NUMBER 13-15-00306-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG 

 

ROBERTO VAZQUEZ, Appellant,

v.

MARIA ANGELICA VAZQUEZ, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 155th District Court

of Fayette County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Garza, Perkes, and Longoria

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes1

Appellant Roberto Vazquez appeals from a final decree of divorce dissolving his 

marriage to appellee Maria Angelica Vazquez and dividing their marital property. By four 

 

1 Pursuant to a docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas, the appeal has 

been transferred to this Court from the Third Court of Appeals in Austin, Texas. See TEX. GOV'T CODE 

ANN. § 73.001 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). 
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issues, which we treat as one, Roberto argues the trial court abused its discretion by 

rendering a judgment which modified the terms of the parties’ mediated settlement 

agreement. We reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

Angelica filed an original petition seeking a divorce from Roberto and the division 

of their marital property.

2

 The parties participated in a mediation on November 25, 2014, 

which resulted in a mediated settlement agreement (MSA). Through the MSA, the 

parties divided the community estate, which included bank accounts, vehicles, farm 

equipment, personal property, and real estate holdings. Roberto received, among other 

things, “66.248 acres . . . in the T.O. Berry League, A-17 [located at] 144 Schulze Road

[(the Schulze property)] . . . contingent upon payment of the $250,000.00 to Angelica.” 

The MSA also awarded Angelica the following:

$250,000.00 in cash to be paid by Roberto to Angelica on or before January 

15, 2015. Robert agrees to begin efforts to secure a loan to pay Angelica 

$250,00.00 [sic] within 3 business days of the date of this Agreement. 

Angelica agrees to produce any and all documentation in her possession 

reasonably required by Roberto to give to a lender to secure a loan against 

the 66.248 acres and to sign any and all documentation reasonably required 

by a lender for Roberto to get such a loan. The Parties agree that this 

Agreement is expressly contingent upon Roberto getting the loan necessary 

to allow him to pay Angelica the $250,000.00 required by this Agreement 

and in the event he is not able to secure such a loan, this Agreement shall 

be of no further force and effect. 

(Emphasis added). The MSA further provided that “[t]he Parties agree to use their best 

efforts to try and implement this settlement[.]”

 

2 The petition alleged that there were “no children under the age of 18 years born of this marriage[.]”
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Angelica later filed a “Motion to Award Real Property . . . or to Order Sale of Real 

Property and to Confirm Terms of Mediated Settlement Agreement.” Angelica argued 

that Roberto “failed to comply with the terms of the MSA by failing to, in good faith, secure 

a loan to pay the sum of $250,000.00 owed to [Angelica].” Angelica requested “that the 

[Schulze property] be awarded in full to [Angelica] or . . . be immediately sold, with the 

sum of $250,000.00 from the . . . proceeds being paid to [Angelica.]”

Roberto subsequently filed a motion to set aside the MSA. Roberto argued that 

the MSA was contingent upon his ability to secure a $250,000 loan, and, because he was 

unable to do so, the MSA was of no further force and effect. Roberto also filed a 

response to Angelica’s motion, asserting the same. The trial court held a hearing on the 

parties’ respective motions but did not enter a ruling. Instead, the trial court rendered an 

order requiring certain financial institutions to produce Roberto’s complete loan 

application files to the parties. Subsequently, the parties filed loan application files from 

three separate banks. Following a second hearing, the trial court granted Angelica’s 

motion and entered a final decree of divorce which provided in relevant part as follows:

Except for provisions with regard to sale of the real property and monetary 

award to [Angelica] as set forth herein from the sale of the real property, 

agreements in this Final Decree of Divorce were reached in mediation . . . 

This Final Decree of Divorce is stipulated to represent a merger of a 

mediation agreement and this Final Decree of Divorce. To the extent there 

exist any differences between the mediated settlement agreement and this 

Final Decree of Divorce, this Final Decree of Divorce shall control in all 

instances.

The trial court ordered that “[the Schulze property] shall be sold ‘as is’” and “[f]rom 

the net sale proceeds, the escrow or closing agent shall assign [Angelica] the sum of . . . 

$250,000.00 and any additional monies owed to her by [Roberto] (which shall include 
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outstanding attorney’s fees and any reimbursements as detailed herein).” The trial court 

further ordered that “all remaining net sale proceeds from the sale of the [Schulze 

property] shall be awarded to [Roberto].” Aside from the disposition of the Schulze 

property, the final decree of divorce disposed of the remainder of the community estate 

pursuant to the terms of the MSA. The trial court awarded Angelica $6,500 in attorney’s 

fees as well as contingent appellate attorney’s fees. The trial court later entered an order 

appointing a receiver “for the purpose of selling the [Schulze property] according to the 

terms of . . . the Final Decree of Divorce[.]” This appeal followed.

II. MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Roberto raises the following issues, which we will address as one: (1) “Was the 

[MSA] in compliance with Texas Family Code [section] 6.602 . . . ?”; (2) “Did [Roberto] 

comply with the provisions of ‘effort’ to [s]ecure a loan to pay [Angelica]?”; (3) “Does the 

trial court have discretion to modify a mediated settlement agreement?”; and (4) “Does 

the trial court have discretion to enter a judgment that [v]aries from the terms of a 

mediated settlement agreement?” 

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

In a suit for the dissolution of marriage, an MSA is binding on the parties and 

irrevocable if the agreement (1) provides, in a prominently displayed statement that is in 

boldfaced type or capital letters or underlined, that the agreement is not subject to 

revocation, (2) is signed by each party to the agreement, and (3) is signed by the party's 

attorney, if any, who is present at the time the agreement is signed. TEX. FAM. CODE 

ANN. § 6.602(b)-(c) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). If an MSA meets these statutory
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requirements, the parties are entitled to judgment on that MSA “notwithstanding Rule 11, 

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, or another rule of law.” Id. § 6.602(c); see also Garcia–

Udall v. Udall, 141 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.). Section 6.602 

provides a procedural shortcut for the enforcement of MSAs in divorce cases, eliminating 

the need for a separate suit to enforce the agreement even when one party withdraws his 

consent from the MSA. See Boyd v. Boyd, 67 S.W.3d 398, 402 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2002, no pet.). Accordingly, a trial court must enforce an MSA that meets these 

requirements unless a party demonstrates that the MSA was illegal or was procured by 

fraud, duress, coercion, or other dishonest means. Id. at 403.

A final judgment founded upon an MSA must be in “strict or literal compliance” with 

that agreement. Vickrey v. Am. Youth Camps, Inc., 532 S.W.2d 292, 292 (Tex. 1976); 

see also Udall, 141 S.W.3d at 332 (trial court abused its discretion by entering judgment 

not conforming with MSA in suit affecting parent-child relationship). A trial court may 

modify the terms of an MSA, so long as those modifications do not add terms, significantly 

alter the original terms, or undermine the parties’ intent. See Keim v. Anderson, 943 

S.W.2d 938, 946 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.) (finding reversible error when trial 

court added provision requiring husband to pay $3,500 of wife’s attorney’s fees); In re

Marriage of Ames, 860 S.W.2d 590, 592–93 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1993, no writ) (holding 

trial court erred when it added terms which “differed significantly from the settlement 

agreement”). 

We review a trial court’s judgment on a mediated settlement agreement for an 

abuse of discretion. R.H. v. Smith, 339 S.W.3d 756, 765 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no 
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pet.); In re C.H., Jr., 298 S.W.3d 800, 804 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). We apply 

the rules of contract interpretation to the MSA. See Milner v. Milner, 361 S.W.3d 615, 

619 (Tex. 2012) (parties’ dispute over interpretation of mediated settlement agreement 

concerning property division was a matter of contract interpretation). The interpretation 

of an unambiguous contract is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. See MCI 

Telecomms. Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 650–51 (Tex. 1999).

B. Analysis

The parties both maintain that the MSA was in compliance with section 6.602 of 

the Texas Family Code. We observe that the MSA provided the following language: 

“THIS AGREEMENT IS NOT SUBJECT TO REVOCATION.” (bold faced and underlined 

type in original). The MSA was further signed by the parties and their attorneys. 

Therefore, we agree that the MSA met the requirements of section 6.602. See TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 6.602. We also note there were no allegations that the agreement should 

be revoked because it was illegal or was procured by fraud, duress, coercion, or other 

dishonest means. See Boyd, 67 S.W.3d at 402. As a result, the trial court did not have

authority to enter a decree that varied from the terms of the MSA. See Udall, 141 S.W.3d 

at 332.

The MSA unambiguously provided that the agreement was “expressly contingent 

upon Roberto getting the loan necessary to allow him to pay Angelica . . . $250,000.00[.]” 

The parties further agreed that “in the event [Roberto] is not able to secure such a loan, 

[the MSA] shall be of no further force and effect.” It is undisputed that Roberto was 

unable to obtain the loan by the date prescribed in the MSA. Therefore, the MSA, by its 
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own terms, was of “no further force and effect.” Nevertheless, Angelica argues, without 

citation to any authority, that “the trial court . . . was within [its] discretion to divide the 

community property no longer covered by the terms of the [MSA] as a result of Roberto’s 

breach of those terms.” Perhaps in recognition of the difficulty of securing the loan and 

delivering the proceeds within seven weeks—November 25, 2014 to January 15, 2015—

the parties agreed that the MSA was “expressly contingent” on this occurrence. Parties 

are bound by the terms of their agreement as written, and this Court cannot rewrite the 

agreement to change its terms. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Miller, 274 S.W.3d 779, 785–

86 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.).

We find no authority for the proposition that a trial court can modify the terms of an 

MSA due to a party’s alleged breach. See Morse v. Morse, 349 S.W.3d 55, 56 (Tex. 

App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.) (concluding breach was not grounds for revocation of an 

MSA). To the contrary, an MSA complying with section 6.602 is immediately 

enforceable, not subject to repudiation by a party, and binding on the trial court without 

approval or determination of whether the agreement’s terms are just and right. See In 

re Marriage of Joyner, 196 S.W.3d 883, 887 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied); 

Cayan v. Cayan, 38 S.W.3d 161, 164–66 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. 

denied); see also Spiegel v. KLRU Endowment Fund, 228 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2007, pet. denied) (when MSA meets section 6.602’s requirements, it must be 

enforced in the absence of allegations that the agreement calls for the performance of an 

illegal act or that it was procured by fraud, duress, coercion, or other dishonest means). 
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The final divorce decree provided that its terms represented agreements that “were 

reached in mediation . . . [e]xcept for provisions with regard to sale of the real property 

and monetary award to [Angelica.]” In that regard, the decree required Roberto to sell 

the Schulze property and awarded $250,000 of the sale proceeds to Angelica. The trial 

court was without authority to enter a final divorce decree enforcing certain terms of the 

MSA while modifying others. See Udall, 141 S.W.3d at 332. We hold that the trial court 

abused its discretion in entering a final decree of divorce which partially enforced and 

modified an MSA that by its own terms was of “no further force and effect.” See Smith, 

339 S.W.3d at 765; In re C.H., Jr., 298 S.W.3d at 804. We sustain Roberto’s issues on 

appeal. 

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

GREGORY T. PERKES

Justice

Delivered and filed the 

10th day of November, 2016.