' . 

Enclosure: Analysis of papers pertaining to proposed measures for 

increased security or COMINT 

I have made an analysis of the recent papers pertaining to the 

subject and submit that a.nal.7sie to you as of possible interest. Y;y 

con:unents thereon are as follows: 

a. From the basic initial proposal to tighten the security 

measures surrounding the production and dissemination of COMINT, which 

proposal was apparentq favorabq considered 1'1' SECCOM in its first 

report, there has now been a significant and important departure: the 

second report of SECCOM not only fails to indicate what measures need 

be taken to tighten up on security but in fact it does the opposite. 

It recommends that there be a rela.xa.tion of measures surrounding 

certain low-level types of COMINT with a view toward flexibility of 

use, making the statement that ad.equate source protection .t'or vital, 

high-grade Co.MINT would be enhanced by such relaxation. SECCOY 

undoubtedly discussed this statement in detail but no arguments or data 

are given in support o.t' the statement in its report. Thus, instead of 

closing some doors and windows dangerous to COMINT security, as was our 

origjnal aim in bringing up the matter in uscm, the net effect so far 

·has been to open some more. 

b. I think attention should be directed !!!2!!! emphatically to what 

has happened in this matter: a canplete reversal of what was intended. 

when DmAFSA originally brought it up. In the first place, if this 

second report o.t' SECCOM is accepted and given effect, I foresee great 

difficulties in deciding from second to second, minute to minute, or 

hour to hour, whether a specific decrypt belongs to one category or the 

other. And in the second place there remains the primary question we 

brought up, the qμ.estion of better protection of COMINT. We thought 

the present regulations for the security protection of COMINTwere 

inadequate; but S~COM concluded "that existing policies and practices 

••• are, if strictly observed, adequate to protect the most sensitive 

types of sources ••• 11 • I do not agree, and do not think you do, either. 

We must be very careful what we finally decide in this matter. 

<tJ~· . a.-&;:.(.. .... WILLIAM F. FRIEDidN 

Technical Consultant, AFSA 

TOP SEBRET 

eclassified and a roved for release b NSA on 09-24-2014 ursuantto E.O. 1352 
... 

ANALYSIS OF PAPERS PERTAINING TO PROPOSED 

MEASURES FOR INCREASED SECURITY OF COMINT 

References: (a) Memorandum f'rom Capt. Wenger to AFSA-OOT, subject: 

COMINT Security, dated 19 October 1950 

(b) Report by the USCIB Coordinator to the USCIB, 

subject: Measures for increased security of' communication intelligence (CO:f.UNT), dated 22 December 

1950 {USCIB: 13/134) 

(c) First report of' the USCIB Security Committee, 

subject: Measures for increased security of COMINT, 

dated 7 March 1951 {USCIB: 13/152) 

(d) Minutes of the 6lst USCIB Meeting (USCIB: 13/159) 

(e) Second. report of' the USCIB Security Committee, 

subject: Measures for increased security of COMINT, 

dated 30 March 1951 (USCIB: 13/163) 

(f') Minutes of' the 62d USCIB Meeting (USCIB: 13/167) 

1. On 19 October 1950 Captain WENGER sent to AFSA-OOT a Memorandum 

(Reference a) in which he expressed grave concern over an apparent 

lessening of' the security of' COMINT in the face of a more pressing need 

for it. Pointing to World War II experience in the German problem., he 

indicated that experience there showed the feasibility of operating 

successfully with the absolute mini.lm.un of dissemination and of maintaining the utmost security umer difficult circumstances. He suggested that 

an appropriate study be prepared for uscm, aimed toward initiating a. 

review of the entire security problem, and referred the problem to 

AFSA-OOT with the suggestion that the preliminary study be limited to 

four persons within AFSA: Mr. FRIEDMAN (AFSA-OOT); Captain DIER 

(AFSA-14); Captain MASON {AFSA-02); and. Colonel PETERSON (AFSA-12). His 

own notes on the subject were forwarded by Captain WENGER tor the consideration of this group. 

2. a. Acting upon Captain WENGER' s suggestion, this group from 

AFSA prepared f'or the consideration of USCIB a staff' study on the problem 

of deter.mining what additional measures should be taken to protect 

present and future COlllNT sources. This staff paper was presented as a 

report by the USCIB Coordinator to the USCIB (Reference b). Conclusions 

reached were: 

(1) A review of all phases of COMINT security was warranted; 

(2) Determination whether any additional measures should be 

established to prevent the repetition of' recent losses, which 

might be the result of leaks, was essential; 

Enclosure with Memorandum f'ro.m 

AFSA-OOT to AFSA-OOB, 4 May 1951 

- .. :I 

., 

II 'Ir- ol 

1 Enclosure 
. . . 

• 

(3) 'Ihe increased mechanisms for the protection of COMINT 

which had been instituted since World War II, such as an 

inter-departmental authority (USCIB); a Federal protective 

law; improved investigative machinery; common security standards among U.S. agencies; security agreements with foreign 

collaborators; and a single U.S. producer of high-level COMINT. 

(4) The nullification to a certain extent of these :improvements by devel-opments within the COMINT field such as: 

(a) Steady and substantial increase in workers and 

consumers; 

(b) Relaxation of certain dissemination safeguards; 

(c) Wide extent of administrative, control, and 

budgetary machinery and procedures; 

( d) Vlide dissemination of results; 

(e) Absence of an over-all authority to insure 

observance of COM:G.l'"T security; 

{f) Rapid turn-over in number of persons indoctrinated; 

(g) Presence of indoctrinated persons in combat areas; 

(h) Probability or imminent military and political 

collaboration with allied nations other than the British, 

with its consequent difficult problems. 

d. In consideration of what additional steps should be taken, 

the COMINT ~ecurity problem was divided into four segments: 

(1) Security precautions applicable to all steps in the 

production of information; 

(2) Format of final products (in relation to revelation of 

source); 

(3) Accounting control of production of copies, and of 

their dissemination to consumers; 

(4) Security precautions applicable to the operational use 

of COMINT. 

2 Enclosure 
. . . 

e. It was noted that under its charter USCm prescribes basic 

security standards and dissemination policies and therefore has cognizance over all these aspects. It is further noted that the uscm 

Coordinator, in his capacity as Director, AFSA, has f'ull operational 

jurisdiction over the first of these segments, but none over the other 

three segments. It was therefore suggested that the USCIB Security 

Committee direct its study to the second two aspects and submit appropriate recommendations thereto, and that the six COUINT consumer 

agencies take immediate cognizance of the last segment. 

3. a. On 7 March 1951 the USCIB Security Committee brought in 

its first report (Reference c). The problem., as stated by the 

Committee, was 11to review all phases of' COMINT security and determine 

what measures should be ta.ken by USCIB to improve that security. 11 It 

was concluded that a review of all phases, as had been suggested by the 

Coordinator's report (Reference b), was beyond the capabilities of the 

USCIB Security Committee, but that there were certain steps which USCIB 

could take immediately to achieve better security, and there were also 

certain long-range security plans which uscm should put into effect. 

It was recognized by the Committee that absolute COMINT security 

requires: 

(1) Detailed and complete regulations and procedures; 

(2) Stringent enforcement of' these regulations plus 

sanctions; 

(3) Thorough investigation of personnel; 

(4) Continuous training and security awareness by all 

personnel; · 

(5) Good physical security. 

b. '!he COIIIIl.ittee recommended: 

(!)Appointment of a full-time Security Officer who 

would report directly to the Chairman, USCIB, and who should 

be assisted by a small, competent staff. Tab A to the report 

outlined the missions and functions of this officer; 

(2) Issue of a basic security manual establishing standards and procedures for all phases of COMINT security; 

(3) A directive to USCIB members to study the command 

control over COMINTwithin their own organizations; 

.. ~ :>! - ,1 

t, "' u I' 

Enclosure 
. . . A REF ID:A555B6a 

.. 'f OP SECRET .. 

(4) Authorization to the USCIB Coordinator to control 

dissemination of certain sensitive categories of COMINT after 

approval of each category by USCIB in executive session. It 

was suggested that this might be accomplished by confining 

affected items to the premises of AFSA and nominating special 

representatives from each Department or Agency to inspect them 

there; 

(5) Designation by the USCIB Coordinator, after consultation with USCIB intelligence consumers, of certain categories 

ot material to be disseminated outside the AFSA production 

establishment in the form. of sanitized reports, sanitization 

to be done by representatives of the intelligence agencies 

working at AFSA; 

(6) Investigation of the possibility of bringing PL 513 

to the attention of pub1ishers and press representatives 

through a special Department ot Defense press conference; 

(7) A directive to USCIB members to examine and perfect 

plans tor maintaining security of COM.INT during emergencies 

involving the rapid expansion or large-scale moving ot 

facilities within the Z.I. or overseas, plans to be presented 

by 1 July 1951. 

c. These recommendations, which were in li,ne with the paper previous~ submitted by the USCIB Coordinator, were expanded b,y a 

discussion in the enclosure to the report containing facts bearing on 

the problem. and reasons for the recommendations listed aboYe. 

4. a. At the 6lst Meeting ot USCIB, the minutes of which are contained in Reference d, the following opinions were ottered in regard to 

the report of the Security Committee (Reference c): 

(1) STATE: Mr. ARMSTRONG was not prepared to come to a 

decision on the report since it was submitted 7 March 1951, 

two dqs before the meeting of USCIB. He suggested members 

might wish to deter consideration until the 62d Meeting. 

(2) USAF: General ACKEBllAN said that he had definite 

views which were rather lengthy, and could not be covered at ' 

the meeting. 

(3) CIA: Mr. DOUGLASS asked if it would be out of order 

to have the Committee review its report, since the Committee 

members might have a different view after having talked to the 

Board members. 

Enclosure 
. . . 

(4) ARMY: General CANINE expressed his opinion that the 

Committee would have to cane up with a different report, an:i 

suggested that the Committee be directed to review the whole 

report, stating that the Al'foy' member would be prepared to propose an alternate solution based on guidance he had received. 

(5) USAF: General ACKERMAN stated that the Air Force 

member likewise would be prepared to recanm.end a dit.f'erent 

solution. 

b. The report was ref erred back to the Security Committee for 

revision in the light of guidance to be furnished by member departments 

and agencies of the Board. 

5. a. As a result of reconsideration of the problem, the Security 

Committee prepared and submitted a substitute report (Reference e) in 

the .form o.f a prel:i.mina.ry report, with individual members of the Security Canmittee requested to obtain the view of their Board members prior to 

.further action by the Committee. In this paper the following conclusions 

were reached: 

(1) The first report (Reference c) did not meet the requirements tor increased security of COMINT because it was too 

cumbersome, complicated and restrictive to permit reasonable 

application to the present wide variations in types or COMINT; 

(2) From a security standpoint, there are two broad general 

categories of communication intelligence: 

(a) 'Ihat for which source protection is a paramount 

consideration; 

(b) That for which source protection is an important 

but not over-riding consideration; 

(3) Existing policies and practices are, it strictly observed, 

adequate to protect the most sensitive types in the first category; 

(4) Existing U.S. Governmental policies and practices provide 

adequate source and information protection for much COMINT under 

the second category; 

(5) Rigid regulations designed tor maximum source protection, when applied to the less sensitive types of COMINT, block 

basic intelligence, deny field commanders necessary flexibility 

in their use of Co.MINT, an:i endanger the more sensitive sources; 

1 ur otiiff c· r ,,. 

5 Enclosure 
•111 .. '• • 

'!'OP S!iGRKT 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Pt 86-36/50 USC 3605 (6) With the advice ani assistance of AFSA, the USCIB 

Intelligence Committee and the USCIB security Committee should 

determine what portions of COMINT fall in the two categories, 

and recommend. precise security provisions for each. 

b. With this entirely new approach to the problem, the USCIB 

Security Committee recommended a draft letter to LSIB asking for a 

conference to modify' Appendix 11B" to the BRUSA Agreement in order to 

increase flexibility in the use of information derived from low-grade 

ciphers and plain text, and to enhance the prospect of being able to 

provide adequate source protection for vital, high-grade COMINT. The 

draft letter mentions the "relaxation of some of the special provisions 

applied to certain categories of COMINT, wherein source protection is 

not an over-riding consideration." 

6. Apparently this basic change in approach was recognized by 

some .members of the USCIB at the 62d Meeting, the minutes of which are 

contained in Reference f, for at the meeting the Chairman referred to 

the seC()nd. report of the Committee (Reference e) and explained that it 

represented a basic change in approach, and called attention to the 

fact that{ if the reJort were approved, a re-draft of Append.ix 11B" to 

the BRUSA .Agreements would be required. He stated that an 

Ad Hoc Sub-committee had been appointed to prepare a study- with reference to the categories or COMINT falling outside the periphery of codeword protection. Views favoring the report were expressed by certain 

of the Service members: General CANINE stated that the Army view was 

that "an;y thing which made COMINT more available to those who had a 

•need to know' was a definite step in the right direction." He spoke 

of the need for a "yardstick" to determine which material should be 

downgraded and which not. Admiral ESPE thought that the report seemed 

a 11logical and sound approach to the problem.11 • The Chairman then 

approached the crux of the problem., re.marking that the report proposed. 

what he considered to be a very interesting and important change but 

that it "appeared to be a question whether an increase or decrease in 

risk would result frc:m allowing access to a larger number of people." 

i:rhe decision reached was to have the Security Committee proceed with its 

determination of the categories of in.formation and recommendations based 

on a more detailed analysis of the proposals contained in the last 

report. 'lbese recommendations were to be submitted to USCIB for consideration. 

TOP SECRE1 

6 Enclosure