REF ID:A601~ 

tlONFIDENTIAl SECURiT'i iNMATION 

Critique and Proposa1 .for Administ.ration or Agency Automatic Sequenced 

Digita1 Canputer Equipnent 

I. Present Situation . l. The present situation at AFSA regarding dig::i..ta1 canputer planning and 

operation will be better understood in the perspective of three types of 

influencing £actors: 

a. Unification, and the residuaJ. influence of the two separate 

lines of developnent that had been under way under the previous 

Army and Navy sponsorship. 

b. Attempts, since unification, to maintain proper balance, 

between activities in the 0.ffices of R and D ani of Operations, 

during the various phases of canputer developnent and operation. 

c. The rapi.d expansion of' the digital canputer industry, and 

its revolutionary influence on a.nalytic and production activities 

at this Agency. 

2. Without attempting specifically to t.race the effects of the forementioned influencing .factors, the results will be listed below, with canments 

where caJJ.ed for: 

a. Division of responsibility for programming. There are now three 

different groups of people havine three dif'f erent concepts of their 

interest in preparing computer progi:-an.s, in divisions 22, 34 and 35. 

Although valiant attempts at coordination of these activities have 

been made, the lack of clear-cut direction and assignment of 

responsibili t;t.es has led to confusion and dissatisfaction. For 

exan.ple, in "3511 we are late in preparing .for operation and 

maintenance of ATLAS II, due oiil¥ to lack of personnel. Yet the 

total of programming personnel in 11 2211 , 113411 and 1135n would probably 

be adequate for. our responsibilities if' they were under one direction 

and i£ waste due to duplication or training were eliminated. The 

need i'or so much coordination on a 11horizonta111 p1ane increases 

paper work, and if' indulged as canpletely as it deserves in the 

present decentra1ized treatment, would have us spending more time 

11 coordinating11 than gettine work done. There is even waste or 

unbalance in t.ravel allowances, since there have been maxw instances 

when attendance has been approved at canputer associationJ11eetings 

for people fran. a1l three divisions. 

b. Because 112211 anticipates the u1t:imate responsibility for 

operation or these equipnents, a crew of maintenance personnel has 

been assigned at least a year in advance of anticipated need, to 

learn enough about ABNER. But at the same time, 113511 has the 

responsibility, as per s.o.P., for "experimental. operation", so 

that 11 3511 a1so has under training, personnel. of' supervisory grade 

to take charge of maintenance until 11 22" takes official. responsibility. 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 01-23-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

00NFIBENTIAL 1 
' M:f. ID:A60156a. 

~am\\lEN 'u'" • 

A similar cri ticisn. can be made in t.he case of ATLAS I. Furthermore, 

even this official policy is not followed strictly; it is understood 

that upon delivery and installation of DELLA, 11 22" maintenance personnel 

will go to work directly, and 11 3511 people will not even come into the 

p:i.cture. 

c. In order for n22rr to be abreast of developnents in the field and 

to have same influence on features of Agency machines under construction, 

they are building up a staff of people, independently of "3511 and are 

kept informed on technical progress in 113511 and by contractors. In 

many cases, decisions to obtain equipn.ent or decisions affecting specific 

features are made in "3511 without .f'ul1 concurrence of "2211 • The latter 

resent this on thG grounds that they (22) a.re to be the ultimate users 

and shou1d have gi:-eater voice in such decisions. Actually, it is likely 

that both 11 2211 and 113511 are pa.rt:cy- right. 

d. Fran one point of view, the future o£ Agency computer equipment 

should be likened to a wartime period in Machine Division history. 

Operational experience with punched card equip;nent led to formation 

of a gt'OUp lr.i. thin that division who developed equipnent or proposed 

and designed equipnent to be constructed outside. During th&tperiod 

a very heal·t:tzy- attitude made possible the construction,, as wartime needs 

developed, of such important devices as the slide-run attachments, brutef orce attachments, key-finder, characteristic message locator,, and other 

devices operable in conjunction with standard IIM equipnent. The ana1ogyto be drawn is that computer-type equipment is likewise in the earJ;y 

stages of developnent in which the direction of the principa1 advances 

will be determined by people Who gain experience in a11 phases of their 

operation. The interplay of the various factors influencing changes :i.n 

equipnent design is nowhere more intimate than in the digital canputer 

field. The fo1lotiing a.re typical questions that :immediately involve 

programmers, crypt.analysts, operators, maintenance men, mathematicians, 

and design engineers: 

a. Deter.m:L'rlation of the degree of speciil..ization to build into 

individua1 orders; 

b. How reliable are certain newly tried engineering techniques; 

c. What is the proper emphasis to give to built-in checks; 

d. The effect on progi:-annn:LTlg techniques of various new design 

proposals; 

e. Relative operational dependability of seria1-versus para11eltype constructionJ 

f. To what extent are certain cryptana~ic attacks amenable to 

digital canputer programJ11.ing techniques, and at what point 

shou1d specialized equipnent be recanmended; 

2 

CONFIDENTIAL 
·. . . e REF ID:A60156-

-GQtW\B£\tl\~\; 

Yet under the present setup, every such question shouJ.d proper:cy be 

considered by personnel in at least two, and sQlleti.'D.es four divisions, 

and overlaps 11 o;ffices 11 • The amount of' coordinating is too great,, and 

it is unsatisf'acto:ry since no authority is present to enforce a decision. 

One serious result of' this has been that decisions on technical matters 

are too oi'ten made by administrative supervisors at an echelon too high 

for good technical continuity. The chains of' command in the various 

administrative groups having day-to-day interest in the canputer field 

do not actuall.y cane together except at the level af Director of the 

Agency& 

II. Proposed Solution 

l. It is proposed that a new division be created within the Office of 

Operations, ca1led Digita1 Canputer Division. It would have responsibility 

for aJJ. activities in the field of general purpose autanatic sequenced equ:i.pment,, with exception of that research and developnent work necessary to keep 

abreast or ahead of' outside engineering accomplishments and techniques 

having possible applications in this field. The latter activity shoul.d. be 

retained by the appropriate branch in 3.5. 

2. !l!he following is a proposed !l?ulr of Organization for a Digital. Computer 

Divisions 

DIGITAL CoM,.UTlif( A-D.a.t. AHD 

DI Vr$•o"' 'P&Jt.Solll llEL 

r...Da ''") 

OPE.RATtotils 

.SRANC:H 

~~R1'M {l2,) 

PLANNIN'4 --1'1l'f PTANAL'/1i ICAN c:.tl &RA!liCH (3(1) l..IAISOlll 

t.s> (z.t) --.res 

I I I I 

'J)A'T".A Art.Ast AB~Y AtU'Jt ?itP• 

(JS) ('l {') "') 

ATLAS l ASNIER ,tfLASlt DE-l ttill &:. '"flV.INING 6X.P4ER. 

• {Io) (10} (10) CoN1"~Arn Sr. 'PUBL. 1Ro&R. 

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60NFIDENTIAL 
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3. There are several comments that can be made on the effect of a 

centralized setup for all digital computers. 

a. The feasibility of the digital computer as an operating equipment 

and its versatility for use in cryptanalysis has been established. 

Programming of analytic jobs for digital computers is a unique specialty 

not required in any other machine types, but still, among various 

digital computers, similar in philosophy. It would not be an 

exaggeration to state that application of digital computer techniques 

for cryptanalytic purposes is effecting the greatest revolution in 

cryptanalytic machine aids since establishment of the first ptmched 

card installation in this activity. 

b. At present there are about 50 people at the Agency engaged in 

different phases of this activity, not including those in 352; these 

latter would be among those likely to remain in 35 under the proposed 

setup. Since delivery of ATLAS I Serial 2, ATLAS II Serial 1, ABNER 

Serial 2, IBM's ADPM will take place within 12 to lS months, the 

computer installation at the Agency will become quite formidable, 

and in fact eventually, with delivery of UOMAD, will undoubtedly be 

the largest in the world. The scope of these machines is so great 

that an estimate of the Agency's capital investment in equipment by 

the time NOMAD is completed, might exceed ten million dollars. 

c. The foregoing T.O. represents a tentative framework that could be 

implemented at once; gradual expansion to the strength indicated 

should take place over the teriod of the next year, at which time the 

total division size would be in the neighborhood of 100 people. With 

greater concentration on preparations for NOMAD, at that time further 

increases might be anticipated. Only the early creation of a centralized organization will make it possible for an intelligent administration to keep this extremely important activity from becoming more 

and more a helter-skelter of competing groups. 

d. It is visualized that the group "Cryptanalytic Liaison" would be 

the link with operational sections having greatest need for machine 

help. It is likely that this group would either be in close touch 

with a similar group in the present 11 2211 division, or that they would 

be physically grouped together, so that potential machine jobs could 

be discussed and assigned the proper treatment with a minimum of 

confusion. Similarly, it is anticipated that there would be a certain 

amount of liaison between "352" and the proposed "Planning Branch" • 

e. It should be emphasized that the strengths shown on the proposed 

T.O., and in fact the actual groups themselves, are only tentative. 

It is visualized and is fully expected that there will be shifts of 

people according to shifts in emphasis dictated by changing conditions. 

This fluidity will be an important advantage of centralization; even 

now, in our early stage of experience with these machines, the lack 

of authority to shift people to compensate for changes in work load 

has resulted in unbalanced assignements and duplication of effort. 

26 September 1952