.----REF- ID:A42878 

·. As a Technical expert -- not a policy maker -- in the intelligence field 

in one e£ the Detenae .Agencies tor O'ler thirt7 79ara, I am led to make the 

following observations on the debacle in which we find ourselves as regards 

" 

the Korean situations 

l a. On 7 Dec•ber 194.t the United States .a.riBBt..I. Forces auf'tered a •jor 

.. The several izweatigations 

or and the investigations 

orr effect on the intelligence 

am-.bq, we S11a.y\1...u.1 at least be in a better position 

telligence authorities ere not provided with authentic inf'ormation, 

or if' the)r ere, it was not used properq. In any case, from an intelligence 

point ot view, the u.s. is in a worse position now than it was before Pearl 

Harbor. The question arises: how and YlaT should this be the caaet 

2 a. On 20 Juq ~the Joint Committee on. the Investigation of tm 

Pearl Barbor Committee submitted its final report (Senate Document lo. 244). 

The following recommendation ha.a been extracted from its set ot five 

principal recommendations (p.2S3): 

1 

•. 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 10-28-2013 pursuantto E .0. 1352a ·----
. . 

REF ID:A42878 

"That there be a complete integration gt Ar!.'r and Ra!f intel-

~ience agencies in Order to &Void the pittall!._Of divided reaeon• 

sibiUt1 which exeeriance hu made 10 abundantg apparent; that !!229 

etf ecting a un1f.1ed intelligence, officers be selected tor intell!gange 

work whb poaseas th! bacW-o~, 2enchant, and capacitz tor such work; 

and that thez be •intained in.the work tor an extend.5_.eeriod of time 

in order that th!f !1!f become ateeeed in the ramiticationa and. r!fiMll!nt• 

S:~h!i:~_tield and m±!?..t this reservoir or knowledge in eyalatipg •terial 

received ••• • Etticiant iptalligenoa services H• 3u& as 

!f&antial in tim9 of Ptagl IS in W, and Qia bz:npQ)I ot our arJlld 

_.en1e11 mat alJ!&YI Ill ACcQrdtd tu impod;apt roll '!high it 4o•1n11.• 

["tq •phaa11J. 

b. The following ia the introductory statement to the aeries ot 25 

recommenda.t~ons concerning •supervisory, administrative, and organizational 

deficiencies in our milit&rT and naval establlahmants rev•led by the Pearl 

Harbor investigation• (p,253)1 

•The Committee has be~n intrigued throughout the Paarl ~rbor 

proceedings b;y one enigmatical and paramount question& !hy. jith 

1ame qf the a:ll!!L~§alligpce a'ftil;able in our hiatol"Y ••• --

!!hy_ 11• it possible tor a barl Barbor ~e occur? f Committee 1 a 

eapbaaiU • ; • lundaaentalq, these considerations reflect 

auperviso1'7, a.dJD1nistrf&t1ve, and orga.Qizational deticienoiea which 

existed in our llilital'T and la.val eatabliahllents in the dqa before Paarl 

Harbor ••• • We desire, however, to Btlbllit thee• prinoiplea tor the 

consideration of our A.rrq and B&V7 establiahQlenta in the earnest hope 

l!:!!t something constructive may be accomplished that wi~d our national 
-REF ID:A42878 

defense ~ preclud•..a..?epetiY-.gg_et the~1:!.P..llE~•.!!!be1" · 7, 19A 

f»r apbaais_7 

c. The following are t'io of the set ot 25 recommendations referred to 

in Par • .R aboves 

•1. Operational and intelligence work requires centralization ot 

authorit7 and clear-cut allocation ot reaponsibilit7.• (p.254) 

* * * * * 

•s. The coordination and proper evaluation ot intelligence in 

. . times of stress 1111st be insured by' continuit7 of service and . . centralization ot respouibillt7·in competent officials •••• 

Beverthelesa, there is substantial basis, from a review ot the 

Pearl Harbor investigation in its entiret7, to conclude that the 

vat• ot bandli ng intellinnce yaa seriously at fault and th,g.t the 

aacμritY gt the la.tigp cg be ingred ong through contimitx ot 

urvica 1nd_untra;l.1zation 9' regponaib\.Ut:y in tho11 cl]qm with 

handling intelligapqe•. l-J/'J.,/L// ftq •phasis_7 (p.257) 

3 a. lxactq tour 7ears have passed since the Joint Committee submitted 

i-£-s repen. In calling attention to ·the aupe!'V"iaory, adllinistrat1ve, and 

organizat~onal deficiencies in our military and naval establishments, the 

Committee noted in its introductory statement that •It is recognized that 

m&DJ' ot the det:Lcieneiea rft'ealed b7 our investigation ll81' verr probabq . . have alread1' been corrected as a result ot the experiences ot the war,• Have 

they all been corrected 1 B.r no meaaa -- not even the most important ones. . . 

Bas the Joint Committee' a •earnest hope ~hat something constructive •117 be 

accoapliahed that will aid our national def'ense and preclude a repetition ot 

the diaster of December 7, 194111 been realimed•. The Korean debacle speaks 
. . 

" 

REF ID:A42878 

e ~ONFIE>ENlllAL. 

Consider the tollow1ng1 

~· Do we now h&ve •a complete integration ot Arrq and •VT intelligence 

agencies 1D order to avoid the pitfalls ot divided responsibilit711 , as recommended 

b7 the Joint Committee! Faz trDll it. We now have three such .agencies in the 

Department ot Defense instead of two, as •s the case before Pearl Harbors the 

Air Force,. established as a separate ServiCe after Pearl Barbor, also. had to. have 

its ewii 1Dtell1ge.nce organization. The situation is hr worse tban before P~arl 

Barbor in respect· to this question ot inteP.tion of.intelligence agencies. 

·Whereas before Pearl Barbor there were tor all practical purposes, onq tm 

such agencies in the Government as a 1'hole, in the U.S.· there are now at . least fitteep operating agencies and/or coordinating bodies h&Ting something 

or other to do with intelligences 

l) Director ot llltelligena• 

u •. s. Anq 

2) Director of Intelligence, 

u. s. •'VJ' 

J) Director ot Intelligenoe, 

U • s. Air Force 

4)·:1 cute: al Joint Iiltelligence Committee (JCS) 

S) Intelligence Adviao17 Committee (Interdepartmental) 

6) Armed Forces Sec1irit7 Aganq 

(AFSA) . 

7 f Armed Forcea Securit7 Al•DC1' 

Council (AFSAC) · 

8 Ar1Q" Security Aa811C7 (ASA) 

4 

(9) •v Secmr1t7 :AB•11C7 (OP-202) 

(10) Air Fo:rce Security Seryice (.AFSS) 

(11) Central Intelligelice Agenc;r 

(12) Ottice of the Special Aaaistant to 

the Secreta.1"1' et State ·ror Research 

and Intelligenae • 

(13) Director or Intelligence, 

Atomic Energy Commission 

(14) Federal Bureau ot IDYeatigation 

(15) United States Cemmunicationa 

Intelligence Board. 

~ ·~ ='!.. 1',#1;~ , .. ;:.-":"~ ~r..I' ._,, ' !::· .... -.. , ~ • 'j. g.@J':%!r'" w~~~-~ & 'Ai-:· 
REF ID:A42878 

Each of these agencies ia constantq and conscientiouaq striving 

to •intain· its own prestige and prerogatives; not onq that, but all 

thoae engaged in intelligence operations compete with one another tor 

funds, and the funds are quite limited tor intelligence. (Bllt there is 

plenty of money t~ erect a continental radar tence to give warning, 

about 30 - 60 ainute1, ot an air at~k on the u.s.) 

c. Have the Defense agencies tollcnred the recommendation •that 

upon attecting a unified in~e~ligence,_ otfioe~a be selected tor intelligence work wha possess the bac~ound, penchant, am capacity tor such 

work"7 Far trom it. (It 'll011ld al.moat. ae•, in tact, that possession ot 

these traits actua~ gisqualitiea an officer tor auqh assignment.) Have 

the men selected been ••intained in the work tor an extended period ot 

time in order that th8J' mq become steeped in the ramif'ications and 

refinements ot their t1eld and employ this reservoir ot knowledge in 

~aluati.ng Mterial received• 7 I.et these t~ts speak tor th•selvean 

~ 

• 

Since Pearl Barbor the .Army,tor inatance, baa had NN1t Bi~ectors ot 

Intelligence; not a single one_ ot them had a dq's working knowledge 

or aetual experience in the field of intelligence betore his assigmnent 

to the position. In the put_ five years there have been two Directors 

of laval Intelligence; and the Air Force,_since its establishment aa a 

separate Service onlJ' three years age, alrea~ has its a~cond Director et 

Intelligence, the first one lasting in office lesa than one year. The 

CIA; created in 19"' baa its third Director alreadT, and talk about a fourth 

became current months ago. And who ia said to be the selected auccesaor 

to the present incUJ1bent -- a 11&11 wll experienced in Intell1gence7 lot 

at all. And he is an old and sick man, to ~oot. ID tomer dqs there 

5 

,,- . :. . ~ r.;, .....,... • ...._ •- -·- .. • 
-REF--ID :A42878 

9eoNFIDEN ffAL 

might have been some excuse tor ••l•cting aa Directer• ot Intelligenoe·otticera 

troa some arm auch aa Inf'ant17, Caval.r7, etc., but since Intelligence baa 

coae to be so complex technioallJ' and so vital stra~eg1calq, it would 

eeem that nperience 1n the f'ield. should be a sine qua non tor the selection at 

a director ot intelligence. Would one expect the Sip.al Corps or the A.riv, 

or the 1&97 Cemmunication ~nice, or Air Force-Comm1micat1ona to be 

operated aat1atactoril1'·1t the men selected to be the heads ot those 

organization• knew nothing about commmd.cations betore their aelectien.T 

"llUll:IJ'iM:H 

d. Ia there !:BI at1chan1• todq whereb7 the data produced b;y 

technical operations in the whole field of intelligence are correctq 

evaluated, properq disa•1Dated. and quickq acted upon b.Y a cegtrali1ed 

authoJ:"it.77 CUT TJ;le Korean debacle speak• for itself in this regard. Two 

7•ars attar the Pearl Barber iDveatigation had been completed and none ot 

the Caamittee•a recommendatiena bad been adopted, a plan •a submitted tor 

the establishment ot at least a·central evaluation and dissemination 

· organi• tor cGllllllUDicatione intelligence produce(l. within the Armed 

S~icea. The plan waa discussed at length, but nothing happened - it 

waa•U hoo-ed• to death, 'by the apraeiea concerned. Had it been ad~pted, 

it might at lea~t h&Te giYen some warning aa to Korea. It, at least, 

would have been the .2!Y:z agenq that could have do1:19 ao. 

e. In the Yariou fields ot intelligence is there .!1,1' bocV' which baa 

the final authority and ia competent te9hnica11r to establish Yalld priorities 

in the collection and processing ot Intelligence7 Ob'vioual1', the answer is in 

the negative, for there waa a plethora of sources tor aa.ch intelligence which, 

it it bad been preduced and. correctl.T evaluated would, 1n all probabili'tJ", 

have indicated quite cleal"q what was brewing in lorea. An action on llUCh 
' . ' . REF ID:A42878 

long and extene1Te p:repaTation. 

4. When will it. become nident to the Commander-in-Chief t~ we 

need a thorough.houeeclaning in the whole field ot U.S. Intelligence and 

perhaps a Czar in tbat field to OV"er-ride inter-senice and inter-agenq 

rivalries, bickeringe; and competion tor tmada, preogat1ves and preatipf 

Or 1s it too late alread77 

7 

- _____________________________ ...:.._ 
REF ID:A42878 

IJ eoNFIDEN lllAt. 

Sa. One_ot the moat important segments in the •hole field or 

intelligence ia that occupied by comnnm.icationa intelligence. There ia 

reason to belieye that a complete consolidation at ta~ilitiea and integration 

ot operations in that portion ot ~he intelligence field could work, and work 

aucceastul.l,J, 1t the entire problem were handled, realiaticalq, at the 

highest governmental leyel. The following are absolute prerequisites to 

au.ch aucceaas 

(1) The designation ot an energetic, forceful, and intelligent 

llBD who has had actual experience in the fields ot intelligence and :who 

would be given full command ot all comunicationa intelligence activities. 

llllRQ 

(2) Bia rank and authority aver the indiYidaal Senice intelligence 

ch~fa ahould be clear and unqueatiomble. The delegation, to mch a 

connande:r, ot almost dictorial powers wer all coamm.1cat1on illtellipnce 

activities should be subject onq to the authorit7 ot the Prea~dent. 

(3) Be should be maintained in office continuousq, Sllbject onq 

to the aucceaatal performance of hie mission. . 

(4) Be ahould be given full responaibilit;r tor the collection of 

raw material, its processing into readable form, and the eyaluation, 

and diaaemination ot the. final product. 

b. Action on such· a propoaal aa the foregoing would necesaariq involve 

the diaclolNl"e or more intormation tban baa eYer betor._!t been made public. 

However, it would seem that °public adaiaaion o£ the fact that cOmmunicationa 

intelligence can be and otten ia a prillaJ7 potential weapon would be a small 

pr"ice to P81' for having an effective erp.n1zat1en which, when established, 

could take care et itaelt aa regard.a publicity, eapecial.q in view or the 

exiatence of_ Public I.aw 513. 

-....,--v--;-, ~, ,:-";_'--:-_._"';'"""; ~~-~-:-:;~::--:. .• -~~"~az-·. """:lj~,::~~" -;;:,.:,;---
..,,.. --:---.-- REF ID:A42878 It i( •• 

• CONFIDE• I IAL: 

c. SeCUl"it7 restrictions plqed a large part in the failure to use 

collllllUDicationa intelligence properq in the case of Pearl Barbor disaster. 

The 11&11.e reatrietiona mq be in part to blaae tor the present. plight of . . 

communications intelligence activities. Thq have largeq prnented the 

sto1'7 ot t:tie part plq'ed by these activities in our winning World War II trom 

reaching the highest leYel persona who, in the final a~sis, control 

them. It 8e81l8 time to acknowledge that such activities are being conducted. 

The high level personnel ot other countries umloubtedq know that tact. 

1fh7 not tell our own people -· and thus gain the public support we need. 

tor these activit1es7 

eaNFIDENTIAl:;. 

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