved, if by accident the human inadequacy or wholly secondary and insignificant 

persons on the. other side opens the way. Tannenberg - a symbol 

of mighty superiority and at the same time a s;vmbol of fateful 

chance. 

The Battle of Tannenberg was the first in the history of man 

in which the interception of enellij" radio traffic played a decisive 

role. This is all the more remarkable since the intercept service 

of the Germans at that time was not yet syste~.aticall)" organized, 

and the intercepted radiograms often represented the reaul·ts of 

chance occurrences. 

After World War I a series of books was published which, among 

other subjects, dealt also with the Battle of Tannenberg. The chief 

~ Hindenburg•s "Aus meinem Leben, ones were: 11 Ludendorff•s "Erinner-· 

ungen, 11 General Danilov•s 11Russland im Weltkrieg," and the German 

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RES~f~~421 .I.~ :JO LI.7 

Archives publication "Der Weltkrieg 1914-lBV In the three lastnamed publications the interception of radiograms of the Russian 

Army before and during the battle is discussed; but nowhere is 

it discussed fully. In the German Archives publication the intercepted Russian radiograms are touched upon briefly; but there are 

many sentences attenipting to prove tha·I;, all the Russian radiograms 

intercepted at that time had no influence whatsoever on the outcome of the battle. 

What are the facts? 

At 1400 hours on 23 August 1~14 the new head of the German 

Eighth Army, General von Hindenburg, and his Chief of Staff, Major 

General Ludendcrff 1 arrived in Marienburg and assumed command. 

The Eighth Arnw, which was to defend East Prussia, was composed 

on that day of an Eastern Group (I Reserve Corps, XVII Army Corps, 

and First Calvalry Division ) on the Nordenburg-Insterburg line, 

and a Western Group (mostly the XX Anrry Corps ) in the region of 

Tannenbe1·g. •.rhe I Army Corps was being transported by railroad 

from the Eastern Group via Marienburg to the Western Group. 

The Eastern Group was facing the Russian First Arll\Y {General 

Rennenkampf) consisting of the XX, III, IV, and II Army Corps 

plus five and one-fourth cavalry div-isions; the Western Group 

was facing the Russian Second Arrey ( General Samsonov ), consisting of VI, XII, XV, XXIII, and I ArmJI Corrs, plus three cavalry 

divisions. The two Russian Armies formed an Army Group under 

General Shilinskij. 

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The Germans had the following radio connnunicationss Tw~ 

heavy radio stations at the Army Headquarters, one hea'\IY and 

two light stations in the First Cavalry Division, making a 

total of five mobile radio stations for the entire Arit.Y• In 

addition there was one radio station each in the garrisons bl 

II Konigsberg, Graudenz, and Thorn. 

Just what radio equipment the Russian Army Group had and 

how it was allocated cannot be accurately statedJ it seems, 

however, that most of the staff headquarters down to the corps 

staffs were outfitted with radio stations. At the outbreak 

of the war there was one radio company each in I, II, IX, and 

XV Army Corps in European Russia, as well as in the Caucasus 

Corps. As can be seen from the above, I and XV Corps belonged 

to the Russian Second Army, and III Corps to the Russia11 First 

Army. Each of the companies which had been organized in the 

years immediately the outbreak of the war had at its disposal at least six radio stations. 

General Sh111nsld. 1 s objective was - according to directives of 13 August - to make a decisive attack in which the 

First Army was to surround the German left wing ( the Eastern Group ) and prevent its retreat to Kgigsberg, while the 

II Second Arnw was to advance into East Prussia south of Konigsw 

berg in order to cut off the enemy's retreat to the Vistula 

and to attack him in the rear. 

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RES~elf !!¥21 

The German A:rll\Y Staff Headquarters obtained information on tliis 

objective of the Russians through an order ,.,hich l''l':l f'1und 0:1 .~ 

Russian officer who had fallen in the battles around Gawaiten ~, ~~ 

August. This order contained an extract from the above-mentioned 

directive of General Shilinskij. 

Almost simultaneously with the arrival of this order in the 

German Army Staff Headquarters, a Russian radiogram was intercepted which mentioned this attack and contained an attack order for the 

Russian IV Army Corps (which was attached to the li'irst Army)., 

Thi~ telegram was, therefore, a confirmation of the order found on 

the \rallen Russian officer. 

On the evening of 23 August General von Hindenburg' s operational plan was essentially complete. The entire Eighth Arnry was 

to be concentrated for the attack on the Russian Second A:rll\Y. The 

XX Army Corps was already organized, primarily only for defense 

purposes. The I A:rll\Y Corps - being transported by railroad - was 

to be stationed to the right of the XX Co1"Ps 1 to attack first the 

left flank of the enem;y, and then the rear. The principal part 

of the XVII Corps and the I Reserve Corps (unlil then in the Eastern Group) were to march in a southerly direction and attack the 

right flank of the Russian Second Army. The two lastnamed corps 

were at that time still at a distance of about three day• march. 

Only the cavalry division and a small portion 0£ the infantry of 

the XVII Corps were to remain behind to face the Russian Niemen 

Army. 

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'· 

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• 

RESip:!tf€~ 1 

How :far this plan was capable of execution depended,, on the one 

hand, on General Rennenkampfts tactics when he discovered the departure of the two German army corps and, on the other hand, on 

the ability of the XX Corps to maintain its position until the 

concentration of the Eighth Ar1.fr3'• 

On 23 August the battle began along the front of the German 

XX Ar1111' Corps, where the Russians started to attack. The Germans 

I 

at firs~ maintained their positions,, but - to reserve their strength 

until an actual crisis - retreated somewmit on the 24th. on this 

day several radiograms were intercepted, which among other things, 

gave inf orrnation on the line of march and the mission of the 

Russian XIII Army Corps. This Corps was to circle around the 

left flank of the German XX Corps and appear in the rear of the 

Oorp's 37th Infantry Division.l 

The Germans succeeded in avoiding this encirclement without 

too great losses on their side. 

On 25 August they continued with the concentration of the 

·1 The two radiograms which were intercepted on 24 August at 

0500 and 0555 hours were as follows& 

To the Commander of the XV Corps. 

The Corps will deploy along the Komusin-Lykusen-Persing 

line till 09001 at which time attack is desired. I 

shall be in Jablonica. Kljujew (-XIII Corps). 

To the Army Chief of Staff 

The XIII Corps will go to the support of General Martos 

(XV Corps) and will deploy along the flank and rear 0£ 

the enenv at 0900 • 

11 

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Eighth Army troops. on this day General von Hindenburg intended 

to leave for the front early in the morning, meet the head of the 

I Army Corps, General von Francois, in Montawa~ D~d acquaint him 

with the existing situation. 

Before his depa~ture from Marienburg a radiogram was handed 

him which had been intercepted in the night of August 24-25. 

This radiogram, which was not enciphered, but had been sent in 

plain text, contained (a thing· which until then had never happened) 

a complete operational order of General Rennenkampf to the IV 

Army Corps. From this intercepted Tadiogram General von Hindenburg 

obtained inf orma.tion on the future aims of the Russian First 

Army, which up till then had been competely unlmown to him. 

Among other things, the radiogram stated that the First Army would 

not reach the Gerdauen-Altenburg-Wehlau line until 26 August with 

the southern flank (IV Corps) at Gerdauen. Also the marching 

goal for the 25th was given, which was to be several miles east 

of the above-mentioned line.l 

* Montawa not found., there is 01· was a Montowo in Western Poland. [Ed.] 

l The radiogram contained the followings 

To General Aljev, IV Corps. 

The army will continue the attack. on 25 August it will 

reach the line of Wirbeln-Saalau-Norkitt.en-PotaurenNordenburg; on 26 August the line of Dam.erau-PetersdorfWehlau-Allenburg-Gerdauen. The river divides the XX anci 

III Corps; the Schwirbeln-Kl. Potauren-Allenburg road 

belongs to the III Corps. Chan Hussein Nachitschewanski 

(2 Cav. Div.) is to proceed in direction of Allenbure 

before the army front and in the sector between Pregcl 

and the r.arkehmen-Gerdauen-Bartenstein line; north of it 

Rauch (2 Cav. Div. Guards). Crossinb of Preg~l is ~is~ion 

of XX Corps. 

l •) 

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Hindenburg now knew that for the present Rennenkampf was no 

menace. Therefore, in the course of the day he was able to decide 

to decrease still further the number of troops which were facing 

the Russian First Army and to withdraw the entire XVII Army Corps 0 

toward the south. 

Hindenburg now went over to the I Arrrry Corps. On his way 

down there, when he was passing Lgbau, another intercepted radio• 

gram of no less importance was handed to him. This time the organization and destination of the Russian Second Army were completely 

revealed. This radiogram., also in plain text, was dated 0600 

hours 25 August and contained an order of General Samsonov to 

the Russian XIII Army Corps. To be sure, this radiogram was somewhat garbled. The intercepted contents were as follows: 

"After battling along the front of the XV Army Corps 

the enenzy" corps retreated on 24 August in the direction 

of Osterode. According to information ••••• the land 

defense brigade by Gilgenburg ••••• The First Army pursues 

tile eneJT\Y further, who retreats to KBnigsberg-Rastenburg. 

On 25 August the Second Army proceeds to the AllensteinOsterode Line; the main strength of the Army Corps occupies: XIII Corps the Gimmendorf~Kurken Line; XV Corps 

Nadrau-Paulsgut; XXIII Corps Michalken-Gr. Gardiene, 

Boundaries between the Army Corps on advance: between 

XIII and XV the Maschaken-Schwedrich Line; between XV and 

XXIII, the Neidenburg-Wittigwalde Line. The I Corps to 

remain in District 5, to protect arn:iy1 s left flank •••••• 

The VI Army Corps advances to the region Bischo£sburg- • 

Rothfliess, to protect the right flank. To protect station 

Rastenburg the 4th Cav. Div,, subordinate to VI Army Corps, 

will remain in Sensburg to observe region between the 

Rastenburg-Bartenstein Line and Seeburg-Heilsberg Line. 

The 6th and 15th Cav. Div ••••• sta£f quarters 2 Army in 

Ostrolenka." 

12 

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Thus when General von Hindenburg arrived at 1300 hours on 25 

August at the General Command Sta.tr ot the I Army Corps, he was 

completely in.formed respecting the mission of the Russian Second 

Army tor that day. It was decided to begin ·~he German attack on 

the following day. On the same day at 2030 hours the orders for I 

the army to attack on 26 August were released in Riesenburg. 

one must admit that it was a piece or unusually good fortune 

tor the Germans that both these radiograms were intercepted on 

the morning of 25 August, that is, at a time when critical decisions had to be made. It seems the more remarkable that these 

two radio grams were the only ones of any considera~le length 

and with contents of decisjve importance to be sent in plain 

text by the Russ:ians, and intercepted by the German radio stations', 

during the entire period from the beginning of the war to the . . 

middle o£ September, 1914. 

On 26 and 27 August the I and XX Army Corps prepared to 

attack the left flank of the Russian Se~ond. Arn\V. The Germ&n divisions which had advanced the farthest toward the right (the Sth 

Landwehr Brigade and the 2nd Infantry- Division) met with stiff 

opposition, and for a while the situation was critical. on the 

~orenoon of the 27th, Russian radiograms were intercepted which 

disclosed that the Russians were expecting recnf orcements or 

perhaps had already rf:Cei ved them, among others, the Third Guard 

Division from Warsaw (which was attached to the XXIII Arr1iY Corps). 

This info1~1ation contributed to the tact that General von Francois 

(I Arn~ Co1·ps) no longer deemed it possible to proceed eastward 

' -,, .... 

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to Neidenbur~ in order to sever the enemy-•s connoction3 in the 

rear, but decided to turn ihe attack in a southerly and southeasterly direction. 

The left wing or the XX Army Corps, which on 26 August had 

not been drawn into the battle to any great extent, was attacked 

by the Russians early in the morning of the 27th. Tha attaok 

gradually spread out more and more toward the north and final.}¥ 

reached the German Third Reserve Div. lion, which was on the left 

0£ the XX Artrf¥ Corps. A Russian radiogram which was intercQpted 

by the Germans now gave information on the attack mission ot the 

opposing Russian XV Army Corps and revealed its intention to encircle the German left wing. Other radiograms disclosed that the 

Russian XIII Army Corps intended to support this attack toward 

the right of the ~ Army Corps, and to proceed toward the rear ot: 

the German Third Reserve Division. 

While these encounters were progressing, the German XVI! 

Arirw Corps and the German First Reserve Corps made forced marches 

toward the battlefield. on 26 August at Gross·BSssau they fought 

with the Russian VI Army Corps which then retreated southward. 

Simultaneously, a Russian radiogram was intercepted from whioh 

.. 

the German Eighth Amur Staff Headquarters assumed that the Russian 

II Army Corps, which was at Rennenkampt•s left wing, had been 

proceeding northward from Mauer lake and was now supposed to march 

in a southerly direction, in order to help Samsonov. 

That the Russian II Arrrsy COI'PS was proceeding northward from 

Mauer.Lake was already known " from reports of the Lotzen garrison, 

but that it was supposed to advance in order to support the Second 

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RES~-~-21 

Army was news. The Germar. First C!lvalry Division, which was 

stationed in the region or Schippenbeil, now received orders to 

halt the advance. or the enem,y corps along the Raat.enrurg-Korsc.:h":'r: 

Line. 

The German Artn7 order tor 28 August was signed by Hindenburg 

on the evening or 27 August. Later in the evening information was 

received that Russian troops from the south had arrived in Allenstein. There was thus the possibility that the Russian XIII Corps 

was striving to reach the north in order to join the approaching 

II Corps. The Army order which had just been signed was now im.-

mediate]Jr replaced by a new one which, among other things, ordered 

the XVII Corps and the I Reserve Corps to Allenstein. 

On 26 August at 0700 hours Hindenburg and his staff arrived 

in Fr3genau t~ direct the battle from there. ~reat tension prevailed at Army Headquarters. They were entirely in the dark as to 

the eneJl\V''S purpose at Allenstein. This group still had complete 

~reedom ot action. 

At 0800 hours radiograms of the Russian XIII Corps disclosed 

that it was marching from Allenstein southward to Hohenstein, e.nd 

that its vanguard would arrive at 1200 hours in Grieslionen, five 

kilometers north of Hohenstein. Its purpose was to aj.d tho XV 

Army Corps. 

On the basis of this knowledge, an order uas irr.ir..odiately 

sent by airi:lane to the :~orman I Reserve Col"Fs to proceed n.t ell 

' 

speed, rccardless of evetything, by the s1'ortest pos~iblo route, 

to the Stabigottcn-Griesl~enen Line (northe~!'lt o:f IIohcnr.tain}. 

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Even while the battle against the Russian Second Al'll\Y was 

still at its height, the attention of the Germans was called to 

the pending operations against the Nieman Army. on the 28th a 

Russian radiogram announced that the II Corps (left flank Corps 

of the First Army) was to begin the retreat toward the .t'rontier 

and to be transported by railroad. This move, however, did not 

take place. 

Early in the morning of 29 August, an incomplete radiogram 

was intercepted, which stated as rollowsi 

"Because or heavy battles of Second Army the 

Army Command orders supporting reinforcements ••• 

and advance or cavalry ••• •" 

(General Rennenk:a.mpf had received orders on the morning or 

28 August to proceed with his left flank to the support of the 

Second Army. This radiogram was apparently an order of Rennenkampf to one 0£ his Arrey- Corps. A later radiogram, however,, 

interrupted the adv(nce again). / 

The above-cited radiogram confirmed what they had been ex• 

pecting in the German Eighth Army Headquarters. During the night 

of the 29th a number of radiograms were intercepted which mentioned the encirclement of Kgniesberg from the south. on the morning 

of the 30th one such radiogram gave inf'ormation that the head of 

the Russian II Army Corps on his countermarch (which thus had been 

ordered ~or a second time) was to demoli~h completely the railroads 

and telf graph wires west of the K:Jnigsberg-Rastenburg line, including Korschen and Rastenburg. This last-mentioned radiogram 

made it possible for the German Eighth Army Staf£ to devote 

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RES 'lfEli 

...... ~ ... 

i1~1121 -.& -- further attention to the remnants of Samsonov•s Artn¥. 

All these Russian radiograms were intercepted by the German 

garrison radio stations Thorn and K~n1gsberg1 but also in part. 

by the two heavy stations o.r t.ha Eighth Army Sta.rt, and were immediately translated and transmitted to the German Ar1fr¥ Command. 

The German Command therefore knew not only the strength and organization or the enemy, but also his objectives. 

It ~s very interesting to note how differently the importance 

or these intercepted Russian radiograms was estimated in the postwar period. Ludendor.rr mentioned this fact very casuall,y in a 

subordinate sentence: "••••we had received an intercepted enem;r 

telegram which gave us a clear picture of the ene~' s moves for :· 

the following days." tudendorff forgot that there was not onl.7 

. .. "one" radiogram but that several dozen were intercepted during 

the course of operations which revealed the situation of the eneI1J7. 

Hindenburg himself, in his book,, "Aus m.einem Leben," which 

appeared in September 19191 did not devote even one word to the 

radiograms; on the contrary, he described the course of the Battle of Tannenberg in such fashion as to give the definite impression that he was in the dark as to the enemy• s objectives and. 

organization. 

The Russian Genera1 Danilov spoke ot an "unpardonable negligence" in the Russian radio servi.oe, and declared that the 

imperfect conununication service had been the chief reason for the 

catastrophic outcome of the battle. 

The German Archives publication declares: 11 ••• on the whole 

the Ger:n~m Army Comm-:ind viewed th,.. intercepted radiocr;ir.1s aa an 

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• 

extremely welcome source or intelligence. The Army staff because 

of them, was temporarily, and even immediately before the beginDing of the Batt:US of Tannenberg, advised of the objectives of 

the enemy in a way rarely possible in wartime." And in connection 

therewith, the German Archives publication immediately strives 

to eave the face of the German Command by continuj..ng: "BUt the 

critical decisions and orders for the battle, according to the 

unanimous statements of all participants, were made independentl;r 

of the information which became known on the morning of 2S Allgust 

through the radiograms. One cannot assume that without these radiograms the course of the battle would have been different." 

To this one can only reply: The general has not yet been 

born, who, after winning a battle, would admit that he had won 

it thanks to a well-functioning intelligence service. Since the 

victory at Tannenberg had become a symbol tor Germany,, the "unanimous statements of all participants" could not ot course 'be 

any different. Undoubtedly the dispositions for the battle were 

made before the first radiograms were intercepted. But during 

the course of the battle the knowledge of the contents ot the 

intercepted radiograms played a decisive role. The development 

of the battle without these radiograms would very definitely 

have been entirely different. 

Now we shall try to find out why the Russians sent their communications in plain text. To use plain text for such important 

conununications as the two radiograms of 28 August was a mistake 

of the gravest kind. However, an exa1nination of the circumstances 

., ~1 

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on the side or the Russians gives an explanation. The Russian 

communication system operated very imperfectly during the battle. 

As a result, the arm,y orders reaohed the staffs of corps at the 

f'ront too late. Many times they did not receive their orders until 

about 1000 hours of the same day on which the orders were effective; under such circumstances the troops could not enter into 

action in the designated formation until almost noon. Very seldom were there telephone connections, which was partly due to the 

tact that there were insufficient cables. For this r~ason, where 

there were radio stations, these were preferred for the transmission or communications, as was the case between the army leaders 

and the army corps. 

In itself this would not have been dangerous if the radio 

traffic had been handled so as to prevent enemy interception, but 

this was not done. \ 

The radiogram of General Samsonov to the XIII Army Corps at 

0600 hours, 25 August was of an urgent nature since it pertained 

to the operations of the same day. It was sent as a priority message. There were no wire connections. One can assume that time 

did not permit the encipherment of this messace; in the last analysis, however, the reason seems to be that in the XIII Corps no 

radiograms could bo deciphered; they had no cipher key! Hence nn 

enciphered radiogram was simply out of the question in traf fie 

uith tho XIII Corps. I 

;i7s nlmost unb3l~evable state of affairs was the reason why, 

uhon the above-mentioned corps headquarters attcrr.pted to l:iL.tcn 

in on thn tr;1f'fic of a i;ic-irhy corps •·rith the Ar:roy Ct:: •r•i :i .. 1 ordi>r 

"!' 

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to obtain desired orientation, this trnffic could not be deciphered 

by them nnd as a result could not be read. For ex.ample, on 26 

August the XIII Army Corps was ignorant or the position and mission 

of the VI Corpe, although they had in their possession intercepted radiograms from the traffic of this particular corpsl 

Since various Russian corps headquartera did not possess facilities for deciphering radio~ams, it is probable that this was also 

the case in the Russian IV Army- Corps, to which General Rennenkamp.t 

sent the above quoted fateful radiogram in plain text. 

General Danilov, QUartermaster General at the Russian Headquarters, in his book "Russia in the World War, 11 gives a different explanation for the use of plain.text in radiotelegraphy. 

He writes: 11The use of radio was sonJething entirely new and there1 

fore unfamiliar to our staffs. Moretver, our enemy was guilty of I 

the same errors, and now and then we were successful in intercepting their plain-text radio messages and orders. But this does 

not absolve us from the charge of unpardonable negligence.•• 

Danilov considers the faulty functioning of the Russian 

commuhications to be one of the major causes for the catastrophic outcome of the battle. Although the Russians at times made 

active use of radio, this means of conununication was, nevertheless, 

not utilized as it should have been. On the Russian side there 

was not the experienced leadership which is required for the maintenance of a dependable radio notwork. vn1en General Samsonov 

betook himself on the morning of the 28th to the XV Arri'13' Corps 

and sent. the major portion of his staff with his radio station 

across the Polish border to Ostrolenka, all radio traffic on the 

2 

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part of his army ceased. All connections, both with the Chief ot 

the Army- Group and with the VI and I Army Corps were thus interrupted, wherewith the command of aperations on the Russian aide on 

this day practically ceased. on 31 August the Battle of Tannanberg came to an end. 

In Geriaan military literature these circumstances have been 

carefully passed over or greatly reduced in importance. But anyone who has ever experienced how thirsty a command in a critical. 

situation is for reports regarding the enemy, whoever knows how 

difficult and nervously exhausting it is to have to reach decisions 

without a knowledge of the eneiey-'s situation, such a person will 

entertain no doubt that the knowledge or the content of the Russian radiograms decisively influenced the course of the actions 

in the Battle of Tannenberg. 

The Germans had learned something from the happenings along 

the ether waves at the Battle ot Tannenberg which was supposed to 

be put to practical use during the "Battle of the Masurian LakesV 

Before the German attack on the Russian First Army began, the 

Germans wanted to tie up the important eneley" reserves stationed. 

farthest to th_,. north - (east of K8nigsberg) - so t. hat these could 

not be moved to the south where the German attack was in progress. 

Since no troop contingents were available to hold this large enemy 

reserve, the German Eighth Army Staff resorted to strategy. In 

the forenoon of 7 September, the rad1o station at K8nigsberg sent 

a radiogram in plain text as followsc 

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"To the Corps Chief, 

Guard Corps, 

Priority telegram. 

Tomorrow the Guard Corps will join the ••• 

immediately west of Labiau, parts of V 

Army unloaded •••• (here follows a series 

of garbles).......... • 

Army Sta.ff Headquarters." 

The radiogram was interceplied by the Russians and the strategy succeeded. This is the first known case of purposely misleading radio traffic during World War I. The contents and the precise 

wording of the radiogram had been well thought out. The Guard 

Reserve Corps, which had shortly before arrived in the theater had 

in reality a different mission, but still was the northernmost arm,y 

corps within the German attack organization; l'.ence the mission designated in the radiogram could be possible. The V Army Corps, 

which was stationed in France, was garrisoned in Posen in peacetime, hence its presence in East Prussia appeared possible. The 

Russian Army Command had also believed for a long time that this 

V Army Corps belonged to the Eighth Army, al though they did not 

know where it was located. 

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THE GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN INTERCEPT SERVICE IN THE EAST 

AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD WAR I 

When the war broke out in August 1914, there was no fixed 

organization on either the German or the Austrian aide for, in• 

tercepting the foreign al'Jlly radio traffic which immediately" developed. The field regulations for German telegraph troops did foresee the possibility- of liBtening-in on foreign radio traffic during 

those periods when their own radio traffic was dorment, in order 

to get some insight into the situation on the ot~· ~ide. Actually this work had never been practiC1!1d at all in peacetime maneuvers, and when the war broke out, nobody tho\&gh~ o£ underi.king 

the task. 

At that time there were two rathe~large fortrese·ra.dto 

stations in eastern Germa.n;y which had relatively little tra!.ri~ 

of their own and consequently were in a position to listen to 

the eneJ1\Y in periods o:t light trai'fic. These were the fortress 

radio stations at Kgnigsberg in East Prussia, and at Thorn. Moreover, there was in Breelau the radio station of the German Eastern 

Europe Inatitute, which was likewise employed £or military traffic 

after the.war begea but was used only for transmission. Entirely 

on thei~:own initiative a few operators attempted soon·atterrt.he 

outbreak o£ the war to listen to Russian army traffic as a -eporting proposition, Qo to speak; it was not long before the lirst 

messagl!?8 wer~ i~tercepted but no one knew quite what to do with , 

·them because there was no regulation stating what ahould be done 

21 

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with such radiogrHmo~ In those days radioteleerapl1y was a novelty both in Gcrmnny and in Russia. people wore astounded ab ·th.;, 

technical progress which rn.~do possible wireless transmission of information over rather great distances, but they did not yet under~ 

stand how to make sensible use of this technical advance in order 

to gain information. In the Russian army the idea had not even 

become general that messages sent out by radio could be heard jus·t:. 

as well by the ene1uy, and on t'i.e German side the i1ea was utterly 

foreign in lower and medium commands that one might be in a posit• 

ion to shape or alter one's own plans on the basis of intercepted 

traffic. Milita?"Y thinking tended to considor one's own operatio11 

on the basis of the orders issued to be a fixed factor which could 

in no wise be influenced by any messages which might be intercepted. 

The Russian operational orders intercepted in the last phase 

be~ore the Battle of Tannenberg were forwarded to General von 

HindenP"Urg by motorcyclists solely on the personal iniative of the 

chief of the German fortress radio station at Thorn. The impressi~n which this produced on the German High Command was, so to 

\ . 

speak, the birth hour or the German.intercept service, since now 

for the first time were the value and the possibilities of this 

service recognized. 

The Austrians had already advanced somewhat further in this 

• field by the time the war began. Here again there was no special 

organization for intercepting foreign radio traffic; here, too, they 

employed existing fortress radio installations for intercepting 

foreign traffic as a side issue. In the ma.in, the stations at 

I'• 

•• • 1 

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Krakow and at Prze:mysl were the ones involved. Howeie1, • ~~. -

was already rather more system in the orgJ.r. i 7.ation of th'! uork 

and, above all, provision had already bC'P., 11''1.df" bef'rir~ • ··-

tor passing on and utilizing intercepted enemy messages 

In this way the Austrians in the very first days oi' the war 

had definitely geared this new branch of the service with theiI· 

secret Service.1 Mor~over, the cipher section had taken up its 

work as soon as the war began, so that within the first fortnight 

it was able to read enciphered Russian radiograms. 

In Germany, on the other hand, the cryptanalytic ser\"ice 

limped so badly that it was almost half a year before the first 

regular wcrk in this field began to take shape. It hardly seems 

credible that, in spi t&.....of the example of the Austrian intercept 

organieation and in spite of the stimulus which must have resulted 

from the intercepting of Russian radio traffic after the Battle 

of Tannenberg, a fixed German organization for the systematic 

monitoring of foreign radio traffic did not come into existence 

until nearly one year after the beginning of the war. a 

1 (G~heimdienst = Crypto6I'aphic Section of the Irnperl:ll 

Chancellery.) 

, . 

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RES¥f>WB~ 1 

.J. .I. ~.I. ~ .L .A-' A.I 

AFTER THE BATTLE OF TANNENDERG 

Tho Russian radiograms intercepted bef'ore and durine the 

Battle of Tnnnonberg had suddenlY' pushed the value of the intercept 

service into the foreground with the Gorman comni.'lnd. Only not-r the 

people began to say that, apart from the radiograms of the armies 

of Rennenkampf and Samsonov, many Russian radiograms had been heard 

which might have been vaJ.uable in the execution or one•s own mea- , 

I 

I 

eures, had they been exploited in time. The fortress radio stations were now instructed to do intercept duty in periods whun they 

were free or had light traffic, and even the 41"11\Y stations were 

told to start hunting for Russian mess~ges, insofar as their own 

traffic a'.lowed. Naturally that was a rather pitiful measure -

compared with the practical possibilities - £or it resembled a 

suggestion rather than an order, and gave the receiving opera·t'or no 

hints at all as to how he should do his job, since for this there 

should have been a systematic search of all wave bands which 

might come into account. The effect for the moment was merely to 

arouse interest in this work, while any practical res~lto depended 

on the intelligence and skill of the momentary heads of the stations. The only thing that was covered by regulations was the for• 

warding of intercepted telegrams so that at least there was DI) 

longer any doubt on this point. The radio intercept service was 

attached at that time to Section IIIb of the General Staff and was 

controlled trom there, insofar as this word can be applied to conditions o! those days. Only during the seqond hal.f of 19J5 were 

special receiving stations for monitoring foreign military traffic 

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set up with the arll\Y groups and only .frr..·m tM · P"int. on w··s any 

real, systematic coveraee of the enems possiblt.. .._J the Gerir..:i., 

Army Command hnd attacked and solved tlJe q \' stJ.011 o.L mt 1 "~l -~1 

and evaluating enemy traffic in the fall or l9lh, il it had introduced a special ore;anization for this purpose in the enst 1'~· 

the end of 1914, i.e., at a time when the cnell\V' was 1.1.a.kihg one 

mistake after the other in this field, it is highly probable that 

a number of decisive operations might have been added to the 

list or German successes. 

The Chief of the German General Staff in the years 1914-

16, General von Falkenhayn, stated later in his mcmoirss 11The 

radiograms intercepted by us permitted us to follow the movements of the enemy on the eastern front, day by d~ week by 

week, from the begl.nning of the war nearly to the close of 1915, 

and we adapted our measures to this circumstance." 

Conrad von Hoetzendorr, who describes the activity of the 

Austro-Hungarian Headquarters in World War I, remarks in Volume 

IV or his memoirs that "from the time when the Supreme Army Command was set up in Neu-Sandee (i.e., since the middle of September 

1914) it was able to get information in an ever more exact and 

dependable manner regarding all measures which the enemy ordered 

by radio." At another point he says: "In this way a b?Lsia for 

the performance of the 00111..ll'-'ll'.LCi functions was created uhich no previous war had ever known •••• 11 

In Volume V of his memoirs, Conrad von Hoetzendorf cr .. phi'.1.sj zes 

the fact that uhenever the wo1"Cis 11accordinB to rclit:.1'lc re:ports" 

~.· 

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were usod in conncc t.ion wi 1:.h orders of the Supr(i!ne Command of the 

Austro-IIuncarian troops, only such reports were Lo be understood 

as had been obl:.ained from intercepted radiograms; this was never 

admitted in order not to betray this highly esteemed source. 

Colonel Nikolai, Chief of the German Information Service in the 

yea.rs 1911+-1918, writes; 11The intercepted Russian telegrams constituted a very trustworthy source of information. Of course, the 

orders were enciphered, but the cipher system was very s:i.m.ple and was 

rarely cha."lged; consequently, it wa.s easy to read the rad.iogr~s. 11 

The common conduct of the war in the east by the German and the 

Austrian Armies was dominated at the outset by the point of view that 

Russian attacks should be beaten off' by active defense until, a~er 

the expected decision in the west, adequate forces could be brought 

from the west to pass over to a decisive attack in the east. The 

Austrian Army was to make a thrust from eastern Galicia against the 

Russians still on the march, the Austrian First and Fourth Armies 

began the advance on Lublin and Scholm; defeated the Russians near 

Krasnik and Komarov; but, due to t.he failure of the Austrian Third 

Army near Lemberg, had to withdraw in the face of superior Russian 

strength during the first half of September to the Carpathian Mountains 

and behind the Wisloka. The Gerrnan Army Command now decided to 

support the Austrian front by detachments from the Eight.h Army 

located in East Prussia, which had participated in the Battle of 

Tannenberg, and, using these detachments, to set up a new German 

Ninth Army in Upper Silesia, with its right wing extended to Krakow. 

Hindenberg took over its conunand. 

•) <11 

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RESBf~llel7mY 1 

The removal of large portions of the Eighth Army in order to 

set up the Ninth Army had to be carried out with great caution in 

order not to reveal to the enemy that East Prussia was now left 

with very feeble protection. Consequently, the Germans decided to 

try deceiving the enemy again by radio. Since the movements of the 

transports could not remain entirely concealed, it was decided to 

bluff the Russians by pretending that a new German thrust from East 

Prussia was impending. Two radiograms ielating to such unloading 

were intentionally sent in garbled plain text under the assumption 

that the Russians would intercept these messages. Actually, the 

trick worked. 

Meanwhile, the Russians had recognized the danger of sending 

plain text by radio, and the Supreme Corr.:nand of the Army (the socalled 11Stavka11 ) sent out instructions by radio on 14 September to 

the effect that as a mat.ter or principle military arrangements should 

only be sent completely enciphered in the future. However, this 

instruction came too late. The Austrian :ryptanalytic servic~ 

had already gott.en so well started that the Russian di~it cipher 

was solved on 19 September. Henceforth, reading Russian radiograms no longer caused any difficulty. 

Meanwhile, the German initial ~ssembly in Upper Silesia was 

completed. 

In their retreat the Austrians had expected the Russians to 

pursue them sharply; however, after reaching the San the Russians 

took a very slow pace and finally stopped at the Wisloka. 

This conduct of the Fr.ussians posed a serious riddle for the 

I' 

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--..........._ 
Austrian Ar~ Connnand, especially as it. was lcnrned from intercepted messages that the Russians were constant.ly receiving reenforcements.. J:t'rom these doubts tbe Austrians were relieved on 23 September 

by an intercepted radiogram of the Commander of the Russian N.lnth 

Army, General Litchjzkij, who ordered the XVI Corps to return from 

the Wisloka toward the San to Stany on the fallowing day. With this, 

the assumption that the Russians would continue frontal attacks was 

dismissed. 

Meanwhile, at the Austrian army commandpost, reports were coming in from agents who spoke of strong Russian cavlry forces in 

the area between the Nida and the River Vistula. Soon, however, 

the radio intercept service showed that here it was a question of 

the Novikov group, which consisted of only one cavalry corps but 

regarding which the Russians had been spreading exaggerated reports. 

An intercepted radiogram from General Novikov to the Russian Figh 

Conunand in Warsaw, dated the morning of 2h September, revealed to 

the Austrians the complete results of his recormaissance work 

and also showed his intentions clearly. 

It was probably the first time in the history of warfare that 

the result of enenzy- reconnaissance was revealed so swi~ly to those 

against whom this activity had been directed. While the Russian 

cryptographers in Warsaw were busy solving the radiogram, the 

Austrians were working on the same text. The telegram was intercepted at 0840 hours. Toward noon it lay deciphered before the 

Austrian High Command. At 1600 hours the German Army Command 

had been apprised of the content and was able to make good use of 

the data in its dispositions for 25 September. 

:q_ 

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'l'he day following, Austrian and German divisions stood rea.dT 

tor battle in their new positions. tn this phase the .Austrians 

agqn intercepted an important order ot the Ccmnnand al the iiu•sian 

~inth Arm;r; it reads as 'rollows: 

JJt dmlllii4lid 0£ the Supreme Conunander arid with reference -io the impending movement.a t o::rder the 1fithdra11a1 tomorrow, the 26th, of the troops ot the Arm:r 

behind the Wisloka and the leaving behind al only 

small rear f?,Uards at the Wieloka. The troops are 

to be quartered in the areas previous1.v oacupied by 

them. Tha g11ard corps will :f'enla:!n 'in t.he area 

Xolbuszowa - ieupno, which it reached todayJ its 

l.dvance guard is to approach neare~. 

Wiih this the situation was clarified for the Austrians. ft 

1'4d Obvious that the Russians were undertaking regrouping& for a 

new operation. The Gerntans now began ta urge the immediate begintting of an offensive, in order to attack the Russians during their 

!'egi'oUping. The Germans had their eyes 011 the middle reaches of 

the Vistula. 

, !ft the night betore 28 September the Austrians intercepted 

the Russian order tor a shift of the Ninth Army behind the Vistula, 

below the mouth of the San. It was new ciear that the Russians plan .. 

ned to shift their main weight from Galicia to Poiand.. 

On 28 September the German Ninth Armt and the Austrian First Arzrw, 

which joined it to thn rieht, start..t d an 1:1civa.ncc ean Ivc.ngorod north 

of the lower Vistula. Eouth of thll Vist.ula the Austl'ie.n Fourth, 

'I'hird, and ~ccond Armies mover fC1rth on 4 Octoter touard the San. 

Tlie A11n'Lrjcn intE'rccpt aer\"i•:o= l-i.ad received frc'm Ruse:ia.n radio&;;ran:.s 

full j nforrut:i en r:-i;arcH n:l: thC' l 1·ssit..n clispcs:i.H en. T}.r. Army ecc .. 

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.e For a time the German-Austrian offensive progressed wel1. 

Soon, however, the intercepted radiograms showed daily moie ~nd 

more clearly a shift ot the Russian Ninth, Fourth, and ~"ifth Armies . trom the San to the middle reaches 0£ the Vistula, and of the First I 

and Second Armies trom the Russian "northwest sector" to tha area 

porth 0£ Warsaw. Other Russian dispositions betrayed the tact that 

the Russians were assembling an enormous force tor an advance 

1gainst the heart 0£ Germa.~ from the Ivangoro:l - Warsaw area. 

Jo less than 94 Russian divisions were to attack $2 German and 

iustrian divisions at most, in which connection it should be re-

· ~embered that the effective strength of a Russian division was tar 

sreater than that of a German or Austrian division. In the event 

of an attack by this military force, a catastrophe for the armies 

/ 

of the Central Powers/was inevitable. · ' 

on the basis~in!ormation obtained from intercepted Russian 

radiograms, the Germans decided to retreat. Without the Russians 

I 

noticing anything, the German and Austrian units broke contact with 

the enemy and retreated, to the Russians' s~rprise, to the line of 

the Carpathians - Krakow - Upper Silesia. Hindenberg was now appointed Commander-in-Chief of all German forces in the east. 

I Mackense? took over the Ninth Army; it was moved to the area of 

Thorn i prepared for a """ t.llrust. at. t.he ri.ght. flank of t.he ad· 

vancing,~ussian army group. Protection of Upper Silesia was taken 

over by the Austrian Second Army, which was moved f'rom the extreme . right wing of the Carpathian front to the region north of Tsch~nstochau. From East Prussia all available forces were sent to the 

;3 :3 

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Ninth Army. 

tor a general achrarace c..n t.he tollr•• · \i' .u.i;v 't..•J ; • J\l'~ · ·11 '"'''it 

dq. From this it was evident t.hat t.he Ru1:JSie.nB ha•i no idea of 

the extent to which thoir nort.hern ilarik vas tlu·eat.tj•l~·Jj the1 

thought that the German Ninth Arn\Y which was attackih-' amounted t.o 

a corps at most. 

On 19 November the Russian Commander"in-Chief, Grand Du...~e 

N~kolaj Nikolaevich, radioed that the hour had come, when by e~­

eirting all ~heir energies the general attack would bo crowned by 

success. 

The next day brought the Germans and Austrians a sud.den surprise. A communications officer of the Russian Fourth Army announced that the old cipher key had come to the knowledge of the enel!Q". 

A new cipher was introduced. The Russians had captured the German 

cipher key, bad deciphered a few messages, and had learned ln this 

way that their system was known to the opposition. 

Thera resu~ted a painful situation for the armies of the Central Powers, since the great struggle had reached its climax. 

The right wing o" 'bhe Russian anl\Y neEH' Lods~ was almost encircled; 

capitulation was awaited hourly. And at this moment the best reconnaiasance means of the Germans tailed. 

The German Conunand now had to operate without knowledge of the 

ene~ situation. This, was all ~he more disagreeable since from 

the Warsaw area new Russian forces were coming up. In a few days 

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e. 
• 

Es~i>iP~l R ~ .l.'-.1."" ... .&.; AJ 

the fortunes of war changed. The German group, which was supposed 

to encircle the Russians, was itself encircled. It consisted of the 

XXV Reserve Corps under the conunand of General von Schetfer-Boyadel 

and tha Third Guard Infantry Division under the command of General 

Litzmann. The result was the well known battle of Lodz, in the 

course of which the annihilation or the German group seemed almost 

certain. In ice and snow, without any supply, it was obviously 

fighting in a lost position. 

At the Austrian and German cipher bureaus they were working 

feverishly to solve the new cryptographic system used by the Russians. 

There were direct teleprinter connections between the two offices, and 

every meaning which was recovered by one or the other was exchanged 

immediately. In the evening ~ours of 21 November solution or the 

Russian cipher was aooomplished, and with it a solution of a number 

of intercepted radiograms. From these the troops forming the encirclement ring were recognized. But it was also discovered that this ring 

was not absolutely closed but that there was a relatively weak spot 

near Brezeziny which was closed olicy" by Russian cavalry units. This 

fact was reported by radio to the encircled German groups, and General. 

• 

Litzmann undertook the task of breaking through the Russian ring nea:r 

Brezeziny. 

Meanwhile, the Russians had already prepared means for transporting the encircled Gennan units off into captivity. To the 

surprise of \verybody General Lit~'Ilann's break-through was a 

success, and ~he encircled group was able to escape although its 

heavy materiel was left behind. This feat later won for General 

Litzmann tho nickname, "The Lion of Brezeziny." Nobody made any 

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mention of the cryptanalysts whose work made it possible to recognize the weak point in the Russian line. If they had not succeeded with their decipherment, then the whole German group would have 

been taken off into Russian captivity along with the "Lion.• 

Before and during the winter battle of the Maaurian Lakes (4-

22 Februal"T 191S) the interception of Russian radio traffic b7 

the German intercept service was ot decisi'Y'9 importance. Thie time 

the Russians sent very little in plain text 1 but the Oerman cryptanalytic service, which had been set up meanwhile, succeeded in 

solving the cryptographic system used by the Russians, the so-cal• 

led "Service Code• (RSK), and thus deciphered all Russian radiograms. 

The German attack under the leadership of von Hindenberg was 

directed against the Russian Tenth Army. From the line Johanniaburg-Lotzen " - Gumbinnen - Tilsit, the German Eighth and 'tenth 

Armies attacked and with encircling operations forced the Russians 

back to the forest of Augustowo where the remnants or the Russian 

Tenth Arm;y had to surrender. All Russian countermeasures against 

the German advance were recogni,ed prompt].y by the German radio 

intercept serTice. 

Since the Battle ot Tannenberg tudendortt had become so accustomed to making his dispositions on the basis of intercept resu1ts that he became impatient and nervous if these radio monitoring reports failed to come, we~e delayed or gave little information. 

His regular question was: 1'Any radiograms?• Later on he took it 

as a matter of course that the Russians would have to send intormative radiograms and that the German cryptanalytic service was 

3G 

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RESTil.te;11fti 1 

· to decipher them. If tor a ~ime no messages or importance were 

I 

intercepted, then he used to growl that they bad not been paying I 

enough attention and would they kindly do better. It a new cryp-

, I 

tographic system was not solved in a very short time, he called 

it a "damned meas" and said the cryptanalysts had become "absolutel.7 stupid ... 

In spite ot all the German successes, the situation in the 

east remained serious. on 22 March 1915 the fortress Prsemy-sl . . tell, after having been encircled by the Russians. In the Carpathians the Austro-Hungar:l.an front laboriously warded off Russian 

attacks. Only because of the smooth functioning of the Austrian 

intercept service was it possible to recognize imperlding dangers 

pr~mptly and to take countermeasures. 

In March 1915 the Austrian intercept service had ascertained 

that in the area between Tarnow and Gorlice the general milit&J"T 

situation on the enemiside was such that this front sector seemed 

the one suited tor a break-through operation. The Austrian Chief 

ot General start, General Conrad von Hoetzendortt, proposed therefore to General Falkenhayn the inauguration ot a large-scale ottensi ve starting trom this area. The plan of operations was 

developed in consultations between the two. It was necessary 

to handle the assembly so that the enellG" should notice nothing 

'bJ' intercepting Qermn and Austrian radio traffic. Radio schedules and the handling or all other camouflage and secrec7 

measures were worked out by the Austrians, and it was actua.11.y 

possible to execute the entire German-Austrian assembly mnoticed 

by the Russians. Colonel General von Mackensen took command ot 

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RES§fa~21 

the German Eleventh Array, which was to efi'ect the break-through. 

on 1 May 1915 the German attack beganJ on 3 May the Russi;m / 

front had been pierced. The Russian armies were caught in a vast 

rolling-up operation in a northeasternly direction and wer~ either 

defeated or driven away. In the second half ot May came the crossing of the San. Early in JUne Pr1em;rsl was recapturedJ on 22 

Jur1e Lemberg was occupied. Mackensen was appointed General Field 

Marshal. In mid-July the German armies in Poland passed to the 

attack. In quick succession during August and September the Russian fortresses Ivangorod1 Warsaw, Lomza, Kowno1 Ncvo-Georgievsk, 

Oswiec1 Brest-titovsk1 and Grodno fell. 

During this-entire operation the Austrian and the German intercept services experienced their period of glo17. The swift change 

ol battlefield forced the Russians to make constant use of radio-

. telegraphy. or course, they were always changing their ciphers, but 

the Austrian crptanalytic service had gotten so well tuned to Russian cryptographic systems by this time that every new key was solved 

in a few days. And in this the Russians often afforded wonderful 

as~istanceJ often they sent one and the same message in the old key 

and in the new one. or they would send an inquiry- in the evening 

in the old key and get the answer from the same station on the fol• 

lowing day in the new key (which had gone into effect at midnight). 

Often they sent messages in plain text with references to encipher• 

ed messagesJ etc. All this facilitated cryptanalysis. Day by 

day the German and Austrian intercept services received so many 

Russian radiograms that in every phase of this operation the Command of the Central Powers was almost completely orientated regard38 

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~Fn~¥:@+3.l R "" .L ... '-.I. ~ .L .J.j J,,.,,I 

ing the eneJIU'. In view of the existing strength ratios~ it is 

absolutely impossible that the German-Austrian summer offensive of 

1915 could have succeeded as it did if Russian radio tra.:Cfic had 

not constantly betrayed the Russian measures. 

The prompt reaction of the German and Austrian Command to 

measures undertaken by the Russians came so often and in such a 

persistant manner that it could not fail to be noticed by the Russians. In Russ~a, however, they could find no other explanation 

than the suspicion that treachery was always involved. The cry, 

"Treason1" ran through all Russia and the Russian Army~ and a 

search for "traitors" began everywhere. Every Russian officer with 

a German or a German sounding name now appeared suspicious. A 

number of them were deposedJ many were court-martialled. It went 

so far that finally this fury had to be stopped by cabinet order 

of the Czar. At that time no one in Russia got on the track of the 

actual •traitor~ And in that fact lay the great tragedy for the 

Russians; for in t.aose summer days of 1915 the entire campaign was 

decided and decided against them. And that was the opening act of 

the revolution of 1917 

Late in September 1915 the front·ran along a line from CzernoIt • 

witz almost due north to Dunaburg and from there a.long the Dvina 

to the Gulf of Riga. on the Russian side, the Grand Duke Nikolaj 

Nikolaevich was relieved and the Czar resumed Supreme Command of 

the ArD\Y himself. 

The eastern front subsided to a war of position. 

Early in October 1915 began the great Ger1nan-Austrian offensive in Serbia which led at the end of November to the complete 

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collapse of Serbian resistance. !arly in December Serbia had been . I 

almost compleie]J· cleared or Serbian troops. 'he lluseians now de-

: I 

cided on a di~rsiona1 offensive to aid Montenegro, which was then 

seriously menaced. They- began to bring units from. southern Russia 

\ 

to the eastem Galician tront, and to ahiti t.he Ninth and Eleventh 

I 

I 

Armies thither. These measures, however, ware 't'ery soon re"V"eaied 

by the Austrian interc~pt service which was able to deduce therefrom an impending Russian orreneive against eastern Galicia. 

ln this tense eituation the command ot the Russian aouthweet 

tront on 2 December forbade all radio traffic until further ttotice. 

The measure was correct; but it oame somewhat too late, sill6i ioo 

1 much had alreaey been betrayed. Three weeks later ( 20 Decetiiber, 

\at eight; in the nening) Ruaaian radio trat't:lo etarled up with a 

lnew cipher (now the thirteenth) J however, this cipher had long 

;since been solved because the Russian Third Arll\Y, which did ftbt 

! 

belong to the Russian nsouthlfest sector,• had begun working 1iith 

\ I 

it on 14 December. The so-called Nev Year•• battle was not a 

success tor t~.1:1 Russians j the exertions •de were in vainJ Montenegro W'as ftot saved. 

40 

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RE~f~fffj 1 

THE INTERCEPT SERVICE IN THI!: WEST 

AND THE "MIRACLE OF THE MARNE" 

When the war began in 1914, there were two countries which 

sought to shape the fortunes of war in their own favor as quickly 

as possible by a swift, powerful thrust far into enem;r territory 

and by crushing hostile armies. The Russian armies wer , to fight 

decisive battles in East Prussia and then advance quickl.7 on Berlin. In the west the German armies were to advance through BelgiWll 

and northern France and deliver a crushing defeat to the French 

army somewhere east of Paris. 

There is a certain iror17 in the tact that, at the veey time 

when in the east the Russians, by clumsy use ot radio, were exposing themselves so disastrously that the course ot the battle 

of Tannenberg wrecked their entire plans for the campaign, the 

Germana in the west should make the same mistake with the same 

results -- namely that, although the war continued for ;years, the 

fundamental idea had already been hopelessly wrecked. In the 

east it was the Battle or TannenbergJ in the weet the Battle of 

the Marne. 

There are few battles in military history regarding which 

so muoh has been written as about the Battle of the Mame. There 

are many names for itJ one of the best liked among the French was 

"The Miracle of the Marne." People have sought and found &11 sorts 

ot explanations for the seemingly inexplicable bogging down ot the 

German advance, and they have tried by clever reasoning to .figure 

out what the course of the Battle of the Marne would have ~en it 

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this or that measure had been taken. on the German side Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch or the Supreme Command of the Army came otf 

worstJ he had to accept the role ot scapegoat because ostensibl.¥ 

he called tor the German retreat without compelling necessity. 

People contented themselves with this explanation because it sounded as it the Battle of the Marne had really 11 almost11 been won. 

In 1928 the Polish Lieutenant Colonel Szieszynski, and shortl.1' 

afterward the French Colonel Calvel, lilted the curtain, inasmuch 

as both ot them gave out so~ information trom the archives ot the 

French Deuxi'me Bureau. These were little memoirs which were not 

given to the public but had only a limited distribution. In Germany they were not publiehed at all but were passed over in absolute silence. These glimpses into the French secret archives gave 

an explanation ot the "Miracle of the Marne," which was no miracle 

but only the logical result or very commonplace and factual matters • . The German war plan had consisted in advancing with a strong 

right wing through Belgium and then by a gigantic sweep eastward 

to the left, thrusting south past Paris, a11d. surrounding and destroying the French armies in a grandiose, encircling battle. With 

that the entire campaigzt was to be decided. The German right wing 

was made up of the German rirst Army under Colonel General von 

KluckJ to this army belonged a cavalr,y corps under the.command of 

General von der Marwitz. 

Immediately after the beginning of operations, an active use 

of radiotelegraphy began on the German side. Since the Germ.ans had 

done practically nothing with radio intercept before the war, they 

could have no idea of the effect which the use of radiotelegraphy 

42 

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RE~Eflil(;t5£tl 1 

by armies in°the fie1d wou1d have on the opposite side. Consequently, camouflage measures were very inadequately developed. The use 

of station call signs, for example, was such that all radio stations 

of an army had call signs beginning with the same letter. More .. 

over, th(re was no change of call sign or of wave length. Therefore 

it was possible after a short time to recognize a given radio station as 'belonging' to this or that army' by its call signs. 

To this we must add the astonishing lack of discipline in 

radio operation on the part of the German station personnel. The 

radiograms were not enciphered (or deciphered) by the sender (or 

recipient), i.e., not by the staffs which were exchanging messagesJ 

the staffs turned the messages over in plain text to the radio 

stations where the cipher materials were located. The messages 

were enciphered here by the rldio officer or the station and were 

then transmitted. If we consJ.der the lack of experience in transmitting, receiving, enciphering, and deciphering radiograms,, it 

is clear that ' chain of errors must be the result; frequently the 

. receiving station requested repetition of part or all o£ the radiogram; sometimes merely of a single cipher group or or a word. Impatient persons sometimes requested the answer in clear. 

' . study by the French of the nwnerous messages intercepted soon 

permitted a division or the intercepted stations into the following three groups: 

a. Stations,, each of which was in communication 

with a number of receivers - always the same ones;. a~ong these were recogniz~d the stations of the higher 

edhelon command; their correspondents were recognized 

aslstations of their subordinate units. 

b. Stations of those units which were constantly 

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or often active; l;.Jm·a~ were int.erprclicd to be stations 

or cavalry di visiom. ope rating on Franch or Belgian 

soil. 

c. Stations of the lower echelon com."lL9.n.d, which 

operated rarely and obviously belonged to units whoso 

staffs rarely changed location; these were the radio 

stations of army corps and of infantry dirlsions. 

Accordingly, a mere checking or radiograms and station call 

signs allowed the French information serVice to ditterentiate quicklyt · 

Call signs or stations belonging to starts ot armies, 

Call signs of stations to be considered as belonging 

to staffs of most of the uavalry diVisions, 

Call signs of stations which were to be considered as 

belonging to stat.ts o.f some arll\Y corps and infantey 

divisions. 

The fact that various cavalry divisions belonged tod!finite corps 

was easily recognized because the station call signs of di'fisions 

subordinate to the same corps began with the same letter. What was 

even more important was that the call sign of the station ot the 

staff of a cavalry" corps could be recognized by the fact that it was .. the only station within a group of radio stations which regularl.7 

communicated with all other stations having call signs beginning 

with the same letter. 

I 

This allowed the French to recognize four groups ot control 

radio stations, each of which belonged to a cavalry corpaJ the difl.aional stations of each corps had call signs beginning with the letters 

"S", "G", "L", or "D"• "S" operated in Belgium., "G" in Luxembourg, 

"L" in the Woevre plain, and "D" in Lorraine. 

These findings were soon confirmed by various radiograms in 

plain text which were intercepted b.Y the French. 

t4 

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Generally the messages were enciphered. Nevertheless, from 

time to time single words of plain text were encountered; these 

were either geographic terms or words which the recipient had not 

understood. Radiograms were intercepted repe~~edly which were 

entirely in plain text, and sometimaa even bore the signature of 

the originator in clear. Thus, ~fter a .few days, it was lmown that 

General von der Marwitz commanded the corps whose staff radio stat. 

ion had the call sign beginning with 11511 ; while General Baron 

von Richthofen commanded the corps whose staff radio station used 

a call sign beginning with "G"• 

From an intercepted radiogram sent in clear {by a station with 

call. .sip beginning with "L" ), it was learned that two cavalry divL~ions hid forced their way ~nto the Woevre Valley, and were moving 

towa.r.d YS'\11.un via Malaviller1:. and Xivry-Circourt, where one of the 

diri.81-- had its sta.rr quarters. 

'!'Boe French had committed their intercept service in full, even 

lbef'~ tile begiming of the war, and were following German al'll\Y" • 

'b<df':fe attentively. After a few days they had a perfectly clear \ 

picture of the operational strflcture of the German army in the 

west._ It was of greatest importance .for them to follow the mo~ements of the German right wing on its way through Belgium in the 

direction of Paris. 

The above-mentioned cavalry corps of von der Marwitz was relatively well fupplied with radio equipment, and consequently used it 

I 

extensivel,y"~ 

There w-ould have been no objection to this in Yiew of the 

situation and of the rapidity of the advance. What wos very 

. ' 

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risky was the tact that these radio stations sent a vast number of 

messages in plain text giving locations, troop designations, movemente, plans, orde~s, and commands. In between, enciphered mesaagea 

i 

were sent, but the{ were all quickly solvable because they referred to the content' of the plain-text messages. Sometimes there 

I 

was a question in1clear, while the answer was sent in cipher. Thia 

/ I 

made it possible/tor the French to solve the cryptographic system 

in the shortest possible time. In the course of 14 d~s, the 

' 

French intercept' service picked up some 350 radiograms from the 

cavalry corps ~der von der Marwitz alone, and through these ~~ 

were informed not merezy of all movements of this corps, its plan91 

and its geographical distribution, but regarding the whole Germ.an\ 

First Ar.my or von Kluck, and the Second Army or von Bttlow adjoini~g 

to the south. 

The French intercept service did not tail to note the movement of the German First Army toward the north to avoid being 

outflanked by the French Sixth Army or Maunoury; furthen1tol'~, 

the overexpansion of the German front and the resulting gap between the First and Second Army, which could only be filled by the 

cavalry corps of vnn der Marwitz, could be quickly recognized by 

the French intercept service. 

The cavalry corps of von der Marwitz was supposed to effect 

a screen between the areas of the German First a.nd Second Armies. 

I 

But what the troops tried to accomplish in car17ing out their orders 

was utterly ruined by the German radio service, for the transmitted 

radiograms gave the French an absolutely clear picture of the 

situation. That gave the French and English the possibility 

1G 

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·, 

' 
of breaking into the above-mentioned gap on 8 September, since I 

they knew precisely the weak places in the German front. This 

threatened to encircle the army of von Kluck, and to outflank 

the army of von Bttlow; and this circumstance was decisive for 

the recall of the German front. 

It is not true that Hentsch ordered the retreat without 

cogent reasons in a situation which was favorable for the 

German troops, and that the Allies were surprised and followed 

only hesitantly; rather, the penetration\by the Allies gave 

Hentsch occasion to recommend withdrawal to the Aisne. On·the 

French side, the fighting units were indeed surprised by the 

change in situation but not the higher comm.and, which had a 

precise view of events on the enenzy- side during the entire 

course of operations becau~e of the intercepted radio traffic. 

With the outcome of the Battle of the Marne, the German 

attempt to gain a quick decision in the west had failed. The 

resulting war of position and the subsequent superiority or I ~ 

.. the Allies in materiel decided the entire course or the ' 

campaign in the west. I 

RESTRI~TED 
RES'l'.:iftlfi>TJlill-21 

'l'IIE Dl~Cirm:.nING OF ClflI'TOGll.Al·(I 

Iu the cour&o of Lho prcci=i<liu~ dGscripLionn, Lhcrc lm~. been 

repeated mcnt ion of Lhe fact. tho.I.. l.110 AusLrlans, F'rench,, anrl. Gormans broke th1J cr~·ptoeraphio syaLcms used by fol'eign eoverrunon"Ls 

o:r armies to re.n.der t.no:il" cqi11munications safe from una:u.t.horized 

reading., ln lay Qircles, a.ny such decipherment of J.'oreign cip:ners 

is always regarded as a kind Q.f "Qlack art" wharG one wq:rks by 

magic recipea. '!'hat,, tumever, is not t.ruo; instead, the a.rt of .. deci:phcrrnont resta on exact scientifi.c foundat:tona, ':!.'A :remier 

the TJ,a,ture Qf this WQl~k ~QffiC1'[pat intclli~i\:>le tq :J-aymen, fiU1. attempt 

will be made be:J_Qw tQ !;ive some c:i.~rU'y.lnr; explanatioqs. 

First, a few words on the question of whaL ~ CI¥flLo~raphic 

system is. W~ J118.Y remark here that. in thia CQnnectic;m. ~~Qret 

writings produced with oh~mtoal ink, which can only pe recogni~ed 

by somfJ chemical or physical procedure, will not be considered 

ht:l;re. Nor ciw we 1.:re~t here cr:,rpt.ograph:ic systems found :j_p. antiquity 

when a lon~ ~trip Qf parchment was rolleg arP'ij!lA ~ ~gnica+ ~t~ff, 

inscribed ac;+Qss the laps and then removed, so that tb~ 3trip 

appeared tg Pe covered merely wilh m;ysterious signs ~d Qg~id 

QnJ~ oe :read by the person who, as rie;htful r!acipient, poasessed 

n.n ab~olut~lf identical ~ta!! aroJllld which h~ wr~pped the strip 

in t):}e prescribed manner. Only such systems will be described as 

can be transmitted b;y technical means (by radio or by wire). 

Cryptographic systems of the last menti9μed type were likewise used in olden times. One of the besL kngwn was inventeQ. by 

Julius Caesar, who subsLitutect for each letter of the alphabet 

RESTRICf'ED 
REs!tf~f~'!'W 1 

either a group or digits or of letters, and thus transtorin~d the 

open plain text into a cryptog~am which consisted mgrely of a long 

series of digits or of letters arranged in seemingly meaningless 

.fashion. 

This type of cryptogram could not be solved until it was learned that every language is constructed according to definite :mo.them:ltical lmis, i.e,, that the frequency of occurrence of tho individual 

letters in any languace differs and is subject to the laws just 

. mentioned. In the Gerlll8.n language, for instance, the letter E occurs most fr~quently; then, at considerable intervals, follow the 

letters R and N, then D and T, then S, and so on. Accordingly» 

one merely neeas to substitute the corresponding letters on the 

basis of the frequency of the cipher elements appearing, and he can 

in this -.ray solve a considerable portion of the cryptogram; the 

rew.ainder comes as a matter of course. 

During World War I this typP formed the basis of many CI'l'Jl~ 

tographic systems; indeed, it was often used in the same way that 

Caesar used it; for this reason it is also called "Caesar." 

In Germany during the Middle Ages, an abbot by the name o:r 

Tritheim invented a cryptographic system in which, instead of 

replacing single letters by secret elements, ho replaced syllables, endings, word stems, prefixes, etc. This resulted in a 

great multiplicity of secret elements occurring in a cipher, and 

the p1·oblem of solution seemed to have been rendered much more 

difficult, until people became aware of the fact that a fixed 

regularity underlay the occurrence oi' endings, prei'i:xrn, and tl1c 

like, with respect to their frequency of occur1·ence. After that 

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cvc:n tM.s typo of cryptogram could be sol vcd. 

People now went on to the use of the s o-callcd muU.iplc values 

(variants),, i .. e., instead of assiening one secret elcmont for the 

most frequently occurring letters, cndines, pre£ixes, etc., they 

now assigned several. But the art of cryptanalysis also found 

ways of solving these cryptograms. Little by little an entire science developed, both with respect to the creation or new cryptoeraphic systems and in respect to their cryptanalysis. They create~ 

the systen1 of the reenciphered ''Caesar" or "Tri theim" through the 

addition or specific groups or numbers to the cipher texts, and 

in this way transformed the so-called "open" cryptograms into 11 oonCeo.led" cryptograms; this did for the noment veil the frequency 0£ 

the cipher elements occurring, and prevented recognition of the 

I 

cipher elements as such. people invenited the "box" transposition, 

. the "comb,'' the 11Raster, "(grille) the "double box," and theu reenciphered these with a limited or an infinite "additive sequence," 

i.e., by a correspondingly long chain of digits. They also invented the 11 open11 or 11 concealed11 code by numbering the entire vocabulary of a language from 00001 to 99999, for instance, according to 

a definite system; or they sometimes used groups of letters instead 

of groups of digits. When the llnd.ts of the individual code groups 

were effaced by reencipherment, then the cryptanalysis of such a 

messagE clearly caused considerabJ.e difficulty. 

But let the resulting ciphers be what they might, the science 

of cryptanalysis always found ways of solving them after a while, 

because every cryptographic system conceals within itself a number 

RESTRICTED 
~F=g\Q:ii~~l RE 01 .1. " ... '"" ... .a:. ....., 

of possibilities of solution; these have to be tried, until one 

finally encounters the one and only correct possibility. It is 

I 

simplJr a question of making the number of possibilities so great, 

\ ' when setting up the system, that tpe unauthorized decipherer needs 

\ ' 

such a.'1 long time to t,ry out these ~~ssibilities, that, practically, 

there J 11 be no useful result; with a really complicated crypto-

: 

of possibilities to be checked runs into 

or cryptographic systems is in most cases f acil1 ta ted by\ errors in their use. In World War I, for instance, it 

frequently happened that a station receiving an enciphered message 

could not decipher it completely and asked the senders "Send 0317 

• 

in plain text, 11 which was sometimes actually done. Or in case of 

change of key: 11We have not received the new code books yet; please 

repeat in the old code. 11 Ey comparing the two transmissions, it was 

often possible to solve the key., Sometimes requests were made in 

plain tex·t; and the answers were sent enciphered, or vice versa. In 

these cases one generally knew the approximate content of the message, and that helped greatly in the task of cryptanalysis. The 

number of such compromising errors was so great that we could take 

a long time telling about them - so we shall only suggest that in 

~ost cases the quick solution of an enemy cryptographic system was 

possible only because of errors made. 

In the use of cryptographic systems, the Russians at that time 

were/so unskilled that the recipients of radiograms often asked whe-

/ ther there had not been a mistake in the encipherment or wheather thjs 

~ I J 

RESTRICTED 
I 

or tlnt eroup uas correct. The Austrian cryptnn~lysto, on the 

other hnnd, were already so a.dept at solving Russian ciphers that 

they would often hnve been in a position to help the Rusaian addressocs decipher their own messages. 

I 

once in a whil+ an oricinal Russian Qipher book (code) was • I 

i captured. In thia rase it was not necessary £or them to make any 

analytic decipherment, since they could eo about decoding at once, I 

using the captured waterial. 

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. ,. 

RE&'f lt!€1'P!f 1 

THE DiltEC'rION FINDING SERVICE 

Today every ~choolboy knows the essential thing~ about. direction 

finding. At one time - in i91.5 - this invention wa.s a novelty, and 

at first an English rather than a German novelty. Soon after the 

beginning of the war the English had developed the system of 

"direction fjnding, 11 that is, of fix.i.ng the direction in which a 

transmitting radio station was locatc:l; and they had put it. to uoe 

against the floating units of the German navy. Direction finding 

• 

stations were not introduced into the Ger.man arnzy- until about the 

end of 1915. 

Since the radio service in all armies \-ra.s tending m.oro and 

more toward the principle of secrecy {not merely regarding the 

content or the radiograms dispatched, but also regarding the 

location of the transmitters), while determination of the location 

of an enemy station wao or great importancc,since it alw837s 

coincided with the location of a unit staff', and the dol:.ormi.na.tion 

of the territorial distribution of radio stations lik0T1rl.se gavo 

clarity reBarctl.ng the front organization of the enemy, he:icaforl:.h 

direction finder stations were coupled with all radio intercept 

statior~s. The sum total or their direction .finding readines made 

possible the determination or the location of transmitters 1Tithin 

a fourth or a square kilometer since at that time all armies were 

using long lJaves. With this the system of changing call signs,, 

which had been devised to prevent idcntific~tjcn of tho st~ticns, 

lost effectiveness. As a rule three direction fi.ndinG re£..d.incs 

fro111 different receiving stations sufficed to dctcm11ino the r;:,lot 

l;:i::-1'.'o t.hc radio station t'las set up. Sinc'J tl:·:: !!:··A,o:..• ol' ::..t~"'..tions 

RESTRICTED 
RES¥R:f€~ 1 

in t.ha armioo of. Europe in thooc do.ya was very oma.11 uhcn cont.t·v.st.cd 

'rlt.h tho 1wcocnt., :lt wao almost a.lw~s possible to idontify positively 

thcoa trantiI11ittinc; stations. 

This became rco.lly important whon troop movements were boing 

carried out by tho opposing side. In this wa:y, one could often 

follow ror hundreds or kilometers the movements of radio stations 

(and hcnco or the ur1its to which they belonBed). This was true in 

• 

a very significant wa:;r, tor instance, during the preparations for 

the first grand Brusilov offensive in the east; later in connection 

with the support of the Romanian front by the Russians; in connection 

with the Austrian grand offensive on the Italian front in 1917; and 

! • 

on other occasions. 

The French set up their direction finding service (goniometric 

service) very quickly and in a very perfect fashion; the Italians 

were also very active in this field. The Russians, on the other 

hand, limped far behind, and had not gotten beyond some very modest 

beginnings by the end 0£ World War I. 

Looked at practically, direction finding operations in those days 

were by no means so simple as they are today. At that time there were 

no maps showing local and magnetic deviations. It was necessary to 

learn by experience how deviations of the direction finding ra:r 

behaved in the terrain lying between the transmitting station and the 

direction finder. When a direction had been .fixed, it was very 

illlportant to know whether the station fixed 18'1 at a distance of 20, 

501 100, 200 kilometers or more. Such experience had to be gathered 

and collated. 

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RE~f~fj-1 Direction finding operations achieved their greatest importa.nee in the naval intercept service. The English in partict ,~~ 

scored outstanding successes in determining the movement of 

German warships, particularl,y or subma.i~ines. Many a German 

submarine sunk in those days could be credited to the British 

direction finding service. Moreover, Zeppelin raids were 

observed constantly by the English with excellent results. The 

task was rendered easier f-:>r them by tt1e fact that the Zeppelins 

handled their radio traffic on a definite wave· length, and worked 

with a fixed system of call signs. Therefore, as soon as such a 

~all sign was heard, people over l:.here knew at once that a 

Zeppelin was coming, and they merely needed to follow its course 

by readings at short intervals, which was easy to do because o.r 

the low flying speed of the airships. 

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POLYPS AND PENKAL/\S 

By a polyp wa understand in zooloey a marine aniln1l uhich 

catches its victim in ita outstretched tcntacleo in ordcx· to 

eat it. \'fl1a.t a "Penkala" is, that probably few people know 

today. Thorefore, it ~ be mentioned that this was the name 

or a firm which before and during World War I was producin3 the 

first mechanical lead pencils. In its advertising, this firm 

11sed a he:ui with an enormous ea.r behind which uas stuck such a 

mechanical. pencil. Beneath was simply the word "Pcnkalo.. 11 

This big ear uf the Penkala poster and the tentacles o:C the 

polyp se1-ved the Austrian and the Germnn intercept services 

respectively from early 1916 on as the symbolic designation 

for a new branch of this service which will be described below. 

In the summer of 1915 Germ.an oncineors near Verdun had 

captured instruments by the aid 0£ which the French had been 

intercepting German telephone lines. These instruments had 

been improved in Garmany by the then Postal.Counc:iior Arendt, 

and they had been used in the war of position, first by the 

Gennan and then by the Austril'11. army, to intercept telephone 

conversations of the enenw. The~e dovlces wero install.ed in a 

dug-out in the front line, and from here insulated wires radiated 

out which ended in the so-called "search grounds"; theso search 

grounds consisted of metal stakes which were driven into the ground 

as clooe as possible to the cn€llzy''s system of trenches. Where a 

single telephone lina was used the currents passing throuch tho soil 

56 

RESTRICTED .. 
would encounter one or more of these search grounds, and after 

b~ing amplified by the attached apparatus b"ere rendered audible. 

' Thus, as if lrl.th a nw..gnet, conversations carried over the telephone net of the eneJIW' were attracted, and, by using a switchboard, any number of search grounds could·be throi..Jll in selectively 

t.o eavesdrop on a definite sector of the front. In the German 

army these listening posts, which by the beginning of 1916 were 

installed everywhere along the front, were c~led "Arendt Stations" 

or "Polyps"; the Austrians called them 11Penkalas11 (big earsl). 

Since at that time the Russians at the f1•ont used almost 

ex.elusively so-callud single wires, and even in the west single 

'Wi!"es were still uaed to a great extent, the German and Austrian 

listening stations generally had very good results. While the 

radio listening service gave the connections, orders, and reports 

of the hieher staffs, the Arendt service supplemented the picture 

~dth respect to small. units and the fron& line. The results 

during l.916 -~ especially in the east -- were so abundant that one 

Arendt stat.ic·n uas supplying on the average 15 to 20 pages a day of 

sienifictlJlt jnforn1ation regarding the enemy. Excellent resul+.s were 

', achieved by the Aust.rians with their Penkalas on the Italian front, 

where thr~y w1Jrc always ve17 exactly informed of the situation on 

, .. • i. 

RESTRICTED 
1..h .... [l ·l.irn :Jltlu.1 

tho :.mri·~ncr or 19l(J onrl the liotcninr; in on Lolr:plionn convr.r.:;ations 

bcc:l!ll.J k.11011n, I'""'oplo bcgon to uso t.vo l:iro connectionn 011cryuhero. 

IL. u .i::.1 much mo1·c dif.ficull., ( ofl.,cm imponoiblc) lio intercept 1:.hu:;o .. 

Ncvorl.,holo;:.1s, it Look a veey lonr; time t.o mo.kc tho chan~e and to 

snfccuard telephone traffic at the front - particularly for the 

Rttm:d.ans - to such an extent tho.t listoning in b~camo virtual.ly 

impossible.. In any case, the German and Aust..rian Arendt, services 

~rere able from early 1916 till about the llliddle of 1917 to hear 

most of the telephone conversations of the Russians up to five 

kilometers behind the front, and to.utilize tho content for 

shaping their o\om measures. The Hussian telephone opera.tors were 

very loquacious when seated at their instruments. When a Russian 

telephone operator took over either by d3\Y" or by night, he began 

"testing" all his connections by calling up the correspondent 

stations. Generally he knew the men at the other end of the 

wire, anci a conversation ensued in the course of which the two 

exchanged exp3riences, impressions, and observations. Very often 

they spoke also of official matters. They discussed impending or 

1. It is true that the Austrians did not find out until November 

1917 that the ~talians, beginning ear)Jr in 1916, had likewise 

set up a considerable number of these listening stations. As 

General Max Rone;e states in his book, "Military and Industrial 

Esplonage," the Italians listened in on some 5200 telephone 

conversations or the Austrio:ns j_n the sector between Wippach 

and Rombon. In October 1916 the leader of an Austrian listenine station deserted to the Italians, and was able to acquaint 

them in detail with the Austrian arrangements and to warn them 

fully. Later on a number of Austrian deserters were employed 

b•r the Italians in this listening service on the basis of their 

lineuistic ability. 

5~ 

RESTRICTED 
accomplished rol.i.efs,, the question of supply., the spirit of the 

troops,, extension of positions,, losses suffered,, changes in command, 

recm:forcements received, and the like. 

" ' 

Asido from these bits of private information,, very good :i.nror-: 

mation could sometimes be obtained from the conversations of the . officcra,.ra..rticularly when patrol undertakings were impendine, 

attacks were planned, etc. Precise information was obta.in~d r.ega ding the locations of staffs, batteries, depots, and the lil{e. 

Artillery obse1""Vers could generally be heard clearly: because thoy 

wore stationed well forward with their telephones. '!'hey gave firing directions; by observing where missiles struck and comparing 

the figures t.ranDmiiJt.~d, one could soon get the exact location of 

the hostile be.t.+,cry. From now on it was impossible tp prepare, for 

' . 

~my m:J.jor military a.ction uithout its being noted by the Arand:t; 

I t 

service, since, if an order was given to stop all telephone traffic 

and this was done., this very measure was enough to attract attan.-

tion and to indicate that the enemy was making preparations. 

Since the telephone lines of the staffs further to the rear 

trcre atl;ached to the same switchboards in which lines from the 

front terminated, induction often made it possible to listen a.lso 

to these wires,, over \·rhich eA.-trcmcly informative conversations 

WC3re cru-ricd. 

Tho introduction of the "Polyps" nnd "Ponkalas" in the a.nnies 

of the C!3ntrul Po\~~rs sj.01ified from the military point of view an 

unparalleled facLor. Since,from the summ'3r of 1916 on, these 

sto:Lionr; •·mre located at intervals of a.bout 10 kilcrn.el;ors alone the 

.., ~) 

RESTRICTED 
REST1l!1e'Y!51 

cntir.J .front, it was possible to monitor the entire oncui.v tel<..phone 

trni'fic at the front almost without a break. In tho cast. thia onesided surcriori t.y continued down to the el'ld of t.ho tm.r; in tho west 

it uas equalized since the French and Enelish used similar apparatus 

to intercept German conversations. 

In the eastern theater the practical result of this superiority was that a large part of the troops of the Central Powers 

could be withdrawn without risk, since there was now no do.nger 

of a surprise movement by the enemy. It would never have been 

possible for the a:nnies of the Central Powers to keep the eastern 

front stabilized, if they had not had such extensive insight into 

. the enell\Y situation, due to the results of the radio intercept and 

the Arendt services, since the streneth ratio on the eastern front 

was in many sectors 10:1 against the Central Powers. 

·.o 

RESTRICTED 
• 

RES'N:l@Di6D21 

THE WEST 

While in the eastern theater the intercept service during 

World War I resulted in a one-sided German superiority, the 

situation in the wost was quite different. Here it was not the 

Germans who start.ed using this novel,. means of gat,hering intorma.-

tion and thus got a head start, rather it was the French who 

began workinJ systematically and purposefUlly in this field as 

soon as political tension began and who derived a corresponding 

advantage. There were two reasons for this: the first was 

that at the very beginning of the war the French had at their 

disposal a fairly well set up system of interception which 

merely had to be adapted to the new tasks; they alI•eady lmew the 

value and the possibility of using this means of gathering informa.tion. The second reason was tactical: while the French were 

operating in their own country and could rely on a closely knit, 

und&ma.eed wire network and consequently needed to use the radio 

but little, thus affording the enemy :few chances to employ radio 

interception, the situation was reversed tor the Germans. A:fter 

crossing the frontier the Germans encountered a telephone and 

telegraph net \ihich had been more or less destroyed or rendered 

temporarily useless. They either _had to set up their own field 

wires, which took time and on the right wing was hardly pz·acticable due to the swij:t advance, or they had to resort to rci.diotelegraphy. This was done to a grf:\at ex.tent and afforded the 

enemy a marvelous opportunity to get practice in interception. 

After a f e-.1 days the French intercept service had al1·oady eot ten 

(' )~ l 

RESTRICTED 
ii.;:; b.:-..i.rl11L,~:, <md frcim LJ11. .. n on 111aintainod vocy close conL~-.:L with 

\·Jc have tlrc.:i.cly reported bl'iofly on tho French in l.erccpt 

scrv:i.co which b1.:c.:ime so in\porl..c.nt before and durinG l.he l>attlo 

' 

of the llnrnc. Imntcdiatcly al't~r this !atc!ul battle there folloucd in, tho 11est the so-called "raco to the sea". The GeriPatl 

I 

atLcmpt to outflank the enemy again f1·01n the nort..h called for 

the utmost wo.t.ch.fulness on the part of the French. Once again 

the focus of French i·econna.iseance la.y in thc intercept service. 

On the other hand, the French army command Lriod to croat.o a now 

sil,,ucition he1·e by threaten:l.ng the Ge:rn1a.n r1.eht uine;. Thns the two 

• 

opponents kept crolf!ding one enother more and more to the no1•th and 

there resulted the famous "ra.ce t.o the sea. u 

These movements forced the Germ.an anny command to make ex.tensive shifts of troops. 'l'l!e French, on the other hand, were faced 

with the problem of recoenizing these movements, their type, extent, 

and goal, and or doing this in time. 

The Germans were still resolved to continue to hold the front 

in Lorraine and the Vosges by defensive action and to force a 

decision in the north. The t"wo German "Southern Az'lllies" (the Sixth 

and Seventh) were withdrawn from the front and replaced by new:cyactivated army units. The Seventh Army, which was in t.he Vosges, 

was transferred to the Aisne sector and committed there. 'l'he Sixth 

Anny was m~ved from Lorraine to the extreme German right wing. Thus 

the Germans succeeded in counterine; the movement or the French a.nd the 

Ene;lish which was extending farther and f'arther to the north. From 

RESTRICTED 
RES __ _ 

1 to 13 Octolior the battle raged a.round Arras; by mid-October a new 

front ran from Noyon to north of Lille. 

The removal of the two Gen1um armies from the southern !lank, 

their replacement by new units, and i:,heir march to the new areas 

of comntl.tment were recognized in the.very beginning by the French 

I intercept service as clea.r:cy- as one ~~ould wish. It was the first 

\ 

time in the history ~£war that such.a 1novement had been followed 

by the technical means of radio intelligence. The French a.lso 

recognized these units as they appeared one after the other in 

the new areas. That gave them and the English a basis for carrying out countermovements, whereas the Germana had to rely exclusively on reconna.i.Dse.nce by patrols and scouts along the front; 

thus at best they had success with their reconnaissance only 

after the hostile units, which had been brought up, had already 

been committed. 

On 9 Octooer 19Jli .Antwerp had fa.llen. From the besieging 

troops thus released and from nei1 units activated in Germany a 

new Fourth Army was formed in Belgium., which started its advance 

on 18 October with the purpose of bringing the channel coast under 

German control. This movement was also recognizod promptly by 

the French intercept service and by the intercept service of the 

British Expeditionary Army which had in the meanwhile become 

active., so that appropriate countermeeGures could bo taken in 

time. After heavy fighting the German attack ua.s stopped at the 

Ysor. •rhe attempt of the Germ.an Six.th Army to break th1·oui:;h 

toward Ypern, which uas prematurczy betrayed in r.a.dio traffic, 

RESTRIC'f~D 
was lilccuisa without success. With the end of the battles around 

Ypern the war of movement in the west was concluded for the time 

being. 'l'ho war of position beean. 

Several years after World War I the French Colonel Calvel 

prepared for instruction purposes £or the Signa1 School in 

Versailles a timetable containing all the German army radiograms 

. intercepted by the French intercept service during those months. 

Upon comparing this table with the operational movements executed by 

the Allies one recognizes clearly that these results were the basic 

factor in carrying out countermeasures, and that it was only due to 

the intercepted German radio traffic that the French and Eng~sh were 

d 

able to act so promptly and to eliminate the German threat in;the 

north. Wlat the uennan intercept service accomplished in the east, 

the French did here in the west. With remarkable parallelism there 

took place here an equalization of spiritual forces which determined 

the outcome of the war back in the fall or 1914. 

In the further course of the campaign in the west the forces 

were eqiallzed in respect to the intercept service, just as the forces 

on that r~ont had been equalized in other respects. On the basis of 

experiences in the east, the Germans began late in 1914 a systematic 

interception or enemy radio traffic. Both sides now developed 

extremely great activity in this field. Thero resulted an invisible 

struggle between camouflage, concealment, and deception on the one side, 

and the intercept service, evaluation, and cryptan~sis on the other, 

which wa.o soon carried on by both pnrties with t.ho most refined Il'.ethods. 

This service extended to interception of all technical means of cor11inun-

{1.f 

RESTRICTED 
• 

i.ca.tion of' the enem_v, but was concerned primarily with i·a.dioLele~.r:-dphy and the telephone. As recognition of the danger of using radiotelegraphy for transmitting secret information began to permeate 

everywhere, people in the western theater began more and more to 

give up the use of this means of communication. Furthermore the 

stabilization of the fronts afforded a possibility or extending wire 

communications. Consequently, the focus of the intercept service in 

the west shift..ed more and more to the interception of telephone lines, 

both on the Allied and on. the German side. 'l'his duel sometimes assumed violent forms, as for ex.ample, in 1915 near Apremont, where m~tual 

interception or the telephone conversations of the artillery formed 

the tactical basis for the military actions. At times some rather 

droll situations resulted. Once the Gennans had even learned the 

hour of the impending attack. But instead of learning a lesson'!ro.m. 

this and being doubly cautious in the use of their own telephones, 

the Germans made the mistake of passing the time of the expected 

French attack in plain language by phone, and all countermeasures 

were adjusted to this point and time. This was inter~epted by the 

French j.n turn, whereupon the French attack was advanced several 

hours and was completely successful in spite of all German preparations 

for defense. 

In the autumn battles in the Champagne (22 September t.o 

J November 1915) and at La Bass&e and Arras (25-September to 

13 October 1915) the Germans were able to frustrate the intended 

65 

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bn.:1.k-L.li1\)l1L,l1 of' Lhc. crJo.'il\Y s:iJnpl,y hccc.u:J,.., through tho iut.ercc:rtion 

thry h1pcudJJ:1G n.l,!:.o.ck and. to prepare appropr.in1.e defcnea .. 

In Scptcu•ber 1916 durii1s '1:.he t·..1.t.!..le on the Somme, the French 

intorccp~ed a GE~rman rad.logrmn fX'Oll\ wJ • .loh they loa't"ned details 0£ 

the in1pendinr; Bl't.'a.I.. Gen11au count,crat.l.1ck :ln the vid.nity of 

Bouchavesno. 

The French ColC"Juel, Givierg<., who dasct•ibes the resuJ.'l..s o.r 

interccpt:i.on durlng the FiJ·st W(•rld Wu.r, says: "'l'he results 

achieved by deciphering telegrams l•~:i:e unueual.J.Jr great. since 

they made possible the ident.ificat,il)n of many units. If ·ue glance 

of rcconne.ie.i::;~mcc; '.li::i~e divlr:.iJ.on:; "liJt'e l.~.t.c1• check,=ld by the statement,s of p\'isonerfi.. lvloreove1·, J2 infun t.·:y regiments werP, spolt.ed, 

whose areas of commitinent. had bcc;,1 asc•.:i·v.:\ined pi~uviousl:t by other 

pt>eaenc~ of ai:.. 'atti:lck di\·ision~ '1c->rt'1 ..:>f SiJ.., Quentin; another 

telegi·am of 10 D~cEunl>E:>i' :l.nfor.ne<l us o" t.h•3 presence of General 

von Erpf,. comm!l.ncler o.r ~ho 24.2nrl divis:.i.on; .:i.nother telegram or 

l' Dece111bel' allouod us to a.l'l.lcip.v.e l:.he Ge:":!nan sori.ie against tho 

Albia .li'arm; our Li·ocps an.t:l.cipat..ea tr1e enemy and ·threw him back. 

A radiogram of 5 Dc-cember reported to us tho change or call sign or 

a German radio station, and gave us the old and new- call signs .... " 

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Of tho utmost importance in the intercept service were so·· 

ca1led llttle things; they often proved of decisive value. In 

many cases the French discovered and identified German radio 

I 

s17ations by the .fact tha.t. when they changod call signs the German 

~tations did not. break the sequence o.f message number in the . /headings. 

One Germ.an divisional radio station (183rd' Infantry Division} 

could always ba recognized by the .fact that it put the sending 

t:Une and the word count a.t the end of the radiogram instead of 

at the beginning, af was generally done. 

Another Gennan station could be recognized by the stereotype formula: "Can you hear all right? 11 , which occurred each 

t:Une it began traffic wil:.h a coi·1·esri011d$11t. In such cases it 

did no good to change the call sign. 

The French and English were especially successful in 

listening to the radio t1•affic of the Germ.an Air Force. At 

the very beginning of the war the German airships were easily 

recognized in radio air traffic because they all had call signs 

beginning with tho letter "T". Whenever this sit:;nal was heard,, 

it was known that the transmitter of a Zeppelin was involved; 

the position of the airship was then determined quickly wlth 

the aid of radiogoniomctry. At the beginning of the war these 

airships cruised over the North Sea and radioed incessantly to 

their hnse in t.he Helgoland Bight; they rcr-orted the spott.ing 

or mine fields,, submarines, warships, mer•chant e:hips, etc. Tho 

French kept pooted on these matters by lis'Lenin~ to i..hes-::: 

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1..r.:m~·•.1.bofrmc ov• l' a cliutuncc of ?00 i.o t!OO ki.loi:t'..it..cr:; .. 

Dur.i.nr, tl13 alr at tc:ii..:ko on P.'.lrif} :lnrl London, the Zoprclino and 

l:irGe ai.rcr.'1.fL \rhich c~rricd out. the uomb.:i.rd.m( nt ircr.J ccnoto.ntly 

roqucol..i.11[.; l>u:~ l'ini;s from vnrious Germ:in direction find:inG st.a.Lions. 

This entire rt.11.o corroopondonce uao listcn~d to by the Franch and 

Enclish, \Jho thus received dirccLly from Lhe enemy valuable clues 

rogo.rdinG thu movement and the direct.ion of the German atLncks. 

l1oroovcr, a.f Ler the Engli~h ~nd French direct.ion fintlinB stations 

had _beco:no a.cquaint.cd wlth t.he signals or the German Air Foi·co 

trane:mittors, they took the necessary rcad.i.nes and doterntlnod 

the momentary posit.ion of the airships. 

Towru.·d t.ho end or ·t.ho wur t.ho Gorm.:m di1·iciblcs - like the 

land stations - changed their call si&'Tls almoat daizy so th11t.. it 

was more dif .Cicult t.o recognize them But t..h.is difflculty \ms 

offset. by the routine uhich hnd hc~n acquired nL<::~mJdle by the 

French a.11d English intorct;)pi.. op::lrators and by the aid of the 

improved direction finning syst.cm. 

Iutercept.ion of hostile arLillcry aviators was .likewls'3 

carried on succcssfulJ.y. Ona system of interception, which was 

ore;a.nized particularly for the purpose, yielded a mass or information which parntlttod the command to orient, ii.self on the following 

questionv: 

a.. Int<:?ntions of the enemy artillery; recoenition or the 

fil'ine; procedure of newly commit.tcd bat..Lerics a.11d the .firine; 

of old batteries eett:Lne a range on neu tareet.s. 

b. Zones and dist.ribution of r:trc of enemy heavy artillery. 

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• 

Interception of this type is not so easy as listening to the 

traffic of ground radio stations. 'l'he planes move very fast; 

fixing their momentary position in the air calJ.s £or great speed 

and practice on the part of the crew of the direction finding 

stations. In addition, it is nece~sary to recognize the transmitters again in spite of the daily change of call signs; moreover, decipherment of the radio dispatches calls for no little 

effort. In addition, the precise times of the flight must be 

compared with those of the artillery,f.ire and evaluated. 

Nevertheless, it was possible again and again to get valuable 

information and to shape one's own measures correspondingly. 

With the introduction of universal military service in' 

January 1916, England manifested the tenacity of its purpose 

to keep fighting. On the other hand, France appeared greatly 

weakened both in a military and an economic wa:y. In order to 

wear do,.i. the French complete:cy and thus bring about a decisior 

in the west, the Germ.an army supreme command decided to attack' 

Verdun. The attack began on 21 February and continued until ! 

I 

I 

September without achieving the desired success. In these 

battles the intercept service on both sides p~ed an unusually 

important role. The telephone line~ were constantly being 

damaged by t:.he uninterrupted artillery fire so that there were 

possibilities of interception by the resultant grounding. 

J.:oreovcr, a new phase began in the uer of inLcrcept.ion. .!!."'veryuh ere along the front so-called ground tele gre.phy j nstruni-:;nt s 

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w·1·0 in::l;.;Jl<>l .. 'l'h1.:il' inlJvducli.::>11 h,Hl hG•..:0111•.· i.11c·~~ .. ,m~-;y l•·.•·1,·1: 

rcliab lu lWc ol' Lh1..' i •:l•Jrhow• h.;1d li~·1;01ni? iJllf'OEmi.bl· 111 v 1(,1 r of l JvJ 

dc:.rt.rucU.vo l!i'fccL of Lile urLillc1.;r fitc. Tl11J grouud lclt::ej·.:ir..11 

sent hu~:r.nr cm·1-.:mls inl o llw earth, und wc1:..; 1.he1·r~for•J indonpenrknt 

of wires.. or cour::.c, it could ue heard Ly tla~ cuE:u'.'f aL short 

dist.a.nee:> lJu l. not l..o Llw ~·<\rnc ex Len I.. a~; radlot<;legraphy. 1'he 

intercept sl.al,ions, cit ·whid1 Id I h•'l"l .. o th•:: 11.;l.cn·..<rn h<:i.<1 bc·m 

accustomC'd to hear nnd t.1-a11ril.Jf ,_. 01·al convc1·:::.at.ionn, now la..-ul I 0 

shift to int.01·ccpLinr: ~101:>e Lcl<~:-~r~pli.y. whj r::h -1lno of!'(:l..c'cu a 

possibility for th1.." ur.·~ 01' cr;11 •to1~1·::-1phi c ::;ysl.,1.:'ms.. The English 

ha.d constructod a special d.t•vic:c for sicn::il conununication in the 

combat zono,. t.ho ;:;-u-c;1Jlcd F1;ll•.1·pho111~,. which t.ht:?y consi<le1·ed secure 

against eavesdropping; hnt even Lhi n L11t nc:.·d ouL t..o be subject, to 

interceptjon under cel'lain co11dilll)t.&, ·30 lhaL I.hi:: struggle in this 

field never C'•. --.ed but JTit.:.rel.\- ch;m1~r~d i11 il.:.; technical aspP.cl:.s. 

The inte1·r.;0pl. service achie·1<>il slral._,;i r; sicuificance in the 

west only once on the G·.:>1mcn1 s id·~, :u1d l hn L waa in February -

March 19l7. From connlle~;:::; iril.crcept.""d rcnver:mtions and telegrams 

the Germans had ascerloi1:cd lbel lh1: Al'lji:i~ "'~r-:.1 iweraring an attack 

on a grand scale in t..he Somnn a re::~. 'l'hc areas of at La.ck and the 

directions of thrutil. could L<J clr::ur~: recoi:.11lzed. 'Ihis Lime the 

German supreme command v.cl11;,, l1y did draw th~ correct conclusions 

£rom the a.vailablb infol·1na.t..ion,, nnd fo~11edi:;i.1.~J..v Lu.fore. the aLt.ack 

was to begin ordered ;) "V"liLh•..lrawal to Llw ::;o-call•~d ~1icgfried Line. 

In this wny, the Larg•JL. \••as withJ.rm111 fl'om the cru.:3hinc sup~rlority 
REs1!~ JP'rfz~.1 . .&. .L'-.L ~ .... ..... ...., 

o.f the Entotitf'.! in materiel, and the a.t t.ack petered out in empty 

space. Of course, tho Allien had recogni.zed !rem intercepted 

German trc..ffic the Germa.."l intention to reLreat, but strane;ely 

enough they did not draw the onzy corr"wt deduction and 

immediately continue the attack which could have resulted in a 

ver-3 difficult situation for· the German troops. Instead,, they 

clung rigidly to their existing plan and missed a very favorable 

opportunit.y. 

Meanwhile, the French had been making excellent progress 

in tha field of direction finding. As earzy as October 1914 

they had started experiments with direction finding apparatus, 

and then developed a model which could be used in the field, 

being held to such dimensions that it could be installed in a 

vehicle.. The ratable frame had 3ides two meters long and was 

located on the roof of the vehicle. The apparatus itself was 

mounted inside the vehicle. 

With this mobile direction finder the French got excellent 

results. Such direction finding stations particularly proved 

their worth early in 1917 when the Germans were preparing to 

retreat to the H.lndenburg Line. Long bafore they started to 

occupy this defense line, radio stations were set up a.rid put 

into operation. Of course, that was sheer stupidity because 

· there was no valid reason for operating 2•adio stations far 

behind the front as it thon stood; they could have gotten along 

very well with the existing wire corrununications. 'l'he fact that 

71 

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RES'P!{IL:ctpEH-2 1 

,iunl. no 1.1i • .t.;ht 11<.w·~ b~c•1 done for practice accordi.nc to Lhc princirlcs ciuploy•:d li~l'oril l'Jl./1• The nou radio ol..u.t.ion::; W'3l'C in1lLCdintc-

]Jr rccor;ni.~i.::d by tho French; rcudine3 wore taken, and th~J loca.t.:lons 

dcLcrm.lncd, E;O LhL\l., iu a. rcl:l:t..ive}¥ r.hort time t..hoy roco(7lizcd the 

exact cour::;c 01· a new Ucrman lino of defense. The French uorc a.l~· 

in a position to recoo1:i.zo wiLh certainty the irrunincncc of Gom1rui 

retreat operationa. 

A little \'lhile arLcr that. Lhc Ger1no.ns also missed an ex.cocdinely 

. .favorable opport..tu1ity uhich the int.erccpt. survice sarved up to them, 

so to sp~ak. In the midcllc of April 1917 the French under General 

Nivelle with sLrong employmont oi troops ru1d ma.l..eria.1 made an o..ttack 

on the Aisne and in the Charnro.01e, east of Reims. The Ger1n.:ins 

intercepted this thrust by a mobile defense, a.11.d in heavy fighting 

ceui:ied the FrPnch such scvoro losses that the morale of the French 

arwy uas badly shalcen. In numerous anny corps t.here was mutiny. 

Troop units and single soldic1·s W•Jre leaving the front, or going 

over to the cne•l'ly. 

The German intercept service had its great hour in the li."'est, 

as one intercepted messBge aftc1· the other revealed clear:cy the 

critical situation on the enemy side. In this situation the French 

front could not have resisted a Gorman o.ttnck., But the incredible 

happened: the Ge1•inan cornmr.md saw in these events u. parallel to those 

on the Hussian i'ront, and expected a collapse o.f the French pouGr o.f 

.. , 

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• 
----

RES'PllleP!D21 

resistance without any action.by the Germans. It missed the chance 

which was never to return, and kept waiting until the French Govern-

\ 

ment and the army command had succeeded in restoring the situati'QL.._ 

Petain resumed supreme command; the crisis came to an end; the 

French front again stood !ir.II\• America was able to proceed 

calmly in shipping its divisions and armies to Europe. The Danube 

Monarchy recognized the hopelessness of the situation, and the · 

idea of a separate peace began to spread there visibly. The 

Entente had survived the crisis; the scale of victory slowly 

tipped in its favor. 

In respect to the intercept service, the tide now began to 

turn. Just as the German intercept service in the east had 

been able to follow the increasing war weariness of the Russian 

soldiers from early in 19171 so now the French were often able 

to observe similar phenomena among t~ German ~roops, ~ven 

though not to the same extent as had been the case in the east. 

The resolution in favor of peace passed by the Reichstag on · 

19 July 1917, the Peace Note of the Pope, the German reply 

thereto, the formation of the "Independent Social Democratic 

Party, 11 the resignation of Reich Chancellor von Bethma.nnHollweg, and in.any other happenings became the subject of 

occasional short convJrsations over the telephone, in spite I 

. . of all regulations, and these· alJ.owed the Allies to in.fer 

that there was a general, slow decline in the wi·ll,..or the I '-....__ 

German troops to resist. Thi~ phenomenon was increased'as. 

the.,American troops began to arrive ~n France from overseas; 

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conversations on this topic occurred a8ai.n and again on the 

telephone, and showed that the Germans at the front were by 

no means indifferent to this problem. But the most valuable 

intelligence was gained by the Fren~h intercept service in 

listening to the telephone con versations of Gennan units which 

were moved from the eastern to the western theater beginning in 

December 1917. These units had no taste for the war, and the 

French intercept service was busy seeking such units sin~e their 

telephone conversations afforded the best information. Nevertheless, the French did not succeed in recognizing from intercept-· 

ed telephone traffic the impending German offensive of March 1918. 

This offensive, which broke loose in the morning hours of 21 March, 

came as a comp1ete surprise to the French, at least as far as its 

timing and the direction of thrust were concerned. Numerous 

German troop movements had been recognized by the French intercept 

service, but in the main very good radio and te~ephone discipline 

had been observed by the Germans. Hardly had the front come into 

movement, however, when the German radio stations again began to 

send eagerly and to supply the French with excellent material. 

Foch quickly recognized that the qerman of£ensive had been undertalcen without adequate, £ast movidg £orces, and he quickly took 

I his countermeasures. A£ter bareJ.t two weeks 0£ successi'ul German 

I 

attacks, the great spring offensiie had bogged dmm. 

A £er.i examples may serve to ~how the importance which was 

attached to the intercept service even in 1918 - a£ter the danger 

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.• 

• 

of using technical means of corrununications had been generally 

recognized-

'l'he French Captain Ccusillan rel.ates that on 6 M:ay 1918, 

for example, the French st.ation "ZZ2" sent a telegram to 

station 11zz111 which began with the words: 11The lieutenant and 

chief of the radio service with the staff of Genera~ x. To the 

chief of the radio service with the staff of General Y. 11 Tl·~ 

Germans, who knew, naturally, what divisions were led by these 

generals, discovered in this way the presence of these units in 

the sectors involved. 

The presence of several Italian divisions on the French 

front was brought to the attention of the German intelligence 

service by the fact that an Italian operator made what would 

seeming]Jr be a very slight mistake. The Italian radio stations 

employed in France were required to follow French regulations and 

I 

to accommodate themselves to t;he French traffic in all particulars. 

The operator in question made lthe mistake of transmitting tne 

I 

Italian signal ny di X" instear of the signal ny de X" when 

calling another station. In t~is way the presence of Italian 

units on French soil was betr~ed. I 

On l June 1918 the French intercepted a German radiogram I 

which they deciphered on the second day following. It had 

been sent by a station in the region of Roye, and contained 

the text: "Speed up supply of ammunition even by day, if 

not subject to observation." This telegram, which suggested 

an impending action, was a warning __ ~igna.L.£or the army of 

75 

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c:n1'lt"lY•'d liy C ~'lh.!l'L•.l I\·mc;in on 11 Jur1P. uuo.r l!,...:i·y-Courcollos to 

hol•.i 1,he a'LL: ... ck,, llhieh t-La.rlc..d near ,t.~on'L<lid:i.~~1· in lh-:: nic:ht 

f1·om 9 t.o 10 Jrn10. 

'Ilw ord.ur or UJo <.lay of tho German Seventh Army on 9 July 

191S stat.es llml. tho presence of the French Tenth Army hnd been 

revealed to tho Germans by mentioning a French radio off lccr by 

name. '!'his o.rn:y betrcyed itself by the storootypc fo.tmula'Liou or 

the daily reports of the weather station Trilport. The Gorman 

daily report also remarks that an the end of the week the station 

call signs of the American 'l'hird Di vision 'had been heard in the 

area east of Chateau-Thierry. 

The French intercept service scored its greatest triUJnph in 

Ju~ of this year before the beginning of the German attack on 

both sides o.t: Rei.ms. From intercepted German telephone conversations 

and ground telegraph traffic 1 as well as from several intercepted 

radiograms, th~ French had ~cognized the area and the t;ime of the 

attack. Th~y did the only thine possible under the circumstances -

they evacuated the front positions and received the German thrust in 

their rear positions. Twenty-four hours after the attack began1 the 

German supreme co1runand had to issue its order to stop the offensive. 

Likewise, the attack of Foch from the forest of Villers-C9tterets 

on 18 July against the right flank of the Gennan bulge was supported 

for the most part by the intelligence gleaned by the French intercept 

service 1 mainly from intercepted ground telegraph traffic. The same 

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RES-21 

I I I 1• 

held true for the attack by Foch ~e~we~~ the Somme and Scarpa in . . . 

the direction of Cambra! on 21 Au~st, and again in connection lfl t 1_. \1~ "I 1 :{" '\ ~ L ,f 

' • I 

with the American attack shortly thereafter on the Lorraine f J -":' ~'"!. _ ..

front near St. Mihiel. 

( 

In all these cases interception ot German ground telegraph 

traffic had given the Allies extensive insight into: 

1. the structure of the German front, 

2. strength, or losses, and weakness of the 

German uni ts, .~ 

3. difficulties with supply of artillery 

ammunition, and with respect to the quality 

of the badly used up German guns, 

I 1( r • 

4. morale of the troops, conditioned by the 

difficult s~pp~ situation, by the war weariness orunits brought from the east, and 

by the impression on morale made by the tanks 

now appearing in large numbers on the Allied 

side. 

On the German side, the above:-menti~ned attacks by the enemy 

had been recognized in time by intercepting telephone and ground 

telegraph traffic; however, there were no forQes le:ft which . . . ... . ,, ',, ~ . • I 0 I 

could be opposed to the superior forces of the enemy. 

The French direction finding service had been greatly 

developed during 1917 and during the first halt of 1918. A 

large number of mobile direction finding stations had been 111 ' I,/' I 

ass~gned to the armies, and these patroled the entire front. 

These stations proved their worth admirably in J~ly 1918; without' havi~g to decipher a single'German radiogram, the German 

intention to retreat beyond the Vesle, then the Aisne, then 

the.Aillette was recognized clearly from day to day by comparing the French direction fixes. The fact that the German 

17 

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ut.c:Lion c."'..Ll ~•J.1 •1:.. ~;ere ch...?ue•xl tlJ.11,y, "r;111...:Lfr1r.Js several ti.l.n:J 

o. da,\1 , l-1 i.d nu L U.l.J[~ni::ic Lil.lo. 'l'ho Gcrrnn racllo ~t:i.t.ion::i ucrc 

workl1 JG so .lmlu:... Ll"i <Jl.u:ily t.hat tho l•'rc11ch ·• .. :re a.'blo t.o raco01izc 

t.ho idcnt.ll..;y oi" tho,,) ol;a1...:ton::J from Lhc abundance of di1·cction 

findinG fixes 1;lv~ucver there uas a chru1t;e of co.11 sign.. 'lho 

long moves of the weal.her st..ations in tho i·ear area.o h~ld by 

the Gc11mi.ns eavo thu French valuable clues o.s to tho Genn:m 

int.ention.:J .. 

Shortly a.rt.er the end of the war it wa.a aoaorl.~d ou the 

Gorman sido th:it 1..ho GG1'lllall aney in th(\ \'rest. haJ re turned 

unbea.Lcn from t.he war· and that only the "dam;er thrust. _i'rom 

the homeland" (the Revolul..ion of Uovembcr 1918) had brought 

about the oo.taetrophe. While maintaining complete objectivity, I must observe that thcra can be no mrmtion of such a 

thing. I had opportunity Lo compare t.he results of the Ger.man 

intercept service and those of the Allies for the year 1918, 

to weigh them agai11st one another, and to compare the military 

measures which were then carried out,. The intercepted messages 

gave a reliable picture of the siluat.ion on both sides; they 

showed the dogree of readiness for battle nnd the morale on 

bolh sides. Without wishing to detract in the least from the 

value of the German soldier, it must be stated £actually but 

emphatically that, from Mey 1918 011, the German front was in 

an utterly hopeless situation. 'l'he assumption that the Germans 

might perhaps have succeeded in gaining more favorable conditions 

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e· for Dn armistice by retreating step by step and fighting all the 

way is quite erroneous. Had this bcea done, then a. complete 

coll.apse would doubtless have come in the spring of 1919 ~~he 

latash and it would haye resulted in the complete annihilat:ton 

of the Gorman army in the west. Any attempt to gainsa;y this 

neglects the facts, and these facts' were nowhere reflected more . I 

cJemly than in the results 1of the in:tercept service. The German 

soldier fought bravely; mote than tha.t - he tried with heroic I 

self-sacrifice to resist just as far as possible in spite of 

undernourishment and hopeless inferiority in materiel. But there 

is such a thing as the impossible. 

RESTRICTED 
rr•1m: BECO?-ID ID\LF OF 'l'IIB W/\.H lN 'l'JJE l~ABT 

{Ll\TEl 1915--1918) 

From Scpt..cmbor l.915 to tho end or Mo.y 1916 virtua.lJ.y noth:ln~ 

occul.'rcd 1.n the ea.st, operat:J.onally spca.klnc;. Then in Jtma 1916 

,., 

on t.he Austro-IIuncar:la.n front the famous Drusilov of.fena:l.vc broke looGe, 

just o.t t,hc moment when lihe Austrians bo.d commitlied a.11 their available forces on the Italian front. ~'his offensive wus not quite unexpected by the Austrians, for the Austrian t"a.d:I o intercept sci•v:l.co 

alone; with tho Arendt service had picked up mo.ny indicationa of an 

impending large scal.e opera.t:ion. In•particular, there vi:o.s a nuoaian 

telegram sent on 3 June which betrayed to the Austrians the itopcnd.ing 

l•1ree scale attack. But in <lownriBht, frivolous underestimation o:r 

the fightina strene;th or the Russians, the Austrians had taJccn the 

matter lightly and made almost no preparations to wa.rd ofr the o.ttack. 9 

Thus Brusj.lov "Was able to penetrate deep in the region of Lutsk e.nc1 

particularly in the Bttkovina before rccmfo1·cements from other sectors 

brought the wavering front to a stand. 

r.rhe Ai.ls·trian intellic;<mce serv:l.ce bad not at that ·tim:? recoanized fuJ ly the vo.lue of the A1'endt service, and had not 01.•e;o.nizcd the 

cxploito.tion or the iutercepte:.d conversat:f.ons, a.s it should h::i.ve (1onc. 

Moreover, tho AustI•ian army c0ta11!".l.nd had turned ita cn·&ire nttcntion 

to the It..a.lian fl'Ol"lt, and, desplte the "\ta.rnincrs or the CO!llll!O.lldo:r-s 

in the ca.::::t, ltu.LI not been able to make up its mind to send reenf'OJ.•cem.cnta to 1..11.e tllrl!atened fl·ont. In the central sector of the ea.s tei•n 

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• 

front, which was hel.d by German troops, the Russian attack had. 

no success, for here the people bad known how to make better and 

' 

prompt use of the results of the intercept service. At tho.t time I 

' ' ' aJ.1 Russian arrangements from army down to company orders bad 

I I · . 

been in,ercepted long bei'ore the be13im1ing of the offensive. The 

attacks \net with a we1l.-organized resistance. 

\ Even at the end of 1915 the Russ:J.ans were still 'suppl.ying \ 

pl.enty of material for the opposing intercept service. Only slowly 

did recognition of the danser lurking in the careless use of 

technical means of communicatio11 begin to spread among them. Late 

in 1915 one station of the Russian Fourth Arnry was ordered to 

monitor the work of its own stations. This was the first recorded 

attempt to increase the securi~y factor by monitoring their own 

• radio discipl.ine; at that time, however, it was already too late. 

In the spring of 1916 the Russians attempted a radio deception 

on the Austrian front, and this caused mu.ch amusement in the Austrian intercept service. To veil the withdrawal of t"WO corps, 

they had several radio stations carry on deceptive traffic. 

Ronge reports that the Russians, innocent as children, announced 

this in advance in a radiogram which was solved, naturally, by the 

Austrians. Moreover, they prefiXed to every fake telegram an en .. 

ciphered sentence with the following content: "Do not be alarmed; 

this' is just deception" This intermezzo was comi'ort:tna to the Aust.ria.ns, I 

/ 

inasmush as it showed that the Russians ha.d no idea that their I 

:n 

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'rh'' l\nm·tJ.ov offensive 'tTO.G !;he lr.1.ol; o.J,Lc111pt by Cm:i.riat Ruosia:1 

to tm•n the forl;tmcs of ·wa.r in i·to awn i'nvor. With i ';s expiration 

in SeJ:>tcml,•.::r 1916 o.nd with the outcome of the i'ollmrina ca.111po.icsn in 

Ron1a11io., the ·uar f:lpil.·.tt in Russia ho.d dlsa}.'>peo.red. Intercepted 

Russian telephone conversations revealed a rapid decline in fiehtine; 

t11oralo and a. clear rise or revolutlona.ry i;endcncy. Over the telephone 

men scolded openly a.bout Lheir officers and talked about the senselessness of prolonc;inc the war. The thouc;hts of the Russian soldier 

turned more o.nd mol•e towo.rcl hom0 rather tho.n to the front and to the 

enemy. Even amon.g the officer corps trends could be recoBfl:l.zd'd which 

aimed at ending the war, since o. mili to.1·y victory was no lenser considercd possible. fJuppJy WO.S lno.dequate; the O.lllm.tmition ~ituation e 

wo.s bo.d. Social tensions bcGo.n· to occt\py more antl. more space in a.ll 

conversations. 

In March 1:117 the revolution broke out in Petersburg. Czar 

Michola.a II abdlcatcd ln l..he nir:;lrc o.r 15 - 16 March. The middle 

I 

I class Democrats awl the morlcra.te Socialists under Kerenski took 

power. In spite of the 'mr wea.rincas of' the soldiers, they determined 

to continue the 1ro.r. llr:initorloa or nussian in·(;ernal traffic showed 

tb.D.t a. ncu wave or ene1·Q' fi•o111 v.uovc roui·cd oul.. over the country and 

the army. Thcr~ 1ras an ntt1.::1.1pli under 11a.tional democratic vatchwords 

to rcenliven l..he mllito:ry i'.i.c;hLing spb·it a.I.. the f.1.•ont. 

Very soon the inLe:t·ccpt fie1·vice lea:.·nc..:11 that tll·~ nuostlr.n front 

irus s l:;'.).bilizine; iLscli' o.nc··1, a.nd we.s !'l'eparinc:; for offencive battles. 

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• 

While the Germans were engaged in violent defensive battles in Flanders, and the Austrians stood at the Isonzo, the Russians under Brusi1ov, who had mea:mrhi1e become command.er-in-chief of' the entire Russian 

Army~ attacked on 1July1917. The i~enil.ing attack had long since 

been recognized by the German and Austrian intercept service. They 

had had ample time to prepare for it. The men at the instruments sat 

tense and listened to every conversation which referred to the attackand its execution. From Riga to Smorgon the storn broke bef'ore the 

German lines. Only in Galicia did the Russians bi·:ve partia.1 success. 

But in the cowitertbrust German and Austrian troo:, s broke through the 

Russian lines near Tarnopol, and caused the entire Russian front to 

waver. All of East Gal.icia and l3ukovina, which iu.a. been lost the 

year before, were again occupied. 

To con:g;>le·te the mil.itary collapse of Russia, on the J.eft flank 

the German EiBbth Army attacked and took Riga. on 3 September. The 

islands Oesel:, Moon, and Da.goe were occupied in October. 

MeanwhiJ.e, the intercept service had learned of the complete 

break-down in morale of the Russian front. The former war ·weariness 

of the Russian sol.diers bad ma.de wa;y for definite hostil.ity toward ""'\ 

wa.r. The tension between men and offlcers changed into open confl.ict. ', 

\, 

The social fti.ctor came into the foreground, sharp and clear. All conversations. turned on the ending of the war and the readjustment or social 

problems •• They to.lked only about capitalists and bottrgeois as parties 

interested in the wur; it 'ms clearly to be :f'el t tht!:t the 'iEU' on t'.:::l.e 

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• 

rnvolu.tion 1>1·01;.:c out 111 rctcrsuw.·c. K•-1·•:nok:I "Wt'll .ovui-tlu·owJ.1. 

'l'hc nol1Jhcv lQ ta toolt over tbc covcrnnlt nt.. UO\T propncn.ndo. l'&\lio-

. gro.nm n.ud i11Bt1·uc·tions from tlle new c;ovcrI1111ent went out o.ll OVCJ.• 

tho cotml.ry by I.he dozen,, thy 11e1·c heard by the Ga:rman lltld Aus:trian 

intt..-rcc."Pt se1•vj ccs o.s well. Tho major activity or. thcoe oeTVices 

wo.s now tui-nl?d i'rom monitoring Russian military radio trai'£ic to 

li&tening to Hussian internal traffic. It WO.IJ a question o:r go.ining clarity regardinG events in Russia. The milit~y intercept 

serv;ice in the ~o.st had completed its o.sstanment; pow the po1itioal 

assignment stepped into the forelJl"'ound. 

A1'ter tile end of World We.t" I,, General Ro.r:rmann,, :Ln his book 

11The War o! Missed Opportunities,, II stated with rogo.rd to the inter- e 

cept service that during the entire war in the east this service 

had su;pplied t.he German comrno.nd currently with such cmqplete information regardina the enemy that it was always :tully ini'ormed 

rcgai-d1ng the situation on the enemy side. 

FromTann.rnberg to the em oi' the war the interception of 

Rueoia.n technical means of cormmmica.tions had given the German 

I and Austrian cOll'mBlld so many suggestions rar the execution of their 

own measures that it is iq>ossible to conceive how the '\lB.r in the 

east"might have gone,, if this meRne of intelligence had not been 

e04lloyed b;r the Central Powers,, and if the Russians ha.d not used 

their technical means of communications in such a careless manner. 

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RESlAllignl)i 

In the course oi' Worl.t1 War I the in~ercept service on both 

sides scored various successes which mo.de it possible to win b~tt1es, 

to plan and carry out operations, or co help shape entire ca.mpa.igns ,' 

to a very great; degree. However iuqlOrtant l;hese individual Sl.l.cces-· 

ses ,,ere and however GI'eatly they influ.enced the course of' r.ll.l.itary 

events, they were nevertheless not able to produce results 't-Thich 

would decide the war. Onl~ in ~ case did this happen, and this 

case will. now be described briefly. 

It ·was in August 1911~, a few days after the occupa"t;ion of' 

Brussels' by the German troops, ·when a German officer appeared in 

an aristocratic villa in the suuurbs of Brussels, presented a 

billet slip and took up his q:uarters there. The villa belor.ged 

to the famil.y Czelt. On the following day the son of the house, 

Alexander Czek, an engineer by calling, announced himsel.i' to the 

German officer and asked i'or a brief' interview. I·c was gra.n·ted willingly, and now Alexander Czek related that he had. set up in his 

house a short time before a radio sending and receiving set which 

was not being used by him at the moment but was ready for operation. He desil'~d to bri11c; this fact to the a:l;tention of the 

German military a.trlihorities so that he would not corr.e under suspicion of' ca:rrying on espionage with the aid of this re.dio set. 

IIe led. the Gerr.'\an officer into the room in question o.nd ~llowed. him 

the o.ppara.tus. The officer nou gave instructions to leave the 

(" . 

... 

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conpetcnt.. Gcrm'ln r.>iennl or ricer 1 who wonJ.cl t.lv:.:11 t..ukc i)ropc1• action. 

On the follovinc; do.y there ap1)cQl.•ed o.t the home of, 1\1e=:::J.11de1• 

C~ok o. Ccrun.n l.icutcnnnt colonel, the s:ic;no.l offlcer or the Germo.n 

cotmno.nd in Brussels,, who ho.d the set demonstro.ted. He recoe;nizcd 

at once thnt Czck had coustructad au apparatus which wus bro.nd new 

·in the field of radioteiearo.phy, since it ma.de possible working 

on an extraordino.rily 'lrj.dc wavc-ba.nd without havina to ~ertD.ltc 

cotnplicated switchinc;s or other chanGes. Such an apparatus was 

exceedin~ly importo.nt for handlirl,1 receptton, espcciaily for the inter1 cept service which still had t'b count on 1~he enemy's using wa.ves for 

I 

which one was not equipped. Czel:'s appa.I·.~tus was dismounted and 

taken to beadquart.crs. With that the matt.er was settled for the 

time being. 

Some weeks later technical trouble developed in the transmitting apparatus of the heavy German radio station in Brussels, which 

coul.d not be eliminated with the means at band. By chance, someone 

remembered the enaineer Alexander Czek and had him summoned. Czek 

succeeded, in eliminating Ghc trouble in a shm:t time and in getting . the station ready for operation. 

The radio sta~ion of the Brussels general. cornmand ha.d three 

assi13I1m.ents at the time: first, it had to work the army traffic of 

the higher German military authorities; next, it "ITo.s in direct communication with Me.uen and KBnieswustcrhausen for handling diplomatic 

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,. 

·~ 

RE~HIJ1 

rau:to tl'nfi'ic 'between the Foreien o.r:r:tce in Bcrljn o.u.c1 ·the "?.:tili- 1 

tary J\.dministro.tion Bclcium"; the third task consisted in copylng 

I 

during free periods foreiGn radio traffic, i.e., in carrying on 

\ 

·.intercept wo1•k. 

\ The technical qualifications of the engineer Ale.:xa.nd.cr Czek 

bad now attracted the attention of the Germans, and it was decided 

\ 

tq m.<J.ke use of his services. Especially since, as it turned out, 

Czek 'va.s not a Belgian but an Austrian. His father had held a high 

position in Austria and belonged for a time to the intimate circle 

of Emperor Franz Joseph. Alexander Czek' s mother was an English 

woman. The family had resided in Brussels for several years, and 

Belgium had become their new homeland. Before engaging Czelt's 

services for a long ter , some investigations were made, which all 

turned out in favor of the Czek family. In Vienna it was stated 

that there was not the slightest doubt regarding the family in 

general or about Alexander Czek in particular. 

Whereupon, Alexander Czek was requested by the Brussels command 

to appear, and they now revealed to him that there was a prospect 

of using his services for sorr~ little time; they suggested that 

he enter the Brussels radio station on the basis of a civilian 

contract. 

Aside from his technical knowledge in the field of radio, 

Czek had a good knowlede;e of several laneue.:::;es, and it was this 

lo.ttor circumstance which finally proved tl:e determining i'c.ctor 

,~I 

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in cn[})G i n~.i; 1J lm o.t: t.11'..: radio s to:l...t on. C 7.".!k o.gr(~c<l tJ,llt.l , ri.r; l~im".:l went 

on, ri·ovec.l. i.o 1.11~ o.n cxtrcrncly useful fellow worker. He took care of 

all ·tll.':} appar.:itus, m. .. i.dc suc;c;cotionc for imp1·ovcrn~nts, anrJ. on cvr:.ry 

occa.sion r1.:11J.uretl i;ood t>~rvico with his linauistic knowlcdce. They 

' 

cam') to trust him o.bsolut.ely and one d.o.y rev'ca.lcd t.o him th.at they 

inteudetl to use hlm ill the radio rcceivinc; nervice. 

Czek lmcw the Uor!lc al;pho.bet o.ud. could copy nt wh::i.t '\-Tt'lS then 

the usual 1:1pccd.. Ile was Bl vcn addi tiono. l tro.ininc; 

ancl wo./ then etiiploycd in copylna the tre.nsmisoions 

I 

I 

in Ct\r rcccrition, 

or foreign stations 

sent f n p lo.in text. They ho.d hacl Czck sir;n a plcclae of secrecy; l:ir1i1. 

' admonjshed him to maintain a.baolute silence; and ·wUh that, all l.he 

i for~.alities were at an end. 

I 

In his new field Czcl;. wurkcd to cveryboiy' s satisfaction. 

Evidently thr::y I.lad lll.'J.rle a. e;ood. fi.nd at the Brussels i•arlio sta:t.iou. I 

Ai'ter sou1e months ho.d. pP.sscd, they went. a step further ancl used 

I 

Czek for their own sendinc; aml rcceivina service, pri.tl'l.n.ri.ly oi:1 traffic 

with Ua.ucn e.ud KBnic;smts terb.u.usen. HI? ho.d to sen<l or receive the 

enciphered telearows. 

Al.exa.wlcr Czck wo.s not; only o.. corrrr:ctenl; t..cchniciru.1 o.nd 1il'.le;ttiElt, 

but l:m nlao proverl to be on ae;reco.ulc compo.nlon and coutt•ar.lc. He 

spent mo.ny an cv .=mina i.n anj ni.'.l.tcL1 conv~rsatiou wj.th 11is ll'.fW cot.w::"a.lle::; 

o.r.d 11lth tlli;i of.i'icc::rs or th·.: Bruoscla conn"and und "11.J.G evcr:,"·rhcrc 

a. 1relCOlll.:l et1 .... r.;t. ThtJ c;cnr::·1·a.1 confi<.lcnce in hiul 1:0.s tUlbOU'Yl'lec1. One 

auy "lrllen thi::rc ·u:J.s _pco.k orere.tion o.t the i•aclio station, sevc:i:el very 

101~ cncipherec.1 tclec1•ams o.rrived £r01a thoJ Fcrcian Off lee at lJcrlin. 

ns 

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It a.lso h..-"l)_Jpcmed that t110 ])Cople at t~he station were si.ck. The 

heo.ds mail.c up their mi11ds quickly and ho.11ded Czek the two code 

books by the a.id of which the cryp togi·ar>hic system used uy lihe 

Foreic;n Off ice was deciphered, cave lllm the necessm·y instructions 

for using the two codes, ~d Czek sc·t t;o work. 

The "cryptogro.ph:i.c system used by the foreiBil Office in communica.tion with representatives a.broad (including the adminstra.-

tion of' the 11General-Gouvernment Belaien") consisted of a. code and 

an cncipherment. The code, or "Schluessellluclt" as it ·was ca..lled 

a.t that time, was a thick volume in which the code elements and 

I 

their meanings in plain text were entered in alphabetic sequence. 

A decipherment by the aid of this key book ·was quite simple; one 

onJ.y had to look u;p the code groups :In their alphabetic seqLtence 

and read off the meaning. To make the system more resistant to 

unauthorized decipherment, they had provided e.n enci:_pherment by 

the aid of which the secret text derived by cha.neing the plain 

text into code groups was changed a.gain, i.e., was reenciphered. 

This encipherment book tr.:!S arelative1y small vol.ume, and when 

deciphering a telegram it was necessary to work with this little 

book first, i.e., to find the basic key by removing the encipherm.ent. This procedure was relatively simple, but called for a ce:r·-

tain skill, since rad.ioarams sometimes ari·ived in garbled condition 

end the solution of' the groups was not always obvioi..1.s. Therefore, 

it ·was necessa.Ty to master the Morse alphabet. e.nc1 to l:J.1011 the 

8D 

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REST!HUf~21 

, ......... n~:Jbl~ .. ~To:..·r. n\1<1 G Tl·l-::o in ordc.1.· to rc.:>.ch ::i. .;;oJ.11 i. :.ell or r .. :1·-

blc.J wcs~:=- ~;co ·ui tl1out ho.ViJ18 to Ecnrl 'L:lel=. lone :I nr.ru11•ii:6 .. 

Cr.:~l:;. turrred out to be o.n c::ct;rcmol.y cl-::vcr dccork:..·, r-n·l :r:a.·u~a. 

then on be l~~::; u~cd repeatedly !or decodj_ri£l li'cannc;cs orriiri.ne 

frOi.l Dci•li.n. By beinB introduced into the intercept nervlce,. 

into the entire set:.d.inc ~nd receiving o.ctivity or th~ ~tatjon, 

into th:! "W01·lc of decodiuc;, o.ut1. j.nl:;o questions of tochno1oSY, 

Czck. hc.d e.1TiV'Cd a:L a confidential. position of the first ro.nl" .. 

r.:c i'illcu it conGciontioWJllr 1 and gave no occc.sion 1'01· at"JY compla.ints i;h:J.tsocver. 

In the D\'Llh.r!.:n" o.r 1915 o. co.pto.in or the En{l1ish Intellii;cnce 

Service turned up in Dr'1.osels 'rho ho.d lea.rm c.l. tho.t there vas a 

ms.n eq>J.oyed at the Brusscln rc.diu st.,. t!o11 11110 lmd. b'!cn rcsidillcl 

in Brussels. Re thou:;ht tb.:f :s mic,ll.t b~ a clio.ncc to aet soma insicht 

into the operation oi' the EiLa.t:ion, a.ncl bci:;o.n to spin a lreb ar~ 

Czek, so to spco.1'". A youn3 lt>tl.;r ol' nrur.&clo l'o.s selected to 'rin 

Czek over to work for the British sec1·ct service. This '\TDS not 

exactly eaoy beco.uso Czck be.d. endeavored thus f'a.r to bo correct 

in every wa:y. Gradually the youna la.dy broucht Alexander Czclt. 

into contact vi th members of' the Belaion Ji ·,era tion movement, and 

o.fter months of work finally succeeded in convincine; him tho.t it 

was his duty to work not i'or the Germans but for t.bc A1l.ies. 

They reminded him o'i: his mother's nationality, of his new home-

:uma., of the German attack on Belgium, of the German striv.ina for 

I .~o 

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RESM.-IGfF>BD21 

pmrer, of the just ca.use or the Allies, and brousht it about. that 

Czek said he was ready to prepare a copy of the code of the 

Ber1in Foreign Office for the British secret service. 

This was the goal of the entire activity of the Brj.tish 

secret service, as far as Czek was concernea. 

This task "li1B.s not exa.ctl.y easy since the two code books wre 

not in Czek's custody but were only handed over to him from timei 

to time when he had to decode an incoroing telegram. A1JfJ. this 

was by 110 means the rule. Normally, decoding was done by the 

German personnel of the station; Czek was only brought in to 

help out. Moreover, there was usua.ll.y a second person in the 

room so that it did not seem feasible to ccrpy the book systema.t1.-

ce.lly. Consequenli1y, Czek chose another way. When decoding 

incoming telegrams, he noted the groups occurring :J.n the telegram 

eJ.ong with their meaning on a sheet of pa.per, as a draft :f.'or his 

:::'air copy so to speak, and then copied the text nea.t1y. The 

pencilled notes on the draft he did not destroy but conceaJ.ed on 

his :person. In this wa:y he succeeded over some months in notine 

the meaning of' a.11. the code groups contained in telegrams received 

during this period. And a.:f'ter a.l.l, those were the sylJ.a.bJ.es, 

words, or phrases which were most frequently used. 

Czek 'Wen·!; about his work so cleverly th.at never once did 

suspicion fall on him.. It was in a. different ·way that he aroused. 

the mistrust of the German military authorities. Ile had been 

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RE~IUFmJ1 

Tiulalan lJ.bcra.tion movu111·:mli. l'coplc i-ratchcd h.!.111 e.ricl i'ournl l,r •• ~.t ho 

went o.rowlll ·ullih o. yot1n13 lc.J.y conc1..:r1dne; whom i.t ·wun 1;,nown cha.I, 

she lias in conte.ct With the 'Br l ti::;h occrct service. 'rI·wrctl_L)On, C: · 1· 

was dismisscJ. £row. the service of the Brussels milito.ry corron.-mc1, end 

was ordered to rcu•::i.in in D1·ussel.o and not to lco.ve ·tho.t city. 

now Czek so.w danBe1• arisinc; for him.self o.nd for his wo1·1:., an'1 

he decided to f1cc. 'R'e left Brussels, ta.kine; a.long his skr f·ch<...s, 

and i•ca.chcd the Dutch border. 1\.lonB this border the r.crmono h'-d 

stretchr:d a greo.t wi1·0 bar1·1ce.do chare;cd uith clcctrlcity. c~cJ:-

knew this. With two boards which he 'Wrapped with inflated. bicycle 

tubes, he succeeded in producing two inuulatod plates by the aid 

of which he crawled unc1er th~ electric fellce and rca.ched Dutch 

territory. Shortly ai'terwo..1·ds Czck•a sketches wore in the British 

Cipher Dur\::o.U in London. Ii'rom then on they were able to decipher and 

read a.ll re.di<." .:rams which were cxcha.nscd between the 'Rcrl.in Foi·eien 

Ofi'ice and. the Germon representatives abroad. This '."•s the case 

from about the end of l.?15 on. 

Even though this stroke by the 'Rritish Intelligence Service 

deserved great recognition, i~ is simply marvelous that the Ene;lish 

aucceeded in keeping secret throuBhout I.he entire war the fact that 

they knew the cryptographi.c system. Mot Llle slightest shadow of 

suspicion was aroused by e:ny la.ck of caution. EYery German telecro.m 

enciphered by this system was la.id bc.rore the "Rritish ForoiBn IIinister personaJ.ly 1 who made his dee is ions c.cc ordir.e;ly. 

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Wha:l. mo.de the Alexe.ndcr Czek caae a matter of the utmost importa.nce will natl be revealed, 

The Secretary or State for Foreien Affairs in Berl.in at tb.o;t 

time was Zimmermann. Late in 1916 and ea.:1.-ly in 1.917 the role of the 

United Sta.tea a.s purveyor of war material for the All.ies had a.osumad 

au.ch importance that it CJ.lmost equaled a. state of bellic;erency. 

Again and a.gain, voices had been raised in the Uni·ted Sta.tee to the 

effect that the United States must enter the war in order to shorten 

its duration. On the German side, an intensive counter-propaganda. 

had been ca.i•ried on 1 and Bl'a.due.lly there had devel.oped a. war party 

and a. peace party. As seen :Crom Germany, ·the possibili·ty o~ the 

entrance oi' the United States into the wo.r loomed threatenine;ly 

on the political horizon. Then in the Foreign Ofi'ice they decided 

on a. political intrigue which was intended to afford a cou11terpoise for this danger. Zimmcr111a.nn decided to play Mexico against 

i:ihe USA. 

At tho.Ii time the President or Mexico wa.s Carranza, ·who had. a·ctained the presidency by the aid of the United States buL, nevertheless, had taken a position distinc·tly i'riendly toward Germany. 

About the mid~e of l.917, Zinn.'l.ernia.nn had i·ecourse to the German 

ambo.ssad.or in Mexico, von EcldJ.ardt, :i.n a. rather 1.ong telegram. 

This telegram ·was so importan,t f'o1• Z:!.m.mermann tho.t he 1ras I 

very an.xiotts to have it reach the Ge1·man ambassador, von Eckhardt,, 

safely under any circums·liances. Accordill{;ly, several i·outcs uere 

""' .., •J 

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chosen for transmission. The i'irst led via radiotelegraphy from 

Nauen to Sayville on Long Island for :f'orwarding to the German 

Ambassador von Eckhardt in Mexico. 

The government of the USA had, to be sure, since the beginning of the war forbidden the use of this w1re1ess link for the 

transmission of messages dealina wi·th the war, and had kept an eye 

on the radio traffic. Nevertheless, the radiogram was sent and 

delivered to Co\lllt Bernstorff, the German ambassador in Washington, 

who forwarded the contents to von Eckhardt. 

The second route was via SWeden, by wireless from Stockholm 

to Buenos Aires, from there to Washington, and from there again 

to Mexico. 

The third route was not without its humorous side. It bad 

been planned to send the telegram in the form of a letter on the 

large German submo.Tine "Deutschland," whose captain, K6n1g1 was 

considered at that time one of the best submarine commenders. 

The departure ot the submarine, which was originally fixed for 15 

January, was delayed and they withdrew the letter in order to 

append its contents to a telegram 'Which was being sent by the 

then American ambassador in Berlin to his government in W~shington. 

How this route came to be chosen was as follows: 

The German Foreign Off ice applied to the ambassador of the 

tTSA in Berl.in, Gerard, with a request to transmit a telegram of 

the Foreign Office to Ambassador von Bernstorff. Since 1 t was 

94 

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• 

customary to show the text of the tel.egram. in plain language 

' in such cases, the Fore18n O~fice showed Ambassador Gerard a 

telegram numbered. 157 which was directed. to vonBernstorff and. I ' I 

'Which referred. to ·!;he peace action of President Wilson. Gerard 

approved of sending the tel.egram. In real.ity, however, the 

Foreign Office had appended to the enciphered ·text of the telegram 157 another telegram, namely, the one previously mentioned 

and intended for Ambassador von Eckhardt. The grotesque feature 

was that Zimmermann was using the .American ambassador,, Gerard,, 

and the American Secretary of State to transmit a tel.egram'Whose 

content concerned a hostile action against ·the USA. 

At the Berl.in Foreign Office they felt at that time t.ha.t 

they bad been very sly, and they were proud of having so neatly 

"taken in" the ambassador of' the USA. But it is an old story 

that, precisely when one is trying to be especially sly, one is 

el.ready about to comm! t something especia.l.ly stu;pid. In this 

casa the stupidity was enormous,, for it was known to the Foreign 

Office that this tel.egre.m. had to take the following route: from 

Berl.in by wire to Copenhagen,, from there by cable to London, and 

from. London by ~able to New York. 

After the outbreak of war 1 England bad generously declared 

itself ready to forward enciphered telegrams of neutral. diploma·ts 

which contained messages o;f tbe German Government to its diplomatic representatives abroad. It never occurred to anyone in 

95 

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Berl.in that this 1Jencrosity ·was prompted by the idea of bcinc 

abJ.e in thi.s way to.control all German telegrams in both directions. 

The humorous part, in this instance, lay in a di:l':f'e:rent 

direction. On 16 January the British Intercept service had 

intercepted the Nauen telegram to Sayville; however. the :reception was so bad that tbe message couJ.d only be cop:J.ed in baclly 

g8.1'bled form. When they.had deciphered the enciphered text 1ri 

London, they fine.l.J.$ go~, ithe following: 

--\ To the I~erial. German.Ambassador in Washington. 

Count Bernstorff, 

1' 

For the Iuq>erial Gertna.1\ Ambassador in Mexico, von Eckhardt. 

' 

Strictl.y secret, intended only for the personal information of Your Excellency and. to be f orwarde~ to the Imperial 

.Ambassador in Mexico, by means of • • • by a secure route. 

\, 

We are planning to eta.rt w:irestricted submarine warfare beginning 1 February. Nevertheless, we are very anxious to keep the United States neutral •••• If that is not 

\ 

successfUl., we propose to Mexico an alliance on the follO'Wing basis: ••• warfare •••• conclusion of peace. Your Excellency will, for the time being, inform the President ••• \re.r 

with USA ••• President ••• , that our submarines will force 

E1113land to make peace within a. few months. Confirnn.tion 

requested. 

Zinu .. Jrma.nn 

P.6 •' 

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Th:i.s d:I spatch showed tbat o. di11lom1J.t:i.c action or the first I 

rank by Germany wns :i.nvol vec1. . rl'llc 11 :..:ecre t Service 11 was imrr.cclia. tel.y told L.o purcho.sc :i.n Uexico C:ity from the l;elegrc.ph btu•oa.u a 

• 

copy of the tnlcc;ram forwarded l>y von Hcrnotorrr to vou !!.ckhiu·dt. 

However, before l;h is happencc1, 1.he tclecram sent by Gerard to 

Washine;'.;on arr.ivec1 in Hoom nur.1bnr 110 of l,hc Eritish Admiralty, 

and this sttppllctl ~he B1·1tt::;h '!r:;1,tarml.yi,k ticrv1.ce w:lth a com .• 

plete text of ti:mt ;;~lc1.i·o.m of ~:i11;.,r~rr:m.nn tc.i von Eckhardt. 

On the cvcnin!; of' 23 ii'ehrnc.r;,· 1 :17, the ai.1bo.ssador or the 

USA in London, l·h·. Pa(;c, received a 1..c-lr.phonc c~ll i'rom the 

Br:l.tish ForeiGn Ilinister, Ur. na.li'our, who rcciut?stcd hint to ca.11 

at the Forcii::;n Of:!'ice t.hat so.me oa.;y. PrJ.se l:.c tnok. hhi1nelf at once 

to Do'\-m:l.nB LJtrect. J\.ftcr the r.;enl;lei.len had c;rccted one another, 

Bal.four without o. word lmnclcd •.;he nmbaoso.dor or the UGA a sheet 

of paper whose t;ypewr:J.tten text Page read with crmr:inc; interest. 

In the i'ollowinc nieht the follmri.n3 w~ry tu•r.;cnt cablcc;l.'am. 

went from London to WashinGton: 

2!~ February 1917 

To the President, 

Oi'i'ice of the Secretary oi' State, Hashington. 

In about three hours I shall dispatch to the Presiden·t and 

Secretary of State a tele(7"am of the c;reatest importo.n~e. 

Page. 

97 

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RES-1 

At (Jtr r-,qi lrn.tton o! 1ih1: DrulO\U\PCtl IJJrC'l bou1•s tlJO London 

211- Fobrna.r7 1?17 

To Llm l'r•:o lrlt"nl., 

orr:lco or t.111• l''l"l-ol:.m."y or Ctn.tic, Uo.sbtncton. 

fJt'Cl"t'(... J.t'or t.h,. l"Tco lrl.onL and Llm Or.f lce or tho fl'!crotary 

Bo.11."0Ul• hoo clv."n me Lbc lcxt or on t?nc lpht!rod Lolo~mn 

I 

from Zlli1 K."1°11111101 t.o t.bo C:e1"111Wl nmt1ae,.oilor ln tlcxico. A cop:r 

cnn :ra1·olio.hl:r 1'c orc1u•ctl l.ln·ou~h Lhe 1.ol'!'crnttb oti"icc 1n 

Ua.ohin:;Lon. 'I ho flro t C"'~iur h:icJ.Lco.tna t.110 telc(..'1.'a.m m11riborJ 

I 

pornono.J 1 clr11 I 1 r1 rn l.: Oil f ,\1\l1ll> • t l\' I M.''lltl:I n,_; by pnn t. G. CO,PJ' 

1100Jl'Wl1tle lhr, !:u 1 1 •.h l.1•nnnlrsl.IOl\ fol.lC'WD; 

slmll 111Ql:1.• I :1•x i rC) I\ lll'' •1XH1 1 l.1 Ill\ fer r• 11 ul.L I t•J].t•., Oil the rol0\\1' pru•t. i.h:.i.:~ 11~ 'I ··n i r In 7"t'l"on !ll"l' 1.11.· l"E L m t.r\n ol' '.Ccxna, I 

I' 

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RE~ll1CHD1 

most secretly inform the President of this when the entrance 

of the united states into the war had become certain, and 

suggest at the same time that he on his own initiative call 

upon Japan to join us, and that he mediate between Japan and 

• 

ourselves. At the same time, call the President's attention 

to the fact that we are waging unrestricted submarine warfare, 

and in that way shall force England to make peace in a few 

months. 

Zimmermann" 

I hasten to send this message so that all necessary measures may be taken to guard our territory against invasion • 

Strictly • secret& -- At the beginning of the war the 

British Government came into the possession of a code. It 

served tor decipherment of the above telegram. The Goveniment obtained copies of von Bernstorff's telegrams which went 

to Mexico. They were sent to London and deciphered there. 

This system has hitherto been a strictly guarded secret regarding which the British Government informed me only in view of the 

Ul\USUal circumstances and of its friendly feelings for the 

United states. The British Government requests maintenance 

of strictest secrecy, but has no objection to the publication 

of this Zimmermann telegram. 

Copies of this and other telegrams were not secured in 

Washington, but were purchased in Mexico. 

99 

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I have thanked Balfour. 

The Japanese have not as yet been informed, but it is 

probable tba.t they will discuss the matter publicly when 

they have knowledge of it, in order to clarify their position 

and to prove their fidelity to the Allies. 

