IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-10708

RANDI HYATT, individually, as the next friend of her minor child C.W.H., 

and as the representative of the ESTATE OF JASON HYATT; LEA 

WILKINS, as the representative of her minor child C.H.; ALEXIS HYATT; 

VICKIE DEAR, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

BRIANNA THOMAS; CHARLES TURNER; MARK ADMIRE; BRANDY 

CAUBLE, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

JAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge:

The family of Jason Hyatt appeals the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of Officer Brianna Thomas on their § 1983 claim related to 

Hyatt’s suicide while in police custody. Because we find that Thomas

responded reasonably to Hyatt’s known suicide risk, we hold that she was not 

deliberately indifferent and thus was entitled to qualified immunity. We 

therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 18, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I

On December 10, 2012, appellant Randi Hyatt, Jason Hyatt’s wife, 

received a call from Hyatt’s coworkers, who informed her that Hyatt had left 

work unexpectedly and that they were concerned about his wellbeing. Randi 

called 911 and informed Thomas, a Callahan County, Texas jailer and 

dispatcher, that her husband “was suicidal, had tried to commit suicide before, 

and that [she] would not be calling the police if [she] did not think something 

really bad was happening.” Thomas dispatched officers to perform a welfare 

check, and Hyatt was soon located and placed under arrest under suspicion of 

driving while intoxicated. When Thomas called Randi to inform her that Hyatt 

had been stopped and to give her his location, Randi again stated that her 

husband was suicidal. Randi arrived while her husband was being arrested 

and informed the arresting officers that Hyatt “had tried to commit suicide 

before and needed to be watched.” 

Hyatt was taken to the Callahan County jail, where Thomas, who was 

trained in the assessment of suicide risk and screening for mental health issues 

of inmates, booked him and completed a “Screening Form for Suicide and 

Medical and Mental Impairments.” In response to Thomas’s questions, Hyatt 

stated that he had been prescribed antidepressants but was not taking them 

correctly, that he was feeling “very depressed,” and that he attempted suicide 

two months earlier because he was off his medication; however, Hyatt

answered “No” when asked if he was “thinking about killing [himself] today.” 

Thomas observed that he was under the influence of drugs and alcohol, and 

noted “1/2 bottle of vodka, Xanax” in the “Comments” section of the form. 

Despite his answers to the questionnaire, Thomas observed that Hyatt “came 

across as very happy and generally in a good mood,” and later stated in an 

affidavit that “[a]t no time did [she] consider him to be a suicide risk and at no 

time did he exhibit any actions which would have made [her] consider him to 

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be a suicide risk.” Nevertheless, “due to his history of depression and suicide 

attempts,” Thomas refused to issue Hyatt the thin sheet or hygiene items 

typically given to prisoners when she processed him into the jail. On two prior 

occasions, inmates at Callahan County jail had used the thin sheets to hang 

themselves from bars in their jail cells.

Hyatt was issued a standard jail uniform and placed in a cell under video 

surveillance. However, a blind spot in surveillance-camera coverage prevented 

officers from seeing the toilet area of the cell. When Thomas’s shift ended at 

9:00 pm, she informed her shift relief, Jailer Charles Turner, about Hyatt’s 

intoxication and history of suicide attempts and advised him “of the need to 

keep an eye out for suspicious behavior.” Turner checked on Hyatt throughout 

the night. Before his shift ended at 7:00 am, Turner made Hyatt breakfast and 

delivered it to him. He later recalled that Hyatt “seemed normal and [was] 

acting in a regular manner,” and that Hyatt “gave no indication of suicidal 

tendencies.” Turner was relieved by Mark Admire around 7:00 am; he told 

Admire that Hyatt had been booked for DUI and that his family would be in 

soon to “bond him out of jail.” Shortly after his shift began, Admire was advised 

by another jailer that Hyatt could not be seen from the video monitor. 

Although the jailer suspected that Hyatt was using the bathroom, she 

dispatched Admire to check on him. At approximately 8:02 am, Admire 

discovered that Hyatt had hanged himself in the cell bathroom with a plastic 

garbage bag. EMS was contacted; personnel arrived at the jail at 8:12 am and 

determined that Hyatt was dead. 

In 2014, Hyatt’s widow, mother, and children (collectively, the Hyatts) 

filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans 

with Disabilities Act against Callahan County; Callahan County Sheriff John 

Windham; and five Callahan County Jailers, including Thomas. The plaintiffs 

alleged, inter alia, that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to 

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Hyatt’s right to protection from harm guaranteed by the Fourteenth 

Amendment. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting 

that they were each entitled to qualified immunity. The defendants contended

that they did not fail to protect Hyatt from a known risk of suicide but rather 

“took steps to protect him from same,” and argued that they did not 

intentionally disregard Hyatt’s suicidal tendencies. 

The district court ultimately denied summary judgment as to Sheriff 

Whindham but granted summary judgment as to the remaining individual 

defendants. With respect to Thomas, the district court found: 

Plaintiffs have failed to direct the Court to specific facts that could 

be interpreted by a reasonable jury as showing that Defendant 

Thomas in fact drew the inference that Mr. Hyatt was an 

imminent or high risk for suicide (requiring an even higher level 

of care and observation than that which was being given him) or 

that Defendant Thomas deliberately ignored such a high level of 

risk.

The district court therefore concluded that no genuine issue of material fact 

precluded Thomas from being entitled to qualified immunity. This appeal 

followed. 

II

A. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo and 

apply the same standard that was used by the district court. Roberts v. City of 

Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is 

appropriate if the record discloses “no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.

56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under 

the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine 

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if the summary judgment “evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the [non-movant].” Id.

“Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless their conduct 

violates a clearly established constitutional right.” Mace v. City of Palestine, 

333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003). Once a defendant asserts the qualified 

immunity defense, “[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of negating qualified 

immunity.” Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). “A plaintiff 

seeking to overcome qualified immunity must show: ‘(1) that the official 

violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly 

established at the time of the challenged conduct.’” Cass v. City of Abilene, 814

F.3d 721, 728 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 

(2011)). Despite this burden-shifting, all reasonable inferences must be drawn 

in the non-movant plaintiff’s favor. Brown, 623 F.3d at 253.

B. Deliberate Indifference

The Supreme Court has held that “deliberate indifference to serious 

medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction 

of pain,’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 

97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion 

of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). Although pretrial detainees like Hyatt 

are not protected by the Eighth Amendment, we have held that “the State owes 

the same duty under the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment to 

provide both pretrial detainees and convicted inmates with basic human needs, 

including medical care and protection from harm, during their confinement.” 

Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996) (Hare II).

In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994), the Supreme Court 

explained that to be deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s needs in violation 

of the Eighth Amendment, “the official must both be aware of facts from which 

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and 

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he must also draw the inference.” Therefore, to avoid liability, “[p]rison 

officials charged with deliberate indifference might show . . . that they did not 

know of the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger and 

that they were therefore unaware of a danger, or that they knew the 

underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts 

gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent.” Id. at 844. 

Furthermore, evidence that an official was aware of a substantial risk to 

inmate safety does not alone establish deliberate indifference. As the Supreme 

Court explained in Farmer, “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial 

risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they 

responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” 

511 U.S. at 844. We have further observed that, “while . . . the law is clearly 

established that jailers must take measures to prevent inmate suicides once 

they know of the suicide risk, we cannot say that the law is established with 

any clarity as to what those measures must be.” Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 

135 F.3d 320, 328-29 (5th Cir. 1998) (Hare III) (quoting Rellergert v. Cape 

Girardeau Cty., 924 F.2d 794, 797 (8th Cir. 1991)). What is clear is that, even 

if an officer responds without the due care a reasonable person would use—

such that the officer is only negligent—there will be no liability. See Davidson 

v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986). 

III

On appeal, the Hyatts argue that the evidence, considered in the light 

most favorable to them, suggests that Thomas: (1) knew that Hyatt was at 

significant risk of committing suicide; and (2) ignored this risk when she failed 

to withhold or remove obvious dangers from Hyatt’s cell and failed to follow 

Callahan County’s “suicide prevention policy.” We will consider each of these 

arguments in turn.

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A. Thomas’s Subjective Awareness of Risk of Harm

In support of their contention that Thomas “knew Mr. Hyatt was at 

significant risk of committing suicide,” the Hyatts point to evidence that she

knew about Hyatt’s recent suicide attempt and his history of depression; that 

she was told by Randi that Hyatt was suicidal; and that she did not issue him 

certain items “due to his history of depression and suicide attempts.” We agree 

that, taken in the light most favorable to the Hyatts, this evidence could lead 

a reasonable jury to conclude that Thomas was subjectively aware of a 

substantial risk that Hyatt would attempt to commit suicide. 

“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial 

risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including 

inference from circumstantial evidence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. Thomas 

reported that, “due to his history of depression and suicide attempts,” she 

refused to issue Hyatt the thin sheet or hygiene items typically given to 

prisoners when she processed him into the jail. Furthermore, she informed her 

shift relief, Jailer Turner, of Hyatt’s intoxication and history of suicide 

attempts and advised him “of the need to keep an eye out for suspicious 

behavior.” Despite Hyatt’s statement that he was not presently considering 

suicide and Thomas’s averment that she did not consider him to be a suicide 

risk, one could reasonably draw the inference from Thomas’s actions that she 

was aware of a risk that Hyatt would harm himself if given the opportunity. 

See Flores v. Cty. of Hardeman, Tex., 53 F.3d 1280, 1280 (5th Cir. 1995)

(unpublished) (finding genuine issue of material fact as to officer’s knowledge 

of detainee’s suicidal tendencies, despite statement from officer and other 

officials that detainee “had not shown such tendencies,” where officer placed 

detainee in observation cell, denied him sheets and a blanket, and took other 

added precautions).

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We next must consider whether, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Hyatts, a jury could find that Thomas was aware of a 

“sufficiently substantial” risk to Hyatt’s safety. Although Hyatt indicated that 

he did not want to kill himself, he stated that he was feeling “very depressed,” 

and Thomas was aware that he had a history of depression, that he had 

recently attempted suicide, and that his wife believed that he was suicidal. A 

reasonable jury could infer that, as an officer trained in the assessment of 

suicide risk and screening for mental health issues of inmates and likely aware 

that the prison had had recent experience with detainee suicides, Thomas 

appreciated that Hyatt presented a significant risk of suicide. Taken in the 

light most favorable to the Hyatts, the evidence thus creates a genuine dispute 

as to whether Thomas was subjectively aware of Hyatt’s substantial risk of 

suicide. 

Thomas argues that the Hyatts cannot satisfy the awareness-of-risk 

requirement without evidence that she had some knowledge that the plastic 

bag Hyatt used to hang himself was present in his cell. However, the Hyatts 

are not required to demonstrate that Thomas was aware of the particular 

means that Hyatt would ultimately use to hurt himself, only of the substantial 

risk that he might try to hurt himself. The Supreme Court made this point 

clear in Farmer, when, considering a claim of deliberate indifference to the risk 

of inmate-on-inmate violence, it observed:

[A] prison official [may not] escape liability for deliberate 

indifference by showing that, while he was aware of an obvious, 

substantial risk to inmate safety, he did not know that the 

complainant was especially likely to be assaulted by the specific 

prisoner who eventually committed the assault. The question 

under the Eighth Amendment is whether prison officials, acting 

with deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently 

substantial “risk of serious damage to his future health,” and it 

does not matter whether the risk comes from a single source or 

multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner 

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faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or 

because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk. 

511 U.S. at 843. In Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Texas Department of 

Protective & Regulatory Services, we cited Farmer and held that “[a]lthough 

deliberate indifference is determined by a subjective standard of recklessness, 

this court has never required state officials to be warned of a specific danger.” 

380 F.3d 872, 881 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).

Thomas’s awareness of the substantial risk that Hyatt would attempt suicide 

if given the opportunity would therefore satisfy the awareness requirement. 

B. Thomas’s Response to Risk of Harm

A prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if “he knows that 

inmates face a substantial risk of serious bodily harm . . . [and] disregards that 

risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Gobert v. Caldwell, 

463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Rhyne v. Henderson Cty., 973 F.2d 

386, 391 (5th Cir. 1992) (“The failure to provide pre-trial detainees with 

adequate protection from their known suicidal impulses is actionable under 

§ 1983 as a violation of the detainee’s constitutional rights.”). Although “we 

cannot say that the law is established with any clarity as to what those 

measures must be,” Hare III, 135 F.3d at 328-29 (quoting Rellergert, 924 F.2d 

at 797), we conclude that in this case, Thomas responded reasonably to Hyatt’s 

risk of suicide. She withheld from Hyatt the most obvious means for self-harm

and placed him under continuous, if ultimately imperfect, video surveillance. 

Thomas also took care to inform her relieving officer that Hyatt was a potential 

suicide risk and that he needed to be observed; it was not until after that officer 

was relieved that Hyatt hanged himself. It is uncontested that she had no 

knowledge of the presence of the plastic bag in Hyatt’s cell. Thomas’s failure 

to inspect Hyatt’s cell and retrieve the plastic bag, and any other potential 

ligatures, was perhaps negligent, see Estate of Pollard v. Hood Cty., Tex., 579 

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F. App’x 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2014), but “negligent inaction by a jail officer does 

not violate the due process rights of a person lawfully held in custody of the 

State,” Hare II, 74 F.3d at 645; see also Jacobs v. W. Feliciana Sheriff’s Dep’t, 

228 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[T]o be considered deliberately indifferent 

to a known suicide risk, an officer’s acts must constitute at least more than a 

mere ‘oversight.’”). Finally, although failure to properly execute a suicide 

prevention policy may amount to deliberate indifference, see Estate of Pollard,

579 F. App’x at 266, in this case, considering the steps that Thomas did take, 

any potential noncompliance with Callahan County’s policy would have been

at most negligent.1 We therefore hold that, while not ideal, her failure to 

exercise even greater care to avoid Hyatt’s suicide did not amount to deliberate 

indifference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844; Davidson, 474 U.S. at 347.

IV

America faces an epidemic of suicide by individuals in custody. 

According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, suicide has been the leading 

cause of death in jails every year since 2000. Margaret Noonan et al., U.S. 

Dep’t of Justice, Mortality in Local Jails and State Prisons, 2000–2013—

Statistical Tables 1 (2015), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/

mljsp0013st.pdf. In 2013, more than a third of jail inmate deaths were due to 

suicide. Id. In 2015, there were 33 suicides in county jails in Texas. Dana 

Liebelson & Ryan J. Reilly, Sandra Bland Died One Year Ago, Huffington Post 

– Highline (July 13, 2016), http://highline.huffingtonpost.com/articles/en/

 

1 Our conclusion is based in large part on the fact that the practical force of Callahan

County’s policy is unclear from the record. For example, the policy states: “When an inmate 

has been identified as demonstrating a need for mental health care services, he/she will be 

referred to MHMR services and the local magistrate will be notified as prescribed in the 

Health Services Plan.” However, the policy does not describe how, when, or by whom an 

inmate is to be identified as demonstrating such a need. 

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sandra-bland-jail-deaths/. Yet preventing detainee suicides is far from 

impossible. Brazos County, Texas, makes an effort to keep people with mental 

health issues out of jail, diverting individuals to mental health facilities 

instead of charging them with a crime. The county jail also screens inmates 

twice, first with an officer and then with a nurse. As a result, the jail, which 

houses roughly 650 inmates, has had only one suicide in the past decade. Id. 

It is clear that more can and must be done to address suicides in prisons 

and jails. Nevertheless, “[d]eliberate indifference is an extremely high 

standard to meet.” Domino v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 

(5th Cir. 2001). Officer Thomas took measures to prevent Jason Hyatt’s 

suicide: she withheld from him the most obvious potential ligature, placed him 

under video surveillance, and directed her relieving officer to keep a close 

watch over him. Although these measures were ultimately, and tragically, 

insufficient, we cannot say that they constitute deliberate indifference. The 

judgment of the district court granting summary on grounds of qualified

immunity is therefore AFFIRMED.

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