CSGAS-14 12 November 1947 

SUBJECT: Comments Requested on Instruction Manual, 

Converter M-209 

TO: Chief, AS-23 

1. My f9rmer concurrenc~ in the recommendation to supply 

a special manual- for the purpose indicated in Par. 1 of Action 

1 was predicated on the assumption that such a mamial would 

include a fair amount of 1nformnt1on on keying. It now appears that all such~nformation may be eliminated from the special manual. Although the views a.nd recommendations of AS-90 and 

of AS-80 on the rna.tter a.re appreciated, I am not certa.1n that ~he adoption of the recommendation would really be~the beet :'_;) interests of the Agency or of the U .s. as a. whole. Aleo, since~B 

the time the decision to supply a speo1al manual was made,, a ~ §] 

new factor h.e.e entered into $e case, and I believe that ~ t:nf:J 

further Qonsideration ·should be given this matter from a 3 ~ 

broader point of view than that based solely upon the effect ~ @::~ 

on the efficient functioning of our signal intelligence e_ffort. ~ ~ 

<3 ~ 

2 •. As I u,iderstand it, these La.tin American countries 

are being assisted by the U.S. so that they will be equipped and trained militarily to be our allies in a hemispheric defense. Communications will be a vital element in such a 

defense and the p~oteotion of those commun1cat1one will·be an 

important part of the military security, not only of the Latin 

American forces themselves but also of any U.S. forces associated with them. To permit the Latin American forcee to use 

Converter M-209 in a manner which will iay all their commun1-

cat1ons open to an easy cryptanalytic attack would therefore 

be likely to lay U.S. communications to similar attack and 

would be eounter~to the best interests of AS-80 in performing its functions in respect to communication security of our own 

forces. On the other hand, there is no question that to suppl these Latin American countries with our own or nearly similar 

instructions for employing Converter M-209 would spread knowledge of proper usage of this device in quarters where such 

information is now ·hot current, and this would increase the· 

future problems of AS-90; thus eonst1tut1ng a disadvantage to 

U.S. s~gnal intelligence interests. 

~\' r: I , \•· 

· Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 10-22-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

~~ rci.,~' 

1'.(~ 

~~t'\o 

·; 

~~~ l~--c 

·' 
.. '\ . -· .. .._ . 

CSGAS-14 311.5 12 November 1947 

SUBJECT: Comments Requested on Instruction Manual, 

Converter M-209 

}. It. seems to me, therefore, that a choice must be made 

bet._ieen two conflicting interests of the Agency as a whole and 

of. the U.S. Government·. The communication security respon- sibilities of the Agency, on the one hand, demand that we do 

not allow our pos~ible allies to jeopardize our own communications; the signal intelligence respons1bil1t1es. of' the Agency, 

on the other hand, make it des1rable not to facilitate the 

spreading usage by other governments ·cf increasingly secure 

methods of using systems based upon the Ragelin mach..tne. The 

question reduces itself to this: from which angle have we more 

to lose, or from which source is tbere,more danger to u.s. 

interests. · · 

4. Weighing the imponderables in this case, it seems to 

me that in this situation we would find less danger to our 

signal intelligence 1nteraets than to our communication 

3ecur1ty interests. In the first place, already several 

hwidred of these devices together with excellent instructional 

manuals h.e.ve been provided certain of these countr1eSJ to 

tighten up on the situati,on now is to take a position equivalent 

to "locking the stable door after the horse has· been stolen.~ 

In the second place, personnel from the Armies of these Latin 

American countries are students at our service schools and 

are presumably being taught our method of using the device. 

In the third plaoe,-to issue a new manual which on comparison w1th the old one would show that the former hae been emasculated 

by deletion or all operating instructions would in itself 

a.rouse suspicions of three sorts:·f1rst, that the U.S. is not 

acting 1..n good faith; second., that the U.S. is trying to hide 

·something that must bo pretty good; and third.11 that the U.S. 

does not want these governments to use 1ts ovn method because 

the U.S. must now be·able to read messages enciphered on this 

device when the mesS61ges are not prepared according to that m~thod. · 

5. a. Assuming that we· do no't include any keying or 

opera.ting instructions in the propos.ed manual, the La.tin 

American governments will have to obtain them elsewhere, for 

it will be. obvious to them that c$rta1n rules for setting up . _the key will be necessary. Their courses of action might be 

a.s follows: 

~l) Probably ae a first step, they would request that, as was previously done, we supply them 

With operating instructions. It· we ehould 

then take the position that we canno~ give 

2 

~~~~,~.' 

I -~ =J \ ~ .! ~ '.) ~ ~ ~. ~ ~ ~ · . ii ·_-..,.· ·.·· •• ,·.-, :'' ·i..:',~ 
) 

.• 

rr.4rr1r1~r~~ ID:A411658l ' 1:"7'; lff":. ·-~ ...... ~ \'/. I J : ~-· · \· i . ' 

·-1} L;S_ :.,._~i": lJJ \l . 

them our own operating 1nstruot1on~,-ror 

the reason that it is contrary to U.S. 

policy in such matters, they vould probably then proceed.to the next step. 

(2}.· They would perhaps.either request suitable 

basic or general information on which to 

prepare their own.,or else they might proceed 

to prepare their own ~1thout further help. 

In either of these two events the risks to 

their and our own communication security would probably be as indicated in Par. 2 

above. · 

(3) It ic also possible that they might try-to obtain operating 1.nstructiona from the 

Ho.gelin Company itself. This would put the 

U.S. in a very embarrassing situation, in 

addition to involving the· security risks 

mentioned above, since 1 t is .doubtful, 

judging by the way certain non-u.s. users 

of the device employ it,· that the Ha.gel1n Company understands or has ·found the best 

way of using it. 

·~ 

·• 

· b. None of t'he foregoing posa1b111t1es or probabilities is particularly inviting as a solution to the difficulties in · this matter. On the other hand, some consideration can be 

given to the signal intelligence fac~ors in the case. 

6. Assuming that· the same manual that.was 1saued with 

the first lot of M-209's furnished the Peruvian Government was 

also nupplied with these additional devicee to.be given other 

Latin American governments, the signal intelligence risks to 

U.S. interest are not thought to be serious. In the firat 

place, these devices are being furnished for low-echelon 

tactical usage by military units and.there is nothing to .indicate 

tho.t either the foreign offices or·th~ high-echelon military headquarters or those governments intend to use the device and 

no machines are being furnished tor such purposes. In the 

second place, even 1r those offices and headquarters d1d adopt· the dev1oe 1n place of their present.methods, the chances that 

they would absolutely avoid all violations of rules and 1nvs.r1ably use the device correctly in a manner as.to defy our 

,own well·developed c~yptanalytic attacks are not 'lfoo good, so 

that, if neceese.ry, we could probably read the bulk of the 

traffic. 
r 

'\' " .... 1 

GSGAS-14 311.5 12 NHvember 1947 

SUBJECT: Comments Requested on Inatl'Uction Manual, Converter M-209 

.. 

7. Sinoe the decision to supply a special manual tor this 

purpose wae made, a new factor has arisen 1n connection with 

this whole subject. The legality or at least the ethics of 

the U. 8. supplying other governments W1.th Converter M-209 may be questionable, 1n view of special patent arrangements made 

by this Government with Mr .. Hagel1n. The u.e. purchased only the U.S. patents to Converter M-209, tor U.S. usage only. It is possible that the whole matter might become most embarrassing from thie point of view, as sooner or later the Hage11n Company is bound to learn of these transactions wherein the 

U.S. is furnishing the machines to other governments. Perh&ps- the best plan of all would be to reopen the whole case, invee.-

tigate the legal~ty of such supply, and if found illegal or 

unethical, recall all the devices vh1ch have already been given 

to Latin American countries and refuse any further requests for 

devicee on the ground that the-u.s. cannot legally furnish them. 

This would extricate us from the.position in which ve now find 

ourselves. Should thoee countries still want the devices and 

if they were told that they must purchase them from the Hagel1n 

·Company, they pr.obably would not 'do so in view or the cos~ 

thereof. If, despite the cost, they decided to purchase the 

machines, they could ask the Bagelin Company to provide operating instructions with them, just as ve did ·originally .as part of 

the contract with Hagelin. Then, i1' it were decided that our 

communication aeeuri.ty interests are paramount and 1t it were 

found that the operat1:ng 1natruct1o:ns supplied by Hag&lin.were 

too defective for our own communication security, our next 

step would be obvious: give them better instructions. That, 

however, is a bridge we oan cross vhen we come to it. On the 

other hand, 1f it is found legal anq ethical for the U.S. to 

supply the foreign governments w1th·th1s ma.chine, then a decision as to whether communication security or signal intelligence 1ntereets of the U.S. shall have first priority 1n·cona1deration should be made and the ASA can b~ guided accordingly. 

8. The pros and cons of this whole.matter are so involved 

and the subject 1teelf is of such a nature that a policy decision ought to be made on the highest level. It is recommended: 

a. That the legality ot our supplying the devices to 

the Latin American governments be definitely ascertained. 

b; ~hat, 1f the legality 1s confirmed, the Director 

of Intel 1.1genoe be requested to make the decision a..s to which 

of the two U.S. interests indicated in Par. } above shall be 

given primar,y coneiders.tion: 

4 
.... .. . .. , ' . .... 

CSGAS 4 14 .311.5 12 November 1947 

SUBJECT: ·comments Requested on Instruction Manual, Convert~r M-209 

(1) If it ls decided that our own commun1ca.t.1on 

security interests are t-o be g-1ven-primary cons1dera.t1on, manuals identical with those 

already supplied the Peruvian Army be furnished.· 

(2) If i·c la decided that our own signal intelligence interests a.t>e to be given·prima.ry · cona!de~ation, spacial manuals of the type recommended 1n Par. 4 o~ Act1on·3 be turnished,· viz.11 m$nuals without any detailed 

keying instructions, in which case the La.tin 

Amer1cap governments should be advised that 

f'Urn1sh1ng auch information ie contrary to 

,. 

U.S. policy in such ma.tte:r>a and that they should consult the manllfacturer or the machines 

tor. ase1sta.nce' in drafting suitable keying -and operating instructions._ 

c. - That, if- "the. lege.11 ty of Olll' supplying these foreign 

government.a w1 th the machines is not confirmed, the action to 

be taken in the premises be determined by the Secretary of the 

Army11 as to whether tho·niachines already issued be recalled or 

some equita~le settlement be made w1th the Hagelin Company. 

l Incl 

Draft of Instruction 

Manual, Converter M-209 

WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN 

Chief, Commun1cat1ons Research 

Ext 215