eclassified and a,RQrWed for r~l~.,se b_v 

SA on 05-14-20 ~rs~1:6'!?.i9 4 T 

3526 . . . 
MEMO ROUTING SLIP I 

3 

ORGANIZATION AN~ 

CIRCULATE 

COORDINATION 

FILE 

INFORMATION 

NECESSARY 

ACTION 

NOTE AND RETURN 

SEE ME 

SIGNATURE 

· QO FllRM 95 ReplaccsDA.AGOForm81l5,1Apr48,andA.FHQ alt-J.0-&8t8i-6 caPo * : I fEB tiO Form lllo lDNov a. wh.lcb maybe WMid. 

··~ ..... 1: .: ' . ·- . . ~ . 
~ .. ! .. ~.. 1-e ,. 

, r .. I • 
CRCULATE 

COORDINATION 

2 FILE 

INFORMATION 

3 NECESSARY 

AC?IOH 

NOTE AND 

RETURN 

4 SEE ME 

stGllATURE 

• 

tlll. FORM 9 5 Replaces D.~ AGO Form 805, l .Apr 48, a11d AFBQ oO-lG-f8487-4 GPO "It - I FEB 50 Funn 12.10 Nov '7• whlcll may tie used. 
' . 

1 ·"". :. r I ~ f" 

. I > 
REF ID:A664J_9 __ ~--~-· 

---OP SECRET 

S!Ctlf\1T'i IHFeR;,:ATIJU 

53--ZFi:/ 'S/k~~~ 

CANOE CJr1 s g b~ 

!:¥Ii MAR 1953 

DllORAHDUM l'Ja Hll .. o•GARI., Teclmical. Conaultant, su, 0 ... 2 .. 

.tooa 1400 •r Bulld1qi1 ABS 

SJBJEcta Ranson Baldwin Article 1n PebNU719Sl Iaau. ot USA 

Ccmbat Porns Jour.n&l 

1. l aa inclosina a cop;r ~ a report tram ISA-94 on the .wbject. 

I ban but two or three comment• tbenons 

•• I concur 1.n the coZJCl.us!.ons or the report. 

b. VJ.th raterence to par. n 1 ( e), I tbink 1 t a bl. t. tar-fetched 

w deduce an iaplicat.1.on that w •pouibl,y mounted a successtul e1'tort 

against Russlan coamwdcattons,• merel7 trom. tba statement bl" Baldwin 

that •f.be detlciencies ot much or t.bis 'hieh lent atu.tt•--vhi.ch caw 

tor 1D<ance the atrateaic n tw1:t!.on on the iu.asian front ••• ". 

o. W1th raterence to par .. II ;, the letter fl'l:.·m General Marshall 

to Oo'VVDOr DINVJ' ( 25 5eptamber 1944) • which vas gi.Ym wide publici v 

when General Manball vas forced t.o release it and vhiab vas pub- Uaba:l in the l.eport ot the Joint CorJgrealllona lDYoat.1.gat.1.on ot the 

At.tack. on Pearl Barbor,, ccmtains .tataents which certa1nl7 rsreal 

ftt'1' at.pi.Acant :lnforaatt.on reaarc!i.ni£ U.S. B\l:cessea qd.nst Germany 

in the OOMDIT t.leld dr.1ring World Var II. I appeni hereto a oop;r or 

t.bat letter am have aide-lined port.tons Qr interest in t.hLs counecttOD. 

t. I haYe not been wacesstul in finding 1n uur public l"eCord rarytbin& vbich dieclosee the OOMIIT 1ntomation revealed in t.be subject 

art.1.cle. at least. •fl regards the Bat.tJ.e or the Bulge.. Bv.t this does mt 

mean that there has 1-m no disclosure other than that c:onta.lned in the 

a\lbject art.tole. ODl;r a ft17 exha..ist1.va •earch .ould brine posi ti ft or 

11.eptt. •• 1ndicat1ou. 

J. a. The .tollov.lng 1s quoted from page VII o:t the l'orevord to 

'Dec era the tull. aecomt. ot the .Batt.le ot the •• by Robert E. 

•01.1t of it all cam n.n 1ong. detailed wlU11as descrlb.in& 

the kt.tle ot the Bulge. froa rq aot.es1 through a=ess to t.'lese { 

'I01.Ulll9• 11b.1.ch are aftilable in t.ba flar uepart.mnt. from. other 

.el.u.Uied doc1.11lenta nov available. and tmm papers llhich I 

bad colleoted during tbia wrk,, the tactwal basis ot this ator7 

1• ptband.• 

lt. .alt.bough the above-quoted extract appears to indicate tha.t 

tb9 t.LYe-vol,_, .td.etor7 o:t the Battle of tbe .8ulp 1n the files ot 

t.ba War l>epartment. contains o.Dl,y unclusif'ied intormattcm. it mq 

lie wortblri:d.le to acu these 'IOlumes to aake au!"e that there are no 

SE:CRET CANOE 
CANOE 

ref'erucea, ..,_ t.hi.D.17 Yed.l.ed ones .. to the part plqed in that 

Battle b;r 00.llillT • or .rather the lack ot it. 

la. Amiiher ari.1.cle on the Battle ot the Bul.&•.t al.so by Hanson Baldwin, 

9hich appeared in the •ew fork Sundaz Tims ·n~-~s December 1946. 

bu aleo betm exam1 ned &it I rrna DO ii? ere.aces WHI HT t.benin. 

S. In 'lq' optnlon, 1n aacuri tq bre•ches or t.b1e nature, •~ ot the 

burden or pioot of non-'Violatton abould be placed upon the aupected 

'Wiolator. I.a oUaer words, it Jd.ght be adY.1.eable ao1 warranted to ask the 

peraon at wbm the .t'.Ulger 1• po:l.n:tal in 1natmces ot t.bis kind w pl'Odul:• 

p.redousl.7 pubU.abltcl •terial or rel'erencea. 1D order to absolve biaselt 

ot reapone1bll1f'1' tor t.be initial aecur1t7 bruch tnvolYld. . . 

I Inclsz 

1. Pbotost.at copy or 

IS.l-9la. rpt,. '1'S Codeword. 

t. Cop7 aE !>eft7-Marshall ltr,, TS. 

111XLLIAM 1. flIEOOI 

Special All81atmt. 

TOP SEC~ET GANOE 
REF ID:A6647. :.::ANOE TOP SECREf 

SECURITY INF Of~Mf.TiCN 

Memorarldum tor: Mr. William Friedman, Technical Director, National Security 

Agency 

From : NSA-924 (i'hru Chamlels) 7~ Cf d ~ Subject : Report on Information of' Possible Ccmpromise of Uaited States 

CCMilfr Activity 

This report, submitted tor your consideration, represents the findings or 

one senior analyst who spent f'our ~s searching open sources & in consultations. 

It is patently impossible to search every available open source in this period 

of time 1 and to that extent this report is incomplete. However, the opinions 

of those individuals who were connected with the United States etf'ort against 

the World War II Germans 1 all ot who could not recollect arq previous:cy published. account or U.S. successes against the Germans, should be of' value 1n 

assessing this possible compranise. 

I. The Problem: _ .... 

In the February, 1953 issue of' the united States ArrJll Canbat Forces 

Journal, an article, ''Battlefield Intelligence", written by i8iilon N. 

Baldwin, makes reference to Ullited States Comrmin:S cations Intelligence 

activities. (Inclosure fl contains pertinent extracts) Research vas 

undertaken to determine 1f' these references represent a security breach, 

and if so, the extent af the security breach. 

II. Facts Bearing on the Problem: 

1. On the basis ot inf"ormation contained in the article, it :Ls 

thought that a foreign :Ln1el..ligence ~t c0'1ld deduce that: 

(a) A "low-level" {tactical COMIHr), am. a "high-level" {Magic) 

effort was mounted by the United States against German 

corrammicat:Lons • 

(b) 'Die "low-level" ef'tort was a responsibility of' lower echelons; 

the nMagic" ef'f'ort a responsibility at higher echelons. 

(c) Success was obtained by the United States in both fields. 

(d) Higher echelons closely guarded the flow of "Magic" to lower 

echelons. 

(~) The Ul11ted States possibly mounted a successful effort against 

Russian Communications, or German COlllllUnicat:Lons on the Russian 

front, or a combination ot both. 

U.S. OFF\C\ALS ONLY 

SECURITY INFOft;,;;) 1;crd 

.TOP SECRET CANOE 
·u.s. OFFICIALS ON~ REF ID:A6647. CANOE 

T-OP SECRET 

2. 'l'h1s 1nf'ormation, comb1ZJed with information a.bout "Magic" 

contained in the Proceedings ot the Pearl li&rbor Investigation, should 

enabl.e a foreign ana."cyst to determine the general level and character 

of the United States ceyptanal:ytic effort 868-'-nst the Germans in l~-45. 

3. If' the intelligence analyst of a foreign government had access 

to c~ured German ccyptographic mach:lnes, devices, and interrogations 

of German personnel, he should be abl.e to deduce more exactq the nature 

of U.S. successes with high-grade German ceyptographic systems. 

4. A search ot open sources such as newspapers, magazines, books, 

and World War II histories 1 thus far does not reveal any significant 

information rega.rdiDg United States successes against Get'1DBD1' in the 

COMI?f.r field during World W8:1° II. 

5. Qualified individuals intimateq acquainted with United States 

COMINJ? activity, particularly theef'f'ort aga:tnst the Germans,, were consulted regarding Mr. Baldwin's articl.e. ~se individuals,, Mr. Oliver 

Kirby, lEA-72, Dr. Carl P. Klltzke, DSA-7IB2, and Dr. Roy Johnson,, 

DSA-7IBJ.1 were of the op:l.nion that the rticle represented a considerabl.e 

compromise of United States COMIJ.11: activity which ranged frOlll "lllOd.erate" 

to "substantial." in importance. 

6. Dr. Roy Johnson, ISA-7IBl,stated that to the best of his 

ability to recollect, the term "Magic" was applied to reports issued 

from Washington and not in the European 'Bleater ot Operations. Such 

reports 1D1Q' have conta:l.ned high grade German material. Mr. Baldwin• s 

use of the term "Magic", could therefore stem from 1Df'ormation revealed 

in the Proceed1ngs at the Pearl Harbor Investigation. 

III. Conclusions: 

1. Mr. Hanson If. Baldwin's articl.e "Battl.efield Intelligence" 

conta:l.ns authentic references about United States COMI:Rr activity 

against the Germans which constitute a breach of security. 

2. The inq>ortance ot this breach is substantial when the 1ntorma.t1on 1n his article is studied in coajunction with previously published information about United States Communication Intelligence 

activities and successes and this must be assumed to be the case. 

Incl.: l 

U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY TOP SECRET: CANOE 
.. U.S.' OFFICIALS O~WInclosure fl SECURIT'r' INFORMATION 

UIU:J:ED STATES .ABMr 

COMBAT FORCES 

February 1953 

'!HE BA'rrLE OF TBE BULGE AS A CASE HISTORY 

....................... ·~ ............. . Radio deception tor some lmits was practiced extensively, and the SiXth 

Panzer Arrq -- the key unit upon which the success ot the offensive depended -- observed cauplete radio silence tor at least three weeks betore the start ot 

the operation. (page 33) • 

Perhaps most i111,POrtant at the "straw& in the v:lnd" was the interception 

and decoding ot a German message (by the J.2th A.rrq Gruup G2) about two weeks 

betore the attack, which ordered certain Luf'twatfe units to reconnoiter the 

Meuse River bridges. (page 35). 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

Another and more basic failure was the inadequacy of collection; we 

just did not get all. the f'a.cts that were available. There was a variety of 

reasODS tor this. 

In General Sibert 's words "we 118¥ have put too 1lll2Ch reliance on certa:tn 

technical types at intelligence, such as signal 1ntell1gence • • • and we 

had too little f's.1th in the benefits of' aggressive and unremitting patrolling 

by Combat troops. We had no substitute, either, tor aerial reconnaissance 

when the weather was bad; and when we came up to the Siegfried Line 1 our 

agents had great dif'f'iculty in getting through, particularly in the winter" • 

Dep~nce upon "Magic" 1 or a1gnal intercepts, was ma.1or 1 particularq 

at higher echelons; when the Germana maintained radio silence, our sources 

ot information vere about halved. (page 40). I • 

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

Higher echelon G2s, privy to a flow of inf'ormation f'rcm ''Magic" 1 Br1 tish 

Intelligence, oss, am. others, often incorporated so much in their reports 

that front-line combat units received a plethora of data, much at it at little 

use to them; the lower-level G2 had great d1tf'1culty in separating the cha.ff 

trom. the wheat. 

U.S. OFFICIAi_ S 0~'1.Y TOP SECRET CJO-..NOf! 

SEGURJTY INFORMATIOW 
. U.S. OFFICIALS lllLY 

Inclosure :/l=l 

- 2 - . The deficiencies ot much of this 11h1gb. l.eveJ. stu:tt'" -- which gave for 

instance the strategic situation on the Russian front, and described the 

psychol.ogy at the Rhineland.ers .. - is best illustrated in the ott:tciaJ. words 

of MaJor ~illpsborn (Summa.cy of Intelligence, 27 Mq lgi&.5): 

''While it is perha;ps an exaggeration, nevertheless there :ts a certain 

amount ot truth 1n the statement that while we knew to a nicety where bridges 1 

tords and brothels were located in towns aJ.l around us 1 we rarely 1 if ever ••• 

knew where the ene1Q''s anti-tank gun was s:tted. 11 

(pages 4<>..41). 

U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY TOP SECRET CANOE