REF ID:A39942 

, 

...,;' 

SECRET . CONFI-NTIAL~ 

DATE Jo ~~ 

RESTRICTEr 

TO / FROM ~r.. FROM 

~Chief, ASA (10) L Tech Staff (96)_ 

Executive 0 (11 _ Ch, Secunty Div (80)_ 

- o'rJomtOper (12 Tech Staff (81)_ 

uty Chief, ASA (20 Ch, Matenel Br (82)_ 

h, Comm Res Sec (14) Ch, Methods Br (83)_ 

_ Ch, Hist Umt (13) Ch, Protective Br (84)_ 

Ch, Pers Sec (21)_ Ch, Mamt Br (85)_ 

Ch, Org & Tng Sec (22)_ _ Ch, Res Lab Div (70)_ 

Ch, Plans & Oper (23)_ Tech Staff (71)_ 

Ch, Materiel Sec (24)_ Ch, Ch C1ph &Cif Br(72)_ 

Ch, Fiscal Sec (25)_ Ch, Int Equip Br (73)_ 

Ad3utant, ASA (26)_ Ch, Elec & Elec Br (74)_ 

Ch, Sec Cont Sec (27)_ Ch, Lab Serv Br (75) _ 

_ Ch, Operations Div (90)_ Ch, C'logic Br (76)_ 

Ch, Lab Br (91)_ _Ch, Pers & Tng Br (61)_ 

Ch, Machine Br (92)_ _Ch~ Supply Br (62)_ 

Ch, Crypt Br (93)_ _Co, Arlington Hall (40)_ 

Ch, Int Cont Br (94)_ 

Ch, I & D Br (95)_ 

( ) Approval & Return 

( ) As Requested 

( ) Concurrence or Comments 

( J.Jtiformation & Forwarding 

( v1' Informatlon & Return 

CSGAS 96 (Rev 12) 16 Apr 47 47938 

mormatlon & File 

) Recommendation 

( ) Signature if approved 

( ) Your action by 

( ) Info upon which to base reply 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-17-2014 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 
REF ID:A39942 

- - -- - - - -
REF rn-: A39942 

Decree o.f 9 June 1947, taken .from "VEDOMOSTI 11 16 June 1947 

Concerning Responsibility .for Divulging State Secrets 

and .for Loss of Documents, Safeguarding State Secrets 

In the aim of establishing unified legislation and reenforcing 

responsibility for divulging in.formation appearing to be state 

secrets, a list of which has been established by the Council o.f 

Ministers o.f the USSR in its decree of the 8th of June, this year--

the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet decrees: 

1. Divulging in.formation containing state secrets, particularly 

in the case o.f individuals entrusted with this information, or who 

may have received this in.formation by reason of their official 

position, insofar as these actions may not have been occasioned by 

treason to the fatherland or espionage--is punishable by imprisonment in a correctional labor camp for a term o.f eight to twelve 

years. 

2. Divulging by an official of the military service (War 

Office) of in.formation of a military character, composed of state 

secrets, insofar as these actions ma.y not have been occasioned by 

treason to the .fatherland or espionage--is punishable by imprisonment in a correctional labor camp for a term of ten to twenty years. 

3. Divulging by a private person of information composed of 

state' secrets, insofar as these actions may not have been occasioned 

by treason to the fatherland or espionage is punishable by imprisonment in a correctional labor camp for a term of five to ten years. 
r 

I 

REF ID:A39942 -

4. Loss by accountable parties of materials, documents and 

publications containing information composed of state secrets, if 

these actions by their own nature do not bring upon themselves, by 

law, more severe punishment--is punishable by imprisonment in a 

correctional labor camp for a term of four to six years. If these 

violations involve more serious consequences, it is punishable by 

imprisonment in a correctional labor camp for a term of six to ten 

years. 

5. Loss by officials or the military service of documents, 

containing information composed of state secrets, if these actions 

by their nature do not bring on themselves, by law, more severe 

punishment--is punishable by imprisonment in a correctional labor 

camp for a term of five to eight years. If these violations involve 

more serious consequences, it is punishable by imprisonment in a 

correctional labor ca.mp for a term of eight to twelve years. 

~ > 6. Disclosing or transmitting abroad of inventions, discoveries 

and technical improvements containing state secrets, produced 

within the borders of the USSR or produced abroad by citizens or 

the USSR, in the service of the state, if these violations may 

not have been occasioned by treason to the fatherland or espionage--

is punishable by imprisonment in a correctional labor camp for a 

term of ten to fifteen years. 

7. Military Tribunals ahall have jurisdiction over violations 

described in this decree. 

2 
REF ID:A39942 

8. In connection with the publication of the present decree, 

the following are superseded: 

a. The decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 

of 15 November 1943; "Responsibility for Divulging State Secrets 

and for Loss of Documents containing State Secrets" 

b. Point "a"J Page 25, Statute on Military Crimes. 
REF ID:A39942 

• ma• _, __ 

' ' 

r• -- IV!JIO'J.'1 Comments on •special Repo~t ISLo/rvp, dated 19 

' .ran. 1948" 1n re 8. 1019 

.. ,.. Ml - ....,_ 

~~l ¢oord.1nator ot Joint Operation•, USO:tB·UBCICC 

~ 

1. The tolloving 0011111.i~t• &ppl7 to Snaloaure (A) to 

the subject repo~ts - p 

r•• (l) Page 1,~tb1Pd paragl'&ph, a•cb~4 •entenoei 

Kecomaend 1nse~t1on of the Vord •peacet1a•• in 1econd lino, 

1111111.ed1atel7 before th• word *proteot1on•. - (2) aea1oni'--t-In wartime, although 1\ i• at1l1 

• 

~•ceaaar7 to prove intent to 1nJur• the United Statea 6 the 

temper or the public, the verr stringent penalti•• u:nde~ Sec. 

Rot the itzap1onage Act• (up to death or thirt7 7eara 111·--

- - • l 

p~i•onment). and the normal caution exerc11•d bf &ll c1t1zena 

in vart1•• are autt1c1ent tor the proteotion. during vart1.me, 

-

&&&1n•t leakage ot vital 1Dtormat!on ot the t7pe oontemplated 

' und•r a. 1019. Xt ia under peaoet1•• oo~d1tione that I. 1019 

would. ... be moat deairabl• ~ tor •1ntent to -injure" vould b• imch 

' 

1Doti• 41.t~icult to pro•• and the temper o~ the public ia~quit• ..__ 

41tterent. Hovever, from o\11' p61a.t ot viev, leakage ln pe&o•-

t1ae la-Juat aa diaaatrov.a &a in vartiae. 

\ 

' v. -

. ... 
REF ID:A39942 

SECRET 

b. (l) Page l., tbird paragraph, J.&at l1ne1 fbe 

•tateaent 1• 11ot oompletel7 accurate, an.4 1ta inaooura.07 baa 

t&r•reacliing conaequenaea on the aubaequent rea1oning. 

(2) Reaaonz (a) The Act oited. that ot 10 June 

193' (48 Btat. 122) 1 1a qU1te limited in 1ta acopo, It bJ 

no aeane, aa ola1med in the proposed statement, me.kea it a 

or1me "to d1eolose details ot an7 diplomatic oode." Pollow1ng 1• th8 oo~plete wording ot the Act: 

'l'bat whoever, by virtuo of hie emplo;rm.ent b1 the 

United States. shall obtain from another or ahAll have 

oustod7 of or acoeas to., or aball have bad cuetod7 ot 

or aoeeaa to, an1 ott1o1al diplomatic oode or an7 matter 

prepared 1n anJ' such oodo., or vh1oh p~ports to have be11n 

prepared in an7 such oode, and eball v1llfully, vithout 

authorization or oompotent authorit7, publ1eh or rurn1ah 

to another any auob oode or matter. or any matter which 

vaa obtained Yh1le 1n the procea• ot tranam1.as1on 

betveen •D7 rore1gn gover.nment and it• diplomatic llieeion 

1n the United ltatea. •ball be :tined not moi-e tban 

•10,000 or 1lll.pr1•oned not more tban ten 7eara, or both. 

Act June 10, 19'' (48 Stat. 122; 22 u. s. C. 1'5). 

