IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Washington Health Systems :

Greene, formerly known as :

Essent Healthcare Waynesburg, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 689 C.D. 2016

: Submitted: September 16, 2016

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE JULIA K. HEARTHWAY, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: November 21, 2016 

Petitioner Washington Health Systems Greene (Employer) petitions 

for review of an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review 

(Board). The Board reversed the decision of a Referee, thereby granting 

unemployment compensation benefits to Christopher J. D’Antonio (Claimant). For 

the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Claimant filed for unemployment compensation benefits on 

November 8, 2015, after being discharged from employment as an emergency 

department registered nurse at Southwest Regional Medical Center in Waynesburg, 

formerly known as Essence Healthcare Waynesburg. The Lancaster UC Service 

Center (Service Center) issued a notice of determination finding Claimant eligible 

for unemployment compensation benefits. (Certified Record (C.R.), Item No. 5.) 
2

Employer appealed, and a Referee conducted an evidentiary hearing. 

Five employees testified for Employer. Kim Daley (Daley), Employer’s Senior 

Human Resources Partner, testified first and explained Employer’s policies set 

forth in the Employee Handbook, Employer’s Code of Conduct, Discipline 

Policies and Procedures, specifically the policy on disruptive behavior, Reflections 

of Service Excellence, and Comprehensive Crisis Management Training. 

(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 8a-12a.) She testified that Employer’s policies 

(1) prohibited disrespectful or unprofessional behavior, including use of profanity, 

against staff, patients, visitors, or volunteers, as well as any activity that leads to 

disrupting or jeopardizing the care of patients; and (2) required employees to notify 

their supervisor and Employer’s Department of Human Resources of any threats, 

harassment, or aggressive or disruptive behavior. (Id.) Daley also testified that 

she gathered reports following a confrontation between Claimant and a patient’s 

companion on October 26, 2015. (Id. at 14a.) She testified that the confrontation 

caused the patient to leave the hospital and seek treatment at another hospital. (Id.)

Employer’s registration clerk Michelle Little (Little) testified that 

Claimant brought the patient and her companion back to a treating room that was 

not visible to Little. (Id.) While Little did not actually see the confrontation, she 

did overhear parts of it. (Id.) She heard two loud noises “that sounded like 

something hit the wall.” (Id.) Little did not hear the patient’s companion say 

anything, but she did hear Claimant using profanity. (Id.) Moments later, the 

companion left the treating area and as he was leaving the hospital, he asked Little 

to note that Claimant pushed him against the wall. (Id.)

Next to testify for Employer was Justin Santoro (Santoro), a registered 

nurse in the emergency department. Santoro testified that Claimant brought the 
3

patient and her companion back to the treating area. (Id. at 31a.) Santoro prepared 

an IV while another nurse, Janet Lowe (Lowe), began taking the patient’s vitals. 

(Id.) The companion became upset that Santoro was in the room while the patient, 

a female, was changing into a hospital gown. (Id.) Claimant asked Santoro to 

leave the room, which he did, until a doctor arrived and informed the companion 

that Santoro needed to be in the room to treat the patient. (Id.) Santoro returned to 

his treatment of the patient when he heard the confrontation. (Id.) The doctor 

instructed the companion to wait in the waiting room. (Id.) Santoro testified that 

Claimant loudly asked the companion, “Are you threatening me?” (Id.) Santoro 

testified that he then heard “loud bangs” and an argument. (Id.) He tried to calm 

the patient, but she removed the tourniquet from her arm and said that she was 

leaving. (Id.) Santoro did not recall Claimant using any profanity. (Id.) Santoro 

testified that the patient left in an “emergent situation.” (Id.)

Fourth to testify for Employer was Lowe, another emergency room 

nurse who cared for the female patient. She testified that the patient was 

experiencing vaginal bleeding and was upset about a potential miscarriage. 

(Id. at 39a.) Lowe testified that after the doctor and Santoro entered the treatment 

room, she heard the confrontation. (Id.) She heard Claimant shouting at the 

companion, but she did not hear the companion shouting. (Id.) Lowe did not

remember hearing any profanity, but she did hear Claimant tell the companion that 

Claimant was going to call security and the police. (Id. at 39a-40a.) Lowe also 

testified that she and Claimant had two work-related arguments prior to October 

26, 2015. (Id. at 40a-41a.)

