UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

No. 01-944
L AR R Y A. P EL EG R I NI , A PP EL L ANT ,

v. ANTHONY J. P RI NCI PI , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.
On Appea l from the B oard of Veter ans' Appea ls and On Appellee ' s Motion for Reconsider ation
(Argued January

23, 2003 Dec ided J une 24, 2004 )

Kenneth M. Carpenter , of To pe ka , K a ns a s, wi th w ho m Se an Ke nd all , of B oulder, Colorado, was on the br ief, for

the appe llant.
John D. M

cNamee , with whom Tim S. Mc Cla in , Ge neral C ou ns e l; R. Ra nd all Cam pb e ll , As si st antGen eral Co un se l; M a r y A n n F ly nn , Principal Deputy

Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Brian B. Rippel , Deputy

Assistant Gener al Counsel , al l o f W ashing ton, D.C., were on the brief , for the appellee

. Ro be rt V . Ch ish olm , of Providence , Rhode I sland, and Barbara J. Cook , of Cincinnati, Ohio, wer e on the plea dings f

or the National Org anization of Veter ans' Advocates, I nc., as a micus curiae ; and Barton F

. Stichman and Ronald B. Abrams , b o t h o f W as h i n gt o n , D. C

. , we re o n t h e p l ea d i n gs for the N ational Vete rans L eg al Service s Progr am and Ame rica n L eg ion as amici cur iae.
Be fore KRAMER, Chief Judge , and I VERS and STEI NB ERG, Judges

. STEI NB ERG, Judge , filed the opinion o f the Court. I VERS, Judge , filed an opinion concur ring in part and dissenting in part.
STEI NB ERG, Judge : The appe llant, throug h counsel, see ks review of an A pril 30, 2001, Boa rd of Ve tera

ns' Appea ls (BV A or B oard) decision that found that an April 1994 Depa rtment of Veter ans Affairs (VA) reg ional office (RO) decision was final and that no new and mater ial evidenc e had bee n prese nted, af

ter that VA RO d ec i s i o n , to reope n his previously disallowed cla im for VA2

"se rvice connec tion for a soft[-]ti s s u e l u n g mass due to exposure to Ag ent Ora ng e or othe r he rb ic ide s" duri ng his se rv ic e in Vie tna m. Re c or d (R. ) at 4. Th e a pp e lla nt f ile d a br ie f a nd a re ply br ie f, in w hic h h e make s c e rt a in a rgume nts in s up port of a

re mand ba se d o n th e Ve te ra

ns Cla ims As sis tanc e Ac t of

20 00 (V CAA) , Pu

b. L . N o. 10 6- 47 5, 11 4 St a t. 2 09 6, sp e c if ic a lly 38 U. S.C. § 5103(a) , as am ended by VCAA § 3(a ). The Sec reta ry filed a br ief, in which he argues that the VCAA does not re quire a rema nd in the instant appea l. There afte r, the Court orde red a ddit ional br ie fi ngfr om t

he pa rt ie s; b ot h par

tie s and a mic us c ur ia e , th e Natio na l O rg a nizatio n o f V e te ra ns ' Advocates, I nc. (N OVA) , filed re sponses. The Court then he ard or al ar g ument and on January 13, 2004, issued an opinion in this case vacating the April 30, 2001, BV A decision and re manding the matter for further development a nd rea djudication. Pelegrini v. Principi( Pe le gr ini I ), 17 Ve t.App. 412 (2004). On Fe bruar

y 3 , 2 004, the Secr etar

y filed a motion for pa

nel re consideration and for a full-Court decision should panel reconsider ation "be denied in whole or in part." Motion (Mot.) at 2. The Sec reta

ry also filed on F ebrua

ry 5, 2004, a motion to "stay the pre cede nt i al i m p ac t " of Pelegrini I pending a ruling on the Secr etar y ' s rec onsideration motion. Stay Motion (Stay

Mot.) at 1

. On Fe b ru ar y 1 2 , 2 0 0 4 , t h e ap p el l an t , t h ro u ghco u n s el , fi l edan o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e S ec re t ary 's motion for a stay

. On Fe bruar y 19, 2004, the Court issued an orde r re quiring the appe llant to file a response to the rec onsideration motion, permitting the Secre tary to respond, and inviting interested amici cur iae to par

ticipate. Pelegrini v. Principi , No. 01-944, 2004 WL 396111 (Ve t. App. Fe b. 19, 2004) (noting that, pursuant to Tobler v. Principi , 2 Vet.App. 8, 14 ( 1991), Secr etar y ' s remedy

"ma y b e f o r th e B o a r d to s ta

y it s p r o c e e d in g s in o th e r c a s e s th a t a r g u a b ly f a ll w it h in the Pe le gr ini I prec edent be ing c hall en ged ")

. I n Marc h 2004, the appe llant filed his response, a nd the Amer ican L eg ion (L eg ion), jointly

with the National Veter ans L eg al Service s Progr am (NV L SP), and NOVA

eac h filed re sponses as amici c uriae in support of t he appellant. Also in March 2004, the Secre tary responde d (Response ( Resp.)) to the a ppellant' s response. I n April 2004, the appellant filed a notice of supplemental a

uthority relating to Hayslip v. Principi , 364 F.3d 1321 (F ed. Cir. 2004)

. The Court expresses its gr atitude for the prompt responses of the par ties and the pa

rticipation of amici. Today , the Court w ill g rant the Secre tary ' s motion for rec onsideration, withdra w its opinion in Pe le gr ini I , and issue this opinion (Pelegrini II ) i n its stead. We hold (1) that the revised notice3

require ments in 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F .R. § 3.159(b)(1) (2 0 0 3 ), VA's re g ulations implementing amended se ction 5103(a) , apply to c ases pending befor e VA on N ovember 9, 2000, the date of

the VCAA' s enac tment, even if the initial age ncy of original jurisdi ction (AOJ) decision was issued be fore that date a nd (2) that the s t at u t e and re g ulation provide that, bef ore a n initial unfavor able AOJ dec ision is issued on a cla im, a service -conne ction claimant must be g iven notice in acc ordanc e with 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)( 1). The Court f urther de termines that, on the cur

rent re cord, it ca

nnot conclude that the not ice de ficienc y in the instant case w as not pr e jud ic ia l to the a

pp e lla nt. Ad dit ion a lly , in

respo ns e to t

he Se c re tary ' s c omm e nts , in his Fe bruar y 2004 motions, reg ardingthe lack of clar ity as to the proce ss to be undertaken on re mand for this and similarly

situated ca ses (Mot. at 2; Stay Mot. at 2), we pr ovide appr opriate c larification. We also hold that a re mand is require d pursuant to Sp e nc e r v . B ro wn , 4 Vet.App. 283 ( 1993), a ff 'd , 17 F.3d 368 ( Fe d. Cir. 1994). For the re asons set for

th below, the Court will vacate the B oard decision and r emand the matter for rea djudication consistent with this opi nion.

I. Bac kgr ound Be cause the ca se involves only proce ss, an evidentiar

y backg round nee d not be provided. Th e ve te ra

n se rv e d ho no ra

bly on a c tiv e du ty

in t he U. S. M a ri ne Cor

ps fr om N ov e mbe r 1 96 8 unti l Ap ri l 1 9 7 0 , i n cl u d i n g s er v i ce i n Vi et n am
. R

. at 2 3 1

. I n De ce m b er 1 9 9 3 , t h e R O d en i edt h e v et er an 's

c la im fo r " [s]e rv ic e []co nn e c tio n fo r Ag e nt Or a ng e e xpos ur e " on the g ro un ds that he fa ile d to c la im "a ny specific disability

relating to exposure" and that " mere exposu re i s not a disability in itself." R. at 106. After the veteran filed a Notice of Disagr eeme nt as t o that decision (R. at 109), the RO, in April 1994, d en i ed s er vice c onnection for a lef t-lung -soft-tissue mass (R. at 124) . He did not appea l that de cision, and it became final. In Marc h 1996, he filed, inter alia, a c laim to reopen. R. at 127-28. In J anuar

y 1997, the RO denied se rvice connec tion on the merits. R. at 175-76. I nt h e A p ri l 2 0 0 1 BV A d ec i s i o n h er e o n ap p ea l , t h e B o ar d d en i edre o p en i n g o f t h e v et er an 's Ag e nt O ra

ng e c laim a

nd e xpla ine d th a t, a lth ou g h th e RO in t he de c isi on

on a pp e a l " imp lic itl y
re op e ned the c la im a

nd a dju dic a te d th e ma tte r o n th e me ri ts" (R . at 11 ), the B oa rd , p ur su a nt t o Ba rn e tt v . B ro wn , 8 Vet.App. 1 ( 1 9 9 5 ), a ff 'd , 83 F.3d 1380 ( Fe d. Cir. 1996), " must conduct an independe nt review " of

the re opening issue (R. at 1 0 ). The Boa rd noted the duty -to-notify and4

duty -to-assist provisions of the VCAA ( as codifie d at 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) a nd 38 U.S.C. § 5103A, respe ctively

), quoted the " Rule Wi th Respect to Disallowed Claims" , 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(f) , and conclude d that the VCAA " has not modified the long standing require ment" that new and materia l evidenc e be pr esente d t o re o p en a claim. R . at 10. The B oard de termined, inter a lia, that the Ap ri l 19 94 RO de c isi on wa s fi na l and that no ne of

the VAme dic a l r e c or ds and e xami natio n r e po rt s
wer e "material" , and thus de cided that there was no new and materia l e vidence to r eopen t he veter an' s claim. R. at 4.

II. Contentions on Appeal I n his principal brief

, the appe llant arg ues, inter a lia, that the B oard e rre d (1) by adjudicating his claim as a c la im to r e o p e n w it h o u t n o ti f

y in g h im b e f

o r e h a n d o f it s in te n ti o n to d o s o and allowing him the oppor

tunity to present e vidence and ar g ument on the issue of re opening (B rief ( Br .) at 6 -7 (c i t i n g Ba rn e tt , 8 Vet.App. at 4, and S u t t o n v
. B r o wn , 9 Ve t

. Ap p. 553, 564-70 (1996) , for pr op os iti on

that B oa rd may a dju dic a te re op e nin g iss ue in fi rs t insta nc e " if a nd

on ly if the ve te ra

n is not prejudice d") ) and (2) by failing to g ive not ice to him under 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) of what medica l or lay evidenc e wa s nece ssary

to substantiate his claim (B r. at 10-12)

. Th e Se c re tary a rgue s in his pr inc ipa l br ie f that the VC AA " do e s no t imp a c t" this ap peal. Br . at 11. Specific ally , the Secr etar y contends that the VA reg ulations implementing the VCAA are inapplicable to the a

ppellant' s claim to reop en b ec ause that claim was submitted befor e Au gu s t2 9 , 2 0 0 1 , wh en VA i s s u edi t s VC AA i mp l em en t i n g re gu l at i o n s p u r s u an tt o 6 6 Fe d

. R eg. 45 ,6 20 , 4 5, 62 9 ( Au g . 2 9, 20 01 ) ( c od if ie d at 38 C.F .R. pt. 3) , a

nd , th us , th a t V A h a d n o d

uty to a ssi st beca use newand mater ial evidenc e had not been presente d to reope n his claim. Br . at 13. As to the notic e p ro v isions of the VCAA, the Secr etar y asser ts that, "a lthough [those provisions were ] not specific ally

addre ssed by the Boa

rd,

. . . the case was fully develope d and ther e is no indication that any add it io nal evi den ce ex is ts whi ch h as n ot alr eady been in clu dedin th e reco rd. " Ib id

. I n Aug ust 2002, the Court order ed the parties to pre sent furthe r brief ing r eg arding , inter alia, "the eff ect, if a ny , of Qu ar tuc c io [ v. Principi , 1 6 Ve t

. Ap p
. 1 8 3 , 1 8 7 (2 0 0 2 )] , o n t h e a p p el l an t 's cla im ." Pelegrini v. Principi , 16 Vet.App. 259, 260- 61 (2002 ) (p er cu ri am orde r). The appellant fi le d a re sp on se a rguin g , in te r a lia , th a t Qu ar tuc c io require s that the ca se be r emande d for5

compliance by

the Secr etar

y with the mandatory

notice re quirements in sec tion 5103(a) a nd (b). S u p plemental (Suppl.) B r. at 14. The Secre tary then moved for

a stay of proc eeding s pending d i s p o s i t i o n i n t h e U. S

. C o u rt o f A p p ea l s fo r t h e F ed er al C i rc u i t(F ed er al C i rc u i t ) o f a d i re ct ch al l en ge to the Secre tary ' s regulations impl ementi n g t h e VC AA. Mot. at 3 (c iting Paralyzed Ve terans of A m
. v
. S e c ' yo f V e t e r a n s A f f air s (PV A v. Sec 'y) (consolidated c ase, a rg ued De cembe r 2002, and subsequently

decide d, 345 F.3d 1334 (Fe d. Cir. 2003))). The Court denied that motion and orde red the Secr etar

y to file his response. Pelegrini v. Principi , N o. 01 -9 44 , 20 02 WL 31 47 00 66 , a t *1 (V e t. A p p
. O c t. 3 1 , 2 0 0 2 ) ( p e r c u r ia m o r d e r )

. I n th a t r e s p o n s e , th e Se c r e ta r y c it e s th e require ments of Qu ar tuc c io , su

pra , and Charles v. Principi , 1 6 V e t.A pp . 3 70 (2 00 2), and asse rt s, int e r a lia , th a t,

a lth ou g h th e B oa

rd did no t a dd re ss t he VC AAno tic e re qu ir e me nts , VA ade quately

notified [the a]ppellant during a n extensive and thoroug h Boa

rd hea ring held on Dec ember

4, 2000 (R.[ at ] 466-506), of the inf or ma tio n a nd e vid e nc e ne c e ssa

ry to s ub sta nti a te his c la im and which portion of such information or evidenc e wa s to be provided by [t he a]ppellant and which portion was to be pr ovided by VA. Suppl. Br. at 11-13 (citing from BV A hear ing R. at 467, 475, 476-78, 481-82, 486-92, a nd 498-502). I nt h e ap p el l an t 's re p l y t o t h e S ec re t ary 's s u p p l em en t al b ri ef

, t h e ap p el l an t co u n t er s t h e S ec re t ary 's Qu ar tuc c io a r g u m e n t s b y s t a t i n g t h a tt h e a p p e l l a n ti s e n t i t l e d

t o " t h e m a n d a t o r

y ' p r e a d j u d i c a t o r y' notices under

[section] 5103 (a) and (b) ." Suppl. Reply at 11-13. I n the Secr etar

y ' s motion for rec onsideration, he makes two principal a rg uments: (1) That application of the VCAA § 3(a ) ame ndments to a n action that an A OJ completed be fore the VCAA was enacte d had a prohibited retroa ctive effec t and (2) that the Court has not proper ly considere d the question whether

the lack of

pre- AOJ-adjudication notice was prejudicia l to the appe llant. Mot. at 1- 2; see Stay Mot. at 2- 5. The Secre tary also notes that the Court in Pe le gr ini I expressed re luctance to addre ss how the Secr etar y might prope rly

cure defe cts in the timing of VCAA notice (Mot. at 2),

and he a pp e a rs to i nte rp re t Pe le

gr ini I as vitiating or nullify ing prior RO actions, Mot. at 3, n.1, 8, 9, 12; Resp. at 2-5.6 III . A nal ys is After submitt ing the ir initial briefing on the applica bility of and V A' s compliance with the VC AA , c ouns e l f

or bo th pa rt ie s ind ic a te d a t or a l a rgume nt, in re sp on se to a qu e sti on fr om the Court , that the B oard should have adjudicate d the appe llant's c laim as an orig inal, rathe r than a s a re opened, claim. Howe ver, the resolution of that question does not af fec t the deter

mination of whether VA complied with the VCAA notice provisions, be ca u s e sec tion 5103(a) a pplies equally

to orig inal claims and c laims to reopen. S ee Qua rt uccio , 16 Vet.App. at 186-87. Henc e, we turn first to the question of VA' s compliance with its dut y to notify

. A. Duty to Notify 1. Ne w N

otic eRe qui

re ments Section 3 of the VCAA a mended, inter

al i a, 3 8 U. S .C. § 5103 ("N otice to claimants of

re qu ir e d in fo rm a tio n a nd e vid e nc e " ). VC AA § 3( a ), 11 4 Stat. a t 20 96 -9 7. Se c tio n 5 10 3( a ) p ro vid e s:

(a) R EQ UI R ED I

N F O R MA TI O N AND E V I D EN CE .–Upon re ceipt of a c omp le te or

su bs tanti a lly

c omp le te a

pp lic a tio n, the Se c re tary

sh a ll notify the claimant a

nd the claimant' s repres en t ati ve, if a ny , of any inf or ma tio n, a nd a ny me dic a l or lay e vid e nc e , no t pre vio us ly pr ov ide d to the Se c re tary that is ne c e ssa

ry to sub sta nti a te the c la im. As part of

that notice, the Sec reta

ry shall indicate wh i ch portion of that info r mati o n a n d

e v id e n c e , if

an y , is to b e p r o v id e d

b y the c la ima nt a nd wh ic h po rt ion , if a ny , the Se c re tary , in a c c or da nc e wi th section 5103A of this title and any other applicable provisions of law, wi ll atte mpt

to o bta in o n b e ha lf

of the c la ima

nt.
38 U. S.C. § 5 10 3( a ). Re g ulatio n § 3. 15 9( b) (1 ) p ro vid e s in pe rt ine nt p a rt : (b) VA's duty t o notify claimants of necessary information or evide nce. (1 ) Wh e n V A r e c e ive s a

c omp le te or

su bs tanti a lly

c omp le te application for

benef its, it will notify

the claimant of

any information and medica l or lay

evidenc e that is nece ssary to substantiate the claim. VA will inform t he claimant which information and evidenc e, if any , that the claimant is t o provide to VA a nd which information and evide nce, if

any , that VA will attempt to obtain on behalf of the claimant. VA w ill also request that the c laimant provide a ny e vid e nc e in t

he c la ima nt' s p os se ssi on

that pe rt a ins to t

he c la im. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)( 1) (2003)

.7 2. Applicabili ty of § 3.159(b) (1) and V CAA § 3(a) I n Dyme nt v. Principiand Bernklau v . Principi , th e F e d e r a l Ci r c u it c o n c lu ded that section 3(a ) of the V CAA " was not intended to be g iven re troac tive eff ect" , Dyme nt , 287 F.3d 1377, 1385 (F ed. Cir. 2002), a

nd thus did "not apply

retroa ctively

to require that proce eding s that were complete be f

o r e [V A ] an d

w e r e o n a

p p e a l t o th e Co u rt o f

A p p e a ls f

o r V e te r a n s Cl a im s o r

[the Fe dera l Circuit] be remanded for readjudication under the newstatute" , Bernklau , 291 F.3d 795, 806 (F ed. Cir. 2002). The Fe dera l Circuit ex pressly declined to de cide, howe v er , "w h et her a pply ing

se c tio n 3 (a ) t o p ro c e e din g s a lr e a dy c omm e nc e d at th e ti me of e na c tme nt o f t he VC AAa nd

sti ll pending befor e the ag ency ' s [R O] or the [BVA] wo u l d co n stitut e re troac tive application of the statut e " and re a c he d a con c lus ion on the VC AA ' s in applicability only as to pr ocee dings that were

" compl ete be fore the agency , b ut [ were] on app eal at t he t im e th e VC AA w as en act ed. " Bernklau , supra (empha sis added). This Court, in Stephens v . Principi , applied the Dyment and Bernklau holdings to rule out a

pplication of the VCAA to c ases pe nding in this Court on or befor e the date of the VCAA' s enac tment. Stephens , 1 6 Vet .App . 1 91 , 1 93 (2 00 2) (p e r c ur iam or de r) ; se e als o Shoffner v. Principi , 16 Vet.App. 208, 215 ( 2002). Rece ntly , in K uzma v. Principi , the Fe dera l Circuit rea ffirme d the Dyme nt and Bernklau holdings a s to retroa ctivity but, ag ain, di d not purport to deal with the applica

bility of t he VCAA to case s pending any wher e other

than bef ore the Fe dera l Circuit or this Court at the time of the VCAA' s enac tment. Kuzma , 341 F.3d 1327, 1328-29 (F ed. Cir . 200 3)

. Th is Court c on sis te ntl y ha s a pp lie d th e VC AAto c a se s p e nd ingbe fo re VAa t th e tim e of the VCAA' s enac tment. E.g. , Huston v. Principi , 17 Ve t

. Ap p. 195, 202-03 (2003) (applying

s ec t ion 5103(a) a

nd § 3.159(b)( 1)); Charles , 1 6 V e t. A p p
. a t 3 7 4

- 7 5 ( a p p ly in g s e c ti o n 5 1 03A); Qu ar tuc c io , su

pra (a pp lyingse c tio n 5 10 3( a ) a

nd § 3 .1 59 (b )( 1) ); se e als o H ay sli p , 364 F.3d at 1324 (fr aming issue to be dec ided as " when is a [B]oard de cision ' not final' as of the e nactment date of the VCAA so that the additional notice a nd assistance provisions outli ned in sec tion 3(a) of the VCAA must be complied with"? ). As is releva

nt here , the Secre tary

expressly acknow ledg es in his rec onsideration motion that "the VCAA applies to all cla ims pending be fore VA on the date of e nactment of the leg islation, i.e., November

9, 2000." Mot. at 3 n.1. Moreove r, the Secre tary expressly made § 3.159( b)(1) , which incorpora tes the three section 5103(a) notice elements, see pa rt I I I .A.2.b, inf

ra , applicable to "a

ny8

claim for be nefits re ceive d by VA on or a fter N ovember 9, 2000, . . . as we ll as to any claim filed befor e that date but not de ci d ed by VA as of

that date" . 66 Fe d. Reg . 45,620, 45,620 (Aug . 2 9, 20 01 ); se e id . at 45,629. I n this reg ard, t h e VA General Counsel has c oncluded in a prec ede nt opinion that the VA implementing r eg ulations "a re be nefic ial to claimants and not inc on sistent wi th t

he VC AAor

a ny oth e r s ta tut e " a nd

" e xpre ssl y

a nd va lid ly pr ov ide d" fo r t

he ir retroa ctive application "to claims filed befor e the date of e nactment of the VCAA a

nd still pending befor e VA a s of that date." VA Ge n. Coun. Prec. 7-03 (Nov. 19, 2003) [ here inafter G.C. Prec. 7- 03] Ho ldi ngpa

ra . E , F ; see 38 U. S.C. § 71 04 (c ) (p ro vid ing that Ge ne ra l Couns e l pr e c e de nt o pin ion is bin din g on

B oa rd ); 38 C.F .R. § 1 9. 5 ( 20 03 ); s e e a l so 38 U.S.C . § § 5 01 (a

uth or izin g Se c re tary

to presc ri b e r egu l at i o n s "co n s i s t en twi t h " l aw s ad m i n i s t er edb y VA , i n cl u d i n g "r egu l at i o n s with respec t to the n a tu

r e a n d c o n te n t o f

p r o o f a n d e v id e n c e " a n d

" th e ma n n e r an d f o r m o f a d ju d ic a ti o ns") , 51 03 A( g ) (a

uth or izin g Se c re tary to pr ov ide " su c h othe r as sis tanc e un de r s ub se c tio n ( a ) [" re a so na ble eff orts to assist a claimant in obtaining evidenc e nece s sary to substantiate the . . . claim" ] t o a
c la ima nt i n s ub sta

nti a tin g a c la im a s th e Se c re tary

c on sid e rs a

pp ro pr ia te " ). Th e Court

a g re e s w ith the VA Ge nera l Counsel's c onclusion in G.C. Pre c. 7-03 that beca use VA' s regulations ha d imposed "r etroa ctive ef

fec ts on VA" , it is "unnec essar y to decid e wh ether" the VCAA itself would have a prohibited retr oactive e ffe ct if construe d to "r equire [] the Board to rema nd all claims pending befor e it o n N ov e mbe r 9 , 2 00 0. " G. C. Pr e c . 7 -0 3 p a ra s. 22 , 2 9; c f. H ay sli p, su pra . Given the Sec reta

ry ' s acknow ledg ment and regulatory actions, it is clea r that the re g ulations

a pp ly to t he ins tant c a se ; he nc e , th e qu e sti on is not wh e the r but ho w the no tic e pr ov isi on s app ly to this case. See Mot. at 3 n.1 (acknowledg ment that VCAA applies to all cla ims pending be fore VA on November

9, 2000, "is not t h e en d o f t h e inqui ry ") . The Court, there fore , will turn to the questions of the timing a

nd content of the requisite notice.

a . T i mi n g o f N o t i c eRe qui re ment. S ec t i o n 5 1 0 3 (a) require s the Secre tary to g ive VC AA -c omp lying no tic e to a VAc la ima

nt " [ u ] pon re c e ipt of a

c omp le te or

su bs tanti a lly

c omp le te

a pp lic a tio n. " 38 U. S.C. § 5 10 3( a ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d)

. " Up on " me a ns " on the oc c a sio n o f, a t th e tim e of, or immediately

there afte r" . W EB S TER ' S C OL L EGE D I CT I O N A RY 1 4 6 5 ( R a n d o m H o u s e 1 9 9 2 )

. In 38 U.S.C. § 5100, "cla imant" is def ined as " any

individual applying for, or submitt ing a claim for,

any be ne fi t un de r the laws a dmi nis te re d by the Se c re tary ." 38 U. S.C. § 51 00

. Th e re fo re , th e pla in9

lang uag e of the statute require s that notice to a VA claimant pursuant to the VCAA be pr ovided " at the tim e " that, or " imm e diate ly a ft e r" , the Se c re tary re c e ive s a com ple te or su

bs tanti a lly

c omp le te app li c a tio n f

or VA -a dmi nis te re d b e ne fi ts. 38 U. S.C. §§ 51 00 , 5 10 3( a ); s e e B r o wn v
. Gardner , 513 U.S. 115, 120 (19 9 4 ) (h o l d i n g t hat " the text and reasona ble infer ence s from it g ive a c lear

an s we r aga i n s t t h e Go v ern m en t , an d t h at , as we h av e s ai d , i s 't h e en d o f t h e m at t er '" ( qu o t i n g Good Sa ma rit an Ho sp . v . S

ha lal a , 508 U.S. 402, 409 (1993), and Chevron U. S. A. , In c
. v
. Natural R es. De f. Council, Inc. , 467 U. S. 837 , 8 42 (1 98 4) )) ; Chevron , su pra (h old ingthat w he n " Con g re ss h a s d ir e c tly spoken to t h e p re cis e question at issue" and " the intent of Cong ress is clea r, that is the end of

the matter" ). I ndeed, the " a t t

h e ti me o f

" d e f in it io n th a t c o n n o te s " w h e n " is a ls o c o n ta in e d in the Se c re tary ' s re g ulatio n in § 3. 15 9( b) (1 ), wh ic h pr ov ide s th at "[ w ] hen V A receiv es a complete or
su bs tanti a lly com pl ete a

pp lic a tio n f

or be ne fi ts" , it

wi ll g ive the re qu isi te no tic e . 3 8 C. F .R. § 3.159(b)( 1) (e mphasis added)

. I n the S upplementar y I nformation accompany ing the Aug ust 2001 promulg ation of § 3.159(b) (1), the Sec reta ry elabor ated a s follows on the timing re quirement: " The statutory notice re quired by

the VCAA oc curs at an earl y point in the claims process whe n the claimant ofte n has not y et identified the e vidence and information releva nt to the claim." 66 Fe d. Re g . at 45 ,6 22 . T he Sup ple me nta ry I nf or ma tio n a lso e xpla ine d: An oth e r c omm e nte r s ta te d th a t th e r e g u l a t i o n s h ou ld s pe c if

ic a lly state that t h e noti ce r equire d under se ction 5103(a) will be sent to the c la ima nt before a decision on the claim has been m ade. We agre e a nd have c ha ng e d the lang ua g e of § 3. 15 9( b) (1 ) to state that V A w ill send the re quired statutory notice " When VA re ceive s a complete or substantially

complete a

pplication for be nefits," rathe r t h an " I f VA rec eives" this application.
66 Fe d. Reg . at 45,622-23 (e mphasis added)

. The Court nee d not pinpoint t he exact moment when V A must provide notice, but the wor ds "[u]pon rece ipt" and " when" in the statutory and regulatory provisions, respec tively , mandate that notice pre cede an initial unfavor able AOJ decision on a service- connec tion claim – the next major

a dju dic a tio n- pr oc e ss m ile sto ne a fter th e ap pli c a tio n is fi le d. 38 U. S.C. § 5 10 3( a ); 38 C.F .R. § 3.159(b)( 1). More over, nothing in the VCAA or other wi s e i n t i t l e 38 of the U.S. Code, in the VC AA ' s le g isl a tiv e his tor y , or in V A' s A ug us t 20 01 re g ulatio ns or the ir re g ulator y his tor y , s ug g e sts10

a c on tr ary re a din g of se c tio n 510 3( a ) or § 3.1 59 (b )( 1)

. F ur the rm or e , the Court no te s tha t ne ith e r i n his moti on for rec onsideration nor in his stay motion does the Secre tary disag ree that the re g ulation

an d s t a tu t e p r o v i d e t h a tn o t i c e b e g i v e n b e f o r e an i n i t i a l u n f

a v o r a b l e A O J d e c i s i o n o n a c l a i m
. In his March 2004 response , the Secre tary conce des expressly that section 5103(a) "g ener ally require s VA to provide the notice specifie d in that se ction to a claimant shortly afte r re ceiving a cla im and be fo re VAre nd e rs its ini tia l de c isi on on the c la im. " Re sp . at 2; see VA Gen. Coun. Prec . 8-03 par a. 2 (De c. 2 2 , 2 0 0 3 ) (st ating that "by ensuring proper

development of

the re cord the first time a claimant submits an application for benef its[ ,] .

. . [ i]t appe ars that the draf ters [of se ction 5103(a) in t he Con gress ] wan ted c la ima nts to k no w e a rl y in t he c la im p ro c e ss what w a s n e c e ssa ry to substantiate their c laims") ( citation omitted). For all of t he foreg oing rea sons, the conclusion is inesca pable that under § 3.159(b)(1) and section 5103(a ), bef

ore a n initial unfavorable AO J d ec ision on the claim, a ser vice- connec tion claimant must be given notice in acc ordanc e with section 5103(a) and § 3.159(b)(1) . I t is undisput ed that the appe llant did n o t re ce i v e s uch notice in this ca se bef ore the initial unfavorable AOJ adjudication by

the RO in J anuar

y 1997; indeed, the Sec reta

ry ' s only contention that notice wa s g iven

re la te s to a

B VAhe a ri ngin De c e mbe r 20 00 (S up pl. B r. a t 11 -1 3) , a c on te nti on

that th e Court

re je c ts beca use none of t he page s cited by the S ecr etar y from the transcr ipt of that hea ring (Suppl. Br. 11- 13 (citing R. at 467, 475, 467-78, 481-8 2 , 498-502)) ref ers to or inc ludes specif

ic notice- comply ing lang uag e, see part I I I .A.2.b, inf ra . Moreove r, under

38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1) a nd Cha rle

s, 16 Vet.App. at 374, it is the B oard' s responsibility to include in its statement of r easons or bases a n "a dequate " disc ussion of the duty to notify and to spe cify whether and, if so, how doc uments ref err ed to by the Board "or any other document in the record satisfied that require ment." N otwithstanding the fore g oing a

naly sis, however , as discussed in part I I I .C, below, we do not hold that this case , or any simil arly situated case in which pre-AOJ-adjudication noti ce was not provided, must be re turned to the AOJ for the adjudication to st art a ll over ag ain as thoug h no AOJ ac tion ha d ever occur red, i.e, there is no nulli fication or vo i ding r equire ment either e x plicit or impli cit in this opi nion, Pelegrini II

. Cf

. Mot. at 3 n.1, 8, 9, 12; Resp. at 2-5. The statute and the r eg ulation provide forpreinitial-AOJ -adjudication notice, but the Co u r t specifica lly

rec og nizes that, where, a s here , that notice was not mandated at the time of the initial AOJ decision, t he AOJ did not err in not providing such11

notice spec ifically

comply ing w ith section 5103(a) / § 3.159(b)( 1) bec ause a n initial AOJ

a dju dic a tio n h a d a lr e a dy

oc c ur re d. R. at 17 5- 76 (Jan. 19 97 RO de c isi on ). I ns te a d, a s expla ine d in part I I I .C, below, the appe llant has the rig ht on remand to VCAA c on t ent-c omply ing notice and pr op e r s ub se qu e nt V A p ro c e ss. b. Cont e nt o f N otic eRe qui

re ment. On re mand, the Secr etar y m u s t provide notice , consistent with the require ments of section 5103(a) , § 3.159(b), a nd Qu ar tuc c io , su

pra , th a t in fo rm s the claimant of

any information and evidence not of rec ord (1) that is nece ssary to substantiate the claim, (2) that V A wi l l s ee kto provide, and ( 3) that the c laimant is ex pecte d to provide. F ur the rm or e , as ind ic a te d in § 3. 15 9( b) , in what can be c on sid e re d a fo ur th e le me nt o f t

he re qu isi te notice, VA must " also reque st that the claimant provide any evidenc e in the cla imant's posse ssion that pe rt a ins to t

he c la im. " 38 C. F.R. § 3 .1 59 (b )( 1) ; see 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(g ) (de scribed in pa rt I I I .A.2, su pra ). B. P re jud ic eto t he App e lla nt Wit h respe ct to the notice defic iency in this case , the Court, ba sed upon th e r ec o rd and ple a din g s, c a nn ot i ntu it that th e re is n o p os sib le inf or ma tio n o r e vid e nc e that c ou ld b e ob ta ine d to substantiate t h e ap p ellant' s service -conne ction claim. Se e Da nie ls v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App 348, 353 (1996) ( holding that Court c annot conclude that err or wa s not prejudicial whe re " it is poss ible that the a pp e lla nt w ou ld h a ve so ug ht a

nd ob ta ine d a dd iti on a l me dic a l op ini on s, e vid e nc e [,] or tr e a tis e s"

on dis pu te d q

ue sti on of fa c t) ; cf. Valiao v. Principi , 17 Ve t.A pp
. 22 9, 23 2 ( 19 93 ) ( " [w]he re the fa c ts

aver red by a cla i m an t cannot c onceiva bly result in any

dispositi on of the a

ppeal other

than aff irmance of the B oard de cision, the case should not be rema nded for development that c ould not possibly change t h e outcome of

the dec ision"). F urther, it would re quire pure speculation for the Court to d e te r

mi n e a t t h is ti me th a t, o n c e g iv e n th e n o ti c e to w h ic h h e is e n ti tl e d , th e a p p ellant de fi nit e ly c ou ld n ot p ro vid e or

le a d V A t o o bta in t

he info rm ation o r e vid e nc e ne c e ssa ry to substantiate his service -conne ction claim. See H uston , 1 7 V e t.A

pp . at 20 3 ( statin g that " [b]e c a us e the Cou rtre c o g n i z e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t , o n c e g i v e n p r o p e r n o t i c e , t h e a p p e l l a n t m a y b e a

b l e to pr ov ide VAwi th e vid e nc e pe rt ine nt t o h is

. . . c la im, it w ou ld b e pure sp e c ulatio n f or the Court

to exclude the possibilit y

that had the a

ppellant re ceive d the re quired re g ulatory and statutory

notice be fo re the AO J a dv e rs e de c isi on , he mig ht have be e n ab le to pr e se nt o r p oin t to e vid e nc e that c ou ld12

have r esulted in his claim being g rante d") . Moreove r, for the Court prese ntly

to make such a de te rm inatio n ma

y re qu ir e fi nd ing s o f f

a c t th a t th e Court

be lie ve s it

is pref era ble fo r t he B oa rd to make in the f

irst instance, see Conway v . Principi , 353 F.3d 1369, 1375 n.4 (Fe d. Cir. 2004); McCormick

v. Gobe r , 1 4 V e t.A

pp . 3 9, 45 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ( r e m a

n d i n g b e c a u se B VAde te rm inatio ns on c e rt a in

e nume rate d que sti on s wou ld be he lpf ul to Co ur

t' s r e vie w o f t

he ma tte r; fu

rt he r, su c h w ou ld l ike ly be ne fi t Co ur

t by pr od uc ingbe tte r re c or ds fo r a

pp e llate re vie w of

B oa rd de c isi on a nd may re su lt i n VAse lf -c or re c tin g a nd

a me nd ingits wa

y s, wh ic h, in t

ur n, wo uld pr ote c t V A a dmi n i s t

r a t i v e a utho ri ty reg ardinginterpre tation of its own issuances a s well as promote judicial eff iciency ). Thus, taking "due acc ount" of

38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2), the C o urt ca nnot presently

conclude that the notice defic iency

in this case is nonprejudicia l to the a ppellant. See 38 U. S.C. § 7 26 1( b) (2 ); Huston , su pr a ;
s e e a ls o U

. S

. S te e l Co r p . v. EPA , 5 9 5 F.2d 207, 215 ( 5th Cir. 1979) (discussing 5 U.S.C. § 706, which is an Administrative Proce dure Act (APA) provision r equiring that fede ral courts take "due

acc ount

. . . o f

th e r u le o f p r e ju d ic ia l e r

r o r " w h e n r e v ie w in g a g e n c y a c ti o n u n d e r

th e A PA , a nd holding that, unde r that provision," the doctrine of har mless error

. . . is to be used only

' when a mis take of

the a dmi nis tr a tiv e bo dy

is o ne that c le ar

ly had no bear ing on the proce dure used or the

s u b s t an ce o f d ec i s i o n re ac h ed '" ( qu o t i n g Braniff Airw ays v. CAB, 379 F.2d 453, 466 ( D.C. Cir. 1967) (empha sis added)) . Fur

thermore , applying the outcome-ba sed def inition of preju d i ce that the Secre tary proposes (Mot. at 13-14) to assess the eff ect of a lack of sec tion 5103(a) / § 3.159(b) (1)

no tic e wo uld le a d to an ab surd re su lt be c a us e the ve ry purp os e of re qu ir ingthat a c la ima nt w ho se
c la im i s mi ssi ngne c e ssa ry e viden ce be notif

ie d o f t he inf or ma tio n a nd e vid e nc e ne e de d to substantiate the cla im is so t hat t h e cl ai m an t and/or VAcan pr oduce that missi ng evidenc e. See Thayer v. Princ ipi , 15 Vet.App. 204, 210 (2001) (en banc) (holding t hat when interpre ting statute, Court must avoid "[a] conclusion that . . . is not supported when c onstruing e very part or se ction of t h e s t at u t e a n d

wo u l d y i el d an ab s u rd re s u l t " an d

ci t i n g Tril le

s v . W est , 13 Vet.App. 314, 324 (2 00 0) ); Holliday v. Principi , 1 4 V e t.A pp . 2 80 , 2 85 (2 00 1) (c iti ng pr e c e de nt re g a rd ing ne e d to a vo id absurd r esult when interpr eting statute). On r emand, ther efor e, the B oard must ensure that the

a pp e lla nt i s p ro vid e d the c on te nt- c omp lying no tic e to w hic h h e is e nti tle d unle ss t he B oa rd " make [s] f in d in g s o nth e c o mp le te n e s s o f th e r e c o r d

o r o n o th e r f a cts perm itti n g [t h is Co u rt t o ma k e ] a

con clu si on o f l a c k of p rej ud ice fro m i mp rop er no ti ce." Conway, 17 Vet.App. at 1375 n.4. I f the13

BV A under

takes the lat t er co u rse, such findings must include a n enumer ation of all evide nce pr e se ntl y mis sin g fr om th e reco rd that mu st b e a

pa rt of the re c or d in

or de r f or the a pp e lla nt t o preva il on his claims. See38 U. S.C. § 7 10 4( d) (1 ); G a b r ie ls o n v
. B rown, 7 Vet.App. 36, 39- 40 (1 99 4) ; Gilbert v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 49, 56- 57 (1990). Mo re ov e r, a s expla ine d in par t I I I .D , be low , re mand

in t his c a se is r e qu ir e d o n a

no the r b a sis

. Given this other basis for rema nd, even wer e the Court to deter mine that the notice de ficienc y here is nonprejudicial, any such deter mination c ould not lead to a n aff irmance of the B oard de cision on

a pp e a l. C. A dju dic ation o n Re mand As discussed pre viously , (1) the Court is neither expli citly nor implicitly

requiringthe

vo idi ngor nu lli fi c a tio n of a ny AO J a c tio n or de c isi on a nd (2 ) the a pp e lla nt i s e nti tle d o n r e mand

to VC AA -c o n t en t -c o mp l y i n g n o t i ce
. Fu rt h er , i tap p ea rs t h at VA i s i n t h e p ro ce s s o f d e v el o p i n g a sy stem to gove rn the provision of suc h notice and any subsequent necessar y adjudication for case s
s u ch as t h i s o n e. W i t h re s p ec tt o t h e d ev el o p m en to f t h at p ro ce s s , t h e C o u rt n o t es t h e f o l l o wi n g. As to which VA entity may provide the requisite noti ce to the appellant on remand a nd which VA entity may rea djudicate the c laim subsequent to that n o t ice, on January 23, 2002, the Secr etar

y
a me nd e d 3 8 C. F .R. § 1 9. 9 to pr ov ide a s f oll ow s in pe rt ine nt p a rt : (a) Gene ral

. I f fur

ther e vidence , clar ification of the e vidence , corr ection of a

proce dural de fec t, or any other a ction is essential for a prope r appe llate dec ision, a Board Member or panel of Members m a y: (1) Remand the case to the [AOJ ], specify ing the action to be undertaken; or (2) Direc t Boa

rd personnel t o u n d ertake the action esse ntial for a proper appellate decision. (i) Any such ac tion shall comply with the provisions of § 3 .1 59 (a ) a

nd (c )- (f ) of thi s c ha

pte r (r e la tin g to VA ' s a ssi sta nc e to claimants in deve loping c laims).

(ii) I f the B oard unde rtake s to provide the notice re qu ir e d b y

38 U. S.C. [§] 51 03 (a) an d/o r § 3. 15 9( b) (1 ) o f t his c ha pte r, the a

pp e lla nt s ha ll h a ve no t le ss t

ha n 3 0 d a y s to re sp on d to14 the notice. I f, following the not ice, the Boa rd denies a bene fit sought in t h e p e n d in g a

p p e a l a n d th e a p p e ll a n t s u

b mi ts r e le v a n t e v id e nce afte r the B oard' s d ec i s i o n but before the expiration of one y ear f o ll o w in g th e n o ti c e , th a t e v id e n c e s h a ll b e r e f e r r e d to th e [A O J].
38 C.F.R. § 19.9(a) (2002) (ame nding prior rule that "the Boa rd shall rem and the case to the [AOJ] " wher e " further

evidenc e, cla

rification of the evidenc e, corr ection of a pr ocedur al def ect, or any other action is essential for

a prope r appe llate dec ision", 38 C.F.R

. § 19.9(a) (2001) ( emphasis adde d)). Subsequently , in May

200 3 , t he F eder al Circuit in Disabled Americ an Veterans v . Secre tary of Vet erans A

ffa irs ( D A V v
. S e c 'y ) , in th e c o u r s e o f r

u li n g o n a p e ti ti o n c h a ll e n g in g , in te r a lia , that

ne wl y a me nd e d § 19 .9 , s ta te d:

We h old tha t 38 C.F .R. § 1 9. 9( a )( 2) is i nv a lid because , in conjunction with the amende d rule c odified at 38 C.F.R. § 20.1304, it a llo ws the B oa

rd to c on sid e r a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e wi tho ut havin g to rema n d th e c a s e to th e A O J f

o r in it ia l c o n s id e r a ti o n an d w it hout having to obta in the appellant' s waiver

. That is c ont ra ry t o the require ment of 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a) that "[a]ll questions i n a matter wh i c h

. . . i s s u

b j e c t t o d e c i s i o n b y t h e S e c r e t a r y s h a l l b e s u

b j e c t to one re view on appe al to th e S ec retary ." Mor eover , we hold that 38 C

. F.R. § 19.9(a )(2) (ii), which r equire s the Boa rd " to provide the n o t i c e r e qu i r e d

b y 3 8 U

. S

. C

. [ § ] 5 1 0 3 ( a ) " a n d " n o tl e s s t h a n 3 0 d a ys to re sp on d to the no tic e ," is i nv a lid be c a us e it i s c on tr a ry

to 38 U. S.C. § 510 3( b) , whi c h p ro vid e s th e c la ima nt o ne y e a r t o s ub mit evidenc e.
D A V v
. S e c 'y , 3 27 F .3 d 1 33 9, 13 41 -4 2 ( F e d. Cir . 2 00 3) ; c f. P V A v
. S e c 'y , su pra (invalidating simil ar 30-day regulatory require ment in § 3.159(b)( 1)). But see Veter ans Be nefits Act (V BA ) of 2003, Pub. L . No. 108-183, § 701(b) , 117 Stat. 265 1 , 2 6 7 0 (De c. 16, 2003) ( seeming ly validating 30-day provisions in § 19.9(a)(2) (ii) and § 3.159(b) that wer e invalidated in, r espec tively , D A V v
. S e c 'y and P V A v
. S e c 'y , both su

pra ). Although the Court need not re ach a conclusion as to the pr oper r emand pr ocess at this t ime, we make the following observations. The rea soning underly ing the Fe dera l Circuit's invalidation of § 19.9(a) (2) ( 2002) in D

A V v
. S e c 'y , su pra , appea

rs to a pply equally

(1) to the va lidity

of par ag raph (a) (2)( ii) as it relate s to the Boa rd' s provision of § 3.159(b)( 1) / section 5103(a )-c omply ing notice and (2) in light of VA ' s curr ent adjudication process, to the c ircumstance s under wh i ch the B oard15

may proper ly adjudicate the claim without rema nd to an AOJ. No thing in § 3.159(b) (1) or

se c tio n 5 10 3( a ) d ic ta te s w hic h V A e nti ty may provi de th e requi sit e no tic e to t he a pp e lla nt w ith respe ct to a cla im remande d by the Court beca

use of a lac k of complying notice

. See 38 U. S.C. § 5103(a) (providing that "the Secre tary shall notify

the claimant . . ." ); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)( 1) (providing that "V A . . . will notify the claimant . . . " ); D

A V v
. S e c 'y , 3 2 7 F

. 3 d at 13 4 6

- 4 7 ( " [b ]y statute, the B oard is an a g ency of the Sec reta

ry , as ar e the AO J s") . The sec tion 7104(a) mandate that "[ a ] ll questions in a m atter which .

. . is subject t o decision by the S ecr etar y shall be subject to one

re vie w o n appeal to th e Se c re tary " may we ll e xten d to VA ' s c omp lia nc e wi th f

a ir -p ro c e ss require ments, such as the que stion whether c ontent-complying notice has bee n proper ly provided. 38 U. S.C. § 7 10 4( a ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; c f. D A V v
. S e c 'y , su pra . I n order to comply

with section 7104(a) ' s rig ht of appe llate re view, re adjudication of the appellant' s claim may

well have to be ca

rried o u t b y t h e AOJ once c omply ing notice is give n on
rema nd, unless AOJ adjudication is waived by the claimant. S

e e D A V v
. S e c 'y , su pra (holding that Boa rd i s n o t permitted, consistent with section 7104(a ), to consider "a dditional evidence without having to remand the case to t h e AO J fo r initial consideration [or] without having to obtain the

a pp e lla nt' s w a ive r [o f s uc h r e mand ]" ); Sutton , 9 Vet.App. at 569-70 (discussing "ne w approa ch" for B VAc on sid e ratio n o f e vid e nc e a nd iss ue s n ot c on sid e re d b y AO J, un de r w hic h c la ima nt c ou ld

wa ive ri g ht to AO J c on sid e ratio n, a nd dis c us sin g po te nti a l im

pli c a tio ns of

su c h w a ive r) ; 38 C.F .R. § 20.1304(c) (2001) ( m andating re fer ral of c erta in newly

submitt ed evide nce by

Boa rd to AOJ "unle ss this proce dural right is waived by the appellant

. . . in writing or . . . formally enter ed on the

re c or d o ra lly

a t th e tim e of

the he a ri ng " ) ( pr ov isi on

su bs e qu e ntl y

de le te d) ; Huston , 17 Vet.App. at 206 (vac ating Bo ar d d ec i s i o n for " proce ed[ing] to adjudicate the . . . c laim in the first instance wi tho ut o ff

e ri ngto re mand the qu e sti on to t he RO " ); c

f. Janssen v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 370, 376 (2001) ( per c uriam orde r) ( requi ri n g t h at waiver of Court' s consideration on appeal of proce dural ri g hts e na c te d in

VC AAmus t be ma de by a pp e lla nt wh o " ha s kn ow le dg e of c e rt a in p ro c e dura l r ig hts that he possesses a

nd has expressed his intention clea rly and unequivoc ally , and on the a dvice of competent c ounsel, to relinquish the Court' s consideration of them in this appeal" ). Withre sp e c t to the pr ov isi on of no tic e on rem and and wa ive r, the Court no te s th a t in response to D

A V v
. S e c 'y , su pra , the Secr etar

y , i n a n o t i ce of

proposed r

ulemaking (NPRM), has16

proposed to ame nd ag ain § 19.9. I f so amende d, § 19.9(a) would provide:

(a) Gene ral

. I f further evidence, clarific ation of t he evide nce, corr ection of a

proce dural de fec t, or any other a ction is essential for a prope r appe llate dec ision, a Veter ans L aw Judge or pane l of Veter ans L aw Judge s shall remand the case to the [AOJ ], specify ing the ac tion to be undertake n. Bo ar d o f V et er an s ' A p p e a l s : Ob t ai n i n g E v i d en ce an d C u ri n g P ro ce d

u ra l De fe ct s , 6 8 Fe d

. R eg. 69,062, 6 9 , 0 6 5 (propose d Dec . 11, 2003) (a lso pr op os ingto r e de fi ne in 3 8 C. F .R. § 2 0. 3 A OJ to inc lud e , in te r a lia , e nti re Ve te ra ns B e ne fi ts A dmi nis tr a tio n) . T he S ecreta ry in t hat N PRM a lso proposed to ame nd 38 C.F.R. § 20.1304(c) , inter alia, to r estore the waiver provision that had bee n deleted in 2001; if so ame nded § 20.1304(c ) would provide:

(c) Consideration of additional ev idence by the Board or by the agenc y of original juri sdiction . Any pertinent evidenc e submitted b y the appe llant or repr esentative which is ac cepte d by the B oard under the provisions of this sec tion, or is submitted by the appe llant or re prese ntative i n response to a § 20.903 of this part, notification, as we ll as any

such evide nce r efe rr ed t o t he B oard by the ag ency

of orig inal jurisdiction under § 19.37(b) of this chapter , must be ref err ed to the [AOJ ] for review , unless this procedur al rig ht is waived by the appellant or

repr esentative, or unless the B oard de ter m i n es that the benef it or benef its to which the evidence relates may be fully allowed on appea l without such refe rra l. Such a waiver must be in writing or, if a he aring on appea l is conducte d, the waive r must be forma lly and cl ea rl y en t er edo n t h e r e c o r d o ra l l y at t h e t i m e o f t h e h ea ri n g. Evidence is not pertinent if it does not relate to or ha ve a be aringon the a pp e llate iss ue or

iss ue s. 68 Fe d. Reg . at 69,066. I nt h e i n s t an tca s e, i ti s wi t h i n VA 's p u rv i ew , an d i tap p ea rs t h at VA i s p re s en t l y u n d er t ak i n g, to establish in the first i n s t an ce t h e process for providing notice and a

ny subsequent nec essar

y adjudication. D. Board Adju dication of Claim as Claim to Reopen The Ag ent Ora

ng e Ac t of 1991(the Ac t) provided f or a presumption of service connec tion to be applied to vete rans who ha d serve d in the "Re public of Vietnam duringthe Vietnam e ra" and

wer e diag nosed as having diseases that wer e "a ssociated with e x posure to ce rtain her bicide ag ents."17

Pub . L . N o. 10 2- 4, § 2 (a )( 1) , 1 05 Stat. 1 1, 11 (c od if ie d at 38 U. S.C. § 31 6, re nu mbe re d at 38 U. S.C. § 1 11 6 b y Pub . L . N o. 10 2- 83 , § 5( a ), 10 5 Sta t. 3 78 , 4 06 (1 99 1) ); see 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e) (1993) (i nit ia l im ple me nti ngre g ulatio n f

or se c tio n 1 11 6) . In a dd iti on to t he dis e a se s liste d in w hat be c a me section 1116, the Act authorized the Secre tary to issue regulations e x tending the servic e-c onnection p r e s u mp t i o n t o o t h e r

d i s e a s e s s o w a r

r a n t i n g
. 3 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 1 1 6 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( B )

. P u r s u a n tt o t h a ta u t h o r i t y, the Secr etar

y in J u n e 1 9 9 4 expanded the list of diseases subjec t to the presumption to include "[r]espiratory

canc ers ( canc er o f t h e lung , bronchus, lar y nx , or trac hea) ". 59 F ed. Reg . 29,723, 29 ,7 24 (Jun e 9, 19 94 ) ( a me nd ing§ 3 .3 09 (e )) . T hat r e g ulatio n n owpr ov ide s in pe rt ine nt p a rt : (e) Di se as e as so c iat e d with e

x po su re to c e rta in h e rb ic ideag e nts

. I f a v e te r a n w a s e xp o s e d to a n h e r b ic id e a g e n t d

u r in g a c ti v e
. . . service , the following diseases sha ll be service [] connec ted if the require ments of § 3.307(a) (6) are met even thoug h there is no recor d of su c h d ise a se duri ngse rv ic e , p ro vid e d f urt he r t hat th e re bu tta

ble presumption provisions of § 3.307(d) a re a lso satisfied.

. . . . Respiratory

canc er s (ca

ncer of the lung , bronchus, lar y nx , or trac hea) [.]
38 C.F .R. § 3 .3 09 (e ) ( 20 03 ); see 38 U. S.C. § 1 11 6( a )( 2) (F ), a s ame nd e d b y the Ve te ra

ns ' B e ne fi ts I mpr ov e me nts Ac t of

19 94 (V B I A) , Pub

. L

. No

. 10 3- 44 6, § 50 5, 10 8 Stat. 4 64 5, 46 64 (i nc lud ingin section 1116 list same respira tory canc ers " becoming manifest to a de g ree of disability of 10 per cent or more" ). The Sec reta

ry ' s regulatory

amendment that include d "[r]espirator y ca n cers" in the pr e su mpt ive ly

se rv ic e -c on ne c te d- dis e a se lis t wa s p ro mul g a te d tw o mo nth s a ft e r t he RO de nie d in April 1994 the veter an' s claim for se rvice connec tion for his left-lung -soft-tissue mass. R. at 124; 5 9 F e d

. Re g
. a t 2 9 , 7 2 4

. T h e v e te r a n d id n o t a p p e a l th a t d e c is io n , a n d it th u s b e c a me final. S

ee 38 U.S.C. § 7105(c). Af

ter the veter an filed a claim to r eopen in Ma rch 1996, the RO in the J anuar y 19 97 de c isi on

a dju dic a te d th a t c la im a s an o ri g ina l c la im f or " se rv ic e c on ne c tio n" (a

nd no t a s a c la im to reope n) and note d the J une 1994 c h an ge i n law that had e x panded the list i n § 3.309(e) . R. at 17 5- 76 . On app eal of that RO de c isi on , th e B oa

rd , in the de c isi on

no w o n a

pp e a l, s ta te d th a t, althoug h "it is not made clear in the record, it appea rs t hat t he RO re opened the veter an' s claim of entitlement to se rvice connec tion .

. . and denied it on the merits in its J anuar y 1997 . . . decision"18

(R. at 10); the B oard the n proce eded to a djudicate the c laim as a c laim to reopen ( R. at 11-14). I n Sp e nc e r v . B ro wn , this C o u rt ad d ressed whether "w hen ther e has be en an inter vening lib e ra lizin g law o r V A i ssu e wh ic h ma y a ff e c t th e dispo sit ion

of the c la im" VAis r e qu ir e d " to conduct d e novo revie w of a previously

and fina lly

denied c laim"; the Court dete rmined that althoug h 38 U.S.C. § 5110(g) does not cre ate such a requirement "on it s fac e or by clea r implication . . . , it appear s to be conting ent upon, and t h u s t o p re s u p p o s e, the e x istence of such a r ight." Spence r , 4 Ve t.A

pp . at 28 8. Th e Court

the n h e ld: Where a claim is based upon a substantive rig ht cre ated by a statutory or re g ulatory provision that did not exist at the tim e of the prior fina l de nia l of the c la im, adju dic a tio n o f t he la tte r c la im i s n ot a "r eopening " of

the first, such a s would be prohibited, abse nt new and materia l evidence , by section 7104(b). And t he fact of the inter vening chang e in law is itself sufficie nt to chang e the fac tual basis such that th e l at t er claim is not "a claim base d upon the same f actua l basis"[, 38 U.S.C. § 7104(b),] as the former claim. Cf. Ak

i n s v. Derwinski , 1 Vet.App. 228, 230 ( 1991) (holding that a pre sumption cre ated by

statute was itself ne w and mate rial evide nce)

. Spence r , 4 Ve t.A

pp . at 28 9. Ac c or din g ly , in vie w o f t he int e rv e nin g lib e ra lizin g re g ulatio n th a t in 19 94 a dd e d " [r]e sp ir a tor

y c a nc e r s " t o t

h e § 3

. 3 0 9 ( e ) l i s t

o f pr e su mpt ive ly

se rv ic e -c on ne c te d d ise a se s, the Court holds that, the Boa rd improper ly

adjudicate d the appe llant's cl ai m as a claim to reope n,
rathe r t ha n a s an o ri g ina l c la im ( a s h a d th e RO ), and that the B oa

rd de c isi on mus t be va c a te d o n th is g ro un d a s w e ll; on

re mand , th e B oa

rd mus t thus de ve lop and

re a dju dic a te the app ell ant' s c la im

acc ording ly

. See Spe ncer , su pra ; Mc Cay

v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 183, 186-88 (1996) (c hara cter izi ng VA re g ulation promulgated pursuant to Age nt Orang e Ac t of 1994 as libera liz ing r eg ulation), a ff 'd , 106 F.3d 1577 ( Fe d. Cir. 1997).

IV. Conclusion For the fore g oing r easons, the Court g rants the Sec reta ry 's Fe bruar

y 3, 2004, motion for

rec onsideration of Pe le

gr ini I , su pra , and withdraws that opinion. Upon consider ation of the re cord on appea l, the parties' pleading s, oral arg ument, the Secr etar y ' s Fe bruar

y 2004 motions reg arding Pe le gr ini I and the r esponses ther eto, and the foreg oing analy sis, the C ourt vacates the April 2001 Boa rd dec ision and remands the m at t er fo r expeditious further de velopment and issuanc e of a19

rea djud i ca t ed d ec ision supported by an ade quate state ment of re asons or ba ses, see 38 U. S.C. §§ 1110, 5100-5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 7104(a ), (d) (1); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159(b), (c ), 3.309(e ); D A V v
. S e c 'y ; Huston , Charles , Qu ar tuc c io , and S p encer , a ll su

pra ; Fletche r v. De rwinski , 1 V e t.A pp . 3 94 , 3 97 (1 99 1) – a ll c on sis tent wi th t his op ini on

a nd in a c c or da

nc e wi th 3 8 U .S. C. § 7112 (as a dded by

the VBA of 2003, § 707(b), 117 Stat. at 2673) (r equiring Secre tary to "take such actions as may

be nece ssary to pr ovide for the expeditious t reatment by the B oard of

any claim that is remanded to the Secre tary by the Court") ; see Vargas- Gonzalez v. Principi , 15 Vet.App. 222, 225-30 (2001) (holding that VB I A § 302, 108 Stat. at 4658, the prede cessor of sec tion 7112, applies to all elements of c laim remande d by the Court or B oard) , and with all applica ble law a nd regulation. S e e Al lda y v . B ro wn , 7 Ve t.A

pp . 5 17 , 5 33 -3 4 ( 19 95 ). On re mand , th e a

pp e lla nt w ill be fr e e to

su bmi t a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e a nd a rgume nt o n th e re mand e d c la im, and the B oa rd is r e qu ir e d to consider any such evidenc e and ar g ument. See Kay v. Principi , 16 Vet.App. 529, 534 ( 2002). The Court notes that a re mand by this Court and by

the B oard c o n fe rs o n an appellant the r ight to VA

c omp lia nc e wi th the te rm s of the re mand or de r an d impo se s on the Se c re tary a c on c omi tant d

uty to

ensure compliance with those terms. Se e Ste ga ll v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 2 6 8 , 2 7 1 (1998). A f inal de c isi on by the B oa rd fo llo wi ngthe re mand

he re in o rd e re d w ill c on sti tu te a new decision that, i f adver se, may

be appe aled to this Court only upon the filing of a ne w NOA w ith the Court not later than 120 day s after

the dat e o n which notice of the new f

inal Boa rd dec ision is m ailed to the appellant. Se e Ma rsh v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 468, 472 ( 1998). B eca use th i s opinion replac es Pe le gr ini I , the Secre tary ' s alternative motion for a full-Court decision in light of Pe le gr ini I and his Fe bruar y 5, 2004, motion for a stay of Pe le gr ini I a re dis mis se d a s mo ot. VACATED A

ND REMANDED

.

I VERS, Judge , c on c ur

ri ng in p a rt

a nd dis se nti ngin p a

rt : I c on c ur in t he Court ' s o pin ion

in parts I , I I , I I I .D., and I V, but dissent from the Court's opinion in parts I I I .A.1, 2.a. a nd b., and B . and C. As a

ptl y pu t by Justi c e Ste ve ns : Th e ma xim th a t "h a rd c a se s mak e ba d la w" may a lso a pp ly to e a sy c a se s. As Ish a ll e xpla in, thi s c a se c ou ld e a sil y be de c ide d b y the str a ig htf or wa rd a pp lic a tio n o f w e ll-20

established pre cede nt. . . . Any prope r concern a

bout the dang er that [ an] opinion mig ht b e int e rp re te d to o e xpa ns iv e l y w o uld be mor e a pp ro pr ia te ly

a dd re sse d in a c a se that was e ither incorr ectly decide d or t hat at least raised a close or diffic ult question. I n my judgme nt it i s most unwise to use this case a s a vehic le for substitution of a rat h e r o p e n - e n d e d a tt e mp t to d e f in e [t h e le g a l is s u e s in qu e s ti o n ] th a t tr ouble the Court

. Hudson v. United States , 522 U. S. 93, a t 106- 07 (1 99 7) (S te ve ns , J ., c on c ur ri ng ). Suc h is the c a se here . Having deter

mined that the appe llant is entitl ed to a r emand pur suant to Sp e nc e r v . B ro wn , 4 Vet.App. 283 ( 1993), in part I I I .D., the Court nee d g o no further

. This Court has discussed t he need t o addre ss multipl e errors when remanding a ca se. I t has bee n the pra ctice of this Court from the outset that, as a g ener al rule, w hen an un do ub te d e rr or

re qu ir e s th a t th e Court

or de r a re mand , th e Court

wi ll not ad dr e ss other putative e rror s raised by the appe llant that are not nece ssary in effect i n g the pr op os e d d isp os iti on . In s ho rt , if the pr op e r r e me dy

is a re mand , the re is no ne e d to analy ze and discuss all the other c laimed er rors that would result in a re medy no b roader than a

rema nd. I n Best v. Principi , 1 5 V e t. A p p
. 1 8 ( 2 0 0 1 ) ( p e r curia m or de r) , th e Court

no te d th a t it

g e ne ra lly

de c ide s c ases on the na rr ow e st p os sib le g rounds, and ther efor e is not require d to rule upon other a lleg ations of er ror . . . . Mahl v. Principi , 15 Vet.App. 37, 38 ( 2001) (per curiam order ). The Court further instructed that "[c]onsidering only the i ssues nec essar y to the dispositi on of the c ase, or , in other words, de ciding

a case on th e nar row est po ss ib le gro un ds , i s t he t radi ti on in general app ell ate prac ti ce." Id. I n Be st v. Principi , the Court also stated: The Court' s prac tice of limiting its opinions to the i ssue nec essar y to effe ct a r emand is consistent with the jurisdictional statute under which the Court operates. That statute states that " in any action brought under this chapter , the Court of Appe als for Ve te ra ns Cla ims , to the ex tent nece ssary to its decision and whe n prese nted shall . . . (1) de cide all questions of law." 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a) (e mphasis added) . Of c ourse, wi thi n th e statut or

y de fi nit ion of " to t

he e xten t ne c e ssa

ry ," the re may

be a pp ro pr ia te circ umstances that would c ause the Court, in its discretion, to t ouch upon anothe r issue, whether

raised by the appe llant or not.
Be st , 15 Vet.App. at 20. Not all Boa

rd er rors are of equal g ravity

. Howeve r, the majority ' s analy sis presumes that they

are . By addre ssing a

p u rp o rt ed VCAA notice e rror be for e acknow ledg ing the Boa rd' s more signific ant fa ilure to adjudicate the appe llant's c laim as a new claim i n violation of Sp e nc e r, su pr a , t h e m aj o ri t y

h as re v er s ed t h e or d er o f i mp o rt an ce o f th e B o ar d 's erro rs i n i t s an al y s i s
. T h e B o ar d 's21

S pence r e r r o r r e qu ir e d th e a

p p e ll a n t to o v e r c o me th e s ig n if ic a n t h u r d le o f p r e s e n ti n g new a nd materia l evidence be

for e his final decision could be reope ned and r eadjudication could take plac e. See 38 U.S.C. § 5108; 38 C .F.R. § 3.156(a ) (2003) . He would a lso not be entitled to al l the assistance g iven a claimant fili ng a new claim. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Se c’y of Veterans Af fai rs , 34 5 F .3 d 13 34 (F e d. Cir . 2 00 3) (h old ingthat th e Se c re tary ' s r e g ulatio n e xclu din g c la ims to reope n from mandatory

medical e x aminations is valid, and that "in the a bsence of newand mater ial

e vid e nc e , V A is no t re qu ir e d to pr ov ide a ssi sta nc e to a c la ima

nt a tte mpt ing to re op e n a

pr e vio us ly disallowed cla im, including providing a medica l examination or obtaining a me dical opinion," inter

a lia ). Sin c e the pr op e r r e me dy fo r t he fa ilure to a dju dic a te the a pp e lla nt' s c la im a s a

ne w o ne is

rema nd, t h er e i s no need to a

naly ze and discuss any

other e rror

that would result in a re medy no g reater than a

rema nd. Be st, su pra . Clearly , the not ice provisions of t he VCAA are curr ently in a partial state of flux. See section 701 of the Ve ter an s Be nefits Act of 2003 (VB A), Public L aw 108- 183, 117 Stat. 2651 (Dec . 16, 2003) and pr oposed re g ulation Bo ard of Veter ans' Appea ls: Obtaining Evidenc e and Curing Procedur al Def

ects, 68 F ed. Reg . 69,062, 69,065 (De c. 11, 2003), which will be applicable to any

re a dju dic a tio n o f t

he a pp e lla nt' s c la im be low

. On re mand , the a pp e lla nt wil l als o be fr e e to s ub mit ad d i t i o n al ev i d en ce an d

ar gu m en to n t h e r em an d edcl aim s in acc ordanc e with K u t sc he ro us k yv . W est , 12 Ve t.A pp . 3 69 , 3 72 -7 3 ( 19 99 ) ( pe r c ur iam or de r) , a nd the Se c re tary

wi ll b e re qu ir e d to add

re ss a ll

a pp lic a ble law a nd re g ulatio n, to i nc lud e tho se re g ulatio ns a dd re ssi ngno tic e a nd

the re qu ir e me nts of the VCAA. Iag ree with the majority ' s asser tion that the plain lang uag e of se ction 5103(a) require s that the Se c re tary

g ive the c la ima

nt a pp ro pr ia te no tic e " [u]po n r e c e ipt of a comp le te or su bs tanti a lly complete c laim." That is obvious to a ll. Howeve r, the majority assumes that, under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v . Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 4 67 U. S. 8 37 , 8 42 (1 98 4) , b e c a us e " Con g re ss h a s d ir e c tly spoken to the prec ise question at issue" and "the intent of Congr ess is c lear , that is the en d o f t he

m a t ter ." An te a t 8

- 9

. U n f o rtu n a t e l y , t h e i n t e n t o f C o n g r e s s o n th e k e y qu e s t i o n i n t h i s c a s e is any thing but cle ar. The key question here is how does the Secre tary addre ss a situation where the cla i m was adjudicated prior to the passag e of the VCAA making compliance with the timing

re qu ir e me nt o f t

he pla in lang ua g e of se c tio n 510 3( a ) imp os sib le ? Th e lang ua g e of se c tio n 5 10 3 is22

sil e nt r e g ard ingtha

t c ir c ums tanc e. Whe n r e vie wi ngan a g e nc y ' s c on str uc tio n o f a

statut e that it administers, the Court first deter mines "w hether

Congr ess h as direc tly

spoken to the pre cise que stion at i ss ue. " Chevron , 467 U.S. at 842. I f t he law g overns the question under consideration, this Court "mu st give effect to th e un amb iguo us ly ex pres sed in ten t o f C on gress ." Id . at 843. I f, howe ver, the statute does not dir ectly addre ss the issue, the Court then must determine whe ther the a dminist ering ag ency proper ly promulg ated a

n interpre tative re g ulation "ba sed on a permissible construction of the st atu te. " Id . The Court may defe r t o the VA's re asonable interpre tation of a statutory provision when the law does not dir ectly addre ss the prec ise question at issue, in other wor ds, when the la w leave s "a g ap for an agen cy

t o fi l l." Id. (" ' The powe r of a n administrative ag ency

to administer a cong ressionally

cre ated . .

. prog ram nece ssarily require s the formulation of policy and the making

o f ru l es t o fi l l an y

gap l ef t , i mp l i ci t l y

o r e x p l i ci t l y , b y

C o n gre s s
. '" ( qu o t i n g Mo rto n v . R uiz , 4 15 U. S. 199, 231 (1974)) ; cf. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) ( holding that inter pretive doubt must be resolved in f

avor of the veter an). There is a conflict betwee n the re quirements of Chevron and Gardner , both su

pra , in the c on te xt of

the re vie w of VA re g ulatio ns
. Ho we ve r, the Cou rt sh ou ld at least provide the S ecr etar y with an opportunit y to promulg ate a regulation for the Court to re view in light of Che vron and Gardner , both su pra , rathe r than e ng ag ing in spe culative inter pretation. Congr ess did not addre ss what should be done w hen prope r VCAA notice does not prec ede a n initial unfavor able RO de cision. As conc eded by the majority , the Secr etar y is in the process of

filling that g a p
. T h e C o u rtn e e d

n o ti n t e r c e d e i n a n a r e a

t h a ti s s o l e l y t h e p r o v i n c e o f t h e S e c r e t a r

y. Despite having no c ompelling r eason to do so, the major ity has chosen t o en ter into a

r e g u lato r y th ic k e t r e c e n tl y v is it e d b y th e F e d e r a l Ci r c u it , a n d to s o me d e g r e e , b y Congr ess. S

ee Di sa ble d A m. Ve te ra ns v . S

e c 'y V e te ra ns Af fai rs , 327 F.3d 1339 (F ed. Cir. 2003) [here inafter DAV ]

an d V B A s e c t i o n 7 0 1

. T h e m a j o r i t y u n n e c e s s a r i l y i n s t r u c t s t h e S e c r e t a

r y o n t h e a

p p l i c a b i l i t y, timing, and c ontent of the VCAA duty -to-notify provisions a s well as the issues of pr ejudice to the appellant a

nd adjudication on re mand. Th e F e de ra l Cir c uit

inv a lid a te d r e g ulatio n § 19 .9 (a )( 2) (2 00 2) inDAV , holding that 38 C.F.R. § 19.9(a) (2) is invalid bec ause, in c onjunction with the a me nd e d r

ule c od if ie d a t 38 C.F .R. § 2 0. 13 04 , it a llo ws the B oa

rd to consider a dditional evidenc e without having to remand the case to the AO J for ini tia l c on sid e ratio n a

nd wi tho ut h a vin g to h avin g to o bta in23 the appe llant's w aiver . That is contra ry to th e re q u i rement of 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a) that "[a]ll questions in a matter which . . . is subject to decision by

the Secr etar

y shall be subjec t to one revie w on appe al to the Secre tary ."
DAV , 327 F.3d at 1341. The F eder al Circuit observe d that the amendme nt to 38 C.F.R. § 20.1304 (2002) e liminated the require ment in 38 C.F.R. § 20.1304(c) ( 2001) that unless the a ppellant waive d consideration by

the RO the B oard must re fer evidenc e not consider ed by the R O t o the RO. Id. at 1345-46. The Fe dera l Circ uit, in its c riticism a nd analy sis of §§ 19.9(a) and 20.1304(2002), did not fore close the a

bility of the B oard to c ure a proce dural err or made at the RO level. Rather , they found the abse nce of

the ability

of an a ppellant to choose be tween r emand to the RO or proce eding befor e the B oard to be problematic. The Secre tary was g iven the opportunit y t o re d ra ft the invalidated

re g ulatio n a

nd the Se c re tary is now in the pr oc e ss of do ingso . E ve n th e ma

jor ity c on c e de s th a t " it appea rs that VA is in the process of deve loping a sy stem to gove rn the provision of suc h notice and any su bs equ ent neces sar y

adj ud ica ti on for

case s s u c h as t hi s o ne. " An te at 13. The ma jority then continues on, opining in gr eat de tail, on the very issu es t hat the Secr etar

y has made the subject of

c u r r e n t r u le ma k in g
. See Boa

rd of Ve tera

ns' Appea ls: Obtaining Evidenc e and CuringProcedur al Def ects, 68 F ed. Reg . at 69,065

. The VAGene ral C o u n s el has also issued a Gene ral Counsel Prece d ent Opini on addre ssing the impac t of DAV upon the B oard' s ability

to cure section 5103(a )

n o t i ce d efe cts at the B oard le vel. See V A G e n
. Co u n
. Pr e c
. 1

- 2 0 0 3 ( M a y 2 1 , 2 0 0 3 )

. N e ithe r the proposed r eg ulation nor the precede ntial opinion are curr ently befor e the Court. The Court need not now insert itself into the re g ulatory proce ss, the sole provin ce o f t h e S ecr etar y un de r 3 8 U .S. C. § 501. Whil e it would g ener ally be appropriate for thi s Court to addre ss and invalidate a regulation, in this case the F eder al Circuit in DA V, su pra , h a s in va lid a te d th a t re g ulatio n. Th e Se c re tary sh ou ld be allowe d t h e o p p o rt u nity to fix the problem be fore this Court di rec ts a solution. I nstead, the majority provides the Sec reta

ry with unnece ssary

counsel on the ong oing r eg ulatory proce ss. Fur thermore , parts I I I .A.1, 2.a and b and B and C of the opinion contain nothing nece ssary to the dispositi on of this case . They are , there fore , at best, dictum. B LACK ' S L AW D I C T I O N A RY define s "obiter

dictum," c ommonly

ref err ed to as "dic ta," as " [a] judicial comment made dur ing the

course of deliver ing a

judicial o p i n i o n , b u t o n e that is unnec essar y to the decision in the ca se and th erefo re no t p reced ent ial (t ho ugh i t m ay be co ns id ered pers uas iv e)." B LACK ' S L AW D I CT I O N A RY24

1100 (7th ed. 1999). T he majority conce des as much by observing "[a]lthough the Court need not

rea ch a c o n cl u s i o n as to the prope r re mand proc ess at this time, we make the following ob ser vat io ns ." An te at 14. I t then proceeds to make detailed obs ervations as t o what it sees a s the

c or re c t path f

or re g ulator y re vis ion . Se c tio n 5 01 , of tit le 38 of the U. S. Co de a ssi g ne d th a t duty to t h e S e c r e t ar

y. R e ga r d i n g d i c t a , t h i s C o u rth a s o b s e r v e d : The da ng er of . . . dicta is that, althoug h theore tically and tec hnically

not binding, pr actica lly , they g ive the appe ara

nce of car ry i ng the cloak of

judicial acc eptanc e. As one scholar ha s stated, " Much d ep ends on t he cha rac ter of the dictum. Mere obiter

may b e enti tled to litt le weig ht, while a ca ref ully considere d statement . . . , though technica lly dictum, must ca rry g reat weig ht, and may

even .

. . be re gardedas co ncl us iv e." C H A RLES A. W R I GHT , T HE L A W O F F ED ER A L C OU R TS § 58 , a t 37 4 ( 4th

e d. 19 83 ); see also Mc Coy v. [ Mass. Inst. of Tech. ], 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (g iving e ffe ct to considered d i ct u m of the Supreme Court). . . . Throug h its dicta , the majority seeks to dic tate the result of any rema nd to the Boa

rd.
Las ov ic k v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 141, 153 ( 1994) (Ivers, J., concurr ing in pa rt, dissenting in pa

rt). Such is the c a se he re . T he ma

jor ity ' s d isc ussio n r

un s a fo ul o f " [t]he da

ng e r o f .

. . dic ta

[wh ic h] is that, althoug h theore tically

and tec hnically

not binding, pra ctically , they g ive the appe ara

nce of car rying the cloak of judicial acc eptanc e," as noted in Lasovick , 6 Vet.App. at 153. Certainly , the majority has put the S e c r e t ar

y o n n o t i c e a s t o w h a t i t b e l i e v e s a r e g u l a t i o n i n c o mp l i a n c e w i t h s e c t i o n 51 03 (a ) m us t loo k li ke

. Th e Court c a n a nd sh ou ld d e c ide thi s a

pp e a l on the na rr ow e st g ro un ds in a c c or da nc e wi th g ener al appe llate pra ctice by rema nding the matter for rea djudication pursuant to Spence r , su pr a . T his is especia lly

so in light of the a

bundant evidenc e that both the Secr etar y and Cong ress a

re a ddressing the def ects identified in DA V, su

pr a , an d in lig ht of the fa c t tha t no ne of the re su lts of

tho se e ff or ts i s now bef ore the Court. As J ustice Stevens stated, in c oncurr ing only in the judgme nt in Hudson , su pra : I t is of course , entirely appropr iate for the Court to perf orm a lawmaking function as a nec essar

y incident to its Article I I Iresponsibility for the decision of " Cases" and "Controve rsies." I n m y

judgme nt, however , a desire to reshape the law doe s not provi d e a le g it im a te b a s is f

o r is s u in g w h a t a

mo u n ts to li tt le mo r e th a n an a d v isory opinion that, at best, will have the pre cede ntial value of pur e dictum . . . .
Hudson , 522 U.S. at 112 (Stevens, J., concurring ). Jus tice Stevens we nt on to express g reat conce rn25

wi th t he c on sti tut ion a l r a mif

ic a tio ns of

the Sup re me Court ' s ma

jor ity op ini on . H is c a

uti on is w e ll taken he re. I f, as I believe to be the case , the m ajority opinion here is dicta, then its direction to the Secre tary amounts to lit tle more than a n advisory

opinion and should be g iven t he pre cede ntial value

a pp ro pr ia te to that ca te g or

y of jud ic ia l utte ra

nc e
. F or the re a so ns state d a bo ve , I re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.