J-A24012-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RICHARD YOUNG

Appellant No. 1532 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 20, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008336-2013

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., WECHT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED OCTOBER 29, 2015

Appellant, Richard Young, appeals form the judgment of sentence 

entered December 20, 2013, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 

County, following his conviction of aggravated assault, simple assault, 

recklessly endangering another person, possession of an instrument of 

crime, and terroristic threats.1 We affirm. 

We take the underlying history of this matter from the trial court’s 

Rule 1925(a) opinion. 

FINDINGS OF FACT

On May 30, 2013, at approximately 10 p.m., Jerome Pierce 

(hereinafter “the complaining witness”) was at home on 6230 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(4), 2701, 2705, 907 and 2706, respectively. 
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Reedland Street. N.T. 10/28/2013 at 8-9. He and his girlfriend, 

Patricia Jenkins (hereinafter “Jenkins”), had a verbal argument 

upstairs in the home. Id. at 10. At the time, [Young] ... was at 

the home visiting Jenkins’ daughter. Id. at 21. During the 

argument between the complaining witness and Jenkins, [Young] 

ran from the lower floor of the home to the floor where the 

complaining witness and Jenkins were arguing, and words were 

exchanged between the complaining witness and [Young]. Id. at 

10.

During the exchange of words, both the complaining 

witness and Jenkins requested [Young] to leave the home. Id. 

at 12. While [Young] was leaving, but still inside the home, he 

informed the complaining witness that he was a “dead man.” Id. 

He reiterated the threat once outside the home. Id. Once the 

complaining witness made his way outside of the home, he 

instructed [Young] to “throw away his guns and his knives ... and 

knuckle up.” Id. at 13. The complaining witness got into the 

fighting position. Id. At this time, without a punch yet being 

thrown by either man, [Young] pulled out a razor from the right 

side of his body with his right hand and sliced the complaining 

witness’ left hand. Id. The complaining witness was cut while 

standing in the street in front of the home. Id. at 28. 

After being cut, the complaining witness immediately left 

the altercation and went inside the home to attend to his 

wounds. Id. at 14. An ambulance was called to the home. Id. 

at 15. When the police arrived, a blood trail led Officer 

Thompson inside the home and up the steps to the second floor, 

where he found the complaining witness in the bathroom with a 

blood-soaked towel wrapped around his left hand. Id. at 31-32. 

[The complaining witness] received 16 stiches and was cut so 

deep, he suffered nerve damage in his hand. Id. at 15. 

Although [Young] admits he purposely sliced the 

complaining witness (Id. at 37), he contends, contrary to the 

complaining witness’ testimony, that he was hit twice by the 

complaining witness in the back of the head, once inside the 

home and once outside. Id. at 37. However, the 

Commonwealth illustrated that on the day of the incident ... 

[Young] informed the police that he was only struck once in the 

back of the head. Id. at 40. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
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[Young] requested and was granted a waiver of a jury 

trial. The bench trial took place before the Honorable Sean F. 

Kennedy on October 28, 2013. Based on the evidence and 

testimony, [Young] was found guilty of [the aforementioned 

charges]. [The trial court later sentenced Young] to three to six 

years[’] incarceration. 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/12/14 at 1-3 (footnote omitted). 

Young raises the following issues for our review.

A. Was not the evidence insufficient to convict appellant of 

aggravated assault, simple assault, recklessly endangering 

another person, and possession of instrument of crime, where 

the Commonwealth failed to disprove appellant’s claim of selfdefense beyond a reasonable doubt?

B. Even assuming arguendo appellant was reckless or negligent 

in appraising the amount of force necessary to protect 

himself, was not the evidence insufficient to convict him of 

the specific intent crimes of aggravated assault and 

possession of instrument of crime?

Appellant’s Brief at 3. 

Young first argues that the Commonwealth failed to disprove his selfdefense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. We note that “[t]he use of force 

upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that 

such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself 

against the use of unlawful force by the other person.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

505(a). “Although the defendant has no burden to prove self-defense, ... 

before the defense is properly in issue, ‘there must be some evidence, from 

whatever source, to justify such a finding.’” Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 

53 A.3d 738, 740 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). Once a justification defense 

is properly raised, “the Commonwealth bears the burden to disprove such a 
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defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Torres, 766 A.2d 

342, 345 (Pa. 2001) (citations omitted). 

The Commonwealth sustains its burden if “it establishes at least one of 

the following: 1) the accused did not reasonably believe that he was in 

danger of death or serious bodily injury; or 2) the accused provoked or 

continued the use of force; or 3) the accused had a duty to retreat and the 

retreat was possible with complete safety.” Commonwealth v. 

McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223, 1230 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). “It 

remains the province of the [finder of fact] to determine whether the 

accused’s belief was reasonable, whether he was free of provocation, and 

whether he had no duty to retreat.” Id. (citation omitted). 

The Commonwealth can negate a self-defense claim if it proves 

the defendant did not reasonably believe he was in imminent 

danger of death or great bodily injury and it was necessary to 

use deadly force to save himself from that danger. 

The requirement of reasonable belief encompasses two 

aspects, one subjective and one objective. First, the 

defendant must have acted out of an honest, bona fide 

belief that he was in imminent danger, which involves 

consideration of the defendant's subjective state of mind. 

Second, the defendant's belief that he needed to defend 

himself with deadly force, if it existed, must be reasonable 

in light of the facts as they appeared to the defendant, a 

consideration that involves an objective analysis.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 787 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations 

omitted).
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In rejecting Young’s justification defense, the trial court determined 

that there was no evidence to suggest that Young was in imminent danger of 

death or serious bodily injury:

Here, evidence presented by the Commonwealth 

established that there was no reasonable basis from which to 

conclude that the use of the razor was necessary by [Young]. 

Prior to slicing the complaining witness, [Young] was not in any 

danger of death or serious bodily harm. Although the 

complaining witness testified that he was willing to enter into 

mutual combat with [Young], he did not make any attempt to 

throw a punch prior to, or subsequent to, being sliced with the 

razor. The complaining witness also did not possess any 

weapons at the time of the attack. Further, [Young] presented 

no evidence that he acted in self-defense, other than his own 

testimony, which was found not to be credible. As illustrated by 

the Commonwealth during trial, [Young’s] testimony was 

inconsistent with statements previously made to law 

enforcement regarding the events that preceded the attack. 

Furthermore, [Young] used the weapon while on a public street, 

away from the house. He could have, at any point after leaving 

the home, retreated from the scene to complete safety without 

harming the complaining witness. Therefore, the 

Commonwealth met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable 

doubt that [Young] did not act in self-defense at the time of the 

attack. 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/12/14 at 5. 

We agree with the trial court’s cogent analysis. The evidence 

presented was insufficient to support a finding that Young – either 

subjectively or objectively – reasonably believed he was in danger of death 

or serious bodily injury. The trial court clearly concluded that Young 

unreasonably and unjustifiably escalated the confrontation when he sliced 

the unarmed victim with a razor blade. Based on the foregoing, we conclude 

that the Commonwealth sustained its burden of disproving Young’s 
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justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Young’s first 

claim is without merit. 

Young next argues that, even assuming his self-defense claim does not 

warrant relief, the evidence was still insufficient to convict him of aggravated 

assault and possession of an instrument of crime. Our review of the record 

reveals that this precise issue was not raised in Young’s Rule 1925(b) 

statement of matters complained of on appeal. See Statement of Errors 

Complained of On Appeal, 7/18/14.2 Therefore, we are constrained to find 

this issue is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in 

the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this 

paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”); Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 39 

(Pa. Super. 2014). 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/29/2015

____________________________________________

2 Young raised two issues in his Rule 1925(b) statement. The first issue 

mirrored the first claim raised in Young’s appellate brief. The second issue 

challenged the weight of the evidence to support his convictions. See 

Statement of Errors Complained of On Appeal, 7/18/14.