.. 

\ 

., 

SECf:ff::¥1 :A488953 

"' J 'Lo. I 

Extra.ct from: 

RIP 98 

Appendix II 

American Measures against Communication 

Intelligence Publicity 

Dated 5 April 1943 Pages 375-419 

SECRE·i . -

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 11-04-2013 pursuant to E .0. 1352a 
.! 

'· I cc. I 

REF.ID:A488953 

RIP gi:~ 

1... .• :LdNAL 

5 : ::':1 1943 

APPENDI.1.. II 

A!J1er1can Measures against Commun1catioD 

Intelligence Publ~city 

JUNE 26. 19J9 

As early as June 26, 1939 the Presiaent of 

the United States, the Honoraole Franklin D. Roosevelt had decreed that the investigation of all espSECRET 

ionage, counter-espionage and sabotage matters would 

be control~.ed by the F. B. I., and. Army ana Navy Intelligence divisions. The directors of these agencies 

were to function as a coordinating co~mittee: 

No. l 

T H E W H 1 T E H 0 U S E 

\'Washington 

Hyde .t'ark, N.Y. 

June 26, 19J9. 

'..illutORANDlfJ: FOR- THE SECRETARY OF Sl'J.TB 

TH.t. SEC•-:ETARY OF 'l'HJ·; 'l'lli•..ASURY 

'l'Ht: tiECRETAfiY OF .•. i'AR 

'l'HE ATTORNEY GENERAJ..i 

'l'HL P0b'l':'.1ASTER GENERAL 

T!Il·, SECRETARY OF THb NAVY 

THr; SECHh'l'ARY ul<' COMMERCE 

3 ( :i 
REF ID:A488953 

r- RIP oe 

'-- i';lGINAL. 

e r PR rg~--

It is my desire that the 1nvest1aat1cm ot 

all espionage, co\.Ulter-espionaget and sabotaae 

matters be controlled and hanaleci bT the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation ot the Department ot Juatice, the ~111tary Intelligence Division ot the 

War Department, an~ the office of Naval lnte~­

igence of the Navy Department. Th~ director• ot 

these tnree agencies are to tunct1on as a coaaittee to coordinate their activities. 

No investigations should be conaucte4 bT 

any investigative agency of the Government into 

matters involving actually or potentiall7 any espionage, counter-espionage, or sabotage, except by the three agencies mentioned aoove. 

l shail be glad if you will instruct the 

heads of all other investigative agencies than 

the three named, to refer i:nmediately to the 

nearest office of the Federal Bureau or Investigation any data, information, or material that 

may come to thelr notice bearing directly or indirectly on espionage, comiter-esp1onage, ·or sabotage. 

{S1gried) Franklin D. Roosevelt 

FEBRUARY 25. 1942 

After the attack on Pearl Haroor, these 

three agencies came to a secret agreement which 

read as follows: 

February 2,, 1942 

SUBJECT: S:E;Cllli'l' AGREEl.1llitfl' BE'.1.'WEEN MID, ONI AND 

li'BI FU.H COORDINJ\'l'INu S.t:>t..'CI/a\L IN'J.'ELLI· GEN~E OP~RATIONS IN TH.t; \VEST.l:!:RH BEllISPHEilli. 

-SECRE'f 

• 

·I 3·1· S ' d 

-~ 
·~ 1 

REF ID:A488953 

· R 1 P ti~: 

I. The undersigned, in order to reduce to 

writing the oasic princiμles regulating the oper- ation and respons.ib1lities for Special Intelligence operations in the hestern Her:11sphere in 

accordance with the Presidential instructions of 

June 24, 1940, <:ma January 16, 1942, and prev.ious instructions referred to therein, and in harmony 

with the "Agreement for Coordination of the Federal Dureau of investigation, Office or Naval Intelligence and the I.Iili tary intelligence l>ivision'" 

dated February 9, 1942, agree upon the assignment of responsibility, as given in paragraphs lI, 11!, 

and IV, for intelligence coverage in ~exico, Central America, (with the exception of the Republic 

of Panama), South America, the Caribbean, ana Canada. Tiesponsibility assit:;ned to one organization 

in a given field carries with it the obligation 

to provide, by the most expeditious means possible consistent with requisite security, to the other 

subscr1o1ng agencies all pertinent information received in that ftelu, but it does not imply that 

the responsible agency alone is interested in, or 

that it only will work in, thnt f1e1u. C.l.o~~ coop<':rntion among the headquarters of the three 

aeencies in all fields is a r.mtually recognized ne:cessity. 

II. ~4ID will _Jl~e_s.P.ons_i_h_+_e_f.QI_: 

1. A continuation of the \·,ork nort1£.lly outlined for anct exccu tc.>d ey '.l!ili tary 

Attaches. 

~. The collection of inforr:u...tion needed 

by the military forces. To this end, authority to maintain such personnel as the 

\'.a!' Department deecs necessary for the pcrto~Jance or such duties is recognized. 

I I I. Qli!._til_l_b_e_ :r.e_s £OnsJ_b_M for: 

1. A continuation of the work normall7 

outlined for ond executed by Naval Attaches. 

2. The collection of information needed oy the naval forces. To this end authority- to ~aintain such personnel as the Navy Department deems necessery for the performance ot 

such duties is recognized. 

311 
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REF ID:A488953 "" ... ~ -.... ,.., 

r RIP f1~~ e APR 1948 

IV. 

v. 

FBI will be responsible tor: 

1. The operation of a Special Intelligence Service in the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico,. Central America, (with 

the exception of the Republic of Panama), 

South America, the Caribbean, and Canada. 

2. The Special Intelligence Service will 

obtain, primarily through undercover oper- ations, supplemented when necessary by · open operations, economic, political, industrial, financial and subversive information. 

'l'he Special Intelligence Service will obtain 

inforcation concerning political movements, 

organi?.ations, ano individuals whose activities are prejudicial to the interest ot the 

United States. 

3. The Federal Bureau of Investigation will 

be responsible for the furnishing to the 

Military ana Naval Intelligence services of 

all pertinent information obtained. 

l. In times of stress, by which is meant, 

times that are such as to anticipate periods of predominant military interest, the collection of and the coordination of errorts to 

obtain additional intelligence ot interest 

to our armed forces, also becomes a responsibility of the military (naval) conanander, 

who is primarily charged with the m1lita17 

(naval) operations conducted within his potential theater or operations. 

2. The general type of militaey and naTal 

information alluded to includes, amongst other items, the following: location of air 

fields; submarine cases; tueling atationa; 

rendezvous for hostile militar7 torcea, lanG 

sea and air; concentrations ot munition• ot 

war, and other supplies susceptible to military use; unusual assemblies ano. action• of 

individuals, organizations or communltiea; 

demonstrations ot undue triendlill••• or bo•tili t7; undue interest 1n 1nd1T1dual1, organ- izations or communities;~or other information 

indicating preparations tor or carJTinl on ot 

open or surreptitious militarJ operations. 

3·1s. 
REF ID:A488953 (:. : .......... ~1. 

RfP (!1 

~ .. ;.pR 1943 J 

SECRE"F 

3. In periods of predominant military in~erest, the Assistant Chief of 8taff in 

charge Of !tilitary Intelligence (Director or 

Naval Intelligence) will advise the Director 

of Naval Intelligence (Assistant Chief of 

Staff in charge of ~ilitary In~elligence) 

and the Df rector of the Federal .t:rureau of 

Investigation of the nature of information 

desired from those two services and shall.advise the two named D1rectors of any coverage desired beyond the norcal cover:~ge of those 

agencies. The Director of Naval Intelligence 

(I.ssistant Chief of Staff in charge of :.lilitary Intelligence) and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation VJill undertcike to perform the 

additional tasks requested in so far as it 

is pr~ctical and possible within the limitations of the facilities available. They 

will advise the Assistant Chief of Staff in 

charge of ~ilitary Intelligence (Director of 

Naval Intelligence) of the additional assistance, if any, which they will be able to render, and it v;ill then be the responsibility 

of ~ilitary Intelligence (Office 01 Naval 

Intelligence) to take the necessary steps 

under its own direction to satisfy its own 

requirements. 

4. In periods of stress (see paragraph V (1)) 

When additional responsibilities have been 

indicated in preceding paragraph for the military (naval),. the FBI will have the additional 

responsibility of effecting delivery of any in1'or1w. tion of interest to tht:- cognizant mil1 tary (naval) c01runander (V (l)). l'ransmission 01' such information will be made through 

the most expeditious channels consistent with 

the req_uisite security or the information and 

its sources. 

VI. Knowledge of the existence of the Special Intelligence Service is closely held, and eVl~ry effort will be made to safeguard its 

existence and responsibilities. To that end, 

only a limited distribution or this document 

is being effected by the headquarters of the 

subscribing services. Recipients of copies of this document [l.re likev1ise requested to 

comply with the letter and spirit of the instructions contained in this paragraph. 
98 

REF ID:A488953 qraGINAL. 

.,: 8 APR ·1948 J 

SECRE'F-

/s/ Ra~ond E. Lee~ 

Assistant Chief ot start, 0-2, 

War Department. 

/s/ T. s. Wilkinson, 

Director, Office ot Naval Intelligence. • 

/s/ J. Edgar Hoover, 

Director, Federal Bureau ot 

Investigation. 

/s/ ·J. b. w. Waller, 

Captain, U. s. N. 

Avproved oy the above signatories on Wednesday, February 25,· 1942. 

MAHC!! .68~ 1942 

In March, 1942 some very important correspondence passed between the Director of Naval Intelligence 

and the State Department concerning the d1sclosure ot 

intercepted messages: 

NAVY DEPARTMENT 

Office of The Chief of Naval Operations W A S H I N G T 0 N 

Op-16 

(SC)A6-2(2) 

Serial No. 0569216 

SECFlE'f 

March 28, 1942 

380 
REF ID:A488953 

c_; • l ,_, ; ' • I\ L. 

R lP \,t.-

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My dear ;.~r. Berle: 

In connection with the recent arrest of 

Axis agents in Brazil ana the question of the 

disclosure of intercepted messages requisite xo 

accomplish their prosecution, I have much appre...;. ciated your consulting me in the matter. 

It occurs to me that similar occasions 

may arise from time to time and that perhaps, to 

my knowledge at least, no general policy has 

been estaclisned for their disposition. The advantage of such a policy may be in1·erred from 

the fact that there are some six agencies receiving :ind brealcing down these messages at present, and any or them mignt, unless guided oy some general instructions, take action on its own initiative, which might be contrary to the interests 

of the others or, more particularly, of the 

United States. These six agencies are the British 

in London, the Canadians in Ottawa, the Federal 

Bureau of lnvestigation, the Federal Com.m.mications 

Commission, the S1gnal Corps, and the Coast Guard, 

now under the Navy Department. 

lt would appear desirable that, for matters 

within this Hemisphere, the St'1te Department 

should be the determining agency as to the primary decision whether action should De taK~n upon a 

decoaed intercept, or whether no action should be 

initiated, for the purpose either of allowing arrangements indicated in the intercept to continue, 

in order that "''e might obtain more information~ 

or to avoid the risk of enemy lalol'~.Ledge of the 

fact that we are breaking dov-n the code. Presumably the State Department would consult and be 

receptive to the wishes of the" intercepting anu 

interested agencies named. 

381 
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~ REF ID:A488953 

5 _APR 194S 

RIP 9ESECRET 

Again the question arises, as 1n the 

recent instance, ol' the desirability 01· allowing decoded intercepts to be disclosed tor purposes of prosecution. It would appear that no clearcut decision could be reached on this, but that, 

admitting the general principle or withholding 

to a maximum degree the disclosure or any intercepts, decision on specific cases must be baaed 

upon the importance of the prosecution on the 

one hand, and the prospective value ot f'Urther 

communication in the same vulnerable channels, 

that is the value of avoiding the risk or a shift 

or code, on the other hana. In this case also it 

would appear that consultation With the interested 

agencies would be desirable. 

Within the United States groups, questio!B 

present themselves as to allocation of interception 

and of processing, and as to the optimum dissemination consistent with security. Ir you consider 

it desirable to arrange a discussion ot these -matters, I should be glad to see to the desig- nation of Navy Department representativesL and 

I have been assured that the British and canadian 

authorities interested will do likewise. It is 

believed that the discussion should at first be 

confined to the u. s. agencies, followed by a 

joint meeting with the br1tish ana Canadian repre- sentatives. 

Very sincerely, 

/s/ T. s. Wilkinson, 

Rear Admiral, U.S.Navy, Director of Bava! ln~eJ..li&ence. 

The Honorable 

A. A. Berle, Jr., 

Assistant Secretary of State. 

382 
REF ID:A488953 

ORIGINAL 

~RIP Qc 0 APR 1~4S 

-SECRE"flo. 4 

DEPARTl.IBNl' OF STATE 

Washington 

(eenfidential) 

March 31, 1942 

Dear Admiral Wilkinson: 

l acknowledge your letter or March 28 relating to the method of determining action taken 

upon decoded intercepts so that disclosure or 

such i~tercepts ~Y be withheld to a maximum degree consistent with effective action. 

Your courtesy in suggesting that the Department of State take the leadership in deter- ~ining action is appreciated though determination on that subject may perhaps be placed before the meeting you suggest. 

In line with your suggestion, I am asking 

that a representative, respectively, 01' the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal CoIIl!Hunications Commission, the S1gnal Corps of the 

United States Army, the Military Intelligence D1vision and the Coast Guard meet in my office 

on Thursday, April 2, at 1130 a.m. I should oe 

obliged if you would name a representative, unless you care to come yourself. 

I fully agree tha~ consultation with the 

British and Canadian representatives should proper- ly follow the determination or policy among ourselves. 

1 have taken the liberty of assuming that 

the ~oast Guard, though under the N~vy, might wish 

to be separately represented. 

Heceived ONI 

011438 April 1942 

Sincerely yours, 

/s/ Aaolf A. Berle, Jr. 

383 
REF ID:A488953 

ORICIN.U, 

5 APR lft.._ •. ·~ .-.e...;t 

c (..' t:RIP -'- • SECRET 

APRIL J, 1242 

Conferences were held on the probl .. of 

publicizing c1"7Ptanal7t1cal succesa, and the result of one meeting was the following letter. 

No, 5 

April 31 1942. 

Hon. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., 

Department of State, 

Washington, D. c. 

Dear Mr• Berle: 

It is my l.Dlderstanding that the follow- . ing is the partial agreement reached at the 

Intelligence Conference held in your office on 

April, 1942: 

"No action toward the closure ot 

international clandestine radio stations or apprehension of individuals 

engaged in clandestine radio communicatiol'.is in which .there is any military or naval interest, or action requiring disclosure 01· intercepted communications, sha.!l be in.itiated 

without the joint approval of the 

Chief of Staff of the Army ana the 

Chief of Naval Operations, or their 

designated representatives." 

Sincerely yours, 

/s/ Geo. v. ~trong, 

Major General 

384 
REF ID:A488953 

HIP 98 

u / ; · 1 ; I ~' < 3 l 

APRIL 23, lW 

G .- ~.,. -

-.:_. , - -- .. ,_ I 

Finally, another agree1nen t was reached oy 

the three agencies as to the respective spheres of 

jurisdiction each was to possess: 

l{o • ...2 

April 23, 1942 

REPORT OF SUBCO:•rMI'1'1'E.ts OF Tllli INTERDEPARTM!!;NTAL 

INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE APPOINTED TO EXPLORE THE 

CRYPTANALYTICAL VlORK OF THE WAR DEPAHT~T, NAVY 

DEPhRTMENT AND FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIUATlON. 

The subcommittee met in the office of Mr. 

D. M,·Ladd, Federal Bureau of Investigation, on 

the afternoon of April 21, 1942. On this occasion, there were present: 

For the War Departmen~: Colonel John T. Bissell 

Colonel Carter Clarke 

For the Navy Department: Commander John R. Redman 

Commander J. N. Wenger Lieutenant Commander 

Alwin D. Kramer 

For the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation: Mr. E. P. Coffe7 

Mr. D. 'M. Ladd 

This subcommittee took up the question ot 

the coordination and cooperation of the c17Ptana1Ttical work or the three services and the 

question or the processing of coded communication intercepts. It was agreed b;y all represent- atives present that there was a definite need tor 

some coordination in this field; and it was point- ed out tbat one or the primaey intereata in tbia 

work was the desire for the aecurit7 ot intormation 

to the effect that such activities were beina carried on, and for the purpose or retaining tbla 

knowledge in the possession or the m1niawl number 

, 

ot people. 3 8 5 
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REF ID:A488953 

'I 

(._• -

l 5 APR 1943.J '. J. 

SECREf 

It was further agreed that in view of the 

limited and talented personnel available, the 

available personnel should be concentrated 1n the 

fewest possible agencies rather than spread out 

through nwnerous Governmental departments; that 

concentration of this persormel in a few agencies would eliminate the competitive bidding for the 

services of such personnel. The desirability ot 

maintaining the minimum number of units hanaling cryptanalytical work suggests that this 'work shoula 

properly be confined to those agencie-s which have 

for some years been responsible for the hanal&ng of this work; and your com~ittee recommends that 

the cryptanalyt1cal work of the Government be 

limited to the War Department, Navy Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This 

recommendation is made because of the close relationship which has existed between these three 

agencies and because of the fact that these three 

agencies are those which are primarily interested • 

in this work inasmuch as it is definitely investigative intel~igence, and the investigative juris- diction in national defense matters rests with 

these three agencies. 

In view thereof, it is the recommenaation 

of your committee that the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference endeavor to secure the 

is:>uance of an executive order restricting the 

setting up of any eryptanalytical sections other 

t'han in the War Department, Navy Department, an~ 

the FBI, and the disbanding of any cryptanalytical sections other than these three which are now in 

existence in the Federal Government., Tb.ere is 

attached hereto a proposed executive oraer in 

line with the recommendation or your committee. 

In carrying out the provisions or the 

attached directive, it is believed that a Co11111un1cat1ons Intelligence Comm.tttee which will be 

known as the CI Committee shoul.d be establisbed 

as a sub-committee or the Inter-departmental Intelligence Oonf erence and shall be composed ot 

one representative to be' appointed by the War 

Department, the Navy Department, and the Federal 

Bureau or Investigation. This CI Committee aboul4 

386 
REF ID:A488953 ORIGINAL 

RlP 9S 5 APR IPL'. 3 

SECRET 

hold frequent meetings for the purpose of farming out the work to be delegated to it by other 

Governmental agencies, for the purpose of eliminating duplication of effort and for the purpose ot working out policy matters. All policy 

matters of procedure and dissemination should be 

referred by the CI Committee to the Interdepart- mental Intelligence Conference for appropriate action. 

_rO}! THE WAH DEfJ~RT,M*#ItT lOR THE NAyY PEPAJll'MENT 

Colonel John T. Bissell Commander John R. Redman 

Colonel Carter ~iarke Commander J. N. Wenger 

~~~~~~~---------- Lt. Comdr.Aiwin D.Kramer 

FOR 'l'liL FliI 

Mr. 1'.:. P. Coffey 

Mr. D ;rr.- Ladd 

APRIL 23. l.'M~ 

Indications of the extreme caution exercised 

by u. S. naval officials in the handling of communication intelligence are seen in the following 

correspondence: 

387 
REF ID:A488953 

ORIGINAL 

RIP gs L 0 APR 1&48 

lfo, 'l -SECRE'fOp-20-vb 

(SC)A6-5 

From: 

To: 

Subject: 

\@10.KANJ)U_I 

April 231 1942 

240630 

The Vice Chief of Naval Operation1. 1'he Commander-in-Chief, United State• · 

F.1.eet, 

Internal Distribution of Radio Intelligence Reports, 

1. . In the interest ot preventing &117 :h - formation· getting into the hands or the enemy in 

regard to the functioning of our Radio Intelligence unit, Radio Intelligence reports should be treated 

with the utmost secrecy and given the absolute minimum of dissemination. 

2. Accordingly it is proposed to make 

internal distribution directly from the Radio Intelligence Section 01· Naval. Communications to the 

War P.1.ans Division (F-1) and Naval Intelligence D1vision (Op-16) and no other distribution of these 

reports as such will be made. 

3. 

requested. 

Your concurrence in this procedure is 

F. J, HORD 

388 
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REF ID:A488953 

No. 8 

FF1/A6-5 

Serial 0700 April 271 1942 • 

MEtwtQ_HANUU.M 

:Q-UI(f!f)f;N':t'IAL 

From: Cornmander in Chief, United States Fleet. 

To: Vice Chief of Naval Operations 

Subject: 

Reference: 

(Director or Naval Communications) 

Radio Intelligence Reports, Internal 

Distribution of. 

(a) Vice CNO Conf. Memo Op-20-vb (SC) 

A6-5 of April 23, 1942. 

1. The Commander in Chief, United States F~eet ls in complete accord with p~ragraph 1 or 

reference (a). 

~. Present procedure requires delivery of three (J) copies of subject reports to either 

the co~ruaunication -Officer or Assistant Communication Officer of t}1,e Commanaer in Chief, United 

States Fleet, in Room 3057.· It is desired that 

this procedure be continued except that delivery be 

effected in sealed envelopes si~ilar to the handling 

of "Sealed Secret" despatches. 

/s/ RUSSELL WI.uLSOti 1 

Chief of Staff. 
REF ID:A488953 

RIP 98 ~ APH 1948 I -

Q :.. ~ < ...... ,.""\ , - r '-"--··I I 

,IUNE ~8 I 1942 

On May 25, and June 5, detailed reports on the 

findings or the above conferences were issued, copies 

of which are on file in Op-20-G. Our principal interest, however, is in the agreements reached by these 

agencies. On June 18, 1942, the Director or Naval Intelligence , in his capacity as Chairman or the Joint 

Intelligence Committee, sent the following letter to 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

No._ j_ 

From: 

To: 

Subject: 

June 18, 1942. 

The Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee. \Rear Admiral T. s. 

Wilkinson, U.S.N.) 

The Joint Chiera or Start. 

Limitation or Cryptanalytical Activities. 

1. The informal standing Committee, 

composed or the Heads of the three Intelligence agencies, F~ B. I., M. I. s., and o. N. I., has 

conducted a study of present and prospective cryptanalytical activities, in order to assure 

the maximum security and efficiency in the conduct of this essential work. 

2. The Committee concludes, 1n the interest of secrecy, elimination or unnecessary dup- lication, and most efficient use or the lillited 

ntDDber or talented perso1U1el skilled in crypt- analysis, that this work sbo•tld be controlled and 

undertaken by a mini.mum number or agencies. In 

view of the tact tha~ the Army the Barr, and the 

F.H.I. now have large organiza!iona wel equipped 

390 
REF ID:A488953 

RIP 9£' 

ORIGli~AI.. 

5 APR 1948 

-SECRE+-

for and capable of hanaling the processing of 

all the raw material currently intercepted, the 

Coramittee recommends that the processing of that 

raw material be limited to the three agencies aforementioned. 

J. It is intended by the Committee that 

any and all necessary cryptanalyt1cal work will 

be allocated among the three agencies named, so 

that the field can be satisfactorily covered. 

4. In addition to the organizations named, it is understood that at present small 

cryPtanalytical un1t.s exist in the offices of 

(lJ Director of Censorship~ (2) Federal Co::ru:tunications Co:nmission, and t3J Coordinator of Information. It is possible that other 01'fices 

have installed or are contemplating crypt.analytical units. 

5. In view of the range of the govern- mental agencies involved now, and possioly more 

in the future, it appears that Presidential 

approval of this be recom:nended and that such 

approval be obtained. 

T. s. Wilkinson. 

' 

CC: Dtrector, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2). 

Vice Chief ot Naval Operations. Director of Naval ColllIIlunications. 

JYNE 20, 1942 

U. s. naval authorities were so concerned over 

the harr:1ful public! t.y a bout communication intelligence 

which had been engendered by the :.lidway success, that 

Admiral ~rnest J. King, Cornmanaer-in-Chief, United 

States Fleet, and Chief of !fa.val Operati'ms, sent the 

following letter to the comnanders of his major units: 

3~1 
REF ID:A488953 

RIP ea ORIGINAi. 

5 APR 194a.J 

No, lQ SECRET 

SEGRt?i' 

Op-20-G/ir 

(SC) A6-2/A8 

Serial 0325520 Jwie 20, 1942. 

From: 

'l'o: 

The Commander-in-Chier, United States 

Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, The Commancter-in-Chief, United States 

Atlantic Fleet. 

The Commander-in~Chier, United States 

Pacific Fleet. 

The Commander, Southwest Pacific Force. 

Subject: Control of dissemination and use of 

radio intelligence. 

1. The extreme importance of radio intelligence as a reliable source of enemy information 

has been repeatedly demonstrated. From no other 

form of intelligence can the enemy's intentions be 

so positively determined. 

2. In view of these facts, it is impera- tive that every possible precaution be taken with 

regard to controll~ng the dissemination and use or 

radio intelligence in order to avoid drying up its 

sources. Any disclosures 1n the past with regard 

to the source of radio intel.l.igence have invariably resulted in an immediate change in the enemy's 

communications and the consequent loss of weeks or 

months of painstaking effort on the part of our 

radio intelligence personnel. It is recognized, or 

course, that radio intelligence is of no value un- le~s 1;roper operational use can be made of it. 

B0 wever, momentary tactical advantage is seldom 

worth the risk 01· compromising the source, for such 

compromise will stop the flow of information and 

thereby vitally affect operations on all fronts and 

in all areas. 

·-~-·--

392 
REF ID:A488953 

r RIP 9C: 

~ 1\ I 'I~ I D 4 .::: 

3. In order to further the maintenance 

of high security in recard to radio intelligence, the following regulations for the dissemination 

ond use of this intelligence are hereoy prescribed: 

(a) The utmost secrecy shall be used 1n de~•ling with decryption intelligence, 

i.e., infor1:1c:-.tion resnlting from the 

reading o!' enemy encrypted despatches.· 

(b) Radio intelligence should be passed 

on to subordina. te co::ru:1anders only in 

the fore of operational directives 

whenever practicable. 

(c) V1hen such intelligence must be given 

out to lower· com::1anders as inforcation it should be passed without 

any reference to its secret source 

and shoulC.. contain, somewhere near 

the begin:iing or the r:iessage, the 

word "ULTRA." or the word "ZEAL". 

(d) Special care must be taKen in every 

command to insure that radio intelligence is provided with special security safeguards and is seen and 

handled by the absolute minimum 

number of persons required for its 

use. Cryptographic systems of the 

highest available"security and the 

narrowest dirtribution which includes 

the originator and addressees sh.all 

always be used for transmitting radio 

intelligence. 

(e) Every effort must be made to avoid 

indicating any connection between 

the source of intelligence anu the 

outcome of operations. When action 

is oased on radio intelligence, local 

commanders y,-ill insure that the action cannot be traced to this source 

or intelligence alone. All. copies or 

radio intelligence messages should be 

destroyed by burning as soon as poss- ible after being read. Ships at sea, 

where enemy action is possible, should 

3~3 
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REF ID:A488953 

RIP 98 SECRET 

Of}JCINAL 

· e APR 1943 

take particular precautions to destroy 

all evidences of intelligence sources 

in order that there n1ay be no possibil- ity of their falling into enemy hands. 

/s/ E. J. KING 

Copy to: 

The Commander, South Pacific Force. 

The Director of Naval Intelligence. The Director of Naval Communications. 

By Officer Courier. 

JUNE 3 0 , l:lit,6. 

Since the problem of dissemination of the results of cryptanalysis was the main reason for all 

the preceding conference re1)orts and correspondence, 

the next report will be or interest since it outlined 

the eventual solution: 

No, 11 

Jwie 30 1 1942 

Subject: Report of Conference Appointed to Stud7-

Allocat1on or Cryptanalysis, 

In accordance with your.directive a conference or representatives of the War Department, the Navy Department, and the F'ederal Bureau of Investigation was held on June .30, 1942, at which 

time th# conference was advised or your directive 

which was as follows: 

394 
--

---

-

-

-

~ ------------------

REF ID:A488953 

u ... L,. •... ·-

5 APR 1943 

"That a committee be designated 

composed of one representative from 

each service to consider the entire 

field of cryptanalysis to assure themselves that the three services can 

cover the entire field, ana having 

assured themselves that they could 

cover the entire field, to avoid duplication of effort by allocation of 

the cryptanalysis, ar:iong the services, 

of those types which the respective 

services are best ~ualified to undertaKe. Provision should be oad.e for 

fJOoling of effort aside from this allocation v;henever circumstances require. 

Consideration should be given to the 

formation of a stanaing committee to 

pass upon any questicns of allocation 

or pooling of efforts which may arise 

from time to tirne. 11 

A study was made of the entire field 

of cryptanalyticai work for the purpose ol" determining whether the three designetted agencies, i.e., 

the Army, the Navy, and the FBI, were able to 

hanale all such work. 

The survey of this fiela reflected that 

this work fell generally into the following classes: 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

Diplomatic 

Enemy Naval Optrations 

Enemy ~!ili tary Operations 

(a) V:estern Heraisphere Clandestine 

(b) International Clandestine other 

than \',estern IIe:nisphere 

Trade Codes 

(a) Arny ~eather 

(b) rlavy ','iea ther 

Domestic Criminal 

Voice Broadcast 

Cover Text Cownw1ications 

;.ascellaneous 

3~S 
REF ID:A488953 

RIP 98 

ORIGINAL 

& APR 1948 

SECRET 

After surveying this tield, it was the 

unanimous opinion of this conference that all ot 

this work cquld be adequately handled tJ)" the 

cryptanalytical sections of the three intereated 

agencies. 

A study was made by the conference with 

reference to the question of the allocation ot 

this work, and the conference agreed on the following allocation: 

1. 

2. 

3. 

*4· 

**5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

Diplomatic: Arrrrr 

Enemy Naval Operations: Navy Enemy Military Operations: ArnJ7 

(a) Western Hemisphere Clandestine: 

FBI-Navy (b) International Clandestine other 

than Western Hemisphere: Navy Trade Codes: To be assigned by 

commit tee 

(a) Army \','eather: Army (b) Navy Weather: Navy Domestic Criminal: FBI 

Voice Broadcast: FBI 

Cover Text Communications: FBI 

Miscelianeous: To be assigned by committee 

*The conference felt that there was sutficient material to occupy both FBI and Navy with 

reference to the handling of Western Hemisphere Ciandestine work inasmuch as both are presently engaged in it and have a vital interest in the results. It was suggested that the duplication in 

this field be eliminated Dy agreement among the 

JT1embers of the committee to be appointed. 

**Inasmuch as this work involves the 

t1uestion of which agency possesses the proper library material applicable to the particular code, 

it was believed that these cases should be assigned 

by a standing cormnittee, which committee should have 

in its possession the complete list of the code 1 book 

material possessed by all three agencies. 

3~6 
REF ID:A488953 

L RIP t . ... -.,.\JAL 

~ . / 1943 1 

The conference recommended that a standing committee composed of one representative from 

each of the three agencies (Army, Navy, FBI) be 

appointed, and it was recomn:ended that the committee should be made up as follows: 

1. Officer in Charge, Signal Intelligence Service of the Army. 

2. Officer in Charge 01 the Radio INtelligence, Office of Vice Chief 

or Naval Operations 3. Orficer in Charge of the·TeGhnical 

Laboratory, 1''edera.l Bureau of Investigation. 

This con~ittee is to meet at frequent 

intervals for an exchange of information and for 

the purpose of eliminating any duplication and for 

the purpose of passing upon any questions of allocation or pooling of efforts which might arise 

from time to time. 

FOR TH,t;; WAR DEPAHTMENT 

Col. Carter Clarke 

Col. Frank w. Bullock 

;Jr. William FriecllDan 

t'Urt Tlk NAyY DEPART.MJJlT 

Comdr. John R. Redman 

Comdr. J. N. Wenger 

Lt. Comdr. A. D. Kramer 

Lt. Comdr. L. T. Jones . FOR THE FBI 

lJ!J,iJ>~ 191.2 

Mr. B. P. Cot'f ey 

Ur. D. M. Ladd 

Acting upon the foregoing report, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff sent the following memorandum to the 

Presiaent: 

3~1 
" I 

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REF ID:A488953 

[ RIP Sc 

3 APR 1943 

-SECRET 

No. l~ 

COPY 

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

WAS!iINGTON 

July 6, 1942. 

SEOFIE'f 

MEMORANDUM FOR TID; PRESIDENT: 

The Joint Chiefs or Staff are of the opinion that, 

_in the interest or maximum security and efficiency, cryptanalytical activities should be limited to 

the Army, the Navy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

At present, small cryptanalytical wilts exist 1n 

the offices or the Director or Censorship, the 

Federal Communications Commission, and the Director 

of Strategic Services. It is also possible that 

other offices have installed or are contemplatin& cryptanalytical units. 

In the interests of secrecy, elimination or \Ul -

necessary duplication, and most efficient use of 

the limited number of talented personnel skilled 

in cryptanalysis, it is believed that this work 

should be controlled ana lllldertaken by a minimum 

number or agencies. As the Army, the NaV7, and the 

Federal Bureau or Investigation now have large organizations well equipped and capable or handling the processing of all the raw material currently intercepted, the Joint Chiefs or Starr recommend 

that these activities be limited to the three agen- cies mentioned. An agreement bas been reached 

with regard to the allocation ot this work between 

the Army, the Navy, and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, • 

3~8 
• 

REF ID:A488953 u .. 1vl····-

5 APR lG43 .A 

RIP 98 

'-""- - I' 

Presidential approval of the foregoing is respect- fully requested. 

(Signed) F. J. FORNE (Signed) O. C. MARSHALL 

E. J. KING 

Commander in Chief 

u. ~. Fleet 

G. C. MARSttALL 

Chief' of ~taff 

JULY 8, 191.2 

~resident Roosevelt th~n issued the following 

memoranaum to the Director of the Budget: 

Jio, 13 

TH.r~ V11il'1'E: HOUSE 

WASHINGTON 

July 8, 1942 

:.lE!.mRANDUM FOR Thl!: DIRI:C'l'OH 01'. THt; BUDGET: 

I am enclos1ng a copy of a me~oranaum received today from the Chief of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of the U. s. FJ.eet. I agree with them. 

Will you please have the proper instructions issued 

discontinuing the cryptana.lytical units in the offices of the Director of Censorship1 the Federal 

Communications Commission and the Strategic Services. 

If you are aware of any other agencies having services of this character, will you please have those 

discontinued also. 

F. D. R. 

Enclosure 
REF ID:A488953 

RIP 98 

ORIGINAL 

t> APR 1948 

SEfTElfiSER 24. 1942 

'l'he request or an American Ambassador 1n 

South America tor certain.decoded material brought 

the following statement or policy from U, S. Naval 

Commwiication Intelligence: 

No. l.4 

SECR:E! 

September 24, 1942. 

Op-20-G/jac 

MEMORANJ?Ul( FOR CAP'.i.'AlN ZAClf.ARiiAS: 

Subject: Request of Ciaude G. Bowers for certain decoded mater1ai. 

Heference: (a) Copy of secret ltr from Admiral 

T. s. Wilkinson to Hon. A. A. 

Berle, Jr., Asst. Secretary of 

State, dated March 28, 1942. 

• 

Enclosure: (A) Secret ltr from llaj. Gen. Geo. v. 

Strong to Hon. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., 

dated April 3, 1942. 

1. The question or supplying decoded material for prosecution purposes has arisen from 

time to time, as in this case. Ihe Radio Intell- 1gen~e Secti.o..n b§s a!waxs taken the stand that no ~ater1al should be sμpplied and.belfeyes it essen-

_lial that this policy should be con inued. 

2. The same question arose in connection 

with the closing up of clandestine stations in 

Brazil. Unfortunately, the matter got out of hand 

arx:l it became public knowledge tha't the ciphers used 

4UO 

•• 
,:~ 

REF ID:A488953 

L .. "_;I .\!AL 

t R JP 9G 

by the espionage agents in that territory were being read by our government. Both the Army ana the 

Navy became very much concerned over the situation, 

and a conference was called Dy the State Department 

to discuss ways and means of handling similar situations which.might arise in the future. lt was 

agreed that no action should be taKen to ciose 

clandestine stations without the consent of the 

Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval 

Operations. 1)ie idea behind this was that.it might 

be much more valuable to the military services to 

obtain the information flowing through clandestine 

stations than to close them up. Furthermore, there 

was always involved, as in this case, the possibil- ity of havingto disclose the source of evidence to 

be used in prosecution • 

.3. I believe that the State Department is 

aware or the foregoing decision and should be guided 

thereoy. In this connection I should like to invite 

your attention to reference (a), a letter to Mr. 

Bprle, of the ::>tate Department, from Admiral Wilkinson, and also to enclosure (A), which is a copy of a 

letter from Gener~l Strong to Mr. Berle. 

Respectfully, 

J. N. WBNUER 

Recortmendations for more restricted handling 

01 commW1icat1on intelligence in the Navy Department 

itself were now agreed to after some dangerous publicity 

leaks had occurred in the newspaper: 

4Ul 
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REF ID:A488953 

RJP 98 ORJGINAI. 

3 APR 1943 l 

l{o. 1.2 

,_---, 

' / 

~Efil!ETOp-20-G/jac 

From: 

To: 

Via: 

Subject: 

MlijMOfiANDUll 

Op-20-G-l. 

Op-20. 

Op-20-G. 

November 18, 1942 

Publicit7 concerning radio intelligence activities. 

1. On November 11th there appeared in the 

"Washington Post" the following statement regarding action in Guadalcanal: "Holcomb said General Vandergrift' s men captured the Japanese lanaing code, 

and he lmew when ana where they were coming in." 

2. In the November 16th issue of "Timen the 

following statement appeared concerning communications 

of a certain clandestine station 1n bouth America: 

"l.ts complicated coded arui trapaposed 

,m.essages were intercepted. and turned aver to 

the U, S. ex:orrts. !ho broke the code, From 

then on. officials 1nWash1Mton tollowd 

care.fully the work of Nazi spies in Argentina, Chile, Peru. Colombia, M§Xlco, and even in tbe 

Y.a§..,." 

3. Bearing upon these 4isclosures, the following ver-y significant statement appears in a secret 

Japanese message from Uadrid to Tok7o1 dated November 

12 I 1942: ft From TJJy experience Of the past t~8 --"' 

years, all leakage of the war plans of the\Unitid __ . ~, 

Nations .can be laid to the door of the UniteCt--states." 

4. The unfortunate "Chicago Tribune• affair 

should have taught us a good lesson but it apparent- ly did not for the publicity continues. The work ot 

the radio intelligence organization is extremely difficult. Its value is recognized. Only yeaterday, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, sent a dispatch of 

4U2 
REF ID:A488953 

RlP gs u APR 1943 

-SECPEL 

appreciation to the organization saying that "once 

again radio intelligence has enabled the fignting 

forces of the Pacific and ~outhwest Pacific to 

know where and when to hit the enemy." 

5. If the operating forces are to continue 

to benefit by radio intelligence, drastic steps must 

be taken to prevent further disclosures or the sort 

mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 above. This action 

is particularly important now that we are about to undertaK~ the analysis of other Axis communications. 

The new work, as pointed out in my memoranuum of 

Septemoer J, 1942 1 will involve a large expenditure 

01' nmas. The success of the undertaKing will depend 

very largely upon our ability to r:iaintain secrecy. 

Should word leak out that we are reading the enemy's 

comr::iunications, it is almost certain that changes will be made, possibly rendering the en~ire project useless. The last change resulted in 1na01lity to 

read these cormaun1cations for aoout a year. During that time we have suffered very serious loss of 

property and life in the Atlantic, much of which 

might have been prevented had we been able to read 

the enemy's comrnunications. 

6. As it stands now, there are many people who see the results of our work whose duties do not 

actually require them to have the information. They 

rend "these dispatches out of mere interest or curiosity. The argument usually given against any effort 

to restrict dissem-ination is that everybody knows 

about radio intelligence anyway, and there is no use 

trying to conceal it. That the existence of radio 

intel l.igence organizations is lcrlo\m must be taken 

for granted. lbe results obtained by these organiz- ations are not known, however, unless they are disclosed, as are ours. If we are not to "kill the 

goose that lays the golden egg," then those who need 

the results must take the necessary action to prevent further disclosures. 

4U3 
REF ID:A488953 

RlP 98 5 APR 1943 ~ 

SECRET 

7. In order to improve the present unaatiafactory situation, it is ur1entl7 recommended that 

an immediate survey be made or present methods of 

dissemination, as well as all individuals Who are 

given or have access to this information, with a 

view to reducing dissemination to the absolute minimum neceslary for operations. It is also recommended that stricter compliance with COYIHCB Secret 

Serial 0325520 of June 20, 1942 1 be required. 

NOV_.EMBER 19, 19,46 

§E61l£l'f 

Op-20-G/ir· 

.w!EMORANDUM FOR QP-~O, 

Via Op-20-1. 

Respectfully, 

/s/ J. N. WENGER 

Op-20-G-l. 

November 19, 1942 

1. 

remarks. 

I concur fully with Commander Wenger's 

2. It will probabl7 be necessary verbally 

to prohibit newspapers and magazines and radio commentators from mentioning al11'thing pertaining to 

enemy codes, enemy ciphers or about results or radi~ 

or other commW'lication intelligence gained from 

intercepting or studying eneJ1!7 communications. 

J. The Army and Navy Public Relations orricers and the Office of War Information probably could verbally instruct representatives ot publishers concerning such a prohibition~ but I think that 

initial announcements by the Commander in Chier anG 

by the Army Chief of Staff (possibly at Press conferences) would be most effective. There should 

preferably, however, be nothinglin writing prohibit- 4U4 
REF ID:A488953 

r RI r 08 ~ I , d lfl43 j 

c· ,- - .. -T ~_, - -. ··-

ing 1nention of enemy codes, enemy .ciphers, or aoout 

radio or other comrnWlication intelligence activities. 

4. No doubt the number of persons who read 

dispatches merely for their own information or to 

satisfy their curiosity can and should oe reduced. 

'1'!lis probably includes many young officers (aids and 

assistants) as well nS a few more senior Officers 

who have access to the offices where secret dispatches must be delivered anci used. 

NOV~MBER 2.4 1 194.2. 

/s/ E. E. STON~, 

Op-20-G. 

In November, 1942, the Secretary of the Navy, 

Honorable Frank Knox, assisted operational authorities 

in the campaign to keep communication intelligence safe 

from unwise dissemination: 

No, 17 

From: SecNav To: ALNAV #25~ 

flES!RIO~SD M:AlhQf!&ll Released cy: Frank Knox 

Date: 24 November 1942 

fl:t:.~'fftlC'tlm :llAILGM,4 

241327/250 

All officers and men are reminded of the vital necessTI.t ol restrlctW to those who need to kilow the nature of the sources of our Intelligence information of 

the enemy, 

4US 
... ,.,. 

REF ID:A488953 5 APR 1948 

StCHEf 

Sxcept as required by official business no reference 

should be made to interrogation or prisoners of war, c~μtured documents, counter espionage or any other 

sources. 

nufore arrival in port followin~ a period or combat 

operations ~ersonnel going on shore leave shall be s~1ccially ctwtioned concernin.{-: these security measures. 

:~ction Copy 

Jei"iartmen tal L.Jlstri but ion: 

Lists I II III IV V VI (VIII, I~~. X) VII :.U XII (15) 

·1,'E.:r jjepartment ( 5) 

DlWEUBEii 11, 1942 

This desirable action was followed very shortly 

by a letter or the Gecretary of l~avy, .ionorable Frank 

I:.nox to the Secretary of './er, :Ionorable Henry L. Stimson. 

It contained a paragraph which was eventually sent to 

the Director of Censorship by the Secretary ot War as a 

statement of policy ap:reed to by both the Army and Havy. 

'.;.'he c orres:!1ondence outlining this policy follows immediately: 

l~o. 18 

~ Qii :/I l:JSU'.t'IAL 

.Serial 0)66820 

'l'he honors ble, 

The Secretary of ·.;ar. 

~ir: 

i.lovember JO, 1942 

Referring to the "Code of Wartime Praoticea" 

ror the .American Press, copy attached, I recODlllend that 

action be taken to incorporate the following therein: 

4u6 
REF ID:A488953 

L RIP 98 -SECRET 

. ·ORic.: .... ..:. 

5 APR fc-.£" • 

Elm1Y cor.t.:UHICATIONS 

·To the· end that the ene~ mar not ba•e 

information concerning any success we *f 

ttttain in deciphering his encoded or.enol-

;ihered communications, no mention should be n~de or available or captured enemy codes 

or enelll.Y ciphers. or about the intelligence 

.:ained rrom intercopti1·~ end studj•ing enelllf 

rHdio messagds. · 

It the Army concurs with the Navy in thi• r~atter, will you plea3e take appropriat~ action 

to effect this addition to "0ode of 1.artltie 

rractices" for the .American :.·rass't 

Uecently, two cases hAve been noted at 

the i~avy Department wherein disclosures were made 

in publications concernin; results of communication int~lligence uctivitles. It is not considered d~sirabla in prosentin£ the abov~ information to 

the Office of Censorship to point out these or 

other specific cases, ~ince to do so mieht emphasize them unduly. lio\'Jever, experience hes shown 

that when the enemy codes and ciphers are changed, 

and comnu,mication ~'9thods modified, thereby 

nullifying much constructive work which r.iay have 

been accomplish~~ only after months or years of 

effort on the p~t of those eur-;a1;ed in cor.ununicotion intelligefl'ce activities. 

'··"' 

Respectfully, 

/s/ ~·.-t.ANK KNOX 

Ho. 18A 

C OHFIU 2l 7±'IAL 

\lashington 

December 11, 1942 

'.i.1he ilonore ble, 

The Secretary of the ~avy. 

406-A 
REF ID:A488953 

RIP 98 O:ilG&. SEC~ 

• 5 "'P~ IP48 

Dear kr. Secretary: 

You ere advised with reterence to your communication of November 30, 1942, that the War Department 

concurs in the recommendation that the "Code ot 

.iartine .Fracticas for the American Press" be revised 

so as to include the ;;ttvy Department's proposed • pare~raph covering ~&lemy CommunicHtiona." 

In accordance with your suggestion, a letter, 

copy of wtich is attached, hes bee.:i directed to ~-r• Byron Price, Director of Censorship, request- ing thet the second paragraph or your letter be 

inserted in the "Code of -.iartir.1e Practices." 

Incl: 

Sincerely yours, 

/s/ HENRY L. STIMSON 

Secretary ot War 

Cy. ltr. to Dir. of ~ensorship 

No. 18B 

December 11, 1942 

Lr. Byron Price, 

Director of Censorship, 

Apex Building, 

',,"ashington, D. C. 

Deer l.'1r. .Price: 

7here has recently been brought to the attention of the '.:ar Department by the 1

1

iavy Department that 

406-B 
• REF ID:A488953 

Hll-' U8 . : I '14'13 , 

information has been published which disclosed results obtained from communication intelligence activities. Experience has shown that when the enemy learns of benefits gained from comrunication intelligence, codes and ciphers are changed and commWlication methods modified thereby nullifying rnuch constructive worlc which may have been accomplisned only after months or years of effort on the pl:.rt of those 

engaged in comml.lllication intelligence activities. 

It is therefore requested that the "Code of 

Wartime Practices for the American Press" be revised 

so as to include the following paragraph; and that · notice of this change be given proper di~tribution: 

ENEMY CU!1UwiUNICATI :JNS 

To the end t})at the enem:y may not have 

information concerqing any success we may attain in deciphering his encoded or enciphered commwiications, no mention should be ma~ 

~availabie or captured enemy cocies or enemy ciphers. or about the inte~ligence gained from intercepting and studying enemy radio 

message§. 

Your.kind cooperation in this matter is appreciated. 

Sincerely yours, 

/s/ lfEtiRY L. STIMSON 

Secretary of War 

This document contains information affecting the 

national defense of the u. S. within the meaning 01' 

the Espionage Act, u.s.c. 50; Jl and 32. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any 

manner to an wiauthorized person is prohibited by law. 

4U7 
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REF ID:A488953 

r fllP 98 ORIGINAL 

L. 5 APR 1943 

SECRET 

DECEMHER 17, 194, 

The following is an important st~tement of policy from the Director of Naval Communications concerning the disclosure of information about clandestine 

stations in Latin America: 

No, 19 

Op-20-G/jac 

Serial 0372020 

December 17, 1942 

g.E..\(ORANDUM FO.t< COLONEL THOMASON. u.s.M.C, 

Subject: Information disclosed in clandestine 

com1mmications transmitted from Chile 

which may have resulted in sinkings. 

1. Enclosed is a list of certain ships which were mentioned in clanaestine messages transmitted from Chile on the circuits indicated, These 

ships were sunk on the dates shown, possibly as a 

result of these m..essages. 

2. It i~ 1.mderstood that this 1nforma~1on 

is desired for use in connection with restrictions 

to be placed upon Axis communications from Argen- tina. In this regard, it should be pointed out 

that although certain exposures have already been 

made concerning these clandestine operations, nevertheless the cryptographic systems employed 

ure still used on at least two other circuits, and 

1 t would be inimical to our future cryptanalyt1cal operations should further disclosures result. The 

closing or clandestine stations in South America 

and the prosecution or the agents involved have 

4U8 
REF ID:A488953 

l RlP gs 

0 r.I GI NAC... 

5 APR 1943 

SE:CRET 

resulted in \D'lfortuna~e publicity. The latest 

occurred in the November 16 issue or "Time," 

wherein the following statement appeared concerning communications of a certain clandestine station in South America: 

"Its complicated coded and transposed 

messages were intercepted and turned 

aver to the U. s. experts, who broke 

the code. From then on, officials in 

Washington followed carefully the 

work of Nazi spies in Argentina, Chile, 

Peru, Columbia, ~fexico, <ind even in the 

u.s.n 

). In connection with this matter, the 

following excerpts from a report on discussions held 

on April 2, 1942, in a conference at the St~te Department under the chairmanship of T1tr. A. A. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, it is believed, are pertinent: 

"The desirability of consulting proper 

responsible authority in the U. S. Government prior to initiating any action 

with regard to closure of clandestine 

radio stations, or apprehension of individuals engaged in clandestine communications, was emphasized in order that t~e necessity for taking such action ~ay be weighed against the disadvantage of disclosing information obtained 

from intercepted and decrypted messages 

sent oy such stations or individuals. 

A!'te:r thorough discussion of this mutter 

it was the general oμinion of the conference that, unless the type of information transmitted by such radio stations 

or individuals was of a nature th~t constituted direct jeopardy to allied 

shipping or military operations, it 

would be more desirable to permit the 

clandestine operations to continue. It 

was agreed that in any event wherein the 

4U:3 
RJP GS 

REF ID:A488953 01 ;ll.Al ,,AL. 

l 6 APR 1948 J 

-SECRE+-

sole Dasis or action against individuals engaged in clandestine COllllRDli- • 

cations was information obtallled from 

cryptanalytical attack on intercepted 

messages, serious consideration must 

be given to the fact that disclosure 

of success would generally result in 

discontinuing the codes and ciphers in 

use, thus stopping the source or information and usually resulting in a 

new cryptographic system more ditfic ult to solve. 

"It was decided 1n the conference that 

any questions or closing clandestine 

radio stations or apprehending individuals connected therewith should be 

referred to the Chief ot Staff of the 

Army and to the Chief of Naval Oper- ations before any positive action was 

initiated." 

4. In view of the foregoing, it is requested 

tl1at every possible precaution be taken in the use ot 

the attached information to prevent its falling into 

unauthorized hands. 

/s/ CARL F. HOLUEN 

Op-20. 

410 
REF ID:A488953 

• HIP '08 \._ 

:§;t!CflU 

S2CHE:T 

Sli.IPS ,,IBN'l'IUNl'~D lN 1N'l'EHCEP'l'S LA ',tER SUNK 

Name of Shi"Q ~.1entioned ~ Circuit 

l. Bayou 2/19/42 2/27/42 PYL 

2. Santa Rita 3/1 /42 

3/4 /42 7/9 /42 PYL 

.3. Berganger 3/31/42 6/2 /42 PYL 

4. Alchiba 4/2 /42 7/8 /42 YLL 

5. U.S. Mercury(men) 5/1 /42 

Mercury Sun 5/18/42 PYL 

6. Mikoyan 5/6 /42 10/J /4~ t'YL 

7. Maldanger 5/6 /42 6/27/42 1-'YL 

8. Ogontz 5/8 /42 5/19/42 PYL 

9. Rio Blanco 5/11/42 4/1 /42* PYL 

10. Edward Luckenback 6/11/42 7/2 /42 PYL ...... 

* Date should be checKcd. 

ENCLOSURE TO VCNO SECRET SERIAL 0372020 

411 

:~ 

lif 

!! 

I 

I-
REF ID:A488953 

ORIGINAL 

6 P.PR IP43 

-SECRET 

A government agency was responsible for one 

violation of security, and caused the following letter 

to be written by the Army: 

No, 20 

SPSIS 311.5-General SPSIS-7 

!.U~~.'lORANDUM For: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 

War Department 

Subject: Supression of cryptographic information 

1. Attention is invited to SSB translation 

#64001, which contains what purports to be "a summary of an American memorandum entitled 'American 

Information on Nazi Spying in Argentina•, published 

by the Consulting Committee for Policies of Emergency Continental Defense". 

2. This translation indicates that information concerning ".at..ecret radio stationa,.,,invisible fnks .. ;nefhoas used to ~o~;le ~format~ from Jhe countres Of this co:t Dtd cont S Of 

telegrams exchanged with Uermany. which have been 

completely deciphered" was publisned in certain 

newspapers. That the message of reference states 

the case fairly accurately is shown by the accomp~­

ing article which appeared in the New York Times ot 

January 23, 1943. Presumably this whole story has 

had a very wide circulation already. 

J. Tbe efforts or th@ War an4 Nayx Departm1pt1 .b._ave for some time been directed togrd th@ aup,•g- ion of information ot this v1r1 cb&racter. Th• o t 

U.S. Communications BOard is even now engaging in 
REF ID:A488953 

· RIP 98 

ORIGINAL 

5 t r'R 10~3 

SEGRE+ 

drafting a detailed paper dealing with the "Security and Suppression of Cryptographic Information", 

the intent of which is to coordinate all U.S. efforts toward this end. 

4. If the information divulged as inaicated 

in paragraphs 1 and ~ above is authentic and 11" it 

was furnished by any Department or Agency of the 

U. s. Government, the inconsistency in U. s. policy 

becomes obvious, since on the one hand the ·armed 

services are striving to prevent such occurrences 

and on the other hand certain U.S. agencies are 

facilitating their occurrences, thus nulLifying the efforts of the armed services which are responsible for the security of information of the nature 

of that dealt with in this memorandum. 

5. Incidents of this nature have come to 

notice several times in the recent past and steps toward thtir repetition were presumably initiated. 

It is suggested that steps should be taken once 

for all to insure that similar incidents will be 

positively prevented in the future. 

Incl. 

C.i.ipping 

I.EBRUARY 6, 1243 

For the Chief bignal Officer: 

W. Preston Corderman 

Colonel, Signal Corps 

CLandestine stations in Latin America had been 

a problem to American cryptanalysts not only because 

of their subversive activities, but also because revelation of American success in deciphering their codes 

would have meant the drying up of v~ry valuable sources 

of information. Finally, suitable action WRS agreed 

. ...-... upon as follov1s: .~ 

,: 

413 I 
REF ID:A488953 • ORICINA&. 

98 LS APR 1948 ~ 

No. 21 

SSOFffi'l' 

Subject: 

SECRET 

Februar)" 6, 1943 

Agreement between FBI, MID, and OWI 

for the operation or a network to 

locate clandestine radio stations 1n 

Latin America, and the action to be 

taken upon the information derived 

therefrom. 

l. The agreement of December 1, 1942, 

subject, "Agreement between FBI and MID for the 

operation of a network to locate clandestine radio 

stations in Latin America, and the action to be 

taken upon the information derived therefrom,• is 

hereby cancelled. The unaersigned, in order to 

reduce to writing the basic principles regarding the operation of a network to locate clanaestine 

radio stations in Latin American countries, agree 

upon the assignment of responsibility as described 

in paragraphs 2 and 3 below. · 

2. ~1ID will be responsible for: 

(a) 

(b) 

J. 

(a) 

The establishment of a network to locate clandestine radio statiqns in 

various Latin American countries including the West Indies by lending direction-finding anu cowmunication 

equipment to the several countries 

concerned, by furnishing technical 

assistance and by coordinating the 

stations involved. 

Disseminating the information obtained 

to representatives of FBI, ONI and the 

appropriate agency of the local count1"7. 

FBI will be respons1b~e for: 

Taking the action consiaered moat advisable, after concurrence ~ repre- sentatives ot: MID:and ONI, either by 

414 

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REF ID:A488953 Ol•l'--'l;\iAt... 

· RIP &8 5 APR lQ<qu 

eliminating, operating or leaving 

urunolested the clandestine stations 

that have been located. 

(b) Keeping representatives of ~ID and 

ONI supplied with all information 

that establishes or tends to establish the existence and/or location 

of any clandestine station, and 

which has been rece:ived oy FBI 

through other means than those descr i b~d in paragraph 2(a). 

(c) The transmission ol such ·material by 

an o~erated clandestine station as 

is requested by MID or ON!. 

lM_RCH 22.._lill 

Major General George V. Strong, 

Assistant Chief of Staff, 

G-2, War Department. 

Fear Admiral H. C. Train, 

Director of Naval Intelligence. 

Hon. J. Edgar Hoover, 

Director, 

Federa~ Bureau of Investigation. 

In :.rarch, 1943, another important bulletin was 

issued by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet 

in regards to use of communication intelligence. It 

summarized the best thoughts of American and British 

cryptanalytical organizations as follows: 

:ll 

:r 

ii 

I! 

II 

i 

ii 

li 
J·~ 

e 

e 

REF ID:A488953 

- RIP 98 

OfUOINAL 

'6 APR 19481 

SECRET 

UNITED STATES FLEET 

HEADQUARTERS OF THJ::.: COMMANDER IN CHIEF 

NAVY DEPART~T, WASHING'l'ON, D. C. 

FFl/ A6-2 

Serial: 00551 

~ E e R E ~ 

March 25, 194). 

From: Commanaer in Chief, United States Fleet, 

and Chier of Naval Operations. To: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

Commander in Chief, United States 

Atlantic Fleet. 

Commander in Chief, United States 

Pacific Fleet. 

Commander, Seventn Fleet. 

All Commanders of Sea Frontiers. 

All District Commandants. 

Chiefs of All Air Technical, Prima1"7 

and Intermediate Training. 

control 01· dissemination and use or 

communication intelligence. 

(a), Cominch Secret ser-ial 0325520 ot ,, June 20, 1942. 

1. Reference (a) is hereby superseded and 

shall be destroyed by burning. 

2. The extreme importance of communication 

intelligence as a reliable source or enemy intormat ion has been repeatedly demonstrated. From no 

other form of intelligence can the en•DIJ''• intentions be so positively determined. 

3. In view of these tacts, it is imper- ative that every possible precaution be taken with 

regard to controlling the dissemination and use ot 

communication inteliigence in order to avoid dryinC 

416 
REF ID:A488953 

I R!P 98 ORIGINAL 

i.. 0 APR 1948 

SECRET 

up its so~ces. Any disclosures in the past with 

regard to the source of communication intelligence 

have invariably resulted in an immediate change in 

the enemy's communications ano the consequent loss 

of weeks or months of painstaKing effort on the 

part or our communication intelligence personnel. 

It is recognized, of course, that communication 

intelligence is of no value unless proper operational 

use can be maoe or it. However, momentary tactical 

advantage is seldom worth the risk ot compromising 

the source, ror such compromise will stop the flow 

of information ana thereby vitally affect operations 

on all fronts ana in all areas. 

4. In order to further the maintenance of 

high security in regard to communication intelligence, the following regulations for the dissemination ana use of this intelligence are hereoy pre- ~cribed: 

A. General. 

{a) Particular care must be taken in every 

command to insure that communication intelligence is 

provided with special security safeguards and is 

seen and hanaled oy the absolute minimum number of 

selected persons necessary for its hanaling and use. 

(b) In exposed locations where enemy action 

is possible, part~cular precautions shali be taken 

to destroy all evidence of communication intelligence 

sources, including authorized files of communication 

intelligence messages, in order that there may be no 

possibility of its falling into enemy hands. 

B. Cryptanalxtical, or "Special," Intelligence._ 

(c) '.lbe utmost secrecy shail be used in 

dealing with cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence, i.e., information resulting from the reading of' enemy encrypted dispatches. 

(d) Cryptanalytical, or 11 Special," intelligence shall be passed on to subordinate commanders 

only in the form of operational directives whenever 

practicable. 

417 
REF ID:A488953 

SECf=f" 

OftlOINAI. , 

! 8 APR 19'48 

(e) When such intelligence must be giYen 

out to lower commanders as 1n1·ormation, it shall be 

passed without &D7 reference to its secret source 

and shall contain, someWhere near the beginning ot 

the message, the word "ULTRA", or the word "SUP.JSR". 

(r) Only cryptographic systems or the 

highest security, i.e., Type X, ECM, HCM, CCK, or 

one-time cipher, and of the narrowest distribution 

which includes the originator and addressees, snall· 

be used for transmitting cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence, or any direct reference thereto. 

(g) Ho11·ever, in exceptional instances where 

it is absolutely necessary to pass cryptanalytical, 

or "Special," intelligence to non-holders or these 

cryptographic systems, only the barest essentials 

required for necessary action by th~ addressee(s) 

shall be given, ana the information shall be transmitted 1n the cryptographic system of the highest available security. 

(h) In disseminating cryptanalytical, or 

"Special," intelligence to lower echelons, care 

shall be taken to avoid, when possible, quoting 

exact dates, times, positions, or actual names or 

enemy units in a manner whereby the disseminated 

information, if intercepted.by the enemy, can be 

tied to the original source. 

(1) Every effort shall be made to avoid 

indicating any connection between the source ot intelligence ana the outcome of operations. When 

action j,p based on cryptanalytical, or "Special," intellitQlce, local commanders should insure that 

the action cannot be traced to this source or 

intelligence alone. 

(j) All copies ot translations and para- phrases 01· cryptanalytical, or "Special, n intelligence shall be stamped "ULTRA" or "SUPER" in addition to the usual secrecy classification. 

{k) No reference to cryptanalytical, or 

"Special," intelligence shall be made in war diaries, 

reports, proceedings, etc., however limited the 

circulation, without specific authority or the Chief 

of Naval Operations. 

418 
REF ID:A488953 ORlGlNA'L 

[ 6 APR lQ4S 

f R L.,, 98 

t:, Traffic Intelligence or "X" lnferwices. 

(1) Traffic intelligence or nyn inferences, 

i.e., information derived from enemy communications 

by methods short of cryptanalysis, shall be stamped 

0 UL'l'RA" or "SUPER" and treated on the same level as 

cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence when it 

is of obvious importance. Other intelligence of 

this nature, including that derived from enemy plain 

language, shall be treated as secret. 

/s/ E. J, KING 

This ends the list of documents which contain 

details of the agreements discussed in Chapter V. 

•