UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

MULLIGAN, HERRING, and BURTON 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Specialist ANTHONY M. MANLEY 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20140381 

Headquarters, United States Army Alaska 

Douglas Watkins, Military Judge 

Colonel Tyler J. Harder, Staff Judge Advocate (pretrial) 

Colonel Erik L. Christiansen, Staff Judge Advocate (post-trial) 

For Appellant: Colonel Kevin Boyle, JA; Major Amy Nieman, JA; Captain Brian D. 

Andes, JA (on brief). 

For Appellee: Colonel Mark H. Sydenham, JA; Major John K. Choike, JA; Major 

Diara Andres, JA USAR (on brief). 

22 December 2015 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

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Per Curiam: 

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial, convicted appellant, in 

accordance with his pleas, of two specifications of sexual assault of a child , in 

violation of Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 920b 

(2012) [hereinafter UCMJ]. The military judge sentenced appellant to a 

dishonorable discharge and confinement for twenty months. In accordance with the 

pretrial agreement, the convening authority approved only eighteen months of 

confinement but otherwise approved the findings and sentence as adjudged. 

This case is before us pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant raises one 

assignment of error which merits discussion and relief. 
MANLEY—ARMY 20140381 

2 

BACKGROUND 

Appellant’s court-martial concluded 12 May 2014. On 30 June 2014, trial 

defense counsel and trial counsel received the record of trial for review. Trial 

counsel completed review on 2 July 2014 and trial defense counsel followed fourteen 

days later. On 22 July 2014, the military judge authenticated the record of trial. 

The staff judge advocate signed his recommendation (SJAR) on 24 September 2014. 

Appellant received the authenticated record of trial and SJAR on 25 October 2014. 

The government received post-trial matters on behalf of the appellant on 17 

November 2014, however the record has no request for a twenty-day extension from 

trial defense counsel pursuant to R.C.M. 1005(c)(1). The staff judge advocate 

signed the addendum on 15 December 2014 and the convening authority took action 

the same day. 

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

In United States v. Moreno, our superior court established timeliness 

standards for various stages of the post-trial and appellate process. 63 M.J. 129, 

142-43 (C.A.A.F. 2006). The Moreno standard applicable in this case is that 

a convening authority should take action within 120 days after the trial is 

completed.1

 Id. at 142. Failure to satisfy this standard creates a “presumption of 

unreasonable delay,” prompting this court to apply and balance the four factors set 

out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), in order to determine whether 

appellant’s due process rights were violated by the delays. See Moreno, 63 M.J. at 

136. 

The post-trial processing time in appellant’s case is 204 days from sentence to 

action. This delay is presumptively unreasonable. Id. at 142. In the face of this 

lengthy delay, our next step is to apply and balance the four factors set out in 

Barker, in order to determine whether appellant’s due process rights were violated. 

Id. at 136. 

Appellant’s trial defense counsel took fourteen days longer than the trial 

counsel for trial transcript errata. The government served appellant with the record 

of trial for review 166 days after the conclusion of appellant’s trial. Rule for 

Courts-Martial 1106(f)(5) automatically grants defense ten days to submit post-trial 

matters. Trial defense counsel submitted post-trial matters thirteen days after their 

automatic due date. Therefore, defense is responsible for twenty-seven days of posttrial processing, and the government’s processing time from trial to initial action is 

 

1 Two other standard—timeliness of docketing with this court after initial action and 

timeliness of appellate review before this court—are not relevant in appellant’s case. 

Moreno, 63 M.J. at 142-43. 
MANLEY—ARMY 20140381 

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177 days. See United States v. Garman, 59 M.J. 677 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2003). 

The delay from trial to initial action is fifty seven days more than where this court 

presumes unreasonable delay in post-trial processing between sentence and action. 

See Moreno, 63 M.J. at 142. This facially unreasonable delay triggers our review of 

the remaining Moreno factors: reasons for the delay; timely assertion of the right to 

speedy post-trial review; and prejudice. Id. at 135-36. 

As to the second Moreno factor, the explanation by the chief of military 

justice was a lack of personnel and experience in post-trial processing. Our superior 

court has held that “personnel and administrative issues . . . are not legitimate 

reasons justifying otherwise unreasonable post-trial delay.” United States v. 

Arriaga, 70 M.J. 51, 57 (C.A.A.F. 2011). The reasons for the delay weigh in favor 

of appellant. 

The third Moreno factor weighs slightly in favor of the government, as the 

appellant did not assert his right to speedy post-trial processing until 189 days after 

sentencing. 

Turning to the fourth Moreno factor, appellant fails to demonstrate prejudice. 

Although we find no due process violation after consideration of the Moreno factors, 

we review the appropriateness of the sentence in light of the unjustified dilatory 

post-trial processing. UCMJ art. 66(c). See Moreno, 63 M.J. at 138-42; United 

States v. Toohey, 63 M.J. 353, 362 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 

219, 224 (C.A.A.F. 2002). After consideration of the entire record, we conclude 

appellant’s case warrants relief in the form of a thirty-day reduction in confinement 

under Article 66(c), UCMJ, for the unreasonable post-trial delay. See Tardif, 

57 M.J. at 224. 

CONCLUSION 

The findings of guilty are AFFIRMED. After considering the entire record, 

we AFFIRM only so much of the sentence as provides for a dishonorable discharge 

and confinement for seventeen months. All rights, privileges, and property, of 

which appellant has been deprived by virtue of that portion of the sentence set aside 

by this decision are ordered restored. See UCMJ arts. 58b(c) and 75(a). 

 FOR THE COURT: 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

 Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: