r 

\ 

REF ID:A39933 

SECRET • • 

16 March 1948 

USCIB: 11/4 

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF USCICC: 

Subject· 

Reference. 

Enclosure. 

Revi~ion of Enclosures (A) and (B) to the 

Intelligence and Security Subcommittee 

Report on S-1019, dated 19 January 19480 

(a} 

(b) 

(A) 

(B) 

( c} 

Final Minutes of 49th Meeting of USCICC, 

held on 28 January 19L1-80 

Minutes of 50th Meeting of USCICC, held on 

25 February 1948. 

Rewritten version of Enclosure (A) to the 

Intelligence and Security Subcommittee 

Report on S-1019, dated 19 January 19480 

Rewritten version of Enclosure (BJ to the 

Intelligence and Security Subcornnittee 

Report on S-1019, dated 19 January 19480 Cop~r of coI'.lnent received from Department 

of State representativeo 

l. In accorddnce with the decision reached at the 

time of the Forty-ninth Meeting of USCICC, members submitted 

corr..ments on the subJect reporto 

3 

2. Certain of the comnents recommending changes in 

the text of Enclosures (A) and/or (B) with the subJect report have been used in the preparation of the attached revised versions. 

Jo Copies of the comments which suggested a divergent 

or modified plan of action are also enclosed herewitho 

4. The enclosed material is for~~arded for information 

and file, since further USCICC action has not been requestedo 

5o At the time of the Fif'tieth Meeting of USCICC, it 

was agreed that the Coordinator would transmit the Committee's 

recommendation that the spokesman for USCIB at hearings on S-1019 

use the "short" form of the Justification, whether an "open" or 

"closed" hearing is held. 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 09-03-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

\ 
REF ID:A39933 

S. 1019/H.R. 2965 

Statement in Justification 

4jtraft by Subcom. 

un I & s. 

19 January 1948 

I am Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, U.S. Uavy, Chief or Naval 

CoinI'l.unications, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. 

I request that my statement be taken in executive session and 

that it not be recorded in the public records of this committee. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • 

In aatters concerning this bill I speak not only in riy 

capacity as Chief of Naval Co!llnunications but also as the duly 

appointed spokesman of the Departments of State, the Army, the 

Navy, and the Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency, 

these being the Joint sponsors of the bill in its present form. 

This bill is straightforward in its intent. Its purpose 

is to fill a serious gap in existing laws which relate to the 

peacetime protection of infornation vital to the national defense and security. Specifically its purpose is two-fold, 

primarily, to insure the continuation of our sources of communication intelligence by protecting infornation about our 

operations in that field, and secondarily, to insure the maxir.iur.i security of our own secret communications by protecting information about the ~~which we employ therein, that is, our 

own codes The Act of 10 June 1933 {48 Stat. 122} makes it a 

crll'l.e punishable by a $10,000 fine, or 10 years in Jail, or 

both, to furnish to another any official diplomatic code or 

- l -

Enclosure (A} C 8lf.l!'ID:ffilff IAL CONFIDEtfRAl 
REF ID:A39933 

S. 1019/H•R• 2965 

Statement in Justification 

~aft by Subcom. ~ I & S. 

19 January 1948 

matter which has been prepared in such a code. It :may be noted 

that the Act in question was rushed through under special circumstances in 1933. It arose from hasty attempts to prevent 

further revelations by Yardley after the publication of his 

sensational book "The American Black Chamber" in 1931. The bill 

first drawn up in the excitement caused by the disclosure that 

Yardley had written a second book., the manuscript of which was 

already in the hands of a publisher, was of such a broad scope 

that it 1IDI!l.ed1ately aroused the nost strenuous opposition frorn 

the press and even within the Congress itself. Wl1en the storm 

aroused by this bill died down, the innocuous measure passed on 

10 June 1933 was the most that could then be obtained in the way 

of protecting cryptanalytic secrets. It was, however, effective 

to meet the emergency situation, for it was known thdt Yardley's 

proposed second book was replete with the actual texts of 

messages~ \Tith passage of the rneasure, publication of Yardley's 

manuscript was prevented; and this Act serves as a deterrent 

against the publication of any book which discloses a diplomatic 

code or nessages uhi.ch have been prepared in such a code.. However, it is very l.r.l.portant to note that this Act is quite lin1ted 

in its scope, anybody who is the possessor of detailed Oormi.unioation Intelligence information can disclose all of it without 

any punishment whatsoever under the Act, as lon~ as he docs 

- 2 -

Enclosure (A) 

OOlf.li'ID=ffiiffIAD 

CONFIDENllAL 
, GONFIDENTIAL 

CQm'!!lp!l:@ 

REF ID:A39933 

S. 1019/H.R. 2965 

Statel'l.ent in Justification 

tk-art by Subco~. on I. & s. 

19 January 1948 

not publish or hand over physically any code itself or a copy 

thereof or any ~essage which had been prepared 1n the code. 

This sort of protection is not what we now need or are seeking 

in the present bill. \le are seeking legislation which will protect the large 8l!lount of general and specific technical information which is extrenely vital to national security and which we 

have built up at great pains and expense over the past two or 

three decades, using the people's money. It can all be rendered 

more or less worthless, without handling over any code and without 

publishing any solved ~essages, nerely by telling in detail what 

we know, or have acoonplished, or are accomplishing in this field. 

Also, it is important to note that the Act of 10 June 1933 applies 

only to diplomatic codes and therefore does not extend to that 

part of our Communication Intelligence effort which may be directed against foreign nilitary, naval, air, and other codes, nor 

to the codes used by our own military establis.hiaent and intelligence agencies. The Espionage Act of 1917 closes pArt of this 

gap but only an insignificant part since, under that Act, intent 

to inJure the United States must be proved. This Act cannot be 

invoked to punish people who disclose vital infol"I'l.ation without 

any intent to inJure the United States. This category includes 

people who, for reasons of personal prestige or vanity. or from 

misguided motives such as in the Yardley case, or in a desJra to 

- J - Enclosure (A) 

C O~tS'I~mP:Piili 

GONFIDElflAl 
REF ID:A39933 

S. 1019/H.R. 2965 

Statement in Justification 

~aft by Subcom. ~I. & S. 

19 January 1948 

profit in a monetary way, proceed to tell all about their wartime 

experiences (as others are doing, witness Captain Butcher's "My 

Three Years with Eisenhower", Captain Zacharias' "Secret 

Missions", Colonel Allen's "Lucky Forward"). Publication of information concerning our Cor.imunication Intelligence activities 

by people who fall in this category is just as disastrous as 

direct delivery, by secret agents, of the information to foreign 

goverm:ients. In any case oorJm.unication intelligence infol"I!lation, 

as I shall presently explain~ is peculiarly vulnerable to even the 

most indirect, roundabout, and piece-meal revelation. Anl such 

revelation has the effect of inJuring the United States. Thia 

bill attempts to close the gaps left by the Acts of 1917 and of 

1933 insofar as information about codes is concerned, and, within 

that l:un.J..ted field, to improve what protection is afforded by 

these older Acts. 

I particularly point out and emphasize that it is nowhere 

within the intent or purpose of this bill, in either its old or 

new forns. to prevent the legitimate revelation to the .American 

public of the contents and substance of specific U.S. Government 

secret communications. In its original forn as S.805 before the 

79th Congress and as S.1019 {and R.R. 2965) before the first 

session of the 80th Congress this bill went further than it does 

now in its provisions for protecting our own codes in that it 

attempted to prevent the unauthorized publiration of tho ~ontent9 I 

Enclosure (A) - 4 -

eaniPi:f>Eff'fIAL CONFIDENTIAl 
REF ID:A39933 

. B.,I019/H.R. 296~ 

Statement in Justification 

~aft by Suboom. 

on I .. & 5. 

19 January 1948 

and substance of our own secret communications. The purpose of 

this feature was not the establishment of a means that would make 

possible the hiding of information by the &xecutive Branch but 

simply the protection of the code systems e!"l.ployed for the trans-

.IILJ.ssion of the information, by preventing reconstruction of those 

systems from a comparison of the code texts with the plain texts 

of message which had been trans~itted in those systems. However 

this feature, undoubtedly open to possible abuse, caused such suspicion an~ drew such opposition that the bill's chances of passage 

appeared to be microscopic. This is the reason why the bill was 

reconsidered by the sponsoring departnents and agencies late in 

1947 and revised to its present fora. with the obJectionable 

foature omitted, ~1th certain other features strengthened in view 

of that omission, and with its purpose and scope clearly stated 

and del..imi.ted. 

Th1s bill's secondary purpose, to protect our own code 

systems by protecting direct information about thee. (and indirect 

information about ther.:i. acquired by covert means), requires, it is 

believed, little explanation. It is not difficult to defend a 

provision under which it shall be a crine to I?lB.ke available to 

foreign governments the means by which they can directly read our 

secret communications. 

The bill's pri.ma.ry application, however, requires some explanation. There is no need here to expla1n wha~ ~ol'1I"lun~cation 

Enclosure (A) - 5 -

06lfFIBBlV':P:IM. CONFIDENTIAL 
OONFIDENllAL 

Com'IllEKfI:AL 

REF ID:A39933 

S. 1019/H.R. 2965 

Statement in Justification 

.. aft by Subcon 

on I 8.. S 

19 January 1948 

intelligence !£!. OT what its value cdn be. The Congressional In- , 

vestigation of the Attack on Pearl Harbor brought out both 

points adequately. On page 232 of the report of that investigation appears this statement by the Conruttee. "All witnesses 

familiar \Uth Magic In.dterial" {that is, coI'lClunication intelligence) throughout the war hdve t~stified that it contributed 

enormously to the defeat of the enel'lJr, greatly shortened the war, 

and saved I'lany thousands of lives." In peacetime also tho value 

of this intelligence source is incalculable because froI"l no other 

source can the intentions of a potential ene:r.iy be so positively 

determined. The necessity of preserving this source is obvious. 

Unfortunately co.rn:i.unication intelligence is peculiarly sensitive to disclosure. \Then a foreign governnent using a code system 

learns that its systen has been broken, it naturally, inevitably, 

and immediately changes the systen. The perfect case in point is 

the change of Japanese diplomatic codes lthich shortly followed 

publication of Yardley's ".American Black Chal'l.ber" in 1931, already 

mentioned. The foreign governnent does not need to learn categorically and specifically that one of its systeP.Ls has b~en broken 

All that it needs is to discover thut \le are aware of inforrie.tion 

which could have been acquired only (or even probably) from its 

coded messages, this is usually sufficient proof that it must 

change the system. It does so, and we are deprive~, at least 

temporarily and 

message traffic 

Enclosure (A) 

perhaps per~nentlFfllof tA{ornation 

involved. -CON ENT 

- 6 - CQlf.IPff>'f!! 'till 

f rorn the 
GOdflUENTIAL 

GON.IPHlEtf'f'!ittl 

REF I-Eli :A39933 

S. 1019/H.R. 2965 

Statement in Justification 

.raft by Suboom. 

on I. 8.. S. 

19 January 1948 

This closing off of an intelligence souroo is the direct and 

obvious result of disclosuro of cryptanalytioal success. It is, 

moreover, the only res~lt which ultimately matters, and the damagq 

involved is measured principally by the a.c:Lount or intellieence 

lost and the duration of the intelligence blackout, but there are 

certain technical aspects of such a disclosure which should be 

considered, since they have an indirect effect on the seriousne~s 

I of the de.nage. • 

If the reaction to a revelation of cryptanalytical success 

were al\Ya.ys a change to another code of the sane general type and 

complexity as the old one, the only dam.age would be. 

(1) tho loss of intelligence during a more or less definite 

interval until the breaki~g of the new code, and 

(2) the :c:i.ore or less definite ti~e, effort, and other expenditures involved in the study Pnd solution of the 

new code by our orypta.nnlyticalorganizations. 

Such losses are incurred in any c~se whenever the foreign government makes routein, periodical, precautionary changos in its code 

systems. Thoso losses wo~ld be bad enough, but unfortunately, in 

practice, they do not represent all of the loss in a dase of disclosure, since the new code, almost inevitably in such a case, is 

approoiably more complex and secure than the sup~rseded one. 

Nations and organization progress in the field of cryptography as 

they do in other fields, that is, usually by evolution. Because 

Enclosure (A) 
~ CONFIDENTIAL 

CQIWIIttJI!fIAt 

~~~~RE....--~F--ID...:.A39933 

S. 1019/H n. 2965 

.raft by Subcom 

on I & S 

19 Jdnuury 1948 

Statenont in Justification 

Because of natural hUD.an complacence and inertia, such progress, 

when normal and undisturbed, is usually gradual enough that it ca~ 

be followed by a co~petent cryptanalytical organization with a 

minimun of difficulty. 1 fhen, however, the success of our crypt-, analytical organizations is disclosed, the foreign nation is made 

aware that the bnsic methods of its cryptography are unsound and, 

in the light of this knowledge, is forced into rnore or le~s 

drastic changes and advances in its methods. For us the continuity 

is broken and the difficulty of the task is increased many fold, 

in extreme oasos the new problem is so far beyond us that we may 

never solve it. Thus, from the cryptanalysts' standpoint, while 

solution of a nor.mnl precautionary cryptographic change by a 

foreign government ralB.y entail merely a routine series of operations over largely well known ground, a revolutionary Jump in 

technique induced by disclosures mny proJect the attack into 

completely unknown territory, so that tha hiatus in intelligence 

may be indefinitely protractud. Again, the best exanple of what 

can happen is taken from thct "J\Ii.crican Black Ch81'.1.ber" affdir, 

after the appearance of this publication, nll Japan&se cryptograpn.r 

in general improved radically and it was obvious that tho Japanese 

were devoting more study to cryptography than thoy ever had before. 

In 1934 they introduced their first diplomatic nachine ciphor, end 

fron 1931 on the progressive improvenents in their military 

systems rendered solution of these systens nore and Ill.ore difficult, 

each year It is not far-fetched to suggbst that our inability to 

Enolosure (A) - s - OONFIDENTIAL 

Q@!BElffIJcL 
, 80NFIDENTIAL .,. OON.FIDB1'PIAL 

~~~~~BEE._IIl:A39933 

s~ 1019/H~R. 2965 

Statement in Justification 

.raft by Subcom 

on I &. s. 

19 J"anuary 1948 

decode tho llD.portant Japan~se I'l.ilitary coD'll'l.unications in the days ' 

immediately leading up to Pearl Harbor may be traceable directly 

back to the state of coI'll'l.unication-socurity consciousness which 

Yardley's revelations had forcod on Japanese officialdom a dGcadc 

earlier. 

Moreover there is no time limitation involved. Because of 

the very principle of continuity which is normal in undisturbed 

cryptographic evolution, it I!lB.Y be as dBl!laging to let the foreign 

government know of old success as it is to disclose current suooees 

since, in the absence of intervening.revolutionary advances, disclosure of the first leads to strong presunption of the second. 

It should bo pointLd out that the bill attenpts to protect 

only classified infoI"lil.B.tion in the stated cat~gories and that the 

term "classified information" is, for this purpose, specifically 

li!'l1ted to inforI!lB.tion restricted and withheld for reasons of' 

national securitv. The sponsoring departnents believe that this 

feature, originally included at the request of tho U.S. Archivist 

for reasons having to do solely with his functions, is an anple 

dafeguard of freedol!l of speech and of.th~ press since, in any 

prosecution under the bill, the goverllLl.ent would have to prove 

not only that the information involved was "classified" but that 

the classificab.on had been imposed for reasons of national 

security. Obviously the government would never undertake a prosecut1on unless it could so prove and unless it could demonstrate 

- 9 - CONFIDENTIAL 80lf.1!'1:DEI~ Eno.loaure (A) 
REF IEi-:-A39933 .. 

.... 

.raft by Subcom. 

on I. &. a. 

B. 1019/H.R. 2965 

19 January 1948 

Statement in Justif idation 

that its reasons for th~ classifica~ion in the specific instance 

.. wero reasonably uoll founddd. Furthermore, it \V'ill be noted, the 

citizen who happens on "classified info:rlmtion" innocontly, througJl 

• 

channels indopendent of the governnent, and reveals it, is probably 

safe from conviction sinco he should be able to prove~his ignoranc~ 

of the classified status ,It is only the person who knowingly 

possossos this classified infornation, acquired from the govormnont 

either legitimately or clandestinol~, over who~ we wish to hold a 

club. This gap in our security is now wide opon. It would be 

possible for a disloyal or disgruntled ox-official or ex-\JDlplo1eo 

of one of our communication intolligence agencies, or oven one who, 

with no actual malice, wished to profit from his "inside" knowlodgo 

by spreading it in a book or published article, to givo away vital 

and ruinously rovoaling information uith complete J.n.punity undoi· 

present laws. Already there have boen instdncos of leakage of in 

formation concerning U.B cryptanalytic successes in the last we~ 

and, as the date of the fol"l'lB.l declaration of th& termination of 

tho war approaches, and as more dnd more persons publish their 

wartimo experiences with considerdble monetary profit, tho tompta 

tion to capitalize on their cryptanalytic experiences may prove 

too great for sono people who have had such experience to resist. 

It may therefore be antici~ated that books or articles on the subJect will be forthcoming sooner or later--unloss proper legislation is now enacted to prevent such an eventuality. We oan atfo~· 

to tako no chances in this situation and trust to good luck. In 

- io - CONFIDENJIAl 

Enclosure (A) PA"N=ll'T'Rlilt 'llPT AT 

• 
REF ID:A39933 

S. 1019/H.R. 2965 

Stator.tent in Justification 

~raft by Suboom. 

on I. & S 

19 January 1948 

times like these, when, in the discharge of its responsibilitiGs, 

the United Stdtes, a peace loving nation, faces the stark roalities 

that exist in a semi-hostile ~orld, protection of this vital information is something that should no longer be left to chance but 

should be covered by law. One of the recoI!ll'lendations of the Joint 

Congressional Comnittec for the Investigation of the Attack on Pean 

Harbor (on page 253 of thoir report} was 

"That effective steps be to.ken to insure that statutory or other restrictions do not operate to the benefit of an enemy or other forces inJlllical to the nation's 

security and to th~ handicap of our own intelligence 

agencies. \/1th this in lill.nd, the Congress should give 

serious study to, anong other things, ••** legislation 

fully protecting the securl.ty of classified I!latter. '' 

It might be asked why this legislation is needed now when'·~ 

apparently got through World Vtar II without it. The answer is 7 hi:J.t 

we very nearly didn't get through---there were tll'l.es when author•-

ties on the highest level spent I:IB.ny anxious days in apprehension 

as to the possibly serious consequences that night result from 

certain leakages that did occur--leakages that might have been 

catastrophic, and in one case was actually extronely serious in 

its effect. Of course, wartime censorship helped and the elimination or curtailment of effective work by enemy agents helped. :Ou•,, 

in peacetime no such screen of general censorship is available or 

Enclosure (A) - i1 - CONFIDEMTI~' G9Hi'IBI!l!i'PIAL 
"' . 

