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, 

GENERAL 

ACRTIS. TEXAS 76711 

September 12, 1973 

The Honorable Russell Cummings 

Executive Director 

Opinion No. H- 98 

Texas Mass Transportation Commission Re: Interpretation of $ 3(e) 

1013 San Jacinto of~senate Bill 642, 63rd 

Austin, Texas 78701 Legislature, as to whether 

governing body of a piincipal city or the Rapid 

Transit Authority is to 

Dear Mr. Cummings: submit plan for review 

Your letter requesting our opinion is directed to a ‘question concerning the procedure for the creation of a Rapid Transit Authority pursuant 

to Senate Bill 642 of the 63rd Legislature (Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., ch. 141, 

p. 302). This statute will be codified as Article 1118x, Vernon’s Texas 

Civil Statutes. Generally it authorizes the creation and organization in 

metropolitan areas of rapid transit authorities. Their creation is governed 

by § 3 which requires the governing body of a metropolitan area, either on 

its own motion or upon being presented with a petition signed by not less 

than 5,000 qualified voters, to institute proceedings to create such an 

authority. The first step required is the adoption of an ordinance or resolution fixing a time and place for a public hearing on the proposal. [F 3(a)] 

Subsection (b) of § 3 requires that notice of such hearing be published. 

Subsection (c) relates to the conduct of the hearing. Subsection (d) provides 

that if, after such hearing, the governing body of the principal city finds that 

the creation of the system would be of benefit&c., it shall adopt an ordinance 

creating the authority and prescribing its boundaries. 

Finally, Subsection (e) provides: 

“After such hearing by the governing body of 

such authority, the said authority shall submit the 

proposed plan to the governor’s interagency transportation council for their review and comment. ” 

(emphasis added) 

p. 447 
The Honorable Russell Cummings, page 2 (H-98) 

Your question to us is: 

ISince the ‘governing body of such authority’ 

has not held any ‘such hearing, ’ is it the intent of 

this subsection to direct the governing body of the 

principal city rather than the governing body of 

authority to submit the plan to the Governor’s 

Interagency Council for review and comment? ” 

In construing the statutes it is always our purpose to so construe them 

as to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. State v. Jackson, 376 S. W. 2d 

341 (Tex. 1964); Calvert v. British-American Oil Producing Co., 397 S. W. 2d 

839 (Tex. 1966). 

Normally, unambiguous language will be interpreted literally. However, 

as it is stated in 53 Tex. Jur. 2d. Statutes, $140, p. 203, with ample support 

in the authorities: 

“It is not the function of the judiciary to correct 

legislative errors, mistakes, or omissions. If the 

language of a statute is plain, a court will not eliminate 

or supply a word or clause on the supposition that it was 

included or omitted by inadvertence. But obvious errors 

or mistakes of a clerical, grammatical, or typographical 

nature may be disregarded. . . .” (emphasis added) 

To that extent, where necessary, courts may add or delete language. 

Sweeny Hospital District v. Carr, 378 S. W. 2d 43 (Tex. 1964); State v. 

Shoppers World Inc., 380 S. W. 2d 107 (Tex. 1964). 

As we read Subsection (e) of S 3 it is clear that the Legislature intended 

that it read: 

“After such hearing by the governing body of 

such principal city, the principal city shall submit 

the proposed plan to the governor’s interagency 

transportation council for their review and comment. ” 

p. 448 
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The Honorable Russell Cummings, page 3 (H-98) 

Any other construction would be meaningless in view of the fact 

that at the time to which reference is made, i.e., “After such hearing, ” 

the “proposed plan” is the plan of the principal city to create an authority. The authority, if it is even in existence at that time, will have 

no plan. The purpose of the notice is to secure the assistance of the 

council in organizing the authority and formulating its plan. We should 

not adopt a construction of a statute which would result in an absurdity. 

State Highway Department v. Gorham, 162 S. W. 2d 934 (Tex. 1942); 

Dovalina v. Albert, 409 S. W. 2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App., Amarillo, 1966, 

err. ref., n. r. e.) 

Further, as we substitute “principal city” for “authority” in one 

place in the subsection, it is our opinion that “said authority” elsewhere 

in the subsection should likewise refer to the same governmental body, 

i. e., the city. 

We therefore answer your question that the notice to be given to 

the Governor’s Interagency Council should come from the governing body 

of the principal city. 

SUMMARY 

Section 3(e) of Senate Bill 642, 63rd Legislature, 

.should be read to require that notice of a proposed plan 

for a Rapid Transit Authority shall be furnished to the 

Governor’s Interagency Transportation Council by the 

governing body of the principal city rather than by the 

governing body of the authority. 

Very truly yours, 

Attorney General of Texas 

p. 449 
The Honorable Russell Cummings, page 4 (H-98) 

APPROPED: 

u I 1 

DhfiD M. KENDALL, Choirman 

Opinion Committee 

p. 450