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-BA~IOBAL SECURI~Y AGBBCY 

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ll/54/-&afJfSf/DSA-JJ) 

COP.V ilo. 27 

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!hi• ~ amtaiDs inf'onmtion a.ttect:tng 'the l'lational De~ or 

tbe 1Jnited. statea vi.thin 'the meayd.ng at the Bap.l.cnaae Ian, '1'1tle J.8, u.s.0111, Seati.01.VJ "193 and 794. See al.Bo Public IAv 513,, 81.at Caagresa, 

Seccm.d Seeaim., Ita 'tral!m:taa1cn or 'the revelaticm ~ its contents in 

8111' .....- to an unauthorized person ia probib:ited 'bJ' lav. 

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Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 01-29-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a· 

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Russ:tan Sources or Inf'mm.tion. 

When Part In or Flicke I 8 "War Secrets in the Ether" was reT1ewed byhigber authority, f'our pagea vere removed. trm the section entitled 

"ffhere did the Ruasians get their 1Df'ornat1onT" since the ma.ter1a1 vaa 

thOQSht to require claaattiaat:ton. 'J?he content of these pa.pa, 71...SO, 

is reproluced here ror the benefit or a suitably limited circle of 

readers. 

'l'he author'• 81ll"ll18e that German enciphered 'tl"affic was read by 

oppmenta ia interesting, ewn though he admits tl:ls.t he has no absolute 

proo:f'. 'l?he :ract tl:at a mn at his experience and with bis backgroand 

entertain8 this idea suggests the necessity ror constant v:lgl.laJlce lest 

one's own Qstema auft'er canprc:aiae due to canpl.acenoy. 

Translated: R.W.P. 

Auguat 1954 

Distribution: n01"m81. 

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4 pages 

30 copies 
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I do lmov when they [the Rusa:l8ll8) succeeded in breaking into the Gei"m9.n 

cryptopapbic ayutema,. In IQ' estimation, they were able by esarl.y Jlm'ch 1942 

'to ree.a. curre~ at least. me ar two o-r the czinrtograpld.c s~ used by 

the Germm R1gh Oammd. 'rhat put tbea. 1n a posi'tion to recognize all details 

of the Genan initial assembly in the Kharkov area and 'the under:cytng 

oiieraticme.J. ideas. :ror there is no doubt that the7 knew all this long before 

the beginning al the :fighting.. And it testifies to their confidence :ln the 

strength and atri'.ld.ng power ar the Red Arary - this am,,y which llit1er vu 

suppoaed to have broken long be:tore - that as soon aa they knew aE Germ.n 

intentions &'Jd p:repa.ra:tiOJJ.8, they decided to undertake a strong concentration 

. of troops in the opposite area and to atrike ~he German assemblies with ga:eat 

f'aree. 

The "K.barkO"I' case , wbicb will be clarified later in another way, 1i1B0 not 

an isolated c:me. '!here were numerous indications that the Russians an all 

sectors of tbe 1'ral1t were well informed reprding the a1tmtion on the Gel"i'.mt 

aide. I have al.read.y said that my view of th1a matter rests on the symptc..ms 

observed and deductions theretrm.. I might illustrate this general statement by 

an example. 

The cipher machine bed been in1iroduced by the German army fer radio tmf'fic 

a.bout 1927. After years of work the so-called nEnigma." was de'vel.oped, a cipbei:-

macbine which vu operated like a tnewriter and auta11Bti~ transformed plain· 

text into cipher text by a system ~ vheel.e, ring sett:lngs, and pluginga. By 

cbsnging the wheel order, the ring setting,. and the plugging, e. "VaSt mmiber 

at variations could be introduced into the cip'her tmct; and the key could be 

cba.nged aa.13.y. In the view at the c~ic experts, messages encipbe1"al 

with the {Enipe} could not be deciphered by unauthorized J;.18.rtiea and were 

therefore 11ecure aga.tut foreign intercept services. 

Sane experts ot the Genan intercept service had warned f'ran the ve191 

b.aginn.ing ap.inat attributing excessive significance to th1a machine, since. it 

would suffice if' the eDeJ1tY reccmstru.cted a considerable DUlllber af the ma.cbi:;iE.HJ -

which was possible at any time - Sl.ld then typed. oEf in a purely mechanical 

m.mier the various posa1bilit1ee - which coul.d be done 'VerJ' rapidly. With 

one machine it would be possible to teat f'our -variations in a minute; i.e., 

5,500 to 6,000 poea1b1lit1es 1n 24 houra. By using a greater number of machines 

tbi11 total coulcl be increased cor.rea»P.41ngly. 

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When CzeehoslO'fak'la waa occupied by German troops, evidence \r"'88 f'ot'lr!CJ 

in Prague that the Czechs bad deciphered messages enciphered with the 

"Enigma". Jlov this vae done remained UDknovn. But this proved that unauthorized decipherment or Enigma messages was possible. One of' the Ge:n:an 

c~~ic experts then undertook to check the :mcbine and found that 

aol.ution was possible given a ain1mum or 25 message& enciphered With the 

sam.g setting or the machine. 1fow it is quite easy- to :f'1nd 25 messages in 

211. hours, conaequentl;v foreign crypta.ns.l.ytic services had a good chance m' 

reading enciphered German army traffic. The "Enigma" was then altered 

eanewhat by increasing the number at wheels fran three to five, whereupon 

the cr;ypt&na:cytic ezperta in Berlin declared that bencef'o:rth messages 

enciphered Vi.th this mcbine would be secure. 

Yea.re passed. 'D:!e Second World Wm- bl-ought~ three years at ~ ... t 

rietories and wo yeara or equally great defeats and reverses. Daring all 

this time the Gel'JDBD. m:Uitary sta:f.'t's had worked to their hea:ri -11 content 

with 'the Enigma. And lnmdred8 of thowlands at radiograms bad been shot out 

into space. 'fheD in the spr:IJ>g ot 1.944 the folloriDg happened. 

A Ceman oft'ice in France inquirecl via Paris ot the er;ypta.na4'tic un:lt 

of OD' in Berlin whether messages on a Polish agent network with a certa.il? 

characteristic Tt.rere being deciphered and read. Due to acme disturbance ~ 

the teletype network, the answer was sent by radio,; it vas afi"1rmative Bll'l 

waa enciphered by the dai~ lmJ" ot the "Enigma" • llef'ore 211. hOlll'S had 

elapsed the Polish cipher ceased to 'be used. 

Saneone may ob.1ect tba.t there might have been irrtentiona:L or carelesi1-1 

betrayal. on the part of the Oermn military ottice :f.n France and that the 

ccmtent or the Berlin answer was revealed to thee~ after it bad been 

deciphered at the o:f'fice to which 1-t was addressed. Of course this is a 

posstbilit7. However, I consider it unlike~. I am. convinced tint tbe 

messages enciphered by this "EniSJD&" llTE!re currently deciphered. and ::t'e&d by 

both the English and ltussia.n crn>tanaJ.ytie services. 

In spite oE 'this Obvious warn112g, nothing changed in Ge~. AD7 ideB. 

ot doing ava;v with the "Bnip1&" met 1mmed:iately with resolute opposition. 

In the cara;petent afftces there was no longer the 'Vigor or the possibility of 

carrying ou.t the long cbaln or measures and changes whhch would reaul.t i'rau 

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abolishing the nEnigma. n Total mobilization resulted not in the total. 

utiliza.tim a£ oar mater:f.al. and spiritual. f'orces but in their exhaustfon. 

Bence even in thia fielJJ. its resul.ta were negative. Bere, too, peopl.e did 

vbat they bad 1..-rmcl and practiced for years; they strewed sand in their 

own and in each others eyes so as nab to see things as they reaJ.l.y were. 

I said earlier that I vaa not in a poait:l.on to of'rer proof's; this 

app11ee simpq to the question whether the Rus•ians could or could not decipher 

Gel'Jll8Jl cryptographic systems. I can readily t:Jtter proof' that they were 11-ell 

inf'ormed in other ways regarding events on the Ge:rma.:n side. This bas already 

been done in the brief' description of the vork at the ".Rote Drei". 

The Otwock case attarda further evidence. 

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