REF ID:A56931 

79th Congress, ~d Session -

Union Calendar No. 860 - House Report No 2734 

INVESTIGATIONS OF THE NATIONAL 

WAR EFFORT 

REPORT 

COMMIT~f.EE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ' I' 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

PURSUANT TO 

H. Res. 20 

A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE ( 

ON MILITARY AFFAIRS TO STUDY THE PROGRESS OF THE NATIQ~AL WAR EFFORT 

• J 

1 tr• r- -; --nr 

•I I ' "'UI 'llllJ'J')' I. i. I~ lfl• ••• - :) 

. '· • . "" •' '·"'U ' • YJ, 

,, 

DECEMBER 17, 1946.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House 

on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed 

UNITED STATES 

( 

GOVERNM.E:NT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON 1946 

@'pproved for Release by NSA on 05-21-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
REF ID:A56931 

COM:\IITTIJE O:S l:IILIT.l.RY AFl'AJRS 

ANDREW 1 MAY, Kentucky, Ohatrm.an 

R. EWING THOMASON, Texas \VAUl'DR G ANDUEWS, New York 

OVERTON BROOKS, Louisiana DEWEY SHORT, Missouri 

JOIIX J SPARKMAN, Alabama Lr:SLIE c ARI:NDS, Illinois 

P-1.UL J KILDAY, Texas CHARLES n. CLASON, Mnssnchusetts 

CARL T DURHAM, North Carolina J PARNELL THOMAS, New Jersey 

JOHN EDWARD SHERIDAN, Pennsylvania PAUL W SHAFER, Michigan 

ROBER'.!.' L F SIKES, Florida '.l.'HOXAS E MARTIN, Iowa 

PHILIP J PHIJ,BIN, :Massachusetts CHARLES H ELSTON, Ohio 

PAUL STEWART, Oklahoma Ji'ORJ~ST A HARNESS, Indiana. 

ARTHUR WI::!{STEAD, Mississippi IVOR D FE~TON, Pennsyhanlo. 

CilE'.I' HOLU'lEJ.D"Cal1fornia J LI:ROY JOHNSON, Callfom1a 

JAMJllS A. ROE, New York CLARE B00'£HE LUCE, Connecticut 

MEL VIN PRICE, Illinois 

J LINDSAY ALMOND, Vlrgmia JOSI:I'H R F.\RRINGTON, Hawaii 

ED\V .UUJ r. B.~ll'.1.'LET'.I.', Alaska 

JLSts T Pl~ERO, Puerto Rico 

JULIA WA?TERS0'7, Clerk 

H RALPH HUR~0"1, Genllf"al Oounaei 

SPECJAI. CoYlnTnE 

ANDREW T 

JOHN J SPARKMAN, Alabama 

CARL T DURHAM, North Carolina 

ARTHUR \\-INSTEAD, Misslsslppl 

II 

MA l:", c1,.z1nnrrt1 

THOMAS E MARTIN, Iowa 

CH.\.RLES H ELSTON, Ohio 

IVOR D FENTON, Pennsylvania 
REF ID:A56931 

A REPORT ON THE SYSTEM CURRENTLY EMPLOYED IN THE 

COLLECTION, EVALUATION, AND DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE AFFECTING THE WAR POTENTIAL OF THE UNITED 

STATES 

In time of war, mtelhgence--that is, m nontechmcal termr;i, reliable mformation on the strength and weaknesses. the mtpab1ht1e'l, - plans, and actions of foreign power~1s un acknowledged essential 

to victory In tune of peace, mtelhgen<'e 1s equally essentrnl for 

the preservation of that peace, nnd for the prevent10n of st111 another 

war. 

That alert and enlightened mtclhgence forms the Nnhon's first 

lme of defense m time of peace seems to be accepted by all who have 

the security of the Nat10n at heart Ttme of peace is emphasized because it is m time of peace th11t nations prepare for war; 1t is m tune 

of peace that true mfm mahon conccrmng the resources, plnns, acllv1-

ties. the pohhcal and m1htary movements of potential encnues. I'Sm these modern days-moo;t dlfficult 1.o obtam and to cnmp1 ehcnd. 

It 1s m hme of pt:'11ce that om people nre least. mterP"ted rn the aspirations ,of others, lenst concerned o\er then· own "afety. least v1g1lant 

agam<;t 1.p:grosb10n, least pieparnd to defend them"t>lYes It 1s m 

time of peace thnt our m1htary forces ale \\enkest It is m 1.1me of 

peace that our elected officmls have sho"n them'>Plve-. reluctant to 

pomt out dangers, reluctant to asli for the under::.tnndmg-and for 

the men, t1me, and money-necPs::.a1y for our defense It ism hme 

of peace tliat our people find it difficult to believe that any nat10n on 

earth would consuler attackmg us • 

The statement that mtelhgence fmms the Nat10n's fhst line of 

defense seems to be accepted ahke by tho<::e Ameucans who behew m 

the destmy of our connt1y as a p:ieat and rndependcnt power, and by 

those wilJmg to surrender a measure of sovere1gnty to some higher 

partnerslnp for the comlnned benefit of mankmd ns a whole The 

statement seems to be acceptable ahke to those who see the world for 

some years to come as a contmumg battleground for confbctmg national mterests, and to those \\ho feel that pcimanent safety ieqmres 

the Umted States to make a umque gift to the woild, discharge a umque 

respons1b1lity rn the orgamzation and mamtennnce of pe11ce. 

That the Umted States reached the extraordma1y pos1t10n 1t currently occup1es m the world without an effective w01]d-w1de mtelhgence service of its own must be ascubed to its £o1 tunate geogmplnc 

situation, its preoccupation with the development of its frontiers. its 

comparative d1smterest m military affairs, its aloofness through many 

:years from the qua1Tels of the Old Worlds, west and Past, and to the 

fact tP,at our overseas rivals had not yet consolidated their plans and 

1 
REF ID:A56931 

2 NATIONAL WAR EFFORT 

powers sufticiently_t;o show us the attention that was certainly, some 

do.y, to be ours. Whatever the reasons for our magnificent growth as 

a nation, and the undeniable fa.ct that it was attained without an e.dequn.te mtelbgence service, participn.bon in the. two World Wars which 

ba.ve been the scourge of the twentieth century changed the situation. 

ln those wars we lea.med, by reliance on the services of another nation, 

Great ~.ritam, whose ma~or mterests e.t the time seem~ to comcide 

with ours, how truly vital mtelhgence can be. ·. There'1s no denying, now, that we must have sound intelligence 

and an efficient and effective intel11gence service tlio.t is entirely American m every respect to get 1t for us. if we mtend to continue to J?la_y 

an mdependent major role m the affairs of the world. Indeed, 1t lS 

hard to imagine our l1arassed 'leaders taking a smgle importn.at step 

in the development of our national policy without knowledge and 

understanding of the alms, capab1hties, mtent1ons, pohc1es, and actions. 

of other nationl!r-in other words, 1t is hard to imagme them takmg 

a step without intelligence. 

. ' 

INTELLIGENCE HAS A.I.BEADY PLATED AN DIPORTAN'J.' ROLE IN OUR HISTORY 

It is not too much to say that the position of tlie United States in' 

the world today would already be sadly d,ifferent but for mtelbgence. 

For while it is true tho.t durmg tl1e past wnr we made many m1sta.k~' .1 

ihtary and pohtical-we also scored some truly great mihtary victones, including_ the final ones. Sound mteJhgence based on the 

reakmg of the J apauese codes emibJed us to turn the tide of _warfare 

1n the Pacific. Sound mtell1gence by an English girl-a matter of no 

apparently greater importance than the r:outme inspection of an aerial photo~aph-enabled the British and Amencan A.Ir Forces to nullib 

the rocket attack on England o.nd save Great Br1tam as a. base 

for future operations agamst the Continent. Sound mtelhgenee' 

enabled us to b1eak up tlie German armies m France piecemeal, thus 

makmg a defense of their homelllnd by the Germans an impossibibty. 

The successes sco1-ed as a result of sound intelligence at-e here emphasized because, up to now, the need for mtelligence has been popularJy based on n. number of spectacular m1sttikes: notably the fa.Ilure to 

defend Pearl Harbor o.gamst Jn.pan's oeenin_g gambit, the failure to 

take proper measures against the mountmg German onslaught m the 

Ardennes, the failure to understand what would niev.itably haI?pen if 

the heart of-Eu1ope 've.re reduced to rubble. These were mistakes 

mdeed, shocking, te'rrible, costly,. utterly unworthy of an Amenca. 

strong enough and wise enough to match strength and wits wrth..._~ID;­ petltors m the mode.m world. But close analysis will show th~t ~ 

were not mistakes of intelligence. The record of the joint SenateHouse committee investigatmg Pearl Harbor showed that a considei:al>le .number of unporta.nt o:fti.c1als knew as a. result of correctly evaluiited intelligence that a sudden Japanese blow was to be expected the' 

mormng of December 7, 1941. Any_ number of United States Army 

officers can testify t.o the fact that it was kno.wn as the. result of correctly offered mteJJ.1gence that a German force of o.larmmg propor) 

tio.ns )Vas i:eady to deliver an attac,k m .the Ardennes shortly before 

Christmas of 1944. And the files of our intelligence serVice contain 

I 

• 

.I -1 

-,. I 

j 

NATIONAL WAR E:fFOR'!' 3. 

a number of vigorous reports on the danger to, our future involved 

in the. wanton destruction of Middle Europe, the wellspring of our 

own western civ1hzation. In all three of these cases, the mtelligence 

was correctly gathered, evaluo.ted1 and even disseminated to the officials most vitally concerned; that it :was ignored or discarded does not 

alter these facts. Tb.ej'omt is important: we cannot continue to live 

and breathe the air o freemen without adequate intelligence; and 

intelligence of itself, no matter how ~od it :is, is not enough; the 

cold facts have to be understood and used. 

INTELLIGENCE SINCE THE CLOSE OF '1'HE WAB 

I 

The unanimity of opinion to be found today regard.in'" the need 

for adequate intelligence stems from the importance 1t attained 

during World War II. Literally, hundreds of thousands who never 

thought a.bout mtelbgence before found it essential to the continuation of their lives a.nd those of their comrades. Other thousands 

gave their lives m search for it that the Nation might hve. Small 

wonder that the.re was an enormous public interest m intelligence 

at the end of the war and that ma.ny theories were advanced as to 

how our intelligence should be conducted m the future, to s_po.re us 

and the world, "J.f poes1ble, a third and even more deadly and devastatjng conflrct. 

Out of the welter of theories, plans, discussions, hearings-most 

of which seemed to call for a new central intelligence agency to 

coordinate for the common good (;he work of agencies aJready exist: 

ing m our vanous Govemment deJ?artments-came the cryste.lhza: 

tion of a new intelligence orgamzo.tion and program for the United 

States. On J "1J.UO.ry 22, 1946i President Truman directed the fo1·m1tbon of the N ationel Inte hgence Authority m the following 

document: 

Tm!: WBlTll Heron:, 

lVaaMngtcm, JtmMG'1J !8, 1846. -

To THI: Sll:CBBTAB!' OJ' STATE, TBB SlllCJl&TARY OJ' w AB, Al'm TBE 8EcuTAKY OI' 

rm NA""Y 

1. It la my desire; and I hereby direct, that all Federal foreign Intelligence actlvltles be planned, developed, o.nd coordinated so as to aBBure the moat 

efteetlve accomplishment of the intel.Ugence mlaalon related to the national 

security I hereby designate yon, together with another person to be named 

by me as my personal representative, as the National Intelligence Authority 

to accomplish this purpose 

2 Within the limits of available appropriations, JOU shall each from time 

to time assign persons and fac1lltlea from your respect.Ive Departments, which 

persons shall collectively form a Central Intelligence Greup and shall, under 

the Director of Central Intelligence, assist the National Intelligence Authorlty- !l'be Director of Central Intelligence shall be designated by me, "Shall be re- sponsible to the National Inte111gence Authority, and shall alt as a nonvoting member thereof 

3 Subject to the existing law, and to the dlrectlon and control of the 

National Intelllgence Authority, the Director of Central Intelligence shall· 

(a) Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of Intelligence relating to 

the national security' and the appropriate dissemination within the Government 

of the resulting strategic and national policy Intelligence. In so doing, full 

use shall be made of the sta1r and factlltles of the Intelligence agencl.es of 

1011r Departmctnts. (b) Plan fOr the coordination of such of the activities of the Intelligence ngencles or your Department& as relate to the national &eC!Drlty and recomme1,1t1 
REF ID:A56931. 

NA'I'IONAL WAR EFF-ORT 

to the National Intelligence Authorlt:y the establishment ot o-v:eNlll policies and objectives as will assure the most dectlve acco:qipllshment of the nal:lon~ 

1ntel1Jpnce mission. 

(o) Perform, tor the benefit of said Intelligence agencies, such services or common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be 

most elllclently accomplished centrally 1 

(cl) Perform such other functions and duties related to Intelligence a:ftectlng 

-the national security aa the President and National Intelligence Authorlcy 

mQ trom time to time direct 

4 No police, law enforcement, or Internal securltJ' tunctlons shall be exercised 

under this directive • · 5 Such intelligence received by the >ntelbgence agencies o:f! your Departments as mny 1)e designated by the National Intelllgence Authority shall be freely available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and 

dissemination To the fi!Xtent approved by the National Intelligence AuthorltJ', 

the operationa of said Intelligence agencies shall be open to Inspection by th,e 

Director of Central InteUlgence In connection with planning functiona 

6. The existing intelligence agencies of y.our Deportments -shall continue tq 

collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental Intelligence 7 The Director ot Central Intelligencie shall be advised by, an IntelUgence 

Advlaory Board conplstlng of the heads (qr their represento.tlvesJ of the principal mllltary and clvlllan Intelligence agencies ot the Government having function~ 

related to the natlonal securlty, u detennlned by the Natlo~l Intelligence 

Authority : 8, Within the scope. of. existing law and Presidential dlrectiveir, other depa:rtments ·and agencies of the executive branch of the Fe'deral Government shall 

furnish such Intelligence information relating to the national securitJ', as ls ID 

their possession, and as the Director of Central Intelligence may, from time to 

time, request pursuant to regulations or the National Intelligence Authority 9 Nothing herein shllll be construed to authorize the making of Investigations 

Inside the continental limits of the United States and Its posseSBlons, except aa provided by law and Presldentral directives. ' • 10 In the conduct ot their activities the National Intelllgence Authority and 

the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for full7 protecting 

ID.telUgence sources and methods. 

Sincerely ;vonra, HADY TBuxAN 

President Truman's directive ended, for the time bemg, a sharp 

struggle then going on between proponents of the State Department, the War and Navy Depo.rtments, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Treasury Depar.tmeI).t, even the 

Bud.get Bureau, all of whom had their own ideas as to how the int.ell.1-

gence of the United States should be--to use the correct technical 

terms--collected, evaluated, and disseminated. 

As a result of the President's directive, the one great step was taken 

that all who were interested m mtelhgence seemed to want. A new 

central intelligence organization was formed. This fact becomes the 

cornerstone of any study of our present intelligence set-up, BJld the 

basis for any discussion of recommendations that might be made for 

its improvement. . The new organization-or National Intelligence Autliority to g.ive 

it its correct name-came into being on January 22, 1946. It consists 

of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the 

Navy; and the personal representative of the President. his personal 

cChfet of Sta.ff. These are obviously very busy mdiv1duals, so that 

one must expect that the real work of the new organization has fallen 

largely on the shoulders of the Director of Central Intelligence~ 

guided by the advice of an Intelligence Advisory Board. consisti~_g of 

.fhe Director of the War Department's Intelligence-Division, the Chief 

of the Office of Na.val Intelligence, the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for 

.!. 

NATIONAL WA'.R EFFORT .5 - Intelligence, and the AssIStant Secretary of State for Intelligm'!ce o.nd 

Research. Agam, it is to be noted tho.t the membei:s of the Advisory Board have full-time jobs of exactmg importance, the pomt bemg that 

the person of the Director of Central Intelligence-h1s understandmg 

of the over-all problem, his energy, his methoas, even his Y.ersonaht_ylS from the very nature of the set-up bound to ho.ve a. considerable effect 

on the course wliich the still-new organization is to pursue. 

During the 10 months in which the new Authority and the so--Called 

Central Intelligence GrouJ> which- does the work have been m operation, there have been two directors. Fortunately, they have both been 

men of the highest cahber, the one a high-rnniing Reserve ofticer of 

the N p.vy with a. considerable busmess career as part of his expenen~ 

the other a. progressive and vigorous Army officer of even higher rank 

whose war record was a senes of personal triumphs. That two men 

of such outstandm_g qualmcations, gamed m somewhat different fields, 

would leave imprints on the struggling new organization was t.o be 

expected. · . . . .. SHOULD THE CENTRAL AGENCY ENGAGE IN OPERATIONS Y 

It is mteres~ that during the first· lQ months of the. organization. 

there wer.e two divergent views as to the proper course for it to pursue. 

One view held that the President's directive should be stnctly interpreted. In other words, the central agency should devote itself to the 

correlation, evaluation, and dissemination of mtelhgence obtained by 

intelhgence agencies already existing m the various de,Partment.s of the 

Government, and that it should cooribnate the activities of these existing agencies and recommend over-all policies and objecbves under 

which they could continue their work most effectively and efficiently. 

The other view was that the new agency should not be content to be 

"a coordinatmg sewing circle" and should not hesitate to plunge mto 

operations. The President's directive is not clear as t.o just exactly which of these 

courses he intended the new "group" to pursue. His directive asks that 

"full use shall be ma.de of the staff and faciht1es ·of the intelhgenc~ 

agencies" already exist~. It asks that plans for the coordme.tmg of 

the activities of the existing agencies be undertaken. But It also asks 

the new orgamzabon to "perform, for the benefit of said intelligence 

agencies, such services of common concern as the N atione.l Intelligence 

Author1t:y determines can be most efticiently accomphshed centrally." 

A careful reading of the document as o. whole might indicate that 

the directive, in discussing services of common concer.n, meant such 

services related to the c.orrelation,. evaluation, and dissemination of 

mtelhgence collected by the existms agencies. ThIS seems a reasonable mterp.retation, for the emphasis throughout-the directive is not 

onlv on these careful!_y named fa:ctors but also on making full use of the 

exiSting agencies. The fa.ct of the matter, however, is that the Presideiit's document did not say exactly what •kind of common services he 

had m mind and the clause calling for the "performance" of services 

of common concern is ·now very broad.1:J interpreted.· It has put the 

new organization into operations, a ·circumstimce which has caused 

conside:cable controvers"yr-auiong tliose experienced: in the unusual and 

delicate field which is intelligence. 

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REF ID:A56931 

6 NATIONAL WAR EFFORT 

There are those who hold that one and the same organization cannot 

fairly both coordinate and operate, that the effect is akm to having 

one and the same man act as prosecutor and judge The one who 

coordinates is in a sense a.1udge, an arbiter. who determines who shall 

do what. The mmute he gets mto operations himself he cannot, given 

normal human nature, make such a decision fairly; he would incline 

to gi vmg himself, or his own organization, the best and most important 

assignments And even if he did not take tins naturn.l course. his 

friendlv competitors would be less than human if they did not think he 

had done so. The result is the same: the beginnmg of distrust, a 

suspicion of unfair deahng m an already highly competitive, often 

do.ngerous, occupation. · . A similar case could be mnde for one who would both evaluate and 

engage in operations. Let the time come when two reports, contradictory but of apparent equal truthfulness. appear. Which one would 

the evaluator believe 9 The one gathered by some intelli~ce agency 

other thBJl his own! Or the one gathered by his own¥ Human nature 

would of course mcline him toward the 1att.er, regardless of other 

considerations That such a situation could lead to loss of efficienc..-y 

and downnght faulty intelligence we.~ amply- demonstrated m G-2 

during World War If when the normal channels brought for,th one set 

of conclusions regarding events m the Balkans and a so-called Special 

Branch, which ho.d its own sources of information, which it kept to 

itself, brought forth something qmte different. The Director of Intelhgence at the time, being in elfect a godfather of the Special Branch, 

disrmssed the intelhgence that came throup:h channels other than the 

one that he was sponsormg and permitted himself to endorse a statement to the effect that there \Vas n-0 evidence that the Russians were 

attempting to sov1etize the Balkans. 

The prol>lem above outlmed is obviouslv perplexing but it;s difficulties become compounded when one deals 'with a tvpe of mtelli~nce 

that very few people know anything a.bout, that "is never willingly 

publicized except bv those who do not really understand it, one tha.t 

should be discussed only with the 1?1'8ntest reticence. This is secret intelli~ce. a highly intncate. involved, hazardous. hidden. ruthless 

O[>erahon, competitive to the nth degree How secret it is when properlv conducted may be gathered from the fact that it was not known 

until 50 yen.rs after lus death that Dame) Defoe, the autltor of Robinson 

Crusoe. had been for many years the head of BritJ.Sh secret intelligence. 

Secret mtelhgence IS a subject better omitted from any repoit but 

it happens to be pertmen"t to the present discussion. It mnst be pointed 

out without further delay- that if anv a~ncy that correlates and 

evaluates also pernnts itself to enter the field of secret mtelb~ce, 

a most unhealthy situation is hkelv to ree.ult For m undertakml? 

secret operations while at the same bme correlating the efforts of other 

r.-ecret int.e)ligence-f?S.thering agencies, the advantage of secrecy is of 

course promptly lost. The central agency would have to be t-0ld what 

all the other "secret" agencies were doing in order to correlate their 

work If the central agency were then to engage in operations of its 

own, it would without doubt tend to subject the existing "secret" agencies to compromise or disclosure, tend to nullify their usefuJness, subject their agents to danger· it could not help but emphasize cutthroat 

competition in a field in w'h1ch the· description is more than a figure 

of speech. 

, ... 

NATIONAL WAR 'EFFORT 7 

MoSt experienc8d operators in the unlisu~ field of tiecret ib.telligeit~ seem to ±eel that one result would be mevitn:ble: Jhe central' agenc1 

would m time drive the others from .the fieid, as tlie Gestapo=-ebminated its com~titors in Germany, to the aefuliment of Gerinaq mtelligence: And fhis result....:.Should it happen' to us-could hardly be 

described ns desir.ous, for it would concentrate all our eg~ of this 

particular breed in one basket, where they could be most ea.sily found 

• by those on the still hunt for them; it would ehmmat.e many useful 

nets somethmg no large-scale fisherman would dream of doing; it 

wouid cut our series of special outposts to ohe, something no wide-awake 

commander would dream of perm.1ttmg. - Obviously, there are some who believe that secret intelligence 

oPet_ations can or should be concentrated in a central agency. There 

are tlrrnll._'!ithin the central aJ!fIDCY who, being _properly ambitious, 

recogmze lb.is form of collection as the tremendous weapon that it 

is and therefore would welcome it under their own command. There 

nre otl1ers outside of the central agency who, respectful of the enormous difficulties involved o.nd anxious to av01d the embarrassment (" 

of possible disclosure, would be glad to see such opero.t1011s conducted 

elsewhere than ·in their own organizations Those wl10 believe that 

secret operations may be concentrated in a central agency profess not 

to see any disadvantage in having ,secret mtelhgence operations m 

one small place. They see "effi.cien~" and "economy" m such a con- ~~p.trabon, where others see a red flag waving. They think it quite 

possible to hide such operations in a small organization, where oth~rs 

point to the apparent advantage of dispersal tlirough a number of 

other agencies. They do not seem to believe that unsual mter~st 

would be created in tlie most mterested qup.rters by the concentration 

of unexplainable JJ8rsonnel that would have to take place, the liaison 

required, the Fwing flow through a smgle stream of unusual d.irectivPE1d.!roduction, dissemination, po.;yments, and the like. 

" ciency" and "economy" are important factors m any govern-

:piental operation, but it is questionable whether efficiency ln intelligence is obtained by continually striving to reduce the number of 

collection nets m operation. Iritelli~ce does not come through a 

mngle easv channel: it is better described as a minute distillation of 

great masSes of raw material. If the masses are continually reduced, 

the final product may be adversely affected. For example, sometlDle 

pnor to Mussolim's downfall a report came mto The Pentagon to 

the e1Fect that a plot was being hatched agaill$.t the Italian dictator 

and that at an appropriate moment he would be dismissed and his 

place taken by Badoglio. The report was ignored because there waS" 

so little to go on; had there been more inforrp.ation on the subject, it 

is possible that thIS highly valuable bit of intelligence might have 

been used to American advantage. , 

The question of "economy" has been·carefully avoided thus far 

in this re~ort ~or the reason that the s~s of money that could be 

spent on mtelhgence would under any circumstances be so small, 

so infinitesimal, compared with the cost of battleships that mi~ht 

hav'?. ~.be built lll!necessarily in ~he abse?1ce of adequate i!1telligence, ot divisions 'Orgemzed 11linec~sanly, or a1:r,pl.Qne plants bmlt unnec~­

ta'11J,.th4t .m9n~y hardl:y d.esei:ves ·a ·place :in the discussion. That 

piece of intelligence which saves the Nation from war-or from 
REF ID:A56931 

8 NATIONAL WAR ErFORT 

defeat-is simply priceless; no pains should be spa.red, no penny 

i>inched, to ma.Ke certain that the intelhgeiice we need 'iloes not 

Blip throUJh our fin~rs. 1 • 

The weight of evidence and experience would seem to be with 

those who would J>refer not to see o.n agenc)" charged with coordmabon and evaluation also engage m tlie field of opere.tions--t1ecret 

OJMll'ations above all Certainly this is a field m which overcentrabzat1on would seem to have more disadvantagies than advantages. 

The question as to whether or not o. central agenc1 should at one and ~e,same time be char~ed with correlation or coordmat1on and evaluation, and also engage m operations is the crux of the present situation. 

It involves an mterpretation of the directive now m force and a. recommended course of action is appended hereto. The other recommendations made1 with the exception of the last, which receives specje.J.-conSldero.t1on DMow, are not designed to cause any change inAthe""present 

sti"Ucture but simply to give !ta firmer foundation. 

BEOOHHENDATIONS FOB AN INTELLIGENCE CORPS 

On 'November 11, 1945, a special committee of the War Department 

began a series 9f heanngs on intelhgence matters. A score of officers 

were heard, among them some of the most exJ>erienced mtelhgence 

' officers m the Army. Highly instructive discussions were held. 

One question brought up over o.nd over again was v;hether or not 

there should be an Intelligence Corps-similar to the En~neer Corps-- in the Army. Obviously, there was no agreement on this pomt, which 

was to be expected with so many officers of wide experience and strong 

opinions part1c1patmg. But there was agreement that intelligence 

reqmres individual officers of the highest co.hber, that the Army muSt 

take more determmed steps to provide officers who are specialists in 

intelligence 'v1thout losing the experience provided only by combat, 

that mtellisence should be made o. ca1-eer and selected officers receive 

highly specialized tro.ming, that the service schools should do their pa.rt 

to instruct officers with a. fl.air for lon~-ran~e thmlnng along geopolitical, mihtar)"-political, n.nd ps:rcholog1cal Imes. They agreed that the 

prestige of intelligence must be deliberately built up throughout the 

Army. They a.greed that there must be emphasis on contmmty in 

!ntelhgence. They o.~d on the further pomt that ap:eropriations for mtelh~ce, and therefore personnel, should p.ot be sub3ect to the usual 

cuts suffered by other umts of the Army m peacetime, on the sound 

theol"I that-as stated m the begmmng of this report-it is in peacetime that mtelhgence must be counted on to perform its most valuable 

work. 

A study of the evidence presented at these hearings would lead to 

the conclusion that the formation of o.n IntelH~nce Corps or service, 

so designed that it would produce trained intelligence officers without 

losi.ng thm.r proper integration with the rest of the Anny, might be 

desirable. 

BEOOlDIENDATIONS 

On October 29, 1945, the chairman of the House Committee on Military il&1rs announced that a special committee had been authorized 

' (1 NA'.CIONAL WAR EFFORT 9 

to mvest~o.te the Umted States intelligence system. A study thereupon was initiated. As a result, and after-consultation with Army and 

Navy officers and civ1hans expene11ced m mtelligence and possessed 

of many divergent views, the followmg recommendations are' proposed: 

Recommendation 1: 

That the National Intelb~enceAuthonty, established on January 22, 

1946',-by Pres1dentm.1 directive, be authoriZed b)" act of Congress. 

(This is designed to give the new authonty a firmer base.) 

Reco'ITl/m6ri.rJ,atio.,,, B: 

That the National Intelligence Authority shall consist of the Sec.retanes of State, War, and the~ avy, or deputies for mtelligence. 

(!'he Secretaries~ obviously too busy to give thIS highly important 

subJe.(l.t the attention it deserves.) 

Rec~fl.(],at;ion 8: 

That the Central Intelligence. Group receive its .appropriations 

direct from the Congress. . "(At _present the Group receives its appropriations as grants from the 

State Department, War Departmeitt, and the Navy Department, an 

unwieldly and sometimes awkward procedure.) , 

Recommmdatio'll. 4: 

That the Centro.I lntelligimce Group have complete control over ,,-.. its own personnel. 

(At present the Group receives drafts from the Departments of 

State, War, and Navy.) 

Recommendation 6: 

That the Director of the Central Intelligence Group be a. mvihan 

appomted for a ~reliminary term of 2 years and a permanent term ~ of 10 yea.rs, at a s8.lacy of at least $12,000 a year. 

(A c1viban would be less subject to the control or criticism of any 

1nihtary estu.bhshment, less hkely to ho.ve am.b1t1ons in another direc- - _...-...... tion, would be more in keepms: with American tradition, would be 

more symbolre of the pohtico-IDlbtary nature of the problem posed by 

mtelhgence m peacetime; furthermore, there is nothing to keep a 

quah.fi.ed Army or Navy officer from acceptmg the post in civilian 

' clothes, and tnere is every desire, by settmg the tenure of office at 10 

years and makmg the salary substantial, to make the post attractive ~ one,who has learned intelligence thoroughl;r m the Army., Navy, or Fo~gn Service of the State Department. Continuity of service is 

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reco~zed as very impoitant.) , 

RecO'llllm6n.datio'll. 6: 

That ilie Director of the Central Intelligence Group be appointed 

by the P~ident by and with the consent of the Senate. 

Recommtmd,atim 7: 

That the Director of Central Intelligence shall ( 1) accomplish the 

correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national 

security, and the appro,Priate dissemmation witlun the Government 

of the resulting strategic and national pohcy intelligence; and in so 

doing making full use of the staff and facilities of the mtelligence 

' agencies already elllStlng m the various Government departments; 

• 
REF ID:A56931 

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• 

10 NATIONAL WAR EFFORT 

{2) plan for the coordination of such of the activities: of the intelli- • 

gence agencies of the various Government departments a.s relate to the 

national security and recommend to the National Intelli~ce Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives is 

will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national mtelligence mission; ( 8) perform, for the benefit of said intelligehce 

aJencies, "Such services of cominon concern relo.ted directly to coordination, correlation;·evaluation, and dissemination as the National Intelligence Authority shall determine can be more efficiently accomplished. Cen.tra.lly; ( 4) perform such other similar functions and 

autie3 related to mtelhgence affecting the national security as the 

Congress and the National Intelligence Authonty may from time to ' 

time direct. It is specifically understood that the Director of Centro.I 

Intelhgence shall not undertake operations for the collection of in- telhg~ce. 

(This paragraph is intended to enable the Central Intelligence 

Group to concentro.te on the analysis and evaluation of high-level 

intelligence for the President and others who have to determine 

natlonOJ. policv. One should not ren~ove any intelligence operation 

from the agenCies where day-to-day policies and deciBlons h.o:ve to be 

made i the collection and basis analysis in each field of intelligence 

shoula. be assigned to the agency having primary responsibility in 

that field.) 

RecommendatiO'll. 8: 

That pnragraphs 2, 4, 5t6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the Presic!ent1al directive 

of J am10.ry 22, 1946, relating to the establishment of a N atione.l Intelligence A.uthonty be enacted mto law. with such rev1Sions m wording 

as may seem necessary. 

(Tlie President's directive was carefully prepared and had at the 

time of its publication, the support of the interested agencies.) · 

Recomme'fl.datiO'll. 9: 

- Tho.t the Arm.r be requested syn1fatheticallx to exam.me further' 1 

the 'luestJon of the establishment of an Intelligence Corps for the 

trainmg, development, and assignment of especially qualified officers. 

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