J-A09026-16

2016 PA Super 253

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JASON ROBERT RANDOLPH

Appellant No. 1246 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 14, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0000594-2013

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING STATEMENT BY PLATT, J.:

FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2016

I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

I concur in the learned Majority’s conclusion that Corporal Hanlon 

obtained valid consent from Appellant to search the vehicle at the scene of 

the traffic stop. However, I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s 

conclusion that Corporal Hanlon’s affidavit in support of the application for a 

search warrant did not establish probable cause. Instead, I would conclude 

that the allegations contained within the four corners of the affidavit 

sufficiently established probable cause, in particular, that the steel box 

welded to the undercarriage of the van would contain contraband or 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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evidence of a crime. In my view, the trial court properly denied the motion 

to suppress. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of sentence.

Our standard of review for a challenge to a suppression court’s denial 

of a motion to suppress is “limited to determining whether the suppression 

court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. 

Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010). 

Pursuant to the “totality of the circumstances” test set 

forth by the United States Supreme Court in [Illinois v. 

]Gates[, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)], the task of an issuing authority 

is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, 

given all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before 

him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons 

supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that 

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 

place. . . . 

Id. at 655 (one citation omitted). 

Here, the affidavit of probable cause states that Appellant and his 

passenger gave inconsistent answers concerning where they were going; 

multiple cell phones were ringing in the vehicle; there was no luggage in the 

vehicle and all of the rear seats had been removed; and officers observed an 

aftermarket welded box on the undercarriage of the vehicle that did not 

match the remainder of the undercarriage. In my view, the Majority’s focus 

on the level of detail in the recitation of Corporal Hanlon’s training, 

knowledge, and experience misses the big picture, and reweighs the 

evidence before the suppression court. I would conclude that given the 

totality of these circumstances, as set forth in the affidavit, the suppression 
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court’s finding that probable cause existed that contraband or evidence of a 

crime would be found in the steel box welded to the underside of the van 

was supported by the record. See id. at 654-55.

Furthermore, I am constrained to disagree with the Majority’s 

argument that Corporal Hanlon was required to demonstrate a fact-specific 

nexus between his experience and probable cause for the search. Such 

analysis exceeds the scope of our review and attempts to re-weigh rather 

than review the suppression court’s determination. See Commonwealth v. 

Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 935 (Pa. 2009) (holding that a police officer’s 

experience may be regarded as a relevant factor, and reasoning that “[t]he 

very foundation of the Gates totality test is the recognition that all relevant 

factors go into the probable cause mix.”) (emphasis added); see also

Jones, supra at 654. In my opinion, the trial court properly denied the 

motion to suppress.

Therefore, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.