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REF ID:A39300 

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U),,,:;l1 {->,,~/ r?? y)u"'.. "'S'f - 7, .... ,.r; /!.I" ~1)' 

Matter, of ·:Fact •• • • ;·J&.eph ands- ~opl 1 The Megatons Did It. ____________ /

1 

AFTER NEARLY two years named by the NSO, to study ,Uoii' whea it took office had a 1• 

of backing and filling, the th~ Nation's air defense re.· :naximum kill-rate of Bo per· / 

Eisenhower Administration is q~1rements and report back cent of a.U attacking aircraft 

finally showing signs of tack· this autumn. , as its supposedly over-ambi· 

ling the American air defense This study has been going tious tai;get. ' 

prQbJem in a serious way. forwai:d for some time in an 

_._..difficulty that has to be altogether 11-ew atmosphere. f'~E:;;RESENT NSC c_om· 

sili!bicninted is the same that There is none of the sleazy in· nuss1011 ts the fifth or Sixth 

has caused the delay to date. terested outcry against "Mag· such body to review the Lin· 

'. An honest and adequate air inot Line thinking" tHat was eoln findings. In addition, a 

defense program can e.vi:nt- heard when an effe~tive Amer• ~~ailed ~chnical review is 

ually add ~rom. ~ve bllhon ican air defense system was bemg carried .•n, on ~el_lalf , dollar.§· to six bilh<;>I!- dollars first proposed in the Lincoln of the new NSC comi;niss1on, ,. annuJJ)I to our military ex- , report of two years ago. There by the Rand C<?rporat~on a!ld · pe~ltures. _ is none of the defeatist talk the Joh~s-Hopkms JJmvers1ty ¥ojt-of tbe increase in out- either about an effective aJ contracters of the Army's of· j Jay \vlll come the second year. defen~e being an impossible fice of research on operations. The increase can, of course, be long-hair dream And instead of being lowered, slowed down by slowing down . ' the air defense target has / ·-~ the program. It can be made THE BRILLIANT success of no N been increased to a kill· I ~ !ess honest and less adequate, "Project Corrode ha~ proven rate of no less t1?an 9~ per- I 

ID short. But even a half- the value of the Lincoln sci· cent of all attacking aircraft 

measure program is likely to entists' designs for new early If 9, out of 10 at~ck· increase the 1956 military warning devices. Work has al- ers can be brought down in 

_budget - the election year ready started on the so-called the "remote air battle," this 

budget-by around $2,500,000,- McGill Warning Line, running country may be damaged, but 

000. across northern Canada. After it will be neither crippled nor 

Thus the decision will no't Corrode, there is growing sup- destroyed by A-bomb or even 

be painless under any circum· port for ~he once-ridiculed ~-bomb attack. That is the 

stances; and it will be opposed Lincoln , proposal of · a Far mcalcuiable increase of securby all-those who give budget· "North Line, ·on the extreme ity ~~ch is n~w promised, 

ary and fiscal convenience a continental fringe. And air· pr.o".1<Un~ th1

e Eisen~ower ;Ad· 

higher priority than national borne early warning devices mm1s~ation s policymake~ , secunty_,.. ' have been developed with are willing to take the bud#· .&-~ such success that the planners etary consequences. 0!'4 THE OTHER hand, it is even talk of detecting an at· They were not even wflling 

very ~ar~ to se~ how the ob- tacking force almost at the to look μte problem in the 

struct10mst tactics that have moment of take-off half· face, until their complaeency wor~ed so well until now can way •round the world.' was. rudely disturbed by the 

contm,ue to succeed hereafter. By the same token, impor- Soviet hydrogen bomb test 

Nearly ~WO years after the tant progress has been made and the appearance of new 

urgent ne~d was first pointed with th other half of the air Russian long-range jet bomb01;1t by the scientists of Proj~t defense problem-the weap- ers comparable to the best 

Lmcoln, the Pentagon has at ons of interception without American types. As one of 

last set up a Continental Air which the best warning is yiem sardonically , remarked1• 

Defense Command under Gen. useless. 'l'he megatons (of the JI. ' 

Bep.jamin Chidlaw. The mere Anoth~r of the Lincoln b~mb's power) did wh~' th~ exi~~ence of such a command, ideas that was once ridjculed .kilotons could not do.'" . · ·, s_pet?1fically c~~:i;ged with spe. and is now beginning to find, Even now. hswe~er, no one 

c1fic respons1b1Ilty for a -life· acceptance is the use of can be ,sure whether.. ·half. a~ death ·mission, -will in- "Hunter .- Killer" aircraft. ~~asures o: an honest_ effort ev1ta~l:i; generate an almost 1:hese will be planes of .con• will ~e. dee1~ed upon-r Iti ~·· irres1st1ble demand for the s1derable size and range, per- A~mmis~rat~.on quarters 1t 1s 

tools that are needed for the haps even bombers. They will bemF said that the country Job. be able to exploit an early won t,, sta~d !or the exit has not been announced warning better than a short- pense -which is sheer non· 

but the National Security range fighter. And they will se!ls~, unless the policy of-_deCouncil in. effect prepared to be equipped with air-to-air cer~mg the cou~try a~out ~he answer this future demand guided missiles, probably \\ith perils of the national situation 

even before the Continental atomic warheads to increase is to be continued. At any Air Defense Command was certainty of a kih. fate, the proble~ is being 

set up. A new special commis- The original Lincoln pro- .:h~~d squarely m the face, 

sion comp~sed of high officials gram, which was waiting for res~c represents great progand outside experts was the Eisenhower Administra· · · N. Y. Herald Tribune Service