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Gloom Over 

Korean Vise 

By Marquis ChiW. 1 ~~~~~~~--11. 

Could Nehru. Help? 

AS THE Korean tnlecb' un• 

falda, It 'becomes apparent that: 

the polltlcal vise In which th• 

United Stat11 la caUlht la almost 

u rilld 11 the mWtarJ one. Th• 

next few dl!YI wlD. determine hoW 

mum ca11. be salvaged palltlcalb' 

and diplamatieally 11 well u mill• 

tlrib'. 

What we.tern Emapean diploin.ats an 111Jin1 privately ls far 

mare splalive than what thl!J' are HJing publicly ar even than th• 

critlcilm contained In the prea af 

their re1pectlve countries. In a- 11nce It comes dawn ta this: 

The 'United Statel mult make 

dam gain& much further than 

any that have yet been Indicated 

ta avoid the dlsuter of an lmpo&-

sible and endless war an the Chi• 

nese mainland with millions of 

Chinese saldlers trained and n- perienced In auerllla warfare and 

moved by 1 llerce fanaticism. If 

such a war results from the pre .. ent debacle. then all hape af sav- ing western. Europe will bi ended. 

The de&ree of maneuverabWtJ'' 

left in the 'United Natiom ii lllllllL 

It la bi&hly doubtful that western. 

European nations would mpport a Korean re1olutioi:i. stronger than 

that vetoed ID the Secmity Council by Soviet RUllla. And that 

resalatian. callin1 on the Comma• 

Dist Chinese to withdraw, Is na• mare ar Ies1 meanlnlless. 

The llrlt reaction of 111111'1 deleptes ta the violent and enven• omed attack dellvered by Gen. WI& 

Bslu-ehwm. head af the Bed delegatlan, wu one of almDlt fatallstlct 

hopelellne11. It seemed ta lhut: 

the door on all Western. cooperation, oJrerinl a choice between 

1etUng out of Alla entirely or 

ftghtlng endlellll)' aplnlt terrtble 

odds. ,,... EVEN the Indian delep.tfon II 

said ta have reacted In the :tint: 

Instance with the belief that UI 

hape In .11egatl1tlan wu aver. Those long ICCUltomed ta 11. N. venom were startled by the vltrl• 

ollc nature of the hatred whlc:la 

Wu sprQad at his audience. 

Over the weekend a faint mete 

of l!oi;ie llu revtvl!d. Iii part. It 

comes oat: of the talk which 'W1I 

had with Sir Benepl Bau. heacl 

of the Indian delegation. In th• camse of that tlik, which wn friendq and pallte on the 11111flC9 . 

at least. Wa Intimated that nath1n1 could be espected IO loq II 

Communlat: China was aatllde th• V.N. . . 

REF ID:A43170 

This Is Indeed a faint I'll' af . ll&ht in. a Ver'1 dark· IQ: HoW 

Communbt: China eoald Ila ad• 

mlttilcl In view of what his hap- . paned Is bani to see. Yet the fact 

remains that In view of tlie mill· 

tarJ lltuatlon, America'• barPln• 

Ing palitlon la far from mans. 

One thlnl this slight hope 1111• 

1e1tl II the need ta use every ave- nue of mediation. Prime Minister 

Jawabarlal Nehra should be In• 

vlted at once ta came ta W11hl111• 

ton to participate In the talks with 

President Truman and Prime Mln• 

liter Attlee. I feel certain be 

would respond to such an lnvlta• 

tlon by SJ1111 here u qulck17 u 

possible. 

By bfl COUD111 and his pre1ence. 

Nehrn woald contribute ta a settlement If settlement Is lltll1 poa- slble. Tao often In the palt the 

Indiana have not been cansulte4 on major pilllcJ declslom direc6' 

af!ect1n1 Alla. And aur An;ib111a• 

dor In New Delhi, Lay Henderson. 

hu several times been embaro 

r111ed to discover that the Brltllb 

had confided In Nehrn an lllae 

prevlausl:y referred to London. 

...... AS TO the mwtarr vise, the 

on}¥ resaurce not yet tried II ta 

bomb acro11 the North Xarean 

border In Mani:b.urJa. It ii technlcallJ correct to 11117'that General 

MacArthur never formalb' re- quested permission ta attack In 

Manchuria prior ta the flDa1 anll 

fateful af!eDlive Intended to take 

the last area of Narti, Korea up 

ta the border, but In hil telesrams 

ta the Peutaion he plalnlJ lmplled. 

that If he could not bomb lllJ'.an.o 

chmlan concentratloDI, he waulcl 

flnd it dlftlcult to brln1 the war to a mcces1ful conclusion. 

