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*********************************************** 
EDITH R. JEMIOLA, TRUSTEE OF THE EDITH R.

JEMIOLA LIVING TRUST v. HARTFORD

CASUALTY INSURANCE

COMPANY

(SC 19978)

Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D’Auria,

Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, whose home had been insured by the defendant insurance

company since 1986, sought to recover damages from the defendant

for, inter alia, its alleged breach of a homeowners insurance policy that

it had issued to the plaintiff. Before March, 2005, the homeowners

insurance policies issued to the plaintiff covered the collapse of the

home resulting from one of several specified causes but did not define

the term ‘‘collapse.’’ Since March, 2005, however, all of the policies

issued to the plaintiff have defined the term ‘‘collapse’’ to mean ‘‘an

abrupt falling down or caving in of a building or any part’’ such that

‘‘the building or part of the building cannot be occupied for its current

intended purpose.’’ The defendant first noticed cracks in the basement

walls in 2006 but did not report them to the defendant at that time. In

2014, she noticed more cracks in the basement walls and was informed

by a contractor she consulted that the cracks posed a serious problem

because it appeared that her foundation was likely constructed with

defective concrete. The plaintiff then submitted a claim to the defendant,

seeking coverage for her alleged loss. The defendant denied coverage,

claiming that the cracks were due to faulty workmanship and the type

of materials used to construct the walls, and that faulty workmanship,

materials, and the settling of walls and foundations were excluded from

coverage under the provision of the policy insuring against collapse.

The defendant also claimed that an engineer who inspected the walls

had determined that their structural integrity was not compromised.

The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment

and rendered judgment thereon, concluding, inter alia, that the provision

of the applicable policy pertaining to coverage for collapse required an

actual falling down or caving in of the home so as to render it uninhabitable, that it was undisputed that such an actual collapse had not

occurred, and that the loss alleged by the plaintiff, therefore, was not

covered under that policy. On the plaintiff’s appeal, held:

1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court incorrectly

concluded that only the homeowners insurance policies issued to the

plaintiff by the defendant since March, 2005, were applicable to her claim

for coverage; the plaintiff’s expert opined that the structural integrity

of the basement walls could not have become substantially impaired

until there was some outward manifestation of cracking or fracturing,

the plaintiff testified during her deposition that she first noticed cracking

in the basement concrete in 2006, and, accordingly, there was no genuine

issue of material fact as to whether the structural integrity of the plaintiff’s basement walls was substantially impaired when the policies issued

before March, 2005, were in effect.

2. The trial court correctly concluded that the collapse provision of the

applicable homeowners insurance policy unambiguously excluded coverage for the cracking in the plaintiff’s basement walls: at the time of

the plaintiff’s claim for coverage, the house had not suffered an abrupt

falling down or caving in, complete or partial, such that it could not be

occupied for its intended purpose, as the plaintiff’s house was still

standing, the plaintiff continued to reside there, the plaintiff’s expert

opined that she could continue to reside there safely for the foreseeable

future, and the plaintiff continued to use her basement for recreational

and storage purposes; moreover, even if the plaintiff’s basement walls

were in imminent danger of falling down, which this court concluded

was not the case, her claim would have been barred by the provision

in the policy clarifying that a collapse has not occurred when, although

there is evidence of cracking, the building is still standing; furthermore,
even if this court agreed with the plaintiff that the definition of ‘‘collapse’’

contained in the applicable policy was ambiguous and, therefore, that

the substantial impairment of structural integrity standard adopted by

this court in Beach v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. (205 Conn. 246)

applied for the purpose of determining coverage, this court would have

been compelled to affirm the trial court’s judgment in light of its decision

in Karas v. Liberty Ins. Corp. (335 Conn. 62), in which the court concluded that a substantial impairment of the structural integrity of a

building means that the building is in imminent danger of falling down

and is therefore unsafe to occupy, as it was undisputed that the plaintiff’s

home was in no such danger.

Argued December 18, 2018—officially released November 12, 2019*

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of

contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of Tolland, where the trial

court, Cobb, J., granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from

which the plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.

Jeffrey R. Lindequist, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Thomas O. Farrish, with whom were Daniel J. Raccuia and, on the brief, John W. Cerreta, for the appellee (defendant).

Ryan M. Suerth, Marilyn B. Fagelson and Proloy K.

Das filed a brief for United Policyholders as amicus

curiae.

Wystan M. Ackerman filed a brief for the American

Insurance Association et al. as amici curiae.
Opinion

PALMER, J. The plaintiff, Edith R. Jemiola, commenced this action against the defendant, Hartford

Casualty Insurance Company, claiming that the defendant breached the homeowners insurance policy that

it had issued to the plaintiff by denying coverage for

cracks in her home’s basement walls under the collapse

provisions of the policy.1 After determining that the

evidence conclusively established which of several

homeowners insurance policies that the plaintiff had

purchased from the defendant over the years was applicable at the time the plaintiff sustained the alleged loss,

the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because that policy defines ‘‘collapse’’

as ‘‘an abrupt falling down or caving in’’ of the home

such that it ‘‘cannot be occupied for its current intended

purpose,’’ and there is no dispute, first, that the plaintiff’s home remains standing and is in no imminent

danger of falling down, and, second, that the plaintiff

continues to occupy the home as her primary residence.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court

improperly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment both with respect to the applicable policy and with respect to the issue of coverage. In particular, she contends that (1) the policy the trial court found

to be applicable is not, in fact, the applicable policy,

(2) she is entitled to the opportunity to prove to a jury

that the applicable policy is, instead, an earlier one

issued by the defendant to the plaintiff that does not

define the term ‘‘collapse,’’ (3) when undefined in a

homeowners insurance policy, that term, under our

holding in Beach v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co.,

205 Conn. 246, 532 A.2d 1297 (1987), ‘‘is sufficiently

ambiguous to include coverage for any substantial

impairment of the [home’s] structural integrity’’; id., 252;

and (4) a jury reasonably could find that the plaintiff’s

evidence meets that standard. The plaintiff also maintains that, even if the applicable policy is one that

defines the term ‘‘collapse’’ as requiring an actual falling

down or caving in of the home, the term nevertheless

is ambiguous, and, consequently, the substantial impairment of structural integrity standard that we adopted

in Beach still applies. We agree with the trial court’s

determination regarding the applicable policy and further agree that the collapse provisions of that policy

unambiguously foreclose coverage under the circumstances of the present case. Accordingly, we affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The

plaintiff’s home, which she purchased in 1986 and

where she currently resides, is located in the town of

Willington.2

It has been insured continuously by the

defendant since 1986. Until March, 2005, the plaintiff’s

policies covered the collapse of the home resulting from
one of several specified causes, but none of those policies defined the term ‘‘collapse.’’ Since March, 2005,

however, all of the homeowners’ policies issued by the

defendant to the plaintiff have defined the term narrowly to mean ‘‘an abrupt falling down or caving in of

a building or any part of a building with the result that

the building or part of the building cannot be occupied

for its current intended purpose.’’ Coverage for the

home’s collapse under the policies issued since March,

2005, is further limited by the following three provisions: (1) ‘‘[a] building or any part of a building that is

in danger of falling down or caving in is not considered

to be in a state of collapse’’; (2) ‘‘[a] part of a building

that is standing is not considered to be in a state of

collapse even if it has separated from another part of

the building’’; and (3) ‘‘[a] building or any part of a

building that is standing is not considered to be in a

state of collapse even if it shows evidence of cracking,

bulging, sagging, bending, leaning, settling, shrinkage,

or expansion.’’

In the late 1990s, the plaintiff observed a crack in

the drywall in her master bedroom, which she repaired

by painting over it. In addition, sometime between 2005

and 2006, she noticed that several nails in her kitchen

walls had popped out of the walls, and, in 2009 and

2010, she saw that more nails had been displaced from

around the windows in other areas of her home. She

first noticed cracks in her basement walls in 2006 but

did not report them to the defendant because the contractor she hired to repair them told her that they were

normal. In 2014, the plaintiff noticed more cracking in

the same area of the basement that had been repaired

in 2006. On this occasion, the contractor she consulted

informed her that the cracks posed a very serious problem because it appeared that her foundation, like the

foundations of thousands of other homes in Connecticut, was likely constructed with defective concrete

manufactured by the J.J. Mottes Concrete Company

(Mottes).3 Upon receiving this information, the plaintiff

immediately submitted a claim to the defendant, which

sent an engineer to her home to inspect the foundation.

Following the inspection, the defendant denied the

claim, stating in the denial letter that its engineer had

determined that ‘‘the foundation was cracking due [to]

faulty workmanship and the type of materials used in

the foundation,’’ and that, ‘‘[u]nfortunately, faulty workmanship and materials as well as settling of walls and

foundations are excluded from coverage under the policy.’’ The letter further stated, moreover, that the defendant’s engineer had also determined that ‘‘the structural

integrity of the foundation walls is not compromised.’’

Following receipt of the denial letter, the plaintiff

commenced the present action, claiming that the defendant had breached the collapse provisions of her policy

by declining to cover her alleged loss.4 The plaintiff

maintained that the loss occurred prior to March, 2005,
and, therefore, that one of the policies issued prior to

March, 2005, applied to her claim. The plaintiff further

maintained that, because none of those policies defines

the term ‘‘collapse,’’ the court was required to apply

the common-law definition of the term, as adopted by

this court in Beach, pursuant to which the plaintiff need

only establish that the structural integrity of her basement walls are substantially impaired.5 Finally, the

plaintiff argued that, even if it is determined that her

alleged loss occurred after March, 2005, such that the

applicable policy is one that purports to define the term

‘‘collapse’’ narrowly, that definitional language is itself

ambiguous, and, consequently, the definition of the

term that we adopted in Beach also applies to any

such policy.

As factual support for her claim of coverage, the plaintiff adduced the deposition testimony of David Grandpre, a structural engineer who has testified in numerous cases involving Mottes concrete. In his deposition,

Grandpre opined that the cracking in the plaintiff’s basement walls is the result of chemical reactions occurring

within the concrete that causes the concrete to expand.

This expansion, Grandpre explained, has substantially

impaired the walls’ structural integrity and will continue

to do so until the walls no longer can support the weight

of the house, at which point the house will collapse.

Grandpre could offer no opinion as to when such a collapse might occur. He did opine, however, that, although

the foundation was ‘‘doomed’’ from the start due to

the defective concrete, its structural integrity did not

become substantially impaired until there was some

outward manifestation of cracking and fracturing in

the basement walls, which the plaintiff first observed

in 2006.

As legal support for her contention that the defendant’s denial of coverage constituted a breach of the

policy’s collapse provisions, the plaintiff relied on

Beach v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., supra, 205

Conn. 246, a case involving a homeowners insurance

policy that, like the policy in the present case, also

covered certain losses resulting from a collapse of the

home. See id., 250. The policy at issue in Beach contained no definition of the term ‘‘collapse’’; see id.,

250–51; and, consequently, we were required to decide

whether, as the insurer claimed, the term plainly connotes a ‘‘sudden and complete catastrophe’’; id., 250;

resulting in an ‘‘actual [caving in]’’ rendering the home

‘‘completely uninhabitable’’; id., 253; or whether, as the

homeowners contended, the term was sufficiently

ambiguous to encompass a ‘‘breakdown or loss of structural strength’’; id., 251; such that the home’s structural

integrity was substantially impaired. See id., 252. We

agreed with the homeowners’ contention that the term

‘‘collapse,’’ when otherwise undefined, is reasonably

susceptible of both meanings; see id., 250–51; and, further, that the term must be understood in accordance
with the more expansive definition advanced by the

homeowners because, under established rules of construction, any ambiguity in the language of an insurance

policy is to be resolved against the insurer as the party

that drafted the policy. Id., 250; see id., 251–52.

In the present case, the defendant disputed the plaintiff’s contentions and filed a motion for summary judgment, maintaining, first, that no policy issued prior to

March, 2005, applied to the plaintiff’s claim of coverage

because the uncontroverted evidence established that

the plaintiff’s alleged loss did not occur until 2006, when

the plaintiff first noticed cracks in her home’s basement

walls. The defendant further asserted that, because the

policies issued after March, 2005, all define the term

‘‘collapse’’ as requiring an actual falling down or caving

in of the home, so as to render it uninhabitable, and

it is undisputed that such an actual collapse has not

occurred in this case, the loss alleged by the plaintiff

is not covered under the policy. The trial court agreed

with both contentions and, accordingly, granted the

defendant’s motion for summary judgment. In regard

to its determination regarding the collapse provisions

of the plaintiff’s policy, the trial court observed that

every court that has interpreted the language in question

in the context of similar facts has concluded that the

policy unambiguously forecloses coverage under those

facts. On appeal,6

the plaintiff renews the claims she

raised in the trial court. We conclude that the trial court

properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary

judgment.7

We first address the plaintiff’s contention that the

trial court incorrectly determined that the policies

issued after March, 2005, are applicable to her claim.

Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the trial court

incorrectly concluded that the defendant had met its

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether the structural integrity

of the plaintiff’s basement walls was substantially

impaired prior to 2005. We disagree.

There is no debate that, for the policies issued prior

to March, 2005, to apply, there must have been a substantial impairment of structural integrity prior to 2006.

As the trial court explained in its memorandum of decision, and the plaintiff does not dispute, expert testimony

is required to establish the existence of a substantial

impairment of a building’s structural integrity. The

defendant noted in support of its motion for summary

judgment that the plaintiff’s expert, Grandpre, opined

that, although the basement walls were ‘‘doomed’’ from

inception due to the defective concrete, their structural

integrity did not become substantially impaired until

there was some outward manifestation of the walls’

cracking and fracturing. The defendant further cited

deposition testimony of the plaintiff, in which she testified that she first noticed cracking in the basement
concrete in 2006. This cracking, Grandpre testified,

established the existence of a substantial impairment

by 2006. Moreover, the defendant asserted, in support

of its summary judgment motion, that Grandpre never

opined that it reasonably could be inferred from those

cracks, or from any other evidence in the record, that

the walls were substantially impaired prior to 2006.

By advancing the foregoing evidence in support of its

motion for summary judgment, the defendant met its

burden of demonstrating the nonexistence of any material fact in the record with respect to the earliest date—

sometime in 2006—on which the structural integrity of

the basement walls was substantially impaired.

The plaintiff nonetheless argues that she presented

sufficient evidence to rebut the evidence on which the

defendant relied, thereby establishing a factual issue

as to when the substantial impairment occurred. In

particular, she refers to her observation of the crack

in her bedroom wall in the late 1990s and the fact that

nails had popped out of her kitchen walls sometime

between 2005 and 2006. The plaintiff contends that,

when those occurrences are considered together with

the 2006 observation of the cracks in the basement

walls, they are sufficient to raise a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether the structural integrity of

the basement walls was substantially impaired prior

to 2006. As the trial court explained in rejecting this

argument, however, Grandpre did not testify that the

crack in the bedroom wall or the dislodged nails were

in any way connected to the cracks in the basement

walls. In the absence of any such testimony connecting

the two events, the trial court could resort only to impermissible guesswork or speculation as to the existence

of any such nexus. See, e.g., Paige v. St. Andrew’s

Roman Catholic Church Corp., 250 Conn. 14, 34, 734

A.2d 85 (1999) (‘‘[d]rawing logical deductions and making reasonable inferences from facts in evidence,

whether that evidence [is] oral or circumstantial, is a

recognized and proper procedure in determining the

rights and obligations of litigants, but to be logical and

reasonable they must rest [on] some basis of definite

facts, and any conclusion reached without such evidential basis is a mere surmise or guess’’ (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Moreover, as the trial court further

explained, during the hearing on the defendant’s motion

for summary judgment, the court expressly invited the

plaintiff to present additional evidence with respect to

this issue, such as a supplemental affidavit by Grandpre

attesting to the fact that a substantial impairment of

structural integrity existed prior to 2006, but no such

additional evidence was forthcoming. Because, as we

have explained, the plaintiff previously had adduced

insufficient evidence from which a fact finder reasonably could find that the structural integrity of the basement walls was substantially impaired before the plaintiff first observed cracks in the walls in 2006, her failure
to accept the trial court’s invitation to provide such

evidence is fatal to her claim that the impairment

occurred prior to 2006. We thus conclude that the trial

court correctly determined that the plaintiff failed to

provide a factual basis for her claim that the structural

integrity of her basement walls suffered from a substantial impairment prior to 2006.

We turn, therefore, to the plaintiff’s challenge to the

trial court’s determination that the definition of ‘‘collapse’’ contained in the policies issued after March,

2005, unambiguously excludes coverage for the deterioration of her basement walls. The following well established principles guide our analysis of this claim. ‘‘An

insurance policy is to be interpreted by the same general

rules that govern the construction of any written contract . . . . In accordance with those principles, [t]he

determinative question is the intent of the parties, that

is, what coverage the . . . [insured] expected to

receive and what the [insurer] was to provide, as disclosed by the provisions of the policy. . . . If the terms

of the policy are clear and unambiguous, then the language, from which the intention of the parties is to be

deduced, must be accorded its natural and ordinary

meaning. . . . Under those circumstances, the policy

is to be given effect according to its terms. . . . When

interpreting [an insurance policy], we must look at the

contract as a whole, consider all relevant portions

together and, if possible, give operative effect to every

provision in order to reach a reasonable overall

result. . . .

‘‘In determining whether the terms of an insurance

policy are clear and unambiguous, [a] court will not

torture words to import ambiguity [when] the ordinary

meaning leaves no room for ambiguity . . . . Similarly,

any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the

language used in the contract rather than from one

party’s subjective perception of the terms. . . . As with

contracts generally, a provision in an insurance policy

is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible to more

than one reading. . . . Under those circumstances, any

ambiguity in the terms of an insurance policy must be

construed in favor of the insured because the insurance

company drafted the policy.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Lexington Ins. Co. v. Lexington Healthcare

Group, Inc., 311 Conn. 29, 37–38, 84 A.3d 1167 (2014).

In light of these principles, it is apparent that the

plaintiff’s claim is barred by the definition of ‘‘collapse’’

contained in the policy because the plaintiff’s home has

not suffered ‘‘an abrupt falling down or caving in of a

building or any part of a building’’ such that it ‘‘cannot

be occupied for its current intended purpose.’’ To the

contrary, the plaintiff’s home is still standing, the plaintiff continues to reside there, and, according to her

own expert, she can continue to do so safely for the

foreseeable future. Moreover, according to the plain-
tiff’s deposition testimony, she continues to use her

basement as she always has, namely, for recreational

and storage purposes. We also agree with the trial court

that, even if the plaintiff’s basement walls were in imminent danger of falling down, which they indisputably

are not, her claim would be barred by the provision of

the policy clarifying when a collapse has not occurred,

that is, when the building ‘‘shows evidence of cracking,

bulging, sagging, bending, leaning, [settling], shrinkage

or expansion’’ but is still ‘‘standing . . . .’’

Clearly, as the trial court noted, the definition of

collapse contained in the policy was crafted in response

to numerous cases; see Beach v. Middlesex Mutual

Assurance Co., supra, 205 Conn. 252 (citing cases);

decided in the latter half of the twentieth century, which

held that, when the word ‘‘collapse’’ is not defined in

a homeowners insurance policy, it should be interpreted to mean a substantial impairment of structural integrity rather than a catastrophic falling down or caving

in. In adopting the substantial impairment standard in

Beach, we stated that, if the insurer in that case had

wished to avoid liability, it easily could have done so

simply by defining ‘‘collapse’’ in terms that connoted

the catastrophic event it claimed to have intended in

that case. Id., 251 (‘‘[i]f the defendant wished to rely

on a single facial meaning of the term ‘collapse’ as used

in its policy [that is, one that denotes a complete falling

down or caving in of the home], it had the opportunity

expressly to define the term to provide for the limited

usage it now claims to have intended’’). The defendant

in the present case has succeeded where the insurer

in Beach failed: the policies the defendant issued to the

plaintiff after March, 2005, define ‘‘collapse’’ in terms

that leave no doubt that coverage for a collapse is triggered only by an abrupt falling down or caving in of

the insured premises.

In concluding that the collapse provisions of the

plaintiff’s policy unambiguously exclude coverage

under the circumstances presented, we join those other

jurisdictions that have addressed the issue. To our

knowledge, every single court that has interpreted the

policy language at issue in the present case—or language that similarly defines the word ‘‘collapse’’ in

terms that require temporal abruptness—has concluded

that a building that is still standing, even if it is in danger

of falling down, has not suffered a collapse within the

meaning of the policy. See, e.g., Valls v. Allstate Ins.

Co., 919 F.3d 739, 746 (2d Cir. 2019) (‘‘the ‘collapse’

provision in the Allstate [homeowners] insurance policy

at issue . . . does not afford coverage for basement

walls that exhibit signs of deterioration but that have

not collapsed suddenly, accidentally, and entirely, as

required by the [p]olicy’’); Cockill v. Nationwide Property & Casualty Ins. Co., Docket No. 3:18cv254 (MPS),

2018 WL 6182422, *2 (D. Conn. November 27, 2018)

(construing allegations of complaint in light most favor-
able to insured and concluding they ‘‘do not allege an

‘abrupt’ or ‘sudden’ collapse,’’ but, ‘‘[r]ather, the [plaintiffs] point to a ‘chemical reaction in the concrete’ that

‘substantially impairs the structural integrity of the

building.’ ’’); Enderle v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., Docket

No. 3:17cv1510 (WWE), 2018 WL 2048364, *3 (D. Conn.

May 2, 2018) (‘‘[the] [c]ourt has held that coverage was

not applicable to a progressive condition causing deterioration [when] the house remained upright and inhabitable’’); Zamichiei v. CSAA Fire & Casualty Ins. Co.,

Docket No. 3:16-cv-739 (VAB), 2018 WL 950116, *7 (D.

Conn. February 20, 2018) (‘‘[t]he [p]olicy at issue

requires ‘an abrupt falling down or caving in,’ and [the]

[c]ourt sees no reason to depart from the analyses in

[other] cases . . . finding that a sudden loss must

occur abruptly, not gradually over time’’); Makufka v.

CSAA Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 3d 275,

280 (D. Conn. 2018) (‘‘There is no question of fact that

the [p]remises [are] still standing and lived in by [the]

[p]laintiffs and [have] not abruptly fallen down or caved

in. Accordingly, the [p]olicy does not cover [the] [p]laintiffs’ loss.’’); Liston-Smith v. CSAA Fire & Casualty

Ins. Co., 287 F. Supp. 3d 153, 157, 159 (D. Conn. 2017)

(plaintiffs’ claim for loss incurred by virtue of cracks

in basement wall was barred by ‘‘express exclusions in

the [p]olicy,’’ which defined ‘‘collapse’’ as ‘‘an abrupt

falling down or caving in,’’ and provided that building

is not in state of collapse if it is still standing, even if

it shows signs of cracking); Alexander v. General Ins.

Co. of America, Docket No. 3:16-cv-59 (SRU), 2017 WL

188134, *2 (D. Conn. January 17, 2017) (‘‘[The] [p]laintiffs cannot avoid the fact that their basement walls are

still standing. The only allegations of impairment to the

structural integrity of the walls are allegations that the

walls are ‘cracking’ or . . . they are ‘bulging.’ Both conditions are expressly excluded under the definition of

the policy, and it is clear that no collapse has

occurred.’’); Markland v. Homesite Ins. Co., Superior

Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-16-

6010323-S (March 6, 2018) (no coverage under collapse

provision of policy when plaintiffs continued to occupy

home and there was no abrupt collapse but, rather,

gradual deterioration of basement walls); Perracchio

v. Homesite Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district

of Tolland, Docket No. CV-16-6010324-S (March 6, 2018)

(66 Conn. L. Rptr. 240, 244–45) (same); Toomey v. Central Mutual Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district

of Tolland, Docket No. CV-15-6009841-S (August 3,

2017) (65 Conn. L. Rptr. 37, 42) (‘‘The plaintiffs’ home

is still standing and habitable. The walls of the home

have not fallen or caved in, and the deterioration of the

walls is occurring over time [and] not abruptly. . . .

Although the plaintiffs’ expert opines that the condition

of the basement walls will continue to worsen and [the

walls will] eventually fall or cave in, they have not yet

done so, and he could not say with any specificity as

to when that could occur.’’) Squairs v. Safeco National
Ins. Co., 136 App. Div. 3d 1393, 1394, 25 N.Y.S.3d 502

(‘‘[T]he record established that [the] plaintiffs’ home

was standing when they submitted their claim . . . and

there had been no ‘abrupt falling down or caving in.’

Thus, based on the unambiguous language of the policy,

there was no ‘collapse’ of [the] plaintiffs’ home’’), appeal

denied, 27 N.Y.3d 907, 56 N.E.3d 900, 36 N.Y.S.3d 620

(2016).

In support of her claim of coverage, the plaintiff relies

on three cases with materially different facts from those

of the present case: in each such case, the building in

question had suffered a genuine or actual collapse that

had rendered it (or a portion thereof) unsafe or uninhabitable. See Scorpio v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London,

Docket No. 10-325 (ML), 2012 WL 2020168, *1 (D.R.I.

June 5, 2012) (building was declared uninhabitable after

‘‘the central portion of the roof . . . collapsed and

[was] being held up by the interior walls that [were]

not capable of supporting the roof’’ (internal quotation

marks omitted)); Landmark Realty, Inc. v. Great American Ins. Co., Docket No. JKS 10–278, 2010 WL 5055805,

*1, *6 (D. Md. December 3, 2010) (building was condemned after floor dropped more than seventeen inches

due to rotting floor support joists); Malbco Holdings,

LLC v. Amco Ins. Co., 629 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1191 (D.

Or. 2009) (hotel was declared unsafe for occupancy

after ceiling had fallen several inches due to deterioration of floor truss system, and emergency shoring was

required to prevent further collapse). The insureds in

these cases all satisfied the first part of the ‘‘collapse’’

definition—that is, an abrupt falling down or caving in

had occurred such that the building or a part thereof

could not be occupied for its intended purpose—and

so the only contested issue was whether coverage was

nevertheless precluded because, to varying degrees, the

buildings were still standing. In each of the cases, the

court sided with the insured, concluding, as one court

explained, that the provision as a whole was ambiguous

as to ‘‘how far a building must fall down or to what

degree a building must cave in to constitute collapse.’’

Malbco Holdings, LLC v. Amco Ins. Co., supra, 1196.

In two of the cases, the court also found an ‘‘internal

inconsistency between one subsection . . . (which

provided coverage for partial collapse causing the building to be unsuitable for its intended purpose) and [two

other] subsections . . . (which excluded coverage

. . . if the building was still standing)’’; Scorpio v.

Underwriters at Llyod’s London, supra, *5; see Landmark Realty, Inc. v. Great American Ins. Co., supra,

*4–5; an inconsistency that created an ambiguity in the

policy to be resolved in favor of the insured.

The plaintiff’s reliance on these cases is misplaced

because, as we previously have explained, ‘‘[c]ontext

is . . . central to the way in which policy language is

applied; the same language may be found both ambiguous and unambiguous as applied to different facts. . . .
Language in an insurance contract, therefore, must be

construed in the circumstances of [a particular] case,

and cannot be found to be ambiguous [or unambiguous]

in the abstract. . . . In sum, the same policy provision

may shift between clarity and ambiguity with changes

in the event at hand . . . and one court’s determination

that [a] term . . . was unambiguous, in the specific

context of the case that was before it, is not dispositive

of whether the term is clear in the context of a wholly

different matter.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Lexington Ins. Co.

v. Lexington Healthcare Group, Inc., supra, 311 Conn.

41–42. The plaintiff’s home has not suffered an abrupt

falling down or caving in—complete or partial—such

that her home or part of it cannot be occupied as

intended. Thus, the issue of how extensive an actual

collapse must be before coverage is triggered is not

before us, and, for the same reason, we also have no

occasion to decide whether the policy’s partial collapse

provision is internally consistent with any other provision of the policy.

The plaintiff finally argues that, in determining

whether a collapse has occurred in the present case, we

should consider only the first clause of the ‘‘collapse’’

definition, which she maintains is the operative definition under the policy, with the remaining clauses merely

illustrating when a collapse has not occurred. The plaintiff contends that the first clause, which requires ‘‘an

abrupt falling down or caving in of a building or any

part of a building with the result that the building or

part of the building cannot be occupied for its current

intended purpose,’’ is sufficiently ambiguous to cover

the gradual deterioration of her basement walls if we

interpret (1) the term ‘‘abrupt’’ to mean ‘‘unexpected,’’

rather than ‘‘sudden,’’ (2) the term ‘‘cave in’’ to mean

‘‘substantial impairment of . . . structural integrity,’’

rather than an actual falling in or loss of form, and (3)

the phrase ‘‘cannot be occupied for its current intended

purpose’’ to mean ‘‘cannot be occupied for the purpose

it was designed for,’’ as in ‘‘[a] typical, single-family

residence is not designed or expected to experience

the type of expansion found in the basement walls of

the plaintiff’s home.’’

The plaintiff’s arguments notwithstanding, there is

no plausible construction of the phrase ‘‘abrupt falling

down or caving in . . . with the result that the building

. . . cannot be occupied for its current intended purpose’’ that reasonably encompasses a home, such as

the plaintiff’s, that is still standing and capable of being

safely lived in for many years—if not decades—to come.

We will not read words to introduce ambiguity when,

considering the common, ordinary meaning of those

words as applied to the particular factual context presented, it is apparent that the words are in no way

unclear or uncertain. See, e.g., Lexington Ins. Co. v.

Lexington Healthcare Group, Inc., supra, 311 Conn.
38. Put differently, ‘‘words do not become ambiguous

simply because lawyers or lay[persons] contend for

different meanings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hammer v. Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Co.,

214 Conn. 573, 584, 573 A.2d 699 (1990). A provision

in an insurance policy is ambiguous only when it is

reasonably susceptible of more than one reading, and

the policy provision at issue, as applied to the facts of

this case, is simply not susceptible of the meaning the

plaintiff would have us ascribe to it. See, e.g., Hurlburt

v. Massachusetts Homeland Ins. Co., 310 F. Supp. 3d

333, 342 (D. Conn. 2018) (interpreting virtually identical

provision and concluding that there was no collapse

when homeowners ‘‘[still] reside in their home and have

not alleged that they cannot or do not use it for its

‘current intended purpose’ ’’); Cyr v. CSAA Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., Docket No. 3:16cv85 (DJS), 2018 WL

7508689, *5 (D. Conn. January 29, 2018) (‘‘The damage

to the . . . basement walls is due to defective material

in the concrete that is causing it to deteriorate over

time. The basement walls will . . . eventually give

way, causing the house to fall into the basement. However, this has not happened yet. . . . Thus, at this point

in time, the . . . home and . . . basement walls are

only in danger of falling down or caving in and [the]

home remains standing. Under these circumstances,

the [insured] cannot meet the abrupt falling down and

caving in portion of the definition. . . . Furthermore,

the . . . home can still be occupied for its intended

current purposes, pursuant to the definition.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.)).

We note, finally, that, even if we agreed with the

plaintiff that the definition of collapse contained in the

policy is ambiguous and, therefore, that Beach’s substantial impairment standard applies to her claim, we

nevertheless would be compelled to affirm the trial

court’s judgment in light of our decision today in Karas

v. Liberty Ins. Corp., 335 Conn. 62, A.3d (2019),

in which we addressed a certified question from the

United States District Court for the District of Connecticut seeking guidance as to what constitutes a ‘‘substantial impairment of structural integrity’’ of a building for

purposes of applying a homeowners insurance policy

in which the word ‘‘collapse’’ is undefined or otherwise

ambiguous. See id., 78–79, 81. We concluded that a

substantial impairment of the structural integrity of a

building means that the building is in imminent danger

of falling down and therefore unsafe to occupy. See id.,

87–91. Because it is undisputed that the plaintiff’s home

is in no such danger, her claim of coverage would fail

even under the standard, adopted by this court in Beach,

that she contends is applicable for purposes of her

policy.8

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* November 12, 2019, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 The plaintiff brought this action in her capacity as trustee of the Edith

R. Jemiola Living Trust because she now owns her home as the beneficiary

of that trust.

2 The plaintiff originally purchased the home with her husband, but she

has owned the home, either individually or as a beneficiary of a living trust,

since 2001.

3 According to a study commissioned by the state of Connecticut and

conducted by the Department of Consumer Protection, the stone aggregate

used in Mottes concrete between 1983 and 2010 contained significant

amounts of pyrrhotite, a ferrous mineral that oxidizes in the presence of

water and oxygen to form expansive secondary minerals that crack and

destabilize the concrete, resulting in its premature deterioration. See Department of Consumer Protection, State of Connecticut, Report on Deteriorating

Concrete in Residential Foundations (December 30, 2016), pp. 1, 7–9, available at http://crcog.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/report_on_deteriorating_

concrete_in_residential_foundations.pdf (last visited November 6, 2019). The

economic consequences stemming from the widespread use of this defective

concrete have been nothing short of catastrophic for many thousands of

affected homeowners.

4 The plaintiff also alleged a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair

dealing and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act,

General Statutes § 38-815 et seq., and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices

Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. The plaintiff can prevail on these

claims, however, only if she can prevail on her breach of contract claim,

which, as we explain more fully hereinafter, she cannot do. Accordingly, the

trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment

as to all of the plaintiff’s claims.

5 The plaintiff also argues that, under our holding in Beach, the term

‘‘collapse,’’ when undefined in a homeowners’ policy, encompasses a substantial impairment of a home’s structural integrity without the additional

requirement of proof that the home is in imminent danger of falling down

or caving in. We apply this interpretation of our holding in Beach for present

purposes only, that is, to determine which of the several policies issued by

the defendant to the plaintiff is applicable, because the plaintiff’s claim of

coverage under the ‘‘collapse’’ provisions of her policy is predicated on such

an interpretation. As we explain hereinafter, however, the term ‘‘collapse’’

does require proof of an imminent falling down or caving in, a showing that

the plaintiff cannot make.

6 The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, and this court transferred

the appeal to itself pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice

Book § 65-1. We also granted permission to the following groups to file

amicus curiae briefs in this appeal: United Policyholders, in support of the

plaintiff’s position, and the American Insurance Association, the Property

Casualty Insurers Association of America, and the National Association of

Mutual Insurance Companies, in support of the defendant’s position.

7 Before discussing the merits of the plaintiff’s contention that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment, we briefly set forth the principles

that govern our consideration of this issue. ‘‘Our review of the trial court’s

decision to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is plenary.

. . . On appeal, we must determine whether the legal conclusions reached

by the trial court are legally and logically correct and whether they find

support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision of the trial

court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cefaratti v. Aranow, 321 Conn.

637, 645, 138 A.3d 837 (2016). ‘‘Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion for

summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . Although the party seeking summary

judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact

. . . a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse

claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with

the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue. . . . It is not enough

. . . for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed

issue.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Squeo v. Norwalk Hospital Assn., 316 Conn. 558, 593–94, 113 A.3d 932 (2015). The nonmoving party, however, has no obligation to submit documents establishing

the existence of a genuine issue of material fact until the moving party has

met its burden of ‘‘showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that
excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any [such] issue of material

fact.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.

v. Tully, 322 Conn. 566, 573, 142 A.3d 1079 (2016).

8 Although she did not raise the issue in the trial court, the plaintiff asks

us to consider the argument of the amicus curiae, United Policyholders, that,

pursuant to the reasonable expectations doctrine, the plaintiff’s reasonable

expectations of coverage for the cost to insure that her home does not

‘‘inevitably fall to the ground’’ should prevail over the plain and unambiguous

terms of the policy. We have characterized the reasonable expectations

doctrine as ‘‘an approach . . . [pursuant to which] judges divine the parties’

reasonable expectations and then rewrite the contract accordingly . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 273 Conn. 448, 465 n.25, 870 A.2d 1048 (2005). In Hammer v.

Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Co., supra, 214 Conn. 573, which also

involved an insurance contract dispute, we expressly declined to adopt such

an approach. See id., 591. Our reasons for doing so are no less applicable

to the present case. Thus, as we stated in Hammer, ‘‘[a]doption of the . . .

contention in . . . light of the . . . language of the [policy] . . . would

render meaningless the words by which the parties expressed their bargain

and read into the contract something [that] is not there. . . . When the

language of the policy is clear and unambiguous, the court is bound to apply

the natural and ordinary meaning of the words employed. . . . A court

cannot rewrite the policy of insurance or read into the insurance contract

that which is not there. . . . [T]he liability of the insurer is not to be

extended beyond the express terms of the contract. . . . [T]he policy

expresses the reasonable expectations of the parties. . . . We, therefore,

cannot accept the [argument in favor of recognizing the insured’s] reasonable

expectations.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.