Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A05-1604-CR-931 | November 23, 2016 Page 1 of 14

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jeremy K. Nix

Matheny, Hahn, Denman & Nix, LLP

Huntington, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

James B. Martin

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Christopher Riddle,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

November 23, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

90A05-1604-CR-931

Appeal from the Wells Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Kenton W. 

Kiracofe, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

90C01-1409-F3-3

Brown, Judge.
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[1] Christopher Riddle appeals his sentence for attempted robbery as a level 5 

felony. Riddle raises two issues which we revise and restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him; and

II. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and the character of the offender.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 30, 2014, Connie Blair gave Riddle a ride from the Signature 

Nursing Home to the Pak-A-Sak gas station in Wells County, Indiana. When 

they arrived at the gas station, Riddle attempted to rob Blair by pointing an 

object at her head that was underneath a piece of clothing which he represented 

was a handgun.

[3] On September 15, 2014, the State charged Riddle with Count I, attempted 

robbery as a level 3 felony. Prior to that date, Riddle had surrendered himself 

to Wells County authorities on an outstanding warrant from Pennsylvania. On 

January 25, 2016, Riddle submitted to a polygraph examination, and it was 

determined based thereon that Riddle was not in possession of a handgun 

during the attempted robbery. On January 27, 2016, the State filed Count II, 

attempted robbery as a level 5 felony robbery.

[4] On February 10, 2016, Riddle filed a motion to enter a plea of guilty to Count 

II, attempted robbery as a level 5 felony. The motion also stated that 

“[s]entencing shall be left to the discretion of the Court with both sides free to 
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argue.” Appellant’s Appendix at 167. That same day, the court accepted 

Riddle’s plea of guilty and took the matter under advisement.

[5] On April 13, 2016, the court conducted a sentencing hearing at which Riddle 

directed the court’s attention to a letter referenced in the presentence 

investigation report (“PSI”) regarding a recovery program called Reformers 

Unanimous.1 The State requested a fully executed sentence of six years, 

arguing that Riddle’s criminal history demonstrates a pattern of escalation from 

property crimes to crimes against persons, that he has had rehabilitation 

opportunities in the past that were unsuccessful, that he was a high risk to 

reoffend, and that the nature and circumstances of the crime were an aggravator 

because Blair believed Riddle pointed a gun at her head and threatened her life. 

The court sentenced Riddle to six years executed to be served consecutive to his 

sentences stemming from crimes committed in Pennsylvania. In sentencing 

Riddle, the court stated:

COURT: The Court has reviewed the Presentence Investigation 

Report, has reviewed the probable cause affidavit in this matter 

as well and presided over the [Riddle’s] guilty plea hearing. The 

Court notes the [PSI] outlines two statutory aggravating factors, 

namely: [Riddle’s] criminal history, also that he was on 

probation while this offense was committed. The Court finds 

those to be valid aggravating factors. The Court does not find 

any statutory mitigating factors. Non-statutory mitigating factors 

the Court will note the [Riddle] has pled guilty to this matter. 

The Court will also recognize the fact the [Riddle] has filed with 

 

1 We note that this letter is not contained in the record on appeal.
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the Court or had caused to be filed with the Court through the 

[PSI] a statement to the victim and apologized to her which I 

give you some credit for as a mitigating factor.

This was charged as a level 3 felony, which is armed robbery, 

and has been amended to reflect the fact as discussed here today 

there was no actual gun. That said, I’m looking at a sentence as 

a criteria for sentencing as an aggravating factor that the harm 

under (a)1, 7.1(a)(1), the harm to the victim was significant. 

Mrs. Blair thought you had a gun, sir. You gave her every 

indication that you had a gun. Whether or not there was an 

actual gun involved or not, you put her in fear for her life that 

you had a gun. You pointed something at her head and told her 

it was a gun. There was a struggle for it. You hit her and you 

preyed...

MR. RIDDLE: I did not hit her, Your Honor.

COURT: I’m going by her probable cause affidavit statement and 

that’s what the evidence would show under the probable cause 

statement. You know, you preyed on her kindness and you ask 

me to show you mercy. She showed you kindness and mercy 

that day giving you a ride and you preyed upon that. Showing 

not a decrease in your criminal activity but actually an 

acceleration, increase in intensity, and now a situation where you 

have threatened someone with their life. Probation has not been 

successful in the past and I have no indication it will be 

successful this time. The starting point in these types of cases is 

starting with the advisory sentence with a level 5 felony, which is 

3 years. I see no reason to deviate from the advisory sentence. I 

think the circumstances and the aggravating factor here justify 

and warrant an increase above the advisory sentence and so I 

think the 6 year sentence requested by the State is appropriate.

You placed someone in fear for their life, Mr. Riddle. I know 

you may be sorry for that now, you have some programs that you 

are trying to go through, the RU Program and I commend you 
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for that but you caused a tremendous amount of trauma to this 

woman. You know, anytime you have a crime in which the 

other person would be justified in using deadly force to stop your 

actions I think warrants a severe penalty and I see no reason to 

deviate from that here. I think you frankly [have] gotten a huge 

break in having it reduced down to a level 5 felony because of the 

fear and the impression you gave to this woman that you had a 

gun and because of that I am going to sentence you to 6 years, no 

part suspended, to the Indiana Department of Corrections. . . .

Transcript at 35-36.

Discussion

I.

[6] The first issue is whether the court abused its discretion in sentencing Riddle. 

We review the sentence for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 

N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). An 

abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect 

of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and 

actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. A trial court abuses its 

discretion if it: (1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a 

sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including 

a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not 

support the reasons;” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that 

are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4) 

considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.” Id. at 490-491. If the 

trial court has abused its discretion, we will remand for resentencing “if we 
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cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same 

sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.” 

Id. at 491. The relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found, or 

those which should have been found, is not subject to review for abuse of 

discretion. Id.

[7] Riddle argues that the court: (A) found an improper aggravating circumstance; 

and (B) failed to find a proper mitigating circumstance. We address each of 

Riddle’s arguments separately.

A. Aggravating Circumstance

[8] Riddle challenges the aggravator identified by the court that the harm to Blair 

was significant. He argues that in order to convict Riddle of robbery as a level 5 

felony the State needed to prove in relevant part that Riddle threatened the use 

of force or put Blair in fear, and, accordingly the harm inflicted was an element 

of the offense. Riddle asserts that where a court’s reason for imposing a 

sentence above the advisory sentence includes material elements of the offense, 

the “reason is ‘improper as a matter of law,’ absent unique circumstances.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 9.

[9] The State argues that this Court has held that, while a material element of a 

crime cannot be an aggravating circumstance, the nature and circumstances of 

the crime can be an aggravator, and in this case the court “correctly found the 

facts of this crime aggravating as they go well beyond the necessary showing 

that [Riddle] attempted to take property from Connie Blair through the threat of 
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force.” Appellee’s Brief at 12. It asserts that Riddle purported to place a gun 

against Blair’s head and threatened to shoot her, which was “more than mere 

threat of force and more than merely placed the victim in fear. It was the 

imminent threat to end her life . . . .” Id. at 13. 

[10] This Court has previously held that “[a]lthough a trial court may not use a 

material element of the offense as an aggravating circumstance, it may find the 

nature and circumstances of the offense to be an aggravating circumstance.” 

Caraway v. State, 959 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Plummer v. 

State, 851 N.E.2d 387, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)), trans. denied; see also Ind. Code 

§ 35-38-1-7.1(a)(1). When a sentence is enhanced based upon the nature and 

circumstances of the crime, however, “the trial court must detail why the 

defendant deserves an enhanced sentence under the particular circumstances.” 

Caraway, 959 N.E.2d at 850; see also Pedraza v. State, 887 N.E.2d 77, 80 n.2 (Ind.

2008) (noting that “a maximum burglary sentence based solely on the opening 

of an unlocked screen door would be much less appropriate than one 

committed by obliterating a locked wooden door with a battering ram”); Filice v.

State, 886 N.E.2d 24, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he nature and circumstances 

of a crime can be a valid aggravating factor.”) (citing McCann v. State, 749 

N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ind. 2001)), trans. denied.

[11] The court, in finding the nature and circumstances of the crime as an 

aggravator, stated:

I’m looking at a sentence as a criteria for sentencing as an 

aggravating factor that the harm under (a)1, 7.1(a)(1), the harm 
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to the victim was significant. Mrs. Blair thought you had a gun, 

sir. You gave her every indication that you had a gun. Whether 

or not there was an actual gun involved or not, you put her in 

fear for her life that you had a gun. You pointed something at 

her head and told her it was a gun. There was a struggle for it. 

You hit her and you preyed...

Transcript at 35-36.

[12] We find that this aggravator was based upon the fact that, rather than merely 

threatening Blair with force, Riddle threatened deadly force using what he 

represented to be a handgun. As a result, Blair was placed in fear that her life 

would end. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by 

considering the nature and circumstances of the offense as an aggravator. 

Further, we observe that “a single aggravating circumstance may be sufficient 

to support the imposition of an enhanced sentence.” Deane v. State, 759 N.E.2d 

201, 205 (Ind. 2001). As previously noted, the court identified other 

aggravating circumstances which were not challenged by Riddle, including his 

criminal history and that he was on probation while this offense was 

committed. See Shafer v. State, 856 N.E.2d 752, 758 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) 

(affirming the defendant’s sentence and holding that even if the court erred in 

finding one aggravator, the court found other aggravators which the defendant 

did not challenge), trans. denied.

B. Mitigating Circumstance

[13] The determination of mitigating circumstances is within the discretion of the 

trial court. Rogers v. State, 878 N.E.2d 269, 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. 
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denied. The trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant’s argument as to 

what constitutes a mitigating factor, and a trial court is not required to give the 

same weight to proffered mitigating factors as does a defendant. Id. An 

allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor 

requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both 

significant and clearly supported by the record. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493.

If the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has 

been argued by counsel, the trial court is not obligated to explain why it has 

found that the factor does not exist. Id.

[14] Riddle argues that the court abused its discretion when it failed to find his 

participation in programs, including Reformers Unanimous in Bluffton and 

Prime for Life, violence prevention, victim awareness, and money management 

while in Pennsylvania, as a valid mitigator. He maintains that “[n]ot only did 

the trial court recognize his participation, but the trial court commended Riddle 

for his participation. However, the trial court failed to find the participation as 

a mitigating circumstance.” Appellant’s Brief at 10.

[15] The State argues that the court did not overlook Riddle’s representations about 

programs he had participated in—it simply did not find them to be mitigating. 

It also notes that Riddle “presented no evidence regarding the programs, their 

duration, their purpose or effects on his behavior, attitude or character.” 

Appellee’s Brief at 15.
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[16] Initially, we observe that Riddle did not specifically identify his participation in 

the programs as a mitigating circumstance. At sentencing, Riddle’s counsel 

identified Riddle’s “open plea” and his “acceptance of responsibility” in 

mitigation. Transcript at 34. These proposed mitigators were both accepted by 

the court as valid mitigators. “If the defendant does not advance a factor to be 

mitigating at sentencing, this Court will presume that the factor is not 

significant and the defendant is precluded from advancing it as a mitigating 

circumstance for the first time on appeal.” Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 651 

(Ind. 2008) (quoting Spears v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (Ind. 2000), reh’g 

denied). 

[17] To the extent that Riddle raised his participation in the programs, the record 

reveals that the court identified that Riddle pled guilty and that he apologized to 

Blair as valid mitigators and recognized that he had participated in certain 

programs while incarcerated and it “commend[ed]” Riddle for his participation. 

Transcript at 36. While Riddle mentions that he has graduated from programs 

including violence prevention, victim awareness, and Prime for Life, and that 

he was currently involved with Reformers Unanimous, in his Defendant 

Version of the Present Offense in the PSI, Riddle has not presented evidence 

regarding the nature of these programs, his involvement, or whether he 

completed any of them. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that Riddle 

has presented a significant mitigating circumstance or that the trial court abused 

its discretion with respect to Riddle’s proposed mitigator.
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[18] Moreover, even if we believed that the court’s failure to identify Riddle’s 

participation in these programs as a mitigator was an irregularity constituting 

an abuse of discretion, “we have the option to remand to the trial court for 

clarification or new sentencing determination, to affirm the sentence if the error 

is harmless, or to reweigh the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances 

independently at the appellate level.” McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 112 

(Ind. 2016) (quoting Cotto v. State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 525 (Ind. 2005)). Even if 

Riddle’s enrollment in various programs had been considered, we are 

persuaded that his criminal history, his status as a probationer, and the nature 

and the circumstances of his offense would likely have outweighed this 

mitigating factor. As such, we determine that any error was harmless. See id.

(holding that “even if McElfresh’s enrollment in various programs had been 

considered, we are persuaded that his criminal history, which demonstrated a 

pattern of offenses towards children, would likely have outweighed this 

mitigating factor”).

II.

[19] The next issue is whether Riddle’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and his character. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that 

we “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of 

the trial court’s decision, [we find] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of 

the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Under this rule, the 

burden is on the defendant to persuade the appellate court that his or her 

sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). 
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Relief is available if, after due consideration of the trial court’s sentencing 

decision, this court finds that in our independent judgment, the sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender. See Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1225 (Ind. 2015). “[S]entencing is 

principally a discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment should 

receive considerable deference.” Id. (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 

1222 (Ind. 2008)). “[A]ppellate review should focus on the forest—the 

aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number 

of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Cardwell, 895 

N.E.2d at 1225. “[W]hether we regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of 

the day turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the 

crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light 

in a given case.” Hines, 30 N.E.3d at 1225 (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 

1224).

[20] Riddle argues with regard to the nature of the offense that Blair “never saw a 

weapon, as it was purportedly underneath a piece of clothing” and that she “did 

not suffer any monetary loss, as Riddle was not successful in taking any 

property from her.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. Regarding his character, Riddle 

asserts that he took advantage of programming made available to him while 

serving a sentence in Pennsylvania and in Wells County while his case was 

pending. He also argues that he was twenty-four years old at the time of the 

offense, was adopted as a baby, and has a four-year-old son of his own. He 

argues that he received a maximum, fully-executed six-year sentence, that such 
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sentences should be reserved for the worst offenders, and that he is not among 

the worst offenders. He also notes that he accepted responsibility for his 

actions.

[21] The State asserts the nature of Riddle’s offense was egregious, in which he 

threatened Blair’s execution by a gunshot to her head. Regarding Riddle’s 

character, it notes that he has a criminal history which escalated and became 

more dangerous from property crimes to crimes against persons. It further 

notes that, despite the fact Riddle purported to apologize to Blair, he 

complained to the court in a letter regarding the State’s plea agreement offers, 

and he asserted that Blair had “accus[ed him] of having a gun and [he] never 

did,” which does not “acknowledge that he put an object to her head that had 

physical similarities to a handgun and threatened to shoot her in the head.” 

Appellee’s Brief at 19. The State argues that he also deflects responsibility by 

blaming drug use.

[22] Our review of the nature of the offense reveals that Blair gave Riddle a ride 

from the Signature Nursing Home to the Pak-A-Sak gas station, and when they 

arrived at the gas station, Riddle attempted to rob Blair by pointing an object at 

her head that was underneath a piece of clothing which he represented was a 

handgun. With respect to Riddle’s character, we note that he expressed 

remorse for his actions and pled guilty to attempted robbery as a level 5 felony 

after initially being charged with attempted robbery as a level 3 felony. Riddle 

has a lengthy criminal history. In 2009, Riddle pled guilty in Pennsylvania 

under four separate cause numbers to three counts of burglary felonies and a 
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count of theft by deception as a misdemeanor. He was released to parole in 

September 2010 on these convictions. On December 4, 2012, a probation 

violation report was filed and Riddle was continued to probation for two years. 

On August 20, 2014, a probation violation report was filed, Riddle admitted the 

allegations of continuing to use drugs, and he was ordered to serve the balance 

of his sentences. We also note that the Indiana Risk Assessment System found 

that Riddle is a high risk to reoffend.

[23] After due consideration, we conclude that Riddle has not met his burden of 

establishing that his six-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offense and his character.

Conclusion

[24] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Riddle’s sentence for attempted robbery as 

a level 5 felony.

[25] Affirmed.

Robb, J., and Mathias, J., concur.