~-'. """ "1 COURT OF APPEALS D;V :

STATE OF WASHING"! CM 

### 2013APR29 AH10= 03

IN THE COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

INRE THE MARRIAGE OF: ) No. 69896-6-1 ) ELIZABETH MARIE PARKER, ) DIVISION ONE ) Petitioner, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) v. ) ) JAMES BRIAN PARKER, ) ) 

### Respondent. ) FILED: April 29. 2013 Spearman, A.C.J. —James Parkerappeals the trialcourt's determination that he failed to remove his ex-wife's namefrom their mortgage "forthwith," as was required by
an amendmentto their Decree ofDissolution. Becausethetrial court's findings offact 

### are supported by substantial evidence inthe record, and those findings inturn support the court's conclusions of law, we affirm. FACTS James and Elizabeth Parker divorced in February 2007. The decree of 

### dissolution of marriage awarded the family home to the parties as tenants in common, and the home was to remain on the market until sold. James was 

### required to pay the mortgage, taxes, and insurance until sale. James becameNo. 66538-3-1/2 delinquent in support obligations under the decree, eventually resulting in three separatejudgments against him. The house did not sell for over a year. In December 2008, the parties 

### agreed to amend the decree. The amended decree provided that James was to 

### purchase Elizabeth's interest in the home and cause her name to be removed 

### fromthemortgage "forthwith."1 Hewas also totransferownershipofhis401(k) to Elizabeth. Elizabeth was to forgive James' obligation to pay the judgments 

### against him. The amended decree also provided that should James notcomply with itsprovisions, "the judgments will be reinstated pursuantto a motion on the court's motion docket." CP 55. 

### At trial, a lendertestified she had agreed to provide James with a loan to 

### purchase Elizabeth's interest, but that she required a quitclaim deed. Additionally, she testified she told James the opportunity for financing would 

### expire in mid-January 2009. According to James, this iswhy he askedElizabeth tosign aquitclaim deed. Theparties disputed whetherElizabeth understood the deed was necessaryforJames to obtain the loan.

1Theamended decree provides: The title to the home shall be transferred to the husband in"as is" condition and he shall forthwith cause the wife's name to be removed from the underlying mortgage, freeing herfrom responsibilitytherefrom, andin anyeventheshall hold herharmless from such obligations, including but notlimitedto any costs, attorneysfees and any other lossor damage as aresultofanydefaulton the obligation. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 55.No. 69896-6-1/3
Elizabeth provided James with a quitclaim deed inApril 2009, although the deed was inadvertently defective. James did not obtain financing and did not 

### purchase Elizabeth's interest. As such, James did notcause Elizabeth's name to be removed fromthe mortgage until the house was sold on the markettwoyears later, in June 2011. After the house sold, James moved to have funds from the sale of the 

### house disbursed to him. On grounds that James had failed to complywith the amended decree, Elizabeth moved for entry ofjudgment for back support and 

### attorney fees, i.e., the judgments against James specified in the amended decree. The trial court conducted hearings on the motions, and concluded a trial 

### was necessary. The trial occurred on August 8, 2012. The trial courtruled in favor ofElizabeth, reinstating the judgments against James, to bepaid out of the 

### proceeds ofthe saleofthehouse. Jamesappealsthetrial court'sfindings offact
and conclusions oflaw. DISCUSSION 

### Wereview challengedfindings of factfor substantial evidence, defined as 

### quantum of evidence sufficient to persuade a rational fair-minded person the premise is true. Sunnvside Valley Irr. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wn.2d 873, 879, 73 P.3d 369 (2003); Wilsonv. Wilson. 165Wn. App. 333, 340, 267 P.3d485(2011). This court's review is deferential. We view the evidence and all reasonable 

### inferences in the light mostfavorable to the prevailing party. Korst v. McMahon.No. 66538-3-1/4

136 Wn. App. 202, 206, 148 P.3d 1081 (2006). When a trial court bases its findings of fact on conflicting evidence and there is substantial evidence to support the findings entered, we do not reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment even though we might have resolved the factual dispute differently. Wilson. 165 Wn. App. at 340; In re Marriage of Greene, 97 Wn. App. 708, 714, 986 P.2d 144 (1999); Brown v. Superior Underwriters, 30 Wn. App. 303, 305-06, 632 P.2d 887 (1980). Regarding challenged conclusions of law, we review whether they are supported by the findings of fact. Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co.. Inc., 132Wn. App. 546, 555, 132 P.3d 789 (2006). The central issue in this appeal is whether James removed Elizabeth 

### "forthwith" from the mortgage on the family home as was required by the 

### amended decree. Although James challenged three findings of fact and five conclusions of law covering a range ofissues, the sole argument in his briefing is that he did, in fact, remove Elizabeth "forthwith" because the parties intended for 

### Elizabeth to provide a quitclaim deed before he was required to remove her
name from the mortgage. Thus according to James, the two-year delay in finally 

### removing her name from the mortgage was caused by her failure to timely provide a quitclaim deed, and the trial court's findings and conclusions to the contrary were erroneous. 

### An appellant must provide "argument in support of the issues presented for review, together with citations to legal authority and references to relevantNo. 69896-6-1/5
parts ofthe record." RAP 10.3(a)(6). As such, we decline to review those findings that James did not brief, and instead review only those portions ofthe findings that bear upon the issue James briefed, i.e., whether the parties intended a quitclaim deed to be a condition precedentto James removing Elizabeth from the mortgage: 3. While the Respondent claims that he had secured refinancing for the above-referenced mortgage, the Petitioner was not effectively notified ofthatfact in such a fashion thatwould cause her to timely execute a Quit Claim Deed to the property, allowing the refinance to close. The Petitioner should not have been expected to deliver a Quit Claim Deed to the Respondent without some sort of mechanism to insure the simultaneous release ofher obligation on the mortgage, such as by delivery] ofthe deed to an escrow agent. 

### 5. As between the parties, the Respondent had a duty to make certain that a Quit Claim Deed could be delivered in a fashion that also resulted in the simultaneous relief from the mortgage forthe Petitioner. Despite his attemptsto do that, he failed. CP at 36-37. 

### We conclude that these findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Elizabeth testified that from the time she agreed to the Amended 

### Decree, she was "ready to deliver" the deed, and that she would do so 

### "simultaneously" with being removed from the mortgage. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (8/8/11) at 108. She also testified she would have given James a quitclaim deed, but only if she knew her name "was going to be 

### simultaneously coming off the mortgage." ]d. at 111-12. She furthertestified she received no communication from the lender on the topic ofthe loan or quitclaimNo. 66538-3-1/6


### deed. |d. at 109. Viewed in a lightmost favorable to Elizabeth, this testimony is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, rational trier of fact that Elizabeth did not intend that the Amended Decree would require her to provide James with a quitclaim deed before he removed her name from the mortgage. James contends other portions of Elizabeth's testimony, as well as his
own testimony, indicates the parties intended otherwise. But again, this court does not re-weigh the evidence or assess credibility, nor do we substitute our judgment for that of the trial court; rather, our purview is simply to examine whether, viewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, there is evidence inthe record to supportthe trial court's findings. Sunnvside Valley, 149 Wn.2d at 879; Wilson. 165 Wn. App. at 340; Korst, 136Wn. App. at 206; Brown. 30Wn. App. at 305-06. James also cites Williams v. Continental Sec. Corp.. 22 Wn.2d 1, 153 

### P.2d 847 (1944), where the Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of"forthwith"
as itwas used inRem.Rev.Stat. § 590, a statute which related to a sheriff's sale 

### of real property. Inthat case, the court held the term generally "'does not mean 

### 'instantaneously,' or 'without any interval of time,' but, rather, means 'as 

### expeditiously as under the circumstances is reasonably possible.'"Williams, 22 Wn.2d at 13. James makes no argument, however, as to why a two yeardelay in 

### complying with the amended decree is a reasonable period oftime. Indeed, inNo. 69896-6-1/7 

### Williams, the delay held reasonable by the court was merely forty-three minutes for a bidderto produce $33,000. Id. at 13-14. Williams is of no help toJames. Finally,the trial court's findings of fact supportthe challenged conclusions of law: that James' obligation to remove Elizabeth from the mortgage "forthwith" meant he had a duty to ensure "she would be simultaneously relieved from the underlying mortgage" (Conclusion of Law 2, CP at 36); that James "had the primary duty to make certain that the mortgage relief was done simultaneously with the delivery of the Quit Claim Deed" (Conclusion 3); that because James' failed to remove Elizabeth "forthwith," the Amended Decree required reinstatement ofthejudgments against James (Conclusion 4); that in light ofthe 

### reinstated judgments, James owed Elizabeth $18,970 plus $5803.89 in interest (Conclusion 5); and that Elizabeth was entitled to be paid this money from the funds held in escrow from the sale ofthe house (Conclusion 6). Elizabeth has requested attorney fees on appeal. We have the discretion 

### to order a party to pay the other party's attorney fees and costs associated with 

### the appeal of an action arising out of RCW 26.09. RCW26.09.140. "In exercising
our discretion, we consider the arguable merit of the issues on appeal and the 

### parties' financial resources." In re Marriage ofC.M.C.. 87 Wn. App. 84, 89, 940 P.2d 669 (1997) (citing InRe Marriage ofKing, 66 Wn. App. 134, 139, 831 P.2d 

### 1094 (1992)).The trial courtawarded Elizabeth attorney fees below, and she has filed a financial declaration attesting that she does not have the ability to pay herNo. 66538-3-1/8
attorney fees. In light of the trial court's award, Elizabeth's declaration, and James' failure to respond on this issue, we grant Elizabeth's requestfor attorney fees on appeal, upon hertimely compliance with RAP 18.1(d)
Affirmed. 

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WE CONCUR: 

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