ASA REVIEW - September 1952,, aEl"-9ID: A592 l.8 

The War .. 1n the Ether: 

TANNENBERG: FINALE AND DISCUSSION 

(8onfidautlal) 

The battle of Tannenberg was the first in the history of man in which 

the interception of enemy radio traffic played a decisive role, although 

the intercept service of the victorious Germana was poorly coordinated and 

some of the vital radiograms, sent jn plain text, were intercepted by 

chance. 

A previous article in the June 1952 issue covered this battle aga1nat 

the Russians to the point where the Germana were ready for the kill. General Hindenburg had learned from intercept that the left wing of his forces consisting of the lat Reserve Corps and the XVII Corps was still unopposed by the First Russian Army of ,General Rennenkampf because the Russians had not yet come up into line and was able to use these forces with 

his right wing, consisting chiefly of XX Corps, which was op-posed by the 

Russian Second Army under General Samsonov, consisting of XX:III Corps and 

other units. 

The forces which General Hindenburg took from his left and used wjth 

XX Corps were the lat Reserve Corps and XVII Corps. Badia deception was 

used to give the impression the left wing was still in strength, as will 

be noted in the following article. 

The Russian XVII Corps and XV Corps mentioned below had come to the 

support of the Russian Second Army. The Russian II Corps was additional 

reenforcement which had not yet arrived. 

On 28 August at 0700 hours Hindenburg 

and his Staff arrived in Froegenau to direct the battle from there. Great tension 

prevailed in the Army Staff Headquarters. 

They were entirely in the dark as to the 

enemy's purpose at Allenstein. This group 

still had complete freedom of action. 

regardless of everything,and on the shortest possible route, to the StabigottenGrieslienen Line (northeastward of Hohenstein). 

At 0800 hours radiograms of the Russian 

XIII Corps disclosed that it was marching 

from Allenstein southward to Hohenstein, 

and that its vanguard would arrive at 1200 

hours in Griealienen, five kilometers 

north of Hohenstein. Its purpose was to 

lend the XV Army Corps a hand. 

On the basis of this knowledge, the order was immediately sent by airplane to 

the German 

The final encirclement on the part of 

the Germans ended in the we 11-known result. 

The Russian Ill! and XV Army Corps,as well 

as large portions of the XX:III Corps, were 

captured and forced to lay down their weapons. 

Even while the battle against the Russian Second Army was still at its height, 

the attention of the Germana was called to 

the pending operations against the Niemen 

Army. On the 28th a Russian radiogram announced that the II Corps (left flank 

I Reserve 

Corps to 

proceed at 

all speed, 

Translated from orisinal German materials lly 

Dr. Ray W. Pettensi II 

Corps of 

the !Army) 

was to begin the retreat toSeptember 1952 7 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 01-30-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
REF ID:A59218 

'lilard the frontier and be transported by 

railroad. Thia transportation, however, 

did not take place. 

Early in the morning of 29 August, an 

incomplete radiogram was intercepted,which 

stated as follows: 

Because of heavy battles of Second Army 

Command orders supporting reenforcements •• 

and advance of cavalry to •• " 

(General Rennenkempf had received orders 

on the morning of 28 August to proceed 

with his left flank to the support of the 

Second Army. This radiogram was apparently an order of Rennenkempf to one of his 

Army Corps. A later radiogram, however, 

interrupted the advance march a.gain.) 

The above-cited radiogram confirmed what 

they had been e:x-pecting in the German 

Eighth Army Staff Headquarters. During 

the night of the 29th a number of radiograms were again intercepted which mentioned the encirclement of Koenigsberg 

from the south. On the morning of the 30th 

one such radiogram communicated that the 

head of the Russian II Army Corps on his 

countermarch (which thus had been ordered 

for a second time) was to demolish completely the railroads and telegraph wires 

west of the Koenigsberg-Bastenburg line, 

including Korshen and Bastenburg. This 

last-mentioned radiogram brought it about 

that the German Eighth Army Staff Headquarters could now devote further attention to the remnants of Samsonov's Army. 

