COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2016COA168 

Court of Appeals No. 15CA1007 

Arapahoe County District Court No. 14CR695 

Honorable David W. Marshall, Judge 

Honorable Elizabeth Beebe Volz, Judge 

The People of the State of Colorado, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

Tio Everette Carr, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED 

Division VII 

Opinion by JUDGE BERGER 

Terry and Booras, JJ., concur 

Announced November 17, 2016 

Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Joseph G. Michaels, Assistant Attorney 

General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee 

Danyel S. Joffe, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for DefendantAppellant 
1 

¶ 1 A jury convicted defendant, Tio Everette Carr, of possession of 

a schedule II controlled substance with the intent to distribute and 

obstructing government operations. His sole contention on appeal 

is that the non-consensual search of his mouth, during which the 

police discovered unlawful drugs, violated the Fourth Amendment 

and the trial court thus erred in failing to suppress the evidence 

obtained during that search. Because the search did not violate 

Carr’s Fourth Amendment rights, we affirm. 

I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History 

¶ 2 A police surveillance team identified the vehicle Carr was 

riding in as possibly being involved in drug sales. As the vehicle left 

a parking lot, the driver failed to use his turn signal. The 

surveillance team tasked two officers to follow the vehicle. When 

the officers observed the vehicle speeding and weaving into another 

lane, they pulled it over. 

¶ 3 The first officer approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and 

smelled alcohol and marijuana. While the first officer was 

approaching the driver, the second officer approached the 

passenger side of the vehicle and asked Carr for his driver’s license. 

Carr was silent while handing it to the officer and would not look at 
2 

the officer or verbally respond to his questions. Throughout this 

interaction, Carr had an unlit cigarette hanging from his lips. 

¶ 4 The officers then requested that the driver and all of his 

passengers, including Carr, exit the vehicle and sit on the curb. 

¶ 5 While the passengers were sitting on the curb, the second 

officer noticed that Carr was making chewing motions with his jaw 

and had a “golf-ball sized” bulge in his cheek. The officer pointed 

this bulge out to another officer within Carr’s hearing and, 

according to the testimony of one of the officers at the suppression 

hearing, upon hearing that, Carr started “squirming” and 

“fidget[ing] around.” 

¶ 6 From his training and experience, the second officer was 

aware that drug dealers sometimes would put drugs in their 

mouths when confronted by the police. He also knew the police 

surveillance team suspected the stopped vehicle was involved in 

drug sales. Based on his experience, Carr’s silence, and Carr’s 

actions, the second officer asked another officer to handcuff Carr. 

¶ 7 Carr then began to attempt to chew and swallow the objects in 

his mouth. He refused the officers’ commands to spit them out. He 

squirmed and thrashed to keep his head out of the officers’ reach. 
3 

¶ 8 Fearing that Carr would swallow what was in his mouth, both 

destroying potential evidence and possibly harming himself by 

ingesting drugs, the officers attempted to retrieve whatever was in 

Carr’s mouth. The officers forced Carr to the ground. The second 

officer grabbed Carr’s chin with one hand and pressed on the nerve 

behind his jaw with the other. The pain caused Carr to open his 

mouth and spit out a plastic bag. While the second officer was 

forcing open Carr’s mouth, another officer straddled Carr and 

searched his mouth with her fingers and then a pen.1 At some 

point in this process, Carr’s lip began to bleed. 

¶ 9 One of the officers called the Aurora Fire Department to 

provide medical treatment for Carr. They arrived with an 

ambulance and placed Carr on a gurney. The second officer then 

saw additional bags in Carr’s mouth as he again began to chew and 

swallow. In response, the officer pulled forward Carr’s jaw so that 

 

1 It was unclear whether officers actually used a pen to explore 

Carr’s mouth. The testimony at the hearing does not support a 

finding that they used a pen. However, a police report admitted 

into evidence at the hearing does support such a finding. The trial 

court made no such finding either way. In any event, the use or 

non-use of the pen does not affect our analysis. 
4 

he could not swallow. He recovered another three bags from Carr’s 

mouth. In total, ten bags were recovered from Carr. 

¶ 10 The contents of the bags tested positive for cocaine, and the 

prosecution charged Carr with possession of a schedule II 

controlled substance with the intent to distribute, criminal attempt 

to commit assault in the second degree, and obstructing 

government operations. 

¶ 11 Carr moved to suppress all evidence resulting from the search 

of his mouth. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court found 

the officers had probable cause to arrest Carr, and that the search 

of Carr’s mouth was a lawful search incident to arrest. Carr 

appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and the judgment of 

conviction. 

II. Standard of Review 

¶ 12 A trial court’s suppression ruling presents a mixed question of 

fact and law. People v. Medina, 25 P.3d 1216, 1223 (Colo. 2001). 

This court defers to the trial court’s findings of fact, unless they are 

clearly erroneous, but reviews its conclusions of law de novo. 

People v. Gothard, 185 P.3d 180, 183 (Colo. 2008). 
5 

III. The Search Did Not Violate the Fourth Amendment 

¶ 13 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 

article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution protect individuals 

against unreasonable searches and seizures. People v. Brown, 217 

P.3d 1252, 1255-56 (Colo. 2009). A warrantless arrest or search 

must be supported by probable cause, People v. Turner, 660 P.2d 

1284, 1287 (Colo. 1983), and “because of the special insult to 

human dignity involved when police seek evidence in body 

apertures or bodily fluids, special rules restrict internal body 

searches.” People v. Williams, 192 Colo. 249, 257, 557 P.2d 399, 

406 (1976). The Supreme Court promulgated these special rules in 

two seminal cases: Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), 

and Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). Schmerber described the 

criteria that authorize a constitutional warrantless internal body 

search,2 384 U.S. at 768-72, and Winston refined these criteria, 470 

U.S. at 761-62. 

 

2 The Colorado Supreme Court expressly acknowledged and 

approved these criteria in People v. Sutherland, 683 P.2d 1192, 

1194 (Colo. 1984). 
6 

¶ 14 We first address whether the issue of probable cause is 

properly before this court. Although it appears that Carr argued in 

the trial court that there was no probable cause to arrest him prior 

to when the officers forced the bag from his mouth, our careful 

review of the appellate briefs demonstrates that any such argument 

was abandoned on appeal. Indeed, the Attorney General’s answer 

brief clearly asserts that Carr did not raise the probable cause 

determination on appeal. Despite this clear statement of position 

by the Attorney General, Carr does not take issue with the 

statement in his reply brief and he does not address at all the 

question of whether or when probable cause arose to justify his 

arrest. People v. Bondsteel, 2015 COA 165, ¶ 61 n.6 (cert. granted 

October 31, 2016). Under these circumstances, we conclude that 

the only question before us is whether the officers met the 

additional requirements imposed by Schmerber for an internal body 

search. We thus assume that probable cause supported Carr’s 

arrest and the search incident to arrest. 

¶ 15 In Schmerber, the Supreme Court held that, in addition to 

probable cause for the arrest of the suspect, the Fourth Amendment 

requires the state to prove three factors to render a warrantless 
7 

internal body search constitutional: (1) a “clear indication” that 

incriminating evidence will be found; (2) exigent circumstances that 

justify the intrusion and make it impractical to obtain a search 

warrant; and (3) extraction of the evidence in a reasonable manner 

and by a reasonable method. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-72. 

A. The Officers Had a Clear Indication That There Was 

Incriminating Evidence in Carr’s Mouth 

¶ 16 Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Colorado 

Supreme Court has defined “clear indication.” We thus seek 

guidance from courts in other jurisdictions. 

¶ 17 In State v. Alverez, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that 

officers had a “clear indication that a search would uncover drugs 

concealed in [Alverez’s] mouth.” 147 P.3d 425, 435 (Utah 2006). 

Alverez drove a vehicle the officers suspected was involved in drug 

sales. The officers observed a “representation” of the “patron saint” 

of unlawful drug dealings and a bottle of water (which the officers 

knew could be used to swallow drugs hidden in the mouth) in the 

vehicle. Id. at 430. When the officers questioned Alverez, they 

noticed he was particularly nervous and was manipulating objects 

in his mouth. From their training, the officers suspected Alverez 
8 

had drugs in his mouth which he was attempting to swallow. The 

court reasoned that “it was [Alverez’s] reaction to the officers’ 

request to open his mouth, in addition to the earlier factors, that 

gave rise to a clear indication.” Id. at 435. 

¶ 18 In State v. Harris, the Nebraska Supreme Court held there was 

a “clear indication” that Harris had drugs in his mouth based on 

similar circumstances. 505 N.W.2d 724, 731 (Neb. 1993). There, 

the officers searched Harris’ mouth in an interview-detention room. 

Harris had been arrested for a weapons 

violation, and police found Zig-Zag cigarette 

papers, sometimes used to smoke marijuana; 

an electronic pager; and a digital gram scale in 

his car. The officers also had confiscated 

marijuana from the passenger in Harris’ car. 

At least one officer at the scene suspected that 

someone was dealing drugs from Harris’ car. 

Harris was waiting to be strip-searched when 

[an officer] saw him chewing something. 

Harris refused to let [the officer] see what was 

in his mouth and refused to spit the crack 

cocaine out upon the officer’s order. 

Id. at 731-32. The court concluded that these circumstances were 

sufficient, in addition to the officer’s experience, for her to have “a 

clear indication that she would find incriminating evidence in 

Harris’ mouth.” Id. at 732. 
9 

¶ 19 Here, as in the above-cited cases, the officers believed that 

Carr was in a vehicle that was suspected to be involved in drug 

dealing. They saw a large bulge in his mouth. He refused to speak 

to the officers3 or reveal what was in his mouth. He was trying to 

chew or swallow what was in his mouth. The officers had 

experience or training that indicated that suspects would attempt to 

swallow drugs. And as in Alverez, the suspect began to act furtively 

once an officer pointed out the bulge in his mouth. 147 P.3d at 

435. 

¶ 20 On these facts, we conclude that there was a “clear indication” 

that searching Carr’s mouth would uncover drugs.4

 

3 Carr’s silence is significant, for these purposes, not so much 

because he was not speaking, but because he was not opening his 

mouth to do so. 

4 We recognize that the trial court did not make such a finding. 

Indeed, as Carr correctly notes, the trial court did not address the 

Schmerber factors at all. Nevertheless, we reject the Attorney 

General’s argument that the trial court’s decision prevents us from 

considering Schmerber on appeal. Carr argued in the trial court 

that Schmerber applied. The fact that the trial court did not 

address Schmerber in its order does not bar this court from 

resolving the issue. People v. Johnson, 865 P.2d 836, 840 (Colo. 

1994). The historical facts are not in substantial dispute, or in 

need of development, and the legal significance of those facts is a 

question of law that we may decide without remanding to the trial 

court. People v. Barry, 2015 COA 4, ¶ 53. 
10 

B. There Were Exigent Circumstances That Negated the Officers’ 

Need to Acquire a Warrant 

¶ 21 In the absence of exigent circumstances, warrantless internal 

body searches violate the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber, 384 U.S. 

at 770. “Exigent circumstances may exist when (1) the police are 

engaged in a bona fide pursuit of a fleeing suspect, (2) there is a 

risk of immediate destruction of evidence, or (3) there is a colorable 

claim of emergency threatening the life or safety of another.” People 

v. Crawford, 891 P.2d 255, 258 (Colo. 1995). 

¶ 22 No one, much less a police officer without medical training, 

can know with certainty what will happen when packaged drugs are 

swallowed.5 People v. Cappellia, 256 Cal. Rptr. 695, 700 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 1989). The police officers were not physicians, and they were 

required to make an immediate judgment of whether exigent 

circumstances existed. They did not know whether the evidence 

was packaged in a manner such that it would successfully pass 

through Carr’s digestive tract. Even if it was so packaged, when the 

officers pointed out the bulge in Carr’s mouth, he began to try to 

 

5 Some courts have held that officers should recognize certain types 

of packaging as being immune to dissipation in the digestive 

process. See People v. Bracamonte, 540 P.2d 624, 631 (Cal. 1975). 
11 

chew and swallow, which may have broken the seal of one of the 

bags in his mouth. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable 

for the officers to believe that the evidence would be destroyed 

unless they took immediate action.6 In other words, there were 

exigent circumstances that justified the search of Carr’s mouth. 

C. The Officers Searched Carr’s Mouth in a Reasonable Manner 

¶ 23 Having determined there were exigent circumstances, we now 

address whether the officers performed the search by a reasonable 

method and in a reasonable manner. 

¶ 24 In Winston, the Supreme Court adopted a three-part balancing 

test to determine when a particular search method is reasonable. 

470 U.S. at 761-62. The test balances (1) “the extent to which the 

procedure may threaten the safety or health of the individual” and 

(2) “the extent of intrusion upon the individual’s dignitary interests 

in personal privacy and bodily integrity” against (3) “the 

community’s interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or 

innocence.” Id.

