PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1608

SOLERS, INC.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema,

District Judge. (1:14-cv-01548-LMB-JFA)

Argued: March 24, 2016 Decided: June 30, 2016

Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and David C.

NORTON, United States District Judge for the District of South

Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the 

opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Norton joined.

ARGUED: Mariam Wagih Tadros, REES BROOME, PC, Tysons Corner, 

Virginia, for Appellant. Gretchen M. Wolfinger, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON 

BRIEF: Robert J. Cunningham, Jr., REES BROOME, PC, Tysons 

Corner, Virginia, for Appellant. Caroline D. Ciraolo, Acting 

Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan S. Cohen, Tax Division, 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Dana 

Boente, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
2

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

In this action, Solers, Inc., a Virginia corporation, 

challenges the IRS’ response to its request for documents under 

the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The 

IRS identified 261 pages that were responsive to Solers’ request

and ultimately produced unredacted copies of all but 12 pages. 

Solers challenged the IRS’ reasons for withholding 6 of those 

pages and for producing 4 other pages with redactions.

After reviewing the documents in camera, the district court 

sustained the IRS’ position and granted the IRS summary 

judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I

Solers, an information technology company, was audited by 

the IRS for its 2010 tax year, and, pursuant to the audit, the 

IRS proposed adjustments to Solers’ tax liability and potential 

penalties. Not long after the IRS closed the audit, Solers 

submitted a FOIA request to the IRS for all documents in the 

IRS’ administrative file pertaining to its tax liabilities and

potential penalties for the 2010 tax year, specifically 

requesting “[d]ocuments, notes, and internal IRS correspondence” 

related to (1) the IRS’ audit; (2) the IRS’ notice of proposed 

tax adjustment; (3) Solers’ response to the notice; (4) Solers’ 

protest of the proposed adjustment; (5) the quality control that 
3

was performed on the notice of proposed adjustment; and (6) 

guidance received by two IRS agents regarding “intentional 

disregard penalties.” Solers also requested all correspondence 

between specified individuals that related to it.

The IRS located 261 pages that were responsive to Solers’ 

request and initially provided Solers with most of these pages, 

withholding 26 pages and producing 32 pages with redactions.

Solers commenced this action, alleging that the IRS was 

unlawfully withholding records and seeking an order requiring it 

to disclose “any redacted materials to the extent that those 

materials are not subject to a proper exemption under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552.” After Solers filed its complaint, the IRS determined 

that 17 of the 26 pages previously withheld could be released in 

full; that 3 additional pages previously withheld could be 

released with redactions; and that 29 of the 32 redacted pages 

could be released in full. Solers eventually agreed that the 

IRS had properly redacted 2 pages, leaving only 10 pages at 

issue in this case -- 6 pages that the IRS withheld and 4 pages 

that it produced with redactions.

At the outset of the proceedings, Solers filed a motion to 

obtain a Vaughn index -- a list describing the documents 

withheld and information redacted and giving detailed 

information sufficient to enable a court to rule on whether the 

withholdings fall within a FOIA exemption. See Rein v. U.S. 
4

Patent & Trademark Office, 553 F.3d 353, 357 n.6 (4th Cir. 

2009); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The 

district court granted the motion in part, directing the IRS “to 

provide all information required in a Vaughn index” for each 

document withheld or produced with redactions.

Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary 

judgment, and, in support of its motion, the IRS attached two 

affidavits from one of its attorneys that provided the following 

information about the 10 pages withheld or redacted:

1. Handwritten Notes: Four of the six withheld pages 

are handwritten notes made by Revenue Agent Arun 

Sharma, the agent primarily responsible for 

conducting Solers’ examination, during a 

conversation he had with Solers’ accountant on 

April 25, 2013. According to the IRS attorney, 

the notes “consist[] of [Agent Sharma’s] 

thoughts, impressions, and [indicate the] 

possible direction of the examination.” The IRS 

attorney also stated that “[n]o decision was made 

at that time with regard to the issues discussed 

by Revenue Agent Sharma and the CPA, and the 

examination was not closed until almost a year 

later on March 4, 2014.” The IRS withheld the 4 

pages of notes pursuant to the deliberative 

process privilege that is incorporated into 5 

U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (“Exemption 5”). The IRS

attorney also stated that he had “determined that 

[the notes] do not contain any segregable 

information.” 

2. Summary Report: The IRS also withheld a one-page 

summary report prepared by Agent Sharma on 

October 16, 2013. The report discusses Agent 

Sharma’s “review of returns of certain individual 

third-party taxpayers, whose tax returns were 

considered in conjunction with [Solers’] 

examination.” The IRS withheld the summary 

report pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) 
5

(“Exemption 3”), in conjunction with 26 U.S.C. 

§ 6103(a), as well as Exemption 5’s deliberative 

process privilege; it also maintained that 

portions of the report were subject to 

withholding under § 552(b)(6) and (7)(C) 

(“Exemptions 6 and 7(C)”). 

3. Graph: The IRS also withheld a one-page graph 

prepared by Agent Sharma on July 30, 2012. Agent 

Sharma generated the graph “from the [IRS’] yk-1 

database, which stores information about which 

individuals and entities are related to each 

taxpayer. The graph shows the identity of thirdparty individuals and entities whose tax returns 

were considered in conjunction with [Solers’] 

examination.” The IRS withheld the graph in full 

pursuant to Exemption 3, in conjunction with 26 

U.S.C. § 6103(a), and Exemption 5’s deliberative 

process privilege; it also maintained that 

portions of the graph were subject to withholding 

under Exemptions 6 and 7(C).

4. Checksheet: The IRS produced most of a “Closed 

Case Review Checksheet,” which was completed by 

Agent Sharma’s manager on March 13, 2014, making 

a redaction only on a line of the form 

identifying “related returns.” The IRS attorney 

stated that the agency had redacted only the 

portion of the checklist “that reflects the 

identity of a third party whose return 

information was considered in conjunction with 

[Solers’] examination.” The IRS maintained that 

the redaction of this third-party information was 

justified under Exemption 3, in conjunction with 

26 U.S.C. § 6103(a), as well as Exemptions 6 and 

7(C).

5. Activity Record: The IRS also redacted a single 

entry from one page of Agent Sharma’s activity 

record. The IRS attorney stated that the deleted 

entry, from July 9, 2013, reflects that Agent 

Sharma “communicated with the IRS Office of Chief 

Counsel with respect to a specific issue in the 

examination,” explaining that “disclosure of [the 

redacted entry] would reveal an area of the exam 

for which the revenue agent sought legal advice.” 

The IRS invoked Exemption 5’s incorporation of 
6

the attorney-client privilege to justify the 

redaction.

6. Two Emails: Finally, the IRS also redacted from 

two emails “the names and contact information of 

[IRS] personnel consulted in connection with 

[Solers’] examination.” Both emails were sent 

from the IRS Specialist Referral System to 

Revenue Agent Dennis Cohen, an agent “who worked 

on [Solers’] exam prior to Revenue Agent Sharma.” 

The first email, dated July 12, 2012, indicates 

that Agent Cohen had requested a consultation 

with a Computer Audit Specialist and a Tax 

Computation Specialist; from this email, the IRS 

redacted the names and contact information of the 

managers to whom the requests were referred. The 

second email, dated July 16, 2012, informed Agent 

Cohen that his request for a Computer Audit 

Specialist had been assigned; from this email, 

the IRS redacted the name and contact information 

of the Computer Audit Specialist who had been 

assigned to consult on the case, as well as the 

name of the manager who had made the assignment. 

The IRS maintained that its redactions of these 

emails were justified under Exemptions 6 and 

7(C).

Before the hearing on the parties’ cross-motions for 

summary judgment, the district court directed the IRS to submit 

unredacted copies of the 10 pages at issue for in camera review. 

