NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

STANLEY SHANE SELF, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0843

Appeal from the Superior Court in La Paz County

No. S1500CR8659

The Honorable Samuel E. Vederman, Judge

The Honorable Michael Irwin, Judge (Deceased)

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By David A. Simpson

Counsel for Appellee

David Goldberg Attorney at Law, Fort Collins, CO

By David Goldberg

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. SELF

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined.

B R O W N, Chief Judge:

¶1 Stanley Shane Self (“Defendant”) appeals from his 

convictions and sentences for two counts of child molestation and one 

count of sexual conduct with a minor. For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm.

BACKGROUND1

¶2 When the victim was about six years old, her mother 

(“Mother”) began a romantic relationship with Defendant and he soon 

moved into the victim’s home. On a day when the victim was home ill, 

Defendant entered her bedroom, “told [her] he had something that would 

make [her] feel better,” and then proceeded to touch her arms, chest, 

stomach, and genitals. The victim questioned what Defendant was doing,

and he was verbally nonresponsive. After approximately thirty minutes, 

Mother returned home from work and Defendant abruptly stopped 

touching the victim, instructing her not to disclose what happened or “he 

would whip [her].” Scared that Defendant would hurt her, the victim did 

not discuss the incident with anyone. 

¶3 Similar abuse happened frequently for years, accompanied by 

threats of physical punishment. Initially, the abuse was limited to 

Defendant’s oral and manual contact with the victim’s genitals. Over time, 

however, Defendant required the victim to perform oral sex on him and, 

after the family moved to Arizona, Defendant began attempting sexual 

intercourse with the victim, who was now ten years old. 

¶4 One evening, the victim’s friend and classmate, N.C., spent 

the night at the victim’s home. During the night, Defendant woke the 

victim and led her to a different area of the home to perform a sex act. When 

N.C. inquired where she had been, the victim revealed what Defendant had 

 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

verdicts. State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 509, ¶ 93 (2013).
STATE v. SELF

Decision of the Court

3

done. Thereafter N.C. told another classmate, V.L., that Defendant was 

sexually abusing the victim. The victim asked her friends not to tell anyone 

else because she feared she would be “beat.” Nonetheless, V.L. told her 

older sister and mother, and V.L.’s mother reported the sexual abuse to 

Mother. Mother confronted Defendant with the allegations and he 

immediately left the home.

¶5 Several months later, Defendant and Mother reconciled and 

Defendant moved back into the home. Approximately a month after 

Defendant returned, he also resumed his sexual abuse of the victim. Rather 

than threatening to “whip” or “beat” the victim, however, Defendant began 

threatening that he would kill her if she talked about the abuse. 

¶6 During the spring of that school year (1982 – 4th grade), the 

children of a neighboring family stayed at the victim’s home for two weeks

while their father was hospitalized. Defendant sexually abused the victim 

during this time period and one of the children, A.H., observed the 

Defendant sexually abusing the victim. Moments later, he saw the victim 

exit the home while “spitting and wiping her mouth.” A.H. reported what 

he had witnessed to his school teacher. Around the same time, N.C.

informed the same school teacher that Defendant was sexually abusing the 

victim. 

¶7 The school teacher questioned the victim about the 

allegations and she confirmed the abuse. On May 12, 1982, the school 

teacher reported the abuse to the Arizona Department of Economic Security

(“ADES”). The school teacher then contacted Mother and expressed 

concern that the victim was crying every day at school. The next day, 

Defendant drove to the school, told the school teacher “he didn’t appreciate 

[the school teacher] getting involved in his family,” and threatened him

with physical harm. 

¶8 On May 15, 1982, while Mother was at work, Defendant woke 

the then eleven-year-old victim and forced sexual intercourse, threatening

to kill her if she told anyone. The next evening while Mother was at work, 

Defendant attempted sexual intercourse with the victim but the victim was 

able to fight him off, after which he hit her knee with a board. 

¶9 On May 17, 1982, two ADES employees, Wayne Wallace and 

John Cook, met with the victim at school to discuss the abuse allegations. 

After the victim disclosed the nature of the sexual abuse, she was removed 

from the home and taken into ADES custody. 
STATE v. SELF

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¶10 On May 18, 1982, Sherman Meyer, M.D., conducted a physical 

examination of the victim at the behest of ADES. Based on the results of the 

exam, demonstrating that the victim’s hymen had been completely 

“broken,” Dr. Meyer concluded the victim had been subjected to sexual 

intercourse. Because no blood or other evidence indicating “a recent break 

of the hymen” was present, Dr. Meyer opined that some time had passed 

since the victim’s hymen was “broken down.” 

¶11 In 1986, Defendant was indicted on two counts of child 

molestation and one count of sexual conduct with a minor (for acts 

occurring on or about May 15, 1982 and May 16, 1982). He was released on 

bond, but failed to appear at trial. After the trial court found that Defendant

had voluntarily absented himself, he was tried in absentia. The jury found 

Defendant guilty as charged. 

¶12 The trial court issued a warrant for Defendant’s arrest in 

September 1986, but he was not apprehended until February 2015. The 

court then sentenced Defendant to a presumptive term of one and one-half 

years’ imprisonment on the count of sexual conduct with a minor, a 

concurrent, presumptive term of seven years’ imprisonment on one count 

of child molestation, and a consecutive, presumptive term of seven years’ 

imprisonment on the remaining count of child molestation. Defendant

timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Expert Testimony

¶13 Defendant argues the trial court improperly permitted the 

State’s expert witnesses, Wayne Wallace and Daniel Wynkoop, to vouch for 

the victim’s credibility. Specifically, Defendant contends that the experts’

testimony regarding the probability that children who report sexual abuse 

are being truthful was inadmissible. 

¶14 We generally review a trial court’s admission of expert 

testimony for an abuse of discretion, State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 

594, ¶ 13 (2014), recognizing the trial court is in the best position to weigh 

“the usefulness of expert testimony against the danger of unfair prejudice” 

when addressing “fact-bound inquiries,” State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 381 

(1986). However, our supreme court has determined that “certain types of 

expert opinion evidence will not assist juries in sexual abuse cases” and are 

thus inadmissible as a matter of law. Id. (citing State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 

472, 475 (1986)). 
STATE v. SELF

Decision of the Court

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¶15 On direct examination, Wallace testified that for ten years he

worked as a deputy sheriff in California and had been working the past 

several years at the Department of Economic Security. At the time of the 

interview with the victim, he was the Child Welfare Supervisor for Parker 

and Lake Havasu. Wallace stated he had handled forty to fifty child 

molestation and child sexual abuse cases in his experience working in child 

welfare. The prosecutor then briefly explored whether the victim’s 

behavior in this case was typical for a sexual abuse victim. Without 

objection, Wallace responded that the victim’s initial reluctance to discuss 

the abuse was characteristic of sexual abuse victims. Wallace explained that 

based on the victim’s allegations, his observation of a bruise on her leg, and 

speaking with the victim’s mother, the decision was made to remove the 

victim from the home. 

¶16 On cross-examination, defense counsel referred to Wallace’s 

direct testimony regarding his prior experience and asked whether it would 

be “more proper[]” to say that he had handled forty to fifty cases involving 

allegations of child molestation rather than forty to fifty child molestation 

cases. Wallace agreed. Defense counsel then asked whether it was 

“possible for a child to make an allegation” that was not true. Wallace 

acknowledged there was a “slight chance of that.” 

¶17 On redirect, the prosecutor asked, over objection, “how many 

times did it come up that you had an alleged victim that was . . . lying about 

the whole thing?” Wallace answered that “in at least 95 percent of the cases, 

we have substantiated the child’s truthfulness to the point where we could 

file a dependency on the child.” The prosecutor then asked, over objection, 

about the other five percent of the cases and Wallace responded that those 

cases involved children who were too young “to be approached on the 

subject,” situations in which there was no medical confirmation, or matters 

in which the family left the area before ADES was able to fully investigate. 

Shortly after trial commenced the following morning, defense counsel 

asked that the record clearly reflect that he had objected to Wallace’s “use 

of percentages,” and the trial court noted that the objections had been made. 

¶18 The State then called psychologist Daniel Wynkoop to testify

regarding his psychological evaluation of the victim. During the interview 

portion of his evaluation, the victim expressed great anger that Mother had 

resumed a relationship with Defendant after learning of the sexual abuse. 

Without objection, Dr. Wynkoop testified that the victim’s feeling of 

parental abandonment was typical of sexual abuse victims. The prosecutor 

then questioned Dr. Wynkoop about the various tests and assessments the 

victim completed during the evaluation and asked whether any of the 
STATE v. SELF

Decision of the Court

6

results indicated that the victim was a “pathological liar.” Without 

objection, Dr. Wynkoop responded “there was no evidence to suggest in 

any way that [the victim] was a pathological liar.” After Dr. Wynkoop 

explained that the results demonstrated the victim understood the 

difference between right and wrong and truth and a lie, the prosecutor 

asked Dr. Wynkoop to opine, “[w]ithout going to the ultimate question,”

whether the victim had actually been subjected to sexual abuse. Dr. 

Wynkoop answered that, given the victim’s detailed and consistent 

accounts, “statistically at least . . . there was a chance that she was absolutely 

telling the truth.” Defense counsel objected and the trial court ordered the 

statement stricken. 

¶19 On cross-examination, defense counsel asked whether Dr. 

Wynkoop had ever been involved in a case in which allegations of sexual 

abuse were not truthful and Dr. Wynkoop answered he had never 

personally been involved in such a case, but was aware that such cases have

occurred. Dr. Wynkoop also testified, however, that “the data continually 

say[s] that children tend not to lie.” 

¶20 When the prosecutor followed-up on this testimony during 

redirect, Dr. Wynkoop testified that “the data” reflects that children make 

false allegations of abuse in “as many as” five percent of cases involving 

custody or child support, but in only “one percent” of cases unrelated to 

domestic relations. Defense counsel objected and the trial court ordered 

“the last portion of the answer relating to percentages” stricken.

¶21 As explained by our supreme court in Lindsey and Moran, 

“[c]hildren who have been the victims of sexual abuse or molestation may 

exhibit behavioral patterns (e.g. recantation, conflicting versions of events, 

confusion or inarticulate descriptions) which jurors may attribute to 

inaccuracy or prevarication, but which may be merely the result of 

immaturity, psychological stress, societal pressures or [other] similar 

factors[.]” Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 474; see also Moran, 151 Ariz. at 381. For this 

reason, a trial judge has discretion to allow expert testimony regarding 

“general patterns of behavior” to aid jurors who may be “unfamiliar with 

the behavioral sciences.” Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 473; see also Moran, 151 Ariz. 

at 381 (explaining “[s]uch evidence may harm defendant’s interests, but we 

cannot say it is unfairly prejudicial; it merely informs jurors that commonly 

held assumptions are not necessarily accurate and allows them to fairly 

judge credibility”). 

¶22 In no circumstance, however, may the court admit “direct 

testimony on the question of credibility.” Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 474; see also 
STATE v. SELF

Decision of the Court

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Moran, 151 Ariz. at 382, 385. Indeed, “[s]uch testimony is tantamount to 

expert evidence on the question of guilt or innocence.” Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 

474; see also Moran, 151 Ariz. at 383. Accordingly, an expert may neither 

opine regarding the likelihood that a particular witness is truthful nor that 

“a certain percentage” of witnesses in general are truthful. Lindsey, 149 

Ariz. at 475; Moran, 151 Ariz. at 382. Stated differently, expert testimony 

that quantifies the probability that another witness is credible is 

inadmissible. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 474; Moran, 151 Ariz. at 382. Based on 

Lindsey and Moran, the expert testimony setting forth probabilities that a 

child’s allegations of sexual abuse are truthful, was inadmissible.2

¶23 The trial court struck Dr. Wynkoop’s probabilities testimony 

as well as his opinion that the victim may be telling the truth, and properly

instructed the jury not to consider any testimony that was ordered stricken 

from the record. Because defense counsel did not solicit any additional

instruction for the jury or move for a mistrial, we need not further address

these errant statements that were properly struck from the jury’s 

consideration. See Payne, 233 Ariz. at 513 (noting “the trial court sustained 

several objections and issued curative instructions” after the prosecutor 

posed improper questions, and “[w]e assume the jurors followed those 

instructions”); see also State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557, 570, ¶ 46 (2003) (noting 

the trial court issued a limiting instruction to cure improper testimony and, 

absent defense counsel’s request for “further guidance for the jury, we 

assume the jurors followed the court’s instruction”); State v. Schroeder, 167 

Ariz. 47, 50-51 (1990) (concluding any prejudice caused by an expert 

witness’s testimony regarding the credibility of the victim was cured when 

the trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection and admonished the 

jurors not to consider it). 

¶24 To the extent Defendant also challenges Dr. Wynkoop’s 

testimony on cross-examination that he has never had a case involving false 

allegations of sexual abuse and “the data” reflects “children tend not to lie,” 

 

2 As noted by the State, unlike Dr. Wynkoop, Wallace did not testify 

to a percentage of truthful sexual abuse allegations generally, but rather 

testified regarding the percentage of allegations he had personally handled 

that had been deemed truthful. Because this testimony nonetheless 

pertained to the “accuracy, reliability or truthfulness of witnesses of the 

type under consideration,” we do not find this distinction meaningful and 

conclude that experience-based probabilities testimony, like its data-driven 

counterpart, invades the province of the jury to assess credibility. Lindsey, 

149 Ariz. at 475.
STATE v. SELF

Decision of the Court

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we conclude Defendant invited the error, if any. See Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 

477 (explaining a party waives any claim of error when the party “procures 

the admission of [the] improper evidence”). Defense counsel specifically 

asked Dr. Wynkoop whether he had ever been involved in a case in which 

allegations of sexual abuse were not truthful and whether, based on his 

“training,” there “is evidence to believe that children will make unfounded 

allegations of child abuse.” Dr. Wynkoop’s answers were responsive to the 

questions posed by defense counsel. Likewise, to the extent Defendant

challenges the admission of Dr. Wynkoop’s testimony that the 

psychological evaluation revealed no evidence that the victim is a 

“pathological liar,” we find no abuse of discretion, much less fundamental, 

prejudicial error. See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 19 (2005) 

(holding fundamental error review “applies when a defendant fails to 

object to alleged trial error”). On direct examination, the school teacher

testified that the victim had “a tendency to tell stories” and admitted that 

he had described her as a “habitual liar” when interviewed by police. 

Viewed within this context, Dr. Wynkoop’s subsequent testimony that 

there was no evidence the victim was pathologically unable to recognize 

truth was not an impermissible attempt to vouch for her credibility, but a 

proper explanation of the evaluation results in light of testimony that 

arguably suggested she suffered from a psychological disorder. 

¶25 With respect to Wallace’s probabilities testimony, however, 

the trial court erroneously overruled defense counsel’s objections. And we 

reject the State’s argument that defense counsel invited the error. Although 

defense counsel asked Wallace whether it was possible for a child to falsely 

allege sexual abuse, and Wallace stated that had not been his experience, 

the prosecutor elicited testimony regarding the percentage of victims who 

had made truthful allegations. 

¶26 When an objection is improperly overruled by the trial court, 

we review for harmless error. State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 588 (1993). 

“Error, be it constitutional or otherwise, is harmless if we can say, beyond 

a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict.”

Id. “The inquiry . . . is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the 

error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the 

guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the 

error.” Id. (citation omitted). The State has the burden of establishing that 

the error is harmless, which we consider “in light of all of the evidence.” Id.

(citation omitted). “Due to this case-specific factual inquiry, an error may 

be harmless in one case but require reversal in another.” Id.
STATE v. SELF

Decision of the Court

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¶27 In Lindsey and Moran, the supreme court vacated child 

molestation and sexual abuse convictions after finding that expert 

testimony regarding truthfulness probabilities was erroneously admitted. 

In reaching these decisions, the supreme court expressly noted that each

case depended on the victim’s credibility. See Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 477 

(vacating defendant’s incest convictions because his guilt or innocence 

“inherently turned on the question of the [victim’s] credibility”); Moran, 151 

Ariz. at 386, (holding that improper testimony was prejudicial because 

“[n]either physical evidence or any other direct evidence showed that 

[defendant] committed the crime. The only evidence was the out-of-court 

statements, later recanted at trial”).

¶28 Here, the evidence supporting the convictions was not limited 

to the victim’s statements. See State v. Haskie, 240 Ariz. 270, ¶ 32 (2016) 

(noting that the expert’s testimony “was not the only information upon 

which the jury could rely to assess [the victim’s] credibility”). For example, 

Dr. Meyer testified that the eleven-year-old victim had been subjected to 

sexual intercourse, demonstrated a lack of physical discomfort during the 

examination, and was “overdeveloped” for an eleven-year old. The 

victim’s testimony corroborated the medical evidence. She testified as to a 

particularized knowledge of sexual acts, and confided in V.L., N.C., and the 

school teacher about the sexual acts. The school teacher testified that 

Defendant threatened him with physical harm after the teacher reported

the sexual abuse to ADES. Although referencing an incident that occurred 

a month prior to the charged acts, A.H. testified that when he was staying 

at the victim’s home, he personally witnessed the victim engaging in a 

sexual act with Defendant. See supra, ¶ 6. Defendant sent A.H. a note after 

the incident, telling him to leave the victim alone and stay out of her 

business. 

¶29 Furthermore, the prosecutor never mentioned anything about 

Wallace in his opening statement and referred to him once in closing 

argument, but said nothing about his probabilities testimony. Cf. State v. 

Valverde, 220 Ariz. 582, 585, ¶ 16 (2009) (“In assessing the impact of an 

erroneous instruction, we also consider the attorneys’ statements to the 

jury.”); State v. Anthony, 218 Ariz. 439, 446, ¶ 40 (2008) (explaining that the 

child molestation allegation that was improperly admitted “was not a 

passing reference, but rather a repeated theme of the State’s closing 

argument”). 

¶30 Given the nature and context of the error, and the totality of 

the evidence presented, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Wallace’s improper probabilities testimony did not contribute to or affect 
STATE v. SELF

Decision of the Court

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the jury’s verdict. See Bible, 175 Ariz. at 588; see also Moran, 151 Ariz. at 383 

(explaining that an error caused by expert testimony regarding the victim’s 

veracity may be harmless “[i]n [some] cases”); State v. Crane, 166 Ariz. 3, 7 

(App. 1990) (concluding that social worker’s improper opinion testimony 

regarding victim’s truthfulness was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); 

cf. State v. Tucker, 165 Ariz. 340, 350 (App. 1990) (holding that testimony of 

expert witness in violation of Lindsey and Moran standards was not 

harmless because it “was the victim's word against the defendant's”).

II. Flight Instruction

¶31 Defendant contends the trial court erred by giving a flight 

instruction because it was not supported by the evidence. We review a trial 

court’s decision to give or refuse a requested jury instruction for an abuse 

of discretion. State ex rel. Thomas v. Granville, 211 Ariz. 468, 471, ¶ 8 (2005). 

“A flight instruction should only be given if the State presents evidence of 

flight after a crime from which jurors can infer a defendant’s consciousness 

of guilt.” State v. Solis, 236 Ariz. 285, 286 (App. 2014). 

¶32 To determine whether a flight instruction is warranted, we 

consider two factors. State v. Smith, 113 Ariz. 298, 300 (1976). First, we 

evaluate whether the evidence “supports a reasonable inference that the 

flight or attempted flight was open, such as the result of an immediate 

pursuit.” Id. Second, when there is no open flight, we consider whether

the evidence supports “the inference that the accused utilized the element 

of concealment or attempted concealment.” Id. Absent evidence 

supporting either factor, the giving of a flight instruction constitutes error. 

Id. 

¶33 Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court instructed the 

jury, in relevant part:

Running away or hiding after a crime has been committed 

does not in itself prove guilt. You may consider any evidence 

of the defendant’s running away or hiding, together with all 

the other evidence.

It is undisputed there was no evidence of open flight in this case; however, 

the State presented evidence that Defendant attempted to conceal his 

whereabouts after the allegations were reported to authorities. 

¶34 Wallace testified that he attempted to contact Mother and 

Defendant the day after he met with the victim at school, but quickly

learned that Defendant “had left the area.” Deputy Hare testified that he 
STATE v. SELF

Decision of the Court

11

repeatedly attempted to locate Defendant in May 1982, but Defendant’s 

residence appeared deserted. About ten months later, however, Hare

received a phone call from an ADES employee notifying him that Mother 

was at the ADES office. Hare immediately drove to the ADES office and 

waited for Mother to exit the building. Hare observed Mother walk down

the street, turn into an alley, and get into a green van. Hare followed the 

van and eventually effected a traffic stop. Defendant was the driver of the 

van and after a short conversation, Defendant agreed to follow Hare to the 

police station for an interview. Consistent with the trial court’s ruling, we 

conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the flight instruction when 

the Defendant left his residence shortly after the allegations were reported 

to authorities and attempted to hide his presence from ADES employees.

CONCLUSION

¶35 Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s convictions and 

sentences are affirmed.