COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Willis and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

BRIAN TAYLOR, S/K/A 

 BRIAN KEITH TAYLOR 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 1920-96-1 BY JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES 

 JUNE 17, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

Robert B. Cromwell, Jr., Judge 

 Diane Fener (Office of the Public Defender, 

on brief), for appellant. 

 Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 In a bench trial, the trial judge convicted Brian Taylor 

(appellant) of violating Code § 53.1-203(2).1 Appellant argues 

on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

conviction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the 

conviction. 

 "On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Maynard v. Commonwealth, 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 1Code § 53.1-203(2) makes it unlawful for "a prisoner in a 

state, local or community correctional facility or in the custody 

of an employee thereof to . . . [w]illfully break, cut or damage 

any building, furniture, fixture or fastening of such facility or 

any part thereof for the purpose of escaping, aiding any other 

prisoner to escape therefrom or rendering such facility less 

secure as a place of confinement . . . ." 
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11 Va. App. 437, 439, 399 S.E.2d 635, 637 (1990) (en banc). 

 The sole witness at trial was Thomas Wirges, who was 

employed as a deputy at the City of Virginia Beach Sheriff's 

Department. Wirges testified that on December 6, 1995, he was 

working in "booking," and that appellant was an "inmate." 

Appellant was locked in Camera Cell 1-F1 in booking and secured 

in a Pro-Straint chair. 

 The Pro-Straint chair is a restraining device used for 

individuals who present such a danger to themselves or to others 

that they cannot be maintained in a regular cell. The 

Pro-Straint chair consists of a large chair with a straight back 

and belts to strap down the inmate's legs, thighs, and chest. 

Long nylon straps with D-ring closures are used to secure the 

hands and feet. Without the straps to restrain the hands and 

feet, the Pro-Straint chair is rendered useless. While in the 

Pro-Straint chair, an inmate is monitored by camera, and is 

checked periodically by medical personnel. 

 On the monitor, Wirges observed appellant squirming out of 

the restraints in the Pro-Straint chair. Wirges grabbed his key 

and went to the cell. As Wirges opened the cell door, he heard 

the commode flush. Appellant, standing near the commode, said he 

"flushed the . . . restraints" so that they would not be put on 

him again. Wirges discovered that the nylon straps were missing 

from the Pro-Straint chair, and he did not recover them. 

 To sustain appellant's conviction, the Commonwealth was 
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required to prove that at the time of the incident appellant was 

"a prisoner in a state, local or community correctional facility 

or in the custody of an employee thereof . . . ." Code 

§ 53.1-203. The phrase "prisoner in a . . . correctional 

facility" refers to the status of that person, and "is not 

dependent upon actual physical presence in such facility or 

otherwise restricted by a prisoner's location." Simmons v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 621, 623, 431 S.E.2d 335, 336 (1993). 

 Appellant was an "inmate" when Wirges came on duty in 

"booking" as a deputy with the Virginia Beach Sheriff's 

Department on the night of December 6, 1995. Appellant was being 

restrained in the Pro-Straint chair and Wirges was responsible 

for monitoring him. These facts were sufficient to prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt that appellant was a "prisoner in a . . . 

correctional facility."2

 Appellant contends that there was no proof that flushing the 

straps caused them damage. This argument ignores the fact that 

the Pro-Straint chair itself was damaged by the permanent removal 

of the nylon straps. In fact, the removal of the straps rendered 

the chair useless for its intended purpose of restraining 

particularly dangerous inmates. The chair was located in the 

 

 2In light of this conclusion, we need not consider 

appellant's argument regarding the failure of the indictment to 

charge that appellant was in the custody of a correctional 

facility employee. Moreover, this argument was not raised at 

trial and is barred by Rule 5A:18. See Jacques v. Commonwealth, 

12 Va. App. 591, 593, 405 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1991). 
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"booking" section of the Virginia Beach Sheriff's Department. 

Thus, the evidence sufficiently proved that appellant damaged 

furniture of a correctional facility. 

 Finally, the Commonwealth was required to show that by 

flushing the straps appellant intended to render the facility 

less secure as a place of confinement. "Intent is a subjective 

state of mind, and proof of it is ofttimes difficult. 

Frequently, it must be proved by circumstantial evidence alone. 

One may generally infer, however, that a person intends his 

deliberate acts." Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 277, 

282, 443 S.E.2d 419, 423 (1994) (citations omitted) (en banc), 

aff'd, 249 Va. 203, 454 S.E.2d 725 (1995). 

 Appellant was placed in the Pro-Straint chair because he had 

been determined to be a danger to himself or others. By removing 

the straps securing his hands and feet, appellant was able to get 

up from the chair and move about the cell. In this state, 

appellant was considerably less secure than while properly 

strapped into the Pro-Straint chair. In fact, appellant told 

Wirges that the reason he had flushed the straps was so they 

could not be placed on him again. These facts were sufficient to 

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant flushed the 

straps with the purpose of making the facility less secure as a 

place of confinement. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant's conviction. 

 Affirmed.