.. 

-- -... 

REF ID:A40393 

.. -~.~~~~<::*'~~ 

3\a ~~~ ~ ~'-~I ' 

SECRET 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 09-25-2013 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 

;, 

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-
RE~D:A40393 

°W-· ~~'- 1 "=1~ SECRET 

APPENDIX 

GUIDE LINES FOR SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 

SECTION PAGE 

GENERAL • ~(;(!~ • . . • • • . I 1 

TOP SECRET CODEWORD • • II 5 

SECRET CODEWORD • • . . III 6 

TOP SECRET •• • • • • • IV 6 

SECRET •••• • • • . • v 7 

CONFIDENTIAL. • • • . . VI 7 

UNCLASSIFIED. • • • • • VII 9 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY • VIII 10 

SECTION I - GENERAL 

1. The classifying of information and material within the 

cryptologic field is an involved and complex problem Every document 

to be classified must be considered as being unique and one whose 

classification is dependent on factors existing within that document 

alone. The decision as to the proper classification of a document 

cannot arbitrarily be determined by referral to other documents or to 

specific rules and regulations. Each item of information or material 

must be adjudged solely on its own merits and classified according to 

its content. There are, h~e?~~~~~~rtain basic principles of classification which will be of assi~~~~to individuals within the cryptologic field in the solution of their classification problems, and 

it is proposed to set forth these basic principles in this document. 

2. As a basis for classification, it is necessary that all 

personnel be thoroughly conversant with the security classifications 

established by Executive Order 10501: TOP SECRET, SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL. These security classifications can be stated as follows 

a. Top Secret Except as may be expressly provided by 

statute, the use of the classification Top Secret shall be authorized, 

by appropriate authority, only for defense information or material 

which requires the highest degree of protection. The Top Secret 

classification shall be applied only to that information or material 

the defense aspect of which is paramount, and the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in exceptionally grave damage to the 

Nation such as leading to a. definite break in diplomatic relations 

affecting the defense of the United States, an armed attack against 

the United States or its allies, a war, or the compronu.se of military 

or defense plans, or intelligence operations, or scientific or 

technological developments vital to the national defense. 

~ 

< Q_ .a.,, ~.- Appendix to NSA Regulation 

..P.~t,..\ \.tV't. 'I \ \ Number 121-7 dated 8 April 1955 

~Tetl:ttf~ Jk .;,il SECRET==~ 
REF ID:A40393 

SEeRET 

b Secret• Except as may be expressly provided by statute, 

the use of the classification Secret shall be authorized, by appropriate 

authority, only tor defense information or material the unauthorized 

disclosure of which cou1d result in serious damage to the Nation, such 

as by Jeopardizing the international relations at the United Sta.tea, 

endangering the effectiveness of a program or policy of vital importance 

to the national defense, or coqipranising i.Jp.portant military or defense 

plans, scientific or technological developments important to national 

defense, or information revealing 1.mt;ortant intelligence operations. 

c. Confidential• Except as may be expressly provided by 

statute, the use of the classification Confidential shall be authorized 

by appropriate authority, only tor defense infonna.tion or material. tbe 

unauthorized disclosure of which could be pre~udicial to the defense 

interests of the nation. 

d. Confidential - Modified Handling Authorized: This does 

not constitute a separate and distinct classification category. In:f'ormation must meet the requirements set dOWD. above for Confidential 

material. The addition of the notp.tion "modified handling authorized" 

only permits modification of the storage and transmission procedures. 

r. "For Of'f'icia.l Use Only"• Th:J.s is not a security classitication 

but is a designation to be used to assure the proper custody, preservation 

and use of official information which requires protection in public interest, 

but is not within the purview of Executive Order No. 10501. 

3. Within the cryptologic field we must provide even more safeguards 

tor our activi+tes than are provided for under the standard. security 

classification: Before any official cryptologic info:rll'.lation is to be 

disseminated, jt must be determined that the recipient has a need-toknow. Informa:\, ton ot an unclassified nature pertinent to the mission of 

a cryptologic f'"!tivity should not be discussed With anyone except for 

officia1 busine3s purposes. 

4. Beyond the basic classifications established by Executive Order, 

it is recognized that there a~e specia1 considerations which must be 

considered separately because of their inherently sensitive nature. 

These special considerations pertain to specific categories of camnunications 

intelligence (COMINT) and are identified by the assignment ot a distinctive 

codeword.. The classification of COM.INT involves two distinct considerations: 

the security of the information and the sensitivity of the source fran which 

the information was derived. Either or both considerations may attect the 

classification, dependent upon whether the information or the source is the 

more sensitive. 

5 • Initially, COMINT material comes to this Agency in the form ot 

collateral COMINT or as raw traffic which has been intercepted by field 

Appendix to NSA Regulation 

Number 121-7 dated 8 April 1955 

- 2 -

IfklffiJ:iB TJH. SQJq.;QJ~ 

Cil.'l.m~~S ON':Ei¥ 

SEERET 
REF ID:A40393 

SECRET 

SIJeRBf 

--

station activities throughout the world. This tre.f'fic is classified 

no lower than COBFIDENTIAL until such time as an anal.ytical processing 

is begun. -Fran the analysis ot this raw traffic, we derive three 

types of intelligence. 

a. Cryptintelli~ece is that CCMD1'.r which results f'ran 

cryptanalysis of the systems utilized by message originators to 

protect the traffic during its transmission. This includes speech 

and facsimile security systems. 

b. Tra:f'fic intelligence is that CCllIN'l' which results tran 

trattic analysis of intercepted electr:lcal communications. This includes 

COMIR'r produced by all means short of cryptanalysis ot message texts. 

c. Intelligence derived tran the analysis ot pla:lnWxt tratf'ic. 

6. Information derived trcm these three analytical processes 

(cryptanalysis, traffic analysis and plaintext arJSJ.ys:Ls) :Ls divided 

into three security categories. 

a. Categoey III CCl4D'l' (Top Secret Codeword) is the moat 

seJ1s:ltive category anc1 contains :lntormation o't the highest classi'ticat:lon 

1 whose source must be protected at all costs. In general, this will 

include inf'ormation derived tran ceyptanalysis (except tor designated 

types of Ca.DlfT) certain des1g1.1&ted types ot plaintext and special wep.ther cryptanalysis and tratnc ane.J.ysis ot certain high level 

systems as specified by existing authorities. For additional items 

in this category, see Section II. 

b. Category II CCMINT is less sensitive than the preceding 

category and is one whose material can, by acceptance ot a calculated 

risk, be disseminated Without over-riding concern for the security ot 

the source. In general, this will include tra.tf'ic intelligence 

resulting from the solution of certa.:tn low level codes and other 

security systems as specified by existing authorities. For additional 

items in this Category, see Section III. 

c. Category I CCMIN'l' (Non-Codeword) is subject to the least 

restrictive regulations of' the three categories and will include 

certain types of low level CCMmT as specified by existing authorities. 

Material in this category will be classified no lower tban COHFIDENirIAL 

Without the assigment of any codeword. Extreme care must be utilized 

in placing CCllINT in this category. (See paragraph g, Section VI - CONFIDENT:rAL). 

7. In addition to these categories, there are certain other 

basic statements that are acceptable as guide lines in detemining classif'ications. 

sr.w:i;u VIA 00M3Jft 

6U!iRmIS Ellll¥ 

- 3 -

SECRET 

Append.ix to NSA Regul.ation 

Number 121-7 dated 

8 April 1955 
REF ID:A40393 

SECRE'f PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

a, CCJ4DT will DOrJJlll,llY' be considered as taJ.ling w1 thin 

category III COJ!"JIUch specitic systems as have been mutually 

agreed upon by and the U. S to be in other ca.tegoriea. Thia 

list is avail.a e n PRpD (0621). 

b. Standing opera.ting procedures, personnel reports, organizational charts and instruction manuals governing respective CCllDT 

organizations will be classified accorcling to the intormation contained 

therein; those indicating operational capacity or success will be claaaitiect 

at least s:m:em. Classification problems which cannot be resolved by the 

originator will be ref'erred to the Ad3utant General for determination. 

c. In reference to type of c:eyptosystems, the terms ''low grade", 

"medium grade" and "high grade" are often used. Definitions ot theee 

categories are as follows: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

Low-gree, Pertains to a cryptosystem.which otters 

sligh resistance to ci:;v:etaneJ.ysis; for example; 

(1) Playfair ciphers, (2) Single transposition, 

(3) unenciphered one-part codes. 

Medium-grade, Pertains to a cryptosystem Vl:lich otters 

considerable resistance to cr;yptanalysis, tor example: 

(1) Strip ciphers, (2) Pol.ypbase transposition, (3) 

Unenciphered two-part codes. 

High-grade, Pertains to a cryptosystem whicJl otters 

a maximum of' resistance to cryptanalysis; for example: 

(1) Complex cipher machines, (2) One-time systems, 

(3) Unknown two-part codes enciphered with an ac1dit1ve 

book 

8. It must be pointed out that, although the ceypta.Dalytic techniques 

associated with a specif'ic operational ceyptosystem f'all into Categorie• 

III, II, or I, nevertheless a detailed description of' the procedures and 

general principles underlying the solution ot a type cryptosystem may be 

ot lower classification or even unclassified, e.g., the solution ot the 

classic PJ.cLyf'air system. This consideration a:pplies also to principl.es 

and techniques involved in the atto.ck. on u.s.I I cryptosystema. 

a. Likewise, although it must be pointed out .that trattic 

analytic techniques and data associated with specific targets tall ii:rto 

Categories III, II or I, nevertheless a detailed description ot the 

general principles and techniques involved. in hypothetical trattic amlysis 

may be ot lower classification. 

b. The classif'ication ot an item ot cryptanalytic or cryptographio equipnent is determined solely on its own merits, based on the extent to 

which protection of' new principles and techniques 1D11Bt be attorcled. The 

Appendix to NSA Re~atio,n _ If. • 

Number 121-7 dated 8 April 1955 ll:ANmd!l VIA 90HIN'i' 

GHt.NHBtS om:.¥ 

SECRET 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 
REF ID:A40393 

SECRET 

BJB8f8!1! 

--

degree of classification does not necessarily concern only the field 

of ct";y:ptology (or cryptologic aspects) but al.so takes into account 

engineering sophistication. 

9. As a means ot fUrther assistance to personnel, the followins 

classification guide lines have been established. Remember they are 

only general in nature and that the cle.aaification of any given item 

must be established solely on its own merits. In addition, an 

abbreviated classification table has been incloaed at the end of tb.11 

document and is intended :f'or reference purposes only. It ma7be 

detached and used separately. WARND'GI! In no instance may this 

table be used to solve classification problems. Reference must alft111 

be made to the complete text ot "Guide Lines for Security Classiticat:lon". 

SECTION II .. WP SECRET CODEWORD (CA'mGORY III) 

The :following t;ypes of inf'ormation 8.l'e to be classif"ied TOP 

SECRET Codeword: 

a. Cryptanalytic intelligence and techniques derived trcm 

any statements of success attributable to a given Category III 

system. 

b. Traffic intelligence based in whole or in part on the 

analysis or use of identifications and other data derived frail 

Category III COMINT. Such traffic intelligence might involve a 

higllgrad.e encryption system or message headings encrY,pted in codes or 

cipJ1ers of high security grading. 

c. Intelligence which can be ide;t:ltied as resulting from 

the study of plain text 'Which is passed on ! I 

circuits and is of such high intelligence value ot sensitivity as to 

require assignment to this category. 

d. Special Weather Intelligence, which does not contain 

information concerning the processes or sources involved will be 

designated by a distinctive codeword. 

e. Intelligence which can be identif"ied as resulting trom 

the cryptanalysis of diploma.tic Cl"l'Ptosystems used by foreign powers 

since 1 September 19391 except as covered in sub-paragraph a, Section 

IV - '!OP SECRET; sub-paragraph l, Section VI - CODFID.ENTIAL; and, 

sub-paragraph 1, Section VII - UNCLASSIFIED. 

t. Traffic intelligence involving such combinations ot 

cryptanalysis and traffic analysis whose value is so great that 

securit7 of contents becomes the over-riding consideration. 

lWF.BHI VlA eetmP! 

