15-3055 

Impala v. Department of Justice 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED 

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST 

CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION 

ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT 

ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the 

2 Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 15th 3 day 

4 of November, two thousand sixteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 AMALYA L. KEARSE,

8 DENNIS JACOBS, 

9 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 ZeeWee Dakar Impala, 

14 

15 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

16 

17 v. 15-3055 

18 

19 United States Department of 

20 Justice, Office of Professional 

21 Responsibility, 

22 

23 Defendant-Appellee. 

24 _____________________________________ 

25 

26 

27 

28 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Thomas J. Lengyel, Milford, CT. 

29 
30 FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Sandra Slack Glover, Assistant 

31 U.S. Attorney, New Haven, CT. 

32 

1 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court 

2 for the District of Connecticut (Bryant, J.). 

3 

4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

5 DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

6 Appellant ZeeWee Dakar Impala appeals from the district 

7 court’s judgment on the pleadings, which dismissed his action 

8 on recommendation by the assigned magistrate judge. We assume 

9 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the 

10 procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

11 “We have adopted the rule that failure to object timely to 

12 a magistrate’s report operates as a waiver of any further 

13 judicial review of the magistrate’s decision . . . at least when 

14 the parties receive clear notice of the consequences of their 

15 failure to object.” Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 

16 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam); 28 U.S.C. § 

17 636(b)(1). 

18 The magistrate judge’s report warned Impala, who was pro 

19 se, that failure to object may bar further review; but that 

20 warning erroneously failed to explain that Impala’s failure to 

21 object would preclude appellate review, nor did it specify the 

22 deadline by which to object. However, the district judge 

23 successively gave Impala two clear deadlines, with express 

24 statements that absent his objection by the deadline specified 

25 the case would be dismissed. Impala failed to object by either 

26 deadline. 

27 We decline to excuse Impala’s failure to object “in the 

28 interests of justice.” Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d 

29 Cir. 1993). The inquiry is “whether the defaulted argument has 

30 substantial merit or, put otherwise, whether the magistrate 

31 judge committed plain error in ruling against the defaulting 

32 party.” Spence v. Superintendent, 219 F.3d 162, 174 (2d Cir. 

33 2000). For the reasons identified in the magistrate judge’s 

34 report and recommendation, Impala’s claims lack a basis in fact 

35 or law. Thus, the district court did not err in declining to 

36 afford Impala an additional opportunity to object. 
3 

37 We have considered Impala’s remaining arguments and find 

38 them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment 

39 of the district court. 

40 FOR THE COURT: 

41 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk