[Cite as State ex rel. Clinton v. MetroHealth Sys., 2017-Ohio-2855.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 104685

STATE OF OHIO EX REL., KAREN CLINTON

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

vs. 

METROHEALTH SYSTEM

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

JUDGMENT:

AFFIRMED

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CV-10-733691 

BEFORE: Laster Mays, J., Boyle, P.J., and Celebrezze, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 18, 2017

-i- 
FOR APPELLANT

Karen Clinton, pro se 

2045 Glenwood Drive 

Twinsburg, Ohio 44087 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 

Michael C. O’Malley 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Charles E. Hannan 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

Justice Center, 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Karen Clinton (“Clinton”), appeals the trial court’s 

denial of her motion for relief from judgment. We affirm. 

{¶2} Clinton assigns eight assignments of error for our review; however, only the 

first assignment of error concerns the trial court’s denial of her motion. The remaining 

seven are not related to the trial court’s denial of Clinton’s motion, but rather concern 

prior decisions this court has rendered on Clinton’s prior cases including Clinton v. 

MetroHealth Sys., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86886, 2006-Ohio-3582 (“Clinton I”) and 

State ex rel. Clinton v. MetroHealth Sys., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100590, 

2014-Ohio-4469 (“Clinton II”). The Ohio Supreme Court refused to reconsider its 

decision not to take jurisdiction of Clinton’s appeal. This court denied reconsideration 

in both cases. 

{¶3} As a result of the denials, Clinton has filed this appeal. She states, “since 

the Ohio Supreme Court refused to hear the merits of my appeal, this motion was the only 

alternative procedural device to bring the errors back before this court to correct its prior 

erroneous decision in Clinton I and II.” We will only consider and review the first 

assignment of error because the other seven are merely Clinton’s way of attempting to get 

this court to review our decisions in past cases we have already previously declined to 

reconsider. 

I. The trial court erred when it denied Relator’s 60(B) motion for relief 
from judgment by relying upon this Court of Appeals judgment 

issued on 10-8-14 in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CA-13-100590 that had 

adjudicating the various errors of law and fact raised in the 60(B) 

notion which highlighted this Court of Appeals erroneous 

conclusions of law and fact. Furthermore, the trial court erred in 

granting summary judgment to MetroHealth System in the first 

place, when evidence showed that MetroHealth wrongfully delayed 

production of, withheld, and destroyed public records. And finally 

this Court of Appeals further erred in permitting the trial court to 

grant summary judgment for the various record requests to 

MetroHealth System as too many questions of fact existed to 

determine the case by that method as we stated in our own motion 

for partial summary judgment filed in the 2014 appeal to this court. 

I. Relief from Judgment 

A. Summary Judgment 

{¶4} “This court reviews the trial court’s decision granting or denying a motion 

for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion. Strack v. Pelton, 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 

174, 637 N.E.2d 914 (1994).” Morana v. Foley, 2015-Ohio-5254, 54 N.E.3d 749, ¶ 5 

(8th Dist.). “An abuse of discretion is connoted by a decision that is unreasonable, 

arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 

N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

B. Law and Analysis 

{¶5} In Clinton’s first assignment of error she argues that the trial court erred 

when it relied on our decision in Clinton II to deny her Civ.R. 60(B) motion. 

Generally, Civ.R. 60(B) requires that the satisfaction of three elements are 

necessary for the vacation of a final judgment. GTE Automatic Elec. v. 

ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976), paragraph 

two of the syllabus. Movants must show they have a meritorious claim or 

defense, they satisfy one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through 

(5), and the motion was made within a reasonable time. Id. 
Foley at ¶ 4. 

{¶6} Civ.R. 60(B) states, 

[O]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party 

or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for 

the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 

neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 

have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(B); (3) 

fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 

misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment 

has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it 

is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable 

that the judgment should have prospective application; or (5) any other 

reason justifying relief from the judgment. The motion shall be made within 

a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year 

after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion 

under this subdivision (B) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 

suspend its operation. 

{¶7} In Clinton II, this court decided that 

[T]he trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of 

MetroHealth on Clinton’s mandamus action. Her requests were either not 

timely made, barred by res judicata, speculative, for confidential 

information, or unclear. 

State ex rel. Clinton v. MetroHealth Sys., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100590, 

2014-Ohio-4469, ¶ 55. In response to this decision and our denial for reconsideration, 

Clinton filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, and the trial court properly 

denied it. These issues have already been decided. Clinton does not demonstrate that 

she has a meritorious claim or defense. This court in Clinton II, has already made a 

decision on the same issues Clinton is now bringing before this court. Clinton does not 

provide newly discovered evidence. Clinton merely restates the same issues she did in 
Clinton II. 

{¶8} Under Ohio law, 

[A] valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent 

actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction of occurrence 

that was the subject matter of the previous action. Grava v. Parkman 

Township, 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995), syllabus. 

State ex rel. Dept. of Edn. v. Ministerial Day Care, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103685, 

2016-Ohio-8485, ¶ 14. Clinton’s claims are barred by res judicata. 

Relying on federal law, the Ohio Supreme Court has identified four 

elements necessary to bar a claim under the doctrine of res judicata: “(1) a 

prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; 

(2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; 

(3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in 

the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or 

occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.” Portage 

Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 106, 123, 2006-Ohio-954, 

846 N.E.2d 478, citing Hapgood v. Warren, 127 F.3d 490, 493 (6th 

Cir.1997). 

Id. 

{¶9} Because Clinton does not assert any new claims, and the trial court’s decision 

was a result of our decision in Clinton II, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny 

Clinton’s motion for relief from judgment. 

{¶10} Clinton’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶11} Clinton’s remaining assignments of error are barred by res judicata. 

{¶12} Judgment is affirmed. 

It is ordered that the appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

___________________________________________ 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE 

MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR