J-S84016-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: I.J.W., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: N.M., MOTHER

No. 3769 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered November 10, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000365-2014

 CP-51-DP-0000694-2012

BEFORE: OLSON, J., SOLANO, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 22, 2016

Appellant, N.M. (“Mother”), appeals from the order involuntarily 

terminating her parental rights to I.J.W., born December 2011 (“the Child”). 

Upon careful review, we affirm.

On April 18, 2012, the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) 

received a Child Protective Services report with allegations that a fourmonth-old was brought by both parents, J.W. (“Father”) and Mother, to the 

emergency room of the Albert Einstein Medical Center in Philadelphia; the 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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baby was suffering from shaken baby syndrome and a brain bleed.1 Trial 

Court Opinion, 6/9/16, at 1. The Child was then transferred to St. 

Christopher’s Hospital for Children (“St. Christopher’s”), where “the report of 

child abuse was substantiated.” Id.

On December 12, 2012, the Child was placed in his current foster 

home. N.T., 6/1/15, at 19-20; N.T., 9/1/15, at 76; Trial Court Opinion, 

6/9/16, at 3 n.8, 9. An aggravated circumstances hearing was held before 

the trial court on October 21, 2013, during which —

Dr. [Maria] McColgan testified as an expert[] in pediatric child 

abuse . . . N.T. 10/21/1[3] at 54. Dr. McColgan testified that to 

a degree of medical certainty, the Child's case was one of child 

abuse. Id. at 74. Dr. McColgan, [St. Christopher’s] Medical 

Director of the Child Protection Program, indicated that the 

injuries to the Child were caused by non-accidental trauma and 

the Child was admitted to [St. Christopher’s]; the injuries were 

certified as a near fatality. Id. at 53, 68.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/16, at 2. Dr. McColgan also testified that the Child 

had old rib fractures and showed signs of long-term deficits. N.T., 

10/21/13, at 55, 69. Based on Dr. McColgan’s unrefuted expert testimony 

that the Child suffered a nearly fatal event, the trial court adjudicated the 

Child dependent and found aggravated circumstances existed as to both 

Father and Mother.

____________________________________________

1 Dr. Maria McColgan, an expert in pediatric child abuse, testified that 

“shaken baby syndrome” is a colloquium used to describe the possible 

“mechanism” or movement that caused the injury. Trial Court Opinion, 

6/9/16, at 1 n.2 (citing N.T., 10/21/13, at 54, 109).
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On August 4, 2014, the Child Advocate filed a petition for involuntary 

termination of Mother’s rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-(2), (5), 

(8). Termination hearings were held on June 1, 2015, September 1, 2015, 

and November 10, 2015.

During the first hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Dende 

Korpoi and Courtney McDonald,2two DHS social workers assigned to the 

Child and Mother’s case. Ms. Korpoi, who handled the case from June 2012 

until late 2014, gave testimony that Mother had a Family Service Plan 

(“FSP”), with parenting and psychological/psychiatric goals, but Mother had 

not completed the requisite parenting classes. N.T., 6/1/15, at 9, 20, 23. 

Mr. McDonald, who was managing the case at the time of the hearing, stated 

that Mother was minimally compliant with the objective of creating a plan to 

prevent future harm to the Child if reunited. Id. at 86, 89-90, 93. 

Mr. McDonald testified again during the second hearing; he stated that 

the Child’s foster parents were interested in adoption. N.T., 9/1/15, at 20. 

At the same hearing, a foster care case worker from Bethany Christian 

Services, Anne Schlonoeker, testified that Mother’s Individual Service Plan 

objectives “were to maintain visitation with [the Child], to maintain 

____________________________________________

2

In the notes of testimony for June 1, 2015, the last name of this DHS 

social worker is spelled “MacDonald.” In the notes of testimony for 

September 1, 2015 and the Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/16, at 3, his surname is 

spelled “McDonald.” Since “McDonald” appears in two court documents and 

“MacDonald” appears in only one, we use “McDonald” throughout this 

memorandum opinion.
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appropriate housing [and a] stable employment, to address any concerns 

that she had regarding [the Child,] and also to follow the recommendations 

of the FSP explained by DHS.” N.T., 9/1/15, at 82. During this hearing, 

Mother also testified, explaining that she had a good relationship with the 

Child’s foster parents. However, Mother did not accept responsibility for the 

Child’s injuries, argued that there was a medical reason for the injuries, and 

did not believe that anyone inflicted injuries on the Child; Mother presented 

no expert testimony in support of her claim. Id. at 125-126, 136-137. In 

addition, on that same day, Father briefly testified that he was involved in 

therapy with a private therapist in 2014. Id. at 138.

At the third and final hearing, a forensic psychologist, Dr. Erica 

Williams, testified regarding Mother’s parenting capacity evaluation in 2011. 

N.T., 11/10/15, at 12. Dr. Williams attested that, although Mother had a lot 

of strengths, they were insufficient to compensate for the one point of 

concern — that Mother will not explain how the Child’s injuries occurred and 

will not create a plan to make sure that the Child does not experience such 

harm again. Id. at 18-20, 27.

After closing arguments, the trial court found that all of the witnesses, 

with the exception of Mother, were credible and accepted their testimony in 

full, while repudiating the testimony of Mother. N.T., 11/10/15, at 95-98. 

The trial court accounted for this finding as follows:

[T]he [C]hild was brought into the ER screaming in pain, limp, 

had not been eating. . . . [S]haken baby syndrome was thought 
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to be one of the reasons. The [C]hild had old and new fractures, 

retinal hemorrhaging, and a subdural hematoma. Mo[ther] 

could not provide an explanation for the injuries. . . . [T]he 

[C]hild was fine when she left for work at 7:30 a.m. [T]he 

[C]hild was in the care of [Father] on 4/17/12. . . . [The

parents] can provide permanency, but for the issue of their 

ability to show capacity for safety, but in general nice people.

Id. at 97-99. The trial court also found no parent-child bond. Trial Court 

Opinion, 6/9/16, at 5 (citing N.T., 11/10/15, at 103). The trial court “found 

that based on the evidence, it was in the best interests of the Child to be 

adopted and granted the termination of Mother's parental rights on 

November 10, 2015 based on 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and 2511(b).” Trial 

Court Opinion, 6/9/16, at 6 (citing N.T., 11/10/15, at 103-104). In support 

of its decision, the trial court explained:

After the findings of aggravated circumstances, the parents did 

nothing to regain custody of their child. Furthermore, after three 

years in DHS care, the parents have not given a plausible cause 

for the Child's substantial injuries, and . . . Father . . . invoked 

his Fifth Amendment protection from self-incrimination. The 

Child was four months old when he was removed from the 

parents' care and has never been returned.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/16, at 1. 

Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On appeal, Mother presents two issues for 

our review:

A. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 

involuntarily terminated [M]other's parental rights where such 

determination was not supported by clear and convincing 

evidence under the Adoption Act 23 Pa. C.S.A. §2511 (a)(1), 
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(a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8) as [M]other made progress towards 

working and meeting her FSP goals, namely staying drug free, 

working towards obtaining housing, working on parenting skills, 

and other goals, during the [C]hild's placement? . . .

B. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 

involuntarily terminated [M]other's parental rights without giving 

primary consideration to the effect that the termination would 

have on the developmental physical and emotional needs of the 

[C]hild as required by the Adoption Act 23 Pa. C.S.A. §2511(b)?

Mother’s Brief at 4.

We consider Mother’s issues mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511, which requires a bifurcated analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 
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termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). The 

burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights 

are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

The trial court found that there was sufficient evidence to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-(2), (5), (8), 

(b). We will affirm if we agree with the trial court's decision as to any one 

subsection of Section 2511(a) and as to Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W.,

843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we affirm the trial 

court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights under subsections 

2511(a)(2) and (b):

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds: . . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent. . . .
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(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

Because we affirm on these grounds, we will not address the remaining 

subsections of the statute at length. See In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 100 

(Pa. Super. 2011).

Mother argues that the evidence does not support termination under 

Section 2511(a)(2), because —

[T]he trial Court erred when it ruled that conditions which led to 

mother's incapacity cannot be remedied in a reasonable period 

of time. Mother acknowledged her shortcomings as a parent, 

which is the first step to remedying the situation, and mother 

completed certain FSP objectives, which demonstrated that 

those conditions could be remedied. Furthermore, DHS did not 

prove with clear and convincing evidence otherwise. 

Mother’s Brief at 6. 

Section 2511(a)(2) concerns the “physical or mental well-being” of the 

Child. In the current appeal, the Child suffered a near fatality, and there 

was a finding of aggravated circumstances and child abuse. Additionally, 

despite being only four months old, the Child already showed signs of 

“repeated and continued . . . abuse,” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), in the form of 
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an old rib fracture and injuries to his brain that were a likely result of longterm deficits. N.T., 10/21/13, 55, 69. 

Also, the trial court concluded that “the conditions and causes of the 

. . . abuse . . . cannot or will not be remedied by [Mother],” 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(2), based on her conduct over a protracted period. After three 

years, both parents were still suspected of causing Child’s nearly fatal 

injuries, and neither of them has given a plausible explanation or identified 

the cause. Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/16, at 9 (citing N.T., 9/1/15, at 76; N.T., 

11/10/15, at 18-20). Even as of the second day of the termination hearings, 

Mother continued to posit unsupported medical theories for the Child’s 

injuries, and refused to believe that anyone had inflicted injuries on the 

Child. N.T., 9/1/15, at 125-126, 136-137. If Mother is unwilling to 

recognize that there was abuse, she is unlikely to be able to remedy or to 

protect against it. In addition, Mother has not complied with all 

requirements of her FSP, including completion of her parenting classes and 

demonstration of her willingness to complete a plan to prevent future harm 

to the Child if reunited. N.T., 6/1/15, at 9, 20, 23, 86, 89-90, 93. Thus, the 

trial court appropriately found clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s 

conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 
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2511(a)(2); L.M., 923 A.2d at 511.3 Accordingly, the first issue raised by 

Mother on appeal is without merit.

With respect to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), this Court has explained that, 

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in 

the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 

1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Further, the trial court 

“must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with 

utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that 

bond.” Id. (citation omitted). However, “[i]n cases where there is no 

evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer 

that no bond exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily 

depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 

A.2d 753, 762-763 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). 

____________________________________________

3 We also accept the trial court’s findings under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), 

(5), (8). See Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/16, at 8-10. Clear and convincing 

evidence demonstrates that the Child was four months old when he was 

removed from his biological parents’ care and he has never been returned; 

the Child was placed with his foster parents in December 2012. Trial Court 

Opinion, 6/9/16, at 1, 9; N.T., 9/1/15, at 76. The petition for involuntary 

termination was filed on August 4, 2014. Thus, for “at least six months 

immediately preceding the filing” of the termination petition, Mother failed to 

perform her parental duties, a ground for termination under Section 

2511(a)(1). The Child has also been “removed from the care of [Mother] by 

the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at 

least six months.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5). Additionally, “12 months or 

more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement.” Id. § 

2511(a)(8).
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On appeal, Mother argues that the evidence does not support 

termination under Section 2511(b). She states:

The trial Court erred in granting the DHS petition to involuntarily 

terminate the parental rights of mother because DHS failed to 

provide the Court with clear, competent, and convincing 

evidence that termination was in the best interest of the child, 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b). This means that the trial 

court must look at the parent-child relationship and examine 

how the effect of terminating that relationship will impact the 

child.

Mother’s Brief at 6-7. We are unpersuaded by Mother’s argument.

First, we note that Section 2511(b) does not require a bonding 

analysis at all. The term “bond” is not defined in the Adoption Act. The 

need for any bonding analysis depends on the unique facts and 

circumstances of each particular case. See In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 

(Pa. Super. 2012). 

In this case, there is some evidence of an emotional bond between 

Mother and the Child. According to Ms. Schlonoeker, who the trial court 

found to be credible, N.T., 11/10/15, at 95-98, the Child was always excited 

and “happy” to see Mother during their four hours of weekly supervised 

visits. N.T., 9/1/15, at 109, 119. Mother has punctually attended all 72 of 

these scheduled visits, and she would bring snacks and have “playtime” with 

the Child. Id. at 91-92, 119. During these visits, Mother and the Child 

would “cuddle,” and he would sit on her lap and give her hugs and kisses. 

Id. at 119. Mother’s behavior during these visits was described as 

“appropriate,” and Mother and the Child would respond well to each other. 
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Id. at 119-120. The Child recognized Mother and would call her “Mom.” Id.

at 120.

