MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2019 ME	111

Docket: Was-18-28

Argued: October	11,	2018

Decided: July	11,	2019

Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HJELM,	HUMPHREY, and	CLIFFORD,

* JJ.

Majority: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and,	GORMAN,	HJELM,	and	CLIFFORD, JJ.

Concurrence/

					Dissent: MEAD,	JABAR,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.

NANCY	J.	McCANDLESS

v.

JOHN	RAMSEY	et	al.	

SAUFLEY,	C.J.

[¶1]	 	 Twenty	 years	 ago,	 responding	 to	 concerns	 about	 the	 costs	 of	

providing	 places	 for	 people	 to	 board	 and	 ride	 horses,	 the	 Legislature	

established	 immunity	 from	 liability for certain injuries	 suffered	 through	 the	

risks	 inherent	 in	 equine	 activities.	 	 See	 P.L.	 1999,	 ch.	 498,	 §§	 2-6 (effective	

Sept. 18,	 1999)	 (codified	 at	 7	 M.R.S.	 §§ 4101,	 4103-A	 (2018)); L.D.	 2108,

Summary	(119th	Legis.	1999).		We	are	asked	for	the	first	time	to	address	the	

scope	of	that	immunity.

 *		Although	not	present	at	the	oral	argument,	Justice	Clifford	did	participate	in	the	development	of	

this	opinion.		See M.R.	App.	P.	12(a)(2) (“A	qualified	justice	may	participate	in	a	decision	even	though	

not	present	at	oral	argument.”).
2

[¶2]		Nancy	J.	McCandless	appeals	from	a	summary	judgment	entered	by	

the	Superior	Court	(Washington	County,	Mallonee,	J.)	concluding	that	John	and	

Tracy	Ramsey’s	daughter	is immune	from	liability on	McCandless’s	complaint	

alleging	that	 the	child	negligently	 rode a	horse	in	an	arena,	causing	injury	 to	

McCandless.	 	 We	 affirm	 the Superior	 Court’s judgment holding	 that	 the	

immunity	 statute	 precludes	 the liability	 that	 could	 otherwise	 arise	 from	the	

equine	activities	at	issue	here.

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶3]		The	basic	facts	are	these:	McCandless	was	standing	on	a	track	inside	

a	 riding	 arena	 when	 a	 horse	 ridden	 by	the	 Ramseys’ ten-year-old daughter,	

after	passing	directly	by	McCandless	three	times,	made	contact	with	her	during	

a	fourth	circuit.		McCandless	fell and	injured her	wrist,	and	she	has	now	sued	

the	child through	her parents, seeking	damages for	her injuries.		

[¶4]	 	 The	 following	 details	 of	 the	 event are	 taken	 from	 the	 parties’	

statements	of	material	facts and	reflect	the	record	as	viewed	in	the	light	most	

favorable	 to	McCandless	as	 the	nonprevailing	party.		See	Avis	Rent	A Car	Sys.,	

LLC	v.	Burrill,	2018	ME	81,	¶	2,	187	A.3d	583.		On	July	7,	2010,	McCandless went	

to	a	horse	arena	to	watch	children	ride	horses.		In	the	arena,	a	circular	track	one	

to	two	inches	deep	had	been	worn	into	the	dirt and	was	visible	to	onlookers.		
3

Horses	were	not	restricted	to	this	track,	however,	and	they	rode	throughout	the	

arena	and	near	the	doors	to	the	barn	in	which	the	arena	was	situated.

[¶5]		Spectators	were	accommodated	in	 the	interior	of	 the	barn,	which

included	an	 observation	 room	with	a	plexiglass	window	where people	could	

observe	the	activities inside	the	structure.		McCandless	had	been sitting outside	

of	 the	 observation	 room	in	one	 of	 a	 set	 of folding	chairs	that	were	 arranged	

along	the	side	of	the	indoor	arena away	from	the	horses.		

[¶6]		McCandless	got	up	from	her	seat and	began	walking	from	the	folding	

chairs	toward	what	she	considered	to	be	the	most	convenient	barn	exit.		On	her	

way,	 McCandless	 walked around	 some hay	 bales,	 which	 McCandless admits	

caused	her	to	walk	in	the	area	where	people	rode	horses.		

[¶7]	 The	Ramseys’ daughter,	then	ten	years	old,	was	riding	a	horse	she	

had	 not	 ridden	 before	 in	 the	 indoor	 arena	 area.	 	 The	 girl completed	 three	

circuits	in the	arena,	passing	McCandless	and	others	each	time.		At	some	point	

during	her	fourth	circuit	in the	arena,	the horse	was	slow	to	respond	to	the	child	

rider’s directions,	and	the horse made	contact with McCandless when	she was	

between	five	and	fifteen	feet from	the	barn	door.		McCandless	fell	and	injured	

her	wrist.		
4

[¶8]		On	July	6,	2016,	McCandless	filed	a	complaint against	the	Ramseys

“as	 parents”	 of	 their	 daughter	 seeking	 damages	 for	 medical	 bills,	 pain	 and	

suffering,	lost	enjoyment	of	life,	and	permanent	impairment	allegedly	incurred	

due	 to	the	 Ramseys’ daughter’s negligence.	 	 See	 M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 17(b);	 Miller	 v.	

Miller,	677	A.2d	64,	67	(Me.	1996);	see	also	19-A	M.R.S.	§	1651	(2018).1 The	

Ramseys moved for	 summary	 judgment	 on	 the	 ground	 that	 McCandless’s	

negligence	 action	 was	 barred	 due	 to the statutory	 immunity	 provisions	 of	

7 M.R.S.	§§	4101	and 4103-A.		

[¶9]	 	 The	 court	 granted	the	 Ramseys’ motion	 for	 summary	 judgment,	

holding	 that	 section	 4103-A(1)	 provides	 a	 broad	immunity	from liability	 for	

injuries	 arising	 out	 of	 equine	 activities under	 routine	 conditions.	 	The	 court	

concluded that	none of	the	statutory	exceptions	 to	immunity	applied.	 See id.	

§ 4103-A(2)-(4).	 McCandless	 filed	 a	 timely	 notice	 of	 appeal.	 	 See 14	 M.R.S.	

§ 1851	(2018);	M.R.	App.	P.	2A,	2B(c)(1).		

II.		DISCUSSION

[¶10]	 	For	 purposes	 of	 summary	judgment,	we	 accept	 as	 true	that	the	

horse	came	in contact	with McCandless and	that McCandless	was	injured	as	a	

 1		There	has	been	no	allegation	of	parental	negligence.		Cf.	Bedard	v.	Bateman,	665	A.2d	214	(Me.	

1995).		Nor	has	McCandless	alleged	that	the	Ramseys’	daughter	“willfully	or	maliciously	cause[d]”	

McCandless’s	injuries.		Cf. 14	M.R.S.	§	304	(2018).
5

result	 of	 that	contact.		McCandless’s	appeal	concerns	 only	whether	 the	court	

properly	interpreted	 and	 applied	the immunity	 statutes to preclude	 her	 suit	

against	the	Ramseys’	daughter.

[¶11]		We	review	this	decision	granting	a	summary	judgment	“de	novo,	

viewing	 the	 facts	 in	 the	 light	 most	 favorable	 to	 the	 nonmoving	 party,	 to	

determine	whether	 the	parties’	statements of	material	 facts	reveal	a	genuine	

issue	of	material	fact.”		Hilderbrand	v.	Wash.	Cty.	Comm’rs,	2011	ME	132,	¶	7,	33	

A.3d	425.		“A	genuine	issue	of	material	fact	exists	when	the	evidence	requires	a	

fact-finder	 to	choose	between	competing	versions	of	 the	 truth.”		Farrington’s	

Owners’	Ass’n	v.	Conway	Lake	Resorts,	Inc.,	2005	ME	93,	¶	9,	878 A.2d	504.

[¶12]		Because	the	person	asserting	the	affirmative	defense	of	immunity	

bears	the	burden	of	proof,	see	Hilderbrand, 2011	ME	132,	¶	7,	33	A.3d	425,	we	

review	 the	 summary	 judgment	 record	 to	 determine	 whether	 there	 is	 no	

genuine	 issue	 of	 material	 fact	 and the Ramseys have established	 the	

applicability	of	the	immunity	provision	as	a	matter	of	law,	see M.R.	Civ.	P.	56(c);	

Stanley	v.	Hancock	Cty.	Comm’rs,	2004	ME	157,	¶	13,	864	A.2d	169.

[¶13]		We	review	de	novo	the	trial	court’s	interpretation	and	application	

of	 the	relevant	statutes governing	immunity.	 See	Perry	v.	Dean,	2017	ME	35,	

¶ 11,	156	A.3d	742; Bank	of	Am.,	N.A.	v.	Camire,	2017	ME	20,	¶¶ 12,	13,	155	A.3d	
6

416. “If	 the	statute	is	unambiguous,	we	interpret	 the	statute	according	 to	its	

unambiguous	language,	unless	the	result	is	illogical	or	absurd.”		Wawenock,	LLC	

v.	Dep’t	of	Transp.,	2018	ME	83,	¶	7,	187	A.3d	609	(quotation	marks	omitted).		

To	the	extent	that	there is	any	ambiguity	in	the	statute,	meaning that	it	could	

reasonably	 be	 interpreted	 in	 more	 than	 one	 way,	 we	“consider	 the	 statute’s	

meaning	in	light	of	its	legislative	history	and	other	indicia	of	legislative	intent.”		

Id. (quotation	marks	omitted).

[¶14]	 Maine’s Legislature	enacted	the	immunity	provisions at	issue	here

in	1999.		See	P.L.	1999,	ch.	498,	§§	2, 5.	 With	certain	exceptions,	the	statute	

provides	that	a	person	engaged	in	equine	activity is	immune	from	liability “for	

any	property	damage	or	damages	arising	from	the	personal	injury	or	death	of	a	

participant	or	spectator	resulting	from	the	inherent	risks	of	equine	activities.”		

7	M.R.S.	§	4103-A(1).

[¶15]	 	McCandless	 concedes	 that	the	Ramseys’ daughter was	 a	 person	

engaged	 in	 equine	 activity	 and	 that	 McCandless	 was	 a	 spectator.	 	 See id.		

McCandless argues,	 however,	 that	 a	 factual	 dispute	 exists	 as	 to	whether	 her	

injury	resulted	from	“the inherent	risks	of	equine	activities.”		Id.		Inherent	risks	

of	equine	activities are,	by	statutory	definition, “those	dangers	and	conditions	
7

that	are	an	integral	part	of	equine	activities.”		Id.	§ 4101(7-A).		These	dangers	

and	conditions	include,	but	are	not	limited	to,	the	following:

A.		The	propensity	of	an	equine	to	behave	in	ways	that	might	result	

in	damages	to	property	or	injury,	harm	or	death	to	persons	on	or	

around	 the	 equine.	 	 Such	 equine	 behavior	 includes,	 but	 is	 not	

limited	 to,	 bucking,	 shying,	 kicking,	 running,	 biting,	 stumbling,	

rearing,	falling	and	stepping	on;

B.		The	unpredictability	 of	an	equine’s	 reaction	 to	 such	 things	as	

sounds,	 sudden	 movements	 and	 unfamiliar	 objects,	 persons	 or	

other	animals;	

C.		Certain	hazards	such	as	surface	and	subsurface	conditions;

D.		Collisions	with	other	equines	or	objects;	and

E.	 	Unpredictable	 or	 erratic	 actions	 by	 others	 relating	 to	 equine	

behavior.

Id.2

[¶16]		The circumstances	that	led	to	McCandless’s	injury epitomize	the	

types of	risks that	are inherent	in	equine	activities.		The dangers or	conditions

inherent	in equine	activities	certainly include	the	danger	of	being	injured	when	

a	horse	and	rider	pass	too	close	to	a	spectator	standing	in	the	track of	a	horse	

arena.		A horse’s	unanticipated	resistance	to	the rider’s	directions	is	part	and	

 2		Contrary	to	McCandless’s	contention,	the	dangers	and	conditions	inherent	in	equine	activities	

relate	to	more	than	just	a	horse’s	potential	to	act	unpredictably.		See Zuckerman	v.	Coastal	Camps,	Inc.,	

716	F.	Supp.	2d	23,	31	(D.	Me.	2010)	(“[T]he	inherent	risks	to	equine	activities	listed	in	the	statute	

pertain	 to	 the	 unpredictable	 nature	 of	 equine	 behavior,	 the	 unpredictable	 conduct	 of	 other	

individuals,	and	certain	natural	hazards	.	.	.	.”	(quotation	marks	omitted)).
8

parcel	of	the	“propensity	of	an	equine	to	behave	in	ways	that	may result	in	.	.	.	

injury	.	.	.	to	persons	on	or	around	the	equine.”		Id. § 4101(7-A)(A).		

