This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A16-0767

In the Matter of the Welfare of the 

Child of: J. L. H. and A. T. S., Parents.

Filed November 21, 2016

Affirmed

Jesson, Judge

Carver County District Court

File No. 10-JV-15-510

Jody Winters, Glencoe, Minnesota (for appellant-mother)

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Martha Mattheis, Assistant County Attorney, 

Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent Carver County Health and Human Services)

Joan Miller, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent-father)

Charles Jones, Chaska, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and Jesson, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

JESSON, Judge

Appellant J.L.H. argues that the record does not support the district court’s order 

terminating her parental rights based on three different grounds. Because clear and 

convincing evidence supports the district court’s termination of her parental rights on the 
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statutory ground that she failed to satisfy the duties of the parent-child relationship and the 

child’s best interests support termination, we affirm. 

FACTS

K.C.S., the child who is the subject of these proceedings, was born to J.L.H. in 

March 2007. In April 2009, an altercation occurred between the child’s parents. 

Responding police and a social worker found their home to be filthy, with animal and 

possibly human feces on the floor, and so cluttered it was difficult to get into any bedroom. 

The child had on only a shirt and had a piece of her own feces stuck to her foot. J.L.H. 

appeared to be under the influence of some substance, as she had slow speech and was not 

finishing sentences. J.L.H. had previously overdosed on medication, and a social worker 

believed that she was overmedicated. J.L.H. also swore and was argumentative, blaming 

the child’s father for the situation. 

Carver County Health and Human Services removed the child from the home and 

placed the child in relative foster care. The county filed a child-in-need-of protection-orservices (CHIPS) petition, and a determination of maltreatment was made. In September 

2009, the parents regained custody of the child.

The CHIPS file was closed in the district court in June 2010, but the county 

continued offering services to the parents, including assigning a case worker; establishing 

a crisis response when J.L.H. was overmedicated; coordinating her treatment goals; 

prescribing medication; and providing individual therapy. A guardian ad litem also 

continued working on the case. In August 2010, the county investigated a report of 

dangerous conditions in J.L.H.’s home. Responding police found a sixteen-year-old male, 
3

a friend of J.L.H.’s teenaged son, passed out in an oversized fish tank; illegal drugs in a 

location accessible to the three-year-old child; a number of empty pill bottles; rotten, moldy 

food; and an insect infestation. J.L.H. returned home appearing intoxicated and wished to 

drive with the child in the car, but she was prevented from doing so. A maltreatment 

determination was made against her. 

In June 2011, the county investigated a report that the child was often seen outside 

the home unsupervised and alone. A social worker and a police officer interviewed J.L.H. 

about the allegations. J.L.H.’s speech was barely understandable, she stated that people 

were stealing her drugs, and her home was in disarray. Officials were concerned that she 

was abusing prescription medication or other drugs and placing the child at risk. The 

county concluded that J.L.H. had maltreated the child. 

The parents divorced in 2011, and the district court granted J.L.H. custody, with the 

child’s father granted supervised visitation. In March 2012, J.L.H.’s mother went to check 

on her daughter and found her asleep on the couch. The child had been unable to wake 

J.L.H. J.L.H. was taken to a detox facility, and a social worker believed that she was 

overmedicated and addicted to morphine. Another maltreatment determination was made. 

The county also initiated a civil commitment proceeding, which resulted in J.L.H.’s civil 

commitment as mentally ill and chemically dependent. The father obtained custody of the 

child on the belief that he could then best care for the child. In fall 2013, J.L.H. sought a 

change of custody in family court, and the parents agreed to joint legal and physical 

custody, with the child alternating weeks at her parents’ homes. 
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In spring 2014, the county received a number of child-protection reports, including 

that J.L.H. had been seen inebriated at the child’s school, that the child had been sexually 

abused by her father, and that the child showed attention-seeking behaviors at school, 

including some with possible sexual themes. J.L.H. reported the suspected sexual abuse to 

several mandated reporters, urging them to contact social services. In March 2014, the 

county opened a child-protection investigation to determine whether the child had been 

sexually abused or exposed to pornographic materials, but did not find maltreatment. The 

county attempted a safety networking meeting, but the meeting was contentious, and it 

appeared that the child’s behavior resulted from anxiety caused by her parents’ conflicts. 

After the filing of a new CHIPS petition in May 2014, the district court granted temporary 

custody to the child’s father and parenting time to J.L.H.1

In September 2014, the county received information that J.L.H. had made a 

recording of the child alleging that her father had sexually abused her. At a child-protection 

interview, the child made no disclosure of sexual abuse, and a nurse who was present 

believed from the recorded interview that J.L.H.’s questioning of the child was unreliably 

suggestive. Criminal charges were never filed against the child’s father. The county 

instead determined that J.L.H. had committed neglect and emotional harm by asking the 

 

1 Although not material to our analysis, we note that the record is unclear as to whether the 

child’s father was granted temporary sole legal and physical custody, or only temporary 

sole physical custody. Compare Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd 3 (2014) (in dissolution 

actions, defining custody, including “legal custody” and “physical custody and residence”) 

with Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 22 (2014) (in child-protection actions, defining “legal 

custody,” but not physical custody). 
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child multiple times about alleged sexual abuse, using leading questions, and that her 

behavior had a substantial negative impact on the child. 

In October 2014, police executed a search warrant at J.L.H.’s home. The home 

smelled of cat urine and feces, with piles of dirty clothes, dishes piled in the sink, moldy 

dishes in the dishwasher, and moldy food in the refrigerator. Police found a large number 

of pill bottles, as well as crushed pills and foil that had been burned and likely used to 

smoke the pills. Beginning in October 2014, the county required supervised parentingtime between J.L.H. and the child. 

In November 2014, both parents participated in a parenting assessment by 

Dr. George Petrangelo. He opined that J.L.H. exaggerated to such an extreme that he had 

trouble making an accurate diagnostic profile. According to him, J.L.H. had mental health 

issues including borderline personality disorder, opioid dependency/polysubstance abuse, 

PTSD, generalized anxiety disorder, and major depressive disorder and paranoid 

schizotypical avoidant personality traits. Dr. Petrangelo believed that J.L.H. had a bond 

with the child, but that she was preoccupied with her mental illness and consumed by anger, 

which affected her ability to focus effectively on parenting. 

In 2014, the county also retained Dr. Susan Phipps-Yonas, a psychologist, as a case 

consultant. She testified that the child, who has special needs, requires a parent who 

provides consistent parenting, sets appropriate boundaries, and follows through with 

assisting professionals. Phipps-Yonas described J.L.H. as a non-responsive parent and 

stated that no progress was being made in the supervised visits, and there were no 

indications that J.L.H. would ever be able to parent the child or have unsupervised visits. 
6

She believed that J.L.H.’s holding out hope to the child of reunification exposed the child 

to “ambiguous loss,” which occurs when a parent is physically but not psychologically 

present, and which may be more damaging than a child losing a parent and then moving 

on. 

J.L.H.’s therapist, Connie Gibson, did not see symptoms of psychosis in J.L.H. and 

indicated that J.L.H. had made changes, but she continued to have difficulty managing her 

emotions. Gibson also testified that she believed that dialectical-behavioral therapy (DBT), 

a skills-based therapy that focuses on issues of borderline personality disorder, would be 

appropriate for J.L.H., but that J.L.H. was unable to complete the DBT modules in 2014 

due to a lack of attendance, and Gibson had no evidence that J.L.H. would have better 

attendance in the future. 

In May 2015, the county filed a petition to transfer legal and physical custody of the 

child to the father. In June 2015, police responded to J.L.H.’s home after she reported that 

officers were executing a search warrant. She pointed to a chair in which she said an officer 

was sitting, but there was nobody in the chair; police determined that no search warrant 

existed. They believed J.L.H. was under the influence of drugs and transported her to the 

hospital, where she was placed on a 72-hour hold. Drug testing for other than her 

prescribed medication, Suboxone, was negative.2 A psychiatric nurse practitioner 

diagnosed her with borderline PTSD, major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety 

 

2 Suboxone is a pain medication that is also used for opiate dependency. 
7

disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. J.L.H. declined a referral to the county for 

mental health services. 

In August 2015, J.L.H.’s supervised parenting time was temporarily suspended after 

she lost emotional control during a parenting-time session and berated a parenting-time 

supervisor and left angry messages for her. In October, J.L.H. was accompanied to a court 

hearing by a suspended attorney who was known to law enforcement to be involved in the 

disappearance of at least two Minnesota children during child-custody cases. The county 

changed the parenting time to a more secure location, and professionals involved in the 

case expressed concern for the child’s safety going forward. 

In October, the county withdrew the petition to transfer legal custody, and in 

November, it filed a petition to terminate appellant’s parental rights.3 J.L.H. entered a 

denial to the petition. In January 2016, a pain-management clinic discharged her for 

violating her pain-management opioid agreement by attempting to crush her pill and take 

it in a different form than prescribed. 

The district court held a fourteen-day trial in January and February 2016 and issued 

an order terminating J.L.H.’s parental rights. The district court found that the county had 

made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with J.L.H. It found that the county had met 

its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that three grounds existed for 

terminating J.L.H.’s parental rights: (1) she had failed to satisfy the duties of the parent-

 

3 The child’s guardian ad litem testified that, although he was concerned when the 

suspended attorney came to court with J.L.H., that attorney’s presence was not 

determinative in the county’s decision to recommend terminating parental rights. 
8

child relationship; (2) she is a palpably unfit parent; and (3) the county’s reasonable efforts 

had failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s out-of-home placement. See 

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5) (2014). It also found that it is in the child’s 

best interests to terminate parental rights. See id., subd. 7.4 J.L.H. appeals. 

D E C I S I O N 

A district court may terminate parental rights if clear and convincing evidence 

establishes at least one statutory ground for termination and if termination is in the child’s 

best interests. In re Welfare of Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004). On 

appeal, this court reviews the district court’s findings of fact for clear error. In re Welfare 

of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). “A finding is clearly erroneous 

if it is either manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported 

by the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660–61 

(Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). But this court reviews the ultimate determination that 

the findings fit the statutory criteria for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Children 

of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). 

The district court terminated J.L.H.’s parental rights on three grounds. But we need 

only address the sufficiency of one of those grounds to terminate parental rights. See R.W.,

678 N.W.2d at 55 (stating that only one ground must be proved for the district court to 

order termination). 

 

4 The district court found that, historically, the child’s father had abused chemicals and 

been violent and uncooperative, but that he had taken advantage of services and made 

significant and lasting changes in himself and his ability to parent the child, so that he was 

currently a more appropriate parent than J.L.H., who had failed to make changes over time. 
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I. Clear and convincing evidence supports the district court’s termination of 

parental rights on the ground that J.L.H. substantially neglected to comply 

with the duties of the parent-child relationship. 

The district court determined that J.L.H. neglected the duties of the parent-child 

relationship. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). A district court may terminate 

parental rights under this section if it finds that “the parent has substantially, continuously, 

or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed . . . by the parent and 

child relationship.” Id. Those duties include providing food, clothing and shelter, and 

education, as well as additional “care and control necessary for the child’s physical, mental, 

or emotional health and development.” Id. To grant a petition for termination on this 

ground, the district court must find that, at the time of termination, the parent is not 

“presently able and willing to assume [her] responsibilities” and that the parent’s neglect 

of these duties “will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.” In re Welfare of J.K.,

374 N.W.2d 463, 466–67 (Minn. App. 1985) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. 

Nov. 25, 1985). 

J.L.H. argues that she has proved that she is able to provide food and other care 

necessary for the child’s physical and emotional health. She argues that before 2014, the 

county did not deem any issues significant enough to recommend a transfer of legal custody 

or a termination of her parental rights. But J.L.H. had at least four determinations of neglect 

or maltreatment issued against her when the child was in her care. Further, when 

addressing the issue of termination of parental rights, the district court’s primary focus is 

on “the projected permanency of the parent’s inability to care for his or her child.” In re 

Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d at 893 (Minn. 1996) (quotation omitted). Therefore, the 
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district court was required to examine more recent conditions and J.L.H.’s ability going 

forward to care for the child. 

Cindy Finch, a child protection worker assigned to the case in 2014, testified that 

she was concerned for the child’s reunification in a safe environment with J.L.H. because 

she had been misusing Suboxone by smoking it, which could cause sleepiness and 

inattentiveness to a child. Police responding to J.L.H.’s home in 2015 observed that she 

appeared to be hallucinating. Charles Jones, the child’s guardian ad litem, testified that 

when the child lived primarily with J.L.H., issues arose relating to a filthy home, neglect, 

and school attendance and homework. Jones also believed that her behavior at times 

reflected an overuse of medication, that she had an impaired ability to properly supervise 

or meet the child’s needs, and that she had been unable to sustain any changes that she had 

made. He testified that, although J.L.H. loves the child, he was concerned about her ability 

to parent in the foreseeable future. 

J.L.H. argues that she has been attempting to address the issue of her own mental 

health, and she notes that termination of parental rights cannot be based solely on a parent’s 

mental illness. S.Z., 547 N.W.2d at 892. But the district court may terminate parental 

rights if a parent’s mental illness is likely to lead to a child’s harm. T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 

661-62. Petrangelo reported that J.L.H. exaggerated her symptoms, was preoccupied with 

her own illness, and had an agenda to blame the child’s father, which made her struggle to 

focus on the child’s needs. J.L.H. argues that her therapist, Connie Gibson, ruled out some 

of Petrangelo’s mental-health diagnoses. But although Gibson testified that she did not see 

symptoms of psychosis in J.L.H., she noted that J.L.H. continued to have difficulty 
11

managing her emotions and that she had been unable or unwilling to engage in 

recommended dialectical behavioral therapy. 

J.L.H. argues that the report of Deena McMahon, a therapist who conducted an 

attachment assessment, conflicted with the reports of other professionals about the strength 

of her attachment to the child. The district court has the responsibility to weigh witness 

credibility, In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992), and the district 

court’s giving more weight to certain testimony does not mean that its findings lack 

evidentiary support and must be reversed. Id. Rather, we defer to the district court’s 

credibility determinations. In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 90 (Minn. 

App. 2012). McMahon testified that she observed J.L.H. acting in a way inconsistent with 

the child’s needs by failing to set limits or provide emotional or physical structure or limit 

setting for the child. She believed that J.L.H. had a poor prognosis for healthy attachment 

based on J.L.H.’s perception of the situation, which amounted to paranoia, considering 

only her own needs and blaming other people. This assessment was also consistent with 

the opinion of Phipps-Yonas, who reported that J.L.H. had made psychologically harmful 

statements to the child, which were anxiety-producing and confusing. Phipps-Yonas stated 

that J.L.H. was a non-responsive parent, that she was not making progress in the supervised 

visits, and that she did not display indications that she would ever be able to parent the 

child or have unsupervised visits. 

Based on this record, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the 

district court’s determination that J.L.H. neglected the duties of the parent-child 

relationship, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by terminating J.L.H.’s rights 
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on that ground under section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(2). See In re Welfare of Children 

of K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d 656, 663-68 (Minn. App. 2012) (affirming termination of parental 

rights of mother who, despite education, instruction, and other services, could not 

adequately parent her children). 

Because at least one statutory ground for terminating parental rights is supported by 

clear and convincing evidence, we need not address the district court’s additional bases for 

terminating J.L.H.’s parental rights. We note, however, that much of the same evidence 

that supports termination under section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(2), also supports 

termination under section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(5), the failure of reasonable efforts 

to correct the conditions leading to the out-of-home placement. J.L.H. does not argue that 

the county failed to provide reasonable efforts to reunify her with the child. Rather, she 

argues that following those efforts, the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement 

have been corrected. As discussed above, however, J.L.H.’s participation in countyprovided services has not significantly improved her ability to parent, and the conditions 

that led to the out-of-home placement still exist. 

II. The record supports the district court’s determination that termination 

is in the child’s best interests. 

Even if a statutory ground for termination exists, before terminating parental rights, 

the district court must still find that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of 

the child. In re Children of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2005). In determining 

the child’s best interests, the district court must analyze: (1) the child’s interest in 

preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-
13

child relationship; and (3) any competing interests of the child. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 

39.05, subd. 3(b)(5); R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d at 4. “Competing interests include such things 

as a stable environment, health considerations and the child’s preferences.” R.T.B., 492 

N.W.2d at 4. “Where the interests of parent and child conflict, the interests of the child are 

paramount.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7. We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard 

of review to a district court’s finding that termination is in a child’s best interests. J.R.B.,

805 N.W.2d at 905; In re Welfare of Children of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 95 (Minn. App. 

2008). 

J.L.H. argues that the district court’s order does not support its best-interests 

determination and does not reflect that it explained the child’s interests or adequately 

weighed competing interests. An order terminating parental rights must explain the court’s 

rationale for concluding why termination is in the children’s best interests. In re Tanghe,

672 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. App. 2003). But we have held that a district court’s findings 

may provide adequate support for termination even when those findings are not greatly 

detailed. See In re Welfare of Child of W.L.P., 678 N.W.2d 703, 711 (Minn. App. 2004). 

The district court found that, despite the love that J.L.H. has for the child and her 

best intentions, she does not have the capacity to act in the child’s best interests, and that 

termination of J.L.H.’s parental rights is the only “reasonable option in order to protect [the 

child] from further harm and mental injury.” The district court found that the child “needs 

safety, security, and stability,” she “has been exposed to trauma her entire life,” and she 

“cannot continue to heal from that trauma without permanent removal from her mother and 

knowing that her father’s home is her forever home.” Although the district court could 
14

have made more detailed findings expressly linking its best-interests determination to the 

record, its order contains sufficient findings reflecting consideration of that factor. And 

the record amply supports the district court’s finding that the child’s competing interest in 

stability favors termination of J.L.H.’s parental rights. J.L.H. has expressed a sincere wish 

to parent the child, but the child has special needs, and an environment with more structure 

and support benefits her short-term and long-term needs of stability. Further, because the 

child has been exposed to adverse experiences throughout her childhood, it is very 

important that she finally has a permanent home. The district court did not abuse its 

discretion by determining that the best interests of the child would be served by terminating 

J.L.H.’s parental rights. 

Affirmed.