J-S71033-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: S.M.W.-D., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.W., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 877 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered February 17, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000653-2015, CP-51-DP-0001592-2013, FID: 

51-FN-003132-2013

IN RE: S.M.D.-W., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.W., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 878 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered February 17, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000654-2015, CP-51-DP-0001590-2013, FID: 

51-FN-003132-2013

IN RE: S.M.W.-D., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.W., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 879 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered February 17, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000655-2015, CP-51-DP-0001591-2013, FID: 

51-FN-003132-2013
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BEFORE: BOWES, PANELLA, and FITZGERALD*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2016

M.W. (“Mother”) appeals from the orders granting the petitions filed by 

the Philadelphia County Department of Human Services (“DHS”) to 

terminate her parental rights to S.M.D., S.M.W., and S.M.W.-D.1

(collectively, “Children”), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).2 We affirm.

On July 25, 2013, DHS received a general protective services (“GPS”) 

report alleging that Mother physically abused Children and was abusing 

prescription drugs. On July 26, 2013, DHS interviewed Children, who 

confirmed that Mother physically abused them. That same day, DHS 

obtained an order of protective custody (“OPC”) for Children and placed 

Children in the care and custody of their paternal grandmother (“PGM”). A 

shelter care hearing was held on July 29, 2013. At that hearing, the Master 

lifted the OPC and ordered Children into the temporary care and custody of 

DHS. On August 7, 2013, Children were adjudicated dependent and 

returned to PGM’s care. 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The children were born in May of 2006, February of 2009, and December of 

2009, respectively. 

2

In a decree entered on April 27, 2016, the trial court terminated the 

parental rights of Children’s purported father, J.J.J.D. (“Father”). Father has 

not filed an appeal, nor is he a party to the present appeal. 
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On September 22, 2015, DHS filed petitions for involuntary 

termination of Mother’s parental rights to Children under Section 2511(a)(1), 

(2), (5), (8), and (b). On February 17, 2016, the trial court held a hearing 

on the petitions and entered the orders terminating Mother’s parental right 

to Children that same day. 

Mother timely filed these appeals with concise statements of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The 

trial court filed a responsive opinion. On April 13, 2016, this Court 

consolidated the appeals.

Mother raises the following questions for this Court’s review: 

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when 

it involuntarily terminated [M]other’s parental rights where 

such determination was not supported by clear and 

convincing evidence under the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.[ ] 

§ 2511 [(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8)] as [M]other made 

progress towards working and meeting her [Family Service 

Plan (“FSP”)] goals, namely staying drug free, working 

towards obtaining housing, and working on parenting 

skills, and other goals, during [C]hildren’s placement?

2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when 

it involuntarily terminated [M]other’s parental rights 

without giving primary consideration to the effect that the 

termination would have on the developmental, physical, 

and emotional needs of [Children], as required by the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.[ ] §2511 (b)?

Mother’s Brief at 4. 

Mother first claims that the trial court erred in terminating her parental 

rights when she made efforts and successfully completed many of her 

objectives for reunification. Id. at 7. She contends that she showed a 
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continuing interest in Children and bonded with them. Id. She notes that 

she successfully completed the Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) 

program, drug and alcohol treatment, and mental health treatment. Id. 

Mother also asserts that she has demonstrated her commitment to obtaining 

appropriate housing through maintaining employment, but her income has 

hindered her ability to obtain housing. Id. at 8. She argues the trial court 

erred in terminating her parental rights based on economic factors, which 

DHS failed to prove could not be remedied. Id. No relief is due. 

Our standard of review regarding orders terminating parental rights is 

as follows:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent 

evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, 

or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial court has 

granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental 

rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s decision 

the same deference that we would give to a jury verdict. 

We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the 

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s 

decision is supported by competent evidence.

In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). “The 

trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and 

is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in 

the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted). 
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In termination cases, the burden is upon the petitioner to prove by 

clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the 

termination of parental rights are valid. In re S.H., 879 A.2d at 806. The 

clear and convincing standard requires evidence that is so “clear, direct, 

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In 

re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003). “However, if competent 

evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if the record 

could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 

A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). 

The initial focus is on the conduct of the parent. In re L.M., 923 A.2d

505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). This Court need only agree with the trial 

court’s decision as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a) to affirm the 

court’s decision. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc).

Sections 2511(a)(2) provides, in relevant part: 

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent.
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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). 

This Court has stated: 

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.[ ] § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must 

be met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal has caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that 

cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the 

contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to 

perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 

2002) (citations omitted). Parental duty requires that the parent act 

affirmatively with a good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every 

problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his 

or her ability, even in difficult circumstances. In re E.M., 908 A.2d 297, 

306 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

A court may reject a parent’s vow to cooperate after a long period of 

uncooperativeness as untimely or disingenuous. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 

340. Moreover, “[a] child’s life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope 

that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of 

parenting.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1276 (citations 
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omitted). Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and 

rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental 

duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or 

her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 

856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

Instantly, the trial court found termination was warranted under 

Section 2511(a)(2) for the following reasons:

[C]hildren . . . have been in placement care for 

approximately thirty months. 

* * * 

[T]he [Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”)] social worker 

testified that [C]hildren were placed into the care and 

custody of DHS due to several issues with [M]other. 

