N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential. 

# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________ RAMBUS INC., Appellant,

v.

T eresa Stanek Rea, ACTING DIRECTOR, U NITED S TATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Appellee.

______________________

2012

- 1480 (Reexamination No. 95/001,166)

______________________ Appeal from the United State s Patent and Trademark Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.

______________________

Decided: June 28, 2013

______________________

J OHN M. W HEALAN , of Chevy Chase, Maryland, argued for appellant. Of counsel on the brief were J EFFREY A. L AMKEN and M ICHAEL G. P ATTILLO , J R ., MoloLamken, LLP, of Wash ington, DC; and K ARA F. S TOLL , Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow , Garrett & Dunner, LLP, of Was hington, DC.RAMBUS INC

. v. REA 2

C OKE M. S TEWART , Associate Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With her on the brief were R AYMOND T. C HEN , Solicitor

, N ATHAN K. K ELLEY , Deputy Solicitor, and W ILLIAM L AMARCA , Assoc iate Solicitor.

______________________

Before R ADER , Chief Judge, O’M ALLEY , and W ALLACH , Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge R ADER

. Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge W ALLACH

. R ADER , Chief Judge

. This appeal arise s from an inter partes reexam ination proceeding before the United States Patent and Trad emark Office (PTO) . The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board) affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of all 25 claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,287,109 (the ’109 P atent) under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). Because substantial evidence does not support the Board’s conclusion , this
court reverses.

I.

The technology at issue involves methods of contro lling a d ynami c random access memory device (DRAM)

. Storing information in a DRAM is referred to as a “write” operation , and retrieving information from a DRAM is referred to as a “read” operation. Information is written
to
, or read from

, a DRAM using a memory co ntroller. For example , in a write operation, a memory controller
transm its control information to the DRAM

, which i ncludes a write request and “address” information indica ting where (by row and column) the data will be stored. The DRAM receives the control information and executes the write operation, i.e

., writes the data to the correspon ding location. Data and control information are tran s-RAMBUS INC

. v. REA 3 ferred between the memory controller and the DRAM through a set of lines called a “bus.”

P rior to 1990 , DRAMs operated “asynchronously” to the memory controller

— that is, read and write operations were not conducted with reference to a system clock. A DRAM would exe cute read/ write operation s as quickly as possible after receiving control information from the

memo ry controller

. Between the time the memory co ntroller transmitted the control information and the time the DRAM executed the operation, the memory controller had to wait for the DRAM to complete internal prepara tory functions. This interface between the memory contro ller and the DRAM rendered the bus unusable because it would freeze in a “wait state” where the memory contro ller could not perform any other functions until the read/write operation was executed.
As processor speeds increased, DRAM s coul d n ot keep up, which created a bottle neck that diminished the a dvantages of faster processors. The 1990s , however, intr oduced the synchronous DRAM, which execute d read/write operations with reference to a sys tem clock. After the memory controller transmitte d a read/write request to the DRAM, the DRAM would wait a pre -determined number of clock cycles before executing the operation . This clock function eliminated the “wait state” and enabled the

memory controller to perform other tasks and send add itional requests to other DRAMs while the operation was pending

. This process became known as “interleaving

. ” This case features different methods of interleaving

. II.

Rambus is the owner of the ’109 Patent , entitled “Method of Controlling a Memory Device Having a Memory Core.” It claim s priority to U.S. Patent Applic ation No. 08/545,292, filed on October 19, 1995, by Richard M. Barth, et al. In 2009, the PTO granted NVIDIA Co rporation’s request for inter partes reexamination ofRAMBUS INC

. v. REA 4

the ’109 Patent . The Exa miner rejected all 25 claims as anticipated by an earlier Rambus patent, U.S. Patent No. 6,584,037 (Farmwald). The Board affirmed the rejection and Rambus sought rehearing. Meanwhile, Rambus and NVIDIA settled, and NVIDIA withdrew from the procee dings. The Board denied rehearing, and Ram bus appealed to this court where the sole issue on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports t he Board’s finding that the ’109 Patent is anticipated by Farmwald.

The ’109 P atent discloses and claims certain methods of controlling d ata transfers to and from a DRAM. As the Board found

, the specification describes “at least two embodiments ,” which the Board referred to as the “strobe” embodiment and the “non

- strobe” embodiment. J.A. 3;

see ’109 Patent col. 10 ll. 25

– 67. In both embodiments, a memory controller transmits a request packet to the DRAM

. ’109 Patent col. 10 ll. 25

– 67. The request packet contains control information indicating whether the DRAM will perform a read or a write operation. J.A. 3

– 4. In the strobe embodiment, the memory controller then transmits a separate “strobe signal” to the DRAM, which

causes the DRAM to execute the operation immediately (with a minimal inherent delay)

. J.A. 4; ’109 Patent col. 8 l. 63

– col. 9 l. 7; ’109 Patent col. 9 ll. 41

– 46. As the Board noted, the benefit of this invention “stems from latency minimization, resulting in a relatively free data bus for other data transfers

— i.e., the command control info rmation tells the [DRAM] to pre

- fetch the desired data . .

