United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Argued September 16, 2020 

Decided November 20, 2020 

Before 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

No. 20-1165 

TREVOR JOHNSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

MARIAN UNIVERSITY, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of 

Wisconsin. 

No. 2:19-cv-388 

J.P. Stadtmueller, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

This is a Title IX sex discrimination case. Plaintiff Trevor Johnson, a male student 

at Marian University, met “Jane Roe” during their freshman year. Johnson and Roe 

drank at a party one night in September 2017, went back to Roe’s room, and had sex. 

The next morning, Roe could not remember having intercourse. 

 

A year later, Roe accused Johnson of taking advantage of her in her inebriated, 

blackout state. Johnson claimed the sex was consensual. Marian’s Title IX officials, 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 20-1165 Page 2 

including dean of students Dr. Paul Krikau, investigated Roe’s complaint and found 

Johnson responsible. Johnson received a two-year suspension from the school. 

Johnson sued Marian, claiming it discriminated against him because of his sex in 

concluding he was at fault. The district court granted summary judgment for Marian 

and Johnson appeals. We review summary judgment de novo, asking whether a genuine 

dispute exists over any material fact. Kopplin v. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 914 F.3d 1099, 1102 (7th 

Cir. 2019). 

A Title IX discrimination claim requires proof that (1) the educational institution 

received federal funding, (2) the plaintiff was excluded from participation in or denied 

the benefits of an educational program, and (3) the educational institution in question 

discriminated against the plaintiff based on gender. Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chicago, 933 

F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2019). The first two elements are not at issue. This case boils 

down to whether Marian discriminated against Johnson “on the basis of his sex.” That 

is the test. Id. at 854–55; Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 667–68 (7th Cir. 2019). 

The record does not permit a finding of sex discrimination here. Johnson leans on 

an alleged anti-male, pro-feminist culture at Marian fueled by politics and current 

events. In particular, he cites the Department of Education’s 2011 “Dear Colleague” 

letter, which pressured universities to prioritize resolving campus sexual assault cases 

or else lose federal funding. For Marian, the potential loss of federal funds was more 

than abstract in light of a recent investigation by the Office of Civil Rights—a subagency of the Department of Education—into its handling of sexual assault complaints. 

Johnson also notes Marian’s Title IX training educated administrators on the #MeToo 

movement’s impacts. And he highlights campus sexual assault awareness events that 

featured accounts of mostly female accusers. All of this, Johnson claims, conditioned 

Marian’s Title IX administrators to favor female complainants and discriminate on the 

basis of sex. 

We have acknowledged this sort of background can be relevant for assessing 

Title IX sex discrimination claims. See Columbia Coll., 933 F.3d at 855 (considering 

campus events “aimed at raising awareness of sexual assault issues”); Purdue, 928 F.3d 

at 668–69 (recognizing Dear Colleague letter and recent OCR investigations of school as 

relevant). But a plaintiff cannot rely on such generalized information alone; he must 

combine it with facts creating an inference that, in his specific case, the institution treated 

him differently because of his sex. Columbia Coll., 933 F.3d at 855 (citing Doe v. Baum, 903 

F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018)). And although our decisions in Columbia College and Purdue
No. 20-1165 Page 3 

examined the issue through the pleadings lens, this requirement does not dissipate at 

summary judgment. 

 

Johnson tries to prove this connection by referencing statements Dr. Krikau made 

while conducting Roe’s initial interview. In a few places, Dr. Krikau noted that the 

events as described by Roe amounted to violations of university policy. From these 

statements, Johnson infers Dr. Krikau jumped to conclusions and determined Johnson’s 

guilt based on Roe’s first impression and report alone. But even were that an accurate 

reading of the interview transcript, Dr. Krikau’s statements reveal no sex-based bias. 

Nothing suggests he believed Roe’s account simply because she was a female; his 

comments were “divorced from gender.” Columbia Coll., 933 F.3d at 856. At most, they 

demonstrate a pro-victim bias, but both women and men can be victims of sexual 

assault. 

 

Johnson also points to several posts from Dr. Krikau’s personal Twitter account 

as evidence of anti-male bias. Around the time of Johnson’s investigation, Dr. Krikau 

endorsed Dr. Christine Blasey Ford as a hero for accusing now-Justice Kavanaugh of 

sexual misconduct. He also defended a woman who complained of having to be 

selective about reporting harassment. These posts have no connection to Johnson’s case. 

They do not call into question Dr. Krikau’s ability to review Roe’s allegations 

objectively. 

These facts do not rise to the level of those alleged in Purdue. In that case, like 

here, a male college student sued his school for sex discrimination after being found 

responsible for a non-consensual sexual encounter with a female student. We reversed 

dismissal of plaintiff’s Title IX claim because he plausibly alleged the school’s 

adjudicators credited the female accuser over him based on sex. The accuser provided 

neither written nor oral account. Her story was summarized through a letter crafted by 

the director of a campus victim support center—the same organization that, within a 

month of plaintiff’s discipline, promoted a Washington Post article titled, “Alcohol isn’t 

the cause of campus sexual assault. Men are.” 928 F.3d at 669–70 (emphasis added). And 

two of the three administrators on the disciplinary panel admitted they took no 

evidence into account other than the female student’s accusations as described in that 

letter. Id. at 669. These allegations created an inference of gender bias. Dr. Krikau’s 

interview statements and unrelated social media musings, on the other hand, do not. 

 
No. 20-1165 Page 4 

We often call summary judgment the “put up or shut up” stage of litigation. 

Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 2010). But the record here leaves nothing 

for the jury to decide. Dr. Krikau’s interview statements reveal no gender bias. Nor does 

his personal social media activity cast doubt on his review of Johnson’s case. Johnson is 

left with general allegations about the school administration’s perceived anti-male 

culture. That is not enough to create a triable issue on sex discrimination, so we 

AFFIRM summary judgment for Marian University.