/ 

/ 

II 

. .. • ~.-•'I.' -- -.? .._ '-..· ~ 

·~·~~NO,:,: . ·-.·~ .'~~{~~\;f""i<--:~~-~-1 ~U~JE_C~. ~- ,,, 

r Plan 

\ ~ .. ~-- ' :~ '•1 ~·:­ _ ... ~;i: 

TO ~- ·· >' ·· · · FROM ' D : f:~;·~~~~;:~;, •• 'i~ •• • TD3/0 . , ' ' u~~:!J~~:~~f r.••.1 · . \·.1.a ·:A-TecbnSe&l 'Mana&eztient Bos%d Workia& Group, ~f .. vbicb I am Cba1J,'uan1 bf.,,e 

40veloM¢ ·a ~84. )U.11tary Cryptologic Ce.reeT ~- tor event~· dieseCd.natic!fl 

to tbe · sem.e~ .'&8 f,111Dtmui atar.dal'dD to be observed 1n developing tlieir ooo. 1,n., . . -di~ c~r pl&na'·for their cmtologlc· coawoneutC!.•. 1!ie tina.l _report is ni'M_ 

beiag~ rolited v.lthtn ·.the four c~olcsie organizations by ea.ch member or the. 

~or,klng (troup· tor. Ml coordination and signature. · 

• ·. « : 2/:·fte:~~ -_oft~ D/r ·1a to obtd.n er. e1m1lar tUu coo~nat1on of'. tne _ re,.On -~thin ~A;.:- Representatives ot the· operating offices and ot&tt -compone:tto 

•.tb!.ch b~ve prl.mar)' il)teNat in tbe ·subject m~tter of the report either served fi..s 

lee•ri1 Cf' the· '.lor~1ng Group or of'f'ered technical advice to the Group,, It ie ~ .. 

q\tJ!Stcd;' theretm, that to expedite coordination, addre8seeo confine their C0!'1• 

muts to the :tinctior.a.l areas or their asa1gned responsibilities. 

3.. In smimary, it ia requested t.hat 'the f~llwing be submitted to tb? ::>:::cutive Secretary, TfS 'Jerking Group ?lo. 20 (noom 19·334 1 Naval Secw.-ity Station) & ~tl!n:uz J;25?i · 

, Statement of c~currence in the report or, if any non-concurrer.;t:a 1 e. 

tlei'1nit1on of tbe rscOt"mer:lded non-co~urrence and an explanation of' .. thi! baste · t~ such non-concurrence. 

4~ '.r~ D/F ,Jt.9:1 be decl.8.ssifled ~n removal of the 1nclos~. "-.; 

~.· . . . 

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'l'Oa fJCS/O 

REF ID:A40564 

' .. 

&ubJa M1l1tary ei,-ptologic C&re~;r flan 

fftOMt 8/ A J.7 J'eb 55 Comment lo. 

60Jl.t)3/cau 

Con<n.t~· l hope tho plan Vill be placed into eftect without delay. 
T 

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REF ID:A40564 

e 

CONFIDENTIAL 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

REPORT 

FROM 

WORKING GROUP 

FOR 

TMB PROJECT NO. 20 

~ ll l\.lllrc.\OOi 

C ftai [;) V© l\aCQ)@ll CC: ~ c.\ 00 ~ m 00 rr> ILC-\ 00 

*** 

CONFIDENTIAL 
31 Janu"'Lry 1955 

REF ID:A40564 

REPORT BY THE WORKING GROUP 

FOR 

TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT BOARD PROJECT NUMBER 20 

DEVELOPMENT OF A GUIDE FOR SERVICE CRYPTOLOGIC CAREER PLANl~ING 

THE PROBLEM 

1. To develop a framework within which individual Service cryptologic 

career plans can be developed, so that these atructurea will be baaed on 

common technical fundamentals. 

FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 

2. The approach ot the Working Group was to determine: firat, present 

atatus of all aspects of career planning; secondly, the status that should 

exist within one yearJ and. finally, action necessaey in order to achieve the 

desired condition. While the desirability ot completely documenting all data 

pertaining to this project was recognized, practical considerations -- especially from the reader's viewpoint •• precluded inclusion of all but directly 

pertinent data in this report. Additional :tactual background de.ta is available in the project file. 

3. Th.e Department of Defense, the individual SerY":l.ces, and the cryptologic components within each SerV"ice have conducted studies conaernins the 

morale, personnel relations, and welfare factors which attect Service careers. 

The Working Group has taken cognizance, in particular, of the study by the 

ad-hoc committees established by the 6969th Air Force Support Squadron tor 

the study of and submission of recommendations pertaining to the Womble Re• 

port. Inasmuch as exhaustive studies are nearing completion and :l.n some in• 

stances, legislative recommendations are pending in regard to the morale 

aspects ot career planning, which are not peculiar to the cryptologic agenaiea, 

such aspects are not coil3idered to be within the study scope of this Working 

Group. 

4. Since technological changes and innovations also affect career plan• 

ning, the Working Group queried the member agencies in regard to any new plans 

which, ~ithin the next three years, would affect cryptologic operational 

l 

C()NFIDENTIAL 
REF ID:A40564 

- -W}NFIBENTIJ\lt 

procedures or practices and have an effect on career planning It was determined 

that consideration must be give11 to the changing trends in foreign communications, 

the increasing emphasis in regard to decentralization of the u. s. Cryptologic 

effort resulting in an increasing delegation by NBA of additional tasks to the 

Service cryptologic organizations, and the introduction of new operating techniques and more complex and sophisticated equipments. Such anticipated technolog• 

ical changes must be reflected in career specialization, especially as they reault in additional requirements for highly skilled Service personnel. As an example, the term "Direction-Finding" was utilized not only in its conventional 

lense but also to include contemplated technological advances, such as other 

methods of fixing the position of a radio transmitter than by measuring the azi• 

muth ot a received signal. 

6. As a result of the member agencies being requested to comment in regard 

' 

to any present operational problems which can be attributed to inadequacies in 

c&reer plans, it was ascertained that generally the quality of the intercepted 

rav traffic, as well as the analytic processes, is deficient as a result of the 

lack of proficiency on the part of the Services' cryptologic personnel. This 

lack of technical proficiency results, to a large extent, from the lack of 

trained. specialists which, in turn, is a result of a low-reenlistment rate. In 

addition to the problems which are common to all components of the milita17 in 

;ret&itting persons tor a military career, the cryptologic components of the military aeem. to lack one or more of the following: 

a. An incentive for Service personnel to continue in cryptologic 

duties. This could be developed in part by a clear-cut career 

plan which would furnish guidance in respect to career opportun1 tiea and pin-point long-range training requirements. 

b. A suitable means f'or profitable utilization by the cryptologic 

servicesin ZI billets ot more 0than a small number of cryptologic 

personnel returning from overseas assignments. 

a. A completely suitable system for not only' identifying persons, who 

through training or experience have acquired cryptologic skills, 

but also tor identifying what those skills are. 

7. In considering factors peculiar to the cryptologic agencies, a basic 

premise followed by the Working Group was that the parent Services will best 

support their cryptologic components when the policies and procedures of the 

Senicea• cryptologic organizations are closely related to the policies and 

2 

CONFIDENTIAL 
REF ID:A'l0564 

CO~·P'IBP!If UAL" 

procedures of the parent Services. It was tlle belief that the cryptologic organizations should differ from the norm only when the norm seriously impairs 

cryptologic operations. 

8. Following the project scope, prior to detailed study of the problem, 

the Working Group after consultation with seqior NSA officials from COM:JEC and 

PROD, agreed to include in the study specialists in the cryptologic organizations who are engaged in COM3EC and maintenance functions. Accordingly, this 

report and related documents re.fer to "cryptologic career planning" rather than 

"COMINT career planning". The inclusion of these two areas was considered de· 

airable because all of the cryptologic agencies generally have cognizance over 

them as well as over COMINT. 