[¶17]	 	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 there	 is any	 ambiguity,	 however, we	 must	

construe	 the	 statute	 in	 light	 of	 the	 legislative	 history.	 The	 Legislature,	 in	

enacting	the	immunity	provision, “revise[d]	the	equine	activity	laws	to	confirm	

that	there	are	inherent	risks	involved	in	equine	activities	that	are	impracticable	

or	impossible	to	eliminate	due	to	the	nature	of equines.”		L.D.	2108, Summary	

(119th	 Legis.	 1999).	 	 The	 Committee	 on	 Agriculture,	 Conservation	 and	

Forestry,	which	recommended	passage	of	the	bill,	accepted	written	materials

from	representatives	of	the	Maine	Equine	Advisory	Council, the	Maine	Equine	

Industry	Association,	and	the	University	of	Maine,	and	from	owners	of	horses	

and	equine	facilities.		Hearing	on	An	Act	to	Clarify	the	Equine	Activity	Law,	L.D.	

2108, Before	 the	 Joint Standing	 Committee	 on	 Agriculture,	 Conservation	 &	

Forestry,	 119th	 Legis.	 (Apr.	 1999)	 (materials	 submitted	 by	 Jacquelyn	

Krupinksy,	 Sarah	 Brooks,	 Rick	 Shepherd,	 Jim	 Jaeger,	 Stephen	 G.	 Ulman,	 and	

James	A.	Weber).		These	organizations	and	individuals urged	the	committee	to	

recommend	 the	 law’s	 passage	 so	 that	 horse	 owners, and	 operators	 of	

horse-related	 businesses, could	 engage	 in	 equine	 activities	 without	 risking
9

excessive	 liability	 or	 facing exorbitant,	 possibly prohibitively	 expensive,	

insurance	premiums.		Id.

[¶18]	 	Interpreting	the	 statute	 at	 issue as	 McCandless	 requests would	

thwart	the	entire	purpose	of	the	law	to	curtail	liability	for	injuries	arising	from	

risks	 that	 are “impracticable	 or	impossible	 to	 eliminate	 due	 to	 the	 nature	 of	

equines” and	 to	 allow reasonable	 access	 to	 insurance	 for	 those	 engaged	 in	

horse-related	activities.		L.D.	2108, Summary	(119th	Legis.	1999); see	Hearing	

on	An	Act	to	Clarify	the	Equine	Activity	Law,	L.D.	2108, Before	the	Joint	Standing	

Committee on	 Agriculture,	 Conservation	 &	 Forestry,	 119th	 Legis.	 (Apr.	 1999)	

(materials submitted	by Jacquelyn	Krupinksy,	Sarah	Brooks,	Rick	Shepherd,	Jim	

Jaeger,	 Stephen	 G.	 Ulman,	 and	 James	 A.	Weber). Reading	 the	 statute	 not	 to	

provide	immunity	to	the	child in	these	circumstances would	be	unreasonable	

and	 against	 the	 intentions	 of	 the	 Legislature,	 and	 we	 will	 not	 construe	 the	

statute	in	such	a	manner.		See	Wawenock,	LLC,	2018	ME	83,	¶	7,	187	A.3d	609.

[¶19] Given	the	particularized	definition	of	the	“inherent	risks	of	equine	

activities”	applicable	here,	and	the	legislative	history	available	for	purposes	of	

interpreting	any	ambiguity	in	the	statute,	we	conclude as	a	matter	of	law	that,	

on	 the	 facts	 presented	 on	 summary	 judgment,	 immunity	 has	 attached.	 	 See

7 M.R.S.	§§ 4101(7-A),	4103-A(1);	cf. Merrill	v.	Sugarloaf	Mountain	Corp.,	1997	
10

ME	180,	¶¶	5, 7 &	n.3,	698	A.2d	1042	(holding—when	the	statute	did	not	define	

the	term	“risk of	the	dangers inherent	in	the	sport” of	skiing—that	the	issue	of	

whether	 the	 plaintiff’s	injuries	 arose	 from	 those	 risks	was	 a	 question	 of	 fact

(quotation	marks	omitted)).3

[¶20]	 The	Ramseys’	daughter	is therefore	entitled	 to	immunity	unless	

one	 of	 the	 statutory	 exceptions	 to	 immunity applies.	 See 7 M.R.S.

