Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 124 / Tuesday, June 28, 2011 / Notices 37799 

performance of the vessel mixing and 

transfer systems. 

WTP will perform the first Large Scale 

Integrated Tests (LSIT) at 4, 8 and 14- 

foot scale. The project has identified 

commercially available vessels to 

support this increment of testing. If test 

results indicate a larger scale test than 

the 14-foot vessel is beneficial, a 

decision point will be included in the 

implementation plan to determine the 

scope and benefit of testing at a larger 

scale. A full technical justification will 

be provided that will support our 

decision. 

• These tests must be conducted 

using appropriate waste simulants with 

properties that conservatively envelope 

the properties of the high-level wastes 

stored in Hanford’s tank farms. 

WTP has issued a charter and formed 

a panel of subject matter experts to 

review and advise on all aspects of 

large-scale mixing including the 

simulants to be used for LSIT that 

address the physical parameters of 

testing and represent known properties 

of tank waste. There are concerns with 

selection of simulants which include 

manufacture, use and disposal of large 

volumes of potentially very hazardous 

simulant materials that would require a 

significant waste disposal effort of its 

own; and potentially prohibitive cost for 

manufacture and disposal of simulants. 

It is understood these considerations 

represent tradeoffs, but the goal is to 

ultimately not undermine the 

representative accuracy of the simulants 

required for testing. 

• Testing must demonstrate that 

pulse-jet mixed vessels can be 

adequately operated using prototypic 

equipment (e.g., control systems) during 

multi-batch operations. 

DOE has approved an additional 

scope of work to release the contractor 

to initiate design, procurement and 

perform ‘‘informational testing’’ 

activities that will be the predecessor to 

the more formalized testing; conducted 

in accordance with NQA–1 

requirements, to support design 

confirmation. 

• The heel removal and cleanout 

systems must be designed and tested as 

early as practicable, the performance 

limits for these systems established, and 

the limits of their operation factored 

into the development of the WAC and 

the operating envelope of WTP. 

Components of large scale testing that 

will result in a better understanding of 

mixing characteristics such as bottom 

motion, zones of influence and partial 

particle separation will be performed 

early within the testing program to 

better define what is required for heel 

removal and cleanout system designs. 

The project then intends to test heel 

removal and cleanout very early in the 

testing phase and in every scale of LSIT 

in order to inform design decisions for 

process vessels. 

• The Board considers that DOE has 

rejected sub-Recommendation 3 

associated with the use of large scale 

tests to verify and validate 

computational fluid dynamic (CFD) 

models of full-scale WTP mixing 

systems * * * the Board believes that 

obtaining data from near full-scale tests 

is necessary to establish within a 

reasonable range of uncertainty, that the 

WTP’s CFD model is an accurate 

representation of the full scale mixing 

systems. 

DOE agrees that it is necessary that 

the CFD model adequately represent 

full-scale mixing systems, but has not 

yet concluded that data from future 

near-full-scale tests is necessary to 

complete model verification and 

validation (V&V). DOE is in the process 

of determining if existing data sets are 

sufficient to complete V&V 

requirements of the CFD model for 

pulse jet-mixed vessels in accordance 

with the ASME V&V 20–2009, Standard 

for Verification and Validation in 

Computational Fluid Dynamics and 

Heat Transfer. The DOE review is 

ongoing, including evaluation by subject 

matter experts from the National Energy 

Technology Laboratory. If necessary, 

additional data sets, that may include 

the upcoming near-full-scale tests, will 

be collected to support the V&V. 

• The Board also considers that DOE 

has rejected sub-recommendation 4 

associated with the capability of WTP 

and tank farms to obtain representative 

samples. The DNFSB also stated that: 

Testing must demonstrate that 

representative samples can be taken 

from waste feed delivery tanks to meet 

the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC), 

and from WTP process vessels to meet 

safety related operating requirements. 

WTP distinguishes between safety 

samples and process samples, and has 

plans to accomplish both in a manner 

that will result in meeting the WAC and 

conducting safe and reliable operations 

in WTP. The current control strategy for 

the Pretreatment Facility safety basis 

requires confirmatory samples for 

criticality safety and inventory control 

samples for the Low-Activity Waste 

Facility safety basis. The sampling 

portion of the control strategy for 

criticality safety is in revision based on 

previous mixing tests results, which 

concluded that the assumptions in the 

Criticality Safety Evaluation could not 

be sufficiently verified in pulse jet 

mixed vessels. The samples for LowActivity Waste Facility safety basis 

compliance can be obtained with the 

current sampling design. DOE will 

continue to work closely with the Board 

staff to establish a common definition of 

representative samples as applied to the 

discussion above. 

[FR Doc. 2011–16138 Filed 6–27–11; 8:45 am] 

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

DOE Final Decision in Response to 

Recommendation 2010–1 of the 

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board, Safety Analysis Requirements 

for Defining Adequate Protection for 

the Public and the Workers 

AGENCY: Department of Energy. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: On April 27, 2011, The 

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 

reaffirmed their Recommendation 2010– 

1, Safety Analysis Requirements for 

Defining Adequate Protection for the 

Public and the Workers, to the 

Department of Energy. In accordance 

with section 315(b) of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 

U.S.C. 2286d(d), the following 

represents the Secretary of Energy’s 

final decision on the recommendation 

and the reasoning for his decision. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, 

views, or arguments concerning the 

Secretary’s response to: Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana 

Avenue NW., Suite 700, Washington, 

DC 20004. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. 

Amanda Anderson, Nuclear Engineer, 

Departmental Representative to the 

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 

Office of Health, Safety and Security, 

U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 

Independence Avenue SW., 

Washington, DC 20585. 

Issued in Washington, DC on May 27, 

2011. 

Mari-Josette Campagnone, 

Departmental Representative to the Defense 

Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Office of 

Health, Safety and Security. 

Report on the Secretary of Energy’s Final 

Decision and Supporting Reasoning 

Regarding Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board (Board) Recommendation 2010–1, 

Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining 

Adequate Protection for the Public and the 

Workers 

SUMMARY: This report, together with its 

attachments, documents the Secretary of 

Energy’s final decision and supporting 

reasoning regarding Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB or Board) 

Recommendation 2010–1, Safety Analysis 

Requirements for Defining Adequate 

Protection for the Public and the Workers. 

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37800 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 124 / Tuesday, June 28, 2011 / Notices 

DISCUSSION: The Board issued 

Recommendation 2010–1 on October 29, 

2010. The Recommendation focused on the 

Department of Energy (DOE) requirements for 

developing and approving Documented 

Safety Analyses for nuclear facilities. The 

Recommendation identified six specific subrecommendations. 

As explained in detail in the Department’s 

February 28, 2011, response to the 

Recommendation (the text of which is 

included as Attachment 1 to this report), the 

Secretary of Energy agreed with the intent of 

the Recommendation, but took exception to 

some of the included technical details on 

how best to meet that intent. The Secretary 

of Energy’s response constituted a partial 

acceptance of the Recommendation. 

Per 42 United States Code (USC) Section 

2286d paragraph (d), when the Secretary of 

Energy does not fully accept a 

Recommendation, the Board must either 

reaffirm or revise the recommendation, and 

the Secretary of Energy must then: 

* * * consider the Board’s action and 

make a final decision on whether to 

implement all or part of the Board’s 

recommendations. Subject to subsection (h), 

the Secretary shall publish the final decision 

and the reasoning for such decision in the 

Federal Register and shall transmit to the 

Committees on Armed Services and on 

Appropriations of the Senate and to the 

Speaker of the House of Representatives a 

written report containing that decision and 

reasoning. 

The Board reaffirmed the Recommendation 

in a letter to the Secretary of Energy on April 

27, 2011. In the letter, the Board provided 

clarifications regarding the purposes for each 

sub-recommendation and stated that there 

was flexibility in the manner in which the 

sub-recommendations were intended to be 

implemented by the Department. The 

Secretary of Energy agreed that the 

clarifications provided by the Board will 

allow the Department to develop an 

Implementation Plan that satisfies DOE’s and 

the Board’s mutual objectives of ensuring 

that DOE requirements are clear and ensure 

adequate protection of the public, workers, 

and the environment. For example, the Board 

clarified that use of the term structures, 

systems, and components (SSCs) controls is 

inclusive of administrative controls. Further, 

the Board clarified that the recommendation 

did not require that the Department use 

quantitative risk assessment to make 

determinations of what constitutes adequate 

protection for the public. 

In a letter dated May 27, 2011, the 

Secretary of Energy reaffirmed his February 

28, 2011, response as his final decision (the 

text of which is included as Attachment 2 to 

this report). DOE agrees with the critical 

importance of the use of the 25 rem 

evaluation guideline in determining safety 

controls that provide adequate protection of 

the public. DOE has appropriately applied 

this approach in the safety analyses for the 

overwhelming majority of its nuclear 

facilities. For the few existing facilities where 

existing safety controls could not mitigate the 

dose below the 25 rem guideline in some 

accident scenarios, DOE has implemented 

necessary compensatory measures and will 

continue to strengthen both those and take 

any additional measures necessary to provide 

adequate public protection. Further, the 

Secretary of Energy confirmed continuation 

of the policy that the 25 rem evaluation 

guideline will be met for all new facilities. 

DOE believes its existing nuclear safety 

regulatory framework, utilizing the DOE 

Standard 3009, Preparation Guide for U.S. 

Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear 

Facility Documented Safety Analyses, as a 

safe harbor methodology, can continue to be 

used to effectively implement the 10 CFR 830 

safety basis requirements. DOE has 

committed to and is in the process of revising 

Standard 3009 and its associated safety 

analysis review Standard (DOE Standard 

1104, Review and Approval of Nuclear 

Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis 

Documents) to ensure the Standards clearly 

describe how the 25 rem evaluation guideline 

is to be applied for designating safety 

controls and the process that will be followed 

when mitigated dose cannot be reduced to 

less than the 25 rem evaluation guideline. 

DOE will strengthen its review criteria and 

approval process for situations where the 25 

rem evaluation guideline cannot be met for 

existing facilities, including designation of 

appropriate senior management levels of 

approval authority when the guideline is 

exceeded. DOE anticipates the review criteria 

to be deterministic criteria rather than 

criteria that would required a risk analysis. 

Attachment 1 

February 28, 2011 

The Honorable Peter S. Winokur, 

Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board, 

625 Indiana Avenue, NW Suite 700, 

Washington, DC 20004. 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

This is in response to your October 29, 

2010, letter which provided Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) 

Recommendation 2010–1, Safety Analysis 

Requirements for Defining Adequate 

Protection for the Public and the Workers. 

The Department of Energy (DOE) is 

strongly dedicated to the safety of the public, 

our workers, and the environment at all of 

our facilities. We share your conviction that 

a clear set of requirements and standards is 

vital for safe operations. In 2008, we began 

a comprehensive re-examination of our 

nuclear safety requirements to assure they 

were clear, concise, complete, and current. In 

March 2010, we enhanced our Directives 

Reform effort to better define and expedite it, 

and we have made good progress in revising 

key nuclear safety Directives and the DOE 

Nuclear Safety Policy. 

We have not changed our interpretation of 

requirements for developing and approving 

Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs). We 

have made significant nuclear safety 

improvements by upgrading facility safety 

bases and designs and by improving our 

safety standards and procedures. Much has 

been learned and will continue to be learned 

about improving safety. With your assistance, 

we have applied the lessons learned from 

industry incidents to upgrade our 

requirements. Our improving safety record 

reflects these lessons. 

Though DOE has an improving safety 

record, we always strive to do better. 

Complacency will not be tolerated. With this 

in mind, the Department has carefully 

evaluated Recommendation 2010–1 and how 

we can use it to improve nuclear safety at the 

Department. The Department partially 

accepts the Board’s Recommendation; a 

detailed explanation is provided below. We 

have clarified aspects of subrecommendation 1, 2, 3c, 4 and 5e. Several 

elements of Recommendation 2010–1 will be 

addressed in the revision of Standard 3009, 

Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of 

Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility 

Documented Safety Analyses. As we develop 

the Implementation Plan for 

Recommendation 2010–1, we will further 

engage the Board. 

Sub-recommendation 1—Immediately 

affirm the requirement that unmitigated, 

bounding-type accident scenarios will be 

used at DOE’s defense nuclear facilities to 

estimate dose consequences at the site 

boundary, and that a sufficient combination 

of SSCs must be designated safety class to 

prevent exposures at the site boundary from 

approaching 25 rem TEDE [Total Effective 

Dose Equivalent]. 

DOE Standard 3009 details DOE’s 

expectations for accident analyses to identify 

hazard controls for most DOE nuclear 

facilities. DOE agrees that Standard 3009 

specifies that the consequences of 

unmitigated accidents should to be compared 

to the 25 rem TEDE Evaluation Guideline to 

determine if safety class controls are 

warranted. As you know, new facilities 

follow the 25 rem TEDE limit as a siting 

criteria according to DOE Standard 1189, 

Integration of Safety into the Design Process. 

For existing facilities safety class Structures, 

Systems and Components (SSCs) are 

normally utilized to prevent exposures from 

exceeding 25 rem TEDE. Standard 3009 also 

includes provisions for use of other means 

and controls to assure safety where off-site 

exposures are not reduced to below 25 rem 

TEDE, or where SSCs are not available. The 

revised Standard 3009 will further clarify the 

use of the Evaluation Guideline in accident 

analyses for both new and existing facilities. 

Sub-recommendation 2—For those defense 

nuclear facilities that have not implemented 

compensatory measures sufficient to reduce 

exposures at the site boundary below 25 rem 

TEDE, direct the responsible program 

secretarial officer to develop a formal plan to 

meet this requirement within a reasonable 

timeframe. 

DOE’s responsible Program Secretarial 

Officer has evaluated the safety measures 

planned or currently in place to protect the 

public at the few remaining defense nuclear 

facilities that have potential accident doses 

above the 25 rem TEDE, and has determined 

that these measures provide adequate 

protection. This conclusion is based on an 

evaluation of all protective measures in place 

at these facilities, including disciplined 

formal operations, training, safety 

management programs, control of materials, 

and layers of controls to prevent accidents 

and/or mitigate their consequences. 

Consistent with DOE’s commitment to 

continuous safety improvement, we will 

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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 124 / Tuesday, June 28, 2011 / Notices 37801 

continue to evaluate options for enhancing 

the safety of these facilities. In some cases, 

such as the Plutonium Facility (PF–4) at Los 

Alamos National Laboratory, DOE anticipates 

that several near-term planned improvements 

will reduce the bounding mitigated dose to 

below 25 rem TEDE. Additionally, we have 

already made substantial progress in 

reducing the projected offsite dose that could 

result from specific types of accidents. For 

many limited life facilities we will achieve 

permanent, long-term risk reduction through 

deactivation and decommissioning. Once we 

revise DOE Standard 3009, DOE will evaluate 

the documented safety analyses for all 

facilities as part of the required periodic 

update process. The Implementation Plan 

will describe the steps that will be taken to 

evaluate safety improvement options for 

those facilities determined to need such 

improvements. 

Sub-recommendation 3—Revise DOE 

Standard 3009–94 to identify clearly and 

unambiguously the requirements that must 

be met to demonstrate that an adequate level 

of protection for the public and workers is 

provided through a DSA. This should be 

accomplished, at a minimum, by: (followed 

by four paragraphs labeled a–d). 

DOE is revising DOE Standard 3009 to 

clearly indicate which of its provisions are 

mandatory. DOE will implement the specific 

steps identified in paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) 

of this sub-recommendation. However, DOE 

will not commit to implementing paragraph 

(c) as written, because doing so would 

predetermine a specific outcome to the 

current revision process without any 

technical basis. This would be contrary to 

DOE’s standards development process. DOE 

will consider the advice provided in 

paragraph (c) (i.e., identification of the 

criteria that must be met for safety class 

Systems, Structures and Components (SSCs)), 

during the Standard 3009 revision process. 

The Implementation Plan will outline the 

development process and how the steps 

identified in all the paragraphs in this subrecommendation will be followed. 

Sub-recommendation 4—Amend 10 CFR 

Part 830 by incorporating the revised version 

of DOE Standard 3009–94 into the text as a 

requirement, instead of as a safe harbor cited 

in Table 2. 

The purpose of a ‘‘safe-harbor’’ is to 

provide a standard methodology that, if 

followed, will provide credible analyses and 

adequate safety. Nothing in the concept 

implies that ‘‘safe-harbor’’ methodologies are 

the only way to meet requirements. Of 

course, alternative approaches must be 

approved by DOE, and the criteria for 

accepting these alternatives should be clearly 

defined. 

DOE is planning to review 10 CFR 830 

(issued in 2001), which identifies nuclear 

safety requirements, but we cannot commit to 

the exact language prescribed in the 

Recommendation-that is placing Standard 

3009 in the body of the rule. As a part of our 

review, we will update DOE Standard 3009, 

clearly identifying those provisions that are 

mandatory. When DOE Standard 3009 is not 

applied, appropriate means for reviewing and 

improving alternative methodologies will be 

established. This will assure implementation 

of DOE Standard 3009, where appropriate, 

while maintaining the flexibility to improve 

the standard, as needed. This approach has 

allowed DOE to make several important 

improvements to DOE Standards in the past. 

Details of the revision process will be 

provided in the Implementation Plan. 

Sub-recommendation 5—Formally 

establish the minimum criteria and 

requirements that govern Federal approval of 

the DSA, by revision of DOE Standard 1104– 

2009, and other appropriate documents. The 

criteria and requirements should include: 

(followed by five paragraphs labeled a–e). 

DOE agrees with the need for clear 

guidelines and requirements on the 

appropriate delegation of nuclear safety 

authorities and will revise DOE Standard 

1104–2009 and other appropriate DOE 

documents to achieve this. DOE will 

implement the specific steps identified in 

paragraphs (a) through (d) of this subrecommendation. However, DOE cannot 

commit to implementing paragraph (e) as 

written, because it implies that quantitative 

risk-based decision making must be 

established and used. The Department is 

exploring how quantitative methods could be 

applied to support decision-making on safety 

issues at our sites and will keep the Board 

apprised of developments in this area. Today, 

deterministic and qualitative means are used. 

The Department agrees that the decision to 

approve safety bases must rest on a 

documented conclusion. The conclusion 

should indicate that the safety basis provides 

a reasonable assurance that the facility can be 

operated safely, that the hazards have been 

adequately analyzed, and that the engineered 

and administrative controls provide adequate 

protection for the public, workers and the 

environment. The Implementation Plan will 

outline DOE’s revision to standard 3009 and 

the safety basis development process, will 

clarity the safety basis approval process, and 

identify how the steps in this subrecommendation will be addressed. 

Sub-recommendation 6—Formally identify 

the responsible organization and identify the 

processes for performing independent 

oversight to ensure the responsibilities 

identified in Item 5 above are fully 

implemented. 

DOE has already identified the responsible 

organization for performing independent 

oversight for the Secretary: the Office of 

Independent Oversight, within the Office of 

Health, Safety and Security (HSS). However, 

HSS Independent Oversight protocols and 

delegation processes will be reviewed and 

modified as necessary to assure adequate 

oversight of nuclear safety delegations. The 

Implementation Plan will describe the steps 

DOE will take review and update the 

protocols and delegation processes. 

We appreciate your advice and will 

continue working closely with the Board to 

improve the Department’s Directives in a 

manner that meets our shared objectives to 

the safe, effective, and efficient execution of 

our mission. We look forward to working 

further with the Board and its staff as we 

prepare the Implementation Plan. 

If you have any further questions please 

contact Glenn Podonsky, Chief, Office of 

Health, Safety and Security, at 202–287– 

6071. 

Sincerely, 

Steven Chu. 

Attachment 2 

May 27, 2011 

The Honorable Peter S. Winokur, 

Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board, 

625 Indiana Avenue, NW Suite 700, 

Washington, DC 20004. 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Thank you for the clarification provided in 

the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board’s 

letter dated April 27, 2011, reaffirming 

Recommendation 2010–1, Safety Analysis 

Requirements for Defining Adequate 

Protection for the Public and the Workers. As 

described in our initial response, dated, 

February 28, 2011, we had largely agreed 

with the intent of your Recommendation, but 

had disagreed on some of its technical 

details. Your letter addressed those details, 

and indicated that you intended for there to 

be flexibility in implementing them. 

Since last February, our staffs have worked 

closely to ensure that we understood the 

original intent of Recommendation 2010–1, 

as well as the underlying safety 

improvements that were sought. Valuing the 

significance of this recommendation, and the 

importance I place upon having an effective 

working relationship with your office, I have 

also directed that Deputy Secretary Dan 

Poneman and Associate Deputy Secretary 

Mel Williams maintain an active engagement 

with the Board members to facilitate effective 

communications between our organizations 

on all safety matters. The clarifications you 

provided in your reaffirmation letter have 

furthered that dialogue, and will help guide 

our work to develop an Implementation Plan 

that satisfies our mutual objectives of 

ensuring that our requirements are clear, 

ensure adequate protection of the public, 

workers and the environment, and can be 

implemented as written. 

We are well on our way to making some 

of the improvements that our staffs have 

discussed. I deeply appreciate the efforts 

both the DNFSB and DOE have made in 

working together, especially in the past 

month. While the analysis and conclusions 

in my enclosed letter dated February 28, 

2011, still hold and constitute my final 

decision, I believe our implementation plan 

will meet the underlying safety improvement 

objectives of your Recommendation. I have 

assigned Dr. James B. O’Brien, Acting 

Director, Office of Nuclear Safety, within the 

Office of Health, Safety and Security, to be 

the Department’s responsible manager for 

developing the Implementation Plan. Dr. 

O’Brien can be reached at (301) 903–3331. 

Sincerely, 

Steven Chu. 

Attachment 2 

[FR Doc. 2011–16141 Filed 6–27–11; 8:45 am] 

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