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eclassifi ed and approved for release by NSA on 11-19-2013 pursuant 

o E.O. 13526 

DD FORM 9 5 Replaces DA AGO Form 895, 1 Apr 48, and AFBQ I FEB 50 Fonn 12, 10 Nov •7, whiob m&J' lie used. 
STANDARD "FORM ND. 114 TOP SECRET REF ID : A6 6 62 4 

Office Memorandum • uNITEn sTATEs GovERNMENT 

TO : Mr. Friedman, Special Assistant DATE: 3 August 1954 

FROM H.J. Herczog, Chief, NSA-063 

SUBJECT: 

Attached is the excerpt .from my address which you requested. I sincerely 

apologize for the d.elay and only hope that this will still be of some use to 

you. If you would like any additional information on this or any other part 

of the address, I shall be very happy to make it available in, I promise, a 

shorter time. 

e. 

Incl: a/s 

APPENDED DOCUMENTS 

CENThlN lODl V."ORB MA1ERlf\L 

_ -lOP SECRET-

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DOWN GRAPE TO~ -i·ns· WBEN INC .. OSURES-ARl R M E ' · 
REF ID:A66624 

lOPSECRET FRE>TI 1· 

AN EXAMPLE OF COMINT CAPABILITY IN THE FIELD 

AN EXCERPT FROM THE ADDRESS 

"FIELD OPERATIONS" 

Given by Chief, Field Operations Direction Group 

- 27 April 1954 -

lOP SE.GRE.l FROTI 1· 
REF ID:A66624 

TOP SECRET 

We have seen something now of what we have in the field, what they are 

doing, and why they are there. The next question to answer is, "how well 

are they doing their jobs?" This one is hard to answer very precisely. 

Existing capabilities in the field vary fairly widely at times, and it is 

not easy. to make a definite estimate. I think we can say, however, that 

the general level around the world is good, and that it is improving at 

a most encouraging rate every day. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

A better way of treating this subject of field capability would be to 

discuss what can happen when a unit 1§. capable. There have been a number 

of instances in recent months wherein many of our field units have made 

truly outstanding contributions; however, of more interest to you, perhaps, 

might be this story about the recent conflict in Korea. 

We had COMINT units in Japan and Korea during the war, as you know, 

and in my opinion these units were, pound for pound, the best in the world. 

One of these units was an Air Force detachment, then known as Detachment 151 

of the 15th Radio Squadron Mobile. The mission of this unit was to provide 

close COMINT support to the 5th Air Force in Kor~a, and it did this by intercepting and processing the 

TOP. SEGRt.1 
EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

lOP ~F ID i'WttTff>~L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

'±'OP SE~ Ftte'fif 

English. I mention these details simply/to show that thi.s exploitation 

effort was not just some sort of low-level/operation uniqtJ.e to\the field, 

but was in fact a traditional, COMINT production .effort. 

At the end of I ... ______ certain messages passed .• on these I ___ _ 

nets indicated the movement ofl.__ _ __. ______________ ___.l area, a 

r-'· fact which was most unusual. 5th Air Force was alerted, and Detachment 151 

began to watch those links very closely. Several weeks later, at about 

\\\ 

matter of minutes and was made immediately availablt:1 tc th~•. 5th Air Force. 

All that was known so far was that here was a sizeable and 'll.nusual flight 

which may have been scheduled to I .... _______ ..... I ·The la~t placename, 

.__ _______ !could not be located on any map. • • 

Meanwhile, this same message was available to the 6920th Security Group 

in Japan which, together with NSA, was providing technical $upport to Detachment 151. The significance of the message was recognized by' Group, and the 

principal officers and non-coms concerned were called in for .a conference. 

The problem was this vital, last placename,I 1 ·.On the assumption that this last location might in fact be in ! .... ____ ___.I a Lt. Green 

of the Group staff, a multi-linguist, translated the I I expression for 

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'fef SEORE'f PRO'fiI 

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to be a 11way" point and not the final destination. This ·additional information was flashed back to Korea, the 5th Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Operations and the Commanding General were notified. 

By this time several other messages were noted involving unusua.l flights 

of various piston and jet aircraft scheduled for the same area and times 

concerned. --
)'"ELLO/I' 

S I!: A 

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3. 3 (h) (2) 

' PL 86-36/50 USC 

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·PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

.· 

The situation looked a little more clear: it was quite possible that 

this flight was. intended to LI _J~-------:--~:--------' If. tr;ie, 

this ~on.stitut~d·· the....._ ______________________ ......1in the 

Korean conflict.~ It was judged that complete failure. 9£· this! L.. _____ ___.I · 

wo~ld certainly have the effect.of discouraging any ruture~action or this ... 

type by the enemy. 5th AF decided to take countermeasures against. th~ 

f:Jj.ght. . . 

" . 

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. "{OP Sl:.GREl FROTl·I~·-

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EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605\ 

EA 

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PAN 

• 
'POP SEEffiE'i' FRO'fH 

The problem now w;as to work out an interception plan. First, a : 

Major Nixon, a pretty sharp iritelli~encer in Kore$., got 'from collater~l 

sources the air-speed of aLJith n~rmalDl~ad. Using this informatio~, plus the sources: 

and the· 1 f oute given in the original mes sage·, 

Nixon calcuiated how ~Ong it would take these bombers to reach the ta;t"get 

from time of take-off. It was then.necessary to plan the approach of; our 

interceptors. The problem here· was to avoid, as nxu.ch as pos\sible, the 

enemy air-defense system which was known to be extremely effective. It 

cOvered virt~ all ofl l•xcept ;for 

one small cor~dor which ._r_an--:f-r-om--;1======::::::;-1t"""."o_a_p_o"""."i-n-t-w .... hich was 

just about in the ~enter of the pe~nsula, as indicated· on the map. 'Most 

. . of our knowledge of this system also came from the.COMINT produced by Deta~hment 151 from the other enemy· air communications mentioned earlier. 

We knew a great deal about this ai~-defense system; we knew where their 

. . visual and rad.ar stations we.re,. how their air-defense sys~em was alerted, 

how their ground-controllers operated when vectoring the~_pl~~s against .. our aircraft, and so on~ 

lOP SECRET 

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REF ID:A66624 

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EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 
It was decided that the interception would be by two flights: one 

would approach the area from the northeast, flying behind the air-defense 

curtain along the 38th Para~lel to the coast, and turning at sea to make 

its run through the unprotected corridor to the target. The other flight 

would approach from the ··sea, southwest of the target area. In this way, 

our interceptors would almost completely avoid the enemy's air-defense 

system. (The flight from the northeast, by the way, was led by Major, 

later Lt. Col~ Davis, an ace· of th~ Korean-war who later lost his life in 

combat). 

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REF ID:A66624 

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EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 

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·---·------- . -- -- . ----------------f------' 

_ _ _ II 
--

lOP SE:CREl •rEO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

ipL 86-36/50 USC 

'l'OP SESBE'l' FR9'l'H 

The plan was now complete. Only the enemy takeoff time •as n~.eded. 

Then, two messages were intercepted, one of which gave the takeoff time 

for the bombers, and the other of which gave the takeoff time of ~e'V'eral . (' -- i .... ' 

. ) 

fighter planes from one of the way points.. Here, then, ¢ame the b()mbers 

and their escorts. The previously calculated flight tifues were appl~ed 

to these actual takeoff times, and the UN fighters wete scrambled at:what 

was hoped to be the appropriate ~ime to intercept eqemy I .... ___ ...,..... I say- , 

"hoped to be" because everything had to be correct: 

The translation of the original message had .to be coITect •••••• 

Lt. Green's rendition of the Korean express.ion for I .... ______ .... had to be coITect ••••• 

Major Nixon's calculations, which were biased on the route given in 

the original me~sage, had to be correct ••••• 

Our knowledge of t~e enemy air-defense sys_tem, which was based largely 

on COM.INT, had to be correct ••• , •.. 

The messages giving the actual enemy takeoff times had to be correct ••••• 

In short, COMINT had to be correct! 

As our fighters gained a::J.,titudeiand broke out over the target area, 

they came upon a ~iig~t otLj'ai:r,c~a.ft and various pis~~n ~~ Je-i .fighter '" ' t : I 

escorts. The situation:.was almost exactly as expected.· Our fighters ;made 

two passes, one in each direction, and returned' to Seoul. Enemy losse!3; 

UN ios.ses: 

none. Further, this bombing mission was effectively disrupted, and 

it is interesting to note that the I .... ________________ ... I . against us for the remainder of the war. • • 

10P St:CREl 

7

FR0TI I 
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REF ID:A66624 

lOP~GRET FROTI I 

'IGP SEGRE! FRO'Plj 

This is an example of what you can do with a capable COMINT unit, 

properly supported, and located in the right place at the right time. 

' . 

TOP SECRET 8 FRC>TI I