-~ IN REPLY REFER TO 

OGA ,_ 1952 

MEMORANDUM FOR I 

SUBJEcT: CONSIDO, History ot . 

1. ID accordance with your request, there is enclosed herewith a 

brief histor,r of the CONSlDO concept and of the various actions which 

followed itis official presentation for cons:ideratil.on. 

00058 

2. The history as set forth in the enclosure, begins with a paper 

prepared in March 1949. That is because it deals with a concept ot 

evaluation and dissemination to which the name CONSIDO was applied. 

However, the idea of a joint evaluati.on and dis~emination center for 

military and naval COMINT antedates the CONSIDO concept. Therefore, a 

brier history of events prior to March 1949, dealing with this phase of 

COMDlT integration. will probably be of interest, and tdl.l be summarized 

in tbe next paragraph • 

.3. a. Beg:i.mdng on 18 August 194S and extending through the em 

of the year, correspondence was exchanged between the Chief of Staff, 

u.s. Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations, relative-to the merging 

and integration of the COMlNT activities o-f the twe Services. Pertinent 

to that correspomence is a memorandlDll dated 22 August 194.S from the 

Chainlan of the .Army-Navy CODllllUllications Intelligence Board to General 

Marshall and Admiral King, in which it is ·stated that the Board reached 

unanimous conclusion t • 

* . * * 

"(h} That ••• art~r merger of Army arid Navy Signal intelligence actiVi ties are effectuated all results be dis·semina1;ed 

as joint A:m.tr-Navy product." 

b. In a man.orandum dated 18 September 1945 to General Marshall, 

Admiral King set forth three basic principles inherent in his approval 

of the memorandum referred to un:l.er subparagraph a. abOV'e: 

•(a) That there should be ••• joint evaluation and dissemination of strategic, non-operational intelligence." 

"(b) The Navy must maintain complete and independent control 

of the production, evaluation and dissemination or naval 

-operational intelligence." 

eclassified and a ro d for relea e b SA on 09- 4-2014 ursuantto E.O. 13 2 
; 

OGA 

"(c) The Navy•s physical facilities for the production or 

cormnunication intelligence cannot be consolidated. into a 

single physical unit with Army Signal intelligence facilities.a 

c. In his reply, 25 September 194S, General Marsliall accepted 

the first of these three principles but stated that the second and third 

"appear to me to remove the practical ba~is essential. to achieve effective 

coordination." 

d. It is unnecessary here to go .t;urther into the foregoing 

correspondence and the long discussions terminating in the creation of 

the Armed Forces Security Agency. That is a different story. ·But I 

wish to continue a bit in this memorandum with the rest of the MarshallKing correspon:lence having a bearing on the first of the three principles 

cited in subparagraph b. above, since that one certainly forms a part 

of the background history of the concept of a CQlSIDO • · 

e. On 2 October 194S Admiral King: 

"noted that we agree that the control and dissemination of 

Navy and Army operational signal intelligence should be exercised 

by tbe service concemed. In addition, I believe the following 

principles have already been implemented or agreed upon: 

* * * •(d) Strategic.non-operational signal intelligence 

should be evaluated. and disse~nated as a joint product." 

Admiral King went on to say: 

•I feel that the Navy• s complete and independent control 

of its.production, evaluation, and dissem.ina:t.i.on of naval 

operational. intelligence is essential to naval command." 

t. On 10 October 194S General Marshall replied: 

01. After reading your memorandlllll of 2 October •••• I am 

convinced that a joint /COMJNT7 evaluation center wOllld be 

ineffective unless in tlie same center there were combined all 

other types of A1."lq and Navy intelligence." 

112. It seems to me that the best solution for improving 

not only the effectiveness or /OOrmT7 but to resolve the 

entire question of Arm::! and Naiy intilligence organization 

would be for us to combine in one locati.cn, un:ler joint control, 

all Ji1nV and Navy intelligem e effor~ personnel and direction 

including all of the product of ·the LCOJ!JJJ'!} •••• n 

2 

:T. -,::-----'---~---::,:-:_:"""· ~. """"·~-- ,- -· .~ • _:_ .::J .J 
'f OP 8:1!'.mC OGA S lf R I A L OQ 05 8 

I 1 · 4~U< 195~ 

Memorandum for ,_ _____ ___,~/Subject: CONSIDO,, History of 

- ~ - ---- ~ -- -- ---- - ----- ------------ g. On 8 November 194$,, in his reply to General Marshall, Adm. King 

stated: 

113. I concur in y-ou.r proposal ••• insofar as it is practi.- . cable to do so a1'li still retain to each service control of those 

matters essential to the effective employment of its forces. 

For this reason it is necess~ that the Navy retain those 

functions which relate to Naval operational intelligence required 

for the exercise of naval command. This includes cryptography,, 

which for the Navy•s purposes,, must be integrated into the communications serV"ice rather than into the intelligence serV"ice. 

•4. Subject to the above,, I agree that intelligence should 

be a joint matter. I suggest that an ad hoc committee be 

appointed to work out a program on the above basis for our 

further consideration. 

115. I share your View that our program should be worked 

out in a manner to permit the armed services to cooperate f~ 

with the State Dep.rtment in the formation and operation of a 

central intelligence agency, should one be established." 

h. On 8 December 1945 General Eisenhmrer,, General Marshall's 

successor as Chief of Staff,, wrote to Admiral King: 

u1. It appears from your memorandum of 8 November that you 

agree that certain phases of Amy am Navy intelligence should be 

a joint matter but that you feel it necessaiy for the Navy to 

impose certain -limitations upon the functions of any joint intelligence agency. General Marshall•s proposal. was based upon the 

promise that there should be no such limitations,, and that there 

should be complete integration of all intelligence activities,, 

including cryptanalytic activities. 

•2. As you know,, the Secretaries of State,, War and Navy 

recently appointed a committee to investigate and -report upon 

the advi.sability o£ the.formation of a central intelligence 

agency. Any action which this committee may take will naturally have a substantial. effect upon the proposal for merging 

Army and Navy intelligence activities. It therefore seems 

appropriate to de.fer action upon the mutual problems of the 

two services until the result of the committee study has been 

announced." 

i. On 28 December 1945 Admiral Nimitz,, Admiral King's successor 

as Chief of Naval Operations,, in reply' to General EisenhOW"er,,. stated: 

3 

·~:::: -:.. ~· 
OGA S B K I A L QQ 05 8 

4MAR t952 

Memorandum forl Ii- Subject: CONSIDO, Histol"Y' of 

- - ~ - - - - -~_ ........ _,..._=-"_=-""'_,....,,,_,..._,,,,....,,_,,.._ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

111. I regret that you feel it appropriate to defer further 

action upon mutual problems of the Anny and Navy communication 

intelligence activities pending result of a study by tile StateWar-Navy Committee as to the adv:isibility of the form ti.on of 

a Central Intelligence Agency. · 

•2. You are correct that reference (b) imposes limitation 

upon joint effort in the field of communication intelligence, 

but only to the limited extent therein stated. It is essential 

for the Navy to retain unier its control those communication 

intelligence functions paramountly related to naval operational 

requirements aDi the exercise of naval comma.Di. This is true 

regardless of the extent of joint effort by tm two services· . 

and, likewise, regardless of the extent of control which ma.y 

otherwise be exercised over the field of intelligence general.q 

by any interdepartinental joint intelligence agemy which may 

be created. 

n3. It has been the consistent hope of the Chief of' Naval 

Operations, as expressed in refereme (b) aDi in former memoranda 

on this same subject, that joint discussions continue with due 

regard 'for the abOV'e mentioned limited restriction. I still 

feel that this should be done. Should you, however, as stated 

in reference (a) still wish to defer further action upon our 

mutual intelligence problems unti.l the final result of the study 

by the State-War-Navy Committee, I reluctantly concur." 

j. The entire problem was thereupon taken up again by the ArmyNavy Communications Intelligence Board ard then by a special board. For 

our purposes it is UDnecessary to go into tho~e discussions, and merely 

say that when AFSA. was finally established, and with state, CIA, and 

FBI as members of USCIB, the concept of a central evaluation and dissemination unit for· all COMINT was eliminated. It is doubtful that the 

unanimous conclusion of ANCIB, quoted in subparagraph a. above, was 

overlooked by mere inadvertence. Consequently, early in 1949 I took up 

the question with Co~. Carter w. Clarke, then Chiet', Amy Security Agency. 

4. a. One of the factors which motivated me in bringing up the 

question and which is briefly referred to in paragraph .3:!:, of Section I 

-of the enclosure, was my growing concem over the large number of copies 

of decrypts being produced to meet the s'tated requirements of the consumers. 

I felt that the situation would soon get out of hand and present. serious 

risk of' loss of copies, only one of which might jeopardize our most 

important sources. The situation has indeed bec011Le serious. 

4 

c .. ""../ cir .. 'I ,._'.,• ---= u 
OGA 

'f 6P SERE'f S E R I A :r, 00058 

...---------. 4~R 195~ 

~~~'.'."'.f~rj t~u~j~~·- ~~~·-~:O?'_o: ___ _ 

b. The gravity ol tm security hazards coincident with the 

enormous number of copies 01: code-word material. being produced and disseminated cUITentl.y' can be gauged by considering the following sample 

statistics: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

SEP 

12,688 

6,96.3 1,54S,29~ 

19.51 

OCT 

1$~424 

7,89.3 

l,842,15o 

NOV 

l.4,192 

7,087 

1,822,364 

DEC 

91968 

· S,919 

1,379,287 

Line (1) No. of translations· of plain-text intercepts. 

Line (2) No. of translations of decrypted intercepts. 

19.52 

JAN 

12,$88 

9,968 

1,-719,093 

Line (3) Total No. of copies of translations of both categories. 

(Nal'E: The appreciable decrease f'rom November to December 

was • the result of the Christmas Holidays.) 

c. The total number of· copies produced is staggering - even 

greater t.h.an the figu.re I gave the Board at the meeting on 22 February 

19.$2. Some of these copies consist of several sheets of paper, each 

bearing the cocle word designator. 

S. a. In 'lfl3 opinian, these statistics alone should be a source of 

worry to all of us. An important reduction in the security risks might 

result from an arrangement whereby such wholesale reproduction and 

dissemination of OOMINT products would not be necessary. A CONSIDO working within AFSA precincts, or ·a D-Reports Group within AFSA• would certainly 

help in this respect, leaving out of consideration other advantages which 

might accrue in the way of producing better and more current pictures of 

the international scene,. as reflected in CCMCNT. 

b. In this connection I call your attention to the current 

dissemination policy and practice at GCHQ, not because I an convlliced 

·that llhat suits British needs should also suit our requirements but as 

a matter of information and possibly food £or tho-uglrli. Dissemination of 

individual COMINT decrypts and translations is on a vecy strict, extremely 

limited basis at GCHQ, ana:, moreover, it is largely determined and controlled by GCHQ itsel£. The guiding principle is the •need to lmow,n with 

strict interpretation. For instance, an item relating to atomic energy 

would be disseminated only to their equivalent of our AEO. At the beginning of each year there are discussims between GCHQ and the consumer 

agencies, the latter irnicating in broad terms their minimum requirements 

iD this respect. From ti.me to time thereafter, by liaison visits by 

GCHQ personnel to the consumer agencies, these requirements may be clarified or amended. Generally, only one or two copies of a decrypt ever 

leave GCHQ, the largest mmber never exceeding halt a dozen. occasionally, 

in the case of a particularly valuable report based upon decrypts or . translations more copies mq- go out but never more than 8 or 10. It is 

·:i·, ,,_ . . s -I " · - ::i - -.. -_ -1-.:-'.- i --~---lF ._, '-.,:- ... 1 r·-~ 1 - ,-~.,.....Lj '(_ .... _~ 
OGA 

a 1f~f. rp:A7~ • ~lS ~i..==~u ·~~ ,.-

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 S B R :it A ~ 00058 

": 41AR 195~ 

Memorand'll11l for I I- SUbject: CONSIDO, His,tory of 

------ -- --- --- ----------------- ----- to be noted taat what has been s8id above applies only to what is done at 

GCHQ; many reports using COMINT and collateral are produced within the 

consumer agencies and· disseminated by them but I do not lmow at the moment 

how maJJY' copies are made or disseminated. That is a responsibility of the 

consumers, not of GCHQ, but I daresq GCHQ has something to say on that 

score, too. 

\ 

c. We learned recently that similar very-' stringent rules are 

followed by thel I 

d. I still believe in the CONSD>O idea but wish to make it (~ 

clear that I do not think it should be performed by AFSA - only that,,; 

for security reasons, it would be best if it could be perf'orned on or i 

within AFSA premises, so that the original. bits and pieces never need! 

leave those premises. A unification of' COMINT processing without some 

sort of unification of evaluation and dissemination appears illogical; 

in fact, it might have been more logical to begin with a unification of 

evaluation and dissemination along CONSmo or similar lines, am then 

follow it 1li th a unification of COMINT processing. In short,. maybe ve 

have here an example or a hysteron-proteron, and if you do not know what 

that is, look it up in Webster. We have an Anglo-Saxon equivalent but 

it does not solllli as nice. 

6. It is advisable that I invite your attention to the .f'act that 

this history of CONSJDO is not an official. document, al though it is based 

upon official. sources ard is accompanied by certain appendices which are 

official. documents. I will al.so add that the comments contained in tie 

preceding paragraphs of this covering memoramum rei>resent my personal. 

opinions. They do not necessarily reflect the views of any of my 

colleagues or superiors. 

ENCL-1 

is dacume&e-s~ifsi 1Bi'Bftlat1 

'tiug the natioual 4•t•n• 

~~' WILLIAM ~ ·a.-if~~ F. FRIEDMAN 

Consultant 

ted States within t mean-

' Title is. 

d 794. ftle 

als~ Public Law 513, 

Congress second session 
~ REF ID:A71767 

~<d(FJ @~«fu~~T T6P 5J!BRBll' = SEStJRB'Y DJl!eRMf}IJ:QR 

BRIEF HIS'l'ORY OF C:ONSIDO 

By: William F. Friedman 

APPEND!ED DOCUMf~TS 

CQNTAiN CODE WORD- M.,·:I.JA'" 

7 · d'ecument contains intorma on 

atte ins the national dete e o~ 

the Uni d States within 

u.s.c., Seat 

transmiss1·on or 

its contents 

unauthori 

by law 

~ e-e- llso Public Law 513, 

j81 Congress second session· 

-·· 

... 
REF ID:A71767 

TOP SECH.e:1 

!6P SBSRB!l' 

BRID' HISTORY OF CONSIDO 

TABLE OF CONTDl'l'S 

I. ORIGDl ARD DEVELOPMENT OF CCfiCEPT 

1. 

2. 

3 • 

•• s. 

6. 

1. 

a. 

9. 

10. 

u. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

16. 

17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

21. 

22. 

Definition of term ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

First steps in tormulatioo ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

DisadTantages ot situation as it then existed ••• •••••••••• ••• 

Advantages of pl"oposed consolidation••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

Recc:1111endationa •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

COllll8Dts of USCIB Co-ordinator ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

Ccmments tl'Oll Operations DiTi.sion, ASA ••••••••••••••••••••••• 

Revised tirstdratt •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

COlllents of Col. Clarke •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

Collaboration with 11811l.bers of Special Research Branch, 

m, Army- ••• •.• ••• · ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• r •••••••• 

Details of llellorandua as final.17 reVised ••••••••••••••••••••• 

Reaction or Director of Intelligence ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

Counterproposal ot Col. Petersen ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

Decision of Director ot Intelligence ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

Action of Secretarj' of Defense••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

Papers referred U> Joint Intelligence COlll'littee •••••••••••••• 

First reply of JCS to secretary of petense ••••••••••••••••••• 

Reconsideration by JIC ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

•Reports Group•; concept •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

Subaillsion of aodi!'iad. report on OOHSIDO ••••••••••••••••••••• 

CGamenta by General Mclarney ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

ReVision not completed ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

II. USCIB•s COISmERATION OF COHSIDO 

1 

1 

l 

1 

2 

2 

J 

3 

4 

4 

4 

6 

7 

7 

8 

8 

9 

10 

10 

ll 

13 

14 

1. Introduction to USCIB ••••••••••••• ·•••••••••••••••••••••••• •• • 14 

2. Comments by CIA. •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 15 

3. Subsequent action by USCIB ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 17 

k. Reports ot USCIB Ad Hoc Colllllittee •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 18 

S. Further USCIB discussion ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 20 

6. The demise of the COISIDO proposal ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 21 

7. The COMSIDO proposal ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 22 

III. BRIIF HISTORY OF COMSIDO 

1. Definition of tel"ll ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 22 

2. Origin of concept •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 22 

3. Consideraticm by USCIB ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 23 
4. 

s. 

6. 

7• 

a. 

9• 

10. 

11. 

12. 

1.3. 

ID:A71767 

BRIEF HISTORY OF CONSIDO 

TABLE OF CONTlmTS 

( Contiriued) 

• 

British rep]Jr ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

Reaction to British view•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

Views of SACEUR ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

Reply of USCIB to SACEUR •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

Reaction of GCHQ •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

Mission to London ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

Opposition or JCS ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

USCIB Ad Hoc Committee appointed •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

SACEUR and GCHQ informed or decision •••••••••••••••••••••••• 

Informal arrangements established ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

(ii) 

TICi~ §geQ>fRstgy 

23 

24 

2$ 

2$ 

26 

26 

29 

29 

)0 

30 
REF ID:A71767 

TQ)p §J~d!({rg:y· • 

BRIEF HISTORY OF CONSIDO 

LIST OF APPENDICES 

A. Jt!emorandum, subject: Maximum Exploitation of COMIN:T, dated 17 May lst..9. 

B. Memorandum to Director of Intelligence, GSUSA, subject: Proposed 

Memorandum for Chairman, USCIB, subject: Maximum Exploi tati.on of 

COMINT, dated 25 April 1949. 

c. MemorandlDll for General McNamey, subject: Establishmen:t of a Single 

Communication Intelligence Eval~ti.on and Dissemination Center. 

D. Consolidation Directive No. • Memorandum For: , subject: 

Establishment of a Consol:Ura£ea: Special Information Dissemination 

Office, . NME. 

E. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

subject: Maximum Exploitation of COMINT, dated 19 Mq 1949. 

F. Consolidation Directive No. • Memorandum for: , subject: 

Establishment of a Consolidated Special Information Dissemination 

Office, National Military Establishment. 

G. Consolidation Directive No. • Memorandum for: , subject: 

Establishment or a Consoliii'itid Special Information DiSsemination 

Office, Department of Defense. 

H. Remarks made by Col. Lovell at Forty-seventh Meeting of USCIB, held 

2 December 1949, in explana~ion of chart accompanying the draft 

CONSIDO paper, with chart. - , •-

I. Statement of Certain Methods for the Establishment of CONSIDO, dated 

4 May 19$0. 

J. Statement of Certain Methods for the Establishment of CONSIDO (The 

Second Report of the Ad Hoc Committee as revised by discussion at 

the Fi.f'ty-f irst (Special) Meeting of USCIB) • 

(iii) 
~ REF ID:A71761 

Ter S~bNET 'i'0P SBGRB'l S:SS'!:JR:I'i'Y IN¥0HHli'IOH 

BRIEF HISTORY OF CONSIDO 

I. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONCEPT 

1. Definition of term: CONSIDO is the abbreviated term for CONsolidated 

Special Iiiforma"Eion Dissemination Office, an organization which woUia" be in 

if.feet a central office for the evatuatian, publication, and dJ.Ssenu..nation of 

communications J.ntelligea:e. 

2. First steps in formulation: The first draft of the paper containing 

the concept, drifted 6y me at the request of Col. Carter w. Clarke, then 

Chief, Army Security Agency, was forwarded on 3 March 1949 to Col. Harold B. 

Hayes, then USCIB Co-o:Minator. Col. Hayes was asked to comment on the 

advisability of bringing the subJect to the attention of USCIB, the manner 

of its presentation, the adequacy of argument, etc. 

3. Disadvantages of situation as it then existed: As was pointed out 

in this dr<ift, the system of' decentra.lJ.zed evaluation and- dissemination had 

three grave disadvantages: 

a. The intelligence coverage am the broad pie ture which might be 

painted from code-word sources was not and could not be painted; 

b. There was serious duplication of effort and product among the 

Departments of the Army, the Navy, State and the Central Intelligence Agencr; 

c. From a security stardpoint, the decentralized operataons connected 

with evaluation and dissemJ..nation, am. the large number of copies of' cede-word 

material in circulation presented very serious hazards to the protection of 

sources. 

4. Advantages of proposed consolidation· Consolidation of the research 

facilities am personnel Elllployed- in the separate agencies concerned with the 

1. There were at that time: 

(l) At least three publ.J..cations wtuch conta:med the final product of the 

signal intelligence activities of the Government, prepared aIXi issued by the 

Department of state; (The Diplomatic Sunmary, publJ.Shed on a daily basis); The 

Army {the MJ..lita.ry Digest, prepared aiii issued on a weekly basis), and the 

Navy (the S'oViet Intelligence Summary, prepared am issued on a weekly basis). 

(2) At least seven types Of special reports and studies contaim.ng codeword material which were prepared and issued on a non-periodic basis (Special 

Reports, Order of Battle Studies, arxi Connnum.cati.on Intelligence Briefs prepared 

by Special Research Branch, Intelll.gence Division. u.s. Army; Special Reports 

and CSAW Handbooks prepared by the U .s. Navy; Order of Battle Stuiies am 

Special Stuiies prepared by the Army Security Agency); an::l 

(3) Periodic publications usl.llg code-word material as collateral sources 

of information prepared and issued by the Central Intelligence Agency. 
TOP 

(Brief History of CONSIDO) 

evaluation ani publication of the COMINT product into a single, central 

organization for the evaluation am. dissemination of the final code-word 

product would, it was believed: 

a. Bring about economies in facilities, space and personnel., 

b. Demonstrate the efficiency and economy of unification of operations within and among the responsible agencies, 

c. Give a better overall picillre of the international situation; 

and 

d. Effect a more efficient control over the security of all operations, particularly through the limitations on dissemination of COMINT products which would naturally result. 

5. Recommendations: As a result of these considerations, the draft 

memorandum prepared recommended that: 

a. A single um.t be established under USCIB direction for the evaluation, publication, and dissemination of the-fruits of COMINT activities of the 

Armed Forces. 

b. The foregoing central umt be located at the cryptanalytic center 

having the most effective collateral information center. 

c. A single CCJDNT Summary be published on a weekly basis, supplemented by more detailed monthly, an1. quarterly publl.cations with cwnul.ative 

indices. 

d. Such special code-word publications as were elaborated by the 

various cryptanalytic processing centers or intelligence agencies of the Anned 

Forces, the Department of State, or the Central Intelligence Agency also be 

published and disseminated by the central unit. 

6. Comments of USCIB Co-ordinator: The USCIB Co-ordmator, Col. Hayes, 

returned the draft on 7 Marcifi 1949. He stated that for the following reasons 

the proposal seemed to him inad.Visable: 

a. Such a proposal would result in the complete isolation of codeword material, while continUJ.ng in each department the normal intelligence 

duties without benefit of code-word source mater.Lal; 

b. A single, evaluatl.Ilg uru..t would probably be taken over by the 

Central Intelligence AgencyJ 

2 

YQjfQJ ~~CG5~fE:Y 
REF ID:A71767 

TOP SECFtET 

(Brief' History of CONSIDO) 

c. A single evaluation agency would have chfficulty in meeting 

military, air,, naval,, political,, economic and other intelligence requirements. 

d. No pronsion was made in the proposal for the dissemination of 

urgent spot itans which was characterized as the "most effective use made" 

and principal value of code-word material; 

e. Arguments advanced tended to support the closer mtegrat1.0n of 

processing am. evaluation rather than the integration of evaluation an:l 

d.J.ssemi.na.ti.on. 

1. Comments from OperatJ.ons Division, ASA: 

a. The Chief, Operations Divl.Bion, ASA also commented on the draft 

memorandum, noting2 that a single evaluation and publication UDJ.t, to be 

effective, presupposed a single processing unit,, an orgam.zat:i.an not at that 

time established although it had been the subject of study by a special board). 

The Chief, Operations Division noted further that the concept of integration 

of the processing,, evaluation,, and publication of COMINT had not yet been 

tested in practice within the framework of American signal intell.J.gence orgam.-

zations, am that the transition from the procedures then in practice to centralized evaluation and publication would require considerable t:i.me aDi adjustment among the consumer and processing agencies. 

b. He therefore recommended that within the franework of the Army 

an integration of processing with evaluation am publication of COMINT be 

effected, an integration wtuch would (1) prove the validity of the integration 

of the three phases, (2) be acceptable under either a unified or co-ord:mated 

concept of processing,, (3) be effected with a minimum of time and administrative adjustment, and (4) serve as a model to be followed, if at a later date 

it was desired to embrace all major processing, evaluation, ani publication in 

a centralized activity. 

8. Revised first draft: Following the comments by the USCIB Co-ordinator 

and the Chia£, operations Division, a second draft for the proposed consolidation was prepared by me, with two noteworthy changes. In the light of Col. 

Hayes' comment that the recODIDlel'xia.tion that the "central unit be located at the 

2. Memorandum, subject· Central Evalua ticn, Publication, am Dissemination 

of SIGINT,, dated 15 March 1949. 

J. This Board, the so-called nstone Board" had reirlered its report but a 

decision on its recommendation had not been issued. The report entitled 

"Department of the Army Study of Joint Organization for the Production of 

Commuru.cation Intelligence" had been submitted 30 December 1948. 

3 
REF ID:A71767 

ut2Jl? §~1 - s ~~r 

(Brief History of CONSIDO) 

cryptanalytic center having the most effective collateral infornation center" 

was an ill-disguised attempt to locate the unit at Arlington Hall Station, am. 

that even if the idea were good, it would be opposed by other USCIB members, 

a more general recommemation was made that th~ c~tral unit be located at 

"one of the existing U.S. cryptanalytic processing center•·" In response to 

the canment of the USCIB Co-onb.nator on the vital need for the disseJlll.llation 

of urgent "spot items," a recomnenda tion was added to continue the policy of 

spot dissElJll.l.na ti on of l.111.portant or urgent i terns, but WJ.. th a more l:united 

distn.bution. 

9. Cormnents of Col. Clarke• 

a. When this draft was submitted to Col. Clarke, he criticized what, 

in his opinion, were two chief weaknesses of the pai:er· (1) that the center, 

although to be established unier USCIB direct:Lon, was to confine itself to the 

fruits of COMINT of the Armed Forces - Col. Clarke suggested that CIA arxl 

State Department DD.ght be iricl'iiied, and (2) that the concept had been limted 

to the integration of the various COMINT publicati.ons, wrereas they should be 

exterxled mto the more elaborate problems of integration. 

b. Col. Clarke concluded his criticism with the follOWJ.llg paragraph: 

"My general comment on the whole thillg is that we should shoot 

for record in thl.S paper, dealing in detail with the specific 

problems of the Services am the difficulty of separating lower 

and higher level intelligence. I also feel that we might well 

here take an J..DCb.rect crack at the Stone Board report by pointlllg 

up those areas in which they avoided making responsible decisions." 

10. Collaboration with members of Special Research Brano~ ID, Anny: To 

carry out Col. Clarke's suggestion Uiat the araft be revised inc1Uie the 

more elaborate problems of integration, I asked the assistance of two members 

of the Special Research Branch (SRB) of the Intelligence Division, GSUSA, 

Miss Caroline Fax and Mr. John 0 1Gara. With their aid a memorandum ravi.sed 

along the b.nes i.nchcated by Col. Clarke was drafted for subnu.ssion by the 

latter to the J;;)irector of Intelligence, GSUSA. As the accompanymg note to 

the Director of Intelligence pointed out, tre memorBDium proposed to do for the 

evaluation and dl.Ssemmation of COMINI' what the proposed Joint Intelll.gence 

Bureau would do for other intelligence. A final step would be the real integration of COMINT processing, by unifying the operatiom of the processing 

agencies under a single head, along the lines proposed by the Army in the Stone 

Report or along sl.Jl'li.lar lines. 

n. Details of memorandum as finally revised: In the memorandum as finally 

revised the basic reason for the establisfuiient of a central COMINT evaluating 

4 

if©P §g:eR!f§Y 
REF ID:A71767 

TOP SE0F$1' 

(Brief History of CONSIDO) 

um.t was repeated, viz., the fact that under the decentralized orgam.zati.on of 

COMINT the Government was not proVided with total intelllgence den.vable from 

COMINT source material. The point was made that radical changes must be made 

if USCIB was to fulfill its responsibilities. The revised DBmorandum continued,, however, with more specific reconune:rrlations for remedying this situation 

than had been previously outlined, ie., 

(1) That a eentr@l COMINI' evaluatmg unit be set up at one of the 

USCIB technical agencies; 

(2) That this um.t be responsible for the prcduction of all intelligence based on COMINT and for the publl.cation am dissemination of all such intellige:me to u.s. Government personnel 

authonzed to receive 1 t. 

(3) That each USCIB ment>er contritute personnel to this center, 

such personnel to be administratively subordinate to their 

respect.1. ve departments a:rrl operationally slt>ord.J.na.te to the 

Chief of the technical agency, ard to have the dual responsibility of producl.Ilg total intelligence for the National 

Security Council and inte~ence of pr.unary interest to 

their respective departments. 

(4) That upon the establishment of the central um.t, all existing 

COMINT evaluating um.ts of the five USCIB members be dl.ssolved. 

b. In the staff study accompanying the memorandum an a.nal.ysJ.B of the 

current situation was made and certain supporting arguments were marshalled. 

The United States, it was indicated, was then spendlllg annually approximately 

thirty-five million dollars for the technical production of COMINT raw material. 

It had,, in addition,, an investment of roughly forty-eight Jlll.l.lion dollars in 

the Anny and Navy facilities for the production of the raw material. For the 

evaluation and dissemination of this COMINT raw material, there existed five 

separate USCIB agencies, whose work was for the most part not co-ordinated. 

and from which was produced no integrated, cornprehenSJ.ve, COMINI' estimate 

covering any subject from the point of view of total U .s. intelligence requirements. The discusSJ.on which followed these facts shmred in some detail how 

the arrangements then in effect of COMINT evaluation and dis semi.nation were 

not efficient, not secure, not economical., and how they failed to insure timely 

dissemination of intelligence. 

c. This memorandum was signed by Col. Clarke on 20 April 1949 and 

forwarded to the Director of Intelligence. A copy is attached,, Appendix A. 

For the sake of easy reference,, it will hereafter be referred to as the "Clarke 

Memorandum." 

5 

V©~) ©~~~~7 
::--,~-- -"' r= REF ID :A71767 

=~_::oQu;:J §~~--'1LS 7 

'1'02' ~!GM!! 

(Brief History of CONSIDO) 

12. Reaction of Di.rector of Intelligence: 

a. The Clarke Memorandum was renewed for the Director of Intelligence by Col. Arthur c. Petersen, then Chief of Special Research Branch. In 

his renew Col. Petersen commented that, while it was obvious that the recommendations of the Clarke Memorandwn would provide a means of acJu.eVJ.ng full 

exploitation of COMINT, nevertheless if the recommendations were submitted to 

USCIB, two alternative reactions could be expected: 

(1) The recommendations would be rejected, with Navy and Air 

Force opposed on the ground that such a proposal would 

preclu:le the operational control necessary to satisfy their 

intelligeree reqnirements; or 

(2) The recamnendations would be accepted in principle by USCIB. 

In this case, the ultimate recommendation which USCIB would 

forward to the National Security Council (NSC) might be: 

(a) That a central evaluating ard disseminating uru.t be 

established urrler the authority and direction of CIA; 

(b) That, since a COMINT evaluating and disseminating unit 

of the 0£fice of Naval Intelligence (ONI) was al.ready 

in operation at the COllllllUill.cation Supplementary Acta. vity, 

Washington (CSAW) this central unit would be located 

at CSAW. 

b. It was implied that neither of these last recommendations was 

agreeable to the Army. The Chier, SRB then proceeded to enumerate the reasons 

why the recommendations of the Clarke Memorandum appeared objeetiaiable to the 

Arrrry and to the National Mtlitary Establishment (NME): 

(1) A single department within the NME would have operational. 

control of all C<lllNT evaluation and dJ.Ssenination at the 

Washington level, and ultimate control would be in the 

hams of a board which would include non-J111l1tary members 

and would be responsible to the National Secunty Council. 

(2) Although the memorandum stated that personnel of the central 

evaluating and disseminating UDJ.t would be responsible for 

producing intelligence of primary interest to their respective departments, no provision was made far direction or 

control by these departments of the production and cb.s seminati on of such intelligence. 

6 
TOP szem 

(Brief HJ.story of CONSIDO) 

(3) No provision was made in the memorandum for the intelligence 

requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nor were the JCS 

given any means of controlling the production and diaserru.nata.on of such intelligence. 

(4) If, as the memorandum assumed, two or more cryptanalytic 

processing agencies would continue to exJ.St, the locaticn 

of a central unit at one of the technical agencies would 

only partially satisfy the reqUJ.rements for the maxJ..mum 

exploitation of COMINT. 

c. Col. Petersen recommended, therefore, that the Director of Intelligence hold the sttdy in abeyance until such time as the Arned Forces Security 

Agency, which was about to be established, could be set up. 

13. Counterproposal of Col. Petersen• 

a. In his review of the Clarke MElllorandum, however, Col. Petersen 

noted that the reasons which led to the recommendations for a consolidated 

evaluation and disseminating center led also to the conclus:i.on that a unified 

cryptanalytic processing center, i.e., an Armed Forces ~ecurity Agency, should 

be established. With the establishment of such an organizata.on, a central. 

COMINT evaluating and dJ.SSEllll.nating umt could be formed at that Agency, composed of personnel contributed. by the Arary, Navy, am Air Force, am operationally subordinate to the Chief, AFSA. This personnel would have the dual 

responsibility of providing intelligence for the Joint Chie.tB of Staff and 

intelligence of primary interest to their respecta. ve services. Upon the 

establishment of such a unit, the Department of State an:l the Central Intelligence Agency could be mvited to contribute personnel to the umt, thus providing for the integration of intelligence in the fields of intelll.gence 

allocated to those organizations. 

b. Col. Petersen suggested, therefore, that, if it was decided to 

submit a memorandum, it shoul.d be revised on the lines indicated above, he 

further suggested that this memorandum be submitted not to the Chairman, USCIB, 

but to the Anny Chief of Staff, with the recommerrlation that it be fo&warded 

to the Secretary of Defense for consideration with the "Stone Report" , wlu.ch 

considered the COMINT pr-oblem through the stage of cryptanalytic processing. 

A copy of the memorandum drawn by Col. Petersen is attached as Appencb.x B. 

14. Decision of ~ector of Intelligence• According to the verbal statement of Col. Petersen~Major General Bolling, then Director of Intelligence, 

4. See Note 3 above. 

5. 1951/1952 
REF ID:A71767 

TQ~ ~~dsf5T 

(Brief History of CONSIOO) 

decided in conference with Col. Clarke and Col. Petersen to follow Col. 

Petersen 1 s first recODD11endation and to do nothing about the Clarke Memoramum, 

pending further developments and particularly the establishment of AFSA. 

15. Action of Secretary of Defense• 

a. When Col. Clarke found this avenue of approach closed by the 

Director of Intelligence, he prepared a memorandum for General McNarney, 

Chairman Management CoD1H1J.ttee, Office of the Secretary of Defense, lihich 

called attention to (1) the proposed integration of all cryptologic actiVities 

of the Armed Forces and (2) the disadvantages of decentralized evaluation am 

dissemination of COMINT. A copy of this memorandum. is attached as Appendix c. 

b. Attached to the memorandum were (1) the staff study on the maximum 

exploitation of COMINT as submitted. to General Bolling, (See Appendix A) and 

(2) a proposed Consol:Ldation Directive establishing a ConsolJ.d.ated Special 

Information Dissemination Office within the National Military Establishment 

and proVJ.dJ.ng for the voluntary participation of the Secretary of State and 

the Director of Central Intelligence. A copy of the Consolidation Directl. ve 

is attached as AppeIXiix D. 

c. With the assistance of General McNarney, Col. Clarke was able to 

present his proposal to the then Secretary of Detense (Low.a A. Johnson). On 

19 May 1949, the Secretary of Defense sent a memorandum to the Joint Chl.efs 

of Staff stating that he was considering the establishment of a consol:u:iated 

Spacial Information Dissemination Office as a "further step to increase the 

efficiency and econouzy- of NME communications intelligence activities" and 

asking their comments and recommendations with respect to the staff st\lly aJXi 

directive by June 15, 1949. A copy of this m.emcrandum is attached as 

Appendix E. 

16. Papers referred to Joint Intelligence ColUDll.ttee: 

a. The JCS referred the memorandum of the Secretary of Defense to 

the Joint Intelligence Conmdttee for preparation of comments aDi recomm.eniations, 

and the JIC, in turn, referred the memorandum to the D:U-eotor of Intelligence 

for comments. 

b. An Ad Hoc CODllrl.ttee was then appointed by tlE JIG to study the 

problem, and to prepare the required comments and recommendations. On 

14 June 1949 the Ad Hoc Comnuttee presented a report in which it was conclt.ded· 

"a. That the provisions of the proposed consolidation directive 

would decrease rather than increase the efficiency and 

economy of COMINT actin.ta.es of the NME. 

8 

1=9p @&;Cb~ET 
REF ID:A71767 

?(C) [=:=i) ~- =LZ::::__-:c> ~5:? -r8u ©~\90 (_s ~ 

,;op S:etmel' 

(Brief History of COOSIDO) 

Plb. That the eval.iation of COMINT should not be divorced from 

the evaluation of all other intelligence. 

"c• That the proposed directive failed to provide (i) for the 

expeditious use of COMINT in support of the commani 

functions of the service departments, and (ii) far the 

satisfaction of Vital operational requirements of cmmn.anders 

in theaters of combat. 

"d. That the proposed consolidation directive was not in consonance with the provisions of the Charter of USCIB 

(NSCID No. 9). n 

c. In view of these conclusions the Ad Hoc Committee reported that 

it had originally considered recommending that the JCS oppose adoption of the 

proposed directive azxl recommend to the Secretary of Defense that, if the 

organization of intelll.gence within the NME was to receive further consider-

' ation, such ccnsideration should be gi.ven to NME intelligence as a whole and 

not be limited to one specific intelligence activity. The Ad Hoc Comm:Lttee 

had also considered adnsing that any reorganization pertaining to COMINT be 

deferred until such "tame as the organization of the newly-created processing 

agency (AFSA) had been determined arr:l was functioning satisfactory. 

d. Since it was feared, however, that such cb.rect rejection of the 

proposal., without a constructive alternate recommendation might result in the 

promulgation by the Secretary of Defense of the ConsolJJiated Directi.ve, a 

rensed Consolidation Directive had been prepared whJ.ch retained the advantages 

of the original directive ar:d e.l1minated the more serious disadvantages. A 

copy of this revised directive is attached as AppendiX F. This reVl.Sion 

(1) allowed the services to retain the necessary control of certain aspects 

of COMM, the loss of which, it was felt, would seriously hamper conmiand 

responsibilities, and (2) provided for integration of COMilfr with other intelligence from all sources. The rensed directi.ve did not, however, eliminate the 

pronsicms ltlich affected the Department of State and the CIA sl.IlCe it was 

felt that this would necessitate referring the proposed directive to the NSC 

where' the non-service members of USCIB woo.ld oppose the establishment of CONSIDO. 

17. Fll'st reply of JCS to Secretary of Defense: 

a. On 15 Jure 1949 the JCS sent the required comments and recommendations to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In their reply the JCS 

stated that they had cansJ.dered the staff stlliy on maximum exploitation of 

COMINT and the draft of the consolidated directive, an:l that they made the 

following CODDDents: 

na. The provisions of the draft consolidation directive would 

decrease rather than increase the efficiency and economy of 

9 

-u-©P §lECfu~E7 
(Brief History of CONSlDO) 

communication intelligence activities of the National 

Military Establishment. Considerable duplication of the 

work of other U.S. intelligence agencies would be necessary, 

if CONSillO-WASHINGTON ~re to tulfill the responsibilities 

assigned to it. In addition, the draft directive states 

that CONSIDO-WASHINGTON will disseminate intelligence 

direct to the Joint Chiefs of Staff but makes no provision 

for the integration of S\lch intelligence with intelligence 

provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the intelligence 

staff'& of the services. 

"b. The draft d:irective would divorce evaluation ot COMINT 

from evaluation of all other intelligence, a situatim 

which would militate against accurate evaluation of both 

COMINT an:i non-COMINT intelligenc~. Since COMINT, as · inte1ligence, :i:s not essentially different from other 

types of intelligence, an;y organization which isolates 

its evaluation from that of other sources is unrealistic." 

b. In view of mat they regarded as serious disadvantages, the JCS 

reconnnended that the action contemplated, i.e., the promulgation of the consolidation Directive, not be taken. This memorandum was signed for the JCS by 

Admiral' Louis Denfeld. and was forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense. 

c. Following a conference, however, with General McNarney, the 

memorandum was withdraw and the paper returned for reconsideration. 

18. Recons:ideration by Jic·: Because of the canplications which were 

obviously involved in this problem, a new date, 15 October 1949, was set by 

the Secretary of Defense for submission of an alternative proposal. The Jrc· 

Ad Hoc Committee imm.ediately began its reconsideration, 'Ki.th further papers 

and studies being prepared by the Department of State, the Central Intelligence 

Agency, and the Federal Bureau or Investigation,· which agencies had now come 

into the picture. 

19. "Reports Group" concept: 

a. At this point in the argument., there was devised within the 

Intelligence Division, Army, a plan for a ''Reports Gl'!lupn within AFSA, a group 

which would have the following functions and responsibilities: 

(l) Determihation of CCMlNT priori ties based upon the intelligence 

requirements of USCIB, the JCS, am. the Ser'lic es J 

(2) Co-ordination of COMINT priorities wi,th cryptanalytic ml 

intercept priorities1 
REF ID:A71767 

TGP ~~l~·~~y 'l'SP SJl:JRE!' 

(Brief HJ.story of CONSIDO) 

( 3) Selection of messages am traffic analysis items for 

publication, with appropriate comments; 

(4) Preparation of CCMINT swnmaries, with comments an:l pertinent 

collateral inf ormaticn; 

( 5) Liaison WJ. th Sel"'ll.o e and other U.S. COMINT groups; 

(6) Liaison with co-operata.ng techru.cal agencies; 

(7) Control of Dplain-textn exploitation; 

(8) Publication of CCJ4INT products. 

b. It was pointed out that such a group could be established um er 

the terms of the AFSA Charter (JCS 2010) 1 WJ..thout additional cb.rectives or 

authorizata.on at JCS or NME level. It was believed that the establishment of 

such a group would el:uninate many of the obJections to the decentral.J.zed 

system which had been used in support of the adoption of the CONSIDO directive. 

It was pointed out that if the group could be organized and functioning before 

15 October 1949 the JIC would have a strong case against the need for a further 

consolJ.da ta. on dl.recti ve. 

c. The outline of this plan was presented to the JIC by the Director 

of Intelligerce, GSlJSA, am it was very nearly accepted by the collll1ll.ttee, but 

its fl.llal adoption was prevented by objecta.ons from the Air Force members of 

the Ad Hoc COlllDll..ttee (Colonel J. R. Lovell), who wanted the priorities to be 

decided by USCIB. 

20. Submission of moch.fied report on CONSIDO: 

a. On 7 October 1949 another am much modified report regarding 

CONSIDO was submitted informally by the Ad Hoc Committee to General McNarney 

for consideration as the JCS reply to the Secretary of Defense. In this 

report it was stated that the JCS agreed that• 

"a. A consolidation of the evaluation, collation, and dissemination stages of COMINT was practicable and desirable. 

"b• Al though most of the speci fie provisions of the proposed 

directive of the Secretary of Defense were necessary a.Iii 

desirable, certa.i.n provisions thereof should be modified 

in order not to ai'f ect adversely the orderly development 

of intelligence for the Military Departments aDi the 

Department of Defense. 

ll 
'f 6P SB3Rffi' 

(Bnef History of CONSIDO) 

n-c. The proposed directive could be mochfied without vitiating 

the pr1111ary objectives of attaining greater efficiency, 

economy and security in the e.x:ploi ta ti on of COl'UNT. 11 

b. To the report. was attached a version of the proposed directive 

modified so as to "facilitate the orderly development of intelligence in the 

Department of Defense ani result in greater efficiency, econoJl\Y and secUI'l.ty 

in the explo1 tation of COMINT. 11 This modified Consol1d a ti on Directive l.S 

attached as Appendix G. Its maJ.Il provl.Sions were 

(1) Name· Consohdated Special Infonnation Dissemination Office, 

designated 11CONSIDO • 11 

(2) Establishment• Within the Depu-tment of Defense, umer the 

direction and control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

(3) Location: At the main commum.cat:i:ona intelligence processing 

center of the Armed Forces Security Agency. 

(4) Purpose· To provide for placing under one authority the 

conduct of evaluation and collation of the produ::t of AFSA 

and for the maintenance of liaison between AFSA aIXi the 

Intelligence Staffs of the Mill.tary Departments, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, ani the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

(5) Composition: Such facilities am DU.l:J.tary and civ:Ll.J.an 

personnel as the JCS JDJ.ght assign; the Secretary of State, 

the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of 

the FBI were innted to participate. 

( 6) Chief• The Chief, CONSIDO was to be appointed by the JCS 

for a p9I'l.od not exceeding three years, the assignment 

being rotated among the Military Departments. A full-tl.Jlle 

deputy was to be assigned from each of the Ml.l.J.tary 

Departments and f'rom such other agencies or departments as 

were represented on CONSIDO. 

(7) Chain of Commarxi: CONSIDO would operate UIXler the direction 

and control of the JCS, direct supervision to be exercised 

by the JIC. 

(8) Control• Military and cinlian personnel detailed to CONSIDO 

woUld be under the operational control of the Chief, CONSIDO. 

The administration of the personnel would be the responsibility 

of the department or agency from which they have been assigned. 

12 
'fOP SB0RB'l' 

{Brief History of CONSIDO) 

(9) Responsibility: Subject t.o the direction a.rd control of the 

JIC, the Chief, CONSIDO would execute policies, plans, ani 

doctrines relatilig tO the evaluation and collation of the 

product of AFSA mrl the dl.ssemination of the product of 

CONSIOO. 

{10) The Departments of the Army Navy and Air Force: Would (a) 

take action tO facilitate the efficient aDi economJ.c operation 

of CONSIDO by assigning :nu.litary ani civilian personnel to 

CONSIDO; {b} be responsible, within the Department of Defense, 

for interpretation of the CONSIDO product an:l for information 

from all other sources for the production of intelligence; 

(c) retain responsibility, within the Department of Defense, 

for dissemination of intelligence bearing the COMINI' code 

word designator; ( d) not uni ertak:e or continue any of the 

functions which were assigned by the directive to CONSIDO. 

(ll) The Director, AFSA: Would make available to the Chl.ef,, 

CONSIOO such AFSA facl.b.ties, equipment, records and fl.las 

as were determined by the JIC to be required for the performance of the functions of CONSIDO, and after the establ.J.sbment of CONSIDO would not disseminate the product of 

AFSA to any U.S. agency other than CONSIDO, except as 

directed by the JCS. Nothing in the directive was to alter 

technical agreements ratified by the USCIB, aDi the provision of information for technical. purposes to the Army 

Security Agency, The Navy Commum.cations Supplementary 

Activities, ani the Air Force Security Service. 

(12) Implementation• CONSIDO was t.o be placed in operation as soon 

as practicable. 

21. Comments by General McNarney: 

a. General McNarney was favorably disposed. toward the draft JIC 

report and the accompanying CONSIDO directive, but in confereme on 19 October 

1949 with Ma.Jor General s. Leroy Irwin, who had succeeded General Bolling as 

Director of Intelligence, General McNarney suggeste:I. that certain points 

required amendment or clarificatl.on. These were 

(1) The cmtrol structure for CONSIDO appeared weak when considered 

in conjunction with the control structlll"e for AFSA. Specifically, it seemed 

unmse to have JIC as the controlling body of CONSIDO and another group, AFCIAC 

as the controlling body of AFSA, when AFSA and CONSIDO were functionally so 

closely related. A single body, reporting to the JCS, would seem to be required 

to control both CONSIDO and AFSA. 

1.3 

((~o-21 8~t9~EY 
e· 

(Brief Histor.y of CONSIDO) 

(2) The directive should be more specific in spelling out the 

functions to be performed in CONSIDO arxl delimiting what 

remained to be done in the Military Departments. CONSIDO 

should be so chartered that it could proYide integrated 

estimates based on all available C()'.l:;nr:I'_ ~ renecting the 

joint view ot all the intelligence agencies. 

(3) The directive should incluie an express prohibition against 

any Mill tary Department 's reconstituting aIJ.7 of its elements 

which wre transf'erred to CONSIDO or reassuming any ot the 

functions passed to CONSIDO. 

b. In his conference with General Irwin, General McNarney stated that 

the directive should be co-ordinated with the Department of State, CIA, and 

tl;le FBI, with a view toward making it acceptable to them wile still retaining 

military control of the operation. He recoDDDended that in.formal discussions 

with those agencies be conducted by JIC. 'With a view to their participation in 

CONSIDO, and' commented that he was sure that it had been made clear to them 

pre~ously that the consolidaticm was a Department or Def'ense matter am. would 

take place r~gardless of their opinions. 

c. In closing, General HcName;y stated that he f'i:ll.t that the propbsed 

consol:id ation had tremendous possibilities for improving Department of Defense 

intelligence. He said that the revision incorporating his suggestions need not 

be referred to h:iJii informally _again but could be tra1JSmitted. directly to the 

JCS. 

22. Revision not completed: Before the revision along the lines recommended by Qeneral RcNarney cOUld be c~rried out, however,, the matter was 

brought before USCIB. The following portion of :this history deals, therefore, 

with the consideration of the proposal. by that Board. 

n. USCIB1S <::ONSIDERATION OF CONSIDO 

1. Introducti~ to USCIB.: 

I 

a. CONSIDO was introduced for consideratign by USCIB at the Fortyseventh Meeting of that Board, ~el~ 2 December 1949 • 7

Presentation of the 

Draft CONSIDO Paper, as outlined in Paragraph 20 above was made by Colonel 

Lovell,, USAF, before the members o~ USCIB ani two members of the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation. As visual aid, Col. Lovell used a cha.rt to describe the 

6. USCIB: 26/1 

7. This draft CONSIDO paper was issued E USCIB: 26/2. 

14 

1-©·tr3 §[g;CQK=-·-·r 
(Brief History of CONSIDO) 

functions of the praposed CONSmo. This chart, with Col. Lovell's explanatory 

comments,, is attached as Appendix H. 

b. Following the presentation, it was agreed (i) that the proposed ' 

plan to establish CONSIDO would be studied by representati. ves of the Depart.men t 

of State,, CIA,, arid FBI, with any assistance these agencies might wish frm the 

JIC Ad Hoc Camnittee which had drawn the proposal, and (2) that the plan wou.ld 

then be discussed at length at a future meeting or the Board. · 

2. Comments by CIAt 

" a. On 12 January 19So the Director of Central Ingelligence forward~ 

to the USCIB members his comments on the proposed CONSIDO. He pointed out 

that by the National Security Act of 1947 the Central Intelligence Agency had 

been made responsible to the National. Security Council for (1) correlation 

and evaluation of communication intelligeme acti"Vi ties; ( 2) provision for the 

appropriate dissem:4tation of such information; and (3) protection or intelligence sources and methods from wiauthorized disclosure. The AFSA Charter and 

the CONSJDO proposal (as drafted) were 1 according to the Director of Central 

Intelligence, in derogation or each of these responsil>ilities since they: 

, (1) Do not contanplate advice or reco.mmen:iation by the Director 

of Central Intelligence to the NSCJ 

(2) Place evalua ti.on aD:l correlation of the AFSA product and 

disseminatim of the product under the control of the JIC; 

(3) Put source and methai security responsibility entirely in 

the Department of Defense; 

(4) Place requirements and priorities under the control of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staf'f. · · 

b. The Director of Central Intelligence also stated that tbe. AFSA 

Charter and the proposed CoN.Smo (as dratted) were derogations of the responsibilities,, authority, and functions of USCIB as established by NSC:J) No. 9. 

c. He therefore recommended that USCIB consider at its next meeting, 

and adopt positive action to: 

"a. 

-

8. USCIB: 26/3. 

Inform the Secretary of Defense of the confiicts with its 

responsibilitie~ ~ functions contained in the CONSIDO 

lS 
· REF ID:A71767 

TYP @g,~f1tr=i7 'IW SERE! 

(Brief History of CONSIDO) 

proposal ani AFSA. directi. ve, am make specific recommendations for modifications necessary for the resolution thereof'. 

Request that the Secretary- of Defense recognize the individual 

responsibilities of the non-military member agencies of USCIB 

and assure that no internal changes or Department of Defense 

reorganization of COMIN'.r activities will result in interrtJpti.on of currently established rights of access, methods of 

collaboration, or dissemination of material. or information 

between those members and the military agencies, or the 

orderly- development thereof. 

Inform the Secretary of Defense that USCIB, in exercise of 

its responsibilities both for the authoritative coordination 

of COMINT acti. Yi ties of the Govemnent and for the further 

purpose of advising the Director of Central IntelligeJ:lce in 

matters for which he is responsible, proposes to: 

"(l) 

"(2) 

Take immediate action toward the formulation of 

policies· and directives necessary tO ilDprove the 

authoritative coordination of COMINl' activities 

in the light of new developments and experience. 

Assist the Director of central Intelligence in 

his proposed sUl"'ley- conducted tA:> determine 8111' 

necessity for advising the National Security 

Council on coordination of ccmrrunica tions intelligence matters which his statutory responsibilities requ.ii-e.· ' 

·- Include in consideration of over-all exploitation problems 

the existing CIA facility am approve the interim informal 

proposals of the Director of Cmt.ral Intelligence described 

iD paragraph ( 7) of this paper. n · 

_ d. A copy- of the proposed CONSIDO directive, modified along lines· 

more agreeable to the Director of Central Intelligence, was appellied. It was 

stated that th.is revision was offered not as a proposal with any- intent of 

recommending its _adoption by the Secretary of Defense but merely to indicate 

some of the objectionable features and omissicns of the original draft 

directive. 

e. Main changes proposed in the revision were: 

(1) Change of name from CONSIDO to AFSIDO (Armed Forces Special 

Inf'ormtion Dissemina ti.on Office"); 
REF ID:A71767 

TOP~~&~:v TO? SB9RJ!l!l 

(Brief Histol'Y' of CONSIDO) I I 

(2) Limitation of authority within and for the Department of 

Defense; 

(3) Deletion from the functions of liaison between AFSA and 

the Department; of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, 

am 1il!le the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

(4) Emphasis upon the functioning of AFSIDO in accordance with 

USCIB policies and.-directives. 

3.- subsequent action by USCIB: 

a. At the Forty-eighth Meeting of USCIB, held 13 January 1950, the 

draft cowsmo paper was again discussed.9 Although th.ere was general agreanent 

among the members that there was a definite need for CONSmo, both the Central 

Intelligence Agency and the Department of State made it clear th.at they objected. 

to the form in which the proposal. had been drafted because it made the Department of Defense alone responsible for running CONSIDO. Admiral Hillenkoetter, 

representing CIA, suggested that the CIA could support a CONSIDO proposal in 

which the Department of State am the CIA would be responsible jointly ~th 

the Depart.ment of Defense. 

b. This vi~ was supported by a statement read by Mr • .Armstrong, 

Departanent of State, in which appeared the following views: 

"It is a matter ot record that the Department has consis tentl.y 

felt that there are basic am. funiamental reasons which require it 

to oppose the exclusive control of the dissemination am evaluation 

o:f COMINT material.a by the Joint Chief's or Staff or an-,- other 

exclusively military body...... The Department is still of the 

opinion that USCIB is the best framework within which the military 

and civilian COMINT interests and .functicms can be developed." 

* * * 

"This plan ••• contain( s) numerous desirable aDi praiseworthy 

provisions lihich should cont.ribu.te materially toward attaining the 

common objectives or all members of the Board. However, the 

Department netes that it also inclllies a number of previsions which 

by- language, it' not by intent, extend definitely into the operating 

and administrative structures of the civilian agencies on USCIB and 

which contravene and would, if adopted, vitiate principles and 

9. USCIB: 26/4. 

17 
'f 6P SEeRM 

(Brief History of CONSlDO) 

provisions of the charter (NSCID No. 9) which the Department believes 

to be VJ..tal. n 

c. In general the Department of State believed that the CONSIDO 

described lll the directive contained a number of elements lbich appeared to 

lie outside the authority of the National MJ..litary Establishment. It, therefore, 

recommended. that the CONSIDO direct:L ve be rewritten so that its terms were 

applicable to the anned sernces only, with provision for adequate liaison 

under the authority of USCIB between AFSA arxi CONSIDO on the one ham an:l the 

civilian agencies on the other. 

d. General Inan, representing the Amy, explained that General 

McNarney• s directive required that CONSIDO be restricted to an NME organization 

and that that was the reason it had the appearance of a military creation. If 

the co-operation of State a.Di CIA could be obtained, he felt that the ultimate 

in efficiency and security would have been achieved. 

e. It was generally agreed that there was sufficient merit in the 

proposal. to warrant USCIB committee action, and, therefore, an Ad Hoc Committee 

was named (1) to study the CONSIDO proposal. in the light of the comments by CIA 

and the Depar'tment of State and (2) to draft a new proposal for presentation 

to USCIB. 

f. The followmg representatives were, therefore, appointed as 

members of the Ad Hoc Conmu.tteet 

State 

CIA 

Anny 

Navy 

Air Farce 

AFSA 

- Mr. T. A. Poly~J.des, Chairman 

- Colonel P. K. Porch, USA (Alternate Col. B. Brown) 

- Captain J. M. Ocker, USN 

- Colonel J. R. Lovell, USAF (Alternate Lt. Col. 

H. H. Towler) 

- Captain J. N. Wenger, USN 

g. Progress reports by the Ad Hoc CoJ11111J.ttee and the date for the 

final report were left to the discretion of the Chairman. 

4. Reports of USCIB Ad Hoc Committee: 

OGA 

a. The USCIB Ad Hoc CoJllllll.ttee, meeting for the first time on 16 January 1950, addressed. itself to the following problems :10 

10. Memorandum for the Chairman, USCIB, subJect Report of USCIB Ad Hoc 

CoD111U.ttee for Consideration of CONSIDO, dated 14 March 1950. 
REF ID:A71767 

Y©P ~~~~[;;lf e 

'f6P SJ!l9Rm 

(Brief' History of CONSJDO) 

•a. Whether the principle or integration of certain COMINT 

intelligence activities is feasible on a six-agency 

basis, am 

"b• If feasible, what vpe of integrated organization can be 

established or;i a basis satisfactory- to all member 

agencies of USCIB • 11 • 

b. As a first step it was agreed that the civilian agencies should 

attempt to draft a plan which would meet their requirements am which would be 

acceptable to the needs of the militaey agencies. 

c. After four meetings held among the non-military agencies, the Ad 

Hoc Committee reconvened on 13 February 19.SO to consider a proposed directive 

prepared by the Department of State member am accepted by the other nonmilitary members as a basis :tor further discussims. At the next meeting, 

however, on 20 February 19$0, separate draft directives ·were submitted by the 

Air Force member and by the CIA meni>er. The CoiDmittee reviewed these drafts 

am. it was dec:ided that the Air Force version, which attempted to compose the 

differences between the NME draft directive and the State Department draft 

directive, waild form the basis for future discussions. 

I 

d. On 2 March 19.SO, when the Committee met to consider the final 

draft, the Department of State, CIA, FBI, Air Force and AFSA agreed that, 

although the latest draft was not acceptable in every particular, it should 

be edited further and be sent to USCIB for consideration. This was- opposed, 

however, by the Army am the Navy members, who submitted jointly (1) a written 

statement that the DONSIDO organization proposed in the draft USCIB directive 

did not meet the requirements of the Defense Establishment, and (2) a revised 

directive for the establishment or CONSIDO within the Department or Defense 

under the direction am control or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

e. It soon became apparent that the cleavage on fundamental principles precluded further effort on the pa.rt of the Ad Hoc Committee to prepare 

an agreed CONSIDO proposal. ~he report therefore submitted. bY." the Committee 

stated: 

"The Committee ••••• is unanimous in agreeing that the principle 

of integration in certain COMINT intelligence activities is 

feasible on a six-agen·cy basis. The Committee stanis divided 

five to two, as to the type of integrated organization which 

can be established on a basis satisfactory to all member agencies 

of uscm.n 

- 19 
• 

TOP Slil0RS'l 

(Brief' History of CONSIDO )' 

S. Further USCIB discussion: 

a. The Forty-ninth Meeting of' USCIB received the report ot tl'B Ad 

Hoc Committee in the form of two draft directives for the establishment ot 

CONSIDO. One draft directive would establish a CONSIDO um.er the 'control of 

USCIB, agreed upon by five member organizations (State, CIA, FBI, AFSA and 

the Air Force) and the other under the control of the military agreed upon 

by the Anq and Navy. The Cha:i.man of the Ad Hoc Committee further pointed 

out that the vote of 5 to 2 pertained to the c-onsideration of the principle 

that CONSlDO should be established under USCIB control and did not necessarily 

mean that there was complete agreement on the details of such a CONSIDO on the 

part of the five who favored USCIB control. It was agreed to postpone any 

action on the establishment of a CONSIDO, allowing the Army and the Navy 

members time to effect internal reconciliation and to explore new avenues of 

approach. 

b. At the next (50th) meeting' o£ USCIB (14 April 19S0) the item of 

CONSIDO was suspended fn>m the agenda, pendjng informal discussion by the 

members. It was agreed that. the members would meet in Executive Session at 

the conclusion of the meeting to discuss the CONSIDO problem. 

c. At the close of the Executive Session, the USCIB Ad Hoc Comittee 

for Consideration of CONSIDO was reconvened and addressed by Major General 

Irwin on behalf o'f the Board. The Committee was directed to resume its work 

toward foI'llllllating a set of basic principles for the creation of CONSIDO. 

The principles enumerated. by General Irwin were: 

u1. Consider USCIB handling all priorities. 

2. Command by: 

a. USCIB through special intelligence committee 

including the Intelligence Directors concerned; 

or 

b. Joint Chiefs of Staff, through JIC augmented by 

CIA, FBI and State. 

). cousmo must be an organization --- not an ad hoc unit. 

4. CONSIDO to disseminate AFSA product. 

$. Consider some special operations by certain agencies, i.e., 

ad hoc additional members for special projects. 

20 

c_ ·u (§; F1 §> ;:..:;;'(g w "~ ii 
REF ID:A71767 

'10~ ~ t;· ,~ :::!!;]~ •--ir"'\!: ET · 

'l9P SSR£r 

(Brief History of CONsmo) 

6. Adequate provision must ·be made for reasonable stability 

,· or personnel to penui t continuity in functiaial operation. 

1. Chief ot CONSIDO to be Mili taey • .,ll 

d. The Committee was instructed further to proVide elucidation of the 

v~ous methods, within the framework or these principles, whereby CONSmo 

could be established. . 

e. In accordance with these instructions, the Ad Hoc Committee presented a second report (attached as Appendix I) which was in t~ farm. of an 

exposi. ti.on rather than a directive, ani which contained alternate proposals 

on controversial. points.12 This report was presented at the Fifty-first 

(Speci:ll) Meeting or USCIB on S ~ 1950, am was discussed by the members 

paragraph by paragraph. The report of the Committee, as revised in the discussion at the meeting, is attached as Appendix J. Changes are indicated by 

underlining.13 

6. The demise of the CONSIDO proposal: 

a. In the final discussion of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, 

the Department of State member reserved his d eci~ion in regard to the comand 

contrel of CONSmo, and the Navy mepiber reserved his decision on the question 

of the control of personnel and the_deputy. 

b. After prolonged discussion, the Ad HC?c Committee agreed unanimously 

that the problems of fona and control of CONSIDO affected all aspects or CONSmo 

to such a degree that it was not feasible to draft ¢her portions of a directive until agreement could be reached on these tw fundamental problems. 

c. At the Fifty-second Meeting of USCIB, held on 9 June 19.$01 

General Irwin recommended that the item of CONSIDO be stricken from the •end.a 

for that meeting since the Military Members required· addi ti anal time for study. 

At the Fifty-thii-d Me~ting, held on 14 July 19SO, the item ¥af1.removed from 

the agenda, subject to possible restoration at a future date.-14 

ll. USCIB: 26/9, Enclosure A. 

12. USCIB: 26/9, Enclosure B. 

13. Umumbered USCIB document. 

lb. References to the discussions of CONSIOO at the. 49th through S3rd 

meetings of tJSCIB are: 49th Meeting: USCIB: 26/7; )Oth MeetiDg: 

USCIB: 26/8; Slat Meeting: USCIB: 26/10; S2nd Meeting: USCIB: 26/12; 

SJrd Meeting: USCIB: 26/13. 
REF ID:A71767 

TO~ ~6~fE:T 

(Brief History of CONSIDO) 

d. To the date of this writing tbe subject has not been restored on 

the agema am it is fair to say that during the period May to July 19.SO the 

CONSIOO concept suffered a decline which caused it to pass from an imminent 

operational to a purely historical status. 

e. The CONSIDO story as related above tells of events in a gestation 

which lasted about 16 months but which did not terminate in an accouchement, 

even one that produced onl.7 a stillbirth. It is difficult to believe that the 

imminence of the birth after so many and such lengthy labor pains was simply 

overlooked by high authority. In certain quarters apparently, so abhorrent is 

the whole concept that even after the passage of two years the mere menti.m 

of the word oousmo causes spots before the eyes am tremors of the body. 

7. The COMSlDO proposal: The CONSlDO concept is somewhat related to 

another proposal which was niide almost a year after the death of CONSmo am 

which also dealt with certain aspects· of dissemination of COMINT. Therefore, 

this history will continue with an account of COMSIDO. 

III. BRIEF HISTORY OF COMSIDO 

1. Definition of term: COMSIDO is the abbreviated term for COMbined 

Special Intelligence Dissemination Office, an organization which, liiCI it been 

istablisned, was to hive provided aii integrated dissemination service of u.s. 

and U.K. - produced COMINT to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 

(SHAPE). To avoid confusion with CONSIDO, and possibly for the reason 

all med to in paragraDh 6e above, the term smo was by common consent substi tuted for COMSI00.15 -

2. Origin of concept: 

a. The idea of a combined special intelligem: e di ssemi.nation office 

at SHAPE had its origin in a request received on l2 March 19$1 by the 

Director of Intelligence, GSUSA, from General Eisenhower (SACEUR) that Major 

General Sir Terrence Airey, British Assistant Chie.t of Staff, Intelligence, 

SHAPE, be authorized to receive CCl4INT in that capacity. After an informal 

exchange of views between u.s. G-2 and GCHQ representatives, it was proposed. 

that as an interim measure the u.s. Army Special Security Officer (SSO), 

Paris would serve all authorized U.S. and British COMDIT recipients in SHAPE. 

b •. Whm the Coordinator, USCIB, was adVi.sed by the Director ot 

Intelligence of this request, he recomeuled that until agreed conditions of 

dissemination and security regulations have been dn1m up and approved by 

both USCIB and LSIB, dissemination of U.S. COMDIT should be confined to u.s. 

J.S. See USCIB: 13/193. 

22 
REF ID:A71767 

(Brief History of CONSIDO) 

personnel and that the British be asked to serve British personnel.. In view 

of the fact that there was a complete exchange between GCHQ and AFSA, the 

Co-ordinator thought this arrangement should result in no loss of intelligence 

either to the Briti.sh Intelligence Head or to General Eisenhower. The matter 

was referred to USCIB for inf'ormation and oonsider4ltl.on. 

3. Consideration by USCIB: 

a. At the Sixty-second Meeting of USCIB, held on 13 April 19.Sl, 

the subject was raised by Major General Bolling, and the relation of General 

Airey• s clea:mnce to the ~arger question of security regulations for Global 

COMINT Collaboration was discussed.16-

b. Admll'al Stone presented informal views of the British on this 

subject, received the day before, which were to the effect that until a policy 

on dissemination of intelligence generall.y" had been prepared no COMDT in any 

form, raw or digested, would be disseminated to SHAPE. But given (1) a 

decision on this matter, and (2) u.s.-British agreement that there should be 

a service of COMINT to SHAPE, the British View was that "the nows of COMINT 

and SIGINT in all forms should if possible meet in one security and distribution office Bild fliere be co-ol'dliiated bj. COMINT am SIGINT speciilists intO 

a sirigle flow to SHAPE." 

c. The USCIB decision at this meeting was tnat tbe USCIB Co-ordinator 

should adVise the Director, GCHQ, of the Board•s opinion that, as an interim 

arrangement, General Airey be serviced with COMINT by a British representative, 

aDd that the Director, GCHQ should be informed tbat this was a matter deserving 

prompt attention. This was done by letter dated lh April 1949.17 On 16 April 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff were informed of tbe USCIB decisim. 

4. British reply: 

a. The Brj.tish repiT,-8 dated io May 1949, repeated its request that · 

as an immediate am interim measure, the u.s. Arm;r SSO in Paris should undertake to supply to General AiI"eY' such CCJUNr as lSCIB would consider necessary 

to· enable him to play his full part as Assistant Chief ot Staff (Intelligence) 

to General Eisenhower. As permanent arrangements for the supply of COMINT to 

authorized U.S./British officers in SHAPE, it was proposed tbat: 

16. _ USCIB: 1.3/170. 

17. USCIB: 1.3/166. 

18. USCIB:· 13/176. 

23 

T~P §Jg©tRET 

• 
REF ID:A71767 

T~~ ~g~~T e 

TOP s1eRBl 

(Brief Histoey of CONSlDO) 

•a. Authorized u.s. an:i British officers in SHAPE should be 

saned with COMINT bj a combined u.s./u.K. office; 

•b. The British element in this office should consist of an 

of'ticer ~ any necessary ,small supporting staff'; 

110. While COMINT sent to this office should, in principle, 

be for cannon u.s./u.K. use, it should reach the otf'ice 

through channels prioviding •ru.s. ~ ONLY" and · 

nu.IC. EIES ONLY" facilities so that,, where necessary, 

matters of purely national. concern ·could be. c6mmunicated; 

"d. In priD:iple, U.S. ani U .K. authorities should inform 

each other what · COMINT each has sent to SHAPE and the 

means to achieve this should be explored•" 

S. Reaction to Britl.sh view: 

a. The British proposal was I"fad am discussed at the Sixty-third 

Meeting of the Board, held 11 May 1949. 9 The USCIB Co-ordinator recommended 

that the British proposal be referred to the USCIB ·Intelligence Committee 

tor study and recommendation, but this recommendation was opposed by" Major 

General. Cabell, USAF, who expressed th~ opinion that the pature of the 

traffic concemed did not lend itself to a joint office, and suggested that 

the Board take cogpizance ot this tact and agree that separate offices be 

established. General. Cabel.l•s view was supported by Lt. General w. B. Smith, 

Director of central Intelligence and Chairman of USCIB, on the gro'Wlds that 

~ral. Eisenhaver probably' would not tolerate a situation like that proposed 

by· the British, principally because the existence of an Anglo-American joint 

center would place him (Gen. Eisenhower) in a bad position vis-a-vis the 

French, the Dutch and other nations represented in SHAPE Headquarters.. This 

opinion met with agreement among most at the members of the Board, but Major 

General Ralph J. Canine, representing the Army, tor Major General. Bolling, 

informed the meabers that Lt. Colonel Russel B. Holton, one ot his officers, 

had just returned from Paris and that he thought that Col. Holton might have 

some information on the attitude ot General Gru.enther, General Eisenhower's 

Chief ot Statt, toward the proposed joint COMINT office in SHAPE. When 

brought before the Board, Col. Holton informed that body that.Brig. General 

(then Colonel) Schow of SHAPE had bean therougbl.y briefed on the U.K. proposal 

am had stated that he thought it would be satisfactory. He preswned that 

General Schow had cleared the matter with General. Gru.enther. 

19. USCIB: 13/176. · 

24 
(Brief History o£ CONSIDO) 

b. At the proposal of General Smith, it was agreed that before a 

reply was made to the British on· the subject proposal, the USCIB Co-ordinator 

should prepare a message to General Gruenther to obtaill his Views. It was 

further agreed that this message would point up possible difficulties in the 

operation of a Joint u.s./u.K. COMINT office in SHAPE, yet adVise General 

Gruenther of USCIB•s willingness to approve the proposal if it was deemed 

desirable. · 

6. Views of SACEUR: In reply to the message sent, as instructed, by 

the USCIB Co-oi"dina.tOr tO the SACEUR, a message was received by Major General 

Bolling for USCIB from the SACEUR, dated 18 May 1951. In this message, 

SACEUR pointed out that the time had come "to decide precisely how COMINT is 

to be handled as between British am Americans at SHAPE.tt20 SACEUR reviewed 

the difficulties inherent in a joint Angle-American unit in SHAPE mi stated 

that COMINT should be handled at SHAPE by a u.s. terminal as at present,. At 

the same time SACEUR emphasized that it was essential. that intelligence 

material reaching G-2 at SHAPE should arrive as an integrated Anglo-American 

Service. It was therefore recommended that intelligence material arriving 

at SHAPE first be integrated on an Anglo·Ameri~ basis in London or Washington, 

preferably the former for ease of reference ani fullest exploitation of 

European sources. ID cases where there was divergence of opinion in interpretation of material., this should simply be stated. It was noted in the 

message that General Airey was putting the proposal to the British authorities 

an:t. felt confident they would agree. SACEUR stated that he hoped arrangements 

could be made to implanent this policy without delay. 

1. Reply of USCIB to SACEUR: 

a. Following consideration of this messMe at the Sixty-fourth 

(Special.) Meeting of USCIB, held on 24 May 1951,21 USCIB agreed to ccept 

the proposal that COMINT be supplied to SHAPE from an integrated Anglo-American Service located in London. It was further agreed that the Deputy USCIB 

Co-ordinator, RADM (then Capt.) J. N.~ Wenger, am Lt. Colonel Holton (AC of S, 

G-2) would proceed to London and Paris· to work out necessary details w:i.1h 

GCHQ am SHAPE representatives. Dispatches were to be sent to SHAPE and 

GCHQ. on these arrangement.s. 

b. The reply sent by General Bolling to General Gruenther23 expressed 

USCIB•s concurrence in the proposal on handling COMINT and in SACEUR•s preference of London as the point of integration. Consideration was expressed 

for the ris'k involved in the u.s. serving British in SHAPE while denying 

material to other nationals, but it was stated that USCIB believed this danger 

could be minimized by proper cOJlllllWlications and handling procedures. As was 

desired by USCIB22 it was expressly stated that USCIB <lid not visualize that 

20. USCIB: 13/177. :-U©tF1 ~(~(Q;b·:-«@i¥' 

21. USCIB: 13/186. 25 . 

23. USCIB: 13/186. This view had not been included in the original. draft of 

the message to SACEUR (USCIB: 13/182). 
REF ID:A71767 

~?<?-)\pi ~ - cc_-- . -~ -- • ~r- @~\9tt-.zs:·:~ '{ 

TOP 5Eeftft 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

(Brief Histo!'7 of CONSDX>) 

the combined Lomon office would be an intelligence division for SHAPE but 

rather a •1:1pecialized message center in continuous operation to integrate, and 

pass on to SHAPE evaluated and other U.S. and British COMINT received from 

u.s. and British sources." The concurrenc.e or comment or S~CEUR was requested. 

8. Reaction of GCHQ: 

a. The reaction of GCHQ1 to General Eisenhower• s proposal was very 

favorable. On 22 May! fof the British Liaison Off;ice in 

Washington relayed a message from the Director, GCHQ, as follows:24 

"Have not yet had time to submit to LSIB this proposal byEisenhower for supply- of SIGINT to be integrated in either London 

or Washington and supplied to S.H.A.P.E. through an American 

office in Paris. I think, however, and will recoDJlllem to the 

Board and am confident of their acceptame1 that this proposal 

should be agreed to, and that the Board•s original proposal for 

a joint office in Paris shwld be withdrawn, now that S.H.A.P.E. 

have said it would be unsuitable. 

"Think taat London is obvious choice for Location. We would 

warmly welcome and would give eveey facility to the u.s. element 

in an integrated Anglo-u.s. party- in London." 

b. On 1 JUJ18 19Sl the USCIB Co-ordinator was informed by-· the Senior 

British Liaison Officer in Washington that LSIB had approved in principle 

SHAPE' s proposals as contained in General Eisenhower• s cable and had authorized the Director, GCHQ, to negotiate agreement with USCIB. 

9. Mission to. London: 

a. As had been agreed upon by USCIB. representatives were sent b;y 

USCIB to GCHQ to work out nec~ssary details vi th SHAPE and British representatives. These representatives, RADM Wenger, Lt. Colonel Holton, and 

Mr. John o•Gara, met with British representatives in London and there drew 

up Terms of Reference for the Combined Special Intelligence Dissemination 

Office, designated (COMSIDO). As has been indicated above.25 this office 

was later referred. to as Special Intelligence Dissm:ination Office or smo. 

24. USCIB: 13/181. 

2s. Paragraph 1. 

26 
!OP 6BSRB!' 

(Brief History ot CCllsmo) 

. b. Upon the return of the representatives, the Terms of Reference 

were presented to USCIB at the Sixth-fifth. Meeting of that Boa.rd, held on 

22 June 19$1. These were as follows:2° 

•Terms er Reference for Co'mbined Special Intelligerx:e Dissemination Office. Preamble. There is hereby established umer the 

~uthority of USCIB and LSIB a Combined Special Intelligence Dissemination Office. Designated and hereafter referred to as SIDO, 

operating under the adminjstrative control ,of the A.C. of s., G-2, 

GSUSA, acti.ng as Executive Agent on behalf' of USCIB am LSIB. The 

smo shall be located at London and shall have the purpose, composition, and functions hereinafter described. 

1. Purpose. SIDO is established in order to provide an 

integrated service of u.s. and--U.K.-produced COMINT to SHAPE. 

2. Composition. 

A. SIDO shall consist of such facilities am personnel 

as are required to provide integrated COMINT service to SHAPE. 

B. A U.S. officer will be the administrative head ot smo • 

.3. Functions. 

A. SIDOs primary mission will be to integrate the fiow to 

SHAPE of COMINT from the respectL.ve u.s. and U.K. Executive 

Agents. 

B. smo shall not function as an agency for the exchange 

of COMINT between u.s. and U.K. agencies. 

' _ c. Personnel detailed to SIDO will be umer the operational 

control ot their respective executive agents, I.E., A.C. of s., 

G-2, or GCHQ. U .s. personnel will contct British COMINT 

agencies only through_ the SUSLO. 

4. Methods ot Operation. To achieve integrated now of COMINT 

to SHAPE, COMSIDO wJ.11 perform tpe following general functions: 

A. Eliminate duplication of identical i tams. 

B. Elimination of discrepancies of fact and, as far as 

possible discrepancies in interpretation of T/A in terms of 

order of battle, move of units, etc., with indication ot 

origin, at least where ditferermes rema:in. 

26. USCIBr· -1.3/19.3. Y~tP §[g:<9~~1r 

27 
- REF ID:A71767 

=,-.=c-- ~~ .. -~-.. ~~ --. ~-A ..... . r-"""L::;.., 

'f 0P SEeRfi 

(Brief History of COOS]])()) 

c. COMSIDO shall not attempt in any 0way to reconcile 

clifferemes in the evaluation (including canments) between 

British and u.s. OOMINT. WRere such differences exist, 

coordination shall be limited.to insuring that SHAPE is advised 

of such differences, or that each version is clearly identified 

as to source. Possible means of accomplishing th:is advice are: 

(1) When both versions are available to COMSIDO at the 

same time, they mq be forwarded in the same transmissicm. 

(2) When one version has previously been transmitted 

to SHAPE, the conflicting version should be cross referenced by COMSIDO. 

$, CollllllUDications. OOMSIDO will employ the special channels 

for COMDlT dissemination operated by the AP of S, G2, GSUSA. 

6. Implementation. 

A. This directive shall be made effeaj&i ve upon agreement 

between USCIB and LSIB and COMSIDO shall be placed in operation 

as soon thereafter as practicable, 

B. After COMSIDO is in operation, all: u.s. or U.K.-produced 

COMINT other than U.S. or U.K. EYF.S OHLY will be disseminated to 

SHA.PE through COMSID0 1 Lomon, In addition, all such COMINT 

which is supplied to SHAPE from sources Within the SHAPE commaul 

area will also be supplied to COMSIDO. 

c, The proVisi.ons of these terms of reference shall not be 

construed. as contravening any provisions ot the u.s.-British 

COMINT agreement, 

D. The pattern of COMSIDO shall not necessarily be· taken 

as a precedent for the dissemination of COMlNT to commands in 

changed conditions 1 for example in war." 

c, In addition to the tenns of reference it was agreed that the 

integrated unit would be located at Grosvenor Square, The Bri tis~ strongly 

£avored locating the office at GCHQ, but in order to avoid becoming involved 

in combined evaluation ot C<JtIJNT for SHAPE the u.s. authorities considered. it 

advisable to ma1ntain the office at Grosvenor Square {Landon) under U,S, 

jurisdiction, and this location was agreed to by the British, Admiral Johnson, 

USN was authorized by USCIB to cable CINCELM in an effort to expedite the 

