alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A17A0609. MELVIN C. JONES v. STATE BOARD OF PARDONS AND

PAROLES.

Melvin C. Jones, a prison inmate proceeding pro se, directly appeals the trial

court’s dismissal of his complaint for mandamus against the State Board of Pardons

and Paroles (the “Board”). The underlying subject matter of this case is mandamus. 

See, e. g., Ray v. Barber, 273 Ga. 856, 857 (548 SE2d 283) (2001) (affirming

mandamus order where the Parole Board failed to follow its statutory duties and its

rules in determining a tentative parole date). The Supreme Court of Georgia has

exclusive appellate jurisdiction of casesinvolving extraordinary remedies, including

mandamus. 1983 Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III (5); see Settle v. McWhorter,

203 Ga. 93 (1) (45 SE2d 210) (1947). Accordingly, this case is TRANSFERRED to

the Supreme Court.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

11/21/2016

November 21, 2016
Exhibit 32.2

            CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

    PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, Robin Y. Deal, the Vice President, Finance and
Accounting of Comtex News Network, Inc. (the "Company"), has
executed this certification in connection with the filing with
the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Company's Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended December 31, 2003 (the
"Report").  The undersigned hereby certifies that:

(1)  the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
     13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
(2)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.

The purpose of this statement is solely to comply with Title 18,
Chapter 63, Section 1350 of The United States Code, as amended by
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.


Date: February 17, 2004                 /S/ROBIN Y. DEAL
                                        Robin Y. Deal
                                        Vice President, Finance &
                                        Accounting

<PAGE>
.d. -,., ..... ••• 

-- --:z~~-~ -----·-· ---------·---·· ·---~~--~-·-··---_··-·····=--=----~----_-···------ ---·--·····-·-
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-6528

TYRONE TONY BRADLEY, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

 v. 

LEROY CARTLEDGE, Acting Warden, McCormick Correctional 

Institution, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Florence. David C. Norton, Chief District 

Judge. (4:08-cv-00903-DCN) 

Submitted: September 18, 2009 Decided: October 5, 2009 

Before MICHAEL, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. 

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Tyrone Tony Bradley, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Samuel Creighton Waters, 

Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

Tyrone Tony Bradley seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate 

judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) 

petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice 

or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). A 

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that 

reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the 

constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or 

wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district 

court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); 

Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have 

independently reviewed the record and conclude Bradley has not 

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate 

of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
# C o u rt o f

A p p ea ls

o f t h e S t a te o f

G eo rg ia

ATLANTA,_

_ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _

Th e Co u rt

o f Ap p ea l s h er eb y p a s s es t h e f

o ll owi n g o r der :

A1 9 A1 49 3 . SAMUEL LEE GHEE v . STATE OF GEORGI A et a l

.

Th e t ri al co u rt en tered a “ No t i ce of No Serv ice Cal en d ar” i n t h i s ci v i l act i o n,

p l aci ng t h e cas e on an u p co m i n g co u rt cal en d ar. Pl ai n t i ff Sam u el Lee Gh ee h as fi l ed

a d i rect ap p eal s eek i n g rev i ew o f t h at o rd er. W e l ack ju ri sd i ct i o n

.

“ Gen eral l y

, an o rd er is fi n al an d ap p eal ab le wh en i t l eav es n o i ss u es rem ai n i n g

t o b e res o l v ed

, co n s t i t u t es t h e co u rt ’ s fi n al ru l i n g o n t h e m eri t s of t he act i o n

, an d

l eav es th e p art i es wi t h n o f u rt h er reco u rs e i n t h e t ri al co u rt .” Th o m a s v. Do u g l a s

Co u n t y

, 2 1 7 Ga. Ap p

. 5 2 0

, 5 2 2 (1 ) (4 57 SE2 d 8 3 5 ) (1 9 9 5 ); s ee al s o OCGA § 5 -6 -3 4

(a) (1 ). Th e ord er t h at G h ee wi s h es t o ap p eal i s a cal en dar cal l n ot i ce t h a t d o es n ot

d i s p o s e o f t h e cl ai m s i n t h e cas e an d t h erefo re i s n o t a fi n al o rd er.

To ap p eal th e o rd er, Gh ee was req ui red t o fo l l o w t he i n t erl ocu to ry ap p eal

p ro ced ures s et fo rt h i n O C G A § 5 -6 -3 4 (b ), i n cl u d i n g o b t ai n i n g a cert i fi cat e o f

i m m ed i at e rev i ew wi t h in t en day s o f th e ord er t o b e ap p eal ed an d fi l in g an ap p l i cat i o n

t o ap p eal wi t h i n t en d ay s aft er t h e cert i fi cat e was i s s ued

. Gh ee’ s fai l u re t o fo l l o w t h e

i n t erl o cu t o ry ap p eal p ro ced u re d ep ri v es t h is Co u rt o f j u ri s d i ct i o n o v er t h i s d i rect March 20, 2019ap p eal

, w h ich is h e r e b y D ISM ISSED. See Ma ys v. Ra n ci n e-Ki n ch en

, 29 1 Ga. 2 8 3,

2 8 3 -2 8 5 (7 2 9 SE2 d 3 2 1 ) (2 0 1 2 ).

C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f t h e S t a t e o

f G e o r g ia

C le r k ’ s O f f i c e

, A t la n t a

,

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r ti fy t h a t t h e a b o v e i s a t r u e e x t r a c t f r o m

t h e m i n u t e s o

f t h e C o u r t o

f A p p e a l s o f G e o r g i a

.

W i tn e s s m y s i g n a t u r e a n d th e s e a l o

f s a i d c o u r t

h e r e t o a f f i x e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r l a s t a b o v e w r i t t e n

.

, C l e r k

. 03/20/2019
#### Anderson vs. Wehe.

*February 4*

*March 3, 1885.*

*Attachment: Fraudulently contracting debt: Evidence of intent.*

1. A finding of the trial court that the defendant fraudulently contracted the debt in suit, is *held*to have been sustained by the evidence.

2. The direct testimony of a party as to the intent with which he did an act does not necessarily outweigh the evidence of circumstances tending to show a different intent.

APPEAL from, the Circuit Court for *Ashland*County.

The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion. "

The cause was submitted for the appellant on the brief of *Cottrill c&*Hanson, and for the respondent on that of *Knight dk Hayes.*

Taylor, J.

This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court sustaining an attachment, after a trial upon a traverse of the affidavit upon which the attachment issued.

*402The issue tried upon the traverse was whether the debt, to recover which the-action was brought, was fraudulently-contracted. Upon this issue the trial court found in favor of the respondent, that the debt was fraudulently contracted. The defendant appeals, and assigns for error that such finding is not supported by the evidence. After a careful consideration of the evidence, we think such finding is well supported. The main reliance of the learned counsel for the appellant is upon the evidence of the appellant himself. It is urged that the testimony of the appellant on the trial that he did not intend any fraud when he contracted the debt, and that he then intended to and expected to be able to pajr the same when due, ought to outweigh all the other evidence in the case which tends to prove a fraudulent intent. It is true that this court, as well as many other courts, holds that, upon a question of the intent with which an act was done, the party doing the act may testify directly; but it has never been held that such direct negative testimony must necessarily outweigh the evidence of facts and circumstances tending to prove such intent. *Wilson v.*Noonan, 35 Wis. 355; *Forbes v. Waller,*25 N. Y. 439; *Plank v.*Grimm, *ante,*p. 251. The evidence in this case, other than that given by the appellant himself, tends very strongly to establish the fact of the fraudulent intent in contracting the debt, and it was for the trial court to determine that fact upon all the testimony in the case. We cannot say, from the evidence contained in the record, that the finding of the' court is against* the clear preponderance of the evidence given on the trial, and we must therefoi’e sustain such finding.

*By the*Court.— The order of the circuit court appealed from is affirmed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
NO. 12-16-00166-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

IN RE:

AMOCO FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, 

RELATOR

§

§

§

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

Amoco Federal Credit Union filed an original mandamus proceeding complaining of the trial 

court’s June 10, 2016 temporary restraining order. On October 31, 2016, this Court conditionally granted 

Amoco’s petition and directed Respondent to vacate the temporary restraining order and issue an order 

abating the real parties’ declaratory judgment action filed May 9, 2016, in Cause No. CV-16-09656, In 

the Matter of Marylou Kusmanoff. By an order signed on November 7, 2016, Respondent has complied 

with this Court’s opinion and order, rendering this proceeding moot. Accordingly, we dismiss Amoco’s 

petition for writ of mandamus as moot. 

