MEMO ROUTING SLIP 

3 

: 

4 

ER USE i'iii. JiffROYALS, DISAPPROYAI.3, 

.CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS 

INITIAlS 

DATE 

MATERIAL 

CIRCU!ATE 

COORDINATION 

NECESSARY ACTION 

NOTE AND RETIJRN 

SEE ME 

SIGNATURE 
DD/COMSF.C 

NSA-41 

Briefing 

REF ID:A57049 

21 Dec 54 

1. The tolloving comments are :turnisbed per ;,your request for a briefing 

on the situation With regard to certain types ot violations as noted in the 

:monthly report. I sball be glad to discuss turther Vi.th you if 70u so desire. 

2. In February 1954, USCIB Directive No. 9 on COMINT compromise reporting 

procedure became effective. Since then, there has been a steady increase in 

such reports. In August, :f'urther detailed reporting instructions were issued 

to the Service Cryptologic Agencies in BSA Circular 90-1 (see subparagraph 3e 

below). The present large volume of' camprcmise reports is not, theref'ore, 

necessarily indicative or an actual. increase in occurrences; it is possibly due 

to the dissemination of' specific reporting requirements. In either case, the 

violation volume is high, particularly that of' inadvertent clear text transmissions and the encryption ot messages in monoa1pbabetic substitution cipher in 

on-line operation. 

3. Various corrective actions 'have been taken and recommended, and equipment 

modif'ications have been designed to reduce these violations. The status of' 

!ng;llementation of' these remedies is as tollovs: 

a. A push-button modification tor the model 19 teletypewriter and the 

131B2 subscriber set has been designed to prevent inadvertent plain text 

transmissions i"ram the plain text transmitter distributor. Tha Army has 

reported installation of' this modification on all but a f'ev COMIB'l! term1na.Js. 

l'iav;y installation is complete. The Air Force has reported installation on the 

:majority of' their termina.J.s, and others are being modif'ied as rapidly as 

m.odif'ication kits becaue available. Many of' the model. 19 teletypewriters used 

by the Air Force are the c0111DerciaJ. type (which bas no tape-out button), and 

specia.1 modif'ication kits are required. 

b. Another required modif'ication on Prl'HON COMINT circuits is the torn 

tape stop mechanism, vhich will interrupt transmission within 3 to l.5 characters 

Whenever a tape hangs up or runs out. The A:rmy, on J.6 Dec, reported installation 

complete on the ASA. Tvo Rock Ranch terminal and nine (9) terminals 1n Europe; 

action has been taken to procure additional. modification kits. ~ Navy no 

longer bas a requirement tor this modification, since they 'have no PYTHON COMINT 

circuits a.t present. The Air Force, on 1 Dec, reported that they bad on hand a 

sutf'1cient quantity of' TTSMs, and that shipment was being ma.de to command issuing 

of'fices f'or eventual installation on PXTBON COMINT circuits. TheyVill advise us 

when installations are complete. 
REF ID:A57049 

SECRET 

o-. Instructions have been prepand tor the installation ot push-button 

mod.it:lcat:tons to the SSM-3 and SSM-4 (ft-16o/FG, SMG>N) equipments. These 

instructions Will be published in a change to AFSAG l.262-1, which is held by all 

COMINT field units. Included also in this change Vill be detailed installation 

instructions tor tbe torn tape stop mechanism. 

d. Serious consideration is being given to installing (or relocating) 

warning lights to a.id in preventing inadvertent plain text transmissions trom. 

te1et;ypevriter keyboards. 

•. The COMIHT aanprallise reporting instructions ot NS.A. Circular 90-1 

are in the bands ot eaoh COMIHT tield unit. Violators are required not only to submit a 

wr1 tten report ot the tacts in each case, but must also include a br1et description 

ot the training program tor COMSEC a.a applied to COMilft material. 

t. A cbeak-ott list or quest1ozmaire aover1ng general, cryptographic 

)

1 and transmission eecurity1 and the physical security ot orypt()Sraphic material, 

bas been prepared 'tor issue to each COMIB'f field unit. Thie questionua:t:i:e, Wbich 

vtll provide us with detailed int'orarJ.tion concerning each CCWIN'l' tiel.d unit, is 

to be tilled out by the Commanding Otticer or Of'f'icer in charge in the course or 

an inspection ot his installation, and returned to us With a copy to the Head of 

the Service Cryptologic Agency concerned. The check list, in. draft :t'orm, bas 

been submitted to the three Service Cryptologia Agencies ror informal review and 

camnent prior to publication. 

44 Dl.tring 1951, 1952 and 1953, our actions in improving the camnunications a~curity or COMINT were oonf':l:ned largely to recommendations f'or corteative action 

and equipaent. modifications, and reQ.uesta that the Service Cryptologic Agencies 

adopt them.. In many ca.sea, they were not adopted.. Currentq, our approach is 

I more realistic,, and ve have laid very spec1t1c and unequivocal reo.uirements on the 

Services, and have directed conq>liance. More and JllOl'e 1rtrol'lll8.tion and guidance 

(

, material :ls being distributed at tbe Service ~vel at Vb1ch it Will do the most 

good .. the tield units.. The Service C%'1Ptolog1a Agencies are cooperating tul.ly 

in iJQ:plementing our directives and instructions. 

5.. Equipqent failures and :meobanical detects are :responsible tor some 

violation&, but. the ma.Jorit7 are due to personal error o-r same kind on the part 

ot the operator. Furthermore, the ma.Jori ty ot personnel errors occur at locations 

w'bere tbe equipuents bave not been modified. Universal instaJ.JJ&tion. o:t t.he 

equipment modifications des4r1bed in paragraph 3 above, however 1 should be completed. 

in the near tuture, and a direct result should be a :reduction in these errors. 

The modifications are designed to eUminate muc1h ot tbe personal h.ctor in equipnent operation. 

6. Ot course, in the absence o't turcy automatic eq.uipm!nt, the possibility 

f 

ot human error remains. Equtpnent modifications are no substitute tor oare and 

attention on the pa.rt ot: the operator. The questionnaire ( paragraph fabove) 

2 

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REF -nr:AS7 0 4 9 

-:;ECRET 

places great empba.sis on canmand responsibility ~or thorough 1ndootrinat1on and 

training of cryptographers, and will unquest:tone.bl.y result in a. more intensive 

trainiDg program. in each COMI?fr t1old unit. 

7. Actually, 'ft are in a transition period. Def'intte goals ba.ve been 

established, and the means ot attaining them provided. Full employment ot these 

means he.a "taken time, 'but much progress has been made" 'l'he present outlook ror 

the communications securit7 or our OOMI?ll is an optimistic one. 

J~·~ DEC SS 10 0 I 

~E.CEIM:O ~2'V-C\:?EC 

3 

F. C. AUSTIN 

Cb!et, lfSA .. 41 

SECRET