MEMORANDUM FOR 

Suoject. 

REF ID:A61215e 

DRAFT 

Mr. Friedman 

In February 1945 Admiral King pr3posed to General Marsnall 

tne establishment of an Army-Navy Communication Intelligence 

BoRra For n~arly a year thereafter memoranua werP exchanged 

JlSCUSSing methods for the bPtter Organizatton vf the production, 

PValuation, pnd dissemination of radio intelligence There \dae 

sharp disagreement on the handling of operational intelligence, 

but the Army anu Navy remained in accord throughout on the 

necessity for joint evaluation and dissemination of strategic, 

non-operational intelligence 

Admiral King to General Marshall ( 18 SE>pteruber 1945) 

"There shoula be effective coordination and integration of 

Army aua. Navy communtcatlon 'l.ntelligence act1vit1Ps, with free 

interchange of technical information, and joint evaluation and 

atsseminatton of stratE>gic, non-opPrattonal intelligence 11 

~dmlral King to General Marshall (2 October 1945) 

11 The J,Jrocessing of non-military end non-naval traffic should 

be jointly unaerts~en • • 3trateglc non-operational signal 

inte ligence shoul~ be ev&luated and dissemtnated as a joint 

vroduct • I recognize a real need for one joint ULTRA c~nter, 

physically located in one building, into whtch all material of 

common interest shall bP fed by the Navy and Army cryptanalytic 

processing units 

I "11 l.ua;ea 

eclassified and a roved for release b NSA on 01-30-2014 ursuantto E.O. 1352 
REF ID:A61215 

swp IY a -a:: w• "i = • 

collateral center ana a joint ULTRA evaluation unit 11 

General ~ersnall to Admiral King (lO October 1945}. 

11 After reading your memorana.um of r OctobPr, I am convinced. 

that a Joint Ultra intelligence eveluation centFr would be 

tnPffective unless in the same center therp WPre combined all 

otr1er types of Army and Navy tntelligence. 

11 It seems to me that the bPst solution for improving not 

only the effectiveness of Ultra lntellig~nce but to resolve the 

enttre question of Army and Navy tntPlltgence organizattons 

would be tor us to combine 1n one location, under joint control, 

all Army ana Navy intelligence effort, personnel and atrection 

inclua ing all of the product of the Ultra 11 

General ELsenhowPr dnd Admiral Nimitz having succeeded to 

top command, the exchange conttnued. 

Aa.m1ral Nimitz to Genpral Eisenhower (28 December 1945). 

11 tt is essential for the 1>J.evy to rPtain under t ts control 

those communication intelligence functions yarsmountly related 

to naval operational requirements ana the ex~rctse of flBVal 

command This is true regaraless of the ext~nt of Joint effort 

by the two srrvlces ~na, likewise, regaraless ~f the extent of 

C)ntrol whlch may otherwtse be ~xerctsed ovPr the ftelu of 

intelligence gPner lly oy the interdepartmental joint intelligence 

agency which may be crPated 11 

G~nerel Etsenhower to Admiral Nimitz (29 December 1945) 

11 There ts cnother factor which has bePn bothering me for 

Eome time ~no. thc.t is the Pstablishment of a system wnere therP 

2 

l VI 
e REF ID:A61215 • 

¥(()F :3 c:erkt El\fO 

is a direct and free exchange of all ln1ormation whtch may be 

Ji value to both departments. The~I ~~~__,lhad such ~n Tntelllgence 

Excnenge Office as rart of the War Cabtnet end T understand it 

served very well. Thts agency ls needed, in ao.attlon to the Jotnt 

Allied Committee, bPcause of the character of some of the lnformation involved 11 

Admiral Nimitz to Gent>rel F1senhower (4 January 1346). 

11 rt ts increasingly/apparent t) me that, with present 

• 1 emobilizat1on of personnel and the tncreasing necessl ty for 

intelligence on 2 number of targets, we cannot Keep ourselves 

properly lnformed unless we havP the most compJete lntegratlon, 

i:--1ther oy jolnt dl:rectton or allocation of all tas1:ts ln the 

communication intelligence fteld " 

