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must then , 

Another example of the inter-relationships is apparent in this triangle 

formed by. intelligence, traffic analysis, and cryptL'"'l&lys1s. Both trattic 

analysis, through its study or net structure and its constant surveillance or 

' tra:r:ric contacts, and cryptanalysis, through the,production of readable messages, make direct contributions to intelligence. However, intelligence is 

, 

not merely the passive receiver of this material. .Li digests the inf"ormat~on 

coming out of these operations, ruses it with items received from other sources, 

and feeds the final result back into the signal intelligence process where it 

can be used as the basis for further exploitation. And we should not overlook 

the very close relation existing between traffic analysis and cryptanalysis. 

Actually one complements the other, traf'fic analysis dealing chiefly with the 

headings and the externals of the intercepted message, and cryptanalysis with 

the text and the internals. Proper performance or either traffic analysis or 

' cryptanalysis depends on the degree or integration achieved between the two. 

The direct benefit which intelligence derives from the reading of enemy 

traffic provides intelligence with a definite interest in what tre.f'fic is under 

analysis. Intelligence, in this sense, supplies priorities since, under usual 

conditions, it's not possible to attack all of the eneJD)" systems at one time. 

Thus, intelligence might feel that, judging by the units holding different 

cryptographic systems, messages in qstem X are of higher intelligence value 

•• 

than those in system Y or system z, and consequently asks that the main crypt-

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analytic effort be devoted to tlle former. However, there's one important 

caution to be exercised in the direction or t..~ese efforts. Very often, it's , 

necessary for the cryptanalyst to solve some or the less important systems in 

order to break into those or greater value. Solution of the lesser systems ~ri r r ---~ r "' .. -,,;r. I I 

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Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-27-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
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I wish I had the time to give you a detailed picture of such a unit which ~ 

was one of several imder my cOlillDM.d in France from the middle of August 1944 , 

to the end of hostilities in Europe. I can give you a few details only and 

show you a few pictures which may give you some idea of the extent of the 

operations. I 111 also cite a few examples of the results achieved. The unit 

I 1ve in mind was known as Signal Security Detachment 11D11 , which began :field 

operations in the middle of August 1944 and operated quite effectively until 

the end of hostilities in Europe. 

The mission of the Detachment was the procurement of signal intelligence 

from the solution of German medium- and low-grade tactical codes and ciphers . for the 1'.JJ of s, G-2, 12th Arary Group; the coordination and ,technical super-

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vision of the Signal Radio Inte~ligence Companies and Signal Service Companies 

operating under units assigned to 12th Army Group; and technical liaison with 

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adjacent Arnry Group Signal Intelligence units and with those of higher head- ~ 

quarters. The Detachment was also charged with the r~sponsibilit7 of enfarcl:!Jg~ 

the general signal intelligence policies of the War Department, Hq. ETOUSA, 

and 12th Army Group, among the Signal Radio Intelligence units of 12th Army 

Group. 

As I 1ve already indicated, Detachment 11D11 was charged with the responsibility of passing to the Assistant Chief of Statf, G-2, 12th Arrrty Group, signal . intelligence procured from the analysis of enemy low-grade and medium-grade . tactical traffic. This was accomplished in two ways. 

•(l..) Direct telephone communication was available until 4 March 1945, 

when, due to the tactical situation, the Detachment operated too far in advance 

or tactical headquarters to allow utilization of metallic telephone lines. 

However, radio or t'eletype (or both) links maintained constant communication 

from that date onwards. The app0intment on 3 February 1945 or a liaison officer 

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from the Detachment to G-2 action also aided in the smooth flow and interI 

pretation or signal intelligence. 

(2) All pertinent technical reports published by the Detachment were 

transmitted daily to G-2 Section. These reports supplemented and enlarged upon 

the information already passed to the G-2 Section by communicati~n means previously described. 

The complete record or all signal intelligence, or immediate value only, 

transmitted to G-2 Section by telephone-radio or teletype is much. too voluminous 

for me to tell you about. All I can indicate here is to say that from I 

1 September 1944 to 1 April 1945 the unit gave G-2 over 1400 items of signal 

in't1tlligence derived from German medium-grade ciphers, 630 items derived from 

low-grade codes and ciphers, and 160 items derived from traffic analysis anq 

D/F work. 

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It's not possible to evaluate the sigilal intelligenoe made ....Ulabla to f 

G-2 Section, either in the form or immedia.tel.y applicable information (i.e., : 

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location of division or army ammunition, supply and fuel dumps, command postsJ I 

I etc.), or in the form of co:nfirmation of prisoner-of-war reports, large scale• 

movements or intentions of m&Jor enemy formations and the appearance of new 

battle units in a given sector. But I can say that the daily G-2 Intelligence Smnmary made great use of the signal intelligence supplied by the 

Detachment, two-out of every three items being information providec:" by the 

unit. Incidentally, this Intelligence Summaey was sent by teletype, operational priority, to the following headquartars1 

SHAEF Ila.in 

6th Arrq Group 

21 Arrrt Group (Main) 

8th Air Force 

lat U.S. Army Command 

3rd U.S. Jrrq Main 

9th u. s. J:rrq ia1n 

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. 15th u.s. Army Jo:rw~ 12th Army Group Main 

12th ArM:y' Group Tac 

First Allied Airborne Army 

Com Z 

ASCZ 

9th Air Force Advance 

Now a tew words about the relationships between Detachment 11D11 and some 

other units. ~ mission in connection with the signal radio intelligence 

units of 12th ~ Group was subdivided into three categories. The first was 

that of reporting signal intelligence of immediate value to Array and Corps G-2 1s. 

' All technical signal intelligence of tactical value, particularly that coming 

J from the solution of medium-grade ciphers, was transmitted daily by the most 

expeditious means to the Army Signa~ Radio Intelligence Companies. This intelli-~ 

I gene~ was reported to Army and Corps G·2 1s, as has been said; but it was also 

employed as a basis tor allocating intercept and direction-finding coverage 

priorities. 

You may be interested a bi1; in the mechanics or rorwarcUng the signal 

intelligence. The most convenient means or transmission or technical signal 

intelligence to the field units was radio, teletype, and courier. Two radio f 

broadcasts, naturally in a veey.secure cryptographic system, were made daily, I 

one in the morning and one in the early evening to establish coverage priorities 

and to assist in the preparation of·technical reports for the respective G-2 I 

• 1 Sections. Technical signal intelligence was also transmitted by the same means ~ 

at any- hour of the day or night when the urgency of the information so warranted, 

The second mission of the Detachment in its relationships with other units ( 

was the consolidation ot technical material or all field units. All technical ~' 

data from the signal radio intelligence units or 12th Army Group, for example, 

were consolidated daily with those ob~ained by the two intercept units directly 

responsible to Detachment 11D11 and with data received from intercept units of the 

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two tlanking Army Groups (6th ah 21~. Items of immediate value were transmitted along with intelligence. In addition, all such aata were published in 

greater detail in reports ot the Intelligence Branch of the Detacr..ment and dispatched to the field units. 

The daily publication of the Intelligence Branch not only aided the field 

units in the normal execution of their missions, but provided the only means of I 

maintaining technical continuity on enemy formations auring the frequent moves 

ot the f::teld units. This was particularly true when Army and Corps fronts were 

radically alerted, resulting lJl an entirely new, and frequently unfamiliar, 

group of enemy uru.ts facing them. 

The third and last mission of the Detachment in its relatienships with 

other ~its was that connected with exercising supervisory control over operaI 

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tions of Signal Radio Intelligence Field Units. Policies concerning operations ~ 

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emanating from high headquarters, or those arising from within Detachment 11D11 ~ 1).....-

trom time to time, ware distributed and enforced. Aid in comp:cy:!Dg wi<th the ~ 

policies was provided in the form of directives, special technical repol'ts, and 

by conferences at the Detachment headquarters. Also frequent liaison visits to 

the field units were made by technical experts from the Intelligence Branch. 

Continuous liaison was maintained with 21 and 6th Army Group signal radio 

intelligence agencies both by personal visits and by radio-teletype and tale-

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• phone communications on a twenty-four hour basis. All technical reports published 

were exchanged with t1-ose two organizations. 

