,,. • REF ID:A72454 

ti The authof, who served as counsel for the 

Rockefeller Cornmittl'c before becoming General 

Counsel for the Defense Department, explains 

the organizational philnsopl1y of all the recent 

Changes Inside the Pentagon 

By H. Struve Hensel 

There have been radical changes inside the 

Pentagon following the report of the Rockefeller 

Committee, appointed in March 1953 by Secretary of Defense Wilson to study the organization of the Departn1cnt of Defense, and consisting of Nelson A. Rockefeller (Chairman), General Omar 'N. Bradley, Arthur S. Flemming, 

Vannevar Bush, Robert A. Lovett, Milton S. 

Eisenhower, and David Sarnoff. 

The Secretary of Defense under the President 

is now firmly established as tbe top boss in fact 

as well as in theory. The Secretary of Defense, 

assisted by a carefully selected staff, is for the 

first time in a position to do an Intelligent job 

of supervising, coordinating, and controlling the 

entire Department. Operations have been decentralized and delegated do,vnward to the three 

military departments. Lines of command are 

being made clearer and simpler. The three 

military departments and their Secretaries have 

been raised in prestige, and at last the Secretaries bave adequate power to operate ancl direct 

their departments. Modern business practices, 

as distinguisbed from governmental formalism 

and bureaucracy, are in the ascendancy. 

Decentralized Operations 

American business has been most successful 

in decentralizing operations. Business leaders 

have known for some time that there is no inconsistency between a concentration of authority 

and a decentralization of operations. As a matter of fact, intelJigent decentralization of operations is possible only under a top autl1ority with 

sufficient power to delegate downward. Decentrallzation must come from tbe top. It can never 

be passed upward. To the new Department of 

Defense leaders, these business principles seemed 

sufficiently tested to merit a trial fn the largest 

executive department in the government - the 

largest employer of personnel and the largest 

buying organization in the world. 

Degree of Complexity 

The Department of Defense, however, differs 

from business in size, objectives, and controls. 

It Is just as large aiid complex as it has been 

pictured_. Geographically, its operations sprawl 

over tbe world. Politically and economically, it 

affects, and in turn is affected by, almost every 

pl1ase of our national day-to-day life. The sums 

of money spent, the items of materiel p11rchased, 

and the numbers of activities supervised are 

astronomical. 

• There exists continuously a sttuggle between 

new ideas and the dead hands of tradition and 

habit. Furthermore, the offi.cials must do their 

work without the customary effi.ciency controls· 

of a balance sheet and an annual profit and loss 

statement. The objectives are security for the 

nation and effective military strength for application when, as, and if needed - rather than 

economy for its own sake. 

The operations of the Department of Defense 

are as difficult to comprehend as they are to 

control. The businessman who seeks to understand will therefore need some guiJelines. Primarily, it is important to identify the basic concepts or foundation stones without wbir,h no 

effective Deparbnent of Defense can be built, 

and then to see the choices that must be made 

once these fundamentals have been identified. 

The purpose of this article Is to explain the 

1 @'pp ----------....... .....-................. -------.--------------------------------------------------------------------~ roved for Release by NSA on 09-17-2013 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 
REF cboil'cs made by the Uockcfcllcr Qmunillcc in 

line with the basic principles llmt il envisaged, 

an<l t11en to take tl1c reader "inside" the Pt.•nlagon 

from l 9.f.7 to date. The fuults of the first socalled "Unification" of 1947 will be traced 

through the appeuls for more Jmv by the: late 

Secretary Forrcstal in l 949 aml the cff ccts of 

the unwillingness of Congress lo go nil the m1y 

with him. Then the 1953 rccommcmlaliom; of 

the RockcfeJJer Committee will be briclly Jaid 

alongside both the basic concepts mul the failures of l 9-1-7 and I 949. 

Basic Philosophy 

Approaching the problem in this m1111m•r requires the appreciation of some starling points. 

First, there is no orgnnizationaJ structure so bad 

tl1at men of outstanding genius aml loyally can 

not make it work with some degree of cOil'k•ncy. 

But such a truism should not lead lo accL'plancc 

of sloppy and ineffecth·e organization. Sccomll~·. 

sound organization aids men of genius lo perform miracles and overage men Lo achic\•e success. This corollary proposition is even more 

true. Finding the key to a sound organization is 

worth all the effort it costs. 

The need for a basic org:mlzalional philosopl1y should be obvious. There is n t<.•mlency to 

rush into the middle of a governmental organizational problem and to focus attention on the 

, minor matte1·s which arc most noticeable. Too 

often the squeaking wheels are greased without 

anyone noticing that in fact the whole chassis 

is out of line. 

The fundamental principles, wllich must be 

identified and appreciated bcf orc any start can 

be made on the organization chart, ore: 

(I) CMlian conh·ol may be of two kinds - active or passive - and each kind requires an entirely 

diff\·~nt type or organizational strncture. 

(2) l\Iilitary decisions cannot be separatell from 

civilian decisions. 

Civilian Control 

Like "\'irtuc," C\'erronc is in fa\'or of "civilian 

contml." It is trnllilional, democratic, and basic. 

Imlced, the principle is so firm))' imbedded in 

our p;o\'cmmcntal philosoph)• that any gh·cn 

milit:u·)' 01·~ani7.alion must be <lcscribcd as subject to civilim1 l'Onlrol C\'en if the opposite is the 

cnsc. Yet what llocs civilian control mean? The 

I : A Sh4'~f fosit.le the l,eutagou 1.' 

tn~;. fa: eve..-; rnu.n has bis own Men ns to the 

proper meaning and hence n different theory 

about the 1nopcr structure for the Deportment 

or Defense. For our purposes the many shades 

ol' meaning c1m be groupc<l under tbe two headings: (a) 1h1• pnssivc concept and (b) the active 

concept. · 

So the fundamental question is: Which klnd 

of ci\lilinn control do \Ve want? Once that decision is made, tl1e organization chart becomes relalh•cly simple. 

Passive Concept 

· Under the passive concept, \Vhile civilians do 

hole.I the highest positions and "influence,'' the 

military really control. A few civilians at the 

lop have the 17011.1er to decide; tbey outrank all 

military officers and can, if they so desire, take 

comm:md. But it is deemed irrelevant whether 

the)' actually do decide as long as the civilian 

signature is the final word. Since these civilians 

arc more interested to know \Vhat has been decided than to bave the data needed to make 

decisions, the fact that aJI the information they 

rcceh•e comes through a single military channel 

makes no difference. 

Such a system cannot work \vithout a n1ilitary 

chief to sit in the center of the web - immediately below tbe civilians but above all the 

others. Through this single military commander 

nil information passes up and all orders pass 

down. The military chief must and does "run" 

the department. The civilian Secretaries arc 

tl1us more like a board of directors than top 

executives. 

Tbe late Secretary Patterson believed in, or at 

least accepted. and argued for, the passive concept. Similarly, former Assistant Secretary of 

War J. J. McCloy, testifying on November 23, 

19-1-;, before tl1e Senate Committee on Military 

Affairs, indicated acceptance of a passive role 

for the top civilians (although he did show an 

awareness of the need for "checking the accuracy ancl the soundness of t]1c judgments based 

upon" a single sourc~ of jnformnlion): 

". . . The fnct that there is n Chief oE Staff 

with full authority in the militnry sphere gives the 

Secrctnry great aJ,·anltlges in his exercise of control. It gives him -

"(a) A single responsible source or information. . . . 

"(b) ... An cxeeulh'c with autl1oril)' mlcquatc 

to carry out lkcisions." 
'\ .. REF ID:A72454 

> 11111T1ml H11si11ess ncl'icu1 

lkpcnlling on lhc fcm·c and indus~ry or the 

top ci\'iliam; hnroh•ctl. the pnssive concept product's co11cc11tralion by the Sccrctnri~s on the 

chnracter mu] ahility or their mi1ilary executives. Once ll1e Secretarit's arc satisfied in that 

respect, they tend lo wmk on the special problems referred lo lht'm hy their military executives rather thon on the over-all day-to-day administrative job. ll1is docs not mean that Sccrctories opcrnting under the passive theory sign 

C\"cry piece of paper put bcf orc them - but 

the odds arc dl•finitcly slanted towarcl their doing so unless the inherent defect is so obvious 

tbat it appears on tl1e face o[ the paper. 

111e passive concept of civilian control is a 

'"'orkable approach. During Worlcl War Ir the 

War Department opt'ratcd substantially in accordance witl1 the passive theory, and no one 

denies that it operated well. This explains why 

all the World \¥ar II department Secretaries 

testified in favor of the original Collins plan, 

\vbicl1 "'as centered on a single military commander \Vith full authority over all service activities. TI1e cMiians, a Secretary and UnclerSecretary of National Defense, a few Assistant 

Secretaries of National Defense for funcUonal 

purposes, were to be clustered at the top, entirely dependent on the over-all military commander for information and the execution of 

orders. There were to be no civilian Secretaries in the military departments. Each service 

\Vas to have a military chief ans\Verable to the 

top military executive. It was a perfect blueprint of the passive concept. 

Active Concept 

On the other hand, the active concept is 

that, if they really wish to control, civilians 

must participate actively in the daily business 

of the department. They must l1ave not only 

tl1e power to drcide but also tl1e ability to decide i11depende11tly and intelligently - that is, 

on the basis of thoroughly informed judgment. 

There is no place under this concept for a 

single military commander with power to "run" 

the department. The civilian Secretary does the 

"running," and any military head is only one 

of several top advisers and consultants. 

The late Secretary Forrestal, Patterson's opposite number in the Navy Department, believed in the active concept. Forrestal's organization of the Navy Department in World War 

II was completely different from that of the 

. War Department. In fact, it was closely akin 

to the subsequent proposals of the Rockefeller 

Committee. , · 

forrestal "rnn" the Navy Department. Tl~ was not satisfied with a single source of :.iformation - miJitary or civilian. He did not 

want lo be forced to approve any action or make 

any decision in cases where l1e did not feel he 

bad fuJI knowledge of the advantages and disadvantages. Forrcstal was particularly upset 

by memoranda which prcsentc.cl only one side. 

Memoranda which by their inherent bias or by 

strings of initials imlicatl."<1. that they had been 

considered by only one group were referred by 

him to some other staff group for analysis. 

Even military estimates of tbe materiel support of tl1e forces in the ficJd were subjected to 

civilian scrutiny. To exercise his control over 

tl1ese military estimates of requirements, Forrestal established a R,cquirements Review Committee of wbic11 tbe chairman was the civilian 

Assistant Secretary and tl1e other bvo me1nbers 

were the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and 

the Chief of Naval Materiel. This committee, 

assisted by a staff of some 60 reserve officers 

and civilians, reviewed in great detail the Navy 

logistical program. They questioned not only 

purely business matters hut also predominantly 

operational matters,· sucl1 as requisitions from 

combat area commanders, training programs, 

advance-base warehouse capacities, ammunition 

expcneliture rates, and the like. 

In short, civilian control meant something active and forceful to Forrestal. He could.not have 

\'l/Orked under the passive concept. He would 

have agreed l"lith Go1don Gray, former Secretary of tbe Army (in the postwar period), who 

said in a memorandum complaining about the 

passive civilian control in his department: 

"If a Secretary delegates his command authority 

to his Chief of Staff and relies upon tbe fact that 

the Chief of Staff is thus 'responsible' to him, such 

a Secretary has thereby failed to fulfill his duty to 

exercise control. . • .• It was not intended that 

tllis supervision take the form of 01erely last minute 

pro fonna policy decision already made by subordinate echelons within the deparbnent." 

Secretary Gray foreshadowed later developments also when he pointed out in the same 

memorandum: 

"In Secretary Root's day I.he necessary cf\rilian 

supervision over the small deparbnent . . . could 

doubtless be adequately performed by the Secretary himself (aided by the single Assistant Secre-
REF ID: A7~16•s 4• Inside the Pentagon 

tary then available to him). Today ft Is obvious that officlol, who, having neither the personal wealth --- the Secretary cannot physically do this. He must 

be aided by a group of civilian assistants. . • . 

Uninformed direction is certainly not adequate 

direction." 

Secretary Gray was obviously not satisfied 

\Vith anything short of active participation in 

departmeatal management. Whereas Patterson 

and McCloy had to have someone else to supervise and direct on a daily basis - the top authority of course being the military Chief of 

Staff - this \vas to Secretary Gray a failure "to 

fulfill his duty to exercise control." 

Rockefeller Committee Choice 

It is readily apparent why a choice must be 

made between these two concepts of civi1ian 

control. They are miles apart in philosoph)•, 

principle, and implementation. They demand 

quite different types of personnel in the key 

positions. Imagine trying to adjust a forrcstnl 

to a War Department civilian position; it wou]d 

have ended in his complete frustration and uselessness as a Secretary. And just as civilian control cannot be part active and part passive, organizations must follow one pattern or the other. 

The Rockefeller Committee frankly recognized the need for choosing between these two 

alternatives. It adopted the active concept, and 

its recommendations \Vere built firmly and consciously on that foundation. But the choice was 

not an easy one; it was made only after careful 

consideration of both sides. 

Cozmterargr1111euts. There remained then, in 

early 1953, jus~ as there still remains, a forceful body of thought in favor of the passive concept. It is a workable approach - or at least 

it has worked in the past. It offers an antidote 

for the weak civilian Secretary. It also offers 

some cure for the lack of continuity in office of 

the cMlians (for instance, five Secretaries of 

Defense in seven years). It bas considerable appeal to many in tl1e career military sen•ice. 

These arguments in favor of passive ch·ilian 

control were presented to the Rocke£ ell er Comm illce by n number of witnesses; ex-Secretary 

l\IcCioy rcuffirmecl bis stand; and tlte case 

agninsl the concept . of active ch•ilian control 

wns summnl'ized in n military study presented 

to the Commiltee, ns follows: 

''111c direct commnncl of military forces in the 

field would tlevol\'e upon an appointi\'e cMlian 

of military experience nor tJ1e continuity in office of 

the Joint Chiefs of StafI, would be tragically handicapped in the discharge of this awesome and personalized responsi~ility for decision." 

Note that the important activity of the top 

executive is described as "direct command of 

military forces in the field," and that the basic 

ingredients of decision are catalogued as "personal wealth of military experience" and "continuity in office." 

The fact remains, hOlvever, that there is much 

more to war than the military command of forces 

in the field. Indeed, a major disadvantage of 

the passive concept of civilian control lies in Jts 

probable unsuitability fol" any future war. Strategic O\'Cr-aJI decisions, the development of new 

weapons, industrial mobilization, relations with 

aJlies, arousing the moral support of the allied 

peoples, support of ci\'ilian population11, extension of supply lines, and materiel distribution -

to name a few important problem areas - in· 

l'Oh'c a spectrum of knowledge and experience 

not usun11y available in any single profession, 

11nrticularly not in the military profession. 

It may be an oversimplification to state that · 

victory in \Vorld War II was due to big factories 

ratl1cr than the big forces in the field or the strategic manipulation of those forces. But there is 

enough truth in the statement to demonstrate 

that modern warfare requires a \Veigl1ing of factors and a bundle of skills not solely, an<l perhaps 

not normally, within the experience and knowledge of the professional military man (or any 

other kind of professional expert). Top-level 

decisions in war must be based also on the experience and knowledge of tl1e scientist, the 

engineer, the production expert, the transportation expert, the psychologist, the fiscal expert, 

even the lawyer. 

Need for Generalists. Not only is there much 

more to war than any single speciaJist skill; it 

is also clear that all the necessary special izcd 

knowledge and experience must be blemle<l into 

a single decision by "generalists" rnther than by 

"specJalists." And the expressions of specialist 

opinion must flow to the genemlists unimpeded 

by any military or other specialist filters. 

The fa,·orite juslificalion for having n spe<.'ialist as top e."l:ecuth'e is the assumption thnl, unless 

l1e l10s a "personal wealth of militur}' experience" 

and "continuity in office," a pcrso11 will not be 

capable of interpreting wartime shualions or of 

. • 
REF ID:A72454 

c; l lcrn·111tl B11si11css HcPicu' ..J 

making the proper decisiom;, Yet commercial 

and industrial _experience has imlic·a'tct.1 that it 

. is far more satlsf.actory for th<! top cxrcnlivc to 

be a generalist. 

There is no contrary experience in the military clcpartm<'nts, in war or in pence. The passive 

concc1lt worked in World War JI because the 

top military Jeadcr in the War Department -

General of the Army Marshall - happened to 

be an outstanc.ling gen~ral executive. It is not 

safe, however, to com1t on general administrators coming to the n1ilitary top. It did not happen in the Navy Department, although the wartime Chief of Nnvnl Operations, Fleet Admiral 

King, was one of tbe greatest global strategists 

of all time. 

Men with a "personal wealth of military experience" arc in the main specialists. While 

there are exceptions, specialists do not normally 

develop into generalists. This comment Is not 

pointed solely at military men. Accountants and 

luvyers are also specialists who as a rule make 

poor top executives, tl1e e.""<ceptions being so few 

that they prove the rule. Furthermore, military 

men are seldom developed for over-all executive 

direction; rather, promotion to top military rank 

often depends on proficiency in a well-defined 

special field. 

There is such a professional as an "executive 

generalist." This type of man is far more effective in the top executive position than is the specialist because he not only develops more objective qualities of mind but also has more skill in 

weighing dh•erse factors and coming to a conclusion on the basis of the several specialist 

points of view. The generalist can and should 

be appointed to the top executive position. He 

will usually be found in civilian life. 

The advantages of continuity in office are of 

course obvious. Lack of continuity has plagued 

all top governmental administration; it is not 

confined to civilians. Military men are, unfortunately, too often subject to a definite program 

of rotation \'Vhich is totally inconsistent with continuity. In neither case, however, can continuity be produced by an organizational chart. It 

depends on the individuals and their inducements to stay in office. 

As for the d~nger of weak civilian Secretaries, 

the Committee felt that the President could and 

sbould avoid that. So, while fully aware of the 

counterarguments, it felt they \'Vere strongly outweighed by the advantages of the active concept. 

Military Decisions 

Jn ac.ldili~n to favoring the active concept r{f 

civilian control, the HockcfcJJer Committee c1:m1e 

to one more f unc.lamcntal conclusion. It rejected the theory that military matters and civilian matters can he kept separate and distinct 

ancl handled in dual lines of command which 

meet only at the very top. TI1e Committee felt 

that departmental decisions had to be made as 

a unit - military, civilian, and all other specialized considerations being blended into a 

single departmental program or decision. 

In tl1e days of hand-to-hand combat, and perhaps for a few generations thereafter, there may 

have been decisions purely military in character. 

But that restricted approach to war became unrealistic many years ago. The only thing that 

bas kept this fact from showing up is.that military education and traJning expanded to cover 

many pursuits which previously had been considered civilian - for example, transportation, 

engineering, science, production management, 

purchase and distribution of supplies, warehousing, construction, and the like. But war expanded even faster. 

Today, with the revolutionary advances of 

science and with the' spread of war to whole populations, the characterization of any decision as 

purely military, except possibly a decision made 

immediately before or during actual combat, is 

simply shadow boxing. Practically all so-called 

military decisions, particularly those reacl1ed at 

departmental levels, involve some application of 

skill and knowledge found just as often in the 

civilian as in the military man. Atomic and 

thermonuclear \Veapons are examples of scientific contribution to actual combat operations. . 

Furthermore, war is only a means to a political end, and to permit decisions in war to be 

made solely by military men often wins the war 

by destroying the political objective - what is 

generally called "losing the peace," though actually it is produced by the way in which the 

war is fought. All wars are regrettable, but wars 

which destroy their original objectives are doubly 

undesirable. 

There is an equally significant corollary to 

the proposition that no decisions are "purely military in character." No decisions are "purely civilian in character," either, except possihl)· the 

purchase of passenger automobiles and office 

equipment for headquarters within the conti-
REF 

ncntal United States. Even those exceptions are 

questionable. 

The recognition of these two propositions 

points logically to two conclusions: ( 1) no organ· 

izational structure can be erected on tbe assump· 

· tion that military matters can be handled under 

one arrangement and one line of command, and 

civilian matters or dcpm·tmental affairs under a 

different arrangement ancl a different line of 

command; and (2) that the final decisions which 

must receive major consideration at tbe military 

departmental level, particularly including those 

in the broad strategic .field, can be made only 

after an integration of military and civilian 

knowledge and experience. 

Tracing the Reorganization 

Nolv, with this background, let us take a look 

at the way the various reorganization moves 

of the past seven years have led up to the im· 

plementation of the Rockefeller Committee's 

recommendations. 

National Security Act - 1947 

In a pioneering experiment, the National 

Security Act of 194 7 split the War Department 

into two separate departments - Army and Air 

Force. The Army and the Air Force continued 

to follow the passive concept of civilian control 

as developed in the War Department. The Navy 

continued under the Forrestal philosophy of 

active control. The. resulting three departments 

(Army, Navy, and Air Force) were loosely com· 

bined into the National Military Establishment 

to be headed by a Secretary of Defense. This 

top Secretary was furnished \Vitb three special 

civilian assistants (not Assistant Secretaries of 

Defense), and also with three statutory staff 

organizations: 

(1) The Mrmitlons Board was to operate accord· 

ing to rigid statutory direction in the fields of 

procurement, production, and supply. 

(2) The Researcli aud Developme'1t Board, un· 

det a similarly rigid charter, \Vas to operate in the 

area described by its name. 

(3) The ]oi"t Chiefs of Staff were to be the 

military planning board for both the President and 

the Secretary of Defense, and in addition were to 

be given a rather vaguely defined responsibility with 

respect to "unified commands in strategic areas." 

The three military departments \Vere given' 

separate administrative command structures un· 

. . ID : A "Pittase4 hzside the Penlago12 · 6 -·· -"""-

der their own dvilian Secretaries, who had the 

right of appeal directly to the President and to 

the Bureau of the Budget. TI1ese military Secretaries were also assigned all powers and duties 

not specifically conferred on the Secretary of 

Defense. And the Secretary of Defe11se had no 

power to appoint civilian personnel in any of the 

military departments. 

The germs of ineffectiveness and confusion 

were inherent in the 1947 organizational stru~ 

ture. CiviJian control of the military establish· 

ment on an ovel'-all basis was hopelessly diluted. 

Debating the pmver of the Secretary of Defense 

became a major pastime in the Pentagon. He 

bad "general control," but the military depdrt· 

ments were to be "separately administered" a"'nd 

were to possess all powers not specifically con· 

fcrrecl on the Secretary of Defense. The active 

concept under such circumstances could not be 

followed; the Secretary was left l'Vithout adequate 

informational sources to make intelilgent deci· 

sions. The passive concept was just as impog. 

siblc; there was no top military commander, and 

the individual military departments were part 

free ancl part subordinate - no one was clear 

just how. 

Two parallel lines of command appeared.' 

Consistent with the principles of geometry, 

those lines never met. Decisions stayed just as 

far apart. In the planning field, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff \Vere unable to free themselves from the 

points of vie\'V of their particular service and 

were s1>lit ·three ways, incapable of movement 

or stability. The statutory boards - Munitions, 

and Research and Development - were not, as 

a practical matter, able to formulate substa11tive 

policies, so they turned to issuing "procedures." 

As sucl1 procedures grm~ more and more defi· 

nite, they became detailed prescriptions of opel'-

ating methods. Operations and operating per· 

sonnel began to appear in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

Key West Agreement - I 948 

As stalemate and confusion increased, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, \Vho had been delegated 

certain command functions during the war, now 

undoubtedly influenced by that background, 

sought to fill the vacuum created by the limita· 

tions on the authority of their directing head 

and began to neglect their fundamental obj~ 

tivc of broad strategic planning. 

In assuming more and more command, the 
REF ID:A72454 

'1 I lt11'1'111'd nmillC'SS Rerieu• 

- I Jojnt Chil'f·., nr St:1IT Wl'rc aided by the J<ey \Vest 

AgrL'<'llll'nl of 1\pril 21, 19..,.R. This so-caJJed 

n~rrl'llll'lll wns really :111 order by the Sccrclnry 

of Dd'L•nsl' -- npproved by Lhc Prt'sh.lcnt -

which, in mldit ion lo cJcfining the roles and missions of the three military s<·rviccs, pl'rmitted 

the Jnint Chids of St:111' to appoint one of their 

mcmhers as the effective «;ormnander of a designated unmcd command in n strntcgic. area (anywhere outside the Unilt"<.1 Stales). An t'ntircly 

separate and distinct lint' of military commnnd 

thus nppenrt'd which was opcrntecl to shortcircuit civili:m control. The marvel is not that 

the structure foiled, but rather that it was able 

to continue at all. 

Forrcstnl Proposals - r 949 

We arc deeply indebted to Forresta) for his 

decision to seek statutory relief in 1949. If he 

had not sought to escape from his predicament, 

the system witb a single military chief over alJ 

services rnight be ,,,,ith us today; that was tl1e 

only alternative. Weakness i11 civilian control 

had alread)• led to a single military commander 

in the 'Var Department; here was proof enough 

t11at the most certain way to introduct' the single 

military commander is simply to )10,•e civilian 

cuntrol fail. 

Although Forrestal did not phrase his r 949 

legislative proposals in terms of a particular theory of civilian control, they were olJ\'inusJy based 

on t11e active concept. This can be demonstrated 

by a very summary listing of his proposed amendments to the N~tional Security Act. Forrcstal 

asked Congress for: 

l. Clarification, in unmistakable and 'ringing 

phrases, of the supreme authority of the Secretary 

of Defense. 

2. Augmentation of his staff by a Deputy Secretary and three Assistant Secretaries. 

3. Transfer lo him of the p<niver of aprointrncnt 

of the Chainnen of the t\'Vo statutory boards, the 

Director of the Joint Staff, and all other civilian 

personnel down into the military departments. 

4. Transfer to his office of the specific statutory 

functions of the Munitions Board, the Research 

and Development Board, and tbe Joint Chiefs. 

5. Provision Eor the Secretary of Defense to 

have effective managerial control over budget and 

fiscal affairs. 

Those changes can be fitted only into an active control philosophy. The fact that, in order 

to make the Joint Chiefs of Staff a more effective 

bod)·, he propusc.•d tlJC' nppointmcnt of a Chairman as the aulhoritnlive head of the Joint 

Chiefs docs not conflict with this conclus~v11. 

11orrcstal - like the llockcf cllcr Committee. 111 

1953 - had discovered that a managerial head 

wos necessary to make the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

function as a planning hotly. 

Jn one major respect, Forrestal did not follow 

bis theory to its logical conclusion. He did not 

seem to sense fuJly the tendency of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff to assume command functions 

at the expense of their planning duties. He did 

not suggest modification of the Key West Agreement to take aIJ command £unctions from the 

Joint Cl1icfs. That remained for the Rockefeller Committee and 1953. 

It is not necessary to trace the legislative history of the Forrestal proposals in the Senate and 

the House of Representatives. It is enough for 

our purpose to state ll1at the ultimate amendments were again a compromise in which no 

principle was followed to its conclusion. 

There was considerable acceptance of the active concept of civilian control. The authority 

of the Secretary of Defense was clarified and 

strengthened by certain statutory word changes. 

Jn addition, tlle Secretary was macle the princjpal assistant to the ·President in all matters relating to tbe Department of Defense. His staff 

was augmented by a Deputy Secretary and tluee 

Assistant Secretaries. The Secretaries of the military departments were deprived of their privilege 

of presenting recommendations to the President 

and the Budget over the 11ead of the Secretary 

of Defense, though they were given the right to 

present such recommendations to Congress. 

The Secretary was refused tl1e right to appoint 

civilian personnel outside bis immediate office. 

The authority and responsibilities of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, and the 

Research and Development Board were not 

vested in him. A nonvoting Chairman for lhe 

Joint Chiefs of Staff in much weaker form than 

reco1nmencled was authorized. The distinction 

between the Joint Chicf s of Staff as a free-wheeling command body and as nn advisory and plan- , 

ning body was never squarely faced. 

The Period 1949-19;1 

Despite the clarifying 1949 amendments, the 

focal points of executive ineffectiveness continued to be much the same as previously discerned by Secretary Forrestal. Except during 

the brief tenure of Secretory Johnson, who as-
REF ID:A72454 

sumed command and made it stick, t11e authority 

of the Secretary of Defense continued to be obstructed by endless challenge ancl argument, 

particularly from the military departments. 111e 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, even with the addition of a 

nonvoting Cliairman, remained primarily a corporate command body asserting authority superior in many fields to that of the Secretaries of 

tl1e military depa.rtn1e11ts; and secondarily a debating society for the airing of service views 

(instead of a vigorous strategic planning body) 

and a sort of staff organization for the Secretary 

of Defense which was overloaded with minor 

problems (for instance, expressing a "military 

opinion" as to how many coffee roasting pl.mts 

should be operated by the Army). 

One of the Joint Chiefs, in tcstif ying before 

the Rockefeller Committee, flatly rejected the 

idea that the Joint Chiefs of StaIT were planners; 

he insisted tl1at they were commanders who relegated planning to a lolver echelon. As the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff continued to concentrate on command functions, tl1e authority of the Secrettuy 

of Defense and also of the military Secretaries 

weakened. The Joint Chiefs went on to consolidate a line of military eommanJ circum\•enting 

all civilians below the level of the Secretary of 

Defense. Clearance ·with even the Secretary 

of Defense was casual and largely after-t11e-fact. 

The 1949 cure as modified by the practice under the Key West Agreement threatened to be 

almost as bad as the I 94 7 disease. 

Lovett Pr0110sals. As had Secretary Forrcstal, 

Secretary of Defense Lovett recommended legislation just as liis tenure emlccl. He felt that he 

liacl accomplished as 1nucl1 as possible administratively in building up tl1c authority of t11e 

chairmen of the statutory boards, and that the 

Secretary of Defense could 11ot continue unless 

his authority was clearly establisl1ed as supreme 

throughout the entire Department. He recommended a more specific legislative declaration to 

that cff ect and thus indicated that he too bad 

come to believe in the acti\'e concept of civilian 

control. 

Secretary Lovett was so disappointed with the 

neglect of strategic planning that he proposetl a 

ratber drastic reforlll for tl1e Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

He suggested a separate military staff for the 

Secretary of Defense. Under such an arrangement, be lelt, the Joint Chiefs would return to 

their primary statutory duty, i .. e., strategic planning. He did not, bowever, suggest removing 

Clumges foside the Pentagon 8 

the Joint Chiefs of Slaff from the command 

functions they had assumed. 

Rockefeller Committee - 1953 

The report of the Rockefeller Committee presented a consistent and logical plan of reorganization. Consistent with tbe adoption of the active concept of civilian control, it recommended 

a simple line of command running directly from 

the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the 

three military departments, and restriction of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the field of planning 

and advice. These fundamental principles were 

supplemented by recpmmendations as to methods and practices, most of which are outside the 

scope of an article on organizational principles. 

The President's approval of the Rockefeller 

Committee Report took the form of a Message 

to Congress ancl the presentation of Reqrganization Plan No. 6. The Committee Report, the 

l\Iessagc of the President, and Reorganization 

Plan No. 6 must be read together to appreciate 

fully the approved changes. Reorganization Plan 

No. 6 wns the n10st abbreviated of tl1ese document~ since it was limited to the few matters· 

which could not be accomplished without legislation. The President's Message was intended 

to approve t11e Committee Report in substance, 

and the fnct that the President did not specifi· 

cally mention each Committee recommendation 

bas no significance. 

Some important steps \Vere taken during the 

course of tbe Committee investigation. For instance, it was soon clear that no legislative • 

amendments were needed to strengthen the 

statutory provisions for the authority of the Secretary of Defense. Everything necessary had 

been done in 1949. It remained only to sweep 

a\vay tl1e an11oying challenges of that authority 

made from time to time by what Secretary Lovett 

characterized as "legal beavers." This \Vas accomplished by a .firm and unmistakably clear 

opinion of the Counsel for the Rockefeller Committee and General Counsel for the Department 

of Defensc.1 This opinion was approved by the 

President and the Secretary of Defense and was 

accepted by the military Sccretaria;. It was followed by unmistakably clear action by the Secretary of Defense. That opinion is now the basic 

law of tl1e Pentagon. 

1 TI1e author, now General Counsel for tl1e Department 

of Defense, \Vas at that time General Counsel for the 

Rockefeller Committee. - T11e Editors. 
REF ID:A72454 

q llnrrnrtl 1J11si11css Rei1ic111 

- I To enable the Secretary of Dcfonsc dTcclively 

and inldlig<.'ntly to supervise, coordinate, nnd 

contrul the cnUre Department, the statutory 

Bmmls with their complicated organi7.ations and 

numerous employees "'ere nbolishccl. 111cir 

f uncli<ms were \•este<l in tbe Secretary of Defense 

where, as staff functions, they should ahvays 

have been vested. 11tis req1tired legislative actio11 and is, t11ercforc, dealt witb in Reorganization Plan No. 6. 

Elimination of Boards 

TI1us, instead of boards with rigiclly defined 

responsibilities, a staff of six additional Secretaries and a General Counsel was given to the 

Secretary of Defense, making a total staff of ten 

men of the Assistant-Secretary rank. Contrary to 

'vluit has been frequently said, tl1e substitution 

of ten men of Assistant-Secretary rank for three 

Assistant Secretaries and tlvo statutory Boards 

is not a "swelling" of the staff of the Secretary 

of Defense. Ten is, of ceurse, a larger number 

tl1an five, but a statutory Board is not comparable on a unit basis with an individual Secretary. 

Considering the Munitions Board as a unit is 

reminiscent of the little boy's restrained request 

for only one Ch.ristmas present - a toy store. 

The replacement of the Munitions Board by 

an Assistant Secretary for Supply and Logistics 

has already resulted in the reduction of staff 

personnel in that area (exclush•e of the cataloguing activiti~) from 449 as of January 1953 

to 232 as of October 1953 - with a further reduction to 145 probably effective by the time 

this article is read. Furthem1ore, the withdrawal 

of the Secretary's staff from operations will permit the new Assistant Secretaries, with much 

smaller staffs below them, to supply the Secretary 

of Defense 'vith more adequate information on 

which to base his decisions than was ever supplied under the former, more complicated statutory Board structure. 

Lines of Authority 

The Secretaries of the military departments 

have not been submerged. They are not subject 

to orders from the Assistant Secretaries of Defense. They do not have to go through the Assistant Secretaries to reach the Secretary of Defense. The channels of communication are just 

as simple and direct ag the lines of authority: 

(I) The line of command runs directly from 

the Secretary of Defense through the Deputy Secretary to the individual Secretaries of the military 

<lerartn1ents. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense 

l1ave no command f nnctJons. 1'h'e Secretarie.i; of 

the military' deparbnents have direct and rr.;;.1,-

access to the Secretary of Defense. 

(2) Most important, the management commit· 

tee of the Deparbnent of Defense consists of the 

Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the three Secretaries of the military 

departments. These S~tarfes, known as the 

Joint Secretaries, meet frequently. Here is the focal 

point of management decision for the Deparbnent. 

The Assistant Secretaries of Defense do not even 

attend such meetings except by invitation. The intimacy between the Secretary of Defense and the 

Secretaries of the military deparbnents has been 

intensified. 

(3) Questions of broad policy are considered by 

the Secretary of Defense with the Armed Forees 

Polley Council created under Section 2. Io of the 

National Security Act, which Council consists of 

the Joint Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Again, the Assistant Secretaries of Defense are not 

members of the Armed Forces Policy Council and 

attend its meetings only by invitation. 

The additional Assistant Secretaries have simplified an extraordinarily complex chart of organization, have brought about a reduction in 

aggregate staff persqnnel, and have facilitated 

the delegation of operating authority to the Secretaries of the military departments. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense are not operators 

or commanders. Strange as it may seem, they 

are just exactly what they were int~nded to 

be - top-level staff assistants to the Secretary 

of Defense. 

The delegation of operational authority to the 

Secretaries of the military departments is inherent in the National Security Act and is emphasized in the Rockefeller Committee report.· 

Under the current organizational structure and 

the precepts of tbe present Administration, it 

\Vould take an internal revolution and earthquake combined to turn the tide again toward 

centralization. 

The thought that a single channel of command is cumbersome is absurd.1 It stems from 

the erroneous assuDJption that every channel of 

communication must follow meticulously the 

lines of seniority in command. That is neither 

necessary nor desirable. The power of decision 

has been, and will continue to be, deleg~ted to 

the operating people most fitted to decide. 111ere 

is no requirement, and there will be no requi~ 

. • Cf. Eugene S. Duf&eld, "Organizing fur Defense," HAR· 

VARD BUSINESS REvmw, September-October 1953, p. a~. 
REF ID:A72454 

Cizanges Inside the Pentagon 10 

tnent, that papers demanding action must pass Pmuer of Removal. , The Joint Staff consists -- through a multitude of bands, none of which has of 21 o officers - 70 from each service - to do 

the power or the desire to act. the necessary factual investigations and anal~ 

upon which the. Joint Chiefs will base their 

Joint Chiefs of Staff judgments. Members of the Joint Staff since 

Before discussing in any detail tbe increased 1949 have been ·appofntP.d by the rmaninious 

pmver of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of concurrence of all fozcr members of the Joint 

Staff, it is important to note that Congress, start- Chiefs of Staff, including the Chairman. That 

ing .in 1947, intended the Joint Chiefs of Staff condition remains absolutely unchanged. 1 

to be planners and not commanders.· Tbe Rocke- On the other hand, since previously all for" 

feller Committee in tum stated that "the Joint Joint Chiefs had to agree on removal - a most 

Chiefs of Staff were established as a planning cumbersome process - the power now delegated 

and advisory group, not to exercise command"; to the Chairman to remove a member of the 

and accordingly recommended that the Key Joint Staff for failure td do his work or because 

West Agreement "be revised to remove the com- of narrowness of vision does represent an innomand function from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in vation. Nevertheless,. the fear that the Chairman 

order to enable them to work more effectively as may mold tbe Joint Staff to his own way of thinka unified planning agency." ing simply by the power of removal assumes 

That revision has been effected. It has gen- that he wilJ be permitted by the President and 

erally escaped public notice because it required the Secretary of Defense to remove all members 

no statutory change. It is the final coup de of the Joint Staff except his adherents qnd then 

grace to the fear about a single mflitary com- somehow prevent the appointment of any sucmander. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is ccsS'Ors except those of bis particular choosing. 

thereby limited to planning along with the Such fantastic procedure is perhaps possible, but 

other Joint Chiefs. If the Joint Chiefs do not it hardly is either realistic Of likely. It would recommend, then no one by controlling them can quire not only a su'pine President and a somnoseize command. He who seizes planning seizes lent Secretary of Defense but also much more· 

a headache. tractable military chiefs than this nation has 

Thus, the expansion of the authority of the ever seen. 

Chairman of tbe Joint Chiefs of Staff is limited 

to planning and is directed solely to expediting Manage11tent of Joint Steff. The provision for 

and making more efficient and thorough the management of the Joint Staff by the Chairman 

planning activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff \Vas inserted solely to make certain that the 

and the subordinate planning group, the Joint Joint Staff completed intelligently and thorStafF. The Chairman was not given any vote oughly the studies and analyses assigned to it. 

in the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs. He is This provision has no otlJer significance and cannot able - even if he bas the inclination - to not be twisted into any other meaning. Someone 

control either the decisions or the deliberations must see to it that the Joint Staff does its "homeof the Joint Chiefs. Although under the statute work" on schedule and well; the word "manage" 

tl1e Chairman is responsible for providing an was selectt>d as the most descriptive single word 

agenda for the n1eetings of the Joint Chiefs to express the intended meaning. If there is 

of Staff, it requires a completely undisciplined any vagueness in the \'Vord, the true ·intent is 

imagination to conjure up the spectre of a vote- made completely definite by the Committee reless Chairman deciding, contrary to tbe votes of port, by the questions and answers in Congress, 

the other Joint Chiefs, what Is to be placed on and by the established practices. 

the agenda and what is not to be placed on the Whether tl1e assignment to the Chairman of 

agenda. these day-to-day administrative duties with reUnder Reorganization Plan No. 6, the ChaJr- spect to the Joint Staff represents a trend toward 

man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was- given only an all-po,verful single military commander is a 

two powers which he did not previously possess matter of opinion or, perhaps more accurately, 

- (a) the right to cause the removal of mem· n matter of clairvoyance. Undoubtedly Secretary 

bcrs of the Joint Staff, and (b) the power to Root would ha\•e resented bitterly the suggestion 

"manage" tl1e Joint Staff and the Director of the that his creation of a Chief of Staff of the Army 

Joint Staff. . ~\reuld lead to passive civilian control and a single 
.. A ... 

REF ID:A72454 

· 11,.. llarrard B11si11ess Re11ie111 

./ 

mlJitary administrative commander for that deportment - an<l yet that is exactly what happened. On the other hand, some of tbe most 

likely fears bave never materialized. 

No one can guarantee what will happen, but 

the odds are heavy against tl1e emergence of a 

single military commander in the United States. 

The Germanic acceptance of obedience as a relief from the responsibility of decision Is alien 

to our national character. Furthermore, the 

danger of a trend toward a single military commander is counterbalanced by the removal of 

the Joint Chiefs from any command function. 

As a matter of fact, the failure of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff to perform their planning duties 

and the way they were turning more and more 

to command was much more of a step in that 

dangerous direction. The restoration of active 

civilian control and the express exclusion of the 

Joint Chiefs of Sta.ff from the line of command 

ended that tendency. 

The increased managerial duties of the Chairman, therefore, do not signify any trend except 

toward increased efficiency of t11e Joint Staff. 

As long as the Department management committee - the Joint Secretaries - is civilian, any 

service military chief sensing the slightest move 

of the Chairman to try to gain control of either 

the thinking or the factual investigations of the 

Joint Staff has a ready civilian avenue of complaint. Knowing the characters of our Joint 

Chiefs, we can be sure they \Viii not hesitate to 

use it. As a matter of fact, the trend a\vay from 

a single military commander, like the trend away 

from centralization, Is both clear and irresistible. 

Conclusion 

The tendency toward centralization in the Department of Defense has been ended. Decentralization is today's reality. Before any reverse 

trend can be started, some very fundamental 

concepts - for the first time clearly identified 

- will have to be faced and a contrary selection 

openly made. Even if that unexpected event 

should occur, the changes would be made consciously, instead of unconsciously as they were 

in the past. 

One \Vora of caution is necessary. Decen~ 

tralization will not be effective unless the mill· 

tary departments in all their echelons are organized to accept the operating responsibilities delegated to them. In order to delegate, there must 

be available an effective recipient of such delegation. Some of the blame for operations haying 

crept into the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

in the past can be laid at the door of the military departments. They have not always been 

anxious to operate. Vacuums are filled - in 

nature and in the Pentagon. Steps are nmv un· 

. der way to reconstitute the military departments 

to discharge their delegated responsibilities and 

powers, consistent with the basic philosophy outlined above. · 

Furthermore; as Secretary ForrestaJ frequently 

said, "Organizational charts do not do the work 

- \Vork requires men." No chart can be prepared which cannot be ruined by weak or stupid 

executives. The concept of active civilian control will not succeed under Secretaries who desire to be passive or who have no capacity for 

sound decision. Shifting responsibility to the 

military hierarchy would provide no guaranteed 

remedy for the unsuitable civilian; it would be 

merely an exchange of risks. There can also be 

weak and unsuitable military chiefs. Furthermore, while proficiency in specialized skills Is 

stfll an Important prerequisite for top military 

command, it is not the most important •attribute 

of a strong and effective top executive. 

The risks can be lessened only by the appointment of suitable top executives - military and 

civilian. The present organizational setup makes 

it possible for the government, for the first time, 

to offer positions of prestige and effectiveness to' 

leaders in industry, labor, and the professions. 

It should result In an increased infusion of the 

needed skills - special and general alike - at 

levels of importance. The contributions of these 

men can now be made not only \Vith a minimum 

of frustration but also with a reasonable chance 

for substantial accomplishment. 

Reprinted from HARV.Alm B113IIESS REVIEW 

by permission of the publisher. 

Januaey-Februa:ey 1954, Vol. 321 Bo. 1