[Cite as Hicks v. Clermont Cty. Sheriff's Office, 2024-Ohio-2186.]

IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

{¶1} The matter before the special master is Requester’s May 20, 2024, Motion for 

Recusal of the Clermont County Prosecutor’s Office from this Matter (“Motion”). That 

Motion is denied.

I. Background.

{¶2} This case arises from Requester Chistopher Hicks’ allegation that someone 

threatened to harm him and his son. The Respondent Clermont County Sheriff’s Office 

(“Sheriff”) investigated those allegations. Complaint, filed April 12, 2024, pp. 2-5.1

{¶3} Hicks made a public records request for records related to the Sheriff’s 

investigation. The Sheriff produced redacted records and withheld other records based 

on the confidential law enforcement investigatory records provisions of R.C. 

149.43(A)(1)(h) and (A)(2) and R.C.2930.07. Id. at pp. 6-69. 

{¶4} Hicks brought this case to challenge the Sheriff’s response. The Clermont 

County Prosecutor’s Office (“Prosecutor”) has entered an appearance as counsel for the 

Sheriff. Notices of Appearance, filed April 23, 2024.

1 All references to specific pages of the Complaint are to the pages of the PDF copy posted on the court’s 

online docket.

CHRISTOPHER R. HICKS

 Requester

 v. 

CLERMONT COUNTY SHERIFF’S 

OFFICE

 Respondent

Case No. 2024-00345PQ

Special Master Todd Marti

ORDER DENYING DISQUALIFICATION
Case No. 2024-00345PQ -2- ORDER

{¶5} Hicks’ Motion seeks to disqualify the Prosecutor as counsel for the Sheriff. It 

is based on the assertion that the Prosecutor has recused himself from criminal 

proceedings that Hicks claims are related to the threat against Hicks and his son. 

II. Analysis. 

{¶6} A “motion to disqualify counsel affects a ‘substantial right,” Guccione v. Hustler 

Magazine, 17 Ohio St.3d 88, 89 (1985), and court considering such a motion “should be 

mindful that disqualification is a drastic measure.” Centimark Corp. v. Brown Sprinkler 

Serv., 85 Ohio App.3d 485, 488, (11th Dist.1993). Disqualification is therefore only 

granted when denial of that relief would prejudice the moving party. State ex rel. Kura v. 

Sheward, 75 Ohio App.3d 244, 249 (10th Dist.1992); Desmond v. State, 2020-Ohio-181, 

(7th Dist.), ¶ 42. The party seeking disqualification has the burden of proving prejudice; 

prejudice will not be presumed. Centimark, 85 Ohio App.3d at 489; Desmond, 2020-Ohio181, ¶ 42. 

{¶7} Hicks has not carried that burden. The only prejudice he properly alleges2is 

to his ability to participate in what he characterizes as criminal proceedings related to the 

threats against him and his son, but that falls short on two levels. Legally, the prejudice 

must be to the movant in the case where disqualification is sought. Kura, 75 Ohio App.3d 

at 249 (requiring a demonstration of prejudice “to one of the parties to the pending case”) 

(emphasis added); Centimark, 85 Ohio App.3d at 489 (requiring evidence “substantially 

related to the present action”). Hicks’ concerns about impacts on the criminal case are 

therefore insufficient. Factually, Hicks has produced no evidence that the Prosecutor’s 

role in this case would impact Hicks’ rights in the criminal proceeding; all he offers is 

conclusory surmise. 

2 Hicks’ reply in support of the Motion also makes the assertion that the Prosecutor’s representation of the 

Sheriff in this case would give the Sheriff additional defenses on the merits, but that fails on two levels. 

Procedurally, it is not properly before the court because it was raised for the first time in Hicks’ reply. Cardinal 

Fed. S. & L. Ass’n v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 44 Ohio St.2d 13, 18 (1975). Substantively, it is hard 

to understand how the identity of counsel would impact the disputed records’ availability under R.C. 149.43, 

the ultimate benchmark in this case. 
Case No. 2024-00345PQ -3- ORDER

III. Conclusion.

Hicks’ Motion is therefore denied. 

TODD MARTI

Special Master

Filed May 29, 2024

Sent to S.C. Reporter 6/6/24