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HEADQUARTERS AIR DEFENSE COMMARD 

Memorandum and Related Papers Pert~ining to 

AN Am DEFENSE COMMAND 

PROPOSAL FCJl 

IMPROVED WARNING 

Prepared for the 

Individual Members ot the Watch Committee 

21-22 August 1953 

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!eturlty lnfo1 n1alion· 

HEADQUARTERS 

AIR DEFERS <X>MMAND 

Ent Air Force Base 

Colorado Springs, Colorado 

21 Augus\ 1953 

MEMO FOR: The IJ'ldividual Members ot the IAC Watch Committee 

SUBJECT: Reed .for a World-wide Indications Syat• 

l. Thie DBmorandum. and ite 1nclol!Nl'8a are f'arnished JOU on an 

intOrmal basis ae a reminder of discussions at ADC dllr:lzlg ;your v.l.ait 

20-22 August and in tull cognizance ot ite neceeaarilT unott:lcial 

nature. 

2. YOU. will have gathered from 1011r briefing here tbe extreme 

dependence ot air defense on adequate warnLng of hostilities and the 

related air attack on the United. states. The current ADC solution to 

the strategic warning iroblem described and illustrated in in.closures 

2 and .3 entitled Project Blindnm and illustrated by the briefing on 

the Indications Board has met certain ot our requireDBnt s. We realize 

its many deficiencies and its relationship to the much larger problem 

of the Watch Comittee. We. are confident that our approach has ma.D1' 

features which would contribute :aeasurably to a world-wide 81'8tem. • 

.3. Inclosure l to this memorandum, in the form ot an informal 

staff study, represents our idea ot the basic structure for a worldwide SYBtem of indications intelligence- using the Watch Committee as 

a central monitor and clearing house. Such a system must be established 

on proven principles of indications intelligence, but above all.11 !:!,-

quires standardization of method and rapidit:v ot informational. excha.nge. 

4. I reiterate here, therefore, the 'Wholehearted though necessaril.J' 

informal reconmendation of the Conmumder, .Air Defense Command.11 that the 

Watch Committee vigorously parsue the earl.7 establishment of a coordinated 

world.-w.1.d.e indications system based on the principles we have discussed.· 

3 Incls 

1. An ADC Proposal for 

Improved Warning (Si:smft') 

2. Manual for Opn of the ADC 

Indicat:lons-Board (SS9fm!) 

.3. Photograph - ADC Indications 

Board - l Jan to 30 Jun 53 

(Sem et) 

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Seca1 ii) lnformalio11 

HEADQUARTERS 

Am DEFENSE COMMA:ND 

Ent Air Force Base 

Colorado Springs, Colorado 

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AN Am DEFENSE COMMAND FRCPOSAL FOR IMFROVED WARII?IJ 

I. PROBLJ!Hs 

1. 'l'o estahl.ish the requirements and criteria tor u.s. ind1cationa 

intelligence eTaluation. 

II. FACTS BEARING OM THE PROBLEM: 

'/.... 2. The Air Defense CODlllBDd has an an~riding requirement trr warning 

. . of the 1mm1nence of air atta'* m the Uaited states. 

3. The missions of all tJ.s. defense agencies and m:llit&17 eommanda 

throughout the world would be made easier \v' adequate, tima'.q and dependable 

warning of events to cama. 

4.. The u.s. government in Washington has the highest requirement :f'or 

similar warning of' general hostilities and related world events. 

5. \The Air Defense Command has established an indications system using 

a graphic portrayal and a mechanical mamory to assist in the orderl.J 

evaluation of in<H:catio.ns of hostile air. attack on the u.s. However, this 

STat• requires the consideration of many' factors which are not within the 

competence or resources ot this oomma.nd to provide. 

6. S1m1lar projects in Tarying degrees of detail ue lmoum 'bo exist 

in various other commands and agencies with general]T similar disadvantages. 

7. 'l'he Washington Watch Committee, a sub-committee of the Intelligence 

Advisory Ccmmd.ttee, maintains a continuous indications evaluation or al.l 

events world-wide which bear on the imminence of general. hostilities and related world events. It rece1Yes contributions from all pertinent am competent JilshingeoD agencies. · · · 

'I.... s. The coordination and exchange of information between these several 

1---- indications efforts are neither· s:rstematized nor time'.q. There is a lack 

ot uniformity of.terms, methods, criteria, scope and scheduling in these 

several ettorts. 

9. The scope ot the Washington Watch Comittee responsibility is 

sufficiently' broad to embrace the severa1 separate efforts. 

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10. The existence of such separate but related efforts, as presentl.7 

constituted, throughout the world involves much duplication of' the evaluation 

effort - in 111an1 cases b.r people not tul..17 competenli and with divergent 

results. 

ll. -Indications efforts as now organized are producing results less 

reliable than the securit7 ot the nation requires and the conaanc:lera 1 concerned deserve. 

ID'. DISCUSSION: 

12. The coordination, standardization and 87stematic inter-relationship 

of this ef'fort would overcome Jll8l'l1' ot the present shortcomings, particularly 

£l"om the standpoint of the Air Defense Coanand. '1'he obvious solution is to 

charge the Watch Committee, as the most competent and mat authoritative ot 

the agencies presentl1' involved 1n indicati.ona evaluation, with specific 

responsibilities tor overall coordination and through its member agencies 

to achie"V8 the required directional effort. 

13. If such central coordination and direction are effected, the following 

are some of the principles, criteria and procedures believed essential bJ" the · Air Defense Command: 

a. .An agreed list of' indications and sub-indications world-wide 

1n scope. The Watch Comnittee would monitor this list on a 

continuing basis making additions and· deletions as required. 

Coordination and even active participation in its ireparation 

b,r contributing agencies and sub-agencies would be necessary. 

The monitoring responsibility would also include continuing 

developnent of the basic philosop'!V ot indications evaluation 

and of new methods tor applying it·. 

b. Assignment of indicators for evaluation to specific parti- cipating agencies or sub-agencies according to primacy of 

interest or competence. As an example -:- Air Defense Cormna:nd 

might well process intelligence concerning its principal 

area ot interest - Soviet Long Range Aviation activity. 

Similar assignment of responsibility would be made to other 

ccmmands or agencies. 

c. Provision to :f'urnish these same agencies with indications 

evaluation on all other indicators which are pertinent to 

their own warn.mg problem l:ut far which they do not have 

Wims.Cl of interest or .t'ull competence in evaluation. The 

Watch Committee, acting as a clearing house for such an 

evaluation, would be responsible for the receipt of this 

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inf'ormation throughout the world, passing trom an overall 

standpoint on its adequacy and reallocating it as required 

to the participating commands and agencies on a t:imel.7 basis. 

d. Timely, secure and dependable communications. The establishment of reliable "WOrl.d-wide indications evaluation wcW.d be 

nullified it the resultant intormation failed to arr.Lve at 

the using &geDCJ' be.tore the event itselt. Present· cODlllUD:1.cationa 

or other.means tor passing information of this nature are 

gEineralq unaatistact017, On-line teletype communications between the coordinating agency and all participatmg am contributizw agencies on a split second basis are mandato17, Cross 

c0Jllll'LU11.cations between selected comman:ls and agencies are also 

essential.. 

e. Standardised methodologr and displa,y sl!tem. At the present 

t:lm.e 11; takll s al.most as long f'or an ott:l.cer reporting to a 

new headquarters to learn its special terms, abbre'Viationa 

and connotations as it he were faced with· a foreign language, 

'!he standardizai;ion ot methodology, terms, displqa and 

criteria throqhout the proposed indications evaluation qstan 

would promote speed, understanding and_ accuraq, n-ot onl7 ot 

warning intormation, but ot intelligence application in general, 

The system of graphic portrayal and mechanical memoey, nov 

used throughout the Air Defense Forces of ADC is an attempted 

solution to this problem. · 

14, Summary and example of the concept. Under the above criteria, the 

Watch Comnittee would mainliain and follow the master list of inclicators and 

sub-indicators pertaining to the 1mndnence o.:f' genera1 hostilit~es and related world events. Ot this master list, the several indicators pertaining 

to Soviet Lmg Range Aviation might be assigned to the Air Defense Command 

tor continuing evaluatio~ and timsl.y' rel.q ot· results to the Watch Conmlttee, 

At the same time, conclusions on a portion of the remainder ot the master 

list might be required by the Air Defense CcmmaJJd as indications of the 

iminence of air attack on the u.s. The Watch Committee would be responsible 

.:f'or continuous and timely transmission to the Air Defense Command of evaluation 

on these subjects. A similar sy's'taa would be in e.:f'tect with each other con-

.tributing agency or canand, world-wide. 

IV, CCllCLUSIONS: 

15. The importance o:t' the warning problem, worl~de, requires its 

consideration on an immediate basis b,y the most competent and cognizant 

agency or level ot government. 

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16. The Watch Committee by virtue of its position, membership and 

authority is best titted to consider this problem and provide :tor its 

solution. 

V. RECOMMENDATION: 

17. The Air Defense Command, cognizant of the limitations and requirements imposed.by command channels, inf'orm.l.lJr reconmends that this study be 

pl.aced before the individual members of the Watch Committee tor their inform.tion 

and appropriate action. · 

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