:MA~, q•7 . \JJ.. . f'j\" 

Taxes And H-Bomb ·! 

Pose U. S.Dilemma . .·\ .. 

By Joseph Alsop 

THE GOVERNMENT analysts are re. 

ported to be tentatively convinced that the 

Soviet hydrogen bomb was - an interim. 

weapon, similar to the American bomb 

tested at Eniwetok in 1951. 

If this .ii correct, the purposes of the Soviet explosion were to gain preliminary data 

on, the hJdrogen fusion reaction, and to test 

tbe ·.very . large atomic bomb that is . needed 

~ ·trigger a full-scale hydrogen bomb. . The · 

1~51 Eniwetok bomb designed for these purposes bad a power of · ab<>ut 250 kilotons, or 

·aii~ut 250,000 tons of TNT. The next year 

we tested our full-scale hydrogen bomb, 

with'l.A power of three to five megatons, or 

three million to five million tons of TNT. 

.These .facts are enough to establish the 

~alify of the Americlin atomic lead. They 

iiUfticiently explain ~he statement . of the 

chairman of .the Congressional Joint Com· 

mittee on Atomic Energy, Representative 

W. Sterμng Cole, that the Americ~ atomic 

program is still "pre-eminent" . -7 

'!'he question is, unfortunately, whether 1 

••pre-eminence" matters. According to the : 

A111erican Government's official estimates, , 

the Kremlin is now able to cripple this : 

country by air-atomic attack. According to 

the s~e estimates, the Kremlin will gain · 

tlie. -ability tQ devastate this country-to' 

strike a knockout blow that will force our 

s~nder to the enemy-within 18 to 24 . 

months. -· .,.... 

THE RECENT Soviet bomb test plainly 

suggests that these American Government 

estimates have erred, if at all, on the side 

of caution. When the Kremlin has the bombs , 

and the airpower to destroy this country, :i 

· it. will be a very poor consolation to know :

1 

that W1' have more bombs than the Kremlin. i 

The consolation will be all the thinner;' 

moreover, since the Kremlin is rapidiy' 

building an air defense against our bombs, 

while we have no air defense worthy of the 

name and are unlikely to buy one. 

The story· of how our policy makers have 

·handled this vital problem of the changing , 

air-atomic balance between the Soviet Union 

and the United States can be allowed to 

speak for !~elf.·___ -----··-·--·-··-

REF ID:A40311 

In brief, when Dwight D. Eisenhower en· 

tered the White House last winter, the first 

thing he found was a warning of grave 

danger, and an ambitious American ail- de· 

fense program to ward the danger off. 

Initially, the President seems to have ·been 

much impressed. But the air-defense pro- · 

gram was goin1 to cost a lot of money, and 

a good many Eisenhower advisers tend to 

think that taxes are more dangerous than 

hydrogen bombs. · ,_ 

As a result, the National Security Council 

has been walking up to l!-lld backing away 

from this vital problem for eight long 

months. The. vast accumulation of data left 

behind by the Truman Administration has 

now been supplemented by. no less than 

three. majqr commjttee reports. 

The Kelly committee, composed of lead· 

ing scientists and industrialists, recommended . a strong air-defense program. The 

Edwards committee, named to assess Soviet 

air-atomic capabilities, sharply underscored 

the extent of the danger. The Bull com· ' 

mittee, chosen by the Eisenhower National 

Security Council to get a "report from our 

own people," recommended an even stronger 

program than the Kelly committee. Those 

who fear taxes more than H-Bombs were 

still displeased. · .,.... THERE IS a new :thotto, _however-"if you : 

don't like the last committee's report, get a 

new committee." Consequently a fourth 

Committee on Air Defense has now been 

named, composed of industrialists and others 

whose most conspicuous qualifications appears to be total ignorance of the problem. 

The most interesting thing about this nevY.- , 

group is the presence in their midst of James 

B. Black, president of the Pacific Gas & 

Electric Co. 

Last spring Mr. Black served on the "seven 

wise men,'; still another committee carefully 

selected by Budget Director Joseph Dodge 

and his allies. As desired by their sponsors, 

the seven wise men tqld the National Security Council that balancing the budget 

was far more important than the defense 

of the United States. The. reappearance ot 

a member of this packed jury on the new 

committee to consider air-defense problem is a coincidence altogether too striking 

to be ignored. 

It all seems to add up to the conclusion 

that the growing Soviet air-atomic threat is 

to be utterly ignored, or at best dealt with 

by half-measures. It will feel· a bit odd to 

be taking the road so brilliantly pioneered 

by Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamber· 

lain. But that seems to be the road that will 

be taken, unless the President himself firmly 

decides otherwise or the new Joint Chiefs 

of Staff powerfully intervene. The.se are 

the two last hopes; 

Cop:rrllht. 1953. N. Y. Herald Tribune, Ina.