Preparations For The Polish War 

Eeouffdeu t:tal) 

Translated from original German materials By 

Dr. Ray W. Pettengill 

Syste!llB.tic penetration of the Polish State by German espionage many years 

before the invasion is related in the accompanying installment of the story 

of German Communications Intelligence. Success of several large intercept 

stations and the solving of Polish air net encryption in 1925 made the Polish Air order of battle available. 

No doubt a number of books, articles, 

and other publications will appear on the 

war between Germany and Poland, which began in the morning hours of l September 

1939. They will cov~r the course of the 

operations, the history of events preceding the war, and many details. We do not 

intend to speak of all these things here, 

but shall deal with a part of the history 

of the preliminaries of this war into which 

relatively few people had any insight. 

The question as to when the preliminary 

history of this war against Poland began 

is difficult to answer, since this preliminary period is longer than is generally 

assumed. We can state with certainty that 

the earliest beginnings of preparation for 

war against Poland go 'te.ckto the period of 

1923. From then on there began a systemat:lc penetration of the entire Polish state 

by the German espionage service using socalled "confidence men." 

The first part of this work consisted in 

a current coverage of all events in Polish 

official agencies, in the armed forces, in 

the government, in industry, in transportaiion, and in all other branches of public 

life. The second part of this activity of 

the "confidence men" or the German ooun:ta:-

intelligence service consisted in infiltrating and under-mining the morale of the ~eople and the military power of resisianoe 

of the Polish State in a practical way. 

Army of Agents Enlisted 

The b:ts:ls for this work was exceptionally 

8 

favorable in the Poland of those days. A 

great many Germans had become Polish citizens, although they were not at heart in 

sympathy with the Polish state. It was now 

a quest:fon of enlisting these people for the 

work by playing on their feelings as Germans. In the counterintelligence grotllof 

the Ministry of Defense a special section 

"Poland" was set up at that time within tbe 

framEnlork of Section I. This unit had existed before, it is true, but its intensive 

work began about 1923. From here on it endeavored to spin a net of agents and "confidence men" over all Poland. This was 

d.om partly from Berlin directly, but partly through the counterintelligence offices 

at Koenigsberg, Frankfurt, anlBreslau, and 

from their advanced branch stationd of 

which there were a number. Use was also 

ma.de of the cooperation of various private 

organizations for gathering information, 

and of official and semi-official agencies 

which were made available for the purpose. 

The work started oft' rather quickly and 

well, so that after some two years there 

was hardly a place of any size in Poland 

where there was not a confidential agent 

of the German espionage service, or at 

least a purveyor of information. 

At the beginning of 1926 the espionage 

service against Poland was greatly intensified. It is not known what the reasons 

were, but in any event a considerable increase in spy activity began about that 

time. It may be that several accidents 

contributed to this, since shortly before 

this, the German counterintelligence servASA Review 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 11-13-2014 pursuant to E .0. 1352a 
REF ID:A60251 

ice had succeeded in enlisting some ver7 

useful agents. . Among them was a man who 

worked in the Regulations Of'f'ice of' the 

Polish War Ministry. From 1926 on photographs of' Polish service regulations were 

received in 'Berlin from this man. Two 

other people were in the so-called D.O.K. 

(Corps Areas) and f'rom these photosraphs 

were received constantly of' tables of' organization, service instructions, summaries 

of' formations, strength sulll!lla.ries, etc. As 

a result German espionage was very fully 

informed respecting every branch of the 

.service and nearly every troop unit. Regulations and instructions for maneuvers 

likewise came into German hands in this 

manner. The first important shipment from 

the confidential agent in the Polish Ministry of' War was a lengthy set of instructions for the Polish air force which was 

then holding its first large scale exercises. 

Deserters From the General Staff' 

Occasionally the Qrman espionage service 

was lucky in that deserters from the Polish armed forces came over and told all 

sorts of things. Among them there were 

also officers, even officers of the general etaff; thus, for example, in 1930-1931 

in the course of seven or eight months, 

three officers of the Polish general staff 

appeared in Berlin and laid most welcome 

information on the table. 

Along with this exploration of Poland 

purely by means of ee-pinnap:e, the Germans 

also carried on a very active radio intercept service against this country. For 

this purpose, the intercept stations in 

Koenigsberg, Frankfurt on the Oder, and 

Breslau were available. Fully half of the 

commitment was against Poland, and they 

i1.tercepted all Polish diplomatic radio 

traffic as well as the traffic of the army 

and the air force. We shall speak about 

successes with the diplomatic radio traffic later. For the moment we shall describe Polish military traffic. 

M;)st fruitful in this regard were the 

German successes against the Polish air 

force. This had been under development 

since 1922, and by the beginning of 1926 

had essentially completed its structure 

from an organizational standpoint. For the 

weather service, the starting and landing 

service, and for the entire administration 

of the Polisp air force, a net of high 

September-October 1951 

powered radio stations had been set up, of 

which the Poles made liberal use. These 

stations (there were ten in all) were covered by the German intercept service day 

and nigtit, and every transmission was carefully noted and passed on to the evaluation center of the German intercept service 

in 'Berlin. A considerable portion of the 

information was enciphered. However, at 

the end of 1925 the Germans succeeded in 

solving the cryptographic system; with this' 

they now got a wonderful insight into all 

that was happening with the Polish air 

torce. Nothing ~emained secret. The7 even 

knew every single Polish plane with its 

-cyp,, serial number, and individual number, 

and they gained this knowledge in the simplest manner imaginable. 

Each Plane Noted 

The Polee announced by radio every start 

and every landing of a plane, with a statement of' the direction of' the flight, the 

time of starting or landing, the type, the 

serial nu~ber, and the individual number 

of the plane - all this in plain text. 

Hence if a plane of the Polish air force 

flew, for exemple, from Lemberg to Lida 

with an intermediate landing in Warsaw and 

returned by the same route to Lemberg, the 

plane was reported not less than eight 

times by radio. On the average there were 

some 60 to 80 of' these landings reported 

daily. All the planes mentioned were entered in a card catalog and at the expiration of a few months one had a complete 

survey of the stock of planes, together 

with the momentary assignment to one of 

the six· Polish air regiments. Soon the 

Germans also knew the condition of each 

plane and after a few years they knew precisely, (using coefficients of depreciation) the degree of serviceability of the 

individual machines. 

In contrast to the army, where the Poles 

made little use of radio-telegraphy, the 

Polish air force worked very diligently in 

this field. On many days hundreds of telegrams could be intercepted. Especially 

lively was this traffic before and during 

Polish maneuvers in which the air force 

participated and also at pure air maneuvers. The results were eo informative that 

these maneuvers could be followed as ex:-

act ly at the map table ae if one were present as an eyewitness. 

With regard to the Polish army radio 

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RRF ID· n.6n2~1 service, German ~cceases were not qui td"- ~een ::!:'~ ~"'the western powers 

so a.'bunOa.nt for - as already men"tioned - ~he e:rmy was ve'Z:7 reserved in its use of r~dio. Only at exercises and. maneuvers 

could any insight be gained. 

The first German work in this field was 

with the Polish maneuvers near Lida in 

1929, the course of which could be reconstructed abnost completely. 

To be sure, the question remained open 

whether the value of disguise of Polish 

radio traffic in the army might not be 

problematic, and be valid only in peacetime; the Polish radio service cloaked itself in an excess of security at the expense of the transmission of informatim. 

In case of war the urgent necessity for 

means of communications would come into 

the foreground and there was danger that 

then the whole system of radio camoUf'U!ge 

would be upset. This system was extremely 

complicated. Every radio station worked 

always with three different call signs simultaneously and also on its own wave 

lengths. :Both call signs and wave lengths 

changed daily, sometimes even twice a day. 

It called for a g.reat deal of skill to 

pick out any relatively certain relation 

under normal conditions. It was inevitable 

that war conditions with all their accidental factors, disturbances, and disquietudes would severely try this system. In 

1928 the Germans began collaborating with 

tihe Lithuanians • The man in charge of inte 111gence in the Lithuanian Ministry of 

'War had given unofficially his consent for 

this collaboration, and soon there was an 

exchange of information between the two 

secret services. Of course, they were not 

too frank on either side and only revealed 

as much as they thought advisable in view 

of the situation. Later there was also cooperation with Esthonia; in the main, however, this was directed against the Soviet 

Union, just as the cooperation between the 

German and Finnish intercept services was 

directed solely against Russia. 

Diplomatic Traffic Read 

In regard to the cryptanalytic activity 

carried out by the Germans against Poland, 

it may be stated that a large part of the 

diplomatic exchange of information between 

the Polish Government and its representatives abroad could be read. This gave 

excellent insight into the activity of Polish diplomacy and into the relations be10 

Of' course, the Poles had set up an intercept service against Ge,rmal]1'. They had 

a very good base for this since the Danzig 

Corridor gave them the chance to encircle 

East Prussia and also to work successfull.¥ 

against the ma.in portion of Germany. '.but, 

in contrast to the French and Czech 1nterC8J>t uni ts, this was so organized and knew 

how to disguise itself so .completely that 

.nothing became known in Germany about this 

service until 1931. Neither its organization, its practical operation, nor the 

scope of its results was known. In 1931 a 

Polish sergeant, who had worked for several years in the Polish intercept service 

and most recently in the Polish intercept 

station in Graudenz, deserted. He reported to the German counterintelligence and 

in his interrogations revealed very valuable details regarding what was going on 

in the Polish intercept service. Now the 

entire organization and technique of the 

service became known in Germany. Moreover 

he was in a position to state which German 

radio circuits were monitored by preference, and which German cryptographic systems had been solved or were being worked 

on by the Polish cryptanalytic service. He 

g1.-ve valuable hints as to weaknesses in the 

German radio service as seen by the enemy. 

Along with the interception of Polish 

radio traffic, the German intercept service was naturally concerned with checking 

on Polish wire connections leading out of 

Poland. The .Polish Corridor gave a favorable base for this. Danzig, too, was wonderfully adapted for getting at the Polish 

wire net. It goes without saying that the 

'telephone conversations of the Polish embassy in :Berlin and of all Polish consular 

representatives were listened to and evaluated by the Germans. 

Intensified Spying in '34 

A new intensification of the entire German spy service began in 1934. From now 

on there ensued, along w1th straight spy 

activity, an undermining of the powers of 

resistance of the Polish armed forces. A 

gigantic network of agents and "confidence 

men" was built up. The recruiting of these 

people was not always carried on in a very 

nice manner but pressure and coercion were 

employed. All offices of the Polish armed 

forces, police, railway, or post were now 

ASA Review 
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infiltrated by rrcori.ndence men" who~ 

working for the German espionage service. 

Reconnaissance of our forti.fi.cations was 

carried on with great zeal. The reward 

paid by the Germans for such services was 

surprisingly small, and many very valuable 

reports were settled for with sums of less 

than 100 German marks. It may be said that 

from 19.34 on virtually no thing regarding 

the Polish armed f oraes and national defense remained hidden from the German spy 

service. Every troop movement, the organization, equipment, and amament of military uni ts, all plans, and mobilization 

measures were reported currently. 

The so-called VDA (Volksbund fuer das 

Deutschtum im Auslazrle - /People's League 

of German Culture AbroadT played a special role in this worlc.- A central office 

was set up in Berlin for this organization 

which might be compared with a government 

ministry. From here thousams.of connecttions radiated into foreign countries am 

especially into Poland; from here under 

the protective cloak of purel.y cultural 

service for Germans abroad an enormous spy 

acti. Vi ty was carried on. 

The reconnaissance of Poland was again 

strengthened beginning in 19 .36 an:i from 

the end of 1938 increased to a regular 

drum fire. 

Change in Zero Hour 

It is generally known that the war against Poland began at 0545 hours on 1 September 1939. It may be less well known 

that the ai;tack had been planned for 27 

August and that all preparations had been 

made for t.ha t date. Late in the evening 

of 26 Augu.st it suddenly occured to Adolph 

Hitler to Fut off the time for the attack. 

What irrluced him to make this change is 

not clear. Perhaps his astrologer was responsible, or one of his well kno1m. whims. 

In short, aoout ten o• clock in the evening 

telephones began to ring, teletypes began 

to rattle, radio stations to function, a.rd 

a flood of thousands of orders tried to 

reach the advanced uni ts in ti.me to take 

account of a new situation am to prevent 

the troops from launching an attack. The 

fact that it was possible to get these orders through in tine was a masterful perfoI'Illince of the German commwtication system. 

Without doubt the Polish communication 

IQ~'5.0£itlhave noticed this activity in 

the German communications net. It must 

have been a very serious warning for the 

Poles. Any specialist knows what such a 

change of decision means in modern warfare 

in an age where there is an intercept service. This naive change in the plan long 

since precisely fitted together with all 

the dangers inherent in such a change was 

the first indication of the pr.i.mi.tive quality of Hi tler1 s thinking in regard to 

military matters. 

Data Available for Bombers 

It is not necessary to depict the course 

of the campaign against Polanl; competent 

people wlll discuss this throughly, insofar as it has not not already been done. 

The focal point of the commitment on the 

German side lay 'Id th the air force. Its 

work was facilitated by the fact that the 

spying on Poland had yielded such precise 

data that the German bombers could work 

with precision. The Polish air force was 

practi.caJJ.y eliminated in a very short 

time. Lt. General Kesselring, who had pr&-

pared the plans, the trainir.g, and the 

commitment of the young Genuan air force 

had been appointed commamer of Air Fleet 

?lumber One against the Poles. He belonged 

to the type which ru1hlessly abuses power 

and by brutal methods he now accomplished 

wha ~ he had prepared for over the years. 

Three weeks sufficed to settle Poland 

completely from a military point of view. 

But with that, the fate of the Poles and 

particularly of the Polish Jews was by no 

means settled, since the real suffering of 

these people was only now beginning. On 

this subject we cannot report more in detail within the limits of this work. I recall from those days the broadcast of the 

Vatican in which it was siad: "The terrors 

and unpardonable excesses against a helpless and now homeless people, the Poles, 

are confirmed by reports of eyewitnesses, 

ani cannot be repudiated. The worst thing 

is the cynical suppression of everything 

which religious acti. vi ty leads one to expect, and this on the part of one or the 

most pious people of Europe. 11 

At that time, when negotiations for surren:ier were being conducted in the command 

car of General of the Infantry Blaskowi tz 

with representatives of the Polish armed 

forces, the leader of the Polish delegat-

(Continued on page 16) 

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WAR IN THE ETHER 

(Cont•d from page ll.) 

ion said: "Remember, 11 gent1emen, the fortunes of war can turn." On the German 

side that was regarded ~hen as a peice of 

incredib1e inso1ence. At that t.i.Ine they 

sti11 ha.d no idea of the frightfUl. manner 

in which these words were to be .fulfilled 

for Germany a few years later. 

p. 16