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Extracts taken from Copy No. l of "Co:mmendati.ons Received by the u.s. 

Naval Communication Intelligence Organization since l January 1942. 

- ~ - --- -- -- ---- ~ - - -- --- - --- ~ ~ - -- ------ 11part D - Comments by Deputy Officer in ~arge, JICPOA 

The following remarks are extracts £ran the Narrative of the Combat 

Intelligence Center, Joint Inte1ligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, prepared by Captain w. J. Holm.es,, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Duputy Oft:i.cer in Charge 

of JICPOA, dated 8 November 1945. This narrative was forwarded to the Chief' 

of Naval. operati.ons by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, with 

this conment: "Captain Holmes had an unequalled opportunity to observe 

and take pa.rt in the development throughout the war of Intelligence .f'or 

high comnand.. He played an able part in this development and his recorded 

• 

observatiorr.s and opinions are therefore 0£ unusual value." 

No. 1 

"The factors that vitally affected the Battle of Midway were many 

and complex:, but it is undoubtedly true that w:i.thout radio intelligence 

it wuld have been impossible to have achieved the concentration ot 

force and the tactical surprise that made the victory pos~:!ble • 

••••• 

"The fate of the nati.on quite literally depended upon about a dozen 

men who had devoted their lives and their careers, in peace and in war, 

to radio intelligence • 

••••• 

"In the defensive stages of the war, radio intelligence was not 

only the most important source of intelligence in the Central. Pacific,, 

it was practically the only source. There were very few captured 

docwnents or prisoners of war. There were no photographs o:r enemy 

held positions. In the Central Pacific,, excluding the Solomons and 

New Britain,, spy and coast watchers• reports never supplied any 

important intelligence • 

••••• 

"During the whole war the enemy• s traffic was consistently read in 

detail and in great volwne. After the Battle of the Coral Seas,, most 

of his major moves were disclosed through this source al.one. Whenever 

the main code was not being read, a feeling of frustration ard exaspera- tion permeated the radio intelligence organization and spurred them on 

eclassified nd a ro ed for release b ursuant to E .0. 1352 
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to each new success. Even during these periods the darlmess was not 

complete. Much information was learned trom traffic analysis short of 

decryption. Minor ciphers were usually being read. Frequently the 

information gained from the minor ciphers rivaled in importance that 

gained from the ma.in naval code. Rather consistent success in breaking 

the weather code resulted in more and more reliance on an excellent 

Japanese weather observation systEm • 

••••• 

11 Just how :many submarine contacts were made through radio intelligence will probably never be known. Particularly in the beginning of 

the war, every effort was ma.de to destroy all traceable connection 

between submarine operation and radio intelligence~ However, it is 

lmown that the nwnber of successful contacts rose and fell with the 

success of radio intelligence in decrypting enetl\V messages. On several 

occasions every submarine on patrol in the Central Pacific area was 

busy on information supplied. by radio intelligence. From the intelligence viewpoint, the results were most gratifying. T"nis was one fonn 

of intelligence that showed immediate tangible results. Sometl.mes it 

was only a matter of hours between decryption of a message and a submarine report of a successful attack. Tb.a news of these successes was 

i:mmediately relayed to radio intelligence personnel who were responsible for the results. Thus everyone in the bu.siness felt they had a 

personal. contact 'W:i. th the submarines on patrol and felt personal responsibility for "the quality of the inform.a. ti.on furnished them. The effect 

of' this on morale is difficult to overestimate • 

••••• 

"Radio intelligence had been, and continued to be, phenomenally 

successful in its field • 

••••• 

"For the duration of the war, Combat /f..e., c.r.c.7 was engaged in 

the production am. processing of intelligence of high-classification 

for higher comma.rd echelons only. The most timely, am the mo st 

important part of this intelligence, was produced by radio intelligence. 11 

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nPart E - Statement of the Honorable c. E. Hancock 

The following statement was mme by Congressman Hancock of New York 

on the floor ot the House of Representatives in support of s. 805 and is 

extracted from the Congressional Record., 25 October 1945, Vol. 91., No. 187; 

P• 10210: 

"• ••• I believe that our cryptographers in the war with Japan did 

as much to bring that waW to a successful aIXi earl.y conclusion as any 

other group or men. Their work saved thousands of precious lives. 

They are entitled to glory am. national gratitude which they will never 

receive. We broke down the Japanese code almost at the beginning of 

the war, am we knew it at the finish of the war. Because or that 

knowledge we were able to intercept and destroy practically every suppJ.y 

ship and convoy thatiried to reach the Philippines or any Pacific island. 

