J-S79028-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

KHALEEF MUMIN

Appellant No. 1960 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 25, 2011

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0012875-2009

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MOULTON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 21, 2016

Khaleef Mumin appeals from the July 25, 2011 judgment of sentence 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County following his 

jury trial convictions for attempted murder, aggravated assault, conspiracy 

to commit murder, carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a firearm 

on public streets in Philadelphia, and possessing an instrument of crime 

(“PIC”).1 We affirm.

The trial court set forth the following factual history:

This case has its roots in a bitter and violent rivalry 

between two Philadelphia street gangs known as the 

Lansdowne Avenue Gang (“LA Gang”) and the 59th and the 

Master Street Crew (“MS Crew”). This gang rivalry was 

apparently sparked by the 2005 murder of [Cornell] 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a), 2702(a)(1), 903, 6106(a)(1), 6108, and 

907(a), respectively.
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Drummond's cousin, a man known as "Peanut," by "Henry 

Snail," who was allegedly a member of the MS Crew. See

N.T. 2/16/11 at 30-31, 101-103; N.T. 2/17/11 at 196-98. 

In the ensuing years, this ongoing feud resulted in regular 

shootouts between the two gangs, as well as multiple 

killings. See N.T. 2/16/11 at 34; N.T. 2/17/11 at 196. 

On the afternoon of October 23, 2007, Drummond, who 

was an LA Gang member, was talking to an acquaintance 

on Redfield Street when he saw two men moving 

suspiciously in his direction, “ducking behind cars” as they 

came towards him. N.T. 2/16/11 at 34-39, 128; N.T. 

2/17/11 at 196. Convinced that “[these] niggas [were] 

trying to creep” him,1 Drummond went to a nearby alley to 

retrieve his Ruger .45 handgun which he routinely stashed 

there. N.T. 2/16/11 at 42. However, when Drummond 

reached the hiding spot, he remembered that earlier that 

day he had loaned it to “Little Dave,” a fellow LA Gang 

member. N.T. 2/16/11 at 39-42, 129-32. Drummond 

immediately called Little Dave, who told Drummond to 

come by his home near the corner of 60th and Media 

Streets to retrieve the gun. As Drummond approached 

that intersection, the same two suspicious men suddenly 

appeared again. They jumped out from behind a vehicle 

parked approximately a half car length ahead of him, both 

armed with handguns[.] Id. at 42-44, 132-33. 

Drummond immediately recognized the men as [Mumin] 

and co-defendant Tyrik Perez (“Perez”), who were 

members of the rival Master Street Crew gang. Id. at 26-

28, 42-44. As soon as the three men acknowledged each 

other, [Mumin] and co-defendant Perez began shooting at 

Drummond. Id. at 42-44, 132-33. Drummond tried to 

flee but was shot in his back/spine causing him to stumble 

and fall. Id. at 44-[4]5, 56-57, 133-34. [Mumin] 

remained near the corner, while codefendant Perez went 

over [to] Drummond, who was laying on the ground 

defenseless, and from a[] distance of approximately 18 

inches, pulled the trigger three more times. N.T. 2/16/11

at 46-48. Fortunately for Drummond, Perez’s gun jammed 

each time he pulled the trigger. [Mumin] and Perez then 

fled the scene leaving Drummond critically injured, but still 

alive. Id. at 48.

1 Meaning that they were trying to get the jump on 

Drummond in order to do him harm.
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Philadelphia police responded quickly to the shooting 

scene. N.T. 2/17/11 at 79. Police Officer Pamela Roberts, 

who was first to arrive on scene, repeatedly asked 

Drummond if he knew who had shot him. Drummond told 

her that “it was two black males with ski masks on,” and 

that “they finally got me.” N.T. 2/16/11 at 49-50; N.T. 

2/17/11 at 70-72. Drummond was then taken to the 

Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania (“HUP”) via 

ambulance. N.T. 2/16/11 at 52, 54.

Assigned Philadelphia Police Detective Ohmarr Jenkins 

went to HUP shortly thereafter and unsuccessfully 

attempted to get Drummond to cooperate with the 

investigation. As recounted by Detective Jenkins:

I began asking him, ‘What happened?’ At that time 

he was uncooperative. He did state, ‘They got me.’ 

He indicated it was some young boys from Master 

Street. I asked him who? He wouldn’t tell me who 

they were. I further asked him a description [of 

their] height, weight, race, what they were wearing, 

[et cetera,] and he was uncooperative.

N.T. 2/17/11 at 200. After his unsuccessful attempts to 

persuade Drummond to cooperate, Detective Jenkins left 

HUP and returned to the Southwest Detectives Division 

office at 55th and Pine Streets to continue his investigative 

efforts. N.T. 2/16/11 at 52-54; N.T. 2/17/11 at 200-201.

The following day, October 24, 2007, Detective Jenkins 

received an anonymous phone call from an individual who 

provided Detective Jenkins unspecified information about 

the Drummond shooting. N.T. 2/17/11 at 202-12. As a 

result of this information and additional investigative 

efforts, Detective Jenkins was able to create two photo 

arrays on October 29 and 30, 2007, one of which included 

[Mumin’s] photo, and the other which included a picture of 

co-defendant Perez. Id. at 212-14. Detective Jenkins 

returned to HUP a few days later and showed each of these 

photo arrays to Drummond, but Drummond did not 

identify any of the pictured individuals as being his 

assailants. Id. at 204.

Drummond remained hospitalized at HUP for roughly a 

month after the shooting. He was then transferred to 

Magee Rehabilitation Hospital, where he was treated for an 
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additional two months before being discharged and sent 

home. N.T. 2/16/11 at 54-55. Despite months of medical 

treatment, Drummond remains permanently paralyzed 

from the waist down and is unable to walk or move 

independently to this day. Id. at 55-56.

[According to Drummond, he] chose not to reveal the 

identities of his assailants because he wanted to “handle” 

the situation by killing [Mumin] and Perez himself. Id. at 

50, 54-55, 57, 134-35; N.T. 2/17/11 at 59. Before 

Drummond could get his revenge, however, he was 

arrested by federal agents and charged with various 

federal weapons and drug trafficking offenses. N.T. 

2/16/11 at 57-58, 111-13; N.T. 2/17/11 at 97-98, 113-15. 

Though he was initially granted bail regarding these 

charges, bail was later revoked, and Drummond was held 

in federal prison as he awaited trial. N.T. 2/16/11 at 112-

14.

In March 2009, while awaiting trial on the federal 

charges, Drummond participated in a proffer session with 

the Assistant United States Attorney [(“AUSA”)] handling

his case, as well as a number of federal law enforcement 

personnel. In exchange for consideration of a reduced 

sentence on the federal charges, Drummond agreed to 

provide information regarding criminal activity in the 60th 

and Lansdowne area, which had been the ongoing subject 

of an extensive investigation by [the] Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”). Id. at 58-60, 

113-15; N.T. 2/17/11 at 98-100. Towards the end of this 

proffer session, Drummond unexpectedly revealed that the 

[Mumin] and co-defendant Perez were the two assailants 

who had shot him on Oct. 23, 2007. Drummond 

volunteered this information despite the fact that this 

shooting was not the focus of the ongoing ATF 

investigation and that the federal authorities did not 

question him about it. N.T. 2/16/11 at 59-64; N.T. 

2/17/11 at 100-10, 117-18, 126-27. Drummond would 

later explain that he finally implicated [Mumin] and Perez 

because he:

just was tired of the game. Like, it wasn’t—first of 

all, I got two daughters that I care about [and] I 

take care of. So I knew somehow I had to get this 

behind me. I wasn’t going to take a chance at trying 
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to kill them and leave my daughters out here again. 

I just got tired, man. Like friends wasn’t friends. It 

was a waste of time to me.

N.T. 2/16/11 at 64 -65. The federal authorities conveyed 

Drummond’s revelation to the Philadelphia Police 

Department, which ultimately led to the respective arrests 

of [Mumin] and Perez on May 15, 2009 and May 19, 2009. 

N.T. 2/17/11 at 119-20, 130-31.

Thereafter, beginning on February 16, 2011 this Court 

presided over the jury trial of [Mumin] and co-defendant 

Perez’s for the shooting of Cornell Drummond. Over the 

next few days, the Commonwealth presented Drummond 

as its main witness, supplementing his testimony with that 

of Officer Roberts, ATF Agent Gary Malone,2 Detective 

Deayoung Park,3 Detective Jenkins, Detective Donald 

Liebsch,4 Officer James Balmer,5and Officer Kareem 

Johnson,6as well as various evidentiary materials via 

stipulation.

2 Agent Malone “initiated a federal investigation 

into individuals in the 60th and Lansdowne 

Avenue area” in 2007, was present at 

Drummond’s proffer sessions in 2009, and 

reached out to the Philadelphia Police Department 

after Drummond stated that he had been shot by 

Mumin and Perez. N.T. 2/17/11 at 97-131.

3 Detective Park, who was assigned to the 

Southwest Detective Division's Special 

Investigation Unit (“SDD SIU”) at the time of the 

Drummond shooting, was part of the team that 

investigated the crime scene and secured on-site 

evidence. See N.T. 2/17/11 at 133-48.

4 Detective Liebsch, who was also assigned to the 

SDD SIU at the time of the Drummond shooting, 

testified that he had been contacted by AUSA Fisk 

on an unspecified date. N.T. 2/18/11 at 17-21. 

This prompted Detective Liebsch to take a 

statement from Drummond, in which Drummond 

specifically stated that he had been shot by Perez 

and Mumin. Id. at 21-22. In addition, Liebsch 

showed Drummond two photo arrays, one which 

contained a picture of Mumin, and the other which 
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contained a picture of Perez, and asked 

Drummond to identify which ones were of his 

assailants; according to Liebsch, Drummond 

picked both of these pictures “immediately,” 

prompting Liebsch to prepare arrest warrants for 

both Mumin and Perez. Id. at 22-23.

5 Officer Balmer testified that he and three other 

PPD officers (Johnson, Long, and Stephan) pulled 

over a blue Buick near the intersection of 53rd 

and Pine Streets on October 24, 2007 (i.e. the 

day after the Drummond shooting), recounting

that they ordered the car’s three occupants to roll 

down their windows and unlock the vehicle’s door. 

N.T. 2/18/11 at 27-29. The occupants did not 

comply at first, but ultimately did as they were 

told, whereupon Officer Balmer opened one of the 

passenger doors and ordered Mumin, who was 

sitting in the Buick's back seat, to exit the vehicle. 

Officer Balmer then noticed that Mumin was trying 

to put something underneath the seat in front of 

him, which Officer Johnson retrieved and 

identified as a firearm, prompting Officer Balmer 

to attempt to place Mumin under arrest. Id. at 

30-31. Mumin then punched Officer Balmer in the 

face, which caused a dogpile as the officers 

sought to restrain Mumin on the rain-slicked 

sidewalk next to the Buick. Id. The recovered 

weapon was loaded with 13 live rounds, which 

Officer Balmer identified as .357 caliber. Id. at 

31-35.

6 Officer Johnson, who took part in the 

aforementioned October 24, 2007 arrest of 

Mumin, testified that he recovered a black Glock 

handgun from underneath the Buick’s passenger 

seat area near Mumin, and mentioned that Mumin 

had resisted arrest, stating that “a fight ensued 

and pretty much [Mumin] just was resisting the 

entire time. We [i.e. Johnson and his fellow 

officers] had a pretty tough time trying to get him 

down.” N.T. 2/18/11 at 37-39.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/1/16, at 1-5 (“1925(a) Op.”).
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On February 22, 2011, a jury found Mumin guilty of the 

aforementioned charges. On July 25, 2011, the trial court sentenced Mumin 

to 15 to 30 years’ incarceration on the attempted murder conviction; his 

convictions for aggravated assault and conspiracy merged, for sentencing 

purposes, with the attempted murder conviction. The trial court also 

sentenced Mumin to an aggregate term of 31⁄2 to 7 years’ incarceration on 

the two firearms convictions, to run concurrently with the attempted murder 

conviction. On the PIC conviction, the trial court imposed no further penalty. 

Mumin did not file a direct appeal but filed a PCRA petition on August 

21, 2012. The trial court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA 

petition on February 10, 2014, seeking reinstatement of Mumin’s postsentence and appellate rights nunc pro tunc. The PCRA court reinstated 

Mumin’s appellate rights on May 27, 2015, and Mumin filed a timely notice 

of appeal on June 25, 2015. 

Mumin raises the following issues on appeal:2

1. Is [Mumin] entitled to an arrest on all charges, as the 

verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence?

____________________________________________

2

In his Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) statement, 

Mumin also asserted that the trial court’s jury instruction on attempted 

murder “was unclear that the verdict had to be attempted first degree 

murder and was unclear as to whether [Mumin] had to have a shared, 

specific intent to kill if the jury found that he was not the shooter.” 

Statement of Matters Complained of Pursuant to Rule of Appellate Procedure 

1925(b), at 2 (“1925(b) Stmt.”). However, Mumin failed to raise or address 

this issue in his brief. Therefore, it is waived. See Pa. R. App. P. 2116, 

2119.
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2. Is [Mumin] entitled to a new trial on all charges where the 

weight of the evidence does not support the verdict?

3. Is [Mumin] entitled to a new trial as the result of Court 

error, where the Court permitted evidence of a weapon 

owned by [Mumin], but where the Commonwealth could 

not demonstrate that it was the weapon in question, or 

[that Mumin] possessed [it] during the crime?

Mumin’s Br. at 3.3

First, Mumin claims that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient 

evidence to support his attempted murder and conspiracy convictions. 

Mumin argues that the evidence showed only that he waited by the corner of 

60th and Media Streets while Perez approached Drummond and attempted 

to kill him and that he fled after hearing the sound of gunshots. Mumin’s Br. 

at 10-11. According to Mumin, the evidence failed to show that he had a 

specific intent to kill Drummond, as “mere presence at the scene of an 

offense is not good enough for a conviction.” Id. at 11. Mumin also 

challenges his conspiracy conviction, arguing that the evidence showed only 

that Mumin and Perez were in the same place at the same time. Id. at 12-

13. 

This Court’s standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims is 

well settled:

We must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, 

and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when 

____________________________________________

3 This Court granted the Commonwealth an extension of time to file its 

brief. Despite this extension, as of the date of this memorandum, the 

Commonwealth has not submitted a brief.
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viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as 

verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Where there is sufficient evidence to enable the 

trier of fact to find every element of the crime has been 

established beyond a reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of 

the evidence claim must fail.

The evidence established at trial need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented. It is 

not within the province of this Court to re-weigh the 

evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. The Commonwealth’s burden may be met by 

wholly circumstantial evidence and any doubt about the 

defendant's guilt is to be resolved by the fact[-]finder 

unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a 

matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the 

combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 141 A.3d 523, 525 (Pa.Super. 2016) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Tarrach, 42 A.3d 342, 345 (Pa.Super. 2012)).

“A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific 

crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the 

commission of that crime.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a). To establish attempted 

murder, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant took “a 

substantial step towards the commission of a killing, with the specific intent 

in mind to commit such an act . . .” In re R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 678 

(Pa.Super. 2008). The Commonwealth may establish a mens rea of specific 

intent to kill solely through circumstantial evidence. Id. Further, “[t]he use 

of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body is sufficient to establish the 

specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1009 (Pa. 

2007).
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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth 

as the verdict winner, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to 

support Mumin’s attempted murder conviction. Drummond testified that 

Mumin and Perez stalked Drummond together, hiding behind cars until they 

reached the corner of 60th and Media Streets and called out to him. When 

Mumin and Perez were half-a-car length away from Drummond, Drummond 

saw both men holding black handguns, and Perez began to fire. When Perez 

fired, Drummond fled. When Drummond looked back, he saw both Mumin 

and Perez firing large, black handguns. Drummond also identified Mumin 

and Perez at his federal proffer session and in court. The evidence further 

showed that Mumin had access to similar firearms, as he attempted to hide 

a black handgun from the police during a traffic stop the next day. The 

evidence established not only that Mumin was present at the scene but also 

that he fired at Drummond.4

“A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person . . . to commit a 

crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he . . . 

agrees with such other person . . . that they or one or more of them will 

____________________________________________

4 Mumin also raises, in passing, a sufficiency challenge to his 

aggravated assault conviction, arguing that he “should not have been 

convicted of aggravated assault and all for the very same reasons” that he 

should not have been convicted of attempted murder. Mumin’s Br. at 12. 

We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Mumin’s aggravated 

assault conviction for the much the same reasons that it was sufficient to 

sustain his attempted murder conviction.
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engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation 

to commit such crime . . .” 18 Pa.C.S. § 903. Thus, to sustain a conspiracy 

conviction, the Commonwealth must prove “(1) an intent to commit or aid in 

an unlawful act, (2) an agreement with a co-conspirator[,] and (3) an overt 

act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 756 A.2d 

1139, 1162 (Pa. 2000). “Because it is difficult to prove an explicit or formal 

agreement to commit an unlawful act, such an act may be proved 

inferentially by circumstantial evidence, i.e., the relations, conduct or 

circumstances of the parties or overt acts on the part of the coconspirators.” Id.

We conclude that the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain 

Mumin’s conspiracy conviction. Drummond testified that Mumin and Perez 

moved together down the street to “prey” on Drummond and that Mumin 

joined Perez in shooting at Drummond after he ran. Mumin and Perez acted 

in concert, both by moving together from car to car before the shooting and 

by firing at Drummond 15 to 20 times. That Mumin then stood on the 

corner while Perez moved in to shoot Drummond in close proximity does not 

alter Mumin’s prior actions. The Commonwealth was not required to prove 

an express verbal or written agreement between Mumin and Perez; their 

actions and the surrounding circumstances were sufficient to show intent, 

agreement, and an overt act.

Mumin next alleges that the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence. Mumin asserts, as in his sufficiency argument, that he was merely 
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present at the scene of the crime, the Commonwealth presented no evidence 

of an agreement between Mumin and Perez, and Mumin did not assist Perez 

in attempting to kill Drummond. Mumin’s Br. at 14-15. However, Mumin 

failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. Pennsylvania Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 607 sets forth the requirements for preserving a weight 

of the evidence challenge:

(A) A claim that the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence shall be raised with the trial judge in a motion for

a new trial:

(1) orally, on the record, at any time before sentencing;

(2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or

(3) in a post-sentence motion.

Pa. R. Crim. P. 607(A). The certified record establishes that Mumin did not 

file a motion with the trial court challenging the weight of the evidence.5 

Although Mumin raised the weight issue in his 1925(b) statement, and the 

trial court addressed it, we are unable to review it. See Commonwealth v. 

Thompson, 93 A.3d 478, 490-91 (Pa.Super. 2014) (declining to review 

____________________________________________

5

In his PCRA petition, Mumin asked the PCRA court to reinstate both 

his post-sentence and appellate rights nunc pro tunc. However, the PCRA 

court’s order only granted reinstatement of Mumin’s appellate rights. 

Regardless, the record reflects that Mumin filed no motion challenging the 

weight of the evidence, even after the PCRA court reinstated Mumin’s 

appellate rights.
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weight challenge where appellant failed to raise issue, even though trial 

court addressed it in its opinion).6

Mumin’s final challenge is to the admission of evidence that he 

possessed a semiautomatic handgun subsequent to the charged offenses to 

prove that Mumin had access to weapons similar to the one drawn on and 

fired at Drummond. Specifically, Mumin asserts that the trial court erred in 

failing to conduct a Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403 balancing test to 

determine whether the evidence’s probative value “was outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice.” Mumin’s Br. at 16.7

Mumin first argues that the court erred in failing to conduct the Rule 

403 balancing test on the record. Id. However, because Mumin did not 

____________________________________________

6 Even if Mumin had preserved this challenge, he would not be entitled 

to relief. As discussed in connection with his sufficiency claim, the record 

contains ample evidence of both conspiracy and attempt. We agree with the 

trial court that Mumin’s “claim[] regarding weight . . . of the evidence [is] 

without merit.” 1925(a) Op. at 9.

7

In its opinion, the trial court recommended that we find that Mumin 

waived this issue because he “failed to provide any legal grounds that this 

evidence was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative.” 1925(a) Op. 

at 9. However, at a minimum, Mumin’s Rule 1925(b) statement addresses a 

relevancy issue and a Rule 403 issue with respect to the handgun. See 

1925(b) Stmt. at 2. Further, the trial court meaningfully addressed this 

issue in its opinion. See 1925(a) Op. at 9-10. Therefore, our review has 

not been hindered, and we will address the issue on the merits. See

Commonwealth v. Smith, 955 A.2d 391, 393 (Pa.Super. 2008) (reaching 

merits of case where trial court’s opinion meaningfully addressed 

Commonwealth’s vague 1925(b) statement).
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raise this issue in his 1925(b) Statement, it is waived. See 

Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 308 (Pa. 1998).8

Alternatively, Mumin argues that the trial court should have precluded 

the evidence under Rule 403 because the probative value of the evidence 

paled in comparison to its prejudicial nature, considering the “political 

controversy over weapons” and that “the issue was not whether [Mumin] 

was an actual perpetrator of the shooting, but rather . . . whether he was a 

co-conspirator[,] whether he was an accomplice[,] and whether he shared a 

specific intent to kill.” Mumin’s Br. at 17. We disagree.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence that 

Mumin possessed a handgun the day after the shooting. See 

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 903 A.2d 1139, 1156 (Pa. 2006) (citation 

omitted) (“The admission of evidence is a matter committed to the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and the court’s evidentiary decisions will not be 

overturned absent an abuse of discretion”). The trial court allowed the 

evidence for a “limited purpose, that is, to show that Mumin had access to 

____________________________________________

8 Even if Mumin had preserved this claim for review, he cites no 

authority for the position that the trial court was required to place its Rule 

403 analysis on the record. Rather, “[w]e presume that trial courts know 

the law . . . .[and s]uch weighing and the general consideration of the 

admissibility of evidence is a discretionary ruling which trial courts routinely 

engage in mentally[,]” which does not require the trial court to “record [its] 

mental deliberations on the record.” Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 

657, 667 (Pa.), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 164 (2014).
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this type of weapon.” N.T. Motion, 2/14/11, at 12; see 1925(a) Op. at 10. 

It considered prior cases discussing the “similar weapon exception,” which 

allows the Commonwealth to present weapons not directly linked to the 

crime for the purpose of showing access, knowledge, familiarity, and 

preference for particular types of weapons. See 1925(a) Op. at 10. 

Further, the evidence showed that the shooters used large, black 

semiautomatic handguns that ejected fired cartridge casings,9and, when 

arrested the next day for a different offense, Mumin hid a black, 

semiautomatic handgun beneath the passenger seat of the car in which he 

was traveling. Further, the trial court considered the possible prejudice of 

evidence that Mumin possessed a handgun the day after the shooting in 

reaching its decision. See 1925(a) Op. at 10. Under these circumstances, 

the trial court properly admitted evidence regarding the recovered handgun. 

See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Broaster, 863 A.2d 588, 591 (Pa.Super. 

2004) (allowing Commonwealth to present handgun, which was not murder 

weapon, recovered three months later to “demonstrate [a]ppellant’s access 

to and preference for the same type of weapon . . . as used in [the]

murder”). 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

____________________________________________

9 According to Detective Park, the presence and pattern of fired 

cartridge casings at the scene indicated that at least one semiautomatic 

weapon was used. N.T., 2/17/11, at 136-37, 148-151.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/21/2016