Page 

The way in which the British came into possession of this 

I 

message is described in the words: "The telegram.was purchased 

in Mexico." Kawever, the English secret $ervice actually got 

this precious message in the following ways: 

1. by intercepting the radiogram from Nauen to Bayville J 

2. by intercepting the radiogram from Stockholm to Buenos 

Aires; 

3. by reading the cablegram from Berlin via Copenhagen to 

London and Washington; 

4. by purchasing from a Mexican telegraph official the 

Morse tape, preserved in the telegral?h office in Mexico, 

of the telegram from von Bernstorff to von Eckhardt. 

The purchase in Mexico did not take place, to be sure, until 

a knowledge of the content had been obtained in the first three 

we.ya mentioned; it merely served for confirmation. 

One can imagine 'What ill'q)ression the knowledge of this dispatch 

made in Washington on the President and on Secretary of State Lansing. 

100 

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Al.though the content of the Zinnnermann telegram was condit:J.one.l 

and onJ.y applied in case the United States declared war on Germany, I 

nevertheless this German step aroused great indignation in Washing-

. ton. The support - even though conditional - of Mexico's cl.aim 

to the three southern states which it had lost to the United 

States in the war or 1846, was reearded as an attack on the territorial status of the United Sta~es. They overlooked the basic 

idea of the dispatch which was to the effect that Germany was 

trying to maintain the neutrality of the United States, and only 

regarded the contingent consequence which would be released by 

America's entrance into the war. 

In spite of all their indignation, people in Washington were 

mistrustful of London. Suppose the entire Zimmermann telegram were 

only a fake to maneuver the United States into the wart They 'Wanted 

proof, and telegraphed to the ambassador in London that he should 

ask the British Government to turn over a copy of the German secret 

code. 

The British Government declined from basic considerations of 

security, but decl.ared that it was ready to have the Zi:nmerma.nn 

telegram decoded once more using the code present in London, and 

to have this done in the presence of a member of the American 

enibassy in London. This was an easy matter, since Mr. Bell, the 

Secretary of the American embassy and representative of the signal 

service, lived quite near the British central intelligence office. 

RESTRICTED 
The enciphered Zimmermann telegram was given to Bell; the 

British loaned him their precious German code, and Dell was now 

~ 

able to perform the decoding w:J. thin a few hours. Wilson was now in 

a position to determine that the message was absolutely authentic. 

However, the President insisted on receiving the German originaJ. · 

text. In answer to this Page telegraphed: 

London 2'March 1917 

To the Secretary of State in Washington 

The first group signifies the number of the telegram 130 • 

• The second indicates the code to be 'used in deciphering. 

From group three on, the groups read: 

AuswU.rtiges Amt, Januar 16.Nr.l. - Ganz geheim. 

Selbst zu entziffern. - Wir beabsichtigen - ••••••••• 

Meanwhile, the second Zimmermann telegram had been deciphered 

in London and Page got a copy: 

To the Imperial German Ambassador in Mexicq von Eckhardt 

8 February 1917 

Strictly secret. To be deciphered persona.11.y. 

·Under the e.ssurqption that the USA would find out nothing 

about it, you are requested to present again to the President 

the proposal for an alliance. Any f':i.nal decision, however, 

is dependent upon the entry of the United States into the war. 

The President may enter into negotiations with Japan on his 

102 

RESTRICTED 
.. 

own initiative. If the President sbouJ.d fear retaliation, 

l • 

you are authorized to offer him a permanent alliance after the I 

conclusion of peace, provided he succeeds in drawing Japan 

• into the al.1iance. 

Zimmer~ 

In London they declared they were ready to have decipherment 

of telegrams of the German Foreign Office carried out jointly with 

a member of the embassy of the USA in order to give guarantee of the 

genuineness of the material. They were also ready to have messages 

sent to Berlin by German representatives abroad deciphered in his 

• 

presence. In Washington they a.greed to this. 

In Berlin, meanwhile, people entertained the firm conviction 

tha·t the ciphers of other nations might be capable of solution but 

not their own. And the method of transmitting a me~sage of such 

importance through the et~r d:i.d not appear to them as a piece of 

folly. 

Through these two telegrams of Zimmermann•s, Wilson's position 

in regard to Germany '\m.s now clearly determined; for those states 

• 

which had not been able to get up any enthusiasm. for the war these 

dispatches afforded proof that an intrigue of the Berlin Foreign 

Off ice was Willing to hand over to the Mexicans great areas of the 

USA. 

Meanwhile, in Washington they had become convinced that the 

lo,· 

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• 

f:irst aml sn~oncl :/. lnm1m·mn1111 telt-Cl•nmn wt:irr• ~r·nu In<·. 'l'hr.;y- lnqulrcd 

in r..onnon whcl..h<•1· ll"'<~l] r. l,hcre uonld o.csrcP. to 1a1'1.ldng t.hc content 

of the firn I, t..i:-lr?cram 1.110,m. A rt.er sott1e llt>s i. Lo. I.. Lon thn Bri tlsl1 

Government~ sl~wd l.h.o.t. :ft WO\.tld scree 011 rondll.lon thuli 1thc l.rue . source should 11ot. ho 1·" ,H~al.cd bu!. Lim.t t..ll•! imr>rcaa ton shonlu be 

given that the l.ol-co.·0111 h!).11 hr-en brou~ht l,o i;be o.l..l.cnt.loii. of l.he 

United States in n01n~ t11Dnncr Jn llcxfro. 'l'hPrPupon, \11.li:.on at. the 

White Ilouse publishc1l I.ht- conl.cnl. of l,he rUGrnt.•·h Oll 1 Ji."J.TClt. 

A storm o:C indic;na.l;ion ;pnsR,..cl lht"ou.1,l\ •JlP. Conc;rcas and thP 

entire cowitry". The wnr ri:.1.1·1.:,· gor~ nn cn0Tmo11F1 J I rt. 

The pul>l lc-o.ti.on In Wo.r.l1 l11:~·.cl1i 11r I.he ~'.inm1cn.Ja.Illl dispo.tcll 

' 

became known n.I. 011c-c in DeJ·ltJ1. '11hcre ua.n a.n l:':>~cit.crl se3sion o.r 

the Rcichst.o.G. ~~i1111::eT"T.1U11a '1(1,r: i'rir ''"-!" 1 o D1lmU 1.110.t I.he dlspatch 

'Was genu tne • 

criticized the i'rlvnlcJ'UlllC"r.:1 or l.lir! ,:cr"tlh r:o•:ei't!l'lCllt, n.rul cJcclared: 

"We cannot co111prc~1end row t\ 11P:,~n.1,r' .-.1• :::"'!h ~11110Tl..l11re can co1ce 

to the knowl.cdc;e o! a. rori:ii..:;u Nl~1 .. : 1:. ~.r rf'.nnn'" C'\.')m•u:f'ire that. 

'though he were tllc l>t:!st 0-1•1 1110u ... r·· l: ! l· 1 ., ti 11.: vo.rlrl." 

Oh the ve1•y da;r on uhkh ~/il:.;...,11 vo.u p·Jl ll·;l1h;, tb.: I.ext of the 

.. I • 

R:ESTRIC'l'ED 
• 

the results of the negotiations. According to him, Corranza had 

shown himself "not adverse to such plans" J he would "consider 

benevolently, 11 and he had "talked tor an hour and a half" with 

the Japanese ambassador in Mexi,co. 

But on the very same dq von Eckhardt learned of events in 

• 

Washington, and on the next day he telegraphed: 

To the Secretary ot State ot the Foreign Office 2 March 

1917, in Berlin. 

The local paper "Universal, 11 which is friendly to the 

Allies, publishes today the same report that was contained in 

yesterday's Washington Telegram - and which apparently has 

been in the hands of President Wilson since the breaking of 

relations - namely, the wording of cablegram A Nr. 1. Naturally, this was not revealed by me here. Treachery or indiscretion must have occurred in the United States or cipher 

I 3040 has been betrayed. 

The wording ot cable Nr. 21 which reached me in the other 

familiar fashion, has not been published as yet. I have 

denied everything here. 

v. Eckhardt 

In Berlin the uneasiness grows. They seek the source ot 

the betrayal. The following exchange of telegrams ensuess 

To v. Eckhardt 7 March 1917 

Please burn all compromising instructions. Have publicly 

10:> 

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recognized the cable. Please see to spreading the word that 

the alliance was onl.y intended in case of America's entrance 

into the war. 

To v. Eckhardt 

Strictly secret. 

Decipher personally. 

Zimmermann 

21 Ms.rch.1917 

Please cable in the same code used for deciphering cables 

1 and 2 bow the originals and keys were safeguarded, and 

especially whet.her the two cables were kept in the same place. 

Stumm. - Berlin. 

To v. Eckhardt 

Various thing indicate that the treachery took place in 

Mexico. The ut.111Jst caution is in order. Burn all compromising documents. 

Zimmermann 

1

.ro Zimm.el'mo.nn 27 March 1917 

Doth cables were decirihered by Magnus a.cco1·ding to my special 

inst1'Uctions • Bo Lh telegrams, as al~ra.ys where political 

documents o.r secret character are involved, did no.t come to 

the knowledge of embassy personnel.. Telee;ram Hr. 1 K 1~ 

e.rri ved in the c 1 pher system I 3011-0 1 whi le Kink.el (a former 

employee of the German embassy in \·la.shi1113ton), who is now 

1 or. 

RESTRICTED 
• 

RES3f'R.!1£?'FB1i 1 

employed here, thinks he recalls that the Washington embassy 

sent it, like all other enciphered telegrams sent here, from 

Cape Cod (a cable station)• In both cases the originals 

were'burned by Magnus and the ashes were scattered. Bol:.h 

• • 

cablegrams were preserved in an absolutely secure sate, which 

was bought solely for this purpose and was.located in Magnus• 

bedroom, down to the time that they were burned. 

'Answer to telegram. Nr. 21. Instructions were carried out. 

cable number 18 has not arrived as yet. 

v. Eckhard-t 

In a further telegram of 30 March 1917, von Eckhardt asserts 

.. again that any indiscretion in Mexico was not possible and recounts 

again all security measures, the reading of the telegrams in a low 

voice at night, the security of the safe, etc.J l111t at the same time 

he calls attention to the less cautious procedures at the German 

embassy in Washington, where even secret telegrams had been known 

to the entire chancelle1"1' and where two carbons had always been 

made for the registry office, something which was never done in 

Mexico. Finally, he insists upon a judicial investigation by 

Consul Grunow. 

• In Berlin they allowed the111Selves to be convinced of von 

Eckhardt 1 s innocence by this telegram, and confirmed this to him 

by radiogram ot 4 April 1917 in which it says: "No blame attaches 

101 

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to you or I In.en.us • " 

?-Ica.nwh:J.lc, ncc;otia·tlons with Ca:rram:a :t.n Haxico continued because the deliveries of aumn.mi ti on stood in the forefront.. 

To v. Eckhardt, Mexico 17 March 19J.7 

Find out; who.t a.mnn.mition and weapons arc desired and what 

Mexican harbor on the easl; or west coast a. German ship wou1d 

enter uncler a. forei~ i'la.a~ As far as poss-ible, Mexico must 

procure arms from Japan aJ1d South America~ 

Zimmermann. 

The Berlin Fore i&rn Office, however, did not 'Luild all. its 

hopes on Carranza alone. They even went so i'ar as to draw his 

political opponents and antagonists into the circl.e or intrigue. 

Thus, on 24 Ha.1·ch 1917 the German uti.l.itary att.ache in Mexico radios 

to Berlin: 

The Vice-Consul in Mazatlo.n repor!;s that Villa., who is being 

supported by the Germans, is cxpectin~ three shiploads of 

amnn.mi t:J on to be landed. between I Iaza tlan and M.a.nzannil1o. 

It is thought that Cantu is also in the alliance. ( Can·tu was a 

Mexican revolutionary lead.er whose field of activity was 

souther11 California.) 

These tele~rams wei·c deciphered in London, and the content 

disclosed in s small intj.mate circle. The German search for the 

source of the com.promise occasione(1 great merri'(l1ent. 

lo~~ 

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• 

In this connection, it :must be emphasized that the Brit.ish 

intercept service was able during the entire war to keep its work 

so secret that not the slightest hint regarding it reached the 

outside. The British secret ~ervice, to wl1tch the intercept 

service belonged, even went so ftil~ in camouflagjng its work that 

it allowed articles to appear in the British press critici~ing 

its own work and making violent attacks on it. In these articles, 

which were written b7 the service itself, the wo:r·k of the British 

secret service was characterized as totall.v antiquated, and it 

was asserted that one .failure followed the other. The at.fair of 

the ZimmernJSnri dispatch was macle the occaaion for special cr.i.t ... 

icism; it was said that the American intelligence service was 

much more 1~horough and precise and it. was a shame that the Zimmer-

.... ..! 

mann affair had been discovered in Washington and not in London,,• 1··' 

By this constant self-ridicule they fooled the German intelligence 

service and German public opinion so thoroughly that these articles in the Engli.sh press were seized upon with great delight, 

were reprinted, and provided with appropriate commentaries. 

Far more serious, however, was the effect of the Zimmermann 

telegrams in the United States. Between mid-Janua?'Y' and the end 

of April 1917 soma 60 telegrams were exchanged between Zimmermann 

and von Eckhardt. All came to the knowledge of Wilson. Their 

pression of a plot between Germany and Mexico. They tipped the 

scales in the foreign policy of the United States. On 6 April 

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1917 the USA declared war on Germany. 

Ho"7evar, the e:idlange oi' telegrams between Berlin and Mexico 

continued: 

Ziunnerma.nn, Berlin 

To v. Eckhardt, Mexico 13 April 1917 

Plense answer tel.egram numlJer 10 stating the sums which 'Will 

be required to support our policy. Preparations :ror the 

shipment of considerable amounts (aid, eventually -weo.pons,too) 

are being made here. I 

v. Ecldlardt, Mexico 

To Ziunne:rmann, Berlin 13 April 1917 

For Na.d.ol.ny and the Grand General Starr. 

Mexico 12 April. 

Where is Lieutenant Wohst 1 Did he send approxima:te1y 25 1 000 

doll.are to Hilk.en'l He or someone elsa nm.st send me money for 

55793 qua.rterl.y payments for Hermann. An expl.a.na.tion: 

Hermann, a handsome, blonde German with an Engl! sh accent, 

claims to have received from the general staff a yea.r ago the 

:mission to destroy the Tampico o~l field by fire; this order 

was repe&.ted supposedly by Hilken 1.n January; he now proposes 

to carry it out, and asks me whether he is to do so. Would it 

not be well to answer him that I am not in touch with Berl.in? 

Verdy thinks tha. t he and hi q companion B 5ll58 Gerds are 

110 

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• 

RES~21 

English or American spies. 

Request an immediate answer. 

v. Eckhardt, Mexico 

• 

To Zinnnermann, Berlin 14 April. l.917 

The President declares he :l.ntend.s to rematn neutral under o.J...!.. 

circumstances. If' Mexico neverthel.ess becomes it11ml v~·:I in ·the 

war, we must wait and see. In his opinion the alliance has 

become a ridiculous matter due to the premature publ.ication 

of the telegram but may l.ater turn out to ~ nef!essary. As . _,- ..... 

for the del.iveries of a.tnmtUlition - 'f mm Mauser rifl.es - and 

money, he will give an answer when he has the power of decision 

in his own hands after getting powers pl.enipotentiary from. the 

Congress. The Congress is dominated by the pro-German tnil.itary 

party. 

v. Eckhardt, Mexico 

To Zimmel'tllB.nn, Berl.in 17 April 1917 

Mexico, 1.6 April. 

Yesterday I attended the opening of the Congress. The 

President expressed his strict neutrality. Both coming and 

going I received great applause. "Long live Germa.nyl Long 

l.ive the Kaisert" On entering the hall the entire chamber 

manifested its aood will. The American ambassador was whistl€u 

at feebly three times • 

'll:ESTRIGTED 
The German public learned nothing of all these events, and 

in the Foreign Office at Berlin no one had any idea that the entire telegraphic correspondence between Berlin and the German 

representatives abroad was being read in England, insofar as it 

could be picked up there. In Berlin they strove for the utmost 

·, 

secrecy, and yet, for all practical purposes, it seemed as if the 

most secret matters stooti in the public press. Down to the end of 

the war the English were able to follow precisely all dispositions 

of the Be lin Foreign Office and of the German Imperial Government. 

of the British secret service during the w:ar, Admiral 

William Reginal~ Hall, declared in 1920, i~ a very interesting 

spee~~at Manchester, that the decipherment of the Zimmermann telegrams/ had decided the World War in favor of the Allies. It would 

be i.Ifl.possible to estimate highly enough the significance of this 

But what became of Alexander Czek? - When World War I had 

·~.o an end, his father tried to follow the trail of his -son.····:.. 

e inquired in Holland and a~er much difficulty discovered the 

trace~ in Rotterdam. From there on nothing could be discovered. 

Since he knew that his son had worked for the British secret 

service, he applied to the chief of that service after the end of 

the war1 and requested news of his son's whereabouts. He received 

this information: "I have received your letter and must inform I 

you that this is the first time I have ever met the name Alex Czek. 

112 

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~~fil .n..n~~-ft"'Y'~ - --

I 

i 

.- I • I am sorry to have· to inform you that I cannol; tell you anythmg , I I 

whatsoeve:i:- regarding your :!J'on and his fate." 

I 

Al&xander Czek had disappearea. 

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114 
• 

RESM.-16N-921 

TllE IN'mRCEI>'l' SERVICE AT SEA 

I 

I 

The var at iea 1914--l.913 (aside from submarine wa.r:fare) 

I did not. play the 1role that one bad. ini tiall.y been 1ed to e~ect. 

Germany's princ~bal opponent at sea 'W8.S Great Britain. On the I 

question wbethe~ the Ge1'Dlall f1eet should seek a decisive battl~ 

I 

with the English Battle F1eet, the German Imperial Gc..vel"lJ1•JSl1l. 

diff~red with the Admiralty Staff and with the Secret.lry of the 

Imperial l'iavy, Grand Admiral von Tirpi tz. While these lo.st t\l'o 

wished to commit the rieet, above all to interrupt Engl.ish-French 

cOllllllWlications across the channel., the Inperial Government considered it correct to guard the 1'1eet against severe losses so as 

to have it as an instrument of power at the time ot tbe peace 

negotiations. 

With.LD the framework of the intercept service, however, the 

intercep·tion of ene~ radio trai'i"ic occupied no J.ess a place at 

sea than w1 th the land forces. In fact, ve may sa,y that the 

battl.e in the ether at sea vas much more intensive than on land. 

Primarily it was England and Germany which paid most attention 

to the naval intercept service and repeatedl.y 1mew how to derive 

advantage from. this invisib1e weapon. 

'l!be principle Of disguising radio traffic w.s here pushed 

into the foreground far more than ashore. From the very beginning, the use of' cryptographic systems was on a larger scale • 

115 

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Moreover, the system of so-ca.lied fa.lte radio traffic vms very 

good; he1·e a mcssa.ae from e. no.val command station to e. sh.lp o.t 

sea was eppe.rently dispatched by radio to some other coastal station, while the wo.rship stood by for reception on the ea.me wave 

length and heard it a.t the same time, 

Soon after the outbreak oi' the war, the German fleet suffered 

a mishap which later turned out to be very disadve.ntaeeous for the 

Gormar~ naval forces. In the Baltic the German fJ.eet opened the 

• 

naval.: war with an attack by the small cruisers "f\.ugsburg" and 

I 

11M'agdeburg" on Libau on 2 August 191li. A 'few months later the 

I 

i 

cruiser "Magdeburg" was sunk by Russian naval. forces in the Baltic. 

That did not rema:l.n e. secret. llowever, it did remain e. secret 

that the Russians sent down a diver to the sunken "Ma.gdeburg" 

who broughi; up from the radio booth the code boolt with its heavy 

lead covers. The book was dried carefully and turned out to be 

utter:i.~r undamaged. Monitoring of German naval trai'fic by the 

Russian naval intercept station at Kronsta.dt; revealed that the 

Germans were still. workill8 with this secret system. Now there 

began a lively deciphering activity at the Hussian cipher bureau 

in Petersburg which yielded excellent :l.nformation regarding all 

events in the German high seas fleet. The EnBlish got a copy of 

the code, and henceforth were likewise in a position to decipher 

German naval radio traffic, -- and that for a period or yea.rs! 

One of the first successes of th~ British fleet, which 

116 

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• 
' 

was based on resul.ts of the intercept and deciphering service, 

was the battle at the Doggerbank on 24 January 1915. The English 

had been able to follow exactly the approach of the German light 

naval :f'otces, and they lmew all the' German ship uni ts which had 

been counnitted for this action. The sinltine; of the German armored 

cruiser 11Bltlcher" at that time was due to the English intercept 

service. 

In the course of World War I, the interception of naval radio 

traffic assumed ever greater proportions; the English in particul.ar achieved very noteworthy resu.tts,especially in monitoring the 

traffic of German submarines with their bases and with other naval 

units on the high seas • 

• 

The London "Times" on 22 December l-927 publ.iehed a short 

resume at a lecture delivered by Sir A. Ewing, Professor or the 

PhilosOJ;>hical Fa.cul.ty at the University of Edinburgh. This man, 

an outstand.i1'lg professor, "Was, during the period 1914-1918, chief 

of that bureau of the English Admiralty whose task it ·was to decipP,er the intercepted radiograms of the Germs.n navy. This bureau 

thrived 'lbe,yoni!l all e:x;pectation and had more than 50 regular decoders; 

on the average 21 000 intercepted messages were handled here daily. 

Al1. movements of' German irarships were followed by the British 

Adm:f.ralty, primarily by the aid of information sec~i.red in this 

fashion. As Sir Ewing remarked, thanks to various fortunate accidents, the British information service had nearly all the German 

,· 

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cod.es :i.n its poMession; the remain<ler wore solved by nne~lyt.ic 

methods. 

The ca.rryinG ottl; of the lone; ranc;e blocka<le or th~ Gcrr1um. 

N01:th Sea. con.st by l:.hc British was possible ·w·j_th only .mt:?a~er forces, 

.because they were prOtrg;>tly informed rer.sa.rdine all movements of 

German units. Moreover, the British cipher bureau very qui.ckly 

succeeded in solvinG the German cipher used in the radio tro.f!ic 

with submarines. This was a success of really inestimable value, 

since now :i.n connection with the direction find.in~ service the' 

English were i~ a position to follow the movementa of the Ge:rman 

submarines precisely from day to day. While in Germany people 

were anxiously endeavoring to keep everything pertaining to the use 

of submarines strictly secret, doublinG and tripling their BtJ.E!XdS 

• and security measures in a downright convulsive fear of EnBlish 

spies, the Enslish intelligence service had nothing to do but to 

follow ca.refUl.ly the German naval radio traffic. In Room Nuniber 

4o in the British Admiralty, in whtch the evaluation center was 

located, there was busy activity day and night. On an enormous 

waJ.1 chart the ascertained positions of German units were entered. 

Everything having to do wi t.h this was as we11 known here as ii' 

dctaiJ.s had been published in an "Extra." 

'l'hc Enslish were the first in World War I to create a technically exact and fast working system of evaluation, a system which 

can be regarded. as modern even today. The "direction finding" 

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RESTR!€~1 

stations were connected with each other and with the central 

office by telet;ype. Every reading taken was passed at once to . the central office, and le.id out here by the aid of silk threads 

• I 

on a great orientation map which was mounted horizontal.J.y. In 

the cipher bureau sat the men who day and night deciphered every 

incoming intercepted radiogram. An enormous card f il.e contained 

all station call signs ·which ha.d hitherto appeared ill \·he inter .. 

cept service, along with e.11 other available de.ta, and. this ma.de 

it possible to recognize ctl.rrently che systems according to which 

cal.1 signs were changed in German traffic, to reconstruct these, 

and even to tell in advance what call signs this or that GermaJ1 

station would have tomorrow or day after tomorrow or a week hence. 

The collaboration between direction finding, evaluation, 

and decipherment was sensible and well-organized, as it never was 

in Germany either during World War I or after the war, or even 

during World Uar II, because here people never got away from 

petty concern with their own interest and egotistic pride in their 

OW11 unit. 

What significance the English attached even at that time 

to the intercept service is evident from the mere fact that there 

was a.n admiral at the hee.d of the service; in Ueumuenster (where 

the central office of the German naval intercept service was located} it was a naval lieutenant. In London, at the last, several. 

hundred men were engaged in decipherment and evaluation; in 

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:Neumucms (,er there were a fe"1J1 dozen. And if, in s~ite of that, successes were scored by the German no.val :Intercept. service,. then that 

was due to l:iha intelligence and initia:tive or ind:l.v:ldual men. 

The over-all orr;aniza.tion was inadequate. 

'rl1e e;re~test success or the young Germa.n submarine weapon 

co.me soon after the bec:lnning oi' the war 111 the sinki11g of three 

English armored cru:iaera by "U-9" under Lieut(-!na.n·I:; Weddigen. i:rb.at 

was bei'ore the breaking of the German cocle far subnl8l"ines. Later, 

when in February 1917 submarine warfare was ca.rr:l.ed on accordine; to 

plan, :l.t did n6t br:l.ng the expected results, and for the above ... 

mentioned reasons could not poasibly do ao. After the sink:lng of 

the "Lusitania" submarine warfa.rc was a.lao 1im.lted by American 

p't·essu1·e. And when it was resumed ar;aln in an intensified form on 1 

February 1917, it only served in co11ju11ction with the Zimmerina.nn 

dispa·tches to bring the USA upon t.he scene as an active opponent. 

'l'he forces available at ~he beginning of the war for cruiser 

warfare aurcio.d consist~d essentially of the East Asiatic Cruise1• 

Squad.roll w1dc1• Vice Admiral Count von Spee. Since von Spee cou1d 

not niainl,aJn himself in eastern Asia asainst the superior forces 

of the .J\l.lies, he put out into the Pacific on 13 AUB"USt 1914. 

His sri.Hal1ron consisted of the armored cruisers "Scharnhorst" a.nd 

"Gncisenau," and the small criliscrs "Dresden, 11 "J.cipzig," and 

''NUrnl)erc." 

mm.t happened in the next weeks on the Pa.cii'ic was an 

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• 

extremely interesting battle in the ether, which was essentially 

something brand new. While the English radioed away bravely in 

their search for von Spee 1 s squadron, with the resuJ.t that it 

was alWfJ.ys possible for von Spee ~o keep posted on the movements 

of the enemy, he himsel~ was able so to mislead the enemy by radio 

silence and occasional deceptive radio traffic by the ship's 

radio of the little cruiser "Emden," which bad been ordered into 

Australian waters, that his appearance in Chilean waters came as 

a complete surprise. At Coronel on 1 November 1914 von Spee's 

squadron in complete battle order and battle readiness met the 

squadron of the utterly unsuspecting Admiral Cradock, who supposed 

that von Spee was far a.way in the direction of' Australia. Von 

Spee was abl.e to brins his ships into such a favorable posi·cion 

and to strike so une:x;pectedly that within a very brief time the 

British armored cruisers "Good Hope 11 and "Monmouth11 were sw'lk, 

and several other units were badly danJB.ge.d. By this naval victory Allied shipping in adjacent areas was almost completely 

paralyzed for a number of weeks. 

To be sure, the "Emden" itself fell. victim, so to speak, 

to radio traffic a few days after the battle at Coronel. After 

a fairly long career as a raider in tm :lhdian Ocean, it bad appeared off the Cocos Islands to take on water and destroy the radio 

station there. In so doing, the radio station of the "Emden" 

engaged in traffic with the land station, which took the "Emden" 

for an Australian cruiser. During this radio conversation the 

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o:pcro.tor of tlie "Emden" did somethinc; in an iJ.nekili'ul "'tray so tho.t 

the la.nd station recosnized the true character oi' the ship anc'J. 

sent ouli ale.rm mess3ges; the "Emden" now sent out s. le.nolina party 

to dnstroy the ra.d.io station. While the ship was vaitiD.6 for the 

return of this unit, a superior Australian cruiser hurried up in 

response to the ala't"m messae;es from the station, :fired on i;he 

"Emden" and ~lo.maeed i·t so badly that 1 t had to be run on the reef 

by its own crew. 

Count von Spee had B similar misfortune with his sqt\0.dron 

on 8 December 1911~ when, on his way a-ronnd South Amertce., he was 

approachinG the Falltland Islands and made contact with the radio 

station there, without noticing that a strong Bri1iish squadron was 

lying p:rotected by the Islands. In this way von Spee gave himself 

away prematurely, o.nd was attacked Wlexpected1y without. beins able 

to deploy M.:J ships properly. 

1

rhe greatest see bai.Lle of World \Jar I was I.he battle of the 

Skagerrak. on 31 May 1916. It, too, was influenr.ed by the :l.ntcrcept 

service and, to be sure, on both sides. Both Lhc British and the 

Germans had f.ollv\-7cd the course o:r the enemy sqna.drons; l;he onl.y 

d:if::r'erence was t;lw.t. the Germans hatl succeeded jn veiling t11e 

course of i~he Geri.um main fleet so tho.I; it appeared as a stU1u•ise 

i'or the Eur;lish, a.nd by so doine; decided lille course of the be l;tle. 

II1 many other undertakings at sea durinG World War I the 

i.nt.ercept service :played a decisive role. A de tailed accounf, 

of' a.ll. these cases will be reserved for a. le.t.el' work. 

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THE ITALO-AUSTRIAN WAR 

Down to the beginning of World War I the Austrian intercept. 

service had been directed against Italy. The Austrian oryp1;a.nalytic 

service had succeeded even before the outbreak or the war in solving 

\ the cryptographic system used by th:' Ital.i.ans in traffic between 

Rome and the diplomatic representatives abroad, and it wa.s able to 

read such traffic. That was a success or the greatest importance, 

since the attitude of Italy :was one of the significant problems 

occupying the Austrian diplomat1c service in those decisive d~s 

of July and Aueust 1914. And the question still remained open; 

therefore, it was a matter of employing all possible intelligence 

sources to obtain clari t.y. 

At the outbreak of the World War, Italy had proclaimed its 

neutrality. In December 1911+ negol.iations were started between 

Vienna and Home which dragged on lazily. Dag.inning in January 

1915 the Austrian radio intercept service established the fact 

that Italy was turning more and more to the Allies, a..11d that 

preliminary conversations wore Laking place in Paris between the . Italian ambassador and the French Mi.nister of Foreign Affairs, 

conversations which must ba taken s-eriously. Vienna decided, 

the:refore~ on a countermove, and on 30 March 1915 made the 

Italian Govc1·nment a proposal to relinquish th1J p\.\rely Italian 

portion of t.he southern Tyrol in return for tho assurDnce of 

benevolent neutrality on the part. of Ital:r nnt..il the end of the 

war, and of complete froedo;n of action for Aunt1·ia in the Balkans. 

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M~ER~!ffSJtRl The Italian Foro.~ ."';l~r,-3Cf'nfi1no, -r.h'Jn held ee.vcral. c'lnveraat.ions wlth the French and F.t1e;l.tsh rurihAssadors, t.he results of 

• 

"1llch were again revealed in radio tra.i'fic picked up and deciphered 

by the A11striaus. It could bo clearly recoe:n'l~ed that. a much greater 

• Austrian concession -- especially with regard to Trieste, Istria, and 

I 

the Balkans -- would be necessary in order to influence the attitude 

of Italy decisively in favor of Austria. The ereateat haste was also 

demanded in order to meet succeesful.l,y the ef furts of France and 

England. In Vienna, however, th(-7 stuck obsi..inat.ol,y by a peculiar 

misinterpret.a.tlon of strength ratios, and decided to wait. 

The Italian Foreign Mlniater thon of ficia.11,y turned down the 

Austrian offer as inadequate, and Italy decid~d to D'ake its entry 

into the war on the side or the Allies. Ear:cy in Apri.l 1915 this 

intention or Italy could be recognized beyond doubt from several 

radiograms exchanged between Rome and London. 

On 26 April Prance, Engl.and, and Russia concluded in London a 

secret treaty '\lith Ita.13 which obligated Italy to declare war on 

Austria 'Within one month. In rel.urn, Italy was assured of the 

fUl.fillment or all its territorial claima and aspirations in Europe, 

and a.lso or an equal shat>e in the division or Turkey. The content 

ot the London secret. treaty was known in its essential points in 

VielUla on 30 April. 

On 4 Ma;v Italy denounced the Three Power Pact; on 23 May it 

declared war on Austria-Hwigar¥• 

Apart from the previm1s'.cy mentioned information received by 

radio, which -- from a military point of view - must exclude any 

factor of surprise from the ata1·t 11 the Austrian intercept service 

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• 

-REStFRl~~l succeeded during April and M~ 1915 in following the Italian 

asseinbly. especial}¥ behind the Ieonzo. But instead of taking the 

clearly recognizable situation into account in any adequate fashion 

and massing strong forces in the southern 1'yrol to create the hase . tor a rapid thrust in the direction or Venice. in order thus to 

take the entire Italian aesem.bJ.y in 'the flank• the Austrian command 

had its principal forces drawn up on the Isonzo front to await hP.:ll 

the enellij1'ts attack. Tha consequence was that series or fruitl~ 

battles on the Ieonzo wh.lch characterized the entire J t..vl·:i~.\P il.Ii.tm 

War. 

The entire conduct of the Austrian command is all the more 

incomprehensible. since the Austrian espionage service had succeeded 

during the summer of 1914 in securing the most important Italian 

code• name:Q- that for communications of the higher starts. which 

actuall,y came into use shortly after the outbreak ot the war and 

which gave the Austrians an abundance or excellent info:nnation.1 

The Italian "Field Keys" had been solved by the Austrians 

back in June 1915. To be sure, they were changed on 10 July but 

the Austrian cipher section soon found the solution of the new 

ciphers. Subsequent]Jr the Italians changed their cryptographic 

systems very frequently. but this did not help them much. Early 

in October 1915 they put the 11Cifrario Tascabile" into use. which 

the Austrians had bought long before the war.. [t had proved a 

profitable deal. 

1. This was the so-called "Cifrario Rosso" which was used for 

·traffic between the general staf r and the army command • 

12:5 

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RES-21 

For t.ha rost, the "Cifrario Rosso" remained in force for almost 

a year~ Nol. tmtil 30 :March 1916 did t.ho Italian High Command. forbid 

in a radiogram !urther use of this system in radio traffic, "einco the 

suspicion that it was pa.rt.ially lo1own by the enemy has been confir1ned11 • 

In reality, it was entire:cy knc..wn to the Austrians. On 1 April the 

new system went into effect. Twenty~.raur houl's later it had been 

solved by the Austri8ll cryptan~ster 

Probably rarely has a sequence of very important. intelligence 

resuli;s been used to so sli.ght a degree as in the first phase ot the 

Italo-Austria.n War. And therewith the course or the entire campaign 

was decided,. 

Not until the spring of 1916 did they try the obvious plan o! a 

flank attack. With several German divisions, which had been requested 

and promised as reenforcements, they want.ed to do what a year before 

would have been correct and might ha.re been crowned by success,,. but 

what now could no longer be accomplished since the Italians had. meanwhile ma.te1•ia.J.zy" strengthened the Tyroleae .front. There was the added 

fa.ct tha.'I:. the requested German divislons could not be spared, because 

tho bleeding of the German army before Verdun had exceeded all expectations. The Austrian command then decided on an attack with its own 

(inadequate) means. As mic;ht be expected, after initial successes at 

Asiae;o and Arsiero, the attack bogged down and had to be broken oil, 

because the Brusilov offensive had started which brought the entire 

Austrian eastern front. into retreat. 

In connection wit.h Lhis Austrian attack, thore was a piece of 

deception which we shall not allow t.o pass without mention. In order 

126 

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• 

to mislead the Italians and to force Cadorna to hold his operational reserves in readiness behind an entire:cy- different sector. 

the decision was reached at an interview between General Ronge. 

Chier of the Austrian Evidenzbuero, and representatives of the 

German General Staff to carry out a deceptive action on a large 

scale based on experiences or the iritercept service. The Italians 

were to be tooled into believing that a. German anny was being 

brought up. 

The on~ chance of success was by using the radio. 'l'he entire 

action had ~o be prepared very conscientious~ and ca.rerully, and 

carried out with the same care, if it were to succeed. For the 

execution of.- thi.s action, a staff was formed, at the head of which 

stood the German von Bonin, at that time Major in the General Stat!. 

He was charged with the tactical management of the deceptive measures. 

For the technical execution, a German radio compall\Y was employed which 

was under the command of the then Captain Meydam. Furliherm.ore, a 

battalion of mountain light infantry was detailed for the purpose. 

The pl.an was to lead the Italians to believe, over the space of 

several weeks, that a German arJey", the headquarters of which had 

hitherto been in Ea.st Prussia {as far as I recall it was the Tenth 

Ant\V) was moving up into the K~ten area. 

Meatudtlle, it had become known to the Austrians that the 

ItaJ.iana·were preparing for a new attack on the Isonzo. 

The radio company detailed for this deception had four heavy 

and four medium mobile radio stations. They began by having t."h"O 

of the heavy stations and a company of mountain infa.ntry change 

trains as conspicuous~ as possible in Munich. The leader of the 

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or general i.n· ... tructions, Md then enjoined uron them the utmost 

secrecy.. "No one nced:J to lmow that we balonc to a Ger11·~n army 

going to the Italian ~heu.ter," he declared at. the end. Th'.1 grins 

of several bystanders showed that the first seed hnd l'.n.llen on 

fruitful soil; tho innate need of the German to tell so1nething would 

take care that \d.thin 211 hours half of Mw1ich would know all a.bout 

the sending of a German army to tho south. 

During the transport, these peopl1:; had to show them.selves 

diligently, and to drop rn;ysterioue hint.s. At the ll')cation selected 

for &nl\Y' heauquarLers, they ~et up the firat of the heavy stations • . The tranamittcr was tuned up, and then communication was begun with 

' two Austrian army radio stations. On tho following day, the second 

heavy l'a.dio stat.ion was set up at a distance of some 15 kilometers. 

Doth stat.ions immediately entered into regular traffic with one 

another. 1',or their radio traffic t..hey used a cipher which had been 

produced ecpeciall.,v for this purpose by t.he Austrian cipher expert 

Captain Figl; il was so constructed that. t.hE' Italians could not fail 

to solve it, but the intent.ion to m.iAlead must not. be evident in any 

event,. For t.h•J rest, the manner of handling traffic at ·t.he German 

st..al..i our dlfft:1"Ud niarkecl~ from that of the Ausl.rian stations so that 

· ii Ii ••l.ations could n<"t fail to be recognized at once a.s Ger.ntin. 

A radiogram. or thi.s "&"lny st.at.i.on" was transmit\r~d to t,hc garrison 

1·lio st.at.ion at 1-iunicti with the request Lhat mail arriving there for 

lhv staff of th~ Tenth Arrny be sent. to • • • in the Tyrol. Other messages 

~1ent via. Nunich to Kt1nigsbcrg and had ref erenoc to the handling of supply, 

)>rc11a.rat.ion of quarters for the. t.roops, fonrartli.ne or mail, r.nd the arrival 

128 --

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• 

RES"Till~B-1 

ot single formations belonging to the Tenth Al"lll1· 

A few days later the two remaining heavy radio stations 

arrived in the area picked for the fake assembly, and entered into 

communication with the "arll\Y radio station1t and with each at.her. 

They were tftipposed to represent corps stations. A second and a 

third company of mountain troops also arrived; they too had to 

show themselves as much as possible in the "assembly area••; they 

were quartered now in this and now in that place, and special 

billeting officers went through the entire region and abe-lcd buLld· 

ings and barns with the numbers of formations belonginp ~.o the TenU 

Arn'\f • 

At intervals of two days, the nine medium stations arrived and 

entered into traffic in the manner prescribed for them. They were 

supposed to pass tor divisional stations. 

The traffic grew more and more animated. The content cf the 

messages now referred to the arr~a.!" of individual units, and had 

to be cor. .a)IJSed very carefully in order to make the take transpo:r.·t 

movements agree with the capacity of the Austrian railways. j 

In order to help the Italians in their task of decipherment, I 

various intentional errors and breaches ot radio discipline wer~ 

made; a few messages were sent in plain text. The handling of the 

entire traffic·was managed so that the new radio net could not help 

but stand out clearls" from the Austrian picture. It was intended to 

reveal to the Italians tte entire 11 assembl7 area" of the German 

Tenth Arn\Y • 

RESTRICTED 
RES'lfPii .&. .&. ~.& Tf.~1121 "" ... - ....-

How it was most important to ascertain how tho Italian int..~rcopt 

I 

service lwas rea.cting to this li"t,tle Gaine. A few deys aft.er tho first 

stationJ had started operations, an Italian instruction to thoir own 

radio s·Jntions was intercepted and deciphered. It ca.lled :for a 

limitat~on of thei.r own operation so as not to "disturb interception 

of the derma.n stations which had just appeared." A da,y lat.er came 

I 

the instruction "to follow most caref'ull,y al1 traffic s:t, the German 

stations, since this was mos·!; important." A few days la.tor several 

telephone conversations of the Italians were intercepted .from which 

it could be recognlzcd that the opposine Italian forces had been 

ordered to watch £or any relief in the enem;,v lines and to ascertain . when the !irol; German troops showed themselves at the .front. A 

couple of Austrian horse-drawn bat.t.erios, to which a number of 

German mountain troops had been assigned, h~d to drive around 

behind the front, go into positlon, !'ire a !cw shots to get t.hc 

ra.uge, and thus little by little indicat.e lhe ar1·.i.Y1J1 Of I.he Germa.'1 

artillery. 

Soon it could be noted from intercepted lt.alian radio traffic 

t.ha:I:. the Italians were beginning to st.rengthen the opposing .front 

and to set up operational reserve units behind it. The ruse had 

succeeded. 

On 13 March 1916 Cardona. began his flfth batt.1e of the Isonzo. 

It brought him no more success than the four precedinm incidentally, 

he was holding a considerable portion of his tl'oops behind the 

Kllrnten front in expectation of the "German attack." 

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• 

RES-1 

But the Austrian offensive on the 'J.Yrolese front suffered 

a great del.q through ~normous snowfalls which made the entire 

district impassable. Instead of beginning in mid-March, it did 

not get going until two .f'ull. months later. 

A tew dqs before the Austrian attack in the T,yrol, the 

deceptive station set up as ttanq radio station" began sending 

time signals for setting watches. This had alwS¥s been a signal 

tor an impending large scale att~Lck. German mountain troops 

appeared at v.•rious points on the front, and had to carr;r on 

telephone conversations which they were. sure would be heard b7 

the Italian intercept stations. Twenty~tour hours before the 

attack, all Austrian artillery assigned for the deceptive game 

began drumrire on the Italian positions, while already, on the 

da.Y' before, the radio stations had sent out orders for a change 

of position and then ceased sending; only' the main radio station 

sent out JJ\Y'Sterious I-signals. 

Then the Austrian attack on the Tyrol broke loose. After 

intial successes it bogged down and ended indecisive~. It had 

been prepared and carried out with total.l;r inadequate means. 

Soon the Austrian intercept service was able to recognize 

the bringing up of Italian reen.torc'8tents. In the night from 

19 to 20 Mq, an Italian radiogram was deciphered from which 

dispositions for a great Italian counter-attack were learned. 

At 3 otclock in the morning the deciphei:ment was completed; an 

hour later the orders tor countermeasures to break up the attack 

were already going out. On l June the Austrian intercept service 

RESTRIC¥ED 
..................... ~J~,.--~ .. ~.-:--:-----:~-··· , .... ,,, ~· ·

.,....... . .;._, • "•I' 

recognized the appearance or a new Italian radio station in the 

region north or Padua. Here the Italians were preparing strong 

forces for a great counteroffensive. 

Meanwhile, in the east the Brusilov offensive had started. 

Reenforcements had to be sent hasti4r at the Vf;ry moment when the 

\ . 

superiority of the Italians on the Tyrolese front was increasing 

greatly. Part or the territory gained had to be sacrificed. The 

entire operation fizzled out with~ut lasting results. 

General Hoffmann later called the First World War the nwar of 

missed opportunities," i.e., or opportunities missed by Germany to 

end the war decently. I should prefer to call this war a ''war 0£ 

hal~ measures,'' or the "war of inadequacies." From beginning to 

end these appeared on all sides, but they were especial~ bad in the 

Italian campaign. 

The whole action should have been based on a really big and 

decisive operation. A deceptive maneuver of the ld.nd described above 

can be effective on~ ,2!!2!i it is hardly possible to repeat it with . 

any prospect or success. Therefore, one should have saved these 

deceptive measures tor a case where their execution must be really 

profitable. Instead, they made use of it where its effectiveness 

was allowed to peter out. The Austrian attack was made with too 

feeble forces. When it was done, history re~orded another battle, 

but the Austrians had to write of£ what was in and of itsel.i' an 

excellent ruse which they had wasted useless~. 

. Since the war between Italy and Austria developed chicf]J.- as· 

a wa.r of position, the "PenkaJ.a.sn achieved_special importonce here. 

One or the principal reasons why all Italian attacks, part.iculc1.rly 

RESTRfmED 

·--
• 

• 

• 

RES~~1 

on the Isonzo~ failed, l~ in the tact that all preparations of the 

Italians were recognized by the Austrians in good time by lis11~.ming 

to their telephone conversations, so that the necessary defense 

measures could be taken. or co.urse, t.he ItalJans likewise eavesdropped sucoessfu1'.cy on the Austrians, so that in this field things 

. were equalized in .the long run. 

The Austrian intercept service in this thea~er attained its 

greatest importance in connection with the German-Au~trian 

I .• 

offensive in October and November 1917. Down to the autumn of 

1917 the Austrians, thanks to their intercept service, had been 

able to frustrate all Italian attempts at an oi'.fensive and t.c> 

maintain their front. Nevertheless, in September 1917 the situation was so tense that the Central Powers decided on a lai•ge scale 

attack. Nothing less could give the Austrians a breather • 

The Austrian intercept service had learned meanwhile that 

the sector Flitsch-Tolmein seemed best suited for such an attack, 

in view of the grouping of the Italian forces. It was decided, 

therefore, to choose this sector. 'l'ho German Fourteenth Army 

was directed into this area and was to force a break-through. 

From 24 to 27 October followed the attack and break-through 

under the command of General Otto von Belm~. On the 28th Ud.ine 

was occupied. Advancing along with the adjo:ining Austrian armies, 

' the Tagliamento was crossed earl;y in October. The Italian radio 

service had been thorough:cy- disorganized by the German attack. 

All movements of the Italians, all plans, and the entire constitution or their front could be recognized clearly. Scarcely had one 

1 3!J 

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o.r tho It.aliun :::~1io stations taken up a now po~iti<:>u lihcn it 

a.nnow1ccd in pl nin text. "l am packine up,'' ~mr:I t.lwn armounccd its 

now location.. That showed thni, the retreat. w~s contilmil1c .. 

Tho entlro offensive bo1.i'mc a tri1Jllll)h of the Austrtan intercept 

I 

I service. Soon, howo.vor, two things became evident from the intercepted I 

I 

radio traffic: .first, that the Waatern .A..lU.rJa were brineine; up strong I 

fdrces to support the Italians; and socon~, that a strong nerr~ defen1 

J

·ve front was being fonned on the P1ave. 

