UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4241

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MAMADOU JALLOW,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,

Chief District Judge. (5:13-cr-00126-D-1)

Submitted: November 14, 2016 Decided: November 21, 2016

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit 

Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Elliot Sol Abrams, CHESHIRE PARKER SCHNEIDER & BRYAN, PLLC, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, 

United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. 

Fritz, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Mamadou Jallow appeals the district court’s judgment 

revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to the 

authorized statutory maximum term of 24 months’ imprisonment. 

On appeal, Jallow challenges the district court’s rationale for 

imposing the statutory maximum term of imprisonment, asserting 

that the selected sentence runs afoul of United States v. Webb, 

738 F.3d 638 (4th Cir. 2013). We affirm.

We have routinely recognized that, in the context of a 

supervised release revocation, “the sentencing court retains 

broad discretion to impose a term of imprisonment up to the 

statutory maximum.” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 

(4th Cir.) (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted), 

cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 494 (2015). “We will not disturb a 

district court’s revocation sentence unless it falls outside the 

statutory maximum or is otherwise plainly unreasonable.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing a revocation 

sentence, we utilize the familiar procedural and substantive 

considerations employed for evaluating the reasonableness of an 

original criminal sentence, but “we strike a more deferential 

appellate posture than we do when reviewing original sentences.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the 

district court considered the advisory policy statement range 
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and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors applicable to 

supervised release revocation. Id.; United States v. Crudup, 

461 F.3d 433, 438–40 (4th Cir. 2006). A sentence is 

substantively reasonable if the district court “sufficiently 

stated a proper basis” for the selected sentence, up to the 

statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if we 

determine that a revocation sentence is unreasonable need we 

consider “whether it is plainly so.” Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373.

In exercising its sentencing discretion, the district court 

“should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, 

while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness 

of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the 

violator.” Webb, 738 F.3d at 641. In determining the length of 

a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release, 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012) requires a sentencing court to consider 

all but two of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

The record confirms that the district court faithfully 

followed this process in sentencing Jallow. After properly 

calculating Jallow’s policy statement range, hearing argument 

from both attorneys, and allowing Jallow to allocute, the court 

announced several bases for imposing on Jallow the statutory 

maximum term of imprisonment. The most significant of these 

reasons was that Jallow egregiously breached the court’s trust 

when, while on supervised release, he repeatedly engaged in the 
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same criminal conduct for which he was initially convicted and 

sentenced. The severity of the breach was exacerbated by the 

fact that Jallow’s supervised release had previously been 

revoked for committing a similar crime. These facts established 

Jallow’s staunch refusal to abide by the terms and conditions of 

his supervised release, as well as his determination to flout 

the court’s authority. We thus readily uphold the revocation 

sentence as reasonable. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440 (holding 

that imposition of statutory maximum term of imprisonment was 

substantively reasonable, given that the district court 

expressly relied on defendant’s “admitted pattern of violating 

numerous conditions of his supervised release,” despite several 

extensions of leniency by the district court). 

Against this backdrop, we consider Jallow’s argument that 

the district court erred, under Webb, in imposing the statutory 

maximum term of imprisonment available in this case. In Webb, 

the defendant received a 32-month revocation sentence after 

being found to have committed a Grade A supervised release 

violation. 738 F.3d at 640. This was near the bottom of Webb’s 

policy statement range and thus presumptively reasonable. Id.

at 642. The primary issue in Webb was whether a district 

court’s reference to § 3553(a) sentencing factors not identified 

in § 3583(e) renders a sentence per se plainly procedurally 

unreasonable, and we rejected this contention. Id. at 641-42 
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(holding “that [the] mere reference to such considerations does 

not render a revocation sentence procedurally unreasonable when 

those factors are relevant to, and considered in conjunction 

with, the enumerated § 3553(a) factors”). Jallow seeks to 

demonstrate the unreasonableness of his sentence by comparing 

the conduct leading to the revocation of his term of supervised 

release to that at issue in Webb. But this argument fails to 

appreciate the considerable discretion judges have in selecting 

a revocation sentence and overemphasizes the significance of the 

court’s use of the word “felonious” in its explanation for the 

selected sentence. Thus, we are not persuaded by this 

assignment of error. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED