[Cite as State v. Jones, 2016-Ohio-7831.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

BUTLER COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2015-09-172 

 : O P I N I O N 

 - vs - 11/21/2016 

 : 

RICKEY D. JONES, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

Case No. CR15-01-0139 

Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, Willa Concannon, Government 

Services Center, 315 High Street, 11th Floor, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for plaintiff-appellee 

Repper, Pagan, Cook, Ltd., Christopher J. Pagan, 1501 First Avenue, Middletown, Ohio 

45044, for defendant-appellant 

 RINGLAND, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Rickey Jones, appeals the decision of the Butler County 

Court of Common Pleas, denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of 

a residence. For the reasons detailed below, we affirm. 

{¶ 2} On February 4, 2015, appellant was indicted on: (1) one count of trafficking in 

marijuana in violation of R.C. 2925.03, a third-degree felony, (2) two counts of possession of 
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marijuana in violation of R.C. 2925.11, both third-degree felonies, and (3) permitting drug 

abuse in violation of R.C. 2925.13, a fifth-degree felony. 

{¶ 3} The charges stemmed from an investigation involving a large scale marijuana 

trafficking organization throughout the Greater Cincinnati area. Following an investigation, 

Detective James Whitehouse prepared an affidavit in support of a search warrant for 6223 

Zoellners Place in Hamilton, Ohio, a residential property suspected as a possible marijuana 

distribution point. 

{¶ 4} The affidavit identified Aris Trammell as the primary resident of that address. In 

addition, Detective Whitehouse averred that law enforcement officials had conducted a trash 

pull on the premises and found evidence of marijuana trafficking. Furthermore, the affidavit 

included information about appellant and his prior history in drug trafficking. The information 

contained in Detective Whitehouse's affidavit provided that: (1) appellant's vehicle had been 

identified at Trammel's residence, (2) appellant had been seen entering Trammel's 

residence, and (3) appellant had been seen speaking with unidentified drivers in Trammel's 

driveway. Based upon all of the information gathered in the investigation, Detective 

Whitehouse averred that he believed that probable cause existed that appellant and 

Trammell were using the residence to store and distribute marijuana and the monetary 

proceeds from those sales. 

{¶ 5} A search warrant was subsequently authorized. The search revealed the 

presence of a large scale marijuana operation, and officers recovered more than 5,000 

grams of marijuana and other evidence of drug trafficking, including a firearm, a digital scale, 

bagging material, and six cell phones. 

{¶ 6} While his criminal charges were pending, appellant filed a motion to suppress. 

The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the affidavit in support of the search warrant 

sufficiently established probable cause. Appellant later pled no contest to the trafficking and 
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possession charges and was sentenced to an 18-month prison term. Appellant now appeals 

the denial of his motion to suppress, raising a single assignment of error for review: 

{¶ 7} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERULING THE MOTION-TO-SUPPRESS. 

{¶ 8} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred by denying 

his motion to suppress. However, given our finding that appellant failed to prove that he had 

standing to challenge the seizure of marijuana from Trammel's home, we find that the trial 

court did not err in denying his motion. 

{¶ 9} Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question 

of law and fact. State v. Brannon, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2014-09-012, 2015-Ohio-1488, ¶ 

24. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court, as the trier of fact, is in the best 

position to weigh the evidence in order to resolve factual questions and evaluate witness 

credibility. State v. Cruz, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2013-10-008, 2014-Ohio-4280, ¶ 12. 

Therefore, when reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, a reviewing court is bound to 

accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. 

State v. Clarke, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-11-189, 2016-Ohio-7187, ¶ 19. "An appellate 

court, however, independently reviews the trial court's legal conclusions based on those facts 

and determines, without deference to the trial court's decision, whether as a matter of law, 

the facts satisfy the appropriate legal standard." State v. Durham, 12th Dist. Warren No. 

CA2013-03-023, 2013-Ohio-4764, ¶ 14. 

{¶ 10} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 

14 of the Ohio Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable governmental searches 

and seizures. State v. Grant, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2014-12-014, 2015-Ohio-2464, ¶ 13. 

Fourth Amendment privacy rights are "personal rights which, like some other constitutional 

rights, may not be vicariously asserted." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-134, 99 S.Ct. 

421 (1978). As such, a person who alleges error by the use of evidence taken from 
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someone else's property cannot claim that his own rights have been violated. State v. 

Coleman, 45 Ohio St.3d 298, 306 (1989). Only those whose personal rights have been 

violated can raise Fourth Amendment claims. Id.; State v. Rodriguez, 12th Dist. Butler No. 

CA2015-02-024, 2016-Ohio-452, ¶ 13. Thus, in order to challenge a search or seizure on 

Fourth Amendment grounds, a defendant must possess a legitimate expectation of privacy in 

the area searched, and the burden is upon the defendant to prove facts sufficient to establish 

such expectation. State v. Graves, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2015-03-022, 2015-Ohio3936, ¶ 10. 

{¶ 11} In limited circumstances, a person may have an expectation of privacy in the 

house of someone else, such as an overnight guest in the residence. Rodriguez at ¶ 14, 

citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89, 119 S.Ct. 469 (1998). However, "one who is 

merely present with the consent of the householder may not" claim a reasonable expectation 

of privacy in the home of another. Id.; State v. Renner, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2002-08-

033, 2003-Ohio-6550, ¶ 10. 

{¶ 12} In the instant case, appellant did not present any evidence that he had a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in Trammell's home. The only facts relating to appellant's 

involvement at Trammel's home were provided in Detective Whitehouse's affidavit. As 

previously noted, Detective Whitehouse averred (1) appellant's vehicle had been identified at 

Trammel's residence, (2) appellant had been seen entering Trammel's residence, and (3) 

appellant had been seen speaking with unidentified drivers in Trammel's driveway. There 

was no evidence that appellant lived at Trammel's residence, stayed there, was a guest 

there, or had ever been inside the home more than the one time referenced in the affidavit. 

As appellant failed to establish a privacy interest in Trammel's home, we find he lacks 

standing to object to the search. See e.g., Renner at ¶ 10-11; Coleman at 306. 

{¶ 13} During oral argument the parties disputed whether the state had preserved the 
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issue of standing, as the state first raised the issue of standing in its opening appellate brief. 

The state cited United States v. Noble, 762 F.3d 509, 528 (6th Cir. 2014), for the proposition 

that the government preserves its right to contest standing if raised during its opening brief. 

While the issue of whether the government may forfeit or waive its objection to standing 

remains unsettled, that specific issue is not presently before this court. See, e.g., Id. 

(referencing the split of authority and holding "if the government fails to raise the issue of 

standing in its opening brief on appeal, then the objection is waived"). The well-established 

law provides that, in these instances, the defendant has the burden of proving that he had a 

legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 

426 (1997), citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S.Ct. 2556 (1980); State v. 

Williams, 73 Ohio St.3d 153, 166 (1995); State v. Campbell, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2014-

02-048 and CA2014-02-051, 2014-Ohio-5315, ¶ 16; Rodriguez, 2016-Ohio-452 at ¶ 13. 

Here, appellant failed to present any evidence to show a legitimate interest of privacy in 

Trammel's home. 

{¶ 14} Because the motion to suppress was properly denied on the basis of standing 

alone, we need not address appellant's remaining arguments. Appellant's sole assignment 

of error is overruled. 

{¶ 15} Judgment affirmed. 

 M. POWELL, P.J., and HENDRICKSON, J., concur.