Filed 2/11/14 P. v. Kingsby CA2/7 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION SEVEN 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

JOANNE KINGSBY et al., 

 Defendants and Appellants. 

 B241328 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. MA053322) 

 APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Reversed. 

 Tracy A. Rogers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant Joanne Kingsby. 

 Sally Patrone Brajevich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant Christel Chantel Featherstone. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels and 

William H. Shin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

____________________ 
2

INTRODUCTION 

 Defendants Joanne Kingsby and Christel Chantel Featherstone appeal from 

judgments of conviction entered after a jury found them guilty on two counts of 

attempting by means of threats or violence to prevent an executive officer from 

performing his duty in violation of Penal Code section 69. The trial court suspended 

sentence for both defendants and placed them on formal probation for three years, 

conditioned on serving 45 days in county jail. On appeal, Kingsby and Featherstone 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions, argue the trial court 

committed instructional error, and contend the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during 

closing argument. Kingsby also argues the trial court erred by denying her request to join 

in Featherstone’s Pitchess1 motion. We agree with Kingsby and Featherstone that the 

trial court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte on the lesser included offense of Penal 

Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1), and that this instructional error was prejudicial. 

Therefore, we reverse. 

FACTS 

 On June 30, 2011 at approximately 12:30 p.m. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 

Deputies Jeffrey Williams and James Dodson responded to a domestic violence call in 

Lancaster. Keiona Stenhouse testified that she called the Sheriff’s Department after her 

husband, Eric Stenhouse, had pinned her down and choked her.2 Keiona called Kingsby, 

her mother, and Featherstone, her younger sister, and asked them to come to her house 

 

1 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531. 

2 Because Keiona, Eric, and Eric’s brother Nathan all have the same last name, we 

will refer to their them by their first names for clarity. (See People v. Ramirez (2010) 

189 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1485, fn. 2; People v. Cabonce (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1421, 

1424, fn. 2.) 
3

because Eric had “just jumped on” her and choked her and the children were scared. 

Kingsby, who was visiting with Featherstone, initially refused because she felt the 

Stenhouses were “always into this stuff,” but agreed to come over with Featherstone 

when Keiona said she was “bleeding everywhere.” Kingsby, four of her six foster 

children, Featherstone, and her son arrived at approximately 10:30 a.m. Eric’s brother 

Nathan, Eric’s cousins Patricia Boyce and Kianna Boyce, and eight children were at the 

house. Keiona was holding her neck, breathing hard, had a broken nail, and her eyes 

were red from crying. When the deputies arrived, Keiona told them that her husband Eric 

had assaulted her during an argument and driven away in their gray Chevrolet Tahoe. 

The deputies stayed at the house about five minutes. 

 As the deputies were leaving the house, they saw a gray Chevrolet Tahoe 

travelling north at a high rate of speed about 100 feet to the east of their location. The 

driver matched Eric’s description. The deputies got into their cars and pursued the 

Tahoe. The pursuit ended back at the Stenhouse residence. 

 At some point, Patricia Boyce ran into the house and told Keiona that Eric and the 

police were outside. Kingsby, Featherstone, Patricia Boyce, Kianna Boyce, and the 

children all went outside onto the porch. 

 Meanwhile, according to the deputies’ version of the events, Deputy Williams 

attempted to prevent Eric from getting out of the Tahoe by pulling up next to the driver’s 

side door. When Eric managed to get out of the vehicle, Deputy Williams drew his gun 

and ordered Eric to stop and to put his hands on his head. Eric responded, “Fuck you, 

bitch. This is private property.” Facing the deputies, Eric walked backward toward the 

house, cursing at the deputies and ignoring their commands to stop. When Eric was 

halfway to the house, a group of people “pil[ed] out of the house.” The deputies saw 

three adults along with children and teenagers. The adults began telling the deputies, 

“This is private property. Leave him alone.” “Get off the property.” 

 Kingsby and Featherstone approached Eric. Deputy Dodson ordered them to stop. 

Deputy Williams grabbed Eric’s arm while Deputy Dodson used pepper spray in an 

attempt to restrain Eric. At the same time, according to Deputy Williams, Kingsby 
4

grabbed Eric from behind in a “bear hug” and began pulling him away from the deputies. 

Kingsby was yelling, “Leave him alone. This is private property.” When Deputy 

Dodson grabbed Eric’s other arm, Featherstone grabbed Eric’s arm and shoulder and 

attempted to pull him away from the deputies. She too was yelling, “Leave him alone. 

This is private property. Get out of here.” 

 During the “tug of war” over Eric, he, the deputies, Kingsby, and Featherstone all 

fell to the ground. One of the people outside the house, Patricia Boyce, began recording 

the incident on a cell phone.3 She yelled at the officers that they were racists, they were 

on private property, and they were “going to get a lawsuit.” Deputies Williams and 

Dodson kept telling everyone to “get back” or they would go to jail. Featherstone called 

the deputies racists and said she would sue them. Eventually, Kingsby and Featherstone 

got up and backed away about three feet, although they continued yelling at the deputies. 

Deputy Dodson handcuffed Eric. 

 Deputy Williams testified that he did not see Eric pulling or grabbing Kingsby, 

although it appeared that Kingsby was trying to get out from underneath him when they 

were on the ground. Deputy Williams testified that Kingsby and Featherstone interfered 

with their attempt to place Eric under arrest and made the incident more serious than it 

needed to be. 

 The family’s version of the events of that afternoon was different. 

 Kingsby testified that at some point, while the family was in the house after Eric 

had driven away, someone heard sirens, and Featherstone said, “That must be Eric.” 

Everyone ran to the front door, but Kingsby was in the back and at first could not see 

what was happening. Kingsby said that she passed through the group of people standing 

on the porch, walked outside, and stood in the driveway, in front of the garage. She saw 

Eric coming up the driveway, followed by the two deputies. Eric made eye contact with 

her and then ran up to her and grabbed her in a bear hug, pinning her arms to her sides. 

 

3 The jury viewed the cell phone recording. 
5

Kingsby asked Eric to let her go, but he kept saying, “Mom, are you serious?” One of the 

deputies ordered Kingsby to “get the fuck away” from Eric, but she responded, “I can’t.” 

The deputy then sprayed her and Eric with pepper spray, and she was knocked to the 

ground. She called for Featherstone to come help her. One of the deputies pried Eric’s 

hands off of Kingsby, and Featherstone helped her up. Kingsby stated, “He wouldn’t 

hurt me.” Kingsby denied grabbing Eric or trying to help him escape. She explained that 

Eric had beaten her daughter and she did not want him to escape. 

 Keiona testified that when she heard the sirens, she went out onto the porch to see 

what was going on along with everyone else who was in the house.4 Keiona heard one of 

the deputies tell Eric to freeze and saw Eric continue walking toward the grass. Eric then 

ran and grabbed Kingsby, who was standing in the driveway, in a bear hug while 

Featherstone tried to separate them. One of the deputies sprayed them with pepper spray. 

Kingsby complained that the pepper spray got in her mouth, and Featherstone told the 

deputies, “Wait, you guys sprayed my mom with pepper spray.” One of the deputies 

tried to pull Eric away, but he resisted. Eric, Kingsby, and the deputies fell on the grass, 

where Eric pinned Kingsby to the ground. Kingsby was yelling, “He has me” and that 

she had been pepper sprayed. Other people were yelling, “Don’t shoot him. Stop. This 

is private property.” Patricia Boyce was yelling, “This is racist,” and “lawsuit.” When 

the deputies ordered everyone to get back, Featherstone complied. Kingsby complied 

once she was able to extricate herself from the pile. 

 Featherstone testified that she went outside to the porch because she “was being 

nosey.” Featherstone saw Eric at the far end of the driveway and Kingsby at the other 

end of the driveway near the garage. Featherstone never thought about going back into 

the house, even though she saw a gun. She saw Eric walking backwards, yelling that it 

was private property, Deputy Williams following with a gun, and Deputy Dobson with a 

gun and pepper spray. Featherstone then saw Eric run up the driveway and grab 

 

4 Keiona admitted prior convictions for burglary, taking a vehicle, identity theft, 

grand theft, and filing a false police report. 
6

Kingsby. Deputy Dobson shot pepper spray on both Eric and Kingsby. The deputies 

tried to pull Eric away from Kingsby, who was resisting, and then the four of them fell 

over onto the grass. Featherstone then stepped off the porch and onto the grass and went 

to help Kingsby by pulling on her arm. Deputy Williams told Featherstone to step back, 

but she did not comply. Featherstone said she was trying to help her mother get away 

from Eric, not help Eric get away from the deputies. 

 Dashell Chastang lived next door to the Stenhouses and was acquainted with them. 

She did not know Kingsby or Featherstone. She was in her house when her children told 

her the police were outside. She went outside and saw Eric’s Chevrolet Tahoe and the 

cars of the two deputies pull into the Stenhouse driveway. According to Chastang, Eric 

got out of the Tahoe and walked up the driveway. He grabbed Kingsby’s upper body and 

said, “Mom, is that how you feel? I love you. I was just at your house yesterday.” One 

of the deputies said, “Let go.” Kingsby responded, “I can’t. He has me.” One of the 

deputies pepper sprayed Eric and Kingsby. The next thing Chastang knew, they were all 

“tussling” on the grass. Featherstone attempted to help Kingsby, who kept saying, “I 

can’t let go.” One of the deputies then ordered Chastang inside, and she complied. 

 Both deputies were injured in the incident. On July 19, 2011 Eric was convicted 

of felony spousal abuse in violation of Penal Code section 273.5. 

DISCUSSION 

 Defendants were convicted of obstructing or resisting executive officers in the 

performance of their duties in violation of Penal Code section 69 (section 69). This 

section punishes “[e]very person who attempts, by means of any threat or violence, to 

deter or prevent an executive officer from performing any duty imposed upon such 

officer by law, or who knowingly resists, by the use of force or violence, such officer, in 

the performance of his duty . . . .” A defendant may violate section 69 in two separate 

ways. “‘The first is attempting by threats or violence to deter or prevent an officer from 

performing a duty imposed by law; the second is resisting by force or violence an officer 
7

in the performance of his or her duty.’ [Citations.] ‘The two ways of violating section 69 

have been called “attempting to deter” and “actually resisting an officer.”’ [Citation.]” 

(People v. Rasmussen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1417-1418; People v. Carrasco

(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978, 984.) 

 Defendants argue that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte 

on the lesser included offense of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer in the 

discharge of his duties in violation of Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1) 

(section 148(a)(1)). This section applies to “[e]very person who willfully resists, delays, 

or obstructs any public officer . . . in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his 

or her office or employment . . . .” (§ 148(a)(1).) 

 The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue whether section 148(a)(1) is a 

lesser included offense of section 69. In People v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, the 

People charged the defendant with violating section 69, and the defendant requested an 

instruction on section 148(a)(1) as a lesser included offense. The prosecution objected, 

and the trial court denied the defendant’s request. (Id. at p. 236.) 

 The Supreme Court noted that the trial court must give “instructions on lesser 

included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of 

the charged offense were present [citation], but not when there is no evidence that the 

offense was less than that charged.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Smith, supra, 57 Cal.4th at 

p. 239.) The Supreme Court stated that this “is because ‘California law has long 

provided that even absent a request, and over any party’s objection, a trial court must 

instruct a criminal jury on any lesser offense “necessarily included” in the charged 

offense, if there is substantial evidence that only the lesser crime was committed. This 

venerable instructional rule ensures that the jury may consider all supportable crimes 

necessarily included within the charge itself, thus encouraging the most accurate verdict 

permitted by the pleadings and the evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he rule prevents either 

party, whether by design or inadvertence, from forcing an all-or-nothing choice between 

conviction of the stated offense on the one hand, or complete acquittal on the other. 

Hence, the rule encourages a verdict, within the charge chosen by the prosecution, that is 
8

neither “harsher [n]or more lenient than the evidence merits.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] 

Thus, ‘a trial court errs if it fails to instruct, sua sponte, on all theories of a lesser included 

offense which find substantial support in the evidence. On the other hand, the court is not 

obliged to instruct on theories that have no such evidentiary support.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at 

pp. 239-240.) 

 “For purposes of determining a trial court’s instructional duties, we have said that 

‘a lesser offense is necessarily included in a greater offense if either the statutory 

elements of the greater offense, or the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading, 

include all the elements of the lesser offense, such that the greater cannot be committed 

without also committing the lesser. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Smith, supra, 57 

Cal.4th at p. 240.) The court held that under the statutory elements test, section 148(a)(1) 

is not a lesser included offense of section 69. (Ibid.) “A person who violates section 69 

in the second way—by ‘knowingly resist[ing], by the use of force or violence, such 

officer, in the performance of his duty’—also necessarily violates section 148(a)(1) by 

‘willfully resist[ing] . . . any public officer . . . in the discharge or attempt to discharge 

any duty of his or her office or employment.’ [Citation.] But it is possible to violate 

section 69 in the first way—by attempting, through threat or violence, to deter or prevent 

an executive officer from performing a duty—without also violating section 148(a)(1). A 

person who threatens an executive officer in an attempt to deter the officer from 

performing a duty ‘at some time in the future’ [citation] does not necessarily willfully 

resist that officer in the discharge or attempt to discharge of his or her duty under 

section 148(a)(1). Accordingly, section 148(a)(1) is not a lesser included offense of 

section 69 based on the statutory elements of each offense. [Citations.]” (Smith, supra, 

at pp. 241-242.) 

 Turning to the accusatory pleading test, the Supreme Court noted that “[i]f the 

accusatory pleading in the present case had charged only the first way of violating section 

69—i.e., that defendant attempted, through threat or violence, to deter or prevent an 

executive officer from performing a duty—section 148(a)(1) would not have been a 

necessarily included offense. But the amended information charged defendant with both 
9

ways of violating section 69. In addition to the first way of violating the statute, the 

accusatory pleading also alleged that defendant violated the statute in the second way by 

‘knowingly resist[ing], by the use of force or violence, such officer, in the performance of 

his duty.’ As explained above, section 148(a)(1) is necessarily included within this 

second way of violating section 69.” (People v. Smith, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 242.) 

Thus, “section148(a)(1) was a necessarily included lesser offense of section 69 as alleged 

in the . . . information.” (Id. at p. 243.) 

 In this context the Supreme Court affirmed the rule “requiring sua sponte 

instruction on a lesser offense that is necessarily included in one way of violating a 

charged statute when the prosecution elects to charge the defendant with multiple ways of 

violating the statute . . . .” (People v. Smith, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 244.) In applying this 

rule, “[t]he trial court need only examine the accusatory pleading. When the prosecution 

chooses to allege multiple ways of committing a greater offense in the accusatory 

pleading, the defendant may be convicted of the greater offense on any theory alleged 

[citation], including a theory that necessarily subsumes a lesser offense. The prosecution 

may, of course, choose to file an accusatory pleading that does not allege the commission 

of a greater offense in a way that necessarily subsumes a lesser offense. But so long as 

the prosecution has chosen to allege a way of committing the greater offense that 

necessarily subsumes a lesser offense, and so long as there is substantial evidence that the 

defendant committed the lesser offense without also committing the greater, the trial 

court must instruct on the lesser included offense. This allows the jury to consider the 

full range of possible verdicts supported by the evidence and thereby calibrate a 

defendant’s culpability to the facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt. As our precedent 

has emphasized, such an approach does not, in purpose or effect, work to the advantage 

of either the prosecution or the defense. Instead, it serves to protect the jury’s truthascertainment function.” (Id. at p. 244.) 

 Here, the prosecution alleged both ways of violating section 69. The People 

alleged that Kingsby and Featherstone “did unlawfully attempt by means of threats and 

violence to deter and prevent [each deputy], who was then and there an executive officer, 
10

from performing a duty imposed upon such officer by law, and did knowingly resist by 

the use of force and violence said executive officer in the performance of his/her duty.” 

Therefore, the trial court had a duty to instruct as to section 148(a)(1) if there was 

substantial evidence that defendants committed only the lesser offense. (See People v. 

Smith, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 239-240, 245.) 

 While the prosecution’s evidence supported a finding that defendants used force or 

violence to resist the deputies in the performance of their duties (People v. Rasmussen, 

supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1417-1418), the defense presented evidence from which a 

jury could reasonably infer that Kingsby and Featherstone, without necessarily using 

force or violence, willfully injected themselves into a situation in which the deputies were 

trying to do their duty and delayed or obstructed the deputies’ efforts to arrest Eric. 

Kingsby and Featherstone came outside as Eric was walking toward the house. Kingsby 

testified that she went on to the driveway even though she saw the deputies with their 

guns drawn chasing Eric. Both Kingsby and Featherstone repeatedly failed to comply 

with directives from the deputies to move away. Eric was able to grab Kingsby, and the 

two of them ended up on the ground with the deputies. Featherstone attempted to pull 

Kingsby away from Eric, adding another person to the struggle. The fact that the 

deputies sprayed Kingsby with pepper spray as they were attempting to subdue Eric is 

further evidence that Kingsby had placed herself in a position where she was obstructing 

the deputies. Thus, there was substantial evidence that the decisions by Kingsby and 

Featherstone to become involved in the confrontation between the deputies and Eric 

made it more difficult for the deputies to place Eric under arrest. 

 Moreover, the jury could have believed the testimony of the officers that Kingsby 

and Featherstone came out of the house and down from the porch and interfered with the 

officers’ efforts to arrest Eric, but believed the testimony of Kingsby and Featherstone 

that Eric grabbed Kingsby rather than the deputies’ testimony that Kingsby grabbed Eric. 

