J-S70029-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.H. A/K/A 

R.L.H., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.H., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3414 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree October 13, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000644-2015, CP-51-DP-0000831-2010, 

FID: 51-FN-002045-2010

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.H. A/K/A 

R.J.L.H., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.H., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3415 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree October 13, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000645-2015, CP-51-DP-0000832-2010, 

FID: 51-FN-002045-2010
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IN THE INTEREST OF: R.H. A/K/A 

R.A.J.H., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.H., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3416 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree October 13, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000646-2015, CP-51-DP-0000833-2010, 

FID: 51-FN-002045-2010

BEFORE: OLSON, OTT, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2016

J.H. (“Mother”) appeals from the October 13, 2015 decrees 

involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her twin sons, R.H. a/k/a 

R.L.H. and R.H. a/k/a R.J.L.H., born in November of 2004, and R.H. a/k/a 

R.A.J.H., born in November of 2005 (collectively, “the Children”). We 

affirm.1, 2

____________________________________________

1 The parental rights of the Children’s father, R.L.H., Jr., (“Father”), were 

involuntarily terminated by separate decrees entered on October 13, 2015. 

Father filed notices of appeal, docketed at Nos. 3481, 3482, and 3483 EDA 

2016. This Court consolidated Father’s appeals sua sponte and disposed of 

them by separate memorandum. See In re R.H., et al., 2016 Pa. Super. 

Unpub. LEXIS 3244 (filed September 7, 2016). 

2 We note that the certified record in this case was originally due on 

December 14, 2015. However, this Court did not receive the record from 

the trial court until March 9, 2016, well past the due date. As a result, the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The record reveals that Mother is diagnosed in the mild mental 

retardation range. ATA Report, 6/22/11, at 6. In addition, the Children 

suffer from mild intellectual disability and autism. N.T., 10/13/15, at 121. 

The Philadelphia County Department of Human Services (“DHS”) began 

providing in-home services for this family in 2004, due to the failure to 

thrive of the twin babies. Trial Court Opinion, 3/4/18 at 1-2.

In October of 2010, the Children were removed from Mother’s and 

Father’s custody after having been found living among “three adults[,] and 

[the Children were three of] four children living in an efficiency apartment. 

There was one full size mattress and a deflated twin mattress on the floor. 

There were roaches, wire under the floor, an extension cord running outside 

to a deep freezer, the children were in diapers, and the children were not in 

school.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/4/16, at 2 (footnote omitted). The Children 

were placed in the care of their paternal great aunt, T.B. (“Aunt”), who is a 

pre-adoptive resource. Id.; N.T., 10/13/15, at 207. 

On November 18, 2010, the Children were adjudicated dependent. 

The Children’s permanency goals were return to parent. Family Service Plan 

(“FSP”) objectives were assigned to Mother, requiring her to participate in 

the following: weekly visits with the Children, a parenting capacity 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

briefing schedule in this matter was delayed by nearly three months. This 

Court has acted diligently in attempting to facilitate the prompt processing of 

this appeal.
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evaluation, a bonding evaluation, individual and family therapy, and family 

school. Further, Mother was required to obtain appropriate housing. Trial 

Court Opinion, 3/4/16, at 3.

The trial court set forth the additional factual history, which the record 

evidence supports.

In 2011, all three adults were given a[] [parenting capacity] 

evaluation, which stated that as a unit of three,[3]there is 

parental capacity.

Due to the special nature of the three parents, Mother and 

Father were given numerous opportunities to visit with the 

Children so that they would gradually adjust to taking care of 

three special needs children. On November 4, 2010, the 

parents’ visits changed to liberal supervised visits, to be 

supervised by . . . [A]unt. On June 30, 2011, the parents’ visits 

were changed to supervised visits at the agency. On May 14, 

2012, the parents’ visits were increased to one supervised visit 

at the agency and supervised visits in the home of Father’s 

paramour’s mother, supervised by DHS. On October 10, 2013, 

the Children started to have unsupervised visits with their 

parents at . . . [A]unt’s home for five hours on Saturdays.

The unsupervised visits were expanded to overnight visits 

(Tuesday through Thursday) on January 2, 2014. The agency 

was assigned to conduct spot checks three times a week during 

the overnight visits with the Children. The unsupervised 

overnight visits were temporarily suspended after a CPS report 

was filed alleging physical abuse. The report alleged that Mother 

had beaten the Children with a belt that left bruises on the 

Children’s arms. The Children were subsequently seen at the 

Emergency Department of Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia 

(“CHOP”). The examining physician, Dr. Cynthia Mollen, testified 

that the Children’s bruising were consistent with being hit with a 

____________________________________________

3 Mother lives with Father and his paramour, with whom he had two children 

at the time of the subject proceedings. The three adults co-parented. Trial 

Court Opinion, 3/4/16, at 1. 
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belt. Dr. Mollen stated that the Children were in severe pain as 

a result of the beating. After this report was substantiated, the 

parents were allowed continued visits with pop-up visits by the 

foster care agency. 

On or about December 16, 2014, [Denise] Burton (Community 

Umbrella Association (“CUA”) - Wordsworth case manager) was 

informed that the parents had moved from Philadelphia and 

relocated to the Poconos. The [c]ourt was informed on January 

29, 2015 of the parents’ move. At this hearing, the visits were 

changed to supervised visits. Father initiated contact with the 

Children via text message on February 7, 2015. After the move, 

[Mother’s and Father’s] first visit with the Children was in May, 

2015. In the interim, the Children did not visit with their parents 

from December 9, 2014 until the beginning of May, 2015. Any 

subsequent visits involved DHS transporting the Children to the 

Poconos; the parents did not visit the Children in Philadelphia 

since their move in December, 2014.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/4/16, at 3-4.

On September 21, 2015, the Defender Association Child Advocacy Unit 

(“DACAU”) filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). 

The trial court held a hearing on October 13, 2015.4 DACAU presented the 

testimony of the following witnesses: (1) Erica Williams, Psy.D., a licensed 

psychologist from the Assessment and Treatment Alternatives, Inc. (“ATA”),

who performed parenting capacity evaluations in 2011 and 2013; (2) Denise 

Burton, via telephone, the former clinical case manager at the CUA -

Wordsworth; (3) Brendan Bradley, a mental health worker at the Northeast 

____________________________________________

4 The Honorable Vincent L. Johnson presided over the subject proceedings. 

He had presided over the Children’s dependency matters since 2012. N.T., 

10/13/15, at 375.
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Treatment Center (“NET”); (4) Leslie Toomer, a supervisor at DACAU; and 

(5) Samantha Salvatico-Parent, the foster care case manager at CUA -

Wordsworth. DHS presented the testimony of Ms. Todd, the DHS 

caseworker. In addition, Mother and Father testified on their own behalf.

By decrees dated and entered on October 13, 2015, the trial court 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights. Mother timely filed notices 

of appeal and concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant 

to Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which 

this Court consolidated sua sponte.

5

 The trial court filed its opinion pursuant 

to Rule 1925(a) on March 4, 2016.

On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review:

A. Whether the trial court erred in failing to find that for the six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition, when 

mother’s children were bonded with her and mother completed 

parenting classes and family school, consistently sought 

treatment for and stabilize her mental health issues, was visiting 

with her children, obtained housing for herself and her children, 

completed her [FSP] objectives, and did not intend to relinquish 

her claim to her child or refused and/or failed to perform 

parental duties[?]

____________________________________________

5 The trial court also issued goal change orders dated October 13, 2015, and 

Mother timely filed notices of appeal. We conclude that Mother’s appeals 

from the goal change orders are waived because she has not raised any 

claim regarding them in her brief. See Krebs v. United Refining Co. of 

Pa., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“We will not ordinarily consider 

any issue if it has not been set forth in or suggested by an appellate brief’s 

statement of questions involved. . . .”) (citations omitted). 
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B. Whether the trial court erred in failing to find that for the six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition mother 

had consistent contact and visits with her children, mother’s 

children were bonded with her and mother completed parenting 

classes and family school, consistently sought treatment for and 

stabilized her mental health issues, was visiting with her 

children, obtained housing for herself and her children, 

completed her [FSP] objectives, and did not intend to relinquish 

her claim to her child or refused and/or failed to perform 

parental duties[?]

C. Whether the trial court erred in finding that there were 

repeated and continuing findings of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect and/or dependency of these minor children by mother, 

when mother’s children were bonded with her and mother 

completed parenting classes and family school, consistently 

sought treatment for and stabilized her mental health issues, 

was visiting with her children, obtained housing for herself and 

her children, completed her [FSP] objectives, and did not intend 

to relinquish her claim to her child or refused and/or failed to 

perform parental duties[?]

D. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to 

exist, as to mother, when mother’s children were bonded with 

her and mother completed parenting classes and family school, 

consistently sought treatment for and stabilized her mental 

health issues, was visiting with her children, obtained housing 

for herself and her children, completed her [FSP] objectives, and 

did not intend to relinquish her claim to her child or refused 

and/or failed to perform parental duties[?]

E. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the children continue 

to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the children, when mother can remedy the 

conditions within a reasonable period of time, and when 

mother’s children were bonded with her and mother completed 

parenting classes and family school, consistently sought 

treatment for and stabilized her mental health issues, was 

visiting with her children, obtained housing for herself and her 

children, completed her [FSP] objectives, and did not intend to 

relinquish her claim to her child or refused and/or failed to 

perform parental duties[?]
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F. Whether the trial court erred in failing to recognize that DHS 

made and were continuing to make, along with the trial court’s 

reunification schedule, reasonable efforts towards reunification, 

in failing and/or refusing to help find a viable option or to 

consider options other than terminating mother’s parental rights, 

when mother’s children were bonded with her and mother 

completed parenting classes and family school, consistently 

sought treatment and stabilized her mental health issues, was 

visiting with her children, obtained housing for herself and her 

children, completed her [FSP] objectives, and did not intend to 

erred [sic] in terminating the rights of mother, when she 

obtained housing and parenting training and therapy, and 

prepared to provide for the medical care, care [sic], and 

maintenance of her children?] 

G. Whether the trial court erred in terminating the rights of 

mother where it was not supported by clear and convincing 

evidence and not in the best interests of the children, and there 

was a bond between mother and her children and the 

termination of parental rights would have a negative effect on 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs of the children, 

pursuant to 23 Pa[.]C[.]S[.]A[.] [§] 2511(b)[?]

H. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that mother’s witnesses 

from CYS, the behavior specialist, and the TSS worker that 

worked with the parents and their other special needs children in 

their home in Mahanoy City could not present evidence 

regarding mother’s participation in the care of the children in her 

household and her ability to care for her children, because said 

evidence was not relevant[?]

I. Whether in addition the trial court erred in denying mother’s 

petition for the behavior specialist and TSS worker to be paid 

fees of $33 per hour for their time in participating in the hearing 

on October 13, 2015[?]

J. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the expert witness’s 

[sic] testimony was credible, when said witness was simply 

testifying her [sic] expert opinion[?] 

K. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that DHS worker Todd 

was precluded from introducing documents into evidence, 

because the city solicitor failed to submit a list of exhibits[?]
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L. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that DHS worker Todd’s 

testimony was only partially credible, when she was the worker 

throughout the life of this case and whose testimony had been 

found credible at every hearing throughout the life of this case 

and was following the specific reunification plan of the trial court 

until the relocation of the family[?]

M. Whether the trial court erred in not finding that the children 

and mother had a bond, when the DHS worker Todd, mental 

health worker from NET, Brendan [Bradley], and testified [sic] to 

the bond[?] Dr. Williams also testified to her bonding 

evaluation.

N. Whether the trial court erred in not considering that the 

continuances of the permanency review and the failure to restart 

the reunification plan of the trial court was a factor in the visits 

in 2015, being less frequent than in 2014[?]

O. Whether the trial court erred in finding that there were 

reasonable efforts, when there was no DHS worker assigned to 

the case [sic] December, 2014 through March, 2015 when DHS 

social worker Todd was on leave[?] 

P. Whether the errors committed above deprived mother of her 

right to due process and equal protection[?]

Mother’s brief at 1-2.6

We consider Mother’s issues mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

____________________________________________

6 Mother’s brief is unpaginated. For ease of reference, we have assigned 

page numbers to her brief beginning with the statement of questions 

involved. 
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or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). The 

burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights 

are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

This Court need only agree with any one subsection of Section 

2511(a), along with Section 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of 
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parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc). We conclude that the trial court in this case properly terminated 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which 

provide as follows:

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

. . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (b). 

To terminate parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), the 

moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the 

following elements: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be 
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without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of 

M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

This Court has explained that, “[t]he grounds for termination due to 

parental incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative 

misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as 

well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 

337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations omitted). Further, parents are required to 

make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full 

parental responsibilities. Id. at 340. 

With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has explained that, 

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in 

the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 

1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Further, the trial court 

“must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with 

utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that 

bond.” Id. (citation omitted). 

We note at the outset that Mother raises sixteen issues on appeal. 

Our Supreme Court has explained that raising a staggering number of issues 

is not effective appellate advocacy and is “borderline abuse of the legal 

system.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 864 A.2d 460, 480 n.28 (Pa. 
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2004). The Court stated that, “multiplying assignments of error will dilute 

and weaken a good case and will not save a bad one.” Id. (emphasis 

omitted) (quoting Jackson, “Advocacy Before the United States Supreme 

Court,” 25 Temple L. Q. 115, 119 (1951)). 

Further, we note that the Rules regarding the content of briefs 

provide, “[t]he summary of argument shall be a concise, but accurate, 

summary of the arguments presented in support of the issues in the 

statement of questions involved.” Pa.R.A.P. 2118. Mother’s summary of 

argument in her brief is deficient in that it consists of one sentence that 

references the needs and welfare of the Children. In addition, Mother’s 

argument in her brief fails to comply with the Rule providing, 

The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are 

questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part 

-- in distinctive type or in type of distinctively displayed -- the 

particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and 

citation of the parties as are deemed pertinent.

Pa.R.A.P. 2119. Mother’s argument consists of twelve pages and is not 

divided into any parts.

In addition, the Rules regarding briefs provide “[l]ettering shall be 

clear and legible and no smaller than 14 point in the text and 12 point in 

foot notes.” Pa.R.A.P. 124(4); Pa.R.A.P. 2135(c). In the statement of 

questions involved, statement of the case, and summary of argument, 

Mother’s counsel used lettering smaller than 14 point. In the argument 

section, her counsel used lettering that is smaller than, and other lettering 
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that is greater than, 14 point. In addition, the text in the entire substantive 

portion of Mother’s brief is not double spaced as required by Rule 124(3). 

Pa.R.A.P. 124(3) (“Text must be double spaced, but quotations more than 

two lines long may be indented and single spaced. Footnotes may be single 

spaced. . . .”). 

Moreover, the Rules limit a principal brief to 14,000 words, unless the 

brief does not exceed 30 pages. Pa.R.A.P. 2135(a)(1). Where the brief 

exceeds 30 pages, a certificate of compliance with the 14,000 word-count 

limit must be filed. Id. Here, the substantive portion of Mother’s brief spans 

22 pages. However, the text is single spaced and/or spaced one and a half 

lines apart. Had Mother’s counsel complied with the Rules by double spacing 

the text, Mother’s brief would have exceeded 30 pages. As such, we 

conclude that Mother’s counsel should have filed a certificate of compliance 

with the word-count limit. She failed to do so.

Pa.R.A.P. 2101 underscores the seriousness with which this Court 

takes deviations from procedural rules, as it permits us to quash or dismiss 

an appeal for procedural noncompliance. Therefore, we strenuously caution 

Mother’s counsel about this conduct. Here, we address Mother’s appeal 

insofar as the Rules permit.

We observe that Mother fails to provide meaningful discussion with 

citation to any statutory or case authority in the argument section of her 

brief with respect to issues F, H, I, J, K, L, N, O, and P. As such, we 
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conclude that Mother has waived those issues.7 See In re W.H., 25 A.3d 

330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating that issues are waived if appellate 

brief fails to provide meaningful discussion with citation to relevant 

authority); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b). 

With respect to Section 2511(a)(2), Mother asserts in issue C that the 

evidence does not support termination because the Children “were bonded 

with her,” and she completed her FSP objectives. We disagree.8 

The trial court set forth its factual findings, credibility determinations, 

and conclusions of law on the record in open court at the end of the 

evidentiary hearing. See N.T., 10/13/15, at 369-380. The court found 

persuasive the testimony of Erica Williams, Psy.D., the licensed psychologist 

from the ATA, who performed parental capacity evaluations in 2011 and 

2013. Dr. Williams testified that the evaluations were “taken in conjunction 

with the three adults [who] would be raising the children. So the findings 

were based on if they were to work as a unit.” Id. at 21. The court properly 

related Dr. Williams’ findings that “neither of the parents individually were 

____________________________________________

7 To the extent Mother argues that DHS did not provide reasonable efforts to 

reunify her with the Children, the record belies her contention. Moreover, 

our Supreme Court has held that proof of reasonable reunification efforts by 

a child welfare agency is not necessary to support a decree terminating 

parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2). See In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 

673-674 (Pa. 2014).

8 Based on this disposition, we need not review Mother's issues A, B, D, and 

E because they relate to Section 2511(a)(1), (5), and/or (8). See In re 

B.L.W., supra.
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capable of being parents. . . .” Id. at 371. However, Dr. Williams found “as 

a corporate unit, . . ., given the proper structure, these parents as a unit 

possibly could parent.” Id. The trial court explained:

And what we did was, and what DHS did was to allow structure 

to give the parents all the help they needed over 60 months to 

show the [c]ourt that as a corporate unit, a unique corporate 

unit, of one man and two women, they could provide proper 

parental care. . . . In 60 months, we found based on the 

testimony of Dr. Williams today . . ., which is un-refuted[,] that 

even now presently . . . not only . . . did they not have the 

capacity individually . . . to parent[,] but now in their corporate 

unit, they are found not to have the capacity to . . . parent for 

these children. 

Id. at 371-372.

Upon careful review, Dr. Williams’ testimony supports the court’s 

findings. Indeed, Dr. Williams testified that Mother and Father do not 

currently have the capacity to parent either individually or collectively. N.T., 

10/13/15, at 63. Dr. Williams explained as follows.

[T]here was some progress with this family. But the concern is 

that over time . . . [t]he issues present similarly despite the 

intensive intervention. The availability of services, and the steps 

identified for the individuals to take [sic]. So, that they are 

eager, they initiate the steps but then they fall off, and they stop 

doing what they’ve been asked to do, so the progress is stunted. 

So after intervention[,] after removal of children[,] despite the 

stated goal of wanting the children, there seems to be a . . . 

repeat of going so far[,] stepping back, going so far[,] stepping 

back.

Id. at 27-28. 
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Further, the trial court noted Dr. Williams’ testimony that the parents 

“simply disappeared, moved with nothing” when they relocated to the 

Poconos. Trial Court Opinion, 3/4/16, at 18. The court reasoned, in part:

Despite all the efforts that DHS and other supportive agencies 

have attempted to do to provide [for] this family[,] they chose in 

December [of 2014] to leave [Philadelphia] and to abandon their 

children, they chose to do that. They made no attempt to 

contact anyone about their leaving until March. Then they made 

no effort to have visitation until much later. 

Id. at 373-374. Moreover, the trial court explained:

[A] question was asked of Dr. Williams by one of the attorneys, 

because of the parents[’] intellectual disability [whether] we 

should excuse them for their inconsistency, for their inability to 

follow through with the protection and support of their family[.] 

Dr. Williams said, no, it had nothing to do with their intellectual 

disability[.] [I]t was a willful act. 

Id. at 375. Indeed, on direct examination by the Child Advocate, Dr. 

Williams testified:

Very often, people with developmental disabilities can thrive as 

parents particularly given the right supports. In this case[,] the 

recommendations have been made for years that they get 

certain supports. And the concern here is despite the provision 

of those supports . . . that they’re making multiple choices to do 

different things that place the children at harm that cause them 

to leave the children’s lives, and that’s not something that 

necessarily can be explained by developmental disability[,] 

rather than a choice in behavior.

Id. at 35-36. 

In short, the court found that “there was no other credible testimony 

presented to show that Mother had resolved any of the issues that brought 

the children into care.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/4/16, at 18. Based on the 
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foregoing testimonial evidence, and upon thorough review of the subject 

proceedings, we agree. The record overwhelmingly demonstrates that 

Mother’s repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal has 

caused the Children, for a period of five years at the time of the subject 

proceedings, to be without essential parental care, control, or subsistence 

necessary for their physical or mental well-being. Further, the evidence 

demonstrates the causes of Mother’s incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal 

cannot or will not be remedied. As such, Mother’s issue related to the 

termination of her parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) fails.

In issues G and M, Mother argues that the record does not support 

termination of her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). Mother 

requests this Court, at minimum, “to remand for further testimony and 

evidence regarding the bond between” Mother and the Children. Mother’s 

brief at 21. Specifically, she argues that there is the need “for an updated 

formal bonding evaluation to aid in the decision regarding the impact of the 

termination of parental rights.” Id. We conclude that this issue has no 

merit.

This Court has explained as follows: 

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child. 

In re K.K.R.S., 958 A.2d 529, 533-536 (Pa. Super. 2008). The 

mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the 

termination of parental rights. See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 

(Pa. Super. 2008) (trial court’s decision to terminate parents’ 
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parental rights was affirmed where court balanced strong 

emotional bond against parents’ inability to serve needs of 

child). Rather, the orphans’ court must examine the status of 

the bond to determine whether its termination “would destroy an 

existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” In re Adoption 

of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 397 (Pa. Super. 2003). As we 

explained in In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010),

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have with 

the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the 

trial court should consider the importance of continuity of 

relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond 

can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

In addition, in considering the affection a child may have for his or her 

natural parents, we have explained as follows.

[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent 

simply because the child harbors affection for the parent is 

not only dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s 

feelings were the dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, 

the analysis would be reduced to an exercise in semantics 

as it is the rare child who, after being subject to neglect 

and abuse, is able to sift through the emotional wreckage 

and completely disavow a parent. . . . Nor are we of the 

opinion that the biological connection between [the parent] 

and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when 

considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a 

parent, to establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The 

psychological aspect of parenthood is more important in 

terms of the development of the child and its mental and 

emotional health than the coincidence of biological or 

natural parenthood.

In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d at 535 (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 
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Moreover, our Supreme Court confirmed that, “the mere existence of a 

bond or attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the 

denial of a termination petition.” In re T.S.M., supra. The Court further 

stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering termination 

must also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and 

whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” Id. at 268. The Court 

directed that, in weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section 

2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. 

at 269. The T.S.M. Court observed that, “[c]hildren are young for a scant 

number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy 

development quickly. When courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is 

catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

Instantly, the trial court found as follows at the conclusion of the 

testimonial evidence:

[W]hile it is true that there’s been testimony that there is a bond 

clearly of some level, the [c]ourt does not find [it] to be a 

parental bond. The testimony has been [that] the children enjoy 

being with their parents. . . . 

[T]he court does not really find from the basis of the testimony 

that there is a parental bond[.] [I]t is a friendly bond.... [I]t’s 

not a parental bond, and while there [would be] a negative 

impact according to Dr. Williams, Dr. Williams also indicated it 

[would] not [cause] irreparable harm if termination was to take 

place.

N.T., 10/13/15, at 377-378. 
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Dr. Williams testified on direct examination that the Children “would 

experience a loss . . . and they absolutely would need to have support and 

treatment to ameliorate any of the outcome of the loss of [Mother and 

Father] from their lives.” N.T., 10/13/15, at 68. Nevertheless, she clarified 

that, with respect to the “irreparable harm” in this context, “the big part of it 

is will it prevent them from ever attaching in a healthy way to another 

adult?” Id. at 69. She continued:

In this case, the children were doing very well with their 

placement, they were thriving, in fact, their behaviors and their 

overall functioning had improved. So they would be negatively 

impacted[,] but there’s no reason to think that it would be 

irreparable harm, and [that] they wouldn’t be able to be 

successful in the absence of their parents.

Id. 

Further, Dr. Williams testified that it is in the Children’s best interest to 

have permanency. Id. at 37-38. She testified that, “the parents haven’t 

shown any evidence of being able to establish permanency, even with 

significant supports.” Id. at 33. In addition, Dr. Williams testified that, 

“with special needs[,] the ones that these children are diagnosed with[,] 

routine structure [is] [in]credibly important to help manage their behaviors.” 

Id. at 36. She continued on direct examination:

Q. And if the parents as in this case . . . are in and out of the 

children’s lives[,] in your opinion is that more detrimental or 

helpful to the children as far as their emotional well-being?

A. Long term it’s detrimental. Often times in a short term you 

see the children be excited at the return of the parent but it 

creates that underlying lack of security, lack of attachment, and 
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kind of inability to know if your needs are going to be met, it’s 

. . . long term, that’s very detrimental.

Q. So in the best case scenario, your opinion for these particular 

children, would it be best then to sever that [relationship]?

A. Based on . . . all of the efforts made, I don’t have reason to 

believe that there will be substantial enough changes for the 

parents to provide the consistency [the Children] need. So at 

this time the best option would be to give them that provider 

who can give them that long term care.

Id. at 38.

Ms. Burton, the clinical case manager at CUA-Wordsworth, testified 

that she was assigned to the Children’s case from the time of their 

placement until August 2015. During that time-period, she visited the 

Children twice per month at both Mother’s home and Aunt’s home. Id. at 

76. Ms. Burton explained that the Children’s bond with Mother was affected

when she moved to the Poconos. She testified that the Children “were used 

to seeing their parents from Tuesday to Thursday, and at one point it was 

from Wednesday to Saturday, and they looked forward to that. But after 

[the parents moved to the Poconos], they had no idea when visits [were] 

ever going to occur.” Id. at 102. She explained that, “the interruption of 

not having a visit . . . [made it] difficult to establish an ongoing bond.” Id. 

at 101. Importantly, Ms. Burton agreed on redirect examination that the 

Children have a parent-child relationship with Aunt, and that Aunt is able to 

meet the specific needs of each child. Id. at 116. 
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Samantha Salvatico-Parent, the foster care case manager at CUAWordsworth, testified that the Children have had supervised visits with 

Mother and Father in the Poconos on three occasions since their relocation, 

with transportation being provided by DHS each time. Id. at 203-205. She 

testified, as did Brendan Bradley, the mental health worker at the NET who 

provides counseling for the Children, that the Children have a parent-child 

relationship with Aunt. Id. at 148-149, 202-203.

Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial 

court in terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). 

The testimonial evidence demonstrates that terminating Mother’s parental 

rights will serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of the Children. As such, we reject Mother’s argument that 

additional evidence, including an updated formal bonding evaluation, was 

necessary for the trial court’s bond analysis. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 

1108, 1115-1116 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted) (stating that Section 

2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation). Mother’s issues 

related to the termination of her parental rights under Section 2511(b) fail.

In summary, the testimony on direct examination of Leslie Toomer, 

the Child Advocate social worker for the family, supports the decrees 

involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights as follows:

Q. [W]hat if any, concerns does this raise for you as to 

[Father’s] and [Mother’s] ability to parent these children? 
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A. [I]t’s my opinion that the parents have sabotaged their 

likelihood of reunifying with their children twice, . . . [.] [T]he 

first time when we were moving toward reunification, and there 

was an incident of physical discipline with a belt, that rose to a 

child line report being made[.] I thought that in that instance 

maybe that they were overwhelmed because it was the very first 

visit that all of the children were at the home again, . . . for 

unsupervised visits, so, I did have some concerns about that[.] 

[T]hen to leave abruptly without letting not necessarily me know 

as a Child Advocate social worker supervisor, but the other 

workers on the case who were very vested in making sure the 

transition was smooth and reunification occur[.] [I]t just spoke 

to the level or lack of insight that the parents have in dealing 

with these children, leaving them[.] [The Children] may not 

understand why they left[.] [I]t shows there’s an inconsistency 

and the level of care that you are willing to provide[,] where the 

kinship parent has been a consistent provider for five years for 

these children.

N.T., 10/13/15, at 182-183. Based on our thorough review of the record 

evidence, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in involuntarily 

terminating Mother’s parental rights.

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/18/2016