IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 16–0540

Filed November 18, 2016

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellant,

vs.

ERIC D. COLEMAN,

Appellee.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, 

Mary Ann Brown, Judge.

The State of Iowa seeks reversal of a district court order requiring 

recalculation of inmate’s earned-time credit. DISTRICT COURT 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and William A. Hill, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellant.

Eric D. Coleman, Coralville, pro se. 
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PER CURIAM.

Eric D. Coleman, an offender incarcerated under the control of the 

Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC), challenges its calculation of his 

earned-time credit. The same legal issue is presented in Breeden v. Iowa 

Department of Corrections, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 2016), decided today. 

Our holding in Breeden is dispositive and requires that Coleman’s

earned-time credit be recalculated at the rate of 1.2 days for each day of 

good conduct. Id. at ____. 

Coleman pled guilty to second-degree robbery in violation of Iowa 

Code sections 711.1 and 711.3 in August of 2009 and was sentenced to

an indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed ten years. He was 

age seventeen when he committed the offense. Second-degree robbery is 

a crime listed in Iowa Code section 902.12 (2009), that requires offenders

to serve a mandatory minimum term of seven-tenths, or seventy percent,

of their sentence before being eligible for parole or work release. The 

IDOC calculated Coleman’s accumulation of earned time according to 

Iowa Code section 903A.2(1), which provides,

For purposes of calculating the amount of time by which an 

inmate’s sentence may be reduced, inmates shall be grouped 

into the following two sentence categories: 

a. Category “A” sentences are those sentences which 

are not subject to a maximum accumulation of earned time 

of fifteen percent of the total sentence of confinement under 

section 902.12. . . . An inmate of an institution under the 

control of the department of corrections who is serving a 

category “A” sentence is eligible for a reduction of sentence 

equal to one and two-tenths days for each day the inmate 

demonstrates good conduct and satisfactorily participates in 

any program or placement status identified by the director to 

earn the reduction. . . .

. . . .

b. Category “B” sentences are those sentences which 

are subject to a maximum accumulation of earned time of 

fifteen percent of the total sentence of confinement under 

section 902.12. An inmate under the control of the 
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department of corrections who is serving a category “B” 

sentence is eligible for a reduction of sentence equal to 

fifteen eighty-fifths of a day for each day of good conduct by 

the inmate.

The IDOC classified Coleman’s sentence as category “B” and calculated 

his earned time at a rate of fifteen eighty-fifths of a day per each day 

served. 

On July 21, 2014, Coleman filed a pro se motion for correction of 

an illegal sentence based on State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014) 

(holding automatic mandatory minimum sentences for juvenile offenders 

constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Iowa Constitution).

On October 28, the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County 

resentenced Coleman to an indeterminate term not to exceed ten years,

without the mandatory minimum. The new sentencing order stated, “The 

defendant is to be given credit for time served,” but did not designate an 

earned-time accumulation rate. The IDOC continued to calculate his 

earned time at fifteen eighty-fifths of a day per day (category “B”), rather 

than the faster 1.2 days per day served (category “A”). As such, 

Coleman’s tentative discharge date (TDD), the earliest date he could 

discharge his sentence, assuming he had all potential earned time, 

remained at June 19, 2018. Under category “A,” Coleman’s TDD would 

have been December 27, 2013. 

On February 15, 2016, Coleman filed a pro se motion to enlarge

the sentencing order, claiming that the IDOC was not giving him full 

credit for his time served. On March 3, the district court entered an

order stating:

It is not clear from [Coleman’s] pleadings how the 

court’s order has affected the calculation of time served. By 

way of this order, the court will clarify its intention as to 

what he should be receiving credit for. 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the record should 

reflect that the sentence the defendant has been serving in 

this matter has been one without a mandatory minimum 

sentence applicable. Even though the court did not enter an 

order until October 28, 2014, removing the mandatory 

minimum portion of the defendant’s sentence, the record 

should reflect that the defendant should be given credit as if

he had been serving a sentence without a mandatory 

minimum sentence, for the entire period of his incarceration. 

The State moved to clarify this order, explaining that Coleman was 

contesting his earned-time accumulation rate and asking the court to 

make a specific determination in that regard. The State argued that it 

was the conviction for a crime listed in 902.12—and not the mandatory

minimum imposed by that section—that controlled the earned-time 

accrual rate. In support of the motion, the State attached the district 

court decisions in James v. State of Iowa, No. PCCE078233 (Iowa Dist. 

Ct. Oct. 19, 2015), and Breeden v. Iowa Department of Corrections, 

No. CVCV049065 (Iowa Dist. Ct. May 11, 2015), which ruled that 

offenders resentenced after Lyle for crimes listed in 902.12 remained at 

the category “B” accumulation rate, even without a mandatory minimum 

sentence. 

On March 22, the district court issued a ruling that Coleman’s 

entire sentence was subject to the accelerated category “A” accumulation 

rate. The district court primarily relied on Lowery v. State, in which the 

Governor commuted an offender’s sentence by removing the mandatory 

minimum. 822 N.W.2d 739, 740 (Iowa 2012). We held removal of the 

mandatory minimum changed the earned-time rate to category “A”1 after 

the commutation order. Id. at 743. The district court stated, 

1We noted that “it is generally well-settled that when an inmate’s sentence is 

commuted, the new sentence replaces the former sentence.” Lowery, 822 N.W.2d at 

741. But because the Governor made clear in the language of the commutation that 

Lowery should not be eligible for release immediately, we determined Lowery was 

entitled to have earned time accrue at the accelerated rate only after the date of the 

commutation order. Id. at 743. “This result,” we concluded, 

 
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Just as with a governor commuting a sentence, [Coleman’s] 

new sentence replaced the old sentence as of the day of the 

sentencing, giving the defendant the same status as if the 

sentence he had been serving had originally been for the 

corrected sentence. If the corrected sentence was the one he 

originally had begun serving, he would have been serving 

what would be classified as a Category A sentence, allowing 

him to earn 1.2 days for each day he demonstrated good 

conduct in prison.

The district court found that Coleman qualified for immediate release

under the category “A” rate, but stayed its order to allow the State to 

appeal. 

On March 29, we granted the State’s request for discretionary 

review and stayed the district court’s ruling. Coleman remains 

incarcerated. 

II. Standard of Review. 

“A challenge to an illegal sentence is reviewed for correction of legal 

errors.” State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Iowa 2013). To the 

extent Coleman’s claim raises constitutional issues, our review is 

de novo. Id.

III. Disposition.

Based on our holding today in Breeden, we affirm the district 

court’s ruling requiring the IDOC to recalculate Coleman's earned time at 

the category “A” rate throughout his incarceration. ___ N.W.2d at ___. 

DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

This opinion shall not be published. 

gives effect to the governor’s intention expressed in his commutation 

order . . . , but also gives effect—from the date of the commutation order 

forward—to the plain language of the statute which provides that 

inmates serving sentences with no mandatory minimums shall 

accumulate earned time at an accelerated rate. 

Id. 

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