Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed December 9, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00847-CR

LISA HUNTER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 185th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1352314

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A jury found appellant Lisa Hunter guilty of tampering with a governmental 

record with the intent to defraud or harm another and assessed punishment at nine years’

imprisonment. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a 

previous conviction and that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. We 

affirm. 
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Appellant and Jeanne Skipwith met at a mental health facility where Skipwith 

was living and the appellant was employed as a cook. Skipwith eventually moved out of 

the facility and into an apartment, where appellant lived with her for some period of 

time.

In December 2011, appellant was hired as a saleswoman by David McDavid 

Honda, a car dealership in Houston. Appellant filled out the new employee paperwork 

using Skipwith’s name, and presented as identification Skipwith’s Social Security card 

and a Texas Department of Public Safety temporary driving permit issued with 

Skipwith’s name and appellant’s picture. Appellant also identified herself as Jeanne 

Skipwith with coworkers and management while at the dealership. 

At some point, police received a Crime Stoppers tip concerning a possible 

identity theft case involving appellant, who was identified as working at David 

McDavid Honda. A police investigation revealed that the appellant and Skipwith were 

two different people, that both were affiliated with the mental health facility, and that 

appellant had presented the temporary driving permit, a governmental record, to the 

dealership when she applied for employment. In June 2012, police arrested the appellant 

at the dealership as she was attempting to collect a paycheck. Appellant initially 

identified herself to police as Jeanne Skipwith, but then admitted she was Lisa Hunter.

ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES

In two issues, appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing evidence 

that she had a previous conviction, even though appellant did not testify in her defense, 

rendering her Fifth Amendment right not to testify ineffective. Appellant also contends 

that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction because there is no evidence 

she acted with the intent to defraud or harm another.
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I. Admission of Evidence of Previous Conviction

Among the State’s witnesses at trial was Mike Mauldin, an investigator for the 

District Attorney’s Office. The prosecutor asked Mauldin if he had run the type of 

criminal background check that a civilian could run on the name Lisa Hunter, as the 

prosecutor had previously requested. Mauldin confirmed that he had done so and 

explained the steps he took to search online. The prosecutor asked him if the search 

showed that the appellant had a criminal conviction. Over defense counsel’s objection

based on “the Fifth Amendment right to testify and hearsay,” Mauldin answered 

affirmatively. The nature of the conviction was not specified.

On appeal, appellant contends the admission of this evidence vitiated her Fifth 

Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination. See U.S. Const. amend. V (“No 

person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . 

.”). Appellant reasons that although Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the 

admission of evidence of extraneous offenses to prove that a defendant acted in 

conformity with that conduct, the State may, in certain circumstances, introduce such 

evidence to impeach the defendant’s testimony if the defendant chooses to testify. See

Tex. R. Evid. 608(b), 613(b). As a practical matter, appellant argues, many defendants 

opt to exercise their Fifth Amendment right not to testify because they know that if they 

do testify, the State will be permitted to cross-examine them about prior convictions that 

otherwise would be inadmissible. Because appellant decided to exercise her right not to 

testify in this case, she concludes that the evidence of her previous conviction was 

irrelevant and consequently its admission “rendered her Fifth Amendment right not to 

testify ineffective.” 

The State argues that the evidence of appellant’s previous conviction was 

admissible under Rule 404(b) to explain why appellant used Skipwith’s name to get a 

job. At trial, the State presented testimony that David McDavid Honda performs 
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criminal background checks before hiring salespeople and would not have offered a job 

to appellant if appellant’s criminal record had come to light. See Tex. R. Evid. 404(b) 

(evidence of extraneous offenses may be admissible for other purposes, “such as proof 

of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 

mistake or accident”); De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) 

(holding extraneous offense evidence need not fit within one of the laundry-list 

exceptions in Rule 404, but proponent of evidence must show a relevant non-character 

basis for its admission). As the State points out, appellant’s exercise of her Fifth 

Amendment right against self-incrimination to avoid discussing her prior convictions 

does not determine whether the evidence may be admissible through another witness.

Additionally, appellant cites no authorities in support of her argument, and we are aware 

of none. Accordingly, we reject appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in 

admitting the evidence of her previous conviction on the asserted Fifth Amendment 

grounds and overrule appellant’s first issue.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In her second issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support 

her conviction because there was no evidence that she acted with intent to harm or 

defraud David McDavid Honda. 

