AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed November 28, 2022 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-21-00947-CR 

LINDSLEY HUGH CRAVENS II, Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 15th Judicial District Court 

Grayson County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 072669 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Myers, Pedersen, III, and Garcia 

Opinion by Justice Garcia 

A jury found appellant guilty of murder and assessed punishment at forty 

years in prison and a $10,000 fine. In three issues, appellant argues: (i) the evidence 

is insufficient to support the jury’s rejection of his self-defense claim; (ii) the trial 

court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial based on an alleged 

Brady violation; and (iii) the trial court erroneously denied the motion to suppress 

statements he made to the police. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment. 
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I. Background 

On the night in question, appellant’s wife, Townie Cravens, called 911 to 

report that appellant had just shot his mother’s boyfriend, later identified as Stephen 

Obar. Obar was shot in the face at close range and was dead when the paramedics 

arrived. 

The shooting occurred in Nancy Coker’s apartment. Coker is appellant’s 

mother. Obar and his mother lived in the apartment with Coker. Appellant and his 

wife visited frequently and were there on the night of the shooting. 

Appellant and Obar were seated in the apartment when they had an 

acrimonious verbal exchange. Appellant got up and said he was leaving. As 

appellant moved toward the kitchen counter to retrieve his belongings, Obar got up 

from his recliner and moved toward appellant. Coker stepped between them. Coker 

then heard appellant’s gun fire as he shot Obar. 

Appellant was charged with murder and claimed self-defense. A jury found 

appellant guilty and assessed punishment at forty years in prison and a $10,000 fine. 

Judgment was entered in accordance with the jury’s verdict. 

When additional discovery materials from a lab analysis were provided to 

appellant after the judgment was entered, appellant moved for a new trial based on 

alleged Brady violations. The trial court conducted a hearing and denied the motion. 

This timely appeal followed. 
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II. Analysis 

Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Appellant’s first issue argues the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s 

rejection of his self-defense claim. According to appellant, there is no evidence that 

his actions “constituted anything but self-defense,” because he only drew his weapon 

after Obar got up and moved quickly and aggressively toward him. He further asserts 

that Obar tried to steal his gun and he therefore believed that deadly force was 

immediately necessary. 

In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 

criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. 

Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The issue on appeal 

is not whether we, as a court, believe the State’s evidence or believe that appellant’s 

evidence outweighs the State’s evidence. Wicker v. State, 667 S.W.2d 137, 143 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1984). The verdict may not be overturned unless it is irrational or 

unsupported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 

846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The jury “is the sole judge of the credibility of the 

witnesses and of the strength of the evidence,” and may choose to believe or 

disbelieve any portion of the witnesses’ testimony. See Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 

267, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1986). When faced with conflicting evidence, we presume the jury resolved 

conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. Turro v. State, 867 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. 
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Crim. App. 1993). Therefore, if any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we must affirm. McDuff 

v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 

We measure sufficiency to support a conviction by comparing the evidence 

presented at trial to “the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically 

correct jury charge for the case.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1997). A hypothetically correct jury charge reflects the governing law, the 

indictment, the State’s burden of proof and theories of liability, and an adequate 

description of the offense for the particular case. Id.

A person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly 

causes the death of an individual. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1). 

Alternatively, he also commits the offense when he intends to cause serious bodily 

injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of 

an individual. Id. at § 19.02(b)(2). 

A person acts with intent with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result 

of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct 

or cause the result. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a). He acts knowingly with respect 

to the nature of his conduct (or to circumstances surrounding his conduct) when he 

is aware of the nature of his conduct (or that the circumstances exist) or he is aware 

that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. See id. at § 6.03(b). A 

person acts recklessly when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial 
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and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. See id. at 

§6.03(c). 

Intent, being a question of fact, is in the sole purview of the jury. Brown v. 

State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A jury may rely on collective 

common sense and common knowledge when determining intent. Ramirez v. State, 

229 S.W.3d 725, 729 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.). Intent also may be 

inferred from the circumstantial evidence surrounding the incident, which includes 

acts, words, and conduct of the accused. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 

38.36(a); Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). “Attempts 

to conceal incriminating evidence, inconsistent statements, and implausible 

explanations to the police are probative of wrongful conduct and are also 

circumstances of guilt.” See Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2004). 

A person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree that 

person reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect him from 

another’s use or attempted use of unlawful force. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(a). 

“An actor is justified in using deadly force if, among other things, the actor 

reasonably believes deadly force is immediately necessary to protect the actor 

against another's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force.” Green v. State, 589 

S.W.3d 250, 255 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d); see TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(a)(1)–(2)(A). 
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In a claim of self-defense, defendant bears the burden to produce evidence 

supporting the defense. Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2018); Moralez v. State, 450 S.W.3d 553, 565 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2014, pet. ref’d). The defendant’s burden of production requires him to adduce some 

evidence that would support a rational finding in his favor on the defensive issue. 

Krajcovic v. State, 393 S.W.3d 282, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). 

After a defendant satisfies his burden by producing some evidence that 

supports self-defense, the State then bears the burden of persuasion to disprove selfdefense. See Braughton at 608. The State’s burden of persuasion “is not one that 

requires the production of evidence; rather it requires only that the State prove its 

case beyond a reasonable doubt.” Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2003). Therefore, in resolving the evidentiary sufficiency issue, we look not to 

whether the State presented evidence that refuted evidence of self-defense, but rather 

we determine whether, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have found the essential elements of 

murder beyond a reasonable doubt and also would have found against appellant on 

the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914; 

Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 609. 

Coker testified that the argument between appellant and Obar began when 

Obar told appellant to get up and go take a shower. Appellant got up and said, “I’ll 

just go.” Obar replied, “Just go and don’t come back anymore.” Coker gave Obar a 
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look as if to say, “why did you say that?” Obar then said, “if you don’t like it, you 

can get out too.”1

When appellant told Obar not to speak to his mother like that, Obar got up out 

of his recliner and started towards appellant. Coker believed that Obar was drunk 

and had drugs in his system, and she described him as “swearing and belligerent.” 

Coker got up to stand in between Obar and appellant. Although she initially testified 

that Obar tried to push her away, she later clarified that he “just kind of” had his arm 

on her and was trying to get by. She admitted that Obar did not injure or threaten 

her. 

At trial, Coker testified that she heard appellant say, “Stop, I don’t want to 

shoot you.” On cross-examination, she could not recall telling the police that 

appellant said, “Oh, I think I will just shoot you.” According to Coker, Obar did not 

grab appellant’s gun. As she stood between appellant and Obar, she heard a “pow” 

as appellant shot Obar. 

Coker admitted that she had been in frequent contact with appellant since his 

incarceration and told him, “We will do whatever we have to do to get you out of 

this mess.” She admitted that appellant “may” have sent her letters in code about her 

trial testimony. At trial, Coker recalled that appellant and Obar were yelling at each 

1

 It was Coker’s apartment and her name appeared on the lease. 
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other and she got in between them, but otherwise said she did not recall much about 

the incident. 

Kevin Clark, a neighbor who lived in the upstairs apartment, said that 

appellant frequently visited Coker’s apartment wearing a holstered weapon. When 

Clark heard the gunshot, he went outside. He saw appellant exit Coker’s apartment 

and heard him say, “I can’t believe I did that.” Coker emerged shortly thereafter, and 

said “You S.O.B., you shot my boyfriend. I hope you burn in hell.” 

The medical examiner testified that Obar suffered a gunshot entrance wound 

below his left nostril, and a bullet and two bullet fragments were recovered from his 

head. The gunshot stippling surrounding the wound showed a one-to-three-foot 

range of fire from the muzzle of the gun to Obar—a close range shot. Obar had 

alcohol in his system that was twice the legal limit for intoxication. His cause of 

death was a gunshot to the head. 

Detective Ballew, a detective with the Sherman police department, 

interviewed appellant at the police station. The recorded interview was admitted into 

evidence and played for the jury. 

According to appellant, he thought Obar was being rude to his wife. Obar 

stood and walked toward appellant and said “something” to him. Appellant said the 

hair stood up on the back of his neck and he was “super afraid” and thought Obar 

was going to harm him. Appellant grabbed his pistol and “racked a round.” He told 

Obar to get back twice and thought Obar was going to grab the gun. 
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Appellant said he did not know why he fired the gun. The only past physical 

altercation he had with Obar occurred three years earlier when Obar dumped him 

out of a chair. Appellant “felt” like he “might” be in danger but was unable to specify 

to what degree. Obar did not threaten him and did not have a weapon. He had no 

idea what Obar’s intent was when he approached him and he did not know whether 

Obar intended to grab the gun. 

Detective Ballew also took statements from Cravens and Coker on the night 

of the shooting. Coker remembered giving a statement to Detective Ballew but could 

not recall what she said. She did not dispute the statement, but simply could not 

recall the content. When Detective Ballew testified about the statement, he said 

Coker told him that appellant did not tell Obar to get back or give any warning before 

he shot him. Coker also told him she heard appellant say, “Oh, I think I’ll just shoot 

you.” Coker also said that she did not think the shooting was justified and she saw 

appellant “just snap.” 

Appellant took the stand in his own defense. He admitted that Obar did not 

threaten him, but he nonetheless felt threatened. When Obar came towards him, he 

picked up his gun from the kitchen counter, chambered a round, and pointed the gun 

at Obar. Obar reached down toward the gun, but he did not get ahold of it. Appellant 

felt threatened and fired one time. 

 Appellant admitted that he had bragged about the “textbook” shot that killed 

Obar in one of the letters he sent to his mother while he was incarcerated. The letters, 
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which were admitted into evidence, included a code for appellant and his mother to 

use in answering and setting up potential questions they would be asked at trial. 

Appellant marked the letters “legal” so they would not be read by the police. 

Appellant’s defense is premised on his testimony and that of his mother. This 

reliance is misplaced because it appears that the jury did not find these witnesses 

credible. See e.g., Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) 

(when record supports conflicting inferences we presume the jury resolved the 

conflicts in favor of the verdict); Rodriguez v. State, 546 S.W.3d 843, 860 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d) (jury not required to accept defense 

claims). Based on our review of the record, we conclude a rational trier of fact could 

have rejected the self-defense theory and reasonably found the elements of murder 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 609. Appellant’s first 

issue is resolved against him. 

Brady Violations 

Appellant’s second issue argues the trial court erroneously denied his motion 

for new trial based on alleged Brady violations. We disagree. 

The prosecution violates Fourteenth Amendment due process when it 

suppresses evidence favorable to the defendant that is material either to guilt–

innocence or to punishment, regardless of the prosecution’s good faith or bad faith. 

See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432–34 (1995); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 

87 (1963); Harm v. State, 183 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). To show a 
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Brady violation, a defendant must show all three of the following: (1) the State failed 

to disclose evidence regardless of the prosecution’s good or bad faith, (2) the 

suppressed evidence is favorable to the defendant, and (3) the suppressed evidence 

is material in that there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been 

disclosed, the outcome of trial would have been different. Little v. State, 991 S.W.2d 

864, 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). When favorable evidence is not concealed but 

disclosed untimely, the defendant bears the burden to show the delay resulted in 

prejudice. Kulow v. State, 524 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2-17, pet. ref’d) (citing Little, 991 S.W.2d at 866). 

Under Brady, “prosecutors have a duty to learn of Brady evidence known to 

others acting on the state’s behalf in a particular case.” Harm, 183 S.W.3d at 406. 

(citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437–383). This includes the police. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. 

Here, it is undisputed that evidence was not timely provided to the defense. 

Thus, the question is whether that evidence was material and favorable to the 

defense. Little, 991 S.W.2d at 866. 

Ten days after appellant was convicted, the Texas Department of Criminal 

Justice Crime Lab in Garland completed a biology report and sent it to the District 

Attorney. The State provided defense counsel with the report and supporting 

documentation (the “Lab Report”) approximately three days later.2

2

 During the hearing, the state told the court that the lab submission form was provided to the defense 

well before trial. 
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Appellant’s shirt, pants, and left boot were submitted for testing. There was 

blood on the boot, presumptively Obar’s. Although Detective Ballew had requested 

trace evidence/DNA testing on the gun, the Lab Report showed that was not possible 

because the firearms section had already done ballistics testing. Morgan Hosbrough, 

a forensic scientist employed by the lab, testified at the motion for new trial and 

authenticated the Lab Report.3

Detective Ballew also testified. He admitted that he testified at trial that he 

had not requested DNA/trace evidence testing on the gun, but the Lab Report 

reflected that he did. He also said that he had not submitted the gunshot residue 

collection kit (“GSR”) for forensic examination, but the GSR was, in fact submitted. 

The detective testified that he was ill with COVID prior to trial and had difficulty 

remembering. 

Detective Ballew confirmed that any DNA that could have been tested on the 

gun would have been destroyed by ballistics testing. He agreed that finding Obar’s 

blood on appellant’s clothing would tend to corroborate that appellant was standing 

in close proximity to Obar when appellant shot him. He also agreed that if DNA 

testing had shown Obar’s blood, hand, or bodily fluid on the gun it would also be 

significant to the issue of proximity. 

3

 After appellant was convicted, the District Attorney’s office requested that testing be discontinued. 

Accordingly, no further testing was done. 
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Appellant contends that if DNA testing had been done on the gun as Detective 

Ballew requested, it might have shown that Obar touched the gun, supporting 

appellant’s claim that Obar tried to take it from him. Moreover, he maintains that 

finding Obar’s blood on appellant’s clothing corroborated his claim that Obar was 

standing in close proximity when he shot him. He further argues that Detective 

Ballew testified untruthfully, saying that certain items that were tested had not been 

tested, and he was denied the opportunity to impeach him. Finally, he complains that 

he was denied the identity of other lab witnesses who were identified in the 

paperwork that was not timely provided. 

Appellant has not demonstrated that any of this evidence was material. There 

was no dispute that appellant was close to Obar—the stippling evidence from the 

autopsy and all of the witnesses’ testimony established that the two were in close 

proximity. Moreover, the trace evidence/DNA testing was not suppressed—it was 

not done at all. While there may have been some impeachment value in Detective 

Ballew’s faulty recollection of what testing he requested, it would likely have been 

minimal in light of his explanation that it was not intentional, information was not 

purposefully withheld, and his illness at the time adversely impacted his recollection. 

And while appellant claims he was denied witnesses (the additional lab workers 

identified in the Lab Report), he offers no explanation about their expected 

testimony or how it might be material to the case. 
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Examining this evidence in the context of the entire record and the overall 

strength of the State’s case, we conclude there is no reasonable probability that the 

result of the proceeding would have been different had the Lab Report been timely 

disclosed. See Harm, 183 S.W.3d at 409. Therefore, the trial court did not err in 

denying appellant’s motion for new trial. Appellant’s second issue is resolved 

against him. 

Motion to Suppress 

When the police arrived at the scene, they identified appellant as the shooter 

and handcuffed him. Officer Spencer Nelson attempted to get basic information from 

appellant, including his name, address, and whether there were additional people in 

the apartment. Appellant told Officer Nelson he could tell him “everything you need 

to know.” Officer Nelson asked appellant if he would like to give him a brief 

overview but said he didn’t need anything detailed at that time. Appellant said he 

would give him a basic synopsis. When Officer Nelson told appellant he was going 

to Mirandize him, appellant stated “then, I would like an attorney.” Officer Nelson 

stopped appellant and attempted to read him his Miranda rights. But appellant kept 

talking. 

Appellant raised this issue at trial, requesting that the statements he made to 

the police be suppressed. The trial court conducted a hearing outside the jury’s 

presence and found that most of the statement made to Officer Nelson was 
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admissible.4

 Appellant’s third issue argues the trial court erred in denying his motion 

to suppress the statements he made to Officer Nelson.5

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated 

standard. Delafuente v. State, 414 S.W.3d 173, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We 

afford almost complete deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, 

especially when based on “an assessment of credibility and demeanor,” but conduct 

a de novo review of mixed questions of law and fact that do not hinge on credibility 

or demeanor determinations. Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2010). We will sustain the trial court’s ruling if that ruling is reasonably supported 

by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Valtierra v. 

State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447–448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 

The Supreme Court requires law enforcement to inform suspects of their right 

to counsel and their right against self-incrimination prior to custodial interrogation. 

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476–79 (1966); see also Wilkerson v. State, 

173 S.W.3d 521, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If a suspect chooses to invoke his 

right to remain silent, police must stop all questioning. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474. If 

4

 The court also found that all of the statement appellant subsequently made to Detective Ballew at the 

police station was admissible. 

5

 Appellant’s brief also includes a sentence asserting that the trial court erroneously concluded that his 

“subsequent Miranda warning and waiver at the police station after originally requesting but not being 

provided counsel was valid.” To the extent appellant seeks to complain that the statements made to Officer 

Ballew at the police station should have been suppressed, the argument is waived for inadequate briefing. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. 
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he invokes his right to counsel, questioning must cease until he has been afforded 

the opportunity to consult with counsel. Id.; see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 

477, 484–85 (1981) (holding that once suspect invokes right to counsel during 

custodial interrogation, all questioning must cease “until counsel has been made 

available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, 

exchanges, or conversations with the police”); State v. Gobert, 275 S.W.3d 888, 892 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The right to counsel is invoked when a person indicates that 

he desires to speak to an attorney or to have an attorney present during questioning. 

Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). 

Whether a particular mention of a lawyer constitutes a clear invocation 

depends upon the contents of the statement itself and the totality of the surrounding 

circumstances. Gobert, 275 S.W.3d at 892. The test is objective: the suspect “must 

articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable 

police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request 

for an attorney.” Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 352; Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452, 459 

(1994) (request for counsel must be unambiguous and an officer need not cease 

questioning if a suspect’s reference to an attorney is ambiguous or equivocal in that 

a reasonable officer given the circumstances would have understood only that the 

suspect might be invoking the right to counsel). There are no “magical words” 

required to invoke an accused’s right to counsel, but a suspect must at least express 

a definite desire to speak to someone and that the person be an attorney. Dinkins, 
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894 S.W.2d at 352; see also Pecina v. State, 361 S.W.3d 68, 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2012); Gobert, 275 S.W.3d at 892. 

The Miranda protections, however, are only triggered when the accused 

makes a statement while in custody and during a police interrogation. Grubb v. State, 

No. 11-20-00037-CR, 2022 WL 320915, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 3, 2022, 

pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Under Miranda, the custody 

analysis requires that courts consider “the circumstances surrounding the 

interrogation and whether a reasonable person in those circumstances would have 

felt that she was not free to leave.” Wexler v. State, 625 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2021) (citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)). Ultimately, our 

inquiry “is whether, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would have 

believed that her freedom of movement was restricted to the degree associated with 

a formal arrest.” Wexler, 625 S.W.3d at 167 (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 

318, 322 (1994); Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). 

Under the circumstances present here, there is no dispute that appellant was in 

custody. Thus, the inquiry turns on whether appellant was interrogated. 

An interrogation includes “any words or actions on the part of the police . . . 

that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 

response.” State v. Cruz, 461 S.W.3d 531, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (quoting 

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980)). When applying the test for 

whether an interrogation has occurred, the primary focus is on the perceptions of the 
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suspect, rather than what the police intended. Id. at 536–37 (citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 

301). 

“Volunteered statements are not barred by Miranda, even when the accused 

is in custody.”6 Pugh v. State, 624 S.W.3d 565, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing 

Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529 (1987)); Jones v. State, 795 S.W.2d 171, 176 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1990). As conceptualized in Miranda, interrogation must reflect a 

measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself. Innis, 446 

U.S. at 300. Indeed, “officers do not interrogate a suspect simply by hoping that a 

suspect will incriminate himself.” Mauro, 481 U.S. at 529. 

Here, after watching the video, the trial judge noted, “clearly he knew he had 

a right to a lawyer and then just keeps talking without any further questions by law 

enforcement.” The court concluded that if appellant invoked the right to counsel, “he 

waived it by talking because the cop didn’t ask him anything else.” The record 

supports this conclusion. 

Appellant does not identify, nor does the redacted video reflect that Officer 

Nelson posed any questions to appellant. Nonetheless, appellant seems to suggest 

that Officer Nelson engaged in conduct calculated to elicit an incriminating 

6

 In addition, when a suspect invokes his right to remain silent and then reinitiates communication 

with law enforcement officers, he then waives his Fifth Amendment rights, and its protections fall away. 

See Cross v. State, 144 S.W.3d 521, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–

85, (1981). 
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response. The evidence shows no such conduct. Indeed, the evidence shows that 

Officer Nelson twice attempted to Mirandize appellant, and appellant continued to 

talk. There was no interrogation. Appellant’s statement was volunteered. Under 

these circumstances, the trial court did not err by denying the motion to suppress. 

See Pugh, 624 S.W.3d at 568. Appellant’s third issue is resolved against him. 

Having resolved all of appellant’s issues against him, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment. 

Do Not Publish 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 

210947F.U05 

 

/Dennise Garcia/ 

DENNISE GARCIA 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

LINDSLEY HUGH CRAVENS II, 

Appellant 

No. 05-21-00947-CR V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 15th Judicial 

District Court, Grayson County, 

Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 072669. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia. 

Justices Myers and Pedersen, III 

participating. 

 Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED. 

Judgment entered November 28, 2022