In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-22-00143-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from 396th District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1589127D

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Womack and Wallach, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth

ISAAC ANTHONY CASTRELLON, Appellant

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Isaac Anthony Castrellon appeals his sentences of ten years’

imprisonment1 for the offenses of aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury, 

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and accident involving serious bodily injury.

We will affirm.

I. Background

In June 2019, Castrellon was indicted for (1) second-degree felony aggravated 

assault causing serious bodily injury (Count 1), (2) second-degree felony aggravated 

assault with a deadly weapon (Count 2), and (3) third-degree felony accident involving

serious bodily injury (Count 3). The indictment also contained a separate deadlyweapon-finding-notice paragraph.2

In July 2021, the State offered Castrellon a plea bargain whereby he would 

receive six years’ incarceration in exchange for a guilty plea. However, Castrellon 

rejected the State’s offer. 

In January 2022, after being admonished by the trial court, Castrellon pleaded

guilty3 to all three offenses and “true” to the indictment’s deadly weapon allegation. 

1

As detailed below, these sentences are to run concurrently.

2

This paragraph indicates that a “DEADLY WEAPON, NAMELY: A 

MOTOR VEHICLE” was used during the commission of or immediate flight from 

the offenses.

3

Castrellon entered an “open plea”—that is, a guilty plea without the benefit of 

a plea agreement. 
3

Although Count 3 is a third-degree felony with a punishment range of two to ten 

years and a fine not to exceed $10,000, the written admonishment form listed the 

punishment range for all three offenses as two to 20 years in prison and a fine not to 

exceed $10,000 (the punishment range applicable to second-degree felonies). 

Nevertheless, Castrellon signed the admonishment form, which contained a written 

waiver including acknowledgments that, among other things, Castrellon fully 

understood the trial court’s admonishments and had no questions; he was aware of 

the consequences of his plea; and his plea was knowingly, freely, and voluntarily 

entered. The trial court acknowledged that the admonishments had been given, that 

Castrellon’s plea was intelligently, freely, and voluntarily entered, and that the court 

was accepting Castrellon’s guilty plea.

In July 2022, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. After receiving the

presentence investigation report and hearing from Castrellon’s three witnesses, the 

trial court sentenced Castrellon to ten years’ imprisonment on each count, with the 

sentences to run concurrently. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Castrellon raises two points. First, he asserts that his guilty plea was 

involuntary because he was admonished for a second-degree felony punishment range

for all three offenses but the third count with which he was charged—accident 

involving serious bodily injury—is actually a third-degree felony. Second, he contends 

that the deadly weapon findings in the trial court’s judgments should be stricken
4 

because they are not sufficiently specific and do not match the allegations in the 

indictment. 

A. Point One: The Trial Court’s Incorrect Admonishment Did Not Render 

Castrellon’s Guilty Plea Involuntary

 In his first point, Castrellon argues that the trial court’s failure to properly 

admonish him of the correct punishment range for Count 3 rendered his decision to 

enter a guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. This argument lacks merit.

Under Article 26.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a trial court 

must admonish a defendant of the punishment range attached to the offense before 

accepting the defendant’s guilty plea. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a)(1). 

The purpose of Article 26.13 is to ensure that only constitutionally valid pleas—those 

that are both knowing and voluntary—are entered by defendants and accepted by trial 

courts. Meyers v. State, 623 S.W.2d 397, 402–03 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981) 

(citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463 (1970)). An admonishment 

that substantially complies with Article 26.13 is sufficient and establishes a prima facie 

case that the defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 

Ann. art. 26.13(c); Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

The Court of Criminal Appeals has instructed us that when the record reflects 

that the trial court incorrectly admonished a defendant regarding the punishment 

range but assessed punishment within both the actual and misstated ranges, the 

admonishment substantially complies with Article 26.13. Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197; 
5

see Lemmons v. State, 133 S.W.3d 751, 757 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d). 

The burden then shifts to the defendant to affirmatively show that he was not aware 

of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed, such that the plea 

was rendered involuntary. See Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197 (interpreting Tex. Code 

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(c)); Lemmons, 133 S.W.3d at 757. In other words, once 

substantial compliance is shown, “[a] defendant may still raise the claim that his plea 

was not voluntary; however, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that he 

did not fully understand the consequences of his plea such that he suffered harm.” 

Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197.

Here, the trial court substantially complied with Article 26.13(a)(1) because it 

assessed Castrellon’s punishment within the actual and misstated ranges.4

See Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197. Thus, to prevail on his first point, Castrellon must

affirmatively show that, despite the trial court’s substantial compliance, he was not 

aware of the consequences of his plea as it related to the correct punishment range for 

his offenses and was misled or harmed by the court’s admonishment. See Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(c); Lemmons, 133 S.W.3d at 759. Castrellon has not met 

this burden.

4

As noted above, the admonishment form incorrectly stated the punishment 

range as two to 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine not to exceed $10,000—the range 

for second degree felonies—whereas the actual punishment range for Count 3—a 

third degree felony—was two to ten years’ imprisonment and a fine not to exceed

$10,000. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.33–12.34. Thus, the trial court’s sentence of 

ten years’ imprisonment falls within both the actual and misstated ranges.
6 

In Martinez, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that because “[t]he only 

support in the record for appellant’s contention that his plea was involuntary [was] the 

incorrect admonishment form,” the appellant had not sustained his burden to show 

the involuntariness of his plea. Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197. The same is true here. 

Like the appellant in Martinez, Castrellon points to nothing in the appellate record 

except the incorrect admonishment form to indicate that he was actually harmed or 

misled in making his determination to enter a guilty plea. See id. Instead, he relies 

solely on the error in the admonishment form to show that his plea was involuntary. 

Accordingly, Castrellon has not satisfied his burden. See id. 

We overrule Castrellon’s first point.

B. Point Two: The Deadly Weapon Findings in the Judgments Need Not 

Be Stricken

In his second point, Castrellon argues that the deadly weapon findings in the 

trial court’s judgments should be stricken because they are not sufficiently specific and

do not accurately reflect the deadly weapon allegations in the indictment. Specifically, 

Castrellon asserts that the recitation under the “Findings on Deadly Weapon” section

of each judgment of “Yes, not a firearm” constitutes an inaccurate, non-specific 

deadly weapon finding. This argument is meritless. 

If a defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of or 

the immediate flight from a felony offense, a deadly weapon finding may be entered 

on the judgment. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 42.01, § 1(21), 42A.054(b)–(c). A 
7

deadly weapon finding must be specific and separate from the charged offense. 

Ex parte Brooks, 722 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Thus, “the judgment 

must contain something more than, for example, the mere ‘recitation of the offense in 

the judgment with the words ‘deadly weapon,’ or ‘firearm used,’ or other similar 

phrases added to the offense for which the defendant is convicted.’” Cobb v. State, 95 

S.W.3d 664, 667 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (quoting Brooks, 722 

S.W.2d at 142). But a trial court’s utilization of standard deadly weapon findings in

pre-printed judgment forms may satisfy the requirements of specificity and 

separateness. See id. (holding that the standard Harris County affirmative deadly 

weapon finding—“Affirmative finding: deadly weapon: yes (circled)”—satisfied the 

requirements of separateness and specificity); Polanco v. State, 914 S.W.2d 269, 272 

(Tex. App.—Beaumont 1996, pet ref’d) (holding pre-printed, fill-in-the-blank 

judgment containing “a pre-printed item: FINDING USE OF DEADLY 

WEAPON” next to which was typed “Affirmative Finding” satisfied the requirements 

of separateness and specificity). And a deadly weapon finding need not indicate the 

specific type of deadly weapon found unless it was a firearm. See Tex. Code Crim. 

Proc. Ann. art. 42A.054(d); Hooks v. State, 860 S.W.2d 110, 114 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1993) (interpreting former Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(2) (repealed 

2017)).

Here, the trial court’s judgments indicated its deadly weapon finding in two 

separate places. As noted above, the first page of each judgment contained a 
8

recitation of “Yes, not a firearm” under the section labeled “Findings on Deadly 

Weapon.” In addition, each judgment’s second page contained a section for “special 

findings” under which the trial court noted “DEADLY WEAPON FINDING 

NOTICE – TRUE.” These affirmative deadly weapon findings are specific and 

separate from the charged offense and therefore satisfy the requirements of articles 

42.01 and 42A.054 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. 

Proc. Ann. arts. 42.01, § 1(21), 42A.054(b)–(c); Brooks, 722 S.W.2d at 142. 

Castrellon suggests that the deadly weapon findings were inadequate because

they did not specifically identify the type of deadly weapon reflected in the 

indictment—a motor vehicle. But because the deadly weapon associated with 

Castrellon’s offense was not a firearm, the judgment need not specify that the deadly 

weapon was a motor vehicle. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42A.054(d); Hooks, 

860 S.W.2d at 114 n.7.

We overrule Castrellon’s second point.

III. Conclusion

Having overruled both of Castrellon’s points, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

Bonnie Sudderth

Chief Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: February 23, 2023