REF ID:A39392 

If the Soviet Union actually· has mastered produc· 

tfon of the hydrogen bomb, as Premier Malenkov 

claims, it is a severe jar to the comfortable debate 

over the H-bomb policy within the Eisenhower Ad-

.. ministration. Of course, it is possible that Malenkov's 

assertion before the Supreme Soviet was propaganda 

designed to bolster public confidence during the in· 

ternal struggle for power. The announcement 

la curious, coinciding as it does with the denunci· 

ations of Beria; for in addition to his secret police 

duties the depose4. B~rla supposedly was in charge 

of the Soviet atomic energy program. . 

But the last time a Russian official made a similar 

announcement-when Foreign Minister 'Molotov disclosed obliquely in November, 1947, that the Western 

monopoly of the atom bomb had ceased to exist-the 

Russian boast turned out not to be a bluff. In the ab· 

aence of the actual explosion of a Soviet hydrogen 

weapon, it no doubt will be difticult if not impossible 

for American authorities to check Malenkov's statement with any precision. But we should have learned 

by now the price of overconfidence; and in the absence Of proof as to how far the Russians have gone 

with the H-bomb, our defense policy must now be 

based on the assumption that they have it. 

This assumption confronts the Administration, the 

American people, and indeed the whole Western 

world witl;l the necessity f-0r momentous decisions. It 

is no secret that this country exploded a thermonu· 

clear device-the forerunner of a hydrogen bomb-in 

the Pacific last fall. The explosion was phenomenally 

successful; the force bas been estimated as equiv· 

alent to that from three to five million tons of TN'f 

as compared with 20 thousand tons for the atomic 

bomb detonated . at ltiroshi:ma. But the Soviet an· 

. nouncement has ended abruptly any confidence in 

American monopoly even for the brief period of a 

year. What it has done is to lessen or destroy the 

·~eri~n bargaining position, as well as to compress. 

drutlcally the time in which the Administration must 

_.. evglve an H-bomb policy. · 

• 

Malenkov's claim does not necessarily mean that 

the R~ssia?s have a refined hydrogen weapon. But the 

eru~tions. ~n the satellites are a misleading index to 

Soviet military strength. American scientists have a 

profound respect for Russian scientific innovation and 

adaptation-as evidenced in the atom stockpile, th~ .. 

MIG fighter plane,· the newly obsenred jet bombers 

and a Soviet all-weather figbter._Russia has the long • 

range bombers necessary to carry an H-bomb attack to 

this country; her growing submarine fleet may afford 

another ~eans of delivery of hydrogen weapons. 

Even in the absence of specific information then i! is possible to list in general terms the ;lterna: 

t1ves forced upon us. One is to think to our air and 

sea def'enses as we have never thought before in 

terms of national survival. For there is now an absolute pre~ium on the first strike. If a few hydrogen 

b.ornbs-m the absence of effective interception-could 

literally flatten every important center in the country 

the .f~ct ~hat we might be able to retaliate in mutuai 

annihilation of the Soviet Union would be little consolation. , 

To make an effective air defense would require an 

approach radically different from that we- are now 

pursuing. The probable interception rate of enemy 

planes, under current conditions, is estimated at 10 

percent or less. Project Lincoln and the K~lly report 

have held out the promise of a workable air defense 

by making use of certain new technologiCal advanc~ -but at the cost of many billions of dollars. Adoption 

of such a program would mean the jettisoning of 

every current idea regarding the budget and the im· 

position at the very least of many new and unpredictable burdens on the economy. 

The other alternative, however remote, is a really 

foolp~oof system of world disarmament, with rigid in· 

spection everywhere. Obviously this is the preferable 

wa! if it is attainable. But disarmament would re· 

quJre .far more earnestness than has been put into 

the atillborn efforts so far, and far more strenuous 

endeavors to reach realistic accommodation with the 

Soviet viewpoint. In this connection the Administration may now want to reconsider its opposition to a 

top-level meeting of beads of state. Events may now 

w.m~t such a conference in the hope of obtaining 

some common denominator of agreement . 

. Possi~ly it will be necessary to work along both 

Imes su~ultaneously. The approach must be one of 

pragmatism rather than of panic. But the situation 

c~lls for leadership of the highest order. Now is the 

time for the Administration to discard its inhibitions 

and give the people the fullest information about the 

hydrogen bomb. For Americans have the courage to 

face the facts. The one thing that would be inex· 

cu~able would be a policy of drift in ~e hope that this 

evil spector of destruction will somehow blow away. 

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