IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15–1459

Filed November 18, 2016

Amended January 31, 2017

SHANNON BREEDEN and LAURA HOCHMUTH,

Appellants,

vs.

IOWA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Appellee.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Arthur E. 

Gamble, Judge. 

The Iowa Department of Corrections seeks further review of the 

decision of the court of appeals accelerating the accrual rate for earnedtime credit after a mandatory minimum term is removed at resentencing. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT COURT 

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED. 

Gordon E. Allen, Johnston, for appellants. 

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and William A. Hill, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee. 
2

WATERMAN, Justice.

This appeal and two others decided today1 present the question of 

how to calculate earned-time (good behavior) credit after an incarcerated 

juvenile felon serving a prison sentence with a mandatory minimum term 

is resentenced without the mandatory minimum. According to the 

counsel for the State, the answer to this question affects the release 

dates of up to 150 inmates. Sentences subject to a mandatory minimum 

under Iowa Code section 902.12 (2015) accrue earned-time credit at a 

slower rate under section 903A.2(1). The offenders and the Iowa 

Department of Corrections (IDOC) disagree on how to interpret the 

operative statutory language after State v. Lyle, which held that 

mandatory minimum sentences automatically imposed on defendants for 

crimes committed as juveniles constituted cruel and unusual 

punishment under the Iowa Constitution. 854 N.W.2d 378, 400 (Iowa 

2014). Numerous offenders were resentenced after Lyle to new prison 

terms without mandatory minimums.2 We must decide whether these

resentencings trigger the faster accrual rate for earned-time credits.

The district court ruled that earned time continued to accrue at

the slower rate for Shannon Breeden and Laura Hochmuth based on 

their convictions for forcible felonies listed in Iowa Code section 902.12. 

The legislature provided that such crimes were subject to automatic 

mandatory minimum terms, and under Iowa Code section 903A.2(1)(b), 

inmates serving sentences for such crimes accrue earned-time credit at 

1See James v. State, No. 15–1827, 2016 WL ___ (Iowa Nov. 18, 2016)

(per curiam); State v. Coleman, No. 16–0540, 2016 WL ___ (Iowa Nov. 18, 2016)

(per curiam). 

2Lyle permits the resentencing court to impose a mandatory minimum sentence 

after an individualized hearing. 854 N.W.2d at 403–04. If a mandatory minimum 

sentence is imposed at resentencing, then earned-time credit accrues at the slower rate. 

 
3

the slower rate. The court of appeals reversed based on the plain 

language of section 903A.2(1), which provides earned-time credit accrues 

at the faster rate for sentences lacking a mandatory minimum term. For 

the reasons explained below, we hold that upon resentencing without the 

mandatory minimum, the IDOC must apply the faster rate for earnedtime credit. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals, 

reverse the district court’s ruling, and remand this case for entry of an 

order directing the IDOC to recalculate the offenders’ release dates,

applying the faster rate. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

The parties stipulated to the following facts. Breeden and 

Hochmuth were incarcerated under the custody of the IDOC.3 Breeden 

was convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to an indeterminate 

term of twenty-five years.4 She was age sixteen at the time of her 

offense. She began serving her prison sentence on March 3, 2003. 

Hochmuth was convicted of second-degree kidnapping, first-degree 

robbery, and second-degree robbery and sentenced to an indeterminate

term of fifty years. She was age sixteen when she committed her 

offenses. Hochmuth began serving her prison sentence on 

September 23, 1997. 

3Breeden and Hochmuth are now on work release. However, the question 

presented in this appeal is not moot because they are still under the supervision of the 

IDOC. We also reach the merits because “the underlying question is one of public 

importance that is likely to reoccur.” Dykstra v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 783 N.W.2d 473, 477 

n.2 (Iowa 2010). 

4The facts of that offense are set forth in State v. Breeden, No. 14–1789, 2015 

WL 8389964, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015). 

 
4

Both Breeden and Hochmuth were convicted of felonies listed in 

Iowa Code section 902.12.5 Both offenders were subject to the

mandatory minimum requirement to serve at least seven-tenths of their

sentences before becoming eligible for parole or work release. The IDOC

calculated earned time for Breeden and Hochmuth under section 903A.2, 

which states in part,

For purposes of calculating the amount of time by which an 

inmate’s sentence may be reduced, inmates shall be grouped 

into the following two sentencing categories: 

a. Category “A” sentences are those sentences which 

are not subject to a maximum accumulation of earned time 

of fifteen percent of the total sentence of confinement under 

section 902.12. . . . An inmate of an institution under the 

5Iowa Code section 902.12(1) (2015) reads,

A person serving a sentence for conviction of the following 

felonies, including a person serving a sentence for conviction of the 

following felonies prior to July 1, 2003, shall be denied parole or work 

release unless the person has served at least seven-tenths of the 

maximum term of the persons sentence: 

1. Murder in the second degree in violation of section 707.3. 

2. Attempted murder in violation of section 707.11. 

3. Sexual abuse in the second degree in violation of section 

709.3. 

4. Kidnapping in the second degree in violation of section 710.3. 

5. Robbery in the first or second degree in violation of section 

711.2 or 711.3. 

6. Vehicular homicide in violation of section 707.6A, subsection 

1 or 2, if the person was also convicted under section 321.261, 

subsection 4, based on the same facts or event that resulted in the 

conviction under section 707.6A, subsection 1 or 2. 

This Code section was amended in 2003, 2003 Iowa Acts ch. 156, § 11 (codified at Iowa 

Code § 902.12 (Supp. 2003)), to require that offenders serve seven-tenths of their

sentence. The previous version of the statute mandated, “Except as otherwise provided 

in section 903A.2 a person serving a sentence for conviction of the following forcible 

felonies shall serve one hundred percent of the maximum term of the person’s sentence” 

and could not be released on parole or work release. Iowa Code § 902.12 (2001). The 

2003 amendment struck the reference, “Except as otherwise provided in section 

903A.2,” yet left section 903A.2 intact, without reforming the category “A” or “B” 

designations. 

 
5

control of the department of corrections who is serving a 

category “A” sentence is eligible for a reduction of sentence 

equal to one and two-tenths day for each day the inmate 

demonstrates good conduct and satisfactorily participates in 

any program or placement status identified by the director to 

earn the reduction. . . .

. . . . 

b. Category “B” sentences are those sentences which 

are subject to a maximum accumulation of earned time of 

fifteen percent of the total sentence of confinement under 

section 902.12. An inmate of an institution under the 

control of the department of corrections who is serving a 

category “B” sentence is eligible for a reduction of sentence 

equal to fifteen eighty-fifths of a day for each day of good 

conduct by the inmate. 

Because Breeden and Hochmuth had committed offenses listed in 

section 902.12, the IDOC classified their sentences as category “B” and 

calculated their earned time at a rate of fifteen eighty-fifths per day for

each day of good conduct. This classification resulted in a tentative 

discharge date of November 23, 2023, for Breeden and July 26, 2040, for 

Hochmuth.

On July 18, 2014, we decided Lyle, which required resentencing of 

all offenders serving prison sentences with automatically imposed 

mandatory minimum terms for crimes committed as juveniles. 854 

N.W.2d at 400. The district court vacated the original sentences and 

resentenced Breeden and Hochmuth. Each was resentenced to the same

indeterminate term of years, but without a mandatory minimum and 

with immediate eligibility for parole. Their sentencing orders did not 

address how to calculate or recalculate their earned-time credits. The 

IDOC continued to classify Breeden’s and Hochmuth’s sentences as 

category “B,” such that their tentative discharge dates remained the 

same. 

On November 12, 2014, Breeden and Hochmuth filed a 

consolidated petition for declaratory relief with the IDOC, arguing it 
6

erroneously and illegally calculated their earned time in violation of Lyle, 

the Iowa Constitution, and Iowa Code sections 903A.2 and 902.12. 

Specifically, the petitioners claimed because they were no longer subject 

to the mandatory minimum under 902.12, the accrual of earned time for 

each of their sentences should have been calculated under category “A” 

at the faster rate of 1.2 days for each day of good conduct, rather than 

category “B” at the slower rate of fifteen eighty-fifths. On December 3, 

John Baldwin, then director of the IDOC, denied their petition, 

concluding that “the method of sentence calculation used by the IDOC is 

mandated by law and that the IDOC has followed such requirements.”

He stated,

While both offenders have had the minimum sentence 

provision eliminated, both offenders were still sentenced to 

an offense identified under Section 902.12. As an offender 

convicted of a Section 902.12 sentence, their earned time 

accumulation is calculated as a category “B” sentence—

which accumulates earned time credit at a rate of 15/85 

days of credit for every day served. 

Baldwin further noted that under Iowa Code section 903A.5(1), the IDOC 

could only apply earned-time credit that was “authorized,” and “there 

[was] no statutory authorization for the IDOC to apply a different rate” 

than fifteen eighty-fifths per day for a category “B” sentence. 

On December 30, Breeden and Hochmuth filed a petition for 

judicial review under Iowa Code section 17A.19 in the Iowa District Court 

for Polk County, challenging the IDOC’s interpretation and 

administration of the earned-time provisions in section 903A.2. The

district court held a hearing on the petition on March 10, 2015. 

On May 11, the district court affirmed the IDOC’s declaratory order 

and dismissed the petition for judicial review. First, the district court 

rejected the constitutional challenge, noting that Lyle “specifically 
7

declined to address the calculation of earned time under section 

903A.2(1).” See Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10 (“The holding in this case 

does not address the mandatory sentence of incarceration imposed 

under statutory sentencing schema or any other issues relating to the 

sentencing schema.” (Emphasis added.)). Second, responding to the 

petitioners’ statutory argument, the district court noted that in 2003, the 

legislature amended Iowa Code section 902.12 to impose a seventy 

percent, rather than a 100 percent, mandatory minimum, but in so 

doing, left intact section 903A.2, including the category “B” fifteen eightyfifths limitation. Thus, the district court concluded,

From the language used and retained by the 

legislature in Section 903A.2(1), the Court can reasonably 

interpret the statute to conclude that the legislature 

intended that individuals serving sentences for forcible 

felony crimes under section 902.12 remain subject to a 

maximum accumulation of earned time of 15 percent even 

though the mandatory minimum sentence for parole 

eligibility was reduced to 70 percent[.] Therefore, the 

individuals convicted of a crime[] listed in section 902.12 are 

serving category “B” sentences and are eligible for a 

reduction of sentence equal to 15/85 of a day for each day of 

good time regardless of whether the court imposes a 70 

percent mandatory minimum before eligibility for parole. 

The district court emphasized the “purpose of section 903A.2(1) is to 

incarcerate individuals convicted of the most violent forcible felonies 

listed in Section 902.12 longer than individuals convicted of other crimes 

including forcible felonies not listed in Section 902.12.” The district 

court ruled that because the petitioners were sentenced for forcible 

felony crimes listed in section 902.12, the sentences should still be 

considered as category “B.”

Finally, the district court addressed the petitioners’ argument that 

the category “B” classification violated article I, section 17 of the Iowa 

Constitution. It found the slower earned-time rate did not offend the 
8

Iowa Constitution because juveniles convicted without a mandatory 

minimum could be paroled at any time regardless of their tentative

discharge dates. Release on parole occurs after an individualized 

consideration of factors consistent with those required in Lyle.6 Thus, 

the district court stated this fulfilled the “individualized consideration” 

requirement under the Iowa Constitution for youthful offenders. 

On June 11, petitioners filed a motion for rehearing. The district 

court overruled this motion on August 3, reiterating, “The determining 

factor in calculating the rate of accumulation of earned time is whether 

the court sentenced the offender for a crime listed in Section 902.12.” 

Breeden and Hochmuth appealed, and we transferred the appeal to the 

court of appeals. 

On June 29, 2016, the court of appeals reversed the decision of the 

district court. The court of appeals focused on the text of the statute, 

which provided that “Category ‘B’ sentences are those sentences which 

are subject to a maximum accumulation of earned time of fifteen percent 

of the total sentence of confinement under section 902.12.” Iowa Code 

§ 903A.2(1)(b) (emphasis added). Relying on the statute’s text and 

Lowery v. State, 822 N.W.2d 739, 741–42 (Iowa 2012), the court of 

appeals concluded that it was the sentence imposed, not the type of 

crime the offender committed, that controlled the earned-time credit 

calculation. Because Breeden and Hochmuth were no longer subject to a 

6See Iowa Code § 906.4(1) (2015) (“The board shall release on parole or work 

release any person whom it has the power to so release, when in its opinion there is 

reasonable probability that the person can be released without detriment to the 

community or to the person.”); id. § 906.5(3) (“[T]he board shall consider all pertinent 

information regarding the person, including the circumstances of the person’s offense, 

any presentence report which is available, the previous social history and criminal 

record of the person, the person’s conduct, work, and attitude in prison, and the 

reports of physical and mental examinations that have been made.”). 

 
9

mandatory minimum, the court of appeals determined the sentences 

should have been classified as category “A” with an accumulation rate of 

1.2 days credit per each day served. The court of appeals did not reach 

any constitutional claim. We granted the IDOC’s application for further 

review. 

II. Standard of Review. 

“We review a district court’s interpretation of statutes for correction 

of errors at law . . . .” State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 616 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 

2000); see also Lowery, 822 N.W.2d at 741 (“[W]e also review statutory 

interpretation for errors at law.”). 

III. Analysis. 

This appeal turns on the interplay between two sections of the 

Iowa Code, one of which was partially stricken on state constitutional 

grounds. Section 903A.2(1) governs earned-time credit and, expressly 

referring to section 902.12, provides two different accrual rates based on 

whether the sentence includes a mandatory minimum term. Section 

902.12 automatically imposes mandatory minimum terms for certain 

felonies, but that automatic feature was held unconstitutional as to 

juveniles in Lyle. The legislature’s intent is clear from the plain language 

it chose in these statutes—offenders serving prison time for the forcible 

felonies listed in section 902.12 are subject to a mandatory minimum 

term and accrue earned-time credit at the slower rate. We must 

determine the accrual rate after the mandatory minimum sentence is 

stricken as unconstitutional. We apply the severability doctrine to 

resolve the question. 

A. The Severability Doctrine. “When parts of a statute or 

ordinance are constitutionally valid, but other discrete and identifiable 

parts are infirm, we may sever the offending portion from the enactment 
10

and leave the remainder intact.” Am. Dog Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. City of 

Des Moines, 469 N.W.2d 416, 418 (Iowa 1991) (per curiam). We must do 

our best “to save as much of the statute as possible, eliminating only 

that which is necessary to make it constitutionally sound.” Clark v. 

Miller, 503 N.W.2d 422, 425 (Iowa 1993) (quoting Harryman v. Hayles, 

257 N.W.2d 631, 635 (Iowa 1977), overruled on other grounds by Miller v. 

Boone Cty. Hosp., 394 N.W.2d 776, 781 (Iowa 1986)). 

Severance of unconstitutional provisions from 

constitutional portions of a statute is appropriate if it does 

not substantially impair legislative purpose, the enactment 

remains capable of fulfilling the apparent legislative intent, 

and the remaining portion of the enactment can be given 

effect without the invalid provision. 

Id. 

Severability protects an act from total nullification if discrete 

portions are unconstitutional. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the 

Common Law of Interpretation, 98 Geo. L.J. 341, 384 (2010) [hereinafter 

Scott]. We “leave the valid parts in force on the assumption that the 

legislature would have intended those provisions to stand alone.” Id. 

This promotes the separation of powers and stable legislative policies by 

permitting as much of a statute to survive as possible. Id. at 386. To 

that end, the Iowa legislature has codified a general severability 

provision, instructing, 

If any provision of an Act or statute or the application 

thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the 

invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of 

the Act or statute which can be given effect without the 

invalid provision or application, and to this end the 

provisions of the Act or statute are severable. 
11

Iowa Code § 4.12.7

We have adhered to this rule of constitutional restraint for over 

100 years. See, e.g., State v. Louisell, 865 N.W.2d 590, 600 (Iowa 2015)

(striking mandatory minimum for juvenile offenders while preserving 

remainder of sentencing statute in section 902.1); Bonilla v. State, 791 

N.W.2d 697, 701–02 (Iowa 2010); Clark, 503 N.W.2d at 425; Am. Dog 

Owners, 469 N.W.2d at 418; State v. Blyth, 226 N.W.2d 250, 261–62

(Iowa 1975); Frost v. State, 172 N.W.2d 575, 586 (Iowa 1969); Smith v. 

Thompson, 219 Iowa 888, 896–97, 258 N.W. 190, 195 (1934), overruled 

in part on other grounds by Carlton v. Grimes, 237 Iowa 912, 939, 23 

N.W.2d 883, 897 (Iowa 1946); State v. Santee, 111 Iowa 1, 8–9, 82 N.W. 

445, 447–48 (1900).8 

We thoroughly reviewed the severability doctrine in State v. 

Monroe, 236 N.W.2d 24, 35–36 (Iowa 1975) (en banc). We held the

sentencing statute for delivery of a controlled substance unconstitutional 

7Scott notes, “Legislatures are wildly enthusiastic about severability: it is 

codified in thirty-five jurisdictions; none have rejected it.” Scott, 98 Geo. L.J. at 385. 

For a more thorough treatment of the favorability of the rule of severability in other 

jurisdictions, see his article. Id. at 385–87. 

8Federal courts apply equivalent severability principles. “Generally speaking, 

when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit the solution to the 

problem, severing any problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact.” PHH 

Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Free Enter. 

Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161, 

177 L. Ed. 2d 706, 733 (2010)). “The ‘normal rule’ is ‘that partial, rather than facial, 

invalidation is the required course.’ ” Id. (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 508, 

130 S. Ct. at 3161, 177 L. Ed. 2d at 733). 

That is true so long as we conclude that (i) Congress would have 

preferred the law with the offending provision severed over no law at all; 

and (ii) the law with the offending provision severed would remain “fully 

operative as a law.” 

Id. (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 509, 130 S. Ct. at 3161, 177 L. Ed. 2d at 

733).

 
12

under the Due Process Clause because it improperly shifted the burden 

to defendant to prove he delivered only as an accommodation for 

another. Id. at 32–33, 34. We noted the “difficult and delicate” task 

remained of determining whether the portion could be severed or the 

statute must “fall in its entirety.” Id. at 35. We declared, “[T]he cardinal 

principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destroy.” Id. 

(quoting Blyth, 226 N.W.2d at 261). We elaborated,

“Whether the valid and the invalid parts of a statute 

are independent and separable, or interdependent, is a 

question of construction and of legislative intent, as 

indicated by the words employed and the considerations 

underlying the enactment of the statute, and the question is 

not one of legislative power. A statute may be 

unconstitutional in part and yet be sustained with the 

offending part omitted, if the paramount intent or chief 

purpose will not be destroyed thereby, or the legislative 

purpose not substantially affected or impaired, if the statute 

is still capable of fulfilling the apparent legislative intent, or 

if the remaining portions are sufficient to accomplish the 

legislative purpose deducible from the entire act, construed 

in the light of contemporary events. 

If when the invalid part is stricken, that which remains 

is complete in itself and capable of being executed in 

accordance with the apparent legislative intent, or purpose, 

wholly independent of that which was rejected, it must be 

sustained to that extent . . . .” 

The converse of the above proposition acts as a limit 

on our power to partially invalidate a statute and leave the 

constitutionally inoffensive portions in force. If it appears 

the legislature probably would not have enacted the statute 

at all if the invalid part had been eliminated, then the whole 

must fall. 

Id. at 35–36 (quoting Blyth, 226 N.W.2d at 262). Applying those 

principles, we deduced a legislative intent to “treat accommodation 

deliverers less harshly than nonaccomodators.” Id. at 36. Because 

excising only the offensive burden-shifting phrase of the statute would 

leave “a viable statute expressive of legislative intent,” we eliminated only 

that portion and upheld the remainder. Id. 
13

We applied the severability doctrine to a sentencing statute in

Bonilla, when we severed an unconstitutional mandatory life term to 

allow parole, but upheld the remaining provisions of the enactment. 791 

N.W.2d at 701–02. We now turn to whether that approach will work 

here.

B. Application of the Severability Doctrine. We first address 

the intent of the legislature in enacting Iowa Code sections 902.12 and 

903A.2. The State notes the legislature intended to punish more harshly 

the offenses listed in Iowa Code section 902.12 in two ways: (1) by 

imposing a mandatory minimum, and (2) by providing for a slower 

accrual rate for earned-time credit. The district court accurately 

acknowledged that “[t]he purpose of section 903A.2(1) is to incarcerate 

individuals convicted of the most violent forcible felonies listed in Section 

902.12 longer than individuals convicted of other crimes including the 

forcible felonies not listed in Section 902.12.”9 To effectuate this 

purpose, the district court applied the severability doctrine to excise the 

unconstitutional mandatory minimum, while still giving effect to the 

remainder of the statutes, including the slower accrual rate for earned 

time for felonies listed in section 902.12.

We struck down section 902.12’s mandatory minimum provision 

for juvenile offenders in Lyle and now must determine whether the slower 

9The legislature clearly intended to punish more harshly offenders convicted of 

certain forcible felonies listed in section 902.12. See State v. Ceasar, 585 N.W.2d 192, 

196,198 (Iowa 1998), overruled on other grounds by State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 

871 (Iowa 2009) (concluding that the offenses listed in section 902.12 were treated 

differently because they had “a broader social impact and, therefore, [were] deserving of 

a greater punishment”); see also State v. Cronkhite, 613 N.W.2d 664, 669 (Iowa 2000) 

(evaluating section 902.12 and stating that “[i]t is entirely reasonable for the legislature 

to conclude the crime of murder in the second degree has a broad social impact 

warranting strict punitive measures”). 

 
14

accrual rate in section 903A.2 survives. We conclude that it does not 

because the legislature expressly tied the slower accrual rate to 

sentences with mandatory minimums, rather than to the crimes listed in 

section 902.12. The court of appeals aptly observed,

Section 903A.2(1)(b) does not say category “B” sentences are 

those sentences being served for crimes listed in section 

902.12. Rather, section 903A.2(1)(b) categorizes a sentence 

as a “B” sentence when the sentence is ‘subject to a 

maximum accumulation of earned time of fifteen percent of 

confinement under section 902.12.’ The focus of the 

language in section 903A.2(1)(b) is not on the offense 

committed but the sentence being served. 

We agree. We must give effect to the legislature’s choice of the word 

“sentence,” rather than “crime” or “conviction” in section 903A.2(1)(b).

Accordingly, an offender is only subject to the slower rate of accrual 

when he or she has received a “sentence” with a mandatory minimum. 

We reached that conclusion in Lowery, when we interpreted 

section 903A.2(1) to determine the earned-time accrual rate after the 

governor commuted a sentence by removing the mandatory minimum. 

822 N.W.2d at 741–42. John Lowery was convicted of first-degree armed 

robbery at age eighteen and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. Id. 

at 740. Lowery’s conviction of a crime listed in section 902.12 required 

him to serve a minimum of seventy percent of his sentence before being 

eligible for parole. Id. In 2011, the Governor commuted Lowery’s 

sentence, removing the mandatory minimum and stating that the IDOC

must “take all necessary steps to effectuate herewith, including the 

scheduling of a parole review, without delay.” Id. When the IDOC

continued to calculate his earned time at the slower rate after the 

commutation, Lowery filed an application for postconviction relief, noting 

that if his earned time had been calculated at the accelerated rate, he 

would be entitled to immediate release. Id. at 741. The district court 
15

denied the application, finding that the commutation had “changed only 

the parole eligibility date and did not change the sentence itself 

(including the rate of accumulation of earned time) or the discharge 

date.” Id. We reversed, interpreting the language of section 903A and 

stating,

Lowery was originally sentenced to a twenty-five-year 

term with a seventy percent mandatory minimum. . . .

Because his sentence had a mandatory minimum, he 

accumulated earned time at a slower rate than if his 

sentence had been for a term of years with no mandatory 

minimum, and he could accumulate no more than fifteen 

percent of his total sentence. . . . In contrast, if Lowery had 

been sentenced to a term of twenty-five years with no 

mandatory minimum, he would have been entitled to accrue 

earned time at a faster rate.

Id. at 741–42 (citation omitted). We noted that “it is generally well-settled 

that when an inmate’s sentence is commuted, the new sentence replaces 

the former sentence.” Id. at 741. But because the Governor made clear 

in the language of the commutation that Lowery should not be eligible for 

release immediately, we determined Lowery was entitled to have earned 

time accrue at the accelerated rate only after the date of the 

commutation order. Id. at 743. “This result,” we concluded, 

gives effect to the governor’s intention expressed in his 

commutation order . . . , but also gives effect—from the date 

of the commutation order forward—to the plain language of 

the statute which provides that inmates serving sentences 

with no mandatory minimums shall accumulate earned time 

at an accelerated rate. 

Id.

The State argues Lowery is distinguishable as involving 

interpretation of a commutation order. We agree that our interpretation 

of the commutation order explains why we allowed the slower rate of 

earned-time accrual before the date of the commutation. But our 

holding—that the faster accrual rate applies upon the removal of the 
16

mandatory minimum—was based on our interpretation of section 

903A.2(1). We reaffirm that interpretation today: removal of the 

mandatory minimum triggers the faster 1.2-day accrual for earned-time 

credit. Moreover, the State concedes that the resentencing replaces the 

original sentence. We hold that upon resentencing without the 

mandatory minimum, the IDOC must recalculate earned-time credits 

using the faster category “A” 1.2-day accrual rate for the inmate’s entire 

period of incarceration.

We recognize that one effect of our interpretation undermines the 

legislative intent to punish crimes listed in section 902.12 more harshly.

Inmates whose mandatory minimum sentences have been removed after 

Lyle will now accumulate good time faster, and thereby obtain earlier

release. Indeed, an inmate receiving a twenty-five-year sentence that 

accumulates all possible earned time may discharge the sentence in as 

little as 11.36 years under the accelerated rate. Thus, Breeden, whose 

tentative discharge date previously was November 23, 2023, will now be 

entitled to immediate release. Hochmuth’s tentative discharge date will 

also be greatly accelerated. Nevertheless, we cannot save the slower

accumulation rate because it is contingent upon the mandatory 

minimum. In Iowa District Court, we recognized that sections 902.12 and 

903A.2 operated together. 616 N.W.2d at 579 (“The practical effect of 

these two statutes is to require that a defendant convicted of a forcible 

felony listed in section 902.12 must serve at least 85% of his 

sentence.”).10 The “factual predicate for application of the statutes—

conviction of the forcible felony”—triggers the mandatory minimum of 

10Iowa District Court was decided under a former version of Iowa Code section 

902.12 requiring an inmate to serve 100% of his or her sentence before being eligible for 

parole. See 616 N.W.2d at 579. 

 
17

section 902.12, which in turn triggers the slower earned time 

accumulation rate. See id. Removal of the mandatory minimum 

eliminates the prerequisite for the slower earned-time accrual rate.

Our interpretation is supported by the legislative history, which 

confirms the slower accrual rate works hand in glove with the mandatory 

minimum. The “legislative purpose of earned-time credits . . . is to 

encourage prisoners to follow prison rules and participate in 

rehabilitative programs.” Kolzow v. State, 813 N.W.2d 731, 738 (Iowa 

2012). Under section 903A.2, an inmate serving a category “B” sentence 

can only earn a maximum of fifteen percent of earned time to reduce his 

sentence. The legislative history of section 903A.2 reveals the slower 

accumulation rate was enacted out of concern that if all inmates received 

the same rate, inmates subject to the fifteen-percent cap would earn all 

their eligible good time very quickly and lose the incentive to behave for 

the remainder of their sentences. The study bill proposing the slower 

accumulation rate states,

Recent amendments to the code requiring offenders to serve 

85% of their sentence has created conflicts within the 

existing statutes relating to good time. . . . [I]nmates serving 

an 85% sentence accumulate “good time” at the same rate as 

before, even though it does not shorten their sentence. This 

means that good time is no longer an incentive for good 

behavior because an inmate can earn all good time needed in 

a very short time.

H. Study B. 73, 77th G.A., Reg. Sess., rationale for change (Iowa 1997); 

cf. Star Equip., Ltd. v. State, 843 N.W.2d 446, 454 (Iowa 2014) (“[W]e give 

weight to explanations attached to bills as indications of legislative 

intent.” (quoting Root v. Toney, 841 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Iowa 2013))). As

enacted, inmates subject to the mandatory minimum received a slower 

accrual rate—fifteen eighty-fifths per day—to ensure that earned time 

remained an incentive for good behavior throughout the inmate’s 
18

sentence.11 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 131, § 2 (codified at Iowa Code § 903A.2 

(Supp. 1997)). 

When a district court removes the mandatory minimum under 

section 902.12, offenders are immediately subject to parole and work 

release. Thus, there is no need to decelerate the accumulation rate to 

allow good time to remain an incentive. The mandatory minimum and 

slower accumulation rate are inextricably linked. We therefore conclude 

that we cannot save the slower accrual rate without a mandatory 

minimum. When deciding whether to sever, we must ask ourselves 

whether the legislature would have enacted the statute at all if the 

invalid part had been eliminated. See Monroe, 236 N.W.2d at 36. The 

legislature likely would not have enacted the slower rate without a

mandatory minimum. 

IV. Disposition. 

For these reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals, 

reverse the ruling of the district court, and remand the case for entry of 

an order directing the IDOC to apply the faster earned-time rate in 

section 903A.2(1)(a) to the sentences of Breeden and Hochmuth. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT 

COURT ORDER REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.

11The math behind the fifteen eighty-fifths rate supports this interpretation. 

According to the Legislative Services Agency, an inmate serving a twenty-five-year 

sentence who is subject to the fifteen percent cap on good time credit can only 

accumulate a maximum of 3.75 years (or 1368.75 days) earned time. Joe McEniry, 

Legal Background Briefing on Seventy Percent Sentences, Legislative Services Agency 

(December 2010), www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/publications/BF/13760. Under the 1.2 

rate, the inmate would accumulate all possible earned time in a little over three years 

(3.125 years). Afterward, the inmate would have no behavioral motivation for the 

remainder of his sentence. In contrast, under the fifteen eighty-fifths rate, the inmate 

does not accumulate the maximum amount of good time until approximately 21.25 

years. Id. Thus, the inmate remains motivated throughout the sentence to earn goodtime credit.