Opinion filed No vember 13, 20 08



### In The 

# Eleven th Court of Appeals

__________ 

### No. 1 1- 07 -0 01 19 -CR

____ ____ __ THOM AS DA LE LY NC H, Ap pellant

V.
STA TE OF TEX AS , A ppellee

On App eal from the 9th Distric t Court Montgom ery C ounty, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 06-09- 09152-CR

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Thomas Dale L y

nch wa s arr ested a fter bumpingsever al other ve hicles on U.S. Highw ay 59 with his Chevrolet Blazer

. L y nch was indicted for possession of a controlled substance and for thre e counts of ag g ravated assault with a deadly wea pon. The State a

bandoned the possession alleg ation at the start of

trial, the trial court g rante d L y nch’s motion for dire cted ve rdict as to one of the ag g ravated assault counts, a nd the jury

fo u n d L y

n ch guilty

of one a g g ravated assault count but acquitted him of the othe r. The jury then assesse d his punishment at confinement for seven y ear s
and six mo nth s. We a ff

ir m.2 I

. Ba c k gr ou nd Fa c ts On August 5, 2006, the Tex as DP S was noti fied that a white SUV was ramming other ca rs on Hig hway

59. DPS Trooper De rek L eitner w as dispatche d, and he obse rved a Chevrolet B lazer trave ling south on Highwa y 59 at a high r ate of

speed. Tr ooper L eitner pur sued the B lazer for two miles, driving a s fast as 120 miles pe r hour, befor e it was fina lly stopped with the assistance of other law enf orce ment officia ls. Trooper L eitner notice d L y nch and a fema le passeng er making f u rtive movement s t o wa rd the B lazer’s c enter console a

rea . During a subseque nt searc h of the ve hicle, po lic e fo un d s e ve ra l g e ne ri c Vi c od in t a ble ts. L yn c h w a s r e m o v e d

f r o m t h e B l a z e r
. H e a

p p e ar e d i n t o x i c a t e d

an d b e g ana c t i n g a g g r e s s i v e l y. Whil e Ly nch wa s being taken into custody , other ve hicles stopped at the sc ene a nd told the office rs that L y nch had hit them. L y

nch was place d in a poli ce car with a cag e. When L y nch lea rned that he wa s under a

rre st, he beg an y elling, sc rea ming, spitting, a

nd cussing . He kicke d the window out

o f t h e c ar an d t r i e d t o e s c a p e
. H e w a s e v e n tu a l l y r e s t r a i n e d b y t h e o f f i c e r s w i t h p e p p e r

s p r ay. I I

. Issue s L y nc h c ha lle ng e s h is c on vic tio n wi th th ree i ssu e s. L y nc h c on te nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e is leg ally and fa ctually

insufficient to support his c onviction a nd that the trial cour

t erre d by including incorre ct def

initions of “intentionally ” and “ knowing ly ” in the jury char g e. I I I

. Discussion A. Sufficiency

of the Evidenc e. L y nch conte nds that the evidenc e is le g ally and fac tually insufficient be cause there was no
e v i d e n c e t h a th e i n t e n t i o n a l l y o r kn o w i n g l y t h r e a t e n e d

t h e v i c t i m w i t h i m m i n e n tb o d i l y i n j u r y. 1. Sta nd ar d o f R e v ie w. To deter mine if the evidence is leg ally sufficie nt, we re view all of the evidenc e in the lig ht most favora

ble to the ver dict and deter mine whether any rational trier of fac t could have f

ound the essential ele ments of the cr ime bey ond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1 97 9) ; J a c k s o n v
. Sta te , 17 S.W. 3d

66 4, 66 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ). Th e fa c tf ind e r i s th e so le judge of t he credibility of t he witnesses and the weig ht to be g iven their testimony

. Ad e lm an v . S tat e , 828 S.W .2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The fac tfinder may choose to be lieve or disbelieve all or any part of any

witness’s testimony

. Sh ar p v . S tat e , 707 S.W .2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App.3

1986). To d e te r

mi n e if th e e v id e n c e is f

a c tu a ll y s u f

f ic ie n t, th e a

p p e ll a te c o u rt r e v ie w s a ll of the evidenc e in a ne utral lig ht. W ats on v . S tat e , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) . Then, the revie wing court de termines whe ther the e vidence supporting the verdic t is so we ak that the ve rdict is clear ly wrongand manife stly

unjust or whether

the ver di ct is ag ainst the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the conflicting evidenc e. Id . at 414-15.

2. An aly sis

. The jury convicted L y

nch of c ommitt ing a

n ag g ravated assault ag ainst Wi lliam Underwood. Th e State wa s r e qu ir e d to pr ov e that L y nc h inte nti on a lly or kn ow ing ly thr e a te ne d U nd e rw oo d w ith imminent bodil y i n

j ury by using or exhibi ting a

deadly wea pon. T EX
. P EN A L C ODE ANN . §§ 22.01(a) ( 2), 22.02(a )(2) (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). L y nch does not dispute that he bumpe d Under wood’s

c ar w ithhis ve hic le . He c on te nd s, ho we ve r, that th is i s in su ff ic ie nt t o c on sti tut e a g g ra

vate d a ssa

ult b e c a u s e t h e e v i d e n c e e s t a

b l i s h e d o n l y t h a th e a c t e d

r e c k l e s s l y. Under wood testified that he and hi s wife were driving home from vacation. They wer e on Hi g hw ay 59 tr a ve lin g the sp e e d limit wh e n he wa s bump e d fr om be hin d. Un de rw oo d lo ok e d in his

re ar v i ew m i rr o r a n d

s aw a c ar “u n d ern ea t h [ h i s ] re ar b u mp er ” p u s h i n g h i m
. T h e d ri v er wa s cu rs i n g, shaking his fists, and making a n obscene g esture. U nderw ood was una ble to move out of the wa y be c a us e he ha d a

n e ig hte e n- wh e e le r on on e sid e and a ba rr ie r o n th e oth e r. F ina lly , a ft e r b e inghit

nume ro us tim e s and

be ingpu sh e d f

or thr e e -f ourt hs to o ne mil e , Und e rw oo d wa s abl e to p art ia lly pu ll his vehicle ove r onto t h e s houlder. Ly nch drove throug h the nar row g ap betwe en Unde rwood’s vehicle a nd the eig hteen- whee ler, a ll the while y elling a nd shaking his fist at Underwood. J ason Gre g ory

Palmer desc ribed a simil ar situation. He and his wife were on Hig hway 59 driving the spee d limit when L y nch hit him from behind. Palmer wa s unable to g et out of Ly nch’s way beca use he ha d an eig hteen- whee ler on one side and another in f ront. After

driving like this for a mi le or two, L y

nch went around Palmer – driving on the shoulder a nd median. Palmer de scribed L y nch as looking ag g ravated and in a big r ush. L y nch ac cele rate d awa

y , weaving thr oug h the traf fic. Palmer saw othe r vehic les moving ove r to the shoulder to avoid L y nch as Ly nch drove throug h. Un de rw oo d a

nd Pa lme r t e sti fi e d th a t Ly

nc h’ s a c t ion s c a

us e d th e m f

e ar a nd c on c e rn , a

nd bo th te sti fi e d tha t the y be lie ve d L y nc h ac te d inte nti on a lly

. Pa lme r sa id that he wa s af ra id L y nc h w ou ld push him into the eightee n-whe eler beside him or i nto the m edian. Underwood told the jury that he

was a fra id L y

nch would ca

use him to lose control of his vehicle. Bo t h als o testified that they b el i ev edL y

n ch kn ew ex ac t l y

wh at h e w as d o i n g.4

A rational juror coul d co n cl ude that Ly nch’s a ctions were intentional beca use, whe n Under wood and Palmer

did not imm ediately

move out of his way , he beg an bumping them until they did so. The fa ct that he took the same action on two separ ate oc casions, couple d with testimony that he ma int a ine d c on tr ol o f h is v e hic le wh ile mane uv e ri ngthr ou g h th e c ro wd e d tr a ff ic a t a hig h r a te of spee d, supports the conc lusion that L y nch intentionally

threatened Unde rwood in orde r to forc e him to move his vehicle. I ssue One is ove rruled. L y nc h a rgue s th a t, w he n a ll o f t

he e vid e nc e is c on sid e re d in a ne utr a l li g ht, it i s f

a c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt b e c a

us e it s ho ws that he wa s not in h is r ig ht m ind bu t w a s in toxic a te d. L y

nc h p oin ts t o Under wood’s testi mony that he appe are d to be out of his mind, to Trooper L eitner’ s testimony that he appe are d intox icated, and to Deputy Constable Richard J. Ford’s testimony that L y nch wa s not

a c tin g no rm a lly

and a pp e are d to have los t th e no rm a l us e of his fa c ult ie s. V o lu n ta r y in to xic a ti o n is n o t a d e f e n s e to th e c o mm is s io n o f a c r im e . T EX
. P E N A L C ODE ANN . § 8.04(a) (Ve rnon 2003). Nor does it neg ate the e lements of intent or knowle dg e. Bake r v. Sta te , 625 S.W .2d 840, 843 (Tex. App.—Amari llo 1981, no writ). Thus, the fa ct that L y nch may have be e n und e r t

he inf lue nc e of dr

ug s or al c oh ol doe s not ma ke the e vid e nc e fa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt. I ssue Two is over

ruled. B. Cha rg e Erro r. L y nch next complains that the trial court improper l y u t i l ized result-oriented de finitions of

“ int e nti on a lly” and “ kn ow ing ly ” in t he c ha rg e rathe r t

ha n n a tur e -o f- the -c on du c t- of fe ns e de fi nit ion s. The State doe s not dispute that the wrong definitions were used but responds that L y nch wa s not harme d. L y

nch re sponds that he was ha rmed be cause the jury

was prohibited f

rom co n s i dering wh e the r h e wa s awa

re of the c ir c ums tanc e s su

rr ound inghis c on du c t. 1. Sta nd ar d o f R e v ie w. L y nch did not object to the jury char g e’s de finitions at trial. C o n s eq u entl y , he must show not only that the t rial court err ed and that he suffere d actua l harm but also that he suff ere d eg reg ious harm. Al ma nz a v . S

tat e , 686 S.W .2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Eg reg ious harm ar ises if the

err or is so sever e that it deprive d the def endant of a fa ir and impartial tria l. Id . Wh e n ma kin g thi s decision, we consider ( 1) the entire jury char g e, (2) the state of the e vidence , (3) the a rg uments of counsel, and (4) any other relevant information in the records a s a whole. Ri c ha rd so n v . S tat e , 879 S.W .2d 874, 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).5 2. An aly sis

. We no te ini tia lly that Ly

nc h’ s argume nt i s c ounte r t o Se c tio n 8 .0 4( a ). Th e c ir c ums tanc e to which he a lludes is his i ntox ication. B eca use voluntary

intox ication is not a defe nse and cannot be used t o neg ate the e lements of intent or knowle dg e, the c ourt’s er ror c annot be c onsidered

e g re g iou sly

ha rm fu l on that ba sis a lon e
. F ur the rm or e , we no te that th e de fi nit ion s in the c ha rg e did

no t pr e ve nt L

y nc h f ro m de ve lop inge vid e nc e of his int oxic a tio n o r f

ro m arguin g its imp a c t on his mental state – in fa ct his closing a rg ument focuse d on littl e else

. Th e jur y wa s w e ll a

wa re tha t Ly nc h w a s int ox ica ted

. Se ve ra l w itn e sse s d e sc ri be d h is appea ranc e and de meanor and all ag ree d that he wa s not acting normally . Trooper L eitner te stified that he fo un d g e ne ri c Vi c od in pil ls and e mpt y be e r c ans in the B la zer , and he c on fi rm e d th a t in his

arr est repor

t he wrote , “Mr. L y

nch was in an altered state of mind when oper ating his motor vehicle.” During closing argumen t , L y nch’s c ounsel emphasized the testimony that L y nch wa s not actingnormally , was c onfused, a nd did not appear

to know what he was doing. He reminded the jury that police found pills in L y nch’s ve hicle. He then ar g ued: We are not sayi n g he is not g uilty of any thing be cause he wa s intox icated. We’ re say ingthat he do e sn ’t

ri se to t he le ve l of

a se c on d- de g re e fe lony

of a g g ra vate d a ssa ult beca use y ou have the “intentionally and knowing ly ” cla

use. L y nc h’ s c ouns e l c on tin

ue d a nd re pe a te dly tol d the jur

y that Ly nc h’ s b e havio r w a s in c on sis te nt w ith an intent to hurt someone be cause of h i s m en t al s tate. The State did not object to any portion of counsel’s c losing a

rg ument or to any

evidenc e of Ly

nch’s intoxi cation. Be cause L y

nch’s intox ication was fully develope d during trial and his counse l was allowe d to ext ensively

argue its impact on his state of mind, he has not shown e g reg ious harm. I ssue Thre e is overrule d. I V. Holding The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med .

RI CK STRANGE

JUSTI CE November

13, 2008 Do not publish. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Wright, C.J ., M c C a l l , J. , an d

S t r an g e , J.