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Filed 9/14/21 P. v. Hart CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RICHARD MAX HART,

Defendant and Appellant.

A159388

(Contra Costa County

Super. Ct. No. 5-190738-5)

Defendant Richard Max Hart appeals his conviction for failing to 

perform a legal duty following a car accident that caused injury. He contends 

the court erred in failing to modify a pattern instruction and that there is no 

substantial evidence to support his conviction. He also challenges a condition 

of probation requiring him to submit to warrantless searches of his person 

and vehicle for evidence that he is properly licensed and insured. We find no 

error and conclude that the search condition is neither unreasonable nor 

overbroad. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment and the conditions of 

defendant’s probation.

Background

Defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 

§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and hit-and-run driving causing serious injury (Veh. 
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Code,

1 § 20001, subd. (b)(2)). As to the assault charge, the information further 

alleged that defendant inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (Pen. Code, 

§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The jury acquitted defendant of both counts but found 

him guilty of the lesser included offense of failing to perform a legal duty 

following a car accident that caused injury (§ 20001, subd. (b)(1)).2 The trial 

court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on formal 

probation for two years on the condition that he serve 90 days in jail.

The following evidence was presented at trial:

1 All statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise 

noted.

2 Section 20001, subdivision (a) requires, as relevant here, that “[t]he 

driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to a person, 

other than himself or herself, . . . shall immediately stop the vehicle at the 

scene of the accident and shall fulfill the requirements of Section[] 20003.” 

Section 20001 subdivision (b)(1) provides the punishment for a violation of 

subdivision (a) and subdivision (b)(2) provides for an increased punishment 

where “the accident . . . results in death or permanent, serious injury.”

Section 20003, subdivision (a) requires the driver to “give his or her 

name, current residence address, the names and current residence addresses 

of any occupant of the driver's vehicle injured in the accident, the registration 

number of the vehicle he or she is driving, and the name and current 

residence address of the owner to the person struck or the driver or occupants 

of any vehicle collided with, and shall give the information to any traffic or 

police officer at the scene of the accident. The driver also shall render to any 

person injured in the accident reasonable assistance, including transporting, 

or making arrangements for transporting, any injured person to a physician, 

surgeon, or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that 

treatment is necessary or if that transportation is requested by any injured 

person.” Subdivision (b) of section 20003 required further that the driver, 

“upon being requested, exhibit his or her driver's license, if available, or, in 

the case of an injured occupant, any other available identification, to the 

person struck or to the driver or occupants of any vehicle collided with, and to 

any traffic or police officer at the scene of the accident.”
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Defendant and a coworker (the victim) engaged in a verbal dispute at 

their workplace, which became a physical dispute in the parking lot after 

they were asked to leave work for the day. After they were informed that the 

police had been called, the victim walked toward the exit of the parking lot

and defendant got into his car and drove towards the exit of the parking lot.

According to the victim’s testimony, as he was walking away he saw, 

out of the corner of his eye, defendant’s car speeding toward him. He tried to 

move out of the way but was unable to avoid the car. Another coworker 

testified that he saw defendant’s car swerve in the victim’s direction. The car 

struck the victim, causing him to land on the hood of the car, roll off the hood 

and land on the ground by the passenger’s side of the vehicle. The victim was 

clearly injured and his supervisor called an ambulance.

After the collision, defendant drove out of the parking lot, pulled over,

and walked back to check on the victim. About three to five minutes later, 

defendant returned to his car and left the scene. The police and an 

ambulance arrived after he left.

Defendant testified that he and the victim generally did not get along 

and that he would try to avoid him at work. On the day of the accident, the 

victim started the verbal disagreement and physically assaulted him in the 

parking lot. He testified that he was scared because “there were three 

employees observing, and nobody intervened.” He tried to get away but the 

victim kept attacking him. After his supervisor called the police and the 

victim started walking away, he ran to his car. As he was driving out of the 

parking lot, the victim ran in front of his car and he was unable to brake in 

time to avoid striking him. He pulled over to check on the victim but when he 

asked the victim why he had jumped in front of the car, the victim threatened 

him and his family. Several of his coworkers also approached and started 
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yelling at defendant. Fearing that they would attack him for having 

accidentally struck the victim with his car, defendant ran back to his car and 

drove home. 

About an hour after the accident, officers located defendant in a car 

being driven by defendant’s wife. Following his arrest, defendant told the 

officers that he initially stopped his car after the collision but decided to drive 

home when he heard his supervisor say that the police had been called. He 

believed he was in trouble and wanted to tell his wife he would be going to 

jail. Defendant told the officers that, at the time of his arrest, he and his wife 

were on their way to the parking lot so that defendant could turn himself in 

to the police.

Discussion

1. The jury was properly instructed.

The jury was instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 2140, in relevant 

part, as follows: “To prove that the defendant is guilty of [failing to perform a 

legal duty following a vehicle accident that caused injury to another person], 

the People must prove that: [¶] 1. While driving, the defendant was involved 

in a vehicle accident; [¶] 2. The accident caused injury to someone else;

[¶] 3. The defendant knew that he had been involved in an accident that 

injured another person or knew from the nature of the accident that it was 

probable that another person had been injured; [¶] AND [¶] 4. The defendant 

willfully failed to perform one or more of the following duties: [¶] (a) To stop 

immediately at the scene of the accident; [¶] (b) To provide reasonable 

assistance to any person injured in the accident; [¶] (c) To give to the person 

struck or any peace officer at the scene of the accident all of the following 

information: [¶] • The defendant’s name and current residence address; [¶] 

AND [¶] • The registration number of the vehicle he was driving. [¶] AND [¶]
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(d) When requested, to show his driver’s license to the person struck or any 

peace officer at the scene of the accident. [¶] Someone commits an act 

willfully when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that 

he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage. 

[¶] The duty to immediately stop means that the driver must stop his or her 

vehicle as soon as reasonably possible under the circumstances. [¶] To 

provide reasonable assistance means the driver must determine what 

assistance, if any, the injured person needs and make a reasonable effort to 

see that such assistance is provided, either by the driver or someone else. 

Reasonable assistance includes transporting anyone who has been injured for 

medical treatment, or arranging the transportation for such treatment, if it is 

apparent that treatment is necessary or if an injured person requests 

transportation. The driver is not required to provide assistance that is 

unnecessary or that is already being provided by someone else. However, the 

requirement that the driver provide assistance is not excused merely because 

bystanders are on the scene or could provide assistance.”

As particularly relevant here, the CALCRIM No. 2140 pattern 

instruction continues, “The driver of a vehicle must perform the duties listed 

regardless of who was injured and regardless of how or why the accident 

happened.” Defendant contends the court erred in refusing to modify this

sentence to read: “The driver of a vehicle must perform the duties listed, if 

reasonably possible under the circumstances, regardless of who was injured 

and regardless of how or why the accident happened.” He contends the 

modification was critically necessary for the jury’s consideration of his 

defense that “he was not guilty of violating section 20001 because he 

immediately stopped his car after the accident, fully intending to stay and 
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provide [the victim] with his information, but was unable to because he was 

in immediate fear for his safety.” 

The Attorney General argues that the requested modification is not a 

correct statement of the law and that in any event, any potential error was 

harmless in light of the court’s instruction on legal necessity. As the Attorney 

General notes, the jury was instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3403 on 

legal necessity as follows: “The defendant is not guilty of . . . the lesser crime 

of failing to perform a legal duty following a vehicle accident that caused 

injury to another person, if he acted because of legal necessity. [¶] In order to 

establish this defense, the defendant must prove that: [¶] 1. He acted in an 

emergency to prevent a significant bodily harm or evil to himself; [¶] 2. He 

had no adequate legal alternative; [¶] 3. The defendant’s acts did not create a 

greater danger than the one avoided; [¶] 4. When the defendant acted, he 

actually believed that the act was necessary to prevent the threatened harm 

or evil; [¶] 5. A reasonable person would have believed that the act was 

necessary under the circumstances; [¶] AND [¶] 6. The defendant did not 

substantially contribute to the emergency. [¶] The defendant has the burden 

of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different 

standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden 

of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it 

is more likely than not each of the six listed items is true.”

There was no error in refusing to modify the instruction. Defendant’s 

reliance on People v. Flores (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1199 is misplaced. In that 

case, the defendant was involved in an accident that caused injury to another 

person. (Id. at p. 1201.) Although defendant was rendered unconscious by the 

collision, when she woke after several minutes, she left the scene of the 

accident without fulfilling her statutory duties. (Id. at pp. 1201-1202.) On 
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appeal, the court affirmed her conviction and rejected defendant’s argument 

that she could not be held liable under section 20001 because “section 20001 

requires her to perform the duties specified in section 20003 only at the scene 

of the accident” and that “she was relieved of her obligations under section 

20001 because she remained unconscious until after the accident scene was 

cleared.” (Id. at pp. 1203-1204.) The court explained, “Section 20001 requires 

a driver involved in an injury accident to do two things: stop and fulfill the 

requirements of section 20003. Neither statute expressly limits the time or 

place for fulfilling the requirements of section 20003 to the scene of the 

accident. We must give penal statutes a reasonable and common sense 

construction. [Citation.] Implicit in both statutes is the obligation of the 

driver to fulfill their requirements as soon as reasonably possible. [¶] If a 

driver is unconscious, obviously she will not be able to comply with the 

requirements of section 20003 at the scene of the accident. Nevertheless, the 

literal terms of the statute apply to the unconscious driver. [Citation.] The 

reason the unconscious driver is excused from performing under the statute 

is that the law does not require the impossible. [Citation.] When the driver 

regains consciousness, compliance is no longer impossible and she must 

comply with the disclosure requirements of the statute as soon as reasonably 

possible.” (Id. at p. 1204.)

Here, defendant did not argue that it was physically impossible for him 

to provide the required information at the scene of the accident. He argued 

that his duty to do so was excused because he was in immediate fear for his 

safety. The instruction on legal necessity fully instructed the jury on the law 

relevant to that defense. Therefore there was no need for the modification.

(People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 31 [trial court may properly deny a 

defendant’s requested instruction if it is duplicative of other instructions 
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already given].) Moreover, because defendant’s defense was properly 

considered and rejected by the jury in connection with the legal necessity 

instruction, any possible error was harmless.

2. Substantial evidence supports defendant’s conviction.

Defendant contends that the prosecution failed to present sufficient 

evidence that he failed to perform a legal duty following an accident causing 

injury. He argues, “To the contrary, the evidence reflects that [he] brought 

his car to an immediate stop after the accident, and that [the victim] received 

prompt assistance. The evidence further showed that it was not reasonably 

possible for [him] to give [the victim] his information due to the 

circumstances of the case, and in any event [the victim] already had most of 

the information [he] was required to give him under section 20001.” The 

Attorney general agrees that defendant stopped his vehicle after the accident 

but argues that there is sufficient evidence that defendant either failed to 

render reasonable assistance or failed to provide the required information. 

We need not determine whether defendant violated his duty to render 

reasonable assistance to the victim because the evidence is both undisputed

and substantial that defendant left the scene of the accident without 

providing the required information to the victim.

Initially, whether or not defendant’s testimony would have supported a 

finding of legal necessity, other witnesses testified that defendant was the 

aggressor and disputed his characterization of the scene after the accident.

The jury was entitled to credit the testimony of these witnesses in rejecting 

defendant’s argument that his performance under the statute was not 

excused.

Similarly, defendant’s performance is not excused by the fact that the 

victim might have already known some of the information and could have 
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obtained defendant’s contact information through other means. Contrary to 

defendant’s argument, there is no evidence in the record that the victim 

already knew “most of the information” that defendant was required to 

provide under the statute. The victim testified that although he and 

defendant had worked together at the warehouse for several months before 

the incident, they both were temporary employees and the victim neither 

knew defendant’s last name nor had his personal contact information. More 

importantly, although the victim might have obtained defendant’s contact

information from their employer, nothing in the statute excuses the driver’s 

performance if the injured party can obtain the relevant information by other 

means. The failure to perform a legal duty following a vehicle accident that 

caused injury is a general intent crime. (People v. Scheer (1998) 68 

Cal.App.4th 1009, 1019.) Defendant’s belief that the victim could obtain his 

contact information some other way is irrelevant to his commission of the 

crime. (See People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1131-1134 [defendant’s

mental state is irrelevant to that offense].)

Accordingly, substantial evidence supports defendant’s conviction.

3. The limited search condition imposed by the court is permissible.

At sentencing, the court imposed conditions of probation prohibiting 

defendant from operating a vehicle unless he is properly licensed and insured 

and requiring him to submit his person and any vehicle under his control to 

search and seizure at any time of the day or night by a peace officer for 

evidence that he is properly licensed and insured. On appeal, defendant 

contends that the search condition is unreasonable under People v. Lent

(1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and unconstitutionally overbroad as applied. We 

disagree.
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Under Lent, a “condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it 

‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, 

(2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or 

forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality.’ ”

(People v. Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) The “test is conjunctive—all three 

prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation 

term.” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) In In re Ricardo P.

(2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1122, the court reaffirmed the Lent framework and 

explained that the third prong requires a “degree of proportionality between 

the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests 

served by the condition.”

The condition of probation imposed here is related to defendant’s crime. 

Section 20003 expressly requires the driver in an accident involving injury to 

provide the injured person with proof of registration and, if asked, to provide 

proof of a valid driver’s license. In addition, the court reasonably required

defendant to maintain current insurance on any vehicle he drives. Sections 

4462, 12951 and 16028 require a driver to present a driver’s license and

evidence of vehicle registration and financial responsibility upon the 

command of a peace officer under varying circumstances. The condition of 

probation requiring that defendant “obey all laws” incorporates these 

requirements into the terms of defendant’s probation. The limited search 

condition imposed by the court facilitates the monitoring of compliance with 

these conditions. Moreover, if the documents are demanded by an officer, a

search can be avoided by presentation of the requested documents.

Accordingly, the condition is not unreasonable. 

Nor is the search condition unconstitutionally overbroad. “A probation 

condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must 
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closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being 

invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 

Cal.4th 875, 890.) “The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the 

closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the 

burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, 

of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical 

necessity will justify some infringement.” (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 

1149, 1153.) The search condition imposed in this case is limited and

sufficiently tailored to meet the legitimate purpose for which it was imposed.

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.

POLLAK, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, J.

BROWN, J.