REF ID:A66443 ~ 

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: 

On 12 August 1953, there appeared in the Washington Post an 

article by Joseph Alsop containing information possibly derived 

from a COMINT source. 

On 25 August 1953, tne Assistant Director, Current Intelligence, 

of CIA sent a Memorandum to the Executive Secretary, USCIB, stating 

that an item in the subject Alsop column was traceable only to COMINT 

On 26 August 1953, the Executive Secretary, USCIB, requested 

that people having access to certain information published by Mr. Alsop 

be queried as to their knowledge of how Mr. Alsop had access to, or 

received, this information. (CIB l/000134, 26 August 1953) 

In a Memorandum for the Executive Secretary, USCIB, dated 

17 September 1953, the Chief of Sta.f'f', NSA, stated that distribution 

of this sort of information is extremely limited and that an 

investigation was under way. (Ser. 039s) 

On 23 September 1953, the Acting Chief, Security Division, NSA; 

in a DF to AG stated that hundreds of NSA personnel could have had 

access to the information and that further investigation should be 

abandoned as impracticable. 

On J2 October 1953, in a Memorandum for the Executive Secretary, 

USCIB, the Chief of Staff, NSA, supported the recommendations of NSA's 

Security Division. 

For subsequent developments see USCIB papers: 

@'pp roved for Release by NSA on 05-12-2014 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 
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... ~~ .. ~ ., ....... IOYlet~ ....--. • ... " .... clllla ..... al tlle 8oriR Joas i:t _., ........ ._ ... .._, __ ..... ,...& ., • - '• to ll••l•t •tainlc ...._ l:vea • ...-. 

'-It would I• ktef. tt i. now ccmlrlned ... '9 .. this COUD• Ullt tbe Sorirtts blft IUrted 

"'· .. '9' ... .,. But It bl a quant1t7 pndaedan of the TU· 

'flftJ pat c1a..- ~ • 31-a 11'1 ~':tfbo-jet bomber J/111111• 1 -' ., • llPaUe ...ebbw eomparable In raqe and other ..... ..-er whlcb 11 DOW cbar.cterlstJca to our own B-31. ........ ....,..tton. Tbe TU-31 will lift the lon1 

IU • tile Bpft'IJlc probldl of r8qe air anD7 what It hu .. llamb, It now seem to be heretofore 1ackecl. the capabil· •IJ' ...U ... bit.bed that no it7 to mue round-trip attacks 

a.tM 11111. explosion bu oe- on American t a r 1 e t 1 from 

cuftecl • yet. Accordine to basei. on Soviet territory. 

reMable report, at . any rate, In addition, there are 1ood 

llO alCD of an explosion hu :pet reasons to believe that the 

Ileen picked up by tbe Ameri· Soviet• now have the proto- can loal r11111e detecUon SJ• type of a 1tant Jet bomber com- tem. parable to our B-52-the moi.t 

What ii now expected, there- advanced bomber we possess. fore, is a Soviet repetition nr The new plane was expected to our own Eniwetok test of 1951. be shown, in fact, at the MosBefore very long, If the fo~ cow air show, that was can· casters are correct, they will celed by bad. weather. If 

try out a weapon hke the chit'f weather perr.uts, the showing bomb qr our 1951 Eniwetok may well have taken place be· • IM'nH. This bomb had a power !ore these words can be printof more than 200 kilotons- ed. In any cue this new plane, . more than the explosive force 1f its existence is confirmed, or 200,000 tons of TNT-and 1t will put Soviet strategic air 

contained a small quantity of development almost on a par 

the heavy hydro1en mixture with our own. wblc!h forms the core of a true Finally, to complete this pat- bydro•n bomb tern of 1rowf.ns Soviet airOur Eniwetok testa had a atomic strensth, there are the 

tlouble purpose-to experiment marted pecullarltle1 of the 

w1tb oneo of the very powerful new Soviet bud1et, ~hich Malatomic bombs that are needed i enkov announced with such a as l r l 11 • r 1 for hydro1en ftourish. 

bombs, and to 1ain data on the ....,. 

IQ'drosen fusion reaction- A. MALENKOV chieft:v empha· llhnUar bomb test will Justify 1lzed the lari'!r share of the 

Kalenkov'• bout. It is In order Russian national income that 

fo rtbe &oYieta. whou blaest is now to be allocated to the 

bomb to date had a power consumer. In view of the ex· 

under IO tllotons. And such traordinary rise of Soviet na· a test wUl not delay the tfonal income and productivity Soviet over .. 11 atomic build-up, al.nee the end of tbe war, grrat1>)' requlrinl eonvef'Uon ot plu· er generosity to the mass of 

tonlum reactors to produce the populatic.n is certainly Iarse quantttiea of tritium, the overdue. It should not be dif· 

fantuUcally costly very heavy ft.cult to anance, either, since 

bydroaen that ls the moat im· the Soviets have larsely com· po~t component of a true p~ their m01t musi•e mlli· 

Ja)'dre>sen bomb tarY pro1ram, the Requipment ..... of their hu1e ll'OUDd forces. 

IF THIS Ill the 1ort of thin1 Meanwhile Malenkov made 

Malenkov wu talJdn1 about, no mention whatever Of two 

there w no rea!IOD to adjust features of the budget which 

past esUmatu of the Soviet are deeply disquieting. On the 

atomic proires11, which placed one hand, aD the grandiose the bellnnln1 of the time of capital projects of Stalin's old 

rHI dalqer toward the end of ... have now been canceled • .next 7ear. Ualortunately, how- For Instance, the dead dicta· 

ever, twe are excellent rea· tor'1 heira have stopped con-

'II.I bllUDn nlml la Ulla J9WI 

1luqd. Tldl .,.clal ..... , 

ol -a.. .. MTer ltemimd ta 

the Sowtet budpL Jt ta aenerally belleyed to provide mOlt 

of the ftnandnl for the Soviet 

atomic dort, tJte guided milslle development pi'Oll'am, and. 

the like. Tbe meaniDs of IUCb an increase, c:ominc at this 

time, should not require fUr.. 

tber comment. 

The likelihood Is strong that 

the Soviet annual Investment 

in the atomic program, guided missile development and other 

special weapon proJects, now considerably exceeds our own investments. Add the pro1ress of Soviet strategic air. Add, I 

further, the Soviet buildup I 

which our own Chiefs of Statr 

have held will reach a stap of 

acute dangl'r 1n 1954. The sum of all the eviclcnce- is a future I 

danger for which. at present, 

this country is makin1 no adequate preparation. 

C'OD,.rllb\, 19113 N T Httald Tribune. Ille 

THE WASHINGTON POST 

12 August 1953 

. sous to adjust past estimates Ar'ti:1fli~n of thhe cacnal t;!m the ... ~· to t e asp .. n sea, 

I

) and the tunnel from Sakhalin, ~ 1 under the Straits of Tartary, ( In Congress to the Siberian ma1nland. By so doiq, they have propol'-

TODAY uonllb' increased the already 

enormous capftal funds avail· 

able for more immediately useful purposes, such as tbe ex• pansion of aircraft produetion. 

Or. the other hand, ''re111dua!'' ~1pendlture1 h~ also ~-~ c i!S..;i..~!-~:,.,~ tnere ,