Opinion delivered November 16, 2016.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(PUBLISH)
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

NOVEMBER 16, 2016

NO. 12-16-00166-CV

AMOCO FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,

Relator

V.

HON. CHARLES R. MITCHELL,

Respondent

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

ON THIS DAY came to be heard the petition for writ of mandamus filed by 

AMOCO FEDERAL CREDIT UNION; who is the Relator in Cause No. CV-16-09656, 

pending on the docket of the 273rd Judicial District Court of San Augustine County, Texas. Said 

petition for writ of mandamus having been filed herein on June 13, 2016, and the same having 

been duly considered, because it is the opinion of this Court that the writ should not issue, it is 

therefore CONSIDERED, ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the said petition for writ of 

mandamus be, and the same is, hereby dismissed as moot.

James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J. and Neeley, J.
Form of Amendment to Change in Control Agreements



 Exhibit 10.3 
 FORM OF AMENDMENT 
 TO 

CHANGE IN CONTROL AGREEMENT 
 This Amendment to Change in Control Agreement is made and entered into as of _______, 2011, by and between Citrix Systems, Inc. (the “Company”) and _____________ (the “Executive”).

 WHEREAS, the Company and the Executive have previously entered into a Change in Control Agreement and, as the case may be,
amendments to a Change in Control Agreement (collectively, the “Agreement”); and 
 WHEREAS, the Company and the
Executive wish to amend the Agreement in the manner set forth herein. 
 NOW THEREFORE, the Company and the Executive hereby
amend the Agreement, effective as of the date first above written, as follows: 
 (a) [For all Executives, other than CEO:
Section 3(a) of the Agreement is hereby amended by deleting the first sentence of said section in its entirety and substituting therefor the following: 
 “Termination by the Company of the employment of the Executive with the Company for any reason other than for Cause, Disability or death.”] 

(b) Section 4(e) of the Agreement is hereby amended by adding the following proviso to the end of the first sentence thereof:

 “provided further that, notwithstanding the foregoing, this Agreement shall not apply to any equity award to the
Executive under a Long Term Incentive Agreement except to the extent expressly set forth therein and that, upon a Terminating Event, each such award shall be treated in the manner set forth in the Long Term Incentive Agreement governing such
award.” 
 (c) Section 5(a)(ii) of the Agreement is hereby amended by adding the following to the end of said section:

 “In such event, the Severance Payments shall be reduced in the following order: (1) cash payments not subject to
Section 409A of the Code; (2) cash payments subject to Section 409A of the Code; (3) equity-based payments and acceleration; and (4) non-cash forms of benefits. To the extent any payment is to be made over time, then the
payments shall be reduced in reverse chronological order.” 







 (d) Section 7 of the Agreement is hereby amended by deleting clause [CEO Alternative:
(c)] [Non-CEO Alternative: (d)] in its entirety and substituting therefor the following: 
 “[(c)] [(d)] the date which is
18 months and one day after a Change in Control if the Executive is still employed by the Company”] 
 (e)
Section 20(c) of the Agreement is hereby amended by adding to the beginning of said section the following sentence: 

“To the extent that any payment or benefit described in this Agreement constitutes “non-qualified deferred compensation”
under Section 409A of the Code, and to the extent that such payment or benefit is payable upon the Executive’s termination of employment, then such payments or benefits shall be payable only upon the Executive’s ‘separation from
service.’” 
 Except as amended herein, the Agreement is confirmed in all other respects. 

[signature blocks] 

  
 2
N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential.



# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________

CLOUDING CORP., Appellant

v.

UNIFIED PATENTS, INC

., Appellee

______________________

2015

- 1799

______________________

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No s . IPR2013

- 00586, IPR2014

- 00306.

______________________

JUDGMENT

______________________

T AREK N. F AHMI

, Ascenda Law Group, PC, San Jose, CA, argued for appellant.

D ANIEL C RAIG C OOLEY

, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Reston, VA, argued for appellee. Also represented J AMES R. B ARNEY

, Washington, DC; J ONATHAN S TROUD

, Washington , DC.

R OBERT M C B RIDE
, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA,argued for intervenor Michelle K. Lee. Also represented by T HOMAS W. K RAUSE , M ICHAEL S UMN ER F ORMAN

, S COTT W EIDENFELLER

.

______________________

T HI S C AUSE having been heard and considered, it is

O RDERED and A DJUDGED :

P ER C URIAM (N EWMAN

, D YK
, and W ALLACH

, Circuit Judges ).

AFFIRMED

. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

E NTERED BY O RDER OF THE C OURT

May 19, 2016 /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner
Date Peter R. Marksteiner
Clerk of Court
Memorandum 

To: File

From: Anita Lee, EPA Region IX

Date: September 2, 2011

Subject: Telephone Voicemail from Elizabeth Bisbey-Kuehn, New Mexico Department of 

the Environment, August 29, 2011

This memorandum summarizes the main point of a voicemail message from Elizabeth BisbeyKuehn, New Mexico Department of the Environment. 

 New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) applies in its emission control cost 

estimates a tax rate of 6.2% on total capital investment to account for the gross receipts 

tax
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

THE JOSEPH PENAR FAMILY § 

TRUST, by its Trustee Joseph § 

Penar; THE WALDER FAMILY § 

TRUST, by its Trustee, Cecile § 

Donnamarie Newkirk; ALLEN § No. 250, 2016 

COOPER, individually; SUE § 

COOPER, individually; and THE § 

ALLEN AND SUE COOPER § 

TRUST, by its Trustees, Allen and § 

Sue Cooper, § Court Below: Court of Chancery 

 § of the State of Delaware 

 Plaintiffs Below-Appellants, § 

 § C.A. No. 10441 

v. § 

 § 

JASEN ADAMS, DAVID § 

HARTCORN, and BRIAN § 

TOLLEFSON, § 

 § 

Defendants Below-Appellees, § 

 § 

 and § 

 § 

PREMIUM OF AMERICA, LLC, § 

and PREMIUM HOLDING, LLC, § 

 § 

 Nominal Defendants Below- § 

 Appellees. § 

 

Submitted: November 2, 2016 

Decided: November 16, 2016 

Before STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND, VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and 

SEITZ, Justices. 
2 

ORDER

 This 16th day of November, 2016, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs 

and the record in this case, and following oral argument, it appears to the Court 

that: 

 (1) Appellants are members of a Delaware limited liability company 

formed by a bankruptcy court order to receive the assets of two affiliated 

companies in the viatical life insurance business. They claim on appeal that the 

Court of Chancery erred when it dismissed their direct and derivative claims 

against the defendants whom they allege misappropriated funds from the company 

and thereby shorted them when liquidating the company’s assets. 

 (2) We affirm on the basis of the court’s April 28, 2016 decision. After 

rightly expressing frustration with the appellant’s failure exercise its statutory right 

to demand books and records before filing suit,1 the Vice Chancellor carefully 

reviewed the pleading deficiencies in the amended complaint. He correctly 

determined that the appellants’ failure to allege in a non-conclusory fashion the 

circumstances of the alleged misappropriation required dismissal of the amended 

complaint. 

 (3) We note that our decision today does not leave appellants without a 

future remedy. Court of Chancery Rule 15(aaa) and other rules of claim or issue 

 

1

 6 Del. C. § 18-305. 
3 

preclusion will not bar appellants and other members from asserting claims for 

misappropriation or improper distribution of assets as part of the winding up of the 

limited liability company. 

 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Court of 

Chancery is hereby AFFIRMED. 

 

 BY THE COURT: 

 

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.

 Justice
REF ID:A104884 

SIGNAL CORPS PATENT BOARD' 

MEETING HO • .30 

COPY e 

-10 

l. The Board met at 10:00 A. M., November 22, 1940, in Room 3435, 

Munitiou Building, with the :following presents 

Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Mitchell, Signal Corps 

Lieutenant Colonel Kirke B. Lawton, Signal Corps Lieutenant Colonel Paul o. Oripper, Signal Corps 

Major David E. Washburn, Signal Corps 

(:a & D Division) (W P & T Division) 

(P & T Division) 

(R & D Division Recorder) 

2. The purpose ot the meeting was to consider the :following :inventions 

and to make recommendations tor their disposition: 

A• The process of altering characteristics of Cryptographic Devices by Re• 

Cipherm.ent or Re-Cod.ement b7 Pih-. Albert w. Small, Junior Cryptanalyst, SSL. 

:Q. A System tor Location and Control by Radio by Mr. Ludlow B. 

Hallman, Jr., Associate Radio Engineer, SSL. 

Sl• Aircraft :Radio Compass and Direction Finder Corrector, by Mr. 

Archibald s. Brom, Senior Radio Engineer, SSL. 

3. The Board finds: 

A• Tbat all the inventions listed above have suf'tioient military value to warrant prosecution of the patent by the War Department. 

R• That the inventions arose in connection with and as a result ot 

the official duties of the inventors, but that there was no specific desigu.tion 

to invent the thi!lgs described. 

~· That the inventors desire to obtain patents under the provisions 

of AR 850·50. 

4. That the inventions listed in paragraphs 2&·and 211. should be 

kept secret • 

.I• That the invention listed in paragraph 2.sz..need not be kept 

secret. 

4• The Board recomendss 

I• That applications for patents of the inventions listed under 

paragraphs 2 a. and b. above be filed under the provisions of IBl'&graph 51 AR 850•50 and-that tliey be placed under the "Three Year Rule n as provided 

tor in Section 4894 R.s. as amended by u.s.o. Title 35, Section "J7. 

ll• That application tor patent ot the invention listed under 

paragraph 2 !l• above be filed Ullder the provision or paragraph 5, AR 850·~ 

COPY 

@'pp roved for Release by NSA on 09-12-2013 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 
s.c.P.B. Meeting No. 30 

4 continued. 

COPY 

and that non-exclusive license to the Government tor use of the invention be 

required. 

Hugh Mitchell, 

Lieutenant Colonel, SigD&l Corps, B:oesident. 

Paul c. Gripper, Lieutenant Colonel, Sig.Dal Corps, Member 

-2-

KirJrl8 B. Lawton, 

Lieutenant Colonel,, Signal Corps, Member. 

David E. Washburn, 

Major, Signal Corps, Recorder. 

APPROVED November ___ , 1940: 

J. o. llauborpe, 

Major General, 

Chier Signal Otticer ot the A.rrq. 

COPY
Exhibit 99.1

Hungarian Telephone and Cable Corp. 

Certifications of Chief Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer

I, Ole Bertram, President and Chief Executive Officer of Hungarian Telephone and Cable Corp., certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

To  the best of my knowledge and belief, based upon a review of this year end report  on Form 10-K of Hungarian Telephone and Cable Corp. for the year ended  December 31, 2002, and, except as corrected or supplemented in a subsequent  report:

**•**         this annual report of Hungarian Telephone and Cable Corp. on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2002 which this statement accompanies fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

**•**         the information contained in this annual report on Form 10-K of Hungarian Telephone and Cable Corp. for the year ended December 31, 2002 fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Hungarian Telephone and Cable Corp. 

 

|   |   |      |
|--------|--------|-----------|
|        |   | By:  | /s/ Ole Bertram |
|   |   |      |  |
|   |   |      | Ole BertramMarch 21, 2003 |

 

I, William T. McGann, Controller and Treasurer of Hungarian Telephone and Cable Corp., certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

To the best of my knowledge and belief, based upon a review of this annual report on Form 10-K of Hungarian Telephone and Cable Corp. for the year ended December 31, 2002, and, except as corrected or supplemented in a subsequent report:

**•**         this annual report of Hungarian Telephone and Cable Corp. on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2002 which this statement accompanies fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

**•**         the information contained in this annual report on Form 10-K of Hungarian Telephone and Cable Corp. for the year ended December 31, 2002 fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Hungarian Telephone and Cable Corp. 

 

|   |   |      |
|--------|--------|-----------|
|        |   | By:  | /s/ William T. McGann |
|   |   |      |  |
|   |   |      | William T. McGannMarch 21, 2003 |

 

 

----