• 

lo TIMES·HERALD 

Washington, D. C. 

TUuDAY, AUGUST 8, 1950 

U. S. Intelligence 

Shakeup Urged 

By Byrd, Bridges 

Br WALTER TBOBAN 

Drastic shakeup of the Nation's 

intelligence service was asked 

7esterday by two senators who 

criticised the failure of the 

United States to be prepared for 

the Communist attack in Korea. 

Sen Byrd <D> of Virginia. de· 

clared that events of the last few 

weeks have demonstrated need 

for overhauling of intelligence 

agencies. He was supported by 

Sen. Bridges <R> of New Ha.mp. 

shire. Both ate members of the 

Senate armed services committee, 

which handles the military budget. 

Reorganize For War 

"The whole intelligence setup 

ought to be reorganized on a war 

basts," Byrd said. "I am particu· 

larl.7 disturbed because military leaders here thought that the 

North Koreans had committed 

most of their troops to the fight- ing zone and now we find that 

more reserves are being poured 

tnto the battle." 

Bridges said the best available 

information shows the United 

States was caught napping by the 

attack. He wants the Senate com· 

mittee to investigate the intelll· 

gence setup with a view to recommending revision of its entire • structure. 1 

1 

Chief Is Questioned 

"I hope that intelligence from 

other parts of the world is better 

and has been better evaluated 

than that which we got in Korea," Bridges said. 

ShOrtly after the Korean attack, the Se n a t e committee 

briefly questioned Adm. Hillenkoetter, director / of the central 

intelligence agency, on the nature 

of information being reported here. HWenkoe~ter said CIA had re· 

ports on massing of North Korean 

troops at the 3Bth parallel for 

more than a year before the in· 

vasion. He said CIA made no attempt to evaluate these reports, but merely passed them on to 

other government departments. 

REF ID:A43071 

·washington 'ailures Blained 

For Korea Intelligence Fiasco 

Information on Communist Moves 

Ignored by Strategic Pl.anners Here 

By WALTER SDDIONS rlntellilence eXPll'ts. 'l'wo da111 before the invaalon. .American ad· 

u. s. HDQ. IN KOREA, Au1. '1 J v1sers who had checked the latest 

CCTPS>-The failure of .American estimates were told natly there 

intelligence at the start of the would be no invasion for a con· 

I Kol'ean war was partly local and siderable time. partly due to a lack of Washln1· . 1 ton co-ordination. Veterans Brourbt In 

These points are notable: The lntelUgence experts noted 

1. Intelligence in K?1·ea failed that from 30,000 to 80,000 Xorea.n 

to predict the enemy s June 25 veterans had been shipped from 

D·da.y \ Manchuria and Siberia. to swell 

2. Te ch n 1 ~ al fntelll1ence in the enemy ranks. Two divisions of . 'War;hmgton failed to give the m~li· Red Koreans had fou1bt on the 

tarv advisers in Korea a true pie-: Germ.an front durin1 the war. 

: ture of the Russian T·34 tanks The failure of Washington to 

used so successfully ln the first I emphasize the dan1er of the Rus· 

mo11th of the war. sian tanks led to fatal compla- ! 

B d Accurate Do- cency. Almost no information on I • - their armor and armament was 

3. American officers 1n Korea available in Seoul when the war 

had accurate information on the broke, althou1h It was in files. 

North Korean military bulld·UP at The Amerlcan.advlsera did not beau times. But lntelll1ence was lieve the bazookas -and 4'1 MM. 

foolfrt by the numerou1 false in· anti-tank: 1un1 with which the 

vas1on alarms. South Korean army was 1 •ll'PPlied I 

The south Korean army was were capable of stopping these I 

d in tanks. This disbelief continued alerted twice in May an once tll the inadequately equipped June by such false alarms. The un d , 1 

-.Amencans had 11rown 110 accus· Gls learned it the har way. · 1 tomed to them that they scotied ---- . whe1, President Rhee and Premier 

Mo warned an attack was immi· 

1nent. 

Such alerts-now reco1nized as 

inspired from North Korea-date Times-Herald, Wash., D.C. 

back to 1947. American lntelll· August 13, 1950 

genre knew and reported these 

facts on the enemy's capabllltie11: 

1. The North Korean army 1n· I eluded more than 100,000 men. Of 

these, 2,000 tankers were trained 

in Ru111ia. There was at least one 

regiment of tanks and between 50 

·and 100 planes. 

2. The bulld·UP of army strength began in January with new draft 

levies supplementing five Russian. , trained divisions. 

Defenses Set U:p 

3. A zone three miles deep was 

cleared north of the 38th parallel during the spring. The Americans 

were not sure whether this was 

standard iron curtain technique 

or to prevent military news from 

seeping through. 4. The North Korean army was 

disposed along the border in three 

defense lines capable of stopping 

any South Korean attack. _ The intell~ence picture du1·ing June was clouded by Russian-in· 

spired political maneuvers. These 

/ included sudden permission for a 

I 

United Nations representative to 

visit the north; the dispatching 

1

· of three North Koreans to the 

south, and the offer to exchange 1 

Cho Man Slk, a famous political 1 leader held prisoner in the north, 

for several Communists held by the soutl~. 

None of these maneuvers was 

' successful. But they produced maximum contusion and milled