lenta.1 extm.pl • in a .ft.pan••• aUJ""My ...a. during, the por1 M. e h-

-......,.!' 1Wl -to !l Ootober 1Q.U 1how how Worme.Uon ft.I obt..ind. by the 

lap*21.••• beoe.us• or la.ak ot aeouri ty preo .. utiOtlJI on th• pe.rt <>t u. I. ,.t'f c>t1M 1. fhe d.ooWDlitnt 1 ta toa a 

•n ... y be •••n 1n tM at:!aumulation ot battle l .. •o~ whioh 

tollcnr that •ld.n1 u.• ~ •l'.la:!lY oommunioa.tion b ot p-ee,t vs.i~ in operatione. Xn al!d.ition to rrteoting OU!' own oommunication 1ecurjty, ... 

ldat do our utmo1t to develop our own op•rat1oll9 a.dvtud;agemal~ by obtaining 8Jl9!11Y intelligeno• through t.ho u1e at radio. 

"It 1a well to hnve a ••para.to enen:y oomnun1-oation 1eotion 

t.ttaoh.d. to eaoh ool'!&l.nd whlah ha1 a dil'eot part in the opere.t on. 

lpeob.l.ista 1hould b9 -.de ot interoeptian peraonnel. to tro.in them tor 

tt.d dutiff and. to &Toicl ohanging their aad.gnments. '1'h. fol Lowing 

U. •~tea ot 11.dT&ntage being '\a.Qn ot •tlie'.Il:IY oomauxdo11.tione. 

~ a(1Yftlent ot ene:iicy- pl..wt• ~ air be..t .. in the Al •utian 

Arohipelago ,,... ln g.x.ral interred by "W.J'iations o£ aignal atrength. 

'.thU .... ut1ed to advantage in o}l9ra.tiona. 

•4t the t1- ot 'he air a.tte.olc en X>utoh 8t.rbor, the u~ter eonha1on. ot th• aDAbo/t• J11;0YeIJMmta 1t'M Z"Mlhed 1.mmediai,•ly b;y tt• •?lEll!ly 

•mJ!Ml"i1ee.t1onti •.aet1on on the tlv~hip e.n4 illportant d.e:ta ..-a.a obtained. 

"Jn th• be:ttle ot the Coral ••a the trequenr-ies ot al ore-baaed 

Uid. ~r1er airoro.ft were 1"'11 known, ainoe th• v-a.te?' part d' the •nel!IY 

1tmimun1011.tion waa in plain lQ.nt;Uap. • 

Another part o~ the japanan survey givea ·~lee ot thnir gaining 

iftlu.a\>1• infonnation tr~ u. a. tranamiuiona in ole'flr text. 

l. 

CONf IBE NllAL 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 09-20-2013 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 

') 
l±l I -~-~--~----~--------------..... ...._ REF ID:A71904 

CONFIDENliAl 

•.in th• battle ot the Oo~ lea p1ain-langua.go oommun1011.tioruJ 

wttioh ftr• ~e4 by the enemy (generally •ooutin.g p1a.me oommun1oa.t1ng 

the dboovery ot our 1hipa) were frequently intercepted,, t.nd. we obtained 

:ld.ter1.al ot oond.d.era.b1• 'ftlue 1.n th• oonduot ot opeta.tiona. 

•.tn the aa:me U.'ftl battle, the 4uatra.lien &M. A.me.t'ioe.:n a.ir 

toroes 0C1tm.unioated to their baa• by plain language rtef'y move:iont made 

tolloring d.laooney- ot Japanea• uni ts. •• ... "' thl.19 a.ble to tal"eoaat th• 

a:ttaolce ot ftleJllY plane• through tho cosaunioationa, and to d.edio• the 

M'Y8dhts of •:nem;y t&ek toro••. 

ttwben •JMtlq planes :ra.ided l:blca, we ••~ g•n•:tall;y ab'te to 

tor•oaa t 1 t tram the repo:i'ts ot •llelrlY wn.thtlr 1oouting planea prior to 

the t.tta.atc.• 

• f;ANf Ul~"' ! t•f_ 

-.... ......... ________________ ~~-
Jlat.rro~tion ot la.panes• !nte11ige:nott otti.,.re a tfl'lf month.II ·~o 

brought iio lighis .. mumer ot W1etul taota about th• wa.tu:re .. extent, and. 

tuOdfl ot tn1AnDy' •rtorb :l.n iihe field ot ooawnio•tion itttelU.genou .. 

.. ptti.ally trattie ana119b. One ot the ottiaer• WU a Oom:nandar H:l.d.eo 

o.--. and '\he other wu :Lt. Oommand.•l' !. latu... lo'th held by porite in 

the radio 1D.t•1U.gac. eeotion of' -bhe 4apamae •val .. Mra.1 8tatt during moe t o-r th• war. 

O....da 'ftl th• oenter ot the aoth1.ty deaoribed by CS.an. and 8·•take. 

•N Al.lied tranamiedona "r• interoepwd.. oopilld.. and 1orted. 'by ue .... 

tun ... :re ~t'V911 ot '\he•• &r•aa .. ih• weat oout at th• tbdted atateJJ, 

~ iadJ.q Oo-.n u4 tiT• d:l.f'terut 1eotora ot th• .hol.tio. l•ve:u.1 o~- , ' . fio•._ ••H a.•ignad. to euh. area. !hot1gh uully unab1o to deoic• 

whriher \rancd.HioM o-.e tram. lhifl or ahortt ata:tiOIJ.8,. mini;y ia.nel;yata 

ueff. dinotion tin4•n to de-tend.ma th• poin't: ot origin. 

hldlli: '1clmrn u an •::dl:lllJ>l•, la take mad• a •·ta:\91Unt u tor on• 

.... month bator• (Jdnawa., ti:YS • • • had • uatabl.• ino~u· in tra.11a-

.ld.11iona. fen 4aya 'befon yOUl" <ld.ne.wa operation_ th.re waa a -.ftc•d. 

b.oreaa• !n •11lmio.l"in• rspert:I. l'he.e ar• ea.y to tpot bHau•• we oould. 

en good dlreotion-tindar fuea ... th.y olca(td in. WJ.n 1111bnarin•• 

~ed troa routin.• gperatlona.1 aamnunioationa to urger.ct:, we hdllOed that 

,...,_,. us. air atrib or landing might. be in th• offing, 4epm41ng upon 

th• taatica.1 aituation. 

--., -.btm ubd what was th• cnatest 1Uoo•H ol m,..l rliio inwl.ligenc• lJ1 pr941ot1ng f'uture operationl 1 JUUll9d. the Jre.rehalla C:p4tr-

&,iOne -W. got the word to the gurb ona in '\U.. to b4t r4 •0111• l •lp 

~t thq 1houl4 pnpue for an attaolc, 111 he atatM.. ..gariing t'h• 

'-'ii ot h fl"'*d.iotd.on, h9 expld.ned u tollon 1 
REF ID:A71904 

•1~b.g gr_. intense. lath 1hip and ail"oratt volume ot rad.lo 

tr&nmd.e•ioll9 ro1• to a ,.ale, and. .... w.r• able to piok up a tflff p1ain 

1~• 'broadoae~. I N118lllber OJJe 1aying leneral o1da would ar '"in 

thortl;r." 

Our a.lroratt o:tten ga.,.. awa.y their pla.na. Wha. B-19* pnparad. to 

. tu;e ott •tlJ.ere •aa JllUOh ad.jW1ting of radio trequeno1••. 11 

' CftMtUir ••~•Pr t 
REF ID:A71904 

t):.9 tallodng ol-.r te..ct •••AgfJ, logged by a. radio aecur1 t;y oi1

-

ticer in .Hal1, u a ahining exaaple ot how pt.an. •y 'M r11vealed t•J tM 

«tlfJJll.yl lalA v .llll •••• RF.SSA.Gt Fat too •••• SRtTISl! wxu. ElE rranG tn.Cll 1! 

TO 1!145 TOl>.AY AT FOLLCWING ronn.'S 908-l4S, 883-141, 8G4-15o ••• .KEQJJ:af 

f()j no •or Flltt tm'.SE POD.rrs J.'f TR.ll ! na:; ..... nm YOU ~ THAT .... ovm. 

An.other 1noident .ar1y in tha .lna1o oampaign illustrates th.a waate or 

.upptioe th:'oUgh th• oanpromi1e of loc .. tiona by mUWIO ot comunioE tion&e 

J,n. advancing ta.Wt be.tte.lion radioed. b'2.ck in th• olear the t an eN'!li' 

~«i:>unteratta.ok waa UXld•r •~Y a.Dd u'ked. 'that all tra.f'fio be •'topped tt.t • 

tpteitied town 'behin4 the 11.nee. lerman lnt•rc•pt notiti ad. 1 ts air 

torot and within 11.n hour a. aquac!ron or planes we.a atrl.f'i:c..t a long oolumn 

f.>t tra.ttio halted on th• roa.d. ~ 'truoka, je11p9. and. cnU'• w•r• wr•olr»4 

1-yd r•pUr, but ~~ bporta.nt atill -.. tha Jl.Ullber or •n kill..,,. 

" 

A 
REF ID:A71904 

CtitJftBflGf:-1 - ett;.n du.ring the war violation.a ot radio •eouri ty Oll a1ror9.ft oir ... 

wits provided the enemy with valuable information. An out.ta.nd1r g exaple ot thi1 ooourred after the first air re.id. on Tokyo in April ot 

1SM.t. !he BctmE'i and th• ENr:ut?RlSE had been 1ighted. It n.a in1•ortant 

to the Japanese to lmow what they would do next. Would. ilhey retw n to 

'9Ul llar'bor t<> r•tu•l or might they eteam •outbsa.rd to 'the Coral. Sea? 

for ••nr•l dqa •ilenoe •urrounded the carrier•. M they approaohed 

r..r1 Barbo?"• howeTer, aD! began to launch plan•, th• air-... en'\ivoned 

with unneoeHaq and unauthori1ed oonnraation which diaolo••d. thi• pre• 

aenoe ot th• oarrier•. %t •'8 known that :lm,portant in1'oru.t1on o,n .. 

e•ming the 111arrier. .... reachine: tho Japanese• and an examinatio 1 ot 

dron.tt olrcui t toga at about 'bhia 1;ime 1hond that diao1otturH '111.d 

been made by pilots. !he traquenai•• then in \US• nre t&vorable to long• 

~6.rtg• interception. 

Co!'l'ecti'V9 aotlon was ta.ken and the pilot. learned their l••eon 

wll. 'When th• carriers le.rt harl Jllrbor and h•aded toward the Coral 

8e,a, 'tbs radio •i1enoe ot their planes wu undieturbed and hops ran high. 

Perhaps the oarri•r• could g9t to the Coral Sea area b•f or$ th• r•:xt 

Japanese puah whioh ••emed to be •ha.pine; up. 'fheb. patrc,.l plan.ea notioed 

the departure ot the oarriert and begui. ta.liing. The i1 Lt'ol"JMtioz ottered 

by the patrol planes may not have h•lped the Jape in making thei1• plana, 

but the .llilUrnT and the EN'l'ER.m'.tlE ar:ri ved too late. 'lhlil patrol planes 

Hoe1ved ac:.n.e •uperhoated e.dvioe regarding radio 1ileno9 and th• de• 

tirability ot reporting only ·~ •hips. 
REF ID:A71904 A 

CuHfiui:N i iAl 

?Ji.iring the Salerno oampa.ign,. a regimental acnmiander ordeJ"ed one 

'battalion -to relieve another at 2300. trntortuna.wly,. the 'battalion 

~oin& reliev.d •P•nt most of the e..rt~r~oon disous•ing the detail• ot the 

.O• on the 'battalion oOiiltla.nd net. 

~t before 2SOO houri,. at th$ oritioal moxr.ent when the bettalion 

holding the tront 11ne W1lJI due to move oft Nl.d. the incoming b•ital1on 

ftj-mafehing up t'f'om. ilblt rear to ta.lot ovor the poaitic~n. th• GtrJZU!Lru! 1aunohe4 

& heavy at~olc with two uaault oomps.nies brought up eapeoiall) for the 

~utpa1•. linoe neither 'battalion was prspared to ••t 'the atte olc1 the 

O.rmarie wan 1tiitial •UooeBB .. ,. and it took three d-.,. of" J:wa.vy tighting 

to re1to:tv the situation. 

