Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 55A01-1510-CR-1661 | May 19, 2016 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Stacy R. Uliana

Bargersville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General

Jodi Kathryn Stein

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael S. Collins,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 19, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

55A01-1510-CR-1661

Appeal from the Morgan Superior 

Court

The Honorable Jane Spencer 

Craney, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

55D03-1412-FC-1929

Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] Michael S. Collins (“Collins”) appeals his sentence for his Class C felony

aiding, inducing, or causing forgery conviction1 and his enhancement for being 

adjudicated an habitual offender.2 On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court 

abused its discretion when it ordered an amount taken from his posted bond to 

pay for his public defender’s fee because he did not agree to pay that fee in his 

plea agreement; and (2) his sentence was inappropriate under Indiana Appellate 

Rule 7(B) in light of the nature of his offense and his character. Because we 

conclude that Collins waived his objection to paying his public defender’s fee by 

failing to object at his sentencing hearing and because his sentence was not 

inappropriate, we affirm.

[2] We affirm.

Issues

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered 

him to pay his public defender’s fee.

2. Whether Collins’ sentence was inappropriate under Appellate 

Rule 7(B). 

 

1

IND. CODE §§ 35-43-5-2(b)(1) and 35-41-2-4. We note that, effective July 1, 2014, the Indiana General 

Assembly amended this statute, and Collins’ offense would now be considered a Level 6 felony. However, 

we will apply the version of the statute in effect at the time of his offense.

2

I.C. § 35-50-2-8.
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Facts

[3] Between May 16, 2014 and June 30, 2014, Collins was incarcerated in the 

Morgan County Jail for various charges, including possession of a handgun by 

a serious violent felon. This charge was based on Collins’ criminal history and 

his possession of a pistol, which was located at the house of his girlfriend, Holly 

Boutwell (“Boutwell”). During Collins’ incarceration, Boutwell decided to 

prepare a bill of sale for the pistol to make Collins’ prosecutor think that she, 

rather than Collins, had owned the gun. Boutwell asked Collins to help her 

prepare this bill of sale. He assisted her by telling her what a bill of sale should 

look like, by writing a bill of sale, and sending it to her. Ultimately, Boutwell 

forged a bill of sale and gave it to Collins’ attorney, who in turn gave it to the 

prosecutor in Collins’ cause.

[4] On December 22, 2014, the State charged Collins with Class C felony aiding, 

inducing or causing forgery and Class D felony aiding, inducing, or causing 

obstruction of justice. On January 13, 2015, the State added a charge alleging 

that Collins was an habitual offender based on two prior felony convictions. 

Subsequently, on May 18, 2015, Collins pled guilty to Class C felony aiding, 

inducing, or causing forgery with an open sentence. In exchange for Collins’ 

guilty plea, the State dismissed his aiding, inducing, or causing obstruction of 

justice charge and his charges in three other causes. The plea agreement also 

specified that Collins would pay: “√ Fine: $1.00 Fine, Court Costs, and ( ) $ 

_____ Fee.” (App. 89). 
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[5] At his sentencing hearing, thirty-three-year-old Collins admitted that he had 

been doing drugs in some “shape or form, including alcohol” since he was 

twelve years old. (Tr. 45). He claimed that his drug addiction was the reason 

for his criminal behavior, and he asked to be admitted to the purposeful 

incarceration program for substance abuse rehabilitation. He also testified that 

he had mental illnesses that he had dealt with for “quite some time.” (Tr. 46). 

[6] In mitigation of his offenses, Collins noted that he had completed several 

courses while in jail, including the twenty-hour “Realizations” substance abuse 

program; several courses with the Reformers Institutional Program, a 

religiously-based addiction program; a Discover Bible course; a Mothers 

Against Methamphetamine drug awareness and prevention program; and 

several months of study in a Bible correspondence school. However, he also 

admitted that he had received “numerous” write ups while in jail and that he 

had been written up the previous time he had been in the Department of 

Correction for trafficking drugs into the prison. (Tr. 63). Collins also 

acknowledged that he had not taken any steps on his own to address his 

addictions when he had been out of prison and that he had committed crimes 

while in prison. In addition to the instant offense, he had also previously been 

charged with threatening the prosecutor in one of his causes from prison. 

[7] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced Collins to six (6) 

years for his aiding, inducing, or causing forgery conviction and enhanced that 

sentence by ten (10) years for his habitual offender adjudication. The court 

documented that Collins could enter the purposeful incarceration program and 
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said that it would consider a sentence modification if he completed the program 

successfully. In addition, the court noted that the trial court clerk still held $650 

of Collins’ bond money. It ordered Collins to pay $183 in court costs out of this 

amount, plus a $1 fine. The court then released “the $650 minus $183 all to 

[the] public defender” to cover the public defender’s fees.3 (Tr. 88). Collins did 

not object to the trial court’s order. Collins now appeals.

 Decision

[8] On appeal, Collins argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in 

ordering that $466 be deducted from his posted bond money to pay his public 

defender because he did not agree to that payment as part of his plea agreement; 

and (2) his sentence was inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B) in light of the 

nature of his offense and his character. We will address each of these 

arguments in turn.

1. Public Defender Fee

[9] First, Collins argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered 

him to pay his public defender’s fee because he did not agree to pay such a fee 

in his plea agreement. He notes that the plea agreement specified that he would 

pay court costs and a fine, but the box on the agreement for “fees” was not 

 

3

It is not clear whether the trial court intended Collins to also pay the $1 fine from his bond money.
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checked. He asks us to interpret this omission as evidence that his agreement 

with the State did not include the payment of any fees.

[10] A plea agreement is a contract between the State and a defendant and is binding 

upon both parties and the trial court when accepted by the trial court. Baker v. 

State, 768 N.E.2d 477, 481 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Accordingly, once an 

agreement is accepted, the trial court is precluded from imposing any sentence 

other than that required by the plea agreement. Sinn v. State, 693 N.E.2d 78, 80 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1998). 

[11] However, we find it dispositive here that Collins did not object to the trial 

court’s order at his sentencing hearing that the public defender fee should be 

subtracted from his posted bond money. As a general rule, a defendant’s failure 

to object before the trial court results in waiver of that issue for purposes of 

appeal. Washington v. State, 840 N.E.2d 873, 886 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. 

denied. A contemporaneous objection allows the trial court the opportunity to 

make a final ruling on the matter. Jones v. State, 800 N.E.2d 624, 629 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2003). Accordingly, we conclude that Collins has waived appellate

review of his fee, and we will not address it. 

2. Appellate Rule 7(B)

[12] Next, Collins asserts that his sentence was inappropriate under Indiana 

Appellate Rule 7(B) in light of the nature of his offense and his character. 

Under Appellate Rule 7(B), a reviewing court may revise a sentence if, after due 

consideration of the trial court’s decision, it finds that the sentence is 
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inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1079-80 (Ind. 2006). When

determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we look at the defendant’s 

culpability, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad 

other factors that come to light in a given case. Moss v. State, 13 N.E.3d 440, 

447 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Although this Court is not required to use “great 

restraint” in evaluating a sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B), we nevertheless 

exercise deference to a trial court’s sentencing decision, both because Appellate 

Rule 7(B) requires that we give “due consideration” to that decision and 

because we recognize the unique perspective a trial court has when making 

decisions. Stewart v. State, 866 N.E.2d 858, 865-66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We 

recognize that the “principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to 

leaven the outliers and to identify some guiding principles for trial courts and 

those charged with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a 

perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 

(Ind. 2008). The defendant bears the burden of persuading this Court that his 

sentence is inappropriate. Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1080.

[13] Here, Collins was convicted of aiding, inducing, or causing forgery as a Class C 

felony and was adjudicated an habitual offender. At the time of Collins’ 

offense, the sentencing range for a Class C felony was two (2) to eight (8) years, 

with an advisory sentence of four (4) years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6 (2013). The 

sentencing range for the habitual offender enhancement for his Class C felony, 

in this case, was from four (4) to twelve (12) years. I.C. § 35-50-2-8(h) (2013)
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(providing that “[t]he court shall sentence a person found to be a habitual 

offender to an additional fixed term that is not less than the advisory for the 

underlying offense nor more than three (3) times the advisory sentence for the 

underlying offense”). As the trial court sentenced Collins to six (6) years for the 

forgery conviction and ten (10) years for the habitual offender enhancement, he 

did not receive the maximum sentence for either conviction.

[14] First, Collins contends that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature 

of his offense. Specifically, he asserts that it was inappropriate because his 

actions did not have any victims and because his co-defendant, Boutwell, who 

actually forged and presented the bill of sale to the prosecutor, was sentenced to 

only four years with two years suspended. As a result, Collins claims that the 

nature of his offense warranted a more lenient sentence. In addition, he notes 

that a month after he committed his offense, the Legislature amended the 

Indiana Criminal Code so that aiding, inducing, or causing forgery became a 

Level 6 felony, which had a sentencing range of one half (0.5) year to two-anda-half (2.5) years rather than two (2) to eight (8) years. While he recognizes 

that this amendment did not apply retroactively to his case, he asserts that the 

drastic reduction in the penalty for offenses such as his demonstrated that the 

Legislature preferred reduced sentences for forgery. 

[15] Contrary to Collins’ first argument, his assistance in creating a forged document 

was a serious crime. He assisted in creating the document in hopes that he 

would be acquitted of a pending felony charge—possession of a handgun by a 

serious violent felon. As the State notes, “[h]ad the forgery not been quickly 
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discovered, the ‘victim’ would have been the entire community, [which] would 

have been left subject to [Collins’] continual criminal offenses.” (State’s Br. 16). 

His willingness to assist in producing a forged document to use as false 

evidence in his trial also demonstrated his lack of respect for the legal system.

[16] Second, Collins argues that the nature of his offense was mitigating because 

Boutwell, who actually perpetrated the forgery, received a lesser sentence than

he did. He cites her sentence as evidence that forgery is not a serious offense. 

However, as we concluded above, the nature of Collins’ offense was serious, 

especially in light of his intent to produce false evidence. Further, we “need not 

compare” the sentences of two codefendants. Dennis v. State, 908 N.E.2d 209, 

214 (Ind. 2009). While we do not have information regarding Boutwell’s 

character or criminal history, Collins admits that his criminal history was 

“much worse” than Boutwell’s. (Collins’ Br. 9). Accordingly, even though 

Collins and Boutwell were co-defendants, their situations were not comparable 

for purposes of sentencing.

[17] With regard to Collins’ third argument, that the Legislature’s amendments 

indicated the Legislature’s intent to decrease the sentences for forgery 

convictions, we note that the Legislature’s amendments did not apply to him. 

Generally, the sentencing statutes in effect at the time a defendant commits an 

offense govern that defendant’s sentence. Marley v. State, 17 N.E.3d 335, 340 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. In Marley, we addressed the issue of whether 

the 2014 criminal code amendments should affect sentencing for offenses 

committed prior to the effective date of the amendments and determined that 
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they should not. Id. Instead, we noted that the Legislature specifically provided 

in the amendments that “‘[t]hose penalties, crimes, and proceedings continue 

and shall be imposed and enforced under prior law as if [the new criminal code] 

had not been enacted.’” Id. (quoting I.C. §§ 1-1-5.5-21 and 1-1-5.5-22). 

Accordingly, we conclude that Collins’ arguments regarding the nature of his 

offense are without merit. 

[18] Next, Collins argues that his sentence was inappropriate in light of his 

character. He contends that, even though “there are aspects of his character 

that are aggravating in nature,” there are also “positive aspects” of his 

character, such as the fact that he filed his own motions in this cause, that he 

had started to improve himself at the time of sentencing, and that he had 

entered into a plea agreement. (Collins Br. 10). We are not persuaded that 

these proffered “positive aspect” warrant a reduction in his sentence. (Collins 

Br. 10). As the trial court noted, Collins has a twenty-year criminal history, has 

violated the conditions of probation whenever he was supervised by the court, 

has failed to follow jail rules, and has committed additional crimes while in jail. 

He also has a history of drug abuse, drug trafficking while in jail, and failing to 

address his substance abuse when not incarcerated. This history demonstrates 

Collins’ lack of respect for the legal system and his failure to take advantage of 

the past opportunities the trial court has afforded him. Accordingly, we 

conclude that his sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of his 

offense or his character.

[19]
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[20] Affirmed. 

Kirsch, J., and Riley, J., concur.