alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
II 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2268 

To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to identify each alien who 

is serving, or has served, in the Armed Forces of the United States 

on the application of any such alien for an immigration benefit or 

the placement of any such alien in an immigration enforcement proceeding, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 24, 2021 

Ms. DUCKWORTH (for herself, Ms. CORTEZ MASTO, Mr. BLUMENTHAL, Mr. 

DURBIN, Ms. ROSEN, Mr. WYDEN, and Ms. HIRONO) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the 

Judiciary 

A BILL 

To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to identify 

each alien who is serving, or has served, in the Armed 

Forces of the United States on the application of any 

such alien for an immigration benefit or the placement 

of any such alien in an immigration enforcement proceeding, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Immigrant Veterans 

5 Eligibility Tracking System Act’’ or the ‘‘I–VETS Act’’. 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2268 IS

1 SEC. 2. IDENTIFYING ALIENS CONNECTED TO THE ARMED 

2 FORCES. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Upon the application by an alien 

4 for an immigration benefit or the placement of an alien 

5 in an immigration enforcement proceeding, the Secretary 

6 of Homeland Security shall— 

7 (1) determine whether the alien is serving, or 

8 has served, as a member of— 

9 (A) a regular or reserve component of the 

10 Armed Forces of the United States on active 

11 duty; or 

12 (B) a reserve component of the Armed 

13 Forces in an active status; and 

14 (2) with respect to the immigration and natu15 ralization records of the Department of Homeland 

16 Security relating to an alien who is serving, or has 

17 served, as a member of the Armed Forces described 

18 in paragraph (1), annotate such records— 

19 (A) to reflect that membership; and 

20 (B) to afford an opportunity to track the 

21 outcomes for each such alien. 

22 (b) PROHIBITION ON USE OF INFORMATION FOR RE23 MOVAL.—Information gathered under subsection (a) may 

24 not be used for the purpose of removing an alien from 

25 the United States. 

Æ 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with BILLS
EXHIBIT
32.1




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,




AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Wind Energy America Inc. (the “Company”)
on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2008 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Robert O. Knutson,
Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.









Date:
            November
      14, 2008
            
            By:
            /s/
      Robert O. KnutsonRobert
      O. KnutsonPrincipal
      Executive Officer and PrincipalFinancial
      OfficerWind
      Energy America, Inc.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-7708
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus AUSTEN O. NWANZE, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior District Judge. (CR-92-4) Submitted: August 28, 1997 Decided: September 19, 1997 Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Austen O. Nwanze, Appellant Pro Se. Nicholas Stephan Altimari, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals the district court's order denying his Fed.R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. Nwanze , No. CR-92-4 (E.D. Va. Oct. 2, 1996). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM (A) THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AND THE CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH (B) FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-26-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             DEC-28-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-28-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           4,038
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   95,442
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (761)
<INVENTORY>                                     54,415
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               187,252
<PP&E>                                         355,885
<DEPRECIATION>                               (119,679)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 526,473
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          105,598
<BONDS>                                        178,731
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           99,337
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        27,102
<OTHER-SE>                                      76,800
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   526,473
<SALES>                                        215,082
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               215,759
<CGS>                                          178,968
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  178,968
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                43,271
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   181
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,667
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (9,328)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (3,703)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (5,625)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (5,625)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.22)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.22)
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> USD

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                          26,095
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   82,327
<ALLOWANCES>                                     6,677
<INVENTORY>                                    121,250
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               238,327
<PP&E>                                         179,722
<DEPRECIATION>                                 106,450
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 339,741
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          222,878
<BONDS>                                        108,243
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           162
<OTHER-SE>                                       (134)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   339,741
<SALES>                                         77,180
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                97,319
<CGS>                                           54,184
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   66,617
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                42,113
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 1,157
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,292
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (15,009)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,692
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (16,701)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (16,701)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (1.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.03)


</TABLE>
#### Benedict vs. Westover.

Libel: *publication.*

An averment, in libel, that the defendant “ composed, *uttered,*wrote and sent to R. Dunn & Company, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (a commercial agency)/’ certain words concerning the plaintiff, sufficiently avers *publication*of the words.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for *Waulcesha*County.

Action for libel. Tlie complaint avers that, at the time of the alleged libel, plaintiff was in business as a hardware merchant in Oconomowoc, in this state, and was of good name, credit, etc., in said business; that, on etc., defendant “ maliciously composed, uttered, wrote and sent to R. Dunn & Company, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (a commercial agency), of and concerning the credit and standing of this plaintiff, a certain article in writing,” which is recited at length, and alleged to be false and defamatory. Special damages are then averred.

Defendant demurred to the complaint as not stating a cause of action; and appealed from an order overruling his demurrer.

The cause was submitted on the brief of *J. Henry West-over*for the appellant, and that of *Edwin Ettrlbut*for the respondent.

OetoN, J.

The only points made upon the demurrer by the appellant are, that the words “ composed, *vtttered,*wrote and *sent*” do not sufficiently allege a publication of the libelous letter, and the statement, “ sent to N. Dunn & Company, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (a commercial agency),” is no allegation that the letter was sent to *a,ny person.*The word “ utter,” according to Bouvier, means, 1. To “offer;” 2. To *“*publish;” and according to Webster, it is used in the sense of “ publishing,” and “ putting in circulation.” It is not the technical word commonly and more properly used in pleading, in cases *405of libel; but is equivalent in meaning, and certain in common intendment to express tbe fact of publication. The word “ sent ” gives force to the allegation, and puts it beyond question as a sufficient statement of publication.

The other objection is simply frivolous.

*By the Court.*— The order of the circuit court is affirmed, with costs.
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1657

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Deborah Theeler

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Sioux City

____________

 Submitted: February 29, 2016

Filed: March 8, 2016

[Unpublished]

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, MELLOY and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Deborah Theeler appeals the denial of her motion to reduce her sentence in

accordance with Amendment 782 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the

retroactive “drugs minus two” amendment. 
In 2007, Theeler pleaded guilty to one count of Conspiracy to Distribute 500

grams of Methamphetamine or 50 grams of Actual Methamphetamine. Her advisory

Guidelines sentencing range was 360 months to life and her statutory minimum

sentence was 240 months. The government moved for a below-Guidelines-range

sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, but did not move pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(e) to permit a sentence below the statutory minimum. The district court

1

imposed the statutory minimum sentence of 240 months. 

On December 31, 2014, Theeler filed a pro se motion for a reduction to her

sentence seeking the benefit of Amendment 782 which would have resulted in an

advisory Guidelines sentencing range of 292 to 365 months. The originalsentencing

judge addressed the motion and determined that, because Theeler had received a

statutory minimum sentence, a reduction was not authorized by statute.

A court may, in some circumstances, reduce a defendant’s sentence if the

Guidelines range upon which the sentence was based is subsequently amended and

if a reduction is “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the

Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Guideline amendments, however,

do not suspend otherwise applicable statutory minimums, and “[w]ithout a

government motion, the district court is without authority to impose a sentence below

a statutory mandatory minimum sentence.” United States v. Holbdy, 489 F.3d 910,

912 (8th Cir. 2007). Here, the parties agree that the government originally moved

only pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, and not pursuant to § 3553(e). The district court

was and remains without authority to sentence Theeler below 240 months. Cf. United

States v. Peters, 524 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (reduction pursuant

to Amendment 706 unavailable where initial sentence was the statutory minimum).

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for the

1

Northern District of Iowa.

-2-
#### The Board of Supervisors of Brown County vs. Van Stralen and others. (On motion for rehearing.)

Tbial. *Issue in abatement to be first determined.*

Where defendant has pleaded both in abatement and in bar, the rendition of judgment for plaintiff on the merits without having determined the issue in abatement, is material error.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for *Fond du Lae*County.

The first decision in this cause is reported in 45 Wis., 675. The respondent moved for a rehearing.

Ryan, C. J.

The learned counsel for the respondents concede the correctness of the rule, that issues in abatement must be tried before issues in bar; and therefore admit the error of the court below in referring the issue in abatement.

