before any answer was filed, and thus, we consider his amended complaint 

in our de novo review. NRCP 15(a) ("A party may amend the party's 

pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive 

pleading is served."); NRCP 7 (listing permissible pleadings, not including 

a motion to dismiss) That complaint, however, fails to state a viable 

claim for relief. Thus, having considered appellant's appeal statement, 

respondents' response thereto, and the record, we conclude that the 

district court properly dismissed the action. See Rae v. All American Life 

and Gas. Co., 95 Nev. 920, 923, 605 P.2d 196, 197 (1979) (a district court 

order will be affirmed on appeal if supported by any of the theories 

presented); Nelson v. Sierra Constr. Corp., 77 Nev. 334, 343, 364 P.2d 402, 

406 (1961) (upholding a dismissal for failure to state a claim, even though 

the district court based the dismissal on different reasons). 

Appellant's first amended complaint asserted claims relating 

to perceived abuses of the inmate grievance procedure. Appellant has, 

however, no constitutional or other right to have the grievance procedure 

carried out in a specific manner. Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374 (5th 

Cir. 2005) ("[An inmate] does not have a federally protected liberty 

interest in having these grievances resolved to his satisfaction."); Ramirez 

v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[I]nmates lack a separate 

constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure."); 

Massey v. Heiman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he Constitution 

creates no entitlement to grievance procedures or access to such 

procedures voluntarily established by the state." (agreeing with Adams v. 

Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994))); Hernandez v. Bennett-Haron, 128 

Nev., Adv. Op. 54, 287 P.3d 305, 310 (2012) (explaining that, with regard 

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to due process protections under the Nevada Constitution, this court is 

guided by federal precedent). 

Further, to the extent that appellant asserted otherwise viable 

claims for relief with respect to prison conditions, it is unclear that he 

properly exhausted the grievance process for those claims. Before suing 

the Department of Corrections or any of its employees, an inmate must 

exhaust his administrative remedies, unless doing so is futile. NRS 

41.0322(1); Abarra v. State, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 3, 342 P.3d 994, 996 

(2015); Berry v. Fell, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 37, P.3d (Ct. App. 2015); 

see also Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining 

that federal law does not require exhaustion when administrative 

remedies effectively are unavailable). Appellant contends that while some 

grievances were exhausted, with others he was prevented from exhausting 

his administrative remedies by respondents' "willful obstruction" and 

"falsified reports," in that some grievances were treated as duplicative and 

not addressed or allowed to be resubmitted. But it is not clear from the 

complaint and other papers which grievances were exhausted, in part 

because appellant failed to provide a "simple, concise, and direct" 

statement of the facts, NRCP 8(e)(1), and appellant has not sufficiently 

alleged that he was prevented from exhausting his administrative 

remedies. One of the things that appellant must show in seeking to be 

excused from the exhaustion requirement is "that prison officials screened 

his grievance or grievances for reasons inconsistent with or unsupported 

by applicable regulations." Sapp, 623 F.3d at 824. Here, from what can 

be gleaned from the record, many of appellant's grievances were properly 

denied as duplicative, untimely, and inappropriate. Further, appellant 

repeatedly grieved those issues, rather than appealing to the next level as 

3 
J. 

required by Administrative Regulation 740.03(6) and (8). Accordingly, 

appellant has not shown that exhaustion is excused. For the above 

reasons, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.' 

Saitta 

Plektt. dAP , J. 

Gibbons Pickering 

cc: Hon. Nancy L Allf, District Judge 

Stanley Earnest Rimer 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

'In light of this order, we deny appellant's July 21, 2015, motion to 

supplement his civil proper person appeal statement. 

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