J-S74018-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

STEVE ROANE

Appellant No. 1492 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 19, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0015731-2013

CP-51-CR-0015746-2013

CP-51-CR-0015756-2013

CP-51-CR-0015757-2013

BEFORE: OTT, J., RANSOM, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 21, 2016

Steve Roane1appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on 

February 19, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, 

following his convictions2on four counts of theft, receiving stolen property 

(RSP), 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925. Roane received an aggregate sentence of seven 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Relevant to this appeal, he was also known as Kyle Roane.

2 Roane was tried in a non-jury trial on October 17, 2014. The trial court 

took the evidence under advisement and issued its verdict on October 24, 

2014, after which, pursuant to the official docket, Roane fled. He was 

apprehended shortly thereafter, still in the courthouse. See Docket, 

10/24/2014.
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to fourteen years’ incarceration and was ordered to pay $6,353.00 in 

restitution. In this timely appeal, Roane raises a single issue; he claims the 

Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to prove he knew the cars he 

transferred to a tow company were stolen. After a thorough review of the 

submissions by the parties, relevant law, and the certified record, we affirm.

We begin with often-stated standards guiding our review:

The standard of review for claims of insufficient evidence is wellsettled. With respect to such claims, we consider the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner. 

In that light, we decide if the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences from that evidence are sufficient to establish the 

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We keep in 

mind that it was for the trier of fact to determine the weight of 

the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. The jury was free 

to believe all, part or none of the evidence. This Court may not 

weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment or that of the 

factfinder.

Commonwealth v. Devries, 112 A.3d 663, 667 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citations omitted).

In relevant part, the crime of RSP is defined as,

(a) Offense defined. --A person is guilty of theft if he 

intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable property 

of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it 

has probably been stolen, unless the property is received, 

retained, or disposed with intent to restore it to the owner.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a).

As noted earlier, the only element of the crime at issue is knowledge –

whether Roane knew the cars were stolen or believed they had probably 

been stolen. The trial court reviewed the totality of the evidence and 
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concluded the evidence proved such knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. 

We agree with the trial court.

We begin our analysis by noting:

That proof of guilt may be established by circumstantial evidence 

is settled law in Pennsylvania. Commonwealth v. Nasuti, 385 

Pa. 436, 123 A.2d 435 (1956). In a criminal prosecution, the 

evidence is sufficient to warrant a conviction where the 

circumstances proved are such as reasonably and naturally 

justify an inference of guilt, and are of such volume and quality 

as to overcome the presumption of innocence and satisfy the 

fact-finder of the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Commonwealth v. Lewis, 190 Pa. Super. 591, 155 A.2d 410 

(1959).

Commonwealth v. Parsons, 335 A.2d 800, 802 (Pa. Super. 1975).

The underlying facts, as related by the trial court in its Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a) opinion demonstrate the sufficiency of the evidence.

July 25th of 2013, Timothy Barnhill was having mechanical 

issues with his 2001 Oldsmobile Aurora which he parked on Fox 

and Abbotsford Avenues. Mr. Barnhill returned later that day 

and his vehicle was missing. On August 19, 2013, Larry Johnson 

left his 1994 Chevy S-10 at 3700 K Street from where it was 

stolen. On August 15, 2013, Rhea Wright went out of town and 

when she returned on August 26, 2013, her 1999 Mazda Protégé 

was missing.[3] On August 31, 2013, Tiara Dubose parked her 

2000 Pontiac Grand Prix on 4300 Clarissa Street. When she 

returned on September 1, 2013, the vehicle was missing. Ms. 

Wright, Mr. Barnhill, Ms. Dubose, and Mr. Johnson all indicated 

____________________________________________

3 The towing agreements for the Wright and Johnson vehicles, 

Commonwealth Trial Exhibits C-10 and C-8 respectively, show both vehicles 

were towed on August 19, 2013. The pre-printed form numbers on the top 

of the towing agreements are sequential, numbers 2514 and 2515, 

respectively.
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that they did not give permission to anyone to use their 

vehicles.[4]

Detective Szatkowski investigated the missing vehicles and 

found towing agreements for the sale of all four vehicles to a 

company called Hooked, Inc.[5] The agreement listed that 

[Roane] sold the vehicles to be junked and received around $350 

for each vehicle. On September 18, 2013, Detective Szatkowski 

interviewed [Roane]. In that interview, [Roane] did not 

remember Ms. Wright’s vehicle; however, he acknowledged that 

the tow agreement indicated that [Roane] had junked the car 

and been paid $300.

[Roane] further indicated that he was called out to look at Mr. 

Barnhill’s vehicle as a mobile mechanic. The car had a bad 

motor and the person with the vehicle told [Roane] to junk it. 

[Roane] paid the person with the vehicle $150 for it and received 

the registration and key. [Roane] then sold the vehicle to the 

tow company to be junked for $350.

In his statement, [Roane] claimed that he was called to look at 

Ms. Dubose’s vehicle and met a young, black female who had a 

baby with her. The transmission was broken and the woman 

told [Roane] to get rid of the vehicle. [Roane] called the tow 

truck, signed for the vehicle, and was paid $350.

In his statement, [Roane] asserted that he was called to Mr. 

Johnson’s the [sic] vehicle because the passenger wheel was 

broken. [Roane] said that it could not be fixed on the street, 

and the man with the car, who identified himself as the operator 

not the owner of the vehicle, told [Roane] to junk the vehicle. 

The man with the vehicle paid [Roane] $45 for his work. 

[Roane] called the tow company and completed the towing 

____________________________________________

4 Additionally, the evidence indicated that none of the victims knew Roane. 

See Commonwealth Trial Exhibits 2 – 5, Ownership and Non-Permission 

Interview Sheets.

5 Technically, three of the agreements are with Hooked, Inc., the fourth was 

with Northside Towing. However, it appears that Hooked, Inc. simply 

changed locations and names and became Northside.
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paperwork but claimed that the tow company paid the 

unidentified man for the vehicle.[6]

[Roane] admitted that the tow truck drivers did not know that 

the individuals junking the cars were not the owners.

Trial Court Opinion at 2-3.7

Summarizing, the official record demonstrated that over an 

approximately five week time frame, Roane acted as the “owner” of four 

vehicles which were subsequently sold to a towing company as scrap. 

Although Roane delivered registration papers and a key for one of the 

vehicles to the tow company, he never had or claimed to have title to any of 

the cars he purportedly “owned.” In one instance, he claimed to have 

purchased the car prior to his dealings with Hooked, Inc. There was no 

indication in any of the evidence presented at trial that Roane ever 

confirmed or even tried to confirm the identity of the person from whom he 

obtained each vehicle. Similarly, there was no evidence presented that 

Roane identified or tried to confirm the identity of those people as the actual 

owners of the vehicles in question.

____________________________________________

6 The towing agreement contradicts the claim that Roane was not paid for 

the Johnson vehicle. The towing agreement lists Kyle Roane as the owner or 

owner’s authorized representative who received a $350 pay-out for the 

vehicle. See Commonwealth Exhibit C-8, Towing Agreement #2515. Kyle 

Roane was also listed as the “owner” of Wright’s Mazda, which had been sold 

to and towed by Hooked earlier in the day. See Commonwealth Exhibit C10, Towing Agreement #2514.

7 At trial, evidence was presented of a fifth car that was similarly sold and 

towed on August 29, 2013. Roane was acquitted of that charge.
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The trial court determined,

According to [Roane], instead of paying [Roane] for his labor for 

looking at the vehicles [as a mobile mechanic], the operators, 

out of pure charity, paid [Roane] the proceeds of junking their 

vehicles. These vehicles were expensive property which any 

reasonable person would not give away lightly.[8] Even if this 

Court accepted [Roane’s] statement as true, these actions are so 

contrary to the operators’ own interests that a reasonable person 

would have known that the transaction was illegal. This 

evidence is sufficient to establish [Roane] knew the vehicles 

were stolen when he arranged to have them towed and took the 

proceeds from junking them.

Trial Court Opinion at 5.

The circumstances of this case are similar to those in Commonwealth 

v. Parsons, supra. There, in 1973, Parsons purchased a 6 mm rifle and 

telescopic scope and a .410 over/under shotgun that had recently been 

stolen from a gun shop. The guns and scope had a combined value of 

$233.00, but Parsons purchased them for a combined price of $65.00 

Parsons, who had owned and sold guns in the past, had a knowledge of the 

value of guns, but did not question the low cost of the weapons. Shortly 

after purchase, Parsons resold the guns for $85.00. Parsons was convicted 

of RSP and appealed, claiming the Commonwealth had not proved he knew 

the guns had been stolen. In affirming his conviction, a panel of our Court 

reasoned:

____________________________________________

8 As noted above, restitution for the vehicles totaled more than $6,300.00.
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The evidence presented in the instant case justifies the 

conclusion that appellant knew or had reasonable cause to know 

that the guns he purchased were stolen. He purchased them 

from a man whom he had seen but whom he did not know well, 

at a Citizens' Club, for a total price of $65. Despite the unusual 

circumstances of the sale, appellant did not question how the 

seller, Frank Powell, had obtained the weapons. Instead, 

appellant testified that he believed Mr. Powell's story that the 

guns were being sold because Powell was divorcing his wife. 

When asked on cross-examination: ‘Why would that mean that 

he would have to sell his guns?’ appellant answered: ‘How 

should I know. He just said he was breaking up and he wanted 

to get rid of his guns so I bought them.’ 

Appellant likewise did not question the low price he was asked to 

pay for the guns, although he testified that he has owned and 

sold many guns in the past. Appellant, therefore, had a basis on 

which to estimate the true value of the weapons. Appellant 

testified that after keeping possession ‘for a day or so’ he resold 

the weapons. The evidence that the rifle and shotgun were worth 

twice what appellant paid for them may give rise to an inference 

of knowledge that the goods were stolen. Commonwealth v. 

Cohan, 177 Pa. Super. 532, 111 A.2d 182 (1955). In the instant 

case, the evidence of the low price of the guns, coupled with 

appellant's failure to inquire about the origin of the guns and his 

subsequent sale of the weapons shortly after he acquired them, 

was sufficient to indicate that appellant was aware that the rifle 

and shotgun were stolen items. As we noted in Commonwealth 

v. Meyers, 154 Pa. Super. 8, 34 A.2d 916 (1943), the 

Commonwealth need not demonstrate the utter impossibility of 

innocence in order to prove its case. It must only offer proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had reason to know 

that the goods in his possession were stolen.

Id. at 803 (citations to certified record omitted).

Instantly, Roane’s abject failure to even attempt to confirm the people 

from whom he obtained the cars were the actual owners, combined with the 

low price he paid for the cars or the fact that the “owners” simply gave him 

the vehicle and his immediate resale of the goods, leads to the permissible 
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conclusion that Roane knew or had reason to know those vehicles were 

stolen. Accordingly, Parsons is not entitled to relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/21/2016