IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

November 2, 2016 Session

MICHAEL ALLEN SPROUSE v. TIFFANY DOTSON

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Robertson County

No. 12-34800 Joel Perry, Judge

___________________________________

No. M2016-00841-COA-R3-JV – Filed November 18, 2016

___________________________________

This appeal requires us to interpret a version of a juvenile court statute effective prior to 

July 1, 2016. A juvenile court magistrate held a hearing on competing petitions to 

modify a parenting plan filed by a child‟s parents. The magistrate announced her ruling 

from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing but did not enter a written order until 

several days later. Mother, dissatisfied with the magistrate‟s ruling, filed a request for a 

rehearing before a juvenile court judge. Mother filed her request within five days of the 

entry of the magistrate‟s order but ten days after the hearing before the magistrate. The 

juvenile court concluded that mother‟s request for rehearing was untimely and confirmed 

the magistrate‟s findings and recommendations as an order of the juvenile court. Because 

we conclude that the time for requesting a rehearing ran from the entry of the 

magistrate‟s written order, mother‟s request for rehearing was timely. Therefore, we 

reverse. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Reversed 

and Case Remanded

W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G.

CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S., and RICHARD H. DINKINS, J., joined.

Terrance E. McNabb, Pleasant View, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tiffany Dotson.

John E. Evans, Springfield, Tennessee, for the appellee, Michael Allen Sprouse.
2

OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Tiffany Dotson (“Mother”) and Michael Allen Sprouse (“Father”) are the parents 

of a child. On January 5, 2015, a magistrate of the Juvenile Court of Robertson County, 

Tennessee, held a hearing on separate petitions related to the child: a petition for civil 

contempt and modification of parenting plan filed by Father and a counter-petition to 

modify parenting plan and child support filed by Mother. Although there is no transcript 

in the record from the hearing, Mother and Father agree that the magistrate announced 

her ruling from the bench and directed Father‟s counsel to prepare a proposed written 

order. 

On January 14, 2016, the magistrate signed a written order containing her findings 

and recommendations. The magistrate found a material change of circumstance had 

occurred that warranted a change in the existing parenting plan for the child. In light of 

the material change of circumstance, the magistrate named Father the primary residential 

parent of the child and adopted Father‟s proposed parenting plan. The magistrate also 

ordered Mother to pay child support in accordance with the child support guidelines.

In addition to the ruling, the order contained language in bold type above the 

magistrate‟s signature. The language included the following statements:

Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107, this becomes an order 

of the Juvenile Court if an appeal is not filed within five (5) days, 

excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, from the date this 

order is entered. This order may be appealed to the Juvenile Court 

Judge by filing a request for rehearing with the Juvenile Court Clerk 

within said five (5) day period.

 

The day after the magistrate signed the order, Mother filed a pro se request for 

rehearing and motion to set. In making her request, she used a form provided for that 

purpose by the juvenile court. The form included a section entitled “NOTICE to 

Requestor of Rehearing/RIGHTS TO APPEAL,” which included the following language:

Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-107 allows you to request a Rehearing 

before the Juvenile Judge by the filing of a Request for Rehearing & 

Motion to Set within five (5) days of entry of the Order by the Magistrate, 

excluding non judicial days.

Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-107, if you do not file a 

Request for Rehearing & Motion to Set within five (5) days of entry of the 

judgment by the Magistrate, the Order of the Magistrate becomes the final 
3

decree of the Juvenile Court and you cannot get a Rehearing before the 

Juvenile Judge. You may appeal the final confirmed Order of the Juvenile 

Magistrate or Juvenile Judge within ten (10) days of the filing of the Order, 

excluding non judicial days.

Despite this language, the same day the request for rehearing was filed by Mother, the 

juvenile court judge signed an order stating that the magistrate‟s order had been 

reviewed, had become the order of the juvenile court, and was confirmed. 

Later, the juvenile court dismissed Mother‟s request for rehearing as untimely. 

The court found that “[t]he final hearing was conducted on January 5, 2016, with bench 

order announced on the record by the Magistrate and in effect immediately on same day

[, and] [t]he Request for Re-hearing has exceeded the statutory 5 days pursuant to T.C.A. 

§ 37-1-107.” 

Mother, acting pro se and later through counsel, moved twice to set aside the order 

dismissing her request for rehearing. The juvenile court denied each motion. In the latter 

of the two denials, the court made the following pertinent conclusions of law:

4. The Mother seeks relief based on ROBERTSON COUNTY JUV. CT. LOCAL R.

25 stating that a notice of appeal must be set five days from entry of the 

order by the magistrate. Also the Mother relies on TENN. R. JUV. P. 4, 

which states that a request for a rehearing may be made “within five 

judicial days of the transmittal to the judge of the written findings and 

recommendations of the magistrate.” It is this Court‟s common practice for 

the magistrate to announce the “order” on the record from the bench and

completes [sic] written findings the day of hearing and submits [sic] those 

to the Juvenile Judge. No evidence was presented to this Court to suggest 

this procedure did not occur in this case. Therefore, the Mother‟s time for 

rehearing extinguished five (5) days from the actual hearing. The Court 

further takes guidance from the advisory commission comments in TENN.

R. JUV. P. 4, which states that a request for rehearing should be within five 

days “of the hearing before the referee.”

5. The Mother also seeks relief under Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107(d)(e), 

which states that a request for a rehearing may be filed “within five (5) days 

thereafter.” The Court affirms its previous two orders in finding the 

Mother‟s request for a rehearing was not timely filed within five (5) days of 

the hearing before the magistrate.

6. The Court agrees there is some argument some ambiguity exists amongst 

all the rules regarding when the request for rehearing shall be filed, but 

finds that the previous two orders of this Court denying the Mother‟s 
4

request for a rehearing are a valid interpretation of the rules viewed in their 

totality.

Mother filed a timely appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS

Mother presents a single issue for review, namely whether the juvenile court erred 

in dismissing her request for a rehearing on the basis that the request was untimely. The 

resolution of the issue requires the application of statutory text to the circumstances of 

this case. “Every application of a text to particular circumstances entails interpretation.” 

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 53 

(2012) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L. Ed 60 (1803)). 

Statutory interpretation and the application of a statute to undisputed facts present a 

question of law, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Kyle v. 

Williams, 98 S.W.3d 661, 663-64 (Tenn. 2003).

When called upon to answer a question of statutory interpretation, our goal is to 

“carry out legislative intent without broadening or restricting the statute beyond its 

intended scope.” Harris v. Haynes, 445 S.W.3d 143, 146 (Tenn. 2014) (quoting Johnson 

v. Hopkins, 432 S.W.3d 840, 848 (Tenn. 2013)). We start by looking to the language of 

the statute, and if it is unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning and look no further. 

Thurmond v. Mid-Cumberland Infectious Disease Consultants, PLC, 433 S.W.3d 512, 

517 (Tenn. 2014); State v. Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d 121, 131 (Tenn. 2013). In doing so, we 

must avoid any “forced or subtle construction that would limit or extend the meaning of 

the language.” Keen v. State, 398 S.W.3d 594, 610 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Eastman 

Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004)). Only when the language of a 

statute is ambiguous do we turn to the broader statutory scheme, legislative history, or 

other sources for clarity in meaning. Thurmond, 433 S.W.3d at 517. A statute is 

ambiguous where it “can reasonably have more than one meaning.” Brundage v. 

Cumberland Cnty., 357 S.W.3d 361, 365 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting Lee Med., Inc. v. 

Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 527 (Tenn. 2010)).

The statute at issue, Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-107, is part of the juvenile 

courts chapter of the Tennessee Code. The statute authorizes a juvenile court judge to 

appoint one or more magistrates to hear cases. The statute also sets forth the effect of a 

magistrate‟s findings and recommendation and the procedure for seeking review of those 

findings and recommendations. The version of the statute1applicable to this case 

provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

 

1

In 2016, the Legislature amended Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-107 by rewriting 

subsections (b) through (g). The statute as amended took effect on July 1, 2016. 2016-1 Tenn. Code 

Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 265 (ch. 716) (Lexis/Nexis). 
5

(b) The judge may direct that any case or class of cases shall be 

heard in the first instance by the magistrate in all cases wherein the juvenile 

court has jurisdiction in the manner provided for the hearing of cases by the 

court.

