IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

STATE OF ARIZONA,

Appellant,

v.

CHRISTIAN ADAIR,

Appellee.

No. CR-15-0337-PR

Filed November 22, 2016

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

The Honorable Robert L. Gottsfield, Judge (Retired)

No. CR2013-111090

REVERSED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One

238 Ariz. 193, 358 P.3d 614 (App. 2015)

VACATED

COUNSEL:

William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney, Lisa Marie Martin 

(argued), Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona

James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender, Mikel Steinfeld (argued),

Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, Attorneys for Christian Adair

David J. Euchner, Pima County Public Defender’s Office, Tucson, and 

Rhonda E. Neff, Kimerer & Derrick P.C., Phoenix, Attorneys for Amici 

Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice
STATE V. ADAIR

Opinion of the Court

2

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER authored the opinion of the Court, in 

which CHIEF JUSTICE BALES and JUSTICES BRUTINEL, TIMMER, and 

BOLICK joined.

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER, opinion of the Court:

¶1 This case concerns the constitutional standards that apply to 

a warrantless search of a probationer’s residence. We hold that such a 

search complies with the Fourth Amendment if it is reasonable under the 

totality of the circumstances and that its legality does not hinge on whether 

the search is supported by reasonable suspicion.

I.

¶2 In March 2012, the superior court placed Christian Adair on 

supervised probation for two felony convictions for solicitation to possess 

crack cocaine for sale. Under his court-imposed, uniform probation 

conditions, Adair agreed to “submit to search and seizure of person and 

property” by the probation department “without a search warrant,” and to 

provide the probation department “safe, unrestricted access to” his 

residence. The probation conditions also required Adair to obey all laws 

and to not possess or use any firearms, ammunition, illegal drugs, or 

controlled substances.

¶3 In late December 2012, an informant told police that Adair 

was on probation for selling drugs to an undercover officer and the 

informant thought Adair was still selling crack cocaine. The informant did 

not want to be named in any police report but gave the police his name,

birthdate, and address. Over the next several months the informant 

continued to contact police and indicated that Adair’s young child might 

have accompanied him during narcotic sales. A police officer confirmed 

that Adair was on probation for selling drugs to an undercover officer and 

had a child with him during one such transaction and that Adair lived at 

the address the informant provided.

¶4 After receiving the above information from police, the 

probation department conducted a warrantless search of Adair’s residence

in March 2013 pursuant to his probation conditions. At the probation 

department’s request, police accompanied probation officers on the search. 
STATE V. ADAIR

Opinion of the Court

3

Adair was home when the officers conducted the search. The officers

entered and seized crack cocaine, scales, packaging materials, about $450 in 

cash, a gun, and ammunition.

¶5 Adair was charged with felony possession of narcotic drugs 

for sale, possession of drug paraphernalia, and misconduct involving 

weapons. The probation officer also filed a petition to revoke Adair’s

probation. Adair moved to suppress the items seized during the search, 

arguing that it was a warrantless, pretextual police search, not a search by 

probation officers under the probation conditions. After an evidentiary 

hearing, the trial court rejected that argument.

¶6 In a motion for reconsideration, Adair argued that the 

evidence should be suppressed because the probation officers lacked 

“reasonable suspicion” for the search. The trial court reconsidered and 

ruled that “[a] probation search must be supported by a reasonable 

suspicion, or a reasonable basis, or reasonable grounds to believe the 

probationer has violated the terms of his probation or is engaging in 

criminal activity,” standards the court deemed “synonymous in the 

probation search context.” Concluding that the search did not meet those 

standards or have a sufficient legal basis, the court granted the motion to 

suppress.

¶7 The court of appeals disagreed with the standards the trial 

court applied and instead held that “reasonableness under the totality of 

the circumstances satisfies the Fourth Amendment when analyzing the 

probation officer’s warrantless search of a probationer’s residence 

undertaken pursuant to the Probation Conditions.” State v. Adair, 238 Ariz. 

193, 199 ¶ 20, 358 P.3d 614, 620 (App. 2015). The court vacated the order 

granting the motion to suppress and remanded to the superior court “to 

determine whether the probation officer’s warrantless search of Adair’s 

residence and resulting seizure of contraband was reasonable under the 

totality of the circumstances.” Id.

¶8 We granted review to clarify the constitutional standards 

governing a warrantless search of a probationer’s residence, a recurring 

legal issue of statewide importance. This Court has jurisdiction under 

article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24.

II.
STATE V. ADAIR

Opinion of the Court

4

¶9 We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for 

abuse of discretion, considering only the evidence presented at the 

suppression hearing and viewing the facts in a light most favorable to 

sustaining the trial court’s ruling. State v. Butler, 232 Ariz. 84, 87 ¶ 8, 302 

P.3d 609, 612 (2013). “An error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion,” 

State v. Bernstein, 237 Ariz. 226, 228 ¶ 9, 349 P.3d 200, 202 (2015), and “a 

suppression order based on an incorrect legal standard may be reversed,” 

State v. Peters, 189 Ariz. 216, 218, 941 P.2d 228, 230 (1997). Although we 

generally defer to a trial court’s factual findings if reasonably supported by 

the evidence, we review its ultimate legal determination de novo. State v. 

Evans, 237 Ariz. 231, 233 ¶ 6, 349 P.3d 205, 207 (2015). Whether reasonable 

suspicion is required to authorize a warrantless search of a probationer’s 

residence is a question of law, which we review de novo. See State v. Serna, 

235 Ariz. 270, 272 ¶ 7, 331 P.3d 405, 407 (2014).

¶10 We first clarify what is not at issue here. This case does not 

involve a random or suspicionless search, and thus we do not decide today

whether a probation officer’s warrantless search of a probationer’s 

residence may be valid absent any suspicion whatsoever of illegal activity 

or other probation violation. Cf. State v. Ballard, 874 N.W.2d 61, 72 ¶¶ 40-41 

(N.D. 2016) (holding that deputy’s warrantless, “suspicionless search” of 

probationer’s person and home violated Fourth Amendment rights of 

probationer subject to “minimal unsupervised probation conditions” for 

two misdemeanors).

¶11 Nor does this case involve consent, a well-established 

exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Butler, 232 

Ariz. at 87 ¶ 13, 302 P.3d at 612 (voluntary consent permits warrantless 

search). The State does not argue that Adair expressly or impliedly 

consented to the search of his house, based on the probation conditions or 

otherwise. Cf. Illinois v. Absher, 950 N.E.2d 659, 668 (Ill. 2011) (holding that 

defendant’s agreement, as part of negotiated guilty plea, to submit to 

probationary searches at any time “constituted prospective consent” and 

valid waiver of Fourth Amendment privacy rights).

¶12 Given the trial court’s now uncontested ruling (supported by 

the record) that the search “was not a mere pretext for conducting a criminal 

investigation by the police,” we also do not address the constitutionality of 

a law enforcement officer’s warrantless search of a probationer’s residence. 

In addition, Adair does not challenge the validity or enforceability of the 
STATE V. ADAIR

Opinion of the Court

5

court-imposed probation conditions to which he agreed and was subject. 

In State v. Montgomery, this Court rejected the defendant’s Fourth 

Amendment challenge to a probation condition that provided he would 

“[s]ubmit to search and seizure of person or property at any time by any 

police officer or probation officer without the benefit of a search warrant.” 

115 Ariz. 583, 583, 566 P.2d 1329, 1329 (1977). Noting a probationer’s 

reduced expectation of privacy, we found that provision neither overbroad 

nor “an unreasonable or an unconstitutional limitation upon his right to be 

free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id. at 584-85, 566 P.2d at 

1330-31. The continued vitality of Montgomery is not questioned here.

III.

¶13 The Fourth Amendment protects “persons [and their] houses

. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 

Because “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the 

wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed,” law enforcement officers 

generally may not enter, much less search, a person’s home without a 

warrant. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 590 (1980). “The touchstone 

of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a 

search is determined ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it 

intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to 

which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” 

United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v. 

Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)); see also Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 

1969 (2013) (“[T]he ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a 

governmental search is reasonableness.”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

¶14 “The question of whether a warrantless probationary search 

may be carried out without a showing of probable cause or reasonable 

suspicion is one that has divided other courts.” Ballard, 874 N.W.2d at

74 ¶ 54 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting); see also id. at 76-77 ¶ 60 (citing 

comparative cases). The United States Supreme Court has not resolved that

question, but three of its cases shed some light on the issue.

¶15 In Griffin v. Wisconsin, the Court observed that “[a]

probationer’s home, like anyone else’s, is protected by the Fourth 

Amendment’s requirement that searches be ‘reasonable.’” 483 U.S. 868, 873 

(1987). But the special needs of a state’s probation system, a probationer’s 
STATE V. ADAIR

Opinion of the Court

6

conditional liberty interests, and society’s interests in rehabilitation and 

public safety justify departures from the usual probable-cause and warrant 

requirements. Id. at 874-76. Thus, the Court in Griffin held that the

warrantless search of a probationer’s residence “was ‘reasonable’ within the 

meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted pursuant to 

a valid [state] regulation governing probationers” that permitted such 

searches on “reasonable grounds.” Id. at 876, 880. Because a probationer 

“is in need of rehabilitation and is more likely than the ordinary citizen to 

violate the law,” the Court observed, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied “if 

the information provided [to the probation department] indicates . . . only 

the likelihood ([the probationer] ‘had or might have guns’) of facts 

justifying the search.” Id. at 880.

¶16 Similarly, in Knights the Court held that the warrantless 

search of a probationer’s apartment, “supported by reasonable suspicion 

and authorized by a condition of probation, was reasonable within the 

meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” 534 U.S. at 122. There, as here, a 

probation condition authorized a warrantless search of the probationer’s 

residence. Id. at 114. Noting that the probation condition “significantly 

diminished Knights’ reasonable expectation of privacy,” and that the state’s 

interest in apprehending criminals and protecting potential victims may 

justify treating probationers differently than ordinary citizens, the Court

held “that the balance of these considerations requires no more than 

reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of this probationer’s house.” Id.

at 120-21. The Court, however, expressly did not “decide whether the 

probation condition so diminished, or completely eliminated, Knights’ 

reasonable expectation of privacy . . . that a search by a law enforcement 

officer without any individualized suspicion would have satisfied the 

reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 120 n.6; see 

also Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006) (stating that Knights “did 

not reach the question whether the search would have been reasonable 

under the Fourth Amendment had it been solely predicated upon the 

condition of probation”).

¶17 Five years after Knights, the Court in Samson held that “the 

Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a 

suspicionless search of a parolee.” 547 U.S. at 857. The Court stated that 

“parolees are on the ‘continuum’ of state-imposed punishments” and, on 

that continuum, “have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, 

because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to 
STATE V. ADAIR

Opinion of the Court

7

imprisonment.” Id. at 850. Based on his parolee “status alone” and the

“plain terms of the parole search condition,” the Court concluded that 

Samson “did not have an expectation of privacy that society would 

recognize as legitimate.” Id. at 852. And far outweighing Samson’s 

interests were the state’s substantial interests, including closely supervising 

parolees because they are more likely to commit future crimes, and 

“reducing recidivism and thereby promoting reintegration and positive 

citizenship among probationers and parolees.” Id. at 853.

IV.

¶18 Considering the holdings and reasoning in that trilogy of 

Supreme Court cases, we agree with the court of appeals that in assessing 

whether the probation officers’ warrantless search of Adair’s residence was 

lawful, “reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances satisfies the 

requirements of the Fourth Amendment.” Adair, 238 Ariz. at 194 ¶ 1, 358 

P.3d at 615. As the court of appeals correctly observed, the cases on which 

the trial court relied “found that ‘reasonable suspicion’ for a probation 

officer’s warrantless search of a probationer’s residence satisfied the Fourth 

Amendment, but did not hold that reasonable suspicion was 

constitutionally mandated.” Id. at 197 ¶ 11, 358 P.3d at 618 (citing cases).

Instead, as noted above (supra, ¶ 16), the Supreme Court has not required 

reasonable suspicion as a threshold standard for warrantless searches of 

probationers’ residences, and for several reasons we are not inclined to do 

so.

¶19 First, Samson reiterated that “[t]he touchstone [or “object”] of 

the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, not individualized suspicion,” 

and that “the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of 

such suspicion.” 547 U.S. at 855 n.4 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Although Samson did not equate parolees with probationers, 

noting that the former “have fewer expectations of privacy” than the latter, 

id. at 850, the Court did not suggest that the difference was so significant as 

to require a showing of reasonable suspicion to conduct a warrantless 

probationary search, particularly when the applicable probation conditions 

specifically and expressly authorize such searches. And, importantly, the

state’s “substantial” interests that weighed heavily in the Court’s balancing 

of interests in Samson — “recidivism, public safety, and reintegration of 

parolees into productive society” — exist here as well. Id. at 853, 855 n.4.
STATE V. ADAIR

Opinion of the Court

8

¶20 Second, Samson observed that “[i]mposing a reasonable 

suspicion requirement . . . would give parolees greater opportunity to 

anticipate searches and conceal criminality.” Id. at 854. That same concern 

applies to probationers, as Samson, Knights, and Griffin recognized. Id.

(citing Knights, 534 U.S. at 120; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 879). “In some cases—

especially those involving drugs or illegal weapons—the probation agency 

must be able to act based upon a lesser degree of certainty than the Fourth 

Amendment would otherwise require in order to intervene before a 

probationer does damage to himself or society.” Griffin, 483 U.S. at 879.

Because “the similarities between parole and probation . . . are far greater 

than the differences,” we conclude that reasonable suspicion is not 

necessarily required for a probationary search. Cf. State v. Vanderkolk, 32 

N.E.3d 775, 779-80 (Ind. 2015) (holding that probationers who have been 

clearly informed that their probation conditions unambiguously authorize 

warrantless and suspicionless searches are subject to warrantless searches

without reasonable suspicion).

¶21 Third, contrary to Adair’s argument, probationary searches 

conducted pursuant to clear, specific probation conditions are materially 

different from other types of searches that require reasonable suspicion.

See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722-26 (1987) (weighing hospital’s 

interests against a doctor’s privacy interests and concluding that search 

would be proper if supported by reasonable grounds for suspecting search 

would uncover evidence of doctor’s misconduct); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 

U.S. 325, 337-42 (1985) (weighing government’s interests against school 

student’s privacy interests and finding search of student’s purse reasonable 

only if supported by reasonable grounds to believe search would reveal 

evidence that student violated the law or school rules); United States v. 

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878-82 (1975) (balancing government’s interest 

against motorist’s to find that roving immigration stops of vehicles must be 

supported by reasonable suspicion); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 30 (1968) 

(requiring reasonable suspicion before conducting investigatory stop and 

frisk of pedestrian on public property). The status and privacy interests of 

doctors, students, motorists, and pedestrians are not analogous to those of 

convicted felons on probation. The respective interests of the government 

and the persons subjected to searches in non-probation cases are not fairly 

comparable to the parties’ respective interests here.

¶22 Accordingly, we reject Adair’s assertion that the Fourth 

Amendment categorically requires reasonable suspicion for all warrantless 
STATE V. ADAIR

Opinion of the Court

9

searches of probationers’ residences. A search of a convicted 

felon/probationer’s home, conducted by probation officers pursuant to 

valid probation conditions, is categorically different from police officers’

investigatory stops of vehicles or pedestrians. Cf. Evans, 237 Ariz. at 235 

¶ 17, 349 P.3d at 209 (holding that “reasonable suspicion under the Fourth 

Amendment does not require officers to testify about how their 

observations reduce or eliminate the possibility that innocent travelers will 

be subject to seizures or trial courts to make specific findings on that issue”); 

Serna, 235 Ariz. at 275 ¶ 21, 276 ¶ 28, 331 P.3d at 410, 411 (holding that, 

absent consent, a frisk of a suspect’s person is permissible only if the officer 

“reasonably suspect[s] both that criminal activity is afoot and that the 

suspect is armed and dangerous”).

¶23 Balancing Adair’s “significantly diminished privacy 

interests,” Knights, 534 U.S. at 121, against the state’s “substantial” interests 

identified in Samson, 547 U.S. at 853, Knights, 534 U.S. at 120-21, and Griffin, 

483 U.S. at 875-80, we hold that the probation officers’ warrantless search of 

Adair’s residence pursuant to the probation conditions complied with the 

Fourth Amendment if it was reasonable under the totality of the 

circumstances. Cf. United States v. King, 736 F.3d 805, 806 n.1, 810 (9th Cir. 

2013) (rejecting argument that reasonable suspicion was required to 

authorize warrantless probationary search, and holding that “a 

suspicionless search [that is, “a search for which the police have less than 

reasonable suspicion”] conducted pursuant to a suspicionless searchcondition of a violent felon’s probation agreement does not violate the 

Fourth Amendment”).

¶24 Adair’s related argument based on article 2, section 8 of the 

Arizona Constitution does not change the result. Under that “right to 

privacy” clause, “[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his 

home invaded, without authority of law.” Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 8; cf. State v. 

Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 463, 724 P.2d 545, 549 (1986) (under Arizona law, 

“officers may not make a warrantless entry into a home in the absence of 

exigent circumstances or other necessity”); State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 265, 

689 P.2d 519, 524 (1984) (absent any showing of exigent circumstances or 

other necessity, officers violated article 2, § 8 by entering defendant’s 

residence without a warrant, inspecting and “securing” the premises, and 

detaining all occupants until a warrant could be obtained). Although that 

provision is different and arguably broader than the Fourth Amendment, 

particularly as it pertains to a person’s “private affairs” and “home,” its 
STATE V. ADAIR

Opinion of the Court

10

proscription applies to intrusions undertaken “without authority of law.” 

A search of a probationer’s residence pursuant to a valid probation 

condition is not “without authority of law” and thus does not violate

Arizona’s constitutional privacy clause, as long as the search is reasonable 

under the totality of circumstances. We next turn to that issue.

V.

¶25 The court of appeals identified several, non-exhaustive 

factors it deemed relevant to the reasonableness inquiry: “[t]he target of the 

search must be a known probationer subject to a valid, enforceable 

probation condition allowing a warrantless search”; “[t]he search must be 

conducted by a probation officer in a proper manner and for the proper 

purpose of determining whether the probationer was complying with 

probation obligations”; and “the search must not be arbitrary, capricious or 

harassing.” Adair, 238 Ariz. at 199 ¶ 21, 358 P.3d at 620. We agree with

those factors but also find others that bear on whether the probationary 

search is reasonable, including the nature and severity of the probationer’s 

prior conviction(s) for which he is on probation; the content and scope of 

the probation conditions; the nature and severity of the suspected criminal 

offenses or probation violations giving rise to the search; whether the 

suspected crimes or violations are the same as or similar to the crimes of 

which the probationer was previously convicted; and the nature, source, 

and plausibility of any extraneous information supporting the search.

¶26 Although we agree with the court of appeals that the 

reasonableness of the search depends on the totality of the circumstances, 

and thus the trial court applied the wrong legal standard, we find no need 

to remand for the trial court to revisit Adair’s motion to suppress. The 

record, even when viewed in a light most favorable to upholding the ruling 

below, establishes that the search was reasonable. See Peters, 189 Ariz. at 

220, 941 P.2d at 232 (vacating trial court’s suppression order, which was

based on an incorrect legal standard, and remanding for further 

proceedings not relating to the defendant’s motion to suppress).

¶27 The trial court’s ruling rested on an error of law regarding the 

applicable legal standard, not on determining any witness credibility issues 

or resolving any conflict in the evidence. Rather, incorrectly applying a 

reasonable-suspicion standard, the trial court granted the motion to 

suppress because the citizen informant’s tip “supplied sparse information 
STATE V. ADAIR

Opinion of the Court

11

without sufficient corroboration by the police or probation department”;

the informant “appear[ed] to have a personal interest in what occurs as 

demonstrated by the informant’s constant calling to the police to learn what 

has happened and when will it happen”; the informant supplied no 

information that was not “available from the public record” and related 

nothing that “could predict future behavior indicating criminal activity” by 

Adair; and limited, periodic police surveillance of Adair’s residence did not 

reveal anything.

¶28 Viewed in the totality of the circumstances, none of the trial 

court’s observations negates the reasonableness of the probationary search. 

The three pertinent factors that the court of appeals identified indisputably

support the State: Adair was “a known probationer subject to a valid, 

enforceable probation condition allowing a warrantless search”; probation 

officers conducted the search in a proper manner and for a proper purpose; 

and the search was not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. Adair, 238 Ariz. 

at 199 ¶ 21, 358 P.3d at 620.

¶29 Other factors also support a conclusion that the search here 

was reasonable. The two prior felony convictions for which Adair was 

placed on supervised probation stemmed from his possession of crack 

cocaine for sale, crimes that were similar if not identical to the suspected 

offenses that led to the probationary search. The informant suggested that 

Adair was continuing to commit narcotics offenses with his child present, 

as Adair had done when previously selling drugs to an undercover officer. 

In addition, the informant was not anonymous but rather provided the 

police with his name and other identifying information and maintained 

periodic contact with the police. A probationary search based on specific 

probation conditions and incriminating information from a known source 

is quite different from stopping a vehicle based solely on an uncorroborated 

“anonymous tip contain[ing] only neutral, non-predictive information 

about the defendant and his activities.” State v. Altieri, 191 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 14, 

951 P.2d 866, 869 (1997) (holding that officers lacked reasonable suspicion 

to support vehicle stop absent showing that anonymous tipster was reliable 

and predicted future events that police corroborated).

¶30 The trial court observed that the informant provided very 

limited, uncorroborated information. But those observations, though 

pertinent to situations involving anonymous tips in which reasonable 

suspicion or probable cause is required for a stop or search, neither 
STATE V. ADAIR

Opinion of the Court

12

diminish the significance of the information that was conveyed nor 

preclude a finding of reasonableness in this context. Cf. Florida v. J.L., 529 

U.S. 266, 273-74 (2000) (holding that anonymous tip lacking indicia of 

reliability did not justify stop and frisk for firearm, but suggesting that 

showing of informant reliability is not necessarily required in other 

circumstances in which people have a diminished reasonable expectation 

of privacy); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328-29, 332 (1990) (holding that 

an “anonymous tip, as corroborated, exhibited sufficient indicia of 

reliability to justify the investigatory stop of [defendant’s] car,” and noting 

that “lesser showing” of “an informant’s ‘veracity,’ ‘reliability,’ and ‘basis 

of knowledge’” is required to meet reasonable-suspicion rather than 

probable-cause standard) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983)).

¶31 As the trial court stated, the information received from the 

informant “never changed” but instead “remained the same.” And, 

contrary to the court’s remark, information that “Adair was still selling 

crack cocaine out of [his] home” was not “available from the public record.”

Nor does a finding that this probationary search was reasonable hinge on 

the informant’s “predict[ing] future behavior,” a showing generally 

required for police searches or seizures based on anonymous tips. Cf. 

Altieri, 191 Ariz. at 3-4 ¶¶ 9-12, 951 P.2d at 868-69 (citing White, 496 U.S. at 

332) (anonymous tipster’s prediction of defendant’s future activity is 

generally required to show tipster’s reliability).

¶32 Finally, and importantly, the court-imposed probation 

conditions to which Adair agreed specifically required him to submit to a 

warrantless, probationary “search and seizure of person and property,” 

and to provide the probation department “safe, unrestricted access to” his 

residence. The search here was conducted in accordance with those 

conditions, a “salient circumstance” that “significantly diminished 

[Adair’s] reasonable expectation of privacy.” Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 120. 

The search also was directly related to the further conditions under which 

Adair agreed to obey all laws and not possess illegal drugs. Considering

the totality of the circumstances, we hold that the search conducted here 

was reasonable and thus constitutional.

VI.

¶33 The court of appeals’ opinion is vacated, the superior court’s 

order granting Adair’s motion to suppress is reversed, and the case is 
STATE V. ADAIR

Opinion of the Court

13

remanded to the superior court for further proceedings.