REF ID:A59205 

ARMY SECURITY AGENCY 

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF 

WASHINGTON 

On the occasion at my assumption to colllll&nd of the Arrmy Security 

Agency I wish not only to e:rtend greetings to all personnel of the 

Agency but also to 9%press my pleasure upon receiving this assignment. 

Althoush I have never been directly associated with ASA before, 

I am familiar with the outstanding contribution ma.de by this organization during World War II and the present conflict in Korea. While 

serving in Frankfurt, Germany, I had the opportunity to observe the 

Army Security .Agency, in Europe, where I gained firsthand knowledge 

at the ezceptional types at personnel in the organization, which I 

believe is an admirable representative of ASA units. 

It is a privilege to share in this associated military and scientific effort of very high priority and to bave a part in the continuance of the worthwhile traditions which have been developed throushout 

the years. 

I shall look forward to meeting all personnel upon my f'uture inspections of your individual activities. 

"·~ 

July -August 1951 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 01-29-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

.. 

3 
• 

ASA REVIEW - July-August 19~ij}p.l!ll6 A592 05 

The War in the Ether : 

Cryptosecurity at Brest-Litovsk 

(eautld:o11tlal) 

Translated from original German materials By 

Dr. Ray W. Pettensill 

Insight into the way the Germans intercepted the Russian traffic 

and rigged the secret Russian conference room in preparation for the 

Brest-Litovek conference, provides another interesting chapter in 

the story of German cryptography. This wae back in November 1917, 

shortly after the Boleheviki had swept into power. 

One of the ma.in goals of the Bolshevik 

Government immediately after it seized 

power in the period of World War I was to 

bring the war to an end. Not merely the 

war between Russia and the Central Powers, 

but the World War as a whole and on all 

fronts. Thie wae the burden of the appeals 

which went out by radio from .St. Petersburg and Moscow. They were directed to the 

working population of the Western Powers, 

and to their organizations and representatives. 

But it soon a'PPeared that the political 

power of these organs was far too small to 

have any decisive influence on the attitude 

of the governments of these countries. On 

the basis of this discovery, the Soviet 

Government decided on separate negotiations 

with the Central Powers to bring about a 

separate peace • On 22 December 1917, at 

Brest-Litovsk, conversations began between 

the Russian delegation headed by Joffe and 

the representatives of the Central Powers 

whose spokesman was, in the ma.in, General 

Hoffmenn. The course of the negotiations 

is, in general, well known; what is not 

known, however, are certain circumstances 

which will be mentioned here for the first 

time. 

The special character of these peace 

negotiations lay in the fact that here 

there sat at the conference table to end 

war not merely representatives of the two 

countries or groups of countries which were 

in a et.ate of war,but that here two philosophies stood apposed to one another between which - from the point of view of 

ideologies - there was no bridge. There 

was added the fact tba.t the Bolshevik Government bad been :In power only a few weeks, 

and this power was exercised in the world's 

largest state. On the side of the Central 

Powers there was, therefore, a very great 

interest in gaining insight into the actual situation of the newly created Soviet 

Union as well as into the thoughts of its 

delegation. Accordingly, in all baste a 

large radio intercept center was set up in 

Brest-Lftovsk whose task it wae to intercept all Russian internal radio traffic 

and to e:rploit it for the information of 

the German and.Austrian delegation. A great 

staff of evaluators and analysts with linguistic ability was at work day and night. 

A teletype line for direct exchange of 

telegrams ~ith the Soviet Government had 

been placed at the disposal of the Russian 

delegation. The Russians even had permission to use cipher. The Hughes teleprinter at Brest-Litovsk 1IB.8 operated by Russian 

personnel. 

Without the Russian telegraphers' knowing anything about it, other teleprinters 

had been wired in parallel with the Hughes 

teleprinters used to transmit telegrams. 

The tapes produced here went at once to 

the cryptanalytic bureau set up especially 

for the purpose, where 15 cryptanalysts 

were sitting who began work at once. At 

tba.t time the German cryptanalytic service 

ASA Review 
• 

REF ID:A59205 

succeeded on the third day of the proceedings in solving the cryptographic system 

used by the Russians. From then on, all 

incoming and outgoing telegrams could be 

deciphered, and General Hoffmann received 

their contents currently; sometimes the deciphered messages were laid before hbn dll!'-

ing the conversations. 

Aside from these two intercept devices, 

there was a third listening device installed in Brest-Litovsk. In the conference 

room of the Russian delegation,the Germans 

had installed in the chandelier several 

microphones from which well-disguised leads 

ran to a listening room. Here sat several 

interpreters who took down in shorthand 

the conversations of the Russians. Moreover, behind the wallpaper in the living. 

rooms of all members of the Russian delegation there bad been concealed a series 

of microphones from which there were leads 

to the above-mentioned listening room. 

Thus, every conversation of the Russians 

could be heard. 

Central Powers Well Informed 

The net result of these three listening 

devices was that the chief negotiator of 

the delegation of the Central Powers was 

not only very well--informed at all times 

regarding the sometimes very unclear situation within the Soviet Union and regarding the actual power of the new government, 

but was also informed regarding all instructions which the Russian delegation received, all reports which it sent to Moscow, 

and all ideas discussed within the delegation. They knew precisely how far they 

could go, how far the Russians were ready 

to go, and what they could answer to the 

threats of Joffe and later of Trotzky. The 

Russian delegation could bring up anything 

it wished, but this did not. make the slip;hest impression on General Hoffmann, since 

he often knew the enemy's situation better 

than the Russians themselves. 

Twice it happened that General Hoffmann 

said too much in the heat of debate so that 

the Russians noticed that their correspondence with Moscow was being read by the 

Germans. Thereupon, they changed their 

cryptographic system but this too was broken in barely a week,and the total picture 

was now the same as before. The Russians, 

from a technical standpoint, found themselves in a hopeless, defensive position 

and could not go a single step forward. 

July· August 19 51 

Then on 10 February 1918 Trotzky declared 

that Russia regarded the war as ended and 

would dispense with a formal treaty ef 

peace, and he broke off the negotiations. 

On the German side this step by the 

Russians was used as a pretext for doing 

away with the armistice; German troops then 

occupied Livonia and Esthonia as far as 

Narva,beginning 18 February 1918, and thus 

threatened St. Petersburg. The Soviet Government found itself' forced to give in,and 

on 3 March the treaty was signed at BrestLitovsk. 

In the meanwhile, a government had been 

formed in the Ukraine which was quite independent of the Bolshevik Government; it 

had come into being with German support; 

on 9 February it concluded a separate peace 

with Germany and Austria-Hungary which provided for the entry of German and Austrian 

troops into the territory of the Ukraine. 

Beginning 18 February the troops of the 

Central Powers marched into the Ukraine, 

occupied Kiev, Odessa, and Kharkov, and 

early in May advanced to the Don. In the 

south the Crimea was occupied. 

In spite of the conclusion of peace the 

ai tuation in the east remained very atrained,indeed - from a military point of view--

it became still less favorable than it had 

been up to February 1918, since in the enormous expanse of the western and eastern 

Ukraine there was stationed only a relatively thinly distributed force of the 

Central Powers. The Soviet Government on 

its part now set about with great zeal organizing a new "Red Army," and let it be 

recognized that itha.d no thought of tolerating permanently the situation in the 

Ukraine. 

Watchful Eye On Developments 

It was now necessary for the Central 

Powers to keep an exceptionally watchful 

eye on the development of the situation in 

the Soviet Union, in order to be protected 

from surprises. A whole net of radio intercept stations was set up by German and 

Austrian troops in the Ukraine and in the 

occupied northern territories, in order to 

monitor the entire radio traffic within 

Russia. The results were so good that actually a completely clear picture could be 

currently secured. 

Along with their entire governmental 

5 
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REF ID:A59205 

apparatus, the Russians also had to reorganize their entire radio service, and in 

the early months ma.de the same mistake aa 

once bef ?re by sending out their measures 

and arrangements all too frankly :Jn to space. 

But they soon made up for this error in 

another way. They began to send over their 

high-power transmitters a propaganda campaign in the German language which was directed to the German andAuatrian soldiers. 

These tranamiasiona Wat'e intercepted by all 

German receiving atatrons, and despite all 

security measures were soon trickling through everywhere. The German and the Austrian soldiers weary of war, were receptive to the propaganda. The reports of 

ASA EXTENSION 

the Russian transmitters were calculated " 

to undermine confidence in the leading 

claaa of the Listener's own country. The 

system of radio propaganda used here for 

the first time in history began to bear 

very serious fruit in the summer of 1918 

in connection with the entire development. 

The war in the east was ended, to be 

sure, but - and this signified far more 

the troops which had been left there began 

to drop out of the p•cture aa a dependable 

military force for the Central Powers. At 

that time Russia became the first country 

to make use of the value and power of modern radio propagandR, 

TRAINING GROWS 

(eunf!tlentlat) 

Lt Col Curtis M. Banks 

The interest o~ ASA personnel in the 

extension training program has greatly increased in the last few months. The number 

of students has risen from 1668 aa of - 31 

July 1950, to 2624 by 30 April 1951, approximately a 57~ increase. In July 1950 

the number of lessons submitted monthly 

averaged .99 per student, while in April 

1951 this average had risen to 2. 85. This 

compares very favorably with the average 

of all extension schools, which was 1.74 

for April 1951. The average ASA extension 

student ranks third co~pared with students 

enrolled in the othsr 17 Army extension 

schools in lessons completed each month. 

Popular With Enlisted Personnel 

Most pop~lar of the nu~bered subcourses 

is the 10-series, usually taken by enlisted men. In April, this series accounted 

for approximately 7ey:f, of the total enrollment. Another l~ of the students were 

enrolled in the 20-series for 2d Lieutenants, while the remaining l~ were taking 

the 30-, 40-, and 50-, aeries, or certain 

special aeries. Particular interest has 

been shown by personnel recently recalled 

to extended active duty, who are applying 

for courses which relate to their new assignments. 

Periodic revision is made of individual 

subcourses published by ASA in order to 

6 

confor:n to changes in Army doctrine, to 

implement suggestions ma.de by student critiques, and to make available the latest 

ASA developments in material, technique, 

and organization. 

In Jenuary, Lt. Colonel C. M. Banks, 

(Arty), a graduate of the ASA Officers 

Course, was designated as Chief of the Extension Training Division, and Captain Wm. 

J. Jackson, Jr. was later named Assistant 

Chief, The duties of the division include 

processing applications, grading lessons, 

preparing completion certificates, maintaining student records, issuing academic 

materials, and other details involved in 

the operation of a correspondence school 

of over 25oo·students. 

Three Categories of Courses 

Enrollment in the courses is normally 

made in a numbered series according to 

rank and in a category according to interest or duty assign~ent, although special 

courses in Cryptanalytics axn'l'raffic Analysis a.re available. Categories are designated as A, which emphasizes Material and 

Administrative activities; B, which is concerned with Comnunications Security; and C 

the "Cryptanalytics Major." The Extension Training Division encourages all eligible personnel to examine the 1951-1952 

catalog of the Division for detailed information regarding courses. 

ASA Review