IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

JAWAUN SHOCKLEY, § 

§ No. 100, 2016 

Defendant Below, § 

Appellant, § Court Below–Superior Court of 

 § the State of Delaware 

v. § 

§ Cr. ID No. 1410001319 

 STATE OF DELAWARE, § 

 § 

 Plaintiff Below, § 

Appellee. § 

Submitted: August 19, 2016 

Decided: November 10, 2016 

Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices. 

ORDER

This 10th day of November 2016, having considered the no-merit brief and 

motion to withdraw filed by the appellant’s counsel, and the response filed by the 

State of Delaware, it appears to the Court that: 

 (1) During the afternoon of October 2, 2014, Wilmington police officers 

patrolling in the area of 6th and Tatnall Streets in downtown Wilmington stopped

their patrol vehicle when they observed the appellant, Jawaun Shockley, standing 

in front of a residence on 6th Street. The officers knew that there was a court order 

for Shockley’s arrest. When Shockley saw one of the officers exiting the patrol 

vehicle, he took off running. After a brief chase, one officer apprehended 
2

Shockley, tasering him when doing so, while the other officer recovered a weapon 

Shockley had discarded during the chase. In a search of Shockley incident to his 

arrest, the police recovered drugs, cash, and two cell phones. 

 (2) Shockley’s arrest led to his indictment on several drug and weapon 

offenses and other related offenses. After a two-day trial in October 2015, a 

Superior Court jury convicted Shockley of several counts in the indictment. At the 

February 19, 2016 sentencing, the Superior Court imposed seventeen years at 

Level V incarceration suspended, after serving six years and six months, for 

decreasing Levels of supervision. The court also ordered that Shockley 

“participate” in a Level V drug treatment program.1

 This is Shockley’s direct 

appeal. 

 (3) On appeal, Shockley’s Trial Counsel has filed a no-merit brief and a 

motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c). Trial Counsel asserts that, 

based upon a complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably 

appealable issues in Shockley’s case. Trial Counsel has advised the Court that he 

provided Shockley with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the no-merit brief and 

appendix in draft form, and a letter requesting that Shockley send him written 

points for the Court’s consideration. In response to Trial Counsel’s letter, 

 

1

 Sentencing Tr. at 7 (Feb. 19, 2016). 
3

Shockley submitted a two-page list of “things to appeal,” which Trial Counsel 

included with the brief. The State has responded to the no-merit brief, Shockley’s 

submission, and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 

 (4) When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief 

under Rule 26(c), this Court must be satisfied that the appellant’s counsel has made 

a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims.2 Also, 

the Court must conduct its own review of the record and determine “whether the 

appeal is indeed so frivolous that it may be decided without an adversary 

presentation.”3

 (5) In his written submission on appeal, Shockley asks the Court to 

review a discovery violation committed by the State. The discovery violation, 

which the State conceded at trial, concerned a forfeiture form signed by Shockley. 

When Trial Counsel objected to the form’s admission into evidence because it 

should have been provided in discovery and was not, the Superior Court ruled that 

Shockley’s signature on the form had to be redacted before the form would be 

admitted. As a result of the ruling, the State decided not to introduce the form. 

 

2

Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 

429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 

3

Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. at 81. 
4

Under these circumstances, there was no prejudice to Shockley from the discovery 

violation.4

 (6) Next, Shockley points to an “unreported sidebar” as a basis for appeal. 

The sidebar in question was taken on the first day of trial when the prosecutor 

requested permission to approach the bench to discuss scheduling. Having 

reviewed the record, we are satisfied that the unreported sidebar did not result in 

prejudice to Shockley’s rights.5 

 (7) Shockley next claims that his tasering by the police was unwarranted 

and constituted excessive force. Shockley does not explain, and the record does 

not reflect, how the police officer’s use of the taser when apprehending Shockley is 

relevant to the criminal convictions on appeal. Consequently, Shockley’s 

excessive force claim has no apparent bearing in the appeal. 

 (8) Finally, Shockley claims that his Trial Counsel’s failure to object to 

certain evidence at trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The claims 

are unavailing. This Court has consistently held that it will not consider claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.6 

 

4

Service v. State, 2015 WL 1234489, at *3 (Del. Mar. 17, 2015) (citing Taylor v. State, 982 A.2d 

279, 283 (Del. 2008)). 

5 Chattin v. State, 2011 WL 987752, at *3 (Del. Mar. 21, 2011) (citing Jensen v. State, 482 A.2d 

105, 119 (Del. 1984)). 

6 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994). 
5

 (9) Having carefully reviewed the record, the Court concludes that 

Shockley’s appeal from his criminal convictions is “wholly without merit”7 and 

devoid of any arguably appealable issue.8 As for Shockley’s sentence, however, 

the Court has determined that the sentence must be clarified to address two 

anomalies noted in the record. First, the written sentence order included in the 

record does not include the provision imposed at sentencing that Shockley must 

“participate” in a Level V drug treatment program.9 Second, if Level V drug 

treatment is a required part of the sentence, it is not clear that Shockley is required 

to successfully complete the program (as is customary) before his Level V term is 

suspended for Level IV supervision. Because of the uncertainties noted in the 

sentence, the Court will remand this matter to the Superior Court for the limited 

purpose of reviewing the sentencing transcript and clarifying the written sentence 

order. 

 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that: 

 A. The motion to affirm is GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior 

Court is AFFIRMED. The motion to withdraw is moot. 

 B. This matter is REMANDED to the Superior Court for the limited 

purpose of reviewing the sentence imposed by the court on February 19, 2016, to 

 

7

 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 26(c). 

8

Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). 

9

Supra note 1. 
6

the extent reflected in paragraph (9) of this Order. The Superior Court shall take 

any action it deems necessary to clarify or correct the sentence. Jurisdiction is not 

retained. 

 BY THE COURT: 

 /s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.

 Justice