\. 

"fOt» _. ~ REF ID: A61210 SE-7-'f 4 ~ A A'' SIP W 'IT .. I Jt • 

uvnnuDn un~ 

TO 

-- ~ DATE 

FROM 

? ~ 

TO FROM 

_ Chief, ASA ' (10) _ 

_ ;"'Executive 0 (11)_ 

~ Co'r Jomt Oper (12)_ 

_ Deputy Chief, ASA (20)~ 

__ Ch, Comm Res Sec (14)k'.:_ 

Ch, Hist Urut (13)_ 

Ch, Pers Sec (21)_ 

Ch, Org & Tng Sec (22)_ 

Ch, Plans & Oper (23) __ 

Ch, Materiel Sec (24)_ 

Ch, Fiscal Sec (25)_ 

AdJutant, ASA (26) __ 

Ch, See Cont Sec (27)_ 

__ Ch, Operations Div (90) __ 

Ch, Lab Br (91)_ 

Ch, Machine Br (92)_ 

Ch, Crypt Br (93)_ 

Ch, Int Cont Br (94)_ 

Ch, I & D Br (96)_ 

Tech Staff (96) _ 

_ Ch, Security Div (80)_ 

Tech Staff (81) _ 

Ch, Materiel Br (82)_ __ Ch, Methods Br (83)_ 

_ Ch, Protective Br (84)_ 

_ Ch, Mamt Br (85)_ 

_ Ch, Res Lab Div (70)_ 

Tech Staff (71)_ 

Ch,Ch Ciph&CifBr(72)_ 

Ch, Int Eqwp Br (73)_ 

Ch, Elec & Elec Br (74)_ 

Ch, Lab Serv Br (75) _ 

Ch, C'logic Br (76)_ 

_Ch, Pers & Tng Br (61)_ 

_Ch, Supply Br (62)_ 

_Co, Arlington Hall (40)_ 

( ) Information & File 

{ ) Recommendation 

{ ) Signature if approved 

( ) Your action by 

( ) Info upon which to base reply 

ursuant to E. 0. 1352 
REF ID:A61210 
MEMORANDUM to Ob.airman,, USCIB 11FrZ It z!o..._ 

Subject: Central Evaluation,, Publication and Dissemination of Sl.GtNT. 

1. It is recommended: 

a. The. t a single unit be established undel' USCIB 

direction for the etalua.t1on,, publ1ca.t1on,, a.nd dissemination of the fruits of signal intelligence activities of 

the Armed Forces. 

b. That the foregoing central unit be located 

a. t the cryptana.lyt1e center having the most effective 

collateral 1nforma.tt011 center. 

c. That a st~e SIGINT Summary be published on I 

a weekly basis,, su~fEdlented by more detailed monthly and 

quarterly publicatiai.1 with cumulative indexes. The 

first few pages of e9oeh Summary should contain highlights 

tor the busy reader. 

d. That s11eh special~ publications as are 

el.abora ted by the ~espect1 ve cryptanalytic processing 

centers or by the l!espective intelligence agencies of the 

Armed Forces,, of tyepartment of State,, or of the Central 

Intel11gence Agenc1 be a.lso published and d.issem1na ted 

by thl central uni\. 

' . The reasoIJ-t'or the foregoing recOJmnendations 

are st forth in IDel. 1. 

' 

P. l 
REF ID:A61210 

• lD? ~fffi~fr- 3. It is retiuested tb.a.t the foregoing recommendations 

be placed on the Agenda. for discussion at the next regular 

meeting of' USCIB. 

Gen. Irwin. 

1 Incl. 

Discussion 

P. 2 
DlSOUSSION 

1. a. There are now at least thl"ee publications 

which contain the final product ot the signal intelligence 

activities or the Government and which are issued on a 

periodic basis. They are as follows: 

(1) The D1plo:ma~ic Summary, prepared and issued on 

a daily bas1s by the Department of State; 

(2) The Milita~ Digest, prepared and issued on a 

weekly basis by the Intelligence Division, U.S. 

Army; and 

(3) The Soviet Intelligence Summal'J prepared and 

issued on a veekly basis by the u. s. Navy. 

b. In addition to the foregoing periodic publications containing~ material there are several others 

wbiCh are prepared 8DA issued on a non~eriodic basis, 

such as the f ollow!Dg: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

.(6) 

(7) 

Special Reports } 

Order of Battle Studies 

Communica tio11 Intelligence Bl'!ets 

Special Reports} t Prepared by Ja.vy 

CSAW Handbooks 

Prepared by 

Special Research 

Branch, Intelligence Division 

Dept.or the A~ 

Order of Battle Studies 1 p4ared by 

Special Studies r Afr Sec'Ul'ity Agency 

c. Finally, there are per1r0 publications 

l1ch do not contain~ma.teriallt Which often use 

\ 

Incl. 1 

P. l 
such material as collateral sources of' information. 

These are produced anddisseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. 

2 • 'With ref erenoe specifically to the publics. tions 

listed under Par. ~, it is only to be expected, and it 

is perhaps unavoidable, because they are produced separately by dif'f'erent agencies, that duplications of material 

or items of intelli@Zloe should appear f'rom time to time. 

F 

Such duplication 1 hdever, is not a. pa.rticula.rly serious 

matter, a.nd might even be considered desirable in some 

small degree. 'What 18 much more serious is that the 

intelligence coverage and the broad picture that might 

be painted f'rom~ sources is not and cannot be painted 

b the present systemof' decentralized evaluation and 

~ssemination. 

3. a. Taking up .first the Diploma tic Summary, this 

~11cat1on, being on a daily-production basis, can only 

' rl!Jl'Bsent at best a series of' isolated items of' intelliEf:ll~e. In fact, it 1s possible that lhe old adage to the 

@ct that "one cannot see the forest for the trees" 

:lt,JPplicable in this case. Little a/em.pt is ma.de in 

~present Diplomatic Summary to con,lidate or integrate 

tldisolated and seriatim items into comprehensive 

P.2 

f 
picture of the policies, diplomatic maneuvers, intrigues, 

and aims or other co'UD.tries, as they are reflected by 

GLINT intelligence, vbieh is by far the most reliable 

and timely source by means of which an accurate and 

timely estimate of the interna.tiona.l diplomatic situation 

can be ma.de. 

b. In regard to the failure to pa.int a comprehensive picture of the sort indicated, the situation which 

now exists is not much better than that which existed 

prior to Pearl Harbor and which was censured in no uncertain terms by the Joint Congressional Committee on the 

Investigation of the Attack on Pearl H.arbor. Upon the 

shoulders of those engaged in the 8IG!l'IT effort rests 

the tremendous responsibility of forewarning the proper 

authorities or the Go~ernment in all international crises. 

But if all the bits of information obtained from various 

SIGlNT sources are not properly pieced together and 

fused with the many items from collateral intelligence 

to give a timely and complete picture, the 8IGINT effort 

as well as the other intelligence effort will have been 

"4,..1 

wasted if another Pearl Harbor catches~una.wares. 

4. a. It is estimated th.at the Army has an investment 

of about $30,000,000 in the Army Security Agency plant, 

andan annual bud.get (FY 1949) of approximately $22~000,000. 

P. 3. 
Of this probably 80~ is devoted to SIGINT operations. 

The Navy's investment and budget are probably not much 

different. Roughly, then, the plant investment is 

$48,ooo,ooo, and the annual budget, $35,000,000. 

b. Basically, there are only tvo justifications 

for the foregoing large investments and expenditures. 

The first is that signal intelligence activities do not 

have their counterpart in civil life and cannot, in viev 

ot their complexities, be improvised de novo on the outbreak of war. It is therefore essential to maintain, 

in peacetime, establishments that Will function effectively 

just before or immediately upon outbreak of actual hostilities, a condition which is today a technical prerequisite to SIGINT success for the duration of the war. 

This means that large plants and large numbers or technicians have to be maintained in peacetime and kept at 

a high level of efficiency. On this score, while it is 

believed that a fairly adequate job is being done, if that 

accomplishment represented the only fruit of the large 

investments and annual expenditures, the cost thereof 

could certainly be questioned and might be thought 

to be excessive. The other basic Justification for the 

P. 4. 
large investments and annual expenditures is the peacetime production of an intelligence picture of such timeliness, accuracy, and completeness as to give forewarning 

of impending momentous changes in the international 

situation. 

c. When viewed in the light of the latter basic 

a. ref on tor .maintaining the large staff and plant devoted 

to peacetime signal intelligence operations, the three 

items mentioned in par. 1 above are not believed to 

represent a product commensurate with the high cost thereof. 

It is probable tha.t TIME, the weekly nel.'5magazine, operates 

on a smaller investment and budget tbs.n is represented 

above. But, TIME'S very existence depends upon the 

perfection of its product. If we are to continue to 

merit the conf"idence and approval of the highest governmental authorities, the SIGINT product must be as nearly 

complete and as perfect as we can possibly make it. It is 

largely upon the quality of this product that the value 

of our SIGINT operations 1n peacetime can be judged 

and defended by those who see only this part of the 

SIGINT effort from day to day. 

5. a. A consolidation of the research facilities 

and personnel presently employed in the several separate 

agencies concerned with the evaluation and publication 

P. 5 
ot the SIGINT product would bring about greatly increased 

benefits and a much improved product. Such a consolidated 

or centralized organization would be more thorough, more 

efficient, and more economical than is now the case. Currently there are four agencies concerned; when the USAF 

• 

begins SIGINT operations in its assigned portion of the 

field there will be five. 

b. It may be pointed out in this connection tb.e.t 

placing the cryptanalytic processing and the evaluation 

centers in close proximity to each other has three important advantages: 

(1) Voluminous files of collateral information 

and special de.ta are required for cryptanalyt1o processing and practically the same types ot information 

and files are essential for the proper evaluation 

of the final~ product. If the ~ files were 

utilized for both operations they would serve a dual 

purpose, eliminating the need for duplicate, triplicate, 

or quadruplicate rac1lit1es, space, a.nd personnel, 

as is now the case. Thus, there would be a considerable monetary saving. 

(2) Cryptanalytic processing often requires 

the elaboration, collection, or development of special 

infol'lDB.tion for the immediate use of the cryptanalysts; 

similar information is later required for proper 

P. 6 
• • 

evaluation of the final product, and must often be 

elaborated, collected, or developed by the evaluators. 

If the material elaborated for or by the cryptanalysts 

were also directly available to and used by the 

evaluators, time would be saved in publishing the 

final~ product, since much of the work that the 

evaluators must now do for themselves by way of 

collecting collateral information would have already 

been done in connection with cryptanalytic processing. 

Hence there would be an improvement in efficiency 

of the overall SIGINT operation, since the time 

required to produce the final results is a vital 

their 

element in JUDCj!alue. 

(3) The ci}.ser the cryptanalytic, collateral 

information, and evaluation personnel are to one 

another, the more effective are SIGINT operations 

as a whole, since the quick and unimpeded interchange 

of new ideas, new developments, and new directions 

of interest among all the personnel involved in 

those operations would improve their respective 

effectiveness. 

6. a. A single, central organization for the control 

and dissemination of the final~product would also 

be advantageous in at least three respects: 

P. 7. 
" ' . ' 

(l} Such an organization would bring about 

economies in taoilities, space, and personnel. 

(2) The substitution of a single complete publication to replace the three or more separate and incomplete 

ones which are now disseminated to the ?re~iden& and to 

the various higher level officials of the GoverDment would 

save the time of these very busy men, would demonstrate 

unit1cat1on or operations within and among the responsible 

agencies, and would give a better overall picture of the 

international situation. 

(3) It would be more efficient in proper control 

tor the security of all operations. 

b. The last-mentioned advantage deserves further comment. One ot the important byproducts of a consolidation of 

SIGINT evaluation, publication, and dissemination agencies 

would be that the present Wide dissemination ot the individual 

items or intelligence in mfomeographed, dittoed, or printed form, 

a condition fraught with great hazard to the security of the 

operations, would no longer be necessary, which would thus 

improve the security of all SIGINT operations, especially the 

cryptanalytic. This would not mean that individual messages 

or items ot SIGINT would no longer be available to those who 

have a need therefor; it would simply mean that these items 

would be ma.de available only on proper request or, if the 

P. 8. 
central dissemination unit deemed an item to be of such character as to warrant immediate forwarding to the officials concerned, the item would be forwarded with expedition without such 

a request. As an example of the breadth of the present dissemination of the individual processed messages, Inclosure l 

shows the distribution given by the Army Security Agency to 

its product. 

q 

P. ~