The last witness to testify for Employer was Bridgett Trump (Trump), 

Claimant’s immediate supervisor. Trump testified that she, along with Daley and 
4

Marty Farstner, the Director of Human Resources, took part in the decision to 

discharge Claimant. (Id. at 47a.) Trump testified that Claimant was discharged for 

conduct detrimental to a patient’s care and use of profanity. (Id. at 48a.) 

Claimant was the final witness to testify at the Referee’s evidentiary 

hearing. Claimant testified that when the doctor arrived and was in the treating 

room with nurses Santoro and Lowe and the patient, Claimant was immediately

outside the treating room gathering information and recording it on a computer. 

(Id. at 53a.) He described the patient’s male companion as pacing outside the 

treating room and repeating that he wanted nurse Santoro out of the room. (Id.) 

Claimant testified that the companion threatened to “knock his teeth in” and made 

an additional threat that he did not understand. (Id. at 53a-54a.) Claimant testified 

that the companion and he were “chest to chest” and that the companion “was in 

[his] face and yelling and such.” (Id. at 53a.) Claimant testified that he threatened 

to call hospital security and he had to speak loudly to speak over the patient’s 

companion. (Id. at 59a.) He testified that he did not use any profanity with the 

patient’s companion. (Id. at 54a.) He also stated that he knew of the policy to 

notify his supervisor and the Department of Human Resources of any threats, but

he did not do so until after the companion left the hospital. (Id. at 57a.) 

Following the evidentiary hearing, the Referee issued a decision,

reversing the Service Center’s determination, thereby determining Claimant to be 

ineligible for benefits pursuant to Section 402(e) of the Unemployment 

Compensation Law (Law).1 Specifically, the Referee concluded that Claimant’s 

 

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. 

§ 802(e).
5

failure to comply with Employer’s policy for its staff to present themselves in a 

professional manner and treat patients and guests with respect rose to the level of 

willful misconduct. (C.R., Item No. 10.) 

Claimant then appealed to the Board, which reversed. (C.R., Item 

No. 16.) In so doing, the Board issued its own findings of fact and conclusions of 

law. The Board made the following findings:

1. Essent Health Systems Greene employed the 

claimant through November 4, 2015, finally as a 

full-time emergency department registered nurse 

earning $28.31 per hour. 

2. The claimant knew that the employer’s policies 

required him to be respectful and professional at 

all times and prohibited disruption of patient care.

3. Around 3:15 a.m. on October 26, 2015, a pregnant 

woman suffering vaginal bleeding entered the 

[Emergency Department] waiting area with a male 

companion. 

4. The claimant took the patient to a female exam 

room, where a female RN and male emergency 

technician began to treat the patient.

5. The claimant remained with the companion outside 

the room, door ajar, and asked questions of all 

involved to complete the triage process. 

6. The companion became agitated and objected to 

males being in the room while the patient changed, 

so the tech left at the claimant’s direction. 

7. A female doctor approached the companion and 

explained the tech needed to help. 

8. The companion calmed and permitted the tech to 

enter the exam room. 
6

9. The companion again became agitated, began to 

argue with the claimant, and insisted the patient 

exit the room. 

10. The claimant again asked the tech to leave, but the 

doctor insisted he stay, so the claimant asked the 

companion to wait in the waiting room. 

11. The companion remained in the doorway as the 

claimant continued to ask questions for the triage 

process. 

12. The companion leaned over to the claimant and 

whispered in his ear that he would knock the 

claimant’s teeth in. 

13. The claimant spoke over the companion and told 

him to go to the waiting room before he called 

security. 

14. The claimant did not use profanity or push the 

companion. 

15. The companion exited the facility, followed by the 

patient five minutes later. 

16. Following an investigation, the employer 

discharged the claimant for violating its policies by 

yelling at the companion. 

(Id.) 

The Board concluded that, based on the record, Claimant was eligible 

for unemployment compensation benefits. (Id.) The Board reasoned that 

Employer discharged Claimant for yelling at the companion, violating Employer’s 

policies requiring him to be respectful and professional at all times, and prohibiting 

disruption of patient care. (Id.) The Board further reasoned: 

The four firsthand witnesses’ testimonies were mostly 

consistent. Some testified the claimant used profanity, 

but others did not. The referee did not find the claimant 
7

used profanity, presumably crediting the claimant’s 

testimony, and the Board agrees. Most witnesses agreed 

both men’s voices were raised, so the Board credits the 

claimant’s testimony that he needed to talk over the 

companion, not that he was unnecessarily yelling. 

Considering the witnesses’ focuses on the patient and 

other matters, their distance from the claimant and the 

companion, and the whispered nature of the threat, the 

Board does not find the lack of corroboration of the 

threat to harm the claimant’s credibility that it occurred. 

Because of the patient’s emergency situation, the 

claimant’s active participation in screening her for care, 

and his proximity to the companion, the Board does not 

find the claimant acted unreasonably by failing to 

immediately notify his supervisor of the threat, as the 

employer’s policy technically required. 

The record is clear that it was the companion, not the 

claimant, who acted unreasonably and disrupted the 

patient’s care. Based on the entire record, the Board 

cannot conclude that the claimant’s actions violated the 

employer’s policy, but instead concludes that the 

claimant’s actions were reasonable under the 

circumstances. 

(Id.) 

On appeal,2Employer argues that the Board’s findings of fact 

numbers 9, 10, 12, 13, and 16 are not supported by substantial evidence. Employer 

alleges that the Board erred in concluding that Claimant did not violate the 

hospital’s policies. Employer also argues that the Board erred as a matter of law in 

concluding that Claimant’s actions were reasonable and, thus, did not constitute

 

2

This Court’s standard of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights 

were violated, whether an error of law was committed, or whether necessary findings of fact are 

supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. 

§ 704.
8

willful misconduct. Finally, Employer contends that the Board erred as a matter of 

law by crediting the testimony of Claimant over conflicting testimony and 

evidence in the record.

3

 In response, the Board argues that its factual findings are 

supported by substantial evidence. The Board further argues that based on its 

findings of fact, Claimant is eligible for benefits because he did not violate 

Employer’s policies and acted reasonably under the circumstances.

4

Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind 

might consider adequate to support a conclusion. Hercules, Inc. v. Unemployment 

Comp. Bd. of Review, 604 A.2d 1159, 1161 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). In determining 

whether there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings, this Court 

must examine the testimony in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, 

 

3

Employer’s first and third arguments, challenging the factual findings and credibility 

determination, are duplicative arguments in that credibility informs factual findings. Despite 

Employer’s contention that failure to weigh credibility in its favor is an error of law, it is actually 

a factual determination within the authority of the Board. See Peak v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. 

of Review, 501 A.2d 1383, 1386 (Pa. 1985); DeRiggi v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 

856 A.2d 253, 255 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). 

4 Claimant, by counsel, intervened in this appeal and filed a brief separate from the 

Board. Claimant’s brief is devoid of any citation to legal authority. Claimant has failed to 

adequately develop these issues in his brief as required by Rule 2119(a) of the Pennsylvania 

Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides:

The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be 

argued; and shall have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or in type 

distinctively displayed—the particular point treated therein, followed by such 

discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.

Pa. R.A.P. 2119(a) (emphasis added). This Court has held that “[m]ere issue spotting without 

analysis or legal citation to support an assertion precludes our appellate review of [a] matter.” 

Commonwealth v. Spontarelli, 791 A.2d 1254, 1259 n.11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). To the extent that 

Claimant raises any additional arguments not addressed by the Board, we decline to address 

them.
9

giving that party the benefit of any inferences that can logically and reasonably be 

drawn from the evidence. Id. A determination as to whether substantial evidence 

exists to support a finding of fact can only be made upon examination of the record 

as a whole. Taylor v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 378 A.2d 829, 831 

(Pa. 1977). The Board’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal only so long as 

the record taken as a whole contains substantial evidence to support them. Penflex, 

Inc. v. Bryson, 485 A.2d 359, 365 (Pa. 1984). “The fact that [the employee] may 

have produced witnesses who gave a different version of the events, or that [the 

employee] might view the testimony differently than the Board is not grounds for 

reversal if substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings.” Tapco, Inc. v. 

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 650 A.2d 1106, 1107 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). 

Similarly, even if evidence exists in the record that could support a contrary 

conclusion, it does not follow that the findings of fact are not supported by 

substantial evidence. Johnson v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 

504 A.2d 989, 990 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986). 

Moreover, in an unemployment case the Board is the ultimate fact 

finder and is, therefore, entitled to make its own determinations as to witness 

credibility and evidentiary weight. Peak v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 

501 A.2d 1383, 1386 (Pa. 1985). The Board is also empowered to resolve 

conflicts in the evidence. DeRiggi v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 

856 A.2d 253, 255 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). 

First, Employer challenges finding of fact number 9, stating that the 

“companion became agitated” and “insisted the patient leave the room.” Employer 

argues that the companion’s demeanor was calm, not agitated, and that he did not 

request the patient leave the room, seemingly implying that it was Santoro that the 
10

companion requested to leave the room. The companion’s behavior and demeanor 

was described by Employer’s witnesses and Claimant. The Board is free to weigh 

Claimant’s testimony that the companion became agitated as credible, and we are 

not permitted to re-examine that determination on appeal. With respect to who the 

companion tried to have leave the room, Claimant also testified that the companion 

was pacing and stated “I want her out of the room,” presumably referring to the 

patient.5 (R.R. at 53a.) Finding of fact number 9, therefore, is supported by 

substantial evidence. 

Employer’s second argument against the Board’s factual findings is a 

matter of word choice rather than an actual contradiction of the findings. 

Employer argues that Claimant “ordered” the companion to leave, rather than 

“asked” him to leave, which is contrary to the language used in finding of fact 

number 10. Employer argues that rather than merely speaking over the 

companion, as found in finding of fact number 13, Claimant was “to the point of 

screaming” at him. Finally, within this argument, Employer contends that 

Claimant was not fired for yelling at the companion, as found in finding of fact 

number 16, but instead for aggressive, loud, disruptive, shouting behavior. This

line of argument is meritless. Peak instructs that the Board is permitted to resolve 

all conflicts in evidence. Peak, 501 A.2d at 1386. The Board has the authority to 

resolve factual discrepancies and assess which characterization, between

“ordering” and “asking” or “yelling” and “shouting,” are most appropriate. As 

such, those findings are supported by substantial evidence. 

 

5 Moreover, Employer failed to develop any argument as to how the alleged difference in 

the companion’s request—that either the patient or Santoro leave the room—impacted the 

Board’s ultimate conclusion. 
11

Employer also challenges finding of fact number 12 that the patient’s 

companion threatened Claimant. This finding is reconcilable with all evidence in 

the record. Claimant testified that the companion threatened him by saying that he 

was going to “knock [Claimant’s] teeth in.” The companion did not testify at the 

evidentiary hearing. Not one of Employer’s witnesses contradicted that assertion. 

Multiple witnesses did testify that Claimant asked, “Are you threatening me?” 

Such a reaction provides further support for the alleged threat. Ultimately, the 

Board had to weigh the credibility of Claimant’s testimony describing the threat.

The Board credited Claimant’s testimony, and we are prohibited from re-weighing 

that determination. This factual finding is supported by substantial evidence. 

Finally, Employer contests finding of fact number 14, which found 

that Claimant did not use profanity. Employer argues that this finding is not 

supported by substantial evidence because Employer’s registration clerk, Little, 

testified that she heard Claimant use profanity. Claimant, testifying for himself, 

denied using profanity. This discrepancy thus becomes a matter of weight and

credibility. The Board remains the final arbiter of a witness’ credibility, and the 

Board’s decision to believe one witness over another is conclusive. E.T. Sys. Corp. 

v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 504 A.2d 992, 994 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986). 

Here, the Board agreed with the Referee’s finding that Claimant did not use

profanity. Both the Referee and the Board credited the testimony of Claimant over 

Ms. Little. We conclude, therefore, that the Board’s finding is supported by 

substantial evidence. 

We next address Employer’s third argument, which is related to its 

first. Employer argues that the Board erred as a matter of law by crediting the 

testimony of Claimant based upon contradictory evidence. Employer argues that 
12

the record actually supports a different conclusion—i.e., that Claimant was not 

credible given his contradictory testimony. Employer’s argument demonstrates a 

misunderstanding of this Court’s standard of review. “Questions of credibility and 

the resolution of evidentiary conflicts are within the sound discretion of the Board, 

and are not subject to re-evaluation on judicial review.” Peak, 501 A.2d at 1388. 

Thus, Employer’s argument is without merit. 

Finally, we consider whether the Board erred as a matter of law in 

concluding that Claimant did not engage in willful misconduct. Section 402(e) of 

the Law provides, in part, that an employee shall be ineligible for compensation for 

any week in which “his unemployment is due to his discharge or temporary 

suspension from work for willful misconduct connected with his work.” The term 

“willful misconduct” is not defined by statute. The courts, however, have defined 

“willful misconduct” as:

(a) wanton or willful disregard for an employer’s 

interests; (b) deliberate violation of an employer’s rules; 

(c) disregard for standards of behavior which an 

employer can rightfully expect of an employee; or 

(d) negligence indicating an intentional disregard of the 

employer’s interest or an employee’s duties or 

obligations. 

Grieb v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 827 A.2d 422, 425 (Pa. 2003). 

The burden of proving willful misconduct rests with the employer. 

Guthrie v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 738 A.2d 518, 521 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1999). Where an employer seeks to prove willful misconduct by showing 

that the claimant violated the employer’s rules or policies, the employer must 

demonstrate (1) the existence of the rule or policy and (2) that the claimant 

violated it. Walsh v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 943 A.2d 363, 369 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2008). Moreover, the employer must establish that the claimant’s actions 
13

were intentional or deliberate. Tongel v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 

501 A.2d 716, 717 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985). 

Once the employer meets its burden, the burden shifts to the claimant 

to show good cause for his refusal to comply with the rule or policy. Great Valley 

Publ’g. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 136 A.3d 532, 536 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2016). A claimant has good cause if his actions are reasonable and 

justifiable under the circumstances. Docherty v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of 

Review, 898 A.2d 1205, 1208-09 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Whether an employee’s 

conduct constitutes willful misconduct and whether a claimant has proved good 

cause are questions of law subject to our review. Dep’t of Corr. v. Unemployment 

Comp. Bd. of Review, 943 A.2d 1011, 1015-16 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).

Thus, we now consider whether Claimant engaged in willful 

misconduct by violating Employer’s policies, and, if so, whether he had good 

cause for doing so. The Board determined that Claimant did not violate 

Employer’s policy to be respectful and professional at all times and not disrupt 

patient care, because the Board found that the patient’s companion threatened 

Claimant, and Claimant did not respond by using profanity or pushing the 

companion. Rather, the Claimant spoke over the companion to instruct him to wait 

in the waiting area. The Board further found that the patient’s companion was 

acting unreasonably and disrupting the patient’s care. As to Employer’s policy 

requiring employees to report threats, which Employer appears to suggest requires 

an employee to report threats immediately, the Board found that although Claimant 

did not strictly adhere to the policy, he acted reasonably under the circumstances. 

Claimant was participating in the emergency treatment of a patient at the time he 

was threatened by the companion. The Board observed that Claimant was actively 
14

participating in screening for the patient’s care, and we agree that Claimant could 

not abandon his role in the patient’s emergency treatment as the volatile situation 

developed. 

Based upon the Board’s determinations that (1) Claimant did not 

violate Employer’s policy to be respectful and professional at all times and not 

disrupt patient care and (2) Claimant acted with good cause to the extent that he 

failed to comply with the “immediacy” aspect of Employer’s notification policy, 

the Board did not err in concluding that Claimant did not engage in willful 

misconduct.

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Board.

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Washington Health Systems :

Greene, formerly known as :

Essent Healthcare Waynesburg, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 689 C.D. 2016

:

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 21st day of November, 2016, the order of the 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review is AFFIRMED.

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge