APPENDlX B 

BPC5J/B/Final 

046 

19 Mo.rch 19 53 

PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION 

INTRODUCTION 

l. These principles shall be the basis of all regulations for the 

security and dissemination of' Communications Intelligence issued by or under 

the authority of' uscm or LSIB and other appropriate authorities of 

the Governments of the two parties. The scope and phrasing of such 

regulations m.!zy" vary in accordance with requirements of the parties, agencies, 

dcpartn:ents, md ministries t~ vrhom they are designed to apply, but all shall 

be.. in accord with these basic principles in every respect and shall observe 

the standards herein as a minimum. As an ai.d to unii'onn interpretation, 

each party shall forward all pertinent Board regulations and directives to 

the other for information. 

2. It is recognized that, while the following principles are in general 

of universal application, changing conditions or emergencies and, in particular, 

the outbreak of general hostilities may require modification to ensure that 

the maximum operational benefit consistent with security is derived from 

communications intelligence. 

DEFINITIONS AND CATEGORIES 

3. Communication Intelligence (COMlNT) is the name given to all 

processes involved in, and intelligence information and technical material 

resulting from, the interception and study (a) of foreign communications 

passed by vdro, radio, and other electromagnetic means (except press, 

propaganda, and public broadcasts) and (b) of selected foreign communications 

sent by non-electromagnetic means. l.!See NOTE l;J 

-1-

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-06-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

• 

1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET C1&1NOE 
, .. TOi SE~Emr501'7.lOE .BPC53/B/FinaJ. 

:f..Q.!.: ... §H!lORC'i' 91'\Mffi - BE!SHRH'Y INFOHM1't'fION o1J.6 

19 March 1953 

4. '£here are two types of COMINT: CryJJt Ipcelliecnce and Traffj.c 

Intelligence @ee NOTE y. They are defined as follows: 

a. 

/// 

b. Traffic Intelligence is that cmmn which results from traf;fic 

anal\}rsjs (e.g. the study of call-signs, massage headings, 

procedure signals, volume of traffic, precedences, D/F /hearings, 

and otrer aids such as D and from plain texts, i.e., 

information produced by all means short of t;he actual cryptanalysis of intercepted communications. 

5. For purposes of security handling and control COMINT is divided 

into Categories and Sub-Categories. 1 

a. COUINT is divided at the present time to three Categories: 

Category III COl:tINT 

EO 3. 3 I h I I 2 I 

Catego:ry II COMINT PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Category I . COMIN'l' 

b. COMillT is placed in appropriate Categories as mutually 

agreed by USCIB and LSIB from time to time. 

c. As mutually agreed by USCIB and LSIB, separate Subcategories of COMINT may be established iVithin Categories 

III and II in order to permit differentiation in the 

processing, dissemination, exchan.;;e or use of material. 

6. Cato~o:ry III OOMINT is that COMINT for mich the protection o.r 

BOlJ!Ce or content is the overriding consideration and vmich must., therefore, 

bn given the highest degree of security protection. In genera], it wi11 include: 

a. Crypt Intelligence except that specifically included in 

other Categories. 

b. Special Weather Intelligence. 

c. Traffic Intelligence involving call-signs or message headings 

encrypted in codes or ciphers of high security g}'adings as 

specified ~nd mutually agreed by USCIB end LSIB • .. -2-

Form781-C13S 1Ju152' TOP SECRET CANOE 
.. ... TCW SEORE'fA~~OE BPC53/B/Fina.l 

'1'01' 6ESR:!!i"£' SlldfO!i - :3f:6tfHJ':t'Y IJf'FAflMi'£'fie!f Ql16 

- 19 March 1953 

d. Other Traffic Intelligence as specified and mutually agreed 

by USCIB and LSIB. 

?. Category II COM.INT is that GOMilJT for which the protection of 

source or oontent is not alwa;ys the overriding· conside:ration and for 

which a less rigid standard o! security is ccnsidered an ~cceptablc r.i.sk. 

In general, it will includet 

a. Traffic Intelligence not specifically included in other 

Categories. 

b. Crypt Intelligence involving solution of codes, ciphers 

and special systems of' lower security as specified and 

mutually agreed by USCIB and LSIB. 

8. Category I COMINT is that COMINT which may be subject to the least 

stringent security re:;;triotions and which ma;r require more extensive 

dissemination in order to provide for effective utilization. In general, 

it will j_nclude certain types of low level COMINT as specified and mutually 

agreed by USCIB and LSIB .. 

ASSIGNMENT OF COMJNT TO CATEGORIES 

9. In assigning COMINT to a Category, the follovdng general 

oriteria will be considered: 

a. 'fhe intelliE;ence value of' its oontent. 

b. The dif'i'iculty of solution or intercept to incltrle: 

(l) Sensitivity of techniques employed in solution and j 

exploitation. 

(2) Sensitivity of source of intercept. 

(3) Inter-relationships between cryptographic sys·tems. 

c. Cryptographic sophistication of the country originating the 

traffic :i.nvolved. 

d. Security grading given to contents by the country originating 

the traffic involved. 

e. 'l'he advantage to be gained versus the risk of loss by 

utilization under a given Cat;egor.r, including: 

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NSAForm781-C13S 1Jul52 TOP SECRET C...4.-NOE 
... . ·

• 

TOj 8Eff!l,WP5~~0E BPC53/D/Final. 

':l..W al!:Q:t,gg] ~.'\WOi!: - OBOURI'fi INPOFl! ffc'i'IO!i 046 

19 March 1953 

(1) The value of extending the disoemination of certain 

COMINT to permit essential use 0£ the operational 

intelligence contained therein. 

(2) The capability of certain Third Party COMINT 

groups to exploit the COMINT in question with the 

attendant security risks beyond the direct control 

of U.S. and U.K •. authorities. 

(3) The value of providing technical guidance or 

COMINT information to Third Party COMINT activities 

to insure receipt from them of unique intercept and 

critical COMINT ini'ormation not otherwise available. 

10. In assigning COMINT to the lower Categories the following 

additional factors will be considered: 

a. A system or class of COMINT,, once downgraded,, may not 

effectively be upgraded. 

b. The distinction between Category I on the one hand 

and the higher Categories on the other is that the former 

does not require codeword protection, whereas the latter 

do. 

11. USCIB and LSIB shall have prepared and maintained in current 

status mutually agreed lists to indicate COMINT placed in. 

the several Categories and in such Sub-categories as ma;y be 

established. 

CLASSIFICATION AND CODEWORDS 

12. Category III COMINT shall be classified TOP SECRET and shal.l 

be desie;nated by a dis~inctive codeword agreed between USCIB and LSIB 

and replaced every two years. In the event that USCIB and LSIB agree 

that positive security advantages will,be obtained by earlier change 

then such change shall be made and a new period of two years shall be 

in effect from Ulat date. 

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• 

•·· TQMSE~~OE BPC53/D/Final 

oJ-1-6 

19 March 1953 

13. Category II COMINT sha.ll be classified SECRET and shaJ.l be 

designated by a distinctive codeword agreed between USCIB and LSIB and 

replaced every two years. In the event that USCIB and LSIB agree that 

positive security advantage will be obtained by earlier change then 

such change shal.l. be ma.de and a new period of two years shal.l be in 

effect from that da.te. 

l.4. Category: I COMINT sha.ll.be classified not lower than 

CONFIDEiilTIAL and shall not be designated by a codeword. 

15. Sub-categories. Whenever a Sub-category is established within 

Categories III or II COMINT, it shal.l be designated by a separate or 

auxiliary codeword agreed from. time to time between USCIB and LSIB. 

16. Technical material pertaining to COMINT shall bear the 

classification and codeword nppropriate to the most higbl.y classified and 

sensitive Category or Sub-category of COMINT to which it relates and shall be 

handled accordingly. 

17. Documents which reveal actual success, progress, or processes 

in the production of COMINT shall bear the classification and codeword 

appropriate to the most highly classified an~ sensitive Category or 

Sub-Category of COMINT to which they rel.ate and shall be hand1ed accordingly, 

even though such documents may not reveal COMINT as such. 

18. Raw traf'fic (i.e., intercepted traffic showing no evidence of 

proce1:1aing for COMINT purposes beyond sorting by clear address elements, 

elimination of unwanted messages and the inclusion of a case number and/or 

an arbitrary traffic designator) shall be classified not lower than 

CONFil>.ENTIAL and need not be designated by a codeword. 

19. Codewords. When used as such, the codewords which designate 

Categories III and II COMINT, and the Sub-Categories which may be established 

within these Categories shall bear the. TOP SECRET classification according 

to the Category. These codewords and their implications shall not be 

made kno'W'll to non-indoctrinated persons, nor shall these codewords be used 

in their codeword sense in the presence of non-indoctrinated persons. 

5 

NSA Form 7B1-C 13S J Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
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SECURITY 

BPC53/B/Final. 

o1~6 

19 March 1953 

20. Conservation of COMINT sources is of supreme importance. 

It is essential, therefore, that the production, exploitation, and 

dissemination of COMINT, and of all related or resultant information, 

be strictly controlled and the dissemination appropriately limited. 

The physical security of related documents is not alone sufficient; 

it is essential that all reference to the existence of COMINT, either 

direct or indirect, be avoided except among those to whom the knowledgeis necesso.ry tor the proper performance of their duties. These provisions 

shall apply to any intelligence which, in whole or in pa.rt, includes 

information which· can be traced solely to COMINT sources. 

21. There is no !iime limit for the sateguarding of COMINT as defined herein. It is of the utmost importance that ccmq:>l.ete and absol.ute silence on all COMINT matters be maintained by those who have ever 

been indoctrinated :f'or COMINT. If 1 at any time, matter referring to 

COMINT is broadcast or publ.ished, even though by prominent people or 

those in authority, this does not in any way :f'ree those other persons 

who are, or ever have been indoctrinated for COMINT :f'rom their continuous 

obligation to maintain silence. 

22. Except as agreed by USCIB or LSIB, all persons to be assigned 

to duties involving COMINT shall be.the subject of security investigation and clearance. As an aid to the uniformity of investigations and 

• 

clearances, and to promote adequate minimum standards, each party shall. inform 

the other of the standards l!rescribed by it for this purpose. 

23. AJ.l persons to be assigned to duties involving Categories of 

COMINT other than Category I shall. be indoctrinated (i.e., instructed as 

to the nature of COMINT and the security regu1ations and practices which 

govern the handling of COMINT material and COMINT activities). Recipients 

of Category I COMINT only will. not be indoctrinated. Producers of 

Category I COMINT only need not necessarily be indoctrinated. 

- 6 -

NSA F-m 781-C 135 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET Ci\NOE 
19 March 1953 

a. KnowledGe of specific Categories or Sub-Categories of CO...T\UNT 

shall be m ad.e available to indoctrinated persons solely on the basis of their 

11 nced to know". 

b. Every effort shall be made to restrict the number of' persons indoctrinated for cm.nNT to the essential minimum. 

c. It shall be permissible f'or. persons who have access only to 

a less sensitive Category or Sub-Ca~egory of COMINT to work within Agencies 

or Centers in which there are located other persons e~aged in the production or exploitation of a more sensitive Category or Sub-Category 

of COMINT, only so long as due precaution shall be taken (by providing 

segregated, secure areas or otherwise) to ensure that the activities and 

knowledge of' such persons are confined to the Cffi{[NT material and activities to which they have access. 

24. Under extraordinary conditions, as determined by USCIB or ISIB, 

it may be essential for an individual to take up duties involving 

COMINT before the requisite investi~ation can be completed. In such.cases, 

the person concerned may be suitably indoctrinated on the authority only of 

senior officers or officials as designated by the respective parties. In 

all such cases, steps shall be taken to ensure that security investigatidns 

and clearances are completed as soon as possible a.:f'ter indoctrination. 

25. Each Party shall ensure that complete lists of indoctrinated 

persons are maintained. 

26. USCIB and ISIB shall keep each other fully informed of the 

approximate number of indoctrinated persons in each of the Departments, 

Ministries, Agencies, and Offices receiving COMINT, by Category of SubCategory where applicable. 

'27. No national of one party shall be permitted access to the 

co~rnrr agencies or to the Categories III and II COl-llNT of the other Party, 

7 

JJul52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
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19 March 1953 

unless he has been approved by his parent agency or Boa.rd e.nd has been 

properly indoctrinated. Such access shall be limited to the Categories or • 

Sub-Categories of COMINT a.greed by his parent agency or Board. 

28. Every effort shall. be ma.de to ensure that no person who 

has a knowledge of current value a.bout COMINT 1 such that his capture 

or interrogation could be a substentiaJ. risk to the security of COMINT, 

sha.J.l be assigned to or engage in activities of a hazardous nature. 

29. "Hazardous activities" are those which place a person in a 

position where he runs a. substantial risk of being captured or otherwise 

subjected to interrogation, e.g.: 

30. In applying these principles persons who are or have been indoctrinated will be divided into four groups: 

a. Producers of Category I COMINT who have no knowledge of 

other Categories m·e classed as Group A. They may be 

assigned to hazardous activities only on the authority . of senior officers. (No restrictions are applied to the 

recipients or non-indoctrinated producers of' Category I 

COM.INT only) • 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

8 PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

NSA Form 781-C J3S 
TOP swwJ:ilian~§!!T ~~ 2£/Final 

())46 

19 March 1953 

b. Individuals who have knowlcde;e of current; value about 

Category II CQ?.1INT are classed as Group B • They may 

be assigned to hazardous activities only a.ft.er six 

months separation i'rom such material. 

c. Individuals, other than those specif'ied in sub-para{!I'aph d 

below, who have knowledge of' curreut value about Category III 

CC»1INT a.re classed as Group C. They may be assigned to 

hazardous activities only a.rter a separation of' one year o:r 

lonaer from this type of information. 

d. Individuals with precise knowledge of COMINT processing 

techniques, competence, or potential, regarding the more 

sensitive Category III COMINT material are classed as 

Group D. They shall not be assigned to hazardous 

activities at a:ny time. 

31. The provisions in para.graphs 28, 29 and 30 shall be applied 

only by senior of'f'icers and officials at a level to be established by USCIB 

ox· I.SIB. Exceptions shall be authorized only after care:f'uJ. consideration 

in each instance of' the advantages to be gained, as opposed to the risk 

involved. In considering exceptions to sub-para.graph 29d, the protection 

offered by diplomatic status should not automatically be considered suf'-

ficient, but should be assessed in the light of the particular circiunstances invvlved. Any exception in the case of' Group D personnel must 

receive prior approval by the Board concerned. The considerations relevant to 

COMI'NT personnel serving with COMINT units in exposed areas are dealt with 

in Annexure B2. All possible action shall be ta.ken to discourage or prevent any individual. with a knowledge of current value a.bout COMINT from 

crige..ging in hazardous activities (as defined in para.graph 29 above) in 

:..iJ.iy 1.mof'i'icial. capacity at any time. 

9 

NSAForm78J-CJ3S JJul52 TOP SECRET c1~1".NOE 
l'OP S:El6l1Bl' Q.~9B - O:ESUR:E'.fY Iff.PORMA'fION 

BPC53/B/Final 

0116 

19 March 1953 

32. Except as implicitly involved in the operation of paragraphs 

35, 41 and 42 below, Categories III ~nd II COMINT sball remain exclusively 

in the custody of indoctrinated persons, secure from examination by nonindoctrinated persons. 

DISSEMINATION 

33. The basic principle governing the dissemination a.nd use of 

COMINT is the "need to know". Each item of' COMINT shall, therefore, be 

made known oDl.y to those individual.a who require it in the performance of 

their duties and, except as specificaJ.1y provided in paragraphs 35 1 36 

and 37 below, a.re indoctrinated and authorized to have access to the 

pa.rticul.a.r Category or Sub-Category of COMINT to which such item appertains. 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 - 10 -

NSAForm781-C13S 1Jul52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
19 March 1953 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 - 11 -

NSAForm781-C13S 1Jul52 TOP SECRET• CANOE 
':FOP SJ!iSRl'!a' SAlfOB Sl!iS9'ffF~Y ±PJFOR:H,'l9?IOH 19 March 1953 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) -12-

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

NSA Form 781-C J3S J Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
TOI SEORB~5V~C2~3/B/Fina1 046 

19 March 1953 

36, Category I COMINT :may be disseminated in accordance with the 

normaJ. practice of each Party as regards intelligence materie1s of 

similar classifications. However, it may not be passed to Third/Party 

recipients except as provided in paragraph 37 below, and must be handled 

accordingly. It is recognized that this dissemination will involve loss 

of control by COMIN'l! authorities, but every effort sba.J..l. be ma.de to 

ensure that the following provisions are enf'orced to the maximum extent 

possible. 

NSA Form 781-C13S 1 Jul 52 

a. Whenever Category I COMINT is to be transmitted b;y a means 

exposed to interception, it shall normall.y be transmitted in an 

appropriate cryptographic system. It mey be transmitted in 

plain language only' when there is no eiuitable means of' secure 

connnunication available and when there is an urgent operational 

need to do so. Whenever possible such plain la.ngua.ge 

transmissions shall be in the form of operational orders so 

worded that the subject matter cannot be traced specif'ical.ly 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

to its COl-UNT origin. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

13 

TOP SECRET C1\:NOE 
... TOI SECRE~5e1')i0,1~53/B/Finctl 0116 

'of.OP SJ::18HE'f E1\iIOB - Sfletffi'.f'f'l Ht.PORM/tl!ION 

19 M:l.rch 1953 

// 

37. Cate(5ory I CO.M.IllT DJEcy" be disseminated to Third Party recipients 

under the following conditions: 

a. In COMINT arrangements with Third PartiesJ· Category/I COMINT 

may be released to these Third Parties in accordance with the provisions 

of Append.ix P. 

