Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-30779

JAMES L. FAHRENHOLTZ, also known as Jimmy Fahrenholtz

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

JAY DARDENNE, In his official capacity as Louisiana Secretary of State and

Commissioner of Elections

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

 for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:08-CV-4098

Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In appealing the dismissal of his application for injunctive and declaratory

relief in an election-qualification dispute, James Fahrenholtz contests the

district court’s res-judicata determination. That issue need not be decided,

because this action is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. AFFIRMED.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

July 27, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-30779

2

I.

In July 2008, Fahrenholtz filed to be a candidate in that year’s election for

the United States House of Representatives. His candidacy was challenged in

state district court. That action contended Fahrenholtz was ineligible because

he had falsely certified his eligibility under the Louisiana Campaign Finance

Disclosure Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1481 (2004), et seq. Also named as a

defendant was Jay Dardenne, Louisiana’s Secretary of State and the appellee in

the action at hand. 

Louisiana election law requires a candidate to certify, inter alia, that “he

does not owe any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties pursuant to the Campaign

Finance Disclosure Act”. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:463(A)(2)(a)(v) (2004).

Although Fahrenholtz signed a certification to this effect, he owed approximately

$15,000 in fines and fees. As a result, the state district court held Fahrenholtz

was disqualified from running in the 2008 election. 

The Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed. Williams v. Fahrenholtz, 990 So.

2d 99 (La. Ct. App. 2008). That court declined to consider Fahrenholtz’

constitutional challenge to the state district court’s interpretation of the statute,

ruling it had not been properly raised under Louisiana procedural law. Id. at

102 n.1. 

The Supreme Court of Louisiana denied Fahrenholtz’ application for a writ

of certiorari. Williams v. Fahrenholtz, 986 So. 2d 671 (La. 2008). As a result of

these proceedings, Secretary Dardenne removed Fahrenholtz’ name from the

ballot. 

In August 2008, in federal district court, Fahrenholtz filed an Application

for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary and Permanent Injunction. He

contended the state-court decisions, and the subsequent removal of his name,

violated the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution by adding

additional eligibility requirements for federal-office candidates. Fahrenholtz
No. 08-30779

3

requested that Secretary Dardenne be barred from removing Fahrenholtz’ name

from the ballot. Fahrenholtz also sought a declaration that the relevant

certification requirements do not apply to candidates for the United States

House of Representatives. 

In opposition, Secretary Dardenne asserted, inter alia, that the issue of the

constitutionality of the requirements was barred by res judicata. The district

court agreed and dismissed with prejudice. 

II.

Fahrenholtz challenges the res-judicata determination. Secretary

Dardenne counters both that the district court correctly concluded the action was

barred by res judicata; and, alternatively, that it is barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine. The res-judicata issue need not be decided, because the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this action. 

A.

A res-judicata ruling is reviewed de novo. E.g., Test Masters Educ. Servs.,

Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2005). “In deciding the preclusive

effect of a state court judgment in federal court, we are guided by the full faith

and credit statute, [28 U.S.C. § 1738] . . . . Accordingly, we must look to the state

that rendered the judgment to determine whether the courts of that state would

afford the judgment preclusive effect.” In re Gober, 100 F.3d 1195, 1201 (5th Cir.

1996). Because a Louisiana state court rendered the judgment, which Secretary

Dardenne urges as being res judicata, Louisiana substantive law controls this

analysis. 

Louisiana law bars relitigation both of issues raised in a prior action or

those that could have been raised. Mandalay Oil & Gas, L.L.C. v. Energy Dev.

Corp., 867 So. 2d 709, 713 (La. Ct. App. 2002). “To maintain a plea of res

judicata, the formula derived in Louisiana jurisprudence states there must be

identity in the two suits as to the thing demanded, the demand must be founded
No. 08-30779

4

on the same cause of action, and the demand must be between the same parties.”

Watson v. Amite Milling Co., 504 So. 2d 1149, 1152 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 

At least two Louisiana Courts of Appeal have held that, “where the

plaintiff and defendant in the present action were codefendants in a prior action

filed by another plaintiff, the parties were not identical as required for an

exception of res judicata to apply”. Fitch v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc., 608 So. 2d

286, 289 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Amerson v. La. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 570

So. 2d 51, 54 (La. Ct. App. 1990)). Because Secretary Dardenne and Fahrenholtz

were codefendants in the state-court action, but are opposing parties in this

action, Louisiana’s doctrine of res judicata appears inapplicable. 

B. 

 As noted, we need not determine whether res judicata applies, however,

because this action is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This

doctrine–developed in two Supreme Court decisions, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,

263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

U.S. 462 (1983)–provides: “lower federal courts lack the power to modify or

reverse state court judgments because 28 U.S.C. § 1257 vests exclusive

jurisdiction to review or modify a state court judgment in the Supreme Court”.

LAC Real Estate Holdings, L.L.C. v. Biloxi Marsh Lands Corp., 2009 WL 937165,

at *2 (5th Cir. 8 Apr. 2009) (unpublished). Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine bars district courts from considering “cases brought by state-court losers

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the

district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and

rejection of those judgments”. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,

544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 

Fahrenholtz contends: “There was no constitutional violation until the

State Court made its decision”. Therefore, he falls squarely within the range of

cases Exxon places under the reach of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
No. 08-30779

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Fahrenholtz “filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended,

complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review

and rejection of that judgment”. Exxon, 544 U.S. at 291. Accordingly, the

district court could have dismissed this action under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. 

 As discussed, the Louisiana court applied its own procedural rules in

concluding Fahrenholtz had not properly raised his constitutional issue. (We,

of course, generally respect state-court procedural determinations. See, e.g.,

Glover v. Cain, 128 F.3d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 2007).) The Louisiana judgment,

therefore, does not address the constitutionality of applying a certification

requirement to federal-office candidates. Similarly, we express no opinion

regarding the constitutionality of these requirements. To the extent Fahrenholtz

may state a viable constitutional claim, it must be addressed in a future action,

not in this de facto appeal from a state-court judgment. Needless to say,

Fahrenholtz’ making that claim in a future action, if any, would not be barred

by res judicata.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.