Now let me cite only a very few of the large nlDllber of items of signal 

intelligence va.l ue turnished by Detachment 11D11 • 

The covername which was applied to the intelligence resulting f"rom the 

solution ot Gem.an medium-grade codes and ciphers was CIRO-PEARL. Examination 

of more than 6000 solved CIRO-PEARL mesages during the few months' period ot -- --..... ,__,..---., --,..-r-- I ' 1

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active operations of the Detachment shows that the m&Jor part of all the information derived can be placed roughly into four main categories: 

a. Information concerning unit locations and dispositions. 

b. Situation reports and operational directives. 

c. Troop Movements. 

d. Status reports., including a variety or statistical information 

observed in numerous stereotypic or form reports. 

Let 1s see the kind of data furnished under the first category. Over 90% 

were concerned with enemy command posts and order of battle. The fact that 

CIRO-PEARL.produced such information about German divisions often in as few 

as B to 12 hours after the messages hati been intercepted placed an extremely 

high premium on the dissemination of the information. 

Let's take a look at some of the information as it ~pplied to forward 

areas. 'Naturally,. information concerning unit command posts would be of deep 

interest. The period during which CIRO-PEARL produced the maximum intelligence, . both in quantity and in quality, occurred during the Ardennes offensive 

16 December 1944 to 2 February 19L.5. .Messages trom thirteen divisional and 

similar formations in and near the 11Bulge" area were read. The divisions 

listed represented the bulk of armored and mobile formations employed by the 

Germans during that offensive and constituted the major threat to Allied forces. 

Consequently, the CIRO-PEARL intelligence gained from these formations not only ' ... 

indicated accurately the trend of operations carried out by all enemy units 

within the 11Bulge11 , but also provided G-2 with reliable information at a time 

when other intelligence sources were relatively llllproductive or non-existent. 

The 1.30 Pl 11LEHR11 Division provided the most noteworthy example of continuous information during this period, particularly' in the matter or divisional • 0 

element CP's. Here are two or three CIRO-PF..A.RL messages of 17 January 1945, 

selected to illustrate examples of high priority division and divisional element 

CP locationat 

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130 PZ LEHR DIV Ic: 

"Div Ic located at WEIIER on 17 Jan. 11 

PZ GREN Rl!DT 901: 

"Attempt communication with PGR 901 at WANDEBOURCY immediately ••• 11 

PZ GREl~ REGT 902: 

"~Pi Btl 1:30, tor delaying action, will be with PGR 902 in the 

future and will move into TAVIGNY11 

Often, CIRO-PEARL provided-intelligence concerning the sectors which enemy 

units occupied or were to occupy, giving information or high value regarding 

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unit disposition from an order-of-battle point or view. Messages which announced [ 

main lines ot resistance, outguard lines ot resistance, sector boundary lines, ~ 

sector junction points, and neighboring units frequently afforded G-2 clear and 

reliable estimates ot specific enemy situations. There isn't time to give you 

more than one eD.mple: I 

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. "SS PZ Grenadier Regt :3 1Deutschland 1 is at EIBEUF; SS PZ Grenadier 

Regt 4 1Der Fuehrer• is in the FORET D1ELBEUF. Boundary l!!!! (between 

regiments)1 railroad. Front and reconnaissance to th~ southeast • 

.Artillery located east ot BOSO-ROGER EN ROUMOIS. Reconnaissance battalion ~ 

with DIV re.serve at LE THUIT (several in area). 11 t!iJI"' 

During the ten-month period under review, it was observed that the CIROPEARL intelligence ot widest scope and greatest interest originated in messages 

involving enemy situation reports and field orders. It was noted that whenever . the enemy was retiring rapidly or otherwise engaged in e:xtremely fluid combat, 

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the need/subordinate enemy units tor precise and cUrrent information concerning 

their immediate situation (and also concerning the disposition and condition ot 

Allied forces in or out or contact) elicited numerous detailed and accurate 

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' situation reports and operational directives on the part ot headquarters, / 

general~ at division level. Situation reports originating with Division Ia 

(operations) and passed down to lower commands included not only intorne.tion 

concerning friendly and enemy troops, but also specific orders and directives 

which were to take effect as a result or the situation indicated. Intelligence 

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concerning Allied disposition was most reliably reported in divisional Ic 

(Intelligence) reports and in situation reports emanating trom divisional 

reconnaissance and artillery elements. 

From CIRO-PEARL analyses, numerous announcements ot enemy unit troop 

movements came to light during the campaign in the West. Although most 

intelligence items of this nature dealt with localized redispositions and 

ma.in-line-of-resistance readjustments, several notable instances or large scale 

and fairly long term troop movements appeared, involving formations up to the 

size of a division. 

' For the purposes of this lecture, the rail movement of the armored and 

heavy weapons elements of 10 SS PZ Div 11Frundsberg11 , from their rest and refit 

area in Holland southward to Join the main body of the division, are of interest. 

.A series or cmo-PEARL c'ommunications pertaining to thiE.i rail movement were read, I 

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from 13 to 19 Deqember 1944, at the time when the .Ardennes offensive was getting 

under way. Just pi-evious to this period the PZ Gren Regts (less heavy weapons 

companies) ot 10 SS PZ Div were attempting to hold back the Allied drive north- , I I I 

east or Aachen. The rest or the division was refitting in Holland, in the area_7 

of RUURLO. There isn't time to go into the details, but suffice to say that , 

practically every movement was noted in the messages and complete intormation 

was made available to G-2, by virtue or almost immediate CIRO-PEARL intelligence from each day's messages. 

A prolific source of CIRO-PEARL intelligence was found in communications 

which contained a variety of unit status reports. The maJor part of' these 

reports was transmitted in stereotypic fashion, but according to a special 

itemized form, the headings or titles of which we didn't know at first. Consequently, detailed study had to be made in the case of each individual message 

in order that exact interpretation could be effected. Unit Status Reports 

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transmitted in CIRO-PEARL messages f'ell into four distinct categories= tank 

states; weapons states; strength reports; and supply reports. 

Here, tor example, is the ay in which a report on the state of weapons 

efficiency within an enemy unit often provided intelligence of importance. ~The 

following message was originated by SS PZ Jaeger Abteilung 2 of 2 SS PZ Div 

"Das Reich11 on 18 September 1944 during the withdrawal of the division into the 

Westwall at PRUDh 

11.A/T preparedness state of' Div elementst 

SS "Dautschland" (SS FGR 3) 

5 x 7.5 cm A/T guns 

5 x Puappchen (Rocket projectors) ' 

lampf'gruppe MILIUS (attached to 2 SS PZ Div) 

2 x 7.5 cm. PAK ' 

2 x 8.8 cm. PAK/FLAX 

SS. 11Der Fuehrer" (SS FGR 4) 

3 x 7.5 cm .. PAK 

1 x 5 cm. PAK 

1 Assault gun 

2 SS PZ Autkl Abt 

4 x 7.5 cm. PAK" I , ... 

Casualty reports were often in detail. For example, the 341 Sturmgeschuetz 

Brigade, while heavily engaged in the defense of' the KOELN plain, requested on 

12 December 1944 that all batteries furnish a survey of casualties sustained 

from "date of initial employment" until 12 December. One battery replied1 

"Casualties sustained since 31 J".lly 19.44: 

Killed 

Severely wounded 

Lightly wounded 

Missing 

Captured 

At Ft. Nazaire I 

Officers 1m.Q OR 

5 4 4 

2 7 

1 9 16 

2 8 19 

4 3 

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Fuel and armnunition reports offered valuable information concerning the 

state of supplies. Here's an example. The SS PZ Regt 1 of 1 SS PZ Div 11 ISSAH11 , , 

while engaged in heavy combat in the Ardennes, filed the following fuel and 

ammunition report with the Div Ib (Supply) on 12 January 1945: 

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"Fu.el Report 12 January: 

OTTO f"u.el allocation:-

Received from Army 

Consumption 

Supply on hand 

Supply of Diesel fuel 

Motor oil 

utility oil 

Grease 

.Ammo expenditure reportr 8-12 Jan. 

Pistol cartridges (S•'lK) 

Pistol cartridges (7.65 l~I) 

Flare cartridges (type 41) 

Signal cartridges (red) 

Signal cart~idges (grePn) 

Smoke cartridges (oiiinge) 

Urgent need for repaired tank and for 

salvage missions: 

10 cbm. 

10 n 

l n 

O.S n 

).8 II 

0.4 n 

~o kgm • 

41 500 rds. 

200 " 

20 " 

10 n 

10 II 

C1rTO (required) 

l Abt 

501 (ijy Tiger Bn) 

DIESEL {required) 

1 SS PGR 

Per Order: GRUHLE (Hstu.f. Ad.Ju. SS P'l Ragt 1). 11 

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10 cmb. 

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~ I So much for CIRO-PEARL intelligence, most or which was provided by 

Detachment 11D11 in its primary mission of supplying G-2, 12th l:rmy Group nth 

signal intelligence. I've already indicated that Detachment 11D11 had another 

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mission, that of technical coordination of the many signal radio intelligence 'I 

units assigned to tactical units for the purpose of deriving intelligenc$ from \ 

the low-grade German coda and cipher tratfic in their immediate fronts. We 

I called the intelligence resulting f'rom low-grade codes and ciphers PEARL 

intelligence, and it tl.JJle permitted I could give you numerous illustrations 

and examples. In addition, there was THUMB intelligence, which was that 

obtained by direction finding. Here's a chart which will show you how mllllY' 

signal radio intelligence units there were and their attachment. You'll note 

that there were 8 signal radio intelligence companies serving the 6th Army 

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Group, 12th Army Group,"lst, 3rd, 7th, 9th, and 15th ..&rmiea; in addition, there I' 

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were two such companies serving Detachment 11D11 , and 14 such companies serving 

as many corps. Quite an aggregation, and these had somehow to be coordinated 

to make them effective. 

Beginning in the month or September 1944, Detachment 11D11 assumed responsibility for all outgoing and inccxdng materials to and from all signal radio 

intelligence units or 12th Army Group. This channelization meant that a 

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detailed record could be kept of all materials exchanged by the numerous field 

units and Detachment "D", excluding captured docwnents. This sort of arrangement was very effective in maintaining a high level of technical efficienc7 

by all field units, since the work of each unit by itself could 1n reality not 

amount to very much; but when the)work of each unit was supplemented and was 

supported by the work or all the others, the effect •a not merely one of. 

addition but rather or multiplication. As new signal radio intelligence units 

came into the field, such as those or the 9th and 15th Armies, these were added 

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to the list of units coordinated technically by Detaclmient "D". I may say th2.,t \ 

in executing tlu.s part or its mission, Detachment 11D11 did much toward molding 

the many field signal radio intelligence units into one large cooperating 

family, all with the same general mission. The results produced by all units 

received rapid and efficient dissemination, a factor of the highest importance 

in the collection and reporting or signal intelligence. But it is to be noted 

that collaboration, coordination, and cooperation is vital to success in this 

field, and that is one or the principal reasons why these radio intelligence 

units must be integrated within and directed technicall)r by a single agency • 

. Note the word integrated, because coordination of independentl7-controlled 

signal intelligence units is not as efficient as integration. of those units 

under a central technical direction. Here's a comment from the final report 

of one of our large signal _i:_~l,±.t~encra ~rmi~:ions -that operated successfully 

in the war, the 849th Sign,: i~t~lligence Service: 

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11 0ne or the most definite conclusions to be drawn from signal 

intelligence experiences in the MediteITanean Theater is that radio 

intelligence and signal intelligence operations should not be conducted by independent organizations working in conjunction with each 

other. Operations of the four Radio Intelligence Co~panies in the 

Mediterranean Theater in providing intercept facilities tor tetachments of the Intelligence Branch have involved many difficult :eroblem~ 

of command and policy between the Companies and Detachments. .Lt is 

felt that the only proper aITangement is to provide for both radio 

intercept and signal intelligence personnel in a single unit, as in 

the case of the 3915th and 3916th Signal Service Companies activated 

in early 1945. All matters or command and policy are then the 

responsibility or one officer, the Commanding Officer of the unit, 

who can prevent differences or opinion between intercept and intelligence personnel concerning such things as advisability or moving the 

unit, determining proper intercept sites, promotions, and supply from 

interfering with operations." 

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