CIMtftff!IJB Q)t1%, 

- 5 - Appendix to BSA Regulation 

Dumber 121-7 dated 8 April 1955 

SECRET 

PL 86-36/50 USC 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 
REF ID:A40393 

SECRET 

g. COMDTT based on traffic obtained from sources 

classified TOP SECRET. 

cryptosys~j,..,. ___ __,~Crypta.na1yt:i..cmushortmtitlesmo:f Categorymiii 

SECTION III - SECRET CODEWORD (CATEGORY II) 

The following types of information are to be classified SECRET 

Codeword• 

a. Crypta.na.1.ytic intelligence and techniques.derived from 

and statements of success attributable to a given Category II cryp~osystem. 

b Tra.f'fic intelligence derived from.the analysis of 

foreign communications after 2 September 194:5 except as covered in subparagraph b, Section II above. 

c. Texta information. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

d. Intelligence which canbe identified as resulting 

from study of' Government, COillllle:i:'cJ..al or private plain text passed 

on circuits, except a.s noted in sub-paragraph 

e, Section II - TOP SECRET Codeword. 

e. Traffic intelligence derived from radio fingerprinting 

(RFP) and Morse operator analysis (MOA). 

f. !:-1 __ ..... ~ryptanalytic short titles of Category II and I 

cryptosystems 

SECTION IV - TOP SECRET 

The following types of information are to be classified TOP 

SECRET: 

a. The detailed mission of a COMINT agency or a. InaJOr 

operating component thereof 

b. The existence of peace time collaboration in COMINT 

matters between U s. agencies and other foreign governments, except 

for collaboration with the U.K., Canada, or Australia, much will 

be classified not lower than SECRET. 

c. Intelligence derived from the cryptanalysis of highgrade foreign cryptosystems between l September 1939 and 2 September 1945, provided the reXerence cannot lead to inferences as to the 

specific systems involved. Such intelligence derived after 

2 September J.945 belongs in Category III. (See exceptions, sub-para.-

graph e, Section II - TOP SECRET CODEWORD and paragraph l, Section 

VII - UNCLASSIFIED. ) 

Appendix to NSA Regulation Numb~ 121-7 dated 8 April 1955 

- 6 - IfANBLE VIA e EMIN'f 

OI~S 8Nfl¥ 

P·L 86-36/50 USC 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 
REF ID:A40393 

SECRET 

d. Codewords (current and obsolete) applicable to 

Category III COMINT. 

SECTION V ... SECRET 

The following types of information are to be classified 

SECRET: 

a. Intercept assignments (N.B. '!bis does not include 

call signs, frequencies or case notations which will be classified 

not lover than CONFIDDTIAL). 

b. Intercept and DF plans and over-all operational 

effectiveness ot intercept and DF organizations as a whole. 

c. Detail& or traffic analysis as applied to enemy 

communications during World War II. 

d. Disclosures of both the identity and details of the 

cryptanalysis of low-grade enemy military cryptosystems during 

World War II. 

e. Existence of ~eace time collaboration between the 

U. S. (NSA) with the U.K. {OOHQ), CABADA (CBNRC) or AUSmALIA (DSB) 

in the COMINT field. 

f. Codewords (current and obsolete) applicable to Category II COMINT. 

SECTION VI - CONFIDENTIAL 

The :f'ollowing types of information are to be classified 

CONFIDENTIAL: 

a. Association of operational COMINT t'u.nctions with 

specific activities and organizations by name (except as provided 

under sub-paragraph a, Section VII - UNCIASSIFl'ED). 

b. General statements pertaining to the operational 

effectiveness of individual intercept and D/F stations. 

c. Intercepted raw traffic that shows no evidence of 

"processing" for COMINT purposes beyond sortirlg b7 clear adaresa 

elements, elimination of unwanted message• and the inclusion ot 

case number and/or an arbitrary traffic designator. 

d. Information about tratf'ic intelligence relating to 

D/F mission assignments, bearing reports and fix reports (i.e., 

target frequencies, call signs, "piped signals," other signal 

information, bearings and :f'ixes), provided that no canplex 

changing call sign systems are included. 