They contend, however, that the error is immaterial, coming within sec. 40, ch. 125, R. S. 1858, and should be disregarded. But the court cannot see that the error does not affect a substantial right of the appellants. If they were entitled to *375judgment of discontinuance, it is surely a violation of substantial right that the action proceeded to judgment against them. There has been no trial of the plea in abatement; and until it be tried, it is impossible to determine its merits. The learned counsel also contend, that the judgment on this appeal affirms the power of boards of supervisors to extend the time of payment of admitted liabilities of their debtors. No such question was considered or involved in the judgment. The judgment affirms only the obligation of a plaintiff to discontinue a suit which he has agreed to discontinue.

*By the Gourb.*— The motion is overruled.
99-827.

#### State v. Grigsby.

Stark App. No. 1998CA00319. On motion for signature appeal bond. Motion denied.
##### 



[Exhibit 11]

North Fork Bancorporation, Inc.

COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME PER COMMON AND COMMON EQUIVALENT SHARE
September 30, 2003
(unaudited)

|                                                     |  |                    |             |                   |  |               |             |               |  |   |             |  |  |   |             | 
|---------------------------------------------------- |  | ------------------ | ----------- | ----------------- |  | ------------- | ----------- | ------------- |  | - | ----------- |  |  | - | ----------- | 
|                                                     |  | Three Months Ended |             | Nine Months Ended
|                                                     |  |                    |             |                  
|                                                     |  | September 30,      |             | September 30,     |  | September 30, |             | September 30,
|                                                     |  | 2003               |             | 2002              |  | 2003          |             | 2002         
|                                                     |  |                    |             |                   |  |               |             |              
|Net Income                                           |  | $                  | 94,330,247  |                   |  | $             | 106,847,133 |               |  | $ | 293,981,805 |  |  | $ | 309,598,074 | 
|Common and Common Equivalent Shares:                 |  |                    |             |                   |  |               |             |               |  |   |             |  |  |   |             | 
|Weighted Average Common Shares Outstanding           |  |                    | 148,853,117 |                   |  |               | 160,306,872 |               |  |   | 151,879,228 |  |  |   | 160,398,369 | 
|Weighted Average Common Equivalent Shares            |  |                    | 1,657,315   |                   |  |               | 1,940,784   |               |  |   | 1,584,395   |  |  |   | 1,906,661   | 
|                                                     |  |                    |             |                   |  |               |             |               |  |   |             |  |  |   |             | 
|Weighted Average Common and Common Equivalent Shares |  | $                  | 150,510,432 |                   |  | $             | 162,247,656 |               |  | $ | 153,463,623 |  |  | $ | 162,305,030 | 
|                                                     |  |                    |             |                   |  |               |             |               |  |   |             |  |  |   |             | 
|Net Income Per Share - Basic                         |  | $                  | 0.63        |                   |  | $             | 0.67        |               |  | $ | 1.94        |  |  | $ | 1.93        | 
|Net Income Per Share - Diluted                       |  | $                  | 0.63        |                   |  | $             | 0.66        |               |  | $ | 1.92        |  |  | $ | 1.91        | 

32
# C o u rt o f

A p p ea ls

o f t h e S t a te o f

G eo rg ia

ATLANTA,_

_ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _

Th e Co u rt

o f Ap p ea l s h er eb y p a s s es t h e f

o ll owi n g o r der :

A 1 8 D 0 1 9 8

. MARI A HERNANDEZ v

. W ILMI NGTON SAVI N GS FUND

SOCI ETY.

On No v em

b er 8

, 2 0 1 7, t h e M ag i s t rat e Co u rt o f Gwi n net t Co u n t y en t ered a

d efau l t ju d gm en t ag ai ns t M ari a Hern an dez an d g ran t ed a w ri t o f po s s es s i o n i n fav o r

o f W i l m i n g t o n Sav i ng s Fu n d So ci et y

. Hern an d ez fi l ed a n o ti ce o f ap peal i n t h e

Su p eri o r Co u rt o f Gwi n n et t Co u n t y wh i ch t h e M ag i s t rat e Co u rt d i s m is s ed p u rs u an t

t o OCGA § 1 5 -1 0 -4 1 (b ) (2 ). Hern an d ez th en fi l ed h er ap p l i cat i o n fo r d i s cret i o n ary

ap p eal i n t hi s Co u rt o n No v em b er 2 1 , 2 0 1 7 . W e, h o w ev er, l ack ju ri s d i ct i on

.

Gen er a l l y

, “ [t ] h e on l y av en u e o f ap p eal av ai l ab l e fro m [a] m ag i s t rat e co u rt

ju d g m en t i s pro v i d ed b y OCGA § 1 5 -1 0 -4 1 (b ) (1 ), wh i ch al l o ws fo r a d e n o vo ap p eal

t o t h e s t at e o r s u p eri o r co u rt .” Ha n d l er v. Hu l s ey

, 1 9 9 Ga. Ap p. 7 5 1

, 7 5 1 (4 0 6 SE2 d

2 2 5 ) (1 9 91 ). Ad d i t i o n a l l y, wh en a d efau l t ju d g m en t is en t ered ag ai ns t a p art y in

m ag i s t rat e co u rt

, t h at part y d oes n o t h av e a ri g h t t o d i r e c t ap peal bu t m u s t s eek

cert io rari t o t h e s t at e co u rt o r s u p eri or co u rt of t hat co u n t y

. OCGA § 1 5 -1 0 -4 1 (b ) (2 )

(“ No ap p eal s h al l l i e fro m a d efau l t j u d g m en t

. . . . Rev i ew

. . . s h al l b e b y cert i o rari

t o t he s t at e co u rt o f t h at co u n t y o r t o t h e s u peri o r co u rt o f t h at co u n t y .”).

Th i s Co urt m ay on l y ad dres s m ag i s t rat e co u rt m at t ers t hat al read y h av e b een

rev i ewed b y t h e st at e o r s u p eri o r co u rt

. See W es t wi n d Co r

p. v. W as h i n g t on Fed

. S &

L As s n.

, 1 9 5 Ga. A p p

. 4 1 1 (1 ) (3 9 3 SE2 d 4 7 9 ) (1 9 9 0 ); s ee al s o OCGA § 5 -6 -3 5 (a)

(1 ), (a) (1 1 ). Bu t h ere, t h e o n l y o rd er i n t h e ap p li cat i o n m at e r i al s was i s s u ed b y t h e

m ag i s t rat e co u rt , wh i ch h as n o t b een rev i ewed b y a s tat e o r s u p eri o r co u rt

. December 20, 2017Fo r t h i s reas o n, t hi s ap p l i cat i o n i s h ereb y DISM ISSED.

C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f t h e S t a t e o

f G e o r g ia

C le r k ’ s O f f i c e

, A t la n t a

,

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r ti fy t h a t t h e a b o v e is a tr u e e x t r a c t f r o m

t h e m i n u t e s o

f t h e C o u r t o

f A p p e a l s o f G e o r g i a

.

W i tn e s s m y s i g n a t u r e a n d t h e s e a l o

f s a i d c o u r t

h e r e t o a f f i x e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r l a s t a b o v e w r i t t e n

.

, C l e r k

. 12/20/2017
1 Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases
on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________ No. 95-10346 Summary Calendar

_____________________ CURTIS BROADNAX,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

LONE STAR GAS COMPANY, A DIVISION OF ENSERCH CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

(3:94-CV-752-D)

_____________________________________________________ December 11, 1995
Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 1

In this action claiming race discrimination in his discharge

from his accountant position, in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights A ct of 1967, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e e t seq. , Curtis

Broadnax, pro se , challenges the district court's denial of his

motion for appointment of counsel and the summary judgment granted
his employer, Lone Star Gas Co. (Broadnax did not respond to the

summary judgment motion.) We conclude that the district court did- 2 -

not abuse its discretion in denying appointment of counsel. And,

for the reasons stated in the district court's opinion (it assumed

arguendo that Broadna x established a p rima facie case), we
conclude, based on our de novo review, that the summary judgment
was proper. Accordingly, we

AFFIRM

.