REF ID:A62837 

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t"pproved for Release by NSA on 12-19-2013 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 
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REF ID:A62837 

IJmlODUC'l'IOD 'lO CRIPl'OLOGY • VI 

ytlUam P. Friedman 

'lb.1• lecture[ the sixth and last in this eertes!J deal.a with crntolo&y 1n 

the P!!'!od fl'al the end ot World war I to t.be end or World War II~~Uncl.asa1fied 

~~ ~~ !he empbuia(in th1a 1~]1• !le ccmntmic&t10t18 seour!!f 

(C<J.!SEC) not only because 1n the tiYe l!'!geding lectures the eg!laais 'WU 

@!Qed yerr l.Fpl;r BP conmm1cat1ona in¥11genc,e (C<>Wi'l) but al.ao because) 

<boush not u spectacular u CCJ1Ilfr, 1n the t1Dal anal.yaia)Ca4SEC is !'!8lll 

more Yital. to National Secur1!% than C<llilft • ...., ""- ')( ~ x >( >(_ x 

,.~ru.1 the l1Xth end t1Dal lecture 1n this series on the history of 

cryptol.ogy / \1Ul. 'h deYOted to a ;pnaentatS.an ot the evente and deYelopnenta ~ 

alp1ticaace Ol' 1D\por'tence 1n that h111'tor7 frCl:a tbe end:: at Wcrld war I to the 

end ot World Warn. 

It woal.d be entirel.7 too amb1t1ows a proJen eTm to attempt t. caa:preu 

within a lecture ot Oll1y 50 minutes all that ahoul.d or could be told in that 

/" segment ~ our hiator,r ~ crypto:Loq). ID a nutaheU, however, it can be said 

[ [ tbat the ..,...; atsnW.cant and 1-taat -ts and d~ 4»r1Dg th&'t 

i./ quarter ot a ce!ltury were d1rectl7 cOl)Cernad or cc:mnected nth the adTances made 

" 

t 

1n the product1cm ot more com,plex meeballical., electrical, and electronic 

c:ryptographlc appan.wa in Ol'deJ> to increaae or to tacUitate greater cryptosecunty 

4~~ C# ~own C191PtoccnnunScatiau; md/\ with the ccmcomitemt ad:nnces 1n the 

:gR'Oduction ot more •ophistieated meoban•oal, eleC'tr1cal alld el.ectranic crypte.na.1.ytic 

ammatua 1n 01."der to speed ~ or to make possible the ·~ut1cm ot enEq' 

canmun:!cationa produced b7 ~ their 1Mrie:eaintl.1' c~ex ~pbic mecldnea. 

Dleee two }ilaaea are i!lter-related because, to use a ;{ort at s1mpl.e analogy, 

02eyptograiii7 and ~is i-epresent the obverse e.ad :reveraa ft&ces of~ .a 

C.,...},. ,.,.. 

':" ; s1ng1.e coin/ .. Uld ~t waal.d. be nice it l could go into sane detail in regard to 

these 1Dcreas~ complex matters but aecUZ'1t7 conllideraUone pr:ievent 1111' doing 

As to adwneea in the developnent and uae of more oQ1IUlllex or more 

aol'histicated crntogn.:pbi.c apparatus I will only note at this point a comment 

~ .. ( ~ ....,- r "'., ·., '-'- '\\;>,~ ,.r which General Qaa.r Bradl.ey,K·makea in his quite but very interesting book entitl.ed 

I.: / \ I'\ 

A Soldier'• stoqt¥ 

'¥ Nev York: HerJl"y Holt and Co., 1951, page 474. 

- \. 
REF ID:A62837 

Sigaal Corpe otticera like to rem1nd us that "al.thaugb C<msre•• 

can make a general, it takes cammmications to Dike him a cll!ftMDC'Jer." 

It is~ to emend General Bradl.q's NlmZ'k but1his 1• how I wiab 

he had wordBd 1 t: 

Signal Corps otticers like to remind ua that "&1.thoagh Congreas 

can make a genft'al, it takes gid and H01JZ'e cnnnm1cat1ou to mke 

him & good CCllll'fUldar. " 

'l'his v.lll 1n tact be the k~ote ot thia lecture. ID other worda, 

cOl!lll\micattona sscur:tt.y, or CCNSEC, will be ita atn theme and the one I wish 

to emitiutze. 

But before ccrning to tbat part at 0\11" bistar;y pel'ha.ps a bit 1ll01"e attention 

must be devoted to even.ta. and' denloinents or ~1c •igntt1came or 

importance durillg the period lsn,8 to 1946. ~tar the moat epectacUl.a:r end 

lntereattng ot these a.re the one wb1ch were so ~ and d.1.9utroualy disclosed 

b7 the wrtoue :blVelltigat1ona conducted by the Anrr and Navy TflrY secretly 

Wile world WU II was still in progresa, and both secretly u4 ~ after 

the close ot h1stU1t1es. ihe iDTeatigaticma were intended to ucerta1n why' 

our A%'llf¥ and Navy forces in llava.11 were caugbt by JUr.Pl'ise by the sneak attack 

on Pearl. Hal"bor by the .rapanoe on the lllOl'A!Dg ot 1 December 1941. ~~ were 

also :lntended to ucerta1n and »in the blame on 'Whoevel" wu :reapcmaible tor the 

debacle. I doJl•t tb1Dk I should even attempt t.o give 3"01111f/ personal opinion 

on these camplex queatiou, which were atlJdiecl b7 seven dltterent boa:rde within 

the Serv!.ces and :r1ne117 by the Joint Congreasional Committee cm the Investigation 

ot the Pearl Barbor Attack. I aentioned the latter inYeStigatic:m 1D my tint 

lecture and now 'W':1ll add to what I then said. ~e eOllllittee began ita work 

early in September l.94-5 with aecret hearing8, but on 70 dqa aubsequent to 

15 November l.94-5 up to and including 31. MEq' 1945_,open heartngs were Cond'1Cted, 

1D the courae of which IClle 15 1000 pagea ~ teatiJl<my were taken and a total ~ 

' 183 exhibit• received 1De1dent to an examination of 43 witnes•ea. In J~ 1946 ,...., 

the canmittee put out a tiDal Re}!O!t ot 58o paaea ccmta1n1ng :lts f':!ntHnga, 

conclus10lU1 and recamnendationa. 1he Report wu acccmpanied by a •ct ot 39 

TOlumea of teat!moll7 and exhibita. 'Jhe ~was rea:u.y nQt a eingl.e Z'epOl't: 

there vu one by the MaJOrity (signed by s1x Democratic and tvo Republican 

members), and one by the Minority (signed by two Republican members). llle 

Minority Report was not near.17 as lcmg as that~ the MeJor1ty but it brought into 

focus certain troublesome points which still torm the aubJect of 8Cl'1Dlan1ous 

d.1scuaa1ona and la"1t1ngs by those who believe the attack was "enginee1"ed' by 

President Roosevelt, and tbat certain authonties in Washington vere u culpab1e 

as were certain camnanders 1n the Army and 1n the Navy 1n Havaii. 
REF ID:A62837 

For this lactuz-e, howsnr, it 1• an interesting tact that both the Ma.1orit7 

and Minari~ Repcn:-ta ecmta.ill glowing tributes to the role plqed 'b)" C<MIH'? i;,eto:re 

aDd 4ur1Dg our partieipatton 1n Worl.d War II.. In '111¥ tint lec:rtuft, (NBA 

_____ ____,_,~,_,r-,---.~---~~~~--~~-----~~~~~~~~~~----~---s-r-~~ ..... _.~ ... _ 

\~·~--- Although reference• to COIUNT &bOUJltl, in the Repon of th• Majority .... :~: ;:A 

a.a well u in the Report of" the Minority. there u-e also ~ reference• 

having to do with COMSEC in both Reports. a• nll M in the 39 eoeomp&n1'1ng 

volum.ea of' testilnoDy and exh1bita. SOlll• t.chnic&l Jld.aoon.ceptiou with regard to those subjects a.J"e ilhere, too, and I will only oOllaleJlt that it is 

quite oam:prehensiblo tha.t there should be ... o~ the part or la.~ 'but 

to encounter a. seioioue one in a book b;r an exparieuood high•lft'el cGlllRl.nder 

in World War II ia a bit di•ooaoezoting. Listen to thia paragrapi h• a 

w J"eceJXt book by one euch 0Cll'llB1!ldei-1 

r !rhe a.rguunt ha• been ad• that .... oould. not afford to let the 

Japanese know we had broktm. their cod•• But th.ii argument ap.imt a 

Pr••i.dentia.l ftrn1ng doe& not llold 11&.ter. I~ •• uot a. ._.. •'tta 

ot ha:rl:n,g broken a 1pMit'1o •ode 1 llha:t w hl.d done 'R.B to dmae 1. 

maohino whioh could bl9k ~ (a.uthw•• eapb&sis) oode prarided it was 

ted the right cC)lllbinat1 ... Jii our utr_.17 able and gifted crn-tographer•• 

tne JapaD.eaa kept ohuging tb.•11- code• throughout the war ~· ad 

,.. kept breaking thea a1-at b ·a. •tter f)f rouu.e. J · 

I don't know -.llere Gen.em Wed-.1er obtained hi1 Wor•:\ion about 

that wondwful ma.chine he Mnti.cm.a. I i:aagi!le that there are any other 

persons 'llho think there i• aoh & •chine beoa.u•• ot all they hear and see 

about those marvelous •ole..tt-oaic braiuti whieh are capable of per.toraing 

auch am.sing feat1 in solTing all kind• ot probleaa.. 1noludin& me.th.-.tical 

..,._ I daresay l 110JJ.'t bo 'WrOl!g iu auuming that any of you do iad"d 

wish there were such a maohiae Jill 'iat mentioned b7 General Wed~. Nobod)r 

doubt8' th.at eleotz.onic digital oomputera O&ll do lot11 ot thiJJ«I ilt omtologic 

re1earoh. and DlD1 1>9rsou cmt.ertah speculatiou a• to the rol• th.,. •7 

plt.J' _111. th•tl" po•11'blo appJ.1"8.1ricms 1n. 0QJJM•i!i011 with BU~ l'e•t!U'el\ ia" 

tutui-e -.rs. But let' a le&Te auoh apeoula.ti9Da, in'cereating aa th97 -.y be,. 

and continue with ov hinoey tit past applioatiaJl•• Leis'• first dispose ot come 

o0111H•ta in --the COMINT vn ot that history not only dJa. the nexrta precedi:Qg 

the Puzl Harbor 1.ttack, but al.co 4n th• \1'*••1 ailitaey. xaa:val and •ir op.. 

erat:lone 11hioh ensued in th• Paoific aa W9U •• 1n th• 'Eurepean !bMth•• 

Yw will recall that h ay first leotur• I called to your •ttaid.on. an 

-.,.tiole which appeared in -the 17 DecabeJ' 1945 iaaue of TDllS •gad.i1e• and 

which •s based upon a 1.-ttet ~~. ~e late Genenl Uar1hall wrou ~G~~ 

Dowey, Republican CQlldido.te .tw "'9d.4ent in the 1944 oampnign. Hen• a Miit' 1*• I 

-(__c:·,,, two priuoipal.-looke_d_a:_t_th-f_ ~-~~!1'· 1). In the lett;;, 'flhioh~-~'J'-:ll,f 

~The 79th CoDgreaa. 2Jld Seasion,, Senate Document Bo. 244• Waahingtoni The 

, .,.,;Gartn"ZlllJIJnt Printing Offlos, 19fS• P• 232. 

'V .Ibid, page SJ.4. 

~ -Wed-.eyer, Gq.eral Albert c. Wed..,., Reports, Ncnr Yorks Henry Holt and 

------------ c~, 1ssa. P• -l30. • 
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;~ --- REF ID: A62837 

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1 27 September 1944, and 1'1LS h&nd-cattied by Colonel Carter w. Clarke, a 

high•lovel officer in Ant:f G-2,, to GOTe:rnor Dewy, General ?Jarahall beggett 

the GOT9111or to say nothi.ng during tho oampaign a.bout a certain pioce of 

vory 'Vital intorma;t.on whioh had become known to the Gowrnor, it havitig 

'been "leaked" to him by P8*'Sana UDknawn and una.uthorized to disclose it .. 

The intonation dealt "With the tao'i that u. s. Government authoriti&s had" 

been reading Ja paneso ood&s and oiphe:re before the attack on Pearl Harbo:-. 

The points which Gn.eral Uarshall wanted to oOJlff)" were that not only wa.a 

_ the 11leaked" 1.nto:rma.tion true, 'but mQh Jl!Ore impo~t nre the fa.ota that. 

(l) the nr was still in progioesa1 (2) tho ~apaneae •re still using oertain. 

o~ the pre-Pearl Harbor cryptos,ystemai and (3) the u. s. Govenment •• still. 

reading h1ghly-ae<>Z"et Ja.paaeee massages in those synella, .aa 11'911 aa bighlys.ecret .-•sages 0£ other &nGJtW governments. 'fh~•• it 11a1 absoluteq 

.Y1ta1 that· Gowrnor Drny not use th• top seoret Woiim.tiOJl t.11 political 

amrmmition in hia ca.m.p&Jln• 

_ Atter merely glancing over the ti.rat _two ~phs ot the letter, 

GOTOrnor Dno7 handed 1~ back to Colonel Clarke irith the oamment that he did 

not wish to read ~ f\ttother-, whereupon there was nothing for Colonel. Clark• 

to do but return imnedia.tely to Washbagton. m,,~e• .s a photograph ot the Colonel (Fig. 2}. Jud,ging by tho 1oowl on his handsome oountem.noe I think it's 

poeaible that th• picture was taken when he got baok to h~• desk in the Pento.gon. Well. General lii11.rshall nado certain ch&ng•• 1n the opening tit igaphs 

or the lette:r and again Colou•l Clarke hand-carried it to the Governor, w!i.o 

then read the whole ot it. In llrli' tirat lecture I said \ih&t I might lo.tfitr 

giTO f'Urther extraota from. !llm1 • acoount of this ep:hode but th.er~ isn1 t ti.ma. 

G ..... ~-.. / Instead, howeTer, I •ve pu't the whole •ocount 1n an ~ppendix to the present 

leoture. The UU-llhal.1-Dn'ey oc;rrespondenoe is so important in cryptolog11' 

4 

G 

history tha.t I han deemed it useful. to put the whole ot it also in the Appendix. 

'l'he intorD&tion diaclosed during the various ottioial iu..eltiga.tions 

COlllft 

of the attack on Pee.rl Harbor. 110 tar as concerns the imporballt"aohie'ftiiidAts 

ot the .A:rsq and the lfa.TJ' before aiid after that attaok, ._. classified informa.tin ot the TW'J' high••" ••ourity le'ftl, and the disolosures wore therotor>e 

highly detrimsnta.l ;fJo oUP national seourity. th\ch ho.s been written about them 

sineo tho end of hostilities and <hough all that formerly top seoret inforJDation is naw in the piblio d01118.in, tortunatoly vary tew dotaila.. of tealmioal 

'JI- '"' ...... .)/~ "":...o:: . ...t ' 
REF ID:A62837 

atgaifioqoe or •lua oa.n be touad theri•in. llillt1 ud. ~ b1'"1lt atat--.ta 

abaltt tho great J"Olo pla.yed b1' COJG)lT .bl u. s. Id.lit....,... Dll.T&l and air operatiom ue found in books and a.rtioles published by u .. s. GOTG!'mll8Jlt ottictlh 

· · · · ·aud Azu.r:1can of1'icer1, as wll u \7 ottioer• ot th• b•ten Ja.panose. a.ran, 

• 

. 'J and Italian armed torces. flme a.t mg d1spon.l. permS.i;a oitiDg only .a.~- -.plea.'. 

b reguda disolosuree bJ u.s. G~t oft101al.1 and otfioer•• I oa.n 

begin with th011• of the lat• :vr. Cordell Bull, who •e S•oretar)- of State at 

the tbl& of the Pearl Harbor attack. In. h1s memoir a are ~ retcrenoes ( onr 

a. dozen •••) to the content• of 1ntoro•pt;ed and 1olnd Ja.~e•• Foroip.. 

Ottioe me11age1'il/ The la.te Ur. Henry L. S'tilUon, Secrsta.ry of WQ' at that time, 

makes olear reterenoH in hi• autob1ogJ;1aph7 to COMmT aucoe1ae1 and. our failUH 

to use then priOl" to th.a a.ttaok'fr" Dr. H•bert F•ia, who was Ur. Hull' a achisv 

-

on ~tional eocm.omio &ttaii"• f'rcm 1937 to 194S.a.and troa 194' to 1944 •s 

Ur. stimacm•a Speoia.l Couvltaut, haa a good deal to sat~ the ffi• pla.Jfd 

by "llagio" in & book WJ*ittm a• & mabv ot the Innitut. fOf> Advanced s~. 

ca.t-Prinoet~ Admiral Ki-1• oite ot tho two comand~• in Raa.ii ab'lllle time 

of" the a."ttack_, ill de.tendU. hblaelt in hie book, o1tea 1111.JV "Jlag1c"- u11agee. ~ 

And Uil..jOJ> Genoral Sherman Kiles, h•4 ot G-2 at the tiae of the a.tt&ok• ha.a 

much to say about ·"lfagion 1n u article published 1n 19'8~ As regards di•-

cloSUM• by .tormer en.mar ot'fioera, the .tollawing are ot fAl"ticul.v il:J.*enst 

becauae th•y c011cern the B&ttle of Jlida.y, which 1• ccna1dered the one tha:t 

turned the t1de of' war in tbs Paoii'ic i"rma a possible Jaiw.n•s• v1.otoey to om 

of ignam:lnloua deteat1 

•, . I 

"!;;A good bibliVS-phical 8urnJ' ot ii;maa ooncarniJ2& tho a.ttaok up to th• yea.r 

1965 will b& f'ound in the .follow1ng1 Yorton,. Louis. "Pearl Harbor in. Per.speot1n." 

u.~. Na'\'al Inttitute ProceedJt!§s, Vol. 81, no. 4• Whols No, 626, April 19561 pp.461-~ 

W The Jlemoirs Of Cordell Hull. )Ter YoJ"k1 Tho liloJlillaJl co., 1948• Vol. II, PP• 

998,1013, 10!s, 1os5, 1081:1, 1oao, 1061. iosa, 1074, 1011, 1os1. 1092• 1095, 

1096, 1099-1100. ,; 

\§/'Stimson, HOJU7 L., and lloGoorge Bundy. )u. AotiTe Ser'rioe iJl Pea.oe a.ud War. 

New York: Harpor & DJ"Others. l9-i7 • pp .. n.t:I, 4U:5. s 

'¥Fs1a, Herbert# The Raad to Pearl Harbor, Priaooton1 The Prb.cwtoa tmivel"aitJ' 

~9•• 1960, po rli, iid PP• 219-SIO, e•aill.. (SM index under "Magic" on p.Sso.) 

V Kf•el, liua'Daail E., Admin1 lt1-l' a Storz, Chioagor B91U"J' bgavJ co •• 1954. 

'4}/'1111ea, Sheran_, "Pes.rl Barbor !Ji Retroapoct," i'he A.tl;aPi• iio~ Vol. 182• 

no. 1, My 19!48, PP• $5-72. . 
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.......... ..:J.t...AdD!i~~ and hi• statt (;ig. 3J were ~ d1a1ourbed by 

~n~~ther and l>y lack ot int'orrmt.tion coneeming th~ doings 

Qt tbe en~, tb.f!7 ...... h&Ye been truly d.1~ had they known the 

actual enem;y situation. Poat- Ameri :ts make it clear that 

tJn1 ted sta; ot 

even b sorti 

-result of sane amaZing-- evements by Am can gence, e 

enezey- bed. succeeded 1n breaking the principal code then 1n use by the 

, .. ' ... · · Japanese Navy. In th1~ ~ the en~ vu ab1e to learn r:4 ~~ ,inten-

// tions al.most u quickly as we had dete:rm1Jled them ourselves-~ 

- -· ~ ~ '"'*" ~ ~ ~ - _ _l The distiJJgUished American Naval histpr1an, Professor S8muel .E. 

i Monson, characterized the victory of united sta1f!a f'orces at Mid'W.81' 

.---- ~ u ·-.,a Vlctofj ot !Dte:tUience. * Xii tbli '1\i1ieiilit the aut1iOi t\lili 

cancun, t~ it 111 bqond th• al.ighteat possibility ot doubt'tbat the 

ad'Vane• diacOTeJ7 ot the Japaneee plan to attack _. the t~t 

aibgl.e and :1medi&te cauae ot Ja:r;irm•e deteat. Viewed t1"Clll thtil Japaztese aide, this aucceae at the enemy*• intel.JJ.gence tnn8late8 itself 

into a t&ilure on our part • a tailure to take adequate preeaut10J'UI 

for gUard.1ng tbe aecrecJ' of Olli" pl.ana. lfad the leoM ~ OUl' intent 

to 1lmade Midwq betm concealed. 'With t.he .._. thorougbne.a u ti& pl.-

lP 

to attack Pearl Barbor, the outcome ot thie battle might vel.l. hl:Ye 

'beein different. ":Bllt it was a rtetory of Amm.can 1ntel.llsence in a much ~ bl"OadeJ' aenae tblm Juat tbi1. &tuall.7 u ~~ u the po•itive 

,r-(.,., • .--::.. ~·w--ta ~the •em.r's :lntel.Ugence on th1a occasion waa the / ~... negatively bad and 1Mtteative tunctioning at Japanue 1ntel.l1gence~ 

It 1a the aeccmd ~t above 'Which is ot a,peci&l 1ntereat t'.o ua at the 

mcnent, emd., 1n pe.rt1euJ.&r, the ponion which iteten to "the n,egatiTeJ.:1 bad 

and tttttect1ve f'urlct1on1Dg of Japanese intelligeDce." IJhe autbOJ' is, I 

think, a bit too aevere OD the Japanese 1nt.ell1ge:a.ee orsamu.t:ton. I sq 

. j tbU bacauae tbeir ~,were up age:!nst much mCd'e eoph1aticated 

~ 

J 

than they 4ztelUllt of, er were qlal.Uied to ao1Te. In fact, even 

1t the,- bad been extt'emety adapt~ c~ta it voaJA ha.Te bun ar DO 

avaU • u. s. hisb-level ccmmnm1eat1ou were pi'Otected. by~ ot 

"17 gre&t • .aecurlty. 

tis br1ngS us to a ))hue d crnrtoJ.ogy which 11 Cit higbeat 1ntportazlce • 

the pbaa& *ich d.ealil 'W1 th ccmnimicationa aecun tr, or CQISD:C, and I shall 

ecr.rr!ne myself' largely to ttB developaent and hi~cal b~ in our 

Armed Porces. Dle background is a Ver'r broad one beoauae S;t; ehou1d include 

the beck(Sra'.m.d ot the det'elopnenta of each ot tho t.bl"ee com;pune.uts c4 

CO!SEC, rl~, (1) C1";\'Ptosecurit)", (2) tx'anlmds11on oecur1ty, and (3) ~ic&l. 

eecrur1 ty ot or.fPtamater1&1A. But since time u Umited end bec&uae X think 

1'011WtJUli1bemo"~1o the- :phalses pertaining -to cr)'Ptoaecur1ty, I will 

cmtt i"ul"therr l'eterencea to the other two components, or to the h1atoz7 ot the~ 

deYeJ.o;cent. And even in lJm:ting the data to crn>to89Curit)r, I 'tdll. blNe 

oppwtimi ty 0111.1· to give acne or the h18'lJ.1gb:tr1 at the d.enl.opnent ot the 

items that caD,pJ."iM our present c~,, aattt1ng c=mmita on the 

histcli7 at the dentlopnent and. ~anent at our teclUdquee, procedures 

and practices, all of which era ~ impo'rtant. 

I lhall begin the lt01'7 'With a def'1n1tian which you will t1JJd 1n ~ 

__ gooa. Br&gl:brh d1ct1oMZ7, a definition at the vO%'d ".cc1d.ent". You w1ll get 

the point ot wat ~ •'811 'to J011 rlght now to be merel.7 ~ ot 1Q' 

'frequent d1tP!'e8siona from the mU.n 't.heme, but tt it be a. d1gZ'eas1on I thiilk 

:rou "W'1ll net~e:teBIJ find 1~ ~ 1ntel"est. ~e word "accident" in Webatei''s 

UDabrid.ged Diction&1:7 is detined as :toll.owe: 

-. ·=¥· ~ - - ' - •• ;._~ ,. c·~ 
REF ID:A62837 

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~ j.__. Literally• a. bofallingJ 

/ 

a. An enm:t that takes place without caie•a toresigb~ or expectationJ 

an ~tgned, audden, and unexpected/event. 

-· .... """ ..o.-~ ..... b. Bence, <irt_e,. an llftdeaigned and usitoreseen occunaoe ot en · 

affl.1ct1ve OJ' nntortunate cbaracterJ a Id.~ resulting in iDJ\l!'Y 

to a person or damage to a tbingj a cuual.tyj u, to d1e by an 

aceideat. 

I 

'!here a1"e further detin1tiona at the W01"d. but vhat I've given is sutficient 

far our purposes. But ~ detine the word? What bas it to do :with CCltSJ!X:? 

__ ~our parl1c1pat1on in World W&r II, the President ot the United 

states, accaipnied by JW11 at bis h.1gbeilt-leve1 mU1t&ry, naval and civilian 

aulitante, JOUl'l1e)"ed HYeral. time• b&U'-wq ~the world. He and. they 1 

Journeyed 1n aat:ety ... net'tber he nor tliey met vith an "accident". Here's a 

f~ .4 picture taken at the Casablanca Conference 1n Janlll.Z'Y' 1943. (Fig. 4). 