ntaonen ot war atterwarde eaid. that the attack ~ :mado u a 

r.1nlt ot interoeption ot our radio tratt10. 
A 

J)urinc tlie battle of Qeru.ny, •Ii int.rcept operaton were 1•rtiau1arly o!l the alert tor .Allied report• renaling that certain u·oaa 

tn.ide Oermany were not mined. Po11mring interception 0£ this ini,ellige:noe, 

~· v.as "'91'8 mined i:alnsdiately. and into the•• trap1 walked mlited 

l'bate1 inte.ntry men. 
REF ID:A71904 

:t.n the latter part ot 194.4,, a lJl:l.1. tttd S.ta.tea inta.ntr;y d.ivid. on be· 

oa;mit inoi"ffairi&ly ea.rel••• a.bout its rad.io procedure. IDemy 1nter-

~1ont of tran1miliaiona containing operator "obat". oharaoteristio 

•ending. ll.ll.d plain language had revealed. the identity ot all r•gim.enta 

within tho di vision. Jarly in Deo«m.bor 1944, th• di vision launched a 

-.j or a ttaok. The •Mm;y we.a li•tening u usual. and. ?M!Hagos 1ent by 

the .Gi•rloe.n diviaion ~&led the time ~ attack and other pertinent 

intorxa~iori. !he1e tranamiuiona wero Llteroepted in t1m.s tor the enemy 

to take etteoti-... eountermaasurea and arrange favorable artillery amplaom!!9nts. !be .American attack was beat~n back with heav,y 1oaaea. 
REF ID:A71904 

ta. th. 1a1ster phu• ot the lllied atten.iw in hrope,, a reccnnabaanae 

tlane 1poiitod a ecmaenration o~ ~ whiol•• ,..._ .. 'bro O.:rmar 

"11s:l.ee. !he pilot inatl"l.lotecl hi• operator to tranamit thia iJLtelligenoe I 

tD hill bue requeetbig :bned.iate a!.1" aupport. T!nthb1kingly, the <·para'bor ••nt this reque•t ln the clear. tnelnJ' 1nteroeption 11iio'kly uaimulated. thia !~oration and aeted to correot an awkward dtuatlon 117 H• 

routing tlw vehiolea te a new looation. !he l.mr1can attaolr:,, d.irocted. 

a'b th• p-nioua 1ooation. ,,.... trui tleaa. 
REF_ID:A71904 

CDNf i~~ft l IAt 

M. the 1e.,uri \y ot eeyptoayatn.a hu improved, •o ha.a the '9JmOll'-how" 

ot aryptana.1)'11 ta, both our awn and •n~. h 1.noident early i)l the :worth 

~ria• ouipaign illuttrat" this point. An enoiphorltd ••••git WU aent 

\:ietweon t.o Brlti1h unit.. !he Mll&ge waa iirtieroepted and br >lcen b:y 

the Clena.n.,. 'lfho uoiphered 'the reault in a thran a71tem and ruahed ii; 

'\lo Jerl:tn. fhe ll"ittah inw.roepted th• hrman •H&gct, and.~~ broke 

J.i. they dlaoowr•d, auoh to 'Uuair ohagrln, ~t ~ Ger.mans iren nadlnc th8:lr 1uppoaedly aeaure o!pber, a:od ~ ooun• ehallgec1 i-41 1 :1. a hurry. 

Pl ot thie took plaoe within a 24-hour period • 

A 

.............. 
REF ID:A71904 

"il"tl I 

!he oontenta ot •seag•e -.y often 'be • 1 ouro• of' dangH in ope:rat1oiw, or the laok ot •Uttioient int'orm&tion eontab1.ecJ, in •••••ges. l>t.lr1.ng 194.~, an •nemy aubma..rilUt ..,.. able to dnk one 01' our 1hip11 and eaoapct 

.from .a.ir:\can ,,.ter• ~01.uae ot inoam.pl9t• meuuea, and !'ailLJ.r• to • •nd 

a :m.eaeage a'i all. The ~bma:rine 111.ight have bef1ll. destroyed borore it 

ocUld do dama~e had not an;y one o!' the f'ollcmint errcrra: oecur red 1 J. 

pl.a.nil reported l'escue or •u+vivore but tailed to giva the tuu of the 

.-ttaak, the poaition ot the attack, the course of th~ sub, or its oondJ. t:lonJ another plan• ru,gleoted to make an B:!lplifyin.g report nnd waeted I 

time a:;king a question to lll'hioh 1 t should he.ve known the anaw•>r J a third 

•1ar.e tailed to give the poait1ar. of the sub or to col!lllrunioa.tu with a 

1!.ane which waa 1n a poaiUcm to &••1•t• It hil•d. also to na.ke amplify• 

lzic l"lport. promptly, in au.tt1cient detail• and in plain lanctage inl'M•4 ot eod•. lpee4 WM rttal, and the information wu of Uttle nlu.e 

to 1;he •r:llfm;f. 

:tn a.nQther o ... • ~oaplioated 'by the laok ot ollU"i ty in a 1 eaaar;•, 

4ur1ng the tinal JllOilth ot the lfar 111 the .Pa.citio •• task crou~ made 

ft41.J" aor.taot wi tb. .n unident1t1•d eu.bmaril:le. .All •ftorta at r•Oogni t1on 

ta.11•4,, d•ibilit)'" waa poor, a.ocl the •ubmarin• gave 1nd1oa.t1o:u of b•ing 

hottil•· At thi8 poin~ one of the ct .. troy•n in 'tbe taak group retie1v.d 

f. Jflii1jag9 trom the 'taU p-oup OQl!!OB.Dd•r whiah ..... under1tood to Ital.tea 

•0101• 'tllrget evaluation i• w-.;y attack and deatrot'. th• destroyer 

t.t'taoked and. the ~get di.aappee.rod. tater 1 t we.a ditoovered that the 

•u'b,.... one ot OUT own. What th• aeeea.,e aotually •aid wae, "~loa• 

"11argot a.nd 1.t evaluation b ·~ d•atroy it•. 

' bv/11· .UJ _!tr;~#: 

I 

-.. 

-

... 

-.,. 

. 

" , 

::; 
A 

IQ&ti ti on ot aesaage e lerc.entc ia a • ouroe ot muoh 1na ecuri ~ , e..a tM 

d.ten4era ot Corregidor tound during the Japanese oonquest of tho Ph.1111-

fine&. On 'Wte C•Tt.te •hore about t811 mile• •Outhe .. t ot Corregidc•r were 

'ba.tteJ"ies of J .. pan .. e artillery whioh ah•lled Oorrtlgirlor and the j'ort1-

' 

tied la land.a intend ttently. During the a.1.r ra.ido ot the next t•r 

IR6nths a •peoial ood• word was adopted to warn ·v·ete•b ot the inahOl'e 

' ,,. ' 

patrol when an air rd.d waa expected. fhe detendera or Corregido" d.1ao°"'ff4, alter a while, that the Japa.n111e battoriee on Cante wou Ld begin llhelling CorregidoJ' ff'Yery time the oode word tor air raid ,.,.. broadoqt 

~ tho !.:mhor• patrol. !hia ahe111ne; waa erratio, but 1-h har&3ae1 th• 

p Cl:t*'f9 ot tlw anti-aironl't 'be.tteriea enough to impair their ef'-

t.ctivenq•• U.• ot the coda word was 4iaoontinued, and the ,..•••l• ot 

the inahore pa.trot were required to 11-ten tor th• airer_ <.n Corr•gidor 

Qt •l•• lld.ntain their own lookout. tor air raids. The 1helling f'rom 

tho Cavite ahore during air raids deoree.aed exoept when bomber1 $pproached 

t1'0IA the aoui;heast, thue pud.ng oftr th• enmy gun pod tiou. 