Tne bPst means to tntegrete communicattons intelligence 

yroduction, evaluation, and dtssemination had concerne>d the 

J\Jevy throughout thf' war. The yroolem was, and ts, to FXueo1te the 

floll. of operational intelligence to theatre coinmandere, whtle 

• 

providing in the same organization for the full exploitation of 

the strategic tn1'ormation which r·E>dto intelligence carries ln 

sucn large volume. The following ts e r~v te:iw 1)f the me thous 

dev~loped ct the various naval ste.ttons durtng the war 

The Navy operated three major cryptanalytic untts. These 

were locstea at Washington, Bonolulu, ana Melbourne The Honolulu 

and MPlbourne effort was devoted ex.elusively to Japanese ctphers 

At Washington two uffices functioned under the same top management 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 3 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 
REF ID:A61215 

e 

, -- t t 1 ,. ~"' lt ·~ '<§~-.< ~.Jr' % ~ f'~-.' 

control but were carefully segregated on the wor~ing lPvel, 

one office collaborated with Bonolulu and Melbourne on 

Jai.-anese systems, the other assisted London on the solution 

of European ciphers 

Each of these Navy 6roups fed its tntelligence ,roduct into 

commana heaaquarters in ~ssentl8lly the same way Because all 

units oper~ted under the control of communications rather than 

intelligence, the differences in methods of dtssemination with 

which eacn began the war tended to disappear. All eventually 

or 0 antzea the cryptanalysts ana the intelligence experts as 

cooperating teams. 

The crux of the matter is that the familiar term "radio 

tntelltgence" ts something of a misnomer. Actually, wha~ the 

crypta .. alyst ! roduces is "radio tnformatton 11 '!'Ii.is lnformatlon, 

when operetlonel in ncture, is the most reliable ~f all eources, 

particularly from the standpoint of revealing enemy plans. When 

it is strategic information it must usually be inteerated with 

infommatlon from other sources for effective use. Only after such 

collation and tnterpretation can tne raw message legitimately 

be callea 11 intelligence " 

At Washington the effort to streamline ~ production and 

dissemination organization continued from February, 1942, until 

the end of the war. tn February 1942 ONO proposed the •stablishment of ~n operational intelligence watch under CtnC USFleet 

4 
REF ID:A61215 e 

1 UI' 01:1tbKli~f' 

to yrovide for more effective cooruinatton Comincn tnstructlons 

on the aisseminLtlon of communtcations tntelli5ence were promul6&tea in June 19421 , ~nd were revtsed and retssued in Maren 

1943 2 On 14 June 1943 DNO proposed better coordinetion by 

the establishment of a Combat Intelligence Center under C0m1nch 

By directive, Aam 1 ral Ktng created thp GPnter on 26 June 1343 3 

In January 1944 DNC proposed that at least part of the CPuter worl:t. 

in colleboration with the cryptanalysts Pt the Navy Co~munications 

Annex Thts proposal was ordered tnto effect by Admiral King 

in lii.JVt--mber 1944. 4 By then, tne nar was in tts final months, 

and no further sweeping ~hanges were found necessary, out 

ex~~riment and revision of methods conttnued on the worKing level 

to the very end 

Tne creation of F-2 tn June 1943 mar~s the relief, durin~ the 

~erioa ~r tne war, Jf ONI rPsponsibility for intelligence 

evaluation ana dissemination rlpnce forwara the cryptanelysts' 

product flowed uirectly into Comtnch headquarters Within 

F-2,F-21 was ~stablished to evaluate German messages The 

?acific section was des1gnated F-22 

That £rt of F-21 allowed to ~v-l~ate iecrypted messages 

consisted of three officers pnd e uettt officer The decision 

had bPPn made at the outset to keep th's 6roup as small as 

possible for reasons of security. ~hE7':LeaK concerning raaio 

tntelligence work in the Battle Jf Midway had taugnt the high 

See Tab A 

2 See Tab B 

3 3ee Tab C 

4 See Tab D 

5 
REF ID:A61215 

3.3(h)(2) TOP SEIREt 

86-36/50 USC 3605 

command the need for extreme caution Nor did this section 

operate on a ~4 hour watch, again for a good reason. it had 

been founu that rerouting convoys uurin~ the night entailed far 

too 6reat a risk of collision OPtween our own ships. A 11 summary11 

of highlights of decrypted messages was reparea by the 

cryptenalyste' watcn officer, therefore, and forwarded to the 

~avy Department about 0600 daily There this "summary" served 

as a guiae to pie~ out the important messages. All actual 

evaluation and dissemination of Ul\ra information was performen bi 

the thrPe officers ln F-21 The official 11 Plot 11 was maintaineu by 

F-21. The sole function of the Atlantic cryptanalytic section was 

to supply raw translations of German illessages, whicn were fozwarded 

throughout the day Tt should be ~ointed out that, under this 

arrangement, the cry~tana11ste were feeding their product directly 

to the ultimate consumer, inasmuch es Comlnch had assumed direct 

command of the anti-submarine forces. It ts interesting to itnow 

olsJ that F-21 was in frequent Lirect comnun1c~t1on each day 

Obviously, unuer the extsttng arrengP111f'nt, the F-21 staff had 

no time to exploit strategic tnformetton 

Fauio intelligence is full ~f such strategic data It can 

often be explotted ~nly when thP r~sparch man can trade btts 

and f;leces or facts 1;i th the cry1tanalyst and with the traffic 

E ....... 

6 ~\~~,~~o~P~c~~ &.i!i-·i'\t...~~ ftA-11_. ..... 1-
REF ID:A61215 

e 

+gp SE6FiE1y 

analyst For this purpose a small group from the translating 

staff of the ctyDtanalyt1c un1t was finally deteiled to do 

reEea.rch Thetr Joo was t~ d~velop tnts gtratPgic anu tecnnical 

tnformation to tne full This rather belated ex~eriment was highly successful they devel)ped invaluable intelltgencp on the 

sonic t •.irpedo, on German radar, on the schnorkel, and on c lpher 

compromise All reports preparea oy th s Jroup were a~proved and 

disseminated by F-21. 

The r'ac1flc office :if the \ifashington cr~ ~ta11s.lytic .stctlon 

was ~l~aJS very much larger than the Atlpntic, the volume of its 

translations was far greater, nut the exploitation of its 

intelligence ~roduct was VPry similar to the plan followed by 

the Atlantic office Washington did not begin to decrypt Japanese 

messages on a current basis until ~hortly be~orP the Battle of 

Miaway. From the time decryption began translations were fed 

OLrectly to 211 theatre command neadquarters, as ~ell as to 

Comlncp, by a special circuit reserved solely for the exchan~e of 

radio intelligence items. All decrypts thus flowed simultaneously 

to CtnCPac (Nimitz), to Comnander South "lest Pacific (Macarthur), 

and to Commanaer Southern ractftc (Halsey) 5 Prior to encoding 

for thts circuit opPrational informatton was passed to Cominch 

headquarters b1 s~cure telephone, while the messages themselves 

were f orwaraed by hand 

During t•~11s e~rly :;erlod in the war very little strategic 

tntelltgence was developed. Much was decrypted but there was 

5 See chart at Tab E. 
REF ID:A61215 

little time for tts explo1tat1on What wor~ was accomplished 

was done by ON! Tne crPat1on of F-2 soon after the cryptanalyttc 

group moved from the JJavy De"Qartment to the Navy Com1uun1cations 

Annex in the spring of 1943 did not alter the previQUS 1nethod for 

hanuling operationel information. As oefore, tt was fed to 

all headquarters by the special ctroutt for whatever dissemination 

each headquarters saw fit to ma~e wtth1n its com~and But strategic 

tntelltgence for the first ttmP was givPn the attention tt deserved 

s~ :rofitable were the st4Uies of Japanese supplies of strategic 

materials, or to11•1ege sunk, of imports, of mine fl i:>lds, etc , that, 

as we have seen, Com,nch authorl2ed a group with F-22 aissem1nation 

authority to wor~ at the Navy Communtcatlons Annex. Li~e the F-21 

strategic intelligence analysts, however, this group in reality 

were drawn from among the Japanese translators .f the cryptanalytic 

office. It eventually numbered more than f\fty people. Their 

efforts were directed solely toward the development of strategic 

~na technical information ~xtracted from decrypted Japanese messages 

F-22, like F-21, Jissem~natea , 11 reports special studies, and 

other va~ers ~repared at the Navy Communic~tione Annex. 

At Honolulu, the Comb~t Intelligence Center was established in 

June 1941, out fur an extended 9ertod functiuned only as a 

clearing house of collateral information to aid the cry~tanalysts 

No diplomctic or other current Japanese traffic was being read 

at Honolulu at the time of the ?eArl H~rbor attack. In the early 

spring, nowever, current Japanese ciphers were broken anu the 

3onolulu unit played a dectqtve role in the winning of the Battle 

of Midway. 8 i Vi 
e REF ID:A61215 

-op GECF?r.-• 

The earliest arrangemPnts for forwarding raaio intelligence 

to commana headquarters w re ooth tapid and tnformal. At the 

uutset, the cryptanalytic unit prepared a aaily eummary of 

messages which was passed oy hand to Admtral Nimttz' headquarters 

for forwP-rding to Fleet units. As tne volume or translations 

~nd tne urgency to act upon them mounted, a secure tel~phone was 

installed connecting tne cryptaualytic watch officer's dealt with 

the desk of the Pacif1c Fleet Intelligence Officer on Nimitz' 

