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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 43254

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

PATRICK SEGUNDO OAR,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2016 Opinion No. 76

Filed: November 21, 2016

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Steven J. Hippler, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and sentence for grand theft by extortion, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, Interim State Appellate Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler, 

Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kale D. Gans, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

GUTIERREZ, Judge

Patrick Segundo Oar appeals from his judgment of conviction for grand theft by extortion

following a jury trial. Specifically, Oar argues there was insufficient evidence to support his 

conviction and the district court imposed an excessive sentence. We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Oar was being housed in the Ada County Jail for a parole violation when he met fellow 

inmate, “Omar.” Omar was a drug trafficker who had been distributing drugs from Mexico to 

California and Idaho prior to his arrest. Omar had been arrested for methamphetamine 

trafficking after one of his associates, M.D., assisted police as a confidential informant and 

testified against Omar. 
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At the time Oar met Omar, M.D. owed Omar several thousand dollars for drugs Omar 

had previously given to M.D. Upon learning of this debt, Oar agreed to help Omar collect the 

money from M.D. with the help of a woman named Blake that Oar knew from a previous job. 

As part of the plan, Oar gave Blake a letter written by Omar that Blake was instructed to deliver 

to M.D. The letter stated that it was from Omar, contained details about Omar that M.D. knew, 

and instructed M.D. to pay the debt. The letter also stated, “my freands [sic] in California are 

really mad so I don’t want you guys get [sic] in troble [sic] let’s fixe [sic] this before becomes 

[sic] a big problem.” 

Blake visited M.D.’s place of work late at night. Blake stated that she was there on 

behalf of Omar and delivered the threatening letter to M.D. In response, M.D. told Blake that 

M.D. would pay the full amount but that she needed a few days to get the money together. The 

next morning, M.D. contacted the detective with whom M.D. had worked as a confidential 

informant in the case against Omar. The detective provided M.D. with marked currency and 

directed her to deliver the money to Blake while recording the conversation. In a transaction 

monitored by police officers, M.D. gave the money to Blake, who was then arrested.

Oar was indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit grand theft by extortion, naming 

Blake as co-conspirator, Idaho Code §§ 18-1701, 18-2403(2)(e), 18-2407(1)(a)(1). Oar was also 

indicted on one count of grand theft by extortion, I.C. §§ 18-2403(2)(e), 18-2407(1)(a)(1), 18-

204. The State later filed an information against Oar charging a persistent violator enhancement, 

I.C. § 19-2514. Following a joint trial with Blake, Oar was found guilty on both counts and 

admitted to the enhancement.

The district court imposed seventeen-year unified sentences with five years determinate

on both counts. These sentences were set to run concurrently to one another but consecutive to 

Oar’s existing sentence for his parole violation. Oar timely appeals.

II.

ANALYSIS

In his appeal, Oar argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for 

grand theft by extortion. He also argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing 

an excessive sentence in light of the mitigating factors presented at sentencing. We address each 

issue in turn.
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A. Sufficiency of Evidence

Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A finding of guilt 

will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable 

trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential 

elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 

P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. 

App. 1991). We will not substitute our view for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility of the 

witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 

from the evidence. Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001; State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 

684, 701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct. App. 1985). Moreover, we will consider the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 

121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001. 

Oar maintains that the statutory language for the crime of grand theft by extortion 

requires that his threat actually be the compelling force behind the victim’s act of delivering the 

property. While Oar does not suggest that M.D. never felt fear as a result of the threatening 

letter, Oar does argue that M.D.’s fear instilled by the threatening letter did not compel M.D.’s

delivery of the money. Oar acknowledges that there was evidence to support finding that he 

attempted to compel, induce, or cause M.D. to deliver the money by threat of physical injury, but 

that it was not his threat which ultimately resulted in M.D.’s act of delivering the money. Oar 

argues that the “undisputed” evidence at trial indicated that M.D. delivered the money because of 

the detective’s instruction, not because of fear.

We first address Oar’s argument by examining the statutory language establishing the 

elements of extortion to determine to what extent the fear instilled by the extortionist must 

compel the delivery of property by the victim. This Court exercises free review over the 

application and construction of statutes. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 

(Ct. App. 2003). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give 

effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Burnight, 132 

Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 

(Ct. App. 2000). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational 

meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If the language is clear and 
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unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules of 

statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. 

The crime of grand theft by extortion is set forth in Idaho Code § 18-2403(2)(e). This 

statute reads, in relevant part:

A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another 

person to deliver such property to himself or to a third person by means of 

instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another 

will:

1. Cause physical injury to some person in the future. . . .

(emphasis added). 

This statutory language is unambiguous, thus we need not explore beyond the plain 

language. See State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 6, 368 P.3d 621, 626 (2016) (“[L]ooking 

elsewhere for interpretative guidance is only appropriate when the plain language is 

ambiguous.”). The plain language establishes that a defendant’s threat must instill a fear that 

compels or induces a person to deliver property. The basic premise behind the crime of statutory 

extortion is the defendant’s use of fear to obtain property. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,

SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW: § 20.4 (2d ed. 2016). However, the statutory language here does 

not mandate that the fear instilled by the extortionist be the sole or even the primary force 

compelling the victim’s surrender of property.

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 The fear instilled by the extortionist need only

remain a motivating force at the time the victim surrenders the property.2 Consequently, a

defendant who obtains property from a victim absent fear instilled by the defendant’s threat can 

be guilty only of attempted extortion. See People v. Gardner, 38 N.E. 1003, 1004 (N.Y. 1894) 

(holding defendant could not be guilty of completed crime of extortion where victim delivered 

 

1 Conversely, some jurisdictions require that the fear caused by the extortionist must be the 

primary force motivating the victim’s compliance. See People v. Bollaert, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 814, 

836 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (“In order to establish extortion, the wrongful use of force or fear must 

be the operating or controlling cause compelling the victim’s consent to surrender the thing to 

the extortionist.” (internal quotation omitted)). The California extortion statute reads: 

“Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, or the obtaining of an 

official act of a public officer, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of 

official right.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 518 (West 2016). 

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This is consistent with the New York extortion statute, which reads identically to the 

Idaho extortion statute. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.05(2)(e) (McKinney 2016) with Idaho 

Code § 18-2403(2)(e). See also People v. Raffa, 393 N.Y.S.2d 852, 854 (N.Y. 1976) (“In order 

to constitute the crime of extortion the statute clearly requires evidence of a threat which creates 

fear in the person threatened.”
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property absent any fear from defendant’s threat, but could be guilty of attempted extortion due 

to his intent to instill fear).

We next turn to Oar’s argument that the evidence is “undisputed” that police compelled 

M.D. to deliver the money to Blake. Although this argument may be factually correct, it falls 

short of precluding Oar’s conviction as a matter of law. His argument suggests a proposition 

that, where police are involved in the exchange of property between a victim and an extortionist, 

such involvement precludes a jury’s ability to find that the victim was compelled by fear instilled 

by the extortionist’s threat. While Idaho courts have never addressed such a proposition, we are 

guided by other jurisdictions with similar extortion statutes. These courts hold that even though 

fear must motivate the delivery of property to the extortionist, police involvement does not 

automatically overcome or dissipate the motivating fear. See State v. Marsh, 603 P.2d 1212, 

1215 (Or. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Prince, 284 P. 108, 110 (Utah 1930).

In Prince, the defendant threatened to kill the victim unless he gave the defendant money. 

Prince, 284 P. at 109. The victim contacted police, who instructed the victim to give the money 

to the defendant and agreed to follow the victim and apprehend the defendant after he received 

the money. Id. at 110. On appeal from his conviction for extortion, the defendant argued the 

evidence showed that the victim’s conduct of paying the money was not actuated by fear, but 

rather by his intent to entrap the defendant at the suggestion of law enforcement officials. Id. at

109. The court disagreed, stating there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the 

victim’s fear, induced by threats, was a controlling factor despite the police involvement. Id. at 

110. The court explained:

From the whole record we are unable to say that the evidence conclusively shows 

that the fear which [the victim] suffered before he visited the sheriff had been so 

overcome and dissipated that when the money was paid he was no longer actuated 

or controlled primarily by fear induced by threats. 

Id.

Then, in Marsh, the defendant participated in a plan to extort money from a drug store 

manager. Marsh, 603 P.2d at 1213. The plan involved calling the store manager and threatening 

to detonate a bomb in the store unless the manager gave money to the defendant. Id. at 1213. 

After the manager called the police, several plain clothes officers arrived and directed the 

manager to put money into a bag and give it to the defendant. Id. The defendant moved for a 

directed verdict, arguing there was no evidence showing the manager of the drug store was 
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motivated by fear in giving the defendant the money. Id. at 1215. On appeal from the district 

court’s denial of the motion, the court affirmed the district court by reasoning:

[I]t was a factual determination for the jury as to whether [the victim] was in part 

motivated by fear of an explosion in giving the money to [the defendant]. The 

jury could infer that the store manager called the police and ultimately 

surrendered the money because of a concern that there was actually a bomb in the 

store which would be detonated if the money was not delivered. 

Id.

Conversely, in People v. Bonsignore, 250 N.Y.S.2d 345, 346 (N.Y. App. 1964), the 

defendant threatened the victim with accusations that he had filed false income tax returns, and 

the defendant demanded a large sum of money. Id. The victim paid the defendant the money 

with the consent and at the direction of the district attorney while surrounded by concealed 

police officers. Id. During trial, the State presented no evidence that the victim’s payment of the 

money was motivated by fear. Id. On appeal from the conviction of extortion, the court held 

that without such presentation by the State, there was insufficient evidence to sustain the 

conviction of extortion. Id.

In deciding the issue of whether police involvement precludes finding a threat 

extortionate, we follow the guidance of these other jurisdictions and hold that it does not. As the 

finders of fact, it is the province of the jury to determine whether and to what extent police 

involvement impacted the motivating fear instilled in the victim by the extortionist. This factual 

determination must be made based upon the facts of each specific case. Thus, in the case at bar, 

Oar could still be guilty of extortion if the State provided sufficient evidence for the jury to 

conclude that, despite the police involvement, M.D.’s surrender of money to Blake was 

compelled, at least in part, by the fear instilled by the threatening letter. 

During trial, M.D. testified that she used to distribute methamphetamine for Omar. M.D. 

stated that while working for Omar, he would reference the people he worked for in California, 

insinuating that they were not nice people. After M.D. was confronted by police officers 

regarding M.D.’s illegal activities, she agreed to participate as a confidential informant against 

Omar, which resulted in Omar’s conviction and incarceration. M.D. testified that when Blake 

came to collect Omar’s debt, it was as though M.D.’s “biggest fear just walked through the 

door.” She described feeling threatened by the letter that Blake delivered and decided “it would 

be better to deal with the nice woman, [Blake], or the option was going to be the not-so-nice 

people in California.” M.D. was terrified when she contacted the detective, to the point that 
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M.D. kept the doors to her building locked at night while she was working. M.D. further stated, 

“I’m still scared to this day actually because of my role, my involvement.” 

Similar to Prince, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to conclude 

that M.D. was fearful as a result of the threatening letter. Moreover, the evidence at trial did not 

conclusively show the fear which M.D. suffered before she contacted the detective had 

dissipated such that it no longer motivated the surrender of money to Blake. In fact, M.D.

admitted during trial that she still felt fearful because of the role she played in Omar’s conviction

and that Omar was still unaware that M.D. was a police informant. Additionally, similar to 

Marsh, the evidence before the jury was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that M.D. 

contacted police, acted at their direction, and delivered the money to Blake based upon M.D.’s

fear that she would be harmed if she did not turn over the money. Unlike Bonsignore, where no 

evidence was presented that the victim was motivated by fear, here there was evidence for the 

jury to find that M.D.’s cooperation with police was at least, in part, motivated by her fear from 

the threatening letter. 

The jury was instructed that, to find Oar guilty of grand theft by extortion, the 

prosecution must prove that “Oar caused M.D. to deliver [the money to Blake] . . . by creating in 

M.D. a fear that if the property were not so delivered then the defendant or some other person 

would physically injure some person in the future.” In considering the evidence before the jury 

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence 

before the jury that Oar caused M.D. to deliver the money to Blake by creating in M.D. a fear 

that she would be physically injured.

B. Excessive Sentence

The district court sentenced Oar to a unified sentence of seventeen years with five years 

determinate on the grand theft by extortion conviction. He argues this sentence is excessive in 

light of the mitigating factors. These factors include Oar’s acceptance of responsibility, remorse, 

and family and community support.

An appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. State v. 

Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Ct. App. 2000). Where a sentence is not illegal, 

the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and thus a clear abuse of discretion. 

State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992). A sentence may represent such 

an abuse of discretion if it is shown to be unreasonable upon the facts of the case. State v. Nice, 
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103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982). A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it 

appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is necessary to accomplish the primary 

objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, 

rehabilitation, or retribution applicable to a given case. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 

P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). Where an appellant contends that the sentencing court imposed 

an excessively harsh sentence, we conduct an independent review of the record, having regard 

for the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public 

interest. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). When 

reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 

144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). 

Applying these standards and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that 

the district court abused its discretion. In rendering its decision, the district court emphasized

that Oar’s conduct jeopardized not only the safety of the victim, M.D., but also the safety of his 

co-defendant, Blake. The court also expressed concern with the fact that Oar was able to 

perpetrate this crime while in custody. After considering Oar’s criminal history and the nature of 

the crime, the court concluded that a significant penalty was appropriate for the purpose of 

protecting society and achieving retribution. The court’s sentence demonstrates its focus on the 

primary objectives of sentencing and is not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, Oar’s sentence 

is affirmed.

III.

CONCLUSION

The evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that fear instilled by 

the threatening letter caused M.D. to deliver the money to Blake. Further, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in sentencing Oar. Accordingly, we affirm Oar’s judgment of conviction 

and sentence.

Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR.