IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION TWO

TUCSON LOT 4, LLC,

AN ARIZONA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,

Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

SUNQUEST INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC.,

A PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATION;

MISYS HOSPITAL SYSTEMS, INC.,

A PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATION; AND

MISYS PLC, A UNITED KINGDOM CORPORATION,

Defendants/Appellees.

No. 2 CA-CV 2016-0088

Filed November 22, 2016

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County

No. C20160742

The Honorable Jeffrey T. Bergin, Judge

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Jackson & Oden, PC, Tucson

By Todd Jackson and Lane Oden

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Farhang & Medcoff, Tucson

By Ali J. Farhang, Elizabeth A. Parsons, and Robert A. Bernheim

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
TUCSON LOT 4 v. SUNQUEST INFO. SYS.

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Chief Judge Eckerstrom authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Vásquez and Judge Miller concurred.

E C K E R S T R O M, Chief Judge:

¶1 Appellant Tucson Lot 4, LLC (TL4) appeals from the 

trial court’s order granting a preliminary injunction in favor of 

Sunquest Information Systems, Inc. (Sunquest). For the following 

reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 In 2004, Sunquest entered into a commercial lease 

agreement with TL4’s predecessor in interest. The lease was set to 

run from August 21, 2006 until November 30, 2016. In 2012, 

Sunquest asserted to TL4 that there were issues with the calculation 

of square footage used as the base for the rental rate and the 

management fee charged under the lease. In February 2016, TL4 

filed suit against Sunquest, alleging Sunquest had stopped paying 

some of the operating expenses, which allegedly constituted breach 

of lease. After TL4 filed suit, Sunquest ceased paying all rent. 

Sunquest filed numerous counterclaims.1 Sunquest also requested 

an injunction to prevent TL4 from initiating eviction proceedings or 

otherwise interfering with Sunquest’s use of the premises. TL4 filed 

an amended complaint against Sunquest for forcible detainer (FED). 

After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted Sunquest’s 

request for a preliminary injunction. The court’s order also 

“den[ied] TL4’s pending request for an eviction order and an award 

of associated damages.” This appeal followed.

 

1TL4 and Sunquest both raised claims against other parties, 

but those parties are not participants in this appeal.
TUCSON LOT 4 v. SUNQUEST INFO. SYS.

Opinion of the Court

3

Appellate Jurisdiction

¶3 Sunquest acknowledges that this court has appellate 

jurisdiction to review the trial court’s preliminary injunction 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(5)(b). Sunquest challenges this 

court’s jurisdiction over the denial of TL4’s FED action, however, 

noting that the trial court’s order did not contain language pursuant 

to Rule 54(b) or (c), Ariz. R. Civ. P. The Arizona Rules of Procedure 

for Eviction Actions (RPEA) generally state that “[t]he Arizona Rules 

of Civil Procedure [ARCP] apply only when incorporated by 

reference in these rules.” RPEA 1. Rule 54 of the ARCP is not 

incorporated into the RPEA. Furthermore, A.R.S. § 12-1182(A)

provides that an appeal may be taken from a forcible detainer action. 

Neither Rule 54(b) nor Rule 54(c) applies to an order that is 

independently appealable by statute. See Brumett v. MGA Home 

Healthcare, L.L.C., 240 Ariz. 421, ¶ 11, 380 P.3d 659 (2016).

2

Preliminary Injunction

¶4 TL4 contends the trial court erred in granting the 

preliminary injunction based on a failure of evidence. We do not 

reach the merits of the injunction because we conclude that, as TL4 

argued below, the trial court did not have the authority to grant it as 

a matter of law. By doing so, it denied TL4 its statutory right to a 

FED proceeding. “Courts of equity are as much bound by the plain 

and positive provisions of a statute as are courts of law. When 

rights are clearly established and defined by a statute, equity has no 

power to change or upset such rights.” Valley Drive-In Theatre Corp. 

 

2Although TL4 stipulated to the joinder of its FED action and 

Sunquest’s counterclaims, TL4 has maintained that the trial court 

implicitly considered inappropriate defenses to the FED action. See

Olds Bros. Lumber Co. v. Rushing, 64 Ariz. 199, 205, 167 P.2d 394, 397 

(1946). Because we do not read the trial court’s denial as a ruling on 

the merits, we do not address which defenses or counterclaims 

raised by Sunquest would be relevant to the FED action.
TUCSON LOT 4 v. SUNQUEST INFO. SYS.

Opinion of the Court

4

v. Superior Court, 79 Ariz. 396, 399, 291 P.2d 213, 214 (1955); cf. A.R.S. 

§ 12-1802(1) (prohibiting injunctive relief to stay pending litigation).

3

¶5 In Valley Drive-In, the plaintiff was awarded a writ of 

replevin for certain property. 79 Ariz. at 398, 291 P.2d at 214. The 

defendant filed a petition seeking to enjoin execution of the writ, 

arguing substantive reasons the writ should not have issued. Id. 

Our supreme court concluded the injunction was improper, noting 

that the trial court, acting in equity through its injunctive authority, 

had inserted financial hardship into the proceeding in spite of the 

implicit legislative directive not to consider it. Id. at 400, 291 P.2d at 

215.

¶6 Here, likewise, our legislature has established a 

procedure for determining whether a landlord may evict a tenant. 

See Curtis v. Morris, 184 Ariz. 393, 398, 909 P.2d 460, 465 (App. 1995)

(purpose of FED action is to provide summary, speedy remedy for 

landlord), approved, 186 Ariz. 534, 925 P.2d 259 (1996). That 

procedure precludes a court from considering a tenant’s financial 

hardship as a factor in determining the right to possession, the only 

issue relevant in a FED action. See A.R.S. § 12-1177(A) (“On the trial 

of an action of forcible entry or forcible detainer, the only issue shall 

be the right of actual possession and the merits of title shall not be 

inquired into.”). Thus, just as in Valley Drive-In, Sunquest’s action 

seeking injunctive relief is an improper attempt to insert the issue of 

hardship where our legislature has stated it does not belong. See 79 

Ariz. at 400, 291 P.2d at 215; see also Sult v. O’Brien, 15 Ariz. App. 

384, 388, 488 P.2d 1021, 1025 (1971) (“The maxim that equity follows 

the law is strictly applicable whenever the rights of the parties are 

clearly defined and established by statutory provisions.”). The trial 

court therefore erred in granting an injunction preventing TL4 from 

proceeding with a FED action.

 

3 Section 12-1802(1) arguably would independently bar 

Sunquest’s request for injunctive relief. But because the parties have 

not discussed this statute, and because it is not necessary to the 

resolution of this case, we do not address it.
TUCSON LOT 4 v. SUNQUEST INFO. SYS.

Opinion of the Court

5

Eviction Order

¶7 The trial court’s ruling did not include a finding 

whether Sunquest was guilty of the forcible detainer TL4 alleged in 

its amended complaint. It appears that the court denied the eviction 

request on the basis that such a proceeding was enjoined rather than 

making a determination on the merits. Because we vacate the 

injunction, we likewise vacate the trial court’s ruling denying the 

eviction order. We do not address the merits of the FED claim or 

whether TL4 properly initiated an eviction action.

Bond

¶8 TL4 next contends that the trial court should have 

required Sunquest to pay the rental value of the property as bond 

during the pendency of the appeal. Because we conclude the trial 

court erred in granting the injunction, we need not decide this issue.

Attorney Fees

¶9 TL4 requests its attorney fees “pursuant to Rule 21, 

ARCAP, the terms of the Lease, and A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01.” 

Under § 12-341.01(A), attorney fees may be awarded to a “successful 

party” in a contract action. If a contract provides for attorney fees, 

such an award is mandatory. See Bennett v. Appaloosa Horse Club, 201 

Ariz. 372, ¶ 26, 35 P.3d 426, 432 (App. 2001).

¶10 However, TL4 has not achieved a final determination 

on the merits. A “‘successful party’ . . . may include those who 

achieve reversal of an unfavorable interim order if that order is 

central to the case and if the appeal process finally determines an 

issue of law sufficiently significant that the appeal may be 

considered as a separate unit.” Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 

147 Ariz. 370, 393-94, 710 P.2d 1025, 1048-49 (1985). This appeal does 

not meet either of these criteria, and we therefore determine TL4 is 

not a successful party for purposes of attorney fees.

¶11 However, because TL4 is the “successful party” in that 

it has accomplished its goal in this appeal, we award TL4 its costs on 

appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341, pending compliance with 

Rule 21, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. See Mahurin v. Schmeck, 95 Ariz. 333, 
TUCSON LOT 4 v. SUNQUEST INFO. SYS.

Opinion of the Court

6

343, 390 P.2d 576, 582 (1964); cf. Henry v. Cook, 189 Ariz. 42, 44, 938 

P.2d 91, 93 (App. 1996) (attorney fees on appeal “can be apportioned 

between successful and unsuccessful efforts” but costs cannot be 

apportioned).

Disposition

¶12 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s 

granting of a preliminary injunction. We remand this case for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.