Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-2351| May 7, 2020 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Elizabeth Eichholtz Walker

Becker Bouwkamp Walker, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jamie Naftzger,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Patrick McCartney,

Appellee-Respondent.

May 7, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-DR-2551

Appeal from the Hendricks

Superior Court

The Honorable Robert W. Freese, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

32D01-1611-DR-642

Bradford, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-2351| May 7, 2020 Page 2 of 7

Case Summary

[1] Jamie Naftzger (“Mother”) and Patrick McCartney (“Father”) are the 

biological parents of B.M. (“Child”). In August of 2019, the trial court modified 

Father’s parenting time, which had been previously suspended. Because she

claims that the modification of Father’s parenting time was not in Child’s best 

interests, Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 29, 2009, Father and Mother were married, and Mother gave birth 

to Child on March 6, 2013. On November 15, 2017, the trial court granted a 

summary dissolution of Father and Mother’s marriage. In doing so, the trial 

court incorporated Father and Mother’s Mediated Property Settlement

Agreement, which in regards to custody and parenting time stated as follows: 

3. Child Custody, Parenting Time, & Support. The parties agree 

that [Mother] shall have custody of [Child,] born March 6, 2013. 

[Father] shall enjoy parenting time as follows: 

a. Phase 1: Until completion of Fairbanks’ PostHospitalization Program (PHP) and receipt of a 

completion certificate by [Mother’s] counsel, [Father] shall 

have parenting time supervised by Pam Kenneson every 

other weekend from 10:00 am Saturday to 6:00 pm 

Saturday evening and from 7:00 am Sunday morning to 

4:00 pm Sunday afternoon. 

b. Phase 2: Until completion of Fairbanks’ Intensive 

Outpatient Program (IOP) and receipt of a completion 

certificate by [Mother’s] counsel, [Father’s] parenting time 
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shall occur from Saturday morning at 10:00 am through 

Sunday evening at 6:00 pm. Said parenting time shall be 

supervised by Pam Kenneson. 

c. Phase 3: Following the completion of Phase 1 and Phase 

2 (above) [Father’s] parenting time shall be pursuant to 

Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines (IPTG’s). 

With the exception of Sunday parenting time in Phase 2, 

the parties agree that [Mother] shall retrieve [Child] from 

[Father’s] residence at the conclusion of parenting time 

with [Father’s] mother to pick-up [Child] at the start of 

parenting time. Neither party shall make disparaging 

comments about the other party, or permit any friends or 

family to do the same, in the presence of [Child]. Starting 

with Phase 2, [Mother] shall permit [Child] to 

communicate with [Father] via FaceTime no less than two 

(2) times per week. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 29–30 (unbolded). On May 14, 2018, the trial court 

amended Father’s parenting time, ordering, inter alia, that his parenting time be 

contingent upon him not consuming alcohol. Father’s last contact with Child 

was November of 2018. In December of 2018, Father was charged with, and 

subsequently convicted of, operating a vehicle while intoxicated. As a result of 

Father’s alcohol consumption, Mother moved to suspend his parenting time, a 

motion which was granted by the trial court on February 7, 2019. On June 16, 

2019, Father moved for a modification of his parenting time, and the trial court 

held an evidentiary hearing on August 27, 2019. At the time of the hearing, 

Father was serving a two-year sentence. On August 30, 2019, the trial court 

modified Father’s parenting time as follows: 
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Father shall have parenting time while he is incarcerated one 

time per week via telephone/facetime or similar media for no 

more than 30 minutes. The time is to be set up once Father has a 

schedule of availability once [he] is placed through DOC. Upon 

release from [DOC] Father shall have supervised parenting time 

one day per week for 12 hours. Parties shall attempt to agree to a 

supervisor or petition the Court. Either party may request a 

Review Hearing after 3 months of supervised parenting time. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 61. On September 25, 2019, Mother filed a motion 

to correct error, which was denied by the trial court.

Discussion and Decision

[3] Mother contends that the trial court erroneously modified Father’s parenting 

time. At the outset, we note that Father has not filed an appellee’s brief in this 

case and therefore, if Mother shows prima facie error, we may reverse the trial 

court’s decision. Kirk v. Monroe Cty. Tire, 585 N.E.2d 1366, 1368 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1992). “Prima facie error in this context is defined as, at first sight, on first 

appearance, or on the face of it.” Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 

758 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotations omitted). We review a trial court’s 

resolution of a visitation issue for an abuse of discretion. Pennington v. 

Pennington, 596 N.E.2d 305, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied. “If the 

record reveals a rational basis supporting the trial court’s determination, no 

abuse of discretion occurred.” Id. We will not reweigh the evidence or reassess 

witness credibility. Id. 
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[4] “[A] noncustodial parent is generally entitled to reasonable visitation rights.” 

Duncan v. Duncan, 843 N.E.2d 966, 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied; see 

also Ind. Code § 34-17-4-1(a). Indiana Code section 31-17-4-2 provides that 

[t]he court may modify an order granting or denying parenting 

time rights whenever modification would serve the best interests 

of the child. However, the court shall not restrict a parent’s 

parenting time rights unless the court finds that the parenting 

time might endanger the child’s physical health or significantly 

impair the child’s emotion development. 

Although the statute uses the word “might,” we have previously interpreted 

that to mean that a court may not restrict parenting time unless it “would” 

endanger the child’s physical health or emotional development. D.B. v. M.B.V., 

913 N.E.2d 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). In these family law matters, the Indiana 

Supreme Court has stated that 

[a]ppellate deference to the determination of our trial court 

judges, especially in domestic relations matters, is warranted 

because of their unique, direct interactions with the parties faceto-face, often over an extended period of time. Thus enabled to 

assess credibility and character through both factual testimony 

and intuitive discernment, our trial judges are in a superior 

position to ascertain information and apply common sense, 

particularly in the determination of the best interests of the 

involved children. 

Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011). To the contrary, appellate courts 

“are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude 

that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and 
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scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly 

understand the significance of the evidence.” D.C. v. J.A.C., 977 N.E.2d 951, 

956–57 (Ind. 2012). 

[5] We conclude that the record reveals a rational basis to support the trial court’s 

determination. At the evidentiary hearing, Father testified that he is a 

recovering alcoholic and that he is not going to use alcohol again stating that

alcohol has destroyed my life, alcohol has destroyed my family, 

alcohol has destroyed my relationship with my son because my 

wife won’t let me see him because of alcohol. Alcohol has hurt 

my health, alcohol, I have lost a lot of jobs to[o]. Alcohol brings 

me into a place where I have to deal with people that I don’t 

necessarily want to have to deal with. 

Tr. Vol. II p. 21. Father also testified that he has not consumed alcohol since his 

arrest in December of 2018; has completed thirty-six weeks of alcohol treatment 

at Willow Center in Brownsburg; and has taken classes through Cummins 

Health while on work release to deal with his divorce, alcoholism, and 

parenting. Further, Father’s mother Pamela Kenneson testified that she has a 

residence where she can help Father with his alcohol recovery and assist with 

parenting time. The trial court was entitled to believe Father and Kenneson’s 

testimony and did. 

[6] In claiming that the trial court’s decision was contrary to Child’s best interests, 

Mother points to the fact that Father has not had contact with Child since 

November of 2018, Father has previously relapsed and has not provided 

verification for counseling he claims to have completed, Child has had to 
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complete counseling to deal with anxiety and sleeping issues which occurred 

after contact with Father, and the current amount of parenting time ordered 

exceeds that which Father was afforded prior to the suspension in February of 

2019. Mother’s argument is merely an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence 

and reassess witness credibility, which we will not do. Pennington, 596 N.E.2d 

at 306. Mother has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion by 

modifying Father’s parenting time. 

[7] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.