### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE N ove m be r 16, 200 4 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. OR SON WEN DEL L HU DS ON
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Sum ner County No. 331-2003 Jane Wheatc raft, Judge

No. M2004- 00077-CCA -R3-C D - F iled March 15, 2005

The de fenda nt, Orson W endell Hudson, pled g uiltyin Sumner CountyCriminal Court to pos session with the intent to sell more than twenty -six g rams of c ocaine , a Class B f elony , and the tria l court sentenc ed him as a Rang e I , standard of fende r to eig ht y ear s in the Department of Corr ection. The de fe nd a nt a

pp e a ls u po n c e rt if

ie d q ue sti on s o f l a w f

rom the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de nia l of his mot ion to
su pp re ss e vid e nc e se ize d pur su a nt to a tra ff ic sto p. He c la ims the tr ia l c ou rt sh ou ld h a ve g rante d h is motion because (1) the arr esting office r’s stated justification for stopping his car w as pre text ual, (2) the offic er did not have probable cause to stop his car for followi n g t o o cl o sely , (3) the of fice r’s questioning tra nsformed his dete ntion into an unrea sonable seiz ure, (4) the off icer ’s questioning of his six- y e ar- olddaug hte r o uts ide his pr e se nc e wa s il le g a l, and(5 ) the of fi c e r co e rc e d h is c on se nt t o sear ch. We af

firm the trial c ourt. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in w hich T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

Michae l T. Pickering , Gallatin, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Orson Wendell Hudson.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Jenn if e r L . Bl e ds oe , Ass ist a nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; L awr ence Ray

Whit ley , District Attorney Gene ral; and Dee David Gay , Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

. OP IN ION

This case rela tes to a roadside s ear ch of the defendant’s car w hich re veale d the pre sence of approximately

one-ha lf pound of coc aine. The defe ndant m o v ed the tria l court to suppress the evidenc e seized. One person testified at the suppression hearing, E ighte enth J udicial District Drug Task F orce I nvestig ator JodyStarks. I nvestig ator Starks testified that he “ was wor king inter diction”
o n I- 6 5 w h e n h e s t o p p e d t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s c ar f

o r f o l l o w i n g a r e c r e a t i o n a l v e h i c l e ( R V ) t o o c l o s e l y. He sa id tha t w he n h e sa w the de fe nd a nt’ s c ar, it w a s le ss tha n on e c ar le ng th be hin d the RV . H e sa id-2-

he believe d the following so closely would potentially lead to a rea r-e nd collision “based upon a ny maneuve r that the RV might have to ma ke, whether it be stopping, eng ine trouble, [or] a flat tire.” He sa id that after

the def endant pulled to the side of the roa d, he aske d the def endant to step to the
rea r of his car and bring his driver’ s license w ith him. He said that he aske d the def endant whe re he was g oing a nd that the def endant replied he w as g oing to Michig an City , I ndiana. Investig ator Starks
sa id h e a lso ta lke d to the de fe nd a nt a bo ut the status of

his drive r’ s li c e ns e , h is a dd re ss, a ndhis driving history

. He said he also explained to the defe ndant the “rule of thumb for following other
ve hic le s o n th e int e rs ta te .” He sa id that the de fe nd a nt’ s lic e ns e wa s val id b ut that th e de fe nd a nt d id not have insura nce. H e also said that during his investigation, he noti ced that the def endant’ s rea

r brake light wa s not working

.
I nv e sti g a tor

Sta rk s a c kn ow le dg e d h e ha d a co nv e rs a tio n w ith the de fe nd a nt’ s si x-y e ar- old daug hter, who w as seated in the passeng er se at of the de fenda nt’s car . He sa id he aske d her w hether she wa s wea

ring a seatbelt and wher e she a nd her fathe r wer e g oing. He said she replied tha t she was
we ari ng he r s e a tbe lt a ndthat th e y we re he a de d to Oh io t o v isi t s om e of her fathe r’ s f ri e nd s. I nv est igat or S tar ks tes ti fi ed t hat bas ed u po n t he co nfl ict in g sto ri es co ncer ning de sti na tio n, hebe c ame suspicious of criminal activity

. He said he then asked the defe ndant about the presence of marijuana and coca ine in the car

. He said the defe ndant told him there wer e no drug s in the car . I nvestig ator Starks said that he aske d the def endant a bout his arre st historyand that the de fenda nt replied that he had bee n arr ested for

domestic battery

and possession of a

handg un. He sa id that based upon the de fe nd a nt’ s c ri min a l hi sto ry , h e a sk e d th e de fe nd a nt f or pe rm iss ion to se arc h his c ar f or we apo ns to which the de fenda nt consente d. I nvestig ator S tarks said he allowed the de fenda nt and his daug hter to wait by the side of the r oad while hesear ched the car

. He sa id the sear ch re veale d two marijuana “blunts” i n the ashtray , burned ma rijuana se eds on the pa sseng er se at, and one -half pound of coca ine in the trunk.

Af te r c on sid e ri ng the e vid e nc e , inc lud ing a vid e ota pe ma de of

the e nti re se qu e nc e of

e ve nts by I nvestig ator Starks’ patrol car , the t rial court found that Investig ator Starks’ a ctions constituted “just g ood police wor

k.” The court further found that

the offic er ma de the stop . . . followed that up with the warning ticket
a ndthe n a sk e d th e De fe nd a nt, a s th e y do in m a ny

c a se s, abo ut h is criminal history . He f

ound out that there w as a w eapons c harg e, and the n a sk e d to se arc h th e ve hic le fo r w e apo ns

. Th e Cou rt

do e sn ’t fi nda nythi ng that is c onsti tut ion a lly imp e rm iss ibl e in this ; a nd , th e re fo re , I ’m g oin g to de ny

the mot ion to
su pp re ss.

F oll ow ing the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de nia l of the mot ion to s up pr e ss, the de fe nd a nt p le d g uil ty
rese rving the following certified questio n s o f l aw: (1) whether I nvestig ator Starks stopping the defe ndant’s car viol ated the F ourth Amendment, (2) whether the investig ation exceede d the scope of the detention cre ating an unre asonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and ( 3) whe ther the defe ndant’s conse nt was coe rce d.-3-

On app e a l th e de fe nd a nt c on te nd s th e tria l c ou rt e rr e d in de nyin g h is m oti on to s up pr e ss be c a us e (1 ) the re wa s n o b a sis fo r s top ping his c ar, (2 ) the re a so ns fo r d e ta ini ng him we re me re ly prete x tual, (3) the le ng th of his detention was unre asonable , (4) the que sti o n i n g o f his daug hter outside his prese nce was i lleg al, and (5) his consent to sear ch wa s coer ced. T he state a rg ues that (1)
a c on sti tut ion a lly

va lidba sis e xiste d f

or sto pp ing t he de fe nd a nt’ s v e hic le , ( 2) I nv e sti g a tor Sta rk s’ subjective intentions a

re irrele vant, (3) the de fenda nt’s detention was r easona ble, (4) the defe ndant’s
arg ume nt c on c e rn ing the ill e g a lit y of the qu e sti on ing of his daug hte r i s n ot p ro pe rl y be fo re thi s c ou rt , and (5) the def

endant’ s consent wa s valid. We ag ree with the state.

AN AL YSI S

I nitiallywe note t h at t h e certified questions of law do not a ddress a n issue of whe ther the questioning of

the def endant’ s daug hter outside his prese nce w as illeg al. Therefor e, that issue is not proper ly befor e this court. See State v. Jenkins, 15 S.W .3d 914, 917-18 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)

. Howeve r, we will consider the questioning of the def endant’ s daug hter re lative to the scope of the investigation and the leng th of the dete ntion.

A trial court’s fac tual finding s on a motion to suppress are conclusive on appea l unless the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst them. State v. Odom, 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (T en n. 1996); State v. J ones, 802 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Tenn. Crim. A pp. 1990). Que stions about the “cr edibilityof the witness es , t h e we i gh t and value of the evidenc e, and r esolution of conflicts in the evide nce a re matters entr

usted to the t rial j udg e as the t rier of fac t.” Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23. The application of the law to the fac ts as determined by the trial court is a question of law whic h is reviewe d de novo on appea l. State v. Year g an, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997).

I. JUSTIFICATION F OR STO P P ING THE DE F ENDANT’S CAR

The de fend ant claims that his car was stopped in violation of the F ourth Amendment a nd artic le 1 , s e c ti o n 7 o f th e T e n n e s s e e Co n s ti tu ti o n

. T h e F o u r th A me n d me n t to th e U n it e d States Constit ution protects ag ainst unrea sonable sea rche s and seizures, and “‘a rticle 1, section 7 [of the Tenne ssee Constitution] is identical in intent and purpose with the Fourth A mendment.’” State v. Downey , 945 S.W .2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Sneed v. State, 221 Te nn. 6, 13, 423 S.W .2d 85 7, 86 0 ( 19 68 )) . A n auto mob ile sto p c on sti tut e s a se izur e wi thi n th e me a nin g of bo th the F ou rth Amendment of the United S tates C onstitut ion and article I , section 7 of the T ennesse e Constituti on. Michig an De p’t of State Police v. Sitz , 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. C t. 2 4 8 1 , 2 4 85 (1990); State v. Pulley , 863 S.W .2d 29, 30 (Tenn. 1993) ; State v. Binion, 900 S.W .2d 702, 705 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). The police may

stop a vehi cl e i f t h ey have e ither proba ble cause or a n “articulable and
rea sonable suspicion” tha t the vehicle or its occupants ar e subjec t to seiz ure f or violation of the law. See De lawar e v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S . Ct. 1391 (1979); State v. Watkins, 827 S .W.2d 29 3, 29 4 ( Te nn . 199 2) ; Stat e v. Col e ma n, 79 1 S.W.2 d 5 04 , 5 05 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 89 ). Pr ob able
c a us e to a rr e st e xists if the fa c ts an d cir c ums ta nc e s with in an of fi c e r’ s kno wl e dg e are su ff ic ie nt t o war rant a prudent pe rson in believing that the ar restee has committed an offense. B eck v. O hio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. C t. 223, 225 (1964); State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 350-51 (Tenn. 1982). An-4-

office r’s s u b

j ective intention for

stopping a

vehicle is irr eleva nt, as long as indepe ndent g rounds exis t for the de tention. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996); State v. Viney ard, 958 S.W.2d 730 (Tenn. 1997).

Tenne ssee’ s following too closely statute provides that a “driver of a motor vehic le shall not follow another

vehicle mor e close ly

than is rea sonable a nd prudent, having due reg ard for the spee d of such ve hicles and the traff ic upon and th e condit ion of the hig hway ” and that any “violation of this section is a Class C m isdemeanor .” T.C.A. § 55-8- 124(a) , (e) . The recor d ref lects that I nvestig ator Starks stopped the defe ndant’s ca r base d upon his observation that the de fenda nt was follo wi n g an RV at less than one car ’s leng th. This constitut ed proba ble cause that the de fenda nt was in violation of the law. I d. Be cause I nvestig ator Starks’ subjective intention whe n stopping the de fe nd a nt’ s c ar i s ir

re le va nt, thi s is su e is w ith ou t me ri t.

II. LEN G TH OF THE D EF EN DA NT ’S DE TEN TIO N

The de fenda nt next cl aim s that the entire se izure was unre asonable beca use I nvestig ator Starks’ investig ation exceede d the scope of the initial dete ntion. Whether a tra ffic stop is initiated based on pr obable c ause or rea sonable s u s p i ci o n , a re sulting investig ation is reviewe d under the fra mework e stablished in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. C t

. 1 8 6 8 (1 9 68). See U nited States v. Brignoni- Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S. Ct. 2574 (1975). Such investigations require tha t an offic er’ s actions must be “r easona

bly re l at ed in scope to the c ircumstance s which justified the interf ere nce in the first place .” Te rry , 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S. Ct. at 1879. The de tention “must be temporary and last no longe r than nece ssary to e ffe ctuate the purpose of the stop.” F lorida v. Roy er, 460 U .S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct . 1319, 1325 (1983); State v. Eng lan d , 1 9 S

. W

. 3 d 762, 767-68 (Te nn. 2000). Mo re ov e r, the of

fi c e r s ho ulde mpl oy

the le a st i ntr

us iv e mea ns re a so na

bly a va ila ble to i nv e sti g a te his or her suspicions in a short period of time. Roy er, 460 U.S. at 500, 103 S. Ct. at 1 3 2 6

. “T he proper inquiry is whether during the detention, t he poli ce dilig ently pursued a means of inve stiga tion that was likely to c onfirm or dispel their suspicions quic kly .” State v. Simps on, 968 S.W .2d 776, 783 (Te n n

. 1 9 9 8 ) ( c it a ti o n o mi tt e d )

. “ I f th e ti me , man n e r o r s c o p e o f th e in v e s ti g a ti o n e x cee ds the proper para meters,” a constitutionally permissible stop ma y be transformed into one which violates the Fourth Amendment and article 1, section 7. United S tates v. Childs, 256 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2 0 0 1 ) ; s e e a ls o St a te v

. M o r e lo c k , 8 5 1 S. W. 2 d 8 3 8 , 8 4 0 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p

. 1 9 9 2 )

. I n th e c o n te xt of dete rmining w hether

investigative methods run a fo ul of the F ourth Amendment a nd article 1,
se c tio n 7 , th is c ou rt

ha s st a te d “ that r e qu e sts fo r drive r’ s lic e ns e s a nd ve hic le re g ist ratio n d oc ume nts , inquir i es conce rning trave l plans and vehic le owner ship, computer che cks, and the issuance of citations are investigative methods or ac tiviti es consistent with the lawful scope of any traff ic stop.” State v. Gonzalo Gar cia, No. M2000-01760-CCA-R3-CD, Davidson County , slip op. at 22 (Te nn. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 20 0 2) (c iting United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1176 ( 10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 268 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Ly ton, 161 F.3d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir. 1998)), ove rruled on othe r g rounds by State v. Gar cia, 123 S.W.3d 335 (Tenn. 2003).

I n this case, we hold that the questioning of the def endant, whic h the record reflec ts lasted approximately six and one-ha lf minutes, did not c reate an unrea sonable detent i o n

. I nvestig ator-5-

Starks initiallyasked the defe ndant questions conce rning his license, re g istration, insurance , and trave l plans and ex plained to him the gene ral rule of following too closely . He then notice d that the defe ndant’s tail light wa s not w orking proper ly

. I nvestig ator Starks ne x t informed the de fenda nt he was g oing to c heck his drive r’s lice nse for outstanding warr ants and criminal history and aske d the defe ndant if he ha d been a rre sted befor e. I n response , the def endant a cknowledg ed that he ha d been
arr ested for domestic battery and unlawful possession of a handg un. After questionin g the de fe nd a nt, I nv e sti g a tor

S t a r k s d e t e rm i n e d

w h e the r the de fe nd a nt’ s d a ug hte r w a s w e ari ng he r s e a tbe lt in compliance w ith state law and as k ed h er a bout their trave l plans. We believe that g iven the evidenc e elicited during this investigation, which we conclude was conducted withi n the scope of the orig inal detention, I nvestigat o r S tarks had r easona ble suspicion to ask the def endant f or permission to searc h his car f or we apons.
III. VOLUNTARINESS OF THE DE F ENDANT’S CONSENT
Finally , the defendant contends that the consent he gave I nvestig ator Starks to sea rch his ca r was the r esult of coe rcion. The state ar g ues that the de fenda nt’s consent wa s g iven voluntarily , fre e from coe rcion.

The a naly sis of any

war rantless sear ch must be g in w ith the proposition that suc h sear ches a re p e r s e u n r e a s o n ab l e u n d e r t h e F o u r t h A m e n d m e n tt o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d ar t i c l e I,
se c tio n 7 of

the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion . T his princ ipl e a g a ins t w arr a ntl e ss s e arc he s is su bje c t on ly to a fe w s pe c if

ic a lly e sta bli sh e d a nd we ll- de lin e a te d exce pti on s. Se e Katz v. Un ite d St a te s, 38 9 U .S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct

. 507, 514 (1967); State v. Ty ler, 598 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). B e f o r e t h e f ru i t s o f a w arr a n t l e s s s e ar c h ar e a d m i s s i b l e a s e v i d e n c e , t h e s t a t e m u s te s t ab l i s h b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that the se arc h falls into one of the na rrowly draw n exceptions to the
war rant re quirement. See State v. Shaw, 603 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) . A war rant is not needed w hen ther e is a c onsent that i s “u n eq uivocal, spec ific, intellige ntly g iven, and
un c on ta min a te d by du re ss o r c oe rc ion .” Sta te v. B ro wn , 8 36 S.W. 2d53 0, 54 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 2) . T hu s, the question bec omes whethe r the c onsent to the s ear ch wa s g iven voluntarily . See State v. Jackson, 889 S.W .2d 219, 221 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

.
I nvestig ator Starks testified that as a result of the defe ndant’s admission that he had a prior
arr est for illeg al possession of a ha ndg un, he asked him for permission to sear ch the car. The rec ord
re fl e c t s t h a tI n v e s t i g a t o r

S t ark s w a s t h e o n l y

l a w e n f o r c e m e n to f

f i c e r p r e s e n ta tt h e t i m e o f

thi s reque st. I nvestig ator Starks a lso testified that he did n ot arre st the defe ndant until after disc overy of the c ocaine . Further, he said he allowe d the def endant to stand by

the side of the r oad while he
was sea rching the car

. Ba sed upon the testimony of I nvestig ator Starks a nd the videotape of the stop,
we c onclude the de fenda nt’s consent to sea rch w as fr eely

g iven.-6-

B a se d o n th e fo re g oin g a ndthe re c or d a s a wh ole , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ J OSEPH M. TI PTON, J UDGE