UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

CAMPANELLA, HERRING, and PENLAND 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Specialist JOHN DADSON 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20160305 

Headquarters, U.S. Army Alaska 

Jeffery D. Lippert, Military Judge 

Colonel Erik L. Christiansen, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Colonel Mary J. Bradley, JA (on brief); Major Christopher D. 

Coleman, JA. 

For Appellee: Pursuant to A.C.C.A. Rule 15.2, no response filed. 

17 November 2016 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

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CAMPANELLA, Senior Judge: 

 A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his pleas, of two specifications of conspiracy, one specification of 

wrongful sale of military property, and one specification of larceny of military 

property, in violation of Articles 81, 108, and 121, Uniform Code of Military 

Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 881, 908, 921 (2012) [hereinafter UCMJ]. The convening 

authority approved the adjudged sentence of a bad-conduct discharge, six months of 

confinement, and reduction to the grade of E-1. 

This case is before us for review pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. While neither 

appellant nor his appellate counsel raise any allegations of error, we find he should 

have been convicted of only one specification of conspiracy. See United States v. 

Chandler, 74 M.J. 674, 686 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2015). 

Appellant was found guilty, inter alia, of two separate specifications of 

conspiracy with another specialist: 1) conspiracy to commit larceny of military 

property; and 2) conspiracy to commit wrongful sale of military property. 
DADSON—ARMY 20160305 

2

A conspiracy exists when one “enters into an agreement with” another and 

“performs an overt act for the purpose of bringing about the object of the 

conspiracy.” Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2012 ed.), pt. IV, ¶ 5.b(1). 

“Whether a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies existed in a given 

circumstance is a question of fact determined by reference to the totality of the 

circumstances. United States v. Finlayson, 58 M.J. 824, 827 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 

2003) (citing United States v. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200, 1210 (5th Cir. 1996); 16 AM.

JUR. 2D Conspiracy § 11 (2002)). As the United States Supreme Court noted long 

ago, “the character and effect of a conspiracy [are] not to be judged by 

dismembering it and viewing its separate parts, but only by looking at it as a whole.” 

United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 544 (1913). “A single agreement to commit 

multiple offenses ordinarily constitutes a single conspiracy.” United States v.

Pereira, 53 M.J. 183, 184 (C.A.A.F. 2000). “The one agreement cannot be taken to 

be several agreements and hence several conspiracies because it envisages the 

violation of several statutes rather than one.” Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 

49, 53 (1942) 

The factors used to determine the number of conspiracies include: “(1) the 

objectives and (2) nature of the scheme in each alleged conspiracy; (3) the nature of 

the charge and (4) the overt acts alleged in each; (5) the time and (6) location of 

each of the alleged conspiracies; (7) the conspiratorial participants in each; and (8) 

the degree of interdependence between the alleged conspiracies.” United States v. 

Inman, ARMY 20150042, 2016 CCA LEXIS 286 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 4 May 2016) 

(citing Finlayson, 58 M.J. at 827). 

After weighing these factors, we conclude, under the totality of the 

circumstances, appellant and his co-conspirator engaged in a single conspiracy to 

effectuate the object of the conspiracy “to steal and sell military property.” We 

conclude that sufficient facts to distinguish separate conspiracies from one another 

do not exist, and appellant and his co-conspirator had a single criminal agreement to 

commit larceny and wrongful sale of military property. 

CONCLUSION 

After consideration of the entire record of trial, Specifications 1 and 2 of 

Charge III are consolidated into a single specification, denominated the 

Specification of Charge III, to read as follows: 

In that [appellant], U.S. Army, did, at or near Joint Base 

Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, between on or about 1 

February 2015 and 1 June 2015, conspire with Specialist 

Anthony Entwistle to commit offenses under the Uniform 

Code of Military Justice, to wit: larceny and wrongful sale 

of military property, of a value over $500.00, the property 
DADSON—ARMY 20160305 

3

of the U.S. Army, and in order to effect the objects of the 

conspiracy the said SPC Dadson and the said SPC 

Entwistle did steal and sell military property. 

The remaining findings of guilty are AFFIRMED. We are able to reassess the 

sentence on the basis of the error noted and do so after conducting a thorough 

analysis of the totality of circumstances presented by appellant’s case and in 

accordance with the principles articulated by our superior court in United States v. 

Winckelmann, 73 M.J. 11, 15-16 (C.A.A.F. 2013) and United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 

305 (C.M.A. 1986). We are confident that based on the entire record and appellant’s 

course of conduct, the military judge would have imposed a sentence of at least that 

which was adjudged and approved, and accordingly we AFFIRM the sentence. 

All rights, privileges, and property, of which appellant has been deprived by 

virtue of that portion of the findings set aside by this decision, are ordered restored. 

See UCMJ arts. 58b(c), and 75(a). 

Judge HERRING and Judge PENLAND concur. 

FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: