REF ID:A59239 

Machine 

Offer Aid 

Unit 

With 

Personnel In ASAE 

Analytical Problems 

(euufieoesMal) 

When the first use of Electric Card Accounting Ma.chines in Signal Intelligence 

was made before World War II, few people 

believed that these machines would one day 

play a major part in the e:xpansion'of both 

the Army and the Armed Forces Security Agencies. 

As time progressed and new methods and 

procedures were developed, machine installation& were set up in all theatres 

during World War II by both the Army and 

Navy. Thie equipment played a major part 

in solving difficult problems that arose 

in a fraction of the time that it would 

require under manual systems. 

With the inception of the Armed Forces 

Security Agency after the war, a large 

part of the responsibility in accomplishing many objectives was placed in the 

ma.chine unit's hand. From that time until now the unit has grown rapidly until 

today it is one of the large sections in 

this headquarters. Mich new equipment 

has been addsl to the standard punched card 

line in order to meet changing conditions. 

The Army Security Agency has set up two 

field installations,one in the Pacific and 

one in Europe • Theatre level problems 

have been handled with tremendous saving 

of time and personnel. With machine and 

operational personnel working closely together, it has been possible to complete 

jobs in a fraction of the time required 

solely by manual means. 

The section has been able to keep abreast o~ recElltdevelopmeIDI in the new techniques 

in the IBM field, and, just as in the 

States, is served by IBM personnel. 

By having machine personnel conduct 

classes for the operational sections in 

all phases of machine accounting in order 

to familiarize operations with punched 

card principles, it has been possible for 

the operation sections to present problems 

of varying nature to the machine unit that 

may never have come to the fore otherwise. 

This has made it possible to reduce many 

July 1951 

large complicated jobs from a tedious manual system to mere routine through the expert use of punched card accounting machines. 

Different machines are styled for different tasks, but they all work on the same 

principle - a little card with oblong holes 

punched into it. Once the card is punched 

from the source document, it is possible 

to run various reports on an accumulative 

basis to achieve the desired results with 

no chance of the human error. 

Although the ma.chines keep a steady flow 

of reports and information flowing at all. 

times, they are so versatile tha..t it is 

possible to still find time to take on odd 

jobs for various unite in need of information such as personnel reports, tables 

of organization and equipment, classifications etc. 

The machine unit in ASA Europe extends 

an open invitation to all ASA Europe personnel to bring any problems they may have 

to them and to see if some plan cannot be 

worked out that would benefit all parties 

concerned. There are few specialized jobs 

that cannot be accomplished by the machine 

pereonnel,and it should be remembered that 

the more information an analyst has, the 

more opportunities he has of solving his 

problem. 

Typical IBM equipment: Alphabetic Key Punch 

5 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 01-30-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
ASA REVI:IM - July 1952, pp. eEU:F ID: A59239 

The War In The Ether 

THE SECOND HALF OF THE WAR IN THE EAST 

LATE 1915-1918 

~eouf1deut1ai) 

From September 1915 to the end of May 

1916 virtually nothing occurred in the 

east, operationally speaking. Then in 

June 1916 on the Auetro-Hunga.rian front 

the famous Brueilov offensive broke loose, 

just at the moment when the Austrians had 

committed all their available forces on 

the Italian front. Thie offensive was not 

quite unexpected by the Austrians, for the 

Austrian radio intercept service along 

with the Arendt service had picked up many 

indications of an impending large scale 

operation. In particular, there was a 

telegram. of the Russians sent on 3 June 

which betrayed to the Austrians the impending large scale attack. But in downright frivolous underestimation of the 

fighting strength of the Russians, the 

Austrians had taken the matter lightly and 

made almost no preparations to ward off 

the Russian attack. Thus Brusilov was 

able to penetrate deeply in the region of 

Lutskand particularly in the Bukovina before reenforcements led in from other sectors brougrt;the wavering front to a stand. 

The Austrian intelligence service had 

not at that time recognized fully the 

value of the Arendt service, and bad not 

organized the exploitation of the intercepted conversations, as it should have 

done. Moreover, the Austrian Army command 

bad turned its entire attention to the 

Italian front. In the central sector of 

the eastern front, which was held by German troops, the Russian attack bad no 

success for here the people had known how 

to make better and prompt use of the results of the intercept service. At that 

time all Russian arrangements from Army 

down to compS\Yorders bad been intercepted 

long before the beginn:hg of the offensive. 

The attacks met with a well-organized resistance. 

Even at the end of 1915 the Russians 

were still supplying plenty of material 

for the opposing intercept service. Only 

slowly did the recognition of the danger 

lurking in the careless use of technical 

means of communication begin to spread 

among them. Iate in 1915 one station of 

the Russian Fourth Army was ordered to 

monitor the work of its own stations. This 

was the first attempt noted to increase 

the security factor by monitoring their 

own radio discipline; at that time, however, it was already too late. 

In the spring of 1916 the Russians attempted a radio deception on the Austrian 

front, and this caused much amusement in 

tbaAustrian intercept service. To veil 

the withdrawal of two corps, they had 

several radio stations carry on deceptive 

traffic. Range reports that the Russians, 

innocent as children, announced this in 

advance in a radiogram. which was solved, 

naturally, by the Austrians. Moreover, 

they prefixed to every fake telegram an 

enciphered sentence with the following 

content: ''Do not be alarmed; this is just 

deception". This intermezzo was comfortlng to the Austrians, inasmuch as it showed that the Russians had no idea that 

their enciphered messages were being deciphered currently by the enemy. 

The Brusilov offensive was the last attempt by Czarist Russia to turn the fortunes of war in its own favor. With its 

expiration in September 1916 and with the 

Translated from original German materials by 

Dr. Ray W. Pettengill 

6 ASA Review 
outcome of the following campaign in Roumania, the war spirit in Russia had disappeared. Intercepted Russian telephone 

conversations revealed a rapid decline in 

fighting morale and a clear rise of revolutionary tendence. Over the tetephone 

men scolded openly about their officers, 

and talked about the eeneeleeeneee of prolonging the war. The though ts of the Rue - eian soldier turned more and more toward 

home rather than to the front and to the 

enemy. Even among the officer corps currents could be recognized which aimed at 

ending the war, since a military victory 

was no longer considered possible. Supply 

was inadequate; the ammunition situation 

was bad. Social tensions began to occupy 

more and more space in all conversations. 

Iu March 1917 the revolution broke out 

in Petersburg. Czar Nicholas II abdicated 

in the night of 15 - 16 March. The middle 

class democrats and the moderate socialists under Kereneki took power. In spite 

of the war weariness of the soldiers, they 

determined to continue the war. M:>nitoring of Russian internal traffic showed 

that a new wave of ene:rgy from above poured 

out over the c01mtry and the army. There 

was an attempt under national democratic 

watchwoldsto reenliven the military fighting spirit at the front. 

Very soon the intercept service learned 

that the Russian front was stabilizing 

itself anew, and was preparing for offensive battles. While the Germane were engaged in violent defensive battles in 

Flanders, and the Austrians stood at the 

Isonzo, the Russians under Brusilov, who 

had meanwhile become Commander-in-Chief of 

the entire Russian Army, attacked on l 

July 1917. The impending attack had long 

since been recognized by the German and 

Austrian intercept service. They had had 

ample time to prepare for it. The men at 

the instruments sat tense and listened to 

every conversation which referred to the 

attack and its execution. From Riga to 

Smorgon the storm broke before the German 

lines. Only in Galicia did the Russians 

have partial success. But in the counterthrust German and Austrian troops broke 

through the Russian lines near Tarnopol, 

and caused the entire Russian front to 

waver. All of Ea.st Galicia and Bukovina, 

which had been lost the year before, were 

again occupied. 

To complete the military collapse of 

Russia,on the left flank the German Eighth 

July 1952 

REF ID:A59239 

Army attacked.and took Riga on 3 September. 

The islands Oesel, M:>on, and Dagoe were 

occupied in October. 

Meanw~ile, the intercept service had 

learned of the complete break-down in morale of the Russian front. The former war 

weariness of the Russian soldiers had made 

way for a definite hostility toward war. 

The tens:kn between men and officers changed into open conflict. The social factor 

came into the foreground, sharp and clear. 

All conversations turned on the ending of 

the war and the readjustment of social 

problems. The~ talked only about capitalists and bourgeois as parties interested 

in the war; it was clearly to be felt that 

the war on the eastern front was virtually 

at an end. On 7 November the second revolution broke out in Petersburg. Kerenski was overthrown. The Bolshevists took 

over the government. Now propaganda radiograms and instructiCJJS from the new government went out all over the country by the 

dozen, and were heard by the German and 

Austrian intercept services as well. The 

major activity of these services was now 

turned from monitoring Russian military 

radio traffic to listening to Russian internal traffic. It was a question of gaining clarity regarding events in Russia. 

The military intercept service in the east 

had completed its assignment; now the 

political assignment stepped into the 

foreground. 

After the end of the First World War, 

General Hoffman, in hie book, "The War of 

Missed Opportunities," stated with regard 

to the intercept service that during the 

entire war in the east this service 

had supplied the German command currently 

with such complete information regarding 

the enemy that it was always fully informed regarding the situation on the enemy 

side. 

From Tannenberg to the end of the war 

the interception of Russian technical 

means of comml:1Ilications had given the German and Austrian command so many suggestions for the execution of their own ~easures that it is inconceivable to think 

through to the conclusion how the war in 

the east might have gone, if this means of 

intelligence had not been employed by the 

Central Powers, and if the Russians had 

not used their technical means of communications in such a careless manner. 

7 
REF ID:A59239 

LIFE Wl1N 1NE 352#0 COMM RECON COMPANY 

-- - - .... -- -

....... -

OP: Group LtoR; Col Greiner, 

Chief, .ASAPAC, Gen Duff, Lt Co 

ddy, and others • SCENE: Fron 

iew of company area of 352d, 

eou l. MEDDLE: Left, Rear vi 

f company area showing moto 

ool; Right, New outdoor -patio. 

O'l'l'OM: Party for south Korea 

hildren given by the personne 

f the 352d. Notice that th 

orean children are warmly clad 

some of them have their hand 

in their -pockets to bel-p kee 

arm. Since the -pictures wer 

taken the season has changed. 

8 

·. ~ • ;.-o-

-r· - -·- _..._ 

.:. 

ASA Review 

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