All these Russian radiograms were intercepted by the German garrison radio 

stations at Thorn and Koenigsberg, which 

were we 11 behind the German lines, but 

also in part by the radio stations of the 

Eighth Army Staff, and were immediately 

translated and transmitted to the German 

Army Command. The German Command therefore knew not only the strength and organization of the enemy, but also his objectives. 

It is very interesting to note how differently the importance of these intercepted Russian radiograms was estimated in tre 

'postwar period. Ludendorff mentioned this 

fact very casually in a subordinate sentence: " ••• · •• we had received an interce"Pted enemy telegram which gave us a clear 

picture of the enemy's moves for the fol8 

. ' 

loving days." Ludendorf'f' forgot that 

there was not only "one" radiogram but 

several dozen which were intercepted during the course of operations and which revealed the situation of the enemy. 

Hindenburg himself, in his book, "Aus 

meinem Leben," which appeared in September 

1919, did not devote even one word to the 

radiograms ; on the contrary, he described 

the course of the Battle of Tannenberg wi1h 

the definite emphasis that he was in the 

dark as to the enemy's objectives and organization. 

The Russian General Danilov spoke of an 

"unpardonable negligence" in the Russian 

radio service, and declared that the imperfect communication service had been the 

chief reason for the catastrophic outcome 

of the battle. 

The German Archives publication declares: 

" ••••• On the who le the German Army Command 

viewed the intercepted radiograms as an 

extremely welcome source of intelligence. 

The Army Staff Headquarters, because of 

them, was temporarily,and even immediately 

before the beginning of the B~ttle of Tannenberg, advised of the objectives of the 

enemy in a way such as happens only seldom 

in wartime." And in connection therewith, 

the German Archives publication immediately 

strives to save the face of the German 

Command by continuing to say: ''But the 

critical decisions and orders for the battle according to the unanimous statements 

of all participants were made independently of the information which became known 

on the morning of 25 August through the 

radiograms. One cannot assume that without these radiograms the course of the 

battle would have been different." 

To this one can only reply: the general 

has not yet been born, who after winning a 

battle, would admit that he had won it 

thanks to a well-functioning intelligence 

service. Since the victory at Tannenberg 

had become a symbol for Germany, the "unanimous statements of all participants" 

should not of course be any different. Undoubtedly the dispositions for the battle 

were made before the first radiograms were 

intercepted. But <luring the course of the 

battle the knowledge of the contents of 

the intercepted radiograms played a deoi si ve role. The development of the battle without these radiograms would very 

definitely have been entirely different. 

ASA Review 
REF ID:A59218 

Now we shall try to find out why the 

Russians sent their communications in plafn 

text. To use plain text for such tmportant communications as the two radiograms 

of 28 August was a mistake of the gravest 

kind. However, when one examines the circumstances on the aide of the Russians, 

one obtains a picture which gives the ex-

-planation for it. The Russian communication system operated very imperfectly durint the battle. As a result, the army 

orders for the staff corps at the front 

arrived too late. Many times these did 

not receive their orders until about 1000 

hours of the same day on which the orders 

were effective; under such circumstances 

the troo-ps could not begin to enter action 

in the designated formation until almost 

noon. Very seldom 'W'ere there tale-phone 

connections, which was -partly due to the 

fact that there 'W'ere insufficient cables. 

For this reason, where there were radio 

stations, these were preferred for the 

case between the army leaders and the army 

corps. 

The radiogram of General Samsonov to the 

XIII A:rm.y Cor-ps at 0600 hours, 25 August 

was of an urgent nature since it pertained 

to the operations for the same day. It 

was sent as a priority message. There were 

no wire connections. One can assume that 

time did not permit the enci-pherment of 

this message; in the last analysis, however, the reason seems to be that in the 

XIII Corps no radiograms could be deciphered; they had no cipher key. An enctphered radiogram was thus simply out of the 

question in traffic with the XIII Corps. 

Since various Russian staff corps headquarters did not -possess the facilities 

for deciphering radiograms, it is probable 

that this was also the case in the Russian 

IV Army Corps 1 to which General Rennenkampf 

sent his above-repeated fateful radiogram 

in plain text. 

The Germans had learned something from 

the happenings along the aether waves at 

the Battle of Tannenberg which was supposed to be put to practical use during 

the "Battle of the J.esurian Lakes." Before the German attack on the Russian First 

Army began, tb.e Germane wanted to tie up 

the •important enemy reserves stationed 

farthest toward the north - (east-ward of 

Koenigsberg) - so that these could not be 

September 1952 

~ !f Tpn•t•"I~ o 10 to )' "° I• 

Sula i NilH 

moved toward the south where the German 

attack was in progress. Since no troop 

contingents were available to hold this 

large enemy reserve, the German E1ghth 

A:rm.y Staff Headquarters resorted to strategy. In the forenoon of 7 September, the 

radio station at Koenigsberg sent a radiogram in plain text as follows: 

"To the Corps Chief, 

Guard Corpe, 

Priority telegram. 

Tomorrow the Guard Corps will Join the •.•• 

immediately west of Labiau,parts of V A:rm.y 

unloaded •••• (here follows a series of garbles) •••• 

Army Staff Headquarters." 

The radiogram was intercepted by the Russians and the strategy succeeded. This is 

the first known case of purposely misleading radio traffic during World War I. The 

contents and the precise wording of the 

radiogram had been well thought out. The 

Guard Reserve Corpe, which had shortly before ar~ived in the theater of war, in 

reality had a different mission, but still 

was the northernmost army corps within the 

German attack organization; hence the mission designated in the radiogram could be 

possible. The V Arrrry Corps, which was stationed in France, was garrisoned in Posen 

in peacetime, hence its presence in East 

Prussia a'PPeared possible. The Russian 

Army Command had also believed for a long 

time that this Army Corps belonged to the 

Eighth Arrrry, although they did not know 

where it was located. 

9 
Unit Develops Germanium-Crystal Antenna Tester 

Publication of any article in the Review may not be construed as author-. 

ization by this Headquarters of the modifications erplained therein. 

By M/Sgt Thomas D. Brooks 

This useful device was made at USM-8 from 

parts which can be found at most any installation and comprises a modified P-337A 

coax antenna plug, a JK-26 plug, a Germanium crystal and a few odd parts. The 

tester is used with a pair of high-impedance phones that p~ into the JK-26 end of' 

the tester. The P-337A end of the tester 

is, in turn,plugged direct into any multicoupler or antenna terminated at a type 

464-A coax Jack. 

The device finds constant use fn the 

multi-coupler units. As the device is a 

simple detector with sensitivity limited 

to the sensitivity of the individual crystal used, and the sensitivity of the headset, a true comparative listening test can 

be made. A "clean" antenna. will render no 

random noise, although broadcast or other 

signals may be heard if the receiving location is near the transmitters. In most 

cases, this will not be true when checking 

the RCA-type multi-couplers, as such frequencies in the broadcast band are rejected. Aleo, microphonic or oscillating 

stages may be detected. 

A type IN21 Sylvania crystal was used in 

this particular unit to allow for changillg 

the crystal unit, if need be, without having to use a soldering iron to replace the. 

10 

crystal. However, the type IN34 crystal 

will work as well and ifJ more easy to find. 

If this type is used, a modification will 

have to be made to connect the crystal by 

means of soldering the leads to the plugs, 

which makes the IN21 preferable. 

In assembling this unit, the P-337A jack 

is first modified as in part "A" of the 

exploded photograph. The jack sleeve (part 

"E"), is removed from the jack, and the 

back of the jack split and bent into shape 

so that the sleeve fits inside of the back 

of the jack, rather than over it. The fit 

is then adjusted so that the sleeve laps 

into the jack flush with the inside of the 

flared jack end, then sweated togehter with 

solder. Ne.xt, sweat a small hollow brass 

rivet (part "B") to the end of the jack 

center pin to make a flat connection seat 

for the crystal. A small still spring 

(part "D"), about 3/8 of an inch long is 

fitted to the pin end of the crystal (part 

"C"). A fibre paper sleeve is ne:xt fitted to the crystal body so that it butts 

the body shoulder and extends flush with 

the pin end of the crystal. Thie is done 

to keep the crystal insulated from the 

jack assembly, ae the crystal is in series 

with the antenDB. and phones. JK-26 (part 

''F"), is next modified by adding a small 

braes extension connector, made from jack 

ASA Review