..SECRET 9 CONFIDENTIAL REF eii~~ 

DATE ~'t ~~ 4j 'W' 

TO FROM TO FROM 

~hief, ASA .... : ...... (10)_ Tech Staff ......... (96)_ 

_ Executive 0 ........ (11)_ _ Ch, Security Div ..... (80)_ 

_ Co'r Joint Oper ..... (12)_ Tech Staff ......... (81) _ 

_ Deputy Chief, ASA ... (20)~ Ch, Materiel Br .... (82)_ 

_ Ch, Comm Res Sec (14) __ v _ Ch, Methods Br .... (83)_ 

Ch, Hist Unit .... (13)_ _ Ch, Protective Br ... (84)_ 

Ch, Pers Sec ....... (21)__ __ Ch, Maint Br ...... (85)_ 

Ch, Org & Tng Sec .. (22)_ _ Ch, Res Lab Div .... (70)_ 

Gh, Plans & Oper ... (23)_ Tech Staff ......... (71)_ 

Ch, Materiel Sec .... (24)_ Ch, Ch. Ciph&CifBr(72)_ 

Ch, Fiscal Sec ...... (25)_ Ch, Int Equip Br ... (73)_ 

Adjutant, ASA ..... (26)_ Ch, Elec & Elec Br. (74)_ 

Ch, Sec Cont Sec ... (27)_ Ch, Lab Serv Br .... (75)_ 

·_. _ Ch, Operations Div .. (90)_ Ch, C'logic Br ...... (76)_ 

Ch, Lab Br ........ (91)_ _Ch, Pers & Tng Br .... (61)_ 

Ch, Machine Br .... (92)_ _· Ch, Supply Br ........ (62)_ 

Ch, Crypt Br ...... (93)_ _Co, Arlington Hall .... (40)_ 

_ Ch, Int Cont Br .... (94)_ 

-··~ Ch, I & D Br . ..... (95)_ 

( ) Approval & Return 

( ) As Requested 

( . ) Concurrence or Comments 

( ) Information & Forwarding 

( ) Information & Return 

( ) Information & File 

( ) Recommendation 

( ) Signature if approved 

( ) Your action by 

( ) Info upon which to base reply 

--------'----t-'eclassified and approved for release by N'.: CSGAS 96(Rev.12) 16Apr47 47 __ .o ___ . _13_s_2_s ____________ _ 
TO FROM 

_ / Chief, ASA ........... (10) _ 

_ · Executive 0 ........ (11)_ 

_ Co'r Joint Oper ..... (12) _ 

_ ·_Deputy Chief, ASA ... (20)~ 

_ Ch, Comm Res Sec. (14)_V_ 

Ch,· Hist Unit .... (13)_ 

_ Ch, Pers Sec ....... (21) _ 

_ ·Ch, Org & Tng Sec: . (22)_· _ 

Ch, Plans & Oper ... (23)_ 

Ch, Materiel Sec .... (24)_ 

_ Ch, Fiscal Sec ...... (25)_· 

__ Adjutant, ASA ..... (26)_ 

_ Ch, Sec Cont Sec ... (27)_ 

_ Ch, Operations Div .. (90)_ 

Ch, Lab Br ........ (91)_-_ 

Ch, Machine Br .... (92)_' 

Ch, Crypt Br ...... (93)_ 

Ch, Int Cont Br .... (94)_ 

Ch, I & D Br ...... (95)_ 

TO FROM 

_ Tech Staff ......... (96) _ 

_ Ch, Security Div ... · .. (80)_ 

Tech Staff ..... '.· .. ·. (81)_· 

Ch, Materiel Br .... (82)_ 

_ Ch, Methods Br .... (83)_-

- Ch, Protective Br ... (84)_ 

_ Ch, Maint Br ...... (85)_ 

_ Ch, Res Lab Div .... (70)_ 

_ Tech-Staff ......... (71)_ 

·_ , Ch, Ch. Ciph &CifBr(72)_ 

Ch, Int Equip Br ... (73)_ 

.-- Ch, Elec & Elec Br. (74)_ 

._ Ch, Lab Serv Br .... (75) _ 

_ Ch, C'logic Br ...... (76) __ 

_ ._Ch, Pers & Tng Br .... (61)_ 

_Ch, Supply Br ........ (62) _ 

_ Co, Arlington Hall .... (40)_ 

( ) Approval & Return ) Information & File 

( ) As Requested ) Recommendation 

( ) Concurrence or ComII.J.ents ) Signature if approved 

( ) Information & Forwarding ( ) Your action by 

( ) Information & Return ( ) Info upon which to base reply 

I. I~ ~is ~tjAA" ~ 

;;, . sr;· ~. "J-~ &A°'lfi ~· s~ -~~~-~ ~ 

~ ~~%'coe. .. ~ 

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+w~ ~- '{.o 4~.· <::{Jr · CSGAS 96 (Rev. 12) 16 Apr 47 47938 ~· 
ARMY SECURITY AGENCY 

WASHINGTON 25 D C 

CSGAS-10 

22 :March 1949 

MEWRA.NDUM FOR MR. FRIEDMA.Nt 

SUBJECT1 Central Evaluation, Publication and Dissemination of' SIGINT. 

1. This dra.f't, together with its supporting discuBBion was precisely the line of' thought which I have on the subject. I have discussed this with my- two legal advisors and submit for your consideration, 

in the rnrlting, the f'ollowingi 

a. Paragraph 1. a. pg l - Why restrict only to Armed Forces? 

Since you are submitting the memorandum to the :Members of' USCIB, it 

would seem to me that CIA and State llll.ght well be included. PoBBibly 

you ha.-ve a reason tor <Xllitting them that does not occur to me. 

b. Paragraph l.o. pg l - This ia alright for the memorandum 

but since it only touches. and does not deal definitely and ef'tectively 

with the individual agency intelligence problems, I think these might 

well be covered in your discussion. This paragraph mentions only 

publications and an.its mention of the more elaborate integration 

problem. 

c. Paragraph 3.a. of' the Discussion - The discussion on the 

Diplomatic Summary does not go far enough. It attacks how the State 

does the job but does not go sutf'iciently into the theory behind it. 

d. Paragraph 4.c. of' the Discussion - The discussion on the 

pea.cetime justification ce.n be ma.de much stronger. 

2. ~ general comment on the whole thing is that we should shoot 

tor record in this paper, dealing in detail with the specific problEms 

of the Services and the difficulty of' separating lower and higher level 

intelligence. I also reel that we might well here take an indirect 

ore.ck at the Stone Board report b y pointing up those areas in which 

they avoided malc.ng responsible decisions. 

CA.lm!R 

~ W. CLARKE 

Colonel, Signal Corps 

Ohl. et, Army Secur1 ty Agency 
MEMORANDUM to Chairman, USCIB 

Subject: 

1. 

Central Evaluation, Publication and Dissemination of' SIGINT. 

It is recommended: 

a. Tb.at a sizgle center be established under 

USCIB direction for the evaluation, publication, and 

dissemination of th& fruits of signal intelligence 

activities of the Jrmed Forces 

b. Tb.at a 8 j,ngle SIGINT Summary be published 

on a weekly basis, supplemented by more detailed 

monthly and quarterly publications with cumulative indexes. 

The first few pag~ of each Summary should contain 

highlights for the busy reader. 

c. Th.at such special~ publications as a.re 

elaborated by the respective cryptanalytic processing 

centers or by the respective intelligence age~~cfs of 

the Armed Forces\ of the Department of State, or of 

the Central Intelligence Agency be also published and 

disseminated by the central unit. 

d. That the central unit for evaluation, publication, and dissemination be located at one of the existing 

i. s. cryptanalytic processing centers. 

e. That the present policy of disseminating "spot 

P. l 
items" of~intelligence in the case of important 

or urgent items be continued~ but with a more limited 

distribution. • 

2. The reasons for the foregoing recommendations 

are set forth in Incl. 1. 

3. It is requested that the foregoing recommendations 

be placed on the Agenda for discussion at the next regular 

meeting of USOIB. 

l Incl. Gen. Irwin. 

Discussion 
DISCUSSION 

1. a. There are now at least three publications which I 

contain the final product of the signal intelligence activi t1es of the U. s. Government and which are issued on a 

periodic basis. They are as follows: 

(1) The Diplomatic Summary, prepared and issued on 

a daily basis by the Department of State; 

(2) The Military Digest, prepared and issued on a 

weekly basis by the Intelligence Division, U. s. 

Army; and 

(3) The Soviet Intelligence Summary, prepared and 

issued on a weekly basis by the U. s. Navy. 

b. In addition to the foregoing periodic publications containing GLINT :material there are several others 

which are prepared and issued on a non-periodic basis, such 

as the following: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

Special Reports Prepared by 

Special Research 

Order of Battle Studies Branch, Intelligence Division, U.S. 

Communication Intelligence Briefs 

Special Reports} Prepared by U. s. Navy CSAW Handbooks 

Order of Battle StudieslPrepa.red by Army Security Agency under authority of the 

Special Studies Director of Intelligence 

c. Finally, there are the periodic publications prepared and disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. 

p. 1. 
They do not contain GLINT material but since the CIA receives such material, it may be possible that it is used 

()., 

asAcollateral sourcel of information. 

d. It is to be noted in this connection that 

~ntelligence is and must be more carefully protected 

th.an oth~r types of intelligence and th.at there is and must 

be a rather strict isolation of~material from other 

intelligence produced within or by U. s. intelligence agencies. 

This implies that there are intelligence units even within 

those agencies which operate without benefit of any~ 

source material. Their reports can, ~herefore, hardly avoid 

reflecting the lack of such material and the usefulness of 

these reports is obviously impaired to the extent of the 

importance of the items which have to be omitted because 

they are unknown and unavailable to the writers. 

2. With reference .specifically to the publications 

listed under Par. la, it is only to be expected, and it 

is perhaps unavoidable, because they are produced separately 

by different agencies, .that duplications of material or 

items of intelligence should appear from time to time. Such 

duplication, however, is not a particularly seriou~ matter, 

and might even be considered desirable in some small degree. 

What is more serious is that the intelligence coverage and 

the broad picture that might be painted from~ sources 

P. 2. 
is not and cannot be painted by the present system of 

decentralized evaluation and dissemination. 

3. a. Ta.king up first the Diploma.tic Sunnna.ry, this 

publication, being on a daily-production basis, can only 

represent at best a series of isolated items of intelligence. 

In fa.ct, it is possible tha.t the old adage to the effect 

that "one cannot see the forest for the trees" is applicable 

in this case. Little attempt is made in the present Diplomatic Summary to consolidate or integrate the isolated 

and seria.tim items into a comprehensive picture of the policies, 

dip~omatic maneuvers, intrigues, and aims of other countries, 

as they are reflected by~intelligence, which is by 

far the most reliable and timely source by means of which 

an accurate and timely estimate of the international diplomatic 

situation can be made. 

b. In regs.rd to the failure to paint a comprehensive picture of the sort indicated, the situation which 

now exists is not much better than that which existed 

prior to Pearl Harbor and which was censured in no uncertain 

terms by the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Atta.ck on Pearl Harbor. Upon the shoulders 

of those engaged in the SIGINT effort rests the tremendo~s 

responsibility of forewarning the proper authorities or 

the Government in all international crises. But if all the 

P. 3 

• 
bits of information obtained from various SIGINT sources 

are not properly pieced together and fused with the many 

items from collateral intelligence to give a timely and 

complete picture, the SIGINT effort as well as the other 

intelligence effort will have been wasted if another Pearl 

Harbor catches us unawares. 

4. a. It is estimated that the Army has an investment 

of about $30,000,000 in the Army Security Agency plant, and 

an annual budget (FY 1949) of approximately $22,000,000. 

Of this probably 80% is devoted to SIGINT operations. The 

Navy's investment and budget are probably not much different. 

Roughly, then, the plant investment is $48,ooo,ooo, and 

the annual budget, $35,000,000. 

b. Basically, there are only two Justifications 

for the foregoing large investments and expenditures. 

The first is that signal intelligence activities do not 

I 

have their counterpart in civil life and cannot, in view 

of their complexities, be improvised de novo on t'he outbreak of war. It is therefore essential to maintain, 

in peacetime, establishments th.at will function effectively 

just before or immediately upon outbreak or actual hostilities, a condition which is today a technical prerequisite to SIGINT success for the duration of the war. 

This means that large plants and large numbers of techP. 4. 
nicians have to be maintained in peacetime and kept at a 

high level of efficiency. On this score, while it is 

believed that a fairly adequate job is being done, if that 

accomplishment represented the only fruit of the large 

investments and annual·expenditures, the cost thereof 

could certainly be questioned and might be thought to be 

excessive. The other basic justification for the large 

investments and annual expenditures is the peacetime production of an intelligence picture of such timeliness, accuracy, 

and completeness as to give forewarning of impending momentous . changes in the international situation. 

c. When viewed in the light of the latter basic 

reason for maintaining the large staff and plant devoted 

to peacetime signal intelligence operations, the three 

items mentioned in pa.r. 1 above are not believed to represent a product commensurate with the high cost thereof. 

It is probable that TIME, the weekly newsmagazine, operates 

on a smaller investment and budget than is represented 

above. But, TIME'S very existence depends upon the perfection of its product. If we are to continue to merit 

the confidence a~d approval of the highest governmental 

authorities, the SIGI~ product must be as nearly complete 

and as perfect as we can possibly make it. It is largely 

,upon the quality of this product· tb.a.t the value of our 

p. 5. 
SIGINT operations in peacetime can be Judged and defended 

by those who see only this pa.rt of the SIGINT effort from 

day to day. 

5. a. A consolidation of the research facilities and 

personnel presently employed in the several separate agencies 

concerned with the evaluation and publication of the SIG~NT 

product would bring about greatly increased benefits and 

a much improved product. Such a consolidated or centralized 

organization would be more thorough, more efficient, and 

more economical than is now ~he case. Currently there are 

four agencies concerned; when the USAF begins SIGINT operations in its assigned portion of the field there will be 

five. 

b. It may be pointed out in this connection that 

on strictly technical grounds7 as established by British and 

u. s. Navy experience, placing the cryptanalytic processing 

and the evaluation centers in close proximity to each other 

has three important advantages: 

(1) Voluminous files of collateral information 

and special data are required for cryptanalytic pro~ 

ceasing and practically the same types of information 

and files are essential for the proper evaluation of 

the final GLINT product. If the ~ files were 

P. 6 
utilized for both operations they would serve a dual 

purpose, eliminating the need for duplicate, triplicate, I 

or quadruplicate facilities, space, and personnel, 

as is now the case. Thus, there would be a considerable monetary saving. 

(2) Cryptanalytic processing often requires the 

elaboration, collection, or development of special 

information for the immediate use of the cryptanalysts; 

similar information is later required for proper 

evaluation of the final product, and must often be 

elaborated, collected, or developed by the evaluators. 

If the material elaborated for or by the cryptanalysts 

were also directly available to and used by the evaluators, time would be saved in publishing the final 

GLINT product, since much of the work that the evaluators 

must now do for themselves by way of co'llecting collateral 

information would have already been done in connection 

with cryptanalytic processing. Hence there would be 

an improvement in efficiency of the overall SIGINT 

operation, since the time required to produce the final - results is a vital element in their value. 

{3) The closer the cryptanalytic, collateral 

information, and evaluation personnel are to one 

another, the more effective are SIGINT operations as 

P. 7 
a whole, since the quick and unimpeded interchange I 

of new ideas, new developments, and new directions 

of interest among all the personnel involved in these 

.. operations would improve their respective effective- ~' r·t'l;-. 

1:,..0- v .¢-) 

~. ,,...1\ cl'·: ness. 

' \~-~ff t:v\ 

<,c-'--,' ·(',,, :,\ ,,~':'L c. The technical considerations outlined in the . ~.)";<) • \" A/ ~4'" 

.. ,-.> \.1\··c!).l~~ receding subparagraph b must, however, play a secondary ,, ~!)" 

....... ~ '. '{ 

'<).)'~~Cu"~ role in view of the present situation within the U. s. 

y' 'Y 

~ \' 

~>' J signal intelligence field,.in which th~ complex problem 

of establishing a unified cryptanalytic processing organization is still under discussion and remains unsolved. Therefore, the best that could be done under existing circumstances 

would be to place the single evaluation, ·publication, and 

dissemination center in close proximity to one of the cryptanalytic processing centers, to be selected on the basis of 

optimum facilities for the operation of the single evaluation, 

publication, and ·dissemination center. 

6. a. A single, central organization for the control 

and di,ssemination of the final~ product would also 

be advantageous in at least three respects: 

(1) Such an organization would bring about 

economies in facilities, space, and personnel. 

(2) The substitution of a single complete publicstion to replace the three or more separate and incomplete 

p. 8 

---n.=·,. i .~ -. -l ' i' I! ' !..J '. I' i::: '." I 
ones which are now disseminated to the various higher 

level officials of the Government would save the time 

of these very busy men# would demonstrate unification 

of operations within and among the responsible agencies# 

and would give a better overall picture of the international situation. 

(3) It would be more efficient in proper control 

for the security of all operations. 

b. The last-mentioned advantage deserves further 

comment. One of the important byproducts of a consolidation 

of SIGINT evaluation# publication# and dissemination agencies 

would be that the present wide dissemination of the individual 

items of intelligence in mimeographed# dittoed# or printed 

form, a condition fraught with great hazard to the security 

of the operations# would no longer be necessary# which would 

thus improve the security of all SIGINT operations, especially the cryptanalytic. This would not mean that individual messages or items of SIGINT would no longer be 

available to those who have a need therefor; it would simply 

mean that these items would be made available only on proper 

request or, if the central dissemination unit deemed an I 

item to be of suoh character as to warrant immediate forwarding to the officials poncerned, the item would be 

forwarded with expedition without such a request. As an 

example of the breadth of the present dissemination of the 

individual processed messages, Inclosure 1 shows the distribution given by the Army SecUI'ity Agency to its p~oduct. 

-ir~~;I ' t ~ I' "( ,INf UJ lW [Lili~ t 

P. 9 
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,,,~ . 
15 March 1949 

SUBJECT: Central Evaluation,. Publication and Dissemination 

ot SIGINT 

1. CSGAS-90 concurs in that portion or the subject paper which proposes closer integration of processing, evaluation,. and 

publication for SIGINT material.. -~ 

2. A single evaluation and publication unit, to be effective, 

presupposes a !._:J.:!'lgl.! processing unit. Considerable difficulty in 

perf onuing proper centralized evaluation and publication of SIGINT 

by a central unit is anticipated it separate processing units exiat. 

t A study on the organization of SIGINT processing has been made by a ~ special board and a decision on the recomm.endat1ons of this board 

has not yet been issued. 

3. The following pol.Ilts must be taken into consideration in 

determining the course of action to be taken in centralizing evaluation 

and publication of SIGIHT: 

a. The concept of integration of the processing, evaluation,. 

and publication ot SIGINT has not been proved in practice within the 

framework or American SIGINT organizations. -11 - --

b. At this time, the course to be followed in effecting 

centralized evaluation and publication of SIGINT must be workable 

under either a unified or coordinated concept of processing. Thi• 

results from the f'act that~sion, as mentioned above, has not 

been issued as to whether SIGINT processing will be unib.ed or coordinated. 

c. The transition from the present procedures to centralized. 

evaluation and publication will require considerable time and adjustment among the consumer and processing agencies. 

4. The major advantages of' integration of' processing 'With 

evaluation and publication of' SIGINT are round in the following: 

(a) Security; (b} Tim.ell.ness; (c) 'Economy; {d) Ef'fectiTenesa. 

These advantages are well covered in the basic p~r • 

• 

TOP SEGRET GLINT 
I • 

5. The .toll.owing course ot action is recommended: 

a. That within the framework of the Arqr an integration 

of processing with evaluation"&nd. publication of SIGINT be effected. 

b. That the ftm.etions of processing, evaluation and publication for the Department or Arm:r be conducted at Army Security 

Agency. 

c. That the function of dissemination be reviewed, taking 

into consideration recommendations "a" and "b" above. 

6. The toregoins recommendations, if carried out, will: 

a. Prove the validity- of the concept of integration ot 

processing with evaluation and publication of SIGINT. 

b. Be acceptable under either a unified or coorcb.nated 

concept or processing. 

c. Be effected with a minim.um ot time and administratiYe 

adjustment. 

d. Serve as a model to be followed l.f' it is desired at some 

future date to embrace all major processing, evaluation and publication in a centralized activity. 

FRANK B. ROWLETT 

Chi.et, Operations Division 

______ fOP_S~RET_2 ~l\Nl __ 
1. The proposal described here seems to me to be inadvisable for 

the following reasons1 

a. I do not believe in the complete isolation of~ in 

overall intelligence operations. This proposal would set up a single 

G&IN'f-intelligence unit, while presUITJ.ably continuing witlu.n each deparilnent the nonnal activities which are now carried on, out Without 

benefit of any~ source material. 

b. A single evaluating and disseminating unit would be easy 

prey for the CIA. I would predict that it would be taken over by CIA 

WJ. tlu.n a few months after 1t started to-function, if not l.nitially. 

c. M1litary, Air, Naval, political, economic and o~her intelligence requirements each have different perspectives even though 

in so~e cases the difference is slight. No advantage can be seen in 

combin.J.ng under one roof intelligence analysis for each of the above 

purposes. In fact, some very serious disadvantages might develop, 

depending of course upon the energy, imagination, specialized experience, 

and ability of the personnel comprising the Joint evaluation unit. 

2. Specific Comments. 

Par l b of memo - This appears to be an ill-disguised attempt 

to locate the unit at Arlington Hall and even if the idea were good, it 

woul~ be £PPO~~-by_th~ other USCI~ manbers. 

Par 6 a (2) of incl. - The President does not receive the 

Military and Naval digests. 

General - In the memorandum., there is no specific reference to 

the dissemination of urgent spot itEms, the most effect1ve use made or 

GLINT. There is a reference to this matter in the last paragraph of 

the inclosure but there it is implied that aissem.ination of spot itans 

would be the exception rather than the rule. A:rry procedure•which fails 

to encourage the frequent dissemination or spot itEms does not take ad.-

vantage of the principal value or ~LINT intelligence. -_,.~-----

3. The arguments which you advance in the inclosure, while t agree 

vnth them, tend to support the closer integration of processing and 

evaluat1on rather than the integration of evaluation and dissemination.