[Cite as State v. Ealy, 2016-Ohio-7927.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

LICKING COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

 Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

 : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

-vs- : 

 : 

LARRY E. EALY : Case No. 16-CA-31 

 : 

 Defendant - Appellant : O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Licking County 

Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 

16CR35 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: November 21, 2016 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

BRYAN R. MOORE PAUL E. MORRISON 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 100 East Main Street 

20 S. Second Street, Fourth Floor Columbus, Ohio 43215 

Newark, Ohio 43055 
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-31 2 

Baldwin, J.

{¶1} Appellant Larry E. Ealy appeals a judgment of the Licking County Common 

Pleas Court convicting him of receiving stolen property (R.C. 2913.51(A)) and sentencing 

him to one year incarceration. Appellee is the State of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 

{¶2} On August 25, 2014, a salesman at Buckeye Ford met with a potential 

customer who identified himself as Clifford White, regarding the sale of a 2015 F-350 

pickup truck, valued at $65,000.00. While the truck was running, White asked the 

salesman to step to the other side of the vehicle to check something. White drove off in 

the truck, and the truck was reported stolen by the dealership. 

{¶3} On January 22, 2016, Trooper Jody Sawyers was running license plate 

checks on vehicles parked at a rest area along Interstate 70 in Licking Township. The 

license plate on the pickup truck in which appellant was seated came back as a stolen 

vehicle. The trooper questioned appellant as to how he came into possession of the 

truck. Appellant explained that he got the truck from his son, who purchased the truck 

not at an auction, but from a man he met at an auction. Appellant told Tpr. Sawyers that 

he acquired the truck in September or October of 2014. He told the trooper that he had 

been stopped by an officer in Alabama, and told the officer that they had a mechanic’s 

lien placed on the vehicle. The key appellant had for the vehicle did not have a fob, and 

did not appear to be the kind of key issued by Ford. The federal identification decal was 

removed from the driver’s side door panel, leaving the word “VOID” exposed in large, 

bright lettering. Further, the VIN number on the dash had been scratched. The officer 

confirmed that the VIN number under the windshield of the car matched the number on 
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-31 3 

the report of the stolen truck. Appellant could not produce a title for the truck. Appellant 

admitted to the trooper that it was “all adding up” that the vehicle had been stolen. 

{¶4} Appellant was placed under arrest for receiving stolen property. On the way 

to the police station, appellant told Tpr. Sawyers that he worked in a mechanic’s shop, 

and had worked on this truck in Alabama, where his son lives. He further stated that his 

sister, Ronda, was mailing him tags for the truck from Dayton. 

{¶5} Sergeant Timothy Root examined the vehicle at the impound lot. He noted 

that the public VIN, located on the driver’s side windshield, was intact with no evidence 

of tampering. However, the federal identification decal had been removed, evidenced by 

white “void” markers. Sgt. Root then interviewed appellant at the Licking County Justice 

Center. Appellant told the officer that his son, Lance, met an unknown person outside 

the venue of the Franklin Auto Auction. Lance agreed to purchase the vehicle for 

$26,000.00 and a Dodge Magnum. Later appellant stated that the Dodge Magnum was 

not part of the deal. His son did not have $26,000.00 in cash, but gave the man 

$16,000.00, and was to receive the title when he produced the remaining $10,000.00, 

which never occurred. Appellant said that he believed the person selling the truck was 

willing to sell it for a low price because there was possibly a lien on it, and it was going to 

be repossessed. Appellant said the truck was purchased in September or October, but 

the temporary tag issued for the vehicle to Ronda Baily, appellant’s sister, showed a bill 

of sale with a purchase date of January 10, 2016. Appellant told the officer that this was 

his second temporary tag; however, the officer did not find another tag issued to Ronda 

Bailey, and it would not have been possible to produce another bill of sale without a 

fictitious document being presented to the BMV for the first tag. 
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-31 4 

{¶6} Appellant was indicted on one count of receiving stolen property. Appellant 

filed a motion to suppress which was overruled. The case proceeded to bench trial, at 

which appellant represented himself. 

{¶7} Appellant testified at trial that his son left the vehicle with him in March of 

2015, at a church parking lot where appellant was involved in ministry and worked on 

cars. He testified that the vehicle sat until December 9, 2015. He testified that he ran a 

VIN check on it, which did not come back with a problem. He called his sister and told 

her he didn’t have a title on the truck, but wanted her to help him get 30-day plates. She 

was able to get a 45-day tag, and later a second tag, but was told that she would need to 

produce a title after that. Appellant did not dispute that the truck was stolen, but testified 

that he did not know that the truck was stolen until his arrest in the instant case. On crossexamination, appellant admitted that he received the truck when his son was picked up 

on a federal warrant in Georgia. 

{¶8} Following trial, the court found appellant guilty as charged. He was 

sentenced to one year incarceration. 

{¶9} Appellant was appointed counsel for his appeal to this Court. Counsel was 

permitted to withdraw on September 29, 2016, after the briefs were filed and oral 

argument was scheduled. The brief filed by counsel prior to his withdrawal raises three 

assignments of error: 

{¶10} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO UPHOLD APPELLANT’S 

RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNDER THE FOURTH 

AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, 

SECTION 14 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. 
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-31 5 

{¶11} “II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 

{¶12} “III. THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING OF GUILT IS AGAINST THE 

MANIFEST WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE AND IS A VIOLATION 

OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 5TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS OF THE 

U.S. CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.” 

