FIL ED U.S . C OUR T O F A PPE ALS ELE VEN TH CIRCUI T Apr il 19, 20 05 THO MAS K. KA

HN CLE RK [PUBLIS H]

IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELE VENTH CIRCUIT

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 04- 1267 6

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ D.C. Dock etNo. 0 3- 00 21 7- CR-T-2 3- EAJ UNITED STAT ES OFAMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee, ve rs us VLADIMIR RODR IGUEZ, D ef en dant- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ ON REQUEST FOR POLL FOR REHEARING EN BANC2

Befo re EDMONDSON, Ch ie f Ju dg e, TJOFLAT, ANDERSON, BIRCH, D U BIN A , BL A CK , CA RN E S, BA RKE T T , H U L L , MA RC U S, W IL SO N , and PR Y O R, Ci rc uit

Jud ge s. O R D E R : T he Co urt havin g be enpol le d a t the r eque st o f one of the m em be rs of the Co urt and a

m aj or ity of the Ci rc uit

Jud ge s who are in re gul ar a ct ive se rv ic e not having voted in favor of it (Rule 35, F ederal R ules of Appellate Pr ocedure; Elev en th Cir cu itRu le 35 -5 ), reh eari ng en ba nc is DENIED.

/s / J . L. E DMONDSON CHIEF J UDGEIn United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S. Ct. 1770 (1993), the Supreme Court 1 held that in order

to satisfy the plain er

ror test, the de fenda

nt must demonstrate (1) e rror , (2) that is plain, and (3) that affe cts substantial rig hts. I d. at 732–37, 113 S. Ct. at 1777–79. “I f all three conditions are me t, an appe llate cour t may then exercise its discre tion to noti ce a forf eited er ror, but only if (4) the err or ‘se riously aff ects the f airne ss, integrity , or public re putation of judicial proce eding s.’” Johnson v. United St ates, 520 U.S. 461, 467, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997) 3 CAR NE S, Circuit Judge, concurring in the denial of rehear ing en banc: W ith its d enial of rehearing en banc in this case, this Court has left intact our c ir cu it lawon B ooke r pla in e rr or a s it is la id o ut b y

our pane l de ci sio n inthi s ca se , U nit ed

S ta te s v. Ro dr igu ez , 398 F . 3d 1 291 (1 1thCi r. 200 5) , and b y our decisions in United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2005), United St at es v. S he lto n, 400 F . 3d 1 325 (1 1thCi r. 200 5) , and Unit ed S ta te s v. Curt is, 400 F.3 d 1 33 4 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 5) (pe r cu ria m ). O ur Ro dr igu ez de ci sio n, w hic h w as f oll ow ed in D unc anand C urtis , establishes th at the use of extra- verdict enhancem ents und er the pre -Booker m andatory

guidelin es schem e is Sixth Am endm ent error that is plain. Rodriguez, 39 8 F .3dat 1 29 8– 99 ; Du nc an , 40 0 F .3dat 1 30 4; Cu rti s, 4 00 F.3dat 1 33 5. Sh el tona dds to o ur

c ir cu it lawthe r

ule that whil e pr e- Bo oke r se nte nc ing f re e of any e xtr a- ve rd ic t e nhanc em en t i s no t a vio la tio n of

the S ixth A m en dm en t, it is statut or y e rr or und er the r em ed ia l part

of the Bo oke r de ci sio n. S he lto n, 400 F . 3d at 133 0–31 . T he ups hot

of our f our de ci sio ns i s th at

the f ir st tw o pr ongs of

the four-prong plain error test ar e m et in all pre-B ooker sentencing cases. T o that 1(interna l marks omitted) (quotingOlano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S. Ct. at 1776). 4 co m m on h old ing S he lto n e ff

ec tiv el y a dds that whe re the thi rd pr ong of the pla in erro r te stis m etin th es e cas es , th e fo ur th on e wil l b e al so . See i d. at 13 33 –3 4. Be ca use the e ff

ec t of Bo oke r er

ro r is the sam e re gard le ss o f the ty pe , our de ci sio ns m ak e no f

unc tio na l di sti nc tio n be tw ee n c onst itu tio na l and s ta tut or y e rr or . F or pu rp os es of t he pl ai n e rro r ru le , un pr es erv ederro r is un pr es erv ederro r. U nde r our

de ci sio ns, w he re the Bo oke r iss ue is ra ise d f or the f ir st t im e on ap pe al th e th ird pro ng of t he pl ai n e rro r te stwil l b e th e d eci si ve on e. As we explained in o ur panel opini on, the Suprem e Court has instructed us that th e third pr ong re qui re s th at

an e rr or have “ af fe ct [e d] sub stanti al r igh ts, ” w hic h a lm ost alway s m eans that the error “ m ust have affec ted the outcom e of the district court pr oc ee din gs. ” Ro dr igu ez , 398 F . 3d at 12 99 ( quot ing U nit ed S ta te s v. O lano, 507 U. S. 725, 734, 113 S. Ct. 1770 , 1778 (1993)). T he standard for showing prej udice is the fam iliar rea sonable prob ability of a diff erent re sult form

ulation , which m eans a pr oba bil ity “ ‘ suf fi ci en t t o un de rm ine c onf ide nc e in the out co m e’ of the pr oc ee din g. ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. D om ing ue z Be nit ez , 542 U . S. 74, ___ , 124 S . Ct . 2333 , 2340 (2004) (quo ting Strickland v. W ashingt on, 466 U. S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 2068 (1984)). O f cr itical im portance, “ [i] t is the defendant rather than the [g] overnm ent who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prej udice.”5

Olan o, 5 07 U.S. at 7 34 , 11 3 S . Ct. at17 78 . O ur f our de ci sio ns d o no t a dopt

ape r se r ule about w he the r the thi rd

pr ong of the pla in e rr or

te st w ill be m et

in pr e- Bo oke r se nte nc ing c as es . I nst ea d, the re sul t de pe nds, a s it

sho uld , on the f

ac ts o f the c as e. F or

that r ea son, it

is en tir el y co nsi ste nt f

or Ro dr igu ez , D unc an , and C urtis to have c onc lud ed that the defendants in tho se three c ases did not car ry their burden of establishin g the third prong of the plain err or test, while Shelton conclu ded that the defendant in th at cas e d id . I. Judg e T j of la t w oul d have thi s C ourt a dopt ape r se r ule that the thi rd

pr ong of the pla in e rr or

te st i s m et

in ev er y c as e of pr e- Bo oke r co nst itu tio na l e rr or , and he w oul d do it

in a w ay that w oul d a lso pr ec lud e ap pli catio n of the harm le ss e rr or doctrine even in the m ost extrem e case . His thesis is that a Booker constitu tional er ro r is a str uc tur al e rr or

or de fe ct , and f

or that r ea son the re is no n ee d f or the defendant to sho w third-prong prej udice for plain err or purposes. Judge Tj oflat br an ds all pre -Bo ok er s en te nc es in whi ch th ere was co ns ti tu ti on al erro r “ il le ga l,” an d he of fe rs no p lausi ble r ea son w hy the f ourth p ro ng o f the te st w oul d no t be m et if the third prong were . The bottom line of his approach is autom atic re versal of ev ery pr e-Bo ok er s en te nc e in whi ch th ere was an ex tra -v erd ic t en ha nc em en t.6

T ha t a ppr oa chdoe s of

fe r the a ttr ac tio n of

r ed uc ing thi s C ourt’ s w orklo ad , be ca use nothin g is e as ie r to a

ppl y than an auto m at ic r

ule that di ct at es the sam e re sul t re gard le ss o f the f

ac ts. E as e of

appl ic at iona sid e, the pr opos ed r ule is not le ga lly or logically

appropriate in the pre-Booker area. N o other judge has ever even sugg es te d th is the or

y , e xc ep t i n th e co ur se of r ej ec tin g it . Contrary to Judg e T

j oflat’ s belief, it sim

ply is not true that “ the onlyrea l dif fe re nc e” be tw ee n hi s a

ppr oa chand tha t of

the T hir d, F ourth, and S ixth C ir cu its is th athi s “ of

fers a m or e sa ti sf

act ory rat io na le forit s re su lt .” See Tjof la t, J ., dis se nti ng, a t 70 -7 1. Whil e the sit ua tio n inthe T hir d C ir cu it is unc le ar , und er the Fourth and Sixth Circuits’ a pproach, sentences involvin g Booker constitu tional er ro r m ay be uph el d un de r the harm le ss e rr or doc tr ine . S ee , e . g. , U nit ed S ta te s v. Tate, No. 02-4382 , 2005 W L 513491, *6 (6th Cir. Mar. 3, 2005) (unpub .) ; United St at es v. Be the a, N o. 04- 5022 , 200 5 W L 807 016, *1 ( 4thCi r. Apr . 8, 200 5) (unpub .) . As Judge Tj oflat concedes, his structural error a pproach precludes ap pli catio n of

that harm le ss e rr or

doc tr ine . S ee T

j of la t, J. , dis se nti ng, a t 48 (“ [S ] tr uc tur al e rr or s ‘ de fy

ana ly sis by

‘ harm le ss- er

ro r’ standard s’ and are pe r se re ve rs ibl e if

an ob j ec tio n is m ad e at

tr ia l. ” (quot ing A ri zo nav. F ulm inante , 499 U . S. 279 , 309 , 111 S . Ct . 124 6, 126 5 ( 1991 )) . N o m atte r howc le ar it m ay be f ro m the record that the defe ndant would n ot have received a lesser sentence, a pre-The e leven c ircuits in this count include the Ninth, althoug h its Booker plain err or 2 decision has be en vac ated f or re hear ing e n banc. See United States v. Ameline, 400 F .3d 646, 654–55 (9th Cir.), re h’gen banc g rante d, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL612710 (Mar . 11, 2005). 7 Booker sentence that involv ed an extra- verdict enhancem ent could no t be aff irm ed under harm less error analy sis if we followed his sugg estion. None of the e leven o th e r c i r c u i t s t o a d dr e s s B o o k e r p l a i ne rr o r

i s s u e s h a v e t a k e ns u c h ane x tr e me ap pr oa ch . 2 T he F ir st C ir cu it ha s e xpr es sly r ej ec te d Ju dge T

j of la t’ s stru ct

ur al the or y of Bo oke r pla in e rr or . T his is w ha t tha t C ourt sa id a bout it : N or is thi s stru ct

ur al e rr or . I n c er

ta in s tr uc tur al e rr or

c as es , tho se which “ underm in[e] the fairness of a crim inal proceeding as a whole, ” er rors can be c or

re ct ed r eg ar dle ss o f anind ivi dua liz ed sho w ing of

pr ej udi ce to the de fe ndant. D om ing ue z Be nit ez , 124 S . Ct . a t 23 39; O lano, 507 U . S. a t 73 5, 113 S. Ct. 1770 ; see A rizona v. F ulm inante, 499 U. S. 279, 309– 310, 111 S. Ct. 1246 , 113 L. Ed. 2d 30 2 (1991) (provid ing exam ples of structural err or). Beca use sentencing u nder a m andatory sy stem is not an error that “ un de rm in es th e fai rn es s o f a cri m in al pro ceed in g a s a wh ol e,” as we dis cu ss a bove , aBo oke r ty

pe e rr or is not astr uc tur al e rr or ; the de fe ndant m ust c onvi nc e us o f pr ej udi ce . I nde ed , ha d th e m aj or ity in Bo oke r tho ught the re w as str

uc tur al e rr or , it

w oul d have sa id s o. U nit ed S ta te s v. A nto nakopo ulo s, 399 F . 3d 6 8, 80 n . 11 ( 1st Ci r. 200 5) ; se e al so United States v. Gonzalez -H uerta, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 W L 807008, *4 (10th Cir. Apr. 8, 2005) (en banc) ( hold ing th at Booker statutory err or is not structu ral); K nox v. U nit ed

S ta te s, 400 F . 3d 5 19, 523 ( 7thCi r. 200 5) ( expla ini ng why App ren di erro r is no t s tru ctur al ).8

In response to the First Circuit’ s reasoning th at if Booker e rror w ere structural the Suprem e Court w ouldhave said so, Judge Tj oflat say s that the Court did . A cc or din g to him , the la st s en te nc e of Jus tic e Br ey er ’ s B ooke r m aj or ity opin ion abou t rem edy

tells us that we ar e dealing with structural er ror. T o see that m es sa ge in the la st s en te nc e of that op ini on r equir es not j ust ase t of r ea din g gla sse s bu t a lso aviv id i m ag inatio n. R athe r than take the se nte nc e out of c ont ex t, it is b es t t o se t ou t the e nti re la st p ar ag ra ph o f the opi nio n: As th es e d i s p o s i t i o n s i n d i ca t e, we m u s tap p l y t o d ay’s hold ings—b oth th e Sixth Am endm ent hold ing and o ur rem edial interpretation of the Sentencing Act—to all ca ses on direct review . That fa ct doe s no t m ean th at

w e be lie ve that e ve ry

se nte nc e giv es r ise to a Si xth A m en dm en t vi olatio n. N or do w e be lie ve that e ve ry appe al w ill le ad

to a ne wse nte nc ing he ar ing . T ha t i s be ca use w e expe ct

r ev ie w ing c ourts t o ap ply or din ar y pr ude nti al doc tr ine s, de te rm ini ng, f or e xam ple , w he the r the iss ue w as r ai se d be lowand whe the r it fa ils the “pla in- er ro r” te st. I t i s a lso because, in cases not invo lving a Sixth Am endm ent violatio n, whether res en te nc in g i s warran te d o r whe th er i t wi ll in st eadbe su ffi ci en t t o re vi ew a se nte nc e fo r re as ona

ble ne ss m ay

de pe nd u pon ap pli catio n of

the harm less-err or doctrine. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S . ___, ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, 769 (200 5) (internal ci ta ti on s o m it te d) . Fo cu sin g onthe la st s en te nc e, Jud ge T j of la t r ea sons that: 1) be ca

use the Suprem e Court explicitly said that the harm less error doctrine applies to s tatutory Bo oke r er ro r, the Co urt m

ust have m eant tha t the harm le ss e rr or doc tr ine doe s no t9

apply to constit ution al Booker er ror; 2) beca

use the harm less error doctrine does not appl y to co nst itu tio na l B ooke r er ro r, thi s ty

pe of e rr or m ust be str uc tur al in na tur e; and 3 ) be ca

use c onst itu tio na l B ooke r er ro r is s tr uc tur al in na tur e, a ll co nst itu tio na l B ooke r er

ro r am ount s to the de pr ivatio n of sub stanti al r igh ts f

or pl ai n e rro r pu rp os es . Neverha s s o m uc h b een in ferr edfro m

so li tt le . Ther e ar e all kinds of probl em s with this theory . To begin with, it is based upon a negative pregnant, and as Jud ge Becker once observed for the T hird Ci rc uit , “ dr aw ing ins tr

uc tio n f ro m S upr em e Co urt pa ssa ge s th ro ugh the use of the ne ga tiv e pr eg nant i s r isky and unsatis fa ct or

y . ” Br ooks v. K

y le r, 204 F . 3d 1 02, 108 (3 d C ir . 200 0) . H er e doi ng s o is part ic ularl y uns at isf ac tor y be ca use it ha s th e e f f e c to f c o n tr a d i c t i n g amo r e d i r e c ts t a t e me n ti nth e s a me p ar a g r ap h o f th e s a me opi nio n. I n th e tw o se nte nc es im m ed ia te ly pr ec ed ing the one in que sti on, the Su pr em e Co urt sa id tha t e ve ry Bo oke r ap pe al w ill not

le ad to a ne wse nte nc ing hearing “ because w e expect r eviewing courts to applyordinary prudential doc tr ine s, de te rm ini ng, f

or e xam ple , w he the r the iss ue w as r ai se d be lowand whe th er i t fa il s t he ‘ pl ai n- erro r’ tes t.” Bo ok er, 5 43 U.S. at _

__ , 12 5 S . Ct. at76 9. In that sentence the Suprem e Court expressed its belief that som e sentences invo lving Booker err or would be aff irm ed because the defe ndant coul d not satis fy the pla in e rr or

te st. T he Co urt’ s st at ed

be lie f that the r igo rs of

the pla in e rr or

te st10

would wee d out so m e Booker er ror ca ses is not s urprising g iven that it has pr ev iou sly

ins tr uc te d us that the pow er

to not ic e pla in e rr or

sho uld be e xe rc ise d

“ spari ngl y , ” Jone s v. U nit ed S ta te s, 527 U . S. 373 , 389 , 119 S . Ct . 209 0, 210 2 (1 999) , and o nly

“ in those c ir cum stanc es in w hic h am isc ar ri ag e of j ust ic e w oul d oth er w ise r es ult , ” O lano, 507 U . S. a t 73 6, 113 S . Ct . a t 17 79 ( int er na l qu otatio n om itted). Judge T

j oflat’ s posi tion d irectly

contradicts the Suprem e Court’ s belief that so m e Bo oke r er

ro r ca se s, e ve n th ose inv olv ing S ixth A m en dm en t vi olatio ns, w ill be a ff

irm ed be ca use the de fe ndants c annot sa tis fy the r igo ro us r equir em en ts of th e p la in erro r te st . Judg e T j of la t’ s stru ct

ur al the or y c ontra dic ts tha t st at ed

be lie f of the Su pr em e Co urt, be ca

use und er his the or y the thi rd pr ong of the pla in e rr or

te st w ill al w ay s be sa tis fi ed

w he re the re is Bo oke r co nst itu tio na l e rr or . A nd the thi rd pr ong is the de ci siv e one . E ve ry c ourt t o a ddr es s th e m atte r ha s a gr ee d th at Bo oke r er

ro r sa tis fi es the f

ir st tw o pr ongs of

the pla in e rr or

te st. L ike w ise , a ll of

the c ourts t o ad dr es s th e iss ue have f

ound the f ourth p ro ng m et

in Bo oke r co nst itu tio na l e rr or ca se s whe re the thi rd

pr ong is s at isf

ie d. S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. O liv er , 397 F . 3d 3 69, 380– 81 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Hughes, 396 F. 3d 37 4, 380–81 (4th Cir. ), am ended on reh’ g by

___ F.3d ___, 2005 W L 628224 (Mar. 16, 2005); United St at es v. A m el ine , 400 F . 3d 6 46, 654 –55 (9 th C ir . ), r eh ’ g e n banc gr an te d, ___A pane l of the Six th Circuit skipped the third prongand held that the f ourth prongof the 3 plain err or test was not met in one c ase. United States v. Br uce, 396 F .3d 697, 719–20 (6th Cir. 2005). Howe ver, the Six th Circuit has since dec ided that the B ruce decision is not to be followed beca use it conflicts with the ea rlier de cision of another

Six th Circuit panel in the Oliver c ase. Se e Un ite d St ate s v . M ila n, 39 8 F .3 d 4 45 , 4 52 n. 3 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 5) (“ To the e xtent B ru c e c on fl ic ts wi th O liv e r, we no te that w e mus t f oll owOl ive r b e c a

us e it w a s d e c ide d f

ir st. ” ). Th e Te nth Circuit’s en banc majority opinion, like that of the Six th Circuit’s Bruc e pane l, also skipped the th ir d p r o n gan d

w e n t s tr a igh t t o th e f

o urth in it s r e c e n t p la in

e r r o r d e c is io n . Se e G o n za le zHuer ta, 2005 WL807008, at *6–9. 11 F. 3d _ __, 200 5 W L 612 710 (M ar . 11, 200 5) ; S he lto n, 400 F . 3d at 13 33–3 4; U nit ed S ta te s v. Co le s, ___

F . 3d _ __, 200 5 W L 783 069, *3 ( D . C. Ci r. Apr . 8, 2005 ) (per

curiam); see a lso United States v. D avis, 397 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 2005 ). 3 Judg e T j of la t do es not

pr ovi de any

pe rs ua siv e ba sis f

or be lie vin g th at

the fo urth p ro ng o f the pla in e rr or te st w ill not

be m et a s am atte r of

c our se if , a s he co nte nds, Bo oke r co nst itu tio na l e rr or is str uc tur al . T he S upr em e Co urt sa id i n Dom ingu ez Be nitez that structural err ors “ underm in[e] the fairness of a crim inal proceeding as a w hole.” 542 U.S . at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2339. Q uotin g another Su pr em e Co urt op ini on, Jud ge T j of la t i nsi sts that “ [b ] ec au se str uc tur al e rr or af fe ct s th e fr am ew ork of

the tr ia l i tse lf

, it s ‘ co nse que nc es . . . are ne ce ssari ly unqu an tif ia ble and i nde te rm inate . ’ ” S ee T j of la t, J. , dis se nti ng, a t 48 ( quot ing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U. S. 275, 282, 113 S. Ct. 2078 , 2083 (1993)). I n expla ini ng the im

pa ct of str uc tur al e rr or s, the S upr em e Co urt st at ed : “ W ith out12

the se ba sic pr ote ct ion s, ac ri m ina l tri al c annot r el ia bly se rv e its f

unc tio n a s a vehicle for deter

m ination of guilt or inn ocence, and no crim inal pun ishm ent m ay be regar ded as fundam entally fair. ” Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S . 570, 577–78, 106 S. Ct. 3101 , 3106 (1986) (internal citation om itted). Be ca use str uc tur al e rr or , w he re it

e xis ts, r en de rs ac ri m ina l punis hm en t fundam entally

unfair, it would be difficult to justify a conclusion th at an er

ror that is s tr uc tur al doe s no t “ se ri ousl y a ff ec t[ ] the f ai rn es s, int eg ri ty

or pub lic r ep utatio n of j udi ci al pr oc ee din gs, ” O lano, 507 U . S. a t 73 2, 113 S . Ct . a t 17 76 ( quot at ion om itt ed ). S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. Re ci o, 371 F . 3d 1 093, 110 3 n. 7 ( 9thCi r. 200 4) (“ W e not e that stru ct

ur al e rr or is part ic ularl y

li ke ly to sa tis fy O lano’ s f

ourth prong.”). So f ar a s c anbe dis co ve re d, no c ourt ha s e ve r ac tua lly he ld tha t an e rr or

is structural but fails to m eet the fourth prong of the plain error test. H owever m uch it m ay detract f rom the appeal of the Booker structural e rror theory , the f act is that ad opt ing that the or

y w ill a lm ost

c er ta inl y r es ult in re ve rs al w ith out

r eg ar d to the fa ct s of an in div idu al c as e. T ha t i s wha t the str uc tur al e rr or

appr oa chge ne ra lly do es an d i s o ne reas on itis so rare ly app li ed . T he r es ult

of Jud ge T j of la t’ s po sit ionthat B ooke r co nst itu tio na l e rr or is str uc tur al e rr or , the n, is that e ve ry Bo oke r co nst itu tio na l e rr or w ill sa tis fy

the pla in13

e rr o r t e s tan dr e qu i r e r e v e r s a l an dr e s e n t e n c i n g . T h u s , i nh i s v i e w , th e S up r e me Co urt’ s be lie f ab out

the e ff ec t of appl y ing “ or din ar

y pr ude nti al doc tr ine s, de te rm ini ng, f

or e xam ple , w he the r the iss ue w as r ai se d be lowand whe the r it fa ils th e ‘pla in -err or ’ te st ,” Bo ok er, 5 43 U.S. at _

__ , 12 5 S . Ct. at76 9, i s wro ng . Apply ing th e plain error

test to unp reser

ved Booker error will not, as the C ourt th ou gh t, p rev en t ev ery ap pe al fro m lea di ng to a ne w sen te nc in g h eari ng . See i d. Se ek ing to fr ee his the or

y f ro m the c lut ch es of

the S upr em e Co urt’ s state m en t tha t no t e ve ry

Bo oke r er

ro r w ill m ee t the r equir em en ts o f the pla in e rr or test, Judge Tj oflat posits that the Court m ust have m eant only

Booker statutory er ro r. B ey ond sa tis fy ing the ne ed s of his the or y , the re is no r ea son to i nte rp re t the Co urt’ s st at em en t tha t w ay . T he Co urt di d no t say that i t e xpe ct ed

r ev ie w ing co urts t o a

ppl y or din ar y pr ude nti al doc tr ine s, suc h a s th e pla in e rr or te st, onl y in ca se s of statut or y e rr or . N or

is the re any

r ea son in l awor

log ic to dis tin gui sh betwee n the two ty

pes of Booker err or for purposes of the plain error r ule. I n or de r to m ak e Judg e T

j of la t’ s po st- Bo oke r pla in e rr or the or y w ork, w e w oul d have to write into our lawa rule that statutory err ors could no t be treate d as structural re gard le ss o f the ir

str uc tur al e ff

ec t. N o de ci sio n of

the S upr em e Co urt or

of thi sThe languag e that Judge Tjof lat quotes from a

footnote in our dec ision in Unit ed States 4 v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250, 1272 n.41 ( 11th Cir. 2001) (en ba nc), is pure dicta. See T

joflat, J ., dissenting, at 54. The er

ror in that ca se wa s constitutional, not s tatutory . Judg e Tj of

lat e xpre sse s so me surp ri se at th e re fu sa l of the pa ne l op ini on

and its a uth or to be impresse d by

that dictum from the Sanche z opini on. Tjoflat, J ., dissenting, at 76 n.18. He shouldn’t be surprised, be cause it is well-established that dicta doe s not bind any one. E.g ., M cD o n al d ’s C o rp . v . R o b ert s o n , 1 4 7 F. 3 d 1 3 0 1 , 1 3 1 5 (1 1 thC i r. 1 9 9 8 ) ( C arn es , J . , co n cu rr i n g) (“F or these r easons, a

mong othe rs, dicta in our opinions is not binding on anyone for any purpose.” ), quoted with appr oval, Shinn ex rel. Shinn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F .3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2004) (Tjoflat, J .). The only thing that is truly

surprisingis J udg e Tjoflat’ s new-f ound respe ct for dic ta, and his reliance on the dictum in the Sanchez opinion, Tjoflat, J ., dissenting, at 54., which comes a ft e r ye ars of

pr oc la imi nghim se lf

no t to be bo un d b y

dic ta in t his Court ’s , o r e ve n th e Sup re me Court’s, opinions. S ee, e .g ., United States v. Smit h, ___ F.3d __, 2005 WL628686, *19 n.7 (11th Cir. Mar. 18, 2005) ( Tjoflat, J .) (“ [T] he prior pa nel rule doe s not ex tend to dicta.” ( internal citation and quotation omitted)); United States v. Santa, 236 F .3d 662, 672 n.14 (11th Cir. 2000) (T jof lat, J.) (“ I t is we ll s e ttl e d, ho we ve r, tha t no op ini on

c an b e c on sid e re d a s b ind inga uth or ity un le ss t he c a se c a lls fo r i ts e xpre ssi on . A s th e c ourt ’s state me nt i n N ixon w a s unn e c e ssa ry to i ts decision, it is a dictum and does not control our decision in this case.” (interna l citation and quotation omitt ed)) ; Klay v. United Hea lthgr oup, Inc. 376 F .3d 1092, 1101 n.12 (11th Cir. 2004) (T jof lat, J.) (s tatin gthat “ [t]his ho ldi ng , mo re ov e r, wa s p ur e dic ta , a s w e ha d p re vio us ly c on c lud e d th at w e la c ke d ju ri sd ic tio n in

the matte r, ” and

c on c lud ingtha

t “ we are no t bo un d to adh er e t o i t ”) ; M o b l ey

v . He ad , 3 0 6 F. 3 d

1 0 9 6 , 1 1 0 2 (1 1 thC i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( T j o fl at , J . , d i s s en t i n g) (statingthat beca

use a de cision on an issue by a prior pa

nel was me re dic ta, that issue re mains open for later r eview) ; Armstrongv. Martin Marie tta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1396 ( 11th Cir. 1998) (Tjoflat, J .) (statingthat he wa s “mindful of dicta” in a Supreme Court de cision “that appea red to be in tension with the conclusions Irea ch today ,” but conc luding that he is not bound by Supreme Court dicta) . 14 Co ur t h as ev er h el d t ha t, an d t he re i s n o re as on forth is Co ur t t o d o s o n ow. 4 The heart of Judge Tj oflat’ s structural err or theory is that Booker co nst itu tio na l e rr or s a ff

ec t the se nte nc ing f

ram ew ork inw ay s th at

are “ ne ce ssari ly unqu an tif ia ble and i nde te rm inate . ” T j of la t, J. , dis se nti ng, a t 48 ( quot ing S ull ivan, 508 U.S . at 282, 113 S. Ct. at 2083). Y et, as he com m endably concedes, Booker constitu tional and st atutory err ors cannot be dist ingu ished based on the eff ect they15

m ay have ha d onthe se nte nc e pr oc ee din g. I d. a t 53 -5 4. E ve ry thi ng tha t c anbe sa id a bout the e ff ec t B ooke r co nst itu tio na l e rr or m ay have on a

se nte nc ing proceeding applies with equal force to Booker statutory err or. Ever

y differ ence betwee n what Judge Tj oflat calls the “ old m odel” of sentencing and th e “ new m odel” that would be in place on rem and exists regardless of whether ther e is an ex tr a- ve rd ic t e nhanc em en t i n ac as e. T he pr es en ce or abse nc e of

pr ej udi ce , and the dif fi cu lty of de te rm ini ng i t, is the sam e re gard le ss o f w he the r the Bo oke r er ro r is c onst itu tio na l or

statut or y . Jud ge T

j of la t c onc ed es that tre at ing one ty pe of unpr es er ve d B ooke r er

ro r as str uc tur al and the oth er

not , e ve n th oughthe y

have the sam e ef

fect on the structure of the pr oceeding, is “ intui tively . . . odd,” id. at 53. T ha t i s an un de rs ta te m en t. I n arg uin g f

or the dis tin ct ion , Jud ge T

j of la t r el ie s onadis se nti ng o pin ion fr om Bo oke r to d ism iss statut or y e rr or s a s “ m er el y

aby pr oduc t of Bo oke r’ s ‘ unne ce ssari ly

br oa d r em edy . ’ ” T

j of la t, J. , dis se nti ng, at 75 ( ci tin g Bo oke r, 543 U . S. a t __

_, 125 S . Ct . a t 78 8 ( St ev en s, J. , dis se nti ng) ). T ha t w oul d be f ine , e xc ep t di sse nti ng o pin ion s e xpr es s di sse nti ng v ie w s. I n a ppl y ing the Bo oke r de ci sio n, w e cannot a dopt the dis se nti ng v ie won the r em edy but m ust ins te ad a cc ep t the m aj or ity

opi nio n a s th e lawand f

oll owit . Judg e T j of la t’ s th eo ry

that B ooke r co nst itu tio na l e rr or is str uc tur al e rr or

is16

also contrary

to this Cou rt’ s own en banc decision in United States v. S anchez, 269 F. 3d 1 250 (1 1thCi r. 200 1) , w he re w e dis cu sse d a t l en gthand r ej ec te d th e co nt en ti on th atan y

of t he va rio us types of Ap pr en di erro r were s tru ctur al erro r. Id . a t 12 72–7 5. O ur

de ci sio n th at

Appr en di e rr or

is not str uc tur al answ er s th e que sti on o f w he the r Bo oke r er ro r is s tr uc tur al , be ca

use Bo oke r is an a

ppl ic at ionof Appr en di o nc e re m ove d. S ee Bo oke r, 543 U . S. a t __ _, 125 S . Ct . a t 75 5–56 (S te ve ns, J. , m aj . op. ) (“ our hol din g inBl ak el y

appl ie s to the S en te nc ing G uid el ine s” ); Bl ak el y

v. W as hin gto n, 542 U . S. __, 124 S . Ct . 253 1, 253 6 ( 2004 ) (“ This case requires us to applythe rule w e expressed in Apprendi . . . . ”). Even if our Sanchez dec ision did no t exist, w e still sho uld no t holdthat Bo oke r er ro r is s tr uc tur al e rr or . T he S upr em e Co urt i tse lf ha s be enc ar ef

ul t o no te that, “ [w ] e have found structural error s onlyin a very lim ited class of cases. ” John son v. United States, 520 U.S . 461, 468, 117 S. Ct. 1544 , 1549 (1997). In describing ho w lim ited that class of cases is, the Court in Arizona v. Fulm inante, lis te d th e fo llo w ing de ci sio ns f ind ing str uc tur al e rr or : G ide on v . W ai nw ri ght , 372 U. S. 335, 83 S. C t. 792 (1963) (the total deprivation of the right to couns el at trial); T um ey

v. O hio, 273 U.S . 510, 47 S. Ct. 437 (192 7) (a biased j udge); V as que z v. H ill er

y , 474 U . S. 254 , 106 S . Ct . 617 ( 1986 ) (unlaw fu l e xc lus ionof m em be rs of the de fe ndant’ s r ac e fr om agr an d j ur

y ); Mc K as kle v. W igg ins , 46517

U. S. 168, 104 S. Ct. 944 (198 4) (denial of the right to self-re presentation at trial); an d W al le r v. G eo rg ia , 467 U . S. 39, 104 S . Ct . 221 0 ( 1984 ) (d en ia l of the r igh t t o a publ ic tr ia l) . A ri zo nav. F ulm inante , 499 U . S. 279 , 309 –10, 111 S . Ct . 124 6, 1265 ( 1991 ) (R eh nqui st, C. J. , m aj . op. ). T he onl y c as e sin ce F ulm inante w he re the Su pr em e Co urt ha s f

ound astr uc tur al e rr or

is Su lli van v. L oui siana , 508 U . S. 275 , 278– 82, 113 S. C t. 2078, 2081– 83 (1993 ), which involved an im proper j ury in st ru ct io n o n t he “be y on d areas on ab le do ub t” st an da rd . A ft er li sti ng those str

uc tur al e rr or

c as es , the S upr em e Co urt i n Fu lm in an te ex pl ai ne d t he co m m on th read : “ ‘W it ho ut th es e b as ic pro te ct io ns , a cr im ina l tri al c annot

r el ia bly se rv e its f

unc tio n a s ave hic le f

or de te rm inatio n of gui lt or inn oc en ce , and n o c ri m ina l punis hm en t m ay be r eg ar de d a s f

undam en ta lly fa ir . ’ ” I d. a t 31 0, 111 S . Ct . a t 12 65 ( quot ing Ro se v. Cl ar k, 478 U . S. 570 , 577– 78, 106 S . Ct . 310 1, 310 6 ( 1986 )) . B y c ontra st, Bo oke r er

ro r doe s no t pr ev en t a tr ia l f ro m se rv ing it s f

unc tio n a s ave hic le f

or the de te rm inatio n of

gui lt orin no cen ce, an d i t d oe s n ot ren de r cri m in al pu ni sh m en t fu nd am en ta ll y un fai r. T he pr e- Bo oke r re gim e w as the lawof the land tha t a

ppl ie d inde te rm ini ng hundre ds o f tho usands of f ed er al se nte nc es in thi s c ountry ove r a pe ri od o f al m ost tw o de ca de s. Whil e Bo oke r ch an ge s so m e of the r ule s, it doe s no t c om

pe l the conclusio n that the sentencing process used in every feder al court in this coun try18

fo r the la st tw en ty

y ears w as so d ef

ec tiv e that i t r es ult ed

in tho usands of fu nd am en ta ll y

un fai r se nt en ces . T he S upr em e Co urt r ei te rate d th e rari ty of str uc tur al e rr or

in N ed er v. United States, stating th at: “ [I] f the defe ndant had cou nsel and was tried by an im part ia l a dj udi cator , the re is a str ong pr es um pti on tha t any

oth er [ co nst itu tio na l] er ro rs that m ay

have oc curr ed

are sub j ec t t o harm le ss- er

ro r an al y sis . ” 527 U . S. 1, 8, 119 S . Ct . 182 7, 183 3 ( 1999 ) (quot at ionom itt ed , br ac ke ts i n or igi na l) . T he sam e point abou t the rarity of structural er

ror w as m ade in Chief Justice Re hnqu ist ’ s m aj or ity

opi nio n inF ulm inante . T he re he li ste d a ll of the ty pe s of er ro r the Co urt ha d he ld t o be sub j ec t t o harm le ss e rr or

ana ly sis and the re fo re not structural in nature: Cl em ons v. Mi ssi ssi ppi , 494 U . S. 738 , 752 –54, 110 S . Ct . 144 1, 145 0–51 (1 990) ( unc onst itu tio na lly ove rb ro ad

j ur y ins tr uc tio ns at the se nte nc ing sta ge of ac ap ita l c as e) ; S atte rwhit e v. T ex as , 486 U . S. 249 , 108 S . Ct . 179 2 (1 988) ( adm iss ionof

e vid en ce a t the se nte nc ing sta ge of ac ap ita l c as e in violatio n of the Sixth Am endm ent Counsel Clause); Care lla v. Ca lifornia, 491 U . S. 263 , 266 , 109 S . Ct . 241 9, 242 1 ( 1989 ) (j ur y ins tr uc tio n c ont ai nin g ane rr one ous co nc lus ive pr es um pti on) ; P ope v. I lli noi s, 481 U . S. 497 , 501– 04, 107 S. C t. 1918, 1921– 23 (1987 ) (j ury instruction m isstatin g an el em en t of

the of fe nse ); Ro se v. Cl ar

k, 478 U . S. 570 , 106 S . Ct . 310 1 ( 1986 ) (j ur y ins tr uc tio n c ont ai nin g an e rr one ous re butta ble pr es um

pti on) ; C rane v. K en tuc ky , 476 U . S. 683 , 691 , 106 S . Ct . 214 2, 214 7 ( 1986 ) (e rr one ous ex cl usi on o f de fe ndant’ s te sti m ony r eg ar din g th e ci rc um stanc es of his co nf es sio n) ; D el aw ar e v. V anA rs da ll, 475 U . S. 673 , 106 S . Ct . 143 1 ( 1986 ) (r es tr ic tio n onade fe ndant’ s r igh t t o c ro ss- ex am ine aw itn es s f or bia s in vio la tio n of

the S ixth A m en dm en t C onf ro ntatio n C lause ); Ru she n v. S pa in,19

464 U . S. 114 , 117 –18 & n . 2, 104 S . Ct . 453 , 454 –55 & n . 2 ( 1983 ) (d en ia l of a defe ndant’s r ight to be present at tria l); United State s v. H asting, 461 U.S . 499, 103 S. Ct. 1974 (1983) (im proper com

m ent on defendant’s silence at trial, in vio lation of the Fifth Am endm ent Self- Incrim ination Clause); H oppe r v. E vans, 456 U . S. 605 , 102 S . Ct . 204 9 ( 1982 ) (s ta tut e im pr ope rl y fo rb idd ing tr ia l c ourt’ s gi vin g aj ur y ins tr uc tio n onale sse r inc lud ed of fe nse in a c ap ita l c as e in v iol at ionof the D ue P ro ce ss C lause ); K en tuc ky v. Whorton , 441 U . S. 786 , 99 S . Ct . 208 8 ( 1979 ) (f ai lur e to i nstru ct

the j ur y on the presum

ption of innocence); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S . 220, 232, 98 S. Ct . 458 , 466 ( 1977 ) (a dm iss ionof ide nti fi catio n e vid en ce in vio la tio n of the Si xthA m en dm en t C ouns el Cl au se ); Br ow n v. U nit ed S ta te s, 411 U . S. 223 , 231– 32, 93 S. Ct. 1565 , 1570–71 (1973) (adm issio n of the out-of-court state m en t of

anon te sti fy ing c ode fe ndant i n vi olatio n of the S ixth Am endm ent Counsel Clause); Milton v. W ainwright, 407 U. S. 371, 92 S. Ct. 2174 (1972) (confession ob tained in vio lation of Massiah v. United St at es , 377 U . S. 201 , 84 S . Ct . 119 9 ( 1964 )) ; C ham be rs v. Maro ne y , 399 U. S. 42, 52–53 , 90 S. Ct. 1975 , 1981–82 (1970) (adm issio n of evidence obt ai ne d invio la tio n of

the F ourth A m en dm en t) ; C ole m anv. A la bam a, 399 U . S. 1, 10– 11, 90 S . Ct . 199 9, 200 3–04 ( 1970 ) (d en ia l of c ouns el a t a pr el im inary

he ar ing in vio la tio n of

the S ixth A m en dm en t C onf ro ntatio n Clause). Fu lm in an te , 49 9 U.S. at30 6– 07 , 11 1 S . Ct. at12 63 (Reh nq ui st , C.J., m aj. op .) (som e citations om itted). T he Fulm inante Court itself held that the adm issio n of a coerce d confession wa s not a structural error. Id. at 310, 111 S. C t. at 1265 . Since the F ulm inante de ci sio n, the Co urt ha s a dde d to the li st o f nons tr uc tur al e rr or s in the f oll ow ing de ci sio ns: U nit ed S ta te s v. D om ing ue z Be nit ez , 542 U . S. 74, ___ , 124 S. Ct . 233 3, 233 9 n. 6 ( 2004 ) (o m iss ionof aF ed . R. Cr im . P . 11 w ar nin g is not a structural er

ror); N eder, 527 U.S . at 4, 14, 119 S. Ct. at 1831, 1836 (j udicial u s u r p a t i o no f th e j u ry’ s f

u n c t i o no f

d e t e rmi n i n g w h e th e r

ane l e me n to f

th e c r i me20

ex ist ed is not str uc tur al e rr or ); Br ec ht v . Abr ah am son, 507 U . S. 619 , 628 –30, 113 S. Ct . 171 0, 171 6–17 ( 1993 ) (the gov er nm en t’ s us e of

the de fe ndant’ s po stMi ran da -warn in gs si le nc e to im pe ach th e d efen da nt is no t s tru ctur al erro r). Against this floodof decisions ho lding that various and su ndry co nst itu tio na l and s ta tut or y e rr or s are not

str uc tur al , Jud ge T

j of la t’ s pr opos iti on that B ooke r er

ro r is s tr uc tur al is unpe rs ua siv e. I t w oul d no t be e noug h to m ak e Booker err or structural even if, as he ar gues, defendants had no incentiv e before Bo ok er t o p ut forwardev id en ce re la ti ng to th e 1 8 U.S.C. § 35 53 (a) fa ct or s. T j of la t, J. , dis se nti ng, a t 62 . W e knowthat w oul d no t be e noug h be ca use the Suprem e Court has held a num ber of er rors not to be structural, even where the error m ay have prevented or discouraged the defendant from puttin g forward additio nal evidence or ar gum ents. For exam ple, in Car ella v. California, 491 U.S . 263, 266 , 109 S . Ct . 241 9, 242 1 ( 1989 ), the e rr or w as appl ic at ionof

ac onc lus ive presum ption about the elem ent of intent, and in Neder , 527 U. S. at 14–15 , 119 S. Ct . at 1 83 6– 37 , th e err orwas t ak in g a n e le m en t o f th e cri m e away from th e jury. Inboth of tho se c as es , the e rr or

m ay have inf lue nc ed the e vid en ce the de fe ndants put f or w ar d or the arg um en ts the y

m ad e. N one the le ss, the S upr em e Co urt he ld im pl ic it ly in Ca rel laan d e xp li ci tl y in Nede r th atth e err orwas n ot st ru ctur al . T he sam e is tru e w he n c onst itu tio na l e rr or is co m m itt ed by pr ec lud ing21

le sse r inc lud ed

of fe nse s inc ap ita l c as es . Ade fe ndant p re ve nte d by state lawf

ro m havin g th e j ur

y c onsi de r a le sse r of

fe nse ve ry

w el l m igh t r ef

ra in f ro m puttin g forw ard evidence that he w as guiltyof it instead of the greater offense. Be that a s it m ay , the S upr em e Co urt i n H oppe r v. E vans d et er m ine d th at

thi s ty pe of co nst itu tio na l e rr or

is not str uc tur al and a ff

irm ed the c onvi ct ionbe ca

use the unc onst itu tio na l pr ec lus ionpr ovi sio n ha d no pr ej udi ci al e ff ec t i n th at c as e. 456 U . S. 605 , 613 –14, 102 S . Ct . 204 9, 205 4 ( 1982 ) (r ej ec tin g th e ar gum en t tha t the pr ec lus ionpr ovi sio n “ so i nf ec te d r es pond en t’ s tr ia l tha t he m ust be r etri ed ” an d re ve rs ing the gr an t of

r el ie f be ca

use that pr ovi sio n di d no t pr ej udi ce the res po nd en t). Fo r the r ea sons j ust

dis cu sse d, it

w oul d no t be e noug h to m ak e Bo oke r er ro r str uc tur al if de fe ndants in pr e- Bo oke r se nte nc ing pr oc ee din gs h ad no i nc en tiv e to in tro du ce m it ig at in g e vi de nc e o r arg um en ts rel at in g t o § 35 53 (a) fa ct or s. How ever, Judge Tj oflat’ s structural theory does depend o n the assum ption that be fo re Bo ok er t he re was no su ch in cen ti ve , whi le th e rea li ty is t ha t t he re was . T his is y et

anothe r pr obl em

w ithhis the or

y . T he a ssum ed

la ck of inc en tiv e is h is the or y ’ s e xpl an at ionf

or w hy the pr e- Bo oke r se nte nc ing r ec or d inany giv enc as e would not con tain evidence indicating the presence of any § 3553 (a) factors that m ig ht m ak e a d iff

eren ce i n t he po st -Bo ok er ad vi so ry sen te nc in g re gi m e.22

De fendants in pre-Booker sentencing proceedings lacked any incentive to offer § 3553 (a) evidence or ar gum ent, Judge Tj oflat say s, beca use it would have been irrelevant unless it fit within a perm issib le ground for downwar d departure, which no t al l § 35 53 (a) fa ct or s d o. Tjofl at , J., di ss en ti ng , at 6 2. Ch ie f Judg e Bo ggs of

the S ixth C ir cu it ha s po int ed out the f lawin thi s ar gum en t: This argum ent igno res a f undam ental feature of the Guidelin es: they pr es en t a se nte nc ing c ourt w ithar an ge , f ro m w hic h it m ust se le ct a sentence. In this case the range was nearly five y ears—57 m onth s. Counsel al re ady ha d e ve ry

r ea son an d e ve ry

opp ortun ity

to pr es en t any

m iti ga tin g ci rc um stanc e that m igh t po ssi bly have save d B ar

ne tt fr om an a ddi tio na l f

ive y ears in pr iso n. A ny

arg um en ts tha t m igh t be r ai se d po st- Bo oke r ab out cu lpa bil ity , f uture dange ro usne ss, of

fs ettin g go od w orks, f

am ily obl igatio ns, or any oth er m iti ga tin g c ir cum stanc e w er e al so f ai r gam e pr e- Bo oke r, and the se arg um en ts f

or m iti ga tio n have be enr eg ularl y inv oke d by

de fe nse co unse ls i n pr e- Bo oke r se nte nc ing pr oc ee din gs. U nit ed S ta te s v. Ri as co s- Su ar ez , 73 F . 3d 6 16, 627 –28 (6 th C ir . 199 6) ( fi ndi ng r ev er sib le er ro r w he n th e de fe ndant w as not of fe re d th e oppo rt

uni ty to giv e m iti ga tin g ev ide nc e at

se nte nc ing ). T he G uid el ine s ne ve r pla ce d any li m its on the ab ili ty of the dis tr ic t c ourt t o c onsi de r the se f ac tor s, so the re is no r ea son to re m an d so the dis tr ic t c ourt m ay c onsi de r ad dit ion al c ir cum stanc es . Uni te d S ta te s v . Barn et t, 3 98 F.3d51 6, 5 37 –3 8 (6 th Cir . 20 05 ) (Bo gg s, C.J ., co n cu rr i n g i np ar tan dd i s s en t i n g i np ar t ); s ee al s o Go n za l ez -H u er t a, 2 0 0 5 WL 8070 08, a t *6 . T ha t’ s agoo d po int . Fo r ex am pl e, in th is cas e th e g ui de li ne s ra ng e was 97 to 12 1 m on th s, a spr ea d of tw o f ull y ears . R odr igu ez , 398 F . 3d at 12 96. I n our Sh el tonc as e, the23

gui de lin es r an ge w as e ff

ec tiv el y 190 to 222 m onths, aspr ea d of m or e than tw oan d- a- ha lf

y ears . 400 F . 3d at 13 28. T he gui de lin e range s inRo dr igu ez and Sh el tone xe m

pli fy the f ac t tha t m ost

pr e- Bo oke r se nte nc ing de fe ndants , inc lud ing the one in thi s c as e, ha d pl en ty of inc en tiv e to p ut f

orth m iti ga tin g e vid en ce and ar gum en ts r el at ing to the § 35 53( a) f ac tor s. T hose f

ac tor s w er e not , a s Ju dge Tj oflat suggests , “ irrelevant in all but the m ost un usual cases” in pre-Booker se nte nc ing . T

j of la t, J. , dis se nti ng, a t 62 . T o th e co ntr ar y , the y w er e re le vant i n virtually every case. (T he Duncan ca se exem plifies the exception, because there the guid elines dictated a life sentence. 400 F.3d at 1300 n.2.). Judg e T j oflat say s that “ we m

ust assum e, if anything , that a defendant such as Rodriguez would have done som ething d iffer ent under the new m odel.” T j of la t, J. , dis se nti ng, a t 65 -6 6. T he re is no j ust if ic at ionf or that a ssum

pti on, es pe ci al ly w ithade fe ndant s uc h a s R odr igu ez w ho h ad tw o y ears w orth o f incentive bui lt into th e guidelines range to com e forw ard w ith any § 3553 (a) evidence or ar gum ents at his pre-Booker sentencing proceeding. E ven if we we re to d isr eg ar d th e gui de lin es r an ge inc en tiv e, the c ru ci al a ssum pti on b eh ind

Jud ge T j of la t’ s stru ct

ur al the or y ign or es the f

ac t tha t, if

the gui de lin es ha d be enonl y advis or y , the pr obatio n of

fi ce r in c om

pil ing the P SR

and the gov er

nm en t i n advoc at ing alon ge r se nte nc e co uld have put f orth e vid en ce and arg um en ts tha t the24

§ 35 53( a) f

ac tor s f av or ed ase nte nc e ab ove the gui de lin e range . T he que sti on i s not what the defendant would have done. T he question is what the district court wou ldha ve do ne aft er h eari ng th e ev id en ce an d a rg um en ts of b ot h s id es . Ther e is no basis for any

assum ption that the differe nces betwe en an advisory and a m andatory

guidelin es sy stem

will favor defendants in general or, m or e im portantl y , apart ic ular de fe ndant. T he f ac t i s th at in m ost c as es , a s in Ro dr igu ez , 398 F . 3d at 13 01, w e j ust don ’ t kn ow . B ut the re are c as es li ke S he lto n, 400 F.3d at 1332 –33, wher e the re cord shows a re asonable probabil ity of a di ffer en t re su ltin fav orof t he de fen da nt if t he gu id el in es ha d n ot be en m an da to ry . T ha t i s why

w e se nt tha t c as e ba ck

f or r es en te nc ing . Whe re , how ev er , w e have no indication either w ay , the par ty with the burden loses. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1301 . Whe n it

c om es to the thi rd

pr ong of the pla in e rr or

te st, that party

is the de fe ndant. I d. II. Judg e T j of la t i s c or re ct about the F ourth and S ixth C ir cu its ’ appr oa chto thi s iss ue be ing w ro ng. S ee T j of la t, J. , dis se nti ng, a t 78 n. 19 ( ci tin g U nit ed S ta te s v. Hughes, ___ F. 3d __

_, 2005 W L 628224 (4th Cir. Mar. 16, 2005), and U nited St at es v. O liv er , 397 F . 3d 3 69 ( 6thCi r. 200 5) ). A s he e xpl ai ns, it is sim ply ina cc ur at e to s ay , a s th ose tw o c ir cu its do, a de fe ndant h as c ar

ri ed his bur de n of25

show ing that a

Bo oke r er

ro r ha s a ff

ec te d hi s su

bst an tia l r igh ts whe n w e can on ly guess what the result would be without the error. Id. Instead of say ing th at there is a burden and then app ly ing it in a w ay that is not b urdensom e, it is m ore fo rth rig ht to arg ue di rect ly, as Ju dg e Tjofl atdo es , th atth e b ur de n o ug ht no t ex is t. See id. (“ In short, these courts require the defendant to sho w that his substant ial ri ght s w er e af

fe ct ed onl y to fi nd tha t the y

w er e in e ve ry

c as e inv olv ing co nst itu tio na l e rr or , w he re as I w oul d si m ply say that no suc h sh ow ing is re qui re d. ”) . F or

the r ea sons a lr ea dy

dis cu sse d, thi s C ourt di d no t a dopt Jud ge Tj oflat’ s approach, but at least his rea sonin g has the virtue of analytical tra ns pa ren cy . Si nc e our Ro dr igu ez opi nio n, the F ourth C ir cu it pane l tha t i ssu ed the or igi na l H ughe s de ci sio n ha s take n anothe r loo k a t i t. T ha t se co nd l ook re sul te d in the iss uanc e of

ane wopi nio n th at

r ea ch es the sam e co nc lus ion . S ee H ughe s, 200 5 W L 628 224. W e have a lr ea dy dis cu sse d a t so m e le ngth th e fl aw s inthe r ea soni ng on d isp lay

in the f ir st H ughe s op ini on, Ro dr igu ez , 398 F . 3d at 13 01–0 4, but the new opinion il lum inates thos e flaw s in way s that war rant additional comm ent. S ee al so Unit ed

S ta te s v. Co le s, ___

F . 3d _ __, 200 5 W L 783 069, *4 ( D . C. Ci r. Apr . 8, 2005 ) (p er

c ur iam ) (d isc uss ing the pr obl em s w iththe H ughe s a ppr oa chand co nc lud ing that i t “ fl ie s inthe f ac e of the S upr em e Co urt’ s r em ed ia l or de r in26

Booker”). T he re is no l onge r any

r ea son to d oubt

that the F ourth C ir cu it’ s e rr one ous ap pr oa chha s a t i ts c or e the pr em ise that the m an da tor y na tur e of the gui de lin es is not an e sse nti al part

of aBo oke r co nst itu tio na l vi olatio n. T his is the para gr ap h of its ne wH ughe s op ini on tha t l ay s bare the sub str uc tur e of it s r ea soni ng: Stated differ ently , the a ct of m istakenlytreating the guidelin es as m an da tor y is not part of the S ixth A m en dm en t e rr or be fo re us, de spi te the fa ct that the f orm er m an da tor

y na tur e of the gui de lin es se t the sta ge f or the co nst itu tio na l vi olatio n inBo oke r. T ha t the e rr one ous tr eatm en t of the guid elines as m andatory

is not part of the constit ution al err or can be see n m ost c le ar ly in a post -B ooke r co nte xt. S uppo se adis tr ic t c ourt, post -B ooke r, e rr one ousl y tr eats the gui de lin es a s m an da tor y w he n im posi ng a sentence that re sts in p art on extra- verdict enhancem ents. Such a sentence w oul d c er

ta inl y be e rr one ous, but

the re w oul d be no S ixth A m en dm en t e rr or because, regar dless of what the district court thoug ht, the guidelines post-Book er are in fa ct advisory and the sentence im

posed di d not exceed the m ax im

um auth or iz ed

by the j ur y ve rd ic t ( w hic h is , of

c our se , the m axim um set forth in the statute of convictio n). H ughe s, 200 5 W L 628 224, a t *1 1; s ee a lso id. a t *1 0 ( T he re is “ a se parate c la ss o f erro r, na m el y , th e err orof t reat in g t he gu id el in es as m an da to ry at s en te nc in g. Su chan e rr or

is dis tin ct

f ro m the S ixth A m en dm en t c la im that gave r ise to the de ci sio n inBo oke r, and i t i s no n- co nst itu tio na l i n natur e. ”) . Wro ng, w ro ng, wro ng . T re at ing the gui de lin es a s m an da tor y is ane sse nti al part

of the constitu tional error, not a non-cons titutio nal error distin ct from

the one invo lved27

in the Bo oke r de ci sio n. T he S upr em e Co urt w as unanim ous ab out that. A ll nin e Jus tic es j oin ed

one or both of the m aj or ity

opi nio ns, e ac h of

w hic h st at ed

that the use of e xtr a- ve rd ic t e nhanc em en ts i n an a dvi sor y r eg im e is p er

m iss ibl e an d th at

if the guid elines are not applied m andatorily there is no constitu tional error. Booker, 543 U . S. a t __

_, 125 S. Ct. at 750 (Stevens, J. , m aj . op. ) (“ If the Guidelin es as curr en tly w ri tte n c oul d be r ea d a s m er el y a dvi sor y pr ovi sio ns tha t r ec om

m en de d, rathe r than r equir ed , the se le ct ionof part ic ular se nte nc es in re spon se to dif fe ri ng se ts o f fa ct s, the ir

use w oul d no t i m

pli cate the S ixth A m en dm en t. ”) ; i d. a t 76 4 (Bre y er, J., m aj . op. ) (“ [W ] ithou t this prov ision—nam ely the provisio n that m akes the r el ev an t se nte nc ing r

ule s m an da tor

y and i m pose s bi ndi ng r equir em en ts o n a ll se nt en ci ng jud ge s— th e st atut e fal ls ou ts id e th e sc op e o f App ren di ’s requi rem en t.” (internal quotation and m arkings om itted)). T he Hughes opini on m anages to rej ect the one pr inc ipl e that a ll nin e Jus tic es a gr ee d onin Bo oke r. A dm itt ed ly , the Jus tic es did

not a dd t o th ei r state m en ts “ . . . and w e re al ly m ean it , ” but

w ha t e lse sh or to f thatc ou l d the C ourth a ve s a i d t o c on ve y thati tw a s se r i ou s? The hy poth etical laid out in the part of the Hughes opini on qu oted earlier hig hli ght s th at

Co urt’ s m isunde rs tandi ng o f Bo oke r. I f a dis tr ic t c ourt i n th e post Booker world applies an extra- verdict enhancem ent and treats the guidelines as m an da tor y , of c our se the r es ult ing se nte nc e w ill be unc onst itu tio na l. T he vio la tio n28

and its im pact on the defendant will be identical to what occurr ed in the Booker case itself. T hat the constitu tional vi olation and its im pact occurs not in obed ience to a statutory

m andate but as a result of ignorance, negligence, or def iance does not m ak e it any

le ss a c onst itu tio na l vi olatio n. C onst itu tio na l e rr or c anbe co m m itt ed f re e of statut or y c om m an d. T he e ff

ec t, if any , on the de fe ndant i s th e sam e if the sam e ac t i s c om

m itt ed in the sam e ci rc um stanc es r eg ar dle ss o f the source of the er

ror. If the guidelin es are applied in a m andatory way when there are extra-ver dict enhancem ents, the re sult is a pattern-perfec t Booker co nst itu tio na l vi olatio n. The F ourth Circuit’ s disregard of w hat the Suprem e Court said in Booker ab out the m an da tor

y appl ic at ionof

the gui de lin es be ing the sourc e of the co nst itu tio na l vi olatio n le d th at c ir cu it to g ive the w ro ng answ er to the que sti on i t pose d inthe late st H ughe s op ini on. T he pr ej udi ce inquir y , H ughe s say s, “ is w he the r the dis tr ic t c ourt c oul d have im pose d th e se nte nc e it did

w ith out exceeding the relevant Sixth Am endm ent lim itation. If the answer to this in quiry is ‘ y es,’ . . . then the defendant has failed to dem onstrate an eff ect on subst antial rights . . . .” H ughes, 2005 W L 628224, at *8. T he answer , of course, is “ y es.” T he dis tr ic t c ourt c oul d have appl ie d th e sam e ex tr a- ve rd ic t e nhanc em en t and im pose d th e sam e se nte nc e it did w ith out vio la tin g th e Si xthA m en dm en t by29

consult ing th e guidelines b ut treating them as advisory . That non-m andatory ap pli catio n of

the gui de lin es w oul d have vio la te d th e Se nte nc ing Re fo rm A ct a s it then existed, specifically

18 U. S. C. § 355 3(b)(1), but it would n ot have viol ated the S ixth A m en dm en t. T ha t i s why the S upr em e Co urt’ s B ooke r de ci sio n in str uc ts dis tr ic t c ourts t o f

ind and a ppl y any e xtr a- ve rd ic t e nhanc em en ts i n f uture c as es but to tre atth e res ul ti ng gu id el in es ran ge as a dv is ory . Ina ddi tio n to r es tin g onapr em ise that i s c ontrary to the state d be lie f in the Bo oke r de ci sio n of

e ve ry sin gle Jus tic e, the F ourth C ir cu it ne ve r ad equa te ly explains why

the decision abou t whether a particular defendant has been pr ej udi ce d sh oul d no t tur n onthe one f

ac tor that w ill be c hange d onr em an d in or de r to avoi d th e co nst itu tio na l vi olatio n. I t ne ve r te lls us h owit s r ule about the third prong of the plain error test serves the m ain purpos e of the prong’ s prej udice re qui re m en t, w hic h is to av oid w as te fu l r ev er sa ls. S ee D om ing ue z Be nit ez , 542 U . S. a t __

_, 124 S . Ct . a t 23 40 ( ap pli catio n of the pr ej udi ce standard

“ shou ld en fo rc e the pol ic ie s th at

und er pinRu le 52( b) ge ne ra lly , to en co ur ag e tim el y objec tions and reduce w asteful rever sals by dem anding strenuous exertion to get re lie f fo r unpr es er

ve d e rr or ”) . B y

div or ci ng the que sti on o f w he the r to r ev er se from the question of w hat would change on rem and, the Fourth Circ uit’s H ughes r u l e d o e s n o ta v o i dw a s t e f u l r e v e r s a l s b u ti s i n s t e a dane n g i n e f o r g e n e r a t i n g th e m.30 III . Whil e ch ee ri ng o n Ju dge T j of la t’ s e ff orts t o c onstru ct

astr uc tur al e rr or theory , Judge Bar

kett’ s dissent ing op inion also sugg ests that the Court has applied the w ro ng p re

j udi ce standard

in the se pos t- Bo oke r pla in e rr or c as es , or pe rh ap s that w e ap pli ed

the c or re ct standard in the w ro ng w ay . T o th e co ntr ar y , w e have ap pl ie d t he co rrec t s ta nd ardco rrec tl y . T his is w ha t w e sa id i n th e pane l op ini on: The third prong of the plain error test, however, is another m atter. It re qui re s th at

an e rr or have “ af fe ct [e d] sub stanti al r igh ts, ” w hic h a lm ost al w ay s r equir es that the e rr or “ ‘ m ust have a ff ec te d th e out co m e of

the dis tr ic t c ourt pr oc ee din gs. ’ ” Co tto n, 535 U . S. a t 63 2, 122 S . Ct . a t 17 86 (quot ing O lano, 507 U . S. a t 73 4, 113 S . Ct . a t 17 78) . T he standard f or show ing that i s th e fam ili ar r ea sona ble pr oba bil ity of adif fe re nt r es ult fo rm ulatio n, w hic h m eans a

pr oba bil ity “ ‘ suf fi ci en t t o un de rm ine confidence in the outcom e. ’ ” U nited States v. D om ingu ez Be nitez, ___ U. S. ___, 124 S . Ct . 233 3, 234 0 ( 2004 ) (quot ing S tr ic kland v . W as hin gto n, 466 U . S. 668 , 694 , 104 S . Ct . 205 2, 206 8 ( 1984 )) . I n r eg ar d to thi s th ir d pr ong, “ [i ] t i s th e de fe ndant r athe r than th e [g ] ove rn m en t who b ears the bur de n of persuasion with respect to prej udice.” Olano, 507 U.S . at 734, 113 S. Ct. at 1778 . Ro dr igu ez , 398 F . 3d at 12 99. W e re pe at ed and a ppl ie d th e re as ona

ble pr oba bil ity of a diffe rent result standard—not a prepond erance standard—at least five m ore tim es through out ou r opinion . See id. at 1301 (“ Ther efore, in apply ing th e third pr ong, w e as k w he the r the re is a re as ona ble pr oba bil ity of adif fe re nt r es ult

if the gui de lin es ha d be enappl ie d inan a dvi sor y ins te ad of bin din g f as hio n by the31

sentencing judge in this case. ” (e m phasis add ed)); id. (“ [W ] here the e ffec t of an erro r on th e res ul t i n t he di st ric t co ur t i s u nc ert ai n o r in de te rm in at e—wh ere we w oul d have to spe cu la te —the appe llant h as not m et his bur de n of

sho w ing a reasonable probabilitythat the result would have been differe nt but for the er ror; he ha s no t m et

his bur de n of

sho w ing pr ej udi ce ; he ha s no t m et his bur de n of showing th at his sub stantial rights have been aff ected. ” (e m

phasis add ed)); id. at 1302 ( “ T he im

portant f unc tio n of

the thi rd pr ong of the pla in e rr or

te st i s to pr ev en t a r em an d f or a ddi tio na l pr oc ee din gs whe re the de fe ndant, w ho f ai le d to m ak e a tim el y

obj ec tio n, c annot

sho wthat the re is a re as ona ble pr oba bil ity that a do-over would m ore likely than not p roduce a diffe rent result.” (em phasis add ed)); id. (“ Ther efore in order to satisfy the third prong of the plain error test, pre -Booker defendants m

ust establis h a rea sonable prob ability that if the district court had considered the guid elines range it arr ived at using extra-ver dict enhancem ents as m er el y a dvi sor y , ins te ad of m an da tor

y , and h ad

take n in to a cc ount

any oth er w ise uncons idered § 3553 fac tors, the court w ouldhave im posed a lesser sentence than it did.” (em

phasis add ed)); id. at 1304 (“ As w e have explained, where the r ecord does not provide ‘ any

indication ’ that there w ouldhave been a diff erent sentence if the c ourt ha d r ec ogni ze d and e xe rc ise d it s § 3 553( a) dis cr et ionand tre at ed the gui de lin es r an ge a s m er el y a dvi sor y , the party

w iththe bur de n of

sho w ing a32

reasonable probabilityof a diff erent re sult lo ses.” (em

phasis add ed)). T he dif fe re nc e in v ie w s be tw ee n th is C ourt and Judge Bark ett i s no t a bout the standard to apply . W e all agre e that the rea sonable prob ability standard applies. T he differ ence is how that standard applies when w e cannot tell whether the error caused prej udice. T he Court’ s posi tion, which is set out in Rodrigu ez, Curt is, and D unc an , is that the de fe ndant l ose s inthi s si tuatio n. T ha t i s so because the burden is on th e defe ndant, and the Suprem e Court in Jones v. United St at es , 527 U . S. 373 , 119 S . Ct . 209 0 ( 1999 ), tol d us that whe n w e cannot te ll whe th er t he erro r cau se d p reju di ce t he de fen da nt lo se s. Judg e Bark ett do es not

dis put e that the de fe ndant h as the bur de n of sho w ing prej udice; she just say s that it does n ot really am ount to any

burden at all. He r vie wis that on ce the re is er ro r, the de fe ndant c ar

ri es his bur de n of

e sta bli shi ng pr ejud ic e b y

sh owi ng th atwe do n’t kno w if t he erro r pr ejud ic edhi m . Bark et t, J ., dis se nti ng, a t 82 -8 3. I n othe r w or ds, nothin g e qua ls s om ethin g; the bur de n is no burden at all. T he adj ective “ oxym oronic” does not do justice to this “ no-burden bu rd en ” co nc ep t. A sid e fr om

r obbi ng a

pe rf ec tly goo d w or d ( “ bur de n” ) of it s pl ai n m eanin g, thi s ke y pr em ise of

Jud ge Bark ett’ s po sit ionis al so c ontrary to a num be r of our pr io r de ci si on s ap pl y in g t he reas on ab le pro babi li ty of a d iff eren t re su ltst an da rd .33

Se e Stra igh t v. W ai nw ri ght , 772 F . 2d 6 74, 680 ( 11th C ir . 198 5) ( de fe ndant f ai ls t o carr y his burden o f showing a rea sonable prob ability of a diff erent re sult where

“ [t ] he re is ab sol ute ly

no e vid en ce ” on the iss ue ); H enry v. W ai nw ri ght , 743 F . 2d 761, 763 (11t h Cir. 1984 ) (per curiam) (where there is noth ing to show that an om itt ed ins tr uc tio n w oul d have appl ie d to the j ur y ’ s de lib er at ion s, the re is

“ nothin g up on whic h af

ind ing of pr ej udi ce c oul d be ba se d, ” an d th e ex ist en ce of

“ onl y apos sib ili ty

of pr ej udi ce ” is n ot e noug h to sa tis fy the de fe ndant’ s burd enof show ing ar ea sona

ble pr oba bil ity of adif fe re nt r es ult ); A dam s v. W ai nw ri ght , 764 F. 2d 1 356, 136 9 ( 11th C ir . 198 5) ( w he re the re is no p ro of on the iss ue , the defendant has failed to carr y his burden o f showing a rea sonable prob ability of a differe nt result). Mor e im portantl y , Jud ge Bark ett’ s po sit ionc annot be r ec onc ile d w iththe sp eci fic ho ld in g a ndin st ru ct io n o f th e Supr em e Co ur t’s d eci si on in Jo ne s. As we expla ine d inthe pane l op ini on, Jon es is dir ec tly appl ic ab le to pla in e rr or

thi rd pr on g s it ua ti on s i n wh ic h i t i s u nc le ar wh ateffe ct , if an y , th e err orha d. Ro dr igu ez , 398 F . 3d at 13 01. T he Jon es de ci sio n c am e in a c ap ita l c as e w he re the defendant had failed to objec t in the dist rict court to the om issio n of a j ury instructio n about th e consequences of a deadlock on the sentence issue. In rej ecting the defendant’ s plain error ar gum ent, the S uprem e Court explained thatTh e Court in Jon e s w a s f

a c e d w iththe qu e sti on

of wh e the r t he de fe nd ant, wh o f

a ile d to 5 proper ly prese rve his objec tion, was entitled to a newsentenc e proc eedingbeca use of the district court’s f ailure to g ive a jury

instruction. 527 U.S. at 387–88, 119 S. C t. at 2101–02. The Court held that the er

ror the de fenda

nt claimed wa s not plain error for two a lternative r easons. It was not plain error

beca use the jury

instructions were not error , id. at 389–90, 119 S. Ct . at 2102, and a lso be c a us e the de fe nd ant h a d f

a ile d to c arr

y his burd e n o f s atis fy

ingthe thi rd

pr on gof the pla in err or test by

showingthat the fa ilure to g ive the additional instructions had pre judiced him, id. at 394–95, 119 S. Ct . at 2105. The Supreme Court’s decision in J ones that the de fenda nt had fa iled to make the r equire d showingof pre

judice for plain err or purpose s provided as muc h support for the r esult in that case, which wa s aff

irmance of the sente nce, a s did its decision that there wa s no err or. Either holding wo uld have be e n a de qu ate . E a c h is an a lte rn ativ e ho ldi ng , a nd e a c h a lte rn ativ e ho ldi ngis binding. See Massac husetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 623, 68 S. C t. 747, 754 (1948); R i c h m o n d

S c r e wA n c h o r

C o . v . U n i t e d

S t at e s , 2 7 5 U . S . 3 3 1 , 3 4 0 , 4 8 S . C t . 1 9 4 , 1 9 6 ( 1 9 2 8 ) ( “ It does not make a

rea son g iven for a

conclusion in a c ase obiter dictum, beca

use it is only

one of 34 th e s i tu a t i o nwa s o n e i nwh i c h i tc o u l dn o tb e d e t e rmi n e d wh a te f f e c t , i f an y, om is si on of t ha t i ns tru ct io n h adon th e o ut co m e o f th e cap it al sen te nc e p ro ceed in g. It instructed us that where the e ffec t of an err or m ay as likely have cut one way

as the oth er , w he re the e ff

ec t i t ha d onthe out co m e is i nde te rm inate , the “ de fe ndant cannot m eet his burden of showing th at the err or actually aff ected his subs tantial ri ght s. ” 527 U . S. a t 39 4–95 , 119 S . Ct . a t 21 05. W e ar e not to spe cu la te in thi s ki ndof s it ua ti on . The d efen da nt lo se s b ecau se th e d efen da nt ha s t he bu rd en . Id.; see also Rodriguez, 398 F. 3d at 130 0 (“ The le sson of the Suprem e Court’ s Jones de ci sio n is that the bur de n tr uly is on the de fe ndant t o sh owthat the e rr or a ct ua lly did m ak e a dif

fe re nc e . . . . Whe re e rr or s c oul d have c ut e ith er w ay and unc er ta inty e xis ts, the bur de n is the de ci siv e fa ct or in the thi rd

pr ong of the pla in error test, and the bu rden is on the defendant.”). 5two rea sons for the same conc lusion.”); United States v. Title Ins. & Tr ust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486, 44 S. Ct . 621, 623 (1924); Union Pac. Ry . Co. v. Mason City & F ort Dodg e Ry . Co., 199 U.S. 160, 166, 26 S. C t. 19, 20 (1905); J ohnson v. DeSoto County Bd. Comm’rs, 72 F .3d 1556, 1562 (11th Cir. 1996) (“ we a re bound by

alternative holdings” ); McL ellan v. Mississippi Power & L ig ht C o. , 5 45 F .2 d 9 19 , 9 25 n. 21 (5 th C ir . 1 97 7) (e n b anc ) ( “ I t ha s lo ngbe e n s e ttl e d th at a ll alternative rationale s for a g iven re sult have pre cede ntial value.”) .

35 Judg e Bark ett a

ppare ntl y doe s no t di sput e that the r ule state d inJon es w oul d co m pe l a f ind ing that R odr igu ez ha s f ai le d to sa tis fy

the thi rd -p ro ng o f the pla in er ro r te st. I nst ea d, he r posi tio n is that w e ne ed not and s houl d no t f

oll owthe Suprem e Court’ s decision in Jones. She gives severa l reasons, none of which are pe rs ua si ve . Judg e Bar

kett argues that what the Suprem e Court said in Jones is “ in direct conflict” w ith what it said later in U nited States v. D om ingu ez Be nitez, 542 U. S. 74, 124 S . Ct . 233 3 ( 2004 ). B ar ke tt, J. , dis se nti ng, a t 86 . T he re is no c onf lic t, direct or indirect. E ven if there w ere, we would be required to follow the m ore spe ci fi c co m

m an dm en t f

ro m the Jon es c as e. A ll that D om ing ue z Be nit ez he ld i s that the thi rd -p ro ng p re

j udi ce standard

r equir es the de fe ndant t o sh owar ea sona ble pr oba bil ity of adif fe re nt r es ult , w hic h m eans a pr oba bil ity suf fi ci en t t o un de rm ine confidence in the outcom e of the procee ding . 542 U.S . at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2338 –40. T he de ci sio n di d no t ho ld o r say anythi ng a

bout w ha t the r es ult

of ap ply ing that st an dard

sho uld be w he re the re is no i ndi catio n w he the r the e rr or actually did have an adverse eff

ect on the outcom e of the procee ding . The C ourt36

re m an de d th e D om ing ue z Be nit ez c as e to the c ourt of appe al s f or appl ic at ionof the standard . I d. a t __

_, 124 S . Ct . a t 23 42. By c ontra st, in Jone s th is v er y iss ue w as pr es en te d, a ddr es se d, and d ec ide d. T he S upr em e Co urt c oul d no t have be enm or e spe ci fi c in t el lin g us that whe re the e rr o r j u s ta s l i k e l y c o u l dh a v e w o rk e di nth e d e f e n d an t ’s f a v o r a s a g a i n s th i m, wher e the ef

fect is indeterm inate, where w e sim ply cannot tell, the defe ndant has failed to car

ry his burden o n the third pron g of the plain error test. D om ingu ez Be nit ez state s th e ge ne ra l st an dard , and J one s sp eaks t o aspe ci fi c sit ua tio n, the one be fo re us i n m ost

of the pr e- Bo oke r se nte nc e ca se s. T he tw o de ci sio ns are not in co nf li ct . Reduced to its essence, Judge Bar kett’ s theory

for disregar ding the direct ap pli catio n of

Jon es is that i t w as im

pli ci tly ove rr ule d by the late r de ci sio n in D om ing ue z Be nit ez , apr em ise ba se d onhe r be lie f that Jo ne s r es ts o n r ea sons re j ec te d inD om ing ue z Be nit ez . T he pr obl em w ithhe r ap pr oa chis that the Su pr em e Co urt ha s r ep eate dly tol d us not

to take it . T he Co urt ha s in str uc te d us :

“ If apr ec ed en t of

thi s C ourt ha s di re ct

appl ic at ionin a ca se , y et appe ar s to r es t on re as ons re j ec te d insom e oth er

li ne of de ci sio ns, the Co urt of

Appe al s sh oul d fo llo wthe c as e w hic h di re ct ly c ontro ls, le av ing to thi s C ourt the pr er ogativ e of ov erru li ng it s o wn d eci si on .” Ro dr ig ue z d e Qui jas v . She ars on /Am . Exp res s, In c.,37

490 U . S. 477 , 484 , 109 S . Ct . 191 7, 192 1–22 ( 1989 ); se e al so T en et v. D oe , 544 U.S. __ _, _

__ , 12 5 S . Ct. 1 23 0, 1 23 7 (2 00 5) (qu ot in g S he ars on /Am . Exp res s, In c., 490 U . S. a t 48 4, 109 S . Ct . a t 19 21–2 2) ; A m . T ru ck ing A ss’ ns, I nc . v. S m ith , 496 U . S. 167 , 180 , 110 S . Ct . 232 3, 233 2 ( 1990 ) (p lur al ity op. ) (s am e) ; A gost ini v. Fe lto n, 521 U . S. 203 , 237 , 117 S . Ct . 199 7, 201 7 ( 1997 ) (“ W e do n ot acknowledge, and we do not hold , that other c ourts sho uld conclu de our m ore re ce nt c as es have , by

im pli catio n, ove rr

ule d an e ar lie r pr ec ed en t. ”) ; H ohn v. U nit ed S ta te s, 524 U . S. 236 , 252 –53, 118 S . Ct . 196 9, 197 8 ( 1998 ) (“ O ur de ci sio ns r em ai n bi ndi ng p re ce de nt unti l w e se e fi t t o r ec onsi de r the m , r eg ar dle ss of whet he r su bs eque nt cas es ha ve rai se d d ou bt s ab ou t t he ir c on ti nu in g v it al it y .”). W e have be enc ar ef

ul t o he ed the S upr em e Co urt’ s a dm oni tio n a bout fo llo w ing it s de ci sio ns unti l tha t C ourt e xpl ic itl y ove rr ule s th em . S ee F la . L ea gue of P ro f’ l L obby ist s, I nc . v. Me ggs, 87 F . 3d 4 57, 462 ( 11th C ir . 199 6) ( “ W e take thi s a dm oni tio n to he ar

t, and w e de cl ine to take any ste p w hic h m igh t a

ppe ar to overrule [prior S uprem e Court decisions]. ”); E ng’g C ontractors Ass’ n of S. Fla. In c. v. M et ro . Dade Co un ty, 12 2 F .3d89 5, 9 08 (11 th Cir . 19 97 ) (“ Of co ur se , we take that a dm oni tio n se ri ousl y . ”) ; S ca lav. Ci ty of W int er P ar k, 116 F . 3d 1 396, 1399 n.2 (11th Cir. 1997 ) (hee ding the adm oniti on and follo wing an ear lier S up r e me C o u rtd e c i s i o ne v e nth o u g h l a t e r d e c i s i o n s o f

th e C o u rth a d“c a s ts o me38

doub t” on i t) ; B ri se nti ne v. S ton e & W eb ste r E ng’ g C or p. , 117 F . 3d 5 19, 525 (1 1thCi r. 199 7) ( “ It

m ay be that the S upr em e Co urt ha s c ut [ ane ar lie r de ci sio n] back so far that it w ill not s urvive. Pe rhaps, but we are not conv inced we are au tho ri ze d to sin g th e dir ge of [ that e ar lie r de ci sio n] . W e w ill le av e that t o th e Supr em e Co ur t, wh ic h h as ad m on is he d c ou rts of app eal s [t o d o s o].”). Lik ewis e, the pane l ha s he ed ed

the S upr em e Co urt’ s a dm oni tio n inthi s c as e. F ai lur e to d o so w oul d no t be r ea soni ng, it w oul d be r eb el lio n. Judg e Bark ett a lso arg ue s th at our appr oa chvio la te s th e Fe de ra l S en te nc ing A ct ’ s di re ct ionthat the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d de te rm ine in the f ir st i nst an ce the se nte nc e that sh oul d be im pose d. B ar

ke tt, J. , dis se nti ng, a t 89 . N ot s o. T he district court has determ ined in th e first instance the sentence in all pre -Booker sentence cases. T he question now is not what the defendant’ s sentence shoul d be, but whether the defe ndant has carried his burden of establish ing th e prej udice req ui redby the th ird pro ng of t he pl ai n e rro r te st . Judg e Bark ett’ s arg um en t tha t W ill iam s v. U nit ed S ta te s, 503 U . S. 193 , 205 , 112 S. Ct. 1112 , 1121 (1992), requires that w e disregard the lack of a prej udice showing is also unpersuasiv e. T he W illiam s decision in volv ed preserved er ror. It did not pur port t o ho ld tha t the c ont em por an eo us o bj ec tio n r

ule w as ina

ppl ic ab le to s en te nc ing e rr or s. I t di d no t say that the pla in e rr or

r ule w as dif

fe re nt f orJudg e B ark e tt a rgue s in a fo otn ote tha

t th is C ourt ’s B oo ke r p la in e rr or po sit ion is 6 somehow inconsistent with a footnote in United States v. F uente- Kolbenschla g , 878 F.2d 1377, 1379 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989) (pe r cur iam). B arke tt, J ., dissenting, at 91 n.9. I t is not. The defe ndant in that case had ra ised the alleg ed er ror by timely , specific objection duringsentenc ing. The opinion in the ca se could not have decide d, and did not purport to say any thing a bout, what happens when ther e is a fa ilure to object. At most Fue nte-Kolbe nschlagstands for the unrema rkable proposition that in a case of pre serve d err or the fa ct that over lappingrang es mig ht have r esulted in the same se ntence beingimposed any way did not insul ate the e rror from re view on a pp e a l. S e e F ue nte -K olb e ns c hla g , 8 78 F .2 d at 13 79 n. 7. Th at is ano the r w ay of sa yingthat if we don’ t know what would have happene d but for the e rror , the par ty with the burden on the prejudice issue loses. (In Fue nte-Kolbe nschlagthat party was the g overnme nt, but it won any way beca use there was no e rror . I d. at 1378–79.) 39 se nte nc ing c as es . I t di d, how ev er , not e that the harm le ss e rr or r ule appl ie s to se nte nc e er

ro rs , id. a t 20 3, 112 S . Ct . a t 11 20–2 1, w hic h is inc onsi ste nt w iththe notio n that sentencing err ors require r em and regardless of ordinary prudential doc tr ine s. 6 IV. N ei the r Judg e T

j of la t no r Judg e Bark ett pr opos es that this Co urt a dopt the Second, S eventh, and D. C. Circuits’ novel approach to th ird-prong prejudice determ ination s. S ee United States v. Cr osby , 397 F. 3d 10 3 (2d Cir. 2005 ); U nited St at es v. W ill iam s, 399 F . 3d 4 50 ( 2d C ir . 200 5) ; U nit ed S ta te s v. P al ad ino , 401 F. 3d 4 71 ( 7thCi r. 200 5) ; U nit ed S ta te s v. Co le s, ___

F . 3d _ __, 200 5 W L 783 069 (D .C. Cir. Apr. 8, 2005) (per c uriam ). A lthou gh un willing to em brace that ap pr oa ch , Jud ge T

j of la t t ak es som e co m fo rt

in the S ev en th C ir cu it’ s c ri tic ism of our application of convention al plain error analy sis. Se e T j oflat, J. , dissenting, at40

63 ( “ O r, a s th e Se ve nthCi rc uit put it , I ‘ cannot

f athom w hy the E le ve nthCi rc uit wants to con dem

n som e unkno wn fr action of crim inal defendants to serve an illegal sentence.’ ” (quoting Paladino , 401 F. 3d at 484 )). O nly three of the e leven ci rc uit s th at

have take n apos iti on o n th e pr ope r w ay to de ci de w he the r pla in e rr or ex is ts in pre -Bo ok er s it ua ti on s h av e ch os en th e Cro sb y /P al ad in o m od el . What the Second, S eventh, and D. C. Circuits do is rem and everypreBooker sentence (where the def endant wants a re m and) in which it is not clear that th e u np re s erv edBo o k ererro r w as h arm l es s . Wil l i ams, 3 9 9 F. 3 dat4 6 0 (“W e rem anded onlyafter

we determ ined that, on the record in Crosby , w e could not say with sufficient confidence that the sam e sentence w ouldhave been im posed.”); Pa la din o, 401 F . 3d at 48 4 ( de sc ri bin g th e co urt’ s in te nti on t o r em an d intho se

“ Booker cases in w hich it is di fficult for us to determ ine whether the error wa s pr ejud ic ia l” ); C ol es , 20 05 W L 78 30 69 , at * 1 (s am e). Inthe S ec ond Ci rc uit , if

the dis tr ic t c ourt de te rm ine s onr em an d th at it would have sentenced the defendant to less tim e under Booker, it is to pron ounce that plain error exists, set a side the prior judgm ent, and proceed to condu ct the rea l re se nte nc e pr oc ee din g. S ee Cr osby , 397 F . 3d at 11 7–18 , 120 ; W ill iam s, 399 F . 3d at 459 –61. B ut i f the de fe ndant f ai ls t o ge t the appe llate r el ie f he is se ek ing in the dis tr ic t c ourt, he appare ntl y is fr ee to ap pe al to the r ea l a ppe llate c ourt ur gin g it

to41

re ve rs e the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s th ir d- pr ong pla in e rr or de te rm inatio n. A nd i f the dis tr ic t c ourt de ci de s th at it w oul d have se nte nc ed

the de fe ndant d if

fe re ntl y and doe s so , the gov er

nm en t a ppare ntl y c anappe al that de te rm inatio n a s w el l a s any ad di ti on al erro rs em

be dd edin th e n ew se nt en ce. Cro sb y , 39 7 F .3dat 1 19 . T he S ev en th C ir cu it’ s pr oc ed ur e is s im ilar, e xc ep t tha t i t f orm al ly r et ai ns j ur isd ic tio n of

the c as e dur ing the r em an d and w ill be the c ourt tha t a ct ua lly va cate s th e pr e- Bo oke r se nte nc e fo llo w ing the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de te rm inatio n th at it w oul d have r ea ch ed

adif fe re nt r es ult

und er the Bo oke r re gim e. S ee P al ad ino , 401 F.3 d a t 4 84 . Then th e cas e wil l g o b ackdo wn fo r th e act ua l re se nt en ci ng . Id. While retaining for itself the responsibil ity to enter the order vac ating the ini tial sentence afte r re m and, it is only a pro form a re servation in th e sense that the actual de ci sio n m ak ing w ill be ve ste d e nti re ly in the dis tr ic t c ourt. S ee id. ( “ U nde r our pr oc ed ur e, sin ce w e re ta in j ur isd ic tio n th ro ugho ut the li m ite d r em an d, w e sha ll va cate the se nte nc e uponbe ing not if ie d by the j udge that he w oul d no t have im posed it h ad he known that the guid elines wer e m erely advisory .” ). T he D. C. Circuit’ s procedure is identical to the Seventh’ s. S ee Coles, 2005 W L 783069, at *7. T he Cr osby

/P al ad ino m ode l e sse nti al ly de le ga te s to the dis tr ic t c ourt the ap pe llate f

unc tio n of

de te rm ini ng whe the r the re is pr ej udi ce ne ce ssary f or42

c o rr e c t i o no f

u np r e s e rv e de rr o r . T h e r e i s n o b a s i s i nan y o f th e r e l e v an tS up r e me Co urt de ci sio ns f

or that de le ga tio n, and e ve ry ind ic at ionis that w e shou ld m ak e the de ci sio n a t the appe llate le ve l f ro m the r ec or d a s it

e xis ts. T he langua ge of tho se de ci sio ns, to the e xte nt the y tou chon the m atte r, ind ic at es w ha t on e w oul d as sum e, w hic h is that de te rm ini ng whe the r pla in e rr or e xis ts i s an a

ppe llate func tio n to be de ci de d f

ro m the r ec or d onappe al , not som ethin g to be de ci de d by the district court after rem and. S ee D om ingu ez Be nitez, 542 U. S. at ___,124 S. Ct . a t 23 40 ( “ [Unde r pla in e rr or r ev ie w , a ] de fe ndant m

ust . . . sa tis fy

the j udgm en t of the review ing court, inform ed by the entire re cord, that the probability of a dif fe re nt r es ult

is suf fi ci en t t o un de rm ine c onf ide nc e in the out co m e of

the pr oc ee din g. ” (i nte rn al quo ta tio n om itt ed )) ; U nit ed S ta te s v. V onn, 535 U . S. 55, 59, 122 S. Ct . 104 3, 104 6 ( 2002 ) (“ [A ] sil en t de fe ndant h as the bur de n to sa tis fy the plain-error r

ule and . . . a re viewing court m ay consult th e w hole record w hen considering the eff

ect of any err or on sub stantial rights .” ); see a lso GonzalezH ue rt a, 200 5 W L 807 008, a t *3 n. 4 ( co nc lud ing that the Cr osby /P al ad ino procedure is “ inconsi stent with plain error doctrine”) . The e m otion al punch behin d the Seventh Circuit’ s criticism of our approach de ri ve s f ro m it s c harg e that w e ar e “ co nde m n[ ing ] som e unkn ow n f

ra ct ionof crim inal defendants to serve an illegal sentence.” Paladino, 401 F. 3d at 484 . That43

ch ar ge de fi ne s “ ill eg al se nte nc e” a s on e in whic h ade ci sio n th at w oul d othe rw ise re sul t i n r ev er sa l i s no t a

ppl ie d inac as e be ca

use of the c ont em

por an eo us objec tion rule. By

equating enforcem ent of the contem poraneous ob

j ection rule, an d th e re co gni tio n th at

the pla in e rr or

e xc ep tio n is “ ci rc um sc ri be d, ” Jone s, 527 U . S. a t 38 9, 119 S . Ct . a t 21 02, and s houl d be e xe rc ise d “ spari ngl y , ” id. , w ith co unt en an ci ng i lle ga lity , the c harg e pr ove s to o m uc h. I n e ve ry

c ri m ina l c as e in which it m atters that the contem poraneous ob

j ection rule wa s applied, and there have be entho usands of

c as es w he re it

ha s m atte re d, som e de fe ndant unde r thi s vie ww ill have be enc onde m ne d to se rv e an“ ill eg al se nte nc e” or , w or se sti ll, w ill have been condem

ned to suffer an “ illegal convictio n.” I f “ ill eg al ity ” is d ef

ine d th is w ay

and the goa l i s to pr ev en t “ ill eg al ” se nte nc es and c onvi ct ion s, the onl y w ay to ac hie ve that go al is to a bol ishthe contem poraneous ob

j ection rule. Not j ust in Boo ker er ror ca ses but in all crim inal ca se s. W e al so w ill have to ab oli sh and r ep ea l the pr oc ed ur al bar doc tr ine w hic h a ha lf c en tur y of de ci sio na l l awand f

ed er al statut or

y de ve lop m en t ha s pu t i nto place. A fter a ll, by

apply ing th at doctrine, a s we do in cou ntless cases, w e ar e co nde m nin g so m e unkn ow n f

ra ct ionof c ri m ina ls t o se rv e “ ill eg al ” se nte nc es or to suffer f rom “ illegal” conviction s. And what of the thousand s of prisoners condem ned to suffer sentences that violate the Sixth Am endm ent under Booker,44

because their ca ses finished th e direct r eview pr ocess before that decision was announ ce d in ste ad

of a ft er w ar ds. N o c ir cu it, inc lud ing the S ev en th, ha s y et to sugg es t tha t B ooke r is r etro ac tiv el y appl ic ab le to co llate ra l pr oc ee din gs, and i n lig ht o f Sc hr ir o v. S um

m er lin , 542 U . S. ___ , 124 S . Ct . 251 9 ( 2004 ), it is hig hly unl ike ly that any w ill . T he onl y

w ay to re sc ue a ll of

tho se pr iso ne rs f

ro m the ir

“ illegal sentences” is to throw out the Teague dec ision and its progeny . See Te ague v. L ane, 489 U.S . 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). T he parts of the A ED PA th atare fo un d i n 2 8 U.S.C. § 22 55 ¶¶ 6 & 8 p ro babl y wil l h av e to go as we ll . Only when all of these decisional and st atutory doctrines and the im

portant values the y se rv e ar e thr ow n onthe tr as h he ap w ill w e be able to re duc e the num er at or of that un known f

ra ct ionof de fe ndants suf

fe ri ng f ro m “ ill eg al ” co nvi ct ion s or se rv ing “ ill eg al ” se nte nc es to ze ro . O ur le ga l sy ste m

doe s no t si m

ply r equir e that the gov er

nm en t c om

ply w ith th e Co ns ti tu ti on . It al so m ak es pa rti es , def en da nt s as well as t he go ve rn m en t, co m ply w ithpr oc ed

ur al r ule s, suc h a s th e co nte m

por an eo us o bj ec tio n r

ule , on p ai n of f or fe iti ng l eg al r igh ts the y c oul d othe rw ise e nf

or ce . R equir ing r igh ts t o be as se rt ed in a tim el y

and a ppr opr ia te f

as hio n f urthe rs int er es ts tha t are vit al to the pr ope r func tio nin g of

our j udi ci al sy ste m . S ee W ai nw ri ght v. S yke s, 433 U . S. 72, 90, 97 S . Ct . 249 7, 250 8 ( 1977 ); U nit ed S ta te s v. P ie la go, 135 F . 3d 7 03, 70945

(1 1thCi r. 199 8) ; E ssl ing er v. D av is, 44 F . 3d 1 515, 152 5 & n. 36 ( 11th C ir . 199 5) ; U nit ed S ta te s v. S or ondo , 845 F . 2d 9 45, 948 –49 (1 1thCi r. 198 8) . T he narr ow ne ss of the pla in e rr or

e xc ep tio n to the c ont em

por an eo us o bj ec tio n r

ule r ef le ct s th e im portanc e of

tho se int er es ts. B ro ad en ing that e xc ep tio n, or c onstru ct ing w ay s to ci rc um ve nt i ts r es tr ic tio ns o n an is sue -b y -i ssu e ba sis , le sse ns the e ff ec t of the r ule an d u nd erm in es th e in te res ts itser ve s. If the m atte r is t o be a ddr es se d in“ ill eg al ity ” te rm s, the n pu t i t this w ay : Failure of a defe ndant to com ply with clear procedural r

ules during the j udicial process is itself a ty

pe of illegality

that m ay block cons ideration of his claim that he ha s s uf

fere d a n i ll eg al it y .46

TJO FL AT , C ircuit Judg e, dissenti ng from the denial of rehearing en banc: Aj ur y in the U nit ed

S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt f or the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida co nvi ct ed V la dim ir Ro dr igu ez f

or dis tr ibu tin g, or

pos se ssi ng w iththe int en t t o dis tr ibu te , a“ de te ct ab le a m ount ” of MD MA , a lso kno w n a s e cs ta sy , in vio la tio n of 21 U. S. C. § 841 (a)( 1), and for conspiring to do th e sam e, in viol ation of 21 U.S .C. § 846 . At sentencing, the district court initially set Rodriguez’ s base offense level at 30 b as ed on i ts o w n de te rm inatio n th at the of fe nse inv olv ed

30, 000 ec sta sy ta ble ts. I t the n a dde d tw o le ve ls b ec au se Ro dr igu ez te sti fi ed f al se ly und er oa th during h is trial that he had no inv olvem ent in the offenses for which he was co nvi ct ed , U . S. S. G . § 3C 1. 1, and aw ar de d atw o- le ve l r ed uc tio n ba se d on Rodriguez’ s m inor role in the offense, U. S. S. G. § 3B1.2(b). Bec ause Rodriguez ha d no pr ior

c onvi ct ion s, his gui de lin e se nte nc ing r an ge w as 97 t o 12 1 m onths i n pr iso n. T he c ourt i m

pose d ase nte nc e of

109 m onths i n pr iso n. Af ter Rodriguez w as sentenced, the S uprem e Court held that the Federa l Se nte nc ing G uid el ine s vi olate the S ixth A m en dm en t r igh t t o atr ia l by j ur y to the ex te nt tha t the y

pe rm it a j udge to inc re as e a de fe ndant’ s se nte nc e ba se d onf ac ts that are ne ith er

f ound by the j ur y nor a dm itt ed by the de fe ndant. U nit ed

S ta te s v. Bo oke r, __ U . S. __, 125 S . Ct . 738 , 756 , 160 L . E d. 2d 6 21 ( 2005 ). T o r em edy this cons titutio nal defect, the Court declare d “ the Guidelines effe ctively advisory .”47

Id . at 7 57 . As a res ul t, a s en te nc in g c ou rt m us t s ti ll “ co ns id er Gu id el in es ran ge s,” but it m ay “ ta ilo r the se nte nc e in l igh t of oth er statut or y c onc er ns a s w el l. ” I d. (citing 18 U.S .C. § 3553 (a)) . W e re view sentences im posed un der this new m odel fo r “ re as ona

ble ne ss” onl y . I d. a t 76 5- 67; se e al so M cR ey nol ds v . U nit ed

S ta te s, 397 F. 3d 4 79, 481 ( 7thCi r. 200 5) ( “ D istri ct j udge s m ust [ ap ply the S en te nc ing Guidelines] as guidelines, with appellate re view to determine whether that task has been carr ied out reasonably .” ). Be ca use Ro dr igu ez did

not r ai se ac onst itutio na l ob

j ec tio n a t se nte nc ing , the Bo oke r cl ai m

he r ai se s onappe al m

ust pa ss the “ ‘ pla in- er

ro r’ te st. ” Bo oke r, 125 S. Ct . a t 76 9. I n ge ne ra l, thi s r equir es the de fe ndant t o sh owthat “ (1 ) ane rr or oc curr ed , ( 2) the e rr or

w as pla in, ( 3) the e rr or

a ff ec te d su bst an tia l r igh ts, and ( 4) the error seriously aff ects the fair

ness, integrity

or public reputation of j udicial pr oc ee din gs. ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. D unc an , 400 F . 3d 1 297, 130 1 ( 11th C ir . 200 5) (c iti ng Unit ed

S ta te s v. O lano, 507 U . S. 725 , 732 -3 6, 113 S . Ct . 177 0, 177 7- 79, 123 L. E d. 2d 508 (199 3)). U nder Booker, it is clear that er ror occurr ed, and that er ro r is n owpla in. T he pane l ho lds , how ev er , that R odr igu ez f ai ls the pla in- er

ro r test because he cannot show that his sub stantial rights we re a ffec ted. T he panel doe s no t su gge st tha t R odr igu ez ’ s su bst an tia l r igh ts w er e not

a ff ec te d; r athe r, it re j ec ts h is c la im

be ca use “ [w ] e j ust

don ’ t kn ow ” w ha t se nte nc e he w oul d haveThis “ver y limit ed cla ss” includes (1) a total depr ivation of the right to counsel, (2) the 1 lack of an impartial trial judg e, (3) the unlawf ul exclusi on of g rand juror s of the def endant’ s rac e, (4 ) t he de nia l of

the ri g ht t o s e lf

-r e pr e se ntatio n at tr ia l, ( 5) the de nia l of the ri g ht t o a

pu bli c tr ia l, and (6) an er

roneous r easona

ble-doubt instruction. J ohnson, 520 U.S. at 468-69, 117 S. Ct. at 1549-50. In contra st, the Court has descr ibed ordinar y “trial e rror ” as “ err or which oc curr ed 2 duringthe pre sentation of the c ase to the jury , and which ma y there fore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidenc e pre sented in orde r to deter mine whether

its admissi on was harmless be yond a re asonable doubt.” Fulminante, 499 U .S. at 307-08, 111 S. Ct. at 1264. 48 rece ived if the district court had treated the G uidelin es as advisory only . United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F. 3d 12 91, 1301 (11t h Cir. 2005 ). The panel’ s error is its failure to recognize that Booker er ror of a constitu tional di m ension is one of a “ very lim ited class” of “ structural err ors.” Jo hn so n v . Uni te d S ta te s, 5 20 U.S. 46 1, 4 68 -6 9, 1 17 S. Ct. 1 54 4, 1 54 9- 50 , 13 7 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1997). “ Ea ch of these constitut ional deprivatio ns is a . . . structural 1 de fe ct a ff ec tin g th e fr am ew ork w ith in whic h th e tr ia l pr oc ee ds, r athe r than si m ply ane rr or in the tr ia l pr oc es s it se lf . ” A ri zo nav. F ulm inante , 499 U . S. 279 , 310 , 111 S. Ct . 124 6, 126 5, 113 L . E d. 2d 3 02 ( 1991 ). B ec au se str uc tur al e rr or

a ff ec ts the fr am ew ork of

the tr ia l i tse lf

, it s “ co nse que nc es . . . are ne ce ssari ly unquanti fi ab le an d in de te rm inate . ” S ull ivan v. L oui siana , 508 U . S. 275 , 281 -8 2, 113 S . Ct . 207 8, 2083 , 124 L . E d. 2d 1 82 ( 1993 ). A s su ch , str uc tur al e rr or s “ de fy

ana ly sis by 2

‘ harm less-err or’ standards” and are per se rever sible if an objec tion is m ade at tri al . Ful m in an te , 49 9 U.S. at30 9, 1 11 S. Ct. at 12 65 .49

A har m less error is sim

ply “ [a] ny err or . . . that does not aff ect substantial rights.” Fe d. R. Crim . P . 52(a) . As such, the Suprem e Court has said that harm le ss- er

ro r an al y sis and the sub stanti al -r igh ts p ro ng o f the pla in- er ro r te st essentially

“ require[] the sam e kind of inqu iry .” O lano, 507 U. S. at 734, 113 S. Ct . a t 17 78 ( statin g th at

the re is onl y

“ one im portant d if

fe re nc e: I t i s th e de fe ndant rathe r than th e G ove rn m en t who b ears the bur de n of pe rs ua sio n w ithr es pe ct

to prej udice” under the plain-error test). Ther efore, if structural er rors “ defy analy sis” by

harm less-err or standards, they m ust also d efy

analy sis un der the third p r o n g o f th e p l a i n - e rr o r

t e s t . I tw o u l dmak e n o s e n s e t o s ay t h a tth e s a me pr ej udi ce inquir

y that i s im pr ac tic al a s harm le ss- er

ro r an al y sis is som eh ow pr ac tic al und er

the pla in- er

ro r te st. S tr

uc tur al e rr or s are not

pe r se r ev er sib le in the plain-error c ontext b ecause a defendant who fails to obje ct at trial m ust stil l satisfy the se co nd and f

ourth p ro ngs of

the pla in- er

ro r te st. B ut i t i s c le ar

that i t m ak es no m or e se nse to re qui re ac as e- spe ci fi c show ing of pr ej udi ce und er

the pla in- er

ro r te st than it

doe s un de r the harm le ss- er ro r standard . ABo oke r er

ro r that i nvol ve s an a ct

ua l S ixth A m en dm en t vi olatio n is a structural err or. Booker dram atically alters the ver

y “ fram ew ork within which [s en te nc ing ] pr oc ee ds, ” Fu lm inante , 499 U . S. a t 31 0, 111 S . Ct . a t 12 65, and the ef fe ct of Bo oke r er

ro r is “ ne ce ssari ly

unquanti fi ab le and i nde te rm inate , ” Su lli van,See infra note 13. 3 50 508 U . S. a t 28 1- 82, 113 S . Ct . a t 20 83. Mo re ove r, the log ic al im pli catio n of

the co nc lud ing para gr ap h of

the Bo oke r re m ed ia l op ini on i s th at “ ca se s . . . inv olv ing a Si xthA m en dm en t vi olatio n, ” Bo oke r, 125 S . Ct . a t 76 9, are not sub j ec t t o th e harm less-err or doctrine and, there fore, m ust inv olve structural error. See infra PartI. Forth es e rea so ns , I di sa gr ee wi th th e p an el op in io n i n t hi s ca se . T he pane l’ s e rr or

is a se ri ous one and w ar

rants r eh eari ng e n banc . T he Su pr em e Co urt i nstru ct ed

that “ w e m

ust appl y [ Bo oke r’ s] hol din gs—

both th e Si xthA m en dm en t ho ldi ng and [ its ] r em ed ia l i nte rp re ta tio n of the S en te nc ing Act— to all cas es on di rect rev ie w.” Boo ke r, 12 5 S . Ct. at76 9. If, h owe ve r, we re qui re de fe ndants li ke Ro dr igu ez to pr ove an e ff ec t onthe ir

sub stanti al r igh ts, apply ing Book er w ill be a m eaningless form ality in all but th e rarest of ca ses subj ec t t o pl ai n- er

ro r an al y sis . T his is a siz ab le c la ss o f de fe ndants . U nti l the

3 Suprem e Court’ s decision last J une in Blakely v. W ashingt on, __ U. S. __, 124 S. Ct . 253 1, 159 L . E d. 2d 4 03 ( 2004 ), the c onst itu tio na lity of the F ed er al S en te nc ing Gui de li ne s was be y on d q ue st io n i n t hi s ci rcu itan d e ve ry ot he r. See i d. at 25 47 n.1 (O ’ Co nnor , J. , dis se nti ng) ( co lle ct ing c as es ); Unit ed S ta te s v. S an ch ez , 269 F . 3d 1250 , 126 2 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ( enbanc ) (“ Appr en di d oe s no t a ppl y to j udge -m ad e determ ination s pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines.”) . De fendants sentencedThe F irst and Fif th Circuits have committed the same e rror . See United States v. 4 Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 77- 80 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Mare s, __ F.3d __, 2005 WL503715, at *8-9 (5th Cir. Mar . 4, 2005). 51 prior to Blakely

had no reason to raise a constitutio nal objection to their sentence be ca use suc h an ob

j ec tio n w oul d have appe ar ed f uti le . A s su ch , the num

be r of ca se s im pa ct ed by the pane l’ s de ci sio n is sig nif ic an t. Be ca use the pane l’ s a

ppl ic at ionof

the pla in- er

ro r te st i s f

undam en ta lly fl aw ed , and b ec au se thi s qu es tio n is of sub stanti al im

portanc e, I dis se nt f

ro m the 4 de nia l of r eh eari ng e n banc . P ar

t I of thi s op ini on e xpl ai ns why Bo oke r its el f requires that w e treat Booker err ors of a constitutio nal dim ension as structu ral error s. P art II briefly

describes how dram atically Booker has altere d federa l sentencing andwhy

this supports th e conclusion that Booker err ors invo lving an ac tua l vi olatio n of

the S ixth A m en dm en t are str uc tur al . P ar

t I II e xpl ai ns h owthe p l ai n -e rr o r t es tap p l i es t o s tru ct u ra l erro rs . P ar tIV re s p o n d s t o J u d g e C arn es ’s opi nio n c onc ur

ri ng i n th e de nia l of

r eh eari ng e n banc . P ar

t Vc onc lud es . I. At the outset, it is im

portant to un derstand that there are two diffe rent ty pes of Bo oke r er

ro r: “ the re is a co nst itu tio na l e rr or ( ba se d inthe S ixth A m en dm en t) w he n aj udge e nhanc es ase nte nc e in a m an da tor

y se nte nc ing sy ste m

ba se d on fa ct s no t a dm itt ed

by the de fe ndant o r pr ove d to aj ur y be y ond a re as ona

ble52

doub t, ” an d th er e is “ a statut or y e rr or (b as ed

in the se ve ra

bil ity pr inc ipl es ) w he n a federa l j udge appli ed the guidelin es as m andatory rather than adviso ry .” D ougl as A. Ber m an, S orting th rough th e Circ uit circus, S entencing Lawand Policy , at htt p:/ /se nte nc ing . ty

pe pa d. co m

/se nte nc ing _law_and_p oli cy /20 05/ 02/ sortin g_thr ou gh.htm l (Feb. 14, 2005). “ Notably , only

som e pre- Booker sentencings in volv ed co nst itu tio na l e rr or , sin ce not e ve ry pr e- Bo oke r gui de lin e se nte nc e de pe nde d up on j udicial fact-f

indin g. But ever

y pre-B ooker sentencing in volv ed statutory err or, sin ce e ve ry

pr e- Bo oke r gui de lin e se nte nc e w as im pose d ba se d onthe a ssum pti on that the gui de lin es w er e m an da tor y . . . . ” I d. T he ins tant c as e inv olv es both constitu tional and st atutory err or. See Rodriguez, 398 F. 3d at 129 8 (“ Under a m an da tor y gui de lin es sy ste m , Ro dr igu ez ’ s se nte nc e w as e nhanc ed a s ar es ult

of fi ndi ngs m ad e by

the j udge that w en t be y ond the f ac ts a dm itt ed

by the de fe ndant or f ound by the j ur y . ”) . T he re fo re , the pr ec ise que sti on p re se nte d is w he the r, in a ca se inv olv ing both c onst itu tio na l and s ta tut or y e rr or und er Bo oke r, the de fe ndant m ust e sta bli sh tha t hi s su

bst an tia l r igh ts w er e af

fe ct ed —tha t i s, “ a re as ona

ble pr oba bil ity of adif fe re nt r es ult

if the gui de lin es ha d be enappl ie d” a s r equir ed by Bo oke r (R odr igu ez , 398 F . 3d at 13 01) —i n or de r to p as s th e pla in- er ro r te st. The distinction b etwe en Booker constitu tional errors and Booker statutory er ro rs is sig nif

ic an t be ca

use the Bo oke r Co urt i ndi cate d th at the tw o m

ust beIn th e same pa ra gra ph , th e Court

a lso e mph a size d th at “ no t . . . e ve ry se nte nc e g ive s r ise 5 to a Six th Amendment violation.” B ooker, 125 S. Ct. at 769. 53 tr eate d di ff

er en tly . I n B ooke r, the Co urt st at ed that “ in c as es not

inv olv ing aS ixth Am endm ent violatio n, whether resentencing is warranted or whether it will instead be suf fi ci en t t o r ev ie wase nte nc e fo r re as ona ble ne ss m ay

de pe nd u pon ap pli catio n of the harm less-err or doctrine.” 125 S. Ct. at 769. If all Booker er

rors w ere 5 ordinary trial er rors, this statem ent would be superfluous because it is we ll-settled that the harm less-err or doctrine applies to all ordin ary trial er rors—even co nst itu tio na l on es . C ha

pm anv. Ca lif

or nia , 386 U . S. 18, 22, 87 S . Ct . 824 , 827 , 17 L. Ed. 2d70 5 (1 96 7) . Thu s, t he re m us t b e so m et hi ng m or e to th is st at em en t. T he log ic al im

pli catio n is that “ ca se s . . . inv olv ing aS ixth A m en dm en t vi olatio n” are not su bje ct to harm less-err or review . In other wor ds, Booker constituti onal erro r is st ru ctur al erro r, fo r on ly stru ctur al erro rs de fy ha rm le ss -err oran al y si s. Fu lm inante , 499 U . S. a t 30 6- 10, 111 S . Ct . a t 12 63- 65. Intuitiv ely , it m ay

seem odd to say

that Booker constitu tional errors ar e str uc tur al w hil e Bo oke r statut or y e rr or s are not . A ft er

a ll, the “ fr am ew ork w ith in w hic h [ se nte nc ing ] pr oc ee ds, ” id. a t 31 0, 111 S . Ct . a t 12 65, ha s c hange d be ca use the G uid el ine s are no l onge r m an da tor y , and this de ve lop m en t a ppl ie s f ull y e ve n if the tr ia l c ourt m ad e no e xtr a- ve rd ic t ( or e xtr a- ple a) f

ind ing s of

f ac t. Mo re ove r, inThis question whether non- constitutional errors c an eve r be struc tural er rors ha s 6 eng ender ed much disagree ment within severa l other circ uits. Com pare United States v. Curbelo, 343 F.3d 273, 280 n.6 ( 4th Cir. 2003) (“De spite occa sionally sug g estingin dicta that structura l err ors must impl icate c onstitut ional rig hts, the Supreme Court has c lear ly held that structura l err ors nee d not be of c onstitut ional dimension.” (citation omitted)), with id. at 289 (Wilkins, C .J ., dissenting) (“The Supreme Court and this cour t have r epeatedly

made c lear

that structura l error s ne c e ssa ri ly mus t a ff e c t a de fe nd ant’ s c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts .” ). Com pa re Gr e e n v . Unit e d St ate s, 262 F.3d 715, 717- 79 (8th Cir. 2001) (holdingthat the denial of a fe dera l prisoner’s statutory rig ht to counsel in collatera l proce eding s is structural and the ref ore not subjec t to harmless-er ror analy sis), with id. at 719 (Bye, J., di ssenting) (“Structur al er rors a ppear to be conf

ined to the constitutional sphere be cause Congr ess has mandated the application of harmless er ror r eview by statut e . Pr e suma

bly , o nly g ra ve c on sti tut ion a l e rr or s c ou ld s ur mou nt t he statut or

y de fa ult ru le that harmless e rror

analy sis applies.” (c itation omit ted)). Compar e United States v. Annig oni, 96 F.3d 1132, 1144 ( 9th Cir. 1996) (“Although we c onclude that the e rrone ous denial of the r ight of pere mptory

challeng e is not amena

ble to harmless-e rror

analy sis, we nee d not decide whether such er ror r ises to the level of struc tural er ror. The err or in this case—the err oneous denia l of a rig ht of pere mptory

challeng e—is simply

not amenable to harmless-e rror analy sis.”), with id. at 1150 (Kozinski, J ., dissenting) (“The rig ht to a cer tain number of pe remptory strikes—or to any at a ll— is n ot gua

ra nte e d b y the Con sti tut ion

. . . . Sin c e the Court

ha s a llo we d f

or the po ssi bil ity of har mless error

even when important constitutional rig hts are violate d, Ifind it hard to believe the Court would now conc lude that it’s alway s reve rsible er ror to deny

a def endant a mere statutory rig ht.” (c itations omi tted)). In Sanchez, we a ppear to have a nswere d this question in t he neg ative. B ut see McGriff v. D ep’t of Corr ., 338 F.3d 1231, 1235 ( 11th Cir. 2003) (holding that failure to appoint counsel as r equire d by the rules g overningproce eding s under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is “structura l error ”); Shephe rd v. United States, 253 F .3d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 2001) (holdingthat failure to appoint counsel as r equire d by the rules g overningproce eding s under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 “ is n ot s ub

je c t to ha rm le ss e rr or

ana ly sis ” ). In a

ny e ve nt, we wo uld

no t ne e d to a dd

re ss t his 54 ge ne ra l, the e ff

ec ts o f statut or

y e rr or s are li ke ly

to be j ust a s “unqu an tif

ia ble and ind et er m inate , ” Su lli van, 508 U . S. a t 28 1- 82, 113 S . Ct . a t 20 83, a s th e ef fe ct s of constitu tional errors. Even so, the distin ction is valid . To begin with, it has clear supp ort i n our ow n pr ec ed en t. I n S an ch ez , w e spe ci fi ca lly state d th at

“ [t ] he re is no s ep ar at e cate gor

y of str uc tur al e rr or

apart f ro m c onst itu tio na l e rr or . T he onl y questio n is whether any

constitu tional errors . . . r ise to the level of structural er ro r. ” 269 F . 3d at 12 72 n . 41. T his state m en t f ro m S an ch ez f

ind s im pli ci t 6br oa d is su e to d e c ide thi s c a se . It w ou ld b e e no ugh to sa y tha t B oo ke r c on sti tut ion a l e rr or is structura l, but Booker

statutory err or is not. See, e.g ., Nede r v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1833, 144 L . Ed. 2d 35 7 (1999) ( “Althoug h [t he har mless error

rule] by its terms applies to all error s . . . , we have re c ognize d a

lim ite d c la ss o f f

un dame nta l c on sti tut ion a l e rr or s th at ‘ de fy ana ly sis by

‘h arm le ss err or’ standa

rds.’” (empha sis added) ( quoting F ulminante, 499 U.S. at 309, 111 S. Ct . at 1265)); id. at 14 , 1 19 S. Ct . at 18 36 (“ Un de r o ur c a se s, a c on sti tut ion a l e rr or

is e ith e r s tr

uc tur a l or it i s not.” (e mphasis added) ); Sulli van, 508 U.S. at 282, 113 S. Ct. at 2083 (Rehnquist, C.J ., concur ring ) (“ In [Fulminante], we divided the class of c onstitut ional violations that may occur duringthe cour se of a

criminal proc eeding , be it at trial or se ntencing , into two categ ories: [trial err ors and struc tural er

rors].” (e mphasis added) ); Br echt v. Abr ahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30, 113 S. Ct . 1710, 1717, 123 L . Ed. 2d 353 (1993) ( discussing tria l error and structur al er

ror a s part of the “ spectrum of

constitutional errors” ); Fulminante, 499 U .S. at 310, 111 S. C t. at 1265 (“Since our dec ision in C hapman, other case s have a dded to the categ ory of constitutional error s which ar e not subject to har mless error

. . . . Eac h of these c onstitut ional deprivations is a sim ilar structura l defe ct . . . . ” ( emphasis adde d)); Chapman, 386 U .S. at 23, 87 S. C t. at 827-28 (“A lthough our

prior ca ses have indicated that ther e ar e some c onstitut ional rig hts so basic to a fair tr ial that their infra ction can ne ver be treated as ha rmless err or, this statement . . . itself belies any belief that all trial err ors which violate the Constitution automatically call for reve rsal.” (empha sis added and f

ootnote omitted)). 55 supp ort i n anum

be r of S upr em e Co urt c as es . I t a lso se em s ( at le as t) r ea sona

ble 7 to s ay that i f a de fe ndant’ s S ixth A m en dm en t r igh t t o atr ia l by j ur y w as not ac tua lly vio la te d, w e shou ld n ot p re sum e pr ej udi ce . I n any e ve nt, it is en oughto say that the dis tin ct ionis one that B ooke r its el f im pli es . II. Bo oke r’ s im

pli catio n th at

the c onst itu tio na l e rr or

it c or re ct s is str

uc tur al is fully consistent with the Suprem e Court’ s structural err or cases. A s noted abo ve, Fu lm inante de fi ne s stru ct ur al e rr or a s a“ co nst itu tio na l de pr ivatio n[ ] . . . a ff ec tin g the f ram ew ork w ith in whic h th e tr ia l pr oc ee ds, r athe r than si m ply an e rr or in the56

tr ia l pr oc es s it se lf

. ” 499 U . S. a t 31 0, 111 S . Ct . a t 12 65. I t i s di ff ic ult to ove rs ta te th e ex te nt to whi ch Bo ok er af fect s t he fed eral sen te nc in g fr am ewo rk . The star ting p oint u nder both th e old m odel (pre-Booker) and new m odel (p ost -B ooke r) of

f ed er al se nte nc ing is 18 U . S. C. § 35 53( a) , w hic h st at es that [t] he court shall im

pose a sentence sufficient, but no t greater than ne ce ssary , . . . ( A ) to r ef

le ct the se ri ousn es s of

the of fe nse , to pr om ote re spe ct f or law , and t o pr ovi de j ust

pun ish m en t f

or the of fe nse ; ( B) to af fo rd a de quate de te rr en ce to cr im ina l c ondu ct ; ( C) to pr ote ct the publ ic f ro m f urthe r cr im es of

the de fe ndant; and ( D ) to p ro vid e the defendant with needed educational or vocational training , m edical care , or o th er co rrec ti on al tre at m en t i n t he m os t ef fect iv e m an ne r[.] 18 U . S. C. § 35 53( a) (2 ). I n othe r w or ds, the und er ly ing goa ls o f the statut e an d th e Guidelines are “ retribution, general deter rence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.” United States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1555, 1558 n .2 (11th Cir. 1992 ). In selecting an ap pr opr ia te se nte nc e, the se nte nc ing c ourt m ust a lso c onsi de r “ the na tur e an d circum stances of the offense and the his tory and charac teristics of the defendant”;

“ the kin ds o f se nte nc es a va ila ble ”; a ll re le vant g uid el ine s and p oli cy state m en ts issued b y the Sentencing Com

m issio n; “ the need to avoid u nwar ranted sentence dis pari tie s am ong de fe ndants w ithsim ilar re co rd s who h av e be enf ound gui lty of sim ilar conduct; and the need to prov ide restitution to any victim s of the offense. ” 18 U. S. C. § 355 3(a)( 1), ( 3)-(7). U nde r the old

m ode l, the dis tr ic t c ourt w as bound t o se nte nc e the de fe ndantPr of e sso r S tith a

nd Judg e Ca br ane s f ur the r o bs e rv e tha

t “ wi th r e sp e c t to c omm on ly 8 oc c ur ri ngc ir c ums tanc e s th at are no t e xplic itl y a dd re sse d b y the Gu ide lin e s, ” c ourt s g e ne ra lly “ a ssume [] that th e Commis sio n h a s a lr e a dy take n th e matte r i nto a c c ount. ” Stit h & Ca br ane s, supra, at 102. That is, if the circ umstance is not ra re, the Commi ssion mustbe aw are of it and there fore its omi ssion mustmean that the Commission does not think i t significa nt to sentencing po lic y . T hu s, “ [t]he re a l qu e sti on is n ot whe the r t

he Commis sio n a c tua lly

too k s ome fa c tor

int o 57 w ith in the appl ic ab le gui de lin e range unl es s it de te rm ine d th at an aggravating or m itigatin g circum stance of a kind, or to a degree, not a de quate ly

take n in to c onsi de ratio n by the S en te nc ing Co m m iss ionin fo rm

ulatin g th e gui de lin es . . . sho uld r es ult in a sentence differ ent from

that described. I n determ ining whether a circum stance w as adequately taken into cons ideration, the court [c oul d] c onsi de r onl y

the se nte nc ing gui de lin es , pol ic y state m en ts, an d of fi ci al c om

m en tary of the S ente nc ing Co m

m iss ion . 18 U . S. C. § 35 53( b) (1 ). S tate d di ff er en tly , the onl y

w ay the de fe ndant w as goi ng to g et adownw ar d de part

ur e unde r the old

m ode l w as by

sho w ing that hi s c as e wa s not within th e “ heartland of ty pical cases. ” K oon v . United States, 518 U. S. 81 , 94 , 11 6 S . Ct. 2 03 5, 2 04 4, 1 35 L. Ed. 2d39 2 (1 99 6) . This was adi ffi cu lttas k. T o st ar t w ith , “ the S en te nc ing Co m m iss ionha s a lr ea dy

c onsi de re d, and the Sentencing Guidelines have already fac tored in, m any

if not all circum stances that ar e ar gua bly r el ev an t t o c ri m ina l se nte nc ing . . . . T he G uid el ine s are , a s C ongr es s int en de d th em

to be , c om

pr eh en siv e . . . . ” K at e St ith& Jos e A . Ca br an es , F ear of Judg ing: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal C ourts 10 2 (1998). T hus, it was qui te unl ike ly

that the de fe ndant w oul d be able to ide nti fy ac ir cum stanc e that the Com m issio n had altogeth er f

ailed to consid er. A nd on ce the sentencing court 8acc ount, but whether the fac tor is rare enough to overc ome a pr esumption that the Commi ssion

has take n it into account.” I d. at 102-03 (c iting Koon, 518 U.S. at 110- 11, 116 S. Ct . at 2052). Se e , e .g ., Un ite d St ate s v . D avis , 9 8 F .3 d 1 41 , 1 45 (4 th C ir . 1 99 6) (“ Da vis argue s th at a 9 sentenc e of le ss than the 30 y ear s . . . would provide just punishment . . . . Davis’ claim . . . that less than 30 y ear s would be suffic ient is mispl ace d. The c ommentary to the sentenc ing guidelines states: ‘dissatisfac tion with the available se ntencingrang e or a pref ere nce f or a differ ent sentenc e than that a uthorized by

the guidelines is not an appropr iate basis for a sente nce outside the applica

ble guideline ra

ng e.’” (citation omitted)); United States v. F razier, 979 F .2d 1227, 1231 (7th Cir. 1992) (“ [Dist rict cour ts may not] depar

t based on their pe rce ption of a lac k of a ne ed for

g ener al deter

renc e. ‘It would be difficult to imag ine a f inding that the Sente ncing Commi ssion failed to ade quately consider the g ener al deter rent e ffe ct of the c riminal law. . . . District courts must justify their depa

rtures by ref ere nce to f

actor s particular

to the defe ndant that the Gu ide lin e s in a de qu ate ly c on sid e re d. ’ [Unit e d St ate s v . T ho ma s, 90 6 F .2 d 3 23 , 3 27 (7 th Cir.1990)] (emphasis added) .”). 58 de te rm ine d th at

the Co m m iss ionha d take n ac ir cum stanc e int o a cc ount , the d e f e n d an tc o u l do n l y a r g u e th a tth e c i r c u ms t an c e w a s p r e s e n t i nh i s c a s e t o s o me aty pic al de gr ee . T his is be ca use the Co m

m iss ion ’ s su

bst an tiv e j udgm en t a s to the signi ficance of the circ um stance in a heartland case w as unassailable. T he c om pr eh en siv en es s of

the G uid el ine s and the invuln er ab ili ty of the pol ic y j udgm en ts o n w hic h th ey r es t e sse nti al ly

r en de re d any

e vid en ce ade fe ndant m igh t pr es en t r eg ar din g th e ne ed f or “ ad equa te de te rr en ce ” or the ne ed f or “ j ust puni shm en t” ir

re le vant unde r the old

m ode l. T he r ea son is s im ply that a lth ough re as ona ble m ind s m ay

dif fe r as to the le ve l of

pun ish m en t ne ed ed

to ad equa te ly de te r or j ust ly pun ishapart ic ular of

fe nse , onc e the Co m

m iss ionannounc ed

it s views on the subject, it wa s difficult to argue that any particular c ase w as aty

pical or out sid e the he ar

tland w ithr es pe ct

to the se iss ue s. R athe r, aparty se ek ing a 9See, e.g ., United States v. J aber , __ F. Supp.2d __, 2005 WL605787, at *3-9, 13-15 10 (D. Mass. Ma

rch 16, 2005) ; United States v. Carvaja l, 2005 WL476125, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y . Fe b. 22, 2005); United States v. B iheiri, 356 F. Supp. 2d 589, 594 n.6 (E.D . Va. 2005) (“N o individual [ § 3553(a) ] factor is sing led out as havingg reater we ight; instead, the richne ss of fac tual diversity

in case s calls on sentenc ing judg es to consider all of the fa ctors and to a ccor d eac h fac tor the we ight it dese rves unde r the c ircumstance s. Thus, the Guidelines sente ncing rang e is not entitled to ‘heavy weight,’ but it is a useful startingpoint in fashioning a just and appropr iate sente nce.” ); United States v. Nellum, 2005 WL300073, at *4 (N.D . Ind. Fe b. 3, 2005) (“ The de fenda

nt is also an Army

veter an, who wa s honorably discharg ed. Unde r the guidelines, . . . milit ary

service is not ordinarily

rele vant in arr iving at an appr opriate se ntence . Yet, this Court finds it very rele vant that a de fenda

nt honorably

serve d his country

when consideringhis history

and cha rac teristics. See § 3553(a )(1) .” (c itation omit ted)); United States v . G a lv e z- B ar

r io s , 3 5 5 F . Su

p p . 2 d 9 5 8 ( E . D . Wi s . 2 0 0 5 ) ; Un it e d St ate s v . H u e rta - Ro dr igu e z, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1025-28, 1029-30 ( D. Neb. 2005) ; United States v. My ers, 353 F . Supp. 2d 1026, 1027-32 (S.D. I owa 2005) ; United States v. J ones, 352 F . Supp. 2d 22, 25-26 (D. Me. 2005); United States v. Ranum, 352 F. Supp. 2d 984, 987 (E.D . Wis . 2005) (“ The guidelines are not binding, and c ourts need not justify a sente nce outside of

them by citing f actor s that take the case outside the ‘hea

rtland.’ Rathe r, cour

ts are f ree to disagree , in individual cases and in the e xer c ise of

dis c re tio n, wi th t

he a c tua l r ang e pr op os e d b y the guid e lin e s, so lon ga s th e ult imate sentenc e is rea sonable a

nd car efully

supported by

rea sons tied to the § 3553(a) f actor s.”). 59 departure genera lly

acce pted his b ase offe nse level as a starting point andthen attem pted to sh ow that the case wa s aty pical because it w as com m itted in an unus ua l m anne r or

f or som e unanti ci pa te d and una cc ount ed -f or r ea son w ar

rante d a do wnwar d d ep artur e. Be ca use the G uid el ine s are m er el y a dvi sor y und er the ne wm ode l, the defendant is no lo nger lim ited to arguing that his case is som ehow aty pical. Such argum ents, of course, rem ain viable, but under the new m odel the defendant can al so s im ply c onc ed e that hi s c as e is ty pic al and c ha lle nge the w isd om of the Co m m iss ion ’ s j udgm en t r eg ar din g th e ap pr opr ia te pun ish m en t i n he ar tland ca se s. T ha t i s, the de fe ndant m ay sim ply arg ue that the appl ic ab le gui de lin e 10Court s ma y be pa rt ic ula rl y lik e ly to d isa g re e wi th guid e lin e ra ng e s d e ri vin gfr om b a se 11 offe nse leve ls tied to drug qua ntities or dollar amounts, which have long be en the subjec t of criticism. Post-Booker , sever al district courts have alre ady indicated a s much. For

example, one district court has a

nnounced, [T] he Guidelines a

re ba sed in part on statistical ana ly ses of pre -Guidelines sentenc ing pr actice s. Ba sed on those statistics, the Commis sion established the offe nse leve ls for ea ch cr ime, linked to a re commended imprisonment ra ng e. Acc ording ly , in many

case s, the Guidelines re prese nt a re asonable estimation of a fair se ntencingrang e. Ho we ve r, fo r p oli c y

re a so ns and

be c a us e statut or

y mand ator

y min ima dictated many

terms of the dr

ug -traf fickingguidelines, the Commissi on depar ted from past pra ctices in settingoffe nse leve ls for such c rimes as fr aud and dr ug tr a ff ic kin g . Co ns e qu e ntl y , a

nd ba se d a lso on

its own e xpe ri e nc e and

fa mil iari ty with state court se ntencing , the cour t finds Guideline ra

ng es of imprisonment for tho se c ri me s are le ss r e lia ble a pp ra isa ls o f f

a ir se nte nc e s.

