Montgomery Park, LLC v. Maryland Department of General Services, Case Nos. 

0035 and 0048, September Term 2021. Opinion by Nazarian, J. 

STATE FINANCE AND PROCUREMENT – MARYLAND STATE BOARD OF 

CONTRACT APPEALS – LEGAL STANDARD FOR CANCELLATION OF A 

PROCUREMENT 

The correct standard of review when reviewing a procurement agency’s decision to cancel 

a procurement is whether the decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. The 

Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals reviews a procurement officer’s decision 

against this standard and may not substitute its judgment for the procurement officer’s. 

STATE FINANCE AND PROCUREMENT – BID PROTESTS – STANDING 

Under COMAR 21.10.02.02, only interested parties may file bid protests. A party is not an 

interested party, and thus lacks standing, when it is not in line for award of a sole source 

procurement. When a party is not an actual or prospective bidder, a procurement agency 

may deny the party’s bid protest on standing grounds. 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case Nos. 24C20000887 & 24C20001565

REPORTED 

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

Nos. 35 & 48 

September Term, 2021

______________________________________

MONTGOMERY PARK, LLC,

v.

MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL 

SERVICES

______________________________________

Fader, C.J.,

Berger,

Nazarian,

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Nazarian, J.

______________________________________

Filed: February 23, 2022

* Judge Kevin F. Arthur did not participate in the 

Court’s decision to designate this opinion for 

publication in the Maryland Appellate Reports 

pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-605.1.
This pair of appeals arises from decisions of the Maryland State Board of Contract 

Appeals (“Board”) to sustain two bid protests filed by Montgomery Park, LLC. First, 

Montgomery Park protested the Maryland Department of General Services’s (“DGS”)

decision to cancel a Request for Proposal (“RFP”) for office space, that DGS had issued 

on behalf of the Maryland Insurance Administration (“MIA”). Montgomery Park was the 

recommended awardee of the MIA lease, but DGS cancelled the RFP before presenting it

to the Board of Public Works (“BPW”) for approval. The DGS procurement officer denied 

Montgomery Park’s bid protest and Montgomery Park appealed to the Board.

Second, Montgomery Park protested DGS’s decision to renew MIA’s lease with St. 

Paul Plaza Office Tower, LLC (“St. Paul Plaza”) on a sole-source basis. The DGS 

procurement officer denied this protest as well and Montgomery Park appealed to the 

Board again. 

The Board sustained both bid protests and DGS sought judicial review in the Circuit 

Court for Baltimore City. Montgomery Park appeals both decisions of the circuit court,

which reversed the judgments of the Board and reinstated the DGS procurement officer’s 

original decisions. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgments of the circuit 

court.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Regulatory And Statutory Background.

We start with an overview of Maryland procurement law. “The State Finance and 

Procurement Article of the Maryland Code,” specifically Title 13, “and its regulations,” 

Title 21 of the Code of Maryland Regulations (“COMAR”), “govern the solicitation and 
2

award of certain state contracts for the purchase of” real property. State Ctr., LLC v. 

Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 503 (2014). Title 21 of COMAR “contains 

the regulations that govern” Title 13 of the State Finance and Procurement Article.

Department of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. ARA Health Servs., Inc., 107 Md. App. 445, 

460 (1995). Under COMAR 21.03.04.01, “[e]ach determination required by the State 

Finance and Procurement Article” or Title 21 of COMAR must be written and “[b]ased on 

written findings of, and signed by, the person who made the determination.”

After a bid is opened but before the award, a procurement officer may “cancel an 

invitation for bids, a request for proposal, or other solicitation” if the officer determines 

that cancellation “is fiscally advantageous or otherwise in the best interests of the State.” 

Md. Code (1988, 2021 Repl. Vol.), § 13-206(b)(1) of the State Finance & Procurement 

Article (“SF”); see also COMAR 21.06.02.02C(1) (“After opening of bid proposals but 

before award, all bids or proposals may be rejected in whole or in part when the 

procurement agency . . . determines that this action is fiscally advantageous or otherwise 

in the State’s best interest.”). Further, a procurement officer who “determines that renewal 

of an existing lease is in the best interests of the State . . . may negotiate the renewal without 

soliciting other offers.” SF § 13-105(g); see also COMAR 21.05.05.02D (“When it is 

determined to be in the best interests of the State, the procurement officer may negotiate 

the renewal of an existing real property lease without soliciting other proposals.”).

Interested parties, defined as “an actual or prospective bidder, offeror, or contractor 

that may be aggrieved by the solicitation or award of a contract,” may file a bid protest. 

COMAR 21.10.02.01B(1). A bid protest is “a complaint relating to the solicitation or award 
3

of a procurement contract.” COMAR 21.10.02.01B(2). Bid protests must “be filed not later 

than 7 days after the basis for the protest is known or should have been known, whichever 

is earlier.” COMAR 21.10.02.03B. “Protestors are required to seek resolution of their 

complaints initially with the procurement agency.” COMAR 21.10.02.10A. If the protestor 

is unsatisfied with the procurement agency’s determination, they may appeal to the Board

under COMAR 21.10.07.02.

The Maryland Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), as codified in the State 

Government Article (“SG”) (1984, 2021 Repl. Vol.), governs judicial review of final 

administrative agency decisions, including the Board’s, in contested cases. Section 10-

222(h) provides the circuit court with authority to review and either remand, affirm, or 

reverse agency decisions:

(1) remand the case for further proceedings;

(2) affirm the final decision; or 

(3) reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of the 

petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding, 

conclusion, or decision:

(i) is unconstitutional;

(ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the 

final decision maker; 

(iii) results from an unlawful procedure;

(iv) is affected by any other error of law;

(v) is unsupported by competent, material, and 

substantial evidence in light of the entire record as 

submitted;

(vi) in a case involving termination of employment or 

employee discipline, fails to reasonably state the basis 

for the termination or the nature and extent of the 

penalty or sanction imposed by the agency; or 
4

(vii) is arbitrary or capricious. 

Parties aggrieved by the final judgment of the circuit court may appeal to this Court. SG

§ 10-223(b)(1).

B. The Requests For Proposal And Procurement Process.

On April 1, 2008, MIA entered into a lease agreement with St. Paul Plaza, located 

at 200 St. Paul Place in Baltimore City. St. Paul Plaza is owned and managed by the 

Kornblatt Company. The lease between MIA and St. Paul Plaza was set to expire on May 

3, 2019, subject to a five-year renewal option and a six-month holdover period. In August 

2017, based on concerns about parking options for its employees, MIA asked DGS to issue 

a RFP for new office space.1 On behalf of MIA, DGS issued RFP No. LA-01-18, which 

solicited offers for new office space, on August 21, 2017. 

On September 19, 2017, Montgomery Park, located at 1800 Washington Boulevard 

in Baltimore City, submitted its proposal and offered to lease office space to MIA. Eleven 

other buildings, including St. Paul Plaza, also submitted proposals for the new office space. 

On May 4, 2018, DGS Procurement Officer (“PO”) Wendy Scott-Napier selected 

Montgomery Park for award of the MIA lease. Ms. Scott-Napier listed the proposals in 

ranked order, and Montgomery Park came in first place with a score of 229.4 while St. Paul 

Plaza came in second with a score of 204.0. 

DGS and Montgomery Park then entered an eleven-month period of negotiations 

1 DGS is a “primary procurement unit” with the authority to designate procurement 

officers to “(1) enter into a procurement contract; (2) administer a procurement 

contract; or (3) make determinations and findings with respect to a procurement 

contract” on behalf of the State. SF § 11-101(m)(2), (p)(1)–(3).
5

over the MIA lease. In June 2018, DGS prepared a briefing summary that detailed reasons 

for selecting Montgomery Park for the MIA lease. The summary noted that “[b]y moving 

MIA to Montgomery Park, the State would save $337,705.27 annually and $3,337,052.70 

over the full 10-year lease term, after factoring in the agency’s moving costs and a moving 

allowance provided by the landlord.” DGS also chose Montgomery Park over St. Paul 

Plaza because “[c]urrently . . . not all MIA employees have access to free parking. 

Montgomery Park operates a surface parking lot where all MIA employees would have 

access to free parking.” 

DGS, MIA, and Montgomery Park met in November 2018 to discuss the logistics 

of a move to Montgomery Park. At this time, DGS also provided Montgomery Park a draft 

lease. Montgomery Park left that meeting “with an understanding that the lease was to be 

presented to the Board of Public Works in January 2019.” 

On December 18, 2018, Ms. Scott-Napier notified Kornblatt representative Tim 

Polanowski by email that DGS would not be exercising the five-year renewal option with 

St. Paul Plaza, but asked for a one-year extension “in the event the move [to Montgomery 

Park] is delayed.” Mr. Polanowski rejected this request as “unworkable for [St. Paul 

Plaza],” but offered to negotiate a multi-year renewal. On January 3, 2019, Ms. ScottNapier emailed Mr. Polanowski requesting “a renewal of the lease on behalf of MIA for a 

shorter period of time” than five years. This conversation continued on February 7, 2019, 

when Ms. Scott-Napier discussed the lease extension with Mr. Polanowski and “requested 

either a 3 year short term lease with [termination for convenience] or a 3 month hold-over 

extension[.]” But as of March 11, 2019, Mr. Polanowski had not responded to Ms. Scott-
6

Napier’s request for a short-term extension because the trustees of St. Paul Plaza wanted 

to meet with her. Meanwhile, on March 12, 2019, DGS informed Montgomery Park the 

MIA lease would be presented to the BPW for approval on April 24, 2019.

On March 29, 2019, Ms. Scott-Napier and another DGS representative met with Mr. 

Polanowski and two St. Paul Plaza trustees to discuss the MIA lease. There were no notes 

of this meeting, but on April 9, 2019, Mr. Polanowski emailed Ms. Scott-Napier his 

understanding of the outcome:

I just wanted to send a reminder that in our meeting on March 

29th, we determined a [Letter of Intent] with fully negotiated 

terms agreed upon by both parties would be delivered no later 

than April 24th or we would have to unfortunately continue 

negotiations with other tenants to fill the MIA space . . . .

(Emphasis in original.)

Ms. Scott-Napier, however, had a different understanding of the meeting:

[COUNSEL FOR MONTGOMERY PARK]: Did the 

Kornblatt Company ask DGS to renew its lease at the March 

29th meeting?

[MS. SCOTT-NAPIER]: They asked, and we told them we 

could not discuss the lease renewal at that meeting. That we 

were there only to discuss a short-term extension or hold-over 

extension. 

Ms. Scott-Napier also disagreed with Mr. Polanowski’s characterization of the meeting:

[COUNSEL FOR MONTGOMERY PARK]: Mr. Polanowski 

reminded you that in that March 29th meeting it was 

determined that a Letter of Intent with, quote, fully negotiated 

terms agreed upon by DGS and the owners of 200 St. Paul 

would be delivered to the owners of 200 St. Paul by April, 24, 

2019, correct?

[MS. SCOTT-NAPIER]: That is what he wrote. I did not agree 

to that. I did not agree to that because we did not discuss terms. 

All I stated in our March 29th meeting was that we would know 
7

by April 24th whether we were moving to Montgomery Park. 

Because that was the Board of Public Work’s [sic] day, and we 

would have sought approval for the lease. 

On April 12, 2019, however, Ms. Scott-Napier responded to Mr. Polanowski’s April 9, 

2019 email, stating “[w]e understand the timing request and hope to get back to you by 

4/22 at the latest.” 

C. Cancellation Of The RFP.

On April 19, 2019, Ms. Scott-Napier sent an email to MIA Commissioner Al 

Redmer and DGS to inform them about the lease renegotiation with St. Paul Plaza:

Just wanted to confirm that DGS will begin the lease 

renegotiation process next week. We are currently in the lease 

hold-over period through November 2, 2019, and there is no 

issue with your occupancy until that date. I am confident that 

we will complete the lease renewal process and seek BPW

approval for a renewal lease no later than September 4th.

On April 23, 2019, the day before the lease between Montgomery Park and MIA was to be 

submitted to the BPW for approval, Commissioner Redmer sent a letter to DGS asking it

to cancel the procurement of the MIA lease. Commissioner Redmer provided four reasons 

to cancel the MIA lease with Montgomery Park: 

1. The initial justification for the Request for Space has 

changed and is no longer valid. . . . Once [Montgomery 

Park] was identified as the intended awardee, it became 

clear that improved parking options were less critical to 

staff than access to multiple modes of public transportation; 

approximately 60% of MIA employees use public 

transportation to commute to and from work. [Montgomery 

Park] is not directly accessible by multiple city bus routes, 

regional commuter buses, Metro and Light Rail. Lack of 

direct access to [Montgomery Park] will require employees 

to board a private 15-person shuttle that runs between the 

Convention Center and [Montgomery Park] during limited 
8

morning and evening hours. Members of the general public 

will not have access to this private shuttle . . . . 

2. Employee retention will be significantly adversely 

impacted. . . . The MIA anticipates that its relocation to 

[Montgomery Park] will result in the departure of 

experienced regulatory staff with the specialized insurancerelated knowledge and expertise needed to perform its 

regulatory functions. An increase in employee turnover and

the time and expense to recruit and train new staff will be 

particularly detrimental to the MIA’s operations . . . . 

3. Interruption of MIA operations and regulations of 

Maryland’s insurance industry will hurt Maryland 

consumers and businesses.

The moving cost estimate did not consider the interruption 

to regulatory operations during the relocation period which 

is projected to last several weeks. . . . 

4. Insurance companies doing business in Maryland have 

opposed the move on the basis that it will be the second 

time in 10 years that these companies must fund the 

MIA’s relocation.

Among other regulated entities, several large insurance 

companies, one a Maryland domestic company, have 

complained that the relocation of the agency twice in 10 

years is a wasteful expenditure of their funds. The moving 

cost estimate did not consider that the relocation would 

increase the cost of doing business in Maryland. Should a 

company leave the state, this will not only hurt consumers 

of insurance, but will reduce jobs, and reduce the premium 

tax revenue. 

(Emphasis in original.) Commissioner Redmer concluded it was “in the best interest of the 

State to cancel this procurement.” 

That same day, Ms. Scott-Napier sent a letter to Montgomery Park cancelling the 

RFP. The letter did not state a reason for cancelling the procurement, writing only that “[a]t

the request of [MIA], [DGS] is cancelling RFP # LA-01-18.” It did, however, attach 

Commissioner Redmer’s April 23 letter to DGS detailing the reasons why MIA wanted to 
9

cancel the procurement. Ms. Scott-Napier then prepared a Procurement Officer’s Written 

Determination, pursuant to COMAR 21.05.03.01, again summarizing Commissioner

Redmer’s April 23 letter. She concluded “[b]ased on the rationale presented, I find that this 

RFP is no longer in the State’s best interest and recommend approval of the MIA request.” 

