SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

993 

CA 15-01714 

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., PERADOTTO, NEMOYER, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF STATE OF 

NEW YORK, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SCOTT PETERS, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

 

THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (NICHOLAS P. DIFONZO OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (LAURA ETLINGER OF

COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Cattaraugus County

(John L. Michalski, A.J.), entered April 3, 2015 in a proceeding

pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 10. The order, inter alia,

committed respondent to a secure treatment facility. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Respondent appeals from an order determining that he

is a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement pursuant to Mental

Hygiene Law article 10. Respondent contends that the evidence is

legally insufficient to support a finding that he suffers from a

mental abnormality within the meaning of the statute because the

testimony at the jury trial did not establish that he has “serious

difficulty in controlling” his sex-offending behavior (§ 10.03 [i]). 

Even assuming, arguendo, that respondent preserved that contention for

our review (cf. Matter of Vega v State of New York, 140 AD3d 1608,

1609), we conclude that it is without merit. Petitioner presented the

testimony of two psychologists who opined that respondent suffers

from, among other things, pedophilic disorder and antisocial

personality disorder, and that, as a result of those mental

abnormalities, respondent has serious difficulty controlling his sexoffending behavior. One of the psychologists testified that her

opinion was based upon respondent’s pattern of sexual misconduct, his

failure to show improvement in controlling his behavior after sex

offender treatment, and his poor prison disciplinary record, which

included multiple instances of misbehavior of a sexual nature. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to petitioner, we

conclude that petitioner “provided ‘[a] detailed psychological

portrait’ of respondent that met [its] burden of demonstrating by

clear and convincing evidence that he had ‘serious difficulty’ in
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CA 15-01714 

controlling his sex-offending conduct” (Matter of State of New York v

Dennis K., 27 NY3d 718, 751; see Matter of State of New York v

Williams, 139 AD3d 1375, 1378).

We also reject respondent’s contention that the verdict with

respect to mental abnormality is against the weight of the evidence. 

Although respondent’s psychologist testified that respondent suffered

from posttraumatic stress disorder stemming from his own sexual abuse

as a child and that his sex offenses did not support a diagnosis of

pedophilic disorder or a conclusion that he suffers from a mental

abnormality, the jury’s verdict is entitled to deference, and we

conclude that the evidence does not “preponderate[] so greatly in

[respondent’s] favor that the jury could not have reached its

conclusion on any fair interpretation of the evidence” (Matter of

State of New York v Gierszewski, 81 AD3d 1473, 1474, lv denied 17 NY3d

702 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Contrary to respondent’s

contention, any failure by petitioner’s experts to adhere strictly to

each criterion listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of

Mental Disorders (DSM-V) does not render their diagnosis of pedophilic

disorder against the weight of the evidence. Here, petitioner’s

experts testified that the DSM-V cannot be employed rigidly and

expressly provides for the use of clinical judgment in the forensic

setting, and the experts opined that the diagnosis was appropriate

based upon their full assessments of respondent’s pattern of behavior

(see Matter of State of New York v Pierce, 79 AD3d 1779, 1779-1780, lv

denied 16 NY3d 712; Matter of State of New York v Shawn X., 69 AD3d

165, 169-171, lv denied 14 NY3d 702; see generally Matter of State of

New York v Shannon S., 20 NY3d 99, 106, cert denied ___ US ___, 130 S

Ct 1500).

We reject respondent’s further contention that the evidence

presented at the dispositional hearing is not legally sufficient to

establish that he requires confinement. Petitioner established by the

requisite clear and convincing evidence that respondent “suffer[s]

from a mental abnormality involving such a strong predisposition to

commit sex offenses, and such an inability to control behavior, that

[he] is likely to be a danger to others and to commit sex offenses if

not confined to a secure treatment facility” (Mental Hygiene Law 

§ 10.03 [e]; see Matter of Billinger v State of New York, 137 AD3d

1757, 1758, lv denied 27 NY3d 911). Contrary to respondent’s

contention, Supreme Court’s determination that he required confinement

is not against the weight of the evidence. The court “was in the best

position to evaluate the weight and credibility of the conflicting

[expert] testimony presented . . . , and we see no reason to disturb

the court’s decision to credit the testimony of petitioner’s experts”

(Matter of State of New York v Parrott, 125 AD3d 1438, 1439, lv denied

25 NY3d 911 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Entered: November 18, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court