p. / I 

I I 

I I 

_., 

• CRYPTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT FOR EITHER . SINGLE-ORIGINATOR OR MULTI-OR_IGINATOR COMMUNICATION 

l. a. Progress in the cryptologic field-during the.past 

few yea-,:s has .led to a basic change in cryptologic philosophy, 

a change Which has already oeen recognized by and is of im.,,. 

portant interest to the ASA. 

b. The ti~ust which 'has heretofore been placed in the 

ordinary types of crypto-systems, the solution of which depends 

upon, or is directly or indirectly correlated with, the number 

of tests that have to be made to exhaust a multiplicity of , / 

hypotheses based upon keying possibilities, is daily decreasing. 

The beginning of this decreasing confidence i~ the degree of 

cryptographic security potentially offered by a vast number of 

permutations and combinations available of keying possibilities 

can be traced back to the advent of the application of ~abu~ 

lating machinery to the solution of cryptanalytic problems. _ Later, when specially designed cryptanalytic machines employing electrical relays came to be constructed and applied, successfully to these problems, a real blow was struck at our former 

concepts of cryptographi·c security. And, now, the assurance 

that electronic cryptanalytic machinery can be a·pplied to 

l?Peed up the solution 9f complex cryptographic systems is tending· slowly to undermine what faith was left in the systems or 

crypto-mechanisms currently considered as being the best there 

are, those using rotors with complicated stepping controls .. , ·· 

. c. - To sum this up, it can .be said that, save for orie 

exception, cryptologic theory and practice during the past 

'quar,ter of a c~ntury serves only to corroborat.E? the theoretical 

validity of ·the century-old dictum first enunciated by Edgar 

Allan Poe: "Yet it may be r·oundly asserted that ht1.lllan ingenuity 

cannot concoct a cipher which hμman ingenuity cannot solve. 11 

2. The foreg9ing summatJon is, as noted, theoretical and 

pessimistic in outlook. From a practical viewpoint, it can be 

stated that, so far as concerns the currently-employed P,igh- e~helon cryptogl'.,'.aphic systems of the U.S. Army, there is 

every reason to believe that, despite the recent advances in 

cryptanalytic techniques and machinery, these systems are still 

quite sequre. .But for how many more years this may continue 

to be true is a matter of serious concern. ·The lead which our 

cryptographic· techniques presently have over our cryptanalytic 

techniques is not sufficiently great to leave no room.at ail 

'for speculation or apprehension as to the situation in Which 

we might· ·find ourselves, say 15 or 20 years from now, when 

the new.ci'yptographic machines under development will _have 

f~O~cl~~~Hied by NSN~S J ·r=-N~~e-~o ;NoT.~l~~t'iOYTeturnToJi~~-'. - . ~~.· ~-~. ·. -· · . f~ p i: · and Records f;= · ,c n cal library when no'longer 02eded 

Deputy Associate Director .vr o ,cyfi))ib' __ i,-"J::~ ·;: ·,; {' (" ~ /1 , 7.ri 7~ :uco·. . ".:. ......... ~' 

On 0~)}\ by,Q!!\lfljJ...,,Lr~ .,_;d.J \b!fwr~ u "·~· . /( .· ffe··tf"_opyNo. · .,9 - ·,·D"o·wo -c;r::;::r- ·,.,v OR \>/.l!'il'filt.~"lilf: .. ~ l- ./. 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-16-2014 
been completed. It is hardly necessary to note that the Research 

Laboratories Division is endeavoring to anticipate what the 

future may hold in store and is bending all its efforts to produce improved crypto-equipment that will be secure against a 

greatly advanced cryptanalytic art. Basically, these efforts 

are in the direction of increased sophistication and complexity 

in the present types of equipment, on the theory that this 

will always keep our cryptography in the lead of our cryptanalysis. 

But what if it should happen that because of unforeseen developments, in electronics and related fields, progress in cryptanalytic techniques and machinery has actually been greater than 

that in cryptographic techniques and machinery? National 

security demands that we take all measures necessary to guard 

against such a contingency. 

3. The sole exception alluded to in Par. le above, in connection ~ith Poe's dictum, appears to be involved in the case 

of ·what may be called a "holocryptic" system, that is; one 

which is theoreti6ally absolutely unsolvable b~cause a message 

in it can be read only by actual physical p6ss~ssion of .the 

key. In a truly holocryptic system, if the key consists .of a 

perfectly random, unpredictable sequence of all the elements · (letters or characters) of the language, the sequence being as 

long as the enciphered text itself· and being a primary sequence 

(that is, one not derived from the interaction of a limited 

number of basic components), the cryptogram appears to be unsolvable in the cryptanalytic sense. It appears to be impossible to present or to develop any pract;tcal technique fol the 

solution of a truly holocryptic system as defined herein. It 

is to be noted that in the thr~e foregoing sentences the phrase 

"appears to be 11 is used. It is empl'oyed, advisedly, for it 

would be somewhat dangerous to insist upon a categorical statement in the absence· of experimentation to demonstrate the 

positive validity of the statements made. -rt is indeed possible 

_to conceiv~· a theoretical general solution for certain of the 

so-called holocryptic systems, but no further remarks will be 

made in this paper on that phase of the subject, except to indicate the necessity for further study.· 

4. a. It is to be noted that there are three conditions 

which a cryptographic system must fulfill before it can be terme~ a truly holocryptic system: (1) the key must consist of 

all the characters found in the plain. text of the language 

involved; (2) the keying characters must form a perfectly, or 

at least an entirely unpredictable, random sequence, so that it 

1Even were telepathy established as a. practical reality, the 

reading of a cryptogram by this means would_,not constitute a 

cryptanalytic solution. 

2··~ 
~41272jsl. --:------ .... must be a'primary sequence, not a secondary one derived frpm 

the interacti9n of a limited nuniber of basic elements; and (3) 

the keying sequence must be used onc_e and orily once. In our 

best rotor-type cipher machines.the first of these conditions 

is fulrilled; the thir~ is fulfilled to a degree which, for 

all practical purposes,, is quite ,satisfactory; but as regards 

the second condition; it is obviou~ that although the keying 

characters in SIGABA, for example, form an unpredictable' 

sequence, for all practical purposes in the present state of 

the cryptanalytic art, it is not a primary sequence and therefore the SIGABA or any similar machine presently falls short 

of competing with the truly holocryptic system in security. 

As time goes on, it is poss1ble that the competition will not 

lessen in favor of SIGABA or its successors. '11his point is 

worth so~e elaboration. .. b. It may·be stated,.in view of what is now practicable and of what may become practicable in the near future, 

that, at least theoretically, whatsoever be the nature or 

cons'truction of a crypto-mechanism, if it embodies within it. 

all the crypto-elements of the system, messages prepa~ed by · it can and-will ultimately be solved. Only when the cryptomechanism is controlled by some external keying means does it 

present truly holocryptic features--and then only if that 

external keying means is properly designed and employed_. 

,Even if an internally-controlled-crypto-mechanism is employed 

·in a manner such that the internally-produced.keying sequence 

is employed only once, as in SIGHUAD for example, the system 

is still theoretically solvable because that keying sequence 

is produced by th~ interaction, of a limited number of primary 

keying elem~nts, that number being very small in comparison 

with the length of the secondary or resulta;nt keys. Therefore 

it cannot in the present state of the art be considered as . falling in the class of holocryptic systems and must be considered to be theoretically solvable. How soon i~ may becqme practically solvable is a questio!l that will be answerable 

only with the passage of a few more years. 9 

5. From a practical viewpoint, it may be assumed that 

messages in a holocryptic system will never be solvable, no 

matter what the state of the cryptanalytic art may be. It 

would therefore be wise to extend the usage of such systems. 

Unfortlina tely, the last two condi ti.ons ·which must be fulfilled 

in a truly holocrypt·ic system impose practical limitations on 

the extensive employment of such systems in military cryptocommunication. The large volume of communication required . and the large number of commands which must intercommunicate 

make it. wholly impracticable_ to prepare and to distribute 

7. . 

·:; 

/ 
the multitude of lengthy primary sequences that would be 

pequired. Moreover, the keying s~quences can only be used 

once. If used more than once; even only two times in most 

cases, such a system is quite insecure. 

6. · It is usual to refer to a system using a pad of sheets 

of paper on which keying characters appear as a "one-time pad 

system", and systems using perforated tapes, such as the SIGTOT, 

as a "one-time· tape system". For the system using the SIGABA 

or similar equipment there is no analogous designation based 

upon the number of times a key is used, though supposedly such 

a system could be referred to as a "many-time system"--a 

designation technically too loose and inaccurate for the purposes of this paper. The· real essence· of the matter is that, 

in the case of a one-time pad or one-time tape system, practical, 

almost...:absolutely-sure intercommunication is assured only when . there are but two copies of a pad or tape, one held by the 

originator of a message, the other by the addressee; and furthermore, an originator must not use as the keying sequence for 

any of his outgoing messages a sequence intended to decipher 

any of his incoming messages. So far as concerns the ability 

to originate messages that will' be absolutely secure, therefore, 

a true one-time.system must be limited in its distribution to 

one originator; for this reason such a system will hereinafter 

be referred to as a "one-originator system". A system such as 

the one employing SIGABA, for example, will be referred to as 

a "multi-originator system",' because many holders of ~he equipment can originate secure messages and thus intercommunication 

among ~any holders can be pr'ovided. 

7. a. The question arises: would it be possible, practical, 

and advantageous to have crypto-equipment which will, in the 

same basic machine, provide fqr truly holocryptic, one-originator 

systems as well as for.high-security, multi-originator systems? 

In other' words, what about.a single machine.which for the · greatest part would be .used for multi-originator communication, 

but whfch could, when special circumstances dictated, serve 

also for single-originator communication? · 

b. The possibility that such a machine can be devised 

has already been demonstrated in at least two cases. The first 

is to be noted in.the case of the obsolete Converter M~l34A, 

wherein the angular displacements of _the rO-tors of a 5-rotor 

crypto-maze were controlled by perforated tapes. Multi- . originator communication was provided for by issuing the tapes 

in sets of 48 and using them according to the variations indicated in a key list. To employ such a machine by-the use of 

individual tapes according to the single-originator system is 

obviously possible, though it was actually not done when 

4 
Conver~er M-134A was in current usage.·. The s_econd example ·is 

to be noted in the case of SIGSALY, .wherein holocryptic, 

single-originator communication was proyided for by the use 

of SIGRUVE records and high-security, multi-originator communicatfon was provided for by the so-called Busch machine. 

The latter was hardly ever used, however, for various reasons, 

mostly because of mechanical or electrical difficulties, not 

for secur.i ty reasons. 

c. There seems to be l~ttle. question of the practicability of the idea of a single machine capable of serving 

both functions. "If the basic equipment is designed to incorporate the idea~ and is in·itself practicable, there should 

be no problem about providing for the dual function by means 

of suitaple a~apters or cooperating components. For example, 

in the case of SIGABA, it. is perhaps possible to provide a 

"basket" or crypto-component in which the control and index 

-rotors are replaced by a tape transmitter through whi~h could 

.be passed a 1-time,tape. With the normal component (present 

SIGIVI), the availability of SIGABA for multi-originator communication would remain intact; yet, when occasion demanded 

the assurance of absolute·security, this could also be furnished 

by the special component.replacing the SIGIVI. 

d. As to the advantages and disadvantages of the proposal, there is no doubt that.it would complicate matters to 

a certain extent, but the advantage of having a single machine 

capable of performing the.dual function and of affording not 

onl·y highly secure multi-originator communications but also 

nearly-absolutely-secure single-originator communication is 

obvious. Even now there would be a practical usa~e for such a 

machine. Recent cases wherein question has been raised with 1 regard to the security of specific .messages demonstlrate the 

point. "Eyes Only" messages also demand special treatment. 

But of' greater significance is the importance of having such 

a machine with -vrhich to face the future. For, should ·it turn 

out that 15 or 20 years from no~r the actual progress in cryptanalytic techniques and machinery approximates or surpasses the · expected progress, we should not be caught unprepared. Our 

security equipment could still meet the·needs of security to a 

better degree than would be the case if we proceed-on the 

assumption that our cryptography can always be advanced, by 

increasing sophistication and complexity of construction, .to 

be sufficiently in the leadof our cryptanalysis to permit our 

confidence in the security of our equipment to remain undisturbed. In short, the proposal here made is in the nature of 

an 'insurance policy against unforeseen contingencies--we ought 

not to allow ourselves .to be caught in an unfavo1'able. communication security position becaus·e of wholly unexpected developments or much more rapid improvement in our signal intelligence position. · · 

5 
" .. ~lT:A41272i6 .... 8. It has been suggested that as an alternative to the dev~lopment of adapter-type components in equipment designed 

to be capable of performi_ng the dual function outlined herein, 

it would be possible to issue special key-lists and use a 

specific keying arrangement once and only once; this being 

nearly equivalent to th~ truly holocryptic single-originator 

system under discussion. There is no doubt that such a scheme 

would give added security, ·but it does not me.et gui te· squarely 

the issue presented her~in. The point has been touched upon 

in Par .. 4b and the argument therein presented is equally 

applicable kere: · · 

, 9. If the principle or proposal advanced herein has 

merit, it could be adopted as a general policy to incorporate 

it wherever possible and practicable. 

10. It is recommended that: 

a. The propqsal suggested herein, viz., that future 

development of security equipment be so directed as to .fncorporate features or components which will alternatively· 

.permit of' s.ingle-or•iginato11 and of multi-originato11 comrminications by the same basic machine-, be studied to ascertain 

its merits. 

b. If the proposal is found to possess advantages 

important enough to outweigh its disadvantages, :i, t be. considered 

for adoption as a general policy. . . 

c. Cons.ideration be given to the prop9sa;l in connection with the current ·revision of SIGIRA. . . 

d. Some research and study be given to .the question 

of holocryptic systems to ascertain what might be accomplished 

by the use of' new machinery now only dimly conceived but 

perhaps possible of being constructed.· · 

e .· . Further research and study be devoted to a careful 

examination of the nature of our.present mechanisms for the 

generation of our 1-time keys and of the nature of the cipher 

alphabets employed in connection therewith for the encipherment 

of classified communications. · 

. (UJ' ' ~~ .. WI~RIEDMA~ 

6 

Chief, Communications Research 

2 May 1947 
2. 

. . . ' . . . . . . . /f/-J-?"'{;y/..:{ 

~ INTER<m!l~ -r@U~272~ · 

AlllfD I OR CARRIER SHEET HQ AS""'lb.Ulll\~ . 

MUST REMAIN WITH ATIACHED PAPERS 

NUMBER EACH MEMO OR REPLY IN LEFT BORDER, PLACE NAME, RANK AND 

TELEPHONE NUMBER BOTTOM OF EACH ACTION. DRAW LINE UNDER EACH ACTION 

ENTER FILE CLASSIFICATION ADJ UT ANT ----

. TO. FROM DATE 'SUBJECT Cryptographic Equipment for Either Single-

.2 May ~ 7 AS-20 Originator or Multi-Originator· Communication· .AS-14 

1 

with 

The ttached .paper is submitted at this time in connection 

he cur ent re lsion of SIGIRA. 

2 The ubstance of the paper .is to recommend that serious 

c9nsi teratio1· be·given to an extension of the potential.usage of 

.1-tim s·yste s by _providing. adapters for use in connection with J ~~) c rrent rypto- echanisms now generally operating only as 

';rnult·'ple-co ll11Unication" equipment or (b) similar mechanisms now 

in th resea ·ch and. evelopment phase. -

· 1 Inc 

q;x~a.G-~~ WILLI.AM F. FRIEDMA'N . . . 

Pap r on Cryptogra hie Equ·p~ f6r Either 

Single-Ori inator r 

Mul i- Orii;;inator omm. 

Ohief, Communications Research 

Ext 215 

AS-14 AS-23 21 Jul 4 

2 With 

inclos 

a. 

the ore .ica.lly 

of h'ol cryptic 

well a produc 

Major Moak 462 

. ) . 

1. The inclosed paper on Cryptographic Equipment 

for Either Single-Originato·r or Mul ti-o'riginat.or Communication has been studied l?Y Operatio:r;i:s Di vision, · 

Research Laboratories Division, and Security Division. 

to the recol,llillendations contained in paragraph 10 of the 

conunents are made: 

n~zed that holocryptic systems provide the only 

systems. At·the present time~ however, the employment. 

s is accompanied by a number of serious operational as 

istril;mtion problems. · Further; in the case of low 

echelo 

has no 

agreed 

crypto 

been e 

that, w 

echanis • a requirement for the provision of infinite· security · 

tabHshe .,,In the case of high echelon cryptomechanisms, it is 

enever p acticable, holocryptic principle's should be embodied in· 

multi- rigi~at 

b • . . , 

mili ta ~ requi 

system 1.~here equired. 

at:.··the· -pres~t- §te.i..J:J.. of 

. : Deel sifiea by SA/r:5'5 

ent work on SIGIRA, account is being, taken of a basic 

a. one~time mecpanism to ~ulf ill the need for holocryptic 

~In. :this conn~ctiori, the questi_on arises a$ to whe"t;her, 

devel<;>pment, it might be better to achieve speed a:i;id 

Oepu Associate Director fo Policy and 

~D~~=}~:;;;1-9; by l?ffl I PAGE NO, __ _ 

'.!6 Nov 45 36900 LIFT HERE USE OTHER .S.IDE 
•-'T~O----F-R.O_M ___ D_A_TE ___ S_U_BJ_E_CT---"-'\-';,.:-=----.. -_,·'?~;·~:~·~l-z72Z----------~ . ~ /", ~i:fbidlEquipment for Either SingleAS-23 Orj gi natar or Multi -Ori gi net or Communj ca ti op 

ligh't'.-· e~ght, i evi:ce,. issu:i.ng. it to all hq;l,dE}rs _for: emergency ·u~e, 

rath·er ·than to burden IJi chine13 :·qe~ign~gi pr~-qiar;ily-·for niul':t1,~o;r:::i,gi~ator ll;Se.,. : , 

Se~tle .en~.~~ '~i~ '.~u~~ .. iqn;)P}iJ~~ ... Q~Vi9~f!!Y~·~w~i t a' ·~9r~. a~~nc_~<!. stage ;;ri·_ ti.le" 

develo ment; of cryptogr phic .d.eV:ic_~s .. noVJ μx;i.d~r. .. ccin,sid~raticin.'.~·.'·· .... ·" ., . ,.,, •• •' _...... ' j • •••••• 1·:- ·.-....·::_.l -. ·-: : .... "'· 

~pr~<l 

s~i,idy..· 

.. c. 1 -.+ ptov~m~n s iJ;;l the methods of '.g;ene:rati~g. perfl'ctly random, 

ci.ta~J,:e"' ·~y"for 'u e -in _c.o~~c~iQr+ .w~th,.,#o_lo~rypt~c_s:ys"~em~' are .. nm'(under 

y Secuz:_t~._Pi~s·9~·-· · >·-. ·"· » _,- _-- : .;· r - , · 

..... r' •. ......:.·: 

• ·: :" .. .. . • .. .. . ' : : .. : ·. -, ·-·. . . • . -. . ,.. -.. . _._ • • . J . : : . : "~ , ... G "7 ... 

. . . : / ~. ·~l'.l; :vi .Yj.~_,o_f -~~e.1 ~~91.~·: .r.~~}'.ar9.~.:~~ i;l).e ~ey~~o~~e~~ -o,~~"a:p_;c.mt~~/~P~ic dev1c~ 13Iiould' include:. ons1derat1·on of.· hoJ,ocrypt10 principles 1n··the··provis1on :''. '(.' , ·( -r -;'".,. ..,.; r:;: '·i_:;) ..... -.~~----·.·r· --- ......... ·· · ·· ·· .... .,.. ... -.-... -. ~ .. ,. -·r. ··· . .r-.• -- --- . 

of dua . :sing;l.e originat r ~ multi-originator equipment;: '·In' this 'conriecti-on it 

is des ·red. th.a the· Chi f;· '¢9~iμnmicS:tions. Res~ariih<;seotion ·colitiritie.:to ·:Pu.r·sue .. 

this m tter an insU:re:, -through c'oordination:with-:tl:ie''.vaf.iou~-,op~ratini divisions, that Co tinuing onsicieration is gi:ren the recommendations contained in 

the."in losed p_ per)·· 

1 Incl 

n/c 

-~ .. \ . . - . 

• 

. · .. 

,J :":~·:·~'.T<'·:: >-~:_,~a.·-. • . . . -- .~/2~C ,._ .. -. - . . PAUL E~· NEFF', 

Lt;· co1oiie1· :·:·gnil ·:corps· 

. ' 

-Acting .. Depu Qhi.ef 

Army Seoufi ty.. Agency . _ .... 

Ext 498 
2o 

/ -.! • 

AS·l4 . AS-23 21. Jul 47 : . Ma-jor Moak/ 462 

. . L .· 'l'he ·i~olosed paper. on Cryptographic Equipment 

for Ei thar· Single-Originator or Mul'ti~Originator Com-_ 

munfoation has ~been studied by Operations ~i vision; 

Ras~arch,- Labor~tories Division._ and .'.secur.ity. Division. : ·. . • ..• . ' l t l . . ' , •• 

2o. With reference ·.to t,ne -reoommenda.tlons. coittained iri paragraph 10 of: the 

inolosure~ :the· 'following -comments are made,: : · . ' . .. . ' . :· -

. ,· 

a. ·rt is recognized: that holocryptio .syst~ms provide the.only 

theoretically unsolvable systems. At the·pr~sent.time~ .hoviaver._ the employment· 

of holoceyptio pr,inoip~es-_ is accomp-an~ed ·by ~- nurilb~r of sariotis~ operational as· 

well as produc:*;~on arid. disi;ribution ·problems.. F~rth;er, in the. oase of' low . 

echelon prypto~echanis~ a requ_iremen.t for t}le :'pr9vi.sion _of" infinite security ' 

. has ~ot been ~stablished.,:._ I~ the cas.e. of high e.oh~ion, cryptom:eohanisms, it '-is 

~greed that, wh~never"practica.ble. :·holoc.rypt~c pr_inoiplt:)s sh~μ,ld be emoodied in 

multi-originator mechanisms.' . .. ' . 

b. In. the presel].t work on"~J:GI.&.· .aocoUn.t is-b~ing taken of' a basic 

'mili ta.ry requirem~nt for ·a one'-tiine-,mechanj.sm to fulfil.). .·the neeq for holbcryptic 

sy~tems where required. ' In this ·connection;. th'e questi.on arises as .to ~hether • 

. at tho present stage of: develo~.en:.~,11,A:;t~dllig"tr'lt)·Q.e bett~r to. achi~ve speed and 

\'f~f;'~ A ~'!cn:.~)~.l.A VtZ'~!ll~A 

1+z·io";{tY:::S.LE:~e: . 

~a:·--. 

-~~ET 
. · . ~ ~);,~~il":r · 

SECR~E" .-'r~\"~4121221: ' '. ' I • 

Cryptographic Equipment for Either SingleAS ... 14 AS.-23 21' Jul 47 Originator or :Multi-Originator Communication • . '-1;,. 1' 

light weight in such a deviQe11 issuing it t.o all- holders· for emergency _use,; 

rather ~ha.n to burd.en ~chines, des_ig;ied p~bia.rily for multi-origin~tor use. . 

·settlement of this -question muat obviously :await a more· advanoed stage in the 

. development or cryptographic' deVices now· ~der oonsidt?ra.tion. · , · o 

c. ImproveI!lents in the methods of generating.perfectly random11 

unp~edictaple key for use in connection with holooryptic systems are-~0'!1 under 

study by Security Di vision~ · I . I 

· 3. In view of the apove 11 research· in the d~velopment of all .~ryptcigraphio 

devices should incl~d!' oonside;rat~on of h~~ocryptio principles in _the' provision 

of dual Single-originator - multi-ori·ginator equipment. In .this connection it ' 

is de.sired that the Chief. C'91.nmuilications. Research Section: ·continue to pursue 

th,i'8 1matter'and insure,. through·coordination·with the var'io~s· operating.divisiQns •. that oontinuing cons~dera~ion ia gfwn the .. recommendations· contained in 

the inolosed paper. 

1- Incl 

.n/Q . 

' 

PAULE. NEFF 

Lt. Colonel •. Sig~l Corps 

Acting' 'Deputy Chief 

A?'tnY' Security Agency 

Bxt 498 . 

. \fH!AL!t 2E.cn1£U .. ;., "11:,:~MCA 

. \-{E';/!:i;'.)" ';i'!::J.LF~e 
., 

. \ . ~ . 

. ··. i 
. '~~:·:-·-i;;, •. t, 

@ , REE.. ID:A4127221· ~'!!;eJtt::! CONFIDEN'II.AL rtJ.';S·_;_·1:UGT.@ 

--- Td DATE '/...I ~ 'f y I?ROM 

--'-

Commanding Officer --- -....,.-----~---;-..;...~ Assistant Co1mnandant · · 

---Dir of C?I"ili~ Research-----;;;"~·=--.·.-----

--- --- Control 0 ---Administr-a~t~i-v-e-cO,,-------------'------

-- Adjutant 

Int ell i gen ------,=-------------------- c e 0 . Frovos t Mars ha-=1--------.:..--

2nd Sig Se,rv Bn , 

------------- Chief, Pers & TrnG Div 

==== Chief, Pers Er ------,---

Chief, Trng Bi· 

--------------- Chief, Oper Serv Div ---- Chief, Communications ---=------- Br 

·Chief, Laboratory Br ---- . Chief) Machine l3r ------- ---- --=------....,...---- Property & Supply 0 ,.., / 

Purchasin1; & Contracting. 9-. ..... _;,,.---

Fiscal & Certifying 0 .. ' 

OIC, Mail Section ~ ----...,..-:-------- '• .~~- ,. :··. ! ... .-:· . 't·· ..... . • .. ·".. ., .. ,f , .... , 

. C'hief', Securi t~r Div· ,, ;";; ';" 1

· 

--:--- ChiE;f, )P!;·otective SE'.c· Br 

. /Chfof, yryptographic Br ---. -

~/ >. :::::J2'.'.S' iCl'r:i;e:f,:; f)e.ye lop:mep.;t' ..!~r. . , . ' .:' ,, .. · . t .. _ . i . ' ..,.., --.'-\ ----

· i \ Chief, Intelligence Div' ------ . Chiflf, 12.nl!,uage. Br · __ ....,,..,,....... ,.r;; ~->Ti-;;,.: --.n~, .. I J.. , .• T-' .... C)iief, hli C17puamuyt1c ... r --- Chi e T~ Gen Cryptanalytic Br ----- --- Chief, T/A o.nd Cantrel Br1 ----

Chief, I & L Br ---~---------

•As discussed ----w · As requested --------------------,-

Cor:iments and_r_e_t_u-rn 

---- --,..-"---------- Information and file ---- ---------- Info rm a ti on and forwarding ----- ~------- Information and return ----

----~,COmr.lenda ti oi1 _____________ _ 

VSee note on reverse -----Signature if approved --=------~-

----Your actipn ·----~----,..-

SIS-SC~Fo1m rto. ~6 (Rev) 

.23 ·August 1 944 
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REF . , . A4127221 ID. 

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RE·F ID: A412 7221 

Date et_( ~·ez&/f{(/" 

From~ L;;rlcs ;;Jr . Col Corderman ______ ._ 

Colo Collins · --..------

Col 
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. -~t ·" ··_: :_· ~~ * .. ' •• • I' ,• - •' •' • • . ., • ~ ,' . -::• • •.. ~ • • ., 

·.:.- :. · current Developmeii:"ts·~:j_n'. -:i:rit·e~cept·· :Equipment . 

·.:· •. M,•' 

. . . Lt·. : ..:c~·oi~ ;Rose~- ~~iitiq~ea>a -~~~lee ·~rhich :is bei~g·, constr:.ic-. · · · .. ·· .ted-':.for· fu.ar.king :"t;;he Baudot 'start. ,p.tilse p·osi tion on. u:hdulator · '. . _tapes. <This ·dev:tce, ·1t ._suc·c·e'ssful:/ wiil grea t-ly. fci:cili ta:te · . . , the reading of :_ta,_pe re9ordE?-,·of 5: ,unit cod,e transmissi_ons. At·· ·. :· .. ·.GCCS. this mark+ng i~L:done by.:hanμ-... ·, · · ·, • ~ ' •· .' ,' ,. :· . •. • I• ,' .. • ••. . . ' • . ' ' : ~ 

··. Mr.- ,Morris s·tated 'tha·t ·th~ :time delay rec.order _is under- . '.going. test: a~ V;i11t Hill."· :r;ri,. a current security monitor-i·ng . . .,.- : missfori_-.1n· _wh:tc:h,mul:ti;ton~· te.le.type trahsinissiqn ·was _trans-. 

mi tted O'n .·9ne ~n1e ba,nd. and/'s.peech::on ·~h~ other, the delay d~vJce made. possi:b1~ ·.an arr~nge~~nt by .which .. :al.1·: tele_ph9rie· comin:uni:cation .w'as recorded·vrithout:the long ,intervals. which·_ 

'_actually ·o'ccur bet1~~~h ·:ti:-ari?mis~:i,"pn~ arid w:i, thout loss of ap.y . par.t of 't_he- :corfimu.nicat':ion. _. -It.,.was sugge'ste·d ~that_-·this. method -· .. i.s .. of. signiffqance- 'ih: conn~~tiorl_ -w.:tth telephone monitoring of -';. ... . . any .sort.-: Mr. Frie:dman p;q:l,.nt out:\:that ~this WE3,~. a 'm$ans· '·of. : . · ·a9complishing. wha;t Capt'. Rh.oads, had suggest'ed- in. 1935-:"· that ·a· 

·message be copied _by autom¢.tic .Jn.ean:~ only whe_re· such ari _iderit:i- · fying word as ETAT appears-. ;in the_::transmi~~ion,;· thus_ say.ihg. , · monitoring tinie. Capt.· Wenger. re:Por.ted that the P /L ''·equipment· : 

·w:111 bE?. . set up" tenipor.arily":·a.t ~k_9-gs I. vntil:. :;iomething further · -.. develop~. on sc:i;>ambl~d'~-~-~peech ,transmissio:μ~ ··Mr., Morris said .. 

·nf .. or}e\'-of : thE?~~ iat te:r_;_<'f .e.-.: ~~:Pan.~:.~.~~--e~ig.in·, ,hB:d' t)eeri' · o~·se!_'.v_ed or a.year~ · - / 

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. EXTRAOT:-FROM FIFTH.-DETXNG OF·-·Arua;;.NAVY ·oRYPTANALYTIC RESEARCH:'-:-

, ... ·.:._ . • • - ::- AND ·D~~C~)PBmNT QODJ:TTEE . 15· NQ~-i;R +944: . .-::·- ·; _ >: •' - • .... • • ... • ~- .. • ··:· ~ ' •· ··.... • "... • •. - •• ": ._~ ' •: • .. ~· •• • ' ' • • ,.- .. l. --~- •• • . 

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Chirr'9nt- -Developments in Int'ercept EgUipnient · . : _ · : · -.. · - ·. ' .,.. " - . . .• . . - "..:• . . ~ . ·• ·.-·'. '.,.. .s. :::· . . .. 

-:- _ Ltq,--Oolo-- ~osen ·mant~_one_d _ra;·~~vice --ifhich.1s-b~~g constructad ·toXo· fu.l.rking the Baudot· :start. pulse position on UD.dulator - ·tapeao ~-;.-This deviee 9 ·if'. s~ccess.t'11:~- wiil gr_eatly _facilitate 

; th~.·read1ng :_of,tape reco~d.s"o_t ·s·un1t cod~ tr.ansmissio~s-o - A-t 

· .. • , GOCS.:this marking'-'is·- done'.'.·by,_,~-~do'; . -... · ::--'. · :,_- : .. - -.. :. :- . ... . ·.... . . . -'. . ~ -·· . ' . . 

,_ - -·-, -~~ -- Bl.lorr.is stat~c{ t~-t ·the ti~~, -delay ·;~~~rder fs. under~- -

. .-: . - going test .~t;-Vi-nt'_Hi_ll.'!. ·:_-;~:-_:a ;~uzt~e~t _seo~_:i.:ty monitoring- . · mission' in .. vhi_ch'mUltitone --~eletype .transmis's-ion·)ras trans- ... :mitted on one side ·ban.d,-_~d.)1p~e~h .. on the otherJ) the delay dsv,ice -made pos~Jble ,an arra.ngemcant by ·which ·all talephone - -communication. vas: recorded.-witho.ut· the ·long intervals ·'.which _ '". -. _. li.C~ually. occur· between· txian~~ssi'ons and wfthout ~ l_OSS of any _ pa.rt. of: th' comm'Unica.tion·~ ·-· 'It was. suggested~· th.at this··method . i!ii of. signiticei.xioe 1n·--co_nne~.tion,with .. telephone monitoring -of _ any sor.to 001"~ Prie-Clman point: out _t~t· this- ·¥as·_~ means of_ . · -··· e.ccomplishing _wb.$t papt .. }ihoads-·had ·sugges-ted,_1.n: 1935&"----~~t ~ - -,, . -. message be. c9pie~ by aut~matic .. mea.ns only :w:here .such ¥tri -identt- . -- - f'yillg vord a:a, ETAr;r.-appe!!Lz-s· 1.D. -th~ --transmission.»- thus· saving:.,-· -- _ · - . . monitoring._ time o .- . Capt o Wenger -:reported t~ t the_ P /L equipment 

·_ <. vill •-be, set. up -~empQrarily·.a:t 'Ska.gs I~· ~t.il.'sc>ln~thing furthet' -- .. _--_ d0velops ·on" 1:1o~a~pl~~~ -.8.l?.~~-~p._.:tr.'?>~~~ssiop.o .- .~.o. Morris_ saici - _. _ .. none of -'the. latter».~.1~-eo '"Japa.ne-~«3 :orig~ :",bad~be~n--observed - --.for a.:yea~~:~ - .-.:.·~ .: . - -·--:->·.~·< .,'·,. -\-.·· «::'.._._-.· __ · .. -.- _ ·. -~ . . ., - .. ·· .. , . ,.._. 

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