-.. .. 

:-ilol~: :AlDl.,l 0 .0 ~~·n . ·- ~t.:it.,. ...... J r~ .. 

·-····ARM¥ SERVfCE· FORCES ' 

SIGNAL SECURITY AGENCY·. 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 

:ifo .. 

SPSIS-3 2 .May 1945 

SUBJECT: Investigation of System Indicator Encipherment 

TO: Major Horton, Security Division 

1. The attached study shows that a good deal of thought 

has been devoted to the problems involved in the d1~gu1se 

of system indicators, and presents a very good case of the 

difficulties that would be encountered. 

2. I regret that I hl!ve to say that I do not agree 

with the conclusions reached therein. I think that sooner 

or later we have got to do something along these lines or 

protecting our communications to the maximum degree consistent with operational practicabilities. Even a delaying effect would be useful. 

3. In view of the fact that there is a good probability 

that an extensive survey of the security of our connnunications 

will be undertaken by a special committee under the JCB, it 

is recommended that this study be held in abeyance until the 

survey referred to i.s actually undertaken or a decision not to 

have such a survey is made. We should know the answer to this 

within two or three weeks. 

l Incl 

s/s, same as above 

subject 

C/-A)3a::-

WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN 

Director of 

Communications Research 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-20-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
.. · .... · .. ·y . 

REF I~iQjjO 0 

WAR DENRTMENT · A.prllt.-19'8-

ARMY SEI ::E FORCES. 

MEMO R(jqrING SLIP. 

To the following ~ order indicated.: OPO ~· 

z 1 7/2,,,. d_~~ 

7 (Name or title) (Organization) (Balldlntl ~.room) 

2 

. 

3 7 

. ' 

From. . (Date) . 

(Organ!rattcm) (BuDdfng mid room) 
f 

2 

3 

TO THE FOLLOWING IN ORDER INDICATED• . NAME OR Tll1..E ORGANIZATION BUIL,DING AND ROOM , INITIALS .. 

Chiet. Securitv Division· DATE 

< 

' 1. The attached investigation or the 

problem of system indicator encipherment is tor-

•rded tor your information. 

2. Concurrence is nquested in the proposal to table this investigation for the tollowing reasons : . 

a. Our iDYeatigation has ind.icated 

that it will be impractical to employ enciphered 

call signs or a policy of frequent changes of 

radio trequencies on the War Department Canmand . and Administrative Network. 

b. Very· little, it any improvement., 

in security may be anticipated.tran enciphering 

indicators in tactical tormations only. 

c. The attached report indicates no 

reason to encipher system indicators from a viewpoint of cryptographic security. 

J. The general problem of system indicator encipherment will be kept on the docket tor stu~ 

FROM: 

W. D., .&.. G. O. l!'Orm. 8111 

10atebc19" 

TELB'HONE 

261 
REF ID:A101100 

SECRET - I~TIGATION OF SYSTEM INDICATOR INOIPHEronEN'l 

I Scope: 

To investigate the following problems with respect to enoipherment 

ot system indicators: 

l. What are the requirements of a system f'or enciphering system 

indicators? 

2. How is system indicator encipherment to be accomplished% 

3. What changes in cryptographic systems are necessitated by system 

indicator encipherm.ent? 

4. To what systems will system indicator encipherment be applied? 

s. Will system indicator enoipherm.ent apply to cryptographic systerns or all echelons? 

6. What is interrelation of u. S. Army system indicator enoipherment with Joint and Combined systemai 

7. What is interrelation of u. S • .Arnf¥ system indicator encipher• 

ment with systems ot other u. s. governmental agenciesZ 

II Discussion: 

Problem l 

1. Whatever cryptographic system is used tor enciphering system 

indicators must tulfill certain requirements that usually are not of prime 

interest in the general cryptographic system. These re~uirement8 must be 

considered in designing a system tor enciphering system indicators. 

a. The system must be capable of' world-wide use. 

b. The system must be a Cryptographic System unrelated to u.y 

now in use. 

- l -

SECRET 
REF ID:A101100 

SEC RB -- c. The solution ot keys tor one day will not ocmpromiae the 

keys ot a~ other day. 

d. The system must resilt. solution in oases where many enciphermanta ot the same plain text is available for analysis. 

e. The system must pro~uoe a different enoipherment of the system indicator in each message. 

2. It is obvious that a single world-wide system must be employed, 

otherwise indicators tor indicator systems would have to be set up, which 

is absurd, and could be extended ~infinitum. 

a. A world-wide system involves several problems in production 

and distribution but these are generally similar to those now arising in 

the production and distribution of other cryptographic systems. The amount 

of production, .ot course, depends on the type of system adopted. Distribution will follow the channel~ now operating. However, consideration 

must be given to oases of compromise of the system and the action to be 

taken when this happens. World-wide distribution does encounter delays. 

b. In the compromise of the usual cryptographic systems there 

must be allowed a day or two ot delay merely to permit notification of all 

holders. For the system with a few holders th.ere isn't much danger of' 

overlooking one or two and tailing to notify them of' the compr~ise and 

resulting changes. On. a world-wide basis, though, a notice must be sent 

to all holders and it is quite possible that some will be overlOoked or - will receive the notice after a delay of' several days. Uilder these condi t~ons there will be contusion at those headquarters on incoming messages 

and at stations receiving messages from these headquarters there will also 

- 2 -

SECRET 

,_, 
REF ID:A101100 

- be con:f'u.sion in identification of systems. Consequently, explicit instructions must be devised to cover all situations involving delays. 

c. Distribution and use of the system must be coordinated on 

a world-wide basis. Consider the general cryptographic system: Should 

a headquarters tail to receive a key list on tiae there is no great harm 

done since the previous key list may be re-used tor a short time or else 

a stand-by system may be used.1 It this is done unenciphered system indicators immediately make this tact known to recipients but may require 

services·on messages received in the "undelivered" key list. On the other 

hand, without the current key list to encipher system indicators there ia 

no immediate solution to handle incoming and outgoing traffic. Incoming 

messages may be tried in a system known to be held by the originator but 

the classification will remain unknown. 

3. There is no cryptographic system held in common by all holders. 

Therefore, a system to encipher indicators must be an extension of a 

present system to all holders or a new system· issued to all holders. It 

is believed that no u. s. AnrI9 cryptographic system now in general use is 

suitable tor enciphering system indicators. 

a. The Converter M-325 has been proposed as a means of aooomplishing enoipherment ot system indicators. 

b. The Converter M-325 is available in quantities and it is believed could till the needs insofar as distribution is concerned. The security of the Converter M-326 does not appear to be adequate and this question is considered in pa.ragrap~ a. 

1 It is believed that inherent security in most liar Department systems is 

sufficient to recognize that occasional re-use of a system is not harmful. 

Every effort is made to have systems in the hands of holders before the 

eff'ecti ve dat87 

-

3 $EGRET. ~·· 
REF ID:A101100 

SEGRET 

4. As a practical matter there should be no linkage from day to day 

or, at least, it a solution is possible on whatever system is adopted the 

difficulty of solution each day should be the same. If unenciphered system indicators change only when key lists change, as at present1 solution 

of the system indicator system will give the plain-text system indicator 

tor other days prior and subsequent to the compromise. 

5. By the very nature of system indicator encipherment, depths 

will exist in greater numbers than have ever been considered to exist in 

!I- cryptographic system. 

a. It may be assumed that the en9D11 is familiar with oui administrative nets and there is no reason to believe that these nets will 

change at the time system indicator enoipherment becomes effective. There 

are a number or holders of only one or two cryptographic systems and these 

will have been established by observation or present practices. When syatam indicator encipherm.ent is instituted it would be natural to assume that 

' these holders will continue to use only one or two systems and must be 

applying enoipherment to the same system indicators .from day to day. (Not 

necessarily the identical system indicators used prior to anoipherment but 

changes contingent upon change or key lists.) By collecting all such 

tre.f'tio, study can be directed to these particular cases tor intensive 

analysia. Solution of the indicators on these few messages will compromise 

the world-wide system. 

b. Errors of several forms are certain to occur in ancipherment 

and should be overcome insofar as practicable. For examples ·11essages will 

be sent without enciphered system indicators, thus providing plain text, 

- 4 -

SEORET 
if it can be recognized. Mistakes in enoipherment will occur which might 

reveal information. Similar unenciphered system indicators may provide 

a means of' entry into the system. 