9. Tbe Working Group considered both peace time and mobilization requirements. It is noted that by their na.tur"'e, the cryptologic organizations are in 

peace time actually operating under conditions similar to those encountered in 

war time. The Working Group considered whether to be.se cryptologic career 

planning on peace-time conditions, making provisions tor necessary changes in 

event ot mobilization, or on ware.time conditions, with modifications applicable 

to peace-time conditions only, which could easily be dropped without disrupting 

the career complex, du~ing war time. The Group decided that the second approach 

was the only sound one, for several reasons, most significant of which were twos 

a. There is no time of "peace" insofar as cryptologic work is concerned; a state of war always exists, and therefore the cryptologic organization is always mobilized (though not at mobilization 

strength), and carrying out real operations against a!!!! opponent, 

for business reasons, and not just for training. 

b. Now and for the foreseeable future the majority of personnel being utilized in cryptologic work are and will be non-career, 

short-term personnel, who are in the military only for their 

period of obligated service. 

Unner war-~ime cond1T.1ons, the influx of a large number of non-career mil1~ary 

personnel who usually are in for the duration only, and the over-riding urgency 

that they become operationally effectiye with the minimum training, dictates that 

&ily,sound cryptologic career plan be suitable tor the inclusion ot such non-career 

personnel. 

10. The present policies and procedures governing applicable phases ot 

1~raonnel and training in the member agencies were reviewed, the most significant 

3 

<JONFIDENTIAL 
REF ID:A40564 

--«lNFIDEN'fIJ\a 

items are as follows 

a. Each ~enbcr organization utilizeo a classiflaation system for 

identifying their occupational skill specialties. At the present 

time, those systems ditt'er in mo.jor respects. The A"r'Jq Security 

Agency has recently developed Els a part ot the Army militaey 

occupational specialty system a comprehensive structure tor the 

cryptologic specialties. The Naval Security Group continues to 

utilize a system which is related to the parent Service_ only by 

broad categories tor example, the rating of' Communication Technician (CT) f'or enl:I sted personnel, which is broken down internally 

within the Naval Security Group by specialized categories and 

skill codes. The Air Force Security Serri.oe utilizes specialties 

found in several USAF career fields, without aDY' further identification f'or internal USAFSS purposes. Within NSA, there is 

currently underway an Occupational Arlalysis Program which will 

identif'y' the militaey billetn within NSA by the specialties and 

the skill level developed by this Working Group and therefore 

will be of' material assistance in planning ZI rotational assisnments for Service personnel. 

b. Promotion systems for enlisted personnel 41f'ter between Services 

ranging from a system ot Service-wide competitive examinations 

to a system which results in promotions without specified obJective examinations being required. 

a. The reenlistment rates ot the Services' cryptoloe;ic organizations 

appear to follow the rPenlistment trend of each parent Service, 

'Which without exception is relatively low being from l~ to 3~ 

when considering all reenlistments and even lower when considering only first enlistment personnel Lacking a uniform statistical base, the Wcr king Group was unable to obtain specific, 

valid overall statistics in this regard. 

d. Rotation policies differ between the three cryptologic services. 

Where a servico policy requires that lo.r8e numbe~s of first enliotM~nt c.ryntoloaic pp~a~n~cl be stationed in the ZI, many 

cc'llI'licntir~ rnctoro aro introcluccn~ 

e. Altrourrh a.ct1v-- nrnf"lr> ~ for ttoininrt cryntolc-,::ic J.".-.rsonnel are 

CONFIDENrrIA~ 
REF ID:A40564 

cn"Ptolo@'ic functiona and do not appear to l1e cnordin11.ted with 

asaignmcnt 1 roto.t.ioMl, an<.l grt\rle advancPmcnt proccd .;r ~3 intn 

workable career devclop~ent plnns. 

f. '.i'hc reserve prog1 nms contR in pronounced di vergenceo. In view 

of pending le~ialation which m:f.ght change materially the n11tion11l 

• Reserve concept, these prognma were not studied by tho Working 

Group. 

11. The personal security requirements and clearance procedures vlthin the 

cryptologic organizations do not ma.teiially affect career Flann1ng. 

DISCUSSION 

12. The purpose of this Workins; Group was to develop a general cryptologic 

carPer plan that would serve as a guide to the cryptologic service agencies in 

building career structures on some common foundation. Since operational differences and variations in structure of the cryptologic service agencies arP major 

fa~tors affecting a study in this field, guide.nee, it was believed, must be 

broa.d and sufficiently flexible to meet the special situations in tho Services. 

A possibility ot th1-ee general patterns of career specialization was discussed; 

1.e., extreme specialization, ne.ximum amount of diversification, and a compromise 

between these two extremes. Each possible choice was found to be inf'luenced by 

varying factors such as rotation policies of the parent Services, promotion requirements, technological and operating developments, and similar variables. 

A system representing a compromise betveen extreme specialization and extreme 

g~neralization was considered the most feasible tor :rurther study. The system 

as presented in suboequent portions of the report provides for specializa~ion 

in a particular specialty at least through a person's first enlistment, and 

permits either continued specialization or broadening into other related specialties or cross-over into another specialty in accordance with the philosophies 

of the several Services in advancing through subsequent enlisted and warrant 

grades. 

13. It was not considered practical to develop detailed career progression; 

but rather to categorize basic specialties and groups of specialties on which 

career structures could be based. It was the intent of the Working Group that 

the Services could then devise, upon such a foundation, career plans to suit 

their individual need.a. In line vith thio concept, no attempt wao JM.de to spell 

out the rclationBhip betw~cn enlisted or Warrant gm.des and the various levels 

C:()NFiilENTIAL 
REF-ID:A40564 

(M)NFIDENTIAle l'f:J' ( FJ I tip 1 

in ol'lvancing tc :..11 .. top of': a oproinlt.y. Instcnd, the. Working Group adopted 

six ~rbitra'I')" skil1 level deocriptiono to indicate this progression starting 

with Trainee level; and progreosing through Awrentice level; OuaJ.ified level; 

Senior level; Supervisor, Specio.list, or Instructor level; and culminating in 

the Operational Superintendent , Technical Expert, or Training Superintendent 

level. 

14. 'J.'o.b "A" contaias recommended specialty fields for enlisted personnel. 

These are grouped in four separate branches: Collection, Analysis, Maintenance, 

and Cryptologic Services. The grouping of specialties in each branch was baaed 

on categories of common skills. With respect to training, each specialt7 

represents a requirement for to:nna.l basic training or advanced schooling. 

Each specialt7 can also be used ea the basis for separate advancement in rating 

examinations or other promotional requirements. To provide flex1b111t:r ot assignJlieD.t and aa an expedient to operations, or in case• involving a Yer'7 ••ll number 

ot specialties, it appears desirable in some instances, to break down specialties 

into more detail. Thia breakdown applies to jobs which require the application 

ot general skills associated with the specialty to a particular narrow ~ob within 

thaG apec1al.t7. Thia method can also be found useful and practical as a means 

to avoid over-specialization. For the purpose o'f this report, this level 1• 

calle4 a "shred-out" and is governecl b7 the cr:Lterta noted below. With regard 

to language requirelD"'nts in certain specialties the;, can obviousl;y be considered 

"shred-outs"J in others, such as Voice Intercept, each l.a.nguage must be treated 

aa a separate apecialt7. 

a. Promotion teats and other qualif')'ing promot1ona1 requirements would 

be baaed. on the apecialt7 and not on the shred-out. Thia would 

prevent personnel in the upper skill levels f'rom knowing 0n17 one 

• phaae of their apecialt7. 

b. lforma.117, formal cOUl"Sea in the shred-out would not be reoomm.ende4. 

and skills would be learned on the job. 

c. Numbers of shred-out jobs in each specialty woul.d be dictated D7 

the needs o'f the individual services. 

15. 'l'b.e conditions governing utilization of Warra.nt Otticer personnel 

difter so much between the Services that the de~elopm.ent of only a general conc~pt in respect to Warrant spec1Alties appeared desirable; namel:.r, that provision 

should be IMCle to in"lure that t I • 1 I t stPd personnel have channels of potential 

advancement to Warran 1 Ofticer o J •\tioned in par'l.graph 12. These are shO\lD in 

Tab "A". 

G 

~ONFIDENTIA~ 
REF ID:A40564 

e •NFIDENTIJ\L e 

EJ0M':t1'Erf'l'IAL 

16. In respect to officer personnel, three distinct types were catego:ti.1ed1 

a. The Cryptologic Career Specialist who is essentially the 

ttgraduate level" specialist in narrowly defined specialties. 

This type would represent a liMited number of officer personnel I 

who would duplicate the skills usually found only in civilian 

personnel but for which because of potential requirements for 

such specialties outside of the ZI, especially in wartime, 

military officer personnel would be required. 

b. The Cryptologic Career Generalist who would make up the hard.-

core of the cryptologic officers. He would initially serve in 

a narrow specialty but would rotate to other cryptologic assignments as he advances in rank in order to have the broad caps. .. 

bility required of a senior cryptologic officer. 

a. The non-Cryptologic Officer who would rotate between general 

operational assignments within the military departments and 

a8Signments with the cryptologic organizations. It input of 

Service personnel into cryptologic fields is restricted solel7 

to inexperienced personnel of lower grades, then sterility is 

generated. Rotation of Service personnel experienced in other 

Service specialties and branches cf the military brings into 

the cryptologic effort the viewpoint or the Services' operational needs and enables NSA to keep tuned to the realities of 

operational requirements. In tum, such Service operational 

personnel upon transferring from a cryptologic assignment, 

take back into the Service a realization of the capabilities 

ot COMINT. 

17. 'Dt.b ''B" contains a recommended specialty structure for cryptologic 

career officer personnel, both specialists and generalists., 'Dt.b "B" provides 

career planning tor category- "a'' and "b" officers as defined above. Category 

ttcn Dtticera were not included in this chart, since this subject was considered 

a natter ot general Service policy and not necessarily as a part of a cryptologic career plan. No attempt was made to provide separate plans 'tor reserve, 

regular, National Guard, temporary and other class of officer personnel, in 

view of the many categories and Service differences. 

7 

C0NFIDENTIAL 
REF ID:A40564 

c•NFIDENTIALe 

CONCLUSIONS 

18. A continued low reenlistment rate will seriously impair the operating 

efficiency of, and services rendered to the nation's COMINT and COM:JEC conswnera 

by the National Security Agency and the Servtces' cryptologic organizations. The 

availability of' a valid long-range career plan, indicating paths ot advancement 

and training is a recognized means ot providing an incentive to both officer an4 

enlisted personnel to continue with the Services. It is considered desirable 

that each Service cryptologic organization develop a long-range career plan. 

19. Since the three Service cryptologic organizations have tar more similarities than dissimilarities, a standardized approach to those aspects ot career 

planning pecu1iar to the cryptologic organizations appears feasible and appropriate. The categorization ot cryptologic specialties (Tabs "A" and "B") affords 

a minimum standard for the Services to utilize in developing cryptologic career 

plans based on individual needs and in consonance with the requirements ot the 

parent Services. 

20. For long-range career purposes, it is considered desirable to restrict 

ZI billets and highly specialized schooling for enlisted personnel to second 

enlistment personnel and, for of:f'icer personnel, tp those o:f':f'icers who indicate 

by their performance and attitude a desire to become Cryptologic Career Ot:f'icers. 

The assignment of' "career" personnel rather than "short-term" personnel to duties 

in the United States and to desirable training is considered to be an excellent 

means of affording an incentive to the cryptologic careerist. 

21. The Occupational Analysis Program within NSA will asaist the Sel"V'icea 

in solving their problem of' utilizing cryptologic specialists in their specialties 

upon return to the Z::t_ from overseas asaignmenta, with the establishment ot a 

system for identitying specific NSA billets into which specific Service specialists can rotate. 

22. For career planning purposes in general and in particular for assignment, rotation, and training purposes, it is desirable within each cryptologic 

9el'V~ce to utilize an auxiliary system of skill identification which would provice readily available data in respect to the qualifications and the proficiency 

or cryptologic specialists in all cryptologic skillSJ this is especially needed 

as a mear.s of' maintaining a record of' cross-overs between specialty fields. 'l'he 

Naval Security Grouu SUJCO code is a workable example ot such a BJ'Stem. 

8 

CONFIDENTIAL 
REF ID:A40564 

t OJ"'Ji''f:O 3 'l'?:EATJ 

23. Wh I le J.. t l.3 rcco("n1.:cd that rc.p1d ch 1Y,~os ir1 triit..uions Llld. opc1 atio11al 

a.::.sic;m,.(.nts oftc.11 require ch:..•1c;rs in type of cryptolcgic personnel ci ther to be 

assi~ned to ?iSA or for f'ield dut.r with the Service crYI)tologic orc;am.zo.tions, 

the validity and timeline3s of the long-ranee pl~nnins and c;uida.nce offer~d to 

the Services by NSA can n1~terially influence the execution of cryptologic career 

programs. This is especially true in respect to furnishlng guidance to the 

Services suf'ficientl.y in advance of auzmentation of the deployment plan for 

decentralization. 

24. When highly specialized training of ntinimum numbers of Service personnel 

in the member agencies is required, it is considered desirable for purposes of 

efficiency and economy to centralize such training with either NSA or one of the 

cryptologic services administering the program for the three cryptologic organizations. It is recognized that because of cross-funding and similar considerations, 

such schools might require departmental approval. 

ACTION RECOMMEiiDED 

25. It is recommended that the specialty structures which are furnished 

as Tabs "A" and "B" be utilized by the cryptologic organizations as minimum 

standards for developing cryptologic career plans and that the Service cryptologic organizations initiate early action with their parent commands to recommend 

any specific change in career structures which are necessary to meet these minimum standards. ... 26. It is recommended that progressively, as the Services c0nq>lete arrangements tor establishing career plans to meet the minimum standards specified herein, 

they supply details to the National Security Agency and that NSA then develop in 

cooperation with the Services, the minimum standards tor qualifications of enlisted 

personnel tor each skill level of each enlisted career specialty included in the 

Services' plans. This will enable the Services to establish a valid equation between skill le~els and enlisted grade structures. 

27. It is recommended that in approximately one year a detailed study, 

similar to this TJ.1B project, be conducted to compare cryptologic career plans 

developed in accordance with the minimum standards turnisbed as Tabs "A" and "B" 

in order to appraise the progress mo.de, provide for the exchange of mutually benef icial infol"l!".ation, and make further career planning recommendations in the light 

9 

~ONFIDENTIAL 
REF fb:A40564 

~NFIDEN'FIAa-ee'ifii'IBEN'ff:Afi 

28. It is recommended that the NSA Occupational Analysis Program include 

provision for identifying specific billets within NSA which can be utilized by 

the Services for ZI rotation of specific Service ~J~cialties and that this identification process be conducted in close coordination with the cryptologic organizations. 

29. It is f'urther recommended 1ln respect to the NSA Occupational Analysis 

Program, that a deterpdnation be made of any NSA billet tor which NBA has requested the Services to provide military personnel, but the duties of which are 

peculiar to NSA1 and if such billets are ascertained, each such unique billet be 

studied to ascertain if civilian rather than military incumbents should be utilized 

to perform the duties. 

30. It is recamnended that valid data be furnished by NSA to the Servtce 

cryptologic organizations on .future plans or changes in present plans which will 

result in c\1Fes in personnel authorizations in order to enabl!e tlle Services 

to program tor and provide required trained personnel on a timely basis. 

31. It is recol!Dllended that in approximately one year a detailed study, 

similar to this TMB project, be conducted of the cryptologic reserve program 

following the adoption of pending legislation and on the basis of the career 

plans for active duty personnel which will have been developed as a result of 

this study. 

COL D F. SMITH 

ACofS, Gl 

Army Security Agency 

cbR G R c,~hi:I..EY, p•:m 

Asst Head, Personnel and Services Sec. 

?Ta.val Security Group 

CAPT DAVID D '>'lI'l'H 

Chie~, Career Dev ~ection 

Air Force Security ~er\ ice 

10 

CAPT J c; HOVI'HCK, USN CHAIRMAN 

DC/C, Operations 

National Security Agency 

,. ,/ ,,.,,.......... ,,,,, 

r ~ .. ,... ~ t'--·?,,.-~ 

MR.-.... -.,.,r""'n"""f!N w i:irx..1Nr~ ,,.,,,- ----

Oh!Pf 1 Intercept Branch, TN11 Nntion~l Security Agency 

eONFillENTIJ\Jj 
TITLE 

STRUCTURE 

SYMBOLS 

REF ID:A40564 

TAB A 

Cryptologlc Career Structure for Enlisted Personnel 

Four Branches 

1 Collection Branch 

2 Analysis Branch 

3 Maintenance Branch 

4 Cryptologic Services Branch 

"A" Common to all Services, being basic and vital, 

recommended as a mandatory separate speciality. 

"B" Should be a separate speciality, but If Service 

desires, may be "shred-out " 

"C" Should be "shred-out" but, If Services desire 

may be a separate spec1al1ty 

- ll -

C0NFIDEN'FIAL 
REF ID:A40564 

COLLECTIOH BRANCH 

~IJPt~VISOR SUPT (OPllS) TRAiii EE APPRi:llTICf UPl:l< .o\.T0 ~ ~R OP:2RAT0i{ l1l)TiWCTOR SUPT (TNG) CATl::GORY I 

.__ _______________________ ~_o_M_-~_~o_~_·s_t __ n_~T_E_-r._<c_~_-~_T ________________________ __.I ~ 

.__ ________________________ v_o_1c_.E_-_1_N_1_E_Rc __ cr_T ________________________ __.I ~ 

~ml-.!SE MONITO~ 

(Could be shred-out of Morse intercept) 

NON-MORSE MONITOR 

(Could be shred-out of non-Morse intercept) 

r-----------------, 

I OPTIONAL I 

L--------------...1 

r------------------------------ - --------, 

1 DIRECTION FINDING I 

I (Preferably shred-out of Morse or non-Morse intercept) I 

L-------------------------------------~ 

,---- ---- - ---------------------------., 

1 RADIO FlllGl:R PRltlTlllG I 

; (Dre'e·ably sl.red-out of Morse or ron-Morse 1nte•cept) I 

L------------------------------------ __ J 

- J2..-

€0NFIDENTIAL 

r---

' I I c I L __ J 

r---, 

I C I 

I I L __ J 
REF ID:A40564 

-(i)NFIDENTIA'e 

ANALYSIS BRANCH 

TRAINEE ANALYST SR ANALYST SUPERVISOR SUPT (OPNS) APPRENTICE LINGUIST SR LINGUIST INSTRUCTOR SUPT (TNG) 

TECHNICIAN TECH EXPERT 

CATEGORY 

l~--~--------------------c-RY_P_T_A_N_A_L_v_s_r ________________________ __,11 ~ 

I TRAFFIC ANALYST I 0 

[ MACHINE AIDS OPERATOR I 8 

I RADIO FINGER PRINTER ANALYST I 8 

r 

COMINT ANALYST n 

(Could be shred-out of another specialty) LJ 

C OMINT LINGUIST 

(Could be shred-out of another specialty) 

[ 

WEATHER ANALYST 

(Could be shred-out of another specialty) 

·-------.I 

.--------------, 

L

I OPTIONAL : ------______ _J 

;--------- --~R~~MISSION-SECURITY A~ALYST ------------: 

I (Preferably shred-out of traffic Analyst) I 

L-----------------------------------------~ 

r----------------------------------------- 1 RADIO FRINTE R TRAFFIC ANAL {ST r 

I (Preferably shred-out of Traffic Analyst or non-Morse intercept) I 

L------------------- ----------------- -- _J 

r----- ------------------------------------ 1 DIRECTIOt-1 FINDING EVALUATOR : 

I (Preferably shred-out of Traffic Analyst or intercept specialty) I 

L -------- - --------------------------__ _J 

- l~ ... 

€0NFIDENTIA~ 

[] 

G 

r--, 

I c I 

I I L __ _J 

r---. 

I C I 

I I L __ J 

r---, 

I C I 

I I L __ _J 
REF ID:A40564 

-ii()NFIDENTIA-.-

MAINTENANCE BRANCH 

Si:IHOR SUPERVISOR REPAIR SUPT 

TRAINEE APPRENTICE REPAIRMAN REPAIRMAN INSTRUCTOR TNli SUPT CATEGORY 

'-------------------------E-L_e_c_T_R_o_-M_E_-c_1_1A_1_11_c_A_L ______________________ __,, ~ 

'--------------------------~E-·L_E_c_T_R_o_1_~1_c_s __________________________ _.I ~ r------------, 

I L ___________ OPTIONAL I _J 

r----------------------------------------

1 MACl-lll~E AIDS \ 

I (Preferably shred-out of Electro-Mcchon1col or Electronics} I 

L----------------------- - - --------- _____ J 

r---------------- --- - - - ---------------, 

1 • TELCTYPE 1 

I (Preferably shred-out ,,f Electro-Mechanical) I L--------------------------------------J 

,--------------CRYPTO EQUl;//iEMT --------------1 

I (Preferably shred-out of Electro·Mechan1cal or Electr.:m1cs) I 

L--------------------------------------~ 

r-------------------------------------

1 INTERCEPT EQUIPMENT : 

I (Preferably shred-out of Electro·lvtcchan1cal or Electronics) I 

L------------------------------------~ 

- Vf -

CONFIDENTIAL 

,---, 

I c I 

I I L __ ...J 

r--, 

I C I I I L __ J 

r--.., 

I C I 

I I L __ J 

,---, 

I C I 

I I L __ _I 
RAIN EE 

REF ID:A40564 

--j()NFIDENTIAa 

CRYPTOLOGIC SERVICES BRANCH 

APPRENTICE CLERK SR CLERK SUPER o/ISOR OPERATOR SR.OPERATOR 

CRYPTO DISTRIBUTION CLERK 

(Could be shred•out of another specialty) 

r------------1 

I OPTIONAL I 

L-----------_J 

SUPT. 

r---------------- - - --- - - --- --- -----------, 

I CRYPTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT OPERATOR I L ____________ (P~fe~abl~shr~~t_:f~~':~~cialty) ____________ J 

r----------------------------------------1 I OPERATIONS CLERK I 

I (Preferably shred-out of another specialty) I 

L----- ------------ - --------t-------------J 

- 15 -

eeNFIDEN'FIA!J 

r--, 

I c I 

I I L __ _J 

r--, 

I C I I I L __ J 
REF ID:A40564 

-9BNFIDENTIA»-

CRYPTOLOGIC OFFICER CAREER FIELD 

01 02 OJ 04 05 06 

LIEUTENANT CAPTAIN MAJOR LT COLONEL COLONEL 

I 

Code "A" CRYPTANALYTIC OFFICER 

l I 

Cade .,8 ,. MACHINE AIDS OPERATIONS OFFICER 

Code "C" COMINT LANGUAGE OFFICER 

Code "D" 

TRAFFIC ANALYSIS OFFICER 

Cade "E" 

WEATHER ANALYSIS OFFICER 

I I 

Code "F" CO~INT ANALYSIS OFFl~E R 

I 

Code "G" RFP ANALYSIS OFFICER 

T 

ANALYSIS OFrlCER 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

For Spoclally Selected Officers 

I 

For Specially Selected Officers 

For Specl ally Selected Officers 

Codes "H" (Input from Cad es "A" thru "G") 

I I 

Code "I" MORSE INTERCEPT OFFICER 

Code "J" N /MORSE INTERCEPT OFrlCER 

Code "K" VOl~E INTERCEPT OFFl~ER __________ l _________ j 

POSITION FINDING OFFICER I 

Code "L" (Optlonal) I 

--- - - - - --,--- - - - --~ I I 

INTERCEPT OFFICER 

Code "O" 

Code1 "U" 

Code "M" (Input from Codes "I" thru "L ") 

I : I 

I COMINT OFFICER 

I Code "N" (Input from Codes "H" and '•M") 

I I 

SECURITY MONITORING OFFICER 

I 

Code "T" I 

I 

\ 

CRYPTOLOGIC OFFICER 

(Input from Codes "N" and "S") 

I 

I 

CRYPTO FQUIPMENT ENGINEER OFFICER 

- 16 -

C()NFIDENTIAL 

TABB 

07-08 

GENERAL 

I 

T