REF ID:A42872 

,___ __ -~--!06~0i!ll:!~~~~~~4'61~.._a...t..J...1.....r-e.4.I 

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@'pp roved for Release by NSA on 10-28-2013 pursuantto E .0. 1352f3_ 

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REF ID:A42872 

• - .. 

·. 

S'1RID T'IOI 

1 a. The primar;r objectives ot Comnmications Intelligence, as at~ted in 

the Report ot the Committee on the Creation of a Unified Armed Forces 

Secu:rity .Agency, are aa tollon1 

(1) Te provide authentic intormation tor planners ad policy .Ura 

to app..:2.lae ~~~~~rrl~ them. of ~e realities ot the 1Dternat4onal situation, .of the 

.war-mak:ing~omatriea, and of the inte~ions ot those-VmWatriei"wlth 

respect to •r. 

(2) To eliminate the el•ent ot .1J11rpr1se troa an act ot aCssion by . A 

another count1'7. 

(3) To provide unique inf'ormat~on essential to. the successful 

prosecution ot war and vital to a aho.rtening of_ th~ period at hostilities. 

b. Let u l'Ut a glance ~°ii talre a look ·at a pil.etun wldch ..,. 

reflect the e~ent to which 'I'! A I obje~tives were attained 10 :reara ago~ 

next, let us ~ake a look at todq1 a picture; then let us t17 to prognosticate 

what the picture aight be in the near tu.tu.re -- it certain elements in the 

p~oture are not changed; and tinally1 let u t17 to figure out what should q./ 

~ to bring about tbe neceaa11l'7 cbangea, . . . 

2 a. In 1941 there were U/'t-J'/'-""'U'/' in the Armed Forcea only 

two agencies engaged in the pro4uotion ot COllD'l', one in:the .Army, the 

other in the •VT. Ia each case the Agency, was directq under the aipal or 

collllllUDication organiaation ot the service concerned. In the ~)the 

Signal/ Intelligence ·senice wu unde~ the Chief Sipal Otfic~r of the .Arm7J 

in the ~the Code and S~t=: IUICln' the Dlreatlcn ~ •val Ccamunicationa. In :!ft case the Director ot Intelligence ot the ~enice 
REF ID:A42872 

concerned exercised two important functions in r eapect to the 

production ot the COllil!lra 

(1) Be supenised from the Start level the conduct ot COlllll' activities. - .. ~ 

(2) He received, evaluated, and diss•inated the COll?r within hisA.Service 

·and to certain ot~r agencies ~tside~ (llA"4. ~. · 

~+L... . . b. ~Z'f!e tirat tion stated above, that of statt auperviaion, waa 

mrciaod in a rather our110r7 unner. Y•i7 geq,e~t1"'!'• ft~~ 

ffr9 laid cloe ~ar the gaidance of the ClllIJll praclllcing llDi~h e wao DO . 

dq-to-dq, detailed, and minute scl"lltiDT by Intelligence of the actual 

operations as. th97 were conducted.• ishe •W 01 owwwm1:teat!bh-diiidiii\ _ e>n.q. . . 

in a Ye-q general wq was there direction as to priorities and the CCllIBl' unit.al ·~ T 

used~ own best judgem~t, ~to a_ ~~~~-de~ee.~ Ill bot~ Services the aecond 

function stated above1 that of evaluation and dias•ination, was regarded and . safeguarded jeal.nsl,y as the prerogative ot Intelligence and .mY.t Ot Intel ligeDCe. 

In .fact, it was made ve-q clear to the producers of COllIIrl' that their prod~t 

was ~ COMI:lr at all; that it was •rel,y raw 3-n(ormatiqn which beaame <ml:l.l' 

'onlJ' after it had _been ml.uated b.J' Intelligence •. (Thia view la still 

zea~l,y •intained by Intelligence.) 

3 a. On 7 Dec•ber 1941 the United States Armed Forces i.mtf'er,ci a • 

•ajor disaster b~cauae ot a Japanese eneak ·attack at Pearl Barbor. T~e 

aneral investigations conducted during and after the war showd that the 

Intelligence authorities had been pravided with perfectll' authentic . • .Properl,y 

communicatioDB intelligence which, it it bad been/ evaluated aDd disseminated, 

''''/would at least have prnented olll'" b•ing completeq taken by surprise. 

But the intelligence authorities did not perform their function properl,y and we we 

were nertaken by" a di · severe saster the consequencea ot Which went t b - . 2 . ar 9J'ond 
REF ID:A42872 

those llUf'fered at Pearl Barbor. Bawner, throughout the war tbat euued tl:B 

COil.ir producers in the Serv1cea provided communications intelliganoe that•• 

. _properq waluated and diss•inatad, and.•• vital to a shortening ot the 

period ot hoatilltlea. 

b. It is clear, therefore, that in World ~ II the third cited 

objective ot collll1UD1.cat1ona intelligence was attained iD .full measareJ the 

aecoad one was completel.7 miaaedJ and the first one was attained to a degree 

after the war started but waa entirel.¥ Iii.seed betore th• comnenc•ent ot 

hostilities. 

c. Bow a few words as to organisation. In the Arrq, The C<llil'.l' 

producer• remained under the Chi et Sign&l Officer but short:q aft.er. 

. ~ l'~!nJ °:fr. . . Pearl Barbor,l\Intel.J.ii8nce ~ p~iDg a mob mor~t1Zl.°~ta 

aupeniao17 tunctions UDtil...iii"'\he end of the war S:atelligeaee t1wk over 

. ~ 

the whole operation, 10 that .Jtt" not only mpenieed but alae conducted the eJ)~,"'5-r . 

.. 

_f\aotiyitiea. The Signal Corps was puahed out ot the picture and todq 

that organisation is still out et the pictmre.· In· the 1a,,.,., too, the .. 

Producers ot COllIB.r remained under the Direetor ot laval CODllllUD1catlons ' . ..-k 

but ahortq after Pearl Barbo-r, lilt.a 1 111 n ~egan pl.qing a leas actiYe 

nle 1n the field or was, bJ' certain clrcwnStancea, pr8'1ented trma 

~~.z . .hrr u'fr" 

plajying as active a role as •llS A Mil:~IC'.17 Intelligence in the klll.Y. In 

fact, at the encl of the war it would have been said that tor all practical 

- purposes .laval Intelligence bad been pushed out ot the picture. ·But in 

the few 7ear8 that have passed since the end of the war_ Raval IntelllgeDOe 

has regained much of the ground it bad lost in the 7ears following 

7 Dec 41 and is now veriy much in the COllIHJ.' pictdlre. 

J. So mu• to,r the backward glance at the situation. lfow tor a 

loot at todq1 a picture. ' 
.• 

REF ID:A42872 

4 a. The dieastroua experience of Pearl lf;arbor. and the i:mrestigationa 

referred to above should have had. some salut0l7 effect.>~. 

~ ao that,. presumabl.7, we should at least be in a better 

position now as regards all intelligence and in particular, COUINr, than we 

were before Pearl Barbbr. Are we 7 Let us •••• 

b. As reg~da Horth Kor~did COJIIllr pr~ide authentic information ot 

the t;ype referred to in Par. 1 a (1) T lone whatner. Did-CC.Ill!' eliminate·. -L.. 

<).,. ~ID ,j..) \/\ 

ce.,_ the el•ent k ~ 

of surprise troa an act of aggression? Again ~--- J10t at all. ~ 

.... 1h11J\ that from. an intelligence point ot view, the u.s. was in a 

worse position before the outbreak of hostilities in Korea than it was· 

~~ ~~M~tJT.w-a.o~·...,_A.~- betora Paarl Barbort. ~ because in the Pearl Harbor I\ a"'11Mlea. ~ere e~ > 

••,,at least) a good deal ot Co.MIBr a.i>pll~ble ~he situation• ai.he11gh h •• 

D.,. Und prep8HJrj ~ the lorean ~tll:s HPS ~as not ffeD an 

·. Q.o M.1--trr t: """' ~ ~t- . t 

opportunity to. ~•at. whether~• would"-bave bean u~ed prop•:~ -- ther as no 

COIINl' to begin withJ · • · . 

~ 

. c ~ ~ ~~~o~ ~ ~ Cl'u1.~.t ~~ o... 

~~~w~,·~rr---- ~. . 

...... .:4"•· On 20 Juq - the .Joint C011111ttee on thit IJlYeatigation ot ti. 

\'earl Barbor Coaittee •ubll1tted 1ta firaal report (Senate Document lo 

.' ~he tollow1.Dg r.e~oml'lendation bas been e~ract.ed tro• ita aet ot tiT• • 

· princi~l recom:r.endationa (p.253)1 ______ .. __ ....___.. 

4 

·' 
REF ID:A42872 

•that there be a coaplete integration of Al'1!7 and la!l intellkence agencies in order to avoid the pitfalls of divided reaponsibilit:r which gperience.has macte so abundant:r apparent; that upon 

eftecting a unified intelligence, oi"ticera be selected for intelligence 

work who possess the background, penchant, and capacit:r for such work; 

and that they be •intained in the work tor an extended period ot time 

in order that thv ma,y bec•e steeped in the 1'Ul1f icationa and :ref inementa 

of their field and empJ.ot thia reservoir o1" knowledge in ev&luating •terial 

received , • • ·• ltf'icient intelligence aenicea are just as 

essential in tiJle of peace as in war, and this branch of our armed 

senices ll'liat &lwvs be accord!d the 11Dpo:rtant roie which it deserves.• 

£.rq empbaaii/ 

b. The following is the ir*roductory stat•ent to the series of 25 

recommendations concerning •sapeNisol"J", administrative, and organizational 

,def"icienciea in our militar,v and naval establishments reYealed by the Pearl 

Harbor iDYeatigation• (p,253)1 

•The Committee baa bee~ intrigued throughout the Pearl Barbor 

proceedings b,y one enigmatical and p&ra11ount questions !hy. with 

some ot the finest intellkence available in our hiatorr ••• 

!ht was it possible 'for a Pearl Barbor to occurT fco1111ittee•s 

· •phaaia_7 • • , .JUndamentalq, these considerations reflect 

aupeniaory, administrative, and organisational deficiencies which 

existed in our llilital"J" and la~al establishments in the dqa before Pearl 

Harbor ••• • We desire, however, to ml:mit these principles f'or the 

consideration of our Arrq and Ba.V7 establishments in the earnett hope 

that aamettilyr constructiTe ma.v be accomplished that rill aid our national 

5 
-· 

·.,., 

. . def'ena• and preclude a repetition of the disaster of Dec•ber 7, 1941 .•• 

C1lT ..q,baai•J . . ·. . . · -f 

a. 'f~e. tollning are. t.O ~ the aet of 25 recoame~~iona referred t~ £ b~b~& ' 

. ·~~::t:-:==~: :::::b=~:~~~· .. ~- •a. The eoordb&tien and proper nalnation ot intell:lgenoe hi times j 

of at re a a must be insured b7 continuit7 of service and centralization 

. of responaibilit7' in c~etent ofticials, • .. lnerthelesa, there is 

. \aubatantial ba.ais~::-rrom a r9V'i8w or the Pearl Harbor IDYestigation .. in 

\its entire't7, to conclude that the aystm of handling inelligence w ~- ·~ . 

seriouag at tault and that the securit:r of the-•tion can be insured 

enl,y through continuity ot service and centralization of responsibility. 

4.n those i:b&rged with handling intelligence•.. . ·[""7 empbaaisJ (p.257) 

8 a. Exactl.7 tour 79ars ha•e passed since the Joint Comittee submitted 

its report. In calling attention to the -superYisory, adll1nistrat1"t, and 

organiiiational deficiencies in our militarJ' and naval establishmen1- the 

Committee noted in its introductol"J' atat~ment that •It is recQgnizecl that ~ \'$ 

- ~ 118.l\Y Of' the deticienciea revealed by our investigation mq ~ery- probably J 

have alr-.dy been corrected aa a result of the experiences of the war,•· The r ta~it ~8Ullption was incorr~~ "ell ~J it has DD bule in fact.· 9V'eD todq, t:)' 

_. . Have. all the defioiellci•• rwealed b.r the ilw•et!ptlon been corr8ctedT By no -J 

tr ... ~ means - not ffen the most important onea. Ha.a t~ Joint Committee' 1 •lal'Deat _, 

j- ~. bope.·that something conatruotiYe mq be aco~lis~ed tl:a.t will aid our . t _C{.....J;..... . ~· 

~~~· m1'1-l cletenao and preclllde a reeetit!on ot tbe diautN" ot D-ber 7, i 

Yf ~ been realized" T Jl~he lorean debacle speaks tor itsel.t'. Bothing~ w¢I ~ - -~~ ~ ~}to\«ai~~o...-.. .. ...,~,,...>­ . _ .w· constl"IJC~ive/\ m the :field 01 1Btell'8aaee •• aeie~~ u a ri&alt 

• f, . C~a:l= : ~:tag tta & ot boo 1511J-oo ........... , A ~ d;k /t"tr'»J.c:v. .. ~ 1- -~ ~~----~l~_~F~~~~- ~-:"}~.; ~~~~=:~-~-
REF ID:A42872 

~ ~- .• ~.u.J..! ~jo.."'· k 

b. I\~ •a . complete integration at A:nq and laVJ' intell~gence 

agencies in order to avoid 

~ 

the pi~alls ot di!ided.respo.nsibili~7~. ae recommeaded 

4-. L.v.,kt4:.~·ol ~o.r·c.~•Oμt.~v 

• the bf id c··='tt 1~ Far ~rom/\.lw nm ha.'it three ~8.f;:,!•t,in the . 

Department of Detenae inatead ot two, as was the o~se before Pearl Harbor: the 

Air Force, established as a .separate Service after 

~ 

Pearl Barbor, also had to ha'9'8 

,Ua og intelligence organization •. The situation 1s,far worse than before ~ea,rl 

Barbor in :respect to·thia question of integration of'. intelligen~e agencies. . . Whereas before Pearl Barbor there w~re tor all practical purposes, onl.7 two 

·such ·agencies in the Goverment as a whole, in the U.S. there are now at 

least fifteen ope~ting agencies and/or coordinating bodiea ~Ying something 

or other to do with intelligence in general and COIIlft' 1n·particular1 

·1) Director of Intelligence, 

u. s. Artq 

2) Director of Intelligence, 

U.S. B&V7 

3) Director ot Intelligence 

tJ. S. Air Force 

4)·Joint Intelll~nce 

Committee (JCS) 

5) Intelligence Ad'9'1sol"J' Com• 

mlttee (Interdepartmental) 

6) Aned Forces Securit7 Agenq 

(.AFSA) 

7) Armed Forces 8acurit7 Agency Council {AFSAC) · 

8f ,Arrq Securit7 AgeD07 {ASA) 

7 

, 

(9) •VT Securlt7 Agenc;y (OP-202) 

(10) Air Ferce Securiv Senice (AFSS) 

{ll) Central. Intelligence Agency 

(12) Of.fie• ot the Special Assistant to 

the Secre'taJ'J' ot·state .for Research . and Intelligence.· 

(13) Director ot Intelligence, 

Atomic Inergy C01111ission 

{14) l!'ederal.Bnrea.U of Investigation 

(15) United State~ COllllllllllications 

Intelligence Board · 
REF ID:A42872 

c. Each ot these agencies ia constantq and conscientiouaq .atriTi.ng 

to maintain its own prestige and prerogatives; not onq·that, but all 

those engaged in intelligence operationa compete with one another tor tunds, 

and the funds are quite limited tor intelligence. (But there is plenty of 

money to erect a continental radar fence to give warning, about 30 - 60 

minutes, ot an air attack on the u •. s.) 

d. BaTe the Defense agencies followed the recommendation •that upon 

effecting a unified intelligence, otricera be seleqted tor intel- • • • J 

ligence work who posseaa the backgroblld, penchant, and capacity for such 

work•? Far tor it. 

Have 

th~••••1° 11t i been •maintained.,..in.the wort tor an extended period of 

time in order that they my become steeped in the r.amitications and 

retin~ents ot their tield and employ this reservoir ot knowledge in 

evaluating uterial·receiTed6 7 Let these facts speak fir themselTea1 

Since ~ 

Pearl Harbor the Jrrq, for instance, baa had ab: Directo:ra of. . a.Q.Q. '>..() ~ ~ M. MA~·•• p...M.a_ ~..l 

I~t~ll~enci; ,.,_not. a ~ngle one or th• had~J~~t.....,.:>;.ling knowledge or ••••~••-.ilP. 

'°'"25 i:::-J;;.~ _in the f'lelJf ot intel.l.igenae before bia uoigment to the 

position. In the past five ye~s there hoe been two Dirtl,ctors ot Raval 

IntelligenceJ and the A~ Force, since its eatabiiahaent as a separate Service 

onl;r three£~ ago, alreadT bu ito oecoad Director ot Intelllpnce, tho 

first one I\ ' in office· ieas than one year. (Incidentally and in t~~a 

connectio:n it is of interest to note that the CIA, created early in 1946, has 

its third Directoz: alreadT, and talk abou~ a fourth became current months 

ago.) W •be l:e aald tb be '\lac moA llbl; •• aeeadv ••1 ;e,ecl ~wceasw 1e 
REF ID:A42872 

-.4-(~~~~~~(~~~~ 

\""~~~~. "'9 ~. ~ 7~ ~(~ 

W 1.~··» • eW wJCl aielE m:;:•:ta tao~tJ In former .dqs there might have \ .· ~ 

been some excuse tor selecting as Di~ctors of Intelligence officers from -1 

some arm auch aa Intantl"J', Cavalr7, etc., but since Intelligence baa come ,Ji 

to be ao compllc tecbnicaJ.4r and so vital strategicallJ, it would seem ~ 

that experience in the field should be a !'~~-~~- ~~ tor the selection ot ~\ a)r.ctor.ef 't.talligence. How can there be &JV' eood basis for the selection ~ . r o~ Directors of Intellige~e in the absence ot a separate technical corps j 

theret.orT Would one expect the ~ignal Service ot the. Anq' or the &"o-unicatioa r 

"Service ot the laV71 or .a .. laes e6 the Air.._ ~llllllUD1cationa to be ~ 

operated satistactoril,y it there were iio such organizations as the Signal_ 

Corps, the Raval Commuioationa Service, or Air· ~~ications, and it the mea 

. ~c~ 

silected to be the heads ot those organizations knew nothing about communications . . " - · . . !' before their selection! · · ·- ,... > oi- ~··~ O>e&~ .. ~- '~~-i:Jl: Ia /.U--J'IH there st mecb&lia~ ~ whereby the data,..••••••• by 

/.~:,,.. ·_ · · t;rnic!r-::.rationa in the whole field ot intelligence mq t>t .correctq _ ...,~ ,/\ ~.~~fO'iu.1t t-101 ~~'tY" •. 

evaluated and properl,- diss•1natetr"6j a centralized authorit~7 GUtt" ~he 1.orean/~ 

debacle speaks tor itself in this regard. 

~ ~~·~~~l Harbor investigation ~d been completed 

(}"--~and none ot.the/\.Comm1tttf:1 a recommendations~ been adopted, a plan waa . . 

sulDitted tor the establishment of at least a central evaluation and disseniination 

organi• for the COMil'l produce~ w1 th~ the Armed Services. An organisation . 

. \\o..~ 

1 _ _ called COHSIDO~s ~oposed. The p~. was d.t,cuase!i at length, but ~-

~~"-"""- A~-.h r..o..u.~ .·. -. · ... ~. ·. - CONSIDO ".AD hoc-ed• to death, ...... the amancies concerned. ff:•~-~ f - - - - - :J - -.:;-_ - rn r . 
REF ID:A42872 

R.. I .Q..tt:J.a ... 9 d 

-- ---~zl:lll~=/31~~!!!MIWa;....~~~~~~~~~~~~~LiCl..a:2r 

.~~~:K.14---~~~~~~~~-&~_:_ __ 

--- ----- --------· -~-- ---------Jt::;;;::=-:::::;;-;;;;;;;::;;;;=-;;;,;;;-;.;;,;-·;;:-;,;;;:-;;:;----- --- --·----. - ·--·--

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REF ID:A42872 

i· ·i, .. _ · ··. ,;~ course. is that Korean cQlllllWlications were "•1'7 ·low on the priorities lU 0 

. ,f- a:...A. te...-t- Af: Sf)- tJ.oe.. . ~ ""4.J-'~-.&.OJ. ~ • • 

A.FSA operations. _...that AF~ does no~ a~blish. thi.e prioritiea,I\. ~ch an answer 

.!IL satiaf)' AFSA authorities but it would hardq aatis~ the American people 

who pq tor AFSA1 a actlYl~l.es. ~ 

1h--- In roapeqt to APSA'11o-i~&m-eot 89J&W 4o 

attl~in, in the lePee dh~, l\a ft~ets tw~Gancior should compel 

the admis·sion t~t AFSA itself is not altogether . blameless) ~·--one of the 

pr1mar;y desidera,ta in COllIBI' operations is tecbnHal con~inuiq. Thia should 

be maintain•~~·~~~ ~e~t and processing priorities sat by 

Intelligence. I\ llllintenance of technical continuity ia .AFSA 1 a responsibility. 

It is not onq important as an aid to the large-scale or wartime production ot 

COMDT, should that become nece.ssar;, ba.t also it serves as a sort of-

. . ti»J ~ g......,..... ;,,..,.·a thermometer of conditions in~ area )"'which * COllI~~. Had ~ . " " . 

.AFSA been •intainingtechnic8:1 continuity on North Xor~a, it is passible or 

. . 10 
REF ID:A42872 . ' (ft"'° ~ll'"· 4:)fA ~i.u tb..o ~JI•~ ~ 40.,\{,.e),- ~ \A~ ~~r ~~-f<.e~4..~v..~:u., 

~-. ~ ~d--u.;A.~a ~r.:.~~)~ ~ r-a-~~ ~ JJtll~-'ilt. ~Ao-U'.6'"~.. ' -· ,.., 

even probable that a deol'J'll\ now ·and then Wllllld have ab011D ~ r~ temperature and direction in ~ich the wind was blowing.,.(Upon ~dications ot a 

storm, _intercept and processing priorities would _s0on enough bave ~en 

changed by Intelligence. I believe that the the01'7 on which priorities are t:l.~ . . 

being established is ilit"out at P-haae with what it shoulP be. Instead ot dJ&.!;f.. I ~ . 

Intelligence setting ~e pr~ori~ies ~or 'JlA~A. a1 r.e~s intercept ~nd • · ~4o,e.L..~~ru..JJ.~A,~·~~le_ processing, AFSA ~~d~R pJlllc•M:i1• ....JPH'S · ~ 

c. Pri~rities tor AFSA's COJII.l'l' operations are set by the Intelligence ~ 

authorities, and the latter receive guidance from the National Securit7 . ' 

Council. What is the composition of the .ICST The President, the Secretar,y 

ot State, the Secreta1'7 ot Defense, the Secret8.1'1' of the lir'fq, the Secretarr 

Go 

ot the BaV7, the Secreta17 ot the Air Force, and the Chairman of the Rational c;l"'-

Sacurit7 Resources Board. · The l8C, among other things, sets pill.icy and 

· preswaabq in so doing it must •PlOJ: Intelligenee. It is bard to see how 

C. 

"' f-

.r 

~ 

poli07 could be formulated without it. Who provides the m~bers of ISC with the£. 

119aeaaary illt.ell~ef llb,y, thaTel'J'..,... "1rie1ala who are euppoaed.to ~~ 

receive, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence to the members of the RCS -- I> 

""!'\ 

The Directors ot Intelligence! (And with rare except.ions, and tor the reasons ~ f- ~the Jo:tnt C-ttee an the luvaet.!ption of the Attack an Pearl llarbcr, E 

those officials were :aot and sti;Ll are not technicalq competent to do.the job, Pre~u of how ._eteni thq ...,. othond.ae he ae- Pneral or ·flag . '$, 

officers). In short~ it appea,ra that tha'~telligence. which the members of ~ 

the 1SC need in order to establish valid poliQJ" determines what intelligence -~ 

the)' will get - a closed circle leading nowhere and having its analogy in ·$-· 

the apeataele of a eat ehaaillg its Dlll1 ta:tll 1'hera was no :l.utelligenoe or at~f 

·leut DO COllillr ral&t.ing t:, ~...::::!ft ~ Unit..i Statea Pol!q before the y 

r- --·--··-------------------- -- ·-
REF ID:A42872 

outbreak ot the Korean -.r disclaimed all milita17 interest in Korea, 

conaequentl.7 there ws DO Intelligence interest in that area; 

conaequentq ·USCIB bad no interest; consequentq, the ·USCIB priorities 

committetp had DO interest; conaequentl)r, Korea was Ifo. 15, categor;r B 

on the priori"ties list; consequentq, AFSA bad ver;r little CCIII.Ir !Jiterest; 

consequentq and final.17 no lorean COMIBl' was produced. Ia the vicious 

circle clear! And what were the consequences of continuing to follow · 

the vicious cirale? The firs~ an~ second objectives of COMil'f.l' were agai.n 

missed altogether. Pearl Harbor -- •strike one!• Korea -~ •strike "t~I· 

Three strikes -.- and we're &I Will there be a third strike! 

'J a. In Par.1.b above, I proposed that n take a backward glance, then 

take a look at "the present picture, and tinalq tey to prognosticate what the 

tutur.e picture might look like unless certain changes are made in the 

situation. One thing is clear. The situation is one which gives rise to 

the ve'r'J' definite tear that there 1118.7 eaaiq be. a third strike. It so, will 

it be possible tor AFSA"to attain the third and final objective of COMIITT 

Perhaps. Might. it not be better to avoid,· it poaaible, strike three? 

Certainl1'. Bow can this be done? I do not know the answer to that question 

in ·detail. But ot this I aa sure: the proper basis for finding the answer 

can be laid onq by getting rid of the three present Directors ot Intelligence, . . 

or by getting AFSA out trom tinder the incompetence, or, tinalq, by AFSA . . . in 

purauing its own WB7• it possible, without or despite their •gaidance•/certain 

respects. I remember, in this connection, how in the dal's of 19.38-39 th~ 

Signal Intelligence service Ullder the .Chief' Signal Officer worked on Japanese, 

German and Italian coltJlllUD1cations; and when it c8Jlle to the attention of G-2 that 

· we were working on the latter' two, German and Italian, G-2 al>reaaed. displeasure, 

raised eyebrows, and wanted us to concentrate everything on Japanese. 

12 
' 

REF ID:A42872 

The SIS. went on working 'on Ge1'111&11 and Italian. Suddenq, in 1941, 

G-2 bad to have GerlllSll and Italian COllIIT. LuCkiJ.y ( t) SIS could give 

G-2 something. It was ,E the vision ot G-2 which made that possible. 

b. AFSA ia having ~ ditticulties in carr,ying on its job.. In fact 

I 

at the moment -- and this is becoming clearer each d&7 -- there is considerable 

doubt about whether it will hold up ,under the strain, or fold up. 

Who for the most part are at the root of and are causing AFSA these 

difficulties? The Directors ot Intelligence. Who #J't"4e are the culprits 1D 

. . 

the failure to' establish long range a centralized evaluation and diSS8Dlination . . . organization tor the AFSA product t The sam.e men. 

c. When will it become evident to the Commandel'-1n-Chief that we need 

. I 

a thorough housecleaning in the whole field ot U.S. Intelligence and perhaps 

a Czar in that field to over-ride inter-service and iJ.dler-agenq rivalries, 

. .. bickerings, and conpetion for funds, .preogatives and preatiage? Or is it too 

late alre&dTt 

8 a. There is reason to bel~eve that a complete consolidation of 

facilities and integration ot· operations in the Intelligence fii:ld could work, 

and work succesafullT, it the entire problem were handled, realisticalq, at ;:.. 

the highest governmental level. The following are absolute prerequisites,(cS,ql 

to such auccess1 

(l) The desigDation ot an energetic, torcetul, am:l intelligent 

man who has had actual experience in the fields ot intelligence and who 

would be given NJ. command.of all intelligence activities ot the United 

States. 

13 
REF ID:A42B72 

(2) His rank and authorit7 over the individual Sel"V'ioe or Age11C7 

intelligenee chiefs should ~e clear and unquestionable. The delegation, 

to such a commander, ot allloat dictor1al powers over all the aotivi ties 

should be subject onq to the e.uthor.1.t7 of the President. 

~3) He should be maintained in ottice continuousl;y, subject onq 

to-the successf'Ul performance of his mission. 

(4) He should be given full r~sponsibilit7 tor the collection ot raw 

material, its processing into ~eadable form, and the waluation, and 

dissemination of the final product. 

(5) In each ot the Services there should be established a separate 

corps tor intelligence operations, so tbt in~elligence can be made a 

. Service career and not a headache to those assigned to intelligence 

work for other arms or services. 

b. Action· on a proposal such as the foregoing might involve the 

disclosure of more information than has fJV'er before been made public. For 

example,· certail'l disclosures might have to be made as to COllIRT. But it 

would seem that public admission ot the fact that COMill' can be and otten is a 

pril11ar7 potential weapon would be a a•ll price to pq tor having an 

effective organization which. when established, co~ld take care of itselt 

as regards publ1cit7. especiall;y in view of the existence of Public Law 513. 

It is true that securit7 restrictions pla1'ed a large part in the failure to 

use COllilll' properq in the -case of Pearl Harbor disaster. The same 

restrictions mq be in part to blame for the present plight of COMilfl' 

activities. The7 have largel;y prevented the sto17 of the part plqed 

tr" these activities in our winning World War II tram reaching 

the highest l89'el persons who, in the tiJJ&l analysis,· control them. It 

seems lime to acknowledge that such activities are being conducted. The 

14 
REF ID:A42872 

high lnel· personnel of other countries undoubtedq know that· tact. Wb7 'not 

tell our own people -- and thus gain the public support we need tor 

these activitiea7 

9 a. There ia, however, in 117. opinion not eno1igh tille lett to put 'across 

such an idea aa is brief~ outlined in Par. 8 a. DIRAFSA should go ahead on 

his own initiative- and do certain th~s. · 

b. In rq mind there is no question that JCS 2010 affords a basis tor 

resolute action in these respects: 

(1) Putting the residual Cl"JPtologic services in their Pl'!>Per 

place in the scheme or thi:qs. Were it not tor the st~ong support of the. 

Directors ot Intelligence, the Service Cryptologic .Agencies could not 

behave as tb97 do. The Directors or Intelligence exercise .their 

1ntluence b7 virtμ.e ot their· presence on USAC, a control bodJ' now I 

intermediate between AFSA and the JCS, and a boq that has proved to be so 

intractable as to impede AFSA's progre88'. I know tbat JCS 20VJ/6 

establishes a clear-cut channel tor relations between DIRAFSA 

and the JCS and that this channel involves AFSAC. I wish to' point 

out that in the basic docwaent JCS 2010, the coancil •s intended to be 

au~h. an f<!vi1on boq intemal to AFSA. The pertinent. paragraph £~.s7 

reads: •An Al'lled Forcea Comun1cationa Intei'llgence .Advisory. ·council 

(AFCUC') shall be established within the Armed Forces Seour1t7 Agenq.• I 

think that that is nactq what •& intended, to~ Par. 3& of JCS 2010 'States& 

"Subject to the .Chorit7 and direction ot the Secret&l7 ot Defense, the 

Jo:lDt Chiefs of Staff' will exer~iae direction, authority and control '!'Y•r 

the Armed Forces Seaurit7 Agency•. It does not 8q that this •direction, 

·authority and control" will be exercised through AFCIAC. In JCS 2010 APCUC . . 

could not recommend; not control. But. iutead ot bei.Dg a creature ot 

AFSA, JFSA has become a creature of AFSAc! How n.a this done7 

lS 
REF ID:A42872 

B7 .AFSAC itself, in realit1, even though JCS 2010/6 waa approved by the 

JCS. fhe anom.lGUS, .it not abnrd, situation that now a::ista is that 

the Directors o£ Intelligence, who should be puppets of the JCS and thus, 

ia turn, of DIBAFSA, so far as regards c17Ptolog_lc activities, are 

pulling the strings and controlling decisions ot their •atera, .J . . . . 

the JCSJiD those activities. lhat I mean to point out la that 

AFSA, ·an agency ot the .res, and dlrectq 'Un.der the:lr control , is 

now being dicbted to bT officials on, a level lower than the .res. 

DIW'SI., inste&ci ot beirig in a position to dictate to the Directors ot 

Intelligence as regards utters in the C1"JPtologic field, la taJdng . 

dictation from these Directors. 
REF ID:A42872 

~ In the various fields of intelligence is there .EE bodJ' which has 

the tinal authority and is gomeetegt t~chnigal__Jz to establish v.;l.id priorities 

9 

:. 
REF ID:A42872 

·'fw'Orsv ~ ~·~o, l~v.-o ~ 

in the collection and prcoeu:l.ail ar 1Dtell!.gence7 Obvious],)'; the ........... ia \' 

in the ·negative, tor there •••• to ~ve. been a plethora ot -~ourcea tor such J 

intelligence wh~ch, it it had been produced and correctq evaluated would, 1n ~ 

all probabilit7, have indicated quite claarq. what waa brewing in Korea •. • . 1 ~~..f...t ~~· !. a~tion on auch· a larp scale as J(s now obvious "could. hard.11'. have bee~ launc~e~,(j' 

without long . preparation and extensive COBlllUDicationa. 

IE$ft \..,, .... . .e--..,,.l 

Badl\"bhe 

le-.tlatter .,...R,. ~ea• ~ 

·mm·risptec! •rd prnu 1, it is quit.a possible that we eould have bad ample . . 

forewarning of what waa illpending and at least the authorities would have bean able 

to plan intelligentq (COllIBr objective lfo. 1) and perhaps the7 would not bave 

· been taken by surprise ·(CCIII.Ir objective lo.2). I aaaame (at the moment), that . . 

COJD:lll' objective lo. 3 is being sought aatisf'aetoriq.