It 1• obvious that under thia Act, eo long aa the all•g•d 

violator doe• not 't>ubl1ah or turnieh to another• either (a} 

the aotual code itaelt or (b) the oontenta or text ot a 

••••age. that 1•, "•n1 •tter prepared in &11J auch oodo" .. no 

1n~ictment could be 4ravn, much lees oould a conviction be 

obtained. In order to underetand the limited appl1cab111tJ 

ot the Act o1ted, 1ta h1ato:ry IN.at be understood. It vae a 

coapl:'omise reached onl7 atter th• atora aroused by the 1ntroduot1on ot a bill all•g•dl7 infringing treedOJ:l ot press 

and apeeoh bad died dovn.. Purther, reterr1rsg to the matter 

on page 2, tourth linei 1n v1ev or the re-.rka made a.bove in 

-aBEr- - - - - ' • -_:--... -----.. 'Ii.. "' 

= 
REF ID:A39942 

connection with tbe Act cited, it 1& believed quite unwarranted 

to 11&J tbat MTbat Act ••• provide• a high degree ot proteot1on 

to~ tbe.t pa.rt or our ool!Zllun1oation 1ntell1genoe ettort vhtah 

m&J be directed solelr ag&1nat tore1gn 41ploaa.t1o codes ••• tt# 

•inoe a person might publ1ah in tull detail a eoJllPlete account 

or the vhole ASA and CSAV organ1zat1ona, their apecial taa111t1ee, 

techniques, eucees•e• and tailurea, and so en, and 7et not 

violate the p~ov1•1ona ot the Act cited. 80 long as no d1plomat1o 

codes or texts are published or banded over, there is no v1ol.at1on ot the prov1s1ona or the Act in qu&st1on and ths~e aah 

thereto~& be no pun11hment. 

(b) Por tbe foregoing reaaon1 it is eugg••t•d 

tb&t the ••ntence or reference c'~d line trom bottom or pt,ge l) 

bo obaoged to reada 

"Tbe Act or 10 June 1933 (~ Stat .. 122) makes it 

a c~i•• pun1ahabl• bJ' a •10,000 r1ne, or 10 7•&r• 1n 

jail. or both, to turn1ah to another All? ott1ei&l 

i1p1omat1o cod• or ... tter which baa been prepared in 

auch a code. It •1 be noted t'bl.t the Act 1.n qU4tat1on 

vae ruehed ~hrough undel" apec1al o1:rcumat&ncea 111 19,,a It aroae trom baat7 attempts to prevent rui-th&~ ~•vel&­

t1ons b7 Yardl•J atter the publication ot b11 ••n•at1onal 

book 'The Aalorican Bl&ck Chanaber• 1n 19,l. The bill 

t1r•1i dM.vn up in the exo1teaent cauaed bJ' the 41•cloeure 

that Ya~dle7 bad v~1tten a aecond book, the m.anuac:ript 

er vbiob was alr•adf in the band• ot a publiaher1 vas 

ot auoh a broad •cope tbat 1t 1mmed.1at•l7 arouaed the 

ao•t •trenuoua oppoaition fro• the p~••• and even within 

the Congress 1t1elt. Vhen the storm aroused bf thia bill 

41•4 d.ovn, th• 1nnocuoua meaeur• pa•••4 on 10 June 19'' 

vaa the moat t'be.t oould. then be obtained ill the va7 or 

proteotin& OPJPtanal7t10 ••creta. It vae, hov•ve~. 

•ttect1ve to meet the emergenc7 a1tua.t1on, ror 1t vaa 

lm.ovn tbat Yardle1'• p~opo••d aecOhd book v&e replete Yi\h the ac\ual text• ot •••••s••· Y~th paaaage ot the 
REF ID:A39942 

--... ...... LtU 

measure~ pu.blicat:lon or Yardle-y•a ma.nuaoript waa pre- vente4J and tbia Aot aerves •• a det•rre.nt against the 

pub11c&t1on or &llJ' book Vhich diaclosea & d.1plomat1c oode or meaaagea vhtoh have been prepared in auoh a 

eode. Rove~e~# it 1a ver1 important to note that thia 

Act 1s quite 11m1ted in its aoopeJ &J17bod7 vho 1a the 

possessor ot detailed oo:lllllun1cat1on 1ntell1ge.nce tnrormation can d1•oloae all of 1t without any puni•haent vbatsoever under the Act~ as long aa he doea po~ 

pu~li•h or.hand ove~ ptiza1oallS apx code ita•lf ,or~ r thereof or any mesaagea v ich i'iid bean pre~red tb~( cfo.de.. t'hia aort ot :Proteot1on !a not vhi ve' 

now need or are aeek!ng in the present bill. We are 

••eking 1eg1alat1on ~bich will protect the large amount 

ot general and apeo1t1o teobn1oal 1ntormat1on Which ia 

extremel7 vital to national aecUl'it7 &nd ~hioh ve h&•• 

built up at great pa.1na and expense over the paat tvo o~ three decades. ua1ng the people's mone7. It can all 

b• rendered more or leas vorthless~ without b&n~1ng oveP 

any eode and without publ1ah1ng an1 solved aeaaagea# aerely bi tolling in detail vbat we knov. or have, or 

ai-e acaompl1&h1ng in thi• tiel.d. Alao, 1t 1a bportant 

to note that the Aot ot 10 June 193} onl7 appl1ea to 

diplomatic oodea •nd therefore doea not extend to that 

part ot our oomm.un1o&t1on intelligence ettort Yb.ioh ma.1 

be directed &g&1nat ~ore1gn m111tar7, ll&val 1 air and 

other codes, nor to tho cod•• used bJ" our own m111t&ry •etabl1ebment and 1ntell1genoe agenc1••·-

(Cancel t1rat 10 line• on page 2, it ~oregoing 1• a4opted.) 

o. Page 2, line• lJ-161 What ve hope to accomplish 

b7 a. 1019 1• the pl'evention of le&lcage by 'Vft'l1-me&n1ng p•ople 

Who have .n.o intent to inj\ll'e the U.S. but vbo •1apl7 cloae 

their •1•a to the oonaequencea~-e1thor tor monetarr gain rrom 

potential publiahera or ror personal van1t7, prestige, etc4 

the vording beginning 1n line l~, •with o•tena1bl~ lnn.ocent 

intent. a aethod vh1cb 1• juet •• ettect1v• •• di~ect 4•11v•r1 

in getting the 1ntormat1on into the band• ot a.n intended 

rore1gn-gov•rnment-&gont-~•c1p1ent", and the taot that thi• 

I-... .. ' t ~ .. -' '~ .. -
REF ID:A39942 

argument 1• given r1~st place 1n bringing up the lapionaee 

Act, implies tbat the obi•t or at leaat one ot the 1.llportant 

reasons for leg1•lat1on auob aa tbat contemplated 1n 8. 1019 

1• to prevent •ucb a •ource of leakage a• the one Cited. It 

1• highly questionable whether this 1• an important rea•on. 

At an7 rate the argument at this point 1a ao veak &a to make 

a change adviaable. A method such a• 1a implied therein• as 

• means of getting 1.Dtormatton into tor•1gn hand•, 1a rather 

rar-tetohed. tor the person 1• rea111 acting aa a roreign 

agent; a person who aoted on the secret assumption that he 

oould aay# if' detected, that h• h$.d no intent to injure the 

U.S •• could very probably be proved to be an agent. On the 

other hand~ the peoplo at vhom 8. 1019 in aimed are not 

potential or actual eneJn7 agenta or the torego1ng type. On 

the contrar7, • person who constitutes a serious aecur1t1 

hazard •o rar as commun1oat1on intelligence 1ntormat1on goee, 

•7 rea;tl.z feel completel7 innocent or Uitent to inJure tb.e 

U .a. Por •xample~ Yardley atated t1Jle and asa1n that tar trom 

b&vtna an,- atent to injure. he vaa reall7 acting aa a 

p&tr1ot1c o1t1zen b7 Md1aclos1ng th1nga vb1ch abowed the 

blindnete ot bureaucr&ta in cloaing 'The Black Chamber•. ft 

there 1• no queetion that the Japioll&g• Aot cloaea onl7 part 

ot the gap in prope~ 1eg1elat1on to proteot oo»nn\U11cat1on 

intelligence inf"o:rmation~ but th• •~gum.ant tbat 1• am.plo7ed 

to 41•oloee th1e 1• rault7 and can be replaced b7 a better 

on•. Th• tollo111ng wording 1• •uas••te41 

s 
REF ID:A39942 

-... ~"'"" .... ..'\... ..... .... ....... ...,,. .......... _ .......,, .. ,,, ..... -i,~.._...~k'ls..11.:;...~ 

•Thi• Act cannot be invoked to pun1•h people "11.o 

41acloae vital 1ntormat1on V1tbout &D.J intent to 1~jure 

the United 8tatea. Thi• category inoludet people Yho, 

tor reaaons or personal pre•tige or vanit7, or trom 

mleguided mot1••• auoh aa in the Yardley cast, o~ 1n • 

dea1re to pror1t in & monetar7 va7, proceed to tell all 

about their vart1llle expe~ienc•s (aa otbera are doing, v1tneae Capt. Butcher'• 1.MJ ~bree Years vith liaenbover•, 

Capt. 2achar1aa• •secret Intelligence', Col. Allen•• 

'Luck; Po:rvard•). Publ1oat1on o~ 1ntor.ma.t1on ooncern1ng 

our col!DBunioation 1ntell1genoe aot1v1t1ea by people vbo~ ~ \;;:.: tall in tbia category 1• Just &• el~iv• aa direct ~CIA 

delivery, bJ' secret agents, ot the 1.ntm:•mation to toraign 

governments. Oommun1cat1on intelligence 1ntorma.t1on 1s pee~li&rl7 vulnerable to even th• llOat indirect roundabout, 

and piece-meal revel&tlon-" .... Btc. ~~ ~ 

~he remainder on page 2, sentence beginning on line 17, 1• 

aatief'e.otor:y. 

d. (1) Page '' at end or 10th line, 1n1ert1 

#Katabliahment or a means that would 1111ke posa1ble the." 

(2) Page '' line 1,, atter the vord •:1.nro~t1onw 

add a ''bJ preventing reconatruotion ot tho•• a7a teu troa a 

compariaon ot the code text• with th• plain texta or meaaage 

vbieh bad been transmitted in tho•• ayatema.• 

•· Page 7, line 141 Th• 1tatuent. regarding "our 

t:tilb1lit7 to deoode the 1•portant J•paneae m111ta17 couunun1cat1on• in the d&1a ialed1atel7 leading up to P•:rl Barbor" 1• 

an underatatement. the truth or tbe lll!Ltter !a that w• were 

unable to read & eingle h1gh-eoh.elon Japaneae A'1!1AJ' or Air ~orce 

•••Mg• \Ult11 :ApJtil l~}. a period ot well ov•r a 7Mr atteia 

Pea:i-1 Jfarbor1 and 1t took another au ao:utha, once tb• natve 

ot the a71tem. vaa und•~•tood, to build up the procedures and 

the atatr to a point vbe~• quantit7 produotion of t,.nalat1ona 

S£GRET 
l 

I 

REF ID:A39942 

._,..._,_,, ...... ...., w-....r.c......_._ - --- ........ _ ,... -

becaae • poa•ib111t7. It 1• 1apoaa1ble to eatimate th• rarreacbi:ng oonaequenaea tbat & ~everae or the actual a1tu&tion 

in thi• regard m1ght have bad on the teaet1cal and etrategic&l 

plans ot the U.S. Bad ve been able to reaa all these h1gh-

•ohelon Japaneee oommun1cat1ons dura1ng the r1ret rear or tvo 

ot the var 1n the Pao1r1c, th• entire course or th&t var might 

poaa1bl7 have been d1tterent. It 1• auggested that the aenten.c• 

be cbanged to read aa tollovas 

... 

"It 1a not rar-tetohod to euggeat that the entire 

course or the var in the P&cit1o might h&ve been ver7 

dttrerent had tbe U.S. been able to decode all Japaneae Al'J!lY and Japanese A1~ Poree h1gh-•oholon secret comm.un1-

c&tiona upon the outbreak or the var there and r~r the 

rirat rear or two ot that var. For 1t 18 a tact tb&t 

whereas in 1931 Japanese m11itary oodea vere childiahlf 

a!mple and na1ve, b~ 7 December 1941 the7 bad become ao 

oom.plie&ted that it took almost two tull years• t1me &nd 

the work ot thousand• or people betore the u.s. Arm7 

vaa in & pos1t1on to decode these bigh-eohelon communieat1ona. It !a 1mpose1ble to estimate vbat thi• tvo-yea~ 

struggle With these high-echelon oomm.un1cati~na coat the 

U.S. people in mone7 and 1n the lives and health or its 

soldiers vho rought the Japanese more or less blindlJ 

for that period or time." 

t. {l) Pago 8, l&et eentenoe, continuing on page 9a ...... ., - tJ Xt is very doubtful whether an exception would be made to the 

general and long-standing rule th.at "1gnoranoe or the lav is 

no excuse." There is nothing in the bill which prov1~es tor 

an exception to be made in the case or a pe~son vho pleads 

1gnoranoo ot the mean1ne of the 1nd1cat1ons of ola~s1f1ed 

•tatus. or o~ the faat that the 1ntormat1on 1s olass1r1ed, it 

an indication 1B not present. It is understood that the interp~etation or non-app11oab11it1 or the penalties to & pe~•o~ 

7 
.a t .,. 

