CLD-040 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 16-2367

___________

LA-QUN RASHEED WILLIAMS,

Appellant

v.

LOUIS FOLINO; TRACY SHAWLEY; PAUL PALYA; LT. WILLIAM SHRADER; 

D.S.F.M. GILLMORE; C/O SUMEY; C/O BLANCHERD; C/O SMITH; All sued in 

their individual capacities; RN NEDRO GREGO; IRMA

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 14-cv-00770)

Magistrate Judge: Honorable Maureen P. Kelly

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

November 10, 2016

Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and BARRY, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 17, 2016)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
2

La-Qun Rasheed Williams appeals the Magistrate Judge’s final order granting 

summary judgment in favor of Defendants on his two federal claims, and remanding the 

remaining negligence claim to Pennsylvania state court. Williams is a prisoner 

incarcerated at SCI Greene, and is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Because no 

substantial question is presented, we will summarily affirm the judgment. 

Williams initially brought suit based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court against 

various officials, coordinators, and officers at SCI Greene. Williams alleged claims 

under the First Amendment for retaliation; the Eighth Amendment for excessive force, 

inhumane conditions of confinement, and denial of medical care; the Fourteenth 

Amendment for due process violations; and Pennsylvania state law for negligence. The 

Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Western District 

of Pennsylvania, and the parties consented to jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate 

Judge. 

Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Magistrate Judge 

granted the motion in part, dismissing Williams’ excessive force, unconstitutional 

confinement, and Fourteenth Amendment claims, and denied it in part, allowing 

Williams’ retaliation, unconstitutional delay or denial of medical care, and negligence

claims to continue. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims. 

The Magistrate Judge granted the motion as to the federal claims and remanded the 

 

constitute binding precedent.
3

remaining negligence claim to Pennsylvania state court. Williams filed a timely notice of 

appeal followed by a motion for reconsideration, which the Magistrate Judge denied. In 

his notice of appeal, Williams referenced only the Magistrate Judge’s second order, 

granting summary judgment and remanding to state court.1

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Review of the Magistrate 

Judge’s grant of summary judgment is plenary, Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 

F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014), and we may affirm on any grounds supported by the record. 

Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). Summary judgment is 

proper if the non-moving party fails to sufficiently establish an essential element of the

case on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Lauren W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 

F.3d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 2007). Mere allegations are insufficient to convince a reasonable 

factfinder to find all of the elements of the prima facie case. Blunt, 767 F.3d at 265. 

A. Deliberate Indifference or Denial of a Serious Medical Condition

 

1 Although Williams does not address it in his notice of appeal, we have reviewed and 

agree with the Magistrate Judge’s first order dismissing Williams’ excessive force, 

unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and due process claims. See Santiago v. 

Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating dismissal for failure to state 

a claim is reviewed de novo). Williams merely complained of being pushed or shoved 

without a resulting injury, which “almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force 

claim.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010). Williams’ due process claim relates 

to rejection of a grievance; allegations of improprieties in handling a prisoner’s grievance 

do not state a cognizable § 1983 claim. See Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th 

Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). Williams’ unconstitutional confinement claim was based 

on exposure to swinging cabinet doors with protruding metal, which simply does not state 

a claim for the deprivation of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” 

sufficient to support the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. See Tillman v. 
4

Williams alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his recurring 

seizures when they refused to treat him and denied the sick call slips, request slips, and 

grievances he submitted during November and December 2014, in compliance with 

prison procedure. It is undisputed that Williams’ history of seizures, which began in 

1997, was noted in his transfer forms to SCI Greene in November 2013, and that on 

January 27 and 28, 2014, he experienced a seizure, filed a sick call slip, and was attended 

to by medical personnel. 

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth 

Amendment’s prohibition on unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Prison authorities are liable where they “deny 

reasonable requests for medical treatment . . . and such denial exposes the inmate to 

undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury,” or if they intentionally refuse to 

provide for a known need for medical care. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 

2004). “Deliberate indifference is also evident where prison officials erect arbitrary and 

burdensome procedures that result in interminable delays and outright denials of medical 

care to suffering inmates.” Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 

346 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted). “[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual 

knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a 

prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eighth 

 

Lebanon Cty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 418 (3d Cir. 2000). 
5

Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236; see 

also Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that non-physician 

defendants were not deliberately indifferent for failing to respond directly to the medical 

complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison doctor). 

In support of his claim, Williams first alleges that he submitted sick call slips on 

three occasions – December 4, December 12, and December 19, 2013 – stating he 

experienced seizures and that he did not receive medical treatment. See R. Doc. 30, 

Exhibit 16. Defendants submit sick call logs from the days following Williams’ alleged 

submissions; Williams’ name does not appear on the sick call logs, meaning he either 

refused to be seen by medical staff or fabricated the submissions after the fact. 

Furthermore, Defendants include other submissions from Williams from around the same 

time, along with sick call logs which show his name and indicate he actually submitted 

other sick call requests, signed in, and was seen by medical staff. Williams did not 

mentions seizures at these appointments. Williams’ “mere allegations” that he actually 

submitted these sick call slips and was denied attention are insufficient to raise a genuine 

issue of material fact on this ground. See Blunt, 767 F.3d at 265. 

Williams also submitted three request slips that detail seizures in support of his 

deliberate indifference claim. See R. Doc. 30, Exhibit 27. The first request merely states 

he is an epileptic who experiences seizures, and requests the metal cabinets in his cell be 

removed because they are health hazards. The latter two requests describe a seizure on 

December 4, 2013, and request medication and that the cabinet be removed or replaced. 
6

However, removing a cabinet is not “medical treatment” that would subject an inmate to 

undue suffering or tangible injury. See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235. Furthermore, these 

requests were submitted to prison administrators, not medical personnel, and the denials 

show that Defendants checked the sick call log before denying Williams’ request to 

verify that he was not seen by medical staff. Therefore, Defendants – all non-medical 

personnel – should not be charged with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of 

deliberate indifference because Williams has not shown that Defendants had “a reason to 

believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not 

treating) a prisoner.” See id. at 236. Accordingly, Williams’ request slips are also 

insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on this ground. See Blunt, 767 F.3d 

at 265.

Finally, to support his claim of deliberate indifference, Williams submitted a

grievance he filed on December 24, 2013, alleging he suffered a seizure, his sick call slip 

went unanswered, and he needed to resume taking medication. R. Doc. 30, Exhibit 20. 

Defendants submit sick call logs which reveal Williams was seen by medical personnel 

during the time that forms the basis of the complaint, and made no mention of seizures. 

Where Williams was receiving treatment for other issues, non-medical prison staff should 

not be considered deliberately indifferent for failing to respond directly to the medical 

complaints of a prisoner. See Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69. Furthermore, the outcome of 

Williams’ grievance is not determinative of the underlying issue of whether prison 

officials were deliberately indifferent to his alleged serious medical needs. Therefore, no 
7

genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Defendants’ deliberate indifference to 

Williams’ serious medical needs, and summary judgment on this issue was proper. 

B. Retaliation 

Williams asserts three instances of retaliation: (1) excessive force was applied 

against him in retaliation for filing previous grievances; (2) after filing a grievance 

concerning the alleged excessive force, he was given a misconduct because prison staff 

said he lied about the basis of the grievance – which he alleges was a false and merely 

retaliatory determination; and (3) he was denied adequate access to the law library in 

retaliation for filing the grievance. In order to prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff 

must show that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, prison officials took an 

adverse action against him, and there is a causal connection between the exercise of his 

constitutional rights and the adverse action. Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 

2001). 

Williams first alleges that Officer Sumey used excessive force when escorting him 

out of his cell and to the shower in retaliation for filing grievances. Viewing the video 

evidence submitted in support of summary judgment in the light most favorable to 

Williams, it is apparent that Officer Sumey merely escorted Williams to and from the 

shower; the video is devoid of any evidence of excessive force. Therefore, Williams has 

not presented “evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable factfinder to find all of the 

elements of [the] prima facie case.” Blunt, 767 F.3d at 265. Accordingly, no genuine 

factual issue exists and summary judgment was properly granted as to this claim.
8

Next, prison staff issued Williams a misconduct for lying to an employee based 

upon the false claim of abuse against Officer Sumey. Williams alleges both that this was 

merely as retaliation for filing the grievance, and that the misconduct was false because 

the abuse claim was legitimate. As discussed above, the video shows no evidence of 

excessive force. Therefore, Williams’ contention that the misconduct was false is a mere 

allegation without any support and creates no genuine issue of material fact. 

In addition, a legitimate misconduct for lying to prison staff is not retaliatory, and 

a misconduct report is legitimate so long as it is issued for “reasons reasonably related to 

a legitimate penological interest.” Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334. In evaluating the legitimacy 

of a misconduct report, this Court considers “the quantum of evidence of the misconduct 

to determine whether the prison officials’ decision to discipline an inmate for his 

violations of prison policy was within the broad discretion we must afford them.” 

Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2016). A finding of misconduct must 

include “a meaningful written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the 

action taken.” Dyson v. Kocik, 689 F.2d 466, 467 (3d Cir. 1982). 

Here, the misconduct conviction is supported by a written statement of the 

evidence relied on in concluding that Williams lied in submitting the grievance. 

Furthermore, issuing a misconduct report based upon filing a false grievance is

reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest of discouraging the filing of false 

or facetious grievances. Therefore, Defendants have satisfied their burden of presenting a 
9

“quantum of evidence” of misconduct.2 See Watson, 834 F.3d at 426. Accordingly, the 

misconduct was legitimate and not retaliatory, and summary judgment was properly 

granted as to this claim. 

Finally, Williams asserts that he was denied adequate use of the law library in 

retaliation for filing the grievance against Officer Sumey, and that he is unable to bring 

the materials he requires with him to the library, since he cannot carry them while his 

hands are restrained during transport. Defendants assert Williams did not suffer the 

adverse action of denial of the law library, and submit a record of Williams’ library use to 

support their claim that he received all the library time he was entitled to – two hours per 

week – during the time period at issue. R. Doc. 30, Exhibit 9. Williams provides nothing 

to support his claim that he is entitled to additional library time, and appears confused as 

to the appropriate amount of library time he is entitled to. Defendants provide affidavits 

stating prison procedure allows for at least two hours of library time per week, and up to 

six, conditions permitting. Williams has not come forward with “evidence sufficient to 

convince a reasonable factfinder to find all of the elements of [the] prima facie case”;

rather, he relies on mere allegations, which is insufficient. See Blunt, 767 F.3d at 265 

(internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, because Williams cannot establish the 

 

2 We recently clarified that this Circuit follows the “quantum of evidence” standard, as 

opposed to the “some evidence” standard used by the Eighth Circuit. See Watson, 834 

F.3d at 426-30 (Ambro, J., concurring) (discussing Henderson v. Baird, 29 F.3d 464, 469 

(8th Cir. 1994) and other cases). Under this standard, our conclusion is supported by the 

record. See Kossler, 564 F.3d at 186.
10

existence of an essential element of its case on which it will he bear the burden of proof 

at trial, no genuine factual issue exists and summary judgment is proper. See Lauren W., 

480 F.3d at 266. 

C. Negligence Claims under Pennsylvania State Law

In light of the above, the remaining negligence claims under Pennsylvania state 

law were properly remanded to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Carnegie–

Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988) (“a district court has discretion to 

remand to state court a removed case involving pendent claims upon a proper 

determination that retaining jurisdiction over the case would be inappropriate”); Shaffer 

v. Bd. of Sch. Dir. of Albert Gallatin Area Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) 

(“pendent jurisdiction should be declined where the federal claims are no longer viable”) 

(citations omitted).

For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. 

See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.