J-S71032-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.W., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: E.B., FATHER

No. 830 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered March 2, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court

at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000433-2016

 FID: 51-FN-393-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, PANELLA, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2016

E.B. (“Father”) appeals from the order entered on March 2, 2016, in 

the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas Family Court, adjudicating 

dependent his daughter J.W. (“Child”), born in May of 1998,1and ordering 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We note that J.W. turned eighteen years of age in May 2016 and, in 

general, is not considered a “child” for purposes of dependency. See 42 

Pa.C.S. § 6302. It is well settled that an actual claim must be present at all 

stages of the judicial process for the case to be actionable, however an 

exception can be made “where a party will suffer some detriment without 

the court’s decision.” Pub. Defender’s Office of Venango Cnty. v. 

Venango Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 893 A.2d 1275, 1279-80 (Pa. 2006) 

(citation omitted). In this case, J.W.’s dependency could be extended to age 

21, if she were adjudicated dependent by the trial court prior to age 18. 

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302; § 6351. Therefore, the instant case is not moot 

because J.W. would suffer a detriment without the trial court’s adjudication 

of dependency. See Pub. Defender’s Office of Venango Cnty., 837 A.2d 

at 1279-80. Further, the mootness exception is also applicable because 

E.B., as J.W.’s father, could suffer a detriment in any future proceedings 

with DHS should J.W. be declared dependent. See In re D.A., 801 A.2d 

614, 616-17 (Pa. Super. 2002).

 
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that she remain in the care and custody of Department of Human Services 

(“DHS”). We affirm.

The trial court related the factual and procedural history as follows:

[The dependency] petition was filed pursuant to an Order 

of Protective Custody (“OPC”) obtained by DHS on 

February, 22, 2016.

The previous involvement of DHS stemmed from August 4, 

2012, when it received a Child Protective Services Report 

(“CPS”) report alleging that [Child] had been the victim of 

sexual abuse by her former step-father, K.W., when she 

was between the age of nine (9) and twelve (12) years 

old. K.W. and J.W. (“Mother”) were the caregivers of 

[Child] and her sibling. It was reported to DHS that 

[Child] disclosed the sexual abuse to [Mother]. The report 

further alleged that the abuse stopped after [Child] 

watched an episode of Special Victim’s Unit, and informed 

K.W. that if he did not stop abusing her, she would report 

him to the police. Thereafter, K.W. stopped sexually 

abusing [Child]. The report was indicated.

[Child] never received sexual abuse therapy.

In August 2012, [Child] went to live with her maternal 

aunt, [T.W.].

From November 2012 to June 2013, [Child] lived with 

[Father] in Harrisburg, Pa.

Prior to age fourteen (14), [Child] had never spoken to or 

seen [Father].

While living with [Father], [Child] did not perform well 

academically. [Child] was unable to participate in 

extracurricular activities, because she had to care for her 

nephew after school.

Subsequently, [Child] ran away from [Father]’s home and 

walked to Hershey, [Pennsylvania], stating that she no 

longer desired to live with [Father] and wanted to return to 

[Mother]’s home.
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On January 28, 2016, while residing with [Mother], [Child] 

voluntarily went to Pathways Youth Shelter (“PYS”), a 

program for children experiencing conflict with their 

parents, and [Child] was accepted into its twenty-one day 

program.

Consequently, on February 18, 2016, DHS received a 

General Protective Services Report (“GPS”) which alleged 

that [Child] had been living at PYS for the last twenty-one 

(21) days and had reached the final day and could no 

longer remain at the shelter. It was alleged that [Mother] 

refused to allow her to return home and that [Child] did 

not initially want to return home. The report further 

alleged that [Father] had been notified; that he was willing 

to travel from Harrisburg to Philadelphia to pick up [Child], 

but that [Child] did not want to go with him; that she was 

on the honor roll at her high school and she wished to 

remain in Philadelphia to complete her senior year.

Subsequently, on February 19, 2016, DHS met with [Child] 

at PYS. [Child] expressed that she experienced a lot of 

conflict in her interactions with [Mother]. [Child] also 

reiterated to DHS that she did not want to go to Harrisburg 

to live with her father. Furthermore, [Child] told DHS that 

she did not want to return to [Mother]’s home. However, 

[Child] later retracted her statement and agreed to return 

home, if [Mother] decided to participate in therapy with 

her. 

On February 19, 2016, [Father] travelled to Philadelphia to 

pick her up, but [Child] once again declined to go to 

Harrisburg with her father and returned to PYS instead.

On February 19, 2016, PYS agreed to allow [Child] to 

remain at the shelter until February 22, 2016.

Subsequently, on February 21, 2016, [F]ather visited 

[Child] at PYS and attempted to convince [Child] to return 

with him to Harrisburg, but [Child] still refused to go.

The following day, on February 22, 2016, DHS spoke with 

[Mother] who stated that [Child]’s choices were to go with 

[Father] to Harrisburg or to be placed in foster care.
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As a result, DHS obtained the aforementioned Order of 

Protective Custody and placed [Child] in foster care 

through Turning Points for Children.

On February 24, 2016, a shelter care hearing was held 

before [the trial court] where [the trial court] ordered that 

the OPC be lifted and the child be temporarily committed 

to DHS.

Trial Ct. Op., 4/12/16, at 1-3 (unpaginated).

On March 2, 2016, a dependency hearing was held. At the hearing, 

Ms. Tara Fisher (a caseworker from DHS), Child, Mother, and Father 

testified. Following the hearing, the court adjudicated Child dependent and 

committed Child to the care and custody of DHS.

On March 15, 2016, Father timely appealed and filed a statement of 

errors complained of pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On 

appeal, Father raises the following issues:

Whether there were grounds for the adjudication of 

[dependency] of [] Child, as to the evidence having been 

sufficient to establish [Father] as unwilling or unable to 

care for [] Child?

Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the 

placement of [] Child into [DHS’s] [c]ustody?

Father’s Brief at 5.

Our Supreme Court set forth our standard of review for dependency 

cases as follows.

[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an 

appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by 

the record, but does not require the appellate court to 
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accept the lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. 

Accordingly, we review for an abuse of discretion.

In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted).

Section 6302 of the Juvenile Act defines a “dependent child” as a child 

who:

(1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, 

education as required by law, or other care or control 

necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or 

morals. A determination that there is a lack of proper 

parental care or control may be based upon evidence 

of conduct by the parent, guardian or other 

custodian that places the health, safety or welfare of 

the child at risk, including evidence of the parent’s, 

guardian’s or other custodian’s use of alcohol or a 

controlled substance that places the health, safety or 

welfare of the child at risk[.]

42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1) (emphasis added).

In In re G., T., 845 A.2d 870 (Pa. Super. 2004), this Court clarified 

the definition of “dependent child” further.

The question of whether a child is lacking proper parental 

care or control so as to be a dependent child encompasses 

two discrete questions: whether the child presently is 

without proper parental care and control, and if so, 

whether such care and control are immediately available. 

Id. at 872 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also In re J.C., 5 

A.3d 284, 289 (Pa. Super. 2010). “This Court has defined ‘proper parental 

care’ as ‘that care which (1) is geared to the particularized needs of the child 

and (2) at a minimum, is likely to prevent serious injury to the child.’” In re 

A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 349 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Additionally, 

the “burden of proof in a dependency proceeding is on the petitioner to 
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demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a child meets that 

statutory definition of dependency.” In re G., T., 845 A.2d at 872 (citation 

omitted).

With regard to a dependent child, in In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614 (Pa. 

Super. 2002) (en banc), this Court explained:

[A] court is empowered by 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(a) and (c) to 

make a finding that a child is dependent if the child meets 

the statutory definition by clear and convincing evidence. 

If the court finds that the child is dependent, then the 

court may make an appropriate disposition of the child to 

protect the child’s physical, mental and moral welfare, 

including allowing the child to remain with the parents 

subject to supervision, transferring temporary legal 

custody to a relative or a private or public agency, or 

transferring custody to the juvenile court of another state. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(a).

Id. at 617 (alteration in original and citation omitted).

Regarding the placement of a child who has been adjudicated 

dependent, this Court has explained:

When a child is adjudicated dependent, the child’s proper 

placement turns on what is in the child’s best interest, not 

on what the parent wants or which goals the parent has 

achieved. See In re Sweeney, 393 Pa. Super. 437, 574 

A.2d 690, 691 (1990) (noting that “[o]nce a child is 

adjudicated dependent . . . the issues of custody and 

continuation of foster care are determined by the child’s 

best interests”). Moreover, although preserving the unity 

of the family is a purpose of the Act, another purpose is to 

“provide for the care, protection, safety, and wholesome 

mental and physical development of children coming within 

the provisions of this chapter.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1.1). 

Indeed, “[t]he relationship of parent and child is a status 

and not a property right, and one in which the state has an 

interest to protect the best interest of the child.” In re 
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E.F.V., 315 Pa. Super. 246, 461 A.2d 1263, 1267 (1983) 

(citation omitted).

In re K.C., 903 A.2d 12, 14-15 (Pa. Super. 2006).

Instantly, after careful review of the parties’ briefs, the certified 

record, and the trial court’s opinion, we are satisfied that the record 

supports the trial court’s findings, the findings support the trial court’s 

conclusion that Child is dependent based upon a lack of parental care and 

control, and the placement of Child with DHS was necessary and appropriate 

for Child’s well-being. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s 

opinion.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/18/2016