*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 17, 2007*

Decided October 29, 2007

Before

Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

 Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 06-4092

ABDUL REHMAN,

Petitioner,

v.

PETER D. KEISLER, Acting

Attorney General of the United

States,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

No. A95-925-184

O R D E R

Abdul Rehman, a Pakistani, arrived in November 2000 and overstayed his

tourist visa, though his employer had asked state and federal labor agencies to

approve a labor certification. While he waited for approval, in 2003 the federal

government initiated removal proceedings against him. The IJ initially granted

Rehman’s request to continue the hearing pending the labor certification, but on

hearing that the labor agencies had not yet approved it, the IJ denied further

continuances on that basis. But he continued the hearing over the next two years

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance 

with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 06-4092 Page 2

for another reason: to allow Rehman to pursue a withholding of removal based on

his claim of persecution. The IJ ultimately denied withholding and, having never

received an approved labor certification, ordered Rehman removed. Rehman

challenges both the denial of withholding of removal and the denial of a continuance

to await a labor certification. We deny his petition as it relates to the denial of

withholding of removal; we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of his motion to

continue and therefore dismiss that portion of his petition. 

We begin first with the denial of withholding of removal. Rehman claimed at

his removal hearing that he had been persecuted on the basis of his political opinion

when he had lived in Pakistan and was afraid to return there. In particular he

testified that he had lived in Hyderabad and “was friendly with” (but not a member

of) the People’s Pakistan Party (PPP). Rehman said a different political party, the

Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) “came to power” in 1995, and its members

appeared at his grocery store demanding money and threatening to set fire to the

store if he did not pay. He paid them until he could no longer afford it; they then

set fire to his store. He reopened a year later in a new location, but the MQM again

threatened him and all nearby shop owners, whose political affiliation Rehman did

not specify, unless they contributed money to MQM. People holding MQM banners

again torched Rehman’s store in September 2000. After that, Rehman left his

village and made his way to the United States.

The IJ denied Rehman’s request for withholding of removal for several

reasons, only one of which we need discuss. The IJ found that Rehman had not

shown past persecution on the basis of one of the five enumerated grounds; after all,

reasoned the IJ, Rehman admitted that his store was burned for his failure to pay

donations rather than some political reason. The IJ also concluded that Rehman

had not shown that it was more likely than not that he would be persecuted if

returned to Pakistan. 

On appeal Rehman argues that he submitted “credible evidence” that the

MQM “constantly and relentlessly intimidated” him in their demands for money,

and he says that the IJ therefore erred in denying him a withholding of removal. 

When the BIA summarily affirms without opinion, as happened here, we review the

IJ’s decision. See Bejko v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 2006). We review a

denial of withholding of removal under the substantial evidence standard, under

which Rehman must show that the evidence compels a conclusion contrary to the

IJ’s. See Kaharudin v. Gonzales, No. 06-3576, 2007 WL 2457932, at *3 (7th Cir.

Aug. 31, 2007). To merit withholding, Rehman needed to establish that it is more

likely than not that his life or freedom will be threatened “because of” one of the five

statutorily enumerated grounds which, as relevant here, include the alien’s political

opinion. BinRashed v. Gonzales, No. 06-2939, 2007 WL 2685148, at *4 (7th Cir.

Sept. 14, 2007); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). Rehman could have done so by showing
No. 06-4092 Page 3

that he suffered persecution in the past (which would give him the benefit of a

presumption of future persecution) or by providing evidence showing a clear

probability that he would suffer future persecution if removed. BinRashed, 2007

WL 2685148, at *5.

Rehman argues the MQM intimidated him by demanding money, but that is

not sufficient to establish persecution. He was required to show that any

persecution by the MQM was because of his political opinion, rather than another

motive. Id. at *4; Jun Ying Wang v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 2006). 

The facts here did not compel the IJ to conclude that the MQM targeted Rehman

because of his political opinion. Although Rehman began his hearing by asserting

that the MQM demanded money of him because he was friendly with the PPP, he

later testified that the MQM indiscriminately threatened all nearby shop owners,

apparently regardless of political affiliation. He also explained that they burned his

store because of his failure to cooperate and pay them as they demanded. But an

alien’s refusal to cooperate with a political party does not, without more, compel a

conclusion of political persecution. Tapiero de Orejuela v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 666,

673-74 (7th Cir. 2005). Rehman did not show more than a failure to cooperate with

the MQM, and the record therefore does not compel a conclusion that the MQM

demanded money from Rehman or burned his store because of his political opinion

or affiliation. For similar reasons the record also does not compel a finding that

Rehman would be subjected to future persecution on the basis of a forbidden ground

if returned to Pakistan. We therefore deny his petition as it relates to the denial of

withholding of removal.

Rehman also asks us to review the IJ’s denial of a continuance. Just before

the LIFE Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), “sunseted” on April 30, 2001, Rehman’s employer

filed on his behalf a labor certification. If approved, the certification would have

allowed Rehman to pursue an adjustment of status to legal permanent resident. 

See Subhan v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 591, 593 (7th Cir. 2004); 8 C.F.R.

§ 245.10(a)(1)(i)(B). For two years Rehman awaited an approval of his labor

certification, and once removal proceedings began he sought continuances to buy

more time, because he intended to try to adjust his status to legal permanent

resident after it was approved. The IJ denied the requests, noting that even if

Rehman’s labor certification were promptly approved, a visa number would not be

immediately available to him. Thus, reasoned the IJ, Rehman was unable to

establish that he would be able to adjust his status.

Though Rehman urges us to review the IJ’s denial of his motion to continue,

we lack jurisdiction to review such denials. See Tariq v. Keisler, No. 06-2518, 2007

WL 2915714, at *6 (7th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007); Ali v. Gonzales, Nos. 06-3240 & 06-3879,

2007 WL 2684825, at *1-3 (7th Cir. Sept. 14, 2007). We therefore dismiss his

petition as it relates to that decision. 
No. 06-4092 Page 4

Accordingly, Rehman’s petition for review is DENIED in part and

DISMISSED in part.