Security 

Major W. N. Hamilton 

(eunf'id:en'l!ie:i) 

We recently wrote in the Review regarding the information to be gained from aecuri ty lapses in the enemy's cc:mnunications 

nets. Wh5le· our intention was to drive 

home the importance to our nets of communication security, the article itself was 

written from the Japanese point of view,to 

show how the failure to maintain security 

in our nets aided the Japanese in anticipating our actions in the South Pacific 

area. 

No doubt the Japanese radio intelligence 

service was very clever and added a few 

new wrinkles to the game of interception 

and traffic ar.alysis. But they were beginners compared with the larger, more 

prosperous Western nations who had developed the radio from the beginning. 

This time, let us look at the question 

of communication security from the point of 

view of the German radio intelligence service. As has been told elsewhere in the 

Review the Germana had an extensive service of this sort. But while much has been 

said about their activities directed against foreign agents and partisan radio 

stations, not much ha.a been told concerning their work against our military fo:roes. 

ItLsecure Message Handling 

At times, cryptographic compromises have 

resulted from insecure message-handling 

practices employed in some of our message 

centers. In one office, for example, it 

was an established custom for the plaintext of a message to accompany the cryptotext all the way to the teletypewriter operator, who transmitted the cryptotext and 

later filed both versions separately. One 

day early in World War II,an inexperienced 

teletypewriter operator, who was doing his 

best to keep up with heavy traffic, transmitted both the encrypted and the plaintext ver~iona of a message,and it was subsequently relayed by radio. The method of 

processing was abruptly changed. The communications officer, however, who was experienced, bu~ had been stationed at that 

headquarters only 3 days, received an official reprimand because he had not acted 

before a compromise could occur. 

In another instance an inexperienced and 

relatively untrained communications aff'.icer 

was acting as control officer and handling 

nearly ten times the normal amount oftraffic. Decrypted messages were brought to 

the radio shack to be typed. One day a decryption which was not properly marked, 

either as a classified message or as a decryption,found its way by mistake into the 

radio files and was later transmitted in 

response to a request for a repetition . .. The two cases cited above are outstanding examples of why operating procedures 

must be good, without weaknesses, and must 

be followed explicitly. The failure of 

the Control Officers to follow operating 

procedures or to prescribe secure operating procedures brought about these compromises ~f cryptographic security. 

Incident .a.t Ordnance Plant 

A prime example of a breach of physical security concern~ a Major at an ordnance plant. As a result of two bitter experiences,he is now fully conscious of security regulations. After being charged 

with losing a cryptographic document for 

which he could not account, the Major requested that his account be inactivated. 

He was "through" with cryptography. The 

authorities obliged, requesting the return of certain materials and a report of 

the destruction of the rest. The Major, 

who has been severely reprimanded for his 

first violation, replied at some length on 

ASA Review 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-08-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352\3 
_ .. ASA REVIEW - MaltApril 1951, ~#..JID: A66~ 

Physical, l rans mission, -

~ Cryptographic Security 

Major W. N. Hamilton 

(C:onf' :t:a:errM:a;i.) 

We recently wrote in the Review regarding the information to be gaineu from eecuri ty lapses in the enemy's ccmnunicatione 

nets. Whjle· our intention was to drive 

home the importance to our nets of communication security, the article itself was 

written from the Japanese point of view,to 

show how the failure to maintain security 

in our nets aided the Japanese in anticipating our actions in the South Pacific 

area. 

No doubt the Japanese radio intelligence 

service was very clever and added a few 

new wrinkles to the game of interception 

and traffic ar..a.lyeis. But they were beginners compared with the larger, more 

prosperous Western nations who had developed the radio from the beginning. 

Thie time, let us look at the question 

of communication security from the point af' 

view of the German radio intelligence service. As has been told elsewhere in the 

Review the Germane had an extensive service of this sort. But while much has been 

said about their activities directed against foreign agents and partisan radio 

stations, not much has been told concerning thelr work against our military fo:roes. 

!~secure Message Handling 

At times, cryptographic compromises have 

resulted from insecure message-handling 

practices employed in some of our message 

centers. In one office, for example, it 

was an established custom for the plaintext of a message to accompany the cryptotext all the way to the teletypewriter operator, who transmitted the cryptotext and 

later filed both versions separately. One 

day early in World War II,an inexperienced 

teletypewriter operator, who was doing hie 

beet to keep up with heavy traffic, transmitted both the encrypted and the plain2 

text ver~ione of a meseage,and it was subsequently relayed by radio. The method of 

processing was abruptly changed. The communications officer, however, who was experienced, but had been stationed at that 

headquarters only 3 days, received an official reprimand because he bad not acted 

before a compromise could occur. 

In another instance an inexperienced and 

relatively untrained communications af'ficer 

was acting as control officer and handling 

nearly ten times the normal amount oftraffic. Decrypted messages were brought to 

the radio shack to be typed. One day a decryption which was not properly marked, 

either as a classified message or as a decryption,found its way by mistake into the 

radio files and was later transmitted in 

response to a request for a repetition. 

The "" two cases cited above are outstanding examples of why operating procedures 

must be good, without weaknesses, and must 

be followed explicitly. The failure of 

the Control Officers to follow operating 

procedures or to prescribe secure operating procedures brought about these compromises ef cryptographic security. 

Incident .a. t Ordnance Plant 

A prime example of a breach of physical security concern~ a Major at an ordnance plant. As a result of two bitter experiences,he is now fully conscious of security regulations. After being charged 

with losing a cryptographic document for 

which he could not account, the M3.jor requested that hie account be inactivated. 

He was "through" with cryptography. The 

authorities obliged, requesting the return of certain materials and a report of 

the destruotion of the rest. The Major, 

who has been severely reprimanded for his 

first violation, replied at some length on 

ASA Review 
REF 

-~. 

f 

i 

Radio-Equipped Jeep 

the destruction of some forty or fifty documents. The case was forgotten. 

Iater, a routine investigation of the 

Major's files, conducted by a carefully 

trained security officer, revealed that 

some 25 of the documents reported burned 

were still on file. The Major, and a Captain who had "witnessed" the burning of 

the documents, were charged with false 

swearing, and were heavily fined under the 

104th Article of War. 

In the above cases no one but the enemy 

knows if use was ma.de of these compromises. 

Interception ~f just the right message-the 

clear text of a coded message-or the cbmcB 

look at some classified material-the "destroyed" crypto material-is enough to start 

a chain reaction of events. The thwarting 

of laboriously conceived plans, the counter attack at a weak sector, the destruction of vital supplies, and, coincident 

with all of these, the death of many good 

men and women. 

In the following cases we do know what 

action the enemy took"and how thankful the 

German signal intelligence service was for 

our lack of.communication security. 

Regain Our Message 

As the security of cryptoayatema has improved, so has the "know-how" of cryptana lye ts, both our own and the enemy' s. An 

incident early in the North African campaign illustrates this point. An enciphered message was sent between two British 

March -April 1951 

Soldier at Junction Box 

units. The message was intercepted and 

broken by the Germana, who enciphered the 

result in a German system and rushed it to 

Berlin. The British intercepted the German message, and they broke it. They discovered, much to their chagrin, that the 

Germans were reading their supposedly secure cipher,and changed it in a hurry. All 

of this took place within a twenty-four 

hour period. 

We must assume that clear-text transmissions of important classified messages 

are intercepted by the enemy. If this information is in any way useful to him, you 

may be sure that he will make use of it. 

The intercept effort of the enemy provides 

one of his moat prolific sources of informa. tion about us and our Forces and our ac~ 

tiona. 

The following clear-text message, logged by a radio security officer in Italy, 

is a shining example of how plans may be 

revealed to the enemy: KHA V XIM •.• :MESSAGE 

FOR YOU ••• BRITISH WILL BE E'IlUNG FROM 12 

TO 12: 45 TODAY AT FOLLOWING POINTS 908-143, 

893-141, 894-150 ... REQUEST YOU DO NOT FIRE 

THESE POINTS AT THIS TIME ••• DID YOU GET 

THAT •.. OVER. Another incident early in 

the Anzio campaign illustrates the waste 

of supplies through the compromise of locations by misuse of communications. An 

advancing tank battalion radioed back in 

the clear that an enemy counterattack was 

under way and asked that all traffic be 

stopped at a specified town behind the 

lines. German intercept notified its air 

force and within an hour a squadron of 

3 
REF 

planes was strafing a lo~olumn of traffic halted on the road. ~ny trucks, Jeers, 

and cars were wrecked beyond repair, but 

mor~ lamentable was the number of men killed. 

