J-S72040-16

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

 v.

PATRICIA ANN PARTHE,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 

 No. 718 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 9, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-06-CR-0004500-2015

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., DUBOW, and STRASSBURGER, JJ.*

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 22, 2016

Patricia Ann Parthe (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed after she pled guilty to theft by unlawful taking. Upon review, we 

affirm.

The Commonwealth summarized the factual history underlying 

Appellant’s guilty plea as follows.1

At the sentencing hearing, the lower court heard testimony 

from two of the victims in the instant matter. Victim Leianne 

Cunningham Munch (hereinafter “Mrs. Cunningham Munch”) 

testified that the company, Munch Mechanical and Industrial, 

Inc., (hereinafter “the company”) hired [Appellant] in April 2015 

to handle the company’s payroll. [Appellant’s] initial job 

performance was satisfactory. During the first months of her 

employment, [Appellant] earned Mrs. Cunningham Munch’s trust 

by attending church with her and her [family], caring for her 

 

1 Only the Commonwealth has provided this Court with a detailed recitation 

of the factual history of this case, consisting mostly of testimony provided by 

one of the victims during the March 9, 2016 sentencing hearing. We further 

note that this Court has not received a copy of the guilty plea transcript.
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dogs, and running small errands. The company eventually hired 

[Appellant’s] husband. 

Beginning in July 2015, [Appellant’s] attendance became 

sporadic to such a degree that Mrs. Cunningham Munch 

considered terminating [Appellant’s] employment. In reviewing 

her job performance, Mrs. Cunningham Munch discovered that 

[Appellant] had embezzled over $20,000 from the company by 

inflating her own pay and that of [Appellant’s] husband. The 

loss led the company to hire accountants in order to keep the 

“small ma-and-pa business afloat.” 

When Mrs. Cunningham Munch confronted [Appellant] with 

her crimes, [Appellant] calmly admitted her guilt. In so doing, 

she expressed no remorse and made no offer to repay the stolen 

money. [Appellant] further admitted that the company was not 

her first victim, showing no remorse for her past crimes. Finally, 

Mrs. Cunningham Munch reviewed [Appellant’s] Facebook page 

which revealed that [Appellant] had gone on an extensive 

vacation and had a “wonderful summer.” In addition to live 

testimony, two letters written by [Appellant’s] victims from 

previous cases were reviewed by the court prior to the 

imposition of sentence.

In support of her request for a county jail sentence, 

[Appellant’s] daughter testified that [Appellant] “always provided 

for” her and her brother. [Appellant’s] husband Robert [Parthe] 

testified that he was unaware that [Appellant] was stealing from 

the company and that [Appellant] is extremely remorseful. 

Robert Parthe further testified that he forgives Mrs. Cunningham 

Munch for “causing a lot of drama” for their family by 

“harassing” them after [Appellant’s] felonious activities were 

revealed. Speaking on [Appellant’s] behalf, [Appellant’s] 

counsel described her mental health issues which prevented her 

from attending court on a prior occasion because she had 

“checked herself into Schuylkill Medical Center for psychological 

problems she was having.”[2]

 

2 Counsel averred Appellant was “extremely remorseful” and had voluntarily 

committed herself following an attempted suicide after learning about the 

death of Jim Munch, a co-owner of Munch Mechanical and Industrial, Inc. 

N.T., 3/9/2016, at 15-16.
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Prior to imposing sentence, the lower court reviewed 

[Appellant’s] incomplete PSI. In addition to the 18 misdemeanor 

and felony priors reflected in the PSI, the parties agreed that 

several more offenses were not included for some unknown 

reason. The overwhelming majority of [Appellant’s] prior 

convictions, which included at least four felonies of the 3rd 

degree, are for theft offenses or other offenses involving 

fraud/dishonesty in financial matters. Furthermore, 17 of the 

counts for which [Appellant] was convicted resulted in 

concurrent sentences. Finally, of the $106,454.06 in restitution 

ordered in [Appellant’s] previous cases since 2003, she paid only 

$10,081.01 at the time of her sentencing in the instant matter. 

The parties agreed that [Appellant’s] prior record score is 

4. The offense gravity score for the theft charge is 5, placing the 

standard range at 9 to 16 months, with an aggravated range of 

19 months. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 3-5 (citations removed). 

Appellant entered an open guilty plea to the aforementioned crime on 

January 5, 2016. She was sentenced on March 9, 2016, to the statutory 

maximum: a term of three and one-half years to seven years of 

imprisonment.

On March 24, 2016,3 Appellant filed post-sentence motions requesting, 

inter alia, to modify her sentence, which the trial court denied following a 

hearing on April 14, 2016. This appeal followed, wherein Appellant’s sole 

issue is “[w]hether the [sentencing court] imposed an impermissibly 

 

3 Following her sentencing hearing, Appellant expressed a desire to file an 

ineffectiveness claim against trial counsel. The trial court thereafter 

appointed new counsel and granted Appellant an additional ten days to file 

post-sentence motions. Therefore, Appellant’s post-sentence motions, filed 

fifteen days after her sentencing hearing, were timely-filed.
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excessive sentence beyond even the aggravated sentencing guidelines 

without a sufficient basis in the record for doing so?” Appellant’s Brief at 6.

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not 

entitle an appellant to review as of right. An appellant 

challenging the discretionary aspects of his [or her] sentence 

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part 

test:

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 

902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and 

modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether 

appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) whether there is a substantial question that the 

sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some 

citations omitted). 

Here, Appellant filed timely post-sentence motions and a notice of 

appeal, and included a statement pursuant to Rule 2119(f) in her brief. On 

appeal, Appellant alleges the reasons given by the sentencing court for 

imposing the statutory maximum “may [have justified] an aggravated 

sentence, but they are hardly so unusual as to justify a total departure from 

the guidelines.” Appellant’s Brief at 9. She further argues that 

Appellant’s theft of approximately $22,000.00 is not 

unusually high as felony theft cases go, and is not an amount so 

high that it would be effectively impossible for a person to make 

restitution payments towards in the course of their supervision. 

The Assistant District Attorney made some remarks about 

pending restitution in other cases in other counties, but those 
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remarks are not evidence and were not, apparently, considered 

by the sentencing court. 

The sentencing court pointed to [A]ppellant’s risk of 

recidivism and undersigned counsel does not disagree that risk 

can reasonably support an escalation of sanctions. But the 

sentencing guidelines are not inadequate to the task of 

escalating sanctions as the sentencing court indicates.[4] Instead 

of a standard range sentence of, for example, 9 to 23 months in 

county jail (which is a standard range sentence in this case) the 

sentencing court could reasonably have entered an aggravated 

range sentence of 19 to 84 months in state prison.

Id. at 12.

Because the discretionary-aspects claim Appellant presents on appeal 

is not identical to one she presented in her post-sentence motion, we must 

determine if Appellant’s claim is properly preserved for our review. In so 

doing, we observe that

challenges to a court’s sentencing discretion must be raised 

during sentencing or in a post-sentence motion in order for this 

Court to consider granting allowance of appeal. Moreover, for 

any claim that was required to be preserved, this Court cannot 

review a legal theory in support of that claim unless that 

particular legal theory was presented to the trial court. Thus, 

even if an appellant did seek ... to attack the discretionary 

aspects of sentencing in the trial court, the appellant cannot 

support those claims in this Court by advancing legal arguments 

different than the ones that were made when the claims were 

preserved.

 

4 The sentencing court also cited Appellant’s lack of remorse, based on her 

“demeanor.” Appellant argues that “to generally reference a person’s 

‘demeanor’ is little different than saying, ‘I don’t like your face.’” Appellant’s 

Brief at 11. 
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Commonwealth v. Rush, 959 A.2d 945, 949 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations 

omitted).

In her post-sentence motion, Appellant alleged “that her statutory 

maximum sentence is manifestly excessive and that it was an abuse of 

discretion on the part of the [s]entencing [c]ourt.” Post-Sentence Motion, 

3/29/2016, at 1 (unnumbered). At the hearing on Appellant’s motion, her 

counsel requested Appellant be sentenced within the guideline range, 

arguing that even if Appellant’s additional convictions which were not taken 

into account in her PSI were accounted for, the aggravated sentence would 

still be significantly lower than that of the statutory maximum imposed. See 

N.T., 4/14/2016, at 3-4. Appellant did not include a claim based on the 

sentencing court’s alleged failure to provide adequate reasons for the 

sentence within in her motion nor did she argue such a claim at the hearing. 

Therefore, we find her claim waived. Rush, 959 A.2d at 949.

Even if we were to address the merits of the claim, Appellant would 

not be entitled to relief. At the outset, we recognize that “[t]his Court has 

found a substantial question exists where the sentencing court failed to 

provide sufficient reasons for imposing a sentence outside of the guidelines.” 

Commonwealth v. Lewis, 911 A.2d 558, 567 (Pa. Super. 2006) quoting 

Commonwealth v. Robertson, 874 A.2d 1200, 1212 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

Here, Appellant’s counsel admitted “there are aggravating factors in 

this case” and further stated he wouldn’t “pretend that there are significant 
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mitigating factors.” N.T., 4/14/2016, at 3. Additionally, in her 2119(f) 

statement, Appellant sets forth all the reasons provided by the sentencing 

court for sentencing Appellant to the statutory maximum: (1) “[a]n 

extensive prior record of theft-type offenses which [were] not adequately 

accounted for by the sentencing guidelines’” (2) “[a] likelihood of 

recidivism;” (3) “[t]he impact of the offense on the victims;” (4) “Appellant’s 

lack of remorse as evidence by her undescribed ‘demeanor” and; (5) “[a] 

lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the case.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 5. 

Nevertheless, Appellant attempts to argue that such reasons may be 

adequate for imposing a sentence in the aggravated range, but cannot 

support a statutory maximum sentence. We disagree. 

The statute requires a trial judge who intends to sentence a 

defendant outside of the guidelines to demonstrate on the 

record, as a proper starting point, [its] awareness of the 

sentencing guidelines. Having done so, the sentencing court may 

deviate from the guidelines, if necessary, to fashion a 

sentence which takes into account the protection of the 

public, the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and the 

gravity of the particular offense as it relates to the impact 

on the life of the victim and the community, so long as [it] 

also states of record the factual basis and specific reasons 

which compelled [it] to deviate from the guideline range.

Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254, 1264 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

removed; emphasis added; brackets in original). Furthermore, “[w]here the 

sentencing court had the benefit of a [PSI], we can assume the sentencing 

court ‘was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character 
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and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.’” 

Griffin, 65 A.3d at 937 (quoting Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 

18 (Pa. 1988)). 

As acknowledged by Appellant, the sentencing court set forth ample 

reasoning for sentencing Appellant to the statutory maximum: 

The [sentencing court] is not impressed by the fact we 

were scheduled for sentencing and conveniently a day before 

sentencing [Appellant] checks herself in to self-report another 

issue prior to sentencing. [The sentencing court] finds she is a 

danger to society, a danger to society in the fact that she has a 

history of going and getting people and confide[s] in them then 

stealing from people who she befriends and taking families and 

putting them in financial distress. [The sentencing court] has no 

doubt [Appellant] will continue to do this as long as she is 

allowed to do this. 

[Appellant] has multiple current convictions. She has[,] as 

I said[,] a repeat criminal pattern. She is a habitual offender. I 

find her to be a career criminal. I don’t find she show[s] any 

remorse whatsoever. I am completely disturbed by the fact that 

[] these victims had to sit there and watch her spend their hard 

earned money while she traipse[d] through the country on 

vacation. 

There are multiple victims involved in this case, a lesser 

sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the case. She has 

a long prior adult misdemeanor record which is not accurately 

reflected by the guidelines in this case. And it’s interesting to 

the [sentencing court] that she received probation after 

probation and then was sent to jail.

N.T., 3/9/2016, at 20-21.5 Here, the sentencing court set forth the 

applicable guidelines and provided several reasons why the court felt a 

 

5 The sentencing court echoed its reasoning at Appellant’s post-sentence 

motion hearing. 
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deviation from the guidelines was necessary. Appellant has provided no 

case law to support her argument that the reasons relied upon by the trial 

court “may justify an aggravated sentence” but cannot support “a total 

departure from the guidelines.” Appellant’s Brief at 9. In light of the 

foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to 

impose the statutory maximum sentence in this case.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/22/2016

 

As I stated before, my concern here, which I believe is a 

legitimate concern, is that [Appellant] has perfected a craft of 

deceiving people, of knowing how to get into people’s lives, 

making them trust her. She has done this as a career and her 

prior record does not in any way reflect the amount of damage 

that she is doing to people’s lives. There is just no way. 

N.T., 4/14/2016, at 7.