alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL A. BRUZZONE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

INTEL CORPORATION; ARM, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-17003

D.C. No. 3:14-cv-01279-WHA

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 16, 2016**

Before: LEAVY, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges. 

Michael A. Bruzzone appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his

action alleging a conspiracy to defraud the federal and state governments and the 

public. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Stoner 

v. Santa Clara Cty. Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2007), and 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 21 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 14-17003 

we affirm.

The district court properly struck Bruzzone’s complaint and dismissed the 

action because Bruzzone improperly attempted to proceed pro se as a relator in a 

qui tam action alleging a conspiracy to defraud the United States. See id. at 1125-

27 (concluding that pro se litigants may not prosecute claims based on fraud 

against the Unites States).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bruzzone’s recusal 

motion because Bruzzone’s allegations of bias were exclusively based on adverse 

judicial rulings. See Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 911 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(setting forth standard of review); see also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 

555 (1994) (explaining that “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid 

basis for a bias or partiality motion”). 

Defendants’ unopposed motion for judicial notice, filed February 20, 2015, 

is granted.

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 1.7

[TRANSLATION]



LOGO





CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT

Business Corporations Act (R.S.Q., c. S-31.1)



| |  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |  |  |  | 
| |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  |  |  | 
| |  | I hereby certify that the following corporation:
 LE SUPERCLUB VIDÉOTRON LTÉE
 Amended its articles under the terms of the
Business Corporations Act to amend its name to: 
9293-6707 Québec inc.  On December 29, 2013 at 0:01 minute |  | 



|                           |  |                                                                                   |  |                                     
|-------------------------- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | ------------------------------------
|[Seal of Québec Registrar] |  | Filed with the Register on December 19, 2013 under registration number 1144188886 |  | [Signed] Acting Enterprise
Registrar

R90Z14L27V90JA
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

862 

KA 13-01481 

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, LINDLEY, TROUTMAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V ORDER

WILFREDO ROMAN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

 

FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (PIOTR BANASIAK OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (JAMES P. MAXWELL

OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Anthony F.

Aloi, J.), rendered July 26, 2012. The judgment convicted defendant,

upon his plea of guilty, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in

the first degree, criminal sale of a controlled substance in the

second degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the

third degree (seven counts) and criminal possession of a controlled

substance in the fourth degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Entered: November 10, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A19A1493. SAMUEL LEE GHEE v. STATE OF GEORGIA et al.

The trial court entered a “Notice of No Service Calendar” in this civil action,

placing the case on an upcoming court calendar. Plaintiff Samuel Lee Ghee has filed

a direct appeal seeking review of that order. We lack jurisdiction.

“Generally, an order isfinal and appealable when it leaves no issuesremaining

to be resolved, constitutes the court’s final ruling on the merits of the action, and

leaves the parties with no further recourse in the trial court.” Thomas v. Douglas

County, 217 Ga. App. 520, 522 (1) (457 SE2d 835) (1995); see also OCGA § 5-6-34

(a) (1). The order that Ghee wishes to appeal is a calendar call notice that does not

dispose of the claims in the case and therefore is not a final order. 

To appeal the order, Ghee was required to follow the interlocutory appeal

procedures set forth in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b), including obtaining a certificate of

immediate review within ten days of the order to be appealed and filing an application

to appeal within ten days after the certificate was issued. Ghee’s failure to follow the

interlocutory appeal procedure deprives this Court of jurisdiction over this direct

March 20, 2019
appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED. See Mays v. Rancine-Kinchen, 291 Ga. 283,

283-285 (729 SE2d 321) (2012).

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

03/20/2019
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 18

- 00087

- CR

Marcus DeLeon v. The State of Texas
On Appeal from the 156th District Court of Live Oak County , Texas Trial Cause No. L

- 05

- 0075

- CR

- B

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this ca use on appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed. The Court orders the appeal
DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion

. We further order this decision certified below for observance. April 19, 2018
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                         137,982
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   61,680
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      1,365
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               334,353
<PP&E>                                      18,065,768
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,670,069
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              14,438,829
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,182,931
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     2,187,862
<OTHER-SE>                                 (7,291,789)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                14,438,829
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                        1,012,327
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,861,122
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (53,768)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             368,851
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,807,354)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,807,354)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.41)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.41)
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit
10.1


 


 


September
28, 2021


 


Assaf
Ran, President and CEO


Manhattan
Bridge Capital, Inc.


60
Cutter Mill Road, Suite 205


Great
Neck, NY, 11201


 


Re:
Waiver of Portion of Salary


 


Dear
Mr. Ran:


 


Reference
is made to that certain Employment Agreement, dated March 1, 1999 (the “Employment Agreement”), by and between yourself
and Manhattan Bridge Capital, Inc. (formerly known as DAG Media, Inc.), a New York corporation (the “Company”). The
purpose of this letter agreement is to set forth your voluntary agreement to forgo your base salary to be paid for the months of October,
November and December 2021 (the “Waived Salary”) that would otherwise be earned by you pursuant to the Employment
Agreement.


 


You
agree that (i) the Company will not pay you, and you shall have no right to, the Waived Salary and (ii) your voluntary waiver of the
Waived Salary shall not constitute a breach by the Company of the Employment Agreement and shall not give you a right to terminate your
employment pursuant to Employment Agreement for any reason.


 


Except
as set forth in this letter, all other terms and conditions set forth in the Employment Agreement shall remain unmodified and in full
force and effect. If there is any conflict between this letter and the Employment Agreement, the terms of this letter agreement shall
govern and control. This letter agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts and by different parties hereto in separate counterparts,
each of which when so executed and delivered shall be deemed to be an original and when a counterpart has been executed by each of the
parties hereto, all of the counterparts, when taken together, shall constitute one and the same agreement.


 


Please
execute this letter in the space provided below in order to evidence your agreement with the terms hereof.


 


Sincerely,


 


Manhattan
Bridge Capital, Inc.


 


	By:	/s/ Vanessa Kao	 
	Name:
    	Vanessa
    Kao	 
	Title:
    	Chief
    Financial Officer	 


 


	ACKNOWLEDGED
    AND AGREED: 
	 	 
	/s/ Assaf Ran	 
	Assaf
    Ran
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 96-4154WM

_____________

Vincent Canalli Lee, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Richard Stinson, Employee of the U.S. *

Real Property Disposal; George * Appeal from the United States

Prochaska, Employee of the U.S. Real * District Court for the Western

Property Disposal; Mark Duffy, * District of Missouri.

Employee of the U.S. Real Property *

Disposal; Blaine Hastings, Employee of * [UNPUBLISHED]

the U.S. Real Property Disposal; Glen *

W. Overton, Employee of the U.S. Real *

Property Disposal, *

*

Appellees. *

_____________

 Submitted: November 5, 1997

Filed: November 26, 1997

_____________

Before FAGG, BOWMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

_____________

PER CURIAM.

Vincent Canalli Lee sued Richard Stinson and other officials of the General

Services Administration (GSA) after Lee's unsuccessful effort to purchase the former

federal building in Kansas City, Missouri. The district court granted summary
-2-

judgment in favor of the public officials. After careful review of the record and the

parties' briefs, we conclude that an extensive discussion is not warranted, and we also

decline to consider the arguments Lee raises for the first time on appeal. We believe

the district court's decision is correct, and we affirm substantially for the reasons given

by the district court. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
October 27, 2014

Mr. Lee A. Bauer

Counsel for Avemex, S.A. de C.V.

Avemex, S.A. de C.V.

45005 Aviation Drive, Suite 200

Dulles, VA 20116

Dear Mr. Bauer:

This is in response to your March 15, 2013 letter (public docket No. FAA-2013-0278) 

petitioning the Federal Aviation Administration on behalf of Avemex, S.A. de C.V. 

(Avemex) for an exemption from § 129.5(b) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). 

That exemption, if granted, would allow Avemex to operate its Mexico-registered aircraft in 

U.S. airspace under the same flight data recorder (FDR) requirements that are applied to 

United States (U.S.) registered aircraft operating under 14 CFR part 135.

Upon review of Avemex’s petition for exemption and applicable regulations and 

international standards, the FAA has determined that Avemex is not required to have an 

exemption from § 129.5(b) and should be permitted to operate its aircraft in U.S. airspace if 

its aircraft meet either the ICAO Annex 6 standards for FDRs or the FDR standards the FAA 

has applied to its own similarly situated part 135 operators. 

Per a memo sent to the Office of Rulemaking from Ms. Beverly Sharkey (copy enclosed) in 

the Office of Chief Counsel dated September 20, 2013, it states that “...when FAA rules 

allow U.S. air carriers to meet different standards, then the FAA can permit foreign air 

carriers to operate in the U.S. airspace either under the U.S. standards appropriate to the class 

of air carrier or under ICAO Annex 6 standards.” In a separate policy memo to Mr. Robert 

Shuter (copy enclosed) dated May 15, 2008, clarifying specific issues regarding the U.S. 

application of Annex 6 requirements for Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems, it 

states that “...when the FAA allows all U.S. carriers or a class of U.S. carriers to meet 

different safety standards in U.S. airspace, we believe that our Article II obligations permit us 

to allow similarly situated carriers from ICAO member States to operate in U.S. airspace 
2

under standards that do not make distinctions among the operators based on nationality.” 

If you have any questions, please contact the FAA’s International Law Branch at (202) 267-

8018 or (202) 267-3073. Because the relief you seek has been determined to be unnecessary,

we will take no further action on your petition.

Sincerely,

/s/

John S. Duncan

Director, Flight Standards Service

Enclosure
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In the Matter of : No. 103 DB 2020 (No. 70 RST 2020)

:

A. VICTORIA SHILTON : Attorney Registration No. 69992

:

PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT :

 FROM RETIRED STATUS : (Out of State)

O R D E R

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 25th day of September, 2020, the Report and Recommendation of 

Disciplinary Board Member dated September 17, 2020, is approved and it is ORDERED 

that A. Victoria Shilton, who has been on Retired Status, has never been suspended or 

disbarred, and has demonstrated that she has the moral qualifications, competency and 

learning in law required for admission to practice in the Commonwealth, shall be and is, 

hereby reinstated to active status as a member of the Bar of this Commonwealth. The 

expenses incurred by the Board in the investigation and processing of this matter shall 

be paid by the Petitioner.
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1792 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1792

 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to equalize the exclusion 
from gross income of parking and transportation fringe benefits and to 
provide for a common cost-of-living adjustment, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 16, 2015

   Mr. Schumer (for himself, Mr. Cardin, Mr. Casey, Mr. Carper, Mr. 
Menendez, Mr. Merkley, Mrs. Gillibrand, Mr. Blumenthal, and Mr. Markey) 
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 
                          Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to equalize the exclusion 
from gross income of parking and transportation fringe benefits and to 
provide for a common cost-of-living adjustment, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Commuter Benefits Equity Act of 
2015''.

SEC. 2. UNIFORM DOLLAR LIMITATION FOR ALL TYPES OF TRANSPORTATION 
              FRINGE BENEFITS.

    (a) In General.--Section 132(f)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 is amended--
            (1) by striking ``$100'' in subparagraph (A) and inserting 
        ``$250'',
            (2) by striking ``$175'' in subparagraph (B) and inserting 
        ``$250'', and
            (3) by striking the last sentence.
    (b) Inflation Adjustment Conforming Amendments.--Subparagraph (A) 
of section 132(f)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended--
            (1) by striking the last sentence,
            (2) by striking ``1999'' and inserting ``2015'', and
            (3) by striking ``1998'' and inserting ``2014''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2014.

SEC. 3. CLARIFICATION OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEE BENEFITS.

    Section 7905 of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)--
                    (A) in paragraph (2)(C) by inserting ``and'' after 
                the semicolon;
                    (B) in paragraph (3) by striking ``; and'' and 
                inserting a period; and
                    (C) by striking paragraph (4); and
            (2) in subsection (b)(2)(A) by amending subparagraph (A) to 
        read as follows:
                    ``(A) a qualified transportation fringe as defined 
                in section 132(f)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
                1986;''.
                                 <all>
```
.- ,-

NSA-712 19 July 1955 

STATUS OJil.._ _ ____.ISYS'l'DE 

36,June 1955 

(Supplement to the Report of' 31.December 1954 

and 31 March 1955.) 

* This supple~nt includes new\systems, 

systems on W:hich work has been suspended, 

and systems in which there have been · significant developments' since 3i Mar 54. 

DISTRIBUTION: 

S / ASS'r (Mr. Friedman) 

0 

NSA-18 

NSA--iJ64 (Mr. Levison) 

NSA-S621 

NSA-7m 

NSA-71 

NSA-7m1 

1 

1 

1 

5 

1 

1 

2 

1 

1 

3 

1 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 08-27-2013 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 

TOP SECRET EIDER 
. . 

PRODUCTION STATISTICS 

Apr-Jun Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Year 

12~~ l~~ 1~4 1~4 

Orig Cipher Mags Recd* 43,461 47,515 57;932 213,427 

Dup Cipher lfsgs Beed 24,175 25,815 34,111 lrlB,498 

Total. Cipher Mags Recd* 67,636 72,531 92,133 321,925 

Cipher llsgs Decrypted 18,271 14,538 25,523 87,918 

Cipher Mags !lranslated 3,644 4,589 5,829 21,137 

Cipher Ifs.gs Summerized 231 646 159 2,649 

P /L Msgs Trans or Summ** 317 368 332 1,4n 

Code Meanings Recovered 1,273 1,693 5,566 llt.,252 

1,144*** • • I 

Average Number of Personnel 113 ll5 124 122 

I 

PL 86-36/50 USC - 1 -

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EO 3.3(h)(2)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARTHA JO PETERS,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, NA,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 14

- 55375

D.C. No. 5:13

- cv

- 01735

- JGB

- DTB

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 11 , 2017 **

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Martha Jo Peters appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismiss ing her diversity action a lleging state law claims arising out of foreclosure

proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo a

district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

APR 24 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 14

- 55375

Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler , 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010)

. We

affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Peters’ action because Peters failed to

allege facts sufficient t o state any plausible claim for relief. See United States v

.

FMC Corp

. , 531 F

. 3d 813

, 820 ( 9th Cir

. 2008 ) ( “[U]nder Ninth Circuit precedent,

incidental third

- party beneficiaries may not enforce consent decrees

. . . .” ) ; see

also Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys.

, LP , 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir.

2008) (“A Rule 12 ( b )( 6 ) dismissal may be based on either a lack of a cognizable

legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal

theory .” (citation and internal quot ation marks omitted)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)

.

All pending motion s (Docket Entry Nos. 18 and 21) are denied.

AFFIRMED

.
Order entered March 16 , 2015

In The



## Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 14

- 00918

- CR

ORINTHIOUS DEONTE BR OWN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2

Dallas County, Texas

Tria l Court Cause No. F

- 1241281

- I



### O RDER

T he Court GRANTS appellant’s March 15, 2015 second motion to extend time to file his

brief. We ORDER appellant’s brief filed as of the date of this order.

/s/ LANA MYERS

JUSTICE