We lmew, for example, that shortly after MacArthur landed on Leyte a 

large convoy with 40,000 Japanese troops was dispatched to reinforce 

the Japanese forces there. They were met by" our fleet and by our 

airpl.anes at sea and were totally destroyed: Our forces knew that a 

certain high-ranking Japanese admiral. was headed for a certain spot 

at a certain time. When he arrived there our planes were on hand to 

receive him. n 

"Part F - Statement of Pearl Harbor I11vestigating Committee 

The following statement with regard to. "Magj.c, 11 the cover name for 

Communication Intelligence, appears on page 232 of the Report of the Pearl 

Harbor Investigating Committee ot the 19th Congress: 

"· ••• All Witnesses familiar with Magic mate ial throughout the war 

bave testified that it contributed enormously to the de.f'eat of the 

enemy, greatJ..y shortened. the war,, a.ni saved many thousa:OO.s of lives.n 

npart G - Statement of the Honorable Chan Gurney 

The following statement was made by Senator Gurney o:r South Dakota 

on the floor or the Senate in opposition to proposed. reductions in the 

Naval appropriation for 1948 and is extracted from the Coqsressional Record, 

14 February 1947, Vol. 911 No. 30, p. 1081: 

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" •••• Not only will curtailment of programs be required in the areas 

just mentioned, but research and development of vital concern to all 

of us will be necessar.i.ly retarded,; inte1ligence activi.ties, so 

important when other factors of na tionaJ. secur.i. ty are shrinking, 

must be curtailed. Naval conmun:i.cations, including communication 

intelligence which played a vitaJ. role in the recent oonfiict, will 

suffer." 

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Part I - Statement of Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood,, USN 

Vice Admiral Lockwood sent the following letter to the Chief of Naval 

Communications,, enclosing a statement as to the value of Communication 

Intelligence against the Japanese in World war II: 

'l'eP SEIBR:E! 

NAVY DEPARTMENT 

Office of the Chie.f of Naval Operations 

Washington 25,, D. C. 

17 June 1947 

From: Vice Admiral. C. A. Lockwood,, USN 

To: Chief' of Naval Communications. 

Subjeat: Communication Intellige11ce against the 

Japanese in World War II. 

Enclosure: (A) Statement as to value of subject actiVity. 

l. I am encJ.osing herewith a statement as to the value of 

communication intelligence against the Japanese in World war II. 

2. I feel that this is a very modest outline and that there 

are undoubtedly a very great nwnber of incidents and examples which 

time and memory have obliterated. Howver,, I hope that there will 

be no thought of curtailing the operations of this activity,, or of 

eliminating research and training in peacetime of a facility which 

must of necessity be· immediately available on the approach or war. 

C. A. LOCKWOOD 

CONTRIBUTION OF COMMUNICATCON INTELLIGENCE 

TO 'lHE SUCCESS OF SUBMARINE OPERATIONS AGAINST 

. THE JAPANESE IN WORLD WAR II. 

The contribution to the de.feat of Japan in World War II by United 

States submarines is a matter of record. More than two-thirds of the 

entire Japanese merchant marine an~ numerous warships, including some 

of every category, were sunk. These sinkings resulted,, by mid-1944, 

in isolation or Japan .from her overseas sources 0£ raw materials am 

petroleum,, with far reaching effects on ttle capability of her war 

industry to produce a.rd her anood forces to operate. Her outl.ying 

bases were weakened by lack of reinforcements and supplies and fell 

victim to our air, surface ani amphibious assaults; heavy bombers moved 

moved in to the captured bases ani decimated am demoralized the 

Japanese to the point where they were forced to accept uncozrii tional 

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surrerxler. These effects of' submarine operations have been substantiated, 

both .from Japanese and Allied official records, and for the most part 

have been made public in detail,, but nettling has been tol.d about the 

manner in which such outstandi:r:g results were achieved by such a rel.ativelj' small submarine organization .• 

As Commander of the Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, f'rom 

February, 1943, through the end of hostilities, I can vouch for the very 

important part which Co:nmuni.cat:i.on Intelligence played in the success 

of the submarine campaign. Through intercept., crn>tanalysis ani translation of Japanese messages, Communication Intelligence supplied the 

Submarine Force with a continuous f'.Low of information on Japanese naval. 

and merchant shipping,, convoy routing aOO. composition, damage sustained 

from submarine attacks,, anti-submarine measures imployed or to be 

em.ployed., effectiveness of our torpedoes, am a wealth of other pertinent 

intelligence. 

The Submarine Force Operations Officer was designated the Combat 

Intelligence Officer. He was gi. ven access to al.l. of the Communication 

Intelligence .files and through him information was .furnished to the 

Force Comma.mer and thence to the individual submarines concerned. 

A private telephone was installed between SubPac operations office and 

the combat intelligence center o.r JJ:CPOA so that information on convoy 

routing could be supplied ld. tp. a minimum of delay. Special. internal. 

codes, carried only by submarines, were used for relaying this type of 

information, so that our own surface ships, though they might be able 

to decipher the submarine messages, were unable to determine the type 

of informa ti.on being supplied. When ComSubPac moved his opera ti.onal 

headquarters to Guam a special cryptographic channel was authorized by 

OpNav to supply this inform ti.on direct .from JICPOA at Pearl Harbor. 

The information .furnished made possible the assignment of submarines not only to the most pro£itab1e patrol. areas but al.so to specific 

locations at particular times where contacts were made with convoys of 

known composition and importance, and .ftoequentJ.y with enemy course am. 

speed known exact1y. Combatant units o1' the Japanese Fleet were 

similarly 1ocated on many occasions. During periods, which .rortuna. tel.y 

were brief, when enemy code changes temporarily cut of£ the supply of 

Cornmunicati.on Intelligence, and of consequent sinkings almost exactly 

paral1eled the curve of volume of Communication Intelligence available. 

There were many periods when every available submarine on patrol in the 

Pacific Ocean Area was busy on in.formation supplied by Communication 

Intelligence. The vast reaches of the Pacific Ocean could not o.therwise 

have been coverf;)d so thoroughly unless a far greater number of Sllbmarines 

had been available. In early 1945 it was 1earned from a Japanese 

prioner-of-war that it was common saying in Singapore that you could 

walk from that port to Japan on American periscopes. This feeling among 

the Japanese was undoubtedly created, not by the great number of submarines on patrol, but rather by the fact, thanks to Corr.mun:i.caticn 

Intelligence,, the submarines were al.ways at the same place as Japanese 

ships. 

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Regu1ations required that messages containing Coil!Dlunication Intelligence be destroyed, and as a consequence, no record of tile many successes 

due to this intelligence can ever be compiled. However, some or the more 

notable achievements come immedia tel;r to mim: 

Severe damage to carrier HITAKA (or HIYO) by TRIGGER in June, 194.3, 

which put her out of commission for almost a year. 

Sinldng of aircraft transport MOGAMIGAWA by POGY in August, 1943. 

Sinking of escort carr.i.er CHUYO by SAILFISH in Decenber, 1943. 

Sinking of submarine I-42 by TUJlNY in March 191J4. 

Decimation of large Saipan-bound convoy by PINTADO and SHARK II 

just prior to our la.n:iings on that island. 

Sinking or submarine I-29 by SAWFISH in July , 19!,4. 

Sinking or submarine I-41 by SEA. DEVIL in September, 1944. 

Sinking of escort carrier JINYO by SPADEFISH in November, 1944. 

S.i.nking of carrier UNRIU by REDFISH in December, 1944. 

Severe damage to carrier HAYATAKA (or JUNYO) by REDFISH arii/or 

SEA DEVIL in December, 1944, which put her out of co:mm:i.ssion 

for remainier of war. 

Sinking of submarines R0-115, R0-112 am. RO-ll3 by BATFISH within 

four days in February, 1945. 

Sinld.ng of submarine R0-56 off Wake Islam by SEA OWL in April, 1945. 

Sinking of light cruiser ISUZU by CHARR in April, 1945. 

Contact and trailing of YAMATO task force by 'IHREADFIN and HACKLEBACK 

in April, 1945, which resulted in sinkings the :f'ollow.ing day by 

carrier air forces of the battleship YAMATO, the cruiser YAHAGI, 

and destroyers H.AMAKAZE, ISOKAZE, ASASHINO arrl KASUMI. 

The above are but a few of the many successes against the Japanese 

Navy that can be directJ..y attributed to Communication Intelligence. The 

sinkings or Japanese merchant ships J:-esulting from Communicati.on Intelligence ran into hundreds of ships and probabl.y amollllted to fifty percent 

of the total of' all merchantmen sunk by submarines. 

In additi.on to the direct results there were equally as important 

indirect results which must be credi. ted. to the same source of information. For example: From an analysis or Communication Intelligence 

extending over a period of' many months it was determined that our magneti.c 

torpedo exploders were not f'unctianing properly', and steps were taken to 

correct the defects. Then again, informa. ti.on concerning enemy minefields 

was so complete that defensive minefields laid down by the enemy served 

our purpose rather than his. Not on.1.y were our submarines able to avoid 

the areas or danger, but Japanese ships, being required to avoid them 

as well, were forced into relatively narrow traffic lanes, maR:i;ig it 

easier for the submarines to locate and attack them. It is impossible 

to estimate the number of our submarines which were saved and the 

number of Japanese ships which were lost because of' the accurate information about enemy minefields supplied by Communication Intelligence. 

Also, information concerning names of ships sunk, nature or cargo and 

number of troops lost was of' inestimable va1ue in assessing damage 

sustained by the enemy and gauging his capabili ti.es. 

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With.out Communication Intelligence submarine operations would 

unquestionably have been far more difficul.t and costly because of the 

vast areas which had to be covered and the attainment of the u1timate 

objectives would have been greatl.y delayed. 

/s/ C. A. LOCKWOOD 

• 

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"Pa.rt K - General Commendation by Assistant Secretary of State 

In August 1947 the ColTllllWlication Intelligence organization assisted 

the State Department delegation at the Inter-American Conference at Petropolis,, Brazil in the handling of special iJ1telligence. After ihe conference, Mr. Norman Armour, Assistant Secretary or State for Political Affairs, 

sent the followillg letter to Op-20-2: 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

WASHINGTON -

15 SEP 1947 

Dear Captain Wenger: 

It g:i. ves me great pleasure to be abl.e to express to you the State 

Department's appreciation of the very valuable service which your Division 

rendered apropos of the recent Inter-American Conference at Petropolis, 

Brazil. 

I understa.m that we owe to you and your staff not only a large share 

of the benefit of the coverage prov.i.ded, but also the ef'fieient technical 

means which were used for this purpose,, and the naval personnel who functioned so smoothly at Rio in behalt of the Secretary, myself and Mr. Fildy. 

It is highly gratifying to realize that such interdepartmental cooperation is an established fact,, and that it can be called upon from time to 

time in the interest of the national welfare. 

Captain J. N. Wenger, 

Room 17-105,, 

Naval Communications Annex, 

3801 Nebraska Avenue, N.w.,, 

Washington 25,, D. c. 

Sincerely, 

Norman .Armour 

Part L - Statement of the Honorable Cordell Hull.z Secretary of State 

Reg~ the value of Communica ti.on Intelligence in diplomacy, the 

Secretary o£ State stated in a memorardwn dated .3 January 1944: 

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"· ••• The Department has found this material valuable at all times,, 

and v.i.tal in a number of highly important situations. It would 

appear that information of this kind,, and its analysis,, will be 

even more v.i. ta1 in the future than in tile pa.st,, both during the 

period of actual hosti.li t.tes,, and after hostilities may be concluded. 

This material is o!' great va1ue in determining the !'acts on which 

policy must be f'ormu1ated or actd.on taken. 11 

Part M - Statement of General of' the Azmy Douglas MacArthur 

General of the A.rsny Douglas MacArthur, St.preme Commander of the Allied 

Powers in Japan, has ma.de the following statement regarding the va1ue of 

Co:mmunication Intelligence: 

rr •••• The information .f'rom this source saved us many thousands of 

lives and shortened the war by no less than two years.11 

Part N - Letter of Appreciation from the Department of State 

In the letter which follows the Special Assistant to the Secretary or 

State for Research and Intelligence extems his appreciation to the 

Communication Intelligence organization for the valuable intalligence made 

available to the Department of State during the year 1947: 

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE 

WASHING1'0N 

January B,, 1948 

Dear Admiral .Stone: 

:tt is w:i.. th pleasure tha. t I wr:i. te to you,, as we enter the new year,, to 

express the appreciation of the Department and or :my office for the unique 

source of intalligence which is ma.de available to us through you am the 

personnel of your diVision. I refer,, or course,, to communication intelligence arxl the very real benefit which it brings to bear upon the complex 

problems or our country• s foreign relations and or the Department• s ef'.f'orts 

to maintain and consolidate a state of peace favorable to the national 

wel.t'are. 

The Department now relies upon the technical facilities ani the skills 

of the Communication Supplementary Activities,, Washington,, and the corresponding unit in the Azmy,, for its basic communication intalligence material.,, 

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102 sreRtl 

and I should be grateful if you would infonn. Captain Wenger and Captain 

Harper or our appreciation for this indispensable service. It is certainly 

an outsta.ming example of interdepartmental collaboration to mutual. 

advantage am in the spirit of team-work which is now, more than ever, 

the expressed goal 0£ our Government. 

The relationships which exist on the working level between our people 

and yours are still another source of grati.t'icati.on to me, and I should 

like to extend our thanks to them through you. 

Rear .Adllli..nl. E. E. Stone, 

Director of Naval Communications, 

Department o:t the .Wavy, 

Washington 25,, D. c. 

11 

TOP. SEGRElh 

Sincerely yours, 

w. Park Armstrong, Jr. 

Actirg