IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Americans for Fair Treatment, Inc., :

:

Appellant :

: 

v. : No. 1618 C.D. 2015

: Argued: October 17, 2016

Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, :

Local 3, AFL-CIO; The School : 

District of Philadelphia; and School : 

Reform Commission :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge 

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION BY

SENIOR JUDGE COLINS FILED: November 21 , 2016

This matter is an appeal filed by Americans for Fair Treatment, Inc. 

(Plaintiff) from orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial 

court) dismissing Plaintiff’s amended complaint for declaratory judgment and 

injunctive relief (Amended Complaint) for lack of standing. For the reasons set 

forth below, we affirm.

On February 25, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Philadelphia 

Federation of Teachers, Local 3, AFL-CIO (Union) and the School District of 

Philadelphia (School District) challenging the union leave of absence provision in 

the 2010 collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the School 

District (the 2010 CBA). Both defendants filed preliminary objections to the 

complaint. On May 22, 2015, Plaintiff, in response to the preliminary objections, 

filed the Amended Complaint at issue here, a six-count complaint that added the 

School Reform Commission (SRC) as a defendant and sought a declaratory 
2

judgment that the union leave of absence provision in the 2010 CBA is invalid, an 

injunction barring the School District and SRC (collectively, School District) and 

the Union from continuing to implement that provision of the 2010 CBA and a 

declaratory judgment that a union leave provision in the Public School Employees’ 

Retirement Code (PSERC)1is unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania 

Constitution to the extent that it authorizes the union leave provided by the 2010 

CBA.

According to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff is an Oklahoma 

nonprofit corporation with “members throughout the country” that “facilitate[s]

and support[s] litigation to enforce and expand human and civil rights of 

employees who have suffered public sector union abuse,” and its “membership 

includes public sector union members and nonmembers, as well as supporters of 

public employees.” (Amended Complaint ¶1, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 14a15a.) The Amended Complaint alleges that “Plaintiff’s membership rolls include 

Philadelphia teachers with less accrued seniority than many of the teachers who 

have left the classroom to perform union work on school time,” and that 

“Plaintiff’s membership rolls also include Philadelphia taxpayers whose taxes fund

Philadelphia schools.” (Id. ¶¶7-8, R.R. at 16a.) The Amended Complaint does not 

identify any member who is a Philadelphia teacher or taxpayer and does not allege 

any facts concerning the positions that its Philadelphia teacher members hold, the 

schools where they teach or the subjects or positions for which they are 

certificated. The Amended Complaint also does not allege what School District 

seniority its Philadelphia teacher members have other than asserting that they have 

less seniority than many teachers on union leave. 

 

1

24 Pa. C.S. §§ 8101-8535.
3

The Amended Complaint seeks to declare invalid and enjoin Article 

III, Section B of the 2010 CBA, which provides:

1. Employees who are elected or appointed to full time 

positions with the Federation or any organization with which 

it is affiliated will, upon proper application, be granted leaves 

of absence for the purpose of accepting those positions. 

Authorized Federation leaves shall be requested in writing by 

the President of the Federation only. Employees granted such 

leaves of absence shall retain all insurance and other benefits 

and shall continue to accrue seniority as though they were in 

regular service. Annually, the President of the Federation shall 

inform the School District of the salary to be paid to each 

employee on approved leave with the Federation. The School 

District shall adjust each employee’s salary accordingly. Upon 

return to service they shall be placed in the assignment which 

they left with all accrued benefits and increments that they 

would have earned had they been in regular service.

2. Employees on such leaves of absence shall be permitted to 

pay both their and the School District’s regular contributions 

to all plans requiring such contributions.

(Amended Complaint ¶¶20-27, Prayer for Relief & Ex. A, R.R. at 18a-20a, 31a, 

49a.) Article III, Section B of the 2010 CBA permits up to 35 teachers and 26 

other bargaining unit employees to take this union leave to hold full time positions 

with the Union. (Id. ¶27 & Ex. A ¶5, R.R. at 19a-20a, 49a-50a.) In addition, 

Article XIII, Section F of the 2010 CBA permits up to 10 teachers or other 

members of the Union to take union leave to hold full time positions with the 

Union’s Health and Welfare Fund. (Id. ¶20 n.4 & Ex. A, R.R. at 18a, 89a.) 

Plaintiff alleges that at least 19 School District employees are on union leave and 

that “many” of the teachers on union leave have been on union leave for over 15 

years. (Id. ¶¶7, 26, R.R. at 16a, 19a.) The information from the School District on 

which Plaintiff bases these allegations lists all of the employees on union leave as 
4

having been employed by the School District for more than 10 years. (Id. Ex. C, 

R.R. at 258a-259a.)

The 2010 CBA provided that it was to be in effect from September 1, 

2009 to August 31, 2012. (Amended Complaint ¶14 & Ex. A, R.R. at 17a, 34a, 

36a.) The Union and School District extended the 2010 CBA for an additional 

year, to August 31, 2013. (Id. ¶15, R.R. at 17a; CBA Extension Agreement, R.R. 

at 415a-416aa.) The Amended Complaint alleges that the 2010 CBA expired on 

August 31, 2013, but that the Union and School District have continued to adhere 

to its terms because no successor agreement has been reached. (Amended 

Complaint ¶16, R.R. at 18a.) In October 2014, the School District attempted to 

cancel the 2010 CBA. (Id. ¶17, R.R. at 18a.) That cancelation was enjoined as 

beyond the SRC’s powers and on August 15, 2016, the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court upheld the injunction. See Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, AFT, Local 

3, AFL-CIO v. School District of Philadelphia, 144 A.3d 1281 (Pa. 2016).

The Amended Complaint also seeks a declaration that Section 8102 of 

the PSERC is unconstitutional to the extent that it authorizes union leave. 

(Amended Complaint ¶¶84-97, R.R. at 29a-30a.) The PSERC provides that school 

employees receive credit in calculating their retirement benefits for periods that 

they are on “approved leave of absence,” if retirement contributions are made for 

the leave of absence periods. 24 Pa. C.S. § 8302(b). Section 8102 provides that 

union leave constitutes “approved leave of absence” for which school employees 

receive retirement credit if the union leave satisfies the following conditions:

“Leave for service with a collective bargaining organization.” 

Paid leave granted to an active member by an employer for 

purposes of working full time for or serving full time as an 

officer of a Statewide employee organization or a local 

collective bargaining representative under the act of July 23, 

1970 (P.L. 563, No. 195), known as the Public Employe 
5

Relations Act: Provided, That greater than one-half of the 

members of the employee organization are active members of 

the system; that the employer shall fully compensate the 

member, including, but not limited to, salary, wages, pension 

and retirement contributions and benefits, other benefits and 

seniority, as if he were in full-time active service; and that the 

employee organization shall fully reimburse the employer for 

such salary, wages, pension and retirement contributions and 

benefits and other benefits and seniority.

24 Pa. C.S. § 8102 (emphasis added). 

The 2010 CBA provides only that the Union “shall inform the School 

District of the salary to be paid to each employee on approved leave” and that the 

“School District shall adjust each employee’s salary accordingly” and does not 

expressly require the Union to reimburse the School District. In the past, the 

School District has paid the salaries of the teachers on union leave and the Union 

has fully reimbursed the School District for all salary and benefits for teachers on 

union leave in accordance with Section 8102’s requirements for pension credit. 

Kirsch v. Public School Employees’ Retirement Board, 985 A.2d 671, 672-73 (Pa. 

2009). Plaintiff does not allege that the Union has failed to fully reimburse the 

School District for all salary and benefit payments for those on union leave under 

the 2010 CBA. (School District Preliminary Objections ¶4, R.R. at 340a; 

Plaintiff’s Answer to School District Preliminary Objections ¶4, R.R. at 607a.) 

Under the PSERC, only the salary to which employees on union leave would be 

entitled in their school positions can be included in calculating retirement benefits 

even if the employees are paid a higher salary while on union leave. Kirsch, 985 

A.2d at 675-78. 

The Union and School District filed preliminary objections to the 

Amended Complaint seeking dismissal both on the grounds that Plaintiff lacks

standing and on the grounds that the individual counts of the Amended Complaint 
6

were legally insufficient. On July 22, 2015, the trial court issued orders sustaining 

defendants’ preliminary objections to Plaintiff’s standing. On August 17, 2015, 

Plaintiff timely appealed the orders sustaining defendants’ preliminary objections 

to this Court.2 In its Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on 

appeal, Plaintiff contended only that the allegations of the Amended Complaint 

were sufficient to support standing and did not assert that the trial court should 

have granted it leave to amend to plead any additional facts in support of standing. 

(R.R. at 677a-678a.)

To have standing to seek judicial relief, the plaintiff must show that it

is aggrieved by the action or matter that it challenges. Fumo v. City of 

Philadelphia, 972 A.2d 487, 496 (Pa. 2009); Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC v. 

Commonwealth, 888 A.2d 655, 659-60 (Pa. 2005). A plaintiff is aggrieved only if 

it is adversely affected and has a substantial, direct and immediate interest in the 

matter at issue. Fumo, 972 A.2d at 496; Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC, 888 A.2d 

at 660. To be “substantial,” the plaintiff’s interest must be distinct from and 

surpass the interest of all citizens in procuring compliance with the law. Fumo, 

972 A.2d at 496; Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC, 888 A.2d at 660; North-Central 

Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association v. Weaver, 827 A.2d 550, 554 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2003). For the interest to be “direct,” there must be a causal connection 

between harm to the plaintiff’s interest and the alleged violation of law that is the 

subject of the action. Fumo, 972 A.2d at 496; Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC, 

 

2 Whether Plaintiff has standing is a question of law subject to this Court’s plenary, de novo

review. Office of the Governor v. Donahue, 98 A.3d 1223, 1228 (Pa. 2014); Johnson v. 

American Standard, 8 A.3d 318, 326 (Pa. 2010). Because the trial court dismissed the action on 

preliminary objections, this Court must accept all well-pleaded material facts set forth in the 

Amended Complaint and all inferences fairly deducible from those facts as true, but need not 

accept Plaintiff’s conclusions of law or argumentative allegations. Stilp v. Commonwealth, 940 

A.2d 1227, 1232 n. 9 (Pa. 2007). 
7

888 A.2d at 660; National Rifle Association v. City of Pittsburgh, 999 A.2d 1256, 

1258 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). The interest is “immediate” if the causal connection is 

not remote or speculative. Fumo, 972 A.2d at 496; Pittsburgh Palisades Park, 

LLC, 888 A.2d at 660; National Rifle Association, 999 A.2d at 1258. 

An association has standing to bring an action on behalf of its 

members where at least one of its members is suffering an immediate or threatened 

injury as a result of the challenged action. Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 

83 A.3d 901, 922 (Pa. 2013); North-Central Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers 

Association, 827 A.2d at 554; Pennsylvania Social Services Union, Local 668 v. 

Department of Public Welfare, Office of Inspector General, 699 A.2d 807, 810 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1997); National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Casey, 580 

A.2d 893, 899 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990). This rule applies equally to nonprofit 

membership corporations. Parents United for Better Schools, Inc. v. School 

District of Philadelphia, 646 A.2d 689, 690, 692 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994); Concerned 

Taxpayers of Allegheny County v. Commonwealth, 382 A.2d 490, 493-94 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1978). 

To have standing on this basis, the plaintiff organization must allege 

sufficient facts to show that at least one of its members has a substantial, direct and 

immediate interest. Pennsylvania Social Services Union, Local 668, 699 A.2d at 

810; National Solid Wastes Management Association, 580 A.2d at 899; Concerned 

Taxpayers of Allegheny County, 382 A.2d at 493-94. General descriptions of an 

organization’s members cannot establish standing if they do not show that a 

member or members are sufficiently adversely affected to have standing. Compare

Armstead v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of City of Philadelphia, 115 A.3d 390, 

398, 400 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (en banc) (allegation that organization’s “members 

live within one to three blocks of the proposed sign” was inadequate to establish 
8

standing to challenge the sign) and Concerned Taxpayers of Allegheny County, 

382 A.2d at 494 (allegation that members were residents and citizens of 

Pennsylvania was inadequate to establish standing to challenge constitutionality of 

statute governing payment of state officials) with Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 

922 (organization had standing where it submitted affidavits showing that 

members resided in or owned property in zoning districts directly affected by the 

statute that it challenged) and National Solid Wastes Management Association, 580 

A.2d at 899 (organization had standing to seek declaratory judgment where it 

pleaded that its members had filed permit applications that were directly affected 

by the challenged order). Where the organization has not shown that any of its 

members have standing, the fact that the challenged action implicates the 

organization’s mission or purpose is not sufficient to establish standing. Armstead, 

115 A.3d at 399-400; Concerned Taxpayers of Allegheny County, 382 A.2d at 494.

Plaintiff argues that the dismissal of its action must be reversed 

because the trial court required it to disclose the identity of a specific member or 

members and because it alleged sufficient facts to establish that its teacher 

members have standing and to assert taxpayer standing. We do not agree.

Contrary to Plaintiff’s contentions, the trial court did not hold that 

Plaintiff was required to identify members by name to show standing. Rather, the 

trial court held that the Amended Complaint 

provides no specific Philadelphia teachers or taxpayers in its 

membership rolls nor presents any facts as to how these

members or the association are directly harmed by the 

collective bargaining agreement being challenged. The facts 

as alleged in the Amended Complaint are insufficient to 

establish that [Plaintiff] or its members would be directly 

aggrieved by the collective bargaining agreement.
9

(Trial Court Op. at 4.) Thus, the trial court dismissed the Amended Complaint for 

lack of standing not because Plaintiff failed to identify its aggrieved members, but 

because it failed to plead sufficient facts, whether by identification or description 

of the allegedly aggrieved members, from which it could be determined that those

members had standing. 

The trial court’s legal analysis was correct. Dismissal for lack of 

standing is proper where the plaintiff organization neither identifies its affected 

members nor pleads sufficient facts to permit a court to determine that they have a 

substantial, direct and immediate interest. Lincoln Party by Robinson v. General 

Assembly, 682 A.2d 1326, 1330 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (plaintiff organization failed 

to show that it had standing where it did not “set forth the nature of its membership 

or the names of any of its members” and “neglect[ed] to identify any of its 

members”) (emphasis in original); Eastern Pennsylvania Citizens Against 

Gambling v. Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1912 C.D.

2013, filed Nov. 10, 2014), slip op. at 10, 2014 WL 10298868 at *5 (community 

organization lacked standing where its filings “do not identify any member ... or 

set forth any individualized interest of its members”).3 Standing may be shown

without identification of individual members, but only where the complaint’s 

description of the organization’s members is sufficient to show that they are 

aggrieved. See North-Central Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association, 827 A.2d 

at 555 (association alleged that its membership included Pennsylvania medical 

malpractice attorneys and challenged statute directly affected Pennsylvania 

medical malpractice attorneys); Narcotics Agents Regional Committee v. American 

 

3 Because it is an unreported decision, Eastern Pennsylvania Citizens Against Gambling is not 

binding precedent, but is considered by the Court for its persuasive value. 210 Pa. Code § 

69.414(a).
10

Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 780 A.2d 863, 870 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2001) (association represented all employees who were affected by 

defendant’s actions); Pennsylvania Social Services Union, Local 668, 699 A.2d at 

810 (union alleged that it represented claims investigation agents and claims 

investigation agent supervisors, including members of that group who were 

affected by the challenged removal from civil service protection); Parents United 

for Better Schools, Inc., 646 A.2d at 692 (nonprofit corporation alleged that its 

members included parents of students in high schools where the challenged policy 

had been implemented).

The issue here is therefore whether the allegations of the Amended 

Complaint are sufficient to establish that Plaintiff’s teacher and taxpayer members

have standing. As the trial court correctly held, they are not.

Plaintiff argues that its members who are Philadelphia teachers have 

standing because under the 2010 CBA’s union leave provision they have lower

seniority than teachers who are on union leave. (Amended Complaint ¶7, R.R. at

16a.) Plaintiff asserts that under state law4and the 2010 CBA, seniority affects 

layoffs and staffing decisions. In addition, the 2010 CBA gives union leave 

teachers the right to return to the position they held at the time they went on leave. 

(Id. Ex. A, R.R. at 49a.) We agree that teachers’ seniority is a substantial interest, 

different from the interest of the public at large in enforcing compliance with the 

 

4

Plaintiff cites to Section 1125.1 of the Public School Code, Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, § 

1125.1, added by the Act of November 20, 1979, P.L. 465, as amended, 24 P.S. § 11-1125.1, as 

requiring that teacher layoffs be determined by seniority. It is unclear, however, that this 

requirement applies to the School District, as Section 696(i)(7) of the Public School Code grants 

the SRC the power to “suspend professional employes without regard to the provisions of section 

1125.1.” Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, § 696(i)(7), added by the Act of April 27, 1998, P.L. 

270, as amended, 24 P.S. § 6–696(i)(7). 
11

law that could support standing if that interest were directly and immediately

affected by the 2010 CBA union leave provision.

What is absent from the Amended Complaint, however, is any factual 

allegation sufficient to show that this lower seniority has any direct and nonspeculative, immediate effect on Plaintiff’s teacher members. The Amended 

Complaint does not allege the number of years of seniority that Plaintiff’s teacher 

members hold or that any of them are sufficiently low in seniority as to be subject 

to any risk of layoff or involuntary transfer. Given the Amended Complaint’s 

allegations that “many” of the teachers on union leave have been on union leave 

for over 15 years, the allegation that Plaintiff’s teacher members have less seniority 

than “many” of the teachers on union leave establishes only that they have less 

than 15 years of seniority. Moreover, even if years of seniority were alleged and

Plaintiff’s teacher members presently have low seniority, that would not show a 

likelihood that a union leave teacher would return while any individual teacher had 

insufficient seniority to avoid layoff or involuntary transfer because the Amended 

Complaint alleges that teachers stay on union leave for lengthy periods. The mere 

possibility that future events might occur that could cause one of Plaintiff’s teacher 

members to be affected by union leave teachers’ seniority is not sufficient to 

establish the direct and immediate interest required for standing. National Rifle 

Association, 999 A.2d at 1259 (possibility that an association member’s gun might 

be stolen in the future was insufficient to constitute direct and immediate harm

from ordinance requiring reporting of stolen firearms). In addition, without any 

allegation as to the subjects for which Plaintiff’s teacher members are certificated 

and that they are certificated for the same subjects or positions as teachers on union 

leave, it cannot be concluded that teachers on union leave would be favored over 

any of Plaintiff’s teacher members in filling positions. Because the Amended 
12

Complaint does not allege the schools at which Plaintiff’s members teach or the 

positions that they hold or that they are the same schools or positions as teachers 

who went on union leave, there is no basis to conclude that a union leave teacher 

would be favored in staff reductions within a school over any of Plaintiff’s 

members or that a union leave teacher would be entitled to take the job of any of 

Plaintiff’s members upon returning from leave.

Plaintiff’s allegation that union leave “deprives Philadelphia teachers 

of assistance, leadership, and valuable service from those teachers performing 

union work on school time” (Amended Complaint ¶7, R.R. at 16a) is likewise 

insufficient to show that any of Plaintiff’s teacher members are aggrieved. Union 

leave would only affect the School District’s ability to adequately staff its schools 

if the Union does not fully reimburse the School District for union leave teachers’ 

salaries and benefits and Plaintiff admits that it does not allege that the School 

District bears any cost of the union leave. The absence of particular teachers 

would not affect any schools other than the schools to which they are assigned, and 

Plaintiff does not allege that its members teach in any of the schools where the 

union leave teachers would be if they were not on leave or returned to their prior 

positions.

Plaintiff also argues that its members who are Philadelphia taxpayers 

have standing because their taxes fund School District schools. Taxpayer standing 

is allowed as a limited exception to the ordinary requirement of a substantial, direct 

and immediate interest where the parties directly and immediately affected by the 

government action in question are beneficially rather than adversely affected. 

Fumo, 972 A.2d at 503-06; Stilp v. Commonwealth, 940 A.2d 1227, 1233-35 (Pa.

2007); Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC, 888 A.2d at 661-62. Five requirements 

must be satisfied for taxpayer standing: (1) the government action that the plaintiff 
13

challenges would otherwise go unchallenged; (2) those directly and immediately 

affected are beneficially affected and not inclined to challenge the action; (3) 

judicial relief is appropriate; (4) redress through other channels is unavailable; and 

(5) there are no other persons better situated to assert the claim. Fumo, 972 A.2d at 

504; Stilp, 940 A.2d at 1233; Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC, 888 A.2d at 662. 

