This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A16-0504

In the Matter of:

Trust Agreement of Don D. Henyan

Created Under Agreement

Dated May 1, 2006, as Amended.

Filed November 21, 2016

Affirmed

Johnson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court

File No. 62-TR-CV-15-9

Melissa Henyan, Franklin, Tennessee (pro se appellant)

Eric J. Lindstrom, Lindstrom Law Offices, Edina, Minnesota (for respondent trustee 

Molly S. Baglio)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Johnson, 

Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

JOHNSON, Judge

The parties to this case are two sisters who are the beneficiaries of a trust established 

by their father, who now is deceased. One sister challenged actions taken by the other 

sister as attorney-in-fact for their father during his lifetime and as trustee of the trust after 

their father’s death. The district court rejected the challenge on a motion for summary 

judgment. We affirm.
2

FACTS

In 2006, Don D. Henyan (decedent) established a revocable living trust. He 

appointed himself and his wife to serve as co-trustees. His wife died in 2012. He later 

appointed a daughter, Molly S. Baglio (Baglio), to be a co-trustee.

In January 2013, decedent amended the trust instrument. As amended, the trust 

instrument provides that, upon decedent’s death, the trustee “may, directly or through the 

Personal Representative of my estate, pay . . . the expenses of my last illness and funeral, 

valid debts and expenses of administering my estate, including my non-probate assets.” 

The amended trust instrument also provides that, upon decedent’s death, the trustee shall 

distribute tangible personal property in the manner specified in a document written or 

signed by decedent or, if unspecified, to Baglio. The amended trust instrument further 

provides that Baglio is to receive $250,000 “because of all the care, affection and attention 

she has provided to me over the years.” And the amended trust instrument provides that, 

upon decedent’s death, all remaining trust assets should be distributed in equal shares to 

Baglio and decedent’s other daughter, Melissa A. Henyan (Henyan). At the same time that 

he amended the trust instrument, decedent executed a bill of sale by which he conveyed all 

of his tangible personal property to the trust.

In January 2013, decedent also executed a statutory short-form power-of-attorney 

document in which he authorized Baglio to act as his attorney-in-fact with respect to all 

matters specified in the form. Baglio’s authority was to remain effective if decedent were 

to become incapacitated or incompetent. The power-of-attorney document states that 

Baglio was not required to provide an accounting unless requested by decedent or required 
3

by section 523.21 of the Minnesota Statutes. At the same time that he executed the powerof-attorney document, decedent executed a will in which he named Baglio as his personal 

representative. 

Decedent died on February 25, 2013. On that date, he owned a Bremer Bank 

checking account with a balance of $45,481.97. After decedent’s death, Baglio made 

expenditures with funds in the Bremer Bank checking account. In November 2013, Baglio 

transferred the balance of the account, then $11,099.64, to the trust by way of an affidavit 

for collection of personal property. See Minn. Stat. § 524.3-1201(a) (2014). 

Approximately a year after decedent’s death, Baglio, with the assistance of counsel, 

prepared a final accounting for the trust in preparation for the termination of the trust. On 

February 12, 2014, Baglio’s attorney sent the final accounting to Henyan by mail. Section 

6.3.6 of the amended trust instrument provides that if a beneficiary does not object to a 

trustee’s accounting within 90 days, the lack of an objection “shall constitute a valid and 

effective release of the Trustee with respect to all transactions disclosed by the accounts.” 

Henyan did not object to the final accounting within 90 days of February 12, 2014. 

On October 23, 2014, an attorney retained by Henyan sent a five-page letter to 

Baglio’s attorney. The letter alleged that Baglio had breached her fiduciary duty as trustee 

and had failed to properly administer the trust in several ways. Henyan’s attorney 

requested additional information and documents. The letter does not expressly refer to the 

February 12, 2014 final accounting, though it refers to some of the transactions disclosed 

in it. 
4

In February 2015, Henyan commenced this action by filing a petition pursuant to 

section 501B.16 of the Minnesota Statutes. In March 2015, Baglio responded to Henyan’s 

petition and, separately, petitioned the district court for approval of a supplemental final 

accounting, the payment of professional fees, and the termination of the trust. The 

supplemental final accounting differed from the original final accounting by using a 

different method to value bonds owned by the trust and by including a gift of a vehicle 

from the trust to Baglio pursuant to decedent’s written instructions concerning tangible 

personal property. The supplemental final accounting also revised the amounts of interest 

income, trustee fees, attorney fees, and accountant fees and showed a corresponding 

decrease in cash. 

In April 2015, Baglio served and filed a second supplemental final accounting. The 

second supplemental final accounting differed from the previous accounting by allocating 

to Baglio the estate taxes incurred on life insurance proceeds that she had received. The 

second supplemental final accounting also revised the amount of attorney fees that had 

been incurred since the previous accounting and showed a corresponding decrease in cash. 

On May 5, 2015, Henyan served and filed a response to Baglio’s second 

supplemental final accounting. Henyan asserted objections to Baglio’s actions as trustee 

pursuant to section 501B.16 of the Minnesota Statutes and objections to Baglio’s actions 

as attorney-in-fact pursuant to section 523.26 of the Minnesota Statutes. More specifically, 

Henyan objected to certain payments made by Baglio from the Bremer Bank checking 

account, certain distributions made by Baglio from the trust, and certain transactions 

disclosed in the second supplemental final accounting. 
5

In November 2015, Baglio moved for summary judgment on Henyan’s petition and 

her own petition. In January 2016, the district court granted Baglio’s motion. Henyan 

appeals.

D E C I S I O N

Henyan argues that the district court erred by granting Baglio’s motion for summary 

judgment.1 A district court must grant a motion for summary judgment if the “pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 

if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. A genuine issue of 

material fact exists if a rational trier of fact, considering the record as a whole, could find 

for the nonmoving party. Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp., 751 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Minn. 

2008). This court applies a de novo standard of review to the district court’s legal 

conclusions on summary judgment and views the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the party against whom summary judgment was granted. Commerce Bank v. West Bend 

Mut. Ins. Co., 870 N.W.2d 770, 773 (Minn. 2015).

I. Objections to Actions of Trustee

Henyan first argues that the district court erred by granting Baglio’s summary 

judgment motion with respect to her objections to Baglio’s actions as trustee. 

 

1Henyan was represented by counsel in the district court and in earlier stages of this 

appeal. Her attorneys withdrew from representation after submitting appellant’s principal 

brief on her behalf.
6

The district court rejected Henyan’s objections primarily on the ground that her 

objections were untimely. The district court relied on section 6.3.6 of the amended trust 

instrument, which provides that a beneficiary’s failure to object to a trustee’s accounting 

within 90 days constitutes a release of any objections to the accounting. The district court 

stated that Henyan did not object to the original final accounting until October 2014, which 

was far more than 90 days after Baglio’s attorney sent the original final accounting to 

Henyan. The district court further reasoned that Henyan’s opportunity to object was not 

revived by the supplemental final accounting or the second supplemental final accounting 

because the transactions disclosed in the original final accounting “were not substantively 

changed” in the subsequent accountings. 

Henyan contends that the district court erred on the ground that a separate 90-day 

period applies to the original final accounting and also to each subsequent accounting. 

Henyan’s argument requires us to interpret the amended trust instrument. In doing so, “our 

purpose . . . is to ascertain and give effect to the grantor’s intent.” In re Stisser Grantor 

Trust, 818 N.W.2d 495, 502 (Minn. 2012). The grantor’s intent is “determined from the 

document as a whole.” Norwest Bank, N.A. v. Beckler, 663 N.W.2d 571, 581 (Minn. App. 

2003). If the language of the trust instrument is unambiguous, we determine the grantor’s 

intent without resorting to extrinsic evidence. Stisser, 818 N.W.2d at 502. If the language 

of the trust instrument is ambiguous, however, we consider extrinsic evidence to resolve 

the ambiguity. In re Estate of Arend, 373 N.W.2d 338, 342 (Minn. App. 1985). We apply 

a de novo standard of review to a district court’s interpretation of an unambiguous trust 

instrument. Stisser, 818 N.W.2d at 502.
7

Section 6.3.6 of decedent’s amended trust instrument prescribes the manner in 

which a beneficiary may object to a trustee’s accounting and the consequences of a failure 

to make a timely objection:

Approval of Trustee’s Accounts if I am 

Incapacitated or Deceased. If I am incapacitated or deceased, 

the Trustee (or the Personal Representative of any deceased 

Trustee) may render accounts to the persons who are currently 

eligible to receive distributions. The approval of these 

accounts or the failure to object to the accounts within 90 days 

after the receipt of the accounts by those persons (or by those 

authorized to act on behalf of any such person), in writings 

delivered to any Trustee, shall constitute a valid and effective 

release of the Trustee with respect to all transactions disclosed 

by the accounts, and shall be binding and conclusive as to all 

persons.

(Emphasis added.) The district court interpreted the word “accounts” in section 6.3.6 to 

refer only to the original final accounting. But the use of the plural form of the word 

indicates that the grantor contemplated that a trustee might issue more than one accounting 

and, if so, that a beneficiary would have more than one opportunity to assert objections. 

Also, the text of section 6.3.6 reveals that a failure to make a timely objection gives rise to 

a release “with respect to all transactions disclosed by” an accounting, not to the entire 

accounting. In this case, some transactions were disclosed in the original final accounting 

and later were reiterated in subsequent accountings. Some transactions, however, were not 

included in the original final accounting but were disclosed for the first time in the 

supplemental final accounting or the second supplemental final accounting. We interpret 

section 6.3.6 to allow a beneficiary 90 days to object to each new disclosure of a transaction 

within 90 days of the disclosure. Given that interpretation, the district court correctly 
8

reasoned that Henyan was precluded from objecting to the transactions that were disclosed 

in the original final accounting. But the district court incorrectly reasoned that Henyan was 

precluded from objecting to the transactions that were not disclosed in the original final 

accounting but were disclosed for the first time in the supplemental final accounting or the 

second supplemental final accounting.

2

Henyan asserted objections to certain transactions in the document she served and 

filed on May 5, 2015, which was within 90 days of her receipt of both the supplemental 

final accounting and the second supplemental final accounting. Specifically, Henyan

objected to ten items in Baglio’s second supplemental final accounting. Four of those items 

(22a, 22e, 23a, and 23d) were disclosed in the original final accounting. Five items (22b, 

22c, 23b, 23c, and 23e) were disclosed for the first time in the supplemental final 

accounting or the second supplemental final accounting. One item (22d) was not disclosed, 

according to Henyan. Henyan’s objections to six of the ten items (22b, 22c, 22d, 23b, 23c, 

and 23e) were not untimely.

The district court also rejected Henyan’s objections to Baglio’s actions as trustee on 

an alternative ground. The district court reasoned that, “even if” Henyan’s opportunity to 

object was revived by the supplemental final accounting and the second supplemental final 

 

2Henyan argues in the alternative that the district court should have considered her 

objections by applying equitable principles. We need not consider the alternative argument 

because Henyan did not preserve it by presenting it to the district court. See Thiele v. Stich, 

425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 1988). In any event, the alternative argument is 

superfluous because, in light of our interpretation of section 6.3.6, Henyan did not release 

her objections to transactions that were disclosed for the first time in the supplemental final 

accounting or the second supplemental final accounting.
9

accounting, Henyan “fail[ed] to demonstrate” that the later-disclosed transactions were not 

“ordinary, necessary and reasonable adjustments.” The district court’s alternative ground 

for rejecting Henyan’s objections is valid. In both her objections and her memorandum of 

law in opposition to Baglio’s motion, Henyan did not explain to the district court why the 

claimed attorney fees (22b) or trustee fees (22c) are unreasonable. Henyan also did not 

develop an argument why Baglio acted improperly with respect to alleged undisclosed 

expenses related to decedent’s condominium (22d). Henyan also did not explain why 

personal property distributed by the trust to her (23b and 23c) was inaccurately valued or 

why she was prejudiced by the valuation. And Henyan did not explain why the allocation 

to Baglio of estate taxes incurred on life insurance proceeds that she had received was 

improper (23e). On appeal, Henyan either ignores these particular items or reiterates her 

general argument that the disclosures raise questions about the propriety of the transactions. 

Henyan has failed to identify any genuine issues of material fact with respect to these 

disclosures that would warrant a trial.

Thus, the district court did not err by granting Baglio’s motion for summary 

judgment with respect to Henyan’s objections to Baglio’s actions as trustee.

II. Objections to Actions of Attorney-in-Fact

Henyan also argues that the district court erred by granting Baglio’s summary 

judgment motion with respect to her objections to Baglio’s actions as attorney-in-fact, 
10

which are focused on expenditures Baglio made before decedent’s death using his Bremer 

Bank checking account and his credit card.

