~- -Soviet 

. Scphisticutiou • 

in 

~715i~~~ Com.~unicaticns S3curlty ana ~o:nmunication~ 

Intelligence. 

Any design as to what safeguards must be provided the US COt.iINT effort. 

against USSR and Satellite si~nal co1ll!llunications should consider the 

£ollowint related £actors: 

a 0 Soviet sophistication in c:eyptographic security: how "good" 

are their ciyptot;raphic systems; what security at;ainst 

cryptanal,rsis are they desic;ned to afford; and~ what 

security have they been found to afford in practiC!l'o 

bo Soviet sophistication in communications intelligence: 

uhat the.:t consider their own co:nmunications intelliE;ence can 

produce; what they know eneD137 COMINT has produced against them 

in the past; what they expect their own communications 

syste;ns to provide in terms of security against en~ 

analysiso 

A. Soviet Sophistication in Cryptographic Security: 

Soviet cryptoera.Fhic security should be traced to its historical 

origin which may be inferred from the clandestine nature of the terrorist 

and subersive organizations of Czarist Russia from. among \-.hich the 

Bolshevik party emergedo Cryptographers and historians of the Czarist 

Secret ~olice have published inonographs on the cipher systems which these 

19th century groups employed for their private correspondenceo 

· It is interesting to note that the official Soviet "History of the 

Communist Party" approved by Stalin includes as an exhibit an enciphered 

message passed by the Bolshevik co::u:dttee to the Communist t:roup in the 

· Czarist fleet at Leninerado (Sto Petf::lrsburg)o Unfortunately not too 

much is known about Czarist cryptographic practices beyond the .fact that the 

cryptot:raphers had the reputation of corn}:etence in the cryptot;raphic 

practices of the dayo Practically nothing is known as to whether any Czarist 

cr.n-tographic personnel continued to serve under the Soviets after the 

October Revolution, and in any event present day Soviet cryptography is a far 

cry re:noved from the syste.ns reported from German and Austrian records 

as having been used in v•orld v•ar Io · 

After ••orld i~ar I the head or the Austrian cipher bureau, General 

llaximillan Ronge published a world famous book on the activities or his 

organization and the intelligence produced from monitorinE; Czarist ani 

Bolshevik radio comm.unicationso Subsequent to \lorld ~~ar I the 

Bolshevik invasion of Poland airected by Trots.Ir¥ was decisively defeated 

due to the success of French and Polish cryptanal,ysis in reading the Red 

A:rmy communications o The details of this success were recorded in an official 

Polish ~ignal Corps monographo Both this Polish monograph and Ronge 1 s bo'ok 

are c:li.ed and quoted by Russian lecturers on cryptographic securityo 

The lessons to be derived from these past failures ot Russian cryptographic 

practices are apparently basic in present day Russian thinking and training 

tor cryptographic securit70 

, 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-21-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
- REFl'fij) :~~" ~UE~ ... .. • I '-"~':.I HJ.. I 

After the first Ht1.&sian-binisn 1var a.uring the early pc:iriod 01 -.orla 

,iar II, the cipher section of the r;eneral staff .o!, the Hed. .H.rilJ¥ published 

a series of lectures on cr,yptographic security which cited both the 

Polish roonograph and Ronce•s book, and further included an ana.l.¥sis of 

bad cryptographic security by their troops in the first Finish ca:npaigno 

These lectures specifically pointed out cases in which cryptographic 

materials were :nishand.led. insLances in which code boo::Cs were captured 

and their loss not reported• am examples of i.a.proper message handlingo 

Further available from German caFtured documents are the regulations of 

the Red Aril1'3' and of the ~KV1.l for the security of cryrt rooms and cipher 

materials datillG !ro;n approximately 1939 - 1941 and manuals for radio 

cocu:iwdcations in the Red lU'lrJY (includes the Air Forces ot the Red ArmiY') 1 

and t.ne Hed Navy dating in 1944 are availableo From all of 'these the 

Russian p.nilosophy both in colili:wnications procedures and cryptographic 

security is revealedo It is clear that they e:l(.pect their tactical 

com.'Illlnications to be intercepted. and compromised. by loss or captureo 

The lectures on cr,yptoE;raphic security clearly indicate the time limit 

for which they expect ttese tactical cr,yptographic syste;ns to provide 

protectiona The regulat.ions tor code an:i cipher security also iniicates 

t.he priority ;in which cipher uiaterials are to be destroyed in the event 

that capture of a code room is expectedo 

Significantly first priority is assigned. to destruction of additive, 

second to plain text of transudtted messages, and third to code booksa 

The record of Ger.nan cryptanalysis of all Russian cryptographic systems 

during ,,orld ~,ar II, and the continuing effort o! the U.S. since viorld 

k/ar II is well known and no one should have any delusion as to the fact 

that the Russians know what secure cr,yptographic systems are and employ 

them regularly and carefully o It is therefore pertinent at the present 

t.ime to note that the Russians them.selves assume that their tactical 

communications will be intercepted am their intentions in designing these 

systems is to provide security for only a limited period of timeo 

Bo Russian Sophistication in Communications Intellic;ence: 

\Ve noted above in rt:.fereme to the lectures on cryptographic securit.7 

that the Russians were a\1are of foreign cryptanalysis and its present 

success against their own cQ.1Jlilunicationso It should be noted that the 

Russians have carefully stuciied the Pearl Harbor report. and all of its 

implicationso The Biblography of the lectures on cr.yptographic securit7 

in addition to the two works mentioned .also refers to many of the 

standard international writers in this fieldo Actual knowledge ot the 

Russian COlillllunications intelligence orcanization is extremely limitedo 

However,dur.ing l~orld War II German and .Finish reports cited instances 

in which Hussian CO~Il~T had been used !or tactical operationso A 

captured Russian Operational Order .tor .Russian troops in the Ukrain cited 

without part.icular euiphasis radio intelligence as among the intellieence 

sources forming the basis .tor tbis order and other instances of this sort. 

of tactical or operational COMINT have been mentioned in German interrogation 

ot Hussian prisoners of waro Finally the Red. A1.'Uf3' manual on Radio 

Intelligence issued in 1944 and beginning with an appropriate quotation 

from. Stalin on the value of radio intelligence is available and in the 

TOP 8(CHET S_IJEDE 
.:iam.al. on 

From defector reports obt.alned since 1946 there is evidence including 

in so:ae cases copies of the re1,orts prepared of the activities of Iwssian 

radio intellic;ence 1mita monit.orine the traffic oi' the u • .::;. and British 

occupation trbopso It is notel'iorthy that all ot the defector and captured 

document.'evidence available onl.;,t reveals low level direction i'indinc;s, 

traffic analysis, at::.<l plain text. exploitationo The absence of cry,μtoeraphic 

analysis above the H..I. Cox..pany level is strikinc;. Finally the ;.i.anual !or 

.SiE,;nal co.:I1.aunications in the lied Air 1''orce of 1944 provides tmt the Battle 

Head<1uurters of the Air n.rmy shall httve "intercept receivers for listening 

to the co .• caunications of the ener.i.y Air .to'orce .. " 

There have been a few indications tha~ the Soviets have interests in 

German cryptanalysis and intercept op-srators to the extent of questioning 

some of theai, and more recently offering tn-,:ri. em.ployr.1ent. 

During .:orld iia.r II the British attempted to set up an exchani;e in 

Si_nal intelligence with the Russians. uh.ile complete details o.f what. was 

accoiaplished have never been revealed by the British it is known that the 

British delegates felt that the Russians were well on the way to, it not 

already successful in, cryptanaly9is of the German cipher machine, EnigmasQ 

In this reg.:i.rd it is interesting to note that when a U.S. and British 

teamvisi~ed the Ger~n fac~ory which had produced Enicrnas they le~rned that 

a Russian Army tea."l had preceded the:n1 and or greater interest in the opinion 

of the Geruan factory personnel, the liussian A~ Officer had sesned co~pleteJ,y 

.ta.lliliar with the German Army •. 1odel Lut had been more i.ntereste<.i in the 

Gerinan ?~avy iaodel which did di!f e"' ir· certain details .trom the Germ.an Army 

machineo 

Conclusions: 

ilhile the above j,s intel.lded to outline information available on Soviet 

sophistication in co1.ununications security and CU~IM~, it is clear both i'rom 

the evidence listec1 above ana i'rorn our l<nowledee of Russian co 1U1u.nicntions, 

and the result.a of our studies that the Russians are highly sophisticated 

in both .natters. It is sugcested there.fors, that a detailed study of all of 

the above evidence be initiated if not already Wlder wa.y in ttFSAo It is also 

the opinion of the writer that in view of t.he Hussian philompby and 

cryptogra,tllic pract.ices in ret:ard to thej_r tactical communications that they 

expect a laree scale effort. at,.ainst these comm.unications and have no ilium.on 

aa to their ultimate cry,EJtographic securityo Therefore, it is believed 

that U.S. policy :for work in this category of Russian communications is 

pri)V.ided by Category "D" as presently proposed by the USCIB Security 

CoLllld.tteeo 

THCMAS A. MILLER 

USAFSS, Member 

Security Committee 

T8P S~CRET SUED~