[Cite as State ex rel. Belle Tire Distribs, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 2016-Ohio-7869.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio ex rel. : 

Belle Tire Distributors, Inc., 

 : 

 Relator, 

 : 

v. No. 16AP-92 

 : 

Industrial Commission of Ohio and (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

Herbert Melroy c/o Judy Melroy, : 

 Respondents. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on November 22, 2016 

 

Licata Law Group, and David J. Kovach, for relator. 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Eric J. Tarbox, for 

respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio. 

Law Office of Megan E. Burke, LLC, and Megan E. Burke, 

for respondent Judy Melroy. 

 

IN MANDAMUS 

ON OBJECTION TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION 

SADLER, J. 

{¶ 1} Relator, Belle Tire Distributers, Inc., commenced this original action 

requesting a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio 

("commission") to vacate its order exercising its continuing jurisdiction to allow a death 

benefits claim of Judy Melroy, the surviving spouse of a fatally injured worker. 

{¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of 

Appeals, this matter was referred to a magistrate who issued the appended decision, 
No. 16AP-92 2 

including findings of fact and conclusions of law. The magistrate determined that 

relator had a plain and adequate remedy at law by filing an appeal pursuant to R.C. 

4123.512. As a result, the magistrate recommended that this court grant claimant's 

motion to dismiss the requested writ of mandamus. For the following reasons, we 

overrule the objection and dismiss the requested writ. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶ 3} None of the parties have filed objections to the magistrate's findings of 

fact, and following an independent review of the record, we adopt those findings as our 

own. As more fully set forth in the magistrate's decision, on the date of his death, 

Herbert Melroy was employed by relator. His surviving spouse, Judy Melroy, filed a 

claim for death benefits with the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation. The claim 

was initially rejected as not work related, but after several appeals and requests for 

reconsideration, the commission exercised its continuing jurisdiction to reconsider the 

claim due to a clear mistake in fact regarding how the decedent worker died and then 

allowed the claim on its merits. 

{¶ 4} On February 5, 2016, relator filed a mandamus complaint with this court, 

alleging that the commission abused its discretion in exercising its continuing 

jurisdiction and allowing the claim. Claimant filed a motion to dismiss on March 3, 

2016 arguing that, pursuant to the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in State ex rel. 

Alhamarshah v. Indus. Comm., 142 Ohio St.3d 524, 2015-Ohio-1357, and this court's 

decision in State ex rel. Johnson v. OSU Cancer Research Hosp., 10th Dist. No. 14AP430, 2015-Ohio-3249, relator had a plain and adequate remedy at law in an R.C. 

4123.512 appeal. 

{¶ 5} In its brief in opposition to relator's motion to dismiss, claimant cited 

State ex rel. Saunders v. Metal Container Corp., 52 Ohio St.3d 85, 86 (1990), for the 

proposition that mandamus is the proper means to challenge the propriety of the 

commission's exercise of continuing jurisdiction. According to claimant, the commission 

is not "[i]nsulate[d]" from a mandamus challenge by entering a single order that 

includes both the determination of continuing jurisdiction and the determination of the 

right to participate. (Relator's Brief in Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 6.) Claimant 

contended that Alhamarshah is distinguishable as it did not involve continuing 
No. 16AP-92 3 

jurisdiction, that Johnson was incorrectly decided, and that an appeal did not afford 

relator an adequate remedy. 

{¶ 6} The magistrate determined that the Supreme Court's decision in 

Alhamarshah applied and that relator was not entitled to relief in mandamus because 

an adequate remedy at law exists by way of an appeal under R.C. 4123.512. In doing so, 

the magistrate discussed the Johnson court's finding that the commission's decision to 

exercise its continuing jurisdiction was essential to the ultimate determination that 

denied the claimant's participation in the workers' compensation system, and, therefore, 

mandamus relief was inappropriate as an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law 

because there existed an appeal under R.C. 4123.512. The magistrate also discussed 

State ex rel. Black v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-120, 2015-Ohio-4868, 

which addressed the implication of the Saunders decision after Alhamarshah. 

Ultimately, finding this case akin to Johnson, the magistrate recommended that the 

court grant claimant's motion and dismiss the action. 

II. OBJECTION 

{¶ 7} Relator sets forth the following objection: 

Because It Does Not Afford A Remedy By Which Belle Tire 

Can Challenge The Exercise Of Continuing Jurisdiction By 

The Commission, R.C. 4123.512 Is Not An Adequate Remedy 

At Law Sufficient To Negate This Court's Mandamus 

Jurisdiction. 

III. DISCUSSION 

{¶ 8} Relator's objection sets forth the same argument made to and addressed 

by the magistrate. We conclude that the magistrate correctly reasoned that Johnson is 

directly on point and determines the issues here, that Alhamarshah applies, and that 

relator has an adequate remedy at law in an R.C. 4123.512 appeal. Relator's assertion 

that Johnson was decided incorrectly and associated request for en banc consideration 

is without merit. Therefore, for the reasons set forth in the magistrate's analysis, we 

overrule relator's objection. State ex rel. Schottenstein Stores Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 

10th Dist. No. 07AP-1066, 2009-Ohio-2142, ¶ 4. 

 
No. 16AP-92 4 

IV. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 9} Following review of the magistrate's decision, an independent review of 

the record, and due consideration of relator's objection, we find the magistrate properly 

determined the facts and applied the appropriate law. Therefore, we adopt the 

magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

In accordance with the magistrate's decision, the requested writ of mandamus is 

dismissed. 

Objection overruled; 

writ of mandamus dismissed. 

BROWN and KLATT, JJ., concur. 

________________ 

 
No. 16AP-92 5 

A P P E N D I X

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 

State of Ohio ex rel. : 

Belle Tire Distributors, Inc., 

 : 

 Relator, 

 : 

v. No. 16AP-92 

 : 

Industrial Commission of Ohio (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

and Herbert Melroy c/o Judy Melroy, : 

 

 Respondents. : 

 

M A G I S T R A T E ' S D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on April 25, 2016

 

Licata & Associates Co., L.P.A., and David J. Kovach, for 

relator. 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and B. Alexander 

Kennedy, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio. 

Law Office of Megan E. Burke, LLC, and Megan E. Burke, for 

respondent Judy Melroy. 

 

IN MANDAMUS 

ON CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 

{¶ 10} Relator, Belle Tire Distributors, Inc. ("Belle Tire"), has filed this original 

action requesting that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent 

Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission") to vacate its order wherein the 

commission exercised its continuing jurisdiction as requested by respondent Judy 
No. 16AP-92 6 

Melroy ("claimant"), as the widow of Herbert Melroy ("decedent"), and allowed 

decedent's claim. 

Findings of Fact: 

{¶ 11} 1. The following facts come directly from relator's mandamus complaint: 

[One] Relator, Belle Tire Distributors, Inc. is a compliant 

state-fund employer of Ohio's workers' compensation 

system. 

[Two] Relator employed Respondent Herbert Melroy 

("Decedent") on November 19, 2014, when he died. 

[Three] Judy Melroy ("Claimant") is the surviving spouse of 

Decedent. 

[Four] Claimant filed a death claim with the Ohio Bureau of 

Workers' Compensation ("BWC") on January 27, 2015. 

[Five] The BWC assigned the claim number 14-867936, and 

denied the claim because the death was not work related. 

[Six] Claimant appealed the denial of her claim to 

Respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio ("Commission"). 

[Seven] A district hearing officer ("DHO") of the Commission 

vacated the BWC order and allowed the claim. 

[Eight] Relator timely appealed the DHO order, and a staff 

hearing officer ("SHO") vacated the DHO order and 

disallowed the claim in its entirety, finding that Claimant 

had not met her burden of proving that Decedent died in the 

course of and arising out of his employment activities. 

[Nine] Claimant appealed the SHO order to the Commission, 

which refused to hear her appeal. 

[Ten] Claimant sought reconsideration of the SHO order, 

asserting that it was based on clear mistakes of fact and law. 

[Eleven] In an order mailed on January 9, 2016, the 

Commission concluded that it had continuing jurisdiction to 

reconsider the SHO order because the determination of the 

SHO that Decedent died "while in the process of beginning" 

to change a super-sized semi-truck tire was a clear mistake of 

fact. 
No. 16AP-92 7 

[Twelve] Having exercised its continuing jurisdiction to 

reconsider the claim, the Commission then allowed the claim 

on its merits. 

{¶ 12} 2. On February 5, 2016, relator filed this mandamus complaint alleging 

that the commission abused its discretion when it exercised its continuing jurisdiction 

and allowed the claim. 

{¶ 13} 3. On March 3, 2016, claimant filed a motion to dismiss arguing that 

relator had a plain and adequate remedy at law by filing an appeal pursuant to R.C. 

4123.512. Claimant cited the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in State ex rel. 

Alhamarshah v. Indus. Comm., 142 Ohio St.3d 524, 2015-Ohio-1357, as well as this 

court's decision in State ex rel. Johnson v. OSU Cancer Research Hosp., 10th Dist. No. 

14AP-430, 2015-Ohio-3249.

{¶ 14} 4. On March 7, 2016, relator filed a brief in opposition to the motion to 

dismiss arguing that neither the decision in Alhamarshah nor the decision in Johnson 

addressed the following passage from this court's decision in State ex rel. Saunders v. 

Metal Container Corp., 52 Ohio St.3d 85 (1990):

Appellants also challenge appellee's resort to mandamus, 

contending that the commission's February 2, 1987 order 

could have been appealed under R.C. 4123.519. Appellants, 

however, misdefine the issue before us. The relevant 

question here is not one of appellee's right to participate in 

the State Insurance Fund for a "back" injury but is instead 

whether a mistake sufficient to invoke the continuing 

jurisdiction provisions of R.C. 4123.52 existed. We find this 

latter question to be the proper subject matter for a writ of 

mandamus. State, ex rel. Highway Co., v. Indus. Comm.

(1980), 70 Ohio App.2d 41. 

Id. at 86. 

{¶ 15} 5. The matter is currently before the magistrate on claimant's motion to 

dismiss.

Conclusions of Law: 

{¶ 16} Finding that the court's decision in Alhamarshah does apply here, it is this 

magistrate's decision that this court should grant claimant's motion and dismiss this 

action.
No. 16AP-92 8 

{¶ 17} A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint. State ex rel. Hanson v. 

Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 Ohio St.3d 545 (1992). In reviewing the complaint, 

the court must take all the material allegations as admitted and construe all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.

{¶ 18} In order for a court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted, it must appear beyond doubt from the complaint that 

relator can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery. O'Brien v. Univ. Community 

Tenants Union, 42 Ohio St.2d 242 (1975). As such, a complaint for writ of mandamus is 

not subject to dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) if the complaint alleges the existence of a 

legal duty by the respondent and the lack of an adequate remedy at law for relator with 

sufficient particularity to put the respondent on notice of the substance of the claim 

being asserted against it, and it appears that relator might prove some set of facts 

entitling him to relief. State ex rel. Boggs v. Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 

72 Ohio St.3d 94 (1995). For the following reasons, respondent's motion should be 

granted and relator's complaint should be dismissed. 

{¶ 19} Recently, the Supreme Court decided Alhamarshah. In that case, Mustafa 

Alhamarshah alleged that he sustained a work-related injury while working as a laborer 

for Mohamed Salem, d.b.a. Ballmohd, L.L.C. ("Salem"). The Ohio Bureau of Workers' 

Compensation ("BWC") allowed the claim against Salem as the employer and ordered 

the payment of medical benefits and temporary total disability compensation. The order 

informed the parties that the decision would become final unless a written appeal was 

received within 14 days and further advised the parties to contact "Jolene M" at the 

BWC's Columbus Service Office with any questions. Id. at ¶ 4. 

{¶ 20} With the help of a friend, Salem telephoned Jolene about filing an appeal. 

Salem asserted that there was no employer-employee relationship. The documents 

faxed to the BWC failed to include the claim number or the date of the order being 

appealed. Upon receipt, the words "construe as appeal" were hand-written on the cover 

page and forwarded to the appeals section of the commission. Id. at ¶ 5. 

{¶ 21} Ultimately, the commission concluded that Salem's appeal substantially 

complied with the requirements of R.C. 4123.511(F) and further found that there was no 
No. 16AP-92 9 

evidence that Alhamarshah had been prejudiced by any omission in the notice of appeal. 

The commission then disallowed the claim on the merits, finding that Alhamarshah was 

not an employee of Salem and the commission affirmed that order. 

{¶ 22} Alhamarshah appealed to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

pursuant to R.C. 4123.512 and filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Tenth 

District Court of Appeals, alleging that the commission's order determining that Salem's 

administrative appeal was valid was an abuse of discretion and contrary to law. 

Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined that Alhamarshah was not entitled to relief 

in mandamus because he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way 

of appeal under R.C. 4123.512, stating: 

Once the commission has issued a final order determining 

the claimant's entitlement to participate in the workers' 

compensation fund, any party may appeal the order, except 

for decisions as to the extent of disability, to the court of 

common pleas pursuant to R.C. 4123.512. R.C. 4123.511(E) 

and 4123.512(A); State ex rel. Liposchak v. Indus. Comm.,

90 Ohio St.3d 276, 278-279, 2000 Ohio 73, 737 N.E.2d 519 

(2000). This court has held that decisions determining an 

employee's right to participate in the workers' compensation 

system because of a specific injury or occupational disease 

are appealable to the court of common pleas. Felty v. AT & T 

Technologies, Inc., 65 Ohio St.3d 234, 1992 Ohio 60, 602 

N.E.2d 1141 (1992), paragraph one of the syllabus; Afrates v. 

Lorain, 63 Ohio St.3d 22, 26, 584 N.E.2d 1175 (1992). 

The lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the 

law is a necessary prerequisite for relief in mandamus. State 

ex rel. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm., 18 Ohio St. 

3d 281, 284, 18 Ohio B. 333, 480 N.E.2d 807 (1985), citing 

State ex rel. Sibarco Corp. v. Berea, 7 Ohio St.2d 85, 88, 218 

N.E.2d 428 (1966). When the relator has a plain and 

adequate remedy at law by way of appeal, courts lack 

authority to exercise jurisdictional discretion and must deny 

the writ, regardless of whether the relator used the remedy. 

Id.; State ex rel. Davet v. Sutula, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

96548, 2011-Ohio-2803, 2011 WL 2409641, ¶ 10. This is a 

threshold question that we must consider even when the 

court of appeals has not addressed the issue. State ex rel. 

Woodbury v. Spitler, 40 Ohio St.2d 1, 3, 318 N.E.2d 165 

(1974). 
No. 16AP-92 10 

In this case, the commission decided that the documentation 

submitted on behalf of the purported employer substantially 

complied with the statutory requirements for a notice of an 

appeal of the bureau's initial order. This decision conferred 

jurisdiction on the commission to proceed to consider the 

merits of the purported employer's appeal. The commission's 

exercise of jurisdiction resulted in a decision denying the 

claimant's right to participate in the workers' compensation 

system. Consequently, the decision allowing the appeal to 

proceed was essential to the ultimate determination that 

denied the claimant's participation in the workers' 

compensation system. As such, the commission's decision to 

accept the appeal as valid was appealable pursuant to R.C. 

4123.512. See Consolidation Coal Co. at 284-285, 480 

N.E.2d 807. 

Id. at ¶ 10-12. 

{¶ 23} Recently, in Johnson, this court addressed the applicability of the recent 

Supreme Court decision in Alhamarshah. Eleanorene Johnson suffered an industrial 

injury in 2010 and her claim was allowed for the following physical condition: sprain 

lumbosacral. On August 23, 2013, Johnson filed a C-86 motion requesting that her 

claim be additionally allowed for the following psychological condition: major 

depression, single episode, non-psychotic, severe. A district hearing officer ("DHO") 

disallowed Johnson's request. The matter came before a staff hearing officer ("SHO") on 

October 18, 2013. The SHO granted Johnson's request and additionally allowed her 

claim to include the requested psychological condition. OSU attempted to appeal the 

SHO's order, but the commission refused the appeal. 

{¶ 24} OSU then filed a request for reconsideration with the commission. On 

January 9, 2014, the commission issued an order vacating the SHO's order and setting 

the matter for a hearing. The commission concluded that the SHO's order contained a 

clear mistake of law, as it failed to find that the requested psychological condition was 

causally related to the allowed physical condition. The commission accordingly granted 

OSU's request for reconsideration, and denied Johnson's request for the additional 

allowance. 

{¶ 25} Johnson filed a mandamus action in this court asserting that the 

commission abused its discretion when it granted OSU's request for reconsideration and 
No. 16AP-92 11 

asked that the commission be ordered to reinstate the SHO's order which allowed her 

claim for the psychological condition. 

{¶ 26} OSU argued that this court did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter 

asserting that it was a right to participate action and that Johnson had an adequate 

remedy at law. As OSU asserted, if this court found the commission abused its 

discretion when it determined the SHO's order contained a clear mistake of law, 

Johnson's claim would be additionally allowed for a psychological condition and OSU 

would have to challenge that allowance in common pleas court. 

{¶ 27} This court's magistrate found this court did have jurisdiction finding that 

the commission's determination that it had continuing jurisdiction was reviewable here 

in mandamus and could not be challenged elsewhere. Thereafter, the magistrate found 

that the commission did not abuse its discretion when it exercised its continuing 

jurisdiction.

{¶ 28} OSU filed an objection to the magistrate's decision and argued that, 

pursuant to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Alhamarshah, this court should find 

that mandamus relief was inappropriate because Johnson had an adequate remedy at 

law. Finding that the commission's decision to exercise its continuing jurisdiction 

resulted in a decision which denied Johnson the right to participate in the workers' 

compensation system, this court found that the commission's decision was "essential to 

the ultimate determination that denied [Johnson's] participation in the workers' 

compensation system," and mandamus relief was inappropriate as Johnson had an 

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of an appeal under R.C. 4123.512. 

Id. at ¶ 12. 

{¶ 29} More recently, this court addressed the implication of the Saunders 

decision (1990) after Alhamarshah (2015). In State ex rel. Black v. CVS Pharmacy, 

Inc., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-120, 2015-Ohio-4868, Sharon Black sought a writ of 

mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its order exercising its continuing 

jurisdiction and finding that her claim should not be allowed for disc herniation at T12-

L1 when she had already filed a notice of appeal from the disallowance of other 

conditions pursuant to R.C. 4123.512, and ordering the commission to reinstate its order 

allowing her claim for disc herniation at T12-L1. The magistrate issued a decision 
No. 16AP-92 12 

applying Alhamarshah and finding that Black had an adequate remedy at law by way of 

an appeal to the common pleas court. Black filed an objection arguing that mandamus 

was the appropriate remedy citing Saunders. Black argued that, because she had 

already appealed the disallowance of other claims to the common pleas court, the 

commission did not have jurisdiction to invoke its continuing jurisdiction to deny her 

claim for other conditions. 

{¶ 30} In discussing the applicability of Saunders following the Supreme Court's 

decision in Alhamarshah, this court stated: 

In Saunders, the commission's district hearing officer 

("DHO") issued an order allowing a condition described as 

"back." At the time, R.C. 4121.36(B) required the order 

allowing a condition to contain a "description of the part of 

the body and nature of the disability recognized in the 

claim." The commission subsequently attempted to correct 

the error by amending the part of the body affected from 

"back" to "lumbosacral" and "lumbar spine." 

