REF ID:A485355 

OF 'l'.BE V.AltIOUS OFFICIAL INVEmGATIONS 

mo 'l!BE A'.t'.J!ACK ON PEA.BL MRBOR 

··. •· . ' I-.-
REF ID:A485355 --;-~·;-:;-.:- ... 

-~ .... ,""'-·I';"~-""",~-·;,'~;~~~-~~. \,-::):t~<.""',. -.~\~=---:~-.,,-1f~': ------== ,,.--.., "t-,-.\;' .,-~,-. 

Certain As;pects of 1tMsgie 11 in the Ct;r:ttol~eaJ.. De.ck.ground 

of the V{'J."':touc; Offic!.&.1. Invest1@(1ons 

Section 

l. 

2. 

4. 

8. 

into the Atttlck on Pearl Harbor 

INDEX 

Introduction • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

The Real Essence of the Problem • • • • • • • • • 

A Ziev Look a.t the Revisionists Allegations of 

Conspiracy to Keep K:l.mmel and S'bort in the 

Da:rk • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

Was MtlGIC Withheld from Kimmel and Short and, 

if so, ~ ••••••• ,, •••••••• 

• • 

• • 

The tiWinds Code Message:B '

1 . . . . ~ . . . .. . . . The Question of Sabota.g~f! • • • ti ~ • • • • • • • 

Conclusions ....... ",., ....... . Epilogtte • • .. • • • • ' • ' It • Ill • • • • • • • • 

APPENDIX 1: 11Pearl H&'bor in Pernpective1

11 

by Dr. Louis Morton, Uni:ted States Na.val 

Institute Proceedi!!is,, Vo1. 81, No. 4, 

April 1955; P-.kl. 461'.:468 

APPlitWIX 2: !lpea.rl Ra.rhor and the Revlsionists, 11 by 

Prof'. Robert H. Ferrc:Ll.. The Historian, Vol. XVII, 

No. 2, SprinS 19551 :Pl~· 215·233 

11 

18 

35 

49 

53 

65 

60 
REF ID:A485355 

1. nmOD"OCTION 

More than 15 yea.rs have passed. since the Japanese, with unparalleled 

good luck, good luck that nov seem:s astoundinS, and vith a degree of 

skill unanticipated by the United, :3tates, executed their surprise attack 

on Pearl Harbor during the morning hours of 7 December 1941. It was an 

attack that constituted a. momentou::; disaster for the United States; it 

ma.de our Navy's Pacific Pleet, for all practica.l purposes, hors de combat 

for m.a.ny months. In the view of M:a.rk s. Watson, in a volume written for 

the Army series on the history of 1llie U. s. Army in World Wa.r II, Chief 

of Staff: Provar Plans end Preparations ( 1950) 1 the disaster was the 

result of a. 11fa.teful series of misc~ances" among which he listed those 

which he considered the most import.ant. He did not list them a.ll; to 

do so would make the disaster pa.rtuke of tlle character of an enormous 1 

and almost incredible Greek tra.ge~r-so many big and ll ttle things went 

wrong to make the disaster possibl1~ end to prevent its being averted with 

:Little or no damage. 

The Battle of Pearl Earbor is still being fought but the adversaries 

this time are e.ll Americans; a.nd. though the battle is bloodless, because 

the weapons a.re now words 1 not bul.1.ets or bomb a, it is quite acrimonious 

and intense, as interna.1 or civil Vu.rs genera.lly arc. 'lhls time the 

battle is intended to capture / by E~ sort o:f' literary ''brainwa.abing1 n the 

minds of a lc.rge segment of the American :people vho more or less dimly 

feel that the tru·Ch, the wll.ole tru'toll, has not yet been told. t"18.ey 

Amer-J.cana 1 I am sure 1 are still uuclecided in regard to 'Who or what was 

l 
REF ID:A485355 

responsible tor this most momentous and most humiliating naval disaster 

in our history. 

Fifteen million t-rords, more or less, he.ve been written concernll1g, 

exple.1mns, or attempting to assess and fix responsibilities for the 

Pearl Harbor disaster 1 end to shml· wb:3' the U. S. forces at Honolulu were 

caught napp1ns 1n the ear:cy hours of what President noosevelt referred 

to as that rrde¥ of infaney-" when hei appeared before Congress on 6 December 

1941 to declare war on Japan. Thet Report and Hearings Before the Joint 

Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (79th Congreso, 

2d Session, Government Printing 01:1'ice, We.shington, 1946), hereinafter 

referred to as PHR, a.lone contain l.51000 tra.uscript pages; the over-all 

final report of the Ccmmittee ~)rises some ten million words and fills 

50 volumes of cloaell printed text~. Thus far, in addition to this vast 

amount of material. there must be o..t l.east ti ve million words in the 

wr1 tinas of private 1nd1 viduals. Some of them defend the Findings 1 

Conclusions, and Recommendations «>f the Ma.Jori 1;y in the PBR; others 

defend the :Findings and. Co:u.clusioi:is of the Minority in the ?BR; still 

others d.ise.grae and violant11 attt!J.Ck both Yhat the Ma.Jori ty and the 

r.finori ty aaid. Even rap:resentat1·1re Koefe, a Reptibl1ca.n Ylho oignecl. the 

Majority Report found it nee3ssar;r to add to that report aom.e additional 

views of hia ow where he could. not agree with thoGe of t11e ll'ta.Jor:i.ty. 

It is obvious that in this brochure it vill be impossible to deal u1~ 

all that ha.a been wr-ltten on the su.bJect. Even to list b;r title the 

books, brochures, a.rticles (not to mention the thousands of' newspaper 

accounts, letters to editors, etc.) which have Gomething to add to the 

2 
REF ID:A485355 

story would be a fe.:Lr~ large task. A bibliography covering the items 

on Pearl !!arbor in 'll'S:f private colli;iction 'Will be found in the nsubject 

:f'ile 11 now in the NSA Library. ~it 1!_!._a~ -E!de~L.!.~-is !: 

~~e :f'ac:._t tba:,t~ot a a~1~.~ item of inf~tion ha~~ 

bea~ :!JPOn att~ts t~ eeale.in _!tj~ the P~ Ha.~<?£...!!°?ck could have 

~~ d!.9:HCom!:.,_E!:.'!..~-~~~E,l.se tq__~~Y:....§.~~~ turned~~ 

!!E.ce 194~ whe.!l __ ~.:; •• ~1!.£~-!!~;~.;..£._~~e c~!_~ted i_~ ~-!c 

One may well assume, therefore, th:!Lt oince no new facts l:llwe come to light 

it must be som.ethizlS else that is Ii;eeping the Battle of Pearl Harbor 

going. The assumption is true: the facts developed in the various 

investigations of 1944, 1945, and 19!t6 a.re being scrutinized now through 

different sorts o:f spectacles and 'oy d:U'i'erent obaervers; this results 

in ncv ninterpretation.s 11 of the olli, well-known facts. 

comments Qn the (":UI'X'ent :RattlP. of PearJ. Harbor. '..;.'hey a.re directed a.t the 

wri'tings of certain historians who call themselves or a.re lmown as 

11revisiollista, '.! and vho find much support in two recently published bookG 1 

both by high-ranking o:f'f'ioerr~ of th0 U. S. ?)tJ,vy. P.hese charges fl.re very 

serioua-ind.eed they are tanta.."TI.ou.nt to :lruputing at lea.st very question• 

able behavior by persons of such stature as the late President Franklin 

D. Roosevelt, the Arlq's Chief of Sta.t':f 1 General George c. Harshal.11 and 

the ~!avy 's Chief or Naval Operations , Ad.raira.l Harold R. Stark. 'lttie 

charges a.re rea..Uy not new; their auteaedents, or nuclei of them or 

care:fully vei:!.eCi. hints at them, can be found in some of the early writ ... 

ings of the mrc rabid RoosevGl t --Daters, o.ud even in same parts of the 
REF ID:A485355 

reports made by various o:fficieJ. u. s. investigating bodies appointed to 

look into the mi::i:M;er during the last; phases of World War II or soon after 

that war had been won. 

In another section of' this report will be found an attempt to explain 

the genesis of t.he suspici01·s which a.roused the Roosevelt haters and 

which kept them "needling" the Pres:Ldent and his Administration for a.n 

explanation of hov it was possible ·!;bat the U. S. was ta.ken so completely 

by surprise when the Japanese a.ttacJs:ed Pea.rl Harbor; to introduce the 

explanation at this point ! think would be con:t'u.sing. ALt that can. 

logically be se.id right here is that the President, his Administration, 

and the Cbief'o o:f' the two military services simply could not afford to 

permit the true explanation to be 'broad.cast vhile the war ·was still in 

progress. 

A very impartial 'bibliograph1c;:aJ. Gurvey of the principal i teins in the 

ll tera.ture of the aUbJect has been prepared by a. historian o:f recognized. 

standing, Dr. I.r.>uis 1r:i?°t')n, Ch·1.ef '':i~ the Pacific Section of the u. s. 

Arncy''a Of:fico of Hilltary liiatory. J:is survey, entitJ.ed nPearl Harbor 

in Perapecti ve, 11 was published in 'the April 1955 issu.:: of the United 

States N.!_v&, I~itute _Ero~~ (Vol. 81, No. 4, Whole Uo. 6261 IJ:P• liG1 ... 

468) • A copy o-Z Dr. Z•1ort.on' s r.u:rvey forms A:ppendh: l to this 'brochure. 

A second recapitulation of th.e Pearl Earbor story and e.lso a. source 

of material which may interest the· reader in wha.t the present brochure 

aims to do is found in an article by Robert H. Ferrell, Assistant Prof'easor of !Iistory at Indiana. University, :published also in 1955 1 1n 

The His~.,;an,, un<ler the title ''P<:arl. Harbor and the Revi.sionists" 

- - - -- ~---
REF ID:A485355 

(Vol. mI, No. 21 Spring 19551 PP• 2l5·233). Prof. Ferre!J.•13 article 

( g1 ven ccmpleteq in Appendix 2 to this brochure) beg:Lno as :f'ollovs: 

It t-m.s perhaps inevitable that after the second World War, 

a~, "--Ptcr the ·wp...r o'!: 1914-1.8, tt~er.:i ~~l.r .. r11td B".J:"'l.flt:a;e l.:l ·thf:: U'u:i:t;ed. 

States a school of historians qμeetioning 'the pu...-poses of the 

w~r ::-,u:t t:J.~ :n:.;-,t:tye,s ot the 11a.:d;:t:..1e a~te1i'll:.a.. :7.:i~ <.;o;t o~ 'ti~'1.:t 

world vara, in human lives and in plqs1eBl resources, was very 

:'light ::.:r.1 11; :r.ii;. 01ily ;1a.tr~a:t -~ih:E.t JC•Je i.r1·.lt vi1lu.sJ.u :::ho!ll:'i cr.1e;;-

tion such expenditure. Yet the! new school of "revisionism" o.~~o::.:J.ng Y.f~;r ~lm f»C;·C::>nd Wi·,r1.d Wt\t' 'l.ii-W ·un1lc~tak0:t! ;:;. li:a.e cf 

investigation which, if auccesi:1M., w.Ul :f'orce the rewriting of 

:.:.::s. entire e1·0. :~!\ kn,,;;;;:tc.;;n hi,:;tc;r.l• Th~ J:8'1'!~1o:::.~tst;s h:Ji)C t·:• 

prove that 1D 1914-l President F?'fmklin D. RoooeveJ.t pu:r,poseq 

e.'!';!'!OSC1. the Pn.c11':!.C F:i..eet a.t P.<:~e.r:i. rr ... :t",)(Jr I and ~Or',.'ied th~ 

Japanese into attacking ~.t, thus bringing the UD.ited Statfls 

!!!to the W.'I.'" on. thr-:: ~t~.c of t;1i;: All1 ... ~s,. A-;; Pro1.'e.:amr :Im."l.'"i/ 

Elmer Ba.mes lll\S put the case; in rather plain English, 11The 

net reanlt of rev1a:toni-Jt :.Je•llo~'.ai•;:;hi) :-i:pplie\1. to Pearl ::Iar'b-:>r 

'boils down essentieJ.J.y to this:: In ord.er to promote Roosevelt's 

l:)Ol:'1.t1ca..1. ~lmh:ttions and his me:mla.cious ;!oreign policy sa1e 

three thousand Americ&Zl b07s \mre quite needl.ess~ butchered. 

• • • 

Pr~:feascr Ferrell tol..'tO'TlS th:.:s extra•~t fran Pr.;:f.'e13$or Barner; with 

the :£'ollo~d~1 wo:rd3 (in a ;footnote): 

::or course, they were :.m..~ n. o.r,;p in t.he bucket compa.re\l to 

those who were ultirilately sle.110. in tb.e war that resulted., which 

wa a,-, ne<?il~:ss 1 in terms of v:Lta.1. .American interests, as the 

surprise attack on Pee.x"l Ha.rbo:r. " 'R. E. 'B8J!'Jlea, ed. 1 ~e!'ietual 

Ue.r fo1· Pc:i..l'etual Pea.ce ( Celdw~:t::., IdeJ10, (.953); Ch~ J.O, Siu1ne.r;t 

and Conclusions," p- 651. ' · ' 

known historian such as Barnes. What substan.ce is there to the 8tr1dent 

claims of those proteasional historians; some of tltem very w;r.:U .. known and 

able men, who a.re the spokesmen tor.· the revia1oDi'9ts'Z \n'Jlt is it that 

they wish to prove from ~ir study ot the :facts concerning the Pearl 

Harbor disaster? First, they wish to prove that there wr.a no need at all, 

n1u terms of viteJ. American interests," for the u. s. to enter into World 
REF ID:A485355 

War II as one of the belligerents. Bame ot 'them no doubt believe '1lat 

we tought OD the wrons side I vi th the wrong allies i With this phase of 

the &ubJect I sha.U DOt concern m;yselt in this brochure, since I make no 

pretence whatsoever~ being a histor1ail competent to deal vith such an 

1.Jli>ortant aubJect. Next, some of the rev1ai0Diata cla.1.m or believe that 

they have ;eroo:t that the disaster at Pea:tl Harbor vu no 11accident 1 " that 

it was brought about del:i.bera;t~J.yb7 :President Roosevelt. 'Bley believe 

that what they call olir ''back-door" entrJ' into the conflict was based 

v;pon an erroneous view, held b7 Ja1m e.ud his Administration, as to wba.t 

the U. s. role should be in 1rorld affairs; al.Bo 1 tbe7 want us to believe 

that our entr,r into World War II was tor the personal. political advantage 

~ Pl"esident Roosevelt and his followers 1n the Administration. They 

contend, in tact, tb&'b he goaded the Japaliese into making the attack, 

that he enticed them into doing so br using the u. s. PacUic Fleet as a 

"lure J 11 that he knew t:om the so-called 11MAGIC" 1 the Japanese secret. - communications which Arsq and Nav cr;yptaneqsts had solved, the exact 

time the attack would be :made and tbe exact place where tb.e7 were going 

to make it; that the President sensed that such GU attack wa the onl.7 

thilJ8 which would un11';y American opinion and. bring the pea.ple of the 

United States to e. pitch of excitement and resentment sutt:tcien~ high 

to lead them to accept with equan1mtq u. s. entry into World War II on 

the side of the British and the French, thereb71 as Roosevelt felt and 

as turned out to be the case 1 assuring the conq>le'te defeat ot 1ihe Axis 

powers; that President Roosevelt should and. could have avoided iihe 

disaster at Pearl Re.r'bor but d.eliberatel.¥ chose not to do so 1 tor the 

. ---------------
REF ID:A485355 

reaeona cited above J and that he pur.poaeJ.7 Vitbheld MAGIC intelligence 

fl'OJD Admiral Kimmel, C011111ande:r•1n..Ch1et ot the u. s. Pacitto Fleet, and 

General Short, COJlll1lllrl'l.C Gene:ral. of the Hawai:f.e.n Department, the two 

highest-ranking ~ in Hawa.11 who should have been but were nat; 

81 ven this inf'ormation and who, 'bheretore 1 were permit~ 'b1 h1m 'to be 

deliberate?;!: misled u to the real situaUon, misled to t.be point, in 

ta.at, that When the attack came the~ were entU'el.1' unprepared even to 

meet it, let alone repulse it. In w:J.~lding this information, one ot 

the proponents ot this theo:r:r 1 a rettired ad:m1raJ. of the :re~ U. S. 

tiav,y, Rear Admiral Robert A. Theoba.ld1 implies :J.n his book, 'l1he Final 

Secret ot Pearl Harbor (Nev York: '.fhe Devin.,.dair co., 1954), that to 

make 1t quite ce:rte.in that the Japa.uese attack would be a camplete surprise 1 so far as Gene:ral Short and Admiral Kimmel were concerned, the 

:President had to :t.iave and did have -? reiuctant partners in his :gii;.tpk'Sl) 

or wbat was tautaaouni "1lereto, Geti.eral. M&rshall, the Chief of Staff ot 

the ArmJ', mid .Admin.l Si;ark1 the Cl:~et ot Naval Operations 1 bottl reguJ.sr 

otticers ot ld.Shest integn:t7 and i~ute. And altbougb. Aami:ral Kimel 

in his own book A~ I«anel • s S1;on: (Chicago: Henrt Regnery ·Co., 1955) 

does not go qUite so far '"8 does ACl.m.iral !Cheob&l.d as to make cbaqes 

tantamount to conspil'&ey', he does ''° quite a long distance along the same 

route. There is a degree of confuaien in re~ to this point, however. 

'!he tolloW1ng1 tor example, e.ppear1J on the inside flap of the dust cover: 

Admii-al Ximmel sticks to his ow end of the stoJ.'7. Be tel.le 

us c:bout the material he vas cienied.1 the wam:1rJg messages he didn't 

get. He 1111.P~ no mot1ves 1 lle ma.ltes no deductions from unproved 

b1,potheses. L "Is tbia a slap a.t 1'heoba.1.d? :J But the book is 

' 

7 

\' 

I 

------------ -- ___________ ._,, __ -~---

--- -·--
REF ID:A485355 

sutticien't to nail dovn the ixLesCS.pable point: the blame tor the 

loss of the Pacific Flen batiaesbips rests aqua:re.11' on Washington 

not on the men at Pearl. 

But on 'the back of the dust JacketJ, :repeated from the las't; chapter ot bf.s 

book (p. 186), Atlm.:1nl K~mel sqs :: 

Again and again 1n Drf mind I have reviewed the events tbai; pre• ce~ the Japanese attack1 set~ 'bo de'tel'.ll1ne U I was m3URU'ied 

1n dravJ.ng trcm 1;he orders 1 d.trectives and iltf'omation that we:re . forwarded to me the concl.usioxis that I did. 'rhe fact that I then 

thouaht and now think '1118 concJ~usions vere sQ'Ulld when based u,pon the 

1nf'ormat1on :t received1 bas sustained me dur1na the 1ears that have 

passed since the first Japamene bomb tell on Pearl BA'rbor. 

When 'the in:rormation a~l.la.ble in Wuhington prior to the attack 

was ~ disclosed to me lc>ng &ft.er 1 I was appalled.. NothiDS 1n 

111' ex;penence ~ near~ :torty .• tvo years service in the Nav had pre• 

pared m.e tor the actions of tbe big'hest otticiaJ.a in our govel!'mlent 

wb1cb denied iibis vi ts.\. inton11&tion to the Pearl Harbor COlllDlmders. 

If those in authority viahed to e:ngsge in power policies, the 

least th&'t they should have &me was to advise their naw.l a.nd mili .. taJ."7 comimtnders what tbe7 we:rca endeavoriDS to accomplish. To 

utilize the PacU'ic Fleet and. the Arzq forces at Pearl Harbor as a 

lure tor a Japanese attack w11bhout advis:Lng the cQ111DN'ld.er·1n-chiet o~ the neet and \he c()1!11DBJ1de:~ of the Arm:! base at Ra.wa.ii is H<·rtetbing I em whol.11 unab1e to cc:=prehend. 

While I am still able to do so, I feel that I must tell the 

storr ao that those who toll.oil mar ~ realize the imperative 

neceas1v ot tum1shil3g ~ :Wit.val and militu.'7 cozm.anders a.t the 

trcmt vi th f'ull ar.vi clear iuf'i,ru:tion. o.aJ.;r in this WfJ:8' can the 

future secur:tv of our cOUDtr:r be preserved. 

Dr. Morton 1n commenting '"I>On Admiral Kimm.el 's Stoq aqs (p. 461): 

'. 

· Mmiral K11mel •a case re:sts \WOD "1le all.ega.Uon 1;hst he was 

•

1 deliberately denied inf"ormat11on available :1n Wasb:tngton. Rad he 

had this intor.ma.Uon, he sap, he would have know the Ja.panese 

:tntended to strike Pearl H&rbror and could have adopted measures 

to meet the attack and miniu&i·ae 1ihe losaes. 'J!hese mee.sw:es 1 wbicb 

he outlines, are of considerable interest, \bough one wonders to 

wha.t exten't they are guided b;r hindsi&ht· 

Dr. Morton cont:tnues M fo!lmm: (p .. 462) 

8 

. ---~~-·---------- ----------
REF ID:A485355 

To su.ppon bis case / Admi'ral Kimel draws on the evidence 

presen'ted d.ur.lng the :tnveetiptions of the Pearl Harbor attack. 

!his evidence, he cl&ima was not onJ.¥ obscured ai the time bl3 

was evaluated to prod.Uce a desired result. Inconsistencies in 

the test:t:m.olQ' were ignored, and 1mport;1m:t questions ra1sed dur• 

1ng the hear1qs left unanswered. He cbaqes bias on the part 

of 1nves'\igating officers aud a d.eliberai;e effort to vb1te•wash 

the adm:lnisva'bion and block e.u ~al ae&l'ch for tb.e Wuth· 1

'The Ccmgreaaional 1DvestigatS.on1 " Kimel declares / "vu governed 

'b7 the •jorttJ' pa:r't,J'1 the Deuiocrata. ':he hllge volumes or 

test1Jaol>J ill that 1Dquirt aened to contuse the public mind as 

to '2te s1gnU'icance at '1ie tac:ts and to smother testilllorQr dama&• 

:lag"° the administration." 

Respona1bilit7 tor Pearl Iiarbor, Iaanel chal'ps1 rests 

aqμa:relJ ~ tb.e lhoulders of. his aupertoi-s in Waahin&tOn and. ul:t;Sma~ on 'the CQ1111l8!D.der-:1l1-cbiet, PJ.teaident Roosevelt. 

"Until this day1 " he writes, ux have kept silence on the subJect 

at Pearl Harbor • • • Now / hovever / I deeD1 1 t 'llfl' c1uV to speak 

out. Wb&t took place in Wash:J.ngton ll\1St be so clear~ placed 

on the public record t.bat no group ot pex-aons in adminia'tre.U ve 

power will ever dare -aa1n to invite another Pearl Harbor and 

pl.ace the blame on the ottice:rs in '11e tleet and 1n the fiel.d.." 

