_ .. 

USCIB: 13/358 

~ ~~jj~458 .& '-".I. U.L.:tl""".&1..1...:J .&. 

SEEURl:'f\' ll~FeRPt1*T'l6N 

20 

.Aff'BNf)Ef) BeetJMlil:lff S e Olff:A:m 

eom: wmm MAY!ftliL 

10 August 1953 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB/USCIBEC: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

Compromise of CClUNT Inf onna ti on. 

(a) USCIB 13/334 of g May 1953. 

(b) USCIB 13/338 of 28 May 1953. 

(c) USCIB 13/339 of 29 May 1953. 

(d) USCIB 13/340 of 3 June 1953. 

(e) USCIB 13/355 of 2!} July 1953. 

1. Reference (b) is a summary of compromises of COMINT information by U. s. activities from November 1952 to March 1953. Reference 

(a) is a report of a compromise that should have been included in 

reference (b) but for some reason or other was not. References (c) 

and (d) are reports of U. S. compromises subsequent to the summary 

contained in reference (b). Reference (e) is a sununary of British 

compromises that have occurred "in the pa.st few months". The enclosure is a report of an additional U. S. compromise submitted in 

accordance with the enclosure to USCIB 13/308, together with certain 

views of the Director, National Security Agency, with regard to change 

of codewords. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

2. An examination of the references and the enclosure reveal 

that out of a total of 25 reported U. s. and British compromises 22? 

were due to ineffective communications security, l was due to loss of 

accountability of a document, 1 was due to an error in marking 

documents for mailing, and the remaining one was due to careless 

telenhone conversation. Breakin2 this down into U. S. and British 

···························· ... 

3. In the enclosure the Director, National Security Agency, 

questions the advantage to be gained in changing codewords. The 

Executive Secretary, USCIB, concurs in the view expressed. Changing 

codew0rds would appear to serve only the purpose of denying to 

foreign intelligence efforts the knowledge a.a to under what guise 

should our COMINT information be sought. A glance at the nature of 

USCIB: 13/358 - 1 -

TOP SECRET 

APPENDED DOCYMENTS CONIAI~ 

COBE WORD MATERIAL 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-12-2014 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 
USCIB: 13/358 

TOP !IC1?.lP : A6 6 4. 

SECORll J llQFOF<JVtATIOJ'4 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Subject: Compromise of Ca.MINT Information. 

our compromises reveals that foreign efforts need no such assistance. 

It seems clear that far too much emphasis has been placed on the magic 

of codewords and not enough on a practical overhaul of communications 

·procedures and discipline. 

4. Experience in the Armed Forces has demonstrated that even if 

crypto-systems and procedures are sound, good communications security 

can be achieved only through elimination of poor practices and\personnel failures. This can be accomplished by a continuing program of 

education and training directed through commanding officers and\. by an 

unrelenting application of disciplinary action which carefully s.crutinizes and impartially criticises the actions of c0Illll18nding officers 

as well as of those of the individuals directly performing communications duties. The Executive Secretary recommends that USCIB adopt 

such a program forthwith and do all in its power to presuade LSIB\to 

do likewise. 

5. 

able to c 

It should be noted that the 11 U. S. compromises attributications failures all occurl!ed in so-called technical 

Whatever the causes, it can happen to the consumers as well 

as o e processors. Paragraph 2e(4) of NSCID #9 {revised) places 

on the Director, NSA, responsibilities for prescribing and enforcing 

requisite security regulations for those elements under his operational or technical control. It would appear to be appropriate for 

USCIB to suggest that the Director, NSA, include in any action he may 

contemplate the steps outlined below insofar as elements under his 

technical or operational control are concerned, and, in order to 

minimize the likelihood of still further compromises, to direct that 

he extend his inspection and advice in communications matters pertinent to the security of CClUNT to all el!ements under the cognizance 

of USCIB. 

6. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Director, NSA, be 

directed by USCIB to: 

a. Immediately conduct an investigation by inspection if 

necessary of the crypto-systems, procedures, practices, and 

trajning programs used by all member departments and agencies of 

USCIB for accomplishing the transmission of COMINT by electrical 

means. 

USCIB: l'.3/'.35S - 2 -

rOPSECRE'T 
.. 

, -Mi tIR..;A§Ji 45 a .I. '-'.I. IJ .LJ 'l.t .I. .. .LJ ..I. USCIB: 13/358 SEEURl'f"I' lf<fffl"l'VM:'f'ION 

'fOf' SEleRffi' = 6Ei6URI'l'¥ IllFOBICA'±'iGM 

I 

Subject: Compromise of C()].UNT Information. 

b. Report to each member thus investigated the deficiencies 

noted together with recommendations for their correction, including a request for a report from the member concerned to the 

Director, NSA, of the action taken to correct the deficiencies 

noted. 

c. Report as soon as practicable to USCIB any uncorrected 

deficiencies together with the reasons therefor. 

d. Repeat the above process on a semiannual basis. 

e. In each case of compromise involving ineffective coIIUnunications security, obtain a report which will include: 

(1) A formal report of investigation by the officer in 

charge of the activity concerned (to include a brief description of his training program for security). 

(2) Statements from the individuals involved. 

(3) A statement of what corrective and disciplinary 

action, if any, has been taken or is contemplated. 

f. If dissatisfied with the results of paragraph 6e above, 

report the circumstances to USCIB together with appropriate 

recommendations. 

g. Collaborate with the Director, GCHQ, and the Director, 

CB, in an effort to standardize the equipment, procedures, 

practice, training, and the level of discipline required to 

maintain effective communications security insofar as it relates 

to CCMINT information and report to USCIB if not satisfied with 

the actions of the Director, GCHQ, or of the Director, CB. 

7. This item will be placed on the agenda for the next regular 

meeting of.USCIBEC. 

Enclosure 

DIRNSA Ser 000419-S of 4 Aug 53. 

USCIB: 13/358 - 3 -

TO!' SECRET 
c 

0 

p 

y 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 

'fOP SBSR:Elf 01di0Ei Sl!i0URI'H' BWORH.f:'PIO:N 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB 

SUBJECT: Possible Compromise of COMINT Information 

Serial: 000419-S 

4 AUG 1953 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 

l. I regret to inform you of a cryptosecurity violation which 

The actual codewords did not appear 

in e messages invo ve • 

2. Although no reaction has been observed to date in foreign 

communications, these messages, nevertheless, must be considered as 

having been subjected to compromise since their transmission was not 

immune to interception. Counting the possible compromises reported 

in the GCHQ letter of 16 July and previous ones reported by me, the 

total possible compromises to date of codeword material or the codewords CANOE and CHUTE since the last change is 24.. It is recognized 

that one, or only a few compromises, may not be serious, but the 

cumulative effect of' several, or many, may well be. Nevertheless, 

I see no real security advantage to be gained in changing codewords 

prior to normal expiration date as the Director, GCHQ, recommended. 

However, I will not oppose a recommendation for change if' it ie 

presented to USCIB by LSIB. 

3. The Director, GCHQ, has been requested to inform appropriate British officials. The foregoing is submitted in accordance 

with the Inclosure to USCIB: 13/308. 

(Signed) RALPH J. CANINE 

Lieutenant General, US Arrr.y 

Director 

Enclosure with USCIB 13/358 dated 10 Jug 19530 

TOP SECRET CANOE