On April 25, 2019, Ms. Scott-Napier sent a letter to Mr. Polanowski, cc’ing 

Commissioner Redmer, stating that DGS “would like to begin discussions on the [MIA] 

lease” with St. Paul Plaza. The BPW approved DGS’s request to renew MIA’s lease with 

St. Paul Plaza on January 8, 2020. 

D. The Bid Protests.

1. The first bid protest

On April 30, 2019, Montgomery Park protested (“First Protest”) Ms. Scott-Napier’s 

decision to cancel the procurement. It contended that “DGS’s decision to cancel the RFP 

was arbitrary and capricious, lacked a rational basis, and was otherwise unreasonable.” 

First, Montgomery Park asserted that the cancellation notice violated COMAR 21.03.04.01 

and 21.06.02.02 because there was “no ‘determination’ made by DGS that cancellation ‘is 

fiscally advantageous or otherwise in the State’s best interest,’ nor are there reasons offered 

by DGS why cancellation is necessary.” Second, Montgomery Park argued that the reasons 

offered by Commissioner Redmer in his April 23 letter did not “provide DGS with a 

rational basis to support its decision to cancel the RFP.” Third, Montgomery Park 

contended that MIA’s reasons for cancellation were “pretextual” and meant “to prevent the 

State of Maryland from entering into a lease agreement with anyone other than St. Paul 

Plaza.” (Emphasis in original.)
10

On June 20, 2019, Ms. Scott-Napier, in her capacity as procurement officer, issued 

a final decision letter denying Montgomery Park’s First Protest. She detailed that “[a]fter 

a careful and detailed consideration of all of the factors . . . I determined that [] the 

solicitation was no longer justified, and that cancellation of the RFP was fiscally 

advantageous and in the best interest of the State.” Ms. Scott-Napier rejected Montgomery 

Park’s contention that the cancellation notice violated COMAR because the “absence of a 

continued need for the procurement is, in and of itself, a sufficient reason for canceling the 

RFP.” Ms. Scott-Napier also found that DGS had a rational basis for canceling the RFP:

DGS did not enter into this procurement with the intent of 

cancelling it. During the negotiation period after the 

recommended award to Montgomery Park, it became clear that 

the parking accommodation issue was minor in comparison to 

other issues arising from the relocation . . . . In addition, for a 

number of other reasons . . . MIA concluded that the move 

would negatively impact its employees, visitors, the insurance 

companies that provide its funding, and ultimately, Maryland 

taxpayers and the business community. DGS evaluated the 

concerns raised by MIA and reached the same conclusion. 

Ultimately, DGS determined that the relocation could not be 

justified financially and was not in the best interest of the State. 

Once DGS made this determination, it had the absolute right 

under COMAR and DGS’s Standard Specifications to cancel 

the RFP and negotiate the renewal of MIA’s lease with 200 St. 

Paul Place. 

(Emphasis added.) On July 1, 2019, Montgomery Park appealed DGS’s denial of the First 

Protest to the Board.
11

2. The second bid protest2

On September 27, 2019, Montgomery Park filed another bid protest (“Second

Protest”), this time challenging DGS’s decision to renew MIA’s lease with St. Paul Plaza

and citing three errors. First, Montgomery Park argued DGS violated COMAR because 

Ms. Scott-Napier negotiated the MIA lease with St. Paul Plaza without determining, in 

writing, that renewal was in the best interest of the State:

COMAR 21.05.05.02D required DGS and/or the procurement 

officer to make a written “determination” that it was in the 

State’s best interest to negotiate the terms of the Renewal 

Lease. No such “determination” was made, and therefore the 

ensuing negotiations are ultra vires and will result in a void 

contract. 

Montgomery Park asserted it was not aware of the absence of this written 

determination until September 23, 2019. It contended that it didn’t receive the April 25, 

2019 letter from Ms. Scott-Napier to Mr. Polanowski discussing renewal of the MIA lease 

until September 18, 2019, during the discovery phase of the First Protest appeal. In 

response, on September 19, 2019, Montgomery Park submitted a request under the 

Maryland Public Information Act seeking:

The written “determination” in accordance with COMAR 

21.05.05.02D that it was in the best interests of the State of 

Maryland to negotiate the renewal of the real property lease 

agreement between (i) St. Paul Plaza Office Tower, LLC, and 

(ii) the State of Maryland, to the use of the Maryland Insurance 

Administration. 

2 Montgomery Park filed another bid protest on August 23, 2019, about a month before 

it filed the protest that we have labeled the Second Protest. This bid protest was denied 

as untimely. Montgomery Park did not appeal this decision to the Board.
12

On September 23, 2019, DGS informed Montgomery Park there were “no records within 

[DGS’s] custody and control responsive to your request.” Therefore, Montgomery Park 

asserted, the timeliness requirement that “protests shall be filed not later than 7 days after 

the basis for protest is known or should have been known, whichever is earlier,” was met 

because only four days elapsed between September 23 and September 27. 

Second, Montgomery Park “preemptively challenge[d] any finding [] that it was in 

the State’s best interest to negotiate the Renewal Lease . . . .” It enumerated specific reasons 

why it was not in the State’s best interests for DGS to renew the MIA lease with St. Paul 

Plaza, including that the renewal lease was “prohibitively expensive.” Third, Montgomery 

Park asserted that it had standing to challenge the proposed renewal award because “it was 

aggrieved by DGS’s unauthorized negotiations with St. Paul Plaza, and will be aggrieved 

by the award of the Renewal Lease which will effectively prevent Montgomery Park from 

entering into a real property lease with the State for use by MIA for at least 10 years . . . .” 

Ms. Scott-Napier denied the Second Protest on October 15, 2019 as untimely. She 

found that Montgomery Park knew well before September 23, 2019 that DGS was 

renegotiating the MIA lease with St. Paul Plaza. And because “Montgomery Park was 

aware on July 23, 2019, at the latest,” of the renewal lease, the Second Protest, filed on 

September 27, 2019, was untimely. Ms. Scott-Napier also found that Montgomery Park 

did not have standing to protest the renewal of the MIA lease because it was not an 

interested party and was not in line for a renewal lease. In addition, she found that the 

Second Protest had “no merit as DGS’s determination that it was in the best interests of the 

State to negotiate a renewal lease with St. Paul Plaza was entirely consistent with 
13

COMAR.” On October 24, 2019, Montgomery Park appealed DGS’s denial of the Second 

Protest to the Board. 

E. The Board’s Rulings.

1. The Board’s first ruling 

On October 23, 2019, the Board held a merits hearing on the appeal of the First 

Protest. The standard of review was a prominent issue throughout the hearing. Montgomery 

Park urged the Board to “render a decision that the decision to cancel the procurement in 

April 2019 was arbitrary and capricious, and that there was no rational basis to support the 

decision,” while DGS asked the Board to consider “whether the decision to cancel that 

procurement, which is within the discretion of the procurement officer for DGS, was so 

arbitrary as to be fraudulent or a breach of the public trust.” 

At the hearing, Ms. Scott-Napier testified she canceled the RFP because she 

determined that it was in the State’s best interests to do so. She testified that she knew of 

MIA’s concerns about moving to Montgomery Park before the April 23, 2019 cancellation, 

and noted that “when we met in February we were reviewing the moving costs to address 

their concerns, but we were still working toward seeking approval for the Montgomery 

Park lease.” She asked Commissioner Redmer to put MIA’s concerns in writing. Ms. ScottNapier reviewed that writing (Commissioner Redmer’s April 23 letter) and considered 

MIA’s reasons “to be legitimate because of the conversations that I had had with MIA,”

and “[b]ecause I’m hearing it directly from Al Redmer, and I take it seriously.” Ms. ScottNapier acknowledged she did not state her reasons for cancelling the RFP specifically in 

her letter to Montgomery Park, but reasoned she failed to do so because “I felt it had been 
14

stated in the Redmer letter” that was attached to her cancellation letter. 

Commissioner Redmer also testified at the merits hearing. He acknowledged that

“[o]nce Montgomery Park was announced as the awardee of the RFP, there was instant 

heartburn” among MIA employees who protested the move. Commissioner Redmer 

testified that over a period of time, he became concerned about the move to Montgomery 

Park:

Well, there was certainly a cumulative effect. So while I’m 

hearing heartburn from all of these internal and external forces, 

while we’re hearing the heartburn, we’re working on a daily 

basis, my Deputy, in preparing for a move. . . . 

As we rounded the end of 2018, I had growing concern about 

the items that I mentioned and the risk of not having a home. 

You know, the lease expires May 1 of 2019. We had an 

automatic extension of six months until November 1st, what? 

Two weeks from now. You know, as we got into the spring of 

2019, you can’t move 250 people in 4 or 5 or 6 months. You 

just can’t do it.

So when you look at the fact that we didn’t have a lease, I have 

a lease that’s expiring with 250 people that I need to have desks 

for. That, in addition to all of the other heartburn is what raised 

my temperature. 

He communicated these concerns to DGS in his April 23 letter, noting “the issue of parking 

no longer outweighed everything else.” 

The Board issued its opinion (“First Opinion”) on January 29, 2020. Before 

addressing the merits, the Board dedicated almost twelve pages to analyzing the standard 

of review, explaining that its intent was to clarify the “muddled” state of Board opinions 

on the issue: 

[W]hen dealing with bid protests relating to cancellations of 

solicitations, the Board has been less than clear about the 
15

standard of review it applies . . . . Because the Board’s case law 

in cancellation cases is muddled with inconsistent and 

seemingly contradictory opinions, this Board begins its review 

and analysis of this issue with the case most often cited, 

[Hanna v. Board of Education of Wicomico County, 200 Md. 

49 (1952)], in support of what [DGS] argues is the “higher” 

and correct standard of review (i.e., “fraudulent and so 

arbitrary as to constitute a breach of trust”). 

The Board ultimately rejected DGS’s contention that the standard of review in cancellation 

decisions is the “higher” fraudulent intent standard from Hanna:

In light of the policy and principle that cancellations of 

solicitations in Maryland are strongly disfavored, the standard 

of review prescribed by the APA for courts reviewing 

administrative decisions in contested cases, and the firmly 

established procurement law in federal courts regarding the 

standard of review when evaluating cancellation decisions, we 

believe that scrutiny of the decision to cancel should not be 

focused on whether the decision to cancel was made with 

fraudulent intent or whether it was so arbitrary that it would

constitute a breach of trust, but should instead be on whether 

the procurement officer abused her discretion to such an extent 

that her decision was unreasonable, did not have a rational 

basis, or was not sufficiently supported by evidence. 

(Emphasis added.) The Board noted that its core standard of review for all bid protests, 

including cancellation of solicitations, is an arbitrary and capricious standard: “a 

procurement officer’s decision will be overturned only if it is shown by a preponderance 

of the evidence that the agency action was biased, or that the action was arbitrary, 

capricious, unreasonable, or in violation of law.” 

On the merits, the Board concluded that the process leading to Ms. Scott-Napier’s 

decision to cancel the procurement was flawed:

In this case, it is clear from the evidence presented, both in 

documentary form and from witness testimony, that the 
16

reasons stated in support of the PO’s determination that it was 

in the best interest of the State to cancel the solicitation were, 

in fact, the four reasons asserted by Mr. Redmer for why Mr. 

Redmer believed it was in the State’s best interest to cancel. 

The PO wholly adopted Mr. Redmer’s reasons as her own, 

admittedly without undertaking any significant independent 

investigation to confirm that the facts stated by Mr. Redmer in 

support of his reasons were accurate. In short, the process by 

which she made her determination was flawed. 

The Board addressed each issue identified in Ms. Scott-Napier’s Procurement 

Officer’s Written Determination, “which were derived from Mr. Redmer’s April 23, 2019 

letter . . . .” For each issue, the Board cited decisions from the United States Court of 

Federal Claims to support its conclusions. First, the Board cited merits hearing testimony 

to support its conclusion that Ms. Scott-Napier failed to consider, “in the larger context of 

the Procurement Law,” whether the initial justification for the procurement had indeed

changed and was no longer valid. Instead of verifying independently or taking “any 

affirmative steps to ascertain the accuracy of Mr. Redmer’s assertion[s],” the Board said, 

Ms. Scott-Napier adopted this first reason as her own:

The PO testified that although she was aware that Mr. Brooks 

had discussions with Montgomery Park during the negotiation 

period about the shuttle service and various modes of accessing 

public transportation, she did not participate in these 

discussions and had no first-hand knowledge regarding any of 

the specifics that were discussed. She did not verify Mr. 

Redmer’s assertion that Montgomery Park “is not directly 

accessible by multiple city bus routes . . . .” She did not verify 

that there was a “[l]ack of direct access to the Property[.]” 

The PO did not verify Mr. Redmer’s assertion that 60% of the 

MIA employees use public transportation to commute to/from 

work, and she did not take any affirmative steps to ascertain 

the accuracy of Mr. Redmer’s assertion that members of the 

general public will not have access to the private shuttle, an 

assertion that was inaccurate. 
17

Furthermore, other than Mr. Redmer’s testimony, no credible 

evidence was admitted to support the assertion that the 

employees’ transportation and parking needs had indeed 

changed after it was announced that Montgomery Park had 

been selected for award. Yet the PO adopted this reason for 

cancellation as her own without undertaking any significant 

actions to obtain and examine the “relevant data” to verify that 

such changes had occurred.

Second, the Board found that Ms. Scott-Napier likewise failed to verify 

Commissioner Redmer’s contention that employee retention would be impaired by the 

move to Montgomery Park:

[T]he PO again took no affirmative steps to obtain and 

“examine the relevant data” to verify Mr. Redmer’s 

assertion. . . . The PO simply relied on her own “knowledge 

as a manager and knowing the difficulties we have” as her 

justification for wholly accepting Mr. Redmer’s assertion that 

he would lose staff with specialized knowledge of the 

insurance industry. . . . She acknowledged that she accepted 

Mr. Redmer’s assertion “at face value” and “did not investigate 

further.” 

* * *

While Mr. Redmer may perceive the move to Montgomery 

Park to be a significant impact on the retention of his 

employees, it was the PO’s responsibility to determine, based 

on credible evidence, whether the asserted impact was merely 

Mr. Redmer’s perception, or whether it was real and, if real, 

whether and to what extent the impact on MIA was more 

significant than the impact upon any other agency undergoing 

a move . . . .

Third, based on her testimony, the Board found Ms. Scott-Napier could not 

reasonably have concluded that cancelling the procurement was in the best interests of the 

State after she failed to confirm independently that MIA’s move to Montgomery Park 

would hurt Maryland consumers and businesses:
18

She did not investigate the accuracy of Mr. Redmer’s assertion 

that the “moving cost estimate did not consider the interruption 

to regulatory operations during the relocation period which is 

projected to last several weeks.” It is unclear to the Board how 

a moving cost estimate could take into consideration an 

intangible such as “the interruption to regulatory operations 

during the relocation period,” but it is clear that the PO did not 

attempt to investigate this either. 

Fourth, “and most illuminating, is the PO’s lack of knowledge that the MIA is fully 

funded by the insurance companies that it regulates and the impact this newly acquired 

knowledge,” that “insurance companies would be required to pay the moving costs,” had 

on her decision to cancel the procurement. The Board found it “surprising” that Ms. ScottNapier “did not become aware of this information until she received Mr. Redmer’s letter

on April 23, 2019, and then cancelled the solicitation the same day.” The Board was not 

persuaded by Ms. Scott-Napier’s testimony about this “determining factor”:

Notably, the PO testified that “the determining factor” in her 

decision to cancel the solicitation was that the insurance 

companies would be required to pay the moving costs up front 

via a special assessment spread out over market share. Yet 

nowhere in Written Determination #2 does the PO identify this 

as a basis for her determination. If, indeed, the special 

assessment for moving costs was the determining factor in her 

decision, it should have been expressly stated in Written 

Determination #2.

Even more surprising is the PO’s failure to take any affirmative 

steps to verify any of this newly-acquired information before 

abruptly determining (on the same day that she was advised of 

information that she says was the determining factor in her 

decision) that it was in the State’s best interest to cancel the 

solicitation. She did not read any letters from any insurance 

companies prior to making this determination—she merely 

verified that these letters were “in hand.” She did not ask and 

did not know who the letters were from, how many letters there 

were, or what information was contained therein. Again, she 

did not “examine the relevant data” to support these assertions. 
19

[] Instead, she relied solely on Mr. Redmer’s assertion that 

“several large insurance companies” had complained that the 

move was a wasteful expenditure of their funds since it was the 

second move in ten years. 

Because she failed to investigate or verify the extent of Commissioner Redmer’s 

claims in his April 23 letter to DGS, the Board declined to find Ms. Scott-Napier could 

reasonably have concluded that cancelling the solicitation was in the best of interests of the 

State.3 And as such, the Board found, Ms. Scott-Napier’s decision to cancel the 

procurement was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious: 

In this case, the PO’s abrupt determination that it was in the 

State’s best interest to cancel the solicitation was, in effect, 

made by the head of the using agency, the MIA, rather than the 

PO and the procuring agency, DGS. The process by which the 

PO made her determination was flawed: she adopted virtually 

whole cloth the head of the using agency’s reasons for wanting 

to cancel the procurement without verifying the facts 

supporting his assertions and exercising her independent 

judgment based on those verified facts. The stated concerns 

may well have been legitimate and factually based, but it was 

incumbent upon the PO to investigate and determine whether 

the facts adequately support those concerns and to weigh all 

the advantages and disadvantages to the State of cancelling this 

solicitation before making a determination that cancelling the 

solicitation was in the State’s best interest. 

The Board sustained Montgomery Park’s First Protest appeal. 

2. The Board’s second ruling

The Board held a merits hearing on the Second Protest on February 3, 2020 and 

3 Because the Board concluded that Ms. Scott-Napier’s determination to cancel the 

procurement was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious, it did not address 

Montgomery Park’s third ground for the First Protest, that DGS’s reasons for the 

cancellation were pretextual. 
20

issued its opinion (“Second Opinion”) on February 28, 2020. The Board began by finding

Montgomery Park an “interested party” with standing, within the meaning of COMAR, to 

challenge DGS’s decision to enter into a sole-source renewal lease with St. Paul Plaza. The 

Board rejected DGS’s argument that the First Protest and Second Protest were separate 

proceedings for standing purposes because Mr. Scott-Napier’s “determination that it was 

in the best interest of the State to proceed with the instant sole-source procurement arises 

and flows from the wrongful cancellation of the prior competitive procurement.” Because 

Montgomery Park was “the recommended awardee of the prior competitive procurement 

that was cancelled in violation of the Procurement Law,” and because Montgomery Park 

was “‘aggrieved by’ the wrongful cancellation,” the Board found that it qualified as an 

interested party.

The Board also found Montgomery Park’s Second Protest timely. The Board

considered when Montgomery Park “knew or should have known that the PO failed to 

make a written determination in violation of SF&P §13-105(g) and COMAR 

21.05.05.02D” and not when Montgomery Park “knew or should have known that [DGS] 

was proceeding with a sole-source rather than a competitive procurement . . . .” The Board

concluded that Montgomery Park didn’t know that Ms. Scott-Napier had “failed to prepare 

a written determination setting forth her reasons for determining that it was in the State’s 

best interest to conduct a sole-source procurement and award the MIA lease for St. Paul 

Place to Kornblatt, rather than a competitive procurement for a new lease” until September 

23, 2019, and Montgomery Park filed the Second Protest within seven days of that date.

Then, turning to the merits, the Board held Ms. Scott-Napier violated the 
21

Procurement Law by failing to document separately her reasons for determining that it was 

in the State’s best interests to renew the lease with St. Paul Plaza. And because she failed 

to make a written determination, the Board was “unable to evaluate whether her reasons 

were unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful.” The Board sustained Montgomery 

Park’s Second Protest.

F. Judicial Review In The Circuit Court.

On February 13, 2020 and March 13, 2020, DGS requested judicial review of the 

Board’s First and Second Opinions, respectively, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

The judicial review hearing was held on January 20, 2021 and the court issued two 

memorandum opinions on February 8, 2021. With regard to the Board’s First Opinion, the 

court held that the Board had applied the wrong standard in reviewing DGS’s decision:

The Board concluded that DGS’s decisions that it was in the 

best interests of the State to cancel the procurement “was 

unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.” [] In reaching its 

conclusion, the Board overturned decades of precedent and 

rejected application of a heightened deference standard to 

procurement cancellation decisions. 

The court found Hanna, 200 Md. 49, instructive, noting that although it was a 

taxpayer standing case, “it stands for the proposition that there are circumstances where 

courts will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of an administrative agency acting 

within its authority unless such exercise is fraudulent or corrupt or such abuse of discretion 

as to amount to breach of trust.” Because the Board departed from this standard of review, 

“it acted arbitrarily and capriciously.” 

With regard to the Board’s Second Opinion, the court found that Montgomery Park 
22

“knew of the basis for its protest no later than August 23, 2019 . . . .” As such, the court 

found that the Second Protest was untimely and the Board had lacked jurisdiction to hear 

the appeal. The court reversed the Board’s decisions, and Montgomery Park filed timely 

appeals from both.

II. DISCUSSION

Montgomery Park and DGS raise numerous questions on appeal4that we have 

4 Montgomery Park phrased the Questions Presented as follows:

1. Did the MSBCA apply the proper legal standard in 

reviewing Appellee’s decision to cancel the procurement? 

2. Are the MSBCA’s findings of fact and conclusions of law 

set forth in its 50-page opinion supported by substantial 

evidence and unaffected by error of law? 

3. Does the record contain sufficient evidence to support the 

MSBCA’s findings and conclusions that Appellant (a) had 

standing to protest, and (b) filed a timely protest? 

4. Did the MSBCA correctly interpret SFP § 13-105(g) and 

COMAR 21.05.05.02 to require that Appellee provide a 

written justification before awarding a sole source contract? 

DGS phrased the Questions Presented as follows:

1. Did the Board err when it departed from its precedents 

applying a deferential standard of review to procurementcancellations and instead crafted a new requirement that a 

Procurement Officer thoroughly investigate an agency’s 

reasons for not wanting to move forward with the 

procurement?

2. Did the Board exceed its statutory authority by closely 

scrutinizing the process by which the Procurement Officer 

determined to cancel the solicitation and by substituting its 

judgment about what is in the State’s best interest? 

3. In the absence of substantial record evidence that the 

agency’s reasons for abandoning the procurement were not 

legitimate, did the Board err by shifting the burden of proof 

to DGS to demonstrate that the determination to cancel the 
23

rephrased and condensed into two. First, in its First Opinion, did the Board apply the 

correct legal standard in reviewing DGS’s decision to cancel the procurement with 

Montgomery Park? Second, was the Board correct in finding Montgomery Park had 

standing to file the Second Protest?5 We hold that the Board stated the legal standard 

essentially correctly in the First Opinion, but applied it incorrectly, and that Montgomery 

Park lacked standing to bring the Second Protest.

The Board is an administrative agency whose decisions are subject to the same 

standard of judicial review as other agencies. See CSX Transp., Inc., v. Mass Transit 

Admin., 111 Md. App. 634, 639 (1996). In reviewing an administrative agency’s decision, 

“we ‘must look past the circuit court’s decision to review the agency’s decision.’” 

procurement was supported by data acceptable to the 

Board? 

4. Did the Board err in concluding that Montgomery Park’s 

protest of DGS’s lease renewal was timely filed when it was 

filed more than two months after Montgomery Park was 

notified that DGS had decided to negotiate the renewal of 

MIA’s existing lease?

5. Did the Board err in determining that the Procurement 

Officer was required to issue a written determination prior 

to renewing MIA’s lease, when the regulation that governs 

lease renewals does not require a written determination? 

6. Did the Board err when it determined that Montgomery 

Park had standing to protest the lease renewal when 

Montgomery Park was not a party to the existing lease and 

the renewal did not involve a competitive procurement? 

5 Because we hold that Montgomery Park lacked standing, we need not address the 

timeliness of the Second Protest or the merits of whether the Board was correct in 

concluding that DGS violated State procurement law by failing to make a written 

determination that renewing the lease with St. Paul Plaza was in the best interests of the 

State.
24

Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch. v. Donlon, 233 Md. App. 646, 658 (2017) (quoting Sizemore 

v. Town of Chesapeake Beach, 225 Md. App. 631, 647 (2015)). We “ordinarily give 

considerable weight to the administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the 

statute that the agency administers.” Montgomery v. E. Corr. Inst., 377 Md. 615, 625 

(2003) (citing Lussier v. Md. Racing Comm’n, 343 Md. 681, 696–97 (1996)). 

We are “‘limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a 

whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the 

administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.’” Id. (quoting 

United Parcel v. People’s Couns., 336 Md. 569, 577 (1994)). “Under the substantial 

evidence standard, a reviewing court must uphold an agency’s determination if it is 

rationally supported by the evidence in the record, even if the reviewing court, left to its 

own judgment, might have reached a different result.” Travers v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 115 

Md. App. 395, 419 (1997) (citing Dep’t of Econ. & Emp. Dev. v. Lilley, 106 Md. App. 744, 

754 (1995)). Thus we affirm agency decisions “‘if, after reviewing the evidence in a light 

most favorable to the agency, we find a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the 

factual conclusion the agency reached.’” Geier v. Md. State Bd. of Physicians, 223 Md. 

App. 404, 430 (2015) (quoting Miller v. City of Annapolis Hist. Pres. Comm’n, 200 Md. 

App. 612, 632 (2011)). 

Conclusions of law, however, “are subject to more plenary review by the courts.” 

Maryland Off. of People’s Couns. v. Maryland Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 226 Md. App. 483, 

501 (2016). We review the Board’s conclusions of law de novo. Schwartz v. Md. Dep’t of 

Nat. Res., 385 Md. 534, 554 (2005). So “‘where an administrative agency renders a 
25

decision based on an error of law, we owe the agency’s decision no deference.’” 

Brandywine Senior Living at Potomac LLC v. Paul, 237 Md. App. 195, 211 (2018) (cleaned 

up).

A. The Board Stated The Correct Legal Standard For Cancellation 

Protests, But Erred When It Applied It.

First, Montgomery Park argues the Board correctly applied the unreasonable, 

arbitrary, and capricious standard in determining whether DGS’s decision to cancel the 

procurement was in the best interests of the State. DGS contends the Board erred “when it 

ignored its own precedent and crafted a new standard of review,” and asserts that DGS’s 

“decision may only be disturbed upon a finding that it ‘was not in the best interest of the 

state to such an extent that it was fraudulent or so arbitrary as to constitute a breach of 

trust.’” Neither party hits the nail exactly on the head. Although the Board was correct in

characterizing the standard of review in cancellation protests as whether the procurement 

officer’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious, it erred in its application of 

this standard to Ms. Scott-Napier’s decision to cancel the procurement.

1. The core standard of review when reviewing a procurement agency’s 

decision to cancel a procurement is whether the decision was unreasonable, 

arbitrary, and capricious.

Before a procurement officer may cancel a bid or RFP, they must first “determine[] 

that it is fiscally advantageous or otherwise in the best interests of the State” to do so. SF 

§ 13-206(b)(1)–(2). The issue before us is what standard of review the Board should 

employ in reviewing whether a procurement officer’s reasons for cancelling a bid reflected

the best interests of the State. The Board doesn’t conduct a de novo review or substitute its 
26

members’ judgments for those of the procurement officer—like an appellate court, the 

Board reviews the officer’s decision against a standard that reflects the officer’s role and 

expertise. The dispute here revolves initially around the level of deference the Board owes 

to the officer’s decision, and how to articulate that level of deference. And once the 

standard is set, we look at whether the Board applied it properly.

The Board’s core conclusion—that the base standard for reviewing procurement 

officers’ cancellation decisions is whether the officer’s reasons for canceling were 

unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious—was fundamentally correct.

6 As the Board stated, 

“arbitrary and capricious” is the baseline standard for reviewing decisions of administrative 

agencies. But we disagree with the Board, however, that the core arbitrary and capricious 

standard and the “fraudulently or so arbitrarily as to constitute a breach of trust” language

from Hanna v. Board of Education of Wicomico County, 200 Md. 49 (1952), utilized in 

earlier Board decisions represent categorically different standards. We read these as 

differing in degree rather than kind, and the latter as articulating the sort of conduct that 

would demonstrate arbitrary or capricious decision-making in the context of a cancellation.

In Hanna, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed earlier decisions establishing the 

standard of review for courts of equity reviewing administrative agency decisions. The 

6 Since the First Opinion, the Board twice has had the opportunity to consider bid protest 

appeals of procurement cancellations. In both instances, the Board cited the First 

Opinion, stating “[a] procurement officer’s decision will be overturned only if it is 

shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency action was biased, or that 

the action was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or in violation of law.” MGT 

Consulting Grp., LLC, MSBCA No. 3148 at 9 (2020). See also Medical Trans. Mgmt., 

Inc., MSBCA No. 3151 at 1 (2020).
27

Court phrased the standard in terms of arbitrariness to a degree reflecting fraud or a breach 

of trust: 

On a suit by a taxpayer, a court of equity will not review the 

exercise of discretion of an administrative agency, if it acts 

within the scope of its authority, unless its power is 

fraudulently or corruptly exercised; but the court will restrain 

an agency from entering into or performing a void or ultra vires

contract or from acting fraudulently or so arbitrarily as to 

constitute a breach of trust.

200 Md. at 51 (emphasis added). There isn’t a huge body of cancellation cases in the 

Board’s jurisprudence, but as it noted in its opinion, the Board has cited and applied Hanna

regularly in those cases. In Automated Health Systems, for example, the Board described

its scope of review as so narrow that an agency’s decision to cancel a bid or RFP could be 

disturbed only “upon finding that the decision was not in the best interest of the State to 

such an extent that it was fraudulent or so arbitrary as to constitute a breach of trust.” 

MSBCA No. 1263 at 12–13 (1985); see also Megaco, Inc., MSBCA No. 1924 at 5 (1995).

In Kennedy Personnel Services, the Board quoted Automated Health Systems to 

“recognize[] the discretion vested in State agencies,” but ultimately found that the agency’s 

determination “has a rational basis and is neither arbitrary nor capricious.” MSBCA No. 

2425 at 5, 6–7 (2004). In TekXtreme, Inc., the Board referenced Automated Health Systems

and Kennedy Personnel Services as recognizing the Board’s standard of review as 

“fraudulent or so arbitrary as to constitute a breach of trust,” but then denied the appeal on 

the ground that the agency had a rational basis for its determination. MSBCA No. 2451 at 

4 (2005). Similarly, in STG, International, the Board noted “the burden of proof for an 

appellant to overturn the State’s justification for such a [cancellation] decision is extremely 
28

high,” and quoted Automated Health Systems and Hanna to support that proposition. 

MSBCA No. 2755 at 7 (2011). The Board applied that standard and concluded that “prior 

decisions of the Board as well as appellate authority support the legal conclusion that 

cancellation of a solicitation after bid opening may be so arbitrary as to be unlawful.” Id.

Then, in Hunt Reporting Co., the Board dropped the “fraudulent or so arbitrary as to 

constitute a breach of trust” language altogether and denied the appeal because “the action 

of the agency’s procurement officials w[as] not arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or in 

violation of law.” MSBCA No. 2783 at 1 (2012).

As the Board worked through these prior opinions, it recognized that over the years

it “continued to struggle with establishing and applying the standard of review in 

cancellation cases.” We agree with its observations that the various articulations of the 

standard in cancellation cases seem out of sync with its general standard of review bid 

protests, and that Hanna’s reference to fraud suggested a standard higher than the core 

administrative law standard of arbitrary and capricious review. It made sense for the Board 

to (re-)calibrate the standard in cancellation cases to track the standard of review for bid 

protest cases generally. And the Board’s articulation here of the overall standard—“a 

procurement officer’s decision will be overturned only if it is shown by a preponderance 

of the evidence that the agency action was biased, or that the action was arbitrary, 

capricious, unreasonable, or in violation of the law”—nevertheless is consistent with the 

principles underlying Hanna and the Board cases following it. 

The bottom line is that it takes a lot for the Board to reject a procurement officer’s 

decision. And it should: the Board shouldn’t substitute its judgment for the procurement 
29

officer’s and generally should find itself deferring to the officer’s decision, even if 

reasonable people could disagree on the merits. That said, DGS’s contention that the Board 

“ignored its own precedent and crafted a new standard of review” overstates the impact of 

the Board’s restatement of the standard: the fraud notion in Hanna was never meant to 

replace arbitrariness or capriciousness, but to demonstrate the extent of deviation from 

reason necessary to justify finding a procurement officer’s cancellation decision arbitrary 

and capricious. Therefore, we hold the Board was correct in deciding that the standard of 

review to be applied in cancellation decision is whether the procurement officer’s decision 

was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.7

2. The Board erred in shifting the burden of proof to the procurement officer.

Notwithstanding our general agreement with the Board’s view of the standard it 

articulated in this case, we disagree with the Board’s application of that standard to the 

record in this case. Under the guise of reviewing the procurement officer’s decision, the 

Board shifted to DGS a burden it doesn’t have: a burden to investigate independently 

Commissioner Redmer’s four reasons for wanting to cancel the procurement. 

Administrative agencies “have no powers beyond those that have been conferred upon 

them by statute.” Brzowski v. Md. Home Improvement Comm’n, 114 Md. App. 615, 626 

7 On August 31, 2021, Montgomery Park filed a motion seeking to strike citations to 

circuit court opinions from DGS’s brief. DGS cited two circuit court opinions to support 

its position that the correct standard of review in cancellation protests is the “fraudulent 

or so arbitrary as to constitute a breach of trust.” Circuit court opinions aren’t prohibited 

strictly by Maryland Rule 1-104, which prohibits citation to unreported opinions of this 

Court or the Court of Appeals, so we deny the motion. Even so, Montgomery Park is 

correct that those opinions lack any precedential value in this case, and we haven’t 

relied on them in our analysis here.
30

(1997). “[T]he power delegated to an administrative agency to make rules is not the power 

to make laws.” Sullivan v. Bd. of License Comm’rs for Prince George’s Cnty., 293 Md. 

113, 124 (1982). And by requiring DGS to prove that Ms. Scott-Napier’s decision to cancel 

the procurement wasn’t arbitrary and capricious, rather than requiring Montgomery Park 

to prove that it was, the Board exceeded the scope of its delegated powers. 

There is no language in any statute, regulation, Board decision, or case imposing a 

requirement on DGS and Ms. Scott-Napier to investigate and verify Commissioner 

Redmer’s four reasons in favor of cancelling the RFP with Montgomery Park

independently. Indeed, by the Board’s own reckoning, in bid protests the “Appellant bears 

the burden of proof” because they are “the party seeking to disturb the Procurement 

Officer’s decision to resolicit” or cancel. Stronghold Sec., Inc., MSBCA No. 2499 at 11 

(2005). It fell to Montgomery Park to provide evidence demonstrating that Ms. ScottNapier’s cancellation of the RFP was arbitrary and capricious. Instead, the Board found 

that Ms. Scott-Napier had an independent duty to investigate and verify Commissioner

Redmer’s four reasons for wanting to cancel the procurement. 

The Board acknowledged “[t]he stated concerns may well have been legitimate and 

factually based,” but ultimately found Ms. Scott-Napier’s cancellation decision 

“unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.” The Board’s reasoning that Ms. Scott-Napier 

was required to conduct a “significant independent investigation to confirm that the facts 

stated by Mr. Redmer in support his reasons were accurate” is unfounded. That premise

has no basis in law.

To the contrary, the record supports the conclusion that Ms. Scott-Napier did 
31

exercise her discretion and judgment in determining Commissioner Redmer’s four reasons 

were legitimate. She testified before the Board that she cancelled the RFP because the 

Insurance Commissioner had articulated reasons why cancellation was in the best interests 

of the State and she agreed with those reasons:

[COUNSEL FOR DGS]: So based on your review of that 

[April 23] letter, and your discussions with MIA during this 

April 18 to 23rd timeframe, what was your determination?

[MS. SCOTT-NAPIER]: That we should cancel the RFP.

[COUNSEL FOR DGS]: And did you conclude that it was in 

the best interest of the State and fiscally advantageous to cancel 

that procurement? 

[MS. SCOTT-NAPIER]: I did. That was in my written 

procurement officer’s determination that was in our file. Not 

specifically stated in my letter, but I felt it had been stated in 

the Redmer letter. 

This is all that was required of Ms. Scott-Napier. She was not required, as the Board found, 

to conduct an independent investigation into whether Commissioner Redmer’s four reasons 

were accurate. Indeed, the Board’s own decisions support the principle that Ms. ScottNapier acted within her broad discretion in cancelling the procurement with Montgomery 

Park:

[S]tatutory procurement authority makes clear that, based only 

upon whatever may be deemed to be “in the best interest of the 

State,” any RFP may be cancelled or all proposals rejected. The 

State is simply not obligated to finalize a procurement and 

award a contract just because an RFP has been issued. . . . 

Moreover, the State’s freedom to cancel a procurement at any 

time is so broad that even after issuing a fully executed award, 

the government may unilaterally terminate a contract merely 

on the basis of its own convenience.

Baltimore City Ent. Grp., LP, MSBCA No. 2690 at 41 (2010).
32

The Board erred when it “engaged in a detailed explanation of what, in its view, the 

Procurement Officer should have done to evaluate whether a relocation to Montgomery 

Park was in the best interest of the State.” We agree with DGS that “[n]othing in the RFP 

or COMAR required” Ms. Scott-Napier “to demand from Commissioner Redmer 

supporting data, detailed analyses, or employee surveys to justify his decision to retract his 

request to procure new office space.” The procurement officer relied on the rationale 

articulated by the head of the tenant agency, who is closer to its needs and concerns than 

the Board is, and Montgomery Park offered no evidence or testimony that undermined 

Commissioner Redmer’s reasons for requesting the cancellation or the procurement 

officer’s decision to rely on them. The Board committed legal error in shifting the burden 

to Ms. Scott-Napier to prove that her reasons for cancelling the procurement with 

Montgomery Park weren’t unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious, and we agree with the 

circuit court that the Board’s decision to sustain the First Bid Protest must be reversed.

B. Montgomery Park Lacked Standing To File Its Second Bid Protest.

Second, Montgomery Park contends it had standing to file the Second Protest, which 

was directed at DGS’s renewal of the MIA lease with St. Paul Plaza. Under COMAR 

21.10.02.02, only interested parties may file bid protests. An “interested party” is defined 

as “an actual or prospective bidder, offeror, or contractor that may be aggrieved by the 

solicitation or award of a contract, or by the protest.” COMAR 21.10.02.01B(1). The Board 

found Montgomery Park to be an interested party with standing to file the Second Protest 

because it was aggrieved by the sole-source procurement between MIA and St. Paul Plaza:

[DGS] would have this Board ignore the facts and surrounding 
33

circumstances of the prior competitive procurement of a new 

MIA lease . . . as well as our previous decision in [First Protest] 

that the solicitation relating to the competitive procurement of 

a new MIA lease was wrongfully cancelled by the PO. 

However, that we cannot do. The PO’s determination that it 

was in the best interest of the State to proceed with the instant 

sole-source procurement arises and flows from the wrongful 

cancellation of the prior competitive procurement. Had the 

solicitation in the prior competitive procurement never been 

cancelled, then [Montgomery Park] would likely have been 

awarded the MIA lease, and the PO’s decision to proceed with 

this sole-source procurement would not have occurred. In other 

words, but for the cancellation of the prior solicitation (now 

determined to have been in violation of the Procurement Law), 

this sole-source procurement would not have occurred, and 

[Montgomery Park] would have had a substantial chance of 

being awarded the MIA lease.

* * *

We believe that [Montgomery Park], as the recommended 

awardee of the prior competitive procurement that was 

cancelled in violation of the Procurement Law, falls squarely 

within the definition of an interested party under COMAR. 

[Montgomery Park] is an “interested party” because it was an 

“actual...offeror” of the prior competitive procurements for a 

new MIA lease. [Montgomery Park] is “aggrieved by” the 

wrongful cancellation of the “the solicitation,” and [] is also 

“aggrieved by” the subsequent sole-source “solicitation” 

because, but for the wrongful cancellation of the prior 

competitive procurement, the sole-source procurement would 

not have occurred and [Montgomery Park] would have likely 

been awarded the MIA lease. 

We disagree with the Board’s analysis and interpretation. First, the First Protest and 

the Second Protest are factually and legally distinct events and must be considered 

independently. Although the timeline supports the Board’s assertion that the sole-source 

procurement “arises and flows” from DGS’s decision to cancel the RFP with Montgomery 

Park, that logical and temporal connection doesn’t give Montgomery Park a legal interest 
34

in the sole source renewal lease. 

Second, and relatedly, in order to qualify as an interested party and thus to have 

standing, one must be “in line for award.” Branch Off. Supply, MSBCA No. 2372 at 4 

(2003); see also DESCO Assocs., MSBCA No. 2680 at 2 (2010); Devaney & Assocs., Inc., 

MSBCA No. 2477 at 9 (2005); James F. Knott Constr. Co., Inc., MSBCA No. 2437 at 3 

(2004). “It is well settled by the Board that a protestor is not an interested party ‘where it 

cannot establish that even if the protest were sustained it would be in line for award.’” 

DESCO Assocs., MSBCA No. 2680 at 2 (quoting James F. Knott Constr. Co., MSBCA 

No. 2437 at 6).

In denying the Second Protest on standing grounds, Ms. Scott-Napier reasoned that 

“[b]ecause Montgomery Park is not the holder of the existing real property lease, even if 

the protest were to be sustained, Montgomery Park would not be in line for a lease renewal 

under COMAR 21.05.05.02(D), the COMAR provision permitting DGS to renew the 

current lease for office space for MIA.” The Board disagreed, finding that “[b]ecause of 

the wrongful cancellation of the prior competitive procurement in which [Montgomery 

Park] was the proposed awardee, [Montgomery Park] has a unique status in relation to this 

sole source procurement.” 

We disagree. When Ms. Scott-Napier cancelled the RFP with Montgomery Park on 

April 23, 2019, the cancellation severed the relationships among Montgomery Park, DGS, 

and MIA for procurement purposes. Montgomery Park was no longer an actual or 

prospective bidder or offeror—it stood “in the same position as every office building that 

is not St. Paul Plaza: it is not the holder of the existing lease, it has not suffered any damage, 
35

and it is not in line for the award.” Montgomery Park asserts it “is a qualified, prospective 

offeror with a substantial chance of being selected in a competitive procurement for the 

proposed award under protest.” But this was not a competitive procurement, there was no 

competitive bidding process, and Montgomery Park was never in line for the renewal lease 

between DGS and St. Paul Plaza.

Third, Montgomery Park’s argument fails to recognize the distinction between a 

regular sole-source, non-competitive procurement and a sole-source renewal procurement 

under SF § 13-105(g). Citing AGS Genasys Corp., MSBCA No. 1326 (1987), Montgomery 

Park claims that it may protest the sole-source procurement between DGS and St. Paul 

Plaza. But AGS concerned a bid protest over the awarding of a contract for goods. The 

Board concluded there that “noncompetitive procurement is justified only where it is 

established that there is a critical need on a public exigency or emergency basis, not 

whether it is merely impractical and inconvenient to engage in a competitive procurement.” 

Id. at 5. And the renewal of an existing lease of real property is not equivalent to a 

noncompetitive procurement of goods. Indeed, the exception for a sole-source renewal of 

real property is codified within the subtitle of the Source Selection title of SF, “Competitive 

Sealed Proposal Procedures; Real Property.” (Emphasis added). Whether or not 

Montgomery Park is right about procurements for goods, “[i]f a procurement officer 

determines that renewal of an existing lease is in the best interests of the State, the 

procurement officer may negotiate the renewal without soliciting other offers.” SF § 13-

105(g). In other words, DGS was not required to engage in a competitive bid process before 

renewing the lease with St. Paul Plaza because this situation fell within the statutory 
36

exception.

8

Accordingly, Montgomery Park lacked standing to file its Second Protest, and we 

agree with the circuit court that the Board’s finding that Montgomery Park was an 

interested party in the renewal lease between MIA and St. Paul Plaza must be reversed.

JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 

FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED. 

APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS.

8 Again, we do not reach the merits of whether SF § 13-105(g) requires this 

determination to be in writing.