(c) A magistrate has the same authority as the judge to issue any and 

all process. The magistrate in the conduct of the proceedings has the 

powers of a trial judge.

(d) Upon the conclusion of the hearing in each case, the magistrate 

shall transmit to the judge all papers relating to the case, together with the 

magistrate‟s findings and recommendations in writing. Any hearing by a 

magistrate on any preliminary matter is final and not reviewable by the 

judge of the juvenile court, except on the court‟s own motion. The setting 

of bond in detention hearings and any matter that is a final adjudication of a 

juvenile shall not be construed to be a preliminary matter under this section 

and are reviewable by the judge of the juvenile court upon request or upon 

the court‟s own motion as provided in this section.

(e) Any party may, within five (5) days thereafter, excluding 

nonjudicial days, file a request with the court for a hearing by the judge of 

the juvenile court. The judge may, on the judge‟s own motion, order a 

rehearing of any matter heard before a magistrate, and shall allow a hearing 

if a request for such hearing is filed as herein prescribed. Unless the judge 

orders otherwise, the recommendation of the magistrate shall be the decree 

of the court pending a rehearing.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107 (2014). 

In dismissing Mother‟s request for a rehearing, the juvenile court focused on 

subsection (e) of Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-107. Specifically, the court 

interpreted the word “thereafter” in the phrase “within five (5) days thereafter” to refer to 

the conclusion of the hearing before the magistrate. The court also noted the “common 

practice” for magistrates to announce their “order” from the bench and to make and 

transmit written findings on the same day as the hearing. 

Our reading of subsections (d) and (e) of the statute leads us to the conclusion that 

a request for a rehearing must be made within five days after the magistrate transmits to 

the juvenile court judge “all papers relating to the case, together with the magistrate‟s 

findings and recommendations in writing.” Id. Thus, a written order setting forth the 

magistrate‟s ruling must be filed before “all papers relating to the case” can be 

transmitted to the juvenile court judge. Only this reading gives effect to every word of 

the statute, as we must in interpreting a statute. See General Care Corp. v. Olsen, 705 

S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tenn. 1986). 
6

Our interpretation of the statute is further buttressed by the former Rules of 

Juvenile Procedure,

2 which were “designed to implement the purposes of the juvenile 

court law.” Tenn. R. Juv. P. 1(c). At the time Mother requested a rehearing, Rule 4 

provided that “[a]ny party may, within five judicial days of the transmittal to the judge of 

the written findings and recommendations of the magistrate, file a request with the court 

for a hearing by the judge of the juvenile court.” Id. 4(c)(1) (emphasis added).

Because we conclude that the time period for requesting a rehearing ran from the 

magistrate‟s written findings and recommendations, Mother timely requested a rehearing 

by filing her request on January 15, 2016. Although “common practice” may have been 

for magistrates to complete and submit written findings the day of hearing, as the record 

reflects, common practice was not followed in this instance. The magistrate signed her 

written findings and recommendations on January 14, 2016, and they were filed with the 

juvenile court the following day. As a result of her request filed the same day as the 

written findings and recommendations, Mother was entitled to a de novo hearing before 

the juvenile court judge. See Kelly v. Evans, 43 S.W.3d 514, 515 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)

(“[T]he language in the Statute, „shall allow a hearing‟ contemplates a traditional de novo

hearing.”).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the juvenile court, and we 

remand with instructions for the juvenile court judge to conduct a de novo hearing. 

_________________________________

W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JUDGE

 

2

 The General Assembly ratified amendments to the Rules of Juvenile Procedure effective July 1, 

2016. H. Res. 145 & S. Res. 79, 109th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2016).