NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

LARRY STEWART JONES, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

CAROLINE JONES, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0803 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FN2012-001293

The Honorable Katherine M. Cooper, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Jennings, Haug & Cunningham, L.L.P., Phoenix

By Julianne C. Wheeler

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Caroline Jones, Laveen

Respondent/Appellant
JONES v. JONES

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Rick A. Williams1 joined.

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Caroline Jones (“Wife”) appeals from a judgment of the 

superior court amending the consent decree that dissolved her marriage to 

Larry Stewart Jones (“Husband”). Because the superior court lacked 

jurisdiction to amend the decree, we vacate the judgment and remand for 

further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2012, Husband and Wife divorced pursuant to a consent 

decree. The decree awarded Wife a home located at 5221 W. Pedro Lane in 

Laveen, but did not allocate responsibility for the debt secured by the home. 

Six months later, Husband petitioned the superior court for an order 

removing his name from the mortgage. The court held a hearing during 

which the parties entered an agreement pursuant to Arizona Rule of Family 

Law Procedure (“Rule”) 69, providing that (1) Husband would quitclaim 

the home to Wife, (2) Wife would refinance the home in her sole name, and 

(3) if Wife failed to refinance the home by the established deadline, the 

home would be sold. Wife failed to meet the deadline for refinancing the 

home.

¶3 In light of Wife’s failure, Husband moved the court to order 

the home’s sale. The court granted Husband’s motion and appointed a real 

estate commissioner to list the home. The court ordered the parties to 

cooperate with the commissioner.

¶4 Less than two months later, Husband filed a motion for 

sanctions claiming that Wife “continues to stall the listing” and a motion 

for approval of a counteroffer on the home. At a hearing on the motions, 

 

1 The Honorable Rick A. Williams, Judge of the Arizona Superior 

Court, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant to Article 6, Section 

3, of the Arizona Constitution.
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the superior court found Wife in contempt of court for failure to comply 

with its prior orders and directed her to “make the [home] available to show 

promptly” upon the commissioner’s request and to vacate the home on or 

before November 8, 2015. The court ordered the real estate commissioner 

to counter the two pending offers. The court further advised that if Wife 

failed to comply with its order, Husband should file an affidavit of

noncompliance.

¶5 One week later, Husband filed an affidavit of noncompliance

alleging that Wife refused to permit the commissioner to show the home

and refused to sign the acceptance of counteroffer. In response, the court

held a hearing and again found Wife in contempt. The Court thereafter 

issued a signed minute entry on November 5, 2015 (the “November 5th 

Minute Entry”) ordering that “[t]he Consent Decree shall be amended to 

award the [home] at issue to Husband” and “[a]ll proceeds from the sale of 

the house . . . shall be applied 1) first to any pending community debts, 2) 

then to Husband’s attorney’s fees and costs relating to these proceedings, 

and 3) the remainder divided equally between the parties.” That same day, 

the court entered a Judgment Amending Consent Decree (the “Judgment”).

¶6 Wife timely appealed,

2 and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(2).

3

ANALYSIS

¶7 On appeal, Wife argues the Judgment “has the effect of 

drastically re-writing the divorce decree in areas that have not been brought 

before the court.” In his answering brief, Husband asks this court to vacate 

the Judgment and remand to superior court “for further proceedings 

consistent with the contempt orders entered by the trial court.”

¶8 We first address the issue of our jurisdiction, previously 

raised by Husband in a motion to dismiss, which Department M of this 

court denied. As a general rule, civil contempt orders are not appealable. 

See Berry v. Superior Court In & For County of Maricopa, 163 Ariz. 507, 508, 

 

2 Wife moved to stay the order, and upon the filing of adequate 

security, the court approved Wife remaining in the home pending the 

resolution of this appeal.

3 We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred.
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788 P.2d 1258, 1259 (App. 1989). If a judgment goes beyond a finding of 

contempt, however, and qualifies as an appealable order under A.R.S. § 12-

2101, then this court has jurisdiction. See Green v. Lisa Frank, Inc., 221 Ariz. 

138, 145 n.3, 148, ¶¶ 13, 21, 211 P.3d 16, 23 n.3, 26 (App. 2009). In this case, 

the Judgment is appealable under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2). Therefore, we 

have jurisdiction. As previously noted by Department M, we do not, 

however, have jurisdiction over the superior court’s contempt order

entered October 23, 2015. Thus, we limit our review to the Judgment 

awarding the home to Husband and that portion of the November 5th

Minute Entry directing distribution of the sale proceeds.

¶9 We next address whether the superior court had jurisdiction 

to amend the decree. See Danielson v. Evans, 201 Ariz. 401, 411, ¶ 36, 36 P.3d 

749, 759 (App. 2001) (explaining that appellate courts independently review 

the superior court’s jurisdiction as a matter of law). We review the superior 

court’s jurisdiction de novo. In re Marriage of Dorman, 198 Ariz. 298, 301, ¶ 6, 

9 P.3d 329, 332 (App. 2000).

¶10 Our supreme court has acknowledged the well-established 

rule “that property settlements are not subject to modification or 

termination” because “[t]he need for finality and stability in marriage and 

family law is great.” De Gryse v. De Gryse, 135 Ariz. 335, 338, 661 P.2d 185, 

188 (1983). Entry of a decree precludes “modification of the terms of the 

decree and the property settlement agreement, if any, set forth or 

incorporated by reference.” A.R.S. § 25-317(F). Likewise, property 

disposition provisions cannot be revoked or modified “unless the court 

finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment 

under the laws of this state.” A.R.S. § 25-327(A); see Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 

85(C) (listing grounds for reopening a decree).4 “[T]he inherent power of 

 

4 Rule 85(C) provides:

On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may 

relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final 

judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons:

a. mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

b. newly discovered evidence, which by due diligence could 

not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 

under Rule 83(D);
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the court to vacate or modify its judgment does not extend beyond the point 

at which the judgment becomes final, except as authorized by law.” See 

Preston v. Denkins, 94 Ariz. 214, 219, 382 P.2d 686, 689 (1963) (noting that the 

power of a court to vacate or modify a judgment is governed by the Rules 

of Civil Procedure).

¶11 Here, the consent decree awarded Wife the home as her sole 

and separate property. The parties later entered a Rule 69 agreement 

agreeing that (1) Husband would quitclaim the home to Wife, (2) Wife 

would refinance the home in her sole name, and (3) if Wife failed to 

refinance the home by the established deadline, the home would be sold.

¶12 The superior court has jurisdiction to enforce the decree and 

the Rule 69 agreement.5 See A.R.S. § 25-317(E) (establishing that a court can 

enforce the terms of a decree “by all remedies available for enforcement of 

a judgment, including contempt”). In the absence of an affirmative request 

to set aside the decree and/or the agreement and circumstances justifying 

relief under Rule 85(C), however, the court lacks jurisdiction to amend the 

property disposition provisions of the decree. See LaPrade v. LaPrade, 189 

 

c. fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse 

party;

d. the judgment is void;

e. the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or 

a prior judgment on which it is based has been reversed or 

otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 

judgment should have prospective application; or

f. any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 

judgment.

Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 85(C).

5 Rule 69 provides that:

An Agreement between the parties shall be valid and binding 

if . . . the terms of the agreement are set forth on the record 

before a judge, commissioner, judge pro tempore, court 

reporter, or other person authorized by local rule or 

Administrative Order to accept such agreements.

Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 69(A).
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Ariz. 243, 246, 941 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1997) (“[T]he trial court does not have 

jurisdiction to modify property settlement provisions unless circumstances 

exist which justify reopening the judgment.”).

¶13 Here, the court was understandably frustrated with Wife’s 

intransigence and apparent willful refusal to timely obey the court’s orders 

in furtherance of the legitimate exercise of its civil contempt power. 

Undoubtedly, the court was also influenced by likely time-sensitive 

negotiations which were stalled or otherwise frustrated by Wife’s failure to 

comply. However, neither party had moved for relief under Rule 85(C) and

neither party alleged, much less established, grounds for relief under this 

rule. And by ordering that (1) the proceeds from an anticipated sale of 

Wife’s home be used to satisfy pending community debts and (2) excess 

proceeds be divided equally between Wife and Husband, the court 

improperly modified the property disposition provisions of the decree. 

Because the superior court lacked jurisdiction to sua sponte modify the

property disposition provisions, the Judgment is void and must be vacated. 

See Solomon v. Findley, 165 Ariz. 45, 46, 796 P.2d 477, 478 (App. 1990), 

approved, 167 Ariz. 409, 808 P.2d 294 (1991) (“[A]ny action taken by a court 

which does not have jurisdiction is void and a nullity.”).

CONCLUSION

¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the Judgment amending 

the decree. We likewise vacate that portion of the November 5th Minute 

Entry ordering distribution of proceeds from the sale of the home, which 

was a de facto modification of the decree’s property disposition.

6 We 

remand the matter to the superior court for further enforcement 

proceedings consistent with this decision. We award Wife her costs on 

 

6 Specifically, we vacate the following part of the November 5th 

Minute Entry:

All proceeds from the sale of the house shall be held in a 

secure account pending either a) the parties’ agreement as to 

disbursement, or b) a court order. The proceeds shall be 

applied 1) first to any pending community debts, 2) then to 

Husband’s attorney’s fees and costs relating to these 

proceedings, and 3) the remainder divided equally between 

the parties.
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appeal upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 

21.