~e charges that Admll'al Kimel mates a.re not new and vere 

beirlg circulated even before the end ot the war. The Japanese 

attack on December 7 had unified '1\e coun\3:7 and ended tempor• ~ ~ debate between the 0

Isol.at1onists" sad. the ttinterven1i1oniats 0 which had Jllll.l'ked. the p~ 'years" All classes and 

pa.J."ttes closed ranka tor the duration o'f \be struggle. »ut even 

dm:ing the W&1'1 there had bee~ a recognition of. the political 

implications involved in the question of responsib1lit7 for 

Pearl Harbor, and tba aam.me~tration had tit.ken steps to preserve 

the record. Six invea'Ugat:Lcms had been conducted even vbile 

the contlic'f; raged., all but; one ~them bJ" the Arm:/ and Navy. 

Aa a result, a large volume c>f t.estimDJQ' and documents tba\ 

might otherwise have been lont was assembled. But the require• 

men.ta ot wan1me securi v aml a unified national effort made 

public debate impossible. 

The wv over, :partisan ditterences reappeared, e.ud critics 

of President Roosevelt began to challenge openl1 the views so 

widely held during the W&1" 'flea.rs. fhe cooling of passions and 

d.1a:Ulus:ton with the poswar world raised turf;her questions 

about American part1c1.patton in the va;r. m.stonans and 

publicists 1 as theJ' have done a.ner everr war j sought to 

reassess 1;he causes ot the wsi- and to :glace Roosevelt's policy 

1n the la.:';er perspec1;i ve of Am.erican h1stoq. 'rhus 1 in the 

;res.rs follo'Wing the end ot the conflic't1 a new in'ber,pretation of 

the events that bad. preceded. 'the var and o'f iihe conduct · ot the 

wa.r itself emerged. · 
REF ID:A485355 

The foregoing t1Dal. paragraph of the extract from Dr. Morton• s 

article brings us d.1reC'tJ¥ '° iale principal revisionist contention which 

vUl be exerrrh.?.ed in the pt'eaent b1·och\U"e. The CODtention, ea noted above, 

was first stated in 1945 bf John T. Flzynn1 one ot the ea.r:t.;r e.ud. most 

vi\riolic ~vilers of P:resident Rcc1s-s-ve.1 .. t, 1n a. pe.Dqlbl.et entitled The 

- Final SeC1'et of Pe~l Barbor 1 in v.hicll he revealed the fa.ct that. U. S • 

~ts ha!l solved i;he J29:mese <lipJ.Olll&t1c cocles and ciphers bef'ore 

the Pearl. Harbor a"8clt. Hie eon:tiEaition was that the intelligence 

derive<l or derivable tram the solVEld and translated mesaases, the so· 

\. 

cal.led MAGIC 1 told ext:t.cW vhere atld when the Japanese vere going to 

strilte; iiiba.t this priceless info:ru~tion Roosevelt deli'bere.tel.1' k.eg1; hom 

Acl:m1n.l Kimel and General Short, 1rith the rea..sul" that tbe Japanese vere 

able to make their ai;tack With CCIUJ~lete surprise; and that the loss of 

men aucl ships that resulted tb.eref'l:'ODl, however unfortunate 11; was tor 

the u. s. and. e. few Amerioa.n fem.U:Les, unified the countr;r. That, cJ&Sms 

Fl.1'm1, \18S Rooseve1t'a aim. At a.n;ir rate1 as Dr. Morton indicates, the 

Japanese e.tte.ck on Pearl Ha.r'bor emied ~e debate betveen the "isolation• 

1sts" and. the n:tnterven,iomsts. ti 

10 

-- --·--
REF ID:A485355 

Distilled down to its essence, there:tore, the tint question is: Did 

MAGIC rea1.J.7 con1;a.in clear and weQ)llivocel indications M to exactl.;y where 

and when we would be hit bf the Jap:!S.aese in ~e lflll" "Which Rooaevelt knew, 

or was expectiJ3,g1 or at least. felt 1it"'S.S 1n the of'fi~'l 

Much bes been 'Wrl."te:n on this :~a,sic ~W:S'iicn; ht:md.reds of thous~ds1ndeed1 miJJ.:lone ot vords 1 iA f&."t--ha.ve be: pu:blish::;:d on the que3t:ton in 

an attemv;>t to answer it; e1"11e:r.~ aiT1'mati ve:cy or nep.:t1 veJ:y. It some 

Americana now scoff a' the v"nole business and sq that a.ll that could be 

e&id on the po:t.n-ti was afd.d yefi.'rS a.so-wi.q not stop flosgiDs a deao. horse'llet them note that. in IW sts.td ..-.u0. unacnse:tioneJ. e. newspaper ae The WaJJ. 

Street Journal wre appeared a loug review of Adl'J.i.ra.l Kinl'mel 's, Bto=z in 

~ issue for l.4 J~ 19551 acco~ed by a !e~ editorial entitled. 

"Pearl Harbor" in the same issue; l.et them note, too, another le~ 

ed1'°1'ial eu'titled t

1

1'fth of the b:n:;ike4l CQ&..:;u ill t'he is3ue ot ~ seme 

newapaper for 21 Ja.nua.J7 :;.9;;s; J.et 1mcm rcai abo the· ~r's c.r.:~zen 

"Letten to the Editor0 in tlle 1SGtt.ea tor 2:J. Ja.nv.a:ey'; 3l .r~~., 4 Web• 

:ruary, and 6 Feb~ 19551 au cmmentillg upon the ~ editonels and 

the book J"eview Dm'bioned. a.bow. ~~ question tb.eref'olle ca.n b7 no meua 

be said to be ndead and. buried; n UL f'act1 even ~ this dtq ~terences to 

the "MAGIC" that vu avail.able and was no°' used at the time aZ :Pearl Barbor 

keep popp:1nc v;p in the 6aU1 newspnpen, in per1od1cals 1 and 1n books. 

FW w•ce, thel"e are WO ''Lette2:-s to the Editor" 3.ll the Was~ Pos-t 

on Pe&l"l Jivbor as recently as 3l December 1956 end 4 Ja.n~ l957. A.ml. 

ll 

-------------------- ---- ---~---
REF ID:A485355 

$8 I 'W"J!'ite this brochure word. has ~iust com.e that 'the Chicago Tribune is 

about to pu'bl1eh auother (rev:1s1onj.st1 no doubt) article on the aubJeot. 

Let me tbere:t'ore repea' the qi;res'Uon: ~!cl.;~~ re!J:ll contain clear 

and un.eqUivocal ~a~t.~ as !P .,::ota2!1.Z where apd. "when ve voul.dJ.! hi~ 

bz: the Jal!!le.ae in 'tbr..:.-w.!!. ~~.!!~-!-.~ev,. or ~ e?W!~t • ..0!" • .!1?.. 

least :telt wae_t:,l'."_9~ab~~ to eon!_? 

In th1a brochure I sh&U attenipii to d.isi'IOse of this basic qumstian: 

in a ra~ simple and.1 :tn rq opiid.on1 a def1nitive umier by e:ttacl:ing 

it in what -_,. aem to be a l"O\t'Dd-e'houb Wf11• But .jw!t before get'\;ing 

rtgb:t down to iil I ¥1.ll pl&ae be:f'oi~ the reader a Rhon extract from a 

book published late 1n 1956 b;y a l'E~centl1-deoee.sed and s. hi~-respected 

(b1 certain Amel'icau Who knew '.bim)I Japanese whose words '..tere such- be 

died 1n prison-as "° 1ndicate tbai~ he had no parl;icul.e.r reason tor hiding 

'1le truth. I refer here to the 'boctk written by Sbigenori ~ago, the men 

vho 'itU Japanese Minister of ForeiE'1 Attatrs at the time of the attack on 

Pearl Harbor and across whose desk ~re ce~nl.7 aust have pe.ased "'11.e 

moat important ot the messages t.o Emd :1'rom. the Foreign Office and Japanese 

abaasaclors, ministers, and consul.£1 abroa.d.1 

I't 1• to be noted, Ud indeed emphasized, before Soin3 into th.ia 

phase of 1;he subJect, tb&t &t the 1;ime or '1le attack the onl,y orn>WP'&.Phic. 

smeu vh1ch the u. s. cryptanal.y1;1c agencies had solved. 817A were able to 

Q'Btems used by the Foreign ottice;. Whatever intelligence the u. S. 

authorities ~rere able to obtain trca MAGIC tbei-erore must have been und 

12 
REF ID:A485355 

-was clea:rl.1 derived from Japanese d:1plomat1c COllll'UD.1cations. Wi tb. tbia 

tact in m:lnd let us take a look at a;n item of aucb interest in 'rogo •s book 

(pp. us....u9 and. 197) .: 

. It :ts not .ditticul:b to cotLce:S.ve \he ~1; ot the ~ ot 

the m1l11;art power traa the fact t.hat cm ~ eve ot the Pacific 

War auch a t\Uldwn'8l. datml u1 the total tmmage of Japanese naval vessel.a-not to speak of the displacement of the gigan1;ic 

battleships Yamato lind ~uaaa1t;~ or the plan to attack Pearl Hal'borwe.a v18iJ.an~ld 'trCii le· lmoYJ.ed&e of the civ:W.an cabinet 

, atzd1ters ~· · General 'rO&O even i~d m.e in Sugu&o Prison tha'fi 1 t was 

onl1 &1; '\he IMLTE ·the;~ he bad ~~1ra1; J.emm.ed bot the Japanese task 

force Which C&lTied out the at1~ on Pea;rl Ba.i'bor had assembled 

e.1; W.tolrappu Bq on lO ?fo.-be1~ 1 and weighed. em.choJ.' for lta.wa:J.i on 

the momiilg of the 26'hl The !lig'b ccwnd Q.id not di "f\il.ge :I.ts 

secrets even to the tuU ceneral. who was Preaier and Min1ster ot 

War,; it 1G eu7 to c:ouoe1"1e hoi1 other ldnis1;en wi-e treated.. 

• • • • • • • • • • • 

The var decision vu thus made, Nld. various problems which 

wolald. a:r1se w11;h Vie opelling at the war vere submi'tted to :meetinga 

of tbe L1aiaon Conference. ODe th1Dg wbich-needless '° sq-vu 

not diacusaed in the Liaison c.onference waa operational aspects 

of the 1mpend'1na hoaUliUes. It waa disclosed at 'the Dm'E tbat 

t.be naval task force under Adm:Lral ttagumo had ae.Ued from. llitoka,ppu 

Bil' on 26 lfoveaber UD.de:r orders to strske Pearl Barbor, and in its 

Judgment the tribUJJAl :made 'the absurd finding tbat the aeheduled 

attack we :txieel,y diacussed at. tbe meeting of the Liaison Confer• 

ence on 30 November. We had, of course, no knowledp of the plan; it was tbe invariable pi-actice, of the bigh eOllml.tld not to di wlge 

to civilian ottieials, au.eh as. us 1 tJ1.fl' scrap ~ 1ntonaa.Uo:n bear• 

:tng on these h1slll¥ secret o.pe1n.t1ons, and ~ tamUier Wi1ih 

the &)"Stem w:Ul read' l~ unden.tana. our total la.c1t of knowledge of 

them. (rus condition is sutf11c1entlJ' well illustrated by the 

tact, 'Which I ha.Ye llel1t1oned eW!ewhe:re, t.bat Tojo told. me 'that 

:tt was on'.11' at the Dm'E trial. itseU that he tix-st learned atO' 

opeJ.i'&tional. d.eWls o't the Peei.rl Hai-bw attack; a mass ot addi.• 

'1on&l evidence vu adduced a1; the 'trial showiDS tbat the ctv.Uian 

merabers of \he Cabinet had. no prior k:nowledae even of the existence ~ the pla.n to attack. Ha1rai1.) 

It 11 e. t'a.ii' 8:ltl logical dedu.(~ion to con.elude that it 'logo wu 

•l.lJJl& the truth1 t.e. 1 that tb.e 1:1'V1JJ.An membeirs ar the Japanese Ca.bin.et, 

!!,Cl~ Pr:lme, M1m.!J~~ Tp JO 8ZJ.d. ,!;he Foreie ~ster himself, had no 

13 
REF ID:A485355 

prior lmovledge ot the plan, inoJ.udj- ot cowse "11.e exact a.a.te on Vhich 

t.he Pearl BN.'bot- attack was to take place (as set b7 the Japanese high 

cOllllfmd) then the MAGIC messages thtmmelvea 1n 1;be C011.1Dl\m1cat1one %raa 

and to the Foreign Office could not poas1bl1' have contained arq def'lnite 

intoiution1 let al.one a cleai--cll't iatateaent, on this vert :tm;ponaut 

poin'fh .bf! U the MA.GIC messages dj~d no• contain ~s information or 

••Wment how could President Rooseirelt or arq mem'ben ot hie :l.mrl1ed1ate 

official 1 or the hew ot u. s, Ar:tlfl an.cl u. s. lfav intell1gence 

swts know traA the MlGIC messages esactJ.t where a.ud when the a~ 

- was COlld.Dgi But tbia ques•ion ~ &i'ise: did Toso tell the truth in 

bis book? It he did, bow are we to ex.plain cenain of the MMIC messages 

~ reCOl'da ot PBR contaiD'l 

Atte~ l"e•reading the hundreds c>f MAGIC messages that were exchanged 

beWeeD. the Foreip Min1&W7 and :I.tis ottices abroad in the 7ear 19411t 

seems faatastic, :t.t. s~ oUl" creciuli ti' 1 to believe that :~•ogo did not 

~ vh&t was be11:lg pl.aimed. To mel1tion onlJ one set ot messaaes 1 the 

"dead line" messages-after which 0•1ibSngs are automatic~ ao1ila to 

happen ° -how could. 'l'ogo nab kn.aw wblt.t was being :plemlecl? How a.i.-e we to - expla1n them, U he didn't know tba~~ the u. s. was going to be atw.cked? 

But let it be remembered that we &%'1~ norr re-reading the messages hem the 

vantage point ot hindsight. 'l!here :Ls not a single message that can be 

said to contain categorical evidenc(a p;roviiJ& that. Minister 'l!ogo must have 

know t.ha'ti Pearl Harbor vu to be t.ltle taqet. In 19461 and even now 

vhen,je re-zoead 1;hose messages 1n Pim l2 of the PRR, I reaJ.i~e that it 

la ~ic that aomebQdl: :1D U. S. In;~elligence did not or aoUl.d. no1; 

I 

see 1-bat the blow was beiDS prepare:l agairurb Pearl Harbor. Bub if ve I I 

14 

------ - ___ ,__ --------
REF ID:A485355 

'believe Togo was an honora'bl.e man uLd was telHng the truth., then we~ 

conclu:le t'bat he end his closest ass1oc1ates 1n the Foreign Ottice were :t1 o 

bette:r at 1ntel.Ugence 'tball ou:r own in'iell1gence authorities J They knew 

or o~ S\leased tbat ff~ was i;o:tng w happen after 29 November 19411 

but th.el ~dn '1; knoY ·~ vhere .. pr Ybenl Or sbaJ.l we assume iha.t aomebod1' :S.n 1rhe Japanese Fo:re1sn Offlc::e J1 some subord.1na~ ~ Togo / 1;he :<"oreie;n 

Mim.ster, was "in on the seCZ'etn-axLd itt was he that took ca.re of' all the 

mesaaaes that ;pointed to Pearl Ha:rbc.r-: Could be I Could easut be S Rolr 

marq messages going ol3 ot &rf¥ 011e <>'£ our own lvge executive departments 

a.nd stp.ed bJ' the Seeftta:q' thereof are &Ctuall7 seen b7 the Seczietar1.<& 

But; I do not Wish to 'bele.bor td1e po:Urt;. Ln us -~ sq 1;bat it is 

qUi te possible tha't Togo sav ttone o'J~ tl1e orucie.J. messages o:-., ':!hat :Lq 

aon probable, that he sav thea but" not beillg "in on the aecretstt o'! the 

JQanese hip caam.ud.1 <11.d no1' dnw the coneet ded.Uctions-th&'t 'the u .. s. 

was to be atte.cked.1 w1tho~ wand1J841 at Pearl Harbor in the ear]J hours 

ot 7 December 1941, an<1. that the o'b•lect ot 1;he a1;taak was to deatrc>J' the 

tr. s. Pa.cUic Fle~ it possible. But let us also remellber that rewl1ng 

the MAGIC messages in 1946 or 1n 19~)6 16 aua.l.ogcus to tiea.d.ing the fiMJ. 

cbapW of a cleteet1ve ta.J.e-.betore the preaed:tng ohaptenJ, With their 

:ralse and purgose~ :raisleadinS eluei~ m.1e~ b;r the author to evoke 1-b.e 

reader's :l.fltereat. In i-eacuns sueh a detective stoey" in the normal. me.nner 

'1>.e t1na1 cb.apte:r often makes the rc:!ader feel interior 1 even silJ.11 tJlat 

he could not see 'tale truth., the re&L elements ot the JQ'ateq right from. 

the begS.nm.ng. The Japanese were gc!tting intelligence i-e:ports-call them 

U you. vUl.1 11ord:l.nas."1 sw reports" frm several u. s. mil1ta;ry bases 

15 
REF ID:A485355 

'besides kwaii1 such as the PhUipp:lnes, Panama Canal, Seattle, aad San 

Francisco. It is true that Ja.paut:.?si! ~at in Pearl Ha:rbor seemed. to 

be &lld actually was mucb g;Nl&ter thlm at 8J21' otbeio base; bu.t one could 

aJ.ao srq that this grt'.ti.ter :tnwrest stemmed ~ a perhs;,ps Justifiable 

tear by t.ll.e ~fa.pwae "1:\at the u. s. Pa.e1f1c Flee' !!Et sortie some da:rk 

night a.nu. n:rike t.be t1X'st blow a.t .J"apan. ~ u well as the u. s., 

did not wmt to 'Uc teken by &'U.rpris:el Perhaps an 1nwlligencc specialist 

Vitb. the p1-oper kind of ~nation migb.t have hit~ the real ~ason 

tor the greater Japanese interest i:n Pec.rl Ha.t'bor 1 but who can be cenain 

ot tbis? All tbl4 can Gatelf be sa.:td :1n rega.rd. to the ~ogo stGtement is 

this: Both he and Pi"ime M1n1ster T( Jo 'ltJIJ:3' have been told1 or 1;.btq 1!JllJ:1' 

have guessed; that. Ja_pan was going to otri.ke-but :not exactlJ where Wld 

when. 'lh..~e two very :JJn.portant elements the Japanese h18h conmiand kept to 

1 taelf even a.f'ter the task force left Sape.ne1Se w.ten. And tor tb.ose 

:rev:Ls1on1s'ts who '1drlk the u. s. note of ::..7 llovember 1941 was a.n uJ.t.tma.tum. • IO<i_tl,. lb 

.a. b' it va.s that note -w'hieh ~i~d. ott the attack on Pearl,. let 

them iwuminate on the tact tba.t the Jape.neae taelt force. wb1ch attacked 

Pearl left J"a.panese waters the: ~ 'before that note was sent ott by 

Seoreta:r.Y of State RUll. Ias note cay he.ve constituted an u.1:~ima.tu:nbut it did. nab b~ on the attack. The attack vu plamled vert ~" 

mon'ths before tha.1;1 &J4.1 to :a:epee.t,t.T.S e.J.re~ J.1$;im.ched. to the ;point o~ 

ha.villa depait"ted ~ J8.l,Jnnese ve.te?•s .. 

lj~ there :ts ~.no·tlle1• rev1s1oni.ct praf) 1 v.nd. a ver:1 im,porto.r.d; one 1 I 

must eq>hasize 1 Vhich I wish t.o undLermine 1 tor it should be sreatl.1' veak• 

ened. when consideration :ta gtven tc• another a:rgum.ent which 1$ so obvious 
REF ID:A485355 

and s.in{pl.e that 1 ~ baa been a source1 o'Z asWntebment to me that the :revi• 

stom.sts 'themselves h&ve not thoU&}lti of it. {Paren~ti~lly I vaut to 

preface the a.t'g1Den1; by saying tbat aus hesitancy I m.igb:t he.ve 1n staUus 

it melts ~ wheu I 1·~.ne. that 11evex•a.:.1. vt:-l"j' ablG nc."•-c.l ~::;torte.us w-J.th 

"4lom. I have d.iucusaed 1t expresaed ~i.stunistuent thc.t it ho.d. ri.ct h:!:therlo 

been mentioned. ~.e ot t11.aa said~~ 2:~ :tu a rc:ccllt pe::-soneJ, letter: 

"In re'trospect I ne.l12oe '\ba~ sOitJ.e C)Z ~ idc~ ~ ;;o-.;. mentioned. e.'ba>.:t the 

events l.ceiling uy to the s.tta.ck on i·~cr: ll'a:rbor (like Col1llllbl:.3 • e'6 

i;ri.cld) are ata~ :tn th<:.:11: sil!'i':~city t.a~ dbvio122ne1Js-·W1'°'...ic4 1~ pro ... 

babl:f vttg no one ll~ her.atof ol.16 rcc.:)e;r..izee. th.cir ~~rte.n'=c." ?;~ co:>J.• 

tenti.on.1 I tb.ink1 v~~>.ts ·t&killg s. n::tt loo!t e.t c. ceri...un phs.::e cf! t'b.e 

Pearl mr~or myste1'3'-U' indeed ~~ 1a ~ .i.veteq u.ilOi>.t tb.o facv..x~ 

enw~ :tnto our b~ ts.ken 'sf au:~-:1.!1~. 

17 

------·--~----
REF ID:A485355 

3. A NEW LOOK 112 THE REVISIONISTS A~ONS OF CONSPI'BACY 'ro KEEP 

mnm. AND SR<m m m DARK 

The reV1s1on1sta• ~; wld.ch I hesitate to te,pea.1; (since :Lt has 

~been stated in tbia brochurEtJ but its repetition DlfJ.1" mate what I 

have to aay cqatal oleu-) Z'U118 as 1~oUova: rres1dent Rooaevel.1; deeper- , 

ate:cy- needed a good :reason t~ Jus~1)ing .Amdca •s entr)r into World War 

II. Re needed it 1n ordel" to aave 1;he Bn'11h fral.utter ~ea\ b7 G~J 

Frauee was alread1' d.ovn and outJ B3:'itain was next on Hitier•s list-and 

then "11e United Sta.tea. ('l?he l'e'Yis:l~oniaw de:q this most vehem.entl,y, but; 

e~ that liitJ.er had. acne thun tar vaa s\rictlf in accorc1ance with 

1;b.e plans he oll'blined 1D Me~ Keg.>1) In "1d.s conneotton, and aa I w1te 

this, there bas J\1St come ou\ a bool~ which nt.WJt be regarded as authorita• 

Uve and vhieh is e&Ued. '.rhe O.rmau. W!!iODS and. Secret Wes>ons ot World 

War II, bf Rudolt Lusar. Lusar was head ot the 'feclmical Ams De;pat"tmen~ 

ot the Webrmaeht. S:e diacloses the:~ Gel'Jll8ZJ1' vu also building the Keinkel 

343, a bombel.- capable ot reacb1ng t1b.e United States a.vA return1rJS v.l1'b.out 

retueJ.JJ.ng. Several ~ Ce planes ·wre :reat.11' at. the end o-£ the Vat-. ~ 

book also says th&°' 1t ws ~11 planned to stage the tirs\ air raid 

on the United SU.tea in Ma1' 1945. ;So much for the reVisionis' contention 

t.b.a.t '1ie benign Herr lI1 tleio had no des:S.Sns wbawoever on the United staws; 

tor it 1B verr cleai.- that he pl.a.uned to bomb this countr;y Just u soon as 

he bad finished oft England.) 'l?lle :President wanted to get the u. s. in1io 

the conflict not ~ 'bo save :Sri ta.in butt, ultimawl-¥, also to save the 

u. S. Timely action vas needed. He bad goaded liitler ey several 

unneutnl acts in the Atlau1;ic, as well as in establlsbinS ce:r:tam u. s. 

18 
REF ID:A485355 

logiatica.l relations With l3r1ta.1n ( 11:lend·l.easei'1 the 1;ransfer of 50 u. s. 

des1;roJ'era 1 etc.); but H1 tler was tcio clever to be pushed to the point 

Vhere Ge~ would ha.ve w declare war on Am.eric& premature~ or vhei-e 

a<a:naan action would 3ustif1 an Amel1.can decle.ration ot var on Ge~ 

bef'ore Ge!'!!!Jl ~. !'eaC!l tor such ac~. Hitler realized, as vell as 

Pl"es~ Roosevelt, that what ~.can did. held 1;.be e.naver to Ge1"!111.n1's 

problem. Pres1den't; Roosevelt knew 1ihat the Amer.Les. :people were not, at 

all anxious to 'be di-a.vn into the Eu:t~opean wa.i"'J but he felt that 11; ws 

absolute)¥ necessa:rt th&\ scme'piy be "engineered," so to spe&Jt, in order 

that 'the TJ11 s. vould1 will¥-rd.l.1¥1 l~e draw into the contliot. Thie, the 

revisionists contend, as I h&ve rei1~ra.ted, Roosevelt telt vas neceasaq 

to aave England; it was inciden~r also intended, 'they contend, to 

cU. veri attention from '\he failure o~r the Nev Deal to bols'ter 1ibe 'bsd.11' 

s•nc ·~as a :result of d.etei:tive mane~ policies and other 

:tnternal d1.t'fi.CU1.1;ie&. u. s, parti•::1pa'\ion was a:Lao a. DetlOCra'Uc obJec• 

l i. ' 

tive1 the,' say1 fOJt Roosevelt's ree:Leo-tion; and., of course, it was desir• 

able to preserve the Rooseveltian p:r:-estige. ~ long...arawn out e.r~nts 

with the Japa;nese aigb'b, in viev of the 'l!ri--pa:tite pact of the German1 

Italian, sad Je.pa;nese Axis, and des:~ite Ilitl.er*s ~ strategr ot not 

succumbina to AmeX'iean p~voLation :m tho Atlantic, serve his purpose. 

Amei"icans did not like the Japal).eee ~ and vere dis'U'us1;ftal of these 

Orienta.ls. Je.pa.nese alibitionG in 'the l"e:r East ~ d:i.s.trust oi~ the 

Japanese kept popping up eveJ:'IWhere in the American pt."ess and public 

o,pin:lon. »~ noosevel't; tel.t the't there 'UO.S one !'~ e DOD; to getting 

in'to a shooting 'W8o1' with the Japanese. In the vords of Mr. Stimson, bis 

--- -··-----
REF ID:A485355 

Secl:'etal7 ot We:, unfortunate V01"da c)ne ~~now adld.t, it was all a 

ma'tte~ of how th\} Japa.ue.tJe u could be me.ueuvered tnto the :pos:tt:ton 01! 

t:trtq the f!t'et shot," o\berw:tse the American :people vou1.d. 'be lut~ 

&bout a wari with tb.em. MA.OIC 1 ~t :Ls, the 2eore'I 1nwU1gence 'f-'tic:h 'the 

~olution of the Je.penese ~lon!at1c i~ooim.'lUlications ~ ava.Us:bl.e to the 

Roosevelt Mminirstre.t:t.on 1n peat flb·tm.d.a.nc~, ;px-ov.t®d e. golden i..11ir:ortun1v-so the revt.1om.ate1 including Adm.ir&i. Theo'bald.1 :f'e:rventl1' bi;allevo. 

I b&ve o.l.l"ealf.7 s.nd. ?r.Ore t.b.en once eta.tee. 1n this bx-oohure tbta.t tho revi• 

'111on.Uts ~ CO?J.Vinced. that !$GlC told ille P:rest\.tent exs.otly \fh,~ and 

where their attel:llt was goine; to 'be ~.~unehed: in the ear~ hours cf. the 

mo~ of 7 Deeember 19411 at Pea.x·l SJ»:'bor. ~1' •,..'i·tbhold:tll$ b'om the 

u. s,. conm.no.ern at l'eax-l n&t'bor this pr:tvat.e lrJ.lowJoedt)e wh!.cb. :E'reaid.ent 

Rooe'!:"'\'elt eame1 ~ MA.GlC-1;1'.e hotsc 1s JOO\\\li,, BO to opeo.k-et1E1.blea the 

Pl'es1dent to .a.ccompllsh h1$ hean's desh-e. v!ith this higbly secret 1nfot~ 

aa.tioo he coultl mane1wer tbe Ja.pnnf:ae so that they would fire the :f'ir:;t 

shot; he reaJJ.zerlt 1'he1 concede, the.t there would be some lonneif of meu 

e.ud ships, of cou..."'"2!e 1 as $0 er>.J.l.OU.'ll::f 21#e.t(.>d in the extra.ct i':'Om Pro:t'e:mor 

Ba.rn.ee llbich ~f'M quc.~et't above 1 but tiheue l.oFiSf'l'S / th.$7 cont"nd.1 he vou.td 

regard ns j\Wt:t.fieG:. in the 1on,s run 'b;:r ss.ving En.gtnnd, Fl."'a.ttce., and, lc.ter 

on, A.'!J.erl.ca :i"'rom the Axis Pove11S-atLd it. vo1a.d. ~!lt.cille:nta.l~ ea.ve h:tu own 

i;irestige a.nd 1nslll"e h:ts ~election. 

The iq,lorta.n.t el.emen:~ in the f't:,:eiego1.Q&. ~S'JJ»Mnt; let it t.e noted, is 

that, to quote t~ Sec;~ St.twwn'a di.a:-~":! ~ .. bit, Japan wns. io be 

'':maneuvered into 1." ::os:tt:T.nn t'Y!! "'.J.'iil~ the ~r~t shot. 11 The tllDllel.tve;r, 

e.cco~ to the rev:tsivn:t.sts, 1ncl1~'¥. 'i.l.'!:lng 'the ships of the tJ. s. 

---- ------- ---------
REF ID:A485355 

Pae1tic PJ.ee1; as a llU"G; 1;bat is ~r, "11.q ~, Roosevelt insist;ed. on 

havtq bt fleet based on Pel\t'l l-Imt'bor ins~ of on '1le west coast ot . ~ 

' .:;,~ 

the u. s., as A~ Ricbardson, K:~•a predecessor, v.t.ahed. BU't lei; 

be noted that Mla.Ual Richardson *s obj~~iona stemed from pureJ.3' J.ogis• 

ti.cal comidera.tions 1 such as eas:Le:~ ma~e an4 repair; and. :morale I <"•~ ........ 

'' '1 l ~\, ~ 

ot the sailo%*s eir\e~d mw the piC'~~liawa.ii was a. long war trm 'home" 

tt# the men and otficen of the tleiet.. (~ Ricbard.aon had. not the 

3ligh"tes' idea "114' keeping 1;he tle1e1; at Pearl would deter the Japaueae 

trca doq Ybat "1le7 W.S.ahed. to do i:o. the Far Eaai;. In :ta.ct, he thoutib' 

keepiq the fleet OD the Vea-t Coast vould be more effective. Well, the 

Pres1~, '1te C~er-in..Chiet, 1Udn'\ agree With Admiral Bicharda011-

and. 1iiba't;'s ell~ \JU 1;o 11;. Iii Wrned. out, Ullf'onuna.te.111 tha.1; 

Adm:t.z'al Ric¥rd.son'o viev we.a mol"e neair]¥ ecn-rect. than the President*sbut does that mean 1ibat: 1;he P:reside:A'l; had u.1:t;ertw :mo"i ves in keep1Jlg 1ihe 

:tleet at Pea.r11 I &m •t 1ah1nk so at all.) 

And now tor '1118 counte~ egme11:t on ws a core. 

It we e.aouae tor 'the maaent Ulat the rev:l.a:tom.ns' arpment is vaua., 

Wi:Ia' don •t they ao .1!!" one ate» ~~ It aU that President Roosevelt 

~ necess&.17 tor his J1l.UllOSea, 1:f' all tba.1; he was seeld..D81 uaG "to 

maueuver the Japanese into t'iri.Dg 1ihe tir&t ehot," and it MAGIC con~ 

all that the revisionists claim it conta.ined., would it not have been 

poasible, 'b1 means o't 'libat ver, MA.C!IC to acc<J11plish hie p-&arpose vi'ChoU\ 

Suell a :t;em.bl.e J.oss of Amen.can lives and.1 W11;ho~ loss o'Z m:Jf or the 

ahipa that constJ.wted. ~ apple o'J.~ the President's eye, the Nav•s biS 

battleships'& It Boosevel'9 was so c:J.ever a ;politician and. so M.a.Cbiaveu 1a.u 

' ' 
REF ID:A485355 

in bis strategy as to ~ -qp a ·wa,y of ~ '1le Japanese ~ a 

posits.on Vherein tbq vould be enticed or -.neuvered into fi1'1ns ~ :tiZ'&t 

allot, ehcnil.d one doubt ·e.b.a:t he lacked 1;he iJrCelJ.1gence to have sane one 

sW,p ~in h1s i;binkSn1 Uld. sfqing sOl!teWDg JJ.ke the follow1ng 1;o 

J:Wuelt; . t'El.u:'ekal. I •ve got. iii• MAGIC Will pro'Yide "11e sol.den o:pporturl• 

itJ' I've sougb:b tor so 'llAfJ'I llOl>.t.bs. I *ve hit U;p<>n a pert~ :marvelous 

idea and. opponunt1;tl An absoluiie~ e.nd amaz:l.DSl1' vondedul op,ponun:tvi 

~'he Japanese have to cam to Pea.ri llarbo:r to llllte their aw.prise a.t.taclt1 

an attack ~l,y indicawd b7 tbese MAGIC messages. They have to travel 

aeveraJ. thousand l\Ues, in tact, to pt 1'o Il$'wa1i from Japa.ueae wa~n. 

It ve caught '\ihea i'ed-baa>.ded1 so to apeak, IP!Bil' llaw.11 and. pret'Q'abl,-

Just before the a"8ck.1 :n.o'boQJ' calllld p0saib3" el&1m. "11ey were on a siJlwle 1 

~as reconna:taaam:e misa:t.on-or on ~UYen. W}V"1 v.tth Ja,pazieae-

~can l"elations so 'Cen$e 1 evet.1~ it ~ vere caught as ·DIBilQ' as 500 miles 

ft"cD Pearl lta,rbo;r evlflt7 unbiaaed crJ:Uc vould aa, 'talat tbq realJ¥ 1':tred 

tintl So :t•ll 'brina Kimmel and Short; Nt.:q into~ p1ctu"re-I'll tell. 

thea the sto%7 MAGIC is i;el.Ung 1111. :t 'll se~ ordet' "1la here rigbt 

mtaJ (November 26th, to~ exam,ple) 8Zld. I'll have Manball and S'8.rk coiae 

u. I •u shov ~l am Short the ~ messages. ~n I •11 'tell 

them acaeW,ng like this: Look, mJ' bOJ'S, :you see nov, don •-t :rou.1 vb.at 

1our're 1n an excellens position to do to 'tb.e ?11pe1 You see, don '1; you 

tbat this Wide and &biol~ B•utlleD.tiC 1DfomaiJ10Jl H1'J \hat tbq ere 

ccaiq from Japan \o attack Pearl. Ilarbor 'b7 surgrue at seven o'clock on 

the J101Ding ot 7 Deceaber.; tb.e7•z-e c~ wt~ a i;aak force which w:lU 

c~ be a pJ.'e'iV big one, ;rc1u mat' be sure. !-b vill c~se several 
REF ID:A485355 

e.Ucl'Stt Ca:'riers; '1lq•U lave m&J'be u Jll1Jlrl u 350 e:ir~; incl~ 

dive bombers, ftc., o'£ cow:"Se• Nov u COl'lllJUde:r-:tn..Chiet, I direct ,-ou 

to do ever,ything tJ:aat. will be necess817 to meet them when o:i pefetab]1' 

just before they e.n-ive to launch 1:rhe12:' attack, I direat ;rou to d.es'\ro:t 

themJ knock out the vhole task :f'orce, ~en, planes, and. all, Jus.t 

bef'ore theJ' reach Oahu 1t ;you can. I dit'ect yoU.1 Killlnel, W &et eJ.1. J<JU'l: 

' b&t'Ueshipa and, ot coUl"Se1 7our enrr1erz out ot their b~ poa11"1ons 

at Pearl. Ra.tbor sae ~ ~ing tli.e nia,b.\1 so that 1-b.e:re von•t be fm'I' 

ships t.here fo'r! them to 'bomb. And. I wan.\ 3..1.l JOU?.' planes 1 including 

\bose on ':/OW car:tieft51 the Lexing'km and the Entel"e1'1Gs1 ti> 1n \he oJ.r 

before seven o'el.ock; 7outd. bette::- get ott liVl$S8fleS aii once to 1Ia.1.sey1 

?:tevton, mM1 Brawn to al.en 'bi~ 't!ask :rorce';l; if tih&J •re ~ a.t J.>ea:c-1 get. 

~ back as aoon a.a 10u can; mape ,-Qu 'll "lS.».t. 'to set the Saratoga. 'back 

tram the Vest ace.st to Join your other c~ers 1f" t.here*s o~ill t.Ulie1 

a:o.d. tba'l's OK nth me. Short, l want a.u rou:r an\1..a.irc~ ba"terie~ on 

ahoz-e to be r.~ tll$.U\f!d and wi'1l l1ve mrmmn.1.t:Lon a'\ band, ~ t~ uses 

:.t know 10U don it have tco 111.Uch in the 'tnQ' oi fiab:ter and banbel:' :pla.neu but 

I vant you to wipe out aa m»Jrt ot the:t.r a.:trcfttt a.a ponei'IJJ.e vi'th \I'll.at ,-ou 

have. ll'o~:?t that so~ mesaf16e JOU sen'b about be:tns prepared '!or 

sa'boi;age-1n viev ot these messagE~s tll&tta an. absurd notion. You. ca.n see 

th&' tho Japs are after our fleet a.ud the ;proteot:ton of the :fleet wb.Ue 

&\ Pea.t"l 11;1 :rour job, 1Q"J. mm.;,,, l~e a'l.We 701.tt- ~ 1s wO="k:t~ PX'a,Perl.1-

24 lwu:rs a day. 1. van~ you, Kimn\€:.(":.,; to ge'i your ~e:rs end b&ttlevagons 

~ where they can des1flto1 the ·1~~anese cs.i-riers and escort sbipa tmile 

their aircra;tt are being shot dou:Ll Just beforG the,' reach Peo.rlt TbiGo, 
REF ID:A485355 

'llfl' lad81 U done well Will go clown :l.n b1a1iorf u "11.e mos'b ~ and 

1Qo"8.n.1; battle ot all -.1i1e. lheD much .,i-e !Jqpori;,ant, is the tao"t the." 

it JOU knock ott the~ ""8k force aitld aasw:blg we'll bave mn1mal losses 

ve'll come out t8/lf M.ead 1n naval S'~ because :i:igh1; now ow Paoific 

Flee't :I.a no match to'f! ~ Japanese f~aabined Flen-tbq•ve '°"more 

~hi:pa, taster ships, and. YJ.'ib. J.onge:~ ... ra.Jt&e SUD$ '1l8A we ha.ve, t•m. sorq 

to ea.;y~ Now I don •t \1ml1; JOU to te:U ~ I •w ~d you bee&\lae of 

~"hat MAGIC is tell :IDS us. We ':re readine \heir mosii secret dipl..anatic 

codes and. ciphers, 'Which a:te au tha.t coe.t now an;rhov fight nov1 aaJ. it'a 

Ye't'l ,,MJ)O~t that ~ don •t get :aus:p:te:loua about the eecunv ot ~eir 

Foreign Office oomnmica:biona. I ve.nt tb.em to con1;:tnue us:tng those 

C$'togr&;phic systems 'because the i:in-ornation we •re gett1na out ot 1alem 

nO'fl is ?JriceleaiJ and will be even more ao in the war which w:U1 without 

tl'Ut!Stion ensue when ;you •ve de~d t.J>.eil." task force tor P~l. 'Ib.q 

won't get SW!P1c1ous :J:t rou Will act ~ as "11ough '10111: opera."1.mus 

e.n•1 ae.neuvers are a routine ma~ter ..... ~-bu\ I want ~ 1;o be cm 

Alert No .. l. non''t target tbs."1 on l7 June l91Jo, when we~ t;b.e Ja.ps ' ' 

an'i the Gema.nu were about to gmtg u;p on us,. ve sm mes~u~ges aJ.rectU>a . 

our COl'llllland.ers to put o\4"' toreen a.t Pear1 one. Ml al.en, and tou did 

so; that time, f'ol"tunateiy, :nothing happened. We veiwe ;pZ'Obab~ jm@irlg , . ~' . 

at conclusions then, but now it's dittereni;-nov -we've got i;bis MAGIC.' 

You'll ha.veto go at '1da ~11'1 of course,. so aa not to al.am the 

Japs a:Ad. lead. ~ 1nW eaJ.l.ing the whole ~ ott 1 vbJ.cb. t't1q a~ll ca.;;i 

do, . as we understand. the:1<t plNl. But the :blq>orta.n:t thins is <to keep traa 

d.oi'Dg ~ng tha't 'W'.111 $.lam themf and make 'theia ce.ll the whole Wns ott. 

----------------~--------------------------------
REF ID:A485355 

I want tbem to fire the ftrat shot. I'm wre 10\f. ce.n t.h1nk 'tW ~ to 

won~ "° a. cond11;10Jl or tu.u al.en so "11&\ "11e7'll ~ get suap1c1oua. 

'J?baif· might prec:1:pt1Jaw ea u1Dc1dent 0 and glve tAe Jape an excuae w 18.1' 

\hat we ccmd:t;ted the n.nt. oven act. Beai<les ve don ''t ~ to alaJ.'m 

t.be civil po:pulation, ot CO'l.U'lJtl• Eft~ lalo1niJ that relations ~een 

Japa.n md ou:raelvea a:re ve-q ifense :ri~ uow1 so "1la1; exercieee ant.I. 

ma.euven ot a deteDSlve 'tin>e 'Will cerCainl)" be :te~d as ~ logical. 

and \'b.e U'W1'al ~'to do. lfov I sv.gest lb.a'* JOU ge'~ back to '1mlr 

posts aa fas\ u )'OU e&n-J'OU. tve gort; oni, a rev t.JJqa to prepare a. ~ 

su:r;nae tat '\he S'Utlll'iae tb.eJ' "1l1Jl(k. t'b.e7 1:re &Oil.Ii w sprtng on us • . ' 

' . tei;•a see bow vell you. ca.u knock •em ott. GiV'e •ea helll So l0ll$1 a.ud 

~ ben of luck '° ~u.. About l5Ct m:\l l :lon Americans will p:to0au1" never 

kt1ov hov lllUCh they will owe rou tvc• for vhat I •14 s\tre 1ou•u be able i;o 

4o1 eve11 with what 11\'3.e JOU J>.a.ve,, I Viall JO\\ llad. ~.;....'bU'l fOU know 

what the ia!'oU'ble :Ls. I d.o.a.'t have to tell. l'OU• I" •s 61:1Dl28b mel'e:cy- to 

remind 10u tha" the Selec1aive Se:M':l.ee Act· was ~ in the llou.ie Jue\ 

a few mon\ha ago 'bJ a at.3ori'Q' of ~lust one vote." 

On 3 December t.he P~si~ (s:n this ima&t»Uve account) sends & 

message to Kiiael aad. Shon tiell 1n.E' t'liea 1b.at we •ve aeaipllered , a l®I 

meaaage f:o.--am \ti.a JapaneGc Couul.1 la.ta, iu :itonol:Ql.u to Toqo. , r1Kita. is 

\he Jap whose been Siv.i.n6 them \he a.ape about ships b harbor; he's the 

one whose been ;em1ng ~ok;ro i;.b.e w~1 s'torr of vha:b ~hips er~ anel1o:ree. 

where. :Bub from "1lis 3 i.Jecember :a&t~ssace 1t ·~ c.lr:ar 1'bat sanehov Kita has 

~d o'U\, or J819be sa.ebodJ' in ~~o!qo l1e.q figU.t'ed. out, th&t it woUld be 

a. ~~ble denaw.aen;~ to come all t;11e w;q f;com Ja.po.n to m.ake "1'J.e1r BU.t'l»:ise 
REF ID:A485355 

at;tack onl.1' to find that the 'birds :llad flown the coop. ' So Kita baa 

figured oub a pl.am Whereb7 he atJ4 hi1s spies 1n and around Pearl caa aend 

last word to the Japanese Attack For,ce C~ tb&t everything is OK, 

that the ~t elements of the u. s. Fl.en are still in their berthiDS 

poai 1;1ona, ~ ha.ven 't sud.de~ departed .1UBt a few bOtll'a before the 

attack is scheduled to carnence." (See Message from Kita to 'folcy'o fl 

3 December 1941., P• 267 of ?art 12, :i?BR, a ~sss.ge Vbicb b7 the we:, was 

no1; processed until JJ. Decem.beir 1941 but whieh if there re~ was a con• 

spll'ae1 would certain~ have been done before 7 December.) "Ki ta doean •t 

even bave the aligbte!Jt itlkU.ng, ot co'Ul'Se 1 that I'm teJ.li_'l'lS you, Kimmel 

and. Short, about tbe l!le't-'\\\} he has prepared to ma.lte sure to get vord to 

the Japanea~.:task force th.a~ the bi:rds haven't flown the coop. You~ 

W1~ Naval lrrtell1gence 1 Arrq Intell.1.gence and the FBI at Honolu.l.u to 

grab Kita and Ki ta' s spies on Satura.q and hold them in cold storage 

until after the ita.acmed tor a'"8ck ll~ com.,e off .....and l:la.s 1 ~ course 1 

tailed, because it .Will tau, 11' 1oti 've done 10ur part." 

It a-q reader of i;his brochure thinks that the foregoing tanc1tul, 

:J.magl~ti ve; or con3ectwal account of What might have happened 1s too 

'bizarre tor serious cona:L4.erat1on lErt me call his attention to what 

Admiral Kimmel sqs he could a.ud. wottl.d have done-if ~ he'd been °let 

1n on" MAGIC, or at least had been 1;old what was in those messages. Let 

me quote from his book (pp. 87-88): 

Xo one had a more direct Emd 1-ediate interest in the 

secunty of the fleet in Pearl !!arbor than its eClllD\El,Uder-inch:let. No one had a. greater J!i~gbt than l to know tb.a" Ja.pm 

had ca.rved ~Pearl Harbor :!.ntc) sub-e.reas and was seeking and 

receiving reports as to the PX'E~dse berthings 1n that ~r 

' I 

' 

----------- ------~-- ------------ -------
REF ID:A485355 

~ the ships of the :tlee... I bad been sent Mr. Grev's irepon ea.rlier in the year v:t.t;b positive advice ttam the liav De.p~· 

l1ent tha-t no credence was 'to be plac:.ed m 'Cihe t'UlllOX'ed. Japanese 

pl.aus t01: an a"iaek on Peazol. E:&:r.-boJ:>,. I vu Wl.d '\hen, "1at 

11.0 Japanese llO'Ye aga.}U\ :Peai"l. RarbOJ." &ppe&red u~ OJ:' 

plamied for in '11e toresee&blet tuture.n c~ I was entitled ~ know vthen Wor.u.tion :s.n tl:"' N&v.Y D~~ ccmi,plete~ alter• 

ed the in:f'oiw.'1on ad advice pl:'evious}1', given 'to me. SUl'el.11 I 

vaa entitled to know ot \b.e 11~~ ~\chea between '.rolqo 

a.ud Ho11olu1.u on and at1ier Sept-ember 24~~.;l:94l, which imlica'C;ed. 

that a Japanese llO'"le a.plna't i•eai-l H.al'bor we.a ;plAmled in IJ!oqo. 

Knaw'leclge ot these 1.JRer<~epted. Japa;oaae dispatches would 

have ~ce.ll.1' clwJ&ed the es1,imw of the 111-..uon maM1e 'bJ' 

me and. rq si;att. It would ha.ire auacea'kd ~ i:e-ortei:rtation ot 

our plan:ne4 open.'1ou a' \he outse._ ot 'bo.stil.:1 'ties.. !l'be VB.1.-

pJ.aws of tm Na.v D~ •and ot 1ibe Pacific Fleet, aa well 

as OUl" d:JJ:recti ves and :lnto:a.w.·~ion t.rm. Wuh1ngton pnor to 'the 

attack, 1ndicated trhat the P~::ific Fleet could be most ettec• 

t:Lve.1.J emplo)"ed 8iP'1••" Japa:n through d.1vera1onarr ra:td.s on 

the M&rsballa vben '&be Japanese stnck et, tbe Mal8\Y Ba.l'r1er. ~le<lge ot a :pJrObabl.e Je.pa;oeae ~ on Pearl Rarbe>l" would 

have 

tol"Ce 

attorded. 

aa it vem'Ql'ell 

c op_pori;uniV 

to Rava.11. 

•to ambush 

It would 

• 

llave 

Japanese 

suggesW ~ the 

V1Gdoal of conce~~ our resources w 1bat -41 ratllei- tllan 

COJisening ~ tor \he ~hall Isl.ar.ld.s ex;edit:ton. 

~ K1"'1e1 c1tes instance after insteace, message after message, 

'Wich contaiJled :lD.for-.tion vb:ich1 he Sa.J'S1 would b&ve been of Vital 

impo1'ta11ce to h1a ad VOUld. bave ;p1revented 'tb.e disaster U oJ'll¥ he Md 

been g1 ven the information which he should. have i-eceived as Comms.nderin..chiet oi' the u. s. Pacttic Fleeit. Maf'be1 m.atbe he's rigb:t in his 

con'8n\S.on. tie pioox1m3.:Q' to the scene mish' bave led h1m to make the 

1Jllalinat1ve JUllil 1ib&t was neeesse.i~ in ~~ to reach 'the conect ~olution 

to the aatoundiug 8"°17 tba.t MAGIC mi.s UlltolslUg. , 

Imag:f,nat:tcm bop clov.Q When 01:ie com.tide$ what auch a picture as I 

ll.ave CODJUX'ed 'UP mi&biJ ba'V'e been. J~med baa vha't the Japanese messages 

were a&Jilll-or vha• 't;he revision:tsta cla.1m ~ ole&'t'~ sa.ta.. 

I . 
REF ID:A485355 

I't is true th&• 111 lfaw.11 i&herE' were fewer figb."1zag e.U-CX'afti, both 

~ and Ne.~·, tbAn waiie released fl:-om. the ,Je.:pa.nese ce.rriers vb.en the 

a'~ wes l.aunclwd. Bu.-t "1le eJ.r~lft on 1the u. s. '.Na.v co.mere~ 

and Enter,pr.t.se 1 bad. these carri.en l>een ;pos~:t;toned. on the ba.s:Ls ot the 

info1w:t1on the :revisionists ola1.lli l~sid.ent .R<Xmevelt had, Yould. have 

.as up tor the lack ot aircra.tt on Hmm.ii a.t the time of the a.14iiack. 

In ~nl !9!!!.l!!.Jl..19.!l iihe J\dmiral ~e1 e :rev comments on the 

question ot whethe h1B account ftPlr.<esen\s action that he m1Sh' have 

'f;aken. :BU'b le\ ii; be ~i-ea. tha:t; Wha'\ he s~ :t:-; baaed on biudaiglrt;; 

at.Id 1lbe AdmUal ti-eeJ.1' a.da1ts tbia l~Oint. He OOJltends t:ba.b bad be had 

'1le benefit of '1le inteJJJ.gence wbiclh wa :l.n Wte MA.GIC mesGages Ct.Dd which 

he never received trlle ·~ wauld h~ve been 'ft'q dittereut {pp. 109 ... m): 

~ queati.oa wilt. ati.ae il:i ~ m.nds, o.s it hao in mine: 

Would. the reeeip'\ ot \b.ia info:r:se:'1on have JU.de a ditference in 

the eveata of DeceJl'bexit 71 No IllNl can now e"8.1ie ea a tact. '1la' 

he would have taken a ce:nain 1::ourse ot ~on ;rea.t"S aco had he 

known facts which were then UDlis:D.OW to him.., AU he can give is 

h:1a preaeJ>:t coa:ri.ctd.on1 divoro:Ln.g h11uelt tr<S himlsipt o.s ta:r 

as b:t'l!IN2l7 poaai'bJ.e.t and re-cri•tina the atlloaphere of the pas'b 

o.na. 'the tactora 'Which tJien int:l.uenoecl. h1rt. I give JOU 1111 v.tevs, 

tOl'Sled in this -.mt.er. 

Had I leatned. tltese ntal. f'e.cW and. tb.e ns~s in b&rbo:rn 

aaeaaages on November 28th, 11; :ls 'lilT preaat c;,on.viction that I 

voUld have re.1ectied 0t.he lav,y Di~t•s sugestion to ael1d 

car.riera to wake a.nO. ~· :t woul.4 ll&ve o~ the '1.tlrd 

cn.::r:1er1 "1le ''S&1.'&1op/' back :trc:a. '12.e Wea1; Coast. I ·would 

:have loi'I& to •ea W:S.1;h the tlee-b a.ad. ent\eavored to keep 1\ 1n 

an mterceptiDC position a't sei11.. !hf.a vou.1.d. have pemitted 

the disposal of the a~ pCJWer ot the fl"' to meet an 

attack in the EaYaliaD area. ~b :oequtreslents of keepq the 

tlee1; tu.elea., hoWever, 'W'OUld :ba'1e Md.e llece$8flit.7' \be presence 

uni'(;a 

b Pearl o~ llazlbe>J:' 

the~ 

fltOllt. 

ba<V ~ of 

to 

the 

time 

:tl.en. 

of deWblla.'• of ~ 

On Deoe.mbet' 4, aaqple time rema!.ned 'tor the 1!.e.v :nepart. 

aent to to~d 'to me t.he 1.nfa:&.'IOAtion Vhich I bave outlined, 

-- -------------- --
REF ID:A485355 

and 1n addi'tion the fol.low1na signiticaa\ t&c'\S, 'Which the Ne.'V 

Dep&l"f:men' lea:nLed. 'beWeen No•reml>er 27 and tba't date: 

l) Japan bad 1nfolWd lliW.e:r.- 1iba' W&J' v:l.th "118 Anglo...Sa.xon 

poven would b¥'ftk o\l\ sooner tban liltJ'one drear&\; 

2) Japan bad. broad.cu' be- id.ads code a1pal. •inl \be vorda - "east wind. rain/' me~ var or a~ 0: cliploma"ic 

rela'i:tons w:t \b. the United. sta.i~s" 

Ass'Urrlir.g th.t>.t fer tb-: f:!il:'s.t time on. Dee~ 2 ! taJ. c..1.l the 

iliporta.nt 1nfoniation then ava.il.&ble in 1:.he li&"fJ' Depa.rt.me~, i~ 

is.., presen coanni.on t.het I would have gone to sea With the 

neet, tncl~ the earner 111~on" and ~ed a. rendez· 

vows at sea 111~ lta.luq's Cai':lC"ier force,, am be~n in a. Sood. 

poait:ton to :tnteroept th~ Ja.pi~ese a'\tack. 

At SOllle "1m.e pr:lo=> to De«~embeX' 6, J.91"11 'the <!~N Of 

liawali Cvu.1.tt. have been 1%>.tora<!d of the pramilile of a.:rme(l. ~upport 

u detailed 'b7 the w~ DeparQ11ent :tn London to Air !·fa.t"aba.l :Broo1:•31 

Pophaat in SitJp.pore. '.l.1liia vj.1~ WOl"!ml'l.ti.QD ~ deniett. 1;o tll~~. 

On Dec~e)!" C, fL.~en hc)urs 'before the a:l;tauk1 qll<; time 

otm ~ed. tor the ?iav:r Df~ to give me e.ll the signi ... fice.:D.'\ :tacw which I have out:Lined Wld. 'Which ·trere not a.va.:U.a.ble 

to a.e in KavaU. In adclitton1

• the Jav D~nt. coul.4 then 

have ad.'Vised me that thirteen pa.rtll ot the Jape.use reg.11' to 

the .American propo~als had. beEm received..- that the tone and ~el.'" oi' Ws measa.ge im.iea.1;ed a break in d.iplana.tio rel.L\t:loll.t.i 

or va.:- '4th 1;.b.e th1. ted States;• and tba.'b the Japane~ rcpJ.1' -r,ras 

to be :t'~ ;preeented to tlns govermnt:n:\ a'G a. apeoUJ. houtaoon to be f!xed.. ?:tad. I reee~~ved this Wonia-tion on ~ 

afternoon of Decen.ber 6, it if~ 7111 :presen\ conviction that Z 

vouJ.d ua·te orJ.er·~d all ~eet 1m!ta :Lr.. Pee.-rl lia.rbl)l• to seri., ar:raaaed a nndezvou Yi'tb ltaJ!.SeT'• task fo~ :retu:rn.1ng :rrom 

!fake, ~ 'bcon rec.d.1' to in'te'rm:wt the iTapt!..-itese :f'~e b1 "1te 

time fixed for the outbreak <»~ wa:r. 

Even on 'tb.e :mol'll.1D& of Df~c~ 7, tou:r or five hourfJ bef~l'.J 

the at~l:.k, had tlre :te.vr ;}epa:r~ for the i"~st t1me seen :N.:~ 

to send lite aJ.l W.S aisnificaitt information, and th<? e.ddit1ott.al 

tact tlmt 1:00 P .M .. 1 Wa.s~.,c:m titt.e 1 had 'been nxed tor the 

deliveq o'r the Ja.pa.uese ul'S:1nsa.'tua to tile tm.ii;ed. Sta\es, i:v 

light :f'o:i!ee~ c..1uld. h:J.ve mov~ o'® of Pem-l liarbOl', al.J.. ships 

in the harbaJ.4 vould :bave been at seneraJ. quaners, a.nd. aJ..1. ~sotl!'ces o:r t,t:i,e tJ.oet in :tns1;o.nt re:ld.".neso to ~pel nn alts.ck. 

For aom.e yeal'S :t, too, ll&ve vcm.de~ to what ex'belr~ ~l'a sta~­

aents as to 'Wha" we cO'l.lld or m:1gh'b ha.ve done / bad he haA or had h1~ been 

~ven ~ :tn:f'onaa.Uon 1n ~MIC, ~) guided. b7 hinda~. '.B'i;.t. :DD.Vi!() 

------~-=.--.==--.--:- -~------ ----- ----~--------
REF ID:A485355 

read hie book~ I f'ee1 "11at :l:t ts qlli\e :possible that he is 

~tecl. 1n Mld;ag Ids sk'temenw. ~e defense ot Pearl Iiat'bor was no\ 

bis responsib1lJ;t.J1 of cO\'&l'Se.-11; was Genaa.l Shon's• B~ between 

IG.mel ud Sbo", both ca,pabl.e ott11:en, "1lei:" clmseneaa to the situation 

and the greaw uount ot ti.me thef had '° .Wnk about 1;heu dU\tea Q.Xld. 

resp01ll1bll1~ies Y.t..t.b. :respect w ue.~~ "11.e Pe.cttic Fle~ Dd.gb.t 

have lod them. to e. sate cOJlCluaion: "1la1' 1ibe:y had belter take all precau• 

Ucms to avoid a sudden a.1-taclt on P~earl ~. 

One tull'ther ~•: :U' / as a :result 0: 4'he inaide Woration the 

revisionists aa., we act t'J."aA MAGIC, all i:be s~s, des~w, 

~era and ba•Uesbips "11 a large Wk force ot tbe u. s. l?acUic Fleet; 

or even 'bhe 'Wbole of the :.tled had 'been ~ in wa:l.'b tor 1-he Japanese 

task force sent to ate the at.tack on Pea.Jll J!airbor the:re would have been J 

stl:'enctb enoug'b., I ~, w v:t.pe cl\lt the whole Japanese task force. It 

:ts "rue ialat 'the Japanese task torc~e included ~ two battleships 1 bub 

1~ had. !1:!, C8l'riefa, t\tO Jle&'VJ' Cl'\d.sera, & l1gl:d; Cl"\11Sel"t eleven des~S 

and. a nlllbex- ot s~• 1 e.'bout ~~ve, scae ot which ca.n'ied Id.~ aw· 

~es. (Capt. Rarlq Cope, USN ~i.n 11Climb Moun.t Niitaks.1 ° U. s. Naval 

~itu\e ~, Vol. "{21 No •• 121 Deceriib~ 1946,) I sa, tb18 OD 

the aaa~on that Adm:1ral K;tJ!lael. vould have timed bis counter"4ft.Ove so 

that 1;b.e Japaneae task force voul.d Ile* have had. 'W1e protection of the 

aircraft of its carriers, 'because :Lt K:bmlel and Shon had operated. on the 

basiu ~ ira'Ol'Wl~im i;he :rev1G1onilns claim was cl.ear~ in MlGIC \he 

Japanese 361 planes would ~ :bave ~a. on their illisaion. This 

I rep:rd aa a ;poat of considerab1'o ~~ce. ~:re is l'e&son ~ 

-----·------------· -~--- ·-- -------· ·----
REF ID:A485355 

believe flhat bad onl;r a '\;a8k torce (ff 1Qa.e u. s. Paciftc Fleei; gone ou-. to 

ei:agace the ,.ra.panese task torce in battJ.e on "11e high seas, 'tale u. s. Wk 

tol'Ce would pro'bab]¥ b&ve tared veley' ~ because of the tact \b,a-; the 

Japanese not on.11' cl1d have s:S.x eul~en to Ou:t' \WO buiJ also "1le:tr bn~ ... 

ships were :ta.at.er and. had J.oi:ager l'ILZt.£e gmis. Also, U even i;b.e wole 

u. s. J?e.cU1c Fleet had. gone o"°'1 cm~ basts or MAGIC-as MAGIC is con- . ' 

cei vea. 'bl .\he ttre'fiaioniats" -to m.ee' the Japanese wk force which wo.s 

1;0 ~ Pea:tl lf&l"bor, 8Zld had the 1iwo navies an on the b1sb seas, vith 

1;b.e Je;aneae cani~ SUl.l aaiJ.inEC vi'\h \b.e1Jt mift CQllU>lezent of air• 

plaaea ~ 141.e u. a .. Paciftc Fleet votll.d pioobab~ b&w auttered • \emble 1 

hUltl J ia._ing a.ud. 1gua11n1 ous defeat,, because the Japanese task force 

'beca.•e ot vba°' I have ~ se.161.~ !!!. cam.era to our '!{W:o., 

theu tirst•lln.e 'bat'Ueahi.pa were ei)eeclier aua. bad J.cmger-ra..n&e guns than 

~ o~ oUJ." own batUesJdpa :beA. :fc11t on:f.1' would. "1:le:re bave been a area~ 

loas at American lives, bus also f!aie aZ pv ~e.abiJ?S, or c~iers cOU:J.~ 

haw been :raised and:~· As 1if vas, and quite :tonid.:touaJ.71 there 

were no ca;n-iera st; P~l on 7 DecemberJ and. With one exce,ption \be ba,'Ue ... 

ah:lps dsmagec1 or sunk • P~l B'ax'bor were soon back i.n commission, ~ 

to &1l obvious sva•gic er.tor made b7 '1e Japu.e1e hi&h cormtll!U>d-tl:lq could 

have but the7 te.Ued to deswot tb.e &7 docks, macldne shops, and.~ 

repair :tac:lliUea a-t Pearii Wb1' i;he Japanese ove1."J.oolted. this ~~ 

obVioua i>oint :ts noti too cl.eeJ it shoW thea to be not i;oo aooo. as naval 

lfVategl.sts. OJll.1' one Japanese 11&.ve.l. oi'ricer bas. thus f&'r' tried to 

~lain this Gtl"ategl.c error. '2b.e1' 1 or e.1; leas\ Admiral Iamaaoii.o ~ \he 

~ti.on to :realize tbat v.1'11 the u. s. Fl.eei; in being 1n ~ Pc.cific 
REF ID:A485355 

·~ plaas tC# conqUeat coul.d not be Ca:t%'1ea. '° completion ver:J euUJ; 

therefore 1\ was necea~ to d.ea-Aw ~ u. s. Fleet.. Dr. Louts Mo:ilon 

~ bia article "b Jap*tWse decis~.on tor: wa:r0 (U. s. N~l&l .tnatitut:!. 

Proee!41!11, Vol. 801 no. 12, DecmiB>er 19541 P• l.329) aqs: 

Apinat the aJJDost, '&mM~moua C'l)poaiUon of 'ihe na.va.1. ::.>l.annerS I 

Aald.ral. ?__,\o remained. adeiaaut. Unless "1>.e .Amencan Fleet 

could be desWa1ed. at one blolr a1; the 1~ of '\be var, he 

inaia'ted, ~ J~se would l»:i"Obab~ ~au in their etton to 

seize tihe Ifeib.e:-~ In«:tea ax>.d Mal.ttp.. And. even U ~ vet~ 

auoceaatUl.1 he predicted that they voul.d. be UUble to hold. &:q 

ot iiheir p1Ds tor l®C. • • ·~ A detend.ned et-lort 'b'I' "1le 

PaCitic Flee't ld.gb:\ Yell resU:~1ir in 41saa\e1". • •• 'Jnie Japanese 

believed 1\ neces1&J.7 to d.et~~ or neUVa.JJ.ze '\he Amer.Lean 

Fleet a1; Pearl ltatbor CQld. 4'o cleprive the UuiW States at 1'8 

base :i.D the l1h1.liP»ineS. * .Amfn"ica 'a 1:1.ne o'Z CQll'lllUrri cat.ions 

ac~a 1;be PacUic vas to be ~:u't 'bJ 1;.b.e se~ ot Wake and. 

Guma. 

:B\lt tba\ vas 8$ tar as htag:tnation of Japanese lfe.v stra.tes;i.s\a c;.a.?J-.:t'!erl 

th.em: t11e oJll1' 't1U:rlg t'b.ey thoup\ necesaaJ:7 was w destrot f;lte Ut s. 

Pac:tf'lc Flee1;. Cit. the othet hand.1 al .. the u. s. var :plans ale.bet'• 

con:te!!lpla:ted 

a~ 1:n Ute firs'\; halt of 1941 (l.ln M.af of 'tib&t 7ear) took. into account 

t:be poaa1'bU:f:'7 ., \he Japanese :11118ht1 ( u \bey' had three timee before 

*1ld. sucees~) beg:t.rr. s. war on an~ Withed a pl'eeed.ing dec:~tion 

ot war, ~'b a, 'b;y e. s:u:t.1lrise attack, and. although w.a por.wtbUitf va'.J 

;p1a.ced. ~tri on the Ua'b of con'Ungel\Cies1 with Pearl B'atbor as ~.,.tooal; 

:PS.int of the ~t,tack, ap.a. ~ the VU' J.>l.W even ~Vi~ioned \lw.t aucb 

an a.'"8.ok coll'l.d cooie. tram a.Uoreft, :tlow ~ .~!!'118,1 it ~-an al~! 

