United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted October 23, 2019*

Decided November 22, 2019 

Before 

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge 

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 19-1115 

PEDRO DONALDSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of 

Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:18-cv-05869 

Charles R. Norgle, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

For a second time, Pedro Donaldson has brought a federal lawsuit challenging 

the Chicago police’s failure to file a police report after he was allegedly assaulted by a 

Chicago Transit Authority train operator. At screening, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the 

district court dismissed the complaint, with prejudice, for failing to state a claim 

because the Due Process Clause does not establish a right to police assistance. That 

 

*

 Appellees City of Chicago, et al., were not served with process in the district 

court and are not participating in this appeal. After examining the appellant’s brief and 

the record, we have concluded that the case is appropriate for summary disposition. 

See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 19-1115 Page 2 

conclusion was correct, but the court did not address whether Donaldson could have 

amended his complaint to state an equal-protection claim. Res judicata bars any such 

claim against all but the unnamed defendants in their individual capacities. Thus, we 

affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. 

In the operative complaint for his first lawsuit, Donaldson alleged that the City 

of Chicago and CTA worked together to violate his constitutional rights by failing to file 

or reconstruct a police report about an assault. See Donaldson v. City of Chicago, et al., 

Case No. 16-cv-10878 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2018), ECF No. 75. The district court determined 

that Donaldson had failed to state a claim that the City and CTA were liable under 

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), because Donaldson had 

not alleged that either entity had a policy that caused the wrongful conduct and 

dismissed the case. ECF No. 105, at 2–4. 

In this second lawsuit, Donaldson added as defendants three unnamed police 

officers and an unnamed CTA supervisor and raised claims that they, along with the 

City and CTA, violated his rights to “due process of law and equal rights protection” by 

failing to file or reconstruct a police report about the assault. The district court screened 

the complaint and dismissed it for failure to state a claim. Construing Donaldson’s 

complaint as asserting a due-process claim only, the court explained that the Due 

Process Clause confers no right to police assistance. Any amendment to the complaint 

would be futile, the court concluded, and so it dismissed the complaint with prejudice. 

Donaldson twice moved for reconsideration and requested leave to amend his 

complaint, asserting that defendants had acted in accordance with official policies or 

customs to deprive him of his rights. The district court denied these motions because 

Donaldson’s “mere disagreement” about whether he had a constitutional right to file a 

police report was “wholly insufficient” to justify post-judgment relief.1 

 

1 The district court construed Donaldson’s two motions to reconsider as arising under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) because, according to the court’s calculation, they 

were filed more than 28 days after judgment. This was an error—Donaldson filed his 

motions exactly 28 days after judgment. Although the district court’s docket sheet 

reflects that district judge signed the final judgment on October 25, 2018, the Clerk of 

Court did not enter the judgment on the docket until October 29, 2018—and it is this 

latter date that triggers the time for filing a post-judgment motion or appeal. 

See Laborers’ Pension Fund v. A&C Envtl., Inc., 301 F.3d 768, 775 n.5 (7th Cir. 2002). 
No. 19-1115 Page 3 

On appeal, Donaldson maintains that defendants violated his constitutional 

rights by failing to file a police report and investigate his case in accordance with a 

departmental policy or custom. But nearly all of the claims Donaldson asks us to revive 

were already decided in his first lawsuit. Res judicata bars any claim that was litigated 

or could have been litigated in a previous action arising out of the same operative facts 

and involving the same parties or their privies that has already been resolved by a final 

judgment on the merits. Kilburn-Winnie v. Town of Fortville, 891 F.3d 330, 332–33 (7th Cir. 

2018). Although res judicata is an affirmative defense, sua sponte dismissal on this basis 

is warranted when, as is the case here, it is plain “from the face of the complaint” that 

res judicata bars the claims. See Muhammad-Ali v. Final Call, Inc., 832 F.3d 755, 763 

(7th Cir. 2016). Donaldson’s claims against the City and the CTA in this suit arose from 

the same set of operative facts—the police’s failure to file a report about his alleged 

assault—as in the prior action, where they were dismissed on the merits. See Tartt v. 

Northwest Cmty. Hosp., 453 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2006) (dismissal for failure to state a 

claim is “a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes”). He is therefore 

barred from litigating them anew. 

In this suit, however, Donaldson has added four new defendants—three 

unnamed police officers and a CTA supervisor. Although these defendants—in their 

official capacities—are in privity with the original defendants, the City and CTA, privity 

does not extend between the City and CTA and their agents in their individual 

capacities. See Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 405–06 (7th Cir. 1989). Donaldson does not 

specify whether he wishes to sue these defendants in their official or individual 

capacities, but we will infer that Donaldson intends to sue them in their individual 

capacities because he seeks punitive damages, which are available only in individualcapacity suits. See Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001). 

Because res judicata does not bar Donaldson’s claims against the officers in their 

individual capacities, we turn to the district court’s handling of these claims. At 

screening, the district court dismissed these claims with prejudice because, in its view, 

amendment would be futile. When a district court denies a plaintiff the opportunity to 

amend his complaint at least once before dismissing the entire action, as was done here, 

“its decision will be reviewed rigorously on appeal.” Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater 

Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 519 (7th Cir. 2015). We agree that Donaldson failed to state 

 

Donaldson’s motions should have been construed under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 59(e), but this error has no effect on our analysis. 
No. 19-1115 Page 4 

a federal due-process claim because he does not have a constitutional right to demand 

that the police investigate his alleged assault, even by merely completing a police report 

about the matter. See Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing 

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)). 

But we disagree that Donaldson asserted only one claim. Count I of Donaldson’s 

complaint asserts that officers failed to submit a police report in violation of his rights to 

“due process of law and equal rights protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution.” In his post-judgment motion, Donaldson asserted four 

times that he was denied “equal protection of the law.” It is axiomatic that pro se 

pleadings should be construed liberally. See, e.g., Terry v. Spencer, 888 F.3d 890, 893 

(7th Cir. 2018). While these references to equal protection are merely labels and legal 

conclusions—which are insufficient to state any kind of claim, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)—they are nonetheless identifiable. To the extent Donaldson did 

not adequately develop his equal-protection claim, the district court should have given 

him an opportunity to supply the missing information—or at least explain why it 

would have been futile for Donaldson to try to amend his complaint. See Luevano v. WalMart Stores, 722 F.3d 1014, 1023–25 (7th Cir. 2013). We have repeatedly emphasized that, 

before dismissing a case at screening, a district court should give a litigant, especially 

one proceeding pro se, an opportunity to amend his complaint “unless it is certain from 

the face of the complaint that any amendment would be futile or otherwise 

unwarranted.” Tate v. SCR Med. Transp. 809 F.3d 343, 346 (7th Cir. 2015). 

Donaldson’s appellate brief suggests that amendment would not be futile. He 

asserts—for the first time—that officers refused to file a police report on his behalf 

because he is black. And selective withdrawal of police protection “is the prototypical 

denial of equal protection,” Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 2000). 

As heavy a burden as Donaldson may face to prove this claim, at the pleading stage we 

cannot say that amendment would be futile. See Freeman v. Metro. Water Reclamation 

Dist., 927 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 2019) (to state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff need 

only allege mistreatment occurred because of race). 

We therefore VACATE the judgment and REMAND for further proceedings with 

respect to Donaldson’s equal protection claim against the unnamed defendants in their 

individual capacities. We AFFIRM in all other respects.