I. 

{¶13} In his first assignment of error, appellant challenges the trial court’s ruling 

on his motion to suppress. However, in his argument in his brief, appellant concedes that 

the trial court did not err in overruling his motion to suppress based on the law and the 

evidence presented by the State at the suppression hearing. 

{¶14} Appellant’s first assignment of error is accordingly overruled. 

II. 

{¶15} Appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective. However, appellant 

represented himself at trial. The right to effective assistance of counsel necessarily 

presumes that the defendant has counsel; therefore, the law pertaining to effective 

assistance of counsel does not apply when the defendant exercises his right to selfrepresentation. State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27, 2002-Ohio-7017, 781 N.E.2d 72, ¶ 82 

(2002). 

{¶16} The second assignment of error is overruled. 

 
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-31 6 

III. 

{¶17} In his final assignment of error, appellant argues that the judgment 

convicting him of receiving stolen property is against the manifest weight and sufficiency 

of the evidence. He specifically argues that the State failed to prove venue, and that the 

court erred in finding that he had reason to believe the truck was stolen. He argues that 

he was unsophisticated in ways of title law, and the BMV issued tags for the vehicle 

without checking to see if it was stolen. He further argues that the trial court was biased 

against him due to his criminal history. 

{¶18} To determine whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, the appellate court reviews the entire record, weighs the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses, and determines whether in 

resolving conflicts in evidence the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a 

manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial 

ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997–Ohio–52, 678 N.E.2d 541, 

quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1983). 

{¶19} An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, 

paragraph two of the syllabus (1991). 

{¶20} Appellant was convicted of receiving stolen property in violation of R.C. 

2913.51(A), which states, “ No person shall receive, retain, or dispose of property of 
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-31 7 

another knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the property has been 

obtained through commission of a theft offense.” 

{¶21} The trial court made the following specific findings that appellant knew or 

had reasonable cause to believe that the truck was stolen: 

The question is did the State demonstrate the Defendant knew or 

having reasonable cause to believe that it had been obtained through the 

commission of a theft offense. 

Reasonable cause to believe is defined in determining whether the 

Defendant had reasonable cause to believe that the truck was obtained 

through the commission of a theft offense, you must put yourself in the 

position of this Defendant with his or her knowledge or lack of knowledge 

and under the circumstances and conditions that surround him at that time. 

You must consider the conduct of the persons involved and determine 

whether their acts and words and all the surrounding circumstances would 

have caused a person of ordinary prudence and care to believe that the 

truck had been obtained through the commission of a theft offense. 

The ordinary conditions involved here of that knowledge consisted of 

the truck didn't have a title, the sticker had been stripped, there was a bill of 

sale that was either shaky or false. When you call your sister and tell her to 

get plates on it with no bill of sale to her. You don't know who owned the car 

before or the real circumstances of how it came to be owned by the person 

who gave it to you who had just gone to prison. 
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-31 8 

It seems to me that a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence 

and care would believe that the car -- has reasonable cause to believe that 

the car had been obtained through the commission of a theft offense. 

Didn't take steps to clear the title. Don't have it. Didn't get it. Couldn't 

get it. On that basis, I'll enter a guilty finding here today. 

{¶22} Tr. 250-251. 

{¶23} The trial court’s findings are supported by the evidence presented through 

the testimony of Trooper Sawyers and Sgt. Root, and through appellant’s own testimony 

at trial. Although appellant argues he was unsophisticated in matters of title, he admitted 

to Sgt. Root that he had experience in salvaging vehicles. Sgt. Root testified that if 

appellant had gone through the salvage process to get a rebuilt title on a vehicle, a 

vehicle with the FID removed and “void” displayed would immediately be flagged, and he 

would have to show some level of documentation as to how the vehicle was purchased 

and why the label was removed. Tr. 142-143. Based on all the facts and circumstances 

surrounding appellant’s acquisition of the truck, the court’s finding that appellant should 

have had reasonable cause to believe the truck was stolen is not against the manifest 

weight or sufficiency of the evidence. 

{¶24} Finally, appellant argues that the State failed to prove venue in Licking 

County. R.C. 2901.12(C) provides, “When the offense involved the unlawful taking or 

receiving of property or the unlawful taking or enticing of another, the offender may be 

tried in any jurisdiction from which or into which the property or victim was taken, received, 

or enticed.” 
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-31 9 

{¶25} While venue is not an essential element of a charged offense, courts have 

required that venue be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt unless it is waived 

by the defendant. State v. Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 477, 453 N.E.2d 716 (1983). Venue 

need not be proven in express terms as long as it is established by all the facts and 

circumstances in the case. State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 82 N.E. 969, paragraph 

one of syllabus (1907). 

{¶26} Trooper Sawyers testified that he is based out of the Granville Post, and 

encountered appellant at a rest area on I-70 in Licking Township. Tr. 56-57. From this 

testimony, the trial court could conclude that the facts and circumstances establish venue 

in Licking County. 

{¶27} The third assignment of error is overruled. 

 
Licking County, Case No. 16-CA-31 10 

{¶28} The judgment of the Licking County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. 

Costs are assessed to appellant. 

By: Baldwin, J. 

Gwin, P.J. and 

Wise, J. concur.