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Malenkov' s(-Claim 

Is Warning To U.S. 

By Joseph Alsop 

GEORGE MALENKOV has told the 

world that "the United States no longer 

has a monopoly of the. hydrogen bomb." 

The first question is whether Malenkov 

was ·telling the truth. The answer is con· 

ditioriaJ. If he was lying, he ls· a big1er fopl than he looks. ' · · 

The earlier tests of Soviet atomic bombs 

-the first in September, W49, and the sec· 

ond and third in October, 1952-were first 

announced here in Washington and only 

confirmed in Moscow. The Washington an· 

nouncements were possible because of the 

American long-range detection project, first 

established in 1948 at the behest of the 

present chairman of the Atomic, Energy 

Commission, Admiral Lewis Strauss. 

The principle, if not the practice, of long· 

range detection is fairly simple. The fa• 

mous bomb-clouds of the weapons of total 

destruction rapidly ascend into the upper 

air, and circle the earth in the stratospheric Winds. The powerfully radioac:tive 

particles that the clouds contain can be 

detected by Geiger counters. Air sam:Pies, 

taken by patrol planes, tell much about 

the bombs that produced the clouds. Even 

the sqene of the explosions can be locatea, 

by seismographic and other evidence. . 

It is almost inconceivable that the ex· 

. plosion Of a ·Soviet hydrogen bomb has 

escaped this system of long-range deU!ction. Atomic explosions can in theory 

be concealed if the bomb is detonated un• 

derground-in a mine, for example. But 

the essential component of ~ hydrogen 

bomb, the very heavy hydrogen, tritimn, 

is a volatile gas which would escape into 

the air somehow. A method for detecting 

the most minute quantities of tritium in 

the atmosphere has already been published 

by Dr. W. F. Libby of Chicago University. 

Thus concealment seems out of the ques- tion. 

On the other hand, the radioactive cloud 

takes some days to circle the earth. Analysis 

of the data produced by long-range detection takes a much longer time-probably 

two weeks or mo~. In short, we ought to 

know whether Malenkov was lying before 

,,ery long, but our Government maY not 

know now. 

ID:A393BB 

SINCE long-range detection is also undeJ"-

stood by the Soviets, it has io be assumed 

for the present that· .Malenkov was not-lying. 

The next question, therefore, is whether 

his news is as serious as it looks. Here 

the answer is again conditional. Unless 

past American Government estimates of 

the scale and speed of Soviet atomic development have . been ludicrously wrong, 

Malenkov's news is deadly serious, certainly; but it does not justify despair. 

Here, again, tritium is the key to the 

problem. The chief limiting factor on an 

atomic program is the incredibly costly, 

massive and time-consuming process of · uranium separation. How many· atomic 

bombs you have is ultimately determined 

by how fast you can separate fissionable 

uranium-235 from the far more conimon: 

. ~.otope, in~rt uranium-238. By the same 

token, the· chief limiting factor on a hydrogen bomb program is the need for the very 

heavy hydrogen, tritium. How many hydrogen bombs YOU have is determined by your 

supply of tritium, which plays the part in 

a hydrogen bonib of the paper and kindling 

in a dampish log fire. 

G'+.I 

THE FACT remains, however, that in· 

ordinately heavy sactifices have to be made 

to get the tritium for a hydrogen bomb. 

You may gain one hydrogen bomb with the 

power. of two megatons, of 2,000,000 tons 

of TNT, But by using your Teactors to 

produce tritium instead of plutonlwn, you 

will lose a larger number of atomic bOmbs 

with a much greater explosive power>Very 

crudely and appropriately, one hydrogen 

bomb of two megatons, might cause the 

loss of. 100 plutonium bombs with a total 

power of ten megatons, or 10,000,000 tons 

.of TNT. . 

This is a poor exchange at best; for a 

big atomic bomb is quite big enough to d~ 

stroy all but a very small number of targets. · A nation like the United States, which 

already bas an ample atomic stockpile, can 

afford to make this exchange of large num· 

bers of atomic bombs for one hydrogen 

bomb. But a nation whose atomic stockpile 

is not ample already, will be distinctly 

short-sighted to make this exchange. 

If our intelligence has not ridiculously 

underrated the speed . of Soviet atomic 

build-up, the immediate effect of this first 

Soviet bomb may not be wholly unfavorable 

to this country. It will allow the Kremlin 

to boast about its new terror weapon, but it 

may also delay the over-all Soviet atomic 

build-up. The "if" above is a very big one; 

and the problem needs further exploration. 

Meanwhile, there is no escaping one point. 

Malenkov's hydrogen bomb is the final 

warning. Whatever else it means, it most 

certainly means that we can no longer be 

complacent about Soviet air-atomic power. 

And if we abandon· this suicidal compla. 

cericy, if we face the hard facts of our na• 

tional situation, the next phase will be a 

drastic change of national policy.