US AND UK POLlCIF.s Alm PRA01'1CiS IN 

fHE DISSElmlATION OF OOMilfl' 

DUBllfG WORID WAR II 

ENCLOSURE "B" to "Report of the USOIB Secn:aity Clomm1ttea to the USCIB on 

the Dissemination of COMDJT to Foreign Nationals Saning in .NATO or Similar 

Command.a (SC B-.35/14). Issued aleo as USCIB U/J.5lo 

1 

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eclassified and approved 

or release by NSA on 

5-07-2014 pursuantto 

.0. 13526 
/ 

+ 

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DmEX OF COHTDITS 

l!!.e 

Io INTROWC'l'ORY R&tARKS l 

II. DISSJMINATim OF COMIN'l' TO FOREIGN NATIONALS 1 

IIIo CATEGORIES OF COMINT 6 

IV. LEVELS OF DISSDUNATION 7 

Vo CHANNELS AND MEANS OF DISSEMINATION 11 

Vlo MISCELLANEDUS PROVISIONS 13 

VIIo OPmATICliAL USE OF COMINT AND ITS DISGUISl!: 15 

APPDiDIX "A11 19 

THE COHINT SITUATION AS RmARDS .FR.l!J{CH UNITS 

UNDER US COMMAND DURING WORID WAR II 

APPDIDIX "B" 2.3 

F.ARLY WORLD WAR II POLICIES AND PRACTICES 

APPl!HDIX 11C11 

lo AG 312ol (11 Mar 44) OB-S=B, subject: Securit7 31 · ot Special Intelligence with &iropean, North 

African and Middle East Strategic Air Forces 

in Europe, dated 15 March 19440 

2o AG 31lo5 (4 Aug 45) OB-S-B, subject.: Security 50 

Regulatims tor PINUP Intelligence, dated 

6 August 19450 

APP.IWDII "D" 

CHART SHOWING Lh"VELS OF DISSDIINATI<Jf OF ULTRA 

APPRDIX "E" 

CHART SHOWING I,b,V&.S OF COMINT DISSI!MINATION 

WITHIN US ARMY 

APPENDIX 11.F" 

OPERATIONAL USE AND VALUE OF ULTRA 

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57 

58 
TOP SE~69'YEDE US AND Ult POLICIES AND PRACTICm3 IN 

TH~ DISS!MDATI<li OF COMINT 

DURIRG WORLD WAR II 

I.. IHTRODUCTORI RllHARKS 

lo &o This iiaeloaure deals ml1' with the following phases ot 

Camnunicat.ima Intelligence ( COMINT) operations aa agreed. 

upm between the US and the UK authorities 'bJ' the md ot 

active hostilities in World War II: 

{l) The various categories or COMIHT; 

(2) The lwela ot diaaeminatim in each categor.rJ 

(3) The lcinda ot disguise employed to provide 

"cover" tor COMINT; and 

(4) Dissaa:l.Daticn or COHINT to foreign natimalso 

bo Since the laet ot these tour ~apeote is ot immediate interest and• moreover• can be disposed ot in a relativ~ 

'brief manner• it will be treated ti.rat.a 

II. DISSPJIDATICll OF COMIBT TO FOREIGN .NATI<JIALS 

2o &o Fran the earliest days or US/UK COMINT collaboratim ( earll' 

part ot 1941) there was a tu. bilateral understanding 

( later8 a formal agreement) not to disseminate C<JIIHT to 

third partiea b.J unilateral act:lm.. So tar aa oancerna 

US..produced. C<IUHT9 it may be stated categoricalq that 

nm• was ner diaaminated ca an authorized basis to an., 

J!klcloaure "B" to "Report of the USCIB Security Ccllln1ttee to tbe USCIB en 

the Diesminatim ot OOMDll' to FoNllJl Batiaaala S~ in HATO or Siml= 

Jar Cc-neade (SC B==-35/14),, Issued also aa USCIB l4/1Slo 

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/ 

nca.=BRUSA foreign natimals; 1£, m Washington, there 

were apqradic cases ot thf contents ot an 1nd1'9'1dual message being cGllllllUll.ica~ed. to a nan-JBJSA perean. the records 

exam:lned did not diaoloae or wen b:int thereof o However, 

it ie the recolleet:l.m of the llriter that advance warning 

ot the impending :lnvaaim ot Rueaian torrito17 b7 the 

Gel'lllD Armed Forces 1n June 194la a waming derived frca 

COMIHT baaed upcm the rea4ing ot c:o:mmunicaticna enciphered 

by the Japaneao highest-grade Diplomatic CZ7J)toQ"at•8 vaa 

.commmicatecl to the USSR by US/UK agreement. t.o do no, tor 

by the apr1ng of 1941 there bad been established COHINT 

oooperatim l:Jetiwem the US and the UK. 

bo For a period of. about me Te&r an otticer ol the Dutch 

Anq (Lieuto Colo Verlav"l) who had worked in the OOHDT 

unit of the Dutch Armed Forc:ea :l.n the Netherlands East 

Indiee and who bad escaped when the Japanese ner-nn 

JaYa 1n the ear:i,- 11GDt.ha ot 1942, vae permitted bl' the 

A~Co ot So3 G-2, War Departmct., to wark 1D ane of the 

~ic eeetian• ot the Signal Security Agmq9 

US AftV' Signal. Corp•o Thia officer waa not a recipient 

ot COMIRT but obri.ouq aw the deczn>ta produced wit~ 

the aectiaa to Mitch h• •s attacheclo That sectian dealt 

with Clllll of the mdium=gad• Japanese diplomatic crn>to=. 

Q'lltea know •• J-1911 a Pree French cl7Pl00Q"St•, ancl 

certain Hagelin qateao Wb.m Colo VerkuJ"l expressed a 

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desire to be permitted to 'NOrk 1n other 11ectians, too., 

the request was declined. and soan therea:tt.er Colo Verk.lq'l 

tound it ccnven1ait to ratum to Holland.a 

Co In regard to naa.-BRUSA toreip natimala participating in, 

or receiving the product ot, US COMDr1' activities in in .. 

atallatione CllZ' units out.side the US, a categorica1 anlnflr 

can be givm ao tar ae concerns high-grade material: 

there was uane - even whm French units were direct:Q' 

under US tactical organisaticma; not ao categorical an 

an81fer can J'et be gi vm ao ta:r u cone ems the lower 

categories ot COHINT o .Uthough the records examined do 

not indicate apecil"icalq that such low_....grade .material 

wae not dissmainated to the French, conterences with US 

perecxmel in a position to give intoraticn en this point 

lead to the conclu:Laa that. no COHDIT ot wen the lower 

categories was given the Prencho Extracts troa t.he record• 

taring a bearing ca th:l.e point are contained in Appendix "A" 

to this Ehclosureo A CU'eful at.uct.Y ot those records leads 

to the toll.awing ccncl.uaicna1 

(1) Ho CCJmlT as such was pa.seed to the French unit• under 

Sixth Arrq G~p or under First Tactical Air Fore• 

(ProTiaicmal)J 

(2) Intorm.tim based 11pcm OOMIHT •• occ:as1c:malq giv111 

them mder eo• diegui••J 8Dd 

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(3) Frcch units were not part.icul.arl.7 handicapped bJ' 

not b~ recipicts ot COMDT, since the.r benetitted. 

.tram it to the ext.mt that thq bad ta:r better ord1-

D&l'J' (nan-ooMIHT) inteW.gence fl'OJll the Sixth Anq 

Group than otherlr.Lse wauld have bee the case, their 

operations being 1D reality guided bJ' US otticera who 

did have access to C<IUNT o 

dq When the US Al'lll' was operating 1n North Africa, there was 

110D111 liaison with tho Frech, bu.t sole~ cm 017Ptographic 

•tteraa No OOMIR'l whatever waa passed to th•o 

eo In the Pacific Theater there was some pressure from the 

Chinese, under the SinO=Aaerican Cooperaticm Organization 

Agreement; (SA.CO), to pronde them with COMINT., The chief' 

US member ot SA.CO added to the pressure b7 caning to 

Waahingtcn and 11olicit1ng·aesiatance on the highest governmental level t.o bring pressure upm the .ln1'.slf&V7 Ccmmunicaticna Intelligence Board (AHCIB) in order to bring abcmt 

COMIR'l' oollabarat.icm with the Chin•••o Howwer, the preS= 

11\11'8 •• aucaeaafallJ' resisted and the probl• •s llOl.Vacl 

in the toll.awing mannero A ..:U US unit, neet RacU.o Unit 

(PllU) Cb:l.na, •a aet up as a part. ot the US Naval Group at. 

Ch'CIDgldzJg, with Capto J oS" Holt.wick, USN• :in charge ot &J>= 

prmd.mt~ 100 US officer• and enlisted :man and approxi-

:matel1' the same nmber ot Chinese persoanelo The unit. was 

charged wit.h t.vo ld.11sima 1 

e I+ ... 

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( 1) Intercep1i:lng tratfic tor US services; and 

(2) Training Chinese personnel 1n traffic anall'eia and 

ceyptanaqsiso Thia FRU was give no technical assistance from &fJ'¥ US units or aourcea 11 but succeeded 

independmtq in aol'l'ing certain lov=level Japanese 

codes used in riyer comrminicaticnso Capt.o Holtwick 

states that What waa produced had little 1t 8111' :t,n ... 

telligence '1'8.1.ue, except as regards the US aectim 

111hich was with the AAF unit at Kumdng and later at 

Kwlin. when uaetw. air 1nte111gence m coaatal 

shipping was producedo 

:Jo &o Scme in.tormatiCJq. was obtained. trcn Brigadier Tiltman,, the 

present Senicr British Liaiean Of ticer f<Jf.' COMD'l' mttere 

1n Wasbingtm,, :ln regard to British COMIN'l' cou,&boratim 

with the French am the Poleso Details will be found in 

paragraph 3, Appendix "B" to this !ilcloaur•o 

bo To aumarize that intomaticxa and also the mtormat~m 

giYen in paragraph 2 aboT•• it m7 be eid that~ aave tor 

Ter,r exceptianal instances during the earq pa.rt. of World 

- War II, no OOHINT as auch was disseminated an an authorized 

and regular basis to azrr nan .... JIWSA naticmalao 

Co In Appmdix "B" will alao be found a brief note cm disseminatim poliq and practices in the US and the UK immediateq 

'be.tore and during the earq pbases ot World War IIo 

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IIIo CATmoRI.ES OF COMIHT 

4-o a. The categories and aub--categoriee ot OOMINT, a brief 

descripticn of each, the security classi.f'ications and 

COMJHT deaignatora were as shown belowo The intormaticn 

baa been take tram otticial documents issued by the War 

Department and the Navy Departmento (1) 

Name DefiniJ:!m Daaie.natgr Q)assiticatim T 

Special Inte~aice Intelligence resulting f'roll ULTRA TOP SECRET 

I aolutica ot high grade codes ~ and ciphers or ot those for 

eecurit7 reasons placed in 

this cat•&Ol'J'. 

Cant Intelligence Intel.Ugcce reBUl.t:ing fl'all PEARL(a) SlfCREl' 

aoluticm ot low and medi\1111 

grade cod.es and ciphers un ... less placed in the special 

categ0?7 aboYeo 

'l'rattic ~~sis(3) InteUigence obtained tram a THUMB(2) SECRET 

st'lllQ" ot radio traffic and · direct1ca tinding bearings .. 

Weather Intelligemce(4) Weather intelligence de= MANX TOP SBXmE? 

rived frclll cryptana11'a1so 

~-$-------------------------------------- (l)wn~AG 312ol (ll Mar 44) Oa..&=.B=M. subject.: Security ot Signal Intelligence 

within &lropean, North African and Middle .East Theaters ot Operation•• dtd 15 

Mar 44; WD,AG 312ol (llHar 44) OB-S-B,. subject: Security ot Special Intelligence within FA1ropean$ Nort.b African and Middle East Theaters ot Operatims,. dtd l.S 

Mar 44; WD,.AG 380001 (8 Jul 44) O&.s=B. subject.: Security Regulaticna tor Special 

Intelligmce, dtd 10 Jul 44; WD..,AG )llo5 (4 Aug 4S) OB-S-B9 subject: Security 

Rogulat1ms tor PINUP Int4ll.J.igcce• dtd 6 Aug 45; WD1AG 3110 5 TS ( 23 Mar 45) ·os,. 

S-BmK, subject: Regulatims for the Diaseminat.im and Uee of Coammicaticn Intelligence COD.aerning Woather8 dtd 6 Apr 450 Appendix 110" reproduces two ot 

these documentao . 

<2>0n 6 August 1945 PEARL and THUMB COHIR'l' were oombined under cne designator, 

PlMUPo Because bJ' that date hoatilitiea in &n-ope were onr, 0D]¥ tho Pacific 

and associated 'l'heaters were ai"tected 'b1' th:io cbangao 

(3)The name "Traffic An&qsia" was not consistent with the n&ll•s ot other cat.,. 

gori••• although what was meant was 8 lrltelligence deriYed from traffic an&:qsi•"· 

The tem "Trattic Intel,ligence" som came into general ueage by- the US authoritiea concemedJ the· term ny Inte...,..c•" by' the Britisho 

C4>Adoptecl m 6 April 1945 and e.rtGcting principaUy the Pe.citie and associated 

'!heaterao See also below note ( 6) o 

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b. In the IUl'opean Theater of OperatiQ!le Cr,rpt In.ttdligence 

and fltattic .Analp1a ( Tl'atf.SO Intelligence) were each n'bdl..w.t J.nto \wo aub-cateprieea 

DIA!~- l!•setsa: mu1mat.1sm 

CJ7pt :tnt.uJ.gence (l) llltellictnce reeult!ng tr. CIRO-PEARL smur 

IOlutiCa ot medlum-gr&cl• ... 8114 oiph••~ 

Cz7pt. Intelligmce (2) l'm.ellJ.g•c• reault.ing froa 

mlat;ian ot low-gracle cocl•• PEARL matn 

and ciphen. 

T/A Intolligmce (1) AU intomat.iclll obtainecl trail THUMB 1 

trattio anal.Yaia except, d1rect.1m ftndia&o. 

T/A Intelligmce (2) Direct:l.cm tinlling beariD&• THUMB 2 

and oU\er technical aidao 

IY. LEVitS OF DISSDIIIA'f Im 

5. &a With refer111ce to diesem:laaticn to otticiala in Washington, 

Landan, or m• Jar 1ocat1ma 1dave COllIH'1' was being produced at a large national. center,, ULTRA was diaseadnatecl 

anll' to ttaa.e ataft officers in Departments and Minlat.l'i•• 

tor whca the Head ot the Department. or the Hiniatw can ... 

eidered the .intormat1Clll to be absolutely rital to tbe exec~ 

ticn ot their duties,, that i•, strictll' on the needi=ato-know 

'basiao Special :lndoctrinat1cn waa requ1recl, together with 

the aiga:lng of' a opecial ca.tho 

bo With reference to dias--.tian to operating ccmianda in 

the t:Leld. a brief ISWllJIArizing statement would be that 

- 7 ..... 

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UL'llA ._. nnv llJMl• aYailabl• to etaf'ta below the level 

ot Anl.J' (GI' equiwl.ct Air and laftl. collllDfll'lls). GDept that 

(1) UL'1'IA eo\lld be pa••ed to Janr tormatiGDI 1n t.be tom 

ot 111 NUcmal. ard•• worded acaClll'dJ.Da to emaill l'Ul.ea• 

ana (a) sa GD8p\ianal ou.u.tano•• Eldng it. illpent:S.T•, 

th• c:-sn-c ot a !beater aoulcl authorise ULTftl to be pa•ee4 

t.o i..z. echelma cl01llD to the l.....:L ~ div:laialla ~ equ:l.T&-

l•t. Ur fGl"Ce tomaticm• it t.h9J' were operating independen~, 

but ~ in acoordanae with rigid regulations aa regard.a 

tramndseion channels and plqs1cal securit7 o£ the recipient 

headquarters. (5) '?h• chart shOND as Append:.bc "D" to ·this 

&I.closure givea a graphic pict;ure ot the ].eyela ot diss-.i.na• 

t1m ot ULTRA llithSn a !heater of Combined operationao 

Co The aotual recipients Gt ULTRA were apecitical.q designated 

(according to command or atatt rerspcnsibilit;r of recipients) 

and included. mlJ' the caaaander ot the unit and laia depa.t7, 

the chief ot etatt and bia deput7, the Senior G-2 ( Intell.1-

gcce), and the Senior G-3 (OperatiClllll). In unite larger 

than Arrq, the commander'• scior G-S (Plana), the Smior 

Signal Oi'ticer, and. the Senior SifP.a1 Intelligence Otticer 

could 'be reoip:LCltso. In all ca.sea proYis:Lan could be made, 

mt calT ae apeoii':Lcal.JT authorized b7 the caanancter ot the 

-~-~-~---~--------~----~-------------- (S)It appears that the regulatians m the Pacific Theater ditteracl tram those 

in t.be F.uropean Theater in this regardo In t.he regul.ationa pertaining to the 

latter, ULTRA could. be dissmnated d01tD to and including Corps Hq onq when 

Corps \or equiYalent Air or Naval. commard) was operating :lndepandentqJ in the 

Pacif'ic Theater it could be diss•inate4 dom to am including DiViaiUl Hq 

under simUar circmnat.ances;) However. no cases of dissemina.ticm to Diris.1CD 

level were found in the records a.am:inedo 

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uni' ema...s, tor adcU.ticaal at&tt otticera to be reolplents. !bat tbh loophole :In the authorised IUlee •• 

1111.S la lbowla b.r at 1-..t Wo reterencea1 (a) 1n tbe US 

31'4 ...., tlae Cl-2 Baoutt. .... Ottioer and the A•118tan\ Q.2 

wre a1H Ndpientea (b) at 9'b Air Poree Hq tbe Cbiet 

, ..... Ottloer, the Cblet PUlt Ott1cer, th• keouUn ottioe, G-2, mr1 th• Operat:lcnal. lnteUigmc• Eucut.l•• wve 

WO reel.plea ot ULTRA. 

do Cl"J'Pt Intelligence (CIRO-PEARL and PJ:t:OL) and Trattic InteUigence ( 'MJMB) could be disseminated dONn t;o and in• 

cl.wti ng the headquarters ot an AlflJ'¥ Corps (and ~Talent 

Air ad Raval tormaticm)., However, under SHAEF regulatiaaa 

Amr Hq was pem:lt'ted to paea to Corpe Hq cnq paraphrases 

ot CIBO-PEABL CCllDT, n"°er the Ol'iginal texts. Parapbraeee or original texta ot PF.AIU. could. be eento (6) Whether 

the British adhered to tbie added pracauUoa 1• not known at 

thia writingo Tbe cllart 8hOllll :ln Appeaclix "E" to tbie Encloeure gives a graphic picture ot thia pbaee ot the dies..._... 

ticn regulatianao Recipict.s ot PF.ARI, and THUMB were, a.• :ln 

the case of ULTRA, spec1tical.l7 designated according to the 

poa1tlaa occupiedo 

(6)' 

SHAEr • AG 380001-l. GBl. - AOM, subject: Secur:l.t.7 ot Signal Intelligence, 

dated 24 August 19440 

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•o MANX was di.es..,tecl alao CD the •need•to-knov" basis• 

an4 •• restricted to the ldn:lmnm number ot 1eleo\ed and 

na-4 otn.ova abC1 ncn-ccmd.1111iened ottlcere (or nb_. 

J>9NCll• apeeltio&UT authorised 'b7 the Theater <:amande 

or otf1ow U.ign&ted. 'b.Y Ida) neceaear.r tor its P'OC••Uns 

and m•o Indootrinatica. tor MANX waa requ1recl topther v.l.th 

tbe algnmg ot an oath., D1a11eminat:lcn never w1nt 'bo1w the 

leYtll ot a ll'Ullbel'ed A:t.r Poree; in excep1;icnal o:l.rcuiutancea, 

n.ch ae special operaticn11, it could be made available dONn 

to US Wing (British Group) level. it apecifical.11' authorized 

bJ' th• Theater Commander :1n •ch inatance. In normal oircUlllo 

stances the Weather Sect1m ot the Air .Force ccmcemed. could 

produce a mp an&qsia, without SDT :lndicat1an ot eource, 

whieh .could be passed dotm to US Wing (British Group) levels. 

The latter could than add their loca1 obaervatima and iasue 

torepaata. Hap anal.711•• as iened b,y Air Forcea were to C&1"17 

no indi~t.im ot th• source and could. not bo c:l.aasitied lower 

t.hm CXllFIDDITIAL.C7) Forecasts or concluaicms 4er1Ted in 

mole 9r in part fraa •P ana.11'••s eould be issued to 1'lJ'1slg 

personnel and at.her \11lindoctrina:ted peraons ~ in 81lCJh tOl'll 

aa to give no ind1caticn vb.at.ever ot the sourceo SUch forecasts -and caaclualcma could the be disseminated in the normal 

mannero 

-~~--~-~-~---~~-~~~--~~-----~~--~------

(?)It was penaiasible tor the Senior Weather Officers down to US Wing (British Group} leYela to be indoctrinated :la MANX so tbat thq could betf#er·apcprec:l.ate the •P anaq••• :l.asued to thlllllo 

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v D CHAHHELS AND MEANS OF DISS!MIHATICJI 

6. &o Or1g1na1 diasminatica ot ULTRA to Departments. M1rd.atriea, 

Oommnds• GBQe, Alliecl Bqa, both at heme and O'nl'•••• bad 

to be carried out by a centralized diaaeminat!ng aut.hor1Q', • 

¥14 had in all casea to be over specific~ authorised 

cipher vatans or by pouch stat oYttr epeci.f'icalq authorized 

air roateso ( 8) 

bo ULTRA was d11sem1nated. to operaticmal. cmmands cal¥ through 

special channeleo In the Pacific and associated. Theaters. 

aa regards US Arfq (and AAF) recipimte, ULTRA was handled 

b7 Special Securit7 0£.ticea (SSO) who vere attached (not 

assianed) to t;he etafta ot the headquarters authorised. to 

i:-eceiTe ULTRA and tho SSO actod as a special and direct 

representative ot the AoCo ot So• G-21 War Departimmto ID 

the eaae theat.Rs, aa regard.a the US Rav, ULTRA •• handled. 

at the headquarters ot the connmd authorized. to recein ULTRA 

by speciallF appointed o.tticera trained. in CCllIHT •tt.•• and 

speoiticaJ.11" charged with distributicn and 11ecurit7 ot ULTRA. 

In tha &iropean Theater, at all Hq, dissadnaticm ot ULTRA 

was handled hr tha Britiah, who Wied t.he sau t.ne ot 878t• 

~ - et=lr. _. - - c::D 9a at.:::. CO Git Cit - - CD - - C9 - Cl9 G:ll - 1:11 CD -·- • Clll - - - - - - - .. -

(S)Tbe systems uaecl were SIGABl/ECK. CCM9 T!PEX, ancl On~tiae Pado All 

hol4era ot thoae SJ""lltes had to be authorized recip1enta9 and special k9J'8 

were ued with the eyei;•ao In the Ult traneaiasion in plain language vae 

authorised 'bJ' teleprinter ( cmq 9 it coaplete:J.l' secure and could not be tapped.) 9 b.r telephcne (onl.1' it nscramblers" were used.) 8 and by 11eate band" over reaaceable distanoe11 and under circ:umstanoes unl:Uteq to inwlve dieastero In caae 

ULTRA was aetit onraeaa b7 'bag or poLlcb.8 it had to be enciphered 'Ullleaa the 

route•• coapleteq aecure and. bandliDg arrangements at. both end.a were con= 

fined to properq authorised persaanelo 

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as the US Anq- an1 called in the Special Liaiacn Unit (SW); 

the peraoanel of these mite included US Anq Spec1al Secur.Lti' Officers attached to MID,, War Department,, Londmo 

Co The foregoing stringent regulatima were rel.axecl in tbe caae 

at COMIHT ot the loller categories ( CIRO-PFARL,, PEARL, THUMB) 

cnl,y to the a:tMlt that. thq did not require the use of SSO 

Gl" SLU otticera tor diaseminat:lmo The goveming princ:l.ple,, 

the '9neecloo4io-lcnow11 was applied here,, too,, and the otticera 

who could be recipiet11 were alao apecitical.17 designated.o 

In general,, the recipients were the aame as in ULTRA. except 

that at each level additional~ start Officers,, aa specitical.l;r authorized b7 the camnan:ler ot each headquarters, 

could be recipients, bu.t not when a Corps was operating independentq. Special. c~oS,Jstema were used in tranamiaalcm., 

aa :ln the caae ot ULTRA.o 

do 'l'he SSO 9711tan was also used. tor the disseminatim ot MANX, 

the informa.tim being placed b,r the SSO otticer (or Haftl. 

otticer designated tor ULTRA di•a~t.iaa) directJ.y in the 

hands ot the appmpr.1.ate A1"IDJ' Weather Ofricero Regulaticna 

required that mp ~es 'be passed cm ane-t:lme pad or 

high-grade machine cipher regardl.eaa ot the method ot tranamissiano 

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VI. MISCELLAHJDJS PROVISICllS 

?.. a. There were Yari.oua additicnal safeguards placed around 

the dias-1nation and use of COMINT, eapeciaJ.lT ULTRA, 

auch •• thoae relating t.o: 

(1) Pb7aical aecurit7 ot the recipient Heu 

( 2) Maintenance or liata ot authorized recipimta and 

•sign-otta"J 

(3) Reterenc~a to COMD'1' in war diaries, logs, journals, 

act1cn reports, etco, without prior authorit7; 

(4) Destruction am/or filing ot copie•J 

(S) Briefing ot operating personnel who were not indoctrinated; 

(6) Movements ot indoctrinated personnel in forward areas 

where there •s danger ot capture; 

(7) CcxmnunicatiOllll among recip1ente; 

( 8) Operaticaal use ot <X>MDT; action baaed an it J orders 

to subordinate commandso 

bo Ot the foregoing, the ••t illportant regulation.a, ao tar aa 

ooneerns tbi• &ac1oaure0 were those relating to (8) above, 

Tis., those d•Jing with the operational. uae of COMIHT. 'l'he 

basic regulat:l.cma an this phase of COHINT act1v1tiee come 

tram the references cited in Note (1), above, two ot which 

are reproduced in Appendix 11011 to this FAcloaureo Studl' ot 

paragraphs S and 6 ot the regulations governing ULTRA and 

paragraphs 8 and 9 ot tha.• goYeming PlliUP (PEA.BL and 'l'BUMB) 

will be autticient to indicate that much thought was givm to 

th• proper WIG ot COMINT in. order to protect its 80l1?'0911o 

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It 111111 be noted. that. the regulatiOllB were so drafted as 

to permit good oparatianals uae without serious risk ot 

comprClllise ot CCJO:N'l' sources. pronded the precautions indicated in the regulaticna were taithtull,y obaen'edo The 

principal methods •Plo7ed to protect. these sources tall 

under five tJP8a: 

(1) CarrJing out ot appropriate air or land reconnaissance 

~ore actim is take against apecitic targets; 

(2) Use ot nm..coMINT nourcea &I vehicles bJ" means or which 

COMINT 81' be dioaeninatecl,.. •eg., P/w interrogaticn re... 

ports• telephone and radio reports ot aigbtinga and incidents, authmtic or "manufactured" reports ot secret. 

agents, or in appropriate situations "manutacturod11 

raporte; :lntormat.im trom detectors, or deserters, etco 

(3) Selecticn and use ot COMINT oE a lower grade which can be 

attributed aa a source oE a highezo...grade, eog.. report• ot 

nyn activity or maller units .. 

(4) Uae ot documents (eogo" OB, intelligence l!IWlllllari••• ap.. 

precia'tima, etc.,) which are disseminated to nm=recipienta ot CCJWIT and in which there are conclusion• 

which were deriYed trm COHDJT, these conclueians being 

stated eo as to give no indication whatever of t.he 

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(S) Issue ot operational orders based upon COMJIT but 

emitting all reterence to it and so worded that if 

captured or intercepted the origin or the orders 

cannot. be traced back to COMIHTJ eog•• such orders 

must nner ccatain the precise time, date or place 

of an en~ operaticm.8 specific names of target.a, 

etc. 

Co How well these various :methods worked in practice 1&1 diacussed in the next paragrapbo 

VII• OPF&TICJIAL USE OF COMINT AND ITS DISGUISE 

So &o On lS March 1944 General. Marshall seat to General Eisenhower 

a letter which set. torth the basis upGD which ULTRA was to be 

made available to American field ccmmandso '.hie ot the Dig~ 

niticant paragrapho in that letter are as tollowac 

"?••• The receipt and diatributim, at the Field. CC'amanda, o? messages containing or relating to ultra intelligence, is handled bl' Special Liaiaan Units furnished and 

controlled bJ' the Director General.» G,Co&C~So The personnel 

ot these unit.a :Includes American otticera attached to MID, 

War Department, Loada1cn70S.• One or DIGi'e Ameri.can ot.f:Lcozoa assigned to MID» 

War Department• Lcnion• will be detailed to each American 

Field Camnand. Which receives uli;ra intelligenceo These otticere will be subject to t.he administratim and discipline 

of' the Command to which they are detalledo They will work 

\1Dder th• control ot the G-2 ar A-2 ot the Camnand as part; 

ot bis at.aft o They will ha.Te had a period ot training at 

GoCdcCt.So• am. it possible,, with operat.ioaal OO'D'"Anda 1n 

the Mediterranean Theater. and thi• training v.111 be directed toward equipping them to uae ultra intelligence ef'-

tectiT•l.1' and sacurell' o Their primar.y :reapcneibilit7 wW. 

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"be to evaluate ultra :lntelligence.i> present it. in uaeable 

tora to th• Callmanding Oi'ficer and to sw:h of hie senior 

staff otficer1 as are authorised ultra recipicts. assist 

in tu1in& sJ.tra :lntel}!gaice with inteWgf!!9• derived 

.t'rg! other eeurces. and give ad~ce a ccmneattm with. •»M operat.1me3, u1e ot ultra intelligence such taehim 

that t!i aecur1tz ot the l!K'urce ia nov endanser9!!£" 

(&npha ·a supplied) 

bo In Appendix arn are extracts .tl'OJll a rather voluminau report. 

prepared in the Kilitary Intel;LS.gence Division• War Department 

General statt in 1945...6. m the Specia1 Security Operations 

1n oveneas thoaterao(9) These extracts throW cans:l.derabl.e 

light on how COMINr wae employed. technical.q in intelligence 

and other operations, and how the manner ot its eplopient. 

under the guidance ot the general regulations referred to in 

Paragraph 7ol!o above served to disguise and to protect COMINT 

aourceso 

Co (1) The Tft'8' extensive operaticma of tho US Rav in the Atlantic anti=submarine warfare were aucceaetal.11' con= 

ducted without dissminat.im of OOMINT aa auch to com=-

mandera a.tloat, although apeoitic intormation as to 

targets wae supplied them in the form of aubnarine 

pollitian estimates ostenaibq 'baaed. on D/F tixeso 

----~~-----~---~~-·---~--~~-~---~--- (9) H1st01'7 ot Special Security Operations OVeraeas in five volumeao Volo I -

History of Supervisor,,. Activities, MIS; Volo II - Histor;y ot European Theater; 

Volo III - Anq Forces, Pacific; Volo IV - Pacific Ocean AreaaJ Volo V - India-Burma and China Theaterao 

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So eecureq and euccessfu.1.11' were the Hav,y• a C(K[NT 

operation• ccaducted that no-word or auapicicn ot the 

real truth ever got to the enam;r. who were driven to 

the conclueico that the Allied .Forces bad dev.J.oped. 

new or greatl.1' improved long-range detectico devices 

which cab1ed them to locate targets unerringl.y tram 

a grea't dietanceo In the US Nav in general. the 

Nav•s aucceas in the Atlantic anti-submarine warfare was attributed to excellent D/F work. 

(2) In the US HaTy" 1 s aulnarine warfare in the Pacific and 

associa.t.ed. Theaters,, sul:llla.rine commanders were never 

given CCllIHT as such but were provided. with spec1tic 

information which was caretully disguised and sent to 

them bJ' secure cryptos;ystems,. This intorma.tian was 

often mrded and interlarded with American slang expressioaa designed to ward ott suspicion as to source; 

the intormaticn was available to mq an• or two otticera on each nbmarine eo suppliedo 

9o The concluaicna to which careful ccaaiderat.icn ot US/UK practical 

experience in World War II 1n regard to the uae &."ld protection ot CC»fDT 

sources in act.ive operatims leada Jf1a1' be aummarised. aa follows: 

&o The regul.atione in et.feet in the latter part ot the War 

were eoundJ 

bG Thq Coult\ be executed. succeastull1' 1n pract.ice; 

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c. They' were adequate to protect and to conserYe COMIRT 

80Ul'Ces; and 

do · Thq permitted maxi.Bua operaticnal uaage to be made ot 

the intell:l.gcce eva:i under conditime where same duguise was neceasar.ro 

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.. 

'.r.UE COlr'IIN'r SITUATION AB REGARDS FRENCH UNITS UNDER US COlJl4AND 

DURING WORLD WAR II 

1. The f'ollowing chart giws that portion or the Allied Order o£ 

Battle tor the final offensive in Europe which shows the French units 

:l.n'VOl Wd I (l) 

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS 

ALLIED EXPEDITIOBARY FORCES J 

SIXTH A It II Y GROUP 

I 

-

I I lRENCB ilRST ARM? SEVENTH US ARM? 

I FRENCH CORPS 

II FRENCH OORPS I 

- - --' -

2 .lRll)lll!D DIVISil 1 ll>tmTAtN DMSIO nBBT TACTJ.CAL AIR 

J .IIP'il'J!B.Y DMSIO FORCE (11

ROV •) 

1Xll~~J FIB.ST FRENCH 

AIR CORPS 

' 

APPENDIX •A• to ENULOSURE •B" to ~:r&l»l'"t Gf USC!:S llocurity Conaittea SC J3.>35/l4 

See UlCLOSURE nan, Parao 2oCo 

AFSA FORM 781-ClOS 

6 JUL 51 

.,. 19 -

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• 
.. 

2, The tollaring extracts are from the reports ot Special Secur1t7 

Operations in the J!mtopean Theater as compiled in the of ticial US AraJ7 

Q.:.2 histor.r of Special Security Operations:<2> 

&o From the t:lnal repart or the SSO with Sixth•Arsq Group: 

•6e Relati09a with the Frencho The French probl• at 6th 

Arrq Group had. tl«> aepecta, (a) the Uaiaan ottice.ra in the 

fftU and (b) the lat French A:nll', neither ot which caul.d, ot 

course, be allowed to IAlapect. the existence of ultr&o 

"ao French Lid.em Of'ricerso Whatever lla1' haYe been 

t.he cr1g1nal intmt1cn8 the French bad no operaticzal. role in the Anq Group Hqo There were, however, a 

lliseable cluster of Frenchmm in each sectica., doing 

what I do not knowo Since the,y did not at.tmd the 

etatt conteren.cea9 and since there was in a:rq event 

no impul.ae to an OY_....gmeroua candor with the Fraich8 

there waa at no point &D7 securif;J' prob1• as regards thomo 'lo this there is one exceptims the one or two 

btticera stationed in the G-2 Section who of necesait7 

were alfBl"e ot the locked ultra roca., the dail1' appearance of the general.a, and the tact that I figured 1n 

operational 1ntell1genceo I ehould think it. posllible 

that Major de Chiselle, who wae longest :ln the ottice, 

bad a rat.her abreWd idea ot what :Ln tact. was cooldngo 

He was, bownera too much ot a gentleman ner to make 

arq direct. inquirieso 

"bo lat. French Amo No eecurit7 prob1em ever arose 

vitb reap~ to thia 8l"llW' and• correlat:l.vel.7 8 ultn. 

lnt;elligence waa r&Nl1'8 it wer, ot direct benefit to 

the operations ot that. &1'11¥ o On the COllparat:l.veJ.y few o 

occasion• when the inte111gence presented a matter ot 

operatic:mal urgency. Torrielli and I were uaualJT able 

to concoct an approximateq correct story out or agents• 

report•• 'l'ac R8 etco which was passed d01Gl to the Al"IQ' 

0-20 Apart trm these baltcad.osm instancea9 the French 

Al"JQ' benetitted tram ultra !nteW.gence onq so tar ae · it had tar better opm intolllgenca trom the Al'IP1' Gl'OUp 

than otherwise 'lllOvl.d. lave been the oaaeo Thi• waa ot 

aoae gaiera1 Talue .in that after about 6 mcntha ot indignant protests at Arrq GrWp estimates (which pernetecl :1n placing the opposing enem;y torces at about 

Olle-qu&ner instead ot quadruple the .Fralch A1'117) the 

Frencb began nct'U&l:q to ban a fair degree ot ccm.-

tidmce in the American intelligence estimates.;>" 

(Volume II=Part. II, Po 440) 

(2)see late (9) ot .&lcloaure "B"c. 

AFSA FORM 781-ClOS 

6 JUL 51 

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, 

AFSA FORM 7B1-C10S 

6 JUL 51 

b., Jktract tram t;he final report ot the SSO with First Tactical 

Air Force (Prov.isicnal)g 

"Colonel.a Taylor and YCMlg and l ccnterring at 

Vit.tel thought. t.hat the norma.1 ult.ra SJ'Bt• could 'be 

installed at TACAF using the Sixth A.nu Group SW _ tacilitieao Then we lea.med that General RoJc• intended his statt to be joint French=American rather 

tban Am.ericen with French Uaiem ot£icera aa was the 

case at the Artq Groupo Natura~ the normal ultra 

methods had to be abandm'4o "0" decreed. (1) that.no 

'Ultra material was to enter TACAF hoadquarters and 

that no ultra conferences were to be held there, ( 2) 

that cml1' the top persannel ( Coamandina General, 

Deput7 Ccmmanding Gceral and Aa.2) wore to be indoctrined, and (3) that aenice we.a to be rendered through 

the Sixth A:nq Group SLU and ultra rocm.o 

nrarmal assigmamt ot an MIS, wo. otticer to a 

headquarters to which ncn bad CDl7 reluctantl.1" granted 

8'A7 ultra was considered inadri.sableo We agreed that 

the tollow1ng procedure would be toll.owed: (1) I would 

·continue to maintai.D 'lffl' ultra office at the AftlY Grau.p, 

(2) the three indactrinated otticera would attent the ~ air=ground ultra briefing at the Anq Group0 (3) 

me ot the :lndoctriJ3ated officers would be notified ot 

urgent. aeaaagea tbrou,ghout. the day &."ld transmiss:Lan 

would be arranged personalb'8 (4) I wuld spend at leaat 

ba1f ot 1lfl' time at the Air Force acting as Assistant 

G.-2• the Deputy A-2 boing a Frencbma..uC' · 

"'lho plan WGl"ked ~ parto The three indoctrinated 

perscmnel were taitbtal attendant• at the mondng briefing tn>a General. Dever"• tir•t -ocmtermce at. Vittel to 

bia last :In Heidelbergn Moasagea requiring illmadiate 

act.ian were eaoil1' taken care ot b7 -.y walking OTV to 

tb.e Air Farce Headquarters or Young coming to the .Al'llJ' 

Groupo No ultra material. vae ever ta.ken into t.he Air 

Farce Hoadquart.era and no ccm1'ereao•a wore held. th•reon 

............................ nt) Securit70 Securit7 neYer presen'ted a prob1• 

at TAC.AF o Ho 11aterial entered the headqvartera and 110 

aontermcea were held there at the ultra l•Y•lo Sime 

the Air Force rareq9 it ner, took sq direct opera= 

tianal acticn there was no occasion .tor a aecurit7 

breach of this natureo 

.... 21 !!"' 

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• 
AFSA FORM 781-ClOS 

6 JUL 51 

nrrhere waa probabq little apeculatim among the 

unindoctrinated. at TAOAF about the morning conference 

and iq job because both were connected. with A.rtq Graupo 

There was JDUch about the Arrq Group they did not expect to knwo For t.hese reaaone the French were not.' 

a securit7 dangero 

ng) The French Probl•o The French bad a natural 

reluctance to camp]¥ with orders ot higher headquarters 

run 'b1' Americanso Gendl"al Boyce• s plan to make '?ACAF 

a trul.T combined American-French headquarlere was therefore admirableo The plan was newer carried out~ howenrc 

The Americana were alwqs in ccmplete control ot TACAF 

and the French sat arcn.md aa ncn....world.ng deputies, bald 

miner jobs and tilled liaison aectionao There were just 

enough to mke the :l.ntroductim of ultra 11ilposs1ble and 

,.et not •ough to gain tho ad:nntages ot a cambined 

headquarteraon (Volo II-Par II, pp.382•38.3 and 385~ 

, 

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FARLY WORLD WAR II POLICIES AND PRACTICES 

INTRODUCTORY Ri'MARKS 

lo &o In the US just betore Pearl Harbor, the eene.1.tiTe nature 

" 

ot COMINT and tbe necessity of protecting its aourcea were 

recognised. .from the earliest day's ot its productica by both 

the Aftl1' and the Navo These two .factors J.ecl to auch a 

rest.rlctiT• dieseminat~ ~ tbat the Joint Congressional. 

Cclllllnittee ca the ln'Yeatigaticm ot the Pearl Harbor Attack 

camnent.ed upcin 1ta ettecta in no uncertain languageo Fol.-

lowing are eome exliracta bearing en th• point.• take trcm 

the Reccmmendaticlne of the Majorityg(l) 

• 

1120 fhlperriaog officials cannot. satel.y ~ake 

tp?h~ tor Q'&nted in the alerting of !Uborcll.nateeo 

Po 2S4 

• • o "With Pearl Harbor as a aad experience, 

crucial int. el.ligence ahould 1n the future be aupplied 

command.era acc~ied by the beat estimate ot its 

aigniticanceo" (po 255) 

n'lhe Magic intelligence was preadnct;J¥ important 

mcl the necesslt;r tor keeping it caatidential. cannot be 

owrapbaaisedo Howner. ao cloae]1' held and top secret 

~--~--~~-------~~------~~---~~-~----~~ 

(l)senate Document Hoo 244a ?9th Cangreaa. 2d Seasimo 

APP»IDIX "B" to »ICIOSURE "B" to Report. of USCIB Securit7 Cmnmittee SC 'B=35/14o 

See mCLOSURE "B" • Para. 3o 

AFSA FORM 781-ClOS 

6 JUL 51 

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• 

''was this intelligence that it appears the tact the 

Japanese cod.ea had been broken was regarded as ot 

lllOl"e importance than the information obtained trom 

decoded trat!ico 'l'he resul.t or tbia rather specious 

premise was to leave large numbers ot poliCJ"·-maldng 

and mtorcement. of'ficials in Washingt.an caap1eteq 

obl1Yioua of the most pertinent intormaticn coiloerning Japano 11 (po 261) 

* * * 

"While, aa previoualy indicated.9 it is appreciated 

that prmiecuoua diatribu.tim ot higbq conticlential material is dangeroua 8 it nevertheless ~ould be made 

aTaila'bl.e to all those whose reaponsibilit7 cannot adequateJ.y and 1ntell.1gent]¥ be discharged without knowledge ot such confidential data... It would sem that 

tbl'O\lgb auf'ticict paraphrase of the original material. 

the source of the :lntormatian could have bean adequatel.7 

protected.o Certainll' ae great confidence could be placed 

in ranking otticials ot variows depart.m.ente and bureaus 

ot the GoYernment aa in the numerous technicians. cr.yptographora. translators, and clerks required tor tho intorceptica am processing ot the Magico 11 (po 2.62) 

bo Changes in pol107 and practices with regard to dissemination 

were made by the Anq and the Nav,y aoan aft~ Pearl Harboro 

Specific regulations were then established bJ' both Serri.cos 

and al.though not issued as Joint regulat:l.ma8 they were prac ... 

ticaJ.l1' identicalo B,y Mq 1943 they were also practic~ 

identical with the British regulations. separate agreement.a 

ba'ring been mtered. into between th• UK organ:l.zaticn and the 

US ArJQ' .. and between the aame organiB&ticn and the US 1&'170 

2o ao In the UK th_.e was a lang traditicm ot eeourit7 in regard 

AFSA FORM 781-ClOS 

6 JUL 51 

to COMlllr operaticna going back aneral centurie118 no doubt, 

but scrupulouaJT toll.owed 1n World War I, When the actiritiea 

- 24 ... 

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of the OOMDrl' organisation 1fe1"tl conducted uncle!" the COYername "Rqom 40~ OoBo 11 Almost ten years had. to pass before 

the veil ot secrecy biding ita work was lifted a bit and 

the .Earl ot Halitax cow.cl sq: 

"To Rocm. 40;, the country ovea an im.ense debt. ot 

gratitude - a debt which at the time• at. least. 

could neYer be paida Secrecy was or the Yer:/ 

essence of the WDrk, and never was secrecy more 

succeesful.l¥ obaervedo" 

bo During the ear~ ~ ot World \iar II all the high ... grade 

OOMINT produced b,y' the UK organ1zation(2) was nner di11= 

aeminated as COMmr but aa intorma.tion picked up by secret 

agentso The present Senior British Liai8CID Otticer tor 

COMlHT in Washington (Brigadier Tiltman) stated that these 

"rep~a" were passed. to three groups of o.tticiala: 

(1) Those "in the know"• who made proper uae ot the 

intelligence; 

(2) Those not; "in the know" who correctl;r guessed the 

source" 'l'h197 sometimes used the 1ntell1genoe im= 

properJ.7 but since QC • CS could exercise no control over them they represented a hazard to aecurity; 

(3) Thoe• not. "in the lm.c'N" who were entirel.1' unimaginatiYe and threw the material away aa the worth.less . produc:t ot untruat.worthl' acoundrelao 

<

2>eurrent COW".....aame8 the Gc>Yemm.ent Communicaticms Headquarters {OOHQ); 

ccwer-name in World. War II,, GoTe:mment Code and Cypher School (GC&CS)o 

AFSA FORM 781-ClOS 

6 JUL 51 

- 25 = 

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Tbi• sort ~ c:lieguiae was dropped lV' the end ot 1943, aps. 

parentq not. because it •• unsatiatactor;r as cover. but tor 

political reascna not gel"llUle to this studyo 

.30 &o With regard to COHIB'l' oollaboratim with the .French and the 

AFSA FORM 781-ClOS ' 

6 JUL 51 

Poles, Brigadier 'l'iltman ottered the toll.owing intormaticrn 

(1) Bri.tish liaiacm with the French in COMIRT matt.ere was 

conducted through Major (later Colonel) Bertrand,, the 

head ot the French Arrq nyn (OOMIHT) activities under 

. ' the Frech ~ Ga:leral staff, Deuxieme Bureauo 

(2) Cammencing about 193.38 the British eatabliehed a relationllh1p with the French in regard to work m the 

Ruasian probl•o Aa this relationabip netted nothing 

to the Br1tiah9 it was event~ diacont:lnuedo At 

about the time ot the Munich Pact, a relaticmehip va11 

reeatabliehedo The French bad obtained. an agent•• repo~ concerning the German military Eaipa machineo 

The re~ g&Ye the results ot a test which had bee 

made ot the ma.china, apparmtq indicatq the cipher 

sequence produced by enciphering a single letter a 

·J&rge number of timeso The British made an anaqais 

ot this report9 but, apparentq through an error an 

the part ot the anaqst,, taUecl to obtain from it the 

technlcal. intorma:tim lddch it. was possible to deriT•o 

... 26 ... 

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• 

AFSA FORM 781-ClOS • 6 JUL 51 

A subsequent contact was apparantq made with the 

French, as a result ot wb1ch Bertrand renal.eel to the 

British 1ntormat1m 1dlich had been receind troa the 

Poles!> According to TUtman, the Poles had. made an 

anaJ¥sis o£ this same report,, and, as a result, had 

succeeded in devising a scanning ayat• capable ot 

r'Umdng rapicll¥ through all of the diphar machine 

coJDbinatioaso This 117st.em wae 1n tact9 the basic 

principle ot the bclllbeo Br its uae8 the Po1es were 

able to reconstruct the wheel wiring ot the German 

machineo All ot this intOl'Jl&ticn was eupplied to the 

Preach, mo in tum passed it aa to the Britisho 

(3) According to TiltmnD the Poliall graup joined the 

~ench cryptanaJ¥t;1c group in Paris, although the Poles 

wrkecl aa a dietinot :-itQ The British also bad a part7 

under a Major Pritchard vorlcing with the French CJ7Pt- , 

an~ic organization at the same place. filtman bad 

occaeicln to visit them periodical.qo At t1rat9 the 

.Frtnch were resernd in their dealings with the British8 

but ulti'matel.1' their relat1cna nre quite treeo 

(4) Collaboration with the French at tbe min Britieh COMINT 

center in Lend.an began in September 1939,, with tho attach ... 

ment ot an otticer ot the Frech Air Force (Lieuto Braccxmier) to the atatt in Hut 6 (where t.h• work m German 

-TOP SECRET SUEDE 
AFSA FORM 781-ClOS 

6 JUL 51 

Arm;y and Air Force Pb:l.gma qatcs was handled) at 

Bletchl_,. Park (BP). 

C 5) Socn thereaft.er a group ot about eight. French Nav (and 

tour more French Air Force) officers cam.e to work at BP. 

Hone ot these French ott:lcers waa ever in the acti'Yitiea 

connected with &dgma eoluticm nor in the precincts ot 

Hut 3 (where emendatim and diasemina.tian of tinal COMlifT 

was done). These otticera were c:eyptanaJ¥sta and were -

pa.rt ot the British sections which worked. en material of 

lower grade than l!Digmao 

( 6) COMIH'1' products from the aolutim ot the ao=ealled 11Red. 

Ke,yn • the ga:ieral German Ai:r Force Enigma Q'Stem., were 

given to the French through Colanel. Bctrt.rand.11 but t.b1s 

stopped :1n June 1940 with the t&ll ot France. 

( 7) ·The French Hav otticera at BP left soon after the 

German air attacks en Britain in 19400 Four French Air 

Force otticera atqed. on at BP tor some time thereafter" 

Also, me Frenchman (Liv.l.ngaton, J Scbaetter)9 an 

archaeologist ot considerable repute, stqed. cm. at the 

Berkelq street office (Dipl.cmatic OOMIHT) in Londono 

bo It was further stated that 1 

(l) Collaboration came to a cloee short~ after the tall 

... 28 .... 

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• 

AFSA ~ORM 781-C105 

6 JUL 51 

TOP SE~-&9l3EDE 

(2) ,'.l'h• French OOMllfl organizaticin went "underground." after 

the tall o£ France, JllOring to a hiclNwq in Southern 

Franeeo Colonel Bert-rand gave oral assurance to the 

Britieh that Frech COMINT persc:mne1 would rma1n 107&1 

and not divulge either French or British COHDT secrets. 

Thie promise was apparmt]T kepto 

(:3) There was tor a ti• a Free French intercept or ''Y" statica north ot Landen, at which were alao some J'OUD& 

Polish mathematicians under a Polish Colone1 Langer 

who had been the head ot the Poliah group mmt.icned I 

above under Par&a .30 a. (.3)0 l'Anger was at BP during 

the war but exact~ how lcag was not indicatedo 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
TOPRV,.. Wrill6r§556 :>t\......KC. I 

lo AG 312ol (11 Mar 44) OB-S-B, subject: Security oE Special Intelligence with European, Horth African and Middle Fast strategic Air 

Forces 1n 1Wrope11 dated 15 March 19440 

2o AG 31105 (4 Aug 45) OB-S-B, subject: Se~t:r Regulat1aaa tor PINUP 

Intelligaice, datecl 6 August 194So 

APPlliDIX "C" to IfiCIDSURE "B" of Report ot USCIB Securit7 Committee 

SC B-3S/14o See P.HCIOSURE "B", Parao 4o&oHote (1) o 

TOP SECRET 
' 

WAR .DEPAR'l'l&T 

W&ahington 2S, D., Co 

AG 3l2ol (11 Jlar 44)0B-S-B 

su&Dm's Secu.riv or Special InteJ.ligence within l!bropean, North Atrican 

and 13.ddle East Theaters ot 

Oporationso 

T01 Supreme Co.mander, 

Allied Exped1tiona17 Forc.-

1'he Conaanding Geneal.a, 

n/md 29-939 Pentagon 

l5 Jlarch 19.lt4 

··········••oooO•O••OO ;····a•a¥c•a·1·t·····i 

1A'1th: To A. Go I 

1Init1ale1 L1t E. J. : 

aDatet JS Ila.I' 4J+ I 

o••••••••••••••••••••o ooooooooeeooeoooooeooo 

u .. s. Forces :ln tbe :European Theater of Operaticlns 

u.s. AnJT Forces in the North Atr!.can Theater ot Operations 

UoSo Arnv Forces in the iJ:i.ddle &!st 

Sbrateglc .Air Forces 1n Europe 

1. In order tha1- in ~dn cmbinec:l Opel'ations British and American 

recipients of int.elUgance resulting from the solution ot high grade codes 

and clphers JmV" be bound bJ' the same aecuri'Q' regulations, the inclosecl 

Secur.l.t7 Instruction •A•, Jlemoranclum on the Dissemination of Signal In° 

telligencewithin the British and American Forces. and the incloaed. 

Sec111'it7 Instruction •Bli, Regulations ff# Jla1Dta1D1ng the SecUl"itJ of 

Spec:lal Intelligence, have been agreed upat l:tr!! t.he aircpean, Horth .Atrican 

and 18.ddle Iaa1o Theaters ot Operatians. 

2o Ettoctive 1 Apr.1.11944 the 1ncloMd SecUl'itJ" Instruction llAi and 

Securlt7 Instruction •B• will supersede lat.tar, AG 31201 (13 Oct. 43) 

OB=a-B-K, 14 Oct.obar 1943, eubjecta Secur1t7 ot Ul\ra Dextezo Intelligence, 

Within the Fm-opean,, North African and Kiddle .Eaat Theater• ot Operations 

and., within tho• Theaters, 11111 appl.T to all ocnaanda ot ~he Arai' o 

lo The inclosed Securit,y Instruction 'B v ccntaina detailed regulatioml 

te maints1n;lng t.he aecur!t7 ot Spec1al Intelligence, de.tined as intonaa.=-

t!cm. ~ained b7 Cl'J'PtoSJ"ai:Mc means from enarv high grade codes am ciphers or those tor eecurit.y reasons placed in that categ0170 The 1nclosed 

SecuritJ" Instructicm 'A 11 ls a genera1 guide tor the handlJ.ng ot all Signal 

Intelligence, including no1- onJ.y Special. Intelligence but also lower grade 

Signal Intelligence. . 

4o The :lnclosed Security Inst.ruction 11 A e and Securit.,' Ina\ruction 'B' 

wU1 be distributed ~ over t.he special channels prescribed in S.curi\7 

Instruction. 'B' tar Special Intelligence and will be made available call' 

to persona author.lzed to NCaiYe Special Intelligence pursuant to !n.st.:ru.c:-

t:lon 'B1 o All provisions of Securi.t7 Instruct.ion 9A9 applicable to Signal 

-31 ... 

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T~q:p~~ r V'-'-''11- I 

'i'0P &.i!iGRBl 

AG 3J.2,,l (ll liar 44)0B-S-B (Cont'd) 

Intelligence ot lower grade than Special 1.ntell.1gence (1.e •• ncr.vpt Intel~ 

ligence1t and "Trattic Anal.J'ai•") vUl be aepal'ateq issued through conaand 

oharmel.8 as Security Inatr11cbion •o•o 

5o Reproduction of tbla ].et.ter and the inclosuree hereto is prohibi'Hdo 

_. order of the Secretary ot \Vari 

2 Incl.a., 

11 - Secmv Instruction •A• 

112 - Secur.l.t7 Instruction •B• 

/s/ J.A., Ullo 

J.Ao ULIO 

1lajor General 

The Adjutant General. 

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SPX:URI.'l'Y INSTRUCTION 1t.A. t if E 1.1 0, I x N D ti H 

on the 

DISSEr.O:NATION OF smNAL INTELLIGENCE 

WITHIN 'l'HE BRrl'ISH AND AJll!RICAN FORCES 

lo 69tent1on of ll9e>randum. 

'.rhis Mmnoramwn is intended to serve as a general guide to ell 

Conmandere11 Intelligence staffs, am Signal InteW.gem:e Otticers at 

equal levels, tor dealing with the handling, dissemination and aecuritJ' ot Signal Intelligence.io 

Special nomenclature to be used in s1gnala and written COlllllWd.-

cations d.eal.bJg with S1gnal Irl+.elligence 1a set oiit in .Annexure (b) ~ 

.30 Securik• 

i'he preservation ot aecreq in the handling of Signal Intelligence 

is a vital factor :ln the conduct ot the war 4 

It this degree of eecurity ia to be maintained,, it la essential 

that the British and American Signal Intelligence Services ehould 

pm1ue the same mathoda at OW17' level and in ever,y theatre ot waro 

lsakage at tJDT cne point may not cml,y jeopardise the flow ot intelligence 1n the thea1;re ot -.r cc:ncemed, but alao etfecti vel,y dr.r up 

the source all Oftr the mrld~ 

4., Ieeue ot Secur!t;z Inatru.ctionso 

· Uniform securit.:r inst.ructions tor the handling ot C17Pt Intelligence and Tratfic AnaJ¥8ia will be issued tram time to time through 

the eezd.or S1gnaJ. Intelligence Otticen serving 1n the relevant 

theatre of war or through the local Signal InteUJ.genoe Board where 

me has been f'o.rmado 

Die handling ot, and qphea aaed in connection with Special Intelligence al'e dealt with in the mpecial instructions referred to 

1n Parao 5 (ii)o · 

5 o lll.stribution 

(i) i'he goveming principle l'ega.rdin& the distributaion ot Signal 

J'.ntelllgence ie that. it will ~ be disclosed to those Otticera who 

have the abeolute need to know it for the proper execution ot their 

diitie&o 

... 3' -

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(ii) Special Security regulati.ona as :regards Special Intel.ligence 

1n the European Theater have been agreed and will be issued by British 

m:l American author.I.ties to all concerned. 

Arq alterations 1n the regulations tor the disseminaticn and security ot Spec1al. Intelligence mq OJll¥ be sent to author.teed :recipients of 

ellOh material and over the spec1al routes that have alreactr been laid 

down, am1 are not to be included 1n documents connected with Cl'J'PI;. Intelligence and Tratt1c ~s.1.s •. 

(iil) The levels on which intelligence derived tram Signal Intelligence will be disseminated ai-e given in AnnexUre (a.). 

6. ftm9\P!g ot Intelligsn.ce obtained f'.'rcm C!'JRt Int~llipnce and Tratfic 

Anyysis 

In general the British and American .ArJqy and Air authorities have 

agreed that. as a pr.1.nciple "In arv action taken upon Intelligence derived from Crypt Intelligence and Traffic .AnalJreis and arrr doti:umente 

or telegrams based upon it.11 it is essential that its or.tgin be disguised, and that the codes and qphe:rs used tor its dissemination be 

abeolutely aecure11 o In accordance with the above, when 1t is nece&s81'1' 

:ln the text. to specit,r the source, this should be done b7 using NspectiTe:q the single words PEARL and THWm enC1Phered in the ta.to 

Ho other reference to source ahould be made,,. 

7 ~ gyphers to_bo used in signal!! ng Cmt :rptellia,nca, 

Signals containing Cz7pt Intelligence 111.1.st alwnqs be sent as lfost 

Secret (UoSo Secret) in special. qvphers to be authorized tor the purpoaeo 

80 Qrphera to be used f'or aignal.liM 'l'ratft.c Apallsis .. 

Sipla cmtaining :lntormation dcarived tram 'frattic Ana.l.Tais must 

al•.,a be sent 111 the highest grade qphera avail.&ble to all addressees a but l1J81' be regarded as requiring a lower degree ~ aecurit7 than 

CJ7pt 1.ntelligenceo 

9 o Exchange ot resultp o 

It has been agreed. with tm approval. ot the Chiefs ot statt, that 

the British Signal IntGlligence ozgaD1.zat1on and the UoSo Signal In• 

tel.ll.gence Service operating 1n a CCllllROl'l theatre or war shall cooperate 

and excbaDge the results ot their Sipal Intelligence work without 

reservation, am shall make these results available to those Of'fioars 

m levola as laid down in .Annear.ure (a) o 

.ftzrthel'lllOre it has been mutuall.y agreed that the distribution ot 

theae results UJq' not be degraded belam' these levels without retcance 

to the London Signal Intellipnce Board or equivalent. American aathol'-

it;r.., 

.. -34-

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10., 

0 REX_lJ2;..~6..§556 T p !:>tLl<t: I 

Intorm&ticn ngardWg Signal Intelligence Unite 9lozecl in theat1'fts 

gt War 

In order to carJ7 out the above poliqr1 the British and u.s .. U:l.lit1.17 and Air Authorities haft agreed to Worm. each other of the st.guaJ. 

lhteW.gence Units that 1t is proposed to emplOJ' in all theatres ot waro 

llo Raval Cooperation 

1'he British .Admiralv has associated 1taelt with the tollCM:lng arrqements and the Naval lsv'els ot dissemination are aholln in Annexure 

(a)., 

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TOP 19ffiRfA166ss6 

LEVELS ON WHICH mrELLmENCE DERIVED FR())( vsm, M' 

llAY BE DISSE:JINATED TO GEN.112AL AND INTELLIGllEE 

STAFFS OF ALLIFD SERVICF.s 

frsm111gation Leve1 

'.l!ype or v1• British Sen1ce American Service 

SPJOOIAL 

COMBINED .ALLIED FORCE 

cOmmmder-in-=Chiet ot Allied Forces 

Chief ot Btatt 

Senior Btatt b.tticere {G-2) Intelligence 

n n n (G-3) Operations 

n n n (G-S) Plans 

Cmmander=in-chiet Allied Air Forces 

and his Senior statt Officer or c .. o .. s .. and hie Senior 1.ntelligerme Otticer 

Air Force Comnandera-in-Chiet. 

their Senlor Air St.att Otticera 

and Senior A1r Intelligence 

Btatt Cltticers. 

Air Otticers camand1ng Air 

Forces.or Coamanda• their 

Senior Air Statt Otticera,, and 

Senior Air InteW.gence Otticerso 

Air Fol"Ce Commanders ... in...chie.f, 

their c.o .. s. and Senior Air 

Intelligence Sta.ft Otticers') 

Air Di v.1.s.ton Commanders, 

Chiet ot Statt Air Division~ 

and Senior Air Intelligence Otticers .. 

Additional statt' Ot'ticen as mq be special.]¥ authorized b.Y' the 

Comander-in-Chief o 

Cmm>ander 

SPJOOIAL C.OoSo 

Principal staf'.f Otticer 

Intelligence Principal Statt Officer 

Operation a 

Principal statt otticer 

Plana 

GoSo9olo (I) {a) 

GoSoOolo (I) (e) 

- 36 ... 

Oo Co Intelligence Branch, G-20 

Signal Intelligencfi! Of'ticer'J 

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.. 

Promulgation Level 

'l)'pe of 'I' lh'itish Service .American Service 

SP.IOOIAL 

Air Force Ccmaander Air Force or Division Comander. 

Senior Air st.alt Officer c.o.s. (A.F.) 

Seid.or J.ntelligence Officer R.A.F. A .... 2 .. (A.F.) 

Additional statr Ofticera ae mq be speciall.Y authorised b7 the 

Comnandero 

Arnv Comnander 

CoOoSo 

GoSoOolo (I) GoSoOolo {Ops) 

Additional. I Otficers as 

apec1.a.lly' authorized by Arrq 

Comnander. 

Air Force Commander 

Senior Air Sta.ft O.tticer 

Arrrq CQD'IDal'lder 

CoOoSo 

G=2 

G=3 

Additional G=2 Staff otticera 

as apeciallT authorised b,y 

A1'J1V' Commander.. , 

Air Force Coamander 

IN THE EVF.NT OF A CORPS OR TASK FCBCES OR AIR iURCE 

JmoUPS CU,S, W~ OPERA.TDD INDJfjNDENTLY, AN AlU(l' 

GROUP COllUNDER MAY BE GIVEN SPBJIAlf AUTHORITY F<Jl 

• DISSEMINATIO?l TO THE FOLLO'lING: 

Corpe Caaeander 

SPECIAL BoGoSo . Corps Ccmna.nder 

CoOoSo 

Principal stat!" Officer (I) 

n n n (OJ>so) 

Group Comnanders R.A.F. 

Senior Air statt Otticer 

Senior Intelligence Officer. 

NAVAL COWANDS 

Naval Cammanders ... in=Chiet. 

G=29 

G ... 3. 

Wing Caaaanders (A .. Fo) c.oQs. A,P. Wing 

A-2. Wingn 

SP.JOOIAL .Force Camnando:rs and sel.ected FJ.ag 

otticera, and their Senior staff 

Otticara spedalq authorised b7 them.. 

""37 .... 

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'?ype ot •I• s 

CRYPr AND 

TRAFFIC 

ANALYSD3 

T 0 ~2= r:~ ifL&VSS 6 0 C Cl' t: I 

Annexure (a) Cont'd 

British SFVJ.ce Amer.lean Service 

All recipients ot •Special• J all Intefilgence Officers 

in all Headquarters higher than Corps or Group (u.s. Wing) 

and in addition: 

CORPS Ha.ms 

Corps Canmand.er 

B.G.S. 

G.s.0.2. Inte11igence G.s.0.2. Operations All Intelligence Otticers 

Air InteW,gence Ott1cer 

Additional I otticers as 

authorized by Corps Comandero 

UISCELLAN!DUS 

Group Conma.ndera R.A.Fo 

Senior Air Staff otticero 

Senior I Otf'icer 

.Additional St.aft Ottice:rs as 

authorized tv Group Candra, 

RoAoFo 

.... 18 -

Corpe Cc:llllnand.ero 

c.o.s. 

0-2 

Galo 

All G-2 Intelligence Otticera 

Air Otticer. 

Air Di vision Comnanders. 

c.o.s. Air Division 

Wing Ccmmandera (Ao.Fo) 

C.OoSo Ao.Fo Wingo A-2. Wingo 

Additional statt Otticera 

as allthorJ.zed qr Air 

Dlvision or W1ng Comnan~ra., 

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TQPRitStrnila¥ss6 .J t... '-"I'._ I 

Annexure (b) 

NOD~CLATURE .FOR ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE 

STUDY OF FORElnN SIGNALS. 

Item ( c) concerning Special Jatelligence must not 

under 8D1' circmstances be disclosed to BD¥ peram not aware 

ot the existence ot this source. See Prmulgation Levels in 

Anncmre (a),, 

Terms to be anplaredo 

(a) Signal Intelligence 

Short Titleo Datinitiono 

stg.,Int. Comprises (a) the inte~ 

ception ot all enenv am 

neutral ccnmcnications and 

radio transmissions, and 

their solution; (b) the 

Intelligence resulting therefrclm, and the prepara--

at:lm ot such Intelligence 

1D. a uaetul tarmo 

(b) Y Service Y (Bro) 'l'he Organisation Nspc:lll ... 

sible tor the interception 

of all eneqr and. neutral 

radio tranmd.saim including the cperation of 

D/F aerviceao 

Radio Intelligence Service Roio (Amer.) 

(c) Special Intelligence 

(d) C17Pt Intelligence 

Code Word 

Ultra 

Pearl 

Int.elligence naulting 

tram aolution ot high grade cad.ea and c,y.phera 

or ot thoaa tor security · nascns placed :ln this 

categar.r., 

Intelligence reeul.Ung 

frail solution ot low and 

medium gl'ada codes and 

CJphera unlus placed 1D 

the special catego1'7 

aboY&;, 

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" -

Terms t.o be emplgyedo 

(e) Trattic An&b'sf.s 

REF ID:A66556 

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Short 'l'itleo Detinitiono 

ThumJ:> Intelligence o~ained 

f'ltan a study ot radio 

trattic and D/F bearingao 

Reference item (b): It ia important; to note that the 

expression 'Y' ia restricted to 

the above det:l.nition. 

Reference item (c): This now supersedes and takes the 

place of all previous cede names 

such as S1rdar, Sll'ell, et.co 

Reference items ~d) These code Y1ords will be changed 

and ( e _ trcm time to time as Dial' be 

cansidered necess&170 

""'.40 co 

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REF ID:A66556 

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SECURITY IrlSTRUCTIO?l 'B' 

THESE msrRUGTIONS CMmEL PREVIOUS REGULATIOtlS orl THIS SUBJJOOT 

RmULAT lOllS FOR MAI?lTAillING THE SJOOt.IU'.l'!' 

OF SPECIAL Dn'ELLIGEiiCE 

I DEFDUTION 

Special 1.ntell.1gence is the agreed name tor the reaultan't moat. 

secret inf'ormation obtained tv' Cl'J'Pi;ographic means trail enesv high grade codee and c,yphers, or those tor securit7 reaacma placed in 

this categ017 o 

II ID»ll'IFICATION 

All messages dealing with Special Intelligence whether ccn .... ta1n1ng the actual intormation or summarie• • appreciations, queries 

and oonments thereon, are to be identified ~ the code word ULTRAo 

All other code names (eogo SIB.DAR, ZDDTIC) are therefore cancelled 

bl' these instructions. 

III VAWE 

Intormation tran Ultra can be regarded as reliable and action 

ma.y be Uken upon it in acc:ordance w:l.t.h the aecurit7 instructions 

given henundero 

n smuRl'l't 

lo GeQeral 

P.reael'V'aticm ot the source ot Ultra !ntomation 1a of the 

atmet 1mport.ance in the ccnduct ot the waro This consists ot 

preventing the development of auapicione on the part ot the 

enemy that his canmications are being read, thereby g1Ying 

him no cau• to change his C17'Ptographic and signals securit.7 ~o U han IJ!l7 document that might tall into hia handa, 

tJrm a1J7' message that he might intercept, hen UV' \10l'd that 

.might be revealed bf' a prisoner or war, or traa aiv ill<=CX>Aaidered action baaed upon Ultra 1n1'orliat1on, the enur were 

given cause to believf!) that his caawd.cations were not adequatel.J' aategua.rded against the interception which he knows 

to be employed against; him, he will effect changes which will. 

deprive us ot the :1med1ate knowl.edge ot his operations and 

strategy. The loss ot this information would vitally' affect 

operations on al1 front$, 

-41 = 

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REF ID:A66556 

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The source and contents ot Ultra messages a.re to be disclosed onll' to those otticars and their statts who tor the 

proper execution or their duties have the absolute need to 

lmow such informationo 

2o Authorized Recipients 

The number and level ot officers authorized to receive 

Ultra is severe:J.y restr.l.ctedo 

In Ministries and Defiartments = to those statt officers 

tor whom the lti.nister or ead of Department conaidere the in ... 

formation is v.l.tal to the proper execution ot their dutieso 

British Service .American Service 

COI.a3llmD ALLIED FCfi.CE 

CCJnnander=in...Chiet ot Al.lied Forces 

Chief' ot Btatt 

Senior stat.f Ot.ticera (G-.2) Intelligence 

11 n n (G-3) Operations 

11 11 n (G-S) Plans 

Comander=dn...Chiet Allied Air Forces. 

his Senior Statt Otticer or CoOoSo and 

his Senior Intelligence Officer ... 

Air Force Connanderamin...Chiet 

their Senior Air statt Otticers, 

and Senior Air Intelligence Sta1't 

otficor•o 

Alr Otticez'a Camnanding Air 

i'Qrces or Commands, their Senior 

Air statt Otticerra and Senior 

Air Intelligence Otticerso · 

Air Force Coaaandera=:in...Chie.t, 

their C.OoSo and Senior Air 

Intelligence statt Of'ticera. 

Air Di vision Ccmnandara, 

Chief ot Statt Air Division 

and Senior Air Intelligence 

Otticer&o 

·Additional statt Otticers as ma;y be spec.iaU;,v authorised b.v the Cea= 

mander-in=Chieto 

Oomander 

CoOoSo 

Prindpal st.att Officer 

Int.elligeme 

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.. 

REF ID:A66556 

TOP S!e!tE! 

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British Service 

Principal statt otf icer 

Operations 

Principal stat.t' Ot.t'lcer 

Plans 

GoS.O.,l(I) (a) 

GoSoOo1(I) (s) 

Air Force Conmander 

Senior Air staff Orticer 

Senior Intelligence Otticer 

RoAoF. 

Amer.lean Serri.oe 

O.Co Intelligence Branch• G=2 

Signal InteW,gence Of .ticer 

Air Force or Di vlaion Commander 

CoOoSo (A.,F.) 

A=2o, (A.Po) 

Additional statf Officers as mq be speciall,y author.1.zed by the Comnandero 

.ARttY HIXJtS 

Al'JqJ' Commander 

CoOoSo 

GoSoOolo(I) 

G .. S. Oo1o (Ops) 

Additional I otticer.s ae 

apecial.ly authorized by Arnu 

Comnsnder 

Air Force Commander 

Smiior Air statt Officer 

Arlq' Commander 

c.o~s. 

G=2 

G-3 

Addition.al Qc=.2 Staff Ot.t'icera as 

specially author.I.zed by Arnv 

Coamander 

Air Force Commander 

C.OaSo (A.F .. ) 

In the e~ of a Corps or Task Force or Air Force 

Groups (UoSo Wings) operating independently an Al'!IW' Group 

Commander m;q be given special. authorit7 tcr Ultra to be 

disseminated. to the .t'ollowi.ng1 

Corps Conmander 

BoGoSo 

Principal st.att Otticer (I) 

n 11 • n (Ops) 

Group Comnanders R .. A.Fo 

Senior Air start O.t'ticer 

Senior Intelligence O.t'ti~ezo 

Naval Connan.der-in...Chiet .... Force Commanders and selected Flag 

Officers and their Senior staff' 

Officers special.11" authorized by them .. 

- Corps r.onnander 

CoOoSo 

G....2 

G=.3 

iVi:ng C(xnmanders (A .. F o) 

C .. OoSo AoF •· Wing 

A=2 'frling 

= 43 -

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REF ID:A66556 

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3 o Regulations to be AeJ?lied to Authorized Recipientso 

All o!ticen who are authorized to :recein Ultra must be 

properl,y trd.tiated into the nature of the source azid briefed 

regarding the security regulat1onso They' .nm.st read these rag= 

ulat1ona and men a form stating they have done 80 and .tul.11' 

understand the penalties f'or infringement ot the eecrec.y acte 

both duri.ng and after the war. · 

Special Liaison Units '(S.LoUo) are attached to each Opera= 

tional Canmand or Headquarters authorized to receive Ultra. 

They are responsible tor 1-he secure handling ot Ultra and the 

general carr:ying out ot these security regulationso They ho1d 

the special cyphers in which Ultra is transnitted and are t.he 

unit through which all Ultra messages must be passed. 

Initiation and briefing in operational areas should be 

carried out either by the Senior Special Lia1aon Unit Otticer, 

or a Statt Ot.f'icer ot equivalent J'Uk ot Brigadier. 

In cases where Operational Coalllandera cmaider that additionaJ, officers to thoae apecial.17 emaerated 1n paragraph 2 

should be aut.horized recipients ot Ultra, th97 must app]T through 

the .Special Liaison Units to Washington or London over Ul.tra 

routes, giving reaaons tor t.he :requ.eat .. 

Where individual otticers holding poata which entitle them 

to Ultra at OperatSonal CoDllWlds are changed, the Comander 

making the change llUl&t peraonalJT guarantee the new holder as 

a reliable recipiaat. The new holder can tt en be :1n1 tiated 

and b:rieted. without 1'8ference to London or Waahingtono 

It an ortlcer l"ellnquiahea a post which has entitled his 

access to Ultra. he autamaticall.Y tOl'feite hie right to aee 

this material and will aign an undel'taking to this ettecto 

\1hen e>rticere who have had an intimate knowledge or 

Ultra material leave these posts it is highly. undesirable that 

they should be transl'erred to posts which might involve capture bJ' the eDUVo 

Mithol'ized recipient.a ot Ult.ra DIB1' not under 8D7 circumatance show, J'ead6 or diecuaa Ultra measagee or their contents, 

wit.Ii ar.v other peracn of arv service wll.ea11 thq are satistied 

that such persons a:re al.so authorised to receive ito 

Up to date list.a of named author.I.zed recipients 1111st. be 

kept in 11:1.rd.~riea, Departments, Collllal1.d111 and G.HoQBa• where 

Ultra is received. It ia the dut.7 ot the Special Liaison Units 

to keep these lists at. Operational ~de and Comanders JilllSt. 

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REF ID:A66556 

'f 0P ~ TOP SECRET 

therefore keep the Special LialsCXJ. Units intormed ot the names 

of ·all otticers on their starts who are author.I.zed to rece1 va 

Ultrao 

'!he names am posts ot all authorized recipients and Bl\Y' 

ohanges ahould be tol'\varded pramptq b7 th& Special Liaison Units 

to London or Washington,, in order that complete lists or al1 

authorized recipients mq be maintained at London and \Vaahington 

on a current basiso 

4., Dissemination ot Ultra 

A. To J.i.inistries, Departments, Commands, G.H.qs., and A.H.<;soe 

both at Home and OVerseas. 

Original disseadnation or Ultra .mst be carried out by 

a centralized disseminating authorit,. 

lliasemination to the authorized recipients ahown in para0 

graph 2, must in all cases bez 

(i) over special:q author.I.zed rout.ea, 

(11) in apecialll' authorized C.JPhera, which muat either 

be one time tables or special settings of a machine 

qpher which ia agreed as secure "1' the C1'"1J>'tographic experts ot both the United Kingdom and the 

United States ot America, 

-except in the following oaaea when Ultra 1DQ' be disseminated 

1n plain language within the u.Ko or within th:.. oountrr of 

cir.I.gin, provided it is not •occupied.V or •neaor territ.Ol'7o 

(a) owr teleprinters, onl3 it the teleprinters 

are camplete]1' aecure and cannot be tapped 

b.r Wl&Uthor.lzed persozmel, 

(b) owr telephones, cml.,- it scramblers are uaedo 

(c) _. sate hand ot otticer owr :reasonable distances and under circm.sloance• unlikel.T to 

irnol.ve disaster, 

(d) Ultra material sent. overseas 'bJ' bag or pouch 

mut be enCJ'Phel'lld ml.ass the route ia cca~ 

pletel,y secure and handling arrangements at. 

either end are confined to proper]¥ auth01"-

1zed peraaanelo 

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l 

?lote lo Special Laintenance engineers should be 

empl.oyed. tor the teleprinter c1rcu1tso 

Teleprinters and their stal'f's should be 

segregated tram general teleprinter rooms 

and. access to them forbidden to un&llt.hol--

ized persons. ThfO" should preterab.11' fOl"m 

part ot a special section responsible tor 

the sde dissemination of all Ultra material. 

in the ll1nist17, .Departmen\ or Comnand. 

Note 2. Bags and pouches should not be sent: 

(a) by air over routes which might incar 

tarced landings in neutral or enelD1' 

territo17, 

(b) J:lv' aea on routes which might involve 

capture by the eDeD\Y. 

Bo To gperational Comnands Overseas 

Normal.l1' Ultra messages at.t"ecting both higher and lower 

formations who are authorized recipients, are eent direct tram 

the dissaminating catre to each tormtion cancerqed., 

The spacial.JT authorized routes referred to above consist of W/T or cables and no:rmalq Special Colllllunicatim Units 

(Soc.u.) in direct W/T ooamnmication with the disseminating 

centre, are attached to Operational Coamanda., SoCoUo are 

also attached to static Hea.dqaarters, unless a ccmpletel.Y 

adequate alternative CCIDlllunication .,.at-. ia available., 

Special Liaiaon Units are nepons1ble tor the sate deliva1"7 

ot daCJPhered Ultra messages to authorized recipients at the 

Command or Headquarters to which th97 are at.tachedo 

. Co Intercanmanication between Ultra Recipients., 

Intercmnmunicaticm between recipients on matters which 

in al\1' wq concern tntra materi.al, \Yhether in the tom ot 

queries, CQlllllltnts, summaries or appreciatJ.ona, JJlQst be onr 

the aat.horized Ultra rautea and unless tranamitted 1n U= 

ccrdance with the exceptions 1n paragraph 4. A.. must be sent 

in the special m.tra CiJPbers either through the original 

diaaeminating centre or the S .. LoUo 

Do Further Dissemination bl Recipientl!<J 

it ~ rec1pien1;a consider that ~ original Ultra 

massage should have a further distribution to that alread.Y 

= "" so 

TOP SECRET 
given,, they m11st not retrananit direct but must refer.- t.ho 

request to the original disseminating centre or SoLoUo who 

1fill undertake the further diatribution to other authorized 

rec.1.pients u required. They will also intorm. arv other 

interest recipients ot the further action taken. 

Bo S.L2 Units in H.¥. Shipao 

It is p}\yaicaJ.:q impossible and al.so undaairable to have 

S .. Lo Units attached to the Statt ot all Flag Officers.. There 

are in addition a Dlllber of instances where the method ot application ot these ngulations is not. applicable to naval 

uaageo The AdmlraltT, therefore, retain their own Ultra 

aervice to all naYal units o 

5 o :!np1grmant ot UaterJ.al 

An;r action baaed upon Ultra intorm.a.tion which is taken by a 

Commmder .must be so camouflaged that the action itselt cannot 

lead the enenv to the concluaion that it is based on Ultra Intelligence aloneo 

Jloment&lT tactical advantage ia not sutficient ground fOl" 

ta1dna UV' risk ot compl'Gmiaing the source,. 

Ro action JNll' be taken against apecit:lc sea or land targets 

revealed b,r ui:tra. unless appropriate air or land recmmaiasance 

has also been undert.akeno 

\'then ultra information ia to be used 1:6" a Comnand as a basis 

tor action to be taken by a subordinate cammand \Yhich ia not an 

authomed recipient, the intormation when passed to the subordi• 

nate coamanc:l .muat; be translated into tezms ot an operational 

order, ao worded that it capt.u.red or intercepted by the ena.v 

the origin ot the order could not be traced back to Ultra 1nto:nnat1on1 •o&o 1 orders must. never contain the preciae time, 

date or place ot an en.mv operation, or the name ot arv ship 

revealed "1' Ul\rao Such operatioaal orders it tranamittad b,r 

W/T mst 'be in high grade qphoreo 

'lhe utmo8' care is to be taken when brieting pilots tor an 

operation baaed on Ultra intormation that ~ such detaila are 

g1 ven them aa might have bean obt.a1ned by other means 1 such aa 

air reoaanaiasanoe, and onl1' such as are essential to the eucaeas of the oplll'atiano 

6. ~mmmes, Appreciations am Paws 

When Ultra m.ter:lal ia prepa.Nd in the form ot a mnmal7, 

appreciation or paper, these aatomaticaU:r become subject to 

·- 4'1 .... 

TOP SECRET 
same security regulations concerning dissemination, distribution, 

handling and use1 as the Ultra material itself, emept: 

(i) ~·.'here the information has also been received tram other 

sourceso 

(11) Order ot Battle information whi.ch m;q be included in 

normal secret docments after a aui table lapse ot time 

during which it is reasonable for the enell\,Y to suppose 

that the information oould have been obtained by other 

meanao 

It is therefore evident that 1n order to avoid undue restrictions on in.fo:rmatic:n fran other sources, such information should 

not be mixed with Ultra unless this is abaolutel.Y neceesa17. 

7o Safety 

No original tntra message, and onl,y auch records as cannot 

give an:r clue to the nature ot the source, ~ be kept at az>;r 

Operational Headqu:irters below that o£ an Arsv Gr0'1p. · 

It is the dut7 ot the Special Lid.eon Units to keep an accur= 

ate log ot all copies ot m.esaages deli wred to Commands and in 

the case ot formations below the level. or ARJ¥ Groups, to retrieve 

and destrqy tbemo 

The number ot houn during which the Comnanders mq retain 

Ultra messages depends on their p:ro.ximit..7 to the eneaJ7, but de=-

struction should nomal.ly take place aa soon aa the necessary 

action has been takeno 

Becipient.e ot Ultra at Operational ~nmands ma..Y' not under 

arJ7 drcmnstances CazTY' on their peraona or despatch out.aide 

their HDadquarters, Ultra messages whieh have been delivered to 

themo 

It is the :reaponaibilit7 of the Coamander to whom the Special 

Liai.aon Units. al'e at ta.ched to see that Spec1al. Liaison Units a.re 

never reqt.d.Nd to go within probable risk of capture bJr' the enmqy o 

It is the reaponsibilit7 ot the Senior Officer· of Special 

Liaison Units to destrcv all in clear Ultra messages, qypher pads 

and material, should he consider the situation warrants auch 

actiono 

Special measures are to be taken to ensure that all Ultra 

material whether at LJ.nistriee, Departments, Home or Oversea.a 

Comands, is at all times so caretullT handled and kept tha't 

-1.8 -

TOP SECRET 
'l'6P S8Elft1ft' 

no unauthorized peraon can obtain access to it and that it is 

properl.1' destroyGd at the earl:\.est. practicable IDDlll8Jlt. 

Je.H..1 Records will no~ be kept at pzado~ion centres which will be 

able to produce back messages it 

nquiredo 

-49 -

TOP SECRET 
RE~ ..-1~~6556 &J::w1 

The Adjutant Genera1•a otric:e 

Washington 251 D..,Co 

AG 3u.,5 (4 . Aug 4S )OB-..S-B CIJ!/mjm 28-939 Pentagon 

6 August 1945 

SUBJECT: Security Regulations tor Pil'WP Intelligence~ 

TO' Comrnandezr-in .. .Qiier, U.:S. AftV' Forces, Paci.f'ic; 

Comand1ng Generals, 

U,So Arqr strategic Ail" Fbrcee; 

u.s. Arlq' Forces, ?:iddle Pac1t1c; 

u. s. Forces China Theater; 

u.s. Forces India...J3u.nna Theater; 

Alaskan Department,,· .Rear Echelm,, 

1:111,11:::1::::::11: 

: S B G R i T I 

1.lutb:-T:"'A";b'; - : 

1In1tiala1 B.z. : 

•Date I 6 August 1945 I 

11:::::::::::::::1aaa 

lo Ef'f'ect-ive u~n receipt ot t.hia letter, ~ulations tor !la.intain• 

1ng the Secunw ot Pearl and Thumb Intelligence, rete:rence letter» ID 

3lloS (15 Nov 44)0B-S=-:&1.!, 16 November 1944, subject: Securit7 Regulations 

ror Pearl and Thumb Intelligence, are superseded by the incloased B.egW.ations 

tor Maintaining the Securit._y ot PINUP .Intelllgencoo 

2., This letter and. its 1nclosure will be made available onl,y to persons 

authorized to receiw PINUP Intelligence pursuant to the inclosed Rttgulat.ionso 

. . la Letter, NJ 3lloS (15 Nov 44)0B-.S .... J3..Mio 16 November 1944, subjectt 

Secur1t7 Regulations for Pearl and Thumb Intelligence, will be destro;ved b.r 

burning., ?lo report ot destruction is :requiredo 

4o Reproduction of this letter and iw 1nclosare ia proh:tbited.:> 

87 order ot the Secr.tar,y of War: 

l Inclo 

Regulat1onao 

- 50 ... 

/a/ Fd1rard F .. Wl\Bell 

EDWARD , 0 wrrsELL 

Ua3or General 

Acting Tho Ad.1utant Ganural., 

SECRET 
RE~ .....l:Q...\~556 

SEbK~ 1 QW:i 

~~ PW 

Rl!XJULA'l'IONS FOR MAINTAIHDD THE 

SECURITY OF PINTTP INT.b:LLIGEliCE 

lo Scope and Purposeo These Regulaticoa are dewigned to aateguard. the follcming types of inte1ligence: 

,!o Crzpt Intelliga:ic2: Information resulting f'rom the 

aolutim of SlfllV codes and ciphers,, unless such information baa 

been placed in a special category tor which separate regulations 

have bee iasuedG 

l!o Trattic Anal.yais 1 Information renulting from tho stud,y, 

abort of cr.rptana]3ais 8 or auav ctJIDDlUDication netwrka9 CODl'll'UDicaticn procedure, C1"3'ptographic procedure, and call signs coupled 

with the uae ot D/F and other technical aidso 

So Pffi!l &a!!guage: Into:rmatian resulting tram translations o~ m-v plain language traffic and a'bbreriated plain language intercepted en enemy military circuiteo Ccmmercial. plain language 

traffic :Le exclwled tzoa the aboYe detinitiano 

2o Securitrs '?he extreme import.a.nee ot Cr;ypt Intelligence, 

Traffic Ana.Jteis and Plain Language ae sources ot re1iable intormatim 

eonceming enmq actiuties and intentions has been repeatedl7 proTedo 

Preeenatian ot these C90urcea requires that the enetQ' be given no 

reason to suspect the degree ot our success in acquiring euch intell.1-

genceo If~ from arry documrint mich might tall into his hands,, 1'rcm allJ' 

meaeage be 111.ght intercept. from MJ' word revealed by a prisoner ot war9 

or trom. 8fl7 1lleoeonsiderecl actim taken upcn the basis ot such intellie 

gmce,, tm •-.r wre given cause to beline that his cOllmUDicaticns 

are not adequateq aateguardecl against the interception which he kriowa 

to be •ploJ'ed against bim.D ha llOuld ef'teot changes which wuld deprive 

ua ot lmowladge of hia operatiana en all frontao bix:treme can 111 

theretare required. in order to pres•rY• the eecurit7 ot nch intel.Ugece trm all unauthorized. perametJ and these regulatiaos are to bo 

strict)¥ obae"edo 

3o Code Wordo All aeaaa.gea or other documents tranmrd.tting Cr",J]Jt 

Intel.ligaice,, Trattic Anall'aia or Plain Language or aiv refermce thereto 

will ccnt.ain a code word to indicate the source and to insure handling 

in accordanctp with theae Regulaticmao The cod• word tor 017Pt. IntellJ..=. 

gence8 'lrattic Anaqaia and PlaJ.n Language is PDIUP c In tranmliasicma 

b7 wire OI' radio, the code Word 1fil1 be cr0cipb.erecl in the text0 

Ito Securitz of Code Wordo Tho meaning ot tbl nde wrd PDIUP 

ehall n~ be discloeecl to iD7-Person not. 41gible under th••• a • ..,. latims to receiTe PINUP Intell.igenceo It ahall bo the respansibility 

ot werr persm eligible to receive PlHUP Intel.ligencd to take all 

possible precautions to preserve the 111ecrec;r or the cod• 'WOrdo 

SECRET 
REF ID:~556 

SECRE1 

5o Classiticaticno All PINUP Intelligence will be classified 

SEOREro 

60 Authorized Recipient!o I 

.!o The leYela upcm which PINUP Intelligence may be disseminated, 

and the officers at 8D7 level eligible to receive it, are reatrictedo 

The peming principle is to limit disseminaticn cml1' to those who 

have absolute need ot the information tor the executian or their 

dutieso 

J?o Except as otherwise provided i.'l these Regulations. PINUP 

Intelligence will. not. be made available below the level of Corps 

or8 in the caae of Air Force tormaticns" below the lnel ot Group (British) or Wing (UoSo)o 

,So W1th1D bead.quarters aut)orized to receive PI.NUP Intelligence, 

it •7 be made aYailabl.e ml.J' to officers hold1ng the following poatas 

(l) Camna.nder and his Deput7 

Chief ot start and bis Deput7 

All Intelligence Officers 

Senior Operations statt Officer 

Senior Pl.ann1ng Staff' Of'ticer 

Sciior Signal Otticer 

Signal Intelligence Of'f'icera 

(2) Additicml officers absolutel.T necea15&17 tor its band ... 

ling and use within such headquarters, as specifically authorized 

in each instance bJ" the '?heater CQDllJ8nder who shall aatisfT himself as to the necessity therefor and as to the reliability ot 

the individuals concernedo 

(3) In exceptional circumstances making it imperative8 the 

Theater Canmand.er may authorize the passing of PINUP InteJ.11 ... gence to commands below the levels prescribed in subparagraphs 

)!.and ,!o abol'e, bu.t cnly it the physical security ot the r«P 

ceiving headquarters i• aaaured.o 

,40 Persons eligible 'to be recipients ot PINUP Intelligence in 

accordance with the foregoing provisions J1USt be thoroughq briefed 

in these Regulatione before such intelligence ia actual.Q' made 

available to thao 

7 o Tranaission and Han4M.u...&c 

.!o Messages containing PnIDP Intelligence or arrr reference 

thereto will be tran.Utted anl;r in crn>togra.plW: qstems 

... S2 = 

SECRET 
• 

REF ID:A66556 

• 8!'Bll:'lft SECRET 

epecitical.11' authorised tor that purpoaeo For Ua&o 1'orc•s 

•oh authorisation will be b.J" the Theater Canmander; tor 

Jhoitiah tore•• such authorisaticn will be b1' the Chief Signal 

Intelligence Service Otf'icer in the reapectiTe theatero 

l!o Docummta containing or reterring to PINUP Intel.11-

ga'lC• ehould be addressed cal1' to authorized recipieate bl' 

naao or appomtment and. marked an iriner CO'ftr "to be opened 

bJ' addreesee ~on Such docwnte8 :lnclud~ng cl"J'P'tographed nraiane, 11111 'be bumed 1-edi&t.0]¥ an.er- their uaetulneea 

ceaaeso At headquanere belaw Anq lnel tbia will n~ 

be ae aom ae th~r ccmt.ents ha.Te been absorbed b,r' those who 

haft to act upan thao SUch dOCUlllCts will taot be carried an 

the peram ot a recipient outside his headquarters, except as 

dictated b,y absolute neces11it7 o 

Co In order to aYo:ld aubjeet:lng these Regulations 

intelligence he.Ting leas stringent aecurit7 requirements, such 

intelligence should not be 1nc1ucled in the smae documents with 

PDIUP Intelligence,, e:mept when absolutel.7 neceau.170 

80 . Qperat:lans Baaed an .. PDJJP lnt!'lk~Uo Cwnders v1U 

take ..,_.,. preeautiaa to 1nmre th"t BDJ' aotian talctn upan the 

buia ot PDUP :rntelligence cannot be traced b7' the enav to this 

aourceo Fer ez:ample 9 appropriate land or air reconnaissance should 

be Wldertakci ldienenr pract1cable8 in such manner, and autticient]¥ 

1n adftllce ot the proposed actimD .0 that the enem.y is led to be11en that ouch recmnaiaaance tm:m.shed. the basis tor the acticn; 

and ard.era directing such recormaiaaan~e, as ve1l aa •7 other 

operaticmal orders baaed on PIIUP Intelligence9 mat nner contain · prec:lae namea, dates, t:Laea or other d.etaila Im.own ~ through these 

aourcea, and must be dispatched in high grade crn>tograpbic 111&teso 

Simi larll' 9 great care mat be taken :la briefing airplane crEMS8 in 

order that oal1' nec••8&17 detail.a are gl Tell th• and al1RQ"'• in a 

.tGl'll that cannot be traced. to thia aourceo 

9o Excepticns to Reatrict.icm! on pjas@in.at:l.990 It ie 

recognised tbat, t:roa tia• to tU., special cireumstancea 'Will 

require that persona not eligible under these Regulat.iaaa to become 

recipients of PDUP Intell1gcmce mil' 7R require in.t'omat1m der1Yed 

theretraa tor the proper pertormnco ot their dutieao Accordinw, 

the following exceptiona to tho rezstrictians embodied in these Regulations are authorized: • 

.!,o In Wire or Radio Me•sag9: When9 in the judgment ot 

the 'l'beater Ccnmnde, circmatances require that conclusicns 

baaed en PIIUP Intellig1nce be paesed to camands or peracanel other than thoae provided tor :1n paragraph 6 above, such 

ccncluaiona 97' be eo passed, eubject to the following ruless 

- 53 .... 

SECRET 
, 

REF ID:A66556 

SECRET 

(l) The eode word PIHUP will not be used.but the 

claaaiticatim SECm."T 1d.l.1 bo retained; 

(2) The conclusions will be so staated as to givo no 

ind:lca.ticn lfbatwor ot the aaarceo Special care muat be 

taken in this respect With Cr,vpt Intelligence to avoid azl1' 

apparent relation between tbe statement ot con.cluaiona and 

the content ol the en-. aeaeage m 1fbich the cancluaicm 

i• b&sed.J to this end no a.act atrengt.h figures, t.imea, or 

other precise details that have appeared 1D an en-.r me8aago 

will be included.o 

(3) Messages conta.ining euch conclu&ime will al.wqa 

be sdilt. 1n the cryptographic qsta or bigheat security 

avallableo · 

(4) The aesaa:ge will el.'"'7• include the expreae 

stipula.tion that tho concluicns mq be uaed by the 

recipiet onlT as the bssis tor operaticnal orders and 

shall not be given further disseminationo . lo In 0.£4.era of Ba;t tle .ti ,SUJJl!ll&l"ie_b. AERr_!!:c¥oticnD ed ~..ID!:. 

Documentai Whon., in the judgment of the ?heater Cammander, circ'Ull= 

stancee juatit7 the inclueicn ot conclusions deri..-ed troll Pl!WP 

Intelligence in 8D1' ar"der ot battle• •umm&r7.t apprec::latian or other 

si.m:U.ar document the distributian ot which is not restricted to the 

cCllDftl!Ulda and personnel provided. tor in paragraph 6 aboTe8 such cm= 

cluaiom 188¥ be eo UBed1 aubject, however, to the toll.owiJlg cmditicmsz 

(1) 'l"ho code word PIHUP will not be uaed.., but the 

claseification SmR.t"r will be retained; 

(2) The cmcluaions will be eo stated as to give no 

indicaticn mat.ever ot the aource (see sub-paragraph !: ( 2) 

above); 

the clocuJnlnt 

(J) The 

m 

further 

which thq 

diasadnation 

are thus permitted 

ot auch conclusions 

to appear will 

~ 

be prohibited., 

lOo Per1pel Iiandl.!94.,P!tJY.e ~!ll!P-!C!u 

!.o Perecmnel whose duties inclw:le ccyptographing9 transmit ting, tiling., or handling aoanages or other docwunta requir«l 'b7 ttieee Regulations to qontain the word PINUP will be kept to 

the m1nillua number necesaar.r o 

SECRET 
-===-=---------------- ~ - REF ID:A66556 

SECRET 

Jlo Before mdertaking their dut.iea, so.ch peraamel will 

be caref'ul.q' briefed• to ineure an understanding ot the CGDtent . and iJapart;ance ot these Regulationeo 

£0 The handling ot PIWP Int.uigence will be restricted 

to coaiaaicmed peraonne1 inso:f'ar aa poasible9 bu.t 

(1) e.nllsted pereonnel mq pertOl"JL\ the neceasar.r 017ptographic duties :llnolved in the tranmdsaicm of PINUP InteW.-

gence provided the7 ban the no:rmal aecurit7 clearance 

required b,y their respective services, and proricled the 

requirement.a of nb-sparagrapha .! and s aboYe an obsC"Tedo 

( 2) men sq otticer wbo 1a a recipient ot PIRUP lnteUJ.-

gence ltha1l require enlisted personnel to assist h:lm :ln the 

handling ot aucb materia10 and when their duties do not 

inolme the c17J>'tograpb:lng of aesaages, he J1Q' make appli- cation to the Theater Ccrmander tor permiseica to use auch 

personnel and suc:h permission mq be granted upm the peracnal. 

guaranty ot the ot.tlcer requesting such permiasim aa to the 

relia.'bil1t7 ot llUCh personnel, and isubject to the 1m.derlill1dng 

ot wch officer thoroup]¥ to brief such personnel. in theae 

Regula1;icms before any such use ahall be made ot their aerr.lceso 

llo Peracrmel ProducilM P1'UP Intel.lkm.s!o Nothing in these 

Regulaticaa shall be construed to prohibit signal intelligence personnel direct:Q' engaged in tile proclucticn ot PINUP Intelligcce frma 

baring access to such intelligence to the extent necesaar.r tor the 

proper performance ot ther respective duties., 

120 Questions Concsnin& Regplftiqo All questima with respect 

to the interpretation er applicatim ot these Regulations which cannot 

be disposed of 'bJ' the Theater Cmaander. ehoulcl be directed b.r hia8 

through the most secure channela9 to the Aseiatant Cbiet oE statt11 G-2, 

War :Deparl;!ant o 

l3o D1atritzution ot },lee.tioat.o To preserve eacrecy it is essential that tbe d1atribut.1an of thia document be lillited to those who 

require it in order to ul'eguard. the eecwit7 ot PDIUP Intelligenceo 

-'' -

SECRET 
9,UTSIDE THiATER 

SSA 

SSA 

Waahinr.to1 

aahington 

QClcCS 

London 

other 

Thaatera 

REF ID:A66556 

us Crypt 

rganizatic 

(a) 

DISSEMINaTiliG 

AGl!;;,CJ: 

(b) 

(a) u.s. and British or;,itana.tysi..; organizati..:.ns may be 

oornbined uhen s!tU'ltion permits. 

(b) May ..ie separ:ito U.iti. ani J"itish disseminating acenciea 

v1hon s1 tU:ttion re .uires. · (c) As aut::orized !)Ursuant to r.oeuJ.a":-1ons, 

{d) Includes D.~.I. India anJ .i.uotralia 

Ot.bor 

JfA.l'a \c) 

Arzq 

Group 

Brit 

H~'s 
• 

CHART SHOWING Ll!."VELS OF COllIRT DISSEllIN.A'l'ION "ITHIN US ARM? 

OIBD-PEARL 

PEARL 

ftlJMB 

I?rrELLIGENCE SlJJIJWW'.S 

,, PARAPHRASE OR ORIGIBAL - - - - - - PARAPHRASE om.I 

A:i!PENDIX 111" to ENCLOSURE "B" of Deport or USCIB Security Comlittee SC B-JS/14 

... S1 CD 

AFSA FORM 781-C105 

6 JUL 51 TOP SECRET SUEDE 

• 
TOP SE0RE'P'6

&e'EDE 

OPmA.'l'IClfAL USE AND VALUE OF ULTRA(l) 

lo Extract fraa a report; compiled at the War statim &lgland 

antitled 11The Use ot Ult.ra Intel.ligence by U. s. A'1.'DfT CCllD!Dands in the 

European Theater ot Operatiaaa" g 

1150 Operational. value ot ul.tra: 

"Paragraph ?ofo of the Marshall letter charged the repre- s,mtat~ves with presenting ultra intelligence 'in useable tarm• and 

with giving advice in ccmnection with mak:blg operaticmal use of ito 

_The experiaice of the EfO repreaentatiYes ehows that the reliable 

guiding intluence ot ultra in working With other intelligence auttve1ghs it• value as a separate and distinct source ot operational 

intormaticmo Ita normal tuact.im 1a to mable the repreemtative 

and hie recipients to salect the correct :tnf'orm.a.ticn tram the huge 

mse ot aigint, P/W, agent,, recaanaiasance and p~ograpbic reportso 

Ultra ia the guide and the censor to concluaiCllUJ arrived at b.r means 

ot open :J.nt.elligmce1 at t.he llallle time the latter ia a secure vehicle 

bJ' which ultra mq be dissaWl&ted. uader cover, •It i.& import.ant t.o 

protect sovce1 it is also important to get the last. bit ot explo1taticm9 the ultinate f'rc:a 111.tra ccaaistent 'Mith aecurit.70 8 

"And ultra often did haYe a direet operational valueo The 

reports liat man7 emples ot ultra 1ntormat:lm which va11 ot nch 

immediate Yal.ue that the ehorteat poasible atepa ( •ogo aerial reccmnaiasance) were used to transl.ate it. into eptn intelligence so that 

operaticnal action eauld be take at. ancea In some few :lnataneea9 

Allied air nperiorit7 waa such that target :l.ntormatim coulcl be ez.... 

ploited at ,once, Vi.tho.& UT need tor COYU"o Thus,, :In a period \!Ihm 

the t.act.:1cal ail' commands were dd:b' attacking in.habited loc•1;ltiea 

a dozm mUes behind the tl"aat. • a mesuge stating that a Oerlll&n dicoo 

Yiaian wa11 ••••bling in a giYen Yillage oauld 'be cGDYerted to act.im 

.tmediatalT b.Y :including that YiUage in the liat ot targets tor the 

na.t format.icn t.o go out.a• (Volo IIo Part II., PPo 2?9=280)0 

~~~---~~---~~-~----~--~~~=~--~-~~--~o 

(l)Extraeta are quoted troa the "Repart ot Special. Securit7 Operatian• · OYeraeaa•o See llfCIDSJRE "B", Nate (9)o 

APPDDIX 11rn to .ilf CIDSUBI "B" ot Report ot USCD Security Camnittee 

SC...B 35/U+o See DICLOSURE •B11

8 Paraa Sob., 

AFSA FORM 781-ClOS 

6 JUL 51 TOP SECRET SUEDE 
.. 

2o Extract traa tinal report ot SSO with Ninth Air Force: 

AFSA FORM 781-ClOS 

6 JUL 51 

"Nm=-Ultra Materials 

"It ie so obri.owsq true that Ultra is but cme aamg many 

sources ot :l.nt elligence that a diacueeicn ot tuaicn ot nan...Ultra 

aterials with Ultra would be interminable., The principles of 

fusion ot thie intelligence with others are not. unique.. The 

sole unique feature is the aecurit.y requirement that it ~ dme 

in a cool,, dark placeo Thia question i8 really prel:1ndpar,y to a 

diacusaim ot disseminatim ot Ultra to recip:Lent•o 

"In Nin.th Air Force, intelligence f'rca all sources waa avail.a= 

ble at. all times and was searched constant~.. Regarding air order 

ot battle, it was routine to examine the t0Uowing1 

(1) Photo reccnnainance report of air.field coverage as 

aunmarissed in the D~ Airfield Intrepa, plus se.. 

lected detailed report&o 

(2) P/w interrogatim reportso 

(3) Telephone and W/T reports ot sightings and incidentso 

(4) Repwt. of "Y" activit;ro 

(5) All poop eheete, charts and prepared matter ot intelli= 

gence nature emanating trva Air Ministr,y9 SHAEP, or 

ot.ber organisatic:a or eonmmdc 

I 

"With regard to intelligence other than that relating to air 

order of battle,, tam1Uar1t7 with the intolUgence materials and 

procedures ot all ~her eect.ime ot the Headquarters became a 

necessit79 and the use ot auch nca....Ultra •teriala 11181' best be 

mentioned under the auc:ceediag eectian ot this paper<>" 

* * * 

"Purportedl.7 8 the aource• of thia intelligence were princ:l.palq radio traffic anaq-eies but. al.80 PW interrogatim report.a, 

photo recaanaiasance,. crew report.a. and miscellaneous eourceao ActuaJ.11'" Ultra played a m.jar part. in the dev~@pment ot all the•o 

ilUJlll8riee9 apprec:iati:ana8 and op:lnhmao Ultra was a guide and a 

censor to canclueiana arri.Yed at DJ' meana ot other eri.dence8 eapecialq Y nideaceo Ccm'eraeq8 Y was a aoet excellent. cover bi 

vhicb Ultra intell:l.gtnce ot OB,, d1apositima9 and taetica could b4I 

masked and dias-1Datedo 

"A fflW aamples k\ll d•Q!Ultrateo 

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"Short~ after jet aircraft began to operate tactical.17 m 

the West Frmt, it became apparent. in Y that each time jets were 

detected active convent1oaal fighters were also up» remaining in 

rear areas en aome undisclosed m111siano Ultra iDdicated that the 

conventional fighters vere ~g airi'ield cover tor jets during 

take-off and lan:lingo Thus,, the I staff could issue the appreciatim» the ~guess' that fighters were screening jet airf1elda 

dnring the times that jete vere ua:S.ng themo 

"Whm in J&nu1U7 a high percentage ot the eru11v tighter 

gruppen was withdrawn trom the Wese. to combat the Russian otteo.-

ai:n, it ~· at oace .indicated trom I tra.ti'ic ana]¥ais t.bat a reductim of tore:• lad been accmpliahed, and it. was clear which 

'bale area• were no lmger actiYeo .Frca the latter tact it could 

be eatabliahed. what. unit.a had. been withdrawn, with a fair degree 

ot pr~ie1cno BT deduct1cn then,, using I alone, a good app.reciatim was poasiblen However,. with Ultra at band to guide the deductin pZ"OC:ese•Bo the t atatt cau.ld speak out wi'h an assurance 

U1d. a degree of preciaim not poseible othel"Wiaeo These aame proceaaee were gone through,. not CXll7' in January, but throughout the 

WU'J 'Nbenever Ultra indicated a baa• ebange, a withdrawal.9 or a 

r•intarcement bJ" a un1t. eridmce would be looked tar .in r 80 that 

the tact coUld be diastlliDated trm an ope aouroe; conTerael¥, 

1lben Y BUggested. a changed s:Ltuaticn., Ultra would. be read tor 

oontil"at01'7 mdence or for precise detailao 

"'! direc\icu-.t.lnrling apparatus permits the eatab11ehment ot 

baa• area.a ot c_,- mite, wt wen a number o:r airfield.a are can ... tained in a Ytlq anall area it i• eel.clan possible to D/F the -.act. 

fieldo Ultra, :bl euoh casea9 told ue the a:aGt tield9 and pezmit ted the Y start to make another accurate 0gueaa0 " 

"Th••• .... maor examples., and not speo:lal~ good an••· ot the 

applicatic:n ot Ultra t.o Yo There were ~. mAJ' related circWDa> 

stances :ln llbich authoritat.1Ye opin:lclaa were expreased9 based o:st.tnaibl;r an Y (~ photo recce 11 or PW interrogat:l.m) Snt.el.μ.gence,. 

mt aotuall.1 supported bJ' Ultrao Had Ultra not. lain unaeen in the 

baclcgzound 11817 ot t.he expressed opinicna would either not. ban 

bwen risked at all or wuld bave been rmdered with lees assurance, 

orin.g to th& acrapw _. iacanclui"h qual:lt.7 ot the Y intelligaicea 

During the past ;rear few dafa passed dw:lng Which Ultra did not; 

insert. it.selt into tho est.imtea anc1 opi&dm• ot the Y atatto 1' 

eridmce ie often not; complet.eJ.ir concl.uiT•o Like other open llOWC••,, it ia often trap1111tU'J' and pend.ta ot more than me al.-

t.emati't'• conel.uaicno Ultra iuur•• that. the correct altel'll&t1Y• 

ie aelactecl_, Thus Ultra ia the guide and canaor tor Y9 and at. the 

MIDI tae the latter ia a secure T•hiole lV' whidl TJJ.tra mq be disseminated under coTero Thia point ia not to be under-eat.imateclo 

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11It is important to protect eource; it. is al.so important to get 

the laa'ta bit ot exploitatim. the ultimate from Ultra consistent 

with security" Y ie a first class COTer tor such exploitatica,, 

"It all the foregoing may be called indirect aid to Y by 

Ultra, there waa also the direct support~ Occasionally Ultra 

signals contained valuable information directl.¥ relating to radio 

frequencies, call-signae times or tranllllli.aaian by ground ataiiion•. 

and like teclmic:alitieso When such signals contained COIBpletely 

technical intonaatim relating to cypher tables. kq sheets., frequencies, cal.l-aigna, etco• of interest cnlT to ai~al intelJJ.... 

gence, 1t was the polic;r of BP to address them directq to the 

aigint etatta at SHAEF, 2nd 'l'AF, and Hinth AF" These stat.f's would 

then mnage to impart the needed adnce to the technical I peraonnelo That aectica at BP, under S/L Sad.th, which prepared the 

special signals tor Y starts are to be ccmmended tor their attectiveneas to t.he needs ot the ft.eld. Y eerviceo n (Volo II9 

P&l't I, PPo 305 and 313-.315) 

3o Extract firm final report ot SSO with Ninth Tactical Air Cammanda 

"IV o OP.WTICllS 

Ao EHPIIJIMED'? 

"Moat :lapartant in the mplo,yment ot ULTRA intelligence ia 

that it be collated with other lower le'f'el materialo :Seaidea 

Specia1 Intelligence,. 1ntorm.t1m trca all aourcea = higher head ... quarters, adjacent conmande,, pilots reports,, air P/w intrerrogationa• photo interpretations,, neual. reccea, signal intelligence 

( •y•) • captured document a. ground eourcea, agenta9 and c1'riliana - JlllDt be utilised.o AB &'f'aila'bl.e evidence muet 'be collected and 

fused together to produce the answers to the Eee111tial Elements 

ot Into:mat;iono 

H'fo bring together all information ~om:em:lng the enem;r and 

grind it 1Dto meaningful intelligence was the real lliesian ot this 

Recipient at IX TACo It thie recognilled conc8P\Iao is understood, 

then the u.e ot ULTRA Sntelligenco operatima.117 at this field 

ec.aand ll8l' Dke aeneeo 

11The ot&e ot this ULTRA Spec1al1at 11enecl as the t1aasabl3 

roca9 tor :lnformatim wherein collecting and tuldng was doneo Here 

all repaM;a ot other CGllmanda, pilot•• recce, P/wa8 etco were sent 

tor perueal and ooll.at.icno The Writer•s concepticm 111 that there 

are tM> intelligcee pictures - cme, the ULTRA Source. ancl the 

otber8 the general open 90Ul'C•o The 0aaambl.y roc:a" was t.be place 

where an et.tart was •d• to build up the general intelligence picture to the ULTRA leYel b7 ascertaining the extent to which ULTRA 

itma bad been secv~ rnealed by open eourceao" 

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* * * 

nkcover• tor ultra activities was prOYided through the 

medium of the CGoAoFo Sect.ion1 o This officer acted as aeltappointed ~expert.• m all matters relating to the GoAoFo All 

inf'ormtion from nan-ultra sources relating to eneaw airtield•a 

aircratt., air order ot batt1e. technological developnents, etco 

'were routed to the otficer, and various articles were written 

from time to time in the dail3' A-2 periodic report ( trca open 

aources) an the strength and d1apoaitim or various parts ot 

the G.,A..,Fo and en the serviceability ot airtieldso Thus the 

receip\; of ultra intelligence was kept well submerged. in other 

1&ttera from open eourcea relating to the GoAoF. in generalo 11 

(Vol.. II. Part Io PPo .3Sl and 379) 

4o Extract .trma tinal repcrt ot SSO with First Tactical Air 

Force(Pro'V'isic:inal.)s 

"a) Place ot Ultra In Intelligence... Ultra was the moat 

important source ot intormat.im to TACAF just aa it mat have 

bem to a11 other m.jor cammnda in Europ•o In writing about 

the place of ultra at aae command there ia an inevitable temenc7 

to ooapare the value ot the messages receiYed at the cOlllUlld1a 

SlU link 1dth tile vaJ.ue ot the comand'• photograpb;r,, sig:lnt Ol'" 

PW'•-> 'l'hD attmpt to anawer in this aim.ple fashion the trequmt questic:n 1bow .taportant waa it?• leaves out of the weighing the "llfVT impartant. guiding :lnnuenfte llhich ul~ exeroiaecl 

an each headquarters through other head.quart.erso For :J.nst1P1C• 

th• widel.7 circalated Sha.et WeekJ1' Target Intelligence Report with 

its priority list• ot tue15 arrmm:l.tian and o:rdnance dumps was almost ~llpleteJ.y reliable and quiakq respanaiTe to ult.rao Iet., 

it was neTer looked upcin at TACAF as part ot the ultra pict.ureo 

Or almllarll' an airfield attack 511ggeated b,y t.he Ninth Air Force 

through open channele uaua.iq contormed with what. I 1RJUl4 baY• 

selected .troa 111.tra records at TACAF o 

n1t appears to 'be oo~ accepted among field recipients 

t.bat the reliable guiding influence ot ultra in workmg with other 

intelligence out.weigha its value &11 a source ot operaticnal int~ 

•tim., Aa instances cited by Gardner ahw 9 it doe• baye opera.- ticnal Yal.ue wt it• naral tmctiGa ia to enable me to select 

the correct 1ntormat1cn baa the huge •e• ot PW. agent, recce 

and phatograp!v reporliao 11 (Volo II .. Par I, ppo 386-lS?) 

'o Fmiract trom final report ot SSO with Pirat Allied Airbol'De Aftt1'1 

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' 

.. ., ) 

"The •in impartance ot ul\ra int-1.JJ.gmoe with the lst 

Allied. Airborne Arm7 cansist.ed. primariq ot turuiehing a con .... 1'1rmator;r touclation tor the campilatim and issuance ot enemy air appreciat1cna applicable to GAF roact:l.CJD.1 possible CO'QDtermeaaures and strength ot oppositicn attect:ing cont•plated airbome operaticna in various are&•J each plarmed parachute drop 

and glider landing naturall1' calling tor reTieed. or entireq new 

appreciationao It 1a obrioua that ultra air intelligence was in-= 

Taluable 1n writing these appreciatims, :In that it .tu.miahed the 

necessary confirmation ot German Air .Force Order ot Battle, strength 

ot operaticmal aircraft, type of aircraft, scale ot ettort, etco 

For each planned operatim,, two appreciaticn• wre writtanJ one 

based entireq Gl'l ultra tor perusal and atwv by the General staff 

and cne written in generalised •open' terms tor di11smdnatian down 

to Corpe Ccmnandera and DiTiaicnal G-21 sn 11 (Volo 119 Part I, p.392) 

6:> Extract trom tin• l repcrt ot SSO With SeYenth An\YI 

nThe ultra apec1al.1at was expected to be currently fam1 JBr 

with intormatic:m troa other sources, mt at no time was it desired 

that hi.a 'brietiJ2ge include a •rging ot ultra and other intonatian.. This dist1nct1m •11 cl.oe.:Q' drawn by the G-2• both tor 

re&BOne ot secur1t7 and because the merger ot all eources ot 1zl... 

tormaticn was accamplished in other WB.7•" At the Snenth Artq 

tbe chief ot the Ol"der ot batt.le section was a recipict and the 

8opming up• ot ultra was bis prim.17 reapcna1bil1t7o Estimates 

of the en_,. aituatim were prepared b,r' still another otticer iD 

the combat intelligence secticaa and ultra vaa injected into these 

eetiates ot eneav capa'b111t1ea "1' intarmal. conaultatian with the 

G-20 Target into:rmatian der1Yed trm ultra prwided no problem 

for it had been agreed between the G-2 and the A-2 ot llI 'l'act1cal Air CamneM9 m.ppcrt:Lng the Sevmth Anq, that all ultra 

targete 'NOUld be handled b7 the Air Forceo With order ot battle9 

eatimtes, and targets F09ided tor in the above manner,, the r ... 

•inin& ultra required little or no oorrelation with other mtor-

•ticnc.11 (Volo II, Part II, Po 448) 

7o Eld.ract from t:l.nal repGl"t- ot SS> with Eighth Air Forces 

•It is ditticult to compare Ultra with intonatiCJD from. other 

aourcea, aince it resembled. none ma:ept. repcrta trca Allied agmtso 

It actual.q amounted to being able to read the ll1nda ot moat ot the 

top Oentan aUitar.r leaders a comid.erable part ot the timeo Ultra 

coaplemented other t7pe• ot intorma.ticn and th.,- prcrtidecl a con= 

et.ant check GD its conUnued accura@70• (Yol,. II9 Part II, Po4?1) 

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.. 

TOP SE@ltl9~l1"EDE 

So Jxtract from tina.l report ot SSO serving the ground and air 

forces ot the Tmth A:nv during the Oldnawa campaign in t.he Pacific 

Theater: 

npertinent ULTRA. was passed to Corps in the tom ot operaticnal orders b,r Cammrmder Amphibious Forces comnanding Taak 

Force Fift7 One, the Ol'erall ccimmander during the amphibious 

phase ot the operationon (Vol,,. IV, po 86.3) 

9o Extract from final report ot SS> •erring with the XXIV Corps 

1n the Pacifica 

"ULTRA intel.ligaice on a tactical level ia needed by an 

independmt]¥ operating Oorpo o SUch a Corps should have an SSOo 

In the past ULTRA has bem ot •alue to Corpe ground troops,, though 

its prime.17 Yalue haa been to air and naval commandao In a larger 

«>mbat. zone an az'll1'.t however, ahoald have no d1t.f1cult7 in passing pertinent intormaticra to subordinate Corps t.hrou&h operaticmal 

orders and regular signal channelao Thia was done in the E'l'O ••• 

Thl"ougbout the operatim the Corpe G-2 and 09 detiniteq desired 

to aee and naluat• all ULTRAo This was torc1bJ.1" expreaaed during the tirat. three weeks When Corps had almost. aole charge ot 

the fighting respans:l.bi.lit70 Corpe will therefore oppose 8JJ7 

poliq that would force rel.1ance an the Taguer operatianal mes- ~· Tere:1cn rather than perecaal view or the raw ULTRA o. o 

(Volo IV, PPo 881-882) 

lOo Extract frail report ot visit to the Mediterranean Theater SSO•a: 

"ULTRA vmsus arHER FORMS OF DlTELLIGbXCE 

ncn one point 8Yft'IGIJ.• 'ri.eitecl and interri.ewed -· in accordo 

That la, that special. intelligence JllWlt be wsed !!! con;JunctiCB with 

other larru ot in.telllgcceo A full and cmplete knowledge and. 

understanding ot Phcto Reccmnaiesance,, Prisoner ot War l'nterroga- ticn, OSS Agent 1 • Reports., lWU.o Intercept, et.co are 'Vital in 

m'der tO' deriTe the max1Jmm Yal.ue tr• Sou.rcen 

"There is no la.ck ot appreciaticn ot Special Intelligaice in 

the Mediterranean Theater tor those people know and admit that it 

WClll the Battle ot Horth Africa tor the and that it is the moat 

import.ant single intelligence factor a'lailablea But tbe7 likewise 

oounael the iapartanco ot not relJ'ing en tbie &lane,. but rather 

ut:Uis1ng it to substantiate intorma.ticm. received tJ"all. other -.irces 

and. to -.pl.07 ®her eourcea :Ln obtaining intelligence alreacv 

eatabliahed 'bJ' vltraQ 

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"An :l.ndiTidual ot.f'icer with no general combat :l.Dtelligence 

backgrotmd cannot be 1 bathed in the blood or ttse lamb' and thereb,y 

be mde :Into a trul.1' valuable special intelligence otticero Key 

intelligence otticera "liaited counseled without dissenaim that 

such recipients Dlllat be mm with wide experience in ordina17 c<DP 

bat inte.lligcceo Learning to ue the special 1m top ot• general 

intelligmce is a task 1n itaelt, and the special inteWgence otticer should not be handicapped b.Y' a lack ot lmowledge and understanding ot the capabUit1ee11 limitatima, empl.OJ'1181lt9 and productivity ot these other f'orma ot :lntelligenceG 

"The ultimate aim. m nery intelligence aecticm is to build 

the ordinary intelligcce picture up to the leYel ot the special 

intolligmce pictureo Thia not CXJl1' requin•s init:l.atin and 111-

gcuity' but a broad know1edge ot general intelligenc•o Just aa 

me must have particular backgzround md train.mg :1n the interi:retaticn and evaluatic:m ot special .intellJ.sence, it is essential 

that tho chosen recipient have a background in general intolli ... 

gen.coo 

"The greatest alue which the specia1 intelligence otticer 

can be to the headquarters which he is eerYing• is to be conatantl,y 

dweloping and exploiting (in a legitimate manner) tho general. 

intelligence which he knows has been confirmed b.v Saurceo Likewise 

:ln guiding the enplAJ;plent of other intelligence sources in order to 

bu.Ud up the general intelligence picture and bring to t.be knowledge 

and WI• ot all intelligence personnel the informaticn invoJ.vedo To 

inft.uenee the genera1 intelligenoe piet.ure according~ the special 

in1;elligence otficer must know these aourcee inti•teq :1n order to 

avoid compromise and to dniae proper coyer for bis BOW:'C• ot knowledgeo Thi• is the .£.!!! cha.119{&• :bl the job cmf'rmting the 

special intelllgence oft:lcero" Volo II, Part Ilg pp:i 594-595) 

llo Extract. boll another repart ot viait to the Mediterranean Theater 

"On me point tbese people were all unanimualT agreed; next 

to •ecur.l.t7 itaelt.!) the moat impcrtant conaiclerat1cn ill connecticn 

with this :intelligence ie that it be collated wit.h lower level 

atatt. and that it be interpreted tor the operational people b7 

intelligence otticere taaiU-ar with ita pittalla, trained :1n :f.t• 

interpretaticm, alJd experienced :l.n ita uaeo Luard was especiaJl1' 

atrcng m tbia point and .aphaaised the tact that it could mialead 

an inexperienced hand as ottc aa it could enlighten hia - he is 

therefore placing ... mo ban •rked Clll it. tor acme time under 

h1118elt in the poaiticn of recipients in the more forward HQO •11 

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.. I\. 

f 

TOP SEeRET6~EDE 

"On ccnd.deration ot the above, it was interesting to me that 

eome 16 recipients at 15th ArfA'1' Group HQ, more than h&l.t were Intel~gence PersGnnel, and that ot the rema:inder8 which included 

.Alexander and his C of S and his a-,,, YfJ17 tew of them ever maw 

C17 ot t.he criginal itemso Their being 1 in the picture• entit.ltX! 

tbem to raain in Alexander's 9:00 staf'r meeting attar all the nan ... authorized peracmnel trapped. out,, and to hear the daiq G-2 ap-o 

preoiatim based on thi• materialo Of course Alexander himself 

could sea &D1'tbing-he lJlted, and baa bad ccnaiderabl• experience 

with the material, mt he relies m bis G-2, Brigadier Aier.r8 and 

the persoanel under biJll to interpret the atutf tor himo In the case 

ot 5th Artq,, as I baYe al.react¥ reported, even the G-3 ia not in the 

picture; moreover,, it ia large.'1.7 itans containing OB information 

vbich are act there direct fro.JI BPo Material requiring more collatim and interpret.aticm, such aa infOl'llatlm about eneaDy' 1upJ>l1" 

and coJlllllUDicationa,, as a rule reach 5th Al'IQ' HQ cal1' in the tom 

ot appreciaticm from AFHQ and fra 15th Artq Group. who haTe more 

aterial available and larger intelligence personnel. t.'o work it 

'11> in usea.ble and intelligible t'omo As tar as the •ccwer0 tor 

OB and other intomation aYailable !'roll this aource is coa.cemed., 

that is ingeniowsq 1110rked out b,y the men wo prepare the various 

appreciatiCXl8o AFHQ UJ' know that a certain diviaicn is being sent 

:Into the line facing Sth or 8tb Ara7J depending an the aount or 

collateral intelligmce indicating such an 91'18111V' reintorcement 9 

thtF •7 ha.Ye to aa:r that photo recce suggests such a move., or that 

N interrogation places a certain di'Yiaian in a certain area suggesting its possible movement into the line (in both cases the PR 

and PW CIO'Yer mu.st be genuine} or they mQ" have to sq •impq that 

in Yiev of the caBUaltiea lmawn to ha"Ye been auttered 'h1' the en_,. 

1n a giTm area. reinforcement is like}¥., and any one ot the 5 diri•ian• lcnoMn. to be available are m.aitimed a.a poasibl.e tor movement - aae ot which will be the actual cne known to be ordered upo 

Aa 80Cll •• contirmatiaa an a later le'Yel. is received the bean.a can 

thm be apUledo" (Volo II, Part II,, PPct 609=6U) 

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