. . . . Th e Gu ide lin e s’ qu anti ty -d ri ve n, “ mark e t- or ie nte d” a pp ro a c h a lso contributes to disparity

and unre liability

in drugsentenc ing. T he quantity sy stem was de veloped to punish big g er distributors more ha rshly , but prac tices of char g ing c onspiracie s over a long pe riod of time has the r esult of ag g reg ating many small distribut ions so as to make a long -term small quantity distributor look like a lar g e-qua

ntity distributor. For e x ample, a distributor re sponsible for selling one gram at a time a hundre d times ge ts the same sente nce a s the dea ler c aught selling 100 grams only

once. Huer ta-Rodriguez, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 1025-26 & n.6 (citations omitted). Simi larly , another district judge has obser

ved, [I ]t is w or th p ointin gout th at un de r t he guid e lin e s, the we ig ht o f t he na rc oti c s is the drivingforc e behind the se ntence . The g overnme nt is well awar e that for ever y controlled buy

that is made, the qua

ntity of drug s is increa sed, and so is the se nte nc e . T he re is a

ra nd omn e ss t o th is i n th e fo llo wi ngse ns e : [th e de fe nd ant’ s] guideline ra

ng e would have been significantly decr ease d if he wa s arr ested a fter 60 se nte nc e is “ gr eate r than ne ce ssary ” to a ch ie ve the pur pose s of the S en te nc ing Reform Ac t. 18 U .S .C. § 3553 (a). “ [T ] he Guidelines . . . are the product of pol icy de ci sio ns b y

the S en te nc ing Co m

m iss ion. . . . I f tho se pol ic y de ci sio ns are no long er m andatory , the sentencing j udge is free to disagree w ith them .” Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 790 n.3 (Sca lia, J. , dissenting). 11the fi rs t [un de rc ov e r] b uy . . . a nd no t a ft e r t

he fo ur th b uy . Und e r t

he guid e lin e s, this fortuity

incre ased [his] guidelines rang e fr om 87-108 months . . . to 168-210 months . Ind e e d, on

the oth e r h and , if

the of fi c e rs wa nte d to , th e y

pr ob a bly c ou ld have ma de additional contr olled buy s from [the defe ndant] and the total weig ht of the drug s attributable to him would have be en eve n highe r and so too his sentenc e under the guidelines. It is . . . difficult to ignore the ra ndom nature of

how the s ys t e mp l ays o u ti nr e a l i ty. Nellum, 2005 WL30073, at *5; see a lso J aber , 2005 WL605787, at *12 (“ Drugquantity may well be a kind of ac cident, depe nding on the fortuities of law e nforc ement or e ven the mar ket, as much as it ref

lects the de fenda

nt’s culpability .”). The district judge in Nellum also noted that the guideline sentenc ing dispa rity betwee n cra ck coc aine a

nd powder

coca ine was likely

to be a c ontr ov e rs ia l and

re c ur ri ngiss ue in s e nte nc inghe ari ng s c on du c te d und e r t he ne w m od e l, a lth ou g h h e c on c lud e d th at he c ou ld i mpo se an a pp ro pr iate se nte nc e wi tho ut a dd re ssi ngit direc tly in that case . Nellum, 2005 WL30073, at *4; cf. United States v. Wi lson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 91 0, 91 8 ( D. Ut ah 2 00 5) (a rguin gthat th e Gu ide lin e s g e ne ra lly re fl e c t pu

bli c op ini on , w ith one notable e x ception being“the Guide lines’ diffe rentially harsh tre atment of distribution of crack cocai ne (a s co mp aredto po wde r coc ain e)”). Re cent ly , i n Un it ed S tat es v . S mi th , _ _ F. Supp. 2d __, 2005 W L549057 (E.D. Wis. March 3, 2005) , another district court imposed a lowe r sentenc e than that c alled for by the Guidelines to avoid a n “unwa rra nted disparity

betwee n defe ndants convicte d of possessingpowder coca ine and de fenda

nts convicted of posse ssing c rac k coca ine.” I d. at *9. 61 Su bj ec t t o r ev ie wf

or r ea sona ble ne ss, dis tr ic t j udge s are nowf re e to a ppl y the ir “ ow n pe rc ep tio ns o f j ust pun ish m en t, de te rr en ce , and p ro te ct ionof the pub lic ev enw he n th es e dif

fe r fr om the pe rc ep tio ns o f the Co m m iss ionm em

be rs w ho dr ewup the G uid el ine s. ” I d. a t 79 0. A lth ough“ j udge s m ust sti ll co nsi de r the sentencing range contained in the Guidelines, . . . that r ange is now nothin g m ore than asug ge sti on tha t m ay or m ay not be pe rs ua siv e . . . w he n w ei ghe d a ga ins t the nu m ero us ot he r co ns id erat io ns li st edin [§ 3 55 3( a)].” Id. at78 7 (S te ve ns , J., di ss en ti ng ). Ind eed , as o ne di st ric t ju dg e h as alr ead y ob se rv ed , the r em ed ia l m aj or ity

in Bo oke r[ ] dir ec t[ s] c ourts t o c onsi de r al l of the § 33 53( a) f

ac tor s, m any

of w hic h th e gui de lin es e ith er r ej ec t orSee, e.g ., United States v. L acy , 99 F. Supp. 2d 108, 112 (D. Ma ss. 2000) (footnotes 12 omi tte d) : [W]hile the Gu ide lin e s’ e mph a sis on qu anti ty and c ri min a l hi sto ry

dr ive s th e se h i g hs e n t e n c e s , s a d l y, o th e r f a c t o r s , w h i c hI b e l i e v e b e ar d i r e c t l y o nc u l p a

b i l i ty, ha rd ly c ount at a ll: Pr of

ound dr uga dd ic tio n, so me tim e s d atin gfr om e xtre me ly youngag es, the fa ct that the off ender was subjec t to serious child abuse, or abandone d by

one par ent or the othe r, little or no educa tion. Nor may

Iconsider the fa ct that the disarr ay

so clea r in the lives of many

of these de fenda

nts appea rs to be re peatingitself in the next gene ration: Many have ha d children at a young a g e , a nd re pe at th e vo latil e re latio ns hip s w iththe ir g ir lf ri e nd s th at th e ir

pa re nts may have ha d. And I

surely cannot e valuate the extent to which lengthy incar cer ation will ex ace rbate the problem, sepa ratingthe def

endant f rom whate ver fa mil y re latio ns hip s h e may

have , o r t he imp a c t on

c omm un iti e s whe n th e se youngmen re turn. 62 ign or e. F or

e xam ple , und er

§ 35 53( a) (1 ) a se nte nc ing c ourt m ust consider the “ histo ry

and charac teristics of the defendant.” But under the gui de lin es , c ourts are ge ne ra lly f or bid de n to c onsi de r the de fe ndant’ s a ge , his e duc at ionand v oc at ion al ski lls , his m en ta l and em oti ona l c ondi tio n, his phy sic al c ondi tio n in cl udi ng dru g or a lc ohol de pe nde nc e, his e m

plo ym en t r ec or d, his f

amily ti es and responsib ilities, his socio-econom ic status, his civic and m ilitary co ntr ibu tio ns, and h is l ac k of gui danc e as ay outh. T he gui de lin es ’ prohibi tion o f considering these factors cannot be squared with the § 3553 (a )( 1) r equir em en t tha t the c ourt e va luate the “ his tor y and ch ar ac te ri sti cs ” of

the de fe ndant. U nit ed S ta te s v. Ranum , 353 F . S upp. 2d 9 84, 986 ( E . D . W is. 200 5) ( ci ta tio ns om itted). T hus, m itigatin g circum stances and subs tantive pol icy argum ents that w er e fo rm er ly

ir re le vant i n a ll but

the m ost unu sua l c as es are nowpot en tia lly 12 relevant in every

case. Tha t co ns ti tu ti on al Bo ok er erro rs are “ co ns ti tu ti on al de pr iv at io ns . . . af fe ct ing the f

ram ew ork w ith in whic h [ se nte nc ing ] pr oc ee ds, ” Fu lm inante , 49963

U . S. a t 31 0, 111 S . Ct . a t 12 65, is thu s in es ca pable . I t i s e qua lly

c le ar that the ir

“ co nse que nc es . . . are ne ce ssari ly unquanti fi ab le and i nde te rm inate . ” S ull ivan, 508 U . S. a t 28 2, 113 S . Ct . a t 20 83. I nde ed , the pane l r ec ogni ze s th is whe n it

“ as k[ ed ] w he the r the re is a re as ona ble pr oba bil ity of adif fe re nt r es ult

if the guid elines had been applied in an advisory instead of bind ing fashion ”: T he obv iou s answ er

is that w e don’ t kn ow . I f the dis tr ic t c ourt j udge i nth i s ca s e h adth e l i b er ty o f i n cr ea s i n g o r d ec re as i n g Ro dri g u ez ’s sentence above or below the guidelines range, he m ight h ave given Rodriguez a longer sentence, or he m ight h ave given a shorter sentence, or he m ight h ave given the sam e sentence. T he rec ord pr ov id es no reas on to be li ev e an y res ul t i s m or e li ke ly tha n t he ot he r. W e jus t d on ’t kn ow. Ro dr igu ez , 398 F . 3d at 13 01. I do n ot s ee howw e can di sm iss Ro dr igu ez ’ s S ixth Am endm ent claim

on the groun d that “ [t] he rec ord provid es no reason to believe” that he w oul d have r ec ei ve d ale sse r se nte nc e unde r the ne wm ode l. O r, a s th e Se ve nthCi rc uit

put it , I “ cannot

f athom w hy the E le ve nthCi rc uit

w an ts t o condem n som e unkno wn fr action of crim inal defendants to serve an illegal se nt en ce.” Un it edSta te s v . Pal ad in o, 4 01 F.3d47 1, 4 84 (7t h C ir. 2 00 5) . Before adoptin g such a rule, w e shouldat least consider w hat in the record m igh t have “pr ovi de [d ] . . . r ea son to b el ie ve ” that a le sse r se nte nc e w oul d have be enim pose d ha d R odr igu ez be ense nte nc ed und er the ne wm ode l. A t the sentencing h earing, the defendant m ight h ave ar gued that hi s guid eline sentenceAlternatively , if “the district c ourt duringsentenc ing e x presse d sever al times its view 13 th at t h e s e n te n c e r e qu ir e d

b y th e G u id e li n e s w a s to o s e v e r e , ” s tate d th at i t w a s “ un f

o rtu n ate []” that the Guidelines ove rstated the se riousness of the de fenda nt’s criminal history , imposed the lowest possible sentence under the Guidelines, and r emar ked that eve n that sentenc e wa s “more than appr opriate,” then the def endant will satisfy

the Rodriguez standard. United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1331-33 (11th Cir. 2005). Shelton involved only statutory err or, so I agree with the panel that a prejudice inquiry

was ne cessa

ry . Ialso agree that the def endant established pre

judice. Indeed, I

do not understand why

the cour t felt the nee d to emphasize that “ [a]ll of the se c omm e nts take n to g e the r c onvin c e [d] [it] th at th e re [wa s] a re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity the district court would have imposed a le sser sente nce . . . if it had not felt bound by

the Guidelines.” I d. at 1332-33. I should think t hat any

one of the se circ umstances standingalone wo uld be su ff ic ie nt. 64 w as “ gr eate r than ne ce ssary ” to a ch ie ve the se nte nc ing pur pose s id en tif

ie d in§ 3553 (a ). Mo re spe ci fi ca lly , the de fe ndant migh t have pr es en te d th e dis tr ic t j udge w ithlaw -e nf

or ce m en t datate ndi ng t o sh owthat the ne ed f or ge ne ra l de te rr en ce is low w ith respect to his particular offense and in his particular com m unity , and that his gui de lin e range is the re fo re unn ec es sari ly hig h. A lte rn at ive ly , the de fe ndant m igh t have arg ue d th at

his pe rs ona l hi sto ry

or c ir cum stanc es som eh owr en de r him le ss cu lp ab le or l es s l ik el y to co m m itfut ur e cri m es th an th e Gui de li ne s s ug ge st . O f co ur se , non e of

thi s ty pe of e vid en ce or

arg um en t i s li ke ly

to be f ound in the re co rd of apr e- Bo oke r he ar ing . 13 Any attem pt to assess p rej udice resulting from Booker err or is, there fore, pur e gue ssw ork. I n c as es inv olv ing statut or y e rr or onl y , it is ne ce ssary

gue ssw ork, fo r the S upr em e Co urt ha s c le ar ly ind ic at ed that the harm le ss- er

ro r an d pl ai n- er

ro r doc tr ine s a

ppl y to suc h c as es . A ga in, thi s is r ea sona ble giv enthat the se65

de fe ndants have suf

fe re d no a ct

ua l c onst itu tio na l de pr ivatio n. B ut whe n, a s inthi s ca se , the Bo oke r er

ro r is c onst itu tio na l, the f ac t tha t i ts e ff

ec t i s whol ly

“ unqu an tif

ia ble and i nde te rm inate , ” Su lli van, 508 U . S. a t 28 2, 113 S . Ct . a t 20 83, reinforce s its structural nature. I n this s ense, B ooker error is sim ilar to other ty pes of err or that fit w ithin the very lim ited class of structural err ors. S ee supra note 1 (listing structural err ors). It is, for exam ple, sim ilar to Gideon err or in that just as we cannot kno w what evidence a ca pable attorney

m ight h ave uncovered, what favor ab le te sti m ony

he m igh t have e lic ite d, or w ha t pe rs ua siv e ar gum en ts h e m igh t have m ad e, w e al so c annot kno ww ha t e vid en ce or

arg um en t a

de fe ndant m ight h ave presented had he been sentenced under the newsentencing m odel. It is a lso sim ilar to an e rr one ous re as ona ble -d oubt ins tr uc tio n, f or j ust a s su cha m isi nstru ct ion“ vit ia te s a ll the j ur y ’ s f ind ing s” so tha t an a

ppe llate c ourt c ando n o m or e than “ en ga ge in pur e spe cu la tio n—i ts v ie wof w ha t a r ea sona ble j ur y w oul d have don e, ” Su lli van, 508 U . S. a t 28 1, 113 S . Ct . a t 20 82— al l w e can do is speculate as to what a

rea sonable sentencin g judge m ight h ave done under the new m odel. Indeed, we are in one sense worse off because a c ourt assessing an er ro ne ous re as ona

ble -d oubt ins tr uc tio n c anat l ea st a ssum e that the r em ai nin g record w as not affec ted by the instruction err or, whereas I thinkwe m ust assum e, if anythi ng, that a

de fe ndant s uc h a s R odr igu ez w oul d have don e som ethin gRodrigue z did, however, objec t to the district court’s ca lculation of the number of 14 ecsta sy tablets involved in the offe nse. The E ighth Circuit “ha s held that when a defe ndant objects to a District Court’s de termination of drugquantity at sentenc ing, the defe ndant pre serve s a B ooker- based c halleng e to his sentence and is entitled to a newsentenc ing pr ocee ding.” United States v. Sdoulam, 398 F.3d 981, 995 (8th Cir. 2005). 66 dif fe re nt unde r the ne wm ode l. I am thus firm ly

convinced that Boo ker constituti onal error is structural er ro r. I n th e ne xt P ar

t, I e xpl ai n th e sig nif

ic an ce of thi s c onc lus ionin the pla inerro r co nt ex t. III . It is cl ear that stru ct

ur al e rr or s are not

sub j ec t t o harm le ss- er

ro r an al y sis and the re fo re a lw ay s r equir e re ve rs al if ati m el y obj ec tio n is m ad e. F ulm inante , 499 U. S. at 309-10, 111 S. Ct. at 1264-65 . Rodriguez did no t raise a constitu tional objec tion to his sentence, howe ver, so the questi on here is how structural er rors are to be treated under the plain-err or test. T he Suprem e Court has never 14 squarely addressed this iss ue, but on several occa sions it has sugg ested that str uc tur al e rr or s are not

sub j ec t t o th e subs tanti al -r igh ts p ro ng o f the pla in- er ro r te st. S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. D om ing ue z- Be nit ez , 542 U . S. 74, __, 124 S . Ct . 233 3, 2339 -4 0, 159 L . E d. 2d 1 57 ( 2004 ); U nit ed S ta te s v. Co tto n, 535 U . S. 625 , 632 -3 3, 122 S. Ct . 178 1, 178 5- 86, 152 L . E d. 2d 8 60 ( 2002 ); Joh nson , 520 U . S. a t 46 8- 69, 117 S. Ct. at 1549-50 ; Olano, 507 U.S . at 736, 113 S. Ct. at 1778. Sim ilar67

statem ents can be found in a num ber of our opinion s, see , e .g. , Mc Coy v. United St at es , 266 F . 3d 1 245, 125 2 n. 9 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ( “ Appr en di e rr or is a co nst itu tio na l e rr or , sub

j ec t t o pl ai n- or

harm le ss- er

ro r re vie w , and d oe s no t c re at e a str uc tur al e rr or . ”) ; U nit ed

S ta te s v. S m ith , 240 F . 3d 9 27, 930 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) (“ [F] ailure to subm it the issu e of drug quantityto the jury did no t affe ct De fendants’ subst antial rights. Apprendi did not create a structural er ror that w oul d r equir e pe r se r ev er sa l. ”) ; U nit ed S ta te s v. F ro st, 139 F . 3d 8 56, 859 ( 11th Ci r. 19 98 ) (d is cu ss in g J oh ns on , supr a), as well as t ho se of o th er ci rcu it s, s ee, e.g ., U nit ed S ta te s v. Br

uno, 383 F . 3d 6 5, 79 ( 2d C ir . 200 4) ; U nit ed S ta te s v. A dam s, 252 F. 3d 2 76, 285 & n. 6 ( 3d C ir . 200 1) ; U nit ed S ta te s v. W ils on, 240 F . 3d 3 9, 44 (D . C. Ci r. 200 1) . Mo re ove r, tho se c ir cu its that have squ ar el y a ddr es se d th is i ssu e have held that structural errors are not subject to substantial-rights analy sis un der the pla in- er

ro r te st— or , state d di ff

er en tly , are pr es um ed

to have a ff

ec te d th e de fe ndant’ s su

bst an tia l r igh ts. S ee U nit ed S ta te s v. Re ci o, 371 F . 3d 1 093, 110 3 (9th Cir. 2004 ); U nited States v. D avid, 83 F. 3d 63 8, 646-47 (4th Cir. 1996). T ha t stru ct

ur al e rr or s sh oul d no t be sub j ec t t o su bst an tia l- ri ght s ana ly sis se em s ob vio us t o m e. I nde ed , F ed er al Ru le of Cr im ina l P ro ce dur e 52, r ea d inli ght of the Suprem e Court’ s structural err or cases, com pels this conclusion . Rule 52(a) defines harm less error as “ [a] ny err or . . . that does not aff ect substantial righ ts.”68

And Rule 52(b) say s that we m ay corre ct “ [a] plain error that a ffec ts sub stantial ri ght s. ” T hus, w he n th e Su pr em e Co urt sa id tha t stru ct ur al e rr or s “ de fy

ana ly sis by ‘ harm le ss- er

ro r’ standard s, ” Fu lm inante , 499 U . S. a t 30 9, 111 S . Ct . a t 12 65, it m eant tha t stru ct

ur al e rr or s “ de fy ” subs tanti al -r igh ts ana ly sis , f or sub stanti al -r igh ts an al y sis and h ar

m le ss- er ro r an al y sis are one in the sam e. O lano, 507 U . S. a t 73 4, 113 S. Ct . a t 17 78 ( statin g th at the onl y dif fe re nc e be tw ee n th e tw o is that the de fe ndant b ears the bur de n of pe rs ua sio n un de r the f

orm er and the G ove rn m en t unde r the latte r) . I c annot im ag ine howan e rr or

w oul d “ de fy ” subs tanti al -r igh ts analy sis un der Rule 52(a) but no t under Rule 52(b). T herefor e, structural err ors cannot be sub

j ect to the third prong o f the plain-err or test. This does not m ean that str uc tur al e rr or s are pe r se r ev er sib le und er the pla in- er

ro r standard , se e John son, 520 U.S . at 466, 117 S. Ct. at 1548; Recio, 371 F.3d at 1100 n.4; David, 83 F. 3d at 647- 48, but

it doe s m ean th at

w e cannot

a ff irm sim ply be ca use the de fe ndant i s una ble sho wthat hi s su

bst an tia l r igh ts w er e af

fe ct ed . Be ca use str uc tur al e rr or s are not

sub j ec t t o su bst an tia l- ri ght s ana ly sis , the pa ne l’s re li an ce o n J on es v. Un it edSta te s, 5 27 U.S. 37 3, 1 19 S. Ct. 2 09 0, 1 44 L. Ed. 2d 370 (1999), is m isplaced. I n Jones, the defendant argued that the j ury wa s erroneously

“ led to believe that if it could n ot reach a unanim ous sent ence recom m endation h e w ouldrec eive a j udge-im posed sent ence less severe than life69

im pr iso nm en t. ” I d. a t 38 4, 119 S . Ct . a t 21 00. T he Co urt f ir st h el d th at

no e rr or wa s com m itted. Id. at 389-90, 119 S. Ct. at 2102. It then explained that “ [e] ven assum ing, arguendo, that an er ror occurr ed (and that it wa s plain),” and further as sum ing that the j ur or s w er e co nf use d ov er the c onse que nc es of de ad loc k, pe tit ion er

c annot sho wthe c onf

usi on n ec es sari ly

w orke d to his de tr im en t. I t i s j ust

a s li ke ly that the j ur or s, loath t o r ec om m en d a lesser sentence, would have com prom ised on a sentence of life im prisonm ent as on a death sentence. Where the e ffec t of an alleged er ro r is s o un ce rt ai n, ade fe ndant c annot m ee t hi s burd enof

sho w ing that the e rr or

a ct ua lly a ff ec te d hi s su

bst an tia l r igh ts. Id. at 394-95 , 119 S. Ct. at 2105. T he dissent in Jones respond ed only that such u n c e rt a i n ty s h o u l ds a t i s f

y t h e s ub s t an t i a l - r i g h t s p r o n g o f th e p l a i n - e rr o r

t e s t : “I w oul d de m

ur . . . to that po sit ion . I t sh oul d su ff ic e that the pot en tia l t o c onf use existed, i.e ., that the instructio ns couldhave tilted the jury towar d death.” I d. at 416, 119 S . Ct . a t 21 15- 16 ( G ins bur g, J. , dis se nti ng) . I n othe r w or ds, the dis se nt ar gue d on ly

that the de fe ndant h ad

m ad e a suf

fi ci en t sh ow ing that the e rr or af fe ct ed his sub stanti al r igh ts, not that he w as not

r equir ed to do s o. N ei the r the m aj or ity nor the dis se nt e ve r m en tio ne d th e co nc ep t of “ str uc tur al e rr or . ” N or , f

or that m atte r, did

any of the part ie s inJon es , e ith er in the br ie fs or

a t or al arg um en t. It is cl ear that Jo ne s di d no t i nvol ve str uc tur al e rr or

and, the re fo re , doe s no t re sol ve thi s c as e. I nst ea d, Jon es announc es age ne ra l r ule of thum b th at the defendant loses if we can only speculate as to whether

he w as prej udiced by

an70

ordinary trial er ror to w hich didnot ob

j ect. Jones would no t apply if, for exam

ple, the j udge f

or got to giv e a re as ona

ble -d oubt ins tr uc tio n and the de fe ndant d id n ot obj ec t; that i s, w e co uld

not say , “ W el l, the de fe ndant d id n ot o bj ec t, and w e j ust don’ t kn oww ha t, if

any , pr ej udi ce thi s om iss ionc au se d hi m , so h e fa ils the pla inerror test.” Beca

use Booker constitu tional error is also structural err or, Jones does not appl y here e ither. IV. As Judge Carnes say s, no feder al court has explicitly held, as I would, that Bo oke r co nst itu tio na l e rr or is str uc tur al e rr or . A nte , a t 6. Whil e te ch nic al ly ac curate , thi s st at em en t i s a t l ea st a li ttl e m isl ea din g. A ft er

a ll, the T hir d, F ourth, an d S ixth C ir cu its appe ar to thi nk tha t e ve ry

