J-S75001-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.C.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.R., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 874 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered February 18, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000091-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0002139-2013

IN THE INTEREST OF: O.G.Z., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.R., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 875 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered February 18, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000092-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0002137-2013
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IN THE INTEREST OF: W.G. JR., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.R., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 876 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered February 18, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000093-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0002138-2013

BEFORE: BOWES, MOULTON, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2016

J.R. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees entered February 18, 2016, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County that granted the 

petitions of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) to 

involuntarily terminate her parental rights to two daughters, D.C.S. and 

O.G.Z., and a son, W.G., Jr.1 Mother additionally appeals from the order 

changing the permanency goal of D.C.S. to adoption pursuant to the 

Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351.

2

 We affirm.

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1

In a separate decree entered on the same date, the trial court terminated 

the parental rights of the unknown father of D.C.S. Subsequently, on April 

11, 2016, the trial court terminated the parental rights of R.Z. as to O.G.Z. 

The matter relating to W.G., Jr.’s father was continued due to an issue with 

service. Not one of the fathers is a party to the instant appeal.

2 While Mother purports to appeal the goal change as to all three children, 

the court only entered a goal change order as to D.C.S., despite finding on 

the record that it was in the best interests of all three children to change the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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O.G.Z. was born during November 2004. Mother had W.G., Jr. in 

October 2008, and gave birth to D.C.S. during November 2012. DHS has 

had extensive involvement with the family since 2013 based primarily on 

Mother’s drug abuse and her neglect of the children. On September 21, 

2013, DHS received a General Protective Services (GPS) report concerning 

Mother’s abuse of drugs and neglect of her mental health treatment. 

Prior to the adjudication of dependency, DHS installed in-home 

services through Community Umbrella Agency (CUA). However, Mother 

squandered that assistance. During October 2013, she admitted to 

continuing abuse of marijuana and PCP, refused to cooperate with service 

providers, and neglected to take W.G., Jr. to his mental health treatments. 

Additionally, while Mother had access to appropriate housing, she elected to 

forgo that assistance so that she and the three children could share a room 

with her paramour in a residence that housed a convicted felon. 

On November 14, 2012, the trial court adjudicated O.G.Z., W.G., Jr., 

and D.C.S. dependent and committed them to the care and custody of DHS. 

Throughout the dependency proceedings, the children’s permanency goals 

were reunification. In furtherance of that objective, a Family Service Plan 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

permanency goal to adoption. As the change of a child permanency goal to 

adoption is not a prerequisite to involuntary termination, the omissions do 

not impact our review. See In re M.T., 101 A.3d 1163, 1166 (Pa.Super. 

2014) (en banc) (“a goal change from reunification to adoption is not a 

necessary prerequisite to the initiation of involuntary termination 

proceedings.”). 
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(“FSP”) was crafted that included, inter alia, the requirement that Mother 

“ensure [her] drug and alcohol needs are being met, ensure mental health 

needs are being met, [attend] court ordered visitation, and [maintain] safe 

and suitable housing.” N.T., 2/18/16, at 15-16.

The children remained in DHS care for approximately fifteen months. 

However, on February 27, 2014, the trial court discharged that commitment 

and ordered the return of physical and legal custody of the children to 

Mother. The dependency adjudication persisted, however, and the trial court 

directed DHS to continue to supervise the family.

Whatever progress Mother had achieved prior to the children’s return 

to her care during February 2014 quickly dissipated. On March 5, 2014, 

Mother stopped participating in drug and alcohol treatment, and she was 

subsequently discharged from the program on April 5, 2014. Thereafter, she 

tested positive for PCP on July 16, and August 8, 2014.

On August 14, 2014, the trial court reinstated the commitment of 

O.G.Z. and D.C.S. to the care and custody of DHS. W.G., Jr. was placed 

with his father under DHS supervision until January 22, 2015 when the trial 

court ordered his recommitment to the agency’s custody.

On February 3, 2016, DHS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights and to change the children’s permanency goals to adoption. 

The trial court held a combined goal change/termination hearing on February 

18, 2016. At the hearing, DHS presented the testimony of Jose DeJesus, 

who was the CUA case manager assigned to the family. Mother testified on 
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her own behalf. By separate decrees entered February 18, 2016, the trial 

court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights to D.C.S., O.G.Z., and 

W.G., Jr. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). 

Additionally, the trial court entered an order changing the permanency goal 

of D.C.S. to adoption.

Thereafter, on March 18, 2016, Mother, through appointed counsel, 

filed timely notices of appeal, along with concise statements of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). This Court 

consolidated the appeals sua sponte on April 21, 2016.

Mother raises the following issues for review:

1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in terminating [Mother]’s parental 

rights under Pa.C.S. Section 2511?

2. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in finding that termination of 

parental rights best served [D.C.S.’s, O.G.Z.’s, and W.G., 

Jr.’s] development, physical and emotional needs under subsection 2511(b)?

3. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in changing [D.C.S.’s, O.G.Z.’s, and 

W.G., Jr.’s] goal to adoption?

Mother’s brief at vi.

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 

2012). “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts 

review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or 

abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be reversed for an 
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abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The 

trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely 

because the record would support a different result. Id. at 827. 

We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that 

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 

2010)].

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to 

make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In 

re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f 

competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if 

the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of 

T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). 

The termination of parental rights is guided by § 2511 of the Adoption 

Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis of the 

grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating 

parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the 

parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). 

Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond. 
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In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We 

have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, 

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In 

re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter 

of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)). 

In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). We 

have long held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we 

need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of § 2511(a), 

as well as § 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004)

(en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s termination pursuant to 

§§ 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

. . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 
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child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We first examine the court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to § 2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A § 

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that 

cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the 

contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to 

perform parental duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 

(Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 

2002)).

In addressing § 2511(a)(2), the trial court first recognized the precept 

that “grave concerns about [a parent’s] ability to provide the level of 

protection security and stability that [a] child needed was sufficient to 
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warrant termination.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/20/16, at 4-5 (unpaginated) 

(citation omitted). The court then emphasized Mother’s extensive history of 

chronic drug abuse, including her hospitalization for a drug overdose. Id. at 

5. 

Mother argues that DHS “failed to present clear and convincing 

evidence that the ‘causes of incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied.’” Mother’s brief at 3. Mother asserts that, since she 

was “fully compliant” with all FSP objectives prior to the filing of the 

termination petitions, regularly visiting with D.C.S., O.G.Z., and W.G., Jr., 

and participating in mental health and drug and alcohol treatment, she 

established that she “can and did remedy the reasons the children came into 

care.” Id. We disagree.

Our review of the certified record supports the trial court’s finding of 

sufficient grounds for termination under § 2511(a)(2). Mother failed to fully 

comply with her FSP objectives, notably drug and alcohol treatment and 

visitation. N.T., 2/18/16, at 15-20, 22. Mr. DeJesus testified that Mother 

still had not “successfully completed” drug and alcohol treatment. Id. at 17-

18. He further indicated that, while Mother was currently enrolled in a drug 

and alcohol program, she was in danger of being discharged due to her noncompliance. Id. at 17, 30. Moreover, Mother not only tested positive for 

drugs on numerous occasions between July 2014 and July 2015, she tested 

positive for drugs as recently as January 20, 2016, her final screening prior 

to the evidentiary hearing. Id. at 12-13, 16-17. See also DHS Exhibit 2. 
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Although Mr. DeJesus acknowledged several months with negative drug 

screens, he also identified “lapses in treatment where [Mother] did not 

attend treatment [and] therefore [the agency] could not do any screens on 

her at that time.” Id. at 30-31. Significantly, Mr. DeJesus “still [had] 

concerns with [Mother’s] drug and alcohol use based upon the recent 

positive screen.” Id. at 18. He further opined that, given Mother’s 

continuing drug abuse, she “ha[d] not remedied that issue which caused 

[Children] to come into care.” Id. Hence, the record supports the trial 

court’s finding that Mother cannot or will not remedy this situation. See id. 

Mother has chronically abused drugs over an extended period of time, as 

evidenced by multiple positive drug tests. Additionally, she has proven 

incapable of successfully completing a substance abuse treatment regimen.

As to Mother’s visitation record, she attended only forty of the fiftyseven visitations with D.C.S., O.G.Z., and W.G., Jr., offered since August 

2015. Id. at 19. Notably, Mother missed eight visitations, or approximately 

three to four weeks, in October of 2015 when she was hospitalized due to an 

overdose of PCP. Id. at 19-20. Mother missed two visitations in December 

of 2015 and was late for two visits in January of 2016, which had to be 

canceled as a result. Id. at 22. The trial court noted the lack of harm to 

D.C.S., O.G.Z., and W.G., Jr., as a result of the missed visitations with 

Mother. The children’s resilience is a testament to the stability in their 

respective foster homes and the bonds they enjoy in those environments 

rather than anything attributable to Mother. For all of the reasons that we 
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outlined supra, we find the record substantiates the trial court’s conclusion 

that Mother’s repeated and continued incapacity and neglect has caused the 

children to be without the essential parental control necessary for their 

physical and mental well-being. Thus, we discern no trial court error in this 

regard. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272. 

We next determine whether termination was proper under § 2511(b). 

With regard to § 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child 

have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as 

love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 

791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M., 620 A.2d [481, 485 (Pa. 

1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s 

“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional 

bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” 

should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of 

permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 

791. However, as discussed below, evaluation of a child’s bonds 

is not always an easy task.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “[I]n cases where there is no evidence of a 

bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond 

exists. Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily 

depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re Adoption of 

J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations omitted).

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, § 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.” 
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In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citing In re K.K.R.-S., 

958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations omitted). 

In discussing § 2511(b), the trial court expressed:

In the instant matter, O.G.Z. and D.C.S. are in a preadoptive home together. O.G.Z. shares her parent-child 

relationship with the foster parent. She has a strong bond with 

the foster parent. O.G.Z. and D.C.S. refer to the foster parents 

as “mom-mom” and “pop-pop[.]” The foster parents provide 

them with love, safety, stability and support. The foster parents 

meet all of their medical, educational and developmental needs. 

W.G.[, Jr.,] is in a kinship foster home with his paternal aunt. 

W.G.[, Jr.’s] primary parent-child bond is with his foster parent. 

He looks to the foster parent for love, safety, stability and 

support. The foster parent meets all of his needs. Moreover, 

the social worker testified that the children would not suffer 

irreparable harm if the mother’s rights were terminated. Lastly, 

the testimony indicated that it would be in the best interest of 

the children if the mother’s parental rights were terminated and 

the children’s goal changed to adoption.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/20/16, at 6 (unpaginated) (citations to record 

omitted).

Mother argues “termination [w]ould not be in the best interest of [the] 

children as it would terminate the only love, comfort, security and stability 

that these children have ever known.” Mother’s brief at 5. She highlights 

the testimony of Mr. DeJesus that D.C.S., O.G.Z., and W.G., Jr., were happy 

to see her during the visitations and bonded with her. Id. We disagree.

Contrary to Mother’s assertions, the certified record corroborates the 

trial court’s best interest analysis pursuant to § 2511(b). Initially, we note 

that Mother never progressed beyond supervised visitation. Mr. DeJesus 

indicated that unsupervised visitation was impossible due to Mother’s 
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continued drug abuse. N.T., 2/18/16, at 18. Moreover, Mr. DeJesus 

expressed concern that Mother had been under the influence of drugs during 

some of her visitations with D.C.S., O.G.Z., and W.G., Jr. Id. at 21. He 

explained:

During my time on the case, we had some concerns during 

some visits where [Mother] would come or she would be over 

excited or she appeared to be under the influence of some type 

of drugs and we would continue the visits because it would not 

put the children in harm but some of my staff members also, 

that would assist me with the visits, would mention it to me as a 

concern that she would come to a visit under the influence of 

some type of drug. We did not have a way to prove it because 

we do not do screens at our agency.

Id.

Further, D.C.S., O.G.Z., and W.G., Jr., are all in pre-adoptive homes. 

The girls, D.C.S. and O.G.Z., are together in the same foster home. 

Mother’s now-eight-year-old son, W.G., Jr., is in kinship care with his 

paternal aunt. Id. at 22-24, 26, 27. While Mr. DeJesus acknowledged 

D.C.S., O.G.Z., and W.G., Jr., have a bond with Mother, he indicated that 

their “primary parent-child bond” and/or “primary parent-child relationship” 

is with their foster and kinship parents. Id. at 23-24, 26. Accordingly, 

D.C.S., O.G.Z., and W.G., Jr., look to their pre-adoptive foster and kinship 

parents for “love, safety, stability and support.” Id. Additionally, the 

foster/kinship parents, not Mother, meet the children’s developmental, 

educational, and medical needs. Id. 
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Notwithstanding Mother’s protestations to the contrary, Mr. DeJesus 

opined that the children would not suffer “irreparable harm” or “trauma” if 

Mother’s parental rights were terminated and they would no longer see her. 

Id. at 26, 31. The children’s positive response to the three to four weeks of 

visitation that Mother missed due to her drug overdose demonstrates that no 

harmful consequences would flow from permanently severing the parental 

bond. Thus, the record supports the trial court’s finding that the emotional 

needs and welfare of D.C.S, O.G.Z., and W.G., Jr., favor termination. 

Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of 

discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Mother’s 

parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(2) and (b).

Lastly, we turn to the question of whether the trial court appropriately 

changed D.C.S. permanency goal to adoption. Although the court found on 

the record that it was in the best interests of all three children to change 

their respective permanency goals to adoption, the court only entered an 

order as to D.C.S. N.T., 2/18/16, at 35; Permanency Review Orders, 

2/18/16. Hence, we address Mother’s argument only in relation to that 

child. We first note that our standard of review is the same abuse of 

discretion standard as noted above. In the Interest of L.Z., 111 A.3d 

1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015) (citing In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010), 

for proposition that the abuse of discretion standard applies in a dependency 

matter). Further, following an examination and findings of factors provided 

in 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f) and (f.1), regarding matters to be determined at the 
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permanency hearing, the trial court must also find that a goal change is in 

Child’s best interests. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(g); In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179 

(Pa. 2010).

Mother posits that the trial court should not have changed the 

permanency goal to adoption, as she had complied with all of her FSP goals, 

and as the children had a bond with her. Mother’s brief at 6. However, 

upon review of the certified record, we find that Mother’s claim lacks merit. 

The record reveals that a change of the permanency goal to adoption was in 

D.C.S.’s best interests. The child has been under some form of DHS 

supervision since September 2013 and Mother has received services since 

October 2013. The agency designed the FSP to help Mother address the 

central issue of her substance abuse problem. Nevertheless, Mother 

overdosed in October 2015, and tested positive for drug use on several 

occasions since August 2015, including as recently as January 20, 2016. 

N.T., 2/18/16, at 16-17, 20. Mother is in danger of discharge from her 

current treatment program due to non-compliance, and she failed to 

complete the drug treatment outlined in the FSP. Id. at 16-18. Indeed, the 

testimony demonstrates that she is unable to “reunify the children safely” 

due to her continuing drug abuse. Id. at 18. Further, Mr. Dejesus testified 

that it is in the best interests of D.C.S. to change the permanency goals to 

adoption. Id. at 27-28. As we find that the record supports the trial court’s 

conclusion that the goal change was in the best interest of D.C.S., we 

discern no abuse of discretion in its decision to grant DHS’s petition. 
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Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decrees terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to D.C.S., O.G.Z., and W.G., Jr. and the order changing 

D.C.S.’s permanency goal to adoption.

Decrees affirmed. Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/18/2016