ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

SPERRO LLC D/B/A SPERRO 

TOWING AND RECOVERY, FENNER 

& ASSOCIATES LLC, AND BRIAN 

FENNER

Hilary Bowe Ricks

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Harley K. Means

John J. Petr

Steven E. Runyan

Kroger, Gardis & Regas, LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Sperro LLC d/b/a Sperro 

Towing and Recovery, Fenner & 

Associates LLC, Brian Fenner,

and AMI Asset Management, 

Inc.,

Appellants-Defendants,

 and

Indiana Bureau of Motor 

Vehicles,

Declaratory Defendant,

v.

Ford Motor Credit Company 

LLC,

November 17, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1601-PL-187

Interlocutory Appeal from the 

Marion Superior Court

The Honorable Thomas J. Carroll, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49D06-1512-PL-40415

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016 Page 1 of 27
Appellee-Plaintiff

Crone, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Sperro LLC d/b/a Sperro Towing and Recovery (“Sperro”) is in the business of 

transporting and storing collateral. Sperro towed and stored certain vehicles 

that had been financed by Ford Motor Credit Company LLC (“FMCC”). 

Sperro sought to assert possessory mechanic’s liens on the vehicles pursuant to 

Indiana Code Section 9-22-6-2 and sold the vehicles. FMCC filed a complaint 

against Sperro, Fenner & Associates LLC, and Brian Fenner (collectively 

“Appellants”), and AMI Asset Management, Inc. (“AMI”),

1 for civil 

conversion, replevin, tortious interference with a contractual relationship, and 

conspiracy to commit fraud. FMCC also filed a petition for a preliminary 

injunction. Following a hearing, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction 

granting FMCC prejudgment possession of specific vehicles in Sperro’s and 

AMI’s possession, ordering Appellants to turn over to FMCC any known or not 

yet identified FMCC-financed vehicles that may be in Appellants’ possession, 

and enjoining Appellants from taking or maintaining possession of any vehicle 

on which FMCC is the lienholder. 

1 AMI and the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles did not file briefs in this appeal, but Indiana Appellate Rule 

17(A) provides that “[a] party of record in the trial court or Administrative Agency shall be a party on 

appeal.”

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[2] Appellants now bring this interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s entry of 

preliminary injunction. Appellants challenge the trial court’s conclusions that 

they did not comply with Indiana Code Section 9-22-6-2 and that they 

intentionally induced the vehicles’ purchasers to breach their retail installment 

contracts with FMCC or proceeded with reckless disregard of their contractual 

relationship. We conclude that the trial court’s conclusions are not clearly 

erroneous, and therefore we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The following facts are undisputed.2 Brian Fenner is the sole owner and 

employee of Sperro, an Indiana limited liability company established in 

February 2015, which is in the business of transporting and storing collateral. 

Sperro’s principal office address, as provided in its articles of organization, is 

P.O. Box 163 in Camby, Indiana, 46113. The 46113 zip code covers parts of 

Marion, Morgan, and Hendricks Counties. Fenner testified that P.O. Box 163 

is located in Hendricks County. However, Sperro transports vehicles to and 

stores them at 2534 Bluff Road and 2334 South California Street in 

Indianapolis, Marion County (collectively “the Storage Yards”). Also, Sperro 

advertises that its lien auction sales are held at the Bluff Road property. Fenner 

& Associates LLC is an Indiana limited liability company with its articles of 

incorporation signed by Fenner, and its principal office address is the Bluff 

Road address. 

2

 Appellants challenge only one of the trial court’s findings of fact, which we discuss in Section 1.

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[4] Fenner was a former employee of AMI, a Wisconsin corporation registered to 

do business in Indiana. Dennis Birkley is the sole shareholder of AMI. Fenner 

and Birkley both worked as repossession/recovery agents and have known each 

other for over twenty years. Birkley was Fenner’s mentor at one time.

[5] FMCC financed some of the vehicles that Sperro transported to and stored in 

the Storage Yards. Seven of these vehicles (“the Vehicles”) are the subject of 

this lawsuit. The Vehicles’ purchasers (“the Borrowers”) financed their vehicles 

through loans from FMCC pursuant to retail installment contracts 

(“Installment Contracts”). The Borrowers have contractually defaulted on their 

payments due to FMCC under the Installment Contracts. The Installment 

Contracts granted to FMCC a continuing security interest in the Vehicles, and 

FMCC perfected its security interest in each of the Vehicles by placing its liens

on the certificates of title. The Installment Contracts required the Borrowers to 

keep the Vehicles free from the claims of others; not expose the Vehicles to 

misuse, seizure, confiscation, or involuntary transfer; and not sell, rent, lease, or 

transfer any interest in the Vehicles or the Installment Contracts without 

FMCC’s written permission. Plaintiff’s Ex. 28(d). Upon a Borrower’s default 

under the Installment Contract, FMCC was entitled to demand the full amount 

owed and take possession of the Vehicle. However, FMCC was not contacted 

by the Borrowers or Sperro prior to transportation of the Vehicles to the Storage 

Yards and did not consent to Sperro taking possession of and transporting the 

Vehicles hundreds of miles from their surrender points. Sperro transported the 

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Vehicles from New Mexico, California, Louisiana, and Arizona to its Storage 

Yards in Indianapolis. 

[6] Fenner operated Sperro according to a certain business plan that the trial court 

referred to as “the Sperro Plan.” Appellants’ App. at 27. Under the Sperro 

Plan, Sperro established contacts with numerous consumer bankruptcy 

attorneys throughout the United States, who would notify Sperro when a 

prospective bankruptcy client had a financed vehicle that he or she could no 

longer afford to make the payments on. Although such vehicles would 

normally be voluntarily surrendered to the secured creditor, Sperro would offer 

to pay the client’s bankruptcy legal fees in exchange for the client’s agreement 

to have the vehicle towed to Indiana and stored pursuant to a Transporting and 

Storage Authorization Agreement (“TSAA”). The TSAA authorized Sperro to 

make the following charges: $1.85 per mile to transport a vehicle to the Bluff 

Road property; a $75 loading fee and a $75 unloading fee; a $45 per day 

outdoor storage fee; a $250 preventive maintenance care package; up to an $800 

fee if a lien sale proceeding commenced; and a $175 administrative fee if the 

owner defaulted under the TSAA. Plaintiff’s Ex. 36. The TSAA also provided 

that the storage fees began to accrue on the date that the bankruptcy client 

entered into the agreement and were due in arrears on the first day of each 

month. Id. Upon declaring a default under the TSAA, Sperro would issue a 

notification of lien to the owner of the vehicle and the lienholder, stating that if 

the demanded amount was not paid within fifteen days, the vehicle would be 

considered abandoned and any lien or interest in the vehicle would be forfeited. 

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By signing the TSAA, the client acknowledged that Sperro had a security 

interest in the vehicle and a “right to claim a lien to recover transport/storage 

and other charges incurred.” Id. The Borrowers’ execution of the TSAAs and 

surrender of the Vehicles to Sperro constituted a default on their promises in the 

Installment Contracts to keep the Vehicles free from the claims of any others, 

not to expose the Vehicles to seizure, and not to transfer any interest in the 

Vehicles without FMCC’s written permission. 

[7] Since Fenner implemented the Sperro Plan, approximately 40% of the vehicles 

towed by Sperro to Indianapolis have been redeemed by lienholders who paid 

the towing and storage fees. The people who surrendered vehicles to Sperro 

pursuant to TSAAs have rarely, if ever, picked up or redeemed a vehicle. 

Sperro has sold the remaining vehicles at “purported lien auctions” for the 

alleged towing and storage fees. Appellants’ App. at 14. An auctioneer has 

never been present at any of the lien auctions. Although Sperro purportedly 

held the lien auctions at the Bluff Road property in Marion County, Sperro 

advertised the lien auctions in the Hendricks County Flyer, which is not in general 

circulation in Marion County. Since January 2015, the Indiana Bureau of 

Motor Vehicles (“BMV”) has issued forty-nine new certificates of title for 

vehicles sold at Sperro’s purported lien auctions, and of these, forty-three were 

sold to AMI, three were sold to Sperro, two were sold to Fenner, and one was 

sold to William Boger, Fenner’s neighbor.

[8] On August 9, 2015, Sperro took possession of three of the Vehicles (“the Group 

1 Vehicles”) that are the subject of this lawsuit. On August 26 and 27, 2015, 

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Sperro sent a notice of lien for each of these Vehicles to FMCC. The notices of 

lien failed to correctly identify the proper statutory authority for Sperro’s 

asserted liens. On August 29, 2015, Sperro published a notice of sale for the 

Group 1 Vehicles in the Hendricks County Flyer. The notice of sale was 

published within thirty days after Sperro took possession of the Group 1 

Vehicles. On September 14 and 15, 2015, AMI purchased the Group 1 

Vehicles. On November 9, 2015, Sperro sent notice of lien correction 

statements to FMCC, asserting possessory mechanic’s liens on the Group 1 

Vehicles under Indiana Code Section 9-22-6-1. 

[9] Also in August and September 2015, Sperro took possession of three more 

Vehicles (“the Group 2 Vehicles”). On August 24, 2015, Sperro took 

possession of one of these Vehicles. On September 13, 2015, Sperro sent 

FMCC a notice of lien. On October 1, 2015, Sperro published a notice of sale 

for it in the Hendricks County Flyer, and on October 9, 2015, Sperro sold it to 

Collateral Services of Indiana LLC (“CSI”). Fenner is the sole member of CSI. 

On August 24 and September 30, 2015, Sperro purchased the other two Group 

2 Vehicles. On November 9, 2015, Sperro sent notices of lien to FMCC. On 

November 14, 2015, Sperro published notices of sale in the Hendricks County 

Flyer, and on November 28, 2015, Sperro purchased them. The sales of all the 

Group 2 Vehicles occurred less than fifteen days after the notices of sale were 

published. Lastly, Sperro took possession of the seventh Vehicle, a Fiesta, on 

October 7, 2015. Sperro did not send notice to FMCC of its intent to hold a 

mechanic’s lien and has not sold this Vehicle. 

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[10] As of December 22, 2015, FMCC was owed $159,141 under the Installment 

Contracts for the Vehicles. The estimated wholesale value of the Vehicles is 

$95,000. The towing and storage liens on the Vehicles totaled $33,799.50, or 

approximately $4800 per vehicle. The usual and customary cost of a voluntary 

surrender in the towing industry is less than $300. 

[11] FMCC wrote to the BMV to request that it stop and withhold any title transfer 

to Sperro or any alleged lien sale purchase of the Vehicles (“the Stop Title 

Requests”). FMCC sent copies of the Stop Title Requests, along with copies of 

the Installment Contracts, to Sperro and Fenner prior to the alleged sales of the 

Group 2 Vehicles.3

 FMCC made written demand for the return of the Vehicles 

from Sperro and Fenner, which was ignored or refused.

[12] As a result of the Stop Title Requests, and other irregularities in the title 

applications submitted by Sperro, Fenner, AMI, and CSI, the BMV decided to 

apply a heightened degree of scrutiny based on the potential for fraud. 

Applying this additional scrutiny, the BMV rejected approximately forty title 

applications submitted by AMI for vehicles that it had purchased from Sperro.

[13] Carla Resler, a legal assistant from the office of FMCC’s counsel, attempted to 

monitor one of Sperro’s lien auctions. Sperro advertised a lien auction in the 

Hendricks County Flyer to be held on December 4, 2015, at 6:30 a.m. at the Bluff 

3

 FMCC asserts that it sent the Stop Title Requests to Sperro prior to the sale of all the Vehicles, but the trial 

court found that FMCC sent the Stop Title Requests prior to the sale of only the Group 2 Vehicles. 

Appellants’ App. at 17 (finding 50).

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Road property. At the specified time, Resler went to the Bluff Road property, 

but no lights were on at the sale site, and Fenner was not present. In fact, 

Resler was the only person there. She then went to the California Street 

property, but no one was there either. Nevertheless, Sperro submitted title 

applications to the BMV for twelve vehicles that it allegedly purchased for cash 

at the December 4, 2015 lien auction.

[14] In December 2015, FMCC filed a complaint for damages, possession, 

temporary restraining order, and preliminary and permanent injunctions against 

Appellants and naming the BMV as a declaratory defendant. FMCC asserted 

causes of action against Appellants based on conversion, replevin, tortious 

interference with a contract, and conspiracy to commit fraud. The same day, 

FMCC also filed a petition for temporary restraining order and preliminary and 

permanent injunctions. The trial court held a hearing on FMCC’s petition, at 

which FMCC submitted thirty-six exhibits and called four witnesses, and 

Sperro submitted ten exhibits and called two witnesses. 

[15] In January 2016, the trial court issued findings of fact, conclusions thereon, and 

entry of preliminary injunction and prejudgment possession (“Entry of 

Preliminary Injunction”) in favor of FMCC. The findings of fact provide that 

since June 2015, five additional complaints have been filed and are being 

litigated in Marion Superior Court against Fenner, Sperro, CSI, and AMI based 

on facts similar to those set forth above and in FMCC’s complaint (“the Sperro 

Plan Litigation”). The conclusions provide as follows:

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6. Upon a request by a party for prejudgment possession, “the 

court shall consider the showing made by the parties appearing 

and make a preliminary determination which party, with 

reasonable probability, is entitled to possession, use, and 

disposition of the property, pending final adjudication of the 

claims of the parties.” Ind. Code § 32-35-2-14.

7. FMCC is the superior, proper and first lien holder in the 

Vehicles, perfected by FMCC’s liens noted on the certificates of 

titles, with priority over any alleged lien or right asserted by 

Sperro, Fenner, CSI and AMI.

8. Accordingly, in determining whether FMCC is entitled to 

prejudgment possession, the issue is whether there is a reasonable 

probability that FMCC’s interests in the Vehicles by virtue of its 

perfected liens noted on the certificates of title are superior to 

Sperro’s claimed interests, if any, by virtue of alleged statutory 

possessory liens and sales.

....

10. A vehicle subject to a possessory mechanic’s lien cannot be 

advertised for sale sooner than thirty (30) days after the date the 

vehicle is left in, or comes into, the possession of the claimant 

and thereafter cannot be sold earlier than fifteen (15) days after 

the date the advertisement is published. Ind. Code § 9-22-6-2. 

Accordingly, there is a minimum time period of forty-five (45) 

days before a vehicle subject to a possessory lien can legally be 

sold.

....

12. Sperro advertised the sales of the [Group 1 Vehicles] less 

than thirty (30) days after the date the three vehicles came into 

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the possession of Sperro. Accordingly, the alleged lien sales 

relating to the [Group 1 Vehicles] to AMI are invalid.

13. Sperro cited to inapplicable Indiana Code sections in the 

Notices relating to the [Group 1 Vehicles] and acknowledged 

these misstatements in the Corrected Notices. Accordingly, the 

lien sales relating to the [Group 1 Vehicles] to AMI are invalid 

for the additional reason that the Corrected Notices were not 

transmitted to FMCC prior to sale to AMI.

14. The mechanic’s lien sales relating to the [Group 2 Vehicles] 

were less than (15) days after the date the advertisements were 

placed in the Hendricks County Flyer. Accordingly, the alleged 

lien sales purporting to sell the [Group 2 Vehicles] to Sperro were 

invalid.

15. The mechanic’s lien sales relating to the Vehicles 

purportedly sold to AMI, Sperro and CSI were solely advertised 

in the [Hendricks County] Flyer, a newspaper that does not 

generally circulate in Indianapolis, Marion County, Indiana, the 

city where Sperro is located. Accordingly, the alleged lien sales

relating to the Vehicles are invalid.

....

19. There is a substantial risk that [Appellants] will seek to sell 

or transfer title to the Vehicles or move them from their current 

locations in Indianapolis, Indiana and Mukwonago, Wisconsin 

in an effort to hide them, prior to a determination of the merits of 

this controversy, which will cause irreparable harm to FMCC.

....

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21. [Appellants’] attempted sales and transfers of the titles to 

the Vehicles, possible movement of the Vehicles, and Sperro’s 

and Fenner’s likely ongoing solicitation and transportation of 

additional vehicles in which FMCC maintains liens justifies 

emergency action by this court.

22. FMCC’s remedies at law are inadequate.

23. The threatened injury [Appellants’] continued conduct will 

cause to FMCC outweighs any harm to [Appellants] from being 

preliminarily enjoined from selling or transferring title to the 

Vehicles, moving the Vehicles, and from taking possession of and 

transporting additional vehicles in which FMCC holds liens from 

throughout the country for the obvious purpose of obtaining and 

enforcing towing, storage and mechanic’s liens under the dubious 

business model called “the Sperro Plan”, until this Court enters a 

final judgment on the legality and validity of [Appellants’] 

conduct and alleged liens or ownership of the Vehicles.

24. The alleged lien auctions did not comply with Indiana 

Code § 9-22-6-2.

25. FMCC has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits 

at trial by having established a prima facie case that Sperro, 

Fenner, CSI and AMI are not in lawful possession of the 

Vehicles.

26. Sperro, Fenner, and AMI have exerted unauthorized 

dominion and control over the Vehicles in contravention of 

FMCC’s first priority liens, by among other things, refusing to 

release the Vehicles to FMCC despite demand, demanding 

seemingly exorbitant transport and storage charges of 

questionable economic justification, and attempting to sell and 

re-title the Vehicles.

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....

29. Sperro and Fenner had or should have had general 

knowledge of the existence of retail installment contracts between 

FMCC and Borrowers and the general provisions therein. ....

30. The TSAA[s] between Sperro and the Borrowers, by their 

very terms, violate the Borrowers’ Installment Contracts with 

FMCC.

31. Sperro and Fenner have intentionally induced the breach of 

the Installment Contracts between Borrowers and FMCC, or 

proceeded with reckless disregard to the contractual relationship 

between Borrowers and FMCC.

....

33. The public interest is not disserved by granting a 

preliminary injunction. To the contrary, the public interest is 

likely served by granting the requested injunctive relief due to the 

very similar allegations and causes of actions asserted in the 

Sperro Plan Litigation; also that the Declaratory Defendant [the 

BMV] has no objection to the prayed for relief.

Appellants’ App. at 23-28. 

[16] Based on the findings of fact and conclusions thereon, the Entry of Preliminary 

Injunction (1) orders Sperro and AMI to immediately surrender the Vehicles in 

their possession to FMCC; (2) orders FMCC to post a surety bond for the 

protection of Sperro and AMI in the amount of $101,000; (3) enjoins the BMV 

from processing any application by the Appellants or AMI for issuance or 

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transfer of a title related to the Vehicles; (4) authorizes the BMV to issue 

certificates of title to FMCC for the Vehicles upon submission of the 

appropriate title application documents; (5) authorizes FMCC to sell the 

Vehicles in mitigation of the remaining indebtedness relating to them; (6) orders 

Appellants, AMI, and any entity with which Fenner is an owner, officer, agent, 

or employee to immediately turn over to FMCC any known or not yet 

identified FMCC-financed vehicles that may be in their possession or come into 

their possession; and (7) enjoins Appellants, AMI, and any entity with which 

Fenner is an owner, officer, agent, or employee from taking or maintaining 

possession of any vehicle in which FMCC is the lienholder. Id. at 29-31. This 

appeal ensued.4

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[17] The trial court is required to issue special findings of fact and conclusions 

thereon when determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction. ThorntonTomasetti Eng’rs v. Indianapolis-Marion Cnty. Pub. Library, 851 N.E.2d 1269, 1277 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). Here, the findings and conclusions 

4 Appellants’ and FMCC’s appendices do not comply with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure 

because they contain exhibits, which are considered part of the transcript and therefore are not to be 

reproduced in an appendix pursuant to Appellant Rules 29 and 50(F). In addition, FMCC’s appellee’s brief

is not in compliance with our rules because the citations are placed in footnotes rather than in the text of the 

document. Ind. Appellate Rule 22 (requiring adherence to Bluebook rules); see THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM 

SYSTEM OF CITATION R. B1, at 3-4 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 20th ed. 2016) (“In nonacademic legal documents, such as briefs and opinions, citations generally appear within the text of the 

document directly after the propositions they support.”). 

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also apply to the trial court’s grant of prejudgment possession of the Vehicles to 

FMCC. We review the special findings and conclusions for clear error. Ind. 

Trial Rule 52(A).

Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks 

evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support 

them. A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the 

record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been 

made. We consider the evidence only in the light most favorable 

to the judgment and construe findings together liberally in favor 

of the judgment.

Orndorff v. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 982 N.E.2d 312, 319 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2012) (quoting Coates v. Heat Wagons, Inc., 942 N.E.2d 905, 912 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2011)), trans. denied (2013). 

Section 1 – The trial court did not err in awarding 

prejudgment possession of the Vehicles to FMCC.

[18] Appellants first challenge the trial court’s decision to grant prejudgment 

possession of the Vehicles to FMCC. Prejudgment possession of the Vehicles is 

governed by Indiana’s replevin statute, Indiana Code Chapter 32-35-2. “A 

replevin action is a speedy statutory remedy designed to allow one to recover 

possession of property wrongfully held or detained as well as any damages 

incidental to the detention.” United Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Michalski, 814 

N.E.2d 1060, 1066 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Indiana Code Section 32-35-2-1

provides that if personal goods are “wrongfully taken or unlawfully detained 

from the owner or person claiming possession of the property,” an action for 

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the possession of property may be brought by the owner or claimant. To 

recover in a replevin action, the plaintiff “must prove his title or right to 

possession, that the property is unlawfully detained, and that the defendant 

wrongfully holds possession thereof.” Michalski, 814 N.E.2d at 1066 (citing 

Snyder v. Int’l Harvester Credit Corp., 147 Ind. App. 364, 368, 261 N.E.2d 71, 73 

(1970)). When a party requests prejudgment possession in an action for 

replevin, the trial court is required to “(1) consider the showing made by the 

parties appearing; and (2) make a preliminary determination which party, with 

reasonable probability, is entitled to possession, use, and disposition of the 

property, pending final adjudication of the claims of the parties.” Ind. Code § 

32-35-2-14. If the trial court determines “that a prejudgment order of 

possession in the plaintiff's favor should issue, the court shall issue the order.” 

Ind. Code § 32-35-2-15.

[19] Appellants concede that FMCC has perfected first liens on the Vehicles by 

virtue of the Installment Contracts and the notices of lien placed on the 

Vehicles’ certificates of title. However, Appellants contend that the trial court 

erred in concluding that they failed to comply with Indiana Code Section 9-22-

6-2, the possessory mechanic’s lien statute (“the Statute”). Specifically, they 

contend that the trial court misinterpreted the Statute. In addressing their 

argument, we are required to apply our rules of statutory interpretation:

A question of statutory interpretation is a matter of law. In such 

interpretation, the express language of the statute and the rules of 

statutory interpretation apply. We will examine the statute as a 

whole, and avoid excessive reliance on a strict literal meaning or 

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the selective reading of words. Where the language of the statute 

is clear and unambiguous, there is nothing to construe. 

However, where the language is susceptible to more than one 

reasonable interpretation, the statute must be construed to give 

effect to the legislature’s intent. The legislature is presumed to 

have intended the language used in the statute to be applied 

logically and not to bring about an absurd or unjust result. Thus, 

we must keep in mind the objective and purpose of the law as 

well as the effect and repercussions of such a construction.

A.J. v. Logansport State Hosp., 956 N.E.2d 96, 104-05 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)

(quoting In re J.J., 912 N.E.2d 909, 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)).5

[20] “The possessory mechanic’s lien statute is meant to ensure that a garage 

mechanic/repairman is reimbursed for the reasonable amount of the repairs 

performed at the request of the vehicle’s owner.” Banks v. Jamison, 12 N.E.3d 

968, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).6

 “A possessory lien on a motor vehicle is 

5

 The parties and the trial court state that “possessory liens” are in derogation of common law and therefore 

are strictly construed. Appellants’ App. at 24; Appellants’ Br. at 20-21; Appellee’s Br. at 23. In support of 

this principle, they cite Deluxe Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Plymouth Plastics, Inc., 555 N.E.2d 1296, 1298 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1990), trans. denied (1991), cert. denied. However, the Deluxe court did not state that possessory liens are in 

derogation of common law; it stated that “the mechanic’s lien statutes are in derogation of common law.” 

Id. The Deluxe court was discussing the construction of the statute governing nonpossessory mechanic’s liens. 

Possessory mechanic’s liens and nonpossessory mechanic’s liens are different and are governed by different 

statutes. The possessory mechanic’s “lien was long recognized at common law,” and “[b]y contrast the 

second species of mechanic’s lien is known as non-possessory because it dispenses with the common law 

requirement of possession.” Jones v. Harner, 684 N.E.2d 560, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). The Jones court 

explained that the requirement “of the filing of a notice of intention to hold mechanic’s lien and the absence 

of a requirement that the person remain in possession of the vehicle represent a significant departure from the 

common law. As such the notice provision must be strictly construed.” Id. at 563. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the strict construction language in Deluxe does not apply to the possessory mechanic’s lien

statute. 

6

 Appellants do not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that the Sperro Plan does not serve the purpose of 

the Statute. See Appellants’ App. at 29 (“[N]one of the services Sperro claims it performed conferred any real 

benefit to the Borrowers, and certainly not to FMCC.”).

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perfected by retention of possession of the vehicle by the person asserting the 

lien.” Gangloff Indus., Inc. v. Generic Fin. & Leasing, Corp., 907 N.E.2d 1059, 1066 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “A possessory mechanic’s lien is foreclosed ‘by sale 

without judicial process [and up]on notice to the owner.’” Banks, 12 N.E.3d at 

979 (quoting Hendrickson & Sons Motor Co. v. Osha, 165 Ind. App. 185, 202, 331 

N.E.2d 743, 754 (1975)). 

[21] The version of the Statute in effect from January 1, 2015, to June 30, 2016, the 

time period during which Sperro took possession of the Vehicles, provides as 

follows:

(a) An individual, a firm, a limited liability company, or a 

corporation that performs labor, furnishes materials or storage, or 

does repair work on a motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, or 

recreational vehicle at the request of the person that owns the 

vehicle has a mechanic’s lien on the vehicle for the reasonable 

value of the charges for the labor, materials, storage, or repairs.

(b) An individual, a firm, a partnership, a limited liability 

company, or a corporation that provides towing services for a 

motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, or recreational vehicle at the 

request of the person that owns the motor vehicle, trailer, 

semitrailer, or recreational vehicle has a mechanic’s lien on the 

vehicle for the reasonable value of the charges for the towing 

services and other related costs.

(c) If:

(1) the charges made under subsection (a) or (b) are not paid; and

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(2) the motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, or recreational vehicle is 

not claimed;

not later than thirty (30) days after the date on which the vehicle is left in 

or comes into the possession of the individual, firm, limited liability 

company, or corporation for repairs, storage, towing, or the 

furnishing of materials, the individual, firm, limited liability 

company, or corporation may advertise the vehicle for sale. The 

vehicle may not be sold earlier than fifteen (15) days after the date the 

advertisement required by subsection (d) has been placed or fifteen (15) 

days after notice required by subsection (e) has been sent, 

whichever is later.

(d) Before a vehicle may be sold under subsection (c), an 

advertisement must be placed in a newspaper that is printed in English 

and of general circulation in the city or town in which the lienholder’s 

place of business is located. If the lienholder is located outside the 

corporate limits of a city or a town, the advertisement must be 

placed in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in 

which the place of business of the lienholder is located. The 

advertisement must contain at least the following information:

(1) A description of the vehicle, including make, type, and 

manufacturer’s identification number.

(2) The amount of the unpaid charges.

(3) The time, place, and date of the sale.

(e) In addition to the advertisement required under subsection 

(d), the person that holds the mechanic’s lien must notify the 

person that owns the vehicle and any other person that holds a 

lien of record at the person’s last known address by certified mail, 

return receipt requested, that the vehicle will be sold at public 

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auction on a specified date to satisfy the mechanic’s lien imposed 

by this section.

(Emphases added.)

[22] Here, the trial court concluded that Sperro failed to satisfy the statutory 

requirements by advertising the sales of the Group I Vehicles within thirty days 

after the date they came into Sperro’s possession. The trial court concluded 

that Section 9-22-6-2(c) requires that vehicles not be advertised for sale until 

thirty days after the vehicle was left in or came into possession of the mechanic. 

Appellants disagree with the trial court’s reading of subsection (c), arguing that 

it states that “a vehicle may be advertised ‘not later than thirty days after the 

date on which the vehicle is left in or comes into the possession of the 

lienholder.’” Appellants’ Br. at 19 (emphasis and brackets omitted). They 

assert that they complied with subsection (c) because the Group 1 Vehicles were 

advertised within thirty days of the date they came into Sperro’s possession.

[23] We disagree with Appellants’ selective reading of subsection (c). Reading the 

subsection in its entirety reveals that it provides that if the charges made under 

subsection (a) or (b) are not paid and the vehicle is not claimed not later than thirty 

days after the date the vehicle is left in or comes into the possession of the 

mechanic, the mechanic may advertise the vehicle for sale.

7

 Thus, after the 

7

 The current version of Section 9-22-6-2(c) supports our reading. It now provides, 

(c) A person that has a mechanic’s lien on a vehicle under subsection (a) or (b) may advertise the 

vehicle for sale if:

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vehicle comes into possession of the mechanic, the mechanic must wait thirty 

days to allow an opportunity for the charges to be paid or the vehicle to be 

claimed before advertising the vehicle for sale. Appellants’ reading would have 

the absurd result of permitting a mechanic to advertise the sale of a vehicle just 

one day after the vehicle was left in or came into his or her possession 

regardless of whether the owner had defaulted and without allowing the owner 

an opportunity to claim the vehicle. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court 

did not err in interpreting Section 9-22-6-2(c) and concluding that the 

publication of the notices of sale of the Group 1 Vehicles was not in compliance 

with the Statute. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that the 

sales of the Group 1 Vehicles were invalid.

8

[24] As for the Group 2 Vehicles, the trial court concluded that the mechanic’s lien 

sales were invalid because the sales occurred less than fifteen days after the date 

that the notices of sale were published. Appellants claim that two of these sales 

occurred at least fifteen days after the sale date was published. Appellants’ Br. 

at 20. They are simply mistaken. The notice of sale of one of the Group 2 

Vehicles was published on October 1, 2015, and that vehicle was sold on 

(1) the charges made under subsection (a) or (b) are not paid; and

(2) the vehicle is not claimed;

within thirty (30) days after the date on which the vehicle is left in or comes into the possession 

of the person for repairs, storage, towing, or the furnishing of materials. The vehicle may not be 

sold until the later of fifteen (15) days after the date the advertisement required by subsection (d) 

has been placed or fifteen (15) days after notice required by subsection (e) has been sent.

8

 We observe that the sale of the Group 1 Vehicles was also invalid because the sales occurred before FMCC 

received corrected notices of liens. Appellants’ App. at 25 (Conclusion 13).

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October 9, 2015. The other two notices of sale were published on November 

14, 2015, and those vehicles were sold on November 28, 2015. Accordingly, 

the trial court did not err in concluding that the sales of the Group 2 Vehicles 

did not comply with Section 9-22-6-2(c) and therefore were invalid.

9

[25] Appellants also assert that the trial court erred in concluding that the sales of 

the Vehicles were invalid because Sperro’s publication of the notices of sale in 

the Hendricks County Flyer did not comply with Section 9-22-6-2(d). Subsection 

(d) states that the advertisement for sale must be placed in a newspaper of 

general circulation in the city or town in which the mechanic’s “place of 

business” is located. The trial court concluded that the Hendricks County Flyer

was not in general circulation in Indianapolis, Marion County, where Sperro’s 

“place of business” is located. The sole finding of fact Appellants challenge is 

that Sperro’s “place of business” is located in Indianapolis, Marion County.

Appellants contend that the “place of business” would reasonably include the 

address registered with the secretary of state for the principal office, and 

Sperro’s principal office as provided in its articles of incorporation is P.O. Box 

163, Camby, Indiana, 46113. Fenner testified that this P.O. Box is in 

Hendricks County.

[26] Although Title 9 of the Indiana Code, does not define the term “place of 

business,” under the facts of this case, we can say with certainty that Sperro’s

9 Also, the sale of one of the Group 2 Vehicles is invalid for the additional reason that Sperro sent the notice 

of lien to FMCC within thirty days of the date the vehicle came into Sperro’s possession: Sperro took 

possession of that vehicle on August 24, 2015, and sent FMCC a notice of lien on September 13, 2015.

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P.O. Box is merely a mailing address and not a place of business. Cf. Ind. Code

§ 9-13-2-50 (“‘Established place of business’ means a permanent enclosed 

building or structure owned or leased for the purpose of offering for sale, 

trading, and selling motor vehicles. The term does not include a residence, tent, 

temporary stand, or permanent quarters temporarily occupied.”). Appellants 

cite to no evidence in the record that Sperro conducted any of its business at 

P.O. Box 163 in Camby. It is undisputed that the Vehicles were towed to and 

stored at the Storage Yards and that the purported lien auctions were advertised 

as being held in Indianapolis, Marion County. When Fenner was asked at his 

deposition which county Sperro does business in, he answered, “Marion 

[County].” Appellee’s App. Vol. III at 126. Accordingly, the trial court did not 

err in concluding that Sperro’s place of business was located in Indianapolis, 

Marion County, that Sperro’s advertisements in the Hendricks County Flyer did 

not comply with Section 9-22-6-2(d), and that the sales of the Vehicles were 

invalid for this reason. See Mobile Home Mgmt. Indiana, LLC v. Avon Vill. MHP, 

LLC, 17 N.E.3d 275, 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (concluding that auction was 

invalid because of failure to comply with notice requirements for sale of mobile 

homes), trans. denied (2015). Because Appellants failed to comply with the 

Statute, there is a reasonable probability that FMCC is entitled to possession of 

the Vehicles by virtue of its perfected first liens on the Vehicles, and therefore 

the trial court did not err in granting prejudgment possession of the Vehicles to 

FMCC. 

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Section 2 – The trial court did not err in granting a preliminary 

injunction.

[27] Appellants also claim that the trial court erred in ordering them to surrender to 

FMCC any known or not yet identified FMCC-financed vehicle in their 

possession and enjoining them from taking or maintaining possession of any 

vehicle in which FMCC is a lienholder. “The issuance of a preliminary 

injunction is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the scope of our 

review is limited to deciding whether there has been a clear abuse of 

discretion.” City of Gary v. Mitchell, 843 N.E.2d 929, 932-33 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2006). “Preliminary injunctions are generally used to preserve the status quo as 

it existed before a controversy, pending a full determination on the merits of the 

dispute.” Stoffel v. Daniels, 908 N.E.2d 1260, 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). To 

obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party typically must show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that

(1) the movant’s remedies at law are inadequate, thus causing 

irreparable harm pending resolution of the substantive action; (2) 

the movant has at least a reasonable likelihood of success at trial 

by establishing a prima facie case; (3) threatened injury to the 

movant outweighs the potential harm to the nonmoving party 

resulting from the granting of an injunction; and (4) the public 

interest would not be disserved.

Apple Glen Crossing, LLC v. Trademark Retail, Inc., 784 N.E.2d 484, 487 (Ind. 

2003).

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[28] Appellants apparently concede that FMCC carried its burden with respect to 

factors (1), (3), and (4) because they do not discuss these factors in their brief. 

Therefore, we will not address them. Appellants’ sole argument is that FMCC 

failed to carry its burden to show that it has “at least a reasonable likelihood of 

success at trial by establishing a prima facie case.” Id. Specifically, Appellants 

contend that the trial court erred in concluding that Sperro and Fenner 

intentionally induced the breach of the Installment Contracts between

Borrowers and FMCC or proceeded with reckless disregard of the contractual 

relationship between Borrowers and FMCC.

10 Appellants implicitly challenge

the trial court’s conclusion that Sperro and Fenner had or should have had 

general knowledge of the existence of retail installment contracts between 

FMCC and Borrowers and the general provisions therein. 

[29] Appellants recognize that, pursuant to the Installment Contracts, the Borrowers 

agreed to keep the Vehicles free from the claims of others and not to transfer 

any interest in the Vehicles without FMCC’s written permission. Appellants

concede that the TSAAs, by their very terms, violate the Borrowers’ Installment 

Contracts. Appellants also acknowledge that the Installment Contracts give 

FMCC the right to take possession of the Vehicle upon the Borrower’s default 

of any promise. However, they contend that the trial court’s conclusion that

10 The conclusion addresses an element of FMCC’s action for tortious interference with a contract. Tortious 

interference with a contractual relationship consists of the following elements: (1) the existence of a valid and 

enforceable contract; (2) the defendants’ knowledge of the existence of the contract; (3) the defendants’

intentional inducement of breach of the contract; (4) the absence of justification; and (5) resultant damages. 

Sheets v. Birky, 54 N.E.3d 1064, 1072 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

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Sperro and Fenner intentionally or recklessly induced the Borrowers to default

on their Installment Contracts is speculative. They argue that Fenner testified 

that he never personally financed a vehicle and that none of the Borrowers 

testified at the hearing regarding why they entered into a TSAA with Sperro. 

[30] We observe that Appellants do not challenge the trial court’s finding that 

Fenner worked in the repossession business for twenty years. Also, Sperro’s 

business was to transport and store collateral, and therefore Fenner had to 

know that all the vehicles surrendered to Sperro pursuant to the TSAAs have 

been financed and are subject to the liens. Fenner’s business experience

supports the trial court’s conclusions that he had or should have had general 

knowledge that the Borrowers purchased the Vehicles pursuant to retail 

installment contracts and the provisions generally included therein. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that Sperro and Fenner 

intentionally induced the breach of the Installment Contracts between the 

Borrowers and FMCC or proceeded with reckless disregard of the contractual 

relationship between the Borrowers and FMCC.

11 Therefore, we affirm the trial 

court in all respects.

11 Appellants also argue that the trial court erred in concluding that FMCC did not abandon the Vehicles. 

They argue that they reasonably believed that FMCC abandoned the Vehicles because FMCC had previously 

recovered six other vehicles by paying the towing and storage fees. However, Appellants do not explain how 

abandonment is relevant to the trial court’s decisions to grant prejudgment possession or a preliminary 

injunction. FMCC suggests that “Sperro asserts that FMCC abandoned the Vehicles as the sole ‘good faith’ 

justification why it should not be held liable for [civil] conversion.” Appellee’s Br. at 35. FMCC correctly 

states that “no mens rea is required and good faith is not a defense in a civil conversion action.” Id. at 34 

(citing Schrenker v. State, 919 N.E.2d 1188, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). Therefore, we conclude that 

Appellants’ abandonment argument is without merit.

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[31] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and May, J., concur.

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