UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4098

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JERRY LEE EDWARDS, a/k/a Magic,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., 

District Judge. (3:14-cr-00034-MOC-DSC-1)

Submitted: October 31, 2016 Decided: November 21, 2016

Before MOTZ, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jeffrey W. Gillette, GILLETTE LAW FIRM, PLLC, Franklin, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Jill Westmoreland Rose, United States

Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

A federal grand jury indicted Jerry Lee Edwards for 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012); possession with intent to 

distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a); 

possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012); and 

possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1) (2012). Edwards moved to suppress the evidence 

seized during his arrest and the district court denied the 

motion. Edwards then waived his right to a jury trial, and 

stipulated to facts sufficient to demonstrate his guilt of the 

offenses, to preserve his right to appeal the denial of his 

suppression motion. The district court found Edwards guilty and 

sentenced him to 130 months of imprisonment. Edwards appeals, 

challenging the district court’s order denying his suppression 

motion and his sentence. For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm.

Edwards first argues that the district court erred in 

determining that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop him. 

“We review the factual findings underlying a motion to suppress 

for clear error and the district court's legal determinations de 

novo.” United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 233 (4th Cir. 

2012). When the district court has denied a defendant’s 
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suppression motion, we construe the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the government. Id.

“The Fourth Amendment permits an officer to make an 

investigative detention or stop only if supported by a 

reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is 

engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Foster, 634 

F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The officer must have “at least a minimal level of 

objective justification” and “must be able to articulate more 

than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of 

criminal activity.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 

(2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts assess 

whether an officer has articulated reasonable suspicion for a 

stop under the totality of the circumstances, giving “due weight 

to common sense judgments reached by officers in light of their 

experience and training.” United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 

317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004).

The analysis of reasonable suspicion must take into account 

all the factors known to the officer at the time. See United 

States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 339-40 (4th Cir. 2008). “The 

reasonable suspicion inquiry is fact-intensive, but individual 

facts and observations cannot be evaluated in isolation from 

each other.” United States v. Hernandez-Mendez, 626 F.3d 203,

208 (4th Cir. 2010). Moreover, “factors consistent with 
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innocent travel can, when taken together, give rise to 

reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 

781 (4th Cir. 2004) (emphasis omitted). It is not enough, 

however, for an officer to articulate factors that are not 

probative of behavior in which few innocent people would engage; 

“[t]he articulated factors together must serve to eliminate a 

substantial portion of innocent travelers before the requirement 

of reasonable suspicion will be satisfied.” Foreman, 369 F.3d 

at 781.

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and the relevant 

legal authorities and conclude that the officers here had 

reasonable suspicion for the stop of Edwards in a motel parking 

lot based on the factors identified by the district court. 

These factors include: 1) that the officers stopped Edwards in 

a parking lot of a motel known for drugs and prostitution; 2) 

that this motel was in a generally high-crime area; 3) that 

instead of moving from his parked car to the motel, Edwards 

remained in his car, which did not have any lights on; and 4) 

that the car parked across two spaces in the motel parking lot. 

The fact that parking outside the lines of a parking spot 

violates a city ordinance only bolstered the officers’ 

reasonable suspicion to stop Edwards. Branch, 537 F.3d at 335 

(“Observing a traffic violation provides sufficient 

justification for a police officer to detain the offending 
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vehicle for as long as it takes to perform the traditional 

incidents of a routine traffic stop.”); see also United States 

v. Wilson, 2 F.3d 226, 231 (7th Cir. 1993) (violation of 

ordinance against exiting a moving vehicle justifies

investigatory stop).

The district court concluded that the vehicle was parked 

between two parking spaces and Edwards does not challenge that 

factual finding. Based on the officers’ observations, there was 

reasonable suspicion to investigate, even if the violation of 

the ordinance, for example, was a pretext for the stop. See

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Once officers 

approached the vehicle and witnessed Edwards in possession of 

marijuana, they had probable cause for his arrest. Therefore, 

the district court’s denial of Edwards’ suppression motion does 

not constitute reversible error.

Edwards also challenges the district court’s attribution of 

an extra criminal history point to his North Carolina common law 

robbery convictions, arguing that those convictions were not for 

crimes of violence and that since they were consolidated for 

sentencing, the extra criminal history point was incorrectly 

applied under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.1(e) 

(2015). However, as the Government correctly argues, Edwards 

waived appellate review of this issue. “A waiver is the 

intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” 
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United States v. Robinson, 744 F.3d 293, 298 (4th Cir. 2014) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). A waiver is distinguishable 

from a forfeiture, which involves the failure to timely assert a 

right. Id. Where courts may review a forfeited claim for plain 

error, a claim that has been waived is not reviewable on appeal, 

even for plain error. Id. Here, Edwards filed an objection on 

this basis to the initial presentence report, but explicitly 

stated at the sentencing hearing that he had no outstanding 

objections to the revised PSR and agreed with the Guidelines 

calculations. This waived Edwards’ claim. See id. (“A party 

who identifies an issue, and then explicitly withdraws it, has 

waived the issue.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED