alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[ J

- 114

- 2016 ] [MO: Dougherty, J. ] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

GARY H. POWELL

v.

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW

JOE KRENTZMAN & SONS, INC.,

Intervenor

APPEAL OF: UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

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:

:

: No. 38 MAP 2016

Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court at No. 1704 CD 2014 dated November 6, 2015 Vacating & Remanding the Order of the UCBR at No. B

- 13

- 09

- D

- B064 dated August 13, 2014.

SUBMITTED: September 14, 2016

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

JUSTICE BAER DECIDED: March 28, 2017

I join the majority to the extent it holds that Appellee does not have the right to be

represented by a suspended attorney in an unemployment compensation hearing

. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to remand this ma tter for

further proceedings.

Appellee was informed that Disciplinary Enforcement Rule 217 preclud ed a

suspended attorney from representing him at his unemployment compensation hearing.

With no serious question that he understood the basis for disqualification of his

representative, and with ample time to seek a new and proper counsellor, Appellee

ret ained yet another suspended attorney, who, consistently, was disqualified from

representing him. Ultimately, Appellee proceeded pro se

.[ J

- 114

- 2016 ] [MO: Dougherty, J. ]

- 2

In my view, Appellee had every opportunity to obtain appropriate representation

in this matter

. Moreover, as was recognized by the Unemployment Compensation

Board of Review (“UCBR”), Appellee received a full and fair hearing before the referee,

in which he had the opportunity to testify, submit evidence, and cross examine his

employer’s witnesses. UCBR Op. at 3. Under these facts

, I would not give Appellee a

third hearing and a third opportu nity to obtain representation.

Accordingly, I would vacate the order of the Commonwealth Court and reinstate

the UCBR’s order affirming the denial of unemplo yment compensation benefits.
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 14**  **- 6786** 

ANTHONY JOHNSON , Plaintiff

– Appellant ,

v. G. SINDY, in his individual capacity; R. RODERICK, in his individual capacity; DR. JACK CUNNING, in his individual capacity , Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Greenbelt

. Deborah K. Chasanow, Senior District Judge. ( 8:14

- cv - 01188

- DKC )

Submitted : October 16, 2014 Decided: October 20, 2014

Before MOTZ, WYNN, and THACKER , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Anthony Johnson, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Anthony Johnson appeals the district court ’ s order
d ismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (20 12 ) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the
district court. Johnson v. Sindy , No. 8:14

- cv - 01188

- DKC (D. Md. Apr. 28, 2014) . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
, ... REF ID:A363562 ;...-

Ds Application ~or Patent of * WILLIAM l'. FRIElTMAH 

* s.r!al Btaber 

5'1,172 * DiTision'23 

ft.led * 25 August 1944 llf1M>Jim 

* For 

iutliEifiOATDG JEVICI * 

* * * * * .. * * * • ~/('A .1 p}'1 (JJ { () 

The Hcmcrable Comisaioner or Patents I\ }J"' aM.. . (, • 1JI' 

Waahington 25, n. o. H '{ rw 

n ,-Y 

Sirs yO 

. !h1a 1e in response to Patent Of'.t'ice action ot 4 Jlcmsiber 1950 ii\ 

\ha a.bovc•identitied application tor patent. Please amend the case 

U ~llolrGI 

D THE OLA.DIS 

'lith tho ce.eollation ot Claiu 2, 3, and 5, onlT allowed Claira 6 

appears in the application. 

leapecttul.11', 

WILLIAM F. PRIE»lWl • ApplJ.co.t 

His Attone7 

@'pproved for Release by NSA on 07-29-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

-----··-- - .::=.=---· ,..... ---· --· ---··-··· ·- ··- --·--· -·-··-··-- ·--------·-----··· - ----··-··- ...
NO. 07-07 -041 2-CR IN THE CO URT OF APPEA LS FO R THE S EVEN TH D ISTRI CT O F TEXAS

AT AM AR ILLO PAN EL A SEPTEM BER11, 2008

_________

_________

_________

___ JOSE MARIA L OPEZ, APPE LLA NT

V. THE S TATE OF TEXAS, APPEL LEE

_________

_________

_________

______ FRO M T HE CRI MI NA L DIS T RI CTCOU RTOF J EF FE RS ON COU NT Y; NO . 989 68; H ON ORABLE JOH N B. S TEVEN S, J UD GE

