1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

_________________

NO. 09-14-00442-CV

_________________

DAVID JONES, Appellant

V.

CITY OF PORT ARTHUR, TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 172nd District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. E-193,143

________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

David Jones was employed as an operator of a residential garbage truck with 

the City of Port Arthur, Texas (the “City”). After he was terminated and his 

administrative appeal to the City denied, Jones sued the City for violation of the 

Texas Whistleblower Act. See generally Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 554.001–.010

(West 2012); Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Carr, 309 S.W.3d 174, 175 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (explaining that chapter 554 of the Texas 

Government Code is commonly referred to as the “Texas Whistleblower Act”). 
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Jones sought damages and attorney’s fees. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction 

and traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment. The trial court 

granted the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and motions for summary judgment and 

dismissed Jones’s claims against the City. On appeal, Jones contends the trial court 

erred and abused its discretion by granting the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and 

motions for summary judgment because (1) he presented numerous issues of 

material fact that should have been resolved by a jury, and (2) he demonstrated that 

the City violated the Texas Whistleblower Act. We affirm the trial court’s order 

granting the City’s plea to the jurisdiction.

I. Factual Background

According to Jones’s Third Amended Petition, on May 23, 2012, he was 

employed with the City as an operator of a residential garbage truck. Jones 

believed the truck assigned to him that day, Truck 1713, was “leaking potentially 

flammable hydraulic fluid used by the truck’s hydraulic lift system.” Jones 

reported the malfunction with Truck 1713 to the senior mechanic in the City’s 

Operations Center of the Public Works Department. Jones alleges that after the 

senior mechanic indicated it was a small leak, his immediate supervisor instructed 

him to perform his garbage collection duties using Truck 1713. When Jones 

refused to operate Truck 1713, he was told to report to Anitra Smith, the City’s 
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Solid Waste Management Division Superintendent. Jones alleges that he informed 

Smith that he did not want to operate Truck 1713 “because of the potential 

environmental and safety hazards that the hydraulic leak posed to the public and to 

the driver of the truck.” Jones claims that he told Smith he believed the operation 

of Truck 1713 was “illegal and that he could be cited by law enforcement” for its 

operation. According to Jones, he requested another truck to complete his route, or 

alternatively asked to delay his route until Truck 1713’s leak could be repaired. 

Jones contends that Smith ordered him to operate the leaking truck that day, and 

when he refused to comply, Smith “sent him home from work indefinitely, as an 

adverse and disciplinary employment action.” 

According to Jones’s pleading, on June 11, 2012, he filed an appeal of his 

termination to the City’s Appeals Committee. Jones alleges that a hearing was held 

and that at the hearing, he presented his complaints regarding the condition of the 

garbage trucks and his belief that he had been terminated in retaliation “for his 

good faith reports of multiple violations of law by the City pertaining to 

environmental compliance and safety and workplace safety.” On June 28, 2012, 

Jones was notified by John Comeaux, the acting City Manager, that the Appeals 

Committee recommended Jones’s termination be upheld and that Comeaux had 

decided to follow the Committee’s recommendation. 
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Jones filed suit against the City on September 12, 2012. After the trial court 

granted the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and motions for summary judgment, 

Jones filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. Thereafter, Jones 

filed a timely notice of appeal. 

II. Plea to the Jurisdiction

A trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a suit against a 

governmental unit enjoying immunity from suit. City of Houston v. Ranjel, 407 

S.W.3d 880, 887 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). A party may 

challenge a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction by asserting a plea to the 

jurisdiction. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225–

26 (Tex. 2004). We review a trial court’s decision on a plea to the jurisdiction de 

novo. City of Elsa v. Gonzalez, 325 S.W.3d 622, 625 (Tex. 2010).

A plaintiff has the burden to allege facts demonstrating jurisdiction, and we 

construe the plaintiff’s pleadings liberally in the plaintiff’s favor. See Miranda, 133 

S.W.3d at 226. When a governmental unit challenges the existence of jurisdictional 

facts, and the parties submit evidence relevant to the jurisdictional challenge, we 

must consider that evidence when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues 

raised. Ranjel, 407 S.W.3d at 887. In our determination, we must take as true all 

evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and 
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resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228. If the 

evidence raises a fact question on jurisdiction, then the trial court cannot grant the 

plea, and the issue must be resolved by the factfinder. Id. at 227–28. On the other 

hand, if the evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question, the trial court 

must rule on the plea as a matter of law. Id. at 228. This standard of review 

generally mirrors that of a summary judgment. Id. 

The City of Port Arthur is a municipality and thus is a local governmental 

entity. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 271.151(3)(A) (West 2016); Tooke v. City 

of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 345 (Tex. 2006) (“A local governmental entity is 

defined to include a municipality.”). Local governmental entities are immune from 

suit unless the legislature expressly waives governmental immunity. Lubbock Cty.

Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Church & Akin, L.L.C., 442 S.W.3d 297, 

300 (Tex. 2014). Immunity from suit deprives the courts of jurisdiction and 

therefore completely bars a plaintiff’s claim. Id. Under certain circumstances, the 

Texas Whistleblower Act (“the Act”) waives a local governmental entity’s 

immunity from suit for claims of retaliatory discharge under the Act. Tex. Gov’t 

Code Ann. § 554.0035; State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 881 (Tex. 2009). The 

elements of a whistleblower claim are jurisdictional when necessary to ascertain 
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whether a plaintiff has adequately alleged a violation of the Act. Lueck, 290 

S.W.3d at 881, 884. 

In the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, the City maintained that Jones’s 

whistleblower suit was barred by governmental immunity because Jones failed to 

meet the required jurisdictional element. The City specifically argued in relevant 

part that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Jones’s whistleblower claim 

because: (1) there is no pleading or evidence that Jones filed a report of illegal 

activity with an appropriate law-enforcement authority prior to the time the City 

decided to terminate Jones; (2) there is no pleading or evidence that any of the 

decision-makers had knowledge of Jones’s reports to the United States Department 

of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) or to the 

Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”) before Jones was 

terminated on June 8, 2012; and (3) there is no causal connection that indicates that 

but for Jones’s reports he would not have been terminated under the circumstances. 

Both parties submitted evidence relevant to the jurisdictional challenge for the trial 

court’s consideration. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227 & n.6, 231 (explaining that 

in the context of a plea to the jurisdiction, it is sufficient that the party previously 

filed documentary evidence as an attachment to its plea to the jurisdiction or a 

response thereto).
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III. The Texas Whistleblower Act

The Texas Whistleblower Act prohibits governmental entities on the state 

and local level from suspending, terminating, or taking adverse personnel actions 

against a public employee who, in good faith, reports a violation of law committed 

by the employing governmental entity or another public employee to an 

appropriate law-enforcement authority. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.002(a). The 

City’s plea to the jurisdiction did not contest that Jones was a public employee. 

However, the City contested the other elements Jones had to plead to qualify for 

the Act’s waiver of immunity, including that Jones made a good-faith report of a 

violation of law, that he made a good-faith report to an appropriate lawenforcement authority, and that he suffered retaliation as a result of making a 

qualifying report.

A. Good-Faith Report of a Violation of Law

The Whistleblower Act prohibits a state or local governmental entity from 

taking adverse personnel action against a public employee who reports in good 

faith a “violation of law[.]” Id. The Act defines “law” as “(A) a state or federal 

statute; (B) an ordinance of a local governmental entity; or (C) a rule adopted 

under a statute or ordinance.” Id. § 554.001(1). The Act does not require that the 

employee identify in the report the specific law he asserts was violated, but there 
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must be some law prohibiting the complained-of-conduct. Wilson v. Dallas Indep. 

Sch. Dist., 376 S.W.3d 319, 323 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). And, the 

employee-plaintiff must identify the specific law he asserts was violated at some 

point during the litigation. Id. at 327. “A plaintiff appealing a dismissal of a 

Whistleblower claim for want of jurisdiction may not assert on appeal that the 

conduct described in the report violates a law not identified in the trial court.” Id. 

An employee’s report of a violation of law must be in good faith. Tex. Gov’t 

Code Ann. § 554.002. The employee “must have believed he was reporting 

conduct that constituted a violation of law and his belief must have been 

reasonable based on his training and experience.” Gonzalez, 325 S.W.3d at 626. A 

report that a violation of the law might occur in the future is not a good-faith report 

of an existing or past violation of the law. See id. at 627; Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 885 

(noting that report of possible future regulatory non-compliance does not equate to 

reporting a violation of the law).

B. Appropriate Law-Enforcement Authority

Section 554.002(b) of the Government Code defines when a public 

employee has made a report to an “appropriate law[-]enforcement] authority”

under the Whistleblower Act:

[A] report is made to an appropriate law[-]enforcement authority if the 

authority is a part of a state or local governmental entity or of the 
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federal government that the employee in good faith believes is 

authorized to:

(1) regulate under or enforce the law alleged to be violated in 

the report; or 

(2) investigate or prosecute a violation of criminal law. 

Id. § 554.002(b). Under the statutory definition, it is not enough that a 

governmental entity has general authority to regulate, enforce, investigate, or 

prosecute. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 319 (Tex. 2002).

Rather, the entity must have authority to regulate under or enforce the law alleged 

to be violated in the public employee’s report, or to investigate or prosecute a 

violation a violation of criminal law. Id. at 320. An entity’s authority to internally 

discipline its own employees for an alleged violation is insufficient to make that 

entity an appropriate law-enforcement authority. Id. at 320, 321. An entity “must 

have outward-looking powers.” McMillen v. Tex. Health & Human Servs. 

Comm’n, 485 S.W.3d 427, 429 (Tex. 2016). “[F]or an entity to constitute an 

appropriate law-enforcement authority under the Act, it must have authority to 

enforce, investigate, or prosecute violations of law against third parties outside of 

the entity itself, or it must have authority to promulgate regulations governing the 

conduct of such third parties.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Gentilello, 398 

S.W.3d 680, 686 (Tex. 2013). The power to “urge compliance or purge 
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noncompliance” with the law is not included in the Act’s limited definition of law 

enforcement powers qualifying an entity as an appropriate law-enforcement 

authority. Id. at 684. The Act included “law-enforcement authority” and not “lawcompliance authority[.]” See id. at 685. An entity may itself be subject to 

regulation, but not charged with subjecting others to regulation; “being regulated is 

not the same as being the regulator.” Id. 

Under certain circumstances, however, a Whistleblower Act report may be 

made internally. Id. at 686. For example, when an employee works for an entity 

with the authority to investigate the citizenry at large for violations of the same 

crime reported by the employee an internal report may be internal:

A police department employee could retain the protections of the 

Whistleblower Act if she reported that her partner is dealing narcotics 

to her supervisor in the narcotics or internal affairs division. In such a 

situation, the employee works for an entity with authority to 

investigate violations of drug laws committed by the citizenry at large.

Id.

The statute provides that even if the entity is not an appropriate lawenforcement authority, the public employee may still obtain Whistleblower Act 

protection if the employee can show that he in good faith believed that the entity to 

which he reported the violation of the law was an appropriate law-enforcement 

authority. Needham, 82 S.W.3d at 320. However, it is not enough that an employee 
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had a strongly felt or sincerely held belief that he had reported to the appropriate 

law-enforcement entity. Gentilello, 398 S.W.3d at 683. The “good-faith” 

requirement in the Act has both objective and subjective elements. Id. To be in 

“good faith,” an employee must not just believe the entity was an appropriate lawenforcement authority under the Act, but his belief must be “reasonable in light of

the employee’s training and experience.” Needham, 82 S.W.3d at 321. A plaintiff 

can only satisfy the good-faith requirement if he is able to show that a reasonably 

prudent public employee in similar circumstances would have believed he had 

made the report to an appropriate authority. Id. at 320–21; see also Gentilello, 398

S.W.3d at 683. It is not enough that the employee believed the entity to which he 

reported had the power to discipline its own employees or investigate internally the 

alleged violation of the law. Gentilello, 398 S.W.3d at 686; Needham, 82 S.W.3d 

at 321. Likewise, a belief that the entity could forward the report of the violation of 

the law on to another entity for prosecution is not evidence of a good-faith belief. 

Needham, 82 S.W.3d at 321; Office of the Att’y Gen. v. Weatherspoon, 472 S.W.3d 

280, 282 (Tex. 2015). Furthermore, that an entity has a division within it charged 

with investigating and prosecuting crimes, does not transform the entire entity into 

an appropriate law-enforcement entity. Weatherspoon, 472 S.W.3d at 283. Rather, 

the plaintiff-employee must show that he reported directly to a division or 
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department within the entity that has the appropriate law-enforcement authority 

contemplated by the Act. See Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Okoli, 440 S.W.3d 

611, 614 (Tex. 2014). 

In Okoli, the plaintiff was an employee of the Texas Department of Human 

Services (“TDHS”). Id. at 612. He was fired after reporting misconduct within the 

TDHS to his supervisors. Id. at 613. The plaintiff filed suit under the 

Whistleblower Act. Id. TDHS argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction 

because the plaintiff failed to make a good-faith report of a violation of law to an 

appropriate law-enforcement authority. Id. The Court considered whether the 

plaintiff’s report was made to an appropriate law-enforcement authority when he 

reported the violation to his supervisors, who in turn were required to forward the 

complaint to the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”), a division within TDHS that 

had outward-looking law-enforcement authority. Id. at 612-13, 614. The Supreme 

Court rejected this argument and reiterated that generally “reports up the chain of 

command are insufficient to trigger the Act’s protections.” Id. at 614. The Court 

explained that when a public employee has knowledge that “the report will have to 

be forwarded elsewhere for regulation, enforcement, investigation, or prosecution, 

then the employee is not reporting ‘to an appropriate law[-]enforcement 

authority.’” Id. at 615 (quoting Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.002). The Court 
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further explained that “[t]he fact that the OIG is an internal division of TDHS does 

not change the analysis.” Id. at 616. For the OIG to have received the plaintiff’s 

report, someone had to forward the reports to the OIG. Id. at 615. 

C. Adverse Employment Action Caused by Making Report

Even if a plaintiff establishes that he made a good-faith report of a violation 

of law to an appropriate law-enforcement authority, he must still show that he 

suffered retaliation as a result of his making the report. City of Fort Worth v. 

Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Tex. 2000); see Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 

904 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex. 1995) (“[A] public employee can recover under the 

Whistleblower Act only if he proves that he was suspended, terminated or 

discriminated against ‘because’ . . . he reported a violation of the law in good faith 

to an appropriate law enforcement authority”). To establish causation in a 

Whistleblower Act case, a public employee must demonstrate that after he reported 

a violation of law in good faith to an appropriate law-enforcement authority, the 

employee suffered discriminatory conduct by his employer that would not have 

occurred when it did if the employee had not made the report. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 

at 67; City of Houston v. Levingston, 221 S.W.3d 204, 226 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (op. on reh’g). That is, a plaintiff “must establish a ‘but 

for’ causal nexus between his report of the illegal activity and the employer’s 
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prohibited conduct.” Levingston, 221 S.W.3d at 226; see Hurley v. Tarrant Cty., 

232 S.W.3d 781, 786 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (explaining that 

“[t]his causation standard has been described as a ‘but for’ causal nexus 

requirement”). However, the plaintiff need not show that the Whistleblower report 

was the sole reason for the adverse personnel action. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 634.

A plaintiff can establish a causal link between the adverse employment 

action and the report of a violation of law through circumstantial evidence, 

including evidence that the employer (1) had knowledge of the report of a violation 

of law, (2) expressed a negative attitude toward the employee’s report, (3) failed to 

adhere to established policies regarding employment decisions, (4) subjected the 

employee to discriminatory treatment in comparison to similarly situated 

employees, and (5) stated a false reason for the adverse employment decision. 

Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d at 69; Levingston, 221 S.W.3d at 226. The plaintiff must show 

that the person who took the adverse employment action—the decision-maker—

knew of the employee’s report of illegal conduct. Harris Cty. v. Vernagallo, 181 

S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); see also 

Kirkland v. City of Austin, No. 03-10-00130-CV, 2012 WL 1149288, at *2 (Tex. 

App.—Austin Apr. 5, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op) (stating that a plaintiff must show 

“at a minimum . . . that the person who took the adverse employment action knew 
15

of the employee’s report of illegal conduct”) (internal quotations omitted)). A trial 

court’s decision to grant a plea to the jurisdiction in a Whistleblower case can be 

based upon insufficient evidence of causation. See Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 

Farran, 409 S.W.3d 653, 656 (Tex. 2013).

D. Application of the Law to Jones’s Reports 

Jones contends that he made reports of three different violations of the law, 

including that the City was operating garbage trucks on the public streets in an 

unsafe condition; (2) that a City official committed perjury; and (3) that the City 

had committed “Water Code/Environmental Violations[.]” Jones argues that he 

reported these violations of the law to various appropriate law-enforcement 

authorities, including: (1) the City Manager; (2) the Director of Public Works; (3) 

various members of the City Council; (4) the Superintendent of the City’s Solid 

Waste Division; (5) the City’s Appeals Committee; (6) OSHA; and (7) the TCEQ. 

We analyze each of Jones’s reports below to determine if any of his reports qualify 

him for protection under the Whistleblower Act.

1. Report to the City Manager-John Comeaux

On appeal, Jones argues that John Comeaux, as the City Manager, is an 

appropriate law-enforcement authority under the Act and that he reported a 

violation of the law to him. However, Jones’s pleadings contain no allegations that 
16

he made any reports to the City Manager. There is a letter in the record dated May 

23, 2012 and addressed to the “Human Resource Dept.” and to the “acting City 

Manager[.]” On appeal, Jones argues that this letter amounts to a report of a 

violation of the law to the City Manager. However, Jones does not cite us to any 

portion of his petition where he properly alleged this letter as a qualifying report 

under the Act, and we find none. In fact, Jones’s petition does not reference the 

May 23, 2012 letter at all. 

Jones had a reasonable opportunity to amend his pleadings in response to the 

City’s plea and in fact previously amended his pleadings twice in response to the 

City’s jurisdictional challenge. See Harris Cty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 639 

(Tex. 2004) (explaining that if a plaintiff has been provided a reasonable 

opportunity to amend his pleadings after a governmental entity files its plea to the 

jurisdiction, and the plaintiff’s amended pleading still does not allege facts that 

would constitute a waiver of immunity, then the proper remedy is dismissal). 

Despite these amendments, Jones has not pleaded facts to establish he made a 

qualifying report to the City Manager.

Even if Jones had properly alleged this report in his pleadings, we would not 

be able to find that the report satisfies the requirements of the Act. In the letter, 

Jones first complains about adverse employment actions he has suffered as a result 
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of posts he made on the Internet criticizing Ross Blackketter, the Director of Public 

Works for the City, for creating racial tension and oppression within the 

department. Second, he complains about the City’s inconsistent stance on policies. 

Third, he complains that Smith’s action in sending him home was “an attempt to 

retaliate because [he] ‘blew the whistle’ on poor vehicle policy and made people 

aware about discrimination on the part of [Blackketter].”1

Jones argues his letter to the City Manager essentially reported a violation of 

section 547.004(a)(1) of the Texas Transportation Code when he complained that 

his supervisor asked him to operate a truck that was leaking hydraulic fluids, and 

when he refused, the City sent him home and allowed someone else to drive the 

truck. Section 547.004(a)(1) provides that “[a] person commits an offense that is a 

misdemeanor if the person operates or moves or, as an owner, knowingly permits 

another to operate or move, a vehicle that . . . is unsafe so as to endanger a 

person[.]” Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 547.004(a)(1) (West 2011). A necessary 

element of finding a person or entity has violated this statute is that the person 

actually operates the vehicle. See id. If the person or entity is the owner of the 

 1 To the extent that Jones alleges the City took adverse personnel actions 

against him in retaliation for his reports of discrimination, we note that as a matter 

of law, retaliation claims by public employees based on reports of discrimination 

are not actionable under the Texas Whistleblower Act. See City of Waco v. Lopez, 

259 S.W.3d 147, 155-56 (Tex. 2008); see also Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 21.001, 

21.055 (West 2015).
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vehicle, then it is also a necessary element that the person or entity have

knowledge of the unsafe nature of the vehicle. See id.

Jones’s May 23, 2012 letter does not assert that the City knowingly allowed 

an employee to operate an unsafe vehicle. Rather, in the letter, Jones specifically 

informed the City Manager that the City’s mechanic inspected the truck and found 

it was safe to operate. Jones informed the City Manager that when he refused to 

operate the truck, another City employee took the truck out, but ultimately had to 

return the truck because the leak became worse. Jones, however, does not assert 

that the leak had progressed to the point that the truck was in an unsafe condition 

before the employee returned the truck to the garage. Jones does not report that the

truck was unsafe or actually operated in an unsafe condition. Jones does not report 

that the truck posed an environmental or safety risk. Rather, he states very plainly 

that he refused to drive the truck because he did not want to get “blamed for taking 

a truck out knowing it is broken.” He is very clearly complaining about 

inconsistent policies regarding truck use and maintenance. We conclude that 

Jones’s report to the City Manager did not describe conduct that would violate 

section 547.004(a)(1) of the Texas Transportation Code.

Jones may have believed that his letter to the City Manager constituted a 

report of a violation of law; however, his belief had to have been reasonable based 
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on his training and experience. See Univ. of Houston v. Barth, 403 S.W.3d 851, 

856-57 (Tex. 2013). Jones testified that he graduated from high school and 

obtained two associates degrees, one in management development and the other in 

process technology. He served in the United States Marine Corps and was assigned 

to a supply unit. Jones worked for the Texas Department of Criminal Justice

(“TDCJ”), but was terminated from that position based on an allegation that he 

retaliated against an inmate. In response to his termination, Jones filed a 

discrimination claim against TDCJ, but the claim was dismissed for failing to “hit 

all the parameters of race[.]” Jones testified that he has never worked as a 

mechanic on vehicles and has had no training as a mechanic. Jones does not 

dispute that the senior mechanic told him the truck was safe to operate that day. 

We conclude that Jones has failed to present evidence that it was reasonable, in 

light of his training and experience and the circumstances presented, for him to 

believe that the conduct he reported to the City Manager—that the City allowed a 

driver to drive a vehicle the mechanic inspected and deemed safe—was a violation 

of the law. At most, Jones’s letter reflects his dissatisfaction with the City’s 

policies and inconsistent application thereof. As such, the letter cannot form the 

basis for a report of a violation of law. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 554.001(1), 

554.002(a).
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2. Report to the Director of Public Works-Ross Blackketter

Next, Jones contends that Blackketter, as the Director of Public Works for 

the City, was an appropriate law-enforcement authority under the Act. Again, 

however, our review indicates that Jones’s pleadings contain no allegations that he 

made any reports to Blackketter. Even after amending his pleadings twice to 

address the City’s jurisdictional challenges, Jones has not pleaded facts to establish 

he made a qualifying report to Blackketter.

Even if Jones had properly pleaded facts to support this contention, the only 

reports that Jones argues on appeal that he made to Blackketter were not reports he 

actually made to Blackketter, but rather reports Jones made to other City 

employees that Jones assumes were ultimately forwarded to Blackketter. There is 

no evidence that Smith told Blackketter that Jones had reported that his truck was 

unsafe to drive or that there were possible environmental issues with Truck 1713. 

In fact, Smith testified that she did not tell Blackketter that Jones had reported 

these issues because, according to Smith, Jones had not reported these issues to 

her. And, in Blackketter’s affidavit, he stated that he was not aware of Jones 

making any report of any violation of law by the City or its employees prior to his 

decision to initiate termination proceedings on May 23, 2012. Therefore, we 

conclude there is no evidence in the record that Jones made a report to Blackketter 
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as contemplated by the Act. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.002(b). See also

Okoli, 440 S.W.3d at 614–15. 

3. Report to City Council Member-Kerry Thomas

Jones also contends that members of the City Council generally are 

appropriate law-enforcement authorities. In his brief, Jones argues that he made 

reports to multiple members of the City Council. However, in his petition and in 

his appellate brief, Jones only identifies one council member to whom he claims he 

made a qualifying report—Kerry Thomas. In his Third Amended Petition, Jones 

alleged that on May 16, 2012, he reported to Thomas that Blackketter had 

knowingly lied to the City Council during an official meeting about the existence 

of “official City preventative maintenance records” that showed the City’s Solid 

Waste Department had been adequately maintaining its garbage trucks. Jones 

alleged various violations of the Penal Code and stated that it is within the City’s 

authority through the City’s Police Department to investigate these violations. 

Jones did not allege that Thomas directly had the authority to regulate under, 

enforce, investigate, or prosecute a violation of the Penal Code. See Needham, 82 

S.W.3d at 320. That the City has a division within it, the Police Department, 

charged with investigating and prosecuting crimes, does not transform the entire 

City as a governmental entity into an appropriate law-enforcement entity. See 
22

Weatherspoon, 472 S.W.3d at 283. Rather, to satisfy the requirements of the Act, 

Jones had to show that he reported the alleged violation of law directly to the 

City’s Police Department. See Okoli, 440 S.W.3d at 614. Here, there is no evidence 

in the record that Jones ever reported a violation of the Penal Code to the City’s 

Police Department. 

Even if a member of the City Council were considered an appropriate lawenforcement authority, Jones has failed to show that he, in good faith, reported a 

violation of the law. Jones alleged that his report to Thomas about Blackketter was 

essentially a report of a violation of law under sections 37.01(2), 37.02(a)(2), 

37.09(a)–(d), and 37.10 of the Texas Penal Code. Section 37.02(a)(2) of the Texas 

Penal Code provides that a person commits the offense of perjury if, with intent to 

deceive and with knowledge of the statement’s meaning, the person makes a false 

unsworn declaration under the Unsworn Declaration provision of the Texas Civil 

Practices and Remedies Code. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 37.02(a)(2) (West 2011). 

The unsworn declaration covered in section 37.02 is statutorily defined as a written 

declaration that is subscribed by the person making the declaration as true under 

penalty of perjury. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 132.001(c) (West Supp. 

2016). The conduct described in Jones’s report to Thomas, as alleged in his 

pleading and reflected in the evidence, does not support a violation of section 
23

37.02(a)(2). Furthermore, there are no pleadings or any evidence to support that 

Jones believed in good faith that he reported a violation of this law.

Section 37.09 of the Texas Penal Code describes the offense of “Tampering 

With or Fabricating Physical Evidence[.]” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 37.09 (West 

Supp. 2016). It provides that a person commits an offense under this section if, 

knowing that an investigation or official proceeding is pending or in progress, the 

person “alters, destroys, or conceals any record, document, or thing with intent to 

impair its verity, legibility, or availability as evidence in the investigation or 

official proceeding” or “makes, presents, or uses any record, document, or thing 

with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the 

investigation or official proceeding.” Id. § 37.09(a). Subsection (d) of section 

37.09 provides that a person also commits an offense under this section if 

“knowing that an offense has been committed,” he “alters, destroys, or conceals 

any record, document, or thing with intent to impair its verity, legibility, or 

availability as evidence in any subsequent investigation of or official proceeding 

related to the offense[.]” Id. § 37.09(d)(1). Section 37.10 describes the offense of 

“Tampering With Governmental Record[.]” Id. § 37.10. It provides that a person 

commits an offense under this section if he:

(1) knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of, a 

governmental record;
24

(2) makes, presents, or uses any record, document, or thing with 

knowledge of its falsity and with intent that it be taken as a genuine 

governmental record;

(3) intentionally destroys, conceals, removes, or otherwise impairs the 

verity, legibility, or availability of a governmental record;

(4) possesses, sells, or offers to sell a governmental record or a blank 

governmental record form with intent that it be used unlawfully;

(5) makes, presents, or uses a governmental record with knowledge of 

its falsity; or

(6) possesses, sells, or offers to sell a governmental record or a blank 

governmental record form with knowledge that it was obtained 

unlawfully.

Id. Section 37.01(2) defines “[g]overnmental record[,]” in relevant part, as 

including “anything belonging to, received by, or kept by government for 

information, including a court record[.]” Id. § 37.01(2)(A).

Jones does not allege any facts and there is no evidence in the record to 

show that at the time he spoke to Thomas, Jones, in good faith, believed that

someone was currently, or had in the past, tampered with, altered, concealed, or 

otherwise fabricated evidence or government records. Jones appears to concede 

this point in his brief. Jones argues on appeal that “[t]he issue and concern for the 

City Mechanic and [Jones were] that maintenance records (which clearly qualify as 

‘government records’ within the meaning of § 37.01(2)(A) of the Penal Code)
25

might be fabricated after the fact to support [Blackketter’s] false statements.” 

(emphasis added). Jones further argues that “if there was a concern that 

maintenance records might be fabricated, § 37.09(a)--(d) would apply.” (emphasis 

added). He then argues that had Thomas directed the Police Department to 

investigate Jones’s report, then “a potential plan to fabricate City documents” 

would have been discovered. (emphasis added). Even if Jones believed that 

Blackketter might violate laws in the future, belief in the possibility of a future 

violation is not evidence that he made a good-faith report of an existing or past 

violation of law. See Gonzalez, 325 S.W.3d at 627; Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 885.

4. Report to the Solid Waste Department’s Superintendent-Anitra Smith

In his Third Amended Petition, Jones alleged that on May 23, 2012, he 

reported to the senior mechanic that Truck 1713, which was assigned to him, was 

“leaking potentially flammable hydraulic fluid used by the truck’s hydraulic lift 

system.” The senior mechanic informed Jones that the leak was small, and Jones’s 

immediate supervisor ordered Jones to perform his garbage collection route using 

Truck 1713. When Jones refused to operate Truck 1713, he was instructed to report 

to Smith. Jones alleged he reported to Smith on May 23, 2012 and informed her 

that he did not want to operate Truck 1713 “because of the potential environmental 

and safety hazards that the hydraulic leak posed to the public and to the driver of 
26

the truck.” Jones alleged that he told Smith that he believed the operation of Truck 

1713 “was illegal and that he could be cited by law enforcement for operating the 

truck.” Jones alleged that Smith had the power and authority to prevent the 

operation of defective residential garbage trucks by the City’s employees and was 

responsible for implementing the City’s program of garbage collection with the use 

of properly maintained vehicles and equipment and properly trained staff. 

On appeal, Jones contends that the primary violation of law that he reported 

was the operation of Truck 1713 on the public streets while in an unsafe condition

in violation of section 547.004(a)(1) of the Texas Transportation Code. As noted 

above, section 547.004(a)(1) provides that “[a] person commits an offense that is a 

misdemeanor if the person operates or moves or, as an owner, knowingly permits 

another to operate or move, a vehicle that . . . is unsafe so as to endanger a 

person[.] Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 547.004(a)(1). As with Jones’s report to the 

City Manager, Jones’s report to Smith did not include a report that an actual 

violation of the Transportation Code was occurring or had occurred in the past. 

Rather, he reported his concern that operating the truck on the road would be a 

violation of the law. Jones’s concern regarding the potential of a future violation of 

law is not evidence that he made a good-faith report of an existing or past violation 

of law. See Gonzalez, 325 S.W.3d at 627; Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 885.
27

Jones may have believed that his report to Smith concerned a violation of 

law; however, his belief had to have been reasonable based on his training and 

experience. See Barth, 403 S.W.3d at 856-57. Jones testified that he had never 

been stopped or cited for problems with the condition of the City’s garbage trucks. 

He cites to no evidence of his past experiences that would support his subjective 

belief that he had reported a violation of law to Smith. In his deposition, Jones 

expressed concerns over things that could have happened had he taken the truck 

out that day. It is also undisputed that Jones’s truck was inspected that day and 

determined to be safe to operate. We conclude that Jones has failed to present 

evidence that it was reasonable, in light of his training and experience and the 

circumstances presented, for him to believe that the conduct he reported to Smith 

was a violation of the law. At most, Jones reported his refusal to drive Truck 1713

for fear that he would violate an unspecified law.

Additionally, Jones has not shown that he in good faith believed Smith was 

an appropriate law-enforcement authority under the Act. On appeal, he claims that 

Smith was not just his “supervisor,” but as a “department head” within the City, 

Smith was a City official and, as such, was an appropriate law-enforcement 

authority. He contends that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether it 

was reasonable for him to believe that Smith was an appropriate authority to 
28

enforce “whether Port Arthur allowed the operation of residential garbage trucks 

with leaking hydraulic systems over the streets of Port Arthur[.]” 

Even if we accept as true Jones’s assertion that Smith had authority to 

enforce certain laws within her department, the type of internal authority to require 

or prohibit one’s own employees from driving trucks in violation of a law is 

insufficient to make Smith an appropriate law-enforcement authority. See 

Needham, 82 S.W.3d. at 320, 321. The authority described by Jones is not the type 

of “outward-looking powers” the Act requires. See McMillen v. Tex. Health & 

Human Servs. Comm’n, 485 S.W.3d 427, 429 (Tex. 2016). 

Moreover, Jones’s testimony suggests that when he reported to Smith, it was 

not reasonable for him to believe that Smith was an appropriate law-enforcement

authority to address the violation of law he contends he made. Jones testified that 

when employees reported problems with the trucks to Smith, she informed the 

employees that she could not do anything about it and directed them to speak to 

Blackketter. Jones has not alleged or presented any evidence to raise a fact issue as 

to whether Smith had the authority to enforce, investigate, or prosecute violations 

of the Texas Transportation Code against third parties outside the City’s 

government structure. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Gentilello, 398 S.W.3d 

680, 686 (Tex. 2013).
29

Jones further argues that he reported unspecified “Water Code” violations 

and “Environmental Violations” to Smith. In his Third Amended Petition, Jones 

does not associate any specific Texas Water Code violation with his report to 

Smith, and he never alleges that Smith had the appropriate authority under the Act 

to address a violation of the Water Code. Jones alleges generally that sections 

26.0136 and 26.121 of the Water Code give the City the authority to “manage and 

enforce the implementation of water quality management functions and the 

protection of its watershed against activities that may cause the discharge of 

pollutants into its water supply or its watershed.” 

Section 26.011 of the Water Code provides that unless specifically stated 

otherwise, the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (“TNRCC”)

shall administer the provisions of chapter 26 and control the water quality of the 

State and establish the level of water quality to be maintained. Tex. Water Code 

Ann. § 26.011 (West 2008). While the Water Code defines “Commission” as the 

TNRCC, the TNRCC changed its name as part of the agency’s 2001 sunset review

to the TCEQ. See Tex. Water Code Ann. § 7.001(1); Act of May 28, 2001, 77th 

Leg., R.S., ch. 965, § 18.01, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1985; see FPL Farming Ltd. v. 

Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., 351 S.W.3d 306, 308 n.2 (Tex. 2011). Section 

26.0136(a) of the Code sets forth the enforcement authority for violations of 
30

provisions within chapter 26 of the Code, which governs “Water Quality 

Control[.]” See id. §26.0136(a). It provides that the Commission is the State 

agency with primary responsibility for implementation of water quality 

management functions, including enforcement actions within the State. Id. §§ 

26.001, 26.0136(a). Subpart (b) of this statute provides in relevant part that this 

section is not intended “to enlarge, diminish, or supersede the water quality 

powers, including enforcement authority, authorized by law for . . . local 

governments.” Id. § 26.0136(b). Section 26.121 governs discharges of waste and 

pollutants into or adjacent to water in the State. See generally id. § 26.121. We 

note that sections 26.121 and 26.027 of the Code provide that there are 

circumstances in which the Commission may issue permits and amendments to 

permits for the discharge of waste or pollutants into or adjacent to water in the 

State. Id. §§ 26.027, 26.121.

Even if we were to assume that Jones reported a violation of the Texas 

Water Code when he made a report to Smith, Jones has failed to show that Smith 

was an appropriate law-enforcement authority under the Whistleblower Act. 

Section 26.0136(b) of the Texas Water Code does not give local governments the 

authority to enforce violations of chapter 26. See id. § 26.0136(b). Rather, it 

provides that the provisions of chapter 26 do not diminish authority that may be 
31

granted to local authorities by other laws. See id. Jones has not alleged any 

provisions of the Texas Water Code expressly giving local governments the 

authority to enforce the provisions of chapter 26. We conclude that Jones has failed 

to show that Smith was an appropriate law-enforcement authority under the Act. 

See Gentilello, 398 S.W.3d at 687 (“A supervisor looking into and addressing 

possible noncompliance in-house bears little resemblance to a law-enforcement 

official formally investigating or prosecuting that noncompliance on behalf of the 

public, or a regulatory authority charged with promulgating or enforcing 

regulations applicable to third parties generally.”). We further conclude that Jones 

has not presented any evidence that it was reasonable in light of his training and 

experience in the department to conclude that Smith had authority outside the 

department to enforce Water Code provisions generally. See id. at 689. For all of 

these reasons, Jones cannot rely upon his report to Smith to form the basis of his 

Whistleblower claim.

5. Report to the City’s Appeals Committee

In his Third Amended Petition, Jones alleges that under the City’s grievance 

procedure, on June 28, 2012, he spoke at the appeal hearing of his termination. 

Jones alleges that during the hearing, he reported to the Appeals Committee “the 

dangers of leaking hydraulic fluid from its garbage trucks” and that he informed 
32

the Appeals Committee that he had reported safety violations to OSHA. Jones 

informed the Appeals Committee that “he believed that he had been terminated in 

retaliation for his good-faith reports of multiple violations of law by the City 

pertaining to environmental compliance and safety and workplace safety.” Jones 

alleges that the Appeals Committee retaliated against him for this report by 

recommending that Jones’s termination be upheld. He further claims that the City 

Manager retaliated against him by accepting the Appeals Committee’s 

recommendation. 

To the extent that Jones is claiming on appeal to this Court that he made a 

qualifying Whistleblower report to the Appeals Committee, we conclude that Jones 

has failed to allege or otherwise show that the Appeals Committee was an 

appropriate law-enforcement authority to report any violations of the law regarding 

the garbage trucks. The very nature of the Appeals Committee suggests its 

authority is restricted solely to compliance-type issues within the City. Jones has 

presented no evidence to show that the Appeals Committee had any lawenforcement authority over anyone other than the City’s own employees.

Moreover, even had Jones presented evidence that he subjectively believed the 

Appeals Committee was an appropriate law-enforcement authority, we conclude 
33

that he has failed to allege or present any evidence to show that this belief was 

objectively reasonable in light of his training and experience.

6. Report to OSHA and the TCEQ

In his Third Amended Petition, Jones alleges that sometime before June 8, 

2012, he reported the unsafe working conditions at the City’s Solid Waste 

Department to OSHA. He also alleges that sometime before June 8, 2012, he filed 

a complaint with the TCEQ accusing the City of violating title 30, section 

330.103(a) of the Texas Administrative Code by failing to collect municipal solid 

waste containing putrescibles at least once a week.2 See generally 30 Tex. Admin. 

Code § 330.103(a) (Westlaw current through 41 Tex. Reg. No. 8226, dated Oct. 

14, 2016) (Tex. Comm’n. Envtl. Quality) (“Municipal solid waste (MSW) 

containing putrescibles shall be collected a minimum of once weekly to prevent 

propagation and attraction of vectors and the creation of public health nuisances.”). 

The complaints that Jones filed with OSHA or the TCEQ are not in the appellate 

record. However, in his sworn answers to interrogatories, Jones states that he filed 

his report to the TCEQ sometime between May 24, 2012, and June 8, 2012. In the 

same answers, he states that he made a report to OSHA on May 24, 2012. 

 2 Jones alleged that he reported that the City violated “30 TAC §300.103(a) 

pertaining to [the City’s] failure to collect municipal solid waste containing 

putrescibles, a minimum of once per week.” Inasmuch as this is an apparent 

typographical error, we refer to the correct statutory provision herein.
34

Therefore, both reports were made after Smith decided to send Jones home 

indefinitely and initiate termination proceedings on May 23, 2012.

Even if Jones could show that either his report to OSHA or his report to the 

TCEQ was a good-faith report of a violation of law to an appropriate lawenforcement authority, Jones is still required to show that his making the report 

caused him to suffer retaliation. See Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d at 67. The City contends 

that Jones cannot show causation regarding his OSHA and TCEQ reports because 

the evidence shows that the relevant decision-makers had no knowledge of these 

reports prior to making their respective decisions to terminate Jones. 

Jones argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the date 

he was terminated. He contends that the notice of termination from the City is 

inherently contradictory on this point because it was signed and approved on June 

7, 2012, but the notice states that the termination is effective dating back to May 

23, 2012. He argues that “[a]t best, the evidence shows that [Jones] was not 

terminated before June 8, 2012, when he was given [the notice].” 

However, it is undisputed that the City made a decision to take adverse 

personnel action against Jones on May 23, 2012, when Smith sent Jones home 

indefinitely for his refusal to drive Truck 1713. In Jones’s Third Amended Petition, 

he alleges that Smith “sent him home from work indefinitely, as an adverse and 
35

disciplinary employment action.” It is also undisputed that later the same day, 

Smith and Blackketter signed a notice of termination concerning Jones’s 

employment with the City. By June 7, 2012, all of the required decision-makers 

had approved the decision to terminate Jones and had signed the notice of 

termination. The termination notice is signed by Smith, Blackketter, Comeaux, and 

Albert Thigpen, the Director of Personnel. Jones received his notice of termination 

on June 8, 2012. 

Jones had the burden to present some evidence that at least one of these 

decision-makers knew about his reports to OSHA or the TCEQ when he or she 

took adverse personnel action against him. There is no evidence in the record to 

show affirmatively that any of the decision-makers were aware of these complaints 

before they made the decision to terminate Jones. In fact, the evidence in the 

record supports that the decision-makers were not aware of these complaints. Jones 

testified that he never informed Smith or Blackketter that he had filed complaints 

with TCEQ or OSHA. Jones testified that he did not send copies of his TCEQ 

complaint to the City and could not recall if he had sent the City a copy of his 

OSHA complaint. When asked whether he ever told anyone at the City that he was 

speaking to TCEQ, Jones responded, “I’m not sure.” The only evidence of Jones 

informing anyone with the City that he had filed a complaint with either OSHA or 
36

TCEQ comes from his argument before the Appeals Committee. While the full 

transcript of this hearing is not in the record, the parties both acknowledge that 

Jones informed the Committee that he had filed a report with OSHA. 

In Smith’s affidavit, she states that prior to making her decision to terminate 

Jones, she was not aware that Jones had made any report of a violation of law to 

either the TCEQ or to OSHA. In Blackketter’s affidavit, he likewise states that he 

had no knowledge of Jones’s complaints to the TCEQ or to OSHA prior to making 

his decision to support the termination of Jones. Comeaux, in his sworn affidavit,

states that prior to his decision to approve the notice of termination, he had no 

knowledge of Jones’s complaints to the TCEQ or to OSHA. He further states that 

he had no knowledge of these complaints prior to his decision to follow the 

recommendation of the Appeals Committee in upholding Jones’s termination. The 

record does not contain an affidavit from Thigpen, but there is no evidence in the 

record that Thigpen was aware of Jones’s complaints prior to his decision to 

approve the notice of termination. While there is evidence that Thigpen was the 

chairperson on the Appeals Committee, his position appeared to be that of a nonvoting member. Jones received his notice of termination on June 8, 2012. As such, 

that Jones mentioned his OSHA complaint during his hearing before the Appeals 
37

Committee is not informative of Thigpen’s knowledge prior to making a decision 

related to Jones’s termination.

In Canutillo Independent School District v. Farran, the employee of a 

school district reported violations of law regarding the use of government funds 

and waste disposal regulations to the school district’s superintendent, assistant 

superintendent, internal auditor, and the school board. 409 S.W.3d at 654. In 

March 2009, after the employee had complained about the violations of the law, 

the employee was suspended for making threatening calls to a man whom he 

believed was having an inappropriate relationship with the employee’s wife. Id. at 

654-55. In May, the board voted to give the employee notice of termination. Id. at 

655. In July, the employee contacted the FBI regarding the conduct he had 

previously complained about. Id. The school district became aware of the 

employee’s report to the FBI. Id. In August, the board held a due process hearing 

on the employee’s termination. Id. The hearing officer determined good cause 

existed for the employee’s termination and recommended that the board’s initial 

termination decision be sustained. Id. In September, the board accepted the hearing 

officer’s recommendation, and the employee was terminated. Id. 

In concluding that the employee failed to show causation under the 

Whistleblower Act, the Texas Supreme Court noted that the employee was 
38

suspended and had been given notice of the board’s intent to terminate him before 

the employee made the report to the FBI. Id. at 656. The Court explained that for 

the employee to prevail on a claim that the FBI report caused his termination, the 

employee would have to show that but for the report, the school district would 

have changed its mind and retained him. Id. The Court concluded that there was 

legally insufficient evidence from which a reasonable and fair-minded factfinder 

could make such a finding. Id. According to the Court, the employee’s “evidence 

showed that from the initiation of [the] termination proceedings, prior to the FBI 

report, the District never wavered in its view that [the employee] should be 

terminated.” Id. The Court found no evidence in the record that the school board 

would have been persuaded to change its mind but for the FBI report, that the FBI 

report had any influence on the hearing officer’s recommendation that the initial 

termination decision be sustained, or that the report in any way played a role in the 

board’s initial or final termination decision. Id. The Court affirmed the trial court’s 

judgment granting the plea to the jurisdiction. Id. at 657.

Here, there is no evidence in the record that the City wavered in its view that 

Jones should be terminated. The evidence showed that prior to Jones’s reports to 

OSHA and the TCEQ, Jones’s supervisors had decided to terminate his 

employment with the City. There is no evidence that at any point in time relevant 
39

to Jones’s termination, any of the decision-makers learned or had knowledge of 

Jones’s reports to the TCEQ or OSHA prior to making their decisions. In fact, the 

evidence in the record shows conclusively that the decision-makers had no prior 

knowledge of Jones’s reports, so he could not have been terminated because of 

those reports. See Vernagallo, 181 S.W.3d at 25; Kirkland, 2012 WL 1149288, at 

*2. Moreover, there is no evidence that anyone, including the Appeals Committee, 

would have changed their decision but for the OSHA and TCEQ reports. We 

conclude that Jones has failed to establish that he suffered retaliation as a result of 

making a report to either OSHA or the TCEQ. See Farran, 409 S.W.3d at 656; see 

also Barth, 403 S.W.3d at 857 (concluding that a Whistleblower report to the 

university police was not a report to an appropriate law-enforcement authority

when the employee did not make the report of the violation of the law until after 

the alleged retaliatory acts occurred); Tex. Dep’t of Aging & Disability Servs. v. 

Loya, 491 S.W.3d 920, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.) (concluding that 

the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss retaliation claim under the Texas 

Commission on Human Rights Act when employee’s protected activity could not 

have caused the adverse employment decision because employee did not engage in 

protected activity until after she received notice of her termination); Esparza v. 

Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 471 S.W.3d 903, 914 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.) 
40

(holding that employer’s alleged retaliatory acts that occurred before plaintiff filed 

EEOC charge could not have been caused by the EEOC filing).

IV. Conclusion

Jones failed to establish an objective, good-faith belief that he reported an 

alleged violation of the law to appropriate law-enforcement authorities that caused 

him to suffer an adverse personnel action under the Act.3 Accordingly, we 

conclude that the trial court did not err in determining it lacked jurisdiction over 

Jones’s Whistleblower action and in dismissing the cause. We overrule Jones’s two 

issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED.

 

 

______________________________

 CHARLES KREGER

 Justice

Submitted on May 22, 2015

Opinion Delivered November 17, 2016

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ. 

 3 Because our determination as to the trial court’s ruling on the City’s plea to 

the jurisdiction is dispositive, we need not address any issues concerning the trial 

court’s ruling on the City’s motion for summary judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 

47.1.