And how they must have licked their'Ci:Jcps 

over something like the following. During the early part of the breakthrough in 

France a staff officer heard a familiar' 

warbling tone on his tactical radio set. 

It was irritating but not enough to hinder 

seriously his contact with the battalions in hiR unit. But in one of his transmissions to a battalion he said, "Looks like 

the Krauts are trying to jam us." Within 

minutes the warbling shifted frequency to 

cover completely that net frequency and 

the bag pipes stopped all transmissions 

until a shift could be made to a new frequency. 

Ie.nd Mines Result from Intercept 

During the battle of Germany, Nazi intercept operators were particularly on the 

alert for Allied reports revealing that 

certain areas inside Germany were not m:b:Ed. 

Following interception of this intelligence, those areas were mined immediately, 

and into these traps walked United States 

infantrymen. 

The contents of messages or the lack of 

sufficient information contained in messages may of ten be a source of danger in 

aperations. During 1943,an enemy submarine 

was able to sink one of our ships and escape from American waters because of incomplete messages, and failure to send a 

message at all. The submarine might have 

been destroyed •before it could do dal!IEIBe 

had not any one of the following errors 

occured: A plane reported rescue of survivors but failed to give the time of the 

attack, the position of the attack, the 

course of the sub, or its condition; another plane neglected to make an amplifying report and wasted time as~ing a question to which it should have known the answer; a third plane failed to give the position of the sub or to communicate with a 

plane which was in a position to assist. 

It failed also to make amplifying reports 

promptly, in sufficient detail, and in 

plain language instead of code. Speed was 

vital, and the information was of little 

value to the enemy. 

Information which, alth~ugh classified, 

ID:A665li._ •. 

cannot be acte.pon by the enemy within " 

the time the action is to take place can 

usually be transmitted in the clear. In 

some situations, speed is more vital than 

the security of the information to be trammitted. By the time the enemy bas intercepted these clear-text messages, and has 

passed the information to where it can be 

acted upon, the action has taken place and 

the information is no longer valuable to 

him. 

Denying the Enemy Information 

The efforts to develop secure cryptosystems, the adopting of procedures which 

lend themselves to speed of message-handling and the following of procedures for 

safeguarding and using cryptographic nate:r:'-

ial are all done with a view towarn denying the enemy information. 

Continued efforts to develop more secure cryptosystems,the adopting of operating procedures which lend themselves to 

speed of message-handling and the strict 

adherenc& to authorized procedures for the 

safeguarding and use of crypto-material 

are all for the purpose of denying the enemy classified information. Failure to adhere strictly to authorized procedures for 

the safeguarding and use of crypto-material will assist the enemy a great deal in 

his efforts to compromise our crypto-systems and gain access to vital militar1 infoI"ma:tion of a classifie~ nature. Or as 

the Germans said ''FIEND HORT MIT." 

--· _-.,,, ___ _ 

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! ew -

ASA Review 
REF ID:A6ilil.4 ~~~~~~~..,....~~~~;;,._._...,.--- -~--

View of buildings in area assigned to ASA School at Fort Devens 

ers. Guest houses on the Post are available for visitors. 

Adequate Facilities Provided 

The post has adequate facilities which 

include clubs for officers and noncommissioned officers, a service club, a post 

exchange, and, in addition to the golf 

course mentioned above, tennis courts, and 

two small lakes with excellent swimming 

and fishing. The vicinity of the post includes a number of these small lakes, or 

"ponds" as they are called in New England. 

The communities of Fitchburg (12 mi. from 

the post) and Leominster (9 mi. from the 

post) and the big manUfacturing town, Lowell, population 195,000, are fine shopping 

centers. It is not far across the New 

Hampshire border to Nashua. Winters are 

cold and snowy, Springs damp, but pleasant, 

and Summers moderate to hot. Autumn is 

the beat part of the year. It is the countryside made familiar by the poet Whittier; 

south Europeans have taken over many of 

the farms. 

Fort Devens, built at a coat of $44,ooo 

000, total in World War I and II, occupies 

10,000 acres. During King Philip's War in 

1671 the house of Major Simon Willard,situated where the ma.in gate of the Fort now 

stands, was burned to the ground by Indians, and the settlers of the area were 

January-February 1951 

forced to flee. The camp was named after 

Major General Charles Devens who served in 

the War between the States and latar became Attorney General of the United Stal:Ee. 