1:S 
.4\ t1 ... the method ot proaeae1ng meaaagee ha.a pro4uo•d oompro~l•• 

•ituatione, the method• uaed being eonducive to •rZ"or am therefore 

faulty. !n one of'.f'lo•, ~or example, it was an ••tablhhed custom hr the 

p1ain text ot a •H&p to accompany the oeyptotext all ihe wa.y to 'the 

wl.typ• operator. who trammitted the oryptotext and late til•d bo1h 

"9t1iona ••JJ&rately. One day an inexpttri«J.oed t.l•'t1P""riter opera1or 

who wu doi!Jf; hl.1 beet \o keep up with hcn.vy tra:f'tio transmitted. bcrlh 

the encrypted and. the plain-text Teraiou ~ Olla ot t.he .-i:.1e.gea, a:11d it 

..... au1-aqutntly r.lay•d. by radio. !h• :method ot procesalng was abi·uptlt 

ebnged. but the oorxmun:loation otticer, who wu experienced but had been 

1 ttationed at that headquarter11 only thr•• d.aya, recdved an otfioia 1 

rttprimand beoauae he had not aoted before a oomprom.11• could ooour. 

:tn anoth•r inatanoe an h.oxper1enoed and r•latiTe1y untrained 1somJ11Un1cationa ot'fic•r waa aoting aa oontrol and b.endl1ng nearly lo ti•11ea the 

11D1"Jdl amount <>t trs.f:N.o. neorypted •111a.gea wen brought to th» r a.d.io 

ihaok to be typed. OM day a decryption whioh wu not properly •r ced, 

•i ther u a o1aaalfiecl ••••g9 or u a deoryi>t1an, tound i t:e wa.y by 

ldttake into th• radio tiles and waa l.a.ter 'branandtted in reeponae eo a 

,_queat tor a teP6tition. 

C'S Cb' !' s z ? - tr n , btrtm· d, 
REF ID:A71904 tOM .... i:l, '"t. i' ! I 

!&ldn& a pace from. the enern;y'• notebook, wo m7 derive a leseon in. 

-1.ntainini the 1eourU.y of u. s. aryptosyetems. The tol.l.md.ne extract;a trom. 

the t.J."'a.n•lAtion ot a captured Japanese clooum.ent. make it clear \.."lat t.he Japanese 

a.pected tba.lr own cr,ypto""°aphed .mesaagea to be attacked by CIJptanal,ylia, and 

\::t7" impllcat.ion., that they wre expe.n.din.:; considerable effort to bre:ik J. s. 

errPtosraphed trattic. 

11Klt.n.,y yoar9 Of 8tud,y have gone into the compilation Of C"J.r latest. &l'll\Y 

coda booka, which embody apec1al original systems., and we can bo con1'1·1ent ot 

achievin.6 security 1n the face o! incroaaineJ.7 determined ac1entifio •Upionage. * 

It • have 8.lJ¥ w1proved •U•piciomJ baaed on doubt.!'ul 1nfomatio11, thas·• ehoul.d 

be thoroua.'ll.:r investigated and care taken net to ca.use naedl.ese an:JJ.iet.r to 

hiDier authorit,y. !a.!!!. countries acientilia esp1pnage !!.!!! &2. J!.2. s~ lens!':£! 

ea brin, m. b4lar !h! utmost int.elllnnce !!!. order ~ break ~ !. ~~.. ~a.kin.~ 

H13P!diate fdvan~ses .2! ~ the sllshteat flaw, ~ ~ !?,[ concent.raMne every 

&.-Q $. .Y!!!» will break !h!, .!?.2· For this reason we must. SjJBre no effort to 

obtain definite concrete pr-oot • ••• 

"Ju.st. aa ants ma.y enter t.l'lrou~ one hole and destroy everythin~. \G.thi.n,, ao 

.-ntn a tritliog error oay lead to th• loss or a whole IU."I:\Y• Therefore: it is 

expected that. hencetort.?l. code di..scipl1ne ahaJ.l be maintained 1n use ot codes., 

eo that by all~.::; abeolute.1¥ no error• to oreap in.t the sec1.i.rity or tJ1e codes 

can be preserved. • • • 

"It ia of t.i.10 utmost isn,{:.ortance tnat '!"'9 ahoul.d make cont:Lnoouo pre ~eas with 

our cod.ee, so th.at persistent eo.em;r scianti.t'!c intelligence Dll'..Y not cat oh ua up, 

trJa.Panese tem.s;-for enq- cryptanaly•i•. 

-----------~--- - ----------
{ 

.. 

~ '; 

.. 

'a. 

and that we should "cognize the necessit.:· tor uni.11.terrupted re1ee.rch endeavors 

under all cin:.umetancee. It wo interrupt our atudies 1n this d1rectic•n 1n ti.1e 

belief that our present eta.rnard is adeq,l.4.ate, even ter.i.porarlly, t!te e:-.~ 'Will 

outwit us b,y scienti..fia 1nte1li~ce 1!18thods and wo will be liable to eutfer 

undesirable results. Since !irat.-rat.e .mat.Lematical research 1o requ11vd tor 

theoretical study of these matters, iie must redouble our ef'torta and r.atural.ly 

•ke full wsa o:t mathamatioia11s ot h.1.gh standin.;. In t!'!.is direct.ion,, al..l. 

oou.ntriee are onergetical1y turning their attention. Howeve.:.~, oUl" coc.ea have ot 

late made great strides fol"\:ard and while t'ley ee8!il to have reached tr .e peak of 

per.tecticn in this matter, under the circumstances mat."iematic&l study must be 

1ncrea=ied and. our code.s •et on a eecu.re eoientif'ic footing. Striving atter new 

-.nd oric:;ina.l. crjpto~ra,r.hic methods, n 'fll!l.:J' sxpect that our codes will lead t.he 

•rld and tn~ ac~rl.eve the most important taator iii aisnals security. • . • 

tts1nce ~ c.u:::t ar ticipate tnat even our be•t technical scha;.es will at once 

'be eurpas•ed bJ" t.ne tn.8.iili.Y'• technical offensive, we must be victorioue in the 

keenq contested deci•ive eattle ot acience and once and .for al1 aecwe o'V8r the 

enerq a position or dacdn.ation in technical .matters. • • • F..quipnent has not as 

,.et attained the desired objective, eit~er becauee of a low standard c! aoncealment or becau•e of reluctance to put it into general use throu.;.::iout t..tie A1"t13. 

Tb• National An.1¥ will hencefort;.1 redouble its 01~.forts in the tec..~icel field to 

overcome di.!"ticulties tnat appear insuperable, and will preserve its ,i:reeminent position in a science pec..i.llarl.y Japanese 1n nature. It is o1 the ut:nost 

importance at preaent. that in this mtter we a;1ould t.nus aurpass the ~ne:ny and 

oontribute to the ultimate perfection of our arms •••• n 

It i• intereatin!,; to note that the Japane•e feared their codes TIC u1d 

-~ be broker., yet insisted. that t .ose codes were secure. Tne.r aeera.cd .m1J d.1¥ 

t £. 

i': · ·· ·· .. · . i ~I 601tf hirit I•"~-
REF ID:A71904 

GONf 16~N I lAl 

hT•t•ri.cal ori both. pointa. The U. s • .Arm;y 1a attitude !a that ita c:cyptographio 1yetems, SID. Y!!!l 1ccoJ'd!nL .l2, 1nat.ryctiona, provide adequate 

•ecur1.t1 tor the t,ype of cq1nm.icationa tor which they are authorized. 
llovin,g cautiously ahead during mop-up operatiqna on KwaJal•in, a coral 

atoll of the Karahall l•lands, a U. S. llarL~• stumbled. across t..he body ct a 

dead Jap. This in itself •s no u..'luau&l occurrence for that not d.a,y in 

.Janu.a.r,, 19M., but the rs.ct t.hat the marines •:;• was attracted 'by a •te1'-

eoaked sheet 0£ paper lyin;: next to the bod.7 started a chain o:f o1rcumshantial evidence which cl.ear~ demonstrated the io.portance or report.inf all 

poes1ble loaaos of 017Ptographic documents. It developed that the pa.per 

was a cmtographic document extensively used in the Pacific area at th• time, 

!Nld Japanese wtitine an the document -. later translated to read "dece1ved. 

J Janual')'" 1944"'. 

Bllb•eq~ent i:iwat.igation raveal.ed that the document nad orie;inal.l) been 

:l.aaued in bulk to the Chief Signal Otf'icer tor redietribution to t.he An111· 

Air Forces for ua• in the Pacific area. 'fne pa.rt.icular docmont \'8.8 t1·aced to 

a eerta.in 'bomber comnand inYOlTed in the lnjalein campaign. Purthor ~.nveetiA 

gation n&l"l"O·t1ed the eearoh down to a epecific equadron ot the bomber ornm:1and, and 

ft'entuall;r it liaa found through questionine the aquadron com:nander tha:. one o! 

the !.iberator Bombers 1n his equs.dron had been ehot down in shallow water near 

th.e beach where tho water-soaked document had been discovered. The squadron 

comnander, nein~ t.ha Japaneee car.-tUJ"• the plane and its cm, reported the 

loss of the plane and. aaaumed. that hieher authority would ta.l::e care of the 

4ocument, 1inco 1t was carried oc all t.he planes or that mission aa a part 

ot the equipnent. 

The fact. remaina that. no one reported loss of t.ii.e docum.-ant. until it was 

too late. 'The Japanese had received the doc\111.ent on .3 January, and the 

dead Jap was not fowtd unt!l 8 January. Th.is means that it is ver-J llkel,y 

the Japa..~ese were reading our tactical air-ground mesaa~ea, and any o~her 

m1 .. •a;;e1 • .,,t in that. partic.J.ar 1yat.am, tor a period of five days at tho 

height of a critical campaign. f!df4j;':lif J.i 1 lif 
. REF ID :A71904 

CQNf IBtk i •Al 

Sworn 1t.ateir.ents reporting that. ai=-ecitic orypt.odoc;aente have beer 1nadvertantl.J" cleetroyed b7 bumin: and :Nqueatin.: release tnm accountab1.11ty 

at"e tZ"equent]Jr r~eivod by accountinc: head .. uartera. One auch El.8&& ._e 11&a 

l"9ce1ved trom tho aecur1ty otticer at a cert\l:in Port of Embarkation, aimouno1ne the loss o! a docul'llent containln~~ a llet of typea or inat&lla.tiona using & 

or;ypt.o8yst.m uaed by t?l.e A.l'!:\V. The document •s suO.equentl.Y ren:oved. from. 

aocountabilit.y aft.er a routine ir·irestigation, and th0 case "GU tor;;otten. A 

tew .aont.he later the document reappeared myateriou.aly and the puzzled port 

eecurity officer reported that fact and 'W8l'lted aceountabilitjr resuned. 

All t!le CLployeea or t.h.e sic:;nal ottice were questioned b;r i."!.vest:Lglltors, 

ancs it 11aa learned that a woman mm:ployee of the establiehmeni had takin the 

document hc::m9 with herJ she claimed she 'VIBnted to atudy the docment t.o lean1 

all the eetabliet-iments 1n this cou.-itry u.sint tae Cl'J"Ptosystera., so ai':.e could 

A 

appl,y tor a. job elsei.·.bere. An 1 ~vest.ieat iai of the WQ".'la..'\ • • put re cc rd revealed t.h.at 

ah• had. or1.;:1n~lly been trclearedR at Bolline Field, and 11ubee::1uentl.y diem!Hed 

tor 11BUspicious aotions," and t.at two other a1r force installations had disJliaaed her tor the &1me reaeon, althoueh not.bing was ner ";ainned't Ol her. 