Nevertheless, the existence of some bond between a child and a 

biological parent does not necessarily preclude termination of parental 

rights. K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 764. The question is whether an existing bond 

between the Child and Mother is “worth saving or whether it could be 

sacrificed without irreparable harm to the Child.” Id.

Contrary to Mother’s argument, the trial court could reasonably find by 

clear and convincing evidence that the bond is not so strong that it should 

not be terminated. See generally K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 762-763. According 

to Ms. Schlonoeker, the Child had no issues separating from Mother after 

each visit. N.T., 9/1/15, at 97, 110. Mother was described as nothing more 

than a “four-hour playmate” for the Child. Id. at 110. Most significantly, 

Ms. Schlonoeker testified that the Child would not suffer irreparable harm if 

Mother’s parental rights were terminated. Id. at 109-110. Ms. Schlonoeker 

added that the termination of Mother’s parental rights would not be a 

significant change for the Child, because he had lived with his foster parents 

for three years, as of the date of the second termination hearing. Id. at 

110-111. The Child does not look to Mother to care for his quotidian needs; 

he considers his foster parents’ residence to be his home. Id. at 110-111. 

Ms. Schlonoeker also expressed her concern that Mother does not take 

responsibility for her role to keep the Child safe. Id. at 120.
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It is important that the Child’s relationships with his foster mother are 

irrefutably strong. 

[C]ourts considering termination must also consider whether the 

children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a 

bond with their foster parents. . . . [T]ermination may be 

necessary for the child's needs and welfare in cases where the 

child's parental bond is impeding the search and placement with 

a permanent adoptive home.

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268-269.4 In the current case, the Child has a robust 

relationship with his foster family, is comfortable with his foster mother and 

foster siblings, and is safe in his foster home. N.T., 6/1/15, at 38, 41-42. 

His foster mother ensures that all of his needs are met on a daily basis, and 

the Child understands the rules and expectations of his foster parents. Id. 

at 39; N.T., 9/1/15, at 19. The Child calls his foster mother, “Mommy.” Id.

The Child’s circumstances are analogous to the facts of K.Z.S., 946 

A.2d at 764, in which no evidence suggested that K.Z.S.’s mother had a 

bond with him equal to his bond with his foster mother. This Court wrote:

No evidence suggests . . . that terminating Mother's parental 

rights will sever an existing beneficial relationship, or that it will 

result in irreparable harm to K.Z.S. Therefore, we agree with 

the court that the bond between K.Z.S. and [his foster mother] 

is the primary bond to protect, given K.Z.S.' young age and his 

very limited contact with Mother. Because competent evidence 

____________________________________________

4

In T.S.M., we explained that “termination of parental rights generally 

should not be granted unless adoptive parents are waiting to take a child

into a safe and loving home,” but that “the Adoption Act specifically provides 

that a pending adoption is not a prerequisite to termination of parental 

rights involving agencies,” as is the case here. 71 A.3d at 268 (quoting 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2512(b)).
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of record supports the court's decision to terminate Mother's 

parental rights, we have no reason to disturb it.

Id. Similarly, in the present appeal, nothing in the record suggests that 

terminating Mother’s parental rights will result in irreparable harm to the 

Child. The record supports the trial court’s view that the bond between the 

Child and his foster mother is the primary bond to protect, given the Child’s 

young age and his very limited contact with Mother. See Trial Court Opinion, 

6/9/16, at 5. Since competent evidence of record supports the trial court’s 

decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights due, in part, to the lack of a 

strong emotional bond between parent and child, we have no reason to 

disturb it. See L.M., 923 A.2d at 511.

Furthermore, the parent-child bond is not the only factor that a court 

can consider under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). “While a parent's emotional bond 

with his or her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) bestinterest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered 

by the court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.” In 

re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he trial court can equally 

emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider the 

intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might 

have with the foster parent.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). In its analysis of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), the trial court emphasized 

that the foster family “provides safety,” whereas “there is no way to ensure 
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the safety of the Child [with Mother] because there was never an 

explanation for the Child’s near fatality and no way to make sure that the 

Child was not endangered again.” Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/16, at 11 (citing 

N.T., 9/1/15, at 103-104; N.T., 11/10/15, at 18-20, 27).

Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial 

court in concluding that the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental 

rights serves the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare 

of the Child pursuant to Section 2511(a) and (b). Accordingly, we affirm the 

trial court’s order.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/22/2016