' REF ID:A485419 

SECRET COiiFID:CNTIAL 

TO DATE I i+· ~ 1H 

Lco.mnanding Officer / 

FROM 

----Assistant Commanda-n~t----.,-~....,.-

Dir of Comm Research V' ----- ------~~-- Cont r o 1 0 -----

~ 

Adm in is tr ------------------- at iv e 0 

------------ Adjutant 

Int e 11 i gen ----~----------- c e 0 Provost Mars ha.,...1 ______ _ 

2nd Sig Serv Bn ------- Chief, Pers & Trng Div ----- Chief, Pers Br --------

Chief, Trng Br -------- Chief, Oper Serv Div ---- ----,,,---- Chief, Communications Br 

Chief 1 Laborat Or'J Br --- Chief, machine Br .....,,.. ____ -----_ 

Property & Supply 0 

__,....,--~-- Purchasinr; & Contracting 0 

Fiscal & Certifying 0 

ore, Mail Section ---- ------ Chief, Security Div ----- --,---:::----- Chief, Protective Sec Br 

Chi~f, Cryptographic Br --- Chief, Development B r __ ---- ...,.1 __ 

Chief, Intelligence Div --- Chief, Language Br --

Chief, Hil Cr~rptanalytic Br 

Chief, Gen Cryptanalytic Br--

Chief, T/A and Control Br --

Chief, I & L Br 

------- - ----------------

As discussed ----As requested -----------~--- ----Comments and_r_e_t_u_rn _________ ~ 

Information and file ---- ------------ 1 n formation and forwarding ----- ~--- I ormation and retiirn 

omme nd a ti on 

note on re_v_e_r_s_e~----~~~ 

Signature if approved ------ ---.Your action -----

SIS-SC Form No. 96 (Rev) 

23 August 1944 

Jeclassified and approved for release 

JY NSA on 11-07-2013 pursuant to 

:::.o. 13526 

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REF ID:A485419 '1)f (_, , . /' 

Total pages-23 Summaey•••l2 

TAB A•·--11 

Copy No. 20 

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By Auth. A. C. of S., G-2 

Date ~5 November l§~ 

Initials - A. MeC. - GsA. MILITARY 

Vial' Depa.:rtment 0ff 1ce of Assistant 

Chief of Staff, G-2 

25 November 1943 

l. V1clJl: As previously noted, Governor (CS) 

General Decoux recently informed Vichy ot JapanGs 

demnnd for an advance of 40 million piasters to 

meet her military expenditures in Indo•China during 

November and December.* Decoux inferred from the re= 

quest that the Japanese were planning further in• 

oreases 1n their forces 1n Indo-Oh1ne "during the 

next few weeksritt but suggested to Vichy that in 

pnrt the dem~nd might also represent an attempt to 

obta.in by a "roundabout method" the piaster exchRnge 

needed by- Japanese commercial and industrial enterprises in French Indo•China (M. s. 20 Nov 4;3). 

*It will be reoalled that the monthly rate for 

total Japanese m111tary ex.penses in Indo-Ch1na for 

the 6-month period JulT-December 1943 was budgeted in June at only 5.2 million y~n. The supplement requested for November and December represents a monthly 

rate equivalent to 20 million yen (M.S. 23 Jul 43• 11 

Nov 43). 
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to hand. 

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REF ID:A485419 

Laval 0 s reply, dated 13 November, has now oome 

He admits that the large supplementary f'unds 

may be in.tended 14 1n rather large pa.rt to bolster the 

position of the Yokohama Specie Bank and the various 

Jn.pn.nese enterprises in Indo-China," and then goes on 

to state that: 

"I believe 1t would be w1see before agreeing 

to comply ~1th the JapRnese request, to obtain 

. a statement from.the Japanese author1t1ee that 

they will make no new demand upon us, for at 

least 6 months let us say, for piaster currency 

to be advanced for the various Japanese commercial and industrial enterprises 1n French Indo0 

China whose activities contribute to the 

Japanese military effortv Under these conditions 

I agree to your advancing the requested 40 million 

piasters in 2 monthly installments~" 

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8ESR:m' -seoURI'fY 

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REF ID:A485419 

B. POLITICAL 

1. Stockholm: The French Oommittee 9 s repre• 

sentat1ve in Stockholm reports that on 18 November he 

had a long talk with Madame Kollontay, the Soviet Am~ 

bassador, and that she made the following statements: 

.!• uThe Soviet Government is ready to 

tteoogn1ze e.n independent Finland and Poland. 1• 

b. "Converse.tions were cormnenced between - Finland and the u.s.s.R., but they are now at 

a standstill. 11 

S• Msweden, whose efforts to settle the 

Winter War nearly embroiled her in the struggle 1 

does not ~dsh to be a party to any new negot1-

ations. 11 

d. t'The u.s.s.R. will demand of Poland only - Russian-speaking territor-y." 

A 21 November communication 

from Pierre Laval to his Ambassador at the Vat1can 

reads as follows: 

"Marshal Peta1n, contrary to widespread 

rumors, 1s in good heal th. It is eque.lly untrue 

that he has tendered his resi~nat1on." 

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BSSRB'l'· BSOYRI!Y 

(VIHT) 

(LTS) 
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REF ID:A485419 

3o L1sb0ng A recen~ report from Japane~e 

Minister Mor1sh1ma contains the following observations 

on German-Portuguese relationsg 

"Rumors of Portugal 3 s participation in the 

war are now fadinF,; and there appears to be little 

chance, as things now stand, for an expansion of 

the Azores agreement. On 15 November Premier 

Salazar again declared to the German Minister 

that there was no possibility of this. Moreover/) 

.it seems that b:>th Germany s.nd Portugal are now, 

more carefully than before, seeing to it that 

their mutual relations do not get worse; and 

shipments of wolfra.m1te, tin and other materials 

are proceeding more smoothly than beforeo 8 

4. Wash1ngtou: Two recent messa~es from 

Henri Hoppenot, head of the French Comm1ttee 6 s Civilian 

Delegation, are concerned with the probable effect of 

the Moscow Conference on the future European policy of 

the United States. On 18 November Hoppenot reported 

that "one of Mro Hu11°s confidential agents, who went 

to Moscow with him:>" had made the following statements 

to "one of my collaborators": 

"Mr. Hull was greatly reassured about the in• 

(102723 i;!. 

24 Nov 

43 

ORN) 

(102437 

102694 

ORN) 
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REF ID:A485419 

tentions of the Russians. He ~Rined the con• 

v1ct1on that after the war Russia wants only 

to live in understn.nd1np; and frank cooperation 

with all the European nations, once the latter 

have returned to a healthy democratic regime. 

11 The Russia.ns. made no special claim _with 

re~Rrd to Germany, and. it will be eas1 ··to come 

to an understand1n~ with them about the treat• 

ment . which Germa.n;y· must receive. They insisted, 

however, that the German people should not enjoy 

a standard of l~vin~ better than that of the 

Russian people. "''11hat wish seemed absolutely 

leg1t1mate and just to the Secretary of State.tt 

Hoppenot oommentsg 

unuss1at>s attitude with regard to Germany 

undoubtedly arises less from a wish to punish 

the German people than from a desire to subject 

them to eoonom1o and soo1al conditions which 

would make them more susceptible to Soviet propae 

ganda.. Secretary Hull possibly did not immediately fathom the import of those Russian wishes. 

11The Secretary has suddenly gone from a 

state or excessive distrust to an easy and too 

il".SCRS'Pu WI es OUfl I'.l'Y 
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REF ID:A485419 

systematic optimism with regard to the Russian 

pol1cy in Europe. However, it is not yet possible 

to decide whether his optimism expresses his real 

feeling, or whether it is calculated to counteract the deep anti-Soviet teeling which ex1ste in 

most of this country. 1t 

On 19 November Hoppenot commented on Secretary 

Hull 0 s 15 November press conference as follows& 

.§• 11Taken 11terally• .... and 1t is d1f'f1cult to 

take them any other wny--M. Hull's statements mean 

that the peace conference, 1.e., the Council of 

the three great powers, will decide upon the 

frontiers ot the various states in the new world, 

and that the populations concerned will not be 

given the opportunity to decide for themselves 

on their allegiance by means of a plebiscite. 

Each liberated nation will then be called upon, 

within the frontiers assigned to it, to dec1de 

freely on the fonn of its government." 

,£0 .. It 1s d1ff1oult not to see 1n this new 

attitude a complete triumph ot the Soviet point 

of view and an 1mpl1oat1on that Russia's claims 

with ref,ard to Poland, Finland and the Baltic 

-sSS6RS'P=05SSetJRf!Y 
REF ID:A485419 

States will be satisfied. Thn.t is exactly how 

Secretary Hu11°e statements are 1nterpreted among 

the best informed l\merican and forei~n circles. 11 

S• MSecretary Hul1°s stat~ment nbout the 

military oontro1 to be exercised over each liberated territory by the army \ll]hioh first reaches 1 t~ 

undoubtedly indicates that Russia's hands will be 

free for a certain period in Polando However, we 

cannot overlook the poss1ble app11cat1on of that 

principle in the oase o~ Franceo Such an attitude indicates the difficulties which we shall 

have to overoone in order to secure recognition 

of the Committee's power over the terr1tor1es of 

metropolitan France as their liberation progresses." 

• ~ccording to the "New York T 1mes '

1 report of the 

press conference, when the Secretary was asked whether 

all three powers would ~arantee to the people of every nation of Eurooe a nleb1scite to select their form of 

government and· their offic1ala, he stated that 11 1t de 0 

pends on what military organization miP;ht e;o into the 

country and restore it~~ 
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REF ID:A485419 

SECRE'fusesOBOURI'!'Y 

c. ECONOMJ;.P, 

1. ].'okm: The summary for 15 April noted 

that extensive efforts were being made to improve the 

harbor channel into the ports of Taku and Tangku at 

the mouth of the Peking Rivero T'.ne ports in question 

serve not only Tientein but Peking and the entire Inner 

Mongolia area. on 9 October the A.~erican Embassy 1n 

Chungking relayed a report from British sources that 

the harbor works at Tangku had been abandoned after 

being 40% completed. 

There has no\V oome to hand a 30 October 

massage to Peking from the Japanese Foreign Office 

which seems to indicate that the work at Tangku 1s 

proceeding. It states that 200 tons of cement have 

been allotted 11 for the concrete poles of dock #2 in 

the new harbor at Tanglm., 11 

(102454 72667 

?3763 

JMcC) 
REF ID:A485419 

D. fSYOHOLOGICAL '\ND SUBVJtRSIVE 

l. Chungklng: A propaganda d1rect1ve of 

19 November from the Chinese Foreign Office to 

Ambassador Wellington Koo 1n London states that: 

as1nce Sino-Soviet relations are dail7 

improving, you should exercise particular 

caution in all utterances affecting the 

Soviet Union in &?Jl1' wa7." 

Note: A 20 November report from Ambassador 

Oshima 1n Berlin indicates that the Germans are 

supplying the Japanese with information to the effect 

that "the Chungking Government is dissatisfied with 

the Sov1et•s attitude toward China and is considering 

(JBB) 

a reorientation of its policy in regard to the u~s&SoRon 
REF ID:A485419 

E. MISCELLANEOUS 

1.. Tolqo: There bas recently come to hand 

a circular which the Japanese War ~U.nistl"'Y' sent out 

the daJ after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The message, 

(D=3108 

ECL) 

9 which was,addressed to Japanos m111ta!'1' attaches through= 

out the world, apparently represents the Arm3" 1 s explana= 

tion of the reasons why Japan went to war.. It contains 

a fairly accurate resume of the negotiations carried on 

between the United States and Japan from April to Decem= 

ber 1941; it oonfirms previous indications that during 

the summer and fall Japan had made progressively more 

definite decisions tor war; and it also discloses the 

following facts: 

~· In April Japan decided to go ahead with 

the negotiations 1n Washington, believl;ng that 

it would enable her "to mak~ preparations for 

the restoration of her national strength~~ and 

in the hope that the negotiations would enable 

her "to close the China 1nc1dent. 0 

R,o While Japan recognized that her move 

into French Indo=China in late July would have 

an adverse effect on the course of the negotiations, her "policy in regard to French Indo~China 

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REF ID:A485419 

was fixed, irrespective of any negotiations with 

the United Stateso~ 

S,o After the oooupat1on of Indo=Ch1nap Japan 

decided "to complete her war preparations by the 

end of September at the very latest~ and at the 

same time to exert evel"1 effort through d1plomat1o 

channels to see her demands fulf 1lled. If her 

demands were not met by earl1 October, an Imperial 

deoree would be issued deciding upon war against 

England and the United Stateso" 

S,o As long as he was 1n office Premier 

Kono7e disagreed with the Army 0 s conclusion that 

further negotiations were useless, but "the estab= 

11shment of ToJoos Cabinet [On 16 Ootobe!'7 brought 

about cooperation between the Gove:Alment and the 

High Command. 0 On 6 November the decision was 

made to open hostilities earlT in Deoembero "'l'hereafterp Japan went ahead with plans Xor war, while 

on the other hand she sent Ambassador Kurusu in a 

laat endeavor to reach a settlemento" 

!,o Upon receipt of the Uni.tad States propo= 

sals of 26 November. "the Supreme War Command 

immediately decided upon war, and on l December 

c:>llOiieRSf-==SEOURI!Y 

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REF ID:A485419 

the Imperial deoree was 1ssuedo 1 

As a document of cons1derable historical in= 

terest, the circular is set forth 1n full as TAB A 

annexedo 

For the Assistant Chief ot Staff, G-2 

Alfred 

~~e~ uocormaok 

Colonel, General Staff 

Acting Ch1ef 0 Special Branch, M~IoDe 

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REF ID:A485419 

SECRE'f SEOUfiI'fi 

Circular sent out by Japanese War 

r.'i1nistry on 9 December 1941 

A. Ea.rly Negot1ations: April-July 

In April Ar.lba.ssador rroaura 1n Washington \'1ired 

home for inst11lt0t1ons regarding a '

1 Proposal for an Understanding" bet\•1een Japan and the United Sta.tee, \7h1ch had 

just about been agreed upon betr1een hirn and the United 

s·tatee authorities. (He had received no instructions 

whatsoever from the Home Office.)* 

The Proposal covered the following points: 

(1) The international feelings of the 

United States and Japan. 

(2) The attitude of the United States and 

Japan toward the European war. 

(3) China-Japan peace. 

(4) United states-Japan trade. 

(5) Economic and maritime problems in 

*Throughout this. TAB, material in parentheses is 

aG set forth in the original Japanese circular; materinl in brackets is supplied. 

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8EORE'f==S:SOURI'iY 
REF ID:A485419 

SEORE!==SECtlftI'fY 

these areas.* 

Now the purpose of the United States in this 

was, by taking advantage of Japan's weak points, to 

make us stop our southern advanoeo I.~eanwh11e, she 

planned to build up her armaments and inorease her aid 

to England at the same timeo 

The Japanese Goverrment decided to ta.lt:e advantage of' this occ;:ision ( foreseeinG t'lhat would be brought 

up) to settle the China. incident (the United States proposed to act as mediator between Ja~an and China), and 

to rnake prepa.ra.t1ons for the.restoration of her national 

strengtha Because of this, she did not violate the 

spirit of the agreemento** 

•The 11Propo.sal for an Understanding" which Nomura 

com:nunica ted to Tokyo on 17 Apr11 actually contained 

provisions under 7 headings. The first 3 were approximately as given above. The remainder vrnre as follows: 

11 (4) air and naval strength and navigation in the 

Pacific; (5) commercial and financial cooperation between the two countries; (6) economic aot1v1t1es of the 

two countries :ln the Southwest Pacific; (7) the policies 

o:t the t\·10 countries regarding poli tioal stability in 

the l?acific. 11 

**The meaninc of this statement 1s not clear. It 

may refer to the fa.ct that Japan r:iade no further move 

southward until July. 

A-2 

SEGRB~ s=aURI'fY 
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REF ID:A485419 

We dec1ded to continue the negotiat1ona aa 

long as Japan did not lose her independent pos1t1.Qn in 

the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and in .order 

to close the China incident. 

B. i:.relim1nary Decision for War 

However, Amerioa 0 s sincere attitude, once war 

broke out between German1 and Russia /:}.2 Juni/ was gone; 

and turthermore Japan6 s advance into southern French 

Indo-China. {J.ate Juli[ had an adverse effect on trade 

negotiations with the United Stateso (Our polioy in regard to French Indo-Ch1na was fixed, irrespective of 

any negotiations with the United Stateeo) 

Subsequentl1, up to the time of the mass res1~ 

nation of the Konoye Cabinet,* England and the United 

States increased and strengthened their own armaments 

and mil1ta?'1' preparations in the southR in contrast to 

Japan whose national defense was lagging because of a 

break.~off in trade /:f.oeo, embargi? by England and the 

Un.1 ted States .. 

Japan decided therefore to oomplete her war 

preparations by the end of September at the very latest, 

•This apparently refers to Kono7e 0 s final fall on 

lG October. He had resigned onoe bef ore-=on 16 July-- but had remained as ~remier with a new cabinet. 

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OSEJRSil=• Sti!etJftI'fY 
REF ID:A485419 

5!Cft'Ef--5flCUHifY 

and at the same time to exert every effort through 

diplomatic channels to see her demands fulfilled. If 

her demands ,.,ere not met by early October, an Imperial 

decree would be issued deciding upon \-r:lr against Enr,land 

and the United Statet. 

These were Japan's m1n1mun demands: 

(1) The United States ~nd ~nGland not to 

medcll e in Japan' s di sr;os1 ti on of the China 1nc1uen t and not to present any obstacles fJ.e., to 

discontinue aid to Chungk1nB7'e 

(2) England and the United States n:ot to 

do anythlng in the Fa~ East which nould present 

a threat to Japanese security. 

{3) "England and the United States to cooperate 1n the procurement of goods needed by 

Japan [iron the Southwestern Pac1f1.Q.7. 

If these demands were met, Japan was prepared 

to rnalte these promises: 

(l} Japan ~ould not use French Indo-China 

as a base for striking at.any of the neighboring territories except Chine.. 

(2) Japan would withdraw from F~ench IndoCh1na once last1n£ peace was established. 

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REF ID:A485419 

SSORS'f••SECtm:I'fY 

(3) Japan would RUnrantee Philippine 

neutrality.* 

The answers which we had received to th1s 

proposal of neutrnlity up to 2 October were very h1gh• 

handed indeed. They demnnded the urtcond1t1onal acceptance of four basic principles: 

~· Complete respect for nnt1onal territorial 

1ntell;r1ty. 

~· No tnterf erence in the internal problems 

of other nations. 

' *The above version of JApnnGs position at th1s stage of the ne~ot1nt1ons is be.sed partly on the proposals of 

6 l\u~st and partly on ·thoae of 6 September. 11 !i:in1mum de• 

mand" number (l) and "nromise11 number (1) are both to.ken 

from the 6 September proposal; the other points parnphr~se 

pn.rts of the 6 i\uJ;Ust proposal, except for demand number 

( 2) h1ch 1s o. very rour;;h pe.ra,phrase of a cln use in both 

documents. 

The net effect of this curious Jumble is to m~ke J~pan•s 

position appear more uncornpromts1n~ than 1t actually was. 

The messnp;e conceals the f.~ot that• ns late as 6 .l\.uri;ust > 

Japan was st111 aek1nP: the United States to use 1ts p;ood offices to initiate p~aoe ner;otiationa bet~-reen Japnn .. and 

the Chungkln~ Govp,rnment and that, in the 6 September proposal, Jnpnn offered a va.p;ue promise to tJw1thdraw 

its nrmed forces from China as soon as ooss1ble in accordance w1 th the oqreements between Jnpa.n and China. 11 

Moreover, the outline su~gests that Japan had preM 

sented its "m1n1mum demands" to EnP:lo.ncl, as well as to 

the United States. That of course was not the case. By 6 September Japan had withdrawn her proposal suggesting that the United States use its ~ood offices to persuade En~land to negotiate a similar a~reement. 

A-5 

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Equality in commercial opportunity and 

general economic equn.l1ty. 

S· No disturbance of the stntus quo 1n the 

Pnc1f1c except by peaceful means.* 

Subsequently, the United States demanded not 

only immedinte w1thdrnwal of our forcas from French 

IndoQCh1na, but complete evacuation of Chinn as well, 

and also the giving up of the special close eoonom1o 

t1es between Japnn nnd Chinn. 

At this po1nt we felt that it was useless to 

continue negotiations with the United States, and we 

urged this upon the Government. However, Premier Konoye 

did not agree. 

O. The Final Decisions 

The establishment of ToJo0 s Cnb1net [8.rter 

Konoye 9 s full on 16 Octobe,t7 brou~ht about cooperation 

between the Government· and the Hi~h Command. 

*The above represents a fairly ~ccurnte paraphrase of the 11 four fundament~l nr1no1nles" first enunciated 

by President Roosevelt in· a statement handed to ~mbassador 

Nomura on 3 September and reiterated in a statement handed 

to Nomura by Mr. Hull on 2 October. According to a 6 

September report from A.mbassador Grew, on that day Premier 

Konoye expressed his "whole-hearted agreeI!lent" with the 

four basic pr1no1ples. 

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REF ID:A485419 

The whole matter was reviewed once a~ln, 

and finally, on 5 November, wnr wa.s decided on aga.1nst 

En~land and the United States. ~n Imperial decree was 

1ssued, sett1nr, the commencement of host111t1es at the 

beg1nn1n!! of December, and ora.er1ne; the cornplat1on of 

military preparations whilA carryin~ out last minute 

diplomatic negotiations. 

Thereafter, Japan went ahead with plans for 

war, while on the other hand she sent Ambassador Kurusu 

ln n last endeavor to reach a settlement. 

However, the United States showed that her 

idea of reaching a settlement ~as to supply us ~~th a 

little 011 in return for the immediate withdrawal of 

our troops from French Indo.,Ch1no.. The United States· 

refusAd to reco~n1ze the peculiar nature of the Chinese 

problem and the need for preservation of Japan°s special 

position in East ~sia~ and demanded the scrapping of 

the Tripartite Pnct. 

The!'efore, the Je.pnnese Imperial Government 

dropped its former policy and on 20 November presented 

its requests and demanded a yes or no nnawero 

These last ditch proposals were as follows: 

( 1) Except f'or !t~rench Indo-China, Japan will 

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REF ID:A485419 

SECHET•·S!!Ctlft:I'fY 

make no further armed advances in East Asia and 

the South Pacific. 

(2) The United Otates and Japnn shall co• 

operate in 1nsur1nP. [to both countrie,!7 the neces• 

sary supply of ~oods from the Netherlands E~st 

Indies. 

(3) The United States and Japan shall restore 

their oommercinl relnt1ons to those prevn111ng prior 

to the freezin~ of assets. The United States will 

agree to supply Japan '.'Ji th the oil she needs. 

(4) The United States will not present any 

obstacle to efforts for br1n~1n~ alx>ut a peace between Japnn and China. 

(5) Japan promises that a Chinese-Japanese 

pAaoe w~.ll be concluded, that she will establish 

a just peaoe in the Pac1f 1c, and that once these 

are settled, she will withdraw the forces which 

have been sent to French Indo-China. ~lso Japan 

will move the troops which she has stationed 1n 

southern French Indo-Ghina to the northern part 

when the present a~reement 1s si~ed.* 

*The forego1ng is an accurate paraphrase of Japan's 20 November proposal • 

~e 

SS6ftS'fwas980URI'!'Y 
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REF ID:A485419 

Hov:ever0 the United States had already been 

negotiating secretly with England41 Holland and China, 

and as soon e.e she received the new Japanese proposalsf) 

she made clear her intention of forming a close union 

b1~ti.veen these four pO\"Jers.. In a note of· 26 November:'! 

she laid down ·i;he four so=oalled fundamental principles 

to be accepted as the ba.ais o:f' future ne.g.otiations, 

and then proposed the follo'.~11ng specific' measures to 

be carried out by both countries: 

(1) · Bo·th countries a.re to contra.et a multi= 

lateral non=aggresslon pact with England~ Russia~ 

Holland~ China and Thailand~ 

(2) Both countries will arrange an agreement 

between Japan~ the United States, England~ Oh1na 9 

Holland and Thailand in regard to reepeat1ng the 

territorial sovereignty of French Indo-Ch1nac 

(3) Japan will wl thdrat'J all her troops from 

China and. Fraench Indo=China (army~ navy and air 

force) o 

(4) Neither country will give pol:lt1cal, 

military or economic recognition to any Chinese 

eovernmental authori·ty other than Chungking., 

(Repudiation of the Nanking Governmento) 

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REF ID:A485419 

SSORJ3'P .. c:•SEOtfft!9:'¥ 

(5) The two countries will ne~tiate a 

commercial treRty b~sed on the principles Of 

reciprocal most 0 favored-nation tree.tment, and 

the lower1ne of trade. ba:t·rierao 

(6} Each country w111 remove the freezing 

:r·t.:;..;)"t;ril.!·t1ons on the othel" 0 s assets. 

(7) Even thou~h Japan and the United States 

may have concluded treaties with th1rd powers, th1s 

a~reement is fundamental.* 

In short~ the United States proposals aqreed 

with everythin~ that we regarded ns inconsistent with 

the preservation of peace in the Pnc1f 1c arenso (They 

also ·~·muld have made the Tripartite Pn.ct a. dead letter.) 

This United StatP.s answer at one fell swoop showed us 

how utterly ridiculous end usel~ss had been the con• 

ferences which had been held since ~pr11, and come 

pletely swept a'11ay all understandinn;s reached. We 

saw now that future ne~otiations would be to no purpose, but oould only fit in with the delay1nr, policy 

of the United States. 

*Except for the omission of three clauses, the forego1n~ represents a fairly accurate paraphrase of 

the u. s. proposals of 26 November. 

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Consequently, the $upreme war Command 1mmed1• 

ately decided upon vrar. On 1 December the Imperial 

decree was 1ssued. 

A-11 

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I 

Sfil8Rt\! -$!etm'.I!I 

-IA13A h 

MA41c SvMMA .. } 

~.9) ::tS' lJ.:,\) ~~ 

lTO.\'\ ~ \1' red ~ \\Jo1' 43 (Pvb.- 25 November 1943) 

Cir.cular sent out by Japanese War 

Ministry on 9 December 1941 

A. Early Negotiations: April-July 

In April Ambassador Nomura in Washington wired 

h='me for instructions regarding a "Proposal for an Understanding" 

between Japan and the United States, which had just about been 

agreed upon between him and the United States authorities. (He 

had received no instructions whatsoev.er from the Home Office.)* 

The Proposal covered the following points: 

(1) The. international feeli'ng of the United 

States and Japan. 

(2) The attitude of the United States and 

Japan toward the European war. 

(3) China-Japan peace. 

(4) United.States-Japan trade. 

(5) Economic and maritime problems in these 

areas.ff 

Now the purpose of the United States in this was, 

by taking advantage of Japan's weak points, to make us stop our 

southern advance. Meanwhile, she planned to build up her armaments 

and increase her aid to England at the same time. 

The Japanese Government decided to take advantage of 

this occasion (foreseeing what would be brought up) to settle the China 

incident (the United States proposed to act as mediator between Japan 

and China), and to make preparations for the restoration of her national 

strength •. Because of this, she did not violate the spirit of the agreement.*** 

*Throughout this TAB, material in parentheses is as set forth in the 

original Japanese circular; material in brackets is supplied. 

**'!'he "Proposal for s.n Understanding" which Nomura communicated to 

Tokyo on 17 April actually contained provisions under 7 headings. The 

first 3 were approximately as given above. The remainder were as follows: 11 (4) air and naval strength and navigation in the Pacific; (5) commercial 

and financial cooperation between the two countries; (6) economic activities 

of the two countries in the Southwest Pacifio; (7) the policies of the two 

countries regarding political stabllity in the Pacific." 

***The meaning of this statemen·t is not ~lea.r. It may r_ef er to the fact 

that Japan made no further move southward until July. 

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We decided to continue the negotiations as long as 

Japan did not lose her independent position in the Greater East Asia 

Co-Prosperity Sphere, and in order to close the China incident. 

B. Preliminary Decision for War 

However, America's sincere attitude, once war broke 

out betwee¥ Germany and Russia L22 Jun.!/ JraS gone; and furthermore Japan's 

advance into southern French In.do-China Llate Julii} had an adverse effect 

on trade negotiations with the United States. (Our policy in regard to 

French Inda-China was fixed, irrespective of any negotiations with the 

United States.) 

Subsequently, up to the time of the mass resignation 

of the Konoye Cabinet,* England and the United States increased and 

strengthened their own armaments and military preparations in the south, 

in contrast to Japan whose nation1!:1 defense was lagging because of a . break-off in trade jJ...e., embargQ/ by England and the United States. 

Japan decided therefore to complete her waB.preparations 

by the end of September at the very latest, and at the same time to exert 

every effort through diplomatic channels to see her demands fulfilled. If 

her demands were not :met by early October, au Imperial decree would be 

--... issued deciding upon war against England and the United States. 

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These were Japan'a minimum demands: 

(1) The United States and England not to meddle in 

Japan's disJ2osition of the China incident and no_l to present any 

obstacles Li .e., to discontinue aid to Chungkin_g/. 

(2) England and the United States not to do anything 

in the Far East which would present a threat to Japanese security. 

(3) England and the United States to cooperate in 

the procurement of goods needed by Japan lJrom the Southwestern Pacifi..£7. 

If these demands were met, Japan was prepared to make 

these promises: 

(1) Japan would not use French Indo-China as a.. base for 

striking at any of the neighboring territories except China. 

{2) Japan would withdraw from French Indo-Ghina once 

lasting peace was established .. 

*This apparently refers to Konoye 1 s final fall on 16 October. He 

had resigned once before--on 16 July-~but had remained as ~remier with a 

new cabinet • 

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(.3) Japan wou11i guarantee. Philippine neutrality.* 

The answers which we had received to this proposal of 

neutra).ity up to 2 October were very high-handed inQ.eed. They demanded 

the unconditional acceptance of four basic principles: 

!· Complete respect for national territorial integrity. 

£. No interference in the internal problems of other 

nations. 

' .£• Equality in commercial opportunity and general 

economic equality • 

..Q;. No disturbance of the status quo in-the Pacific 

except by peaceful means.** 

Subsequently, the United States demanded not only 

immediate withdrawal of our forces from French Indo-China, but complete 

evacuation of China as well, and also the giving up of the special close 

economic ties between Japan and China. 

*The above version ot Japan's position at this stage of the negotiations 

is based partly on tne proposals of 6 August and partly on those of 6 September. 

"Minimum demand" number (1) and "promise" number (1) are both taken from the 

6 September proposal; the other points paraphrase parts of the 6 August pro-. 

posal, except for demand number (2) which is a very rough paraphrase of a 

clause in both documents. 

The net effect of this curious jumble is to make Japan's position appear 

more uncompromising than it actually was. The message conceals the fact 

that, as late as 6 August, Japan was still asking the United States to use 

its good offices to initiate peace negotiations between Japan and the Chungking 

Government and that, in the 6 September proposal, Japan offered a vague promise 

to "withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as possible in accordance 

with the agreements between Japan and China •11 

Moreover, the outline suggests that Japan had presented its "minimum 

demands" to England, as well as to the United States. That of course was 

not the case. By 6 September Japan had withdrawn her proposal suggesting 

that the United States use its good offices to persuade England to negotiate 

a similar agreement. 

*Wl'he above represents a fairly accurate paraphrase of the "four fundamental principles" first enunciated by President Roosevelt in a statement 

handed to Ambassador Nomura on 3 September and-Teiterated in a statement 

handed to Nomura by Mr. Hull.on 2 October. According to a 6 September report 

from Ambassador Grew, on that day Premier Konoye expressed his "whole-hearted 

agreement" with the four basic principles. 

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At this point we felt that it was useless to continue 

negotiations with the United States, and we urged this upon the Government. 

However, Premier Konoye did not agree. 

C. The Final Dec~isions 

The establishment of Tojo's Cabinet .J;..rter Konoye 1 s fall 

on 16 Octobe.i7 brought about oooperELtion between the Government and the High 

Command. 

The whole matter was reviewed once again, and finally, 

on 5 November, war was decided on against England and the U~ited States. 

An Imperial decree was issued, setting the co1111encement of hostilities at 

the begi.nlling of December, and ordering the completion of military preparations while carrying out last minut;e diplomatic negotiations. 

Thereafter, Japan went ahead with plans for war, while 

on the other hand she sent Ambassador Kurusu in a last endeavor to reach 

a settlement. 

However, the United States showed that her idea of 

reaching a settlement was to supply us with a little oil in return for the 

immediate withdrawal or our troops from French Indo-China. The United States 

refused to recognize the peculiar nature of the Chinese problem and the need 

for preservation of Japan's special position in East Asia, and demanded the 

scrapping of the Tripartite Pact. 

Therefore, the Japanese Imperial Government dropped its 

former policy and on 20 November presented its requests and demanded a yes 

or no answer. 

These last ditch proposals were as follows: 

(1) Except for French Indo-Chi:na, Japan will make no 

further armed advances in East Asia and the South Pacific. 

(2) The Unit_!d States and Japan shall cooperate in 

insuring Lto both countrie.§/ the necessary supply of goods from the 

Netherlands East Indies. 

(3) The United States and Japan shall restore their 

commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of 

assets. The United States will agre~ t:o supply Japan with the oil 

she needs. 

(4) The United States wiil not present any obstacle 

to efforts for bringing about a peace between Japan and China. 

(5) Japan promises that a Chinese-Japanese peace will 

be concluded, that she will establish a just peace in the Pacific, and 

that once these are settled, she will withdraw the forces which have 

been sent to French Indo-China. Also Japan will move the troops whioh 

she bas stationed in southern French Indo-Ghina to the northern part 

when the prese~t agreement is signed.* 

*'!'he foregoing is an accurate paraphrase of Japa.n 1 s 20 November proposal. 
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However, the United States had already been negotiating 

secretly with England, Holland and China, and as soon as she received the 

new Japanese proposals, she ma.de elear her intention of forming a elose 

wiion between these four powers. In a note of 26 November, she laid down 

the four so-called fundamental principles to be accepted as the basis of 

future negotiations, and then proposed the following specific measures to 

be carried out by both countries: 

(1) Both countries are to contract a multilateral nonagression pact with England, Russia, liolland, China and Thailand. 

(2) Both countries will arrange an agreement between 

Japan, the United States, EngJ,and, China, Holland and Thailand in 

regard to respecting the territorial ~overeignty of French Indo-China. 

(3) Japan will withdraw all her troops from China and 

French Indo-China (army, navy and air force). 

·(4) Neither country will give political, military or 

economic recognition to any Chinese governmental authority other than 

Chungking. (Repudiation of the Nanking GoverWD.ent.) 

(5) The two coun.tries will negotiate a commerc.;bal treaty 

based on the principles of reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment, and 

the lowering of trade barriers. 

(6) Each country will remove the freezing restrictions 

on the other 1 s assets. 

(7) Even though Japan and the United States may hve 

concluded treaties with third powers, this agreement is fundamental.* 

In short, the United States proposals agreed with everything that we regarded as inconsistent with the preservation of peace in the 

Pacific areas. {They also would have made the Tripartite Pact a dead letter.) 

This United States answer at one fell swoop showed us how utterly ridiculous 

and useless had been the conferences which had been held since April, and 

completely swept away all understandings reached. We saw now that future. 

negotiations would be to no purpose, but could only fit in with the delaying 

policy of the United States. 

Consequently, the Supreme War Command iI!lllediately decided 

upon war. On 1 December the Imperial decree was issued. 

*Except for the omission of three clauses, the foregoing represents a 

fairly accurate paraphrase of the U. S. ·proposals of.26 November. 

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