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ASA REVIEW - March-April lMf pp[Dl.-A/5 faaJI 6 

The War In The Ether 

THE ROTE KAPELLE CASE: 

Denouement and Exploitation of Successes 

Ceaf iiee~ial-Part II 

The "Rote Ks:pelle" was a Russian Spy Ring operating against Germany with a number 

of a.gents including a group who maintained a villa in Brussels, whose activities 

were related in the last issue of the Review. Their radio was monitored, the operators arrested, and the cryptographic system employed solved through the discovery of 

a key in a novel in the library of the villa; the names of important principals including the chief a.gent, Kent, and a confidential a.gent, Coro, were disclosed. Kent 

was arrested, but Coro, whose real name was Schultz-Boyzen, a relative of the Tirpitz family with entry in top echelon air offices and industrial plants, remained at 

large. Using masterly disguises, Coro had become head of a widely ramified German 

resistance organization. He was being watched by the German police, but he persisted in evading them. At this point the following account begins. 

Every reader of detective stories knows 

how in these the strangest accidents and 

complications, which are obviously dragged 

in by the hair serve to cla:ir up or to complicate the situation. And every reader 

probably thinks to himself that these are 

accidents which can only be invented by 

the imagination of an author. Real life 

does not know such accidents. 

To this I would like to reply that any 

author is a bungler at inventing such 

accidents in comparison to what real life 

can do. 

The cryptanalytic group of the station 

monitoring a.gent radios had at that time 

been reenforced; among the newly engaged 

gentlemen were two students of the UniVersity of Berlin. Henceforth we shall call 

them A and B. 

There are some 80 million Germane. The 

cryptanalytic section for the monitoring 

of a.gents' radio consisted of some 15 men. 

These 15 men had been chosen at random. 

And, sure enough, among them were two who 

were in contact with Coro!~! 

A. was a b:armleee acquaintance through 

whom Coro had go¥ten at the other student, 

B., and induced him to supply information 

on the cryptanalytic work. A. knew nothing 

of the matter. A. had arranged to go on a 

Saturday afternoon for a sailboat party on 

the Wanneee with Coro • At the last moment 

A. was held up by hie work, and tried to 

inform Coro of this. In order to tele- ~hone quietly he went to the room of another analyst which wae empty, since the 

man who worked there had already left the 

office. A. called Coro' a number but did 

not find him at home. He left hie name, 

telephone, and extension with the ma.id requesting Coro to call immediately when he 

cs.me home. Thie did not ha~en, for Coro 

had already gone to Wanneee, and did not 

come back home until Monday. There he 

found the urgent note of th~ maid, on 

Translated from original German materials by 

Dr. Ray W. Pettengill 

March-April 1952 11 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 01-30-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
REF ID:A59246 

which was noted, without giving the name, 

the telephone number which Coro should 

call. 

The telephone had recently been installed, and the man who normally sat in the 

room was none other than the analyst who 

had in the previous weeks worked on and 

deciphered the entire radiogram material 

picked up in the Brussels Station! It was 

Dr. V., who knew about Coro from the deciphered messages, and who also was informed that steps were being taken to trap 

him. 

You can imagine Dr. V's surprise when 

Coro called him that Monday and said he 

had been instructed to telephone there because someone wanted to talk with him 

urgently. This call was interpreted as a 

trial balloon by Coro who must have gotten 

wind of something. In reality it was a 

perfectly harmless coincidence. 

They now decided to act. Coro was arrested. And gradually they arrested the whole 

circle with whom he had been in contact. 

Schultz-Boysen (Coro) was a man of exceptionally high mentality, great initiative and energy, and of such an a.mazing 

intellect that his collaborators were only 

slightly disturbed at the arrest;they were 

convinced that this man would betray 

nothing and that the Gestapo, on the other 

hand, could easily be •onvinced of his 

innocence. 

After a hearing lasting eight days they 

had not gotten the slightest thing out of 

him; he bad a credible explanation for 

everything, and he maintained his composure and mental alertness so that he 

never became entangled in contradictions. 

In spite of the fact that the man was 

proved guilty of the radio messages, the 

experienced criminologists repeatedly 

doubted his guilt, especially as he was 

regarded very favorably by his office ~nd 

his comrades. He himself said nothing, 

but some of the others arrested talked out 

of school. More than 120 persons now became involved, including a very high official of the Foreign Office. 

Little by little the entire organization 

was unravelled. There was a gigantic trial 

which ended in the execution of some 60 

persons. This ha-p-pened in December 1942. 

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In this way the Russian Intelligence Service was deart a serious blow. German 

agencies supceedal in crippling the Russian 

Intelligence Service for a time by injecting themselves into the espionage and 

radio net thus revealed. Agents who were 

newly dis-patched we~e arrested at once. 

By deceptive traffic the entire radio net 

was kept in opera ti on. However, it is a 

question of how far, or how long, this deceptive traffic was really able to mislead 

the Russians. For at that time the organ·-

ization of the "Rote Drei" was already 

working at top efficiency. In my opinion, 

the Russians did not allow themselves to 

be deceived very long but then cleverly 

continued playing the radio game with Germany in order to give the impression that 

the trick was a success. In reality they 

set up a new spy net unnoticed, with reports passing to M:>scow mainly via the 

"Rote Drei. " 

From the statements of those arrested 

leads had been secured regarding people 

who belonged to the third Berlin address. 

In this way they got on the trace of a 

second Russian agent radio station in 

Brussels, which the Germans were able to 

pick up by surprise. There several people 

were arrested, including a certain Hermann 

Wenzel,who in his day had played a certain 

role in connection with the burning of the 

Reichstag Building. By force and threats 

the man was rendered submissive and continued for a full year down to the summer 

of 1943 to work in the radio deception 

with Moscow under German control and guidance. The game might have continued until 

the end of the war if Hermann Wenzel had 

not succeeded in the summer of 1943 in escaping by a daring trick. He reappeared 

later in Holland, made contact with the 

English secret service, and through London 

established his identity in M:>scow. However, they declined to use him any further 

since they no longer really trusted him. 

Meanwhile in Paris in June 1942 another 

Russian agent transmitter bad been picked 

up. At the hearing nothing worth-while 

could be elicited from the operator and 

his wife. However, it could be established 

that the messages of this transmitter were 

composed with the same agent key as those 

emanating from the Brussels station. This 

led to further revealing connections. A 

special detacbmen~ was sent to Brussels to 

try to penetrate into the Belgian, Dutch, 

ASA Review 
REF ID:A59246 

and French groups. Gradually this succeeded so well that finally five radio 

stations could be surprised in Belgium and 

used in the radio deception with Moscow. 

But despite time consuming enterprise it 

had hitherto been impossible to clear up 

two matters. The guiding principal agent 

in Brussels had thus far been able to 

avoid seizure; no one knew who he was but 

merely knew from hie deciphered radiograms 

his cover name "Kent. " In the second place 

it had not been possible thus far to establish connections with the Paris group 

and to penetrate it. 

In August 1942 the Germans seized and 

interrogated very thoroughly an agent who 

maintained the contact between the Dutch 

and the Belgian group. When cornered, a 

remark escaped him that he had once been 

in the dwell:kg of the principal agent Kent 

which he also revealed. 

Investigation which was started at once 

revealed that Kent actually had lived in 

the dwelling indicated. However, he had 

fled immediately after the raid on the radio station in Brussels. Kent had been 

active as a part owner of the Sim.ex Company 

in Brussels and had been able in this way 

to make a great many connections and to 

take extended tripe. The Simex Company 

was a commission house which did business 

on a very large scale with various agencies of the German armed forces and also 

those of the Organization Todt. From here 

the trail led to a similar business in 

Paris; this was the seat of the French 

group. 

Kent had as a lady friend the widow of a 

Hungarian; she lived with him along with 

her child. Under no circumstances did he 

wish to separate himself from this woman, 

and that turned out fateful for him. Since 

hie friend was a striking person, it became possible to follow hie trail and 

finally learn hie address in Marseilles - at that time still unoccupied territory. 

After negotiations with the French Government Kent, who traveled with a Uruguayan 

passport, was turned over for arrest and 

picked, up in Marseilles in October 1942. 

In spite of close watching of the Paris 

firm and in spite of efforts to enter into 

negotiations with the firm for big deals 

through the Organization Todt, the German 

agencies did not at first succeed in coaxMarch-April 1952 

ing the cautious head of the French group 

(cover name Gilbert) out of hiding. Finally they succeeded in arresting several intermediary agents who were picked up so 

quietly outside of Paris that the firm 

noticed nothing;in this way they discovered the dentist of Chief Gilbert and the 

latter was arrested there one day in the 

dentist chair. Soon there followed the 

arrest of several of his collaborators who 

had been under surveillance for some time. 

Further investigations showed that the 

transmitter picked up in June belonged 

to Gilbert's group of agents. It could be 

ascertained that Gilbert 1 s group of agents 

was in contact with the Communist Party in 

France. 

Gilbert had made preparations for inaugurating four additional radio circuits. 

Moscow had likewise sent through a radio 

key for another important agent with the 

cover name "Harry." With the cooperation 

of the French Communist Party, new operators had already been provided for the 

Gilbert group, two of whom were Spanish 

Rede. Of course the radio schedule for 

Gilbert had not yet arrived; it had been 

lost somehow along the very circuitous 

route. On the other hand, Gilbert's secretary, who had decoded the radio schedule 

for "Harry" four weeks earlier, was able 

to give some information from memory regarding the call signs employed. 

It chanced that the German monitors had 

been listening to a Russian transmitter at 

this time, which regularly gave its calls 

and waited for an answer. An attempt was 

im:nediately made to get into contact with 

this transmitter since the German agencies 

were very anxious to use Agent Gilbert, 

who was highly regarded in M:>scow,to carry 

out a deceptive game with M>scow in order 

to get further clues respecting persons in 

the Russian Intelligence Service who might 

be located in areas controlled by Germany 

and also of learning their connections 

with the French Communist Party. 

The attempt to enter into radio traffic 

with M:>ecow appeared for the moment almost 

hopeless because the wave lengths,on which 

transmission was to be effective, were not 

known; the wave lengths which Gilbert's 

secretary thought he remembered had proved 

false. 

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'But to everyone s surprise the improbable 

succeeded at the second attempt and, to be 

sure, by chance. The Moscow central office, whose calla were heard and followed, 

suddenly ordered a change of wave and gave 

the new wave. Normally, the number is enciphered in such oases but in this case it 

clicked. The agent transmitter put into 

operation by the Germana was heard in Moscow, whereupon a message was dispatched to 

M'.>scow saying that the radio schedule had 

arrived in garbled.condition and requesting 

a repitition. Even now it was questionable 

whether traffic would ever come about 

again, but in the very next traffic period 

Moscow ordered a new alternate wave, again 

using the plain number, whereupon a radiogram was put through with the new schedule 

for traffic to M'.>scow and another for 

traffic via London. In this way the connection was definitely assured. 

Now it was possible to work in a new 

connection for agent Kent who had been 

arrested. This was very imp'"ortant because 

the Germana had to keep Moscow from building up a new secret spy net. 

By typing it to the Gilbert transmitter 

northern France was henceforth protected agains~ the Russian Intelligence Service; 

the same thing happened with southern 

France by using the Kent transmitter with 

German operators. 

The reports which now went to Moscow revealed Kent - who had long since been sitting in the safe custody - as a man with 

good connections in France. In the intelligence outfit guided by him was incorporated among other things, a "spy organization" under a format" Latvian general. 

Thia general was won over by disguised 

middlemen and was made to believe that he 

was working for a French resistance movement. He set up a spy ring which was directed against Germany, without knowing 

that all his work was guided and financed 

by the Germana. His reports were valuable 

and interesting, since they gave insight 

into the weaknesses of German security and 

secrecy and could be used in part to provide the Central Office of M:>scow with 

credible reports ahd so to string it along. 

In this way the German Intelligence Service succeeded in penetrating further into 

the organization of the French Communist 

Party and in recognizing the goals and reports which were particularly important 

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REF ID:A59246 

for Moscow; since Moscow had to believe 

that the Keny Organization was still at 

work unchanged, the Germans kept the 

Buaaians from setting up a new ar.datronger 

intelligence service. 

The time when this was going on was the 

time when the great German offensive on 

the eastern front before Stalingrad and in 

the foothills of the Caucasus had bogged 

down hopelessly, it was the time when it 

became clear to every rational person that 

this war could never result in a military 

decision favorable to Germany. It was 

precisely the time to try to sound out 

skillfully the political situation so that 

the foundation might be laid for a tolerable conclusion of the war. And for Germany it was a very favorable moment because the German armed forces were still 

an important factor; Germany was still 

able to strike powerful blows by land, by 

sea, and in the air;and there were certain 

frictions between the Soviet Union on the 

one hand, and England and the USA on the 

other. 

The captured Kent transmitter afforded 

the most favorable opportunity imaginable 

for cleverly touching on questions, the 

clarification of which was necessarily of 

importance to Germany. What were the conditions under which the Soviet Union was 

ready to enter into negotiations? On 

which questions was there antagonism between it and the Western Allies? Were its 

political goals directed at a penetration 

of Central and Western Europe or not? And 

other questions of like kind. 

In view of the character of the Kent 

transmitter, such leading questions could 

be undertaken very easily in a completely 

innocent and unobtrusive manner, because 

in view of his numerous connections Kent 

had discussed and brought up all manner of 

questions. 

Some experts of the German radio defense 

promptly made such propositions. But in 

Berlin they had cold ~eet. They considered 

the idea original and not without some attractiveness, but they did not find the 

courage to do anything in this direction. 

"What would the Fuehrer say if he should 

find out that we are in communication with 

Moscow? He will have us all hanged!" That 

was the general attitude. The utter lack 

(Continued on page 21) 

ASA Review 
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WAR IN THE ETHER 

(Continued from page 14) 

of freedom on the part of the German 

authori ti.es - even though they might be 

the very highest - , the pettiness o.f 

their thinking, and their fear of responsibility found expression he re. 

The "Rote Kapellen case remained one of 

the most :interesting of the entire war. 

The principal agents had been quietly 

introduced and established in the countries 

concerned long before the war without arousing the slightest suspicion. Through 

their position as manager of important 

commercial enterprises they had excellent 

connections with leading persons in industry and trade, with the political parties,and even with the German armed forces, 

the entire situation. The principal agent, 

Gilbert, had e.xact informati.on regarding 

the impending landing of Allied troops in 

Algeria three weeks before it took place, 

whereas the Germans were taken completely 

by surprise. 

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