- -~ The kind of stuff that went into the 

Grow diary will confirm in many minds the 

opinion that the military are bent upon 

provoking war. General Grow is indeed a 

firebrand. "War!" he ejaculates to his diary. 

"As soon as possible! Now!" L~st year the 

time appeared to him to be "ripe for a blow." 

He called to his diary for a leader who 

would get on his white horse and lead the 

American people to the destruction of com· 

munism. 

To what extent General Grow expresses 

the view of his colleagues is anybody's 

guess-. But we should imagine that his view· 

point is not unrepresentative. After all, war 

is the culmination of training in the pro· 

fession of arms. It is only in wartime that 

an officer's professional mettle is proven, 

his adva!lcement and promotion quickened. 

Warmindedness on an officer's part is not in 

itself reprehensible. The country requires 

that its militfry should be devoted to the 

study of war in case of emergency; the 

national security depends in great part on 

the reaoiness and alertness of the military 

establishment. However, there is a big 

gulf fixed in this respect between the Grows, 

or the operating officers, and the men who 

are actually in charge of military policy. 

With responsibility goes a caution and 

sobriety that is lacking below that levelindeed, that is sometimes lacking . among 

civilians in comparable posts in Govern· 

ment. 

At least this has been the general experi· 

ence. In the war which ushered in the 

modem r wars that have disfigured the , 

twentieth century...,..the Russo-Japanese war 

of 1904-the Russia:n Mjnister of War, Gen· 

eral Kuropatkin, was perhaps the most 

pacific minister in St. Petersburg. He knew 

too much. Knowing what he did about the 

military weakness of Russia, he made the 

drastic proposal that Russia .should abandon 

her ambitions in Manchuda and Korea and 

concentrate instead on development in the 

Vladivostock area further north. Nor in 

the First World War is there enough evi· 

dence to satisfy the historian that the 

conftagration was sparked . by the German 

military. In the last war, cerlainly, the 

record shows that their successors were 

constantly trying to restrain Hitler, while 

our own military chiefs were similarly 

nonbelligerent. Even in Japan the least 

war-lik~, · .l\W'ong. · the elemenf:s: _i~ cont~?l 

of aff~Wei'A, ~ navy leatfP~68ntiill 

Yama ~·~~stance, w~1r.'.;..~n for peace. The hotheads in Japan for 

the 20 years previous to the outbreak of 

war were the young officers. Eventually 

REF ID:A42931 
REF ID:A42931 

_. 

.... 

the~ ·/ound a man In the person of General 

Toi;Jo who would accept their dictation. 

:v What makes military men of the stamp 

of General Grow dangerous to peace is when 

the authorities put them in front positions 

in the conduct of the cold war or otherwise 

in positions of authority. Yet 1this is pre· 

cisely what is now being done in mainland 

Asia. Official policy on Formosa still remains neutralization of the island till the 

war in Korea is over. However, the reports 

keep on,coming from the Burmese frontier 

of Chinese Nationalist activity directed and 

fed from Formosa and of American partici· 

pation in that activity. The. latest news to 

this effect.is a current Associated Press dis· 

patch filed by Jack Macbeth from "Near 

the Burmese border in northern Thailand." 

This is the kind of thing to worry about, 

more than the attitude of mind revealed in 

the Grow diary. If the natural warmindedness 

of our military officers is, irresponsibly; 

given its head, then we might as well prepare for trouble. Of course, stories such 

as a.re coming out of Burma are denied. 

But more and more it appears to us that 

the right hand df ou1· Government in oper· 

ations abroa!l does not know what the 

left hand is doing.