Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 285

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION I

No. CV-23-356

BONNIE MONK

APPELLANT

V.

UNION COUNTY INDUSTRIAL 

BOARD

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered May 1, 2024

APPEAL FROM THE UNION

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT 

[NO. 70CV-22-473]

HONORABLE JIM F. ANDREWS, JR., 

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge

Bonnie Monk appeals the February 3, 2023 order of the Union County Circuit Court 

that granted an easement by default judgment in favor of the Union County Industrial Board 

(UCIB) as well as the orders striking Monk’s untimely answer to the complaint and denying 

her motion under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (2023) to have the default judgment 

set aside. She argues that the default judgment is void and should be set aside for failure to 

describe an easement with particularity and that the circuit court erred in not granting a 

hearing on her Rule 60 motion to review the default judgment to cure the void order. We 

affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

The UCIB, a public entity formed by the government of Union County, Arkansas, 

for the purpose of promoting industrial development in southern Arkansas, filed a 
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complaint on October 18, 2022, which sought to establish a prescriptive easement over a 

roadway on property located in Union County and owned by Monk. It is undisputed that 

the roadway in question has been in existence for many years, is clearly known to both 

parties, and has been used by the owners of both the UCIB property and Monk’s property 

for decades without any question as to its location. UCIB’s complaint reads in relevant part:

5. UCIB owns a tract of approximately 247 acres of land located in Section 

14, Township 17 South, Range 15 West, Union County, Arkansas. The property is 

used for producing aggregate materials for use in road construction and economic 

development projects. The only means of access from Champagnolle Road, the 

nearest public roadway, to the property owned by UCIB is across a narrow dirt road 

part of which traverses the Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 

14, Township 17 South, Range 15 West owned by Defendant Monk.

6. The dirt roadway in question has been used by UCIB and its predecessors 

in title for many decades as the sole means of access to its property.

7. Defendant Monk has erected a gate across the roadway and is denying the 

use of the road as a means of access by UCIB to its public real estate.

8. The use of the roadway by UCIB for more than thirty (30) years has been 

open, notorious, conspicuous, and adverse and has developed into a prescriptive right 

in UCIB to use the roadway.

9. UCIB should be granted a declaratory judgment holding that the roadway 

in question is subject to a prescriptive easement allowing the use thereof by UCIB 

and others accessing this public property.

10. Further, Defendant Monk should be enjoined from further interference 

with the use of the dirt road as a means of access to the UCIB property. UCIB 

requests that a temporary restraining order, temporary injunction and permanent 

injunction be issued against Defendant Monk as UCIB has no other means of access 

to its property and therefore has no adequate remedy of law and will otherwise suffer 

irreparable harm as a result of the intentional blocking of the road by Defendant 

Monk.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Union County Industrial Board, prays that the 

court enter a declaratory judgment holding that Plaintiff has a prescriptive right to 

the use of the roadway in question against the real estate owned by Defendant Monk 

and granting a temporary restraining order, temporary injunction and permanent 

injunction restraining Defendant Monk from further interference with Plaintiffs use 

of the roadway, for its reasonable attorney’s fees and all costs herein expended, and 

for all other just and proper[] relief to which Plaintiff may be entitled.

The complaint and summons were personally served on Monk by Lieutenant Erick 

Meadows with the Union County Sheriff’s Office on October 23, and the return summons 

was filed on October 24.

Monk did not file a timely answer, and the UCIB moved for default judgment on 

December 2. On December 5, a default judgment was entered by the circuit court. Monk 

maintains that she was not served with the motion for default judgment in such a way that 

she could appear and request that a definitive easement be set out across her property, but 

when she received the documents, the issue regarding the lack of description of the easement 

as entered became apparent.

Monk retained an attorney, and on January 18, 2023, she filed a motion for relief 

from the default judgment, stating defenses and citing Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 

60(a), asking for the judgment to be set aside due to deficiencies: the order “does not 

specifically lay out [metes] and bounds, nor the purpose and scope of said use, as well as a 

lack of proof of necessity or establishment of all elements necessary for a prescriptive 

easement.” Her motion was filed within the ninety-day time limit identified by Rule 60(a),

which provides for the vacation, modification, rehearing or other relief from an order as 

follows:
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(a) Ninety-Day Limitation. To correct errors or mistakes or to prevent the 

miscarriage of justice, the court may modify or vacate a judgment, order, decree on 

motion of the court or any party, with prior notice to all parties, within ninety days 

of its having been filed with the Clerk.

A response to Monk’s motion was filed by the UCIB on January 23, and on January 

24, Monk filed a belated answer to UCIB’s original complaint citing and reserving all 

applicable defenses. On January 25, UCIB moved to strike Monk’s answer.

On February 3, Monk filed a response to UCIB’s motion to strike her answer, arguing 

that the circuit court had erred in granting the default judgment; she also filed a motion for 

reconsideration thereof. UCIB filed a response to her motion on the same day.

Also on February 3, an order on motions was filed by the circuit court in which it 

denied Monk’s motion for relief from the default judgment, denied her subsequent motion 

for reconsideration, and granted the motion to strike her belated answer to UCIB’s 

complaint. The circuit court found that Monk had been properly served with process, was 

in default, and was not entitled to relief under Rule 60(a). The circuit court further ruled 

that Monk had failed to plead any basis for setting aside the default judgment under 

Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) (2023). Monk timely filed a notice of appeal on 

February 24. 

II. Discussion

A. Did the Circuit Court Err in Granting a Default Easement Without a Particular

Description of the Scope, Location, Width, or Burden on the Subservient Tenant?

Rule 55 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure governs default judgments, with 

subsection (a) providing:
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(a) When Entitled. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is 

sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules, judgment 

by default may be entered by the court.

Subsection (c) provides the means for setting aside default judgments:

(c) Setting Aside Default Judgments. The court may, upon motion, set aside a default 

judgment previously entered for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 

surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) the judgment is void; (3) fraud (whether heretofore 

denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an 

adverse party; or (4) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 

judgment. The party seeking to have the judgment set aside must demonstrate a 

meritorious defense to the action; however, if the judgment is void, no other defense 

to the action need be shown.

Our standard of review for an order denying a motion to set aside a default judgment 

depends on which grounds the appellant claims the default judgment should be set aside.

Wester v. Wester, 2024 Ark. App. 156, 686 S.W.3d 52. When an appellant claims that the 

default judgment is void, we conduct a de novo review and give no deference to the circuit 

court’s ruling because the matter on appeal is a question of law. E.g., Bell v. Bell, 2023 Ark. 

App. 246, 666 S.W.3d 874; see also Glover v. Glover, 2020 Ark. App. 89, 595 S.W.3d 54. In 

all other challenges to the denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment, we do not 

reverse absent an abuse of discretion. Wester, supra.

Monk argues that the default judgment is void because the easement granted therein 

cannot be located with any particularity: it cannot be located by metes and bounds, and it

essentially gives an easement across any and all portions of Monk’s forty-acre tract. She notes 

that a court order may be set aside under Rule 60 if it is void, or it can be remanded to the 

circuit court for proper modification of any existing deficiencies.
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Monk points out that this issue was brought to the attention of the circuit court by 

her motion and reiterates that she was not served with UCIB’s motion for default judgment 

in such a way that she could appear and request that a definitive easement be set out across 

her property. Yet Monk also specifically acknowledges that she was properly served with the 

complaint, albeit while she was suffering from COVID-19, and concedes that she did not 

file a timely answer.

Monk submits that the issue before us is whether the easement is valid, and she 

requests that we either remand this matter for correction or declare the default judgment

void due to the inadequacy of the description of the easement. She maintains that a careful 

review of the default judgment shows that it clearly fails to define the size, scope, or burden 

of the easement on Monk’s property as the subservient tenant; moreover, it fails to establish 

how such easement was established.

Monk submits that this court should remand this matter to determine whether the 

easement was one of necessity or prescription or whether it even exists at all. She contends 

that UCIB owns property on two sides of her real property tract and that it is asserting an 

easement across her property simply for convenience purposes. She argues that the default 

judgment grants an easement that could be as wide as the entire forty-acre tract, fails to define 

the burdens of such easement, and includes no provision explaining when the easement 

could be declared to be overburdened in the future in such a way that the easement could 

be set aside if ever challenged as exceeding the scope of the easement. Monk notes that an 

order dealing with real property must be described with sufficient specificity that it may be 
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identified solely by reference to the order. See Petrus v. Nature Conservancy, 330 Ark. 722, 957 

S.W.2d 688 (1997); see also Riddick v. Streett, 313 Ark. 706, 858 S.W.2d 62 (1993); Harris v. 

Robertson, 306 Ark. 258, 813 S.W.2d 252 (1991).

Monk also claims that the default judgment is void because the record fails to 

establish the necessary elements of a prescriptive easement. She submits that the circuit 

court’s failure to create a record that could give rise to a legal description of an easement as 

to what exactly has been possessed by prescriptive easement would require findings of fact 

sufficient to grant a legal description across the property and that this matter should 

therefore be remanded to remedy this issue. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 64 Ark. App. 20, 977 

S.W.2d 903 (1998); see also Rice v. Whiting, 248 Ark. 592, 452 S.W.2d 842 (1970); Jennings v. 

Burford, 60 Ark. App. 27, 958 S.W.2d 12 (1997).

We disagree. Because Monk purposely decided not to contest UCIB’s complaint, the 

allegations of the complaint are taken as admitted. Ark. R. Civ. P. 8(d) (2023); see, e.g., JeanPierre v. Plantation Homes of Crittenden Cnty., Inc., 350 Ark. 569, 89 S.W.3d 337 (2002). There 

is no allegation that service was defective. To the contrary, the record reveals that Monk was 

personally handed the complaint by a deputy sheriff with the Union County Sheriff’s Office, 

and she expressly declined to “do anything about” the suit. Although Monk’s “health issues”

are mentioned in her pleadings, she makes no genuine argument that her default was the 

result of excusable neglect or mistake. Accordingly, the default judgment is valid and is in 

no sense “void.” Solis v. State, 371 Ark. 590, 269 S.W.3d 352 (2007); Tharp v. Smith, 326 Ark. 

260, 930 S.W.2d 350 (1996).
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Rule 60 is inapplicable because it specifically refers to matters relating to default 

judgments pursuant to Rule 55(c), and none of the grounds for relief provided in Rule 55(c) 

are present in this case. Monk’s complaint about a lack of a metes-and-bounds description 

of the roadway in question arose after she failed to file a timely answer in the proceedings. 

Monk’s statement of case and facts states, “When Ms. Monk received said Motion for Default 

Judgment and read the document, it was apparent that there was an issue about the 

easement, as entered.” UCIB’s complaint specifically alleged that the “dirt roadway in 

question has been used by UCIB and its predecessors in title for many decades as the sole 

means of access to its property.” The motion for default judgment was filed on December 2, 

2022, some forty-seven days before Monk filed her motion for relief from the default 

judgment on January 18, 2023. There is no basis in the pleadings or the facts for concluding 

that Monk was prejudiced by mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect as required 

in Rule 55(c).

We hold that Monk’s assertion that the default judgment is “void” is misplaced. She 

provides no support for her allegation that a default judgment that was entered legally, based 

on effective service of process, and unaffected by fraud or mistake—such as the one in 

question—is void. And lawful default judgments are as valid and enforceable as judgments 

after trial. Meisch v. Brady, 270 Ark. 652, 606 S.W.2d 112 (Ark. App. 1980). In this case, 

UCIB’s complaint alleged that a single narrow dirt roadway leading from a public road across 

Monk’s property and onto the UCIB property has existed for decades and has been used 

regularly, without permission, and under a claim of right as the only reasonable means of 
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access to the UCIB property. Because all these averments are deemed admitted in this case,

Monk’s belated objections about the description of the road in the default judgment do not 

eliminate or otherwise save her from those admissions.

B. Lack of Hearing on Monk’s Rule 60 Motion to Review the Default Judgment

Orders regarding Rule 60 are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. 

Hawkins v. Willis for Snow Cemetery Ass’n, 2022 Ark. App. 249, 646 S.W.3d 257. Rule 60 

governs the manner in which a void order is corrected. Monk filed a motion as well as a 

belated answer asking for the default judgment to be set aside within the ninety-day time 

limit identified in Rule 60(a). Monk submits that the circuit court erred in denying her 

motion and not setting the matter for a hearing to establish a record as to the size of the 

easement, the burden it would place on her, and whether the easement was properly 

prescribed due to the lack of a record on how long the alleged easement had been in use.

Monk asks that we remand this matter to the circuit court, set aside the order granting 

the easement, and require strict proof of all elements of a prescriptive easement, such as size, 

scope, and burden, as required by case law.

We hold that the circuit court properly denied Monk’s Rule 60 motion to set aside 

the default judgment, noting that Rule 60(c), in its express language, does not apply to 

default judgments:

(c) Grounds for Setting Aside Judgment, Other Than Default Judgment, after Ninety Days.

The Court in which a judgment, other than a default judgment [which may be set aside 

in accordance with Rule 55(c)], has been rendered or order made shall have the 

power, after the expiration of ninety (90) days of the filing of said judgment with the 

clerk of the court to vacate or modify such judgment or order[.]
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(Emphasis added.)

Rule 60(a) applies to mistakes that a circuit court may correct to make the judgment 

conform to action taken at the circuit court level. See First Nat’l Bank of Lewisville v. Mayberry, 

368 Ark. 243, 244 S.W.3d 676 (2006). The rule’s purpose is not to permit action that the 

court should have taken but, in fact, did not take. See Hawkins, supra; Scales v. Vaden, 2010 

Ark. App. 418, 376 S.W.3d 471.

There is no basis under Rule 60 for this court to vacate the order of default judgment, 

which is the only claim pled in Monk’s motion challenging the order. See Wilcoxon v. Thomas, 

2015 Ark. App. 311, 462 S.W.3d 705. Monk did not request that the default judgment be 

modified or amended to include a description of the roadway in question that is more 

acceptable to her. The sole relief she requested was that the default judgment be set aside 

and held void. Because the default judgment is not void, its operative effect on the 

admissions resulting from Monk’s failure to file a timely answer remain legally in effect and 

are not subject to being vacated. The circuit court properly denied Monk’s attempt to 

misapply Rule 60 notwithstanding the total absence of any basis for concluding that the 

default judgment in this case is void.

Affirmed.

KLAPPENBACH and GRUBER, JJ., agree.

F. Mattison Thomas III, for appellant.

Gary R. Burbank, for appellee.