REF ID:A39328 

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~ &..-. ',.. flt1Af 'S-~.J.r\c:r 

Moscow H~ Fast, 

Offensive· Bombers· 

By Joseph and Stewart Altop 

THE Russian ~ industry is now producing two new heavy bomber types capa:. 

ble of round trip strikes at American targets, carrying atomic or hydrogen bombs. 

These are the Tupolev-200 and the D.Ju· 

shin-38 .. This highly significant fact of· lnterna• 

tional life has been suspected for some 

· time. The probability that one of these · new bombers had passed the prototype 

stage was reported in this space last sum• 

mer. Now it fs conftrmed. howeVer, that· 

both bombers are in active production, 

and are already being ftown by regular 

formations of the Soviet sμoate_lic air 

army. . . 

The news is a depressing commentarJ 

on Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wll• 

son's ccntentien that Soviet military preparations are "not o:llensive" in character. 

It proves that the Soviets are pressing the 

development of o:llenslve weapons with 

great energy. The Secretary was ta1klnl 

through his hat. . The existence of these new bomben 

radically changes the whole air-atomlo · 

balance. Until now the TU-4, an improved.· 

version of the B-29 crudely comparable 

to our B-50, has been the workhorse of the 

Soviet 11trategic air army. The TU-4 is 

entirely capable of striking any American 

target, but it canno"t do the round tdP 

:from Soviet air bases to American targets 

and back again. 

Thus the strategic air army is essentiall1 

a one-shot air :force, so long· as it must 

mainly depend upon the_ TU-4. Expert 

opinion is unanimous that the Soviet .air 

crews are trained to fty one-wq missions, 

and that the Soviet high command will 

order one-way missions, if n~ed be. Nonetheless, it was and is a severe handicap to 

have a one-shot air force. . The importance 

of the new bomber types is that they will 

·give the Soviet air planners tbfi power tea 

st.rlke and strike again. 

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( BOTH the D!!W Soviet bombers have . 

\ their American· 11anllels. The Tup01ev-ZOI 

1 is' the size ··of 0111' giant B-38, with' a Wing · 

\ span above 230 feet and a leJllth OI 208 · 

: feet over-all Its enormous size Indicates I great range. It. is powered by six turbo- . 

prop engines. The qu~ty of these engines, plus certain :features o:f the afr.. 

! :frame design, give positive evidence Of 

superior speed. 

It is thought to :fly at more than 450 

mile11. an hour and above 50,000 feet. These .. 

are substantially better performance characteristics than the best the B-38 can bout. 

Because the engi~es are turbo-prqpi, the 

!

new Russian intercontinental giants can · alio attack efficiently at very low altitude, 

'on the deck," where existing radar detection systems are seriously deficient. . 

The Ilyusbin-38 is a. somewhat smaller 

and more compact aircraft with sharpJy 

swept-back wings and a speed estimated 

at close to 500 miles per hour. Four turboprop engines ~rovide its present power 

plant. But its aerodynamic characteristics 

suggest that it has been designed to permit substit\ltion of jet engines for turboprops when. the time comes. 

Even· now this bomber has· Dl8D1 ·of tJie 

qualities. of the ~erican B-52, .which ls 

not yet in active production.· When end 

if the jet-turbo-prop substitution fB made, 

the comparison will be exact. 

To conclude this collection o:f disturbing data, both the Tupolev-200 and the 

Dyushln-38 are equipped with radar bom'bsights. The Pentagon's merchants of com· 

placency used to claim the Russians 

would never make radar bomb-sights. 

· WHEN first reported, "' the Dyusllln-38 

was known as "Type 31," while the Tupolev-200 was commonly called the TUG-75. 

(Besides the brllliant Tupolev, who built 

the TU-4, another· famous Russian -alr designer, Gurevich, collaborated .in the de1 velopment of the Tupolev-200.) The elrlf 

reports of both bombers were rejected as 

iD.herently incredible by the .same merchants of complacency who swore the 

Russians would never ·1earn to bomb bJ 

night and in bad weather. 

Now, however, the existence of both 

these bombers is somewhat glumlf ac- · cepted even by the Pentagon's clvlllln 

overlords, who have learned some harcl 

lessons in recent months. The new Soviet 

bombers are already in squadron forma,..: 

tions. . 

· No operating unit of the American Strategic Air Command will get new bombers 

of comparable range, speed and weight 

for many more months. The hope o:f SAC 

for the present is the B-47, a superb. aircraft but a medium-range bomber. And 

the number of operating squadrons which 

have exchanged their B-50s for M7s ts 

still very small. 

In short the Soviets may soon be able 

to claim parity with the United States, in 

point of equipment at least, in the great 

military specialty which has always been 

supposed to justify our neglect o:f other 

for.ms · of armed strength. In these circumstances it is plain dishonest for the 

Pentagon to go on smugly boastini about . 

American air-atomic striking power, with• 

out at least uttering a warning word or 

two now and then about Soviet air-atoJ.Dic :! striking power. L--------