'

1 

i • REF ID:A6942. 

:Etcerj>ts from Investigation of Communist Propaganda, Report No. 2290, ' 17 Januar-.r 1931, 7lst Congress, 5d Session, House of Representativea 

pp. 54-35 

Military intelligence.--The Military Intelligence Section, G2, of the 

War Department, has considerable knowledge of the propaganda and activities 

of the communists in the various units of the Military Establishments and 

of the so-called auxiliary units, but claim they have no power to combat 

the destructive influences of communism beyond assuming a defensive positilJJl:l 

and protecting themselves the best they can. 

The G2 of the Army looks upon communism in the United states as a political issue, and, therefore, mostly outside of the realm of' their duties 

and responsibilities. In reality, communism is a mortal enemy within our 

country, aiming to destroy our republican form of government, guaranteed 

by the Constitution, to cause civil war and bring about revolution in the 

United States. 

The attitude of the War Department up to now has been that communism, 

being a political question, it was not the function of the Army ~o maintain detailed knowledge of the activities of the communists and therefore 

relied on the Department of Justice to furnish the necessary information. 

The fact is that the Department of Justice has had no power or authority 

from Congress to obtain the facts regarding communist propaganda and 

activities since 1925, and of necessity the War Department has been ever 

since hopelessly in the dark regarding these revolutionary activities 

directed against our domestic institutions by the enemies within our 

gates. ' 

IJ!! !!!:!Z.-The United states Navy has been largely free from communist 

propaganda, but has not hesitated. to take every precaution to obtain the 

most complete and up-to-date information concerning the activities of the 

communists in the United states. Lieut. Commander H. R. Hein, of the 

Office of Naval Intelligence, attended every hearing of our committee held 

in Washington and submitted, as a witness, a most helpful and detailed 

report or the communist organizations throughout the United States, with 

accurate information as to leadership and activities. 

The Navy Department realizes the vital importance of preventing the 

formation of communist nuclei on board the ships of the Navy as well as 

among the navy yard civilian employees. One man, if he possesaes even a 

small amount of technical knowledge, could destroy, at l.east temporarily, 

the combat efficiency of any naval. ship. 

The distribution of communist literature among the sailors on shore 

leave has invariabl.y resuJ.ted in the agitators being manhandled by the 

sailors and coming off second best in the m~l~es that have ensued. 

Naval. Intelligence Section.--In spite or the fact that recent history 

teaches us "that revolutionary propganda takes hold more quickly among naval 

forces than in the military, it appears that the United states Navy is 

comparatively free from any indicat.ions of communism and that the Navy 

Department, through its Intelligence Section, is in constant touch with the 

situation and is not relying on any other department of the Government 

for their information. 

pproved for Release by NSA on 01-02-2014 pursuant to E. 0. 

13526 
~ and SignaJ. Section.--The ·Code 'and SignaJ. Section of the Navy 

Department has been attemptins for the past .five months to decode 51 000 

cablegrams between Amtorg Trading Cor_P9ration and Moscow, without success. 

These cables were subi:,oenaed by the committee. 

The NaV-J" Department code experts are considered among the best in the 

country, but claim that the cipher used by the Amtorg is the most complicated and possesses the greatest secrecy within their knowledge. 

There are only two code experts in the Code and Signal Section of the 

Navy Department, which is a very important branch of the service, in 

view o.f the tremendous advance made in naval communication and the value 

of rapid decoding of radio and other secret messages. 

P• 48 

The best inside view or .Amtorg is given by Basil W. Delgass, who was 

three and a half years vice president of .Amtorg. He was born in Russia, 

was never a communist, and he came to this country in 1926. Mr. Delgass 

resigned as vice president of Amtorg July 25, 1930. He resigned of his 

own accord; although a month before he was advised to return to Russia. 

He is no" under a death sentence in Russia, sentenced to be shot,. and all 

of his property forfeited, he says, because he resigned from Amtorg and 

refused to return to Russia. With respect to the meeting of Amtorg 

officials, looking to the investigation by the Fish committee, Mr. Delgass says that statements were prepared which different officials should 

swear to, and, using Mr. Delgass's 'bwn J.anguage, "I did not want to 

participate in perjury, as was done by Mr. 13ogdanov and the others. 

ill. officials mentioned in the Whalen documents were in this meeting." 

p. 55 

There is probably no way of checking up definitely on the O.G.P.U. 

agents in the United States without conducting a raid, or by deciphering 

the cab1egrams sent to and from the Am.torg and Moscow. 

p. 54 

The organization of the O.G.P.U. is enormous and takes up half 6& a 

mile of buildings, including two big prisons, in the heart of the city of 

Moscow. It is stated on good authority that together with the shock 

troops that there are 50,000 active members or the secret police force in 

Moscow. 

According to G. Agabekoff, a form.er official of the O.G.P.U., trds 

secret police service is one of the most important departments in the 

entire soviet system of government, and divided into the following de~ 

partments: 

Intelligence~ service (K. R. O.). 

Foreign department (I. N. O.). 

Secret department (S. O.) 

Special department (O. O.). 

Extra special department (S. P. E. K. O.). 

Department of economics (E. K. U.). 

Information (Info.). 

Oriental department (V. O.). 
• .e 

Frontier service (P. o.). 

Executive and organization department. 

For example, according to Agabekoff, the function of the extra special 

department is the' intercepting of foreign codes,. and the reading of' code 

telegrams f'rom abroad. It. also composes codes for the soviet departments 

within the country and abroad. This department carries on the work of 

reading codes &~ splendidly and compiles weekly a list of foreign code 

telegrams it has read,. for the information of the heads of the o. G. P. U. 

departments, as well as for members of the central committee. The foreign 

department deals with the secret service work in foreign countries. It 

has its representatives in every soviet embassy, legation, important 

consulate, and trading agencies outsiae of Russia.