As in People v. Lacefield (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 249, disapproved on another ground in 

People v. Smith, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 242, the “jurors were entitled to accept or reject 

all of the testimony, or a portion of the testimony, of any of the . . . witnesses. [Citation.] 
11

They might have believed part of what the officers said and part of what the defense 

witnesses said. They therefore might have found that [the defendant] acted unlawfully, 

by arguing with [the officer] and refusing to disburse, but he did not use force 

unlawfully . . . .” (Lacefield, supra, at p. 261.) Even if neither Kingsby nor Featherstone 

used force in pulling Eric away from the deputies, they still could have violated 

section 148(a)(1). Although “‘[s]ection 148 is most often applied to the physical acts of a 

defendant,’” the statute “‘“is not limited to nonverbal conduct involving flight or forcible 

interference with an officer’s activities. No decision has interpreted the statute to apply 

only to physical acts, and the statutory language does not suggest such a limitation.” 

[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Christopher (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 418, 431; see In 

re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329-1330; People v Quiroga (1993) 16 

Cal.App.4th 961, 968.) 

 Thus, there was substantial evidence on which a jury could find that Kingsby and 

Featherstone violated only section 148(a)(1), by delaying or obstructing the officers, 

without violating section 69 by resisting the officers by force or violence. This case is 

not like Carrasco, where “if [the defendant] resisted the officers at all, he did so 

forcefully, thereby ensuring no reasonable jury could have concluded he violated section 

148[(a)(1)] but not section 69.” (People v. Carrasco, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 985.) 

Instead, this case is like Lacefield, where the court found that “there was an evidentiary 

basis for instructing on section 148(a)(1) . . . because there were different versions of how 

the incident occurred, such that the jury might have found that [the defendant] violated 

section 148(a)(1) and not section 69, if it had been given section 148(a)(1) as an option.” 

(People v. Lacefield, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 260.) Therefore, the trial court erred in 

failing to instruct the jury on section 148(a)(1) as a lesser included offense of section 69. 

(People v. Smith, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 239-240, 245.) 

 The erroneous failure to instruct on a lesser included crime is prejudicial if it is 

reasonably probable that defendants would have obtained a more favorable result absent 

the error. (People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 555-556; People v. Millbrook (2014) 

222 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1146; People v. Ramirez (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1487.) In 
12

this context, a reasonable probability “‘“‘“does not mean more likely than not, but merely 

a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.”’”’” (Millbrook, supra, at 

p. 1146, quoting People v. Wilkins (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 351.) Here, the evidence 

revealed a rapidly unfolding situation with a number of people becoming involved, either 

in the physical struggle with Eric or yelling at one another. The deputies were 

outnumbered and trying to take Eric into custody while Kingsby and Featherstone were 

struggling with them and various other family members were yelling at them. The 

witnesses for the prosecution and the defense had different recollections of what 

occurred. The evidence of guilt was not overwhelming or uncontested, and each side 

presented equally plausible versions of what happened, leaving the jury ultimately to 

decide a credibility contest. 

 Given the state of the evidence in this case, we cannot say that the failure to 

instruct on the lesser included offense was harmless. “The absence of an instruction on 

section 148(a)(1) forced ‘an all-or-nothing choice between conviction of the stated 

offense on the one hand, or complete acquittal on the other.’ . . . The pleadings and 

evidence here suggested a middle ground, a conviction for section 148(a)(1), but the jury 

was not given that option.” (People v. Lacefield, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 262.) The 

evidence in this case “was not so overwhelming as to show there is no reasonable 

probability that [defendants] would have obtained a more favorable result if the jury had 

been instructed” on section 148(a)(1). (People v. Ramirez, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1488; see People v. Villanueva (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 41, 53 [where conflicting 

testimony given by two witnesses is not “inherently incredible” and is “evenly balanced,” 

failure to instruct on lesser included offense is prejudicial].) Therefore, the convictions 

must be reversed.5

 

5 Because we conclude that the judgments must be reversed because of the trial 

court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense, we do not address Kingsby and 

Featherstone’s argument that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing 

argument. Nor do we address Kingsby’s arguments that the trial court’s denial of her 

request to join in Featherstone’s Pitchess motion deprived her of the right to present a 
13

DISPOSITION 

 The judgments are reversed. 

 SEGAL, J.*

We concur: 

 PERLUSS, P. J. 

 ZELON, J. 

 

defense and that her counsel’s failure to file a Pitchess motion deprived her of the 

effective assistance of counsel. Kingsby will have an opportunity to file a Pitchess

motion on remand if she chooses to do so, although the fact that Featherstone did not 

introduce into evidence any of the information she discovered as a result of her Pitchess

motion suggests that such a motion is not likely to aid Kingsby’s defense. Kingsby and 

Featherstone also contend that the trial court erred by using an obsolete version of 

CALJIC No. 7.50 that did not instruct the jury on the specific intent required for the first 

type of violation of section 69, attempting to deter an officer. On remand, the trial court 

will have the opportunity to use the revised version of this instruction. 

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.