United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 21-3503

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Suellen Klossner,

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,

v.

IADU Table Mound MHP, LLC,

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant,

Impact MHC Management, LLC,

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.

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United States; Disability Rights Iowa; Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under

Law; MHAction,

lllllllllllllllllllllAmici on Behalf of Appellee.

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No. 21-3544

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 Suellen Klossner,

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,

v.
IADU Table Mound MHP, LLC,

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee,

Impact MHC Management, LLC,

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee.

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Appeals from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Eastern

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 Submitted: September 21, 2022

Filed: April 10, 2023

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Before COLLOTON, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

This appeal concerns the scope of a landlord’s duty under the Fair Housing

Amendments Act of 1988 to make “reasonable accommodations” for the “handicap”

of a tenant. The question is whether that duty extends to “accommodating” a tenant’s

lack of income by accepting a government housing voucher that the landlord

otherwise would not accept from a low-income tenant. We conclude that while the

statute requires a landlord to make reasonable accommodations that directly

ameliorate the handicap of a tenant, the obligation does not extend to alleviating a

tenant’s lack of money to pay rent. The district court believed that the landlord’s

position was “facially appealing,” but thought itself constrained by a decision of the

Supreme Court on a different issue to enter an injunction in favor of the tenant. We

respectfully disagree, and therefore vacate the injunction.

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I.

Suellen Klossner has lived in a mobile-home park in Dubuque, Iowa, since

2009. The park is owned by IADU Table Mound MHP, LLC, which is controlled by

Impact MHC Management, LLC. Tenants in the park pay rent for a lot where they

can situate a mobile home. Klossner receives income from government programs that

she used to pay her rent for ten years. She is unable to work full-time due to

psychiatric and physical disabilities.

In 2019, the City of Dubuque approved a measure allowing the local public

housing authority to provide residents of mobile-home parks with housing choice

vouchers that could be used to supplement their rent payments. Under this voucher

program, the federal government provides funds to local public housing agencies,

which in turn may distribute them to low-income tenants. As the rent on Klossner’s

lot increased, she received a voucher and sought to use it to supplement her rent

payments, but the companies declined to accept the voucher. 

The companies explained that federal law does not require landlords to accept

housing choice vouchers, and that Impact declines to do so except in limited

circumstances: where state law requires acceptance or where the company has

purchased property where a prior owner accepted vouchers from a holdover tenant—a

total of approximately forty tenants out of more than twenty thousand under Impact’s

management. Impact cited the administrative burdens of accepting vouchers,

including the obligation to sign a housing assistance payment contract with

restrictions on rent amounts and lease terminations, the requirement to meet certain

housing quality standards, and the inefficiencies of keeping records and collecting

rent when multiple payers are involved.

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Klossner sued Impact and IADU Table Mound, alleging that the companies

violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act by refusing to accept her voucher. Her

theory was that she is a person with a “handicap” under the FHAA, and that the law

required the companies to accept the housing voucher as a “reasonable

accommodation” that was “necessary” to afford her “equal opportunity to use and

enjoy a dwelling.” See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). Klossner requested an injunction

requiring the companies to accept her housing choice voucher, and she sought

damages for alleged emotional distress. Klossner also brought claims under state law. 

The case proceeded to an expedited bench trial on the federal claim only, with

the state law claims to be resolved at a later time. The district court ruled that the

companies’ refusal to accept Klossner’s housing voucher violated the FHAA. The

court concluded that where a tenant’s disability prevents her from working enough

to afford rent, the statute may require a landlord to accept a housing choice voucher

as a “reasonable accommodation.” The court found that if Klossner were not

disabled, then she “could work and earn enough money to pay her rent.” The court

further determined that Klossner’s requested accommodation was reasonable, because

it would not impose an undue financial or administrative hardship on the companies

or fundamentally alter their policy against accepting housing vouchers except in

limited circumstances. 

As a remedy, the court granted injunctive relief requested by Klossner, and

ordered Impact and IADU Table Mound to accept Klossner’s housing choice

voucher. The court declined to impose damages, explaining that “the law in this area

is far from clear,” that the companies acted in good faith, and that the companies

reached an agreement with Klossner about rent pending the trial.

Impact and IADU Table Mound appeal the district court’s order requiring them

to accept Klossner’s housing voucher. Klossner cross-appeals the district court’s

refusal to award damages. We have jurisdiction over the companies’ appeal from an

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interlocutory order of the district court granting an injunction. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a)(1); R. Doc. 86, at 23-24; see Williams v. St. Louis Diecasting Co., 611 F.2d

1223, 1224 (8th Cir. 1979). 

II.

The FHAA makes it unlawful to discriminate in housing or make unavailable

a dwelling “because of a handicap of [a] buyer or renter.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(A). 

“Handicap” is a “physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or

more of such person’s major life activities.” Id. § 3602(h)(1). And “major life

activities” means “functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks,

walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working.” 24 C.F.R. 

§ 100.201(b). The statute prohibits “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations

in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary

to afford [a handicapped] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42

U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(B). Other statutes use the term “disability” rather than

“handicap,” but as this case involves the FHAA, we will employ the term used in the

statute at issue.

On appeal, the companies argue that although the FHAA calls for reasonable

accommodations that directly ameliorate the effect of a handicap, the statute does not

require a landlord to accommodate a tenant’s economic circumstances by accepting

housing vouchers. Two leading cases support that view. 

In Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998),

tenants asked a landlord to accept government housing certificates to assist with rent

as a reasonable accommodation for their handicaps under the FHAA. The landlord

refused, and the Second Circuit held that the FHAA did not require the landlord to

accept the certificates.

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The court reasoned that “the duty to make reasonable accommodations is

framed by the nature of the particular handicap,” and that illustrative accommodations

included providing a preferred parking space for tenants with difficulty walking, or

lifting a no-pets rule to allow the use of a service dog by a blind person. Id. at 301. 

The court concluded, however, that the tenants in Salute sought an accommodation

to remedy economic discrimination “that is practiced without regard to handicap,”

and that the accommodation sought was not “necessary” to afford handicapped

persons an “equal opportunity” to use and enjoy a dwelling. Id. at 302. The court

emphasized that the FHAA “does not elevate the rights of the handicapped poor over

the non-handicapped poor,” and that “economic discrimination” is “not cognizable

as a failure to make a reasonable accommodation” under the FHAA. Id.

In Hemisphere Building Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 171 F.3d 437 (7th Cir.

1999), a developer of a community designed for tenants using wheelchairs asked a

municipality to grant a zoning variance to allow the construction of more structures

on a plot of land. The developer argued that the proposed variance was necessary as

a “reasonable accommodation” under the FHAA because it would reduce the cost of

each housing unit, and thereby alleviate the economic impact of handicaps on

prospective tenants who needed inexpensive housing. The village refused to grant

a zoning variance, and the developer sued.

The Seventh Circuit concluded that the developer’s position would lead to

absurd results and rejected it. The court pointed out that if the reasonable

accommodation provision required consideration of a tenant’s financial situation,

then the statute would allow developers not only to ignore zoning laws, but also to

obtain a “reasonable accommodation” that suspended a local building code that

increased the cost of construction, or a minimum wage law, or regulations for the

safety of construction workers. Id. at 440.

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The statute did not call for these results, the court explained, because the duty

of “reasonable accommodation” is limited to modifying rules or policies that hurt

handicapped people by reason of their handicap, rather than by virtue of

circumstances that they share with others, such as limited economic means. Id. The

court believed, for example, that if the statute meant that a landlord or developer must

accommodate poverty caused by handicaps, then it would allow handicapped persons

“to claim a real estate tax rebate.” Id. at 441. The court viewed this as a “radical

result” that required “something more than a spinning out of the logical implications

of ‘reasonable accommodation.’” Id.

We conclude that the reasoning of these decisions is sound, and that it

forecloses Klossner’s claim here. The term “reasonable accommodation” is not

defined in the statute, but it was adopted against the backdrop of a predecessor

statute, and must be viewed in the context of a law that forbids discrimination

“because of a handicap.” 

The predecessor statute, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, provided that no

otherwise qualified handicapped individual shall be subjected to discrimination under

any federal program solely by reason of the person’s handicap. 29 U.S.C. § 794

(1973) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 794). By regulation, a recipient of federal

funds was required to make “reasonable accommodation” to the known physical or

mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant. 45 C.F.R.

§ 84.12(a). Congress used equivalent statutory language in the anti-discrimination

provision of the FHAA in 1988, and Congress also adopted the regulatory language

of “reasonable accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f). “[W]hen Congress uses the

same language in two statutes having similar purposes, particularly when one is

enacted shortly after the other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended

that text to have the same meaning in both statutes.” Smith v. City of Jackson, 544

U.S. 228, 233 (2005) (plurality opinion); see Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S.

427, 428 (1973) (per curiam). Other decisions have recognized, therefore, that the

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term “[r]easonable accommodation is borrowed from case law interpreting the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973.” City of Edmonds v. Wash. State Bldg. Code Council, 18

F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1994); see also H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 25 (1988).

Under the Rehabilitation Act, reasonable accommodation was defined to

include (1) making facilities accessible to and usable by handicapped persons, and (2)

“job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, acquisition or modification

of equipment or devices, the provision of readers or interpreters, and other similar

actions.” 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b). Judicial decisions preceding enactment of the FHAA

established that reasonable accommodations could include such actions as providing

an oral aptitude test in place of a written examination for a dyslexic job applicant,

Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666, 668-69 (11th Cir. 1983), allowing a teacher with

tuberculosis to assume a job that did not threaten the health of susceptible students,

Arline v. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty., 772 F.2d 759, 765 (11th Cir. 1985), or providing

additional training, staff assistance, or scheduling flexibility for an employee with

epilepsy, Reynolds v. Brock, 815 F.2d 571, 572 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Consistent with the regulation promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act, these

decisions called for accommodations that provided what one court later described as

the “direct amelioration of a disability’s effect.” Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard

Cnty., 124 F.3d 597, 604 (4th Cir. 1997). Nothing in the law suggested that the duty

of “reasonable accommodation” extended to the dissimilar action of alleviating

downstream economic effects of a handicap. When Congress adopted the FHAA in

1988, therefore, it acted against a background understanding that the concept of a

“reasonable accommodation” was so limited.

Regulations adopted under the FHAA illustrate the same point: a landlord

must make an exception to a no-pets policy for a blind person who requires assistance

of a seeing eye dog; an apartment manager must modify a “first come first served”

policy for allocating parking spaces to accommodate a tenant who is mobility

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impaired. 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b). A landlord’s duty to make reasonable

accommodations extends to direct amelioration of handicaps, but does not encompass

an obligation to accommodate a tenant’s “shortage of money,” Salute, 136 F.3d at

302, and the far-reaching implications that such an obligation would entail. 

Hemisphere, 171 F.3d at 440-41. Indeed, if Klossner’s position were accepted, then

we see no principled reason why a landlord could not be required in the name of

“reasonable accommodation” to reduce monthly rent for an impecunious disabled

person. Accepting payment of five fewer dollars per month is no more “fundamental

alteration” of a landlord’s business than is assuming the cost and administrative

changes that come with accepting government housing vouchers.

The district court found the reasoning of Salute “facially appealing, especially

when it involves the voluntary housing voucher program,” but concluded that the

decision could not be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s later decision in U.S.

Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). We conclude that Barnett addressed

a different question and does not supersede the holdings in Hemisphere and Salute.

Barnett concerned a different statute, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and

its prohibition on discrimination in employment. The ADA dictates that an employer

may not “discriminate against a qualified individual” with a disability, 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112(a), and defines a “qualified” person as one who, “with or without reasonable

accommodation,” can perform the essential functions of the relevant job, id.

§ 12111(8). The statute further provides that “discrimination” includes “not making

reasonable accommodations,” unless the accommodation would impose an undue

hardship on the employer. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

Barnett held that the duty of reasonable accommodation under the ADA may

require an employer to make an exception to a seniority rule that ordinarily is used

to allocate employment opportunities. 535 U.S. at 406. In that case, a disabled

worker injured his back while working in a cargo-handling position, and he sought

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a less physically demanding job in the mailroom. When he learned that two

employees senior to him intended to seek the mailroom position, the disabled worker

argued that the employer was required to make an exception to the seniority rule as

a reasonable accommodation.

The Court rejected the company’s position that there was no duty to consider

an exception to a “disability-neutral” seniority rule, and that an employer has no

obligation to prefer applicants with disabilities over other applicants. Id. at 397-98. 

Barnett explained that by definition, a special “accommodation” requires an employer

to treat an employee with a disability differently and preferentially: “The simple fact

that an accommodation would provide a ‘preference’—in the sense that it would

permit the worker with a disability to violate a rule that others must obey—cannot,

in and of itself, automatically show that the accommodation is not ‘reasonable.’” Id.

at 398.

Barnett, however, does not resolve whether a landlord is obliged under the

FHAA to “accommodate” a tenant’s lack of sufficient money to pay rent. We do not

conclude that preferential treatment for a handicapped tenant, in and of itself, takes

a proposed accommodation outside the scope of what the FHAA may require. 

Consistent with Barnett, there is no dispute here that the FHAA sometimes requires

a landlord to provide preferential treatment: a disability-neutral rule on pets or

parking spaces must yield when a tenant requires a service dog or proximity to an

entrance. 

The issue here, like in Salute and Hemisphere, is whether the duty of

reasonable accommodation goes further and extends to measures that would alleviate

a disabled tenant’s impoverished economic circumstances. Barnett did not address

that question. That case involved a potential accommodation that would have directly

ameliorated an employee’s inability to work in cargo-handling by placing him in a

mailroom job, and it addressed a different statute outside the context of housing. We

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think the Ninth Circuit in Giebeler v. M & B Associates, 343 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.

2003), overstated the meaning of Barnett by presuming that it dictates the ambitious

interpretation of the FHAA that was rejected in Hemisphere and Salute, despite what

Giebeler termed the “facial appeal” of those decisions. Id. at 1154.

* * *

For these reasons, we vacate the injunction ordered by the district court. 

R. Doc. 82, at 24. The cross-appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

STRAS, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.

Sometimes simpler is better, and this is one of those times. See Paul Vincent

Spade & Claude Panaccio, William of Ockham, The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy § 4.1 (Spring 2019 ed.) (describing Ockham’s Razor). The court makes

multiple assumptions on the way to holding that a housing voucher is not an

“accommodation” under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988. I would take

a simpler route and just conclude that the request is unreasonable. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 3604(f)(3)(B) (requiring any “accommodation[]” in “rules, policies, practices, or

services” to be “reasonable”).

Complying with regulations can be a burden. To participate in the housingvoucher program, landlords must be willing to guarantee “certain housing[-]quality

standards,” sign a contract containing “restrictions on rent amounts and lease

terminations,” and keep an entirely separate set of books. Ante, at 3. For those

already willing to take housing vouchers, accepting a few more is not a big deal. But

for those that are not, like IADU and Impact, it is unreasonable to force the regulatory

burdens on them. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); see also Salute v. Stratford Greens

Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 297–98, 300 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining why it is

“unreasonable”). 

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The burdens here are even greater than usual. Typically, a landlord owns both

the unit and the piece of land underneath it. But mobile homes are different. The

tenant purchases the trailer and then parks it in a space owned by the landlord. 

When it comes to housing vouchers, the split in ownership has real

consequences. The quality standards apply primarily to the home itself. See 24

C.F.R. §982.401(c)(2)(i), (f)(1), (g)(2)(i), (m)(1) (requiring, for example, a “sanitary”

unit free from “serious defects” that has all “fixtures” and “equipment” in “proper

operating condition”). And as its owner, Klossner recognizes that it is her obligation

to “complete [the] necessary repairs.” But if she falls short, it is IADU and Impact

that will bear the brunt of the harm by not getting paid, regardless of who is to blame. 

See 24 C.F.R. § 982.404 (explaining that payments will be “terminate[d]”). 

Requiring a landlord to shoulder the financial risk in these circumstances is a “major

adjustment” to the landlord-tenant relationship. Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S.

397, 412–13 (1979) (concluding that “major adjustments” are “unreasonable”); see

Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. DHS, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021) (noting that the right to

exclude—especially those who cannot pay rent—is a “fundamental element[] of

property ownership”); Heights Apartments, LLC v. Walz, 30 F.4th 720, 735 (8th Cir.

2022) (same).

It is true that landlords can try to evict residents who neglect their units. But

going to court costs time and money. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(f) (“The owner may

only evict the tenant from the unit by instituting a court action.”). And the housingvoucher regulations may make that option even more burdensome and unpredictable

than usual. Eviction is only for “good cause,” meaning that severing ties with

residents is not always easy. Id. § 982.310(a), (d). “[D]epriving [landlords like

IADU and Impact] of rent payments with no guarantee of eventual recovery” is a

significant and unreasonable risk to place on them. Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct.

at 2489. 

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Klossner cites nothing suggesting otherwise. In Giebeler v. M & B Associates,

for example, the requested accommodation was allowing a resident’s mother, who

possessed “significant assets,” to cosign on the lease as a way of meeting a minimumincome requirement. 343 F.3d 1143, 1144–45, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003). Waiving the

no-cosigners policy was a “reasonable accommodation” because it did not “alter the

essential obligations” of the relationship or create “substantial financial . . . risk.” Id.

at 1157–58. Not true here.

Schaw v. Habitat for Humanity of Citrus County, Inc., is no different. 938 F.3d

1259 (11th Cir. 2019). The question there was whether a landlord had to count

monthly payments from family and food stamps as income. Id. at 1268. The court

concluded that the answer was yes, but it also explained, in a passage that is relevant

here, that the forced acceptance of housing vouchers is an example of an

unreasonable accommodation. Id. at 1267. Faced with that precise situation today,

I agree.

In the end, Klossner simply asks too much of IADU and Impact. Forcing them

to accept a housing voucher is not a “reasonable” accommodation. 42 U.S.C.

§ 3604(f)(3)(B). I would not say “a single word more,” United States v. Treanton, 57

F.4th 638, 643 (8th Cir. 2023) (Stras, J., concurring), particularly if it means

undertaking the needlessly complicated task of trying to evaluate how tight the fit is

between a disability and an accommodation, see Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355,

361 (2019) (decrying “[a]textual judicial supplementation” of a statute).

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