NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

LEILA S., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, X.G., X.F., X.F., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0217

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JS517583

The Honorable Janice K. Crawford, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

John L. Popilek, PC, Scottsdale

By John L. Popilek

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Mesa

By Nicholas Chapman-Hushek

Counsel for Appellee DCS
LEILA S. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Jon W. Thompson and Judge John C. Gemmill joined.1

J O H N S E N, Judge:

¶1 Leila S. ("Mother") appeals the superior court's order 

terminating her parental rights to three of her children. For the following 

reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On a petition by the Department of Child Safety ("DCS") and 

after a trial, the superior court terminated Mother's parental rights with 

respect to the three children based on nine months' time-in-care and a prior 

out-of-home dependency under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.")

sections 8-533(B)(8)(a) and (11) (2016), respectively.2 This court has

jurisdiction of Mother's timely appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the 

Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. § 8-235(A) (2016) and Arizona Rule of 

Procedure for the Juvenile Court 103(A).

DISCUSSION

¶3 The superior court may terminate a parent's rights upon clear 

and convincing evidence of one of the statutory grounds in A.R.S. § 8-

533(B). Michael J. v. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248-49, ¶ 12 (2000). 

Additionally, the superior court must find by a preponderance of the 

evidence that termination is in the child's best interest. Jeffrey P. v. Dep't of 

Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 212, 213, ¶ 5 (App. 2016). We review a termination 

order for an abuse of discretion. Id. We may affirm an order of termination 

 

1 The Honorable John C. Gemmill, Retired Judge of the Court of 

Appeals, Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant 

to Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.

2 Absent material revisions after the relevant date, we cite a statute's 

current version.
LEILA S. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

on any one of the statutory grounds on which the superior court ordered 

severance. Jesus M. v. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3 (App. 2002).

¶4 Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a), parental rights may be 

terminated when:

[t]he child has been in an out-of-home placement for a 

cumulative total period of nine months or longer pursuant to 

court order . . . and the parent has substantially neglected or 

wilfully refused to remedy the circumstances that cause the 

child to be in an out-of-home placement.

¶5 On appeal, Mother does not contest the court's findings that

the children have been in out-of-home placement for more than nine

months, DCS offered her appropriate reunification services and she had

substantially neglected or wilfully refused to remedy the circumstances that 

caused the children to be in out-of-home placement. Nor does she contest 

the court's finding that termination was in the children's best interests.

¶6 Instead, Mother argues the court abused its discretion when 

it admitted evidence that the three children's father, who is not a party to 

this appeal, had abused another child of hers, Y.H. Mother argues the 

evidence was highly prejudicial and, because she had consented to the 

termination of her rights with respect to Y.H., not relevant. The evidence 

Mother cites, while arguably relevant to other severance grounds alleged 

by DCS, bore little relevance to the nine-months-in-care ground for 

severance. Mother offers no argument beyond speculation, however, that 

the evidence improperly influenced the court in its consideration of the 

petition to sever based on nine months' in care. See State v. Arellano, 213 

Ariz. 474, 480, ¶ 23, n. 5 ("A trial judge usually will not exclude evidence as 

unduly prejudicial when the trial is to the court.").

¶7 Mother also argues the court abused its discretion in granting 

DCS's request on the last day of trial to take judicial notice of several minute 

entries from the current case and prior dependencies. Without agreeing 

with Mother's contention that the court erred by taking judicial notice of 

any of the minute entries at issue, we note Mother does not make any 

attempt to explain how she might have been prejudiced by the court's 

consideration of them. She does not argue the court based its order of 

termination on the orders, or that without the prior orders, the evidence 

was insufficient to support the superior court's findings.
LEILA S. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

CONCLUSION

¶8 We affirm the superior court's order granting severance based 

on nine months' time-in-care under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a). Having 

affirmed the termination based on that ground, we need not address the 

other ground for termination. Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 3.