### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on

Briefs D ecem

ber 11, 200 1 DANIEL B. TAYLOR v. DONAL CAMPBELL, ET AL 

### . Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 99-948-I Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr., Chancellor

No. M2001-00479-COA-R3-CV - Filed October 1, 2003

This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner and the Department of Correction rega rding the prisoner’s sentence credits. After his request for a declaratory

order was denied, the

prisoner filed suit in the Chancer

y Court for D avidson County against the Commissioner of Correction and others seeking a declaration tha t the Depa

rtment ha d miscalculated hi s sentenc e and ha d errone ously ref used to classif

y him as a Range I e specially mi tigate d offend

er. The trial cou rt gra nte d th e Department’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the petition. We concur with the trial court’s conclusi on that the Departm ent is enti tled to a j ud gm en t a s a ma tt er of la w a nd , a cc or di ng ly, affirm t he summar

y ju dgment. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

W IL LI AM C. K OCH , J R ., J., delive red the o pinion of t

h e court, in wh ich W IL LI AM B. C AIN and P ATRIC IA J. C OTT RELL , JJ., joined. Daniel B. Tay

lor, Only, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Paul G. Summers , Attorne y General

a nd Rep orter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; and Kimberly J. Dean, De

puty Attorney Genera l, for the appelle es, Dona

l Campbell , Comm issioner, Tennessee Department of Corre ction, Willi ams Keeling, Roland Colson, Faye Cloud, Dinna Wilson, Wye ma Helms, and Shirle

y Plu ckett.

OPINION

I.

In the fall of 1980, Daniel B. Tay lor s hot an una rmed man

with a rif le for “ messing

in his business.” State v. Taylor , 668 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984) (internal quotes omitted). A Shelby County

jury found

him guilty of second degree murder and sentenc ed him to life in prison. Mr. Taylor’s direct

appeal and subsequent petitions for post-conviction relief and for a writ of habeas1 Stat e v. Taylor , 668 S.W .2d 681, 682 (Tenn. Crim. App. 198 4) (direct appeal); Taylor v. State , No. 02C01-

9703-CR-00091, 1998 WL 119506, at *1 ( Tenn. Cri m. App . M ar. 18 , 199 8), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 14, 1998) (po st-conv ic ti on actio n); Taylor v. Morgan , No. M1999-014 16-CCA -R3- PC, 200 0 WL 1278373, at *1 ( Tenn. Cri m. Ap p. Au g. 31 , 200 0), perm. app. denied (Tenn. M ar. 12, 2001) (habeas corpus).

2 See, e.g., Ta ylor v. N eil , No. 01A01- 9211-CH-00439, 1993 WL 73905 (Tenn. Ct . App. Mar. 17, 199 3), per m. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 2, 1993) (unsuccessful suit seeking access to Jud iciary D epa rtmen t’s Annu al Re por t); Taylor

v. State , No. 02A01- 9508-BC-00229 , 1996 WL 367 782 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jul y 3, 1996) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 appli cati on filed) (un succe ssful suit for dama ges against State for al leged legal malpracti ce by court-appointed lawyer); Taylor v. State , No. 01A0 1-9707-CH -00338, 199 9 W L 5859 9 (Tenn

. Ct. Ap p. Fe b. 9, 1 999 ), perm. app. dismis sed (Tenn. Oct. 11, 1999) (u nsucces sfulsuit chall enging retroac tiv e applicat ion of s tatu te dise nfranchisi ng convicted felons); Taylor v. Heldman , No . M 199 9-00 729 -CO A-R 3-CV , 200 0 W L 13 679 60 ( Te nn. Ct. A pp. S ept. 2 2, 20 00) , perm. app. denied (Te nn. Se pt. 16 , 200 2) (un succe ssful suit for d ama ges ag ainst trial jud ges wh o de nied h is petitio n forwri t of habeas corpus); Tay lor v. S tate , No . W 200 0-01 467 -CO A-M R3 -CV , 200 1 W L 87 347 0 (T enn. C t. App . July 31, 2001 ), perm. app. dismis sed (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2001) (u nsuc cess ful sui t f or dama ges against the State, 2 judge s, 3 prosec utors, and 1 public defender).
-2- corpus proved unsucces sful. 1 He is currently incarcerated at the Turney Center Industrial

Prison and Farm in Only, Te

nnessee.
For the past decade, Mr. Tay

lor, who views hims elf

as a “reknown [sic] pro se litigant,” has filed numerousunsucce ssful law suits cha llengin g his sen

tence a nd seeking damages from his courtappointed attorne

ys a nd the judg es who ha

ve denie d his petitions

. 2 This appeal arises out of a petition Mr. Taylor filed with the Depa rtment of C orrection for a declaratory order regarding

the proper calculation of his sentence. The Department re viewed Taylor’s sentence, concluded that the current sentence structur

e was va lid and co rrect, and sent Mr. Taylor a letter dated March 3, 1999 denying his petition. A month later, Mr. Taylor filed a p eti tion for a declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court for Davidson County asserting tha t the Department had miscalculated his sentence, and that his sentence for second degr ee murder was illegal and void.

This case has already

been to us once before. The trial court initially dismissed Mr. Tay lor’s petition on the ground that he had f ailed t o exhaust his administrative remedies. Mr. Taylor appeal ed, and this Court vacated the judgment dismissing the petition and remanded the ca se fo r further proceedings. Taylor v. Campbe ll , No. M 2000-00217-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 1050787 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2000) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed). On rema nd, the trial court determinedthat Mr. Taylor ha d fai led to d emonstrate: (1) that the Department of Correction had miscalculated his sentence; and (2) that the petition to the trial court provideda proper procedural vehicle for a collateral attack on the leg ality of his 1982 sentence for second degree murder. The trial court held that the Department was entitled to judgment as a matter of la w andgranted its summary judgmen t motion. Mr . Tay

lor appe aled the

summary judgmen t.
II. T HE S TAND ARD O F R EVIEW
The trial court disposed of this case by summary judgment under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56. The standards for reviewing

summary judgmen ts on appe al are w ell settled. A summary judgment may be used to conclude any

civil case that can and should be resolved on the basis of legal issues alone.-3-

Fruge v. Doe , 952 S.W.2d 4 08, 410 (Tenn. 1997 ); Byrd v. H all , 847 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993); Pendleton v. Mills , 73 S.W.3d 115, 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) . A summa ry judgme

nt is not appropriate, however, where there ar e genuinedisputes regarding facts that a re material to the case. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56. 04. Thus, a summary judgmen t should be granted only

when the undisputed facts, and the in

ferenc es reas onably

drawn f rom them, s upport one

conclusi on: that the party see king the summary judgme

nt is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pero’s Steak & Spaghetti House
v. Lee , 90 S.W.3d 61 4, 620 (Te nn. 2002) ; Web ber v. Sta te FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 49 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tenn. 2001).

The party see

king a summary

judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine dispute of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Godfrey

v. Ruiz , 90 S.W.3d 692, 6 95 (Tenn . 2002); Shadrick v. Coker , 963 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tenn. 1 998). To b e entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the moving party must either affirmatively negate an essentia l e lement of the non-moving party ’s claim or establish an affirmative defense that conclusi vely

defeat s the non- moving pa rty ’s claim. Byrd v. H

all , 847 S.W.2d at 21 5 n.5; Cherry v. Williams , 36 S.W.3d 78, 82-83 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Once the moving party

has made a properly

supported motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party

to set for th specific

facts e stablishing the exis tence of disputed, materia

l facts that must be resolve d by

the tr ierof fact . Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56; Bain v. W ells , 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). Mere conclusory

generalizations are insuffi ci en t t o p la ce a m at er ia l f ac t i n c on tr ov er sy. Caw oo d v. Davis , 680 S.W.2d 7 95, 796-9 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 84). The non-moving party

must convince the trial

court t hat there are sufficient factual disputes to war rant a trial: (1) by

pointing to evidence either overlooked or ignor ed by the moving

party that cr

eates a factual dispute; (2) by rehabilitating ev id en ce ch al le ng ed by t he mo vi ng pa rt y; (3) by produc ing additional evidence that creates a material factual dispute; or (4) by submitting an affidavit in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.07 requesting additional time for discovery

. McCarley v. W est Qualit y Food Serv. , 960 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Ten

n. 1998); Byrd v. H

all , 847 S.W.2d at 215 n.6. A non-moving party that fa ils to carry its burden faces summary dismissal of the challenged claim because, asour cour ts have re peatedl y observed, the “failure of proof concerning an essential element of the cause of action necessa ril y renders all other facts immaterial.” Alexand er v. Me mphisIndividual Practice Ass’n , 870 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tenn. 1993). Summary judgments enjoy no p

r esumption of correctness on appeal. BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Co. v. Johnson , 100 S.W.3d 202, 2 05 (Tenn . 2003); Scott v. Ashland Healthcare Ctr., Inc. , 49 S.W.3d 281, 285 (Tenn. 2001). Appellate courts must fres hly determine whether the moving party has met its requiremen ts under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56. Hunter v . Brown , 955 S.W.2d 49, 50 (Tenn. 1997). We m

ust consider the evidence in the light mo st fa vo ra bl e t o t he no n- mo vi ng pa rt y, and we must re solve all

reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’sfavor. Godfrey

v. Ruiz , 90 S.W.3d at 695; Doe v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., Inc. , 46 S.W.3d 191, 196 (Tenn. 2001). When reviewing the evidence, we must first determine whether a ny factua l disput es exist. If a factua l dispute exis ts, we must

then determine two things: (1) whether the fact at issue is material to the claims or defense s th at form the basis of the summary judgment motion; and (2) whether the disputed fact creates a genuine issue for trial. Byrd v. H all , 847 S.W.2d a

t 214; Rutherford v. Polar Tank Trailer, Inc. , 978 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).3 Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 40-28-301 (f) (1982) (repealed 1985 ).

4 Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 40-28-301 (d) (1982) (repealed 19 85).

5 Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 39-1-703(2) (19 82) (Repealed 1 989).
-4- III. M R . T AYLOR ’ S S ENTENCE C REDIT C LA IMS
Mr. Taylor first asse

rts that the Depa rtment misc alculated his sentenc e becau se it wrongfully deniedhim various types of sen tence redu ction cr

edits to wh

ich he wa s legally e

ntitled. T

hese claims do not involve calculation errors but instead rest on Mr. Taylor’s disag reement with the Department

regarding the proper

in te rp re ta ti on of

th e a pp li ca bl e s ta tu te s. Ac co rd in gl y, this dispute raises only

legal issues, and the Department is entitled to a summary judgment unless Mr. Tay

lor can demonstr atea legal basis for th e sent ence cre dits he is s eekin g. Mauldin v. Tenn. D ep’t of Cor

r. , No. 01A01-9801- C H-00014, 1999 WL 5084, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 1999), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 21, 1999).

A. For quite some time now, state prisoners in Tennessee have been ab le to red

uce the l ength of their incarceration through the use of “sentence credits,”whi ch t he prisoners must earn. The progra ms governing the availability of these c redits have changed over the years, Jones v. Reynolds , No. 01A01-9510-CH-00484, 1997 WL 367661, at *3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 2, 1997) (N o Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed) (discussing different ty pes of sentence reduction credits), and we need notdescribe these pr ograms in g reat detail in this opinion. Mr. Taylor insists only that he was entitled to earn prisoner

perfor mance se ntence c redits, good co nduct cr

edits, and incenti ve cred

its. He is mistaken. Mr. Taylor wa s never eligible to earn s uch cre dits because he is a Class X felon, and Class X fe

lons serving life

sentenc es are n ot allowe d to earn such cre dits.

The Clas s X Felon

ies Act of 1979 (the

“Act”) , was des igned to

provide s wift and c ertain punishmentfor those

who commit the most serious violent crimes. Davis v. Campbell , 48 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). The Act required determinate sentence s and speedier trials. The Act provided that persons convicted of C lass X crimes who received life sentences w ould be required to serve 30 ye ars before becoming eligible for release, 3 and that t he 30-y ear sen tence w ould be “undiminished by sentenc e credits or good, honor or incentive time of any sort.” 4 To make the pointcry stal clear, the A ct provided further that Class X felons were “inelig ible for work release, trusty ship status, furlough of any sort, educational or recreational rele ase or an y other prog

ram whereby the prisoner’s term of imprisonment may be reduced.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-301(a), (f).

Before

July 1, 1983, Class X felons, including Mr. Ta ylor, were not able to earn sentence reductions of any sort, and the ir sentences were not terminated until after ser vice of eachand every day of the sentence imposed. 5 In 19 83, the Ge neral As sembly

amended the Act to

permit c ertai n Class X felons to earn prisoner performance sentence credits to reduce their sentenc e expi r ation dates, bu t not their releas e eligi

bility dates. Th

e new la w stated in pertine

nt part a s follows:6 M r. Taylor d oes not take issue with the D epartme nt’s actual calculation of his sentence red uction cred its.
-5- Notw ithstan ding the provisions of this chapter to the contrary , a person co nvicted of a Class X felony shall be eligible to receive prisoner performance sentence cr edits as provided in Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-230 to reduce the expiration date of such person’s sentence. The provisions of th is su bsect ion shall not affect the release classification eligibility date of Class X offende rs. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-301(1) (Supp. 1983) (repeale d 1985) (emphasis added).

Unfortun ately

for M r. Ta yl or, a n exp irati on date “

reduc[tio n]” is of no

use to cr iminals serving life sentences. By definition, a life sentence expires on the same day the prisoner does. It would be impossible to “reduce” the length of such a s e ntence until it was already completed, because until then, the expiration date would be unknown and unknowable. Carroll v. Raney , 953 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Ten n. 1997) ( stating life sent ence do es not expir

e until de ath); Blackmon v. Morgan , No. 01C01-9512-CR-00437, 1997 WL 110017, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 1997), perm. app. denied

(T en n. Oc t. 27 , 1 99 7) . N ee dl es s t o s ay, it would also be po intless to a

ttempt to “reduce” the length of a life sentence that has already been completed, because at that point, the prisoner has already

died.

In 1985, the General Assembly again amended the sentence credi t statutes . These amendme nts permitte d Class X fe

lons to ea rn prisoner sente

nce red uction cr edits to reduce the

ir sentence exp iration d ates an d thei r relea se eli gibil ity dates . Howe ver, p rison ers wer e requi red to sign
a written w aiver to

become e

ligible t o earn th ese cred its and we

re entitl ed to beg

in earning these prisoner sentence reduction credits prospectively from December 11, 1985. Tenn. Code Ann. § 41- 21-236(c)(3) (1997); Davis v. Campbell , 48 S.W.3d at 746; Brown v. Te nn. Dep’ t of Corr. , No. M1999-02519-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1770 59, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2001), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 11, 2001).

Before the establishment

of the prisoner sentence

reduction credit program, Class X felons serving a life sentence like Mr. Tay lor could not earnsentence credits of any sort. After March 1, 1986, the effective date of the Tennessee Comprehensive Correction Impr ov ement Act of 1985, these felons became eligible

to earn prisoner sentence reduction credits prospectively , but nothing else. 6 As a

matter of well-settled law, the trial court correctly ruled against Mr. Tay

lor’s claim that he was due prisoner performance sentence credits, good conduct cr edits, or incentive time cre dits. He was ne

ver elig ible for t hem.

B.

Mr. Tay lor also asserts that he is entitled to additional sentencecredits for the time he spent incarcerated

in the Shelby

County jail before being transferr ed to a state institution. Mr. Taylor was confinedto the Shelby County jail from December 22, 1981 through April 11, 1984 . During this time, Mr. Taylor wa s both convicted and sentenced. The sentencing took place on January 20, 1983,7 Mr. Ta ylor fails to g iv e any c ode ci tations ref erenc ing the addit

ional credi ts he re quest s. His pet it ion charact erizes these credit s as “ basical ly a l ongevit y credi t.”
-6- and Mr. Taylor re

mained at the Shelby County jail for approximately three months there after before his transfer to a state institution.

Mr. Taylor and the Depar tment are in agreement tha

t the eff ective d ate of hi s sentenc e is December

22, 1981. Accordingly , pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-23-101 (1997), Mr. Taylor wa s entitled to pretrial jail credit for every day he spent in the Shelby County jail from Decembe r 22, 1981 – the effective date of his sentence – to January 20, 1983 – the date the sente ncing decision
was actually handed down by the trial cou rt. Mr. Ta ylo r acknowledgesthat the D epartme nt proper ly credited him with 394 days for this time.

Mr. Taylor wa s not, however, g iven pre trial jail credit for the time he was incarcer ated in the Shelby Co un ty j ai l f ol lo wi ng hi s s en te nc in g. Th e d ays he spent in the Shelby County jail beginning January 20, 1983 , have bee n credit ed to him no t as pretr

ial jail credit but r

ather a s straig

ht time served. Contrary

to Mr. Tay

lor’s ass ertions, the Depa rtment ha s calcul ated his pretria l jail cre dits
correctly and appr opriately gave him the credit for the time he remaine d in the She

lby County jail follo wing hi s sent encin g.
Mr. Taylor see

ks additional good behavior and incentive jail cred its, p erhaps under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-236(e). 7 Mr. Taylor did not qualify for these type s of credits. Until its repeal in 1989, Ten

n. Code An

n. § 39-1- 703(2) e

xpressly prohibited Class X felons from earning sentence credits of any kind, including sentence credits based on behavior ea rned in a jail or workhouse. Furthermore, Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-236(e ) (199 7), the statute authorizing pretrial behavioral credits, was not enacted until 1989, long after Mr. Ta ylor put in his pretrial jail time.

IV. M R . T AYLOR ’ S C HALLENGE T O H IS L IFE S ENTENCE
Fi na ll y, Mr. Tay

lor asse rts that hi s lif

e sentence is vo id and that he has the right to be sentenced, in his words, “as a Range I , especially mitiga ted o f fender, at twenty

percent with an additional ten percent reduction.” H e claims tha t the Depa

rtment ha s the powe

r, by virtue of its alleged authority to “audit ” sentences, to substitut

e a lesse r sentence for M

r. Tay lor’s exist ing Class X felony life sente

nce. As support, Mr. Tay lor relies on a departmental training manual directing that new prisoners be“audited”the first day they arr ive at the prison. Mr. Taylor’s argument on this pointoverstates the Department’s power and mischaracterizes the nature of the “a udits” performed by the Depa

rtment.
The Department has no power to change any

prisoner’s criminal sentence under the guise of “audi ting” it for correctness. State v. B urkhart , 566 S.W.2d 871, 8 73 (Tenn. 19 78); Williams v. Tenn. Dep’t of C

orr. , No. 01A01-9801-CH-00010, 1999 WL 22359, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 1999), per

m. app. denied

(Tenn. May 10, 1999) . The intake “audits” referred to by Mr. Taylor simp lyensure tha t each new inmate’s paperwork is in order, a nd that the prison has the correct records relating to each prisoner’s sentenc e. This is a far c ry from a pr ocedure that would

invest in-7-

the Department the power to review, set

aside, or alter criminal sentences as established by the trial courts. Nothing

in the tra ining ma nual authorizes – or

could auth orize – the Department to usurp the trial court’s auth ority by setting aside or altering a sentenc e and replacing it with some other sentence more to the Department’s liking. At most, the De pa rtment could call to the trial court’s attention any cler

ical or othe r errors that the Department believes it has found in the trial cour t’s sentencing judgment. The Department has no power bey ond that. According ly , Mr. Taylor’s complaint on this issue utterly fails to state any legal claim for which relief ca n be granted.

V.

W e affirm the dismissal of Mr. Tay lor's petition and remand the case to the tri al court fo r whatever further proceeding s may be required. We tax the costs of th is appeal to Daniel B. Taylor for which execution, if necessary , may issue. We have a lso determinedthat this appeal is frivolous in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 41-21-807(c ) (Supp.2002) and 41-21- 816(a)(1) (1997).

_____________________________ WI LL IA M C. K OCH , JR. , J.