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/ ... .. SECURITY Cl.ASSIFICATION (/f11arJ 

DISPOSITION FORM 

Studyi: 2£. the Security Division 

TO I/A FROM DATE ,DR? ::> ,gc;t; COMMENT NO 1 

SEC 

1. Attached hereto for your information is a copy of a Study:~~ Security 

Di,·ision. 

2. In an agency of such sensitivity and importance to the interests of the 

nation as NSA, security must be a paramount consideration. This paper therefore 

discusses the policies and practices believed necessary to afford maximum. security. 

Further discussions consist of security practices and procedures fran the beginning 

of AFSA, changes and improvements inaugurated to meet pressing needs, together With 

future plans to arrive at the ultimate security deemed necessary for an intelligence organization as sensitive as NSA. 

3. Offices and divisions desiring additional copies may- secure them by request 

to SEC. 

!nc1. 

a/s 

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Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 09-23-2013 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 

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16-&tSOl-3 U S. OOYERKJIENT PRINTDIQ OJ'PICE 1951 0 911118'15 
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WASHINGTON 25. D. C. 

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I NATION.AL SECURITY AGENCY 

Washington 25, D. c. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

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I Page No. -- A. Introduction 1 

I B. Policies and Procedures Believed Necess&rl' 

for Maximum Security 2 

I c. Operations of the Security Division 8 

I: Physical Security 8 

I II• Personnel Security 15 

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III: Security in COMINT Elements under the 

Operational end Technical Control ot the 

Director,, NSA 37 

I IV: Industrial Security 39 

V: Administration and Files 42 

I VI: Planning 46 

VII: Interim Operation at Fort Meade 48 

I VIII: Participation in Agency Security Policy 50 

I D. Organization Chart 51 

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INTRODUCTION 

The National Security Agency he.a two prilnary tunction1 -- one, the 

coordination and control of the production and distribution of communications intelligence; the other, the production of cryptologic mterial.s 

and security ot United States communications; and the res~arch and devel• 

opment aspects of both. The compromise of a COMIM source or success 

could effectively cause exceptionally grave damage to the security of the 

United States by deny!Dg to this country intelligence regarding the pro• 

grams, operations, end plans or foreign governments, especialq potential 

aggressors. Coou;>rO"'l.ise of a cryptographic system could cause equa.l:cy' 

grave damage b7 m'9ldng available to a foreign nation lmowledge of the 

pl.ans, policies, programs, and operations ot the United State• government, especial.1¥ as the;y concern the defense of the United States. Certainly, in an &geDCJ' of such importance and sensitivity to the 1ntereata 

ot the nation, security must be a paramount consideration. 

~ Security Division :La the component of the Statt concerned With 

the security requirements ot the OOMI!ft' activities under the operational. 

and teclm:Lcal control ot the Director 1 KSA1 and the t'ulf'illment ot aecu• 

ri ty requirements w1 thin the Agency. 

!'bis paper Will discuss the policies and prMtices believed necea-

•8Z7 to afford maximum aecurit7 to an Agenq ot thia kind; the securitJ' 

practices and procedures f'l'Olll tl:u!t beginning of the Armed Forces Security 

Agency, ad their vealmesaea; and the cblmgea and in;>rovementa inauaUr-i 

ated to meet prea11Dg needs, together With :tUture plans to ar:rive at tb4!f 

ultimate aecuriv deemed 11.ecea118l7 for an intelligence organization .. sensitive as BSA. 

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POLICIES AND PRACTICES BELIEVED NEC.ESSARY 

FOR MAXIMUM SECUBITI 

It 1a fi~ believed that security weaknesses result from the total. 

separation of and lack ot coordination between the security, counteriptelligence1 and intelligence activities ot the federal government. Sec• 

urity el.ements should have full access to in:f'ormat1on compiled by intelligence agencies, particular1'r that information which shows the degree ot 

success of foreign intelligence efforts. Knowledge of the information 

which foreign countries possess or do not possess, derived from successful intelligence operations, is of inestimable value in determining the 

essential elements of ini'ormation of the intelligence agents at those 

foreign countries. Counterintelligence agencies should make available to 

security officers complete information concerning the known targets ot 

foreign intelligence and the modus operandi and identity- at known or sus• 

pected agents. This close coordination and exchange of information would 

enable security elements to place maximum security- emphasis on that classified information end material which is not already in the possession ot 

toreign intelligence and to eliminate wasted effort expended in protect• 

ing classified material which has been compromised. It Will assist secu• 

r1 ty Jin instituting realistic sa:f'egue.rds as well as focusing attention in 

those areas which might have been successful.q penetrated. 

Security of any- sensitive agency, in general, involves the protea• 

tion of' classified information and material f'rom. acce1Ss by- unauthorized 

persons end insurance that authorized access by aey individual or group 

is clear:cy consistent With the interests of' national security. 

Pl!Jsical Securit;r. 

Pl\vsical security is that component of security which results fraa 

all pey-sical measures necessary to safeguard classified equipment, material, documents and information from access to or observation by unauthor1 zed persons. pey-sical security, therefore, supplements personnel aecu• 

r1 t;r by insuring that authorized persons only have access to classitiecl 

security information, ewd that, in receiving, handling and transmittil'lg 

such information, the necessary f'ac1lit1es and procedures are employed to 

protect it. 

A p~ical seauri ty program encompasses installation security to in• 

clude perimeter control, internal canpartmenta.lization, personnel ident1-

f'ication, and property control. It provides tor aa:te storage f'acilities, 

includi.Ds locked cabinets, sates, and vaults. It pranulgates and impl.e· 

lll8Jlts secure means 8Dd procedures tor the destruction at claasif'ied waste. 

It further preacribes and conducts such inspections and SUl"V'eJ'B as ~ be 

required to maint&iD high stam.m:da ~ ph;ysical security. 

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Perimeter control is desi~.ed to protect an installation against the 

entry of unauthorized persons end rns:y be accanplished by means of perimeter :fences, exterior guards, controlled gates, lighting, automatic a.lam 

systems, and an identification system. Caution must be exercised in realizing the degree of privacy afforded by perimeter control. Fences can be 

negotiated and, unless properly lighted and surveilled, only keep out law 

abiding citizens, sometimes becoming more dangerous than no fences in 

that they establish careless attitudes and a false sense of security. 

A Visitor control system is designed to insure that non-employees 

granted entry to a sensitive instaJ.J.ation are proper~ cleared for access 

to claoaified material., and that they are granted access only to that 

classified material tor which they have a "need to know" and to which 

their level of clearance entitles them. Visitor control is accomplished 

by means of screening before entry 1 a pass end identification system., and 

an escort system. 

Compartmentalization is the restriction ot individuals to areas and 

classified material for which they have a "need to know". It prevents 

every em;ployee from gaining knowledge of tbe whole of the installation's 

operations when such knowledge is not essential to the performance of his 

duties. It may be accomplished by designation of restricted areas proper'.cy secured against unauthorized access, an internal identification system, personal. recognition, and the use of interior guards and patrols. 

Property control is designed to prevent the entry" into a sensitive 

installation of material. or devices which might represent a threat to the 

security of the installation and to prevent the unauthorized removal from. 

the installation of classified material. or other government property. 

Property control can be accomplished to some extent by the use of property passes, but it can be rigidly controlled o~ by search and inspection methods. There is no system, other then by the personal integrity 

of ~loyees, for controlling the knowledge in the minds of those indiv:l.-

duals who have authorized access. 

Accountability, saf'ekewine;, transmission, ~ destruction .2!, £!!:!,· 

sified mo.terial. Normal.1¥1 highly classified material can be considered 

secure f'rom. unauthorized access only when it is rigidly accounted for 

from the time of its conception to its eventual complete destruction. 

Classified material is saf'eguarded by proper classi:fication, a receipt 

system, secure methods of commnnication or transmission, and efficient 

and secure methods ut destruction of classified waste. Proper classification is essential to good security; however, caution must constant:cy be 

exercised age.inst over-classification and classification for purposes 

other than the security ot the contents of' the document. The protection 

of classified material depends to a great degree on the individuals hand· 

ling it. They must be impressed with the accuracy of its classification 

and their continuing responsibility to af'tord it the prescribed protection. Buman f'ai1ure is much more :trequent and dangerous than is mechani.• 

cal. failure. When classitied material is not under constant surveillance 

by authorized individuals, it must be properly- safeguarded by the most 

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aecure mea.us e.vai1e.ble, depending upon its sensitivity and, therefore, 

its classification. It muot be recoe;nized that locks, sa:tes, and vau1ts 

only atf'ord a degree of privacy, and other precautions must be taken if' 

the sensitivity of the material warrants it. 

Surveys. Constant effort must be expended to insure that the p}\ysi• 

cal. security of an installation has not been breached. This should be 

accamplisbed by a combination of all. of the toll.owing procedures: 

1. Daily inspection of' areas to mske sure that physical barriers have not been breached to permit surreptitious entry 

and that classified material is properly secured. Sensitive areas should be checked hour~ or more frequently to 

detect a forced or surreptitious entry and to apprehend fmY' 

unauthorized individual in the area. 

2. Immediate reporting and investigation of security violations to f'ix responsibility and to determine if physical 

means are adequate. 

3. Periodic search w1 th technical equipment to insure that no 

surreptitious listening devices have been installed b7 

which classified inf'or.ma.tion might be transmitted electronically outside the installation. Liaison shoul.d be maintained with the proper agencies to receive complete intelligence information regarding the development of new devices, both by United States agencies and :f'oreisn agencies, 

and the counter devices to protect against them. 

Industrial. Security. In addition to the pb¥sical. security provisions discussed above / a sensitive activity must take measures to insure 

that its classified material. and in:f'ormation transmitted to other actiTI.-

ties, but f'or which it retains responsibility, is properly safeguarded. 

Included is classified material. in the possession of contractors, consultants, and other associated activities. Protection of such classitied 

material may be accomplished by the preparation of adequate regulations; 

frequent surveys and inspections to insure that the regulations are :f'o1-

lowed; end, through effective liaison 'With the officials concerned, mu• 

tual understanding of the importance of adequate security. 

Personnel Securl ty. 

It is firmly believed that three processes a.re necessary to insure 

that those persons authorized access to classified material. are not potential or actueJ. security risks. These processes are: pre-empl~nt 

or pre-access screening,, investigation and clearance; and security supervision or cleared individuals. Most government agencies place considerable emphasis on clearance and investigation procedures, but they tend to 

alight or !snore the others. Ef':f'icient personnel security can be attained 

only it every available means is used to ef'f'ectively complete all three 

processes. 

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Pre-cmoloY!J~ent ,2!: pre-c.ccc13a ocrccnin~ is designed to eliminate before employment tbooe who are, or who Iili~t reasonably be expected to become, security rislts. It may be o.ccom.plished by means of' a thorough 

interview of the applicant, covering the in:forma.tion listed on bis Statement of Personal History, his suitability for ecployment, and his subversive belief's or activities. Such a.n. interview is more effective if' verified by means of the pol¥graph or lie-detector machine. This concept is 

based on the fact that an individual lmows more about himself' than aey-one 

else, and certainly more than aey- background investigation coul.d possibq 

develop. In e.dd1 ti on, p~·employment screening Dla\Y provide a basis 1 in 

conjunction w1 th other preliminary investigative processes 1 tor granting 

an interim clearance prior to completion of' a background investigation, 

tJius utilizing the services of employees productivel1' much sooner than 

voul.d otherwise 'be possible. 

Pre-emp~t screening tends to discourage foreign agents from 

atteq>ts to infiltrate an activity, particulerq one which utilizes the 

polygraph interview. Penetration agents are invariab:cy selected f'rom. 

those with no previous subversive record so that the background investigation of such an individual seldom Will develop iJJf'ormation sufficient 

to reflect a danger to the security of' the activity. The poqgraph interview, on the other hand, through intensive questioning, mtq' develop 

the tacts, or at l.east raise sufficient doubt, to eliminate the agent 

f'rom. consideration f'or em;pl.oym.ent. Caution llll.lSt be exercised that the 

importance of the po:Qrgraph to sound security is not overemphasized. It 

is not the purpose of this s"tudy to develop a thesis on the relative merits of the po4'graph, but rather to indicate its extreme value as an adjunct to a sound personnel security program, particular~ to preemployment or pre-access screening and, in some instances, to personnel security supervision. 

Investigation ~ clearance. Prior to granting clearance to an in· 

dividueJ., every- investigative proce:ss practicable should be utilized to 

insure that the applicent is not an actual or potential security risk. 

The investigative process begins with a thorough review and ~sis of 

the applicant's Statement of' Persona.l History. Bis name and all. names 

appearing on the Statement of Personal History, such as relatives, references, employers, and organizations, should be referenced and checked in 

the employing organization's security files. After completion of the 

review of' the Statement of' Personal History and the pre-employment interview described above, a National Agency Check is requested, wherein the 

files of all federal investigative agencies maintaining cr:fminal and subversive files on a national. level. are checked. If no derogatory information is developed as a result of these checks, a c~lete background 

investigation should be conducted by the sensitive agency's own. investigators or by another investigative agency. !lb.e background investigation 

should include verification of education, employment, and residences, 

through interviews with educators, employers, co-workers, character references, neighbors, and acquaintances, and checks of' l.ocal. law enforcement and credit agencies in all areas where the applicant has resided or 

been empl.oyed. 

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8ecurit;y: supervision. A dynamic security supervision progrND. is 

necessary to achieve satisfactory personnel security by insuring the continued reliability and suitability of cleared employees. If effective, it 

should identify successful foreign in:filtration and those employees who 

are or may be logical prospects for defection. It should afford a means 

ot keeping leaks of inf'o:rni.e.tion e.t e. minimum. The following processes are 

considered basically necessary to an effective $ecur1ty supervision program: 

1. ~curi ti education. A security education progr8lll is designed to acquaint eJ.l employees with the security obligations and requirements of the employin~ activity end to 

explain to them. the necessity for these requirements. Employees in en 56ency as sensitive as the National Security 

Agency must o.lwSNs realize the importance of their work to 

nationfl.l. security. They must nllm~S be aware of foreign 

interest in the activities of the acency and the constant 

possibility ot success:rul foreign penetration. Such a progrmu must be designed to instill in all employees confi• 

dence in the officials 8d.ministering the security program 

end a willinflllcss to cooperate and assist in every w~ possible in malting their organization and its classified material secure e,aainst compromises. Once confidence and 

mutual trust a.re established, the employee is encouraged to 

approach security otticials with inf'orms.tion coming to his 

attention which might be considered detrimental to the installation. Employees must be aware of their security 

responsibilities at all times; they should be able to recog. 

nize any activities which have a security significance and 

have enough confidence in the security organization to be 

Willing and desirous of making , the information available. 

2. Liaison. There should be immediate and continuing liaison 

With al.l counterintelligence, investigative and law enforcement agencies in the area to insure that information concerning the sensitive agency, or ez:q ot its employees, ia 

passed on promptly to the security officials, facilitating 

the expeditious handling of investigations. The p~t receipt of derogatory inf'ormation, even before verification 

by investigation, enables the security officials to take 

administrative action to minimize the danger to security 

that would result if the allegations were true. Liaison 

should not be lim:I. ted to outside agencies 1 but should in• 

clude the other ataf't divisions and operating elements ot 

the agency concerned. 

3. Investigations. The sensitive agency should have a force ot 

investigators who can conduct immediate investigations ot 

security violations or compromises ot classified material, 

unauthorized entry or access, and allegations concerning 

the J.oyaltJ' &:Ad/or suitability of &D1' employee. However, 

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they should be prepared and willins to refer investigations 

beyond their scope, or matters not vi.thin their Jurisdiction, to the proper investigating agency. 

4. Reseiu-ch. A continuing and detailed research program should 

be established to effect a detailed study of the security 

files of all employees concerning whom unresolved derogatory in:f"ormation exists, of those who have been associates 

or co-workers of others proven to be security risks, o~ 

those vho have not been thoroughly investigated, and, ultimately, ot all employees. This is an at:f'irma.tive counterinte1ligence approach to security based on the reasoning 

that an agency as sensitive to national. security as the 

National Security Agency must be high on foreign targets ot 

interest and penetration and, turther, that sound security 

compels a presumption ot successful foreign penetration. 

The investigative approach is based upon the receipt and 

investigation ot an allegation, the counterintelligence research approach is based on assumptions. These assumptions 

require a close working relationship with the intelligence 

organizations in an attempt to more definite~ discern the 

relative degree of foreign interest in specific areas. With 

these assumptions, the researchers, who should be experienced counter1nte1ligence agents, can better search out and 

identify any successful foreign penetration. The liaison, 

investigative and research functions are dependent upon 

each other and should be included in one organizational segment under a single supervisor. 

5. Reinvestiga.tion. Finally, an effective program. of securit7 

supervision of personnel should'include periodic reinveati• 

gation. Follow-up interviews w1 th the aid of the polygraph 

are considered essential. These interviews me:y be confined 

to questions bearing on subversive activities or associations and unauthorized divulgence of classified intorma.-

ticm. Reinvestigations should also include a National Agenc1 Check, a check of local police and credit agencies, end. 

neighborhood interviews. 

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OPERATIONS OF THE SECURITI DIVISION 

PART I 

PHYSICAL SECURITI 

The mission ot pb¥s1cal sec~ty is the protection of NSA classified 

material and areas from unauthorized access, by all possible means, and 

the esta.blislmtent and supervision of effective measures for the handlillg 

of classified information. It is designed. to protect all of NSA's information, m.aterial, end facilities aaainst conq:>romise, whether unintentional or throuah any subversive or criminal activ1ty. 

Historz. 

Physical security at the beginning of the Armed Forces Security 

Agency (.AFSA) was bandled by personnel attached to the military installations at which AFSA was located. They were employed in a two-told ce.paci ty as security officer and staff' for both the military station and AFSA. 

As the operations of AFSA grew, involving more equipment, materials and 

apace, the need for a separate p~sical security control unit became 

apparent. Ear:cy in 1950 the Physical Security Branch was organized in the 

Security Control Division under the I.FSA Office of Administration. 

The peyaical security of Al'SA, end later NSA, has been int'luenced by 

certain p~sical limitations. The location ot the .Agency at several military aites necessitated statements ot policy to establish the responsibilities ot internal security. 

The Arm:! Security Agency issued two letters, dated 22 December 1949 

and 27 February 19501 on the subject of the interrelationship of AFSA and 

ASA. AFSA assumed the responsibility tor internal. security and tire watch 

at the Naval Commun:lcations Station, and "A" and "B" Buildings at .Arlington Hall Station. It was further stated that all directives concerning 

the functioning of AFSA elements at Arlington Ball Station must conf'orm. 

to the administrative policies and regulations of the Chief, ASA. The 

Director, AFSA1 was given the responsibility tor insuring that all personnel at Arlington HaJ.l Station under his control complied with such 

policies and regulations. In turn, ASA performed the tollOWing functions 

which benefited .AFSA: 

l. Formulated and administered security policies tor personnel 

located at Arlington Ball Station. 

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e. lnvestigated security violations. 

3. Conducted security orientation of newly assigned personnel. 

4. Made and issued identification badges for military and civ• 

ilian personnel in accordance with policies Jointly estab· 

lished by Headquarters, AFSA and ASA. 

5. Provided armed guard protection tor the entire area within 

Arlington Hall Station and its specifica~ designated RESTRICTED areas. 

The tollo'Wing excerpt, containing background information pertaining 

to the Security Control Division, is from a letter dated 21 July 19501 

trom the Commanding Officer, Naval Communications Station, to the Director, AFSA, on the sub,ject of Comm.and functions and responsibilities: 

"Physical Security Branch, Naval Communications Station, 

will provide for p~sical security and Will restrict 

access to the Station to properly authorized and accredited personnel. Only the Commanding Officer, Naval Communications Station and the Commanding Officer of the 

Marine Gue.rd will issue orders to the Marine Guard. AFSA 

will provide personnel for the interior security patrol, 

will issue instructions for the performance of' duties, 

and will make, fabricate and issue identification badges 

to al1 personnel who ms.y be employed at or visit the 

Station. The administration of these responsibilities of 

AFSA will not relieve the Commaoding Officer, Naval Communications Station, of his res~onsibilities for the 

military command ot the Station, nor restrict his authority for exercising it. Nava1 Co.mmunications Station 

will set up an organization for the tire protection ot 

tl).e Station. Fire Marshal and Assistant, if' neceasary, 

will be provided from Naval Camnunica:tions Station's 

personnel. AFSA Will provide patrols, it necessar)", for 

the interior of the buildings. These duties maybe combined vi th those duties ot the security patrol." 

Based on the information outlined above 1 the main functions ot the 

fh1'•1cal Security Branch were Visitor control; issuing at badges tor personnel identification; property control; directing and supervising the 

APSA interior guards; and prescribing the procedures and methods tor the 

collection, accountability and destruction of classified waate. !J.'he functions ot the Branch were somewhat restricted since the Branch was governed by the Naval Security Manual at the Naval COD111Dmicationa Station 

and the ASA Regulations at Arlington Hall Station. On 1Januar,y1950, and 

until the present NSA Security Manual was published on 5 November 19531 

the regulations outlined above, with certain mod1tications, governed at 

all AFSA installations. 

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There were no major reorganizations within the Pb¥sical Securit)' 

:Branch until November 19531 at which time,, in order to equalize the workload and better utilize personnel, the Branch wae diVided into the following Sections: 

Administrative Unit 

Badge Section 

Naval Security Station Security Section 

Arlington Hall Station Security Section 

Survey- and Investigative Section 

Other organizational changes occurred in 1954. In June, the peyaical 

security responsibilities of the NSA Training School were absorbed by- the 

Physical Security Branch. A Security Section was established using keypersonnel of the Naval Security Station Security Section as a nucleus and 

uncleared personnel as guards. The responsibility of industrial security 

and the evaluation of COMINT compromises were reassigned tram this Branch 

in J~ to the Technical Assistant to the Chief, Security Division, who 

in turn waa authorized additional personnel 1n order to activate the Industrial Security Branch. In October, the SUrvey- and Investigation Section waa redesigna.ted as the Inspection and Survey Section, when all the 

investigative functions were assigned to the Special Research Unit. 

Guards. It should be understood that at no time since the Agency waa 

1nitial..q activated haa the Physical. Security Branch had any guards avaiJ.. 

able for exterior guard dut7. All exterior guard duty has been performed 'b7 guards from the respective services, over whom the Security DiVision 

has had no control. A f'orce of' interior security- patrol guards has been 

maintained at both the Naval Security Station and Arlington Hall Station, 

whose function it is to detect any unauthorized entry, either forced-or 

surreptitious, and to apprehend any unauthor:lszed indi Viduals w1 thin NSA 

areas. The guards escort Visitors during duty hours, and patrol all NSA 

areas at periodic intervals during non-duty hours,, checking tor fire and 

Violations of' security requirements. 

A civilian guard post was established at the entrance of one of' 

the main buildings at the Naval Communications Station in September 1951 

and maintained until 1953• Later this guard force was changed to another 

building, providing better control. over the movement ot large groups in 

both buildings, and requiring all personnel entering or leaving either 

building atter normal duty hours to use the entrance where the guard 

:rorce was stationed. 

On 1 February 1954 the security patrolmen began an inspection 

of unlocked desks tor classified mater1a1. A notice to the effect that 

the desk was inspected was placed. in each desk. On 22 April 1954, NSA 

Regulation No. 121-71 "Storage of Classified Material," was revised and 

published. 

Until June 1954, civilian guards were utilized tor physical 

secur1't7 purposes at the NBA Training School, located on "U" Street,N.w., 

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Washington, D. c. When the Training School vas moved :tram the "U" Street 

location to Temporary "R" Building,, the Physical Security Branch of the 

Security Division assumed the security duties at that location With the 

utilization of military guards. 

!~ea. In the earliest period of AFSA history, responsibility for 

the m.anu:facture, control, and issuance of' personnel identification badges 

was maintained by the Naval Communications Station. As the Agency grew, 

personnel billets for the identification badge operation were incl.uded in 

the Agency's personnel allotments, and personnel, equipment, and supplies 

ot the Naval Communications Station were assigned to AFSA for this operation. 

In October 1949, AFSA assumed the responsibility for photographing, manuf'acturing, controlling, and issuing of the personnel identification badges. In April 1950, a new identification system was established 

tor the Agency. In July 1950, AFSA no longer rented the equipment and materials tor this operation, but had tull ownership of al.l the Agency's machinery for badge production. A new identification badge system was again 

initiated in April 1953, vbich system is nov in effect. The Badge Section, Pb;y'sical Security Branch, at the present time pertorms photographic 

duties for ASA, NSA, and the Naval Communications Station, and mmmtactures badges tor NBA, the Naval Conmunications Station, op .. 202, and consumer personnel. The Section does not, however, msnute.cture badges tor 

ASA at the present time. 

Propertz Passes. The AFSA Securit;y Manual, dated 5 November 1952, 

assigned to the Physical. Securit;y Branch, Securit;y Control Division, the 

responsibilit;y for identification and control of property (property pass 

system). This Manual designated the Chief, Security Control Di vision as 

the competent authority for the identificat~on end control of property 

(matter) being carried into or out of the Agenc;y by other than electrical 

means and made all such property, whether publicl;y or privately owned, 

subject to inspection. NSA Regulation 121-3 1 dated 27 January 1954, 

required that civilians end enlisted military personnel have propert;y 

passes to remove classified documents, government-owned property", and all 

carrying devices which conceal their contents, from either station. The 

three types of passes which authorize removal of propert;y tram either station are the NSA Messenger Badge, the NSA One-Time Property Pass, end the 

NBA Monthly Property Pass. 

A survey was conducted at Arlington Hall Station end Naval Securi t;y Station from 9-24 J~ 1953, to determine if propert;y passes were 

being properly controlled. Another survey vas initiated to check all 

property passes issued since the new system beceme effective in Febl"WUT 

1953 to determine if passes were being properly utilized. The entire 

property pass system is nov being investigated to detennine possible wealtnesses and to take steps to revise the system for more secure operation. 

During the month of October 195~, a review was made of the prop. 

ert;y pass and badge system, including control of consultants and experts 

vho have contracts with the various NSA offices and diVisions 1D order 

1ili&:t. ~r movement may be more adequate~ controlled. 

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Visitor Control. The present visitor control system became etfect1 ve on l April 1953. During June 1953, minor changes were made in the 

visitor control and escort prohedure at the Naval Security Station, which 

resulted in a more effective operation., The patrolmen were moved from 

the Quarter Deck to the Gate House, making them immediately available for 

escort duty. The Plzy'sical Security Branch assigned one man behind the 

counter at the Gate House to handle NSA vieitors in coordination with the 

visitor control office. This operation has been performed very satisfactorily, eliminating delays. In October l.953, a new procedure was placed 

into effect to enhance the security of the visitor control system. No 

"one .. day badges" were to be issued to personnel reporting for duty as in 

the old system. All personnel reporting for duty or briefing were pro• 

cessed as visitors and required an escort badge prior to indoctrination 

by the Personnel Security Branch. 

In December 19531 as a result ot a discussion between G-2, ASA 

and members of the Security Division, NSA, the regulations governing the 

processing of NBA visitors at Arlington Hall Station, and the procedure 

for handling NSA personnel desiring to remove property or material from 

the c~ounds, were changed to permit mt>re efficient entry and exit. Thia 

chsJlse permitted NBA visitors to be escorted from the Main Gates to compounds and back by NSA personnel.. NSA personnel apprehended at the gates 

With classified material, who did not have the required authorization, 

were referred to the Security Division, NSA, rather than to G-2, ASA, tor 

investigation. This procedure precluded del.ays which had existed under 

the form~r system. NBA Regulation No. 122-2, "NSA Visitor Control System," was revised on 26 J.4'.arch 1954. However, no major changes were made 

at that time. 

Designation of Areas. In November 1953, in order to more e:f':f'ectivel.¥ com.p~rt."Uente.J.ize iSA operations, and to bette~ protect particular]Jr sens:fr. 

tive nreao, a system of designating certain areas as RES'mICTED1 SECURE, 

or EXCWSION areas was adopted. Physical security standards and requirements were established ~or each type of e.rea. Representatives of the 

~sical Security Branch inspected each area to be designated as a SECURE 

or EXCUJSION area, prior to its being authorized as such, in order to 

determine if' established standards were met. P~sical standards were not 

considered rigid and could be modi~ied by instal.lation of e~ secure 

alternate physical barriers, so long as the modi~ications would prevent 

unauthorized access as effectively as the original barriers. SECURE and 

EXCWSIOlf areas are resurveyed periodical~ to insure that they continue 

to meet security requirements. They a.re resurveyed at other times whenever information comes to the attention of the Securit)r Division which 

indicates that security interests necessitate such a resurvey. 

Areas and installations outside the confines of Arlington Hall 

Station and the Naval Security Station, which are under the Jurisdiction 

of the Director, a.re surveyed to determine security requirements prior to 

utilization by NBA and are inspected periodic~ to insure that security 

requirements continue to be met. Such areas include records storage facilities at Crane, Indiana, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania; Alexandria, 

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Vi1ginta; Congressional Airport, Maryland, and Franconia, Virginia; and 

operating facilities at Vint Hill Farms, Virginia; St. Paul, Minnesota; 

Ft. Meade, Ha. .. -yland, and others. 

~ Cr.mlbinations. The combination of each safe end storage facilit;y 

for claasified documents is recorded in the Phy'sical Security Branch, together With the names of the individuals authorized to have each combina- tion~ It is the responsibility of the ~sical Security Branch to insure 

that all aa:f'e and lock combinations are changed every six months. 

Classif led Material. Promulgation of ad.equate regulations governing 

t.he hauru1ng;8:ccountability, safeguarding, transmission, end destruction 

ot classified material, and supervision to insure compliance, are 1ntegra1 ftlnctions of peysical security. The Chief, Security Division, has 

coordinated with the Adjutant General in preparation and publication of 

such regulations, and exercises staff superv:t.sion for the implementation 

of such regulations. Supervision is exercised by inspections and surveys, 

investigations of violations, and recOlJllllendations for corrective measures 

and discipline.r,y action. The destruction of classified waste is accomplished by personnel of the Physical Security Branch using pulping or 

burning methods. Classified waste is under continuous guard from the time 

it leaves the generating area until it is completely destroyed. 

Resul.ations. All regulations pertaining to peysical security matters 

are const£Utly reviewed, and revised when necessary, to meet changing 

situations and to adapt the policy to NSA's tenant status on installations administered by other activities. Regulations for the ~sical protection of NSA classified material are promulgated from a counterintelligence approach to the problem, i.e., to prevent the entry of subversive 

elements to NBA spaces end to prevent NSA cl.a.ssified material. tram being 

placed in a position where it might eventwill.y fall into the hands or 

subversive elements. 

Future Plans. 

Physical Security Publications. A program has been initiated by the 

peysical Security Branch to review all physical. security regulations, 

memoranda and procedures in order that tighter controls in the various 

areas ot pbysical security ~ be provided. This program will be continuing in nature and reviews will be made periodicall,y by this Branch, when 

deemed necessary. 

Surveys ,5?! Sensitive Areas. A program of pl:JiYsical security surveys 

tor designating certain areas of the Agency as EXCWSION and SECUBE bas 

been initiated end Will continue until all spaces have been resurveyed, 

in order that the physical security standards required for these areas ~ be made current. 

Classified Material. The Physical Security Branch will work and coordinate very closel,y with the Adjutant General, NSA, regarding handling, 

transmission, se:f'eguarding, accountability and destruction of classified 

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materia1 within the Agency. At the present time, this Branch is in the 

process of coordinating an NSA regulation with the Adjutant General rela• 

tive to the- above mentioned subjects, in order that all information 11181' 

be contained in one reference tor use of•all .Agency personnel. 

Visitor Control. A recommendation has been forwarded to the Chief, 

Security D1v1sioB, regarding transfer ot the functions of visitor control trom the Physical Security Branch to the Clearance Branch. The 

checking of clearances and indoctrination status and the processing of 

the Visitor control forms would thereby be conducted in one 'Office, et• 

fecting tighter control. The P~sical. Security Branch would maintain control of the escorts. This recommendation has received the approval of the 

Chief, Security Division, and will be implemented in the very near future. 

Consultant Personnel. Coordination }las. been effected tor a praposal 

which wow.a. provide tigliter controls of consultant personnel entering and 

circulating throughout the Agency. The Physical Security Branch is anticipating the manu:f'acture of a special. badge for all consultant personnel 

which will indicate that the individual. is a consultant, his clearance 

status, and 1ibe organizational segment which is utilizing his services. 

Prope:t"ty Passes. Discussions have been held with the Naval Security 

Station Security Office regarding the Navy's feeling toward officers carrying property passes. The Station Security Officer inf'o~ indicated 

that be had no objection to this proposal. It is hoped that in 1ibe ver:1 

near future similar discussions will be held with the Station personnel 

at Arlington Ball Station and that they will interpose no obJection to 

such a proposal. Steps will be talten at that time to revise the NSA prop· 

erty pass system. 

~sical Security field Circulars. Periodicall:y, since the spring 

of 195; a P~sical Security Field Circular for the COMINT elements under 

the operational and technical control of the Director has been written 

and submitted to the Plans and Policy DiVision, RSA. The results up to 

the present time have been negative. 

Technical Surveys. Equipment haa been obtained 'l:or uae in conducti.Jlg 

technical surveys to detect the introduction of surreptitioua listening 

devices in NSA areas. Initial., periodic, and spot aurvqs Will be conducted at such time as perscmnel trained 1n the use ot the equipment are 

available to the Security Division. 

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PART II 

PERSONNEL SECURITY 

Personnel security measures are designed to prevent authorized access 

to NBA classified material by those individuals who could reasonably be 

expected to do damage to the United States, intentionally or unintentionally1 by reason or such authorized access. Generally, the following methods 

are employed by foreign agents to obtain security information: (1) In:f'iltration, or gaining access to a sensitive installation and its classified 

material by legal means, employment, assignment~ or authorized visits, (2) 

Detection of a cleared and legal employee; (3J Picking up and piecing together bits of classified information thrOUgh perusal of publications, the 

press, and loose talk by employees. 

Attempts to infiltrate can be minimized by a thorough pre-employment 

screening program. The risk of' defection can be materially reduced by 

eliminatiJJg, before employment, those whose background and character, as 

revealed by pre-employment screening, warrant the presumptions that they 

would be potential security risks, and by a continuing security supervision 

program tor those cleared and granted access. Loose talk can be materi~ 

reduced by a thorough security education and supervision program. 

PRE-EMPLOYMENT OR PRE .. ACCESS SCREENING 

Personnel Interview Br!\Ilch 

Mission. 

The mission ot the Personnel Interview Branch, as originally established, was to interview, with the aid of the polygraph, civilian employees 

or the .Agency who were awaiting clearance before they could be productively 

em.ployed. In recoglli tion of the desirability of eliminating from. consideration applicants for employment concerning whom in:f'ormation existed which 

would be a bar to clearance, the additiona1 mission ot interviewing local 

applicants tor hire was assigned in November 1951. 

This Branch is currently performing the same mission for which it was 

first organized. There have1 of course1 been shifts in emphasis and techniques, as experience developed better ways or performing the mission. 

Other aspects of a well-rounded polygraph program, such as interviewing 

military- personnel and re-interviewing employees at regular intervals, have 

not yet been placed into effect. A policy indicating the desirability of 

re-testing employees was adopted in 19521 but implementation of the plan 

was abandoned because it was ill conceived and had not been properly presented to the employees, resulting in bad employee morale and an ever increasing chasm between the employees and security. It was reasoned that to 

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attempt to completely illlplement the program as planned and presented to the 

employees would not develop significant information of value but would render imposs:tble the development of mutua1 confidence between the employee• 

and security which is deemed essential ~ sound security. A program is in 

progress, and a series of meetings held With other divisions ot the Agency 

which are designed to clear up confusion and misunderstanding concerning 

policies, opere.tiona, end plans of the Security DiVision and its branches. 

BistO!:l• 

The po~graph program at NSA was instituted ini tial.l.1' because ot dire 

operational necessity. The NSA Training School, in the latter part of 1950, 

was Jammed With more than 1000 employees awaiting clearance, which at that 

time could be granted only upon the receipt and evaluation of a complete 

background investigation. At that time, the Chief ot the AFSA Security Control Division and the Chief of the Personnel Security Branch investigated 

the potentiaJ.ities of the pol.¥graph as an aid to security clearances. Since 

the Central Intelligence .Agency had been utilizing the polygraph for about 

two months in employee screening, liaison was established w1 th CIA, and the 

operation of their program was reviewed. It was the opinion of the SecuritY" 

Control Division that the program offered obvious advantage• to AFSA in expediting the clearance• of ci Vilian employ~ea. 

The Chief, Security Control Division, on 24 January l.9511 recommended 

to the Director that a polygraph program be instituted on a voluntary basis 

among AFSA employees awaitlng clearance in the Training School. Prior 

favorable consideration had been received i'rom the Office of the Comptroller, the Spec.ial Assistant to the Director, the Deputy Director, and the 

Chief of Staff. On 26 January 1951, the Director approved the program as 

outlined, and the Security Control Division took steps to implement it. The 

Personnel Iuterview Branch became operative on 11 May 1951, and the first 

pol1'grapb interview was conducted. More than two months bad elapsed since 

a skeleton staff' for the unit had been recruited and trained. Most of the 

del.8¥s were caused by the difficulty in securing proper peysical facilities 

tor the polygraph operation. The original quarters for the Branch were 

located in part of what had been the dispensary at the Training School at 

1436 "U'' Street, N. w. The necessity tor sound-conditioning the area and 

isolating it from other activities ot the Training School required a great 

deal at construction work. Because ot construction compromises, satisfactory soundproofing ot interview rooms was never achieved. at this location. 

Since the staff' recruited to administer the polygraph interviews 

lacked experience, the AFSA Security Control Division proposed to begin 

operations slowly and to let Branch personnel get their f'eet on the ground 

before attempting seriously' to reduce the employee overload in the NSA 

School. School author! ties 1 however, were understandably anxious to secure 

clearances tor the excess employees being held there. After a consideration 

of the factors involved, the Director ordered that full-scale operations 

begin immediately, end a recruiting program was inst1 tuted to secure ad.di· 

tional examiners. During the period, July through Sept~er 1951, this 

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Branch worked on an overtime rhedul.e trom 0700 hours to 2200 hours on a 

seven-day-a-week basis, processing 2,052 interviews during the period. 

Examiners worked on two shifts, and interviewed more cases than is recommended for peak efficiency and avoidance ot errors. Because of the limited 

time e.llotted to each interview and the relative inexperience of some of 

the examiners, it was impossible in many cases to complete the proper psychological conditioning of the subject This resulted in a large number of 

unresolved cases, sometimes as high as 25~ of all cases run, necessitating 

one or more re-interviews ot many of the employees. The tremendous backlog 

of employees awaiting interim clearance in the Training School bad been 

cleared up by 30 September 1951. The processing of employees has remained 

on a current basis since that pertod, end close liaison with the Personnel 

Division has enabled the Branch to plan to meet its commitments in the foreseeable future. 

When :full-scale operations ot the Branch were ordered in May 1951, 

there were three examiners assign~d for duty. The shortage of trained examiner• in the country forced the Agency to recruit men whose interrogational 

background was all in criminal. or mill tary work. Some of these men were 

unable to make the transition to employee screening work, where the person 

being interviewed is not a known or suspected criminal. In an et:f'ort to 

obtain control reactions to validate the charts, some inexperienced examiners asked hi~ personal and embarrassing questions, wh1.ch were quite 

proper~ resented by the employees being interviewed. Some justifiable complaints were also received concerning the attitudes and interrogational 

methods of some of these :former criminal interrogators. 'rhe personnel 

guilty ot such offenses have been replaced, and no inexperienced examiners 

are present4' on duty w1 th the Branch. All personnel of the Branch are 

expert in employee screening interviews, which are one of the most delicate 

types ot polygraph interviews. No Justifiable complaints concerning an adverse attitude by examiners have been received since the Fall o:f 1953· 

In November 19511 when the processing of local civilian applicants tor 

hire was begun, temporary f'scilities were established at Arlington Ball Station, at the request of the Personnel Division. The rooms were not soundprooted, and the subjects were dietracted by many outside st1muli. In addition, the forty-five minutes allotted to each interview were insufficient 

'for a complete employee screening interview, resu1ting in undeveloped intel'-

rogationa1 leads. Operating under such condition• proved hiihl¥ unsatiaf'actoey. It has been the consensus in this Branch, since the experience at 

Arlington Hall, that temporary gains in the number or cases handled under 

auch conditions are more than offset by the loss in accuracy and efficiency 

caused by working under adverse conditions. 

Another experimental program. was established in March 1952 to interView recruitments in the :tield. Although it was recognized that such a program bad merit 1 the experiment was abandoned because the limited number ot 

persona recruited from any one geographical area made field operations 

economical.11' unsound and because the ideal physical conditions necesaar.r 

tor a successful polygraph interview could seldom be met. 

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Until January 19521 definite recommendations tor or against clearance, 

or statements that no recommendation could be made because of unresolved 

charts, were forwarded by the Personnel Interview Branch as a part of the 

polygraph report. Recognizing that such' recommendations were a function ot 

security analysis, on 22 January 1952, this Branch ceased to make any recommendations as to the action to be ta.ken on the basis of the polygraph 

report. Under present practices the examiner reports m.ere~ the information 

developed during the interview and his professional opinion, derived from 

the charts, as to the completeness end the accuracy of the information forwarded. 

A change was instituted in March 1954 whereby' the applicant's State• 

ment of Personal History was referred to the Personnel Security Branch for 

review and checking of references prior to bis polygraph interview. All 

information available in the Central File could then be made, available to 

the examiners as an aid in conducting the 'interview. 