And at the hearing, the court ruled, based on the record and its 

in camera review, that the IRS’ withholdings were justified. As 

a preliminary matter, the court ruled that because it had 

“thoroughly reviewed” the records “directly,” Solers’ challenge 

to the sufficiency of the IRS’ Vaughn index was no longer an 

issue. And as to the 10 withheld or redacted pages, the court 

concluded: (1) that the IRS had properly withheld four pages 
7

consisting of the agent’s handwritten notes, based on Exemption 

5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), because the notes “reflect the mental 

processes of the revenue agent and [his] thoughts on [the] 

possible direction of the investigation”; (2) that the IRS had 

properly withheld the graph and summary report, based on 

Exemption 3, id. § 552(b)(3), and 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a), because 

“[t]hose two documents . . . contain identifying information for 

third parties”; and (3) that the IRS had properly redacted

“identifying information of other individuals” from the 

checksheet and the two emails, based on Exemptions 6 and 7(C), 5 

U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), (7)(C). The court accordingly entered 

judgment for the IRS.

From the court’s judgment dated May 15, 2015, Solers filed 

this appeal.

II

As a general, preliminary matter, Solers contends that the 

IRS “produced generic and inadequate affidavits that provide[d]

no justification for the withholding of any document,” thereby 

“disregard[ing]” the district court’s order that the IRS provide 

all information required in a Vaughn index. It argues that 

because the IRS failed to provide a sufficiently detailed 

justification for withholding the documents, it “was thwarted” 

in its efforts to challenge those withholdings and that this 
8

failure remained meaningful even after the district court’s in

camera review because “the district court’s ruling from the 

bench . . . did not provide Solers with a detailed analysis and 

rationale regarding its decision to sustain the [IRS’] claimed 

exemption[s].” In essence, Solers challenges the sufficiency of 

the IRS’ Vaughn index.

Solers’ argument, however, fails to appreciate the role of 

a Vaughn index. A Vaughn index is “designed to enable the 

district court to rule on a privilege without having to review 

the document itself” and thus functions as “a surrogate for the 

production of documents for in camera review.” Ethyl Corp. v. 

U.S. EPA, 25 F.3d 1241, 1249 (4th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added); 

see also Rein, 553 F.3d at 366 (describing a proper Vaughn index 

as a “substitute for in camera review”).

In this case, because the district court reviewed the 

documents in camera, it correctly concluded that its own 

“thorough[] review[]” had “completely eradicated” “any issue 

about an inadequate Vaughn Index.” Stated otherwise, the issue 

of whether the IRS provided a Vaughn index sufficient to enable 

the district court to evaluate the IRS’ claimed exemptions

became irrelevant and moot after the IRS complied with the 

district court’s order to produce the records for in camera

review and the court completed its own review of the records.
9

III

Turning next to the merits of Solers’ challenge to the IRS’ 

withholdings, FOIA requires generally that federal agencies make 

their internal records available to the public upon request. 

See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). The Act, however, exempts certain 

categories of records from disclosure. See id. § 552(b)(1)-(9) 

(listing what are referred to as Exemptions 1 through 9). If an 

exemption applies only to a portion of a document, FOIA requires 

that “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be 

provided . . . after deletion of the portions which are exempt.” 

Id. § 552(b).

In this case, the IRS relied on Exemptions 3, 5, 6, and 

7(C) to withhold or redact the 10 pages at issue. We address 

the IRS’ claimed exemptions in the following four categories:

(1) the agent’s handwritten notes; (2) the summary report, 

graph, and checksheet; (3) the activity record; and (4) the two 

emails.

A. The Agent’s Handwritten Notes

The first category consists of four pages of handwritten 

notes made by Revenue Agent Arun Sharma during a conversation he 

had with Solers’ accountant on April 25, 2013. To justify 

withholding the notes, the IRS relied on Exemption 5’s 

incorporation of the deliberative process privilege, 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b)(5), maintaining that the notes “consist[] of [Agent 
10

Sharma’s] thoughts, impressions, and [indicate the] possible 

direction of the examination.” The IRS also took the position 

that the notes “do not contain any segregable information.”

Upholding the IRS’ position, the district court observed 

that, while the notes were very difficult to read, they were 

nonetheless covered by the deliberative process privilege 

“because they do represent the [agent’s] thought process,” 

adding that they “reflect the mental processes of the revenue 

agent and [his] thoughts on [the] possible direction of the 

investigation.”

Solers contends that the information with which it has been 

provided about the notes does not establish the notes’ 

“deliberative” nature, leaving unclear whether “the notes were 

somehow related to the process by which any agency policy was 

formulated” or “whether the notes played a role in reaching an 

agency decision.” Solers also asserts that the IRS “did not 

provide any information to support its conclusion that the 

documents were not segregable.”

Exemption 5 shields “inter-agency or intra-agency 

memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a 

party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” 5 

U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). “Among the privileges Exemption 5 

encompasses are the attorney-client privilege . . . and the 

deliberative process privilege.” Rein, 553 F.3d at 371. And 
11

the deliberative process privilege, on which the IRS relies to 

withhold the notes, “rests on the obvious realization that 

officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each 

remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news.” 

Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 

U.S. 1, 8-9 (2001). The privilege thus “encourages free-ranging 

discussion of alternatives; prevents public confusion that might 

result from the premature release of such nonbinding 

deliberations; and insulates against the chilling effect likely 

were officials to be judged not on the basis of their final 

decisions, but for matters they considered before making up 

their minds.” City of Virginia Beach v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 

995 F.2d 1247, 1252-53 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted).

To justify application of the deliberative process 

privilege, “the government must show that, in the context in 

which the materials [were] used, the documents [were] both 

predecisional and deliberative.” City of Virginia Beach, 995 

F.2d at 1253 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Predecisional documents are those “prepared in order to assist 

an agency decisionmaker in arriving at his decision,” 

Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 

184 (1975), and deliberative documents are those that “reflect[]

the give-and-take of the consultative process by revealing the 
12

manner in which the agency evaluates possible alternative 

policies or outcomes,” City of Virginia Beach, 995 F.2d at 1253 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The privilege

thus protects “recommendations, draft documents, proposals, 

suggestions, and other subjective documents which reflect the 

personal opinions of the writer rather than the policy of the 

agency.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). But the privilege “does not protect a 

document which is merely peripheral to actual policy formation; 

the record must bear on the formulation or exercise of policyoriented judgment.” Ethyl Corp., 25 F.3d at 1248. In addition, 

“since the prospect of disclosure is less likely to make an 

advisor omit or fudge raw facts than opinions, purely factual 

material does not fall within the exemption unless it is 

inextricably intertwined with policymaking processes such that 

revelation of the factual material would simultaneously expose 

protected deliberation.” City of Virginia Beach, 995 F.2d at 

1253 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In this case, after the district court conducted its in

camera review and its review of the sworn statement of an IRS 

employee, it concluded that the four pages of handwritten notes 

“represent the key or salient points that that agent was writing 

down” and “reflect the mental processes of the revenue agent and 

[his] thoughts on [the] possible direction of the 
13

investigation.” The court also determined that the four pages 

could be withheld in their entirety, effectively ruling that 

there were no segregable portions that could be produced.

We conclude that the district court’s factual findings 

regarding the content of the notes are amply supported by the 

record -- which includes the IRS representative’s statement that 

the four pages of notes “consist[] of [Agent Sharma’s] thoughts, 

impressions, and [indicate the] possible direction of the 

examination” -- and therefore are not clearly erroneous. See

Ethyl Corp., 25 F.3d at 1246 (noting that, in FOIA cases, 

“factual conclusions . . . are reviewed under a clearly 

erroneous standard”). Moreover, because the notes were the 

agent’s preliminary evaluation of issues implicated by the 

audit, the court did not err in concluding that they were 

predecisional and deliberative, thus satisfying the criteria for 

withholding them under Exemption 5. See Nat’l Whistleblower 

Ctr. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 849 F. Supp. 2d 13, 38 

(D.D.C. 2012) (“Handwritten notes may be deliberative or part of 

the agency’s deliberative process where they contain the 

author’s opinions, analysis, or impressions of the event he or 

she describes”); Carter, Fullerton & Hayes LLC v. FTC, 520 F. 

Supp. 2d 134, 144 (D.D.C. 2007) (upholding agency’s invocation 

of the deliberative process privilege to withhold “a set of 

handwritten notes of a senior FTC employee taken during 
14

meetings” based on agency’s description of the notes as 

“representing the employee’s ‘thoughts and impressions’ of the 

meeting”); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Clinton, 880 F. Supp. 1, 13

(D.D.C. 1995) (concluding that “handwritten notes reflecting 

preliminary thoughts of agency personnel” were covered by the 

deliberative process privilege). We also affirm the district 

court’s implicit ruling that there are no segregable portions of 

the notes subject to production.

B. The Summary Report, Graph, and Checksheet

The other two pages withheld in full are (1) a summary 

report prepared by Agent Sharma on October 16, 2013, describing 

the process and results of his review of tax returns for certain 

individual third-party taxpayers, which he conducted in 

connection with the Solers’ audit; and (2) a graph prepared by 

Agent Sharma on July 30, 2012, which he generated from a 

database that “stores information about which individuals and 

entities are related to each taxpayer” and which “shows the 

identity of third-party individuals and entities whose tax 

returns were considered in conjunction with [Solers’] 

examination.” The IRS also produced a “Closed Case Review 

Checksheet” form with one line on the document redacted, 

explaining that it had redacted that portion of the checksheet 

because it reflected “the identity of a third party whose return 

information was considered in conjunction with [Solers’] 
15

examination.” The IRS contends that its withholdings with 

respect to these three pages are justified by Exemption 3 and 26 

U.S.C. § 6103(a).

Exemption 3 protects from disclosure information that is 

“specifically exempted from disclosure by [a] statute” “(i) 

requir[ing] that the matters be withheld from the public in such 

a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue; or (ii) 

establish[ing] particular criteria for withholding or 

refer[ring] to particular types of matters to be withheld.” 5 

U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). And 26 U.S.C. § 6103 “is a statute 

contemplated by FOIA Exemption 3.” Tax Analysts v. IRS, 410 

F.3d 715, 717 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). That statute prohibits the disclosure of 

“[r]eturns and return information . . . except as authorized by 

[Title 26],” 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a), and it defines the term 

“return information” as including “a taxpayer’s identity . . . 

[and] whether the taxpayer’s return was, is being, or will be 

examined or subject to other investigation or processing,” 

although the term “does not include data in a form which cannot 

be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or 

indirectly, a particular taxpayer,” id. § 6103(b)(2).

We conclude that, although the summary report does not 

specifically name third-party individuals whose tax returns were 

considered in conjunction with Solers’ audit, the individuals’ 
16

identities could easily be discerned from the report or any 

segregable portion of it, therefore justifying its being 

withheld. Likewise, because the graph and checksheet 

specifically identified third-party individuals and entities, we 

conclude that the IRS acted properly in withholding the graph 

and redacting one line from the checksheet.

In an effort to avoid this conclusion, Solers asserted for 

the first time during oral argument that four of its employees 

had authorized the IRS to release their tax return information 

to Solers, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6103(c), and that the IRS was 

therefore not entitled to rely on Exemption 3 and § 6103(a) to 

withhold records insofar as they relate to those third parties. 

It is well settled, however, “that contentions not raised in the 

argument section of the opening brief are abandoned.” United 

States v. Al-Hamdi, 356 F.3d 564, 571 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004) 

(citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th 

Cir. 1999)). Moreover, the record reflects that after the IRS 

noted to the district court that Solers’ employees had failed to 

submit the proper authorization forms, Solers made no effort to 

counter this representation. In these circumstances, Solers’ 

efforts to obtain tax documents identifying third parties are 

unavailing.
17

C. The Activity Record

The IRS produced the relevant portions of Agent Sharma’s 

activity record, a document similar to a time sheet, with a 

single entry on one page redacted. The IRS explained that the 

deleted entry reflected that Agent Sharma “communicated with the 

IRS Office of Chief Counsel with respect to a specific issue in 

the examination,” adding that “disclosure of [the redacted 

entry] would reveal an area of the exam for which the revenue 

agent sought legal advice.” The IRS relied on Exemption 5’s 

incorporation of the attorney-client privilege to justify this

redaction, and the district court agreed with the IRS.

Solers contends mainly that the entry should not have been

redacted because “the subject matter of an attorney-client 

communication is not privileged.”

While, as Solers contends, “the general purpose of the work

performed [by an attorney] [is] usually not protected from 

disclosure by the attorney-client privilege because such 

information ordinarily reveals no confidential professional 

communications between attorney and client,” In re Grand Jury 

Subpoena, 204 F.3d 516, 520 (4th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted), the privilege nonetheless shields 

from disclosure “the specific nature of the legal advice sought 

by [the client],” In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 341 F.3d 331, 335 

(4th Cir. 2003); see also id. (holding that, while the fact that 
18

an attorney “provid[ed] advice regarding an immigration matter” 

would not be privileged, a question “specifically ask[ing] 

whether [the client] consulted with Counsel about the 

preparation of [a particular immigration form]” sought 

information protected by the attorney-client privilege). 

Accordingly, we conclude that the attorney-client privilege 

justifies the IRS’ limited redaction of the activity report so 

as to keep confidential the specific issues on which Revenue 

Agent Sharma sought legal advice while working on the audit.

D. The Two Emails

Finally, the IRS made redactions to two emails that it 

produced, withholding the names and contact information of 

certain IRS personnel who were consulted in connection with 

Solers’ audit. The IRS maintained that the redactions were 

justified under Exemptions 6 and 7(C), and the district court 

agreed.

Exemption 6 specifies that FOIA’s disclosure requirement 

does not apply to “personnel and medical files and similar files 

the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted 

invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). The 

Supreme Court has instructed that the phrase “similar files,” as 

used in Exemption 6, should be given “a broad, rather than a 

narrow, meaning,” explaining that “[w]hen disclosure of 

information which applies to a particular individual is sought 
19

from Government records, courts must determine whether release 

of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted 

invasion of that person’s privacy.” U.S. Dep’t of State v. 

Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 600, 602 (1982). And to 

determine whether an invasion of privacy would be “clearly 

unwarranted,” courts employ a balancing test that weighs the 

individual’s privacy interests against the public interest in 

disclosure. The public interest is served to “the extent to 

which disclosure of the information sought would ‘she[d] light 

on an agency’s performance of its statutory duties’ or otherwise 

let citizens know ‘what their government is up to.’” U.S. Dep’t 

of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 497 

(1994) (alteration in original) (quoting Dep’t of Justice v. 

Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)).

A similar analysis applies with respect to the application 

of Exemption 7(C), which allows agencies to withhold “records or 

information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to 

the extent that the production of such law enforcement records 

or information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute 

an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(7)(C).

In this case, Solers does not dispute that the redacted 

information was contained in “personnel and medical files and 

similar files,” within the meaning of Exemption 6, or that the 
20

redacted information was “compiled for law enforcement 

purposes,” within the meaning of Exemption 7(C). Rather, it 

contends that the district court did not adequately consider 

whether the release of the names and contact information of 

these IRS employees would constitute “even a general invasion of 

privacy” and that it failed to “weigh Solers’ right to review 

its tax documents against the asserted privacy interests.”

We conclude, however, that the district court struck the 

right balance in permitting these email redactions. On the one 

side of the scale, IRS employees, as well as other government 

employees, “have a substantial interest in the nondisclosure of 

their identities and their connection with particular 

investigations because of the potential for future harassment, 

annoyance, or embarrassment.” Neely v. FBI, 208 F.3d 461, 464-

65 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. United 

States, 84 F. App’x 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) 

(concluding that “the privacy interest protected by Exemption 6 

encompasse[s] . . . the names of federal employees,” including 

“lower-level I.R.S. employees”). But, on the other side of the 

scale in this case, the record contains no indication that 

disclosing the names and contact information of these IRS 

employees would serve the public interest. See Neely, 208 F.3d 

at 464 (recognizing that the public interest in the names of 

government employees alone “would appear to be negligible” 
21

absent a “compelling allegation of agency corruption or 

illegality”). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court 

did not err in holding that the IRS employees’ interest in 

maintaining the privacy of their names and contact information 

outweighed the public interest in the disclosure of this 

information.

The judgment of the district court is accordingly

AFFIRMED.