IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Falls Township, :

Appellant :

: No. 503 C.D. 2023

 v. : SUBMITTED: April 11, 2024

:

Police Association of Falls Township :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER FILED: May 10, 2024

Falls Township appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas 

of Bucks County denying the Township’s petition to vacate arbitration award and 

affirming the grievance arbitration award rendered pursuant to the Policemen and 

Firemen Collective Bargaining Act (Act 111).1 In the award, the arbitrator 

determined that the Township’s discharge of Grievant, Stephanie Metterle, was not 

supported by just cause and reduced the discharge to a 30-day suspension. We 

affirm.

As summarized from the Arbitrator’s award, the facts are as follows. 

Grievant worked as a police officer for the Township for approximately ten years 

until her October 20, 2020 discharge for an alleged second violation of Section 

103.175 of the Falls Township Police Department Code. The Code addresses 

1 Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 217.1-217.12.
2

Conduct Unbecoming an Officer in the form of “[r]epeated violations of Department 

Rules & Regulations and/or any other course of conduct indicating that a member 

has little or no regard for his/her responsibility as a member of the Police 

Department.” Jan. 5, 2022 Arb. Award at 1-31; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 14a44a. The Township’s impetus for the discharge was its determination that Grievant 

made false statements in her March 2019 complaint to the Pennsylvania Human 

Relations Commission (PHRC) by alleging that she had been a member of the multicounty Major Incident Response Team (MIRT) but had been removed in favor of a 

male officer.2 Past misconduct included a 30-day suspension in 2012 for an off-duty 

fight and a 10-day suspension in 2018 for falsifying records by submitting overtime 

slips listing herself as “off” while she was out testifying when, in fact, she was 

working a modified-duty day shift. Id. at 19-20; R.R. at 32a-33a.

Before the arbitrator, the parties stipulated to the following issue: 

“Whether the Township had just cause for the discharge of Grievant? If not, what 

shall the remedy be?” Id. at 2; R.R. at 15a. Following hearings held on July 21 and 

August 16, 2021, the arbitrator rendered the following award:

The discharge was not supported by just cause. The 

discharge is reduced to a thirty (30) day suspension. The 

Township is ordered to reinstate the Grievant to her former 

position; restore her seniority; and make her whole for any 

loss of wages (minus the 30-day suspension), benefits, and 

other emoluments of employment flowing from the 

2 Following the events of September 11, 2001, MIRT was formed to respond to emergencies 

as well as to provide coverage for large-scale events, natural disasters, terrorist threats, crowd/riot 

control, and dignitary protection. Jan. 5, 2022 Arb. Award at 3-4; R.R. at 16a-17a. Generally, 

MIRT includes Philadelphia, Bucks, Delaware, and Montgomery counties, with Chester County 

sometimes also being included. Id. at 3; R.R. at 16a. “The initial training for members, going 

back to 2003 or 2004, included and still includes five days of training, involving riot control, crowd 

control, formations and movements, personal protective equipment, hazardous materials and 

‘officer down’ training.” Id. at 7-8; R.R. at 20a-21a.
3

discharge. The Township is ordered to adjust the 

Grievant’s disciplinary records to reflect the altered 

discipline.

Id. at 31; R.R. at 44a.

On appeal, the trial court denied the Township’s petition to vacate 

arbitration award and affirmed the award. The Township’s appeal to this Court 

followed. When reviewing appeals from Act 111 grievance arbitration awards, our 

Supreme Court has held that “[t]he narrow certiorari scope of review limits a 

reviewing court to questions regarding: (1) the jurisdiction of the arbitrators; (2) the 

regularity of the proceedings; (3) an excess of the arbitrator’s powers; and (4) 

deprivation of constitutional rights.” City of Phila. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge 

No. 5, 677 A.2d 1319, 1422 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) [quoting Pa. State Police v. Pa. 

State Troopers’ Ass’n (Betancourt), 656 A.2d 83, 85 (Pa. 1995)].

Before this Court, the Township argues that the arbitrator exceeded his 

authority by impermissibly requiring the Township to violate the clear mandates of 

its disciplinary code where the only available penalty thereunder should have been 

dismissal. In addition, the Township maintains that the arbitrator’s penalty reduction 

thereby lowering the agreed-upon standard of maintaining the highest moral 

compass of policing violated (1) Article 30 of the parties’ collective bargaining 

agreement (CBA), prohibiting unilateral reform of the CBA; and (2) Article 2, 

Section 2 of the CBA, the parties’ agreement that “[t]he Department of Police and 

the individual members of [Police Association of Falls Township] PAFT . . . are to 

be governed by the highest standards of honor, integrity and dedication in all their 

public and personal conduct in order that the Department . . . and the individual 

members of PAFT may merit the respect and confidence of the general public it 
4

serves.” Art. 2, Sec. 2 of the CBA between the Township and PAFT, Jan. 1, 2013-

Dec. 31, 2017 at 2; Original Record (O.R.) at 23.3

The Township’s position is without merit. As this Court has 

acknowledged: “[T]he arbitration process allows arbitrators to modify disciplinary 

penalties and fashion appropriate awards based on the specific facts of a given 

case.” In re Melamed, 287 A.3d 491, 500-01 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) (emphasis in 

original) [quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. Allegheny Cnty. Prison Emps. Indep. Union, 

244 A3d 873, 882 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020)]. Notably, the parties in the present case 

stipulated that the issue before the arbitrator included the appropriate remedy. Jan. 

5, 2022 Arb. Award at 2; R.R. at 15a. In addition, mindful that the arbitrator 

considered Article 2 of the CBA,4 his determination that Grievant’s statements in 

her PHRC complaint were false did not dictate that he find just cause for the 

discharge.

In addressing the specific facts of the present case, the arbitrator 

considered the effect of management fault on an arbitrator’s ability to reduce 

discipline. See id. at 31; R.R. at 44a. In so doing, he painstakingly outlined the 

witnesses’ testimony and his respective credibility determinations. As an initial 

matter, he noted the parties’ agreement that a MIRT detail was assigned to the 2018 

Philadelphia Eagles Super Bowl Parade. Id. at 4; R.R. at 17a. Upon Grievant’s 

learning that three Township police officers had been sent to Philadelphia as part of 

a MIRT detail and that she was more senior than one of them, Grievant asserted that 

she should have been given the opportunity to work the parade detail and submitted 

a request for the overtime that would have been due had she done so. Id. 

3 Because the original record was filed electronically and not paginated, the original record 

page number references the electronic pagination.

4

See Jan. 5, 2022 Arb. Award at 31; R.R. at 44a.
5

Notwithstanding the fact that Chief Wilcox tasked then-Lieutenant Whitney, now 

Chief Whitney, to determine whether Grievant was a member of MIRT and, 

therefore, entitled to overtime, Lieutenant Pletnick processed the overtime slip 

signed by Sergeant Belinsky and Grievant received the requested overtime payment 

before Whitney concluded his investigation. Id. at 6; R.R. at 19a. “Pletnick 

indicated that, since Belinsky had signed it, ‘that was good enough for him.’”5 Id. 

Ultimately, the Township concluded that Grievant had never been a member of 

MIRT. See id. at 4-7; R.R. at 17a-20a.

Given Whitney’s experience with Grievant, Whitney decided to clarify 

which officers were in MIRT and the requirements for an officer to be included. Id. 

at 6; R.R. at 19a. After discussions with Lieutenant Pennington, the assistant team 

commander for the Bucks County MIRT, Whitney was left with the impression that 

MIRT team operations were much more relaxed than special weapons and tactics 

(SWAT) team operations. Consequently, Whitney sent out an April 10, 2018 

memorandum listing active members of MIRT and advising all other officers that 

they were ineligible for MIRT activities. In part, the memo provided: “If you are 

not on this list, you are not part of MIRT and not eligible for any MIRT activities . . 

. . If you were formally [sic] on MIRT, please turn in all of your MIRT equipment 

to [Lieutenant] Ward.” Id. at 14-15; R.R. at 27a-28a. Because Grievant was not on 

the list that Pennington provided to Whitney, she was not on the list of active 

members. Id. at 6-7; R.R. at 19a-20a. “Pennington acknowledged on cross that the 

MIRT leadership relies upon the individual departments to notify MIRT of changes 

in membership status.” Id. at 9; R.R. at 22a.

5

Indeed, “[t]he request was approved by three supervisors, including Corporal Pinto, Sergeant 

Belinsky (who actually signed the slip before an investigation was undertaken), and Lieutenant 

Plotkin.” Id. at 29; R.R. at 42a.
6

Upon receiving the April 2018 memorandum listing active MIRT 

members, Grievant expressed surprise that she nonetheless had been paid overtime 

for the Eagles Parade. She emailed Whitney and asked whether she was being 

removed from MIRT. He advised her to talk to Ward if she wanted to be on MIRT. 

Grievant “testified that she did not contact [] Ward because, in a conversation with 

Whitney, he advised her that it might be better if she concentrated on her accident 

reconstruction duties and her good work with traffic tickets and arrest on patrol.” Id. 

at 18; R.R. at 31a. Grievant acknowledged that Whitney advised her that, from what 

he had learned, Grievant had never been on MIRT. Id.

In March 2019, Grievant filed a complaint with PHRC. Pertinent here, 

she alleged in paragraph 12 that she was removed from MIRT in February 2018 and 

replaced by a male member of the team. In addition, she alleged that Whitney 

“informed her that she had never been on MIRT despite the fact that she had 

previously undergone MIRT training and had worked on MIRT details.” Id. As 

noted, the Township discharged Grievant in October 2020 for making false 

statements in her PHRC complaint pertaining to MIRT.

After rendering credibility determinations and weighing the relevant 

evidence of record, the arbitrator concluded that Grievant knew the falsity of her 

assertions that she was removed from MIRT and replaced with a male member. Id. 

at 30; R.R. at 43a. In support, the arbitrator noted the fact that Grievant was never 

advised that she was on MIRT, never engaged in the five days of core training 

required of new team members, never received equipment or a MIRT identifier, and 

never registered as part of the Everbridge Notification System used as a 

communication system for the team. Id. at 27-28; R.R. at 40a-41a. The arbitrator 

emphasized Grievant’s inability to return a MIRT uniform and/or equipment. In that 
7

regard, Whitney testified that the easiest way to prove whether Grievant was on 

MIRT was to have her produce the uniform. Id. at 5; R.R. at 18a. Soon after 

Whitney made the request, he ran into Grievant outside the MIRT equipment closet 

at which time she claimed to have lost the uniform. Id. Rejecting Grievant’s 

testimony, the arbitrator found: “I don’t believe that [Grievant] ever had the 

uniform, and thus could not have lost it[; T]he conversation between [Grievant] and 

Whitney that day convinces me that [she] really knew she was not on the MIRT 

team.” Id. at 29; R.R. at 42a.

In reducing the discharge to a 30-day suspension, the arbitrator 

reasoned:

Based upon my findings, [Grievant] breached the 

high standards in place through the misconduct found 

here. The Township urges that, as this is a second 

violation of Section 103.175, the disciplinary scale calls 

for discharge. In this just cause analysis, however, 

management was at fault too for not fully addressing the 

issues at the time then-Lieutenant Whitney investigated 

the MIRT overtime request for the Eagles Parade overtime 

and, instead paying her for the overtime. As such, I find it 

appropriate to reduce the penalty from discharge to a 30-

day suspension.

Id. at 31; R.R. at 44a. Notably, Grievant “was never advised that this overtime 

payment was made in error.” Id. at 29; R.R. at 42a. Accordingly, we discern no 

issue with the arbitrator’s having considered the specific facts of the case and 

fashioning an appropriate award.

Next, the Township argues that the trial court erred in refusing to 

consider the Township’s public policy concerns. If this Court determines that the 

trial court so erred, the Township urges this Court to modify the narrow certiorari 

review to allow for consideration of such concerns and to reverse where an 
8

arbitrator’s award is contrary to public policy, fails the test for judgments 

notwithstanding the verdict employed by the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA),6 or 

fails the essence test employed in review of arbitration awards issued under the 

Public Employe Relations Act (PERA).7

We reject the Township’s position.8 As noted, our Supreme Court 

established the narrow certiorari review for courts to use when reviewing appeals 

from Act 111 grievance arbitration awards. Notably, the Supreme Court has rejected 

calls to expand the narrow certiorari review to include public policy concerns. The 

Supreme Court reasoned:

Broadening the narrow certiorari scope of review to 

include a provision which would allow the courts to 

interfere with an arbitrator’s award whenever that award 

could be deemed to be violative of “public policy” -

however that nebulous concept may be defined by a 

particular appellate court - would greatly expand the scope 

of review in these matters. If we were to adopt the State 

Police’s recommendation to include this ill-defined term 

6

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7301-7320. Section 7302(d)(2) of the UAA provides that “a court in reviewing 

an arbitration award pursuant to this subchapter shall . . . modify or correct an award where the 

award is contrary to law and is such that had it been a verdict of a jury the court would have entered 

a different judgment or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(d)(2).

7 Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101-1101.2301. For employees 

covered by PERA, grievance arbitration awards are reviewable under “the highly circumscribed 

‘essence test[.]’” City of Bradford v. Teamsters Loc. Union No. 110, 25 A.3d 408, 412 (Pa. 2011). 

Pursuant thereto, a reviewing court must first “decide whether the issue is encompassed by the 

CBA [at issue],” and “second, the court must uphold the arbitrator’s award if the arbitrator’s 

interpretation can rationally be derived from the CBA.” Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Millcreek 

Twp. Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 210 A.3d 993, 996 (Pa. 2019). The narrow public policy 

exception to the essence test prohibits enforcement of an arbitrator’s award that contravenes public 

policy. Neshaminy Sch. Dist. v. Neshaminy Fed’n of Teachers, 171 A.3d 334, 338 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2017).

8 As PAFT observes, the Township preserved an argument as to the applicability of the UAA 

but not PERA. PAFT’s Br. at 37 n.11.
9

within the narrow certiorari scope of review, we would 

markedly increase the judiciary’s role in Act 111 

arbitration awards. This would undercut the legislature’s

intent of preventing protracted litigation in this arena.

Pa. State Police v. Pa. State Troopers Ass’n, 741 A.2d 1248, 1252-53 (Pa. 1999).

Moreover, noting that we were bound by Supreme Court precedent, this 

Court in Borough of State College v. Borough of State College Police Association, 

303 A.3d 248, 259 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023), reiterated that “the standard of review for 

Act 111 cases does not encompass, and this Court cannot expand it to include, a 

public policy exception under the excess powers prong of narrow certiorari.”

Accordingly, we affirm.

 

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

President Judge Emerita
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Falls Township, :

Appellant :

: No. 503 C.D. 2023

 v. :

:

Police Association of Falls Township :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 10th day of May, 2024, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Bucks County is hereby AFFIRMED.

 

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

President Judge Emerita