J-S79006-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

STEPHEN KING

Appellant No. 1749 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered April 13, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0004595-2013

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MOULTON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 21, 2016

Appellant, Stephen King, appeals from the order entered in the Lehigh 

County Court of Common Pleas, which classified Appellant as a sexually 

violent predator (“SVP”). We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

In July 2013, Appellant began residing with a friend’s family. During this 

time, Appellant masturbated his friend’s son (“Victim”) while Appellant 

fondled himself. Victim and another child, who was in the room during the 

incident, reported the sexual abuse. As a result, the Commonwealth 

charged Appellant on November 18, 2013, with corruption of minors and 

indecent assault. On April 29, 2014, Appellant entered a nolo contendere

plea to indecent assault, and the court ordered the Sexual Offender 

Assessment Board (“SOAB”) to assess Appellant and determine if Appellant 
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met the criteria for SVP classification. After learning about the potential SVP 

classification, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his plea on August 29, 

2014. The court subsequently granted Appellant’s motion. On October 20, 

2014, Appellant again entered a nolo contendere plea to indecent assault, 

and the court immediately sentenced Appellant to time served to twentyfour (24) months’ imprisonment. The court ordered the SOAB to assess 

Appellant and determine if Appellant met the criteria for SVP classification. 

SOAB member, Dr. Veronique Valliere conducted Appellant’s assessment. 

The court held a SVP hearing on March 27, 2015, which continued on 

April 13, 2015, where Dr. Valliere testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. 

Dr. Valliere testified that her assessment of Appellant revealed Appellant 

met the diagnostic criteria for other-specified personality disorder. 

Specifically, Dr. Valliere stated that Appellant exhibits many antisocial and 

narcissistic traits. Dr. Valliere further opined that Appellant’s disorder makes 

him likely to engage in future predatory behavior. Dr. Robert M. Gordon 

testified on behalf of Appellant at the SVP hearing. Dr. Gordon stated 

Appellant has poor impulse control due to his paranoid schizophrenia, but he 

does not suffer from a personality disorder. Dr. Gordon concluded that 

Appellant does not meet the criteria for SVP classification. At the conclusion 

of the April 13, 2015 hearing, the court determined the Commonwealth had 

proved by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant met the criteria for 

SVP classification. 
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On April 23, 2015, Appellant timely filed a motion to reconsider the 

court’s imposition of SVP status, which the court denied on May 14, 2015. 

On June 12, 2015, Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal.1 On June 

25, 2015, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant timely 

complied pro se on July 14, 2015. 

Appellant raises the following issue for our review: 

[WHETHER APPELLANT’S SVP CLASSIFICATION WAS 

SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE?]

(Appellant’s Brief at 2).2 

Our standard review of a trial court’s SVP designation is as follows: 

[T]o affirm an SVP designation, we, as a reviewing court, 

must be able to conclude that the fact-finder found clear 

____________________________________________

1 An appellant has thirty (30) days to file an appeal from a SVP 

determination. See Commonwealth v. Schrader, 141 A.3d 558, 561 

(Pa.Super. 2016) (explaining judgment of sentence is not appealable until 

court renders SVP determination because imposition of SVP status is 

component of judgment of sentence). Likewise, a post-sentence motion 

filed within ten (10) days of the SVP determination tolls the appeal period 

until the disposition of the post-sentence motion. Here, Appellant filed his 

motion to reconsider within ten days of his SVP determination, which tolled 

the appeal period. The court ultimately denied Appellant’s motion to 

reconsider on May 14, 2015. Thus, Appellant’s notice of appeal, filed on 

June 12, 2015, within thirty days of the court’s denial of his motion for 

reconsideration, was timely. 

2 Appellant filed a counseled brief, but the brief is missing a statement of 

questions involved as well as a statement of both the scope of review and 

the standard of review, summary of the argument, and a short conclusion 

stating the precise relief sought. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111. Nevertheless, we 

discern the issue from Appellant’s brief. 
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and convincing evidence that the individual is a[n SVP]. 

As with any sufficiency of the evidence claim, we view all 

evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth. We will reverse a 

trial court’s determination of SVP status only if the 

Commonwealth has not presented clear and convincing 

evidence that each element of the statute has been 

satisfied. 

Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 186, 189 (Pa.Super. 2015), 

appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 125 A.3d 1199 (2015) (internal citation 

omitted). 

“After conviction but before sentencing, a court shall order an 

individual convicted of a sexually violent offense to be assessed by the 

[SOAB].” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(a). Section 9799.24(b) provides:

§ 9799.24. Assessments

* * *

(b) Assessment.—Upon receipt from the court of an 

order for an assessment, a member of the board...shall 

conduct an assessment of the individual to determine if the 

individual should be classified as a sexually violent 

predator. The board shall establish standards for 

evaluations and for evaluators conducting the 

assessments. An assessment shall include, but not be 

limited to, an examination of the following:

(1) Facts of the current offense, including:

(i) Whether the offense involved multiple 

victims.

(ii) Whether the individual exceeded the 

means necessary to achieve the offense.

(iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the 

victim.

(iv) Relationship of the individual to the 

victim.
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(v) Age of the victim.

(vi) Whether the offense included a display of 

unusual cruelty by the individual during the 

commission of the crime.

(vii) The mental capacity of the victim.

(2) Prior offense history, including:

(i) The individual’s prior criminal record.

(ii) Whether the individual completed any 

prior sentences.

(iii) Whether the individual participated in 

available programs for sexual offenders.

(3) Characteristics of the individual, including:

(i) Age.

(ii) Use of illegal drugs.

(iii) Any mental illness, mental disability or 

mental abnormality.

(iv) Behavioral characteristics that contribute 

to the individual’s conduct.

(4) Factors that are supported in a sexual offender 

assessment field as criteria reasonably related to the 

risk of reoffense.

* * *

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b). The SOAB’s duty is to assess the defendant; it 

does not perform an adjudicative function. Commonwealth v. Kopicz, 840 

A.2d. 342, 351 (Pa.Super. 2003). 

“To deem an individual a sexually violent predator, the Commonwealth 

must first show [the individual] has been convicted of a sexually violent 

offense as set forth in [section 9799.14]....” Commonwealth v. Askew, 

907 A.2d 624, 629 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 709, 919 A.2d 

954 (2007). See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12. “Secondly, the 
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Commonwealth must show that the individual has a mental abnormality or 

personality disorder that makes [him] likely to engage in predatory sexually 

violent offenses.” Askew, supra. When the Commonwealth meets this 

burden, the trial court then makes the final determination on the defendant’s 

SVP status. Kopicz, supra at 351. 

The SVP assessment is not a trial or a separate criminal proceeding 

that subjects the defendant to additional punishment. Commonwealth v. 

Howe, 842 A.2d 436, 445-46 (Pa.Super. 2004). SVP status, therefore, does 

not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt; the court decides SVP status 

upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence. Commonwealth v. 

Killinger, 585 Pa. 92, 104, 888 A.2d 592, 600 (2005). 

“With regard to the various assessment factors..., there is no statutory 

requirement that all of them or any particular number of them be present or 

absent in order to support an SVP designation. The factors are not a 

checklist with each one weighing in some necessary fashion for or against 

SVP designation.” Commonwealth v. Brooks, 7 A.3d 852, 863 (Pa.Super. 

2010), appeal denied, 610 Pa. 614, 21 A.3d 1189 (2011). Thus, “[t]he 

Commonwealth does not have to show that any certain factor is present or 

absent in a particular case.” Id. Moreover, “to carry its burden of proving 

that an offender is an SVP, the Commonwealth is not obliged to provide a 

clinical diagnosis by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist” of a specific 

personality disorder or mental abnormality. Commonwealth v. Conklin, 
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587 Pa. 140, 158, 897 A.2d 1168, 1178 (2006). 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable James T. 

Anthony, we conclude Appellant’s issue on appeal merits no relief. The trial 

court opinion fully discusses and properly disposes of the question 

presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed August 21, 2015, at 3-5) (finding: 

Dr. Valliere opined that Appellant suffers from personality disorder with 

antisocial and narcissistic traits and pattern of accusations against Appellant 

indicates his sexual interest in adolescent boys; after thorough discussion of 

required statutory factors, Dr. Valliere concluded Appellant suffers from 

personality disorder that makes him likely to engage in future predatory 

sexual behavior; defense expert, Dr. Gordon, disagreed with Dr. Valliere’s 

personality disorder assessment; however, Dr. Gordon agreed Appellant 

presents narcissistic-like egocentricity and antisocial behavior; some of 

statutory factors weighed in Appellant’s favor, but record amply 

demonstrated Appellant suffers from mental abnormality or personality 

disorder that makes him likely to reoffend; thus, court concluded Appellant 

meets criteria for classification as SVP). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis 

of the trial court opinion. 

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/21/2016