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'ARLJHGTON HALL STAT ION ,_: 

, .· , REF ID :~4146452 

Date ( ~. _,__ 7 __ _ To From 

. Gen. Stoner Col. Corderman 

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REfl'±'RIGT:.31) C01WIDl3U'HAL .... ~~~~~._ 

eclassified and approved for release by 

SA on 1 0-14-201 4 ursuant to E .0. 1352 
v 

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SPSIS 311.5-Gen. 

8 July 1943 

To: Colonel Corderman 

Subject: Preliminary Report of Trip to England 

1. This is in the nature of a preliminary and general ~eport of my visit to England. Detailed reports on the vario~s 

operations and activities observed will be submitted at a 

later date. 

2a. · The activities to which I devoted the major portion 

of my time and attention at BP were those in connection with 

their handTing of German Army and German Air Force high grade 

secret communications. A detailed report of those operations, 

which are very complex but well coordinated, will be made as 

promptly as time and opportunity affords •. It is a story which 

has never been written. It may not be amiss to indicate in 

this preliminary report, however, that British success in this 

field represents, without question, the most astounding and the 

most important cryptanaly~ic and intelligence achievement in 

all history. · · 

b. Their achievement is astounding not only because 

of the breadth of the concept upon which the operations are based 

and of the directness with which they are prosecuted, but also 

because of the maimer in which the British tackled and su.ccessfully solved a cryptographic system which apparently presents 

insurmountable and impenetrable bulworks against attack by pure- cryptanalysis. It must be understood that the solution was 

attained not by pure Dryptanalysis at all but by exploiting _ to the fullest degree possible the_weaknesses injected into the 

system by the methodicalness of.the Germans in their formulation 

and operation of the system, by studying and making use of the 

well-known German addiction to fixed habits, and by taking 

advantage of the occasional carelessnesses and blunders on the 

part of German cipher clerks. The margin upon which the 

British had and still have to operate in their solution is 

indeed a very narrow one, so far as technical cryptanalytic 

weaknesses in the system are concerned, but dogged British 
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persistence, extremely painstaking attention to minute details, 

and brilliance in coordinating and integrating into one vast picture the many small operations involved, have brought about a 

success beyond the wildest expectations of any cryptanalyst's fancy. 

I 

c. Moreover, the success the British have attained 

and continue to attain in this field is also astounding in that 

they have been able to keep the whole operation utterly secret 

from the enemy for so long a time, d~spite. the hundreds of 

people who participate in the operations and despite the very 

tenuous threads upon which these operations rest--threads which 

might be broken by a mere whisper in the proper place at any 

moment. How they have maintained security will also be told. 

d. The British success in the solution of E communications is-the most important cryptanalytic achievement in all 

history because it is, in fact, largely responsible for Britain's 

continuance in the present war: . the Battle of Britain in 1940 

was won largely on the basis of information provided by this 

source. It is perhaps also largely responsible for the military successes of the United Nations in the North African 

theater, and for the successful conduct of the Battle of the. 

Atlantic. Indeed, the E operations constitute Churchill's 

"Secret Weapon" and its very exis:tence and astonishing accomplishments constitute the most carefully guarded secret of the 

many secrets of this war • 

. 3. In the course of my tour through the many divisions 

at BP I was given the opportunity of making detailed notes 

of my observations, a courtesy which is not accorded as a rule 

and reflects the spirit of cordiality and cooperation accorded 

me by the GC & CS directing heads. When the time ror my departure came it was realized that nobody had hitherto been 

permitted to carry away such highly s~cret and detailed information and accordingly it was agreed that these notes Should 

be.transported by the official BP courier in the regular diplo- matic bag. In order to insure that my·note-taking should not 

have been in vain, in case of accident, a complete microfilm 

negative of the notes was made at BP at .my request, and it was 

further agreed that this microfilm should be retained there 

until word of the safe arrival of the originals reached BP. 

To write a detailed story based upon these notes, which arrived 

without mishap after a couple of weeks, will be a job requiring 

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much time and labor but I hope to keep at it as steadily as 

possible until it is completed. 

4. During the course of .my_ sojourn and especially while 

in London numerous telegrams were sent to Washington~ embodying 

the gist of the observations and impressions of myself, Colonel 

Alfred McCormack, GSC, and Lieutenant.Colonel Telford Taylor, GSC, the latter two officers accompanying me on the trip. 

Except as regards the E operations I believe those telegrams 

cover fairly well the story of what we saw. However, even at 

the risk of some duplication, I hope to prepare special reports 

on all the activities observed by me, with a view to presenting 

a unified picture of the British·accomplishments in our field. 

5. The things which most imppessed me during the whole of 

my tour through GC & CS operations are these: 

a. The importance of continuity of studies. They 

have many: people who have been engaged in this field ever since 

1914. Their experience and training constitutes the most 

valuable asset of the British Government in the intelligence 

field.. Their Continuity of records of past studies constitutes 

the greatest store of cryptanalytic treasure in the worlda source of information that is useful every day. 

b. The close attention they give to minutiae of 

detail. No bit of information is too small for them to note 

and to us.e to good advantage.;_: The painstaking records they keep- largely by hand-have paid large dividends. 

£• The fluidity of their organization, which takes 

one who is accustomed to rigidity in this respect quite by surprise. They state frankly, at times, that they have no 

formal organization, can show no detailed charts, or schedules 

of responsibilities; that they added to the organization as 

needs developed, paying little attention to chains of command, 

lines of responsibility, etc. The organizat·ion is distinctly 

not a military organization. Its personnel comprises many people in uniform, of course, but they are superimposed upon 

a purely civil organization of the Foreign Office. The buildings 

and grounds are occupied by a curious conglomeration·of army 

and navy officers in and out of uniform and on-active and inactive· status, of WAAF officers and privates, of. ATS officers 

and privates, of WRNS officers and privates, of civilian men 

and women, of quasi-military people, etc. The person having 

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the longest experience and the most ability in each division, 

section, and subsection runs the show, regardless of uniform, 

rank, or sex. 

d. The ability and high calibre of their key personnel. The largest portion of their leading people are men 

of eminence in their respective fields if they are. University 

people, or if they came f~om the business or professiona+ 

world, as did a few, they were top-notch business and professional men. For the most part, their leading personalities from 

Cambridge and.Oxford are not the young graduates but the older 

more experienced. "dons" and professors, men with wide backgrounds and excellent training in research. 

e. The extent and excellence of their own communications systems. · This is in reality the crux of modern global 

cryptanalysis. The.GO & CS communications networks for contact 

with the many intercept stations producing the raw material and 

with their several cryptanalytic echelons at overseas stations 

are astonishing in their scope and impressive in their efficiency. 

· r. The manner in which complex operations are 

coordinated and integrated to make a unified piet.U:re. The most 

amazing illustration of· this will be found in my report on their 

E operations. 

g_. The manner in which the cryptanalytic work is 

integrated with.the intelligence operations; how the two phases 

react on each other. It became perfectly obvious that-so far 

as military operational cryptanalysis iB concerned the two 

activities must be conducted side-by-side. And as far as diplo- matic cryptanalysis is concerned, the equivalent of military intelligence, which is info~mation ~ed back by· the diplomatic · establishment (Foreign Of~ice, Colonial Office, India Office), 

is just as important in its reaction upon the technical side 

of the work in that field. The contrast between the GC & CS 

situation and our own in this respect was quite striking. In 

both military and diplomatic operations the cryptana,lysis and 

the intelligence phases could, of course, be kept· in more or 

less separate compartments but the British were emphatic in· stating that the loss in efficiency would be considerable.and would 

undoubtedly be reflected in both, thμs yielding an i:ncomplete 

and unsatisfactory picture. 

h. The manner in which traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, 

and intelligence are coordinated and integrated.to make one 

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astonishing, complete; detailed, and accurate picture of the 

enemy's battle order, his communication systems, his supply 

situation, the morale of his tropps, and_his immedia,te as well 

as his long term intentions. It is in this field that we 

should be able to derive much benefit from British experience, 

for they have demonstrated brilttance in it, to judge only from 

the amazing results they have produced. Of course, it must_ be 

noted that they have had four years of active operations in 

which to attain this high level of efficiency but we should 

take advantage of their experience and save time in attaining 

a similar-stage, if possible, in connection with our Japanese 

Army operations. 

i. Finally, I was much-impressed with the manner in 

which the British have tinified, under one parent organization, 

all the cryptanalytic and related intelligence activities of 

all the services, and what is really more important, at the same 

time have set up mechanisms adequately to insure that each of the 

services gets everything it needs in the way.of information arising from cryptanalysis and intelligence thereon for its own 

effective operations. These have been the most important 

elements which led to the establishment and control (for security purposes) of the extremely effective military weapon they now 

possess. Just what the mechanisms they have set up to serve 

the respective services both at home and in the field are, 

how. they function, and so on, must form the subject of a separate 

report. It appeamto the British, at least, that ·without unification such activities can·make an only partially effective 

weapon1'-:_difficult to control, giving rise to unnecessary duplication of effort, conflicts in responsibilities and aims, and, 

on the whole, one that is much more likely to be found out and 

thwarted by the enemy because multiple organizations are· not 

conducive to security control. The foregoing statements are, 

of course, beyond my sphere of interest and responsibility but 

I offer them for what t~ey are worth. 

6. A few words may not be amiss as regards my estimate 

of their technical efficiency and abili~y in pure cryptanalysis. If one were merely to judge them by the language they use in 

their daily activities, or by the terminology and nomenclature 

they employ in technical reports, one might be deluded into · thinking that the British are merely gifted (if not brilliant) - amateurs~but amateurs nonetheless.· They use a jargon all their 

own, especially in the E operations. For_ the most part the 

reports they issue_ in the latter field would be quite unintelligible to people not knowing what the whole thing is about. 

Perhaps the peculiar language is intended as a camouflage, for 

security reasons, but I doubt it. However, it is not the type 
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. of language one us.es· that differen,tia tes the amateur from the 

skilled professional, but .their relative accomplishments. As 

regards the accomplishment of difficult tasks and the solution 

of complex problems I am of the opinion that our own people 

are certainly as good as the British cryptanalysts when pure 

cryptanalysis is all that is involved. But when it comes to 

operating upon a problem where pure cryptanalysis and high 

cryptanalytic skill are of little avail, I am sure that we have 

lots to learn from the British. Their uncanny ability to 

gather up scraps of information and add them together properly, '"'' 

their high class "second story work", their painstaking devotion 

to minutiae, their genius in coordinating the efforts of thou.:. 

sands of people, and, above all, their downright practicality 

when it comes to getting things done, are well worth admiration 

and copying. The successes and achievements of the GC & CS 

has brought them such prestige in the circles of the British 

Government that practically anything within reason they ask for is 

granted them. I am sure they are deserving of this. It is 

reflected, perhaps, in their growth in numbers. I note, for 

instance, that in a report made by (then) Major Kullback after 

his visit there in the summer of 1942 the strength of the organ- ization was 2100 people; now it is 4700,·and is still on the 

increase. Their· chief, Commander Travis, reports directly to 

a man who has direct and frequent contact with the Prime Minister 

himself. The latter ,made a special visit to BP not long ago; and while I was there Mr. Joshua Cooper, the head of the Air 

Section there, was accorded a very high.honor, ·having been made 

a Commander in the Order of St. Michael and St. George, in recognition of his achievements. I cite all this merely by._ way of· 

indicating the importance which the Government attaqhes to the 

work and accomplishments of the GC & CS. 

7a. A chronological account of my tour begins with my departure shortly after l p.m. on April 23, 1943, from the 

National Airport with Colonel Alfred McCormack, GSC, and 

Lieutenant Colonel Telford Taylor, GSC. We arrived in London, 

after a quick passage without special incidents worth noting, 

at 8:30 p.m. (London time) Saturday, April 24. The next day 

I reported my arrival to the Adjutant General's Office Headquarters, ETOUSA~ The afternoon was spent in conferring with 

Colonel George A. Eicher in connection with the Signal Intelligence activities conducted by him in London, under the Chief 

Signal Officer, ETOUSA. The next morning (Monday, April 26), 

in company with· Colonels McCormack and Taylor, I reported to 

General Peabody, the U. s~ Military Attache; the afternoon was 

spent with Colonel Eicher, making a hasty tour· through his · 
REF ID:A4146452 

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SIS activities. We also had a conference with Captain Johnson 

in regard to E matters. Later we _called upon Colonel Black, 

G-2 of ETOUSA. In view of Colonel Bicher's innninent departure 

for the United States we continued our discussion of his and 

British SIS activities during the whole of the long evening. 

b. On Tuesday, April 27, I reported to General 

Rumbaugh, Chief Signal Officer:, ETOUSA, and attended to various 

administrative duties, including the making of arrangements (plirsuant to a telegram from you) to meet Commander Travis the 

next day. A very friendly meeting with the latter was held in 

my room at the Park Lane Hotel about noon on Wednesday, as a 

result of which arrangements were made to call upon Brigadier 

Menzies that same afternoon at 3 p.m. The conference with 

Brigadier Manzies occupied approximately one and a half hours. 

We received a very cordial welcome from him and it was agreed 

that we should proceed with our tour of the activities under . his charge, without reference to the then-pending controversy. 

Brigadier Menzies stated that he wished to facilitate our visit 

and that all GO & CS activities would be open to us for our 

inspection. · 

c. On Thursday, I continued with administrative 

duties and-in the evening I had a very nice meeting with General 

Ingles, being his guest for dinner; Colonel McCormack accompanied me. A first telegraphic report to you-(on our meeting 

with Travis and Menzies) was sent on .this day. 

d. On Friday, April 30, the thre·e of us proceeded 

to Tidworth with Major Damey, Deputy for Colonel Bieber, to 

observe the activities of the Radio Intelligence Company producing .raw material for Colonel Bicher 1 s SIS. We were all most 

favorably impressed with the layout there, with the scope of 

·the SIS activities at the intercept station, as well as those 

in London. · 

e. On Saturday, May 1, Commander Denniston made a 

courtesy call at the hotel and extended a very cordial welcome 

to all of us. We again called on General Peabody, who took us 

up to call upon General.Davidson, Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office. This was a very short and formal call; 

no discussi·on of official business took place. · In the afternoon we made our first visit to Commander Denniston•s office 

and had a brief tal~ which indicated that careful preliminary 

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discussions had taken place between him and Brigadier Menzies. 

It was agreed that we were to present Commander Denniston 

with a schedule of what we wanted to see; such a schedule was 

submitted to him after preparation by the three of us the next 

day. 

f. On Monday, May 3, we made our first visit to 

Bletchley Park, arriving there on the noon train. We were met 

at the station by Colonel Tiltman, who took us to Commander 

Travis 1· office. There we had a :few minutes discussion relative 

to their organization, sources of raw material, methods of getting 

the latter to BP, and its routing thereafter. We were informed 

at this preliminary conference that we were to be permitted to 

see everything at BP except Naval material. This latter decision, 

we were informed, had been made at the request of our own Navy, 

for reasons best known to them; it was with some embarrassment 

that Commander Travis told us· of this. decision. 

. · g·. The afternoon .was spent by me in discus·sions with 

Colonel Tiltman and some of his assistants, at the end of which 

Colonel Tiltman took the three of us for a quick external survey of the buildings at BP. · 

h. There are at BP now over 4700 workers, exclusive 

of. maintenance and guard personnel •. The activities are housed 

in frame "huts" of various sizes, which were constructed in the 

early days (1938) and some of which are still in use. There are 

also 9 new, one-story, brick buildings. We did not go inside 

any of them as· there was insufficient time on this day, except 

tl:et Mr. DeGrey, Deputy for Commander Travis, took us on a rather 

hasty tour of the traffic reception and communication center, 

which will be described in my detailed report later. We returned 

to London in the early afternoon. 

i. The next three days were spent in London going through various sections of Commander Denniston's operations 

in the diplomatic field. On Friday, Colonel McCormack and I 

again went to Bletchley Park arriving there at noon. At this 

time we met Lieutenant Colonel Marr-Johnson from Delhi, India, 

and Lieutenant Colonel Sandford, of the Central Bureau, Brisbane, 

together with two or three others who were going to participate 

in the conference on Japanese Army codes. The opening-session 

of the conference was held immediately upon our arrival, in 

Commander Travis' office. With a few preliminary and carefullychosen words of welcome he outlined the scope of the discussions 

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and indicated the, principal subjects thereof. Commander Travis, 

who was abou:t to depart for Washington, then asked me to act 

as chairman, an honor which I declined in favor of Colonel Tiltma.n, 

in accordance with the requirements of protocol. After lunch 

the conference reconvened and began its work. My next few days 

were taken up with this work and a copy of the minutes of the 

several meetings held have already been received. Occasionally 

during the foregoing conference, when an intermission of an hour 

or two provided an opportunity, I took advantage of the interval 

to meet with various persons of interest, as for example, Major 

Morgan, who is the head of the research group under Colonel 

Tiltma.n, and Mr. Cooper, head of the Air section, with whom I 

spent almost a whole afternoon making a tour through his establishment. In the Air Section I saw Dr. McVittie (head of 

meteorological section) and spent a few minutes discussing an 

accomplishment which he had just finished and which had occupied his attention on and off for about two years. The.solution, · which he finally had just re~.ched after only two days 1 study, is one which yields a five-way crib. The thing which impressed · itself upon me most in connection with the meteorological work 

is that while the results obtained are, of course, useful in 

themselves, they are perhaps more important in that they afford 

first class cribs into· the E and other material. 

j_. On Monday, May 10, we practically completed the 

deliberations on JAC and finished up·what we were able to, 

pending the receipt of further data froin the various centers.· 

It was·agreed that the final session was to be held on.Monday, 

May 17, in order to be able to have Brigadier Harris, chairman 

of the Y Committee, present. . . . ' ' 

k. Monday afternoon was spent with Colonel Pritchard,· 

who is the-}lead of what.they call the No. IV Intelligence School, 

which is not a school at all but conducts cryptanalytic activities 

on German police, Italian military and problems of. -similar nature 

outside the E field. 

J..ltl,t11S I 

1 •.. On Tuesday, May 11, I visi-ted Major E·JaB:ei 1 activities on the WT.side of theE picture. This was the beginning 

of a long tour of observation of how they tackle the·E problem~ 

The totir was interrupted by visits to London and other points. 

From Wednesday, May 12, to Sunday, May 16, the three of us 

continued our t.our of Commander Denniston's activities. 

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m. On Monday, May 17, I returned to BP and took up 

the tour of the E activities from the point where I had left 

off, and this continued, with some minor interruptions, until 

the end of my stay. One of the interesting interruptions consisted in making a visit to Oxford, where I made a tour of the 

code and cipher compilation activities of the GC & CS under 

Commander Hok, which will form the subject of a special report. 

On Saturday, May 29, I returned to London to participate in a 

Signal Corps· conference and tour of the various Signal Corps installations in London. 

n. On Sunday, May 30, Colonel Taylor and I left 

by train for a visit to the largest intercept station run by the British Army, known as "WOYG", meaning'War Office Y Group". 

We were met at the station in London and conducted through the 

show· on Sunday evening and Monday morning by Colonel Lycett, who supervises the Y activities of the War Office. A report 

thereon will be made in detail later. Monday afternoon I returned to Blatchley Park by auto with Colonel Lycett and spent the next four days continuing my tour of E operations and other 

activities. Among the latter visited were Major Morgan's research 

section, the Air Section, the No. VI In-telligence School, and the 

activities known as "ISOS" and "ISK" in the clandestine field. 

All these will be dealt with in special reports. 

o. On Sunday, June 6, I made a journey to Cambridge with Professor Vincent, who is coordinator of certain activities 

at BP. This was-purely a social visit, as there are no GC & .CS 

activities there. I returned to BP at·noon Monday, June 7, 

finished up some odds and ends of work, turned over my notes and 

papers, and left for London in the evening. . ~ . ' 

:Q.. On Tuesday, Lieutenant Colonel Taylor and I made 

a journey from London to the large RAF intercept station at 

Cheadle. A report of the activities thereat will be made later. 

I returned to London in the late afternoon on Wednesday, June 9, 

and found that arrangements had been made by Colonel-McCorillt:!-Ck 

for our return to Washington on the coming Friday. 

~· Thursday and Friday were spent in conference with 

various people at the War Office, among whom were Mr. Williams, 

in charge of code and cipher compilation and distribution for 

the Army; Colonel Lycett, who has been mentioned before; and 

Wihg Conmlander Johnson 9f the RAF security group. Reports of 

these visits-will also be made. -

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r_. Colonel McCormack and I left Londo~ on Friday 

evening, June 11, and arrived at the National Airport on 

Sunday evening, June 13, after an tineventful trip. 

8. I~ closing this preliminary report I wish to indicate 

that I found all the·British with whom I came in contact most 

cordial, 'cooperative, and anxious to show me all I wished to 

see. If I went to England with a high estimate of the ability 

of the people at the GC & cs, I saw nothing that caused me to 

revise my estimate downward, much that leads me to revise it 

in the upward direction. From a technical viewpoint my visit. 

was quite a valuable experience and I derived much benefit therefrom, which I hope can be reflected in future progress. It is 

specifically recommended tpat we try to emulate the British in 

respect to the points which I have cited above as being the ones 

which impressed me most. 

9. Finally, I desire to convey my thanks to all those who 

made my trip possible and afforded me the time and opportunity 

to do so. 

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9J~d William F. Friedman 

Director of Communications 

Research