### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT KNOX VILLE D ec embe r 3, 200 8 S es sio n

JE FFERSON LEE YOUNG V. ENERPAC

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forMcM inn County No. 26820 Hon. John B. Hagler, Circ uit Jud ge

No. E2008-00069-COA- R3-CV - FILED JANUAR Y 22, 2009

Pla int if f f ile d th is a c tio n a ft e r the sta tut e of lim ita tio ns ha d r

un , a nd de fe nd a nt m oved to di smi ss. Plaintiff attempted to invoke t he dis covery rule, claiming that his injuries had re quired surge ry and he wa s sedated f

or a f ew da ys follo wi n g t h e accident. The Trial Court gra nted the def endant summary judgment and plaintiff ha s appea led

. We affirm the Trial Court on the grounds tha t the discovery r

ule was not a

pplicable to the c ircumstance s of this case.

Te nn. R . A pp. P .3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ff

ir me d.

H ER S CHEL P ICK EN S F R ANKS , P.J., de livered the opinion of the Court, in whic h C H A RL ES D. S US ANO , J R ., J., and J ON K ER R Y B LA C KW OOD , S R

. J., joined.

Roy P. Neuenschwa nder, K noxville, Tennesse e, for appellant, Je ffe rson Lee Young.

R. Kim Burnette, Knoxville, Tennesse e, for appellee , Enerpa c.

OP IN ION

Plai n ti f f s , Je f f e r s o n a n d Sh ir le y Y o u n g , f il e d a Co mp la in t a g a in s t E n erpa c, a Wis consin business who marke ted and sold a product c alled Porta Power . Plaintiffs alleg ed that on J une 21, 2005, while Mr. Young was working at his employ ment with Heil Trailer

I nternational and using the Porta Power product, a part of the produc t broke a nd struck Mr. Youngwith gr eat f orce , causing a deep lace ration over his e y e, a skull fr actur e, and cr ushing the bones ar ound his left ey e. The Complaint c harg ed that defe ndant impliedly war rante d to Mr

. Young and his e mploy er that the product wa s safe and fit for its int ended use s.-2- Pla int if fs a lle g e d tha t Y oungha d s uf fe re d p a in a

nd pe rm a ne nt, dis fi g ur inginj ur ie s, and alongwith his wife aske d for da mag es in the amount of $1,200,000.

Enerpa c filed a

Motion to Dism iss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), a sserting that plaintiffs’ Complaint wa s untimely beca use it wa s not f

iled within the one y ea r s t at u t e of lim itatio ns , a

nd a sse rt e d that the Com

pla int wa s n ot f

ile d unti l June 23 , 2 00 6, wh e n th e inc ide nt i n question occur

red on June 21, 2005. The Motion expla i n ed t h at J une 21, 2006 did not fall on a

wee kend or holiday , and that the Complaint was untimely on its face

. Plaintiffs responded to the Motion, rely ing on the discovery rule, and stated that due to the sever ity

of his injuries, Young was not able to know or under stand the ca use of his injuries for

se ve ra l da y s. Pla int if

fs fi le d h is A ff

ida vit wh ic h w e qu ote in p e rt ine nt p a rt :

I wa s inj ur e d on -t

he -j ob on June 21 , 2 00 5 w he n a po rt ion of the po rt a -p ow e r t

hat I

wa s u sin g wh ile wi th t

he e xer c ise of du e c a re a nd in t he c ours e of

my e mpl oy me nt, broke of f and w ith gr eat f

orce and velocity struck the inside of the tank wher e Iwas working and then struck me i n the face w ith tremendous forc e and pr essure . . . . Iwas

ru sh e d to the Un ive rs ity of Te nn e sse e Me dic a l Ce nte r wh e re I imm e diate ly underw ent plastic surg ery to repa ir the cuts on my

fore head, e y ebrowand ey elid. I underw ent surg ery

to repa ir my

skull very

late on Thursda

y , J une 22, 2005. For

the fi rs t sev e ra l da

y s f oll ow ingthe a c c ide nt I

wa s h e a vil y

se date d o n s tr on g na

rc oti c s, lotrel, orata dine, per coce t, keflex, pheneg ran a nd mor p h in
, during the times that Iwas not under a

nesthesia f

rom the surg erie s and did not rec all any thing a bout the acc ident until S aturda

y , J une 25, 2005. I

was not fully

awa re of what happe ned to me and ho w i t ha pp e ne d unti l ma

ny da y s a ft e r t he a c c ide nt.

An Affida vit wa s filed by the spouse’s fathe r, and his w ife and sister, to the eff ect that Young was in the hospital f or sever al day s afte r his acc ident, and that he w as not fully awa re of what happene d for a

fewday s.

The Tr ial Court dismi ssed the ac tion and found t he C omplaint should have been f iled befor e June 21, 2006, but it was not filed until J u n e 23, 2006. The Court found that Young ’s

me dic a l r e c or ds sh ow e d th a t on the da y of the a c c ide nt, he de mon str a te d a n a wa re ne ss o f t

he fa c ts of his acc ident s u ff

i ci ent t o put him on noti ce of a potential ca

use of a ction, and found that the dis c ov e ry ru le wa s in a

pp li cabl e to the fa c ts o f t his c a se . Pl a int if

fs have a pp e a le d a nd ra ise the se iss ue s:

1. Whe the r t he Tr ia l Co ur

t e rr e d in a llo wi ngMr . Y oung ’s me dic a l r e c or ds to be admitted into evidenc e?

2. Whether the Tr ial Court erre d in refusingto hear medical testimony

re g a rd ingthe e ff

e c t of Mr . Y oung ’s inj ur ie s?-3- 3. Whe the r t

he Tr ia l Co ur

t e rr e d in fa ili ngto a

pp ly the dis c ov e ry

ru le to t oll the statut e of

lim itatio ns ?

Plaintiff a rg ues that the discove ry

rule is applica

ble to the fa cts of this case to toll t he statute of limitations. He states that he underw ent surg ery and wa s under a

nesthesia, a

nd could not
appre ciate his injuries nor the cause there of until a few day s afte r his a ccide nt. B oth parties ag ree that W oods v. Sherwin-W

illiams
, 666 S.W .2d 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), appropr iately prese nts the history of the discove ry

rule a s it has developed in this state.

I n W oods, this Court ex plained that the discove ry rule wa s develope d to preve nt p laintiffs from be ing ba

rre d from filing a cla im before they even kne w it exi sted. Id . This Court fu rt he r s ta te d th e su

bs tanc e of

the ru le a s:

the cause of action acc rues and the statute of limitations commences to run whe n the injury occur s or is discovere d, or whe n i n the exercise of rea sonable c are and diligenc e, it should have be en discove red.

Id

. , q u o ting McCroskey

v. Bryant Air Conditioning Company , 5 2 4 S. W. 2 d 4 8 7 ( T e n n

. 1 9 7 5).

Th e Sup re me Court

ha s e xpound e d o n th e ru le a s f oll ow s:

. . . th e on e -y e a r s ta tut e of lim itatio ns be g ins to r

un wh e n a pla int if f dis c ov e rs , o r i n the exercise of

rea sonable c are and diligenc e, should ha ve discovere d, the exist ence of a le g al ca

use of action. This so-ca lled “discove ry rule” preve nts the anomaly of requiringth at a plaintiff f ile suit “prior to knowledg e of his injury or ... that he sue to vindicate a non-exist ent wrong , at a time whe n injury is unknown and unknowable.” As we ha

ve explained:

[A] cause of ac tion in tort does not ac cr u e u n t il a judicial reme dy is available. A jud ic ia l r e me dy

is a va ila ble wh e n ( 1) a

br e a c h o f a

le g a lly re c og nize d d

uty ow e d to plaintiff by defe ndant (2) cause s plaintiff leg ally cog nizable da mag e. A br eac h of a leg ally cog nizable duty

occur s when plaintiff discove rs or ‘r easona bly should have dis c ov e re d, (1 ) t

he oc c a sio n, the mann e r a nd me a ns by whi c h a

br e a c h o f d

uty

occur red that produce d

... injury ; and (2) the identity of the de fenda

nt who brea ched the duty .’

We further

stated in Carvell v. Bottoms , 900 S.W .2d 23 (Tenn.1995) :

I t is not required that the pla intiff actua lly know t hat t he inj ury constitutes a bre ach of the a ppropriate leg al standar d in order to discove r that he ha s a rig ht of ac tion; the pla int if f i s d e e me d to have dis c ov e re d th e ri g ht o f a c tion if he is a wa re of fa c ts

su ff ic ie nt to pu t a reason a

ble pe rs on

on no tic e tha

t he ha s su ff

e re d a n in jur y a s a

re su lt o f w ro ng fu l c on du c t.-4- Id

. at 2 9 (q u o t i n g Roe v . Jefferson , 875 S.W .2d 653, 657 (Tenn.1994) ).

Terry v. Niblack, 979 S.W .2d 583 (Tenn. 1998) (interna l citations omit ted).

Th e Sup re me Court ha s a lso e xpre sse d that “ the statut e of lim itatio ns is t oll e d o nly duri ngthe pe ri od

of tim e wh e n th e pla int if

f h a s n o a c tua l kn ow le dg e of the inj ur y a nd , a s a

rea sonable pe rson, would not be plac ed on inquiry notice.” Potts v. Celotex Corp. , 796 S.W .2d 678, 680-81 (Te nn. 1990).

The disc o v er y rule is desig ned to shield a plaintiff f rom the unjust result of being barr ed fr om filing a

claim bef

ore he even kne w that he ha d been w rong fully injured, i.e. a

n injury that is latent i n nature

. I n this case , the pl aintiff allege s that he was disoriented for a fe w day s after his inj ur y , b ut t he re wa s n o p ro of that the inj ur y re nd e re d h im i nc omp e te nt o r o the rw ise dis a ble d h im for a ny signific ant p er iod of time such that he would have bee n barr ed fr om filing his claim in a timely fashion abse nt application of the discove ry rule. Clearly
, the rec ord establishes his injury was not latent, and assuming arguendo, as w e must, that plaintiff s uffe red a temporar y loss of full mental

rea soning a

bility , he wa s not thereby preve nted from f

il i n g h i s claim within the statute of limit ations, and wa s on inquiry notice duringthat period. I n our vi ew , t h e d iscovery rule is not desi g n e d to “ ta c k o n ” d a y s o r w e e k s to th e s tatute o f li mi tati o n s f o r s h o rt p e r io d s o f time w hen a plaintiff might not be fu l l y aw ar e o f what had occur red. I f such we re the case , the statute of lim itatio ns wo uld

be c ome a

ne bu lou s r

ule wi th diffi cult

a pp lic a tio n, wh ic h c ou ld b e a rb itr a ri ly le ng the ne d e a c h ti me a

pla int if f h a d a tem

po ra ry dif fi c ult y , but wa s ful ly c omp e te nt to fil e his c la im wi thi n th e statut or

y pe ri od

. We a g re e wi th the Tr ia l Court that on the se fa c ts, the dis c ov e ry ru le is not applicable.

Our ruling rende rs moot the i ssue as to consideration of the medica l rec ords, which
t h e r e c o r d d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e p l a i n t i f f d i d n o to b j e c ta tt h e t i m e t o t h e i r

a d m i s s i b i l i t y.

For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the J u d gm en t of the Tria l Court and rema nd, with the cost of the c ause a ssessed to J eff erson L ee Y oung

.

______________________________ H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P

. J.