II 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2073 

To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait 

accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 16, 2021 

Mr. HAWLEY (for himself, Mr. TILLIS, Mr. TUBERVILLE, Mr. DAINES, and 

Mr. CORNYN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces 

to deny a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of 

China against Taiwan. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Taiwan Defense Act 

5 of 2021’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

7 In this Act: 

8 (1) DENY.—The term ‘‘deny’’ means to use 

9 combined joint operations to delay, degrade, and ulVerDate Sep 11 2014 05:12 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2073.IS S2073

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1 timately defeat an attempt by the People’s Republic 

2 of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan, 

3 resulting in— 

4 (A) the termination of hostilities or at 

5 least the attempted fait accompli; or 

6 (B) the neutralization of the ability of the 

7 People’s Republic of China to execute a fait 

8 accompli against Taiwan. 

9 (2) FAIT ACCOMPLI.—The term ‘‘fait accompli’’ 

10 refers to the strategy of the People’s Republic of 

11 China for invading and seizing control of Taiwan be12 fore the United States Armed Forces can respond 

13 effectively, while simultaneously deterring an effec14 tive combined joint response by the United States 

15 Armed Forces by convincing the United States that 

16 mounting such a response would be prohibitively dif17 ficult or costly. 

18 SEC. 3. FINDINGS. 

19 Congress makes the following findings: 

20 (1) Taiwan is a beacon of democracy in Asia 

21 and a steadfast partner of the United States in the 

22 common pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific re23 gion in which— 

24 (A) all societies enjoy sovereign autonomy; 


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1 (B) the people of the region live securely, 

2 prosperously, and with dignity; and 

3 (C) the societies of the region rise and fall 

4 not by coercion but on the basis of peaceful 

5 competition. 

6 (2) If the People’s Republic of China were to 

7 use military force to compel the unification of Tai8 wan with the People’s Republic of China— 

9 (A) the world would lose one of the great 

10 exemplars of freedom and democracy; 

11 (B) the United States and allies and part12 ners of the United States would face severe dif13 ficulty in maintaining favorable balances of 

14 power relative to the People’s Republic of China 

15 in Northeast and Southeast Asia; and 

16 (C) as the balance of power in the Indo17 Pacific region shifted in favor of the People’s 

18 Republic of China, the People’s Republic of 

19 China would possess an increasing ability to— 

20 (i) impose its will throughout the 

21 Indo-Pacific region, including by threat22 ening or using force against Japan, South 

23 Korea, the Philippines, and other allies 

24 and partners of the United States; and 


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1 (ii) restrict United States access to 

2 key trade routes and markets in the Indo3 Pacific region, thereby imposing economic 

4 hardship on middle-class and working-class 

5 Americans and increasing the ability of the 

6 People’s Republic of China to intrude into 

7 political life in the United States. 

8 (3) There is growing concern that the Govern9 ment of the People’s Republic of China may con10 clude that the cross-Strait military balance has tilted 

11 in its favor and launch an invasion of Taiwan sooner 

12 than previously anticipated, including as follows: 

13 (A) Former Assistant to the President for 

14 National Security Affairs H.R. McMaster testi15 fied in March 2021 that Taiwan is ‘‘the most 

16 significant flashpoint now’’ between the United 

17 States and the People’s Republic of China. 

18 (B) Commander of United States Indo-Pa19 cific Command Admiral John Aquilino testified 

20 in March 2021 that the threat of an invasion 

21 by the People’s Republic of China of Taiwan is 

22 ‘‘much closer to us than most think’’ and could 

23 materialize well before 2035. 

24 (C) Former Commander of United States 

25 Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Phil Davidson 


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1 testified in March 2021 that the threat of an 

2 invasion by the People’s Republic of China of 

3 Taiwan ‘‘is manifest during this decade, in fact 

4 in the next six years’’. 

5 (4) Defense policymakers and analysts across 

6 multiple administrations have found that, if the Peo7 ple’s Republic of China does invade Taiwan, the in8 vasion will likely take the form of a fait accompli, 

9 including as follows: 

10 (A) The Defense Science Board assessed in 

11 June 2018 that the People’s Republic of China 

12 ‘‘will attempt to achieve a decisive outcome very 

13 quickly, presenting the United States and its al14 lies with a fait accompli,’’ in the event of con15 flict. 

16 (B) The Department of Defense Indo-Pa17 cific Strategy Report released in June 2019 

18 found that— 

19 (i) if the People’s Republic of China 

20 or another strategic competitor in the 

21 Indo-Pacific region decides ‘‘to advance 

22 their interests through force, they are like23 ly to enjoy a local military advantage at 

24 the onset of conflict. In a fait accompli sce25 nario, competitors would seek to employ 


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1 their capabilities quickly to achieve limited 

2 objectives and forestall a response from the 

3 United States, and its allies and partners’’; 

4 and 

5 (ii) an attempted fait accompli by the 

6 People’s Republic of China or another 

7 strategy competitor would constitute one of 

8 the ‘‘most stressing potential scenarios’’ 

9 facing the United States Armed Forces. 

10 (C) The Tri-Service Maritime Strategy re11 leased by the United States Navy, United 

12 States Marine Corps, and United States Coast 

13 Guard in December 2020 stated, ‘‘In the event 

14 of conflict, China . . . will likely attempt to 

15 seize territory before the United States and its 

16 allies can mount an effective response—leading 

17 to a fait accompli.’’. 

18 (D) The Army Multi-Domain Trans19 formation strategic guidance released by Army 

20 Chief of Staff General James McConville in 

21 March 2021 stated that China and other adver22 saries of the United States will seek to ‘‘seize 

23 their objectives quickly as a fait accompli,’’ if 

24 the Joint Force ‘‘cannot present credible deter25 rent options’’. 


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1 (E) Then-Acting Secretary of Defense Pat2 rick Shanahan testified in March 2019 that the 

3 Government of the People’s Republic of China 

4 is developing capabilities that could be used to 

5 ‘‘achieve a ‘fait accompli’ that would make re6 versing Chinese gains more difficult, militarily 

7 and politically’’. 

8 (F) Special Assistant to the Secretary of 

9 Defense for China Ely Ratner assessed in Jan10 uary 2020 that ‘‘China has made significant in11 vestments in long-range ISR and strike assets’’ 

12 and ‘‘China hopes the threat of these attacks 

13 will deter U.S. intervention by negating a sub14 stantial portion of U.S. airpower early in a con15 flict, thereby creating time and space for a fait 

16 accompli’’. 

17 (G) Former Under Secretary of Defense 

18 for Policy Miche`le Flournoy warned in June 

19 2020 that the Government of the People’s Re20 public of China may believe the United States 

21 ‘‘lack[s] the military capabilities that might be 

22 effective in the face of A2/AD’’ and ‘‘conclude 

23 that China should move on Taiwan sooner rath24 er than later, a fait accompli that a weakened 


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1 and distracted United States would have to ac2 cept’’. 

3 (5) There is broad agreement that the United 

4 States should maintain the ability of the United 

5 States Armed Forces to defeat a fait accompli by the 

6 People’s Republic of China, including as follows: 

7 (A) The National Defense Strategy Com8 mission assessed in November 2018 that com9 peting successfully in ‘‘the Indo-Pacific region, 

10 while also managing escalation dynamics, re11 quires positioning substantial capability forward 

12 . . . to deter and prevent a fait accompli by an 

13 agile, opportunistic adversary’’. 

14 (B) Then-Acting Secretary of Defense Pat15 rick Shanahan testified in March 2019 that im16 plementation of the 2018 National Defense 

17 Strategy was required to ensure the United 

18 States had ‘‘the capabilities, posture, and em19 ployment of forces’’ necessary to prevent a fait 

20 accompli by the People’s Republic of China. 

21 (C) Assistant to the President for National 

22 Security Affairs Jake Sullivan and Deputy As23 sistant to the President and Coordinator for 

24 Indo-Pacific Affairs on the National Security 

25 Council Kurt Campbell warned in September 


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1 2019 that ‘‘Beijing cannot be allowed to use the 

2 threat of force to pursue a fait accompli in ter3 ritorial disputes’’. 

4 (D) Former Under Secretary of Defense 

5 for Policy James Miller wrote in October 2020 

6 that ‘‘U.S. defense planners must maintain a 

7 laser focus on a scenario for which U.S. forces 

8 are ill-prepared today, in which China . . . 

9 see[s] the opportunity for a quick invasion of a 

10 U.S. partner or ally and attempt[s] to impose 

11 a fait accompli that would be costly and risky 

12 to reverse’’. 

13 (E) In January 2021, Secretary of Defense 

14 Lloyd Austin upheld the assessment by the 

15 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report that Department 

16 of Defense ‘‘initiatives on force employment, 

17 crisis response, force and concept development, 

18 and collaboration with allies and partners’’ 

19 should be ‘‘aimed to help address this critical 

20 challenge’’ of a potential fait accompli scenario 

21 involving the People’s Republic of China. 

22 (F) Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen 

23 Hicks testified in February 2021 that the Peo24 ple’s Republic of China is ‘‘less likely’’ to at25 tempt a fait accompli against Taiwan if it 


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1 knows that the United States will be able to de2 feat such an attempt, and that the United 

3 States should therefore maintain the ability to 

4 defeat a fait accompli by the People’s Republic 

5 of China against Taiwan. 

6 (G) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

7 Colin Kahl, Admiral Aquilino, and Admiral Da8 vidson testified in March 2021 that they agreed 

9 with the testimony by Deputy Secretary Hicks, 

10 and that the United States should maintain the 

11 ability to defeat a fait accompli by the People’s 

12 Republic of China against Taiwan in order to 

13 strengthen deterrence against such a contin14 gency. 

15 (H) Former Assistant to the President and 

16 Deputy National Security Advisor Matt 

17 Pottinger testified in June 2021 that ‘‘the De18 partment of Defense must ensure that it can 

19 deny China’s ability to forcibly subordinate Tai20 wan, including through a fait accompli at21 tempt,’’ and that ‘‘time is running short’’ to do 

22 so. 

23 (I) Secretary Austin testified in June 2021 

24 that the United States should maintain its abil25 ity to defeat a Chinese fait accompli against 


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1 Taiwan, including by maintaining a combat2 credible forward deterrent posture. 

3 (6) There is likewise broad agreement that a 

4 strategy of denial is essential to deter or defeat a 

5 fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China 

6 against Taiwan, including as follows: 

7 (A) The 2018 National Defense Strategy 

8 tasked the Department of Defense with pos9 turing and employing forces to ‘‘delay, degrade, 

10 or deny adversary aggression’’. 

11 (B) Secretary Austin argued in January 

12 2021 that a ‘‘combat-credible, forward deter13 rent posture is instrumental to the United 

14 States military’s ability to deter, and if nec15 essary, deny a fait accompli scenario’’. 

16 (C) Deputy Secretary Hicks, Under Sec17 retary Kahl, Admiral Aquilino, and Admiral 

18 Davidson reaffirmed the emphasis by Secretary 

19 Austin on denial and testified that a strategy of 

20 denial is essential for deterring Chinese aggres21 sion. 

22 (D) The Joint Operating Concept for De23 terrence Operations released in December 2017 

24 states that forward-deployed forces contribute 

25 to ‘‘denying benefits’’ and thereby reduce ‘‘the 


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1 likelihood of an adversary achieving strategic or 

2 tactical surprise, thus helping to prevent adver3 sary decision makers from concluding they 

4 might achieve a military fait accompli that 

5 could be extremely costly for the US to reverse 

6 by force’’. 

7 (E) The United States Army’s Multi-Do8 main Operations concept document released in 

9 December 2018 states that Army forces must 

10 demonstrate the capability ‘‘to immediately 

11 deny a fait accompli’’ in order to deter a near12 peer adversary. 

13 (F) The Marine Corps Force Design 2030 

14 report released in March 2020 states that for15 ward-deployed forces possess the capability to 

16 ‘‘attrite adversary forces, enable joint force ac17 cess requirements, complicate targeting and 

18 consume adversary ISR resources, and prevent 

19 fait accompli scenarios’’. 

20 (G) The Tri-Service Maritime Strategy di21 rects the United States Navy, United States 

22 Marine Corps, and United States Coast Guard 

23 to ‘‘deny adversaries their objectives, defeat ad24 versary forces while managing escalation, and 


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1 set the conditions for favorable conflict termi2 nation’’. 

3 (7) Under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 

4 3301 et seq.), it is the policy of the United States 

5 to consider any effort to determine the future of 

6 Taiwan by other than peaceful means to be of grave 

7 concern to the United States, and— 

8 (A) the Taiwan Relations Act further es9 tablishes it as the policy of the United States 

10 ‘‘to maintain the capacity of the United States 

11 to resist any resort to force or other forms of 

12 coercion that would jeopardize the security, or 

13 the social or economic system, of the people on 

14 Taiwan’’; 

15 (B) implementation of the Taiwan Rela16 tions Act therefore requires the United States 

17 to maintain the ability of the United States 

18 Armed Forces to defeat a fait accompli by the 

19 People’s Republic of China against Taiwan; 

20 (C) since 1979, the United States Govern21 ment has consistently upheld the commitments 

22 of the United States under the Taiwan Rela23 tions Act; 

24 (D) section 1260 of the William M. (Mac) 

25 Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act 


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1 for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283) re2 affirms that the Taiwan Relations Act and the 

3 Six Assurances are the cornerstones of United 

4 States relations with Taiwan; 

5 (E) the Department of State reaffirmed in 

6 January 2021 that ‘‘[t]he United States main7 tains its longstanding commitments as outlined 

8 in the Three Communiques, the Taiwan Rela9 tions Act, and the Six Assurances,’’ and that 

10 the commitment of the United States to Taiwan 

11 is ‘‘rock-solid’’; 

12 (F) a failure by the United States to con13 tinue to uphold all of its obligations under the 

14 Taiwan Relations Act, including by clearly 

15 maintaining the ability of the United States 

16 Armed Forces to defeat a fait accompli by the 

17 People’s Republic of China against Taiwan, 

18 could draw into question the willingness and 

19 ability of the United States to uphold analogous 

20 commitments elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific re21 gion; and 

22 (G) any such loss of credibility could jeop23 ardize the ability of the United States to forge 

24 and sustain the coalition of nations required to 

25 maintain a favorable balance of power against 


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1 the People’s Republic of China, thereby denying 

2 the hegemonic ambitions of the People’s Repub3 lic of China. 

4 SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

5 It is the sense of Congress that— 

6 (1) the ability of the United States to maintain 

7 a free and open Indo-Pacific region would be signifi8 cantly compromised if the People’s Republic of 

9 China were able to invade and seize control of Tai10 wan, with severe implications for the lives, liveli11 hoods, and freedoms of working Americans and the 

12 allies and partners of the United States in the Indo13 Pacific region; 

14 (2) the most effective way for the People’s Re15 public of China to seize control of Taiwan is by way 

16 of invasion, and an invasion of Taiwan by the Peo17 ple’s Republic of China is likely to take the form of 

18 a fait accompli; 

19 (3) implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act 

20 requires the United States to maintain the ability of 

21 the United States Armed Forces to defeat a fait 

22 accompli by the People’s Republic of China against 

23 Taiwan, and officials across multiple administrations 

24 have affirmed that— 


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1 (A) the United States should maintain the 

2 ability of the United States Armed Forces to 

3 defeat a fait accompli by the People’s Republic 

4 of China against Taiwan, and 

5 (B) a strategy of denial is the most effec6 tive option for deterring or defeating a fait 

7 accompli by the People’s Republic of China 

8 against Taiwan; 

9 (4) the Department of Defense has nonetheless 

10 struggled to consistently focus sufficient attention 

11 and resources on maintaining the ability to deny a 

12 fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China 

13 against Taiwan, and as a result— 

14 (A) the Government of the People’s Repub15 lic of China may believe that it can launch a 

16 successful fait accompli against Taiwan as soon 

17 as 2027; and 

18 (B) the governments of allies and partners 

19 of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region 

20 may question the will or ability of the United 

21 States to lead efforts to prevent the People’s 

22 Republic of China from dominating the Indo23 Pacific region; and 

24 (5) it should therefore be the policy of the 

25 United States to maintain the ability of the United 


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1 States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli by the 

2 People’s Republic of China against Taiwan in order 

3 to— 

4 (A) ensure the Department of Defense 

5 adequately prioritizes maintaining the ability to 

6 deny a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of 

7 China against Taiwan as it develops strategies 

8 and plans and designs, postures, and employs 

9 the United States Armed Forces; and 

10 (B) by doing so, clarify for the Govern11 ment of the People’s Republic of China and 

12 other governments in the Indo-Pacific region 

13 that the United States maintains and will con14 tinue to maintain the ability of the United 

15 States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli by 

16 the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan, 

17 as required by the Taiwan Relations Act and in 

18 order to strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pa19 cific region. 

20 SEC. 5. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

21 It shall be the policy of the United States to maintain 

22 the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a 

23 fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against 

24 Taiwan. 

Æ 


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