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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP No. CC-16-1414-FLKu

)

TIA DANIELLE SMITH, ) Bk. No. 2:16-bk-17692-NB

)

Debtor. )

_____________________________ )

)

TIA DANIELLE SMITH, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) MEMORANDUM*

)

IH4 PROPERTY WEST LP; KATHY )

A. DOCKERY, Chapter 13 ) 

Trustee, )

)

Appellees. )

______________________________)

Submitted Without Argument on January 25, 2018

Filed – February 1, 2018

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California

Honorable Neil W. Bason, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

 

Appearances: Appellant Tia Danielle Smith, pro se, on brief.

 

Before: FARIS, LAFFERTY, and KURTZ, Bankruptcy Judges.

FILED

FEB 01 2018

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 

Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may

have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, see

9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.

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INTRODUCTION

Chapter 131 debtor Tia Danielle Smith obtained a state court

injunction against creditor IH4 Property West LP’s (“IH4”)

enforcement of an unlawful detainer judgment against her. After

Ms. Smith filed for bankruptcy protection, IH4 moved to quash the

injunction in state court. Although the state court never acted

on the motion, Ms. Smith sought damages against IH4 for its

alleged violation of the automatic stay. 

The bankruptcy court denied Ms. Smith’s motion for damages,

holding that the automatic stay did not apply to the state court

action because Ms. Smith was the plaintiff and the action was not

“against” her. The court also ruled that IH4 did not violate the

automatic stay because the bankruptcy court had granted limited

stay relief to IH4 to defend itself in that state court action. 

Finally, the bankruptcy court held that IH4’s filing of a motion

that was never heard did not inflict any compensable damages on

Ms. Smith.

Ms. Smith appeals. We AFFIRM.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

This appeal is yet another phase of Ms. Smith’s extended

1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section

references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, all

“Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy

Procedure, and all “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 We granted Ms. Smith’s request that we waive the

requirement that she file an appendix containing her excerpts of

record. We exercise our discretion to review the documents on

the bankruptcy court’s electronic docket, as appropriate. See

Woods & Erickson, LLP v. Leonard (In re AVI, Inc.), 389 B.R. 721,

725 n.2 (9th Cir. BAP 2008).

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campaign to block the foreclosure of a deed of trust on her

property. The procedural history is complex, mostly because

Ms. Smith is a prolific and determined litigant despite repeated

and comprehensive losses, but also because her adversary, IH4,

was less diligent than she.

In December 2006, Ms. Smith borrowed $556,000 secured by a

deed of trust on her residence in Los Angeles. Ms. Smith

defaulted in making payments under the loan a year later. After

several workout and loan modification attempts failed, the

trustee under the deed of trust recorded a notice of sale in May

2011. Smith v. Am. Mortg. Network, Case No. B252585, 2015 WL

2438819 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. May 21, 2015) (“Smith I”).

In July 2011, Ms. Smith commenced Smith I in California

superior court. Her basic argument was that the foreclosing

lender failed to prove that it owned the loan and deed of trust. 

The superior court dismissed the action, and Ms. Smith appealed.

Ms. Smith unsuccessfully sought an injunction against the

trustee’s sale. In November 2011, the then-servicer of the loan

bought the property in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and

recorded a trustee’s deed upon sale. The servicer transferred

the property to IH4 in April 2014 by quitclaim deed.

Despite her defeat in Smith I, Ms. Smith then filed another

suit challenging the foreclosure in the superior court of

California against IH4 and others (“Smith II”). Her position in

Smith II was the same as the one the court rejected in Smith I:

the foreclosing lender had not proven its ownership of the loan

and deed of trust.

Shortly thereafter, IH4 filed an unlawful detainer action in

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superior court against Ms. Smith and her tenants (“Unlawful

Detainer Action”). A jury found in favor of IH4, and the

superior court entered judgment (“Unlawful Detainer Judgment”). 

On March 4, 2015, the superior court issued a writ of possession

in favor of IH4.

IH4’s victory was short-lived. Ms. Smith asked the superior

court in Smith II for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”)

staying enforcement of the Unlawful Detainer Judgment. 

Inexplicably, IH4 did not oppose this request, and the superior

court granted it on March 17. The superior court in the Unlawful

Detainer Action granted Ms. Smith’s ex parte request to recall

and quash the March 4 writ of possession until the court in

Smith II lifted the TRO.

But then Ms. Smith suffered a series of setbacks. In May

2015, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of

Smith I.3 In May 2016, the appellate division of the superior

court affirmed the Unlawful Detainer Judgment.4 During the same

month, the superior court dismissed Smith II, based on the

preclusive effect of the Smith I judgment, and vacated the TRO. 

IH4 submitted another application for a writ of possession in the

Unlawful Detainer Action.

Undaunted, Ms. Smith fought back. On May 24, she filed in

Smith II a motion to set aside the order vacating the TRO

3 The United States Supreme Court later denied Ms. Smith’s

petition for a writ of certiorari. 136 S. Ct. 810 (2016).

4 The California appellate court denied Ms. Smith’s appeal

of the Unlawful Detainer Judgment on June 20, 2016. In August

2016, the Supreme Court of California denied Ms. Smith’s petition

for writ of mandate.

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(“Motion to Reinstate TRO”), claiming that IH4 had failed

properly to serve her with its motion to vacate the TRO.

On June 9, 2016, before the superior court acted on IH4’s

application for a writ of possession in the Unlawful Detainer

Action or on Ms. Smith’s Motion to Reinstate TRO in Smith II,

Ms. Smith filed a chapter 13 petition.

On June 23, Ms. Smith filed an emergency motion in the

bankruptcy court to enforce the automatic stay against IH4 and

the superior court. The bankruptcy court denied that motion

without prejudice. In denying Ms. Smith’s request to shorten

time to hear the motion, the bankruptcy court stated in part: 

(1) There is no showing of any imminent or ongoing

violation of the automatic stay, either by the Los

Angeles Superior Court (the “Superior Court”) or by IH4

Property West LP. To the contrary, it seems from the

last exhibit to the debtor’s motion (dkt. 8, the

“Motion”) that the Superior Court has expressly

recognized that the automatic stay appears to apply,

presumably based on the same interpretation of

In re Perl, 811 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2016), as the

debtor. (The debtor herself might want the Superior

Court to proceed, because it seems that the debtor is

the one who wants relief from orders of the Superior

Court that were issued before this bankruptcy case was

filed; but if that is so then the debtor herself would

need to request relief from the automatic stay for that

purpose.)

(Emphasis added.) (As we shall see, the bankruptcy court later

corrected its last comment.)

On June 27, the superior court issued a writ of possession

in the Unlawful Detainer Action. At this point, no party had

obtained relief from the automatic stay. As a result (and as IH4

conceded), the writ was void.

On the same day, Ms. Smith filed an emergency motion for 

limited relief from the automatic stay. She requested that the

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bankruptcy court lift the automatic stay to allow her to pursue

various state court actions, including Smith II, but maintain the

stay against IH4 and other creditors. 

On June 28, the bankruptcy court granted temporary stay

relief and set the matter for hearing on July 5 (“Order Granting

Debtor’s Motion for Stay Relief”). The court ordered, in

relevant part:

b. In Los Angeles Superior Court case no. BC553608

(the “Smith II Action”), the Superior Court is not

stayed from issuing its decision with respect to the

debtor’s ex parte application for an order to vacate

the May 17, 2016 order dissolving the March 17, 2015

order re: preliminary injunction; and all parties in

interest may file any responsive papers . . . . 

(Emphasis added.)

On June 30, Ms. Smith requested that the Smith II court

issue its decision on her Motion to Reinstate TRO. Surprisingly,

IH4 did not appear at the hearing on the Motion to Reinstate TRO. 

The superior court found that IH4 had failed to serve proper

notice on Ms. Smith of the hearing on IH4’s motion to vacate the

TRO and issued an order reinstating the TRO (“Order Reinstating

TRO”).

With the TRO reestablished in Smith II, Ms. Smith filed in

the bankruptcy court a second motion for relief from the

automatic stay. She sought permission to attack the writ of

possession in the Unlawful Detainer Action. In response, IH4

conceded that the writ of possession was void because the

superior court issued it postpetition. The bankruptcy court

denied the motion as to IH4 as moot, stating: “IH4 has conceded

. . . that ‘[t]he writ of execution to which Debtor refers is of

no legal effect, and IH4 acknowledges that fact[.]’”

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On August 22, 2016, IH4 filed its own motion for relief from

the automatic stay. IH4 argued (among other things) that the

automatic stay did not apply to the property, because Ms. Smith

had no interest in the property on the petition date. IH4

further acknowledged that the June 27 writ of possession issued

postpetition was void. It represented that, once stay relief was

granted, it would seek to set aside the TRO and seek a new writ

of possession.

While IH4’s motion for relief from the automatic stay was

pending in the bankruptcy court, IH4 (represented by different

counsel) filed in Smith II a motion to set aside the TRO (“Motion

to Set Aside TRO”). IH4’s bankruptcy counsel subsequently

persuaded IH4’s state court counsel to take the hearing off

calendar “simply as a courtesy and to eliminate the appearance

that IH4 was doing what [counsel] had said it would not do until

after relief from stay was granted.”

When responding to IH4’s motion for relief from the

automatic stay, Ms. Smith argued that IH4 had violated the

automatic stay by filing the Motion to Set Aside TRO in Smith II.

The bankruptcy court granted IH4’s motion for stay relief on

September 15, 2016. It rejected Ms. Smith’s contention that IH4

violated the automatic stay when it filed its Motion to Set Aide

TRO. It stated that it had assumed “that the automatic stay

applies in the various nonbankruptcy actions. But in fact it

might not apply for various reasons. For example, actions

against the debtor generally are stayed but actions by the debtor

(including all counterclaims within that action) generally are

not.”

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Shortly thereafter, Ms. Smith filed a motion for damages

arising from violation of the automatic stay (“Motion for

Damages”), which is the subject of this appeal. She argued that

IH4 violated the automatic stay when it filed the Motion to Set

Aside TRO in Smith II while IH4’s motion for relief from the

automatic stay was pending in the bankruptcy court.5 She sought

damages for emotional distress, a finding of contempt against

IH4, and imposition of punitive damages.

The bankruptcy court denied the Motion for Damages (“Damages

Order”). The bankruptcy court ruled that (1) Ms. Smith did not

establish that IH4 had violated the automatic stay because the

alleged violation occurred in an action commenced by the debtor;

(2) IH4’s Motion to Set Aside TRO was within the scope of the

stay relief that the bankruptcy court had previously granted; and

(3) even if IH4 violated the automatic stay, Ms. Smith did not

suffer any compensable injury, because the only violation was the

setting of a hearing that IH4 subsequently took off calendar.

Ms. Smith filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s

Damages Order. The bankruptcy court denied the motion for

reconsideration (“Reconsideration Order”), stating: 

The automatic stay in the debtor’s bankruptcy case

might not have applied at all (as discussed on the

record and addressed in the filed papers), but to the

extent it did apply it was lifted for IH4 to pursue

all of its State Court remedies, including, but not

limited to, either issuance of a new writ of

possession (if required) or enforcement of its

existing writ of possession, if the State Court chose

to permit IH4 to proceed under that writ (which it

5 Ms. Smith also argued that the superior court in Smith II

violated the automatic stay when it denied her motion for a new

trial. She has abandoned this argument on appeal.

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might well have done, because the debtor has appeared

and the State Court has held hearings, so presumably

she cannot deny any longer that she has had notice of

IH4’s request for a writ of possession and an

opportunity to be heard). If there is any wrongdoing

on the part of IH4 with regard to that writ of

possession, it is a matter for the State Court to

address, not this Bankruptcy Court.

Ms. Smith timely filed a notice of appeal from the Damages

Order and Reconsideration Order.

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1334 and 157(b)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 158.

ISSUE

Whether the bankruptcy court erred in determining that IH4

did not violate the automatic stay by filing the Motion to Set

Aside TRO.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review de novo questions of law, including the bankruptcy

court’s determination as to whether a creditor has violated the

automatic stay. Palm v. Klapperman (In re Cady), 266 B.R. 172,

178 (9th Cir. BAP 2001), aff’d, 315 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2003);

Advanced Ribbons & Office Prods., Inc. v. U.S. Interstate

Distrib., Inc. (In re Advanced Ribbons & Office Prods., Inc.),

125 B.R. 259, 262 (9th Cir. BAP 1991) (the scope of the automatic

stay under § 362(a)(6) is “a legal issue which we review de

novo”). “De novo review requires that we consider a matter anew,

as if no decision had been made previously.” Francis v. Wallace

(In re Francis), 505 B.R. 914, 917 (9th Cir. BAP 2014).

“A bankruptcy court’s decision to deny a motion for

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additional findings, reconsideration or an amended order or

judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Marciano v. Fahs

(In re Marciano), 459 B.R. 27, 35 (9th Cir. BAP 2011), aff’d,

708 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2013). To determine whether the

bankruptcy court has abused its discretion, we conduct a two-step

inquiry: (1) we review de novo whether the bankruptcy court

“identified the correct legal rule to apply to the relief

requested” and (2) if it did, whether the bankruptcy court’s

application of the legal standard was illogical, implausible, or

without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in

the record. United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262–63 &

n.21 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

DISCUSSION

A. The bankruptcy court did not err in denying the Motion for

Damages.

Ms. Smith argues that IH4 violated the automatic stay when

it filed the Motion to Set Aside TRO. We disagree. 

Once a debtor files for bankruptcy protection, § 362(a) acts

to stay certain actions against the debtor and the bankruptcy

estate. The stay is broad but not unlimited. Among other

things, the automatic stay bars “the commencement or continuation

. . . of a judicial . . . action or proceeding against the debtor

that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of

the [bankruptcy] case . . . .” § 362(a)(1) (emphasis added). 

The narrow question in this appeal is whether the automatic

stay applied to Smith II such that IH4’s postpetition motion

violated the stay. We agree with the bankruptcy court that the

stay was inapplicable.

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1. The automatic stay was not applicable to Smith II,

which was an action initiated by a debtor.

By its terms, § 362(a)(1) applies to an action against a

debtor. The stay does not apply to actions commenced by the

debtor against a third party. See Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc.

v. Palmdale Hills Prop., LLC (In re Palmdale Hills Prop., LLC),

423 B.R. 655, 663 (9th Cir. BAP 2009), aff’d, 654 F.3d 868 (9th

Cir. 2011) (“the automatic stay has been found inapplicable to

lawsuits initiated by the debtor”); Eisinger v. Way (In re Way),

229 B.R. 11, 13 (9th Cir. BAP 1998) (“The primary purposes of

§ 362 do not apply, however, to offensive actions by a debtor or

bankruptcy trustee, as the same policy considerations do not

exist where the debtor has initiated a prepetition lawsuit

against a creditor.”).

In Gordon v. Whitmore (In re Merrick), 175 B.R. 333 (9th

Cir. BAP 1994), we considered whether defendants violated the

automatic stay by continuing to defend themselves in the state

court against the debtors’ prepetition fraud action, including

obtaining summary judgment postpetition. We examined the

language of § 362(a) and concluded that the automatic stay

applied only to actions that are initiated “against” a debtor:

It is most unlikely that a contention by a defendant

that the trustee’s claim is unfounded can be equated

with exercising dominion or control over property of

the estate. . . . Thus, the operative subsections in

the case at hand, (a)(1) and (a)(3), contemplate

actions “against” the debtor and not “concerning” the

debtor, which is much broader.

The automatic stay gives the debtor a breathing

spell from his creditors and allows the trustee to

marshall assets of the estate for the benefit of

creditors. While restraint of a defendant in a suit

subject to prosecution by the estate arguably could

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contribute to an orderly processing of estate assets,

we could find no case that supports the proposition

that the automatic stay prevents a defendant from

continuing to defend against a pre-bankruptcy lawsuit. 

To the contrary, there is substantial authority that

the stay is inapplicable to postpetition defensive

action in a prepetition suit brought by the debtor.

175 B.R. at 336 (emphases added) (internal citations omitted). 

We cited the Seventh Circuit’s unequivocal language permitting a

defendant to defend himself against a prepetition lawsuit:

The fundamental purpose of bankruptcy, from the

creditors’ standpoint, is to prevent creditors from

trying to steal a march on each other, In re Holtkamp,

669 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1982), and the automatic

stay is essential to accomplishing this purpose. There

is, in contrast, no policy of preventing persons whom

the bankrupt has sued from protecting their legal

rights. 

Id. at 337 (emphasis added) (quoting Martin–Trigona v. Champion

Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 892 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir. 1989)). We

concluded that “[t]he automatic stay should not tie the hands of

a defendant while the plaintiff debtor is given free rein to

litigate.” Id. at 338.

In the present case, the issue is whether IH4’s Motion to

Set Aside TRO filed postpetition in Smith II violated the

automatic stay. As the bankruptcy court correctly stated,

Smith II is a quiet title action that Ms. Smith instituted

against IH4. It is not an action “against” Ms. Smith or the

estate’s property, so IH4’s efforts to defeat Ms. Smith in that

action did not violate the automatic stay.6 See Parker v. Bain,

6 One might argue that IH4’s goal was to evict Ms. Smith

from the property, and that any step it took toward that

objective (such as its Motion to Set Aside TRO) was an “act to

obtain possession of property of the estate” under § 362(a)(3). 

(continued...)

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68 F.3d 1131, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 1995) (the automatic stay applies

only to actions “originally brought” against the debtor);

In re Merrick, 175 B.R. at 336.

Ms. Smith argues that the bankruptcy court, the superior

court, and IH4 acknowledged that the automatic stay applied in

Smith II and that she relied on those representations. It is

true that IH4 initially conceded – incorrectly – that the stay

applied to Smith II, and that the bankruptcy court suggested the

same. Similarly, the superior court suspended the hearing on

Ms. Smith’s May 2016 Motion to Reinstate TRO in Smith II when

Ms. Smith filed her chapter 13 petition, implying that the

automatic stay applied. But the automatic stay is a creature of

statute. A party’s incorrect statements, a state court’s

decisions,7 or a bankruptcy court’s tentative views8 cannot

expand its scope.

6(...continued)

But because the foreclosure had been completed prepetition, the 

estate had no ownership interest in the Property.

7 A state court’s erroneous interpretation of the automatic

stay is void. “Any state court modification of the automatic

stay would constitute an unauthorized infringement upon the

bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to enforce the stay.” Gruntz v.

Cty. of L.A. (In re Gruntz), 202 F.3d 1074, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Thus, the superior court’s belief as to whether the automatic

stay prevented it from ruling on matters in Smith II is not

dispositive.

8 The bankruptcy court clarified (in its order granting

IH4’s motion for stay relief and the Damages Order) that the

automatic stay may not have applied at all and that it was only

assuming – without deciding - that the automatic stay applied to

Smith II. The bankruptcy court never unequivocally ruled that

the automatic stay applied to Smith II, and the court was free to

clarify any ambiguity in its comments in subsequent rulings.

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2. Alternatively, the Motion to Set Aside TRO fell within

the court’s grant of limited stay relief.

The bankruptcy court ruled that, even if the automatic stay

applied to Smith II, IH4’s Motion to Set Aside TRO was within the

scope of the stay relief that the bankruptcy court had granted in

the Order Granting Debtor’s Motion for Stay Relief. We find no

abuse of discretion. 

In its Order Granting Debtor’s Motion for Stay Relief, the

bankruptcy court ruled that the superior court could decide

Ms. Smith’s Motion to Reinstate TRO and explicitly stated that

“all parties in interest may file any responsive papers . . . .” 

The bankruptcy court ruled that the Motion to Set Aside TRO was a

“responsive paper.” It stated that the motion “directly responds

to the debtor’s ex parte application and is certainly a

‘responsive pleading’ [sic] addressed by this court’s order

granting relief from stay . . . .”

On appeal, Ms. Smith argues that the Motion to Set Aside TRO

was not “responsive” within the meaning of the bankruptcy court’s

order. But the bankruptcy court had the power to interpret and

clarify its own orders. See Wilshire Courtyard v. Cal. Franchise

Tax Bd. (In re Wilshire Courtyard), 729 F.3d 1279, 1289 (9th Cir.

2013) (noting that “it is well recognized that a bankruptcy court

has the power to interpret and enforce its own orders”); Rosales

v. Wallace (In re Wallace), 490 B.R. 898, 906 (9th Cir. BAP 2013)

(“We accord substantial deference to the bankruptcy court’s

interpretation of its own orders and will not overturn that

interpretation unless we are convinced it amounts to an abuse of

discretion.” (citing In re Marciano, 459 B.R. at 35)). The

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bankruptcy court accurately observed that IH4’s motion contested

the substance of Ms. Smith’s attempt to reinstate the TRO. We

hold that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in

clarifying that stay relief applied to the Motion to Set Aside

TRO.

3. We need not reach the issue of Ms. Smith’s damages.

Ms. Smith requested that the bankruptcy court sanction IH4

and award her damages for the physical and emotional distress

that she suffered. As we explain above, IH4 did not violate the

automatic stay, so we need not consider whether the bankruptcy

court erred in denying Ms. Smith’s request for damages. 

B. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying

the motion for reconsideration. 

Ms. Smith also appeals from the Reconsideration Order. The

bankruptcy court held that Ms. Smith did not offer any newly

discovered evidence and that the issues presented were matters

better determined by the state court. We agree.

We examine Ms. Smith’s arguments under Civil Rule 59, made

applicable in bankruptcy through Rule 9023. See Am. Ironworks &

Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 898-99 (9th

Cir. 2001) (“A ‘motion for reconsideration’ is treated as a

motion to alter or amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 59(e) if it is filed within [fourteen] days of entry of

judgment. Otherwise, it is treated as a [Civil] Rule 60(b)

motion for relief from a judgment or order.” (citation

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omitted)).9 “[A] motion for reconsideration should not be

granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district

court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed

clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the

controlling law.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop,

229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 389 Orange St.

Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999)).

The motion for reconsideration largely focused on IH4’s

alleged bad faith (as argued in a motion to dismiss that is not

the subject of this appeal), and not on the alleged automatic

stay violations. The only argument even tangentially related to

the automatic stay is Ms. Smith’s contention that the Los Angeles

Sheriff’s Department served her with a notice to vacate the

Property based on the writ of possession that the superior court

issued postpetition in violation of the automatic stay. But

Ms. Smith fails to address the bankruptcy court’s reasoning in

the Damages Order. Moreover, as the bankruptcy court held in its

Reconsideration Order, her contention that the writ of possession

was invalid is an issue for the superior court, not the

bankruptcy court.10 Accordingly, the bankruptcy court did not

9 The bankruptcy court issued the Damages Order on

October 17, 2016, and Ms. Smith filed the motion for

reconsideration on October 28 and her supplemental brief on

November 7.

10 Ms. Smith implies that the Sheriff’s Department violated

the automatic stay. She is wrong. First, the automatic stay was

not in effect when the Sheriff’s Department served Ms. Smith with

the notice to vacate on November 1, 2016. Second, the service of

the notice to vacate on November 1 cannot retroactively turn the

August 30 Motion to Set Aside TRO into a stay violation.

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abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration.

CONCLUSION

The bankruptcy court did not err. We AFFIRM both the

Damages Order and the Reconsideration Order.

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