CONFIDEtmll 9 

ll a!.t:f ln!:N' .• .'IAL 

REF-~B :A39933-

UiaI~ by S~bcu.ar.m.. 

on I. &S. 

s. 1019/H.R. 2965 19 January !948 

Stat8l'.l.ent in Justification 

- - -- - - - - - -- -- - - -- - -- - - - -- - .... -- -- - - - -... - \ 

died down, the innocuous measure passed on 10 Jwie 1933 was .the 

most that could then be obtained in the way of protecting cryptanalytic secrets. It was, however, effective to meet the emergency situation, for it was known that Yardley's proposed second 

book was replete with the actual texts of J:1.essages. With passag~ 

of the 1'18asure, publication of Yardley's manuscript was preventet)I 

an.d this Act servis as a deterrent against the publ1cat1on of a.pJ<-

book which discloses a diplomatic code or nessages which have 

been prepared in such a code, However, it is very l.rlportant to .. note that this Act is quite limited in its scope, anybody who is 

the possessor of detailed Communication Intelligence infol'l'l8.t1on 

can disclose all of it without any punishment whatsoever under 

the Aot, as lons as he does not publish or han.d over ph.ysicall1 

a.ny code itself or a copy thereof or a.ny message lYhich had been 

prepared in the code. This sort ot protection is not what we ll.DW 

I 

need or are seelang in the present bill. tie are seeking legisl~· 

tion which will protect the large amount ot general and specific 

technical infol"lll8.tion which is extremely vital to national secur~ 

... ity and which we have built up at great pains and expense over 

the past two or three decades, using the people~ noney. It can 

all be rendered nore or less worthless, without handing over all1' 

code and without publ1sh1ng any solved 111essages, merely by telli.£8 

in detail what we know, or have acconplished, or are acconpl1shing in this field. 

Enclosure (B) 

Also, it is JJD.portant to note that the Act 

-2-

c OHl'ff)EH'l'Iil 

GDNFIDENTllL 
.. 

CONFIDENTIAL 9 

(; ON~ l.D!lw.t :th=§ 

REF ID:A399-33 

• ~raf~ by Sub~ol'lID.4 

on I.&S. 

19 January 1948 

S. 1019/H.R. 2965 State~ent in Justification 

------------------------------..--

o"f 10 Jun.e 1933 applies only to di1'lomatic codes and therefore 

does not extend to that part of our Corinun1cation Intelligence 

effort which may be directed against foreign military, naval, 

air and other codes, nor to the codes used by our own nilitary 

establishment and intelligence agencies. The 3s~ionage Act 

of 1917 closes part of this gap but only an insignificant part 

since, under that Act, intent to inJure the United States must 

be proved. This Act cannot be invoked to~punish people who dis~ 

close vital information without any intent to inJure tl.e United 

States. This category includes people who, for reasons of' 

personal prestige or vanity, or from misguided I1ot1 ves such as 

in the Yardley case, or in a desire to profit in a monetary way, 

proce.ed to tell all about their wartirne experiences. Publication 

of information concerning our CoDI:lun1cation Intelligence acti-

• 

v1t1es by people who fall in this categorv is JUSt as disastroup ' 

as direct delivery, by secret agents, of the 1nf'ornation to 

foreign governments. In any case col'lm.unication intelligence 

information, as I shall presently explain, is peculiarly vulnerable to even the nost indirect, roundabout, and niece-meal 

revelation. Any such revelation has the effect of inJurine the 

United States. This bill atten.pts to close the gaps left by the 

Acts of 1917 and of 1933 insofar as inforil'l.at1on about codes is 

concerned, and, within that limited field, to i!!lprove \Yhat protection is afforded by these older Acts. 

Enclosure (B) -Jg QHFI:DDN'f!AL GONflDEMlU\L 
REF ID:A39933 

CONFIDEWTIAt e e 

c Ulil:- _ffi!ltti :tAL Draft by Su \JC Orll'l. 

on I.&a. 

s. 1019/Il .. R. 2965 19 January 1943 Sta~e.r.i.ent in JUst1t1cat1on 

--~~--~----~-------------------~ 

I particularly point out and ernphasize that it is nowhere 

within the intent or purpose of this bill, in either its old o~ 

new forms, to nrevent the legitimate revelation to the Arler1can 

public of the contents .!!!!9:, substance of specific U s. governl"le~t 

secret communications. In its original fern as S. 805 before 

the 79th Congress and as S.1019 (and II.R. 2965) before the first 

session of the 80th Cong:ress this bill went further than it doea 

now in its provisions for protecting our own codes in that it 

attempted to prevent the unauthorized publication of the conten~t 

and bUbstance of our own secret comra.unications. The purpose of 

this feature was not the establishment of a means that would make 

possible the hidin& of inforil'l.ation by the Executive Branch but 

simply the protection of the code syste~s e!'!.ployed for the tran~- • 

mission of t.he inf'ornation by preventing reconstruction of tho~~ 

systens from a comparison of the code texts with the plain texts 

of messages which had been transnitted in tiose systens. However this feature, undoubtedly open to possible abuse, caused 

such suspicion and drew such opposition that the bill's chances 

of passage appeared to be microscopic. This 1s the reason why 

the bill was reconsidered by the sponsoring departnents and agen~ 

c1es late in 1947 and revised to its present forn with tle obJecr 

ti.enable feature omitted, with certain other features strengthened in view of that om1ss1on, and with its purpose and scope 

clearly stated and delimited. 

-4-

Enclosure (B) 0 ON:li' IBEift'IAL 

GDNFIDENTIAL 
RE-F~B: A39933 

.. aft by Subcol'lJD,. 

on I.&S. 

s. 1019/H.R. 2965 19 January 1948 

Statement in Justification I Q p J 

~----~--~~-----------------~---

This bill's secondary purpose, to protect our own code 

systems by protecting direct 1nforI:lS.tion about them (and indireot 

information about then acquired by covert means), requires, it is 

believed, little explanation. It is not difficult to defend a 

provision 11nder ·which it shall be a crime to .cake available to 

foreign gove~ents the means by which they can directly read bu+ 

secret communication~. 

The bill's primary application, however, requires some explanation. There is no need het"e to explain what co.Mnunication 

intelligence .!.!!. or what its value can be. The Congressional 

Investigation of the Attack on Pearl Ha.1.•bor bro•ight out both 

points adequately. On page 232 of the report of that investigation appears this statement by the Committee "All witnesses 

familiar \Yi th Magic Material" (that is, coll'l.munication intelligence) "throughout the war have testified that it contributed 

enormously to the defeat of the enemy, greatly shortened the 

war, and saved many thousands of lives " In peacetime also the 

value o:f this intelligence source is incalculable because :from 

no other source can the intentions of a potential enemy be so I 

positively determined. The necessity of preserving this source 

is obvious. 

Unfortunately oommu.nication intelligence is peculiarly sensitive to disclosure. It is of its very essence that it ~ust operate in secret. 1Vhen a foreign goverm1ent using a code system 

learns that its system has been broken, it naturally, inevitably, 

Enclosure (B) c O!i'ImiiffIAL GONFIOBfflAL 
~ ~ONFIBENTIAL C OLWlD3U'fIA:L 

REF ID:A39933 

tt Dlft by Subcomm.. 

on I.&S. 

S. 1019/H.R. 2965 19 January 1948 

Statenent in Justitication j 

----------------r-----------------

and immediately changes the ~ystem, The perfect case in point is 

the change of Japanese diplomatie codes which shortly followed 

publication of Yardley's ".Ancrican Black Chanber" in 1931, already 

mentioned. The foreign governI!lent docs not need to learn categorically and.specifically that ono of its systclns has been broken; 

all that it needs is to discove11 that we are awdre of inforoation 

which could have been acquired only (or even probably} from its 

coded messages, this is usual~y sufficient proof that it nust 

chanr;e the svstem. It docs so, and we are ,1 epri ved, at least tecrporarily and perhaps permanently, of infornation fro~ the message 

traffic involved. Furthernore, because bredking other people's 

codes is diff'icult, tine-consuming, and expensive work, we have 

lost more thdn intelligence, we have lost money and time and 

labor as well. These losses are all aggravated by the fact that 

the new code is alnost inevitably more conplex and secure than the 

old one, it may be, if' the foreign cryptographers and their superiors are sufficiently impressed with our success and have learned 

their lesson well, that they nay devise a code wLich we can never 

break, thus rendering our loss permanent. Ae:ain the best exarlple 

of what can happen is taken from the ".AI'lerican Black Chamber" 

affair, after the appearance of this publication, all Japanese 

cryptography in general inproved radically and it •vas obvious that 

the Japanese were devoting nore study to cryptography than they 

ever had before, In 1934 they introduced theix first 

-6-

Enclosure (B) 

g mw IDEN'f!IAL 

GONFIDENTIAL 
" 

~~~~~~-RE-F ID:A3-9933 

~GONFIDENTIAL G ONli'IDEN':l?lltL t9 D!~t by Subco:cri.m. 

on I. &S 

S. 1019/H R. 2965 19 January 1948 

Statement in Justification , 

---------------------------------

diplomatic machine cipher, and fron 1931 on thG progrescive i~-

- provements in their military systems rendered solution of these 

systems more ahd nore difficult each year. It is not fa ... -fetched 

to suggest that our inability to decode the important Japanese 

military comr:iun1cat1ons in thcl days iPIDl.ediately leading u~ to 

Pearl I:arbor may bt.3 traceable directly back to the state o:' 

cor...m.unicat1on-secur1ty consciousness which Yardley's revelations \ 

had forced on Japanese officialdom a decade earlier. 

It should be pointed out that the bill attempts to protect 

only clabsified information in the stated catogor1es and that the 

tern °class1fied 1nfor.odtion11 is, for this purpose, specifically 

11ra1 ted to 1nfor!.lat1on restr1ct•,d and w1 thheld for reasons of 

national securit,r. The sponsor1nG departnGnts believe that this 

feature, originally included at the request of the U.S. Archivist 

for reasons having to do solely with lus functions, is an anple 

safeguard of freedor:l of speech and of the press since, in any 

prosecution under t~1e bill, the governPJ.ent would have to prove 

not only that the infornat1on involved was 'classified" but that 

the classification had been 1nposed for reasons of national securJ. ty. Obviously the goverru1ent \1oul<l never undertake a nrosecut1on 

unless it could so prove and unless it could denonstrate that its 

reasons for the classification in the specific instance were reasonably well founded,, Furtherr'lore, it will be noted, tho c1 tizen who 

happens on "classified 1nformat1on" innocently through channels 

-7-

Enclosure (B) 

c mWIDl!H~'f'IAL 

GONFIBENTIAL 
REF ID:A39933 

~ D!ft by Subcomrn.. 

on I.&S. 

S. 1019/II.R. 2965 19 J"anuary 1948 

Stater'lent in .1ustif1cation 

I 

-~-------------~-----------------~ 

independent of the gov•:irnr.ient, and reveals it, is probably safe 

from conviction since he should be able to nrove lns ignorance of 

the classified status. It is only the person who knowinr-ly possesses this classified information, acquired fron the government 

either legi tirnately or clandestinely, over whorn we '\.Jl.Sh to hold a 

club. This gap in our security is now wide open. It wo•1ld be 

possible for a disloyal or disgruntled ex-official or ex-employee 

of one of our co.r.lr'lunication intelligence asoncies, or even one 

who, with no actual r.ialice, wished to profit froM his "inside" 

knowledg~ by spreading it in a book or published article, to give 

away vital and ruinously revealing information vn th conplete inpuni ty under present laws. As the datv of the f'ornal declaration 

of the termination of the war approaches, and as nore and more 

persons publish their wartime experiences with conoiderable raonetary profit, the te!"lptation to capi tdlize on tl~E"ir cryptanalytic 

experiences may prove too great for some oeoplH who hav13 had such 

experience to resist. It may therefore be anticipated that books 

or articles on the subJect will be forthcoming sooner or later--

unless proper legislation is now ~nacted to prevent such an eventual1ty. 1/e can afford to take no chances in tlns situation and trust 

' 

to good luck. In tines like these, when, in the dischange of its 

responsibilities, tl e United States, a peace loving nation, faces 

the stark realities that exist in a seni-hostile world, prot1:.ction 

of this vital infornation i<3 so"'l.etlung that should no longer be left 

to chance but should be covered by law, One of the reco .lillendations 

-8-

Enclosure (B) C Otfli'IBEM'f IAL 

CONFIDENTIAL 
~. · , ~ CONFIDENTIAt 

C GN~F IB~lff ::tA!i 

----REF ro-:~Jt:S-9-933 

:Jraft by SubcoI'lI"l.. 

on I &S. 

S. 1019/II.R. 2965 19 January 19li.8 

Statement in 1ustification 

~ - - - - -.... ......... - ..,_ ...... - - - ..- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - of the Joint Con~ressional CoCI'littee for the Investigation of the 

Attack on Pearl Harbor (on page 253 of their report) was: 

»that effective steps be taken to insure that 

statutory or other restrictions do not operate to the 

benefit of an Pneny or other forces 1n1nical to the 

Nation's security and to the handicap of our own 1ntell1-

gence agencies. ~11th this in nind, the Congress should 

give serious study to, anong other things, *** legislation 

fully protecting the security of classified matter." 

This bill is an attempt to provide JUSt such legislation for only 

a small category of classified natter -- a category wluch is both 