 

6 In view of our disposition, we need not address the alternative 

ground raised by the Attorney General that there was a colorable 

claim of an emergency threatening Carr’s health. 
12 

¶ 25 In some cases, the amount of force used threatens the safety 

or health of the suspect to such a degree that a Fourth Amendment 

violation is obvious. For example, in Hereford v. State, the court 

held that tasing a suspect at least eight times while he was 

handcuffed, and after any exigent circumstances had passed, was 

unreasonable. 339 S.W.3d 111, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). 

Courts have reached similar results in other cases. See Conwell v. 

State, 714 N.E.2d 764, 765 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that 

choking a suspect and macing his face twice was unreasonable); 

State v. Tapp, 353 So. 2d 265 (La. 1977) (holding that a struggle 

that lasted fifteen to twenty minutes where officers pummeled the 

suspect’s head and face and then pinched his nose to cut off his 

breathing was unreasonable). 

¶ 26 The first prong of this test has mainly evolved in response to 

two particular search methods: (1) serious medical interventions or 

drug-induced vomiting and (2) the application of force to the throat 

to prevent swallowing. Alverez, 147 P.3d at 437. 

¶ 27 Courts generally disapprove of the first type of method. The 

Supreme Court has held that both the surgical extraction of a bullet 

from a suspect to use as evidence against him, Winston, 470 U.S. at 
13 

766, and the forced pumping of a suspect’s stomach, Rochin v. 

California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952), were unreasonable. But 

see State v. Strong, 493 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Iowa 1992) (permitting 

the pumping of the stomach). 

¶ 28 In other cases, particularly when force is applied to the 

suspect’s throat — force that could curtail breathing, lead to a loss 

of consciousness, and possibly cause death — courts are divided in 

the amount of force that officers can reasonably apply. In State v. 

Lewis, the court held that applying a chokehold and slapping the 

suspect’s back was reasonable. 566 P.2d 678, 681 (Ariz. 1977); 

accord Harris, 505 N.W.2d at 731 (holding that the use of a lateral 

vascular neck restraint and Heimlich-type maneuver was 

reasonable); Hernandez v. State, 548 S.W.2d 904, 905 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1977) (holding that the choking of a suspect was reasonable). 

¶ 29 In other cases, courts have permitted some pressure on a 

suspect’s throat. In Cappellia, the court held that placing pressure 

on the suspect’s throat was reasonable only if it did not restrict the 

suspect’s breathing. 256 Cal. Rptr. at 700; accord People v. 

Holloway, 330 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Mich. 1982) (holding that it was 

reasonable to apply pressure to a suspect’s throat if that pressure 
14 

did not cut off blood or air supply); State v. Taplin, 676 P.2d 504, 

506 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that whether a chokehold is 

unreasonable depends on whether the hold completely obstructs 

the suspect’s breathing). 

¶ 30 Here, the officers applied physical force to the back of Carr’s 

jaw and chin, in an effort to pry open his mouth, and searched his 

mouth with their fingers and then, possibly, a pen. While the 

officers caused Carr’s lip to bleed, they did not force him to undergo 

any invasive medical procedures or apply force to his throat. Under 

these circumstances, we conclude that the officers’ search 

procedure posed a minimal amount of risk to Carr’s safety and 

health. 

¶ 31 The second part of the Winston test focuses on the officers’ 

intrusions on Carr’s privacy and dignity, rather than his physical 

safety. Winston, 470 U.S. at 762. While officers searched Carr’s 

mouth, Winston does not prohibit all intrusions and, as the 

California Supreme Court observed, “the mouth is not a sacred 

orifice.” Bracamonte, 540 P.2d at 632 n.6. The officers’ search, 

under these circumstances, was not an unreasonable invasion of 
15 

his body. The officers’ intrusion on Carr’s privacy and dignity was 

relatively limited. 

¶ 32 The final part of the Winston test considers the community 

interest in correctly determining guilt or innocence, which includes 

the need to preserve evidence. Winston, 470 U.S. at 762. As we 

concluded above, the officers had reason to believe that Carr would 

destroy the evidence unless they intervened. Thus, the community 

had a strong interest in retrieving the potential evidence from Carr’s 

mouth. 

¶ 33 Balancing all three of the Winston considerations, we conclude 

that the officers retrieved the evidence in a reasonable manner and 

by a reasonable method. The minimal risk to Carr’s health and 

safety and the intrusions on his privacy and dignity do not 

outweigh the community’s interest in retrieving the bags in order to 

determine fairly his guilt or innocence. 

IV. Conclusion 

¶ 34 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the search of 

Carr’s mouth did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights, and 

accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed. 

JUDGE TERRY and JUDGE BOORAS concur.