staff If the translator '!.ead a 11 hot 11 message, he simply phoned 

tts contents to headquarters The Fleet Intelligence Officer was 

responoiole for deltvery of any intelligence to ~perattonal units 

The cryptanalyttc group continued to maKe up ~ally summary 

for hi~, however, until tne end of 1942, wnen the preparatton as 

well dB the dlssemination of summaries was trar1eferred to Fleet 

This change aid not affect the ccyptanelytic 

~roup's responsibility for PXchanging translations with 

Melboui: ne Nld Washington 0nce this s~Pcial circutt--which has 

0 lreaay oeen 1nentioned--wae set up it continued in round-thecloclt. operation to the end uf the war. 

Honolulu began the develooment of strategic information in 

tae summer of 1942 Wtthin the cryptanalytic unit, studies were 

made ~f the location uf Japanese naval unlts end many facts were 

learnea as well about their organization Later, Japanese atr 

untts ana lcind forces cJuld be spotted From these ~ombtned stu~tes 

it oecame possible to estimet~ the enemy ~trength in vartous 

~osit1ons tnrougnout the Pactfic weekly reports were prepared 

9 =-reP seep1=:~· 
.,... ~ ru;F ID:A61215 e 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

P secns;:r 

and these, together wl th ._,ther typed mate-rial, were delivered 

to theFleet Intelligence Officer for dissemination 

Therewas one general exception to thts system ;f releasing 

information only tnrough or with the specific approval of the 

Fleet Intelligence Offtcer Early tn the war, before the Battle 

of' tne Coral Sf>as, ft occasionally .)Ccurred th.st s,μec iftc data 

0f value to submarines on yatrol was ylclted up by radto intelligence. 

Relaying this information through the Fleet Intelligence Officer 

too1t ttme and ln some cases time was of considerable importance 

Blanket autho1lty was therefore granted by the Fleet tntelligence 

Officer for the cry ,t-Jtanalyttc unit to d.esl 'J irectly wt th 

ComSubFor. Ll::l.ter, a submarine officer was stationed full time 

in the cryptanalyt le sect ton to obtb ln strat egtc as •1ell as 

operational lnf'ormation. This was stmilar to th~._ ___ ___.I system, 

whereby representattves of operational commanders were stationed 

a~to serve their needs directly 

In September 1942, the Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area 

came into being It was housed in the same ouilding 1 1th Raaio 

rnte111gence, both offices had the same ,fficer-in-c~arge, aaa 

r~l~tionshtp was very close Tne two groups, for example, used 

the same file of decrypts. All rep~rts were now ed 1 ted bJ the 

Intelligence Center and disseminated tn accordance with the airectton 

of the Fleet Intelligence Vfflcer 

In Se~tember, 1943, a new shuffle created the Joint Intelligence 

CentFr racific vcean Area Undf>r this organization the cryptanalytic 

section was removea from the jur sdtction Jf intelligence and placed 

10 ., ... e f:J. ::. e:c,, ~ ~ 
e REF ID:A61215 e 

'TOP SECRET 

under communicetions Its new name was Fleet Radto Unit Pacific 

One historian of the JICPOA unit has wr\tten: 

"Complete cooperat1on continued between FRUPAC 2nd JICPOA 

Tha- such was the case ls a tribute to the tact, ability, and 

cooperation of both General Twitty end Captain Goggins. No ~~od 

argument against the correctness of the dectsion to separate radio 

intelligence from other forms of intelligence, under the conditions 

then extsttng, Ccln 0e euvanced ~aval communications anu naval 

communications elone haa the officers wtth thP talent necessary for 

tne ~ro~er development of radio intelligence Tt was necessary to 

~et on with the war with ~he .est means available ~na to shelve 

~ny theorettcal ~rgumpnts Now that yeace has returned, however, 

these decisions c ·uld wPll be reviewed Radto tntelligence needs 

complete cooperetion with intelligence as well as communications. 

Tts product needs to be integrated with the ·~hole mass or intellit:Pnce. It will sooner or later r1Ped the service of a t'ar-reachtng 

t.ntelligence agency to u irect 1 t towerd , ts 1roper target .?nd to 

6 ~overn the scope, tine ~na rea of its coverage." 

Co11cerniHg the joint Pffort uf the Army ~ na. the Navy 1.mdE"r 

the JICPOA 01gan1zatlon, thts same historian observes· 

11 An Army message center was ftn~lly "'et up •t Fruvac to 

11.1=1.nale Special Eranch Communic&tions CTC could, ~nu frequently 

~id, c~ll on Special Pranch War Deμartment G-2 to chec~, verify, 

or amplify intelli&ence required for estimates, or ~o conauct 

6 

11 Narratlve of the Combat rutelligence Centt=-r, JICPOA 11 

11 
special rese&rcn for 1 ts bt>11ef it Tnrough the special security 

officer, m~terlal coula oe dietriouted to Army forces as required 

witn complete confidence in its proper handling and security ••• 

The importance of this como1nat1on, tn one room, ~nu unaer a untf ied 

direction, of ~ll the varied requisite sources of lntelligenceJ 

oac~ed by two world wiae communicatton services, ana able to draw 

Jn -C.he multitudinous sources of JIOPOA can hardly be overestimated. 

When estimation of enemy str~ngth was made ~t could be done with the 

assurance that all of the ~est information was available. Moreover 

lt was found that Army end Navy informatton supplemented each other 

lil many ways &nu tnat rhe result was frequently much greeter tt1a.n 

he sum. of its parts. 117 

' 

In the spring of 1945 CtnC Pac he&aquarters were moved to Guam. 

A uirect communic~tion channel was PStablished between Frupac and 

the Fleet Intelligence Officer at Guam. The rPlat1onship of the 

two offices continued wtth a minimum of dtstrubance due to their 

9hysical se~aration Thls transfer ~f headquarters to Guam was the 

t'i nal chaue,e tn tne organ l zatton of rad lo intelligence at t.Ionolulu. 

The metnod followea et Melbourne should be brtefly mentioned. 

The Melbourne unit had been evacuatPd from Correg1aor Compared 

wtth the ')ther units •t was never large, c>na a utrect partnership 

of cryptanalysts and intelligence analysts was never attempted, 

largely oecause of its physical eeparatton from the ?th Fleet 

rntelli~ence Jf ftce. Melbourne, Honolulu, and Washington were 

12 

+OP SEGA E!f 
• REF ID:A61215 • 

.. rep SEeRE:T 

lin~ed by special ctrcutts for the interch~nge of radio intellibence information, Melbourne contrtoutlng the decrypts of its 

own tntercept to the common pool Until the ttme GPneral MacArthur 

moved his headquarters to Prtsbane, the MPlbourne cryptanalytic 

unit screened all radio intelligence information originated by 

Honolulu ~nd Washington, and forwarded any ttems of interest to 

the 7th Fleet to its Tntelligence Officer ~1th the transfer of 

1~acArthur s heedquarters to Brisbane, the 7th Fleet Intelligence 

Center 2t Brisbane 1~as cut into thts special circuit rlencpforward 

tt screened tts own material, receivlng ~elbourne's aecrypted 

messages &s theJ were JUt on this circuit for genPral use. 

While the Mf'lbourne office was never cble to perform eollation 

or evaluation on a lerge ecale because ~f acute lac~ of manpower 

its very swvaration from 7th Pleet Tntelligence heedquarters force~ 

this er y •;tane.lj tic unit to P"" rform what re search work. it C'Oula. • 

.t'>efore a.Pcryμta 1..iere transmittea they were edttPa, footnoted, and 

Gommentea upon, thus addin~ to the raw text any colleteral tnformation available in the MPlOourne unit's filee Thus at Melbourne 

as elsewnere, all preliminary collation dnd eveluetion performed 

by the cry~tanalytlc unit f1lterPd through the office of the 

hPedquarters Intelligence Jfficer bPfore dissemination within that 

headquarters, or to combat units 

Based on the experienc$ of the war, ONT assumed the functions 

of F-21 nu F-22 when the Cominch staff was atsestabltehed The 

Melbourne a.nd Honolulu uni ts "'ere decommtssioned ,-na all Navy 

13 wrGP SEeRET 
I I w e REF ID:A61215 e 

9f()p SEeRET 

cryptanalysts was centered at the ~avy Communications Annex. 

Jection 322Y was set up under the oontrol of intelligenoP but 

oyerating adjacent to the cry;tanalysts within the same builaing 

and utilizin5 common ftles of translated messages. Again based on 

war experience, 322Y invlted transJotors and others from the 

cryptanal~rio staff to prepare speclal reports and to develop 

stratPgic information to the fullest extent possible with 

availaole ersonnel The arrangement has bePn harmonious and 

has led to a ~teady flow of special etudies ~na 1eports which 322Y 

nas disseminated to the ultimate consumers 2long wtth the material 

vre~ared oy tts own staff. 

TOP SECRET 

14