2014 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-28-2014

Clarence Houser, Jr. v. Postmaster General of the

Unit

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 14-1027

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Recommended Citation

"Clarence Houser, Jr. v. Postmaster General of the Unit" (2014). 2014 Decisions. Paper 766.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/766
NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-1027

___________

CLARENCE C. HOUSER, JR.,

Appellant

v.

POSTMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-12-cv-01024)

District Judge: Honorable Magistrate Judge Cathy Bissoon

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

July 25, 2014

Before: FISHER, VANASKIE and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: July 28, 2014)

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM

Clarence C. Houser, Jr., appeals from an order of the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania, which granted the Defendant’s motion to 

dismiss his complaint (the “second lawsuit”). We will affirm the District Court’s 

judgment.
2

Houser was formerly employed by the United States Postal Service. In 2009, 

while still employed, Houser filed a lawsuit (the “first lawsuit”) against the Postmaster 

General (“the Defendant”), alleging that the Defendant discriminated against him and 

retaliated against him based on injuries he incurred in August 2007 and April 2008. The 

District Court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss Houser’s claims of age 

discrimination, slander, and retaliation, but allowed his claims under the Rehabilitation 

Act to proceed. The District Court later granted Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment on the Rehabilitation Act claims, finding that Houser did not suffer from a 

“disability” as defined in the Act, and that he failed to show that the Defendant required 

him to perform work beyond his medical restrictions. Houser did not appeal.

Four months after he filed the first lawsuit, Houser was terminated from his 

position for “willful misconduct” and violations of work rules. In July 2012, a little over 

three years later, Houser filed this second lawsuit. Houser filed an original complaint, 

two amended complaints, and other motions and responses containing factual allegations 

and statutory citations. The District Court generously considered all of Houser’s filings, 

despite their procedural shortcomings, in granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss.1 

Applying plenary review, see Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 

2008), we find no error in the District Court’s judgment.

 

1

The original complaint consisted of two sentences, with an attached May 23, 2012 

decision from the United States EEOC, Office of Federal Operations, denying Houser’s 

motion for reconsideration of its October 25, 2011 decision. The First Amended 

complaint contained two paragraphs; the Second Amended Complaint consisted of two 

pages. Houser’s subsequent filings continued to add claims and name additional federal 

statutes that he believed had been violated. 
3

We agree with the District Court that many of Houser’s claims are barred by res 

judicata, as they were raised, or could have been raised, in the first lawsuit. See

Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Group, Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2009). We further agree, 

nonetheless, that Houser’s filings consist of (1) claims that are untimely, e.g., (a) his 

claims under the Family Medical Leave Act; see 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1) & (2); see also

Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 739-40 (2003), (b) his claims of a 

violation of the labor agreement with the National Association of Letter Carriers 

(“NALC”), see DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983); (2) 

claims that are unexhausted, e.g., his claims of disability discrimination, see Wilson v. 

MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2007); or (3) allegations that otherwise fail to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, e.g., his claims referring to “color of 

law,” “the Whistle Blower Act,” OSHA, and FELA (no allegations in his filings relate to 

these statutes); his age discrimination and retaliation claims (the pleadings do not make 

any reference to allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery would 

reveal that he was treated differently because of his age, nor that he engaged in any 

protected activity that resulted in retaliation), see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 

203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Slagle v. Cnty. of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 265 (3d Cir. 

2006); and his claims of a violation of the agreement with the NALC (filings contain no 

allegation of a breach of duty by union), see generally 39 U.S.C. § 1208(b); see also

Yeftich v. Navistar, Inc., 722 F.3d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 2013).2

 

2

“Although 39 U.S.C. § 1208(b) grants federal courts jurisdiction [over] disputes 

arising under collective bargaining agreements executed by the [Postal Service], § 
4

For essentially the same reasons cited by the District Court, we will affirm the 

District Court’s judgment.3

 

1208(b) is the analogue to section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, and 

the law under § 301 is fully applicable to suits brought under § 1208(b).” See Gibson v. 

United States Postal Serv., 380 F.3d 886, 889 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004).

3 Houser filed a “Supplemental Brief” in our Court without seeking leave to do so. 

We have received it for our information only, but note that the arguments contained 

therein make no difference to our decision, as they do not change our conclusion that his 

FMLA claims were untimely and that he failed to state a claim with regard to any 

discrimination claims.