HA&m 'FEI: ~ 

d!A1mlts eBS 

-7· Appendix to NSA Regulation Dumber 121-7, dated 8 April 1955 

SECRET 
REF ID:A40393 

SECRET 

e. The terms "United States Communications Intelligence 

Board" and "U. S. Communications Security Board", {abbreviations 

"USCIB" and "USCSB" and the abbreviations f'or their subcommittees 

are unclassified) 

f. Plain text tactical or operational traffic provided 

that no interpretations of' complex changing call sign systems, 

enciphered map references, or resuJ.ts of advanced traffic a.na.l.ysis 

are included. This material shall include local procedural a.n.d local 

grid and zone systems used for artillery direction, tactical control 

and movement of' front line units, early warning and exercise of 

tactical combat control of aircraft. 

g. Intelligence derived from analysis of radar tracking 

reports and visual observation reports as found in tactical or 

operational traffic, provided that enciphered aircraft type designations or interpretations of complex changing ca.11 sign systems 

a.re not included. Inclusion of local grid or zone references, local 

procedural codes used for brevity and plain text interspersed with 

cover words is permissible. 

h. COMINT concerning weather derived from the sources 

described in paragraphs f' and g, above. 

i. COMINT derived from Naval tactical maneuvering codes 

and brevity codes. 

j. Special crY,Ptologic features of and magnitude of 

e:t.rort nth computers. 

k. Detailed references to, and description of, crY,Ptat1121;}.ytic success against spec1f'1c military crY,Ptosystems used by ~a.reign powers between 11 November 1918 and 1 September 1939, and 

not used since. 

l. Intelligence deriv~d from the cryptanalysis of the 

diplomatic cryptosystems used by foreign powers between 11 November 

1918 and 1 September 1939· 

m. The extent of collaboration in CAN/UK/US COMSEC P1. 86-36/50 use 3605 

matters. EO.\ 3. 3 ( h) ( 2) 

use. 

n. The extent of production of cryptoma;cerial I 

-----

p. Diagrams and descriptions of' COMINT and COMSEC 

communication networks or rel.a.ted communication pla.n.s including 

cryptographic arrangements except ~mere higher classification is 

~ustified by the listing of sensitive intercept stations. 

Appendix to NSA Regulation - 8 -

Number 121-7 dated 8 April 1955 HA:M:Bfd3 VIA S9Milli' 

6fftdiUBTiS E!H~ 

SEERE'f 
I 

// 

REF ID:A40393 

SECRET 

q. Consolidated listings and records of cryptomate:rials and cryptoholdings by short title. 

r. The broad outlines of operational tra.i'fic a.nalysfs 

processes. 

s. Relationship with CIA a.nd other U.S. consumers in the 

field of COMINT. 

SECTION VII - UNCIASSIFil!ID 

The following types of information are UNCLASSIFIED: 

a. Association of NSA with cryptol.ogy, COMmT, COMSEC, or 

the service cryptologic agencies -- provided such association in 

no way adversely a.f'f ects the missions of the agencies concernea. 

b. Association of NSA with authors of technical papers on 

matters already in the public domain. 

c, The terms NSA Field Activity Far East (NSAFE), NSA 

Field Activity Europe (NSA'EUR), NSAAL, NSAUK, NSA-Field Unit l 

(FU/PAC) and NSA Field Unit 2 (FU/LANT). 

d. Civil Service Job Titles and NSA "Q,ua.lifica.tion 

Sta.nd.a.rds ManuaJ.. 11 

e. NSA' s possession of or interest :i.n computers or 

rapid a.na.lytical machinery, except as noted in sub-paragraph j under 

Section VI - CONFIDENTIAL. 

f. Specific components of equipment under research, if' 

use of component is not revealed. 

g. Report of inspection trip to uncleared company that 

is a prospective contractor, if no mention is ma.de of actual 

applications of components. 

h. Short titles, cover names, and code words. (See the 

following exceptions: Sub-p~e.graph d, Section i:v .= TOP SECRET; 

Sub-paragrapl;t f, Section V - SECRET and sub-paragraph q, Section VI - CONFIDENTIAL). 

-1. Communications g:tv:flng a person's security clearance. 

j. Projects number and titles used in justification for 

purchase of materials when no technical usage is specified. 

k. Detailed reference to, and description of, cryptanalytic success against World War I military cryptosystems. 

HA:NmiE VIA 061'1ilf? .CH~IH!lT:B E!flif 

- 9 -Appendix to NSA Regula.tion 

Number 121-7 dated 8 April 1955 

SECRET 
/j 

,, 

./ 

./ 

REF ID:A40393 

SE€RET 

1. References to intelligence derived from cryptosystems 

in which successful crypta.na.J.ysis has alrea.d.ybeen revealed by 

official U.S. action (e.g., the Congressional investigation of the 

Pearl Harbor attack) • 

m. Any reference to intelligence or cryptanalytic success 

against operational cryptosystems as disclosed by foreign publications 

appearing in the public domain. These references should be 

accom:panied for the purpose of' clarity by the source and be without 

further elaboration or amplification. 

n. The fact that NSA produces and procures cryptoma.teriaJ. 

including rotors, key lists, one-time tapes, one-tJ.me pads, codes, 

discs and other broad categories of' keying materials, and. employs 

special equipment to produce some of this material. 

o. The fact that the U.S. collaborates with other NATO 

powers on COMSEC matters. 

SECTION VIII - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONU 

The following types of :i..nforma.tion, when unclassified, are to 

be designated "For Official Use Only": 

a. Textbooks, syllabi, language dictionaries, telephone 

directories, etc., which of themselves d.o not warrant classification, 

however the wide dissemination of which J11J.ght be detrimental to the 

security of the Agency's mission. 

b. ·Records and information which pertain to individ.ua.ls 

such as personnel records, medical records, and investigative 

reports, documents, and proceedings. 

c. Information as to the identity of confidential 

informants and information furnished by them in confidence. 

d. Information received in confidence f'ram private 

individuals, firms, or organizations in connection with bids, 

proposals, "trade secrets", and reports of a financial, technical, 

or scientific nature. 

e. Information which is, or may reasonably be expected 

to be, connected with any pending or anticipated litigation before 

Federal and state courts or regu.l.atory bodies. 

f. Advance information on proposed plans to procure, lease 

or otherwise acquire or dispose of ma.teriaJ.s,: real estate, facilities, 

or functions, which woul.d provide undue or discriminatory advantage 

to private or persona1 interests. 

Appendix to NSA Regulation 

Number 121-7 dated 8 April 1955 

- 10 -

SE€RErr 

ittNM;E VIA eeMIN! 

OHM1NEL3 eMLY 
• 

REF ID:A40393 

SECRET 

g. Preliminary documents relating to proposed plans and 

policy development when premature disclosure would adversely a:f'f ect 

morale, efficiency or discipline. 

h. Examination questions and answers to be used in 

training courses or in the determination of qualifications of 

candidates tor emplo;yment, entrance to duty and advancement or 

promotion. 

Incl: 

Table 

- 11 - Appendix to NSA Regu.l.e.tion 

Number 121-7 dated 8 April 1955 

SECRET 
• 

REF ID:A40393 

SECURITY CLASstFICATl"C>N REFERENCE TABLE 

EO 3.3 (h) (2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

f(F SEClllBT CODl!lilO!lll 

l.. ~ '1'l!CllJIIQlm $ $T1CCBSSl!S 

L-CS.r:.LB:J: TO CA7EGOEI II!<~ 

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al PAGE Dll>ICATD. 

Inclosure to Appendix. to 

NSA Regulation :No. 121-7 

dated 8 April 1955 

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