J-A26041-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

DENISE SHAFFER, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

JOHN SHAFFER : No. 376 WDA 2016

:

:

Appeal from the Order February 10, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County,

Civil Division, No(s): F.C. 11-90318-D

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., RANSOM and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 21, 2016

Denise Shaffer (“Wife”) appeals from the December 1, 2015 Order 

denying Wife’s Petition for Special Relief, as modified by the February 10, 

2016 Order, following reconsideration. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant facts as follows:

The parties, [Wife] and John Shaffer (“Husband”), were divorced 

by Decree dated July 3, 2012, and their Property Settlement 

Agreement (“PSA”) was incorporated but not merged into the 

Decree. The PSA provides for the payment from Husband to 

Wife of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00) in five (5) 

equal installments, as payment for Wife’s interest in jointly titled 

property in Venango County, Pennsylvania. The PSA further 

provides for alimony payments from Husband to Wife in the 

monthly amount of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) through 

December 1, 2016[, or until Wife’s cohabitation with an 

unrelated adult male].

On August 24, 2012, the parties entered into a “Payment 

Adjustment,” modifying the dates upon which Husband was to 

make payments for Wife’s interest in the Venango County 

property. The Payment Adjustment was formally adopted in the 
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Addendum to [the PSA] [“First Addendum”][,] filed on October 

24, 2012.[1]

On November 17, 2014, the parties entered into a Second 

Addendum to [the PSA] [“Second Addendum”], providing that 

Husband’s obligation to pay Wife alimony is terminated effective 

January 1, 2015[, as the parties agreed that Husband’s alimony 

obligation has been fully satisfied.2] The Second Addendum 

further provides that the parties shall equally share the 

children’s unreimbursed medical expenses, where previously it 

was Wife’s obligation to pay the first $250.00 of those expenses.

Trial Court Order, 12/1/15, at 1-2 (footnotes added and one footnote 

omitted). The Second Addendum was incorporated but not merged into the 

Decree for enforcement purposes. 

Wife subsequently filed a Petition for Special Relief, arguing that the 

Second Addendum did not represent the parties’ entire agreement, and 

requesting the trial court to set aside or amend the Second Addendum. On 

December 1, 2015, the trial court denied Wife’s Petition, finding that the 

Second Addendum represents the parties’ entire agreement. On this basis, 

the trial court refused to consider evidence of a contemporaneous

 

1 Both the PSA and the First Addendum specifically allow for prepayment of 

any of the land installment payments without penalty to Husband.

2

In a separate Consent Order issued on the same day, the trial court 

vacated a previous Order that prohibited contact between the parties’ 

children and Wife’s boyfriend, Eric Avondo (“Avondo”).
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agreement.3 See Trial Court Order, 12/1/15, at 3, 5. The trial court also 

found that Wife freely entered into the Second Addendum without fraud, 

undue influence or duress. See id. at 4-5. Accordingly, the trial court 

upheld the PSA, as well as both Addendums, as written. See id. at 5. The 

trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife $5,000 for the land installment 

payment that was owed by April 1, 2015, less an alimony overpayment of 

$2,412.61. See id. The trial court also ordered Husband to pay $500 for 

Wife’s counsel fees, as “reasonable enforcement expenses” for his overdue 

payment. Id.

Husband filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and attached thereto a 

copy of a check written to Wife for $10,000, dated November 21, 2014. 

 

3

In support of her position, Wife offered into evidence the following text 

messages between the parties, indicating that Husband and Wife discussed 

additional terms that were not included in the Second Addendum:

[Husband]: Never mind. I have the call with the lawyer 

tomorrow. Is this what you said yesterday?

 I pay off [our son’s] car $10,000

 I give two checks @ $6500 each

 Eliminate future alimony

 Eliminate the $250 annual medical for kids

 Eliminate paper on [Avondo]

I would like to send an email to my lawyer tonight so she knows 

what I want to discuss with her at 9am.