It became apparent, almost from the inception of' the polygraph program, that some means of verifying its ef':fectiveness and of establishing 

its strengths and weaknesses was essential. Personnel of' the Security Division who reviewed the polygraph reports, or who took action baned on these 

reports, were in a position to realize the invaluable service 11erf'ormed by 

the polygraph interview in the clearance process. The confidential nature 

of these reports preclude their use, however, in Justifying the use of the 

polygraph to critics of the program. Accordingly, it was decided that the 

polygraph reports for each calendar year would be correlated with the corresponding background investigation f'or each individual, to determine the 

extent to which the two investigative methods corroborated or failed to 

corroborate each other. Because of the length of time required to complete 

a background investigation, a delay of nine months was necessary in order 

to assure that a reasonable number of the background ' investigations had 

been received and evaluated. Definitive proof of the inq>ortance of a polygraph interview in obtaining security information has been established by 

these surveys. They establish also that over-enthusiastic proponents ar 

the polygraph are in error when they make claims of perf'ection for the process. Errors occur in polygraph interviews as in any other process dealing 

With human beings, but surveys of the operation of the Personnel Interview 

Branch reveal that major errors affecting the clearance status of the person concerned are very infrequent. 

Because of' the controversial nature ot the polygraph, the Agency has 

always taken steps to protect itself against charges of coercion in the administration ot polygraph tests. Employees were origi~ required to sign 

a waiver indicating that they were aware of the voluntary nature of the 

interview end that they had been tul:cy" apprised of their rights under the 

Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. This form, which also contained a 

statement by the Agency that in:f'ormation revealed during the interview 

would be held strictly con:f'idential Within the Agency, had been declared 

adequate by legal counsel Within the Department of Defense. When a question 

arose later as to whether the Agency, by use of' this form, was committing 

itself not to reveal i'elonious crimes, the waiver was emended to read "•••• 

will not be released by this Agency outside the government, except!!!!_-

quired by due process of law." The emended t'orm was adopted 13 February -.......... -- 18 

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1953 1 and at the same time reference to the word "waiver" was discontinued. 

Present usage refers to this form as en "agreement". 

Present policy requires the.~ a po:i,ygraph interview be given to all 

applicants for civilian employment with NSA, recruited in the Washington 

area, prior to acceptance, and to all field recruitments immediately after 

entering on duty. Although the interview is voluntary, the Director has 

stated that no individual will be considered tor employment who does not 

volunteer for a polygraph interview. He bas reserved to himself' the right 

to exempt a:ny- applicant or employee. Field recruitments are inf'ormed at 

the time of their application that they will be expected to volunteer for a 

polygraph interview after entering on duty. The polygraph is occasio~ 

used as an investigative aid when the employee desires to avail himself' of 

a polygraph interview to verify statements made by him under norma1 interrogation. 

As a matter of policy, this Branch has never processed military personnel assigned to the Agency. A few Air Force men assigned to the Agency 

were interviewed during a pilot project in January 1952. However 1 military 

personnel who convert to civilian status are given a polygraph interview at 

the time of their conversion. The dua1 policy as regards military and civilian personnel has resulted in some friction and misunderstanding. Background investigations of military personnel are conducted by the ~arent 

service, and it has been the feeling that the military authorities have a 

degree of control tor the physical location and activities of the military 

personnel which the Agency does not possess tor civilians. In addition, 

civilians have considerable freedom of choice concerning where they work 

and what they do 1 and a ci v1lian who does not wish to be interviewed by 

means ot the polygraph has only to seek employment elsewhere. This is not 

strictly true ot military personnel, who have little choice as to their 

assignment. 

It baa been exceedingly difficult for the Agency to justify the fact 

that in the cases of some military conversions, it is impossible to grant a 

clearance to a person to perf'orm the same functions which he had been performing in a military status. The answer is, of course, that in~ cases 

information is developed during the polygraph interview which would have 

been a bar to clearance had 1 t been previously known. 

In addition to military personnel, there are approx1mately 24o0 civilian employees of this Agency who entered on duty prior to Mal' 1951 and who 

have never had a po4'graph interview. The Security Division ha.a also recognized the desirability of reinterviewing employees of the Agency at regular 

intervals, at the time of re-opening their investigation•, to determine it 

continued clearance is in the best interests ot the government. One such 

project was undertaken on an experimental basis in January and February, 

1953, among the employees ot NSA-412. Although the experiment was successful, it demonstrated the need for a security education program for employees bef'ore an Agency-wide program could be established. 

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The program of granting interim clea.ronce on the basis of information 

from the polygraph test and the National Agency Check has been an unqualified success. Experience has indicated that the calculated risk of such a 

procedure is at a minimum. The utilizat:J,.on of this program has resulted in 

a tremendous saving to the government in the salaries and services of persons who are able to enter into a productive status almost immediately in• 

stead of remaining in an unproductive status during the period required to 

initiate end complete a background investigation. 

Future Plana. 

The dual standard of clearance as concerns mill tary personnel and old 

employees, compared With employees who entered on duty since the inception 

of the polygraph program, has given rise to paradoxical situations which 

are extremely difficult to justify. Incj.dents have occurred concerning 

military personnel e.nd old employees which might have been discovered in a 

polygraph interview. Since the trend in the field of security determination 

is increasingly to utilize all possible sources of information on which an 

initial or continued cl.earance might be based, it is difficult to Justify 

not using the polygraph in these cases. 

Detailed plans for a. modified polygraph interview, covering Communism, 

subversion, and the unauthorized disclosure of classified. information are 

currently under consideration, and apparently have an excellent chance of 

receiving approval. Implementation of these plans will require the approval 

ot the parent mill tary services in the case of mill tsry personnel. The 

excellent results achieved from the use of the polygraph and the pro:ressio:nal stature which the program has achieved have gone far to remove some 

of the earlier objections to an Agency-wide program. 

People outside the field of security are not too familiar with the 

tact that a clearance is adequate really only at the close of the investigation or the polygraph interview on which it is based. Thus, it is highly 

desirable that personnel who require a security clearance be reinvestigated 

and reinterviewed With the polygraph at regular intervals to determine 

whether a continued clearance is clearly consistent with the requirements 

of national security. The proposed modified interview by employees of the 

Personnel Interview Branch will contribute much to the program of reexamining the clearance status of Agency personnel. 

INVESTIGATION AIID CLEARANCE 

Clearance Branch 

Mission. 

From its inception, the mission of the Personnel Security Branch, 

which became the Clearance Branch in January 1955, has been to screen Personal History Statements of applicants to determine eligibility tor hire, 

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to certify the clearances of personnel of the three military services for 

NSA duties; to review background investigations and effect clearance to the 

degree required, and to recommend termination action when appropriate. Related functions of equal importance a.re, to verify visitors' clearances and 

to determine the eligibility of temporary personnel, such as consultants, 

contractors, and part·time employees, e.g., special instructors and technicians. 

History:. 

Initially .Agency personnel, both civilian and military, were received 

from the Army Security Agency and the Naval Security Group. Their clearance 

status was continued w1 thout change. Records were incomplete, and it was 

not until approximately January 1951 that satisfactory records of clearance 

on all those individua1s were received f;t"Om the Naval Security Group end 

Army Security Agency. The functions of the Personnel Security Branch were 

performed by personnel of the Office of Administration until the Branch was 

formally organized. 

One factor which is of major consideration in personnel security is 

the necessity of reaching a rapid security determination on the individuals 

concerned. Therefore, in early 1951, it was decided to grant an interim 

clearance based on the results of a polygraph interview and a National 

Agency Check. The person could then be placed in a productive status, involving access to classified data. Final clearance was granted upon the 

receipt and evaluation of' a complete background investigation. In cases 

where the polygraph interview did not reso1ve a1l doubts as to a security 

risk, the individual was held in an uncleared status, with no access, until 

the background investigation was completed, at which time a determination 

as to clearance or termination was ma.de. 

With the aid of the polygraph interview the screening of' local applicants bas become much m.ore conclusive. A hiring recommendation is ma.de on 

the basis of a. report f'rom a polygraph operator and the subject's Personal. 

History Statement. However, personnel recruited in the field are approved 

or disapproved tor hire solely upon the information contained in their Personal History Statements. It the Personal History Statement reveals no disqualifying information, the applicant is approved for hire and given a 

polygraph interview during his first week at the NSA School. If' the interview ia satisfactory, the empl.oyee is given an interim clearance upon receipt of a favorable National Agency Check. If the interview is unsatisfactory, the employee is held in the Training School until a background investigation is COJll>leted, unless the derogatory information is sufficient to 

terminate. Some unresolved cases are referred to the Special Operations 

Branch f'or further development. With their aid, enough information is often 

obtained to either give the individual a clearance or to terminate bef'ore a 

background investigation is initiated. 

Since the organization of' the National Security Agency, there has been 

no basic change in the clearance procedures regarding milita:r;r personnel. 

The parent military service certifies the subject's ceyptologic clearance 

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to the National Security Agency. When the individual reports for duty he 

submits a Personal History Statement to the Clearance Branch. It is reviewed for in:formation which might make the person ineligible under USCIB 

selection requirements, such as relatives living behind the "Iron Curtain", 

citizenship, criminal record, psychiatric treatment, etc. If the statement 

meets the requirements and his certification has been received, he is indoctrinated. If he is not eligible !or indoctrination, he is assigned to 

the NSA Training School or:reassigned out of the National Security Agenc~. 

Clearances of civilian personnel are a different matter. Procedures 

have changed due to additional screening methods. By August 19531 approximately all of the previous background investigations on civilian transferees or military conversions had been reviewed end ad.di tioneJ. investigation 

requested in those cases where the investigation did not meet USCIB requirements or where there were matters requiring solution by further investigation. 

By agreements with the krmy, Navy and Air Force, each of the investigative branches of the three services provide logistical support to the 

Agency by conducting the necessary background investigations on civilian 

personnel hired by the Agency. Im ef'f'ort is made to divide the case load 

as equally as possible between the three services. However, it must be 

recognized that the investigative branches of the three services ve.r:r both 

in the scope and in the time required tor completion of their respective 

investigations. When an indiv1dua1 applying tor civilian eJJ:«>l.oyment with 

the Agency has had a previc;,us background investigation by one o:f' the three 

military services, the :file is obtained and reviewed. I:f' further investigation is required, the agency which per:f'ormed the original. investigation 

is requested to do the additional work. On those personnel who have had no 

previous background investigation, consideration is given to our case load 

With each agency, the type of investigation we wish conducted, and the urgency :f'or completion. 

'!'he promulgation at Executive Order 104-50 had little, it any, effect 

upon clearance criteria or evaluation standards within this Agency since 

clearance had always been e:f'f'ected under the criteria of USCIB Directive 

No. 5 which contains standards equal to end in some cases higher than those 

contained in Executive Order No. 10450. 

Prior to 6 December 1953, persons who had been assigned to this Agency tu a military capacity and who applied for civilian eJJ:«>loym.ent at the exE

ration of their military service were asked i:f' they wished to volunteer 

r a po~graph interview. If they refused to volunteer 1 it did not affect 

eir opportunity for employment. Favorable consideration was given because 

bf a previous clearance granted by their parent military service. Likewiae, ~rior to that time, those civilian applicants who did not wish to vo1unteer 

ior the polygraph interview and whose services were desired 'bJ' the .Agency 

'fl'ere considered for employment end cleared upon the receipt of a :favorable ~ackground investigation. Effective 6 December 1953, applicants tor employment With the Agency were required to volunteer for a polygraph examination 

whether they were new civilian applicants or military personnel converting 

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to civilin.n status. No exceptions are granted except by the authority of 

the Director, National Security Agency. This is not the case with consultants and "special" employees. 

The Agency's need for employees and consultants in the various professional and technical fields is recognized, but the clearance of these outstanding end nationally known people is a tremendous problem. Genera.J.ly, 

this categoey of personnel is given clearance without a polygraph interview. 

Because of their academic background they are often members of professional 

and scientific organizations which may be infiltrated and whose large membership includes some individuals of doubtful loyalties. These indiViduals 

also are sometimes associated or acquainted With indiViduals, both foreign 

and indigenous, whose political beliefs are inimical to interests of the 

United States. 

The previous policy regarding reemployment tollowed Army Special Regulation 38o-16o-101 Section III 121 dated 19 September 1949, which stated 

that a ciVilian or military em;ployee could be reemployed and cleared if not 

absent over 18 months. In March 19521 NSA regulations stipulated that in 

order to be eligible for reemployment under provisions of the above regulation, a favorable po:cygraph interview was necessary. In August 1953, this 

policy was changed, the present rule being that the ti.mi &W8¥ from the 

Agency has no bearing upon whether the individual is required to take a 

polygraph exsmination. 

In January 1952, a program of reinvestigation of personnel who bad 

been cleared prior to l January 19li.9 waa initiated. Until 1 January 1954, 

investigations were reopened every three years. Commencing 1 January 1954, 

investigations were reopened every four years, insuring completion within 

f'ive years in accordance with USCIB Directive No. 5. 

In addition to the basic evaluation function performed by this Branch, 

there is also the :function of verifying clearances of visitors and reViewing files on those persons who are going on TDY and overseas assignments. 

Within the last year appropriate steps have been taken to insure that personnel scheduled for t~.mporary or permanent assignment overseas are :f'ully 

cleared and are not the subject of a pending investigation, since it is 

telt that a person should stay within the continental limits until security 

questions are resolved. By present procedures, an advance check With the 

Security Division is reqμired before orders are cut, thus avoiding embarrassment and inconvenience to the Agency and to the ind1v1dual. 

The policy has always been to hold to a minimum the number of persons 

cleared who do not completely meet the selection standards. However, when 

there is a compelling operationa1 need for a person With unique qualifications, and the risk involved appears to be negligible, a waiver may be 

granted. Before the standards are wa1 ved, a request must be submitted by 

the operational division stating the circumstances. Normally the waiver is 

granted by the Branch Chiefs on minor matters, but when the deviation trom 

standards is extreme, it is forwarded to the Div1sion Chief, the Chief of 

Staff, or the Director, for final decision. A record of such waiver is a 

part of the indiViduaJ.'s security file. Before January 1954, when the secu-

.ri."tY d..sk in-ml.Ye.cl ll.e..O .neJiliJd.bl.e, dQCllmP.ll.ta:tion o:C the compelling need was 

not always obtained. 

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From the beginning of the pe~sonnel eecurity evaluation function until 

July 1952, all ane.lyste' recOI!lll!.ende.l;ions as to hire or clearance were referred to the Branch Chief :to:i: approval. In July 1952, tho.t authority was 

delegated to the Chief of the Evaluatipn Section. Under that p1ocedure, 

one of the analysts made a reconrnendation which was approved or disapproved 

by the Chief Analyst. This actlon we.s considered final un1ess the case was 

strongly controversial, in which ca.ee it wao referred to the Branch Chief 

for determination. Effective ~ 1954, all disapprovals for hire or clearance were forwarded to the Branch Chtef for concurrence or nonconcurrence, 

and to the Division Chief' on matters requiring deviation from established 

policy. 

In arriving at decisions on personnel clearances in the evaluatioD 

process, close coordination With other branches of the Division is essential. The Personnel Interview Branch and its operations continue to pl.Icy" 

an important role in the granting of clearimces. The development ot intor• 

mation ot a derogatory nature during a National Agency Check is comparatively infrequent. For this reason the informetion resulting from the polygraph interview is often the on]3 information available to the security 

analysts who must recommend :for or against granting interim clearance. 

Where the information resu1tiDg from the polygraph interview is not adequate for the a.ualysts to reach a cleer-cut decision, the case is often 

forwarded to the Special Operations Branch for further investigation to 

assist the anal.y-sts in determining the security qualifications of the personnel involved. 

The interview function perto:rmed by the Special Operations Branch bas 

resulted in removing from the Clearance Branch the burden of attempting to 

interview individuals. It has made it possible to bring to a conclusion 

cases that have been unresolved b:y polygraph interview or background investigation. Formerly, some cases were de 1.e.yed several months or a year while 

additional information wee being sought. 

Prior to present administration of the Security Division, all cases of 

questionabl.e loyalty or llllSW.tabillty were summarized for review by the 

Chief of Sta:rf'. Loyalty cases vere then referred with a recommendation to 

the Department of the Army Loyalty Security Screening Board for review and 

final decision. In cases of unsuitability, with unfavorable decisions by 

the Chief' of' Sta.f'f', the employee was terminated. It' the Chief of Staff rendered a favorable decision, the employee was retained and cleared. 

Shortly after the present Chief was appointed to the Security Division 

in November 1953, authority was delegated to him to process cases for termination w1. thout referral to the Chief of Start'. By regulation, now being 

implemented, a Security Review Board has been established within the Agenq 

to advise on cases falling within the provisions of Sec. 8,, paragraphs a(2) 

through (8), ot' Executive Order io450. 

During the period September 1953 through March 1954, a study ot Branch 

operations was conducted by personnel Within the Branch, with the assistance of a representative of the Of'fice of the Comptroller. During this 

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period all forms used by the Branch were reviewed end a file prepared showing the function of each form. Standing Operating Procedures were written 

tor each desk operation, each section operation, and for the Branch as a 

whole. The results of this study included, among other things, improved 

efficiency reducing personnel spaces and the consolidation of ten separate 

card files into one control file. This file system in the Operations Section is a multiple purpose file and is used for control of investigative 

requests, clearance and status records, and preparation of regular and special statistical. reports end studies. 

Personnel security files were transferred to the Office of the Chief 

Clerk, when that office was established on 16 November 1953. The function / of screening Personal History Statements and of logging and controlling 

cases referred for po~graph interview was also transferred to the Office 

of the Chief' Clerk on 4 October 1954. It is contemplated that Within the 

immediate future indoctrinations will be accomplished by the Security Education Group rather than the Clearance Branch. 

Delegation of authority was given to the Director, National Security 

Agency, on 19 May 1954, for the administration of NSA civilian employees, 

resulting in certain procedural ad.vantages to the Branch. Under the new 

procedures, loyalty investigations conducted by the FBI, which are obtained 

by the CiVil Service Commission during the course of a National Agency 

Check, are forwarded directly to the Clearance Branch rather than through 

the Assistant Chief of Staf't, G-2, Military District of Washington, and the 

Assistant Chief' of Staf't, G-2, Department of the Army channels. Formerly, 

there was a delay of from 30 to 6o days, whereas now the cases are delivered directly to the Security Division by special. messenger from the Civil 

Service Commission. Under the new delegation of authority, cases to be considered by a Security Screening Board will be sent to the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense rather than through G-2, Military District of Washington, and G-2, Department of the Army, to the Office of the Secretary at the 

Arm:!• Evaluations are now based upon uscm Directive No. 5 and Executive 

Order 10450 without consideration of Army Regulations SR 38o-6o-10 and 

SR 620-220-1, as formerly required. 

During the months of August and September 1954 the Branch reviewed 

approximately 16,ooo personnel security files and prepared 3 x 5 cards on 

all loyalty cases which had been referred to the Department of the Army 

Loyalty Security Screening Board. Cards were also prepared on employees, 

or form.er employees, who were the subject of FBI investigations. In addition, while this review was being made, care~ in which there appeared to be 

derogatory information were referred to the S~Pcial Research Unit tor further investigation and research. With regard to the loyalty cases, the 

review disclosed the folloWing. 

1. A total of 26 cases were ref erred to the Department of the 

Army Loyalty Security Screening Board with favorable recommendations by NBA and favorable findings by the Department of 

the Army. 

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2. One case was referred to the Department of tl\,e Army with a 

recommendation tor termination by this Agency as a loyalty 

risk. However, atter a hearing the Department of Army Loyalty 

Screening Board resolved the case in favor ot the employee. 

3. One case was returned for additional information. 

4. There are now f'ive loyalty cases under investigation by the 

FBI. 

Future Plana. 

As re1'lected above, civilian ~loyees or this Agency are the subject 

ot polygraph interview screening, as well as interview by the Special Operations Branch where required, in addition to the usual National. Agency 

Check and background investigation. However, military personnel are granted 

interim cryptographic cleara,nces by the parent military aervil!e soleq on 

the basis of a National Agency Check, and final cryptographic clearance on 

the basis of a background investigation, either of which n~ establishes eligibility f'or indoctrination by this Agency under present procedures. 

It is planned that every ef':fort Will be made to: (1) have all military 

personnel assigned to this Af5ency tor duty interviewed With the aid of the 

polygraph; and (2) have the report of any existing background investigations reviewed by the Clearance Branch, prior to indoctrination an4 certification for clearance to NSA material and information. 

Under present procedures the clearance ot consumer personnel having 

access to NSAmaterial and information is merely- verified With the Security 

Office of the parent organization. However, the matter of how NBA may- be 

enabled to evaluate the security reliability of such individuals is presently under consideration. 

SECURITI SUPERVISION 

Security Education Group 

Mission. 

The mission of the Security Education Group (tormerq called the Programs Section of the Plans and Programs Group) includes: 

l.. The NBA Security Education Program -- development and preparation of alJ. pertinent information on security f'or: 

a. NSA Training School 

b. Agency employees 

c. Supervisors 

d. Executive and Supervisory Development Program 

f. NSA field activities 

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2. Revision end continuing implementation of indoctrination procedures. 

3. Review and audit of all security training instituted by the 

Security Division. 

4. Preparation of security posters, pamphlets and security kits, 

containing timely material. 

5. Cross-training programs within the Security Division. 

During the early part of 1953, it was finally recognized that an effective security program depended upon the understanding and cooperation of 

eveey employee. In order to accomplish its mission, the Security Division 

could not rely upon arbitrary and unilateral action, even though backed up 

by regulations for which the airerage employee could see no reason. It was 

determined, therefore, that importance of security in NSA, and the reasons 

for measures ad.opted, must be explained to all supervisors and employees; 

that they must be approached and treated in such a WS¥ that confidence in 

the judgment end ability of' the people administering security would be 

firmly established,, and that all employees would be thor~ aware of 

their individual security responsibilities. Ii' such confidence and understanding could be established, employees could be expected to be constantly 

alert to foreign interest end possible penetration, end to be aware of 

their individual responsibility to bring to the attention of' the Security 

Division possible security violations and instances of personnel conducting 

themselves in a manner indicating that they fail to continue to meet the 

high security requirements of USCil3 Directive.No. 5. The function ot security education was assigned to the Programs Section or the Plans and Programs Group when it was established in July 1953· 

It was decided that the program would be planned to incorporate three 

phases. The first phase involves thorough security education of new employees :f'rom the time of' their entrance on duty until they leave the NSA 

Training School 'for their Job assignment. The second phase involves a continuing security education program for NSA employees working within the 

Washington area installations. The third phase involves assistance to the 

NSA field activities and service cryptologic agencies in setting up and 

administering their own security education programs. 

As a part of the initial planning, personnel from the Security Division visited Brooks Air Force Be.se (Headquarters, Air Force Security Service) for the purpose of studying a security education program already in 

progress. 

In planning Phase I, a schedule was set up for a week of indoctrination at the NSA Training School. This was coordinated with the Training 

Division with the decision that the Training Division would implement the 

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program and the Programs Section, Security Division, would prepare the 

security materia1 end periodically monitor the classes. The program was designed to acquaint the new employees with general security practices 

throughout the Agency end to give some ipsight into security rules and reg• 

ulations. 

Phase II of the Security Education Program was designed to maintain a 

high degree of security-consciousness of all NSA personnel assigned to in• 

atallations within the Washington area and, through thorough explanation 

and expert example, to instill confidence in the personnel and activities 

of the Security Division and insure employee cooperation. This program in• 

volves the use of such media as security lectures for the Management Devel• 

opment groups, posters, hand-out sheets, signs, films, recordings, and 

security Check Lists, as well as the use of a security education questionnaire to determine how much the average employee is awe.re of his security 

responsibilities end to enable the Security Division to further assist him. 

At present, Phase II is being implemented. An effective technique in 

the implementation of this phase has been a type at panel forum presentation on security in NSA. These presentations have been made usually by the 

Chief and a few of the key employees of the Security Division. Requests to 

make these presentations have come from various groups of supervisors end 

other personnel of the Agency who a.re anxious to learn of the operations at 

the Security Division. An outline is presented of the organization of the 

Division and the Security Division's theses ot a sound personnel security 

program. An effort is made to explain what actions are considered sufficient to constitute a security risk under Executive Order 10450. Time ia 

allotted to permit an extensive question and answer period wherein an effort ia made to dispel any fears that eny actions of the Security Division 

impair the civil rights of the emp1oyees and explain, insofar as is possible, the reasons why Security takes certain•action. 

In planning Phase III, it was deemer ~ecessary that the l'1SA field 

activities should be included in the Security Education Program and that 

assistance should be given to the service cryptologic agencies in setting 

up security education programs, partially :f'ulf'illing the Director's responsibilities in those COMINT elements under his operational and technical 

control. 

One of the first accomplishments of the Security Education Group (then 

known as the Progrems Section) was the preparation of the Guide to Individ- ~ Conduct. This booklet was designed to aid the employee in answering 

questions rega.rding his work, his place of empl0'1Jlent, end other questions 

concerning the Agency. The purpose of the booklet was also to impress upon 

the employee the importance of assuming responsibility for being securityconscious and for saf'eguarding classified information. 

In August 1953, the Programs Section assumed the responsibility for 

presenting a security indoctrination to persons who received clearance 

which enabled them to begin working at their regular duty station. Thia 

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indoctrination included the rending of pert1nent laws and reguJ.ations a:rfecting persons workiug with1n the Agency, explena.tion of the badge identification system, signing of the indoctrination oath and en indoctrination 

lecture. 

Arter coordination with the Training Division end approval by the 

Security Division, en indoctrination progrsm tor use at the NSA Training 

School began in September 1953· This program consisted of lectures on such 

matters as individual conduct, security classifications, use of sa.:f'es, 

locks, and burn bags, visitor control procedures, property control, the 

badge system; and loose talk. The lectures were supported by films end 

booklets, as well as illustrations end quotations pertinent to each lecture. 

The program was conducted by the NSA Training School and monitored by the 

Security Division. 

As the Security Education Progre:cn progressed, a surprising development 

was noted. Heretofore, the Security Division end its personnel had been 

looked upon as a thing apart, something :for the average employee to s~ as 

far a\1ay :from end to have as little to do with as possible. Now, as employees began to understand the security program end to have confidence in 

its administrators, more and more requests for security lectures were received :from all organizational segments. In devising the program specit1-

ca1ly for the indiVidual organizations, a security questionnaire was developed to be completed by each employee in the organization. The question· 

naire was designed to determine how much, general:cy, was known by the indi· 

vidua.J. about security regulations and bis responsibilities, thus giving the 

Security DiVision an opportunity to educate him in those items with which 

he was not temiliar, or to change security practices in some instances 

Where indicated. 

A security Check List was designed and prepared end is given to each 

new employee to take to his duty station. The Check List is ini tie.led by 

the employee and his supervisor, who gives further detailed explanation of 

security practices in the specific office where the employee is assigned. 

The Security Education Group organizes and implements the .Agency-Wide 

security poster contests. The response to these contests has been gratifying, demonstrating the desire and willingness of employees to participate 

and support a security program in which they feel they have a part. Cash 

prizes are awarded to persons submitting the winning entries, and al1 contestants receive letters acknowledging their participation in the contest. 

By March 1954, the cross-training program for investigators was completed. About twenty persons received certificates for completion of the 

course. A cross-training program began within the Operations Section of the 

Clearance Branch in May 1954 and, by September 1954, al1 personnel had become familiar with the operations conducted at each desk in the section. 

In November 1954, the Security Division adopted the practice of thoroughly briefing all personnel taking temporary duty trips overseas to advise them of the potential security problems they might encounter and the 

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security safeguards to be to.ken. Conferences are also held With these persons upon their return from overseas, in order to contpile facts on security 

conditions in field activities and to assist~in guidance of persons ta.king 

trips in the future. 

Future Plans. 

Plans are being developed to place an expanded security education program into operation at the beginning of the Fiscal Year 1956. This program 

will be designed so that all segments of the Agency will receive a security 

lecture quarter~, presented by a representative of the Security Division, 

uaual4' a. Branch Chief. The lectures will include a. discussion of the problems ot physical security, personnel security, po4'graph screening, and 

security risks. During the intervening months, when lectures are not presented, informational material in the form of handout sheets will be distributed to NBA personnel. 

Visual aid material pertaining to security education is being planned 

so that once each month a different type of visual aid material will be 

presented to al.l NSA employees. In conjunction With the visual aid program, 

a poster program will also be used. This shall consist of a monthly- distribution of security posters placed strategical.4' throughout the Ag6A1cy. 

The Security Education Group will offer support to the COMINT elements 

in the f'ield for a security education program. It is planned that this support consist of' informational bulletins to security officers in the field 

to guide them in their programs, printed and illustrative material on request, and security posters. 

It is planned that after coordination he-s been effected with both the 

Civilian Personnel Branch and the Military Personnel Branch of' the Personnel Division, the Security Education Group will be responsible f'or conducting all indoctrinations and the Personnel Division all debriefings unless 

there is sound reason for Security to conduct them. 

Upon clarification of' the extent of the responsibility of' the Director, NBA, in industrial security, it is planned that the Security Education 

Group will :f'urn.ish support, consisting of advice and material, to those 

industrial organizations working on classified contracts for the National 

Security Agency. 

Special Operations Branch 

Mission. 

The primary mission of the Special Research Unit, as originally established, was to implement and expand a program of' continuing security supervision of' all personnel assigned to or employed by NSA. In the accomplishment of this mission, the Unit was to (l) maintain liaison with appropriate 

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security and investigative organizations, (2) conduct limited investigations within the confines of NSA, end (3) engage in a program of research 

and ena~sis concerning personnel background data with respect to cleared 

employees of the Agency. Each of thase functions is discussed in succeeding portions of this study. 

Histo~. 

In January 1953, the Chief, Security Division, advised the Chief' of 

Staff of certain deficiencies in the personnel security progrem. of NSA. It 

had been determined that no effective means existed to ferret out those individuals who, having passed the tests of pre-access screening, end background investigation, were, as a result of successful subversive penetration or defection, undetected security risks having authorize~ access to 

classified information. It woul.d have been difficult to estimate the danger 

of such a situation to an organization of such critical impor~ance to the 

national defense as NSA. The Chief, Security Division, proposed that a research activity be established as a means of attacking this problem, and on 

9 February 1953 the Chief of Staff approved this recommendation. 

When initially organized, the activity was designated the Special Research Unit, Personnel Security Branch, Security Division, and, while under 

the administrative control of the Chief, Personnel Security Branch, it was 

placed under the operational supervision at the Chief, Security- Division. 

Prior to l September 1953, the Special Research Unit was primarily 

occupied in orientation and familiarization with NSA activities. In this 

connection, investigators assigned to the Unit were afforded an Agency--Wide 

tour covering a period of several weeks. 

Liaison. 

The Special Research Unit, through its liaison activity-, was to 

insure that items of a counterintelligence or criminal nature which might 

affect the security interests of NSA or involve personnel of the Agencywere brought to the attention of the Security Division as promptl.1' as possible. In addition, liaison contact was designed to insure prompt initiation of investigations of complaint type cases to the proper investigating agency and the thorough coordination and expeditious handling ot these 

cases as well as routine background investigations. 

Due to personnel limitations, 1 t was not possible to establish 

and maintain liaison contact with as many organizations, nor with as much 

frequency, e.s was originally proposed. However, during the early months 

of the Unit's operation, liaison was established with: 

The Central Intelligence Agency 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Office of Special Investigations, USAF 

Counter Intelligence Corps 

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G-2, Deporim~nt of the Army Milit~ry District of Washington 

Intelligence Officer, Potomac River Naval Command 

U S. Civil Service Commission 

Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D. c. 

Arlington County Police Department, Arlington, Virginia 

A:.siatant Chief' of Sta:f.f, G-2, Arury Security Agency, 

Arlington Hal.l Station, Arlington, Virginia 

Originally, contacts were made on a weekly basis. An understanding providing for the exchange of pertinent information was reached with each of 

the above agencies and in every case has proven to be of mutual advantage. 

A ca~e in point involves the Morals Division, Metropolitan Police Department, Waahington, D. c., which in several instances has cooperated with 

NSA by pennitting the Agency to make disposition in routine arrests ot 

NSA personnel on chaJ:ges o~ immoral conduct when trials end resul.tant publici ty might mark the employee for exploitation by subversive factions. 

The task of reviewing pertinent files maintained by other governmental agencies within the Metropolitan area has become an added responsibility of the liaison operation. In view of the unusual value which 

it represents to personnel security case evaluators, a maJor portion of 

the liaison function is now devoted to the review of personnel or security files pertaining to current Agency employees or applicants which are 

maintained by other governmental agencies. The liaison activities of the 

Unit have necessarily been restricted due to personnel lim:l.tations end, 

a.s of this ·writing, the Agency is realizing only a fraction of its full 

value. 

As a means of :further contributing to the Unit's liaison program, the Security Division, NSA, was accepted in 1953 as a member of the 

Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, a local organization devoted to bringing together security and law enforcement officers on a fraternal and 

social basis. 

Investigations. 

The Unit was also to be responsible for conducting overt investigations of personnel security violations and reports of possible espionage, subversion and such deficiencies of character and discretion. These 

investigations were, of course, to be limited to the conf'ines and personnel of NSA. With the beginning of actual operations in July 1953, the 

Unit launched a number of rather basic inquiries into reports of subversion, disloyalty, loose talk and miscellaneous security violations. A 

chain reaction seemed to develop from these first inquiries and as a result the Unit was completely deluged with investigative cases, most ot 

whiC'h should have had prompt attention. In addition, the full effects of 

Executive Order 10450 of 27 April 1953, titled "Security Requirements for 

Government Employment," were just beginning to be felt by the operating 

security agencies end this factor added immeasurab~ to the investigative 

responsibilities o~ the Unit. f.fa.tters of personal. misconduct and character deficiencies such as sexual perversion, alcoholism, mental or nervous 

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dtac~oers, narcotic addiction, etc., now were included in the revamped 

perB<.'DnP l security clearance standards. 

During late 1953, the investigative burden of the Unit was turthl.:!r increacad by two decisions• (1) it was determined that former mili· 

tary assignees desiring to convert to civilian positions in NSA, who sh~vPd specific ~eaction upon polygraph examination, without satisfactory 

rcsol.11tion, should be referred to the Special Research Unit for further 

intervieYT rather then being denied clearance solely on the basis of that 

exP..m:lnation, and (2) it was determined that the Unit would conduct pre· 

li:ninar-J tnquiry into allegations of falsification of questionnaires, p&l'-

ticul.a.rl.y applications for government emplo;yment and Statements of Personal Histt>ry. These decisions added considerably to an alre~ heavily 

bac¥..logged investigative activity. Translated into figures, the Unit's 

receipt of re~uests for investigations has averaged approximately 50 per 

JJ'lonth vhile eomewhat less than half' that figure constitutes the monthly av~re.ge production of closed cases. This figure is one which takes into 

account at least two extended periods during which the investigative capacity of the Unit was almost exclusively devoted to two major cases. 

The Special Research Unit was assigned the responsibility tor 

al1 types of investigations conducted by the Security Division in October 

1954, including investigations of security violations, lost or misplaced 

doc'UDlents, and CO~D:NT compromises. 

A cursory analysis of the investigative activity of the Unit 

discloses tho.t to date it has proven to be Without a doubt the most productive of the Unit's three functions insofar as the security supervision 

program is concerned. Requests for investigation Will increase considerably at such time as the research f'unction of the Unit becomes more active and begins to supply investigative leads~ Resu1ts attained by this 

activity would certainly seem to justify its expansion as well as considerable broadening of the geographical scope of its activities to points 

possibly extendjng outside or the Al!,ency proper. 

In discussion of the investigative activity of the Special Research Unit, it should be noted that it is currently the policy of the 

Security Division that unresolved derogatory information concerning 

Agency employees or IDilita.ry assignees will not be simply filed away and 

forgotten but in each case any area of doubt Will be resolved either in 

favor of the Agency or the employee. In pursuance of this policy, a program was conducted in early 1954 during which all personnel security 

files were screened for such unresolved data end action taken to insure 

that it would receive investigative attention as soon as possible. To 

further aid in elimination of such information from security files, a 

master cross-referenced index has been established and serves to bring to 

the investigator's attention security information heretofore undiscernible. The mill tary sen·ice investigative Agencies which provide NSA w1 th 

backcround investigations are now supplying reports of their investigations on a retention basis rather than in abstract form or on temporary 

loan, the advantage of this arrangement to the internal investigative activity, over that which previously exis~ed, is obvious. 

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Research. 

Another responsi bill ty of the Special Research Unit is the .t'uno- ~ tion of research and a.na.J.ysis whl.ch was to be designed to provide countel'-

intelligence information as a result of the systematic review of existing 

personnel data, as well as information specifically secured through investigation by either the Unit's own investigators or those of other government agencies. The research end analysis were expected to bring to light 

possible patterns of infiltration of the Agency by subversive individuals 

or the detection of those individuals who may have experienced a change 

ot loyal.ty since their initial clearance. This particular activity was, 

in tact, the primary reason for the creation of the Special Research Unit 

and is believed to represent a unique means of exploiting in:f'ormation, 

much of which is already in our files, to the benefit of our personnel 

security program. However, again due to personnel limitations and in view 

ot the pressure of the backlog of investigations, it has been impossible 

to place the research program into full operation. 

Acccmwlishments. 

As of 31 January 1955, nine hundred and thirty-one (931) cases 

had been referred to the Unit. More than J25 individuals have been either 

separated from Agency employment or denied such employment as the direct 

or indirect result of the Unit's activities. The great majority of the 

cases actually closed, in wbich dispositions were made, consisted ot sexual perversion matters. A survey as of June 1954 disclosed that the 

Unit's investigations bad resul.ted in the separation of 91. individual.a 

f"rom BSA. Of' this number, more than 70 could be categorized in the sexual 

perversion classification. 

In October 1954 the persistent effo»ts of investigators of' this 

Unit resul.ted in the arrest of Dr. Joseph Sidney Petersen, Jr., who at 

that time was an NSA employee and who was indicted on charges of espionage. This particular case came about only as a result of the aggressive 

exploitation of an otherwise routine case of' sexual perversion involving 

a former mill tary assignee. .Ags.in, due to personnel limitations and the 

heaVY" backl.og of' more pressing investigationa,, it was not possibl.e to 

pursue this case as fully as it was desired. The damage sustained by NSA 

as a result of the actiVities of Dr. Petersen during his twelve years 

With the Agency is difficult to estimate. Certainly- the cost is in millions and the time loss in years. As ot this writing, the Petersen case 

is being thoroughly investigated by the FBI and further exploited within 

NSA. As a matter tor future research, many months of an~sis Will be 

spent in making certain that no aspects are not thoroughly exploited 

and investigated. Dr. Petersen pleaded guilty to one count ot a threecount indictment and was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. For their 

outstanding performance in conduct of the preliminary investigation of 

this case, two investigators of the Unit have received meritorious awards. 

In retrospect,, the question arises as to wey Dr. Petersen's 

covert activities were not brought to light before a lapse of some ten 

years since he initially ma.de his decision to betray his country and 

serve as the leech or a foreign government on a vital organ of the United 

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Statee. Pre-access screening and pre-employment background investigation 

would have ~ittle hope of pre-disclosing his character as that of a fU .. 

ture defector. However, there is absolutely no doubt that the many keys 

and "tip-offs" to the true nature of hif) subsequent activity wou1d have 

brought him into the sights of an operation such as the Special Research 

Unit at an early date. For exemple, through investigation of any one of 

the then current suspicions of Petersen's moral. conduct, unexpla.:Lned ab· 

sences, a1coholism, mental depression and marked changes in personality 

evidenced by his increasingly unpredictable conduct in the office, his 

declining adherence to religious principles, and his growing tendency to 

distort situations to fantastic proportions, a complete picture should 

have resulted. On the other hand, special research would have certain.11' 

been alerted by his unconceal.ed friendship with a foreign intelligence 

representative or lu.s relationship to known homosexual cliques. Investigation of loss of COMINT successes through system changes, if reported to 

the Security Division, might have resulted in Petersen's apprehension 

much earlier • .,!rbrough liaison With outside investigative agencies responsible for a c6m;paratively recent routine background re-investigation of 

Petersen, their efforts could have been directed along lines to cover undeveloped leads requiring neighborhood inquiries. It is known that such 

inquiry alone would have marked Petersen for more serious scruti~ ultimately resulting in his exposure. 

The Special Research Unit has been instrumental in the preparation and coordination of NSA circul.a.rs designed to provide COMINT elements under the operational and technical control of the Director, NSA, 

with a guide for implementation of a security supervision program within 

the respective cryptologic services. It is anticipated that such a program will result in a uniform improvement in the security of the u. s. 

communications intelJ.1.gence activities throughout the world. The circular 

referred to is looked upon as a pilot model aud, as improved techniques 

and procedu..es are developed in the security supervision program by- NSA, 

further guidance in this field Will be extended to the cryptol.ogic services. 

As evidence ot the response by the cryptologic services it is 

noted that G-2, ASA, has already undertaken a security supervision program patterned primarily after the Special Research Unit. !l'bis action is 

believed to be the f'irst f orwa.rd step in the creating of a far-reaching, 

closeq coordinated network which will eventu.a.J.ly encompass the entire 

COMINT family and proV1de an outstanding means of discharging NSA's security responsibilities to the cryptologic services. 

The considerable contribution of the Special Research Unit to 

the security of NSA was recognized, and the Unit was elevated to Branch 

status in JanUJJ:ry 1955, becoming the Special Operations Branch, Security 

Division. 

Future Plans 

There are immediate plans for the expansion of the Investigative 

Unit of the Special Operations Branch, both in manpower and in scope ot 

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operation. Serious consideration is being given to the possibility of NSA 

special investigators conducting certain types of inquiry outside the previous limitations of NSA proper. The procurement and utilization of necessary technical investigative equipment, i.e., sound recorders, photographic equipment, etc., has been under consideration for some time and 

various commercial models of such equipment have been teated. 

Present plans envision considerable increase in the scope of the liaison activity of the Special. Operations Branch. Due to pers011D.el limitations 1 this valuable mee.ns of intercha.nae of sccuri ty information has 

not been fully exploited. It is anticipated that liaison activities will 

be placed on a routine basis whereby periodic visits will be possible. In 

the near future, an effort will be made to establish liaison with federal 

and local. security and law enforcement agencies in the area of Ft. Meade, 

Maryland, including the city of Baltimore. 

In the tield of special research, it' is expected that increased attention will be given to the ana.J.ysis of crypte.na.qtic probl.ems, solutions to which have been lost through cbD.nge of systems for what have 

been previously described as normal reasons. In fact, it is expected 

that the original concept of special research, whereby analysis of personnel data is conducted to establish patterns of infiltration, defection, 

etc., will be broadened to the extent that anacy-sis of all reports of 

plJ¥sical security violations, COMINT compromises, equipment failures, 

loss of classified material., destruction of critical equipment and such 

other information not directly involving known persona.llties Will be made 

with a View to revealing possible subversive motivation. 

The Special Research Unit was initi~ assigned a compl.ement of 

tbree investigators and one stenographer. During the period covered by 

this report, this force has been temporarily ,augmented from time to time 

by borroWing personnel, not more than one or two, from other activities. 

Selection of personnel for assignment to the Unit has been closely 

limited to those with counterintelligence experience (CIC, OSI, ONI, FBI, 

etc.). Further, consideration is necessarily given to the fact that members of the Unit by reason of their continual association with NSA personnel, many in the top echelon, should be or such character that they 

wil.l refl.ect credit upon the Security Division even in hand-Hng of the 

most embarrassing or delicate situations. The Comptroller at the direction of the Director, NSA, bas recently approved a significant increase 

of personnel spaces for investigators in the Special Operations Branch, 

With additional augmentation promised for the future as the ~ranch expands its activities and is able to train and absorb adt\1.t1one:l. personnel. 

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PART III 

SECURITY IN COMINT ELEMENTS UNDER THE OPERATIONAL Am> 

TECHNICAL CONTROL OF THE DIRECil:>R1 NSA 

NSCID No. 9 charged the Director, NSA, with certain responsibilities 

tor the security of COMINT activities under his operational and technical 

control. It has been the feeling of the Security Division that the Director can best discharge these responsibilities in the field o:t' plzy'sical 

security by issuing regulations setting minimum standards tor the ph;ysical security of field installe.tions, requiring the military services to 

implement such regulations by regulations of their own, and by inspec• 

tions and reports to insure that service regulations are being complied 

with. In the field of personnel security, the Security Division feels 

that each military service should uniformly interpret and implement the 

provisions of USCIB Directive No. 5 and develop effective methods of preaccess screening and security supervision Xor those individuals utilized 

in the production and processing of CO.MINT. 

History. 

In the spring and summer of 1953, the Assistant Chief and another 

representative of the Security Division traveled extensive~ in Europe 

and the Far East, visiting maIJY field installations of the cry,ptologic 

services, in order to get some idea of the security practices in representative activities. They found that there was a wide range in security 

directives as well as in the manner of compliance with those directives 1 

and determined that certainly guidance and direction to the COMINT elements was desirable. 

Since these trips, the Security Division has drafted numerous circulars in the fields of pb,ysical security, personnel security, and security supervision, in an attempt to exercise the Director's responsibility 

but has been unable to reach agreement at the policy l.evel on the form., 

content, end force of these directives. 

On 20 March 19531 by a D/F signed by the Chief of Sta.ff implementing 

USCIB 13/3091 the Security Division was assigned the responsibility of 

evaluating reports of possible CO.MINT compromises, and compromises resul'bing from other than communications insecurities, which occurred in the 

elements under the operationeJ. and technical control of the Director, NSA. 

This directive required that the Security Division evaluate all incidents 

of ph;ysical security violations which occurred in the elements under the 

operational and technical control of the Director to make a determination 

as to whether or not the material in question was subject to compromise. 

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The Security Division's evaluations vere forwarded to the Office of Pro• 

duction for its action, as established vithin the provisions ot the D/F 

from the Chief of Sta.ff, cited above. 

The Security Division operated in accordance with the abovementioned D/F from the Chief of Sta.ff 1 insofar as the evaluation of 

COMINT compromises are concerned, until 12 April 1954. At this time the 

D/F was revised implementing USCIB Directive No. 9, "Instructions for Re• 

porting Compromises and Possible Compromises of COMINT Information of All 

COMINT Codewords,u dated 4 February 195li-. 

Prior to 23 July 1954 the evaluation of COl(tNT compromises as a funotion was assigned to the Physical Security Branch. Du.e to the increase 

in activities in this field, and as a result of the publication of NSA 

Circular 120-2, this function was assigned to the Technical Assistant on 

Industrial Security Matters to the Chief, Security Division, and the Physical Security Branch was relieved of the responsibility. Presentl.¥1 it 

is the responsibility of the Industrial Secui·ity Branch to evaluate all 

reports of compromises and possible compromises submitted in accord.a.nee 

with NSA Circular 120-2 and to forward the final evaluation to the Office 

of Production which, in turn, after COMINT evaluation, forwards a complete report to the Executive Secretary of USCIB. 

Thia involves a tremendous responsibility in that the Director is 

responsible for insuring that adequate investigations al a11 instances of 

possible CO~ll:NT compromises in ~ element of the United States Government are conducted and for determining vhether or not a compromise of a 

codeuord has occurred. Responsibility for investigations of COMINT compromises has been delegated to the Special Operations Branch, while evaluation remo.ins with the Industrial Security B:J\anch. 

Future Plans. 

Possible compromises, whether COMJ:N'? or COMSEC, should be carefully 

considered in order that a determination can be made as to whether the 

possible compromise resulted because of a personnel or a pbysical_sec~ 

rity violation. It is planned that all reports of possible compromises 

will be reviewed by the Security Division and, it there is e:o:y indication 

of personnel or physical. security violations, an investigation will be 

instituted and necessary action taken. 

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PART IV 

INDUSTRIAL SECURITY 

Mission. 

The mission of industrial. security is to ensure that classified material and in:f'ormation tra.nsmi tted to other activities, but for which NSA 

retains responsibility, is properly safeguarded. 

History. 

Prior to 5 May 1954 the Security Division had, on ~ occasions, 

been cal.led upon for guidance and advice on security matters which were 

directly or indirectly related to NSA classified material in the hands of 

contractors or on NSA classified contracts themselves which were awarded 

through the military procurement activities. Due to the nature of some 

of these problems, the Director deemed it advisable to have the Chief 1 

Security Division, and his representatives visit some of the facilities 

engaged in work on NSA contracts to observe their methods of handling and 

protecting classified information. Serious security discrepancies and 

conditions were noted and reported to the Director. 

As a result of the discrepancies noted in the process of collecting 

information on industrial security, it was deemed advisable to establish 

the problem as a special function, operating directly under the supervision of the Chief, Security Division. 0n'23 July 1954 Administrative 

Memorandum No. 22 established the position of the Technical Assistant on 

Industrial Security to the Chief', Security Division. The Physical Security Branch was relieved of participation in industrial security matters. 

The Chief of Sta.ff directed the Security Division to conduct a study 

of the industrial security problem and make recommendations which would 

insure that NSA' s classified material would be adequately safeguarded. On 

24 September 1954, the Security Division reported to the Chief of Staff 

its evaluation of the security weaknesses existing in NSA's relations 

with contractors and procurement agencies, and the factors contributing 

to those weaknesses. These factors were determined from observation during the :field trips, past experiences with the di:f:ficu1ties of contract 

negotiation and clearances of personnel and facilities, and research 

within NSA. 

The Department of Defense Industrial Security Regulations were not 

realistic in their requirements for the clearance of facilities. No regulations existed which governed the safeguarding of cryptologic information and material in the hands of contractors. Due to persoimel shortages 

and lack of guidance from NSA and the procurement agencies, the military 

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services were not adequately fulf'illing their security responsibilities. 

Security inspectors representing the military services were not cleared 

for access to cr,yptologic material. Contracts and projects were not prop• 

erl:y classified. In many cases there was no effective liaison between 

the procurement activities and the contract management branches of NSA. 

NSA personnel engaged in contract negotiations f e.1.led in many instances 

to compl:y with the provisions of Industrial. Security Regulations. Classified contracts had been awarded to firms which did not he.ve the proper 

facility clearance. 

The Chief of' Ste.:f'f' was informed of preliminary measures which the 

Security Division bad taken prior to submission of' this study. These 

measures included the following a.ffirmative action. 

Liaison was established with the Industrial. Security Branch of the 

Department of Defense and with the mili"t817 procurement agencies. Recommendation was made to them regarding revisions of the Industrial Security 

Regulations. A meeting was arranged between representatives of the Office 

of Communications Security, the Logistics Division, the Office of Research and Development, and the Security Division to formulate requirements f'or the se.:f'eguarding of cryptologic material in the possession of 

contractors. Several facilities working on NSA cryptographic contracts 

were surveyed and the Security Division ~ade recommendations to enable 

them to qualify for facility clearances, and assisted and guided the NSA 

Contract Management Branches on industrial security matters, when requested. Security standards were established for crash projects involVing 

SCAMP, Anderson Nichols and the Friden Calculating Company. Changes were 

recommended in the procedures for shipping cryptographic equipment to industrial concerns. The procurement activities were ad.vised to contact the 

Security Division on matters pertaining to the security of NSA classified 

material.. 

Recommendations for the improvement of industrial security were made 

• to the Chief of Staff and approved by the Director and the Chief of Staff 

on l October 1954. It was reconunended that an Industrial Security Branch 

be established Within the Security Division to hand.J.e a11 matters pertaining to industrial security. The Security Division was to arrange with 

the procurement activity to include a security supervision clause in all 

NSA contracts, permitting NSA representatives to visit any facility working on NSA classified contracts to observe its security practices and to 

advise the procurement agencies of discrepancies noted and corrective action required. The Security Division representatives would visit facilities presentl:y working on NSA contracts. The Security Division would continue liaison with the Industrial. Security Branches of the m:Llita;r;y departments to advise and assist them with the security requirements of NSA 

contracts. A Classification Advisory Sub-Panel was to be established to 

evaluate and proper~ classify contracts. An NSA industrial. security regulation was to be prepared and published by a coim1littee representing the 

Office of Research and Development, the Logistics Division, the Office of 

Communications Security, NSA Procurement Activity, and the Security Division. The Industrial Security Branch was established in January 1955 and 

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is beginning to function. It was agreed that initially this Branch would 

be staffed by the Technical Assistant and two additional civilians qualified in the field of industriaJ. security. 

Future Plans. 

A Security Pan.el has been established with representation from the 

Logistics Division, the Office of Communications Security, the Signal 

Corps Procurement Office, and the Security Division for the purpose of 

reviewing NSA contractural procedures and publishing regulations to guide 

NSA Contract Management Branches on industrial security matters end to 

establish a control point between NSA and the procurement activities on 

contractural matters. 

Contract files are being established within the Chief Clerk's Office 

by the Industrial Security Branch. 

Arrangements are presently being made to include a security super• 

vision cl.a.use in all NSA classified contracts, enabling the security specialists of the Industrial Security Branch to conduct inspection visits 

to facilities engaged in work on NSA contracts. When this bas been accomplished, an itinerary will be prepared and all plants visited. An effort 

will be ma.de to revisit each plant at periodic intervals. 

Lia:l.son has already been established with the of'ficers of the mili· 

t&ey" departments assigned security cognizance for the facilities engaged 

in work on NSA classified contracts, and it is intended that a representative of these offices accompany representatives ot NSA on all inspection 

tours. 

The present planning in the Industrial Security ' Branch is based on 

the inadequacy and restrictive nature ot the existing Department ot Defense Industrial Security Regulations. Future planning envisions some 

modifications ot these regulations after the revised regulations, presently' in preparation, have been revised by NSA. Some consideration is being given to the establishment ot cryptograpldc facility clearance criteria for facilities working on classified cryptographic contracts. The 

program ot the Industrial Security Branch was designed with su:f'f'icient 

flexibility if' modification to the plan is required. 

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PART V 

AIMtNIST.RATION AND FILES 

The Administrative Group was assigned the function ot general ad.ministration; personnel matters; Top Secret Control; property and space control and assignment; review and control of all correspondence and preparation of reports, Administrative Control Point; and organization and 

supervision of the Chief Clerk's Office, which was established to provide 

the Chief, Security Di vision, With a Master Index ot all available intelligence data in a Central File. 

Histoq. 

Administrative activities and files pertaining solely to one branch 

of the Security Division were generally handled by each Branch, independent:cy of each other. The establishment of an Administrative Group and a 

Central File System was deemed essential.. .An ad.equate file and reference 

system, which is all inclueive, is the backbone of' any counterintelligence organization. Therefore, it was imm.ediate:cy necessary to revise the 

file system so that aJ.l inf'ormation an~ reference material held by the 

Security Division was readily available in usable form. 

Files. 

Prior to January 1953, the files of the Security Division were 

maintained by the interested Branch or Group. The major group were the 

personnel security files, and these were used only to indicate whether or 

not a person was employed by NSA. These files were o:f no use tor counterintelligence purposes. The e.f'orementioned files were controlled by the 

Operations Section, Personnel Security Branch, and there were two people 

from. this Section whose sole responsibility was pulling files and :filing 

mail. At this time the personnel files were arranged in alphabetical 

order rather than numerically and were broken down into eight categories: 

(1) Prospective employees -- people who were eligible for hire but not 

immediately available; (2) Prospective, hold for CBI -- people who had to 

have a background investigation completed prior to availability for hire; 

(3) Special employees, (4) Contract employees; (5) "Live" civilian and 

(6) "Live" military -- which referred to employees current]¥ employed b7 

NSA; (7) "Dead" civilian and (8) "Dead" military -- which referred to 

employees no longer employed by NSA. As a secondary means of ascertaining 

whether a person works, or did work, for NSA, there were maintained two 

strip files -- one for military and one :for aJ-L other categories. 

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The filing system was modified in January 1953· The original. 

eight categories were reduced to three -- "Live" files, "Dead" civilian 

files, and "Dead" military- files. The strip file was also modified. The 

two strip files were consolidated, and the clearance status of all individuals was noted on this strip file. 

The personnel security files of' all individuals Who have been 

separated from the Agency have been microfiiiied and prepared for transmittal to the storage facility at Crane, !ndiana. In the case of individuals who have been cleared subsequent to 31 May 1953 1 a duplicate copy 

of the clearance certificate was prepared for transmittal to the storage 

facility at Crane, Indiana. As of' 15 November 1954, this practice has 

been discontinued. It was felt that unless subsequent actions affecting 

clearances were also forwarded, the clearance certificate would be of 

little value. 

In August of 1953 an aud.i t of the Security Di vision was made by 

the Office of' the Comptroller to examine the need for a complete reorgani za ti on of the filing system. Also, at this time, the first Division 

meeting was held to plan the establishment of' the Central File and Master 

Index. As a result of' the audit and subsequent Division meetings, the 

Central File and Master Index system was inaugurated and became a function of the Chief Clerk's Office. 

The Chief Clerk's Office began operation on 16 November 1953 

and, as a first step, a Standing Operating Procedure was placed into 

effect to establish a Central Files and Master Index Section. To centralize the files, it was necessary to phase the task· Phase I, convert the 

jackets of' the security files; Phase II, cross-index al1 references; and 

Phase III, consolidate all Branch files and correspondence. 

Phase I has been completed. Since 16 November 1953 all of' the 

personnel security files formerly located in the Operations Section, Personnel Security Branch, have been transferred to the Chief Clerk's Office 

and have been converted to a numerical filing system, which is capable of' 

handling all types of material. At present there are 13 categories ranging from Category I, Personnel, through Category XIII, Industrial Security. 

The Master Index of the Chief' Clerk's Office also started on 

16 November 1953, when the 121 000 alphabetical files were converted to 

numerical files. Phase II, the task of' cross-indexing all references, was 

begun as an emergency project on 22 November 1954. Typists and file 

clerks, less in number than considered necessary, were loaned to the Security Division from other organizations in the Agency to complete the 

cross-indexing in approximately 6o work days. The Master Index has continued to enlarge as each file has been cross-indexed so that today it 

contains approximately 8o,ooo cards. When total cross-indexing has been 

completed, the Indices will be enlarged to approximately 2001 000 cards. 

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The r1ies of the various other Branches have not to date been 

com.pletel:y integrnted into the numerical filing system but those that 

have been are cross-indexed. 

The Chief Clerk's Office not only assumed the duties of a file 

room, but also those of the mail room. Formerl:y the mail room consisted 

of one person pb¥sica.lly located in the Office of the Division Chief. He 

was responsible for receiving and disseminating a.11 mail. Todey the mail 

desk is located in the Chief Clerk's Office and one person is assigned 

full time and another person part time to handle this Job. 

Administration. 

Recommendations were submitted to the Comptroller for the establishment of an Administrative Group on 26 Jucy 1954. The administrative 

functions were generall:y being performed in the Office of the Chief, 

Security Division, but the Group was not identified in the organizational. 

structure, and many of its functions were being duplicated by the Branches. 

Organization. 

At the same time, reconmendations for a complete reorganization 

of the Security Division were submitted in order to more clear~ fit the 

Security Division. The reorganization was approved by the Conq>troller on 

26 January 1955 and additional personnel spaces authorized. The new organization is as follows with changes explained brief~: 

Chief, Security Division 

Assistant Chief, Security Division 

Assistant for Operations 

Administrative Group 

Plans Group ~ 

Security Education Group) 

Fort Meade Group 

Plzy'sical Security Branch 

Clearance Branch 

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- To supervise the operating functions ot the Branches. 

- Explained above. 

- To replace the Plans and Programs Group. 

- Comprises Security Section ot 

the Interim.Move Support Group 

and Marine Guard 

- Remains the same. 

- Change of designation from Personnel Security Branch. 

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Personnel Interview Branch 

Special Operations Branch 

Industrial Security Branch 

Future Plans. 

- Remains the same. 

- Replaces the Special Research 

Unit. 

- Combines industrial security 

and COMINT compromises evaluation function. 

Further plans of the Chief Clerk's Office include the continuation 

of the cross-indexing project and the incorporation of all Branch files 

into the Central File. When these two projects have been completed, the 

functions of the office will continue, on a day to day basis, the proper 

cross-indexing of all material files in the Security Division. 

It is planned to attain greater uniformity of correspondence procedures and internal routing so as to fix responsibility for action on specific individuals. 

Effort • to obtain more satisfactory operating space to accommodate 

increased personnel and responsibilities will continue. 

In order to more effectively utilize clerical and stenographic personnel, an attempt will be made to equalize their workloads and to shift 

stenographers and clerks temporarily between areas within the Division as 

the need arises. The possibility of increased use of dictating machines 

is being investigated. 

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PART VI 

PLANNING 

Mission. 1 

When the original recommendation for a Plans end Management Branch 

was ma.de in May 1953, it was proposed that the functions of the Group 

would include the following preparation of a realistic study and evaluation of the Security Division's Disaster, Emergency and War Plans; coordination of plans for the New Site, establishment of firm security 

adjudication procedures with the Office of the Secretary or Defense; review of the indoctrination procedures of the cryptologic services and 

their standardization, pl.a.nrnng and establishment of a strong Security 

Education Program for the Agency, coordination and standardization of the 

physical and personnel security procedures Within and among the COMINT 

elements under the operational and technical control of the Director. 

HistO!]'.• 

Prior to the establishment of the Plans Group, planning and coordination of security operations were handled by the Assistant Chief, Security Division. Plans concerning operations within the Division were made 

by the Chief, Security Division, in coordination with the Branch Chiefs. 

A need was rea1ized for a separate group for the purpose of properly 

coordinating activities of this Division In J.l(a.y 1953 the Chief, Security 

Division, recommended the establishment of a Plans and Management Branch 

for the Division. However, it was not until 6 July 1953 that final approval was granted by the Chief of Sta.ff for the reorganization of the 

Division to include a group of this type with the title "Planning and Programs Group." 

The Group as approved consisted of two Sections, the Planning Section and the Programs Section, and had a maximum of five operating personnel: Chief, Planning Section; Assistant Chief, Planning Section; Chief, 

Programs Section; Assistant Chief, Programs Section, and one secretary. 

No additional spaces were requested because of an overall Agency personnel space reduction at that time, but positions were filled by individuals aJ.ready assigned to other segments of the Security Division, thus 

leaving the Branches With insutticient personnel to ful:f'ill their responsibilities. 

During the past year the functions of the Planning and Programs 

Group have been expanded to include coordination of all Security Division 

planning and policy matters, including the preparation of security regulations; representation of the Security Division in matters involving 

planning and policy affecting the Security Division, with other NSA staff 

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divisions and offices and with other United States and foreign agencies; 

preparation of the Monthly Operational Summary" and Review and ~sis 

Reports. The Programs Section, responsible for security education, gradually functioned more and more independently of the Group and finally was 

designated the Security Education Group and divorced from the Planning 

Group. Its functions and accomplishments have been described more ~ 

in preceding sections or this study. 

Future Plans. 

Security Division planning encompasses some new fields of security 

operation, not as to principles but as to location and. extent. Much discussion bas been provoked by the la.ngua.ge of NSCID No. 9 stating that the 

Director is responsible for security within COMINT elements under bis 

technical and operational control. One phase of' the program plamled to 

discharge the Director's responsibilities is the publication of security 

circulars for the guidance of the cryptologic services. It he.s also been 

recommended that a representative of the Chief, Security Division be stationed at each of the NSA field activities. He wou1d be the liaison security representative for a given area. In recognition of command responsibility, this security representative would be in a position to properly' 

guide the field elements in security principles as promulgated by NSA and 

to serve as an advisor on security matters Within bis area. He would be 

able to control movement of NSA personnel and to prevent security problems :from arising, or to detect security problems when they arise, so 

that proper administrative action may be taken to assure continued sound 

security within all NSA elements. 

To fully discharge its responsibility for the planning, programming, 

budget and :fiscal matters of the Security Division, the Planning Group 

intends to include a program of self-inspection of the elements of the 

Division to insure at all times compliance with the policies of the Chiet 

and the most efficient operational procedures attainable. 

Security principles dealing With those phases which are included 

Within communications security matters should be reviewed and redesignated after a realistic appr&.tsal and. determination of the principles 

utilized. It is conceivable that this would mean a realignment of the 

responsibility for security within both physical and personnel aspects of' 

cryptographic matters. 

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PART VII 

INTERIM OP~RATION AT FORT MEADE 

Histocy. 

Planning for the security requirements upon NSA's move to Fort 

Meade, Maryland was begun in the summer of 1952 Being constantly aware 

of the difficulties experienced in the Washington area where NSA had no 

control of the exterior guard or perimeter defense system, an early decision was required as to what type of guard system would be utilized at 

the NSA installation at Fort Meade It was decided that civilian guards 

would not be satisfactory because of Civil Service regulations regarding 

hours and pay, excessive turn-over of personnel, and lack of control. 

Difficulty had always been experienced in obtaining sufficient qualified, 

trained guard and patrol personnel from the Army, Navy and Air Force. 

Therefore, it was decided that because of the experience of the Marine 

Corps in installation guard duty, a Marine Detachment, permanently assigned, would most adequately fill the Agency's requirements for interior 

and exterior guard duty. 

Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense was requested in December 1952 

to assign to the U. s. Marine Corps the responsibility of protecting the 

Agency's permanent installation at Fort Meade The Secretary of Defense 

requested the Secretary of the Navy to direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to furnish a Marine Detachment, over and above Marine Corps 

authorized strength, to the National Security. Agency in late fiscal yea:r 

1955· When it became evident that guards for the Interim Operation would 

have to be supplied by the Second Army, it was decided to request the 

Marine Corps to furnish the Detachment in November 1954 to begin operations with the activation of the Interim Operation. This was done, and a 

Marine Barracks consisting of 5 officers and 144 enlisted men was officially activated at Fort Meade on 15 November 1954. The Commanding Officer 

of the Marine Barracks was designated the Chief of the Security Section, 

Support Group, tor the Interim Operation. 

Since the early stages of the planning for the Interim Move, the 

Security Division has participated in and established security requirements for the Interim Operation, including coordination with the Commanding Officer, Fort Meade, and staff divisio.t1'3 of the Second Army, regarding logistical support for the Marine Detachment, clearances of custodia1 

and support personnel furnished by Fort Meade, and security phases of the 

construction, including fencing, alarm system, identification system, communication system, lighting, locks, etc The Security Division will be 

responsible for the security of classified material during the Interim 

Move and bas completed a Security Annex to the movement order Measures 

have been taken to protect all buildings at the New Site against the installation of surreptitious listenin~ devices or other threats to the 

security of the building, during the construction phase 

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The Security Division has been authorized four additional personnel 

spaces in addition to the Marine Corps personnel to function as the Security Section of the SUpport Group for the Interim Operation. These consist of an Assistant Chief, a Physical Security representative, a Personnel Security representative, and a stenographer. 

The security plans for the future concerning NSA operations at Ft. 

Mee.de have been developed and Will continue for implementation as the in• 

terim move to the New Site progresses. Security- precautions, in both physical and personnel security aspects, have been taken into account. The 

position of the Provost Marshal at the New Site will be established under 

the Chief, Security Division, when the final move takes place. This 

Office will be responsible for those physical security functions of a Mil.. 

itaey Police nature. 

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PART VIII 

PARTICIPATION IN AGENCY SECURITI POLICY 

Until recently, the Security Division bas not been consulted on many 

internal policy and planning matters, and mainly on relationships with 

other agencies and organization, which had a security interest. This ovel\-

sight has been corrected to a large degree and the Chief, Security Division, has assumed responsibility for coordination on ezry matter which has 

a security interest. 

In October 1954, the Chief, Security Division was appointed NSA Representative on the Security Committee of USCIB. This insures expert 

Agency- participation in USCIB policy- and planning on security matters. 

The Planning Group has been given the job of compiling and analyzing all 

the material of this Security Committee and briefing and assisti'1g the 

Chief, Security Division, on these matters. 

The Security Division has been assigned certain responsibilities in 

connection With the security aspects of general United States participation in COMINT activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

The Security Division has responsibility for implementing the security- provisions of bilateral agreements with foreign governments. 

Security representatives from time to time sit as members of other 

agency and combined committees such as the Classification Advisory Panel, 

Special. Intercept Problem Board, Relocation Planning Board, Proficiency 

Awards Committee, Promotion Board, and others. 

During the early part of this year the Security Division participated in a survey of the methods of handling, control and accountabilityof classified documents within elements of the Office of 'Production. This 

survey was conducted at the request of the Office of Production by teems 

composed of members of that office, the Adjutant General, end the Security Division. It was designed to detect the weaknesses of document control in the Office of Production and to make recommendations for a tighter and more uniform system, especially designed to maintain control and 

accountability despite the tremendous volume of classlfied material. The 

survey was compl.eted, reconnnendations adopted, and a sy-stem of control 

put into effect gradually by each division of the Office of Production, 

with progress reports submitted to the Security Division. 

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-------------~--~ 

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Ail!t.I '11 S l'Ra Tl v: 

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PHYSICAL SECURITY 

BRA:fCH 

?lSA-161. 

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NSA-1601 

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SECURITY DIVISION 

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OFFICE OF 'm CHIU 

!ISA-16 

ASST. CBJ:EF 

liSA-l6A .ASSIS~ 10R OPE:RA!rlONS 

l'lSA-l6B 

•••••••••• 

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FORT ?-tE.\DE ClaCUP 

NSA lEM 

SECURI'lY EDUCATIOll 

GROUP 

!ISA-l6o2 

PLAh:; GROUP 

NSA-1603 

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SPECIAL OPE:RATIOUS 

'BRArt'Cll 

BSA-1611. 

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Im:US'mIAL s:cCRITY 

B."qA.'l'CH 

lfSA-165 

.._//''k_ , Appmacl br. -....... /// v--::_ ; -- ,.._..._,_ __ l>ate: 20 Janu&l")" 1955 

Prepced 'b7: Security Dtvision 

•