IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-30801

Summary Calendar

EDDIE F. ARMSTRONG,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

RONAL SERPAS; LESTER C. MARSHALL,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:15-CV-808

Before BARKSDALE, HAYNES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Louisiana prisoner Eddie F. 

Armstrong appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as time-barred. Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissals are reviewed de novo, “accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and 

viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff”. Groden v. City 

 

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 21, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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of Dallas, 826 F.3d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Hines v. Alldredge, 783 

F.3d 197, 200–01 (5th Cir. 2015)).

Armstrong contends a New Orleans police officer violated his 

constitutional rights by using excessive force in the course of arresting him. 

For § 1983 claims, the statute of limitations is “‘the forum state’s personalinjury limitations period,’ which in Louisiana is one year”. Smith v. Reg’l 

Transit Auth., 827 F.3d 412, 421 (5th Cir. 2016). Armstrong’s claims accrued 

12 February 2013, the date he alleges he was subjected to excessive force. See

Price v. City of San Antonio, 431 F.3d 890, 893 (5th Cir. 2005). He did not file 

his complaint, however, until January 2015 — well after the applicable oneyear prescriptive period had run. See Smith, 827 F.3d at 421. Before the 

magistrate judge, Officer Marshall and Superintendent Serpas sought 

dismissal based, inter alia, on the running of that period. (Armstrong only 

appeals his claims against Officer Marshall, the arresting officer, and not as to 

Serpas, the police-department superintendent.) In response, Armstrong 

asserted the period was tolled under the equitable-tolling doctrine of contra 

non valentum, maintaining he was not able to file this action because of the 

recovery time for his injuries and inadequate legal resources in prison. The 

magistrate judge recommended dismissal, and the district court adopted the 

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation.

Armstrong re-urges his contra non valentum contentions. Under 

Louisiana law, however, the doctrine applies only in four circumstances:

(1) where there was some legal cause which prevented the courts 

or their officers from taking cognizance of or acting on the 

plaintiff’s action;

(2) where there was some condition coupled with a contract or 

connected with the proceedings which prevented the creditor from

suing or acting; 

(3) where the debtor himself has done some act effectually to 

prevent the creditor from availing himself of his cause of action; or

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(4) where the cause of action is neither known nor reasonably 

knowable by the plaintiff even though plaintiff’s ignorance is not 

induced by the defendant.

Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So.3d 234, 245 (La. 2010). The facts pleaded 

by Armstrong do not meet these criteria, and analogous contentions have been 

deemed insufficient by our court. See Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171–72

(5th Cir. 2000) (equitable tolling in the AEDPA context); see also Boswell v. 

Claiborne Par. Detention Ctr., 629 F. App’x 580, 582 (5th Cir. 2015) (equitable 

tolling of § 1983 claims by a Louisiana prisoner). 

AFFIRMED.

JUDGE HAYNES concurs only in the judgment. 

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