3

 

The district court again rejected Henyan’s objections primarily on the ground that 

the objections were untimely. The district court again relied on section 6.3.6 of the 

amended trust instrument and reasoned that the balance of the checking account was 

disclosed in the original final accounting and that “[t]he fact that specific transactions . . . 

were not disclosed . . . is not of consequence.” We question whether the amended trust 

instrument was intended to preclude a beneficiary from objecting to an action taken by an 

attorney-in-fact for the grantor. We also question whether the final accounting actually 

disclosed the transactions to which Henyan objects. Nonetheless, the district court also 

rejected Henyan’s objections to Baglio’s actions as attorney-in-fact on an alternative 

ground. The district court reasoned that, “even if” the 90-day period did not apply, 

“summary judgment would still be proper under the circumstances” because Henyan did 

not have sufficient evidence to prove that Baglio breached her fiduciary duty or that she 

acted in bad faith. 

 

3Henyan also contends that Baglio “abused her power as Decedent’s attorney-infact after Decedent’s death” by making purchases with decedent’s Bremer Bank checking 

account and credit card. This contention is without a legal basis because, as a matter of 

law, Baglio’s attorney-in-fact status terminated on decedent’s death. See Minn. Stat. 

§ 523.08 (2014). Henyan’s brief identifies only a few specific expenditures after 

decedent’s death, which were for utilities for decedent’s condominium. Baglio was 

appointed personal representative of decedent’s estate. “The powers of a personal 

representative relate back in time to give acts by the person appointed which are beneficial 

to the estate occurring prior to appointment the same effect as those occurring thereafter.” 

Minn. Stat. § 524.3-701. The expenditures at issue surely were beneficial to decedent’s 

estate. Henyan has not established that Baglio acted inappropriately in making those 

expenditures.
11

An attorney-in-fact shall exercise her authority “in the same manner as an ordinarily 

prudent person of discretion and intelligence would exercise in the management of the 

person’s own affairs.” Minn. Stat. § 523.21; see also Erickson v. Van Web Equip. Co., 270 

Minn. 42, 49, 132 N.W.2d 814, 819 (Minn. 1964). “The attorney-in-fact is personally 

liable to any person, including the principal, who is injured by an action taken by the 

attorney-in-fact in bad faith under the power of attorney . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 523.21.

In her principal brief, Henyan contends that Baglio breached her fiduciary duty by 

writing checks on decedent’s Bremer Bank checking account on nine occasions. 

Specifically, Henyan states that Baglio wrote a check to herself for $1,200, a check to her 

husband for $343, and seven checks to “cash” that total $1,740. In deposition, Baglio

testified that she wrote the first check because her father expressed a desire to make a gift 

to her in that amount. She testified that she wrote the second check to her husband to 

reimburse him for paying the license registration fees on her father’s vehicle. And she 

testified that she used the cash derived from the remaining seven checks to make purchases 

specifically requested by her father. 

Henyan also challenges a few instances in which Baglio used decedent’s credit card 

to make purchases during his lifetime. Specifically, Henyan states that Baglio used a credit 

card to purchase an iPad as a gift from her father to herself, to purchase wine at a liquor 

store, to pay for meals with friends, and to purchase groceries. In deposition, Baglio

testified that her father directed her to purchase the iPad as a gift for herself. She testified 

that she purchased the wine for the benefit of guests who visited her father’s home during 

his final illness. She also testified that her father approved of her taking her friends out to 
12

lunch because they had been helpful to her during his final illness. And she testified that 

she purchased groceries for guests and family members who visited her father’s home. 

Henyan’s examination of Baglio at her deposition did not effectively undermine her 

testimony concerning the purposes of the purchases she made with the Bremer Bank 

checking account and the credit card. Likewise, Henyan did not offer any evidence that 

contradicts Baglio’s deposition testimony. Accordingly, the summary judgment record 

contains only Baglio’s unrebutted testimony concerning her reasons for making those 

expenditures. The undisputed facts lead to the conclusion that Baglio did not act in bad 

faith when making those expenditures.

Thus, the district court did not err by granting Baglio’s motion for summary 

judgment with respect to Henyan’s objections to Baglio’s actions as attorney-in-fact.

Affirmed.