79th Congress, 2d Session -

REF ID:A488995 

U niou Calendar No. 860 - House Report No. 2734 

INVESTIG!\TIONS OF T!IE NATIONAL 

WAR EFFORT 

REPORT 

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

PURSUANT TO 

H. Res. 20 

A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE 

ON MILITARY AFFAIRS TO STUDY THE PROGRESS OF THE NATIONAL WAR EFFORT 

DECEMBER 17, 1946.-Committed to the Committee.of the Whole House 

on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed 

UNITED STATES 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHING TON : 1946 

--- ---~----- - --- -- -

Ci..pproved for Release by NS.A. on OS-·13-20·14 

)llrsuant to E. 0. ·13526 
REF ID:A488995 

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS 

ANDREW J. MAY, Kentucky, Chairman 

R. EWING THOMASON, Texas WALTER G. ANDREWS, New York 

OVERTON BROOKS, Louisiana DEWEY SHORT, Missouri 

JOHN J. SPARKMAN, Alabama LESLIE C. ARENDS, Illinois 

PAUL J. KILDAY, Texas CHARLES R. CLASON, Massachusetts 

CARL T. DURHAM, North Carolina J. PARNELL THOMAS, New Jersey 

JOHN EDWARD SHERIDAN, Pennsylnnia PAUL W. SHAFER, Michigan 

ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida THOMA.S E. MARTIN, .Iowa 

PHILIP J. PHILBIN, Massachusetts CHARLES H. ELSTON, Ohio 

PAUL STEWART, Oklahoma FOREST A. HARNESS, Indiana 

ARTHUR WINSTEAD, Mississippi IVOR D. FENTON, Pennsylvania 

CHET HOLIFIELD, California J. LEROY JOHNSON, California 

JAMES A. ROE, New York CLARE BOOTHE LUCE, Connecticut 

MELVIN PRICE, Illinois 

J. LINDSAY ALMOND, Virginia JOSEPH R. FARRINGTON, Hawali 

EDWARD L. BARTLETT, Alaska 

JESUS T. PINERO, Puerto Rico 

JULIA WATTERSON, Clerk 

H. RALPH BURTON, General .counsel 

SPEOIAL COMMITTEE 

ANDREW J. MAY, Chairman 

JOHN J. SPARKMAN, Alabama THOMAS E. MARTIN, Iowa 

CARL T. DURHAM, North Carolina CHARLES H. ELSTON, Ohio 

ARTHUR WINSTEAD, Mississippi IVotl D. FENTON, Pennsylvania 

II 
REF ID:A488995 

A REPORT ON THE SYSTEM CURRENTLY EMPLOYED IN THE 

COLLECTION, EVALUATION, AND DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE AFFECTING THE WAR POTENTIAL OF THE UNITED 

STATES 

INTELLIGENCE THE FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE IN PEACE 

In time of war, intelligence-that is, in nontechnical terms, reliable information on the strength and weaknesses, the capabilities, 

plans, and actions of foreign powers-is an acknowledged essential 

to victory. In time of peace, intelligence is equally essential for 

the preservation of that peace, and for the prevention of still another 

war. 

That alert and enlightened intelligence forms the Nation's first 

line of defense in time of peace seems to be accepted by all who have 

the security of the Nation at heart. Time of peace is emphasized because it is in time of peace that nations prepare for war; it is in time 

of peace that true information concerning the resources, plans, activities, the political and military movements of potential enemies, isin these modern days-most difficult to obtain and to comprehend. 

It is in time of peace that our people are least interested in the aspirations of others, least concerned over their own safety, least vigilant 

against aggression, least prepared to defend themselves. It is in 

time of peace ,that our military forces are weakest. It is in time of 

peace that our elected officials have shown themselves reluctant to 

point out dangers, reluctant to ask for the understanding-and for 

the men, time, and money-necessary for our defense. It is in time 

of peace that our people find it difficult to believe that any nation on 

earth would consider attacking us. 