§ 4103-A(2)-(4).	 McCandless argues	that	two	exceptions	apply because (A) the	

Ramseys’ daughter	 acted	 recklessly in	 causing	 McCandless’s	 injury and	

(B) McCandless was	in	an	area	where	horses	would	not	be	expected	or that	was	

a	protected	area	for	spectators.		See	id. §	4103-A(2)(C),	(4).

A. Exception	for	Injuries	Resulting	from	a	Reckless	Disregard	for	the	Safety	

of	Others

[¶21]	 	 Immunity	 will	 not	 lie	 if	 the	 party	 involved	 in	 equine	 activities

“[c]ommit[ted] an	act	or	omission	that	constitute[d] reckless	disregard	for	the	

safety	of	others	and	that	act	or	omission	caused	the	injury.”	Id.	§	4103-A(2)(C).4

 3		McCandless	also	argues	that	the	trial	court	improperly	placed	on	her	the	duty	to	demonstrate	

that	her	injury	did	not arise	from	an	inherent	risk	of	equine	activity.		See Hilderbrand	v.	Wash.	Cty.	

Comm’rs,	2011	ME	132,	¶	7,	33	A.3d	425	(holding	that	the	person	asserting	the	affirmative	defense	

of	 immunity	 bears	 the	 burden	 of	 proof).	 	We	 discern	 no	 such	 misapplication	 of	 the	 burden	 and,	

reviewing	the	summary	judgment	de	novo,	conclude	that	the	material	facts,	viewed	in	the	light	most	

favorable	to	McCandless,	show	that	McCandless’s	injury	resulted	from	the	inherent	risks	of	equine	

activity.

4		Although	not	raised	by	the	Ramseys,	the	heading	for	this	exception	suggests	that	it	should	apply	

only	 if	 a	 participant in	 equine	 activity—not	 a	 mere	 spectator—is	 injured.	 	 Compare 7	 M.R.S.	
11

For	purposes of	the	statute,	“[a]	person	acts	recklessly	with	respect	to	a	result	

of	the	person’s	conduct	when	the	person	consciously	disregards	a	risk	that	the	

person’s	conduct	will	cause	such	a	result.”		17-A M.R.S.	§	35(3)(A)	(2018);	see	

7 M.R.S.	§	4103-A(2)(C).

[¶22]		Although	“conscious	disregard”	is	a	subjective	state	of	mind	that	

may	be	inferred	from	objective	conduct,	there	are	no	facts	on	this	record	from	

which	such	a	state	of	mind	could	be	inferred.		See State	v.	Taylor,	661	A.2d	665,	

668	(Me. 1995);	State	v. Goodall,	407 A.2d	268,	280	(Me.	1979).		The	Ramseys’	

ten-year-old	daughter was	riding this	particular	horse	for	the	first	time.	 When	

the	girl	approached McCandless	on	her	 fourth	circuit,	she	attempted	 to	steer	

the	horse	to	avoid	a collision, but	the	horse	took	longer	than	the	girl expected	

to	respond	 to	her	directions,	and	she had	difficulty	getting	 the	horse	 to	 turn,	

which	led	to	the	collision	at	issue.		Although	these	facts	may	suggest	negligence,	

and	indeed	it	is	negligence	that	McCandless	has	alleged	in	her	complaint,	they	

are	not	facts	from	which	a	trier	of	fact	could	find that McCandless	was	injured	

because the	child consciously	disregarded	a	known	safety	risk.		

 

§ 4103-A(2)	(2018)	(entitled,	“Exceptions;	participants”)	with 7	M.R.S.	§	4103-A(4)	(2018)	(entitled,	

“Exceptions;	 persons	who	 are	 not	 participants”);	but	 see	1	M.R.S.	 §	 71(10)	 (2018)	 (“Abstracts	 of	

Titles,	chapters	and	sections,	and	notes	are	not	legal	provisions.”).		Because	we	conclude	 that	 the	

exception	is	inapplicable	for	other	reasons,	we	do	not	address	this	question	further.
12

B. Exception	for	Injuries	Occurring	in	Places Where	Horses	Would	Not	Be	

Expected	or	in	Designated	Spectator Locations

[¶23]		McCandless	next	argues	that	the	Ramseys’	daughter	is not	immune	

from liability because	she either

A.		Cause[d] injury	.	.	.	to	a	person	who	[was] not	a	participant	and	

who	[was] in	a	place	where	a	reasonable	person	would	not	expect	

an	equine	activity	to	occur;	or

B.		Cause[d] injury	.	.	.	 to	a	spectator	and	 that	spectator	was	in	a	

place	designated	or	intended	by	an	activity	sponsor	as	a	place	for	

spectators.

7	M.R.S.	§ 4103-A(4).

[¶24]	 	 By	 McCandless’s	 own	 report,	 the	 incident	 occurred	 in	 an	 area

where	 a	 reasonable	 person	 would expect	 equine	 activity	 to	 occur.	 	 See	 id.

§ 4103-A(4)(A).		Specifically,	McCandless	was	standing	in	an	area	where	horses	

were	ridden,	and	she	saw the Ramseys’ daughter ride directly past	her	three	

times	before	the	accident.		The	place	where	she	stood was	a	place	where	equine	

activity	was,	in	 fact,	 occurring	 and	where	it	 could	 be	 expected	 to	 occur, and	

McCandless	herself	observed that	equine	activity	was	occurring there.		

[¶25]	 	 Nor do	 the	 facts—viewed	 in	 the	 light	 most	 favorable	 to	

McCandless—show	that	McCandless	was	in	a	designated	spectator	area.		See	id.

§	4103-A(4)(B).		A designated	observation	room was	available,	but	the	incident	

did	 not	 occur	 in	 that	 observation	 room.	 	 In	 the	 arena	 grounds where	
13

McCandless	 suffered	 her	 injury,	there	 was	 no	 differentiation between horse	

traffic	 areas	 and	 pedestrian	 traffic	 areas.	 	 Although	 the	 area near where	

McCandless	stood was used	by	pedestrians	to	exit	the	arena, she	was	standing	

in	 an	 area	that	 was	 intended	 to	 be	 used—and	 was	 actually	 being	 used—for	

equestrian	activities and	not	an area	“designated	or	intended	.	.	.	for	spectators.”	

Id.	 	The	 specifically	 designated	 spectator area is	 not	 where	 McCandless	 was	

standing, or	exiting	from, when	the	collision	occurred.		

[¶26]	 	 Because the	 facts—viewed	 in	 the	 light	 most	 favorable	 to	

McCandless—show	 that	 no statutory	 exception	 to	 immunity applies,	 we	

conclude,	 as	 did	 the	 trial court,	 that	 the	 Ramseys’	 daughter is	 entitled	 to	

immunity	pursuant	to section	4103-A(1)	as	a	matter	of	law.		Cf.	Zuckerman	v.	

Coastal	Camps,	Inc.,	716	F.	Supp.	2d	23,	32-33	&	n.5	(D.	Me.	2010)	(concluding	

that	 summary	 judgment	was	inappropriate	 because	 there	were questions	 of	

material	fact	regarding	the	applicability	of	a	statutory	exception	to	immunity	

from	liability	for	equine	activities).

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.	
14

MEAD,	 J.,	with	whom	 JABAR	and	HUMPHREY,	 JJ.,	join,	concurring	in	part	and	

dissenting	in	part.

[¶27]	 	I	 concur	in	 part	with,	 and	 respectfully	 dissent	in	 part	 from,	 the	

Court’s	opinion.		I	do	not	disagree	with	the	Court’s	description	of	the	immunity	

from	liability	for equine	activities	established	by	Section	4103-A	of	Title	7	of	

the	Maine	Revised	Statutes	and	the	court’s	discussion	of	the	objectives	behind	

that	statute.		 It	is	clear	 that	 the	Maine	Legislature	created	a	broad	immunity,	

with	narrow	exceptions,	for	liability	resulting	from	equine	activities.		I	diverge	

from	 the	Court’s	conclusions,	however,	based	upon	 the	Court’s	application	of	

our	 standard	 of	 review	 of	 summary	 judgments	 to	 two	 of	 the	 narrow	

exceptions.5		In	reviewing	the	Superior	Court’s	granting	of	summary	judgment	

de	 novo,	 and	 viewing	 the	 facts	 of	 this	 matter	 in	 the	 light	 most	 favorable	 to	

McCandless	as	we	must,	I	would	conclude	that	genuine	issues	of	material	fact	

exist	regarding	the	application	of	two	exceptions	to	the	statutory	immunity	for	

equine	activity.		I	would	vacate	the	grant	of	summary	judgment	and	remand	for	

trial	on	those	limited	issues	only.

[¶28]		Subsection	4	of	7	M.R.S.	§	4103-A	provides:

4.	 	 Exceptions;	 persons	who	 are	 not	participants.	 	Nothing	in	

subsection	 1	 prevents	 or	limits	 the	liability	 of	 an	 equine	 activity	

 5		I	concur	in	the	Court’s	opinion	in	all	other	aspects.
15

sponsor,	an	equine	professional	or	any	other	person	engaged	in	an	

equine	activity,	if	that	equine	activity:

A.		Causes	injury	or	death	to	a	person	who	is	not	a	participant	

and	who	is	in	a	place	where	a	reasonable	person	would	not	

expect	an	equine	activity	to	occur;	or

B.		Causes	injury	or	death	 to	a	spectator	and	 that	spectator	

was	in	a	place	designated	or	intended	by	an	activity	sponsor	

as	a	place	for	spectators.

[¶29]		Under	subsection	(4)(A),	the	Ramseys would	not	be	immune	from	

liability	if	McCandless’s	injury	occurred	in	a	place	where	a	reasonable	person	

would	 not	 expect	 an	 equine	 activity	 to	 occur—an	 objective	 inquiry	 that is	

ordinarily	 entrusted	in	 the	 first	instance	 to	 the	 trier	 of	 fact,	not	an	appellate	

court	on	a	review	of	a	summary	judgment.		In	their statement	of	material	facts	

supporting	their motion	for	summary	judgment,	the Ramseys asserted	that	the	

collision	occurred	in	an	area	where	it	was	typical	to	see	horses.		This	assertion,	

if	 uncontroverted,	 would	 be	 dispositive	 of	 the	 issue:	 the	 subsection	 (4)(A)	

exception	 would	 not	 be	 available	 to	 McCandless	 to	 avoid	 the	 immunity	

provided	by	7	M.R.S.	§	4103-A(1).

[¶30]	 	McCandless	 properly	 controverted	 that	 fact,	 however,	 asserting	

that	horses	did	not	 ride	in	 the	area	regularly	used	by	pedestrians	 to	exit	 the	

building	when	pedestrians	were	present.		Accepting	that	fact,	as	we	must,	in	the	

light	most	 favorable	 to	 the	party	against	whom	summary	judgment	has	been	
16

granted,	McCandless	has	established,	 for	 the	purposes	of	summary	judgment	

review,	that	equine	activities	would	not	take	place	in	the	vicinity	of	the	collision	

if	pedestrians	were	present.		The	questions	of	(1)	whether	or	not	this	conditional	

practice	actually	existed,	or	(2)	whether	it	indeed	occurred	on	July	7,	2010,	or	

(3)	whether	a	reasonable	person	would	have	held	McCandless’s	opinions	and	

perceptions	at	the	moment	of	the	collision,	are	categorically	questions	of	fact	

that	are	exclusively	the	province	of	the	finder	of	fact	and	cannot	be	resolved	by	

summary	 judgment.6	 	 See Curtis	 v.	 Porter,	 2001 ME	 158,	 ¶	 7,	 784	 A.2d	 18	

(“If material	 facts	 are	 disputed,	 the	 dispute	 must	 be	 resolved	 through	

fact-finding . . .	.”).

[¶31]		Additionally,	the	exception	provided	in	subsection	(4)(B)	may	also	

operate	to	avoid	the	immunity	created	in	section	4103-A(1)	if	McCandless	was	

in	a	place	designated	or	intended	as	a	place	for	spectators.		The	undisputed	facts	

establish	that	the	indoor	arena	was	located	in	a	barn	with	an	observation	room	

 6		The	Court	posits	that	because	the Ramseys’	daughter had	ridden	the	horse	past	McCandless	in	

the	same	spot	on	three	earlier	occasions,	this	establishes	that	it	is	impossible,	as	a	matter	of	law,	that	

McCandless	could	ever	prove	that	she	was	in	an	area	where	she	would	not	expect	equine	activity	to	

take	place.		See Court’s	Opinion	¶	24.		Despite	the	fact	that	we	may	deem	a	litigant	to	have	a	steep	

challenge	in	proving	a	necessary	element	at	trial,	or	find	her	assertions	seemingly	implausible,	we	

may	not	superimpose	our	perceptions	of	the	permissible	inferences to	be	drawn	from	disputed	facts	

in	our	appellate	review	of	summary	judgments.	 See Rose	v.	Parsons,	2015 ME 73,	¶	4,	118 A.3d 220

(“[The	s]ummary	judgment	process	is	not	a	substitute	for	trial,	even	if	the	likelihood	of	success	at	

trial	by	one	party	or	another	is	small.		When	facts	or	reasonable	inferences	to	be	drawn	from	the	facts	

are	 in	 dispute,	 the	 court	 must	 engage	 in	 fact-finding,	 and	 summary	 judgment	 is	 not	 available.”	

(citations	omitted)).
17

from	which	spectators	could	observe	the	goings-on	in	the	barn.		Additionally,	

folding	chairs	had	been	placed	along	the	interior	wall	of	the	barn	in	the	indoor	

arena;	horses	were	not	typically	present	in	this	area.		The	parties	do	not	dispute	

that	 the	 observation	 room	 and	 the	 chairs	 along	 the	wall	were	 designated	 as	

places	for	spectators.

[¶32]		Prior	 to	 the	incident,	McCandless	had	been	 sitting	in	 one	 of	 the	

folding	chairs.		The	collision	occurred	after	she	left	the	area	of	the	chairs	and	

was	 proceeding	 to	 the	 south	 barn	 exit	 to	 leave	 the	 arena.	 	 The	 fact	 that	 the	

observation	room	and	the	folding	chairs	were	located	inside	the	building	and	

could	be	accessed	by	a	spectator	only	by	entering	or	exiting	through	one	or	the	

other	of	the	doors	presents	a	plausible	conclusion:	the	exit	routes	between	the	

observation	 points	 and	 the	 doors	 may	 be	 deemed,	 by	 extension,	 places	

designated for	spectators.		That	conclusion,	and	the	purely	factual	question	of	

whether	McCandless’s	most	direct	exit	route	required	her	to	pass	through	the	

area	where	 the	collision	occurred	are,	again,	questions	of	 fact	 that	cannot	be	

determined	on	this	summary	judgment	record.

[¶33]		Because	unresolved	questions	of	material	fact	remain	surrounding	

the	issue	of	whether	the	subsection	4(A)	or	4(B)	statutory	exceptions	to	liability	

apply,	we	should	not	conclude	that	the	Ramseys	are entitled	to	immunity	under	
18

section	 4103-A(1)	 as	 a	matter	 of	law.	 	 See Zuckerman	 v.	 Coastal	 Camps,	 Inc.,	

716 F. Supp. 2d	23,	32	n.5	(D.	Me.	2010).

[¶34]		 I	would	partially	 vacate	 the	granting	 of	 summary	judgment	and	

remand	 for	 trial	 on	 the	 issues	 of	 whether	 the	 subsection	 4(A)	 and	 4(B)	

exceptions	 to	 immunity	 apply.	 	 I	 would	 affirm	 the	 granting	 of	 summary	

judgment	on	all	other	issues	relating	to	liability.

Arthur	J.	Greif,	Esq. (orally),	Gilbert	&	Greif,	P.A.,	Bangor,	for	appellant	Nancy	J.	

McCandless

Gregory	 S.	 Clayton,	 Esq. (orally),	 Primmer	 Piper	 Eggleston	 &	 Cramer	 PC,	

Camden,	for	appellees John	Ramsey	et	al.

Washington	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	CV-2016-14

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY