THE POTENTIAI,I'fIES OF COONT FOR STRATF.GIC .. ,,ARNING 
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THE POTENTIALITIES OF CCJllNT Pl>R STRATEGIC WARNIKO 

·Prepared by . . · . 

. ·. .. · · ~cial· Stwq Group. .. ot·tne 

NBA Scientific Advisory Boa.rd 

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THE POtD'X:IALITIES OF COMIRT FOR S'!BA.TEGIC W.AmTIRG 

s~ ••..••••••.••••••..•••••••••••••••• · ••.••.••••••••••••• 2 

Dm.OOOC'rIOR • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ; ; • 191 • • • • • , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3 

FIRDIBGS Mm RECC»mNDATIOll3 

IDdicatOJ11 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• -•••••••••• ·• • • • • • • 8 ' V 

I 

Interception •••••••••••.••.•••••••• • ......... , • • • • • • • • • • • 10 

Conmunicationa •••• " • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ll 1/ 

Traffic Analysis, Low-level Codes and Ciphers, and 

Plain 'l!ext. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •.• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • l.2 

Special Intelligence •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 15 

Electronics Intelligence (ELINT) •••••••••••••••••••••••• J..8 

Research and Development: ••••••••••••••••••••• · •••••••••• 21 

Pers01JD.e 1. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 23 

APPENDICES 

I - The Speci&l"Stu~ Group 

II - The 'l'hreat 

III - Borth American Continental Air Defenae Syatms 

IV - Indicator Systems 

V - Communications 

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VI - Traf'f'ic .Amlyais, Low-level Codes and Ciphers, and Plain Text 

VII - Special Intelligence 

VIII - Electronics Intelligence (BLINT) 

IX - Personnel 

X - COMINT as a Source of Advance Warning in World War II and the 

Korean Conflict 

XI - Bibliography 

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Tlm POTEN'l'IALITIES OF COMINT FOR STRATEGIC WARNING 

SUMMARY 

This study evaluates Communications Intelligence (COMINT) a.s a. means 

of obta:i.nill8 strategic warning of' Soviet intentions to attack the continental 

United States. 

COMINT is now providing substantial information on Soviet capability 

to initiate e.nd sustain an attack against the United States. In addition, 

it is probable that COMINT, particularly through Special Intelligence, cQU].d 

give warning of' Soviet intention to mount such an attack •. The reliability of 

this strategic warning would increase with the approach of the attack, with 

first indications appearing 4 to 12 weeks prior to the attack. 

This potentiality can be :f'u.l.ly realized only with an inQrease in.th~~ 

current level of ef'f'ort. However, significant improvement can be effectec9" 

by more intensive exploitation ~f' the present COMINT program. 

It is recognized tba t COMIN'l.1 cannot with certainty provide the 

tactical warning obtainable from an Air Def'ense Warning System. The 

effectiveness of' our Continental Air Defense System will, however, be 

greatly increased if' provided with reliable strategic warning. The 

signif'ica.nce of adequate warning to our survival cannot be overestimated; 

this is particui.arly true with respect to conservation of our retaliatory 

forces and the preservation of our population. 

In order to utilize fullY the potentialities of COMINT as a source 

of strategic ~rning, it is essential that operational plans and eve.l\lation 

of our Continental Air Defense consider a~ an int~gral pa.rt the im;pact of 

the warning COMINT can provide. · 

.Further, to maximize ~he potentialities of COMINT for giving strateg~ warning, it is necessary that the following steps be taken: · 

1. Top priority should be accorded to the solution of' high-level 

Soviet cryptographic systems and to their exploitation on a timely basis. 

2. Traffic analysis activities should be expanded and organized 

to give the maximum information obtainable from the :material intercevtcd. • 

In particular, it should be more effectively quantified through the development of indices or measures of activities, graphically presented to show 

·changes in time. Field personnel should be sufficiently indoctrinated, 

within realistic security limi"tations, in the details of' traffic analysis 

which ca.n be used to develop strategic warning. 

3. Personnel policies should be revised to improve the selection, 

training, and retention of skilled personnel, both civilian and military, for 

COMntT activities. Strong recOODD.enda.tions should be ma.de to the Servicet;: ""',.,, 

the Civil Service Commission to effect these changes. 

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'PE>P SEGma' SANO:B 

THE POTENTIALITIES OF COMINT FOR S'.I.1RATEGIC WARNING 

INTRODUCTION 

During ·the past few yea.rs, the Defense Es~blishment and, through: it, 

t~e .American People have become inc~easingl.y' aware of the potentialities 

of the USSR for mounting a direct a·tanic attack against the US. This 

awareness has resulted in increasing official and popular interest in building 

up an air defense system capable of at least bluni?ing, if' not withstanding, a 

possible Soviet air attack against the continental us. In response to this 

interest, there hA.s been a succession of high-level reports on the air 

defense problem (WSEG, LINCOLN,· EAS'r .~IVER, Kelly, Edwards and Bull Reports) 

whose conclusions leave no doubt that a surprise atanic attack on the US 

would resul,t in carnage, devastation, psychological shock, and curtailment 

of our retaliatory- ability on a scale difficult to estimate, or even to 

comprehend in terms of any previous experience. 

The degree of success obtained by the · enenty" in an· air attack depends , 

sharply on the timeliness of warning received. Accordingly, the provision 

of early warning is ·the first essential element for an effective air 

defense system. Tile system ·in being ha~, built into it, radar and g:z:ound' 

observer warning nets which could at best give early warning of less than 

an hour at US perimeter targets. The future systems under· consideration, 

involving·radar chains at various northerly latitudes in Alaska, CaDa.Ps,, 

Greenland, and seaward extensions, my give a distant early warning up to 

four or six hours. Sane such early warning chains must be developed for 

tactical purposes, but their greatest usefU.llless for deployment 8lld 

neutralizing operations· occurs only after hostile action has commenced. 

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Extension ot the reliable warning period to two or four days would provide 

time for the complete deployment of our offensive and defensive forces, 

which would increase the chance or turning the en9J1\Y. 1 s operation before 

its mission had been accomplished and might even induce the en~ to 

abandon th~ attack (see Appendices II and III). 

Such strategic waming ia not obtainable trom the early warning 

· component of an air defense system; the- previous studies ot these systems 

have, perhaps appropriate].J, been based upon the.ass~ion·that no earlier 

waming will be available. For such waming we J1D1st, there.fore, turn to 

other sources. or intelligence--:ind most or these previous studies have, ~ 

fact, laid great stress, in terms of US readiness, on the value of intel!igence. The strongest expression of this need is that conta1!1ed in the Bull 

Report., which considers the pay-off so great as to warrant &n'1 possible 

attack on the problem, regard.less or its cost in funds and manpower. 

The sources or strategic waming can be broken down into overtf, covert. 

and si ls sources. or these the si ala sourceThe traditionalovert a 

and covert. sources must be vigorously cult:;J.vated in the race or the increasing 

difficulties created by Soviet secilrit7 measures, but toplace reliance on 

them as the sole solirce or time'JJ" indicator intelligence would be to court. 

·disaster. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Since the beginning of World war I, the ext.ensive use or radio has 

. been an essential part. or military and governmental conmunications and 

operations. All count~es must use radio for communication with their ships 

and aircraft. The USSR, because of its great distances, and consequent 

difficulties of constructing an adequate system or land lines, uses and will 

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continue to use radio ror the transmission of a considerable volume of 

internal conmunications. Thus we are given the opportunit7 to pene~r~!~ 

the frontiers and to share the secrets or the Soviet GQvernment. 

The value of 'Signal Intelligence during Wor;Ld War II can scarcal.7 be 

overestimated. Through the decrfPtion or high-level German and Japanese 

messages, we were able to penetrate the eneJQ" lines, enter ministries and 

militar,y headquarters, and secure advance knowledge ot ppere.tional plans. 

The spect.acular effectiveness or collllllll\icationa intelligence has been 

thoroughl.7 covered in the Brownell Report; and in other surYqa--a.n 

effectiveness apt4' epitomi•ed -in the following passage from General 

Marshall's letter of 25 September 1944 to Govemor Dawq: 

"The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all 

operations in the Pacific are closely' related in conception and 

timing to the information we secretl.7 obtain through these 

intercepted codes. They contribute greatl7 to the victory and 

• 

tremendously' to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct 

ot current. opera~ions an~ in looking toward the eai-17 termination 

of the war." 

While these past achievements bring us' no firm. assurance or corresponding successes in future operations, we do find in them promise that a 

corresponding abilit7 to deceypt en-. radio massages will result in 

·~ . intelligence of inestimble "(alue. Signal Intelligence,.above all COMINT, 

is the most promising source of strategic wa.ming of an impending attack 

on the US; f'or the complaxit7~of' the process of' preparing the forces tor 

such an at.tack makes it practical.17 impossible to avoid the use of radio 

communications and other electronic signals at all points in the process • 

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The intercept.ion and t1me}7 eY&luation. or these signals will then 

constitute indicators tor strategic waming. The evaluation or such ~ 

"WB.ming indicators.must be •de against a background plan, whether 

tacit or explicitJ this aBBwned eneJq" plan should be based on intelligence 

from all sources, including information on our own operations or on 

operations sinml.ating possible ene~ altematives. The present Air 

Defense Conaand program dealing with indications or an air attack on 

the US is set up along these lines. Possible indicators are displayed 

on an Indications Board, and relevant :l.ntellig~ce items are f'iltered 

into the board as a f'unction of time and the degree ot criticality. Th. 

significance or the whole. array is then brought out h1' a comparison ot 

this complex of realized indicators with the postulated plan or plans. 

It is significant that, at present, about 80% ot the items associated 

with a direct air attack on the US are derived from COMINT. 

On a national scale, indications or hostilities against the U~ are 

)\ monitored by the Watch Committee, set up, on an all-source basis, under 

I 

the Intelligence Advisory Cormnittee (IAC). A proposal to use the Watch 

· Conunittee as a central monitor and clearing house for all indications ~ 

intelligence has been advanced 'h1 Air Defense CQnaa.nd, and a aurve1 ot 

procedures for disseminating such intelligence to those responsible for 

decisions is at present under WB.7 under the sponsorship or the IAC. 

In accordance with the request 0£ the Director, NSA (see Appendix I)", 

this Report ot the Special study' Group examines in some detail the present 

and future potentulltit1s or COMIN'l' as contributing to the strategic· · 

waming of an impending attack on t.he us. The .Group, conscious of its 

l~tations in time and talent, has confined itself primarily' to a 

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. fUi' S:tib:K:Jf 1 · bAi~U:ti 

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"consideration or indicators of a direct air at.tack on tfre· continental US. 

It is well a~re that these indicators are but. part ot a· ~~ger system vl 

indicators or impending hostilities against tbe interests of t~ us, 

including attacks against its possessions and forces overseas or against 

its allies and other friendly nations. The Group's invest{gat-iort's have 

in some instances taken it into these matte~a, and 8'0119 ol it~ tfndfnga 

and recommendations will apply in this broader settfng.. S:fmf:fd.Tl!y, it.a 

investigations have taken it into some matters beyond the purview of the 

National Seeurit.1 Agency; because these have in some cases a bearing on 

the better utilization ot COHINT in the indicator problem, the Group 

has thought it app~opriate to bring its findings to ~he attention of the 

Director within the framework ot this Report;. Instances ot this .are to 

be found in the discussion~ on ELINT1 on organization and use of the 

Indications Board, and on the Watch Conmd.ttee. 

The Group has studied the contribution which COMINT can or co'Q1d 

make to the waming or an impending attack on the us. Its findings 

and recoDDBendations on variou~ facets or this problem are presented in 

the following sections or the Report;. These conclusions are supported 

' I 

by the material presented in the Appendices to the Report 1 which are 

referenced in the appropriate places. 

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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

INDICATORS 

Rer. Appendix IV 

Since the effectiveness of COMINT as a source of warning depends 

upon the speed and accuracy or the recognition and communication ot that 

' 1ifarning1 the study Group necessarily included in its survey some investigation of the present arrangement~, within the va~ious US Intelligence 

agencies, for detecting hostile intentions. A detailed assessment of 

those arrangements wo~d be outside the terms or reference ot this ~eport.. 

The Group has stu~~ed the indicators which have be~. proposed by ·9 

' various competent agenctes and commands as significant to the s~rategic 

warnings or the initiation or hostilities against the us. Most relevant 

to the present problem or detecting movee. associated with a direct air 

attack on the US is the Indications Board maintained by the Intelligence 

Directorate or Air Defense CoJ1111and (ADC) at Ent Air Force Base, Colorado 

Springs, Colorado. The evaluation of tbe in\plli~ence reeresented by 

~is indicator array, a_!' it retiegt,a,Lb..e..stat.A...£t.!_:r.~a:~ine_s~I!. or in!!_ent 

ot the USSR to initiate stra~gig .aJ.r.,Jios_!~ill!~~it.. is made ~_:C?,mpariso. -

with the steps which must be taken by the en..emr prior to th.!__?>un~ing '!t 

_such an attack. This procedure is a more detailed. application to the 

present "Warning problem or the method rollowed by 

Behind these e~tor.t..s is a philosophy which holds that at least some 

ot the steps required be.tore the initiation or hQstilities a.re detectable by 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Z1." .J.I.C. (52) 51 (Final),, 18 December 1952. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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the processes of intelligence. The Group believes that, among these 

processes, COMINT ~as the highest waming potential. This finding is 

bolstered 'bJ" the foll.owing theoretical arguments: 

(1) A militar:r move or ar17 appreciable scale requires the 

coordinated action or mal'J1' persons, usually several hundred thousand. 

(11) The task or achieving the necessary de~ee or coordination 

requires that mar17 massages be passed. 

(iii) The apace over which the coordination is required and the 

. . • time during wt:iich the action must be prepared demand the use or radio 

communication tor a reasonable ·traction ot the total conmunication. 

(iv) A reasonable fraction or the radio communication carried. 

out in support. or the DK>Ve can be intercepted. 

(v) or the traffic which can be intercepted, some traction can 

·be deceypted, read in plain text, or subjected to exhaustive tratric anaqsia. 

The Group accepts this philosophy. It further supports the ADC proposal that the Watch Conmittaa, under the Intelligence Advisol'1' Conmittee. 

be used as a central monitor and clearing hoU:se tor all indications intelli-· 

gence. The Group also believes that the imminence or hostilities can 

appropriately' be measured against a postulated &neJl\Y plan and that the 

formulation or such· a nonnative plan can be greatl.T assisted b7 our own 

operational experience and, it need be, 'bJ" experimental operations designed 

t"o test it. 

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INTERCEPTION 

Expansion of intercept facilities is being undertaken. Geographical 

limitations require that the antenna fields and placement of intercept 

poaitiona be examined with close regard to highly technical matters 

relating to propagation phenomena. Therefore 1 the National Security Agencr 

should augment ita scientific and engineering starr with a view to assisting . ....... . 

the SerYices in these matters. 

There are many" intercept.ion problems which require strong ei'f ort. in 

researcn and development; reconanend.ations thereon are contained in the 

Section on Research and Development. 

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COMMUNICATIONS 

· Ref. ~ppendix \" 

A conmunication qatem, no matter how good, cannot guarantee the 

timel.7 receipt ot warning intorm.tion. A study or the present s7stem 

shows that the longest delqa in the qstem a~ise 'from human failure to ... / \,,. - ' ..... _ 

aaaeaa a warning e1gnal P=P8rl.7 in the field and from human slowness in ... ---........ --..... 

e&H';YinLJ?!P..!£' ______ ........ trnm PDI ~ ll!!-VJi._jp_f!l.Otlt.!r• p Improvements . are needed in 

the training and instruction of collllllmiications personnel and i~ operations 

or the entire communications networlt to insure against personnel failures. ~ .... . The planned communication system will remve soae o:t the possibilities of 

failure a\ message centers and·--wiU cμt :the delays within anaqsis and 

' 

evaluation units verT conaiderabl.T. 

Planned electrical communication facilities are adequate tor the &mall 

YOlume of traffic involved in warning. However, severe jamming of radio _ 

.circuits incident to hostilities would.probably render those circults 

largel.T inoperable. Alteniate radio links and cable facilities are being 

expanded. This will tend to orrset the threat or jamming. 

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TRAFFIC ANALYSIS, LOW-LEVEL CODES AND CIPHERS, AND PLAIN TEXT 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 Ret. Appendix VI 

EO 3:3{h)(2) 

Traffic anaqaia (T/A) ia a me1ihodology b;r which COMINT.ls deriYed 

from the anal.1'a1a or traffic volumes, operator chatter, and message 

extemala. The COMINT derived trom T/A is collated with that recovered 

fl'Oll low-level codes and ciphers, plain text messages, an,f voice communications in an operation lmown as "T/A Fusion". Since i948, Wh«i readable 

. · .. ·. · .. ·. 

Traffic anal.7aia and. the decoding ot low-level trattic have enabled 

ua to C&1"17 torward and build up intelligence on Sorlet air and naval 

Or'1a~ ot ~tle even in the absence!.___ ________ ___, 

Traffic analJ'eia ia a aource from which aome intorma.tion can be 

deri'!8d at. all timea and ia Ver¥ necessary in aupport.ing C/A work qn 

high-level orn>t.ographic ayat,ems. · It guides interception and aaaiata in 

the categorlB&tion and ordering ot raw traf tic and the identification ot 

cr;vpt;ographio qatems. .e 

At the tactical level, it has been tirml.T established by the expel'ierioe 

or World War II and Korea that T/A Fusion plays a baaic role in close 

support of air, aea, and land fighting units. 

Because of the Cl"Llclal impo~ca ot all information on Soviet 1ntant.iona, and our heav.depandence on T/A Fusion at the present time, ~t la 

important "bo organise our T/A Fusion effort ao aa to provide lllBXimma 

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information on a timely basis from material now being intercepted. 

this end, the Group makes the tollowing recommendations: 

~ 1. That the COMINT resulting trom T/A Fusion now being used 

I ae the main basis tor Air Detense Comnand indicators (see page 8) 

be mre e!!ective:cy quan1iitied 1ihrough the development o! indicea 

or measures or activity ot the Soviet Air Force--part.icula.rl7, 

the Long Range Air Force and the air detense system-and be 

graphical.4" presented to show changes in time. 

2. That special intensive and comprehensive studies be made 

ot the activities or the Soviet Air Forces during periods ot large 

scale exercises~ 

3.· That the T/A Fusion effort in the National Security Agency 

. be decentraJ,iz1d to some extent by establishing T/A units in 

operational areu and providing some T/A support at intercept 

stations, along lines now established by the Air Force Securi\7 

Sel"'lice. 

4. That a small. research group be established to e&1'17 out 

research and development on new methods 0~1, including 

adaptation ot certain problems to high speed machines. I • 

~ 

We also suggest that the National Securit7 AgenC)" re-examine its 

eelection, training, prof'icienc7 evaluation, and promotional procedures 

tor T/A cirtlian personnel and that modern psychometric methods be explored in connection with personnel selection procedures. Similar 

procedures should be explored tor selection, training, and proficiency 

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evaluation ot·SerV'ice personnel, and oonaideration should be given to 

the establishment ot a career service in communications intelligonce 

in the Air Force and Anq along lines which now exist in the NaVJ'. 

(See page 23) 

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SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE 

RL 86-3B/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) Ref. Appendix v·r .• 

11Special Intelligence" is\COMINT derived from decryption or high 

cryptographic systems. Potentiall.y1\it. is the most important and the most 

. reliable source of indicators of ho.stil•. intention. 

During World War II, Special Intelligence was the __ unique source ot 

advance .knowledge of the strategic p1alls 0£ the enem;r. It was 1'.he 

timeliest, most complete, and most reliable source or intelligence on 

his Order of Battle, inteQtions, and capabilities. From the end or the 

war until the swmner or 1948, intelligence or tho ea.mo qualit;y. was obtai~ed 

from thel ________________ lused b;ythe Soviet Armed~ 

Fo~ces. Radio tran~ssion or message~ enciphered in those systems has 

been prohibited since late 1948. Other high-grade systems continue, 

however, to be passed b"J radio. In view of (i) past experience with 

The Group considers that (i) 

is a matter of th~ highest priority for obtaining 

strategic wam~itg; and (ii) alt.hough the problems involved ma.y be more 

difficult than those whic!J! have been solved in the pas.t, some. widel.7 used . and important 'cryptographic systems are solvable. They rcquir~ the 

application, however, or new types or nw,chinery as well as additional ... facilities and personnel. 

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!GP 6!SR!Ji' 6J\NO:S . . . 

In particular, the follo~ring matters require inmediate attention: 

1. Continuity or Effort.: Because or the research character or 

- the high-level problems, there has been a tondenc7 to s~itt personnel to 

ether areas promising more immediate results. The potentials ot this 

source ot intelligence are so great that a tirm policy should ·-~• established 

to control and regulate the transfer of.personnel familiar with thee~ 

problems tc other activities. The atatt on these problems requires 

augmentation 'b7 several top-flight ana:J-7sts. 

2. Colll2!tat1onal SUppgrt: In spite or the fact that the 

National Securit7 Agency maintains an ext.ensive computing establiahmen~, 9' 

there is still a lack or computing facilities and skilled programmers. 

The lack ot progranmera is the most serious deficiency at the .present 

time, and the number or such persona on tbe NSA Start should be increased· 

ae promptly as practicable. In addition, the possibility of utilizing . \ 

cleared and indoctrinated personnel skilled in the art or pro~ng . ~ . ... 

who may be avail.able outside the National Security Agency should be 1~· ~ . investigated. · 1 · ,, 

.3. Electronic Developments: .. The requirements or Special · - · .. e . . . 

Intelligence in connection with high-speed computing devices are, . 

unique. In view of t.he difficult7 of maintaining a ekllled engineermg 

1tatt at the National Securit7 Agency, the possibilities of carrying , 

out electronic developnents outside the Agenc7 should be'investigatcd. 

It is the opinion of the Group that there are ma1'17 problems in connect~on 

.vi.th the development of general purpose analytic equipment 'Which remain 

to be solved. The complications or programming bear witneas to tho ract 

that the general purpose electronic computers are probably not the best 

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type of equipment for attacking these problems. Additional high~speed. 

ana]Jrtic equipment should be developed and ma.de available as needed~ 

It appears that the potentials of Special Intelligence, part.icular-17 

with regard to strategic wa.ming, warrant a research and dev,~lopment 

program or more extensive scope than is presently being carried out by 

the Rational Security Agenc7. 

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!eP - . 9Al9lj 

ELECTRONICS IITELLICDCE (EIDT) 

Ret. Appendix VIII 

ELINT-knowledge resulting.from the interception and ana]Jraia ot 

f oreiga non-conmmicationa electromagnetic rad:lations--can be used 

along with other collateral •terial in the evaluation ot COMINT inf'or-

•tion on en.av intentions, but; the degree ot coordination among the 

SerYices and with the COMIHT effort; la at present unsatistactory trom. 

a •ming etandpo:lnt. BLD'l' is based on the detection., reception., and . . 

anaqaia ot radio·~•. which do not reduce to literal tm. ELilfl' 

data concem ahiet~ the'enenr electronic reacl1neaa., but can also be 

used to provide Order of Battle information and can support. COMIHT in 

Mft7 WTS in •ming ot an impending attack. Indications in FLINT. are 

drawn from sudden changes in the density nt signals such as radar which 

may indicate ah1p, aircraft., or troop movements, and from the presence 

ot new or unusual signal.a. Radio altimetera., IFF, blind bombing,, 

nari.gation, and tire control devices produce signals or interest. Guiclecl 

missile signal.a may also be detectable. The Services now maintain ELINT 

tacilltiea in atrategical.q located points around the Soviet perimeter • 

and conduct electronic recormaiaaance m:l.asiona with ships and aircraft . . . 

1n nmu- arm.a ot the world.. 

To be tulq ettective, the important BLINT data should be available 

tor coordination with COMINT within leas than one hour, both at tiald 

lwel.a and 1n the US. COMC!lr' data should 11kew1ae be mado avo.ilable to 

ELDT agencies tor the proper direction ot their intercept e.ff'o:ts. This 

t1P8 ot continuous coordination bas proved ver,y ettective j,_"'lJ .... __ ___, 

-1~- PL 86-36/50 USC 3q05 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

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forces, where ELINT, COMINT, and other intelligence sources are closel.1' 

combined at all levels from field operations to finished intelligence_ 

EI.INT facilities are now equipped to report. their results bJ electrical 

conmunica~ion; but, as in the case or many other intelligence: sources, . . . -.. 

the speed of communication depends on the training and instruction of 

field personnel and on a continuous direction of their efforts to obtain 

the types of information which are desired. 

ELINT facilities which are in operation or planned b7 the Services 

c;over most of the usable areas at present. Deficiencies in the EI.INT 

program· from the waming standpoint are: 

1. There is inadequate control of ELINT operations. ELINT work 

within each theater of operations shou~d be centrally directed on·'.a basis 

of adequate, all-source intelligence so that the maximum amount ot.usei"ul. 

intormation could be received. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

2. The channels by which Et.INT information is reported a~e 

tailgled and in many cases too slow for the delivery of short term warnings. 

3. The evaluation of ELINT information which would applY" to long 

term wamings is divided within the US between an Air Force Activit7 and 

a joint Al"D\Y-Navy Electronic Evaluation Group (ANEEG). The .exchange ot 

intormation between these groups imposes a needless delay on any wanting 

which comes from detailed evaluation. 

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!eP B8eftlft' 6AN61 . 

../ ./ 

5. ELINT equipnent naw in use is inadequate in many respects. 

6. Present ELI~ operations do not take advantage or the possibilities ot "anomalous" propagation mechanism which can be predicted trom 

geography', weather and ionosp~-ere measurements. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

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'J:OP 86SRSI' 6kN0B 

RESEARCH AND DEVEIDPMENT 

In addition to -the obviously needed research and development toward 

better cryptanalJ'sis and more effective traffic analysis, there is a need 

tor basic research on. the theory or communication intelligence and tor the 

development or methods and equipments which wi.U permit the most efficient 

exploitation or the theoretical potential or the field. 

In particular, ,the entire concept Gf military, diplomatic, and commercial 

communication must be examined to reveal those aspects or the communication 

networks which are most susceptible to communication intelligence activities 

and to relate the value or intelligence gained through exploitation or these 

aspects to the coi!t of ~itation and to the coat to the·~....,. of securl.t;r~ 

measures which would reduce their vulnerabilit:y. In brier, our eventual 

COMINT activit:y should be aimed at the transmissions which an enemy must 

- subject to our scrutiny in order to ca1"1'7 out his own operations. .In the 

absence ot the general theoretical research which is needed, it is possible 

to conjecture that developments along some or the following lines will prove 

Taluable in tuture COMINT operations: 

(i) Antenna s;ystems and integral receiving facilities to permit 

intercept operators to determine the direc..ticm or arrival or a signal 

~tely' at the time ot its reception without reliance on a separate 

direction tinder and intermediate coDIJlUllications system. Multiple unit 

antenna.a should be considered tor this function. - (11) ·Repeaters, receive.rs, antenna s:ystems, and techniques to 

improve the range and qualit1 ot communication signal reception at .trequenciea above 30 me. 

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(iii) Equipments tor better utilliation o:! immediate. aetion 'voice. 

/ 

commun~~tions, including ~ter-receivers, better ~udio recording machiner.r, 

automatic time registering devices, better techniques of receiving and 

coJ)1ing this tratric, and, eventually, aut.o•tic senantic processing · 

equipnent tor use in trattic analysis and in recovery of brevity codes. 

(iv) Equipments tor reception of noise modulated communication 

signals (such as those represented in the NOMAC system development under 

/ Project LINCOLN) . PL86~39/~0 USG.3605 

• . EO 3.3(h)(2) 

. ( v) :Equipments tor. detection and reception otl • 

/pulse, and trequenc;y di~persalco:rrmunication s;ystems. 

(vi) Installation and use ot pro~gation measuring equipment to 

permit m:>re efficient direction or intercept ettort.. 

(vii) Inverse LORAN., or other position measuring devices to 

produce position data on transmitters. 

(viii) Continued d~elopment ot demultiplexing,J ______ land 

precision recording devices tor use in breaking out messages sent over . 

· multiplex and I phannele. 

(ix) Continued development of fingerprinting devices tor tr.an~ 

mittera and operators, both voice and Morse. 

There are definite indications that the USSR will. use VHF for ~irborne 

COJlllll1D'licat1ons. The extension ot microwave networks within the Soviet ... "'· 

Union is in progress. Interception ot these types of communications . . 

presente an extremel.7 complex problem. Studies should be initiated to 

de~~nnine possible met.hods of solution. 

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'1'0P S!SRB'f 01'NOE 

PERSONNEL 

Rer. Appendix "!" 

Tbroughout all discussions and brietings ll1 1fhich the Group has 

pa.rlicipated, no single problem has been more wideq discussed than that 

or improving the quality and proticienc1 or personnel now engaged in ~he 

COMINT ettort. The attention or the Group has been especia117 drawn to 

personnel problems related to three important groups: research ~d 

development p~raonnel, anal:rtic personnel, and interception personnel. 

The following comments are confined prima.riq to problems relating to these 

groups. 

The success or ~he National Securit7 Agency in research and development activit1 needed to keep pace with COMINT requirements will depend very 

largely on the quality or research and development personnel which can be 

engaged in the ertorl. At the present time 1 the salary scale at NSA is not 

adequate to compete with industl'J", nor are the working conditions l!lld 

scien~itic prestige factors sufficient at NSA to compete with universities. 

Establishment or mre high level positions and opporlunities .tor advancement 

ina7 help correct the situat.ion; but other measures should be explored, such 

as borrowing scientists and engineers from industry and universities tor 

limited periods or timee- A good part ot the developnent needs of RSA can 

probably be met through contract a; but, even so, NSA must have a strong 

core ot research and dnelopment personnel to do the research and to 

recognise and formulate requirements tor equipment, machines, etc. 

The second crucial group ot COMINT personnel are the analysts: cr,yptanal.1'sts and tratfic analysts, or NSA and the Services. The civilian 

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coinponents or these groups provide the basic continuity or analytic ettort. 

The principal problem. racing NSA and The Sertices as.tar as this group 

is concerned is that or attracting and recruiting highly competent personnel. 

The·Group is of the opinion that NSA would do well to re-examine its recruitJDent, selection, training, and proficiency eVa.luation procedures tor ~l.7sts. 

In order to attract the interest or prospective analysts, the present 

recruitment policy ot NSA should be restudied in the light or realistic 

aecurit7 limitations. The use ot modem p17Cho~ric methods in close 

cooperation with leading NSA anal.Tata can be expected to improve the selection procedures. The problem. or holding . good ana~sts dep~ds to a larg. 

ext.ant on a sound salaey and promtion polic7. Such a policy will also 

provide ef'tectiva supervisoey personnel. The Gr0up questions whether 

aalar.r and promotion policy in NSA is as favorable t~ a sound development 

of' T/A attorli as it is in the case or C/A, especially in view o.t our 

present heav,y dependence on COMINT derived from T/A. 

The third important group of personnel in the COMINT ettorli are the 

intercept operators, who at present are almost entirely' military. The 

main probl• conceming this group is that created b;y the usual enlistm~ 

and rotation policies. These policies do not permit the intercept 

operator time to build up enough familiarity with the material intercepted at hia site to be ettectiva in interpreting and r~cognizing the 

eigniticance ot it. This situation is highly' relevant to the problem 

ot picking up clues ot an impending attack. The Group suggests that, 

partiall.7 to meet this ditticult;y, ~onsideration be given to the 

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establishment or a serV"ice career in COMINT to encourage longer periods l 

of service. such a plan not only would help solve some or the inte1· ... dpt ~ 

opera~or difficulties but also would provide highly qualified officers 

tor auperrlsion. Consideration should also be given to the provision 

ot some analytic support. at the intercept site either b)" indoctrination 

ot intercept personnel with rudiments or cryptanalysis and traffic 

analysis, or b)" assignment or an analy'st to the site. 

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'feP S~ SMleB 

I - THE SPECIAL STUDY.GROUP 

In its meeting ot 11-12 June 1953, the National Security Agency 

Scientific Adviaol")" Board (NSASAB) discuss9d the problem ot evaluating 

the contribution which COMINT can or could ~ke to the waming of an 

impending attack on the us. The Board raised the question or whether 

the Director, NSA, might consider it desirable to request the Advisorr 

Board to inaugurate a atudT ot this problem. 

In a letter or 26 June 1953 to Pro.fe~aor stewart S. Caift!a, Chairman 

or the NSASAB, ~i~·enant General Ralph J. Canine, Director, NSA, made 

the .. following statement: 

"M;r purpose or writing you now is to indicate not only that 

I would veey much like to have the Board undertake such a st~ 

but also that I hope it could be initiated at once and will be 

glad to place immediately at the disposal ot the Board whatever 

facilities, personnel and records the Board d~ems necessary' or 

uaetul tor conducting the study and f'or producing the final. 

report thereon as soon as practicable~" 

General Canine suggested that Dr. H. P. Robertson serve-as 

Chairman or the Special Study Group. 

The following individuals comprise the membership or the Group: 

*Dr. H, P. Robertson, Prof'essor of' Mathematical Physics,, Calif'omia Institute of' Technology, Chairman 

*Dr. Samuel S. Wilks, Prof\,;ssor ot ~thematical Statistics,, 

Princeton Un~versit7 

······~ 

'llf>r. Howard T. Engstrom, Vice:President, Remino!J'ton-Rand Corporation 

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Dr. Richard c. Raymond, Member, Electronics Division, Rand 

Corporation 

*Mr. John C. McPherson,, Vice-President, IntematiQnal Business 

Machines Corpo:r.a.tion 

Mr. M. Dean Post,. Start Assistant, Assistant Secretaey of Defense 

tor Research1and Development 

Hr. Charles s. Weaver, start Assistant, Assistant Secretar.y; ot 

Defense for Research and· Development · 

fn.ose marked with an a~erhk. a~e members of the. NSASA~ . 

Th• Group was assisted b,w Mr. William F. Friedman, Executive Sec~&'Jl'T 

ot the lfSAS~, his assistant.., l/Lt. Irving T. McDonald, Jr., USAF, allfl • 

Misa Caro.lyn J. Fox. 

On several occasions, tbs- Group received special assistance from 

the following persons: 

Mr. Ra1ph L. Clark, CIA 

RADM William Goggins, USN (Ret. ) , ERA 

Capt. Wilfred J. ib-lmes, USN (Ret.) 

Col. James L. Weeks.,. USAF, NSA 

Col. Gordon W. Wihtes, USAF, USAFSS 

In the drafting or the Report, valuable assistance was ·rendered: tJaeGroup b7 Professor s. s. CaiJl"l'1'S., Mr. J. z. Millar, Dr. L. T. E. Thompson. 

&11 ot tktr NSASAB. 

AGENDA OF ACTIVITDJS OF SPECIAL STUDY GROUP 

Waslld11glon, D. c. 

Aasel.T or Group for <HRMsion and planning proposed activities 

et Group... 

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28 Jpll 195l 

Washingt.on, D.C. 

Briefing on role or intelligence 

in US air defense Sl'st~. 

29 Julz 1953 

Directorate ot Intelligence, 

Headquart.ers, USAF 

Brooks Air Force Base, San Antonio, ·Texas 

Sumna.17 or COMINT capability 

to provide advance wanting. 

USAFSS Organization and Operations 

Tratfic Analysis 

USAFSS ELINT program 

Intelligence Requirements and 

Dissemination 

Communications 

lO July 19SJ 

Commander, USAFSS 

Deput7 Chier of start/ 

Operations 1 USAFSS 

Analysis Control Division, 

USAFSS 

Chief, Implementa~ion Division, 

USAFSS 

Chier, Current Reporting and 

Requirements Branch, USAFSS 

Command Communications Office, 

USAFSS 

Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado 

PhiloaophJ' of intelligence 

requirements tor air detense 

Smnma.17 or air defense of 

continental US 

Mission, operations, and 

capabilities o:f anti-airorart 

weapons systems. · 

DiaCllssion of intelligence 

indicators system 

_,_ 

Directorate of Intelligence, ADC . 

Directorate of Intelligence, 

ADC 

.Anv Anti-Aircraft Command 

Director of Intelligence, 

ADO 

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Offutt Air.Force Base, Omaha, Nebrask& 

Discussion of COMINT and 

collateral intelligence 

Location and identification 

ot targets 

PhiloaophJ' or intelligence. 

!'flquirementa tor strategic 

operat.iona 

Commmtf cationa 

Director of Intelligence, SAC . 

Target Jhterials Division,· 

Directorate or Intelligence, 

SAC 

Air Estimates Division, 

Directorate of Intelligence, SAC . 

Director or Communications, • 

SAC 

Headquart.era, Central Air Defense Force, Kansas Cit7, Missouri 

The role or COMINT in the 

Korean war 

l Augast 1953 

Wash:lngf,on, D.c. 

Commander, Centrai Air 

Detense Force 

General discussion session of Group to plan future activities. 

4 l.!pst 1953 

Was~, n.c. 

Discussion ot COMINT 

capabilit.ies and potentiali.'U.es 

I 

S Avpst 1953 

Washington, n.c. 

CIA 

Indirlaal studies b7 member& ot the Group on specific problems. 

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6 Ausuat 195] 

Washington, D.c. 

0rpn111ai1on and function 

of t.he Watch Conmd.ttee 

Discueaion ot COMINT act1Yitiea 

or the us NaT7 

7 August 195] 

Washington, D.c. 

Special Research Branch, 

0-2, Department of the AntlT 

Operational Intelligence Section, DepaJ'l;aant ot the 

•v 

• General diacueaion ~d plann:lni aeaaion of Group. 

1-10 September 19Sl 

Washington, D.C. · 

General eeaalon ot Group tor further studies and preparation ot r9port. 

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II - THI THREAT 

The Soviet Union baa at present the capabilit7 to ~1D'lch an ettactiTe 

large scale atomic air attack against the North Alllerican continent and, in 

particular,, against all mjor targets within the US, including population 

and industrial centers and milital7 bases. The agnitude of the Sorlet 

threat through 19SS will not be govemecl by their del1Y9r.r qstems but; 

rather by the size of their atomic stockpile and,· further, by that P,rtion 

ot the stockpile which thq would allocate tor use against targets in the us. 

In addition,, the :magnitude of the threat would increase it the Sorlets 

realize their capabilit7 ot developing BW agents which might be empl07ed 

in a large scale air attack against the US. . . 

Wea non a 

The Joint Atomic Enera Intelligence Conlld.ttee estimates that ~he 

Soriet atomic stockpile in mid-1953 would contain apprmd.mateq 120 atomic 

'weapons. Accordingl.7, they estimate that this atockpile will increase to 

aj>proxi-.te}T 300 b7 1955. However, in view of tt)e uncert;aint7 oonceming 

the production of tiasionab~~ materials, the n~i'mbar ot atomic weapons 1 ET 

be aa low aa 200 or as high as 600. 

Apart from. the tact ~hat the Sorleta conducted a thermmmclaar test . .. ... • (' . ~ ! • 

in August 19~3,, t,~are ia no intelligence :lntomi.tion which would indicate 

that the Sorleta are ·a~ckpiling weapons of this t1J19. 

DeliTel'l Sntmm 

The SoTiet ·Long Range Air Poree baa at its diapoaal approxiatel.7 1000 

..U.• bombers ot the 'l'U-11. tJP8 (US B-29) whieb are· capable . or reaching 

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all targets in the US on a one-way mission from bases in the USSR. B7' 

1955, the number or available TU-41s will increase to about 1100. Furliber, 

it is believed that, by 1955, this force will be augmented by approximate]T 

180 heaVJ' bombers having twice the range ot the TU-4. These hea'VJ' bombers 

will most likel.7 be capable of reaching all targets within the US.t'rom. Soviet 

bases on a t.wo-lfB.7 mission carrying atomic weapons. _ 

Employment of long range aircratt is the most ~ike]T means at the 

SoYiet 1 a disposal or carrying out a. mass attack on the us. Thq do have e· 

the capability of developing guided missiles or the V-1 type carrying an 

atomic warhead and launching them against coastal targets from submarines 

or sur~ace vessels. In considering the Soviet air threat to the continental 

US such a possibility cannot be overlooked. In part;icular, in the case of 

a surprise attack, it would appear that they would use all the means at 

,; their disposal to make the in'-tial strike as devastating as possible. 

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III - NORTH AMERICAN CONTINENTAI~ AIR DEFENSE 

Active defense forces parl;icipating in the air defense of the Nort.b 

American continent include the United States Air Defense Command, the 

Royal Canadian Air Force Air Defense.Command, and the Alaskan Air Defense 

Command. These forces function as independent commands and not as one 

integrated air defense system. 

Advance waming is the first essential element tor an effective 

air defense s1stem. Recent M !:!2£ Committees which studied the 

continental air defense problem for the National Security Council and 

the Secretary or Defense have noted, without exception, the tremendous 

value of more complete intelligence to provide advance warning and the 

potential impact or such waming on continental defense. 

The Group feels that, if intelligence could effectively and reliabl.7 

give a warning or 3 to 6 days or an impending attack on our nation, the 

. significance would be of tremendous magnitude. In f'act, waming of this 

nature would permit mobilization which, if known to the eneiq, might 

induce him to cease his preparations for an attack. 

Some notion of the value of such warning can be gained rroa the 

data in the accompanying table which have been obtained from Armed Forces 

estimates. 

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'!!GP 8~RW-r GMJO! 

WaminR Time 

J)qa: 3 to 6 

Roura: 6 

6 

5 to 8 

4 

3 to 4 

l 

Significance of Early WA.ming 

Significance 

Would pennit full scale deployment of SAC Forces for an 

immediate counterattack. 

Approximately" 90% of all serviceable SAC aircraft can be 

dispersed. 

Approximately" 100% of Naval Forces in commission in 

harbor can be dispersed. 

Between 600 and 1000 interceptors could be made available to ADC from other units. 

Approximately 90% of merchant vessels in commission in 

harbor can be dispersed. 

Approximately 50% of Naval Forces in commission in 

harbors c&.n be dispersed. 

ApproxiJM.te]Jr 50% of serviceable SAC aircraft can be 

dispersed. 

Most all civil air traffic can be grounded. 

Navigation aids CRO be turned orr. 

Air Defense Connn~nd can commit all serviceable ADC 

interceptors. . Civilian casualties reduced by about 50%. 

At present., warning is p1•ovided by radar and 'ground observers. The 

United States Air Force is now operating 71 radars in the US and southern 

Canada which perform surveillance and control functions. The radar 

network gives about 30 minutes warning for US perimeter targets on large 

aircraft of the B-29 type !lying between 10.,000 and J0,000 feet.· The 

ground observers corps is at present the only errectiva means of detecting 

low fl7in~ aircraft (below 5000 feet). However, thus far it has not been 

possible to make reliable use or the ground obsEtrvertt. 

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Available weapons consist or fighters and antiaircraft artiller.r• 

At present, Air Detense Cormnand has 53 intercept.or squadrons based in the 

us of which 15% have all-weather capability. orrensive armrunent tor th~se 

aircraft consists in fixed forward !iring aircratt. guris. Anti-aircraft 

weapons are deployed to assist in the defense or 22 critical targets 

in the US. There are a total of 57 AAA battalions in place which include 

52 gun battalions (90 nun and 120 nm) and S automatic weapons battalions 

(40 mm). 

OUr present air defense system has a kill probability or between 0 

and 15% depending ~pon the pattem or attack .. 

Present planned programs are geareCi to reach maximum ertectivenesa 

b7 the end of 195.5. The present radar network will be augmented with 

additional equipment to eliminate perimeter gap$. In addition, an earl.J' 

waming line is planned which would extend from Alaska down the Alaskan 

highwa.7 and across Canada appl"QXimatel.y at the 54th parallel to th9 Hudson 

Ba71 thence across Quebec to the Atlantic Ocean. Extensions or this 

a7atem are planned.. in both the Atlant~c ~nd Pacific Oceans tor. approximate:cy 

500 miles . using . picket ships. and airborne ea:rly wa.ming aircr&f't. . In 

addition, an early warning line may be established in the tar north as 

reconmended by Project LINCOLN. By 1955, the air defense weapons system 

will be greatly improved and strengthened. It is planned that the tighter 

forces will be increased to 57 squadrons (25 aircraft; per squadron) ot 

all-weather fighters equipped with collision course fired rockets and based 

in the US. Antiaircraft point defenses will be greatly strengthened by 

converting a number or the gun battalions with NIKE guided missil,~s.. By the 

end or 1955, antiaircraft defenses will include 20 gun battalions, 42 NIKE 

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battalions, and 14 Sky-sweeper auto11V:1.tic weapons battalions deployed to 

assist in the defense or 22 critical targets. 

As noted in the statement of the thr!_,at~ . ..(Appendix II), the Soviet-& 

have the capability ot developing V-1 type missiles careying atomic 

warheads and launching them trom surface vessels and/or submarines against. 

coastal targets. Our most effective means to counter such an attack is· to 

locate and destroy the launching vessels. Detection at p~esent is 

accomplished by radar, Sonar, or visual:t all of which have definite range 

limitations. A shore-based sound surveillance system is now being ~ 

evaluated. which will give appr0xim:1te position data on engine driven 

vessels cruising at nornal speed at ranges up to 300 miles. A network 

baaed on this type of equipment planned to be operational in the 1956-58 

period will greatly increase our capability in countering such an attack. 

With these improvements, minimum available warning time is expected 

to. be increased. to 2 hours or more tor perimeter targets, and the r;a;rstem 

aa a whole should provide kill probability or approximately 50% under all 

weather conditions. As an d.tder of magnitude, the funding required. ove. 

the next. several 7ears to attain our presently planned air detense 87st•. 

w:l.11 be at the rate or approximately' $5 billion per ;rear. Cumulative 

investment through FI l 96o will be about $40 billion. The number of 

lull-time active service personnel will increase from approximately 

1201 000 at present to approximate11' 1801 000 by 1957. 

In reviewing our present and planned active air defense systems 

ettectiveness in conjunction with intelligence, it can only be concluded 

that the Soviet threat is increasing to the extent that the nwnber or 

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atomic bombs which they can put on a target b:y the end or 1955 will t-.;J 

the same as, or greater than, the number which they could ei'tectivel,y 

deliver today even with the increased. air: defense capabilit.7 outlined 

above • 

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'feP SB0R:IR 0AN0B 

IV - INDICATOR SYSTEMS 

The nature or the threat has been stated in Appendix II, which 

describes the area ot capability or the USSR. These facts are available 

trom examination or intelligence. The all-important unanswered question 

remaining is the time such an attack will be executed. The onl1' means 

ot obtaining strategic waming is through intelligence. 

For this purpose, various indicator s7stmns have been organized in 

an etrort. to predict Soviet intentions. The systems most relevant to 

Continental Air Defense.are those of the Watch Committee and Air Defense 

Command. 

The Air Defense Command has established an indications s7stem using 

a graphic displa7 to assist in the orderly evaluation ot indications ot. .. .. 

hostile air attack on the US. The Watch Conmittee maintains a continuous 

indications evaluation of all events world-wide which bear on the imminence 

ot general hostilities and related world events. It receives cont;ibutions 

trom all pert.inent and competent Government agencies. The group consists 

• ot part-time personnel, meets ~weekl.7, .and utilizes no ronnal set or o I I Io :· o o I I,: 1 ' ··_.:,.:'I ,: 1 

1 

1

.. 1 o o 

indicators in evaluating Soviet intentions. 

T.!1.!. mofi serious deficiency ,or el] \bl ipdipa.tg;c ~..J.11-tlae 

lack of' coord~tion and exchagge or in~g!!J!ltio.n on a ttmely b!si'!! The 

existence of such separate but related etf'orte,, as presently constituted, 

throughout the worlc:l involves much duplication or the evaluation ettort.-

in mar17 cases by people not tull.y competent and with divergent results. 

Indications ettorlis as now organized are producing results less reliable 

·-"!. 

· ..... 

than the securit7 or the nation requires and the commanders concerned deserve. 

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· Th~ coordination, standardization and systematic inter-relationship 

of this effort wo~ld overcome man,Y of the present shortcomings, pa.rt.icularl.T 

trom the standpoint of t.he Air Defense Command. It is believed tQit a small .-·~ . ~ 

_gr.oup !~~~~rea~~~eJlr!!l!llt_~g -~h~ Ir\te_lligence _M!i~ory Comnn.~ee, 

- operating on a full-time basis ( 24 hours a day), and responsible for the 

over-all coordination and direction of related indications systems. More ,,. 

ettect~-utilization of intelligence can be achieved only.by such_ central 

coordination and direction. In part.icular, the following are some or the 

principles which are believed essential: 

(i) An agreed list or indicators and sub-indicators world-wide 

in scope. 

(ii) Assignment of indicators tor evaluation to specific participa.ting agencies or sub-agencies according to primaCJ" of interest or 

competence. 

(iii) Provision to furnish these same agencies with indications 

evaluation on all other indicators which are pertinent to th~ir own 

warning problem but for which they do not have primacy of interest 

or .full competence in evaluation. 

(iv) Timel.¥, secure, and dependable conmunications. 

(v) Standardized methodology and display systems, more etrectivel.1' 

quantified through the development or indices or measur~s of activities, 

graphically presented to show changes in ti.me. 

(vi) Formulation of nonnative en~ plans against which the 

imminence or hostilities can be measured. 

Additionally, it is part.icularly important that this group be kept 

informed on milital"1'. and political maneuvers of the US which could produ~e 

Soviet reactions that might otherwise be misinterpreted. 
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Care 1D1st be exercised that our evaluation or indications'~ tocu~z"ld . . 

on ~gniticant actions which the en!5'.must take in preparing tor particular 

... milita1"1' operations. For this purpose., it will be necessar,y to develop what 

we consider to be the probable steps the Soviet Union will take prior to 

the initiation or hostilities, and a time span for each step. An excellent 

initial step in the development or this kind or methodology is contained in 

the ADC Intelligence Staff Report, "USSR Attack Planning Plan." 

The Canadian Government has an active interest in the problem or stra9 tegic waming of an attack on North .America. There is at present under 

preparation, in the Joint Intelligence Bureau, an all-source report on a 

"Surprise Attack on North America," to which the Conmrunications Research 

Branch has contributed on the COMINT aspects. Discussion with the Director, 

CRB, has indicated that these conclusions, based upon traffic analysis., 

plain text and presently exPioitable codes and ciphers, are consistent with 

those arrived at in this Report.. 

In the United Kingdom., the Joint Intelligence Committee has prepared 

.e an evaluation ot an over-all indications system, on an all-sourc.e basis. 

In briet, this study'·describe~ .a :few, selected indicators asso-ciated with· 

specific types or activities and indicates the probability ot obtaining 

intonation through overt., covert., and COMINT sources. 

Significant improvement or our indications systems can be achieved by 

closer coordination with both British and Canadian eff'ort.s. We strongly 

believe that it will not be possible to effect such coordination until a 

coherent indications system has been firmly established in the US. 

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V - COMMUNICATIONS 

Timely warning or impending air attack depends greatly upon rapid, 

accurate communications. 

Rapid electrical communication facilities s·erve the COMINT 

organization in three general way-s: 

(i) Delivery of intelligence information. 

(ii) Collection or raw intercept material. 

(iii) Intra-station exchange or technical material. 

We are interested in the first two functions. 

The communication process is gerierally considered to include 

everything between ~he handing or a message to the message center and 

· the handing of the message to the desiEinated recipient. Thus, the time 

tor handling a message includes: encryption, routing, transmission, 

decryption, reproduction and messenger service. The alacrity with which 

'· 

the procees is performed is determined b7 the precedence set by th' 

originator. 'nle highest precedence is assigned to a FLASH message, 

' .......... 

which is handled before all others except those or the same precedence. 

Delivery or I~t~llige~~e Into:nnation 

An item of intelligence infonnation worthy of FLASH or other high 

precedence designation may originate at any or the tollowing places: 

Intercept station 

Field cODDDand evaluation group - field analysis group 

Central evaluation group - central analysis group 

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At present, such a dispatch can be delivered to the most distant 

addressee within one hour. Where extra-continental circuits are not 

involved, the time ma.7 be less than ten minutes. It is the ·opinion 

ot the Group that these times are adequate. 

Collection of Raw Intercept Material 

The recovery or the recognition of an important item or· intelligence 

intormation 111a7 occur at stations to which raw intercept material is 

transmitted. There are two or these: the field .command evaluation group -

tield analy'sis group and the central evaluation group - central anal.ysie 

group. At present, all the locally intercepted raw material is sent to 

the allied field group. About 20% is selected for electrical transmission \ . 

to the central group in the US, the remainder being delivered by courier. 

The tield group recei-ves its material in about 30 minutes and the cent.ral 

anal.7ais group in one to five hours. These times are considered to be 

adequate. 

Discussion 

We have examined the present communication s7stem used tor COMIRT 

and have been shown the proposed improvements which are to be made. The 

present channels, both overseas and continental land lines1 seem to be 

fairly adequate tor their purpose. Certain contemplated improvements, such 

_aa automatic switching and on-line encryption, will provide more expeditious 

handling or traffic through relay centers. We have not been shown any 

detailed time studies or traf'tic dela7s but presume th97 are available. 

Ettorlis to route overseas traffic through the best possible routes seem 

to have been made. Two channels on North Atlantic cables are now available 

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to the Department o.f ~erense on an irmnediate call-up basis; and,, in 

addition, an eight channel trans-Atlantic cable will be installed in 

about two years for exclusive use of Oefense comnunications. At present, 

some 245,000 groups per day are being handled by electrical communications. 

While this is a creditable performance, some imp~vements are still to be 

made. 

Technical imErovements 

Among the technical improvements which are !easible may be included: 

better and faster encryption devices, higher transmitting speeds, and more 

efficient utilization of radio frequencies and land line facilities. 

We have been informed that newer and better cryptographic techniques 

are contemplated which will provide fast and secure on-line operation. 

Some considerable reduction can be made in the actual transit time 

of high precedence and of other traffic by adopting at a future date some 

ot the principles and methods now available. Among these may be DJ.E;ntioned 

those reported by the Programs Research Unit of the Johns Hopkins University 

conceming this subject. 'J:l These methods which are applicable b~th :to radio 

and land line communication. chann~ls propose the utilization of the available 

band widths or present cormnunication channels to increase the speeds ot 

transmission some 10 to 40 times those currently in use. 

Methods or determining the most effective radio frequenc7 to use at 

a given time have been published. The back-scatter measurement technique 

is a. notable example. The use or this method alone should provide 

additional assurance that an early we.ming message will move with the 

Ll• PRU14S to DMR 

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mini111U11l delay. Furt:;hennore, it offers the possibility that a frequency 

can be chosen which will be least susceptible to enenw jamming. A 

careful study of this subject ~eems to be indicated as a possible means 

or maintaining the required continuity of overseas communications'\ St.udy 

should also be given to a method of pooling all available radio !requencieswith assignments to individual stations on an immediate basis to me~t. 

ionospheric conditions. 

Operational Imrarovement: \ I 

Time studies should be continued with a view to reduct.ion ot pro~ 

times in message centers. Training programs to implement the indicated 

improvements should be pressed vigorously. In particular,, the delive17 

or messages to their recipients should receive careful attention. Our 

information is that considerable time can be saved here. 

Ca.retul consideration should be given to (i) the matter of delegation, 

or authority to intercept and analysis-evaluation groups to origin~te 

urgent intelligence messages,, (ii) the sort or material for which they should 

watch, and (iii) the address·ees to whom the information should be sent. -

Timel.7 waming of ene!J\Y attack is more likely to come from units nearest. 

to the intercept station. 

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VI - TRAFFIC ANALYSIS, LOW-LEVEL ~ODFS AND CIPHERS, AND PLAIN TEXT 

General Remarks 

Traffic Analysis (T/A) is a methodology by which COMINT is derived trom 

the anai,sis or traffic vol~e•, operator chatter, and message externals. 

The COMINT derived from T/A is collated with that recovered f'rom low-level 

codes and ciphers, plain text. messages, and voice conmunications in an 

operation known as "T/A Fusion". Since late 1948~ we have been forced to 

·rel.Jr on information obtained by T/A Fusion for almost all COMINT on the 

Soviet Armed Forces (see Appendix VI~). 

COMINT Now Produced. from these Sources 

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ot units ot the SoYiet Long Range Air Force. From the same source we 

have leamed something also .a.bout bombing accuracy and aerial gurme?7 

effectiYeness or C~rtain of "ttte units. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

E03.3(h)(2) 

A variety of items of -economic and military intelligence,, too 

numerous to list here, is constantl.7 being produced by.T/A and coianerekl 

plain text messages. 

Pinal.17,, it should be emphasized that the experience ·or World War lt 

and ot Korea established th~ tactical neceasit7 or analysis and read~ di 

low-level codes and ciphers and plain language transmissions tor close 

support of A1"1DJ1 Nav, and Air Poree fighting units, irrespective of the 

degree of our crn>tanalyt,ic suocess with high-level s7stems. Whatever 

capability the T/A Fuai~n operation attains in peacetime, it will have 

indispensable value in wartime,, when properl.7 deployed. 

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Possibilities of ImEroving COMINT from these Sources 

1. Improving Sources of Material for TLA: Adequate direction tinders 

in con.1unction with intercept operations can save much valuable time and 

allow better evaluation or traffic. Present direction ·tinders are often 

separated b7 as mu.ch as 100 miles trom the intercept station and the two 

units not connected with secure lines. These efforts should be co-located so 

that D/F data would be at the intercept operator's hand, or intercept and D/F 

stations should be connected by direct and rapid ~elephone communication. 

Alternativel.71 a secure and rapid communi·cation service should be provided •. 

' 

Even such meager efforts as obtaining one line or direction and transmitting 

the intormation promptly to the intercept center would save mch intercept 

time. D/F operations in the field are not well coordin&tad. Better training 

or officers in D/F is required; current training is much too brier tor the of> 

import;ance or the subject~ 

Similar remarks appJ.¥ to another important s~urce of supportll)g evidence 

tor T/A, namely, procedures tor identification or transmitters and operators. 

.• EI.INT has a potenti&lity as a source or supporting evidence tor T/A which is 

7et to be ·tulii developed ~nd ·exploited. (see Appendix VIII). 

2. Increa:sing T/A's Cnntrjbntinn to Iod1Mtnrs: At the present time. 

almost all or the infomation underlying the direct indicators or the 

imminence or war as developed by the Air Defense Command arid the Air Force 

Directorate or Intelligence is obtained through T/A Fusion. Yet. in the case· 

ot some ot these indicators,, the COMINT is rather coarse and roughly used. 

?r.ere is a need tor doing a better job or quantifying some or the information. 

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' . This is eapecial]Jr true or information conceming the activities of the 

Soviet Long Range Air Force and ot the tighter detense system. Consideration 

should be given to the construction ot measures of' amount or activit7 ot 

various t11>911. These meas_urea or indices should be plotted again~t time 

to show rates ot change ot actirlt7, rates of' change of' build-ups or various 

kinda, etc. The7 should be constructed by analysts who have intimate 

~owledga of' the material underlying th•. 

The possibilities ot machine methods in this work d~serve careful atuq. 

3. Uae or T/A Fusion Sources f'or Constructing Pattem of Soviet Wax~:· 

neuYera: It is axio•tic in milita1"7 intelligence that the potential eneJq"1 a 

training exercises provide the moat important source of' 1.ntorma.tion on hie 

abilit7 to use his military machine. Our chief access to such information 011 

the Soviet Armed Forces is through COMINT. It becomes important, therefore, to 

1ntensif7 our interception and T/A ef'tort during Soviet maneuvers in order to 

build up as complete a picture as possible. To the extent to whicb a pa~ of 

exercises could be used as a ti.ine to launch an aerial attack against. the US, it .. is important to construct an ace~rate pattem or the beharior or the SoTW'°ng 

Range Ai~ Force. This would entail special intensive studies based on T/A and 

low-level traffic. 

4. The Deployment ot AnalUic Effort: The Problem of Timeliness: Hera 

'" consider the problem of deriving through COMINT and utilizing a pre-radar' 

. waming ot an impending attack against the US during a period in which we are 

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There are three distinct phases to this problem. The tirs'lo phase ,;.s to· 

pick up t.he clue or clues or an impending attack. This depends on the 

capabilities or our interception 97stem--the men and equipment at the intercept stations. It the cl~es are contained somewhere in intercepted material, 

then the second phase is to recognize them at some stage in the processing of 

the material. The third p~e is to transmit the 1ntomation recognized as 

the clue to those responsible tor the air defense of the US in time to take 

action. 

This is obviously- a precarious chain of events and nc;>ne bu'lo the naive 

and toolhard)" would claim. that the tipoff would, with 100% certainty, be 

diacoYered, transmitted, and acted upon in time to take effective action. 

Yet we must be realistic and consider.what practical steps might be taken to 

increase the chance or success. Here we comment especial~ on the aspects 

ot the situation conceming T/A, voice tratf'ic, and information t'rom low-level 

qstems. It the clue is contained in one or several ••sages inte~epted. 

at a given site and if' the significance or such a clue can· be recognized b)" 

e the interceptor or by an analyst 1 it is obvious that we should increase the 

chance ot recognising it at the intercept station. This argu-es tor the 

desirability or assigning an analyst or two to each intercept station to work 

closeJ.7 with the intercept operators. Such a situation now exists at some 

stations, part.icularly in the case of the intercept squadrons operated. b7 AFSS. 

It the clue ia more dif'tuse and must be Bitted from intercepted material 

from a given geographical area, this argues for the establishment of forward 

anal.7sis units b7 geographical areas which would perform analysis on intercept. 

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material trorn the area, incorporating into their ana]Jrsis material alrea'di 

aununarized by the intercept stations, which would make use or D/F, RFP, ELINT, 

and &llJ' other relevant data. For example, in the case of AFSS, the 6920th 

Securit7 Group in Japan and the 60loth Security Group in Gel'fJ'Jall7 perform 

aucb·a !unction. 

Under such a s;vat• or deployment or analytic ef'torli, the main r.rction 

ot the Hea.dquart.ere analysis units 'Would be 'to. ca~ey out deeper analy-S'is .and 

develop COMINT or more long nmse value. In order to build up and maiuta.in 

an adequate and sensitive background tor anal)"sts against which to in\•rp• 

intercept.ad material at the intercept, and area levels 1 there woulCl Jila,ve to be 

a constant feed.back or COMINT reports as well as report.a baaed on collateral 

intelligence. Some rotation or personnel through the system would be neoessa17 

to keep it sensitive. 

In wartime, a deployment ot analytic ettorli along the lines indicat.ed 

aboTe would form the basis or a tactical COMINT system to support the t.heat.er 

commanders. The necessity for a deployment of this tJPe baa been clea.rl.7 

indicated by the experience of World War II and Korea. 

5. Research in Connection with the T/A Fusion Ef'.f'ort: At the. present 

t.1-, al.most all T/A Fusion effort. and thinking is directed toward product.ion 

ot material to meet consumer requirements. Not enough attention ia devoted 

to research and development of' new methods ot ana.l,yais including turther studJ 

ot the poaaibilities of high.speed machines tor handling some ot the problems. 

The NSA wuld do well to set up a small research group whose members ha.ve 

competence to investigate new approaches in various fields relevant to the · 

proble. 

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6. The Personnel Problet The qualit7 or the COMINT effort based on 

' 

sources discussed in this Appendix depends heavll.7 on the ettectiYeneaa ot 

interception and the competence of the anaqsts. The probl• of improYinS 

procedures tor the selection, training, and protlcieno7 evaluation of such . peraonnel and related per~nnel problams are discussed in Appendix IX • 

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VII - SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Special Intelligence is COMINT resulting rrom\15uccessf'ul cryptanalytic 

attack on high-grade cryptographic systems. Its value during World War II 

can scarcel.1' be overestimated.. Through the decr,yption\ of German and 

Japanese messages, we were able to penetrate the enenv lines and enter the 

Headquarters ot High Commands, Arrq Groups, Fleets, and Air Forces. On a 

strategic level, Special Int~lligence was'the unique source\of advance 

e knowledge Of the enem,y1 S plans for both Offensive and defensive OJ?8r&t1ons. 

It was the timeliest 1 moat co~ete 1 _and most reliable source ot intelligence 

on his Order ot Battle, intentions, and capabilities (see Appendix I). 

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____ _____.1· 

Meanwhile, the reading or a small number or messages enciphered in 

qstems used throughout the higher-echelons or the Soviet Anned Forces 

promised a rich yield.of strategic intelligence, if the point or full 

solution, on a large-scale, current basis could be achieved •. Up to August. 

1948, the solution of only a lind.ted number or me~sages enciphered in one 

. ot those s;ystems had provided us with such items ·as I 

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(see Appendix IV). PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

--- EO 3.3(h}(2) 

-COMINT which includes Special Intelligence baa considerable 

potentialities. as .a source ot waming or hostile intent. For example, 

one or the most widely used 

The capabilitie.s or t~e lower-level· 

COMDT sources~· .partiq~a~17:·t.ratric analysis., .would also increase .in 

direct proportion to the availability or supporting evidence derived trom 

the content ot decl!)'pt.ed messages. 

The po~entialities or Special Intelligence are so great that the 

ditticulties involved in obtaining it can scarcely be considered a deterrent 

~actor. Nor should the benefits which it could reasonably promise be discounted on t-he grounds that it would not have the demnstrable capability 

ot tumishing specific wa.ming that hostilities.were about to be i."litiat~. 

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SU:ch ~ guarant·ee is bqond the ·power ot 81>1'. COMINT organization, which 

reads the messages originat-ed by a r~reign nation but does not write them. 

. With that : exception, however - a limitation which applies to COMm 

not onq in i:~s present condition but also in a hypothetical state in which 

intercept tacil:itiea were virtuall7 unlimited and crn>tana]Jrtic succes.a 

was complete~- it can be stated that the capability of COMINT to.proT1"de 

warning ot imminent hostilities is directly proport.ionate to the Ycilllll8 

and currency 

the time when the decision to attack is made to· the period llmed.iat.el6 

preced.ing D Dq. 

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VIII - ELECTRONICS INTEIJ..IGENCE (ELINT) 

The An!lY ELINT Program 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3606 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

l. General Remarks: The Department. ot the A'f'm1 niaintains ELINT . 

stations.in Europe, the Far &..st, and Alaska. These stations cover the 

frequency rang~ or 15 kilocycles to 12,500 megacycles and are primaril1' 

designed. to concentrate on radar-type signals. \A 24-hour watch is maintained, and three main indicators have been established as a basis tor · 

FLASH reporting. These are (i) any indications or radar build-up, 

(i:!.) any indication that known or identified enemy signals appear· to be 

unuauallT close to the stations, and (iii) unusual signal\activit7 which 

the operator ma.7 reel to be cause for alarm. . . 

2. Intercept Locations: 

Alaska - Base at Nome,, mobile stations at Bambell on St. Lawrence 

Island, mobile station at Tin City, Cape Prince of Wales. 

Two mobiles working on pulses; base station works on VOA 

. jamming signals. 

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EO<l3(h)(2) 

The above ettort includes 10-12 teama. About 16 teams will be overeeas 

in the next year. There are not at present sufficient p~rsonnel in these 

teams to sustain a 24-hour operation tor longer than a l.iJDited emergenc7 

time. 

). Rem>rting: Logs from intercept stations are routinel1'' sent by 

-.11 twice a month, sustaining a del.y or ~pproximate:q 3-4 weeks~ Dupμ. :. 

copies are sent to the Electronic Warfare Center (EWC) at Fort Monmouth, Air 

. Technical Intelligence Center (ATIC), Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) 1 and 

the.Anv-Na'97 Electronic Evaluation Group (AN.Em). AN.Em retains and tiles, 

aa well aa evaluates, these report;s. 

Each team under EWC has a one-time pad tor FLA.SH report.:lng. A code 

wrd alerts EWO that FLASH traffic is under way. EWC then alert.a the" Mont/ mouth cryptana]Jrsis personnel who decode the message. Sig--Op-5 in Washington 

is then alerted, which in tum alert.a G-2 and ANEEG. The message is t.hen 

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received by" G-2, evaluated, and tmnsmitted to appropriate personnel ~ ·i .hin 

the space of a few minutes. Current arrangements are such that a FLASH 

message can be transmitted to the Washington area. in approximately 35 

minutes frofn the time or intercept. 

4. Coordination: The JEIC (Joint Electronic Intelligence Center) in 

FECOM receives the FLASH message simultaneous]Jr with o.ther addressees and 

alerts other service electronic countermeasures activities in the theater 

(the word "Joint" means Anl\Y-Navy .only--no Air Force participation). In 

Europe, the Army El.e'Ctronic Intelligence Center performs similar !unctions, 

again without Air Force participat~on. ASA stations are also alerted, and 

arrangements are being ma.de for.ASA to alert the Army teams on a reciprocal 

basis. This is the only contact between field agencies. 

Nan ELINT Program 

l. Generali The Naval effort is directed more toward acquisition of 

' . strategic technical data than towa~d warning indicators. Naval era.rt. look 

tor the unusual and examine the capability or any kind or radar signal 

encountered. SUr.f'ace ship~ are able to approach certain areas in a more 

leisurely' fashion than is possible by other means. Frequenc7 coverage is 

trom 916 kilocycles to 101 750 megacycles. An 8-hour watch is maintained, 

and indicators are simil.a~ to those of the Army. Usuall.1'. one or two 

submarines are under special control. They do not have f'ull teams aboard. 

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E03.3(h){2) 

2. Intercept Locations: PL 86:;;36/50 USC 3605 

I Airbome ,____~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---' 

team baaed in the Phillippines\ 

Middle F.ast - F.astem Atlantic and Mediterranean area has on~ 

team available tor visits .. CINCNEI.Mforces --·---- make;~ 

3. Reporling: 

three other teams in vary'ing places around the 

Mediterranean, depending upon deployment of 

forces.. These operate around the Aegean Sea and 

occasional'.cy in the Adriatic, and with the Sixt.h 

Fleet.. Airbome operations are based at Port I,Jautq 

in ·French Morocco and operate to cover Black Sea and. 

F.astern Mediterranean. 

Airbome teams report through Top Secret channels w. . 

priorit7 rating to CNO as the prime addressee, with others on ~he list. 

Meaaage t.:lme varies from 1 to 4 hours. Reports are received at the Nav.y 

Securit7 Station in Washington. and given to ANEm. Ship teams report. in 

aimllar fashion, it the report is sufficiently import.ant, but the data are · 

usuall.7 autticiently routine to be sent by secret dispatch. Land based 

teams have one-time pads in conjunction with the Anq, and their reports 

go both to A:rmy- and to CNO. Routine reports come at intervals or about; two 

weeks by mail, although emergency channels· are available for reporting. . . 

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4. Coordination: COMINT officers at ASA collate Navy intercept reports 

with other intelligence and send the·.-~i1nal report to :P.!:t~. There is a 24-hour 

dut7 watch in Washington. Field COMINT personnel are alerted in advance or 

Na"f'1 maneuvers. These data are coordinated with the British in routine excba 

There is also a field exchange between the Air Force and the Navy, with certa 

exceptions such as magnetic tape recordings or the USAF. There are two 

evaluation units in the field. 

Air Force ELINT Program 

l. General: Frequency coverage is ·rrom slightly leas than 30 

k11ocycles to 10,750 megacycles on an 8-hour watch basis (tor ground teams). 

Indicators are similar to those or the Arnry and Navy but more limited. 'l'he 

prima.17 effort. is directed to-ward locating en91111 stations; secondary effort; 

is toward detennining technical characteristics or the radiating station. 

The Air Force also monitors Soviet LORAN radiations. 

2. Intercept Locations: PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

United States - Nine ground stations asaninteVfil part; of Air 

Defense Command around the perimeters or the US. 

Black s~ - I I one more 

expected by November 19.53. One mobile station along 

south shore or Black Sea. 

·. ·. · .. ·. ·. 

Airbome teams operate out of lmgl.and. They cover the area around 

Franz Joset Land every three months or so and, more trequentrl.y, the Berents 

Sea, Murmansk area, Baltic, and mack Seas. Additional airbome t&ams cover 

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'fE)P 8B6Rlfi' QANeB 

3. Report.ing1 SAC tiald operators can flash messages from field 

operations in 2-3 hours to (i) theater Haadquart.ers, (ii) local NaY,Y" and 

A~ Headquart.ers, and (iii) SAC Headquart.era. Air Force personnel state 

that the time or communication depends on atmospheric conditions and 

mention that a 4-hour time might be '.'-- ttgure to shoot at. It hae. been 

stated that 30-ndnute reporting would be possible it ttae requirement• "9re 

BUtticientl.1' strong. 

4. Coordination: Raw da.ta are not given to the \~r Force by th.• .A.l'IV' 

in the tield, but the Air Force gives such data to the Al"ll\V, with tho ·• 

exception or magnetic tape recordings which are sent to Wright Field .tor 

anal.7a~a and, much later, to A.NEEn. These recordings contain highJ.T 1'8-4'-ful . 

da.t.a, and, to be full.7 ettact.1.ve, should be made available to a group such 

as ANBEG in the shortest possible time. The need tor coordination 1.s .,-uch 

as to override individual serv-ice prejudices. 

Again there does not appear to be adequate tie-in with co~.at 

"field levels. All services should have cloaeJ.T coordinated COMINT and. 

BLINT activities trom field Wl:l.te on up to the highest levels, and all -

aerviee ILIBT activities should be closel.T coordinated at a central p)4oe· 

within a g:i,ven operating area, 

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II - PERSONNEL 

General Remarks 

In the various ·discussions and briefings which the study Group has 

had conceming the present COMINT effort, the most universally mentioned 

problem is that of improving the qualit7 and proricien07 or personnel. 

The success of &lJ7 organisation depends criticall.7 on its personnel. In 

the case or NSA--and the military Services--a number of factors which limit 

the errectiveneaa of cert.ain k97 groups or personnel has been brought to 

the attention of the Group. 

Here we describe briefly some of the problems now raced primari~ in 

connection with three crucial groups or NSA personnel, namely, high-level 

research and development personnel, anal.Jtical personnel, and interception 

P,eraonnel. We shall also make some comments and suggestions conce 

auperviso1"7 personnel. 

Research and Development Personnel 

At the present time, there is serious need tor tu.rt.her research and 

development activit7 in NSA. The success or such a program will depend 

allllOs~ entirely' on the quality or research and development personnel. 

A good.pa.rt or this activity can be contracted out t~ private 

organizations; but, ·even for this effort. to be successful, it is necessary 

that NS.A itself have a highly competent group to recognize NSA 1 s needs and 

to translate them into requirements which can be used by privat.J firms as 

a basis tor research and development. NSA has lost a considerable number of 

men ot this type and is finding it al.moat. impossible to compete with indust1'7 

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'!OP S!Cft!'I' 9Mf9E 

in tilling t.he vacancies ereat~, not to mention recruiting such men 

to expand the research and development start. This situation calls 

tor a re-examination ot aalar7 scales tor research and development 

personnel.. It is also suggested that explorations be •de to determine 

the extent to which scientists and engineers from universities and 

industrial laboratories could be uset:ul]Jr borrowed tor limited·perioli. 

ot time. 

On• ot the basic ditf'iclU:ties in attracting and retaining top-ttill'A 

( oalontitia perao1D1ol io.ihe probl .. ot providing recognition tor t.11.tlr~ 

i contri~ions 1 not measured purelT in status and salary advances 1 but, 

in terma ot scientific presUae. At the present time, the onl1' poss:lbilit.7 

for such recognition is throup sci&l)titic contributions almost who~ 

· · unrelat_.d to their research in the COJ«NT field. This sets a· double 

standard of achievement which Yery few persons can meet. The Group lute 

no solution to otter concerning this dilemma. The least that can be done . :le t.o co~eider extra premiums in term& ot ,.orking conditions and financial. 

inducement tor good men to ent.er 'the field. 

Anal.ysts 

The se~ond kq group or COMINT personnel consists or the anal.y'ata: 

_the orn>t&nal.Ts~s, a~d the t-nftic ana4'sts. The main core ot this group 

ia comprised or mre than llOO .el vilians, but it also contains a larg• 

complement ot service personnel. The civilian members provide the baas:1c 

oontinuit7 of the analytic etto~, although there is considerable turnover. 

The turnover is even greater tor the sei-vice personnel because of rotation 

polic7 and relative4' short. terms or senice tor most militar,r personnel. 

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There is great variation in the quality of personnel in these tw;.; 

groups or analysts. Considerable ditrerence or opinion exists as to what 

type or person at recrt~itment will make a good analyst and what type will 

not. It is general!:' agreed, however, that, once a good ana1yst is selected, 

his proficienc7 steadily improves with experience. In view or this 

situation, and since there is a continuing recruitment. program to keep 

analJtic personnel up to strength, it is extreme1y important to establish 

sound selection and training procedures. Modern.·psychometric methods 

applied in close consultation with leading NSA analysts can be expected 

to aid materially in improving·selection procedures. It is not sufficient, 

however, for such procedures merely to be applied to some candidates •. They. 

must bt;t applied to candidates from the most promising sourc.ea.-.. This in 

turn calls for a re-examination or NSA policy for giving the potentially'. 

good candidate some notion, within realistic security limit.ations, of what 

crypt.analysis and traffic analysis are and how important in· terms • 

or national security. Onl)" then will NSA attract the potent:lallT best 

~ 

candidates actually to become candidates for selection. In making these I 

suggestions, the Group is thinking primarily or eivilian anal.Tats, but the 

principles e.re no less applicable to military personnel. 

Another important aspect of the problem or recruiting and holding good 

ana:Qrsts relates to salary- and promotion policy. At present, there seems to 

be some disparity in this respect between crn>tanalysis and traffic anal.y'sis. 

We raise the question whether salary and promotion policy is as favorable to 

st'"'Ollg development ot T/A capability in NSA as it is in the case ot C/A, 

especial:Qr' in view or our present haa'V)" dependence on T/A. 

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A final aspect :ls the supporting servlClls a"Vailable to the ana]3'sts 1 

p&rticular17 the machine sections which do the ext.enaive ma~hine proceasil'lg. 

The personnel in these sections have a routine but highly r&sponsible task 

and the etticient performance.of the work depends on skiltul leaders~ip and 

ingenuity in planning the use ot the machinery to best advantage. steps 

should be ta.ken to make this work attractive 'b1 expanding the opport.unitiee -·-

tor advanced training and promotion in the area. 

Intercept Operators 

The third large group ot persomel in the COMINT ettort are the • 

aept operators, who, at pres~i, are almost entirely military. The greatest 

probl• here is that created by the usual enlistment and rotation policies •. 

The potential value ot an intercept operator increases with experience at. 

a particular intercept location. The more familiar the operator becollt'a ritti 

the material he intercepts the more expert. he can become in the prelifllnai'it, 

interpretation of it. It is widel.7 recognised that the problem ot·bllilcHng 

up and maintaining a reasonable amount or lmow-how tor interpreting mtarial , 

at the intercept site is ot baaic importance with respect t~ ~rq. wam9 

Part ot the solution of the problem, as tar as it oan be dealt with, ta ' 

probabl.T to.be toUnd in the eda.blishment or a senice career tor milit..17 

personnel in CO.MINT. A service ~ with intercepti~ experience at o• nte 

can be expected to capitaliz,e.~idly o~ this experi~ca when placed at. 

another- site. Another possibility tor imprt>ving our interpretation capabilit,7 . . 

at the intercept site, in soma: cases at least, is to ind.octr~te intarcept 

operators in the rudiments of' cryptanal7sis and traf f'ic analJ'sia or to sUJ>l>l7 

an ana'.qst tor the aite to work in close coliaboration with the ope:n...._..,. 

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!0P SE0R!!l! 6ANOE 

In sites where voice intercept can be taken, the importance ot knowleclg .• 

ot the Russian language is obvious~ 

There are well-recognized difficulties in using civilian expert.a at 

intercept sites or in theaters or operation. Ori tbe other hand, World 

t 

War II experience in operations research, use or radar, and other fields 

are tull of instances where these difficulties were overcome. 

We also point out that profitable retuni can be expected trom the use 

or modern psychometric methods in the selection and proticiency evaluation 

or intercept operators. 

SUeervisory Personnel. 

,· 

Final.ly, we wi~h to make some comments conceming the selection or 

supervisory personnel, especially those in, an immediate supervisory capacity· • 

It is axiomatic in good personnel management that immediate supervisors of 

&J11: technical activities should themselves have expert; lmowledge or t'he 

actirlty they supervise. The best way or obtaining such supervisors is 

by advanc~ent or properly qualified individuals from within the groups th• I 

s;vea. This principle, however, is more easily applied to the civilian . . 

component or a group than to the military personnel. In the case of 

mllitar,y personnel, with rotation policy as it now exists,. the Group 

believes the beat approach to the supervisor;y problea lies in the establish- ' 

ment ot a career service in COMINT in the A~ and Air Force along lines ) 

already developed in the Navy. 

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X - COMINT as a Source or Advance Warning in 

World War II and the Korean Conflict 

During World war II, and again during the confiict in Korea, COMINT 

was the timeliest, most complete, and most reliable source of intelligence 

on the Order of Battle, intentions, and capabilities of the enenv. It 

was the unique source of reliable advance knowledge of his pl.ans for both 

offensive and defensive operations. The following examples have been 

selected from among innumerable instances which illustrate the COMINT 

capability to provide advance waming of impending eneJV operations., on 

both strategic and tactical levels, ~nd the advantages which nay be derived 

from the receipt of such warning. 

World War II-The German Attack on the USSR: 

During 1;he first three months of 1941, Special Intel~igence /J. 

indicated a general eastward movement of German air and ground forces which 

enabled British Intelligence to estimate with increasing certainty.that the 

' concentrations which were taking place were to be directed agair,st the USSR. 

By' the end of March, sufficient fnf orma.tion was available .from deciphered 

German. messages to suggest that (i) preparations were being made to 

intimidate the Soviet Union by assembling an armored striking force 

on the Russo-Polish frontier, and (ii) those preparations Ddght lead to the 

outbreak of war. 

Special Intelligence then revealed the deflection of the striking 

force to the Balkans for the conquest of Yugoslavia and its subsequent 

withdrawal, arter a month's participation in the campaign, and redeployment, 

. Ll COMINT derived trom decryption or high-level cryptographic s7stelllS. 

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together with an air corps, to its previous destination in south Poland. 

a,. 31 May-1 little doubt remained that the Germans intended ~o initiate 

hostilities and not merely t.o intimidate their erstwhile ally. In an 

; 

estimte or 7 June 1941, the British COMINT organization predicted "a . \ . 

T8l'7 large scale cempaign a~st Ruaoia, with the ~in front or attack 

in Poland and Fast Prussia," an~ st'-ted that· the German forces would be 

read7 to begin the operation so';,n'i.tter 16 June. 

An estimate or 16 June summarized the COMINT intorm.tion received 

during the preceding nine days and concluded: . " ••• it is probable that. e 

the Gennan Air Force will be ready to strike as from 19 June onwards.'" 

German messages or 19 June, which were available to COMINT recipients . 

on the following 'day, ma~e it clear that the period inmediatel.7 preceding 

D Day had been reached. 

Thus, COMINT provided (i) a general warning several months in advance• . . . 

ot the attack aild (ii) .as the date or invasion grew nearer, 1ncrea111ingl.T 

specific information which enabled intelligence personnel to estimate the 

s~ope ot th~ intended campaign, the areas or concentration,. and the app. 

im.te.date on which the frontier crossing would take place. 

For the British strategic planners, that advance intelligence was 

invaluable. In view or the weakness or. their militaey rorcea, it was not 

poasible to prepare tor the defense or eveey wlnerable point which the 

8D8Jl\Y might choose to attack. Reliable intelligence on the eneJl\Y' a intentions 

was vital, therefore, to the continued existence ot the British nation. 

COMINT supplied that intelligence and, incidentall.7, gave the Prime Minister 

a period or several weeks to consider the policy which he announced at 9 r.>~m • ... ~ ..... ,,,,.,,.. 

on 22 June 1941 that Britain would give "whatever help" she could to the 

Soviet Union. 

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Korea: 

The COMINT contribution in Korea during the period November 1950-· 

Jul3' 1951 is summarized in a citation for the lat Radio Squadron, Mobile, 

dated 11 October 1951. That c-itation include~ mention of the :t.ollowing · 

"specific accomplishments, considered. or extraordinar,y value to the mission 

ot the UN P'orces in Korea and in at least two cases to the vi~al interests 

of the United states": 

(i) advance notification that the ~n91117 was aware of UN plans 

to attack An.1u and Chinampo, as well as his plans for countermeaeurea; 

(ii) advance waming of the en8JDT' s intent to bomb American 

troops on Hill 872 near Tuk SonJ 

(iii) advance waming or the exact times and intentions of the 

eneJJU" air attack on Sinmido Island on 19 June 195l'which resulted in severe 

reverses tor the enell\V'; and 

(iv). advance information on the times and places of intended . . attacks during the evacuation· or the Ham Hung beachhead. 

More recentlJ', COMINT provided waming that, during the final stages 

ot the armistice negotiations, the Chinese Comnamista were PJ'.8p&ring an 

offensive against the UN Forces. It is too earl.T to .establish the reasons 

for cancellation or Postponement ot that attack, but UM countermeasur~a-­

•de possible bJ" the advance knowledge or eneJl\Y' intentions-ma,. well have 

caused the Comnmnista to decide that sutticient milit&l'J advantage to 

warrant disruption or the amistice negotiationa was no longer assured. 

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XI - BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1. Report to the Secreta17 ot State and the Secreta1'7 ot Defense 

("Brownell Conanittee Report."), lJ June 19S2 ('leP S!eRB'l' 8Aff6B) 

- . 2. G.c.&:c.s. Air and Military History (T6P BEeRJR UL!RA) 

3• 

4. 

'· 6. 

7. 

s. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12 • 

13. 

'Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation ot the Pearl 

Harbor Attack 

Waming or Soviet Attack, 1952-1954 

British JIO (52) 51 (Final), 18 December 1952 ('IOP 91Cm' Q.QJQB) 

KellY' Committee Report. - Ma7 1953 (BBGRB'I) 

Edward.a Committee Report; - NSC 140/l ('.l!QP &~) 

Bull Committee Report - NSC 159 (T6P S!SRB!I') 

Operation Sign Post, Final Report - 24-28 Jul.7 1952, Headquarters, ADC 

(TOP SEeRET) 

USSR Attack Planning Plan - DCS/I, Headquarters, ADC . ..('?OP RQRBI!') 

Manual tor the Operation ot the ADC Indications Board - Headquarters, ADO 

(TOP SBeRB't') 

Ext.ension or Early Warning aa. a Deterrent to Air Attack and an Aid to 

Defense, 8 April 1953 - Headquarters, kDC (!eP SBEJRBP) 

The Cost and Eftectiveneaa of the Defense of the U .s. Against Air Attaak, 

1952-1957 - Headquarters, ADC ('MP SESRBP) - . 

Report ot Project -st River, 1952 (U.S. Civil Air Defense) 

.14. Soviet Bloc Capabilities Through 1957, 9 June 1953 - NIB-65 · {TOP SB8R111') 

15 •. 

16. 

17. 

Soviet Bloc Capabilitie1 Through Mid-19551 11 August 1953 - IIE-'10 

('1'9P ggagr) 

SUmma1'7 of the status of the Soviet Atomic Energy Prograil, 8 Janua1"7 

1953 - NSIE-lA ('feP SEfJfti'P) 

·1 

Soviet Capabilities for Clandestine Attack Against US with Weapons ot 

Maaa Destruction and the Vulnerabllit7 ot the US to :·aich Attack (Mid-1951 

to Mid-1952), 4 September 1951 - NIE-31 ('1'9P 8ECRl:L') 

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18. Soviet.' Bloc Capabilities and Probabl.\f Courses or Action in· Elec..:.' 

tromagnetic Warfare, 24 Aprll 1953~ ..;· Si-.38 CB'CP!"'L 

19. Indications List - Headquart:'ere;d.f§.A.i' (S!l9R!R') . 

20. Eatiated Soviet Bloc Air Ol"d.~. o( Battle, 1 Jul.7 i953 - AIS 2-2/2 • 

Headquarters, USAF (TeP SBeRm)" · . · 

a •. The Threat ot Action tr011. CodiUni\st' Air Forces to the Continental 

Strengths ot North Apaerica, · l.T Octt,'ol)er 1952 - AIB-1 ('feP SBeRBr) .. 22:. Project LINCOLN - SUmm.ei"'~'Oi'oup,· Fil1al1 Report_. 195.3 (Sl!iSMI) 

An Operational A.aseamnent.: (St° a1

· lllfrtli«m' Rad&~ Alerting Chain! Augaat 

1952 - Department· or .iat.1tbifaJ:. Jl·t'9Yatw,: dari&lftt. ~SBeRBl'-1 . - ~ 

An Far~ W'aming Sys_t'eftF',., 26 PeWrUA,tT,· 1;53' -·-Jteport; 'b7 the. Joint strateaio I 

Plana Conmdttee·toi M (TOP !BeftBP:...' . j 

25. An Ear~ Wam11fM-:s7atem, .30 June 195.3 ..;·ff~~rt. br the Continental : 

U.S. Detenae"PlAnning Group to JCS' (MP'MZft!l!) 

26. A Reriaed Plitt' tor an Earq waming SyatftrJ.r 20 Juq 19.5.3 - Report; b7 

the Continental u .s. Defense Pl&nn"ing G°t'Ou'tf to JCS ('1'0P SBEJRBP) 

z-r. An Earl.T ~ing S7atem, 27 Jul.J' 1953 - Memorandum bT the Chiet o~ 

start, USAtf', ~tor JCS ('fOP Slelt!T) 

28, A RerlsedlP'.lin·tor an Early Wam!ng S7-'BM! 27 Juq 1953 .- Memorand• 

by the Chltd'f o·r staff, UslF, tor JCS.: . tf9P Sl!lEJRBI') 

29. A Rnised· Plln\•rcn·· an Far17. waming-··~, 28 Jul7 19.5.3 - Memoranda 

'b7 the Chier' off N'atal Opa~ltons tb'if"JMi° · . ('fep SleRBT) .. 

30. Air Detenae" stbtli~s - ·Pif.&'jia~ ud' (S&eKZT) 

31. An El:.m.tnattim•1offsitlWA•fl'iMAt":df' th'e"Control and w&m}n! Facilities 

Aftllable b7 19S3'J,,W8ij~Sthfi' s'tWtj'i '1 (TM' SBeft1ft} 1 

32. Eatinated Capabilit~:l.a · ot' Plinnecl' A~ A.nti-aircrart Defenses tor 

Continental United 'states a~-~t_JJ:Ld:.:.1954 (Vols I and n) - WSl!lJ 

. start stuclJ' 19 (fJJ!ielm) 

. · 33. The Eftluation ot Present and 'Proje~ted Air Detenae Weapons and . · 

Weapons SJ"atems, 1950 - WS1iD Report; 1/1+1 JCS 2084/15 · (89NPI~) 

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