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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

v. :

:

ANDREW JOSEPH PATTERSON, :

:

APPELLANT : No. 1539 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 30, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-31-CR-0000460-2014

 

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2016

Appellant, Andrew J. Patterson, appeals from the Judgment of 

Sentence entered by the Huntingdon County Court of Common Pleas 

following his conviction by a jury of Indecent Assault and Corruption of 

Minors. After careful review, we affirm.

We summarize the relevant factual and procedural history as follows. 

On July 29, 2014, Appellant was arrested and charged with Rape, Statutory 

Sexual Assault, Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse, Corruption of 

Minors, and Indecent Assault1for an incident that took place on Appellant’s 

 

* Retired Senior Judge Assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.1(b); 18 Pa.C.S. § 

3123(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(ii); and 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(2), 

respectively. 
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farm in May 2012. The male complainant, B.S., alleged that when he was 

15 years old, Appellant forcibly performed oral sex on him while he was 

working on Appellant’s farm. 

Appellant elected to proceed to a jury trial. Prior to trial, the 

Commonwealth filed a Notice of Prior Bad Acts, seeking to introduce the 

testimony of G.J. and C.B, two additional boys who alleged Appellant had 

also had inappropriate sexual contact with them when they were 15 or 16 

years old.2 The Commonwealth argued that the testimony was admissible 

as part of a common plan, scheme, or design. The trial court agreed, ruling 

that the testimony was admissible at trial. The Commonwealth withdrew the 

Rape charges against Appellant at the same hearing. 

At trial, complainant B.S. testified that in May of 2012, when he was 

15 years old, his parents arranged for him to work on Appellant’s farm in 

order to earn money for an upcoming vacation. While they were performing 

chores on the farm, Appellant rubbed up against B.S. in a manner which 

made him uncomfortable. When B.S. told him to stop, Appellant stopped for 

some period, before later putting his hands down B.S.’s pants and grabbing 

his genitals. After B.S. again protested, Appellant backed off, before 

eventually tackling B.S. to the ground and forcibly performing oral sex on 

B.S. while pinning him to the ground.

 

2 The prior bad acts at issue were the subject of criminal charges filed 

against Appellant at CP-31-CR-244-2013. Appellant entered a plea of nolo 

contendere to the charges. 
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Victims G.J. and C.B. also testified at trial. Prior to G.J.’s testimony, 

the trial court gave a cautionary instruction to the jury, admonishing them 

against considering the testimony as propensity evidence. N.T., 4/6/15, at 

131-32. G.J. testified that after Appellant lured him to his farm with the 

promise of employment, Appellant twice groped G.J. without his consent. 

G.J. also testified that Appellant later sent him text messages, asking G.J. 

for pictures of his genitals and offering G.J. money to allow Appellant to 

perform oral sex on him. 

C.B. testified that Appellant obtained his phone number by promising 

C.B. employment. However, instead of using his number to arrange work on 

the farm, Appellant texted C.B. to offer him money in exchange for pictures 

of C.B.’s genitals. 

On April 6, 2015, the jury convicted Appellant of Corruption of Minors 

and Indecent Assault. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the 

remaining charges, and the Commonwealth withdrew them. 

The trial court ordered a Pre-Sentence Investigation (“PSI”) and on 

July 30, 2015, the court sentenced Appellant to the statutory maximum term 

of incarceration on each conviction, with the sentences to run consecutively, 

for an aggregate sentence of six to twelve years of incarceration. 

Appellant filed Post-Sentence Motions, which the trial court denied. 

Appellant then timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court have 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 
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On appeal, Appellant raises the following two issues:

I. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed an abuse of discretion 

in allowing the Commonwealth to present testimony regarding 

Appellant’s “prior bad acts”?

II. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed an abuse of discretion 

in sentencing Appellant to the statutory maximum on each of the 

convictions for an aggregate sentence of six to twelve (6-12) 

years[’] incarceration? 

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

In his first issue, Appellant avers that the trial court erred in admitting 

the testimony of G.J. and C.B. under an exception to the general prohibition 

against admitting evidence of prior bad acts. Our standard of review 

concerning a challenge to the admissibility of evidence is as follows: 

The admissibility of evidence is a matter for the discretion of the 

trial court and a ruling thereon will be reversed on appeal only 

upon a showing that the trial court committed an abuse of 

discretion. An abuse of discretion may not be found merely 

because an appellate court might have reached a different 

conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, 

or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so 

as to be clearly erroneous. 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 42 A.3d 1017, 1027 (Pa. 2012) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted). 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits evidence of a 

defendant’s prior bad acts “to prove a person’s character” or demonstrate 

“that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the 

character.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). Nevertheless, the Rule further provides that 

prior bad acts evidence “may be admissible for another purpose, such as 
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proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 

absence of mistake, or lack of accident. In a criminal case, this evidence is 

admissible only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential 

for unfair prejudice.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). See also Daniel J. Anders, 

Ohlbaum on the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence § 404.11 et. seq. (2016 ed. 

LexisNexis Matthew Bender). 

Evidence is properly admitted under the common plan, scheme, or 

design exception where all of the alleged acts are of a similar character. 

Commonwealth v. Booth, 435 A.2d 1220, 1226 (Pa. Super. 1981). To 

establish a common plan or scheme, courts must examine the details of the 

prior and present incidents for factual similarities. Commonwealth v. 

O’Brien, 836 A.2d 966, 970-71 (Pa. Super. 2003). “[A] comparison of the 

crimes must establish a logical connection between them.” 

Commonwealth v. Arrington, 86 A.3d 831, 842 (Pa. 2014) (quotation 

omitted). 

Even where the alleged acts are sufficiently similar, “the court must 

balance the potential prejudicial impact of the evidence[.]” 

Commonwealth v. G.D.M., Sr., 926 A.2d 984, 987 (Pa. Super. 2007). In 

so doing, the trial court should consider “the degree of similarity established 

between the incidents of criminal conduct, the Commonwealth’s need to 

present evidence under the common plan exception, and the ability of the 

trial court to caution the jury concerning the proper use of such evidence by 
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them in their deliberations.” Id. On review, this Court may affirm a trial 

court’s ruling where we conclude that the court’s cautionary instruction to 

the jury was sufficient to “ameliorate[] any undue prejudice caused by the 

introduction of the prior bad acts.” Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 

A.2d 483, 497-98 (Pa. 2009); see also Commonwealth v. Watkins, 843 

A.2d 1203, 1216 (Pa. 2003) (observing that “[a] jury is assumed to have 

followed the cautionary instruction given.”).

In the instant case, all three incidents were relatively close in time and 

locality, occurring between 2010 and 2012 on Appellant’s farm. N.T., 

4/6/15, at 25, 133, 140. All three victims were either 15 or 16 years old at 

the time of the offenses. Id. at 25, 134, 140. Appellant used an offer of 

employment to entice or attempt to entice his victims to the farm in all three 

cases. Id. at 25, 27, 134, 140. All three victims were affiliated with the Mill 

Creek Fire Hall, and Appellant met each victim through their connection to 

the Fire Hall.3 Id. at 47, 133, 140. With all three victims, Appellant sought 

to see, touch, or perform sexual acts on their genitals. With B.S. and G.J., 

Appellant inappropriately rubbed and groped both while they were doing 

chores on his farm. Id. at 31, 135. In both instances, when the victims 

protested, he briefly stopped before ultimately continuing the offensive 

 

3 Although B.S., the victim in this case, had not met Appellant before the 

assault, he testified that his parents knew Appellant through their connection 

to the Fire Hall and arranged for B.S. to work on Appellant’s farm. N.T., 

4/6/15, at 47.
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contact, attempting to, or actually, performing oral sex on both. Id. at 32, 

39, 135-37.

In his closing argument, Appellant’s defense counsel reminded the jury 

of the trial court’s cautionary instruction. Id. at 218-19. Before sending the 

jury into deliberations, the trial court again delivered a cautionary 

instruction, reminding them of the limited purpose for which they could 

consider the testimony of G.J. and C.B., and admonishing the jury that they 

“may not convict a person simply because [they] believe he may have 

committed similar acts in the past.” Id. at 243-44.

Based on the foregoing, we agree with the trial court that there were 

sufficient similarities between the prior bad acts and the allegations in the 

instant case to support the proper admission of G.J.’s and C.B.’s testimony. 

We further conclude that the trial court sufficiently addressed any risk of 

unfair prejudice with its cautionary instructions to the jury. Accordingly, we 

find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in admitting the 

testimony of G.J. and C.B. under the common plan, scheme and design 

exception provided in Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). 

In his second issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of 

his sentence when he avers that the trial court erred in sentencing him 

outside of the guidelines after considering the details of his prior offenses.4 

 

4 The argument section of Appellant’s Brief presents a confusing 

amalgamation of alleged errors, none of which he supports with citation to 
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He alleges that the sentencing court’s “equating the case under review with 

his prior convictions reflects the [sentencing c]ourt’s prejudice against him 

[and] the [c]ourt’s rationale does not support such a significant departure 

from the sentencing guidelines and is manifestly unreasonable.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 14-15. 

A challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing is not 

automatically reviewable as a matter of right. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 

66 A.3d 359, 363 (Pa. Super. 2013). Rather, where, as here, the appellant 

has preserved the sentencing challenge for appellate review by raising it at 

sentencing or in a timely post-sentence motion, the appellant must (1) 

“include in his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for 

allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a 

sentence[,]” pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (2) “show that there is a 

substantial question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code.” Id. at 363-64.

In the instant case, Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a 

timely Post-Sentence Motion. He also included a separate Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) 

Statement in his appellate brief. In addition, Appellant has presented a 

substantial question for our review. See Commonwealth v. McNabb, 819 

A.2d 54, 56-57 (Pa. Super. 2003) (holding that an appellant does raise a 

 

supporting law or legal analysis. Appellant’s Brief at 13-15. 

Notwithstanding these briefing errors, we are able to review his sentencing 

challenge.
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substantial question when he avers an excessive sentence due to the court’s 

reliance on impermissible factors); Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 

187, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008) (holding that an “[a]ppellant’s contention that 

the sentencing court exceeded the recommended range in the Sentencing 

Guidelines without an adequate basis raises a substantial question for this 

Court to review.”). 

Accordingly, we turn to the merits of Appellant’s claim, mindful of our 

standard of review:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. 

Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, 

that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, 

exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias 

or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. 

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

Where a trial court imposes a sentence outside of the sentencing 

guidelines, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) requires the trial court to provide, in open 

court, a “contemporaneous statement of reasons in support of its sentence.” 

Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254, 1264 (Pa. Super. 2012). To 

satisfy the requirements of Section 9721(b), the trial court must:

demonstrate on the record, as a proper starting point, its 

awareness of the sentencing guidelines. Having done so, the 

sentencing court may deviate from the guidelines, if necessary, 

to fashion a sentence which takes into account the protection of 

the public, the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and the 
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gravity of the particular offense as it relates to the impact on the 

life of the victim and the community, so long as it also states of 

record the factual basis and specific reasons which compelled it 

to deviate from the guideline range.

Id. (brackets and citation omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Hunzer, 

868 A.2d 498, 514 (Pa. Super. 2005) (observing that the trial court’s 

statement of reasons need not be “a detailed, highly technical statement.”). 

In addition, where the trial court has the benefit of a PSI, “it is 

presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and 

considerations, and that where the court has been so informed, its discretion 

should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 

1135 (Pa. Super. 2009) (discussing Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 

12, 18-19 (Pa. 1988)). Thus, if the sentencing court states that it 

considered the PSI, the court has properly explained the basis for the 

sentence that it imposed. Ventura, supra at 1135 (citation omitted).

Where the trial court deviates above the guidelines, this Court may 

only vacate and remand a case for resentencing if we first conclude that “the 

sentence is unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(3). A sentence is not 

unreasonable simply because the trial court deviates above the guidelines to 

impose the statutory maximum. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 

863 A.2d 1185, 1194-95 (Pa. Super. 2004) (affirming a statutory maximum 

sentence imposed after the trial court considered and balanced all of the 

relevant mitigating and aggravating facts). Our Supreme Court has 

emphasized that “rejection of a sentencing court’s imposition of sentence on 
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unreasonableness grounds [should] occur infrequently, whether the 

sentence is above or below the guideline ranges, especially when the 

unreasonableness inquiry is conducted using the proper standard of review.” 

Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 964 (Pa. 2007). 

In the instant case, the trial court made the following detailed 

statement on the record before imposing sentence:

[Appellant], I have read the pre-sentence investigation. I sat 

through trial. I think the statements you made in the presentence investigation regarding these young men are 

ridiculous.[5] You have a history of grooming young men. I 

went back and I reviewed the files from your previous 

conviction. In 2007 it was the same thing.[6] You used text 

message. You get young boys to the farm and you do what you 

do. 

I have reviewed the sentencing guidelines in this case. What the 

sentencing guidelines of one to 12 months don’t take into 

consideration is the fact that you have been convicted of 

corruption of minors before and this is exactly the same conduct. 

You have not learned your lesson. You continue to do the same 

thing over and over. The public is at risk. Young men are at 

risk.

 

5 Appellant averred that B.S., G.J., and C.B. must have seen the high-profile 

allegations against Jerry Sandusky on the news and made up their 

allegations against him in order to get money. Pre-Sentence Investigation 

at 2. 

6

In 2013, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with two counts each of 

Unlawful Contact with Minors and related offenses. He pled nolo contendere

to one count each of Criminal Solicitation (Unlawful Contact with Minor) and 

one count of Corruption of Minors. G.J. and C.B. testified at trial to the 

events underlying the 2013 charges. In 2007, in an unrelated case, the 

Commonwealth charged Appellant with Possession of Child Pornography and 

related offenses. He eventually pled nolo contendere to one count of 

Corruption of Minors in the 2007 case.
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I’ve read the letter from your brother Brian. I heard the 

comments of your dad. I feel very bad for your parents. I really 

do because you have put them through this and they are victims 

of this, maybe not so much as these young men but they are 

victims as well. They have fought through your convictions and 

your conduct over and over and over. Again, you are a threat to 

the public. 

I’ve considered your rehabilitative needs and I don’t think you 

can be rehabilitated. The only way that the public is protected is 

if you are in the state prison. So once again I have considered 

the sentencing guidelines and I’m not going to follow the 

sentencing guidelines. 

N.T., 7/30/15, at 9-10. See also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, at 10-13.

Contrary to Appellant’s contention, we conclude that the trial court did 

not impose its sentence as a result of prejudice. The record indicates that 

the sentencing court properly considered and balanced all of the relevant 

mitigating and aggravating facts, including Appellant’s background and his 

prior conduct. Appellant has not established “that the sentencing court 

ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable 

decision.” Raven, supra at 1253. 

In light of the record facts of this case and the sentencing court’s 

thorough explanation of its rationale, we are not persuaded that the 

imposition of consecutive statutory maximum sentences was unreasonable. 

Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s Judgment of Sentence.

Judgment of Sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/17/2016