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REF ID:A42968 

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SU!DO'? 1 Intellipaoe hac;t1one and 1teapoaa1b111t1•• · 

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C9 ARJIDI z • x. •114 111>. w. . co coa&B OD at.an oou.aa 

Chief• ot Adm.1n1••l"&t1v• aa4 Teobnioal lervicea 

1. B•aulting troa ov exper1eao•• 1a tvo vai-a a.ad· N• 

our paiatul aurpriae at Peai-1 Barbor, 1• •• be•n.·•o.,,ledge4 

on th• J:aS.gb.eat levels tb&\ Iatellii••o• ~•rvic•• o~ ~· 

Qovermaeat 11\&St be rebab111~t•4 aad ~t to ld.gh ett1-

oieno7. luch.aakaoYled.gmeat b&• prev10lla1J ~n-•o1ce4 on 

•lae general pr1ac1ple tbat &a our peait1•e,J)Ower to provide na.tional aecur1t1. 1.e., ll111t.ar1 atr~.- 1• cleor•ae4, 

\he ett1c1•••7 ot our Iat•lltfence ••1"'Ytc•1 .... t be corr••- ~UJ'aclJ 1acreaae4 1a orO..r o tuur• •utti•J.ent &4Y&ao• 

v&Paila& ot boat11• lat••' aa4 capabil1t1ea to allov aob1111&• 

t1oa ol our national reaourc••~ 

2. Preoccupat1oa v1\ll pi-Obl••• ot 4-ob111a&ti• and 

r....,Uaatioa ba• &bMl't. .. p•tl7 tb• till• aa4 tho'Glbt ot 

•• higher c0-a4en and pPS.acipal at&tt ott1c•r•·· 4ur'1Jag · "cent -••. · l\ 11 4ea1M4 aov te aav th• at\e\ion or 

the•• ott1c•:tt• to th• iapoi-t&nce ot placin& Iat91lig•ne• • 

\be pr1or1t7 l•v•l wb1oh·1a Nt111M4 .J.a ui1o:Ml ta••"•'•· 

;. bogre•• 1a th• 111pl'o•-•' et tbe •1't1o1enc7 •t the Iat•~•no• aervic•a ba1 b••n atta1a..S 11ao• tb9 poatvar 

nor aa'l•• ot Ul• War Deprta•at t~oll&h the appl1cat1oa of 'Y&r1oua reoOmD.ead&tiona ot Board• ot otf10••• ;&nd 1J1veat1-

pi1ag o:omitte••· !Mn an, bo••Y•r, o•am tudwa'tal 

dUt1cv.lt1•• trbicb tead 'o retard t\tll recso-1--1• ot tbe 

111po•\ance et Jate111,.ao• 1a. our national a.r .... at111oture. !'b••• aret . ' 
• 

REF ID:A42968 

a. A lack or tull understanding and appreciation on 

&11 levels, from the War Department to the lovest troop echelon, of th• scope and vital importance of Intelligence 

to national aecurity. 

b. Assignment of inexperienced peraonnel to Intelli~ 

gence duties; lack ot atreaa of Intelligence training in all 

echelons; frequent !turnover or trained per•onnel on intelligence duties,. thus ••cr1tic1ng benefits ot experience and 

cont1nu1t7; and inadequate incentive to attract and continue 

on Intelligence duty the highest type or m111tar~ personnel. 

c. Curtailment or Intelligence personnel available 

tor collection, evaluation, and diaaemination ot Intelligence. 

4. A long-term plan has recently been approved which, it 

applied progressively b7 commanders and staffs of all echelons, 

should reault in the elevation of the Intelligence Service to 

the level or pr1or1ty 1t demands in our scheme of national 

preparedneaa. Th1s plan 1•: · 

a. Continuing reviev ot the curricula and field 

inspection or instruction in.all Arm7 service schools by 

appropriate commanders and b7 the Director of Organization and Training and the D1rect6r of Intelligence 1n cooperation, 

to insure that the co'11'••• in Intelligence training emphasize the importance or Intelligence and are adequate and consistent 

vith the mission or the achool1. 

b. Continuing review ot programs and field inspection of training by appropriate commanders and by the Director or 

Organization and Training and the Director or Intelligence in 

cooperation, to insure that Intelligenae training in the service is adequate and appropriate to the m1sa1on or the 

units concerned. 

c. ln1t1atlon and monitoring by the Director or 

Intelligence, WDGSf of continuing review by the Joint Intelligence Committee v1th Joint Chiera ot Starr approval) ot 

1n1truction in the schools under control or the Joint Chiera 

ot Starr to insure that Intelligence is adequately stressed, 

and tbat the Intelligence courses are adequate and consistent 

with the mission or the schools. 

d. Continuing empbae!a b7 the Secretary ot War and 

the Chiet of Staff in testimon7 before the Congress and in 

conterencea with military commanders ot the vital importance of Intelligence in our national prepa.redneaa. 

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REF ID:A42968 

e. Batabl1sh the pr1ne1ple at the earliest practicable date tbat a requirement tor asaignment to Intelligence position• vill be the prior completion ot a aerv1ce school Intelligence 

courae, or equivalent var experience, appropriate to the po11~ 

tion; the detailed plan to be originated bf the Director ot 

Intelligence along the·tolloving general 11nea: 

Unit poait1ons below division 

and numbered Air Force level: 

Pos1t1ona including and above 

the division and numbered Air 

Poree.level, excepting the War 

Department General Starr and 

Military Attaches: 

Senior positions above division and numbered Air Poree 

levels and including Var 

Department and M111tar~ 

Attaches: 

Special Service Schools 

General Service School 

Strategic Intelligence School 

r. Continued monitoring or assignment or officers to 

Intelltgence positions by appropriate commanders and by the 

D1rector 6 Personnel and Administration, and the Director ot 

Intelligence to obtain greater stability or Intelligence organization and increased length or duty tour. 

g. Continued review by the Director of Organization and Training and the Director of Intelligence of tables or 

organization and allotments to insure tbat Intelligence po•1- t1ons are accorded a&p1.e prestige of rank aa are operat1ona 6 

var planning and supply positions. 

h. Continuing review by appropriate commanders and 

b7 the Director ot Organization anu Training and the Director 

of Intelligence to avoid assignment to Intelligence officers 

Of duties Vhich prevent proper performance or their intelligence tunct1one. 

1. Continued carerul selection by appropriate commanders and by the Director, Personnel and Adlll1n1atrat1on, 

on advice ot the Director ot Intelligence, or otticera to till 

top level intelligence positions including military attaches. 

j. Continued decantra11zat1on or selected runetions 

by appropriate commanders and by the Director of Intelligence V1tb1n the A'I'my structure where ett1c1ency Will not be 

aacr!ficed.· 

·cnDv . ~ "", . :" r.' ~J ~ .... 1 "':... .~ ~I 
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REF ID:A42968 

.. 

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k. Continued •ttorta b7 th• Director or Intelligence through the lational Intelligence Agenc7 to pa.11 tunctiona 

not or primary interest to the War Department either laterall7 

to other departments of the Government or to the Central 

Intelligence Group where ett1c1enc7 will be gained. 

l. Allocate personnel to Intelligence, recognizing the principle that a1 OUl' positive power tor aecuritr decline• 

OUl' reliance on Intelligenoe to determine the etrength and 

direction or thl'eats to our ••curity 1noreaaea. 

5. It 1• requested that each addressee impress all 

appropriate elements within his sphere of reapons1b111tJ vith 

the importance or an etticient Intelligence aerv1ce within 

the Army, and by appropriate 1natruct1ona and continued field 

1napect1on r94u1re execution or the general plan cited herein. 

BY DIRECTION OF THI CHIEF OF STAPF 

/s/ M. I. Hodes 

Brigadier General, GSC 

Aaat. Deputy Chier of Starr 

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