Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1604-CR-720 | November 18, 2016 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Ann M. Sutton

Marion County Public Defender

Agency–Appellate Division

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Matthew B. Mackenzie

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jeffrey Murto,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

November 18, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1604-CR-720

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Allan W. Reid, 

Judge Pro Tempore

Trial Court Cause No.

49G10-1503-CM-8009

Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1604-CR-720 | November 18, 2016 Page 2 of 6

Case Summary

[1] Appellant-Defendant Jeffrey Murto was convicted of Class A misdemeanor 

criminal trespass after he refused to leave the Irvington Public Library (“the 

Library”) after being instructed to do so by a Library employee. On appeal, 

Murto contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. 

Concluding otherwise, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The Library is located on East Washington Street in Indianapolis. Michael 

Hylton is a Public Services Associate with the Indianapolis Public Library who 

was assigned to work at the Library1 on the date in question. The rules 

governing patron conduct are posted in both the lobby of the Library and on the 

Library’s website. Violation of the Library rules may result in expulsion from 

the Library. As part of his position as a Public Services Associate, Hylton had 

the authority to ask patrons to leave for violations of the Library’s rules 

governing patron conduct. 

[3] On March 6, 2015, Murto went to the Library. While at the Library, Murto 

became involved in a noisy “ruckus” with another patron. Tr. p. 49. Fearing 

that a fight was about to break out, Hylton approached Murto and the other 

patron. Hylton first engaged Murto, a frequent Library patron, because he felt 

 

1

 The Library is a branch of the Indianapolis Public Library.
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that, in light of his previous encounters with Murto at the Library, he had some 

level of rapport with Murto. The other patron left the Library while Hylton was 

speaking with Murto about his conduct, i.e., yelling and loud talking, which 

violated the Library’s rules. In the interest of maintaining decorum, Hylton 

repeatedly asked Murto to leave the Library. Murto refused, instead opting to 

continue to yell and to loudly tell Hylton that he was “Hitler and the Gestapo, 

and was taking away his rights.” Tr. p. 52. Murto also loudly told Hylton to 

“have another donut.” Tr. p. 53.

[4] After approximately five minutes, and numerous warnings to Murto, Hylton 

called the police. When the police arrived, Hylton, another Library employee, 

and the responding officers escorted Murto to the lobby of the Library. Murto 

refused the continued requests of Hylton and the responding officers to leave

the Library. Once in the lobby, Hylton gave Murto a trespass notice indicating 

that Murto was, at least temporarily, not welcome at the Library. Hylton also 

read this notice aloud to Murto.

[5] Eventually, the responding officers were able to get Murto to step outside the 

Library. Once outside the Library, Murto positioned himself under the 

Library’s awning and refused to move further. Despite clear instruction that the 

area where he was standing constituted Library property, being told to leave at 

least fifteen additional times, and being warned that he would be arrested for 

criminal trespass if he refused to leave, Murto refused to leave the Library. 

Even though the responding officers considered arrest their “last resort,” given 
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Murto’s continued refusal to leave the Library, Murto was eventually arrested 

for criminal trespass. Tr. p. 103. 

[6] Also on March 6, 2015, Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (“the State”) 

charged Murto with one count of Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass and 

one count of Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. Following a February 

8, 2016 jury trial, Murto was found guilty of Class A misdemeanor criminal 

trespass. The jury did not reach a unanimous decision with respect to the 

disorderly conduct charge. The State subsequently moved to dismiss the 

disorderly conduct charge. At sentencing, the trial court sentenced Murto to a 

term of 365 days with credit for time served and the remaining time suspended 

to probation. As a condition of Murto’s probation, Murto was ordered to 

complete forty hours of community service. The trial court also ordered Murto 

not to have any contact with Hylton and to stay away from the Library.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Murto contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for 

Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative 

evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is 

the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess 

witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether 

it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, 

when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, 

they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. 
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Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence 

overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The 

evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn 

from it to support the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (citations, emphasis, and 

quotations omitted). “In essence, we assess only whether the verdict could be 

reached based on reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence 

presented.” Baker v. State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012) (emphasis in 

original). Upon review, appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or assess 

the credibility of the witnesses. Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind. 

2002).

[8] Indiana Code section 35-43-2-2(b)(2) provides that a person who “not having a 

contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally refuses to leave 

the real property of another person after having been asked to leave by the other 

person or that person’s agent ... commits criminal trespass, a Class A 

misdemeanor.” Thus, in order to convict Murto of Class A misdemeanor 

criminal trespass, the State was required to prove that Murto did not have a 

contractual interest in the Library and that he knowingly or intentionally 

refused to leave the Library after having been asked to do so by the Library’s 

agent. See Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 142-43 (Ind. 2012). 

[9] It is undisputed that Murto did not have a contractual interest in the Library. 

The only question at issue in the instant appeal is whether the evidence is 
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sufficient to prove that Murto knowingly or intentionally refused to leave the 

Library after having been asked to do so by the Library’s agent. We conclude 

that it is.

[10] The evidence clearly demonstrates that throughout the entire episode, which 

lasted approximately thirty minutes, Murto was continuously and repeatedly 

told by both Hylton and the responding police officers to leave the Library. 

Hylton also read aloud and gave Murto a trespass notice which indicated that 

he had to leave the Library. In light of these facts, we conclude that the 

evidence is sufficient to prove that Murto knowing or intentionally refused to 

leave the Library after having been instructed to do so by the Library’s agent. 

Murto’s claim to the contrary amounts to nothing more than an invitation for 

this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.2 See Stewart, 768 

N.E.2d 433, 435.

[11] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Brown, J., concur. 

 

2

 Further, to the extent that Murto cites to Olsen v. State, 663 N.E.2d 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1996) for the proposition that he could not be found guilty of criminal trespass because he had 

a reasonable belief that he had a right to remain at the Library, we observe that the facts of this 

case do not support a determination that Murto’s claimed belief was reasonable.