STANDARDFORMN0.64 ~ RE]f rp__:~.a,qo.6L • 

-· .. e·~FlDL:N I IA._ 

Office Memoran um • UNITED sTATEs GOVERNMENT 

_,..JF!. . ........ ,..·~ 

TO DATE·25 Oct 1950 

FROM .A.FSA-OOB 

SUBJECT 

With reference to the memo on CO:Ulfr Security that I recently gave 

you, I think the fewer involved in the study at this time the better. 

In view or this • I suggest that you, Dyer• Mason and Peterson confer. 

The four o£ you have as much technical am intelligence ba.Okground as 

can be mustered in any small group and I thillk you should be able to 

come up with some sound and practical ideas. 

cc: 

Captain Dyer (w/o incl) 

Captain Mason (W/Incl) 

Col. Peterson (W/Incl) 

-- -J. ~ie:/"J N. WENG / 

CAPTAIN, US 

DEPtslY DIRECTOR, AFSA 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-23-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
. . " It ID:A5SB0 T~ SECRET 

6 MORN 

AFSA.-OOB/ jow 

19 October 1950 

:MEMOIWIDUM FOR AFSA-OOT 

SUBJECT: COMINT Security 

1. I am becoming increasingly concerned over what appears to me 

to be a gradual lessening of the security of COMINT in the face o£ a 

more pressing need for it. While a. number of important and be.sic steps 

have been taken since the wa.r to establish security on a firmer foundation. other developments have occurred which have,, to a large extent,, 

nullified the effects or our advances. 

2. It is my conviction that nothing is more important to our 

.future success in COMINT that the reestablishment of security safeguards• 

such as were in force in connection with the German problem during World 

War II. In my opinion,, the experience we had with that problem am.ply 

demonstrated the feasibility of operating successfully with the absolute 

minimum of dissemination and of mairrbaining the utmost security under 

difficult circumstances. To me it is a complete contradiction of the 

frequent:; contention that effectiveness is inevitably defeated by too 

strict compa.rtmantation of activities and limitation of dissemination. 

3. I believe we should prepare an appropriate study for USCIB,, 

aimed toward initiating a review of the entire security problem. The 

possibility of some approach to a state of readabili"l:;y makes it imperative 

that we not deley- the application of measures which will prevent a. 

repetition of what we have suffered in the pa.st. 

4. Attached a.re so~~ notes which occur to me as points that might 

well be included in such a. study. I would appreciate your undertaking 

this task or at least giving me your ideas as to who else might be 

better able to do it and as to what else should be included. 

Incl osure - l 

Ifotes for CO?fiNT" Security Study 
·. 

f1F ID:A55806 " 

TOP SECRET ACORN 

AFSA-OOB/jow 

E03.3(h)(g) 

19 October 1950 

NOTES FOR COMINT SECURITY STUDY 

P L86-36/50 USG 3605 

1. Since the war we have seen a steady tightening of'I lcommunic ation Security. All high-level z;ys~ems which were solved a.nd 

exploited in the normal manner have been withdra•m from use. 

2. or the types or high-1eve1 systems sti11 in~~~ hY' I ... _____ ___. one is uPreadable and the other has been read fragmentarily to a very 

limited degree. In the latter case. work has been surrounded by the 

most stringent safeguards and virtually no dissemination has been made 

of end products. \ 

3. Meanwhile there has been a steady and substantial increase of 

both workers and .consumers. The indootrinated list has risen from 

594 in February 1947 to 1.332 in June 1950. In addition. there have 

been innumerable individuals brought into the fringe of knowledge for 

administrative. budgetary. or other reasons. 

4. Aside from the\foregoing. certain dissemination safeguards have 

gradually been relaxed. Material is now distributed and maintained in 

a number of areas in Washington outside the producing agencies. where 

it was never permitted before. Moreover. distribution has been authorized 

to ad.di tional o.gencies. Restrictions on the distribution of material to• 

and maintainence in. occupied areas have also been eased. 

s. In the face of all this_. .the demand for COMINT has become 

increasingly great and the need for its protection imperative. Vie have 

"' now been virtually out of touch withj I high-level connnunioa.tions 

for three years. If we should regain contact and then lose it again we 

are likely to be denied this vital source of intelligence for a much 

longer period. 

6. Since the war_. the basic essentials f'or effective security 

control have finally been established after years of' effort. We now 

have: 

a. A federal protective law 

b. Security agreements with our foreign collaborators 

c. Improved investigative machinery 

d. An interdepartmental authority ( USCIB) 

e. Comm.on security standards 

£'. A single u.s. producer of' high-level COMINT (AFSA). 

g. General appreciation of' the value of CC!HNT 

Inolosure - l TOP S £CR ET ACORN 
. 

• 

.REF ID:A55806 m 

TOP SECRET AC RN 

7. \Ve have not taken full advantage of these recent assets. 

other shortcomings,, are the following: 

Among 

a. 

b. 

Too much individual authority and discretion are loft to 

individual consumer and producer agencies to insure uniform. 

application or ad.equate security measures. (The security 

control of atomic energy information is more centralized 

and rigid.) 

There is no over-all authority to insure observance of 

security regulations. (Inspection authority such as that 

which was exercised by the Cryptographic Security Board }} 

mie;ht \Vell be vested in USCIB.) . 

o, There 

l,,000,,000 

ia for 

copies 

too wide 

of' C<UI?fl' 

dissemination 

translations,..(were 

of result~ dissemina."ted .J.°!"r _ ·""' 

,- ~ in September,, 1950. The handling of the German problem 

d. 

proved that CCl.tINT can be effectively used even with the 

most drastic restrictions on dissemination.) 

The administrative1 control,and budgetary machinery and 

procedures are such that large numbers of individuals 

must be apprised of numerous details of CCF!I~""T activities. 

(The large number of agencies,, offices,, boards,, and 

com:~ittees concerned with the operation and administration 

of COMINT activities necessitates innumerable reports,, 

justifications,, etc.,, which are very hazardous to security. 

The arranGements governing the operation of CIA are much 

more conducfive to secrecy.) 

Under such conditions,, the laws of chance are bound to operate to produce 

inadvertent leaks even though loyalty ma;y be unquestionable. 

8. In addition to talcing such measures as may be practicable to 

correct recognized deficiencies, consideration should be given to the 

feasibility of disseminating high-level decrypts as special plain text 

products or in other disguised form which will not readily reveal the 

exact source. 

TOP SECRETACORN