Jnagine the d.18Uter it would have been 1t the plane c~ tbie diat1ngu1shed. 

group had been shot down mid lost in the Atlantic or the Mediteri'aDe&n. On the ~. 

otber hand, 1n Apr1J. 1~3, Adm1ral Iaoroku Yamdtoto, Ccmnder 1n Chief' of the 

Canbined Fleet ot the Japaneae Imper1&1. Navy at&J'ted ou,t on what was to be Just 

an Ol'dizla.'ey inapection trip but ,p:crned out to be a one-~ trip for him. Hera' a 

.r~.S"' a. good picture of the AdmU'al (Fig. 5), who WILi the &%"Chit~t ot the at:tack 

1 ! 

an Peal Harbor. ms death wu mmounced 1i1 an ottic1al Japmese Nav;y 

commun:f.que/ stating that the Adm1reJ. "had niet a glorious 8l1d while directing 

operations in a ns:val e.ngagemimt against superior ~ forces. " But we know 

that this was aimpl.y not tru.e1 AdmSnJ. Yamamoto "met with an accident .. " But t;lane 

- br!gb.t person-I tbil>k it wu the late Jimmy W&lker, when Mqor ot New York Cit~ 

who Ba1d tbat "accidents don't Just bappen~•tbey a.re brought about. n J~ 

'Walker's canaent ~ true in this case at least: Adm11'el. TmDlmoto did not d.1e 

by accident,; he died becauae our Navy knew the schedule ot his tl'ip dCM1 to the very 

last detail so that it was poaa1bl.e to aet up an ambuab with high ~ ot 

success. Ben is the •tor.Y aa told 1D an 1.ntereet1ng 'M.Dl'er by neet Adm1"'1 

mu1am F. Bal.say, u~.s .. B., ill his book enttt.ted Adm1r&1. H&l!ey'a storz:l3 

' 

I returned. to Noumea in time to sit in on an operation tb&t 

w.e ..Uer but extremely grat1fyillg. 'lbe NaV7's code expert• bad 

hit a jack pot; the)' had discovered that .Adm1r&1. I101"'0ku Yallmoto, 

/JJhe Ccmmmder~:tn-Chiefi(>f the Imper1eJ. Jcr.i;anese Navy, was about to 

V1•1t the Solomons. 'In f'act, he was due to e.iT1.Vf! at B&J 1•1 e Ial.end, 

just south ~ :Bouga1nville, precisely at 0¢5 on A»rU 18. Yamamoto, 

WC> had concelTc and proposed the Pearl. Harbor attack, had al.so been 

wid~ quoted U 8'cy'iDg that he WU "l.oold.ng forward. to dictating 

peace 1n the White Bouse at Washington." I believe that thie statement as aubsequentl.y proyed a canard, but ms accepted its 

authentio1ty then, and it was an a4d1t1onal reason -ror h:la being 

No. 3 an 1lf1 private list of public enemies, c1osely tnJH.ng llirohito 

end Tojo. 

.. 
,f 

REF ID:A62837 

Rf.Chteen P-38 'a of the Alfq' • 339t-h Pightel' Sq'aa.dltarl, baaed at 

!leDdenal Field, were u1igDed to mte the irrt;eJleeption over Bu.in, 

35 mu.ea abort ~ Pall ale. Ymm.oto • • pJ.ene, a Betty, a.ccc•~pezd ed 

ey another Betty' ad c~ by aix Zekea, hOY9 in 91.&bt ~ on 

schedule, and Lt. Col.. 9lcm.a G. Lamphier, Jr.'I "1ve Cll it and lfhot 

it down 1Jl flaea. !J!>.e other Betty vu al.ao shot down 'for good 

~, plua one ot the Zekee ••• We bottled~ the st017, or couree .. cne obdoua teuon na that ve didn'" want the J~ to 1mov 't'.l:mt n: 

had bi-oken their code • ~ • untortunatel-7, sanebocl7 took the 

story to Austftl.1&, 11hence l't leaked into tM PLperll, a:ad no 

doubt fJV'em.tual.ly into Jape.it .... BUt the Zaps evidtmtl.1' 414 not 

realize the ~cation &'fS9" Jl\01"e then did t.he te.ttletal.eJ w 

cont1mu!d to bl'e8k theiJ:> eod.u. 

$iga1ficance and int~ to•· other authors, both American and Japmeae,..__c1te _ 

s111111 a.r 1il8tancea. [one Juanese author atated in catego?'1c&1. language tbat 

Japan was detested beoauae ot poor- CCl4SEC on the part or the Japmeae ~and 

good c~ on the iC"t ot the hnerican Navy J 

Bu.t lest )"OU get the im,preaa!on that ~ 1ntelligence egend.e• ba4 no 

sueceas at all 'With secret e(J!!ISl1ft1c&tiona of u. s. Armed Fcrces,, l.et me 'tell 

;you that thq d1d. !lave same wccese and 111 c8l'ta:1D :t.nstanaea, Vtn:7 a:tgnif'ieant 

succes$. '-he:re ie not t1Jne to go into this eaawat disappoint:f.ng or 

d.i~us!Oning statement but t can sq that as a general rule tbe e:ucceeeee 

wet'e attributable not to tecbntcal weaknell& in u. s. c~ but to 

tm.p:roper~ or 1nsuttic1ently t.ft.tned C17.Ptoo'&Pbio ele:rkl. I Jf!lq u well tell 

10U right new that thie weakness in cryptoc<StumcatiO'llS bu been true ~Ql- a 

~~CS> 

great man;r ~·, for centuJ'iea as a matter ot ta.ct, ~ u long ea the year , f\ 

l6os Plucis :Bacon, ~o 'Wl'Ote the firat treatise in F.bg,Ush on the aub~ect at 

c~, '1118de tho fol.lowing ttcmnt!l1;)~,~Jr/ 

~" Arte of ~, hath for Belative, en An of D!a~er­

~; by auppoa!tf.oiiiiiiiJilQfi1ia'ble; but, a& tb:lnga are ot great use. ~~ae that Cypbars were vel.l 'DPU'Jneged,, the:re bee Mul.tiWdet at ~which excl\Jde t.IJe I>.S.seY@erer. But in regade or the rawnesse 

and: unak1llf'ttlnes8 or the band.ea, ~ugh 'Which thq puse ~ t.he 

greatest Matter$, at"e ~ times oa.t"l')'ed in t.be ve&ke.it ClRh!!s. 

la1en el.ectrieal and pe.¥'ticul.U"ly radio tmnalld.aaion entered into the 

' 

~ 

" < 

<' 

ptcture.JIAditionBJ hazards to camnm1cat.1ona security had to be taken :1,Jato t.~ 

~~~w,.;~~· h>_/'1.~~~............&.. ~.&._ ~d.-~~!'.t &cccnmt-, 'butAfl'QI a~ ot the procedures used in the tra1'1emil81CC at ~8 

as well u tJian a study of the dil'ection and flow ot i'8d1o ua:ttic, the eall signs 
REF ID:A62837 .. ' 

. ot the tranaai\t!.ftg and Nae1'11ng et&tionfl, etc., aU w1tho'1\ IOl.Yillg 1ibe .. ' 

I 

c._imtcati.ODJJ, even if' tb&7 wre in cJ7,Ptio fOl'll. Follow1Dg are two ~JM \ 

extracted 1'rClll a" docUrDeDt entitled Geiman Operatio:aal, prte111pre'-, publhheB. 

I 

1D .ADtU 1946 by 1ibe aeiwm. MU1te3.7 Doc'Ument Section, a Cmb1necl Bi"1t1ah1.: 

CanM1an, aftd. u. s. staff': 

~~· , S1gnaJ 111tell.1genee (L_e., caamsaat10D8 .tntelJ.1genae or C<Jlilfl) ~~ 

~ 

_ ..-- --~-a ~ef' s~e of_~~~on~~~ ~, tbe s1gn&l. ~ httelJ.Sgence aft"11ce- waa vel.l.•organized ·W1t.b well.-d.e:fiDed ~, , ~ ~ etticifjft,t penormel.,, and aclequate equipnent. In i:M cOUNe ot the _ 

~¢..- cupip, it vas reorganlzed t.o exploit to tmt tulle.is the aucoua a.1.fta41' 

aJ;Jer!enced, and.., 'b7' J.943, there ex!ated a oc:iliQ!llrte and ~ 

,, 

f ·'-· functioning mchiae sutt1c1erat to meet au d"DMde. (P. 8) 

~ +" .:;: * -ff-

/ 

I' 

I ' 

'• ' ,,.. ', 

' ' ' I 

I 

' 

Moat ot their •1gnal ~ept aucceu came :r.ca low echel.Oll 

tn.m•., A:naOftd ad &l"t1Uey HMo nets :puatiag opentional. tmtttc 

wee toll.owed w~ am wee one ot ~ chio:t soarees at &1gDA1. 

~. A2'tW.eJ7 l'edio ~ wzre 11...- :tint coverage p.r.tor!'t7. 

A:IJQt tzCll .. 1ages mtel'Qepted 1il code er 1ll ol_., atgnal procedll1'8, 

pecuiai"1tiea at trezuanitt!iw, ema. chafteteristiee of Allied ndlo 

opetaton prot'ided -enQlimotJa aenstwe in hd.ping to eveJ.uate at-1 

in:tOl'SllStton. IJhe ~ notieeA tha'\ call aigna were ~ the llJtl& 

'Ear a unit OYer long periods and 1ih.n wen h'equenaie9 ~ mcbanged tor weeks at a time. (p. 8) 

A great J!llZQ' "O"P'l(pleat at :lnteziaepted messages ot tact1c&l content ue 

cited in th& &tONlll!it,1cned d.ocument, v!d.ch 18 ~ete vith intalllaticm ot ~ 

deep ~n ~ai1ihougb tbe dOO'Umellt \188 ~ UdUecl wt~ the lowelt 

iH1a'@iiry claQ1ficat1on t.hen 1a uae (u. s. "ReatrtQ'tecl"; Brt~ 

"FOR ar.ncIAL USE ONLY".•1)/ I v18h t.hei'e were t1- to quote at greater length I -

fl'<lll tld.• uae1"u1. brochure. 

Cce1!18 cU.rec~ now to the biator:y ot the dfMtl.QllDeDt of <1t1I' cr.yptcmatenaie , 

themMJ.vea, I hardJ.Y need reiteftr.te What vu po1.Jlted OU't 1D previous leet\Jzle& u 

to t.he protcnmd ettect Of the advance& 1n the 1e1eaoe wia. 8l"'t ot el.ectrical .. 

cedl1mad.c&ticmai in the 20th Cent:u:ey. 1!loae advance• had a d.1l'eet etteot·-i.ipon 

Jdd.:11tal'T ccrimml!dc&t1ona and an 1D41rect ettect upon m111tt.17 ctl'1Ptol0&7' .. 

ir.act-oper&ted ciphftlil ea141 ~ coura'~ codebooka became a1moft obsolete because 

the need taz pteate'l' l!lzad ~~ speed ot ~pb1c Opa'aUOD8 became I 

I 

' obvtoua 1n crd.er to •tch u much u' poasible the TeJ!7 s:reat ~· m 

. the speed at ccwmmteationa bzto'Q8ht a.bO\Jt b7 1nTentiOQ and. 11up?ro"Rlller.lta 1n 

elec1:ric v1re and rad!o-tel.esaJ:lbY~ The Med tar ~»b.1c ap1*1"8:tua e.nd 

' 

1 llll!SebS110 t.h11a ~ soon 'becDe quite obV1oua,,. but it took quite ~ t1-.e to I ~· 

,/ 

/ aatiat.Y that need in a mvmer tba't aoulcl be CClllidered to gift adflllU&te security 

tor mtlita.17 OQID1micaticma. 

'lhe hi•tol7 Of the invention and deyelopment ot oryptograpb1c dw:t.cea, 

ac!dMa and aeaoe1ated appe.n.tua and materi&l. 1• long and ~e\Ug. 

Let U8 begin vith a rJ~ of the earu.t. item. ot importanae 1n that history. \ 

\ 

.. 

\ 

\. 

·~ 

\ 
,. 

f"<'i ~ t / 

{I-Lt ('f 

I I 

lb 

REF ID:A62837 

tliitil the adVent at e1eetroido cipher machines moat cr:r.{Jtograpbic appantus 

8JJd devices weJ."e built upon or U'cnmd concentric circul.a:r' rotatmg membere liUCb 

ae cipher 'Wheels, cipher d1eks, etc.. A very early, perhapa the earl199t picture 

ot 8UCh 11 device appears in a ~tise by an I+.a;l 1an cryptol.ogf.9t namd Alberti J\ 

'Who~ Tre.ttat1 in Cif'm 'W8.$ vritten 1n Bame about 1470. It is tlle oldest tract 

an ~pby the world now poueaaea. Here's a ]ilhoto at Alberti• a d1ak 

{Fig. 6), wt I wantt take the time to expla1D it exoept to aq tbat t,he digits 

1, 2, 3, 4 were used to encipher code groups 8llid. to cell your attenticm to the 

fact that the 1etten ot the cii;iler or MV'Ol.ving alphabet were :f.n mixed order. 

I'D. Porta.'s book, first pu.b.Uehed 1n 1563 1n Napl.ea, then appear ~eral 

~ipher disks; 1n the eeJ!l:I wich was given me as a gUt ey Colonel Fab.Yan ,,_they 

are still :ln work111g con41tion. Here is a picture of one ot them (!'ig. 7). 

In this 'Veft1on the device uses ~ols as c1phw characten. And apparentJ.y 

nobody th<>usht up anyt.bing much better ,tor a long, l.c.tig t1m&. It aeema, in 

- -

tact, that not only did nobody tb!nk up anytbiDg new or even same inq)rovememta 

cm 'the or1g1Da.l .A:Lberti or~ disks but those who 414 &JQ' tb:!nk1ng at all. on 

the subject merely ":ltrVented" or "n·invented" the Ame thing again, and that 

- hf~ed repeatedly in succeseive genere.tiona. For wtance, iD Lecture No. IV 

μ 

of this smea YoU vee lhown a pictlJN ~the c1lh• d18k "invmted" b7 Major 

Alber M;rei-1 the f'il"•t Chief S1gnal otfioer ot the U. S. Artq, who obtained a 

patent on hi• :tnvention in 1865. Here• e a picture ot the l,19.tentacl disk 

(Fig. 8) and ~ exp1Jmat1on ot the invention (Fig. 9). You may also ~ 

~ that s:lgnal'Jlleft o£ the Conf'ederate Signal. Corps mecbsm.zed the old Vigenere 

Square and put 1 t out in the tom of a cylinder (see Figs.; 13, l.4 &md 15 ot 

Lecture No. IV). ~e cipher disk used by the Signal Corps of the u. s. Arm:! 

during the decade l.910 to l.~O, that is, during the pm>iod 1ncl.ud1Dg our 

a..rpart1c1pation a.a a belligerent in World War I, waa nothing but 'White celluloid 

\\7·~~_.:t:" i/l>-

w.r:taticm of the or1g1n&l. Albei-tiA-diak ot t.he vinta.ge at 1470 (except tba1; it 

was even .siJDpler then its progenitor, because 1n the latter the ciitier 

alphabets »rodUCed wre mixed alphabets whereas, in the Signal Corps disk, the 

,r,- ~.i 

u-~.~t:>; 

cipb~ alpbabets BN s~e re'l'ereed stenda1"d sequences. We all know tbat it 

" generaJJ.:v take• a pretty long time to get a patent through the u. s. Patent 

Otticei, but 1:n: i-. the ancient dence was patented 1D 1$24 bys. B. Huntington 

{Fig. ll). Here you can aee a great 1.tqprovement over the S1gnal COJ"Pa version-

& blank 1Si added to both sequences 10 that the space between words could be 

ene:ti;ibered. Indicattm ~ word spac,1 a.a YUll have learned, is a :tatal. weakness 

\ 

I, 

\ 

\ 

' 
.-' If( 

/ 

I 

I 

I 

REF ID:A62837 

tt seen 111 the ci»ber text; in the Buntington clevic:e the spaces between word.a 

wuld be~ but the cipher text would have space si~e, &tthougb. thq 

ID 

• the mmtingtcm device, the 8J*Ce 111.gna in the cipher text Wllld be a b'-t 

m.aieaa1ns but nbt t.o an ex:p«d.enced ~' vbo voul.d •con Jle&U.~ that 

- c;+ ' 

the,y do not actlaal.1.1' ~ ~" in the pla1n text. A . 

It 1a :l.nt.ereat1.ng to note that in 1936, dlJli.ns the dl\T8 when the GonBn 

Na1klnal Soc:!aJista were tuned aa ci oipnization 111 Auatrta, the Nazis UM4 

thi8 van.a:ttcm. ot the old d1ak-1t had l.O disita on both tbe outer ed. the inner 

sequences tor enciphering digita {Fig. 12). -"••"-:;J:>"" r t .[.,.. I 

- '.&e ~t aigntticant ~ement on the old cil'bel' d18k wa that made by 

~ l8b~,~k 

Sir Charles Whea.tnone,/\ wbe-. botme be!ele 18" ilmmted. a cipher derice Wich - - _ ........ ~ 

he called n:he ~· lie deacgbed it in a "l'Ol.urne ~tled !1'he Scientific 

-1a19 

zaperp ot ssr Clw"les 'Wheatstone; publiehc" b7 the Ibya1ca1 Society ot ·~· 

--~·""' i{.Jl,. '\ 

Kel"e ill a picture at ~tlltone' device , .., t &a 1a iq private collect1on 

ft " 

(Fig. J.3). What Sir Cha:rl.ee di4 wa.a to make the outer cil'c1e ot letters - .. ~ r .- ---='--""----· 

1 

' (~or the plain text) cai;>riae the 26 letters of the Alphabet, plue one adtitional. 

,1 

I charactw to :te,P%etent "apiae." ~e inner circle, ~or cipher equivalent•, 

conta.1.n8 on:b' the 26 letters ot the ~ m1d theee can be di~ 1n 

a nd.x«l ef:q11tmee. Two hands,, like the hour and minute handa or a clock, were 

PJ'OV'ided and tbey are und• control. or a difte.rential gear mec:han11m, so that 

when the long or "Ji1mtte ham" is ad'Va!lced to make a caJg\lete cll'mlS.t ot the 

ietten an the oute::f' c1rcle t.be abort or "hOU1' band n advaneeG one space or 

segment on tb.e inner eUCJ.e. In Fig. 13, far ~e, the pla111-text 1etter 

G .. 1a rep:reeented by-itbe cipher l.etter A, that is, <Ip = ~· It the long hand 

1a nov a4'9anced iD a cl.ockw1ee direction !for one ~utiOl11 Gp will be 

repreaemted no l.CftSR 'b1' Ac 'bUt by Ge 1 tbe letter immediately to the Y'18bt or 

Ac on the 1nner c11'Cl.e. In enciphentent the .long hand 1a &l:waye maved u the 

same direction (cl.ockv1se, tar example) and its a~ :ls placed auceeniTely 

over tbe l.etters on t.he outer cil"cle accOl'ding to t.be eucceaaiva letten ot 

the pla1n-text message, the cipher equivalents being :recOl"ded. by hand to correapand 

with tha letten to Wich the short band point. on eat2h eneilJhement. In th1a 

way, identical 1etters a£ the plain text v1ll be l'&'pl'ellented by d1tterent 

- end varying ~· 111 the cipher text, depending upon how iDmey' NYol.utiona of 

r 

the long hand 1ntevene between the f'int and SU'baequent appe81'8DCea ot the same 

" plain-~ letter. ~, with the alphabets shown 1n Fig. 13, and with the 

initia.l setting ~ = A\: 1 the vord "ref~e" vould be repl'esented 1n cipher 

as follow: 
./ 

REF ID:A62837 

RB., Ell E 11 c El~in which it w11l. be ... that ~tecl lnten :Ul the ]iL1.a1n text 

X Z Z Z E G Q A MJ 11'9 Mpl"UClte4 by dittwent lfttera 1n the c1itier- ~ cornspcmdenta must ~ 86Nft \tp02l ~ att.xed alphabet u.1.S. 111 the v 

c1fcle and the :.t..itial. poait1cma ot the tvo bu4a at tbe begtnnine; ot the 

ea.otpheftlent at a Masage. In dee!pheaent, the operator ,_., the long b*1d 

e.a*in cl.ockw1se, until. the hour hand pointe ~ the cipheil" l~ ill th~ plA!n•t«&t . ----

letter "Which 1• seen ~ the aperture at the- end or tbe long band. on the outer 

cil'cJ.e. 1lhul, tn the ~ ·~ the exaapl.e as.ve11 above the ciJ;h- ietten 

./ -- XZAABaQAM wW. be :round to ftgftaeat the vOl'd ,-l!!Hil\,~~ / 

DLll'"1Dg World ~ I, acm ~ in 19171 the BrS.tUb AntY' ftllCUiltated 

Vhatstone•a c~ and ~wed it both mecbaftSoall11md Ql7ptosnpb1naJly. 

f.{\l' \~ Bel'e'e & netute or the deYtce (rig. 14,,) h'l *1• it wUl. be •• th&'\ then 

a:re 1lOW no longer the "nd.Jmte• and "llcnJr" baWI• bUt a •:t.ngl.a ~ v.ltll an 

operdJ:tg or 1t'1z2d.ov -t t111ultaneoua:Ly d:1.scloaee both the .pl&.1a and the c!pb_. 

1~111t ill••... WherJ. the 4'!Jlgl.e band. 18 turned,, the imi• cUcle of 

segments, vhich are made ot a aubatanee upon. 1itlioh letta:ra JD&1 ~ 11.ti'tten 1n 

ll_ 

' pel\CU or $ll f.n1t 18 sdWnced eco~ and 41Pinst A 8'nUar~-Md.e outer 

cUel,e ~ •eaments• In tbi• implo'vemnt on the ar.t~nal Whee.~ device 

both Mq.Uened t4 l.etteP ~ now lldxecl ~~ Mftldng tha outw <:U.Ue 

&1.eo a Jdxed sequeace a&1ed a CODl1derable ~fir security to~ oiphel". 

When 1t 1la8 ~ tha't au the Al.lied aftd.ell ~ thi• dwioe f~ tiel.4 

~~cation.I and. 1.ta •eout"lV Md been ~ b1 Br1ti11h, Ftelleb~~-

&Dd Allllrican er,ptologieta (both at GHQ-All' *Dd. at ~on) a opp:ortmdty to 

ae;ret or lli~e 'W'ltb the ••eelfr.tllmt ~ 1shea& ~Vil.I givtn M 

Wile $'b1U at ru.~. I vu abl.e to show tbat 'the mod1.f1ftd Wb.eststcJne 

~ ws atill Wtltticient:b' aeoun ~<# mil!~ pur.poan fD1. tha dmaes, 

thoueana•~ Wich w. beea ammutaotured ana. inued, were v.ttbdJ&vn. tt you tare' 

Ud;eeated ill the~ ot IOluttm I uaed you vUl. find it m :MTet'bank 

P\.lblic:&'t10ll lfo. 20, entitled Se'le1'el. MMh'ne C1J!h!!! .ana Metho4a for thell' 

SolutioaJ ~191f}). A bettc- method of soJ.uttan 'VU devised by me a~ ' . 1~3. 

SOJlle ~later, ad at.moat by ehew good fmmie, I leeaed 'tb&t a 

oipb.- •ab'ne -. tn the mueum ot email town m e~ mmi 

...:; 

Rmten. I wu 1nte1'elt.ed and 1t1JtOte 1oo the curator aE the llUHmll, i-eque1Jttng 

tbat be lend the 4w1cl' for a aban period. to • al pr1ncipal ~ ct 

t'he WIL1"' De1,1artment. lnes;;\11e tQ' utcn11abmmit and pl..,_.. Wm1 I unpacked the 

," 

bQ'X u,pon its ftCfi1pt end f'ound a device, beautU'ul.17 mad$ and e:ncaaed iti a ttne. / 
REF ID:A62837 - - t 

rt-"')l~,J·1:~-·~~I !1th iU iJmmtor'a Dime, Dec1U w.dewarth, ml the datll,l.~17,1 .... J 

engrave« on i;he face or tbe Jlll.Cb1ne, whiCh "WU nothing but $.!lOtber Ters1on ot 

#, .... the 'Wheatstoa.e eryptognph. Here's a picture 'ot it. (Fig. 15).. 'fhAIN a.re good I 1q, \') - I 

JleUOn.S to·~ tbat ~model vu made bl' Eli Whitney. Mechani~ it~ 

«imflq to the :Britiab. m:od:1:tica~ exc~ tb&t iihe outer ~e W 33 

ch8nctere, the :lJmer 26, ao th&'t tbe ~ geu" ~ r# operating on 

the at1o o:J!-27 to 26 was now on the ratio 33 to 26. 'lhua;Cclonal Dl!lciua ~) 

who wae th-.· the fi:ret Ch11!tf ot Oidnance ot the: U. s .. kns:f, bad arzt1cipated 

Wb.eatdtcme by ~ 6o ~· m th18 irrnmt1Cll. Jie aiao anticipated the Bl'iti-1i ~Wd..f:·\~ WM 

/u:rJri' ~ltffiby a wbOl• ceniur, in their mcdtticat1on ot Wheatstone'• 

A \ 

'· 

arlgf.Dal, beeause in the wadnorth dence, too, th.ere .. only one hand. and both \ '\ '\ 

alphabets eould be -.de mixed sequence•. Th1* i• "nlf'1 el.early eh.own- 1n Pig.. 16 

_ u-:regud,e iii tb.e outer sequenee, and I believe the mner one cou:Ld. al.so be 

~ but the piature does not cl~ly abov th1$ to be me caae, so that 

I e iio.t ll'.Jl'8 es to this point. I retumed the dev'ice a goacS. !'llmY yee.n '180 Md 

it 1• now an di~ in the Eli Whitney Roan ot the l'few B&Yen Jii1-tonoaJ. Soetet,-'s 

Die next dB'lic.e I bring to your attention u ahow. 1n Fig. lT, a device 

1nvented by a F1"ench ~ ~aerrtat, C<mnandant Buer.tea, wo tor acme l.O 

years· ~ but unaucces~ tried to aet the ftaCh Am.r to ~ 1t. 

Re mcl.Uded. a deilcriptiOZl ot '.b:t.a device, W1ch he cal.l.ttd h1a "~Jh• 

-Cyl.indrtqueti ar "cr,yptograpbio eyl.ind.er," in a book publlabed in J.901 1n Parta.l.5 

\ 

' ' 

Re had, howeve1"1 ~OUSlY deecr1b~ hia de'lice in 811 artiele ent1.tled "c:eyptograpbe 

}. 20 rend.el lea-&1.phabett (25 J.etttes par a1pbabet)," publUhad ~-J.891~§.r' In 

this deV'ice there 1e a central sbatt on which can be mounted. 20 numbel'ed. 418ka 011 

the p&1'1.pher.1•• of which are ditteren~ m1Xed alphabets Of 25 l.etters eaah. 'lhe 

er.v A~ ~,lt~llif.:it-h;v.e:,ru;~ ~t> c:.c:...-£e.~~-~ 

diiks can be aaaembled ill 90Jlllt ~or ke:y aequence"am then lock~ into 

c:.. positica(Oi'L the e.hatt by puabtng 1n the loOld.llg 41sk at the extreme l~. ~ 

fir8t 20 lettera at tl1e plain text ar a menage are 1'1Nt aligned., as seen 1n fig .. l.7 

, 

(JE SUIS ~ = "I am 1ndec1.phent.ble"); the di*1ta are then locked into 

~ poaitlon~ao that the wole uaem'bly can be "tutbed,J ,and.•1 as cipher text one ~ seJ.eet 

any cae ot the othe:r 24 l'OW8 ot l.ettfnos > whloh ee 19COS'd.ed then by band on paper 

\ 
It~ 

REF ID:A62837 

./ \ 

~ the uxt 20 pla!Jt-telft 1~ are aligned, one ot th& otbv ~li. l'OV8 at 1etten 

1el.cted ml l'GCotded, fate. !o dec!ph• a ~ >1ib.e dUlal ba1q betltt Usabl.ed 

on th• lhe.ft. m accOSdamo wt.th the ~ or ~q MqUettee 1one t.a.kea the 

~ 20 CS.Jher letten, aligns; at'l4. then~ them fJito poli.tion m th6°cled•e;; and. 

thelt t\ll"llS the whole ~' ·~ tor a .-av ot l.etterl 'Whicb :toa 

~text. !htre will l>* one atld ~ cme web row, and the ~teft 

letterlJ are ZoeOol'd.ecL 1!1t!n the aext 20 letten at ctitier aft aligned, ete, 

.Anotlber ~ eieypto:Logiat, tbe Marqu1iJ dt Viar.ta, aoan .ehowed bov 

Jltellagea ~ by ..... ar the Buer:loa c~ ctphet' cOUld be etftd.17 

MaYbe isbn 1B ~ ·Eazer:t• --·~ too •\lOt'f..iul m h:ta ~ to set 'the 

bencb A'l!tq_to actopt hi• amce. But 1n the~· s .. then ll8r(t ~ llOAe 

vho encountwea eitner W&t l!Uel'i•• or de~ wrote an the aubc1eet. Capt. 

~ ll1t't, u. s. ~, llhom J: have JlleDtietied i,n a previous l~, in 1915 

~ a dMce 'taled qMm. the llazeriu ·~pte 'but not 1n the f'Ol'JI at disks-

-mOmstecl "Jell. c~ ~. ?.nltead 1ot dllkS~· mtt•81 deWice WJed al.id.1Jlg 

str.tp ..a her. a a P1ctu!'e at hi• ft1'Y t~ din (Fig .. J.6), which he _ II rl 

/'f'./-

ptellented: to mt same t1- in 1923 61' l.~4. E!Jii:'lll). M X ·1eazned about 

/\ 

hU defiete some t1a iil 1917 "1lUe st11l at B1Y81'1*2k, ad tol.Yed one 6ball.enge 

menage P1t ~by~· ~t'b, a m.verbaftk guut tor a d!Q'. In meeting the 

cb&U~ ~ ('dlich bl:oaglxt a 'bcct ot chocolate• faf! Mrs. ~ ~ 

Mn. Bi-) X didn't uae ~like what I odUld.. or ndsbt bave l.ea11D:std 

',,,~ 

~,, 

I 

\ 

\ - ::. 

\ 

\ 

\ 
REF ID:A62837 

from c1e vi.z.1a, because at that time I hadn't yet come across the de Viaria 

book. I solved the massage b;y guessing the ke7 Mrs. Hitt employed to &1'1'allge 

her strip alphabets. She wasn't Vise to tbe qairks ot inexperienced ceyptograpbic 

clerks; 8be ued RIVEEmAmC IAB'.>RA'IORIES as the key, juet u I suspected she 

-~ ~ 

vould. The device she bro\lght with her was an 1mproved m:>del: the alphabets 

were on iaper strips and the latter were glued to strips of wood, as seen in Fig. 19.-

1 capt. Hitt brought his device to tile attention of tbe then Majer Mauborgne, 

vbom I have also mentioned in a previous lecture and vbo vu then on duty 1n the 

Office of the Chief Sipal. Officer in Washi.JJgton. '?here is some question as to 

whether 1 t wu Jli tt who first brOUght his de'Yice to Mauborgne' s attention; Ma\lborgne 

later told me that he had indep!ndently conceived the ilm!ntion and, moreover, 

bad~ a model usi.ns disks instead of stripe. I have that mod.al, a p-esent from .... _ - - -

General. Mav.borgne many J1!ara later. It 1e made or very heavy brass diska on the 

peripheries of Yhich be bad eDgraved the letters of his own s1_:1ec1&lly-dertsed 

alphabets. In 19191 a.fter 'fll3' return to Riverbank trom m:J' service in the AEF, 

~ sent Riverbank the beg1nn1ngs (the first 25 letters) of a set of 25 

\ 

messages encipbered 'b7 hi• aey1.ce and al:pbabets. Be also sent the &8me data to I 

Major Yardl.ey, in G-2. llo~ ~ 110lved the me1aages, even atter a good deal 

of work end even after Maugorpe told u that two consecutive worda in one of the 

olllJilenge maaseges were the words "are you." ~;years later I f'cnmd tbe reason 

-

tor our -complete laek of success, vben I came acroas the plain texts ot thoae 

\ 

messagea in a dUsty old ~ile~in one ot the rooms occupied in the o1d Mlm1 tionfJ 

Building by the ottice of Chief SigDal. Otticer. Bere is a picture of the beginnings 

' 

of the first eixe messages (Fig. 20). Mauborgne 1 when I chided h1m :lJl the 

( 

unfairness ot his cballeJJge mesaagee, to1d me that be had not prepared them himsel:t--

be had an underlJ.JJg fMaJor Fowler was his mme 1 I atill remember it!} prepared them. 

In our struggles to so1ve tbe challenge messages we bad aa8\1111ed that they WO\lld 

contain the u.aua1 sorts~ vords found as~1n1tial vord.8 ot mllitary messages. 

It was the complete failure by Riverbank: and G-2 to solve the cbal.le1lge messages ,. 

tbat indllced Mauborgne to go ahead w1 th the developneut of hie dertce.. It 

culminated 1l1 what beceme known as Cipher Device, T,ype M-94. Here is a picture 

f\ ~l-l of it (Fig. 21). That device vu stemdardi~d and used :for at least 10 years d.n 

the U. S. by the knr3, the Navy 1 the Marine COrps, the Coast a,.ard, the Intelligence " ~.> ,, , 

Agencies of the 'l're8Sll1"7 De:pa.rtment, and perhaps by other maenci••· 

\~ 
/ 

REF ID:A62837 

In 19221 a var-time cou.eaeue, the late Capt. Jolm M. Manly (Prof. and Bead 

o~ the ~ Of E!Jillsb at the Un1~1ty of Ch:l.cago) brovght to 'at:/ ot~ ~f.\G'Gl ... 

attenti01l e. itiotoe'tat ot a hol.Osi'alilic 1D811W1Cl'ipt 1D. the l.aTge cou.ction of 

A ~~ ti . ~ ;;;; -' · 4'-'- ~1' M:~--~~ ' 

Jetter110D hp!!• in the Li'bre.17 ot Cotigreas. a" eeMlste~ ~t 11. We ~· entitled 

"The Wheel cntier" and bere is a picture of tbe second pp (Fig. 22) shoving 

Jetteracn'• b881• for caJ.culating tbe number ot pe:zmutation• attoraa4 'bJ' the aet of 

36 vheela 01' hia device.. fh 41cb;•t attempt to lll&k$ tbe tmltipU.cation; be didn •t 

ba've an electJ'ODic di&ital compster .... for the total msmber ia aatroncmd.cal in size. 

Jetteraon anticipated Jazeriea b7 over a centur)", and the Ritt .. Maborgne conbin&tion 

-~ a.tmo.t a centW7 ad a bal:t. 

r ' 

It soon became anarent to both Arart and N&Vf ceyptologiets th&t a great 

iDcftue in cryptoaecur1t7 would be obtained 1f tbe alphabets ot tbe M-94 device 

coal4 be made variam1r Wtead ot 1.uva.rl.ant. 1'he?'e began efforts ill both services 

to ~wlop a pn;ctical 1nstrument baleci upon this pc1.nc1ple. I p •t take time 

~~~~~ -~ show all these deV'elopamta but ~ the f'1n&l. form of,... tJM;. Arm.v~_s~1p' Cipher 

De'rie<! ~ 1 M.-l3S...A (Fig. 23). 'l'hie f'orm U88d an ah:iad.mn bUe Urto Vhicb 

w',1(. ~verha.-..A_,..,.,,~ ed..ge$ ~ ,. ' 

clwmele/\ were..., rib to hold eard.board strips ot &lpb&bf:ts vb1cb coUld be\ slid 

easiJ.7 Within the- Q-J:emlela. It may 'be ~ interest to you to learn tbat after I 

I 

ba4 g1 ven up in rq atteDQJta to ~ind a firm Wiob would or coUld make such 

&1.Ulllimlm grooved devices 1n ·qaamtit7, ML-a. Fr1e&mm, by wmanly viles end cajoleey 

on bebaJt' of her own grou,p ill tbe u. s. Coast OL1ard ncceeded in inducillg or 

enticing one firm t.o make tba tor ber. And that's haw the first models of 

strip ci}'her device• ma4e at a.l't1Dd mm b7 the extruioD P"OC6•• came &bo1lt 1 and how 

tbe v. s. Arlq, 'b7 a&ainistrati'Ve cooprat1on on arf, 111ter .. Service level and 

tedmical coop!l'&tioD on a mant&l leYel1t'ound it practical to develOl' and produce 

1D 'q_U811'tit7 its strip Cipher Device, Type N-138-A.. This waa used from 1935 to 

l~l or 1942 by t1'm Arm:!, tbe· lfavy, the MariJ1e Corps, the Coast Guard, et al, 

l~~ inelud1J2g the state l)e~. It vas used u a 'back·'llJ> system even a:rte:r tbe Arma: f\ ~ 

Sel"Vicea u well as the Deprtment ot state 'beg&ll employing much better and Dl>re 

sophisticated ci»}le:r mac~s ot high speed aml security. 

'l'hua far ve bave been dealing Vith cipher devices of the so-cal.led "hand· 

opera.teal" tne. Nm2e of them can readil.3' be considered u be~ "machines," that 

i~ &Pl*l"&tus employ1rig mechanically-ariven me:nbera upon which alphabetic aeqtiences 

can be maunted so that constant~-cbang:tmg sequences ot cipher alphabet• are 

~. We come n; to types of app!L?'atua which can be cal.led mach'1D4a1 and one 

such nacb1m is -.hown in Fig. 24. It is cal.led the KRYBA, the name ~ its German 

I 
\1 

' 

REF ID:A62837 

inVentor, w'bo untortum.tely aomitted aucide a tev iean ago, perhaps because 

the last model ot his improved nach1lle tailed to 11U>nss proteaa1oml crntologista. 'D1e Kryha has a fixed semi-circl.e of letters eaatnet which 1• J'Wdlaposed a :rotatable circle of letters. Both sequences ot letters can 'be Bade 

miDd alphabets (the sepenta an nlDOftbl.e &!Id :lnterchan&eable cm each sequence). 

'l'b.e handle at the right se:rvea to wind a rather powerful, steel clock sprlng which 

~c:rtc~ c-rr'l 1frt .. -.,..1 

drives the ~' memlHtr cm which the letters ot the d.nner circle are mounted. 

In Fig. 25 can be seen eomthiag ot the inner mechanism. Tm large wheel. at the 

right hu segments vhich are open or closed, depending upon the "setting" or ke7 • .... 

Thia wheel control.a the anggl.ar displacement or ''stepping" of the circular rotating platfon~~ vht'clrf.1m"""llitfA1"8" ot the--ei~wnnre'"1i'ie~ Iii)~ '!he 

1D1t1al ~uxtapos1tion ot the inner or IDDftable alpba'bet agaimt the outer or tized 

one) as well as the composition ot these alphabets 11a governed by some key or other 

prearrangement. Tbe cipher equivalents nmst be recorded 'b7 band. After each en• 

ciphement, the button you sav 1n the center of tbe panel in. (the pnced1ng) Fig. 

2i. is pushed down, the imier wheel is advanced 11 2, 3, 4 • • • steps, d.epelJding 

on the ke;r1 and the next letter is enciphered, etc. The pictures I've shown you 

aP.PJ.1' to the latest model or the Kryba; as regards the fin't model, which came on 

the market sometime in the 1920's, a Gezmn mathematician pl'Oduced' an 1D1Jresa1ve 

brochure ehow1Dg how many d1tte:rent pe:nnu.tations am comb1nat1oDS the machine 

attorded. Here's a picture of a coupl.e ot paaea of his dessertation (Fig. 26) 

but even 1D those days pl"Of'eas1onal cr;yptamlysts were not too impressed by cal .. 

culations of this sort. With modern electronic computers auch cal.cul.ations bave 

become of even less s:tsnificance. 

Let us nov proceed with som more complex and more secure mcbinea. In this 

next slide (Fig. 27) you see a machine which :represents a rather ml'ked illlprovement 

~· 

by a Swedish CJeyptiographic f'il"lll upon the 01188 Shown thus far. It ie mchaniCO• 

' f\ 

electrical machine designated as C!'lPtogra@! :S-211 _. Here tor the tirst time you 

see a cryptographic machine provided with a keyboard a:l.m1lar to that on an ol'dinary 

typewriter. Depressing a key on this ke7board causes a lamp to liSht under mm of 

the letters on the 1nd1cat111g bank above the keJ'board. At the top of this mach1ne 

can be seen f'our wheels in f'ront of two rear wheels. The :f'our front vb.eels are 

the rotating el.ementa which drive the two rear wheels; the latter are electrical 

conautators that serve as cmmeotion-chmagera to change the circuits between the 

keys of tbe keyboard and the lamps of the indicating baud. There isn't time to 

• 
REF ID:A62837 

diaouaa ln dft:a.11 th• ~1 -"t• 11blol\ oon:trol the roat!Dg •le;&Cts 

·Qd ciphering 11heel•· or 11b1oh 1ou(U H• & gl:l.apte lat.er. 1'ut I •It lhow 

you the next step '-1l the iap.rOTem.eut of such &JIJl.l'&'\ua1 wbioh ad• 1t pota1b1• 

to elilllinate the really teclioua job ot rooording• by hand on p&peP, the result• 

ot oporation. '.l'hia •• dou by meam or assooia:b1ng a b).IPl*l"iter with th• 

orypto-ocmponent. Rve is a piotu.re (Fig. 28) whioh ehowa the &1Jaftlbl7 -

the B-21 connooted to a Rf.JJlingt.on electric> tYpewt'iter• 11.0ditied to b• actua-ted 

by iapul•ea i'roa th• orypto-m&.ohiae. Ot oourlae, it-•a ua.tura.l that the 

next step would be to -.lee the reoord!Dg maohalli.m. an integral pa.rt ot the orwtof ,

1 

__ .. -. i', •chine• Tb.i• you can sea in th• um picture (Fig. 29-A), in 'Which the tour 

'rota.tlng aeallber1 referred to in camiect1on with Fig. 17 and llhich conttel the 

two c(JmllUt&tora alao aentioned in oom1eotion with .... that fi&UJ'e a.re. aeen. The 

slide-bar aeobanism b. r1g. 29-8, a.t the right. 1• oalled the "oage" QI' ~el_," 

and control• the displac-.nta or 1:he printing 'ffhffl• oausing the proper letter 

to be 1'?"1ntod upon the moving tl.pe seea. at th• ~t ot the ma.ohi.Jl•'· 

-

Now we cme to BQlllli8 TOey Ui.porta.:a.t nmr t,pea ot eleotrio oi:Piw •ahillea 

:f'irst. oon.oe:t:nd and developed in Eu.J'ope. but very •Oft th.en&f'ter, and pz-Nabl7 

independently. al10 in the u_ s. In tho crypto-oampcneut of theae aohs,,. ... 

the eloctr1ca.l iatb.e betweea the elomeat1 representing the pla1n•text ebuao:ter• 

and those reP.osenting their ciphel" equivalents ai'• cOD8tantl7 Tal"ied by mlti)le 

ocnmection-changeJ"a w1'11.in the ceypto-ooapOJlente In Mrly E\utopeau aodel• of 

Otthis ~ or machine tho oomiectiani-cha.!Jg•r• oondeted of" t:rame upon 'Whioh -

iuul&tecl wires were aaun.ted to oomwot in. 8.Jl arbitrary -=er a aories ot 0011-

tacta on one aide of the t:ruua to a similar number 01' contacts oa the othei" 

side ot the frame. TM.a fl"aM -.a slid b..t:nen. tn i'i:xGd oo:ntaot-.bearbg Jl.8Dlbera, 

one cm. ea.oh aS.do of th• traaa. By alid1Dg the .tram bnween 'the two fixed ....,. 

bera, 1ihe paths b .. a tAe oppodte oonU.ota on. the latter could be vqied as 

a whole set with a •ingl• ao1aont or the alidS.~ t:raM-• A OCllDJl'9o.1d.on-'Ohanger 

of this sort is ~own 1.n 1oh-.tio form in Fig. 3Q..A_. wher• the slid:l:ag member 

lo. slides botwea:n fl.x&d IM!lllbera ll and 12, thus changing the eleotrioal patba 

boheen the keyboard 8l1d the pJ"inting meohaa1.a. The OOJUlectien•chdger 10 ia 

moTed to the lett or right 11 2,3, • •• po11t1ou. aa deteu1d.ncd by .._ cam meah• 

ani.sm. We won•t go into thil type at •ohble &Jl1' turthor beca.u•e it n.su•t loi:ij;' 

'betore illY'entoriJ saw tho adwntagea of' ua1ng.,in.1isff.d ot 11:1.~l>l.e conneotioncha.ngora_. meoha:rd.•u per:tormillg a similar tunetion. but of a. rotatable 1111ture 
..; 

f, .'.j ·~ ' \.-

i..: ... ' 

~/ I 

. 

·1 ' , .): i:· ,, 

REF ID:A62837 

which we na oall "eleotric roUI"••" l.J1d whioh rotate, ulUl.117 st•'.P"bJ-atep, 

between ciJ"oulU', .tised, 00».t&~e&rinc JMllbera called "dlatorle • RotQl"I 

and stators ot thU tne ~in seheJa'tio form in Fle.SO-B. th9r"e beb.g · i;....J 

a. l~lwld stator labeled 1. three :rotOl'• labelled. 2a. 2b• 20,, and a righ.._ 

band stator labeled 3, The oozmeotions loadi:a,g aw7 from stator l toard the 

le.tb go to the key. or the keyboard1 those l•cling any tram ratv S toara th•_ --: 

right go to the sg».eta of the pri.Jrter. About these elements ... Gall explai11. 

some details presently. 

In Europe,. the tirat •ch1J:Le UJS1Dg rotor• and ata.tors •• that denloped 

by- a. Germ&.n firm," tbe Ciphw-aaahiae Coa~ of Berlin, and •e a.ppropri&tely 

naud the ENIG11A. Here'• a. picture -of*• Fig. so-o. in whioh yw aee a kqboard,. a •et of eight :P:otore juxtapoaed in line6 or. as n 11.ow generally 1a7. 

tt juxtaposed in oasoade." and a printer. Thi• maohine •s app1.1"entl7 too camiplioated fer practical unge and waa superseded b;y a. aeoond aodel, which also 

printed and was alao unsuooesatul.. ono of' the dittioultie• with th••• two 

models w.a that a :multiple switch with man,y contact• to be a.de siJml:taneoualy 

wa.s requi:recl in order to eata.blilh an opera.ti-re an.cipher-deoipieP relatiouhip, 

so that it in encipher1Dg the letter Dt, tor oza:mple. and the corresponding 

key on the ke~oa.rd is depressed. a. oipher lettei-, sa.y F;e, 1• printed, then. on 

deoiphe~ilag the letter F,.and tho corresponding key ea. tho t)':pftriter i• d._ 

pressed, the plain-text lotter ~ 'ldll be p.rinted. In this mohine this oould 

only be done by :making th• currat tor deo1phennent traverse exactly the same 

pa.th through the rotors and stator• tha.t it had traver•ed in enoipherment. This 

wa.• the function or the multiple n:l.tch sham acheaatiaally in Fig. so-n. in 

which a aohine with only six chazoa.oters (A to F) is depicted. In the lett-hand 

oiropit diagram,. D t~ ia being •llciphered and produces Fe. J in the i-ight-hand 

o1rou1t diagram F~. produces D~ • But the switohing •eh.anias 4 and 4;• 1J1 rig. 

\,~\ Sw'"J) SO-D make thing• a bit acmp11cated. bsoauae they are within oae llfi.'tohing meabor that operates in OJle or two. poaitions, 1)Jte tor encipierae»:t .. tAe othel" for 

deoipbenaen.t, o.nd '1llAtl'1 contacts mst be established iJl aae tell noop so to epeak. 

l wontt go into fwotber detail• as to iu oonatruction booauae a. ol~ iJnoeiltor 

of tha'b German :ru. oaae "P with a new idoa 'Which greatly simplified matters. 

t 

no~ onl7 hi. regard to th• crnto-campon•nt but also in regai-d to '\;he indi~ing 

.. chanisa. W. -.;y quickly explain haw the •tter of •i .... attq •implltyiDg 

the 1nd1cat1ng mecbaniem wu o.ocom.plished• namely, by eliJld.Dat1ng the print~ 

altogether .and replacing it with a simple banlc of flashlight type laapae ••11 
REF ID:A62837 

•kip the ·~ •del of the mm, "llhieh ... -11' .. 1lig.ht17 111lpl1r Tereion 

ot th• twrth mod•l. 'Whi.ch 18 lhClllf.L in rig. aw. Thi• one oempri•ed a. te,-. 

boa.rd. .. bank or indicating laaps. and a. aet or ~or• and ata.tor•. but uo 

printer.-

In Fig. 31-A is aaen the achine with its ccrrer-plate dawn. At the front 

ia the kOJboardf abon it. the ihd1"'8.tor board.. conairliJJ& o£ 26 lam.pi benee.tll 

glass diaks upmi. llhiah lette.r.slha.'W '11een inacrio.cl. AboYe the indicator board 

I 

are aeen tour oval a.pertv•• with acner•, through which let-tera can be eeen. 

To the rir)lt of each aperture oan be ••en the J*"ipheriee ot tour aotal eoalloped 

whoo.ls. the tir•t boizi$ uiuauked bv.t the aext tlhree being labeled l. A m.tah 

lner •een at tho right cen. be set to enc1ph91""1 deoipher, or neutral po11t1Glla.-

(.9 ~ 1 -B In. li'ig. U·B is aeen th• •olliJ:l.e with the covar•pla:te removed, exposing th• 

mterm.l orypto-c011ponent. !'hr&e r-otorJ1, labeled -l in thi• tigure, are lffn, 

and affixed to them ar• th• ao&lloped utal. r1Dga, 1'h1ch are not lab•lede. A 

··- f'owth scalloped ring.. label.a. 11 in Fig. 3W, 1• a.ftlud to &Mt.her- rot~ 

like aembv labeled 8 in that .f'igure. Thi• JM!liber looka UU an ordinary rotOJ" 

in thi• p1ci;ure but is ree.117 a lt&~or et special ofJIUltru.<Yt;ioa to be deso:tibed 

' 

presem.tl7. Pel'haps it would b• useM at thia point to abow you what In DIGJIA 

f;~ ~I-(__ rotOl" looks likG end thi• oan be •een in-· ~. Ia eaah of these mor• I 

theJ"G is e. cil'olo ot 26 equally.spa.oecl con.tact pint on me faco of the rot.or 

\,., (Fig. 31-C-I) e.nd a circle ot 2' equa.lly-epa.o•d oontaot SUJ"1"aces on the other 

\ 

tace (Fig. 31-C-II). lnsul11.t9d wires cOJme<lt the contact piu on on. hoe w 

the conta.ot surfaces on ~o otb.e~ ta.oe., theae oomteO'fd.c• being ads 1Jl G.D. ubitra1'7, s1atem.tic,, or ~-.tio manner, dopen.dh1« on oerta!Jl oiro_...,_., 

into whioh we n&ed not go. Wllea the rotors are juxta,,.aed as seen 1n Fig. Sl-CIlI. the o011t..ct pins .on 0110 ~otor are brought agai:lld tA• contact aurtaoH on 

the a.djacent rotor,. eo tha.t an eleotrio ourrent will tra""'r•• all three rotor• 

via. a certain path. Tho large sot.ll.oped .rlliga ar• tOJ' aet'Uag th• rcrliera ln 

.. 11gi::miat -.nually when they ara juxta.Poaed and rota.tu to .tC%'9. a po:rtion ~ 

the key--sett~ ( ... E•Z•I. 1n i'1g• Sl-C.UI)• Tbs tooth-4 2Utal ring ••NL ill 

ik (1:'\ 

Fig. Sl-C•I ia aaaooia'Md w1 th a oa, uchaniaa ao tha't,,.: rotor" will be a4vanced 

- c ( rr) 

oae step ,e_ea the px vtp,4'1.mg ro\Or "-ha• u.de a nti'icieat maib9Z" ot steps te pero...1: 13 :;b..~.:itn~?>t..:.... . "b ~ (.,, ''Ir fr:-,- ~\ • 

mit a ff& to tall mto a JWtoh/\in the/\ ring(_'. Samethles a compln• r...-olution 

w:i.11 bo- noQe::t.sary botoJ"e thia ha.ppena. depend~ upon the init1al k~ae'tti:qg. 

l'h& tirat l'otor immediately to tho left ot tho at&tor at the extreme right in 
REF ID:A62837 

Fig. '1.•B,. howner. a1'-ra :akes ne nep with eaoh depreadon ot the k97 

cm the keJboaz-d. The athu.M ot the roton u li•'l.ar to that Gt the •••1• 

ot .. oouzner like that o~ the od..ner Oil rour autcaobile. 

W• oame nw to the attar ot aimplifyillg the omto-ocaponont ot th• 

ENIGMA $hon. iu Fig. 3l•B to elimina.te the multiple switching MChantam shown 

'"' in Fig.~ w:ttb.out D11ch loss in security (or 10 it "M:>uld seem, at least). 

Let us see how thia simplli'ication was acoomplillhed in the ENIGMA,. by shOWing ~ 

Fig. ft-n. bl coxmeoticm. with the t1rat. ENIGMA. model. For thia pu:rpo•• I 1how 

you ncnr Fig. 31-D,. in which the encipher-decipher oircuitry- ls clearly seen. in 

a ma.chine having• tor iUQtra.tiw- pd'poaes, only three rotors. labeled i.2.z, 

rota.table betheen two sta.tw•• the one on the left labeled 4• tha.t on the right 

5"" 

labeled 5. Stator 4 ls fixed or nm-rotatable in this modol, and 1t has 26 

'*1.taota on. its left face, only two of which are shown. These contacts are 

connected fixedly to the k..,a of the keJboard and to tho lam.pa of the lamp4 

bqard. statOl' 5 is rota.table-, bu· only ma.nue.117, and it has 26 cOJrtaot surta.ce• 

Aon it• right ta.ca, only two or which are shown. But in thia stator/\ 'Wle 26 oonta.ot aUZ'ta.ces ~o i.JLter-oounooted iJ1 p&irl by lS .iuuJ.a.ted wiros paaaing tbl"ough 

the umber. 'l'hua. a current entering one of the 28 conta.ct surfaces on the 

a-t 4 

rie;ht A.oe goes through the stator and returu to one of the r01mining 2.6 oonA , A ~.,,,.. ""t- ':> ~ 7··· .I ........ ~ .... -. 

tact aurta.ces. i'or th1a rouon 11# is called a "reflector." and sGl"fts to 

t.. 

return a current that has came frGm one of the 26 c•tacts on tho fixed ata.tcr -=:. 

at the extreme right" then through ~· rotors and into the :reflector vi& one 

s 

path. retunul throUgh the rotor• u.d baot into the .tater "fit. a differeut path, 

emergillg at one ot the 25 other oan.t&ots cm. tho left face of the atl.tor at th• 

extreme right. Thi• cil"cuit17 &£8'Ul"es tha.t in a particular setting of the 

:ma.chino_, if Yp • Zc, for example, then z~; ~" that 1•• the cipher i• reoiprooal 

in nature. It also has as a. consequence that uo letter can bo enciphered b7 

itself', that is. Yf • for example. O&mLot be repreaented by Y c. • no -.tter what 

the setting of the oeypto...cClllpOllet ia and this is true ot all the otho:r letters 

of the alphabet with retard to the ElttGVA.. 

U 10U like you •7 trace tho path tftyenod b)" the current ill Fig.:51-D 

in enoi}il.U'JllSnt and dooiiileNent. where t~ • Y11., and Y-e;; Zp.• but Z p camiot be 

Tepresented by Zc • a.or can Y \> be represented by Y c • 1 h&Te ah-eacly told JOU 

brief'ly' about how tho rotors are achanoeA. In the ElJIGU! ehown6 the total 

mmber of encipheruat• that ou. be JDil.da be.fore the ke7-aett!nf; of' th• u.chiuo 
, 

'. 

'1 I 

I 

/ 

,.. ... 1-:Z. I ''{· ..>.:>-""' 

REF ID:A62837 

\ 

& t• aa••* • *• lhRing JCIU. th• first picture ot the t~ modal 

~l l 2. ~ DICllA.. i• u.soo. le - II • aad ~ 16 • tor teolud.oal r••-. :t woa•is go / I\ 

into Jlri°• 

_I Pdwri for the o1eotrical circutta la provided 'b7 aal.1 irT eel1• Sn the I , I 

1 '-~. 1'h1• model anj019d a fair degree ot tiDmoial suooesa. but 11ha. 

I 

tlitl• cam mto ponr further promotion ad .... et the EBIGllA. 11We proldb1te4• 

Sutf&.oe 11: to •8¥ tbat lt be~ ~~ basis tor Jl&Ghbl.ea uaed by tu Genan 

Armel Forces bl World 1liLI'" n. I 

ln the Vnit•cl Sta.tea, in- abwt the rev 19101 a Cal1forn:l.a in.'Ylllttor -...d 

' 

Edn.rd u. Rebern (Pig. 81) began to denlop olp1'1er •chine• but h• •• ~11 

tioaveUbag alcmg roada +Jua.t had thus lazt lad oth• lnTeatora nowhere• Ia about 

- u 

the~ 1918 he·~'* out alcmg a mnr path 111-.nca. ? •on•t bMr 11h"'1v 

he indepadatly wll14ted the idea of a m.ohiU u11x1& u. eleotrlc rot••• 

bad• ia hS.• r•HU"ah ocme e.orosa patent:• a~ ....,,. reoantl7 i1J.Teut•d Ear• 

op..._,leotrioal cipher •cid.a••• A"t aJ17 rate. llebera•a ftrat applioat:lcm 

for- a pa.°'eat caveri.Dg a rotor •aib.:lati which he Q&U•d n "eleotrl.e code,." •• 

filect m Jra.rcb 31. 1921, a:a4 a. pa.teat •• isaued. on so Septmbe,r 1924. B•r• 

-A 

1• a p:l.ctuZ'e {Fig. SS) which eon the machine that he h!melt told• ••• 

I\. 

~ 7ear1 ago hetd buil't tor the Ku Kluz nu.. You will. note that th• ol"JP'bocQmp011eni;. had but cm• rotor• u.d liJte the early models ot th• DIG?& it waa 

aasoclate4 with a printillg •abui-. a. vnaowriter operated electrloa.14'• 

Ilebon.• • ol:Pter s;yat• •• also •'9' l ar in nature with that ot the firlt two 

:JllIGIJA model• - a. Ml l'ft'U'Biag ni toh •s eaaC'bla1 alnoo the eleotrio aurrent had to tre.Tel"se a:aotl7 th• AM p1.th in deollJherun,t as 1t haci in CllO:lph• 

81"JIOUt~ _ ? don't think tkat h• e"NJ" 001SCelnd the id• ot using a ref'leotorJ 

perhaps he •• too late. At azq rat~. he Jle'f91' incorporated that 14• 11l ~ 

of hi• •ohinea. UoreOWI'"• 1 dou''t think he had U¥ idea. aa to tho orntologic 

0 

ad'wan'tagea a.nd disad'ftZlta&•• ot a Q17Pto--•OllP.lu.t u11Jig a "smgle "ti-averse• or 

t. 

"~dght through" qft-. ot ro,ora,a.a o01IJIU'•d *with one using a "double-

-t;ra..,..e• ~ "twlce-tbraugh* IJl'l;ea of rotor• with a retloator. 9-lt 119 Wall'\ 

go into iihat ll•H• tor S:~t a a pretty 1JlTOl.Ted plece ot buala•••• 

But Bebern.•a ro'tior• had a Tirtuo not po11•••9Ci bJ' thoae o~ tbe DlGMA ~ 

maohme1. aa4 not 5.n.corporated 1n the rotors of the lahw • ..,17. the 'Wir!nga 

ot the rotors could re&d11f be ohanged. bJ 11he uaer ot the llebern. •ohS... a. 

fwJ. ~:-~ -.B 

f'eo.ture of great importmco in crypto-seaurity. J\ lleben imer••te« IUr Ba."17 
~ REF ID:A62837 ~-~ """"""~ .. : (ft B -t), 

in lUa l\aolhlaf G.nl~ Q.:J fl. l90Gult or C~.Jl'f)UCOf'J wit:l ::a.-v:f 01"'.JPta.nD.lystu he 

'built the &-rotor 1:1.0clol \id.ch is S'-ou is Z'i~. 3!. Anoth~· vory inpol"tant 

c:cur1t:f .fon.tul•o I 'ho.TO thus to.r failed to mention au rceordc -~o ::cbOl'ZI. 

:re-:.~rc me t!w.3:; ·~1oy could be in&tortod in a "risht-sidc upn or in a.u "upsidodO'L11n :_):toition iu "i;.ho :m.oh1no, lmieh ccr.ilt1 not bo dono trlt.'b. \..t.:-J ::.:IC"!JA rotora. 

~o ::!c..-vy lil.."'Cd t:1c. 5-roto:r ooecl, ev-..:;n thouch it v:n.o not "!- !!rittbiZ.3 mohine, - "Lo- - - .. ~ - ... ---- ... - - - - - - <. .... 

: - , ~ :~, -_ ~ ·~as-~ #PPf'l",lJ'; that tJu . fl'dc1ed 1atet' _ ~ ~~1"$fori?-• th..,, !~~ ·_p}i>.cecl I 'I" 'I. ~-- l 'L I ... .. I • \ - • ~ 

1--~----y- -~' .... : - ')..,.r---- ' :!-,..,,."'l!ifll'#'.,,, ". -- ' - .;-- :;-' --- ----

:___ ~·••••or~.- !··flfJl'~-1921 •l•tQ(fl•l~­

ebastns a ra~ nud,;~-;t tbem -lat.er. - ¥.~~t Strubel, ~Ch~ef o~n ~ ~...J ~ ~~ Vri.A..-A~:> the Navy's Code am. Sipal f;lect1oa of the Offic~ ot Naval Comnnmicaticms~ asked 

.. me to stl.ldy t.ba mach:.lne tor 1 ts crntosecuri ty. NaVJ' had but tvo machilles, ne1 tber 

ot which could be made available, sc I induced tbe Chie:f' S:lp.l Officer to bu_y a 

couple ot them tor M:IT.r¥ study. The Ol'der was placed on 7 October 1924. The rotor 

wir:lDas of the Army's machilme were altogether d1tterent from those of the NaVJ', 

-o)if.' ~ \ I 

~o --

' I , , t)-:J 

a f'act which I discovered silrJply 'by astsng Stnbel to encipher a tew letters on 

his 11&chine, using se'ttiJJgs I specified. Aft.er sosre stud.7 I zieport.ed that in 

'llf/I op1D1cm the security ot tbe machine was not as great as Navy thought. 'l'he 

resul't vese a challenge, 'Wbich I accepted. NaV7 gave me ten messages put up on 

its mach1ne and I was auccess.tul in solving them. There isn't time to go into 

tb.e methods used, but 1t ;you a.re interested you can fiM tb.em described 1D my 

br_ochure-enutled A~~ \'"""..c&.°". ·.;;r]-~.!l ~)r~I~~)~.T~9~rrt-.1f(\>.3.S"). 

1f' Rebera built several more models tor Navy and these had pr1Dt1Dg mechanisms associated with them, but Navy dropped negotiatiOZIS With He'bern when 1t became obvious 

that he was not competent to build what Na17 vanted and needed. Navy then estab· 

lished its own cryptographic :research am. deve1opmqt UD1t at what is now knmrn 

as the Naval Weapons Plant in Waa~. AZ'IQ' developed at the Sipal Corps 

Laboratories at Fort Maalouth a machine kDom as Converter M-134, and here• s a 

;,'5"', slide (Fig. 35) showing what it looked like. Army and Navy went ee~te ways 

./ 

1n such work for a number of ,ears but fillally, ill 1938 or 19391 close colla'bontillg brought as a result an excellent machine which was developed and produced 111 I 

.... I ~ I .... .. "' ' \ 

qwmtity by tbe Teletne Corporation in Chicago. This machine was distr1l>uted \. , 

and used very succeesfUJ.l.7 b;y all our Armed Forced from 1~0 to the elld of World 

~ 6.ic.~..,,Jo. ...... ~ ~·~~ 'Y\OWJi~~& ....... ~~)~r War II and for some years theroafter. rrt.1a...,.. •->n~ () i w~ 
REF ID:A62837 

WU cJadgn&ted U t'be SIG.ABA, in ~ vlth a D811111Clat.N in wl11cb iteu of S1gaa1 

~~ eoz.pa c:rntosraP1c •ten..lt\89 gs.vwn abort title• nth tm 11d.t1&1. trSgra:ph sm. 

f&oQ I 

~ ancl 1111eh '°j'~ to be carried abou.t by a dgDal. Operator prtcmrdrlg t!eld ..m.ce. 

It vu aaftpan1e4 with extzem cue and 1lllder atrS.cteat -.cantr ftplatieBs dm"1tlg the 

.. - ..., ___ 

,. .~-- ~ 

, aaa. Bl'i.tiah rozicee)• aaaptor.)_. deftloped .•. ao tba-t1 'li7 .. ot the latter m111 t'• 

..:"~~:Tl-,."- J ,.. .... ..,, /) .r-"\....-"'lL..( t;_ ... A <':.._r~,,._.:;r.,.. 

&tll Uli 1LRMPllCM·;8Jml~l ..... cw1d be uobnged iD ci}lber ~:Britiah lmitd,. 

' e'111&1Y*1¥ft;Q::tb&-..tetm ne mi been ae;e~ '?h111 system of inter•CmmD?'c~tion 

_ __, ' 

worked aat18faetor1~ and secul"ely. r 

- - ~~~!lb\,.~~~ 

\_ CertaiD· imptOVel!lenta in t1le metbod Of usage an~J.1.1•,• Lt • compments, to be associated \ 

\ 

i \the war-iwne empl.o,ment of these machine•• But the SIOABA-!CM as org,nauy developed and 

w-°w-.r.v (}w..j..~. 

~ produced became obaol.ete same years after the close ot hostill ties ~ newe1A machines deve1oped by NBA er,r.ptologista and engineer.a: replaced them, but not because there were ever e:tJ.y" 

- indicaticma that message a enci];lbered on the machine had been deciphered b}" the eneJQ". As a 

matter oi"1~atori~ tact it 'lJ1IA'¥ be atated that" all en~ effort• to aolvel~b messages r ' 

, were ~Ueaa, and it is slao a :tact that no1 machines were ever, captured by the enemy; nor were 

"IV 

there ev~r miy euapiciO)U that a machine bad been exposed to u.emy inapection at aw time. 

Once and~ once were there tJ1X¥ apprebeneions 1D thia reg&l"d, vben, tbroogh a carele•s 

d111l"egard ot specific 1natract1ons 1 a truck and an attached trailer,, in wtiah thia machine 

aud associated material were housed, vere stolen during the night when pa.rkd in front of' tbe 

~ 

. 

,, 
--

Let • add tllat nch &PJll'8heuioas u wre entene.1Decl at tlle tim ot thia ~1 loss 

amaU oi);ller macMne tor field ue beew: obviou. b atrip cipbe:r qatem vu not am. table 

%~~t ..-P..c~~''"" .l "f~"...t.;6~ ~ ,1tD~"i1'1 

for this pD"JOS91 llm" wu tbe ATJQ"'•~~eillieat}mac:Mne 1 Conftt tat M-13't-,, auitable, for 

,, nuona ~ :lll-.dS.cated 111 eomaectlcm with the SIO.ABA. The- aum of $21000 wu '-

" w:re enciphered lq tbe Chief ot the Sif!) Wli!tg aettirlgs ot bia CMl ael.ectioD. Be tllen 

~ .. · Jumaed the meaaegea am 'tbe modil OYer to me u tecl:mical. clirect~ ad I turned tlal over 

to two Of rq uaill'tellta. 1'be reaeon tor t\1rld.Jl8 OTer tbe moc1el vitb tJ2e :messages ._. that 

1 t mut be unmed tbat under field cODM. t1ona nachinea Will be capt11red. One ot t!le 

two test messages was eo1ve4 1n aboat 20 mimtea; the other took longer • 35 ld.mlte•. Thia 

teat brought an igominS.oua end to the SCL deYelopnent, ~rought about 'b7 t!le failve on the 

REF ID:A62837 

tll' s.r.f'eft4 .., 1'elDOne ._ I 1eal'De4 abo1lt tbe .._,, saaoeaaflal. attack8 cm M-209 

I k'att1o, those mlJJts• wn genenteA bJ' '1111 4 ot JmY1Dg tailed .,.elt to Wiik 

~~~ oJt~~ 1IP 1ometh1wg better than tbe •209 deqite the •h~t ..... ot the mUitar,r 

Of 1 ta GnU.m&7 pr1ntiJJg telegraJ:lb. Brat 1 -~.1'ev eQl.mlatm7 vordll about the baaic 

~YI£. 

:princ1~• of/4.1/IOden te~rsr be 111etul.. ~ P"imi»le ~ w!Jat is ca1le4 

tm ":aavaat Coae", tbat 1•, a sptea s.a vld.ch penaatatiou ~ tw dittennt eJ.emelrl;a 

taken in..,.,. of ftw - ~to ...,..amt..--. at r· ~ 

o/ emtlgb.1 FNDcie :S.Coa ,... t!ae firat to em;p1.oJ' neh a "co&t" WllJ' ~ i1a tlle ear]¥ 

el.ectricit7, or tbe l'ftaeDC• and absence of cur:rent, tbe latter •Jll"tem being often 

REF ID:A62837 

..i.P :rt (' f , ' f I , 

- ·1" J '\..o.,. ... ,A.J,; <of v~ ( .... flt~(...'." _;;_, u~-t, i'~ ~( ..... -:f ... -tc .- s• ('-;1 ) v-. GA 

telegratl;'- cipber mcbine, or, to pat 1

, the ;pl!'tating telegraph ei"Pber mach!M"' tbe 

/, · 

( I 

I 

American !e.lepbone 8lld 'l'el.egr&J>b COJQID1 'WU fart\lnate 1n b&Yi!lg .at 1 ta diqioal 1 

~)-~ ~ : (r=~-39) , 

~~ thlt aerrtce~ of a ~cwotn'e~iou ~r named Gil.bel-t s. Venam_,Yho ocmce1ft4 

~~cu.J-~U'P~~1r~~~~ ~~~~- •,/ 

/ 

a br1ll1aDt princil'].e~A. 9&41 JB!~ turned out to be ao uaend and valuable,'r\ot"a><~ ~~-.. 

""-'~v.s.~~t'.-.k .. ~~~ ~ 11 V~~ .. ''~ 

tllat 1 t baa come to bear hi• - and 1• on.efn N1'erred to u tbe A "Vezima nle. ft 

",J \\ -.J , .... 

«.f '{~v:t,. ......... ,~-2.. ~) ~. 

Vei'mlm aaw tbat U' in ac:~ wi"th 80Jlit gener&l. bat 1mariant rule the marking (\ 

'(~_,.., .... / 

the aame kq1ng gr®,p in accordance w1 th the ame general rule ,.:)lti the f:t.na1 

~~ ~ ~ ~'-"'~l~ reaUtat 1fO\lld b6 the Orig1nal. chareoter. Vena. ea hW?n' ti~· 1 dea-*8 mtr tt 

~ ~~~ \<\\"\• 3-~~~~'lc~~~~~~('.&..ou.l.\fs&,.,C\\iJ 

J\fif!.JiJJr"e'bl • t• ~ et,.._. fJ•tl• .,.._ Mle)lftsM-Jt• u4 a al,P!!est::twt·~iliili'°'Fw 

~~~~~~a.~~'~k~O;,)~) 

"'~led in the v. s. Patent ~ce on 13 September 1918, and Patent No. 11 310,719 

"2.2..~ \C\,,,c~ 

vaa granted on"tm 1Jmmt1on entitled a "secret SipaJing System." .. aa ~ i;lSt; 

etJgi.mere who .. uaoc1ated with Mr-. Venam at the time the 1Jmmt1on vu 

,/' \ 

20 - In thms system which uses only two different symbols or ele~Dts,_~he so-ca.J.led ~-- ~~-- -- ----- - "binary-- code," the ~ombinins-;e is its own inverse,,.·' - \_ 

~; -.,./ 4 • a-1?, i~ •; 9tt11luntw ••it•••~• t11rt ·~ 1i• = ••\=! - 3 ·- -~------ ~W!:'l;lf;J~;~tsa~~~?~~--·~-~!~ -.r•_• ---L ~=- __ \tiA.' 
i ------, 

: ~._.::; ~ I 

~---

Message character 

REB{eXCD : A62 83 7 

Cipher Cf.caracter 

Key 

Deciphered Character 

+ + - - -

+ - - + + 

- + - + + 

+ - - + + 

+ + - - -

It was 1 however 1 recognized that the opposite rule would work 

equa:Lcy well, two like elements when combined giving a mark and 

two dissimilar elements a Sll&Ce, thus: 

Message Character 

Key 

Cipher Cbaracter 

Key 

Deciphered Character 

+ + - - -

+ - - + + 

+ - + - -

+ - - + + 

+ + - - - . other pa.tent applications filed and later granted described 

the corresix>nding - "off-line" - method, where the encipherment 

is recorded in punched tape form for later transmission, but a 

single one-time random key-tape is used; the sim:ul.taneous use of 

of two endless key tapes, as described below; a scheme for eliminat~~. f-.y.--r-r-- ..- -_ "stimt" C.Qm61Ditions'":-' "bells", •tiitte.:'lhiftu-.and "the ·like - and -· ( · · .; ;; .. · · · -.. ~ 

· -' · ~- other',j .. 9-eae and (levices in thii 'fieia. · .~' : · · . ?,:4«""' • · :: 

'' .... '; .. . .. ' . ... · ' 

' . , . - ~ ~ :. .. .!, •". I , f' I I .. .! ~\I J' • lo 

., ... , .. ' ., ,? ."I 

~· .. ... " -: .. ,,..._1,..,,,¥ . ~- ~ 

·. ' -. 

.. 

'nere i~ an extract from a paper by Vernam. himself. which in simple language; explains 

how his invention worked in.<9- system developed during World War I for use of the 

Su./ 

. jo 

Signal Corps, u. s. ~?W 

CIPHER MACHINE - Ml1.l!IOD CF OPERATION 

'lhe messages are first punched in a pa.per tape by mem s of the ke;Yboard 

perforator [Fig. 30 of this lecture). • • • 

The cipher ''key" may take the form of another tape of s1milar form having 

characters punched in it at rand.am and with every tenth character numbered, so 

that the tape JD8.Y' be set to any designated starting position. The key tapes are 

prepared in advance, the original key being perforated by band, as by working 

the keyboard at rand.am, additional copies being made automatically by the ma.chine. 

The message tape is passed throug'h a unit Im.own as a transmitter, where 

the holes in the tape serve to control the positions of five contact 

levers, each of which makes contact with eilib.er of two bus bars. The key tape 

controls the contacts of a second tape transmitter. The contacts of the two 

transmitters are connected to a set of five magnets or relays as shown in Figure 

9 (Fig. 4o in this lecture). ~ magnet will be energized if the correspondingly 

numbered contacts of the two. transmitters are age.inst opposite bus bars, but 

not if they are ma.king contact with s1m11 a.r bus bars. In the d1fml"Sn11 contacts 

1 and 2 of the messr:me transmitter, are against the left or positive bus bar, 

this setting representing the letter "A". Contacts 1, 4 and 5 of the key 

transm1tter are age.inst the positive bus bar; representing the letter "B" in the 

printer code. This will energize magnets 2, 4 and 5, which combination 

represents the letter "G". 

Al1 of the possible combinations resulting from various characters in the 

two tapes might be shown in a cipher square which would have 32 characters on 

a side instead of 26 {as in the case of the ordinary VigenE\re Square] • 

The characters of the cipher messages, formed in this way, Jl'JIP.)" be recorded 

as perforations in a third tape. For this purpose a ''machine perforator" is used. 

Th.is device is similar in many res.Peets to a keyboard perforator and is shown in 

Figure l.O [Fig_. ft in this lecture]. The tape, from a reel on the top of the 

machine, p&'sses through the punch block at the front left corner or the ma.chine. 

Here it passes under a die plate and over a group of Bi.lit punches, which may be 

forced up through the tape by the action of an electromagnetic hammer. Five 

of these punches are too short to be acted on directly by the hammer and are 

pushed through the tape only when an individual. "selecting finger" is interposed 

between the punch and hammer. Tb.e five selecting fingers are actuated by five 

magnets 'Which may, be controlled by the relays shown in Figure 9 [4o). A 

ratchet-operated lstar-wheel feeds the tape forward after each character-has been 

punched. 

~Vernam, Gilbert s. "Cipher Printing Telegraph Systems i'or Secret Wire and 

Radio Telegraph Cmmmmi cations. 11 a paper presented at the Midwinter Convention 

oi' the A. I.E. E., New York City, 8 - 11February1926 • 
r • ... ~ '• 

REEl'CD:A62837 

...... ~ 

CiJiaa'~ .., 

Dlci)lmed~ 

... + - - .. + ...... + + 

.+.++ - + ... + + 

++·--

It-., bowteJ"1 reooptse4 that ti. OJIJIOalte nJ.- ....U tlOrk 

•-~ wu .. two iu.. •l rants when cc.b'Md Ci'Y1111 a 9'1"k a4 

tvo a•m lar •1-IW • q&ce, tJ:ma: 

+ + .. • .. + .. .. + + 

+ - + • .. + ..... + + 

++ ••• 

-

,.,-,-- ~ 

haw bl• mventtan varked 1f .,ata 4fn'el.ope4 4ur1n8 Vo&-14 vm- I f~ ~ ~ tale 

-... 

81 IP'&1 Cal"»*' u. s. l.J!ltJI~' ._; .;. ............ ' \, -'\' .. • ., ' ,_.,.,_ -: ~ 1°"1 '\ -c:-, -·~._. ... ,,. \ ) 

ClHIBB JllCBDIB "'WlffiOD CW u.c-6MA.1.va ~" \ \ \ "· \ - ...... ' • . 

.. ....... an nton paohe4 bl a JI.pd ti.pt - ~- ,dr •• ke;vboa:td .-oatcw {;sg. '11 ot w.a ~]. • • • -. 

~ 

'lbe aiitaer "k8J" 1lli/q take the :tClll'll at anathal' t&pe at *imflp fQl'll ha:lng 

pmobect :lD ifA at ftD!.m aza4 Vitti. ffrflrl 1;miill chaNOter mmibcNd., ao 

tbat 

~ 

tbe tai- .,- be Mt to ~ da'P.1*1 ~ p:lts.aa. !be ke;r tapee azre 

m a4n.Dce, the Gl'1g1Dal key be!Dg ;pea-toatect b1' lumd, u b7 WGrldDg 

: the~ at nnam, a441Uaral cople• being .se ..._t.t,,.,17 'b1 the mcb:lne. 

/ •. 

~ ..1) 

!be WIBP t&pt 1a r••ed th'tou&1r a mdt tnom u a tnnm."1;e, wheft 

the hol.• Sa tbe 1mpl seine to control the pJatUcma ~ ftw coatut; 1.,.,., 

~ 

-* ot 1fhtoh mtea ocn1:act v.ttti eltlwr ot ho bu ban. 9a• ke.7' taJl8 

t.he contActa ot a Meabd tape tnamt"8r. iae occtaata al tlae 1Na 

tnnai~ are oameow to. Mt at fl.ft--~-~ "1.ltl8 .. 80llll 11i."ftgure 9 (ng. 4o m ~lecture). Blah •P«wU1 be metg!Md tt the oorznpoMjng'l;t 

mWI,..,_ ccntaota ot the t;wo ---.S.ttllft ae agai»d ~1'8 ~ban, b'1t 

l. 

not 

and 

U 

2 

tbq 

at ............. 

ue mld'QS ---.'"8r, oaatac1J vith 

lift 

tt•U• 

•p.in4' 

bUa ....... 

1:ibe left 

JD 

QI' 

ttMt 

Jl09it1ft 

4tN1m, 

bua ~ 'bd, 

tbU ~ ~ tlle letter "A". CCllltllote 11 4 ml 5 at the k91 

tftmmltW are aptnat tlae potliUft bus bar11 *'*S*•••Un& the l.ntw "Ba 1n the 

i Jlll'!DW coa.e. 1D:d.a WS1l --.S- -.neta 2, 4 and 51. vb:loh canb1aa.Uoa 

ftPIMCta tile lettei' aG". 

. -
~ / 

I 

;r 

- 'J!le-,.ci~~~ 11l th1a ,_. ia \11d.Dte1l.!glb1e .sn tcrra 

e.n4 .., w ~ w the &-Walr~ .-uca ._ -......- CJit b7 -.u, ~ tt ~. 

tt _, be ~tted "b7 'wh'e ce ~o and t'*Jl'OC\llled by another ,.,,,,. perton.tar 

at; tbe ftCetnns »olld· 918 o~ tape 1• tbae rua ~ the _..._ 

~..-, ee:re ita ~ o~ with thOM at a ~-- ke7 tape to ....,.adW,. the Ol'ig:1D&1. .,_., vb1ch wU1 be ~ m 111 ,._ toi'll . 

Fo&ilta tma. 

LDIO!B al D'f TAR 

vt'th Uie Q"Btm u 4ffcftbecl abon, tile kq taps llmt be at t-.it -.a 

1- u tbe Siii of all t.he 11191aa&e ~· uaed v:l.th it, u the ... _.. will 

loae th9U' ·~ to ecma extent if. 1ihe key tape. u un4 npeate417.. 9le ue 

ot & ehart ~ keJ 11111' gift autfic:lent M01'te7 f~ IC. uaea, h~. 

A 1"'QU d tape 8 lnahea 1D 41..ter c~ abo1n 900 f'Mt ot tape aa4 

1IUU1cl 

ar.d a aJU• 

aene 

PW 

to enoiitier 

VOl'd, Vi~ 

about 18,000 

Z'Q8&tSng 

'VOid& 

tbe cOUlltillg kq. It 

ft.ft 

Miit prlnte4 at •. .., 

~ 

.... apeec1. 

ot 45 1"'.11'41 pel' ~ 1bta 4Ull1* ot. worda WOtil4 l'eq\d.l'e 40o ~ ~ ..nearl.1' 

1 bou:ra to t:N.naa:l.t. ; 

- Jn order to ftllw)e the ...t ~ k8" tape ~ ~I# "'""' tng J.Mse '. 

a.mat• or~, the "double •" .-ts .. ~~..' ?a thU ~ "'° 

key ~ 14, t.be en4f ot eiM:b 1l&Je being glued together to tana a laop 

~eelllfiy 88YCl ten Sa oil'cmtetmce. 918 taiNta ahould c1:1tter in 

1eQBth ~ one ~ or by -. ll18ber wb1eb 18 not a ~ ot tlle ~ 

ot ~ SD e1the te;e. A ~ t:tandtte i• ,_. t• eaob tape, ~ 

1114 the cbu&eWn ot the ao ke.Y ta:Pe• sre OClliMnecl; 'b7 a method 81'-S'V to \ 

1bLt llbOWD 1n ~ 91 1d,t.h thoae at the w-.. ta»e 'to tOll'll the 01Jller -*Q&e• ' 

' 

a• ft9Ul.• u •• ..... thOl2ltJ • two k97 .....,.. we.re ~ ocilbine4 -. 

to Jl'o4uce a 1-ceg atngle Dob-t'epl&t1ng kq, 1Moh,.. later cmb11le4 with tb9 \ --••&e t&»e· !!d.• laq, a1Dgl.e 1£81 iii Dot, ~ .,_k'ng, a~ Id&!• 

and 

teJ" ~ 

~-~ 

ita 

eon 

1egtb 

kq 

.. 

,.... 

1- 1• 

. 

ada 

!he cbanctea 

'Up ot cceinat1caa 

SD - leer 

ot the 

4o not 

two 

repeat 

~ 

I 

b 1IQ w HqUe!DOe at COllU*tat1Y617 6art ~ SDtotlls, how.,..., u WOlll4 

be th• oue tt anl7 one ke'.Y 1-~ loop nzie \lHd. · , 

919 a\1llbe ot ~ 1n 'thi• ~111gle keJ' 1a equal to ., tbe proc1un or the mlllbw ~ ebl:racten :SD tbe tvo ta;e 1oopt, and ..... ut. 

e:lOeed 600,ooo bef.'cee 8111' lllft at the ke7 M8'"• to 'l'Qeat. It proper~ \ 

1• 

~ 

takm ~use the.,.- 110 a.a to &TOS.4 s1Tins ilifoim.Uott tot.be._. ',, 

tl9 lcmgths «the two 1-7 tape 1oopa or tMU- :isnitsa.'L "*'1Dd eD4 · · to &'fOld the poae:lbili't7 ot nw *'9-Qing 8111 lU't ot the J:UUJ.taat atagle , \ 

ke71 tld.• qat-. u tlXQ~ ~t to '=-it evm 'b7 a. c.pecrt ~. '\ 

baYSDg • l&l'SfJ nuliber ot ...,_.. anil hll lmovlAd&e at the c~1Clll ot the ~ mohtne anA f.u utbQd ot o,petat!ca. \ \ 

I 

tttree ~ o1nvltt 111d.ch ,,.. wed taJt tatara~ emans roui- stats.or- , l r -~~t''t::t•,"' ol '. ) 

.~~-··· ~ 

a8"1llg ~, lf\W' YCl'k, Bobok9n ea. BOl'fal.k, end 11b1oh ecoCJ1t11Dg to ~ '-\ 

~\ \ 

'·' ~too...,_ 21. ab<ml~ t•CODtilNed in opera'ticai 'f°' Ul\T llOl1'tha1 even~ the endJ<\ 

\ 

·' ' 

~ \ Of the ,... Ill lddttioa, a m 8M' Oo.:t:llB Ct~ .,. Ol'&Ul1ze4 to SQ to Barope wt.th '-

/ \ 

I 

/ Dft' equ1plmt ti# 1DStall.aticm ot ~-tel~ o1rouib 1D J':t-....ue. 911• I 

"_ .... • I • 

.,,. 

Ca1.cMl ftbJ*il, t.he Cb1e.f S1eMJ otttaer, the mnotar ~ M:lli'ta17 ~e, ..i the >s"" 

_, 
REF ID:A62837 

I 

I 

;t I IB ' at •l1t:1• a chall.enge b7 the Signal Co.rJ8 to JrCW9 ll'al>Jan 18 contmtie • 

. ~ ~~\.~-.. ~~~f~,°' '~ \C\\9>a-d.~~fo~ "l' 'r '11 the •ilber tapes ~about i:5o message• selected fl1'Clll ~e. dq'• ~:le . ' 

---

• ----· ·-tn·~ .. .,!::.~-~~~~~-~Y-~~~ - a~ cm tile aal.llU<a, ~ ot a bu1e ~ IJ 

,, 21 tniem:tten pages, an Addendum. 1 ot 10 pap•, .(. Nldencl\1111 2 at 25 papa .ancl ~ __ _ ~ ' _,. ,fl 

~~~~--~---~ ~~.!,~-~flll!-~!~_Jt-;~~ ~~~ws-~~~.~~~~ .. ~~~~~μZ A_. a pertorated. oipber-measage tape to each ot the offtee)I named above. In order to 

~ 1'be8e --tile Cldet St8M' Officer 11114 J,.. bili"';;:: ta;ee, - ( 

' I I t i& • , / . pvr1Ds tbat not OAl.J' W R:l:verbmsk •o1ved '1le Q8tm but '.bad i-ecanred 'both k07 

-.-... ·- Your "lffl!7 'bJ'WJ.ant actentUic achievement retlecta great Cftdit upon 

7CJU and yom' whale pei-sonnel.. 7t 1IOUld be ~Sible to exaggerate :ln ~ -

you and Biverbarak the deseJ:'Yecl tribt.tte tor this Tfll!T ~ aaccmpl.1ahmeDt • ...,_... 

'!he paper by Mr. Pazrker (see footnote 21) closes 1dth the fallow1ng t1nal. 

PelisPS sane ctq Mr. J'riecbnan v.Ul. tell or the part that he and the 

BS:V'erbank L&baatories p.lJQed :tn the ~:le pbue ~ th1e dft'el.opamt. 

Mr. Parker n1 not &WBZ"e or the tact that wmt he auggelted had not ODl7 been 

disappeuance .tn the volv7d!lous rues ~ 'bureaucl'SC7 • '!he 11ec0Dd t!me -. soon after tbe 

~ 

' 

REF ID:A62837 

, 

I ~ thi-ougb '1111 own tUea and ~ tho hendvr1tten manueorift ot certain 

-

lJU1;a at llbat I had written at the erase ot the aucceastul solution u tbat ayatem 

.,,, I 

the sub-title or wb1ch u "Cen

1

Cl7Ptoloas.c h1stoi7 :repeat 1taelf't" l't :ta poaa1ble 

/ 

Mr'. ~'•paper (see footnote 2l above) devotea a good deal. of ap&ce··'P> the 

' 

., \ I ' I ._,.,I 6 l I . ·' 

' "o .. iiled. abOut the d1tt1oult1ea that~ be experienced int.he pre,pan.Uon and 

d1atribut1oa ot ~!me nn4.aD. b7 ta:pu, anc1 a..a. :iJlolSnecl to diaappro./e ot the 

" 
REF ID:A62837 

. 

&114 among lage h~ where tile Tol:\119 at ttett1c .1utttied th• use of t.&1a·-·· 

' 

equS,paent. !he prSacipll 84.'falltage w.e the ~1V at c~tiaaa~. ~ 

-

9t.e A.!' .. a. f. ~ P11.nt!Dg !elesralih C1Jl&er eqmpaen,~ecl 'bJ' the 

- -

cWmmtl.ed. But. after I left Rtvez'blmk at the encl ot 1920 an4 bad .1+ the Cbiet 

. ) 

stsnal orno_.. •Wt sn ~' I U4uoet tbe Oh1e:t Signal Ott1cer to reacuattate two ~ 

. c~~$ eqUipante. 9iue I elqpl.OJ'fd, ballne it or not, :IA cod•, o&lled D.l.vta1on Field 

A 

t)rpe. 

" ' cmt1DUe work SD tbi•f f:lal.4 waa the lliOk ~ S1gna1 Corpe fUDll8 t°' reeeueh and 

; 

/ 

cleval.opuent ror- ~ WOJ.1t. However., the leeA1ng mmaben ot tlle s.. l. s. l&1.nta1De4 a 

'1 1, 

'/ 

'/ 

, ' 
REF ID:A62837 

CJWtocammea\iau 'b7 1'1410, 'Dle ~ at- sta'M ftC1\18ated the 8eft'etU'1 ot war 

wh1~rJ....tlftlhe'-sk~a~~-~M-ii•~~·la·t~~ to ·'~ tbe Jm0b1MJ f'.rca the p)!Jlt of 'fiW of 'le1D1;\y. 1~ tb1a ~19 WAPS " enc~ 'b1 tbe Chief' at tbe CGlllllUDicats.ana 4D1. ¥OJ.Ida m:n.a1cn ot t:he De)aftamt 

Here ~~~~1\1,gt'f~~~~a....J..~·"4-t·5~ 

or state wre ~. , It :La a .-or 11&t:f.llhatlioa to be a'ble to tell 11111 111at tba "'-\t 

s. x. s. ~ aoived tbe ten waase• and tbdetot'e HpOrteI ~ the mcb1ne wa ~ .. 

r 

~ quite iuecur6J but :r.t 1a with much ~ tllat I must now tell J'OU who ~ *1d <- .. , • • 'iii' 

de'lel.oped the ; JlllOM,,;t I It .. ~. ~ ~.: ot ~ S1sDal ~ and w other' tb&a l 

I 

1nadepc1ea ~ lda bft.1n chUd. As 1• ao oftm the om4e, 1lhen a competent . ( 

teohrd.c11D bas to neglect h:lS technical atudies beeauae ot the preaaure of a411d.n1RatS:ve 

it w:r.! ao :f'autt.y,, ~further work an j,t. Cdtm.el Kitt, Im sJ,ad. to~ 

iee41:~ '11ttivel the dl~ ml 'Wa8 'V8ll enou8h 1n 19112 to be able to ftttdl'D 

\ 
... \-,,., --

REF ID:A62837 

r 'C'ec \)f'i(?., M~1,..t' 

its lJmd connonieations and Joflled ktfrJ:r ~ the ,_61•fl!:oflaen~ th-.of. 1h$ wM:aea. 

were p?'Oduced 'Witb ~ rWkabl.e epeed b.Y 'the Tel~ Corpoft.tion. ~ ot tht!ll I 

'·· 

or :t'a.csim.Ue t$1.em1sa1~ and a~tus ~~ protecting CIBIOBY tranamdstd.ona, ~~ _--·-

UJ tel.eii>cmic cC111111U1ie!&t1011&;wee alao clenl.o:;ed. ·-th+'t tme to gofta 

details \d. th regard to maoh1nes and &pl'l&t'&tua tor thoe l.ut 'two categories ot 

w :l. -\ 

the ap_paratua .. ,prod.uced by canm91'01&1 neearch and d~opaent :tui.a v.l.th.-- direet 
REF ID:A62837 

deYel.oped and built by the A. '!'. & 'l!. c~. It WU c&lled SI~. 'lbere 

' -- ~ 

were eix terndnals, each ~ vbich coat afer $1,000,000. But NBA cr.r,ptologista 

and engineers have produced sm&Uer and better equipnenta buec1. upon SI-Y - -~ 

wars in t.he future, 

----So much for the histozy ot the developnents. and progress in cryptographic 

a~tus at this point. I ahall retum to that phase of ~ogic history betore 

t 

the cose at this lecture. Bigb.t now I ahaJ.l. sq a tev wordS about the history ot the 

A. 

' 'lhe solution ot modern cmto-commm.ie&t1on systems bu been facilitated and, 1n 

same cases, Dade possible aDl7 by the invention, denrel.opnent, and application ot 

One must understand the baa1c nature ot the problem which contronts the c~t 

when he attem;pta to solve one ot these modem, ver:r complex Cleyptosyatema, First ot 

&1.l he must be given the CJ.")'Pto-cammunica.tions 1n a tom vh1ch make_s:them Visible tar 

·' 

inspection and study. U8\18J.ly tbey are cha1'a0tera (lettere or numbers) 1D the case 

ot 11 teral. camml'Q1 cations, or they are electrical aigaal.a ot a recordable type in the 

case ot citax ~ c1l'hOD1 aonmun1cat1cms. Next he muat have a.ve.ilable to h1m 

inatrumental.1tiea tht 'Will assist him 1n his analytical. work, ftCh as macbinel7 tor 

~ 

/ J!Zking ~counts, comperisons of seq;uences, etc., and this, in the case of 

/ 

ccmiiex systems, nrust be done at high speed. ~18 at modern cryptosystems 

requires teathig a ~ gree.t number ot ass'Ullq>tiana and bypothesea becauae sometimes 

"' ·~ "'-. 

~oally large number ot posaib111t1ea) 1.e., ~ti.Oil& and combtnat1ons~/ ~_,,.--~ .- o-\:~e.r 

must be tested one,,_o.tter the eqtaw until the correct ansver 1s :.tound.. Since the - ~-- - I\ - - ~~. 
REF ID:A62837 

b)r these aati'onam:lca.1.l;y great numben ot poaa1bU1t1es. 

Bl.1d1Dg strips or paper could scnettms tacU1tate reaching a solution to a 

4 v the u. s.. 18 the ane Bhown 1D ns.1 ~ , Wich ia a picture t:4 what l made at Riverbank 

\.· 

But I did now &nd 'then d.nelop and t17 out certain ideu tor ~c a1da, 

I think or I1l4 macb1nee? I dicl,, but 1*at good did that do? D14 the S1ghal Ott1ce 

)'ea.rs from 1921. to 1933, and in the laet-Dllllll!d year ve were in the depths of a sreat 

Bect1cm had scne rw macb1nea or two, and DO' cbasrtD vu ~ ~bl.e: Not long/ 

atterwuds I I.earned. that a certain divi.aion of t.be Ottice ~ the ~~ermutcn:' General 

I ) 

~the Mun1ticms Bnild1ng had an ?al 1Uta.1.l.at1on ~~bad ~ed for 8;"c~ing 

(' 

purposes in c~ection ntb tbe C.C.C•·the C1'YU1an Cons~t1on C~ &atablished to 

I "-, 

:pl'OV'ide ~and subsistence tor young men who could find no Jobei1D ta: depression. 

l 

'1'1. 

.. 

I also learned. that a new otticer had Just beetn assigned to head that particular division-
REF ID:A62837 

_,/ 

and that be 3ust; had no uae for the new-tangled ideas ot hie pedeeetsor an4 wanted 

to get rid~ tboae nasty ID« machines. But the contftct with DH atUl bad same 

expintton. 'lhi• amw;red me, but it also f!IJ.Ve me an iclea.. I wrote a mmonndum 

>l3v/ and hel'e'«S a pict-tu:.e ~ 1t (Fig,4.3 ). I'll :read you idlat it eap: 

30 Octobel" 1934 

)fa3or Aid.tu In J111D7 ~ een1.ce, here I h.a'le nwer once "set BG" 

bee.rt on" getting something I :reit de81nble. But in this case 

I have set ~ bean on the mtter because of the tremendous l~ 

it would lift ott au out backa. 

'J!le basic idea at. _using naab:ln917 tor code ccmpllat1Qll is lline 

and is ot atm!l'&l ~"a)atanding. 9ie fletails of the proposed 818tem 

W8l'e developed 1n col.laboratiOB w11ib Mr, case 1 or the Int. Bua. MacbinesCorp. 

I regard ~a u one ot m;y moat 'Y&luab1e eontributicma to the 

pramot101t of the VOl"k tar which w a.re reaponaible. 

Pl.eue d.o ~ utmo.t to put this a.croae ff# me. If' you d.o, 

we can real.ly' bes1D to 40 ~Ue ~ie -work. 

\ Attached to the Dle!QO was a briet expl.mlation ~ing to 'Wat I •ve told you \ 

about that X!tl 1nstal.J.aUOD in the Ql'ttce at the ~ a.neni. Note that \ 

\' 

because t.lie responsibilities ar' th.a s.1 .. s. tor ~10 operations were at tbat. 

I 

on :toreip Cl"l'P'to818tems bad been. a l"e8pcm.8ib:Uit1' at 0-2 at the General sta:tt until 

iN~-~ 

1929, f\ :reapc;maibil1t1 W been transterred to 'the Ohieit S1gaa1.. otticer and the 81gnal 

Corps in the year~· But the Chief' Signal otticer bad Wll:':f little money to ~e tor 

l. "-~·~ ,_ -1 

specU'1call.y ree~cted cryptanal.Jt;1c operationa on ~oretsn e+ ••ontcationa to -.rt1me. 

-l 

' ,. ' "--
REF ID:A62837 

az\'YWhere 1n or o$1de t.he u. s. But tbat'a anothei" atorr and I'll procffd to tbt 

v I month after I wrote and . / t 1n his- "In" basket I got the macbinea moved trm the .. ~ 

ottice at tbe ~ General to 1lq" ow -warren 11'1 the Office ar the Chi.t 

Signal Otticerl 'lbat memo must have been potent mg.2.c. 

Once having demonsti'ated their ut1Uty t.o the Cbiet S1gnal Otticer the almost 

prema~ tend.n&ted contract with IBM-.. renewed--and soon expanded. I don't 

Lf--4 a picture (Fig. 4:lf) at one ot two vho.1.e wings ill me ot Ol2l' bu' 1 "'nss at Arllngton 

We built or had built tor us by lJlot and otber concerns adaptors to vork v:tth 

Even were time ava.Uabl.e I coUl.dn!t shw you pictures of acme ot the bigb...ol.Ua ; ·, 

gadgets we used; neitheJ' ia it _perml1Jaible to say more than I have a1.nady aa1d 

\ 

~ ' l \ ,, 

I 

about them, even tho.uab it is no longer a deep "~that electronic caa.puten a:re, 1 

fran. a. Russian book entitled 

and be.low it 1a 'What it says 1n EngH eh. 

cane to 1igbt as, 'tor exmqpl.e, 1n the various inTestigations ~ the attack on Fear1 I 

' 

~, a.re DIUCh more taac1natins tban thoae of cr)lptosralhei-•, whose l.Ohievementa· 1n 

~~~<>-" 

their tield appear" to be dull or tedious to the~. But long consideration of the 
~ .. -

.... .C:· ,.•''.. t;r ..... 

REF ID:A62837 

ld.lituy importance of COMSEC t.1 against COMm leads M to ret\u"Jl to 

sOll9thing 1 mn.tioned at th• T&'.ty begimling or th11 leoture. 11hen l ad• 

a Ra.'\ment to the ei'teot. tha't cryptography and oryptanaly•i• npreeent 

the obverse and reverse .taoes or tho •&mo •1ngle ooin. In closing this 

lecture I rill expand 'that eta.te.unt a bit,, and in so doing pvhap• forail&te 

a dictum whioh we IJaY call the law governing the minting and usage of the 

cryptologic combat com. It would run something like th1ar 

' 

When. a.n officer i• aeleot.ecl to oomnand a tighting unit, u eft1oioat 

appoint!J2g a.uthori ty g!Tes hi& amt entrusts iJ:lto his care a top seoret8 

magic ta.l:lnan of groa~ potenq.. a. coin which 1• called bi1 oryptolog_io 

Qomba.t coin. and whiah• u i• uaual in the ca.a• ot all but trick coin$, 

has two faces, a COllD!l' tac. a.nd a COMSEC ta.ce.. When g1'ffl1 to hill that 

coin should be in mint ocmdit10JL, it should be bl"ight and ah1.D¥ oa. both 

faces, and he should .trln hi.a utmost to keep th• both that 9Y• It', 

to begin with, he is ginu a coin that 1• t&.l"nished a 'bit on both ta.oes, 

he 1s really startlng out with a great handicap. no matter how good he 

and hia foroes ai-e 1n re1pect to s1se, eq1\1i;aent. traini:ng and ability. 

It he keepa only the COMINT f'a.oe bright and a~, he 1tands & good ohuoe 

. ot winn1l2g a battle erven 1t hb foroe1 a.re iDterior in sise, etc., oompared 

with those oft.he encv• But it he leta the COJISEC taoe or his coin became 

dull traa indittvence. CQ"eleaaness. or ign.oranoe. he will al.moat surely 

lose the battle-, even if' hi• forces are nperior in size, otc., ocap&J"•d 

with those ot the on.eJD¥• 

As a PEllD&rkable enm.ple ot the ftlidity of the toitegoing diotta, an 

exa».ple that omea directly tram tho two Japanese Na"f7 offioer• who 'W'J'ote 

Uicha.z1 !he ,.Battle that Doomed Ja.p&n (a .. f'ootnote 12 &bOTe)let u quote 

the initial paragraphs ot the Pr•faoe to their book (p. xiii) 1 

For Japan, the Batt.le of W.d-.y ,.. indeed « tragic def•t• The 

Japanese Combined Fleet, placing it• :taith in "quality rather 'Wlan 

quantity, n had long trained and prepared 1as 'ff defeat a :a.\llN.rioall.y 

superior enq-. Yet at Jlidway a atron.gv Japanese foroe went d0111l to 

def•t bef())."e a. weaker --:Y• 

Not only were our part1oipating 1urtaoe f oroea .far superior in 

number tq those of the enemy. but the initiatin was in our handa. 

)for were 119 inferior. qualitatively,, in the crucial element of ai:r 

1trellgth• which plafed the •jor role throughout the Pacific War. 

In •pita ot this we sut'fered a deoiaift detea.t such as the modorn 

Japanese Na.,,. had nO'Yer before experieaoeci or wen dreamed possible. 

- - ------ -------
REF ID:A62837 

~liw la ~i• lecture (••e P• ), I q\lRed two otheJ" pare.graph• 

tr• ilh11 l1UU book. 1A 'llhiob th• Japane1e author1 .ice ii perttctq olea 

the :rea•on1 tor th• lo1a ot "11• Battle ot W.dn.7,, ,. ... , ... 11hich hrre alto 

beou stated b)" othor writera. The crtptologio combat ooin our Jla.'97 entrusted 

to A&Dil'al Nim1t1 w.s highly polished and bright en both aides1 the •• th• 

· Japanese 1&1'1 entruat•d to A.Oiral Yauamoi;o •e dull on both aidN to begin 

with. Admin.l. Yamae'So not only didn't nen tnMr how ta.ms.shed it ••J he 

lost his life because ot his ignorance a coupl• of yea.rs l&tv. Nel:ther 

h• nor hia superiOl"• had the uperi.eno• and k:nqwledge that we.re neoe•H.r1 

to polbh up tnat ooizt. It took almost ten 19ara for the truth ot that 

dictum I tornW.ated tor 7ou a JDOMD.t or two ago to beeome c:leu to the- Ja.paneso Na-r,,. Had they taken quick and full advantage of the unfortuna.te 

~; ~-~~~;~·-J~f th• vital c~.-~ . ...--.•~. !he Battle of W.~t ~ - ',_-~ -· .. ~ ,t• 

't,_ .. " ~ • -, ~ l~ -- J"' ,,f -. ~ .!: •: ' - ';.. ; .:._ -~ ... • ¥ _• ~ '1 .&. -· < I 

7·::..·.- _,_,c· - ~ "ct:ra1:4, ~a ~perhapa would have b-dllle t'o the ~ conclusions long ·bM'ore ~ - ···.··- · 

they did. F.ho knawD mat tho roaulte migJ\t ha.TO bean. a.zld the effect thoroof .,,.....------...-- - -- - - - - ~ r· 

·' 

on the outooma of th.a 'WU' !a 'tile PMU'i•T 

·r~~ ·~:-j~~~:~~~.. · e1ar' 1;;-ii ... tt• 11Jf. ~" ·. :·~,· · ·: .. ~~.-.'._. ,~- -. • i• the c 1JlflllfJ~ "." ... ~'- .... ,..t! , .. .,....-,"i'ii ... )'1·· t .. ... .. ' ·L-.._~ .. -:; L -- • .:--;~ ~· .. 't' ~. l"'t'-J- . ~-3...,.;;:::.. ,· ...... 

battles ot 1:orld War If"eacaped ~ atteauon ot Winston Churcb.111. who 

'Nr;.._t:.V\. he. ~ nen' W&Y back 1n 1915) •a First Sea Lord ot the Britiah Na"17 in 

- ha.cL (\ He. ~ ~ tvv:.. ~~ 

l'Tqrld War 1, takl*1 a great 1aterest in CJ7Pbolect.,..._W. tinal oamMnt "bn 

f\ ~c.~~ 

the Dattlo of Uida.7 1• illp:reaaive- in it• parded revelations and in it• ~· .),... 

rostrainti 

One othor le11on -*da ollt. Th• .-nean. lntcdligenoe s7•tem. 

\sllo-~ded in penetra.tillg the ~ 1 llOR oloael.J guarded seorna ... u 1Jl 

~.4.,...11 of event1. Thus Admiral Nimitz, albei'\ 'the weaker. -.. twiee 

a.blo ·to oolloentrate all the foro•s he had in •~lent strength a.t 

the right time and place. lfhen th• hour atruok tnis proved deoia:tn. 

"Th& importuoe ot Hcreoy &tN the con1equenoea of leakage of interll• 

ation are here prool&iDld. · 

l'.t will probably ••• to llllUlY 0£ rq liatenera and readers that I ,have 

pa.id more tributes to tho aohievementa of our Ua.vy oeyptanalysta 1n World -' 1-he;-r 

U'-ar- II tho to those ot ~ Army and Air Foroe opposite numbers. It I ban 

done so, I can only sa7 in extenuation. ot -.hat 1l1AY appear to be i'aTOritim 

........., 

'hftllllil Jf&'V'Y' and neglect tOW&l"d Anrf3 aud Air Force. tha.t three tt.otore ue 

here in'Yolved. FiJ"at. as regvda m;f apparent oTerlooking the oontr1but1.on.s 

ot tho USAF, I need but r.e:m:lnd you that i't •an't UD.til attor the -.r •a 

all over tha.t the .Arsrt3' Air Corp9 beo&M autmumou•J before then the technical 

e.chienaollts or oryptu&l,..-ta of that Corp• 'ftl"e merged with tboae ot the 

Ar'lq. Second, a1 a ..iab•r of the Arsq' 1 Sipal Iatelligence Senioe., and 

thon the AT!1I¥ security Agenay durinc World War· 11, i't 1• fitting 't.hAt .om.a .. ·, 

body other than I blow 'the trwa.pet• in oelebra.tion ot our Arrq' a cryptanalytic 

aob.ievement1. All I will say ia that they were a.11 iaportant as those of our 

·1avy. but for VU'iou1 rea:aona they have not rec•1Ted :ouch P')lblioity. wh1eh is 

juat ais well i'rcm the point of view of National Secna:1 ty • As a :ma.tter of" 

raot. the pUblioity regarding our Ua-vy'• cryptologic 1'llocH1•• omua T•IT 

largel7 trom. former enem.y offioe~s and troa the T&riou.e ottioial in,..•tigations into the attack ou Pearlllarbo, and not 1"rom. any u.s. lavy personnel· •• 

Thud. there has been wry little leakage with Hg&l"d to Arll\Y' a cryptualytio 

•ua~aaea exoept •ucb aa can alao bo tnaed beck to those PearlHaJ'bor investigations. General E1ee?lb.O'WQl' 1 a Crusade ill b.u"oi!• ha1 not one word to 8&)" 

on tho nbjeats ot aigu:l intellige1Loe. oeyptau.l1•1•1 oodea. oi}i191'11• OJ" 

aip;ml •ecurity. etc •• alt,hoUC}l he doe• alee a tn rather oauatic remark• 

about the failure• and error• or h1a own. tntelllgeMe l!ftatt. Gn.enl. Bndley' • 

~l'he Binge of Fa~•. Vol. ?V.. '.Bostons Roughton MU'tliu co., 1950• p.252-3. 
REF ID:A62837 

laook 1• eqmll.J rnio•~ • •••• nb3en1 ~ 1 •'llllft refn.ia fl'• 

quot111g one nth.er umaiag episode hn1»c to do wi11la. COMSEC1 

To idatUy hill•, r•d junoti.Glla, and t~thout our g1'ri»g 

our plu.a a•7 in. the enut ot au •Ulll' tap on. thlt 1d.ro,. I had k97 

teaturea manbered on mr war •P and gave oopie1 ot thoao nuabera t• 

the div.lsion oomazaders. It •• a lllk••llitts pr1.,.te oode, la: enough 

to aauao Dlcka011[Bn.dl•)''• G-!)W01'17 cnw the aecurity of our plaa. 

Ou inorzdug 11ha I called r.l).t&jor-0.-al Tvey Allen,. ho ret..-ra4 

to an ob•CUl"• Ol"oaa•road by ite m.uaber in thi• pri•te code. · 

11Just_a mimlte,. terry, 19 l aa5.d. "X oaa•t fl.ad th&t mmber on DiV' 

mp..• 

"Well,. liatcm caref'ul.17.a B:n.cl," he aa1d. •The nam;y m.y be listening 1D. l'll aa;t tho 1LU1D of the place as ta11; a1 I mm." 

Dickson onl"h•ar"d. ti• C011Ter•a'ti• and thrn up hia hu.da. "securltJ" wouldn't be mob ot a problem," be said, •1t anl)' iihere. wre fewer 

genuals in the &l'l\Y'•,. 

G8Aft'l.l Hap Arnold' a book I 1T• mnt1°"e4 before, u.d haw take ou · ~ · 

e:dlraot .from it. Daere ue several oth•J'• I ldgbi; haw u.ed• bu't thoy an 

aot too 1igm.ticau.t 1ll reTelatiou. OJle T011ZM of- the history of "?he u.s. 

~ - - 1ZL ftforld \lar Il'.. entitled •nte Signal Corpa1

' oou1:aina a. tew retereuoes 

' 

to the acbinemon.t111 of the Signal lntelU.geace Senioe.'but- th.ea•,, too., are 

D.ot very lllllJlli,nating. ln on.17 au book 'b7 a f'o~ tr.s. Anq otfl.cer, Col. 

- Robert s. Allen.., entitled ~US' Forward• 2.'h& hllt9rz of Patton'• fhird #51.! ~ 

do 1 tind a specific referaae to the help th• SIS g&Te fa'"-1. ln. telling 

about Pattcm•s aignal oftioer. Colonel B•...apd. Al.le wii;eB1 

OJLe ot his aoe a.its•• tbe SIS. A l'lld.io-bterceptim ag02107. 

OOJID'Jlded °by ?Ja~or Chu'lea n:f.ut. & young. triggV•aDJ't expert. it 

worked clo1el7 w:1. th G-2 on. a dual 11.i.HiO'llt mizltab.Sllg a vigllult 

aecuri.""7 ohaok on Me1ldl7 oonmm1aa:b5.0IUI ad ~ffoeptlng ellfJDW' 

•••1••• The witt pertormd 011"1taudingl.JJ 1a bfth ti•ldt· 

Its roporba plQgged up u. uard."1ag leU:: troa a Kechaaizod Ca'tO.lry 

souroo, cape.ble ot r"88liag brporiu.t troop..llO'f'amat ini"Ol'.ation. to 

the ellelW• Aac1 at a oritiaa.1 period ln. the Battle et Baetogn.e. the 

unit broke a German coded•••&• that eabled h•v loeaes ta be ta. 

i'licted upon the redoubta.'bl• 6 Para DiTi•ioa.. !he SIS •s pa.rtioularl7 

truittul bl breakthrough• ancl fluid aitu:t!.ona ... the enaw was on 

the run and had to uB• Padlo .. 

rile toregoitig eztract :La. of oourae. tar t'ram. apeota.oular. Iucloed. 

I iml.gin.e tb&t it will hazodly 'br111g .torth more~ a polite ,awn from 

I 

~members of an audience that haa alraq l.8U'lted about the aensats...-1 

rh'elatiou ad• during the w.i-ioua PearlHarbor lawatigatione. and abou'l 

tho•• fuulus letters that General Marsha.11 wot. to Gannor Dne1. But 

~- Yorks 1'he Vanguard Pre••• Inc •• , 195'7 • P• •• Th• author J:ia.kes ... quit• caustic comments abaut the failure of 'Wle 1.Jnelllgen.ce ata.f.'fa to 

m.ke uae 0£ the izltelllgace they nre turn18hed. 1'hey are worth r•d:lng. 
REF ID:A62837 

there raaina this .much JIN'• to be aaida the aol:d.ernmmna of our Jn\Y' • 

ceypt;ologio- units both 111. Washillgton and in th• field,. as well aa o9"&1n 

still unaiaolosed top 1ecret auoceaaea o~ our la'V)'•a unit• ashore aad 

afloat. are locked ••1 in arohiwa where they will pnbabl7 reain tor 

a long. long time. Jloi'e than this l aa not at libeJ'1;7 to tell 7ou 1a 

thi• leoture. 

\lith thia atataent l bring th1• aeries to a rath• ucb'ua'tic but 

I hope mcaningtul close. I will wind ii; up bJ' puapbraaing the last 

ae'\iace ~ the IntZ'oduotion to that important book !he Ba;ttl~ of Midway 

frOllL wb.ioh I have quoted at aom lqth. fhe lnt:redu.ctlon as :wrtt1Htn bf 

Admiral Hobutalca Kem.do. th• aa.lor livtnga .+•1 oowander ~ -the ~or'llJBJ: 

Im.p81'1al lfa."'1, who participated in that battl• 1 oloae this aeri•• with 

the hope that Di' leoture1 w.lU aene &I •tedal t•r ari'filolBll ad retleotlon. 
REF ID:A62837 

rt 

~1-9f 4 mach1ne and bU.ilt tbe 5-rotor model vbich yo• sea in thia allde (Fig. ~). '1'ba rotors 

!~~t 

~~ ..... ~ - """ be inserted ~rigbtaida-11;11" 01' ~la.e-&M>"; the imemal. 

~ ~ 1 Wirlllg e01ll.d be readil.1' chazlged. But this was not a printing acbine. Power '1188 

iJi~ ~A.,,...,,.r~\.:4,;.!- lj'f~~~ ~~~- ~ ~3o~·1~ 11~ f\u'nilbed. by the emaU ~ell $een at the 1ipP!r lett. '!be B&Ty"-vu conaideriDg 

-,~ ~:;'- ~Q~,. u ~ psrchasiJl& a rather"' nUmber ot 1mese machht&• •i L19]1t Stru.'bel, the Chier of the 

{J f !llny'• ~and S:lgnal Slction ot: the Ottiee ot: Ila.al c-•catiou, aalmd me to 

~ 1n~ 11~1 T at~ the machine tor ita ceyptoaecarit,-. DaTy had but tvo macbjnea, neither or which 

~- iw~~.~~~ ~ .1 could be made a'Y&Uable, 10 I 1n<blcecl tbe Chief'/ Signal Ott1cer to "bv\Y a cOU}lie ot them" 

J~~~ ·~~.,ru--~\~3'\. ~-+M ~ ~~ ~ "'t A'* • !?be rotor WiriDg.( were al.togetber ditterut from those ot tba B&'f'1', a tact vbich 

"Si~· ·-,!! i1~ I Cl18CCIVVe4 81Dqll.y by as!dng 8-1. to enci~ a t:n ltttten oa bls lllllcldlle)uaiJ>g 

·~1,aett1- I a;pecified. At:ter aam a~ I rep>rted that in~ op1D1oa the ae01lrity ot: the 

~ ~~ 

maobine vu not as great as Bt.T.Y tbaUgbt. The resULt vaa a challenge, which I accepted. 

~ 

~ ~ ·, B&'YJ" pye me ten measqes pit 'DP on its maebine and I was succeas1'ul in aolviJlg them. 

( ""'!1 ~I c;/ fii. ~ : There ien't time to go into the methods use~, ~ ~t JOU are ~rested JOU._can f'ind ?.;;..-.),.!" • .d!fl,'f\ ~~h~ ~~~I c,._ ...... ,~~ ... ~tl.\..':~~)(-'he>ll_ eQ.,_.. ~ ~~ -:i-·" wo.---.J0.:.-,. t-~ ·, /j~-~---~..,_;;t- f~-.-\ o~~ 1 ct~{,.~~ J~l"'t\, tbtm. described in my /'..brochure tnt1tled l J • , /1\ 

"} ~ I ;ct :J~ Bebern b\Ult H'Vet'&l more moaele tor Boy and tbe~e bad print~ mechmlisms associated '7 

l- § ~l w.; IC\~4. s $el ~ 1 ~'~with~!~ :N&'fY' dropd ~iationa with Hebern!.\W'ben it becmae obrt~ ~the ._ 

1 ~.1ictr~~~~~i·!;~;a~~;;~~~~~~~~t:i:~~~ J~i1 vu mot ccllipetent ~~ ~ ~~-.-1"'4. a111f~ded~ ~ t~ ~~ its__::/ 

]":L ~ -~ "1'7,Ptographic reaearch and dnelopnent 11111t at vliat is nav Jmown as the i'llm&l. Weapma 

!~~~ ,_ \ 

~~~.' 

1:.~ t~ PlJmt in Wash1.llgton. kiiJrg Clnel.op!d at the Sif!nal Corps laboratories at Fort Ml!lmm:>uth 

~ 1:: ~ {!.. machine known as Comerter Mi-134, and fare' e- a slide (Fis. 35) GowUg what 1 t 

t\ __ ,,/ 

looked like. A::rq and B&'YJ' went separate W11f8 1n S\'ICh work for a number ot years but 

/tiJlall;r, 1n 1938 or- 1939, c1oae eoJlabatat!~~ aa a .. IA1lt mi excellent llllcll1Jle 

vbieh waa de"nlo)ed and produced in "*1t1t~ the ~letne Corp:,-rat1on}i Chicago. 

'l'hi• macld ne was d1atr1buted. and ued ftr7 ncceaaf'Ul.1¥ by &ll our Armed Forces f'rom 

. ~ tf.s<- 1'1~ ~T ~~ l~ to the end Of World War II and tor soma 19ara tbsreatter. '!:Iii! • ,., a <lit•• 

- '30 - I'\, 
v 

J REF ID:A62837 
------------~RE~F; ID: A62837 

-~Gt ··Al 1' ... 

L4~J__~~~~~~~~::i .. ~-~---------- -1---
REF ID:A62837 

~~_.>mt:l!h.~~L.d~b~~Lr ~-- , 

O'o ~L'"'f'-· ~ ~'~~~~b-1-E~~-.J 
REF ID:A62837 

,. 

. 

~-
REF ID:A62837 
REF ID:A62837 

REF ID:A62837 

---~~_&,-4=~-~cfe 'IUM~----

-~-14- ~jL&_~~-~ - -~i-

___ re-., o" ~ --- --------- ---

---k ; .. ~ &- ~~----_&..,~--- -- -

-----1~~~--~~A ~ ~--t~.,.-~t:-j)~ ~-~:v.~- , ~ u .... f---~~~~...._~~~~~~~~~UUl...~~~~-;-------

--~--r'C;--'fiC ~ o.,..J.. __ ::(~e.~-Zt-- ~ • ....,.:t-__ 

-~~JWa¥k-t)_ ~- :z_, ~~ '(p fi,e_.,-D~•1:w __ ,~-

-----1e-----• ------- - ----------

------- --- ·-------- --- --
\ 

I 

:J' I 

/." 'Y\1 

I 

:)I I . I 

REF ID:A62837 I 

) ~~dt,~~ ~-the internal works which control the rotating elements and ciphering 

. 

~l-\..~~~~ wheels .(you will see ,..thel\i later) "but I must show you the next step in the improvement of such,cryptographic ma.chines, which ma.de it possible to eliminate 

the tedious job of recording, by hand on paper, the results of encipherment or 

decipherment. This was done by means of a printing mechanism which was associated 

with the ~~~1'- c~c ma.cliine. Here is a slide {Fig. 28) which shows the assembly- /t., 

the B-211 connected to a Remington electric typewriter, modified to be actuated 

~'CO by impulses from the cryptographic me.sh:i.ae. Of course 1 it was natural that the 

next step would be to make the recording mechanism an integral part of the cryptographic machine. This you can see in the neat slide (Fig • ~"' .JG~, in which the four 

rotating members referred to in connection with Fig. 27 and which control the two 

commutators also mentioned in connection with that figure are clearly seen. The 

"~ I':°· Uf-(j 

slide-bar mechanisili"at the right, called the "barrel" or "cage", controls the 

displacements of the printing wheel in front of it and causes the proper letter 

to be printed upon the moving paper tape seen at the front of the machine. 

Now we come to the next and a very important development, one first conceived 

by a European inventor, who was followed soon thereafter, but independently, by 

an American inventor • ..l:8'" In this advance the circuits between the keys of the 

keyboard and the lamps of the indicating board are varied by electrical circuitchalJgers called "rotors", which rotate between fixed members called "stators". 

In Europe the first of such machines put upon the market for purchase by anyone 

desiring one is shown in the next slide (Fig. 31). The machine was appropriately 

named the ENIGMA--for solution of messages enciphered by its means was believed 

to be impossible• -OP :eeul:y -&&. 

,__ ' ~"(> ....;~ 1..-:. -I' 

In Fig.~l ~-(~-I1 is seen the machine with the top cover 

f. 

plate closed. At the front is the keyboard; above it the indicator board, consisting of lamps underneath glass disks upon which letters have been inscribed. ,,brt#..r %""""'"\. ~~·~·-~er-,i.Q.!I'" ~i~ ~--,t... ""~._t.., b-~ Above the indicator boa.rd ~t&-the=lef.t. are seen;\~; J>~heries of four metal r~ 

~ W1J>..d''l... 1.. ! 'i"~-.<.. .&"'-"- C.-~ \ f.:i? ,c.-.cJ..,.z... ........ -%' ~- "'\ ~~~.(. . ~~I 

notched wheels,,1 a.t tbe--lefiT-,.A. switch~ which can be set to "encipher", "de- :ff!:;-.... \I.I .G-~...U- • i· ~,Gitt. I ~~ .i-1~ cipher" or "neutral" positions/\ A:t;..-tJ:ie-1-~.;5. n Fig.~l-J(±e:bei~ the top To ft,. 

A ....... ,..Y .. I 

/ I " I' ;, ....... '\. 

cover plate has been removed, exposing the internal ciphering mechanism. Three e: fJl"""· c~_-('.' ... ____ _ .. ;:. 

6'---~~~.u '1.§,J I have some doubts o~~his ~estion of priority of invention' in this case. a.~""T:~ ... - ,.Hebern began working op:'iJle·~i~e.t'in.1910 or 19ll, although his fi~t u. S. .. '(li)!,.C• 'l'n.1Mll. •\l\Q. ;' .. • °W' UC.. " applicatio~ was filed on I .:i f"1~v _\.. 1c;i.1 • The date of conception may be ear ier than 

7:: . On_,,.,r ___ 3:9i1', I do not kflo~ ·what ~t' :Wis'?"TI;e date on which _:the'"' application f~r a patent ~~r' on !FA rotor mac1!ine was filed in F;urope in lf a..."~~~;:-~ , by a'll~ inventor named ~-..: I) A,~..,,.. Sc~ .. ~ ... ~;·L~··4' ~ ll ~.s~y..'\'7~1... • vt ".7 .. \ O v C/ D 9 ;; l,. o · ........ - = ..... t"" 0 /J , ~ / / , / 
{Jr 

REF ID:A62837 

show JOU the intel'D&l. works vbich control tbe rotat1Dg elemnts aDi ciphering 

wJ..t ~~~ vb.eels but F lllR sllev '°"'the next step 1n the impZoOVenlm.t- of such crwtogre.pbic D&Cb1nes, which llBde it possible to el1m1Date I 

the tedious job of recol'diDg, by band on paper, tbe results of enciphermnt or 

deciphel'llll!nt. 'lhis vaa done by means of a printing mcham.em vbich was associated 

with the cryptographic mchille. Here is a slide (Fs.g. 28) which ahoVB the asaemblytlle B-211 cmmect.ed to a Rem1llgton electric t;ypewri t.er, modified to be actuated 

by impulses f'rolD the crntographic mch1ne. Ot course, it was mtural. tbat the 

next step would be to make the record1128 mechanism an integral. part of the cr;ypto. 

:.ci-,':\ ..... 

,'l 1 gnphic •clWle. 'lhis you can see in the ne~t slide (Fig. 30), 1D which the tour , I 

~tating members referred to 1ll comaection with Fig. 27 and wh1ch control the two 

cQDDlltato:ra also mntioned in connection with that tipre a.re clearl.7 seen. Tbe 

slide-bar mechanism at tbe right, called the "buTel" or "cage", controls the 

displacements ot the printing wheel in tront ot it and causes the proper letter 

to be p:rinted lJl»OD the llOV111g pa.per tape seen at the troll~ of the mchille • 

. Nov we comEt to the next ud a very' 111.Portant de'Velopaent, ODe firSt coace1ved .._ - I ""' 

r)\. / 

/ 

by a Earopean inventor/*° . ...,. followed soon thereafter, but 1.Ddepemently, by ' Ji - A 

Bii ~rtcan inventor.'~ In this advance the circuits between the keys of tbe 

keYboard and the J.amgs ot the indicating board ue varied by electrical c1rcu1 tchaisers called "rotors", which· rotate between fixed members called "stators". 

I ~p.i...i~--"'-&~•.h" 'frr t( ~.J ~ ··-" - ~ .....4. ~ ....... --.c.....:. ....... ,.,.;,_. fi~ ._ ?.<,.-..... , ....... , 

In Europe the first ;...Of' such machines put upon the maxiket for purchase 'ti}r ~ 1 

desiring one is shown 1n the next slide (Fig. 31) • 'l!be mach1n.e was appropria.tely 

.namd the ENIGMA--tor Go1uUon. of messages eneipbezed by its means was 'believed 

- -, to be impossible. e :aedl'iy =so-• ..._ --

Ill Fig.31 at·tbe left (labeled I) is seen the machine with the top cover 

plate: cJ.osed. At the f'ront is the keyboud; al:lcms it the indicator board, con• 

s1st1Dg of lamps tmderneath glass disks upon which letters bave 'been imcribed. 

Above the 1ndicator 'board and to the le.ft are seen the peirpheries of tour metal 

notched whee~, at tbe left a. sv1tch button which can be set to "encipher", "decipher" or "neutral" positions. At the right in Fig. l. (labeled II)., tbe top 

cover plate has been removed, exposiJ:lg the inte:rml ciphering mechanism. Three ')~ "' ... ~) 

' •' 
' 

REF ID:A62837 

rotors or connection changers "in cascade" can be seen attached to notched rings. 

The rotors serve to change the circuits between the keys of the keyboard to the 

lamps of the indicator board. In such a rotor there is a circle of 26 equallyspaced COii.tacts on the left face and a similar circle of contacts on the right 

face; wires passing through to rotor connect the contacts on the two faces, two 

by'two, and these connections are arbitrarily made. The rotors have engraved or 

painted on their peripheries the 26 letters of the alphabet,, which *8'4i11eN can be 

seen through. small windois in the cover plate/ so that the rotors can be aligned 

to the initial key setting. At the left of the first rotor is a stator, on the 

periphery of-which are also 26 letters of' the alphabet. This stator also has a 

circle of 26 equally-spaced contacts, but these are only on its right face and . 

the contacts are connected by wires to 26 double-pole, double-throw switches 

operated by and associated with the 26 keys of the keyboard. The connections 

between the 26 contacts on the stator and the 26 switches of' the keyboard are 

fixed. But the stator is rotatable and its position at any time can also be seen 

3 \, through a window, labeled 3 in Fig.31 (I), so that the initial setting of the 

stator and the three rotors can be seen through the four windows. The initial 

settings of these four elements constitute the key for the starting point in 

ciphering operations. I used the expression "in cascade" a moment ago, in referi:ag 

to the rotors, which simply mea.us that the current initiated by depressing a key 

of the keyboard passes through the stator and then through all three rotors before reaching a lamp of the indicator board. In the 'F.NIGMA, when the current ,...... ./ exi~ts from the third rotor, th8.t is, the last rotor at the right, it enters 

- ow 

./ into another stator also having a circle of 26 contacts, but these are only" its 

left face. This stator is fixed, or non-rotatable, and its contacts are connected, 

two by two, by 13 internal. wires. 'Dlis stator,, called a "reflecto~ serves to 

return the current, which exf}ts from one of the 26 contacts OD the right face 

.:;' 

of the third rotor, back into one of the 25 other contacts OD the right face of 

that rotor, thence back through a contact on the left face of that rotor into a 

contact on the right face of the second or middle rotor, thence through the first 

rotor to a contact on the right face of the left-hand stator. The circuitry in 

this ma.chine insures that if Ap•Kc, for example, then Kp•Ac, in the same position 

of the rotors, that is, the cipher process is reciprocal in nature. The circuitry 

can be seen in Fig. 32. It also has as a consequence that no l.etter can encipher 

itself rt is, A_p, for example, can never be represented by Ac, DO matter what 
REF ID:A62837 

·: 

' paint.ad on their peripheries tbe 26, lette:ra of the alphabet) which lette• can be 

- settings of these tour elemsnts constit11t.e the ke:r for the starting point in 

' 

c1:pheri1Jg open.t1ona. (I used the expression "in cascade" a mcment ago, in Nfering L-. 

- ot tbe roto:ra, that 1s, tbe cipher ~ess ia reciprocal in nature. 1'he circllitr,y - ~1~~ 

can be seen iD ~· .32< It also has as a consequence that no letter can -.cipher 

itself that :ls, 1..g, tor enmple, can never be :represented by Ac• no matter vbat 
REF ID:A62837 
REF ID:A62837 
REF ID:A62837 

position of the three rotors and the left-hand stator happens to be. The same 

// 

is true of all ~ther 26 letters of the alphabet. The three rotors ~· interchangeable, so tha.t.\x_2J(l or six permutative arrB.Dgements of these r~t'i;s is the 

maximum possible, since~ ' f this construction the rotors cannot be,,.inserted in e.n 

...... tv.i '\...ii - +c.,A-

"upside-down" position. In ~ther tn>es of such ma.chines the rotors are me.de so ' ~ , \ p ~ , that the;y ce.n be inserted in e~ther a "rigb.tside-up" or i~ "upside-down" posi-

\ . tion. '!his makes possible a maximum of 6x4x2 ort: lf8tations of tb.e three 

rotors. Of course, if more ~ ~e rotors are a: ilable, from which a selection 

of three ce.n be made, the possibilities increase.I ey considerabl;y. The stator 

at the left ce.n be moved onl;y b;y ha.Dd; ·~t.~ ector at the right is fixed in 

this model of the F.NIGMA. Depressing a ke ~of the keyboard causes the first rotor 

/ \ "" to advance one step, thus changing the .'1rcuit.\from the left-hand stator, thence 

/ \ 

through the rotors to the reflector,/~nce back ~ugh the rotors to the left-

• \ 

hand stator, thus causing a sec depression of the·.._.~ ke;y to produce a different 

\. ' equivalent. 1me to tell you about h01! the rotors are caused to 

\, 

advance so that almost 17, letters ce.n be enciphered before the window settings ... 

of stator e.nd rotors re to their initial alignment. (~total number is not 

·~ -~c."" n ,---· 

in this case 2~ or p,576,but 16,900 ~6x25x26),for technical ~sons which there 

-isJ?-'t time to e+n.). Power for the electrical circuits is prov~d b;y small 

dry- cells in box. at the upper right in Fig. 31 (II). \ 

The o ginal ENIGMA enjoyed a fair degree of success in sales but i ~s b;y 

no mean spectacular. When Hitler came into power, further sales were prohi~d. 

ce it to say that it became the. basis .for machines used by the German Armed 
REF ID:A62837 

poa1Uoa ot tlut three ioto1'il Biid tlm ~ stator~ to be. b .... 

1• true of aU the other 26 .letters ot the alphabet. } 'J!ba three roto:ra are 1Dter-

/ cmmgee.bl.e, ao tbat 3p.-,..1 or six permutative &ITlmlBllli!mte ot theae rotol's 1e the 

mrfppm poas1ble, s1Dce in th1s conatruction the ro'tora cannot be illserted. 1D an 

"•ide-do'WD" poa1tiOD. In other tnea ot e\ICh acbtMe the roton are Bide so 

that tbet caa be iDserted in e1tber a "rigb.taide-Up11 or 1D an "u;ps1da-d.ovn't poa1-

t1CD. 'Dlia Jlllkea possible a llt.X1lm*I of ~ or lt8 penutat1.cma of the thZ'ee 

rotors. M course, if mre than three rot.on an &.vailable, trom which a select1cm 

. ~ 

ot three caa 'be ma&i, the posa11>Wties ~ase ve17 considerably. '!!le stator ~y·v~ t,.μ.J. ~ 

·r:\~:1i at~- ieh_ e~. ~-~ ODly by bald; the :reflector at ~>~-et is t1xed tA 

r-"':."<!A --: this model Qf tbe ENIGMA; A Depressing a ke7 ot the ~~causee the first rotor 

~~ ..... • ~-~ -iv i-..-.;.,_ %-1· ft s. ~ ·.l'·if"·· _ "'""_a.tr ~~ , . 4 • "to ~vance one step, thus_ changing 'the c1rblli. t tram the[ len.-haDl statolj," t'henae 

. t.brov8h. the rotM..,.. to tbe i-etlecWl", thence back through tbi .roton 'lto t.ha )j..nhanci\ statorJ th'l&S eam·111g a~ seccmd depression ot the same ke7 to produce a d1tterent _, . 

equiva.l.mrt. I wm•t take the t:lJle to tell you about bow the l"OtoJ'B 8.J'e caused to 

""..,. wi:........_~ Orth~~...Jf ~'-' {.... }{~ w.l!C1:4o.~ i... ,,.,. • ·.~. tt.-. .... Q..~.:.... --. o~o---..><.--.r- c,...,...u .,:;..~..,_._~Ji. 

advance,..so tbat al.most 111 000 lettere can be enc1Jdmnd before tbe~ov •ett~a 

.. c;..<--\ k.i. /'w- b~ 

ot ~ta tor am!, ro~ re'brn to their 1J11 tial al 1 gmmnt. ('Die tot.al. nmber 1s not 

/ 1a this casa,...26j or 17,576,but 16,900 (26lc25x26);tor teclmical reasons which there 

.J 

·1BD't timt t,o expJ.aiD.) Power -ror the electrical circuits 18 prortded 'b7 amll 

dr,y cells iD. the box at the upper riSht ill Fig. 31 (.II). 

~ ---~!#J~~ ibe ongma.i. ENI<Jl!A eJoyecl a tair degree of success in saJ.•a but it was by 

no means spectacular. When Hi tlor ca.ma 1Bto power, turtber aales were prohibited. 

suttice it to sa7 tbat -1t 'becw tbe basis tor PBCh'nes used by the Ge1'11Ul Aned 

Forces 1D World War II. 

In tbe u. s.,,_ ill about 1920, a California ilmmto.r ll8Dtd. Hebem imependently 

conce1'ftd a -'*Chine which he called an "•lectr1c code". l:lebern 1 s tiJ'st patent 

application 1s datfod 1"3 ~ll)"l.I and covers ai'JDaehi.De aoaawhat s1JD1l•r to tbe 

+t--1 1,.J... { i •• h 

ENIGMA. but vi th same important differences; the cipher alphabets produced by it 

were not rec1proeal and, :morecmtr, a pl.aiD•text letter could repreaen"t itael:t in 

the cipher text.. Hebel'll .managed to avoid these tvo weaknesses 'b,- 1Dcorporat1Dg .. _ ,..v .. -;:"1 ... ,,J' ~ ~r .. / 

a. av1 tch plate 'Wbich could be set one VB.)"' tor encipber1ng and deciphering another 

' "\{.. )J..., ( r 

way. On the other hand, not as is the case ot tJle ENIGMA, the- electrical CUl'J'ellta 

made cmJ.7 one traverse through the rotors.• :rather than two 'tirlweraes: into the 

rotors via one circuit and back throush tbell via another circuit, as is the case 

in the ENIGMA. 1D the HEBEHN, iD enc1phermtnt the current went 1n one directicn 

tb.rou8b the rot.on -aner·in dec~phenaent in the l'eftr&e direction Tia the same path. 
REF ID:A62837 

APP~NJ)I)( Yo \-E.CTLJR"E YI 

._T_._-_\h,g._~--~---''~~- ~-~='-' i''!_~----~Cf_4~_: _______ _ 

-----------·---------rM~;::~~~--- -------------------- -- ---~-=~= 

------ -------~---- --

---------------------------

E~ t'l~-J)~~ ~7 • ..5"......i._~l~'""t __ 

t~~ 

_,. ______ ----- -- - - - - - ~--- ---- --------- - ------ --- -- -- ---
) 

/ J ( '; 

REF ID:A62837 

r 

'lhe Marlhall•Dewey correspondence 1• IO important 1D cryptalogic hUtary 

that I f'ee1 that the whole of it should be 1Dcl.ud.ed even 1D tb1a briet history. 

When the letter was W'itten it was, of course, !OP SJ.mmf and it wu only'~ 

sr-t pre&IU1'e trail oerta:sn members at the Joint Congressional. Cammittee 

that General Mal'sb&U revealed ite canterrts.8 9>.ue, it came 1:ato the publ1c 

dcmain not Obly on the Vetr.Y dq tbat General Marshall was f'orced to pla.ee 

tt 11\ evtdence-1ta publication cauaed a great aen.ation 1D the nevapapers •• 

'Wt a1.ao when th~ 4o vol~ ot the He!!!tys at tbat Camnittee were publisbed 

and put on Ale b)" the ~t of Doo1.11118!l'ts cfi tbe GoVemlumt Printing 

otticie. 'lhe 41.ecl.oaure of tb.e contents ot the Maraball.•DeveJ' correapandence 

vaa indeed such a eanaat!cm that LD'E magazine pnnted the whole ot i't in its 

iesue ot'·11 December 194-5, vith the following Ultroduction: 

i\ 

MABSIJALL-DEWft L81'J!EBS 

GENERAL '1'0LD ~ WE RAD BBOXER JAP CODE 

Du)::!.ng the 1944 election cempeJ.sn. General George c. .MarahaU 

wrote two let'tet'e to BepUblican Ce.ntlid&te 'lhaaaa E. Dewey, tel 1 1ng 

h1m that Ara1:J' ~en had broken the Japanese "ultra" code. 

'lhis taot was tir8t re"te8led in a stor,y by t..tPE m.itor, Joh:a. Chamberlain, 

wich appeared in LIPE, Sept. 24. Manh&U'• ~ae, ~wrote 

wa to foreetall Dewey's revelation of that :tact 1n a poss1b1e attack i\ 

· on the Roosevel.t adm1n18'fa'at1on'a Japanese policy before Pearl. Baztbor. 

!the 

~ 

actual text of the letten rem&1ned secret until , ast wek, wen 

Marehall appeared before the Congre•s1cmal. a~ttee 

investigating ~l Ba:rbor and :made the letters pu.blio. 'lhey 

appear below. 

When he had f~ed reading the :f'irat two paziagrapha ot the 

first letter, GaveJ$0l' ~ etopped becDM, as the ~lain 

article reported,. "the l.ettel' misht possibly contain mterial 'Which 

ba4 already acne frca other sources, ~ tbat ~, a eandidatefor Pns1dent 'WU in no position to make bl.ind praniaes. 0 General 

Manhall aent the letter back again with an intro4uct1on which .rell..-ed the garezinor at b1ming condi:tiou.. ~ time Dewey :read the 

l-etter and after l1UCh tb.ougbt ancl. diecusaion decided not to make 'Wte 

durtng the ~ of ~ intonation he previ~ hid. 

(POR MD.. ~'S !ml CELY) 

My Dear GoVe1"Z1Qr: 

I am writing 1'QU w1 thout the knofllec!ge of an.l' other person ~ept 

A&n:1r&1. King (\Ibo concurs) becauae w &1'e approaoh1Dg a grave dilemma in 

the political. :reactions ot Congress regarding Pearl. Barbor. 

8 So i'a:t u ! em aw.re it has neither becm ucertained nor diacloeed, u 

known/',Who gave Covemor Dewey the :ln:farmation. But it u a. tact tbat/\aa a 

patriotic citizen,. he acceded to General Marahal.l.ts requeat--he made no use 

1lbateYer ot the Tit&l secret inf'ormatian during the cem.pai.sn ~after 1t. 

(TIME' s account specifically states that Dewey "held hia" tongue. 'lhe War 

Department's most valualbe secret was kept out o£ the campaign." I know 

this to be true. ---WFF'.-
"! I 

i \,I ' I 

I 

..; 

!i: i:r p P ·~ij~t li!H~ ~pci: :fJij I r r JI~ 

' 

l --~I 1111 f.; ilK '!ti:f .!i~wt 11 l• Jfijft Ii ~1-:1: !tt ~ 

f 

R !I ~ ~ t Is.~~ Ir'~~ s1~1, ~ig1li g ~i: ~ t~~ t sfi 

i git IJa I fj I' ~~1 t! liJij~~ tf 11~ ; IJf ~! !f fr~! f~t: i I~ 1'i e lls(~ i:~ !fl t1 ~ QEG!I !~ t ~ij1~ i I c), ii! fti:~ f 1li~ ~ t 1~·! II I f i ·ir I els 

.. 

! if! •

4 !t M t; ~ t i: •atl lfi ·~ii i '~•1° ri 

I 

\ 
" 

~ ,' I 

\ 

REF ID:A62837 

You will understand trca the foregoing the utter tragic conae• 

quences 1f the present political debatea regarding Pearl Barbor disclose to the enem.y, German or Jap, eD'3 suapicion. ot the dtal sources 

of infomation we nov posse••· 

["'> 

'lhe Robert~~) report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from 

it all reference to this h1gbly secret natter, therefore 1D portions it necessarily appeared 1ncan;alete. ~e same reuon mtch dictated 

that course 1s eyen more 1mportant todq because our aourcea have 

been greatly elaborated. 

ti a turtber aemple Of the delicacy ot the e1tuat1on11._sane ot 

Donovan's people (tbe OSS), without tel.11ng UG, 1astitutM a aecNt 

search of tbe Japanese Fimbuq otticea in Portugal. As a result 

the entire m1l1tar.Y attache ... Ja,panese code all onir the world waa 

changed, and though this occurred. over a year ago, we have not yet 

been able to break the new code and have thus lost tbia imaluabl.e 

iDf'cmnation &CNl"Ce, ~ic\11.arl.y regarding the Burepean s1tw\t1on. 

A recent speech in Congress by RepJ:iesentative Barr.Leia would 

c1early suggest to the Japanese tbat we have been read1ng their codes 

though Mr. Bernese and the .American public vau1.d probably not draw 

8D1' such CDDCl1Ua10D. 

'lhe conduct of General Eisenhower'• cupaign and of &1.l. oper. 

ations in the Paoif'1c are cloael.y related 1n conception and tim1 ng 

to the inf ~ion we secretly obtain through these intercepted 

codes. 'Ibey contribute greatly to the Victory aod tremendouslf to 

the sav1ngif of American livea, both in tbe conduct at current operations 

and in loOking towa:rd. the early termination ot the war. 

I am Pl"l!Sent1ng this mtter to you, f'or your secret 1nf'Ol'llation, 

ill the hope that 1'0U v1ll see your WQ' cle&l' to avoid the tragic 

reaul t& with w1cb ve are now tbreatensied in the present pol.itice.t 

canpign. I might add that the recent action ot Cangreas 111 requiring 

Arrq and NftJ' !nVestigations tor action before certain d&tea has 

cam.pelled me to bring back the corps connander, General Gerow, Whoee 

troops ee fighting at 'l'.rier, to testify here while the Ge1'118.DS are 

counterattacking hie f'orces there. 'lhia, howwer, is a verr JQinor 

matter compared to the loss of our code irlformation.l.O 

Please :return thls letter by bearer/I v.Ul hold. it 1n JQ' 

secret f'Ue subJect to your reference sbold you so desire. 

SJJ:OND LF1l!l'Ea 

'fef SBeBI! 

Fa1 thfully yours, 

G. C. Manhall 

(FOR MR. DEWEY'S nE OBLY) 

21 September 1944 

J.ty Deal" Governor: · 

// 

Colonel Clarke, UJ/¥ messenger to :you of yes~, Sept. 26, has 

reported the reault of bis del1n¢7 of~ letter dated Sept,,.- 25. A8 I understand him you (X} were unwilling to camtt ycurself' to any agreement regard.1.ng "not communicating its contents to any other person" in 

view ol :the f'act that ;you f'elt you~ knew certain of the things 

probably al.reaey :referred to in the letter, u suggested to you by 

seeing the wrd "ceyptogralil," mad. (8) you could not feel that auch 

a letter u th1e t? a Presidential. oendiM.te could have been add:resaed 

to J'OU ':!7 an ott:lcer in~ position without the knowledge ot the 

President. 

10 'Die last tvo ser.tences 1A this paragraph were omitted f'ram the Second 

Letter. Bee footnote 11 bel.ow.--WFF 
.-· 

-·' 

! 

/ ,t 

--\-' I 

/ 

v;t~ 

:-

('./ 

,f 

REF ID:A62837 

I 

As to C•) lhoV'e I mm quite villinS to;haTe you :read. what comes 

hereafter with the underatanding that you are bound not "° calllllmicate to e:rq other pt:l"Son ~ porticu on Wicb you do not now baVe 

or later receiTe ~aatual. lmowledge b'ca aame other source tbam JIO"Seli". 

AB to (B) abOYe you haTe...., word that neitber the Secretary of War nor 

t.he President bu 8IJ1' intimation Wat1oever that such a l.etter bu been 

addreased to 1'0U or that tbe preparation or sending at such a CQllllDJD1 .. 

cation vas being cou1dered. 

I &elUl'e )"OU that tbe o~ persona who 11&'11 or lmov ot the existence 

ot either this letter ¢' 'Ill:/ letter to 70u dated Septi 25 are Adm:11'l 

King, seven k-ey otticen responsible tor securtv of m:llitu'f aOlllllNDication.s/\. 

any '111¥ secretary wo typed theae lette:rs. 

I am tr.y.tng f11:1 best to ..- pla1n to you that thia letter 18 

being addresled to ,-ou solely on 'lll3 1n1 tiative, Admi:ral. Kil28 having 

been consu:lted only after the letter vu ~~ and I am penieting 

1zl the matter because the military hazardS involved are eo aerioue 

that I feel aane action 1a neoesaar,y to protect the 1Dtereats ot our 

armed f'orcea. 

('l!ie second letter then :repes.ted aubatanti~ the text of the 

first letter except tor the first two paragraphs). 

LIFE tailed to note that the lut two sentence• in the penultimate 

paragtaph ot the "Pirst Letter" were omitted tram that paragraph in the 

"Second Letter," but there 1a no expl-anation far the amiaston. ll Pezbaps 

r 1t was simply tor the sake of 'brev1. 't1', bUt tbis aeema tmprobable. 

! In 'llJY' :t:trllt lecture I called attention to the :tact that the aeoount given I - , I - '~; 

: 1n ~ TIME articie gj.vea cred1 t to Arrrq cryptana].ya1s for proy1d1ng the secret 

ii / 

' 

.. 

,, cCllllllUD1cationa !ntel.ligence "which enabled our Davy to v111 aUCh spectacul.ar 

battles as tboee of the Coral sea and Midwa1', and to wa;yllO' Japanese canvaya," 

W.ereas the credit 'for the cammm1catione intelligence which enabled our Na.'V'Y 

I 

! I 

, I 

j I 

' 

y ,,..·: ... 

·' ' _L 

1/ ' 

' , 

/ 

. 

, 

!"/ 

I .(I I 

I ...,, . I n'f.' l 

I 

{ 

l , 

to win these battlea wu produoed by Navy c~ta. One cannot blame 

the ed.1 tors of TIME -ror maldng 8UCh a bad ft'l'O%' 'because the source ot the a-ror' 

can be traced direc~ to General Maraball' B l.etter itself. Several ye8" ego 

I Uked uq ~illd Colonel Clarke, who bad carried Geberal. Marshall's letter I 1,_1 

to Governor Devey and 'Who was at the time a high level otticer in G-2, bmr 

sucb an error had o:rept into General Marshall' a letter/ and vu to1d that 

the letter which bad been prepared f'ar General. Marah&ll. • s signature did not 

meet vitb the GenenJ. t IS ld>.ole•hee.rted &pprova.l and tbat the Genera.1. himaelf bad 

modified it. Perhaps that is haw the error to which I have referred crept into 

'"it. - ·0ne aaul.d hUdly expect General Marshall. to be entirel.y famUiar with I 

the technical. cryptanalytic detail.S involved in what he mmted to- tell Governor 

'\ .(\ 

Dewey, nor Should one cri~ze h1m tor not being ab1e-, in h1• very busy d"8 ~ 'i: 

n The sentence beg1zming "I might add. • • " and tbe one beghm1ng "IJhia, 

however 1s • • • " were an1 tted. --WFF 

J ~ ... ~ 

' 
•' 

' a.r/ 

( 

-

REF ID:A62837 

under TflZ'T hea1'7 pre1aure ot. events, to bffl' in m1M or even to know about the 

ditte:rence• between the en_, Q'81*u Y01"ked upon by the reqectiTe and •epar&te 

kzsy and 1'a'Y7 orntanaJ.ytic organ1:r.at10b. It is o:t couru »e>••ible, indeed it 

ma:y be ,_that 1D the cuea or certain 1m;portant riaval operat1ona 'nluable camr.r /' 

came fZ'm :me•asea read by A'Z'lq ~· and this ~ be 'What ccmtuaed 

General. Marshall 1D 11llply1ng that all t.he ezoedit belcmged. to th• 'beoawse of 

their solutiOl'l ~ the Japmeae higbeat-l.«mtl diplmstic c~eu, the one 

,... that used the ao-cal.1ed "Purple Code," vbich -..n 't & "code" but a cipher 

mecl>ine. 

Since the period during which tbe discl.oeu:rea ot the Jo!Dt Congressional 

Investigation were a.de, d1aal011ures v!d.cb wee d1saatroua so te:t" aa concerns 

) the important acc<D,Plisbment• ot the two •eni.cea, betore and a:tter the Pearl. 

'\.· Barbor attack in the field of cC111111UDJ.cat1ou 1nt.ell1gence,, ud-. much lue hu been 

written and 1• now in the public domtjn regarding those acccmrs;>liehmenta, but 

:tortuna~ no techD.ical details ot s1gnif'icance have been d.Ucloaed. llinta 
~·-.,} - , 

1 

-

The Majority Report made five main recommendations, of' w.blcn me secu.uu 

,1.1 REF ID: A62 83 7 is of speciaJ. interest;'\Y 

That there be a complete integration of Army and Navy intelligence 

agencies in order to avoid the pitfaJJ.s of divided responsibility which 

experience has made so abundantly apparent; that upon effecting a unified 

intelligence, officers be selected for intelligence work who possess the 

background, penchant, and ca.pa.city for such work for an entended period 

of time in order that they may become steeped in the ramifications and 

refinements of their field and employ this reservior of' knowl~ in 

evaluating mteriaJ. received. The assignment of an officer having an 

aptitude for such work sboul.d not :fJnpede his progress nor affect his 

promotions. Efficient intelligence services are just as essential in 

time of peace, as in war, and this branch of our armed services must el.ways 

be accorded the important role 'Which it deserves. 

I assume that due note of this recommendation has been taken by the 

services but how far it has been possible and practicable to insure that the 

recommendation has been carried out or ·will be I do not know. In this connection 

I think it may be of interest to cite what the distinguished commander whom I 

have al.ready mentioned, GeneraJ. Omar Bradley, has to say on this point~ 

In thefr intelligence activities at Allied Forces Read.quarters, the 

British easily outstripped their American colleagues. The tedious years 

of prewar studies the British had devoted to areas throughout the world 

gave them a vast advantage which we never overcame. The American 

"-19th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Document No. 244, Washington: Government 

Printing Office, 1946, p. 232. 

'J"Ibid, page 514. 

YI Ibid, page 253. 

~Op. Cit., page 33. 
L 

r < .......... , 

~ 

I 

REF ID:A62837 

'5001V 

Arm:!' s long neglect of intelligence training was aeeon reflected by the 

ineptness of our initial undertakings. For too :many years in the 

preparation of officers for crnrnnand assigmnents, we had overlooked 

the ~eed for specialization in such activities as intelligence. It is 

unre&Listic to assume that every officer has the capacity and the 

inclination for field command. Many are uniquely qualified for staff 

intelligence duties and indeed would prefer to denote their careers to those 

tasks, Yet instead of grooming qualified officers for inteJ.ligence 

assignments, we rotated them throu8b conventicmal duty tours, making 

correspondingly little use of their special talents. Misfits frequently 

found themselves assigned to intelligence duties. And in same stations 

G-2 became a dUD«>iDg ground for officers m suited to line carmand. 

I recall how scrupulously I avoided the branding tbat came with an 

intelligence assignment in IQ" own career. Bad it not been for the 

uniquely qualified reservists iho so capably filled so many of our 

intelligence 41:Pbs throughout the war, the arm;,y would have fcnmd itself 

badly pressed for carrpetent intelllgence personnel. 

Have same of you pondered over the reason why an officer who reaches 

the highest level of corrnnet1d 1n BZl7 B.l'Jll1', ours as well as in foreign armies, 

is cal.led a "genere.l officer" or "Genere.l'l" It is because he is supposed to have 

by diligent st~ and first-hand experience learned sanething about everything 

connected with military operations. But a high-level generalist is not a specialist 

1n all the operaticms under his cognizance and responsibility. As a f'ield 

camma.nder the generalist could conduct his operations satisf'acto.r;S:-1.y w1 thout 

being a specialist 1n all. the phases of warfare before the latter became so 

complex as it has become in modern times. Be can perform satisfactorily even 

brilliantly, even now, provided he has competent specialists to assist h:l.m. 

And it is in the very- 1.nq>ortant areas of cryptology, in COONT and CCH3EC for 

m:lli tary 1 naval and air operations and services that you; if' ;you become real 

specialists, can be of utmost assistance to field canmanders, the genera.lists, 

That is where you cane into the picture--as their responsible and qualified 

specia.lists in the quite complex. operations of cryptology as applied in modern 

warfare. 

But let us leave speculations as to the possib1e applications of cryptology 

!JM"""' _, 

in modern [are 1n the future, interesting as they may be, and continue with 

o'Ur histoey of such applllcatious 1n the pa.st. Let us first dispose of certain 

canments in the CCJO:NT area of that history, and specifica.lly to the rol.ll that 

CCMCNT (or "Magic") plqed., not only in the events preceding the attack on 

wl,.i:.clv 

Pearl Barbor but also 1n the military, naval and air operations" ensued, not only 

in the Pacific but also in the European 'lheatre. 

You will recall. that in the first lecture I called to your attention an article 

which appeared in the 17 December 1¢5 issue of TIME :magazine, and which was 

based upon a letter that the late General George C. Marshall., then Chief of 

Sta.ff' of the A:rllly, wrote to Governor Thomas E. Dewey, Republican candidate f'or 

President in the 1944 e1ection campe.ign. Here is a picture shOWing how the two 

a7J princip,les looked at that t:l.me (Fig. 1). In that letter, which was written on 
:::::- -:::-=- .-

REF ID:A62837 

~ Arntr'• long negl.eot- ot ta~e tft.1ntqg WU ueari 1'$flected by the 

~··at our 1n1151&1 ~ .. "8~ too lllU\'Y 1ftZ'* :ln the ~ttan of ottieen tw ec "" wisuu•,a, ve bad c:mtrlOOked 

the need. ff# apeetaU:zatian s.a SWJh 80'\t"f'i\ies aa intel.l..tg'enc. It 1a 

uare&U~ic to ultUlla tba.t ~ oftic• u.. the cape.ci'tr air1 the 

1ncl=Jnatton for :field crc11poancl. Jfatq' &ft un1qu.e1'Y qualitied tor et&f1: 

intellf geme dU\iea aJ'l4 ~ 1mUld pfttet' to denOte their CU"ee:ra to thote 

aaatgmr:nta, 

~.. 

c~ 

Yet msteaA 

we Jtetated 

ot ~ 

.,._ tbl'ougb 

qU&Utted 

QOJWent!crml. 

ottteen 

dut)r 

tar 

tom, 

~ 

tnlktng 

little uae of" their ~ t&1.enta. M:latite f'J'equentl.1 touad tblllMlvn aaa!gaed to 111te111gemee 4UU.e1. .All4 s.n 84*8 ttA.Uou 

a-2 be<)ame a 4Ump1IJg gounct for otticen ill autted to l1na ecmauut. 

I reea.u. how ~oualy I avoided tbe brtmdins: that came· 'Vt.th an -~ u•1g.tD1"'rt -sn 'llf1 own careo. Jfad tt not been tor- the untq~ 

~ 

qualii'!ed ~ Who ao ea~bl.7 f'W.ed eo llB1Q' t!f our 

J9bs thtc>UShout the war, the IJ:l!lfl1 WOttld have found Itself' 

bad1T Pl'fflled tor~~·~. 

Rave eCIJ1tt of )GU pandel'ed;,,~ the ftU08 • an ottic• who ~ 

the h1Rhestl 1evel. Gt' c .-.a iii - (Aftq, ·Ol.U'S .. ~ .. 1ll t~ ... ,

1• oalled • "senewl. ~" ~ "Geneal t" It ia beeawae he 1• IUppollecl to haT9 

by ~ ~ and f'i.rJl't-hemd experieaee 1..-..ned ~about ~ 

carmectad nth adlttary opara.'ttona. But • hl&h•1evel. -~ u *" a •peaia.l.tart 

m AU the opeai$:fi1dd \1Jlida bu ·eoani~ an« 1espauiM.U:tr. /4 a field 

~the ~ ~ ocmuet b1a operattou .atiafaeWil.7 i4thout 

be1rlg a jpec!al.1~ in au.. the pb.Mu Cit vitft'8" befCJ'e the latter b- so 

eanpl.u as 1t bu 'beOame :tn ~ ~. B• can. pq-torm '"1*1'actor117 ev~ 

~. nb uov, ~et he ha• CJ~ apec1a.\1ns to aaatn b.1m • 

.bd. it is 1n th• Vf'lf1!3' ~ areas at ~, 1n caa:ir.r D1 O.~ te 

) m1litaz7, !l&Ya.'l. $M1 ail" o:per&tiOM u4 ~ tbe.t 700., U :fOl1 ~an Z'e8.1 

speciel.1.ts, can be at utmost USUt.ence, to tteld c~, the gen«f&lidb. 

!l!bat 11 wheJe 1c:ftt eane into the pi~ the1:r ~ble and qu&U.fted 

~iaUata m the ca.111w e~ex opE!:fttiou ot ~co ae ~ect in modem 

~ ie.t ·ua lu:ra .apecutat!ona as to the poaetble appUeattou ot ~ptcdogy 

1JJ ~"~ Sn ~ f'ut'Ul'e, ~ .. tb.,- .. be, and •antS2rllt! v.tt.Jl 

OU1" h1ator.f or ISUCh appU.el1.Ucu 1il the pan. Let ua :rtnt diapoee or certain 

e....u m the C<Mafl' uea of tbat hiat017, l!LIW1 ~ to the l'Ole that 

CCJmr! (or "'"""" 

~ .. ") ~, not anl.)' in the ·erenw p:relied1ng the ~ attack on -

~ lfRb01" but alao tta the· mU1~, Mftl. and a.Sr opeatiomt"euued, not cml.)' !\ 

111 the Pao:lfie but al.ao 1n the European 'lhea.tft. 

tou vill. HCal1 tbat in 'the 1'it'st lectuff I c&1 led 1K> J0'2r attelltt.?n a article 

T 

~~%,~} 

Stef'f ot tbe Arnry, 'Wl'Ote to aovemo.r Thew• 1. Deve,y-, llepu"blioan cand1de;te tor 
______ 

______________________ 

i REF ID:A62837 

27 September 1944, General Marshall practicall7 begged Governor ~ to 88.7 

~ nothing during the campa1gn about a certain ~e of very tttal.. information 

which General Marshall had reason to believe had became known to Governor 

Dewey, it having been "leaked" to h:lm by persons not authorized to disc1ose it. 

The :lnf'ormation dealt w1 th the fact that the U. S. had been readiug certain 

/ high-level Japm.ese codes and cipher.seven before the attack on Pearl Barbor. 

j 

The vital point which General Marshall wanted to convey to Governor Dewey was that 

not onl7 was the information which had surreptitousl7 been given to Governor 

Dewey true, but more important were the foll.owing f'e.cts !!.!,, that (1) the war 

w.s still in progress; (2) the Japanese were still using certain of the pre-Pearl 

Harbor cryptosyatems; and (3) the u. s. was still reading the secret J~~o..'Tle..'Se.­

ccmnmmications in these s78tems, as well as certain other enemy cammmications. 

'l!lerefore, 1 t was v1 tal that Governor Deve7 not use the information which had 

came into his possession as to our reading Japanese secret cammmications prior 

to the attack on Pearl Barbor and that he not use as po11tical azmmmition the 

unproved assumption, or even if the assumption were true; that the attack should 

not have caught us by surprise. I said in that first lecture that I might later 

give further extracts from TDm's account and, to continue the extracts fran 

that account, here they are: 

General Marshall had a long series of bad manents after U. S. 

f'lyers, showing a suspicious amont of foresight, shot down Aamiral 

Yemaoto 1 s plane at Bouga.inville in 1943. Gossip rustled through the 

Pacific and into Washington cocktail parties; General Marshall got to 

the point of asking the FBI to find an officer "who could be made an 

example of." ('llle FBI, fearful of l.ooking l.ike a Gestapo, refused). 

Once a decoder 'WB.S caught in Boston trying to sell the secret. 

Once, well-meaning agents of the ortice of Strategic Services ransacked 

the Japanese Bnbassy in Lisbon, whereupon the Japs adopted a new code 

for military attach~s. This code remained unbroken more than a year 

l.ater.6 !l!be worst scare of all came during the 1944 presidential campaign, 

when George Marshall heard that Thanas E. Dewey lmew the secret and 

might refer to it in speeches. 

- . ., 

Yet for all. these fears, the Japs never discovered that the U. s. 

was decoding their messages. Even after the surrender, the Army still ~j 

used Magic as a guide to occupation moves; though it had once been ~ed l 

to send a who1e 8.1'2Q' into Korea, Magic showed tbat a single-regiment 

would be enough. 

~"/#pPf ... 

The letter, on stationery of the Chief at Staff's Office, bore a bo1d 

heading: TOP ~Rm', FOR MR. DEWEY'S E!m o.NLY. Candidate Thomas E. Dewey, 

his curiosity piqued, read rapidly through the first two paragraphs. 

S If' I ever learned about the Boston incident, I have forgotten all about 

it. But I shall never forget about the Lisbon episode. --WFF 
L •' 

REF ID:A62837 

27 Septenber 1944, Genenl Mlnball practically begged Govel"D~ Dewey to l8r,V 

V ~~ nothing during tbe ~8'1 aboUt e. certain ~e ot ver.r vttal intemation 

which Gellenl Mlreball. had l'eUOJi to believe had 'beocme knom to ~ 

Dewey, it ha"l1.ng been "leaked" to h1m by persona not authorized. to d1saloae :tt. 

,~/ f 

I 

1he !nf'an:atian deal.t with the tact that the u. s" had been ftait'TJS certa:S.n 

h1sb•leVel Jqu.me code& -1. c1PJ.ef1 ev-en bei'OM_ the attack on Pearl Barbar. ·- \ 

Tb.e Vital po!n1i 'Which General Mli:rahaU '4mted to convey to aovemor Dewey vas that 

not only wu the Ulf'Ol'm&t1on 'Which had auneptitoual.y been gt"Ven to ~ 

DJtWeY tiiue I\ but mere 1mpol'tant ~ the tal.l.M.Ds :taeta Uz, 'tbat 1 (l) the W'aJ' 

was at.1ll in pioogrees; (2) the Japanese wel'e stul. using certain o£ the pre.Pearl 

Barbar cryptosyutema; m;a- (3) -the u. $. 'W&S at1U reading the see:ret Jo..po..v-~ I 

cmmmm:lcations in these syatema)''., well Ill oeftain otba" ~ caauu•tlca.t1ona. . Ml~~.-«.-.1~~°'1 ..... 

IJ!b.eretQXif:1 it was vital that~ Devey not use the infotmatian~lell hat 

-

~ the 

jzsteM• 

att•e'r 

---

ea Peul lJel!bor, 

'tie 

am 

...... 

·tbs~e 

i'&A'liHg ~~ ~j;JU'ttttcai maunttt......t!m 

.,.,-·- / 

Ue§fQ Jll4 M8Wijftic.aiT ........... - re 9.:S~:tcrt 11($0 ..,, .. '1l!J:a-. ~k~ 

~ bev• aeurSIW 11!Pb'J~f:ee,. I said in that firtlt iecture that l might later ~lt..·.i.s.. U)'IJ!J. k /.,,,.._J. -.... /\ : :__ ~ :......._' j.;. .· 

give i"urtber eJttracts f'rCln iJ.IIME's account and, to oon'9iaue the extracts tram 

that account, he!"e they are: 

aenemt Mtlnba1.l. had a longuserl.ea a£ bad momenta after u. s. 

tl.yers, showiZlg a suspicious amqnt of foresight, eot down .Admil'll.l. 

~'•pl.anti $.t Bouge.1nV1ll.e'ln 19'4"3· Goesip NStl.ed through the 

Pacihc and into Wa.Bb1.ngton cocktail parties; GenenJ. Mm:ehal.l got tc 

the po1!lt at asking the P'.BI to t1nd an cd'f1cer '"who cOUl..d be made an 

exampl.e -ot. n {'lhe !'BI, feartu:L of :Loold.Dg like a Gestapo.~ ref'utled). 

once a decoder was caugb:t ~ B0.8ton trying to sell tbe tteoM. 

Once, we.U-meantng agents of the or.rice ·a£ Strategic Sel'Ylcee ~ked 

the Japanese .Embe.$sy/:lD Li•bon, whe:-eupcm the Jap5 6iiopted a b.ew cede 

tor m:Uitary atte.ehes. 'l'.bia code remm1nect unbroken mare than a yea 

later. 6 IJJle wont scare of all oe:ma- during the l.~ presideritieJ. campe.!gn, 

when George Mal'ehall. hea1'd that 'lhcmea E. Dewey knetl thG secret at1d. 

m1eJlt ~e:r to it in speeche•~ 

. -· 

Yet tat: all t,heae tears, the Jape never dlscovexed tbe.t the u-. s. 

was decod:S.ng their meslJB6eil. Eireu attn- the eun-end•, the A1!tfJy atUl. 

used l.tt.gic as & guide to oecupat1on move•; though tt bad onee been ~ed 

to send a llhole ~into xore&1 Mag;S.c ehowed. tbat a single-regiment !\ 

would 'be enough. 

~BE.J! KEP.I! 

:::;;: -- -- !the letter, on stationery of the Chief or statt•s Office, bore a bo.1.d 

beading: TOP SEXmE?, FOB MR. DEWEY'S EDS ONLY. Candidate ~C!1B$ E. I>ewey, 

bis curiosity piqued, read l'apidly through the fin't two pB:tagra.pbs. 

S If' I ever lea.med &bout the Boston incident, I h&ve forgotten all about 

it. But I shall never forget about the Lisbon episode. -WFF 
REF ID:A62837 

I am writing YQU w1 thout the kpowledse of e.nv other ...R.ei:.scm/....§.~ 

Admiral King (wbJL.5:2n~~~ l.l>.!.<!.'-~s_e -~ ~~ ~&RF-..£>!<:~~-&JE!Ve d&l.emma. ii! 

.the po1itical reaction! o,t~,£esp r.§!_.@-!d~ .J:!e,!£1 .... ~.£!:: 

What I have to tell zou below_!.s of such a hiS'h!X secr,!j;, natm:!.-~ 

I f'eel !:,OlllPeld,ed to a!!_z9,H..!!'!aJ.er .. to accept it on the basis of ygur not 

cammmicating its contents to g_o~er person and_;eturninS this letter 

or not r~~ further and returning; the letter to the bearer. 

Tom Dewey looked up :l'rom -ehe typewritten page. As he did the 110rd cryptograph, 

a f'ew paragraphs below, flashed into his vision like a red tratf'ic light. He maa::e 

his decision quicl:l.7,f'olded the letter, handed :!t back. Colonel Carter w. Clarke (in 

mufti), who had f'lown f'rom Washington to Tulsa to catch up with Tom Dewey's campaign 

went back_,his mission uncompleted. [Here's a picture of' Colonel Clarke, (Fig. 2). 

Judging by the scowl on his f'ace the photograph :mB.Y' have been taken on the return 

from his f'irst visit to the Governor1 

, "Jou hav~ ~JfP:rd." It was September 1944. The campaign train rolled up 

througbt tneJfidlrest, returned to Albany. A few days later Tom Dewey received 

another visit f'rom Colonel Clarke.1 

The Colonel,,again in civilian clothes,handed over another letter from General 

Marshall. 'lhe General hand changed his mind somewhat: 

"I am quite willing to have you read what comes hereafter with the 

understanding that you are bound not to ccmmnmicate to any other person 

any pDl!tions on which you do not how have or later receive factual. lmowledge 

from some other source than :m;yself. • • • You have-my word that neither the 

Secretar:r of" War nor the President has any intimation whatsoever that such 

a letter has been addressed to you. • •• " 

THE !iOCKED fILE. 'lhis time Tom Dewey read on. As he turned the pages, he 

f>ecame the first man outside the high command to lmow the full story of "Magic" 

and what it was accomplishing in the)l6.r against the Japs~ (see above). The 

letter closed with a plea: 

I. 

"I am presenting this matter to you, tor your secret inf'ormation, in 

the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with 

which we are now threatened in the present political. campaign." 'I 

~ I 

Tom Dewey locked the letter in his files, went back to his .electioneering.' 

'Dlougb he had known before that the U. S. had cracked the Jap code, had suspected 

that lihis information cast grave doubts on P'ranklin Roosevelt's role before Pearl 

Harbor, he held his tongue. 'lhe War Department's most valuable secret was kept 

out of the cam;pa.ign. 

MEErDlG AT A FUNERAL. Recounting this story at the Pearl Harbor hearing last 

week,"l!!"General MarsiiS.il recalled that he and Tom Dewey never discussed the matter 

in person until they met at Franklin Roosevelt's f"uneral last Aprni 11I asked 

Mr. Dewey to came with me to the War Department and I showed him current Magic 

showing Japanese movements. His attitude was friendly and gracious. 11 

Had Marshall ever told Franklin Roosevelt ot the letters to Deirey'l Said 

Marshall: 11'l!:le President died without knawlegge of' it." 

'lbe Pearl Harbor committee blithely tossed&IB.Y one still-secret U. s . .. 1 11anlllit weapon. George Marshall's letters to Governor Dewey (see above) mentioned 

that the u. s., with the help of the British had decoded German as well as Japanese 

messages, George Marshall begged the Comm:l ttee to cut out these references. 'lhe 

Committee retused. 

Publication of the letters thus gave the Germans their f'irst lmowledge that their 

code had been broken. It we.a al.so a brJl'llch of diplomatic CX>f'idence with the British, 

who had let the U. s. in on the secret on the understanding that it would be kept. 

,7/ ''A few days later. • • 11 But note that the First Letter is dated 25 September 1944, ~e Second Letter, iahli 27 September. It is possible that Colonel Clarke ws.J 

unable to deliver the letter immediately but 1113' recollection is that he did deliver 

it the next day---WFF 
-

REF ID:A62837 

I a writ!q 7011 w!thout the Jmowledae ot mq other peraoaf. except :,,/ 

Adm1ral K'1ng (who coacun) becauae ve are app:oe.ch1Dg a pave d,Q.ema in ,,_ 

the pollt1cal reaniona ot Conpieaa regud1ng Pearl Barbor. 1 

· What I haYe to tell 70U be.low 111 ot auch a htgbl7 seem nature that 

I feel cCIQ8l.led to ask JOU either to accept :lt on the bui• ot 10ur not 

ccmmmicating 1ta contenta to '8Zll' otber penon BD:1. re\um1ng tb!a letter 

02"' not readjng an_y turther and ntum1ng t.he letter to the bearer. 

/" 'lan Dewe.r l.ook.ed up tJ!'Clll 'td19 tnewrltten JB&e• As he cU4 t.he 'IDl'd ~@_, a ts ~ below6 flaabecl mto his Yia1cm Uke a "4. Vaftic lisbt. Be Dade -

' b1• decision qui&J""fol.cled the letter, handed:& back. ColClllel Carter w. Clarke (1D 

mufti), who ha.cl tl.ow frcn WU1dngton to 'lldea to catch up with 'Ian J>eve7'• c~ ,J ... ,t went back,~a mission mcmqpletea.. 'CJ!ere'a a p1ctuzoe of Co1onel. ~,!r: (ng. 2)~ ( f ' Judgjns bJ' the ecawl cm Ms face the pbatograpb JllV' have been taken on tbe return 

-, fraD bis nr.n vieit to the Gavemor~ _ _ 

-

, 

~ 

"You have 1113 wm-d. n It _. sept;ember 1944. 'lbe cauip!gn tn1n Z'Q'Llec1 ~ 

tbe Midwest, Mumed to ~. A few c1qa late Tm DeweJ received 

another rtait frail Ccdcmel Cl&l.'keW 

'Die Col.aael.l\again 1D ctvilla clot.b~:-°ed. arer anothel' letter tram OenenJ. 

Marahall. !l!le Geilenl .. changed bia • smewbat: 

~ 

"I m qUite vnung to have J'OU read what cames ha:re&fter with the 

that 70U are bound not to camnau!d.cate to 8IQ' other pencm 

arrr i>ortiau on which :,you do not ilow have or later NCei'Ye tactual lmowledge 

f'rm SOlll8 other aouzirce than ~. • • • You have._ wozd tbat neither the 

Searet&.17 at War nor the P.NsS.dent baa aD¥ illtf.m.tion whataoever that such 

a letter haa been 14dresae4 to JOU• ••• n 

). ,c.rlvf.}. 'l'llE LOCKJm !'IL'I. 'lbie time 'l'clD DeweJ' read on. Aa he tuned tbe pagea, he 

"' becmae the n.nt mn outside 'the high command to kl1ov tile :tull ator.Y .ot ''Magic" 

<? • <... • v and Vh&t 1t was accampllahing 1D tbe )l8r ap.1n•~ tbe Jap . (see abaft). 'Die 

letter closed with a pl.ea: - 1 

y. 1 

, 

v 

-- ...... ../ 

/ " (. 

"I am preeatmg this mtter to J'OU, tor JOUZ' •eozoet 1Dtomatton, 1D 

the hope tbat JOU w111 aee :roar ,,._,. clear to avoid the trasic i-ttsUl.ta with 

which we are now threatened. 1D the pnaent pol.1t1cal cenp1gn." 

fam Dawe7 looked the letter 1n hi• tile•, went back to his electioneerillg'":"t--

!hougb he ba4. know 'before that the U. s. had. cftCked the Jap code, had auapectecl 

that !Jh1a s.ntozmticm cut 81'&"'9 doubts on l'nnkUn Roosevelt'• 2'01.e bef'ore Pearl. 

Jla:rbor I be held b18 tcmpe. 'Die 'War Department 18 lll08t 'valuable 8ecre"t 'VU kept 

out of the oampL!gn. ----~-

MEE'tDO A'l A FUIEBAL. Recount1ng thi• 8tQZ7 at the Pearl Jfa1'bor hearing la.at 

week, Geneml Marahall recalled tbat he and 1'am Dewey nner d11CW1se4 the •tter 

1D penoa until thq met at Jrnnkltn Roosevelt'• funeral. lal1; April; "I asked 

Mr. Dne7 to came with me to the War lleplrtmm1; aad. I llhowed h1m cUZTellt Magic 

ahovJ.Dg Japanese JllOfalenta. Bis attitude wu ft!.endl.1' aD4 gracioua." 

Bad Marahall enr told Pranklin BoC>Hftl.t at the let'ters to DeweJ'? Said 

Manhall: "'.l!le Pl-eaideat died without lmowlelge ot it." 

smcm:.r um 

'Jhe Pearl. Barbor committee bli~ tossed~ one aUU-secziet u. s. 

[GoYermen:\\ wea:pon. Geoztge Marabal.l.' a l.etteN to Governor Dn8J'L (aee above)\ aeatloned 

tbat the u. s.# with the help ot tbe Bri:t1~ha4 decoded aermn u wall aa Japanese 

message" George ManbaU begged the Ccmm:lttee to cut out these zierermcea. 91.e 

Ccmnittee Ntwsed. 

Nbl.1cat1on ot tbe letten thus gave the Gezmna their ftZ'st JmowlecJge that t.1le!r 

code had been braken. It was also a ~ at dipl.amatic CDficleDce with the British i\ 

who bad let the U. s. 1D cm the secret on tbe \1Ddentand1ng that 1t voul.d be kept. ' 

',T/ "A fev CLij8 later ••• " But note that the l'1nt Let'tel' 1• dated 25 September 19"1 

~e secana. Letter ,C datedJ 21 September. It 1a poeaible that Col.CD'lel Clarke wa e 

unable to deliver tb.e letter 1mmecl1atel7 but .v recoll.ecticn 1a tb&t he did deuver 

it the next ~--wr:r.