On the Austrian aide they wore w1cortain re:.;p""cting the strength 

d organization of the new front. 'l'hon a lon~ measa.ge from the chief 

o} the Italian radio service gRve ab~olute clarity. In its address . I 

' I 

this message listed a.ll the higher units With the locations of their 

I 

staff radio stations.. This bctr~cd the entire organization of the . new battle alignment,, but showed that the nrmy group opposing the 

Austrian and German troops was far too strong for the lat.ter to think 

of overrunning the new front.. '!'here.Core, the decision wus made to 

break of! the offensive. Henceforth, t.he Piave remained the new front 

line. 

In summing up, we must s~ th.9.t the results of the .Austrian 

intercept se1 lfice during th~ entire H.al~an c.empa.ign we1·e so 

abundant and good that st times thoy far exceeded the results of 

the intercept service on the Russian front. Strangely enough, full 

advantage of this was never take~1, except in connection with the 

last descrlbed attack in the fall of 1917. But at that time the 

proper moment had already boen missed, due to gc•neral political and 

military developments. 

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• 

• 
I 

The strugg,le was to flare up once more on the Austro-It,alian 

front in the su.mn1e:t• of 1918.. Early in March the Austrian intercept 

oervice noticed that. the English and French had begun to withdraw 

their troops i'rom Ital;y-. By mid-March it could be clearzy seen 

;that only the French XII and the English XIV Gorps were le.ft. I 

I 

I The. Austrian attack was planned for mid-,June. The intercept 

eervice began in the spring to strengthen its work because the 

listen~.ng stations which had become free in the east could be 

profitably used here.. By the beginning of Jw1e more than SO 

"Perucalas" had been insta.lled on the Austrian southwest front. 

The Austrian radio intercept stations aluo found. a fruitful 

field or activity. There was, to be sure, on the Italian side 

a general order to use radio only in urgent c~ses, but the chief 

of the Ita.lian army radio service required daily reports from all 

his stations, so that the Austrian intercept service was very well 

supplied with material dq by day. The situation reminded one of' 

the fairest ~s or the war in the east. All the prerequisites 

roi• the success of tbe Aust,rian at tack were at hand. 

But in this case the equalization or strength in the intercept 

field, which I have mentioned several times, s~owed up in an 

especi~ stri.king rashion. Not only had the Austrians been 

listening industriously, but so had the Italians. In spite of all 

orders to the contrary, the Austrians had used the telephones 

incautious]~·· The preparations for the attack1

, and even the 

precise hour of atta~k, had become known to thE1 Italians. 

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They abo.ndo111. d their front, l.i.ncu atltl dolw:"d tl11· 1ulvr•nc i fl/~ A· I I r 1: , • I l 

a hail o:f shells fl·om bntLorios which Jiau .lik .... 111:.Ju :.hli'l.utl l.hr.:lr p".l.,il.101• 

in tlmo. 'l'ho AusLrlM art.lllcry prcrllraUon had been \lat1Lcd c•n an c..mpt.y 

area; the second Il..alian defcn6ic lino wa.s woll equippGd. 'l.'ho Aual.l·io.n 

at,tack fo.i.1ed and tho looses wure heavy. 

136 

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• 

1.'he desorlpt:i.011 of t.he affair with t.he Zinv:ner.mann telegrams 

abov·e has shown that t,he Allies during almoi:Jt 1.hree ;rears of . World W&I• I were in a position to decipher t.he diplomat:tc traffic 

of the Berlin Fo1·e:1.gn Of'£:1.ce Bnd 'to 1dsrive o. g1·oat dea..l of' profit 

theref1"0m. In rega.1'Cl to Austria, something similar occurred in 

the course ot 1;he lfB.ru although in quite different . .form, andai 

indeed, in the following way: 

Since 1.913 Count. Czern.in had been i11 Buchs.rest as the 

Austrian anibassador·. Ha wa.s a. diplomat 0£ the old school, and 

likewise a. polished society me.n and cavalier who not 011)¥ lmew 

h:ls job but also knew· how to take li . .re in an ag1•eeab.le fashion. 

Just when the event we are about to describe took place I can 

no longer recall. exa.ct'.cy 1 but I believe it was before ·the outbreak 

of World War I. Count Czemin had talcen a little ride in a cab 

and then gone :j.nto e. ca.te to spend a. brief hour. While he was 

talkir1g 1rl:lih a lady ot his acquaintance a.t one of the tabl.es, i'I:; 

suddenl~ occurred to hi1n that he had left his brier case in the 

cab. He excused himself, hastened to the cab, -,,rhich was waiting 

for him, only to d.lscover that the brier case 11-!l.d vanished. The 

cab driver could give no explanai.ion; he had lef"t, his carriage 

for a little while and claimed that he had not noticed a brief 

case in it. J.n this brief case there were a nUinbor of extremel,y 

importm1t documents, including the cipher used by the Austrian 

embassy in Bucharest for comm.unica:Lio11 with Vienna • 

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RES'¥ll!WPED21 

Count Czcrnin :Lmrn.cdiate.1.Jr r-2portcd the mo.l.t.er lo tho Bucharest 

police who wil.lingzy pJ:omlaed their aid, and irorncdial.,ezy bognn 

investic;at.ions concerning the whereabouts of the brief case. Three 

days l.a.ter Count. Czernin goL back his brle.t caae undamaged and with 

all tl1e conte;nto. 

Conscientiousl,y Count Czerni.n h~d informed Vienna or the 

occurrence, and offered his Nsignati.on. Dnperor Franz Joseph in 

his courteous fashion declined to accept the res1gna.l.ion, called 

the mat l:.er a reerettnble ov~~rsir.,ht, and requcsl:.ed Count Czernin tc 

continue in a!'fi.ce. With that the wh9le affair was settled, snd in 

the Foreign Office in Vi~nna it never occurred to anyone to change 

the cryptographic system, although lts continued use contravened 

all principles of security; for any document which haa been in 

strange hands for even a row hours without control must be regarded 

as comp1·omis'9d .. 

'!'ho first ph'lee of World War I ran its well-known course. The 

attitude of Romania toward A11stria became cooler and cooler; 

relations grflW more and more tenoc; and fina.l..ly, at the insistence 

or Russia and the Western Alli.es, Ro•nania det>lared war on Austria 

in August 1916. 

~'he course of the c~.inpaign wo.s not what had been generally 

expected, ti.nd after a few months the Romani:m anny was crushed a.nd 

Romania was conquered. Huasia hnd not been able to give adeq1Jate 

l-LSSi.stance because, from a mil.i.tary point of view, Russia itael.r 

had alrea.ccy- been forced fa., the defensive. 

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When the Austrian troops had occupied Bucharest, the dwellings 

o:l members of the former Romanian Government and other perso11s of 

high station were searched. '.!.'here in the atc:i.o of the villa of ·(,he 

former Romanian Prime Minister 0Bratianu was .found a box of photographic negatives. When they were studied more closely and the 

individual plates checked, some turned out to be photographic 

copies of all the documents which had boen in the brief case ot 

the Austrian ambassador, Count Czernin, at the time of its loss, 

among them the sec:i.~et code. The Rom.a.n..i.ans had, therefore, been 

in a position to !ollow the entire t.elegraphic correspondence of 

the Viennese Foreign Office with the Austrian embassy in Bucharest, 

and also to decipher all inessages enciphered in the same syst~n and 

radioed to other Austrian embassies. 

Meanwhile, Count Czernin had become Austria's Minister of 

Forei.gn Affa.trs. Not lllltil now was the cryptographic s,ystem of 

the Foreign Office changed. However, the damage could not be 

repai1 .. ed, for in 1917 the war had been virtually decided. 

On the one hand Zimmermann, on the other Czeminl The 

Allied secret service could be quite satisfied with the Cent.ral 

Powers, since copies of the Austrian diplomatic secret code had 

been supplied to France and England by l:.he Romanians. 

It seems almost incredible that the two powers which had developed the intercept service to a high degree of perfection during 

World War I and whose militaey operations were based to a very great 

extent on its results, wM.ch therefore lmew very well how exposed the 

conununications of a country or of an a~ are to the attack of an 

139 

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REffRJF:tFlffff 1 

oncnzy, shouJ tl h.:i.vG displnycd at times such uttor unconcern in 

rospocl. to l..hclr own communi.cRLions, an tmconccrn which could hardl-3" 

be oxcccdcd. 

l4.0 

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• 

RES-1 

'l'HE 11JUDGEMENT OF GOD" AND ITS EXPLANA1'ION' 

During World War I there was a German soldier song v1ilich 

contained, a.rnong others, the followin8 couplet: 

••• For this campaign 

Is no fast train ••• • 

Although in general there is little logic and sense to soldiers' 

songs, the accuracy of tltla verse could not be disputed. From a 

campaign at express speed, such a.s had been expected in August, !'-,~.' 

there developed one which at best had the speed or a sJ•"\' .f1·el1{ht-., 

and this was true on all fronts. 'l'here was 011]¥ ~ exception. end 

that was the campaign 1916-17 against Romania. In four months th 1.s 

action was carried out. from the beginning to a completely HUCCAe:u.ru.l. 

conclusion, and the ene.'ey" was utterly beaten. In those daya in 

Austria and Germany they spoke of the Judgement of God which had 

fallen on this country. But thay were careful never even to lrhtt. 

at what had rea.l.ly brought on this "Judgement of God." 

In 1913 Romania had renewed its treaty of alliance with tbfl 

Central Powers. The condition for any actl ve pa.1 tj.r.ipD-tion in the 

,.,.ar by Romania on the side of the Central Powers wa.s that the attack 

must not be made by l.he Central Powers, and that Italy should i.mmediately enter on the side of Austria and Germany. However, since 

Austria had let loo.:!e the war by its at.ta.ck on Serbia, and since 

Italy took a waiting attitude, Romania proclaimed its neutrality 

on 3 August 1911+. After the death of King Charles on 10 October 

1914, it became more and more evident from month to month th~t 

Romania was turning more and more to the Allies.. At 'Lltc ti.1110 

of my sojourn in Hom .. <mia in the spring of 1915,, I could fc.91 

'.1.41 

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pJ.:J.in1.y thnt. ::;ymprLl hy Col' U1c Cant. rnl ro~10ro lmd rcccclci..l crcatl;;r, 

a.nd the:L U1c quc:;t,lon of cnl.orll1G the m1r on the sidl) of Lhc J\llics 

ha.d bi.;com1 m-::m:::Jy ou-::i of tlln:::i ciJ1d of a ravorablo opport.unity. 

Strnnccly cnoueh, people in Aust..l'ian :.:ind Gorman official circles 

Gimply wou:J.d not bclluvc th.ta change,. The Austrian amba.osa.dor, 

Count Czcrnin, sent to Vicnn.a one roport aft.or tho ot.her in which 

he cmphaoizod nomnnio.' s love of pea.co and strcoscd the fnct t.lm.t, ho, 

as representative o:r Austria, was being treatcu by all organs of the 

Romanian Government in the most respectful o.nd cooperative fashion 

and that he was constantly being asnurcd that. Homa.'1ia's entry into 

the war against Austria was a thins wM.ch could not even be discussed. 

The German ambassador took a sindlat' position in his reports. On the 

other hand, the Austrian military al.to.cha had his oyos wider open. 

From the sprine of 1916 on, he reported earnest militar-.r prep.a.rations 

on the pa.rt of Rom:.1.nia which by their vcr;1 nature could on~ be 

directed against Austria. The difference of opinion bctueen the 

Austrian arnbasso.dor and tho mil:i."Lary attacho went so rs.r that an 

open conflict brol<:c out between them. 

It must be e.dmit'Lcd t.hnt.. the Romanians \·T•.3re able to deceive the 

diplom'l.tic ropre::;onta.tives or tl11J Central Pmrcrs in masterful fashion 

rec 1 ding the t,rue a.ttit,udt.· or tho eoverrunenL. 'Tho two ambassadors I 

wero invited ou every occasiou, l,}1.) "Lru.ditiona.l frie~dship" with 

Austria and Ger.many was dilieent..1.y strcsoad, and the existence of any 

tension or or causca .fo1~ confl.icl, ltas positively denied. 

Sin~o t.he Hom':\..'lie.n Govcrnnl!.."'nL was in pooseooion of the Austrian 

code, it l":ould follou p.<'tlcise:Jy the eff.oct or its deceptive measures 

by rc·.id'i.n~ the ·t.clq;rl•lil:J sent by Ccuul~ C:.:.crnin Lo Vic11na.. For tho 

~!A:~ 

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I 

I 

Romanians it was an extremely' interesting pl~ which was going on 

here behind the scenes. 

Now while the official. diplomatic representatives of the 

Central Powers continued their•report-.s fron1 the point ot view 

that the Romanian Government intended to maintain absolute 

neutrality, the reports of the Austrian militacy attache t.ook 

on more and more a tone of warning, especially attar the beginning of the Bruailov oflensive. 'fhese warnings f:J.nally led to 

a conmon consultation of the chiefs of staff of Austria and 

Germany during which it was decided to set up an increased 

security force along the Transylvanian border. A new 

Austrian First Army was fonned, with a new German Ninth Arrq 

at its right; but both consisted solel:y of worn-out formations 

which had been withdrawn from the Russian front for rest and 

to be brought up to strength. Many of them consisted of very 

scant l"emnants without. any fighting st.rength and needed to be 

built up almost entirely from new personnel. This was done without any haste because nobody believed there was any serious 

threat to the Austrian border in the southeast. 

Meanwhile in Romania they were preparing tor the attack; 

above all, the Russians urged a.omania•s entry into the war. 

On 27 August l.916, on a qui.et Sunday a.ftemoon, the Romanian 

ambassador in Vie11na delivered a long-winded declaration of .. war, 

while in the same hour the Romanian troops began their advance. 

• 

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The moment or Romania's entry into the war could not have 

been better chosen, for the Austrian offensive in It..al.y had 

bogged down and the Austrian troops there were engaged in severe 

defensive fighting. 'rhe Brusilov o.f.fensive was progressing 

beautifully, and a thrust by the Romanians could tie in with the 

advance of the Russians. Gennany and Aust..ria had their hands 

fu1.l. trying to stop this Russian advance. Furthermore, Gexmany 

was badly tied up in the west before Verdun. Moreover, posseosion of the Austrian diplomatic code gave the Romanians extensive 

information and a reeling of great security. 'l'hey were convinced 

that the coll.apse or Austria was impending, and that for the 

Romanian arnzy- it would merel,y involve more or less of a picnic. 

1

rhey had to hurry in order not to arrlve too late for the division 

or the spoils. 

'fhe Romanian decls.rat..ion or war was direcl.ed onl¥ against 

Austria-Hungary,. hul,, necess"lricy and aut.omaLica.lls lt involved 

Germany too. The .first. result. of t.his doclaral.ion of war was 

the resignation in Genna.ny of nnneral Falkenha..vn as Chief of t.he 

General St.al"!; Lhe failures al Verdun and tho crises on the Somme 

had help,,,rt hri.11g this about. HindenbttrJh wi.th !.urlrmdcir.f! as First 

Quart.erma.st.er General, I ep Ll\celi f'al k,.nha.vn, while t..llc• latter 

asswned conunand of t.he Gel'man Uinth Army ~g~tinsl fto111nni.a. General 

Arz von Strausscnl:err: ro111m;mde1t Lllf:! Ausl.rian J-~jrsl.. Anny. On 

Bulgarian soil alonr~ th~ ~ouLlttH'n f rontlc1· oI RoDJ.Rnia 3tood l,,he 

Danube Army under General liosclt 111.:-J lllo Dulga.ria.n Third Anl\V, the 

latter .racing t.he ]}")hrurl .i:t. 

1 .f ' 

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RESifRl~'J1§tD 1 

The Romanians had marshaled their main torces on the 

Transylvanian border. Inunediately after t.he declaration ot war, 

they started ari attack on Transylvania from the east and the 

south, using an encircling operation with g1·eat]Jr superior 

forces against the German Ninth AI'Irf¥• Fighting a del~ng 

action, the German units withdrew while the Romanians press~d 

forward over the eastem and southem Carpathians and turned in 

the direction of Klausenburg. 

The Austrian and German intercept service had done 1.0 wo_rk 

against Romania until short~ before the outbreak or the wPr; 

in fact neither Romanian diplomatic nor army radio traffic had 

been monitored. Now and then they had listened to Romanian 

stations, but that was rather due to accident. Consequently, 

the Central Powers had no special experience with the handling 

ot Romanian radio traffic before the end or July 1916. Not 

until early August were several receiving stations committed 

by the Germans and Austrians to begin a systematic monitoring. 

However, during their assembJ.¥ the Romanians had been so 

cautious in their use or radio telegraphy that very little 

information could be gleaned. When war broke out on 27 August, 

the German and Austrian intercept service raced an utterly n~w 

problem. 

The picture changed, however, within a few days. Scarce~ 

had the Romanian advance gotten under wa:y, and scarcely had the 

first engagement resulted, when the Romanians began to use tpe 

radio to their hearts' content and, to be sure, in a way that 

145 

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~ftB21 n..na:)-.C-ft.!~ - -- -

would have mado l,he incautious Russians of 19lJ+ tuJ:'Il pale with 

envy. They i·adiocd ·with fixed ca.ll sien a in plain text; eave the 

nomes, munbers, and designations of troop units and formations; 

sent back all reconnaissance reports in plain lanetJ.age; and 

received their instructions and commands in clear. or course, 

they used cipher for a large part of their radiograms, but this 

was done with so little skill, and the number of plain-text 

messages gave the Austrian cryptanalysts so many clues, that the 

cryptographic system was solved in a ve-.;ry short ti.Jne. 

And now on the part of the Gel"lll1¥1 and Austrian intercept 

service began an activity which was and remained unique during 

the entire war. The number ot translators was hardly sufficient 

' 

to translate aJJ. the intercepted messages. The evdl.uators were 

busy d83' and night turning the results into situation reports. 

In a short time they had a clear pictux·e of the organization, 

strength, and intentions of the enemy, and or all of the 

difficulties which the enemy was '3XPeriencing in respect to 

supply and communications. Through their own radio traffic the 

Rom'Jlrl.ans gave aw83 their operational and tactical situation so 

complete~ that even the handling of radio traf ric by 'Lhe 

Russlans before and during the battle of Tarmenberg seems 

simply superb in comparison with what went on here. fnr 

Tanncnbcrg was something ~hat happens only once, and OW' h11.d 

to excu~e llir~ Russians be~ause of the nov~lty iri the UG" of 

tl1ls rno1l(!n1 means of communication. Meanwhile, however, ·t..hcre 

had l:Jci.:n l:io yea.rs of war and the Romanians of a.11 people should 

h-.:.1.v·~ d1 :a·m 0. lesson for t..hci1· cnm arnw from their pracl.ice in 

1 1 n 

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RE~~l'1~9 1 

intercepting Austrian radio traffic. But now they aQted as it they 

had never encountered the idea of an intercept service. 

General F'alkenhayn seized the opportunity which was thus 

ottered him. Every three hours the radio evaluation center of 

his oper.a.tl.onal section had to supply a situation report on the 

enemy. For four weeks he withdrew into the interior of the country, 

deceiving the enemy. Then the si'l:.ua.tion was such as he requ..i.red 

!or his blow. From 26 to 29 September he cruahed t.he Romanian 

left flank near Hermannstadt; in the following weeks he broke 

through the center or the Romanian line o~ battle near Fogaras, 

and inunedia.te:cy afterward in the battle before the Geisterwald 

drove the enc.llzy' back on Kronetad.t. On 8 October Kronstadt 

was taken; on the loth the passes of TUrzburg and Predeal were 

occupied. At. the same time~ on the left, of the German Nint.h 

Ai-my the Austrian First, Al'll\1 at tacked the Romanian right wing ~ 

and threw it back., Transylvania was reconquered within two 

weeks. 

In the meantime, the Bulgarian Third Arnw had begun its 

attack from the aouth against the Dobrudja. Collaborating with 

the Bulgarians, the Austrian intercept service had set up a 

central office in Sofia, and from here was able to give the 

Bulgarian army valuable suggestions. On 6 September the bridgehead Tutrakan was taken; on 9 September Silistria was occupied. 

A!'ter the loss of' Konstanza the RomaI\ians withdrew f'rom the 

Dobrudja late in October, and left the protection of the mouth 

of the Drumbe to the Russians. 

147 

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1u1v lilco a '.,hund<Jl1 nl.orin. Tt • .rr1ulri hAppen as 1L did m ,~,. because the 

UonvmiPd 1·a.dlo serv i.ee supnlJ Pr\ the ~11-a!Jlj! "' t 1 '• :\l l I he d~! :-. · 1.a required by itf.~ inte.lllgeuc~ e.arvic·~· It. ,.-a,5 a. play irri th El • r.>tesaue cha.rm 

which one WAS vatohi1w hAra; if rocy-one were to descr.i b.; the details 

of th.e or.,rai,i_nn.s cat·l.i.ed out. 011 the basis «I' intercept results, it 

would give a stocy con\parahle wii,h t.he moet th1~illi118: uot.ecl.ive story. 

Th<=t RoJT1:.i.rdQ.11S WG.re de~~;l;y impressed by the prec'lAi_on with which 

convincet! that treachery was ·1nvolveri.. 'l'llP.V looked !c>r traitors, 

replac.ed men in .. 1ariow:i posH.:\.ons, coin-t-mart..i.alled a. numbe1~ of hlgh 

offlcers:t but. in t..h~ main a.Uowerl. th.-d t" rn.c\io to OI":!r~te in the same 

old Wa.J'• They mllrel.y rha.nped some cryμtopre.phic systems and did S•) 

wi:lh the coop~ra.t.l•Jll •>( i.li~ Ji'n:.-r;••h JT1.n.it1n-y misrion vhi._t~l1 had. meanwhile 

a.r:ri. vert. 

Bui, it. hapμenE"c! ~hat. in th~ dP-dphPrin::i. offi.c,:; {•f the Nint.h Ar.my 

the1"\3 W"l'f:I fa·•O dec1p~1crers who hr.ti workol for ~01111-1 l.i. ii;t solvi.ng French 

crypt .• JJ?;l arhi.r ftyst.eins. 'rho;r wEn·A 1.u· 1 1"'.l.inted wit.h a d£>fiulte French 

ach.!.P.ve<i t:oml'l1Ate su~cH.~!1.. A.l.l told, the Gerr1M and J\ustri.::.n interMeam;hile, the i1.01J11\ni1~J1s had once ag:.d,1 uull ·ct thmns·alvet:i 

tor:<"'ther for determined i .1sist.nn::e. m·1d nppc•se·1 all 1!1.Vailri.ble 

Tt'l":.;hurr: ~'ld Predeal Fass t,oHm·rl 1-mcha.-r·est.. 'J'h~'Y wc.~re c•::nvinced 

. ( ·' 

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• 

that the Germ.an att ..ack would come here, and omitted strengthening 

theil• le.C't wing. This circwnstance could be recognized in all 

details from intercepted traf!ic. Falkenh~ therefore decided on 

a mighty surprise attack against thE! Romanian left wing.. In midNovember at the Vulcan and Surduc Passes the right wing of the I 

Al'll\Y brpke through the Romanian position, overran the main 

Romanian force on 17 November near Targu-Jiu, and 01~ 21 November 

took Craiova. The out-flanked Romanians then had to abandon 

their resistance at the Roten-Turm Pass. On 23 November the 

Danube Army, which had learned from intercepted Ro1~ian traffic . • ....A' 

of the withdrawal or some units, forced a crossing or the Danube 

near Swischtow by a surprise attack. The battle on the Argesul 

(1 - 5 December) ended with the defeat of the demoralized 

Romanian troops and with the evacuation or Bucharest. Covered 

by rear guard actions the Romanians retired behind the Sereth. 

The Romanian campaign was then concluded and settled into a 

war of position. The Russians, for whom Romania's entry into 

the war was supposed to bring relief, bad been forced during 

the last phase of the struggle to send troops of their own to 

aid the Romanians. 

At the conclusion of the Romanian campaign, three-fourths 

of the Romanian aruw had been annihilated and, save for a meager 

remnant, had ceased to exist. 

Later on, the lightning campaign against Roma..'lia was ascribed 

to the outstanding strategy of General Field Marsha.11 von Mackensen, 

149 

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whose troops occupied Bucharest. Actuall,y, von Mackensen was nominal. 

commander-in-chief of the troops operating against Homania but 01113 

the "Aney- Group Mackensen", which was oonipoaed or the Danube Arm,y and 

the Bulgarian Third Anl\Y, was directly under his comm.and. This sout.hem 

group was assigned onl,y a secondary role during the entire campaign. I 

The decisive operations took place on the northern front, and the 

focal point hore lq with the Ninth Ancy. This anny, however, would 

never have been able to deliver such decisive blows against the I 

Romanians' in Transylvania, and later on against their left wing in 

the no~'· if Romanian radio traffic

0

had been handl i according to 

modem/prl:nciples or concealment. The on:cy credit due Mack:msen came 

from 'he crossing of the Danube near Swischtow, the battle or the 

Arge ul, and tho occupation of undefended Bucharest. All this was 

Falkenhayn' s operations - and t,hanks to 

ian radio Lraffic. 

RESTRICTED 

• 
• 

RES:EfTHE I.N'rERCEPT SERVICE IM THE BALKANS 

The various campaigns and operations in the Balkans during 

the course of Vlorld Viar I were very largely influenced by the 

Austrian intercept service. Ill a number of izldividual actions 

the Austrians and Germans were successful soleq because of' the 

results of the interception of' the technical means or communications employed by the enemy. To report on this in detail 

would far exceed the limits of this work. However, we must 

not fail to mention that, after their landing at Sa1onila, the 

Allies on their part devoted very great attention to t;he intercept service and were especieJ.4r concerned with preventing 

intelligence material from reaching the enelllJT through their 

radio traffic. The greatest triumph in securing one's own 

radio traf'f ic against enemy- interception oame for the Allies 

in September 1918. At that time, the French !22nd Division 

and the 17th Colonial Division aucceedad in maintaiJ1ing 

absolute radio silence up to the moment of their comm:f.tment 

at the front, so that neither their disembarkation nor their 

transport to the :front was recognized b;r the enemy. According 

to an admission of" the Bulgarians, the element or surprise, 

which was thus gained, was the reason for the def eat of the 

_Central Powers in the Balkans • 

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• 

BRESr-L:r.rOVSK 

One of tne main goals of the Bolshevik: Government immediatel1' 

I 

ai't.er it seized power was to bring the war to an end. Not mereq ' . I 

the war between Ralssia and the Central Powers, but the World War 

I 

as a whole and 011 all fronts. This was the burden of the appeals 

I 

which went out by radio from Petersburg and Moscow. They were 

I 

directed to the working popula.~ion 0£ the Western Powers, and 

to their organizations and representatives • . Bu.t it soon appeared. that the political power of these 

organs was rar too small to have any decisive influence on the 

attitude of the governments of these countries. On the basis 

ot this discoverr, the Soviet Government decided on separate 

negotiations with the Central Powers to bring about a separate 

peace. On 22 December at Brest-Litovsk conversations began 

between the Russian delegation headed b,y Joffe and the representatives of the Central Powers whose spokesman was, in the 

main, General Hoftmam. The course o:t the negotiations is in 

general well-known; what is not known, howeve't", are certain 

circumstances which will be mentioned here for the first time. 

The special character of these peace negotiations lay 

in the f aot that here there sat at the conf'arence table to 

end war not merely representatives o:t the two countries or 

groups of" countries which were in a state of war, but that 

here two philosophies stood opposed to one another, between 

• which • from the point of view of ideologies • there 'WB.8 DO 

bridge; on the one side were the representatives ot militarism, 

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impcrial.i~m, and capitalism; rn the other the ropresenta.tivcs o.f." 

ra.d:i.cal socialism, of anti-militarism, and of the inl.ernal..ional 

collaboration of the prolel..ariat. From l..he boc;innine; this 

created a hostile atmosphere. There was the added fact that the 

BolshGvik Government had only been in power a few weeks, and this 

in the greatest continonta.l country on earth. On the side of the 

Central Powers there was, therefore, a vef7 great interest in gaining insight into the actual ail.ll:i.tion in the newly created Soviet 

Union as well as into the thoughts of its delegatj~on. Accordingly, 

in all haste a. large radio intercept .center was set up in BrestLi tovsk, whose task it was to intercept all Russian internal radio 

traffic and to exploit it for the info1'111ation of the Gennan and 

Austrian delegations. A great staff of evaluators and ana:I¥sts 

with linguistic ability was at work day and night. 

A teletype line for direct exchange of telegrams with the 

Soviet Government had been placed at the disposal or the Russian 

delegation. The Russians even had permission to use ciPher. The 

Hughes teleprinter at Brest-Litovsk was oper~ted by Russian 

personnel. 

Without the Russian telegraphers' knowing anything about it, 

other teleprinters had. been wired in parallel with the Hughes 

teleprinters used to transmit telegrams. The tapes produced here 

went at once to the cryptanalytic bureau set up especial.1¥ for the 

purpose, where 15 cryptan~sts were sitting ready to begin work 

• 

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RES1Tit!l:T~ 1 

at once. On the th:trd day 0£ the prooeecU.ngs the German crypt.-

analytic service succeeded in solving the 017Ptographic system 

used by the Ruasia.na. From thi;,n on, oJ.l ,incQming and outgoing 

telegrams could be deciphe~,~. f1A4 G§tnera,l Hoffmann r~ceived . their content c.urrentzy; eP.m•t~n~• the thtCiJ'hered measages were 

laid before him during tne conver,~ti~ns, 

Aside from these two inte~qeit devic•a, there was a third 

1.i.stening device installed ill ;0reot-LitW9sk, In the conference 

room of the Russian delegation the Germans had installed in the 

chandelier several microphones from which 't'\"ll-disguised leads 

ran to a listening room. Here eat several interpreters who took 

dmm in shorthand the conversations of the R11ssians. Moreove1•1 

behind the wallpaper in the living rooms of all members of the 

Russian delegation there had been concealed a series of microphones from which there 1~re ~ad~ tQ th~ above-mentioned 

listening room. Thus, every coriversatipn or the Russians could 

be heard. 

The net result o.1.' these three listening devices was that the 

chief negotiat.or of the delegation of' the Central Powers was not 

only very well-inf orm.ed at all times regarding the sometimes 

very unclear situation within the Soviet Un1.on and regarding the 

actual power of the new government,, but was also informed 

regarding all instructiona which the Russian delegation 

received, all reports which j t sent to Moscow, ancl all ideas 

discussed within the oel~('9.+ion. 1hr>y knew precisely how fa.;r 

• 1 r,;, 

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they could go, how far the Russians.were read,y to go, and what they 

could answer to the threats of Joffe and later of Trotzlcy. The 

Russian delegation could bring up anything it wlshod, but this did 

not make the slightest impression on General Hoffmann, since he 

often knew the enenty's situation better than the Russians them.-

selves. 

Twice it happened that General Hoffmann said too much in the 

heat of debate so that the Russians noticed that their correspondence with Moscow was being read by the Germana. Thereupon, they 

~hanged their cryptographic system but this too was broken in 

barely a week, and the total picture was now the same as before. 

The Russians, from a technical standpoint, found themselves in a 

hopeless defensive position and could not go a single step 

forward. Then on 10 February 1918 Trotzky declared that Russia 

'regarded the war as ended and would dispense with a formal treaty 

·or peace. He then broke off the negotiations. 

On the German side this step by the Russians was used as a 

pretext for doing awtJ'3' with the armistice; beginning 18 February 

1918 German troops occupied Livonia and Esthonia as far as Narva 

and thus threatened Petersburg. 'l'he Soviet Government found 

itself forced to give in, and on 3 March the treaty was signed at 

Brest-Litovsk. 

Meanwhile, a government had been formed in the Ukraine which 

was quite independent of the Bolshevik Government; it had come 

into being with German support; on 9 February it concluded a 

• 156 

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separate peace with Germany and Austria-Hungar-3 which provided 

for the entry of Genna.n and Austrian troops into the territory 

of the Ukraine. Beginning lS February the troops or the 

Central Powers marched into the Ukraine, occupied Kiev, 

Odessa, and Kharkov, and early in May advanced to the Don. 

In the south the Crimea was occupied. 

In spite of the conclusion of peace the situation in 

the east remained very strained, indeed - from a military 

point of' view - it became still less favorable than it had 

been up to February 1918, since in the enormous expanse 

or the western and eastern Ukraine there was stationed only 

a relatively thinly distributed force or the Central Powers. 

The Soviet Government on its part now set about organizing 

with great zeal a. new "Red Arn\V,n and let it be recognized 

that it had no thought of tolerating permanently the situation in the Ukraine. 

It was now necessary for the Central Powers to keep an 

exceptionally watchful eye on the development or the situation in the Soviet Union, in order to be protected from 

surprises. A whole net of radio intercept stations was 

set up by German and Austrian troops in the Ukraine and in 

the occupied northern territories, in order to monitor the 

entire radio traffic within Russia. The results were so 

good that actually a completely clear picture could be 

secured currently. 

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Along wit.h t,hoir entire governmental appa.ra.tua, the Russians 

al•io had Lo reorganize their entire radio service, and in t.he early 

mont.hs they made t.he same mistake as once before by sending out 

their measures and arrangements all too frankly int,o space. But 

they soon made up for this error in another w~. They began to 

send over their hieh-p<>ft-er transmitters a propaganda campaign in 

the German language which was directed to the German and Aust.rian 

soldiers. These transmissions were intercepted by all Gem.t>'l 

receiving stations, and despite all sccul'ity measures were soo11 

trickling through everywhere. The German and the Austrian 

soldiers, weary of war, filled with the questions of a new social 

order, were eager to hear and to absorb what was coming out of this 

land or consistent socialism. The reports of the Russian transmitters, however, were calculated t.o undermine confidence in the 

lea.ding class of one's own country. The system of radio 

propaganda, used here for the first time in history, began to 

bear very serious fruit in the swruner of 1918. The war in the 

east was ended, to be sure, but - and this signified far more -

the troops which had been left there began to drop out of the 

picture as a dependable military force for the Central Powers. 

At that time Russia wa.s the first country to recognize and make 

use of the value and power of modern radio propaganda. 

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RES~ JP.qr&'F.t')? 1 ............ ""' ........ - COMPIEGNE 

The First World War showed during its course a number of paral- . lel incidents in the intercept service, some o:t which strike one 

I 

as remarkable, some as downright comical. The first of these paral• 

lels is between the battle of Tannenberg in the east, and the Battie 

• of the Marne in the westJ the last is between Brest-Litovsk in the 

east and Compiegne in the west. 

In the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk the Germans listened to 

all communications from and to the Russian delegation, and deniphered them - insofar as was necessary. In the forest of Co.mpiegne the 

smne thing occurred,, although in an abbreviated and simplified form. 

On 8 November 1918 the German armistice delegation headed by 

Erzberger arrived at Allied Headquarters in the Forest of Compiegne. 

It remained there until 11 November. During this time all telegraph ... 

ic traffic of the delegation was deciphered by members of the Deuxieme 

Bureau of the French General Staff. Even the famous dispatch to 

Erzberger: "Try for milder terms; if not obtainable, sign nevertheless." was deciphered by the French. To a certain extent, this 

decided the fate of the defeated partner in the negotiations. The 

. interception and decipherment of the German telegrams to and from 

Compiegne were the last act of the intercept service during World I 

war I. 

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REER!RFU'P!B 1 

' 

IGO 

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PJ\R'l1 II. 

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162 

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TUE GERMAN Il'l'l'ETICEPT SERVICE 

J\li"l'J.m 'rllli: l!!IIJD. OF U01:1IJ) WAH I 

The col.lapse in the west a1~l the o.rmistice in the Forest 

of Com;pieGne ended the First Woi·lrl Har. At least in the west. 

In the cast the s l;ruggle went on in a new form; in the lJ1a-aine, 

in the Baltic provinces, and alone; the Polj.sh i'ron~~ier, since the 

Poles had announced extensive claims and had set up a new a:rmy, 

and since there was fishtinG in l;he border re~ions. On the Gernia.n 

side, volunteei· corps were formed. In Berlin the National :Ministry 

of Defense 1ras created; a small. remainder of the general. staff 

tool~ up j_ts work anew. 

The German intercept service likewise began immediately, 

under the chanc;ed conditions, a task adapted to the new situation. 

All ga.'l"rison radio s't.ations wei·e reoriented for intercept service, 

which they had to carry on along with their own trai'f'ic. It was 

a question of' foll.owing developments in the Soviet Union where 

civil war had flared up. MoI·eover, the sjtuation in IIunaary 

required the closest attention. In Berlin, in Friedrichs·tro.sse, 

a new central office was set up for the intercept service and the 

cryptanalytic section. The then Lieutenant Colonel Buschenhagen 

took charge. He had been concerned 11ith the Geruian radio deception in Italy a.nd had subsequently worl:.ed in the intercept service 

at Grand Headquarters. 

This newly created o:t'f'ice bore the designa.tion 11Voluntcer 

lG3 

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Evo.luuU011 Office of l.ihc OIIL11 o.nd consi~licd at~ flrst of a t11Jla.ll 

group, which wo.s sl..jll tnore reduced in a. short t,jrn~ when vurlous 

pe.rtkipnnl:.s rouml more promlsin13 jobs in prj.vatc indu:::;try. 

Buschenhe.Ben now cmdetwored to creo.tc a. new Grour which would 

form the ba.sls i'or the subsequent development of this brnnch of the 

service. At Glle so.me tim.c o. Captain Selchow, who had lil;:·~wise 

been active in the intercept service during ·t;he war o.m.1 bad for a. 

time headed ·the cryptana.lyt..J e (7"0U:£l or the OHL, set. up a. bureau 

' in the Foreign Off lee which was occup:!ed wlt.h the dcvel.011meut; of 

cryptographic systems and !:.heir employment in cliploma'l.ic correspondencc and o.lso - and thls uo.a I.he r.ovelt..y - wlth the decipherment 

or i'orei1311 systems. The assiGnment covered foi·ejgn dlp1omo.tic 

radio ·traff le. 

Tht ts a.:r ter the end of t..hc wa.r there enoucd l:.he l..yp :i co.l German 

phenomenon, that ins Leud or l!Omuininc o.ll enerc;ies to attaln the 

greatest possible useful rc~ult.a, Lhere be60.l1 a spU.tt.ing up, a. 

struge;le between rivo.lo. •ro Lhc outside wor] d the creo.cion of 

the two btu·110.us was ,jus tlf lccl by sajlinc; l:.ha.t !..he "Dltreo.u Buschenhagen11 was to occupy itself wlth cr;ypi..uua.lysis a.ml evoJ.uo.tion 

o:C' i'orej_cn military ro.dio traffie, while 1113urcau C o:C' "Lhe I•'oreign 

Office" vas to carry out cryptanalysis of roreic;n lliplomi..ic cryptographic systems. In pra.c tice, ho'\lcver, it was lly no 1:1.cans easy 

to draw ·the line l)etween t.hem since the :radjo trurr;c of o. military attachd',for exa.1nple, can fn.11 both inl..o 1..ho mtlltary ana. 

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into the U.iplo1r.atic circle oi' interest. Furtllermore, in solving 

a cr;yp toe;ro.phic sys t.ein it is an 011en qucs l.ion whe1•e l;he contenli . of the messaaes to be deci.l?hered will lie. l•'urthcrmore, a. cryp·tographic system - no ma.l;l;ei· where it is uaed - is simply a crll?tographic syste111, which ho.s to be solved by l;he so.me methods 'Without ree;ard ror the use to whi.ch it mo.y be put. 

The methods of c1·yptan.o.lysls hall to be tile same, naturally, 

in both bureaus, and the experience and. yractica.1 app1ication 

were the same • Any lmowlcdGe o;a thered in one of the l:;wo bureaus 

must also be oi' value to the work of the othe:r. 

Wi'l:;h rational. collaboration between the liwo offices, it would 

have been possible in the J.ong run to avoid duplication and one 

could ho.ve e1aployed the scanty perso1mcl available in a rational 

manner. However, anyone who knows German conditions will not be 

astonished if I tell him that, as soon as the two offices had 

been set up, there sprane; up a mutual jealousy, an efi'ort on the 

part of each to out-sl;rip the other, to flnd out as much as possible fro~ the other with.out givinc anything in return, and to 

hold i"l:;self apart as far as possible. '11here was an attempt, to 

be sure, to keep up appearances and to arra.nGe a so1·t of exchane;e 

of ldeas, but l'rom the beginnine; these a~i,;tempts uere not based 

011 any honest intent.ion, so that no really senGible collaboration 

came about, either during the period of organization of the t1io 

bureaus or later. Of coui•se, with the small nu .. 1ber oi' l'eally 

hiQ,11-gra.de crypte.1.1.a.lysts available, this mean~ a very j_raprac·tical 

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1110 of 1:'1oilt r~i'I. 1•:-11y ~"Cc.Tn rssr-cd b·~:Cu-1. .... ·th".: t.•:.J ori'.i.c.:~a l"t:""d 

develor-?d Fm crl.-.:qn•i.t') mn•i•,.-..:r o:r cood cr:,'j?tr.1ryJ..y;:..t..a. 

Uh.11c '\1i tl\ B\r,,·oun C of' t\'~ Forci(lil O.i'£1cc the;! P :.ln. c:;.'h.1."\h.nr.io 

waa on c:t."Y!">1:·,'tln.l.y~1o, :l.n thd con'l;.1•01 office of tl1e 11rl;c:rct?pt 1:tc1· ... 

vice of the l!a.tic.1~~ Ulu!nl.:r,Y ot Dc.:C<::uee, ti•'' li'"'\1.11 c.;.;~ho.sis r:ioon 

tui"nf::d to tln field of oo-co.ll.cd cva.ltuJ.tion, :f •• t)., to tho synte ... 

mn,tic !'ir.cill,(J tQgoth-~1· Of llU·' er.O?.!S SiT.l{;le I'\'11::nrq;;:::no. in fw_~;::ipl 

radio t1•l'.fi'ic i"vr tl!'!! p'l.11.''l,)Ofl!:.t O.f c~t;l;.in_z V'l QVl..;r-nlJ.. p1C'f..'1.n."e O[ t.he 

situatiou. in the o:r.·ca. to bo ohrJ~i:V'•::iu. 'J.lJr1:t: lnf; to the point, c.nd 

a01TcGponded to the dntloo of e.n iulc..1·ccpt; co11trol. s·tation o.ttacbcd to th~ hit)i·~Gt co1M1~rnl or tho arw.~<l rorcea o:r a cot.m:try. The 

reeW.t1 hOt.'.lVr}r, 'l,.!Jl tllat soon there brol\.c out o.n cuvloun co-.n.vet.tt1on botw1..en th'J eec tiono 11C1·y_pl.ana.lyuiu'' tmi.l 11.EvtJJ.uation", re .. 

gardilllJ -which mo1•e wJ.ll bu c:lid lat21·. 

AB el.'t'c.01.ly n·-::J'bic:,n.:=d, ltu·Jl·:ldio.t.ely .-.i't· . .r tL~~ cu.-.l ot th~ GJ.'~o.t 

Wtl.J!', :t'!~b.f.!t1e Ji:.\d llrOk•~U out u~l.\.~Oll thrl Polco ('lld Ccru!MS aJ.ong 

tbo u..:..\tly ~ot.;r.blltd•~;d t·u1•11do.ry in th~ co.at. Ou th•.: GoI'Wfl.U r;idc 

so ... call.c.d BN'il"\'r CU!ll.'u A!.•nl<.B w1111·~ vet up; o.o:;.-, :Pordt..r Gu.a.r,1 Army 

Soul..h vith itu clilur co.: • ..:. . .1.ud in Dreolnu, ci,1111 a. r·:c'o21J. DorC:\·~r Gu:.~i.·J. 

Arl!iY ITorth with 1ta cll.1<::1' cc-1.,,.'.lJld .Lu thu Vichi!ty o:r: IT.lT1iu .. Ji·1.~·t.e:in. 

These ccroioted in 'l.ll.e m.:.1:in or v"lunt:.:-cr ro1~n·,tioll~;; 1;l)~ co11lm.·•:1J.J., 

b-;;1,-.;:vc1•, o.hoCa.\ly l·ul.ouc; .... J to the ced:.a.•e of tlle n ~·wJ.y e r.:-·u:tcd Rcicbol ... 1b.l.". In boLh Do1·d•::r Gu.::.l:d J\ly.n.1.cs cva.Luat.iou <.:.i..ll<.:i:...i ,;.:i-..: set up 

fo"J.· t;he inh!rcept; JJ'".rvicc~, t-lJ111 the a.tl.:.111pt lT.:.:.ll ~,_._,le t.o intu.rc1...pt 

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Polish traffic both by radio a.nd by wjre. Since the Poles had 

110 experience in this field, they used their technical means 

of communication jn a very carefree fashion, and. thus gave the 

German intercept service a vas·t amount of e;ood :i.nforma.tion. 

All preparations and plans of the Poles, all proposed undertakings, 

and all details regari'ling dli'i'iculties encountered in them were 

revealed to the Gerrria.n in'Gercept service, so that it was almost 

always possible to start countermeasures in time. 

Here in the east there was a repetition of the situation which 

had existed on the Russ.Lan front during World War I. With the 

internal sjtuatlon of those days i.n Germany, with the great variety of political currents, with the constantly recurring, ~ever_7 

I ~··-

internal tens ions, wi·!ih the militia-like character of' the relil.-· 

·tively feeble border guard formations, it would hardly have been 

possible to safeguard the German i'rontier in the east to the extent it was, had not constant knowledge of events among the Poles 

put the German command in a position to intervene at the danger 

points in such effective fashion that the enemy was always forced 

to take the defensive. Here the Poles bad to pay the same tui.tion 

f'ees that the Russians had had to pay at !;be beginning of World 

War I. Of course, they learned their lesson more ~uickly than 

the Russians and i;ovcrned themselves accordingly. We shall have 

something to say on this poini; later. 

1 G'l 

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168 

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Older readers may perhap~ recall an episode which occurred 

in 1906 in ·t.he vid.nity of Berlin and which, under the title 

"The Ca:;?tain of Koepenick," formed a favorite subject of conversation for many yea.rs and, in a sense, even became a part of German 

history. For those to whom l:;his theme is new we will report l:;he 

occurrence briefly. 

On a beautiful summer Sumlay morning a small detachment of' 

German soldiers under the charge of a non-commissi9r.J.ed officer ~ .· ,_, ... , 

was ma.rchin~ throu~h the litt.le old city 'o'!f Koepenick, southeast; 

o:f' Berlin. In the vicin·Ity or the city hall, a man in captain's 

uniform ra.et them, to whom !:;he non-commjssioned officer reported his 

netall j_n accordance with regula tlons. Thereupon he was ordcrec1 

by l.he captain to march with him to t.he ICoepenick city hall, since 

he (the captain) had the rnisston of arresting t.he mayor because of 

serious malfeasance in office. 

The non-commissioned o!ficer saluted snappily, had his 

forma·t;ion about-face, and marched his little force under 'i:;he corunand 

or the captain to the city hall. The entrances were occupied, and 

the captain, along with the non-commissioned officer and two men, 

betook himself to the office of the mayor where the latter was told 

that he was under arrest because of serious irregularities, and was 

to turn over the keys, in particular that of the city strong box, 

·t;o the captain at once. This was done, ·whereupon the mayor was led 

away; the detachment oi' troops departed; the captaln reuiained in the 

169 

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RESftl~2J. 

building. On the .rollowina day it tur11ed out. thR.t the whole a.i'i'air 

was a. bluff; the supposed captain had been a ahoemalcer, Wilhel '11 

Vo1.gt, who had a.11·ead.y been convic·l;ed rcpeo.tedly. IIe had procured 

a captain's uniform and relyin~, correctly enough, on the absolute 

obedience in tho Gerrr.an army to the insignia or e. higher ro.nk, 

had used this occasion to appropriate ·wlth the aid of this small 

detach11ient, all the money he could lay hands on in the town hEl.1., 

and tbaihsii vanished vith it. 

T~ere was a great deal of laughter about the aifair later on, 

and i/ was called "tY,Pically Prussian," althoueh people were incli£1et\ 

to J.mi t th.a. Ii it probably could happen but once. It probably was 

typJca.J..l.y Prussian, but it can be said that it would on1y happen I . 07e as far as the external. circumstances were concerned; Koepenick 

p:i:a.nks of J.ike type ha.ve often occurred in Germany especially :l.n 

Jrussia; onJ.y they were less ta11ced about. 

I 

The event d.escr ibed above lla.s been mentioned here, because a.n 

event which took place in the summer of 1919 in the Border Gtw.rd 

Command South in Bresla.u i•emlnds one vividly of the Captain of 

Kcepcnick, save ·~hat in Breslau matl.ers "Were f'a.r more serious. 

One forenoon in March J.919 there appeared in "St. Petersburg 

Court" in the Teichstrasse in Dresla.u, where the A:J.•rny High Command 

(South) was stationed, a. ~entleman in army tmii'orm, having the 

insignia of a technical officer with ·the rank of major, to see the 

head of the intercept service. He introduced himself as Dr. Winiker, .. 

17() 

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pl'i.va.t.e Sl;hol.a.r a.nd. teacher at the Ins·titute of Tecb1101.ogy ln 

Berlin, and declar~d that he,, along 'With a.11 students of this 

institu·tion, bad placed himself at the disposa.J. of the Border 

! 

Defense against Poland. H~ himself bad been ordered to the .Army 

liigh Command (South) in Breslau by the head of the communication 

system in the new Defense Ministry because o~ his linguistic 

ability, and was now placing himself at its disposal. 

Winiker gs.ve the impression of a. man weil vel"U<1 in the 

ws;y& of the world and pos-sessing godd ma.nne.1'&J he wa.B" very etociabl.e 

and in a short time ·was lmown a.11 over tht! place • He was- n;;,t 

a friend of much work, in contra.st to this~ haw'Sver, a friend of 

long drawn-out conversations and goS"sip. Since he possessed a. 

co~lete command of &he Polish language, he was en1ployed in the 

trQSle.tion ot' Pol.ish documents. Re telephoned to Berl.in almost 

daily, especially to numbe1•s in tlle Defense Mirt::ts.try, and ma.de 

a. great showing oi' his far-reaching connections. Since his family -

as he declared - was living in Berl!n, he sometimes traveled 

fromBreslau to Berlin over the weekend, e.nd. as a. rule, did not 

return unt.il some time the following Mond.4y. 'l'hese- trips a.J::ways 

f'w:nfshed hui: with more material i'or chats in his circle of collU"ades 

inl\ftGlau. J:t wu l\'.'etther remarkable that on his journeys between 

Berl.in an<! Bres1'8Al ~ m.a:.rJ.y al.ways met someone ~Jllilo was very well 

:lo.t'ormed on the situath:>n in Poland. At tha;t tinne no one in 

Bre.s1au attar.hed any 4'ignificance to this circums.'tdllce, but on the 

cOliD:l:tzD!try, they-:w~ mily interested in the stories toJ.d by Winiker • 

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............. ..,..- ........... , ti .. '. "' ......... 
• 

RES¥1lll13~ 1 

A rew \reeks o.ftcr Winil;;cr• s '8:I"rhnl.._ ~io'-\S S<.:-:~.:re'C. pnverr. 

bcGa.ll to dlsaypcar from ·l:;he ma.in o:f'i'ice of the intercep·t servlce, 

I 

ad well as from the off:ice of the head of the communications system, f which Lhe intercept service was subordinatei these, however, 

;generally reappeared el.scwhere • As a rule, it so happened tha:li 

I 

they disappeared toward the weekend, and reappeared on one of the 

first days of the following week. 

It took a. very long time before one lleE;an to pi..y attention 

to the legality oi' these ho.ppeuinr;s. After some time it was established that; the Poles a.t different times had information a.t their 

disposal which they could have acqulred only through treachery. 

In the meantime,·Winiker lived in Dreslau in a. good hotei, boasted 

about his excellent connections in Derlj.n and his private wealth'; 

• ana.,wherever possible, incurred debts. 

The months passed until the begj_nninc; of August 1.919. Then 

on a Saturday .forenoon, there disappeared from the private office 

of the head of the communications system a strictly secret map, 

on which were mim1.tely drawn ·t.he complete wire cotmections of the 

Southern Army. This disappearance wa.s inllll.ediately discovered a.nd 

created great excitement;. Not until. Monday, when Dr. Winiker failed 

to report for duty, did they become suspicious and make inquiries 

at his hoteJ_, on._1-y to discover that Dr. Winiker had vanished 1.eaving behind him nothing bu.t a large unpaid hotel bill. 

Now a.n investigation was begun which showed tba.t Winiker 'Was 

l'12. 

RESTRICTED 
. neither a doctor nor a professor at the Institute of Technology 

I - in Berlin, but e.n1 ordinary spy who had. brazened his way into the 

I Defense Ministry Jin Berlin through his personality and references 

to his outside crnnections in the same way that he had deceived 

the men in Breslau. They now found out that Winiker had undertaken, 

I 

while in Breslau, to obtain for himseli' knowledge of the most secret 

matters, wh:l.ch he then delivered on h:l.s journeys '!Jetween Breslau 

and Berlin to liaison men of the Polish secret service. 

Tb;e incident was hushed up as much as possible in the office 

of the Army High Connnand (South) because the affair was too shameful. All. inquiries e.s to what had become of the ca.pe.bl.e co-worker 

yielded no results. The episode has been related here ~ecause, 

for one thing, it is symtomatic of' German conditions, but al.so 

because the effects of this incident were very far-reaching. 

• 

Winiker had communicated to the Pol.es a1J. results of the German 

intercept service, and had given them val.ua.ble pointers on what 

not to do in radio traffic. This gave the Pol.es their i'irst 

1esson in regard to camoui'l.age and one must admit that they learned 

to fo1l.ow these instructions in a com_parativel.y short time. 

1'13 

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' ....... ---· ~~~~~~~-·~~~·:.........,;-~;~~~~·~··-·~.....;::::::~::..r;;;.:;.;;;... 

 ....iii;;;;a~~~··----·---------- .... ,"" ... ,,,.. ... 
1'74 

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• 

THE WOHK 0.1!' 'l'II!!l GEHMAN IN'l'.I!:HCEPT SERVICE 

In February 1920 I.he "Volunl;eer .Evaluation Office oi' ·the 

Army High Comm.and" moveu from Friederichstra.sse to the De:J:ense 

Ministry Building in Bendlerstrasse~ The oi'f.ice now received the 

designation "Cipher :Bui•ea.tt oi' bhe Army High Conmia.nd," and bel.oneed 

to the "Abwehr"* Section as Group II. This merging with the 111\.bwehr" 

Section lasted only a !av yea.I's. Since the intercept service bad 

to ·work id th personneJ. a11d e13.u1.pment of the communication troops, 

there na·t;urally i'oll.ow~d a. c:lose c01U1t;!c ti on 'With the Inspection oi' 

Communlca.t.ions Troops. In l;iruQ thiiJ led to friction between the 

Abwehr Soetion and the lnapectiou 0£ Ot>tumunications Troops; so 

that evenbu.a.J.J.y the il1tarclilpt ae:tvice was wholly subordinated to 

the Inspection ot Communications Troops. or course, to a certain 

extent cooperation ,.,.t th the Abweh1• Section was still main·~ained; 

this was, howev1'!.t',, mo:t•G of a.n ini'ol'wa tional i::ha.i!a.c ter. 

In the yctll'S l.S12C> ... 1~25 the ts.ult OJ: the O<:!:t'Uiall Intercept Service consisted in i·tatchi.ne5 tha enti:l.~o inLerna.tional :press rad:i.q 

service. '.Che interoe1rbB \ICl."e wr:I. b ~en ttp in brief' reviews, antl 

e.;ave the governmen !, 'V'B.l1.1.a.1Jl e :t.nsi~h !j a11d ini'orma !.ion of' a poli tical and economic charaGt&2:'. J'.n a.rlt11 t:Lo11, they turned more and 

t!lOre to the e:x;pansion O! tJ)lil cr~'l'tO.nr.tl.j"tic e;roup a.TJ.d the intercaption or international d1;lot:s.tic radio t~~ffic. This work proceeded 

·X· 1\.bwehr = counterinbelliGence 

175 

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ra·ther slowly, but was carried on very systematically a.nd in time 

showed gradually increasing results. At that time they were es ... 

pecial.ly successful in deciphering Ita..l.is.n diplomatic traffic, 

and in this way derived rrom the reports of the Italian a.mbassadors and lec;ates in London, Paris, :Moscow,and other places,a good 

insight into the governmental proceedings or these nations. 

Viewed as a whole, the focal point of' the work of the 1 :e,..1:1.a.r. 

intercept service lay in the field of politics. With rege.r<" t.o 

military matters the work was l.imited to the observation of events 

in the Russian Civi1 War and the course of the Greco-Turkish War. 

Es,pecia.lJ.y in regard to occurrences in the Soviet Union it was 

possible for the GertllSll intercept service to pursue events in a.1-

most uninterrupted sequence. It was especially interesting, however, to follow the radio traf'f'ic on both sides, and in particular 

on the Russian aide du.ring the Russo-Polish War in 1920. 

The course of this campaign was one of the first noteworthy 

things in the period fo1lowing 1918. At that time Russia found. 

itse1f in a state of civi1 war which raged everywhere. The armies 

of' Kolchak, Denikin, Wra.ngel, Petljura, Judenich, Miller, and 

various other \lhite Russian leaders were seriously threatening · 

from. e.ll. sides the structure or the newly a.risen Soviet Union. 

Resurrected. Poland took advantage of this condition to declare 

war on the Soviet Union, and to annex l.arge areas. At that titr.e 

the Poles succeeded in pushing forward and reaching the Dnieper, 

176 

RESTRICTED 
• 

in crossing it at some points, and in adva.nci~ beyond Volb.ynia 

towe.rd the south. 

A very critica.t situation resu1ted for the Soviet Union, but 

this soon led to an astounding reaction; the resui·t was that w.i.th .. 

in the terrltories dominated by the Soviet government eJJ. pol.itica.l 

dissension ceased at once and there arose a. united defensive front 

~ainst Pol.and. Even high ot'i'icers o:f.' the former Czarist army 

placed ·themselves at ·the disposal of ·!:;he Soviet government, and the 

"Third War for the Fatherland" began. 

The onrush of the Polish troops was brought to a halt, and 

in bol.d advances, units of the Red Arriry' succeeded in th:ro'Wing the 

Pol.ish forces back a. J.ong way. It was particularly the ce.va.lry 

a.'t'my of' Budjennyj which was abl.e to achieve surprising resu1ts in 

the beginning, until there came that famous "Miracl.e at the Vistula.," 

which was no miracle a.t all. but the result of very matter-of :-fact 

ca.uses. These were as follmil"s: 

Dm•ing Worl.d War I the Russians had had to pa.y dea:rl.y for , 

their lessons in the proper use of radio in the face of the German 

intercept service. Ii!'evertheJ.ess, they b.a.d. begun to J.ea.rn and in 

the course of three years of the war had in some cases ma.cle very 

good pro13ress. The collapse of the Czarist army resulted in scattering aii previous experience and kn.owl.edge to the wind 1ike 

cha.ff, and the new1y a.risen Red .Arrrr3' virtua.J.1.y had to begin again 

.i'rou the beginning. 'lllat meant that in respect to the security 

177 

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RES6P!l:RE'!~D21 

or their 01m J.•adio tra:l.'i':l.c they were preciscJ.y where the Czarist 

arlll;y had been ill 1914. 

TlJ.e command of the Hed Army attached great importance to the 

use oi' wireJ.ess tel.egraphy in c;encra.l nnd especie.lJ.y in the a:rmy. 

When the new i..1efcnse aiinies were set u;p B.Ba.inst the Pol.iah invader / 

they were equi11pcd. e.1JundanLly "N"i th radio apparatus from tho remaining stocks of the old Czariot &•my. This equipmeut wa.s - :relatively -

i'a.i• more cxtensi"lre than any one or the Czar:! st armies had ever had 

during the Wo1•ld War. 

The shock of the Russian forces, whkh had passed to the a.tta.ck, 

threw back the PoJ.ish i'1·ont. encl vresaed it nearer a.nc.l. nearer to t:.he 

Vistula.. I"t looked a.s though there woul.d be e. vasl:; bactle of annihilation in the gi·ea.t bend or the Vistula, but the Russian su.r:cesses suddenly besa.n to diminish until i'inalJ.y there came the wellknO'W'll, decis:l.ve turning point. Thts came a.bout in the following 

wa.y. 

In the first phase of the Russian atta~k, the Poiish conw.iand 

had virtua.ll.y r·o information regartline; the organization, a trengl;h, 

of'fens:i.ve pmrer, aud intended direction of attack o.r the Hussian 

armies. Thus l:ihe Russla.ns ·were able to take advantage oi' the element 

of surprise l;o a i'ul1 extent. However, scarcely had t.he Polish 

front beGWl to move backward when the Russians beGan to use radio 

on a. large scaJ.e. Tliis 11as PaI"tlcu1a.rly the case ·wi i.h the cavalry 

army of Budjenn:yj. 

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Some eight yea.rs a.flier this campaign, the Pol.ish Colonel. 

Szieszy11slti rev-eaJ.ed the secre·t;s of those days in a briei' memoir,* 

and cited a number of interesting ra.diogratn.s which were aent l>y ·!;he 

Russians during those weeks, partly in clea.l', portly in a. very 

primitive cryptographic system, and which were intercepted and 

deciphered by the Polish intercept service. The Polish intercept 

service had been built up i'rom former Austrian-Polish and GermanPol.ish officers as soon as the Polish army was created. From the 

eve11ts mentioned in the Ui11iker case, they had had a good opportunity to gather e:xperience and to brain themselves. 

When the Polish-Russian War broke out, there was a small but 

nevertheless very useful Polish listening organization. It wa.s 

innnediately committed for the monitoring of Russian military traffic, and after the beginning of the Russian offensive afforded such 

an abundance of fine and superfine intelligence regarding the enemy 

that we can onJ.y corrq;>are with these events those associated wi·th 

the cavalry corps of' von der .Ma.rwitz in i911~, but with the difi'erence that the individual. messages of the Russians were much more 

comprehensive and informative than ~hose sent in its day by the 

cavalry corps on von der Marwitz. In content the Russian teie •. 

grams c1ose1y approached those from the days of the battle of 

Tannenberg. In particuJ.ar / i·t was the cavalry army of BudJenn;y-J 

which soon distinguished itself in this direction. Such conduct 

* For the Polish Signal Corps. 

J'19 

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RES,..Ai!ef¥D21 

tmist naturally lend to a se~ious reverse sooner or la~er, especially since the Poles for their part made no use of radio due to 

la.ck or apparatus, a.nd hence were not supplying the n.ussinn :l.nt;er ... 

cept sc1·vice, which did not exist to any a]?prcciable ex'i;ent, with 

information oi like value. The nussia.ns reveaJ.ed their measures 

and in·l;entions to such a degref~ thal; the Pol:J.sh general staff, 

in collaboration wlth the l!,rench military mission, could pre ,..,.?tl 

successi'ulJ.y wil:ih the preparation and execution oi' a counl:ierhlaw. 

This 1ras the famous "Miracle of the Vistula," that as·l;oundingly 

striking peral1el to the batl;J.e of the Harne, which c;ave a. decisive turn to the enl:iire campai5n a.nd put the Pol.es in a. position 

to secure a drawing of the boundary virtually a.s ii:; remained until 

the autumn of 19 39. 

From the giE;antic mass of radio messages intercepted by the 

Poles we reproduce a. few below. 

From a telegram intercepted 2 July 1920 from the chief of the 

radio service of the Bolshevik Fourth .A:rm:y, IJr. 517/op. ta.j., it 

couJ.d be learned that; the radio station oi' the 48th Infant1•y 

Division was to be moved to Dzisna. to serve the stafi' of the 

Folll'th AJ.."fIJ:Y. In this way the Polish in·t;elligence service received 

definite con:t"irmation of ea:rJ.ier reports or the formation of' a 

Fourth Army. At the same time, the localiion of' the aJ."llly sta:f'i' 

was disclosed. 

On 24 July l:ihe chiei' of' the signal. service of the 16th Arrey 

180 

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revealed in a service message through the signal. officer of the 

10th Inf'antry Division the location of the army staff in 

Bara.11ovichi. 

On 26 July the chief of the radio station of the Fourth Infantry Division ini'ormed the chief of the radio station of the 

54th Infantry Divialon of his location in the village of Olszana~ .. 

On 30 July the heads of the radio station of the lOth and 

53rd Infantry Di visions clid the same thing. This was repea·ted 

during the entire war, so that the Poles knew the precise loc~tion 

of a.11 higher Russian starrs, and hence the grouping of the enemy. 

On 10 August a service telegram of the War Commissar of the 

Fourth Army was intercepted which was deciphered on 12 August; 

its wording was as follows: 

"To the War Commissars of the 10th, 12th, 15th, 53rd, 54th, and 

48th Diviaions, to the Third Cavalry Corps, to the 161Jth Brigade, 

and to che Quartermaster Section of the Fourth Art.ny: from. the 

niome11t or the arrival. of this presc;;nt; messa~e tlle use or cipher 

'Natisk' :1.s forbidden; in its pla.ce the key 11Hevol.ucija. 1 w.tll 

be used f'or counnunicai;ion o:r d.ivisi.on staffs 11ith army staffs. 

The key 'Natisk.' may be used U.P to receipt of the key "Hevol.ucija.1 , 

which has been dispa.cched by cow.•iel". Then it is to be retired 

from use, and sent to the field sta.i'f' of the .xn:l'J'. Ileport on 

receipt of the key and on measures urnlerta..lten." 

In JuJ.y 1920 the Poles learned f'rom most Jt.IJ.Jortant operational 

telegrams oi' the commander o:r the cavalry army, General Dudjennyj 1 

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wM ch 11crc llo.t.cd I~>r7.cc, 11 JuJ y o.t. 20JO hoin· : • pr"!"! i...r.... t1c::-l.d 1:-; 

oi' hio i nl.cnuc:ll atl.v!:'.nc.c aml t..hc mi.l.ito.ry coulJ:>OGll,,ion u.L l.llc arr:~', 

'rhich 'ID.S e;iv~n in f..hc:i Ol?r"ll o.U.rb:ess Of \..he t.clr.1~n.m: "To l.hc 

comm.o.ndcrs or the l.th, 6th, lll,h, anrl J_l1 !,J, Ca.va.lry DlvistonEJ a.ml 

·to l.he Cotmua.mlcr of t.hc h)l.h Infa.nt.ry DJ.vlnLou." 

On 5 July U1'? f lrst opriora.l~ ional orclcr or the Crnui.~tuucr of 

the ]'ourth A.ru~y, General •.rsclmvocv [?), wns heard, ;rhich was 

add1·esscd to the commi:mdt:?rs of l.he l2l.h, )3rd, anrl 18th I11fo.ntry 

Dl vis ions, the Commander 01' l.hc i1n,..,1, Hrir~ndc, unc1 ·t.hc Co1m110.11der 

of the III Cava.u:y Corps. 

Ou G July a. s.itnila.r 01·tlcr frou tl1c connno.u<lci• of the 1~+,h 

A:rrrq was in l•Jrccp Lcc..1. 

These l:illl'i:?e, alT'ios t, s 1 u.ul GDl!LOllf.l or•lcrs uerc the t•a.sic orclcrs 

oi" Lhe three l~u::;oio.n army <'!Oi:11r.a.nclcrr; for l.h·~ b·!(.',lnnin[7, or a. new 

eta.cc or the Hussian offen!3lVC. 

Sur~h orrlcrs in enoru.oq::; 1L1•1.1J.cr ·m:u·c inl.erccpteU. and dcciphP.red clur:i.nr: t!11 . .: 1no11th nf .J11l.). 'll1 ·:,1~ in l.erccptcd l.cleGro.m.s were 

usually dee J.phc?l1~?1l on 1 ..ht· sorK: tlA.", or ou t.he followiue, clay aL 

the la.t~st, awl wr:>1·e b.1."01.1.ght.. f,;o the iuu.1eula.t.c noUe~ or l;llk! II 

De~ tion of th~ GcncrrJ. ~j t.aff a~ ucll ns l.o tha.i:; or l.he 011cral.io11s 

::>cct.ion. Tlle l\ussiun 111 Cavalry COt'P:J disl.il}GUioh•::>l1 itself 

pa.r tictl.iarly 111 Lhls l:es1•c··~ l.; it. snppliccl t.lw l-'olh;l1 :in lcrc1..rJ? t 

service 11ith nt lco.s1.; oue very infu1·r.la.1..ho radioouw do.lly. 

RESTRICTED 
The events during the Polish-Russ.tan War were also observed 

a.nd evaluated by the German lntercept ser'V'ice no that day by .day 

the troop organization of both sldes sud the course of events 

could be follmred by use oi' large ma.ps. This was the first training which the reconstituted intercept service received and its 

first opportunity for practice. 

At the beginning of 1920 the tota..1 s tre11gth of ·the centra1 

office of the German intercept serv1.ce inBendlerstrasse consisted 

of some 12 persons. Then they began to expand both the cryptana.-

l.ytic and the evaluation groups. This program, however, was not . eisy to carry out, since the organs of the Inter-A1lied Military 

C~ntrol Commission were endeavoring to foll.ow closely all ha.ppen1~.gs in th~ National Ministry of Defense. The Germans tried with 

alJ. means in the:i.r power to deceive these control officers. The 

c::oyptana.1.ytic group was transferred in part to Grunewal.d. To the 

outside ''l'Orld the evaluation group became a newspaper translation 

ofi'ice, and in this way it was possibl.e again and again to escape 

the threatened dissolution of the intercept center. For the intercept service had been strictly forbidden to the German Reichswebl.• 

by the Inter-A11.ied Military Control Commission. The ciphe;t" bureau 

was onJ.y authorized t.o develop, reproduce, and distribute cryptographic systems for German use. Any unauthorized decipher.ment of 

f'o~eign cryptosraphic syster.is was forbidden by the Inter-allied 

l-iilitary Control Commission. A few times the Inter-Allied 

]83 

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• 

RES1¥ROO?EB2 1 

Stirvcilla.n.cc orc.;rmn ho.d cott.cn on the tro.cc ol' t.hc a.c tivl·l,y or the 

Gcrmn.n 1111..erccpl; Gervlcc, o.nd thc:rc 'WO.S 0. rC(;W.Ell' fox-hunt. nut 

in ca.ch co.ac the matLcr l;urneci out favorubl.y fo1· tlic Gc1:mnn inter-. 

cc:p t center. 

While the German lntcrccpt servlce had l,bus far llmitcc1 it.-

self to in Lcrccp t.ion of forci6n ro.d i.o tral'fic, in l'.)25 a. t. the 

intercept center in Bcn1llcrt:l.i·usue o.n office we.~~ set up whi·~h uo.s 

concerned ,.,11.,11 listcuing to telephone convcrso.tions. In the main 

it -was a qucs l;ion or l:lotcniug t·.o converso. l.ions or the Hussian 

embassy e.n.d the Hussian mil.il,a.ry att.achc. In a. special. room u 

series of S\litchboo.rds was inst.o.llcd, and every tlnvJ a telephone 

at the Hussian embassy en Untc~r den Linden ucco.mc active, a :f'lap 

fell do'm, and. the interprc tc14 on du '·.y could listen to ·the conversa.tlon, and if necessary could even record it wlth a. rnaGnetophone. 

Lal:ier the Germ-::1s also bei;o.n observin~ the Dri Lish anrl ]'r<mcll 

embassies, and the resu.lts or this activity not only lJl"OVt.d of 

great interest because of the direct inl'ormnt:i.on 1 bul. al.so indirectly, since they cave such Good iusii;ht into what; ·vas c;olna on a.t 

these emba.ssjes l:ihat the cryptnna.l;ysis o.r enciphered messa6CS 

f"manati:ng from them was in many cae:es greo.t.ly i'a.c:fllta.Led • 

• 

In spite of aJ.J.. budo::ito.r:t difficuJ.l:;ics and in spite of the 

sttrveilla.nce of the Inter-Allied 1-lili tary Control Con.mission, the 

e:x;pansion o:r the cry:ptnnalyl:.ic r,roup anc.1 the evaluation group 

oi' the cipher bureau made i:sood proc.sress, whcreliy the main errrphasis 

• 1R4 

RESTRICTED 
res{,cd more on crypl.analys"is f;han on evHlllat.ion. 'l'hls situation 

did not cha.nc;e when, beainninr; in 1~23, an increased monitoring 

of the radio traffic of roreien arm.icG began. In particular, the 

observation of t;he rac.Uo service o.r the rolJ sh airf'orce, ancl ·f;he 

results achieved thereby, lent charm and stimulus for a. further 

extension of the intercept aml evaluat"ion service in the pu::rely 

military i'i.eld. A sound ba.lancillG of' the interests of the ·two 

branches of work would have been the only correct solution, since, 

in t;he f'ramm10rk of the army, the focal po.tnt of the work must 

nccessaril.y lie i.n a purely military fiel.d. 

Sttprisinsly, ho·uever, a·t that time another development gained 

the upper hand, namely, ·the defense Minis·t;ry meddled in pm•ely 

pol.i ticaJ_ ai'i'a.irs and especially foreign political a.f'fa:i.rs. A 

dec:iphered diplomatic radiogram of'.rered f'ar more material for 

lectures, conversations, and interesting discussions 1~han did 

the detcrminal.;ion of rrdlitary details about the armed forces of 

foreicn count1•ies. 

Hatttl'a.lly, the l''oreisn Offtce did not lil::.e 1.;his development 

at all, and. i:.llere '\10.s cons i..e.nt tcmsion and fric !;ion be tMeen 

"Durea.u. C" a.nc1 the "C::iphel' Durea.11. 11 J\.not:ier restLlt 1ms th,it a.n 

increa.sinGlY sli::u•p con Lest c.rC's ~ bet~·een J.;he evaluation ~roup 

rull1 f;he cr~11t~ma.l;rtic Group, since the la. 'jter a.1''2-~rl:i 

• 

lB5 

RESTRICTED 
RESTP-re~ 1 

I 

above, ·11-.1.a f'ar mcrre intel" ... Pt('1l :In pol:ltiral J>1"0Cell!di1•ra1 c.han 1n 

Such an 1.n&tallM.t.Lon, wblr.h 1!'1.r-.111 ba.ve bet!n c1ucti.!ied in 

1914 or 1915 but vhJnli now tsnored +J1<" tMtR ·"'nmpletel.y, later 

• 

prove'1. t" have om:lnousll· tletl'Jntt:ntl\l rcsul.'.iia for the German intiercept service ,cspec1al1y during Wor.'.-' War II. 'l'hCI preaent-dA7 

pursuit of evaJ.ua1.luu Jn tbe 'inte,.,:opt r~e!d reauirea aw-ha va<h 

0'£.Jmow:l~ oi' tt.e t'rf:CFU:alzo.'ion, Lact1.rR1 n1;ructure, an.l equi11-

. ment ot forel1ui m:m:•·•o 1 4•i'~ Rbovo All. llllurh a far-ri=tBl'htng knawloage 

nel who ore h•u'hlv qun11 r.~Pr1 ""01" i.• • .is wrl-•• 

In ._•01•w-uaL r.o t'11c: 1 ••r" rc,.A.l poLn'L in c1-:yptan9lya.:.a l.Jos 

in +:.ha fie?Jrt or st.ttlJq~foa, "r'!l~,.h '·""'be r11vcl1 DIOT'C .raptdJ.y 'lil'lBt-

• 

l::\ abltl' 1.,, arouse mu.re 1nl".erP.'St. 

I ~R 

RESTRICTED 

.. 
• 

the evaluation group remained restricted essentia.llar to a ver.v 

small group or persons. This picture became still more marked in 

the autumn or 1928 when Major Kesselring (who later became General 

Field Marshal), as delegate tor the personnel retrenchment program, ordered a further reduction in personnel in the militar.v 

evaluation group. 

As m.ent1.oned above, the results or observing t.he radio ti~arfic or the Pol.l$h a.tr'torce spurred the riermans on to an intense 

vigilance regarding the radio s-,rstems or the armed forces of the 

countries bordering on Gem1an.y. At that time the Polish air force 

was being built up and delivered an extraordinari4" large volume or 

radio traffic, which was sent part]¥ in plain text and part;q in 

secret text. The German cr.ypta.nal;ysts were successful in breaking 

the system used by the Polish air force, and thus were able to 

read all its enciphered radio traffic. I ,,,,,,,..--

, I 

ThP. :results were so vol11lni.rt01ls that the German evaluation ·

1

1 service, insof'ar as collective proceedings and details of the . 

I 

I 

Polish air .force we1·e concerned - no matter :tn what field - wa.1 

able to. obtaln the very best kind of :information. Arter a rew_ j 

months they knew ever.y airplane with its number and engine number, 

eveey pilot, evecy officer, all details of equipment, organization, 

structure, tactical views, preparedness tor commitment, etc., so 

completel,y as has perhaps never before or sil1ce been the case in 

the German intercep·t. service. One day, however, this fine source 

ot inf'ormation was stopped by' the following event: 

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J Polish espionase service had been auccesetul in obtaining thJ services ot a German railway postal clerk working betwogn 

B:raal&J and Berl.in. Thia clerk, whose duty it was to sort the 

mail .Ja:ressed to Berl.in whicb came into Breslau and Frank.tort 

on tbe /Oder, bad received ~nstructions from the Polish secret aerv.t.,e 

to bold. back pieces of mail bearing certain addresses, and on 

ar.r:htJ.l in Berlin to band the111 over to a eonf'1dent1a.l. agent. who 

care~ opened the envelopes, looked over the contents, pJ....,toetated them, care:t:'Ul.ly reRealed the envelopes, and on the same clay 

'rftturned tbr.m to the clerk tor f'orwardirig. 

This work proceeded very smootb1y tor several months until 

a chance discovery revealed the activity of the railway postal. 

c1erk. He was :toll.owed, but plunged into the Le.ndvelu.• Ce.nal and 

drowned. Bis body wu.s recovered the next day immediately in front 

of the Defense Ministry Building. 

. ..... The Poi1oh intell.igence service bad obtained 1'rom this poste.l. 

clerk information tho.t the German intercept stations in Breslau 

and Fl"anki'ort on the Oder vere engaged in watching the Polish 

air force tro:ffic, and 'Were able to ascertain from the i11·tercepted 

mail just how far the Polish enciphered teJ.egrams vere being deciph ... 

ered by the Germans, since the deciphering ot theee tel.egraDls was 

not done in Berl.in but in the individua.1. intercept stations. The 

Pol.es therefore cllans~d their system and su'Lstituted tor it one 

that va.s extraordinarily complicated and cou1d not:. be bt"oken by 

lBS 

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Germans for several. years. In addition, they restricted their 

r dlo traffic so greatly, both as to volume and content, that 

ere was no cOttq>a.rison at al.l between the present results and those 

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• 

THlTI OBSERVATION OF MANEUVERS 

The yes:r 1928 signified a turning point for the G~rma.n inter-

· cept service inasnroch as rroni this year on the actual duties of a 

milita.::l intercept service began to be cultivated more than hitherto. 

In part this was a natural. developmen~, because in most of the states 

of Europe ·down to 1928 there had been no maneuvers on a large scale. 

The possibility of t1·aining ·(;he intercept service in the observation 

of the course of military operations wa.s therefore prese~t only 

to a very limited degree. Now a maneuver is a military action 

which in its essence closely approaches a state of war. The intercept 

service of the armed forces of a cotmtry has the ta.sk of training 

itself for the observation of the radio traffic of a potential 

opponent in time of war. If the German intercept service had transferred its primary interest to the observation of political events, 

that would have been an unnatural phenomenon. Of' course, this 

continued to be the case, but, nevertheless, on the in:i.tiative 

of a few men, the proper task of the German military intercept service, namely, the observation of foreign armies, began to gain in 

inwortance. 

The first opportunity for carrying on an observation of reguM 

la.r maneuvers was affoi•ded by the Rhineland maneuvers in 1928. 

These bee;an with a crossing of the Hose1 near Trier by the British 

troops, and continued duriJlB the course of a week into the vicinity 

1g1 

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RES~1 

or Eunkil'chcn. At tha.t time the German intercept service suececdcd .ror the :Cirst time in foll.mri1113 very exactly l:.hc entire I 

i 

cotj:L·ae or the mnncuvers and in reconstructing the proeross of 

op rations in aJ.l. details. 

r.fue next opportunity wns afforded in 1929 by the maneuvers 

in Czechosla.vakia and Poland. The Czech maneuvers at tho.t ·l;ime 

t It place somewhere in t~e neighborhood of Olmuetz, and one ot:' the 

I 

man crypta.nalysts succeeded in solving within six hours the 

i 

togre.phic system empl.oyed. Tha. t pcrmi t t.ed such extensive 

I 

in,sight into the course ~r the maneuvers that these could be re- , ' 

: I constructed in the same '(«B.Y as the Rhinele.nd maneuvers. The 

German intercept service was not quite so successful. that yee:r in 

observing the Polish maneuvers in the vicinj. ty of Lida. To be 

sure, here too they succeeded in recoGnizln~ in general the entire 

course and the orsanization of the troops; however, l..he way the 

Poles used radio a.nd the cryptographic system which they etJI.Ployed 

ca.used such difficulty ·t;ha.t only after a considc1•a.ble timo was 

it pos.siule to gain insight; i11!io the details. 

'I'he observation of these three maneuvers l'PVca.1.c.•rl t.ha.L 

the tlu·ee co1.llltries in question differed r,reatly in their use or 

ra.diotele~raphy. Consequently, jt was necessary t.o atlnpt ~he 

cornmi tment of interce:p I., uni ts, diTC(' !:lion f indlng unl t.s, eva.J..uati0n and cr}1?t~u.a.l.yti~ sections to th~ condition- or each individua.l CA.Se. Never l;heless, one could say even now that when i'ollowinc; 

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--------------------------------------------

· foreign maneuvers results could be achieved in every case, if the 

. tac·tics employed in commitment were sensible, and if the units 

could feel their way into the radio situation of the country to be 

observed. The extent of this success might vary according to 

circumstan~es, but in al1 cases good information was to be e.Jr;pected. 

That n.eant that the' intercept service, if -enq>J.oyed properly, 

must necessaril.y gain great significance in a coming war. If I 

say ''if empl.oyed properl.y 1 " then I mean that the connni tment of one• s 

own monitoring organs must be carried out very carei'ull.y and must 

be adapted to the situations then eXisting; but I also mean that 

for this type of evaluation of the resu1ts of the observations, 

it is of the greatest importance to have a. large nuniber of really 

first-cl.ass men who lllUst be appropriately trained and constantly 

given additional training. No improvisation is possible in this 

tiel.d. If one does improvise., one is exposing himsel.f to the 

danger tha.t not on1y wil1 the value of the intercept service be 

C,.iminished by false1y drawn conclusions 1 but that this service in 

the hands of ine.Jr;perienced people can become a great danger for 

one•s own command. 

From 1930 on there began a J.ong series of French maneuvers 

and large-scale exercises. They occurred chiefly in the northeastern part of France, specifically in the French defense distr:I.cts 

VI, VII, and XX. Almost al1 were observed by the German intercept 

servlce and in almost all. cases it was possible to gain extrerr.el.y 

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RES¥il1'TI~ 1 

i'o.r-reo.ch.lnlj ins ii_;hl, Hot, only into the cow.•sc of the m.a.ncnvcrr; 

but also 1rll.h rcopccl:. l;o ·1..roop or13e.nl~a.t,ion, L1~.cl;ics c~n11loyc~d, 

woo.pons coumLf. l; l~cd, maJ.•c.:h pcr.l'or1.m.nce, cmploymcn !:; of the td r rorc:e, 

etc. France l:;ui•ucU. on l; to be Lllc country whose mancuve1·s couJ.d 

be obsc1·vcd in an cs:r>ec:J.ally favorable rash1.on. We shall apcak 

lut.er Of the l•ear;ons i'or \,hi B • 

It was intereslinG not. only to follow the lo.nd manuuvers 

but., also to observe drills a.nd maneuvers of the l•'rcuc.:ll air .force. 

Thus Lhe Gen1a1.1 intercept, S('rvicc succeeded, wh I le ol>oei·ving o.n 

air exercise in the vicini Ly of Il!lllCY 1 :l n calr.:u1a:Ling precisely 

how the l!'rench 11urning service wo.r; relal..cd to f;hc speed of the 

at.ta.cldnc Pne1ny. It wa::i posolblc Lo set '.l.J.> ro11\J.)arative ti1nctahles uh.Leh sholrnd on a. LJ.me 1.Jasis f·.he movement of ·Lhe :lncominp; 

tu1i ts and sbr:rwed simu1taneously the uJBllner in which the warritnr; 

ser·1i~e rea.cl.ed. It turned out that in all ca.sea the warning 

B""'rvice went into operation promptly at the s·ta.rting point, but 

alerted the objects to be warned much too late, and this based o'l. 

the relatively low flying-speed of those days! 

In observing French air maneuvers in the area of Grenoble, 

the German intercept serYice had succeeded in reco11structing the 

air ue.rninc; system, the reportine; system, and the coUq:>ass points 

used by the spotting system, all by means of short; rt!dio reports. 

The Ge.rman intercept service succeeded in following some 

]rench maneuvers, e.g., on the Aisne in 1932 and on the Harne, 

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to such an extent tllat the results were considerably more comprehensive than the reports of a.11 the military attaches and a.gents 

employed. 

The copiousness of the resul.ts of monitoring French maneuvers was exceeded only by the results which coul.d be obtained 

against the ItaJ.ia.ns. The Italians used radiotelegraphy at all 

maneuvers and exercises as if they had never heard of radio camouflage, radio deception, or of an intercept service. ~1ost of the 

radiograms were cotrg;10sed in plain language • Their conten·t; was 

so informative as to rendnd one of the best periods of the World 

War; indeed, they sometimes surpassed these. The observation of 

Italian maneuvers or exercises did offer one dii'ficul.ty, inasmuch 

as the distance, the intervening massif of the Alps, a.nd the sharp 

angles resulting from a short direction finding base resulted in 

many disadva.ntages; however 1 ·these were compensated for compJ.etely 

by the rich and instructive content of the radiograms which were 

tra.nsmi·tted with high power. It would be ha.rd to conceive of a 

more satisfactory opponent for one's own intercept service than the 

Ita.1.ia.n radio service. 

The observation of Austrian, Dutch, and Belgian maneuvers 

was al.so crowned as a ru1e with very good success. The problem 

children of the German intercept service were and continued to be 

the Poles and the Russians. In the case of the Poles it was possible to achieve certain successes by etIIJ?1oyine; a very large nutl.'lber 

195 

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RE~ltf€~1 

of direct1011 f'inding stations to recognize the movement and tbe 

location of the individual radio stations. That in itself was 

a greo.t dc.al.l For the rest, the Po11sh air force saw to it by its 

use of radiotel.egrapby tha.t 'lllUch was revealed regarding the ground 

forces. In general., however, Poljsh radio tre.tfic was lumdl.ed 

so cleverly that i·h was only with the greatest difficulty that 

real.tions could be recognized. 

With respect to the Russians the situation was still less fQ~~ 

orable. Distance alone ottered insqpera.ble difficulties. Any 

mass euiPloymcnt ot direction finding station was possible on:Ly 

from East Prussia., and consequent1y gave such sharp angles tbat 

any certain J.ocation of' the stations was in most cases impossible. 

The radio p1•ocedure used by the Russians was the best in all Europe 

as far as the cat1Y.>u:f:lage factor was concerned. Their cryptogre.phic 

s)"Stems also proved in 1D0st cases incapabl.e of' solution. ot course, 

covering Ruasian maneuvers always gave a certain B.1lK>Unt of illf'ormation, but this was so slight that it scarcely repaid the time and 

effort e:lq>ended. 

Aside from the observation o:r ::roreign man~uvers there was one 

other opportunity to get training on a war bon1s. 

In general., people are accustomed to regard the period ot 

time betveen the First and Second WorJ.d Wa:rs as a period of peace. 

In reality during this entire time there was an uninterrupted chain 

ot revolts, revolutions, uprisingP. 1 and military actions, with 

one f ollowiDg on the heels or the other or someti~a running 

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paralle1. In the years 1926 to 1932, f'or instance, the IteJ.ians 

waged a series of six ca'!li'aigns in Tripolitania and Cyrena.ica, 

of which one read littl.e in the European papers, to be sure, but 

which afforded an extreme1y we1com.e target for the training of 

a wartime intercept service. 

The six Libyan cattq)aigns were led chiefly by General. Graziani, 

started initial1y from Tripoli, subdued al1 Tripolita.nia down to 

Gat, and ended later in Cyrena.ica. with the conquest of the Kufra 

oases. For this, fast mobile colunms were enge.5ed which ma.de very 

extensive use of radiotelegraphy. The entire traffic of all units 

engaged in these operations both in communication with one another 

and with their bases, in communication between Tripo11 a.nd Benghasi 

and between these places and Rome, all instructions emanating from 

Rome, and almost al.l. orders and reports were handl.ed by radio. 

That gave a wa.tcb:rul. intercept service the chance to follow the 

course of operations and to recognize on the basis of numerous 

reports and orders the preparations for :further operations long 

before they began. 

The resul. ts of n1oni toring the Italian Libyan campaigns 1 

together w;tth the results or following Italian maneuvers at home, 

gave reason to assume that in any coming war the monitoring of 

Italian radio tra.ff'ic by a foreign intercept service would not 

fai1 to give the best possib1e resu1ts. 

· Things were simi1ar in Spanish r.Iorocco during the revol.t 

of the Riffs under the leadership of Abd el. Y...rim. The Spanish 

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expcdl biono.ry troops ma.I 11 l;a.incu a very a.c.: t.i ve ro.dio tra:C fie, 

bol..h at110na f·.hcmsclves and o.lso with the e;arri.3on stat,.i..ons Ccuta, 

Te l;uan, ancl l·Ielillo.. These lnst three s 1;a tions also comrmnica ted cons to.n Uy wi t.h Bo.rcelona and. l1a.drid. Almost; a.ll the 

traffic was SC'nt ln plain text. Insofar ris d.phers were cn~1oyed, 

they were extremcl.y prim"i. t1. ve and ca110.hlc of quick solution. 

Consequentl.y, it was easy in those days for the l!'rench, as well 

as for the Italians and Ge1·mi:ins, to eet. detailed lnsiGht into 

events in Spanich Morocco. 

But even the French ucl·c no L nc ting very dlf rercntly in 

those days. In conncc t,ion wi l..h t.hr upr i sine; in Spanish Horocco, 

there ·were other serious nu.t;J ve ltpris.i nss in l~reuch I·1orocco, 

in particu.lar in the area of Lhe midclle and hl c;h At,lo.s ra.nse. 

On the one hand, the for al 1••) in t;s were in Lhe ro·ce. Ouezze.n -

Ta.za. - Oudjda, ru1d on the ct.her ho.nd in t.he area 'i'a.f' llclt -

Ksar es Souk - Ain ucrra. The rail.io traffic of l..he lare;cr garrison stations cave so many inci.ghi·.s into l..he course of t.he entil•e operaLion that. one could follow events verr pc>rfectl.y from 

Europe. As in the co.sc oi' l..he Italians and t;}l(" Spanish, the 

entire he.ncUin/3 oi' militat:"y t1·afi'.i.c was guicled solely by the 

idea of transmit Ling the in.rorma. ti on to the add.res Rec qukkly. 

The fe.c lior of dis au i sc ret:rea ted entirel.y lni,o the l>ackc,round. 

From a tac tica.1. po in L of vj_c-;r this was an "n·or in any case 1 

since even though it mic;ht be assumed that, t..I:e 11.\l..jvcs in I.ibya 

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• 

and Morocco had no radio intercept service, and consequentl.y coul.d 

draw no advantage from enemy traffic (which is by no means proven), 

nevertheless, this repreaen"l;ed a. danger in respect to the training 

of the signal troops, a. danger which was not to be underestimated. 

The same signal units, which were developing their radio traffic 

in this manner here, mi13hl. be engaged at any moment in an entirely 

I 

different theater of war. There wa.s. great danger that they would 

then operate in the same manner they did here. 

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THE INTERCEP.r SERVICE OF OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 

Not only had Germany pl.aced great efil.Phasis on its intercept 

service after World War I and built up a good organization accordingly 1 other Europeat\ countries were also busily working in the 

same direction. However, the me·thods adopted were vastl.y different. 

On the basis of its previous experience, France had built up 

a very good organization, the ma.in part of which was merged with 

the Deuxieme Bureau of the General Staff. This handed out the 

various wo1•k assignments, and here also were to be found the 

cryptanalytic group and the evaluation center. The technical 

acc01I1plishment of intercept work was in the hands of' communica:tion 

troops. The organization for intercept service in France differed 

from that in Germany in that the intercept stations instal1ed in 

Germany from 1925 on formed themselves into special organizations 

and were never used for domestic radio traffic, while the French 

many times entrusted their domestic military radio stations with 

intercept duties as well. This was a great mistake, for it happened again and again that the radio traffic of these stations showed 

that they were also engaged in intercept work. For example, they 

would request certain forms which were only used in intercept service, 

or they gave information on equipment which also was used only in 

intercept service, and so on. The knowledge obtained from observing these French radio stations was so far-reaching that in 1931 

the German intercept service was very well informed on the French 

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intercc1lt service, its organization and practica.1 accomplielm:ents. 

Tho or6ani7.ation of these intercept stations was very ~1early recognized. 

While in the l!'rench intercept service the i'ocal pciint wa.s 

directed toward the observation of radio 'traffic of foreign armies, 

the English worked in two di!ferent directions, namely, in obeerva.tion of a.11 ra<:1io traffic of all nations in the world, and in 

complete coverage of the international poli·tica.l (diploma;bic) 

radio traffic. The last-named field was, of course, also cul-

·tiva:ted by other countries, but in no co'lmtry in such e. comprehensive and strictly centralized manner as in Ene;land. Accordingly, their resuJ.ts in this field were uudoubtedly the best in 

Europe, since the English placed great emphasis on the selection 

and training of personnel. 

The Italian intercept service presented a picture of rather 

extreme laxity. The Italians had erected a legion of relatively 

sma.11 intercept stations a.long the 1''rench and Austrian borders, 

and in addition were operating several such stations in southern 

Italy. The coutrol s·te.tion with its auxiliary organizations was 

located in Rome. From a technical standpoint, the Italian intercept stations were well equipped; but their organization and the 

' 

processill6 of material was deficient. Also, their cryptanalysis 

was in quality far behind that of the Eng11sh, Germans, and 

French. 