The statement that intelligence forms the Nation's first line of 

defense seems to be accepted alike by those Americans who believe in 

the dest!ny of our country as a great and indep~ndent power, a~d by 

those w1llmg to surrender a measm,'.e of sovereignty to some higher 

partnership .for the combined benefit of mankind as a whole. The 

statement seems to be acceptable alike to those who see the world for 

some years to come as a continuing battleground for conflicting national interests, and to those who feel that permanent safety requires 

the United States to make a unique gift to the world, discharge a unique 

responsibility in the organization and maintenance of peace. 

That the United States reached the extraordinary position it currently occupies in the world without an effective world-wide intelligence service of its own must be ascribed to its fortunate geographic 

situation, its preoccupation with the development of its frontiers, its 

comparative disinterest in military affairs, its aloofness through many ~ears from the quarrels of the Old Worlds, west and east, and to the 

fact that our overseas rivals had not yet consolidated their plans and 

1 
REF ID:A488995 

2 NATIONAL WAR EFFORT 

powers sufficiently to show us the attention that was certainly, some 

day, ~o be ours. Whatever the reasons for our magnificent growth as 

a nat10n, and the undeniable fact that it was attained without an adequate intelligence service, participation in the two World Wars which 

have been the scourge of the twentieth century changed the situation. 

In those wars we learned, by reliance on the services of another nation, 

Great Britain, whose i:najor interests at the time seemed to coincide 

with ours, how truly vital intelligence can be. 

There is no denying, now, -that we must have sound intelligence ~nd an efficient and effective intelligence service that is entirely Amer1ca:r:i in every respect to get it for us, if we intend to continue to play 

an mdependent major role in the affairs of the world. Indeed, it is ~rnrd to iinagine our harassed leaders taking a single important step 

m the development of our national policy without know ledge and 

understanding of the aims, capabilities, intentions, policies, and actions 

of other nations-in other 'vords, it is hard to imagine them taking 

n step without intelligence. · 

INTI::LLIGENCE HAS ALREADY PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN OUR HISTORY 

It is not too much to say that the position of the United States in 

the world today would already be sadly different but for intelligence. 

For while it is true that during the past war we made many mistakesmilitary and political-we also scored some truly great military victories, including the final ones. Sound intelligence based on the 

breaking of the Japanese codes enabled us to turn the tide of warfare 

i.n the Pacific. Sound intelligence by an English girl-a matter of no 

apparently greater importance than the routine inspection of an aerial 

photograph-enabled the British and American Air Forces to nullify 

the rocket attack on England and save Great Britain as a base 

:for future operations against the Continent. Sound intelligence 

enabled us to break up the German armies in France piecemeal, thus 

making a defense of their homeland by the Germans an impossibility. 

The successes scored as a result of sound intelligence are here emphasized because, up to now, the need for intelligence has been popularly 

based on a number of spectacular mistakes: notably the failure to 

defend Pearl Harbor against JapaJl's opening gambit, the failure to 

take proper measures against the mcmnting German onslaught in the 

Ardennes, the failure to understand.what would inevitably happen if 

the heart of Europe were reduced to rubble. These were mistakes 

indeed, shocking, terrible, costly, utterly unworthy of an America 

strong enough and wise enough to match strength and wits with competitors in the modern world, But close analysis will show that these 

were not mistakes of intelligence. The record of the joint SenateHouse committee investigatin$ Pearl Harbor showed that a considerable number of important officials knew as a result of correctly evaluated intelligence that a sudden Japanese blow was to be expected the 

morning of December 7, 1941. Any number of Unit()d States Army 

officers can testify to the fact that it was known as the result of correctly offered intelligence that a German force of alarming proportions was ready to deliver an attack in the Ardennes shortly before 

Christmas of 1944. And the files of our intelligence service contain 
REF ID:A488995 

NATION AL WAR EFFORT 3 

a number of vigorous reports on the danger to our future involved 

in the wanton destruction of Middle Europe, the wellspring of our 

own western civilization. In all three of these cases, the intelligence 

was correctly gathered, evaluated, and even disseminated to the officials most vitally concerned; that it was ignored or discarded does not 

alter these facts. The point is important: we cannot continue to live 

and breathe the air of freemen without adequate intelligence; and 

intelligence of itself, no matter how good it is, is not enough; the 

cold facts have to be understood and used. 

INTELLIGENCE SINCE THE CWSE OF THE WAR 

The unanimity of opinion to be found today regarding the need 

for adequate intelligence stems from the importance it attained 

during World War II. Literally, hundreds of thousands who never 

thought about intelligence before found it essential to the continu-· 

ation of their lives and those of ·their comrades. Other thousands 

gave their lives in search for it tha,t the Nation might live. Small 

wonder that there was an enormous public interest in intelligence· 

at the end of the war and that many theories were advanced as to 

how our intelligence should be conducted in the future, to spare us 

and the world, if possible, a third and even more deadly and devastating conflict. 

Out of the welter of theories, plans, discussions, hearings-most 

of which seemed to call for a new central intelligence agency to 

coordinate for the common good the work of agencies already existing in our various Government departments-came the crystallization of a new intelligence organization and program for the United 

States. On January 22, 1946 President Truman directed the formation of the National Intehigence Authority in the following 

document: 

THE WmTE HousE, 

WasMngton, January :e:e, 1946. 

To THE SECRl!n"A'kY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF WAR, AND THE SECRETARY OF 

THE NAVY: 

1. It is my desire, and I hereby direct, that all Federal foreign intelligence activitieB be planned, developed, and coordinated so as to llSSure the most 

effective accomplishment of the lntelli~ce mission related to the national 

security. I hereby designate you, togetb,er. with another person to be named 

by me as my personal representative, 11.\1. the National Intelligence Authority 

to accomplish this purpose. . 2. Within the llmits of available appropriations, you shall each from time 

to time assign persons and facilities from your respective Departments, which 

persons shall collectively form a Central Intelligence Group and shall, under 

the Director of Central Intelligence, assist the National Intelligence Authority. 

The Director of Central Intelligence shall be designated by me, shall be re- sponsible to the National Intelligence Authority, and shall sit as a nonvoting 

member thereof.. , 3. Subject to the existing law, and to the direction and control of the 

National Intelligence Authority, the Director of Central Intelligence shall: 

(a) Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to 

the national security and the appropriate dissemination within the Government 

of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence. In so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and facilities of the intelligence agencies of 

your Departments. 

( b) Plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence ngencies of your Departments as relate to the national security and recommend 
REF ID:A488995 

4 NATIONAL WAR EFFORT 

to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of over-all policies 

and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national 

intelligence mission. 

(c) Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence agencies, such services of 

common, concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be 

most efficiently accomplished centrally. " 

( d) Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting 

the . national security as the President and National Intelligence Authority 

may from time to time direct. 

4. No police, law enforcement, or internal security functions shall be exercised 

under this directive. 

5. Such intelligence received by the intelligence agencies of your Departments as may be designated by the National Intelligence Authority shall be freely 

available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and 

dissemination. To the extent approved by the National Intelligence Authority, 

the operations of said intelligence agencies shall be open to inspection by the 

Director of Central Intelligence in connection with planning functions. 

6. The existing intelligence agencies of your Departments shall continue to 

collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelllgence. 

7. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be advised by an Intelligence 

Advisory Board consisting of the heads (or their representatives) of the principal 

military and civilian intelligence agencies of the Government having functions 

related to the national security, as determined by the National Intelligence 

Authority. 

8. Within the scope of existing law and Presidential directi"ves, other departments and agencies of the executive_ branch of the Federal Government shall 

furnish such intelligence information relating to the national security, as ·is in 

their possession, and as the Director of Central Intelligence may, from time to 

time, request pursuant to regulations of the National Intelligence Authority. 

9. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the making of investigations 

inside. the continental limits of the United States and its possessions, except as provided by law and Presidential directives. 

10. In th_e conduct of their activities the National Intelligence Authority end 

the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible f9r fully protecting 

intelligence sources and methods. 

Sincerely yours, HARRY TRUMAN. 

President Truman's directive ended, !or the time being, a sharp 

stru£~le then going on between proponents of the State Department, 

the War and Navy Departments, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Treasury Department, even the 

Budget Bureau, all of whom had their own ideas as to how the intelligence of the United States should be-t-0 use th~correct technical 

terms--collected, evaluated, and disseminated. 

As a result of the President's directive, the one great step was taken 

that all who were interested in intelligence seemed to want. A new 

central intelligence organization .was formed. This fact becomes the 

cornerstone of any study of our present intelligence set-up, and the 

basis for any discussion of recommendations that might be made for 

its improvement. 

The new organization-or National Intelligence Authority to give 

it its correct name-came into being on Jan nary 22, 1946. It consists 

of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the 

Navy, and the personal representative of the President, his personal 

Chief of Staff. These are obviously very busy individuals, so that 

one must expect that the real work of the new organization has fallen 

largely on the shoulders of the Director of Central Intelli~nce, 

guided by the advice of an Intelligence Advisory Board, consistmg of 

the Director of the War Department's Intelligence Division, the Chief 

of the Office of Na val Intelligence, the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for 
REF ID:A488995 

NATIONAL WAR EFFORT 5 

Intel1igence, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 

Research. Again, it is to be noted that the members of the Advisory 

Board have full-time jobs of exacting importance, the point being that 

the person of the Director of Central Intelligence-his understanding 

of the over-all problem, his energy, his methods, even his personalityis from the very nature of the set-up bound to have a considerable effect 

on the course which the still-new organization is to pursue. 

During the 10 months in which the new Authority and the so-called 

Central Intelligence Group which does the work have been in operation, there have been two directors. Fortunately, they have both been 

men of the highest caliber, the one a high-ranking Reserve officer of 

the Navy with a considerable business career as part of his experience, 

the other a progressive and vigorous Army officer of even higher rank 

whose war r~ord was a series of personal triumphs. That two men 

of such outstanding qualifications, gained in somewhat different fields, 

would leave imprints on the struggling new organization was to be 

expected. · 

SHOULD THE CENTRAL AGENCY ENGAGE lN OPERATIONS~ 

It is interesting that during the first 10 months of the organization, 

there were two divergent views as to the proper course for it to pursue. 

One view held that the President's directive should be strictly interpreted. In other words, the central agency should devote itself to the 

correlation, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence obtained by 

intelligence agencies already existing in the various departments of the 

Government, and that it should coordinate the activities of these existing agencies and recommend over-all policies and objectives under 

which they could continue their work most effectively and efficiently. 

The other view was that the new agency should not be content to be 

"a coordinating sewing circle" and should not hesitate to plunge into 

operations. . . The President's directive is not clear as to just exactly which of these 

courses he intended the new "group" to pursue. His directive asks that 

"full use shall be made of the staff and facilities of the intelligence 

agencies" already existing. It asks that plans for the coordinating of 

the activities of the existing agencies be undertaken. But it also asks 

the new organization to "perform, for the benefit of said intelligence 

agencies, such services of. common concern as the National Intelligence 

Authority determines can be most efficiently accomplished centrally." 

A careful reading of the document as a whole might indicate that 

the directive, in discussing services of common concern, meant such 

services related to the correlation, evaluation, and dissemination of 

intell.igence coll~cted by the existing agencies. This se~ms .a r~asonable mterpretat10n, for the emphasis throughout the d1recbve is not 

only on these carefully named factors but also on making :full use of the 

existing agencies. The fact of the matter, however, is that the President's document did not say exactly what kind of common services he 

had in mind and the clause calling for the "performance" of services 

of common concern is now very broadly interpreted. It has put the 

new organization into operations, a circymstance which has caused 

considerable controversy among those experienced in the unusual and 

delicate field which 'is intelligence. · 
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6 NATION AL WAR EFFORT 

