• • 

• REF_ I.]2: ~~62~ • OP ~:hLK:h 

~SP SBeRE1' ---

USC!E:I 13/J3l~. 22 December l9SO 

Subject: ~eaaures for Increased securJ.ty ot Co.mni.un.ication 

Intelligence ( COMn"'T). 

lo I have had the attached atuctr prepared in AFSA.1 and present 

it for your consideration,, with a viov.r to discussing the problem at 

the ne:Ja."'t meeting 0£ uscm. 

2o The Coordinator, tor reaeone set forth in the attached report, 

:ta bccCl!!ing increo.~d.Ilglv concerned over what appears to be a. gradual 

weakezd.ng of the security of C~INT" 

EARLE. STONE 

22 

Rear Admiral, u.s. Na.v 

Director, Arm.ed Fo110es Security Agency 

user.a CoordJna.tor 

USC!l3: J..3/1.34 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-22-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

PRNC-NCSW-3% TOP SECRET 
REPOffi' BY 'l'HE USCIB COORDINATOR 

to the 

UNITED STATES CruuutD:CATIOIIS INTELLIGEHCE :OOARD (USCIB) 

on 

:tmASURES FOR INCREASED SECURITY OF ComJ.JNICATIOii ·gfl'EILIGI!NCE ( CC!iJll'!'J. 

THE,EjQBLEM 

J.., To det.ermine what additional measures should be t:lken to protect present 

and future COMINT sourceso 

FACTS BEAR1NG ON THE Pll>BLW AND DISCUSSION 

2a See Enclosure herewit~ 

CONCLUSIONS 

3o It is concluded that: 

!o A review of all phases ot CWIMT security is vta?-ranted b7 the present 

need tor increased protection of all. COMINT sources and by' the evident 

inc~scs in hazards to COl.iIHT securJ.t.,'o 

~ n. i.s essential to detemine whether arq addi.tioual. measures shoul.!i 

be established to p~t a repet1tinn of recent l.osse~s~ which mq wall 

have been due to J.eaks.o 

S,«a It may be advisable, tor the protection ot high-level COJJINT sourcos 1 

to institute particularq stringent security- safeguards such as those in 

i'orce in connection tiith certain high-level cor.mr.r prob:J.ems in ~7orld t'lar II~ 

RECOI.lJ!DATIO!§ 

~-o It is recommended that the Unitei states Colllnunications Intelligence 

. Board: 

,!o Approve the above conclUslonso -· · 

,20 Direct the USCIB Security- Com'Dlttee to make the review re.terred to 

in paragraph 3,!o and. to in.elude in their report specitic Hcommendationa 

pertinent to para.graphs 3bo and 3co o - - S,o Direct the USCIB Security Commi.ttee to submit 1.ts report. to I 

USCIB not later than l February J.9Slo 

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.. EHCLOSURE 

FACTS BEA.RIUG ON THE PROBLl!U AIID DISCUS§iON 

lo Since the end of flor1d war II there has been a oansiderab1e improvement 

in the security- 0£ orypto s7stems empl07ed by foreign goverm.ents, and a rather 

general tightening of com.uni.cation security practices, ma.king the production 

ot COMINT increa.s~ d.if.ficulto 

;, Concurrent~ 1 there has been a demand tor DX)re COMINT and for lvider 

d.'\.eseminaiiion of .ito The need tor the protection ot OWINT sources is therero 

fore inorea.aingl;y imporlia.nto This need must be considered not o~ trom. the 

sta...11dpoint ot current sources 8 but in the J.iBht ot COMINT potermiaU.ties as 

w~ 

3 o The essentiaJ. features of etfective security control ot CWIIlT have 

been established gi'E!.ci~ during yea.rs of et"tort, and the security foundation 

is considered to be soundo There is adequate appreciation of the val.us of 

COliINTB and Oft.he need for protecting its SODrC8So There is,, howeverp no 

ground tor complacency concerning the current state ot aecuriifweftecti.venes1. 

in pra.ctice0 USCIB has plqed an important role in devel.op11ent ot c~ 

CWINT security policies and doctrines, and can be expected to pla.y an equall,y 

important one in the perfecting of their implementation and observanceo 

4<> t"'le now have the tollow.Lng mechanisms tor :protection: 

~. An interdepartmental authority ( uscm)~ 

So A Federal protective law (Public Law Mo. 5l3)o 

.clo Iraproved investigative ma.chine170 

,So Con:mm security standards among u.s,, agencies concerned with CWINTo 

.!o Security- agreement;s with allthol".l.zed .torei.gn collahoi-atorso 

l,.o A single UoSo producer 0£ bigh..J.evel COIJINT (AFSA)o 

Some ot these mechanisms are not yet cOl:lpleteo For example, the &d.etence o.t 

Public La'!.v ?loo Sl3 should be ma.de knonn to publishers, reporters, etco; and 

there should be a speed-up in investigative procedures to permit more rapid 

clearance ot poraonnel.., with no sacrifice or thoroughness" 

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S" ilthough import.ant. and basic steps have been ta.ken since the \'1181' to 

establish security on a tirm1'oundat1on,, certain developnents have, to a 

conSiderable extent, nullified the effects ot our advances by introducing 

additional hazards. Despite the existing mechanisms tor control,, it is believed that present security is not adequate to insure againl;lt tatal. leakage 

ot information of our success 1n the solut;j.on of high-level problems.,. The 

basis or the Cocirdinator•s continued apprehension on this score is strengt.lle.ned 

by certain new ra.ctqrs in the field ot counrr. Among them. are the tollovd.ng: 

Ao There h·lS bean a steady' and substantial increase o£ both vlO!'kera and. 

co.."!sumers o The list of indoctrinated consumers alone has risen .from 594 in 

February 1947 to 1 1.3:32 in June 19500 In addit.ion, inn 

have been brought into the fringe 0£ knoo-ledge £or -.u~i~·strative9 budgeta.-ey8 

and other reauonso 

,ko Certain dissemination eaf'egua.rds have gradual.q b en relaxedo £.;aterial 

is ll0\1 distributed to and ma.intained in a number o:t a 1n Uash1ngton8 outside the producing agencies, where it tvas never permitt be.to.reo :t:oreover, 

distribution to personnel ot additional agencies,, e.g., AEC, ECA, NSRB.., RDB.11 

and probab~ others, has been au.thor1zedo lil addition., restrietions on the 

distribution ot ca.mrr material to~ and ~ts retention 1 overseas occupied 

a.ree.e have been easedo 

Jlo The adminiatra.tiw, control1 and budget817 ma rg- and procedures are 

SllCb that large numbers 0£ individuals must no\"1 be a.ppr sed 0£ numerous details o.t COMlll.l' activitiesa (The mu1tiplici\y of a es, ottices, boa!'ds9 

and committees concerned v.d.th the operation and admini 

activities neceslll.ta.tee distribution beyond COMIHT agen es ot inmunara.ble reporho8 

just~fica.tions• etco,, vlhich,in the aggregate,, are hazar us to secur.1.tqo) 

.2o '!he dissemination of results is far too vo1umino £or safetyo (It is 

estimated that about 7.501000 copies of COlUll.r transl.a.ti ns, representing some 

16,,000 1nd1v.1.dual deer~ed messages, were distributed September8 19509 to 

C()!lBWDSr agencies,,) 

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£_., There is no over-=-all authority to insure observance of CCL.ltn' security 

regula.tions within the cam:-rr consumer agencies and organizations., 

Possib1'f too much individual authority and discretion in the application 

ot the canm.on principles are le.ft. to indi'Vidnal consumer and producer 

agencies., (The securitu con' ;.rol o.:t atanic energ}/ in:forma.tion is an exaq>le 

!p Mot ~ly has there bo 1.TJ. a significant increase in the number 0£ persons 

Vlbo have been brought into the CQMJlr? Sphere since the end Of hostilities in 

19451 but also there has 1: •een an increase in the rate of replacement and 

turnovero In time ot \'ra.1:, beca.uae of rotatia.t.! of personnel. to owrseas units, 

this turnover rate ma.v b :1 expectad to become greatero 

8P Since the end of ·.1ostilities in 1945., and _especial.q since the recent 

outln'"eak of ne\T overt 11oetW.ties, the presence ot indoctrina.ted peramnel 

(particular~ ground. and. air personnel) in combat areas has increased the 

danger of ccmpromis .> of COlmJT intormlltion through captureo 

!lQ The probabj} .itq o.t inrninent mUitaey and political collaboration v1ith 

allied nations <1 Gher than the British (UATO) \d.ll pose additional. aDi 

more ditticult problems in the .t"ield ot COLilh"T security, es~ it 

col~bora.tio.1 should include diseemination and usage of COlrilN'l' material., 

6~ It is ob'i':'.ous that under these conditions the laws ot probability are 

bowid to oper~· ~e against the continued securiqr of COLiINTo The cbances of 

inadvertent l Jakage ot information. even aside from all considerations of 

1oy-alty 1 inct:ea.se as the area of dissemination of COMINT increases, since these 

chances incre.ase 1n direct proportion to the number of persons \"1ho knm1 the 

secrets 1 arut ·l.ihe chances of il'Ja.dvertent l.oss of docment.s increase in direct 

proportion to the number of documents disseminatedo In preciseq the same V183' s 

• the chances ·:if a foreign enmy agent's success in covert operations to acquire 

COlmr.l' in:rors.nation increase lS the number of his targets increases~ In tile 

Ca.&Irlr f1el :l, the 1oss of a siJJgle document 1 eCEBtimes rega.rdles11 ot its specific 

contents$ .

1

/,_Vf' have disastrot s consequences., 

-4-· 

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7. During ~lorld ·.var II certain special security safeguards were established 

in parhicul.ar segments of the high-level German COUiln' prob1em. Actual elq8 r.tence with those safeguards amp]¥ demnstrated their feasibility and t.he practicability of' operating successi'ul].Y td.th an extremeJ.y l:lmited. number of operating 

personnel who had a real "need.-to-lmoi.vrt, and vdth the absolute m1n1mwn ot dissemiF..a.tion. That experience proved the practicability of maintaining the utmost 

security of high-level material under ditticult circumstances without aDJ' detriment to milita17 operational effectiveness. 

So It is possible to safeguard COMIIn' by employing special disguises which 

v1ill not handicap its usefulness and which at the same time will serve to hide 

the exact source from v.r:hich it ~s. EJtploitation of this poasibiUty, together v1ith more rigid limitations on dissemination, mq be neceesa.17 to insure 

. against the drying up ot the sources or this vita.l 1ntormation. 

9o D1 the consideration ot rlha.t additional steps should be taken, it is cmvenimt to divide the 1tt-..ole problem of C01JINT security into .f'our principal 

segments: 

r security precautions applicable to al.l steps in the production oi' 

information .. 

.h• Format ot tinal products (in its ::relation to revelation of' source}. 

c. Accounting control of production ot copies, and o£ theu dissemination -to consum.erso 

do Security precautions applicable to the operational. use of Com:N'.ro - (Including maximum extent to \7h1Cb COmNT can be safel1" da;mgraded for 

tactical use by cover echelons) 

Under its charter USCID prescribes basic security standards and dissemination 

policies and therefore has cognizance over all ot these aspectso 

lOo The USCIB Coordinator (in bis capa.citq as Di:rectcn•, AFSA) has full 

operational jurisdiction onr the first of these (paragraph 9j•), and has 

i11stituted tvithin AFSA as rigid security controls in the production of COI.mtt 

ini"ormtion as practicable. Compartmentation has been especiallT 1'1g1d in 

the processing of the principal high-level C1"J1Pt°'"'8J"stems, and. it is doubtful 

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that further steps could be taken in that direction flithout detriment to 

e£fectivenesa0 The USCIB Coordinator has no jurisdiction, ho1nwer, over the 

other three segments of' the problem and believes that it is to !?o and ,S.o 

that USCIB should direct its attentiono The USCm Securi'fi7 Comnittee should 

be directed to stud.Y these segrn.exms ot the problem and to submit appropriate 

recomr~clationsD The f'ourth aspect (paragraph 9,So) is primar.i.ll' a matter 

under the imnediate cognizance of each of the six COUINT consumer agenciesa 

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