United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 23-1295

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Ian Todd Good Left

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of North Dakota - Western

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Submitted: October 16, 2023

Filed: December 27, 2023

[Unpublished]

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Before GRUENDER, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Ian Todd Good Left pleaded guilty to assault of an intimate partner by 

strangulation and suffocation, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(8), 1153, and domestic 

assault by a habitual offender, see id. § 117(a). Good Left’s Presentence 

Investigation Report (“PSR”) calculated a total offense level of 21 and a criminal 

history category of IV, producing an advisory sentencing guidelines range of 57 to 
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71 months’ imprisonment. The PSR noted that an upward departure from this range 

may be warranted due to Good Left’s twenty-six prior tribal-court convictions, 

“many of which involved similar violent behavior.” At sentencing, the district court1

adopted the PSR and departed upward to a criminal history category of VI. Good 

Left’s adjusted criminal history category of VI, combined with a total offense level 

of 21, produced an advisory sentencing guidelines range of 77 to 96 months’ 

imprisonment. The district court sentenced Good Left to 90 months’ imprisonment. 

Good Left appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court committed significant 

procedural error at sentencing and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.

We first review a sentence for significant procedural error, analyzing the 

district court’s factual findings for clear error and its application of the guidelines de 

novo. United States v. Rooney, 63 F.4th 1160, 1170 (8th Cir. 2023). A district court 

commits significant procedural error when it “fail[s] to calculate (or improperly 

calculate[s]) the Guidelines range, treat[s] the Guidelines as mandatory, fail[s] to 

consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, select[s] a sentence based on clearly 

erroneous facts, or fail[s] to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Good Left asserts that the district court committed 

significant procedural error by relying on his tribal-court convictions as a basis for 

the upward departure and by failing to adequately explain the upward departure.

We disagree. It was proper for the district court to rely upon Good Left’s 

tribal-court convictions as a basis for the upward departure. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3; 

United States v. Cook, 615 F.3d 891, 893 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The Guidelines list 

several situations which may form the basis for an upward departure. Among these 

are when prior sentences for tribal offenses were not used in computing the criminal 

history category.” (citation omitted)). The district court also adequately explained 

its reasons for departing upward. At sentencing, the district court assigned six 

additional criminal history points to Good Left due to his tribal-court convictions. 

1

The Honorable Daniel M. Traynor, United States District Judge for the 

District of North Dakota. 
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The district court determined that these convictions placed Good Left in a 

“[c]riminal [h]istory [c]ategory of VI rather than V.” It noted that Good Left 

“suffer[ed] from fetal alcohol syndrome” but that an upward departure was 

nevertheless appropriate as Good Left “ha[d] not, apparently, addressed his long 

history of abuse to others.” According to the district court, Good Left’s “history of 

aggression and violent behaviors [was] reoccurring” and he was a “habitual abuser 

of individuals.” 

Although Good Left argues that the district court committed significant 

procedural error based on United States v. Sullivan, 853 F.3d 475 (8th Cir. 2017), 

and United States v. Azure, 536 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2008), those cases are 

distinguishable. In Sullivan, we concluded that the district court erred in departing 

upward from criminal history category II to category VI based on conduct that had 

not resulted in convictions and on state-court sentences that the district court thought 

to have been too lenient. 853 F.3d at 479-80. In Azure, we concluded that the district 

court abused its discretion in departing upward from criminal history category I to 

category VI based on questionably relevant evidence and uncharged conduct. 536 

F.3d at 931-32. Here, the district court departed upward by only two criminal history 

categories and sufficiently explained that its decision was based on Good Left’s 

lengthy history of violent behaviors. See United States v. Shillingstad, 632 F.3d 

1031, 1038 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding no significant procedural error at sentencing 

where the district court “departed upward by only two criminal history categories 

and sufficiently explained that its decision was based on [the defendant’s] extensive 

criminal record”). Thus, we discern no significant procedural error. 

In the absence of procedural error, we next consider the substantive 

reasonableness of a sentence under the highly deferential abuse of discretion 

standard. Rooney, 63 F.4th at 1170. The district court did not abuse its discretion 

in sentencing Good Left to 90 months’ imprisonment. Although Good Left

disagrees with the weight that the district court afforded the different sentencing

factors, such disagreement is insufficient to establish that the district court abused 

its discretion and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. See United States 
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v. Richart, 662 F.3d 1037, 1054 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Simply because the district court 

weighed the relevant factors more heavily than [the defendant] would prefer does 

not mean the district court abused its discretion.”). 

Affirmed. 

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