Where another party is better situated to assert the challenge that the plaintiff seeks 

to raise, the mere fact that it has not chosen to do so is not sufficient to support 

taxpayer standing. Fumo, 972 A.2d at 506 (“the fact that more appropriate 

governmental parties have not elected to challenge a particular governmental 

decision cannot be enough on its own to generate taxpayer standing - particularly 

where those executive authorities are not ‘beneficially affected’ by the decision”); 

Stilp, 940 A.2d at 1234-35 (because Auditor General was better situated than 

taxpayer to seek declaratory judgment that he had additional audit power, 

requirements for taxpayer standing were not satisfied even though Auditor General 

in his discretion had not chosen to bring suit).

Plaintiff cannot satisfy the requirements for taxpayer standing. 

Plaintiff admits that the School District is directly and immediately affected by the 

union leave provision of the 2010 CBA and could assert the claims that Plaintiff 

seeks to assert, but contends that because the School District is a party to the 2010 

CBA, it is not inclined to challenge it. (Amended Complaint ¶8, R.R. at 16a; 

Appellant’s Reply Br. at 6.) The Amended Complaint’s allegations contradict 

Plaintiff’s claim that the School District has no inclination to challenge the 2010 

CBA. The School District agreed to the terms of the 2010 CBA for the period 

from September 1, 2009 to August 31, 2013, but has not agreed to extend the 2010 

CBA beyond August 31, 2013 and the 2010 CBA expired on August 31, 2013. (Id.

¶¶14-16, R.R. at 17a-18a.) Although the 2010 CBA remains in effect and 
14

Plaintiff’s challenge is therefore not moot, that is because no successor agreement 

has been reached, not because the School District continues to agree to the terms of 

the 2010 CBA. (Id. ¶16, R.R. at 18a.) Moreover, it is clear that the School District 

is willing to challenge the 2010 CBA. As Plaintiff admits, the School District 

sought to cancel the 2010 CBA and filed a declaratory judgment action in 2014

seeking a ruling that it was not bound by the 2010 CBA. (Id. ¶17, R.R. at 18a.) 

See Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, AFT, Local 3, AFL-CIO, 144 A.3d at

1283-84. While the School District’s attempt to cancel the 2010 CBA was 

enjoined on the ground that the SRC lacked the unilateral cancelation power that it 

asserted, Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, AFT, Local 3, AFL-CIO, 144 A.3d 

at 1293-94, that ruling has no effect on the School District’s ability to challenge 

provisions of the 2010 CBA as illegal if it believed that there is a valid basis for 

such a challenge. 

Nor is the School District the only directly and immediately affected 

party better situated than taxpayers to challenge the union leave provision. To the 

extent that Plaintiff contends that the union leave provision inflates pension costs, 

the Public School Employees’ Retirement System has the power to challenge 

inflated pension claims and has in fact successfully made such a challenge. See

Kirsch, 985 A.2d at 673, 675-78. A School District teacher who loses his or her 

position to a teacher who returns from union leave or is laid off as a result of 

another teacher’s union leave seniority would be directly and adversely affected by 

the union leave provision and could have standing to challenge the 2010 CBA’s 

union leave provision. 

In addition, even where the five requirements for taxpayer standing 

are satisfied, the plaintiff must allege some adverse effect of the challenged action 

on taxpayers as a whole. Upper Bucks County Vocational-Technical School 
15

Education Association v. Upper Bucks County Vocational-Technical School Joint 

Committee, 474 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Pa. 1984) (no taxpayer standing to challenge 

reduction in number of school days because there was no allegation that reduction 

in state subsidy would cause any tax increase to offset the lost state funding). 

Union leave would only affect the School District’s finances and Plaintiff’s 

members’ taxes if the Union does not fully reimburse the School District for union 

leave teachers’ salaries and benefits. Because Plaintiff does not allege that the 

Union does not fully reimburse the School District, there is no adverse effect on 

taxpayers and its members’ status as Philadelphia taxpayers cannot give them 

standing to challenge the union leave provision.

Because the trial court correctly concluded that Plaintiff failed to 

show that any of its members have standing, we affirm its dismissal of Plaintiff’s 

action.

_______________ ____________________

JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Americans for Fair Treatment, Inc., :

:

Appellant :

: 

v. : No. 1618 C.D. 2015

: 

Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, :

Local 3, AFL-CIO; The School : 

District of Philadelphia; and School : 

Reform Commission :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 21st day of November, 2016, the July 22, 2015 

orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in the above 

captioned matter are AFFIRMED. 

________ ___________________________

JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge