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Facts On Defense ;;.5fiv'J- .:;··3 

The assertion by Air Force Secretary Talbott that 

Russia could launch. an atomic attack on any point in 

the United States merely emphasizes what has been 

said unofficially for a long time. This does not mean 

that an attack is· imminent. But Soviet bombers now 

have the capability of such a blitz on a one-way 

mission, and Russia is known to be experimenting with 

planes of longer range. Moreover, the new jet bombers 

reported in the Moscow air show indicate considerable 

technical advance. 

. tf the United States is vulnerable, our allies upon 

whom we depend for bases for effective retaliation 

are more vulnerable. The tact is that the capability 

of air offensive seems to be running away from the 

defensive-at least the present defensive. Nor is there 

much solace in the statement by Chairman Cole of the 

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that the United 

Statel!· maintains its lead over Russia in hydrogen 

weapons. Russia has a formidable atomic stockpile, 

and the time is approaching when a lead in hydrogen 

weapons will be a wry consolation, for either side 

will have it within its power to destroy the other. 

But in the absence of effective international control 

of nuclear weapons, we must consider what is feasible 

by way of improved air defense and civil defense. It 

is encouraging in this connection to · have Secretary 

Talbott's reassurance that the cutback in Air Force 

expansion is not "fixed." As General Bradley noted 

in bis current magazine article, the cutback looked 

"'like coasting before you reach the top of the hill." It 

is imperative that the new Joint Chiefs of Staff be 

candid in their resurvey of defense l"equirements, 

irrespective of whether their findings please the Ad· 

ministration budgeteers. 

Indeed; more information about air defense re· 

quirements, as well as about the hydrogen bomb 

itself, is still the No. 1 necessity. In this connection we 

inadvertently did a disservice_ to the Atomic Energy 

Commission in an editorial last week criticizing the 

AEC for its delay in disclosing that it had detected a 

Soviet hydrogen explosion on August 12 and implying 

' that only now had the AEC acknowledged that its 

weapons tests at Eniwetok in 1951 and 1952 involved 

thermonuclear (or hydrogen) reaction. The fact is 

that the AEC announcements in 1951 and 1952 did 

mention thermonuclear research, albeit about as cryp· 

tically as possible. Whether the cominission could have 

speeded its statement on the Soviet hydrogen explosion 

is a matter of conjecture, though certainly it was 

better to double-check the findings than to announce 

the conclusion prematurely. 

· In any case, the basic problem of secrecy remains. 

Not yet has anyone· said officially in so many words 

that the United States has the hydrogen bomb. Yet 

every step toward international control, or toward 

improved air defense and civil defense, depends upon 

full public ·understanding of what -this new force 

means. In the face of impending decisions that not 

• onl7 involve billio,ns of dolb,trs, ~ut a.l~~ _that. m~~ 

shake the very roots of our society, there is' now only 

apathy. The problem goes beyond the Atomic Energy 

Commi5sion ·to the President himself. He has a great 

opporturiity, in his forthcoming series of speeches, to 

give the country the sort of enlightened factual guid· 

ance the H-bomb age demands. 

REF ID:A39374