[Cite as Hightower v. Hightower, 2016-Ohio-7870.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Rudolph L. Hightower, II, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

v. : No. 16AP-182 

 (C.P.C. No. 12DR-04-1445) 

Galyna K. Hightower, : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellee. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on November 22, 2016 

 

On brief: Rudolph L. Hightower, II, pro se. Argued: 

Rudolph L. Hightower, II. 

On brief: The Law Office of Nicolas W. Yaeger, and 

Nicholas W. Yaeger, for appellee. Argued: Nicholas W. 

Yaeger.

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Division of Domestic Relations 

TYACK, J. 

{¶ 1} Rudolph L. Hightower, II, is appealing from the trial court's refusal to more 

fully modify the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities based upon changes 

which occurred after his divorce was finalized. Mr. Hightower also contests, among other 

things, the failure of the trial court judge to remove the magistrate who was managing 

part of the proceedings. Mr. Hightower assigns a total of ten errors for our consideration: 

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE SUBSTANTIAL 

PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE IN DENYING 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S MOTION TO CHANGE THE 

CUSTODY VISITATION SCHEDULE DUE TO 
No. 16AP-182 2 

SIGNIFICANT CHANGES OF CIRCUMSTANCES CAUSED 

BY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. 

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

APPELLANT['S] MOTION TO CHANGE CHILD 

VISITATION SCHEDULE DUE TO OFFICER OF THE 

COURT'S OVERT AND BLATANT LIES, MISSTATEMENTS, 

AND IGNORING OF INDISPUTABLE FACTUAL 

EVIDENCE. 

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

APPELLANT['S] MOTION TO REMOVE MAGISTRATE 

ELLIOT FROM THE CASE DUE TO HIS PATTERN OF BIAS 

DECISIONS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT-APPELL[EE]'S 

CONVENIENCE AND DESIRES OVER THE BEST 

INTERESTS OF THE CHILD. 

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

APPELLANT['S] MOTION TO CHANGE CHILD 

VISITATION SCHEDULE BY VIOLATING THE TRIAL 

COURT'S OWN STATED REQUIREMENT TO DO WHAT IS 

IN THE "HOLISTIC" BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD. 

V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING IN FAVOR 

OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE BY VIOLATING OHIO 

RULES OF EVIDENCE BY ADMITTING HEARSAY 

EVIDENCE, AND CONCURRENTLY, BY EXCLUDING 

RELEVANT TESTIMONY AS INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY. 

VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISOBEYING OHIO 

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BY MAKING A 

DISRESPECTFUL MOCKERY OF THE COURT OVER A 

NON-SENSICAL, IRRELEVANT POINT, AND BY 

SOLICITING NON-EXPERT WITNESS OPINIONS FROM 

STRANGERS IN THE COURTROOM. 

VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 

ACCEPT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S INDISPUTABLE 

FACTUAL EVIDENCE THAT WOULD COUNTER 

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE'S PERJURY AND MAGISTRATE 

ELLIOT'S ENDORSEMENT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE'S 

PERJURY. 

VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VIOLATING RULES 

AGAINST EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS BY ISSUING 
No. 16AP-182 3 

GAG ORDER RULING ON DISPARAGING REMARKS TO 

CHILD'S MANDATED REPORTERS. 

IX. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING MISLEADING 

STATEMENTS AND FORCING THE EVIDENTIARY 

BURDEN OF PROOF UPON PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 

WHEN IT WAS THE CHILD WHO MADE ALLEGATIONS 

OF BOTH DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE 

IN THE HOME OF DEFENDANT-APPELL[EE]. 

X. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING 

GUARDIAN AD LITEM'S RECOMMENDATION TO 

ADJUST CHILD VISITATION SCHEDULE IN THE EVENT 

OF AN ACTUAL, ACTIVE SEVERE WEATHER ADVISORY 

BEING IN EFFECT. 

{¶ 2} After her divorce from Mr. Hightower, Galyna Hightower moved from the 

Upper Arlington area to the Pickerington area to be with the man who is now her 

husband. The move did not change what was necessary to make the shared parenting 

plan involving their young child work, namely complete cooperation between the parents 

of the child. Mr. Hightower felt that their child should spend every school night with him 

so the child would not have to travel from Pickerington to her elementary school in Upper 

Arlington. Galyna did not want to lose a chunk of her parenting time. 

{¶ 3} A hearing was held in front of a magistrate to address the issues argued by 

Mr. Hightower. The magistrate rendered a magistrate's decision which did not grant Mr. 

Hightower all the relief he wanted, but did recommend some changes. 

{¶ 4} Mr. Hightower did not order a transcript of the proceedings before the 

magistrate. He filed something akin to objections to the magistrate's decision, which in 

reality were more of a personal attack on the magistrate. The "objections" were: 

1. The Magistrate lied to protect Defendant's parenting time. 

2. The Magistrate misrepresented the facts and testimony of 

the trial. 