The Supreme Court noted that a statutorily defective 

allowance, such as the one issued by the DHO, constituted a 

"mistake," which permitted the commission, pursuant to 

R.C. 4123.52, to invoke its continuing jurisdiction to correct. 

It held, however, that the commission could have simply 

amended the allowed condition to reflect "back sprain," but, 

instead, the commission went too far in narrowing the 

named body part from "back" to "lumbosacral" and "lumbar 

spine." The Supreme Court held that, although the 

commission was permitted to invoke continuing jurisdiction 

to correct the mistake, the continuing jurisdiction did not 

allow the extent of the correction attempted here. 

Relevant here, the Supreme Court in Saunders also held that 

mandamus was the proper remedy to address the 

commission's improper extension of continuing jurisdiction. 

The Supreme Court noted that "[t]he relevant question here 

is not one of appellee's right to participate * * * for a 'back' 

injury but is instead whether a mistake sufficient to invoke 

the continuing jurisdiction provisions of R.C. 4123.52 

existed. We find the latter question to be the proper subject 

matter for a writ of mandamus." Id. at 86. 

Relator suggests that Saunders controls. We disagree. The 

question before us now is not whether a mistake sufficient to 

invoke the continuing jurisdiction provisions of R.C. 4123.52 
No. 16AP-92 13 

existed. The crux of relator's argument here, however, is that 

the institution of an appeal of the disallowance of other 

claims, pursuant to R.C. 4123.519, deprived the commission 

of jurisdiction to even consider whether there was a mistake 

sufficient to invoke it's continuing jurisdiction, pursuant to 

R.C. 4123.52, regarding the disc herniation at T12-L1 claim. 

The issue here is a precursor to the issue of whether a 

mistake existed sufficient to invoke the continuing 

jurisdiction provisions of R.C. 4123.52. 

Relator argues that the magistrate's reliance on State ex rel. 

Alhamarshah v. Indus. Comm., 142 Ohio St.3d 524, 2015-

Ohio-1357, 33 N.E.3d 43, is misplaced. In Alhamarshah, the 

commission accepted documentation from the employer and 

determined that it substantially complied with the statutory 

requirements for a notice of an appeal of the Bureau of 

Worker's Compensation's initial allowance of a claim. The 

Supreme Court of Ohio noted that "[t]his decision conferred 

jurisdiction on the commission to proceed to consider the 

merits of the purported employer's appeal" and that such 

exercise of jurisdiction "resulted in a decision denying the 

claimant's right to participate in the worker's compensation 

system." The Supreme Court held that "[c]onsequently, the 

decision allowing the appeal to proceed was essential to the 

ultimate determination that denied the claimant's 

participation in the worker's compensation system. As such, 

the commission's decision to accept the appeal as valid was 

appealable pursuant to R.C. 4123.512." (Emphasis added.) 

Id. at ¶ 10-12. Likewise, here, the commission's decision to 

proceed, while the appeal of other disallowed claims was 

pending in the common pleas court, was essential to the 

ultimate determination that denied relator's participation in 

the workers' compensation system for the disc herniation at 

T12-L1. 

Black, at ¶ 4-8. 

 

{¶ 31} Here, as in Johnson, the commission exercised its continuing jurisdiction, 

vacated the order of the SHO, concluded that the SHO's order contained a clear mistake 

of fact, and granted claimant the right to participate in the workers' compensation 

system finding that the commission's decision was essential to the ultimate 

determination that granted claimant the right to participate in the workers' 

compensation system, the magistrate finds that the commission's decision to exercise its 
No. 16AP-92 14 

continuing jurisdiction is appealable to the court of common pleas pursuant to R.C. 

4123.512. 

{¶ 32} Based on the foregoing, it is this magistrate's decision that claimant has 

demonstrated that relator has an adequate remedy at law by way of an appeal to the 

common pleas court under R.C. 4123.512 and this court should grant claimant's motion 

to dismiss. 

 /S/ MAGISTRATE 

 STEPHANIE BISCA 

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES 

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as 

error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or 

legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a 

finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 

53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects 

to that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R. 

53(D)(3)(b).