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In the four milita'l"y districts of' Czechoslovakia, all the 

larger garrison radio stations were integrated for intercept service. The Czech intercept service operated not at all badly, but 

it made the same mistake as did the French, by compromising itself 

through the radio traffic of its own intercept stations. The 

Czech intercept service was connected with many ol the traditions 

and experiences of the Danube Monarchy, and maintained excellent 

cooperation with the French intercept service. 

Strange to say, the new government of Poland had one of the 

best organizations. Indeed, I would like to say that this organization was really better than that of the French. Here there was 

a clear separation between radio s~rvice and the interception of 

foreign radio traffic, so that no comprom.tses could take place 

by radio transmission. Occasionally officers of the Pol.ish communication service were ordered to France where they participated 

in intercept training courses. Since France had gathered abund&.nt 

experience 1n Worl.d War I, this training was extremely advantageou.s. 

On the other hand, the Poles themselves had already had opportunity 

to gather practical experience which was now turned to good account. 

Polcnd maintained a still more intensive cooperation with the 

French intercept service tha.n did Czechoslovakia. 

The Russian intercept service had the most obscure organi~ 

zation. That they attached great importance to it, however, was 

shown by the fact that in all communication formations they had 

20s 

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r \I .. 
RES'M:I:@ND21 

large contingents for purely military intercept service. How the 

watching of foreign diplomatic and military radio traffic was 

carried out as a peace measure is shown only indirectly by the 

fact that they made use in their own radio traffic of all experience 

gained from the mistakes made by all other countries. For the 

rest, it appears that the organization was very simple but tar 

that very reason was more rapid and exact in operation. 

The Austrians and Hungarians had. also established a very 1.J..1e.ble 

intercept organization in their countries. The Hungarians e.s well 

e.s the Germans J.a.id stress on the political side, while the Austrians 

looked beyond this and directed more attention to the military 

side of the intercept service. In cryptanalysis the Hungarians 

were far ahead of the Austrians. 

'l'he cooperation of the intercept services of the different 

European countries presented a fascinating picture. The German 

intercept service had since 1926 cooperated closely with the 

Hungarian service - particularly in regard to diplomatic decipherment. The cooperation of the cipher bureau of the Defense Ministry 

with the cryptanalytic bureau of the Hungarian Honved Ministry 

was closer and more intensive than that with the Foreign Ministry 

in Wilhelmstrasse. 

Late in 1929 cooperation started bal·tingly between the Germans 

and the Austrian intercept service, which was beamed especially 

toward Italy and Czechoslovakia. About the same time cooperation 

began between the German and Finnish intercept services, maintaining 

204 

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a united front ago.inst Ruasia. Since the .Finnish intercept sorvice on its part also cooperated with the Polish service, very 

tick1ish situat:l.ons some·t;Jmes arose. The Germa.n 111tercep·t,; service also maintained after 1930 a ccrtf.\in amount of cooperation 

with Litbua.nia.. This was directed aga:i.nst Russia as well as 

against Poland, bu.t was accompanied by a great deal of mutual 

suspicion. 

01~ty occasional cooperation existed be~~een the German. and 

Spanish lnte~cept eervices. It was directed against France and 

England and was chiefl.y sponsored by ·~he Get'man naval :l.ntercept 

service. Afte~ 1933 collabo~ation was also brought about botween 

the Italian and the <lernian services, especially in the field of 

cryptanalysis. The1·e has :p1•oba.b1.y se1don1 been a cooperation 

which i'rom its very beai11lling was marked by· such strong mutual 

suspicion as this. Dil•ections were always given on both sides to 

exhaust all intercept possibilitiea of one's paTtner, bu~ to reveal nothing yourself. 

The French ma.i11ta.ined good coopera:tion in intercept work 

with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, ahd Yugoslavia, and. occasionally al.so with Svitzerland. 

'l'he English cooperated with the I:lorwegiou and Danish inter-

· cept services, and also in part with PortuBal. Essentially they 

worked only for themselves, which 'Was easy i'oi- thera. since they 

were in a position to establish intercept st~tions th~oughout 

RESTRICTED 'I """"f'!r• •I J t I .. .:. t.. o 
bho -worl11. ln tho:l:s:• own l"OOOOl'JS1ona, 

Between l"c;lanu a.nr't O~ochoelc>vo.ltia. o.s well e.o between Pola.nd 

and notnnl'l..tll there rU.tlO ~X:l.Sf:.ed fl COopera.l;ion 'Which sometimes bet!at'ne qu1. 'l;ai fo.r .. :reach inG. Du.t ~.n a.11 the e.bove-men·tioned ce.ses, 

th:J.s 11ave1' kopt ·tbf.l 0011l~:r.·l.\otini;: pal."tors o:f' tho moment from actively monitorina enoh otl'lera tra:f'fic. One o:r tho closest :t:ori:as 

Of cooperation p:ral>o.bly exisl.ed later du."C'ill6 World War II between 

Germaey ut1t't lI\.U'1.t:nl1Y and be !,;ween Germany o.nd It.e.ly. And yet these 

th.'t'eie Qt.)Un.tries watched ea.ch o l,he:r so closely that a large part 

at OL\Cil. lnonitoring oreanization was burdened with this W'Ork. 

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• 

RE~~ ........... JFfPUff ._ ... __ i 

so~m: IIBM1U1KS OM '11lll!l TECHNIQUE OF TUE INTf!}HCEPI' SERVICE 

If in what follows somethina is said regarding the teclmique 

oi' the intcn•cept service, then this does not mea.11 the technical. 

apparatus by the aid of which the stations to·be observed are ronitored, but rather the teclu1ique of practical commitment for the 

monitoring or foreie;n ra.dio stations and the processing oi' the 

material intercepted. 

For the observation of flx.ed radio stations abroad there were 

in Gerrna.ny in 1926 six so-called. 11Fixec1 Intercept S t;ations"; one 

each in 

K8nigsberg in East Prussia, 

E'rankfur t; on the Oder, 

Breslau, 

Mw1ich, 

Stu t (;go.rt, 

MUns l:;er in Uestphe.lia. 

'fhe monitoring of .roreign s ta tj ons was generally dl vided up 

by countries, thus Stu l; 1.;Bar t moni toi•ed France, Spain, and north 

Africa.; 1-iunich monitorec1 Italy, Switzerland, Austria, and a part; 

oi' tlie Balkans, e t;c. Along with t;M.s, hmiever, for technical reasons those stat:l.ons which '\rere difficult to hear '\Tere a.ssienecl to 

the intercept stations where they could be hea.rtl best. 

Not quite so easy to solve 11as ,.;he question of noni toring 

the r.:i.L1:i.o ti•ai'fic ~rhcn tllo.neuvcrs uere l ... cld u1:roc.t1. 1"or th:i.s prttpose 1 

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de tach111c11 t;s llhtl l..u be set, up which wer~ .t11u~hecl i'LJrwr.tr'l l;o Lhc 

i'ronl..icr. In l.his connecL.lon; the nrear. or c-01111nil.mcnl, de:pr·11dci:J. • 

primo.r ily on l.he arcp. in which Lhe maneuvers to be ol)G<:?rved were 

tak.ine pl ace. Des iclcR i,;his, the fol.low lug .rac Lors hall t;o be considerecl: recnpl;.tou comliL:i.ons in t.he plnc1_;:; where the st.acio11s 

were set up; wire connec !;ions a.va:lla.hle for tra11sinission or Lhe 

observed results; and above all, electronw.~nel;ic connitions ror 

emploY1ncnt; of direction fin(lc1·s. 1:rllc J.oce.tions for l,;he direction 

i'inders ha.d to be selected very carefully if t'he rea.d.inc;s were 

to prove rel.ia.ule • I•'ur t;hcrmore, it; wo.s very impori;a.n t;, when 

euq>loying direction finders, to know in which direction the maneuver parties would 1110ve. If the maneuver ran off in such fashion 

that the i;wo parties Noved po.rallel to the dircc tion fin.dine; 

base, then it was· relatively simple to keep the rallio sta.t:i.ons 

apart and l;o determine their loca.tio11s. On Lhe ol;her hand, if the 

parties to the ma.ncttver moved on a line vertical to the direction 

finding base, then the resul. t. inG angle wa.s Generally so acute the:t 

0 

an error of 1. in a. readJnc; was oi'ten cnouuh to ca.use ·wrong conclusions. There.l'ore, lt was not; at all sim;pl.c to differentiate 

the two pa.:rties to the maneuver 1Jy direction finding. 1\nd wi t;hin 

the one party matte1·s often lay so that small errors in ·tlle readil1(5 

were eno~h to give fu.lse concep·Lions rego.rdine; the c;rouping of 

this party. Iu such cases it was necessary to choose o. relativel.y 

broo.d dlrec Lion f j ndin~ base. However, this '1S.~ lit:1i teu by the 

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• 

au<libili.l;y oi' the radio a·lia.tions. The best possibi1:i:ties resulted 

when a 1nai1euver occurred in an area which could be surrounded, 

so "Lo speak, by direction finders. '.Chis 'Was usually the case, 

for example, when oboerving Polish maneuvers, since here the opponent could be taken in t.he f'lank from Ea.st Prussia. 

Until 1936 a e;reat obstacle to Lhe observation of French maneuvers '\Tas the so-called demili ta.rized zone, ~n which no organs of 

the German a.I'med forces were to be employed. l!'rom 1928 on, there 

we1•e camouflaged ope1·a.tions here each year, whereby the uni ts 

committed were represented as technical surveyine; detachments of 

the German Droadcas l;ina Cong;>any 1 oi' the Ge:rman pos lia.l dis·!iricts, 

or of the German Central Post Office. Persons par·ticipa.ting wore 

I ,.t. 

civilian clothes. So far as I know 1 complete c.Usguise of' the ~ -

commil:iment was achieved in all cases; o.t least, the French never 

raised any objections throtlgh diploma·tic cha.'l'lilels • 

. Of the utmost. im:portance was the manner or carryine ou.t evaluation of the incercept results, since the work was so planned as 

to lcecp step at all. M.mes with the development of' the opera'l:.ions 

so that, for e:r-..c.mple, the fl'uits of the day's activities should 

be avtdJ.a.blc late that eveninc:; at 1.he cenl.ral. evaluatlon office. 

This called for precise ,,Ol'k Oll the part or the C0l'llUUlliCa.GiOll6 

se1•vice, and .ror inteJ.lieent cooperation by the various branches 

of t.~ie evalu.u.tion se!"Yice. 'l'he reports oi' clir~ct.!.on fimlj n,;i.; 

were passed every hour by Leli::phor..c to Lhe evo.lt:.a~lon ce:1Ler ana 

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of tho radio stations wbich could be heard were marked by colored 

pins. TJ.•ai'.fic evaluation endeavored to recognize from the reJ.a:tions 

of the radio stations to one another the framework of the command 

net of the parties. ~'he cr;vptanalytic section meanwhile worked 

feverishly to solve the cryptographic systems employed, and to decipher the radiograms sent. The content evaluation section tried 

to deduce tactical conclusions from the content of the intercepted 

dispatches, while the final evaluation section combined the i.•esul.ts 

of aLt the above-mentioned branches, and endeavored to gain a cleer 

picture of the course of the movements. 

We must say tha.t the monitoring of foreign maneuvers by the 

German intercept service dUl•ing tlle period lrom 1928 to J.939 was 

attended by great success, The most f'a.voro.b1e period lay between 

1931and1937· Of the 52 maneuvers and large sea.le exercises 

covered in this period, the German intercept service achieved a 

complete reconstruction in 35 cases, a good partial reconstruction 

in 12 cases, while the 2•esul ts in the 1•0.maining cases were still 

good enough to yield use:ful information. 

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'!'HE CHANCES FOH. THE INTERCEPT SERVICE 

The monitoring of the radio traffic of foreign armies and 

air forces afforded an excellent opportunity £or a comparative 

estimate of the radio procedures employed in the various 

countries. Spontaneousfy the question arose, to what extent 

the radio traffic of an army would be vulnerable, so to speak, 

to the enemy intercept service, i.e., to what extent it was 

likely to afford the enemy information. Around 1936 all the 

European countries could be divided into three groups, and it 

.;; .. ; ;-. 

is very tempting to compare these groups yrith one another. 

To the first group belonged Lhose countries whose radio 

traffic gave the most information and which consequent:cy in 

case of a future war would be likely to offer welcome targets 

for a hostile intercept service. To this first group beloneed 

Italy, France, Aust.ria, Belg.tum, and Holland. 

To the second group must be assigned those countries 

whore t.he armed forces worked accordine to ra.dio procedures 

which were likewise calculated to offer good information to 

a watchful intercept service, but by no means to the same 

degree as the countries in the first catecory. Here belonged 

primarily England,, Czechoslovakia, and YugoGlavia. 

To the third group bclonccd. thoi:::e count.rie:::: l·There ::;p3cial 

aLt.ention was given to the camouflaginr; and di.[;r;uisinc of rRrlio 

traffic, and where these measuros were so far de•rn loped Lh[l.t 

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informut.lon <.'f a Lu.~ Lico..J. .. ' ' 111._d cha.racl.or could L•..: obtaine<.l Lo only a i-: l i 1~h I., l'.X.l ... 11 i I I -.1 ·1•ory one must assign primarily Ruf'lsia o.uct rolaud. 

Before defining mor-r• l '· • -1 • I I I . ' 'LLion in rn r.rc~ct t,o the 

several groupfl of countricu,, somc;- l '"llPt la; may be in order regarding 

radio procedurcr. in ecncral. The oldest and simplest procedure, which 

was used especially in World War I and ha.d heen retained by the 

l 

countries mentioned in the first group above, is the so-called 

circular/ traffic (Kroisverkehr). Here a certain number of stations 

conununipate with one another on a common wave lengt··, using fixed 

I 

call sfgns. 'l'he call sisns may be chane;ed daily, but are fixed for 

' any ope radio station insofar as its call signs remain the same in 

I 

coI!Ul\unication with any other station. This system is very convenient 

for/practical radio communication, and affords a large degree of 

s7curity for the transmission of the message. However, it has the 

ithrnistakable di&advantase that the enemy intercept service very 

i 

soon recognizes the connections between the radio stations and can 

easily draw from them deductions as to tactical relations. 

Another system is the so-called star traffic (Sternve~kehr), 

where a do.CiniLc number of stations conununicate with a control 

station. In this system various call siens and wave lengths can 

occur. 

A Lhird method is termed net traffic (Netzverkehr); it is 

similar to star traffic in its use of wn.ve lengths and call 

signs, but differs in that the radio st.aLions communicate not 

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only with a control s~atlon but also ~ong themselves. The two 

last mentioned systems make the work of the enemy intercept 

service much more difficult because the relations within the 

command net are not inunediately obvious, since in every 

traffic direction a different call sign and a different wave 

length will be used; a considerable amount of observed traffic 

is necessary to be able to recons~ruct a tactical or operation··. 

·al command net on the basis of the traffic handled and the 

direction findings obtained. 

It is si:.ill more difficult when so-called line traffic 

(Lini~nverkehr) is introduced in an army; here only the radio 

traffic of two stations with one another is recognizable, since 

for each so-called radio link a particular instrument is employed with its own wave length and its own call sign. If in this 

case, as happened in Poland and Russia, several call signs are 

used optionally by one and the same radio link, and if traffic 

in the two directions is worked on different wave lengths, with 

daily change of wave length and call sign, then recognition of 

the relations is possible only if an extraordinarily large 

number of very dependable direction finding readings is available, 

or if the type of traffic sent permits some deductions. If 

neither of these conditions is satisfied or is satisfied only 

..- to an inadequate dee;rce, then we no longer get on the evaluation 

map of the enemy's intercept service a picture of a coherent, 

command net., but simply a large munber of individual links 

totally without connections,, a'1d with these nothing can be done. 

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' \foi.k H io 0~1siblc l.o r.:.•cowL•"Ucl, the 1.acl,ical. and opera.-

tionaJ. commoml ncL from Lile Lraff 1.c of un nney worki.ne wi.th 

cil'culn1• ti·a.r.ric, oven when it is not. possibliJ l.o gel, a single 

plain text messo.ge or to solve quickly the cryptocrnp:1 le system 

u~cd, it is generally impossible to worlc out tho conunand net 

without a knowledge of the content of tho mcssaecs when line 

I 

traffic is used. 

I 

Of very great importa.~ce in dissuisine radio traffic is the 

manner of usine call signs and wave lengths, or of the system 

according to which tables of call signs 8.11d wave lengths are 

constructed. 

I just used the word "system", cind precisely in this 

there is a trap. If a table of call signs and wave assignments is constructed according to a system (i.e., with a 

periodic recurrence of the srune call signs or wave lengths in 

a definite rhythm), then the enemy is in a position to recognize ; 

this system after a time, to reconstruct the table, and the 

disguise that was aimed at becomes unavailing. The temptation 

to worlc according to a system is very strong, however, since the 

use of such a table is extremely practical for the operator and 

for handl:ng a change of call signs and wave lengths. It is 

possible to change such tables relatively often and without great 

difficulty. Furthennore, the preparation of such a call sign table 

is easy. If it is lost in any manner, it can be reconstructed 

quickly. When using call sign tables which are without system 

the difficulty lies in the fact. that a single table must be 

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• 

prepared foi• the entire army in order to avoid repetitions of the 

same call sign. In sp:l.te of its relative simplicity, t~e produc-

• 

tion of such o. table is very time consuming and must be carried 

out most conscientiousl.y, if subsequent erro~s are to be ruJ.ed 

out. If such tabl.es a.re l.ost, then the dnmo.ge cannot be ca.l.culated, since the production of new tables always caJ.l.s for a great 

deal of work and their introduction entails a whole avalanche of 

changes in the army. Nor can one keep such tables in stock in 

any ecsired quantity. 

These technical questions have onl.y been indicated here in 

I 

a rough way in order to show the significance which the use of a 

specific radio procedure may have on the disguising of traffic. 

However, there are still other factors affecting to a large degree 

the camouflaging of tra.f'fic. One of the chief of these is the organization of the communications troops of an army. In this respect the various countries of Europe differed very greatl.y from one 

another, and the organization ranged from one that was greatly 

centralized to one which wns entirely decentralized~ 

France had the centralized type of organization with all 

communications troops combined into three regiments from which 

detachments were sent, according to need, to the individual divisions, corps, and armies. On the other hand, there was great 

decentralization in the Soviet Union where every division, every 

corps, and every army had its own signal,. unit. From the standpoint 

of disguising radio trafficf tha.decentra.l;ized.organization is 

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u11•.lllln• l.luw,1.bly \,, · L t.c·r :Ji.nee it is he l.. tc.:r st~:i.l..cd Lo Lake into account 

the prncLical n,;;.cdr. of radio opr•ration, o.r;A, no p'l'."ovio11r. nt..,ming 

up period" ls required. In Fr~nce, for instance, when large scale 

manouv ... n-s wore held, communicnt.lorn:; companies were assic;ncd to t.he 

divisicns comrnULod and these companion had f;.o set up their t.raffic 

for these divisions, start.ine; from scratch. Consequently, it was 

often possible to recognize the radio net in t.he .maneuvor arcn before 

the maneuvurs actually began. In H.ussia such a thine was :impossible. 

But this phenomenon was not limited to the initial stage of the 

conunitment but in many respects cont.inued on. With centralized 

organization the signal unit always remained a foreign body within the framework of the unit, while with the decentralized form it was 

organicall.f fused with the unit. 

The above-ment,ioned criteria and a number of other factors were 

decisive for the question of the extent to which it would be possible 

for an intercept service to get insight into the radio traffic of one 

of the European armies or air forces in caso of war. They could not 

fail to have a decisive influence in any future war • 

• 

Within Group I the Italian armed forces undoubtedly took the lead,, 

and there was not the slightest doubt that in any future war the radio 

traffic of the Italian army and of the Italian air force would give 

the enemy r.iost valuable information. Not quite so bad, but st.ill 

very informative, was the situation ln France, Austria, Belgium,, and 

Holland. The circular traffic employed here, the frequent transmission of plain text, Lhe use in France of no less than 78 different 

types of radio apparatus, the use of signal tables - which were very 

easy to solve - for brief tactical reports, the tendency to be 

RESTR1ttTED 
• 

RESftM'lll921 

syatamatJ.c in lihe construction or tables ot call siF.ns and wave 

J.engtha, and 11181\1 C'.'the1· things. made it certain that in a war 

bet.wen Ga:rm&J11" and ~e Ct)Wltries just mentioned the intercept 

aervi.ce would have the best 0£ SUCC98S in gathering inteW.eence. 

lfit.h 1·i:o,.."t'Cl t.o 1.he countries or Group II t.he prospects 

tor a l'ot .... l~o intercept service wore distinctl.v less favorable. 

In Eugl~nri.. rnorl'ov'!r. the use or short and u1tra short. waves 

had boon ~rea~Jy daveloped. so that it was rather ditflcult to 

l:L"<: t.he location or the transmit tinp: stations. iurthermore, 

!&111,tlar1d. Czechoslova.1<"1."· arirl Ynp:osla'V'ia strove to make as little 

11ae as por.sili.Ln ol' i·actio tra1'1"1e. It is true t.hat YuP,Oslavia. 

worked ba~icall.v accordin2 to French method.al' but thel'c was a 

~ertain ti1J1ldit;v aho1.1t. employi~ radio telep:raph.y, and this 

timidity was based on unhappy experiences which ::>erhia. had had 

in World War I when the Austrians monitored all. 3erbian trai"fic 

and derived the beat. possible intonnation therefrom.. 

Russia and Poland wore the countries where Utt• disP.Uiso or. 

radio trattic had been develo~ to the greatest poostble perfection, at least. in the aI'll'{V. From trafi"ic or the airf'orce oi" 

each ot these countrios it wao still possil•le to f.FJt ~od 

information; on the other ha:l~i. throu~h lnte~-.i·r• t-'"""n-1::"~ ~r · 

a point h&d. been reacn~:.'. ·.·~u:- -·· ,, ,,.. ....... ··:_ ... ··:'r- _:r- J -•• ·.:-nn:,, 

the needs of its c:.~&i aonnanc. tPr the transmiseiion of 1ncGG.i..:-:es 

and also achieved -ll'ery gcod disguise. Long before Wor1d War II 

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it cou1d be recognized that these two countries had learned a great 

deal from their experiences during World War I and the post-war 

period; it was certain that :l.n a war with these two countries the 

:l.nteroept service ooul.d. onq count on ve17 modest reeults. 

The preceding remarks force us to roeognise not C>Dll' that 

the central organisation of a well-functioning intercept aarvioa 

cannot mere].J' limit itael.t' to stUCV:l.ng and evaluating the radio 

traffic of a foreign cowitJ7, but that a YeJ'I' extensive training 

ot the persomel ampJ.oyed in the evaluation statt is neoea11&l7. 

Even in peacetime one must haw an absollltel,y clear picture ot 

the organ:l.mation, tactics, equ:l.pnent, and training ot toreigo. 

cClllllllWlications troops; must knav the 81'&tema according to which 

the;y wrk; muat get. practice in reconstructing their tables of call 

signs and trequenoies; and must maintain constant touch with the 

c:eyptographic s;rstems put into use. For intercepting and evaluating 

the radio tratfic of a foreign armed toroe, a large number ot aids 

must be prepared which, in the event of war, will allow the personnel 

ampl.oyed to secure the neces&ar7 insight within a short time. 

In this last-mentioned direction, it happens that in Gmman;r 

sane WJ'I' good prelJ.minaJ7 work had beeri done h1' 1936. However, 

in the train ot the rapid rearmaent, it was so bad:q battered h1' 

a personnel poli07, which in some caaes waa bandl.ed. in a downright 

senseless taahion, that at the outbreak ot World War II the German 

intercept service took the field with the same material.a that had 

been produced between 1930 and 1936. In most oases these could 

onl,y be regarded as antiquated. 

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·e 

• 
• 

• 

'l'HE "FORSCHUNGSAMT" 

It was in the first weeks after the assumption of power 

by National Socialisnt that Hermann Goering in Berlin set about 

realizing a. plan which was calculated to give the government and 

the dominant party such far-reaching insight into the thoughts, 

feelings, and aspirations of the entire German people as had 

never been known in all history. Compared with this plan, the 

informer methods of l•1etternich and the French Minister of Police, 

Fouch&, had been amateurish experiments. 

It was Goering's intention to create an organization which 

would cover all channels by which an exchange of information 

or ideas took place within Germany. Furthermore, by intercepting all means of cow.munication of foreign countries which were 

open to tapping, an opportunity was to be provided for securing 

extensive infonnation regarding the situation abroad. 

This last-mentioned idea had already been realized in two 

forms, since the interception of the radio traffic of foreign 

countries and the exploitation of the material thus obtained 

was being carried on both in the Foreign Of !ice and in the 

Ministry of Defense in Berlin. These two .Vdnistries were 

Cabinet Ministries, however, and it was Goering's intention 

to build up an organization which would service and be bound 

to the Party on the one hand, and to his own person on the other • 

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• 

'J'here was thcrefoce no hundred pr:rcenl. c:onfidc!1cc in whai wa.s being 

of uni.fylng and comb.irtin:; !.11•.· dottble organizaLion or 1 h~ intercept 

service and thu3 creating a compelJent one, Goering decided to let 

these two offices of 'Lht:i l.nt.~rccpt servic' continue to exist, and to 

set up a third one alongside them which should be al. his personal 

disposilion. 

In order to realize this idea, it was necessary to find trained 

technical personnel; w:i.thout long daliberalion recourse was ha.d to the 

Cipher Burea~ of the Ministry of Defense. Here there was a naval 

lieutenant, by the name or Schirnpi', who had been serving for some 

years as liaison officer beLwcen the naval intercept sarvice and 

that of l,he anny, and who was a persoual friend of Goering and a 

convinced Party member. 

3chimpt' had for some yf."ars p~yed the role of a silent observer 

at the Cipher Bureau, and had organized within i'L a National Socia.list 

Party cell without any wo1'Cl of thls having leaked ouL to Lhe outside 

world. He had made a few trips abroad, had arranged for collaboration 

between the u~rman intercept. service and that of the ILalia.11 armed 

forces, and had also set up a small ill..i.cit Germ.an intercept station 

on a private estate near Barcelona in Spain. This intercept station 

was working p:rimarizy for the:: navy and had the mission of watching 

shipping in the Mediterranean. It was also supposed to listen to 

Fre1Jch radio stations in North Africa and in the southwestern part 

or 1''rance. 

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In connect.ion with these trips, Schimpf had established 

contact with Party organizations in Italy and Spain, and had 

made a great many connections with leading personalities. It 

was Schimpf who was entrusted by Goering with t.he formation 

of the projected surveillance organization. From the officers 

and civilians in the Cipher Bureau, he immediate~ selected a 

group of eight persons, all reliable Party members, who were 

to be the key men in the new office. 

This new office differed, as indicated above, from the 

corresponding organizations of the Foreign Office and the 

Ministry of Defense through the fact that the two lastnamed limited themselves to the interception or foreign 

radio traffic, and thus were organizations such as were 

customary in all countries, while the office planned by 

Goering turned its attention to the interior, and was intended 

to penetrate all means of conununications existing within Germany 

or leading from here to foreign countries. This meant, therefore, 

the monitoring of evel'Y type of radio connection, of all means 

of wire communication within the country, and of all wires 

leading over the frontier; it also meant watching the press, 

magazines, and all other printed material, the surveillance 

of letters, and the interception of conversations carried on 

without the use of wire connections, this latter by installing 

microphones in particular rooms. 

Schimpf and his collaborators went to work about the middle 

of March 1933.. In Berlin, in Behrendstrasse, a building was 

requisitioned and the central office of the new service was set, 

221 

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up here. It received. the cover name "Research Thu·eau o.r the German 

Air Ministry" ( 11li'orschunesamL des Heichshi CtfahrLminis Lerlums"), 

q.ltqq~eh it had absolutely nothine; to do functionally wl'Lh the Air 

Hin.:1.r:itrr, buL was directJ .. v subordinated to Goering. In between 

at.Qqq the then State aecretary, Koerner. 

For listening to all foreign radio traffic ( e.xc~opt military) 

and to illicit. transmitters within the country, a system or 

intercept sLations patterned after those of the army wa.s distributed over aJ.l Germ.any. At the headquarters or all postal districts 

and at all cable junctions so-called postal surveillance posts 

were established where it was possible either to listen in or to 

copy. In this way all wires leading out of the country were covered 

as a matter of principle by switching in, in parallel, a recording 

device. No telegram of any foreign diplomatic representative in 

Germany could now get out of the country without a copy going to the 

Forschungsamt in Berlin. That applied to all enciphered telegrams, 

as well as to all messages in plain text sent to a foreign address 

by a.riyone whomsoever in Germany. 

Special value was attached to the interception of the telephone 

conversations of government officials and of those holding high offices 

in the state and in the Party service. For this purpose a number o! 

listening posts were created, some large, some small. GradualJ..y an 

enorinous, invisible spy net was spun over all Germany. No officer, 

no official, no government employee, no Party functionary, and no 

person of any impor t.ance could telephone from now on w:i.. th a.rzy 

222 

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assurance that his convo1:aation was not listened to. 

Ot course, the Geiman public had no suspicion ot all this. 

Even high and ver.y bigh of .rices in the state .knew nothing about 

the Forschungaamt, or had on'.cy' veey nebulous conceptions of this 

agency. Furthe:nnore; the cover name "Research Ottice ot the 

Air Ministry" had been ao well chosen that &nJ'Ol18 would have 

been led to believe it to be a ~J.y technical agenq. 

The Forechungeamt paid special attention to the Miniat17 

ot Defense and to the conunands ot the milit&rJ" districts. Here 

most ot the telephone conversations carried on b.r higher officers 

wre listened to; moreover, there was established. a qstem. ot 

"confidential agents" whose duty it was to gather information 

and pass it to the Forschu.'lgsamt. 

The surveillance or general delivery letters formed a large 

part of the work ot the Forachungsamt. 

The house in Behrendatrasse was only' intended as a provisional and tempora.r.r aol.ution of tho housing problem. 

While they began organising the ncnr task in this location, 

a to1'1D8r hote1, 11am Knie", in Charlottenburg was remodeled 

tor tho purposes ot this agency. The technical organization 

· ot thtt 11Haua am Kni~" was car1~iod out according to the most 

modern principles. Po3tal pneuma~ic tubes, teletype installat.ions, soundproof rooms, listeni,ng centers, switching 

devices, etr.., came into b.::111~ here which 1'A:t:i:';'.) :i.nR ..... alled on 

t.ho bn.ois or all provJ.ous expo1•1ie1'!.ce in th•"J 1':1.ol·i or intc1-:-

coption. 'l'O'!.·rard t.he end o t' l '133 tho no:mcy mo~·.1.:l. into Lh'ls 

'· ... C) . ' 

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') 

In "°th' 111€1MUl'IJ@1 ·tJ1et psrlionmal. and matioriol ot tha oryptanal1t;,io 

8t16tl6rt 1mi bh@ @Vll\.l.tUon u"nt.or ho.d buan :l.rMNJtLPQd w\tl l,hull'" wo.rk 

ha6 be~ b@Ml:Jh lit~ ifi the IUIM\O~ ot 19JJ, 

At. the outsett1 the Foraohuni:11amt trilld to work 1n oonjunotion 

\iflth the cH .. pher ~reau 6t the Mtni11try er Di.:-Cunaa and with Buree.u C 

~f the Foreign Otfica, but aoon ""1't with a ool.g sh01Jl.d.,l" 1inoe 'the 

Forschungaamt int.ended &a a 11Atter of prinaiple always to be the 

recipient. and never th9 al"f• It was only • abort.. time before 

there was an open ~ait, an4 the cooperation oont.!AU.Mi O'fl'l;/ in a 

pure}¥ formal wa:t. wltft MM party endeavoring not to let the other 

gain 8i:ii' i.ntliihl. ittt• tu Wl lfQJ'k. 

in ~ t4.N\ ~" Of tao work or the Fo:rachUftiRI(\• .a :rrumber 

v IJM!M. ohJfft."l:vo&t a:roee on which work began. (kle ot tbo aoR e 

MIW\t-1" was the surveillance or the Of ricer Corps of the M1nist.r,r 

9f Defense and or the anned forces in general. Tlie second target 

comprised the high leaders or the NSDAP and their formations, siilce 

it was believed that one could not absolutely rely on the loyalt7 ot 

these men. The third target was the Catholic Church with all its 

institutions and the surveillance or the communications or the Vatican 

with Catholic organizations or personalities within Germany. In this . . 

activity the,y tound at that time traces of various mone,y transactions 

of Catholic monasteries, and the flood 0£ so-called foreign exchange 

suits and other measures directed. against the Catholic monasteries 

had its origin in the activity or the Forschungsamt. The fourth 

224 

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RESTR!eTP-f 1 

target was the German People in general, and part.icularl.7 all 

persona who had .f'ormerq been active in political lite, in trade 

union movements, in labor organisations, and the like. There 

was close collaboration with the Gestapo. 

In creating the Forschungsamt, Goering had intended to use 

this instrument excluaiv~ tor bis own purposes. However, the 

nature ot the work soon brought it about that. Hin:lnler attempted 

on his own initiative to gain an influence over the Forachungsamt 

and :t.ts activity. This soon .:.Sd to a rivalry between the two 

men 1'1hich at times took on a serious character. In t:Lme Himniler 

succeeded, however, in getting a stronger and stronger infiuenoe, 

so that gradually power in respect to the Forschungsamt passed 

from Goering to Himmler. 

The first great "justification" ot its work was achieved by' 

the Forschungsamt in connection with the Roehm attair. Boehm and 

his adherents, aa well as the group in the Ministry ot Defense 

which was opposed to Nati~ Socialism, had been 11a.tched. oonstantq since the end of 1933. .Ever.Y telephone conversation ot 

these people, everr letter written by them., and eveey other 

utterance was recorded; in time, a veritable mountain ot material 

could be eathered in this W81' in the eval.uation center of the 

Forschungsamt. In the case ot many ot these men, there had 

been installed in \heir private rooms microphones which were 

concealed in regular tel.ephones, table lamps, chandeliers, 

electric clocks, etc. It was at that time that tho first serious 

contact with Himnler resulted; he used ~he work ot the ForschungsRmt, 

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in conjunct.ion wlth Ooo1·ing, t.o ellminat.e troublesome opponents. 

The evaluated matet"fa.1. was cleverq pieced together u11rl Wd 

before Hitler, whJ "then in!'1.it.uted that. celebrated blood purge 

ot 30 June. In the train or this action f'ell General von 

Schleicher, General von Bredow (rormer Chief' or the Def'ense 

Section), and other orr!cera. Schimpf, who had meanwhile 

• 

become a councilor or ministerial. rank (Minister:Lalrat), 

secured for himeel.f' b7 this action a position or great power but 

also a nwhber or enemies who had to be taken ser:l.ouslJ'. 

To that period belongs also the attempt on the lite or the 

student, Bell, in Kutatein, wh:!.ch was organized on the basis or 

information tram the Forschungsamt; the action against Professor 

Lessing 1n Karlsbad and the kidnapping of Jakob Salomon were also 

due to the activity or the Forschungsamt. 

In mid-Apri~ 1935 the following occurred: Ministerial 

Councilor Schimpf', who until then could almost alwqs be 

reached b,r telephone, had suddenlJr ngone awrq tor an indetinite 

period," and the information one could get was pu.t so str~ 

that it was impossible to keep from reeling that BClll8t~ or 

other was wrong at the Forschungaamt. Soon rumors began to 

c1rculate, and one dq it came out: Schimpf 1IB.B dead. 

The first version was an auto accident; the strange thing 

about. that was that the statements.regarding the place where the 

accident was supposed to have occurred differed widel1"• First it 

·happened in Silesia, then in Berlin, then in Kltnigsberg. Soon 

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afterward it was le&rneci that Schimpf had 6(!111111tt~ .J.a'ida. How- . ever, the oaae waa· the aame aa with the auto aoo1dent~ At leut a 

i 

dosen hotels 1n Brealau, Dnigsberg, and· Berlin and environa 8re 

I 

named, 1n which the trapd;y ws auppoaed to have ocaurrecl.. One 

sto17 was that he ahot h:lmae1t; the second &tol7 was that ha 

killed himself along with a l.acV' friend, but even here there wre 

so lll&D1' variants that it was 1mmediat~ obvious that the apread1ng 

of' these rum.ore ne onlJ' intended to veil the truth. 

In 1ta propaganda activity National SocialiBDL al'lf81'B made 

tke mistake ot working too olumail,y. It did not aatisf)' theae 

people to wrk out a version of a etol"I' and then spread it conei.stentl,y, instead thq al'W81'B tr.led to apmad a haze, and to 

cause contusion by a whole collection of' dif'f'erent stories. 

Thus it was with the burning ot the Reichstag; thua it was on· . 

countless other oocasiona1 thus it RB later on in the Ress 

case; and so it RB in the case of' Schimpf'. Bat the ve17 

clnmei.nesa which underl.q this propaganda pneralJT resulted 

in letting peopl.e get on the right track f'airq soon. It ns 

not long bef'ore the fol.lowing tacts were lmowru 

For his eavesdropping on the Ministr.r of' Def'ense Schimpf' 

had amugg1.ed a number of conf'idential agents into tJie bureaus 

ot this ministl"J" or had recruited persons there for his work. 

In March l93S one ot these agents had extracted an exceedingl1' 

I important Qocument from a sate in order to turn it over to the 

I 

! Forschungsamt tor a short time tor inspection. , As chance would 

• 

• 

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have it, this document, along with severa1 others, was noeded a few I 

d81'S batoro Easter; they looked tor it and could not tind it. An 

investigation, which was started immediatel.1'1 cl.eared up the attair, 

and it waa reported to the then Minister of Defense, von Blomberg. 

Blomberg, who was alread;r in opposition to Goering and Schimpf,, was 

extrem.e]T· perturbed and used the occasion to make before Hitler a 

viol.ant attack on the Forschungaamt. The matter ended with Hitler's 

dropping and disavowing Schimpf. 

On t)jie div after Goering's departure on his wedding joun197, 

Schimpf was found in Gruenewald. not tar trom Potsdam with a bullet 

hole in t¢a head. 

There can be no doubt that Schimpf did not ccmmit suicide but was 

pu:t out of the 1f8l' by the Geatapo as one who lmew too lll8IJ1' secrets. , ~ahill&pt was a ha.PW tell.ow who was extremeq fond ot lite, and who 

would never haYe taken a moral repr:lmand aa an occasion for leaving 

this world. Bll.t. Schimpf had become not onl,y wibearable but downright 

dangerous to Goering and Himmler, and he had to disappear. 

Goering prepared tor him a great cremation cermorJ1' at the 

oremator.r in Wilmerlld.ort, and sent a gigantic wreath of laurel 

with ribbons bearing the inscription: "Tcs-1\f Faithful Collaborator _ __,,. I 

·'llans Scbimpt 1•' Gratitude Hermann Gooring." State SecNtar.r Milch 

delivered an ad.dress. Then followad a 'Salute of honor. The 

"Voelld.sche Beobachter" carried an article glorifJing the 

"untiring old tighter of the National.Socialist Movement and faithful. collaborator in the building of the Third Reich. 11 

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The Ministry o:r Detenae sent no representative to the cremation ce:remcqr; Sch.1mp£1s tonner comrades were i'orbidden to 

participate. 

The work or the Forschungo811lt round its second justii'ication in connection with tho Tukhachevcki caso, concerning 

which wv sh3.l1 spe~k at o. L'l.t.cr opporlr.ait.y. In t.hio action the 

lea.dine; role w.ss in t.11::.'! ha-nds at" tho £'ot"al'!bun5c:.\ n1..~ where, as 

aucoessor to Schimpf, Prl11co ChriBtoph o.r HesAe htid been 

appointed chiet. 

The Forscbungsa111.t. had a '..hi rd opr.-ortur1lt.y -t .. o PTOJE' t.he . . "worth" ol its l't'Ork in a bi& ·W"liY wh~n .!.~to ln °1'].36 the gl"G&t 

housecleaning lfQ.S undertakon .Ln the then Jiini.rstz7 of War. 

Von Blomberg, J?aron vo11 Ji'1•U .... ·~]·, e.utJ. a. n•~1:1bur ot othc1· oi'ficors 

ot high and v~J"Y" high .. ~a~'ll h~.r.' : .o c · .~ i.I~ i. l·u fi d-:!. '!'hi:" waa 

Schimpf case. 

A_tte1• what has b3t:n sY.t.d, no ~aa ui!l be :=m1~~:;;-J.::drl "to hoa1" 

that. this ar,e11c7 was n 1 ·,,> (.:., •. i· .... ! '"'·: ~)r• i&b::..nlr~r·';; Fo1•oign 

1.h:i.11g. 

Jl.ut;t:;.•lu. bct!oro the Gexm:Ul occupa.t.ion. For th:~ .j t."\r.~~ u. ::::::.c~to.l 

..rt•'t~ ,.r. .... 

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subsection was torm.od, arid !l'Olll here t.ho ponet.ration or the 

entire communicat.ions system of Austria was accomplished by' 

tbe Forschuns~anit. They had an ea191' time since a large part 

ot Aust.1'1.an ot.ricialdom. PJ;Oved quite ready to aid in this 

respect.. For instance, alJ. teleph'one conversations carried on 

within the ministries •. the content ot all telegrams sent to 

representatives abroad, and the coutent ot many important J d.ocumc· ts were channeled. to the Forschungsam.t. They oven 

went o tar as to betr&l' to the agents ot the Fo1 ·chungsamt 

pr/ ic~ all the cryptographic 151etems used by the Foreign 

Of 1j1oe in Vienna, by the Austrian armed :Coreas, ~ by the 

Au~trian police. The Austrian telephone and telegraph cables 

I 

I lf aillng through the Berchtesgnden area were tapped by representa-

~ ves of the Forschungsamt. 

During t~e war thero were countless opportunities tor 

significant wrk on the part or thi'e agency. To detail all 

these here would lead us too tar afield. We shall onl.¥ 

mention that the r.rustrat.ion or the action ot 20 Jul.1' 1944 

and the disclosure or those participating in f:.he conspir&cy' 

was due in large part to the surveillance activity ot the 

Forschungsamt. At that time Himmler had al.rea.d1' tought his 

way through 't!_o a victor,y over Goerihg, and the work or the 

Forschungsamt was dil"fl9cted according 1.o his wishes; it lf&a by" 

no means an accident that Himl.or was not present at the tuo 

conferences in tho "Fuehrerllaup'Lquartier" during which the 

RESTH11€TED 

• 
attempt cx{iu.tler'a ri.te Wl!-B to be and was carried out.- A.tlier 

/ 

I 

20 J~ 1944 Himler was the undisputed master, even ::J,n respect I 

to the work ot the Forechungsamt. 

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The SA-Man, Fo:mis, had taithtulq and studiouaq done his 

d.ut7 :ln hia native WUrttemberg dur.l.ng the so-called llperiod. ot 

struggle." He had marched, had sung, and had dlligentq drunk 

beer on PartJ' evenings. You could tell that by looking at him. 

· tor hia gl.rth had increased so that when ha took a bath he onl1' 

had to till the tub one-eighth tull ot water; it ha than laid 

him&elt down in it, it was sure to be .f'ull. 

Along with his lllcing tor SA evenings, he had tram JOU.th 

up had another love, which was tinkering with the radio. .And. 

this he did with devotion and skill. Therefore his ocnrades 

and superiors in the SA con&idl)tred him a radio apart. Tbat led 

to bis getting a job with the Stuttgart broadcasting station after 

the "assumption . ot power,n and, to be sure, as arm.ouncer. And . 

this ottioe he l.1.kew1ae administrated henceforth w.l.th the 

requisite diligence. 

Up to that point his career reveal.ed nothing'extraordinar7 

and it might haw remained ao tor the rest ot bis lite, it 

. serious injustice had. not been done him by the Party and the 

· S.A. in the J'8&l" 1934. It does not matter to us what this 

injustice was; nor does it aignif)' who was responsible tor this 

injustice;' it is certain 1n 8Zf8' event that Fo:mis had been 

calumniated in base fashion and telt de8J>l1' aggrieved - despite 

his usual cheertulnesa and optimism.. The spectacles of optimiam. 

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and tait.h 1.hrouC'Jl which ho hc1.d hi.LhcrLa rogardc4 evor,yl.hina t.rut.t . went On within t.he tlSDAr nnd itu .rormations has beon shattered, 

and he now began to regard very criticall,y what had hitherto 

been considered by him aa an untoucbab1e aa.nctu.ar.v. It waa not 

long before Formis had a nose tull. - as the s¢ng goes, so .full 

that he thought he cou1d no longer ,.tand tlle stench ot the new 

era in Germany, and betook himself to Czechoslovakia where he 

attached him.sell to the qppositional Strasser group or the 

"Strasser Movement.n 

Here in Czechoslovakia a so-called "Black Front" had been 

formed which was waging a bitter but hopeless struggle against. 

the Hitler regime in Germazw. Fo:nn!s with his lmowi.lge and 

ideas -came very opportuneq tor theoe people. With his aid th"1' 

thought of setttng up a propaganda broadcasting station in order 

to C&rrJ' their own ideas and their agitat:t.on age.inst Hitler and 

his 87Stem. across the border to GennarJT• 

So Formi' went to work and within a short time constructed. 

a shortwave transmitter tor telephOD1"1 which was so emall it 

could have been carried in a BID&ll }¥mdbag. He rented a room in 

a tavem in the vicinity ot Prague and installed his radio station 

ver.r sld.11~ in the upholste:ey or a big armchair, so that outward:Qr nothing could be S'8n ot the entire apparatus. 

After these technical preparations had been campl.eted Form.is 

was supplied twice a d.81' by the ini"o:nnation section of the "Black 

Front" with news which seemed suitable for propaganda work in Jlerm&n1"• 

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.. Formia himself' 11&W to the tranamia~on, and served as announcer. 

The transmitter was Ye'rJ' soon heard in Germany' and it was 

astonishing to see howlll&IV' listeners this first anti-Hitler 

German broadcaster f1thin a V81"J' short. t:ima. Peopl.e were 

whispering to one anoth : "Have JOU heard.? Waw 31 m I . 

Evenings at six and mo gs at tenl Ver'I' interestingl 

But.pastl Don•t betrq aDTthingl" 

And so they listened with pleasure to the new tranamitter 

of the 11.m.aok Front.11 They real.:cy' enjOJ'8Ci he¢ng a vo1oe at 

last vb1oh ventured to speak againat this new reg:l.me of toroe 

which suppressed all cr1 t1c1am.. 

Ccmpared with preaent d.q standards, the tran81111saiona of 

Form1s wre not br1w.&nt perfo:nnanoea.. At that time no one 

had &rJ1' uper:l.ence 1n this field. But at that t:l.ms, in 1935, 

they wre a sensation and a dangerous one. 

The intercept stations of the &l'Jll1' and of the police, 1n 

conjunction with the organs of the Forsahungaamt, monitored 

I 

the new sender tor the purpose ot aacertain1ng its location 

and "ot picking it up it possible. But this was more easUY 

aa1d than done. Getting bea.r:l.n€s on shortwave transm1t:ters 

was still ;Ln its infancy in those dqs. 'l'hq got the most 

varied directions and for a time were of the opinion that the 

tranam1tter was located in Hamburg. other readings pointed 

to Epgland or southem Gemany. A good .marJ1' of the readings 

did point.to Csechoslovakia, and to be sure, to the general I 

area of Prague • 

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In his broadcasts Form's tried to give the impression that he 

was in German territory. ''We are standing here at the microphone," . he eaid once, "and beside us are 600 pounds ot d;vnam:l.te. It those 

bl.aak dogs came (he meant the SS), thq 'Nill be blown up ~with 

us.11 Another time he said: ''We here in 0e:rm&n1'••• .n or: •'When . w look mt of the window and see those brONn rascals paseing I 

1'7··· •" 

A few times he did make a slip and used expressions ~ch gan 

the :l.m:pression that he was outside the boundaries ot the countey. 

Onq one never knew whether this was done intentianall1' to mislead • .. 

The newscasts ot Fo:nnia testified to the taot that there must 

be a amootbq f'unctioning, tairl,y sizeab1e information organization 

behind h~. . He was al.W81'S veey wll informed on all. happenings 

'Id.thin the Party and the government and its organs. The general 

tenclenc7 was toward an overthrow ot the Party- government and the 

abolition ot the entire system. "Brown ia the ••• , and Hit.l.er is 

leading UB to. • • •II 

Aft.er aome months ot observation the Forachungaamt bad . aacert&¥ied IV" direction finding the approximate location ot the 

tranamit:_ter. The axaot location could not be dete:nained, ~· 

An aacident helped th.a pt an it.a trail. 

I 

Hitherto, no one had 8ZI3' idea who the armouncer might be. 

' However,_ Formie bad a oharacteristio manner ot speaking, and in 

the·.Foraptmngaamt, whose intercept stations wre mmd.tor:l.ng_thia 

transmitter, there was an official who had. tormerl,y been wll 

acqua:l.n"t41d 'Id.th Fo:nnia. He listened to the transmitter aeveral 

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t.imea and came to the concl.usion that the speaker could be none 

other than ll'o:rmia. Now a Gestapo man was sent out into the reg:l.on 

where the transmitter mu.st be located. Attar a few dq'a he had 

gotten on the trail of Formis. 

Now the Gestapo •a determined. to pick up the atati.on. But 

that was not so earq, becm1se it was located in Czeohosl.ovak:l.a, 

that is to sq, in an independent countr.v where the Gestapo had 

no possibility ot making a raid. It •s impossible to count on 

an;r cooperation by the Czech police. 

Since there was no 1181' ot taking action in •'legal" fashion, 

thq resolved on an illegal act ot vioJ.ence. 'J.b.97 inquired 

oaretulq about Formis' habits. An official of the Gestapo took 

a roam in the same tavem and watohed the mn. Attar th97 had 

gotten auf'ficient clarity", an auto with two other apern111' 

sel.ected Gestapo agents was sent out to the place where the 

tranamitter was located. The action was CflN..tull,y prepared in 

ever.r detail. Fo:rmis was to be over-powered and brought to 

German territo1"1'. 

At the appointed hour, at six otclook in the evening, i.e.,, 

at transmission time, the auto arrived in front of the inn. All 

three Gestapo agents rushed into the house and into the roam. 

Formis attempted to defend. himself and then tried to escape 

through a wind.oti but. was shot. during the melee. The Gestapo 

men now climbed into their car again and sped awq- to the frontier. 

The occurrence became known instal}tly and all Czech bard.or 

stations were instructed b,y telephone to stop the car ld th the 

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perpet.raLora. 'l'his was done. The German Government, however, 

immecliateq intervened. with all posaibl.e pressure and t.he Cneh 

Governmen:t., which did not desire 8ZfT serious incident, gave 

.instructions to let the three men go. 

Thia encroachment PJ' the Gestapo CC'.used ereat agitation 

in Czechoslovakia. In Germ&!ll' there wre lll8l1Y people who 

• 

continued tor a long time a f'ndtless search on their radio dial 

ror the transmitter or the "Black Front" until they tinal.q 

became convinced that all their ei"torts were in vain. 

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THE THILO CASE / 

It ie certainJ;v' not an ~ occurrence that a man baa the • I 

glven 1181118 'fhilo. ait 1n the present caea not onl,y should the 

name of the mn be claeeed ae a raritq but the whole affair can 

l.q al.aim. to being rather unique. 

One dq 1n the aprd.ng of 1926 a man wae engaged at the 

Cipher aireau of the M!nistery of Defense who had the glven 

name 'l'hilo, and who was the brother of a major 1n the General 

Statt who was then tunotioning 1n the Miniatrr of Defense. 

Later on this Major occupied a very high position of ccmnand 

1n the amed forces and tor that reason the 1181118 will not; be 

mentioned. 1n this connection. . It is enough it n speak henoeforth of the "Thilo case." 

Thilo was then, as alreadT .mantioned., em;pl.oyed in the 

Cipher ll1reaU and, to be exact, in that section in 1dd.ch 

' .. or.n>tographic s;rstema intended. tor use within the armed forces 

wre compiled., reproduced., and distributed.. 'l'hilo had bean a 

first li~tenant in World War I, had then married, and bad had 

a soap f&etol"T and'bone 7ard 1n the vioinitJ' of Berlin. His 

business had gotten into difficulties during the econamio 

crisis; 'l'hilo had been compelled to close the doors ot hie 

tactorr, and h&d sought the help of hie brother in getting a 

position. 

As it soon turned out, Thtlo was not one of tho'se people 

I 

who are in the habit of working over hard. .Even his external. 

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appeatanoe auggeated that he•• one who could take things .. ...,., but 

1n h1ai wrk thia •• even more 10. At 1-t, that vu the ialpre11ion 

he Md.a. In the morn1ns he - the lut to report tor wrk, ·at noon 

the tiret to diaappe&I' tor bi1 .mall and a.pprmd.-teq 8V8l7 1eoond 

Dr thi:rd afternoon he bad "eamething to do outaide. tt In thi• manner 

he oontinuec:l to work within the Cipher Bureau, without doing mob, 

td.tbout .ma1dng ltlJuelt a burden to hi• colleapea, or d.iaplqins &rV" . \ 

ambitiou tendanciea. Vel'7 often he traT9lad. u aourier to ... he 

~ of the milit&l'I' dietriota1 :la order to bring the a. 

oiphera to the appropriate pai"tiea vben 81'atma wre ohanpd. He 

euperviaed the printirig ot nw lmJ'• and the reaall and deatmation 

ot Q'lltema retiNd. traa u•• 

lie did tld.1 sort ot work until 1934• Dll'1n8 that time oertaiD \ 

m:lehapa ooourrec:l, due to til.o•a.aareleaaneaa and u a oonaequenoe 

ot hi• pronounced luinea111 it 11811 therefore decided to transfer 

Tbilo to anothe1· aaotion of' the Cipher Bureau. The a~ 

aeotion deolined to reoeive him into ita rankal t1 nel ly he landed 

in "evaluation" and, •ina• he bad - knowledge of the Bngli.eh 

1 ensnap, vaa set up u a epeoialiat in the Bngliah 1111baeotion • . Sinoe Thilo had atood on an UDell.ent tooting v.lth all bia 

prev:Lcma aolleaguea, he aont1nuec:l to .m:lnta:l.n aontaot v.lth the 

Motion tor German 0.17Ptograpbio 878t-. and atill 3ourne,red DOW 

abCl thm. to the aomandB ot the milituT diltriota aa courier. 

He &1.ao .m..voncl to continue hta old a\7le of VOl"k in the DW 

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Ot oouraa that could not. well go on :ln tbe long run, lino• 

the assignment waa oonstantl;r grow1nf& and, in order to muter 

the material., it was neoes8&17 to tam11 iari.se oneaelt v.l.th mlO" 

questions oonoeming the British armed toroes. ltowner, neither 

11::1.ndq persuasion nor serious admonitione aould. move '.l'hilo to . . tamiliari• himself more intenainl.}" with hi• ti9ld, and the end 

ot the •tter was that 1n 1936 he waa. dimi•Md tzraa the service 

ot the Cipher Bureau. It•• all the easier to clear up· the 

IJituation, a1nce Thilo had axpreaeed the intention of quitting 

' I 

tlla aenioe &r'11Rll' and ot reopenins bia faotory, Id.nae he·had. 

':."~cl in setting together a oonaiderable 8llOUDt !'f ~ 

,.,,....winch wOu1d enable hill, in the new eooncmo ait,.tion, to pt 

hia enterprise going v.l.th some proapeot ot auooeaa. 

So 'fh:Uo left the Cipher Bureau and bepn gr1nd1.ns bonea 

and ma1d.ns eoap. Bu.t the buaineaa did not lut long, and one 

dq Thi.lo taced the probl.mi of haviq to look U'01JDcl tor a nev 

. . .. job. At the M:lniatey ot Deitenae. the cloora wre · clo,aecl to bi.ml . 

aooordinW be applied to the lonohungaaml;, eepeo"!'l17 mnoe . 

he oould pl'OV8 that he waa a good old~ ot tile P&r.t7• In 

toak up hi• vork. 

Two 7881"• later the Seconcl World War broke out. Poland 

na aubduec!. In the 8Wllll8I' ot 1940 Prance vaa ~reel and . . .. oooupied, and at one ot the ~ stations in Paris the 

German troop• capt1μ'ed. a .freight train filled with docnmmita 

1~1 
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trom the French Ministry ot War and the Foreign Office which waa 

I . 

auppoaed. to have lett tor the aouth of France. The d.oc~te wre 

taken to Germani' where theJ' began to a1tt and arrange L-.. 

lfaturalq this was done with oharaoteristic Deman tl1o~as, 

i.e., slowq. First of all lists and tables of oontenta wre prepared and 119 a considerable time wnt bJ'1 before anyone found ou.t 

in detail what bad been acquired. 

BJ' the end of 1941 thq bad progressed eo tar aa to aaoartaiD 

that th97 bad captured. here a large number ot docU111BDts frail the 

French aeoret service. Rov th8J' eat about a 81'•te-.t1o evaluation 

ot theae d.ocumnta and earl¥ in 1942 amid the m.ountaine of pa.pen 

th97 found a neatq arranged liet - provided 'Mith all deta:lll!I and 

giving the appearance of an al.moat Pruaaian thorougbneea - of 

those oont:f.dential agents who had been vorld.ng tor .l'rench :lDtelligenoe in Gel'Er\Y• And lo, among other wall-lmown namea the7 found 

that of Mr. Thilo. Bl.It 'llhereaa in the aase of the other confidential 

agents it waa ganeraJ.:q a •tter of ao-callad mall t171 eince thq 

had. been paid oft with relativelT amall amounta, there wre ftl'J' 

ditterent 81llD8 entered in Tbilo•s account, whiah led one to inter . that he had nalJ¥ been providing aometh1nl• '1'he lut 81BOU11t wbioh 

had ,._ paid out to him vu the aool round sum of 100 ~ Ge~ 

mrka. 

Row it ia an open aearet that the espionage eervioe does not 

ue11a117 aot verr ~in p8iJ1ng agent.a. When 8Wll8 ot thia 

magnitude ware paid, on:q into:rmat:l.on could be inTolved 11bioh we 

of espeoia1J¥ great Tal.ue to a foreign ponr. 

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. ~ltf€~1 . Row th97 be~~ f=onow- up the at.tair and leamed that ~ · 

tr.land 'l'hilo during the entire period ot hie aot1vit7 in the 

lliniatr.r ot Delena• had currentl3 betrqed. to the rNnoh lia:leon 

man ~ Berlin all the cr.vptographio B,TBteme then uaed in the 

German &l"IV• Moreover, cl'7J)tograpb1o 15J"atema, tables ot call 

e!gna, details regarding the German cipher maohinea - allot 

which wre intended. tor use in case of war - had. traveled the 

1181118 route. In the field ot evaluation he had. become more 

adept than an;yone had 11USpeoted, since it was with the real 

understanding ot an expert that ha had brought to the knowledge 

ot the French. secret eervice all details respecting the organima-. 

tion of the German intercept service, regarding the BT•~ ot . evaluation and their applioabilii,., regarding the .mthode ot 

German oOlllllitm.ent tor the observation ot foreign .maneuvers 'b7 . . the 1.nteroept service. Both the betrqal. of the ol'.JPtographio 

8J11tal8 and that ot the call sign tables oauld. not have tailed· 

to put the e1U1Q' intercept eervioe into a position where it woul.d 

be able to read all German radio trattio without ditt1cultJ'. 

'!'his 'lfBll ot inestimable value tor the French; the betrap.J. ot 

the aasignmmit ot the German intercept service l.ikew1se revealed to them the waalmesses ot their own radio organimation and 

showed them to what extent it wu possible to penetrate into 

the aeorets ot their .means ot coamunioation. 

'l'hUo had, moreover, eu.pplied the French with lists ot 

those persona who might be considered as reall,y competent and 

capable evaluators on the German aide; tram this it was 

possible to see that their number was axceeding4r small • 

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RE91'RleTP-t 1 

Aside J.ram. t.he things al:re~ mentioned, Thilo had au.pp.Lied the 

French with lll&rW' other bite o:C intormation, which he had bean able 

to secure aas:Lq since he was a fam111ar figure in the Ministr.r of 

Defense and the name ot hia brother opened doora tor hi.'11 aivwa;v. 

During the period ot hia activit7 in the Forsahungsamt, he had brought 

to the knowledge of the French the entire organisation of that age11C7 

and a good lll&lV details regarding its worl't1 

In vin of the oooparatioa between i'IN! frenoh and .Inglish 

intelligence sei"doe, it was aelt-evident fiitK.·the English wre,alao 

into:med of at least a part of these deliveries of Tb11o. 

Thilo •a arrested and his hearing revealed so man;r tbinga that 

the interrogators r.iever oaaaed to shake tWeir heads~ Before the oaae 

reached the court.a, Th1lo conmitted suicide in his oell. 

Whether Th1ld 1188 world.ns cmq tor the French secret ser"d.oe or 

whether he blti at.her connections will probabl.1' never come to light. 

The French at all events ware not able to protit moh from. bia work 

ainoe the war aped across the count17 too End.~. It is to be 

a11SUD11Jd; hoilever; tha1. the Bngllsh nre able to make use of mu.oh 

that Thilo had supplied to France. . 

It is interesting to note in this conneot16n that the ftThilo 

Caae•• bad i& itaida linen wbioh was noi without it.a humorous aspeci. 

'!be counter-intelligence aeotion ot the M:lniatry tor Dat9nae had 

gotten on the trail of the work of a Frenoii agent in Berlin in 

19'0. '1'he7 decided to plJv' ta.ice materiai into the hands ot this 

man. Por ih:ta pirpOa a sergeant F. wu selected io act as midcdtreM• 

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r. -· ampl.oyed in the llini&tl'I' of Defense •• cl.erk and drattanan 

in the Cipher Bureau. He was now put in tau.oh with the French 

agent, had to meet him now and than, and had to tum over 

documents or photographic copies thereof, which bad been 

taJ.eitied or faked in Je oounterintel.11gence section. That 

wnt aJ.q tor a while quite aocording io plan. ait Tbllo •• 

vel"T well acquainted with this sergeant r. 1 th97 even worked 

tor a time in the 881118 subeeotion. In a al.ever manner, Ddlo 

eucceeded in transforming r. trail a "fake" eupplier into a 

"genuine" JAU"f810r• Prom now on he betrqed to the French 

agent ~ •a tala1f1ed, ao that the Prench eeoret aervioe 

vaa intorm.ed regarding the deception. The game continued tor 

J9&l"S• Prom t}J.e papers captured. 1n Paris iu the above 1118Dtic:ned 

tr&in the double rol.a ot Sergeant r. was liland.se renal.ed. 

Thilo's treason gave the French intercept service an unheard 

ot opporturdv, tor it made it possible to read all Germn military' 

radio trattic over a lOng period. It gave the French at the oa.t-

'break of' the war poes:l.bil1.ties ot a reaorma.issance aervi.ce 1n the 

ether which cou1d not tail. to have great oonsequances. Stranpq 

enough, the French did not make tu1l use of' this chance. We get 

the impression that, rel,Jing on the -.01"1' ot the decisive role . . ot the French intercept service in 1914 and 1n the reassuring 

knowledge t~t thq were in possession ot the German ciphers and 

call sign tables, thq neglected to do Jll8lV things wJiich thq 

necessaril,y should have done, in view ot the German super1orit7 

in personnel and materiel • 

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141 

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THB IBVBLOPJOW.r OF THI GBRIWl IR'l'BBOBPT SBRVICB .AND 

OF I'l'S CClft'BOL STATIOK AP'mR JANUARY 19.3.3 

At the end of 19.32 the control a:tation of the German intero~ 

service had reached a state in its organisation and perammel. 

11h1ch enabled it to direct the paa.cetillle work ot the intercept I 

service rather wlJ. and to process the results. xnaec11 ateq 

after the "assumption ot power'' by' National Sooialim. in Oezm.rw 1 

a devel.opnent eet in at the Cipher Bureau which gl'Y8a the 

impression of being an advance, but in real:l:tJ' sigaif:l.ed a 

retrogression. 

This developnent moved in.two d1rections1 on the one hand, 

in regard to the personnel eituation1 on the other, in regard 

to the general organisation. In the train of the rearmament . 

which now began, peop1e were constantq brought in who bad. not 

the slightest qualification for the intercept. aenice. The1r 

on:q •rit was. that th8J' had been officers in World War I and 

111.ahed now to reenter the German armed. torcea, 11h:l.ch vere being 

expanded. Th8J' were all ot.t'icere who had served dur:l.ng the 

World War ih the Signal Corps, but whose outlook 'RB never 

broad.er than that ot a Compml1' commander. 

First th81' were brought in as civilians; then ~ got the 

designation ''L-0£ticere"; and tinaJ.l1' they' became the so-called. 

"Fr-0££icers". They usual.q got credit tor a good. .lll8D1' years ot 

service, and in consequence in Jll8D1' cases obtained a rank: 

higher than that ot the experts who had. been in the service up 

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to that time. ·Thia :l.nned:latel.v brought a factor ot friction into 

the whole situation, and elnc-,. the newcomer• wre often iDetalled 

u section heads, etter a ehcn·t. period during which tJaq wre to 

fam11tarise theuelvee with the work, while the previous aection 

head.11 wre subordinated to tham. the 307 of the old perBODDel in 

the work declined rapicll.y, eapeo161.q •• the nn muter& general.17 

acted in a V•!7 preeumpt,uou.s fft.Bhion. 

In ~ oaeea gentlemen wre en~ who turned out later to I 

I 

be ve17 questionable ah"'ractfllrs. 'l'h11R .. ftrr aample, in 19.34 \tJie 

Organisation and Assignment Section ot the Cipher Bureau-~ 

turned over to a new .man llho, up to then, had bean selling ""1Pevritera, who had no1. tJ1e e.1.il'.hteet idea ot the tecbniclue and 

taotica ot the intercept. service, and who 1'1nal.q bad to be condemned on account ot various ahad,.v dealings. On the baais of 

docuMnta captured in Waraaw after the occupation ot Poland in 

19.39 another of theae new gentlemen t.umed out to bave bean a 

fol'lll9r agent of the Polish aecret aemce. In the meantime be 

Dad rlaen to the rank of ma..1or in the German armed toroeal 

Natu.rall1', not all the newq aaaigned gentlaman wre :ln I 

thia aategor,r; howe'V'er, thq were in moat inatanoaa - looked. 

at object!~ - whoUT unsuited and onq had a desire to advanoe 

as quialcl,J' aa possible and .make .a good career tor tbauelna. Arq 

feeling tor oaretu1 aaientitic work ..... compl.eteq laoldng an their 

part. 

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Arv ptl'Mation ot euoh eeuiU.w orpnimatiana •• the 

evaluation and the c~ groups by ~t• ot this 

sort naturalq oouJ.d not tail to cause aeri.oue harm. Thi• tell 

·. manU'eetecl in the oaae of the evaluation group, tor :t.nstenoe, 

in the tact that henceforth there wre .m:re man~• covered and 

ll.01'9 oftioial journqa made, 'Nhile the reeulte were tar interior 

I • 

to those ot the earlier 1981'•• 

In reapect to the organi•atioa ot the interaept Mnioe, 

the .masures which wre now pit through nre likewise 8UOb u 

\ 

to oauae eeriou.conoern. The creation ot the Poreohungl&mt, 

oonaeming which w have :reported, withdrew troll the eontrol 

etation of the Geman intercept 118l'Vioe a couiderable DWlber 

of good Dml withou.t arr, correepcmding reduation in the ueipm.ent. Por, although it had been stated ori~nell7 that the,,, , ,j 

·.; 

.monitoring ot all d1plo.mat:lo radio trat.tio woaJ.d now be taken 

"'!187 ~ the Cipher Bureau of the Jlinill't17 of Detanea, there' 

1f&ll aot~ no ahange :ln the picture. 

~ littl.e later aall8 -her11 oE the Cipher azreau. vmc:lerecl 

off to the K1Diat17 ot Propaganda. Moreover, the nwq oreated . .Air H1n1•tr.V' now Bet ap an intercept 18"1oa ~ its ~. Md 

ap;I n drew _,,,. a certain percentage ot the old, trained 

pereon,nel. of the Cipher au.au. In th!.• eue, too, there wu 

no olumge in the aaa1ganwnt ot the Cipher Blll"eau, ainea it bad 

to oont:l.nue to monitor the radio trattio of foreign air torcea I • . ~ 

L 

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.. 
just as before, because there was no posa1bil1ty, either :Ip 

lntercept technique or in m.ethoda of evaluation, of aeparating 

tlle monitoring ot trattio of to:reign armies tram that of foreign 

S£ forces. 

A J.ittl.e while before the ou.tbreak of Wor'lli War II, the control. 

station or the German intercept service waa again aplit up, tbia • • 

time by assigning one halt to the High Cammand of the Ami' while 

the other halt was left with the High Command ot the Armc:l Forces. 

Instead ot creating one great, competent, central intercept orpn111a-

•, . . 

tion, one waa thus breaking up the little old organisation more and 

more from J'e&r to 1aar, and was tilling out the gaps bJ" engag:lng 

unsuitable personnel. A.t the outbreak of World War II there ware 

iptercept organisations in German;y with the High COJllll&l'ld of the 

Armed Forces, w:l.th the High Command of the lrrq, w:l.th the High 

Ccmmand of the Air Force, w:l.th the High Command of the Rav, w:l.th 

the Forschungaamt, with the Security Service, w:l.th the Ministry of 

the Interior, w:l.th the Police, w:l.th the M1n1at17 tor Propaganda, 

w:l.th the Foreign Office, &l)d w:l.th a whole string of other agencies 

and offices. OrLq in very rare instances caul.d one speak of &D7 • . 

sensible cooperation among them. In general, theJ' worked at best 

side by side w:l.th an enormous amount of eupertl.uous and avoidable 

duplication. 

.. 

The same dissipation ot energy was also found w:l.thin the Cipher 

Bureau, which was supposed. to be the control point tor the entire 

intercept service qt the aimed forces, but which in reality had 

not the.. ·Hghtest authority to impose its wishes on the int.f.rcept 

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llE9¥Rfc¥!NJ 

services ot the three branches of the a.med Mnia4ta• The olJ:I 

·organisation, which had been tested and proved adequate, ws t•ened more and more, and new nbaeotiona wre OODBtantll' 

' oreatecl to aet apart an appropriate independent sphere 

areas, which had bithert.o been 1ntermeahecl, nre now 

aeparated trom one another and each WDt its own 1ftQ"• 

In the .middleo of 1939 the personnel strength in all 

~ ol tile - inten9(Jt. ..m.ae ... lS time ~ Dumber ampl.0784 :l.n 19.321 but there,... not even a :rmo 

\ . . o0:rreapancling inoreaae in tangible, uaetul results • 

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l&I 

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I 

THB nIN'J:BRCBPT ~ARDS" 

The a:lx t:Lxed p.r!teroept stations which existed 1n GermarJT 

:1J1 1932 tor monito~ foreign radio. 001111111n1 cations wre nen 

then eoaroell' autdoient tor o&rrJing out the moat neoesaa.rir 

• I . . . taake. It waa ~onoeivabl.9 that th97 would be 1n a poaiticm 

I . . 

to oOp. with tlie eno~Bll' expanding :requirements in the oaae 

of war. . Bven 1n peacetime the obaervation ot maneuvers ooulcl . 

on:q 11• oarried out :lt the t:lxed :lnteroept station• dete.ohed 

troops and ~ant thm forward to the }jorder. HOW8'V9Z"1 th11 · 

4 . al.wqa entailed a temporar.r · ne.gleot ot other ~a:lgnmnta. A · . . nw 'Wiil' had to be found ot creating .mobile tormat:lm;us wbioh . oould. be mplOJ9d in case of need (prJar:lq 11'1 war) whenmlr 

this might prova n•f?•S8817• They had to md.at in time. of peace 

and became thorougbl.J' fam1]1ar with the proapeative.~t. 

:ror these reasons :lt waa de~d to aet up an intercept 

• CClllpll.IJ1", to wh:loh a seaond waa aoon added. In and of :ltaelt 

the idea waa doubtl.ee&q good, ainoe a motoriHd unit which 

waa kept oonatan~ in praat:loe and we trained to mmd.tor the 

. army radio traf'tia ot a specit:lo opponent, could achieve good 

reeulta at onoe, 1t th1nga beaame aer:l.Olla. 

The praot:laal CNll'Z7inl out of the tra:lrd.ng ot these intercept 

acnpaniee, hoNever, 'W8llt ap1nat aμ. reaaon. Inatead of oaauw1111 these formatione conatantq with the monitoring of foreign . radio trattic, thq ware onl1' rarel7 ellJP].oTed in monitoring 

.toreign amrcisea to give them "praaticen; in the main thq were I 

118 

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uaed to" intercept and follow the radio trattio of German units . oarl"J'ing out exercises. How the wq the Ge:man 8!'1111' radio trath.o 

waa handl eel was not comparable with the met:ftod of 8Zf1 ot the at.her 

and.es of Europe. The ttpractical wrk" ot the asBignment and ot its 

evaluation resulted, therefore, in a distorted picture and wu utter]¥ I 

a8Dlleleaa. -Ot courae, under theee circJunustanoea it was possible to 

get praotioe in :l'1x1ng a radio station and d.ete:rm1D1ng 1t:a geographic 

positions but one could not J.eam the characteristics and pec..u.iaritiea of the traffic which 1tOUl.d have to be monitored in case of var. I • 

The intercept oompanie11, on the other hand, wre more interested in 

listening to their own traffic than to foreign traffic because the 

charaateriatioa ot their OND traf tio vare known to each ot the MD in . . 

all detaUa, ao that the work vaa 8&81'• Mol'90T8r1 the peraonal oontaote 

often made it possible to t1nd out a great deal about "the other 81cie• • 

over a glue ot beers this 11as of value for the intercept ~ 

ilm>l.ved.. 

=;so it' 'RB no 1'0Dder that these compan1ea, llhiah wre later 

increased to ldx, tell down in the .monitoring ot foreign maneuvers. 

'l'h1• toraecl people to recognise that 'these oampan1ea would not, 1n 

cue of var, be in a position to auppq uae1'ul intelllgenoe, until 

1;heJ' hacl had a month ot training under -.rAHl!Jditione, aasming, ot , . 

~-· -L-- that ~.,. wre uai,gnecl wll qual1.f:t.ecl ·--- evaluators to 'lfOrk 

over the result• ot their mmitoring. Pl'eo1eeq 1n thia resaz.id, 

hcMmtr, ft17' little .. dme. 

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It 118 consider. this developnent tram the stand.point of a 

tactual testing ot its value, 11& are forced to the conclusion . . 

that the intercept companies under these circumstances wuld 

oauM more harm than good in the event of 1fBZ"1 since the 

intercept service is a t.1t0-edged sword. It it wries preoiaeq 

and v.l.th scientific accur&07, then it can be ot great use to its . 

own collllll8Dd. It it does not do this, and it the work in 8UCh a 

compl.1cated field is carried O"'l 'bJ' inadequateq trained people, 

then the reau1ts 1118.l" cause the carmnand. to make fateful. errors 

in judgement. • 

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858 

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• 

The :Lnteroeptian ot teob.uical means of aaammioation had 

t ita beglmdng 1n World War I and. vu developed. iuto a ~pifiaant 

militar,r instrument. The number ot battle aotiona, operations, 

plans, and diplanatio measures which wre baaed on the reeults ot 

actual. intercepts became ver.r great. 

That one was silent about thie during World War I .... 

selt-evident. B.r WB1' of limitation, I must rmark that evm' 

then llClll8 things trickled tbroulh to the general piblio, but 

wre not given nm.oh attention. For :ln.atanae, a f8tl weks after 

the battle of 'fannenberg a Berlin paper carried an art;iole la . vbioh attention was called to the fact that Russian nd!o trattlo 

made it poaaible for the German OOJllDU1Cl to c&rl7 through the 

operations in the W8i1' it did. Two 79are later a haDkturt 

paper carried. a a1m11 ar artiole whioh had re.f'erenoe to the rellUl.ts 

of the intftocept eervice :Ln the W&at. The art:Lole :Ln the Berlin 

aheet gave the Ruaeiane a warn1ng and resulted :Ln the:Lr pq1ng 

aore attention :Ln the future to the aecuriv of their radio 

meaaape. The art.:Lcl.e 1n the Frankfurt paper also turned ou.t 

to be ver.r incautious and 1Ulfort.UD&te. 

1lheD World War I came to an and, literature on th:Le wr 

began to appear el.owq :Ln publ:La. The Tariou pnerale 

expressed. their opin:Lone reprding the operatione thq had 

ocmduated or regard:Lng the var 111 general, and hen and there 

offered ver.r :Lntereating cleta1la on the pract:Lcal application 

of the intercept, eerv:Lce • IST 

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Thia question was treated in a tar more detailed fashion 'b1' 

General Max Ronge, in his book ''Mil.it.au 1\nrl Industrial Bapionage,n 

:ln 1lh:1ch he gave a large number flt "'""'' i ..... rrom. the actual work 

ot the Austrian intercept service. So r • • ·'lA I know, this book 

rema:lne the onq one which oocup1ed iL~·,•.! wlt.h this ~eme to 

arrr areal> ax:t.ent. Th• other things which "' ~ared. on the subject. 

were either relativel.1' short. treatises on single topios or . 

official memoirs, sometime there were rather brief art.iole~ 1n 

nnapapers and magasinea. · 

Among the treatises on individual topics waa a brochure by 

the veJ.l .. lmown Austrian crn>tanal,yst, Figl, under the title 

1187stema ot Decipherment. 11 The French oolone1, Givierge, 

mpreased himself on the same theme. The then American ambaaeador in London (Page) expressed himself on the subject or the 

ZiDa.erman telegrams in his book ot war memoirs. Regarding the 

battle or Tanr..inberg, an article appeared first in Swden. To 

aum it all up, during the entire period. betvaen the Flrat and 

Second World Wars onq three men - ao tar as I know - a:xpresaed 

thamse1vea in brief form on this theme. These were Colanel 

Calve1 in .Franca, Col.onel SzieBQ118ld. in Poland, and Major 

Vasiliu in Bonania. 

Calvel•a memoir was intended as a textbook: tor the French 

ccmmmication. service. It did contain a number of ver.r interesting namples tram the period. ot World War I, but the chief etresa 

was on teohD1.oal questions, on what had been learned b7 uperience, 

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• 
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• 

• 

ltESSQC~1 / 

and on directifts tor the"seourit.T of one's OMD conmmioaticms 

against hostile 1ntero9ption. 

The Pol.e. ·Colone1 Slliesiqnald.. 1IU a pip1l of calvel and on 

his return from Veraaill.es OOlllPO&ed a manoir which included a11 

the exam.plea which had be'come 1mcnm to him in France. as wll as 

additional notewort;q J..rw,s tram Gile period ot the Polieh1 

Russian war. Smie&Qnaki' s 11181110ir. which appeared under the 

tit1e 1'lntercaption and Direction Finding Service as a Soaroe 

of Intelligence Regarding the Bnav." contained man;,y- emiting 

exam.plea from ~he past. Thia 11tt1e volume - like Calftl.'a 

brochure - was not published but vaa intended onq tor•inatruotion within the Polish conmmications service. 

'l'he Roman:tan. Major Vaailiu. had attended the courses in 

France along with SsiesQ'DBld.. and had llkew:lae brou&ht bane 

a nwnber ot things which he had heard ~ seen there. In the 

sama 1flll' as Ssiesqnllld.. he composed a .aano1r in which be 

length direotifts tor O&rl7ing on a •thodioal intercept 

service. 

In Gmmzv" th97 tried to permit as little as possibl.e to 

appear in piblio on this theme. After 1933 there was even a 

deoree forbidding 81J10D8 to touch on such •tters in the press • 

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• 

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RES'AII~D21 

THE .ABMAMENT OF lWROPB .AP'lE 1933 

AS RBVEALED BI 'l'HB INTBROEPT BERVICB \ 

It. 1IOUl.d. be a great miat.ake to assums that the rearmament 

ot Germarv" did not begin until the autumn ot 193.3 attar Oel'mDJ' 

J.ett the League ot Nations. It wuJ.d be alao wrong to believe 

that in the preceding two years there had mereq been a certain 

amount or preparation tor rearmament. With respect to the 

preparation tor the production or waapona and of technical 

equipnent, the beginnings or rearmament in Germany reaohad. 

back into the firat 79ars after the end ot the First World War. 

HOW8Tel', peopJ.e abroad. noticed rlrtual.l¥ nothing ot this. Even 

within the countr,y nothing was lmown about it outside a small 

informed circle. 

The earq stages or this ettort became visibl.e earq in 

1929. At tb:lrs time a remarkable deval.opnant began both among 

the various statta and. alao in the H1n1at17 ot Det'enae. 

Ever.J'where so-called "empl.o.yeas• or "civilian emplcveea• 

appeared, who 'WBre employed at first 1n simple taaks, but 

then in more and more important ones. These were al1 form.er 

of'ticers. The7 were engaged as "spectators" or •assistants• 

at drills and maneuvers, and attached great importance to 

being addressed b.r their tonier titl.e. A series ot nn subsections was set up in the Minietey of Defense and in the . 

seven milit&l"J" districts • 

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RE~'PllB1 '-l! - --- -4 - --

Ir one oni;t\8od one of tbeae men 1n intimate oon'V1'raation, one 

aoon SoL aoma insight. into their trend ot thought. At tirst they 

a.pro11etl their satisfaction at having escaped trom tile inter.Lor . at.atua ot an agent or traveling sal.eaman and once more at finding 

empl.oJment suitable t.o thoir station• Soon thq would admit tb&f; 

things lf9N moving toward rea:nnament and that their present occ11Jla.-

tion aa ~·• waa •rell' an 1ntermediat9 stage. 

lf one obaerved the entire radio tratt1c of other European 

countries, it could be recognised that in all oountriea, without 

exception, militaey amam.ent had reached a certain starulatill. 

To be sure, organizational. changes nre made here and there, or 

antiquated weapons nre replaced b;y new ones; even the tra.ining 

regulations ware revised now and then. But there was 'Yirtualq 

no real change in effective strength and in respect to the 

training and. preparation of reserves, or with respect to the 

quantit7 or &Iml!I available. 

In 19.321 and indeed earq in this 79ar, German propaganda 

tor the creation of a 300,000 man aI'Jl\Y took shape open:q. In 

realit7 the effective strength ot the German armed torces had 

a.lreaq expanded tar bqond the 1001 000 man limit set. It one 

counted in the numerous "8lllP107ees" and assumed that tJi.,. wre 

to serve as a skeleton tor a mnr ott'icer corps, one :reached the 

concl.uion that all that was neceasarr was the induction of a 

corresponding number ot recruits, llhereupon the entire 3001 000 

man anv wou1d be complete. ·The arms, toola, and equipnent had 

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long Bince been at band • 

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The monitoring ot .milit&17, diplomatic, and intemal radio 

trattic of all the Europe"=°" countries, which 1n general gave 

V8l7 good and aometimes ve17 ext.enaive 1.n:tozmation, did not 

afford the llllghtest proof that at that time there was 8ZJ1' 

building up of armaments abroad, not even 1n the spr1ng ot 

19.32 when a flood of plaoards and postcards poured out all 

over Germa.D1' showing 1n graphic form. how defenseless and 

unprotected Ge:rm&rJ7 was against 8ZJ7 hostile attack and what 

. the m111t&r7 strengt,h ratio of all adjacent countries to 

Gel'lllllZV' was. These postcards, which were produced 111 al>1' 

variations, were sent out through Ge:rmaD1' b.f the mill1ons • . Corresponding large placards could be seen 1n f!IVerJ' govemment 

office, in 8'V8l"J' station, and in the corridors ot all pu.blio · 

ba:lldings. There was not the slightest doubt that this wa'V8 

of propaganda ananated tl'ODl the Mirdstl'J' of Defense. 

Immecfi ateq attar the assumption of power 'b7 Rational 

Soo1aliam, a great~ increased activi.t.7 began in the German 

a.mad forces, eape9"•ll7 in the then M:lniat17 ot Defense. 

There seemed to be no tinancial or budget817 difficulties 

connected with the empl.o,ment of civilian ampJ.o7ees. In all 

parts of the building on 1'1rpitsuter thq shot up like 

muahroClllll attar a rain. Numerous new organizations W:re set 

up, and new sub-eeotiona were created; there was an anxl.oua 

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shutting of oneself ott against other sections1 the requiaition182 . 

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ing ot vien Irom tho &l'2J\Y by tho Minist17 or Detense and vice versa 

assumed ever g1"eater proportions. The numerical strengt.h or the 

milit.8.l"J' district commands doubled within a ve:ey short. time. The 

creation ot the Air Hiniet.17 was ror 81J1'one at all acquainted with 

the situation an open indication that this was the first step 

toward the oreation or a larger German air force. 

In tho 1BUD1111er or 1933 in the diplomatic radio traffic or 

various countries could be noted the first indications t.hat 

people ab~ were beginning to 'P87' some attention to this development. This occurred primar~ in Great Britain and in Cuchosl.ovald.a, 

then to a certain extent in France and Poland. With respect to the I 

Savi.et Union nothing could be ascertained directq, since the aritire I 

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· d1pl.omat1c tratfio of this count17 rema1ned undecipherabl.e; con-t I 

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cium.ons could ~ be drawn indirect~ from the radio traf't:Lo dt 

. other c-:>untriea. From. this it appeared that Russia was the firat I 

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and at that time the o~ countey in Europe to recognize quite • 

olearq :t.he developnent which was beginning in Germ&n1" and to i;.ic. 

counter-steps or a milita.?7 character. With regard to the other 

countries of Europe, nothing of thia·sort could be noted, not even . when Ge~ quit the League of Nations on l4 October 1933. There . . 

was, to be BUl"91 a great deal of talk in diplomatic circles to the 

etteot that Gel'lll&IJl' 118.11 beg:l.nning to arm on a large scale. Moreover, 

col.unms 1n ~· nevapa.pers abroad began to be tilled with articles. 

dealing with. this topic. In the parl.1mumts questions were introduced 

and debates wre conducted. ait fl'Clll. a practical. point ot viev 

nothing as f.\one 1n the armies of Europe which ooul.d. be designated 

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in M7 'W8if aa an increase in armament. let alone an increase in 

milit&17 strengt.b, which would threaten Gel'J1181V'• OnJT in the 

Soviet Union was the m1lit&17 budget increased.. 

During the course of 19.34 Geman rearmament took torma 

1dlich coul.cl no longer be over1ooked. bJ' the public. The mere 

building ot barracks we calculated to give ::lntomation. 

However, onq.one who had some insight into the doings ot the 

Ministry of Detense could get an approximate idea of what waa 

real:q being prepared. Here events and plans began tallins 

all ~r one another. . ~ ~ ~ · 

Inmediate]T atter the assumption ot·~r, Hitler had 

issued the directive to make all preparations tor setting up 

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a 300.000 man &l'IQ'• These plans wre 8&87 to carrr out, aince 

the7 coincided with the previous trend ot thought and with the 

prel.1m1narJ' IJl8&sures a.J.rea<V' taken. Sh~ thereafter 

instructions came from the Ohancellorr to make plans tor a 

500,000 man &l'Dl1'• A quarler of a 79ar la:bar Hitler issued 

a directive to work on the basis ot a 100.000 man standing • 

arm.?'• Attar a wh1l.e this number was increased. to 900,000, 

and later to 11 2001 000. 

Later on, after 20 J1Jl1' 1944, attar he had had him. 

strangled, H1t1er spoke ot tormer Colonel General Bac_!c as 

a miserable weakling who got a nervous breakdown and cried 

11.ke a tell.ow with a hango'V81' eveeytime he had something 

extra to do •• Back, during that critical period ot German 

armament, was the Chief ot General Staff and was regarded in 

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wide circlco.a.s a second Moltke. Deck1 c militGrT ability" - at leaet 

in tho •~~tLer or organization - ia beyond all question. However, 

Beck was a very conscientious 1nan who waa accusto1ned to L"'ivo all his 

pl.t\ns the stBJDP of p1·ecision. 'l'lie constant changGs in ,lirectivea, 

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thd increases of numbers at sllort interval.a, the new :Instruct.ions i I . 

coristantq issu'ed bJ" HL.tler, these al.,-s up8et Beck's previous 

l s. It is trobabq true that lll8lQ" times Bock sat at his de&k 

' knowing what to do and was more inclined to wep than to laugh. 

reason, however, was not a wretched wealm.ess or this man, but 

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' the impulsive action and ordera of Hitl.er which ex.cludod &n7 0

cciacien1:.ioua ~ing. Hitler's trends of though~ d~bt.leas made 

possible the qidclt setting up of a great numerical atrongth but not 

the solid toundatio11 which is needed for a large modern &rmT• No 

one lmew thia bet.tar than Beck, and in this f'act.. is f'ound the 

e.xpl.anation . .,r his occaaional want or camposuro whe~ ha found .himaelt facing the ruin or his previous plans and arrangements. 

1, The tirst lndications that people abroad wre beginning to 

take into milit&rJ" account the ait.uation resulting through Germn 

rearmament wre tound in the swnmar of 1936, i.e., after German 

troops occupied the ws:t:.em demi J 1 tarisad zone. Bu.t even now such 

measures in the European armies ware limited to a ver,y meager, not 

to sq pitilul. extent. Qn:q the Soviet Union began going ahead in 

two directions: in the direction of bt:d.J.ding up a strong &r'11181118Dt 

induatr.r, and in the direction ot training a strong m:Uitar,y 

Tl'lserve. · Otherwise, the situation in almost alJ. the C01D'ltries ot . . 

Europe .L-emained practicall,y the same as it had been in 1929. Thia 

was particularq true with reapect t.q France. 

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When in the ear]¥ dqa ot Feb1'1lal7 1938 Hitler c&ZTied out hia 

sweeping change 1n the Miniat17 ot Detenae and made h:l.maelt supreme 

Commander ot the German Armed Forces, and when he dimisaed. Colonel 

General. Baron von Fritsch, who had been oppoaed to 8Zf8 aggressive 

war, there was no doubt left in the minds of the initiated. whither . this developnent waa going. Thia devel.opnent was also recognised. 

in political oirolea in moat of the non-German cauntries of 

Europe. Thia was most clearq the case in Bngland. Here. thq 

began inoreasing their armaments in the air and to 80lll8 met.mt 

on the water. Csechoal.ovald.a increased the number ot its 

diviaiona and their effective strength. In Poland the air force 

was likewise strengthened and a partial rearming of the tiel.d 

arm;r waa carried out. Othend.se, practioal.q nothing chanpd. 

. Hitler asserted later that increased armament ever,r1there . abroad had forced him to increase ~ta aind final.l1' to 

strike. 'that is totalq untrue ii!nce the intercept service, . . which reaJ.q eised up the situation in foreign and.ea and air 

forces down to small details, did not give the aligbteat 

support to the claim that inoreaeed armaments abroad nre 

forcing Hitler· into an armaments race • 

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HITLER .AND CDCHOSLOVJKU 

There nre two countries against 'Which Adolph Hitler 

made thorough preparations tor war from. the V827' first dqs 

ot his activit7 as leader ot German pol.107: Poland. and 

Cseohosl.ovald.a. Hardq ever in all h1sto17 has a count17 

been BO IQ'lltematica.llT and deei>J.1" undermined and prepared tor 

external attack 'b7 the empl.oym.ent of spies, agents, and con- -. 

tidence Dl8n (so called V-men). as was here the cue. The 

starting point tor this work waa attorded by the German 

spealr1ng elment in these countries. B;r' using their attachment to all that waa German. in all circles ot the German 

~~ population so-cal 1 ad qontidence men wre recraited. 

as purveJ01'8 ot inf'ormation, partq directq, pa.rtl.J' through 

the VDA (Volkabund tuer daa Deutachtum im Au.al.and or Peop1et a 

League tor German Culture Abroad). There waa a preference tor 

peraona in ottioial poaiticma. or in the CMah armed toraes 

but buaineaa mn. traT1Jlers. and. the like ware alao gathered 

in. It 1f&ll most valuable when. thv succeeded in viDning an 

officer ot the Csech armed toroes as a contidence man, and 

thi• happened repeatec:lq • 

.Al.read1' by the end ot 1934 the situation was auch that 

almost nothing that occurred in the Csech armed torcea._ 

administration, or industry remained concealed trail the 

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German espionage service. The number ot individual reports 

. on Csechosl.ovald.a reaching the countel"intelligence unit in 

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Berlin aver"'r;od. rrom five to ten dail.1'· Olten there were micrcr 

f'ilms ot original document.a incJ.ud1 ng 1ntonnat1011 on the most 

secret matters. 

Eavesdropping on telephone conversations plqed a/p&rticular 

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part in this BWins on the Czechoslovak state. For this an entire 

qstem. ot listening stations had been set up. The results were sent 

to the counterintelligence offices in Broslau.. Dresden, and Munich, 

or to their advance branches. and passed from here to Berlin. All 

cable lines leading out ot Czechoslovakia which touched German, 

Austrian, or Hungarian territo17 were monitored. For this purpose 

there was close cooperation.between the German. A.uatr:l.an, and 

Hungarian espionage and c:eyptanaqt.ic services. 

Much energy was devoted in Germ&n1' to setting up the radio 

intercept servi.ce against Czechoslovakia. However. in this tiel.d 

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there vaa little success. As earq as 19.33 there vaa oollaboraticm • 

betwen. the German intercept service and that ot the Austrian and 

the Hungarian and.as. but the Cmechs were so cautious in their use 

ot radiotelegrapq that the results were onl,y moderate. 

A ve17 clear indication that the C&echs had been ealected Iv' 

Hitler as tm object ot a military att..ack wa to be had an 

24 December 1936. On this unusual da.v there occurred at ihe Cipher 

Bureau in the Minist17 ot War at Berlin a discussion with otf:l.cera 

ot the Air Ministr,-. The subject "11118.8 a new organisation and a 

strengt.hening ot the intercept work against Cmechoel.ovalda. The 

main theme was a surprise attack. The Ministr.v tor Air took the 

initiative and it looked as it the air force were to plq the chief 

role. Not until later was it clear wb,y the Ministr.v f'or Air took 

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. . the lead 1n thia and later oonwr11ation11: Glr.lng and hi11 atatt 

favored the plan. Colonel General Baron von Fri.tech, Oaaaanderin-chief Of the .Anqr, VU opposed • 

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