SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

928 

CA 16-00300 

PRESENT: PERADOTTO, J.P., LINDLEY, NEMOYER, AND SCUDDER, JJ. 

 

 

JOAN STEIN, AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF 

MEREDITH M. POWERS, DECEASED, 

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SARKISIAN BROTHERS, INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

COOK, WETTER, CLOONAN, KURTZ & MURPHY, P.C., KINGSTON (ERIC M. KURTZ

OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

KALTER, KAPLAN, ZEIGER & FORMAN, WOODBOURNE (IVAN KALTER OF COUNSEL),

FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order and partial judgment (one paper) of the

Supreme Court, Erie County (Donna M. Siwek, J.), entered May 19, 2015. 

The order and partial judgment, insofar as appealed from, denied the

motion of defendant Sarkisian Brothers, Inc., seeking summary judgment 

dismissing the complaint. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order and partial judgment insofar

as appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the

motion is granted and the complaint is dismissed in its entirety. 

Memorandum: Plaintiff’s decedent commenced this action seeking

damages for injuries she sustained when her shoe caught on the

bullnose tile used as a transition from a concrete floor in the

hallway of an arena to the tile floor in a bathroom, which had an open

entrance. It is undisputed that defendant directed subcontractors to

install bullnose tile rather than a threshold as provided for in the

contract. Contrary to defendant’s contention, we conclude that

Supreme Court properly determined that plaintiff raised an issue of

fact whether it owed a duty of care to decedent because, “while

engaged affirmatively in discharging a contractual obligation, [it]

creat[ed] an unreasonable risk of harm to others, or increas[ed] that

risk” (Church v Callanan Indus., 99 NY2d 104, 111; see Hannigan v

Staples, Inc., 137 AD3d 1546, 1549; see generally Espinal v Melville

Snow Contrs., Inc., 98 NY2d 136, 141-142). We nevertheless conclude

that the court erred in determining that plaintiff raised an issue of

fact whether the alleged defect was trivial as a matter of law and

thus erred in denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment

dismissing the complaint. 

It is well established that we “must consider ‘all the facts and
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CA 16-00300 

circumstances presented’ . . . before concluding that no issue of fact

exists” whether the alleged defect is trivial as a matter of law

(Hutchison v Sheridan Hill House Corp., 26 NY3d 66, 77). Such issues

of fact include the dimensions of the alleged defect, its appearance

and elevation, and the time, place and circumstance of the injury (see

id.). Here, the record establishes that the bullnose tile was

slightly less than one-half of an inch in height and was not the same

color as the tile floor. Decedent testified at her deposition that

she was standing in the hallway conversing with a group of people,

approximately three to four feet from the bathroom, before she turned

to walk into the bathroom. She testified that she glanced at the tile

floor but did not see the “lip” that caught her shoe and caused her to

stumble and be propelled several feet before she struck the towel

dispenser. In opposition to defendant’s motion, plaintiff provided

the expert affidavit of an architect who opined that “such a vertical

edge constitutes a snare and a trap for those who might be distracted

by the crowd moving in and out of the bathroom.” We conclude that the

opinion of plaintiff’s expert is not sufficient to raise an issue of

fact whether the defect is trivial because it is speculative and

conclusory on that issue (see Ciccarelli v Cotira, Inc., 24 AD3d 1276,

1277), particularly because there is no indication in the record that

anyone other than decedent was entering or leaving the bathroom. 

Furthermore, “the test established by the case law in New York is not

whether a defect is capable of catching a pedestrian’s shoe. Instead,

the relevant questions are whether the defect was difficult for a

pedestrian to see or to identify as a hazard or difficult to pass over

safely on foot in light of the surrounding circumstances” (Hutchinson,

26 NY3d at 80). Upon our review of the photos of the alleged defect

and in view of the less than 1⁄2-inch height of the bullnose tile and

the circumstances surrounding decedent’s accident (see Germain v

Kohl’s Corp., 96 AD3d 1474, 1475; Sharpe v Ulrich Dev. Co., LLC, 52

AD3d 1319, 1320), we conclude that, although an accident occurred that

is “traceable to the defect, there is no liability” because the

alleged defect “ ‘is so slight that no careful or prudent [person]

would reasonably anticipate any danger from its existence’ ” under the

circumstances present here (Hutchinson, 26 NY3d at 81). 

Entered: November 10, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court