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REF ID:A40011 

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SUBJECT: Proposed aaended version ot Bill s.1019 

1. a. ~he attached proposed amended version ot s.1019. 

as adopted b7 the Intelligence and SecU1'1t7 Sub-Coma1.ttee ot 

USCICC on 20 August 19,7. baa been carefully studied. By way 

ot general co .. ent. it ia .., opinion that because the bill ia 

a1aed directly at onl7 one pbaae of matters pertaining to the 

••cur1t7 ot the u.s •• and eapeciall7 because ot the h1ator7 

ot attempts to obtain legislation ot this sort. it will excite 

undue attention and encounter aoat careful acrutiD.J" tor hidden 

aotivea. even though there are no hidden •otivea. Our experie~ea 

with the several attempts made in the past to bave such very apecitio legislation enacted should be convincing in this 

regard. It appear• to me that it would be aore advisable and 

reall7 easier to obtain passage ot a aod1tication to existing legislation rather than &111 at brand new legislation bound to 

be eX&llined with llicroacopic acrutin7 tor ulterior aotivea. 

On this poas1b111t7 something further is stated below. 

b. The new - version ia an improvement on previous 

atteapta to correct the aerioua detects in the original bill. 

in that it •11ainat•• the principal provision that would have 

been the center ot auch controvera7. v1z. Clause (') ot Sec. i. 

the one that would make it a cr1a• to publish or divulge any 

aeaaage vh1ch haa been transmitted in a u. s. Government code 

or cipher. 

c. Additional specific comments on the draft are con• 

tained in Par. 2 below. 

2. a. ~he present draft •till baa one tatal detect. so 

tar •• its aeeting the requirements ot the situation which the 

bill is designed to aeet. Under 1t. "whoever ••• shall villtullJ:. 

COllllunicate ••• "•hall be tined etc. It will probably be 

accepted by all concerned 1n considering thia legislation tbat 

the tera •willtu117• aeana •1ntentionall7 or deaignedll• without 

lawful excuse. but not neceaaar117 with an evil intent • 

"Willtull7" here would imply only a person who, having aaked 

@'pp roved for Release by NSA on 09-26-2013 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 
REF ID:A40011 

• e· 

WDGAS-14 (25 August 47) 

pel'lliaaion to d1Yuls• or publish claasitied inf'ormation and 

having been denied auch perlliaaion, then proceeds to divulge 

or publish the intormat1on could be indicted tor bia willtul 

d1aregard ot the prohibition. It 1• not that aort ot vlolition 

ot security that baa caused ua more d1tticultiea. Recent 

caaea ot leakage ot claaaitied intol'lllLtion have coae largel7 

troa mare loose talk or thoughtleaa action, without an1 willtul 

atteapt to circumvent an ott1cial prohibition. The word 

"willfully" should therefore be deleted. 

6. On the other band, th1a version, unlike s.1019, pro- vide• no procedui-e or :aeans tor authorizing the publi~t1on ot 

any cl&sa1t1ed cr1ptologic 1ntol"JD&t1on when this might be advisable. Thus under a strict interpretation 1t would be a 

violation tor the armed services to publish docUD1enta containing claasitied 1nf'ol'Jll&tion regarding the crJPtographic or 

crJPt&n&l7tic activities ot the services, tor instructional or 

other purposes. The failure to provide aoae procedure or aeana 

ot th1• sort should be corrected and a new Sec. 6 1• proposed (aee Incloaure 2). J 

c. ~he bill will ver7 probably aeet with strenuous 

objection fro• the representatives ot the preas. It reads: 

"Whoever having obtained ••• knowledge ot ••• (:5) an7 cl&sa1t1ed 

1ntormat1on concerning the communication intelligence activities 

ot ••• any toreign governaent; or (4) &DJ' claaa1t1ed 1nto.rmat1on ob~11U!td troa the comm.UD1c&tiona ot the United State• or 

an7 foreign governaent b7 the processes ot coJ11aUJ11cat1on intelligence, aball villtull7 ••• co .. unicate ••• or publish &D.J' 

such claaai.t1ed 1n.torat1on shall be ••• etc." Thia aeana that 

it an American nevapaperman ahould obtain such 1ntormat1on in 

some foreign country, he could not without expectation ot serious 

puniabllent, send it to his home ottice in this countr7, nor 

could the editor at this hoae o.ttice publish it without similar 

expectation; the eaae goes tor radio news, co .. entators, and net 

works. Considering how care.tull7 the press exaJllines any measure 

which even remotel7 111.ght 1nf'r1nge upon its right to print what 

1ntormt1on it obtains, no matter how tbat 1nrormat1on baa been 

obtained, this part ot tbe proposed bill will be a controversial 

issue. Unf'ortunatel7, I can recommend no change to el1m1nate 

th1• defeot without a oomplete redrafting. 

d. The definition, in Sec. 6, ot the phrase "a person 

not authorized to receive such 1ntormat1on11 1• prob&bl7 too 

reatrictive to be acceptable. It would means. tor instance. 

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WDGAS-14 (25 August 1947) 

REF ID:A40011 

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that the Secretary or the Treasury could not, without violating the lav, disclose to the Secretary or State some classified 

1ntor .. t1on concerning a cr?])tographic aystea used by one or 

the ageno1ea or bureaus in the Treasury Department, tor example, the Bureau or Internal Revenue or the Bureau or Customs; vice 

versa, the Secretary or State could not di1cloae siailar information to the Secretary or the Treasury. Kor could any 

foreign service orr1cer in our diplo111.tic service, having obtained aoae 1ntorna.t1on concerning the co .. unication 1ntelli· 

genee activities or some foreign governaent, disclose tbia 1ntormat1on to his superiors, even to the Secretary ot State hJ..•-

aelr, without violating the law. Alao~.Aaerican e1t1&•n abroad, 

vho bas in soae 11&nner or other obtained aiailar information 

and wants to collllUD.1.cate it to aoae U.5. agency where it 111ght be useful or important, would have to •k• certain that the 

person to vhom he d11cloaes the information 1• authorized to 

receive it; be would violate the law it he disclosed it to the 

Aab&ssador or to any State Department eaplcyee in tbe Eab&sey-- altbougb prea\lll&b!{ be would not violate the law it be d11-

cloaed it lo the litary or naval attacbe. Furthermore, as 

the definition in Sec. 6 now etande, it vould appear neeeseary, in a strict interpretation or the definition, that each and 

every civil 1erviee eaployee or officer assigned tc duty in 

cryptologic work tor the goverI111ent be given written authority 

to receive such information, such authority to be signed by the Secretary ot War, the Secretary ot the JlaVJ, or the Attorney General. Thia ia carrying matters pretty tar, it seeD to ae. 

It i• euggested tD&t Sec. 6 ia not necessary and that the detee~a pointed out could be elia.inated by changing the clause 

•a person not authorized to receive euch information,• 

appearing in Sec. 1, to ... ke it read •a person not entitled 

to receive sueb intormation"--tbie being the wording in the 

long-standing Espionage Act. The present See. 6 can then be 

deleted. 

e. The proposed bill does not make the "pun11bllent tit 

the cri••·" It i1 clear that the disclosure or soae piece or 

a.inor bureaucratic scandal not even remotely arreeting the 

aatety ot the U.5., provided only th&t the intor ... tion waa 

claaeitied (even as low aa restricted) and obtained by the proceaaea ot coaaUJlication intelligence, vould be autticient 

violation ot the lav to bring about the 1-prieollllent ot the 

ottender tor ten years, aa well aa his tining up to the sum ot 

$10,000. It 1• doubtful it ao stringent a propoaal vould meet 

with acceptance by the Congreea, or avoid the blasts ot th• 

preea. It i• reeomllended that a graduated scale or sanctions 

and penalties be incorporated. 

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WinA8-l~ (25 Auguet 1947) 

a 

REF ID:A40011 

t. The proposed bill makes no allowance tor the etteeta 

or tbe p&aaage of time. It vould, tor example, be a violation 

or the law to publish anything &bout the codes and ciphers u1ed by the Federal Array in the Civil War or about the solutions ot Confederate cipher• by Federal crypt&nalyata in the 

Civil War; on the other hand, it would not be a violation or 

tbe law to disclose intor ... tion about a new eryptogra.pbic 1y1-

t•• in the re1earch or develo:paent at&ge, provided it did not 

involve & device or apparatus. It i• reco ... nded that the word 

•currently• be inserted in Sec. l betore the word •c1aaaitied•, 

so ae to inaure tb&t declaa11tication would occur fro• tiae to 

time and that no person'• aatety could be iapaired by a apitetlil pro1ecution baaed upon diacloeure ot old and obsolete 1ntor ... - tion. 

g. There llight atill be aoae doubt aa to whether or 

net the lav would reall7 prohibit the diaeloaure or 1ntormt1on 

tran1.itted in a U.S. code or cipher. Reference 1• ... 4e here 

to clause (~): •An.J' cl&aaitied 1Jl1"ol'"ll&tion obtained trem the 

collll\U11cations ot th• United Statea or any foreign gover.Dllent by the proceaaea or cOllll\U11eation intelligence•. It is true 

tbat the abaence or a cemaa after "United Statea• probably 

iapliea that th• q\l&litying pbraae •bt the proceaaea ot co-unio&tion intelligence• alao applies to collllWlicationa or the 

United Statea•, but •o•ed&y 1oaebody might raiae & queation in · th• pr•ai•••· It the clauae ia ... de to read: ·An~ olaaaitied 

iDtorma.tion obtaiaed trom th• comnuaicationa ot the United 

States ••• by th• proce•••• or co911W11.cat1on 1ntell1g•nce• it 

1• obvious that aucb iatorma.tion vo111.d ba•• to coae tro• 10 .. 

foreign eountr7, 1n which ease, it would not be claaaitied intor111.tion within the acope ot t~ det1ait1on fi••n 1n Sec. 2, 

which require• that th• ... tter b• ela11itied by a United St&tea 

fOYern11ent agency•. I aee ne ~otnt in including in that cl&••• 

colllll1llie&t1ona or the UD1te4 St&tea" at all, and reco .. end it• 

deletion. 

h. The derinition of the term "colanmication intelligence (See. 5) aa a tield ot endeavor• excludes the "iatelligence• it1elt. Thi• ... 7 be 1at1atactor,. tor th• purpoaea ot the bill 

but 11 ao .. vh&t llDU•ual &a a d.•f1n1tion. 

i. !he det1n1t1on in Sec. 6, should be changed to read: 

•any person vho, or agency which, 11 ••• •. The definition 1• 

pretty coaplex. Its deletion baa been reco .. •nded above. 

j. It 1• doubtful it the title ot the bill should re ... 1n 

aa it stands. Hov can the aecurit7 of th• United States b• 

furthered by preventing diacloaurea or 1ntor11&tlon concerning 

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.. , ... REF ID--:A40011 

VDGAS-14 (25 August 19-7) 

the cr7ptograph1c a7steas and the commun1cation intelligence activities ot foreign govermaenta? 

3. It is still believed that a bill of much more general 

scope in relation to security and national defense would be 

preferable and aoreover would receive the hearty support of all 

bureaus and branches ot the araed torcea. A sugges•ed draft 

of an amendment to the so-called espionage Act ot 1917 was 

aubllitted recentl7 by this section. All references to crypto- graphy, cryptanalyaia, communication intelligence, etc., vere 

eliminated f'ro• that draft, but the scope of the measure vaa 

broad enough to be applicable to &n.J'thing of a cryptologic 

nature. ll'urther, the punishments cited therein vere graduated in severity, so as to make them tit the criae committed. This 

is believed sound in principle and it is believed that such a 

provision is likely to meet with more favor than would a bill 

wherein punisbllent tor revealing top secret information ia 

aa severe as that tor revealing restricted information. However, it there is now no possibility ot presenting the AS-14 

draft bill tor consideration, then the present version vill have 

to be used. A draft as amended in the light of the toregoing comaenta ia submitted as Incloaure 2. However, aa stated above, 

I am not able to suggest a sillple change which will eliminate 

the objections cited in Par. 2c above. 

~8d- 2 Incls WILLIAM P. PBIEDJIA.R 

2 d.ratta ot s.1019 Bill Ob1•t 1 Oommn1cat1ona Reaearch