[Wife]: That is what we talked about.

Exhibit F; see also N.T., 9/24/15, at 19-20 (wherein the trial court admitted 

the text messages into evidence as Exhibit F). Because the trial court found 

that the Second Addendum constituted the parties’ entire agreement, it 

admitted the text messages “for the limited purpose of determining whether 

fraud occurred.” Trial Court Order, 12/1/15, at 2.
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After a hearing, the trial court found that Husband had complied with the 

terms of the First Addendum, and amended the December 1, 2015 Order, by 

striking the provision that required Husband to pay the land installment 

payment due on April 1, 2015, and vacating the obligation for counsel fees. 

See Trial Court Order, 2/10/16. The trial court ordered Wife to pay Husband 

the alimony overpayment. See id. 

Wife filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Stay, which the trial court 

denied in separate Orders. Wife filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a courtordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement. 

On appeal, Wife raises the following questions for our review:

I. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law or abused 

its discretion in finding that the [Second Addendum,] prepared 

by Husband’s counsel on his behalf and presented to Wife 

surreptitiously, resulting in Wife signing the same without her 

counsel’s knowledge or advice, represents the entire contract of 

the parties[?]

II. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law or abused 

its discretion in finding that the [Second Addendum,] prepared 

by Husband’s counsel on his behalf and presented to Wife 

surreptitiously, resulting in Wife signing the same without her 

counsel’s knowledge or advice, was not obtained by fraudulent 

means[?]

III. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law or 

abused its discretion in failing to hold that Husband’s counsel’s 

violation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct by 

communicating with a represented party through a third person, 

in itself or in considering the totality of the circumstances, 

invalidated the purported contract or made it subject to reform 

due, inter alia, to counsel’s overreaching, which is against public 

policy and renders an unconscionable result[?]
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IV. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law or abused

its discretion in finding that the [Second Addendum,] prepared 

by Husband’s counsel on his behalf and presented to Wife 

surreptitiously, resulting in Wife signing the same without her 

counsel’s knowledge or advice, was entered into freely without 

undue influence or duress[?]

V. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law or abused 

its discretion in reversing[,] upon reconsideration[,] its 

determination that Wife was still owed two land payments, and 

counsel fees as a result thereof, where Husband appended to his 

Motion for Reconsideration a copy of a check, which copy 

contained a statement regarding its purpose not appearing on 

the original check, and a copy of the unaltered check had been 

entered as an exhibit in the underlying hearing[?]

Brief for Appellant at 12-13 (issues renumbered).

The determination of marital property rights through 

prenuptial, postnuptial and settlement agreements has long 

been permitted, and even encouraged. ... Moreover, a court’s 

order upholding the agreement in divorce proceedings is subject 

to an abuse of discretion or error of law standard of review. An 

abuse of discretion is not lightly found, as it requires clear and 

convincing evidence that the trial court misapplied the law or 

failed to follow proper legal procedures. We will not usurp the 

trial court’s fact[-]finding function.

Lugg v. Lugg, 64 A.3d 1109, 1110 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Paroly v. 

Paroly, 876 A.2d 1061, 1063 (Pa. Super. 2005)) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted).

We will consider Wife’s first and second claims together. In her first 

claim, Wife contends that the trial court erred by finding that the Second 

Addendum represents the entire contract between the parties. Brief for 

Appellant at 21. Wife argues that although she agreed to terminate alimony, 

she did so in exchange for consideration that did not appear in the Second 
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Addendum, and she asserts that the above-mentioned text messages 

provide evidence of this consideration. Id. Wife asserts that because the 

Second Addendum is not a fully integrated agreement for purposes of the 

parol evidence rule, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to reform 

the Second Addendum to include the terms discussed in the text messages. 

Id. at 21, 23.