. and the [DRAM] then waits for the strobe signal to send the data.” J.A. 4.

In the non

- strobe embodiment, the memory controller “varies the timing of data transmission without use of the above

- described strobe signal.” J.A. 5. Rather, “t he [request] pack et contains a delay value that indicates to the DRAM when the [operation should be executed] relative to the time at which the request packet is sent.”RAMBUS INC

. v. REA 5

J.A. 4

– 5 (quot ing ’109 Patent col. 10 ll. 52

– 60). For e xample, if the request packet contained a write request and a delay value of eight clock cycles, the DRAM would execute the write operation after eight clock cycles elapse

. As the Board noted, the benefit here is that the “[memory] controller is able to dynamically adjust the operative interleave .” J.A. 6 (emphasis added).

III.
The Farmwald patent, titled “Memory Device which Samples Data after an Amount of Time Transpires,” likewise discloses and claims a method of controlling data transfers to and from a DRAM. As the Board found, Farmwald teac hes using a memory controller to send a request packet to the DRAM , which c ontains control information specifying a read or write operation

. J.A. 8. Farmwald’s request packet also contains a bit that selects

an “access

- time register” within the DRAM. J. A. 8; Farmw ald col. 9 l. 54

– col

. 10 l. 1. T he a ccess

- time reg i sters are central to Farmwald’s invention

. E ach of Farmwald’s DRAM s contain s “access

- time registers 173 which store a set of one or more delay times at which the device can or should be available to send or receive data.” Farmwald col. 6 ll. 40

– 45. For example,

one access

- time register might contain a delay value of two system c lock cycles, another four sy stem clock cycles, and another eight , and so forth. The access

- time registers “can be modified and preferably are set as part of an initialization sequence that occurs when the system is powered up or reset.” Farmwald col. 6 l l. 45

– 47. In other words, the delay values are stored in the access

- time registers on start

- up, prior to the memory controller transmitting any request packets to the DRAM. J.A. 10993 (“Farmwald relies upon the previously received [delay] value signal . . . .”).
As the Board found, Farmwald teaches that after the memory controller transmits a request packet to theRAMBUS INC

. v. REA 6

DRAM

, the DRAM will wait to execute the specified read/write operation depend ing on which access

- time register is selected by the bit in the r equest packet. J.A. 8; Farmwald col. 9 ll. 23

– 25 (“The time after which a data block is driven onto the bus lines is selected from values stored in slave access

- time registers.”). For example , if the request packet con tains a bit that selects access

- time register no. 4, and access

- time register no. 4 was previou sly programmed with a delay value of eight clock cycles, the DRAM will execute the operation contained in the request packet after eight clock cycles elapse

. IV.
The ’109 Patent and Farmwald are no strangers to

one ano th er. First , the ’109 Patent specification disti nguishes Farmwald as prior art. For example, the ’109 Patent describes Farmwald’s method of controlling a DRAM as “inflexible” because the start of an operation is tied to “a predetermined number of clock cycles” after the

re quest packet is transmitted, and “t he number of clock cycles

. . . may be determined by a value stored in a register within the DRAM.” ’109 Patent col. 10 ll. 32

– 37

. Moreover

, Farmwald’s parent patent , U.S. Patent No. 5,319,755 (Farmwald ’755)

, shares the same specifica tion as Farmwald and was cited by the Examiner during initial examination of the ’109 Patent application

. The Examiner rejected the ’109 Patent claims as being antic ipated by Farmwald ’755 , but withdrew the objection after Rambus responded to the Office Action

. Further , the ’109 P atent has been widely litigated in at least sev en causes of action. In at least two of these actions, Farmwald or Farmwald ’755 were directly in front of the tribunal . In ITC Investigation No. 337

- TA

661, the Respondents and Staff Attorney advanced sim ilar arguments as the Board does in the present case, but the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s conclusion that Farmwald ’755 does not antic ipate the ’109 Patent

.RAMBUS INC

. v. REA 7 Certain Semiconductor Chips Having Synchronous D ynamic Random Access Memory and Prod s. Containing Same , Inv. No. 337

- TA

- 661, 2011 WL 6016982 (October 1, 2011). Likewise, in ITC Investi gation No. 33 7- TA

- 753

, the ALJ held in an Initi al Determination that Farmwald does not anticipate the ’109 Patent. Certain Semicondu ctor Chips and Prods

. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337

- TA

753 , 2012 WL 927056 (March 2, 2012).
Notwithstanding the above, the Board found in the present case that Farmwald anticipates the ’109 Patent. In other words, a reference that was overcome during initial examination, distinguished as prior art in the patent specification, and found not to anticipate by at least two different tribunals

, now

— according to the Board

— disclose s each and every element of the claims. The result is somewhat surprising, especially with not hing in the record indicating whether the Board considered these prior decisions

. Upon comparison of the relevant claims, this court conclude s that Farmwald does not anticipate the ’109 Patent ’s claims

. V.
This court reviews the Board’s factual findings for substantial evidence. In re Gartside , 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Anticipation is a question of fact. In re Baxter Travenol Labs. , 952 F.2d 388, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1991). “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found . . . in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal.

, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987)

. This court reviews the Board’s claim construction de novo. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc. , 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
The parties agree that claim 1 is representative of all claims:RAMBUS INC

. v. REA 8

1. A method of controlling a memory device ha ving a memory core, wherein the method compri ses: Providing control information to the memory d evice, wherein the control information includes a first code which specifies that a write operation be initiated in the memory device;
Providing a signal to t he memory device, wherein the signal indicates when the memory device is to begin sampling write data, wherein the write data is stored in the memory core during the write o peration;
Providing a first bit of the write data to the memory device during an ev en phase of a clock signal; and
Providing a second bit of the write data to the memory device during an odd phase of the clock signal.

’109 Patent col. 41 l. 61

– col. 43 l

. 2. The central issue is whether Farmwald discloses the step of “providing a signal to the memory device , wherein the signal indicates when the memory device is to begin sampling write data. ”

The Board construed the term “signal” broadly to

mean “the physical represen tation of data ,” and concluded that Farmwald disclose s s uch a signal

. The Board’s construction of the term “signal” is unreasonably ove rbroad

. Indeed, construing the term “signal” to mean any representation of data would essentially convert every element of claim 1 into a signal because the control info rmati on, including the write command and the data being written, are all physical representations of data.
The patent specification makes clear that “ signal ” is being used in a narrower sense as a start i ndicator for the DRAM to begin an operation

. See, e.g. , ’109 Patent A b-RAMBUS INC

. v. REA 9 stract (“A signal is provided that indicates when the memory device is to begin sampling write data . . . .”).

T his court does not need to re

- construe the term “si gnal ,” however. Nor does t his court need to reach the question of w hether “signal” encom passes just the “strobe signal” in the strobe embodiment of the ’109 Patent, or whether it also encompass es the delay value in the non

strobe embodiment . E ven under the Board’s broad co nstruction , Farmwald does not anticipate the ’109 Patent ’s claims

. The Board held that Farmwald’ s method of storing and recalling delay values from the DRAM’s access

- time registers anticipated the “providing a signal” limitation of claim 1 in one of four ways. The Board stated

, “Farmwald’s delay value . . . is either “1) in the request packet; 2) stored in an access

- [time register] ; 3) provided for comparison to a clock; and/or 4) implicitly used to generate another implicit signal after comparison to signify a match.” J.A. 13. These theories are discussed in
turn below. The court notes that the Board ’s failure to pick one theory of anticipation it found persuasive, or even most persuasive, itself causes questions about the Board’s confidence in its anticipation rejection.

1. In the Request Packet

The Board stated that Farmwald’s delay value is “in the request packet ” transmitted from the memory contro ller to the DRAM. J.A. 13. The record does not support this view

. The record shows that Farmwald’s delay value is previously stored in an access

- time regis ter within the DRAM

. Farmwald col. 6 ll. 40 –47 ; J.A. 10993 (“Farmwald relies upon the previously received [delay] value si gnal

. . . . ”)

. Although Farmwald’s request packet s contain a bit that selects an access

- time register, this feature differs from claim 1 , which requires “ a signal . . . [that] indicates when the memory device is to begin sampling write data.” ’109 Patent cl. 1. The bit in Farmwald’sRAMBUS INC

. v. REA 10

request packet does not contain any timing information, but merely selects an access

- time register. Although subsequent events or signals from the access

- time regi sters may cause the DRAM to begin an operation , that part of the Farmwald operation does not transform the bit into a signal that meets the limitations of the claim

. The invention claimed in t he ’109 Patent eliminates the need for access

- time regis ters

— a significant advantage over the prior art

. ’109 Patent col. 10 ll. 27

– 39.

2. Stored in an Access

- Time Register
The Board alternatively held that “storing the delay value in the access

- time r egister” in Farmwald anticipates the “providing a signal” step of claim 1. J.A. 14. Howe ver , Farmwald’s delay values are stored in the access

- time registers prior to the memory controller transmitting any request packet s to the DRAM . Thus, the Board’s i nte rpretation requires performance of the first two steps of claim 1 out of order. While the steps of a method are not limited to a specific order unless th e claim explicitly or implicitly so requires, Baldwin Graphics Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc. , 512 F .3 d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2008), h ere, a plain reading of claim 1 evinces a specific order. The first step of claim 1 “specifies that a write operation be initia ted in the memory device

, ” and the second step “indicates when the memory device is to begin sampling write data.” ’109 Patent cl. 1. It would make no sense for the second step to be performed first —tel ling the memory device to begin sampling write data

— before the memory device was even instructed to perform a “write” operation. Therefore, the Board’s finding is clearly erroneous

. The Board also stated that “skilled artis ans would have considered . . . retrieving [the delay value]” from Farmwald’s access

- time register as constit uting “ providing a signal .” J.A. 14 (emphasis added)

. Th e record also supplies no support for th is finding. Farmwald’s access

time registers are within the DRAM , and thus, the D RAMRAMBUS INC

. v. REA 11 is essentially “ retrieving ” the delay value from itself. Claim 1 of the ’109 Patent requires “[p]roviding a signal to the memory device .” ’109 Patent cl. 1 (emphasis added). The Board’s reasoning that “[c]laim 1 does not preclude providing the signal from one part of the memory device to another part of it ,” J.A. 15 n.3, can neither be reco nciled with the plain language of the claim n or the patent specifica tion, which is replete with references and figures showing an external memory controller transmitting signals to the DRAM. See

, e.g. , ’109 Patent col . 4 ll. 8

– 26.

3. Provided for Comparison to a Clock

The Board stated that “skilled artisans would have considered . . . comparing [Farmwald’s delay value] to a clock value . . . as also constituting ‘providing a signal,’ as recited in claim 1.” J.A. 14. However, nowher e did the Board identify where Farmwald discloses this compar ison ; nor did the Board explain how “comparing” a delay value to a clock value equates to a “signal

, ” particularly under the Board’s construction of “signal” to mean “the physical representa tion of data.” This court has made clear that “[b] road conclusory statements stand ing alone are not evi dence .” In re Kotzab , 217 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000) . In this case, the Board does not show that comparing a delay value to a clock signal anticipates the claim

.

4. Implicitly Used to Generate Another Implicit Signal After Comparison to Signify a Match
The Board again , without any discussion or citation to Farmwald, determined that “Farmwald’s system implici tly compares a clock signal to [the] register

- stored delay value, and thereafter implicitly generates another signal for completing the data read or write operation upon a de termination that the clock counter equals the delay value. . . .” J.A. 1 2. The record does not support this finding. Furthermore , the implicit signal relied on by the Board appears to be generated from the access

- timeRAMBUS INC

. v. REA 12 registers. As mentioned above, Farmwald’s access

- time registers are located within the DRAM itself

, and cla im 1 of the ’109 Patent requires a signal be provided to the DRAM from an external source

. Therefore, even assu ming that Farmwald’s system implicitly generates a signal upon determination that the clock counter equals a delay value, the signal would not a nticipate the claim.

VI.
In conclusion, the Board’s determination that all 25 claims of the ’109 Patent are invalid as anticipated by Farmwald is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, this court reverses.

REVERSED

# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________ RAMBUS INC., Appellant,

v.

T eresa Stanek Rea, ACTING DIRECTOR, U NITED S TATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Appellee.

______________________

2012

- 1480 (Reexamination No. 95/001,166)

______________________ Appeal from the United State s Patent and Trademark Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.

______________________

W ALLACH , Circuit Judge , dissenting.

T he Board’s conclusion that the patent is anticipated is supported by substantial evidence

, and therefore I dissent from the majority’s decision.

The dispositive question in this case is whether su bstantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Farmwald discloses the step of “providing a signal to the memory device, wherein the signal indicates when the memory device is to begin sampling write data.

. . . ” ’109 patent col. 42 ll. 61

– 63. It is uncontested that Farmwald’s DRAM contains “access

- time regist ers” with various delay values. Farmwald teaches sending a “request packet” from a memory controller to the DRAM w ith controlRAMBUS INC

. v. REA 2

information that

, inter alia

, selects an access

- time regi ster. The Board found that this request packet was a “signal” that “indi cates” when the DRAM “is to begin sampling write data.” This is supported by substantial evidence. Although the delay value choices are stored in the DRAM, a reasonable person could conclude that the request packet is a “signal” that “indicates” when the DRAM “is to begin sampling write data.” Id. col. 42 ll. 61

- 63; see Consol. Edison Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd.

, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (S ubstantial evidence “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a con clusion

. ”); I n re Kotzab , 217 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ( “S ubstantial evidence is something less than the weight of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla of evi dence

. ”)

. The majority says that although Farmwald’s request packets contain a bi t, that bit merely selects an access

time register ; it does not contain any timing information itself. However, g iven the Board’s broad construction of the term “signal

, ” which the majority accepts
, see Maj. Op. 9 , the bit in the request packet provides a signal by selec ting an access

- time register which indicates when the DRAM is to begin an operation. It is the bit that selects

an access

- time register, and therefore indicate s “when the memory device is to begin sampling write data.” ’109 patent col. 42 l l. 62

– 63. That is, the request packet i ncludes a bit, a “value,” that tells the memory device to wait x amount of time after receiving the command to write data. The fact that the x is stored within the memory device does not change what the value repr es ents. Without the value in the request packet the memory device would not know when to begin sampling; it is that bit which instructs the memory device when to begin. Farmwald teaches that the request packet controls the timing of writing data either by d irectly “select[ing] a certain register in the slave DRAM memory device which stores the (delay value) timing information” or indirectlyRAMBUS INC

. v. REA 3 by “indicat[ing] pre

- selected (delay value) access times.” See J.A. 8 (citing Farmwald col. 9 l. 46 – col. 10 l. 5)). Contrary to the majority’s characterization, n o subs equent steps or signals are necessary. See Maj. Op. 8 –9

. Once the specified amount of time elapses

, sampling begins. Farmwald col. 27 ll. 19

– 20 (Claim 25 specifies “outputting the data to the memory devi ce after a delay time transpires.”).

T he second basis for the Board’s reasoning is that the claim language does not require sequential reading of the first two steps. The first two steps state:
Providing control information to the memory d evice, wherein the control information includes a first code which specifies that a write operation be initiated in the memory device;
Providing a signal to the memory device, wherein the signal indicates when the memory device is to begin sampling write data, wh erein the write data is stored in the memory core during the write o peration . . . .
’109 patent col. 41 l. 64 – col. 42 l. 64. T he “write oper ation” instruction does not need to come before the claimed “signal” since that signal only indicates when the “ write operation” is to happen. There is no reason the write instruction and the signal indicating the timing of the write operation could not come at the same time

— like they do in Farmwald’s request packet

. T he majority states that “a plain reading of claim 1 evinces a specific order,” because “[i]t would make no sense for the second step to be performed first

— telling the memory device to begin sampling write data

— before the memory device was even instructed to perform a ‘write’ operation.” Maj

. Op. 10. However, it is not clear, as a matter of “logic or grammar, ” that all of the steps in claim 1 must be performed in the order written. See Altiris, Inc.RAMBUS INC

. v. REA 4 v. Symantec Corp. , 318 F.3d 1363, 1369

– 71 (Fed. Cir. 2003). “[A]lthough a method claim necessarily recites the steps of the method in a particular order, as a general rule the claim is not limited to performance of the steps in the order recited, unless the claim explicitly or implicitly requires a specific order.” Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert , Inc. , 512 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The third step, “providing a first bit of the write data to the memory device during an even phase of a clock signal,” and the fourth step, “providing a second bit of the write data to the memory device during an odd phase of the clock signal,” have parallel structure and sequential language. ’109 patent col. 42 ll. 66

– 67; col. 43 ll. 1

– 2. But the same cannot be said for the first two steps of claim 1. The first step describes a “first code” but the claim fai ls to identify a “second code.” There is no sequential language in the first two steps to indicate that they must occur in the order written. The broadest reasonable interpretation of signal indicates when the operation is to happen, but does not necessa rily require immediate initiation. Ther efore, in instances like the ’109 patent’s delay value embo di ment, wherein the signal instructs the DRAM to wait some number of clock cycles before initiating action, it does not matter whether the DRAM has been inst ructed to do a write operation until the specified period of time elapses.

The role of this court is not to determine if the record could support a differ ent outcome, but to determine if the Board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. In re J olley , 308 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (If “the evidence in [the] record will support several reasonable but contradictory conclusions,” then this court “will not find the Board’s decision unsupported by substantial evidence simply because the Board chose one conclusion over another plausible alternative.”). Because the Board’s findings on anticipation are supported by substantial evidence

, I respectfully dissent.