THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Ex Parte: South Carolina Department of Disabilities and 

Special Needs, Appellant, 

In re: State of South Carolina, Respondent, 

v. 

Rocky A. Linkhorn, Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2013-002208 

Appeal From Lexington County 

J. Michael Baxley, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27684 

Heard December 3, 2015 – Filed November 16, 2016 

REVERSED 

Andrew F. Lindemann and William H. Davidson, II, both 

of Davidson & Lindemann, P.A., of Columbia; General 

Counsel Tana G. Vanderbilt, of South Carolina 

Department of Disabilities and Special Needs, of 

Columbia, for Appellant. 

Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Deputy Solicitor 

General J. Emory Smith, Jr., and Assistant Attorney 

General T. Parkin Hunter, all of Columbia, and Public 

Defender Elizabeth C. Fullwood, of Lexington, for 

Respondents. 
 

 

 

 

 

JUSTICE BEATTY: Rocky A. Linkhorn was arrested and charged with 

Criminal Sexual Conduct with a Minor in the First Degree, Lewd Act on a Minor, 

and Disseminating Obscene Material to a Minor. After finding Linkhorn was 

incompetent to stand trial and unlikely to become fit in the foreseeable future, the 

circuit court ordered the solicitor to initiate judicial admission proceedings in the 

probate court to have Linkhorn involuntarily committed to the South Carolina 

Department of Disabilities and Special Needs ("DDSN"). Before the probate court 

determined whether Linkhorn was intellectually disabled, the solicitor filed a 

motion for a rule to show cause in the circuit court, requesting DDSN be ruled into 

court "to show just cause for services being denied to [Linkhorn] as previously 

ordered." The circuit court granted the solicitor's motion and ordered DDSN to, 

inter alia, take custody of Linkhorn and house him in a secure facility until the 

probate court determines whether Linkhorn is intellectually disabled. Additionally, 

the court prohibited DDSN from refusing involuntary commitment of individuals 

similarly situated to Linkhorn. DDSN appealed. We certified the appeal pursuant 

to Rule 204(b), SCACR. For reasons which will be discussed, we reverse. 

I. Discussion 

This case concerns the application of the South Carolina Intellectual 

Disability, Related Disabilities, Head Injuries, and Spinal Cord Injuries Act1 

("Act") and certain provisions under Title 44, Chapter 23 of the South Carolina 

Code. The Act and Title 44, Chapter 23 contain competing definitions of the term 

"intellectual disability." The crux of the issue before the Court is which definition 

is applicable to Linkhorn. 

A long recitation of the facts and the tortured procedural history of this case 

are unnecessary to determine the resolution of the ultimate issue presented. The 

uncontroverted evidence shows that Linkhorn suffers from dementia caused by an 

anoxic brain injury resulting from Linkhorn's attempt to hang himself. Linkhorn 

has numerous cognitive and intellectual deficits in addition to slow speech and 

difficulty performing certain motor activities. It is noteworthy that Linkhorn's 

disability did not manifest until he was twenty-three years of age. 

A. Statutory Overview 

Title 44, Chapter 23 outlines, inter alia, the procedures for individuals found 

unfit to stand trial. These provisions apply to both the mentally ill and persons 

1

 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 44-20-10 to -1170 (Supp. 2015). 
 

 

 

 

with intellectual disabilities.2 Under this Chapter, "person with intellectual 

disability" is defined as: 

a person, other than a person with a mental illness primarily in need of 

mental health services, whose inadequately developed or impaired 

intelligence and adaptive level of behavior require for the person's 

benefit, or that of the public, special training, education, supervision, 

treatment, care, or control in the person's home or community or in a 

service facility or program under the control and management of the 

Department of Disabilities and Special Needs. 

S.C. Code Ann. § 44-23-10(21) (Supp. 2015). This definition does not have an age 

limitation. The General Assembly limited the application of this definition to Title 

44, Chapters 9, 11, 13, 17, 23, 24, 27, 48, and 52. Id. § 44-23-10 (Supp. 2015). 

Notably absent from this list is Title 44, Chapter 20. 

The Act sets forth specific procedures applicable to judicial admission 

proceedings concerning the involuntary commitment of an individual to DDSN 

once the individual is found unfit to stand trial. S.C. Code Ann. § 44-20-450 

(Supp. 2015). Under section 44-20-450(A)(8) of the Act, if an individual is found 

unfit to stand trial, the solicitor responsible for the criminal prosecution pursuant to 

section 44-23-430 is authorized to initiate judicial admission proceedings for the 

involuntary commitment of the individual to DDSN as long as the individual has 

an "intellectual disability" or "related disability." "Intellectual disability" is 

defined under the Act as "significantly sub average general intellectual functioning 

existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the 

developmental period."3 Id. § 44-20-30(12) (Supp. 2015) (emphasis added). A 

"related disability" is defined as: 

2 Prior to this appeal, the probate court determined Linkhorn was not mentally ill. 

Neither party disputes this determination. Therefore, while provisions of Title 44, 

Chapter 23 apply to both the mentally ill and people with intellectual disabilities, 

we limit our review of this authority to its application to individuals with 

intellectual disabilities. 

3 In 2011, the General Assembly substituted the term "mental retardation" with 

"intellectual disability." Act No. 47, 2011 S.C. Acts 172. The definition of the 

term stayed the same. Act No. 47, 2011 S.C. Acts 172, 176. The General 

Assembly has not defined the term "developmental period." However, since the 

term was part of the same definition previously used to define mental retardation, 
A severe, chronic condition found to be closely related to intellectual 

disability or to require treatment similar to that required for persons 

with intellectual disability and must meet the following conditions: 

(a) It is attributable to cerebral palsy, epilepsy, autism, or any 

other condition other than mental illness found to be closely related to 

intellectual disability because this condition results in impairment of 

general intellectual functioning or adaptive behavior similar to that of 

persons with intellectual disability and requires treatment or services 

similar to those required for these persons. 

(b) It is manifested before twenty-two years of age. 

(c) It is likely to continue indefinitely. 

(d) It results in substantial functional limitations in three or 

more of the following areas of major life activity: self-care, 

understanding and use of language, learning, mobility, self-direction, 

and capacity for independent living. 

Id. § 44-20-30(15) (Supp. 2015) (emphasis added). 

If the court determines the individual has an intellectual disability or related 

disability, the court shall order the individual "be admitted to the jurisdiction of 

[DDSN] as soon as necessary services are available." S.C. Code Ann. § 44-20-

 

which has generally been accepted as a condition occurring prior to age eighteen, 

we believe the General Assembly intended for the same age limitation to apply to 

intellectual disabilities. See the American Association on Intellectual and 

Developmental Disabilities, Definition of Intellectual Disability, 

http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition#.V7NoXE32Y5s (last visited on 

Aug. 16, 2016) (defining "intellectual disability" as "a disability characterized by 

significant limitations in both intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior, 

which covers many everyday social and practical skills. This disability originates 

before the age of 18"). Our belief is also supported by the expert testimony of 

psychiatrist Dr. Richard Frierson in this case. During the hearing on the rule to 

show cause motion, Dr. Frierson opined that a condition which does not manifest 

prior to the age of eighteen is not "the same intellectual disability that has been 

[previously] referred to as mental retardation." 
 

 

 

 

 

 

450(E) (Supp. 2015). If, however, the court determines the individual does not 

have an "intellectual disability or a related disability to an extent which would 

require commitment, it shall terminate the proceeding and dismiss the petition." 

Id. § 44-20-450(D) (Supp. 2015). 

While the Act also applies to individuals with "head injuries" and "spinal 

cord injuries," the provisions of the Act concerning the involuntary commitment of 

individuals to DDSN only apply to those with an intellectual disability or a related 

disability. Id. § 44-20-450 (Supp. 2015). Therefore, those individuals with a head 

injury or spinal cord injury can only be voluntarily committed to DDSN. 

B. "Intellectual Disability" 

DDSN contends the circuit court erred in applying the definition of "person 

with intellectual disability" under section 44-23-10(21) to the determination of this 

case. We agree. 

"Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear 

and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the 

court has no right to impose another meaning." Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 

533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000). 

We find the statutes concerning the involuntary commitment of individuals 

to DDSN are clear and unambiguous. Under the Act, only individuals who 

developed an "intellectual disability" during the developmental period or a "related 

disability" before the age of twenty-two can be involuntarily committed to DDSN. 

Our finding is supported by the General Assembly's exclusion of the Act 

from the list of chapters to which the broad definition of "person with intellectual 

disability" may apply. See S.C. Code Ann. § 44-23-10 (Supp. 2015) (stating that 

the definitions within Chapter 23 also apply to "Chapter 9, Chapter 11, Chapter 13, 

Articles 3, 5, 7, and 9 of Chapter 17, Chapter 24, Chapter 27, Chapter 48, and 

Chapter 52, unless the context clearly indicates a different meaning"). Chapter 20 

is not included. 

Respondents argue this is an absurd result given, in part, the language of 

section 44-23-220, which states: "[n]o person who is mentally ill or who has an 

intellectual disability shall be confined for safekeeping in any jail." S.C. Code 

Ann. § 44-23-220 (Supp. 2015). We disagree. Respondents overlook the language 

from the Act which states "No person with intellectual disability or a related 
 

 

 

 

 

 

disability must be confined in jail unless there is a criminal charge pending 

against him." S.C. Code Ann. § 44-20-450(G) (Supp. 2015) (emphasis added). 

Thus, based on our interpretation of the statutes, we conclude that if an individual 

cannot be involuntarily committed to DDSN following judicial admission 

proceedings, the individual may be confined in jail if there are criminal charges 

pending against him. 

As this Court has acknowledged, "it is not the court's place to change the 

meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute." Hodges, 341 S.C. at 85, 533 S.E.2d 

at 581. Consequently, we reverse the circuit court's decision, finding it erred in 

applying the definition of "person with intellectual disability" as defined in section 

44-23-10(21) to this case. Instead, we hold the proper definition to apply in 

involuntary commitment proceedings to DDSN is the definition of "intellectual 

disability" as defined in section 44-20-30(12) under the Act. We are constrained to 

recognize that the General Assembly has failed to provide for involuntary 

commitment to DDSN for any defendant who did not manifest his condition before 

age twenty-two. 

II. Conclusion 

In conclusion, we hold the circuit court erred in applying the broad 

definition of "person with intellectual disability" found in section 44-23-10 to 

Linkhorn. Because this issue is dispositive of the appeal, we decline to address 

DDSN's remaining arguments.4 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the circuit 

court. 

REVERSED. 

PLEICONES, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, JJ., and Acting Justice 

Jean H. Toal, concur. 

See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 

S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (providing this Court need not address remaining issues 

when disposition of prior issue is dispositive of the appeal). 

4