In her second claim, Wife argues that the trial court erred in finding 

that Wife’s agreement to the Second Addendum was not obtained through 

fraud. Id. at 23. Wife asserts that Husband fraudulently induced her to sign 

the Second Addendum, which did not contain all of the terms that the 

parties had discussed in their text messages, without the assistance of 

counsel. Id. at 25-26. Additionally, Wife claims that Husband induced her 

to sign the “incomplete” Second Addendum by assuring her that he would 

pay the sums referred to in the text messages. Id. Wife also argues that 

Husband partially complied with their text message agreement by sending 

her a check for $10,000, but that Husband subsequently altered the memo 

line of the check to indicate that it represented the final two land installment 

payments, consistent with the PSA and First Addendum. Id. at 26 n.9.

The trial court considered these claims in its December 1, 2015 Order, 

wherein it set forth the relevant law concerning the validity of the property 

settlement agreements, the parol evidence rule, and Wife’s allegation of 

fraud. See Trial Court Order, 12/1/15, at 2-3, 4. The trial court considered 
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the relevant evidence, and properly found that Husband and Wife intended 

to modify the terms of their PSA; the Second Addendum represents the 

entire agreement between the parties; the Second Addendum was entered 

into freely, without fraud, undue influence or duress; and accordingly, any 

evidence of a contemporaneous agreement (the text messages) must be 

excluded. See id. at 3-5. We adopt the sound reasoning of the trial court in 

regard to Wife’s first and second claims and affirm on this basis.4 See id. at 

2-5.

As Wife’s third and fourth issues are related, we will address them 

together. In her third claim, Wife argues that the trial court erred by 

declining to hold that Husband’s counsel violated Rule of Professional 

Conduct 4.2, which prohibits a lawyer from communicating “about the 

subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be 

represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the 

consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court 

order.” Brief for Appellant at 29 (quoting Pa.R.P.C. 4.2); see also id. at 26-

 

4 To the extent that Wife claims that the alleged fraud was a result of the 

failure of Husband’s counsel to consult with Wife’s counsel, we will address 

these arguments with her third and fourth claims.
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27. Wife also cites to Comment 4 to Rule 4.2, and Rule 8.4,5and claims 

that Husband’s counsel violated Rule 4.2 by obtaining her signature on the 

Second Addendum through Husband, without the presence of Wife’s counsel, 

and that this violation renders an unconscionable result. Brief for Appellant 

at 29-31; see also id. at 26-29. Wife asserts that, as a result of an ethical 

violation by Husband’s counsel, the Second Addendum must be reformed to 

include the terms discussed by the parties via text message.6 Id. at 30-31;

 

5 Comment 4 to Rule 4.2 provides, in relevant part, that “[a] lawyer may not 

make a communication prohibited by this Rule through the acts of another.” 

Pa.R.P.C. 4.2, cmt. 4. Rule 8.4 provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t is 

professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the 

Rules of Professional conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, 

or do so through the acts of another.” Pa.R.P.C. 8.4(a).

6 Wife’s fourth issue also appears to invoke a claim of undue influence or 

duress. However, Wife does not set forth the required elements of either 

defense. Therefore, this claim is waived. Rather, Wife merely restates that 

Husband’s counsel violated Rule 4.2 by drafting the “incomplete” Second 

Addendum, and by using Husband to obtain Wife’s signature, without first 

communicating with Wife’s counsel. Brief for Appellant at 26-29. 

Additionally, to the extent that Wife argues that Husband engaged in fraud 

by “providing the appearance of partial performance” of the purported text 

message agreement, we defer to the trial court’s sound reasoning as to the 

issue of fraud, and note that the Second Addendum does not require 

Husband to pay Wife a lump sum of $10,000 as consideration for 

termination of alimony. See Trial Court Order, 12/1/15, at 4-5; see also 

id. at 4 (stating that “[t]he text messages merely demonstrate that 

additional terms were discussed.”).
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see also id. at 29.7

Initially, in regards to Wife’s representation at the time the parties 

entered into the Second Addendum, the trial court noted the following:

The Second Addendum was prepared by Husband’s counsel upon 

Husband’s request. The parties reviewed and signed the 

document without the assistance of counsel. After the document 

was signed and notarized, Husband requested that his attorney 

file the same. Wife claims that she was represented by counsel 

at the time, while Husband contends that Wife communicated to 

him that she was no longer represented. The [trial court] notes 

that Wife’s counsel had not withdrawn her appearance[;] 

however[,] the divorce litigation ended on July 3, 2012, upon 

entry of the Decree in Divorce.

Trial Court Order, 12/1/16, at 3 n.2; see also id. (declining to make a 

finding regarding counsel’s conduct, “as it is not relevant to a contract 

defense under the facts of this case.”).

Assuming that Wife was still represented by counsel at the time the 

parties entered into the Second Addendum, Wife has nevertheless failed to 

show that an ethical violation occurred in this case. Rule 4.2 prohibits 

communication between a lawyer and another individual who is represented 

by counsel, but it does not prohibit communications between two individuals 

who are represented by counsel. See Pa.R.P.C. 4.2; see also id., cmt. 4 

(stating that “[p]arties to a matter may communicate directly with each 

 

7 Wife does not similarly contest the validity of the Consent Order, despite 

the fact that Wife also signed the Consent Order without consulting counsel. 

Moreover, because Wife testified at trial that she and Avondo began 

cohabitating in February or March of 2015, see N.T., 9/24/15, at 35-36, 

Husband’s requirement to pay alimony would have been terminated at that 

time, pursuant to the PSA.
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other, and a lawyer is not prohibited from advising a client concerning a 

communication that the client is legally entitled to make.”); ABA Formal 

Opinion 11-461, at 1.

Here, there is no evidence that Husband’s counsel communicated 

directly with Wife, or that counsel used Husband to make a prohibited 

communication. Indeed, Wife testified that she never communicated with 

Husband’s counsel. See N.T. 9/24/15, at 31. Husband’s counsel drafted the 

Second Addendum, and sent it to Husband for his review. See id. at 41. 

Husband subsequently sent the draft to Wife via email, and the parties 

independently arranged to meet and execute the agreement. See id. at 47; 

see also id. at 30-31 (wherein Wife testified that she met Husband to sign 

the Second Addendum before a notary, and she did not consult her attorney 

before doing so). Husband then returned the fully executed Second 

Addendum to his counsel for filing.8 Therefore, there is no evidence that 

Husband’s counsel breached her ethical duties under Rule 4.2. See Lugg, 

64 A.3d at 1111, 1114 (finding that Husband’s counsel did not breach Rule 

 

8 Husband’s counsel admits that notice of intent to file the documents should 

have been provided to all counsel of record “as a precaution.” Husband’s 

Brief at 2 n.1. However, at the time of filing, the Second Addendum was 

uncontested, and therefore, Husband was not required to provide Wife or 

her counsel notice before presenting the Motion to Adopt the Second 

Addendum to the trial court. See Butler County L.R.C.P. L208.2(d) (stating 

that “[a]ny motion [] bearing the written consent of the opposing party, or 

the opposing party’s attorney of record, may be submitted to the assigned 

judge without formal notice of presentation....”); see also Trial Court Order, 

11/25/14, at 1. (including notation that the Motion to Adopt the Second 

Addendum was consented to by all parties). 
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4.2, where counsel drafted a post-nuptial agreement, and Husband and Wife 

met independently to sign the agreement). Moreover, even if Wife had 

provided sufficient evidence of an ethical breach, she has cited to no legal 

authority to support the proposition that the proper remedy for such a 

breach would be to invalidate or reform the parties’ agreement. See id. at 

1114 (stating that “even assuming the validity of [the ethical breach] claim, 

[Wife] has presented no legal authority that her remedy would be to 

renounce the agreement.”). Accordingly, this claim is without merit.

In her fifth claim, Wife asserts that the trial court erred by finding, in 

its February 10, 2016 Order, that Husband had paid the two land installment 

payments, thereby satisfying the December 1, 2015 Order. Brief for 

Appellant at 31. Wife claims that the $10,000 check she received from 

Husband was meant to pay off their son’s car, rather than to satisfy the 

fourth and fifth land installment payments. Id. at 31-32. Wife further 

asserts that the copy of the check attached to Husband’s Motion for 

Reconsideration had been altered to include “Land Payments 4 + 5” in the 

memo line, whereas the copy of the canceled check admitted into evidence 

during the hearing had a blank memo line. Id. at 31-32.

After Wife filed her Petition for Special Relief, the trial court conducted 

a hearing on September 24, 2015. At the hearing, Wife testified that the 

$10,000 check was meant to pay off their son’s car, as indicated in their text 

messages. See N.T., 9/24/15, at 26, 27. A copy of the check was admitted 
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into evidence. See Exhibit H; see also N.T., 9/24/4, at 28 (wherein Exhibit 

H was admitted into evidence). Wife also testified that Husband had 

previously made land installment payments to her in accordance with the 

PSA and First Addendum. See N.T., 9/24/15, at 27. In its December 1, 

2015 Order, the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife $5,000 for the land 

installment payment that had been due on April 1, 2015. Husband 

subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration, attaching the check for 

$10,000, dated November 21, 2015, and explaining that the check included 

both the overdue payment and a prepayment for the final installment. 

Wife filed a Response, wherein she again cited to the text messages and 

argued that the payment should be considered a payment for their son’s car. 

The trial court conducted a hearing, at which the parties discussed the 

possibility of a mistake about the purpose of the $10,000 check, resulting in 

the trial court granting reconsideration to consider the possibility of such a 

mistake. See N.T., 12/22/15, at 2-5. Upon consideration of Husband’s 

Motion and the entire record of the case, including the exhibits entered into 

evidence during the hearing, the trial court found that Husband had 

complied with the terms of the PSA and First Addendum by paying Wife for 

the land installment payment that was owed by April 1, 2015. See Trial 

Court Order, 2/10/16. Discerning no abuse of discretion or legal error, we 

will not disrupt the trial court’s finding on appeal. See Lugg, 64 A.3d at 

1110 n.1; see also Stamerro v. Stamerro, 889 A.2d 1251, 1257 (Pa. 
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Super. 2005) (stating that “[w]hen interpreting a marital settlement 

agreement, the trial court is the sole determiner of facts[,] and absent an 

abuse of discretion, we will not usurp the trial court’s fact-finding function.”) 

(quotation omitted). Thus, Wife is not entitled to relief on her final claim.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/21/2016
Property Settlement Agreement filed on October 24, 2012. 

County property. The Payment Adjustment was formally adopted in the Addendum to 

the dates upon which Husband was to make payments for Wife's interest in the Venango 

On August 24, 2012, the parties entered into a "Payment Adjustment," modifying 

the monthly amount of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) through December 1, 2016. 

Pennsylvania. The PSA further provides for alimony payments from Husband to Wife in 

installments, as payment for Wife's interest in jointly titled property in Venango County, 

Husband to Wife of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00) in five (5) equal 

incorporated but not merged into the Decree. The PSA provides for the payment from 

by Decree dated July 3, 2012, and their Property Settlement Agreement ("PSA") was 

The parties, Denise Shaffer ("Wife") and John Shaffer ("Husband"), were divorced 

follows. 

2015, and upon review of the record in the above-captioned matter, the Court finds as 

DENISE SHAFFER, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

F.C. No. 11-9031~ 

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ORDEROF;OURT "J~ ; ~:;j 

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AND NOW, this 151 day of December, 2015, upon considerat~it of the evidence 

\\ 

presented during the hearing on Plaintiffs Petition for Special Relief on September 24, 

JOHN SHAFFER, 

Defendant. 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF BUTLER COUNTY, 

PENNSYLVANIA 

Circulated 10/17/2016 03:44 PM
I The Second Addendum was prepared by Husband's counsel upon Husband's request. The parties reviewed 

and signed the document without the assistance of counsel. After the document was signed and notarized, 

Husband requested that his attorney file the same. Wife claims that she was represented by counsel at the 

time, while Husband contends that Wife communicated to him that she was no longer represented. The Court 

notes that Wife's counsel had not withdrawn her appearance, however, the divorce litigation ended on July 3, 

2012, upon entry of the Decree in Divorce. Wife's counsel claims that Husband's counsel acted improperly in 

failing to contact Wife's counsel regarding the Second Addendum. Husband's counsel was unaware that Wife 

was represented. Based upon these facts, the Court makes no finding regarding counsel's conduct under the 

Rules of Professional Conduct, as it is not relevant to a contract defense under the facts of this case. 

contracts generally." De Witt v. Kaiser, 484 A.2d 121, 123 (Pa.Super. 1984). "Absent 

the courts in accordance with the same rules of law applying to determining the validity of 

"A property settlement agreement between husband and wife will be enforced by 

false statements which induced making of contract is not abridged by parol evidence rule). 

Warner Theatres, Inc., 374 A.2d 1342, 1345-1346 (Pa.Super. 1977)(buyer's right to show 

limited purpose of determining whether fraud occurred. See Sunseri v. RKO-Stanley 

their negotiations, it is appropriate for the Court to consider the text messages for the 

claiming that Husband's actions constitute fraud in misrepresenting material facts during 

discussed the additional terms that were omitted from the Second Addendum. As Wife is 

evidence communication between the parties by text message indicating that the parties 

that does not appear in the formal writing. In support of her position, Wife has offered into 

agreement, in that she agreed to terminate alimony in exchange for certain consideration 

Wife now claims that the Second Addendum does not represent the parties' entire 

it was Wife's obligation to pay the first $250.00 of those expenses.1 

parties shall equally share the children's unreimbursed medical expenses, where previously 

terminated effective January 1, 2015. The Second Addendum further provides that the 

Settlement Agreement, providing that Husband's obligation to pay Wife alimony is 

On November 17, 2014, the parties entered into a Second Addendum to Property 
that the language of the contract was chosen carelessly). 

bargains"); Goss v. Timblin, 622 A.2d 347, 350 (Pa.Super. 1993)(the law does not assume 

understood and irrespective of whether the agreements embodied reasonable or good 

by their agreements, without regard to whether the terms thereof were read and fully 

Addendum. See Simeone, 581 A.2d at 165 (1990)("Contracting parties are normally bound 

Settlement Agreement in consideration of the mutual promises set forth in the Second 

The writing clearly establishes that the parties desired to modify the terms of their Property 

obligation without any uncertainty as to the object or extent of the parties' engagement. 

Court finds that it represents the entire contract of the parties, importing a complete legal 

Upon examination of the Second Addendum to Property Settlement Agreement, the 

Yocca v. Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc., 854 A.2d 425, 436 (Pa. 2004)(citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

Therefore, for the parol evidence rule to apply, there must be a writing that 

represents the entire contract between the parties. To determine whether or 

not a writing is the parties' entire contract, the writing must be looked at and 

if it appears to be a contract complete within itself, couched in such terms as 

import a complete legal obligation without any uncertainty as to the object 

or extent of the [parties'] engagement, it is conclusively presumed that [the 

writing represents] the whole engagement of the parties .... 

Where the parties, without any fraud or mistake, have deliberately put their 

engagements in writing, the law declares the writing to be not only the best, 

but the only, evidence of their agreement. All preliminary negotiations, 

conversations and verbal agreements are merged in and superseded by the 

subsequent written contract . . . and unless fraud, accident or mistake be 

averred, the writing constitutes the agreement between the parties, and its 

terms and agreements cannot be added to nor subtracted from by parol 

evidence. 

agreements." Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990). 

fraud, misrepresentation, or duress, spouses should be bound by the terms of their 
determine whether fraud occurred. 

addition, the Court found that the testimony presented was not sufficiently credible to 

discussed. There is no evidence of fraudulent misrepresentation in the text messages. In 

fraud was established. The text messages merely demonstrate that additional terms were 

Upon consideration of the evidence presented, the Court does not find that proof of 

(1981). 

that he states or implies for the assertion." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 162 

states or implies in the truth of the assertion, or ( c) knows that he does not have the basis 

the assertion is not in accord with the facts, or (b) does not have the confidence that he 

assertion to induce a party to manifest his assent and the maker (a) knows or believes that 

of Contracts § 159 (1981). "A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker intends his 

misrepresentation is an assertion that is not in accord with the facts." Restatement (Second) 

proximate result." Hess v. Hess, 580 A.2d 357, 359 (Pa.Super. 1990). "A 

reliance by the recipient upon the misrepresentation, and (5) damage to the recipient as the 

intention by the maker that the recipient will thereby be induced to act, (4) justifiable 

"The elements of fraud are ( 1) a misrepresentation, (2) a fraudulent utterance, (3) an 

Yocca, 854 A.2d at 436-37 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Once a writing is determined to be the parties' entire contract, the parol 

evidence rule applies and evidence of any previous oral or written 

negotiations or agreements involving the same subject matter as the contract 

is almost always inadmissible to explain or vary the terms of the contract. 

One exception to this general rule is that parol evidence may be introduced 

to vary a writing meant to be the parties' entire contract where a party avers 

that a term was omitted from the contract because of fraud, accident, or 

mistake. In addition, where a term in the parties' contract is ambiguous, 

parol evidence is admissible to explain or clarify or resolve the ambiguity, 

irrespective of whether the ambiguity is created by the language of the 

instrument or by extrinsic or collateral circumstances. 
this Order. 

in the amount of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) as counsel fees within thirty (30) days of 

Dollars ($5,000.00) that was owed by April 1, 2015. Husband shall remit payment to Wife 

the parties' Property Settlement Agreement for failure to pay Wife the Five Thousand 

3. Husband shall be responsible for reasonable enforcement expenses pursuant to 

April 1, 2016, pursuant to the First Addendum. 

payment. Husband shall pay Wife an additional Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) by 

subtract the alimony overpayment at DRS 36652 in the amount of $2,412.61 from this 

the Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) that was owed by April 1, 2015. Husband may 

Settlement Agreement filed on October 24, 2012, in that he shall immediately pay to Wife 

2. Husband is directed to comply with the terms of the Addendum to Property 

Addendums shall be enforced as set forth in writing. 

Agreement is DENIED. The Property Settlement Agreement and the First and Second 

1. Wife's request to Set Aside or Amend Second Addendum to Property Settlement 

Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED: 

not be set aside or amended, and the parties' contractual obligations shall be enforced. 

the parties without undue influence or duress. Accordingly, the Second Addendum shall 

Furthermore, the Court finds that the Second Addendum was freely entered into by 

effect without reference to matters outside the contract. 

the parties shall not be considered, and the terms of the Second Addendum shall be given 

unambiguous. Therefore, evidence offered to show a contemporaneous agreement between 

The Court further finds that the terms of the Second Addendum are clear and 
~E~ 

President Judge, Butler County 

BY THE COURT: 

claims to be dilatory, obdurate or vexatious. 

4. No counsel fees shall be awarded to Husband as the Court did not find Wife's 
The Prothonotary of Butler County, Pennsylvania hereby certifies that a copy of the 

foregoing Order of Court was mailed to: 

BURTON AIMEE L; 

PAULISICK GERRI V; 

DR (CERT); 

on Tuesday, December 01, 2015, by first class mail, postage prepaid. (0) 

ri<I ') ~ ~ / l--l- 0J'.,v-- a>. . ov ~"" 

DENISE SHAFFER vs JOHN SHAFFER 

Case Number: 2011-90318 

Certificate of Mailing 

December 01, 2015