IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2018-CA-01094-COA MICHAEL WILLIAMS APPELLANT

v. CHANTELLE HANLEY WILLIAMS APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/05/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROBERT GEORGE CLARK III COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: FRANKLIN ALAN GARRISON HEATHER MARIE ABY ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: CHRISTOPHER A. TABB NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/17/2020 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE BARNES, C.J., WESTBROOKS AND McCARTY, JJ. McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. T h e M a d ison County C hancery Court granted Chantelle W illiam s a d i v o r c e f r o m Michael W illiams f

or habitual cruel a nd inhum a n treatm ent. T h e chancery court also awarded C hantelle sole legal and phy sical custody of t he couple’s two m i n o r c h i l dren. Michael now appeals f

r om the chancery c ourt’s grant o f the f a ult-based divorce and custody determ ination. ¶2. Finding th a t t h e c h a n cery court was not m anif estly wrong or clearly e rroneous in granting the divorce and sole custody to Chantelle, we af

f irm

. FACTS ¶3. Michael a nd Chantelle W illiam s were m a rried in Adam s County , Mississippi. Therewere two children born of t he m arriage. Af ter thirteen y ears of m atrim ony , Chantelle f iled

a com plaint f or divorce o n the ground of habitual cruel and inhum an treatm ent. Michael responded by d eny ing Chantelle’s allegations and f i ling a counterclaim r equesting custody of the couple’s m inor children. The f our y ears since their s eparation have been acrim onious. ¶4. Contem

p o r a n e o u s ly to f

i ling her c om

plaint f o r divorce, Chantelle s ought, and was granted, a dom estic-abuse protection order against Michael. T he order p rohibited Michael f rom c ontacting either Chantelle or their children. Shortly a f ter, the couple agreed to m odif y the order and allow Michael to have visitation, while Chantelle r etained sole phy sical custody

. The m odif

ied order stipulated that neither party was perm i tted t o take t he children

out of the country , e strange the children f rom the other parent, or d iscuss t he aspects of the case with the children. ¶5. A y ear l ater, the c hancery court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent and protect the interests of the m inor children. During t his t i me t h e c h ildren had been in the phy sical custody of Michael f

or approxim ately one y ear, despite the court order granting custody to Chantelle. Not long af

ter his a ppointm ent, the guardian ad litem f i led a m otion f

or contem pt against Michael. The chancery court f o u nd that M ichael h ad f

ailed to cooperate with the guardian ad litem a nd had also discussed the litigation with the c hildren. The chancery court considered placing t he children in the custody of the Departm ent of Hum an Services due to Michael ’ s f

l a grant d isregard f

or the court, obstruction of t he guardian ad litem ’s investigation, and his consta n t , i n tentional interf erence in the children’s relationship with their m other. Michael had also f ailed to return Chan t e lle’s clothing and passports per the

2order. As a result of the chancery court’s f indings, M ichael was f

o und in contem

pt, and he was incarcerated in the Madison County Jail f or two day s. ¶6. The g uardian ad l item subsequently a sked to be discharg e d f r o m t h e c a s e . In his

m otion, the g uardian ad litem alleged that in addition to his f ailure to c ooperate, Michael had repeatedly th r eatened and harassed the guardian ad litem , the g uardian ad litem ’s f am ily , Chantelle’s f

orm er counsel, and others involved in the case. The guardian ad litem requested to be discharged due to f

ears f or his and his f

am i ly ’s saf

ety

. ¶7. A recorded conversation between Michael and the g uardian ad litem was presented

to the court. I n the recording Michael can be heard telling the guardian ad litem that he hoped the guardian ad litem ’s f am ily m em

bers would get cancer a nd t hat the guardi a n ad l i t e m deserved f

or his wif e to die. W hen discussing his f rustrations with the guar d i a n a d litem and the court, Michael stated he understood why Tim othy McVeigh “ l e v e led the f ederal [ building].” ¶8. An em ergency order was entered shortly thereaf ter. Michael h ad ref

used t o allow the guardian ad litem to m eet w ith the children alone a nd ref u sed to h ave the children
psy c h ologically evaluated. He a lso openly discussed t he litigation a n d h i s h a t red f or Chantelle in f

r ont of the children. Michael repeatedly use d r a c i a l slurs to describe the chancellor, and m ade m ore threats to the guardian ad litem

. I n g ranting t he em e rgency order, the court placed the children in t he sole custody of Chantelle. Michael was not p erm itted to contact the children without approval by the counselor and the guardian ad litem

. ¶9. The court then f

ound Michael in contem

p t f or a second tim e . Michael h ad taken the

3children outside of the United States in contravention of the court’s o rder. F urther, Michael

continued contacting the children af ter a no-c o n t a c t o rder was entered. Michael had also f ailed to return Chantelle’s personal property , including her passports f ro m t h e United Kingdom and New Zealand. Michael was to be incarcerated until he reim bursed Chantelle f or her personal property

and returned her passports. ¶10. The court sim

ultaneously entered y et another order o f contem p t against Michael. The third contem

pt was f or his f ailure to cooperate with and pay the guardian ad litem

. Michael

was held in contem

p t until he paid the m oney o wed to the guardian ad l item and petitioned the court f

or release. ¶11. Michael represented him self at trial. Af

t er hearing all the proof

, the chancery

court entered a judgm ent granting Chantelle a divorce and sole legal and phy s ical custody of the parties’ children. The c h a n c e r y c ourt f ound that Chantelle had proven h abitual cruel and inhum an treatm ent by providing evidence o f M ichael’s controlling, abusive behavior and its negative ef

f ect on Chantelle’s health. ¶12. The c hancery court went on to address custody of t h e c h i l d r e n. Af t er conducting a thorough Albright 1 analy sis the court f ound tha t i t was i n the children’s best interest f or Chantelle to have sole phy sical and legal custody

. ¶13. Aggrieved by

the lower court’s decision, Michael now appeals.

ANALYSIS ¶14. Michael asserts t w o a s s i g n m ents of error on appeal. First, he argues the chancery

1 A lb rig h t v. A lb rig h t , 4 3 7 S o . 2 d 1 0 0 3 , 1 0 0 5 (M iss. 1 9 8 3 ). 4court erred in awarding C hantelle a divorce on the ground of h abitual cruel and inhuma n

treatm ent because her testim ony was uncorroborated. Second, Michael argues the custody award should be reversed.
I. The chancery court did not err in g ranting Chantelle a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhum an treatm ent. ¶15. Michael argues that the chancery court erred by granting C hantelle a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhum an treatm ent. He a l l e g es that the chancery court erroneously

relied on Chantelle’s uncorroborated testim ony . ¶16. “W e apply a lim ited s t a n d a rd of review when exam ining a chancellor’s decision in dom estic-relations m atters.” Littl efield v
. Littlefield , 2 82 So. 3d 820, 824 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). “W e review the f acts o f a d i vorce d ecree in a light m ost f avorable to the appellee, and unless the chancellor’s judgm ent was m anif estly wrong, clearly erroneous, or based on a n er r o n eous legal standard, the judgm e nt should stand.” Id

. (internal quotation

m arks f or citations om itted). ¶17. A divorce m ay be granted to an injur e d p a r t y o n t h e g r ound of habitual cruel and inhum an treatm ent, including spousal abuse. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-1 (Rev. 2018). Cruel and inhum an treatm ent is def ined as “conduct that either: (1) e ndangers lif e, lim b, or health,

or c reates a reasonable apprehension of such danger and renders the relationship u nsaf e f or the party seeking relief

, o r (2) is so u nnatural and inf a m ous a s to render the m arriage revolt ing to the non-of

f ending spouse, m aking it im possible t o carry out the duties of the

m arriage, theref

o r e destroy ing the basis f or its continuance.” Littlefield , 282 So. 3d at 824 (¶8); see also Russell v
. Russell , 157 Miss. 425, 128 S o. 270, 272 (1930). T o s ucceed on this

5ground, “there m ust b e a causal connection between the treatm ent and t he a ctual or threatened harm

to the claim ant’s health or well-being.” L ittlefield , 282 So. 3d at 824 (¶8). ¶18. Spousal a

buse under this ground ma y be established by showing “[ t]hat the injured party ’s spouse engaged in a pattern of behavior a g ainst the i njured p arty o f threats or intim idation, em otional or verbal abuse, f orced isolation, sexual extortion or sexual abuse,

or stal k i n g o r a g g ravated stalking

. . . if the pattern of b ehavior rises above the level of unkindness or rudeness or incom patibility or want of af

f ection.” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-1. ¶19. “ U p o n r e v iew, we m ust em ploy a subjective s t andard, r at h e r t h a n a n o r d i n a r y , reasonable person standard, u nderstanding that the im pact of the conduct on the com plaining spouse is crucial.” Littlefield , 282 So. 3d at 827 (¶19) (internal quotation m arks om itted). ¶20. Chantelle testif

i ed at trial that Michael was both phy sically and m e ntally abusive and that his behavior c aused C h a n t e l l e to f e ar f or her saf ety

. Michael h ad threatened to shoot Chantel l e and of

ten expressed his desire f or h er to die. He even adm i tted in his testim ony that he had said, “[ T ]he only resolution to this is f

or [ C hantelle] to die and f or the children

to get her social s ecurity [ .]” Chantelle’s f e ar of Michael is s o g r e a t that she sought and obtained a dom estic-abuse protection order against him

. ¶21. There was also testim ony a b o u t M i c h a e l ’ s s exual abuse. Chantelle described how Michael attem

pted to sexually assault her on m ul t iple occasions. Chantelle described one attack wherein she r eached f or the phone to c a ll f

o r help, but Michael ripped i t out of the wall bef ore she was able to use it. During another a t tack, Michael held her hands down to restrain her while he attem

pted to sexually

assault her, only

relenting because he was unable to get

6an erection.

¶22. Chantelle sought m ed i c a l a t t e n t i o n a s a direct result of Michael’s b ehavior. She suf f e red f rom depression and suicidal ideation as a result of her abusive m arriage to Michael. Chantelle provided her m edical records showing that she had been treated f o r d epression and

attem pted suicide. ¶23. Af ter the separation, Michael took all of Chantelle’s shoes, c lothing, and passports. Chantelle testif

i ed that “ [ t]here w as nothing lef t in t he w ardrobe [ with] which to clothe [ herself ] .” The court ordered Michael to return Chantelle’s personal item s. The unref uted testim o ny is that Michael only returned one single shoe f r om each p air that Chantelle owned and threw the shoes’ m ates out with the g arbage. M ichael only returned her United States passport. At the tim e of trial, Micha e l had y et to return her United Kingdom and New Zealand passports. ¶24. Michael also s old Chantelle’s jewelry that she had inherited f r om h er grandm other, which was worth around $30,000. During a r e corded conversation, Chantelle conf ronted Michael about selling the j ewelry . Instead of deny ing that he had sold it, he responded, “I needed the m oney .” The jewelry w as never returned to Chantelle, and so the chancery court assigned its value to Michael during the equitable d ivision of the m arital assets. Michael’s award was lowered by

$30,000. He did not appeal or challenge this judgm ent. ¶25. Likewise, M ichael exerted f inancial control over Chantelle. Both parties testif ied that Michael rem oved C hantelle’s nam e f rom their joint checking a ccount—the account in which her m oney was deposited. Michael t hen a d ded their nine-y ear-old son a s a signatory to the

7account. W hen M ichael would travel f or work, Chantelle was required to get her own child’s approval in order to have m o ney . ¶26. Michael’s controlling and threatening behavior was also evidenced in his interactions with t he guardian ad lit e m . M ichael threatened a nd h arassed the guardian a d litem to the

extent that he sought to be discharged f rom the m atter—som ething he had never done in any prior case. In a ddition to threats, Michael attem pted to control and i m

p ede the guardian ad litem ’s investigat i o n . H e ref used to allow the guardian ad litem to m eet with the children alone; he insisted on being present f or every interaction. ¶27. During recorded phone conversations with the guardian ad litem , Michael expressed that he did not wish f

or Chantelle to be involved in the children’s l ives at all. He believed that Chantelle “ doesn’t deserve” to have a relationship with her children. Mic hael also stated, in t he children’s presence, that their m other had “abandoned” them

. He continued to reinf orce his desire that Chantelle die so that the children could receive her Social Security benef its. ¶28. U l t i ma t e l y , the chancery court f ound that “ [ d ]uring the c o urse of th e ma r r i a g e , Michael W illiam s w ould constantly y ell at Chantelle Hanley W illiam s, b e l i t t l e her, and

attem pt to have sexual relations with her” and that this “behavior caused Chantelle Hanley
W i lliam s to seek and obtain m edical treatm ent.” ¶29. Mindf

u l o f our lim ited standard of review i n dom estic-relations m atters, we “will not

reverse a [ chancery court’s] d ecree of divorce unless it is m anif estly wrong as t o l aw or f

act.” Reed v. Reed , 839 So. 2d 565, 569 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). W e f ind no error or abuse

8of

discretion in the chancery court’s f indings and conclusions. ¶30. Michael’s core argu me n t o n a p p e a l i s t h a t Chantelle’s t estim ony regarding the habitual c ruel and inhum an treatm ent was uncorroborated. Yet the statute def ining the faultbased g rounds f

or d ivorce w as am ended in 2017. 2 The Legislature e lim inated the corroboration requirem ent and instead provided that “[ s]pousal dom estic viole n c e a buse m ay be established t hrough the reliable testimony of a single credi b l e witness, who m ay be the injured party [ .]” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-1 (Rev. 2018) (em phasis added). ¶31. In i ts judgm ent, the c hancery court explicitly f ound C hantelle to be a credible witness.
In contrast, the chancery court f ound that “Michael W illiam s’ dem eanor, c o n d u ct, and testim o ny was, at tim es f

lippant, condescending, evasive and [ ] that M ichael W illiam s lacked credibility as a witness.” This f inding explicitly echoes the statute. See also L ittlefield , 282 So. 3d at 825 (¶9) (holding t h a t a grant o f divorce on the g round of habitual c ruel and inhum an treatm e nt will be upheld w here the chancery court’s “m a in source of evidence cam e by way of [ the wif e’s] sworn testim ony ”). ¶32. Given the plain language of the statute, t he o verwhelm ing proof presented at trial, and

our def erential standard o f review, we f i nd no error in t he chancery court’s judgm ent. Even though not required in this c as e , Chantelle’s testim ony was corroborated by the recorded conversations s u

b s t a n t i a t i n g M i c h a e l ’ s b e h a v i o r , M i c h a e l ’ s o w n t e s t i m o ny , and t he testim ony of the guardian ad litem

. The grant of divorce is af

f irm ed.
II. The child custody determ ination w a s proper.

2 T h e d iv o rce w as g ran ted o n Ju n e 2 8 , 2 0 1 8

. T h e r e f o r e, th e n ew v ersio n o f th e statu te is ap p licab le. 9¶33. Michael challenges the c hanc e r y c o u rt’s custody determ ination on two g rounds. First, he contends that the custody order should be vacated due to perceived shortcom ings in the chancery court’s Albright analy sis. Secondly , he a rgue s t h a t t he chancery court im p erm i ssibly relied on the guardian ad litem ’s hearsay e v idence i n m aking its custody determ ination.

A. The chancery court properly analy zed each Albright factor. ¶34. W e have long held that “the polestar consideration i n child custody cases is the best interest and welf

are of the child.” Albright , 437 So. 2d a t 1 0 0 5

. T o determ ine the child’s best interest, t he court weighs the f ollowing f

actors: ( 1) the a ge, sex, and h ealth of the child; (2) “the c o ntinuity of c are prior t o t h e separation”; (3) the p arenting skills of each parent; (4) “ t he willingness and capacity to provide prim ary child care”; (5) “the em p loy m ent of the parent a n d responsibilities of that em ploy m ent”; (6) the “phy s ical and m ental h ealth and age of the parents”; (7) “em otional ties of [ the] parent and child”; (8) the m oral f itness of each parent; (9) “the h om e, school, and com m unity record of t he child”; (10) the pref erence of the child; (11) t he stability o f the hom e environm ent; and ( 12) “ other f actors relevant to the parent-child relationship.” Id

. ¶35. Michael r elies on Parra v. Parra , 65 So. 3d 872 ( Miss. Ct. App. 2011), and Pelligrin

v. Pelligrin , 224 So. 3d 555 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017), to support his argum ent that the chancery court’s custody d eterm ination should be reversed f o r f ailure to m ake f

indings of f

a ct on each Albright f actor. Parra and Pelligren hold that a “it is reversible error if the chancellor does

not articulate the reasoning behind the f inding f o r each Albright

f actor.” Parra , 65 So. 3d

1 0at 876 ( ¶10); s e e a l s o Pelligren , 224 So. 3 d at 5 63 (¶40). In Parra and P elligren , we reversed the lower court’s custody award f or f ailure t o a n aly

ze and apply e ach of t he Albright f actors to the f

acts of the case. Parra , 65 So. 3d at 876 (¶12); Pelligren , 224 So. 3d at 563 (¶40). In both of those c ases, the lower court’s judgm e n t m e rely s tated w hich parent was awarded custody w ith n o m ention of Albright , its f actors, or even the best in t e r e s t o f the children. Parra , 65 So. 3d at 876 (¶11); Pelligren , 224 So. 3d at 559 (¶14). ¶36. This case is dif

f e rent. The chancery c ourt in the present case caref u lly analy zed each Albright f

actor and provided support f or its d eterm ination. “W e w ill reverse a chancery court’s decision regarding child custody determ inations only

when the decision of

the trial

court w as m anif

estly wrong or clearly e r r o n e o u s , or an erroneous legal standard was

em ploy e d.” Martin v. Martin , 282 So. 3d 703, 708 ( ¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quotation

m ark om itted). ¶37. Having f

o u nd that the chancery court properly a pplied the correct legal standard and that its decision was neither m anif estly wrong or erroneous, we f ind no error.
B. Michael f

ailed to preserve h is h earsay c hallenges for appeal. ¶38. Michael takes issue with the chancery court’s disposition of custody d ue to its alleged reliance on h earsay . Specif ically , Michael argues the chancery c ourt erroneously relied on the guardian ad litem ’s reports and testim ony . ¶39. At trial, testim onial evidence was provided b y Michael, Chantelle, and the guardian ad litem

. The guardian ad litem testif ied t o i n f

o r ma t ion he had c ollected during his investigation, as well as h is f i rst-hand knowledge and experience f rom interacting with the

1 1f

am ily

. Michael f

ailed to contem

poraneously object to those portions of the testim ony that mi g h t have been s ubject to hearsay rulings. “As there was n o c ontem poraneous ob

j e c t i o n
to testim ony based on hearsay , the t r i a l c o u r t was not af f orded an opportunity to rule on specif ic testim ony on the hearsay evidence issue.” McDonald v. McDonald , 39 So. 3d 868, 884-85 (¶54) (Miss. 2010). “The well-recognized rule is that a trial court will n ot be put in error on appeal f

or a m atter not presented to it f or decision.” Id

. ¶40. W e f

ind that Michael f

ailed t o preserve this error f o r a p p e a l , a n d i t i s theref ore without m erit. CONCLUSION ¶41. The chancery c ourt was not m anif estly w rong o r clearly erroneous and d id not apply

an erroneous legal standard. Accordingly , we af f irm the chancery court’s granting of divorce and sole custody

to Chantelle. ¶42. AFFIRMED. BARNES, C.J., J. WILSO N , P.J., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, TINDELL, McDONALD , L A W R E N C E A N D C . W ILSON, JJ., CONCUR. C ARLTON, P.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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