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REF ID:A43085 

Washington Failures Blametl 

For Korea Intelligence Fiasco 

81' WALTER SIMMONS •

1

disposed along the border in three 

u. s. BDQ. JN XOREA, Aug. 8 defense lines capable of stopping 

<CTPS>-The failure of American any South Korean attack. 

intelllgence at the start of the The intelligence picture during Koi·ean war was partly local and June was clouded. by Russian-in· 

part,ly due tQ a lack of Washing· spired political maneuvers. These 

ton co-ordination. included sudden permission for a These points are notable: United Nations representative to 

1. Intelligence in Korea failed visit the north; the dispatching 

to predict the enemy's June 25 of three North Koreans to the 

D-day. south, and the offer to exchange 

2. Technical intelligence tn Cho Man Sik,_ a famous political Washmgton failed to give the mill· leader held prISoner in the north, 

tary advisers in Korea a. true pie- for several Communists held by 

ture of the Russia.n T·34 tanks the soutl:. 

used so successfully in the first None of these ma.neuvers was 

month of the war. successful. But they produced maximum confusion and misled 

Bad Accurate Dope intelligence experts. Two days be- . . fore the invasion, American ad· 

3. American_ officers in Korea visers who had checked the latest 

had accurate information on"the estimates were told flatly there 

North: Korean mi~itary build-up at would be no invasion for a con· all • times. But intelligence was siderable time. " 

foo;.ed by the numerous false in· 

vas1on alarms. Veterans Brought In 

The South Korean army was alerted twice in May e.nd once in Tim intelligence exPerts noted 

June by such false alarms The that from 30,000 to 60,0QO Xorea.n 

Americans had grown so accus- veterans had been shipped from 

tomed tO them that they scoffed Manchuria and Siberia to swell 

when President Rhee and Premier the enemy r&:nk&· Two divisions of 

Mo warned an attack was iJmni. Red Koreans had fought on the 

nent. German front during the war. Such alerts-now recognized as The failure of Washington to 

inspired from North Korea-date emphasize the danger of the Rusback to 1947. American intelli- sian tanks led to fatal compJ.a. 

gence knew and reported these cen~y. Almost no information on facts on the enemy's capabilities: theJ! arm.or and armament was 1. The North Korean army in- available in Seoul when the war· eluded more than 100 ooo men Of broke, although it was in file3. 

these, 2,000 tankers ~ere trained ~e American advisers did not befn Russia. There was at least one llev!' the bazookas and 47 Ml\II. 

regiment of tanks and between 50 antj.-ta.nk guns with which the 

and 100 planes. South Korean army was supplied 

2. The build-up of army strength were capable of stopping these 

began in January with new draft ~a. This disbelief continued 

levies supplementing five Russtan· until the inadequate.- equtpped trained divisions. GIB learned it the hard way. 

3. A zone three miles deep was cleared north of the 38th parallel during the spring. The Americans were not sure whether this was standard iron curtain technique or to prevent military news from 

seeping through. 4. The North Korean army was