...... ,.~ .. 

REF ID:A39942 

i 

.:¥" ~ ..! 

• 

... - ., 

, 

vho plead• ignorance ot the olaaa1t1ed status or th• 1ntorm4t1o.n ~--- 1• an 1nterp~etat1on •ubm.1tted b7 aome legal authorities who .-IE:.=;:~ -= 

were consulted by the I & S Subcommittee. However~ it 1• tei\-

that Vhen the Oongreaa comes to examine this bill there v1ll --- __ 

" _, 

be & oonaider&ble amount or questioning raised on this point~~ r 

It would appear that an innocent person vould in the final ... 

anal7a1e be at the mercy or & court or a jury, tor whether a 

eolll"t o~ & jur7 vould sive credtnce to a plea ot ignorance 

vould be Y1thin their province. 

(2) Por th• roregoing reason, and because it 1• 

too late to change the vord1n.g or the bill. it 1• auggeated 

that the sentence in question be alloved to stand, vith the 

insertion Of tbe YO~d ftprobablyw i.mmed1&tel7 be£ore the Word 

"aa:ren. 

g. (1) Pase 9, 12th line, the sentence beginning 

•Tbat such a person has not yet come to light ••• " -- The 

~-

. - ... ~ 

-.1.,. ..... ..... .,._.__. 

~__,,·~ 

-~ 

_;_~"T 

~ ._ 

--....-. 

=~:- ~ .:. .. _...,.... 

,...... - ~_.,, 

.. 

~ 

argument bere i• exoeptionally veak and might lead to the 

casting &Bide or tho entire measure, since some member ot 

Congreaa might vell aak1 "If that 1e true up to now~ vh7 

ahould not the situation continue to r•at on the aame baaia?" 

lloreover~ 1t is believed tbAt the statements nTbs.t such a 

person has not yet come to light indicates loyalty. pat~iotism, 

• 

-

&nd i-eatra1nt" " .. and ~it must also b& regarded as evidence 

ot inoredibly good luck" are erroneous. In the first place, 

the end of the v&r ha.a not 7et tormall7 been declared termJ.nated 

&nd tborerore the more aevare penalties under Sec. 2, ~itle I 

8 -BECRE1 

-
REF ID:A39942 

-&GRETot the Bap1onas• Aot &r• at111 applicable, and 1erv$ aa a 

deterrent to tnoe$ who vould violate the prov1•1ona or that 

Act. In the second place, there h&ve already been some 

1natanoea ot leakage or arypta.nalytic information b7 P•~•o~s 

•w1th no actual m&lice.K All three aerv1oea have alread.J 

encount&red suah oaaea. And even during the war tb.e:re v•re 

at leaat two !natanee& 1n which leakage or vital commun1~at1on 

intelligence 1ntormt1on occurred. "vitll no malice"-·the d1sclo1ure or the Bav1'• reading ot the Japanese Javal tre~fio 

prior to the .Midway Battle and tho d1aoloaure of the N&VJ'• 

reading ot the Japanese Naval tratt1e concern3ng the inspection flight bJ Admiral Yamamoto. Prosecution or the persona 

Yho allowed tbia intormat1on to be disclosed was not poae1ble 

tor various reasons, pr1no1pally because ot the dittlculty or 

prov1ns •1ntent to injure• and beca.use 1t was felt that in the 

abeence ot proper leg1slat1on a proseo~tio~ ending in an 

acqu1 tal might be :more damaging than taking a chance that no 

catastrophic eonaequenees would follow the disclosure. 

(2) ror the foregoing reasons, it is suggested 

that the sentence beginning on line 12 be deleted and tbe 

rolloving two sentences be eubetituted: 

"Already there hAve been instances of leakage ot 

1.?J.rormat1on concerning U.S. oryptanal7t1c sucoessea in 

the last var and as tne eate of tt-e formal declaration o~ the termination of the var appro&ohea, and aa more 

and mo~e peraona publish their vart1me expar1enoea with 

considerable monetar) profit, the temptation to 

oap1t&l1ze on their cryptanalytic exper1enoe1 ms.J prove 

9 
REF ID:A39942 - - ..--..sa ' 

'oo great tor aome people vho have bad •uch expe~1•nce 

to r••11t. It J1&7 th•retor• be anticipated tb&t books 

or article• on the aubject V1ll be torthc0lll1ng sonner 

or JA.ter--unl••• proper l•g1al&tion 1• nov enacted to 

prevent auoh an eventual1t7. Ve call attord to take no 

obancea in this •1tua.t1on and trust to good luek.• 

h. (1) Page 10. 10th line: The statement "It might 

be &aked why thie leg1al.Ation is needed now when we got through 

Vorld War II v1thout it". im.pliea that there were no momenta 

vhen ver7 aeriou• apprehons1ona wer• entertained on the •core 

ot leakages. !bat there vere plenty euch moments can bardlJ 

be 4uest1on$d1 and the implication should be el1m.1nated. 

Continuing, the atatement goes on to aa11 "The answer 1a that 

even though s•veral potentiall7 serious leaks aotually occUl'red 

4ur:f.ng the var they apparentl7 did not reach the onemy, probabl7 b&oauae or the protection af~orded b7 wartime oenaor~hip 

plus the tact that activity or enemy agents in the U.S. vas 

erteotually curta1led.n Unleee recollection is 1.naocurate 1 

Within a tev weeks after the Midwe1 leak, drast1e changes 

began to be introduoed in Japanese Kav1 e~7ptogr&ph1e syatem• 

•nd commun1c&t1on procedurea. The•• caused the u.a. Nav7 & 

1r•at deal ot trouble and hindered suoceasful eryptanal7a1a 

tor a011e time thereafter. 

(2) It ia theretore suggeeted that this portion 

or the &rgW!l.ent be obanged to correspond more nearly with the 

tacts. 1'he tolloving 1• auggeated aa a repl&oement to~ the 

tvo aentencea beginning on line 10, pe.ge 101 

"It might be asked vhy this legislation is needed 

nov vhen ve ap:earen~ got th.rough World War II withQut 1t. The a.never le t t ve ver7 nearly didn't get through-· 

10 SE8BS 
REF ID:A39942 

Sf Offff 

there v•~• time• Yh•n authoriti•• on the b1.ghe1t level 

•pent m&ll:7 anx1oua da7a in appr•hena1on a• to the 

po1•1bl7 ••r1ou• conaequeno•• tb&t •1ght re•ult trom 

certain leakages that clid oocur--le&k&gea that might have been cataatrophio, and 1n one caae vaa aotuall7 

extremely serious in its ettect. ot course, wartime oen•o~1h1p helped and the el1JD1nation or curtaillllent 

ot etteotive work b7 eneJi.17 agents helpsd-" 

{The rest~ beg1nn1ng v1th "But 1n peacetime ••• "to remain 

unchanged. ) 

1. The remainder ot ~ncloaure (a) appear• to bo 

aat1etactor7. 

2. Bnoloeui-e (B) should be mod.1t1ed 1n the light ot 

the comments made 1n Par. l above. 

• >!• 

BA.ROLD G. BADS 

Oolone11 Signal Oorpa Oh1et 6 ArlllJ' 8eour1t7 Agene1 

11 

.. -~-
REF ID:A39942 

• ll;t tuits!Jiqto• ,. -· .. · .. ~ 

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••• Saturday, lanuary 3, 1~48 

Supersonic Security 

It is debatable whether the editors of 

Aaia&ion Week magazine actually injured 

Jlati:onal security in publishing the story that 

an Air Force experimental rocket plane has 

gone faster than the speed of sound. If, 

as the magazine's editors contend, the Air 

Force had been preparing a release of its 

_ o~ on this accomplishment iD breaching 

the supersonic wall, then all the subsequent 

fuss is meaningless. Prevention of the leakage_ of vital information is of course a matter 

~ ~e utmost importance. But the lesson 

iJl.. the present case will have been lost if 

U... only result is an effort to penalize the 0

mliazine. More than anything else, the 

incident -- demonstrates the need for a unifted, 

~ IMICUt"ity policy_ in natiaiaal defense. 

Tllat there is no such policy now is only too 

obVIOus. 

THE ~:.ASHINGTON POST 

1:ashinrton, t.c. 

J JE-nm:irJ 194g 

It cannot be denied that some Tnfurmation I 

has been published that may be harmful to , 

our long-range security. Much of this in- j 

formation has been of a technical nature, j 

such as was contained in the Smyth report 1 

on atomic energy .. As one top scientist put 

it, we have been doing the Russians' research for them. U our defense is to be 

adequate, then manifestly we must have 

son1e milita,y secrets which we do not display in a showcase. A situation in which ~ 

important information leaks out merely for : 

went of a coordinated security policy is of \ 

i!cutse dangerous. At the same time we I 

eannot afford to go to the opposite extreme I 

of a completely clamlike approach in which i 

the label "national security" is applied to • . I 

e~ery scientific advance . 

The problem is one for Secretary Forrestal. Part of the difficulty lies among his 

subordinates in the various services. Tbete 

la-still a tendency, no doubt a hangover from ; 

\ p~unification days, for each service to i I. sp-i:"e to outdo the others in "competing" for ; 

publiQ1.tion sPJce. A little less Hollywood . 

press agentry and a little more accent on ; 

unity would be helpful. Secondly, there ; 

must be recognition that the American press 

as an entity is not only loyal but is anxious : 

not to violate the requirements of genuine : 

security. Cons~quently, a basic step in enllstlng cooperation of the press is to dellne . 

what those requirements are. i 

I More than that, there must be an effort ' 

to understand the particular problems of \ 

tile press-to understand, for example, the ' 

reaction when the results of a reporter's 

initiative are bottled up for "security" only 

to have them released inconsistenly elsewlaere. What is needed above all else'is one I 

ageney to which the press can refer its se- I 

curity questions, an agency open 24 hours 

1

. 

a clay. N<it only must this agency have au· 

tbority to lay down· a security poliey with [ 

respect to outside publication, but there ; 

must also be assurance that its decisions · 

will be respected within the · services as 

welL The prime requisite of this office is that 

it have the confidence of the person with 

• whom it is dealing. There will be no diftl-1 

CU\tr in enlisting cooperation of the press 

if the press is convinced that security policy . 

is .a matter of intelligent planning and not i a helter.Uelter affair left to whim and \ 

. caprice. 

·-· -· _ ... __ ,, _______ :., 
REF ID:A39942 

i 

i V olunfnry Censorship 

I A good example of the inadequacy of the . 1 hodgepodge military security system under : 

which the country is now operating was the 

story in Sunday's newspapers about the . 

opera1 ion of the world's first low-pressure :-

supersonit wind tunnel at the University of : 

Californi<1. F'unds for the development of • 

this t11nnel were provided by the Office of 1 

:-o;aral 1.lPscareh. Yet the Secretary of De- ; 

fensr had 110 prior knowledge of the release. ~ 

WhetlH'1 1 he announcement in this case ac· 

tuiilly r:nnst ituted a breach of security is 

not lh•· 'luei<tion. The point is that there '. 

are sotn!' ar.eas of research in which 

m.1intrna11ce of secrecy is essential to n;if ional srcm·ity. Top scientists associated 

wil !l 1 he Goverhment are genuinely conc·erned about the military implications of 

somf· of the technical information wh;rh 

already has found its way into print. 

A reader has seen in our editorial of last · 

Saturday. "Supersonic Security,'' an im- . 

J plied plea for a return of voluntary cen- ' 

i sorship such as existed during the war un. 

der Byron Price. We intended no such . 

formal connotation. What we suggester! 

was the establishment of a single office or 

agency; respected by the press, with au· 

thorit.y to coordinate and pass upon military 

information vital to the national security. 

Our suggestion was inspired by the present 

unintentional leakage of such information 

for want of a consistent security poliry. 

It is obvious that. from the security stand· 

point the Government's left. hand does no1 

know what 1\le right is doing. 

Con:::ress rel'ognized the existence of an 

area in which sec:recy is paramount in.pass-

, ing the Atomic F.nergy Act. of 1946. Indeed. ' 

i the Atomic Energy Commission already has 1 

J instituted a reasonable procedure for the re-

~\'i1SHINGTON POST 

~:Mington, D.c. 

7 Jan 48 

· lease of Important information. The 

Espionage Act of 1917 also covers military 

, secrets, although there is some difticulty of 

I application in ordinary cases because of its 

: concern with "intent." Within the frame-

; work of these laws there is always a certain 

; amount of voluntary censorship by the 

' press. The trouble is that in many instances 

the press is not competent to know what is 

and what is not information vital to security. We think there ought to be a clear 

definition of such information. The way 

to obtain the cooperation of the press in 

tbis cause is not by enacting additional ' 

'legal penalties but by substituting for the ' 

present willy-nilly approach a unified aecur-

. ity policy administered by the Department 

·of National Defense. 

~·--····- ....