There are those who hold that one and the same organization cannot 

fairly both coordinate and operate, that the effect is akin to having 

one and the same man act as prosecutor and judge. The one who 

coordinates is in a sense a judge, an arbiter, who determines who shall 

do what. The minute he gets into operations himself he cannot. given 

normal human nature, make such a decision fairly; he would incline 

to ¢ ving himself, or his own organization, the best and most important 

assignments. And even if he did not take this natural course. his 

friendly competitors would be less than human if they did not think he 

had done so. The result is the same: the beginning of distrust. a 

suspicion of unfai~ dealing in an already highly competitive, often 

dangerous, occupation. 

A similar case could be made for one who would both evaluate and 

engage in operations. Lei the time come when two reports, contradictory but of apparent equal truthfulness, appear. Which one would 

the evaluator believe? The one gathered by some intelligence agency 

other than his own? Or the one gathered by his own? Human nature 

would of course incline him· toward the latter, regardless of other 

considerations. That such a situation could lead to loss of efficiency 

and downright faulty intelligence was amply demonstrated in G-2 

during World War II when the normal channels brought forth one set 

of conclusions regarding events in the Balkans and a so-called Special 

Branch, which had its own sources of information, which it kept to 

itself, brought forth something quite different. The Director of Intelligence at the time, being in effect a godfather of the Special Branch, 

dismissed the intelligence that came through channels other than the 

one that he was sponsoring and permitted himself to endorse a statement to the effect that there was no evidence that the Russians were 

attempting to sovietize the Balkans. 

The problem above outlined is obviously perplexing but its difficulties become compounded when one deals with a type of intelligence 

that very few. people know anything about, that is never willingly 

publicized except by those who do not really understand it, one that 

should be discussed only with the greatest reticence. This is secret 

intelligence, a highly intricate, involved, hazardous, hidden, ruthless 

operation, competitive to the nth degree. How secret it is when properly conducted may be gathered from the fact that it was not known 

until 50 years after his death that Daniel Defoe, the author of Robinson 

Crusoe, had been for many yell.rs the head of British secret intelligence. 

Secret intelligence is a s1tbject b~tter omitted from any report but 

it happens to be pertinent to the present discussion. It must be pointed 

out without further delay that if any agency that correlates and 

evaluates also permits itself to enter the field of secret intelligenc\l. 

a most unhealthy situation is like.ly to resnlt. For in undertaking 

secret operations while at the same time correlating the efforts o-f other 

secret intelligence-gathering agencies, the advantage of secrecy is of 

course promptly lost. The central agency would have to be told what 

all the other "secret" agencies were doing in order to correlate their 

work. If the central agency were then to engage in operations of its 

own, it would without doubt tend to subject the existing "secret" agencies to compromise or disclosure, tend to nullify their usefulness, subject their agents to danger; it could not help but emphasize cutthroat 

competition in a field in which the description is more than a figure 

of speech. 
REF ID:A488995 

NATIONAL WAR EFFORT 7 

MO!!t experienced operators in the unusual field of secret intelligence 

seem to feel that one result would be inevitable: the central ag~ncy 

would in -time drive the others from the field, as the Gestapo ehm1-

nated its competitors in Germany, to the detriment of German intelligence. And this result-should it happen to us-could hardly be 

described as desirous, for it would concentrate all our ·eggs of this 

particular breed in one basket, where they could be most easily found 

by those on the still hunt for them; it would eliminate many useful 

nets, something no large-scale fisherman would dream of doing; it 

would cut our series of special outposts to one, something no wide-awake 

commander would dream of permitting. 

Obviously, there are some who believe that secret intelligence 

operations can or should be concentrated in a central agency. There 

are those within the central agency who, being properly ambitious, 

recognize this form of collection as the tremendous w~apon that it 

is and therefore would welcome it under their own command. There 

are others outside of the central agency who, respectful of the enormous difficulties involved and anxious to avoid the embarrassment 

of possible disclosure, would be glad to see such operations conducted 

elsewhere than in their own organizations. Those who believe that 

secret operations may be concentrated in a central agency profess not 

to see any disadvantage in having secret intelligence operations in 

one small place. They see "efficiency" and "economy" in such a concentration, where others see a red flag waving. They think it quite 

possible to hide such operations in a small organization, where others 

point to the apparent advantage of dispersal throμgh a number of 

other agencies. They do not seem to believe that unsual interest 

would be created in the most interested quarters by the concentration 

of unexplainable personnel that would have to take place, the liaison 

required, the ~rowing flow through a single stream of unusual directiv.es, productwn, dissemination; payments; and the like. 

"Efficiency" and "economy" are important factors in· any governmental operation, but it is questionable whether efficiency in intelligence is obtained by continually striving to reduce the number of 

collection nets in operation. Intelligence does not come through a 

single easy channel: it is better described as a minute distillation of 

great masses of raw material. If the mas_ses are continually reduced, 

the final produ.ct may he adversely affected. For example, sometime 

prior to Mussolini's downfall a report came into The Pentagon to 

the effect that a plot was being hatched against the Italian dictator 

and that at an appropriate moment he would be dismissed and his 

place taken by Badoglio. The report was ignored because there was 

so little to go on; had there been more information on the subject, it 

is possible that this highly valuable bit of intelligence might have 

been used to American advantage. 

The question of "economy" has been carefully avoided thus far 

in this report for the reason that the sums of money that could be 

spent on intelligence would under any circumstances be so small, 

so infinitesimal, compared with the cost of battleships that might 

have to be built unnecessarily in the absence of adequate intelligence, 

or divisions organized unnecessarily, or airplane plants built unnecessarily, that money hardly deserves a place in the discussion. That 

piece of intelligence which saves the Nation from war--0r from 
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8 NATIONAL WAR EFFORT 

defeat-is simply priceless; no pains ·should be spared, .no ~nny 

pinched, to make certain that the intelligence we need -does' not 

slip through our fingers. 

The weight of evidence and experience would seem to be with 

those who would prefer not to see an agency charged -with coordination and evaluat10n also engage in the field of operations-secret 

operations above all. Certainly this is a field in which overcentralization would seem to have more disadvantages than advantages. 

The question as to whether or not a central agency should at one and 

the same time be charged with correlation or coordination and evaluation, and also engage in operations is the crux of the present situation. 

It involves an interpretation of the directive now in force and a recommended course of action is appended hereto. The other recommendations made, with the exception of the last, which receives special consideration below, are n9t designed to cause any change in the present 

structure but' simply to give it a firmer foundation. 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN INTELLIGENCE CORPS 

On November 11, 1945, a special committee of the 'Var Department 

began a series of hearings on intelligence matters. A score of officers 

were heard, among them some of the most experienced intelligence 

officers in the Army. Highly instructive discussions were held. 

One question brought up over and qver again was whether or not 

there should be an Intelligence Corps-similar to the Engineer Corpsin the Army. Obviously, there was no agreement on this point, which 

was to be expected with so many officers of wide experience and strong 

opinions participating. But there was agreement that intelligence 

requires individual officers of the highest caliber, that the Army must 

take more determined steps to provide officers who are specialists in 

intelligence without losing the experience provided only by combat, 

that intelli¥ence s_hould be made a career and selected officers receive 

highly specialized training, that the service schools should do their part 

to instruct officers with a flair for long-range thinking along geopolitical, military-political, and psycholog;ical lines. They agreed that the 

prestige of intelligence must be dehberately built up throughout the 

Army. They agreed that there must be emphasis on continuity in 

intelligence. They agreed on the'further point that appropriations for 

intelligence, and therefore personnel, should not be subject to the usual 

cuts suffered by other unit~ ·of the Army in peacetime, on the sound 

theory that-as stated in the beginning of this report-it is in peacetime that intelligence must be counted on to perform its most valuable 

work. 

A study of the evidence presented at these hearings would lead to 

the conclusion that the formation of an Intelligence Corps or service, 

so designed that it would produce trained intelligence officers without 

losing their proper integration with the rest of the Army, might ha 

desirable. 

RECOJ-IMENDATIONS 

On October 29, 1945, the chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs announced that a special committee had been authorized 
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to investigate the United States intelligence system. A study thereupon was initiated. As a result, and after consultation with Army and 

Navy officers and civilians experienced in intelligence and possessed 

of many divergent views, the following recommendations are proposed: 

Recommendation 1: 

That the National Intelligence Authority, established on January 22, 

1946, by Presidential directive, be authorized by act of Congress. 

(This is designed to give the new authority a firmer base.) 

Recommendation f!: 

That the National Intelligence Authority shall consist of the Secretaries of State, vVar, and the Navy, or deputies for intelligence. 

(The Secretaries are obviously too busy to give this highly important 

subject the attention it deserves.) -

Reco7111mendation 3: 

That the Central Intelligence Group receive its appropriations 

direct from the Congress. · (At present the Group receives its appropriations as grants from the 

State Department, War Department, and the Navy Department, an 

unwieldly and sometimes awkward procedure.) 

Recommendation 4: 

That the Central Intelligence Group have complete control over 

its own personnel. 

(At present the Group receives drafts from the Departments of 

State, War, and Navy.) 

Recommendation 5: 

That the Director of the Central Intelligence Group be a ·civilian 

appointed for a preliminary term of 2 years and a permanent term 

of 10 years, at a salary of at least $12,000 a year. 

·(A civilian would be less subject to the control or criticism of any 

military establishment, less likely to have ambitions in another direction, would be more in keeping with American tradition, would be 

more symbolic of the politico-m1litary nature of the problem posed by 

intelligence in peacetime; furthermore, there is nothing to keep a 

qualified Army or Navy officer from accepting the post in civilian 

clothes, and there is every desire, by setting the tenure of office at 10 

years and making the salary substantial, to make the post attractive 

to one whd has learned intelligence thoroughly in the Army, Navy, or 

Foreign Service of the State Department. Continuity of service is 

recognized as very important.) 

Recommendation 6: 

That the Director of the Central_Intelligence Group be apRointed 

by the President by and with the consent of the Senate. 

Rec.owmendation 7: 

· That the Director of Central Intelligence shall (1) accomplish the 

correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national 

security, and the appropriate dissemination within the Government 

of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence, and in so 

doing making full use of the staff and facilities of the intelligence 

agencies already existing in the various Government departments; 
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NATION AL WAR EFFORT 

(2) plan for the coordination o:f such o:f the activities o:f the intelligence· agencies of the various Government departments as relate to the 

national security and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and obJectives as 

will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission; ( 3) perform, for the benefit of said intelligence 

agencies, such services of common concern related directly to coordination, correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as the National Intelligence Authority shall determine can be more efficiently accomplished centrally; ( 4) perform such other similar functions and 

duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the 

Congress and the National Intelligence Authority may from time to 

time direct. It is specifically understood that the Director of Central 

Intelligence shall not undertake operations for the collection of intelligence. 

(This paragraph is intended to enable the Central Intelligence 

Group to concentrate on ihe analysis and evaluation of high-level 

intelligence for the President and others who have to determine 

national policy. One should not remove any intelligence operation 

from the agencies where day-to-day policies and decisions have to be 

made; the collection and basis analysis in each field o:f intelligence 

should be assigned to the agencl having primary responsibility in 

that field.) , 

Recormmendation 8: 

That paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the Presidential directive 

of January 22, 1946, relating to the establishment of a National Intelligence Authority be enacted into law, with such revisions in wording 

as may -seem necessary. 

(The President's directive was carefully prepared and had at the 

time of its publication, the support of the interested agencies.) · 

Recommendation 9: 

That the Army be requested sympathetically to examine further 

the question of the establishment o:f an Intelligence Corps for the 

training, development, and assignment of especially qualified officers. 

0