J-S78029-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: Z.J., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: J.W.J., FATHER

No. 787 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered May 5, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000053-2015

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2016

J.W.J. (“Father”) appeals from the order entered May 5, 2016, in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which involuntarily terminated 

his parental rights to his minor daughter, Z.J. (“Child”), born in March of 

2010.1 After careful review, we affirm.

The orphans’ court summarized the relevant factual and procedural 

history of this matter as follows.

The child was initially referred to [the Allegheny County 

Office of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”)] in May 2010 [due 

to] allegations that Mother had refused to get [] medical 

treatment for the newborn child. Moreover, the Mother was no 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The parental rights of Child’s mother, H.M.M. (“Mother”), were terminated 

by the same order. Mother has not filed a brief in connection with this 

appeal, nor has she filed her own separate appeal. 
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longer allowed to reside with relatives after they accused her of 

stealing. Mother was alleged to have unaddressed drug and 

alcohol concerns. She had three other children outside of her 

care. Father was incarcerated at the Allegheny County Jail. The 

child was removed from Mother’s care and placed with the 

maternal grandmother. But after services were installed, the 

Mother was able to resume custody of [Child] in June and the 

case was closed four months later in September. 

The child came to the attention of the agency again in 

January 2013 upon allegations that Mother was drinking and 

driving with [Child] and other children in her car and that Mother 

was not diligent in providing her children with necessary medical 

care. Like the last time the child was removed, Father was not 

in the home. Instead, he was living in Renewal, a halfway house 

following his release from the Allegheny County Jail. [Child] was 

returned to her Mother in October 201[3], but then removed for 

a third time in January 2014. Mother had been arrested for 

drunk driving; [Child] and other children had been in the car 

without seatbelts. 

Family Service Plans (“FSPs”) were created for both 

parents to address the issues that seemingly prevented them 

from providing adequate parental care. The FSPs were identical 

for both parents. The goals included: follow the terms of 

probation; achieve and maintain recovery from substance abuse; 

ensure that the children attend and perform satisfactorily in 

school; eliminate domestic violence; ensure supervision of the 

children; ensure the children have medical care; maintain 

contact and cooperation with the agency and visit with their 

children; [and] attend[] [a] parenting program. . . .

Father was also largely noncompliant with his FSP goals. 

He was incarcerated in 2010 and was living in the Renewal 

halfway house in 2013. He has never been compliant with his 

drug and alcohol goal; he refused to take drug screens, and in 

2013 the children told authorities that he grew marijuana in the 

home. Father has never attended any medical appointments or 

any school meetings. Although he was probably not given notice 

of such things, it is also clear that he did not ask. Father has 

never provided any proof that he engaged in any domestic 

violence prevention programs. . . . Meanwhile, he did not visit 

consistently with the child until June 2015. Apart from his
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stretches of incarceration, there would still be months at a time 

where he would not visit the child. 

Father has an extensive criminal history. In 2007 he pled 

[guilty] to two separate cases of disorderly conduct. In 2008 he 

pled guilty to criminal conspiracy, felony manufacture and 

delivery with intent, and receiving stolen property. In 2011 he 

was found guilty of terroristic threats, simple assault and 

resisting arrest.

Father testified that he was in the home of the child until 

she was approximately a year old, at which time he was 

incarcerated. He was released to the halfway house when the 

child was two and a half. But he left without permission and was 

eventually arrested six weeks later in March 2013. He served 

another six months until he was released to another halfway 

house. Again he left without permission and was arrested again 

and incarcerated again in January 2015. He was incarcerated 

until June 25, 2015. . . .

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/5/2016, at 1-3 (citations to the record and 

footnote omitted).2

On March 10, 2015, CYF filed a petition to involuntarily terminate 

Father’s parental rights to Child. CYF then filed a motion to withdraw its 

termination petition on October 5, 2015, which the orphans’ court granted.3 

CYF filed a second petition to terminate Father’s parental rights on January 

25, 2016. The orphans’ court held a termination hearing on April 4, 2016, 

____________________________________________

2 Child was adjudicated dependent as to Mother on January 28, 2013, and 

adjudicated dependent as to Father on March 24, 2014. N.T., 5/4/2016, at 

42.

3

In its motion, CYF averred that Child’s maternal grandmother, who is also 

her foster mother, no longer wanted to adopt Child and instead wanted to be 

Child’s permanent custodian. Child’s grandmother later changed her mind, 

and again wants to adopt Child. 
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and May 4, 2016, during which the court heard the testimony of 

psychologist, Terry O’Hara, Ph.D.; family service transporter, Milton L. Butts, 

Jr.; Child’s maternal grandmother, S.M.; CYF caseworker, Terese Tuminello; 

and Father. Following the hearing, on May 5, 2016, the court entered an 

order involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to Child. Father 

timely filed a notice of appeal on June 2, 2016, along with a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal.

Father now raises the following issue for our review.

Did the [orphans’ c]ourt commit fatal and reversible error and/or 

abuse[] its discretion by ruling that [CYF] proved by clear and 

convincing evidence that terminating the parental rights of 

Father, [] best meets the needs and welfare of his minor child 

[Child] pursuant to 23 Pa[.]C.S.A. [§] 2511(b)?

Father’s brief at 1.

We consider Father’s claim mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.
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In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). Father presents no 

argument in his brief with respect to Section 2511(a). Thus, any challenge 

to Section 2511(a) is waived, and we need only consider whether the court 

abused its discretion by terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to 

Section 2511(b). See In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011), 

appeal denied, 24 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2011) (quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 

897 (Pa. Super. 2010)) (“‘[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any 
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discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the 

issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is 

waived.”’).

Section 2511(b) provides as follows. 

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

This Court has explained our analysis with respect to Section 2511(b) 

in the following manner.

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has 

explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding 

analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. 

Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, 

if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as 

part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or 

her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) bestinterest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be 

considered by the court when determining what is in the best 

interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court 

can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, 

and should also consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the child might 

have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court 
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stated that the trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships and whether 

any existing parent-child bond can be severed 

without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted). 

Here, the orphans’ court concluded that terminating Father’s parental 

rights would best serve Child’s needs and welfare. The court acknowledged 

that Child and Father have a positive relationship. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 

at 7/5/2016, 5-6. Nonetheless, the court found that Father has never been 

a consistent caretaker for Child, and that “this positive relationship has 

occurred in spite of Father’s behavior not because of it.” Id. at 6. The court 

further observed that Child has a secure attachment with her maternal 

grandmother and that Child has thrived in her care. Id. The court 

emphasized the testimony of psychologist, Terry O’Hara, Ph.D., who opined 

that Child’s need for stability, safety, and security, outweigh whatever 

detriment Child might experience if Father’s parental rights are terminated. 

Id.

Father argues that CYF failed present clear and convincing evidence 

that terminating his parental rights would best serve Child’s needs and 

welfare. Father contends that Dr. O’Hara “arrived at his opinion in part 

based on collateral information that was not true or was taken out of 

context.” Father’s brief at 6. Specifically, Father contends that Dr. O’Hara 
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relied on negative and allegedly false statements made to him by Child’s 

maternal grandmother.4 Id. at 6-8. Father also asserts that Dr. O’Hara 

based his conclusions on “partial information he received from Father from 

fifteen (15) years prior when Father was a juvenile.” Id. at 8-9. Finally, 

Father claims that the orphans’ court failed to conduct a sufficient analysis 

on how terminating Father’s parental rights will impact Child. Id. at 15-17.

After carefully examining the record in this matter, we conclude that 

the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating 

Father’s parental rights to Child. During the termination hearing, Dr. O’Hara 

testified that he conducted an interactional evaluation of Father and Child, as 

well as an individual evaluation of Father and two interactional evaluations of 

Child and her maternal grandmother. N.T., 4/4/2016, at 15, 22, 38. 

With respect to Child’s interactional evaluation with Father, Dr. O’Hara 

testified that Father “interact[ed] well” and “showed some positive parenting 

skills with his daughter.”5 Id. at 38. Dr. O’Hara also observed that Child 

displayed characteristics of a positive attachment with Father. Id. at 38, 

____________________________________________

4 These statements include allegations by Child’s maternal grandmother that 

Father says negative things about her and Mother during his visits with 

Child, that Father told Child to tell Dr. O’Hara that she wants to live with 

him, and that Father is unemployed. See Father’s brief at 7-8.

5 Dr. O’Hara testified that Father displayed parenting deficits as well. N.T., 

4/4/2016, at 38-39. Dr. O’Hara explained that Father spoke “very 

negatively” about Mother in Child’s presence, and that Father’s comments 

appeared to make Child upset. Id. at 39-41.
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41-42. Child “referred to him as daddy, . . . she smiled with her father and 

praised him. She showed affection to him. She excitedly interacted with 

him. She was compliant to [Father]. She made a statement something to 

the effect of, ‘It’s fun when you’re around me.’” Id. at 38. Dr. O’Hara 

opined that Child has a beneficial relationship with Father, and that “there 

would certainly be some psychological harm” if Child’s contact with Father 

were to cease. Id. at 46, 92. 

However, Dr. O’Hara expressed concern regarding Father’s extensive 

criminal record. Dr. O’Hara reported that Father has a history of convictions 

dating back to 2007. Id. at 32. Most recently, Dr. O’Hara believed that 

Father was “on the run” from police for a period of about two years, from 

2013 until 2015, due to violating the conditions of his probation or parole.6 

Id. at 33. Father also reported to Dr. O’Hara that he has a history of 

juvenile delinquency. Id. at 30. Father informed Dr. O’Hara that he “was 

placed at Harborcreek for four years . . . . It was sometime, I believe, 

around 11 and 12 years of age until then 15 or 16.” Id. at 26-27. Based on 

Father’s lengthy history of engaging in criminal activity, Dr. O’Hara 

diagnosed Father with antisocial personality disorder. Id. at 30.

____________________________________________

6

Father testified that he absconded from a halfway house on January 27, 

2013. N.T., 4/4/2016, at 113. Father recalled that he was arrested on 

March 11, 2013, and was incarcerated for six months due to absconding. 

N.T., 4/4/2016, at 113, 117-18. Father then went “on the run for a year 

and a half” from September 11, 2013, until January 8, 2015. Id. at 116. 
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Dr. O’Hara further testified that Child appears to be doing very well in 

the care of her maternal grandmother. Id. at 20. Dr. O’Hara explained that 

Child’s grandmother demonstrated “significant” parenting abilities during her 

interactional evaluations with Child. Id. at 16-17. Child also exhibited 

several factors indicative of a “secure attachment” with her grandmother. 

Id. at 16-18. For example, during her second evaluation with her 

grandmother in February of 2016, Child stated that her grandmother is “kind 

and nice,” that she loves her grandmother, that she is best cared for by her 

grandmother, and that she would like to continue living with her 

grandmother. Id. at 17-18. 

Ultimately, Dr. O’Hara opined that Child’s needs and welfare would 

best be met by being adopted by her maternal grandmother. Id. at 43. Dr. 

O’Hara emphasized the security and stability provided by Child’s 

grandmother and explained, “When I look at [Father’s] level of criminal 

activity, which includes assault and aggression and violence and then also 

being on the run for two years, . . . I just don’t have evidence that [Father] 

is able to refrain from criminal activity for a sustained amount of time.” Id. 

at 42-43. While Dr. O’Hara recommended an open adoption if possible, he 

believed that the benefits of adoption would outweigh any harm that Child 

might experience even if she is not able to maintain a relationship with 

Father. Id. at 43-44. 

Thus, the record supports the finding of the orphans’ court that 

terminating Father’s parental rights will best serve Child’s needs and 
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welfare. At the time of the termination hearing in this matter, Child was six 

years old, and had been in foster care continuously for nearly two and half 

years. Further, Child has a positive relationship with her maternal 

grandmother, and is thriving in her care. While the record indicates that 

Child and Father also exhibit a positive relationship, it is clear that this 

relationship is outweighed by Child’s need for permanence, safety, and 

stability. As this Court has stated, “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance 

while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume 

parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate 

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims 

of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 

502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006).

Additionally, we reject Father’s claim that the orphans’ court abused 

its discretion by accepting the testimony of Dr. O’Hara. First, our review of 

the record belies Father’s assertion that Dr. O’Hara’s conclusions were 

influenced by negative and allegedly false statements made to him by Child’s 

maternal grandmother. When explaining why he believed that Child should 

be adopted by her grandmother, Dr. O’Hara said nothing about the 

grandmother’s statements concerning Father. Instead, Dr. O’Hara 

emphasized the security and stability that Child’s grandmother provides, as 

well as Father’s lengthy criminal history. The statements made by Child’s 

grandmother appear to have had, at best, a minimal impact on Dr. O’Hara’s 
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conclusions. Even if Dr. O’Hara had placed significant weight on the 

statements made by Child’s grandmother, it was for the orphans’ court, not 

this Court, to assess the veracity of those statements, as well as the 

credibility and weight to be given to Dr. O’Hara’s testimony. See In re 

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.

For the same reasons, we reject Father’s claim that Dr. O’Hara’s 

conclusions were based on incomplete information regarding Father’s 

juvenile criminal record. During the termination hearing, Dr. O’Hara 

explained that he took Father’s juvenile record into account when diagnosing 

Father with antisocial personality disorder, as this diagnosis “supposes a 

pervasive pattern of disregard for the violation of rights in others since 15 

years of age.” N.T., 4/4/2016, at 104. However, Dr. O’Hara does not 

appear to have relied significantly on Father’s juvenile record when making 

his ultimate recommendation that Child should be adopted by her maternal 

grandmother. To the contrary, it was Father’s recent criminal activity that 

Dr. O’Hara emphasized when explaining why he believed that Child should 

be adopted. The record confirms that Father’s criminal history as an adult is 

quite extensive, and this history by itself amply supports Dr. O’Hara’s 

opinion that Father is simply too prone to recidivism to serve as an 

appropriate parent for Child. 
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Accordingly, because we conclude that the orphans’ court did not 

abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to 

Child, we affirm the order of the orphans’ court.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/18/2016