vital and Tulnerable to an almost uni1ue deeree. 

CONFIDENTIAL 

Enclosure (B) O Off.F I3EM'TI1tL 
REF ID:A39933 

;. 

j)~ AR'rME~ r 0.1!' STA'l"J!.. • 

l JASHIUGTON 

28' January 1948 

.MEA.ORANDUU FOR Tl!!:: COOR::lI'~ATOR OF JOIMT OPERATIONS 

SUBJECT Recorn~endations of I & S. Subco~.m.ittee re S/1019, 

Concurrence in and Corin.ents on. 

REFER...."'NC~ Special Report of I. & S. Suboomnittee on subJect 

bill dated 19th inot. 

The Department of State's repreqentaticn on the Suococn.ittee 

concurs in the program and reco!DI'lendations contained in paragraph 

2 uf the reference. 

It r11ght be of interest to .note, however, a pertinent St..Egestion made by the roeMber of the ~e~artMent's Legislative ~1vis1on to whon problens connected with the pa~sage of S/1019 have 

been regularly referred. Ue, Hr. Marcy, believes that 1 whether 

open or closed sessions with the Judiciary Co~.nitt~es are obtained, it would be advisable to provide the ~oI"lrl.ittees with 

extracts fro~ the arBument which could be freely used on the 

floor as ammunition for debate. This might forestall unfortunate and inadvertent revelations, and give tne Congressional adherents of the bill, if any, a greater ~onfidence in arguing 

its merits. 

The suggestion put forward in the above paragraph would 

only be applicable, of courbe, if it is decided to allow the bill 

to proceed beyond discussion in camera, as explained in paragraph 2c of the refer~nce The !:>epartl'lent is entirely in favor or withdrawal if the conditions are pre-Judged as adverse. 

SECRET 

Enclosure (C) Em0R'¥2 

/s/ Grant Manson 

GRANT ~..AN'SON" 

Liaison Officer 

Special ProJects Staff 

, 
SECRET 

SSORE':P 

_MEMORANDUM JfOR 

SUBJECT 

REF ID:A39933 

CENT:?.AL • Il~T~t1±G :r.:rc::: J,.G 3IJCY • CO!?Y 1 TASHiNGTON 2 5 , D. C • 

24 Februar~r 1948 , 

I 

Tf'"E USCICC S~CR:STARILT 

Crypto Security Bill 

1. The CIA1 1s concerned over the ru,k to COEIHT security 

whioh night attend the JUstifination and passage of subJeJt ~111. I 

2. Regsrdi1ng the "Statement ::..n Justification" to be e;.Lven 

in closed session, it is feld that throughout this stdtenent, and 

on pages 5, 6 and 7 in particular, runs a ph1loso9h~r of cryptanalys.Ls that it 19 ur-wise to disclose. 

).. It is further pointad out that even t!•ough thesP references be deleted, the nembers of Congress in closed session may 

feel free to ask questions, and to expect answers that will re,-eal 

much more than any statenents contained in the Justifiodtion. 

The ~ross-exa.l".l.1nat1on of JQStifioation witnedses on this bill will 

be not only within the rights of the ConGres~ional CcI'lIIJ.1ttee but 

they nay feel 1t to be their obligation. Onoe the till is presented 

to the JudJ;iary )onri1ttees subst~ntial Jontrol\of the disoussions 

will be lost4. The practical usefulnes9 of the bill, even 1f enacted, is 

also open to q~estion. Prosecution under the bill may involve 

COLilJT disclosures rendering suoh action inadvisable. The bill at 

best will be a deterrent, rather than an insurance, dgd1nst revelations. 

5. In view of these security risks, it is rocomrJPnded that 

careful consideration be given bn uscr:c-us:;r..3 in weighing the 

results to be obtained against the risks involved, with full real1-

zat1on that once' the bill is 1n conm.ittee the ensuing di"3CUbSJon 

may get out of control. Thus our efforts to prevent "unai...thorJzed 

disclosure" nay result in leaving little to disclose. 

I 

6. The CIA Legislative Counsel is of the o~iniJn that there 

is no hope for passage of this bill through the pre~ent Cungress. 

The opinions of the legislatJve advisors of the other sponsJrJng 

departments are not known. It is sugeested that their opinions on 

the success of the bill be caTefully considered b~fore steps are 

taken to present' the bill to the Ch~irnen of' the two JudJciary Committees If the opinion of the leg1sldt1ve advisors lb favorable 

and 1f USCIB decides to support the bill actively, it lb suggested 

that the next step follow the recoinI!l.endation of the USCICC subcommittee, and the bill be presented infornally to the Chairmen of the 

SECRET 

Enolosure (~) S~CR3~ 
REF ID:A39933 

' 

SEBRET 

~ • • COPY 

MEI WRARDUM FOR. THJ uscrcc SJCRETA..~IAT 

24 February 1948 

SUBJ:SCT Crypto Security Bill 

------r---------------------------

two Judiciary Corami ttees. Then 11 if the Chairr1en of the two Judiciary Committees believe after discussion that the bill has little 

or no chance of passage, USCIB should give serious consideration to 

withdrawins the bill altogether for the present rr 

FOR TI:J! :HR:!:CTOR OF c::~JTrtAL INI'~LLIG..:!l'TC::l: 

OGA 

Chief, Advis~ry Council 

Enclosure ( D) 

-2-

,/ SEGREl