REF ID:A42963 

The Washington Merry-Go· Round 1

THE w ASHINGTO~ POST 

Saturday, December SO, l950 I 

MacArthur Puzzles _Pentagon ~ - . By Drew Pearson. 

Trouble is continuing between 

Washington and Tokyo over General MacArthur's faulty inteUi· 

gence. Ever since MacArthur's 

for the continuation Of the offen-1 according to 'lVilloughby, lacked 

sive· or of continuing to objec- fire-power, air strength, artillery, tive~ according to their set sched- could not ·travel with an7 speed~ we." · : while their high command, being 

"bring the boys 

home by Christmas" statement 

and the failure 

to spot 200,000 

Chinese Communists' in 

North Korea, 

!

Washington has 

been skeptical 

about the suThis fs interpreted in the Army "stereotyped," could not regroup 

Department as meaning that the easily to take advantage of the 

Chinese were slow-moving, had U. N. retreat. 

only limited obje_ctlves, and never These are some of the fact.ii 

expected to run us out Of North which don't. show up in the preu 

Korea so quickly. dispatches from Tokyo. The in· 

If his intelligence ls correct, escapable conclusion ls that either 

Chinese manpower did r.ot total Willoughby ls wrong or the Ma.C. 

anywhere near a million men, nor Arthur press communiques ha•re even near 500,000 men, but only been deceiving the American 

285,000 plus 150,000 North Ko- p··blic. 

reans. In addition, the Chinese, Co'Pllrll11&t. zsso. the Bell s1111111aate, riio. 

pre me com- ............. 111111111111111111111111111111111111 

mander's intelligence reports. Willoughby 

Because of this skepticism, it 

I 

was hinted, after the tragic re- treat from North Korea, that MacArthur should replace his intelli1 

gence chief, Maj. Gen. Charles 

Willoughby. However, this has 

not been done. · Meanwhile MacArthur's public I statements in Tokyo are frequent1 Iy at complete variance with the 

I 

confidential reports cabled back 

by his intelligence chief, and 

Washington, in turn, is puzzled 

; as to which to believe. 

I For instance, MacArthur esti- · mated publicly on December 2 I that there were about 500,000 Chi1 nese troops in Korea. (This was in 

direct contrast to his estimate just 

six days before that there were not enough Chinese in Korea to 

interfere with getting the boys 

home by Christmas.) On December 4, however, MacArthur upped 

his esti'"late to more than one million Chinese in Korea or on the 

border, while on December 15 he 

announced that "a bottomless well 

of Chinese Communists manpower 

continues to ft.ow into Korea." 

Opposite Reports 

However, this was not what his 

intelligence chief was meanwhile 

cabling tt.e Joint Chiw..s of Staff. 

On December 6, just two .iays 

ifter MaCArthur had announced 

his million-man Chinese army es- timate, Genera! Willough}?Y cabled 

asfolo s· : · 'Units believed to be on Eighth 

front are, west to east: Ele· 

ents 50th CCF <Chinese Communist · Field) ·Army, elements t 

66th Chinese CCF Army; 39th 

CCF Army; 4oth CCF Army; 38th 

CCF Army; 42nd CCF Army." 

If all these six Chinese armies were· of full strength with no cas- ualtie~whicli is doubtful-the 

total Chinese force which sent the u. N. Eighth Army into a 120-

mile ntreat in less than two · weeks was only 96,000 men. Yet the U. N. Eighth Army ~ad 

more than 100,000. front-~e com- · bat troops, not counting engineers 

and·' service troops behlnd the 

lines.· · : .,_' :· .. · · 
e Ida ear ecem · mate~ GeDenl wmOlllhbJ m1· 1n-! 

creued hill fllure• on Chinese' 

avei-ell llf;nngtb. But even the ! 

revised &111re•. 11o not matedaJb' I 

chaDp the picture. Be DOW eatl• 

mate• that thl total Chinese · strenath In Korea faclDI not cml7 ! 

the Eflhth..ArtnJ, but-~: 

:fi.clq the Teiit.h CoQ>S around the i 

JlunP,am beachhead, II 2B~poo ; 

plua 150,000 ~ortb Keh~ i. · I 

The llze Of .the U. N. forees II · ~ a · mllltU'J' '.Hcret. But lt .can be ; 

stated that theJ are 1101Dewh&t ! 

mon than the Chlllele ~ i 

It 11 ·suppoaed to require a man- p~ · mperlorl~ oi-~ to 1 to 

lamich a · IUC!Ceuful otremlve. , J'mthermcn, lt II an lndfaputable '. 

faCt: tbit W. haft complete con.-

trol Of th8 a1r while the Chlnele 

have · almost lio artllle!'J' acept 

• that cip\ured from UI. '!hUI, even 

usumlq the WW.Oughb)' eltl- i 

mates are" COllllderabl7 oil, the , 

Pentqon Is puzzled over our pre- I 

clp!tloul 120-mlle retreat. The I 

i Immediate ·retreat~-11, ~ coune, · I explained by the fact that·we were I 

i spread too thin,· but not the con1 

tlnued 120-mlle retreat. · 

Poor Chine&e Weapom ,. In mld-)2ecem]>~. General Wll-

~q~~ ca.Jll!1Lt1.lt.J~t.-

l SC::Xl.p of _CJ:rlll~-~I. _!gWPment: "Battalion CCF Ani1j With 

tme grenades and rifle or B.us-

" slan aubm'acblne gun per man and ~ 300 North Korean ~ stra.1-

; glen cro1sed Taedong." 

1 In other words, each Chinese 

soldier had no more than three 

hand grenades and a rl8e or submachine gun. Th11 II extremely 

light firepower for an attacking 

U'IDJ', but It bu been about the 

avera1e Chinese armament. Chine.ie troops have had no means j of carrying amJ.J.unltlon other , than ox or mule carts, and each 

• man -i'Oi!lll Into battle with most of 

' his amm.unltlon on him, plus his 

rice for the next few 11Q1. 

. Another of WlllOQlh§'s lnt!J.· ~aziCiea]lii;'lQ:"W~~A a out'mtd-Decem:ber-l"liifinif: 

Ing: ~'Lilek Of CCJ' OD Eighth Arm'/ 

front. ·Due to deep withdrawal 

executed bJ Eighth Arniy, It iB 

evident -that C!Jll!JD)', lacking any 

11"eat degree of mobility, bu been 

unable ·.to regain contact." 

This II Interpreted In the Pentqon u iQIDI that the Chinese, 

lacldq any means ·of transportation, were unable to keep up with 

the: fut ·retreat ·of the . Eighth , 

A.rmJ, IJJ other words, we failed I 

to keep contact with the eliem;y, one of the fundamental rules of 

mllltarJ strateu. . Another of General Wm..!!JllllJ!D : £ at abOiit""tlii same time, i a: "Thole well·veraecl In Chi· 1 

neae mlllt&17 operatloni atreu an I 

Inherent lack of elaltlcltJ ID plan· 1 

DIDI and similar lnelutlcltJ ID 

ltd and coDIJIWld structure. Such 

deflclencles can onlJ' ·reBult ID 

stereotyped. campalpl, and hold 

otremlve action to Blow 11UCC11111lon 

of limited obJectlve1. • · . ''It follows, then," continued ; 

General .. Wllloulhb:r. "that CCF 

high command; being unable to 

predict degree Of success for his 

initial oft'emlve of November 28, 

was confronted bJ the problem of 

immediately reallgninl hill force& 

REF ID:A42963