REF ID:A42860 

>-...... .. <. . 

~ M.EMO ROUTING SLIP 

1 NAME OR Tl1LE LJ 

/f#*$,-, - ORSANIZATION AND LOCATION 

f1f'511 -11 Y: 

L -· •.- . . 

CIRClllATE 

COORDINATION 

FILE 

INFORMATION 

NECESSA.RY 

ACTION 

NOTE AND 

RErURN 

SEE ME 

SISNATURE 

pproved for Release by NSA on 10-28-2013 pursuant to 

.0. 13526 

NM E FOIM 10 9 5 BeplBllllll DA AGO l'onD 8911, I OCT 48 1 .Apr 48, whicb m&J' be 1U8CL 1.........,-8 CIPO 
IAre We .Pr.epared? f;_. ":. /l .- . -

!Intelligence Service· 

;Is Our fi~st Weak Spot · This la the 'ftrst of a seriu of articles on the state of the 

countrv's d.ef ensea. Tod.a71s article d.eals with the American 

intelligence services. Subsequent articles will be d.evoted. to the 

Nation's top-lnel policy and. planning; continental d.ef em es,· 

11tom attack anct civa ctefense; the armed services; the potential ctefense of western Europe; national mobilization antl resources; 

the ·condition of the country's lanct, sea and 11ir transport; the 

propaganda wa.r,· antl, ~nallv, a.n evaluation of America's national &IJCUrit1/. 

By Ogden R. Reid ind Robert S. Bird 

Oonrfjrl'l.t, tN0, 11. r. H-lll 2'rill'Mle. lttO. 

BElUND America's costly and belated e1!ort to rebuild ita crumbled national defenie, ln the wake of the Korean outbreak1 lies a history of fallure ln one of the most essential arms m 

tbe Nation's mWtary establishment-th intelllgence services. 

A country'• intelligence ma.chtn-1---e: 

ery ideally ought to furnish tbe information on which national Polic:J 

and military planning can build toward sound obJectlvea. If the United 

stat.a la.c:IU reliable intelligence, lt 

will flounder in the dark, dlsBlpatIDI lta enormous pawer. Korea brought home the weakneas 

and mfBUse of Ameriea.D. :lnteWgence 

and demonstrated the tmmedla.te 

need for :Improving these· seniceB. 

EVEN before Jtore& our put 

iDtelUpnce ICOl'e shows :llve 

major failures-: 

Coldlaaell oa Pap 4 CollllBll I 

------
REF ID:A42860 

Are We Prepared? ., 

Intelligence $ervice. Is W,eak .Spot 

By, Ogden ~· Reid 

and Robert. S. Bird 

1nterioratt.on of persona who have of. tbeh' 2000 supeio-eecnt atMtqla Information to give. papera that a.re the bula for the NaOften three or more American tlem.'1 overall planning, and would 

services will process such a person bti the blueprints for actloD In countto a point where he dries up ID anger leu dlirerent areas, can be turned 

1 The fall of CsechoSlovakla - or frustration. Around the fluid IODe. G7er to CIA. 

we" thought this would be a routine boundaries of Germany, where much :l"Urthermore, It has ant" been In 

change In government, not the down· of the iDtelllgence from Rul81a ii tbe wt three weeta that CIA repfall of a free Czecho8loftk1a.. gathered from defectl.onist.a who nlllentatives have been. · l&llowed In• 

2. Tit.o's defectl.on - . We had no have fled that country, fumbliDI Die Joint Chiefs of Sta.tr "lltuatlon 

tnowledP. or forewamlnr of tbl8 techniques of tbtll kind become a room" where current U. s. and 81111111¥ 

Important;' ·breat m the BUllllan •loua JD&tter. opetatlana mformatlon·il poeted.: 

satemte r.Wance. The G-2 . .ArmJ When· the Sntelllgenoe COllveJO? 'Thia mlatruat· of CIA 1s abetted 

IDtelligeDce omcer tn charge of the belts from around the wcq"ld CODVBl'I• by :the state Departmen~ whlcb;: 

Yugosla,v desk at the time was bUBJ SD their reapectlve omca in Wash· ~not admit tha eg~ to *·fio.P: 

anaJJllDI Tit.o ID terms of b1s belnl 1qton, the same dupllcatl.on occurs IJOl1by councill. And reaantlJ the; 

Stalin's valet. · -ID the examination of 'ballc doOll~ B&at.8 Department wu 8low to ~ 

3. The fall of the Chinese Na- ments <CIA'• o1llce of reports idld over to CIA tbe cablel from our. 

tt.onall8ts-All our ··mteWpnce ser- estimates a:amines the same docU· e$lbals7 In :Moscow :relative· to the 

vices save G-2 dlscoUDted the •P- menta be1n,r scrut1nilled 'bJ' the t;allrs between the Brltlah AmbusaabWtles of the Cominunlllts to mer- ArmJ'I G-2, the .Air Poree'• 'A-2, the dtir; Bir David V. Xe1J7, aml..A!llnl run China. Ofllce of Naval Intelligence, and the GromJko over~ · ·, • :. ! • 

4. Palestine-The mllltarJ ablll· Sfiate Department), ID the monltor· :J?ecauae of tam poor lD~ 

ties of tbe .Arabs were emba.rrass- q of forelnl radii> broadaasta <both of .ii.U IDtelllppce, the Natlmi'1 cab!- ' 

inll:r overrated 'bJ' .the mteWgence CiA and tb.e Defense DeParimmt net;;omcershavne:r:rJltt.ltleonAcleDce 

groups have Iarglt upenslve monltorSDr ID ':IDtewrence ID l8Dlilll, and ID 

&. :ecirota-Ofpalnfulmemor:rwas setups), and In the IDfierrOlatlon of ~cular in CIA'• product. TheJ 

the lntelUgence ftasco at Bogota iD Am.erlcaDB or other natlonals return• telid to . relJ OD tbe lntelllpDce of 

April, 11K8, when a Colombian Inf from overseas. . their own aervlceB. 

revolution aploded without notice • • • · The separate mW~ senr.lces base . under the 11011e11 of the Intematt.onal B UT most lnim:usable of all, and much of theJr operational· planning , Conference of American Sat.es and most fateful for the Nation are on their own IDtelllpnce estimates, : 

the chlttf l7nlted Stiatel delegate, the JP.uddles in IDtelligen.ce eftiua- Dot on CIA re)J0.111 or OD Jo1Dt brief· 

SecretarJ of State George O. Mar· tlon and coordination, the lnterpre- Snp. 

shall. It wu explained later that tat1ons placed on the evaluated .B:ven. the Prelldellt does not alIDtelllpnce had reported, that there materlala, and tbe Jact of dlmemlna- W8P 'llt1llze either the Joint aervlce 

~ht bi llOJ'.D8 plctetlnr, bUt ~t tlon of raw and :ftnlahed tnteWgence brle:ftDp, or·the CIA report.·. ·-:-: · ·· abOotlnl. . t.o IDterested oustomeqi. · • • • 

. • • • It ls the dut:r of CIA, under the I .NTlllLLIOENCB cd!lcers of Jong 

I

N ALL these flve . IDtelllgence direction oi the Nat.tonal SecurltJ stan.dinl and experience sq that 

breakdowDll we had ample num- Council, t.o correlate and evaluate the followllll steps ·muat be ta.ten 

bers of agent.a on the scene: we do lnteW.gence touchblr national seaur- before the u. 8. can have baslo connot have the same opportunlt:r with ltJ. This has Dot and 1s not being fldence ID it.a Intelligence. 

Basila. done acept Jn haphazard fashion.· · 1. The National BecurltJ ·Council 

The raw materials of our Intel· The Joint lntelUrence rrouP' has should give CIA the power t.o collate 

llgenee senr.lces flow IDt.o Waahlllr· tried to pull t.ogetber the senic:e In· and coordinate all relevant intel· 

ton from sources all over the globe. lielllgence point.a of view and then. Jigence, and should dellneate clear 

Some of It comes from forelrD scl- cro11-chet:t· their :!Dished reports Jines of Intelligence respcmalbilltJ 

en.tlflc Joumala: some from our with the ;Joint Intelligence Commit- among the Ba'Vlces and libe St;ate · "deep cover" agent.a, from mWtar:r tee <composed of the service Intel· Department. · ' attaches, from ilat1onals of other Brence elliefs>, the state Depart- 2. OIA. lhould be headed bJ a 

countries who have defected, from ment and CIA. . " clv.lllan or a retired service omcer 

various m!Wona, and other ao~es. '!'bis has ODlJ resulted in crllll· who will mate the 818DCJ his life 

Each of the three mWtar:r ser- checks of :finished papers but not ID wort. Be should be aulsted b7 three 

vices and tbe Stiate Department has an mltlal putting together of all raw mW.tar, deputies. 

Its own IDtelllgence machln.er:r, and IDtelllgence material before the a. A top five-man boa.rd t.o collate 

standlnr outside all thue 1s the papers are written. all natlonal IDtelUpnc:e, evaluate It 

major organlntlcm-Cen.tral Intel· • • • and reach conaldered IDterpretatt.ona 

llgence Arenc:r-supposedlJ the CC?· A TOP fl.ve•man board,· freed of 'lhould be aet up within CIA. The 

ordlnatlllg bod)' under tile direction all other duties save that of members of this board sbould have 

of the National Securltf Council. carefullJ oollatlng and evaluat1Jir all no other administrative duties. · . SeparatelJ, another lntelliien.oe material bearing on the mtt.onal se- '- CIA should weed out much of 

ofllce, the Joint Intelllgen.c:e Group, curlt)', was recommended 'b:r the Its second-rate personnel awulred 

servlce8 Intelligence for the Joint Hoover Commission to ft11 the pp •. during It.a rapid expansion. · : 

c•s of Std. Thus the Amer1caD But after two yea.rs nothing has &. "Departments within CIA'• five 

Government has the eyes and ears been done. . omces should be reduced to pi,>mote 

of six dlirerent IDteWrence branches This Is no mall ovenlgbt because better worldnl llllilOD and to avoid 

t.o keep 'It lnformed on all the mJl'lad IDal11 of the most serlous f~ures of dupllcatlon. ' · · ,· actlvlt1ea that should be the vital lntelllrence In recent jean have not 8. CIA should aet ample funds to concern of an:r world power.' been ID getting tbe needed informa- provide realist.to cover for their . • • • t1im but ID testing il'Ar vallcUtJ and agent.a. The U. 8. could purchase 

I N THIS countr:r, IDtelllpDce analJzini Its meamnr. "E:res" and foreign business concerm where 

wl!B]messes beriD ID the fteld. "ears" a.re valueless without "mind." necell&l'J and advisable for this PUJ'· 

Too ma111 arents depend, ID the In ~. 1948, for example, the pose. 'I'he Brltlsb--Iong CCIDlldered 

first place, on a tblD State Depart- Defense ;Department sot l.ntelllaenae profesatDnala in· IDt.elllrcmoe-have 

ment and ArmY "cover," whlc:h not from Gen. Lucius D. Olay ID Ger- spared no upenae ID this dlrectlcm. 

oDJJ 1s euilJ unmasked bUt Incurs many lndlcatfnr the lltellhood of a 7. Mllltiary lfll'Vlc:e clvlllan Intelthe rlak of ear}J departure from the Russian invasion of Europe. llgence persomiel Bhould be hlred on 

foreign COUDtry when trouble starts. . The late Secretary of DefeDl8 the basis of their IDteJllpnce, e:a:-

State Department and ArmJ people James Forrestal llWDD10J1ed all In- perlence and quall:flcatlona. All too are amODtr the 1lrst t.o go when ten- tentrence chiefs to his o1llce over a frequently, trained 1Dte1Jfpnce peoslon verrea on war, JUlt the time two-day period and by sheer force pie In the emploJ of the urv1cear 

rood IDtelllrence ls moat needed. of p8l'IODallt:r under the threat of have been let 10 because they· nre· 

A ~er serious weakness ln thia serious danpr fused their best not able to meet Civil Bervlce pernuclea.r are is the lack of llclentulc- tblnkllll on the subJeot manent stiatus and seniority quaUflally trained agent.a l.n the fleld; men The:r reached a majority agree- cations. Persons of no mteWgenca 

and women who know what t.o look ment that the suaplclous troop move- ezperlenoe but with long ClYll Senfor and when t.o recognlu •matter manta in Eastern OermB117 were.not fee senlorltJ were hired ID· fibelr' 

of sclentl:fla tmPC>rt to thia country. torerunnera Of an lnvulon but a place. 

A t.op aclentlst ID this country's buildup for the blockade. ' 8. The mflltal'J services should give pl~nr councils makes the point, • • • more attention t.o·the posslbWtlea or: 

ID tliis connection, that " well-tra.ln- T BIS evaluation was correct but set;tinfr UP. career Intelligence bfancb· 

ed scientist· c:an t.ell from an aerial It wu reached on}J after ail In- • co\.erlng cryptographers (code' 

view of an at.omlc plant it.a pro- t.elllgence available on the matter experts) and mWt&rJ attachei. Of• 

ductlon wltbln 10 ~ cent. had been presented and reoonailed, flcen destined for 0-2 du&,· should 

• • wltb some dissent. be . usured Of adequate IDtelllpnce LESBEB faults that arouse crltl· Up t.o now t.he servlees stlll wlth- trainlDs along with their cimunand 

cJsm amonr the ofll.claJs wholle hold plannfiJg and. operational ID- uperlence. · wort Is based on IDtelllgence reports formation from CIA The Joint Tomorrow• Top Lenl 'PelloT' • JnvoJve ~e e:a:tenalve dupllcatton ·of Chiefs of Stair bave ruied that none '.· an;. m---•-- · ,ort 1li the :field. Ezamples are the "' --

=-::=