[M]other did not have appropriate housing. Furthermore, 

[M]other lacked the appropriate parenting skills and used 

inappropriate discipline with [C]hildren. [M]other did not 

rectify any of these issues. The social worker testified that 

[M]other’s visits with [C]hildren were chaotic. Moreover, 

[M]other had a hard time interacting with [C]hildren during 

visits. The testimony indicated that [M]other “does not 

have the skills” to control [C]hildren. Furthermore, 

[C]hildren continued to be fearful to be alone with 

[M]other. Lastly, [M]other’s visits with [C]hildren were 

always supervised. [Mother] never progressed to 

unsupervised visits.

Trial Ct. Op., 5/20/16, at 4 (unpaginated) (record citations omitted). 

Our review of the record reveals the following. Heather Miller, the CUA 

case management supervisor, testified she has been the supervisor assigned 

to Mother and Children since April of 2015. N.T., 2/17/16, at 17. Miller 

stated that Mother’s objectives were to obtain appropriate housing, to attend 
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mental health treatment, to attend drug and alcohol treatment, to 

participate in ARC services, to participate in domestic violence counseling, 

and to maintain visits with Children. Id. at 18. Miller testified that Mother 

completed her drug and alcohol treatment, mental health treatment, ARC 

programs, and obtained employment. However, Mother did not have 

appropriate housing. Id. Additionally, Mother did not complete a courtordered parenting capacity evaluation. Id. 

Zoe Taddie, a CUA social work intern, testified that Mother’s visits with 

Children were “pretty chaotic.” Id. at 31. Taddie expressed her concerns 

about Mother’s ability to handle all three Children at once. Id. at 31-32. 

Taddie testified that she had to ask Mother to get up and show Children she 

has authority over them because Mother often sits on the couch and ignores 

Children when they are acting out. Id. at 38. Mother also missed seven of 

the last twenty scheduled visits with Children. Id. at 31. 

Thus, the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by competent 

evidence in the record. See In re M.G., 855 A.2d at 73-74. Mother’s 

argument that the court terminated her rights based solely on economic 

factors lacks merit. Rather, Mother essentially asks this Court to reweigh 

the evidence considered by the trial court. Although Mother has made some 

progress over approximately thirty months, Children’s lives cannot be put on 

hold until she summons the ability to handle the responsibilities of 

parenting. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1276. Accordingly, 
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we discern no basis to disturb the trial court’s finding or its conclusion that 

Mother’s conduct met the elements of Section 2511(a)(2).3

Mother next argues that the trial court failed to give “primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child” or consider the bonds between her and Children. 

Mother’s Brief at 9-10. Mother contends that “the record reflects that [she] 

willingly made efforts to comply with DHS and CUA objectives in attempts to 

make herself a better parent and reunify with her children because [she] 

loves her children and has a bond with them.” Id. at 10-11. According to 

Mother, “a bond or lack thereof was never proven by clear and convincing 

evidence.” Id. at 10. No relief is due. 

Section 2511(b) provides:

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the 

parent. . . . 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). 

The focus in terminating parental rights under Section 2511(b) is on 

the children. In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 

 

3 Because, we affirm the court’s decision based on Section 2511(a)(2), we 

need not address Mother’s arguments regarding the remaining subsections 

of Section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., supra.
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2008) (en banc). Pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial court must consider 

whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs of the child. See In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 

1284, 1286-87 (Pa. Super. 2005). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, 

security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare 

of the child.” Id. at 1287 (citation omitted). The court must also discern 

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the 

effect on the child of permanently severing that bond. See id.

With regard to Children’s bond with Mother, the trial court found: 

[C]hildren do not share a primary bond with [M]other. 

[C]hildren’s primary parent bond is with the kinship 

parent, [PGM]. PGM is the primary care giver. She takes 

care of the medical and educational needs of [C]hildren. 

[C]hildren have stated that they want to live with PGM. 

Furthermore, [C]hildren would not suffer emotional 

damage if the parental rights of [M]other were terminated. 

Lastly, it would be in the best interest of [C]hildren if their 

goal were changed to adoption. 

Trial Ct. Op., at 5 (unpaginated) (record citations omitted). 

Instantly, Mother testified that “every time I leave the visit[,]” the two 

younger children say they want to go with “mommy.” N.T. at 64. However, 

Miller testified that Children are fearful of being alone with Mother and 

S.M.D., in particular, requested on several occasions not to participate in 

visits because of his fear. Id. at 19. Dwyone Sanders, a CUA case 

manager, testified that Children stated they want to live with PGM and see 

PGM as their primary caregiver. Id. at 47-48. Sanders concluded that 
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Children will not suffer any permanent damage if Mother’s paternal rights 

are terminated and that it was in Children’s best interest for Mother’s 

parental rights to be terminated. Id. at 48. Taddie observed that 

sometimes the two younger children will “give [Mother] a hug,” but at other 

times, they “won’t really do anything” when they first see her at a visit. Id.

at 41. Taddie also concluded that Children have transitioned well into the 

home of PGM. Id. at 42. 

Thus, we find no support for Mother’s assertion that the trial court 

failed to consider the requirements of Section 2511(b). We further conclude 

competent evidence supports the trial court’s determinations that the bonds 

between Mother and Children, if severed, would not be detrimental to 

Children and that the termination of Mother’s parental rights would best 

serve the needs and welfare of Children. Therefore, we do not disturb the 

trial court’s conclusions under Section 2511(b). See In re M.G., 855 A.2d 

at 73-74.

Having reviewed Appellant’s arguments, the trial court’s findings of 

facts and conclusions of law, and the record, we affirm the orders 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children on the basis of Section 

2511(a)(2) and (b). 

Orders affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/18/2016