## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

In re Marriage of Golden , 2012 IL App (2d) 120513

Appellate Court Caption In re MARRI AGE OF J I L L GOL DEN, Petitioner-Appellee
, and AL AN FRI EDMAN, Responde nt-Appellant.

District & N o. Second District Docke t No. 2-12-0513

Filed Aug ust 13, 2012

Held (Note : Thi s syl lab us

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed b y the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Respondent ’s e-ma ils complaining about the fre quency of petitioner’s forf eiture of her time with the children pursuant to their regular pare nting schedule raised an issue within the scope of the arbitration clause of their joint pare nting ag ree ment, despite petitioner’s contention that there was

no “cle arly define d co n fl ict,” and there fore responde nt’s motion to compel ar bitration should have bee n g rante d.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l f rom the Circuit Court of L ake County
, No. 00-D-853; the Hon. Donna- J o Vorde rstrasse , J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Reverse d and re manded.Counsel on

Appea l Richard D. Grossman, of L aw Offic es of R i ch ar d D. Grossman, of Chicag o, for a

ppellant.

J ames M. Quig ley and Kather ine A. Grosh, both of Be erma nn Swerdlove L L P, of Chicag o, for a

ppellee.

Panel J USTI CE BI RKETT deliver ed the judg ment of the c ourt, with opinion.
J ustices McL are n and B owman conc urre d in the judgme nt a nd opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Respondent, Alan Fr iedman, who was divorce d from petitioner, J ill Golden, in Aug ust 2000, appea ls from the judgme nt of the trial court denying his motion to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the parties’ pare nting ag ree ment. The trial court rea soned that responde nt failed to show the exis tence o f an ac t u al controve rsy for the arbitrator to settle. We hold that a co ntroversy did exis t, and we there fore reve rse the trial court’s judgme nt.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 As a threshold matter, we addre ss a motion by responde nt to supplement the rec ord. The appendix to respondent’s openingbrief inc luded a c opy of the trial court’s April 27, 2012, order denying his motion to compel arbitration. After petitioner noted in her response brief that the April 27 order was not included in the rec ord, responde nt moved to supplement the

rec ord with the order

. Petitioner has fi l ed n o o bjection. We here by g rant the motion to supplement. ¶ 4 The Aug ust 2000 divorce decr ee desig nated petitioner as “primar y residential custodian” of the parties’ two children and est ab l i s h ed a “joint pare nting ag ree ment.” The pare nting
ag ree ment set forth a detailed “par enting scheduling ” dividing th e p ar t i es’ time with the children. The rec ord co n t ains two subsequent amendments to the pare nting schedule

. The first amendment, in Dec emb e r 2 006, g ave petitioner sole phy sical custody of the children and

sever ely limit ed direc t contac t betwee n the parties. The Dec ember 20 0 6 am endment also modified the parenting schedule

. The second amendm en t , d ated April 30, 2010, instit uted the use of a pare nting coordina tor and re quired the parties to c ommunicate with e ach other exclusively throug h the coordinator “ex cept if the child or chil d re n [are] in the hos pital or

-2-are on their way to the hospital for a medical emer g ency .” The April 2010 amendment also 1 contained a parenting schedule that superse ded all prior schedules. The schedule provided for “re g ular pare nting time,” “h o l i d ay pare nting time,” and “additional pare nting time for [respondent].” Parenting time was to be c oordinated through a virtual c alenda r ca lled “our family wizard.” Eac h pare nt had the rig ht of first ref usal reg arding pare nting time that the other pare nt was willing to relinquish. Additionally
, the amendment contained the following provision conce rning arbitration: “The matters of camp, medical decisions and the regular pare nting time schedule are the only matters which sha ll be arbitrated.” ¶ 5 On J anuar

y 13, 2012, responde nt filed his motion to compel arbitration. Respond en t alleg ed that petitioner had forf eited 53 day s of her regular pare nting time in 2011 and 14 of 18 day s of regul ar pare nting time so far in J anuar y 2012. Respondent also alleg ed that petitioner had alre ady forf eited dates afte r J anuar

y 2012. Respondent argued that “one
pare nt’s regul ar fo rf

ei ture of at l east one-third or m ore of her reg ularly schedule [d] pare nt time over the course of a y ear and 80% of her regularly s ch ed u l ed t i me in one month (January 2012) aff

ects ‘the regular pare nting time schedule ’ ref err ed to in the April 30, 2010, [o] rder requiring arbitration.” Respondent rec ounted that, pursuant to the arbitration clause
, he “re quested numerous times to [petit ioner] throug h the arbitrator and the pare nting coordina tor that the parti es m ee t to discuss his conce rns about the curr ent [p] are nting [s] chedule .” According to responde nt, arbitrator Sally L i chter informed him on J anuar y 5, 2 0 1 2
, that petitioner repor ted that she would not attend arbitration beca use she saw no conflict be tween the parties. ¶ 6 Respondent’s motion attache d the following e-ma ils b etwee n (1) him; (2) L ichter; (3) L ichter’ s para leg al, Patti Siedelmann; (4) J oy ce Shatney
, who appar ently was the pare nting coordina tor under the April 2010 amendme nt; and (5) pe titioner: (a) Respondent to Shatney, August 29, 2011 : “Joy ce, p l ea s e s en d to J ill: You just

surre ndere d another 9 day s of y our pare nting time on the [f] amily [w] izard. This comes

on the heels of many other forf eitures of y our pare nting time. I have rec ords of all y our absenc es g oing back many y ear s. I am very conce rned about the amount of absent time

on y our part from the children at a t i m e wh en they need supervision in their lives,
espec ially Emily [,] and the impact on the children. You are supposed to be the ‘primar y residential pa

rent.’ T he issue of the ‘re g ular pa renting time’ is a matter to be discussed in arbitration AND we also have a child’s rep[. ] ap p o i n t ed in order [ sic ] reg arding the welfa re of the children. I think it[ ’]s time to have a visit to discuss my conce rns about the children’ s welfa

re reg arding all of y our absenc es as [I ] clea rly cannot keep the children

as often as y ou are leaving them. I t appea rs obvious to me that the children are not y our

Pet it ion er cl ai m s tha t the Apri l 2010 amendm ent came abo ut bec aus e re spo nde nt viola te d 1 the con ta ct re st ri ct ion s in the Dece m be r 2 0 0 6 a me n dm ent , pro m pti ng her to fi le for a te m por ar y

re st r a i n i n g ord er and to see k the implementa ti on of a par ent ing coo rdi nat or. T he onl y sou rc e pet it ion er ci te s for the se re pre sen ta ti ons is a set of si m il ar al le gatio ns in her re spo nse to the m oti on to compel a rbi tr at ion

.
-3-first priority in rela tionship to y our quite fre quent vacations. P l ease advise, Alan Fr iedman.” (b) Respondent to Lichter, Novembe r 12, 2011 : “Hi Sally
, please forwa rd this email
t o J ill to inform her of my rea sons and conce rns for our children. I am re q u es t i n g arbitration to addre ss J ill’s almost 70 absenc es from the regular pare nting schedule this
y ear

. Our pare nting ag ree ment say s we g o to arbitra tion for mat t er s o f camp, medical, and ‘the regular pare nting schedule .’ There is no ‘re g ular pare nting schedule ’ any longe r

as J ill continually disrupts it with very regular absenc es from the children in California. She is a stay awa

y mother, not a stay at home mother. *** Her regular offe rin g of the rig ht of first ref

usal is not the issue I want to a ddress. I want to a ddress the fac t that she is disrupting the schedule so often that there is no regularity [,] which is not g ood for our children ***. This provision was purposely written into our pare nting ag ree ment fo r arbitration so can y ou off er u s b o t h d ates in Dec [.] *** to see y ou to discuss my

conce rns? ” (c) Siedelmann to petitioner, Novembe r 14, 2011 : “Please se e the f ollowing e -mail which Mr. Fr iedman has reque sted that we forwa rd to y ou. As I am copying Mr. Fr iedman on this e-ma il, please note that Ms. L ichter doe s have time the afte rnoons of Dec ember

8, 2011[,] and De cembe r 12, 2011. Please a dvise as to y our re sponse.” (d) Lichter to petitioner, Dec embe r 7, 2011 : “Ala n h a s r e q u e s te d a r b it r a ti on reg arding the regular pare nting schedule in terms of Monday nights a s well as the regularity with which he states y ou are absent during y our reg ular parenting schedule to see if there is a better schedule to minim ize absenc es and if not to sti ck with what is cur rent. Do y ou ag ree to meet in J anuar

y and do y ou ag ree to arbitrate? I f so m y as s i s t an t will forwa rd dates in January [,] if not let us know.” (e) Lichter to petitioner, Dec embe r 13, 2011 : “Ji ll, Alan states he would still like to arbitrate reg arding the pare nting schedule

. You stated the two of y ou came to a resolution and h e s t at es the conver sation was not complete. Do y ou ag ree to arbitration and if so Patti will provide da tes in J anuar y if not we will let Alan know.” (f) Lichter to petitioner, Dec embe r 13, 2011 : “Ji ll, [A] lan wants to have a m eeting
to discuss if y o u ex p ect y our 2012 awa y schedule will be simil ar to 2011 and if so he
wants to discuss how to handle the absenc es and how to handle the children this summer ***.” (g ) Lichter to petitioner and respondent, Dec embe r 15, 2011 : “I n review of the I llinois Uniform Arbitration Act a party has the rig ht to br ing an attorney to a ny and all Arbitration sessions. Howeve r there is [ sic ] no prec onditions to arbitration. Alan has set forth the topic of arbitra

tion[ ;] he does not have to set forth an exact proposal. There fore the two of y ou can contac t my office to say y es or no to arbitration. Attorney s may attend and ther e is [ sic ] no preconditions. I hope this answer s both of y our conc erns.” (h) Lichter to petitioner, Dece mber 30, 2011: “Ji ll, I have not he ard from y ou from
my e-ma il of Dec ember 15, 2011. Al an h as set up a tentative arbitration session on J anuar y 16, 2012, from 2:00 to 4:00. Please let my office know if y ou plan on attending .” (i) Siedelmann to respondent, January 5, 2012: “Ji ll has responde d that based on the

-4-exis ting or ders a nd no clea

rly define d conflict, she w ill not be attending a rbitration.” ¶ 7 The oth er co rrespondence of note was a letter dated Fe bruar y 3, 2012, and sent from responde nt’s attorney to petitioner’s attorney . The letter first appea red as an attachment t o peti tioner’s Marc h 2, 2012, response to the motion to compel. The letter beg ins by

re fe rencing a court appea ranc e for which there i s no documentation in the record. I t sta t es in part:
“Dur ing our rec ent court appea ranc e this wee k on Wednesday
, y ou stated that our motion for arbitra

tion lacke d specific ity

. You said that with a more specific reque st that [ sic ] y ou could respond and we might eve n be able to settle this matter. You also seem to think that without a specific proposal arbitra tion is not indic at ed despite the arbitrator’s statement that Alan wa s in fact spe cific enoug h to pr ocee d. In fac t, nothing in the [April 2010 amendment] limit s attending arbitration other than that the matter 8must relate to the Par enting Schedule ( or ca mp, or medica l matters).
I t’s quite clea

r from our motion that we want to a ddress J ill’s c hronic absenc es and obvious la ck of adher ence to the Parenting Schedule[,] which is di sruptive. To addre ss y our conce rns and to avoid further litigation about the need for arbitration, I am offe ring the following lang uag e to be enter ed as an Ag ree d Orde r. I f J ill ag ree s, then we can avoid arbitration altog ether

. ‘As the sole custodial and residential parent and for the bene fi t of the children, Jill s h a l l n o t forf eit m ore than 10% of her regularly scheduled parenting tim e.’ This actua lly would allow J ill to continue to exe rc i s e h er time awa y from the children that her history clea rly demonstrates she desires while still allowing the children the neede d benef it of being mothered by

her f or the majority

of her schedule d time. After a ll, J ill actually proposed the c urre nt schedule a nd has not adhe red to it.
I f J ill is willing to acc ept this specific proposal we could settle this mat t er n o w. Howeve r, if she reje cts this very specific proposal, then we wa n t to proce ed with arbitration to address this chang e and matters rela ted to the schedule . Ilook forwa rd to
y our timely

response .” (Empha sis in original.) The recor d contains no response to this letter. Respondent, curiously
, did not mention this letter in any

of his oral or w ritten arg

uments below. ¶ 8 I n her Marc h 2, 2012, response to the motion to compel, petitioner arg ued that arbitration

was inappropriate beca

use responde nt’s motion stated only that he wished to “ discuss” the
regular pare nting schedule and “[ga ve] no additional detail reg arding what issue exis ts that

can be proper ly arbitrated per the [Ap ri l 2010 amendment].” Petitioner acknow ledg ed responde nt’s Fe bruar

y 3, 2012, letter but argu ed t h at , even there
, responde nt was “not
reque sting a chang e to the regular pare nting time schedule ,” but was “simply reque sting a discussion reg arding what happe ns during her pa renting time.” ¶ 9 At the hea

ring on the motion, respondent ar g ued:
“Your Honor, as we set forth in our brief, there ’s absolutely no question that there is an ag ree ment to arbitrate. The ag ree ment to arbitrate encompa sses the phrase that’s critica l here [ sic ] i s the regular pa renting time schedule. ***
*** [P etitioner] had g iven up approximately 80 perc ent of her time with the children, in any –in one month and so we said, all rig ht, look, it’s obviously –the pare nting schedule

-5-has lost any semblance of regularity

. We would like to arbitra te that issue and so we sent

a demand to a

rbitrate and it ha s been reje cted and I just think that the law, the case s are just extraordinarily clea

r t h at wher e there ’s an ag ree ment and y ou have the lang uag e, regular pare nting time schedule and y ou have the uniform arb itration act that say s–it almost doesn’t seem to leave the Court with much discretion on how–y ou need to issue an orde r to arbitra

te ***.” ¶ 10 I n response , petitioner ag ain emphasized the lack of any dispute over how the pare nting schedule should specifica lly be alter ed:
“The issues about whether or not my client’s g iving up 10 perc ent of her pare nting time

or [respondent] ac ce p t ed 15 day s on a rig ht of first ref usal and my client acc epted 9, that’s not an issue in dispute. Quite fra nkly
, we don’t know what the issue in dispute is. I ’ve asked counsel does he want to chang e the schedule beca use may be we would simply
ag ree

. I f he wanted a chang e in the schedule [and] we disag ree d, then there may be a dispute

over the regular pare nting schedule

. That’s not the case

. He wants to g et into controlling
my client’s life.” ¶ 11 As responde nt notes, the trial court appea red to chang e course in making its decision. The court orig inally

said:
“So we’ re clea

r on my ruling for the motion on the arbitration, it is g rante d so long as it is put in writing that [respondent] wants to discuss pare nting time schedule chang es and the basis of that is beca

use he fee ls there is a lot of time that [petit ioner] is awa y from the children and perha

ps a new schedule could be adjusted to a ccommodate whateve r time she nee ds to be awa

y form the c hildren.” ¶ 12 Petitioner asked the c ourt to modify its ruling:
“I would ask that the order require [respondent] to g o further with that beca use arbitration is not mediation, it’s not a point to g o in and discuss that. I f [respondent] has

a proposed chang e, my client either can ag ree to that or disag ree to that. I f she disag ree s, then I ag ree , now there ’s a subject matter to be arbitrated. I f she ag ree s, there is nothing to be ar bitrated.
I f he simply say s I want to g o in and discuss the chang e of the schedule
, that doesn’t tell me whether

or not we ha

ve a dispute.” ¶ 13 The trial c ourt then ag ree d with petitioner’s view:

“I am deny ing the motion for arbitration under the fa cts as pre sented to me a t this t ime beca use y ou have not pr esente d an issue of a ctual contr oversy to the other side.

***
What y ou’re [respondent] g oing to do as we laid it out in our plan to prese nt the issue of actua l controve rsy is y ou prese nt it to them, what the issue is and what y ou want to do about it. And then they may ag ree and ther e’s no issue of actua l controver sy

that needs to go to mediation.” ¶ 14 I n its written order denying arbitration, the trial court imposed a three -stag e protocol to apply when a party moves for a

rbitration:

-6-“a) A party shall set forth the issue to be arbitrated and the resolution of the issue
soug ht by that party

. b) The other p ar t y s h al l respond to the statement of the issue within 14 day s there afte r. c) I f the parties cannot ag ree on a resolution of the issue within 14 day s there afte r the parties sha ll arbitrate the issue (under [t he Apr il 2010 amendment]).” ¶ 15 Respondent filed this timely appea l.

¶ 16 ANAL YSI S ¶ 17 A motion to compel arbitration seeks injunctive relief

. Feldheim v. Sims
, 326 I ll. App. 3d 302, 308 (2001). There fore
, though a ruling on a motion to compel is inter locutory
, it is
appea lable under I llinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a) (1) (I ll. S. Ct. R. 307(a) (1) (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010)), which permits an interlocutory appea l from an order of the trial court “g ranting
, modify ing, ref

using, dissolving, or ref

using to dissolve or modify an injunction.” See Carr v. Gateway

, Inc. , 395 I ll. App. 3d 1079, 1084 (2009). ¶ 18 Respondent challeng es the trial court ’s re as o n ing that, beca use he never proposed a specific chang e to the pare nting schedule under the April 2010 amendment, there exis ted no arbitra ble controve rsy as to that schedule

. Respondent argues that the law does not “re quire that the party reque s t i n g ar bitration on an is sue covered by the arbitration ag ree ment spell
out a sug g ested resolution of the issue befor e he or she is entitled to arbitration.” Acc ording
to responde nt, it is “cle ar that t h e issue soug ht to be arbitrated fell within the ambit of the
ag ree ment to arbitrate.” I n the alternative, he argues that it was at worst unclea r whether the issue fell within the scope of the arbitra tion clause
, and so the case should still have g one to the ar bitrator to re solve the scope issue. ¶ 19 Section 1 of the Unifor m Arbitration Act ( Act) ( 710 I L CS 5/ 1 (West 2010)) provide s: “A written ag ree ment to submit any exis ting controve rsy to arbitration or a provision in

a written contra ct to submit to arbitration any controve rsy there afte r arising betwee n the parties is valid, enfor cea ble and irrevoc ab le save upon such g rounds as exis t for the

revoc ation of any

contra ct ***.” ¶ 20 Section 2(a) of the Ac t (710 I L CS 5/ 2(a) (West 2010)) provide s:

“On app l i cation of a party showing an ag ree ment descr ibed in Section 1, and the opposing party ’s ref

usal to ar b itrate, the court shall order the parties to proce ed with arbitration ***.” ¶ 21 “I t was intended, under the [Act]
, on an application to compel or stay arbitration, unde r section 2 of the Act, that the sole question for the court to deter mine is whether there was an ag ree ment to arbitrate.” Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenre tte Futures, Inc. v. Barr
, 124 I ll. 2d 435, 449 (1988). “I f it is obvious that there was an ag ree ment to arbitra te the dispute in question, that is, if the dispute clea rly falls wi t h in the scope of the arbitration ag ree ment, the court should order arbitration.” Id. “I f it is clea r that it does not, arbitration should be ref used.” Id. Gene rally
, the issue upon revie w of the g rant or denial of a motion to compel arbitration “is whether there was a sufficie n t s h o wi n g to sustain the order of the trial court g ranting or

-7-denying the relief soug ht.” Cohen v. Blockbuster Entertainment, Inc.
, 351 I ll. App. 3d 772,

776 (2004). “H o we ver, wher e the trial court does not make any fac tual finding s or the underlying fac ts are not in dispute, the court’s decision is based upon a purely leg al analy sis and we revie w the trial court’s denial of a motion to stay the proce eding s and co m p el arbitration de novo .” Id. Her e, since the t ri al co u rt t o ok no evidenc e at the hear ing on the motion to compel, and there is no factua l dispute, our revie w is de novo

. ¶ 22 Petitioner’s threshold asser tion is that responde nt forf eited his alternative argument that, if the arbitration clause is unclea r, the case must still g o to the arbitra tor to decide the issue of arbitra bility

. Acc ording to petitioner, b ec au s e responde nt never raised below the possibili ty that the arbitration clause is unclea r, the only basis he may now claim to compel arbitration is that the arbitration cla u s e clea rly require s arbitra

tion on the merits of the dispute that he claims exis ts. We need not decide the forf eiture question, howeve r, beca use the arbitration clause clea rly does encompa ss the issue that responde nt raise d fi rs t to petitioner and la ter to the trial c ourt. ¶ 23 The arbitration clause broadly provides for arbitration of the “matter s of camp, medical decisions and the regular pare nting time schedule .” The complaint that responde nt made to petitioner in e-ma ils, and later prese nted t o the trial cour t, is that petiti oner’ s forfe itures of her “re g ular pare nting time” wer e detrimental to the children and impossibl e for h i m to

acc ommodate. Petitioner does not dispute that responde nt’s complaint rela ted, at least in substance, to the “re g ular pare nting time schedule ,” as set forth i n the April 2010 amendment. Her position, rathe r, is that responde nt ha d to pr opose a specific chang e to the
regular pa

renting schedule to cre ate a “disag ree ment” that would trig g er the availability of arbitration. The trial court simil arly deter mined that the only manner in which to cre ate the requisite “contr oversy ” was for responde nt to propose a specific chang e to the reg ular
pare nting schedule and for petitioner to reje ct the chang e. Petitioner, howeve r, cites nothing in the arbitration clause, the A ct, or c ase la w to support this view. ¶ 24 We beg in with the clause itself, noting that its lang uag e does not condition arbitration on the exis tence of a dispute reg arding o n e o f t h e “matter s” stated in the clause

. Such a prer equisite must come, if at all, from external source s. Section 1 of the Act states that a written ag ree ment to arbitrate a “contr oversy ” is enfor cea ble and irrevoc able (710 I L CS 5/1 (West 2010)), which may be rea d to imply that a clause is not enfor cea ble to the extent that it require s arbitration of nondisputes. Thoug h the Act does not define “contr oversy ,” we have

rec ourse to case law that predates the passag e o f the Act in 1961. “[W ]ords and phrase s having well-de fined meaning s in the common law are interpre ted to have the same meaning s when used in statutes dealing with the same or simil ar subject matter as that with which they

wer e associate d at common law.” Scott v. Dre is & Krump Manufacturing Co. , 26 I ll. App. 3d 971, 983 (1975). L ang uag e in these pre- 1961 decisions sug g ests that the very conce pt of arbitration impl ies a controve rsy or dispute. Nothing in the se decisions, howeve r, supports the nar row c oncept of

controve rsy

or dispute proposed by

petitioner. ¶ 25 I n Norton v. Gale , 95 I ll. 533, 534- 35 (1880), the parties to a 50-y ear land lease ag ree d
to appoint a panel of appra isers to valuate the land ever y five y ear s. The valuation ag ree d to by t h e appra isers would be binding and deter mine the rent for the following five y ear s. Pursuant to the valuation clause
, the proper ty at issue was appra ised at the close of the first

-8-five y ear s, and subsequently the plaintiff sued to rec over the rent that was based on the new

appra ised value. The defe ndant claimed that the appra isal proce ss constituted an arbitration of which he was entitled to, but did not rec eive, advanc e notice. The supreme court held that
t h e appra isal proce ss was not an arbitration. The court rea soned that “ ‘[a] refer en ce t o arbitration occur s only wher e there is a matter in controve rsy betwee n two or more parties.’ ” Id. at 543 (quoting Curry v. Lackey
, 3 5 M o

. 3 8 9
, 394 (1865))

. There was no controve rsy when the l ea s e wa s signe d or when appra isers wer e selec ted. Rather, the desig n of the valuation proce ss was “to prec lude or preve nt the arisin g of differ ence s, and not to settle differ ence s which had a

risen.” Id. ¶ 26 L ater , in Sebree v. Board of Education
, 254 I ll. 438, 446 (1912), the court ag ain clar ified the nature of ar

bitration by

contra sting it with the proce ss of appra isal:
“The re is, howeve r, a plain distinction betwee n an appra isement and an arbitration. The latter, in the proper sense of the term, p re s u p p oses a controve rsy or a differ ence to be tried and decide d. Arbitrator s g ener ally proce ed in a quasi judicial manner to se ttle the dispute. Their jurisdiction is in the nature of a judicial inquiry
, and cer tain rules of
proce dure must be obse rved or the awa rd wil l be void. On t he other hand, an a

ppraisal i s the proper term to be used when an appra isement or valuation is to be made as auxil iary or incident to a contra ct. The appra isers are selec ted to prec lude or preve nt, by appraisal, the arising of differ ence s, and not to settle differ ence s which have alre ady arisen.” ¶ 27 I n Cocalis v. Nazlides
, 308 I ll. 152, 156 (1923), the court cited Nort o n an d S eb r ee i n stating: “I t is essential to the very idea of an arb i t ra t i o n that there should have been an antec edent dispute or an exis ting matter of differ ence to be adjudicate d and deter mined, so

as to conclude the parties as to the matter in issue betwee n them.” The court clar ified that “[a]n exis ting leg al cause of action is not nece ssary to authorize a submissi on and awa rd, but there must be a dispute or honest differ en ce of opinion conce rning some subject in which both are interested.” Id. at 158. ¶ 28 Notably
, Cocalis held that ag ree ments to arbitrate future disputes a r e in v a li d b e c ause the y infring e parties’ “rig ht[ s] to resor t to the courts provided by the constitution for the redr ess of g rieva nces a nd the settlement of disputes.” Id. This rule wa s abrog ated in 1961 with the
passag e of the Act. See Ramonas v. Kerelis
, 102 I ll. App. 2d 262, 269 (1968) (“Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Arbitration Act, on Aug ust 24,1961, I llinois followed the commonlaw rule that ag ree ments to arbitrate future disputes divested courts of their jurisdiction, and had ref used to en fo rc e such contra ctual ag ree ments as contra ry to public policy

. *** An
ag ree ment in a contra ct to arbitrate future disputes arising out of [a] contra ct[ ] enter ed into afte r Aug ust 24, 1961, is valid and enforc eable .”). ¶ 29 We have found only one post-1961 case allud i n g t o t h e n o t i o n t h at ar b i t ra t ion
presuppose s a dispute. I n TDE Ltd. v. Israel
, 185 I ll. App. 3d 1059, 1064 (1989), the plaintiff, a contra ctor, sued for amounts it claimed wer e owed under a building contra ct. The plaintiff named both the trust that owned leg al title to the proper ty (the Trust) and the entities that held the benef

icial i n t ere st (the Owner s). The Owner s moved for arbitration under an arbitration c lause that cover ed “ ‘[a]l l c laims, disputes and other matter s in que stion.’ ” Id.

-9-at 1063. The plaintiff arg ued that it had no dispute with the Owner s as they had co n cede d liability for the sums in question. The court acknow ledg ed pre- 1961 case s “support[ing] the proposition t h at arbitra

tion presumes an identifiable conflict betwee n the parties.” Id. at 1064. The court was skeptical, howeve r, beca use those ca s es “e x press common law principles preva iling prior to the adoption in I llinois of the [Act] .” Id. Nonethele ss, the court went on to addre ss, and re j ec t , t h e plaintiff’s contention that it had no dispute with the Owner s over the sums in question. Id. at 1064-65. Specifica lly
, the court found not hing in the rec ord to sug g est that the Owner s had, as the plaintiff claimed, conce ded liability on the claim broug ht by

the plaintiff. Id. ¶ 30 Ba sed on sec tion 1 of t he Act and the case law, we hold that the ex istence of a dis pute or controve rsy

is a prer equisite to arbitra tion under the a rbitration clause in the April 2010 amendment. Not just any dispute or controve rsy is arbitra ble under the clause
, but only one that is related to one of the “matter s” specifie d. Contrary to pe titioner’s position, however, the dispute or controve rsy need not take the form of a disag ree ment over how specific ally to alter the regular parenting schedule

. The langua g e of the arbitration clause speaks n o t h ing about the form of the dispute or controve rsy

. Ex trinsic source s also d o not support petitioner’s position. F irst, se ction 1 of the Ac t contemplates a “contr oversy ,” but g ives no criter ia. Second, case law aiding our construction of the Act states that an arbitra ble
controve rsy consists of “a dispute or honest differ ence of opinion conce rning some subject in which both [parties] are interested” ( Cocalis
, 308 I ll. at 158). The dispute need not amount to a leg al cause o f ac t i o n

. Id. The case law g ives no further require ment for a dispute or controve rsy

. We must enfor ce the statute as written and not rea d i n t o it exceptions, limit ations, or conditions that the lan gu age d oes not support. Solon v. Midwest Medic al Rec ords Ass’n
, 236 I ll. 2d 433, 441 (2010). Petitioner proposes a narr ower construction than the lang uag e of se ction 1 can sustain. ¶ 31 As ear ly as Aug ust 2011, responde nt strenuously complained t o p et i t i o n er about the fre quency of her forf

eitures o f t i m e u n d er the regular pare nting schedule

. Although the emails g ive some sug g estion that the parties spoke about the issue, it seems petitioner mostly ignor ed responde nt’s complaints while continuing to forf eit time. Finally
, s h e answe red responde nt that she would not ag ree to arbitrate, b ec ause she saw “no clea rly define d conflict.” ¶ 32 The rec ord here discloses an arbitra ble conflict on two levels. First, t h er e was c onflict

over the propriety of petitioner’s forf eitures. Petitioner could not elude controve rsy by declining to answe r responde nt’s co m p l ai nts. Her continuation of the conduct to which responde nt objected wa s an implicit defense of that conduc t. ¶ 33 Second, another l ev el o f co n fl i ct was cre ated by petitioner’s denial that there was a “cle arly define d conflict” appropr iate for arbitra t ion. By this we do not mean that an is sue exis ted as t o t h e s co p e of arbitra bility itself. As we noted, the arbitration clause
, rea d in conjunction wit h section 1 of the Act and the case law on arbitration, allows arbitration of
any controve rsy rela ting to one of t h e “matter s” specifie d, e.g. , the regular pare nting time schedule

. Under the case law, a controve rsy is “a dispute or honest differ ence of opinion” ( Cocalis
, 308 I ll. at 158). Petitioner denied not that r espondent’s complaints conce rned the
regular pare nting time schedule
, but only that a definite conflict exis ted. I n t h i s co urt,

-10-petitioner cont i n ues not to contest that responde nt’s protests rela ted to the “matter ” of the

regular pare nting time schedule

. As the conflict over whether a conflict exis ted was itself “a dispute or honest differ ence of opinion,” and there is no question that this dispute rela ted to the regular pare nting time schedule
, it is clea r that the conflict falls within the subject matter of the a rbitration clause in the April 2010 amendme nt. ¶ 34 W e n o t e al s o re s p o n d en t’s Fe bruar y 3, 2012, letter to petitioner, which proposes a specific limit on the amount of pare nting time petitioner may forf eit. We do not know how, if at all, petition er re p l ied to this letter. Since responde nt does not rely on the letter in his
arguments to us, and since we have alre ady found adequate evidenc e of an arbitra ble dispute
or controve rsy

betwee n the par

ties, we ne ed not discuss the letter f urther. ¶ 35 For the fore g oing rea sons, we h o l d t h at t h e trial court err ed in denying r espondent’s motion to compel arbitration. We reve rse the trial court’s judgme nt and rema nd this case for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

¶ 36 Reverse d and re manded.

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