Bo oke r co nst itu tio na l e rr or a ff ec ts subs tanti al r igh ts, w hic h is r ea lly a ll that c al lin g su che rr or “ str uc tur al ” m eans i n the pla in- er

ro r co nte xt. S ee , e . g. , U nit ed S ta te s v. S piv ey , 200 5 W L 647 345, a t *5 (3d Cir. Mar. 22, 2005); United States v. Hughes, __ F. 3d __ , 2005 W L 628224, at *5- 12 ( 4thCi r. Mar. 16, 200 5) ; U nit ed S ta te s v. O liv er , 397 F . 3d 3 69, 379 -8 0 ( 6th Cir. 2005 ). T he Ninth Circuit also took th is pos ition initially , though it h as since granted rehear ing en banc. U nited States v. A m eline, 400 F. 3d 64 6, 654 (9th Cir. 2005 ), r eh ’ g e n banc gr an te d, __ F . 3d _ _, 200 5 W L 612 710 (9 th C ir . Mar. 11, 2005 ). Indeed, the only

rea l differe nce betwe en these opini ons and m ine is that71

m ine offer s a m ore satisfactory rationale for its result. Se e infra note 19. In ad dit ion , the E igh th i s st ill y et to w ei gh i n onthi s is sue w ithasig nif ic an t op ini on, and the Tenth Circ uit has addressed on ly statutory Booker err or. See United St at es v. G onz al ez -H ue rt a, __ F . 3d _ _, 200 5 W L 807 008, a t *3 ( 10th C ir . Apr . 8, 20 05 ) (en ba nc ) (“ Thi s ca se pre se nt s u s wi th a no n- co ns ti tu ti on al Bo ok er erro r.”). Thus, I do not believe that m y opini on is nearly

so radical as Judge Carnes sugg es ts. InBo oke r, the Co urt i nstru ct ed that “ in c as es not

inv olv ing aS ixth Am endm ent violatio n, whether resentencing is warranted or whether it will instead be suf fi ci en t t o r ev ie wase nte nc e fo r re as ona ble ne ss m ay

de pe nd u pon ap pli catio n of th e h arm le ss -err ordo ct rin e.” Bo ok er, 1 25 S. Ct. at 76 9 (e m ph as is ad de d) . Judg e Carn es f

ai rl y sum m ar iz es w ha t I inf

er f ro m thi s in str uc tio n: 1 ) the harm le sser ro r doc tr ine doe s no t a

ppl y to “ ca se s . . . inv olv ing aS ixth A m en dm en t vi ol at io n” ; 2 ) erg o, Bo ok er erro rs “ in vo lv in g aSix th Am en dm en t v io la ti on ”—i .e., constitu tional Book er e rrors—m ust be structural errors, for only structural err ors defy harm less-err or analy sis; and, 3) ergo, all constitu tional Book er e rrors af fect subs tanti al r igh ts f

or pla in- er ro r pur pose s. S ee ante , a t 8- 9. Jud ge Carn es say s,

“N ev er ha s so m uc h be eninf

er re d f ro m so l itt le . ” I d. P ro posi tio ns 2 and 3 in thi s ch ai n are , how ev er , r el at ive ly unc ontro ve rs ia l, and I do n ot unde rs tand JudgeJ udg e Carne s say s that my approa ch to the plain-e rror test will result in all sentences 15 inv olv ingc on sti tut ion a l e rr or be ingva c ate d. Th is i s so , h e sa y s, be c a us e “ She lto n e ff

e c tiv e ly a dd s th at whe re the thi rd

pr on gof the pla in e rr or

te st i s me t in

[B oo ke r] c a se s, the fo ur

th o ne wi ll b e a l s o . ” A n t e , at3 - 4 ( c i t i n gS h e l t o n , 4 0 0 F . 3 d at1 3 3 3 - 3 4 ) . T h ati s n o th o wI r e a d S h e l t o n . If that c a se do e s, in f

a c t, h old that th e thi rd

and fo ur th p ro ng s o f t

he te st a lw ay s g o h and -i n- ha nd in B oo ke r c a se s, it c e rt a inl y do e s so su

btl y . T he pa ssa g e Judg e Carn e s c ite s st ate s:

72 Carnes to disagree w ith them —that is, it is clear

that onlystructural err ors defy ha rm le ss -err oran al y si s an d t ha t s tru ctur al erro rs alwa y s af fect subs ta nt ia l ri gh ts . A s su ch , Jud ge Carn es r ea lly onl y take s is sue w ithpr opos iti on 1 . I be lie ve that I m ak e a soun d c as e in P ar t I that the Co urt’ s st at em en t r eg ar din g c as es not inv olv ing S ixth A m en dm en t e rr or w oul d be sup er fl uous if

it doe s no t m ean w ha t I conclude it m eans, but m y m ain poin t here is that the extent of m y inference shou ld n ot b e ove rs ta te d: p ro posi tio ns 2 and 3 f oll owlog ic al ly

if pr opos iti on 1 is ac ce pte d. J u d g e C arn e s th e nar g u e s th a t“ [ t ]h e r e ar e a l l k i n d s o f p r o b l e ms wi th [ my ] the or y . ” A nte , a t 9. H e say s th at it c ontra dic ts the Bo oke r Co urt’ s e xpe ct at ion that we “ apply

ordinary prudential do ctrines, determ ining , f or exam ple, whether the iss ue w as r ai se d be lowand whe the r it fa ils the ‘ pla in- er ro r’ te st. ” Bo oke r, 125 S. Ct . a t 76 9. T his sim

ply is not so. I n c as es inv olv ing onl y statut or y e rr or , Jud ge Carn es and I w oul d, I thi nk, appl y the pla in- er

ro r te st i n m

uc h th e sam e w ay . A nd ev enin ca se s in vol vin g c onst itu tio na l e rr or , I w oul d r equir e the de fe ndant t o sa tis fy the f ourth p ro ng o f the te st. T hus, m y appr oa chis in n o se nse in co nf lic t 15A plain er ror a ffe ctingsubstantial rig hts does not, without more, satisfy the plain-er ror test, for

otherwise the fourth prongand the discr etion aff orded by the fourth prongwould be illusory . We conclude that the fourth prongis established here and that an e x erc ise of our discr etion is warr anted in this particular case . The district cour

t in this case indicated a

n express desire to impose a se nte nc e le sse r t

ha n th e low e nd of the Gu ide lin e s r ang e of

13 0 mo nth s’ imprisonment, and the Supreme Court in B ooker pla inly indicated that the district c ourt no w h a s th e dis c re tio n to do so , p ro vid e d th e re su lti ngse nte nc e is rea sonable in lig ht of the § 3553(a ) fa ctors. Unde r these c ircumstance s, defe ndant Shelton has car

ried his burde n to establish the fourth prongand has shown that the pla in e rr or

that a ff e c te d h is s ub sta

nti a l r ig hts a lso se ri ou sly

a ff e c te d th e fa ir

ne ss, integ rity or public re putation of the judicial proc eeding s in his particular c ase. Acc ording ly , we va cate Shelton’s sentence and re mand for r esente ncingconsistent with Booke r. Shelton, 400 F.3d at 1333-34. Ido expect that in most cases the de fenda nt will also satisfy

the fourth pr ongof the plainerr or test if he is able to satisfy the third prong . But if, f or example, the Gove rnment could show that the district court e x presse d a strongdesire to impose a more seve re se ntence than the Guidelines per

mitted because of circ umstances not ea sily counter ed by

mitigatingevidenc e, decliningto corre ct the plain er ror would not lea d to a “misca rriag e of justice.” Of c ourse, unde r the pa ne l’ s a pp ro a c h, su c h a

de fe nd ant w ou ld n e ve r g e t pa st the thi rd pr on gof the pla in- e rr or

te st any wa y . A s su c h, pa

rt of the re a so n Jud g e Carn e s th ink s th at my a pp ro a c h w ou ld m e an th at a ll sentenc es involving c onstitut ional err or would satisfy the plain-e rror

test is a direc t result of an aspec t of the pane l opinion with which Idisag ree and would not follow. Ialso note that, addr essingstatutory err or only , the Tenth Circuit re cently reje cted the proposition for which Judge Carnes r eads Shelton to stand:

As a pr e lim ina

ry matte r, we no te tha

t in the wa ke of B oo ke r s e ve ra l c ourt s of a pp e a ls h ave c oll a

ps e d th e thi rd

and fo ur th p ro ngana ly se s. Th at is to s ay , if the se c ourt s f

ind the thi rd pr on gsatis fi e d, the y

c on c lud e tha

t th e fo ur th p ro ngis me t a s a matte r o f c ours e . We c ann ot s ub sc ri be to t his a pp ro a c h. Th e Court

in Olano cle arly

held that “a

plain err or af

fec ting substantial rights does not, without more, satisfy

the . . . standar d, for other wise the discr etion aff

orded by Rule 52(b) would be illusory .” Gonzalez-Huerta , __ F.3d at __, 2005 WL807008, at *6 (c itation omit ted) (quotingOlano, 507 U.S. at 737, 113 S. Ct . at 1779); see also Gonzalez-Huer ta, __ F.3d at __, 2005 WL807008, at *12 n.2 (Ebel, J., concurr ing) (“I agree with both the majority opinion and with J udg e Ha rtz that we c ann ot c on fl ate the thi rd and fo ur th p ro ng s o f t

he pla in- e rr or

ana ly sis . Rathe r, we mus t addre ss these two inquiries sepa rate ly .”). J udg e Carne s further

argues that it would be “diff icult to just ify

a conc lusion that an err or that is structural does not ‘se riously aff ect[] t he fa irness, integ rity or public re putation of judicial proce eding s,’” a

nd that, “[s] o far

as ca n be discove red, no c ourt has eve r ac tually ” re ache d such a c on c lus ion . Ante , at 12 (q uo tin gOl ano , 5 07 U. S. at 73 2, 11 3 S. Ct. at 17 76 ). Th e Sup re me

73Court, however , has twice conclude d that a def endant f ailed to satisfy

the fourth pr ongof the plain-er ror test e ven assumingthat the er ror c laimed was both plain a nd structura l. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 632-34, 122 S. Ct. at 1786-87; J ohnson, 520 U.S. at 468-70, 117 S. Ct. at 1549-50. Al tho ugh th e Court

did no t a c tua lly

say tha t th e e rr or s it

a dd re sse d in the se c a se s w e re str

uc tur a l, it necessa rily held that, in g ener al, structura l error s do not per se a ffe ct the fa irness, integ rity , or pu bli c re putatio n o f j ud ic ia l pr oc e e din g s. Othe rw ise , th e Court wo uld have be e n r e qu ir e d to re a c h th e de fe nd ants ’ s tr

uc tur a l- e rr or

argume nts . F or

the same re a so n, Cotton

and John so n a lso nece ssarily

hold that the plain-er

ror test a pplies to even struc tural er rors, a nd, so far as I have dis c ov e re d, no c ourt

of a pp e a ls h a s h e ld o the rw ise . Jud g e Carn e s’ s o pin ion is i nc on sis te nt w ith this holdi ng , as he a ll but say s that structural e rror s are per se reve rsible eve n in the plain-er ror context. Moreove r, in the same pa ragraph, the Court also stated, “[W] e must apply today ’s 16 holdings—both the Six th Amendment holding a nd our re medial interpre tation of the Sentenc ing Act—to all ca ses on direc t review . That fa ct does not mea n that we be lieve that eve ry sentenc e g ives rise to a Six th Amendment violation.” B ooker, 125 S. Ct. at 769. The pa nel’s appr oach rende rs the obser

vation that not “eve ry

sentenc e g ives rise to a Six th Amendment violation” superf luous beca

use Rodriguez and prog eny treat all Booke r er

rors e x actly

the same. See ante, at 4 (“B eca use the e ffe ct of B ooker e rror is the same re g ardle ss of the ty pe, our de cisions make no functional distinction betwee n constitutional and statutory err or. F or purpose s of the plain er ror rule, unpre serve d err or is unprese rved e rror .”). 74 w iththe S upr em e Co urt’ s e xpe ct at ionr eg ar din g th e ap pli ca bil ity of the pla in- er

ro r test. F or the sam e re asons, it is entirely consistent with the Court’ s statem ent that not “ ev er y appe al w ill le ad

to a ne wse nte nc ing he ar ing . ” I d. 16 Judg e Carn es ne xt atta ck s m y dis tin ct ionbe tw ee n c onst itu tio na l e rr or s and st atut ory erro rs , arg ui ng th atitlac ks supp or t “ in law o r lo gi c.” Ant e, at13 . Appare ntl y , he thi nks that the re is no d if fe re nc e be tw ee n ac as e in whic h th e de fen da nt ’s con st it ut io na l ri gh ts were v io la te d a nda cas e in whi ch th ey were n ot . I thi nk tha t the re is. T he S upr em e Co urt se em s to thi nk s o, too . S ee Bo oke r, 125 S. Ct . a t 76 9 ( “ [W ] e m

ust appl y tod ay ’ s ho ldi ngs—

both th e Si xthA m en dm en tThe Te nth Circuit has also noted the distinction betwee n constitutional and non- 17 c o n s t i tu t i o n a l B o o k e r

e r r o r s . S e e G o n z a l e z - H u e rt a , _ _ F . 3 d at_ _ , 2 0 0 5 W L 8 0 7 0 0 8 , at* 4 . It “[held] t hat non-c onstitut ional Booke r er ror is not structura l error ,” id., but did not reac h the i s s u e o f c o n s t i tu t i o n a l B o o k e r

e r r o r . In c o n c l u d i n g , a s I d o , th atn o n - c o n s t i tu t i o n a l ( o r s t atu t o r y) B oo ke r e rr or

is n ot s tr uc tur a l, i t ob se rv e d th at th e Sup re me Court ha s im pli e d th at “ g e ne ra lly speakingstructura l error s must, at a minimum , be constitutional err ors.” I d.; see supra note 7 & a c c omp anyingte xt (c oll e c tin gc a se s and ob se rv ingthe same ). L ate r i n it s o pin ion , th e Te nth Cir c uit a lso no te d th e no rm ativ e dif fe re nc e be tw e e n c on sti tut ion a l and statut or y B oo ke r e rr or s: Th e e rr or of wh ic h [th e de fe nd ant] c omp la ins is n ot t he su bs tanti ve e rr or

fi rs t rec og nized in Blakely

and which B ooker sought to eliminate—namely , that the Six th Amendment is violated when a judge , rathe r than a

jury , finds fac ts that mandatorily

incre ase a

defe ndant’s sente nce. Rather, the e rror in [ this] case—that the Di str ic t Co ur

t a pp lie d th e Gu ide lin e s ma nd ator ily —is on ly e rr or ins of ar a s it 75 hol din g and o ur

r em ed ia l i nte rp re ta tio n of the S en te nc ing A ct

—t o a ll ca se s on direct re view. T hat fact does not m ean that we believe that every sentence gives ri se to a Si xthA m en dm en t vi olatio n. . . . [ A nd] in ca se s no t i nvol vin g aS ixth Am endm ent violatio n, whether resentencing is warranted or whether it will instead be suf fi ci en t t o r ev ie wase nte nc e fo r re as ona ble ne ss m ay

de pe nd u pon ap pli catio n of the harm less-err or doctrine.” (em phasis add ed and citations o m itted)). Stated d i ff er en t l y, st at u t o ry Bo o k ererro rs ar e mer el y a b ypr o du ct o f B o o k er ’s

“ unnecessarily

broad rem edy ,” id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenti ng), whereas co nst itu tio na l B ooke r er

ro rs are vio la tio ns o f the S ixth A m en dm en t r equir em en t that, “ [o ] the r than th e fa ct of apr ior c onvi ct ion , any

f ac t tha t i nc re as es the pe na lty f o r ac r i me b e yo n dth e p r e s c r i b e ds t a tu t o ry m a x i mum m u s tb e s ub mi t t e dt o aju ry, and proved bey ond a reasonable doub t.” Apprendi, 530 U.S . at 490, 120 S. Ct. at 2362 -63. Moreover, as Judge Carnes concedes, see ante, at 14 n.4, this court has

17runs af oul of the Court’s re medy for the unc onstitut ional implications of the Guidelines. This disconnec t betwee n the constitutional violation and the remedy makes B ooker unique . . . . The for tuity of the Court’s c hoice to excise 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)( 1), instead of

a re medy more dire ctly

related to the under lying constitutional problem, is key to our deter

mination that the District Court’s err oneous—althoug h not constituti onally err oneous—mandatory

application of the Guidelines is not particula rly egreg ious or a miscar

riag e of justice. Gonzalez-Huerta , __ F.3d at __, 2005 WL807008, at *8. Althoug h Ido not ag ree with all of the Tenth Circuit’s ana ly sis, Ido agree that there is an important distinction between c onstitut ional and statut or y B oo ke r e rr or s. J udg e Carne s may

be cor rec t that Sanchez’s statement is “pur e dicta.” Ante, at 14 n.4. 18 As such, I do not sugg est that he is “bound” by it. I d. My

only surprise is that what this court said—in an en ba

nc opinion that J udg e Carne s joined—less than four year s ag o is today thought so obviously

wrongheade d. 76 alrea dy stated once that onlyconstitu tional errors can be structura l error s. S ee Sanc he z, 269 F . 3d at 12 72 n . 41. 18 Judg e Carn es the n r el ie s onS an ch ez , arg uin g th at it s ho ldi ng “ that Appr en di er ro r is n ot s tr

uc tur al answ er s th e que sti on o f w he the r Bo oke r er ro r is s tr uc tur al , be ca use Bo oke r is an a

ppl ic at ionof

Appr en di o nc e re m ove d. ” A nte , a t 16 . T his state m en t i s ob vio usl y

w ro ng. B ec au se the Guid el ine s w er e sti ll bin din g po stAppr en di, ac ourt r ev ie w ing Appr en di e rr or c oul d si m

ply de te rm ine w he the r the ev ide nc e supp ortin g any

j udi ci al f ac t- fi ndi ng w as so c le ar

that f ai lur e to s ubm it the iss ue to a j ur

y w as harm le ss; if

it w as , the n th e er

ro r w as harm le ss p re ci se ly because the G uidelin es we re still bindi ng. But post-Booker, even if the evidence supp orting all facts found bythe j udge is ov erwhelm ing, we can still onlyguess as to wha t se nte nc e the j udge m igh t have im pose d un de r ana dvi sor

y -g uid el ine77

re g i m e. We, t h er ef

o re , c an n o tkn o w wh et h erth e e rr o r a ff ec t edth e d ef

en d an t ’s subs tantial rights. This is w hy Booker constitut ional error is structural even tho ugh Appr en di e rr or

w as not . U nli ke Bo oke r, Appr en di d id n ot f undam en ta lly alter the sentencing fram ew ork, and the ef fects of Apprendi error w ere j ust as de te rm ina ble a s th e ef

fe ct s of any oth er sor t of tr ia l e rr or . I nde ed , apane l of thi s co urt, in anopi nio n Ju dge Carn es j oin ed , ha s a lr ea dy obs er ve d th at “ Bl ak el y e rr or in the S en te nc ing G uid el ine s c ont ex t . . . w as j udi ci al ve rs us j ur y f ac t- fi ndi ng o f se nte nc ing e nhanc em en ts and i s e nti re ly dif fe re nt f ro m the e rr or w e nowkno wto ex ist und er Bo oke r as to the S en te nc ing G uid el ine s. ” U nit ed S ta te s v. S he lto n, 400 F.3d 132 5, 1333 n.12 (11th Cir. 2005 ) (e m phasis add ed). Fi na lly , Jud ge Carn es arg ue s th at m ost m iti ga tin g e vid en ce or

arg um en t a de fe ndant m igh t pr es en t un de r the pos t- Bo oke r se nte nc ing m ode l sh oul d a lr ea dy be in the r ec or d be ca

use it w as arg uably

r el ev an t ( pr e- Bo oke r) to de te rm ini ng the de fen da nt ’s sen te nc e wit hi n h is gu id el in e-m an da te d ra ng e. See an te , at 2 1- 24 . T his m ay be the c as e w ithr es pe ct

to som e ty

pe s of m iti ga tin g e vid en ce , but it ign or es r ea lity

to sugg es t tha t i t i s tr

ue a cr oss the board . F or

e xam ple , a lth oughit wa s theoretically

possi ble under the old m odel for a defe ndant to seek a sentence at the low end of a

m andatory

guidelin e range by

presenting statis tical evidence that the Sentencing Comm issio n had overestim ated the need for gener al deterr enceThis is essentially the position taken by

the Four th and Six th Circuits. E.g., United 19 States v. Hug hes, __F .3d__, 2005 WL628224, at *5-12 (4th Cir. Mar ch 16, 2004) ; United States v. Oliver, 397 F .3d 369, 379-80 (6th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Ameline, 400 F .3d 646, 654 (9th Cir. 2005), vac ated a nd reh’ gen banc g rante d, __ F.3d __, 2005 WL612710 (9th Cir. Marc h 11, 2005). In prac tice, this approa ch re ache s the same r esult as mine in case s involving c on sti tut ion a l e rr or . M y

dis a g re e me nt g oe s o nly

to i ts r e a so nin g . It is ina c c ur ate to s ay that a de fe nd ant h a s a c tua lly

e sta bli sh e d a n e ff e c t on his su bs tanti a l r ig hts if

we c an o nly

gue ss a s to what sente nce he might g et under the new se ntencingmodel. In short, these c ourts require the

78 w ithr es pe ct

to his of fe nse in his part ic ular co m m uni ty , I pe rs ona lly

ne ve r he ar d of suc h an arg um en t be ing m ad e. N ow , how ev er , suc h S en te nc ing Co m m iss ion policy j udgm ents are open to attack in any given case. In sum , m y opini on is no t nearly

so nov el as Judge Carnes suggests, it does not de pe nd o n any

m onum en ta l i nf

er en tia l l ea

p, and i t i s e nti re ly

c onsi ste nt w ith the Suprem e Court’ s opin ion in Booker. The distin ction I drawbetwee n co nst itu tio na l and s ta tut or y Bo oke r er

ro rs ha s am

ple sup port i n lawand l ogi c; in fa ct , it is not e ve n unpr ec ed en te d inthi s c ir cu it. F ina lly , Jud ge Carn es ’ s op ini on i s ground ed in large part on the faulty assum ption s that Apprendi error and Booker er ro r ar e es se nti al ly

the sam e an d th at

Bo oke r re al ly

w on’ t do that m

uc h to c hange the ty pe of the e vid en ce and arg um en t pr es en te d a t f ed er al se nte nc ing he ar ing s. V. I te nd t o a gr ee w iththe pane l i n th is c as e that w e cannot auto m at ic al ly equa te pr ej udi ce w iththe im posi tio n of

e xtr a- ve rd ic t se nte nc ing e nhanc em en ts, sin ce the se sam e enhanc em en ts m ust be c onsi de re d un de r the ne wm ode l. I 19defe ndant to show that his substantial rights we re a ffe cted only to find that they

wer e in eve ry case involving constitutional err or, whe rea s Iwould simply say that no such showingis require d. To the extent that some courts ar e automatica lly vacating se ntence s that involve only statutory err or, e.g ., United States v. McCrave n, __ F.3d __, 2005 WL608263, at *6 (6th Cir. Marc h 17, 2005), this cannot be c orre ct bec ause it re nders mea ningle ss the Supreme Court’s instruction that we a pply the plain-e rror

test to cases pe nding on dir ect r eview. The Sec ond, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have adopted the nove l approa ch of r emanding a ll B oo ke r c a se s to a llo w the dis tr ic t c ourt to d e te rm ine wh e the r t

he de fe nd ant’ s su

bs tanti a l r ig hts wer e af fec ted so as to re quire a

new se ntencinghear ing. See United States v. Coles, __ F.3d __, 2005 WL783069, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 8, 2005) ; United States v. Crosby , 397 F.3d 103, 117- 11 8 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 5) ; Pa la din o, 40 1 F .3 d at 48 3- 85 . T o th e e xtent th at th is a pp ro a c h f a ils to distinguish betwee n constitutional and statutory err or, it is inconsistent with t he B ooker r emedial opinion. Moreover , g iven the sig nificant diff ere nces be tween the old and new se ntencing models, “the only

way to know whether

a diffe rent sente nce w ould have be en imposed under advisory guidelines” is to actua lly hold a full hea

ring . Paladino, 401 F.3d at 488 (Kanne , J ., dissenting f

rom the denia l of rehe aringen banc ). I f this is what the district court is to do, then thi s a pp ro a c h is no mor e e ff

ic ie nt t ha n s imp ly re mand ingfo r a

ne w h e ari ng , a s I

wo uld do in a ll case s involving constitutional error . I f, howe ver, the district court is only g oing to take a “quic k loo k” on re mand , id . at 48 6 ( Rip ple , J., dis se nti ngfr om t he de nia l of

re he a ri nge n b anc ), the n it overlooks the f

undamental c hang e B ooker ha s wrought in the fede ral sente ncingframework a nd fails to fully

reme dy structura l constituti onal er rors. F inally , by

rema nding e ven ca ses involving only statutory err or, this approa ch fa ils to relieve district cour ts of any of the burde n the limiti ng final par agraph of

the B ooker r emedial opinion see ks to avoid. 79 com pletely agree with the panel that we cannot kno w what effe ct Booker er ror had on Ro dr ig ue z’s se nt en ce. I t ak e a d iff eren t l es so n fr om

th is un cert ai nt y , th ou gh . Be ca use it s e ff ec ts “ ar e ne ce ssari ly

unquanti fi ab le and i nde te rm inate , ” Su lli van, 508 U . S. a t 28 1- 82, 113 S . Ct . a t 20 83, and b ec au se Bo oke r dr am at ic al ly “ af fe ct [s ] the f ram ew ork w ith in whic h [ se nte nc ing ] pr oc ee ds, ” Fu lm inante , 499 U . S. a t 31 0, 111 S. Ct. at 1265, Booker err or is structural in nature. Moreover, treating Booker constitu tional error as structural e rror w ouldgive effe ct to the distin ction Book er dr aws be twee n c on st it ut io na l an d s ta tu to ry erro r. See 1 25 S. Ct. at 76 9.80

The panel e rrs by

acce pting Booker’ s invit ation to “ apply ordinary prudential do ctrines” w ithou t following its im plicit ins truction as to ho w they shou ld be applied. Id. A s a result, it erroneously requires Rodriguez to prove an ef fe ct o nh i s “ s ub s t an t i al ri g h t s .” Th i s an i m p o rt an ti s s u e b ec au s e t h e p an el ’s opi nio n im

pose s avir

tua lly im poss ibl e bur de n onalarg e cl as s of de fe ndants w h o s e c a s e s ar e s t i l l i nth e p i p e l i n e o nd i r e c tap p e a l . O u r r u l e w i l l “c o n d e mn som e unkno wn fr action of crim inal defendants to serve an illegal sentence.” Paladino, 401 F.3d at 484. T he panel does not deny that this is th e case . It concedes that it has no way of knowing whether Rodriguez is serving an illegal sentence. Rodriguez, 398 F. 3d at 130 1. A t a m inim um , w e know that his sentence w as im pose d inan un co nst itu tio na l m anne r. N ev er the le ss, the pane l r ef

use s to gr an t a ne wse nte nc ing he ar ing . F or the f or eg oin g r ea sons , I dis se nt f ro m the denial of rehear ing en banc.United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2005). 1 81 BARKE TT , C ircuit Judg e, dissenti ng from denial of rehearing en banc: As an initial m atter, I agre e w ith Jud ge Tj oflat that the issue presented here is e m ine ntl y

w orthy of e n banc r ev ie w . F urthe rm or e, I f ind his r ea soni ng ex tr em el y pe rs ua siv e. H ow ev er , e ve n a ssum ing that c onst itu tio na l B ooke r er ro r is not “ str uc tur al , ” I be lie ve that the pane l e rr one ousl y appl ie s Jo ne s v. U nit ed

S ta te s, 527 U . S. 373 ( 1999 ), ins te ad of U nit ed S ta te s v. D om ing ue z Be nit ez , __ U . S. __, 124 S. Ct . 233 3 ( 2004 ). I n so doi ng, the pane l e rr one ousl y r equir es the de fe ndant to p ro ve that hi s “ subs tanti al r igh ts” w er e af fe ct ed by apr ep onde ranc e of

the ev ide nc e, ins te ad

of r equir ing him

to pr ove onl y

a“ re as ona

ble pr oba bil ity ” that, but for the error, the outcom e of the district court proceedings would have been dif fe re nt. Ro dr igu ez is a Bo oke r “pip el ine ” ca se w he re in the de fe ndant w as

1 unc onst itu tio na lly

se nte nc ed

be fo re Bo oke r w as de ci de d bu t di d no t pr es er ve the erro r fo r ap pe ll at e rev ie w. Con ced in g t ha t t he de fen da nt ha d m etth e fi rs t t wo pr ongs of the “pla in e rr or ” te st, Ro dr igu ez a ddr es se d th e que sti on p ose d by the third prong of that test, whether the defendant could prove that th e constituti onal vi ol at io n a ffec te d h is “ su bs ta nt ia l ri gh ts .” Ro dr ig ue z, 39 8 F .3dat 1 29 9- 13 00 . Ro dr igu ez he ld tha t i f the e vid en ce is in e qui poi se , the de fe ndant h as not m et hisDomingue z Benitez, 124 S. Ct . at 2340. 2 I d. (interna l quotation marks omitted) (citingStrickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 3 694 (1984), a

nd United States v. Ba g ley , 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). I d. at 2342 (Sca lia, J ., concur ringin the judgme nt) (empha sis added); see also id. at 4 2340 n.9 (“The rea sonable-pr obability standard is not the same as, and should not be c onfused with, a re quirement that a defe ndant prove by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that but for e rror things would have bee n differ ent.”) . 82 bur de n of pr oof . I d. I be lie ve thi s c onc lus ionc onf lic ts w iththe hol din g of Dom in gu ez Be ni te z, an d i nd eed , app li es th e p rep on de ran ce o f th e ev id en ce t es t, a standard of pr oof D om ing ue z Be nit ez spe ci fi ca lly r ej ec te d. InD om ing ue z Be nit ez , the S upr em e Co urt sp ec if ic al ly c lari fi ed : ( 1) that a de fe ndant p ro ve s th at

an e rr or a ff ec ts h is s ubst an tia l r igh ts b y e sta bli shi ng a

“ reasonable probability ” that, but for the error, the outcom e of the district court proceedings would hav e been diffe rent; (2) that a r easonable probabilit y of a 2 dif fe re nt r es ult

is one that i s “ suf

fi ci en t t o un de rm ine c onf ide nc e in the out co m e of the pr oc ee din g;” and ( 3) that this “ re as ona ble pr oba bil ity ” standard

dif fe rs f ro m 3 the “ less defendant-friendly ‘ m ore likely

than not’” preponderance of the evidence standard . 4 I ag re e that the de fe ndant b ears the bur de n of pr ovi ng this “ re as ona

ble pr oba bil ity . ” H ow ev er , I be lie ve the de fe ndant m ee ts this bur de n by sho w ing that: (1 ) the gui de lin es w er e m an da tor y and tha t no thi ng i n th e re co rd ind ic at es that theF or e xamp le , in

B oo ke r, the dis tr ic t c ourt in d e fe nd ant F anf

an’ s c a se did

no t a pp ly 5 applicable provisions of the guidelines eve n though the y wer e mandatory

at the time. United States v. Booke r, __ U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 738, 747 (2005). 83 dis tr ic t c ourt a

ppl ie d th e gui de lin es in a non- m an da tor y f as hio n; and ( 2) nothin g

5 in the record indicates that the district court would applythe sam e or a greater se nt en ce o n re m an d u nd er t he ne w, adv is ory gu id el in es . Although the panel repeate dly cites to the “ reasonable probability ” standard of D om ing ue z Be nit ez a s th e tou ch sto ne of it s in qui ry , ta lis m an ic r ep et iti on o f the pr ope r standard

doe s no t ne ce ssari ly

tr an slate int o it s f

ai thf ul a ppl ic at ion . D es pit e the pane l’ s r ep eate d a sse rt ion s to the c ontrary , id. , 398 F . 3d at 12 99- 1301 , the te st itap pl ie s ap pe ars id en ti cal to a “pr ep on de ran ce o f th e ev id en ce” s ta nd ard , a standard Dom ingu ez Be nitez explicitly rej ects as exce ssivelystringent. Rodriguez state s th at : if it is equa lly

pla usi ble that the er

ro r w orke d in f

av or of the de fe nse , the de fe ndant l ose s; i f the e ff ec t of the er ro r is so unce rt ai n th at

w e do n ot know which, if eith er, side it helped the defendant lo ses. W here e rrors co uld have c ut e ith er

w ay and unc er

ta inty e xis ts, the bur de n is the decisive factor in the third prong of the plain error test, and the bu rden is o n th e de fe ndant. Id . at 1 30 0. Re qui ri ng a

quantum of pr oof be y ond eq

uip ois e is the pr ep onde ranc e of the ev ide nc e standard . U nde r the pr ep onde ranc e of the e vid en ce te st, the de fe ndantJ udg e Carne s argues that my rea ding of

the “r easona

ble proba bility ” standa

rd diffe rs 6 from prior Circ uit case la w. He states that we ha

ve held in seve ral c ases that a defe ndant fa iled to meet the “r easona

ble proba bility ” standa

rd whe n there was no e vidence on the re cord that an alleg ed er ror pr ejudiced him. Ante, a t 32-33 (Carne s, J ., concur ringin denial of re h’gen banc ). Howeve r, I

do not believe that a

ny of the c ases he cites ar e of pa rticular significanc e to the inquiry here . In eac h case there was re cord e vidence contra dicting the defe ndant’s cla ims of prejudice . In Henr y v. Wainwright, the judge failed to instruct the jury about the conse quence s of a 6-6 split over whe ther to sentenc e the de fenda nt to death. 743 F.2d 761, 763 ( 11th Cir. 1984) (p e r c ur iam) . H ow e ve r, the re c or d c onta ine d e vid e nc e su g g e sti ngtha t th e jur y wa s n e ve r a c tua lly deadloc ked, bely

ing the defe ndant’s cla im that the lack of a n instruction prejudice d him. I d. Adams v. Wainwrig ht presente d a similar jury instruction claim in which the cour t felt “[b] ound by” He nry

beca use there was no e vidence that a dea dlock eve r existed in the first place, 764 F .2d 13 56 , 1 36 9 ( 11 th C ir . 1 98 5) , a nd a lso pr e se nte d a

n in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ou ns e l c la im wher ein the def

endant f ailed to re but a “strongpresumption” that a jur y is presumed to have fo llo we d th e tr ia l c ourt ’s e xpre ss, and c or re c t, i ns tr uc tio ns . I d. An d in

Str a ig ht v . Wa inwri g ht, the def endant’ s theory

of pre judice stemmingfrom alleg edly ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel was so attenuated as to borde r on the incr edulous. 772 F.2d 674, 680 ( 11th Cir. 1985). There , the def endant c laimed that his attorney rende red ine ffe ctive assistanc e by failingto “re habilitate” jurors who ha d stated “e ither that they could not return a

death pe nalty

in any case or that they 84 los es w he n th e ev ide nc e is i n e qui poi se be ca use he did

not pr es en t tha t sl igh t qu an tu m of e vi de nc e n eces sa ry

to ti p t he ba la nc e fro m

equi po is e to hi s fa vo r. See, e. g., Nat’ l Lim e A ss’ n v. E nvtl. Prot. Agency , 627 F. 2d 41 6, 453 n.139 (D. C. Cir. 1980 ) (“ [T ] he sta

ndard of or din ar y c ivi l l iti ga tio n, apr ep onde ranc e of the ev ide nc e, de m an ds o nly

51% c er ta inty . ”) ; B la ck ’ s L awD ic tio nary 120 1 ( 7the d. 1 9 9 9 ) . Ho w e v e r , Do mi n g u e z B e n i t e z s ays th a tth e “ r e a s o n ab l e p r o b ab i l i ty” standard is m ore lenient than the prepond erance of the evidence test. D om ingu ez Ben it ez, 1 24 S. Ct. at 23 42 (Sca li a, J., co nc urrin g i n t he jud gm en t); id . at 2 34 0 n .9. Thus, e quip oise m

ust of necessity

be sufficient to satisfy

the lesser burden of a r e a s o n ab l e p r o b ab i l i ty. 6could not evaluate the evide nce f airly , knowingthat the def endant wa s char g ed with a c apital crime.” I d. He c ontended that if his attorne y had succ essfully

coaxed out more ambiguous an s we rs ab o u tj uro rs ’ s en t i m en t s wi thre s p ec tt o th e d ea thp en al ty th ro u ghfu rt h er

qu es t i o n i n g, the pr os e c uti on

wo uld no t ha ve be e n a ble to s tr ike the m f

or c a us e , a nd wo uld thu s h ave ha d to e xpe nd “ e xpe ns ive ” pe re mpt or

y c ha lle ng e s to e lim inate the m. I d. Th e re su lt, a pp are ntl y , w ou ld have be en a jur

y somewhat less inclined to sente nce the defe ndant to death. I d. In Rodrigue z, in contrast, the defe ndant’s theor y of pre judice re quires no such f

lights of fanc y . We are cer

tain that the district court e rre d, and the c hance that this error pr ejudiced the defe ndant is quite rea l — just as likely as not, as the pa

nel itself admits. Furthe r, there is no evidenc e on the r ecor d in Rodrigue z contradictinga showingof pre judice. Indeed, that doctrine a

pplies to situations , unlike this one, where one Supreme Court 7 case is unmist akably

on point, but where the rationale underly ing that decision has bee n undermined indire ctly

by subsequent ca ses. See, e .g ., Tene t v. Doe, __ U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 1230, 12 38 (2 00 5) ; H ohn v . Unit e d St ate s, 52 4 U .S. 23 6, 25 2- 53 (1 99 8) ; A g os tin i v. F e lto n, 52 1 U .S. 20 3, 23 7 ( 19 97 ); Am . T ru c kin gAs s’ ns Inc . v . Sm ith , 4 96 U. S. 1 67 , 1 80 (1 99 0) (p lur a lity opinion). 85 To support this de fac to prepond erance of the evidence standard, Rodriguez reac hes back to the 199 9 decision J ones v. United State s, 527 U. S. 373, in which the Suprem e Court noted that when it wa s “ j ust as likely ” that an er

ror prej udiced the de fe ndant a s no t, the de fe ndant c annot m ee t hi s burd enof

sho w ing that the er ro r af fe ct ed his sub stanti al r igh ts. R odr igu ez , 398 F . 3d at 12 99- 1301 ( ci tin g Jones, 527 U.S . at 394-95 ). H owever , Jones w as decided we ll before D om ingu ez Be nit ez spe ci fi ca lly

e nunc ia te d th e standard

by w hic h th e de fe ndant m

ust pr ove pr ejud ic e in th e p la in -err or co nt ex t. Obviously , w e cannot hold th at the Suprem e Court has im plicitlyoverruled Jone s inD om ing ue z Be nit ez . R odr igu ez de Q uij as v. S he ar son/A m er ic anE xpr es s In c. , 490 U . S. 477 , 484 ( 1989 ). H ow ev er , w e ar e co nf ro nte d w ithlangua ge in 7I t would appea r that we are encounte ringthe difficulty of apply ing the various standa

rds 8 for a naly zing “pr ejudice” that J ustice Scalia pr edicted in Dominguez Be nitez. 124 S . Ct. at 2342 (S c a lia , J., c on c ur

ri ng ) ( “ B y

my c ount, thi s Co ur

t ha s a do pte d n o f

e we r t ha n f our a sse rt e dly differ ent standar ds of proba bility relating to the a ssessment of whe ther the outc ome of trial wo uld have be e n d if

fe re nt i f e rr or

ha d n ot o c c ur

re d... .Su c h in e ff

a ble g ra datio ns of

pr ob a bil ity se e m to me qu ite be yon d th e a bil ity of the jud ic ia l mi nd

(o r a ny min d) to gra sp .... Th at is espec ially so when they

are applied to the hy

pothesizi ngof eve nts that never in f act oc curr ed.”) . 86 Jone s th at is in d ir ec t c onf

lic t w iththe “ re as ona

ble pr oba bil ity ” standard

of D om ing ue z Be nit ez , statin g th at ade fe ndant c annot

pr ove pr ej udi ce w he n it

is

“ j ust a s li ke ly ” as not

that an e rr or

w as pr ej udi ci al . T he que sti on, the re fo re , is not w he the r D om ing ue z Be nit ez im pli ci tly ove rr ule d Jo ne s by

und er m ini ng i ts unde rl y ing r at ion al e, but

r athe r howto re sol ve the se se em ing ly ir re co nc ila ble ca se s. 8 T he S upr em e Co urt of

fe rs li ttl e gui danc e, if

any , about

the r ole of

aCo urt of Appeals w hen faced w ith conflicting prece dent, although Justice Scalia has re co gni ze d th at

suc h si tuatio ns d o ari se . K ai se r A lum inum & Ch em . Co rp . v. Bo nj or no, 494 U . S. 827 , 841 ( 1990 ) (S ca lia , J. , c onc ur ri ng) . H ow ev er , the Se ve nthCi rc uit , w he n f

ac ed w iththe c onf

lic t Ju sti ce S ca lia

a cknow le dge d in Bo nj or no, of fe re d so m e he lpf

ul a dvi ce . I t st at ed

that whe n w e ar e fa ce d w ith conflicting Suprem e Court prec edent, w e shouldattem pt to reconcile the two ca ses i naman n e r

w h i c h c o mp o rt s w i th th e i r u n d e r l yi n g p o l i c i e s . M o z e e v . A m. Com m ercia l Marine S vc. C o., 963 F.2d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 1992 ) (c iting Rodriguez87

de Q uij as , 490 U . S. a t 48 4) . I n part ic ular, it r ea sone d th at

w e shou ld b eg in b y asking “ which line of ca ses em bodi es the general r

ule of construction and which lin e of c as es ha s m or e lim ite d a ppl ic ab ili ty . ” I d. A n e sti m at ionof w hic h ho ldi ng the S upr em e Co urt w oul d li ke ly appl y if pr es en te d w iththe c as e m ay a lso sug ge st the prefer red prec edent. E aster H ouse v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387 , 1409 (7th Cir. 1990 ) (e n banc) (E asterbrook, J. , c oncurring) (“ Inconsisten t lines of precedent ar e co m m on i n A m er ic anlaw . ...S uc h ha ir -s pli tti ng l eave s j udge s of the inf er ior fe de ra l c ourts i n adif

fi cu lt posi tio n, be ca

use any e ff ort t o r ec onc ile and a

ppl y the ca se s w ill be m et

w ithac onvi nc ing de m onst ratio n...tha t the re is a fl y in the oin tm en t. ...I be lie ve that de spi te the f or ce of [ the dis se nt’ s] arg um en ts, [ the m aj ority ] offer s the best estim ate of the c ourse a m aj ority of the [S uprem e] Court will take, and I theref

ore j oin [its] opinion.”). It is hard to se e w hy

w e w oul d no t de ci de that D om ing ue z Be nit ez , and n ot Jones, is the controllin g case here . Whereas Jones sim ply noted that, even if a co nst itu tio na l vi olatio n di d e xis t, the de fe ndant’ s sh ow ing w oul d no t satis fy the

“ subs tanti al r igh ts” pr ong unde r the f ac ts i n th at

c as e, 527 U . S. a t 39 4- 95, D om ing ue z Be nit ez und er too k to c le ar ly

art ic ulate abur de n of

pr oof f or pla iner ro r ca se s ge ne ra lly . 124 S . Ct . a t 23 36. Mo re ove r, Jon es c oul d no t, a s Ju dge Carn es sug ge sts , have appl ie d th e D om ing ue z Be nit ez standard to a sit ua tio n88

“ wher e there is no in dication whether the er ror ac tually

did have an adverse eff

ect on the ou tcom e of the procee ding .” A nte at 35-36 (Carnes, J., concurring in denial of reh’ g en banc). T he sim ple fact that Jones wa s decided over five y ears bef ore D om ing ue z Be nit ez e sta

bli she d th e “ re as ona

ble pr oba bil ity ” standard

be lie s any ar gum en t tha t Jo ne s so m eh owc onst itu te s an a ppl ic at ionof

that st an dard . T hus, D om ing ue z Be nit ez , not Jon es , e m

bodi es “ the ge ne ra l r

ule of co nstru ct ion ” re la tin g to pla in- er ro r re vie w . Mo re ove r, it

is m or e lik el y

that a m aj ority of the Suprem e Court w oulddeterm ine that Dom ingu ez Be nitez applies to this c as e ins te ad

of Jon es . E igh t m em

be rs of the Co urt si gne d th e m aj or ity opi nio n inD om ing ue z Be nit ez , inc lud ing the auth or of Jon es and thr ee of

the f our Jus tic es w ho s ign ed

his opi nio n. I n c ontra st, onl y f ive m em be rs of the Co urt m ad e up the Jon es m aj ority . Further, in Jones th e Suprem e Court actually held that there wa s no error of law in the fir st place, and that any hy poth etical er

ror had been m itigated bythe district court. Jones, 527 U. S. at 393-95. T he Jones Court no ted that the sub stanti al r igh ts p ro ng w oul d no t be sa tis fi ed onl y a ssum ing arg ue ndo that su chac onst itu tio na l e rr or c oul d st ill be f

ound . I d. a t 39 4- 95. T his r ep re se nts a m arked departure from

the case at bar, wher e w e ar e cer tain that the dist rict court was op erat in g u nd er an erro ne ou s p rem is e o f la w. Essentially , in ca ses like Rodriguez, where the def endant can prove that89

B o o k e r e rr o r d e n i e dh i m ac o n s t i tu t i o n a l l y- man d a t e dp r o c e s s an dth a tth e o u t c o me of that pr oc es s c annot

be kno w n un til the pr oc es s a ct ua lly take s pl ac e, ade fe ndant sufficiently

underm ines our confidence in the out com e of his sentencing to m eet the pr ej udi ce pr ong. S ee , e . g. , U nit ed S ta te s v. P al ad ino , 401 F . 3d 4 71, 486 -8 7 (7th Cir. 2005 ) (R ipple, J., dissenti ng from denial of reh’ g en banc); see a lso ante, at 58- 60 ( T j of la t, J. , dis se nti ng f

ro m de nia l of r eh ’ g e n banc ) (n oti ng tha t the m an da tor y gui de lin es e ff

ec tiv el y f or ec los ed m any a ve nue s ade fe ndant m ay now pur sue in re que sti ng a

m or e le nie nt s en te nc e, suc h a s arg uin g th at the re co m m en de d gu ide lin es se nte nc e is n ot a “ j ust pun ish m en t, ” or

c ha lle ngi ng the w isd om of the S en te nc ing Co m

m iss ion ’ s po lic y

de ci sio ns the m se lve s) ; se e al so Uni te d S ta te s v . Serra no -Bea uv ai x, 4 00 F.3d50 , 57 -5 8 (1 stCir . 20 05 ) (Lip ez, J ., concurring); United States v. Crosby , 397 F. 3d 10 3, 115 (2d Cir. 2005 ). Moreover, I believe that the re sult th e panel re aches im perm issib ly

trenches uponthe F ed er al S en te nc ing A ct ’ s po lic y of a llo w ing “ the dis tr ic t c ourt, not the co urt of appe al s, to de te rm ine , in the f ir st i nst an ce , the se nte nc e that sh oul d be im posed in light o f ce rtain fac tors properly considered under the Guidelines.” W illiam s v. U nited States, 503 U. S. 193, 205 (199 2) (citing a 1986 cong ressional am en dm en t t o th e A ct

de le tin g pr ovi sio ns tha t auth or iz ed appe llate c ourts t o co rr ec t a se nte nc e im

pose d a s ar es ult

of an in co rr ec t a

ppl ic at ionof

the90

gui de lin es ). T he statut e its el f re fl ec ts this c onsi de ratio n: If the c ourt of appeals determ ines that-- ( 1) the se nte nc e w as im

pose d invio la tio n of

lawor im pose d a s ar es ult of an in co rr ec t a

ppl ic at ionof

the se nte nc ing gui de lin es , the c ourt sh al l rem and the case for further sentencing proceedings with such in st ru ct io ns as t he co ur t co ns id ers ap pr op ria te [.] 18 U . S. C. § 37 42( f) (1 ) (2 005) . T he W ill iam s C ourt un de rs co re d th e im portanc e of thi s langua ge in the r em an d pr oc es s, statin g th at “ Se ct ion374 2( f) (1 ) doe s no t c al l fo r a re m an d e ve ry

ti m e a se nte nc ing c ourt m igh t m isa ppl y apr ovi sio n of

the G uid el ine s; r athe r, r em an d is r equir ed onl y if the se nte nc e w as ‘ im

pose d a s a re sul t of an in co rr ec t a

ppl ic at ion ’ of

the G uid el ine s. ” W ill iam s, 503 U . S. a t 20 2- 03 ( quot ing 18 U . S. C. § 37 42( f) (1 )) ( em pha sis in or igi na l) . E ve n un de r thi s som ew hat restrictive re ading of the statut e, in every case involvin g constit ution al Booker err or, the district court surely has im posed a sentence “ as a re sult of” an inc or re ct appl ic at ionof

the gui de lin es . G ive n th e statut or y langua ge and the pol ic ie s be hin d it , that e rr or w oul d r equir e a re m an d inthe abse nc e of e vid en ce in the r ec or d r en de ri ng i t ha rm le ss. Mor eo ve r, the T hir d C ir cu it he ld, pr e- Bo oke r, that this pol ic y c onsi de ratio n pr ec lud ed spe cu la tio n a

bout the se nte nc e a dis tr ic t c ourt w oul d im pose upo n re m an d w he n de te rm ini ng whe the r a gui de lin es se nte nc ing e rr or a ff ec te d a defendant’ s “ subs tantial rights,” m aking su ch err ors presum ptivelyprej udicial. InIndeed, this circ uit has expressed similar conce rns. In deter mining that a de fenda

nt 9 could appe al a se ntence enhanc ement whe re the sentenc e also fe ll within t he guidelines rang e he ha d a dv oc ate d b e fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt , w e sa id t hat w e we re “ no t w ill ingto s pe c ulate a s to whether appellant’ s sentence would have be en the same without the enhanc ement. In our view, that deter mination is for the district court in the first instance .” United States v. Fue nte-Kolbe nschlag , 878 F.2d 1377, 1379 n.7 ( 11th Cir. 1989). 91 United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2001 ), the district court applied an incorrect sentencing range, but im posed a sentence that also fell within the correc t guid eline range. Id. at 205. T he Knight Court refused to speculate about whether the dis tr ic t c ourt w oul d im pose an e qui va le nt s en te nc e on r em an d f or pur pose s of the pla in- er

ro r “ subs tanti al r igh ts” inquir y . I d. a t 20 8. I nst ea d, it

r em an de d f

or resentencing. I d. at 210. Quoting W illiam s, it stated that this approach ef fe ct u at edth e S up re m e C o u rt ’s d et erm i n at i o no f t h e f ed er al s en t en ci n g s t at u t e’s int en t t o a llo wthe dis tr ic t c ourt t o de te rm ine the pr ope r gui de lin es se nte nc e in the first instance. Id. at 208 (quo ting W illiam s, 503 U. S. at 205 (1992 )). 9 O the r pr e- Bo oke r pr ec ed en t a lso pr es um ed pr ej udi ce in ca se s whe n a sentencing error’ s effe ct on the length of a def endant’ s sentence wa s ex tr ao rd inari ly

dif fi cu lt to a sc er

ta in. S ee , e . g. , U nit ed

S tate s v. P la za -G ar ci a, 914 F. 2d 34 5, 347-48 (1st Cir. 1990) (Br ey er, C. J.) (vacating and rem anding an illegal se nte nc e al so f

al lin g w ith in the c or

re ct gui de lin es r an ge und er

the pla in- er

ro r doc tr ine be ca

use it “ m ay w el l have be eninf

lue nc ed by the [ er ro ne ous] se nte nc ing recom m endation”); United States v. Rey na, 358 F. 3d 34 4, 351-52 (5th Cir.) (en92

banc), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2390 , 158 L. Ed. 2d 966 (2004) (presum ing th at de nia l of de fe ndant’ s r igh t t o a llo cu tio n c au se d pr ej udi ce , be ca use of the na tur e of the right and the di fficulty of proving th e violation aff ected a specif

ic sentence); U nit ed S ta te s v. A dam s, 252 F . 3d 2 76, 287 ( 3d C ir . 200 1) ( sam e) ; U nit ed S ta te s v. A lba P ag an , 33 F . 3d 1 25, 130 ( 1st Ci r. 199 4) ( “ [T ] he im

pa ct of the om iss ion[ of the r igh t t o a llo cu tio n] on a dis cr et ion ar

y de ci sio n is usu al ly

e nor m ousl y dif fi cu lt to a sc er ta in. ”) ; Unit ed

S ta te s v. P ro uty , 303 F . 3d 1 249, 125 2- 53 ( 11th C ir . 200 2) (p re sum ing pr ej udi ce “ w he re the de fe ndant w as not a ff or de d th e oppo rt

uni ty to al lo cu te an d t he co ur t d idno t i m po se th e lo wes t s en te nc e u nd er t he gu id el in es ”). A s Ju dge T

j of la t and Judge L ipe z of

the F ir st C ir cu it have poi nte d ou t, the e ff ec ts of c onst itu tio na l B ooke r er ro r ar e sim ilarl y

hard to gauge . A nte , a t 62 -6 6 ( T j of la t, J. , dis se nti ng f

ro m de nia l of r eh ’ g e n banc ); S er

rano- Be auva ix, 400 F . 3d at 56 -6 1 (Lip ez, J ., con cu rri ng ); s ee al so Pal ad in o, 4 01 F.3dat 4 86 -8 7 (R ip pl e, J., dis se nti ng f

ro m de nia l of r eh ’ g e n banc ); U nit ed

S ta te s v. Barn ett, 398 F . 3d 5 16, 526- 29 ( 6thCi r. 200 5) ; U nit ed S ta te s v. Cr osby , 397 F . 3d at 11 6- 18. Ac cordingly , I respectf

ully dissent from

the denial of rehearing en banc.