latter•s furnishing space in the Grosvenor Square area for this office, The 

office would operate um.er authority of USCIB ard. LSIB and administrative 

control would be exercised by the u.s. Army, G-2, in accordance with its 

interim responsibilit7 as Executive Agent of SIA.PE. Each side would exercise 

operational control of his own personnel attached to the office. 

Y©JF ~ ~ t~-©~~b;t~·-~2a Li \S= 
REF ID:A71767 

T©lF' ~i1~~~y 

I 

, (Brief History ot CONSIDO) 

d. All members of the Board agreed to the terms of reference as read, 

with the exception of General Ackerman, USAF who stated that while he could 

perceive no serious objections thereto, he would like to defer the Air Force•s 

decision until after General Cabell' s return to Washington. On Sunday, 24 

June 1951, General Ackeiman informed. the USCm Secretary of the Air Force•s 

concurrence. On Monday, 25 June, however, the Navy and Air Force members 

withdrew their approval pending consideration of the problm by the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. 

10. Opposition of JCS: . 

a. At the Sixth-sixth Meeting of USCIB, held l3 July 1951, discussion 

of the terms of reference for SIDO was reintroduced.27 General Bolling stated 

that in view of recent developments he 'WOUld prefer to withdraw his original 

recommendation conceming the establishment of the office to serve SHAPE. 

Admiral Johp.son, representing the Navy, stated that his proposed message 

requesting space for the SDlO office in Grosvenor Square had been the subject 

of very strenuous objection 'on the part of his Chief, and that subsequent 

consideration ot the project by the Operational Deputies to the Joint Chiefs 

of Staf'f (Lt. General C. L. Bolte, Vice Admiral D. B. Duncan, am Major 

General T. D. White) had elicited similar objections, it being believed 

impossible to conceal such a bilateral arrangement from other signatories ot 

NATO. 

b. Faced with this disapproval. -on the pa.rt of the JCS, the Board 

recalled with same embarrassment that it had already informed SHAPE aRi GCHQ! 

that USCIB agreed in pr:in.cipl.e with SIOO and would now have to inf arm these 

Head.quarters of its inability to implement the pl.an. It was apparent, however, 

that the JCS would not recognize such a bilateral agreement. 

c. An. alternative proposal was made by General Cabell, Uider which 

the Air Force Commander in Europe would gi. ve SHAPE a combined opinion on air 

problems, the GroUid Force Commander on ground problems, etc., but it was 

pointed out by the Chairman, General Smith, that General Eisenhower was 

operating at a level at which the non-military side' was at least as important 

as the military side, i! not more so, particularly since the conunam was not 

engaged actively- in var. General Cabell•s plan would therefore result in 

five or six channels going into SHAPE simultaneously'. 

ll. USCIB .Ad Hoc Committee appointed.: After some discussion, it was 

agreed that the matter shOU!d be iiven tO an Ad Hoc Committee with instructions 

that the plan be considered further am that recamnardat.ions be made to the 

Board. The Ad Hoc Committee appointed consisted of Lt. Col. R. G. Holton as 

27 • USCIB: 13/197. 

29 

T©:H3 ) ~·~~ET. 
W~r 

'1'6P S!eft!IT 

REF ID:A71767 

e - - • . ·:-.::o._? 

(Brief Histor.y of CONSIDO) 

Chairman, Col. W. J. Davitt, and Commarner R. L. Taylor. The Committee was 

instructed tq draft a proposed message to General Gruenther, explaining to . him the existing situation with regard to smo, and suggesting a course of 

action in view of the Board•s inability to obtain concurr.ence in the proposed. 

terms of refereDCe for smo. This mes-sage was to be circulated among the 

members for consideration be.fore dispatch. It was further agreed that the 

appropriate U.K. authorities would be informed of the inability of the u.s. 

to implement the smo proposal. 

12. SACEUR and GCHQ informed of d·ecision: In lftcordance with the USCIB 

decision, a message was dispatched on JI Jlil;y 19$1, to the'SACEUR informing 

him of the inability of USCIB to implement SIDO. Appropriate U.K. authorities 

were also informed of the nature of the decision. The message is reproduced 

in full: 

lllSACEUR from USCIB. 

"The plan for establishment of a combined US-UK Special Intelligence Dissemination Office in London cannot be implemented by USCIB 

pealing JCS determination of policy concerning bilateral arrangements within the NATO structure. Considerable opposition to the 

proposed arrangements has been expressed by the "Operations Duty 

Chiefs of Staff." 

· "Until such time as the JCS policy has been determined, US 

recipients in SHAPE and General Airey will continue to receive 

COMINT through the US Army SSO, Paris• 

"In view of the expressed opposition to an integrated COMINT 

service, USCIB suggests you reconsider your object.ions to the 

previous proposal that the British establish an SSO within the 

British national facilities SHAPE to provide British COMINT to 

SACEUR and British recipients at SHAPE. 

"Pending your decision on the above suggesti.cn, as a further 

measure to assure best possible interim solution, Army SSO London 

will translllit such COMINT as British desire to send SACEUR over 

Army SSO system to SSO Paris." 

lJ •. Informal arrangements established: 

a. At the Sixty-ninth Meeting of USCIB, held 14 September 1951~9 

28. USCIB: J.4/147. 

29. USCIB: J..4/l.56. 

30 

'"'"o-·©tP ~b~~~ET 
'P0P S:SSREl 

(Brief History o£ CONSIOO) 

Lt. Col. Holton, who had been sent to Paris and London to confer with senio~ 

recipients at SHAPE ani British authorities at GCHQ in regard to the U.S. 

position on SIOO,, report.ed to the members that he had informed the British 

authorities that the u.s. was prepared to proceed, on a ltighl.y informal. basis, 

with implementation of the principle of the combined d:issemi.na'tlon arrangements originally proposed. LSIB authorities 1 he said 1 were receptive to the 

plan outlined. am as a result the British decided to provide one civilian 

qualified. in intelligence and one secretary,, while the u.s. personnel wuld 

consist, ultimately,, ot one colonel and one captain. Physical space for this 

personnel had been made available by RADM Boone, Chief· or Staf'f to 

COMNAVEASTLANTMED. 

· b. Following Col. Horton•s report, USCIB agreed to approve informal. 

arrangements with British authorities for the servicing ot General Eisenhower 

with COMINT,, and to infom the Director,, GCHQ ot this decision. This was 

done by memorandum 2S September 1951.30 · 

c. At the Seventieth Meeting of T:JSCIB,, held 12 October 1951,,31 

General. Smith reported that the informal arrangements for servicjng SHAPE 

appeared to be very satisfactory. The item was dropped from the agenda. 

fil11.c_aa;. ~.,, .... ·~ f- WILLIAM F. FRID.AN 

Consultant 

2.8 February 19.$2 

.30. Memorandum for the Senior British Liaison Officer, Washington,, subject: 

Dissemination or COMINT to British Personnel at SHAPE, dated 25 .September 1951. 

31. USCIB: J.4/162. 

31 

CU-9LF'' §~;g[f=({~y 
REF ID:A71767 

I 

. ' - I I • -6LJN1 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

l. IM Pr9bJ,'9t To •u.mine pr•Mnt U8 CC.Ill?' e:qleiU.ti..c>R u4 

oiHea.ination 1-a ord•T '\o 4eteniu & .. t.h.od wb..!eh •ill prl9Ti4• tull 

e..,loitat1oa ot th1• aouree with th• ~ •!fieienc7, N$W1ty, ti~elineaa, &Jld econ.ollT• 

2. ft.qt& 8!A£1Wl qtl lQ.t P"rjjztl-9; 

a. r~. U.S. Aal'l:Qlllly a~•nd• appro~te.LJ" .,~,000.000 tar in. 

technioal prod\;aotio» or COllil'l' raw •tvW. It ha.a r~blT a l4.B,OOO,OOO 

punt irrt••tru1t in t.h• t"aaili tie• of AS& aod cu•. 

b. 4ch of the •tabel'& of USCI8 aa.brta.iu a Cctlltlf evaluat111\i afd 

diHecoi'iat1114i unit. ior the Moat pa.rt, th• wol"k of th.a• !iT• 1llllit.J ia not 

cooJ."(,iMtecf al)(.~ lo date, there h.e.1 'lot b.u produotid an 1trt.e(l"&hd,\. t~ 

hen.in, CCIHJT esti1u.te ~O'f'&rifti ~ w;1ven uubjtot frea the pein'\ st\ Tift' 

.;,f total u .. s. ir.tellia.ne• r&q'l.'lir .. •nta.. OlM1er thilt pYe•nt arranpsecrt., 

t~r9 11 no pl"OTiaio':l !or the t.iMl,r application of total C-OllIM' t.$ ti!• 

1ntellig•rw• requlrPents o! th• Jiati~ ~ao.r1ty Cauneil er tllB poll«y 

pla.nnt1r• .,f tre departaanta or a.geney repreMated cm "G!CIB • 

.t.. r~ uaique and vital natllre of COII.-r' a.ad the eost of CC11Ilff 

~roduction oictate that ar~ar~f1Ctent1 ~ astnbliah.t •hieh ialMU'a aa.xiltl.lll 

•xploitation -:.t thh acnreo. T'<u present &M"&nJH•"'t• for th• evtlu .. di® 

&rui dieHl!iMtion Qf CQMI)f'l" pr•C.J..Ude SO.Ch nploit&t.1en. Tiley are QOt 

ef 1 ic 1•nt , uot s.aur•, &nd not econo ~ieal, c.!ld, 11or•ovn, thq !a.11 to 

ln~ure ti.feely diaaasina\ion ~! intelligtilo•. 

(l) K(i<fiffOll The f1Te CQUW!' .-n..lnatio11 uiu:h produoe aBd 

olaa .. ioate a nuaber of publioat1o~ eovevieg !iald• of p~ intereat 

to their re•p•ot be dep&rtllent.--•. i•, the XILITA.R! lHGEM' (Ar!IJ'J J the 

SJVIET l\l!~W..I;='t'CE stJtLJJJU (11.v,.) 1 th• DIPI.alUTlC StMIARI (prfOldu.eed l&rJ•lT 

""1 St.ate under the attthol"'itT cf USCIB), CiUJIR 01 BAT'fL.X (.lt1Y, Ja'7,, Ur)) 

and a;..oh .. .l ai.-'-1Jies (all departa11nt.a). Th.ep publioatio-na r:ient.aiB nalWLted 
REF ID:A71767 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86.,,36/50 USC 3605 

CMift ea Y&l'iilua nilJ•s\s. Oo.G*aie.maJ.lr. ta• .._.. re.w a&te:r.i&l.--utluai\-4 

f'I:'ea "• psi.at Qf •i•• e4' tb• ~art•~t &r a&-enq 1nv0lY-4--;h utse4 aa tb.• 

Ba.91• ttt~ r•,port1 tn. twe er ure ef the uite. Ta de.te, th•re baa bt lJ••• 

10ro&toed u. 1-ategrat.ed O<llIRr •at.tu.te c.overint anr g1veu •ab ec-t !rM the 

1at ~t Tiew et t~\al i.S. intell e?IO'e nirettemt1. 

lior, 

er • i'Aff'1 &rli'LQl'Ul•:a •• •'0-U a. aft *1 eat iaat.e be pr~oo.C with 

R.ff iGie'lll.t ape9d tG •k• auch u a?a.d.erte.k.in1 'ractieAela, and ,?9licf leT•l 

reeipi-.nt1 of Gelll!' r.cei-.e a V&l'it.\1 t}f QLlft rep~r"\1, lthbb llWl1 wpliee.t• 

el" etilltliet witln, eM a11ottl.s!!", llM whl.oti th• rw..ur hiaH.lI auat\ qnth••i•e. 

Ira •MiUaa te its oepuation !'roa oth.r COO!fr wtlh, •Gh o.f the five 

evalua.timg 'Ullita !\matier:>.• a.ere or l••• a.part f'roa th~ 1-..101 1ntell11..nc• 

ua·it• within it-s departa«it:. er &ge::iay alad, or uo-..lrH, frOM the C*.nartl 

illtelllgeaee unit.a or the other d~iHnta or &itnc;r. SUet> arra.wao•ots, 

ftlt.ho~ neoaenry tor CCllllM' see-arit.7 und.r preaent eol'.14.1.ti.~m•, inhicit 

!"t\pid, dir•ot •pplleation 0l eiJllitva.l int.elllgeno• to CClllNT &nd aili t.ate 

a.p.1nst. the t.iaal,r prCl..tOO'tion of tet&l 1.t'ltelligrt1'.C• em 11. ttiv.m 1Ub~eet both 

Ylt~~m and l..a6)ne the OSCIB •~rs. 

(2) "fil•l~e: Clearl7, tho v•lu. o! all iotell11eQc• depend1 

te a la.res ute~t ea it.e 1d••ll.n•••· Thia i• p&:rtioul&rJ.T true in the o.&M 

ot COIUl'r. A »••.a&• il!di~at ing i•pend.1'1i att.n.ak d111•i.n&ted tj'te?" 

tll• f•ot u ot ae&tlwie 1st.rest otU¥. UM.er the pr1taent n.rrSDgMent.a • 

b1>nv•r, t.he iAe-vit.&.hls tili•-1.a& r•ae.ltil'lg !:roa t.he ••p&ra.tie'A of the 

fiT-e nalu\im& Utilta trcca ea.ch otMr, s.n.d et •ch of th•• trQll on• er 

both o! th• arypt&P.alytio pr<><:uaing *i•tleiiu, e!fcetlveq redillcee thQ 

cb&M•• u! Heeiviq wehl .. ••sa&c• b•for• it i• te0 lat• t.e ae\. (It ii 

&asuaed ae a atr0nc ?Nba.Oillty th&t ne sin&l.e a-es-a• 11'!11 contain pQ!!itiv•, 

sieltpevidnrt. iooieati~n o! h.oatile intent--.withottt •valuation on the bada of 

ether infona•tioa •Ye.ilable at one or all of the 1ut•lli,enee unit•.} In 

Addition, the a.,:iar8:t.1!)!1 o! •v&l.na.titttt a.n.e prooeuin.g l;;l.Qits 1ta.kea 1apo•8ibl• 

the tiaelJ'" p-r~araticm of baaio CC*lltr studies Of'l s'Ubj•cts of Joint inter•1t 

and t.he aa1ntonance of aueh 1tuf!iea at a current d&te l.vel. 

()) l1cyr1t,u 'fn• d1nr1bution e>f C':*m :raw u.teria..l to 

!1,,.. iRtsllig:onee \Ulits iu W..ah1J1f;ton J'WiSHlilta t.n obvious PhJ'•1cal aecurit.7 

basa.rcd. 'The uparst.io-a of t.he" unit• frG!l the prOC$aaing ~'"\Ci.•• rQGuire• 

the public•tio.~ or 1nc!.ividna.l •~HPi• t.ns, nete.ted ..o a& t-0 reYe&l t"'ls 

crypt$fir&phic syn& in 'alhleh th.,. were ••nt &.."'a the radio circuits [l"'QZ 

whieh th•1 wero 1nt9l"Oepted-.. a pre.oti~• wli.ich rev•l• the eore Gf US COMilr 

operation.a' epeoif1o aMt.us of crypta.nabtic atte.ck. 

SU 

i_) -- , J J J ~~ I 

2 
I _j 

I 

REF ID:A71767 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

' I I 

' 

(4) h9waf% Th• erlatllooe gf five C(lf!Jft" •n.l.oe.t.Uic Wlit• 

re~t• is •n•••iY• axpswHturaa !or per.-011.nel a.ad e.quipeant and 

oena!dera.•l• dupliC'Uo» et •tf•rt. Thb Ch:i.plioatioa of e.t'fot'\ !"•alts 

in a d.iacipa.t1on ot the luite<i, &Yail.able, quallfi.d un;>•wr ar.td adY•reell" a.!'f•ot• the quality and (1\LIUilt 1t;r e! COilm p.roduetMl. In M.ditioa, 

it. or .. te• the ne.el for publlllinc Ml'lT oopl .. o.t the Ctll!Jrt raw aat.•ri&l, 

tor an extenaiY• ctx.U""ier eerv1ee, !er aeve.ral filAia a! ths .._.. la4te:ria.l, 

a.nd tor the po.bl1oation by the proaeaai.nc ...-•ooi•• ot ~ it.a •icb 

could ha:n bMll di.aa.rd-.i at t"ie firut st•i• ot PNiQ•••icg ii' & nal.uatitac 

gHUp had hffn clo•• at Jl&OO to i;uide th• wZ"k •f th• t"1taioiana. 

"b. The .atabllshsant of a aintl• C<YMIJ'f waluatin< a.net 

41a1 .. 1oati:eg Wl1t, to b• loea\ed pretenbly at t.be 4ryptana)Ttie 

proe•Hill...,. aaeney (aa~.ing a+>ProTe.l of prcipcaM. Pi.Nctiv. e.U.l:llia!ai!l( 

A.naed lore•• Seeurit;r A,J9Gq), 1'0ul4 eliciaate the diea¢n.mtaf(H <!Her19"' 

H abon, atid wou.W. ~•nit better, all!ld 90uibl.T 11ulrlJJW11 explaitatlom of 

CCW.Dn'. The oontraat Mtweea th4 •itu.tisn reM!ltl31 f'rfJa the ~reaat 

a.rra.ngM'lnta and that •hleb wou.ld remlt trM -ui. enahll•hli•.a"t> .er a 

sing.le Wlit !or .,,.laatioe u• di•••lnation ia d•outra~-1 hr ax.aa1n1n,t tta .... elnem.a u •er• diH'U.Ued. in p&r•pa,Ja a a1'0Ye. 

(a) t!kta°t' aa arnl.l.plleiat ffUU .PT•vido, &t the Y"•ey' lea1t, 

th• phydu..l conditi•ll• UM•Hry fer 00lla.00rat.ion CJM:>t\I the CC*llf!' 

na.l.Wt.t 1q ~ermel er ttJ. UBCII aeeber1. 

(b) Buio C~Ilf eva.luatiH H:UJA be imJ>revd., f•r the 

tol~ina r .. aonas 

(1) Th• raw 11&teria.l wwl~ n ..,.,lu:\.ed at 1te 

90Unf.--an opt!lla e.lldition ror &.oQUI'a\• b1t.ailicnee pre4wrt1ea. 

(ii) I.at.-eratia>n tJf othiH" HV8• itat•llic•ai• with 

CC.II!' would k .taeiliu"4. Tb• proeesai.Jlc a.c«lCT, fo.r er,p1:,u.al,Ytia 

purpoa••• n.at aaiat.&in oentn.l !il.e• et 1tl\4llic•~ r~rta r:r. a.l.l 

aoo.rc••· r~ sin&l• na.luati?;)f "Wdt.. throt1"1 the nllat..r.J. tile• e! 

the p.r04lHdn& agenq, wu.ld hln'• d.1.r-.c\ &"*U to th• u:~.rt.&l b>oa et.h.e;r 

lnt.llir•ne• 90'Ure•• now Mf41"9.'t.•l.r b.•ld ~ eu.b et t.h.e tin O&Cll ••b••· 

(iii) J.xploit.a\1&11 ot canw.r i"R tu t!.U.a et 

pri.Mr,r i:atena\ to eaoh or th.ts USCIJ ••her• woald lN iaprffN. 9T tbe proxia• 

it..7 of ft'&hi&tw• to -t.ra.n.lat.en and \n.N'"i• aaal.T.t• .. 

) 
REF ID:A71767 

(G) CQUJtt opttatio:u aa a whol• weuJA be impreved. Tb.1 

ftlli•lc .00 M.•i.Jl:;>ffed ex.cha~• ot .._1' 1Ele&•, ~ d.evelei*Qtz, a.nd ~ 

in.tell.~eMe ?Jr tecMi1t•l r9'qtlirt1aente ~ (TM.t.q iM!'MM \h• 

e.tfiai•MT e! bs\.h teehW.c:aJ. &!Id ..,a.lrat12& pe.ra&l'ln91. 

(ti) finished GI..IIT im~ellli•M• Wtlald be ava.ilable for 

tlia ... 1~tiq te ~llcy•level recipient.• 1i:a a. !ona iledgn94! to •••t tn8ir 

DMd.-i.•., they nuld rMeiT• tetal COIIJn' oA a ilVeti aubjsct, fta $119 

.,-nt.besiz~ rer;.rt.. 

(2) I1Pelip!111 

(a) Th• proxiai\T o! ne.lli&ting .P•:r•On.'\el t0 \ffhm1$tll 

peran»:n•l lP:luld pemit clieccrt11.ntr 91' wd11pf>rt&nt u.tuia.l •t th• ea.rli•at 

RaJff et c.ryptalC8.1.;'tli• and, im •e r~n-einc tlM MH e£ M.teiria.l !'UllT 

proeened, weu.ld exp-4it• tb• prt1Hes1ni ot vital 181atetr1a.l. 

(le) Jlaaie intelli,c.m.e• •t:tl!di•• ot joist imere•t. to all 

col'lM'JMJ'e sould 19• ex;ptdit.io".laq illit.iatff. aJ3d crarrentlT n.ir:itunsd. 

(o) Jl.1.ait--tioa of the pttbiiaatioa ~-$d deliYery ef DA.rq" 

cephs ot CO.IM' :ra• •llt..l"ial would •Ub.ta.nti&ll,y rech1e• the t i!I• la& 

!M\ftR ••a.MP a.el'!iltion Ul4 .,..l9tit>1h 

(a} The diu•1nat.ie~ &f COMtlr raw 11ut.terial wtslde th. 

pl'ff.tniJ')f ag0$i•t woald be rff.eeed to a aini.a9. 

(\l) tne-wled.ce o!' tlH <iegrH Gf 9P•«11.fic e-:ryptana.lJ'tie 

SIUiHMtlfa c4'l:J..l4 ~r• -..11.y be U.ited to nrlcint pera•nnel with th.e need te 

kmeir &.M, in tb• eaH of tn.lua.tlai peraeAMl:t oontinefi t.() OM h1ata.U..tioo.. 

(A) 01 .. a.rd •f uaiJlporta.m. aatarial at M.rlle1t •t&.c•• 

o! ~lrtie pr00eaa1~1 would re<luee t..he total corl or iatalli.guo• 

fr~l!!Ced ia r•l•t1on•hip to to1-a.l ••t•rlal proaeaaed. 

(le) Publio..t1oa 8"t1 we\tld be Mteritl.1.7 redl.M*4. 

(e) :Dl.1pllut1-ea of iut.ollif•DtH !ilea, ldth ita atte--ide.nt 

~•:i:l..oal use e! lia~tn sp.&G• .. _. l"a?"noo.l, a.nit UDMC••ar.r d'..ap...icaUon 

or .ti'<»ir\ at th• ft'•luaUon ln-.l. nuld. lle •llai.oated. 

4. qHCl'itiay 

a. J. ee.s.t.ral comm \!Pl.it. ahMtllll b9 •n•»liahed at. the crypt.analytic 

f [ 'i 

Cltil .. 
REF ID: A71 767 ... 

. . 

P~Nia, apDq, with tJie ~i&illt..7 tor JW••ilc ill iat.•1.U.,... 

\le.Md oti c. 111wr and il .... 1 ... ~1ec &U meta 1.atel.l.ipue tie 11.a. anenment per .. nnel au~or1a.M\ to reeeiTe it. 

. . 

la. &aeh o.t the fiY• USCIB ... ber Mpanaens or ~ -.C:a.14 

oontria.rt.e p•rso1uM1l to thi• eemer. S--h per•n-1 . IJ'bgal.d. p..t'e:ra \u 

dua.l function or prodncil1C tet&l 1Rtel.l1pm• for the l&ti••l 1Mwit7 

Counoil and int•llla•no. ot pri-.ry intw.et. to their nap.ct1Y• uparteenta or ~eenGT• · 

c. Upon t.he e.t&hliar..nt of the eent.ral wlit, all ex1at.1m& 

COMIIT eTa.iuat.in& uoi\9 ot t.ba tiYe tl!CIB ... \Ma'a lhotal\I. 1De 41 ... l'ff'l. 

s. Hto•trS&t.!ou: It ie Neomend.t thats 

a. A. cuiral CCllUl'l naln11.t,1.ni wilt 1M nt u.p a\ the e17PUH.1~1e 

prooeaain.g i!.i•ll07· 

b. Thb Wldt be r•IJ'POn.aibl• for t."Mt prochwt:.1ea ~ all 1.m.t..U1paa• 

baaed on CC*I!t! and !or t.:O. publioaUea and 4ieaellinat.iera et all 9Uah 

lntelUpoc• to U. s. i'1"1'Jaen\ paao&tMl a.uthori.1-M \o 1'••1'1'9 u .• 

&. E1SDb ot the tin 'OSCIB ••her '4op&rtae.ata or apney cont.ril>ut.e 

PN"110nn4ll to thi• cent.er, 1111ch p.raonnel to be adainiat.ratiYel,y aubordiu.t• 

to thelr r•9P•et.1n depe.nment.a or agency a.ad operatioaal~ a~ord.iute t.o · the Director o! the Anted 1orees Sec:ru.rit.7 A&•n'V', and to \\an the dual 

re1pon1it>il1t7 of prodtu.iit:1.c-; tot.al. intel.tipzaoe tor t.he la.tieul S.eeuritT 

Council and in1.ell11cio• or pri.MJ7 i.nt.tt.nll\ t,Q tb•i r reapect1T• 4.epart-

••nt• "'r agenq. 

d. Opon the ..tabllabaent rJ \be O«lt.~ unit, &l.l axiat.lnc 

CJllliT e-v•l.na.t.in;J unit.a of th• fiff OSCIB ... b.xa lM diaMlY-4. 

I \ . ~ \ I ; l ; '_) ·~ u ..I \ ~ _. :_)' 

s 
t ( ,3 

~ ~u1· bLCHl~~:A717~ 

25 April 1949 

T0: Bireciter of In tefll1ge.mce. GSliJSA 

Sil!IBJ:Xell': Prof)e'sed. Jle.:marandum for Cha.1l"BJS.n. liJSCIB, subJeet: 

llaxinnm Exploitation at COXDIT. 

l.. Sabjeet memor&n4mn., submittea bJ" Chier, ASA., :recommenda 

that: 

a. A central C0JIIW'r evaluating unit be set up at ene 

of the cryp1ta.nalytic procee,sinig agencies. 

b. This unit b~ r6spons1ble for the production of all 

1ntel11genee based on C0JUll'l' and for the publication a.nd 

d1sseminat1en of all such 1ntellige1nce to liJ.S. government peraon1nel authorised to reoei ve 1 t. 

c. Bach USCIB member contribute personnel to this 

center. Sl.iCB persannel to be administratively subordinate to 

their re1spective departments and operationally subordinate to 

the chief et the technical agency and to he.ve the dual responsib111 ty ef ~roducing total intelligence for the National Sec.irity 

CoWllcil and intelligence of primary imterest to th&1F respective 

departments. 

d. That., upon the establishment of the central unit~ 

all existing C©1UNT evalaat1ng units of the five USCIB membez; 

be dissolved. 

2. Attached to the subject memorandum is a staff study which discu.sses the inade~uacies of the present methods of 

handling C0MIJIT evaluation and dissemination and the adYantages 

of the method recommended. It is obvious that, under the 

present system., maximmll exploitation of CO.MINT cannot be achieved 

and that., in theory. the recommenQ.ations made in the subJect 

memorandum weuld provide a means of achieving full exploitation 

of this soui•ce. If submitted to USCIB, hewever, the following 

a.lterae.ti"W1e -re1sults could be expected: 

a. The recommendations would be reJected, with Navy and Air Forc1

e o:pf>osed en the grounds that such a proposal would 

preclude the operational control necessary to satisfy their 

intelligence requirements. 
b. The recommendations vould be accepted in principle 

by USCIB. In this case, th• ultimate reaommend.at1ons forwarded 

to th• ~at1onal Security Council would probably take the 

following form: 

(1) That s central evaluating and d1seeminat1ng unit be established under the authority and direction ot OLl. 

(11) That, since a COM.INT evaluating and disseminating unit gf ONI is alread:f in operation at CSAW., this central 

unit be located at CSAW. 

Roreoyer, if the recommendations or the subject memorand'l:Il!l were accepted by USCIB, they might lead to & further 

recommemdat1on tbs.t full responsibility for COM.INT processing., ev&lus.t1on and dissemination be g1Yen to CIA. 

3. Without reference to the possible effect or the eubject memoran4um on USCIB., the recommendations of that memorandum 

appear to be objecti&nable to the Department ot the ArT!!1 and 

th• national 11111tary Eatabliehment on the following grounds: 

a. A single department within th• Natienal K111ta17 

Bstabl13hm&et would have operst1onal CQnt~ol of all COJUNT 

evaluation and dissemination at the Washington level; and 

ultimate c@ntrol woald be in the hasds of a bC>B.rd which includes 

non-military members and 1s reepon81bl• ta the Rational security Couno11. 

b. Th• recommendations 1tete that p8r3Qnnel of the 

central evaluating and disseminating unit would be responsible for produ~1ng 1ntell1genoe of pr~n.a.ry interest to their reapeetive departments. Wo prov1s10n 1s made 1 however., for d1reet1on or 

control by thess dspartmenta of the production and d1sseminat1 a 

of euch intelligence. 

c. The recGmmendat1ons state that personnel of the 

central unit would be responsible ror produaing total 1mt•ll1g•nce for the nat1enal security Council. The total 1ntell1genoe requirements or the Joint Chiefs of Starr are oat ment10ned and, 

under the organj~ation as reaommende~the Joint Chiefs would 

have no means of directing a~d centrolling th~ production and 

dis8em1nat1on of such 1ntell1geDce. 

d. The recommendations are made on the ae1umption 

that tv9 (or 1 eventually, three) cryptanalytic processing agese1es v1ll continue in existeJil,ce. ID this case., the location ot the 

central unit gt 0n• or the t•chnie&l agencies v0uld only partially satisfy the requirements ~or ma..xtmwa exploitation or COMINT aa 

6b1~• 
( t 11t 'v · BEF ID: A7¥767 

' 

outlined in the staff study. Moreover, the reasons which 

lead te t..~e c0~olusions on which the recommendations are baaed 

lead alao ta the conclusion that a unified Armed Forces Security ,Asenoy ah0uld be established. 

4. Assuming that a unified .Armed Forces Security Agencr is •~tablished, the reoommendat1ons made 1n the oubjeot memorandum 

could be applied within the Nations.l Military Eetab11shment, 

aa follows: 

a. A central COMINT evaluating and disseminating unit 

could be established at the Armed Porces Security .Agency, composed er personnel cont~ibuted by the Army, Navy, and Air 

!Poree, and operationally subordinate to the Chief, AFSA~ho, 

in turn~ W©Ul4 be subordinate to the Joint Ohiers of Staff). 

b. The personnel contributed to tho center by the 

three services could have the dual res;tions1b111ty of producing intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Sta.ff and intelligence of 

primary interest to thetr respective eervio~~. Such an arrangement would provide the Natioael Military Establishment and the 

Joint Chiefe or Starr with that p0rt1on of total intelligence baaed on CQKINT which has been allocated to th• National Military Satab11ehm•nt under the NIS. It would not ~~ovid~ the means for 

1nt•grat1ng those rields of intelligence which are currentl7 

allocated to the State .Department and CIA with tne intelligence produce4 by the A.FSA unit. However, upon the establiehment of 

a central C@JIIlfT evaluating and d1es•minst1ng unit within the 

JS&tioaal Military Establ1ahment, the State Department and CIA 

oould be invited to contribute personnel to the central unit. 

The fuJ l advantages outlined in the staff study attached to the 

subject meaorand'Wi weuld thus be aeh~eved w1tho~t the danger or 

loes 0f optt,rat1onal oostrol by the Be.t1onal Military F.f!ta.blisbmen'. 

s. It is recemmeaded that: 

a. The subject me~orandum not be submitted to the 

Chairmas, USCIB. 

. ' 

3 
::>UBJJWfi •x'ww Bxplo1t.At1on of CoimuB1cat1oo Intell1geooe 

within the 1'at1o:aal Military Dat&bl1slaent. 

1. The Intellige.nce a.genctes or tae three service 

d•p&rt.elnt. are presently en~ed in the production or 1ntell1-

ge-nce baaed on COMI1'T in their reispect1ve f1elC!ls or prtm&ry 

inter.•t and in ths s.sveral field.a 1n v1h1ch all ••rvioss have 

a CO!BOft 1.At.rest. Oeder th1a arre.ngement, t~ Joint Chi•!• 

of sta.rr and the Beoret&r,- of N&t1ooa.l nerenatt are not provided 

with total intelligence deriv&bl• from COHINT. 

2. A at~ ha.a been prepQred by ID, G8U5.A, which exam1nea pre~ent COJlI1fT exploitation and dt.e .. 1nat1on by tho three 

eervio•• ror the purpose of determining a method wh1eh v111 

ineure t'ul.l. axplo1t&t1on of th1s source vitb 1111&X1-tlll efficiency, 

securit7, t1-elinssa, and economy, and vh1ch will prev1de ea.ch 

depgrtaont with &11 essential COKDiT required fop tta ovn needs. 

The studJ ~on.atre.tam the close relatlonship between the 

produotion and the evaluation or COJUXT and conclude• taat ~1.mua e::Q)loit&tion of COM.IliT requ1~a changes in pre8snt 

a.rrans-menta vi thin thfl NMR, not only .ror evaluating aad d1asem1-

n&t1ng, but also for ceyptanalyt1c processing ot CONIKT. One 

of the rec~ndat1ona 11&de 1n this atudy is that a UPl11'1ed 

Armed. Pora•• Security Agencry be establiahed. Thia h&B been 

recommen<Wd bJ" the .Department of the krPq in the StudJ" or Joint '~TN.Tlisation.a for the Production of Cotm!UI11cat1on Irit6111 nee, 

C , prep&re or CM ry O e-nse. 

reasons laAJ11ng to th1e recrnmaend&t1on in the attached. stA!'t 

atudy are in addition to thoae given in the study or 30 Deo 48, 

which col191d.el"ed the COJllI!tT problem only through the stage or 

ory.:pta.n.&lytio proces31ng. The full recoamei:idation• or the staff 

atuety a.re &a follows: 

a. That a. un1f1&<1 Armed Force3 ~cur1t,- Agsncy b4t 

established. 

b. Th&t a csntrsl COtlliliT evaluating unit be s~t up 

gt ths .AF".:l.A. 

a Th.st this unit be r~sponntble for tbe production 

of intell1genoe ba$ed on COM.INT and for the publication amd 

dlasem.1.na.ticm of euch intelligence .ror the NME. 
IUi" StCR£lE:F6~lA71~7 • 

(§.. ftl.at each er the tuee eierv1c1e1 contr1bate 

per1eoeqe,l &e"' tla1a 0entel", such persamnrel to be operat1osall'y alllb~r~tnt'• t'o the Chief, AF'BA, and to hav1

e th• dual re1p0a11-

b111ty 0~r pr1od11!1c1ng intoll1genc• for th• JCS and 1ntell1genoe 

of pr1maey interest to their respective eerv1c1es. 

3. It' thes,e peoommend&tions were adopted, the COJIIX'11 

r 1ect;1!11.remeuts 0;f the s1e1rvtc1ea s.md et the JC:i eoul.d be met. Th• 

further at•P ~r 1nt~grat1ng pol1t1oal and economio with military 

1ntell1;sne•' eoal,d then be achieved by inviting th• rsme.1ning member~ 0,f \l;lie Wai t'ed au tes ColUll\lF.lica ti on In tellig~nce Boa.rd 

State ~;rt1umt and CIA -- to co,ntr1bute peraomnel to the 

central eva~~ting unit at AFSA. 

4. It is recommended that thie staff etudy be forwarded 

te the S.cret&ry of Defense for oon31derat1on in conjunction vith the Btudy of Joint Ongan1~at1ons for the Production of 

Comn:nan1cat1on Intelligence. 

2 
REF ID:A71l.e7 ' , 

MAXIMUll EXPIJ)ITA!IOM OF CO~T WITHIN THR NATIONAL MILITARY 

EST ABLI8RKgMT 

l.. The lToblem: To o.x&mine :pressnt COMI}(T e,XJJlo1tat1on 

and ~1asemlllitlon within the llfKE in order to deter-mine a method 

which vil.l. pro~1de full ex:plo1t&t1on of th1a source with the 

maximum eff1cienay, s&curity, tiltel1n9ee, and sconort.y. 

2. l'Uc t• Bea.ring on the Problem: 

&.. The mm annually expends s.pp~ximately $35,000,000 

ror the teobrlice.l production or COMW1r raw material. It hits 

roughly a $48,000,000 plant investment in the fae111t1es of A5A 

e.nc1 CSA\l. The establisbm.ent or a third techn1e&l a.gene,- by the 

Air Force is 111tl111nsnt 

b. Each or the depart.aente of the mm ae.1nt&1n11 a 

COM.INT •"Ya.luat1ng a.nd di~seminating untt. For the moat pert, 

the wortc or theee three unite is not cool"d1nated e.nd, to date, 

there ha.8 not been produc&d an int8grated, comprehen31ve, COM.DfT 

est1m&te coTer1ng any given eubject from the point of vi&w or 

total JCS intellj gence nquiremsnta. Under the preacnt arrangement1 tber. 1ti no provision !or the timely application or total 

COM.INT to tb9 1ntsll1genoe requirement& of th• JCS or the policy ~lannel"S or the thr$e eerv1aea. 

::5. Diaoua:11ofl EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

a. '!'he unique and Yital nature of COMDrT and the coat 

of COJU.WT pr-eduction dictate tbAt &rrengsmenta be eetabl1shed 

which 1..D.a\11'9 -.aximum exploitation of th18 isource. '!'he present arran&iementa ror the evaluation and d1asem1n.&tion of CO.MDrl' 

v1th1n tbe !OCR preclude eueh exploitation. Th8y are not 

effioant, not secure, snd not economical, and. moreover 1 tl"le"1 

fail to i.naUl"'e ti!Ml.7 d1esem1nat1on of 1ntell1s-aoe. 

(1) 11!'!1c1eno1: The three COMilfI' evaluation Wl1ta 

produce and diesemrn&te a n\.aber of publ1cat1ene covering f1•lda 

or pri.m&.rJ illtereat to th•ir reapect1v9 serv1cee--e.g., the 

.MILITARl' IltGUT ( .Arm7); the SOVI:irf DfHLLIGDCR SUMMARY ( N& vy ); 

ORiitR 0'8 BAftlB (Army, Wavy, Air); and special atlldiee (all ••r~1a••). Tbaae plibl1oati~na cont&1n e~&ll:l&t.d COMIJi~ on 

"l&r1ows aubjeota. Ooca.a1onally, the aame raw •teri&l- -evaluate<!. 
-------·---

.REF ID:A71~7 

'" 

from the p01Dt, of v1e·w .of the service invol ve-d--1s used as the 

basis for repo.~,.s from two or more of the units. To date, there 

has not b9'q.pre,~uced. s.n 1ntegPS.ted. COMIN'f estime.te covering 

any give:n {ifl!ll:>.J.eet from the point of view of total 1ntell1 ence 

Nor, under the present 

cau .. a com ne est mate be produced with suffioient 

spe-&Hl such an undertaking practicable. Policy level 

!"ec1p1ents of' COM.INT receive a variety af' GLINT report.a, which 

may d.upl1cate, or eonflict with, oae another, and. which, the 

recipients the:mselv·es must synthesize. In addition to its separa.~1,o.n :from other COMIB'l' units, ea.ch e:f the three evaluating uni ts tUDctions m.o:re or less apart from the general intelligence 

units within itB· service and, of course, :from the g~n·eral 

1ntell1genee units e·f the other services. Suoh arrangements, 

although necessary .for COMINT security under present con41t1one, 

inhibit rapid., direct application of collateral intelligence to 

COMIJr.f and militate a.gain.st the timely pr0d.uct1an of total 

1atell1gence on a given subjeet both within and among the services. 

(2} 'l'1-f311ness: Clearly, the va.lu• of all intelligence 4eP&n4.a to a large extent on its timeliness. This is 

par·t1cularly t.l'ue in the case of COMINT. A message indicating 1.spending atta.ek disseminated after the fact is of academic 

1nt&rest only. lJnder the present arrangements, however, the 

1n.ev1table time-lag resulting from the separation of the three 

evaluating units rrom ea.eh other, and or each .Gf them. from on$ 

or both of the teehn1cal agencies, effectively reduces the 

cha.noes of receiving such a message before it 1s teo late to a.ct. 

(It is assumed &s a stron.g· probability that no single messag6J · will contain positiv·e, self-evident indication of hostile intent--

without evaluation 011 the basis of other in.formation available 

at one or all of the intelligence units.) In e.dd1tien, the 

separation of evaluat1.ng an.d technical units makes impossible 

the timely preparation ot basic COMINT studies on subjects ~£ 

joint interest and the maintenance of such studies at a current 

date leYel. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

(.3) 8e·eurity: The distribution of COMIN'l' ra/L86-

36150 USC 3605 

material to the 1nte111gen.ee unite of the services and to the 

COMift unit.a of' State Department and CIA presents a.n obvious 

physieal aecuri ty bazaPd. 'fhe separa. tio·n of these wii ts from ·· the tee!mical a.gene iea requires the publication of 1nc41 vidual 

message texts. neta.t•·d ao as to rew·eal the c17ptographic system. in whieh the7 vepe sent and the rad10 e1reu1ts from which they 

were int•r<:epte·d--a praetice which rev·e.als the core of us CO.MIBT 

operations: spe·e1f1e status of e -tan.al tic attack. 

2 
( 4 ) :le 13BO!.{: The •xis t•1Itoe 0f three €@EH 

•valuating unitis withi?ill!e JOIE re11liltts 1R e21c1esei\11e fXfe·Iil~1\llri'S 

.for personnel ana •(!lU11iiB•nt s.m,.d oe>m,sidrs.ra.bl• d\;m_p,licatia.n ef 

effort. D.tss1pat1&D or th• limited. ava1labl•. ~ua.litiad maapewer 

a.dvsrsely &ff&Gts the fl.U&l1ty &Jnia <1.ue.ntity of C©MDfT prod·l!lc1e4. 

In add.1t1oa. tho existence ot e,evaral, separate ev1alut:1ag units creates the need for publishing mar.iy copiea of the ©©MINT 

raw material, for an sxten.sive courier service. fer se'v1era.1 

file5 of th• sa.mtt material. and f0r the ~ubl1ca.t10n b¥ the 

technical agencies of many items which c©ulcd have be•1111 discarded 

at the first 1tage of proc$asimg if an evaluatimg graUll> had been 

closs at hand to guids th.a work of the teichnicia.ns. 

b. The establishment of a unified Armed Farces 

S•curity Agenay (as recommended b1 th!! D91parment af the Army 

in ths ~tudy of Joint Organizations fo~ the Pre~uct10n of 

Communication Intelligencs. dated JO Dio 48), and of a :single COJilfifT evaluating ani disaem1nat1ng UBit at that ~gemoy, would 

sliminate the disadvantages d&scribea above and wol:ll4 permit 

maximtml exploitation or CO!UNT with1m ths :ntE. 

(l) Efficiency: 

(s) such an arrangement W©ula provi~e, at 

the very least. the ph;rsical con~itions necessary for collaboration 

among ths 00.MIWT evaluating personnel of the MME. 

(b) Ba~ic COMINT evaluation would be improved, 

for the following res5on!: 

(i) The raw material woul.a be evaluated 

at its source--an optimum condition for accurate intelligence 

production. 

(11) Integration of other source intelligence with COM.INT would be facilitated. The technical agency, for cryptanalytic purposes, must maintain central files of 

intelligenc9 reports frgm all sources. The ~1ngle evaluating unit, through the c0llateral files of the technical agency, would havEt direct access to the material from other intelligence 

sources now separately held by each of the three eer~ices. 

(111) Exploitation of COMINT in the fields 

of primary interest to each of the services would be improved 

by the proximity of evaluators to translators and traffic an~lyst3. 

(c) COitINT operations ae a whole would be im~roved. Ths qu1c~ and unimpeded exchB.nge of nev ideas, new 

develo.flllents, and new intelligence or technical requirements 

would greatly increase the efficiency of both technieal and 

evaluating personnel. 
REF ID:A71767 

( GUf-

(4) F1.B1•be4 SLiln' imtel.11.paee voul.d be 

&'W&il.&1>2- I• •"1a•eminat1as te policy leYel re-e~ienta 1o & 

farm ~ to ... t tbeil" meec1s--1.e., they woul.~ no•1•• 

tf>tal ta a si'tlen awj•at, in one 11nthe11s•ii n~rt. 

{i) 'l'iJHlin.•• i 

(a) The ~&x.U&1t1 or evaltS&ting personnel to 

teatmi-dl ..... Imel WOU«l permit <liaoarding et UOill]lOrt&tlt 

mat.rial. .&.i \M earl1eat stage• or eryptanalJ'•1• uid., in ao 

redumia• ~ .aaa of M.ter1al fully ~r0c••••d, woUld expedite the P~••.,•tac at vlt&l aater1&l. 

(b) Bu1e 1IJtell1g&r.ice attl<!1es or joint 

1mt.rMt too $.ll oon•um•r• could be expeditiously initiated and 

eurre-a tl1 -.1.n t.alned. 

(o) :111.ainatifiH<l of the publ1eat1on and deliv•~ td ~ eop1em or COKI.tff' raw material wauld aubstant1all.y reduc• thlt ti.IM-lag 'bf)tween JDeeeage solution and evaluation. 

(~) ~curltyi 

(a) The d1man1nat1on or COMIJtT raw satertal 

outa1d:e tN U':iA would be r.duced to a a1n1mUll. 

(b) .Mnowl•dge ot thfi degree of specific Cr:JP~io au.ccea~ could aore easily be 11.IiBited to working 

pera(!;n»el with the need to know, and.,, 1n th& caee er evaluating persocoel el the MME, confined to one installation. 

( ~) Economy s 

(a} D1acard. at unil'l~ortant material ~t 

&&rli••t ·~ of Cryl)t&nalytie processing ~ould reduce the 

total oo•~ ot intell1.,semoe produced in rel&t1oneh1p to total 

1111t•r1.&l. ,..... .. aed. 

(b) Publication oostm would be m&ter1al~ 

(c) DJ.plic&tion of intelligence file•, with 

1 ta att.odaat \uu1eonoa1cal ua• of 11Wl1 t.d ape.ott and. pel"aonnsl,, 

and ~•eaa.ry duplication or effort &t th• technical and 

evalua\!on l•v•a. woulc1 0. •1111.ine. tec1. 

4. OOMlmiona-1 

a. A unified Al'med Forcem 8ecur1 ty Ag~ncy 3hoUld. be 

•• t&bli•bed~ 

I 

<;A I ; ' 1 
b. A central COMDIT uait ahould be eatabl1shed at 

the .AP3.A1 with the reapona1b111ty to~ producing 1ntell1gonoe based on COMillT anc1 <11.seemin&ting sueh intsll1gsnce ror the mm. 

c. Ea.ch of the thre-a aerv1coa should contribute 

pereonnel to this center. Such personnel, Wlder the direction 

ot the CbJAt _. A.FSA, shoulc1 perform the dual function or producing 

1ntelliaenoe tor the JCS and intelligence ot p.r1aa17 1ntereet 

to their roapcctive services. 

AFS.A. 

s. Becceaendationru It 1a recOl8Soded that: 

a, A un1t1ed ~d Forces security Ageno~ be established. 

b. A central COIUlf'1' •valuating unit be set up at the 

o. 'l'hia unit be reepons1ble tor the production of 

1ntelligenoe baaed on COM.INT and tor th$ publ1e&t1on and 

d1aaem1.nat1on ot BUCh intelligence for the 1'lm. 

d. F.aoh of the threo aerv1e•• eontr1bu~ personnel 

to thia oent.!'1 such personnel to be operationally subordinate 

to the Chie:t, APSA. and to have the dual napona1b111ty ot 

prodUQ1ng intelligence :ror the JCS s.nd intelligence or pri.m&r;J 

tntereat to tlwir respective ••~vices. 

5 
REF ID:A71767 

SUBJICT t lnabliahaut. of a 'in&l• C.-ini~•tion It1tell1,eoo• lvalu.ath11'l 

aad n1 .... iM\il!>C Center 

l. '.th•r. •• reeetttq 1ulM..t tted to y0t1 " dn.ft of a prepoiJed Conaw11dat1~11 Dire~t iY• ha.vi.TIC •• it• aim the integJ"a.titH\ of' a.11 Gryptologie 

actiY\ti•• er the !raed 1erG••, ln~ludin~ ib~•• e~"lI!eoted Ytth th• aecurity 

of 011r oltB a~oatit>'na •• well aa tooae deYot•d ts th«' 1nte:roept1ea 

a.Id grypt.analytle pre~sain1 of for•t«R eos•un1<~tio~e If th.at rlir~ctiTI 

ia kd.i:>ptftd, it is bel1ne4 th.at a. grut step forward will '!&Tl been taken 

i:c th• ov1ral.l •fri~ienoy e! tboae aat1Yiti••· 

2. 'Tha pr•M!\t aefQO?'a.OOUJI ti-.s.la wit'! a phaH of coaAUnicntion intellil•M• activiti•• oot ecY•red 111 the •b&T•-••ntii.'.>oed d.ir.ctin a.nd perb.ap• 

of ~na..l. iapor\~n~• •1th imt9.1rati0n or in~•l"eeption and crypta!l-'l]'tio 

proee .. ina: e! fGreip e~ii>e.tiei:111. It is obTiona that •xilrula beoefit 

!'rr:;e all the tJffort a.rid .fund a devt>ted to tneH tlfO exp-u1liive oper...t iona 

w-1ll ~ G>bh .. iI>H only i! thfl"• is lMxiJNa e!t'lcieoey 1.n tbe exploitation 

of the frui\1 thereef. The exploit.ttt~A inv~lv•n, •• preliclna.ry ateps, 

th• •T&l~:tfo», pubUo-tloB, aoo diaeai'tttion !.)!' the rewlt.1 of orypt-

&'l&J.rt.ic proou•i?il(. 11 1\)U ar• no doubt .. 11 lll'lftl.r"-9, th• lnttsr t.hrH 

s\99s ha.Ye for a lon( ti&• b••n r.,..rded 1trlctl,r A• 1nt.lli~ona• ~ctiv1t1•• 

sbl8h tlUltt. he oon<iucted wit"'tln a.nd tmdl!T the r'irect supe!"'1"ision of the 

IAtelli1eose orrani5ati~n.a of t~~ r••?•ctl .... .:>ervlce•, ~ th.eal• •itb -~~b 

1 Ul a•n~rall.r i~ ~...unt. Ro..,.Yer, the.a• r~i.11~~·~0• or1anisatj0na now 

f•u1cti~n ih:iep•"X!ently, w!tb ••;~r•ts ataff• ~nd plant !aoiliti••, and therefti", altb.O\lfh they ..r• pr\Wlcittd •it.b or har• aQeeu t-o ti.ll the d.4u which 

n oall OC*IIIT rur u.t.xlal (th4t ia, t~• firllLl trtnclat.ic:ms er at<Jh•ttd 

..... ie• reaultinc f'rw. arypU.M.lytic p~a• .. Ln&:). th., eYal1.1ation, publle&tion, and di••elll~at1oo operation• ar. nondu.cted 1ndspend•ot.1J' &llld 

Hpt~atel,y 07 thoae orp.Dlutie:u Yher~ is z09e 1-iaitlod coorditiation, 

\t ia true, btlt ta.t.t canno'\ be•• •ffici•nt &•unified dir•ctio~ ln fAet, 

the pre•ent dtWtti<Mt a.ot. C!!rUy reanl ta i.n \IUUileoeaary Cul'ilc.ation in oert.ain 

t,..,,.a e! .tudiea, ~1th ec~a•i~D«Ll inconai•t$~cl•• in !imial r•.olta, but al99 

ditpUHa t.he U. s. effort .a \hat oerta.in tn,.• o! etu.diH Qo&:nn.ot M •&de 

WG&U.H of lau or pe.r~l and :!'e.oili t iea. 

,). a. Another ol....,"at. im t.h• Itiotun a"m" to eMtpliG&t• the ai t•-

\i&z. th• re•pe<.:tive ln~all1,enoe orr~nisati~ns or tBe Ana~ Foro•• suit 

aeoeaaar11T b&Y• ~le .. relatio·u with thC' Pf'1);U'ta.et of St.&te and tbie 

Ceat.ral latellii~ igenoy. Th• ildt.d 1'\.at•t CGMUnnicratian Intellii'en&e 
REF ID:A71767 

~ ~li(l I\ J 11 I 

I I • 

'-11 J 

iff.rd {f:JaCI8), a.n 4.ll'p.misatieira ud~ ~- jlB'U«J.ct.iA)a 'tJ£ ~ kt.ie-1 

iffvit.r Cwuil, •• ••ltliabH. lt.T "th •SS 1• ita tu.reotin IG. ' 

(IIMl&tur• l, ~· l), "tG att'M~ \b• e.lit\heJ"i"Mtin eeerG.iMtiea ~ 

C...unicatiQ .. hit•lli.g•ac• a.a"tiTi tiff Gt t.be 0Gttl'M.*n\ u6\ te ~i .. 

w .Oireet.0J" of Ce"1'&l I~t.elllpaoe 1• t~ae nt\wa 111 tlae !iel4 of 

Cenaa.ieati.one Int•l.lli~ f&r wllliak Ml la r•llf.>euai'blei¥. Th• 183 

IHreatiY• lo. 9 (:rar. 2) ale fixed t.h• Cel\Poaltioa 0r tl!• IMN. te 

••n•i.t "o! M>t te .aMd. \n aea!tn• h<>il ea.eh o! \lile !tJlle11'1.ng hf>&n• 

•eta or .\&.w9ieat The D9p.a.rtante ~ at.ai., th• !l"rq, tlil.e 1&.,,., and 

\.b4 Air fora•, alld tise Ccnt..l'a.l Iatellitueie A«•mey•. CO&lSBMmt. •1 tla tlae 

d.tistition of 11Ce&D:Ulloat1ou Intell1p'Q.0e a.et.1Y'iti••", i1Ytil 1n Par. Uc 

ot •sc D1r•ct1vc So. 9, the O$erdina.\i1Hl iaeotio~ttd abeTe 1~alu4os ~aai 

of ~'1nati1:1g the rtaluatin., ~lle.dtoo, and diae-.i~t.ian et 

oCllUltlllio•:t.io.a iat•l.ll.&aJJOe. la• Pu. 4 ~ \be JI£ DlreG1~iY• •\•t.ea t.ilA\ 11 ~1a101ta o! tb$ Beard will h• base& 011 th• prin.oipl• or uu.ni.lai\'rg a.md 

Par. 10 of the Lir~c:tive •-\a.tu thet "The Je&r<l shall lMTe the i.mternl. 

adltiniatntiou a.nd op.en.tiG>n or Ceiritt\U'do&tio•!a-9 Iatelllpm.ce a.e\iYiti•a 

to tha SMber uepart1uat• '11' J.a•ne.i•a"'. lano•, A• la ilillHreat in tile 

M.tu:re d a Soard sueli a.a tbe !ere,oln1i, wltlrah ha& elll,y 0eordi..ao.ti.QC 

flanctiGma, no authffi\1 to iaplMMt. U1 deeiaii)n1, am la <llM;l&1ed &!' 

a .. b-.ra re~ouibl• to aept11..ra.ta •g11na1•• se.~ti••• Mvi~ eo!!lflletlmg 

a~, id•a, soo opinions, 1ts e.ff is~ey, .!I•!i 1» t?tt gt~tt 2! ~rn.or41oa­

.i!!at ia queaticnahle. 

b The &GOi:.WbWViai IMloaure 2 11 a. 1tudy du.lilai s~eeiti.eall.T 

and •olcl,y with th• pr ... ;it a1 tua.\i(!)n •• r•1ard• enlua.tiea, fl!il>lic•tiQn., 

•oo c1a1a.inatioa ~ co;imu:rlcs.t1o.'1 intellia•.nJCe, a!.~1ac a. \l\dt• euscim.ot 

pieture or th& da!ects therei~ And. preaenti~ cert.ain r4'<:0WieDllati~o.a f 0r 

lt• aprov•eut.. 

c. B&aed upolil t.h• r~e.ndationtt •bwd194 in lmlo'lllre 2, a 

propc9ed Cons-0lidati~~ Dir•ot1Ye baa ~n iira.r~ed fer TO'fAr ~oa1iderat1en, 

and i• proHnted herewith &a Iiac.loftr• J. 4 few worde £1! expl&.aa.tioa et 

cert.a.in !•at..trH thereor NJ' ti• 1a o.rdw., 

4. a. 1' irat of all, the ol.a.saitioat1o:ia 11n.n th• proposed Direetin 

ia ~Hite.ted by the cl ... r iaplioa.\iQ.O that we a.re aow deriY1ng 1.at.•lli· 

l•DC• tree. f&r•icn ccaaruniea.tion.., a !aet •hich 11Uat be kept Quite nil 

hiddea to preTant so\111t~.aaures t~at sigbt clry up thi1 type et 1atell1- rer~• at. its tJOUrc••· The d&uii ice.ti.om 101 ~ICRIT GUIT has tbuat~re 

bffn ap;;ll.d tc th& l:'irfftlvs in &caoordanae nth C11trrtm:t applloabla rep• 

latione. 

h. Arlain( ~ the n9C<eaeity of affordi~I aapla ..-curit1 ~ret9C!l• 

t.ia>a. to the •atiT1t.iN eaver9d l:7y' the prepoeed Dlr~tiTe, but beea.1J. .. .-. 

• 
REF ID:A71767 

lt111f1I [ 1 J r rr l ...,,, l 

\. I I I " i ~ I 

uu .aut lM PY•lil ts the c.tmt•plaffci e.eimtralla.ecl 0/!iGe far fl'llrt"M• 

et '.l'ef.-9Me all'A d.••i&Jl'&\iea ia 9$l'T••~iaea, ete. 1 \he ra\bar iimoe~• 

4Nl&MU~a .1.nliKW h Pa. l~ tlHHaf iA na•s\ed. !lae, f'>r r•aeme 

pr•,..ntlJ" \e S.. 1iv.A, t~• pratate:r,y q\l&lif.Tia1 adjeetiY• •tta12•£>)!;\1.~ 

ra.t.ls.u tbl.~ "Arud. PorsH" ha.• H<b 4Nllf'hy..t. 

e. 1itfd"err-imc t..o t&r. ta., it 1• 0bvi~u. tut • D1r•etlY• et&n-1 

ay th.a aecnt.ar.r et 'Vetn.a• e&n?M\ be ltiadim.a apon Orfi1.Dia11.ti0ne •Ut•id.e 

tu WI, a."1 lh•r•fer• the 'WCFdliq llfue c.0N.1a.llJ' invited te partieil>•t.•,. 

ia Mf).Q1M in ibe prea~t baet 1n ~ernn.c to :partisif)&titm bT the 

De~t f4 ft.at.• uti the C•iatru Intel.liieaoe 'c•M7. ht it i• aig14s\eicd that llJi.lil'Ul.4 ~E-.liai11&ry ae&atiationa Yith th• $ec:t'".tary of 8t4te 

ani '\M 1"..lP-.stw ot t.ll• G•iGtr.l Im:t.ell1cenoe A1~ ~ suo.c•uf'41 in ealnimc 

t1leil!' ueep-tuoe er tla.t t&..ia llP-3!1 whic'la the pr090ffd lH.x-.etiye i• bit.Md, 

t.h• qt.Ult-4 f>moan Nw.d. be r•plac-1 aiap.l.J' ~ the nrcb •wUl participate• 

C "llllJ" pariieipate"; 4.Uot the Utredl.\Cto17 C.l.&Uff r!Jf P'ar. 8't), MI! the 

fur•piuc 1.iitYit.at.io 1• &eM;>t.~•, n;.tld 1M deletod. 

cl. R•f•rrimc ta Par. 9&. it i• <lM5niecl ••••ntial to loeate th• 

octSltNfla.ted oentr&l rn.ludi0a&, J;'el!>llCJilltioa, ud ~u.11111111.Jutien cff ie• 

at a or,y~io prcjxse•imc o•ater u t)le WAabl..ni"ben are bttea.ue ot tll• 

bett« tMhm1cal •tf'lei•CJ tlutt •Ul UctN• t.e> beth eatepr1•a er DP•ft- ti•~· innlYed.. Tai• peia\ i• •"11&.itled JJa 1'~. Jh 01' In.eloirure 2. 

•· B.e.f.rri.Jlc t-0 Par. 9b, it i• 4eu..& adYiaable te aa.ke it elur 

tut the eetral diee•inat.i.oa af.fio• au1t be nal\y to 11eet a.a aeraenq 

f!1aHaina:t1on lituatiG1n at aey :eaent, ud in order te b• in • poattion to 

do ae th• ..ana a.Bi ta.~ill1.ie! 1.b.ero-ter will ha.Te te he prsYided for 1:m 

OOdr•tar.Y arn.ac••nt•. 

f. .a.!'er:ri~ to Par. lla, it te deea•d ••21•nt.ial to th• security 

of our a~isatien ilatellic-no-• &etiTities, techniouea, 4~ opftretions 

theaaelYea to ellai.ee.te at the .rli•.t. po-asible •011utJ;lt tf14 pr•••nt rat.he?' 

wide distributio.n o! the terls o! 901Yed ttM tranela.tod ae••J••, no• un-

&Teidablo beea.uae the ourrentl.r da.oe....,_tre.lia-ud operatiGns of eYa.ltut.tio11, 

,ublio~tio~~ and di .. eeirut.tion aa..rte it n.e.c:e294ry to d18tr1bute copies ot 

tranalat.ed texts to t..ht fiv• orp.niza1.1ol.l.8 aepa:rately •.na•t:ed in ooaduet1.ag 

tho•• op~ationa. It is r~lii&d that im,p-o11t1o~ at a prohibition a,a136t 

:re>'t!ltiu ilseaiu.t.ifi)a, a. aaasnr• •hic.b is necGapry for ••eurit,y r..s.aon.a, 

aq »Ht 11ith et.renttOUa obJ~tiona troa the I\ep.nrtaont of State and fro. 

-the C.ntra.l. Il'ltAllii•Ae1 A1enc:y ab.ould the" two ore-anizationa 0. unwillltll 

1.Q Rbaerleo tG the pro?OMd DireotiT9, but. at the MD• ti••• f1.raoeu an4 

in•latu.o• e.n thia peiat b7' tl:u• Armed. forces, which ar• the produo.ers of 

the b&aio uterial, u.r haY• th• lieainKi p•r!N&si'ts artect on tho" t'W9 

orpnis.at.1.on.t te je.im with. u h eet&hllehl:tg the 11iagla eeatral ot"f ioe 

3 
REF ID:A71767 

.. 

!onriDC the subject o! tbi• paper, to the ultl8at.e aennt.ace of ill 

the a_aeneiea inTolved. 5lcu.ld thb C-Ota• t.G pa•• th• djeetiTe "Ceaa9lita.U4", 

would be ,..nieularl;r applicable ae part of tM uai(D&titNa o! t.b.e eentralised of.ti••· 

I• It •ill 'M notttd t.hflt t.h• DlrntiT• P'f'OT14ea t.lu.t tl'ie chief 

or the c•ntnl diu .. 1Illlltion aTZd ev1.l.1.u1.tiina ai•:ae1 1• tWt;x,rdiM'\M t.e the 

Direotor, ArMd 1 oroea "1eeur1. ty A.c•UT. Thi• h ~a-as id.red taunt 1tj. it 

the 001u1olidt.ted &1•001 i. aituated a\ the cJ7l)U.-1ytJ.e ee.ater, Al"IUCI 

1 ore ea Se.curl tr Age'ley. To de otharWiM WG"Uld Ti~lat• a twd.aaeatal 

principle l!Jt aOlnl....00. U, howaTer. thi• 4ltmeelid&t.¥i a.c•ncy ie loeat9d. 

ic the Pe.ntq"om &r al.Mwbfl'e, Pan.~ha 2a a.34 2~ of tn. DiractiT• aipt. 

r-4 ~• followa s 

J rooi. 

'' 2. a. Tb• of!iee oL th* COifSIDO •eTYirJC the lq, lVa will 

a.pc-ate undv UM aauanl -.perrieior; of the Direet.o:r, Joint 

Cniefa of St.art ~nd will N deaigut~ a.a COJGI.DO-WAS'CHJJ'fOJi. 

b. T'M Chie!, Joil"t b.tellipnee 'J.vow.p, U!lder ta• 

den•ral di~ion of ~he Joint Intellig•lle• Ceeaitt•• will 

Hrte alee •• Chie.t', COISI00-1U.SHIJfOi'ON, and for tbe purpeao 

o! .... htin.r hiJl 1.a •xsaut1S,i his !unetio?UJ l!ll t~ latt.er 

eapacit;r he •ill i,e.ve a '4.ej'uty !'re. oaeh of t.he S..rTlc•• °'' he.r the tho one to wbioh he belnga. 11 

~I I J 

\ 

' I 

' l 

I I 

4 

CJ.MB W. CU.RD 

Cele10Wl, Si111&l Cerpa 

Chief, Ano- s~w.-Uy !.gney 

> I J - J 

' ' j I • I • j 
REF ID: A71 76,7 

- • , ..... ! r-~ :~1 1 1~'- -- ·1 I :J j , • 

J ~ . ',--' 

j 

OFFICI 07 TB S!C.D'l'.AIY 01 D!F!llSJ: 

Waahingtom 

{Date) 

Coa•olldatiea Direc:tiT• lo. _ 

IDOR.UDtDI :rol\1 -------

SUBJE:ra :Sstabliahaeat er a Cenaolidated Special Infermation 

Diaeai:natiea ot'.fiee, •_I. 

..._ 

l. a. In erder t-e iaprOYe e1'.fieiene7 and eoo&e117 in the en.luatien, 

publieation, ana 4i888ainatien of Ct!lllllltnica.tiom intelligence, and with & 

view te 1ivi.Jag better aecurity proteetiom t.ct th• source• of w.eh intalligemce, a aiql• een•e>lld.a.ted. offiee f0r the nalYS.atien, publication, and 

diaaeabe.tien er all intelllge11ee based upea COll.Ilr raw naterial* resulting fl"Qa the eperatiCDIUJ et the Armed P'orcea Seeuri t7 Agene7 will be 

esta0llahed at the leadquartera Gf the lat.ienal lilita.17 lstabllahaelilt ia 

laahizigten. Siailar oftieea U3' be eatabllahed 111 Oversee.a Tb.eater• at 

the l ... q~ers ot am;y Joimt Ce1UD.&:rad at er within wbieb COllI!ll' raw material 

ia preaeed leealq bl the uaed Fereea Securit7 .A&enq branch E>f'fiee within ea.id. 'l'heater er tleillt c.aam. 

b. ler f)Urpe••• or ceYer, a cemeol16lated office perton.ing tlM 

abeYe-ae.at.ieiaed fltnetiom• will be designated ae a QQ!soli~tedJpecial 

jaferaatioa~isaeminatien2rr1ce, abbreTiate4 aa COISIDO. 

2. a. The et.f'ice of' the OOISIDO servini the lq, •1 will mperat..e 

uder th.• general n.p·effiaion an4. operational aom.trel or the Director, 

.Al'lleci lereea S9eurity .AgenCT od will be d.e-llipated a• CONSID0-1'.ASIIJJGTOJi. 

b. The Chief 1 COll'S:WO-WASJ!IIG'f'Oll will b• appo1n.te4 bT the Joiat 

!Jltellic•nc• c-..1ttee. A.a pnvicied i.a Para.graph 2a above, h• will operate 

'Wlder the 1eural mperviaien and eperatiou.l eontrol et the Directer, 

Araed Fore•-• Seeurit7 ~e7. fer the purpa" or aHistimg hill in executinc hi• tueti&lH i1' pr&duciq eemmaication intsllfgence he will haTe a 

deputy tr·• each cf the BerT1c:••· . 

c. Tb.• ehiet er a COJISIDO aening a Jeimt c.c..and will be a.ppoiJl\ed 

*I>efiua &II the published. lngllllh YHal.GlaB Of deern>ted •eamagee. 

;~_'·I·~ 

~lti!7!-f~-. ~~~-,-f~~L1i-,_:_,~~~~~, 

I !_J} JJJ 1_:'__ '. i -~~I. '•· 
- ---·· ---- --··--- ----·---------------

REF ID: A71 76-7 

· .. __ .... 

I' I I· 

bf the Caund.er thereof, btit iB v1n et tae elet• teeJaaieal relatieu 

which J1Uat erl•t betwMl!l COMIOO-•AU:IIQfOJI aH. •illilar e.Cti.c•• eperating tor Joiat CeamaBda, .m•h appe1ataeut.• will be aulDjee'\ t.o ta• appr:e'Ml 

et the Jo!nt Chiet1 ot 8tatf. 

3. a. Th• Chiet, coamo-11u11rmoi will 'H relll">uibl• ter.- Ute 

producrt.1o• et eHIMUlioat.iom. in.tellig••·• kae4 .,,..a COOi! raw aaierial 

furnished b7 the crypte.nalTUo prooeuimc aceq o£ 118 1B ta. lf&aiqtea 

ar• and tor the publication ud clia•eainatin. et .uta iatellipu·e te 

ageneiaa autoorized. to reeei'f'• it. 

b. The Chief' ot a COlfSIOO 8ll'hiae llatlai.Ba\en will be re1pen·aible 

tor the production ot cmiauaieatiea imtelllcne• baaM upon COllilft' n.w 

u.terial turnishecl b7 the leeal er,.ptuel,.tie pr&••••inl amer ud fer 

the publieatioa and tlio•i.Dat1on "~ aeh illt•lllgeaoe te the lecal ca-••, 

and to other local acenciea as authorised ~ the Joint. Cbie:f• rd Stat.t. 

4. Rd'erril'ae 1pecif'icel.~ to C01'SIOO-Wl1INGTOI, the ree1>eetin 

Secretarie• ot th• three Servi•• Department• are h•r•b)" authorized and 

directed to tran•f•r to the eonrtrel et the Chief, CONSIDO-WASRIMGTQI ncll 

faoilltiee, equipaeat, recerd•, and file• a• are ow •pl07ed by their 

a1enciea ia the Waehinctoa area ter t.h4 enluatien et COMIJll" raw material 

and tor th• publicatien uui di•••imatiea ot the renlt&nt oomnmieatiea 

intelligence. 

5. a. Military and e!Tiliu p•r11one.1. will be cietailecl to G·OKSDOWASHIIGTO!f by the reepeeti·,.. Senie•• ia queta• •• requested 1:o" t.he Chief, 

CONSIOO-WASHIJta!.'Ol( and aa apprO'f'ed. by' the Seeretariea of the re.ap•eti'f'• 

Depart.aenta concerned. 

b. A.a a Mtter ot policy, ett1c.r per1oimel will be clotailatl te 

Sttch duty for a period or net le111s thu thirt)" (30) monthe, u& oi'f'iliu 

personnel, for indefinite period•, reserYi.ng, aowever, to eaeh Depanment, 

after appropri~t• notif'ication te the Chiet, COISIDO-WASllilaI'ON, the rigs\ 

to withdraw, add to, or substitute. 

6. Kill tar,- a.nd oirtllan 1>4traonDel detailed to COISIDO-WASlUlf(}fOI will 

be operationally subordinate to the Chier, COHSI00-1.A.SIIJGTOI aBC!l adaini.tratin]J' subordinate to the re•peeti'f'e Departant• Br• whieh th.,- have 'Hen det.~iled. The administration will be exercised througlli the !enieir Of'tieer 

detailed frOM aaeh Service to CO:NSIDO-W.ASHUiGTON, whieh ottieer will rep9rt1 

aa appropriate, tu the Ch1e1' o!' start or the Are.7, er te th• Chief et Statt 

of the .lir rorce, sr to the Chiet' or lanl Operations ter ad.d.itieraal dut7 

for this purpose. In a.dd1 tion to the:l.r other duti••• the Senier ottieer• 

£roa ea.eh Service will be re•ponsibl• for 11Gr11&l amd reutim.e iaS}Deetion 

ot their Service ce11peruu1t11 in COISI:OO-IAS1UH0'1'01 is aecerdanee with 

current directiv•• and policiu reapectiY•l.1' pr&lmlgated b)" the Chief of 

Start at the .t.r.r, or by the Chiet or Staff or th• Air 1erce, er S, th• 

2 

Y'-

; 

I 
REF ID:A71767 

Wet et la.ftl ltperiatieH. h U:41 ~ie1l, 1raar>eet1eu er inYest.111.tien af th• 

re,apeet1Te ia41Titl.\t&l 8-rTin e_,•mMt• aq be aafl• by th• ffrreapGn!1ding 

krrioe reprenntatiTea wku •o t\ireettd "1 Hafetnt anthorit7, t.h• CM.et, 

CelSlOO-WillilftlTe• lbei:nc aetifie4 iia eula in.ta.-.. 

1. a. The 91>•eif'1• reapeaaibilltiea 0! CG1'$IDO-MSl.l!ll!TOI are &I 

tellewi 

{l) '1'0 iJTechlH e~icati&n iat.ellicaee frea CCJUJl? l'&W 

aateria.l aad t.-0 ru .. P?Ck ia~•llic•ae• with pe?'ti••ftt e0llatera.l intara•-

tiDm reeeiTed tr.a ather •ourcea. 

(2) Ts :publllh a.M 41 .. ,ninate n_gh iatellic•ne• te the JCS, 

te t'M tl.lrH S•nie•a, arul t.0 Gther U.S. a1•oi•• aa aut.horized aaa direct-

•i S,- tu JCS. 

(3) To prepare amrie•,, stutlie• and re9&rt1 ba.•ed upe.ia 

noll 1ntellic•:m~H. 

(4) To diufJ!linate t• anrepriate arenoiet in the Waab.ill.(t0n 

ar-. e..-u.laieatien iutelligeue recobt-4 frOll a field cryptanafy-tia proeeaa1.ag eetllt•r, er .tres a Tb:eate:r COISIDO, or !rom a u:n-l:J'.i. COOl'f oel1ter with 

wkie~ ceep~ati0n ha• been ~uthoriz~. 

(S) Te 118.hlaill ¢lea• lis.i1N11. with t.\t• JCS and the Imtelllcne• 

B1Yi•1Hus or th• respeetiv• ~rTi0•• in. all u.tt.ra iJJfflTiEC the diuDinatiem $f SUQb im~elligeI1$.e a.nd the eetabliahl&eat ~r prier1t1•• thereia, aa 

nil aa tkoH invol-ri.ng f>n>eureaeet of ¢Olla.teral ild'oru.ti&!l tre1a U.S. ff'IU'e••· 

(6) To eX&e11te ~~liei•• est.abli1hed bJ'" th• JCS for the exelauge f)f SU.lih iatellig&Be wit.la 1l1Hl-U.$. CCWI!r.r agencie8. 

(7) To enrei•• guera.l IN?erTJ.aiam n•r the apee1al ayat• !rsr 

t.he eleetrical trut111ie.aiem of 11'.leh iia\elllgemee to Th ... ter CE>m1HL:iider1 and 't0 

f'u:r•i•h t}a.e texta of suah aaterial for tra:m.llllie1i~, aecordi.mg ta prieritiea 

d.et.er•im.et\l bT the Ch1e!', COISIOO-WASliIHal'OI. 

(S) To suppl7 to t.he cr;yptana.l.ytic preceadng agency pertillent 

tecl!llliaal aU GOilateral inforHtioia which Hy be 4.eT&l.oped ia the ccurH of 

eTa.1"1.B.tiea aai which ... y ~ et aa1ieta»o• iR gatherimi and proeeeeit11 

CCIII.It' raw 11.&terial. 

(9) To s:urcia• general aupe.nieisn oirer th• security et 

publioati9n and dle'8$11na.tian pr0c9'h.irea, 8llder r9gllla~1Qn• ••tablieh9Cl 

by the JCS. 

(1 O) To Mi at.a.in all appropriate file a and records. 

SUht 
REF ID:A71767 

.... ; 

-. , 

b. 'f'h.e r•.tp0n1Sibilltiea ot a COISIPO •9'l'Tiag a Joint OCIWllU:4 

will in general be aimilar to those outlinei in 1t1b-par•craph .! above. 

Its principal reepouibilit7 1• (1) to tTa.luate, publish, and. diaauiaa.te 

cOEIUaica.tion intelligence ba.Hd upon COMilfl' ra• material. ftlrni8hed by 

the local eti'JPt&~ic precessing agency, and (2) to d1aa.ea1.na.te 

te &ppropria.te a.genoie• withia the Thea.tar, •• authorise<! by the JCS, 

BUCh e09Wl!licat10n intelligence a.a ie fot"'Rrd.ed \71' COlfSIDO-WASllINOTOH. 

8. a. The Secr.t&ry of State and the Direetor of the Central 

Intelligence Agency ara cordialJ..1 invit-4 to participate in the work et 

CO!fSIDO-IA.SHING"l'OI, by contributing an.11.able pereeuel, raeUitiea, 

equipa•nt, and files theret.o an4 ae appropriate to their re.speeti'Y• needa, 

subj.et to apprOYal of the .ros. 

b. If the foreping i.nitation ia acaept.ed, the peraonnel 

furnished bJ th• Departaent of State and/er the Central Int•lligenea 

Agency "1ll be operatioza.al.ly aubordinate to the Chief, COUIDO-'l.A.!J!IMGTOI, 

and. administratively suboTdil41lte reepeotiv•17 te the .0.partaent a:ad/0r te 

the .Agency by which they haye be-en .furnished. The iadlti:rrlstratiolil will ba 

axerel1ed through the Sanior Repreaenta~ive fr911 the Departaent of 3tate 

and/or froa the Central Intelligence Aeeney for their reap•ctive peraennel 

quota a. · 

c. The .>•nior RepnHnte.tive !roa. the Dapar\•ant of St.at.a a.n4/or 

the Senior Repr•••ntative rnra the Central. .intellige'Dc• Agency IU1 serve 

aa reput7 Chiefs o! CONSIDO-IASfiI!im'ON, with reapensibilities aiailar t& 

thoae ot the Deputy Chie.f'a tram the Ar.111.-4 Service•. 

9. a. The ph;y•ieal 1'>·aat1on ot COISIDO-WA.SIIMGTOlf will Be at the 

JllR C17Pt&na.lyt1o proe•sainl eenter in the Walhiqt&n area. 

b. CLi.NSIOO-WH.IlaTOB will operate on & continu0u• 8alis, 24 

heur• per day, 7 dq• per week. 

10. Thia Directi•• will becoae •:f'tectiYe sn or before l Juq 1949. 

Thereafter, no unita of the DE 1• the lla.ahilllgtoira a.re.a ether than COISID0-

11.SB.IllGTO!I will eup.g• is. evaluating, publilh.1.Dg and tiaaeaiM.tinc eOlll&ll'lldea.tioB llitallla•nee l.Ja4i all CCMilft' naluatien, p>ubliea.tiOJa_, and dieea.1.Ja&-

t1Gll unita other tha:ra COISIDO-W.A.SRU1ctro1 111.ll ba abeliahed &• aooa th•r·ea!ter aa praoticab.le. 

ll. a. 11th a rl .. to eliaiutiq •xi•tiJBC •eeurit.y masari.•, $1l amt 

art.er l Juq 1949 ne eryptanalyt1e proeff•ini eental" ot the 81 will 

dia ... inate 1.1 a routine utter to B.B¥ U.8 • .A&ency er perMnnel mot open.-

tional.11' •plo7ed withia auch a eenter a.rrr CCJIDT raw •te'l'tl. Nowner, 

I •' I I ___ ; _I 

I 'I 
REF ID:A71767 

-- .. ..J . 

wha appropriate and a.a deter11ined in ea.eh instance by the Chief, CONSIDOW.lSIDIGrOI or by the Chief' o! a Theater COISIDO, a e0py or a apecifie 

d.eo.rypt 11&7 be !urniehed to a U.S. Agency or to U.S. per•onnel, but only 

on the baaia that th• pcasesaion of such a d.90r,ypt 1• opera.tionalJ.7 

eSBential. 

h. The !oregeimg prohibitien will not apply to the diaaeaimation 

of COllIW! raw u.teria.l te eoopentb1g COi.Iil' center a w1 th whieh exchange or 

aueh u.t.erial ha• bea authorised. 

\ --1· 

r • . I l 

) 

I 

' . ·- r . .;,;...J . I J .l -....J 
• 

REF ID:A71767 Teton SECRET GLTNT 

C;f.ll.lT 

...... ...,._ ... ~. 

SUBJECT: 

THE ~{f~CtiD'.r;.YY .·~·' UE1<EMti; 

~fl:j ;-, i:...: ~::-: . .'.)\\ 

Maxim.um Erploita.ticn of· C0l4!N'I' 

1. 1 ar.1 considsr:ing e. fu1·ther step to inaros.se 

the effici"3ncy and eoonorrr.7 rJf llME comrmw.icati one 

intallig'Bnee &.ct! vH;ies hy the establishment of a 

consolidated Spacial Inf'ormati.on Disst.'Dliuation Office. 

2.. Fleau le"G me havs your commwnti1 and reoammendations wi.th resf-act to the attach-ud staff study* 

and d:raft OC!n:Jolidaticn directive** by 15 June 1949. 

·:ll- A.pperidi::: "A" nel"eto 

->c-l· Appe!;du "B" he:a:·~to 

/a/ Louis Johnson 

• • ••• •• • • • •• • • • • • ••• •• 

9 - Enclosure "B" 

TOP SECRET GLINT 
.. -,, --- .-·-:.. -;...~A717.67 

• ..... APPEUDIX 

(Re?ised Draft Directive) 

Consolidation Directive No. 

MEMORANDUM FOR: 

SUBJECT: Establishment of a Consolidated Special Information 

Dissemination Office, National Military Establishment 

•• • • • •• • • .. ••• • • 

1. a. A consolidated office for evaluation, publication, and ~ieeGmi.­

nation of colll!llunication intelligence (COMINT) resulting £rom the operations 

of the Armed Forces Securit-y Agency (AFSA) will be established at the Headquarters of the National Military Establishment. Similar offices may be 

established at the Headquartars of unified commands and such other comm.ands 

as nay be deai~nlited by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

b. For purposes of cover, a consolidated offioe performing the 

• • 

abovo-mentione<l functions will be designated as a Consolidated Special Ini'ormation Dissemin~tion Office, abbreviated as CONSIDO. 

2. a. The office of the CONSIDO eerving the Headquarters, National 

Militsry Establishment, designated as CONSIDO-WA.SHINGTON, will operate under 

the ge~eral supervision and operational control of tho Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

such supervision to be exercised by the J'oint Intelligence Corrmittee. 

b. 'l'he assignment as Chief, CONSIDO-WASIIINGTON., will be rotated 

runong ·the Services. The Chief, CONSIDO-\Vi\PHINGTON, will be appointed by the 

Jotnt Chi'JfEl of Staff for a. poriod not exceeding two years. For the purpose 

of nGsisting.him in exocuting his functions, the Chief', CONSIDO-WVASHmGTON, 

will have a deputy from each of the Services. 

c. In ~enaral, the Chief of a CONSIDO serving a unified or other 

ccr1llltllid wi 11 be appointed by the commander thereof. 

:;. a. 'fhe Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, will be responsible for evaluat.ion 0 !'ublico.tion. and dissemination of communication intelligence processed 

by fl.FSA. The Daputios from the Services., in addition to being responsible 

- 5 - Appendix to Enclosure "A" 

TOP BEGBET 
to the Chief J CONSIDO-WASllINGTON, for the evaluation and dissemination of 

.. ., . conmrunication intelligence as directed by himJ will be responsible also!to 

11 • •• 

• ••• 

• Aee • .. • 

th~ir respective departments for the ctissemination·or oommunication intell~gence to those depar'bnents and to field commando, in accordance with 

departmental policies end directivea pertaining to such disoemination. 

b. The Chief of a CONSIDO outside Washington will be responsible 

for evaluation. publication, end dissemination of oommunication intelligence 

to the local command and for the forwarding of communication intelligenco 

produoed locally to CONSIDO-WASHINGTON o.nd other commands, as required. 

4. Referring specifically to CONSIDO-WASfilNGTON, the respectiva Chiofe 

of Staff of the three SeTVices will lll8.ke available to the Chief, CONS!DOWASHINGTON, facilities, equipment, records,, and files neoessary for eve.luation and dissemination of communication intelligence. 

5. · a. MiHtS.?"'J and civilian personnol will be detailed to CONSIDOWASHTIJGTON by the respective Services in quotas as requested by the Chief, 

CONSID04'lASHINGTON, and as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Ste.ff. 

b. As a matter of policy0 military personnel will be datniled to 

such duty for a period of not leas than thirty (30) montho, and civilian 

' 

personnel, for indefinite periods. The Services ;dll reserve the right to 

add, withdraw, or substituts personnel, within limitations of. a.uthoriiod 

personnel strength of CONSIDO, and subject to agreement by the Chief, CONSIDOWASHiliGTOl~. 

6. Mi.lital"J' and civilian personnel detailed to CONSIDO-WASHINGTON will 

be operationally subordinate to the Chief, COUSIDO-WASHINGTON,, e.nd e.dminiBtrativ~ly subordinate to the respective departments from which they have been 

detailed. The e.dminis'tration will be exercised through the Deputy detailed 

from each Servieo to CONSIDO-WASHINGTON, which of'ficer will report. as appropriate, to the Chief of Sta.ff of' the Arr.ry. or to the Chief of Staf'f of the 

Air Force, or to the Chief of Naval Operations for additional duty for this 

purpose and for those outlined in par 3. a., abovo. 

1. The specific responsibilities of the Chief, CONSID04V.ASHINGTON. are 

as follows: 

- s -

·1 Ut' SEGRET Appendix to Enolosure "A" 
• StW\li.:...l.D :A71767 

., --

a. To provide to A~'SA tho intelligence euido.nce necessary to en~ble···~ 

•• • • •o• it to meet the needz of the intelligence agencies. • • ... • • .. • 

b. To determine COMU!T Intelligence Priorities based upon the 

intelligence requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff~ the Services, and 

USCIB; to provide such priorities to AFSA. 

o. To coordinc.ta cotm·rl' Intelligence I·r.:..ori ties with AFSA teehY'li<:nl 

priorities; to roprcsent Intclligenc~ interasts ~n a voti4g member of AFSA 

technical priorities ~roups. 

d. To select massagos and Traffic Analyois items for publio&tion 

for usa by CONSIDO; to prepare intelligence comments to such measa.gee and 

items es appropriate. 

e. 'ro evaluate and disseminate to ·tpe Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

Services, and other U.S. agencies as authorizod s.nd directed by the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, the oornn:n.mication intelligence p?·ocessed by AFSA. 

f. To prepare aun:inaries, studies, and reports b~sed on communication 

intelligence processed by AFSA. 

g. To 1!'.aintain close lie.:l.son with the intelligence diviriions of the 

respective Services and other U.S. agencies authorized to receive COllINT on 

all matters involving the dissemination of such intelligence and the eatablishment of priorities theroin, as well as matters involving procurement of 

collateral in.formation from U.S. &ourcos. 

h. To execute policies established by the Joint Chiefs of Sta.ff for 

the exchange of communication intelligence with no~-u.s. COMINT agenoias. 

i. To provide AFSA with pertinent technical and collateral inf'orma.-

tion which may be of assistance. 

j. To exercise general supervision over the security of publication 

and dissemination procedures, under regulations established by the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. 

k. To maintain such COMINT and collateral files as are required in 

addition to the files of AFSA for perfcrmo.nce of the functions of CONSIDO. 

8. Where appropriate, the responsibilities of a CONSIDO serving a field 

oomrne.nd Yli.11 be similar to those outlined in par 7.~ above. 

Appendix to Enclosure "A" 
'~._ 

,. --,. RllDO!~B1nl!Ji7 

1u1 um;.un~• 

9. a. T"ne Secretary of State# the Directer of Central Intelligence, 

• • ••• •• • 

9.nd the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are invited to ! 

••• 

••• . . 

• • •• 

participate in the 'tfO~k of CONSIDO-ii'ASHINGTON, by making available personnel, 

facilities, e~uipment, and files~ as appropriate to their respective needs, 

subject to approval of the Joint Chiefs of Ste.tr. 

b. rr the foregoing invitation is accepted, the senior representativea from the Depar~nent of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the 

Federal Burea~ 0£ Investigation will serve as Deputy Chiefs or CONSIDOWASHINGTON> with responsibilities similar to those of the Deputy Chiefs from 

the Serv.i.cas. P~rsonnel furnished under auoh an arra.."lgement will be operationally i:;ubordinate to the Chief, CONSIDO-WASHINGTON~ end administratively 

tubordino.te to their respective senior represents.tiveaa 

10. a. The physical location of CONSIDO-WASHiltGTON wtll be at the 

CO!.f!NT processing center of A.FSA. 

b. CO!'lSIDO·-WASHINGTON will operate on e. continuous basis• 24 hours 

per day, seven days per weak. 

11. Thia diraot:i ve will be made effective by order of the Jo~nt Chief's 

of Sta.ff as soon aa p:ra.cticab1e after the establishment of AFSA. As soon as 

practicablo after the eetabliohment of CONSID0-1lASHINGTON, all units of the 

National Military Establishment in the Washington area engaged primarily in 

the evaluation, publication, and dissemination of cormnunication intelligence 

will be obolish~d. 

12. a. With a view to decreasing existing security hazards, after the 

establishment of' CONS!DO-WASHillGTON, the Armed Forc'9& Seouri ty Agency will 

not provide any COi-;iINT to any u ... s. agency other than CONSIDO. However, when 

a.ppropr:late and as determined by thq, Chiefs CONSIDO-WASHINGTON. or by the 

Chief oi' a field Co:tJS IDO. COllINT ms.y be i"urnishedD on a "need to know" basis, 

to U.S. Government personnel not participating in CONSIDO. 

b. The foregoing prohibition will not apply to t.he dissemination 

-of commu.~ication intelligence to COMINT centers with which exchange of such 

material has been authorized. 

- 8 - Appendix to Enclosure "A" 

1 ur titUllEf. 
,-~ . REF ID: A71 7q.;l_ 

·-~roP SECRETDRAFT 

Annex to Appendix 11 An 

(Revised Draft Directive) 

Consolidation Directive No. 

Ml!Ji!ORANDUM FOR: 

Subject: Establishment oi' a Consolidated Special Information 

Dissemination Office, Department of Defense 

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the National Secw.~ty Act 

of 1947 (Public Law No. 253, Both Congress), as amended by Public Law 216~ 

81.st Congress, and in the interest of greater efficiency and economy, 

there is hereby established within the Departme~1t of Defense, undc:?r the 

direction and control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Consolidated Sp;!cial 

Information Dissemination Offic0, designated and hereinafter refeTred to 

a.a 11CONSID011 'Which sha.U be located at the main communications int.ell:':.gimce 

processing center of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), and whinh 

shall have the purpose~ composition, autb.ori ty a.."'ld responsibilities h<'!r3inafter described.. 

1. PurpOS,! 

CONSIDO is establiahed in order to prorlde for plac:ir...g U:.'1dm:· one 

authority the conduct of _evaluation and collati.:>n or the pr'1duct ·:>f t.:1t:i 

Armed Forces Security Agency anj for the mainteoonce o:r lla.:i.son, in iNn·· 

nection wi. th the functions and responsibilities oui:.llned in paragraph ~l 

below, between AFSA and the Intslllgence Staffs of the Milit.ary Depaz·t.11~m·~~, 

the Department of State, the Central Intf,lligence Agency" and the Fodo~·;IJ. 

Bureau of Inveetigation. 

2. Com:p<?_~~ 

a. CONSIDO shall consist of auch f aci1iti.es and militar;r ci::bi 

civilian personnel of the Armad Forces as ·the Joint Chiefs of Staff ~! .. ay 

determine to be necessary to fulfill the functions herein assigned. '.:']-,;~: 

Secretary of State, the Directo::- of Central Int13lligence, and the Dirucl:o~' 

2 

TOP SECRET 
~--- REF ID: A71 7#Jil" 

-1.,0P 8ECRE17' 

DR AF '.l' 

of tha Federal Bureau of Investigation are invi·t.ed to participate in 

CONSIDO by making available personnel and facilities aa appropriate to 

their respective needs. 

b. The Chief, CONSIDO, will be appoinf.ed by tha ,Joint C:-uefa of . . 

Staff for a period not exceeding three years. l'he assignment as Chief', 

CONSIDO, 1'1.ll be rotated among the llilltsry Dep<U'tmenta. 

c. For the purpose of assisting him 1:'1 executing his functions, 

the Chief, CO.NSIDO, 'R'ill have a full-time deputy from each of the Hill t.ary 

Departments and from such other dspartmer~ts and agencies as may be rspresented in CONSIDO. 

J. Functions and Responsibilities 

a. CONSIOO will operate under the dir,3ction and control of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, di?"ect supervision. to be exercised by the Jo:Lnt 

Intelligence Committee. 

b. Military and civilian personnel de·~led to CONSIOO '.rl.J.l be 

under the operational con·trol of the Ctlief, CON:HDOo 

c. Tha admirdst.ration of the personnel of COUSIDO will be t.he 

responsibility of tbs department or agency from which they .t-..ave bGen 

assigned and will be exercised through tee depu ~y detailed fr.om each 

department, or agency. 

d. In exercising direct supervision o·?er CONSIDO_, the Joint 

Intelligence Committee will; 

(1) Establish policies and doctri1es for the conduct C>f 

CONSIDO activities which will insure that. CONSIDO is 

responai ve to the requirement 3 of the Joint Chi·ef~~ of 

Staff and of the indi vi.dual d.:tpart.m-snts and agenc~.es 

participating in CONSIDO. 

( 2) Recommend to the Joint ·Jhiefs of Sta.ff' the f a.cili ties 

and military and civilian per:ionnel to be providec: tc 

3 Annex 'vo Appendi.x 11A" 

TOP SECRET 
- REF ID:A717~ 

··-1'0P SECREtf'· / 

DRAFT 

------

CONSIDO, such recommendation to be baaed on requirements 

as determined by the Chief, CONSIDO. 

(3) With the approval of the Joint Chief's or Staff, establish 

Consolidated Special Information Dissemination Otficeei 

as may be required at the headquarters of unified commands a.nd such other commands as may be designated by t.h9 

Joint Chiefs of Staff'. 

e. Subject to the direction and control of the Joint Intellif;ence 

Committee, the Chief, CONSIDO, 'Will execute polioies, plans, and doctr1t·iss 

relating to the evaluation and collation of the product of AFSA and the 

dissemination of the product of CONSIDO. His specific responsibilities at-e 

as follows: 

(l) To insure equitable treatment in the satisfaction of the 

communication intelligence requirements or the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, t.l-ie Kilitary Departments,, the Department 

of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

(2) To p:r:'Ovids and maintain close liai5on with AFSA, ·<;he 

Intelligence Staffs of the Military Departments, the 

Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, 

and the Federal Bureau of Investigation on all matters 

involving the dissemination of the product or CONSIDO 

and the establishment of priorities therein, as wel:l 

as matters -involving procurement of collateral info:rmation :tor AFSA and CONSIDO. 

4 Annex to Appendix "A" 

TOP SECRET 
REF ID:A71767 • ~· '-:t .. OP SECRE~-) 

DRAFT 

(3) To determine intell;i.gence priorit1.es applicable to C~HNT 

based on the intelligence requirements 

Method {ll Met.hod #2 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the Joi..11t Chiefs of Staff 

the Military Departments and and the Military Departments; 

the other agencies of the to intc.~grate those priorit:les 

United States Cortun\ull.cation with the priorities of the 

Intelligence Board (USCIB); United States Comnrunicat:Lon 

to submit such recommended Intelligence Board (USCIB); 

priorities to USCIB for i:.o provide ai:, integrated list 

approval and transmittal of such priorities 

to the Director, AF'SA, and to cooJ··dina.tf.3 those priorities 

with AFSA priori ties groups and oi~herwiiie. to provide Al1'SA 

with detailed intelligence guidance necessary to enable 

it to meet the requirements of the intelligence agencies. 

Method #l Met.hod #2 

It is to be noted that the 

interest or authority of 

USCIB does not extend to the 

determination oi' relative 

priorities between agencies 

'Wi. thin the Depa.I·tment of 

Defense. 

(4) To insure proper and timely evaluation and colla:t.ion c•f 

the product of AF'SA and di.sseminat.ion o.f. the product of 

CONSIDO. 

5 Annex to AppencliJ~ 11A11 

TOP SECRET 
e , REF ID:A717.i7 

··1·op SECREi"· .·· 

DRAF'l' 

(5) To prepare and dissemir..ate information summaries, 

studies and reports based on the product of AFSA. 

To prepare and disseminate such other sunmia.ries, 

studies and reports ae the Joint Intelligence 

Committee ~ authorize and direct. 

(6) To provide, and exercise supervieion over, the means 

of dissemination of intelligence bearing the communication intelligence code wo~d designator. 

(7) To insure the security of CONSIDO dissemination 

procedures, in accordance With the basic aeourity 

policies prescribed by the United States Communice.-

tion Intelligence Board. 

(8) To provide AFSA with pertinent technical and 

collateral information. 

(9) To collaborate with the Director, A.FSA, in ma.intai.n1.ng joint files suitable to the use of both CONSIDO 

and AFSA and to maintain such files as may be 

necessary to meet the exolusi ·re. neada of CONSil)O. 

(10) To inaure that civilian and military personnel 

assigned to CONSIDO comply wi·th ths regulc-itions 

promulgated by the Director, Alt"'SA, for the administrative operation of the main CmuNT processing 

center a 

(11) To insure continuous operation. of CONSIDO on a 

"watch" basis, 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. 

f. The Deputy Chiefs of CONSIDO will be responsible to the 

Chief, CONSIDO, and Will aseist him in carrying out his duties and 

responaibilities, part:i.cularly those relating to their respective 

departments or agencieso 

6 Annex to Appendix II An 

TOP SECRET 
.. , 

.... . . REF ID:A71jp7 

·-i~OP SEGRE,;----, 

DRAFT 

g. The Depart.ments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force wi.111 

(1) Take necessary action to faciliiate the efficient and 

economic operation of CONSIOO, such action to include 

the assignment of personnel and furnishing of facilities 

and equipnent~ The res pee ti VE~ Secretaries a.re hereby 

authorized to issue such ordel•s as may be necessar-~ to 

effectuate the purposes of this directive. 

(2) Normally assign military persormel to CONSIDO for a 

period of not less than JO months, and civilian pe."C'-

sormel for indefinite periods~ reserving the right to 

add, withdraw or substitute personnel 'Ni thin limitatior.15: 

of authorized personnel atrength of CO.."lSIDO and subject 

to the agreement by the Chief!, CONSIDO. 

(3) Be responsible, within the Depart.ment of Defense, for 

interpretation of the CONSIDO product and information 

from all other sources for tho production of in1;elligenc~. 

(4) Ret.ain responsibility, with.in the Department of Defense, 

for the dissemination o.f inteJ.lig~nce bearing the ·~ommunication intelligence code vrord designator, eraploy:i.ng, 

for inter-departmental and field dissemination, the means 

provided by CONSIDO. 

( 5). Not undertake or continue any of the functions which ar1.:i 

assigned herein to CONSIDO. 

h. The Director, AFSA: 

(1) Will make available to the Cm.ef, CONSIDO, such AFSA 

facilities, equipment, records and files a.s are determined by the ,Joint Intelligence Committee, subject to 

approval by the Joint Chiefs ()f Staff, to be required 

