,. ASA REVIEW - November-December~~' ~ :lilt~ 2 4 7 

The War in the Ether : 

The Russian Radio Agent Service in 1942 

(Sonf'ldeu l:lal) 

Tr•n•l•ted from orl1ln•I Germ•n m1teri1l1 By 

Dr. R•y 'fl. Petten1ill 

Frequent mention has been ma.de of the 

employment of Russian radio agent~, and 

their work has been adequately described. 

We shall now sum up this chapter, and show 

the extent which this work assumed during 

the Second World War. 

Bolshevist Russia was the first country 

to tackle the principle of radiocontrolled 

espionaBe and to put it into effect on a 

large scale. The beginnings go back to 

approximately the year 1931, that is, to 

the time when it became clear that National 

Socialism was beginning to gain ground in 

Germany, and thus a collision with the Soviet Union entered the realm of possibility. This might have resulted sooner or 

later but it was unavoidable if National 

Socialism seized power. The utmost watchfulness was necessary. Therefore the Soviet Union began setting up a widespread 

shortwave radio net with the control station in Moscow and a full dozen subordinate stations distributed all over Europe. 

At that time the German intercept service 

did not succeed in gaining a'fl.Y insight into the content of the messages exchanged; 

it was assumed in Germany that this was 

merely a control net created by the Communist Internationale which served to guide 

Communist propaganda and agitatia:i throughout the world. How mistaken they were 

appeared only during the course of the Second World War when the German radio defense was able to get extensive insight 

into the work of the Russian intelligence service. 

After the outbreak of the war between 

Germany and the Soviet Union it turned out 

that the famed "Comintern Net" - which was 

really a net of the Russian intelligence 

service - constituted only a very small 

portion of the Russian spy net. Much 

greater was the net of agent radio stations 

which bad been set up all over Europe lons 

Nov....,-Dcccmbcr 1951 

before the war but had r-ema.ined silent unti 1 the war began. .This now appeared in 

an all the more dangerous form. Already 

in 1940 the number of Russian agent stations in Europe had increased sharply. In 

May 1941 there were already some 25 radio 

stations. 

In June 1941 the radio traffic on the 

Russian WNA Net-as the Germane called it 

after the call sign of the control station 

in Moscow - grew to 78 radio circuits. 

Shortly before the outbreak of the German-

. Russian War the exchange of telegrams in 

this net increased enormously. In August 

1941 the German intercept service copied 

not less than 600 radiasrams on this net. 

The aims of the Russian secret service 

were: 

l. Seeking information in all fields 

connected with the armed forces and 

armed strength of all European countries, 9f the U.S.A., of Japan, and 

of a few other states. 

2. Seeking information in all fields of 

industry and economics in these 

countries. 

3. Seeking information on all political 

occurrences in these countries which 

might have any reaction on the political life of the Soviet Union. 

4. Infiltration into the centers of the 

secret service of those countries, 

and gathering information ~egarding 

any measures planned against the soviet Union. 

By using its diplonatic and commercial 

representatives or by employing special 

radio agents the Soviet Union organized:an 

11 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 01-30-2014 pursuant to E.O. 1352e 
REF ID:A60247 

intelligence net which worked splendidly. 

In the various branches of this net agents 

of all branches of the Russian secret service had been injected: officers of the 

General Staff, agents of the Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD}, 

Party functionaries, diploma.ts, etc. The 

procurement of' information on ihemilitary, 

political, and economic developments in 

foreign countries was carried out on a 

grani scale and by all possible means. The 

central offices set up abroad, the branch 

offices, and individua.l agents were equipped with special shortwave sets and were 

in direct contact with Moscow. 

THE "ROTE DBE!" 

In the course of the Second World War 

there was a goodly number of vecy dangerous 

groups of agents. M!i.ny groups the Germana 

were able to render innocuous, many they 

could not. But I think it was the moat 

dangerous group of all which they did not 

succeed in rendering harmless. Thia grou1l 

could only be cleared up in small measure, 

and that m1.1ch too late. 

Since June 1941 the German interce"Pt 

service observed three radio circuits running from Switzerland to M:>acow. In 

Switzerland in tile vicinity of Lake Geneva, 

were located three radio stations which 

stood in col!J!!lunication with M:>acow. It 

was BXn recognized that these were agents' 

stations, and that they belonged to the 

Russian mil! tary espionage system. Beyond that no essential information was 

possible, especially since the cryptographic systems employed were not broken. 

M:>nth by month the Germana watched this 

traffic, took down the messages, and tried 

to break the cryptographic system. They 

gave this agents' net the name "Die Rote 

Dre!." This "Rote Dre!" caused many a 

headache to a great many people, - also in 

Switzerland, but the more they worried 

about it the leas clever they became. 

It was not until December 1942 after the 

arrest of the agent Kent ("Rote Kapelle" 

case) that the Germana got any clue for 

breaking into the net of " Rote Dre 1 • " 

Kent had stated that in the summer 1940 he 

brought a cryptographic system to Geneva, 

and delivered it in Rue de Lausanne. Now 

the Swiss Central Office of the Comintern 

was located in the Rue de Lausanne • The 

transmitter's position had been fixed as 

1! 

close to the French border. Through Confidential agents in Switzerland a.nd the 

German counterintelligence af'f.l.ce in Dijon, 

France, an attempt was ma.de to get at this 

organization, above all to get some clue 

which would make it possible to break into 

the cryptographic system so as to be able 

to read the tremendous volume of traffic 

over this network. 

Not until the summer of 1944 was Germany 

able to read those messages which had been 

going out for a long time.. What they now 

saw was enough to take many a person's 

breath away. 

During the whole period of the eastern 

campaign, during the first German offensive in 1941, in the preliminary stages of 

the campaign of 1942, in the moat critical 

period on the eastern front, at the time 

of the battles around Stalingrad and in 

the Caucasus, and then later in the epri~ 

summer, and autumn of 1943, in those decisive days when the German armies in the 

southern and central sectors of the eastern front were being swept back, in those 

days when one e:11>ected that somewhere, 

perhaps on the Dnieper, they would be able 

to make a stand, check the onrushing tide 

of the Russian armies, and build a new 

finn front, precisely in those days, weeks 

and months the most secret information regarding the German military situation on 

the eastern front, regarding troop units, 

strength, assembly areas, intentions, etc., 

was passing currently through Switzerland 

to Moscow. These were exclusively matters 

which must have come from the highest 

level of German military com:nand. 

The sender always signed "Dora"; the 

sources were designated as "Werther," 

"Sissy," "Teddy," ''Fernand," "Taylor, 

"Lucie," "Pacbo," "M!i.ud," "Eduard," "Alfred," "Jim," "Salter," etc. The man who 

directed the work by radio from Moscow 

signed "Direktor." 

By direction finding it had been established by the Germane that two of the 

transmitters were in Geneva, the third in 

Lausanne. Now the work of the German agents in Switzerland began. 

They soon found out the points at which 

the transmitters were located and the or-:= 

ganization they served. In Geneva, at 

Number 113 Rue de Lausanne, sat as chief 

of the organization a certain Rado who was 

officially director of the Geo-Presse in 

Geneva. 

ASA Lview 
1 Alexander Rado was a private scholar and 

a citizen of Hungary. He had lived in 

Berlin until Mirch 1933 and had then gone 

first to Hungary, and from there in 1934 

to Paris where he was active on behalf of 

the Soviet Union in cartographic work. He 

was a fanatic adherent of the Communist 

idea. In 1926 he had gone from Berlin to 

Moscow for nine months, and then returned 

to Berlin. He was a member of the KPD and 

of the Association for the Study of the 

Soviet Planned Economy. After 30 January 

1933 he was again active for the KPD and 

had placed his dwelling at the disposal of 

their central office. 

His wife had been secretary of the Communist women's movement and was the sister 

of the well-known Communist, Gustel Janeen; 

for a time she had worked at the Soviet 

embassy in Berlin under Joffe; later she 

spent some time in the Soviet Union. 

It is certain that Rado was already active as an agent for the Soviet Union in 

1939· In Paris he must have been in contact with Gilbert. When Rado came to 

Switzerland is uncertain; probably it was 

early in 1940, possibly even earlier. In 

Geneva he had two transmitters at hie direct disposal, one of them in Rue de Soleure Number 5. 

'Phe Lausanne transmitter was in the 

house at Number 2 Chemin Longerai. Occupant of the house was A.A. Foote who appeared under the cover name John. He did 

the cipher work himself, sent the reports, 

and also had an intelligence organization 

of his own which worked independently of 

Rado. The Swiss authorities knew nothing 

about this. 

In the course of time the Germans were 

able to clear up many things regarding 

"Rote Drei." One knew 'who the "Direktor" 

was, 'lb:> Rado was; they knew all the operators. In the end they were able to read 

all the messages. But, for all that, the 

principal matter remained concealed. Who 

were those informers whose connections 

reached into the Fueher's Headquarters, 

into the OKW, into the Air Ministry, into 

all industrial plants, etc. 'l Who were all 

these people who knew how to secure the 

most important information with such masterful skill? Who above all were the final sources from which they drew their informa tion'l 

Nov .... -Decembcr 1951 

REF ID:A60247 

The Gt;;:--wans tried by all means to get 

behind this great secret. Hundreds of 

people were watched. In December 1943 in 

the grounds of the Fuehrer's Headquarters, 

of OKH, of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 

and other offices special detachments of 

Nahfeldsuchtruyps (troops charged with policing the area close to the line) were 

introduced who came from ·all directions 

and all distances. It was all in vain. 

Not a bit of th:ls secret was ever revealed. 

It was and remained the moat fateful secret of the Second World War. 

