1

SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the 

convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the 

interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

State v. Charles Bryant, Jr. (A-2-15) (075958)

Argued September 12, 2016 -- Decided November 10, 2016

Timpone, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

In this appeal, the Court determines whether the factual circumstances presented in this case supported a 

police officer’s determination to conduct a warrantless protective sweep in the home of defendant Charles Bryant, Jr.

Officers were dispatched to a report of domestic violence when a woman called 911 to report that she had 

been assaulted and that she was outside in her vehicle. The woman did not give her name or that of the attacker, but 

did supply an address.

Possessed with only this information, the first two officers on the scene proceeded directly to the indicated 

address. They knocked on the door. When Bryant answered, the officers told him to take a seat on the couch. 

Bryant complied, and the two officers entered his home. While one officer questioned Bryant, the other conducted a 

protective sweep of the apartment, searching any place that potentially could harbor a person.

During the course of the protective sweep, the officer spotted what he believed to be marijuana sticking out 

of a box on a closet shelf. The item was seized, Bryant was arrested and removed from his apartment, and a search 

warrant was obtained. Officers searching pursuant to the warrant found an assault weapon, approximately fifty-five 

grams of marijuana, and marijuana packaging materials.

Bryant was charged with fourth-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance, third-degree 

possession with intent to distribute, second-degree unlawful possession of an assault firearm, and second-degree 

possession of a firearm. Bryant was separately charged with second-degree persons not to possess a firearm.

Bryant moved to suppress all of the evidence seized from the apartment as fruit of an illegal search. The 

trial court denied this motion, finding that the officers were lawfully present in the apartment and that, because they 

did not know whether the man who answered the door was the suspect, or whether the suspect was elsewhere in the 

apartment, the officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the area could be harboring an individual 

posing danger. After determining that the protective sweep doctrine obviated the need for a warrant, the trial could 

found that the marijuana located during the sweep was in plain view.

Bryant appealed from the denial of the motion to suppress, arguing that the search was illegal. The 

Appellate Division affirmed on substantially the grounds stated by the trial court.

This Court granted Bryant’s petition for certification, limited to the issue of whether the protective sweep 

of defendant’s residence was lawful. 223 N.J. 162 (2015).

HELD: The officers here lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion that another party was present, much less that 

another party posed a danger to officer safety. The protective sweep was thus insufficient to establish an exception 

to the warrant requirement, and any evidence found as a result of that sweep—even if it was found in plain view—

must be excluded and suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.

1. In light of the State Constitution’s protection of the sanctity of the home, New Jersey jurisprudence reflects an 

unmistakable preference that officers “obtain a warrant issued by a neutral and detached judicial officer before 

executing a search.” State v. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 129 (2012). Thus, it is the State’s burden to show that any 

warrantless search falls within an established exception to the warrant requirement. (pp 8-9)
2

2. The protective sweep doctrine is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement that may be invoked only 

when “(1) law enforcement officers are lawfully within the private premises for a legitimate purpose, which may 

include consent to enter; and (2) the officers on the scene have a reasonable [and] articulable suspicion that the area 

to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger.” State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 95, 125 (2007). A reasonable and 

articulable suspicion must be “individualized, rather than generalized,” and must be evaluated within the totality of 

the circumstances. Id. at 129. An officer’s “subjective hunch” will not satisfy this prong. Id. at 128. (pp 9-11)

3. When the seizure of evidence results from an unconstitutional action, that evidence is excluded from 

consideration, as is any evidence seized in a search incident to the original unlawful search, under the fruit of the 

poisonous tree doctrine. (pp 11-12)

4. Here, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s factual finding that the officers lacked 

information when approaching the apartment, including the name or description of the assailant, the number of 

parties present, or whether there were weapons involved. One officer conducted the sweep without any situationspecific information to justify it; rather, he relied on a subjective hunch that someone else might be present. There is 

no record of a reasonable suspicion in this case, without which the authority for the protective sweep dissolves. As 

such, the evidence seized as a result of the warrantless search should have been suppressed. (pp 12-14)

5. In reaching this conclusion, the Court is mindful of the dangers with which officers are faced and of the fact that 

domestic violence calls are statistically among the most dangerous. The Court notes, further, that the Prevention of 

Domestic Violence Act (“PDVA”), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, was passed in recognition of the serious problem 

posed by domestic violence in New Jersey. The Court stresses, however, that even the mandatory arrest provision of 

the PDVA must be read as subject to both the State and Federal Constitutions’ protections against unreasonable 

searches and seizures. (pp. 14-16)

6. The Court notes that the officers could have asked Bryant questions to either determine that no one else was 

present or to form a reasonable and articulable suspicion that someone else was in the apartment. Because there was 

no record of reasonable suspicion, the State failed to meet its burden of presenting evidence sufficient to establish an 

exception to the warrant requirement. (pp. 16-17)

The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. The matter is REMANDED to the trial court for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZVINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion. 
1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CHARLES BRYANT, JR., 

Defendant-Appellant.

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

A-2 September Term 2015

075958 

Argued September 12, 2016 – Decided November 10, 2016

On appeal from the Superior Court, 

Appellate Division.

Susan Brody, Deputy Public Defender, argued 

the cause for appellant Charles Bryant, Jr.

(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, 

attorney; Ms. Brody, on the brief).

Sara M. Quigley, Deputy Attorney General, 

argued the cause for respondent (John J. 

Hoffman, Acting Attorney General of New 

Jersey, attorney; Ms. Quigley, on the 

brief).

Alexander R. Shalom, argued the cause 

for amicus curiae (American Civil Liberties 

Union of New Jersey, (Mr. Shalom, 

attorney; Mr. Shalom, Edward Barocas, 

Rebecca Livengood, Jeanne Locicero, on the 

brief).

JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Certain core principles underpin our search and seizure 

jurisprudence. Individual privacy rights, especially in the 
2

home, are among the most protected. As Justice Robert L. 

Clifford wrote for the Court, “we are not dealing with a mere 

formality but with an underlying great constitutional principle 

embraced by free men and expressed in substantially identical 

language in both our federal and state constitutions.” State v. 

Fariello, 71 N.J. 552, 559 (1976) (citation omitted). In the 

present case, we must balance those important privacy interests 

with the practical and safety concerns of law enforcement. 

Specifically, we focus on the guidelines surrounding law 

enforcement’s use of a warrantless “protective sweep” when 

investigating allegations of criminal activity.

When a woman called 911 to report that her boyfriend had 

struck her, officers were dispatched to the address she 

provided. While two officers stayed with the woman, who was in 

a car in a nearby parking lot, two other officers knocked on the 

door of defendant Charles Bryant, Jr.’s home. When defendant

answered, an officer instructed him to take a seat on the couch. 

As defendant followed this instruction, the officers entered. 

One conducted a protective sweep of the apartment while the 

other questioned defendant. All of this was done without 

knowing the name of the woman’s alleged attacker or defendant’s 
3

name, and without any indication that there were either other 

people or any weapons present in the apartment.

Under such circumstances, we find that the law enforcement 

officers did not adhere to the rigorous standards for proceeding 

without a warrant under the protective sweep doctrine.

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence obtained as a result of 

their impermissible search must be suppressed. We therefore

reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand the 

matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

I.

We glean the following facts from the testimony given by 

witnesses at defendant’s suppression hearing. On January 27, 

2013, just before 3 a.m., officers from the Plainsboro Police 

Department were dispatched to respond to a report of domestic 

violence. A woman, via a 911 call, frantically reported that 

she had been assaulted and that she was outside in her vehicle; 

she did not give her name or her attacker’s, but did supply an 

address. 

Patrolmen Schroeck and McCall were in the first two cars to 

arrive at the scene, and they proceeded directly to the 

apartment. Corporal Newbon and Patrolman Lapham, who were in 

the third vehicle to arrive, encountered a woman in a car in the

parking lot. When Newbon approached her to ask what was going 
4

on, he discovered that she was the caller. He also noted that 

she was intoxicated, crying, and excited. He had trouble 

obtaining information from the woman, who was incoherent and had 

scratches and marks on her face. Eventually, the woman told 

Newbon that she had been attacked by Charlie Bryant, her 

boyfriend. She did not indicate the number of people in the 

apartment or whether there were any weapons inside. Newbon then 

left the woman with Lapham and went to the apartment to 

determine what was happening there.

When Newbon arrived at the apartment, he found that 

Schroeck and McCall had already entered. McCall was with 

defendant, who was seated on the couch, and Schroeck called to 

Newbon from the back bedroom. Schroeck testified that he and 

McCall, who had been told only the address of the apartment, 

knocked on the door when they arrived. According to Schroeck, 

defendant answered after about a minute. McCall then instructed 

defendant to sit on the couch, which defendant did, and both 

officers entered the apartment. While McCall questioned 

defendant, Schroeck conducted a protective sweep of the

apartment, searching the kitchen, bathroom, bedroom, and bedroom 

closet –- all locations that potentially could harbor another 

person. 

Schroeck, whose testimony the trial court found forthright,

stated that it is his experience to conduct protective sweeps 
5

and that he did so for officer safety, because it was not known 

whether there were any people or weapons in the apartment. 

Schroeck added that he was particularly interested in ensuring 

that no one was hiding in the apartment because domestic 

disturbances are generally very emotional.

While searching the bedroom, Schroeck detected an 

“overwhelming odor” of marijuana coming from the closet. 

Peering into the closet, Schroeck saw a Ziploc bag with green 

vegetation that he believed to be marijuana protruding through a 

hole in a shoe box on a shelf just above eye-level in the 

closet. When Newbon heard Schroeck call to him and entered the 

bedroom, he also detected the odor of marijuana. Newbon ordered 

the marijuana seized and had defendant arrested and removed from 

the apartment. 

After defendant was removed, officers locked down the 

apartment while awaiting a search warrant. The warrant was 

issued, and the subsequent search yielded multiple items of 

contraband including a Tec-9 9mm assault weapon, approximately 

fifty-five grams of marijuana, and marijuana packaging 

materials.

Defendant was indicted on March 6, 2013, and charged with 

fourth-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance

(“CDS”), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3); third-degree possession with 

intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-5(a)(1) and (b)(11); 
6

second-degree unlawful possession of an assault firearm, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(f); and second-degree possession of a firearm, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1. On the same date, defendant was separately

indicted on a charge of second-degree certain persons not to 

possess a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b).

Defendant moved to suppress all of the evidence seized from 

the apartment as fruit of an illegal search. After a 

suppression hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion. 

The trial court found that the officers were lawfully present in 

the apartment because they were looking for the suspect in a 

domestic violence case where the victim presented physical signs 

of injury. Moreover, the trial court reasoned that, because the 

officers did not know if the suspect was the man who answered 

the door or was somewhere else inside the apartment, Schroeck 

had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the area to be 

swept could be harboring an individual posing danger. With 

those findings, the trial court held that the protective sweep 

doctrine obviated the need for a warrant. The trial court also 

held that the marijuana discovered during the protective sweep 

was properly seized under the plain view doctrine.

Defendant appealed the denial of the motion to suppress, 

arguing that the search was illegal. In an unpublished opinion, 

an Appellate Division panel affirmed the denial of the motion to 

suppress, on substantially the same grounds. 
7

We granted defendant’s petition for certification, limited 

to the issue of whether the protective sweep of defendant’s 

residence was lawful. State v. Bryant, 223 N.J. 162 (2015). We 

also granted the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey

(“ACLU”) leave to appear as amicus curiae.

II.

Defendant makes two primary points: first, that entry of 

the officers into the apartment was unjustified because they did 

not have defendant’s consent to enter; and second, that the

protective sweep was pretextual in that the officers lacked a 

reasonable and articulable suspicion that the area to be swept 

could be harboring an individual posing danger.

The State’s justification for its exception to the warrant 

requirement essentially relies on two grounds: (1) the police 

were lawfully present in defendant’s apartment because in midwinter it was unreasonable to have any conversation with 

defendant outside; and (2) the police had good cause to perform 

a protective sweep in this matter because of the danger often 

inherent in domestic violence calls coupled with the officers’

incomplete knowledge of any potential danger awaiting them. In 

combination, the State contends, those factors created a 

reasonable and articulable suspicion that the apartment might 

harbor a hidden, dangerous person.
8

The ACLU, as amicus curiae, disputes the State’s rationale. 

The ACLU asserts the officers were not lawfully present in 

defendant’s apartment, on the grounds that the officers had no 

consent to enter the apartment and were not facing exigent 

circumstances. The ACLU adds that mere uncertainty is 

insufficient to establish a reasonable and articulable suspicion 

that the apartment was harboring a hidden, dangerous person.

III.

We review the relevant case law relating to search and 

seizure. The nearly identical language of the Fourth Amendment 

of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of 

the New Jersey Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the 

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. 

Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. On numerous 

occasions, we have considered “New Jersey’s unique interests and 

values” and in doing so, have “construed Article I, Paragraph 7 

[of the New Jersey Constitution] to afford our citizens greater 

protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than 

accorded under the Federal Constitution.” State v. Johnson, 193 

N.J. 528, 541 (2008) (citing State v. Eckel, 185 N.J. 523, 537-

38 (2006)). Indeed, we “accord the highest degree of protection 

to privacy interests within the home,” Johnson, supra, 193 N.J.

at 532, because “[t]he sanctity of one’s home is among our most 
9

cherished rights,” State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586, 611, cert. 

denied, 543 U.S. 876, 125 S. Ct. 108, 160 L. Ed. 2d 128 (2004).

Toward that end, “[o]ur constitutional jurisprudence 

expresses a clear preference for government officials to obtain 

a warrant issued by a neutral and detached judicial officer 

before executing a search.” Edmonds, supra, 211 N.J. at 129 

(citing Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 597-98). “[A]ll warrantless 

searches or seizures are ‘presumptively unreasonable.’” 

Johnson, supra, 193 N.J. at 552 (quoting State v. Elders, 192 

N.J. 224, 246 (2007)). As a result, “when the police act 

without a warrant, the State bears the burden of proving by a 

preponderance of the evidence not only that the search or 

seizure was premised on probable cause, but also that it ‘f[ell]

within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant 

requirement.’” Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. 

Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19-20 (2004)).

One such exception is the protective sweep doctrine. State 

v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97, 125 (2010). The Supreme Court of the 

United States first recognized this exception in the context of 

an arrest in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327, 110 S. Ct.

1093, 1094, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276, 281 (1990). There, the Court

found that protective sweeps are appropriate when necessary for 

officer safety reasons so long as the sweep is “narrowly 
10

confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which 

a person might be hiding.” Ibid. 

Twenty years later, this Court extended the protective 

sweep doctrine to non-arrest settings. Davila, supra, 203 N.J.

at 125–26. Recognizing the practical concerns and danger that 

law enforcement officers are faced with, we held in Davila that, 

when relying on the protective sweep doctrine to obviate the 

need for a warrant, the State has the burden of proving the 

following: “(1) law enforcement officers are lawfully within the 

private premises for a legitimate purpose, which may include 

consent to enter; and (2) the officers on the scene have a 

reasonable [and] articulable suspicion that the area to be swept 

harbors an individual posing a danger.” Id. at 125. The test 

is conjunctive; the failure of either element is fatal to the 

application of the exception. See ibid.

In the context of the reasonable and articulable suspicion 

prong, we have held that courts will look at the totality of the 

circumstances to determine if there is an “individualized, 

rather than generalized, suspicion.” Id. at 129. There is no 

mathematical formula to determine what amount of suspicion is 

reasonable. Pineiro, supra, 181 N.J. at 27. Visual or auditory 

cues are certainly sufficient to establish that another person 

may be present. Davila, supra, 203 N.J. at 128. In the absence 

of visual or auditory signs, courts may consider factors such as 
11

preexisting police knowledge that a specific individual presents 

a danger or has a propensity for violence, some sort of surprise 

while the police are on scene, overly nervous conduct, and 

inconsistent or dishonest responses. Id. at 129 (citations 

omitted). Those signs must lead an officer to believe not only 

that another individual is present, but also that the other 

individual presents a danger to officer safety. Ibid. 

Reasonable and articulable suspicion is critical and, therefore, 

“[a] seizure cannot . . . be justified merely by a police 

officer’s subjective hunch.” Id. at 128 (quoting Pineiro, 

supra, 181 N.J. at 27).

When the seizure of evidence is the result of the State’s 

unconstitutional action, the principal remedy for violation of 

the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches 

and seizures is exclusion of the evidence seized. State v. 

Burris, 145 N.J. 509, 520 (1996). The exclusionary rule is not 

a “remedy,” in the classic sense of the term; rather, its 

purpose is to deter future illegal conduct by the State. State 

v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 137–38 (1987) (citing United States 

v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 94 S. Ct. 613, 619, 38 L. Ed. 2d 

561, 571 (1974)). In order to achieve the full deterrent effect 

of the exclusionary rule, evidence that is seized in a search 

incident to the original unlawful search is also excluded under 
12

the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. State v. Gibson, 218 

N.J. 277, 298 (2014).

IV.

In applying these principles to analyze whether the trial 

court erred in the present case by invoking the protective sweep 

exception to the search warrant requirement, we “uphold the 

factual findings underlying the trial court’s decision so long 

as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence 

in the record.” State v. Brown, 216 N.J. 508, 538 (2014) 

(quoting Elders, supra, 192 N.J. at 243). However, we do “not 

defer . . . to a trial or appellate court’s interpretation of 

the law,” which we review de novo. State v. Vargas, 213 N.J.

301, 327 (2013).

Here, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support 

the trial court’s factual finding that Patrolmen Schroeck and 

McCall lacked information when approaching the apartment, 

including the name or description of the assailant, the number 

of parties involved, or whether there were weapons involved. 

Although we accept these findings as true, we cannot conclude 

from these findings that a protective sweep was justified. 

Rather, we find that Schroeck’s suspicion, at most, was a 

subjective hunch. See Davila, supra, 203 N.J. at 128. 

Schroeck did not testify that any visual or auditory signs 

existed that led him to believe there was another person in the 
13

apartment. Cf. United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 514 (6th 

Cir.) (holding that shuffling noises heard before officers 

entered apartment were sufficient to establish reasonable and

articulable suspicion), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 981, 122 S. Ct.

414, 151 L. Ed. 2d 315 (2001). Moreover, there is no evidence 

that Schroeck knew defendant. Cf. United States v. Gould, 364

F.3d 578, 591-92 (5th Cir.) (holding that an officer’s prior 

knowledge of the suspect contributed to the totality-of-thecircumstances analysis), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 955, 125 S. Ct.

437, 160 L. Ed. 2d 317 (2004). Nor is there any evidence that 

the officers were suddenly surprised once inside the apartment, 

that defendant appeared overly nervous, or that his behavior 

suggested the presence of another person. Cf. United States v. 

Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1225 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that 

overly nervous conduct, combined with inconsistent or dishonest 

answers, could lead to reasonable and articulable suspicion). 

In fact, Schroeck conducted the sweep without waiting to hear 

defendant’s answer to McCall’s questions. There was therefore 

no opportunity for Schroeck to determine whether any of 

defendant’s statements were inconsistent or dishonest. 

Instead of relying on any situation-specific indication 

that another person might be present, Schroeck testified that it 

was “generally [his] experience . . . to conduct a protective 

sweep to make sure there are no surprises.” Additionally, 
14

Schroeck testified that it was usually “possible” that more than 

two people were involved in domestic disturbances. Those 

statements by Schroeck amount to nothing more than a hunch, not 

a reasonable and articulable suspicion.

We thus conclude that there is no record of a reasonable 

and articulable suspicion propelling the protective sweep in 

this case, without which the authority for the protective sweep 

dissolves. As such, the evidence seized as a result of the 

warrantless search should have been suppressed. We need not 

reach the question of consent to enter except to say on these 

facts, silence does not equate to consent to enter. 

V.

In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful that the 

privacy interests discussed must be viewed in light of the daily 

difficulties facing law enforcement officers. We recognize that 

officers are faced with the difficult task of running toward 

danger, often with little to no information about the danger 

they face. 

This is especially true in the context of domestic violence 

calls -- some of the most dangerous calls officers will face. 

Family violence researchers report that “more police officers 

die answering family disturbance calls . . . than die answering 

any other single type of call.” Joel Garner & Elizabeth 

Clemmer, Nat’l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Danger 
15

to Police in Domestic Disturbances -- A New Look, Research in 

Brief 2-3 (Nov. 1986), 

http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED295090.pdf (citing one 

report indicating twenty-two percent of all police fatalities 

occur during response to domestic violence disputes). 

Domestic violence is a serious problem in New Jersey. Our 

Legislature addressed this problem by passage of the Prevention 

of Domestic Violence Act (“PDVA”), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. 

Recognizing the dangers posed by domestic violence calls, the 

Legislature has mandated that officers receive training “on the 

handling, investigation and response procedures concerning 

reports of domestic violence.” N.J.S.A. 2C:25-20(a).

The PDVA also includes a mandatory arrest provision. See

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-21(a). However, that provision must always be 

read and construed with deep respect for, and adherence to, the 

constitutional underpinnings of our search and seizure 

protections. See, e.g., State v. Younger, 305 N.J. Super. 250, 

258 (App. Div. 1997) (underscoring that the PDVA is subject both 

to the Fourth Amendment and “to the New Jersey constitutional 

guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures”). And, as 

we have held in the past, hunches or lack of information are 

insufficient to satisfy the need for reasonable and articulable 

suspicion in countermanding the search warrant requirement and 

defeating the right of New Jersey citizens to be secure in their 
16

homes, free of unreasonable searches and seizures. Davila, 

supra, 203 N.J. at 128.

In the present case, the officers might have obtained the 

information they needed by asking defendant preliminary 

questions, such as: “Were you just in an argument with your 

girlfriend?” and “Is there anyone else here in the apartment?” 

Had the officers asked those, or similar, questions and waited 

for defendant’s response, their fears could have been allayed or 

a reasonable and articulable suspicion formed. Patrolman 

Schroeck’s failure to pose these basic questions, or wait for a 

response to the other officer’s questions, reduced his actions 

to, at best, nothing more than acting on a hunch.

Officers’ diligence in asking the correct questions and 

assessing the response or the responder’s demeanor before 

conducting a protective sweep of the home ensures the proper 

balance between the rights of citizens to be secure in their 

homes and the need for law enforcement to protect themselves in 

these dangerous situations.

The officers here lacked reasonable and articulable 

suspicion that another party was present, much less that another 

party posed a danger to officer safety. Because there was no 

evidence of reasonable and articulable suspicion, the State 

failed to meet its burden of presenting evidence sufficient to 
17

establish an exception to the warrant requirement. See Johnson, 

supra, 193 N.J. at 552. 

This failure fatally taints the “plain view” evidence 

seized from the initial limited protective sweep search of 

defendant’s apartment. Even if the marijuana was in plain view 

-- a point on which we need not rule in this case -- it was seen 

only in the course of an illegal protective sweep. The sweep’s 

illegality infected both the basis for the follow-up search 

warrant and the evidence seized under that warrant as “fruits of 

the poisonous tree.” The snowball effect of the illegal 

searches and seizures demands that all the evidence seized from 

initial sweep to final search be excluded and suppressed.

VI.

The judgment of the Appellate Division, affirming the 

denial of defendant’s motion to suppress, is reversed, and the 

matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, 

PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s 

opinion.