In a legal sufficiency review, we examine all the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 319 (1979). This standard of review applies to cases involving both direct 

and circumstantial evidence. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007).

Although we consider all of the evidence presented at trial, we do not substitute 

our judgment regarding the weight and credibility of the evidence for that of the fact 
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finder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We presume the 

jury resolved conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and defer to that 

determination. Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We also determine whether the necessary 

inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the 

evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id.

Appellant was charged with intentionally and knowingly presenting a 

governmental record, namely, the Texas Department of Public Safety temporary driving 

permit, with knowledge of its falsity and, further, that her actions were done with the 

intent to defraud or harm another. See Tex. Penal Code § 37.10. The additional 

requirements that an accused’s actions involve a specific type of document and were 

done with the intent “to defraud or harm another” elevate the felony from third degree to 

second degree. Id. § 37.10(c)(2)(A).

Neither the Penal Code nor the court’s charge defines what it means to “defraud” 

another.1 Appellant, citing generally to two dictionaries, argues that to be convicted, she 

had to have intended to either harm someone or “to trick or cheat them out of money.”

Applying this definition, appellant contends that no evidence establishes that she 

defrauded the dealership out of money. 

Generally, undefined statutory terms are to be understood as ordinary usage 

allows, and jurors may freely read statutory language to have any meaning which is 

acceptable in common parlance. Clinton v. State, 354 S.W.3d 795, 800 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2011). Consistent with this general rule, the State argued at closing that the jurors 

were entitled to use their common sense when determining what the undefined term 

“defraud” meant. Further, courts have recognized that “intent to defraud” has been 

 

1 Although “defraud” was undefined, the court’s charge defined “harm” to mean “anything 

reasonably regarded as loss, disadvantage, or injury, including harm to another person in whose 

welfare the person affected is interested.” See Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(25). 
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defined as “the intent to cause another to rely upon the falsity of a representation, such 

that the other person is induced to act or to refrain from acting.” See Wingo v. State, 143 

S.W.3d 178, 187 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004), aff’d, 189 S.W.3d 270 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2006); Martinez v. State, 6 S.W.3d 674, 678 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, no 

pet.). Therefore, we disagree with appellant’s suggestion that the term “defraud” must 

be narrowly defined to require that the defendant have intended to trick or cheat 

someone out of money.

To support her evidentiary challenge, appellant points to the testimony of the 

investigating officer and the dealership’s controller. The officer testified that he had no 

knowledge whether the dealership was harmed or defrauded, and commented that such a 

question would have to be directed to the people at the dealership. The dealership’s 

controller, Michelle Norris, testified that appellant was hired as a sales associate, she 

sold cars at the dealership, and she was paid a commission for her sales. Norris also 

testified that to her knowledge, the dealership had not been harmed or defrauded, nor 

did the dealership lose any money. Consequently, appellant argues, no rational jury 

could have found that she was guilty of the charged offense. See Geick v. State, 349 

S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (defendant indicted for theft by deception 

acquitted when State proved appellant committed theft but failed to produce any 

evidence of deception). 

The intent to defraud or harm another may be established by circumstantial 

evidence such as acts, words, and the conduct of appellant. See Guevara v. State, 152 

S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Williams v. State, 688 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1985). As discussed above, appellant had a previous criminal conviction at 

the time she applied for the job with David McDavid Honda. Norris testified that David 

McDavid Honda performs a criminal background check on all applicants for 

employment, and those applicants who have a criminal background are not eligible for 
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employment. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury 

could have found that appellant intended to harm or defraud David McDavid Honda by 

falsely claiming to be Jeanne Skipwith to induce the dealership to rely on that false 

identity to offer her employment for which she would not have otherwise been eligible.2

See Tottenham v. State, 285 S.W.3d 19, 24–25 n.11, 28–29 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) (holding circumstantial evidence supported conviction of 

constable who presented county judge with falsified training certificates to maintain his 

position even though county judge testified that he had not been personally harmed and 

the county had not been sued as a result of the constable’s actions). 

Therefore, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s 

conviction and we overrule appellant’s second issue.

CONCLUSION

We overrule appellant’s issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Ken Wise

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Busby, and Wise.

Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

 

2

Even accepting appellant’s proposed definition of “defraud” to mean tricking another out of 

money, the jury could have concluded that getting a job—which pays money—under false pretenses is 

tricking someone out of money. In this case, the dealership paid appellant to work as a sales associate, 

a position she would not have obtained but for her deception.