When it was constructed early in 1917 a 

total of 9,000 civilians in nine weeks 

erected more than 600 buildings, built 200 

miles of roads, laid 25 miles of sewer and 

water pipes, strung 400 miles of telephone 

and electric wires, and dug a 3,000,000 

gallon well - all for $6,000,000. In the 

autumn of that year an additional $13,000, 

000 was spent for 800 additional buildlnge. 

Ex-pansion during World War II, totaling 

$25,000,000, included a nine-fold increase 

in area, the leasing of 325,000 acres for 

training purposes, and the erection of 

1,200 buldings. 

In World War I when it was occupied by 

the 76th Division, the Commanding Officer 

was Major General Harry F. Hodges. Also 

the Ca.mp housed the 12th (Plymouth) Division under Major General Harry P. McCain; 

during World War I, 800 persons died there 

of Spanish Influenza. The 26th Division, 

whiah fought at St. Mihiel, was demobilized there. 

Became A Fort In 1931 

' The status of Devens was changed from 

that of Camp to Fort in November 1931. Dlr-

(Continued on page 19) 

3 
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REF ID:A66514 e 

Importanee Of Transmission Seeurity 

(eunfld:eutial) 

by Major William M. Hamilton 

Transmission security plays an important role in military communications. In 

peacetime as well as in war, communicators 

must guard constantly against disclosing 

information which would be beneficial to 

the enemy. 

A survey ma.de by the Japanese during 

the period 8 December 1941 to 31 October 

1943 indicates that they were able to obtain vital information through the nonobservance of communication security precautions on the part of United States personnel. The survey states in part: 

"It may be seen in the accumulation of 

battle lessons which follow that making 

use of enemy communication is of great value in operations. In addition to perfecting our own communication security, we 

must do out utmost to develop our own operations advantageously by obtaining enemy 

intelligence through the use of radio." 

"It is well to have a separate enemy 

communication section attached to each ocmmand which has a direct part in the operation. Specialists should be made of interception personnel, to train them for 

fixed duties and to avoid changing their 

assignments ••. " 

"In the battle of the Coral Sea, plainlanguage communications which were used by 

the enemy {generally, scouting planes communicating the discovery of our ships) 1Bl8 

frequently inteFcepted, and we obtained 

material of considerable value to the conduct of operations." 

"In the same naval battle, the Australian and American Air Forces communicated 

to their base by plain language every movement made following discovery of Japanese 

unite. We were thus able to forecast the 

attacks of enemy planes through their communications, and to deduce the movements 

of enemy task forces. 

''When enemy planes raided Kiska,we were 

generally able to forecast it from the reports of enemy weather scouting planes 

prior to the attack." 

The interrogation of two Japanese intelligence officers, Commander Hideo Ozawa 

and Lt. Commander T. Satake, brought to 

light a number of useful facts about the 

nature, extent, and success of enemy efforts in the field of communication intelligence, especially traffic analysis. Both 

officers held key posts in the radio intelligence section of the Japanese Naval 

General Staff during most of the war. 

The city of Owada was the center of the 

activity described by Ozawa and Satake. 

Here, Allied transmissions were intercepted, copied, and sorted by areas. There 

were seven of these areas - the west coast 

of the United States, the Indian Ocean and 

five different sectors of the Pacific. 

Several officers were assigned to each 

area. Though usually unable to determine 

whether transmissions ca.rr.e from ships or 

shore stations, enemy analysts used direction finders to determine the point of 

origin. 

Ta.king Okinawa as an example, Satake 

made a statement as follows: 

"A month beforl" Okinawa, BAM3*** had a 

notable increase in transmissions. Ten 

days before your Okinawa operation, there 

was a marked increase in submarine repat"ts. 

These are easy to spot because we could 

get good direction-finder fixes a~ they 

closed in. When submarines changed from 

routine operational communications to urgent,we deduced that perhaps an air strike 

or landing might be in the offering, depending upon the tactical situation." 

Ozawa stated that the M:Lrshalls operation SUP"Plied the greatest amount of radio 

intellig3nce and allowed the Japanese sufficient time to notify the garrison of the 

impending attack. Regarding the basis of 

the prediction, he explained as follows: 

ASA Review