1

Filed 12/21/20 P. v. Garcia CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Yolo)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JORGE ANDRES TORRES GARCIA,

Defendant and Appellant.

C089545

(Super. Ct. No. 

CRF201573201)

Defendant Jorge Andres Torres Garcia appeals the trial court’s order denying his 

petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. On appeal, defendant 

contends his voluntary manslaughter conviction is eligible for relief under the new law. 

Disagreeing, we affirm. 
2

BACKGROUND

A 2016 information charged defendant and his codefendant with murder (Pen. 

Code, § 187);1 attempted second degree robbery (§§ 21a, 211, 212.5, subd. (c)); and 

conspiracy to commit a felony (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)). The information alleged defendant 

was culpable for murder pursuant to felony-murder principles articulated in section 

190.2, subdivision (a)(17), and that the codefendant personally discharged the firearm 

that resulted in the victim’s death.

In 2017 defendant pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) 

and other crimes, in exchange for a stipulated sentence of 14 years in state prison.

Consistent with that agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 14 years 

in state prison.

Later, a jury acquitted the codefendant of all charges.

“In 2018, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed into law Senate Bill 

No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437), which restricted the 

circumstances under which a person can be liable for felony murder and abrogated the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine as applied to murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.) 

[The law added section 1170.95,] . . . a procedure permitting qualified persons with 

murder convictions to petition to vacate their convictions and obtain resentencing if they 

were previously convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine.” (People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 989 (Flores).) 

In March 2019 defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, seeking vacatur 

of his manslaughter conviction pursuant to section 1170.95, because he was “charged 

with the same charges as [codefendant] . . . under the [f]elony-[m]urder rule.”2

1

 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2

 Defendant asserts the trial court construed the habeas petition as a petition under 

section 1170.95.
3

The trial court denied the petition, ruling that Senate Bill No. 1437 violates 

provisions of the California Constitution.

Defendant appealed, characterizing the trial court’s ruling as a denial of a petition 

for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95.

DISCUSSION

The parties agree that Senate Bill No. 1437 does not violate provisions of the 

California Constitution. But they disagree whether defendant’s voluntary manslaughter 

conviction is eligible for relief pursuant to section 1170.95. We agree with the People 

that defendant’s voluntary manslaughter conviction is ineligible for relief pursuant to 

section 1170.95.3 

I

Defendant argues that the only “logical way to read” language in subdivision 

(a)(2) of section 1170.95, is that “the Legislature intended those who pleaded to a lesser 

crime to avoid a murder conviction to be able to challenge their convictions of the lesser 

crime by way of this petition process.” The provision, which states one of the three 

threshold (and conjunctive) conditions that a successful petitioner must satisfy, reads: 

“The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or 

accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first 

degree or second degree murder.” (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(2), italics added.) 

We disagree that the only reasonable reading of this language, in context, is that a 

manslaughter conviction is eligible for relief pursuant to section 1170.95. (See Flores, 

supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 995 [rejecting a similar contention, because it “places 

outsized importance on a single clause to the exclusion of the provision’s other 

3

 “In view of our disposition of the case on other grounds, we need not reach”

defendant’s constitutional arguments regarding the statute. (In re Smiley (1967) 

66 Cal.2d 606, 610, fn. 1.)
4

language,” as “the remaining portions of section 1170.95 repeatedly and exclusively refer 

to murder, not manslaughter”].)

Further, the apparent ambiguity in subdivision (a)(2), which defendant identifies 

via a statutory construction argument, is not what it appears to be. Defendant contends 

that if eligibility for relief under section 1170.95 were limited to murder convictions, this 

“would . . . render . . . meaningless” the language of section 1170.95, subdivision (a)(2) 

that we italicized above.

We disagree, for the reasons provided in People v. Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 

914, 919: “Specifying that section 1170.95 applies to murder convictions both by trial 

and by guilty plea clarifies that it does not matter how the murder conviction was 

obtained for section 1170.95 to apply. Regardless of whether that clarification was 

necessary, ‘ “the Legislature may choose to state all applicable legal principles in a 

statute rather than leave some to even a predictable judicial decision.” ’ [Citation.] 

Express statutory language defining the class of defendants to whom section 1170.95 

applies is not surplusage. [Citation.] Such clarification ‘may eliminate potential 

confusion and avoid the need to research extraneous legal sources to understand the 

statute’s full meaning.’ ” 

Even if we assume for the sake of argument that subdivision (a)(2) is ambiguous, 

we agree with the analysis in People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428, that the 

legislative history of Senate Bill No. 1437 reflects that the Legislature wanted to provide 

relief only to those who were convicted of felony murder or of murder on a natural and 

probable consequences theory. (See People v. Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 436-

438.)

Defendant maintains that our conclusion leads to absurd results, because a 

defendant convicted after a jury trial “of a now-invalidated theory of felony murder could 

have his murder conviction vacated under section 1170.95,” whereas a different 

defendant, “who engaged in the same conduct but . . . accept[ed] a voluntary 
5

manslaughter plea deal resulting from the fear of a potential or threatened felony murder 

conviction would continue being saddled with the consequences of that decision.” 

Defendant insists that the two defendants “are identically situated” “in terms of 

culpability”; but “the second one would be punished more harshly than the first.”

Defendant’s scenario ignores that section 1170.95 contemplates relief for those 

convicted “of a now-invalidated theory of felony murder,” only if they can demonstrate 

that they “could not be convicted of . . . murder because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 

189 made effective” by Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).) In addition to 

the “actual killer” (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)) and one who with intent to kill assisted the actual 

killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)), new section 189, subdivision (e)(3) contemplates murder 

liability for one who “was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with 

reckless indifference to human life.” Thus, the hypothetical is too general for purposes of 

the question before us, as neither of the two individuals in the hypothetical would be 

entitled to relief if they were both major participants in an underlying felony and acted 

with reckless indifference to human life; but the individual who accepted a voluntary 

manslaughter plea would be punished less harshly.

Further, even assuming defendant’s hypothetical is valid, our conclusion that 

defendant’s voluntary manslaughter conviction is not eligible for relief pursuant to 

section 1170.95 still is not “absurd,” because the Legislature reasonably could have 

concluded that reform is necessary only in murder cases. (See Flores, supra, 

44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 996-997 [rejecting the contention that an interpretation “limit[ing]

[section 1170.95’s] ameliorative benefits only to defendants convicted of murder” would 

be absurd].)

II

Defendant argues “it is a violation of equal protection to exclude” his 

manslaughter conviction from section 1170.95 relief. Such exclusion, he maintains, 
6

would be “manifestly unjust” and “especially unfair because, at the codefendant shooter’s 

trial, the jury found that no crime had been committed.”

The People disagree, arguing that defendant is not similarly situated to defendants 

convicted of murder, and the Legislature has a rational basis to distinguish between 

voluntary manslaughter and murder convictions.

We agree with the People. 

“ ‘The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is 

a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly

situated groups in an unequal manner.’ [Citations.] This initial inquiry is not whether 

persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but ‘whether they are similarly situated for 

purposes of the law challenged.’ ” (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 

253.)

Because defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a different crime 

from murder, that carries a different punishment, he is not similarly situated to those 

convicted of murder. (See People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884, 888 

[rejecting an equal protection challenge to section 1170.95 by an offender convicted of 

voluntary manslaughter].) Thus, defendant’s equal protection challenge fails at the first 

step.

Defendant’s contention—that the relevant similarity is that both he (“who pleaded 

guilty to voluntary manslaughter to avoid a felony murder conviction”) and “a prisoner 

convicted of felony murder,” suffer from “convictions [that] were obtained before 

[Senate Bill No. 1437’s] effective date and where in neither case could a felony murder 

conviction now be obtained under the law”—is unpersuasive, as it ignores Cooley’s 

guidance that, when considering an equal protection challenge, the relevant inquiry is 

whether the claimant is similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged. Section 

1170.95’s objective is to provide relief to those convicted of felony murder. Defendant’s 
7

manslaughter conviction renders him not similarly situated to those the law was intended 

to benefit. 

Though we recognize the codefendant’s acquittal may appear troubling to some, 

defendant provides no legal authority for the proposition that, having pleaded no contest 

to voluntary manslaughter, he must be allowed to benefit from a jury’s verdict acquitting 

his codefendant of murder. (Cf. People v. Ward (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 604, 608 

[recognizing the “unhappy denouement” of a prosecution, where the codefendant who 

fired the fatal shot was acquitted of murder, while the defendant remains in prison after a 

guilty plea that he entered knowing “the consequences of conviction after a contested 

trial”; but ruling that codefendant’s acquittal does not warrant relief for the defendant 

under “any legal principle”].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment (order) is affirmed. 

 /s/

RAYE, P. J.

We concur:

 /s/

BLEASE, J.

 /s/

KRAUSE, J.