_________

_________

_________

____ Before CAMPBE LL a nd HANCOCK an d PIRT LE, JJ. ME MO RA ND UM OPI NI ON Appel lan t, Jos e M ar ia Lopez , app eal s h isco nv icti on for the offense of ag g ra v ated sexual assau lt of

a child and pun ishm entassesse d by the sam e jury of 99 years c o n f i n e m e n ti n t h e I n s t i t u t i o n a l D i v i s i o n o f t h e T e x a s D e p a rt m e n to f C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e . W e affi r m. A p p e ll a n t ’s a tt o rn e y h a s f il e d a n A n d e rs b ri e f a n d a m o t io n t o wit h d ra w. A n d e rs v. Cal ifor nia , 386 U .S. 738, 87 S. Ct . 139 6, 18 L.E d. 2d 498 ( 1967)
. In s uppor t of hi s mot ion to w it hdraw , c ounse l cer ti fies that he hasdi li g entl y rev iewed the record and, i n hi s o pin ion ,C ounse l shal l, w it hin fiv e days a fter t hisopi nio n i s h anded d ow n, s end hi s c li ent 1 a c opy of the opi nio n and jud g ment, alo ng w it h not ific ati on of appel lan t’ s r ig ht t o fil e a pro sepeti ti on for dis creti onar y rev iew
. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 4 8.4.

2 the record reflect s n o rev ersi ble er ro r upon w hic h an appeal ca n be predi cat ed. Id. at 74 4- 45. In compl ian ce w it h Hig h v . State, 573 S.W .2d 807, 813 ( Tex .C ri m.App. 1978) , c ounse l has candi dly

di sc uss ed w hy , under the cont ro ll ing author it ies , t here i s n o er ro r in the t ri al cour t’ s j udg ment. Addi ti onal ly , c ounse l has cer ti fied that he has prov ide d appel lan t a copy of the Anders b ri ef and moti on to w it hdraw and appropr iat ely

adv is ed appe ll ant o f his r ig ht to fil e a pr

o se r e sp o n se i n thi s matter
. Stafford v . St ate, 813 S. W .2d 5 03, 5 10 (Tex .Crim .A pp. 1 991)
. The cour t hasal so adv is ed appe ll ant o f his r ig ht t o fil e a pro se re spons e. Appel lan t hasnot filed a respon se. By his And ers brief , coun sel raises groun ds tha t could possibly support an app eal, but c oncl udes the a ppeal i s fr ivolo us. W e h av e rev iewed th ese g ro unds and made an inde pen den t rev iew

of the en tire record to de term ine w het her t h e re a re any arg uab le g ro unds w hic h mi g ht s uppor t an appeal
. See Pens on v . O hio , 488 U .S. 75, 1 09 S. Ct . 346 , 1 0 2 L
. E d
. 2 d 3 0 0 ( 1 9 8 8 ) ; B l e d s o e v . S t a t e , 1 7 8 S
. W
. 3 d 8 2 4 ( Te x . C r i m. A p p . 2005)
. W e have foun d no such arguab le groun ds and agree w ith cou nsel th at th e ap pea l is f rivolou s. Accordin gly , coun sel’s mot ion to w ithdra w is hereb y grante d an d the trial court’s jud g ment i s a ff ir med. 1 Mackey K. Hancock Justice Do not p ubl is h.
II 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2091 

To amend the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 to increase appropriations 

to Restaurant Revitalization Fund, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 16, 2021 

Ms. SINEMA (for herself, Mr. WICKER, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, Ms. MURKOWSKI, 

Ms. BALDWIN, Ms. ERNST, Ms. STABENOW, Mrs. HYDE-SMITH, Mr. 

DURBIN, and Mr. HEINRICH) introduced the following bill; which was 

read twice and referred to the Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship 

A BILL 

To amend the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 to increase 

appropriations to Restaurant Revitalization Fund, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Restaurant Revitaliza5 tion Fund Replenishment Act of 2021’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2091 IS

1 SEC. 2. APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE RESTAURANT REVITAL2 IZATION FUND. 

3 Section 5003(b)(2) of the American Rescue Plan Act 

4 of 2021 (Public Law 117–2; 135 Stat. 85; 15 U.S.C. 

5 9009c(b)(2)) is amended— 

6 (1) in subparagraph (A)— 

7 (A) by striking ‘‘$28,600,000,000’’ and in8 serting ‘‘$88,600,000,000’’; and 

9 (B) by inserting ‘‘, of which $300,000,000 

10 shall be for administrative expenses to carry out 

11 this section’’ before the period at the end; and 

12 (2) in subparagraph (B)(i)(II), by striking 

13 ‘‘$23,600,000,000’’ and inserting 

14 ‘‘$83,300,000,000’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
POWER OF ATTORNEY

KNOWN ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that the undersigned hereby constitutes and appoints each of Robert K. Kretzman and Michael T. Sheehan or any of them, each acting alone, his true and lawful attorney-in-fact and agent, with full power of substitution, for him and his name, place and stead, in any and all capacities, in connection with the REVLON, INC. (the Corporation) Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2007 (the Form 10-K) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, to sign the Form 10-K in the name and on behalf of the Corporation or on behalf of the undersigned as a director or officer of the Corporation, and any amendments to the Form 10-K and any instrument, contract, document or other writing, of or in connection with the Form 10-K or amendments thereto,
and to file the same, with all exhibits thereto, and other documents in connection therewith, including this power of attorney, with the Securities and Exchange Commission and any applicable securities exchange or securities self-regulatory body, granting unto said attorneys-in-fact and agents, each acting alone, full power and authority to do and perform each and every act and thing requisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as he might or could do in person, hereby ratifying and confirming all that said attorneys-in-fact and agents, each acting alone, or his substitute or substitutes, may lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has signed these presents this 4th day of March, 2008.



/S/ KENNETH L. WOLFEKENNETH L. WOLFE






---
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: In the Interest of A.T.N.J., A.J., and T.L.J., Jr., Children

Appellate case number: 01-15-00844-CV

Trial court case number: 2013-33236

Trial court: 311th District Court of Harris County

On November 24, 2015, the Clerk of this Court forwarded the pro se affidavit of 

indigence for appellate costs filed by appellant, T.L.J., Sr., to the trial clerk requesting an 

indigent clerk’s record be filed in this Court by December 23, 2015. See TEX. R. APP. P.

20.1(c)(1). On November 30, 2015, the court reporters filed info sheets in this Court 

noting that there were no reporter’s records taken. On February 17, 2016, the trial clerk 

filed an information sheet in this Court stating that there was no contest to appellant’s 

affidavit of indigence filed in the trial court due to the late filing. See id. 20.1(e)(1). On 

March 9, 2016, the trial clerk filed the original clerk’s record in this Court.

Accordingly, the allegations in the affidavit of indigence are deemed true, and 

appellant is entitled to proceed without advance payment of appellate costs. See TEX. R.

APP. P. at 20.1(f). However, because there is no reporter’s record and the clerk’s record

has already been filed in this Court, the Clerk of this Court is ORDERED to deem the

appellant indigent and that he is allowed to proceed on appeal without advance payment 

of costs for purposes of the appellate filing fee and the clerk’s and reporter’s record fees.

Furthermore, this Court generally has appellate jurisdiction over appeals only from 

final orders arising under the Texas Family Code unless a statute authorizes an 

interlocutory appeal. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(b) (West Supp. 2015) (“An

appeal may be taken by any party to a suit from a final order rendered under this

title.”). Thus, to the extent appellant intended that his notice of appeal, challenging the 

trial court’s refusal to act, be construed as a mandamus petition, appellant’s counsel is 

directed to file a motion with the Clerk of this Court within 10 days of the date of the 
2

Order to designate his appeal as an original proceeding and requesting an extension of 

time to file a petition that complies with Rule 52. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.1, 52.3.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Laura Carter Higley

 Acting individually 

Date: March 15, 2016
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14(b) OR RULE 15d-14(b)

OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934 AND 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the
annual report on Form 10-K of Interactive Data Corporation (the Company) for the year ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned,
Christine A. Sampson, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                         |  |  |  |     |  |                                                                           
|------------------------ |  |  |  | --- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                         |  |  | 
|Dated: February 26, 2010 |  |  |  | By: |  | /S/    CHRISTINE A. SAMPSON                                               
|                         |  |  |  |     |  | Christine A. Sampson Chief Financial Officer (principal financial officer)
1The HONORABLE ORTRIE D. SMITH, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 99-2065

___________

Harold H. Knight; Janice D. Knight, *

*

Plaintiffs - Appellants, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

John B. Bissell, et al., *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Defendants - Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: November 5, 1999

 Filed: November 10, 1999

___________

Before BEAM, LOKEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Harold and Janice Knight appeal the district court’s1 order dismissing their action

seeking to recover for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident because

defendants allegedly conspired to harm and intimidate the Knights due to their public

opposition to the Iran-Contra affair and alleged CIA involvement in drug trafficking.

Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court properly dismissed
-2-

the complaint because the Knights failed to prove their allegation of federal diversity

jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-29-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             MAY-02-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-31-1999
<CASH>                                           1,773
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    5,657
<ALLOWANCES>                                       268
<INVENTORY>                                     39,620
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                56,887
<PP&E>                                          86,616
<DEPRECIATION>                                  44,580
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 109,914
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           28,793
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             8
<OTHER-SE>                                      68,355
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    68,363
<SALES>                                        106,204
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               106,204
<CGS>                                           72,878
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  113,212
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 483
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (7,491)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (2,877)
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<EPS-BASIC>                                   (0.57)
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</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32(a)




CERTIFICATION OF


CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF


THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Amendment No. 1 to the Quarterly Report of Thermodynetics, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q/A for the quarter ending September 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, the Chief Executive Officer, hereby certifies to the best of the undersigned's knowledge and belief, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)  The Report complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in all material respects; and





(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date: November 15, 2010
By:
/s/ Robert A. LermanRobert A. LermanPresident and Chief Executive Officer




This certification shall not be deemed "filed" for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or otherwise subject to the liability of that section.  This certification shall not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, except to the extent that the small business issuer specifically incorporates it by reference.
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Electro-Sensors, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Bradley D. Slye, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



November 12, 2009

        /s/ Bradley D. SlyeBradley D. SlyeChief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer










---
#### Sellers, Appellant, vs. The First Presbyterian Church of West Superior and others, Respondents.

*October 28*

November *8, 1895.*

*Pleading: Voluntary assignment.*

An allegation that one A. was duly appointed assignee of the firm of B. & Co. and thereafter duly qualified as such assignee and entered into the discharge of his trust, cannot be considered as an allegation that B. & Co. made a general assignment to A. for the benefit of creditors.

Appeal from an order of the superior court of Douglas county: Charles Smith, Judge.

*Affirmed.*

For the appellant the cause was submitted on the brief of *John B. Arnold.*To the point that the allegation that E. A. Arnold was duly appointed assignee of W. A. Boyd *&*Co., and thereafter qualified as such and entered into the discharge of his trust, etc., implies that the contract was in writing and valid under the statute, he cited *Robbins v. Bev-erill,*20 Wis. 146; *Bank of River Falls v. Qerma/n Am. Ins. Oo.*12 id. 538; *Simmer v. Richardson, B. & Go.*16 id. 464; *Jones v. Baris,*22 id. 421.

For the respondents there was a brief by *Ross, Bwyer & Ila/niteh*and *Reed do Reed,*and oral argument by *W. B. Bwyer.*

WiNslow, J.

This is an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien upon the defendant’s church building, brought by the plaintiff, who claims to own the claim for lien by virtue of an assignment from the original contractor. The claim was the property of William A. Boyd & Co., and the allegations which are relied on.to show that the claim was assigned to the plaintiff are as follows: “ That on the 18th day of August, 1892, E. A. Arnold was duly appointed, assignee of W. A. Boyd & Co., and thereafter duly qualified as such as-signee and entered into the discharge of his trust;” and *329that thereafter the said Arnold, as such assignee, duly sold,, assigned, and transferred the claim in question to the plaintiff. A general demurrer to the complaint was sustained on the ground that the complaint does not show any assignment of the claim to the plaintiff.

The ruling was plainly right. The allegation that Arnold was appointed assignee of the firm of Boyd & Co., and qualified as such, cannot be considered as an allegation that Boyd & Co. made a general assignment to Arnold for the benefit of creditors. We may guess that this is what the pleader meant, but the pleading does not say so. No voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors being alleged, it is clear that the pleading nowhere alleges, either directly or by implication, that Boyd & Co. ever assigned this claim to any one. Such an allegation was essential, and its absence is fatal to the complaint. R. S. sec. 3322.

*By the*Court.— Order affirmed.