~lica'ble :fac'I th&\ aJ..1. W.S w.s s~ f~ten by t.he end of th~ 

~am.a na.r. ~\Jle u. s. h1gb. o01111»'1nd. in Wa.sh:LllPon c.erta~ forgot this 

* some Arneri.ca.u s'Y&l. historians em svategis~s. d.:tsagree W'l.'11 Dr. Mol'ton 

on \his point3 thq :tns1si; \b&'\ the Japa;nese Itav,r needed a spe$C\lleiv:tctoq-1;he A'1.7flt vu ge~ tc.a much publ1civ1 am. th&i; 1s ~ 

I~o il?.B1Gtcd on the Pearl Erarbor attack. :tt was no\ necess!n, tor 

1;be:lr pla:ns to take all tha'b COtald. be '8lten 1n !'oi\Jieas\ Mfii. --
REF ID:A485355 

con\~J and "1le wo principal ccaraasaawa in llava11, b1Deceaber1941, 

also app~ forgot 11'-or cU4 the'I' lack ttb.e ~na.Uon that '1le 

J~ to Ma7 1941 i.m.r ;pl.aim.lei-a us.CL in 'Utinldna up the things tbat the 

Japanese misbt do.? In Was~ '1w1' were Wnldna ~ of ~ 

to Ja.pa.:neae expa.nsion 1u \be Fe:- E.J.S1;. iJ!he7 '!Jaa&Saed tb&' as long ea \he 

u. s. Paoif:t.c Fleet remained in~ iLn the Pacific it woUl.4 serve as a 

deterren' to Japanese movea ~ c<)uq_uen in aou1iiheaa' As:ta.. 1.rhe 

Japaneee a."8.ck Pc:e.rl ID4."~or, our ~miiest. overs~u bas~:ton? Row e.bsUJ"dl 

Wasb:tf!gton, 'by Dec:embe;t- 1941., Jue.\ s:lmpq could nat :tmacJne that tib.e 

Japaneae would be to~ enoUSh ti:> at~ Pearl. H&r'bor and tJ.7 to 

des'troy the &bi,'gs of PacU'ic Flee1r i:ci tb.eJ.r b~ · posi'Uons :m '12.a'tJ 

bar'bOJ.". Except 1'.ete an.d there amons the 3un.10l' otticers of 'tale liav 1;he 

:poss:t.bU1ty ot a suri>rue ~ a.i;tack on the Fl.en vu kep't in mnu.. nA 

groua of' the 7~ otti~ers (on the ~y~a) ••• anticipa~ 

an air attack on the Fleet, had. disoussed among tbeuelves 'WA- to do in 

case 2.' came, and knew ex11.c1;l;r how to ~. tt (Monson, a. E+ ~~!.~ 

aun in 'the. P~~SJ. Vol. III ~ lliai;or.y of United Sifates ?la.val O:t?C&'Uons 

ill Wot:l.d War II, Little Brawn and. c,~., Boa\ozl, 1953, P• 103). ~eir 

foreaigb.t, says Prat. Mortson, saveel Uw !e...I!.'-~· ~ repeat., it 

is ~ '\lul.t thifs con'iinceney about which I have ~ said a good deaJ.1 

W84 exp.lic1'1r a'8.ted. tn war pla.ns-..'but apparen:UJ nobod1 serious~ 

believed ·tha:t; 1~ could be done 1 Off 1~ '1le Japanese would be ao toolisb 

u i;o 1tl7 it. Ind.eed.,, Prof. Morison sqs ot the a'1i&ck on Fearl B"altor: 

(P. 132) 
REF ID:A485355 

~us~ "1le s~e a"8cll~ on Pearl JI&rbo:i:, far from. being 

a "swategic necess11", u as t.'t:LC Japanese claimed even after the 

wai-, was a atr&teg:Lc :f.d>eoW 1i1. Oae can ae.-ch m111"8l7 his\c:».7 

in vain tor aa o;pera'\ion more fa.'tal to '\he agc;resso:r. On ae 

tactical level, tale Pearl Ral1:'or &\tack was ~ cone~ 

on ships nt.'bet' "1Wl pel'.lllmEm.1• inai;&lla.ti.oua and. o:l.l tanks. On 

the sm-gic level it vu id.i.otic. OD the high political level 

1i ns disastrous. 

------------- - --~ --
REF ID:A485355 

We CO'll:Je not to e:io11he:r veJ!1 :lm;t>~t question Yh:Lch bas been X'&ised 

tn ioev1&1onist circles: Wbf <lid no·b the c0111Datlders at Pearl lta:J:obor Seb 

MAG.IC; \!JV' did tb.q not have "1le maeb,nea ua. :facilities tor clecip~ 

'11e Japanese bighesi level diplanatic conaun1ca•ions 1 the so-caJJ.ed 

•1Pur;ple11 cra;pto..,..tea'l Prof. Ferrell sap: 11'1.'he :British a.nd General 

~ur received ~~Pul'»le decoding -.ch~nes f1'Qll Wasbington; Y't'f1' aot 

t••\\ 

the cc:meolsrs a.\ Pe~J. ~cntl (p. 225) 5.'b1a is a Sood question, UW. 

not ea foolJ.ah as it a18b' be made 'to appea.r by '\be usual answer i;bat the 

· authoriti.e1J in ~ couJAn •t p:revent the Pe&l"l Harbor a.tiiack, even 

' 

Y1'\h '1le code, so wba'\ woUla K:tmmel. anc1 b.U knit Ql1.POS1te at lie.va.U, 

Lleut;e~ G~ Wl.l.1ler c. Sho11; bave done vlt.h it.," 

\ ~·""· ... 

Let us ag1.'ee 1alat the qUeltiOI~ i'&ised 1a not a f~~ one b~ le\ 

us consto.ei- i:b 1n t;wo ,ans. nn1;, as w WhJ' the Bri*h go1rthe Purple 

~· In the au.llmt. of l.94o u. EL. lllili~ and na.va.l e.~tiea on 

Ce highest level ag:reed that ~~ should 8lld could. be J~ · exchailge ot 

intel.Ugence betNeen "1le u. s. an.a. the u. IC. Iacl.Uded :t.n tb.e ma.terial. to 

be exchqed vu car.arnm1cation in~~Jligence. It wa ascertained that the 

u. K, ecsmnmication in't;eJJ.:l.ge.nee el".PerU Jlad. not succeeded 1D sol'f1ll8 1rhe 

h.'.f.lb.es't;-level. Japanese d.ipl.omaUc •::rn>tos~ aiid the machine wbieh ws 

involved 1D enci:pheriflg and de~ the messaaes in that qs~. 

/jfor, p~Ucall1t bad "1le Gerlns.n exvens;J C~sts of the 

U. a. ~ts 11g'Da.1. Intelligence Si~rvice, hovevei"., bad accomplished W.S 

"8.alt aad. were ·reading the Japanese messages 1n that cm.toQS'tem.1 wbich 

3S 
REF ID:A485355 

~had. namea., tor brev1v as well as tor dieCQ:ise,, '11.e ~le" qstem., 

its ptedec:essor., also a 3ft8Chf.m sys·l;m, having been ~od the ttned.11 

qatea,. On the otb.eit hand: t'b bad. ibeen ascertained that the u .. s:. C\'7.P•· 

~-, al.t'bougb "1lq 1-d. 'been imsucce&11:tul With 'bhe ".Pttr,ple" s;yste.m, 

had been qUite succeadul vith certa.in Geman end. Italian di;plama.tic 

crntoaJStetm 'the a'Wd1' Cit vbich hotl. Of1l:t l"ecelltl.1' been u.nd.er\a.ken by 

could Pl'Of1't bf sa11.e son of exchange. A iee.11.\ of tour ~w; two 

ttca '\be Ast aal. tvo fro1' the ?favy·, was sestt to LoX1<lon in Janus.rt ot 

1941 to 41.sC\WS 1;he techn148l. aspects ot tm excbange o2 •:tGria.1.. b 

u. s. team i;oolt ri'\b. :!:' e. zieaen,~ .. eomple'ed. ~le" maehine and the da• neoe1sa.J111 to 'QSe it 1Jl deeipb~ring 't;he Japa.uese messages. It is 

'ft"q :lmpo~ to "U.n4en'kod tbat 'the :Britiah had not on.11' eneu1ve 

tacUitiea for ~tug and tO?·~ Japanese diplomatic traffic 

to LoJt4oa ~ the7 also bacl. • cor,pa1 ~ W'l!T canpe~i; C3."1Pta.t1.c.lysw and 

Japanese ~latol-a-v1.1tohouto when possession ot the 'P~,n mach.1ne 

would have been of li"1e ~no va.l;ue* The :St-J:Ush e.l.so were able "° read 

and 1ftaslate otiher s71tema ~ Japanese d:tplomatic tra.t:f."1c-cmd they 

W· so~ on'q in London 'bu.ii also a1; Singapore aad. Rong Kong, and por:~i'blt 

. '~ .. 

in one or two ~her aVa.teg:tc spot11 'U11der the Bt'itish Crawn. 

In the exchaalge of 1ihe ~u:r,ple 11 machine mid info:mational details 

concerning the PUX".Ple s;ystem for SJ~CUic technical de.ta. on .certain Ger.man 

an.a. Iiial~an ~qstella (p~puJ.17 d:tplcaatio) both the u. s. NJd the 

u, K. ga1Ded adva:a'6ges of inestimable ve.J.ue. Ort this po:tn• there never . I 

b.ae 'been &f1I doubt on et~ sid.e. Moreover, thia excha.nse 'paved Ule wo.y 
REF ID:A485355 

tions a.;&;"te:i; the u. & • entrr into WO!~ld WQ.'" II as one of the beJ.l.i&eret1.te. 

'?he value ot this coJJ.aboration can ha.r'~ be ovc;res't;:tma.ted b~ '\i.bia 

'broch'Ure vUl. no' deel with this asJ~ect. 

As loog as we ere deaJing with tb.e g_ueation 6'bou;t; the u, s. deliveq 

~ the :Br1'1Sh o:t a 1'PUJ:»le" -.chi:a•e an4 '1le cJ.7.P'ti.o&J8Wm vhicb used i'IP, 

ve mrq well ao into a related quesii:Lon coa~ wbich littJ.e hal.J been 

aa.s.d in the i;ol'Tellt of woms a'bolrt; ·the Pearl ~or disaster. i:c~ :British 

acqUiftd \he uPQr.ple" ~ Janva;q J.9.1•11 ana. wei-e able fraa the ve-q first 

to use it-no a"Grinp vere a\taohed to this usaae, except 'bbAt the secrei 

would be treated w1 th the care "118.t it d.eaene4 in order to ke<4,P tNm 

eneDl;Y movledge the fact thtt.._ ve hail soJ.:ved. it. (~lhere have al.'W&f'S been 

vert detailed and. strict rep'Le.tions govetlling "1:le hAl:I.~ ot connun:i ca-

'1ons 1n'\ell.1genae Nil. in 'bi1u.e the tr. s. .-.:. u. K. re~"W.ons 'bec;f,QUe 

identica.1..). The reuon tor mention:tna "''bs:b 'thore were no s~ ~~taohed 

to the o. s .. gin to the :British is to t'oreatAl.l a i:evis:LOD1~·4; allegation 

\bat President ROOiieveJ.1; JAWJ1f ba.ve pel'mi'tted the lift w be llUilode ~ on 

cond1Uon th&t no ta:.t"o~tion cam.U:tg from tr1)ur.ple" vould be used by the 

B:d1i:t1b in a. 1iW'liler tbat would interfere Wi"11 his conspi:c~ '° Wi~l.a. 

fl"OJll the two COIDll!ianders a," Pearl Ea~bor ·wha"t;tiiver iniielligenoe '1lq ~ 

obta.in vhicb would pi~vent the Japanese ~ them b:f S'll%»l'iae. Such an 

allegation voulA, ot courae, 'be a\Js,'\U:'d on it3 f~e-btn. then "11.e ~vieiou ... 

ate do not al.~s etaue :i.n a. log:tc::al aaa.nnel". ~ wi:J¥ 1ihe llriitiiih 

vould1 even if thq could. nave ~~ea, to kt:.-ep "Purple" utellige:a.ce ftaa 

Shon and K1mmel ia hard to ur>.de:rsiaua.. In the first placej although there 

I 

31 

---··---
REF ID:A485355 

was no <U.rec1; COlll1AUlica\io~ 'btrt.Yeen \hese ~ and. the British, 

c~ 1 thezte was caaum.cation be-Men BriUah 8Acl Amedcac :l.n1;eW, .. 

pnce authorities in the~ Ee.n. ln tb.e aec®A place, iei 1'\ be nOWd 

tb.a't '1Le Bn'Ush b.a4 been able . '° :re:ad and were zie8'Ullg Japueae d:l.plo• 

ma'Uc s7stema o\he:r:- '11aa Purple; 111 fan, atan1' ot '1le aessscee vhtch the 

:rev:isionia- ela1Jll m.os' defim.'93,,T ~.n4:1caW "111.'ti a n.r,prise au ~ 

we to be -4a a\ P~l Ra:rboii Yfte 1n C1"1'"°8J'8Vms other than fur,ple. 

For example ... the so-c&Ued "banbinS plot" message was uo1i in ''Purple" 

at all b~ in a syst. held 'b1 co1vml.awa, a 111te.a designated b7 us u 

J•l9; and several o'Ghe:r messages re..1.lowd to the bcabU!S plot me.ssaae were 

1n "1ie saae sy&tea. 

WlJ.e,'b 1'.M au tb.4' torego:l.zla to de> 'With the :&ri"sb.'l a:t.nw~ this: ie 

i'b conceivable 'bt 1ihe British, too, -would have pai-Ucipa.ted in a. canQir&CJ' of silence so as to l~ 1ihe Jap&r1e1Je deG~ the u. S. Pacific 

Fleet, ~e fi~t :'11!1'-~.-~ir ~~~.R~C?~~l!i!!!!!. 

!E!!~1on in the~ 'Eaa'b? lI~. Ia it not: clear that tihe vari.aWs 

messages 1n Purple and 1n the o"1leie J&pauese $JZJ"-' convqe4 w the 

British 110 definU;e atateaen' as '° an ~ a'"8ck OA the Amencaa. 

ba.sid.on in the Rawalian area'l The :British, 18' us remember, were tJten 

suppoted to have the fines• am. most ~full¥ ~ 1ntell1geuce ~ 

in the VOX'ld• Ia i'\ u.~ '1la't tb.e c3.e'8Uecl s"'1rt o'f an ~DI a"8.ck, 

U reveal.ed b7 MAGIC, vovld ba-ve 'be:en COll.P~~ overlooked by "1le1r 

ex;peJ:'ts1 Is 11; conceivable 1fbat \b~ woul.d., i:t '1le7 saw the o~s of 

1-b.e ai;o171 have kep'b 11• to '11-.sel~res'Z '£ha.\ they would have kepb it tram. 

theii" u. s. friends'' That; tQle1 '<iOtlld have seen to ii; 'bb.at no word ot 11; 
REF ID:A485355 

leaked to Shon aad Kmlel? !l.'lle B:1.tish ve:re countitlg u.pon the u. s. to 

pi'O•ct Br.l:Usb ~sts in the Fm~ Eaa"• 

In t,he f'oregoittg ~ 1'\ was s'liated. 'f;ha'\ c.e~ Japanese 

messages were J.®g""'1elllfed in the1Z' proce1uJ~ into pl&in EJll)ish b7 '\be 

A'l!llf¥ and. Na-q C17.P~ic units. These de~ vere caused by aeve:ral 

Wngu (l) there vere so~ mes:iagea 1fo be forwarded t.ram u. s. 

~rcept s•'biona '\ha.\ u. s. J!'84io :re.cUi'\1es were ~ nat; equ,a.l. w 

·1fbe ~ ~ ~ them all; 'lllllilJ1 had 'to 1!e sent by air mail pow:b or 

even by ord.inar.r u. s. 1'1&U pouch; 1(2) there wei-e so J118iD1 messages and 

so tev pe:rsou capabl.e ot process:bli' them in W~-J.e't us not forget 

that a few dozens ot :peraons in Was'.b.:1nston vei-e ~to keep up w:tth 

vha't ~ 1 perhaps \haalawls, o:r Japanese wei-e doing in Japa.nese 

m.essage cen1let:'s 1:a Japa.nese embassies, l.ept:t.ons 1 am\ consulates a:u. over 

"11e world; ( 3) thei'e W)'e marJ1 ti.mes vb.en it vu 1D;>oss1ble ~ solve a 

nev kq until a su.ftioietlt amount ot trattic bad acc11D.\11El.ted; ( 4) 1ib.ere 

were JDan1' cases Y.hea deo17.Pting a message vas •-=ed b7 ~ 1n itr&ns• 

'· 

sa:Lasion or :JJRercep\ion.; ( 5) ·~ were cml3' a haa.c1ful ot penons in 

both the kt!1q .a. '\he Ii'avt crn>tano~ic UD11;a 'Who cou.1.d 'tiransJ.aw 

.1h·\ · 

Japanese-and no pool :l.n the u. a. fl"CllD which Uaitted and trwltwor\b1 

Japanese 'b'ausla~ cou1.<l. be sel.ected.1 es 1s the ee.6e in o\b.er fore!p 

~s Such aa French, G~1 fipani.Gh1 etc.3 and un1l the Japanese 

was convened. :tnto English, the mee1sages containing usefUJ. intelligence 

abo'd Japan mght Jusii as well be ~~ea. 1D the waste basket. 

While ve dvell. UPOn '11.e :toregc>ing elements in ii.be s'to%7 it migh't; be 

e. good p1e.ce to poiz>:b o• tbai e. cc>~ to Withhold 1ntom.a.1;1on in 
REF ID:A485355 

OJ'der tbat an attaok ~ be carr.lled. out could ~ e.ttord to ruk 

certs.in cont~ciea. Fo:i ins1a1ce 1 it voul.4 be e.saential.1 vould it not, 

that e b1gb. degree of pr1or1\11n Jrroae.ss!.Dg be acc0%'ded aJ.l Japanese 

Govenmen\ mesaaces ao1ni to 01' ccsaing troa ROD.Ol.Ul.u, eo that '1le allege& 

consp~ themselves ~ nab 1le caup:t n&ppin&'l :But 1t is a fa.ct 

tba;t several. veq :tm!>on&l" :mesaagc~s b&Tiflg a direct 'beuing on the s:t.'ttuaiiion Vel!'e not processed until seve;r."Al.. daJS: after the f1'tits,ck. 'J!he verv 

tac\ tba't the processing ot !.'Y:, meiasagea to and frca Ronolulu was not 

given the h:S.&best or e'Vtm a b1ah p:r:-iori1;r :Ltselt CO?lStitu.'tes an arpent 

aga.3.m._ the alleged comsp:U"aey betag obJect1ve-a;a4 no't canpl~ sub3ecttve. 

Let us now ~ UJ.> tl1e ques·Uon ab~ t.tw withbo.l<1.1Da ~ MAGIC from 

Adm:b:.oal ~ and Ge~ Shon-as viewed b7 the h1ghest 1ewl author- 1 • 

:tt:tes 1l't 'Washiraton• Fin1- C1l aJ.l, it ta easy "° admi°' the :r~ 1J.bat 1the 

cr!UcaJ. MAGIC niessa;e.s ot the em:'~ amta of 1941 and q> to the da1' ot 

'b. e.~ wre vithheJ.4 f1Xll1 tbnDl; there ~be no question whatever 

about Wa tact. But the 1mpor'8al1t point :ts~ i.&e rev:t.a1on1Sw sq 

1;ha.t 11- was Mecssitated b7 the Rc1osevelt~ball..Stark conapr:Lact to 

brlllg about the attack on the FleE~t at Pe~l ll&i'bor. A d.Upassiomte 

viev, however, must take into COllE1ideration quite ditt'e~ end mon 

logical factors.. Fint1 as "11e P\rrple messages ccm°':tnued. to be ~a.cl. in 

~n the s'Rategic value of o\U' aol'\Wion of tbat oryptQQ"Stem. 

became in<::l'eaG~ a.pp~"'" ~Ls is a good place to :Lnsert what Ge:n.el"aJ. 

Marsha:U had to say on the subJeC'I~ at 'the vaJ:ue of MAGIC, ·which he describ• 

ed in detail in e. ~ Gecre't l<~tter he wrote to obvetnor De11ey, a 
REF ID:A485355 

Republican, who l'.18.d le~ about. MILGIC (nobocJ.1 knowa hoW or froa whoa). 

Marsba.JJ. had leo..\"ned. 'b" Dewey was prqpoa:l.q' t.o uae \111s hi~ ~l.Osive . . '\ . . 

2.nfo.-•1on in the 1$)44 ~~Ublican l~resi@n'18J. campaign agains\ a '.toUZ'tb. I 

wm tor Foosevel~~ The~ vas no·&; over~ aere 1\ 181 1D exteMo: 

E:Jttra,eted. tr.am OOHGBESSIOit'AL INVES'.rm.l'rIOli PEABL HARBOR A'l.'!ACK, 

Par\ 31 f!P• ll32•ll33• _ """ ·Lca»ll fl.981DJ 'fer mr 

· Mt dear OoverAOr: ColonE1l Clarke, rq mesaeiiser to rou ot y.~s~rtJJq, Se;ptelnber 26'h, l~ repox'ted the iiesul:t ot his deliyeJ.T of rq 

l.etter a.aw Sep....,er 25th·· As I understead hill 1011 (a) were un'Will· 

1ng "° eamd:t; fo'QJ:'Self 'to SJJ.13' a,sreem.eAt ~ "not e<•«nn1 ca.Ung its contenu to fla1' oth~ person" :tn Yin at the fact 'that TOU felt 

70u e.l:l'ea4f mew cenatn of tlle thinp :proba'b]1' :referred to 1n the 

l8"a, u augeaW t.o ,-OU ~r seeiug '\he word 0emtogr&ph, 11 and 

(b) JOU could ~ feel the.~ su.c:ll. a. le•I" as W.S to a preaidenti.aJ. oe.ndiaate could b&ve been add.Jr.oressed to JOU 'b7 an ottieer tn 'f!l3' poui• 

°'ion without 'tbe know'l.1:dge of 't.b.e PresiQ.e».1;. 

~ 

A• to C ~) El.bcve I sia qui·t;e w.1J l h>S to have JOU read wha't comes 

with "1te undeJ:iata.n4:1DS tb&'l rau are 'bound not to eormtlnrd .... ct.'te to ~ other person 8:ll'1' ·:~au on Vhich JOU do not; :uow have . or la~ receive tactual knowledge ftoa •(Xie o\b.er source ~ lq;aeli'. 

AR to (b) above 7ou he.ve '1lfl vord _.. :ne:l.'1ler the SecretArT at War 

nor the Preaiclen1il! Jaa 8tfJT :S.n.tiation Vhauoeve:t" that such n leitter 

lur.• been e.d.~ssea to )'OU (Jr that the p:repa:ra\ion or aending 0: aucb 

a coammica.UOJ.L vu being COllS1deft4.. I MIJ\\'te 1'QU tb&t. .t'he ()~ 

persons \.1lo :>av or knov of tb.e wdat.eace or ei\b.el!" tb1s let'fkr or 'l.f1I' 

le'Gter to JOU da1ied ~ex· 25\b are Mad.ral ~" seven key offleers re~onsiblu for aec.n;irit.v ot' ai.li"8;q' COlll'lUnicaUons, e.rul 

-r se~ who '1,pec1 these leti!en. I • ~ 111 best; to mtl.'k~ 

plain to you 1s'h&t iihi$ 1et-:r~ is being a.dda.-eased w rou aolel,y on 

rq 1m.tia.t1ve1 .Ada1raJ. K1Qg hav:tng been couulted. oJl.l;y e~~ the lq:~r was drat1ed, ll.l¥i I aa peni.•"JUSC iD ib.e •\'ter bee.a.use i;b.e 

auitl.17 baz.a:rda involved &Z"E9 ao •~r.t.ouu th&t I :teel satte a.~tion 1o 

neeeasa.t"iJ' to piootect tho :f,.nt\~;ces·t;s of ow am.ea. foi'cers. 

I shoill.d lla.;"1-e much ;p;r..."fc;;:rted. to talk 'to 7ou 1n penon bu$ l 

could not deY!ile a aethod t.hat would ».Ob be sub~ect to pi-eaEJ and 

:rad:to reaetiottS a:; to vn.y the Cbiet of SWt ot the A17fl would be 

eeeld.Dg an ht;err.tew With J'O'Ll a" thia pai;1cu.l.a.r mametir· Therefore 

I ha.vo turned to the mot!Uid rJJ: th1a letiier 1 with 'Wt)ich A&l1r&l Kina 
REF ID:A485355 

\ 

cone~, to 'be delivere4 'b7 Jumd '° 7011 'bJ' Colonel Clarke, who, \ 

incideni;al.J.J 1 has charge ot ~ie mo1\ sect'e't doelaellts ot ~ Wu 1 

and. Nayt D~ta. 

In brief, the Dd.lit&i7 a.:~ ia W.s: 

~ most Vital. evidence ;r.n the Pearl liari>c»:' me.tter ccmi.d.sto of 

cru:tt h\tE"rcr.pta or the Japanes•~ diploma.Uc c~'UU.'tC~\1(,illS. Over e 

period of ~ ow Cl'1.PtocraJ~h people ~ed the character of 

'the ne.c-J.Wle 1ihe J'a.paueae <ttere us:tns fo:;;· cnt;od: .. ng t.1u:ir dipl~t;tc 

aesaages.. Baaed a». "1Us a coi~spoa<HDC -.cl:l:Sne was bu.U" b7 • 

1'1hJch l'.r>c:iphers their messe.ge1;i. 'l'heX'(;;f.ore-:1 lit." ;post.essed. a ·<-n::rJ..th 

of Worma\ion ~ ii:Le:lJ~ move& in the Pacific, which :tn 

tur:ued ll't\S fum1sbed 'the State~ De"'~nt-rc·the:i.- tL$n ~ 1.& 

popular~ sv;ppoaed1 \he State ff.9~f!7 De;partaaent prov:td1.ng us 'Wi~ 

the 1.J1f0l'W').tior.-'t.>ut 'Which tm:f'o~teJ;· ruaa.e no !r'~e.r-e!l~t.;l wha'to\"'CI' 

-.0 in:ten,iona ~ lfava.11 w:i"il 't.lle laa'i message bef"ore Deoea'ber 

7th1 vhi.eh did not :reach <Yllr J~~:ld.s un:;:L.l th:;; :f'ol..1.~~¥.t.ng dtv~, ~:t~c~~ 

8th. 

Bow the Point to \he pre11en\ dUema i8 tbai we have gone ah.ead 

with th.1.n 'i>U$1lsess o£ dee:1:ph~l:":ini their c.~a until we- possco:l otho:r 

cod.ea 1 Get»la:o. • well u Japa.iiiese, but; our main 'basis ot :intomation 

rept'ding J:!:ttle:i:•s intentions ln Eutqle :la obta.ine:d :f'l"C.tll B~ 

Oah:IJla's mesp,ges fraa Berlin report;ixlg his intenievs With Hitler 

and. ~e~ otticiaJ..s to the -..TaJ?~.::; Jo"r~rnmcnt. T"nt~t;e A.l."O still :l:u 

't!le codes involved :la the Pe:a:rl narbor evenw. 

ire expla1n ~r the c:C'iti.cal nairu:te ~ this set•\W Which 

'ro'Uld be wiped. out almost in :m inat.."l.nt if the leas·t s~-:;·icion 'tmro 

arouaed niSN'41DI 1\, t.he bat·Ue o-r 1;he Coral. a.a vu based. on 

dec1phered. ~rsst'l.ges and ~~.);f"Cil"·~ cP .. rr fw :::¥;p;;.; w::r,~.· ::b;;. the right 

place at. 1ihe J.':l.gb.1; 'tie. i\tr't:b.er, ve were able to concezmoate our l:1m1:~. forces. to meet their io.a.ve.J. ad.vanc:e on :'.!id.W£1V when othcrtr.!~e 

we slmost cena:f rtl¥ voul.d ha\11e been acae 3,000 miles au\ ot place. 

Ve had. full intottm:\ion or tl.u~ st:i:enph. o:f theiZI i'orci;1s 111 ·t:ru,~t 

advance and. &lao ot "1le w.J.liw f'oroe dil'ecied 1&8-inst the Ale~iu.s 

'!mich f'ina.J.J.7 l.fl.nded troopa o;o. Att.u. and Kiaka. .. 

Ope:rations in the Pacd.fi•:l are largeJ.T guided 'b;y the inioruis.tion 

we ob'kin ot Japu.eae deploJ»alants. We know their sm~ in va:r:Lous 

pm.eons, the nt:tons and other stores con\:tnuing a.va:Unble to the;., 

ana. Wha1.t ii ot vas" ~~·e we cheek tb.eiX' fleet mo'Vsents MW. 

the movements ~ their COll'VQf•S.. ~~ hen\7' los1;es reported. :frgu ii~ 

'to 't:blle wb1ch "11.eT a'Wl"8.in 'b7 reason Of oui- s~ ~' large~ 

:result 1mu. the fact \he:t. ~ :tmow tte · ik::tlina dt.i.~es ttl,',O. :i.~o-;.;i.tet of 

their Cat\'f016 and can ~ iov submrines to lie in 'W141; at the 

p:ro;per points. . : 

1

1 
REF ID:A485355 

The cu.r.r."cmt i'aida 'bJ Adm:f.ral. llalaq ta ca.rrter forces OD Japanese 

tJhipp:blg in Man~Sla B.- and. el£1evhe~ were laqel.¥ based 1n 1;~ on 

$he knov.n movaenw or Japanee1e COD.'V'CV'S1 WO of vh:lch were cauaht1 

as •Uoipa,'\ed, il1 his deatNcrt1ve attack$. 

You w:W. UDtlaJ:atlad trm. ~ foregoing the u'$rl1' vagt.c consequences sz 1ille present pol11;1caJ. debates ~ Pearl ~ 

diac1ose to~ enesq1 Gematn or Jap, 8tJ7 suspicion of t.b.e vita.l. 

soeces of into=-t:ton ve poss1ess. 

':he Robena' report on PE~l HN!bor hid. w laave vitb.d.ralnl tmm 

it all reference '° W.s h1ghJl.J seem •'her, therefore :1.11 portions it neeessa.ril1' &p;pea.Yed :lncaa;~le'te. The saae reason which d.icta1ted tha.1; 

course :is even more 1:mpo~t. todq 'becauae our sources bave been 

grea~ elal)or&ted, 

/J9'f:lftJ As ~%' ~~le ot ·"1le delic;aq ot the s1'1ation1 

1ome ot Donovan•a people (1-be oss) Vi~\& telH.:ag ua, wti-kd. 

a secret aeareh of 1rhe Japa.neae Embua7 offices in P~. As a 

:result. "1le a.Ure ailita.'&7 a.ti;ache Japanese code all over the world 

'WU chrmged.1 ad though tbia c>cCVl'ed over a rea:r ago, we have no\ 

7e" been able to bl."fflt the nev cote and have thua los~ t.his invaJ.• 

uable SOUl"c~ of :tn:toi••~1on 1 J~c'Qlar:J¥ re~ "1le European Si'fiUa~w . ''•C·• 

A furtiher stoa\ aeri.oua eiabarl'assm.ent. 1a '1te :tact that the 

llr1'1ah govenmenii is 11>.vol"fed. concetning its moat aecre~ sow.-ces 

of into:aa"icm, :regard.1.Dg vbic:h oDlf \he P~ M:tn181'er, \be Cbieta 

of Sta.ft~ a ve'lf't lim1ted 111~ ot oi;.b.er otttc1aJ.s have knoWleclge. 

A re~ speech in C~?ss bi Representative Ha.mess would. Clew~ sugges' 1'o the J8;J)&ne11e 'Chat we bave been reaiH.q theil' 

cod.ea, tho'ulih Mr. Rarness 8:QCi. 'She American public would p:r:ob&bl.1' no1; 

d:raw a:at such conclusion. 

~ cond.ucii of Gene~ E:Lsellhowa-*s cam,paisn and. GE all. pet'&"' 

'tions in the PacU:Lc ce clos~ ieelat.ed in conception and tbd.Da 

to the Worm'iion ve secre~r obt&:Ln ~ 'bse intercepted 

codes~ 'rhef con'A'ibu'te srea.~11 w i;b.e v:lcWl-t and ~usl.1' 

to ~ saviDS in Am.efican li'Vles, 'bot.b in b c0llduc1; ar cu:nreni; 

opentions and. ill looking WwiilZ'ds '1le e$.i."l1' te.s.nation o~ the var. 

I am px-eaen'1DC this •t'~r to 1011 :tn iihe hope iiibat JOU will see 

1our 'Wa1' clear to avoid the t:r:agtc ntul'8 wi'W:l which ve are now 

threatened Son the presen't; ... po1:1.t1.ca.l 

;.,;.1. 

~· 

Please re~ this '~:t" 'by bea:ter. :t will bold i~ in '111¥ moaii ae~t file subJeet 'io 10• J:'1ef'ereuce should :to..Vll'filO d~~ • . :; . ·, . .. ~~.j~)1,.."rf(1 . I . • I 

Fa1~~.t· . t'f'< ~ ~ 

-----·---- ------·--
REF ID:A485355 

It seems to me tlaat the foresoiDS letter goes a long Wf9' 'tova.t"d 

answerinS the question as to Wb1' MrLGIC was Vi tbheld bl-. Kimmel and Short. 

Stated b:.t1.ef3" 1 the author1 ties in Washington wete ~eartul that it MAGIC 

continued to 'be sent thea the aecl"iet that we were able to read. all their - diplomatic Cl'J'Ptocommunica1;10DS 1 il11clud:l.q 1

'Purple 11 I their most secure 

s79tem, would soon tind its W8f to the Japanese. 'l!he whole of the island 

ot O&hu had thousands of Japanese iational.s1 among vb.om it was natural 

to assume there were-there must bl!lve been-plenty of spies. The Araq 

and Nav authorities in Wash1Dgton felt that it was becom1ng too d.e.ugerO\lill to the eontinueil secreq ot thle fact that we had solved and were 

read.ins messages in Purple to send a;q more ot the messages to Kimmel 

and Short. Of courae thq could hi~ve been s~ some gists-as bad been 

done in the first halt of 1941-bu-i- General Sheman Miles, the then 

Assistant Chief of Sta:rt tor MilitlU'T Intelligence, stated before the 

Joint Congressional Committee that sendillg even gists would have been 

dangerous, by overlo&d1ng the Z"adic:> circuits; and he went on to sq that 

vhil.e the Na'VJ crJ.PtoSJStems could have been used, because thq were 

·' 

·\, ·,~'. 

more secure than the Arlq's, even 11:;ha.t vould not remove the danger alto• 

get.her. /J. will inter Ject at this point the statement that General Mil.es 

was not too well-informed on these practical. matters, be~e the Navy 

had adopted and was using ea A'l.TJll' c:::eyptos7stem aud a m&chine invented b7 

AftJ'3 peraormelJ] Both the Arrq encl the Na-q's crntoqstems could a.nd 

would have stood up under the streJ.n of sending all the important MAGIC 

messages to Kimmel and Short &ad it~ exteuo. 
REF ID:A485355 

But, :l.D.sist the revis:tonists, the Nav furnished a MAGIC machine and 

information on how to use it to the COJJDA'Dder of the 16th Naval Districtthe P:bil1pp1nes. WhJ' not to Kimel and Short1 There were very good 

reasons tor 1ibis; but at this point we sba.ll mere~ ask: did possession 

ot MAGIC prevent General MacArthur from being taken b7 sur,pl'ise and losing 

e.ll his planes at one tell swoop more 'bbau 12 hours after the General knew --- _, ________ ~---------------------

9t the Jappeae attack on Pearl Ha~? General MacArthur blames his 

chi.et of the AJ:1J11 Air Corps forces in the Philippines / General Brereton, 

for be1Dg caught napping,; and Brereton bl.am.es MacArthur. Possession of 

the Pur,ple macbi ne alone obv1ousl.:1 was not sufficient-the interpretation, 

appreciation, and evaluation of MA!GIO is Just e.s important. It might be 

useful to quote what General WiUough.'bJ, MacArthur's G-2, said on this 

latter point in an a.ttadavit dated 8 Ma7 l.945 (PBR, Part 35, P• 87) in 

protecting the Nav 'a monopo17 of MAGIC: 

In 1941 '11e Nav obtailled and mainta1ne4 a bigbl 7 ettic1ent crn>to~ical semce, specializing in Japanese material.; though 

the A:J:tq had notabl.7 participated. .in the deveJ.opm.ent of this subJect, 

the Navy appears to have obtained :a. lead; eonaequent:q 1 1 t can be said 

that the Nav.r enJoyed on almost monopolistic p:ri vilege. In e.n other• 

Wise aer1tortous desire tar securi:tJ' (though eveq modern nation . lmow that cey.pto~is is &Qing on) 1 the Na.v has shrouded the 

whole enterprise in DG'StelT 1 excl.utling other services, and :rigi~ 

centralizillS the whole ente:r;prise. At this date, for example, i;his 

same s7stem is still in vogue: as far as SVPA is concerned, the 

crypto~is is made 1n Melbour.ne 1 forwarded via. 7th Fleet D ,If .I.; 

the Melbourne station is wder direct orders of Waabington, is no't 

bound b7 8.1tT local ZoesponsibUi ties I :forva.rds What thq select I and 

when it suits them. The possibili·ty of erroneous o:r incOllq)lete 

selection is as evideut now as it ·w.s in 1941. The onl7 excuse the 

Nav bas is that iw field is prima.ri.11' naval intercepts, but there 

is a lot ot Arrq traffic or other iDcidental tra:ttio. This collateral 

traffic is Q.Ot aJ.wap understood. o:r: cone~ iuterpreted. b7 the N·a.vy 1 

in l1f':I opinion. 

---------- ----~---,~..,...-------- ------~~------
REF ID:A485355 

'l!he solution to this vex:Lng and a..agero• problem is a com• 

pletel.3' Joint, 1nter-loek1ng :Lntercept and CJ.7.Pto~ice.l 

service, on the highest level,, with the freest intercJ:mnge of 

messages and 1ntergre1;at1on. 

The sequence ~ messages ref'ened to, had thq been known 

to a compe°'ent intelligence ojt>ficer 1 with Bai;'Ue C1'der and 

tao1;1caJ. backg:roUlld, beginnh14J with November 14th, would. have 

led instant]¥ to t.he inescapal>le conalusion that Pearl Harbor 

naval 1.Dstallaticms were a •~t tor attack, with November 

25th or: l'i'oveml>er 29th as the d.eaQJines, sugesting irresistibl.¥ 

that elapsed time was involved., tor some son of naval. sea.borne 

sortie. 

c. A. W:U.1.ougb.b71 

C. A. Willougbb)r; 

MaJor Ceneral., a. s. c., 

Asast.Chiet ot Staff, G-2, 

General Headquarters 1 SWPA. 

1rhe tact 1s t;bat skilled cm~~ic help and skilled. Japanese 

t.r....nslat.ors were ~ iJ1 sufficient supp]¥ to permit ei th.er the Arat;f o:r 

the Nav to maintain ~ suetll peoJ~le a.nrare outside the u. s. -they 

were ba.dl1' needed 1n WasbiDgt;on. Jmd besides, nob~ tb.ougbt or even 

bmgined that the;y were so ba.cl.l;y nc~ at Pea.x-l Rar'bor as at Manilathe J&panese vould never be so too:~ as ~ attaek Pearl Z The U'. S. 

N&'VJ' authorities believed that the PbUipp:l.nes might be out ott-but not 

Hawaii. Manila needed MAGIC much znore than Pearl! That expla1113 why 

there w.s a Purple machille in Iiran1:Le., more than ~ else. The Na.v 

communications persai.inel at Pearl irere assigned the mission ot tJ.71.ng 

·;'.;: 

des:verately to solve the im,porta.Dt Japanese naval cr.yptos:rstems and to 

get what information could be glew1ed from. tre:f't1c analysio of Japanese 

comDlUDications; the A'l.'fJll' had no sitiPlfll. intelligence OX' crn>tanal1'1;ic - personnel at aJ.l in iawail after 1~~39-the very small unit it did. have 

1n Honolulu was brought be.ck to Wa.i:lbington after but one . year• s operations there-because the few trained. persons of that 1.mi:~ we~ thought 
REF ID:A485355 

to be m.ucb more usetul :1n Vash1ngton. Hawaii seem.ea. to be the last place 

the Japanese would try to attack.J Wb1 keep the few trained ern>tm2alyt1c 

personnel there when they could be so muoh more useful in We.ohtngtcn'? 

What the Army bad, therefore,, was simpl.1 fl!.D intercept unit directed. to 

listen in on certain assigned Japanese cirou1ts and to forward the 

traffic to W&shingtoD tor s~. 

In this decisioa to bring back to Washington that small Arrq' cmt• 

~c unit (two or thZ'ee persons a-t most:) I am qtt1. te sure that the 

Chief' Signal otticer CODSulted no higher authorit1'-a.nd, I am sure too, 

the Comanding General of the Hawaiian Department at that t1Jne, Genera.l 

Short's predecessor, was glad to set rid of the unit-its maintenance 

caused. b:1m d1tt1cult logistical. problems. The secreq of its operations 

certainJ.7 was a. source of im tat1on to him. end bis staff'-the7 never 

got to eee the results. 'r1le trained SisnaJ. Corps officer the Sign.al. 

Intell !gence Service 1D WashiDgtou sen:t to Rava.ii in l94o pedon.ed no 

sipal. intelligence tunctions; bf clirecUon ot t.he local COlllDIN.laer ht' 

was soon given "more siecess&J.7" du:ties, such as devising a.ncl s~ervis:t.ng 

the ~ of CQ11.11111mication cables 1n and around Honolulu.. And. with 

\bis decision I can take no exceytion-the COlllWUUng Genere.l on the 

spot knew 'besi; what he needed. I knov fQr a f'act 1;hat when the Sigrlal 

Corps sent a verr amall. unit to Corregidor it ws only with the greatest 

4itticul:ty tbat the CClllJ13Jlding General there was finally persua.ded. to 

l~ the unit do Wha' it was sen-t out to do-b~ o~ 'for a short ti.me. 

The m.mabers of 8:JJ:1 Signal Intelligence unit (Signal Corps personnel) were 

~ aeec1ed for o~ Si.pal Corps flmctions. Waah1ngton could do 

---------------------- --------
REF ID:A485355 

ver:r li'ttle about ws-t'be local ~r decided. In a.u. that l have 

said above, however, the most imgo:rtauit po111.'t b1' tar was# so tar as 

concemed both the Philippines and. Hawaii, '1lat an attw:k bJ' the Japanese 

was too fa.n:tastic to wa:nant auCb 't'b.ought, so preparations for a possible 

attack were somewhat neg.le~. 
REF ID:A485355 

MU1' thousauds of votds have been expended in d:l.scussina; and writinS 

the ato17 of the so-called "W1nds Code Messages," e.nd, in particular_. 

whether there were wq authentic 11liirinds Code Execute" messages. 

'rhere were tvo "Winds Code n se!t•ups, Vbich were intended, for reasons peculiar to the Or.1eu1;al meutelit7, to give a. certain kind o'f warning but Jut ~ wba:t; klDd of e. warn1Dg is miclea:r because both ot 

these "sn-v;ps" were, to eq the least, impract:l.caJ.1 indeed quite 

toolish, be~use \bey were so suace~t1ble ot beiq contused with ol'41• 

nazi:r weather e.ud. news bzroad.caats. And, indeed, this is e~ what 

<11d happen with rep.1!'4 to the one c~ most iDterest to the u. a. A weather -

broadcast-now temed the false "W~.nds Code Execute" message was inter• 

cepted-and tor a tev hours at 8.D7 rate vas 1iakeD to be the real. thirlg. 

But it wasn't "the real McC0711 -1t resembled. what 'the Execute message 

might have been 'but when ce:retull.;r scrutinized. it Just didn •t meet ~ 

the concli tions specUied. in the cocle 1nsU\letions. 'i'he alarm it set oft 

were recognized. 

1 think that; oue thing was esi;a.blished. eonclusi veq after exha.usti ve 

investigation b7 seveZ'8l of the Pe~~l Barb01" boerds, inclUding that of 

the Joint Congressional Committee: the Japanese never did send out an 

a$entic "Winds Code Executew met.usage vb.2.cll elearq ind1cated that Jo.pan 

was going to a.t1iack the u. s. It ~t.ndeed the Foreisn M1Jrl,s'Vy intended to 

trwmit such a messaae it was to:r1ptten at the last moment; and even U 
REF ID:A485355 

it be4 not forgotten, the moat the measaae coul.d have conveyed vas tha:t; 

~ei-e was going to be a break in n!l.ations between Japan and the coun,1.7 

sipified b7 the ;p&.'rUcul.ait "Winds Code Execute" message. 'J:he other 

tb1ns vhich seems to be certain is that having forgotten to send out the 

"Execute" mea.n1 ng a break between -:ire.pan and the u. s., semeboq seems to 

have remembered to send out after 1ib.e attack on Pearl Harbor a "Winds 

Code Executen o~ tbat Japaz:L ws breeJd.ng relations with Brita.in 

but not Wi~ the u.s.s.a. Even 1ii}U.s one 1;he Japanese who were interro• 

p'bed atte2• the •UJ."Z'ellder of Japan denied hav:Wg tru.nsmS:tted but e.ll the 

eVidence I have exmnined iDdicates tbat tb.q were noi; telllns \he tru.1;h. 

One m1ght S8iJ' 1 it theJ' d:tdn •t <tell t.he truth Qoilt that one we should. not 

pU'b e:q credence 1n their den1aJ. tl:~t a 0W:i.nds Code Execute H was sent out 

on 3 Deeemller, the one indica:ting e~ break in rel&tions (or war) with the 

u. s. CeJ:'tain of the Japa.nese intei:tTOgated. on the point denied ever 

aetting q> the 1:Wintls Cod.en :bl 1-he first place. This point is examined 

in great <1eta1l in Appendix E 'to PEil; JI .Ir. 467-486 and there is COllSUlllll&te 

skill in this exemination. '.rb.e m: arrived e.t the toll.ovillS conclusion, 

which I 1ih1nk represents the la.st irord that cs.n be said on this sub3eet 

(p. 486): 

CONCLUSION: From conside1:ra.1;1on of all evidence rele.t1ng to 

the w1ncla code, it is conclud.Eid. that no genuine message, in 

execution of the code and appl;ying to the Unitec1. States, was 

received :Ln 'the War or Na.v;y DEpa.rtm.ent prior 'to December 71 1941. 

It appears 1 however 1 that meas.ages were received which were :lni~ thought possibl.7 to be in execution of the code but 

· were d.etemined not to be exectu.te messages. In view of the pre• 

pondera.te weight of evidence 'to the ~ 1 it is believed .that c~ sa.ttord 1s honeat;q lld.staken weu he initsts 't;bat an 

execute message was :received :p1rior w Deaenabe:r 7 1 1941. Con• 

sider1ng the period o:f' t1me tbiat b.as elapsed, 1-bis mistaken 

impression ia unders'bamlable. 
REF ID:A485355 

Grant.1.Dg for purposes ot discusaion t.'ba" a genUine execute 

message app~ w the v.tDds cod.e vu 1n1-ercepted before Dec• 

to 

ember 

what 

7, 

was 

it ~ is concluded. 

known 

that 

coni::ez'lling 

such tac" 

the 

would 

cr.LticaJ. 

have 

character 

added ~ 

of 

our :relations with tb.e Emjpire ~ Japan. 

This conclusion :reached 1n l91lt6 rema.1us unahalten to this d&.7-nath• 

ins has turned up to ma.ke a charlge in 1'\ desire.ble, so fer a.s concerns 

&ZI¥ 1Winds CoQ.e Execute" meaaage tbat might have been tra.nsmi tted. on 

3 December, as Captain Safford con:tended. One eot'1<'.l .onJ.:¥ wish that 'f;he 

concl.u&ion bad s1;ated categoricall;r that 'there ws sucb e. meaGage in 

repr'd. to a 'break in relations beti;,een Japa.n e.nd. the D:r-itish (and also 

the Dutch East Ind;J.es) \lecauae 'the eVidence is clear that such (j, f#1gnal 

!.!!. seid;-but then, b7 "Ghat time1 IS Deceaber1 the at."taok on PeD.l. .. l I:Ie.rbor 

was :f'in1shed. 

The 11:-evisionis'Ss 1 ~ however 1 1:1•t;:Ul believe in Captain S6.fi'ord-the 

sole person 'Who stuck to bis stai;e.3nen't ~t there waa ~ 3 December wa:r:n .. . - 1Dg1 and that a:.u copies of that mi~ss:aae were delibera.te:cyi destroyed. 

i'l:l.e in1ferestin6 thiDS abou1i tbio ul~l.e tem.Pest-in-a-teapo't 1a that even 

:1f' there had been a.u e.u.tWmtic u. l:i.~Ju.i:.u1n execute message it would have 

ncit 

toJ.d us nothing vhatever that vas/1l.lre~ known on 3 Decelllber, Mureover, 

and. this :t: "1l1nk is veq i:mponant,, the ~~ on Pearl was prepared tm: 

with so much secreq I would doUbt ~ much that the Ja.pa.ne&e would take 

ap;r che.nce wbatever :l.n sen.ding out a message which might 11t1p 'their ha.ud". 

It ~ust a.oesn•t fi'G in 'the picture e.t au. 

It is interesting to note tba.'' Ad.mire.l Kimel, while he mentions 

'the nwinds Code't a.i'f&ir a.nd cites (p. 100) wha.'b tlle Naval Court of 

InqUiq said about it-ia.ter p:rove11 to be wrong-does not p~eeo 1';ha 

51 
REF ID:A485355 

-.tter t:D eeriousl;r. I tbink the Admiral is ve'f:7 dubious that a real 

Execute was ever sen\ out on 3 Deoera.ber u claimed b:y Captain Settord., 

al'1lougb. he does aq (p, lOl): "Tll.e tin<Hngs ot 'the Naval Co~ ot I 

:tnqu:t.ry on this sub.1ec1.i ere confined. bJ" the evidenee presented to the 

30:1.n.t coogreas1oll&l. 1nvesti.ga.1iing Cami t"He •" !rhe A4m.iral. does not 

state specif1cell1 what the nfinclixip" were ~ the reader is left to 

conclude that the camaittee found i;.bat ~ere was an Execute trBll.Smit'ted 

on 3 December and tba't i'b we :tn\eJ~cep1;ed bJ' us-but the infol"B.lation was 

not ~tted to bill w to o'trher c~a atloe.t. 

Senators Ferguson &1ld Brevste~:o 1n their M:1n.ori.tJ' Report StV (p. 526): 

"Even if the Wind execute message ~lihq saw was e. false one 1ihq believed 

11; 'true at the i;ille and. should have acted acco~." A good po1nt,. and 

I ~. one that should be -bas:tzed; it is too bad it wasn't :followed 

v;p rep:tdless ot anr other cona1de:i:attons. 

52 
REF ID:A485355 

What led. General Shon to p~;iare for ~abo'Wf: :rather then tor 

mili:t!:n!: action b)" "118 Je.paneae'l 

In '1111 opinion the i.te•on toi: neneral Shon• s veq 'brtef awnrer to 

the war w.rni.%lg message sen~ him a,j~ the 26 November 1941 American 

re3o:tnder to Japanese proposals foJt' arriving at e. modus Vivend.:1 waa ='i 

as 'lS1A'ft¥ people 'believe 1 u:tter n0?1S•~nse. Shon said mere.'.cy' tha" he ·was 

prepared. '£or ee.bo1;8§e. !he :fact 1.J:s that every~ in WashiDgf;,on and, 

appe.ren~, also in Honolulu bad. bi11t We> W ngs in mind as to possible 

or pl"Obable Japanese action. FU'a•l;1 the Japanese march waa certc.d.nly- to 

be to the southward (to Mal~a, ~!dl.and1 Indo...Chine.1 Borneo, or the 

Dutch East IDd1es i !nd.eed au thei:t" e.o't;.i.ons seemed to point :l.n tbose 

- directions) and. Shon was :aot a.bl•e to do ~ at all about that. 

irhen, SeCOndJ¥ I tb.el'e W8 iJ1CeSSe.tl:t talk in America I including in the 

:adio broedoa.ats aud ill 1i.'he wr:L\illp of coJ.uamiS• 1 sabo!Be was wha.1i. 

we bad to ~ aaainst. 5!he seneral.l.7-held view VQ.8 'l;he.t the Japanese 

were trick1, that atte:&IJ.)ta to tbval't their .-rch vouia. -be coun"6red bJ' 

1;he vanoua mechanisu o'Z e~o1!tf:.• This I 2:'emember very viv:JAJ.:r. And 

I feel sure that when General Qerow received ~ Short's message 

stating \hat au ateps to pi-event sabotage had been taken and that he 

was 1n liaison w:tth the Nav, General Gerow pX"ObabJ¥ thcmah1; "Fine 

'b'Wlineas-short 's on "1J,e Job. n so, must have the othel's :J.n Washington 

who saw 1t-Genero.l. Mar&hall 1ncllll4ed. B7 ldmlrd.Sbt Shori;'s message 

seems entire:cy- t0.1respons1 ve w the: message sen\ him. :But \he ma'Gter of 

53 
REF ID:A485355 

aabo1iale was 1n 'ibe air. 'r.bat's wba4' we bad to look out :tor. Conf'U'ma• 

t1on ot ~s attitude can be seen ~Ln venous iaeaauges. Even the Na.11 's 

strong message begim$Jal '"this d18J~tcb is to be considered a war va.ming0 

' i 

en<ts wi\h ncont1Slen1al DieWS.cts Guam samoa directed 1io take appropriate 

measures against sa'bo1;age." EveJ.7t•od1' W t~n all about the ~ 

pla.u ot May 1941 Wich envise.ged ws the tint and. most dangerous con• 

'iiZlgenq a au:r.pr.l.se air a\1;ack on 1;.b.e Fleet at Pe~l Ra.rbor. Pa:renthe• 

"icall.1' I mf' add ~ \bose Whose mesaoJ"ies of World War I incl.uded 'the 

two pea' a.eta of sabotage b7 GermEm. agents 1n tbis counU7 (the Bl.a.ck 

TClll explosioa and 1lbe Kingsland Fu~) berore the u. s. became a belligerent 

1n tbe.1' Vat' vill ;perhaps agree v.t.tb me iib&t Japanese ~a.bC?AAF was ~ 

tbit18 .Americans thought was most tc• be tea.red in rep.rd to Amencan 

tetritoq. ~ us not tots" that tb1s tear qUicklf ez.preseed itself' 

ve-rt cleat~ and. heanlessl1' in •~t vu done 'to ~a.nds o'f Ja:pa:riese- , 

American citizens (1ncl\lling Nisei)> in C&l.ifornia 'the mr.aent we declared 

war on Japan. Wll1 did. the1 iaove tllm out of ~e pon e1t:tes? What were 

the au\ho:ritiea afraid ot'l Sa'botae!.l For tbia reason I, tor one, :find 

it dUficul.t to criticize General. Oerov in his b.andHns of Genera.l Short•s 

message ~ response to the 26 N'oveDiber message trca WashJJlSton. 

But vhat about the views held 'b1' u. s. :tnteW.sence e.uthoriti.es OD 

this quen1ou ot sabotage? Were thBJ the same as 'those ot the ave1'86e 

Aaenoa.a citizen, "tbe m&n•in•1'lle-street"'l I think '1ley were....e.ud Just 

as the v:tevs of ""11.e man-in·the·sti'eet., ~ those ~s vere w.rotJS, so i.t 

seems vere ~ Views qt ~ intelligence aut;hor1,1es. WbT? Because we 

never have pa.id. too much attenUon \o :S.utell.1gence. After several. 
REF ID:A485355 

1Qlouaands of ,es:t'a o~ experience, Wl:iJ do mil1tarf and naval authorities 

seem i;o paq 1ess a\tention to 1ntel.J.1&e!£e ~ to logistics, for :1Dsta.nee~ 

Wll7 ~a intellipn~e have to· pJ.a7 1;he 2:0le ot step"®ild in the cond~ 

ot wa:rf'a.re'l Wha\ is 'U>.ere a.bo1A :Ln1~noe tba'ti makes it less desirable 

as a career than a.rtUler.r, tor exmiJiPle? The reasons a:oe c1e&r' when one 

looks into "1le ma.""er· 

Admiral '?b.eobald J.8¥8 great emi~b.a.Sis on 'rolqo to Honolulu message 

number 83 of 24 ~ 1941 (the so-called ''Bombing Plot Message") 

an<J. aura (p. 46): 

After s~ 'l!olqo dispatch :/1831 no mili~ inte~" or~za.tion could tail to reach t,lw.t d.eclu.otiOn. ~at it was tO 

prepare the detailed plaa for .a surprise attack on the me.Jar 

uni-ts of the Flee\ moored "1:J.erril• . 

Here I \hill.k 1a \be kernel ar the nut-the secret at Wb':i' the u. s. 

'Was taken by sUJ.",Prise. I have underlined the ~e "no militar.Y intelli• 

gence organiution" in t.b.e .toregoin,g ~t because I think tbat our 

m.Uite.r:r and. naval ~e ore:e.nize.t:ions bad serious detects e.t 

·~ t1.me....snd I th:1nk they etill. l:L&ve. ('l'heoba.14 does no'\; mean 3uo\ 

milita:tT, u. S. kt:Iq InteW.gence 1 bU\; s.180 u, 3. :Ns:q Intel.U.gence,) 

I tbiz$ that serious detects in our raili'!!1% and-~ intellipnce, made 

:1 t possible tor t2le Japanese '° take us b7 sU't',Prise a.t Pet.Wl I!a;tobor. 

A s't1'QDI statemen:t2 Ye~, buts I tltj~ it 1s wnanted, I v.tU Wi"11 qome 

Wf1dence go into tlds queat1on 'be-'"CEW.Se I do not know too mu® about 

the situation a.a ot 1957. I did kl1m1 wh.&t it was like 1n 1940-41 a.nd 

in 1950, f'our years after "1le PBR t.rDD released. It :Ls cJ.ea.t' that tho 

1n~genee situa.tiou in tho u. s. vaa defective in 1940...4.l and in 

1950s when the Korean 'l>olice e.cti,)11" 'broke out vithout waminS• Where 

55 

I 'I,, 'I 

------- -~~- --- -~- ----~ --- -- -
REF ID:A485355 

wire ow:- S.~ services then.? What. were they d.oi»S C# W.nld.ns 

about? B1 1950 we be.4 CIA. What help vaa CIA? 

Four reva ~r \he PlIR WU t'eleased.,1 M6~or General Sherman Miles 1 

Assistant Cbiet ot Sta.ft tor xm.e111gence of '1le War D~ General 

Staff 1 tram April 1940 to Feb~ 19421 1D vb.at aane people 'llllJ.7 rep:d 

as Nl 9olggta1 has mBl'(J' things to •BY 1n en endeavor to explain wat 

1 

appear 1ao bave been derel~icms o1.' hiuelt end bis s't;aff .- It w.s en 

a"8tlp\ to absolve G-2 t:t'Olll S.te :rescr.>cma1bil1t1 for the debacle cm 1 

December 1941. For the JaOS'b part l:te does u good a Job of this, ;pe:ha_1;10, 

a.a could. be done 'llo excul;pa._ G•2 i~ 1~ tauuree, omiasions 1 and le.ck 

~ the kind of :f.MC:l,naUon which !1:ih1 have toreseen and f'ores-.Ued the 

d.isa.ner caused b7 Q.e J~se SUJ:p:r:tse a~. A ~cnt paragraph 

among S11a1J7 Which cou.14 be quoted 1::1 the :tol.l.o14n& (p. 71): 

1'he plaitl tac• is "1*t tbe ~ ~ sent out 'b7 the 

higbest m:U1 ta.'ey' authol'i ties za.i.ne clqa and aol"e before Pearl 

Barbor were tar :osore au"11.o11.'i11.\ive and more detUliUve of WllA'i 

the J:Iawaiie.n COPaAnds might; ~~ct,. and what WU expected ~ 

them, tb.aD. 8.11¥ izrto..,Uon or ~:reta'Ciona from 11»taglc" that Mili'tarJ' or Ne.val Intell:JLgence coU.ld possibly have sent. 

Complete :reliance vas placed <m the' effect 1ihose wami.np 

should have bad-and Md have eve~ except ill Hawa.U. • 

B'\D ~oqo a.ppareu'til1' believed the.'b 1;he ~bl.e migb.t 

he.m>en a.n.d F.awa.i:t 'be surp:t1.a.eil: Was~n d:l.d. tiot. 

~ r-W.es takes i" tor ~mted 1;;bat th'!' ~ sent out; bf 

Washington prope~ al.eJ"ted ell ow:i oversee.G Ct'.8'18.ndo except the one :in 

Ite.vali~ One wonders al.>011\ the bas:Ls tor "1le General 'a Mauriwt;ion in 

this regard. Ittdeed, in one cue, ~ aentioned, even 12 hou:rs ~ 

nen'!ml MacArthur 1n the PhU1pp1n(as !s!!!! that 1fb.e Ja;,pa.nese bad. made the 

l r "Pea.rl ~r 1n ~o~ect" 1lll the Atle.ntio Ho!il.Wl ::or Ju'J:I' 19481 

PP• 65.72, 
REF ID:A485355 

surprise attack at Pearl Barbor his command was nevertheless taken 

complete~ b7 su.:rprise, when the Je.i)anese destroJed, all his plaues 2!!. 

the ground, just as they did in Ha.wnii. General Miles, notwithstand:l.DS 

his statement that (p. 70): 

"The Hawaiian commands la1;er complained that this ''maaic" 

intormation vas not tra.nsm1 tteel to them-this in spite of their 

failure to react to the a.uthoz1L tati ve warning orders sent thE9 

when the situation was cammonlJr known to be far more critical. 

BJ comparison, it 'llJA'¥ be noted that General MacArthur, who had 

access to 1'magic," could not lJt.ter 1dent1f7 the more important 

"magic" messages; he apparent~r took no action on them, but 

alerted his command tor war on Wash1Dgton's we.rn1Dg orders. 

'l'hus assumes that General MacArthur "alerted bis command for war on 

Waaldngton •s warning orders." What does 11 aJ.erting11 mean, m:qhow1 it e. 

commander loses !!!, his planes b7 wliat I think was inattention? 

General Miles admits (pp •. 70·7JL) that "there were two 'tMAGIC" 

messages • • • which have subsequ.entJ.::r been helcl to have been signposts, 

had we so read them, to Pearl Ha.rbo1~. u The General devotes m&rl1' words 

to these two cases and concludes tb11.t the sigpposts pointed to e. halt• 

hearted propose.11 admit~ cliscus11ed in Washington, that the British 

and U. S. occup7 the Netherland InceLes before the Japanese did so-and 

he thus tried to explain e.wq the famious clue contained 1n a Tolqo messap 

to Berlin telling General Oshima, tlie Japanese Ambassador to Germa.Jl11 to 

tell the Germans: 11Say very secret:cy to them that there is extreme 

danger that wr lD8¥ sudden.J¥ break c)ut between the Anglo-8axon nations 

and Japan through some clash of al'ml~, and add that. the time of the break· 

1ng out of this war m&"1 come qUicke:r than 8.!J1'0ne dreams • " The exple.tla• 

tion of Miles (or, better perhaps, ~l;he la.ek of imagination) on the part 

57 

--------~~~---·-----~-----
REF ID:A485355 

of u. s. intelligence agencies appE~ars to me (even by hindsight, of course) 

to be prettJ thin. 

Here are two more paragraphs j~rom General Miles' article / both of 

which I think are ot considerable nignificance: 

The last twenty•fou:r how~ in Washington before the bombs 

fell have can.e in for much sc2:ut~. 'Wbl1' did the President, 

with most of the Japanese final answer before him, conclude 

that it meant war and then, ~:'ter a fitful attempt to ree.ch 

Admiral Stark b7 telephone, quietl.y go to bed'? wcy was he 

in seclusion the followiDg moJ:'lli.ng'l Why was no action taken 

on the Japanese rep.11 b;y the ~lecretaries of State, War, and 

Navy when they met on that Sun~ morninS" ~ did they not 

consult the President, or he uend. for them'l Where was eveq- b~, including rq humbla selj~? .Why, in short, didn't someone 

stage a last...minute rescue, in good Western st)'le'l 

The picture undoubtedl,y jls one of men still working under 

the ps7chology of peace. Tb.~r were 1 to quote Secretary Stimson 

again, "under a terrific presHure in the face of a global war 

which they felt was probab~ ;tmm:tnent. Yet they were surrounded, outside of their otf:Lces and almost throughout the count~, by a. spirit of 1sola1~1on1sm and disbelief in danger 

which now seems incredible. 11 They were men Who thought they 

had done their possible to Pl'f'Pare for impending w-a.r 1 and who 

bad no id.ea that there was an irm.ocent maiden in need of rescue. 

I will add another extract tluLt maJ' be helpful in seeing th:tnp in 

what I regard as their proper ll!hi~. This extract comes from SeeretaryStimson's statement with respect ·tc> the report ot the ArIISI' Pearl Harbor 

Boa.rd, repeated as a footnote (p. :~39) to the PER: 

As expressed b7 Mr. Stimfson: "A keener and more ~native 

appreciation on the pa.rt of sc:nne of the officers in the Wo.r and 

Na'VJ' Departments of the significance of some ot the information 

might have led to a suspicion of an attack specifically on Pearl 

Harbor. I do not tb1nk tbat c::ertain officers in the War Depart• 

ment :functioned 1D these respc:!cts with sufficient skill. At all 

times it must be borne in minci, however, that it is eas7 to 

criticize individua.J.s .in the light of hindsight, and very difficult to recreate fe.irl.1' the e21tire situation and info~tion with 

which the officers were requiJred to deal at the t1me fJf the 

event. n See statement of the Secretary <1 War W'ith respect to 

the report of the Arrq Pearl l!a.r'bor Boe.rd, cammittee1',ellihibit 

No. 157• 

------------------- --- ---~-- --~------

58 
REF ID:A485355 

M;y own expl.anatio~ of the fa.ilu:res and derelictions of u. s. intelli• 

gence can be stated in fev words: I do not tb1Dk there were no 1.magina• 

ti~ ottioers in G-2 or in ?la.val Inte:lligence; but more importa.ut there 

was ~~ in either the Arsq or the Nav intelligence staffs ill Wasbington 

whose most important, 1f not sole duty, was to s~ the whole stor.y wbicb 

the MAGIC messages were unfolding and which pl&f'ecl so important a part in 

our failure to deduce that the Japanese were p).ann:11J8 a surprise attack on 

the u. s. Fleet at Pearl.; there was nobedl whose responsibilltJ it was to 

tq to put the pieces of the Jig-sa\I' ;euzzle tOgetber. Certainly there 

was nob~ in the Ariq• s Signal Inte:lllgence Service who was assiped to 

or available for this purpose--even 1t the respozw1bil1ty tor this sort 

of work had been i":1xed OD 'tbat orsm:d.zs:tion, which it wasn't. This was 

likevise true of the equivalent Na.'Vlr organ1zat1on. This important phase 

of intelligence was a responsibili~r which in both services was Jealousq 

held by the Intelligence statts. Aud the distribution of the MAGIC 

messages was so riSid.11' controlled ilihat there was noboq 1n either ot 

these Intelligence staffs whose d"Ut:f it was to st!8f the messages from 

a. long-ranee point of view. 'l1he persons, officers and civilians, in 

intelligenee, a.a well as in the WJ:d:te House, bad. the messages onJ¥ for so 

short a time the.t ea.ch message represented onl:,f a. single treme, eo to 

speak, in a long m.otion piditre film--e. t:Llm which Ghoul.cl have beet!. shown 

and should ha.ve been intently gtudied aa e. cou:t;inuoua aeries or pictures 1 

because they were tel.liug a. stor.r. But the :film was aimpl;r not there to 

be studied e.nd this was a veq serious weakneaa, I think, ~ ~e inteitJ.1• (' 

gence o:rganize.tiona of the two Services. It 'lfJB3' :tw.ve been that thq 

59 

---~- - -- --------------- ------ ------
REF ID:A485355 

simply did not have the people to devote to such work. 

Of course 1 there are those cri t,ics who point to the message which 

Navy Captain McCollum testified. that• he thought should be sent to Admiral 

Kimmel, and to the one which the Arnw•s Colonel Sa<J.tler testified that ile 

thought shou1d be aent to General ;.:;l:lort. They, it seemed, senoed that 

MAGIC was telling a story and was pe1inting tow.rd a surprise attack, the 

most likely target being Pearl Ra.rbor. But both ei'l'orte ca.me up against 

stone walls-their supper-lor offieel~s claimed enough he.d been sent to put 

Kimmel and Short on full alert: To send more would only confuse them, 

or worse than that, irritate t!Em. But the latter were obviously 'WrOilf!lor so it seems to us now-again by ·the aid of hindsight. Admirals 'l'heobald 

a.nd Kimmel have made the moat of this :failure on the pa.rt of those above 

Captain Mccollum and Colonel Sa.dtl.e;i:" to realize hov inadequate the warnings 

that had been sent to Short and K:ilmnel really were. 

The Joint Congressional Committee (Ma.Jority Report) clearly :felt that 

what Kimmel. and Short vere sent b;y way o:Z information left nr\leh to be 

desired. One thing seems certain, e.s I b.ave already se.:Ld: the :l.ntelligence arrangements in both Services; were inadequate. The Comilli ttee reached 

certain conclusions and made but :i.':l.ve major recOllllllendations 1 the second of 

vhich is as follows: 

That there be a complete integration of ArifI3' and Navy 

intelligence agencies :J.n order to a.void the pitfalls o:t' di'lid.ed 

responsibility which experienc~e has made so abund.a.ntl.y a:ppa.rent; 

that upon effecting a unified intelligence, officers oe selected 

for intelligence work wo pos1:1eas the background, penchant, and 

cape.city for such work; and. t:iie.t they be ma.lnte..ined in the work 

for an extended period of tiw~ in order th.at they may be1!ome 

::;teeped ill the ramifications and re.f';i..nem.e.-i-1,;g of thei:e i1eJ..d aml 

emplo:y this reservoir of knowledge in evaluating material received. 

6o 

-- -- -- --- - -- --- ---- ~ ------~ 
REF ID:A485355 

The assigmnent of au officer llaving an aptitude tor such work 

should not impede bis progress nor attect his promotions. 

Efficient intelligence service:s are Just as essential in time 

of peace as u war 1 and this b1ranch of our armed services must 

aJ.waJ'S be accorcled the 1mpo"8nt role which it deserves. 

What bas been done about this recommendation b7 the Services'? Ve"J!7 

little; in fact, I think it can be said that nothing has been done. Of 

course, we have the Central IntelU.gence Asencr,; but is that establishment 

rea.ll;r responsive to the Joint Conmd.ttee's recCIDlllendation'l I hardl7 

'think so. The three services no dc1ubt can cite good reasons why they 

have not made & p~fessional careez· in intelligen.ce possible or attractive 

to its officer personnel; no doubt tbe7 can cite at length factors and 

dU'f1cult1es that would have to be overcome. All I cu say is that Judging by what the Arrq baa done the E~tti tucle toward intelligence seems not 

to have changed very much, as is ixldicated by t.he follow:Lns ed.1 toriaJ. 

which appeSZ'ed in the Washington Pc>st on 5 December 1955 and which states 

the case in succinct terms: 
.uEF ID:A485355 

'".'>r.· }- Snub to Intelligence ·s--j)~ ~' 

The recent ~eorganization . In the Army General 

Staff leaves the Military I11telligence Service in an 

ambiguous and rather humiliating position. Al· 

though directors of the other major staff divisions 

have been designated as Deputy . Chiefs of Staff 

with the ·rank of lieutenant general, the Chief of 

Intelligence remains a major 1eneral with the sub· 

ordinate title of Assistant Chief of Staff. 

The extraordinary thing about all this is that not 

long ago the ·special task force which investigated 

the intelligence problem for the Hoover Conimis· 

1ion strongly recommended that in the case of 

those units associated With the three armed services 

their chiefs "be evaluated in the organizational 

structure to level of Deputy Chiefs of Staff in the 

Army and Air Force, and Deputy Chief of Naval 

Operations in the Navy." This was a rather 

prolix way of saying that tltey ought to have a 

little ·more prestige and influence, along with a 

little more gold braid, than they now enjoy. Why, in the case of all three services, was this recom· 

mendation ignored by the Department of Defense? 

The chief function of military intelligence is to 

collate and interpret the information provided by 

the attaches abroad and by other agencies, such as 

the CIA, the FBI and its own counterespionage 

.nrvice. Correct interpretation requires more than 

the accumulation of relevant facts; it also requires 

a considerabre knowledge of the psychology of the 

potential enemy, and this in turn requires an 

extensive study of his language, history, culture, 

customs and philosophic tradition, since these 

afford the keys to such an understanding. But all 

this, together with the secrecy in which their activi· 

ties are necessarily clo~ked, seems to have made · 

Intelligence officers· somewhat suspect to ·a certain 

sort of politician. Even professional military men 

are often inclined to discount tlie ·valu'e ·of' the 

critical function exercised by intelligence officers 

in the dilcussion of pet military projects 'or plans. 

The question raised by the reorg;ani.iation is 

whether we can realistically expect to increase the 

quality of military intelligence by deemphasizing 

its significance. It is hard to see how a career in· 

intelligence can be niade to appeal to capable ofti· 

cers when the importance of intelligence ii so 

obviously downgraded in comparison with other 

1taff functions. 
REF ID:A485355 

High-level. Anq author! ties obvioua]3 c1on •t think that Intell.1gence 

is as important as Personnel, Suppl.1'1 and si•Uar services. How lo.Dg 

w:Lll it take before it becomes quite clear to them that Intelligence can 

be of the greatest help in fighting a var? For too ~ )'e&l'S intelli • 

gence in the Ar:STI:t and in 1;he Nav he1o& been a lfdeadend" tor officers who 

showed au interest. in it.1 or au aptttude tor it. Is this to continue 

:lndeftm tel.71 Do the Armed Forces 1m1Dk that the Central Intelligence 

Agency will o:r can do the Job? ot <:ourae, CIA representatives can be 

assigned to the headquaners of mil.'!. tar.r comn.nds-but will that till the 

need'? I doubt it, I doubt it very 1n.uch. 

The 1ntroductoey stawaent of ·the "Supervisor.r, Administrative, and 

Organizational Deficiencies in our Milital')' and Ha.val Eatabllshmenta 

revealed b:f the Pearl Harbor Invest1gat1onu (p. 253) the PBR begins as 

follows: 

The Cammi ttee has been u:trigued. throughout the Pearl Harbor 

p:roceed:l.ngs by one enipa.tical. and paramount question: Y!!Jl1 with 

some ot the ftneat intell11enc:e available 1D our b.1stoq, W1 i1i 

the almost certain k.novl!4fe tihat vazr was at hand, w1:tt,1lans that con~lated ~ ;erecise me of attaek tli&t was execu b 

Ja;pan on the :mor.rd.g ot Dec~•er 7- vas it ossi le for a 

Pearl ii8i'bor to occ\11"? The arlSVer to s quest1on and the 

causative considerations rep.J:'ded· u having t.:oy :reasone.bJ.¥ pro ... ximate bearing on the disaste1~ he.ve been set torth in the boa, 

of this report. ~'undNDeutaJJ.:r, the&e considerations reflect 

augemsoley' 1 e-Oministrati ve 1 •md. organizational. deticienciea 

which existed in our Mili ta.ry and Naval est&blishm.ents ill tho 

days before Pearl Harbor. In the course of the coum.ttee•a invest• 

tion still other d.cfieien~Les nut re ded as hav a direc~ 

~ari!lg on~- d.1sas~r,, :ve iresented themselves. otherwise 

stated, a.lJ. ot tbeae det'icielllc:ies reduce themsel.ves to princ:tpJ.es 

which are· set forth, not tor their noveltJ' or profundi t)r 'but tor 

the reason tha.t, by their very self-e·v-J.dent simplicity,, it io 

ditficul.t to believe they are ipored. 
REF ID:A485355 

It is recosnized that m8.Jl7 of the deficiencies revealed b7 

our 1nvest1gat1on mA'f ve't"I pz•obab:t,y have e.lre84J been corrected 

as a result of the ex,perience!B ot the war. We desire, however, 

to submit these pl'inc1ples • 'lirbich are &l'Ounded in the evidence 

adduced b7 the Coadttee, to:z• the considei-ation of our Arrq 8Zld. 

Na'Q' establishments in the eet.rnest ha.Pe that something conatruct1 ve ~ be accomplished tba1; will aid our nat10D&l defense and 

preclude a repetition of the disaster ot December 7 1 1941. We 

do this &f'ter caretul aud loi11 consideration ot the evidence 

deVeloped 'through one ot the most imgortant investiga.tioD.S in 

the hi&tor1 of the Congress. 

What have the Services d.on.e 1~ ameliorate the deficiencies mentioned? 

In 111 opiDion, Ve't7 little. Mayb•' it would be correct to sq "nothing." 

As a colleague said to me rec~r "Notbing v.Ul be done-until war breaks 

out. '.J!hen, of course, intelligen(::e is no longer treated a step-child." 

Is that what we vant'l The chanceis are that there won't be time to use 

inteW,geace after a wazo bre<s o'tlt: maybe the u. s. will be down and 

out by that time. 
REF ID:A485355 

1 • CONCLUSIONS 

After reading some but not a.u the m:Ulions ot words alluded to at 

the be83nning of this brochure to wl•t conclusions have !. arrived? I will 

be brief. 

First, I must collfeas, I think that Kimel and Short were not as cul• 

pab1e as I first thought thq ~'back 1n 1941·19421 despite ell the 

nvarn1ngs 0 sent them. '!!he Washington auU:iorttiea were culpable, toomiq'be a lot more culpable tban. were these two officers. Both the Ma..1orit7 

and the Minor11f7 Reports make good sense. The Report ot the MaJor1t7 

con"81ned some ver:1 pertinent recmmemlations.....i>ut noboq seems to be do1Ds 

im"Dortant 

ve1:J' much about illq)lementing 'the aeicond an.d. perhaps the mosti ot these 

ftC01DlllendationsJ nor baa auch, if a~, been done about foll.owing up 

on the Conclusions ot the Minori:Q',, Sena.tors Ferguson and Brewster. In 

1946 I thought the latter two sena1;ors were "hitting below the belt" but 

toda71 1n 1957, I tb1nlt they hit c:Jl.oser to the truth than the M&Joriv. 

I think Mr. Keefe's ue4d1tional v1EM311 on the Ma.4on-ty Report make good 

sense-Kimm.el and Short, he said, irere not the sole culprits. I tb1l1k 

that the Intelligence Services cam<~ ott ra'taher eaa1~-too eas:f.l¥ b the 

tild.Dg of respons1bilit1' and point:Lns out derelictions. I tb1nk the 

inteUigence staffs m1sht have used more Smagination but this was not 

because thq were staffed. with obtuse officers or persons of low.grade 

~e. As a. matter of cold fact, I think, thq were~ understa:tted, beca.uae in b~ the Arnv ·and the Nav 0

1ntell1ece" didn't 

co'2Jlt-f'or much a.1; &'fJ1 rate, then. 'fbis raises the question: does it 
REF ID:A485355 

count for much more ~ 11'1 the AJmed Bervices'l I think that Kimmel a.ud 

Short should have been seni; more ixd'omaUon-even 1t they were sent on:i:, 

"a:t.sts" ot MlGIC-to let them eveJ.tiate tor themselves the a1gn:tt1cance of 

vhat the Japanese were S8fin8• GexLeraJ. Miles aqs that the warning 

mease.gea sent them were of tar morE~ importance tban ~ thq could 

have got fran It.Magic". I don't aga~ee. ~ might have had more time to 

:rumina.te; they might. even have gueE1sed-aa Ad.m1ral Kimmel hints-what <the 

Japanese were pla.mdns; ow cammancls m1gb:t there1'ore have been much more 

prepared than the7 were to meet tb.E: e.ttaek. '.I!bis, one must e&d.t, could 

have been done even 'Without their la.avg a P'!'Rle maohine or a cmt ... 

a.pall'liic eta.ff to solve and tre.nslnte messages in the.'\ or 1n tb.e other 

Japanese diplomatic srstem.s. 

I tb1Dk that Admiral S\ark waa wr<>na in wai tine for Genera.1. Marshall 

to 'be found before sending off a 1l'.¥~ssage to Kimmel and Short-a.nd to the 

other overseas cODlllllmden-as soon as the last par{,; of the 14-part To~o 

to Washington message became available-espec~ when he k.nev from 

UMagic n that KUl."USU and Nam.ura Ve~~ told exa.ctl.3' to the m:l.n.~. Whan to 

present the whol.e message to Secrei_, Hull. (~t we knev the contents 

O't the last pa.rt. of tb&t message f.'deli ver this whole messqe ea~ 

at 1:00 p.m.':]' before the Japanese Embasq code clerks had them is a 

ered1 t to the efficiency of Artifl ai1d Nav.y cr;y,p~c statts.) 

I 1ib1nk that Colonel Edvard F:rench, Chief o:t the Sipa.l Corps Message 

Center, used very poor Judgment Whf1!n he sent Marshall's message via 

commercial radio. Re could have u:aed Navr radio or FBI radio-but I wn 

sure he thought it ws intra dis ti:> ask a 11s:tster0 goverment radio 
REF ID:A485355 

_, __ 

ael"Vice (eapeciaJ.11' the Navy) to do (at a. critical moment) something that 

Arm::/' ndio couldn't do. Or DIB\Ybe Cc:\l.onel Fi-ench di<ln't realize the srav.lt7 

ot the situation, or was not told sc:1 in !Japressive enough J.anluage. 

The Ferguson•Brewter M:Ulorit7 Bepot't does not point 'bbe finger a.t 

all the high ranld:ng officials who s1hould share the responsibUity but -

i 1- does say (p. ;73) "D°'1l in WnslWlgton and in Hawaii there were num.erous 

and serious failures ot men in the l.awer civil. and millt&.1'7 echelons to 

perfora their dutiss end discharge 1;.b.eU' responsibili tiea. 'l1hese are too 

numerous to be trea1;ed in detail a.nCL individually named." I vould have 

liked Uiem to have named the Dil"ec'tc>r'S of Intelligence in the A=r:f' and in 

the Nav, specificaJ.J.u, because I t111Dk poor intelligence work pla.J'ed. such 

a large part in the debacle. 

And.1 of course, although it is cl.ear tbat MA.GIC !!!. withheld from 

Kimel and Short after the summer o:f l94l, I do not tbink (aud ~ t.his I - m qu1te aure) th&' 11- was deliberetbeJ.7 v:t.'thheld .zo;r the :;wecific P'm"R9!!, 

'l!., ~.~.ytg Ol'l the attack at Pearl! Exoept for the most re.bid of the 

z.teVis10D1s'ts this ls ~ te.utastic :a thea:ts; b°"" there is a stl'OllgW 

a.rsment against such a thesis: 11; is not supported b)' the tacts. 
REF ID:A485355 

8 .. EPILOGUE 

What wsa it that so aroused thE~ antt..aooseveltiaua1 leading t.bem to 

s~ct that it was nakulldugsery" a.ud gross .negligence in We.shittg1K>n 

1;1lat was responsible for 'ihe :Peai.•l Jiarbor d.1saster1 

~did the Prea:lc1ent, his cloaest associates in the White Rouse, 

and 'the oi'i'icers in the W.;) ... level p4)a1tiom; in the Arrrr:r and. in the iiav, 

generate so much suspicion in the m:LndG o'! the Re,publicmis~ Wh1' such 

reluctaw:e to ha-1e e.n investigation to ~ vb}' the U. S. foroos were 

causht b7 t1u:pr1se at Pearl narbor'l 1'.Cllis ia a ;point which I <W not tb.iDk 

is expl.Ained 114 the lJ:t;era:tu~e and 1ifhieh ought to be. Wl:q' did the Presi• 

dent and. bis adm1·a1atrat1on a.llow s1:> much suspicion to grow up in the 

minds of the Republicans by the que111tiona which the latter 1"8.ised. e.i'ter 

1 neoembCl- 1941 and which they cont::tnued to raiue throushout the wnr't 

Could this ha.ve been avoided I! It is my opinion that 1 t was tbia refusal 

to explain, this subJeotiou to cont::Lnued. "need.Ung" of tlle :President and 

the Democrats by the Republlos.na throughout the w.r that t\l'Oused \he 

graves·t suspicion& that there 'WS indeed gross negligence in the White '·; 

Rouse and a" the higb.est executive levels 1 Q.lld matbe gi:oea:t;er clerel:J.ct10ll8 

to be bid.den. The ~t resistance the l"resident and the Democratic 

Adnd n:l stration ~ to r.:ia!n'Gain G.pJ.nst r..epubllca.n ;pressure tor Congressional hea:r:1np on ~s poim and the ree.sonu therefor "t.i"ere qu1te obvious; 

we nov know that suoh hearings wouJ.d. ba.vo ,.let the cat out of the ·cagn -

that the u. s. vu read1ug all the Ja.pe.nese erypto...comm.un:t.ca.t1ons between 

the Foreign Otf1ce and 1t$ embaas:tes, legations, and consul.a.tea ab:r:oad.. 

The Japa.uese would bave che.uged theiir Purple S:fBtem without de~. It 
REF ID:A485355 

is 1nconce1 vable, the Adm:tm.atration believed, that the seci-e't could have 

been~ even it au the hear1ngs vere in Execu-tive Sessions. 'Rhe7 felt 

azJ.d were wa.rrantecl 111 feeling \hat RearlDgs on the aubJect would be disastrous dU1'1n8 the war: too much ii'i tal information on the subJect would 

\ 

bave leaited out. I~ 'ts true that 'the Japanese had been alerted duriDS 

the var b7 the Ge:i:ima.u; 1;hq were 3;old., :Ln fact-and nobodl' knows to ~s 

da7 Just hov the Germana found out•-tba.t we were reading Japanese di:plo• 

me.tic messeses. All this appears i.n 'the PHR and makes interest1ng readi.-ag. 

But it is astom.shing that even a.f1;er thq wioe 'told the Japanese Just 

s1m.Pl.1' retused. to believe the sto~r and continued. to use '1le Pw:ple 

&J'l'tem• (Neither, :tor 'b~ matter, did the Gezmans put much credence ill 

the suspicions, torwardecl b7 Marshal Rommel trca Africa., that. the British 

must be re!:d!Y hie messages J Bommc~l felt ~t this tmd cml1' this could 

account for his continuing 4eteats in North Africa after 19431 Have these 

'two episodes s;rq lessons for us? ~les, indeed! Crt,ptographers beoane 

emmored ot the1r 1.nventions aud. tlileir m.1.nde become polerized. in a sort 

Of conviction l s I that the s:rsttems ~ have concocted are invincible. 

It happened. to us, t.ool I can remember the mental shock I bad when 

1ndub11;a'ble evidence was placed. be:to:re me ehoWing th.at the GeJ.'m.8.DS were 

:rea.dirlg the enciphe:rea. code qstem we were using for cammmi cations between 

U. s. ArtfS7 Observel:' with the British Exped3.:t1cna1'1 Forces in Nonb Africa 

in 1942-3 am Washington! 'lhat is Wb¥ I believe '1lat some b~-experts, 

of course-ou"8ide tb.e one that thinks up and produces our ow cmto• 

S1'Stems but with1n NSA should be called. in frequelXtJ.7 to take a good look 

e.1; those s7stems w make sure that. some ~ in the swons CJ!'IP1ioaecur11;J 

'' 
REF ID:A485355 

eaitice the NGA cr.v:ptogaphen 'think they have erected doesn't exist and 

that such a crack can not be 'Widened. 

70 
REF ID:A485355 

'l\J: i:<irecto:r 

National Securit,y ~ 

\J~ 25, o .. <.:. A~on: cm~ o:ttieier, NSA 

In acco:rdance vi th ArUcl.M ll (Jel.1Ye'J.7) an C~t tic. 

:.lA49-l.70-ec-l.739, File No. 69!;...alA-56, 56-NSA/Pf{~fo, 

th1IS invoice 1a submitted tor P81111•11't 

•••••••• r;·4,CXX>.OO 

~ 

I cenu';y 1;.bat t.be above bil.l is con:oect ~ J\W°' tm&1 that 

t.beref'or baa not been received. 

_,..._, -·--· _,y ,_. -· ·-~-·----................. >! 

\J~.f F • J,:;(u.;.u~il.";>{ 
REF ID:A485355 

Heferen.ce io made to GQUtract ~o. :)A49·l70-ec·l139, 1'':.U.e ~{o. J)' .. ..:i~\-).:, 

5(.i..,ro.A/PH-2'/0, vbich vu entered into u of l August l.955 by and 'betlreen the 

ikli ~l Jt&tu ot J.rica and tbe tmderaigued 8Dd 'Which was Dldified only a.a 

to date ot deli ve-q o£ a.U 1lbe i ._ called ror undea" said con11ract.. rn e.c~-e Wit.b tb.e prov:tsicma "of Articl.e 11 (Delive;q) ot aaid contrfM.-t, i 

ilim aenr:UJ.l6 70U herevit.h (a) ~·te~ 150 ca~ c&X\Ui augpl.ementa'E',y to 

those sent. under ?roJect 11 Articl.e I, ~ b(l) 1~ :;;aid cont.rs.ct; and 

(1;i) the CIOllllPleted ~t celled for under ProJect 3 o.f the IHIDle Article, 

vlz •• a aped.al report ariginn.111" 1M!nta'tivel.y enUt.led The iLtw.ogie&l 

m. ~CllDd. of tbe va.rs.ou. 01'1'1c1&1. Jnve.~ into tbe A on ?oa.rl & said rmnw t'1'ile 01· tbe~i;i tor m&i' ProJect 3 is 

nov not. qμite aui:Wale md l have delSlled it ad.viaabl.4 to amend it by prefaciag it vi.th t.be word.a "Certain upec:=ta ot ·=~c•", making the ~lete titll';; 

"Certain !!pee:!! of 1*':\c' 1n tbe c~~:f tit!:und of~ v~~~ Off!QAAi Ipvea!ieil<DS uno t& l"tt· cm ~ • " 

I sw adapted a rather WortlfU. sty.le which tJa¥' 1>e~ make the bro ... 

c:hure .ll!Qre lntereaUng. ;..)everal. 1&1-.a therein cast a new llgbt, I th.ink, on 

certain aspects ot the i.n\l-eatipt1cxas and the qUieStions rai&ed by & categor.r 

ot historiawl wbo have tAUCh to 811\:f el.bout the 8*tack on Pearl Harbor and. vbo 

~ ..kJlown aa "revisioW..atH. " l'>t' brc:M:bure mA:¥ tbe:re:tore be uaetUl 111 a stud,y 

oi' the Pearl Harbor "' .aasw:r, especj~ for h1stor1ans who take a more 

realistic view o£ what ~ 8Dll ~ the u. s. fOZ'\.."'"eS in Ilawaii wre 

caUfSb;t by surprise. It is perm.pa unfartiu.te that. I had. to U&e a small 

amount of •terial which ia still c:1.aas1tied a.nd tberef;'.)1-c the brochure a;; 

v. vhQJ.e baa ma. to be clasaU'ied. 

I reallze ~ too wl:l. that tilt.' present brochure cal certa.i.ncy he 

~roved by f'urt:.ber 'WOZ'k but the Uloo limit~ twice extcmded-perW.t.e 

or no add.itioral delJQ' in the d.e.Uv.U":f <4 t.b.1.s item. .Let 1t be considered, 

in tbe words ot the previous .~Iirocti:n' of the :iation&l Securi t,y ~, u 

''!itodel l'lo. l."