-- -- -

/ 

.··.,,,,,,.~ 

·'>:.•,.. 

·~ ... 

24 

.Releue ot COM to the Turld.ah ~. 

!nclaeed tor 1Dtonatian la a copy ot USC~• 

l'9J>ll' t.o the Cha11'man., J.SlD, cm the abon 811bject D 

8ncl.oaure 

CIB I 00/YJ? dtd 

8 Apl'U 1953· 

USCIB1 2/'JS 

eclassified and approved for release by NSA on 11-13-2014 pursuant to E.O. 

3526 

TOP SECRET - ·--------

APPENBEB B8et:IMENTS eeNTAIN 

C6D! W61tD Mlr'ffltlAL 
• .. 

- CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

WASHINGTON 29, I), C 

• 

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR CIB OOCJ~7 

APR 8 1953 

'!8P SEeRE!' eAfieE • SEeURl'l! !1&'6J14A:fteit 

MJ!MORA?mtJM FOR THE CBAIRMAB I IDIDON SIGNAL IITELL.IGENCE BOARD 

StJBJEal!: Release of Ca.t to Turkish Goverment 

l. Reference is made to your memorandum of 8 December 1952 

respecting the release to the Turkish Governnent ot C<J4 equipnents 

for diplana.tic cammmications (ISIB/317/52). 

2. users is pleased to learn that I.SIB COIJC'Ul'S in UBCIB Is 

decision to release the Ca.4 to the Turkish Govenment. In this 

respect, it is pertinent to note that UBCIB would not have taken 

this decision as it did but for the knowledge that LSIB had received adequate notice of the Turkish intentions. Despite tbia, 

however, it is regretted that LSIB was not directly int'ormed of 

this matter before the USCIB decision was made. It is believed 

that the canbination of circumstances attending these negotiations, 

as described below, mq be informative and helpful in understanding 

the lack ot official prior notice to LSIB. 

3. On 25 April 1952, informal notification was received frail 

the Director, GCHQ, via the British Liaison Officer in Washington, 

that "the Foreign Office have been inf01med b7 a member ot the 

Turkish d1planatic staff that 50 cypher machines are being bousbt 

frm. the U.S.A." The British Liaison Officer ad.vised that the 

Director, GCHQ, "would like to know, if' possible, whether .:the 

~kish statement is correct and if' so what type ot machine 1 t is 

intended to suppl.1." 

/ / / / 

5. The matter was placed before USCIB in July 19,52. In weighing 

t;be •dv1 aab1l1 tv of a1 (11 nq the Tircka • UBCIB gave ca;etul consideration I I In view at/prolonged u.s.-u.IC. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 
.._.•*'••I 

TMl!!M::.Suu!!!;!~~~!ew ....... • 1-4't ,.,.,.. m md wltma:iwcl l:U 1awl1a tlliii mlUimacl&i iijU& WWWL 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL~6-36/50 USC 3605 I 

st \uscm 

6. Based upon these considerations, a decision vs.a finally made 

by USCIB in favor of' assisting the Turke, and I.Sm was advised at U.S. 

intentions in advance of any definite canmitment to the Turks. In / 

fact, the machines requested by them have not yet been provided nor has ' 

8.n:f otber technical assistance been cupplied. / 

7. With respect to your inquiry concerning "technical assistance' 

as an alternate or supplement," the latter refers to changeable 

elements, instructions for operation, security regulations, eta., and 

.even the possibility of providing keys and of wiring rotors. The former 

refers in particul.ar to a paper and pencil cryptographic system \.aa a 

aubati tute for e. cipher machine. However, a suggestion that such a 

system might be used met w1 th no interest on the part of' the Turkish 

representative. 

8. It ia believed that neither the Turkish request nor the 

limited amount at crypto-equipnent that we have offered will be 

auff icient to ensure saf egua.rds aginst the use of' other insecure 

Turkish systems. USCIB recamnends, therefore, that this be considered 

as a separate problem. which will have to be discussed between USCIB 

and LSIB once the effects of' the provision of' the Ca.! can be aaeeseed. 

9. I I ..._~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~_J'USCIB 

2 

I 

i 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY F-,71l~~osc TOP SECRET CANOE 
desires to assure LSIB of its belief that, in addition to the 

requirement for agreement set forth in paragraph 5 above, consultation 

prior to action is desirable when uestions arise concer assist-

•ance ,__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ....... activities. It must be understood, however 1 that the decision to 

camnit the U.S. Goverment to provide cryptographic assistance to 

Third Parties does not rest in USCIB. For this reason, USCIB cannot 

ensure that recamnendations either tor or against the provision of 

cryptographic assistance would prevail even though bilateral:cy'-agreed 

to b;y UBCIB and I.BIB. 

~ EO 3.3(h) (2) gne PL 86-36/50 USC 

W. D S 

3605 

Chairman 

tJnited States Camnunications Intelligence. Board 

NATIONA~ SECURITY AGENCY F- 711-C105C 

1 Jul 51 TOP SECRET CANOE 

3