b. Du.ring active hostilities or in the case of an 

emergency involving a matter of importance to the nationa.l security 

of either. Party, Category I COMINT IllS\Y be disseminated./to nationals 

of Third Parties who are engaged directly with the u.s. or U.K. in 

these hostilities or are BJ.lied directly with the U.S. or U.K. in 

dealing with the emergency concerned. The determination of a requirement 

to :make this exception and the authority to grant this exception shall 

lie only with senior officers or officials at a level to be established 

by USCIB or !SIB. 

38. In the event that either Party produces individual items of 

COMINT which, by reason of the extreme sensitivity of their source or 

content shall be given a more limited dissemination than would normally be 

given to the Category or Sub-Category of COMINT within which the;y fall, 

it will be for the originating/party to indicate the ns.ture of the 

special handling desired and./to request that the other Party afford 

similarly limited dissemination. 

39. Category III end II CO.MINT shall never under any circumstances 

or in any f'orm be disseminated to any Ministry 1 Department 1 Agency J 

Organization, Office, or individual from which or from whom it might 

reasonably be expected to f'in.d. its way, officially or extra-o:f':f'icial.lyJ 

into the 'Possession of any person or group who coul.d use it for commercial. 

competition or commercial gain or advantage. 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

NU Form 781-C13S 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
... TOi 

!OP 8Ei9RB'±' Si\:Pf(Jij - S:Bel:fftfi'Y. Iril"OltMll:I !ON 

PU.OCEDURT!S 19 March 1953 

40. The appropriate classification and codeword shall: 

a. Appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses 

b. 

Category III or II COMINT or a Sub-Category thereof, technical 

material pertaining to theso Categories and Sub-Categories and 

documents vhich reveal actual success, progress or processes 

in their production. Except as provided in paragraph 35 above, 

this rulo applies to maps and charts on which are plotted 

data and in:Cormati on. derived from these oat egories of COUINT. 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

15 

NSAForm78J-CJ3S JJul52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
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19 March 1953 

41. Category III COMINT and related technical material shall 

not be transmit'l:.ed in plain hnc;uage except as follows: 

a. Sealed, by safehand channels, over routes specifically 

approved by USCIB or LSIB. Each Board shall inform tm 

other of all approved routes involving transport across 

territory of a third i:arty, the approval of such routes 

t.o be held to the necessary minimum. 

b. Over landlines specifically approved in each instance by 

USGIB or LSIB .. 

c. Over completely protected local c ommunica.tion syste..ns 

exclusively internal to agencies or offices producing or 

utilizin6 COMINT. 

42. Category II COMINT and related technical material shall not be 

transmitted in pla:in language except as provided in paragraph 41 above, 

or by protected postal channels internal to, or under exclusive control 

of the US, the UK, or other collaborating British Commonvrea~th courrliries. 

43. Category I CCl·ID~T and related technical material should be 

transmitted by CO:MINT channels wherever possible, but may be transmitted 

by convent.ional channels used f'or intelligence materials of' similar 

classification. It shall not be transmitted in plain language by a 

means exposed ·t,o interception, except as provided in sub-paragraph .'.36a 

above. 

44. Raw trai'f'ic may be tral'lSmitted in plain language as provided 

in paragraphs 41 and 42 above. Raw traffic classified CON"FID:E?TTiti.L may 

alr:;o be transmitted in accordance with the nonnal procedure for th:is .. classification, except that when transported across the territory of the 

country originating tho traffic, it shall be vtith the express sanction of 

USCIB or LSIB. ~his sanction will be granted only in cases of compelling 

need. 

16 

,. 
TOiSE~~OE BPC 53/B/Flnnl Ql~6 

19 March 1953 

45. 'E:x.ccpt as prov:ided in paragraph 35 above= 

a. Cat:.egory III COI.lINT and relo.Lcd technical m.: .. i.torial 

transmitted in enc1jrpted form shall be encrypted in 

spccL:::l cryptot,r:i.phic channels expressly provided for 

these subjects. 

b.· Ua.tcgory II COitnTT and related technical material 

transmitted in encrypted fonu shall be encrypted in 

special c1yptoernphic channels e:i..rpressly provided for 

those subjects, those listed in paraeraph a above, or in 

the most secure crypt.03raj .hie channel available. 

c. However, in the case of cryptographic systems mutually 

approved for the purpose, the transmission of COJtINT 

related technical mat t.ers and raw traffic over the same 

channel is authorized, provided that such channels are 

reserved for these> subjects exclusively. 

~ 

46. In order to facilitate a ccncerted effort directed toward 

the determination and assessment o.f the causes and effects of knmm 

or presumed COI:IIlTT compromises or losses, it is agreed that: 

a.• nhencvor any breach of its C01.ITNT security rogulati ons 

or any other circumstance which in fact has, or can be 

presumed to have, compromised OOMI:N'T or co:.1IN'l' codevmrds,, 

or to have revealed CO!l'IDFl' successes to unauthori.zod persons, 

becomes knovm to either .t'a.rty, it shall inform t;ho other by 

means 01' a report. embodying the pertinent. fnct.s ~nd 

conclusions in oach case, except that vihoo the Party 

concerned concludes that there is a. good reason to bel:J.eve 

that such co;npro111ise or revelatiou has•nat reached and will 

not, in feet, reach foreign nationals, no report need be 

m<?.do to ~ho other Party. 

-17-

NSA Form 78J-C J3S J Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
I 

'!'OP S:l5Sll:M.' 91\:l'JQB SESl:HEE~¥ Jlff01~.!M~IOM 

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BPC 53/B/Final 01~6 

19 March 1953 

b. Whenever a s ienif'ioant change occurs in forei~ 

cryptographic or conununica·t;ions security, the Party 

discovering such change shall notify tho other. En.ch 

Party shall then analyze and assess the knovin and 

suspected circumstances having a bearing upon the chm1ge; 

these analysee and assessments shall be exchanged by tho 

Parties; and oach Party shall thereafter keep tho other 

fully inf'onned of' any additional information bearing 

upon the case. 

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NSAForm781-C13S 1Jul52 TOP SECRET C1\:NOE 
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TOJ? Sl l~Q~J!:'f' GMlOtll - SP.ffiJRI'fY INPORMft'f'IOff 

Notes to Appendix B I 

Note l TbrouGhout thls Appendix: 

BPc53/D)"inoJ. 

Ol16 

19 March 1953 

Eo 3. 3 I h I I 2 I 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

a. "Foreign communications" are understood to mean those 0£ the 

Government, or oi' any military, Air or Naval force, i'action,. party, departmcnt, o.gcncy or bureau of a i'oreign count:ry, or a:ny person or\persons acting or purportine to act therefor, and shall include~l~~~~__.land private 

communications originated by nationa;ts Of a. foreign country\ which may 

contain information of military, economic, political, or counter intelligence 

vo.luc. "Foreign country" is understood to include all countries, whether 

or not their governments a.re recognized by the US or the UK, excluding only 

the US and the British Commomrealth of Nations. 

b. 11Technical material" is understood to mean data concerning: 

(1) cryptographic systems, 

l2) communico.tions procedures and meth9ds, 

(3) methods and equipment, as used in or designed for 

C014INT processes; 

a.nd information related to a:ny of the above. 

c. "Communications intelligence" does not include the interception 

and study of non-communications transmissions. The term Signal Intelligence 

(Sie;int) (as used by the UK) includes both COMINT and the interception and 

study of' non-communications transmissions. These transmissions a.re outside 

the scope of this Appendix. 

, (', L:;. 
.. ~ 

~~~~--:-~OE 

'for' SEe'RB'f e1t:NOF:I - SE6UlU'i"'l INP0HMA'fl:ON 

EO 3.3(h) (2) 

P4 86~J6/50 USC 3605 

- BPC53/D/F'1nal. 

Ol+6 

19 March 1953 

Note 3 Paragraph 34 shs::l..l be so interpreted as to allow: 

a. The use oi' COMINT by indoctrinated persons in .the preparation oi' 

National Intelligence Estimates, JIC appreciations and simiJ.ar documents 

issued without COMINT codewords, as specii'ied by either party, provided 

the statements contained in them are so generalised that they c13.11not be 

traced to a. pa.rticuJ.a.r item. oi' COMINT or to their COMIIfr origin. Specific 

COMINT detail must be restricted to supporting papers carrying the COMII>i"T 

codeword. 

• 

::.o 

NSA Form 781-C13S 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE