IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

DONNA ZINK and JEFF ZINK, wife and 

husband, and the marital community 

composed thereof,

Appellants,

v.

CITY OF MESA, a Washington 

Municipal Corporation; DUANA RAE 

ROSS, a married woman; PATRICK 

FAY, a married man; DAVID 

FERGUSON, a married man; 

ELIZABETH DAVIS, a married woman; 

FRANKLIN COUNTY, a Washington 

Municipal Corporation; RICHARD 

LATHIM, in his capacity as Franklin 

County Sheriff; RUBEN BAYONA, an 

individual; FRANKLIN COUNTY 

SHERIFF’S DEPUTY SCANTLIN, an 

individual; and BRIAN PFEIFFER, an 

individual,

Respondents.

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No. 39670-3-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

STAAB, J. — Donna Zink appeals the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of 

her claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her right to video record a 

public meeting under the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971 (OPMA), chapter 42.30 

FILED

APRIL 30, 2024

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
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Zink, et al v. Scantlin, et al

2

RCW. She argues that the city of Mesa and its former Mayor Duana Ross are not entitled 

to qualified immunity, and therefore summary judgment should not have been granted. 

We agree that the City, as a governmental entity, is not entitled to qualified 

immunity. However, we conclude that the right to video record a public meeting was not 

clearly established in 2003 and therefore Mayor Ross is entitled to qualified immunity. 

Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Zink’s claims against Mayor Ross and reverse 

the summary judgment order dismissing Zink’s § 1983 claims against the city of Mesa. 

We remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

This court has already provided a detailed account of the background facts of this 

case in Zink v. City of Mesa, 17 Wn. App. 2d 701, 487 P.3d 902 (2021) (published 

portion); Zink, No. 36994-3-III (unpublished portion), https://www.courts.wa.gov

/opinions/pdf/369943_ord.pdf. Unless otherwise noted, the facts set forth are from this 

court’s opinion in that case.

The city of Mesa is a noncharter code city, with a mayor and city council 

organized under chapter 35A.12 RCW. As a noncharter code city, the city council is the 

governing body of Mesa. Former RCW 35A.12.010 (1997). The mayor serves as 

presiding officer for the city council, having a vote only in case of a tie concerning 

certain matters. Former RCW 35A.12.100 (1979). In 2003, the Mesa City Council 

consisted of five members. The mayor was Duana Ross.
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The Mesa City Council had a meeting scheduled to commence on May 8, 2003. 

Zink appeared for the May 8 city council meeting and began video recording a few 

minutes before the start of the meeting. 

Shortly after Zink began recording, Mayor Ross told Zink she needed permission 

to tape the proceedings. Zink asked what law required such permission. Zink refused to 

turn the camera off and told Mayor Ross she could call the police.

Mayor Ross then called 911. A sheriff’s deputy arrived and talked to Zink. Zink 

informed the officer she had a right to record the meeting as it was a public meeting and

she was not causing a disturbance. After some discussion between the city council, Zink, 

and the deputy, the deputy claimed Zink was trespassing and would be arrested if she did 

not either leave or stop recording. Zink did not stop recording. Zink was then 

handcuffed, transported to jail, given a citation, and released. After Zink’s removal, the 

council resumed its meeting and conducted business on its agenda.

In 2005, Zink sued the city of Mesa, Mayor Ross (collectively Mesa), the three 

city council members present that night, Franklin County, the Franklin County Sheriff’s 

Office, the elected sheriff, and the involved deputies. Zink made claims regarding 

violations of the OPMA as well as civil rights and emotional distress claims regarding 

Zink’s exclusion from the meeting and arrest.
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In pretrial rulings and negotiations, all of Zink’s claims except the OPMA claim 

and a tort claim under § 1983 for deprivation of liberty without due process were 

disposed of. 

A jury trial was held in January 2018. In the middle of trial, Mesa filed a motion 

for directed verdict on the § 1983 claims, which the court granted based on the view that 

a violation of a nonfederal statute cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim unless the 

statute purports to grant a property right and the OPMA does not grant a property right. 

In her first appeal, Zink raised several issues including the trial court’s directed 

verdict on her § 1983 claims. This court reversed the directed verdict for Mayor Ross 

and the City on the Fourteenth Amendment § 1983 claims and the directed verdict for 

Mayor Ross on the Fourth Amendment § 1983 claims, disagreeing with the trial court’s 

analysis and determining that the OPMA grants a right to attend a public meeting that can 

give rise to a claim under § 1983. This court affirmed the directed verdict for the City on 

the Fourth Amendment § 1983 claims, determining that there was no evidence Zink had 

been arrested pursuant to an official city policy or custom. This court declined to address 

any argument surrounding the issue of qualified immunity as the trial court expressly 

declined to reach the issue and Mesa had failed to adequately brief it on appeal.

On remand, Mesa and Mayor Ross brought a motion for summary judgment on the 

§ 1983 claims, arguing that it was immune from suit based on the doctrine of qualified 

immunity. The motion argued that the right to video record the city council meeting was 
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not clearly established on May 8, 2003 such that it would have been known by every 

reasonable official. The trial court granted the motion and accordingly dismissed the § 

1983 claims brought against Mesa.1

Zink appeals.

ANALYSIS

1. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FOR THE CITY OF MESA

Zink argues that the trial court erred in determining that the City was entitled to 

qualified immunity and therefore dismissing her § 1983 claim against the City. She 

maintains that municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity. The City responds 

that the superior court’s prior dismissal of Zink’s § 1983 claims against the city of Mesa 

was affirmed in this court’s prior opinion. 

We reject the City’s argument that this court dismissed all of Zink’s § 1983 claims 

against the City in a prior appeal. Although this court affirmed the dismissal of the 

Fourth Amendment claim brought under § 1983, with regard to the Fourteenth 

Amendment claim brought under § 1983, this court clearly stated that Zink “asserted 

sufficient facts for municipal liability” and “reversed [the trial court’s directed verdict] as 

 

1 Although the trial court initially appeared to say it was not going to include the 

City in its dismissal, it ultimately determined that it would dismiss both Mayor Ross and 

the City.
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to Mayor Ross and the city of Mesa.” Zink, No. 36994-3-III, slip op. at 22-23 (emphasis 

added). 

Here, the trial court erred in dismissing Zink’s Fourteenth Amendment claims 

under § 1983 against the City. Although government officials may be entitled to 

qualified immunity in their individual capacity, “[l]ocal government entities are not 

entitled to the qualified immunity available to their officials.” Robinson v. City of 

Seattle, 119 Wn.2d 34, 64, 830 P.2d 318 (1992), abrogated on other grounds by Yim v. 

City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682, 451 P.3d 694 (2019). The trial court initially hesitated to 

extend its summary judgment dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity to the City, 

noting that the issue of whether the City was entitled to qualified immunity had not been 

briefed. However, in the end, it decided to include the City in its decision. This decision 

was in error. 

2. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY OF MAYOR ROSS

Zink argues that the trial court also erred in dismissing her § 1983 claims against 

Mayor Ross. She maintains that in 2003 her right to video record city council meetings 

was clearly established and therefore Mayor Ross is not entitled to qualified immunity. 

We disagree. 

A government official’s entitlement to qualified immunity is a question of law this 

court reviews de novo. Feis v. King County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 165 Wn. App. 525, 538, 267 

P.3d 1022 (2011). “Qualified immunity is a potentially dispositive predicate inquiry, 
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‘conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff’s claim,’ where summary judgment 

is appropriate if the evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact 

regarding whether the defendant committed acts that violated clearly established law.” 

Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 

(1985)).

A party is entitled to relief under § 1983 if they can demonstrate: (1) deprivation 

of a federal constitutional or statutory right, and (2) the individual against whom the 

claim is brought was acting under color of state law. Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 

Wn.2d 1, 11, 829 P.2d 765 (1992), abrogated on other grounds by Yim, 194 Wn.2d 682. 

However, public officials may raise the defense of qualified immunity to limit their 

liability for damages under § 1983. Benjamin v. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, 138 Wn.2d 506, 

527, 980 P.2d 742 (1999). The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government 

officials from liability unless a plaintiff can demonstrate that the official: (1) violated a 

constitutional right, and (2) that right was clearly established at the time the challenged 

conduct occurred. Robinson, 119 Wn.2d at 64-65. Whether a right is clearly established 

is an objective standard, not a subjective one, and “turns on whether a governmental

official’s conduct was objectively reasonable based on clearly established law.” Zink, 

No. 36994-3-III, slip op. at 29. 

Under the OPMA, “all meetings of the governing body of a public agency shall be 

open and public and all persons shall be permitted to attend any meeting of the governing 
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body of a public agency, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.” RCW 

42.30.030(1). In 2021, this court determined that a core protection of the OPMA “is that 

an individual’s right to attend a public meeting cannot be restricted to fulfilment of a 

‘condition precedent.’” Zink, 17 Wn. App. 2d at 709 (quoting RCW 42.30.040). In 

doing so, this court cited to a 1998 attorney general opinion, which concluded that this 

provision precludes the banning of video or audio recording devices in meetings required 

to be open to the public under the OPMA unless it is necessary to preserve order. Zink, 

17 Wn. App. 2d at 710. 

Zink claims that, in light of the 1998 attorney general opinion, her right to video 

record the city council meeting was clearly established on May 8, 2003, when she was 

arrested for doing so. Although this court is not bound by the opinions of the attorney 

general, they are generally given significant weight. Five Corners Family Farmers v. 

State, 173 Wn.2d 296, 308, 268 P.3d 892 (2011). Since the issuance of the attorney 

general opinion, this court has confirmed, in a prior appeal of Zink’s case, that this 

provision of the OPMA protects, among other things, an individual’s right to video 

record public meetings in a nondisruptive manner because any restrictions on individual’s 

video recording a public meeting would constitute conditions precedent. See Zink, 17 
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Wn. App. 2d 710-11. Arguably, our prior Zink decision clearly established that an 

individual has a right to video record a city council meeting.2

However, the question is not whether the right is clearly established now, but 

whether it was clearly established in 2003. A right is clearly established if it can be 

shown that “‘at the time of the challenged conduct, [t]he contours of [a] right [were] 

sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he [was]

doing violates that right.’” Feis, 165 Wn. App. at 538 (some alterations in original) 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741, 131 

S. Ct. 2074, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011)). Qualified immunity offers protections in cases 

involving “‘a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of 

law and fact.’” Id. at 539 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009)). “Hence, 

qualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent’ and ‘those who knowingly 

violate the law.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 

743).

 

2 We leave for another day whether one decision that does not bind other divisions 

or even our own court can clearly establish a right. State v. Smith, 17 Wn. App. 2d 146, 

152, 484 P.3d 550 (2021) (“We give respectful consideration to the decisions of other 

divisions of the Court of Appeals, but we are not bound by those decisions. And we are 

not even bound by decisions by different panels within our own division.”) (citation 

omitted).
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Although the attorney general opinion Zink relies on would have been given 

significant weight in 2003, it was not binding on this court. As it was not binding, it 

cannot be said that on its own, it clearly established Zink’s right to video record the city 

council meeting. And although this court has held that the OPMA does protect an 

individual’s right to video record a public meeting, this determination was post-2003 and 

actually resulted from the litigation in the present case. Moreover, the right to video 

record is only generally established by RCW 42.30.040’s prohibition on conditions 

precedent. The provision contains no statements regarding any right to record a public 

meeting, and thus the contours of the right to video record were not sufficiently clear that 

every reasonable official would have understood that Mayor Ross’s conduct violated that 

right.

The right to video-record public meetings in 2003 was not a “sufficiently 

particularized statutory or constitutional right” but rather appears to fall into the class of 

“extremely abstract rights.” Id. at 541 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 

639, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987)). Imposing liability, in situations such as 

these, where the contours of a right are unclear, risks resulting in situations where public 

officials do not have “fair warning of when their conduct may give rise to liability.” 

Id.We conclude that the right to video-record public meetings was not clearly established 

in 2003. Thus, the trial court did not error in dismissing Zink’s § 1983 claims against 

Mayor Ross because Mayor Ross is entitled to qualified immunity. 
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We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Zink’s § 1983 claim against Mayor Ross. 

We reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Zink’s Fourteenth Amendment § 1983 claims 

against the city of Mesa and remand for further proceedings.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

2.06.040.

_________________________________

Staab, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________________

Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.

_________________________________

Pennell, J.