It it Is naw true that there are 800.000 Chinese In Korea. then the 

time. for bomblnl In Manchuria 

m1y have p111ed. Bomblnp wouic1 now be concentrated on the Immediate threat U. N. lrlllles face 

from Red troops actually In Korea. 

But whether bombln1 can be ef• 

fectlve aplmt the kind of mass infiltration practiced by the Chi• 

nese, wlfb their limited 111pplJ 

lines. la doabtfU], and this doubt: 

applies Illa to the tactical use af · the atam bomb. 

What: Pre11dent Tnmwl 11114 

about the popularity of generall 

wben th111 are winning battles and 

the decline In their fartane1 when. 

thl!J are losing II a 111bert111 wrll. 

Yet after this hu been Bild,, II: 11 

n9Ce11ary ta condder certain fall• ures and, above all. the fellme af 

lntelllsence In Korea. 

Many people In Washln&tan, In• 

cludlq several European diplomats. knaw of the oveHu. lntelll· 

gence report on Korea prepared 

by the Central Intell119nce A1en• 

cy. The CIA report taok a wry 

IZ'lm forebodlnl view of the num• ben and the Intention of the Como 

munilt Chinese In Korea. Com· 

pleted OD November 21. It WU 

available ta MacArth11r'1 ltd before the oJreDllve wa1 IauncibedAt the VerJ Ieut, ~ pzapa 

mmmlttee1 of Canll'ell an en- titled ta know whether this report 

WU CGDliderecl and, If If WU eOD• 

lidered, why the Information" It 

contained wu lsnorecL l'Clr th• 

rest, ·there ii faith and Pl'Q'er In one of the darkelt boun In our hiltory'. 

w • ·~ .: ... ~ s T"· ,.., ·~ ____ '".:;, rw-...=...._ 1"\ .- • I"' ':;t~O -

To Improve lntel/iger.ce 

The only surprising thing about the Army's 

dilclolUre that it ls creating the nucleus of a 

career Intelligence. corps ls that it has taken so 

long to launch this project. The announcement 

eomea as. questions are being raised at the 

Capitol and elaewhere as to why our intelligence 

1y1tem wa1 caught napping by the Chinese communis€1 ,last Sunday, when the Reds opened 

their. bi1 Korean drive. Why the Anny only now 

Is moving t.o overhaul its intelligence system 

along lines recommended by a Hoover Commls1ion· talk ~orce two years ago ls hard t.o 

understand. 

• The Army says it is organizing a permanent 

G-2 group of omcers 'l!"ho will make a career ot· 

Intelligence. Five of!icers have been selected !or 

this ·permanent duty and some 30 others will b'! 

added t.o the group. This plan is designed to 

supplanli what the Eberstadt task force of the 

Hoover Commission termed the •·somewhat haphazard method" of aelect1ng officers for intelllgence work. The Eberstadt committee pointed 

out that the Army's G-2 had had seven chiefs 

ln u many yea1·s-·•some of them with no prior 

Intelligence experience whatsoever:• 

The Eberstadt report criticized "l.t'Jstake11" 

Intelligence. during the airlift phase of the cold 

war in Germany, condemned poor selection of 

personnel for vital Intelligence posts and refer~ed ·t.o un1ati1factory relationships among the 

Tanous Intelligence services and between them 

and the Central Intelligence Agenc~·. The lat~er 

la the over-all co-ordinating ai1d evaluating 

authority. 

One of the obsiacles in the past to establishing a permanent intelligence service hu been 

the lack of any Incentive for omcers t.o seek 

this· highly important as1lgi:ment. Thit armed 

services have looked upon lntelllgence as just 

another desk Job "which o1fered no opportunities 

for advancement in rank or prestige, The constant turnover of omcers has hampered the 

departments In developing eft!.clent intelllgence 

organizations. To check this turnover the Army 

proposes to keep a "hard core" of career G-2 men 

who wU1 be a&1ured of no loss of promotion 

advantages through their special services. This 

approach, however belated, ls the right one. I:O 

Will eliminate the "haphazard" duty ayatem 

which has resulted In ao much haphazard intelll1ence work rn the past.