Filed 3/13/23 In re N.Z. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re N.Z., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

2d Juv. No. B319715

(Super. Ct. No. FJ57544)

(Los Angeles County)

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

N.Z.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

N.Z. (appellant) is 22 years old. A Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 602 petition alleged that he had committed a 

criminal offense.1 At the jurisdictional hearing appellant 

admitted the allegation based on the understanding that his 

offense did not qualify as a section 707, subdivision (b) (707(b)) 

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare 

and Institutions Code.
2

serious offense. If it did not so qualify, the juvenile court would 

be required to terminate jurisdiction over appellant because of 

his age. (§ 607, subd. (a).) 

The court subsequently learned that the offense qualified 

as a section 707(b) offense so it could retain jurisdiction over 

appellant until his 25th birthday. (§ 607, subd. (c).) Therefore, at 

the dispositional hearing it rejected appellant’s admission. 

Appellant contends the juvenile court should have accepted the 

admission and terminated jurisdiction. We disagree and affirm.

Procedural History

The section 602 petition was filed in August 2021. It 

alleged that between May 1, 2012 and December 31, 2015, 

appellant had committed the offense of continuous sexual abuse 

of a child in violation of Penal Code section 288.5. As of May 1, 

2012, appellant was 11 years old. 

In February 2022 when appellant was 21 years old, he 

admitted the petition’s allegations. Before he entered his 

admission, the juvenile court stated: “It is the court’s 

understanding that [appellant] is interested in entering an 

admission today, a so-called open admission . . . . It is his 

attorney’s opinion that due to [appellant’s] age that the court will 

need to terminate jurisdiction upon taking the admission or at 

the time of disposition by operation of law.” The court said “it 

would like to continue the disposition . . . for a period of several 

weeks . . . to order a disposition report that will include . . . the 

probation department’s formal recommendation regarding the 

disposition in this case, which may be that due to [appellant’s] 

age jurisdiction must be terminated.” 

Appellant’s counsel objected to the ordering of a disposition 

report because jurisdiction over appellant had “ended at age 21.” 
3

The court ordered the People to file points and authorities if they 

believed that appellant’s counsel “is wrong and the court 

somehow can have jurisdiction over this case.” 

The court continued: “It does not appear that the crime 

alleged in this petition is a so-called [section] 707(b) offense. Do 

the People concur in that assessment?” (Italics added.) The 

prosecutor responded, “That is correct, your honor.” (Italics 

added.) 

The court advised appellant: “[Y]our attorney[’s] . . . 

position is that because you are now 21 the court no longer has 

jurisdiction over your case. I am ordering the prosecutor to 

provide the court with their opinion on that question. I am also 

ordering the probation department to provide to the court a 

recommendation regarding how this case should be resolved.” 

Appellant responded that he understood what the court was 

saying. He then admitted the petition’s allegations. 

Several days later, the People filed points and authorities 

in which they argued that the court had jurisdiction over 

appellant until his 25th birthday because his offense qualified as 

a section 707(b) offense. The People’s argument was based on In 

re Emilio C. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1058 (Emilio C.). Appellant 

filed opposition to the People’s points and authorities. 

A disposition hearing was conducted in March 2022. The 

court said that, when it had taken appellant’s admission, it “was 

unaware of the appellate court ruling [Emilio C.] that has . . . 

made it very clear that in such cases a [Penal Code section] 288.5 

[violation] is a [section] 707(b) offense. [¶] So the mistake that 

was made at the last court date is the fact that you were 

misadvised [that the alleged violation is not a section 707(b) 

offense].” 
4

The court gave appellant the option of withdrawing his 

admission. The court noted, “This is all over your standing

objection.” Appellant’s counsel replied that her client “would like 

to be readvised and make the admission with the new 

advisements.” 

The court stated, “The admission that I took on our last 

court date is effectively withdrawn because it was not a lawful 

admission.” (Italics added.) The court readvised appellant that 

he was charged with committing a section 707(b) offense. 

Therefore, “the court may retain jurisdiction over you until you 

attain 25 years of age.” Appellant admitted the petition’s 

allegations. The court declared him a ward and ordered him 

placed in his mother’s home on probation. 

Emilio C. and Its Relevance to the Present Case

“Once the juvenile court has ‘initial’ jurisdiction, it may 

retain jurisdiction over a ward until he or she turns 21 years old 

(§ 607, subd. (a)) . . . .” (People v. Ramirez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 

55, 66.) But if a person has committed one of the serious offenses 

listed in section 707(b), the retention of jurisdiction may be 

extended until the age of 23 or 25 years depending upon the 

maximum sentence for the offense in a criminal court. (§ 607, 

subds. (b), (c).) A violation of Penal Code section 288.5 is not one 

of the offenses listed in section 707(b). 

In Emilio C. the court held that, where a section 602

petition alleged a violation of section 288.5, “[t]he juvenile court 

was entitled to base its Welfare and Institutions Code section 

707[(b)] determination on facts presented at the disposition 

hearing that the court found to be true by a preponderance of the 

evidence. [Citation.] In doing so, the juvenile court was also 

entitled to look beyond the pleadings and consider the 
5

circumstances of [the minor’s] offense.” (Emilio C., supra, 116 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1065, italics added.) Because “[e]vidence 

presented during the adjudication of the . . . petition showed that 

[the minor’s] repeated sexual assaults on his niece constituted” 

violations of offenses listed in section 707(b), “[t]he juvenile court 

properly designated [the minor’s Penal Code section 288.5]

offense as one under Welfare and Institutions Code section 

707[(b)].” (Id. at pp. 1065-1066.)

At the disposition hearing in the present case, the juvenile 

court considered evidence showing that appellant had forcibly 

performed numerous sex acts upon his first cousin, who was 

three years younger than appellant. These acts constituted “lewd 

or lascivious act[s] as provided in subdivision (b) of Section 288 of 

the Penal Code.”2 (§ 707, subd. (b)(6).) The acts included sodomy 

by force and oral copulation by force. (Id., subds (b)(5), (b)(7).) 

Thus, “[t]he juvenile court properly designated appellant’s offense 

as one under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707[(b)].” 

(Emilio C., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066.) Because the 

charged violation of Penal Code section 288.5 would have been 

punishable in criminal court by a prison sentence of seven years 

or more, the juvenile court could retain jurisdiction over 

appellant until his 25th birthday. (§ 607, subd. (c).)3

2 Penal Code section 288, subdivision (b) applies to “[a] 

person who commits [a lewd or lascivious] act described in 

subdivision (a) by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of 

immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another 

person.” (Ibid.)

3 Penal Code section 288.5, subdivision (a) provides that a 

violation of the statute is punishable by “imprisonment in the 

state prison for a term of 6, 12, or 16 years.” 
6

The Trial Court Had the Authority to

Reject Appellant’s Admission

Appellant argues that “the juvenile court lacked authority 

to override” his “initial admission.” (Capitalization omitted.) 

Appellant explains: “There is nothing compulsory in Emilio C. 

about the application of section 707, subdivision (b) to a true 

finding of Penal Code section 288.5 . . . .” “[T]he language used in 

Emilio C. ‘entitling’ the juvenile court to apply section 707, 

subdivision ([b]) is simply permissive.” Thus, “[t]he initial 

admission . . . was not subject to the [juvenile court’s] ‘unlawful’ 

finding.” 

Appellant continues, “[T]he juvenile court was not required 

to make the section 707, subdivision (b) finding . . . . [¶] The 

juvenile court and the prosecution acted unfairly and 

unreasonably in dissolving an admission that was sound and 

which was, according to the record, largely designed by them. 

The juvenile court and the prosecution should not be permitted to 

unwind that admission to appellant’s detriment.” 

We disagree. Appellant in effect entered a conditional, not 

an unconditional, admission. “[A] conditional plea [or admission 

is] where the plea [or admission] is conditioned upon receipt of a 

particular disposition . . . .” (People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th 

432, 435.) The condition here was that the charged offense – a 

violation of Penal Code section 288.5 – did not qualify as a section 

707(b) offense so that the juvenile court would be required to 

terminate its jurisdiction over appellant and dismiss the section 

602 petition. After appellant’s admission, the trial court was 

informed that the charged offense qualified as a section 707(b) 

offense so that it could retain jurisdiction until his 25th birthday. 

In these circumstances, the juvenile court had the authority to 
7

reject appellant’s conditional admission. (See People v. Segura 

(2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 931 [“in the context of a negotiated plea 

the trial court may approve or reject the parties’ agreement”].)

In People v. Thomas (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 921, this court 

enunciated a rule that applies with equal force to the present 

case: “In taking a guilty plea and approving a negotiated 

disposition, the trial court retains the inherent power to 

withdraw its approval at the time of sentencing. . . . A trial court 

should not have to honor a tentative commitment based on a false 

premise.” (Id. at p. 925.) Here, the false premise was that the 

charged offense did not qualify as a section 707(b) offense. At the 

disposition hearing the juvenile court was not required to adhere 

to this false premise. Accordingly, it properly rejected appellant’s 

initial admission. “The very facts of this case illustrate why the 

trial court [or juvenile court], before judgment is final, retains the 

power to withdraw its approval and vacate the guilty plea [or 

admission] sua sponte.” (Id. at p. 926.)

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

BALTODANO, J.
Miguel Espinoza, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising 

Deputy Attorney General, Blake Armstrong, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.