3. The Magistrate violated Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct 

including: Disregarding a child's allegation of physical abuse 

and alcohol use; Minimizing and/or dismissing factual 

and/or logical evidence on the physical safety of [T.L.H.] 
No. 16AP-182 4 

("Child") including but not limited to being driven during an 

active tornado warning. 

{¶ 5} The trial court judge assigned to the case had no way of knowing what 

evidence was actually presented before the magistrate, given the fact no transcript was 

provided. The judge engaged in an extensive analysis of the arguments presented by Mr. 

Hightower anyway, and concluded that no evidence indicated that the magistrate lied or 

misrepresented the evidence presented when the magistrate prepared the magistrate's 

decision. Thus, the first two "objections" were overruled. 

{¶ 6} With no way of knowing what evidence supported the claims before the 

magistrate as to "physical abuse and alcohol use" and as to the alleged endangering of the 

child of the parties, the trial court judge had no choice but to accept the magistrate's 

decision as it pertained to those allegations. In short, the trial court accepted virtually all 

of the magistrate's decision. 

{¶ 7} Mr. Hightower has appealed the trial court's decision, as indicated earlier. 

{¶ 8} We also have no transcript of evidence to consider, so our consideration is 

bound by the four corners of the magistrate's decision as interpreted in the trial judge's 

decision accepting most of the magistrate's decision. 

{¶ 9} Despite the allegations in the first assignment of error, the trial court did 

not leave the agreed parenting plan totally in tact. The court made slight modifications to 

accommodate the new circumstances presented by the mother's move to Pickerington. 

We have no evidentiary basis for saying the trial court judge did not go far enough in 

modifying the allocations of parental rights and responsibilities. 

{¶ 10} The first assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 11} We have no basis for finding that an officer of the court lied, misstated facts, 

or ignored evidence. 

{¶ 12} The second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 13} We likewise have no basis to find that the magistrate engaged in any kind of 

misconduct. 

{¶ 14} The third assignment of error is overruled. 
No. 16AP-182 5 

{¶ 15} Contrary to the allegations in the fourth assignment of error, the trial court 

judge carefully analyzed the custody situation and entered an order which was careful to 

consider the best interests of the child. 

{¶ 16} The fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 17} With no transcript of the hearing before the magistrate, we cannot evaluate 

the evidence presented. While appellant did file the transcript of the hearing before the 

trial court on his motion to set aside the magistrate's decision, that hearing was not a full 

evidentiary hearing. Rather, it was an opportunity for each side to present oral arguments 

to the trial court. And while the trial court mentioned "evidence" in passing during the 

hearing, the trial court did not swear in witnesses or consider the admissibility of exhibits. 

Accordingly, assignments of error five, seven, and nine are overruled as they allege 

violations of the Ohio Rules of Evidence during a non-evidentiary hearing. 

{¶ 18} As to assignments of error six and eight, appellant alleges the trial court 

violated the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct and Rules of Superintendence for the 

courts of Ohio. "Appellate courts do 'not have jurisdiction over the issue of whether an 

attorney violated the Rules of Professional Conduct even when it is raised in the context of 

an appeal.' " State v. Robinson, 2d Dist. No. 2013-CA-33, 2014-Ohio-1663, ¶ 24, quoting 

State v. Snyder, 6th Dist. No. WM-08-004, 2009-Ohio-49, ¶ 35; see also State ex rel. 

Buck v. Maloney, 102 Ohio St.3d 250, 2004-Ohio-2590, ¶ 7-8 (noting the Supreme Court 

of Ohio has exclusive and absolute jurisdiction over the discipline of attorneys). Thus, we 

overrule appellant's sixth assignment of error on the basis that we lack jurisdiction to 

consider whether the trial court violated the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct. 

Similarly, the Rules of Superintendence serve as guidelines for the courts of Ohio but do 

not create substantive rights on the part of individual litigants. Gardner v. Bisciotti, 10th 

Dist. No. 10AP-375, 2010-Ohio-5875, ¶ 26 (holding that even if appellant can show a 

violation of the Rules of Superintendence, appellant is not entitled to reversal of the trial 

court's decision on that basis). As such, we overrule appellant's eighth assignment of 

error. 

{¶ 19} As to the tenth assignment of error, the trial court clearly addressed the 

issue of travel during difficult weather advisories. The judge strongly encouraged the 

parties to communicate with each other when weather conditions were threatening. The 
No. 16AP-182 6 

judge was not willing to turn over control of visitation to the National Weather Service or 

to a local weather broadcast. The judge felt that both the mother and the father love the 

child and should be able to communicate about travelling with the child when weather 

threatens. We cannot say the trial court judge abused her discretion in her handling of 

the issue. 

{¶ 20} The tenth assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 21} All ten assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of the trial 

court is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

KLATT and LUPER SCHUSTER, JJ., concur.