Later, when "Rote Drei" had long since 

ceased to operate, when all traces bad 

been lost, in the summer of 1944 when the 

shades of the "Rote Drei" were no longer 

spooking in the east on the Volga and the 

Don, but were close to the borders of the 

Reich in the east and in the west, at that 

time when men of the German military command could no longer reconcile with their 

conscience the strategic nonsense of a 

prolongation of the war, at that time when 

on 20 July 1944 that clumsily organized 

attempt was made to dispose of the man who 

had brought all this misfortune on Germany 

and all Europe --- at that time, the ghost 

of the dead "Rote Drei" rose once more 

from the grave. Once more a convulsive 

search for traitors swept over all Germany. 

Nahfeldtrupps watched Hitler's Headquarters for weeks. But again no trace was 

found of any auspicious radio connection. 

It could not be found, for it had never 

existed. The information for the "Rote 

Drei" had gone to Rado by completely different, simpler ways. 

(Editor's note: While the nature of the 

indicated "simpler ways" of conveying this 

information from Hitler's headquarters is 

not related in other portions of the manuscript, which can be revealed, it is hinted that the material·waa brought out directly by certain personnel and was not 

transmitted by radio.) 

PONY EXPRESS 

!t's older than you think. Mu-co Polo 

relates that Genghis Khan, ruler ofChinese 

Tartary, had a courier service aimiliar to 

the pony express nearly a thousand years 

ago. Relay stations 'Were provided about 

every twenty five miles, and the couriers, 

by changing mounts at each station, could 

deliver messages as far as 300 miles away 

in a single day. 

13 
Beceiver 

REF JD:A60247 Tuning 

tor Manual Nets 

(8ouft:dent:1:al) 

SFC Henry D Pruden 

In line with the training program employed by Operational Training, Morse Branch, 

The Army Security Agency Training Center, 

Fort Devens, M!.ssachusetts, it bas been 

found that proficiency in copying manual 

speed Morse stations may be better obtained if nets using two or more stations are 

used in the trainine program. The problem 

encountered was in finding a method of 

giving the students actual receiver tuning 

in connection with the copying of manual 

nets, using procedures other than International Point-to-Point. As the type nets 

desired for manual copy could not be heard 

at this station because the power output 

of the transmitters was too low to carry 

this far, some method had to be devised to 

get nets avail.able so that the students ~ould have to tune their receivers prior 

to copyine the traffic. We previously bad 

been able to give them the type nets desired by using TG-10 keyers and inked tape 

·but we only bad an audio signal to "patoh" 

to the students' racks. This method gave 

the .students practice in copying manual 

nets but no practice whatsoever 1n receiver tuning; in fact, the receiver bad to be 

turned to the "send" position so that very 

rstrotl8 signals com:i,ng over the air would 

;not block the output of the TG-10 keyer. 

Due to the classification of the nets 

we desired the students to copy, we could 

not put transmitters on the air and i.ve 

them actually tune these tranlEl!mittera in 

while the instructors sent the traffic be· 

cause other persons oouldalso tune rece1V· 

ere to the world.ne frequencies. In short, 

we bad to put a transmitter an the air tor 

the benefit of the students and have no 1

' output, outside of the imaed1ate vicini t7 

of the Operational Train:lns room. 

Jotf idea was to use the TG-10 ayer udio output to key the RB' output of the frequency meter and then "patoh" this keyed 

RB' s:tscal to the students' raoka througb 

14 

multi-couplers, with no receiving antenna 

attached. The "make-break:" circuit of the 

TG-10 keyer was not sharp enough to key 

the frequency meter properly, but by the 

insertion ofa sensitive relay (255A Belay) 

in the ''B" plus oircuit of the frequency 

meter ~ower supply and the audio output of 

the TG-10 keyer, a sharp "make - break:" 

could be obtained and this RB' output "piped" to the students' racks through the 

multi-coupler with no antenna attached, 

therefore, giving no RB' output except 1n 

the Operational Training room. This method 

worked perfectly and by inserting a switch 

across the relay the frequency meter could 

be used to measure frequencies normally 

when desired. 

Using this arrangement, students are 

given an approximate frequency range to 

search for nets. The instructor sets the 

frequency meter to a desired frequency, 

turns on the TG-10 keyer with the type net 

desired (inked tape that has been previously made U'P by the instructor is used in the 

TG-10 k:eyer, which method of preparation 

will be described in detail later), and 

turns on the relay that is keyed by the 

audio output of the TG-10 keyer. The instructor then takes the receiving antenna 

out of the multi-couplers and substitutes 

the Br output of the frequency meter. The 

students' racks are then "patched" into 

these multi-couplers and when the students 

tune their receivers to the correct frequency, they are able to copy the nets. 

By putting the training generator output through the audio line to the students 

raoks, the 1Datructor is able to provide 

several different types of interference on 

the nets, thus givine the students simulated field experience. 

By using a TG-10 keyer in conjunction 

with a modified frequency meter as explained above, the students have to tune their 

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