J. S76019/16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

QUDRE MCMILLAN, :

:

APPELLANT :

: No. 2490 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 13, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0005532-2014

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 23, 2016

Appellant, Qudre McMillan, appeals from the Judgment of Sentence 

entered by the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas on July 13, 2015. 

After careful review, we affirm. 

The facts, as established at trial and set forth by the trial court, are as 

follows:

The [v]ictim in this matter is a twenty-year-old resident of 

Philadelphia and mother of two children. In August of 

2014, the victim, a former home health aide, had begun to 

engage in prostitution, advertising her services as an 

“escort” on an internet website called “Backpage.”

On August 8, 2014, at approximately 3:00 a.m., the victim 

received a telephone call from a man identifying himself as 

“Kareem,” later identified as[, co-defendant,] twenty-one-

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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year-old Kareem Evans [(“Evans”)]. The victim agreed to 

meet Evans at 213 Market Street in Bristol Borough, Bucks 

County. Lorenzo Broggi[] drove the victim to the 

prearranged location where she met Evans. Evans then 

led her on foot to another location, an unoccupied 

residence located on Cedar Street in Bristol Borough. After 

entering an unfurnished backroom of that building, the 

victim plugged the charger for her cellphone into a wall 

outlet.

The victim, already concerned about the change of 

location, became frightened when she heard someone 

jiggling the handle of the front door. When Evans left the 

backroom and headed for the front door, the victim 

immediately used her cell phone to call Mr. Broggi, her 

driver. When Evans returned, he attempted to take the 

phone from the victim but she was able to temporarily 

regain control of it. The victim then attempted to leave 

the building. When she began to do so, she was 

unexpectedly confronted by a second man, later identified 

as [Appellant]. [Appellant] was armed with a shotgun. He 

pointed it at her and told her not to move. Raising both 

hands, the victim told [Appellant] that he could take the 

ten dollars in her pocket and her phone. [Appellant] 

continued to approach the victim, forcing her to retreat 

into the backroom.

Once the victim was again in the backroom, Evans 

physically restrained her from behind and placed his hand 

over her mouth and nose to prevent her from breathing. 

Fearful for her life, she begged him not to kill her, 

repeatedly telling him, “I have kids.” As she struggled 

with Evans, she heard a car horn sounding. Evans told her 

“not to f—ing scream” and he would let her live. She 

complied, and he released her. The victim sat in the 

corner crying as [Appellant] and Evans attempted to 

access the phone to see if she had called anyone. When 

asked if she had made a call, she told them she had not.

Evans then “dismissed” [Appellant] from the room and 

proceeded to orally and vaginally rape the victim, 

threatening to “punch her in her f—ing head” and kill her if 

she did not do what she was told. Evans ejaculated inside 

her. As Evans sexually assaulted the victim, [Appellant] 
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occasionally watched from his position in the hallway. 

When Evans then left the room, [Appellant] entered. The 

victim continued to cry as [Appellant] vaginally raped her. 

He ejaculated on her buttocks. [Appellant] then left the 

room. While the victim waited for her attackers to return, 

she heard a door shut. When neither attacker returned 

after two minutes, the victim fled the building.

Shortly after dropping the victim off at the Market Street 

address where Evans was waiting, Mr. Broggi received a 

call from the victim. When he answered, the victim did not 

speak to him. Mr. Broggi heard a scuffle in the 

background. As he listened, he heard a male voice. Mr. 

Broggi testified that he heard the victim crying and yelling. 

He specifically heard her say that she did not have any 

money with her. He also heard her tell someone to leave 

her alone, and not to hurt her. The phone call abruptly 

ended. Realizing that the victim was in trouble, Mr. Broggi 

returned to Market Street in an attempt to locate the 

victim. He circled the area sounding the horn of his 

vehicle. Mr. Broggi’s efforts to locate the victim were 

unsuccessful.

At approximately 4:30 a.m., Arthur Carter and his son 

were driving on Market Street approaching Cedar Street 

when the victim ran out from Cedar Street and ran in front 

of his van. When Mr. Carter lowered his window to speak 

to her, she told him that she had been raped and that she 

needed help. Mr. Carter testified that the victim was 

hysterical, that she was crying, and that her hair looked 

“like somebody had been dragging her around.” Her 

clothes were askew and her underwear was pulled out of 

her pants. Mr. Carter called 911 and remained with her 

until assistance arrived. The victim was then transported 

from the scene to Abington Memorial Hospital for a Sexual 

Assault Examination. During that examination, vaginal 

and rectal swabs were obtained.

A search warrant was obtained for the Cedar Street 

address. During the search, the cell phone charger to the 

victim’s telephone was found on the floor of the back room 

of the residence. Police contacted the victim’s cell phone 

carrier who informed them that the victim’s cell phone was 

located at the intersection of Headley Street and Pine 
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Street in Bristol Borough, with an uncertainty of thirty-five 

meters. Evans was staying at 801 Pine Street which is 

located at the intersection of Headley and Pine Streets. 

That residence is approximately six blocks away from 

Cedar Street where the assaults occurred.

On August 9, 2014, police observed [Appellant] in the area 

of Cedar Street. On that same date, police executed a 

search warrant of 801 Pine Street. When police arrived, 

Evans was present. While detectives were executing the 

search warrant, [Appellant] arrived at the residence. The 

victim’s cell phone was found concealed beneath a seat 

cushion of a sofa inside the residence. Kalesha Cruz, 

Evans’s fiancée, told police and later testified that she 

observed [Appellant] give Evans the cell phone on Friday, 

August 8, 2014.

A photo array, which included an image of Evans as 

Photograph Number 2, was displayed to the victim. The 

victim almost immediately pointed to Photograph Number 

2, gasped, said, “That’s him. That’s the man who raped 

me,” and began to cry.

The vaginal and rectal swabs of the victim were submitted 

to the Pennsylvania State Police Bureau of Forensic 

Services for serological and DNA analysis. The items were 

determined to contain spermatozoa and the DNA of 

[Appellant] and Evans.

Trial Ct. Op., 11/13/15, at 2-5 (citations omitted). 

On December 23, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a Motion to 

Consolidate Appellant’s trial with that of Kareem Evans (“Evans”).1 The trial 

court held a hearing on the Motion on January 27, 2015. Neither Appellant’s 

 

1 That same day, the Commonwealth also filed a Motion to Consolidate for 

trial the charges pending against Evans. The Commonwealth withdrew that 

Motion, and tried those charges against Evans separately. 
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counsel nor counsel for Evans opposed the Motion to Consolidate. The trial 

court, therefore, ordered the cases consolidated. 

Prior to trial, on February 27, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a written 

motion seeking to admit evidence of co-defendant Evans’ acts of witness 

intimidation for the purposes of demonstrating consciousness of guilt. After 

an offer of proof, the trial court granted the motion over the objections of 

counsel for Appellant and Evans. 

On March 9, 2015, Appellant and Evans’ three-day joint jury trial 

began. The Commonwealth presented the testimony of ten witnesses, 

including the victim. The court ordered all non-police and non-expert 

witnesses sequestered from the courtroom during witness testimony. 

Relevant to this appeal, during the victim’s cross-examination by Appellant’s 

counsel, the victim became distraught and asked to leave the witness stand. 

The court recessed for 15 minutes, after which, over Appellant’s counsel’s 

objection, the court permitted the victim to retake the stand and Appellant’s 

counsel to continue with cross-examination. 

On March 13, 2015, the jury convicted Appellant of Rape by Threat of 

Forcible Compulsion, Robbery by Threat of Serious Bodily Injury, Robbery by 

Force, Terroristic Threats, Theft by Unlawful Taking, Criminal Conspiracy to 
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Commit Robbery by Threat of Serious Bodily Injury, and Criminal Conspiracy 

to Commit Theft.2, 3 

The court deferred sentencing for Appellant to undergo an evaluation 

by the Sexual Offender Assessment Board pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24. 

Based upon the findings of the Board, and with the agreement of the parties, 

the court found Appellant to be a Sexually Violent Predator.

On July 13, 2015, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 

sentence of 20-40 years’ incarceration, comprised of one term of 10-20 

years’ incarceration on the conviction for Rape by Threat of Forcible 

Compulsion, and two terms of 5-10 years’ incarceration on the convictions 

for Robbery by Threat of Serious Bodily Injury, and Criminal Conspiracy to 

Commit Robbery by Threat of Serious Bodily Injury, all first-degree felonies. 

 

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(a)(2); 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii); 18 Pa.C.S. § 

3701(a)(1)(v); 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a); and 18 

Pa.C.S. § 903(c), respectively.

3 The jury also convicted Evans of Rape by Threat of Forcible Compulsion, 

Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse by Threat of Forcible Compulsion, 

Robbery by Threat of Serious Bodily Injury, Robbery by Force, Terroristic 

Threats, Theft by Unlawful Taking, Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Robbery 

by Threat of Serious Bodily Injury, and Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Theft. 

The court sentenced Evans to an aggregate sentence of 40-80 years’ 

incarceration. Evans’ appeal from his Judgment of Sentence is pending 

before this Court. See Commonwealth v. Evans, No. 2475 EDA 2015. 

A separate jury convicted Evans of Criminal Solicitation (Witness 

Solicitation). 18 Pa.C.S. § 902(a). The court sentenced Evans to 3 1⁄2 to 10 

years’ incarceration, to be served consecutively to the sentence Evans 

challenges in his appeal at No. 2475 EDA 2015. Evans’ appeal from his 

Judgment of Sentence for Criminal Solicitation (Witness Intimidation) is 

pending before this Court. See Commonwealth v. Evans, 383 EDA 2016. 
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The court ordered Appellant to serve his sentences consecutively, but 

imposed no further penalty on the other convictions.

Appellant did not file a Post-Sentence Motion. On August 10, 2015, 

Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following two issues for our review:

1. Did the lower court err, during this joint trial, in 

allowing the Commonwealth to introduce evidence against 

the co-defendant alone, that he (Kareem Evans) 

attempted to persuade the complaining witness not to 

testify, notwithstanding the Court’s limiting instruction that 

the evidence could only be considered against Kareem 

Evans and not Appellant?

2. Did the trial judge err in permitting the complainant to 

resume her testimony after she left the courtroom without 

permission during cross-examination, and spoke with 

members of the district attorney’s office and one of the 

prosecuting police officers, in violation of the sequestration 

order?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

In his first issue, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in 

admitting evidence, pertaining to Evans only, of Evans’s acts of witness 

intimidation and Evans’ plan to induce the victim not to testify.4 Appellant’s 

 

4 Appellant also argues in his brief that the Commonwealth violated his 

constitutional rights by failing to give him adequate notice, pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P 582, of the Commonwealth’s intent to consolidate his trial with 

that of Evans. Id. at 18-19. Our review of the record indicates that 

Appellant did not raise this issue before the trial court. Accordingly, we find 

it waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are 

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”).
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Brief at 14. The challenged evidence, admitted upon the Commonwealth’s 

Motion as proof of Evans’ consciousness of guilt, consisted of redacted 

portions of five prison telephone calls between Evans and his fiancée 

Kaleshia Cruz (“Cruz”), and a letter that Evans wrote to Cruz, which 

demonstrated that Evans and Cruz planned to pay the victim not to testify at 

trial. The court also permitted Cruz to testify.

In support of this claim, Appellant first argues that the 

Commonwealth’s failure to give him notice of its Motion to Admit Other 

Crimes, Wrongs or Acts prior to the date of trial prejudiced him. Id. at 19. 

Appellant claims that, had he known that the court would permit the 

admission of the Commonwealth’s evidence of Evans’ acts of witness 

intimidation to show Evans’ consciousness of guilt, “he may have wanted . . 

. to seek a severance. [However, i]t was too late at that point, as both 

cases were attached for trial.” Id. Our review of the record, including the 

transcript of the argument on the Commonwealth’s Motion, indicates that 

Appellant never raised the issue of lack of notice of the Motion before the 

trial court. Accordingly, we find this issue waived.5 See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). 

Next, Appellant argues that the admission of this evidence to show 

Evans’ consciousness of guilt prejudiced Appellant. Id. at 19. He argues 

 

5 Moreover, even if Appellant had preserved this issue, it would lack merit, 

as the Commonwealth served Appellant’s counsel with this Motion on 

February 27, 2015. See Commonwealth’s Motion to Admit Other Crimes, 

Wrongs or Acts, Proof of Service, 2/27/15.
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that he “was forced to proceed to trial with a co-defendant who attempted to 

intimidate a witness,” and implies that the jury was incapable of separating 

Evans’s conduct from his conduct. Id. Appellant argues that the allegation 

that Evans attempted to intimidate a witness was the “most serious 

allegation against Kareem Evans” and that exposing the jury to evidence of 

this conduct deprived Appellant of a fair trial. Id. at 19, 23. He claims 

that the danger of unfair prejudice and jury confusion outweighed the 

probative value of the witness intimidation evidence. Id. at 22.

 Initially, we note that,

[t]he standard of review employed when faced with a 

challenge to the trial court's decision as to whether or not 

to admit evidence is well settled. Questions concerning 

the admissibility of evidence lie within the sound discretion 

of the trial court, and a reviewing court will not reverse the 

trial court's decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. 

Abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but 

rather where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or 

where the law is not applied or where the record shows 

that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill 

will.

Commonwealth v. Young, 989 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal 

citations omitted).

It is well-settled that “any attempt by a defendant to interfere with a 

witness’s testimony is admissible to show a defendant’s consciousness of 

guilt.” Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1009 (Pa. 2007). 

In the instant matter, the trial court explained its evidentiary ruling as 

follows:
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The evidence admitted at trial established that following 

his arrest, Evans and his fiancée, Kalesha Cruz, entered 

into a conspiracy to identify and locate the victim and then 

to offer her money in an effort to persuade her not to 

appear and/or testify in court. This [c]ourt permitted the 

Commonwealth to introduce a letter written by Evans 

shortly after his arrest, recorded prison calls between 

Evans and Cruz and Cruz’s in-court testimony as evidence 

of consciousness of guilt.

In the letter Evans wrote:

I was wrong. We were supposed to rob her, that’s it. 

But things got out of hand. She a girl from Back 

Page prostituting for money. If you can get in touch 

with her and offer her money, I’m sure she won’t 

show up. You just need to get the correct 

information . . . .

In a recorded call that occurred on August 14, 2014, Cruz 

advised Evans, “No luck yet. I’m searching. I sent your 

brother the information, so hopefully he’s been searching.” 

Cruz testified that she was explaining the status of her 

efforts to find the victim. In a recorded call that occurred 

on August 30, 2014, Cruz told Evans that she had to think 

of what to say. At trial, Cruz testified that she was 

referring to what she should say when she talked to the 

victim. During the August 30th conversation, Evans told 

Cruz that, if she talks to the victim, she should mention 

the money first. In a recorded call that occurred on August 

31, 2014, Cruz told Evans that she called “the number.” 

At trial, Cruz testified that this comment referred to the 

fact that she had called the telephone number for 

“Backpage,” the website Evans and [Appellant] used to 

contact the victim. Cruz also told Evans that she would try 

to speak with the victim when the victim appeared to 

testify at an upcoming court date.

. . . Evidence concerning Evans’ attempt to offer the victim 

a bribe not to testify was therefore admissible against 

Evans.

Trial Ct. Op. at 5-6 (citations omitted).
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We agree with the trial court that it properly admitted this evidence for 

the purposes of establishing Evans’ consciousness of guilt. However, our 

inquiry does not end here, as we must determine whether its probative 

value as to Evans’ consciousness of guilt was outweighed by any prejudice to 

Appellant.

Our Supreme Court addressed the admission of witness intimidation 

evidence at trial against only one of two co-defendants in Commonwealth 

v. Patterson, 546 A.2d 596 (Pa. 1988), in the context of joinder and 

severance. In that case, the Commonwealth charged both co-defendants 

with rape, robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, and conspiracy arising 

from the same incident and involving the same evidence. Id. at 597. Only 

one co-defendant was charged with witness intimidation. Id. On appeal, 

our Supreme Court held that severance of the trials was not required, 

finding that the defendant suffered no prejudice. The Patterson Court 

affirmed the rationale of the trial court, which concluded that the “evidence 

pertaining to the intimidation charge unmistakably and unequivocally 

pointed to the co-defendant only.” Id. at 601. The Patterson Court also 

agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that a “cautionary instruction[] could 

adequately dispel any prejudicial effect on [a defendant] from the 

introduction of evidence on intimidation relating to his co-defendant.” Id. 

When considering the balance a court must strike between probative value 

and prejudicial effect of evidence admitted against only one co-defendant, 
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the Patterson court noted that “[w]e cannot say that the possible 

prejudicial effect of the testimony on intimidation is more harmful than the 

prejudicial effect that we habitually tolerate in joint trials where evidence is 

introduced against only one of the defendants.” Id.

Applying the holding in Patterson to the instant matter, the trial court 

opined as follows:

As in Patterson, the defendants in the instant case were 

charged with identical rape and robbery offenses. The 

evidence of witness intimidation against one defendant 

arose directly out of the rape and robbery charges and 

clearly related only to Evans. The evidence was, therefore, 

capable of separation by the jury and there was no danger 

of confusion. As in Patterson, appropriate and 

unambiguous limiting instructions were given. Prior to the 

admission of the evidence, this [c]ourt instructed the jury:

Ladies and gentlemen, there are two separate 

defendants being tried here. Both of them are 

charged with the same criminal offenses, but they 

are two separate cases and they must be decided 

individually.

In this particular case the Commonwealth is now 

about to introduce evidence regarding conduct by 

one of the defendants, Kareem Evans. This evidence 

is being admitted against him and only him. This is 

not evidence that is in any way connected, and you 

may not consider this evidence as against 

[Appellant].

Prior to the presentation of the telephone calls between 

Evans and Cruz, this [c]ourt instructed the jury:

Again, let me remind the jury. These will be 

telephone calls that are alleged by this witness and 

by the Commonwealth to be telephone calls between 

Mr. Evans and his fiancée. This testimony is being 

offered solely against Mr. Evans. You may not 
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consider any statements made in this telephone call 

against his co-defendant . . . . You may consider 

only the conversation that has not been redacted 

and only consider that evidence against Kareem 

Evans.

During the testimony of Cruz, this [c]ourt instructed the 

jury:

Ladies and gentlemen, I want to be clear. As I said, 

you may only consider the statements made by Mr. 

Evans against Mr. Evans. Any conversations 

between Mr. Evans and this witness may only be 

considered against him.

During final instructions, this [c]ourt reiterated to the jury 

that they could not consider any evidence of the alleged 

witness intimidation against [Appellant]:

There was another piece of evidence that was only 

admissible against one defendant. The 

Commonwealth introduced evidence – and if you 

believe the evidence, it is for you to determine 

whether you do or not and for you to determine what 

the weight will be. The Commonwealth has 

introduced evidence that Mr. Evans contacted and 

was in contact with his fiancée, and that Miss Cruz –

Miss Cruz testified.

And you heard telephone calls that – between Mr. 

Evans and Miss Cruz, and you also saw a letter that 

was written by or alleged to be written by Mr. Evans 

to Miss Cruz. All of that evidence was admitted by 

the Commonwealth to establish that Mr. Evans 

engaged in conduct and conspired by his fiancée to 

interfere in this prosecution, to pay off a witness so 

that the witness would not appear in court and 

testify.

The Commonwealth has argued – and this evidence 

is admissible, if you believe it. If you find it to be 

true – and the Commonwealth introduced that 

testimony and it is admissible to show that evidence 

was – he was conscious of his own guilt and amounts 
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basically to what destruction of evidence by having a 

witness who had critical information not to appear in 

court.

That evidence is admissible solely – assuming you 

believe it, it would be admissible against Mr. Evans 

and only Mr. Evans. You may not use – any attempt 

that you find to obstruct justice in this case, you may 

not use it – you may use it against Mr. Evans, but 

you may not use it against [Appellant].

There was no evidence that [Appellant] was involved 

in that transaction or those conversations or the 

decision of Miss Cruz and Mr. Evans to contact or 

attempt to contact the victim in this case.

So in terms of that, it is only admissible against one 

defendant.

Trial Ct. Op. at 7-9 (citations omitted).

Our review of the notes of testimony indicates that the trial court gave 

the jury “unambiguous limiting instructions” directing them to consider the 

witness intimidation evidence only against Evans, and not against Appellant. 

Id. at 7. Because a “jury is presumed to have followed the trial court’s 

instructions[,]”6 we agree with the trial court that the evidence was “capable 

of separation by the jury and there was no danger of confusion.” Id. 

Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant was not prejudiced by the admission 

of the challenged evidence, and Appellant’s first claim of error fails.

In his second issue, Appellant claims the trial court improperly 

permitted the victim to continue to testify after returning to the witness 

 

6 Commonwealth v. Burno, 94 A.3d 956, 977 (Pa. 2014). 
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stand. Appellant’s Brief at 27. He avers that the trial court did not 

adequately inquire into the contents of the conversations in which the victim 

participated during the court’s recess in order to ascertain whether victim 

violated the court’s sequestration order. Id.

A trial court may sequester witnesses in order to “prevent a witness 

from shaping his [or her] testimony with evidence presented by other 

witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Henry, 706 A.2d 313, 320 (Pa. 1997) 

(citation omitted). Whether there has been a violation of a sequestration 

order is a question of fact for the trial court. Commonwealth v. Marinelli, 

690 A.2d 203, 219 (Pa. 1997). This Court will not overturn the decision of 

the trial court where it is “supported by sufficient credible evidence.” Id.

With respect to Appellant’s claim, the trial court opined as follows:

In the instant case, after the victim left the witness stand, 

this [c]ourt took a fifteen minute recess. Prior to allowing 

the witness to continue her testimony, this [c]ourt allowed 

counsel to question the victim as to whether she discussed 

her testimony while outside the courtroom. The victim 

testified that she did not. This [c]ourt also identified the 

individuals who spoke with the victim and asked each 

person individually if the content of the victim’s testimony 

was discussed. Each person represented to this [c]ourt 

that her testimony was not discussed. Moreover, counsel 

for the [d]efendants conceded that they had no basis [to] 

contradict the representations made to this [c]ourt. This 

[c]ourt therefore properly found that no violation of the 

sequestration order occurred.

Trial Ct. Op. at 9-10 (citations omitted).

Our review of the evidence of record, including the trial transcript, 

confirms the trial court’s conclusion that no violation of the court’s 
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sequestration order occurred. The victim left the witness stand abruptly 

during her cross-examination, during which time the court recessed. The 

victim then returned to the courtroom. The victim testified, and the parties 

who spoke to the victim during the court’s recess reported, that they did not 

discuss the victim’s testimony. N.T., 3/10/14 (morning), at 126-27, 141-42. 

Furthermore, neither counsel for Appellant nor counsel for Evans reported to 

the court that they had any reason to believe that the victim discussed the 

content of her testimony during the recess. Id. at 124-26. 

Moreover, permitting the victim to continue her testimony after the 

recess did not undermine the purpose of sequestration—preventing a 

witness from molding her testimony based upon testimony given by a 

previous witness. The victim in this case was not present during the 

testimony of any other witnesses and therefore, even after removing herself 

from the witness stand during her testimony, could not have shaped her 

testimony in accordance with testimony previously taken from other 

witnesses. For these reasons, we conclude there was sufficient credible 

evidence for the trial court to find that no sequestration violation took place. 

Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Judgment of Sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/23/2016