6. It is desirable to limit the amount of information which va.riations in method of applying the enciphered system indicator may produce. 

a. Two alternatives are possible in the encipherment of system. 

indicators with r~speot to time: 

(1) The system indicator of every message to b·e enciphered. 

(2) The system indicator to be enciphered only at stated 

intervals, i.e., every tenth message, once each day, 

once each week, eto. 

b. In all but strips and double transposition the problem of 

8olution on u. s. Army cryptographic systems is essentially a daily one. 

That is, a solution on one day does not contribute to the solution ot 

another day except tor such information found in the traffic ot the solved 

day which may be extended to contents or messages of' preceding and following days. By enciphering the system indicator once each day little will 

be 7.ained in protection of' cryptographic security since the traffic for 

each day can still be sorted into homogeneous groups. Longer periods add 

nothing at all, being worse than merely a daily change. 

7. With encipherment or the system indicator for each message some 

means must be provided to vary the encipherm.ent. This means can be found 

in either the message indicator or in the cipher text or the message. Either 

of these two sources may be considered to be without order and to provide 

an unpredictable key to encipher the indicator. In order to apply the 

procedure uniformly to all systems the message indicator would be better, 

- 5 -

SECRET 
~-,_: .. -· l' 

T .; 

-

al though one-ti• tape• do not at .'t;Ja.b '1.ae o'ontain alphabet:loal ooaponents. Dittioult ai'tuatiou wolild arlae in aym't- oper-.ted on-line in 

being able to obtain oipher text· prior to idea:Uf)ing the •J"•t• to tile 

ad.dreasee. and tor of'f'-line operat:lcm. ot oertain ayateu the prooedure ahou14 

perm! t enciphen.nent to be made prior 'to pertorating a tape. Otherwi••• 

aplioing or other •Jen.rd arru:agement. would haw to be uaed.. 

Problem 2. 

e. Several ·methods have been canaidered aa a meana of' aooamplbhing 

the enoipherm.ent of' aystem indioaitora'. 

a. Aa mentioned in aubpa.ragraph Sb, the Converter »-325 baa been 

t 

oanaidered aa a means of' enoiphering a7atam indioators. Prelim1.nary ••-

ourity telits on thi8 devioe in oonneotion with the problem rft'ealed aeriou. 

wealmnaes that make the Con:V.~ter Jl-;326 undesirable tor the purpoae. The 

natural aeleotion of' a variable for eaeh .... age i• the alignment of' rotora. 

Ae indioa.te4 in paragraph 7 the external Maaage indicator oould be uaed 

, tor thia purpoee .and would theretore indicate the allgmaent of' the rotora. 

,. 

The external meaaage indicator being ••nt in olear. initial alignment of 

rotor• tor eaoh •J'B'bc. indicator enoiphered. would be known. From th1a information. and with an aaeum.p°'ion o~ identioal pl&in text (aee -the di•-

cuHion in subparagraph 5a) it would be posaible to reoonatruot the rotor 

wiring•• end-plate plugging. and r8"f'8raing rotor. Reoonatruotion of' theae 

element• iB sutf'ioiant tor the da7 ainoe the alignments ot eaoh systan indicator are g1 van in the :meeaage and all system indioatol"a tor that day oan · 

be found ea1ily merely by deciphering the indioato1"8. 

b. A aeoand method propoaed tor the anoipherment of a7etea indicators is the ayatem used a.t the preamt time bJ the u. Se Ba"fY tor en• 

ciphering call eigna. Thie 1• a wtragra.phio traotionating a)"8tea tJla't 

BET 

--, 
uses a 4th order matrix as an enoiphering equation.1 Such a system would 

have to be changed to a pents.graphic type to accommodate 5-letter indicator 

groups. 

(1) Aa in any device whioh may be required for encipherment 

of' system indicator•, design and procurement would have 

to be instituted sometime prior to the date pla.mied to 

place the encipherment of' indicators into effect. The 

system would require that each holder possess a 64-page 

document each month containing the :matrices for enoiphe•-

ing and deciphering. 

(2) The method can be applied by pencil and paper alone but 

still requires the monthly keying information. However, 

with paper and pencil the job is rather slow and is 

subject to errors in addition and subtraction by using 

personnel. 

(3) The type of analys.is that is used for solution with this 

system consists in solving a large number of simultaneous 

linear equations, about 34 as the minimum for a 4th 

order matrix. For this purpose it is necessary to find 

about 35 encipherments of' texts which overlapped, as 

ABCD, ABCE, AFGE, etc., with equivalent plain text. If' 

such overlapping encipherments cannot be f'ound, it is 

necessary to have about 150 anoipherments With equivalent plain text. Solution of' these equations 

1 The principles of the method are well known, having been published in 

mathematical journals several years ago. 

SECRET 
REF ID:A101100 

SEBRET 

compromises the system for the day. With a different 

matrix used for each day the solution of encipherments 

for the next day is a new problem to be treated as indicated above. 

(4) Solution of equations of the above mentioned type, while 

not difficult, is laborious and time conswning. Moreover. in the solving of these equations. the Navy has 

~-found that only a few people (3 to 5) are able to 

work at one problem, and that additional personnel 

hinders rather than aids in the solution beoause more 

interfere with each other. Machines or the kind neeessary to solve these equations are not in common use; 

but since they need only perform a large number of 

arithmetical processes, there is no reason to doubt that 

such equipment could not be constructed to perform the 

job daily.1 

c. A literal one-time system.with normal alphabets offers no 

security at all because the specific key will be known f'rom the message 

indicator (see paragraph 7) thus determining' the plain text. With an unknown alphabet relative values can be established which will be as effective as the genuine indicator. Relative values mAy be linked f'rom day 

to day by analysis of transmission data. 

d. Numerical additive systems will involve conversion from 

letters to numbers and from numbers to letters. Such a procedure is subject to error during the conversion as is any add~tive process involved. 

l 

The calculating ma.chine recently constructed by International Business 

Machines for Harvard Uni't'.ersi ty may be ca pa.bl e of such work. 

. SECRET 

- 8 -
REF ID:A101100 

- SECRET 

e. From studies of various systems proposed for use as methods , 

for enciphering system indicators there are indications that any method 

which makes use of a letter for letter substitution based upon a known key 

is subject to a great many objections from a security viewpoint. The best 

t~at may be expected from the system is a delay in solution. 

f. It appears that of the various systems considered, the only 

type which will provide the necessary security is either an additive system 

with one-time characteristics or a fractionating system. A fractionating 

system which includes all the letters of the indicator and a key contained 

in the message seems to offer the greatest protection. A fractionating 

system, since it involves all letters of th~ indicator, will require solution to be based upon the indicator as a unit. To achieve a solution, 

much material will be necessary and although it is likely that this may be 

obtained, some delay in solution should be expected. A one-time system 

would require an enlarged production plant to produce the system. 

Problem 3 

9. The primary result to be expected of system indicator encipherment is increased security in all cryptographic systems. This may be 

desired because of inherent lack or security in the cryptographic systems 

employed. On the other hand, if the systems used ~o provide a great deal 

of inherent security1or control is exercised over elements which may be 

weak in otherwise strong systemsl, encipherment of system indicators may 

not be necessary. That is, the question may be asked, "If the traffic ~ 

not be solved what degree of security is gained by increasing the difficul ty of solution?" 

l For example: Message length, traffic volume. 

S~~R_ET 
REF ID:A101100 

SECRET 

10. Enciphering system indicators mu.st be integrated with other 

changes in cryptographic systems if it is to achieve its purpose. For 

example: Disregarding the system indicators altogether, other characteristics in the traffic will reveal some information about the various u.s~. 

Arrrzy- cryptographis systems. 

a. Teletype systems (except Converter M-294, of which more 

shortly) can be separated immediately from all other traffic. Converter 

M-228 and SIGTOT can be separated on the basis of differing forms in the 

message indicators. This type traffic is characterized by lack of grouping in the cipher text. other individual characteristics are present.l 

The traffic from Converter M-294 is spaced into groups when used off-line 

but may be differentiated from all other teletype traffic by the eight 

letter message indicator. Traffic from the Converter M-294 may be difficult to distinguish from traffic from the Converter M-228 when the 

Converter M-294 is operated on-line. 

b. These three types of systems can be screened from the total 

mass of traffic without any difficulty. To break them down into •eparate 

systems will involve the techniques of traffic analysis and a more detailed analysis of the systems than indicated here. Without going into a 

detailed analysis of this problem it is sufficient to state that a good 

knowledge of the various nets and with a knowledge of the systems those 

nets are accustomed to use it is believed that a separation could be made 

with some success. 

c. Literal one-time pads, Converter M-134-C, Converter M-325, 

and strip systems have the same general characteristics. The screening 

l The group count, for example, is a word count and is iI1111ediately apparent. 

SEBRET 

- 10 -
REF ID:A101100 

,-. .....-.... 

H.D be ad_•• ....... in m .. tlae paU .. d c~~l"'Mr ~134-0 · .an ...... 

laager length than •••ac• in •trip•_ or Oomerter 11-12&. ltrip .,.._ 

oarey ••sage :lndioator• withopt repeated letten•. !b8 "P09•1'blU.'bJ' ai•ta th&~ ,•trip •111t._ _,. be ida.titlecl 'bJ oharaowriatio• of 1.n~rae 

~quellOJ ot lett81"8. Agah, kll•ledge ot ~· o..Pn:toatian pattem and 

prerioua uage ot •7•t- 1n a za~ will ..S.d ocm.eid.era'bly in ••l"ting in.-

' 

"di "1'1.dual •111t-. 

d. Double-traupo•ition •JS't~ and tbiWar Deputamt !eiegraph Coda oan. be aepan.ted bae41atel7 'bJ' their :l.n.di:Yidual ~raoileri•tio•• 

•• Any other aye--. wtd.oh 9¥ be :lJ1 u.ae or will be plaoed in 

ue in the tutu.re om b~ judged u to indi'fidu.al oharaoteristi•• by •--

.._;.. ,;_ .. - pariaon. 111 th enstillg a711ta.. -·A _..- detaillJd mal.7111• ot 1ila.e obaraoter-

. :' .('1"' iatioa ot ·eaoh type ot a7at• would mdou'btedly add other :1.t-.. ot uiaiat-

'1;'/ __ P1 lv' aiJoe in olus:l.fying eaoh a79t-.. luoh a atudJ' S.. not pel'iJ:l.nmt to thS.a 

~ly•i•· 

lle Jn.other ocmaideratlon t~r molphering .,..-. ilUU.oatOI."• 1• the 

oanoaallllent ot UJ1' intoratlcm. wbioh _,. ~ belpf\ti . to the en-.r in wattle 

anal.J81a. 

•• !m:re·ia a oorrelat:loa bftlrea olualtioa~On. and pr•-

oedmoe, Nld oertain o'ther oharaoteriatioa of the ~••lcm. . ·t11e ·~­

a:l.t:loat!on., it it oan be detel'Jlined tor -.oh •aaage, pend ta ual79:t.a . 

ot f'low · ot trattio 'bo 'tie -.de on the buia of ol&Hltioa1;lan Wbioh -.y · 

rn•l mf'ormat:lon u to order ot batt1e, voop aonmnta, eto~ 

2 Thia praotioa om readily be ohaged UL4 ahou.ld be u aoan u .'bhere i• 

o•~ that the._, bu ·learned. of" the ebange in •••&g• :l.Ddioa._or n.-

o1pherment ~or strip- 119tae. · 

~· ..... ::tr
,- ,~F ID:Al0110jl EClff -~ 

. . 

be There 19 other 1Dtor•:td.a. hown.-, whioh UZI. be .gainecl 

t:raa the h•di.ng 'rithout· retenno• to 1;he aymt.m indioator. Pile 1d.m8 a.4 

tnnemiHiOIL 1;1Ju OUl be uaed. . to gailL -:lnf'on&1;10De !he wluae ot Vaftie, 

iw d1reoti011 ot ft•, and preoecla.e• are other 1 t- whioh ..,- be aubjeoted to analyai• to gain 'ftluabl• infOl"ll&tion. 

Probl• ' 

12. Symt• indioator moipheftlmt oould be applied to all_ '9P• ot 

•'81f- umeq, War Depal"1mlm.t_ .,....._ Theater •J111-a. an4 taoti.oa.l a19t.. 

ued by oambat troop•. 

a. War Departmmlt .,...._ require an. ~cl1oator to idel1't1ty ~· 

•peoitio .• ,.tem. and in ocmjunoticm. w.lth thie 111.toniiation 1lo intioate ·the 

olaeaif1oa1d.011 ot the •.a•&P.• !hea'ber •imt- tor the mHt part al•o refl'lire :bld.i'ri.dual. identitioiLtlon. 'blat •19t- in uae by. taotloal uniw oa. 

di•peme 'ri'th indioaton 1ro a large ·ezben,'ts. Iaflioator• are n-.•••UT ill 

... oue•, perhape, to a'ftid oaatulm but it B&1' b• that a l'fti•ion ot 

'11.e diatrilna"bion. :ll1 taotioal 1111iw omlcl elbd.JL&te all need ft• •JW'tm in· . . 

dloator•• It •nml'!- be noted, though, that the ~80Z7_ 1UIUr wldoh -. •• 

•Jll'bem8 an u•ed 1• a di•trilnlti.cm ot tratfio laau to proten the •••riv 

ot 'the •111t•• (the :meet tor thi• bu bee mdent 1n ue ot the Oanwner 

K•209 8Dd diatril>Ution ot watt!~ let&da atill oould be imprond..) ·ID .u,-· 

inatanoea ·~t• :llldioatara are nOb u• .. ~ relatim between th• 819t.la 

la. hidenoe ti illight ot the Japanese uaing the 179t• in1 

TB Sm 11-SS0-2 •uggeeta that key l1•t :lllcl1oaton (equ1wlem a ·~'!" 

t• :lJldioatan) Dot be. U8ed mleaa there i8 ocmf'WliOD 8&118ed by lea"l'ing .ibe 

indioator otf the -~•age. , as 
REF ID:A101100 

BECIET 

intonation ~am:mitted 1n ol•r. a .. mdmoe. eXl•te that ~- of. 

higher Mh•lom ~re not monitored ~t u 7et tb.i• i•· tn~one1u.1w.2 

o. It •;vet• in41oator eiioipheramt were appli .. to War Departil.mt a7atem amt related Theater •PW. there are We» pl.am. ~•h 

laJ" be omaidered. ~ i• to applJ" the emipherMDt to all 1p'ti-.. Tm 

other -1• to enoipber the a79t.. indioa~a Ot cm.~7 certain. •18.WM• 

(1) !o auwer 1rh• aeom4 point tint •. bgardleaa. ot &l\f 

oomideratiom ot 01"1Ptograpbio aeourltj, i~ adftlltage 

oould be 'bake ot the •18 tea indioator in "tratf'io ·. analJ"ai• it WCNld aeea d .. irable to eneiph9r ai1 a19tea 

iDdioaton in orcler to awid thb ocm~ tiOD.e 

(2) !he worJc inTol~ in moipbering all •JW'- indieaiior• 

i• bu'b little llOl'e than for part of th.ea. Pl"oduotion 

would be about the aNUi · u would di1iiribution. • 

. (I) Buil7 :ldentitia'ble a111t• ('ID.l'C) -.,. be a ·~•H S.t . . 

the a71t• :lndioator 11 moipher8'.Cl. Pl'crriaicm. would mw 

to be •d• to ohange tld.1 ln.dloator trequentlJ'. 

(t) 'Keaaag• to and tr• Jilli tAry Attaoh.. are euil7 

. . . 

1dm1;1fi&ble and whil• vattio intomatd.on &wilable trca 

th•!I• aouro .. .,_,. 1M 111gh1;, emipberaent ot the •JBtGL 

indioaton a,. bee_. poilrta for analJBia of ·the a19t• 

indioator enoiphe--t •JB'tm• 

\ . 

· ~ 2 A jetailed atudJ' ia plame4 to in:n•tigate thor•ghlJ" the aouJl1; ,ot in- .J.'.:\{,· tonation gained. 'bJ'· the Japm•• through tr&ttio an&lJ'Bia• •J.ff Br&DDh bu 

J . ._f. been. making atudi• on oorrelaticm. ot into.-.tion reoeiT94 frcili Japan•• 

./. aouro• and other aw.ilable intonation relating to tr~ti~ mal19ia. 

.. 11 -

BEBBET·. 
Problem. 6 

REF ID:A.101100 ~-

IEt:RET 

18. It moiphenunt ia applied' to all eoh~lom, ooord:lliation. Will 

JlaTe to be etteoted by !beaten wi t1dll th• !heater tor pNdao'td.on of •711-

't- to anoipher a7atem 1nd1oatan·. rri W1 · ~ODDeO'tion ~- poin't Bl81i 

no't be OYel'~ooked. It 1• laiGB tria a atuq of S·OI '• that ~ mi tipl:loi t,.. 

ot •J'81iema exist thrcntghout the ftl"iou theater1. (Kazv" 891 11 tram 811PA. 

UJd POA. han not been reoeiftd tor en.s.m..U.cm ao 'Wlat a ·:im.•led.ge of •P-

'b-. ·in low eohelcma 1a aoan.v.) ·. llhil• ~ of tlw1e do not uae a a19tea 

indioator llD1" whioh do mJce uae ot a qat• indioatal' mat be aui-.bl• · 

for no:lpheramt 01' proT:laiozi .... to oh&Dg• :l't. !110 that :l t om ooae w:l tad.a 

th• lill:ltl -···~· 14:. thl••• a ·a711t• :la deT:laed wh:loh require• ve17 .little prod.~ticm 

1111d oaa.pila.t:lon :ln. •• prep.:ration of a ·le.,- Uat, planning 1181114 ban to . . . 

:lnolude· oons:lderat:lom· tor p_rodu.ot:lon. of thee e lceJ'• tor theater• "1" ti\• 

Signal Beour:lv ~mGJ'· 

Probl• 8 

16. It 1a poaa:lble that moiph81'1lm.t ot 111t• ind:loator• ·WOQld not 

. . . . . . . 

be :bmn9d:latelJ aooepta.ble to th~ Ue le Ba.'9J' for -Ue :lD the •"f1'• In UIJ" 

·nat oonaiderat:lon ahould be gl nn to h1ncll:lng of Jo1D1a •Jistnl. 'fh•• 

• 

qat .. will :lm.ed:latel7 'beocm• evidat th• ~taD.'t tb.q an plaoed. OD an. 

. . 

.A:nq o:lroui t wb:leh balld.l• U., "'8.tt1o with mo:lpherecl .1171wa 1Dd:loatora • 

JllD7 ot the aam.e a:ltaatio:m will niat in aeabined a19t-. 

Probl• T 

18. A. aOMllhat a:lJlilar ai1;uticm to that of Pl'obl•• 8 aria• in the 

..... ot othe.r u ••• governamital agnai• tor "whioh the .u. a. "J.nq aota .. 

- 16 - i 

SECRET. 
• 

REF IDi:AlOilOO 

·" 

· .. Sltl:[.·· ~ 

ahiael' m •tter• ocmoem.i11g ... ~ ~ oiphen. In ._. ••• th• 1.:nf1 

prod.•• the 9711t- ·U•d 1'J' "1&11e• acout•• Iii la 4•1r&bl• to -*•·all 

•'JB'ti- 'll'hieh pu• .onr Amr dre'ld.• r••bl•. Anfr' ~·· ID J1iD7 oaaea 

(ma. tor •2mlPl•) th•• .. , .. 1.. ban Jllo11liarlt1•• iD tlle1r tra.ftte wld.e1' 

would e•tabliah 1 t u diatlnet nm "11.ougb ,th• a79t• 1D4iea1:1en were 9J'!ll-

. . . olphered. These ditteru.oea ahould 'be ~ute4 before U7 ftD&l •.t•pa a~· 

III Conalue1cma. 

17• Before the moipheramt of •111t~ 1D.dio•ton oui ~· &oacapli•hed 

_pnotioall)' a n~er of llliDor probl- w.lll ban tO b• worked out, u iD.-

dlaated 1D the Diaouaaian. lluV' of theae are UDr•lated. to eaoh. other ad 

mtail relatiT•lJ' little ohage flt• 11he aeour11;J' "limpollLt •. llaDf' will 

be ••rioua trca a praottoal open:bional dmpoint. ror illatuo•, the . 

\ l~ of BIGA.BA. -.aag•_,,.. ohuged trClll a l~t ot loO sr-Pa w 160 

I

- / ~.. !bio - done prD&rl]1' 1lo .,q,edlte -dllDg ot lmg -·--· 

_ .r-•• •••rit,' of 8IGABA. ta· not; launl!n. to. aui'~v acler thi• _uap _-: gr•t 

,)}' ad:vantage bu reaul t~ in prutieal 911plioa'tion of~ th• IIGA.Bl. 

~I 18.· there~· n~ poaiUTe nidmee that U'. a .• u_, a79W. a~ 

.i/ 2 _ -oal lnel are -llC •-::111 - -· !bero lo -lt-blo nogJT) , ~ ... nldme• 1lld9h - to ·--- 1'1l• ... .., lo """ ~ -- ~ II"'> the "high-grad•" • .,.t .. generally ued aboTe the lml et Dlnaian .or 

. .., "-' .-~··\ ~~ oaaparabl• unite. ·It 1m lmolin. that ~tioal •J8ttml auoll u tbe Ccm.Terter 

K-209 and amall opera:tioDll oodM ued. w1:t:;bin Dl'Wi•:l.on haT• bea. :r·ead.;; ...,. 

:t· . 

~7 the •MIQ'• There 1a ao. 1nd1oation tba:t a fflli ae&ttencl atrip •JBWm 

-.y han bea .read. From the '9impo1nt ot •l'J'Ptographio aeour1:'J" the nee~ 

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SEGllEJ 
... . . .. 

REF ID ;.A101100 

to~ en.olpbering •J'8'b• indieator• to .. pl'ft'14e .proteoU~n tor ot;her tlwL 

tutieal .aya'tem 4o• not •m.t. 

19~ Proa 'ftrioua aoaro• it i• knon tba'b ...... al taoiion oaatribute 

to aolut!cm. ot taoUoal IJWW. bJ the ....,. U.e. ot •JB'- iad:l.eator1 

do• nob haTe a- dirMt 11,e~ing cm. the 1olu1d.on beea.uae maDJ' of the a711tue no •JB-- iDd:l.oatoril. ?1Mt:sper1•••4 opera.ton aad ood.e olerk1 are in41•1-d to b• 'bile gr•wat •lngle 1ouroe ot erron whioh l•d 'to ol')'Pt-

. 

ual)'tio oOJllProml•• m th•• 179t ... • 

20.. It appear1 liblJ that Do ·•)'at• oa be d.neloped whloh Will 

·:meet all requiremmt1 ·tor a •111tea llldioat'or enoipheriDg 1J11t•• th• 

b•t that~ be attained i• a dob.7. For 1eou.rl'tJ' ot a orypbograpbio 

179tem •nl7 delaying :l.1 not auttioimt mle1a it i• tar a appnoi•ble 

. . . 

·§ \ periocl of time. !here ••~ to be DO. poin.t 1n propoaing to •e a a79t.a 

~/ whioh ·~· on17 to delq. It i• dittiault to •t&bliah th• •timo ot 

. 4•1&7" and it. 97 be .ore appa.rmt than real •. Tho med tor oau1ing a- . I -

, >/ ~ oatuicm U!I 11V1'1: - net ap-r ~ lie juaid.fieol ..., 1he ...,.. 

,.,J )i. . 1ulta to be upeotecl 1n cm.11 a delay. 

-~ r·J 

/. 21. Thora will be ocmaiderable ocnf'Qalon rea.ulting in a oliange- ot 

th• magu1 tad.a oeouioned. bJ m~iphonamt ot a79tea in.dioaton. Caretal 

thought Ud: planning will be abaolutel7 neo••U7 :la prepari:ac to plao• 

1uoh a aoh•• into etteat. ao &1 to aTOid th.raring obaoa into a ocmanmdeatiom ayatea .that ia now tazecl, at tiaea; to mow Vat.tie. -11 . . . 

ahang• :l.D" prooedure daaign.ecl to f'urther th• p:rojeo1; ehou14 be e'tud.le4 

• . with oa.re 'before being put into effeot. otberw11 •• . auba equell'b o'bang• 

baaed upcm. later intormaticm. MJ' Mb the tir11i 1Ulll8ae1aaJ7 ~ required 

1till turther moditiaatiom in 1 t. 

SECRET 

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22. !hr•• other phMft ot aa O'tW all oownmsaaid.on. •M11ritJ' piui. 

whioh are rela~d to the pr"•" probl• mat be kept :I.a aiab' 

a. Proteotin 8M11r11"• 

b. CODYmticmal. •oip~~t ot eall aigu. 

o. Ocmo•l.MD.t· ot all bitonation inol11dilag the 'bota1 DOUD ot · 

trattio 'bJ' mau ot oip~OJJl', oitaz, or •iml~ ••••. 

-···-17. 

SEBRET 

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