Filed 11/18/16

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re CARLOS H., a Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

 B268893

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. PJ51548)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CARLOS H.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Morton Rochman, Judge. Affirmed.

Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan J. Kline and 

Amanda V. Lopez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 

and Respondent.

——————————

Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 

602,

1

the People filed a petition alleging that Carlos H. 

(Carlos) committed two counts of sexual battery against a 

female high school classmate. The juvenile court, prior to 

adjudication, issued a restraining order against Carlos

prohibiting him from, among other things, contacting the 

victim through a third party, and directing him to stay 100 

yards away from the victim (the order). On appeal, Carlos

contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion, 

because the form used by the court to enter the order, form 

JV-255, purportedly does not permit such restrictions.

2

We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the juvenile 

court’s issuance of the order.

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare 

and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

2

Initially, Carlos challenged other aspects of the order, 

such as the purported lack of evidence supporting the order. 

However, those arguments were subsequently rendered moot 

when, during the appellate briefing process, there was an 

adjudication, which found the allegations of the petition to 

be true.
3

BACKGROUND

I. The incident

On March 19, 2015, while at school, Carlos (aged 15 at 

the time) asked the victim for a hug. Although the victim 

did not know Carlos well—they had previously attended the 

same elementary school—she reluctantly gave him one. 

Carlos then asked her for a second hug while he stared at 

her breasts. The victim told him to stop staring at her 

breasts, and she walked away without hugging him. Carlos

followed the victim and poked her in the buttocks. He then 

reached around the victim and grabbed her right breast. 

The victim reported the incident to the school’s resource 

sheriff deputy. During an interview with the deputy, Carlos

admitted that he poked the victim’s buttocks and grabbed 

her breast and stated that he had “messed up.”

II. The order

On May 29, 2015, the People filed a petition alleging 

two counts of misdemeanor sexual battery (Pen. Code, 

§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1)). On that same day, Carlos denied the 

allegations.

On November 17, 2015, the People requested a 

restraining order “for the victim’s safety as well as the 

public’s safety.” The hearing on the restraining order was 

continued to November 30, 2015, in order that Carlos’s 

assigned counsel, who was ill, could attend the hearing. In 

the interim, the juvenile court orally ordered Carlos to have 

“no contact directly or indirectly in any way” with the victim 
4

and to “have no other person on your behalf contact her.” 

Carlos’s counsel did not object to this order.

On November 30, 2015, the People presented the court 

and defense counsel with a proposed restraining order “on 

Form No. JV255 commonly called Restraining OrderJuvenile” (the form).

The form has several numbered sections that contain 

pre-printed orders for the court to select from depending on 

the facts of a particular case; the court need only check a box 

to select an option. For example, section 4 of the form 

includes three pre-printed options for restraining orders for 

a “child in delinquency proceedings.” Section 5, which 

applies to orders for a person “other than [a] child in 

delinquency proceedings,” contains a much longer list of 

possible options, including options that are not offered in 

section 4, such as specifying how far a restrained person 

“must stay away” from the protected person and/or certain 

locations, such as the home, workplace or school of the 

protected person.

Section 9 on the form, in contrast to sections 4 and 5,

does not offer a menu of pre-printed choices; instead, it 

leaves a blank for the court to specify any “other orders” it 

deems necessary.

On the form prepared by the People, a box in section 4 

was checked which required Carlos to “not contact, threaten, 

stalk or disturb the peace” of the victim. Section 9 was also 

filled out; it contained two orders that were not pre-printed 
5

on the form: “Stay 100 yards away from victim”;3 and “no 

contact with the victim through a third party” (collectively, 

the “other orders”)

Carlos’s counsel objected to the proposed “other orders”

in section 9 on the ground that “they are seeking to have a 

level of restraint that is not accorded to a young person who 

is the subject of delinquency proceedings.” Defense counsel 

argued that the proposed “other orders” included options

from section 5, which, according to Carlos’s counsel, was 

improper because section 5 was designed to be used against 

a “third party adult or third party pseudo parent,” not a 

minor, such as Carlos. The People argued that, given the 

facts of this particular case, the proposed “other orders” were 

“appropriate” and the mere fact that certain options are 

included in section 5, but not in section 4, does not mean 

that the People are precluded from requesting such options 

in section 9 in order to have a restraining order “particularly 

tailored” to the facts of the instant case.

The juvenile court signed the order, finding that the 

“other orders” were “well made, well tailored, and 

appropriate.” Carlos timely appealed.

III. The adjudication

On July 11, 2016, the matter was adjudicated, and the 

trial court sustained the petition, extended the order and 

placed Carlos “home on probation.”

 

3 At the time, Carlos and the victim did not attend the 

same school.
6

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of review

With regard to the issuance of a restraining order by 

the juvenile court pursuant to section 213.5, appellate courts 

apply the substantial evidence standard to determine 

whether sufficient facts supported the factual findings in 

support of a restraining order and the abuse of discretion 

standard to determine whether the court properly issued the 

order. (In re C.Q. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 355, 364; see In re 

Brittany K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1512.)

4

 Because

this appeal is now confined to only whether the “other 

orders” were properly included in the order, we will review 

the trial court’s decision under the abuse of discretion 

standard.

“ ‘To show abuse of discretion, the appellant must 

demonstrate the juvenile court exercised its discretion in an 

arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that 

resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ [Citation.] Throughout 

our analysis, we will not lightly substitute our decision for 

that rendered by the juvenile court. Rather, we must 

indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of 

 

4 Similarly, we review the grant or denial of a 

preliminary or a permanent injunction (see, e.g., People ex 

rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1109; Horsford v. 

Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 

Cal.App.4th 359, 390) or a domestic violence protective order 

(S.M. v. E.P. (2010) 184 Cal.App4th 1249, 1264) under the 

abuse of discretion standard.
7

the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings where 

there is substantial evidence to support them.” (In re M.V. 

(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1506–1507.)

However, “[j]udicial discretion to grant or deny an 

application for a protective order is not unfettered. The 

scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being 

applied by the court, i.e., in the ‘ “legal principles governing 

the subject of [the] action . . . .” ’ ” (Nakamura v. Parker

(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 337.) Accordingly, the de novo 

standard of review applies to issues of statutory 

interpretation. (In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 

199, 210 [interpreting § 213.5, subd. (a)]); see generally, 

Bruns v. E–Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 

724 [“[s]tatutory interpretation is a question of law that we 

review de novo”].)

II. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion

The parties have not directed us to and we are not 

aware of any California case law interpreting or construing 

the form. Consequently, we must turn to the relevant rules 

of court and statutes upon which the form is premised.

A. The form’s statutory foundation

The California Rules of Court provide that where, as 

here, a petition has been filed pursuant to section 602, “the 

court may issue restraining orders as provided in section 

213.5.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.630, subd. (a).) The 

California Rules of Court also provide that any such 

restraining order “must be prepared on Restraining Order-
8

Juvenile (form JV-255).” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.630, 

subd. (f)(2).)

Section 213.5 empowers the juvenile court to issue a 

wide range of restraining orders. (§ 213.5, subd. (d)(1).) In 

connection with petitions brought pursuant to section 602, 

the juvenile court is empowered to issue a restraining order 

to protect a number of different classes of people: (1) the 

child who is the subject of the petition; (2) any other child in 

the subject child’s household; (3) the child’s parent, guardian 

or current caretaker; (4) the child’s current or former 

probation officer or court appointed special advocate; and 

(5) “any person the court finds to be at risk from the conduct 

of the child . . . .” (§ 213.5, subd. (b).)

In order to protect the first four classes of protected 

persons, the juvenile court is empowered to enjoin “any 

person” from “molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, 

threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing, 

telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying 

telephone calls as described in Section 653m of the Penal 

Code, destroying the personal property, contacting, either 

directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a 

specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of” those 

protected persons. (§ 213.5, subd. (b).) This language is 

mirrored in section 5 of the form.

However, when the child is the person whose conduct 

must be restrained, the Legislature did not repeat the list of 

enjoinable conduct that it used for the other classes of 

protected persons. Instead, the Legislature opted for a less 
9

detailed, more generalized list: the court may enjoin “the 

child from contacting, threatening, stalking, or disturbing 

the peace of any person the court finds to be at risk from the 

conduct of the child.” (§ 213.5, subd. (b).) This language is 

mirrored in section 4 of the form.

Section 213.5 is part of a web of statutory provisions 

known as the “juvenile delinquency laws.” (In re Charles G. 

(2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 614.) “The purpose of juvenile 

delinquency laws is twofold: (1) to serve the ‘best interests’

of the delinquent ward by providing care, treatment, and 

guidance to rehabilitate the ward and ‘enable him or her to 

be a law-abiding and productive member of his or her family 

and the community,’ and (2) to ‘provide for the protection 

and safety of the public . . . .’ ” (Ibid.) Section 202, 

subdivision (b), in pertinent part, provides: “Minors under 

the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a consequence of 

delinquent conduct shall, in conformity with the interests of 

public safety and protection, receive care, treatment and 

guidance that is consistent with their best interest, that 

holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is 

appropriate for their circumstances. . . .” (Italics added.)

Under the juvenile delinquency laws, and consistent 

with their overarching purpose, the juvenile court is 

expressly authorized to make “any and all reasonable orders

for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and 

support of the child . . . .” (§ 362, subd. (a), italics added.)

The question effectively posed by this appeal is this: 

What is the significance, if any, in the Legislature’s shorter 
10

more generalized approach to identifying threatening 

conduct by the child—does it matter that the Legislature did 

not specify that the child may be prohibited from contacting 

a protected person both directly and indirectly; does it 

matter that the Legislature did not specify that the child 

may be prohibited from disturbing the peace of a protected 

person by having to stay a certain distant away? We hold 

there is no meaningful significance.

B. California law for interpreting statutes

“We begin with the fundamental rule that our primary 

task is to determine the lawmakers’ intent.” (Delaney v. 

Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798.) “In construing 

statutes, we aim ‘to ascertain the intent of the enacting 

legislative body so that we may adopt the construction that 

best effectuates the purpose of the law.’ ” (Klein v. United 

States of America (2010) 50 Cal.4th 68, 77 (Klein).) 

California courts “have established a process of statutory 

interpretation to determine legislative intent that may 

involve up to three steps.” (Alejo v. Torlakson (2013) 212 

Cal.App.4th 768, 786–787 (Alejo).) The “key to statutory 

interpretation is applying the rules of statutory construction 

in their proper sequence . . . as follows: ‘we first look to the 

plain meaning of the statutory language, then to its 

legislative history and finally to the reasonableness of a 

proposed construction.’ ” (MacIsaac v. Waste Management 

Collection & Recycling, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1076, 

1082 (MacIsaac).)
11

“The first step in the interpretive process looks to the 

words of the statute themselves.” (Alejo, supra, 212 

Cal.App.4th at p. 787; see Klein, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 77 

[“ ‘statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator 

of legislative intent’ ”].)

“If the interpretive question is not resolved in the first 

step, we proceed to the second step of the inquiry. [Citation.] 

In this step, courts may ‘turn to secondary rules of 

interpretation, such as maxims of construction, “which serve 

as aids in the sense that they express familiar insights about 

conventional language usage.” ’ [Citation.] We may also 

look to the legislative history. [Citation.] ‘Both the 

legislative history of the statute and the wider historical 

circumstances of its enactment may be considered in 

ascertaining the legislative intent.’ [Citation.] [¶] ‘If 

ambiguity remains after resort to secondary rules of 

construction and to the statute’s legislative history, then we 

must cautiously take the third and final step in the 

interpretive process. [Citation.] In this phase of the process, 

we apply “reason, practicality, and common sense to the 

language at hand.” [Citation.] Where an uncertainty exists, 

we must consider the consequences that will flow from a 

particular interpretation. [Citation.] Thus, “[i]n 

determining what the Legislature intended we are bound to 

consider not only the words used, but also other matters, 

‘such as context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, 

the history of the times and of legislation upon the same 

subject, public policy and contemporaneous construction.’ 
12

[Citation.]” [Citation.] These “other matters” can serve as 

important guides, because our search for the statute’s 

meaning is not merely an abstract exercise in semantics. To 

the contrary, courts seek to ascertain the intent of the 

Legislature for a reason—“to effectuate the purpose of the 

law.” ’ ” (Alejo, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 787–788; see 

MacIsaac, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1084.)

We do not necessarily engage in all three steps of the 

analysis. “It is only when the meaning of the words is not 

clear that courts are required to take a second step and refer 

to the legislative history.” (Soil v. Superior Court (1997) 55 

Cal.App.4th 872, 875.) “If ambiguity remains after resort to 

secondary rules of construction and to the statute’s 

legislative history, then we must cautiously take the third 

and final step in the interpretative process.” (MacIsaac, 

supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1084.)

C. The interpretation offered by Carlos is not 

reasonable

Carlos argues that he cannot be restrained from 

contacting the victim through a third party because section 4 

of the form (and the relevant part of section 213.5, 

subdivision (b)) does not expressly prohibit such indirect 

contact by the child who is the subject of the 602 petition. 

Only section 5 of the form, which is not applicable to him, 

expressly prohibits “indirect” contact with a protected 

person. Similarly, Carlos argues that he cannot be 

prevented from disturbing the peace of the victim by coming 

within 100 yards of her because section 4 of the form (and 
13

the relevant part of section 213.5, subdivision (b)) does not 

expressly allow a “stay away” restriction; only section 5 of 

the form provides for such a restriction.

Implicitly, Carlos is arguing that our interpretation of 

the form and, by extension, section 213.5 should be governed 

by a maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est 

exclusio alterius—that is, “[t]he expression of some things in 

a statute necessarily means the exclusion of other things not 

expressed.” (Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 852.) This 

maxim provides that “[w]hen the Legislature ‘has employed 

a term or phrase in one place and excluded it in another, it 

should not be implied where excluded.’ ” (Pasadena Police 

Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadena (1990) 51 Cal.3d 564, 576.) 

“ ‘[U]nder the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius

we must infer that the listing of terms and conditions is 

complete, and that there are no additional requirements 

which bind petitioner.’ ” (People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 

576, 593.)

However, the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio 

alterius has been defined by our Supreme Court as a “mere 

guide[ ]” to be utilized when a statute is ambiguous. (Dyna–

Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 

Cal.3d 1379, 1391.) The Supreme Court has further limited 

this principle of statutory construction as follows: “ ‘[T]he 

maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is 

inapplicable . . . “where no reason exists why persons and 

things other than those enumerated should not be included, 

and manifest injustice would follow by not including 
14

them . . . .” ’ ” (People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 227.) 

Further, our Supreme Court has noted: “It is true that the 

canon of construction upon which respondent rests its case 

should be applied ‘where appropriate and necessary to the 

just enforcement of the provisions of a statute.’ [Citation.] 

Nevertheless, expressio unius est exclusio alterius is no 

magical incantation, nor does it refer to an immutable rule. 

Like all such guidelines, it has many exceptions . . . .” 

(Estate of Banerjee (1978) 21 Cal.3d 527, 539.) In Estate of 

Banerjee, the Supreme Court listed some of the exceptions to 

the doctrine, including the following: “The rule is 

inapplicable: where no manifest reason exists why other 

persons or things than those enumerated should not be 

included and thus exclusion would result in injustice.” 

(Estate of Banerjee, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 539, fn. 10.) In the 

case of In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 291, the 

Supreme Court noted: “ ‘This rule, of course, is inapplicable 

where its operation would contradict a discernible and 

contrary legislative intent.’ ”

Here, there is no discernible reason why a minor, such 

as Carlos, should not be prohibited from contacting his/her 

victim either directly or indirectly, or be prohibited from 

disturbing the peace of the victim by being required to stay 

100 yards away from him or her. Under Carlos’s reasoning, 

the fact that section 4 does not contain the words “molest,” 

“attack,” “strike,” “sexually assault,” “batter,” or “harass,” 

while the inapplicable section 5 does, would mean that the 

juvenile court would not be permitted to prohibit him from 
15

doing all of those things to the victim in this case. In other 

words, Carlos’s interpretation would invite a manifest 

injustice—the juvenile court would not be able to enjoin him 

from doing the same exact thing that led to the filing of the 

petition in the first place. Such an interpretation is patently 

at odds with the express intent of the Legislature to protect 

both minors and their victims, as well as other members of 

the public at large.

In short, we are unpersuaded by the premise inherent 

in Carlos’s argument that the Legislature intended that 

persons threatened by a minor should enjoy less protection 

than persons threatening the minor. Section 9 on the form 

was included so that the juvenile court could do precisely 

what it did here—complement the general guidance offered 

by section 4 of the form and section 213.5, subdivision (b)—

by tailoring the restraining order to match the particular 

facts of the case by either adding more and/or more specific 

restrictions. Section 9, in other words, is a mechanism 

whereby the juvenile court can issue an order that further 

promotes the dual purposes of the juvenile delinquency laws: 

serving the best interests of the delinquent minor and 

providing for the protection and safety of the public.

Accordingly, we hold that the order, including the 

“other orders” in section 9 of the form, was a reasoned and 

reasonable response by the juvenile court to Carlos’s conduct 

and the other relevant facts of the case (e.g., the fact that 

Carlos and the victim no longer attend the same school). 

Moreover, the order was entirely consistent with the public 
16

policy objectives underlying the juvenile delinquency laws 

generally and section 213.5 specifically. Because the 

juvenile court’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious or 

patently absurd, we affirm the order.

DISPOSITION

The issuance of the restraining order is affirmed.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

JOHNSON, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

CHANEY, J.