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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JOSHUA B. BRIDGETT

Appellant No. 3082 EDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order September 22, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0013148-2008

 CP-51-CR-0013149-2008

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2016

Joshua B. Bridgett appeals from the order entered September 22, 

2015, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing his first 

petition for collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”).1 Bridgett seeks relief from an aggregate term of 111⁄2 to 23 

months’ imprisonment, and a consecutive term of eight years’ probation,

following his guilty plea to two counts of burglary.2 On appeal, Bridgett 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

1 See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a). Bridgett entered a plea to one count of 

burglary at two separate dockets, Docket No. 13148-2008 and Docket No. 

13149-2008.
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contends the PCRA court abused its discretion in dismissing his claim 

asserting the ineffective assistance of plea counsel without first conducting 

an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons below, we affirm.

The facts underlying Bridgett’s guilty plea are aptly summarized by the 

PCRA court as follows:

Complainant was [Bridgett’s] paramour and they lived together 

on and off for several years and have twin daughters. They had 

a tumultuous relationship resulting in several domestic disputes 

and multiple calls to the police. In 2008 Complainant moved 

from [Bridgett’s] residence to a homeless shelter and was later 

placed into an apartment at [] Oxford Avenue, Philadelphia, PA. 

Her two children were in the primary custody of [Bridgett], 

however she was given the right to visit with them on weekends.

On September 30, 2008, [at] approximately 3:34 AM, 

Complainant was awakened by [Bridgett] who had gained 

entrance into her apartment without her knowledge or consent, 

and he had nonconsensual sexual contact with her. Thereafter, 

Complainant reported the sexual assault to Dan Lodise, a 

counselor at the shelter where Complainant previously resided, 

whereupon she was transported to Episcopal Hospital where she 

was examined and found positive for the presence of 

spermatozoa.

On October 5, 2008 Lodise was staying with Complainant 

and asleep in her apartment when he was awakened and found 

[Bridgett] inside the residence. Lodise confronted [Bridgett] 

whereupon [Bridgett] fled. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 2/9/2016, at 2-3 (record citations omitted).

Bridgett was subsequently arrested and charged with burglary, 

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, and related offenses,3

____________________________________________

3 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3502, 3123, and 3124.1, respectively.
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for the incident that occurred on September 30, 2008, at Docket No. 13148-

2008. He was also charged with burglary and criminal trespass,4for the 

incident that occurred on October 5, 2008, at Docket No. 13149-2008. On 

July 15, 2009, after jury selection was completed, Bridgett entered an open 

guilty plea to two counts of burglary, one at each docket, in exchange for 

which the Commonwealth withdrew the remaining 11 charges, including all 

of the sexual assault offenses. 

On October 14, 2009, Bridgett filed a pre-sentence motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea, asserting he was not guilty of the charges and he entered a 

plea only because he was scared of the impending trial. The trial court 

conducted a hearing on December 8, 2009, and denied Bridgett’s motion. 

The same day, the court sentenced Bridgett to two concurrent terms of 111⁄2 

to 23 months’ incarceration, with credit for time served, followed by eight 

years’ probation. He was immediately paroled to house arrest with 

electronic monitoring. See N.T., 12/8/2009, at 55. 

Bridgett filed a timely direct appeal to this Court, asserting the trial 

court erred in denying his pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 

as well as the ineffectiveness of plea counsel. A panel of this Court affirmed 

the judgment of sentence,5and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his 

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4 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3502 and 3503, respectively.

5 Specifically, the panel found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Bridgett’s pre-sentence motion to withdraw his plea. However, the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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petition for review. See Commonwealth v. Bridgett, 24 A.3d 556 (Pa. 

Super. 2011) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 27 A.3d 222 (Pa. 

2011).

On August 16, 2012, Bridgett filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, 

listing both docket numbers. Counsel was subsequently appointed, and filed 

an amended petition on December 5, 2013, asserting plea counsel was 

ineffective for causing Bridgett to enter an involuntary and unknowing plea. 

On August 31, 2015, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the 

petition without first conducting an evidentiary hearing pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Thereafter, on September 22, 2015, the court entered an 

order dismissing Bridgett’s petition, and this timely appeal followed.6

Bridgett raises two, related issues on appeal. He contends the PCRA 

court erred in (1) dismissing his petition without conducting an evidentiary 

hearing, and (2) denying his claim that plea counsel’s ineffectiveness caused 

him to enter an unknowing and involuntary plea. See Bridgett’s Brief at 13-

18. 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

panel deferred his claim of plea counsel’s ineffectiveness until collateral 

review. See Commonwealth v. Bridgett, 24 A.3d 556 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(unpublished memorandum at 3-6).

6 On November 3, 2015, the PCRA court ordered Bridgett to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Bridgett complied with the court’s directive, and filed a concise statement on 

November 5, 2015.
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Our review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is well-established: 

we must determine whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported 

by the record, and whether its legal conclusions are free from error. 

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014). “Great deference 

is granted to the findings of the PCRA court, and these findings will not be 

disturbed unless they have no support in the certified record.” 

Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 A.3d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation 

omitted). Furthermore, a petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, 

and a PCRA court may decline to hold a hearing “if the petitioner’s claim is 

patently frivolous and has no support either in the record or other evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quotation 

omitted).

Where, as here, the petitioner alleges the ineffectiveness of prior 

counsel in conjunction with a guilty plea, our review is as follows: 

To prevail on a claim alleging counsel’s ineffectiveness under the 

PCRA, Appellant must demonstrate (1) that the underlying claim 

is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel’s course of conduct was 

without a reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s 

interest; and (3) that he was prejudiced by counsel’s 

ineffectiveness, i.e. there is a reasonable probability that but for 

the act or omission in question the outcome of the proceedings 

would have been different. 

It is clear that a criminal defendant’s right to effective counsel 

extends to the plea process, as well as during trial. However, 

[a]llegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a 

guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the 

ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or 

unknowing plea. Where the defendant enters his plea on the 

advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on 
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whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence 

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.

Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1001-1002 (Pa. Super. 2013), 

quoting Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citations, quotation, and quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, we note:

The longstanding rule of Pennsylvania law is that a defendant 

may not challenge his guilty plea by asserting that he lied while 

under oath, even if he avers that counsel induced the lies. A 

person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he 

makes in open court while under oath and he may not later 

assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the 

statements he made at his plea colloquy.

Commonwealth v. Curry, ___ A.3d ___, ___, 2016 WL 5885409, at *4 

(Pa. Super. September 12, 2016) (quotation omitted).

Here, Bridgett argues the PCRA court erred in dismissing his 

ineffectiveness claim without first conducting an evidentiary hearing 

because, he asserts, the facts alleged in his petition, if proven, would entitle 

him to relief. See Bridgett’s Brief at 13-14. Specifically, he claims plea 

counsel “unlawfully induced” him to plead guilty to charges for which he had 

a valid defense by: (1) telling him “had no defense to the charges against 

him;” (2) “fail[ing] to discuss trial strategy with [him;]” (3) presenting a 

plea offer at the last minute and threatening a long prison sentence if 

Bridgett rejected the plea; and (4) telling Bridgett counsel “would quit if 

[Bridgett] did not plead guilty and fail[ing] to explain why it was in [his] best 

interest to plead guilty.” Id. at 15. Although Bridgett acknowledges he 

“never told the judge his concerns,” he states he failed to do so because he 

was “afraid.” Id. at 16. 
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Bridgett contends this claim has arguable merit because he 

“continually asserted his innocence” to counsel, and “it seems evident that 

his guilty plea was not only against his better judgment, but also induced by 

the more overpowering collective will of his trial counsel.” Id. at 16, 17. 

Bridgett also maintains counsel had no reasonable basis for forcing him to 

enter the guilty plea, “especially when there was an excellent defense 

available.”7 Id. at 17. Finally, Bridgett insists he suffered “actual prejudice” 

in that “[h]ad [he] been able to try the matter before a jury, a decision of 

innocence may have arguably been found by a jury.” Id.

Here, the PCRA court found Bridgett’s statements at his guilty plea 

hearing belied his claims on appeal.8 The court explained:

[Bridgett] stated that he understood the nature of the facts and 

charges against him and that he wished to plead guilty. 

[Bridgett] signed a Written Guilty Plea Colloquy attesting to his 

understanding, knowing, and voluntary offer to plead guilty. 

When [Bridgett] was asked if he agreed that the colloquy form 

stated his rights and the rights he was waiving, [he] responded 

in the affirmative; when he was asked if he was forced or 

____________________________________________

7 Bridgett does not identify any specific defense in his brief, but rather, 

simply asserts his innocence. 

8 We note the PCRA court also stated it dismissed his claim because this 

Court, on direct appeal, rejected Bridgett’s argument that his plea was 

“offered involuntarily and unknowingly.” PCRA Court Opinion, 2/9/2016, at 

unnumbered 5. However, on direct appeal, we deferred Bridgett’s 

ineffectiveness claim until PCRA review. Nevertheless, “we may affirm the 

PCRA court’s order on any basis.” Commonwealth v. Reed, 107 A.3d 137, 

144 (Pa. Super. 2014).

 
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threatened in any way to plead guilty he responded no; and 

when asked if he was satisfied with his lawyer, he responded 

yes. [Bridgett] has failed to plead and demonstrate any basis 

for PCRA relief.

PCRA Court Opinion, 2/9/2016, at unnumbered 5.

As noted above, “[a] defendant is bound by the statements made 

during the plea colloquy, and ... may not later offer reasons for withdrawing 

the plea that contradict statements made when he pled.” Commonwealth

v. Brown, 48 A.3d 1275, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 63 A.3d 

773 (Pa. 2013). Here, our review is hampered by Bridgett’s failure to 

include the transcript from the July 15, 2009, guilty plea hearing in the 

certified record. It is the appellant’s burden to “identify and order that 

which he deems necessary to prosecute his appeal.” Commonwealth v. 

Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 410 (Pa. 2011). See also Pa.R.A.P. 1911. Therefore, 

the omission of the guilty plea transcript falls squarely on Bridgett, 

particularly where, as here, this Court alerted him that the transcript was 

missing from the record on direct appeal. See Bridgett, supra, 24 A.3d 

556 (unpublished memorandum at 3-4). Bridgett has offered no explanation 

for the lack of a transcript,9and, accordingly, this claim is waived. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 1911(d). 

____________________________________________

9 See Lesko, supra, 15 A.3d at 410 (explaining petitioner may be absolved 

of responsibility for missing transcript if he can show he made a request for 

transcript, but request was “erroneously denied”).
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Nonetheless, even if we were to consider only his signed written guilty 

plea colloquy, which is included in the certified record, Bridgett is entitled to 

no relief. Indeed, in the colloquy, Bridgett averred, inter alia:

Nobody promised me anything or threatened me or forced me to 

plead guilty. I, myself, have decided to plead guilty. I know 

what I say today is final. 

* * * *

I am satisfied with the advice and service I received from my 

lawyer. My lawyer spent enough time on my case and I had 

enough time to talk with my lawyer about the case. My lawyer 

left the final decision to me and I decided myself to plead guilty.

Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 7/15/2009, at 1, 3. Because the record before 

us supports the PCRA court’s determination that Bridgett entered his plea 

knowingly and voluntarily, he is entitled to no relief, and the PCRA court did 

not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/17/2016