COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-15-00429-CR

MICHAEL NNAMANI APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 6 OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 1342673

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DISSENTING OPINION

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Reasonable suspicion is not probable cause.

1 Probable cause provides 

grounds for search or arrest, with or without a warrant, depending on the 

exigency of the circumstances or the applicability of another exception to the 

 

1See Worley v. State, 912 S.W.2d 869, 872 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, 

pet. ref’d). 
2

warrant requirement.

2

 Reasonable suspicion, in contrast, provides a ground for 

temporary detention to allow for further investigation.3 But stopping Appellant did 

not provide the officer an opportunity to investigate whether Appellant was 

speeding because it would yield no evidence of that moving violation. The 

conscientious majority addresses this conundrum, suggesting that

the officer could have questioned Appellant about the speed at 

which Appellant believed—based upon his own speedometer 

reading—he was travelling. Appellant’s response could yield 

additional facts that convert reasonable suspicion into probable 

cause.4 

Essentially, the majority is put in the position of holding that a police officer 

may detain a motorist for the sole purpose of attempting to secure a confession 

of wrongdoing. But what about the transportation code sections requiring an 

officer who stops a motorist for speeding to release the motorist immediately 

upon the motorist’s signing a promise to appear?5 The law is well-established 

that “the detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to 

effectuate the purpose of the intrusion.”

6

 And how long is that, when the purpose 

of the detention is to secure a confession? Until the motorist confesses? Or 

 

2See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 14.01–.04 (West 2015 & Supp. 

2016); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2135 (1993); 

Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

3Baldwin v. State, 278 S.W.3d 367, 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

4Maj. Op. at 16. 

5See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 543.003, 543.004(a)(1), 543.005 (2011).

6Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
3

does the transportation code control, limiting the interrogation period to the time 

necessary for the motorist to sign his agreement to appear to answer to the 

suspicion of traveling at an unknown unreasonably high speed? If the motorist 

was detained for the purpose of securing a confession, was the motorist free to 

leave without responding to questions? That is, was the officer obligated to 

inform the motorist of his rights under Miranda?

7

 Is this conduct truly consistent 

with the original intent of the framers of our constitution? 

As for the officer’s contention that Appellant may have committed a traffic 

offense by briefly straddling a lane line, we have addressed this issue in the past 

in a thorough and thoughtful discussion by Justice Gardner, who explained in 

part,

The relevant provision of the transportation code—section 

545.060(a)—provides as follows:

(a) An operator on a roadway divided into two or 

more clearly marked lanes for traffic:

(1) shall drive as nearly as practical entirely 

within a single lane; and

(2) may not move from the lane unless that 

movement can be made safely. 

Although the statute has two subparts, it does not create two 

separate offenses, but rather only one: moving out of a marked lane 

when it is not safe to do so. In Hernandez, the Austin court 

analyzed the legislative history of section 545.060 and determined 

that because neither section 545.060 nor its predecessor created

 

7Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
4

two offenses, the words “unless that movement can be made safely” 

necessarily modify both subsections, adding,

[T]he very vagueness of the requirement that the 

operator of a vehicle drive within a single lane “as nearly 

as practical” indicates that the legislature did not intend 

for the initial clause of the statute to create a discrete 

offense apart from some element of unsafety. This 

conclusion is bolstered by the use of the term “practical” 

rather than “practicable.” The latter term has a 

somewhat more definite meaning: “capable of being 

accomplished; feasible; possible,” while the former term 

is more ambiguous: “manifested in practice; capable of 

being put to good use.”8

Straddling a lane, as the officer described it here, did not constitute a traffic 

offense.9 And the officer clearly stated that he did not stop Appellant because he 

saw him speeding; that is, the officer did not stop Appellant because he saw 

Appellant commit a traffic offense in his presence. Rather, the officer suspected

that Appellant might be speeding. The scholarly majority has ably explained the 

often misunderstood distinction between probable cause and reasonable 

suspicion. If the officer observed Appellant commit a traffic offense, then the 

officer had probable cause to detain him.10 If the officer had only reasonable 

 

8Fowler v. State, 266 S.W.3d 498, 502–03 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, 

pet. ref’d) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Varley, No. 

02-15-00076-CR, 2016 WL 4540491, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 

2016, pet. filed).

9See id.

10See Tucker v. State, 183 S.W.3d 501, 507 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, 

no pet.) (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01; Williams v. State, 726 

S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); and Tyler v. State, 161 S.W.3d 745, 748 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.)).
5

suspicion to detain Appellant, then the stop was perforce for the purpose of 

further investigation of the criminal activity that the officer suspected.11

Further, if the officer pulled Appellant over based only on a generalized 

suspicion that Appellant might be violating a traffic law, but the officer had no 

specific, articulable facts upon which to base a conclusion that he saw Appellant 

commit a traffic offense, then the record does not support the validity of the 

stop.12 An inarticulate hunch or intuition will not support a seizure.13 The officer 

had the opportunity to check Appellant’s speed against his own speedometer to 

verify whether Appellant was violating the traffic law before stopping him but did 

not do so.

An officer who testifies to an unsupported general conclusion that a car 

was following another vehicle too closely has not testified to sufficient facts to 

justify a detention for a traffic violation.14 Similarly, the officer’s testimony here 

that Appellant might have been speeding or might have been violating the traffic 

law requiring maintaining a single lane to the extent possible and not driving 

 

11Baldwin, 278 S.W.3d at 370; Terrell v. State, 473 S.W.3d 420, 423 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (citing Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. 

Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2458 (2004)).

12Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

13Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

14Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 493–94.
6

outside his lane unsafely was insufficient to justify a detention for a traffic 

violation.

Based on the record before this court, I cannot agree with my 

conscientious colleagues that the record as it stands supports the lawfulness of 

the seizure of Appellant. For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent from the 

majority opinion.

/s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT

JUSTICE

PUBLISH

DELIVERED: November 17, 2016