for the performance .of the fw1ctions of CONSIDO. 

1 Annex to Appendix 11An 

TOP SECRET 
. . • 

~- . _ REF ID: A71 7ti' . 

·-1.,0P SEGRE,..,, 

DRAIC'T 

(2) A.fter the establisirnent of CONSIDO, will not disseminate 

the product of AFSA to any US agency other than CONSlno, 

except as otherwise directed by the Joint Chief a of 

Starr. Nothing in this directive, however, shall alter 

technical agreements ratified by the USCIB, and the 

provision of information for technical purposes to the 

Army Security Agency, the Navy Communications Suppli::-

mentary Activities, and the Air Force Security 3ervL'm. 

4. Implemi:mtation 

a. CONSIDO will be placed in operation as soon as practicab'l.e. 

The other port.ions of this directive shall be made effective immediati:J~r 

·t.hereafter. 

b. Th0 fundamental relationship between the Am.ed F'orcef1 S<~~·urity 

Agency .and the Consolidated Special Infomation Dissemination Offi.ce is e.s 

indicated herein. Such ad.just.'Imnt.s in the relat.ionship as may becom<~ 

necessary will be accompllahed by the ,Joi11t Chiefs of Staff. 

5. Defini~;,ions 

For tha purposes of this directi·ve the follo1nng definitionn .:?.pply: 

a. Svaluation - the process of determining th€ cred.'ibilit:r and 

accuracy of infonnation and of el.1.rninating irrelevant and unrelia~'le ;r.;:.tter 

from further consideration. 

b. Collation - a crit.ical comparison of va.riow:i items o.f ::.dorma.tion concerning the same general subject .• 

c. Irrt.erpretation -- the determination of the probable meanJrig an·1 

signi£icance of processed information in terms of past, p:i:•eaant and f .. ·t:nre 

factors. 

d. Diasemination -- the distribution cf intelligence and inl'ormation in such a manner a::. to insure tl1at they I'each the agencies nec:iin~ 

them, in usable form, and in accordance w.5-th the. urgency. 

B Am.lex to Appen·:iix ii A 11 

TOP SECRET 
. . . ~ . REF ID:A71~7 

. \ ·~op SECREjl·---

DR A F 1' 

e. iJomunicatio:n intelligence - the int.elligence infoz"ma.i;J.:.m 

which is derived from .the study of foreign comnr.m:i.catiomi. (It is to be 

noted that this definitio~1 is iriconsister:.t with the normal di.f.t'erenti.'1"tion 

. between 1nf'ormat1on and intelligence, b11t is ad•:>pted because of long "•l:Hgeo) 

. . 

t. 'l'he AFSA Product - the proC'.uct re:sulting .from communic:a:~-t::ms 

intelligence collect1011 which ia defined as the procurement of tort1ig11 communi.cations a...1d the conversion of such ccmmun.'\.c;1tions into usable English 

form. 

g. The CONSIDO Product ~ the product resulting .f'rom evalua.ti~n 

~nd collation of the .AJ.t"'"SA product. 

h, Intelligence Requirements -· the requirementa for in1'01'!tation 

of each Military Department, the Department of :3tate, the Central Intell:J.-

gence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Invest.igation established lrl.th<Yllt 

reference to existing and potential capabili tiei; of procure1I.ent acen:: ·~;~.s. 

i. Intelligence Priorities -- intelligence requ.i.rement.s e:.iq::···13sed 

in an order of preference which has been determ:Lned on the 'basis of' a. 

consideration of both the importar:.ce and urgenc~r of each rec;.uirement. an:l 

t11e exi3ting and poteniiial capabilities of' procilrement agencies. 

j. USCIB Intelligence Priorit~es - tha integra.tec. int.-elli.g1:li'!::Ei 

rAquirements of t:&1e member departments ar:d agenr::ies of USC.IB for in.f c::-;:·:.a~ 

tion f'rom [non .. military (applicable to Method #:?, parB.{."I'B.ph 3 e (:3) ;. } 

foreign commurJ.c:ations ~pressed in a.n order of preference 'based o:n tin 

following considerations: 

( 1) The importanc~ and urge.ncy of each reqtir€!ment ld:t • .t_ 

respect to ths national inter;.~st and U.e :i.ntr·ira:st c:~ 

each member de,Part.'Jlent or <.1ge~1cy. 

(2) The exi.3ting .:>r potential cap•1bilitien ot' ·c,,.~~ p:t"o~:r;~;-:;:ent 

agencieso 

9 

TOP SECRET 
.. -; ~ - REF ID:A71767 

'·...__ .. · 

REMARKS MADE BY COL. LOVEIJ, AT 47TH MEETING OF USCIB 

HELD 2 DECTMBER 1949 IN EXPLANATION OF ClIART 

ACCOMPANYING THE DRAFT CONSIDO PAPER 

{Extracted from USCIB: 26/1) 

"The cha.rt we are about to use to describe the fun::tions of the proposed 

CONSIDO was originally prepared for presentation to the Joint Intelligence 

Committee. The methods employed for the production of Joint Intelligence 

apply in the same manner for the production of National Intelligence by the 

Central Intelligence Agency. This is illustrated by a second chart which 

portrays the identical idea in outline form. 

* * * * 

"Your attention is now invited to the first chart. To facilitate 

explanation, it will be explained in parts. 

"The color convention used is as follows: 

Dark red for COMINT information. 

Light red for collateral information. 

Blue for intelligence. 

Blue and red for intelligence containing COMINT. 

Dotted black for liaison. 

"This section of the chart shows the method employed for producing joint 

intelligence by the military departments. 

"Information is introduced at the basic research level to produce factual 

intelligence such as that used in the National Intelligence Surveys. COMINT 

is given special handling in accordance with the USCIB security regulations. 

"Factual intelligence is then used by the intelligence staffs to produce 

finished intelligence in the form of strategic estimates and stu:lies. 

"Finished intelligence from all of the intelligence agencies is synthesized 

by the JIG which upon approval by tbe JIC becomes Joint intelligence. 

"The method illustrated on this section of the chart was used recently to 

produce ABCI-15, a joint estimate of the capabilities an:l intentions of the 

Soviet Union. 

* * * * * 

"The second part of the chart illustrates the indispensable role played 

by CIA and State Department in the production of Joint intelligeme on foreign 

nations. The political, economic, sociological and scientific int.elligence 

produced by those agencies is vital in the production of estimates of foreign 

powers. In the production of the estimate of the capabilities and intentiC11s 

of the Soviet Union contained in ABCI-15, the political am economic sections 

of that paper were prepared by State and CIA. ,_ 

1 

. ~ 

·~ ., 
REF ID:A71767 

(Extraeted fl'Qm USCIB: 26/1) 

"As pointed out earlier, the met.bed is the same :for the production of 

Na ti cm al Intel.ligenee. 

"The FBI is not shown on either of these charts because they deal exclusively with the preduction of positive intel.l:i.gence on :foreign powers. For 

the production of counterespionage and co\:Ulterintelligence, the FBI would be 

shown on these charts on the same level and fUIX:tioning in the same manner as 

the other intelligence agencies of the U .s. GovenirEnt. 

* * * * * 

"The third and final section of. t~ chart shows AFSA and illustrates the 

manner in which the proposed CONSIDO :functions in the overall intelligence 

system. 

11 Four important functions of CONSIDO are shown on the chart. 

"The first is liaison between the intelligence agencies on the one haJX:i 

and AFSA and CONSIDO on the other. This liaison is important :for three 

reasoDS: 

It provides :for the selection of information needed to fill 

gaps in research lmowledge in the intelligence agencies. 

It provides guidaJX:e for the selection of items of information 

for transmission by electrical. means. 

It provides detailed intel.ligeooe guidance to AFSA to enable 

that agency to carry out its mission efficiently. 

"The second fun:::tion is the preparation of summaries am reports tailored 

to meet the specific needs of the various intelligence agencies. In this 

connection, every effort should be made to utilize the material in the central 

files in the original language as well as the translated material. 

"The third function is the watch desk which operates on a rouai the clock 

basis :for the electrical transmission of important messages of a timely nature 

to operational commands and the interested intelligence agencies. 

"The final and certainly one of the most important is the operation of 

the security system for the handling of information and intelligence bearing 

the code word designator classification. As in the case of the central files, 

it is intended that a single security message center be employed jointly with 

AFSA. 11 

2 
.. -: •/ 

REF -rn·: A71 767 --··-----···· 

-·· ·-··· 

~TAFF 

IHFOR~ATION 

ALL OTHEH 

sour~cEs 

lN 

:.:.w::.' c:~.1 .. :_,:::Ki~ c !!!. O.RG.!\.N .r.:t.AT IOJ.'~ 

;SIL 6079-lt:J-

!NT 

GiJi!)AilCE 

"'"" ;•.J 

i .=:~;., 

•• J 

.. .. 

.:rI I ,_ ..,,,,,, t!OD~M 

=>iSSrnlNATlOtl 

vPERA Tl ONAL 

C0MM'"'Ni.J~ 

11'1. .. _,. '" 

•I 

\ l ) 
·•· 

-~~--i\·op 

4 Vay 1950 

STATJ:PJEtll' or CERTAIN UE'l'HQDS :roa_ 

!RE E§TA.BLISRMENT Ot, OOMSIDO 

l~ Intelligence nriorities to guide the ~f~orj; ~! AFSA shall 

be e2iabligbod bx USCIB~ 

I '-l t 

u., I 

- l 

' 1- I 

(t 

J 

PRNC-NCSlW-}46 

'l'AB B 

a. The intelligence requirements of each USCI! member 

department or agency, expr~ssed at lea6t in tar.me 

of countrie~ and specific subjects about which 

information is required, will be submitted to 

U~CrB tor consideration end astablisb.ment of 

intelligence prioritiee a:plicable to COJ.tlNTs 

b. The USCIB Intelligence Committee will eatablieh the 

priority order in which A1SA should fulfill tho 

intelligence requ.i remente of all USCIB members., 

In the esta~lishment cf thiG priority order 9 the 

following criteria may be considered1 

{l) The urgency of each requirement, both from 

the point of view of the national interest 

and of the interest of the individual memb0r 

department 5\nd agencies .of USCIB. 

(2) The availability of info~nation from sourees 

other than COMI~1T. 

- 1 ~ 

TOP SECRET 
PRNC-NCSW-)% 

(3) The capabilitie• ot AFSA to produoe the 

information required. 

a• The USCIB Intelligence Cclllllittee will eetabli•h 

1ntelligenoe prior1tie• ae r•quired tor the 

gu1danoe of AFSAa 

:1J (by maJor1t7 Tote) or 

~2] (on the baei• at unanimity) or 

~3J (b1 arbitration by the Committee Chairman !a 

the absenoe of un&nimitJ)o 

do USCIB intolligence priorities will then be torward.ed 

to the Director0 CONSIDO for coordination with the 

DIRAFSA. Suoh detailed intorpratation as amy bs 

roquir~ by th• Ai'SA Oftiee of Operatione and itc 

technical prioriti~a oommittoee will th9~ b~ 

obtaiaecl. 

2. Command qontrpl ot QO~SZDO to bJ!..!..Getad iii 

~1: {Q Spfoi!l ~lligopc1 Com.mlj.te1 of USCIB coWljmtiaf~ 

~be sμ intell1gsmguiaqtors goncem&st) or 

~2] (!-,Spfeiel Irteltigor..2.1 Ccmmiti60 et JIC oo~~iJ.!.~'?..t 

tbe three...J.nttlligeno~ dir~otor~ ot the Yilij,•EY 

U•R!£\m3nte al)d.~ha thret ipttll1g~nop dirgot~r5 f£'m!..... 

PlA, DepartmfJat of SY\:t11 aast th1_mI) • 

&o In eithar aituatioc outlined above, the members of 

the Speaial I~t~lligemce Committee ar~ th@ eamR. 

b. In tho first method above, USOlB would pr~sorib~ 

policy for the operation of CONSIDO snd verity tbs 

TOP SECRET 

- 2 -
~ ·~· 0 p 

execution thereof. After r0viewing and approving 

the organization~ personnel allocations and m~thoda 

or pr01>;edure 0 it would take the necessary action with 

the dopartmenta &nd agoncioa conaerllod to provide 

pereonnel and equipment on a continuing basie for the 

opero.tion or CONSIDOo Based on the periodic report of 

the Di~ctor 0 COMSIDO, USClB would give gonarsl 

guidance lilDd directio~ tor the prepa~ntion of reporta 

designed to facilitate the production of int~lligence 

by the various intelU.gence agencies responsible 

thereforo Diep~t0 within the membership would be 

reeolved in the prescribed manner with ultimato 

resolution by NSC it neceeoaryo 

Co In the second metho~ above~ CONSJ:D:O mll beeomei an 

PRNC-NCSW-)46 

organ of tha Department of Defense Ulider the direct 

uup0rvision of the JCS (Augmented JIC). USCIB~ how&ver~ 

would continue to prescribe broad poliay tor th• 

coordi.ll&tion of COUINT aotivitieu and the JCS would~ 

of coureo, be bouad to comply in axercieing ita 

supervilllion over CONSIDO.. '~:·he Augmetited JIC would 

take action to provide personnel and ri1.cili·ti011 from 

the psrtic1pating a~~enciee and r::\.ve gonaral guidance 

to the operations of CONSIDO pw-uu&nt to the policie!J 

and priorities or USCI!J aa ia done now in security 

mattereo All JIC p&pere pertaining to CONSIDO would 

- 3 -

TOP SECRET 
be handled byi 

r1] (a epeoial aaoticn in the JIC seoretQriat) or 

:2~ (th& USCIB secretari&t) or 

:JJ (th~ CONSIDO etaff)o 

- In th-. event ot failure to aoM eve unanimity within the augmam.tri. 

JIC, the tolloWimg prooed\lres for Qppeiil would applya 

(1) Whenever there io a difference of' view among the 

a1litary member11, th6 matter rill bs trmnemittGd 

as a eplit paper to th~ JCS for deoi~iono Thi~ 

decision trill eetRb1ieh th• pooitioa of the 

Department cf Def e~•0o 

(2) Whenever there i• a diftorenc0 of view betwe~n 

(a) the Department ot Defense on the one hand 

a.mi one or more of th~ civilian clepo.rillV'>i"'"" on 

the other or (b) lllmong the civilian departments~ 

the matter will bs transmitted to the uscm 

Soorot&riat tor ref erGnoe dir~otly to NSC tcr 

decieion. 

3. CONSIDO to be •o qrgentsatioa ~~ not an ad hoc umit, 

It ia essential to the proper funot1oning ot CONSIDO that it hgve m 

clear-out organization vith a fixed emtabli~hmont to carry out 1ta 

mission. It must be capable ot meGting the aontinuing and varying 

aoeda of the participating departmtUrte and agenoi&mo To &as\!!"~ 

PRNC-NCSW-346 

TOP SECRET 
.... --- ~ .. , ... ' ?_ 

permanence am continuity rlthm the COl~OO establishment, the following methods of organization would appzy: 

PRNC-NCSW-3116 

a., Functionsa COUSIDO 1Vill provide such service as is 

considered necessary to meet the needs of the 

participati.ng departme.nts and agencies. The 

particui..ar functions involved in the provision of 

this service will be :l:"ec~"lded by the Director:; 

COl~SIDO and his Deputies and \.'Till be approvied by the 

control body" Nothing in these arrangements will 

operate to preclude the performance by CONSIDO or 

at CONDIDO (within the meaning of Principle 5 below) 

of such flllletions or tasks as mey be desired by any 

participating depart."!li.;mt or agency;: subject only to 

limitations of space and facilitiesa 

b., Assignment of PE!rsonnel., COHSIDO will be established 

on a T/O basis with permanently assigned position 

vacancies., '!hese vs.cancies will be based on the 

interests and needs or the participating departm-ants 

and agenciesll and wi.JJ. be apportioned by the control 

body,, fill parlicii:a t.ing departments and a.geuc:lee wilJ. 

bear responsibility to keep their assigned vacancies 

filled.insofar as possibleQ 

- 5 -

'i'OP S:sGfl:B'l' 

TOP SECREl" 
··--' 

L_ 

I_ 

PRNC-NCSW-3'16 

REF ID:A71767 

t:/1' 0 P S E C R ~~~....__] 

c... Control of Personnel. Personnel detailed to work at 

CONSIOO on special operations (within the meaning o:f 

Principle 5 below) will: 

f1J (remai.'l under the operational direction 

o:f the agency undertaldng the special. 

operation) or 

!JJ (remain i.mder the operational direction 

of the agency undertaking the special 

operation ctr be assigned temporariJ.y under 

the operationnl control of the Director, 

CO?JSI.DO for the accomplishment of the 

specific task in hand as agreed betwoen the 

Director and the agency concerned)o 

All personnel assigned to permanent position vacancies 

will: 

lIJ (be under the operation.al control of 

Director, CONSIDO) or 

f:'{/ (be under the o~ rational control of 

the Director, COUSIDO through the respective 

deputies of the participating departments 

a.r.id agencies)., 

d,, Depu:tzo Each participating department or agency will: 

lfJ (assign a ~uty to the Director, 

CONSIDO to serve on a full-time basis,, 

- 6 .... 
The Deputies will be under the 

operational control of the Director, 

COUSIDO .. ) or 

LY (assign a Deputy to the Directorjl 

COUSIDO., The Deputies will be under 

the operational control of t..'lle Direct.or, 

CONSIDO~) or 

lJl (assign a Deputy to the Dirac.tor» 

COUSIDO.. The Deputies will also serve 

as the responsible liaison representatives 

o.f their parent departments or agencies)., 

e, Administration., An)n1nistra.tive matters between COIJSIDO and 

the participatine departments and agencies rill be handled 

th.rough the appropriate Deputiesu 

4 ,. CO:USIOO to disseminate_ the AFSA l!'~t °' 

'Ihe entire AFSA product will be made ava.ila.ble to COHSIDOo COT-JSIDO · 

w1.ll render Wru.--ma.tion service to the intelligence agencies by m.akir.tg 

the AJrSA product avail.able in the form and manner best suited to 

f~1cilitate research and action by the respective intelJ.igence agencies, 

Every effort will be ma.de to reduce the general distribution of the 

A.F'SA product,, AFSA l'fill cease distribution of the AFSA product upon the 

establishment of COUSIDO except that (a) spacial handling 11vill. be given 

to especial:cy' sensitive material. in accordance with the requirements of 

the intelligence agency primarily" concerned and {b) all existing and 

-7-

PRNC-NCSW-3't6 TOP 
~OP 

.futn •. -e agreements apirov·ed by USCIB pert...Uning to the A.FSA product 

will be observed. 

S~ CONSIDO to conduct special~pera.tions b:y:_c~ain agencies_, 

i.e., ad hoc additional mem"bel·s for special projectso 

Occasions will arise wherein important source material will 

·temporarily increase in volume exceed:lne t.he c apa.city of ~.ssigned 

personnel.. Or, again, the nature of source material may requ.i.re 

highly specialized knowledge for its proper explcitat.ion.. In either 

case CONSIDO will be unable to properly exp1oit the material at hand, 

In such instances aey or all of the interes""ved partici!llnts could send 

special teams to augment the CONSIDO conti."'lgent tmtil the material at 

hand has been either .f'u11y exploit..ed or brought within the capability 

of CONSIDO .. 

60 Adequate provision to be made for reasonable stability of 

personnel to permit co~inuity in functional operation .. 

1Jilitary personnel will be assir:;n.ed to COUSIDO for duty- for 

periods or not less than 30 months.. Civilian personnel will be assigned 

with a View to promote the permanence and continuity of COlJSIDOo 

7 o Chie..f of COlJ'SIDO to be an !l.fficial f1"0lll_one of the mili~""Z 

denartments. 

JIC will normally select and naud.na.te an officer as Director, 

COUSIDO.P and cu.bmit the nom.inati·rn1 to USCID for approvaJ.o The det.ail 

as Director, cmJSIDO.? normally ·1r.l.ll be rotated among the milltar/ 

departments., 

PRNC-NCSW-3~6 -8- T OP SECRET 
,.., REF ID:A71""7 

' 

~.TOP SECRET '~ ~r·" 

STATEMENT OF CERTAIN ~.UTHO!)S FOR 

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CON3IDO 

(The Second Report of the Ad Hoo Committee as revised by 

discussion at the Fifty-first (Special) Meeting of USCIB) 

lu Intelligence priorities to guide the effort of AFSA 

shall be established by USCIB. 

ac The intelligence require~ents of euch USCIB 

member department or agency~ or when appli= 

oable 9 of the JCS expressed ~t least in 

terms of countries and specific subjects 

about which information is requiredp will 

be submitted to USClB for consideration 

and establishment of intelligence priorities 

applicable to COMINTo 

b" The USCIB Intelligence Com!llittee will establish 

the priority order in which f\FSA should fulfill 

the intelligence requirements of all USCIB 

memberso In the establishment of this priority 

order 9 the following criteria may be considered: 

(l) The urgency of each requirement~ both from 

the point of view of the national interest 

and of the intarest of the individual member 

departmen~ and agencies of USC!Bo 

(2) The availability of information.from sources 

other than COMI.NTo 

TOP SECRET 
-- - ------------------~ ·-··-· --- -

\ : ... : 

(3 r The capabilities of AJc'SA ·to produce the 

inf'orruation required, 

Co The USCIB Intelligence Committee will establish 

inte llisence priori ties as required for the 

guidance of A.FSA by majority vote, with an 

additional vote being cast. by the co.mmi ttee 

chairman in the event of a tiev 

do USCIB intelligence priorities will then be 

fori.varded to the Dir~1ctorp CONSIDO for coordination with the DIRAFSAo Such detailed 

interpretation as may be required by the 

AFSA Office of Operations and its technical 

priorities committees will then be obta1nedo 

2o (Depurtment of State reserved its decision on this 

paragraph. ) 

Command control of CONSIDO to be vested in a Special 

Intelligence Committee of JIC consisting or the three intelli~ 

gence directors of the V.ilit~ry Departments and the three in= 

telligence directors· from C!A 9 Department of State 0 anq the FBI: 

ao In the event of a difference in view between the 

committee members: 

(1) In the field of USCIB authority 9 the 

matter will be referred direct to 

USCIB for resolution~ 

{2) In fields other than those in (1) 

abovei the matter will be referred 

to JCS for resolutiona 

2 

TOP SECRET 
~ ·.AQp 

REF ID:A711-fi7 

SECRET "'-· 

bo In the event there is a question whether 

a subject of disagreement is referrable 

to USCIB9 the matter will be referred to 

USCIB for decision as to its acceptability 

by that agencyo 

3o consrno to be on organization not an ad hoc unit9 

It is essential to the proper functioning of CONSIDO that it 

have a clearccut organization with a fixed establishlaent to 

carry out its missiono It must be capable of meeting the con= 

t!nQing and varying needs of the participating departments and 

agencieso To assure permanence and continuity within the 

CONSIDO establishment~ the following methods ot organization 

would apply: 

a~ Functionso CONSIDO will provide such service as 

is considered neoessary to meet the needs of the 

participating departments and agencieso The 

particular functions involved in the provision 

of this service will be recommended by the 

D1rector 8 CONSIDO and hi.s Deputies and will be 

approved by the control body,, Nothing in these. 

arrangements will operate to preclude the performance by COUSIDO or at CONSIDO (within the 

meWling of Principle 5 below) of suoh functions 

or tasks as may be desired by any participating 

department or agenoy 9 subject only to liI!'.11= 

tations of space and facilitieso 

3 

TOP SECRET 
TOP 

bp Assignment of Personnelo CONSIPO will be es= 

tablished on a T/O basis with permanently 

assigned position vaoancieso These vacancies 

will be based on the interests and needs of 

the participating depart~ents and agencies 9 

and will be apportioned by ·the control bodyo 

All participating depart~ents and agencies 

will bear responsibility to keep their 

assigned vacancies filled insofar as possibleu 

c., (The member representing DNI reserved decision 

on this subparagrapho.l 

Control of Personnel~ Personnel detailed to 

work at CONSIDO on special operations (within 

the meaning of Principle 5 below) will remain 

under the operational direction of the aeency 

undertaking the special operation or be 

assigned temporarily under the operational 

control of the Director 9 CCNSIOO for the 

accomplishl!lent of the specific task in hand 

subject to agreement of the agency concernedo 

All personnel assigned to permanent position 

vacancies will be under the op~rational control 

of the Directorp CONSIDO by agreement with the 

respective deputies of the participating de= 

partments and agencies~ 

4 

TOP SECRET 
; 

~TOP RE!° __ ID:_~ 7 l'j'67 

SECRET \.~ 

d~ (The member representing DNI reserved decision 

on this subparagraphQ) 

Deputyo Each participating depart~ent or agency 

will assign a Deputy to the Director, CONSIDOo 

The Deputies will also serve as the responsible 

representati•es of their parent departments or 

agenciesc 

e~ Administration9 Administrative matters between 

CONSIDO nnd the participating departments and 

agencies will be handled throueh the appropriate 

Deputieac4? CONSIDO to disseminate the AFSA producto 

The entire .AFSA product will be made availuble to CONSIDOa 

CONSIDO will render information service to the intelligence 

agencies by making the AFSA product available in the form and 

manner best suited to facilitate research and action by the 

respectiv·e intelligence agencieso Every effort will be made 

to· reduce the general distribution of the AFSA product., AFSA 

will cease distribution of the AFSA product upon the es=. 

tabl1shment of CONSIDO except that (a} material requiring 

special handling will be disseminated in accordance with the 

needs of the intelligence agenoy primarily concerned and (b) 

all existing and future agreements approved by USCIB pertain=· 

ine to the AFSA product will be observed,. 

5 

TOP SECRET 
~ REF ID:A71~7 

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5o CONSIDO to conduct special operations by certain 

e.gencies 1 ioeo 8 ad hoc additional members for special proJectso 

Occasions will nris~ wherein important source material will 

temporarily increase in volume exceeding the capacity of assigned 

personnelo Or» ·again11 the nature of source materi.al may require 

higllly specialized knowledge for its proper exploitationo In 

either case CONSIDO will be unable to properly exploit the 

materisl ~t hando In such instances any or all of the interested 

participants could send special teams to augment the CONSIDO 

contingent until the material at hand has been either fully ex= 

ploited or brou3ht within the capability of CONSIDO~ 

60 Adequate Rrovision to be made for reasonable stability 

of personnel to permit continuity in functional oper~tiono 

Military personnel will be assigned to CO~SIDO for .duty 

normally for periods of not less than jO monthso Civilian 

personnel will be assigned with a view to promote the per= 

manence and continuity of CONSIDOo 

7o Chief of CONSIDO to be an official from one or the 

military departmentso 

JIC will normally select and nominate an of.ticer as 

Directors CONSIDOp and submit the nomination to USCIB for 

approvalo The detail as Director 9 CONSID0 9 normally will be 

rotated among the military departmentso 

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