Opinion filed November 15, 2017

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

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No. 11-17-00137-CV

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IN THE INTEREST OF T.A.C.G., T.M.G. III, N.L.G.,

T.M.G., AND A.M.G., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 118th District Court

Howard County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 51219

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The trial court entered an order in which it terminated the parental rights of

the parents of T.A.C.G., T.M.G. III, N.L.G., T.M.G., and A.M.G. The father

appealed, and he presents two issues for our review. In the first issue, Appellant 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s best interest 

finding, and in the second issue, he complains of the admission of several 

photographs into evidence. We affirm. 
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I. Termination: Best Interest

Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights was in the best 

interest of his children. Termination of parental rights must be supported by clear 

and convincing evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2017).

To determine on appeal if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination 

case, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and 

determine whether a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or 

conviction that its finding was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). 

To determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the 

finding and determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably 

form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. 

In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). 

To terminate parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts listed in 

Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U) and that termination is in the best interest of the child. 

FAM. § 161.001(b). In this case, the trial court found that Appellant committed four

of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)—those found in subsections (D), (E), (N), 

and (O). Appellant does not challenge these findings, but he does challenge the trial 

court’s finding that termination is in the children’s best interest. See id.

§ 161.001(b)(2). Accordingly, we will uphold the order of termination if the 

evidence is sufficient to support the best interest finding. 

With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be 

proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). 

But courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. 

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not 
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limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the 

child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now 

and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the 

programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the 

child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking 

custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or 

omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship 

is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. 

Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination 

may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best 

interest. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266. 

The Department originally became involved in this case when it received a 

priority one intake from the police based upon the children’s involvement in a 

serious domestic violence situation, which resulted in the mother being taken to the 

hospital and the father receiving staples and stitches. One of the children reported 

that the parents “fight like this a lot.”

The mother acknowledged at trial that Appellant had a drinking problem and

that there was domestic violence in the home. Appellant also admitted that he and 

the children’s mother had a history of domestic violence. According to Appellant, 

the children were removed after an incident of domestic violence in which Appellant 

was a victim.

Although Appellant did not complete the services required of him in the 

family service plan, he testified that he was “doing better” and that he wanted to be 

reunited with his children. He also testified, however, that he planned to live in 

Lenorah with his girlfriend and provide a house for the children and their mother to 

live in in Stanton. Appellant did not know the ages of his three youngest children.
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The investigator for the Department testified about the unsanitary conditions 

of the home at the time of the removal; the home was a safety hazard and a health 

risk to the children. Domestic violence, alcohol abuse, the continued use of alcohol, 

and the failure to complete the service plan—which was designed to help Appellant 

with the problems that led to the removal—led the conservatorship caseworker to 

conclude that Appellant was not able to provide a safe and stable home for his 

children. The caseworker testified that the parents had endangered the children and 

had inflicted emotional damage on them.

The caseworker testified that the children were placed in foster homes at the 

time of trial. Although three of the children were placed in one home and two in 

another home, the children had been able to have contact with each other. The 

caseworker testified that the children were happy and safe in their placements and 

that the placements were meeting the children’s physical and emotional needs. She 

explained that one of the current placements was interested in taking all five children 

if they were to become available for adoption. The caseworker believed that 

permanency in the home of that placement was best for the children. According to 

the caseworker, the oldest child does not wish to be returned to the parents; the 

caseworker did not ask the younger children about their desires to return to their 

parents’ care. The caseworker testified that termination of both parents’ parental 

rights would be in the best interest of the children, and the children’s attorney ad 

litem asked that the children not be returned to the parents.

Based upon the Holley factors and the evidence in the record, we cannot hold 

that the trial court’s best interest finding is not supported by clear and convincing

evidence. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. The trial court could reasonably have 

formed a firm belief or conviction that it would be in each child’s best interest for 

Appellant’s parental rights to be terminated. We hold that the evidence is both 
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legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best interest finding. We 

overrule Appellant’s first issue. 

II. Admission of Photographs into Evidence

In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 

when it admitted ten photographs into evidence. Eight of the photographs depicted 

the condition of Appellant’s home at the time of removal, and two depicted the 

injuries sustained by Appellant on that date. When the photographs were offered 

into evidence, Appellant took the sponsoring witness on voir dire and then objected

that he had not been provided with those photographs in a timely manner prior to 

trial as required by the trial court’s scheduling order. The trial court overruled 

Appellant’s objection without a showing by the Department or a finding by the trial 

court of good cause, lack of unfair surprise, or lack of unfair prejudice. See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 193.6. 

Assuming that, without such a showing or finding, the admission of the 

photographs was an abuse of discretion, we conclude that any error in the admission 

of the photographs was not reversible error. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a). Prior to 

the admission of the photographs, Appellant had testified about the incident that 

resulted in the removal of his children. He testified that he woke up with blood on 

his head and stabs on his arms and that he “end[ed] up getting eleven staples and 

five stitches in [his] head.” The two photographs of Appellant were cumulative of 

Appellant’s own testimony. The other eight photographs merely depicted the 

conditions of the house as testified to by the investigator and, thus, were cumulative 

of her testimony. Under the record in this case, we cannot conclude that the 

admission of the photographs into evidence probably caused the rendition of an 

improper judgment or prevented Appellant from properly presenting the case to this 

court. See id.; see also State v. Dawmar Partners, Ltd., 267 S.W.3d 875, 881 (Tex. 
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2008); In re M.H., 319 S.W.3d 137, 149–50 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, no pet.). 

Because we conclude that the admission of the photographs does not constitute 

reversible error, we overrule Appellant’s second issue.

III. This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the trial court’s order of termination.

MIKE WILLSON

JUSTICE

November 15, 2017

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.