NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

LISA MARGARET HARGETT, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0621

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2014-144395-001

The Honorable Annielaurie Van Wie, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Carlos Daniel Carrion

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. HARGETT

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Donn Kessler joined.

J O N E S, Judge:

¶1 Lisa Hargett appeals her convictions and sentences for two 

counts of aggravated driving under the influence (DUI) in violation of 

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 28-1381(A)(1), (3) and 

-1383(A)(1).

1 After searching the entire record, Hargett’s defense counsel 

has identified no arguable question of law that is not frivolous. Therefore, 

in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 

104 Ariz. 297 (1969), defense counsel asks this Court to search the record for 

fundamental error. Hargett was afforded an opportunity to file a 

supplemental brief in propria persona but declined to do so. After reviewing 

the record, we find no error. Accordingly, Hargett’s convictions and 

sentences are affirmed.

FACTS2 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Around 8:53 a.m. on February 19, 2013, an officer with the 

Chandler Police Department responded to a call advising of a white female

in a green Honda with a California license plate “possibly impaired, driving 

all over the roadway” in his area. The officer observed a vehicle matching 

that description turn into a convenience store parking lot. He immediately 

pulled in behind the vehicle and made contact with the woman in the 

driver’s seat, later identified as Hargett. When the officer asked Hargett for 

her driver’s license and registration, Hargett appeared confused by the 

request and flipped through her wallet for several minutes before 

eventually producing her license. 

 

1 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s 

current version.

2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

convictions with all reasonable inferences resolved against the defendant. 

State v. Harm, 236 Ariz. 402, 404 n.2, ¶ 2 (App. 2015) (quoting State v. 

Valencia, 186 Ariz. 493, 495 (App. 1996)). 
STATE v. HARGETT

Decision of the Court

3

¶3 After a second officer observed signs and symptoms of 

impairment, Hargett was arrested for DUI and transported to the police 

station where her blood was drawn, with consent, at 10:49 a.m. Meanwhile, 

a third officer, while cataloging the contents of Hargett’s vehicle,

discovered one pipe commonly used to smoke methamphetamine in the 

driver’s side door pocket, and another protruding from a purse found in 

the trunk. 

¶4 After being advised of her rights pursuant to Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Hargett agreed to participate in a drug 

influence evaluation. During the evaluation, Hargett admitted she had 

taken hydrocodone the day before, smoked methamphetamine around 8:00 

p.m. the previous evening, and taken carisoprodol, a muscle relaxant

prescribed to address a prior injury to her neck and back, around 4:00 a.m. 

The officer who performed the evaluation observed that Hargett slurred her

speech, had a flushed face, and exhibited a number of other signs of 

impairment, including lack of convergence in her eyes, horizontal gaze 

nystagmus (HGN), eyelid tremors, dilated pupils, pupillary unrest, leg 

tremors, swaying, poor balance, an inaccurate perception of time, 

unusually low body temperature, elevated heartbeat, piloerection, and 

raised taste buds. These signs and symptoms are consistent with both 

central nervous system (CNS) depressant and CNS stimulant use. 

¶5 Subsequent testing of Hargett’s blood revealed the presence 

of the CNS depressants clonazepam, meprobamate (a metabolite of 

carisprodol), and the barbiturate butalbital, as well as the CNS stimulants 

methamphetamine and amphetamine (a metabolite of methamphetamine), 

and pseudoephedrine, an over-the-counter decongestant sometimes used 

as a cutting agent during the production of methamphetamine. 

¶6 At trial, criminalists testified a CNS depressant can affect a 

person’s coordination and ability to move fluidly, control eye movements, 

and divide attention amongst various tasks. Even though the CNS 

depressants identified in Hargett’s blood were each within the therapeutic 

range individually, the combined effect of these drugs could be amplified 

when used together. And because the impacted tasks are essential to 

driving effectively, use or misuse of a CNS depressant can cause impaired 

driving. A CNS stimulant often has the opposite effects, causing dilated 

pupils, increased body temperature, body tremors, hyperactivity, and 

agitation, which can also affect a person’s ability to drive, and the level of 

the CNS stimulants found in Hargett’s blood were five to ten times the 

therapeutic range. Further, the criminalists agreed that when a CNS 

depressant and CNS stimulant are taken together, the two “don’t generally 
STATE v. HARGETT

Decision of the Court

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just counter balance each other.” Rather, the combination can exacerbate 

divided attention task problems. Additionally, the presence of HGN 

indicators, which occur with CNS depressants but not CNS stimulants, 

suggests the depressants were still having some quantifiable effect, despite 

the addition of the stimulant. 

¶7 The State also introduced evidence that Hargett’s privilege to 

drive had been suspended and revoked in 2012. Multiple letters were sent 

to Hargett advising of the action taken against her license, and she was cited 

with driving on a suspended license in January 2013, just one month prior 

to her arrest in the immediate case. 

¶8 At the close of the State’s evidence, Hargett moved for 

judgment of acquittal pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20, 

arguing insufficient evidence had been presented for the jury to convict her

of aggravated DUI because the chain of custody of the blood evidence was 

flawed and the State did not present any evidence of impaired driving. The 

motion was denied. 

¶9 Hargett testified in her own defense. Hargett denied driving 

to the convenience store on February 19, 2013, testifying instead she was the 

passenger in the vehicle being driven by her husband. According to 

Hargett, she had entered the convenience store and purchased coffee while 

her husband used the restroom. By the time she returned to her vehicle,

keys in hand, a police officer had pulled in and began asking questions 

about the vehicle, her identification, and her privilege to drive. 

¶10 Hargett was confused about the reason for her arrest, but 

admitted that her license had been suspended, the pipes found in the 

vehicle belonged to her and her husband, and she had smoked 

methamphetamine the evening prior to her arrest. She testified the other 

drugs found in her system were prescribed to her and denied any 

impairment as a result. She believed, rather, the signs and symptoms 

identified by the drug recognition expert resulted from a lower back injury 

and performing the tests barefoot “in the hot pavement” — despite the 

otherwise undisputed evidence that she was arrested on a February 

morning and the drug recognition evaluation took place at the police 

station. 

¶11 Hargett also testified her husband had seen the police arrive 

and left without her noticing; she did not see him again until she was 

released from custody later that evening. None of the officers recalled 

Hargett ever mentioning a husband or seeing a man who could have been
STATE v. HARGETT

Decision of the Court

5

Hargett’s husband at the time of her arrest, and the husband did not testify 

at trial. 

¶12 The jury found Hargett guilty as charged. The trial court 

sentenced Hargett as a non-dangerous, non-repetitive offender to four 

months’ imprisonment followed by three years’ probation and gave her 

credit for thirty-six days of presentence incarceration. Hargett timely 

appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 

13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶13 Our review reveals no fundamental error. See Leon, 104 Ariz. 

at 300 (“An exhaustive search of the record has failed to produce any 

prejudicial error.”). A person is guilty of DUI if she “drive[s] or [is] in actual 

physical control of a vehicle . . . [w]hile under the influence of intoxicating 

liquor, any drug, a vapor releasing substance containing a toxic substance 

or any combination of liquor, drugs or vapor releasing substances if the 

person is impaired to the slightest degree.” A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(1). If a 

person is impaired while under the influence, it is no defense that the drugs 

were taken legally. A.R.S. § 28-1381(B). A person is also guilty of DUI if 

she “drive[s] or [is] in actual physical control of a vehicle . . . [w]hile there 

is any drug defined in [A.R.S.] § 13-3401 or its metabolite in the person’s 

body.” A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(3). The drugs defined in A.R.S. § 13-3401 

include methamphetamine, carisoprodol, clonazepam, and meprobamate. 

A.R.S. § 13-3401(6)(c)(xxxviii), (d)(v), (d)(xi), (d)(xl). Furthermore, a person 

is guilty of aggravated DUI if she commits a DUI “while [her] driver license 

or privilege to drive is suspended, canceled, revoked or refused . . . as a 

result of [a prior DUI].” A.R.S. § 28-1383(A)(1). Based upon the record, 

sufficient evidence was presented upon which a jury could determine,

beyond a reasonable doubt, Hargett was driving under the influence of

butalbital, carisprodol, clonazepam, and methamphetamine, while those 

drugs or their metabolites were in her body, that she did so knowing her 

license was suspended as a result of a prior DUI, and that these drugs or 

some combination thereof had impaired her to the slightest degree. 

¶14 All of the proceedings were conducted in compliance with the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Hargett was represented by counsel 

at all stages of the proceedings and was present at all critical stages except 

for the mornings of two days of trial, for which her presence was 

voluntarily waived. The jury was properly comprised of eight jurors, and 

the record shows no evidence of jury misconduct. See A.R.S. § 21-102(B); 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.1(a). At sentencing, Hargett was given an opportunity 
STATE v. HARGETT

Decision of the Court

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to speak, and the trial court stated on the record the evidence and materials 

it considered and the factors it found in imposing sentences. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 26.9, 26.10. Additionally, the sentences imposed were within the 

statutory limits. See A.R.S. §§ 13-702(D), -902(A)(3), (B)(2), 28-1383(D)(1). 

CONCLUSION

¶15 Hargett’s convictions and sentences are affirmed. Defense 

counsel’s obligations pertaining to Hargett’s representation in this appeal 

have ended. Defense counsel need do no more than inform Hargett of the 

outcome of this appeal and her future options, unless, upon review, counsel 

finds an issue appropriate for submission to our supreme court by petition 

for review. State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85 (1984).

¶16 Hargett has thirty days from the date of this decision to 

proceed, if she wishes, with an in propria persona petition for review. See 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a). Upon the Court’s own motion, we also grant 

Hargett thirty days from the date of this decision to file an in propria persona 

motion for reconsideration.