The 'WO.IDD.n ,.... d.iemls•ed. from her job at t.ne port signal ottice, but the 

tBI requested that 11hct not be prosecuted, as the Inspector General rdcommended., 

M they 4ea1red to keep her mo'V8r.\enta undor wrwillance. 

c;'!c-._(w_ !'-Y)\,lil?'·~ '!.,. - - 'ii •'flJl"fu' 

,,.. __ --.... - .,,, ..... --·---
-

' 

REF ID ·A.:11904 

• .A tint ll•uten.ant in enar&• of a oode NOm in Canada QW'ed b.11 freedom 

and relativelf hoo.orable reputation t.o t:t'3 elem.enc,y o! t.n.e .P.residert. 

fiaited bf id.a w:U'e one day, ha "puU..ed. n.nk" an • eecuritJ-minded e•l"i;e&nt., 

W!'io protested t,h.e violation o! eecurit,y regulat.iona., and pen:dtted bis wUo 

to cte:r tl1e ~ode f'OOQ. no ehOl\ed h1a wife c..ne or t.he chief cr,ypt.o.aach1nea 

in use lv' t.h• A:t;,y, and let her encipher mesaaz•~ ~ .ne pleased. lb• 

Hrltlea.rit, 1li10 !1Ad. covered ~wr;rthin_ in •iGflt., left and retui~ed wi~.h the 

pt»at. in.telli.;ence oi'.ticer, who placed the lieutenant under arrest. m.der t.he 

.,.._ of tt.:e wife he wae trying to impress with h1s importanco. Tho officer 

. 'Illa found guilty at tho aou.rt-itartJ.al llhicb follomd1 and ;:as sentene~ to 

four yaU"a •t. hard. labor,, and a diahonor&.bl$ dbchart;e. In rav1ewi..'lc the 

oaae, the h-esidcmt eo11r.i.uted t!le •ant.ence t.o a reprim!.!1d aa..;J. aubs~umt 

t.r&!1.tter to another •tation. 

A 

__ . ________ __........__ ~----- --

~-----------------~ 
---.------

6DNf~~1904 • ID'..,.. ...... ;._ 

A llajor at an ordnance plant ie now 1'u1l7 oonecious of •ecurity rEgulaUone aa a result of t.wo bitter e:r.periences. A.fter being cha1·el~d with 

loeing a CI'jPtograrhic document ror •~•1ch be could not a.::cou.n':., the Ma.:or 

t"equeated that his account be io.actinted. He was nthrou,:ti• with ory1>10-

gr-aphy. The aut.norities obliged, requosted the return ot certai.n na te1•ial.s 

and the destruct.ion of t:ie reat. The N.a.jor, who had been eeverel,y repl'i-

.unded tor his !lrst 'Violation, replied at so.r:i.e lent:th on the dest.ruct.:.on of 

eome rort1 or fifty documents. The case T.as iorbotten. 

A routine 1:-.veatigation ot the llajor'• tiles, aOD.e time later, conducted by a carefull.y trai.~ed security officer, revealed that sane twe.ut,.-

tive of the doc-:menta reported bumed t<;"Oro •till on tile. Tho ujor and a 

ear-ta.in who ~d "-wltneased.11 the bum:l..n.g of t:ie documents, were charged with 

ta.lee sv.eer!.ng, and were heaviJ..:r .fined unt1er the l04t:.h .A.rt.1cl$ of l\ar. 

A 
. '• 

....... 

J.t tho bip\ ot .... -imuion ot a&.tpan. a Japu.•s• in.tell! gem• 

"tart na piobd. up whioh •tated. in etteot 'tU.is .rap&m•• izrtell.lpn.o• 

ftt having om.1dlirab1• •UO•••• r•IAl1ng tbe •r:loan tn.rtio enc rypted 

b. a oerteJ,n •Jll'kal In ua• through.out "9 .Paaitio ana. I'fi waa not bCRrD. 

~HJ." Qr DO'\ the lllUllQ' oryptanal:r•t• ••H havi»g phenamenal B\.OO•H 

w11h illw :au1a•&ge•. Clll" :l1" aom ph.Jwioal or oeyptographlo oompr~.11• wu 

t.savo1't9d.. 

,f.he \Jremk in th• au• oU.. when a report reached aocoun~: authoriti•• 

1:1-t th4t l'th im-u:tey D1Ti•ion had. 11 ohanged 1t. accounting reo(•rda" to 

11hc;;cr th.-,'b three d.o«Lb18nt• we" .S.edngl the 27th .... then on 8h1pan. 

·- d4 th• battle tor the Mariann• ._. in its oloa:lna phaa••• a.tt41r a lo»g 

'b1oo4;r 1t:ruggle. aue obrlouq 'ftre two taotw wbioh oould 'b9 ~.inbd., 

~.- l~tigation renaled that they were aore than reaotely l:lnk:ed • 

laly 11ib. wu a bad day tor i;he 87th. OD. that 4ate two OOllll&Ud po1ta 

et ih• iO&th '9gi-nt, 'both located m9I' !anapag ~boJ:" .... ro O'rer ... run 

a, a pon~tu.1 .fapane•• toro•. who wiped out both hftclquartera. ·.;he per- . . 

1-.ntl. ~· •ahln•l'T, equipment, enryt'hing in 1ight. .A. a:lgna'L •&1-.ge ' . 

·~ NOO'htte4 Wh&~ tt oou1d, but when all the reporto were :Ln, 'three 

~o-dooumnta oould not be acoaunte4 tor in Ull' n.7 e:mept tiw.t they 

W6N in. th• poa1•••lon at ihe ttnelll¥• !he l06th regiment npoJ't.t4 tbia 

. taoi: 't~ 4!:d•1on heuquarten, whioh wu the oorreat thing to d ,_ Bow• I • I I 

tftli"• ti:d1ion •r•l;y •ent baok u i:cd.onement 1tating that "re 1ordli have 

be•n aha.ngect• noting the lo.• ot the docwunta. the aieaing do >Ulllenta 

..,.. Join' Armr-•v key u .. t. oowring a period tram 1 June i9" to 

11 ~1.:y 1944, •o the Jape un4ou'bwd1y had •oOJUliderable 1ueo .. 1• reading 

-..rtia d.ur1:ag that period& 
.. ~'11.4 ... ....... _ .. 

ft u hbtor1 naw tlat the •aipan GU1p8.!gn w811't well duri11g i ..... 

flnt weak. !he taot that 6.000 men were l.oet in th• amn,e.!.gn. can zutve:r 

"- attributdtd direotly to 1she captured doownent.. but it ••m aor • than 

JIUJre ooinoidenoe that moat ot the1• C)&lfUal tie1 wer• 1uf'tered throu~ 

... 11-Rlanned Japanese oounterattaoka af.'ter 7 July, the ds¥ the first two 

laattaliona ot th• 106th bgimnt were overrun. 
Like the lieutena.nt; m.entioned 1n • previous •to17, a conimanding officer 

ot a •ioial 1t.t1on neglected to .keep intomation abou.t cx-,,ypto,srapllio 

«ratcis to M.aaalf'. H• had a group ot distine,"Uished yiaJ.t;ora frail an 

·Allied nat.ion a• hie gueata • He had shown than many t,hinga abo·:it his ••t.al.>-

JJ.ahm.ent. and 41.ecoverlld that .1e had 2D m:lnutes la.tt.. Bei::g tne perfec Ii ho11t, 

be wanted t.o a•p them. entertained; eo he took th.am to the code .x-oow, 'laived 

.. ide tho proteate of the non-com who wu on guard at the door, and pl"l>Coded. 

to give his vialtore a demonstration of all that -.. th.ere. Subsequen;.J.y 

he ns tried by court martial, reduced in rank from Colonel to hitJ poruanent 

grade or lf&Jor,, :ri!llev~d or his com.and. and •ent home for re.:isa1..}1!!1eu1 •• 
, ' Thi• 11ariq Tiol&tim e:r Tranai•llicm S.curit7 happemd •hort ly 

&tter the outbreak ot the war. 

A tll&ht. ot B-25' a waa aaaiped to patrol d.ut7 on thu W.st. Cor at. 

Orde:r• read to be on the alert. tor eu.baarinea and to &id in oonToylng 

ahipa. 'the SOI required a report, upon return o! the !light, or tl• 

poait.ion ot a certain convoy, the nuaber ot •hips, .to. 

The flight leader sipted t.he conTo,y. lot having read the inat.ru.ct.ions in the $Qt,. he reported the position of the COl1Toy' I giving 

the couree., m:uaber ot a hips, etc., in clear lanauap by" C. W. tram -

ai.Hion. 

for 1te own eatet7, the eonvo7 •• im.ediatei,. ordered into tt e 

ne&:Net. port. '!'he aaillnc was delayed tor a period ot 10 da7a - ard 

who can naluate the LOSS CR THOSE 10 DAYS l 

·- ....... --... , ..... :;J!l:::i1t WWW 
REF ID:A71904 

\J~~~ftiJ£ff l ltl 

'there ia no IA.lCh thins •• an incon9equential radio tran•m.ia•Jon. 

lleasage• Hnt. in the clear can produc• Npercu.aion11 which dilJl the 

"••rbe rati011• ot tallina bamba. 

A IJrlti•h aedioal unit in the SollU/l\ area ot Eapt to:rmed thu habit 

or sending ca8U<7 lists in the clear, giving the ana at the •errice 

t4 the dead and injured1 "lli!lem&n Adah Sin&h, killed at Gits&hJ Artillerist 

Arthur C.. Smith, injured at Haltaya Paes. 11 

CiY•n enough volUDle ot this trat.tic, the C.:rmans Wl"e able to locat• 

and identify all th• major Britbh unite in that aeoto?'. 

It wire had been available, this adidn:Jstratin trattio •hmll.d ban 

bean sent by telegraph. Wire laelcin&, a courier should haYe c&l"l'ied the 

ll•ts. lt radio had to be ueed, the traffic •hould hav• been eModed. 

A 
'fESTING TIPPRD THKM en 

ladio •ilenc• u •ore than aolden to aen who observe it at.r 1.otq. 

!o those who d01l't. -

A division mOYin& up into the combat sone in Horth Atrica !t.1led to 

ob•ern •bsolute radio eilence, and pendtt.ed its radio at.ations to ••nd 

premature tellt ••Haps in their new positions. Capturod Itallar' intelllpnc• reports later rev•al•d that the enemy had intercepted the t••t traneW•ione e.nd deduced that a ~ d.iTiaion we.1 aoving up. 
REF ID:A71904 

lecauat of little oonaideration tor the element ot aecurity, nnd. 

1oae 1.ngeniou• map-plot.tine by an alert en8JD71 ••rioue obstacle• win 

•nc6tlfttered lq' the British. 

An attack on Haltaya Pae••• planned by the Br1ti•h. Befort aoving 

their be.~es, the British opened rad.lo nets at advanced points. lf!th thi• 

clu• to aet upcn, Ger.:aan and Italian intercept platoons nre able to 

anticipate th• disposition ot the Britiah troops - berora they arriTed 

at the front. 

lJ ;._ 1 - • • -
Tiii GIRllAIL'S nm SOUETHING AllllJT rr 

~ the Tiolation• ot tran8Illieeion eecurit7 encountered d.&1~ 

1• th• eftr--frequent. oasa of aendinc important information 1n the cl ear. 

Take this •ll&llple: 

In the ear]¥ dq• ~ the Lilqan campaign, two o.t.ticera were on the 

air talking about the d!ttioult7 of: olo:d13£ the 3-mile pp existing 

betwen the~ lines. 

"l hawn•t. the equipment," one c011111ented. 

•Well,, I can't do anything about it.,~ the other replied. 

lot tar distant a Ger.man intercept operator hastil.T •OU&ht contact 

with hie lhlperior otticar. Thia tltal bit of information •a quick)7 

t.•1imilated 'bJ' enem;r intelligence, and be:t'or.J the end of the day tht 

Ce:rmf.na did aomethi• aboat it. 

Badio i• a direct link to the •neJQ'. 
REF ID:A71904 

i. ~ _." .. , s;s ... " I £ 

V-BOAT3 ISCAPID 

Th.is e1gniticant ato17 is told by an ICO in charge er an aircraft 

warnin& •tation on the coast ot Sc:uth Amrica. 

"In the latt111r part ot 1941 it •• c011111.cm knowled&• that enem;.r 

wbmari1:.ea were operating in South American •tera. Fran cur rocent.17 

eatabliahed location., occasional obaervances ot submarines., preswlL'.LblT 

Oerman., were reported. 

11We had been G»perating at thi• location tor about 6 1:1onth11 whon 

nr •• declared. Innediate]3., the wbmarine aot1Tit7 be<:&'lle aore 

noticeable and •everal reports on llll81Q' aubmarines wel"e •ent b7 raclio. 

Through aareloaaneas1 some of theaa reports were sent 1n the clear ••• 

and without tail, the reported BQbmarinad woald leave the via1nity, 

haT.lni amplo t.iiae to do so, aa the nearest troops were 2 hour a tlir;ht awq. n 

-- ~-,........ .. += p .... 
REF ID:A71904 

C9HF1DJ:tl rt !i' -· 'k.~· 

QlO 

at.017 it can be 1een that •eriou• consequence• maJ attend those who 

tail to obae!'l'e 1t • 

.lbou.t 1 79ar ago, at K1ami, Fla., a plane waa eent. out on 1kn. antiaubmarine :patrol,, ul!ling epecial equipnent. Durlng the course ot the 

tllaht an important pan ot this equipment becue inoperatiTo. The pilot 

in•truct•d the radio operator to aend a meeeage back to t.he air b&ee 

ltating the¥ were ret.uming because t.h• ___ waa out ot ordt•r. 

It tho oornct procedure 81,gnal had Men used,, with no men1.ion of 

the tault7 equipaent, the tranmi••ion would han been in order. Instead the •••P was ••nt. in \he alea:r. Whan the •hip landed there 

•• an e•aort oL M.P. '• •1t.1ng. lath the pilot and the radio cperator 

.. " court.-mal"t.ialed. 

thl• leak ••• VITAL. Unt.11 then• had 8'ff17 reason to believe 

that the imeiq d.1d not know tbie particular equipment was being used ill 

ant.isubu.r1ned. •rtare 1a \b&t. locallt.7. 

uV~l I ... ti t • : 
--- ----- -r- ' ' 

REF ID:A71904 

IISSIOI 10? ACCCl.tPL.ISHBD 

lftaident.a t.hat atresa the hazard• ot Smtt>Dm !Jf ':JR CLlWl cannot be 

reecunted too frequentq. 

A toraation ot B-25' • took oft 1C1Dewhere 1n Tunisia. during tlLe earq 

pal't ot t.he Horth African campaign. 8'ritt17 the:y clim.bed, and aot>n the7 

•J"e halt W1Q' to the designated abjectiYe. Then • • • a mef!sage , ... 

reetiTild tran their air 'base instructing the tlight leader t.o abE.ndon 

the aa!tignecl target and proceed to another area. The intormatior., 1ntDlud1ng the name ot the new targ.t, •• ti-anaitted in the clear .. 

Whan the fonaation approached th~ new objectin a •uperior mmiber 

ot enamt plan•• intercepted the flight. Tm .mission waa not aoampllehed, 

and the degree ot carele11•ne11 took a oorr.•ponding toll 1n men and plan•• • 

.- I "'n ~ ( 

- .,. .... : ... 2 i •• l£ :"" L • ~ 
REF ID:A71904 

'f,BA1'PIO WAS D!IAYID 

J'rcmpt dllt.l"ibution of sat•• with.in a net ia alft1'• an htportani; 

tactor, •• this etorr clearl.T ahowa. 

In the cmbat sone where thia particular net waa 1n operation, 

tran19porta,lon ••• at time• slow and ftl"'J" 1lncert&in. Tl-. onq means ot 

traneportation in this area wre 'b7 water and air. 

8Ql • s were ud.e up by headquarter• 1n the nar echelon, about l , 500 

a1.le1 distant. The major!t7 or etation9 were •o reao•d .tran headqcartera 

that trcn l to ) dqa' travel by 11.ir waa nece•B&l".Y to traverff the ci.illtancea. 

Call signs were changed per!odicallT and trequentq, bttt not. alwa)'"S did 

dietribution ol SOI•• include the fanra:rd etationa. 

Personnel ot the :rear echelon station, not realising the sltua'~ion, 

would, on the appointed h011r, chance over to the new call sign• and 

refuse to anner the old onea. 

Thia cauaed ooneid.erable delq 1n handling trai'tic. 

lt is well t.o remember that becauM of alClf trattio - JIKSSAGES THA.! 

ARRIVED TOO Llfl - battle• ba'ff been loet. 
• W-iWW.£1@ ; •... t..UW.15 !~ 232 

WAS Tit'; r:Sl!! UJT.ill.IJG? 

Radio chattinf; is al,,,.,e music to the ever-list-snin:; eare ut t.ma 

er..erriy. r.ere ie an.otMr '":t.ol'J' 'llfher..in the desi:e to talk paid pcior 

d:l.Tidende. 

lcmE"nhere in North Atr1ca1 e. pilot Rs retum!.n,g from a reconnaissance :niseton suceeastulll' ccnplet.ed. It might have bf'en elaticn OYer 

a job •11 don• or a pneral sense or relaxation which cauaed tht otticer 

to ind'tlle in chatting. 

Duriq the ensuine; chat thi" ottic•r mentioned that a large formation 

ct aircraft had landed e.t a cert.a.in air base. w.., tht!" enelQ' lls·.~ening? 

Cliviou111" he was, beceuse in a !ew ehort hour• the air base "88 haabed 

and al.most tot.ally' deatrcyed. 

-~ \ ......... ~! 

, .. il\i uJt1•iiAt: 

----- ·- ---------===-~-----~ 
IW>l'.O OPDATCR TA.US 

Tran..UHion 1ecu.rit7 cannot 'be ettect1Yttl.T obtained wit.bout a S'fBl(,"f 

PllS<»IAL CilS<:asHIP on the part ot the operatina peraonnel., A l"9)1ori. 

Hoent~ nce1T'9d in Wa•hingtoa clear~ ill•atrate• t.hia. 

'thei report. rNd 1 "Captai.n ---- and l •r• not.ltied in nontidmlc• that w were t.o t.ab a plane to INhwon and llt&nd by tor pau .. npre. 

W. •re notified • ws-. \o lean ----field 118Cretlf. litM.n JO 

ld.nute11 the reat ot the cm reported to ua and aaid that they ha.cl heard 

tna a radio operator that we wre to leaTe in a tn hours. We w1Jre eoon 

'b.sieged with reques\s trOttA A~ and other per•onnel who wanted ti> ride 

1d.th us." 

I 
"REF ID:A/1904 

Ddio deception 1• trequentq pract.1o9d. b7' t.h• •n41lQ' in a11 attq,pt 

tc piJI an obJeat.iw. This lt017 •ho"1d ••rve •• a l.Gaeon in. t he iaportano• ot AtJTIBl'l'ICATION. !er• i• shown how taJ.luo t _, authe nticat• 

,..nlt• 1n an ettort.l••• v1ct017 f'Ol" the flD8Jll7. 

Dvi.D& the 0.l"JIU aampaign against. nonra7, plan• were made b7 the 

inYader tw- an ••81 ocaupat.ion ot •rpn. Ci! 7 April 1940 the Gtmalll 

MUe4 'troop and suppl.7 ships,. a1ong 11ith eeconiaa oruisera and d•-

ltr07en, int.o the harbor. Several hwre before thu task torc1 arrived,. 

th• !Jorw•aian of'ticer• at. Bergen had rece1Yed preeuubly bona tlde order• 

lv radio to aba.adon the tort. Sllace t.be Horw•aian• •de no ett :>rt, to 

••thent.iaate \he19 •••aces, tbq tell e••1 prq to t.he Germanat ru11e. 

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