I. : e read only by those p;:i::::::::! cffid~!!y !~d.~et?!!!!.t!d. !~ a 

RePt1r1ty regulations and authorized to receive the informa 

Q}JC Liaison 3 August 1971 

SUBJECT: Information Rolevant to Soviet COi~INT 

lo Attached hcrav1itll as inclosure il is a cooy of a. 

paper prepored sor.~e time agv in this office and reproduced 

at the present time for your informatiLn since it has a bearing 

on the subject stated above. 

2. Attached as inciosure #2 is an extract frcm a Russian 

Army Operation~~ Order, available only in German translaticn, 

which indicates further Russian use of cm~rnJT. 

3. Inclosures 1 and 2 relate to the "draft" 1;iercu previcusly 

submitted to the Chair:;1an of the Security Ccmm1 ttee c:n the general 

subject or Scviet sophisticaticn in communications intelligence and communicaticns Security as rel.event to the uronosed change of the BilUSA Appendix "B" tc., provide for a Category D • 

~! Incls 

1 o OIJCLO:/i 25'-19 

2 o OlJCLO// 25'-20 

.. 

7 1vlll o.!J C..f ' 77ulJ.v ~ THONAS A. IiITI.I..ER 

USAFSS Member 

Security Committee 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-22-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

Cy_!Lcf~cys 

P&....L,_of_t_ngs 

ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY Form 251-10 TOP SECRET SUEDE 
.. {. - - .... 

ODC/SRL-1 

e read only by those personnel officially indoctrinated in ca security regulations and authorized to receive the inform 

-

c,-.£ -.,1 ~ ~ 

pt..L d,4 .f..,. ~ 

t!JPc,,A t:>#:l.:J-/t; 

Russian K4cwlegp,e of Germa~ Cryntog~aDbic Practice 

(1943 

A German translation of a ca~tured Russian intelligence 

manual designed "for higher staffs" and dated 1943 indicates that as 

ot that date Russian intelligence held a surryrisingly detailed 

knowledge of German Arri.ly signal cor.:municuticns \Tith regard to their 

organization, equinr..1ent, and cry..,tcera~hic media. The report 

also stotcs that the German Army Chief Si~nal Officer supulied 

German Arr.1y Intelligence with a daily re...,ort on intercopt results. 

The brcchurc, availab~e in German translation as GrIDS Document 

IG/382, becomes of interest as another item 1nd1cct1ve of Russian 

appreciation of the elements of' comr:a•nications security. "T!C"'t:0 

1n1'ormat1cr, sum.'Il~ized in the Gene; discussic.n of "The Russian 

'Y' Service" (:., 91/G-38) indicated that it vias the belief cf a 

British liaison mission to rf.oscov1 early in the war that the Russians 

were "'7ell on the way" to the sclution of I·:nigma traffic 

not indeed already s~lved it. The nresent manual, while not 

givine any indicativn Lf such Russian cry~tanalytic activity, does 

• indicate that the Russians were thoroughly familiar with the 

distributiLn and use or EniGm~ ciphor machines in the German Army 

at approximately this date. Ir. a dd1t1on, the "TJC;)··n Tea( which 

investigated a German r~ctory ·which had T)roduced Enigma machines 

discovered that a Russian inspection of tho factory had nreceded 

their visit and that the Russian investieators, \"lho were Russian 

Army officers, significantly showed greater interest in mcdels 

of the Gerr: an Naval Enigma than in mode;L~ of :the German Arm~ 

En~gma which were equally available. (The ir .. plicatic.n is that as 4. .. ~ 

Russian Army "experts" th~ invostMetc·rs were alrc AQY ,,.Qu:!,u 

ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY Form "1m-10 I -rOP SECREr ~UitDE 
.. 

\ 

>e read only by those personnel officially indoctrinated in co aeCUl'lty regwat1ona and authorized to roce1 ve the Inform 

familiar ,,.,1th the German Army machine but the German Navy version, 

?thich differed in stme features fro1:1 the German Army model, was 

new to them). 

Eval~ation of the stat€ments made in the ~anual is perhans 

subjective and shoul<l not be atter ntcd \"11 thout cons1derat1cn ot 

the context in which ~hey ap~ear. The djfficulties of dealing 

with a German tr~nslatiLn fr~m the Russian must be mentioned, for 

example, there is nv indication of its disseminaticn other than 

that to be 1nferree !rom the reference in the German translation 

of the title to "for higher staffs" and thore is no indicaticn of 

the Russian classificction. On the basis er this statement, 

however, it may be assumed that the manual \'las intended for the 

use of staff intelligence officers - whether such staffs uere at 

the Frc·nt or Army leve.L. or may have included Division is unclear. 

~~aking allowance for the linguistic diffj cul ties of an English 

translation fret: a German translatior. frrm the Russian {where the 

Russian text discussed German organizat~cn) the "tone" cf the I 

references tc signal communications ccn1...,are in nhraseolcgy and 

reference tc salient uoints for cc.mmunicatic..ns securi t;r tc 

other recE:ntly avni_able Russian material t1hici. has led ASA tc. 

comment on anparcnt Russian "so.,.,histication" in ctr~.mPnicaticns 

intelligence and cor.municaticns security. This "tone or reference" 

to German ccmmunict:. tic.r..s may be ccr.:oared with the language and 

terminclogy used in the "Lectures c,n Cry~tc..gr~''Phic Security (SUV)" 

recent:iy translated frcm Source 267 by CSA::: ( ~!I-4-TIC~ :·).. The 

ASA translation of the 1S44 "nonual fc.r the Processing cf RadiL 

Intelligence Hatcr1al~" may also be cited in this connectic..n with I 

partic~ar attention to c;~1.~pters 1 and 11 of that tr.<.~nslation 

ARMED ~~~r-r¥tA:~f)yt!~~1~~nai_f@pcJSfi6fft~ S~~lc.ns 
r 

\ 

Consistent with the J..irnitatic.n of discussic·n ir1 thE' "~~anual 

for Processing Radie.. Intelligence :·Dtcria.l.s" tc.. the corrrnunications 

or foreign ~~ies the nr€sent ~..anua~, nre~ared for Red Army . intel...1..igenc@ lfficcrs, l.ir.,1 ts its discussion to the organization 

of the German Army ( "Oberkcmr.lando des Heeres" - the German 

tr~nsJatic.n e;f the title uses "Wehrmacht" - "armed forces" - but 

the subject matter is limited to the German Army"). Examination 

of the complete manual leaves the impression that the German 

Army organizati~n ~as thoroughly familiar tc Russian Army 

intelligence. In the case or German ,Army Intelligence en the 

Eastern Front (I-c Ost), for exa~ple, the manual gives a breakdown of tho v~ricus secticns shovdng their n~merical designatic.n, 

their resncnsibilities, their sources cf 1nfc.rmation, and the 

intelligence produccdo The following tr~nslatior. cf selected 

pages gjves the gist of the informotic.n cc.ntained in the manual. 

a:·ns, H3/382 

OberY.:c.,mr;-,andc des Heeres Gencra~stab des Heeres 

Abt Fremde Heere Ost (III-C) 

"Translation c..r Eu.ssian Contured DocL·ment Number 1: 

Orientaticn :1'anua:i.. c.n the German Armed Forces for 

Higher Staffs 11

1 issued by the Clder Intc~ligcnce 

Directorate c.:r the Red Army; ;~c,sccvr 19430 

Organizations ~r JKII/GenStcb and Freiede Heere Ost, charts 

and eXDlanation, pn. 27-2€. 

"The Signa:.i. Cor .. r;•Unic&tic.ns Secticn (Uachrichten Abteilung, 

Chef Heeres Nachrichteriwesen} provides the signai.. eoml:"lunicatic:..ns 

between command anci operc tic.-ra.. staffs and ,.,laces at their disnosal 

current enemy intel~igence reports es we~J. as a daily renort on 

intercent results (Abh8rgebnisse). This sectio~ is resnonsible 

ARMEJ'~~R~is ~i8£~fi~nXcE&E¥~~!1;1-1o~d ~e81E'{~H.\:Wl1 ~E 
.. 

· and keeps the Waffenamt advised of req11ire['Jc:nts for the development 

of technical equi11ment. The secticn preoarcs ne\•1 cry.,tcgra"lh:ic 

regvlations, administrates the crynt~gra~hic service, and ccntrcls 

enc1?Jher1ng and decinhering \1ork". n .30. 

The strength and equinment cf a Ccrns sigr;a:i complement is 

given in tabular forrr. with the ste:.tcF.ent that each Corns I1as 

22 Enigt.1a ciuher machines. p. 63. 

The radio ccm~any of an Army's signal troon ccmnlemont 

includes 24 Enigma cipher machines. p.65. 

A tabulDr listing cf the various ty"leS or signa..1.. equ1.,ment 

with its specificotions used in the Grrr.1ar Army i~ nresented on 

Under "Trocp Command, '1rganizaticn ct Signal Comnunic.ticns", 

the follovling di scussj c.n c,f "E11ei.phered Command Communicatii:..ns" 

appears: 

"The question of enci'l)hering cor. mana ccmmuniceitions is given 

very great iffiportance in the German Army. The army is equipped 

\vi th c1nher machines rrhicl.1. are used for rc:.dio traffic .frc.rn 

divisir·n staff' upnards. Such a ci..,her machine has over 1 

million possible enci~hcring Clmbinations. 

"Ir• additicn to the cinhor machines the Germans use a 

"Hand Cryptogranhic System". They have a simnle trocry ci··"'hcr used 

by divisivn, regiment, and battaliun. In additicr there is a 

difi'icul t ( "Sch'1.·rierigen") ci .,,her vri th a double enci phermen t 

that is used by divisicr and corns, often by Army. 

"The Troop ci,,her, which is prc"Oared in a b;.:.sjc prjnciple, 

is distributed in thousands of rr:~dii'icutic..1.s. 

11 In addi tic.n, there are thousantis of' v~riC\~S s1~1 table£; 

ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY Form 25~-10 TOP SEGRE SUE E 
<' 

... 

ODC/·,H: -1 

be read only by those personnel officially indoctrinated in nee security regulations and authorized to receive the inform 

covernarnes, and symbols. 

"As a rule fer .nn imlividu£Jl largt:~ op€ratiLn each forr:J.ation 

has its ovm key table, covername listing, radic signal table, 

etco 

"The Germans use v~rious methotls fer n~an encipherment: 

lo Use CJf the standard ruan grid. 

2. Divisicn cf a largo r.1a"J square ( "Quadrattr) into four . parts; middle square {traTleze), each middle square in four 

parts - snialJ. squares; and each small square in nine narts. 

Finally each map point on the map is designated by a five 

digit number. 

3. Cover names are provided for the imnortant orientaticn 

points. 

4. "Stosslinien" method ". p. 107. 

' 

ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY Form 251-10 .&""' TOP SECRET SUEDE