SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1034 

CA 15-02041 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND CURRAN, JJ. 

 

PATRICK KINGSTON, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CARDINAL O’HARA HIGH SCHOOL, THE DIOCESE OF 

BUFFALO, N.Y., AND THE BOYS AND GIRLS CLUB OF 

THE NORTHTOWNS FOUNDATION, INC., 

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. 

 

DOLCE PANEPINTO, P.C., BUFFALO (ANNE M. WHEELER OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT. 

CHELUS, HERDZIK, SPEYER & MONTE, P.C., BUFFALO (THOMAS J. SPEYER OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS CARDINAL O’HARA HIGH SCHOOL AND

THE DIOCESE OF BUFFALO, N.Y. 

GOLDBERG SEGALLA LLP, BUFFALO (MEGHAN A. BROWN OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT THE BOYS AND GIRLS CLUB OF THE NORTHTOWNS

FOUNDATION, INC. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Russell

P. Buscaglia, A.J.), entered September 10, 2015. The order denied the

motion of plaintiff for partial summary judgment seeking a

determination that Arts and Cultural Affairs Law § 37.09 (1) applies

to this action, and granted the cross motions of defendants for

summary judgment dismissing the complaint. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages

for injuries he sustained during a professional wrestling performance.

Supreme Court denied his motion for partial summary judgment seeking a

determination that Arts and Cultural Affairs Law § 37.09 (1) applies

to this action, and granted the cross motions of defendants for

summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Contrary to plaintiff’s

contention, the court properly granted the cross motions insofar as

they sought dismissal of the first cause of action, which asserts a

violation of section 37.09 (1). The statute, entitled “[p]rotection

of aerial performers from accidental falls” (id.), requires that

protective devices be supplied to participants in an aerial

performance “which creates a substantial risk to [the performer] or

others of serious injury from falling” (id.). Here, we agree with the

court that plaintiff was injured when he executed a maneuver that
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CA 15-02041 

included a planned jump with an acrobatic flip onto the wrestling

ring’s surface from the ropes surrounding the ring, rather than from

an accidental fall (cf. Murach v Island of Bob-Lo Co., 290 AD2d 180,

181), and thus the statute is inapplicable. 

Contrary to plaintiff’s further contention, the court properly

granted defendants’ cross motions insofar as they sought dismissal of

the second cause of action, which asserts negligence on the part of

defendants, on the ground that it is barred by the doctrine of primary

assumption of the risk. It is well settled that the primary

“assumption of [the] risk doctrine applies where a consenting

participant in sporting and amusement activities ‘is aware of the

risks; has an appreciation of the nature of the risks; and voluntarily

assumes the risks’ ” (Bukowski v Clarkson Univ., 19 NY3d 353, 356). 

The participant assumes the risks that are inherent in the “sporting

or amusement activit[y]” (id.), which “commensurately negates any duty

on the part of the defendant to safeguard him or her from the risk”

(Trupia v Lake George Cent. Sch. Dist., 14 NY3d 392, 395). 

Consequently, a participant in such activity “ ‘consents to those

commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the

nature of the [activity] generally and flow from such participation’ ”

(Martin v Fiutko, 27 AD3d 1130, 1131). “[F]or purposes of determining

the extent of the threshold duty of care, knowledge plays a role but

inherency is the sine qua non” (Morgan v State of New York, 90 NY2d

471, 484). Finally, “[t]he primary assumption of the risk doctrine

also encompasses risks involving less than optimal conditions . . .

‘It is not necessary to the application of assumption of [the] risk

that the injured plaintiff have foreseen the exact manner in which his

or her injury occurred, so long as he or she is aware of the potential

for injury of the mechanism from which the injury results’ ” (Bouck v

Skaneateles Aerodrome, LLC, 129 AD3d 1565, 1566, quoting Maddox v City

of New York, 66 NY2d 270, 278). 

Here, the court properly concluded that the risk of severe neck

and back injuries is inherent in the planned and staged activity

engaged in by plaintiff, i.e., jumping from a four-foot high rope onto

a wrestling ring, landing on one’s back, and then being pushed out of

the ring by another performer. Thus, “it is indisputable that . . .

plaintiff assumed the risk of landing incorrectly when tumbling in the

manner he had been trained to do during his [five-year career as a

professional wrestling performer]. The fact that the [rope was

slightly looser], a circumstance of which . . . plaintiff was plainly

aware, does not raise an issue of fact” (Morgan, 90 NY2d at 487; see

generally Yedid v Gymnastic Ctr., 33 AD3d 911, 911). Therefore, “by

participating in the [exhibition], plaintiff consented that the duty

of care owed him by defendants was no more than a duty to avoid

reckless or intentionally harmful conduct . . . [and] consent[ed] to

accept the risk of injuries that are known, apparent or reasonably

foreseeable consequences of his participation in” that exhibition

(Turcotte v Fell, 68 NY2d 432, 437), including the risk of the

injuries he sustained. 

Entered: November 18, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court