J. S69018/16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

MELVIN ROHE, JR., JOYCE A. ROHE, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

SUSAN SWINGLE AND REBEKAH J. : PENNSYLVANIA

HALBFOERSTER, :

:

Appellees :

:

v. :

:

D. REESE MEEHAN, TRUSTEE, JOHN :

MEEHAN, ANN MEEHAN, KERRY MEEHAN, :

ESTATE OF BARBARA J. MEEHAN AND : 

ALL UNKNOWN PERSONS CLAIMING BY :

THROUGH OR UNDER D. REESE :

MEEHAN, TRUSTEE :

:

:

APPEAL OF: ESTATE OF :

BARBARA J. MEEHAN : No. 344 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered January 25, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Sullivan County 

Civil Division at No.: 2014-CV-00084

 

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 21, 2016

Appellant, the Estate of Barbara J. Meehan, appeals from the January 

25, 2016 Order entered in the Sullivan County Court of Common Pleas 

declaring that a disputed Assignment was unambiguous and did not grant a 

perpetual one-half royalty interest in oil and gas leases concerning 62 acres 

 

* Retired Senior Judge Assigned to the Superior Court.
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located in Forks Township, Pennsylvania. We affirm on the basis of the trial 

court’s January 25, 2016 Opinion.

On October 31, 1949, the Rohes1executed an Oil and Gas Lease with 

H.R. Hirzel (“Hirzel”) for a primary term of 10 years regarding 62 acres of 

land located in Forks Township, Pennsylvania. On February 1, 1954, the 

Rohes executed an Assignment to “D. Reese Meehan, Trustee” (“Meehan”) 

for a one-half interest regarding the same 62 acres. The Assignment stated 

as follows:

ASSIGNMENT

LAWRENCE ROHE ET AL

TO

D. REESE MEEHAN, TRUSTEE

INTEREST IN OIL & GAS LEASE

ASSIGNMENT.

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That we, Lawrence 

Rohe Alverta Rohe; Elizabeth S. Rohe and Melvin Rohe; Donald 

Rohe, parties of the first and ASSIGNORS in consideration of 

THREE HUNDRED TEN ($310.00) DOLLARS, in hand paid by D. 

Reese Meehan, Trustee, the receipt whereof is hereby 

acknowledged, do hereby transfer, assign and set over unto D. 

Reese Meehan, Trustee an undivided one-half interest in certain 

Oil and Gas Lease or Leases made by me with “H.” R. Hirzel, and 

recorded in Sullivan County, Penna. in Deed Book Vol. 62 page 

247 Said land being in the Township of Forks County of Sullivan 

and State of Pennsylvania, bounded and adjoined as follows:

Covering 62 acres of land more or less.

 

1

Lawrence Rohe, Alverta Crouse Rohe, Melvin E. Rohe, Betty Sherman, and 

Donald R. Rohe, referred to collectively as “the Rohes.”
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This Assignment being subject to any former leases given 

by me for the same property, with the following exception:

That in the event, such lease should be terminated by 

Lessee before the expiration of the full term, which is sometimes 

known as the “Primary Term”, this assignment shall remain in 

full force and effect. The consideration herein mentioned being 

in full for all rentals due against this portion of said lease for the 

full term as set forth in the original lease. Notwithstanding, that 

the original Lessee or Lessees may terminate their lease before 

the term has expired, this portion so assigned shall by the full 

consideration set forth therein, remain in full force and effect for 

the remaining time of said term.

It is further understood and agreed that if this property 

should be re-leased by the Lessor, Lessee or Assignee of this 

lease, or any other person or persons, then this assignment shall 

run with the new lease without any farther remuneration.

This Assignment to be binding upon the heirs, executors, 

administrators and assigns of both parties hereto.

WITNESS our hands and seals this first day of February 

1954.

Lawrence Rohe

Alverta Rohe

Donald R. Rohe

Melvin E. Rohe

Elizabeth S. Rohe

Assignment, 2/1/54, R.R. at 42a.

On April 14, 1950, The California Company obtained Hirzel’s rights 

under the 1949 Oil and Gas Lease pursuant to an Assignment. On 

September 29, 1955, The California Company “cancel[led], release[d], 

quitclaim[ed], relinquish[ed,] and surrender[ed]” its rights under several 

leases, including the 1949 Oil and Gas Lease between Hirzel and the Rohes. 

Surrender of Leases, dated 9/29/55, at 1.
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Subsequently, the Rohes and Appellees executed several2 Oil and Gas 

Leases for the same 62 acres, including with Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC 

(“Chesapeake”). Chesapeake began withholding one-half of the Rohes’ 

royalty payment pursuant to the 1954 Assignment to Meehan, amounting to 

$13,126.14 as of May 21, 2015.

On December 5, 2014, Appellees filed the instant quiet 

title/declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that the 1954 Assignment 

to Meehan did not constitute a permanent conveyance of the one-half 

interest in royalty payments under all leases related to the 62 acres. 

Rather, Appellees argued that Meehan’s Assignment rights ended with The 

California Company’s surrender of rights in 1950 because the Assignment 

included limiting language regarding the duration and the scope of 

subsequent leases.

Appellant, through Answers, New Matters, and Counterclaims, asserted 

that the language included in the Assignment conveyed a permanent onehalf interest in the royalty payments under any subsequent lease in 

perpetuity. 

After submitting the case on briefs by agreement of all parties, the 

trial court issued an Opinion on January 25, 2016. The trial court concluded 

that the unambiguous language of the 1954 Assignment “clearly did not 

 

2 We need not describe the entire title history and each conveyance of the 

62 acres, and parcels thereof, as those facts are not relevant to the issue 

before us.
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intend for a perpetual grant of a one-half royalty interest.” Trial Court 

Opinion, 1/25/16, at 5.

On February 24, 2016, Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal.3 Both 

Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

The trial court erred in finding that the language of the 1954 

Meehan Assignment is unambiguous and does not apply to any 

and all future oil and gas leases.

Appellant’s Brief at 3. 

“Our standard of review in a declaratory judgment action is limited to 

determining whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion or 

committed an error of law.” Peters v. Nat’l Interstate Ins. Co., 108 A.3d 

38, 42 (Pa. Super. 2014). “We may not substitute our judgment for that of 

the trial court if the court’s determination is supported by the evidence.” Id.

We will ordinarily construe an assignment in accordance with the rules 

of construction governing contracts. Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Dep’t 

of Transp., 865 A.2d 825, 831 (Pa. 2005). Under the law of assignment, 

the assignee succeeds to no greater rights than those possessed by the 

assignor. Id. at 830.

The interpretation of any contract is a question of law and this 

Court’s scope of review is plenary. Moreover, we need not defer 

to the conclusions of the trial court and are free to draw our own 

inferences. In interpreting a contract, the ultimate goal is to 

 

3 Ann Meehan also timely appealed. Her appeal is docketed at 353 MDA 

2016.
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ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties as 

reasonably manifested by the language of their written 

agreement. ... This Court must construe the contract only as 

written and may not modify the plain meaning under the guise of 

interpretation.

Southwestern Energy Prod. Co. v. Forest Resources, LLC, 83 A.3d 177, 

187 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). “When construing agreements 

involving clear and unambiguous terms, this Court need only examine the 

writing itself to give effect to the parties’ understanding.” Id.

Appellant avers that: (1) “The trial court improperly considered and 

gave weight to the language of the title block of the recorded Assignment[,]” 

Appellant’s Brief at 11; (2) “The trial court failed to give effect to the 

construction of the 1954 Meehan Assignment and the clauses contained 

therein[,]” Appellant’s Brief at 12-16; and (3) “The trial court failed to 

consider that if more than one reasonable interpretation of the 1954 Meehan 

Assignment exists, it is necessary for a finder of fact to consider relevant 

extrinsic evidence[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 17-18.

Appellant’s arguments fail to consider the complete clause as whole. 

Rather, Appellant takes certain words and phrases out of context. The trial 

court’s Opinion properly considered all of the language of the assignment 

provision.

We conclude that the trial court’s determination is supported by the 

evidence and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit an 

error of law. We affirm on the basis of the trial court’s Opinion. See Trial 
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Court Opinion at 4-5 (concluding: (1) the assignment “is clear that the 

transfer is limited to lease or leases made by the grantors with H.R. Hirzel 

and the language is clear that it is a transfer, rather than a grant of 

interest[;]” (2) the language referencing the full or primary term “represents 

the parties’ intention that the Assignment was to be associated directly with 

the ‘Primary Term’ of the existing H.R. Hirzel lease[;] and (3) the provision 

regarding new leases was “intended to apply should the Grantees exercise 

their right to enter into another lease during the ‘Primary Term’ of the H.R. 

Hirzel lease and to apply in a situation in which the ‘Lessor, Lesse[e] or 

Assignee of this lease’ enter into subsequent assignment pertaining to the 

remaining interests in the H.R. Hirzel lease.”).4

The parties are instructed to attach a copy of the trial court’s January 

25, 2016 Opinion to all future filings.

Order affirmed.

 

4

Insofar as Appellant argues that “the parties should be given an 

opportunity to present extrinsic evidence to demonstrate the intent of the 

language used[,]” Appellant’s Brief at 17, we agree with the trial court’s 

conclusion that the assignment is unambiguous and such extrinsic evidence 

is not permitted. See Wert v. Manorcare of Carlisle PA, LLC, 124 A.3d 

1248, 1259 (Pa. 2015) (holding “[p]arol evidence is only admissible to 

resolve ambiguities, though ambiguities may be latent and created by 

extrinsic or collateral circumstances. An ambiguity is present if the contract 

may reasonably be construed in more than one way.” (citation omitted)).
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/21/2016
Circulated 10/31/2016 02:14 PM