• 

REF ID:A6721~s~ 

~ECRET 

Subjects Requeet tor u.s. Arrp.y Cipher Machines 

SPSIC -&61 Codes 

(22 February 1944) 

let Ind. 

ASF, OCSlgO, Washington 25 1 D. C., 6 March 1944 

Ii ,. ~'!::tit 

81 A· l'iority C!f tbt .3,3 EJ!..r • f :.j.,n,J C.·u~r 

_!~~I• Date 

m::~ ___ .i_ __ ~!f. 'I 

SP SIC 

To: Assistant Chief ot Starr, G-2, War Department General 

Starr, Washington 25, D.c., Attentions Lieutenant Col. 

Goodrich 

l. Attention is invited to the attached communication 

trom Mr. David A. Salmon, Special Consultant to the Assistant 

Secretary ot State, requesting the ieeue of tour (4) u.s. 

Arm7 cipher mach11rE, Converter t7Pe M-134-A. 

2. Subsequent to the receipt or this letter, a1m1lar 

equipment was 1ntormall7 requested for installation at the 

Embassies in Stockholm and Lisbon. 

3. Through informal contacts with the Navy, it has been 

ascertained that the State Department requested u.s. Navy HOM 

cipher machines tor issue to their installations in Madrid, 

Stockholm, Lisbon, Istanbul, Ankara, Algiers, and Cairo. 

The NaV7 Department agreed to the installation ot HCM cipher machines 1n Ankara, Cairo, Istanbul, and Algiers, but declined 

to authorize the subject equipment tor installation in Stockholm, Lisbon, and Madrid for securit7 reasons. 

4. The State Department, at present, has Navy HOM 

cipher machines in most of 1te South .American installations. 

At the present time, the State Department has ei~t (8) 

Converter K•l34-A cipher machines, of which tour (4) are 

located in the United States Embassy in London and tour (4) in the State Department in Washington. 

5. It is obvious that at the present time, and especi- ally in the near tuture, it ia to the best interest ot the 

Government that the cryptographic aeour1t7 ot the State 

Department be of the highest order. For a number ot years the Signal Securit7 Agency, under authorized directives, has 

been rendering technical advice and operational assistance 

in the production ot cryptographic materiel tor the State 

Department and in its proper maintenance and use. Very recently a reaurve7 or the Department's cryptographic communications, from the point of view ot assuring their security, 

was completed by .the SSA and certain remedial measures recom- mended. 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 04-08-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

C'C:CRET 
. . 

• 

SPSIC 461 Cod.es 

REF ID:A67270 

SECRET • 

SPSIC 

6 March 194' 

6. In order to facilitate production or cryptographic 

systems, training of code clerks, maintenance or equipment. and handling of traffic, it is desirable that the aame basic 

mechanisms or cryptographic equipment be used throughout an o~ganization. Thia is not the situation in the State Department communications net at the present time, since both HOM 

and M•l34•A cipher machines are now in use. The.~ollowing 

three plans are orrered a~ possible solutions to this problema 

Plan a.-- The United States Army has available thirty (30) Converter type K-134-A cipher machines. This equipment is obsolete so far as u.s. Army use is concerned and could be 

issued to the Milital'J' Attache at an Embassy or Legation, as 

the case may be. The Military Attache would be responsible for maintaining its physical and cryptographic security. The 

equipment could be operated under his direct supervision by United States Army personnel who would be .turnished for this 

purpose. The principal disadvantages of this plan are that 

(1) the equipment is difficult to maintain and keep in stead7 

service; (2) since this type is obsolete no more machines are 

being manutactured and thererore if it were desirable or neoeaaar7 to extend the distribution within the State Department 

none would be available; (3) even if no more machines were 

needed the matter of supplying replacement parts tor those 

now on hand would present great difficulties; and (4) as the 

machines get older it would be increasingly difficult to 

maintain them. Military personnel for this purpose and for 

their err1c1ent operation would have to be provided on·a 

more or less permanent basis. 

Plan b.-- An alternate plan would be to make available 

a new u.s. Army device called Converter M-325 for State 

Department use. This is a hand-operated device permitting relatively low speed operation, it being approximately equal in this respect to the speed or the strip cipher device, 

but it affords far greater security than does the latter. 

The cryptographic principles involved in the device are 

similar to those of the German Enigma; however, the mechanical 

design of the M-325 is superior to the German design, and 

offers cons1derabl7 greater possibilities for variation, 

therefore making the machine far more secure than the Enigma. The M-325 device could be provided for the State Department and all Embassies and Legations requiring high-level crypto- graphic systems. It would be necessary to train State Department personnel at these installations in the use and 

2 

8ECRET 
REF ID:A67270 

99 SECR~f 99 

SPSIO 4:61 Codes SPSIO 

6 March 194-i 

maintenance of the equipment; however, it is quite simply constructed and relatively easy to maintain. Several 

hundred M-325 cipher devices could be made available to the 

State Department for this purpose in the near future. It 

may be possible that for the State Department code room in 

Washington, and tor such posts as have voluminous communications an automatic, high-speed, printing type M-325 machine 

could be developed by an appropriate conversion ot a Sigaba machine. Such a conversion appears to be possible and would 

in no way jeopardize Army or Navy cryptographic coDDnunications, since the converted machines would not disclose the 

principles underlying the Sigaba. • 

Plan c.-- A composite plan embodying the principles o~ Plans a and b, above, would be to limit the issue o~ 

Converter M-134-A to the State Department code rooms in 

Washington, London, and a ve17 tew additional selected 

Embassies such as Mad.rid, Lisbon, and Stockholm. The actual 

selection would be acco~nlished through conterences between 

representatives ot the War Department and the State Depart- . ment. The provisions tor maintaining cryptographic and 

physical security would be the same as those outl :.1•ed under 

Plan a, above. In addition, the Department and all Embassies 

and Legations could be provided with Converter M-325. This 

plan would provide automatic machines for high-level, high- speed cryptographic communications between the Department 

and thoseEmbassies handling large amounts of traftio and 

hand-operated devices tor high-level, low-speed cryptographic cODDnunicat1ons between the Department and its smaller Embassies and Legations having less heavy traftic loads. The 

hand-operated devices could alao be used tor general intercommunication among all State Department posts. The disadvantages of this plan are that (1) the servicing and maintenance difficulties mentioned under plan a would still be 

present so tar as conc~rns the M-134-A machines, (2) military operating and maintenance personnel would still have to be 

provided to a limited extent and (3) the high-level communication devices would be or two ditterent types, making intercommunication among all 1nstallat1ons more complicated. 

7. Of the torego1ng three plans, the second (Plan b) 

appeara to be the moat advantageous and is the one recommended 

by the SSA. Authority for recommending it to the State Department tor its consideration 1s requested. Details as to 

SECRE1 
• 

SPSIC 461 Codes 

REF ID:A6727it 

-SECRET 

SP SIC 

6 March 1944 

procurement, issue, use, etc., could then be discussed with 

the State Department. If Plan b is adopted, War Department authority will be required to procure the necessary additional 

Converters M-325 or to release the number required tor State 

Department use from Army- procurement and procure replacements therefore tor AXWlfJ7 use. War Department authority will also 

be requi~ed to procure and transfer to the State Department the automatic type M-325 machines and to divert suf'ticient 

Sigaba production to this purpose it the7 are to be received 

prior to the early part ot 1945. 

For the Chier Signal Officer: 

/r/_~ w. Preston Corderman ~· Colonel, Signal Corps Commanding Ofticer, Signal Security Ageno7 

" 

SEC11E+.