&rANDJIRD FORM NO. 84 Rdf'Pft,rDK~~flf MENTS. 

· ; , CONf AIN "Gr:~ 'i.-CnD MATERIAL . Office Memorandum · UNITED sTATEs GOVERNMENT 

TO . ~ ~ 

. . ..,. : Mr • W :t . Friedman 

., 

, 

DOM 1 L .D. Callimahos 

DATB: 17 May 1954 

• · SUBJECT: Draft of an historical brief on traffic analysis • 

J.. The attached history was prepared by Mr. R .s. '.Benjamin for inclusion as 

an appendix in the forthcomiDg BSA text on traffic analysis. The classification of 

the traffic analysis text will be Secret Codeword . . . 2 • The original of this draft bas been sent to CAPT Dyer for review and 

comments. This copy is for your information, and for any comments and suggestions that 

you may care to make . -

~_e.,.. . . 

· .. ~ 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 01-10-2014 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 
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-c 

REF ID:A67698 ... ',, ":, 

AMBLE 

Cmimmnication Intelligence 

(D.ra:tt or a p!'O];IO$e4 appendix to an EA tat on Tra1't1c ADal.JBis (Bee:refi 

Codeword) by Robel"t S. BeDJaatn, JIJA-1421:) 

I 

-
' < 

-

REF ID:A67698 

SECRET AMBLE 

l. Introauct1on 

*· General. When 4id tratt1c: ana~i• beg1nf Who YU the fir•t 

'tf) -pertora tr&ttic aml.Jail ana. wat ft2"e the c:lrcu:mstances! In •eercbiog 

ftor the uavera to these queatioua, 11e eoon nallse that tr&tt1c ana~1• 18 

111. :real1t7 a YeJ7 1Jl!!W aubJect because it is a.pendent primaril.7 upon the 

m..tence o~ ra41o cOD11UD1cation. '!he related :f'1el4 of CX'J'PtanalJB1a 1a hun4re4s of JUr8 ol4--vr1tinp &t.ting 'bult to the Jeer 147'1- are recorded.1 :Bu.t 

a!Jice n41o vu DOt inYented until J.8~ a an4 mt put to common use until after 

the ir¥t1on of' tbe T&Cuum tube in 1906, trattic anaJ.7a1s &114 radio eo.nmm1 ... 

cation intelUpnee are •till lee• than 50 J9U'S old. 

'b. 1!8!:9!'7 o1" Electrical C<Wmic&tton 

(l) A quick look at tbe hiatoey' ~the &!velopment of' elec"tr:tcal 

C<Wm'n•cat1on vill help to giYe ua a~ ap.1nst vh1ch we can •tud.7 cm:mmn1-

cat1on intelligenee *s 'beg:hm:lnga mid &rv'elopment. Morse 1DYented the firat 

practical el.ectrical telegraph in l.8351 

2 u4 Bell 1ll'f'ented the tel.epbo:ae in 

1876. 'J!be t'beorJ' mder~ racUo e,,.,.,:aieation vaa established b7 Mu:weU 

eDl1 Hertz :bl 1865, bvt not uxrtil 1895 414 Jla.rcord. 8end a message, orer a d1a-

~ of' l. 3/1+ mile•. 8"eral J9ll1"fJ later, 1n. 1901, be receiwd a message in 

1 81co Sim'tta'• 8mWlcr1pt 1n Latin, VJ!'itten 1A Pavlo, Ital.7, 4 Ju.17 1472f,. 

l1e1'. Artf.cl.ea OD C!]J>~ an4 Cl'lr!D!'.11!1.a, 9f Oi~. ·~ p. J.&r. 

2 .Aa ear:q in 1753,. a letter to the Scots lfapzine ill Seotlm>A suggested a 

9p1th 1Jall telegraph• vhich 1IQ1llcl eomiilt of iillii8Ul8tea. wire f'or each 1etter 

C)1" the aJpbe-bet, ading 1n a light ball •uapen4e4 awer & piece ~paper with the' 

letWr 11Z'itten upon 1-t. .b an electric charge cam over the vire, 'tbe ball 

would attract tbe ps.ier, and •••aces coul4 thws be spelled out.. Twent7 ,ears 

~ 

later •'Ueh a a;ptea waa built 1a Sv1tserla:a4, u4 iD other cou.ntr1es. 8park 

# ad tel.ugra.p'hll llhich bdieat.ed letters ot the alpba'bet b7 electro· 

-a;rietic deflection ot needles 1IVe tleftl.Ope4 1n 1ibe ea:rJ.7 19th centl.JX7 ....... !pr~ Britamdea, 1952 e41t1on, Vol. 21~ p. 862. 

SECRET 

]. 
,.. ' I .. -:; I REF 

aewrou.mlJ.a co.D1S1.a'tiD& of the l.8tte:r •s• 1n llone eoae aeut across the 

A.tltutt1c tl'Olll Jblsland 'b1' ua11tants. De J"Qreat in 1906 1DYented tbe Taeuua 

tube, which m4e possible great and :nrp1d a4YaDcea 1n. the c!evelopllent or 

n41o. IJa 1909 the practical. a1ae or n41o as draat1call.7 'brougbt be:rore 

'the lNblic wfJeD 1500 llws were aaTed b7 the use af ra41o after the coll1s1on 

of the f!!l'!hli;C Ul4 !'!SJ!'1da. 

(2) Ra41otelephoJQ" a.eloped 1Jl t.be &ecacle from 1910 to 1920, 

-4 eClllllll'C1&l. l'a41o lal'oa4ca8\1a.g 'began 1A 1920 bJ' ti. ftnt station, IOEA, 

Pitta'bwgh. ODe ot tba nnt n41o pro&rama to reach t.be :publio vas the news 

~ the wtco. ~ the JJa.1:"cU.ng-Cox: •lect:lon returns in tbe •a.me 18&1°• !'elepioiatera D4 •tel.e't;J:pewrlten" •tarted to came uto ge'Df!ral use about lS\25,. 

altbou&h rarm or •prtutiJJC teJ.egraphs1

' are aa old as Morse's 1.J:Went1on, •11JCe 

h1a t'.l.ret ll)del (printing &1ts and &usl1es) wa a prilLt:liag model. 'l'elev1s1on 

wa c:oneeiYeCJ. u eer~ u 1920, and experimental. broadcastj.ng began 1n 1937. 

hequenc7 JloCJlJ.la'tion (I'll) vu 1.uvented u recentl.1' u 1939.. Facaimile, Which 

ta mt ~ a a1Dgl.e tle9'1ce1 'bllt a 'id!Dle ea.teaor7 of de'f'icea 1 dates back to 

JS&.3., when 11 p:apc1er BaJll obta.1Ded a British pa.tent caver1DB; the pr1nc1ple or 

•leetrical ~•ion ~ pictures. Other ea:rq workers f iJJcluded Arthur 

~ 1n Gel.'llU.Q", JMouard. Beli.Jl 1n France, u4 ....,.,- at.hers. 

e. JIU!'!!Z: V•e 1'r ~~l Coamwcation 

(1) ~ :rirst ue o't •1Aletr1cal. ccmnnn1eat1on :bl time of var 

._. 1• ~ U .s. Civil Var• when telegraph vu uaed ftxr call:b:tg V» troops ot 

tba Uld.cm Vlq,. u4 uaecl toi- the ftn1o tia 1n a 'tlN' 1Jl t:be field... Var uew 

lla4 travel.led 110 •l.ow:Q' 'bef'ore that tile 'that 1D l.812, General. ADarev Jackson 

1":m a 'Y1e\Oey' ON.T t'be Br1t.1eh at Bn Qrl.eua two veea after i:eace bad been 

2 

SECRET 
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REF ID:A67698 

SECRET_ 

..a.. 3 Ba41o vu mot :put t.o ~ practical ld.JJ:tez7 uae 1Jl the field prior 

to Varl4 War I, altbouih the l3r1t18h u:per!mzated with it :Lu the Boer War in 

llauth Atr1ea 1a J.899. 'l'he f':lnt field racUo eqntpment ill the l1Dtted States 

• 

Jrlll appeared 1D 1903, aJd va.a U8ec1 1D EDe\IYer& held. 111. Xentuck;f. Since 

1906, 1ibe p1Dc1peJ. ara!ea ot 'tbe vorld baYe ba4 acme ra410 equipment .. 4 

(2) Ba41o wa aoon recop.1ze4 u a Yaluable e8.Jl8 ~ a1gm.l c.om-

.Ucatton tor :tcrcea 1dloae .,..._nt• 1N'ft iia;p14. In World Var I 1 'the Brithh 

a.t..4 'tbe 'RI' VS.th n41o proyJ.aed to a 11Jd.te4 extent tor 11¥1ependent cavalq. 

-. the war progreseed, the uae ot ra41o 1Dc:reaae4, and b7 the end ot the var its 

-1.ue bad beo. ks>:astratecl DOt ~ to eava1.z7 bu.t a.180 to oiation, .n111e17,, 

tia.Ue, and f'onrar4 iatentr'J' W11t• of' tbe mtioDS OD both e14es o'f tbe confi1ct. 

(3) Jletwen Varl4 Var I -1 World Var II, there was a period of 

fuZ'thel" ~ clftel.Opaent of ratio ror .UltUJ' use. When Vorld. War II began, 

nil.So wu 'Qlliy~ reprc1e4 u a uaetul. e<anm1eat1on mew ill rap14-movins 

COJdbat, u4 wt and.es were ftll-equipped vith :raAio. '!here vu for the first 

t.t. exte:mt'ft use o~ tnquency mc1nlat10n, part1eula;r~ :lD. tront-ll:ne COJJ11111Jn1-

eattoa., a4 f'>!requenetes 1n 'the 'ft7.7 h!&h l'iUJ&e.. Te:tapriater commwiication vas 

us.a tor hip echelon 111lltar;y CCJ8m:S cation ot the ;pr1Dc1pal varriDg ~ 1 

~ f'ar Japm,. 'Which vas 'lle.ckva:rd 1a th1a regard. ~lephom vas used 

&ttem1ft~ a't lOll' tlCbelCna .a. 1n .:>bile operatioml. 

(lt.) X1l tbe tbllow1:ac ~phs, we 1f1ll survey highl.1Bhts ot 

tbe h18toJ7 ~ ecm.111teat1ou intelUpnce from the ataatJipolnt ot tran.'ic w~18. 

Beea.'58 'tbe1 are • 11Regral pl.rt o~ the Ale •'tm7, crnt~ic &l't'elopneDta 

vill 'be lllfAc:wseed al.Ila• but 111 mch lea• detail. 

"" 1 ! • • \i.oo"-ld-- p..c.b b s&..ecl bT &-clc.l .. p:aed i a gl'l""+.:i .... ;ca 

t,. !If!!!'! Ccmmon1eat10n,,l\.op- •ti .. , »· 21 • 

..._, JlaJ. B .B .. • 1a an article, •l'oUen 8114 L1m1tat101'J8 ot Jtad1o Co11m11n1-

--. Yl\llU & ---1'1el4 ~ J!llllet1D, :lo. 9l,Ju:IT-Allplt 1936. le'ptated m Articles on~- _3~18,, (~, p:lbl1sbe4 'b7 Oft1ee Of the Chie! f!l"1 I }) .,gt; 

' SECF<e1· 
" . REF ID:A67698 

SECi<Eo~. AM~ll 

2., fa!J,p~• Pr1ar t.o Vorl4 Var I (19!J6-1211t.) 

a. !be f1.ra1; reeor4 of ra41o :batereept !'or iatelligeDce purposes 

:la 1a lSlOB, 1lbm ~ Auatr:l.au tatercepted Italian n4Jo tl'att1e an the eontiaent ud a1; le81 a4 perto.nie4 ~~111 lJllOU it .S 9Je .A.WltriaDa were 

,_,.1JJ& a 41epute with Ital7 concerning the umnat:loa 'b7 .Autria or Josllf.a. 

d lerzegortaa. Ia 19111 the .Autriau 1ntercepte4 :ra41o tratt:l.c troa both 

•l&!• in the lliptte 'between Ital.T u4 !'tlrk.97-... tbe tirat time that a neutral 

'\bird part,- toll.aw4 the :a:llltal!7 operation• of t.1IO other mt1ons at a d1BG tuaee, mve 'b1' mYe. 

'b. .llao prior to Varl.4 Var I, the F.rench -.tnta1Decl. an o:rgmdsa-

'li1Dn call.e4 the Dem:ieE 'Bu:rea.u or 'the he11ch Genera1 Statt, 'Wb1ch f'oll.OVed 

f'ore'ign radio tntttc (eqiec1a117 German. &1!14 Italian} for tbe purpose ot 4eYelopbtg Jmowledge 1lh1ch could be used in 'tim or var. 7 

e. Although there 1s ao ftCOl"4 ld'allaltle to this vr1ter of' British 

aet1T1ties ln th1a fl.el.4 prtar to 11orld Var I. lt is Jaolu tbat acUTe 1nterce,pt ot Germn Artq u4 •YJ' tra:ttic ba4 'beaun wU 'be1'ore the wr. '.rile 

Jlu.o•1w 1 Qm:m:as, u4 Ital ins app8ftlltl7 Vl!re aUll <l\lite inept ill the ftelcl 

01" ndio intercept or conm:udcation UteJ.li&ence 4urhg th1a pezi!od. 

4. '?be 'O'nitecl S.tatea "14 IJOt begin its :n41o :brtelli&ence work 

Ufd;U rJur1Dg tforl.4. Var I. 

3. !!!lJ!ia Dllr15 Varld Var I (l.21~-121@) 

•· ~ comment. It 1• or :h'lterest that the tenl •trat.tic 

~ta• ace. mt qpeer !a uq or the available vrit;inp CODCenliltg comnan'-

ea:tion 1ateJ11pnce aet1T1t:ta pr:lar to or &Iring Vo:rl4 Vax" IJI but the tech .. 
... REF ID:A67698 

SECRET -

Jliquea w aov reprO. u compriaf.»& trattk au.J,Ja!a wre 'Wied ua. epoken ot 

• -W/'1 Iatell1.pnce,• •ra&U.ogon1cnetr1" (1.e •• 41rect10n filldin1.d. •radio 

won,• •ft'aluat1on1 • amt aimp17 ·~:la.• It waa &lJP&ftD.tl.J' not un.til 

Vorl.4 Var II ar the p!r1oc1 preeecliZI& it that the term •Vattte anal.1819• 

". !'! All1e• 

(1) Accord:lJt& to ua1lable reference documents the ltrit1ah 

a4 the J'reDch appa.rentJ.7 "llU'e the ftn't t.o pit to :practleal. ue the tech ... 

Oiques ot tratt1c ual.J'llis J 'both wee ua1Jt6 atuclles ~ th1e i;JP! in the aar17 

JIU't of World. Var I. Con.cern:1D,g the Britiah effort, J'llcke tel.la wu8 

•fte J:DgU.h were tbe tirat :bl World War I to create a 

tec.':lmicaJ.11' ma.ct 8llil i'Ut vork1.Ds •:ratea o{P ll'f'&l.uation, a a:ratem 

Which CBD be regarde4 U S>derll t.o4ay. "Direction ti 'O'Uug' .tat1ona were comected vitb. each other a:ad Yith tbe CQ.tZ'al office, 

--4 lai4 out bare b1' the a14 o~ a11k threads on a great orientation 

m» 'flh1ch vu munte4 borimntal~. In the cipher bureau aat tbe 

an 1fbo aa, &114 D!&bt aectpbend ner7 tncomng intercepted ra41.o ... arma. h tlllOJ!'B>U8 card t:U.e eontainillg a.11 station. callaisns wh1ch 

lra4 h1iiberto ~ 1a the illtereept eervice,. &l.on& vith all other 

..Ul.a'ble aata,. uct this -.4e 1t possible to recop111e eurrentl.7 

the •Jllteal accO!'tlUg to *!ch eall.91pa vue eba»&ed in Genaa.n 

'tirat'tic 1 w :recomtruct these, am. enn. 'to tell 1IL &4Taace What 

e$l.181gi:aa th1a or 'that Gel"laal1 station woul.4 b.aTe tcmrrov or dq 

after toBxt-NW or a week hence. 1\w: eollabo:ra't1on 1'etweeD 41.nc.:· 

tton nm1DS, evaluation, 8Dd c!ec1pbc.r'Jlent 11U wensible ud veuorp.nlsea.. • 

07l4en, a ltnd18h co&t lmd cipher expert, Wltil>& in 1931 along aia11Ar lines 

eonc6rld»g ~ill do• ta the Bntteh 11EY7, •qss9 

, B 

-.,. a eollJilled ~!a ot the location or 'tb.e ata't1ons seD41ns 

'the ra.4.1ogrw, the 1pal.a (1.e .. ,. eal.lJl:tps) 1 the UINllt ot 

traffic 1 a4 :part:lal ecmpJ.ete c:rn>tographtc solut!oDS, the coopC"dillg ra4io Nld ~1e •errtces 1ucceeding 1a ftr7 great17 fticiUtatizlc each other'• 110J:'k Ul4 were able to lr.rblg the eosaen4er 

or tbe Br1tiah J'leet eztore:all' ftl.ua'ble atra"tegle ud tactical inf'or .. •'tion.• 

l'licke 1 Ver lecreta in tbe :fther, Parts I llD4 II (BE!IB99m) 1 :p. U8 

9 GJl.aen, !he Con.tr1but1oD of 1ibe Cm1'91!!ih1c Bureaus 111 the World War 

(world Var I) {Qdi'll!ii") 1 p. 20 

' SECRET 
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REF ID:A67698 

SECREt• 

*1ch w .,. ••oc1ate with trattie emlJlli•. !'he7 w:re able to 41st1ngui•h 

the wr1ou aerm.n l'a41o nations m the 'l;uis ot tbe llUBiber of' ra41o atations 

-.ch eontactect, ua4 the Omatton of t:be activit7 of atatiolas, a-ad 1q the eall-

•!pa. llesulta obtaiDed wre •turlie4 aaawt &lciphered radi08X'Ul8, and the 

11et1Y1t7 o-r tne• ~ units &D4 qec1tic GeJ:JIB.11 untts cou.l.cl thus be foll.awed 

s.a a.tan .

10 

(3) '!he 1Jn1ted States entered the var at a compara;tivel.1' late 

4ate, :tn. 1917, 'but tor the period or our pa:rt1cipa.tion ta the var, our Radio 

Intell!&uce IUb-Beetton -.ae at~m1ve use ot trattic anal.181a pr1Dc1plea. 

p&\"tS.cular~ 1». eanJur,lct.ioxl with tirect.ion flwUng.. Aa eDllmO' coi!ea became 

• .,-re 4Ut1cult to 80l'ft, !Jacreasbig 11rp>rtance wu attache4 to tbe Badio 

Qoll1cmetr1e (411'ectton-f!1HUng) Ber'liee, 1loorlBn tell.a ua.u Another tnttie 

maal.18ia tec:l:mf.qae, •tua1' ot -•age wlmea, vu used 111' the U.S. in at~ 

Gel'all hich COllP-'11 :esseges enc1p!lered in a •J'lltea ealled the • Ail'GVX" &19ta .. 

117 •'th11 a r:.ba:rt baaed upon ti. amdber of such assagea intercepted. it 1IBB 

pstble tao diaeon:r .eerta.in tb:lnga &bout the tactical •ltuat1on, &Id, with 

908 &tgree o~ u8Ul'8Dee, predict what a1aht bappea .. 12 

(4) '.rbere 1a "'ft!r7 little !Bf'anaation conceiu1q cmmnu:n1cat1on 

btelligeDCe activities o~ Buaata, Ital.7, or other Allies in World 'War I, 

1nt.t the7 are beUnecl to haYe been l!Jdted in acope. 

c. Central !'onrs 

(1) 9ae Germana entered World Va.r I ill·prep&red tor ceyptopa;h1c .... ~1c 'llOritJ there 1188 a lack o~ umeratanding ot both 

·ns . 

D14., »· 31. llao,. Flicke, op. ci.t. »· 43 .. u lloorm.11, J'raDlt, 'Ba41o Intell. Sect1cm1 GeJJenl Btatt a GeDer&l. llead-

~1" 1 .m;, 11Dal ~ ol !!J!.-ibllf&), p. 7 

J:r1.e4an,_! .r. • CCl'""ldcatiODS Intellip,DCe {lllCRm), a lecture, 

29 ~ i:ou SECRE·r· 

~ 
.' 

, . 

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~~-------------------------~ REF ID:A67698 

SECKC:a -lM\f 

ftal.&11 ..S. b. the Se:nice• tbere .... a 1aek ~ persosmel 'ftraed 1n these 

neu. .

13 Por tbe -pertot 19llf. to i916, tile a.ram 414 ~1cal~ ao ecamn'ratiom wlp:l.8 or &11.7 901"t,, although tbe7 wre ear:q alerted to the 

'l'alw ot oowmlcatS.oa illtelUpnce tmrins the Esttle o'f !a.xmen'burg 1n 

~ 1911f. 1 When tbe Haaaians ued ra41o exteml1Tel.J' f'or the tre.nsm1••1on 

or 9JD1' waagee la the eleU', and tbe Gem lti&h Coarm:a4 .ae arq of 1ta 

et"Ueial &eda1oml 'bue4 on tbe knovlec1ge thus -1m4·1"' '.l'ba Geram came to 

,_. JllDl"e ettictat ta ti• ttel.4 tanr4 the .m ~ tbe va.r., al.though there u 

mo nileDCe 'that tbe7 pertox•I tategratecl anal.Jllie studies ~'the t7,pe carried 

on "'1' the Br:S:U•h ad the J'ziencb. 

(2) !be JuotriaDs,, aa ve baft "DOtecl, ~had a C?l'Ptaal.1\ic Mnice 'betora the V8Z', aml 'lel'e thu8 able to gab. alsost 111aecliate 

"'1Cceaees 1D thi• field ap.1.ut tbe Ruaa1e.m. A •uccesa1on of c~tograpbic 

11114 nammntcation U1IZl&ml OD the pt.rt ot Ruu1W m4e it ps1ble tor the .. 

Amtriana to Jalio9' Satiate aeta1la ot tbe Ruseian •a troop 41spoa1ticms Ul4 

llrt;.ationa. ApJ mt the Ital tana, the A•triw med aome ot the •tho4s ot 

1;.toattic amlJ&f.a. G71'1e1t writ.ea I 

llJ>ur.tng the t.requent c:baqpa ot call stgnala a&t :ln 'the Ital:l.azi 

Anq, the peat mJorit:r of the ratio atations tried, tar purposes ot 

tiontrol u4 ebeck .. up, to pt 1D eonta.ct vtth tbe other radio stations, 

bo\b t.bose located. near them and tbolle located fa?' &1iRQ'. !b1e gaye 

rf.M to the cireumtuce that mlJ1' •tatiom 1fbich hd. been •11.ent f'or 

... 1lm! bet.raJ8d tba1r location. 'lblt7 wre Ueat1fte4 'b7 %"1141oson1o-

..w,.. Ve can ru41J.7 uJMJaratud thil :laport.a.Dce ftri- tbe .luatr1an. com- __. of' 'beil>g Ul.e :ln tlda 119.7 to cheek up »erio41eall.7, &1; leaa'ti 1n 

'1se a.1n, m a-q ebazaps that Jl1gb1; lune ...._ -4.e 1n. tbe grou;ping o~ 

tm Xta:Uau • • 

!!' i ? E 

~n, op. ett., p. 17, 11-3 

~ .. l'J,.tcl'e 1 op. ett., p • 27 tt. 

7 

SECF<C.T 

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... _. ·-·- - . 
.. - .. ., . . REF ID:A67698 

Later in World Var I, Italian C1'1.Ptoai'aJ?h1c •J'Stmi unaervent vut improv'e-

..t (:probab:t, aa a result o~ uai.tance troa the J're:aeh) 1 &D4 subsequent 

results of the Awltriaa 1.Dtercept &.e~ice 'R2"e u a resuit ot techniques 

other than crnrtaml.1Bte--pro'bab~ 1nclud1rig direction finding, trattic 

anal.JB18 I u4 espionage. l.5 

>&.. tpall!1a Between tbe Vara (1912-1939) 

a. ft~ral. Ca11111ents. De'ftl.aplents iu the field t4 cannnn1 cation 

latelllgeuce lletween Vorl.4 Var I aml Vorld Var II wre •J.ov--tbere vu mturall.7 a sreat t1aclim ta ettorte 1n tbia 41reetion .. '!be vr1ter baa been 

~ to t.l.Wl ., recar4 or ra41o iatereept 1n cozmectton vith the onl.7 large 

ld.11t&r7 ectlou l1:l the 1*"104, the Italiu-:ftb.1op1an var :l.n 1935 ad the 

8pmiah C1YU Var 1D 1936. In pneral, 01"pDizat1ona pertormh>g &'DB.l.J1t1s or 

a'Jl)toaraphic &rnloi-nt vere cut to 111.Jlima •1me and operated under d1tti ... 

eul.t1ee. It vu~ llmnn'er, a period or c1nelopment; 1n lurope, m.t1ons tol· 

l.aw4 each other•• ld.litar.Y' mneUYera and minor •kind.shes, and 1u America 

then YeJ."e kYe1019!nts 1n the fielcl o~ crwtograpb.7. 

11. 9!d:te4 States. The Cipher !ureau (MI-8) 1n the M111taey 

Iatelligenee D1T1a:ton of the Var Department, vhich ba4 been created on 

10 June 1917, mved in August l.919 to Bev York Cit7 where it continued to 

ftn:mtion U1'lt1l llcmmber 1929 u a b1gbl;y aecret and well-~n s1gnal intelUaence agene7 ot tbe War Department. Thia group 11as the "Aarican Black 

Chamber,• eoDCerrd.Dg Vhich K.O. Yardley,, 1ta bead, wrote S 'book after it WU 

Uac:outimaed 1n 1929 When the V .8. State Depal"tment Yitbdrev its ehare ot 

f't:m4a •UWortin& the orpn1sation.l6 Tbe1-e V'a8 eontinuous etfort in the 

15 a71aen, P. eo, 81 .. 

J.6 !!J.e pu'bl.illhing 1n 1931 ot Yardle7• • book, 11ll1ch 41.acusaed techniques o~ ~!Sot' codes which were at.ill in use, bu been pnerll.ly blamed f'or 

~Ill tbe tub of all ccm.in1cat1on intelligeDCe :much mre difficult than 

~rl.7. Ita revelation ot the 110lut1on ot Japanese cliplomatic mesaagea :relathg to the Vaahington Disarmament Canterence of 1929 !a believed b1' ~· 

obaenen to haYe le4 to the Japmeae 4emmciat1c:m of the naval llm1tat1on treaties 

tn i93s. . a bECRC:=:rro 
REF ID:A67698 

~cation 1».tell1gence field b7 the U .8 ., however, 'becauae a aeperate 

group 1a the llillt:&r7 JJ:t.tell.ipDce DiYiaion vhich ba4 been ill the code 

t!Olllpilation ln18b:leu :t.rom 1921 to 1929 was tranaterrecl to the Office ot 

the Cbief Signal Of'fieer in im, 8D4 vu g1Ten both co4e compilation &DA 

aol.utioD reapomibiUt7. 

I'm." 'be periocl 1929 t» 1939,. this ..U group, eu:ttei1111i ~ 

laek or a4equate tan4s 1 operated u the 81gml latell:tsence Sen1ce and 

l.aSA a ~k for later ~ion. Plw tor Wa expt:os1on were 

.ecela'ated ila tbe ptr:iod tollovilrg the IO\mt1ng tenaion 1n ~; inten-

•b• traiaS.lll ot eelected :people f.11 cr)'PtOgrapb.7 and C!')'ptanalJB1a was 

1Ul&'le.:rtakez b7 extens10n eourses, ad steps vere taken to :ll;>rove United 

stat.ea crnto&rapbic •J&tems. 

e. f!"!!Ce1 Great Brita1n, and Other Cour+triea • .A.ccordiJ:J& to 

rllcke 1 d.urill& this period the French bad an actin intercept service vhose 

focal point ._.. directed toward the o'bservat1.0n ot foreign armies. The 

Jlrituh •1Jlta:ble4 a comprehensive ettort abed at complete coverage in the 

1nternat1oml political field,. ~ Italiana, although veil equipped from. 

a technleal etan4p>1nt, :tell t'a.r beh1Dd the British, Germans, and :French, 

ta tbe field. of results • 7llcke also uaerts that mJJ7 other countries, 

1aluding Csechoalanld.a, Pola.D4, llwls:la, Austria, Rnnga.r;y 1 'finland, 

Lithuania, SpLin,. Yugoslov1a1 BorwaJ', Demaa.rk, Portuga.11 &D4 8ve4en al.Bo 

•mtained e01111D111j cation illtellipnce ef'f'orts on a J..a;rger or amaller degree • 

!'he caoperatJo:a. between n.r1oull eQlllbimtiorls o~ these eount.r1es 1n tl:Je 

:f.ntelligence t:lel.4 vu & taacled web of btri&Ue and counter-intr:lgae.17 

4. !l!!!!!l· .A.tter World War I, there w a cutting back o-r com .. 

mzdca'tion anaJ.781a etto.rt in Ce1'En1' 1 but at leut a sub rosa continuation 

11' f11eke 1 op. clt., p. 202 tt 

--------- --- 9 
_..... ........ ------------~-

REF ID:A67698 

SECRE1 

of it, J'licb tella ua .. 18 ~ wre two orprd.sattons at the tille1 om 

ta tbe J'Qrefgu Office c&:rr'J'ing out c~u ot' foft:lp 41plomat1c 

~phic •JBtems 1 u4 the otl1er 1 ln the IU.Jd.atl')'" of Deteue11 CZ'J'Pt-

~ing and evaluating reaul.ts or f'ore:tp ll111tar,r :radio tn.tfic. '1'he 

tlll;pbu!a 1a tbe latter group vu on t.be •enJ.uating, • vhich included 

•JStemtieal.17 p1ecblg tocether rmmezoua •1.ngle phenomena 1n toreS&n :f!'841o 

trattie for tbe purpose ot getting a onr-all picture of tbe situation 

111 tbe area 'beiDg observed. 

Je&Snn'ng :la 1928, there wre • number of' Jlilltm.'7 maneuYera 

11hicb. gave tbe Germn ~ta good e:x;pertence. Ill 'tbat Jear, tbe :B.r1tish 

beld Rh1nel.arJ.d -.oeUYeraJ 1n 1929 there wre aneuvera 1Jt Cseehoalovaltt&,; 

1n 1.930 u4 wbaequent Jm.l'& there wen a •eriea of French .UitarJ' and 

19 air -.oeuvera which were obllervect 'bJ' the Gerans • 

•· :1•1'!=· Ve'J:7 little 1• known concend!lg the ettorts ot tbe 

Japanese 1n 'tbe ftel.4 or eommnn1eat1on. 1Dtelligem:e prior to Worl.d 'War II., 

1'he7 appareut]-7 performed little origiual ana:qtical work, Judging b7 the 

vr1t1Dp of Toah11uld. Yok01,. a Japanese lfaftl ~t.20 ~solved 

& 11.S. BavT •trip ci;pher 1n 19321 and suceeeaed 1D eurreptit:lousl.7 ;pboto. 

paphS.ng llZl American 41ploatic code 1n 1933. A .Tapanese DaTB.l otticer ud 

*" ua!at.Dt c..- 1iO the United States 1n late 19'37 Ul4 tr&Yelled al.l OYer 

'the But u4 Vest coasts, aecret~ 1Dtercept;1Dg U .8. Iaval broadcasts and 

»1ecixls together iDf'ormatioD ccmcerDS.ug our Jlrn7'• tertmmace1 mraJ.e, 

aQll tn.1tdng rout1uea. B;J 1938, t.be Je;,paneae lla4 intercept ate.ti.Oms tbrou&h• 

nr nicke, op. c1t., »· 166 

19 J'lleke, ibid.. p. 191 

• 

20 Xoko1, Toah1Juk1, The J&:rezi!Se Version of' the Black Chamber. publlabed b7 EArl.8 u Dr-3°'4. 

! 
~•, ?oko:t n,P(1l"ta 'that •1t vu p:maibl.e to obtain f'air~ accurate 

•tiaawe ot....,. eO!IAitions b7 the uae of the virelella 41rect1on-tind1Dg 

enaratu an4 'b7 l.Hrn1nc the emm:r'• ccmmnication cond1t10n nen though 

tbe aimv co4es cou14 :not 'be rea4.. It vu learned that this vu very- advu.tageoua Vben a)1ng an est:lm.te ot battle plw. • 

'. etrta Daring 'World Var II {12~9·l~5) 

a. G4meral CC8111el1t8.. ])Qring World Var II there were a 'uumber of 

an.tic 1*:14ente vh1ch bad. beb.1.Dd them. accompliebaents 'bJ' tbe crypta~ic 

lnzreaua ~ the -.rriDC nstions ... -Yeaunoto YU allot cJovn; tbe Battle ot Coral 

8e& vu brought to a 111JCceaafUl concluaton large~ u a reault. of aucceastul. 

TJllited Sta.tea ~f.e ot a Japaneae :.aT&l Co4eJ throagbout tbe war 

the .Allie• wre •ucce••tull7 expl01ting Gel'DU1 ern>t<>c;raph1c •J&tenls • On 

~ other llanl, the aer..ns wre su.cce••f'ul.17 rea41ng •D1' Allied •JWtem&, 

llhicb, tor Ullllple1 accounted 'for Baamel '• 1.nitial. auceessea 111 Borth .African 

'9attle•. '!eb.1114 all these auccesaea, bOllev'•tr, t.ra.f':f'te ual.)'818 vu pl.a.J1ng 

1ta part in • 'fttlr7 'f'alua'ble 119.7 'bJ' proyicUDg a. a~ fl.av of 1Jltell1gence 

ta:taraa.t:l.on tbrougbout the 'ftr when auccesaf'ul c~p.is vu not ;poaaible, 

u4 b7 prov14h>g a ~k Yithin vbich tlacrJ:pted •ssages could be interpreted 'Vben CQPtana~1s was aucce•stul.. The importance o'f e~1cation 

in'tell~ ill Wor14 Va- II 18 }'ll'O'babl;r best summarised 'b)' tbe folloving 

.U.temeut 11bich a-ppea.n 1n tbe Report of the Pearl. Karbor I:a.vestigatiug com .. 

.itee or tba '19th tt .a. Coagre••= 

*AU vitmaaes taailiar vit.b colll!Wdcation in:tell:lgence :matttial. tbrougbaut the var haft testified that it contributed enoreua17 to the aetea.t of the eueJQ'" grea.tl.7 ahortened the war, an4. 

•'"4 lalJ1' tbouaan4s ot lives • • 

u 

SECRE1'f.w 

~-----.- --~-- - . -- --~-~ 
REF ID:A67698 

SECRET AMJlf 

b. thdtea. States • 

(1) During 'the earl.7 ~of the Vorl4 Var II, the c:ammmt ... 

cation 1Dtell1ge11ee ~18.tion of the United States Var Depa.rtl!lent undel.--

.. nt a aeries of chaJ16es in Oes.1,pation, 'but !'or tbe laat two Je81'8 of the 

war, it 11811 called the Sigml. Security Aq/m/:7. On 15 September 191&-5, it became tbe Ar7q 8ecur1t7 1.&enc7, tm4 we a.tached t:roa the Signal Corps, Uld 

establ1abe4 as a separate organisation unfter the assistant of Chief" of Staf'f 1 

G-2. During the Var, the United States :laY7 a1Dtaine4 a aepan.te eommani-

•tion 1Dtelligence orp.n1zat1on, caJ.led OP-20-G.Yhich ceoperated with the 

Anq Ol:'gmd.zation. The Artq Secur1t;y Agenc7 bad tbe a.ssigmllent ot producing 

eomrmin1cation lntelligeZJee o~ both eDellQ' ground torces a.ad e'fJl!!lq a1r torces 1 

OP-20...0 bad t.he mission or produciD& coD1111nScatiou intelligence ~ ene:rq 

1'a'n.1 forces • 

(2) The United states and Great Br1ta11'1 cooperated 1n the 

e()rllllm1cat1ons 1Jrtell1gence f'iel4 tbrougbout the war. M a result ot agree .. 

Muta .ae 4urina 1942, the Un:tted States accepted priar7 reapOna1bU1tJ' 

tar producing inteUtpm:e coJ:JCernf.isg the Ja.pmese 1n the P.acittc '!'heater ud 

Gnat Britain. bad aa 1'ta prfar7 ~pons1b111t7 to produce intelligence con-

~ tbe Gft"JIBDll aa. others 111. the Buropea.n '!heater. !hia tivaion or I 

etto:rt applied to all tbe llilitar;r aervtcea, and to both ceyp'ta.t1aJ.:1t1c qd. 

tratt1c &DB.l.)'tic ettort. Intmocept coverage na split roug'hl.7 al.Ong the 

•ame lines 1 but both ourselves &lid the Br1 tiah provided eupport1:og ·cover a.ad 

li11ite4 anal.Ja1• 1n tbe other's •pbere ot reapomdb1llt;r. 

(3) A great deal ot eW!ceas vu acbilm!4 against the JalJ&llese 

bl all pbases o~ the coum1ntcation intelligence ettortJ Japanese ~' •ir 

!'orce, and naval codes Jielded to crntanaJ.pta,. and tratti.c ana1181s pl'OV'.t4ed 

l2 

SECRET 

' .,. -
... 

'•' - . REF ID:A67698 

sccRc:T AMBlf 

a conti.mdng picture of the J11p1.neae ft41o .ts. Field proceasi:ag eentera 

lDeated. :ln Australia and IJJ4.1a worked on the Japanese 8.?'JQ' and air torce 

problem• but the main effort vaa 1n 'W'uhinston. ~ -.in ettort on the 

Japanese J:ISV'al problem vas in a field eenter 1n Bava.11. Other supporting 

D!Wal field ceutere were located 1n Auatralia and Ce7lon, and apecialtsed 

technical research waa carried on in WashiDgton .. 

(4) In the :f'irst ~ar o~ the wu, the United States studied 

Geram comnn>nteations, but after JS.EA (British-United States) agreaents 

1A the field we.re reached, the prim.ey ettort was carried on in ~land • 

c. Great :Britain and :Br!si.sh Commo1iveaJ.th 

(1) The Britiah commun:lcation intelligence o:rga.nise.tion va.s 

cal.1.e4 Government Code aDd Cipher Scnool (G.C .ac .s.) during World War II. 

As int1me.t.e4 1n the prev1o'1S pat'agr&pba, the Brithh ~the oenian•· 

eonnunicationa, IUll1 a1ao those ot the Ital1&no~ acb.ieTiXJg great •ucceos 

both from. a tl-attic ual;rtic and a C1'J'Pta,Da]3t1c sta.ru1.po1:ut • The fact 

tbat the :British baa. continued intercept efforts in the period between the 

'two 1l'BJ:'8 em.bled th.ea to change quick;cy- to a 'Wartime :tootiDg vi th & a1n1.JmJJa 

of vasted. e:f'i'ort. Ill adclition to work on the tvo m.Jor e:rJe.11\7' targets, the 

:Britilsh intercepted. and~ the ra.d1o tra.ttic or JIBZl1' other luropea.n 

oat:J.om. 

(2) Austra11a a.r.v:l C&DB4a had 1'9.irl.7 large conp1111n1cat1on illtel.-

1.lgence organizations 4urina World 'War II, both o~ which were directed pr:l-

..-rl.]3 a~ t.he japa.nese p:robl.em :In the Par East, and which vorked very closelJ' 

V'lth the United states. 

4. Russia 

(1) Little intOl'mBtion ill avail.able e~ the operations 

ot the c-mmuntcation iatell:lgese organ1sat1011 ot tbe 8oY1et um.on &artog 

SECRf:"'·i· 
..... 

~~--------------.......... ._ REF ID:A67698 

SECRE:: t AMBLE 

World Var II, 'but lt 1a certain that lte ettielencJ' ~ 'ft&tl-1' 1JsFoVe4 a1nee 

World Var I. PU.ea, •pee.ldms :tram 'the •!npoint ot tbe Cle.teated Germans, 

'ftJltu're4 the opinion that the ltusaians l.OSt the radio intell1gen.ce pbase of 

World Var I, but tbat 'tbe7 'llDD it 1D Vorll Var II.21 !tle7 had taken tremeDGou& 

•tr14es 1n the t:lel.4 ot COM'•a'caticm aeeu:rit7 since their World Var I errors., 

aa4. on b buts ot &'t'&ilabl• 4.ocumente, f.t can be usumd that 'bJ' the time ot 

'for14 War II tbe7 :aot oJll.7 posaea•ecl Jmosrl.edge ot adnnced c~1e tech- ? 22 

ld.quee, but al.ao 1Mnt well a.re ot a*1 uae4 t:rattic aal.JB1• potentia.11tiee. 

(2) J'lleke reporte that tl'OJ& the spring o:t 1~2 OD, the Buse1ana 

~ Ubwl.J' •ll 1ni'o.rme4 abotrt t.be Genan colllbat strength1 intentions, am. 

all phases of their battle o:r4er.. Althou&h mch of the 1ni\U"mation prob&bl7 

ea111t: troa p&rt1Hns, aome troa pt'iaa.aers of val", and BOJDe f.rolll agents, 'there 

.... ., pstion ta ht.a m1D4 but that the lbiasiaJJ.8 must baTe aucceede4 1n reading 

a.ran eipbers .. • 

(3) A partia.l picture of the :Russian 1ntereept Mrrice 1n tbe 

.r17 part of World Var tt 1a g1Tell 'bJ" an :tDterrogation Of tb.e :l"ormer aperatiom 

otttcer ot the Sc:wiet t1n4 :lltercept •t.atiou, 23 in Mlnsk a Berge:t. Gr1gor1vieh1 

..,., wa ea~ b7 the Cerana in ea.rl.7 1~2. At that time, the Russian krlq 

bail. a aeries ot t:lxed stations 1n the Far Bast and Vest, as vell aa a number ot 

:latereept 'battal101l8 attached to Militaey Districts 1n tbe Western USSR. Pre· . 

111.1m&"bl7 tbe Wav7 U4 Police al.Bo bad their separate intercept serYices 8l1d 

tnt.ercept atatt.ou • Adtgmaents were passe4 on to the 1Jltercept operators to ... 

aether with •ch 1n'f'ormat1on as ns Dll!CeUQ'J' to cot"er targets ettS.ctentJ.7 • 

. In ~llcke, War Secrets 1n the Btbel.'", Part Ill, p. 492 (rough a.ratt} 

22 7U"ticularl7 Taluable 1D t.bi• :reapect :le a S0.1et-prepared Jla.Jmal For the ~is mid Utilization ot llad1o Intell!f'nce Ma.ter1&1, (Moscow, !~ch 1n 

clii.j'&ii outiliiea & BOdii approac to 6'iiffle ~1a • -f!ep- ... - ... 23 A f1D4 ll'tation ia one 1n pmaa.nent quarters, 'DOt desigmd t"or a mobile 

Ol*ft'tion. 

SECflET 

14 

-... ................ ___________ ~~~ 
REF ID:A67698 

SEGRE~ 

.AA::cor41.ng to the hterrogee, m aaal;ra t. wu earrie4 on at the station. 

c~ntats.ou ot peraom:1el vu cal"l":led to utremea .... tbe oper&tion ot 

'the bltercept units vu a~pareatJ.7 fairl7 etfic1ent, although t.be people 

at the •tatton ba4 no k:DoVle4ge rege1"ti.zlg the ~g:ree o-r success mi w.rious 

ir.roblem. At. Koscov, c.--O'lllmll11eat1on intelligence w earr1ed out in the 

bltellipnce 8eC't1on of: the Feop1es • Camiaeariat of' llaticmal Defense (lllCO) / 

'Which consisted ot CL DUlliber ot separate evaluation nct1ons. 24 

e.. Other Allies. Al though it ill almost certain tbat Jll!m1' ot the 

othm' illiea nch u !'raDce and Jlorway "ft1n al.ao 1D the COJllllUDication intelligence a--, tbne 18 m information e:n.1lable to this wr1ter concerning 

their open.tions • 

1:. !Jer!azV 

(l) During World Var II,, tb.e Germans placed great reliance 

upon 1'8410 1uteU1gence a.a a prtle source of operat1om.l intelligence.. Contn.17 to Allied practice, the German& appear to have concentrated on lov 

le'Rl radio nets :tor their eeyptanal)'t1c and trattie an~lJSis studies • AB a 

%'eaul't1 tbeir ta.ctie&l :tntel~"DCe ettorl benefited., but their atra."tegic 

1ntelligence effort suttered. 25 !'he Gernms cla1JD. to have been particularly 

necealf'ul in tbeir trattic aual.Ja1s of' .AJner1ean, British, and Italian com-

-.uications, but as the war progreesed, the7 b.a.d 1ncl"8B.Sing d1tticult1ea 

ap.1nst the Soviets in gettiiag a clear picture of the radio eituation.26 

Allied air commun1cat1om proved espec1al1)" Tul.nerable. 

(2) The importance which the Germans attached to traffic ana~is 

can 'be appreciated by eons14er1ng statements ~ ~- several German prisoners ot 

w.r:rn SEC RE~ 

1S The Rwselul Y Senice {!eP SISRll) ,Ir-821 publiabecl 'bJ' CSGAS-14, 29 Sept 47. 

25 qenan OJ!ntional Intellif!!ce, {~), » .. 27 

26 r1~!~1.-°". e1t. I p. 355,4Jt.3;al8o DC!RPI'S FROM GERMAW 'J!ICOM REPORl!S QI 

fllAPIIC AllALDIS,, 'WP SIEH'f , p.. l 

I!'( DCERPM 1'R<ll GXRMAK !rICCll DOOUMIWts COEBRB:tm JAPAl'ISE AID aRMAH ff./ A.• ,-p .4. . 15. - - --- ~------
REF ID:A67698 

JODI.: "Anothtt important •uccesa, u tar as ~is of' 

.Uitar;r t.rattie wu eoucernea. wu VOl:'kiJ:lg Oll't the Allied order 

of battle. tfh1.s information vas particularly iJr\vOrtant tor & 

Jmowle4p ot the aitw!.t1on in England prior to ll-Da7, -4 was 

obtained minly 1"rom. tre.ttic anal.J818 • • 

tlJW!G: an expert on Al.lied Air Order ot Battle: tcrt can be 

•tated that DO attack of the 8tb A.ir l"orc.e came as a eurprise .. General advanced vern1ngs were giTen some hours 'before the re.:tds." 

DAIOW: "All aque.4rone and grollpB in these commandu {the IX. 

XIX, am nn: TactiC81 Air CQftllll8.'L\l.b} bad tbed callsigna.. !l!hese 

callaipB were lmawn vithout exception :tram our observation and 

:tram captured :material. !'ro!ll this, we could aay on ette%7 raid ._t unit and the t:n>e or t)'l>eB ot pla.Iles in the formations were 

on the Y8."J'." 

(3) In tbe vritiD,gs of' German authorities on communication 

:1.ntelli&ence, the statement 1a ma.de that normsll.J' German intelligence f'rom. 

ly 

this eource accuratel.7 appraised the situation, but that part1cula:q' toward 

the end or tbe var, 1 :Sitler cons1atenti.,. :refused to heed its warning, but 

:preterred to trust to bis ovn 1J1tuitive hunches as to what the true situation 

1l'as .28 

(4) As an indication of' the scope ot German co111un1cation 

s.ntellipnee, it 1a reported that 1D 1945 at the end ot the va.r there were 

12,000 persons engaged in the etf'ort. in the a.rman A:nrr¥ alone •

29 

&· tta.y:. Information. concerdirJg the Italian intercept and anal.JB1a 

ettort a lacldJ>&. 'By 111.f'ereIJCe, boweTer, ve can surmise tha.t the Italians 

nre :aot cmtrlJ'-•k1lled in tbe &l"t of comam1cat1cm intelligence, a1nce tbe7 . ma&! a ftr:1 J100r •hewing 1n their campaign againa't the Greeks 1n 1941, ua1Dg 

the aa:me c<mppnnfcat1ons data tbe7 bad used 1n "the prerlous ,.,ar in theU-

~s, and their radio neta could be -easi~ fbllowed, y:t.el.diJJg :mo.ch intelU&ence .30 

!ti r 

Praun, German Rad1o IntellS§ence, eeJiPftlBII:fllfi, p. ll2; 

29 ibid. p • J.61 

30 :ructe, op. c1t~, p. 359 (UJJPUbJ.i•bed 1"0\llhbatt). 

SECRET 
. '• 

REF ID:A67698 

--------------------· ·-- - -

secr~c--• 

AM~LE ..... t•e 

(1) AccorcJ:1J18 '° !Plicke, ~ut prior to their jo1n1nz f'orcee 

'With Ge~ aga1l'l8t the Allies, the Ja1:>a.nese Ambassador to Germany, O•hima, 

•OO&ht and rece1Ye4 eomplete eoope:rat10J1 with the Germans in the f'1eld ot 

ei!')'ptanalJBiS (presum.bl.y 1nclud11J& all phases ot :racl1o intelligence), u 

cme ot ~ con41tiona ~ enteri.Dg the var on tbe •14e o:t Germrq ucl Ita'.q 

agatnat the 1hlited States, Great :!r1ta111"' &Ud the Retberlan4.s .31 

(2) !!he ~e or tlie Japanese 1D the fie14 of' conmnm1-

eation intelligence was oril.7 1'e.1rJ tb8J' ha4 mu.eh d1tticult7 11'1 their attempts 

to rea4 om' crntographie ·~tem • Interrogation o:r ae'9'eral Japanese liaval 

Intelligence officers revealed t!etails concerning the cammun1eation intelligence 

ettort1 partieul.a:rlJ' trai'f'ie &nalJ111• •

32 The center of' act1v1t7 1f88 at 

Ova4&1 Japan, where Allied tram:m1sa1ons wre 1ntercepted,,opied, and analyzed 

by areas • Traf'fic anal..)'81• vu used 1n con.junction vi th direction fil1ding 

to produce 11ltell.1gence; particular attention vaa J81d to peaks in trattic 

"T01~ aa :rexn-eaenting a ncr181s, • a1though the Japanese could Jl>'t necessaril7 

tell where the crisis woul4 mater1ali11e • 

(3) J'rO?ll a '?ICQM report baaed on other interrogation o-r 

Japanese priao:oers of var, ve read: 

*"?be Japanese Arrifl' had great difficult,- in obta.tn1na operational 

1ntellf&enee due to its f'a11ure to break eneJll1 codes and to lack of 

•J11teatie research •••• In order to cope with thia situation,,. the ArJV 

u a counter-measure resorted to the eYaJ.uation of' 1Dtell1ge?JCe b;r 

:aeane ot traffic aml,.a1s beg1nn1D(: 1 ~'her 194J&..•::J3 

:JI ,. !'l.1.cke ~ op. cit . p. ..58 tt 

32 Interroption 110. 431 (IflftrRieHB) ar.d !lo. 8o8 ot tbe Japanese Intell!se~e Sectoion, G-2, USSBS, elated 20 BOYember 1~5. Cited in •Enemy Traf':fic Ana.11's1a,• 

U't;icle 1a JU1J' 1946 iASlll"e ot Securitz Balletin, pubUahed b7 U .s . Chief' ot 

:18."l'al Operations • 

33"£xcerpts from. '!ieom Documents concerning Japaneae and German ~af:f'ie Ana.• 

1781••, (SISBB!), p. 10 

11 SECRE1' .. .. '!' ·=:r~=·»JP-•4:' ~!--~~· .. ~ ..... ·.. '·' n\. II 

• 
,. --·~~--

SECRl::T AM~LE .A.ppa:rentl.1' tbe Ja:paaese considered ceyptanall'&is a:a4 trattic ~is to be 

-.u *either-er' proposition, and Mel 110t a:ppreciate the fae"'t that for best 

reSUl.t:s the two work together u a team. 

6 • !elria Since World il8:1" ll (191t~ ... 1~~) 

a. ~era.l CQJ!lments. The period since the cJ.ose of World War II 

has been marked b:r a conttnua.t!.on ot &.1.:mDst :f'ul.1-ecale eommun1cat1on 1ntel ... 

l1gence efforts by prhlcipal. nations of the vorld., in contrast to 'the period 

between Vori,t Var I am. Vorld War II wben activities 1n this field -...-ere 

creatlJ' clill1mebed. '!'he continual world tension, al!d the Un1ted lfations 

i><>11ce action in xereo. beg1nn1~ 1n 1950 were motiva.ting f'e.ctors. 

b. United States. Several reorganizations have been the most 

• 

•1gn.11"1cs.nt &!Yelopments in cmmann!cation bi.telligence in the United States. 

Whereas there had been. sepa:rate organizations tor the .Ar1:r3' and. the Dav¥ (Army 

Security Aaene7 and OP .. 20...Q, respect1vel.7) / the Air Force ottic1.ally ente~d 

the communication intelligence and seeur1ty field nth the f'armation of' tbe 

Air :Force Security Service 1n • AJ:io.st simultaneously, 1n May 1949, the - Secretary of Def'e:cse (in the tre:nd toward unification of' the senices) 

&"Clthorized the torm.tion of' the .A:rm:l !brcea Securitz yenc;r (AFSA). The 

basic clirective ate.tea that the Armed Forces Securit7 .Af;,ency was established 

1n order to Ji>rovic!e ft>r the placing uniter one authority the conduct o~ eommun1 ... 

cation 1ntell1gencc and com.m.nteation security activities Yithin the :ratioDal 

M111tary l!!atablisbment, excefJt those 1'"hich a.re to be conducted 1nd1vidually 

b7 the Departments o~ the A-nq, lfa'Yy, am Air :rorce .Later in October 1952, 

jJ'8A. became the llational secur1t7 Agencz (NS.A.), which had broo.a powers over 

all pbaaea or c0111D11n1cat1on 1ntel.l:lgence act1Tities carried on by the u .s. 

The three separate service organ1zat.1ons continued to exist, v1th their 

act.tvitiea 1-ing paeral.17 integrated. &D1 4el1neated b7 SA. 

18 -SECRET 
P 86-36/50 USC 3605 

E 3.3(h)(2) 

REF ID:A67698 

SECRET ~MqlE .lt the close at Worlcl Var n, the United States gradual'.cy' re• 

orientated 1 t8 efforts in tbe CCJ.IIIT :fiel.d ton.rd Soviet fti.u1a1a lmd. the 

COD11111n1st block or nations. tt'be m.jor !ield. of' study bas been the Hussian 

pro'bl.ln, with efforts al.so beiD,g directed at Cc:a:mm:l.et China, the Greek 

Guerilla.II, Korth Korea, Yugoslavia, 8D4 certain other mt1ons. 

'!t1e United liatioDs pol.ice aet1on :la ltorea f'roa 1950 to 1953 vas 

a f'ertile field for eomunication intelligence. The U .8. waa quite auccesat'ul. eptna't the C01111m:lst China and a0

rth Korean opponents, particular]-7 

1n lOW' l.tmt1 rad.1otelepbom 1Jrt.ercept :rram torw.Td JIC)Sitio1l8.. Ia the air 

pba::e or the action, radio intelligence also played an 1Jl.pcxrtant role. Jlah.1' 

ccmn.nders w'bo had preTiousl.7 been skeptical or the 'flll.ue of' COllIM! becm:e 

ermvinced ot its value thro\lah experience, and at tbe 88- t1-e realised 

mre clearl.7 the imp:xt1;ance ot' com:u.nication eecuri ty. 

c:. Great Britain and tbe British Commonwealth. The British and 

Cana.dia.na, pt.rticularJ.7, eontinuecl to cooperate vi th the United States in 

the co111nnzrlcat1on intell:l.Bence 1":1.eld. In the interests or economy and 

......._ ______ __, I other developments c'.hlr:ll>g thia period 1n the British 

organization, DOW ca.lled GoYenment Communication lleadaual-ters (GCHQ), 

eu.u11n the Cemadian organiu.tionJ Compm'Jc~ions Branch, Rational Besaa.rch 

Council (C:BlilC) /1 have para.11.eled United States developments. 

d. Ruas:l.a. Our knawl.e4ge of clnel.op1111nta in. the cOJllllUDication 

1.lrtelligence field. 1A the SoV"iet Union since World Var :a 1a very ake~,-. 

Pram isolated scrape of' 1.nt'Ol"llation, however, 1t can be ate.tea. that an 

extre.17 ett1c1ent arpn!cation continued to be active .la the field of' 

19 

SECF"<ET -·-- - ---
radio intercept, ana. that fairly finiahed e.nal.J'ais w.s beins carried on at 

t'ield cellters ror the l>cr.lefi t ot important local cCJt1!18ndere, vi th copies 

r4 these reports be~ tran.Grdtted. or couriered to hJ&her intelligence 

'.beadquarters. The Sovieta continued to me.L:e active uae of radio di:rection 

:f'1ndi n& in locatino r.adio transmitters of others • 

.Ap.tn deta.1ls are not kl'lovn,, 'but it is auspected as like~ that 

c1ose cooperation ho.a existed. between intercept services of Satellite 'D&tions . ail the eerrlc:es of' Russia. 

e. Other countries • It 1s kn.aim that active intercept and ana1,s1• 

organizations f'wlctioned at'ter the wf!r il1 a number of other European countries, 

i.mluding France, Ital,)r, Vest GC1"2:2Uq 1 Streden, &?Id ll'orway. 

-r. qoncluding; remarks • The history of cmmmmication intelligence 

continues to be written, and e.e tu.tUTe events unfold, it will continue to 

play the important role of furnishing herd.-to-~t intelligence vhich can 

ees1st our mtion's leaders i11 the formulation of policies and. in fu.We 

military actions. A1t'bo"u3h co:i::muniee.tion intelligence bas perhaps h<;.d its 

moat dracat:!.c mor:ients in times ot 'Wal', 1t cmi and bas contributed much to 

the prevention of·war, and ebOUld not be thoua}lt of primarily a.s a var-time 

activity. 

20 

SEC REY