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REF ID:A43107 

Alarm Civen in March: About Korea 

.Army Intelligence 

Warned of War 

87 .JUI G. LUCAS aar111111-111nrar11 Blaff Writer 

'l'Olf:IO, Sept. 1-Three and one-half 111011ths befo1-e it happened, Gen. Douglas MacArtl;tur's intellige11ce officers predicted the invasion of Soutl1 Kot-ea by the Reds. ' 

'l11e Koa?.an war started at dawn' 

June 25. On March.-10 Far East sing. dropped them at all hours. But 

Command Intelllgence said lt had Psycholoitlcal warfare . Is paying North Korean police quickly con.fl• 

reliable reports that the People's bigger dividends here than anyone cated them and anyone caught read· 1· 

(No1·lh Ko1-ean. a1·my would Invade ex11r.cted. Mllll11ns of leailets, In· Ing them was arrested.• So now South Ko1-ea: In June. That went to eluding sunender pa11es, have been we d1-op them only at night and a all responslblle military men In the d1-opped. Early In the war we markt'd lnr1"P11.11e In 1urrende1-. has 

Far East. It also went to WasJ1. - ----· -- l11gto11. 

Far East• Intelligence-particular- I 

ly Its chief, Maj. Gen. C. A. Wllloughbf. - has been shaa·ply crltl- I 

elzed s nee the Ko1-ean war started. 

Its .critics say It gave Washington · bad advl1.-e 01· none at all. But an on·the-11pot Investigation reveals an entirely dlUeiimt sto1·y. lt needs 

to be told. 

Actually, Gen. MacArthur's lntelJlgence men need not have con- cerned themselves with Korea. Spy-. Ing on the North Koreans was the 

responslbWty of the South Korean 

·~· KBPT IN 'rOUCll 

Nevertheless, documents made 

available today reveal that the Far 

East Command - as a matter of 

sound military operating pollcy- dld keep In touch with the situation. 

Last wlnter It forecast an lnvulon 

In the spring. / 1 · At that time, Gen. MacArthur 

said the· threat wu building up. A report on Dec. 8 said no" Invasion 

appeared Imminent and no long- iange p11!dlctlon would be valid In 

view of 1·apldly changing factors--

namely, the Impact of Chinese Communism;. . However, the report.con· 

tlnued: . I 

"With the conclusion of the Chi· n e s e Communist campaign In 

China, more troops and supplies will be channeled Into North Korea. 

It appears that the danger to this 

southern republic will mount at 

that Ume. Clbnate conditions most 

favol"&ble to military operations l1ave posed (December, 1949 • The · next favorable period for any such 

action will occur In April and May, 1950." . 

On Jan. 5, 1950, Far East Intelll· 

genc:e warned that tbe · North 

Korean government had set Marc:l1 

and April, 1950, as the time to Invade South J<orea. In March came U1e flat p1'edlctlon that the Invasion was set for June. 

At that Ume, Gen. MacArthur's 

Intelligence re)JOrted Jt was fairly confident the North Koreans had 

13 divisions and possibly seven more. TCKlay 13 Red divisions and 

)JOSllbly · 15 are massed along our defense perimeter. - . Last fall U. S. Intelligence qf· flcen reported entire divisions of 

Communists of Korean ethnic origin were moving from :Manchuria Into , North Korea. These are not Chi· 1 

nese Communists. 'Ibey are Korean 

·exiles who had Jlved .and fought with the Chinese Red armies for 

many years. One estimate 1s that, · U1ere are 1,400,000 of them. 

OONl!'IRl\IBD Bl' PBISO~ 

Iritelllgence officers at the time 

said they were being used to make 

up manpower deflclencle.s In the Invasion plan. Prlsonenl 111nce have 

-confirmed this. 

It has been established, for In· 

stance, that two Korean volunteer 

army divisions (originally part of 

the Red Manchurian army) crossed 

the border In August. 'Ibey then were broken up and their· batUetrled veterans scatte1-ed. 

Until this happened the averag' No1·th Korean company had 80 m~ 

But 2U lo 30 of the Korean volurt· 

teer army vele1·ans were assigned 

to Nch No1·th Ko11'a11 companJI. Prisoners say 110 com1m.ny 111 with· 

out Its hard core of such veterans. 

Gen. MacArthur's headquarterll 

Is a>nvlnced Russian ottlcers ai with the North Korean ann:y, • Ucularly In Us technical branJ: • Several Red majors and lleutenant 

co1onelll were reported ln Seoulehl week. But the Russians apparent! \\'on't let them go past Seow sin 

Uaelr capture wo11ld be emba 

Tiii: WABlllllOTOll DAIL'°'NllWll, PnlDAY, SllPTSMBllR t~.1•-IS 

been noted. the South Koream to delert. Bul 

In Tokio a powerful transmitter none did. 

beams broadcasts to North Korea One form of psychological waf'o 

24 hours a day. The Reds recently fer worries us most-the growlq tiald us the compliment of copying. feeling that the war will be over Two nights ago they. set up loud· by Cli1istmas. No responsible of· 

speakers along the South Korean fleer of tl1e Far East •Command 

front and spent the night urging believes tbat.