[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

v. Harper, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-2913.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-2913

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. HARPER, APPELLEE. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State v. Harper, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-2913.] 

Criminal law—A trial court must include notice to a defendant that any violation 

of postrelease control will subject the defendant to the consequences for 

such violation provided in R.C. 2967.28—Failure of a trial court to include 

that notice in the sentencing entry does not render the postrelease-control 

portion of a sentence void—If a sentencing court has jurisdiction to act, 

sentencing errors in the imposition of postrelease control render the 

sentence voidable, not void, and the sentence may be set aside if successfully 

challenged on direct appeal—To the extent that prior cases held that the 

failure to properly impose postrelease control in a sentence renders that 

portion of the defendant’s sentence void, those cases are overruled—Court 

of appeals’ judgment reversed in part. 

(No. 2018-1144—Submitted November 13, 2019—Decided May 14, 2020.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

No. 17AP-762, 2018-Ohio-2529. 

_______________________ 

KENNEDY, J.

{¶ 1} In State v. Grimes, we held that a trial court does not properly impose 

postrelease control if the sentencing entry does not notify the offender that any 

violation of the conditions of postrelease control will subject the offender to the 

consequences for a violation provided in R.C. 2967.28. 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-

Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, ¶ 1. This discretionary appeal from the Tenth District 

Court of Appeals asks us to clarify whether our decision in Grimes applies 

retroactively and whether the failure to provide notice of the consequences of a 

violation of postrelease control in the sentencing entry renders the imposition of 

postrelease control void ab initio and subject to collateral attack at any time. Our 

resolution of the second issue makes it unnecessary to address the first issue. 

{¶ 2} Our jurisprudence on void sentences arose out of the recognition that 

the General Assembly alone has the power to define offenses and prescribe 

punishment and that a court therefore lacks authority to substitute a different 

sentence for one provided by statute. In cases in which the trial court inadvertently 

failed to properly impose postrelease control in the sentence, we provided a remedy 

by holding that the failure rendered the sentence—or part of the sentence—void 

and subject to correction at any time before the expiration of the original sentence. 

See generally State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 

332. 

{¶ 3} In attempting to apply this remedy, we have had to add additional 

exceptions to the traditional rule that errors in sentencing are not jurisdictional and 

that those errors render the resulting sentence voidable, not void. Our attempt to 

bring clarity to the law, however, has burdened Ohio courts with unnecessary 

litigation challenging errors in the imposition of postrelease control that could have 
January Term, 2020 

3

been raised by the parties at sentencing or on direct appeal, undermining the finality 

of criminal judgments. 

{¶ 4} Today, we realign our precedent in cases involving the imposition of 

postrelease control with the traditional understanding of what constitutes a void 

judgment. When a case is within a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and the 

accused is properly before the court, any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction in 

imposing postrelease control renders the court’s judgment voidable, permitting the 

sentence to be set aside if the error has been successfully challenged on direct 

appeal. 

{¶ 5} In this case, the common pleas court had subject-matter jurisdiction 

over the case and personal jurisdiction over the accused. Because the court had the 

constitutional and statutory power to enter a finding of guilt and impose a sentence, 

any error in the exercise of its jurisdiction in failing to properly impose postrelease 

control rendered the judgment of conviction voidable, not void, and it is not subject 

to collateral attack. Therefore, to the extent any prior case conflicts with our 

holding today, it is overruled. 

{¶ 6} Accordingly, we reject the notion that the failure to incorporate a 

notice of the consequences of a violation of postrelease control in the sentencing 

entry as required by Grimes renders the sentence void to the extent that it does not 

properly impose postrelease control. We therefore reverse the appellate court’s 

judgment remanding this case to the trial court for further proceedings to correct 

the entry imposing postrelease control. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 7} In April 2012, the Franklin County grand jury indicted appellee, 

Andre Dejuan Harper, on two counts of robbery, one charged as a second-degree 

felony and the other charged as a third-degree felony. In February 2013, he pleaded 

guilty to robbery as a third-degree felony, and the state agreed to dismiss the 

second-degree-felony count of robbery. At the plea hearing, the trial court advised 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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Harper in writing that he would be subject to postrelease control and notified him 

of the consequences of violating it. 

{¶ 8} The trial court then sentenced Harper to three years in prison and 

imposed a mandatory three-year term of postrelease control. Neither party disputes 

that the trial court gave the oral notices required by R.C. 2929.19(B) in imposing 

postrelease control, and the trial court informed Harper of the consequences of 

violating postrelease control—i.e., that the Adult Parole Authority (APA) may 

impose a prison term of up to one-half of the stated prison term—in a separate 

document. However, the court did not include the consequences of a violation of 

postrelease control in the sentencing entry itself. Harper did not file a notice of 

appeal to challenge his sentence, and he was released from prison on September 11, 

2015, and placed on postrelease control. 

{¶ 9} In July 2017, after Harper was charged with violating the conditions 

of his postrelease-control sanction, he moved to vacate that portion of his sentence, 

alleging that it was void because the sentencing entry failed to state the 

consequences of violating postrelease control as required by this court’s recent 

decision in Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700. The trial 

court denied the motion, and Harper appealed. 

{¶ 10} The Tenth District Court of Appeals rejected the state’s arguments 

that our decision in Grimes did not apply retroactively to Harper’s case and that 

Harper’s motion was barred by res judicata, explaining that “a failure to properly 

impose post-release control renders a sentence void in relevant part and therefore 

open to challenge at any time, irrespective of finality or other principles of res 

judicata.” 2018-Ohio-2529, 115 N.E.3d 840, ¶ 15. Notwithstanding this holding, 

however, the appellate court concluded that “although the imposition of postrelease control in the judgment entry was defective under Grimes, it stated enough 

information * * * to impose post-release control and permit the APA to begin 

administering it * * *. As a consequence, * * * Harper remains validly under 
January Term, 2020 

5

sentence, even though it may not have been perfectly imposed.” Id. at ¶ 18. The 

court of appeals affirmed the denial of Harper’s motion to vacate, but it also 

remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to enter a nunc pro tunc 

entry to include the “consequences” language required by Grimes. Id. at ¶ 19-20. 

{¶ 11} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal on the following 

propositions of law: 

(1) This Court’s decision in State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 

19, 2017-Ohio-2927, does not apply retroactively to convictions that 

were already final when Grimes was decided. 

(2) The absence of “consequences” language in a sentencing 

entry as required by State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio2927, does not render the sentence void. 

See 153 Ohio St.3d 1503, 2018-Ohio-4285, 109 N.E.3d 1260. 

Positions of the Parties 

{¶ 12} The state maintains two positions. The first is that a new judicial 

ruling does not apply retroactively to cases that are final—i.e., when all appellate 

remedies have been exhausted—when the new rule is announced. It contends that 

our decision in Grimes is a new judicial ruling because no earlier case had required 

trial courts to include the consequences of a postrelease-control violation in the 

sentencing entry in order to properly impose postrelease control, and the court was 

neither construing a statute for the first time nor overruling prior caselaw. 

According to the state, the court of appeals deviated from these principles when it 

applied Grimes to Harper’s already final case based on the court’s view that the 

failure to comply with Grimes rendered the postrelease-control sanction void. The 

state’s second position is that contrary to the holding of the Tenth District, the 

failure to include the consequences of a violation of postrelease control in the 
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sentencing entry does not make the postrelease-control sanction void. The state 

notes that there is no statute that imposes that requirement on trial courts and that 

errors in the manner in which the trial court imposes postrelease control are not 

jurisdictional errors. And even if the omission of consequences language in this 

case fits within this court’s jurisprudence on void sentences, then the state urges 

that we should overrule those cases and hold that errors in imposing postrelease 

control do not render any part of a defendant’s sentence void. 

{¶ 13} Harper asserts that this appeal should be dismissed as improvidently 

allowed. He explains that the issues presented are moot because the court of 

appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of his motion to vacate his postrelease 

control as void, and he had fully served his postrelease control before we accepted 

the appeal. He also maintains that the trial court’s failure to include the 

consequences of a postrelease-control violation in the sentencing entry could be 

considered merely a clerical error that could have been corrected with a nunc pro 

tunc order “without having made any reference to the Grimes opinion whatsoever.” 

{¶ 14} On the merits of this case, Harper argues that the court of appeals 

correctly rejected the state’s argument that Grimes does not apply retroactively. He 

contends that Grimes did not announce a new judicial ruling because this court’s 

caselaw had already required the consequences of a postrelease-control violation to 

be included in the sentencing entry. But even if Grimes announced a new rule, he 

asserts that it applies retroactively to cases that were final because this court was 

interpreting a statute and explaining what it has always meant since its enactment. 

He also urges that once he had claimed that a new decision from this court had 

established that his postrelease-control sanction was void, the court of appeals was 

obligated to apply that decision to his case, even if it was decided after his original 

conviction and direct appeal. Harper contends that the state’s argument relating to 

void sentences amounts to an improper request for an advisory opinion, because 

although the court of appeals relied on Grimes in finding the sentencing entry to be 
January Term, 2020 

7

defective, it nonetheless held that his postrelease-control sanction was not void. He 

cautions the court against deciding whether to overrule its void-sentence 

jurisprudence when doing so is not necessary to resolve this case, the issue is not 

properly before the court, and it has not been fully briefed by the parties. 

{¶ 15} We decline to dismiss this case as moot. As the state points out, 

Harper’s unfavorable termination from his postrelease control is a collateral 

consequence of his violation. Pursuant to R.C. 2929.12(D)(1), that designation 

must be considered by a court if he is convicted of other crimes in the future. 

{¶ 16} We also find, contrary to the argument of Harper, that the state’s 

second proposition of law—that “[t]he absence of ‘consequences’ language in a 

sentencing entry as required by State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio2927, does not render the sentence void”—is properly before us.

{¶ 17} The Tenth District Court of Appeals distilled the question before it 

as “whether the trial court’s journal entry sufficiently and lawfully incorporated 

notice of post-release control.” 2018-Ohio-2529, 115 N.E.3d 840, ¶ 10. As the 

state properly recognizes, the appellate court then determined that the trial court’s 

entry addressed only one of the Grimes requirements, the applicable years of 

mandatory post-release control, id. at ¶ 11-12, and then, citing Fischer, 128 Ohio 

St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, observed that “the failure to properly 

impose post-release control renders a sentence void in relevant part and therefore 

open to challenge at any time, irrespective of finality or other principles of res 

judicata,” id. at ¶ 15. In conclusion, the appellate court held: 

Supreme Court of Ohio precedent renders judgment entries 

partially void if post-release control is not appropriately imposed 

and consequently enables the relevant parts of such entries to be 

challenged at any time. Because challenge may occur at any time 

concerning this issue, and because the judgment entry in this case 
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imposes the appropriate term of mandatory post-release control but 

does not at all mention the consequences to the offender for violating 

post-release control, we remand * * * for the issuance of a nunc pro 

tunc entry that complies with Grimes. 

Id. at ¶ 20. 

{¶ 18} A defendant’s ability to challenge an entry at any time is the very 

essence of an entry being void, not voidable. See Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-

Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, at ¶ 35 (DeWine, J., concurring in judgment only). If 

the entry were merely voidable, res judicata would apply. See State v. Simpkins, 

117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 30. Therefore, the 

appellate court did hold the judgment entry below void. 

{¶ 19} Lastly, because we can resolve this case by deciding the state’s 

second proposition of law regarding whether the failure to include the consequences 

of violating postrelease control in the sentencing entry renders the postreleasecontrol sanction void, we decline to consider the state’s first proposition of law as 

to whether Grimes applies retroactively. 

Law and Analysis 

{¶ 20} We agree with the state that “the void-sentence doctrine starts from 

the premise that there are two types of sentencing errors: Errors that make the 

sentence void, and errors that make the sentence merely voidable.” 

{¶ 21} More than 150 years ago, Justice Swan, writing for the court in Ex 

parte Shaw, confronted the question whether the trial court’s failure to impose a 

statutorily mandated three-year term of imprisonment for the offense of horsestealing “render[ed] the sentence void, and the commitment of the relator 

unlawful?” 7 Ohio St. 81, 82 (1857). Instead of the required three years, the trial 

court had imposed a one-year prison term. The court answered that question easily: 
January Term, 2020 

9

The question is one simply of jurisdiction. 

The court had jurisdiction over the offense and its 

punishment. It had authority to pronounce sentence; and while in 

the legitimate exercise of its power, committed a manifest error and 

mistake in the award of the number of years of the punishment. The 

sentence was not void, but erroneous. 

Id. The court noted that the writ of error is “for the correction of irregularities and 

errors in proceedings which result in conviction and in sentences.” Shaw at 82. On 

the other hand, the writ of habeas corpus is available “if the court has sentenced the 

relator for an offense over which, by law, it had no jurisdiction whatever, so that 

the proceedings and sentence were manifestly coram non judice, and void, the 

imprisonment following such void sentence would have been unlawful.” Id. The 

offender in Shaw had been “detained by virtue of the judgment of a court, 

possessing general jurisdiction in criminal cases.” (Emphasis added.) Id. 

Therefore, his sentence was not void, and he was not entitled to the writ of habeas 

corpus. 

{¶ 22} In 1967, more than a century after Shaw, we applied the same rule: 

“a judgment of conviction is void if rendered by a court having either no jurisdiction 

over the person of the defendant or no jurisdiction of the subject matter, i.e., 

jurisdiction to try the defendant for the crime for which he was convicted.” State 

v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 178, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967). “Conversely, where a 

judgment of conviction is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the person 

of the defendant and jurisdiction of the subject matter, such judgment is not void, 

and the cause of action merged therein becomes res judicata as between the state 

and the defendant.” Id. at 178-179. 

{¶ 23} Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory 

power of a court to adjudicate a particular class or type of case. Pratts v. Hurley, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11-12, 34. “It is a 

‘condition precedent to the court’s ability to hear the case. If a court acts without 

jurisdiction, then any proclamation by that court is void.’ ” Id. at ¶ 11, quoting 

State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). 

“A court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is determined without regard to the rights of 

the individual parties involved in a particular case.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 

141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 19. Rather, the focus is on 

whether the forum itself is competent to hear the controversy. See 18A Wright, 

Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 4428, at 6 (3d Ed.2017) 

(“Jurisdictional analysis should be confined to the rules that actually allocate 

judicial authority among different courts”). 

{¶ 24} Article IV, Section 4(A) of the Ohio Constitution provides that

“[t]here shall be a court of common pleas and such divisions thereof as may be 

established by law serving each county of the state,” and Article IV, Section 4(B) 

establishes that “[t]he courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such 

original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters * * * as may be provided by law.” 

As we explained in State v. Aalim, “Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio 

Constitution grants exclusive authority to the General Assembly to allocate certain 

subject matters to the exclusive original jurisdiction of specified divisions of the 

courts of common pleas.” 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 N.E.3d 883, 

¶ 2. 

{¶ 25} The General Assembly exercised that power in enacting R.C. 

2931.03, which provides that “[t]he court of common pleas has original jurisdiction 

of all crimes and offenses, except in cases of minor offenses the exclusive 

jurisdiction of which is vested in courts inferior to the court of common pleas.” 

Accordingly, “[j]urisdiction over all crimes and offenses is vested in the court of 

common pleas, general division, unless such jurisdiction specifically and 

exclusively is vested in other divisions of the court of common pleas or in the lower 
January Term, 2020 

11 

courts.” State ex rel. McMinn v. Whitfield, 27 Ohio St.3d 4, 5, 500 N.E.2d 875 

(1986). We have therefore recognized that pursuant to R.C. 2931.03, “a common 

pleas court has subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases.” Smith v. Sheldon, 

157 Ohio St.3d 1, 2019-Ohio-1677, 131 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 8. 

{¶ 26} “ ‘Once a tribunal has jurisdiction over both the subject matter of an 

action and the parties to it, “* * * the right to hear and determine is perfect; and the 

decision of every question thereafter arising is but the exercise of the jurisdiction 

thus conferred * * *.” ’ ” (Ellipses in Pizza.) Pratts, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-

Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, at ¶ 12, quoting State ex rel. Pizza v. Rayford, 62 Ohio 

St.3d 382, 384, 582 N.E.2d 992 (1992), quoting Sheldon’s Lessee v. Newton, 3 Ohio 

St. 494, 499 (1854). And when a specific action is within a court’s subject-matter 

jurisdiction, any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction renders the court’s 

judgment voidable, not void. Id. at ¶ 12, 21. Generally, a voidable judgment may 

only be set aside if successfully challenged on direct appeal. See State v. Payne, 

114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 28. 

{¶ 27} By outlining the history of our jurisprudence and the “modern 

expansion” of the void-sentence doctrine, the state demonstrates that our caselaw 

has not always limited the understanding of void judgments to those that are entered 

by a court lacking subject-matter or personal jurisdiction. Rather, we have 

concluded that the traditional view of void judgments “does not adequately address 

the constitutional infirmities of a sentence imposed without statutory authority.” 

Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, at ¶ 20. Our voidsentence jurisprudence arose out of a respect for the separation of powers in our 

tripartite system of government and our recognition that the General Assembly 

alone has the authority to define offenses and prescribe the punishment for 

violations. State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-7658, 71 N.E.3d 234, 

¶ 22. 
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{¶ 28} Our caselaw provided a remedy for the failure to impose a statutorily 

mandated term in the sentence: “[a]ny attempt by a court to disregard statutory 

requirements when imposing a sentence renders the attempted sentence a nullity or 

void.” State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 75, 471 N.E.2d 774 (1984). In Beasley, 

the trial court had imposed only a fine on the offender when the statute mandated a 

2-to-15-year prison term. We held that “the trial court exceeded its authority and 

this sentence must be considered void,” id., and because jeopardy did not attach to 

the void sentence, “the trial court’s correction of a statutorily incorrect sentence did 

not violate appellant’s right to be free from double jeopardy,” id. at 76. 

{¶ 29} Beasley remained largely an outlier until it gained new life as we 

grappled with trial courts’ failure to adhere to the General Assembly’s specific 

statutory requirements for imposing postrelease control. In State v. Jordan, we held 

that the trial court’s failure to comply with its statutory duty to provide notice of 

postrelease control at the sentencing hearing rendered the resulting sentence 

“contrary to law” and “void.” 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 

864, ¶ 23. We also concluded that the trial court’s duty to comply with the notice 

provisions “is the same as any other statutorily mandated term of a sentence.” Id. 

at ¶ 26. 

{¶ 30} Although Jordan was a direct appeal and not a collateral attack, 

cases following Jordan adhered to the view that the failure to properly impose 

postrelease control rendered the sentence void and permitted it to be corrected at 

any time prior to the expiration of the journalized sentence. E.g., State ex rel. 

Cruzado v. Zaleski, 111 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-5795, 856 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 28; 

Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, at ¶ 6; State v. 

Boswell, 121 Ohio St.3d 575, 2009-Ohio-1577, 906 N.E.2d 422, ¶ 8. 

{¶ 31} Because we treated a void sentence as if no sentence had been 

entered, we held that a void sentence could only be corrected with a de novo 

sentencing hearing on any offense for which postrelease control was not properly 
January Term, 2020 

13 

imposed. State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, 

syllabus, overruled in part, Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 

N.E.2d 332, at ¶ 36. As a logical consequence, offenders began to argue that an 

appeal from a void sentence was itself a nullity because of the lack of a final 

appealable order and, therefore, that an appeal from a de novo sentencing hearing 

to properly impose postrelease control constituted “ ‘[the] first direct appeal’ in 

which [the offender] may raise any and all issues relating to his conviction.” 

Fischer at ¶ 4, quoting State v. Fischer, 181 Ohio App.3d 758, 2009-Ohio-1491, 

910 N.E.2d 1083, ¶ 4. We rejected that argument in Fischer, overruling Bezak, id. 

at ¶ 36, and holding that although a postrelease-control sanction is void if not 

properly imposed, id. at paragraph one of the syllabus, the “determination of guilt

and the lawful elements of the [original] sentence” were nonetheless valid and 

remained subject to res judicata, id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. 

{¶ 32} In State v. Singleton, we acknowledged “the General Assembly’s 

authority to alter our caselaw’s characterization of a sentence lacking postrelease 

control as a nullity and to provide a mechanism to correct the procedural defect by 

adding postrelease control at any time before the defendant is released from prison.” 

124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, ¶ 26. We suggested that 

the legislature had displaced our void-sentence jurisprudence and provided that 

statutory remedy when it passed Am.Sub.H.B. No. 137, 151 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 

7622, 7659-7661, which, among other changes, enacted R.C. 2929.191, effective 

July 11, 2006. See Singleton at ¶ 25. We held that “[f]or criminal sentences 

imposed on and after July 11, 2006, in which a trial court failed to properly impose 

postrelease control, trial courts shall apply the procedures set forth in R.C. 

2929.191.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. Nonetheless, we have continued 

to permit collateral attacks on sentences imposed on or after July 11, 2006. E.g.,

Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, at ¶ 2 (sentence 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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entered in 2011); State v. Johnson, 155 Ohio St.3d 441, 2018-Ohio-4957, 122 

N.E.3d 126, ¶ 2 (sentence entered in 2013). 

{¶ 33} In Fischer, we also proclaimed that our void-sentence jurisprudence 

was “limited to a discrete vein of cases: those in which a court does not properly 

impose a statutorily mandated period of postrelease control.” 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 

2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, at ¶ 31. But rather than contain it to cases 

involving postrelease control, we have expanded it to other sentencing errors—i.e., 

the failure to include a mandatory driver’s license suspension in the sentence, State 

v. Harris, 132 Ohio St.3d 318, 2012-Ohio-1908, 972 N.E.2d 509, paragraph one of 

the syllabus; the failure to include a mandatory fine in the sentence, State v. Moore, 

135 Ohio St.3d 151, 2012-Ohio-5479, 985 N.E.2d 432, syllabus; and the failure to 

merge counts found by the court to be allied offenses of similar import, Williams, 

148 Ohio St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-7658, 71 N.E.3d 234, at ¶ 28. 

{¶ 34} Our void-sentence jurisprudence has resulted in seemingly endless 

litigation asking us to determine which sentencing errors must be raised on direct 

appeal and which may be raised at any time. And we have not managed to contain 

it to “a discrete vein of cases.” It is therefore time for this court to reevaluate the 

basic premise of our void-sentence jurisprudence and the remedy for the failure to 

properly impose postrelease control. 

{¶ 35} Neither Beasley nor Jordan nor their progeny have persuasively 

explained why a sentencing error implicating the separation-of-powers doctrine 

renders any part of the sentence void ab initio, as we have long recognized that 

other failures to comply with statutory mandates make a sentence merely voidable, 

not void. Carmelo v. Maxwell, 173 Ohio St. 569, 570, 184 N.E.2d 405 (1962) 

(“even if a sentence is given for a definite term (contrary to the provisions of 

[former R.C. 5145.01, Sub.H.B. 180, Section 1, 129 Ohio Laws, 1193, 1194]), such 

fact does not void the sentence”); Stahl v. Currey, 135 Ohio St. 253, 20 N.E.2d 529 

(1939) (sentence imposed by a justice of the peace who exceeded statutory 
January Term, 2020 

15 

authority was voidable); In re Winslow, 91 Ohio St. 328, 330, 110 N.E. 539 (1915) 

(“If the court in sentencing [Winslow] did not act under [the burglary] statute, but 

sentenced him under another statute, which for the purposes of this case may be 

conceded to have been invalid, the sentence was erroneous and voidable but not 

void”); Ex parte Van Hagan, 25 Ohio St. 426, 432 (1874) (“The punishment 

inflicted by the sentence, in excess of that prescribed by the law in force, was 

erroneous and voidable, but not absolutely void”). 

{¶ 36} As seen in the lineage of our caselaw, the same year we decided

Jordan, we explained in Pratts that “[a]lthough R.C. 2945.06 mandates the use of 

a three-judge panel when a defendant is charged with a death-penalty offense and 

waives the right to a jury, the failure to convene such a panel does not divest a court 

of subject-matter jurisdiction so that a judgment rendered by a single judge is void 

ab initio.” 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, at ¶ 24. Rather, 

we held that the failure to adhere to the statute’s requirements “constitutes an error 

in the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a particular case, for which there is an 

adequate remedy at law by way of direct appeal.” Id. 

{¶ 37} The current state of our void-sentence jurisprudence also runs 

counter to the doctrine of res judicata and disrupts the finality of judgments of 

conviction. We have recognized that “ ‘ “[p]ublic policy dictates that there be an 

end of litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result 

of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as 

between the parties.” ’ ” State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d 93, 95, 671 N.E.2d 233 

(1996), quoting Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401, 101 S.Ct. 

2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981), quoting Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Assn., 

283 U.S. 522, 525, 51 S.Ct. 517, 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1931). This public policy is 

reflected in the doctrine of res judicata, which “promotes the principles of finality 

and judicial economy by preventing endless relitigation of an issue on which a 

defendant has already received a full and fair opportunity to be heard.” State v. 
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16 

Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, ¶ 18. But contrary 

to these time-honored principles, our void-sentence jurisprudence has invited 

continued relitigation of the validity of a sentence—sometimes more than a decade 

after sentencing, e.g., State v. Billiter, 134 Ohio St.3d 103, 2012-Ohio-5144, 980 

N.E.2d 960, ¶ 6. 

{¶ 38} We do not reach today’s decision lightly. We acknowledge that the 

doctrine of stare decisis dictates adherence to prior judicial decisions. “Stare 

decisis, however, was not intended ‘to effect a “petrifying rigidity,” but to assure 

the justice that flows from certainty and stability. If, instead, adherence to 

precedent offers not justice but unfairness, not certainty but doubt and confusion, it 

loses its right to survive, and no principle constrains us to follow it.’ ” Clark v. 

Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 68 Ohio St.3d 435, 438, 628 N.E.2d 46 

(1994), quoting Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 667, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957). 

{¶ 39} For more than 15 years, we have attempted to manage, distinguish, 

and hold the line of our “discrete vein of cases” to no avail. Our void-sentence 

jurisprudence attempted to bring clarity, but instead has sown doubt over the 

finality of criminal sentences and confused litigants and jurists alike. Continued 

adherence to this jurisprudence for errors in the imposition of postrelease control 

excepts a narrow class of our cases from established, fundamental principles of law 

without providing any sound basis for departing from those principles. We 

conclude that this is no longer tenable and agree with the state and amicus curiae 

the Ohio Attorney General that now is the time to realign our void-sentence 

jurisprudence. 

{¶ 40} For all of the reasons stated above, we overrule our precedent to the 

extent that it holds that the failure to properly impose postrelease control in the 

sentence renders that portion of a defendant’s sentence void. We do this not 

because we reject the precept that courts lack authority to substitute a different 

sentence for that provided by statute, but because noncompliance with requirements 
January Term, 2020 

17 

for imposing postrelease control is best remedied the same way as other trial and 

sentencing errors—through timely objections at sentencing and an appeal of the 

sentence. 

{¶ 41} In this case, Harper was indicted on two counts of robbery in 

violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) and 2911.02(A)(3), which are second- and thirddegree felonies, respectively, pursuant to R.C. 2911.02(B). It was therefore within 

the subject-matter jurisdiction of the common pleas court to accept his plea of guilty 

and sentence him. Any error in imposing the postrelease-control sanction in his 

sentence was an error in the exercise of the trial court’s jurisdiction that could have 

been objected to at trial and that may have been reversible error on direct appeal. 

However, such an error did not render any part of Harper’s sentence void. And 

because Harper could have raised his argument that the trial court failed to properly 

impose postrelease control on appeal, it is now barred by the doctrine of res 

judicata. State v. Were, 120 Ohio St.3d 85, 2008-Ohio-5277, 896 N.E.2d 699, ¶ 7; 

Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d at 95, 671 N.E.2d 233. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 42} A sentence is void when a sentencing court lacks jurisdiction over 

the subject-matter of the case or personal jurisdiction over the accused. When the 

sentencing court has jurisdiction to act, sentencing errors in the imposition of 

postrelease control render the sentence voidable, not void, and the sentence may be 

set aside if successfully challenged on direct appeal. 

{¶ 43} Having realigned our jurisprudence with the traditional 

understanding of void and voidable sentences, we caution prosecuting attorneys, 

defense counsel, and pro se defendants throughout this state that they are now on 

notice that any claim that the trial court has failed to properly impose postrelease 

control in the sentence must be brought on appeal from the judgment of conviction 

or the sentence will be subject to res judicata. See R.C. 2953.02 (providing for 
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18 

appeals in criminal cases); 2954.08 (providing for prosecution and defense appeals 

of felony sentences); 2945.67 (providing when the prosecution may appeal). 

{¶ 44} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Tenth District Court of 

Appeals to the extent that it remanded the case to the trial court to correct the entry 

imposing postrelease control. 

Judgment accordingly. 

TRAPP, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., concur. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in judgment only. 

FISCHER, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion. 

MARY JANE TRAPP, J., of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, sitting for 

FRENCH, J. 

_________________ 

FISCHER, J., concurring in judgment only.

{¶ 45} Although I generally agree with the analysis set forth in the majority 

opinion regarding the need to realign our jurisprudence with the traditional 

understanding of void and voidable sentences, I would defer addressing that issue 

until it has been presented in a case free of the significant procedural defects present 

here. Thus, I respectfully concur in judgment only. 

I. This is not the ideal case in which to consider the continued 

viability of the void-sentence doctrine 

{¶ 46} As noted in the majority opinion, appellee, Andre D. Harper, takes 

the position that this court should not decide whether to overrule our void-sentence 

doctrine when doing so is not necessary to resolve the case, as the issue has neither 

been properly presented to this court nor fully briefed by the parties. Majority 

opinion at ¶ 14. I find this argument to be compelling in this case. 

{¶ 47} More significantly, appellant, the state of Ohio, did not raise a facial 

challenge to the void-sentence doctrine below before filing its jurisdictional appeal. 

“A first principle of appellate jurisdiction is that a party ordinarily may not present 
January Term, 2020 

19 

an argument on appeal that it failed to raise below.” State v. Wintermeyer, ___ 

Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-5156, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 10, citing Goldfuss v. 

Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997). It has been noted that 

“ ‘the most measured sense of judicial restraint confines this court to passing upon 

only those issues developed below.’ ” State ex rel. Parisi v. Dayton Bar Assn. 

Certified Grievance Commt., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-5157, ___ N.E.3d 

___, ¶ 35 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment only in part), 

quoting Fulmer v. Insura Property & Cas. Co., 94 Ohio St.3d 85, 100, 760 N.E.2d 

392 (2002) (Cook, J., dissenting). Thus, in cases in which parties have failed to 

raise certain issues before the court of appeals, “[o]ur review should * * * be 

confined to the issue actually litigated by the parties and decided by the court of 

appeals in the first instance.” Id. at ¶ 36 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 

concurring in judgment only in part). 

{¶ 48} The parties’ decision not to raise the viability of the void-sentence 

doctrine prior to the appeal to this court thus presents a significant procedural hurdle 

to our consideration of the issue addressed by the majority in this case. Given the 

great importance of that issue, I would wait to address it until we have a more 

suitable case in which we can give it our full consideration unfettered by any 

arguable procedural concerns. Notably, this court has ordered briefing in other 

pending cases involving issues related to the void-sentence doctrine. See State v. 

Henderson, 155 Ohio St.3d 1421, 2019-Ohio-1421, 120 N.E.3d 867; State v. 

Hudson, 156 Ohio St.3d 1452, 2019-Ohio-2780, 125 N.E.3d 947. Because we 

consider cases involving the void-sentence doctrine relatively frequently, I believe 

it would be more prudent to address this issue in a more fitting case. 

{¶ 49} Since I would not reach the issue regarding the continued viability 

of the void-sentence doctrine, I would proceed to consider the issues raised by the 

state in this appeal. 

 
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20 

II. The absence of “consequences” language does not render a sentence void

{¶ 50} With its second proposition of law, the state asks this court to hold 

that a trial court’s failure to include in a sentencing entry language about the 

consequences of violating the conditions of postrelease control, as required by State 

v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, ¶ 1, does not render 

a sentence void. I would adopt this proposition of law and, on that basis, reverse 

the portion of the Tenth District’s decision finding error and remanding the case to 

the trial court to correct the entry with a nunc pro tunc entry in compliance with 

Grimes. 

{¶ 51} The state correctly acknowledges that the void-sentence doctrine 

was premised on the notion that “a sentence that is not in accordance with 

statutorily mandated terms is void.” State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-

Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 8. In other words, “ ‘[a]ny attempt by a court to 

disregard statutory requirements * * * renders the attempted sentence a nullity or 

void.’ ” (Ellipsis sic.) Id. at ¶ 9, quoting State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 75, 471 

N.E.2d 774 (1984). Accordingly, this court has held that certain failures by trial 

courts to comply with statutory requirements, even those beyond the context of 

postrelease control, constitute errors that render the sentence void. See State v. 

Harris, 132 Ohio St.3d 318, 2012-Ohio-1908, 972 N.E.2d 509, paragraph one of 

the syllabus (mandatory driver’s-license suspensions); State v. Moore, 135 Ohio 

St.3d 151, 2012-Ohio-5479, 985 N.E.2d 432, syllabus (mandatory fines); Beasley

at 75 (statutorily-required minimum prison sentence). 

{¶ 52} In contrast to those cases, which involved a trial court’s failure to 

follow statutory requirements, there is no statutory requirement mandating that trial 

courts set forth in the sentencing entry the consequences of violating postrelease 

control. Rather, that requirement was imposed solely by this court in Grimes. 

Because there is no statutory requirement to include “consequences” language, 

there is no concern about the trial court imposing a sentence without statutory 
January Term, 2020 

21 

authority when not including that language, and thus no concern about a trial court 

violating its “statutory duty” by imposing a sentence unauthorized by statute, see 

State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 23 (holding 

that a trial court’s failure to fulfill its statutory duty of providing notice of 

postrelease control at sentencing renders the sentence void). 

{¶ 53} This court has stated its intention to limit the void-sentence doctrine 

to only cases in which a trial court violates a sentencing statute, see Fischer at 

¶ 8-9, and it should not expand the doctrine in this case. Because a court that fails 

to comply with the Grimes “consequences” requirement does not act without 

statutory authority, a sentence imposing postrelease control without setting forth 

the consequences for violating postrelease control in the sentencing entry is not 

void but, rather, is voidable and subject to correction on direct appeal. 

{¶ 54} I accordingly would hold that the absence of “consequences” 

language in a sentencing entry as required by Grimes does not render a sentence 

void. Because I would reverse the portion of the court of appeals’ judgment finding 

error and remanding the case to the trial court to correct the entry in accordance 

with Grimes, I would decline to address the state’s first proposition of law in this 

appeal. 

III. Conclusion

{¶ 55} I would defer considering whether we will continue to adhere to the 

void-sentence doctrine until that issue has been presented in a case in which we can 

give it our full consideration unfettered by any arguable procedural concerns. In 

considering the issues raised by the state in this appeal, I would hold that the 

absence of “consequences” language as required in Grimes does not render a 

sentence void. I accordingly concur only in the court’s judgment. 

_________________ 

Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. Gilbert, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
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Yeura R. Venters, Franklin County Public Defender, and George M. 

Schumann, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee. 

Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, State Solicitor, 

Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, and Zachery P. Keller and Samuel 

C. Peterson, Deputy Solicitors, urging reversal for amicus curiae Attorney General 

Dave Yost. 

Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Evy M. Jarrett, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae Lucas County 

Prosecutor Julia R. Bates. 

_________________