'"(\~.-~ ro~ 4~ S-o 

Matter Of Fact 

By Joseph an4 Stewart 

Alsop 

· Who Failed? 

EVERY AMERICAN, In and out 

of public. life, ls asking who ls re• 

sponsible for the disastrous Intel .. 

ligence failur.J which has now led 

to militacy disaster In Korea. Tha 

answer ls simple. The whole responsibility belongs to Gen. Doug .. 

las MacArthur's own intelligence 

organization, beaded by one of the 

little circle of high staff ofticer1 

who have been with .MacArthur 

·since Bataan, Maj. Gen. Charles A. 

Wllloughby. 

This would not be so If General 

MacArthur were subject to normal 

rules.· In a normal w~r theater. 

agent . nets and other machinery 

for gathering and processing in· 

telligence belong to the national 

intelligence organization, the CIA. 

In a normal theater, by the same 

token, the theater G-2 is primarily 

responsible for military interpre• 

tation of the intelligence thus ol>=o 

tained, and has only the most llm• 

ited responsibility for .intelligence 

collection. 

Even during the second World 

War, however, when this pattern. 

was becoming established In other · theate1·s, General MacArthur 

showed sharp dislike for it. In· 

deed, he actually banned the 

CJA~-s wartime predecessor, the 

Oilice of Strategic Services, from. 

operating in his Pacific theater. 

Postwar, he continued to maintain 

the same ban until this spring, 

when the CIA was at last permitted to get its toe in the door. 

Even then, moreover, the unusual 

co.o.ceuion was demanded and 

granted, that the local representa1 

lives of the CIA should be placecr 

under the operational control · oi 

General Willoughby, as theater 

G-2. 

., 

·-

REF ID:A43129 

c+-9 

TH IS ARRANGEMENT re• 

• mafned in force. after the Korean 

War broke out, until after the 

Inchon landing operation. The 

bold and brilliant stroke at Inchon 

was the best possible proof that 

a great military commander like 

MacArthur can work real miraclea 

with good l11telligence. Inchon 

would hardly have been possible 

without solid detailed information 

about the weakness of the enemy def~nses: and MacArthur himself 

congratulated the CIA representa• 

lives on their part in securing this 

Information. . P'or some occult reason, Jiow· 

ever, trouble followed almost at 

once. ·Not very long after the 

Inchon landing, the arrangement 

made in the spring was suddenly 

upset. The old ban on the CIA 

was again enforced. 

The whole task of gathering and 

processing intelligence, as well as 

intel"'preting the intelligence for 

the theater commander and for 

Washington, oncP mori reverted to 

General Willoughby's organiza· 

tion, where the e11tire responsi• 

bility still remains. 

Rather transparent attempts are 

now being •made to suggest tha.t 

the intelligence thus provided was 

not really so bad alter all. It is 

hinted, "In one breath, that our 

plans in Korea only miscarried 

because of the interdict on air op. 

erations beyond the Chinese bor• 

der <which General MacArthur of 

course knew all about long before 

he gave the recent order to attack). In the next breath, it is also 

stated that the true intention of 

the "bome by Christmas" offensive 

was only to blunt an expeeted 

Chinese onslaught. This la deinon .. s~able nonsense. 

.... AS EARLY as late September. 

General :MacArthur had been posl· 

tlvely convinced that the Chinese 

would net Intervene in Korea. At 

Wake Island he expressed· this 

convlctfon most forcibly to the Senate Republican L e a d e r 

President, only. a few days before Kenneth s. Whe1·ry (Nebr.> yeste1·-

the Chlne111e crossed the border. day said some Government official 

The sudden appearance of Chinese "blundered" in not recognizing the 

troops in combat In October verr danger of a Communist invasion in 

evidently took our dlvisiona in Korea,. "And In due time we shall 

Korea wholly by surprise. And ftx that responsibility," he wamed. 

even thereafter, the authorities in He said Rear Admiral Roscoe H. 

Tokyo clearly believed that the Hillenkoette1·. chief of the Central 

Chinese intervention was essen• Intelligence Agency. has testified 

tially unimportant, inspiring many that cu warned that the North 

'stories about the small numben of Koreans were massing troops alongl 

Chinese troop3 in Korea and their the thirty-eighth parallel ••a few 

demoralization by American fire• days before the attack occurred." I 

pow'!r. ''Someone blundered In not Finan~·. no general in his senses recognizing that an invasion was in. 

would have hurled our thin lines the offing,•• Whe1·1-y said on a radio! 

of men, with a great gap In the broadcast. I 

center, against an enemy whom Wherry 1-enewed his demand thatl 

be did not <'Onftdently regard as Pi·esident Truman ftre Secretary of 

weak and on the run. General State Dean Acheson to help ··unite! . MacArthur must, he can only, have the American people." He :;aid: 

• ·ordered the '"home by Christmas" Acheson's record on Western Euro-1 

offensive on the basis of an esti· pean pl'oblems "is no better tl1anl 

mate of enemy capabilities and his ineptness on problems of the· 

intentions so grossly false that Pacific." : 

over 200,000 Chinese troops were On the question of home front, 

somehow lost in the shume. He mobilization, Wherry said he willl 

must, ~e can only, have been per-- support ''whatever measures exfectly sincere 1 in saying that he perlence teaches are necessary to 

1 

hoped to "ena the war for all prevent" runaway Inflation." practi~al purposes." a L a dread• He said the President should be 

ful tlung tha~ General l\'lacArth~ given authority to set up priorities! thus walked 11?-to a hug~, well-laid for the manufacture of military 

trap. Blf t it ii. mo~·e Just t~ our goods, but he opposed granting 

most emment American soldier to . hard-and-fast conti·ols over pi-ices admit this frankly, tha11 to try d •cs ' 

Io prcl en.d that· he. ~ol in lo the 311 .. ~~~~lute powei· to gove1·n : . trap of lus own volltlon. prices and wages-these are seg- ! 

In short, the horror that con- t f the •Fair Deal' in conflict . fronts us proves the converse of men s 0 , 

a rule already given. Just a!I a with ~he goals for. whlc_h we o:!: I 

great commander can work mira- opposmg comm~n1sm m K 11 

• cles with good intelligence, so and elsewhere around the globe, 

e'•en the greatest commander clf,n• he said. 

not overcome bad intelligence. Wherry said the "greatest conSince the bad intelligence em!I• trlbution" Mr. Tru!Dan and Connated from General 'MacArthur's gresa could make to hold dow11 

own headquarters, this may dis· prices would be to .cut nonmilitary 

please those who like to believe Government spending. 

that he has attai11ed a sort of Asked about the r~ll of the RedivinE' perfection. But facts are publican Party durm_g the war 

facts none the less and they must emergency, Wherry said It should 

t-e faced. · ,be one of constructive criticism 

of Administration "failures."