J-S60023-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

BIRDELL BROCKINGTON

Appellant No. 3611 EDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order October 30, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0002736-1997

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2016

Birdell Brockington appeals, pro se, from the order entered in the 

Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas, dated October 30, 2015, dismissing 

his second petition filed under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), as 

untimely.1 Brockington seeks relief from the judgment of sentence imposed 

on May 26, 1998, following his convictions for various offenses including, 

inter alia, first-degree murder.2 Based on the following, we affirm.

The facts and procedural history are as follows. Brockington’s 

convictions stem from an incident on August 2, 1997, when he and Kevin 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2501.
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Taylor burglarized the home of Bruce Kight in order to steal personal items 

from him, and subsequently, Taylor shot Kight numerous times, killing him. 

On May 22, 1998, a jury convicted Brockington of first-degree murder, 

burglary, criminal trespass, theft by unlawful taking, and five counts of 

criminal conspiracy. Four days later, he was sentenced to an aggregate 

term of life imprisonment. A panel of this Court affirmed the judgment of 

sentence on July 31, 2000, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied 

allowance of appeal on December 14, 2000. See Commonwealth v. 

Brockington, 764 A.2d 1119 [493 EDA 1999] (Pa. Super. 2000) 

(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 764 A.2d 1064 (Pa. 2000).

On December 14, 2001, Brockington filed a timely, pro se PCRA 

petition, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Counsel was 

appointed, and an amended petition was filed on his behalf. The PCRA court 

held an evidentiary hearing on May 29, 2002, and subsequently denied 

Brockington’s petition on July 15, 2002. A panel of this Court affirmed the 

PCRA court’s order on May 20, 2003, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

denied allowance of appeal on June 22, 2004. See Commonwealth v. 

Brockington, 829 A.2d 353 [3028 EDA 2002] (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 853 A.2d 359 (Pa. 2004).

The case went dormant for over ten years until June 19, 2015, when 

Brockington filed the present, pro se PCRA petition, his second, requesting 

the admission of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification “being 
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that it is no longer per se impermissible” in this Commonwealth. 

Brockington’s Motion for Post Conviction Collateral Relief, 6/19/2015, at 3. 

In support of his assertion, Brockington points to Commonwealth v. 

Walker, 92 A.3d 766 (Pa. 2014),3 which he read about in a March 31, 2015, 

article, titled “Handling Eyewitness Identification Experts and Cases,” in The 

Legal Intelligencer. See Brockington’s Motion for Post Conviction Collateral 

Relief, 6/19/2015, at Exhibit A. Brockington also filed a “brief and 

memorandum of newly excepted state law in support of PCRA petition” on 

July 8, 2015. 

After reviewing the matter, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 

notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without first conducting an 

evidentiary hearing on October 5, 2015. Specifically, the court found the 

petition was untimely filed and Brockington did not prove any exception to 

the timeliness provisions of the PCRA. Brockington filed a response to the 

Rule 907 notice on October 27, 2015.4 Three days later, the PCRA court 

denied Brockington’s petition. This appeal followed.

____________________________________________

3

 In Walker, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that “in Pennsylvania, 

the admission of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification is no 

longer per se impermissible, and [it] join[ed] the vast majority of 

jurisdictions which leave the admissibility of such expert testimony to the 

discretion of the trial court.” Walker, 92 A.3d at 769.

4

 The response was not docketed until October 30, 2015.
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On November 23, 2015, the PCRA court ordered Brockington to file a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b). A review of the certified record reveals Brockington did not file a 

concise statement. Nevertheless, the PCRA court issued an opinion pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on December 17, 2015.

Herein, Brockington presents the following questions for our review:

Whether the PCRA Court erred in denying [Brockington’s] 

Post-Conviction Petition of Newly Excepted State Law in Support 

of PCRA Petition as untimely filed when [Brockington] 

established that his [after-discovered facts claims [was] within 

the [plain language of the timeliness exception set forth at] 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) and section 9545(b)(2)?; When 

[Brockington] requested an Evidentiary Hearing / Expert on [t]he 

Well-Known Fallibilities of an Eyewitness’s Testimony / Frye 

Hearing in relation to the Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 A.3d 776 

(Pa. 2014) case.

Whether the PCRA Court erred in denying & dismissing 

[Brockington’s] Response To Notice of Intent To Dismiss To 

Pa.R.Crim. 907, when [Brockington] humbly presented / shared 

the following new case law with the court: Commonwealth v. 

Burton, PICS Case No. 15-1348 (Pa. Super. Aug. 25, 2015) 

Bender, J. (47 pages); To further show why [Brockington’s] 

PCRA and Memorandum of Newly Excepted State Law in Support 

of PCRA Petition should have been granted.

Whether [Brockington] is entitled to a new trial, or remand 

for an Evidentiary Hearing / an Expert on the well-known 

fallibilities of an Eyewitness’s Testimony / Frye Hearing based 

upon: The Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 A.3d 776 (Pa. 2014) 

case; Elaborated on by: Mr. Jules Epstein and Ms. Marissa 

Bluestine in: The Legal Intelligencer, dated: Tues. March 31, 

2015, and an Exhibit (A) in [Brockington’s] Memorandum of 

Newly Excepted State Law In Support of: Post Conviction Relief 

Act Petition.

Brockington’s Brief at vi.
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Before we may address the merits of Brockington’s claims, we must 

determine whether he has properly preserved these issues. As noted above, 

Brockington failed to file a court-ordered concise statement.

Rule 1925 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, in pertinent

part:

(b) Direction to file statement of errors complained of on 

appeal; instructions to the appellant and the trial court. — 

If the judge entering the order giving rise to the notice of appeal 

(“judge”) desires clarification of the errors complained of on 

appeal, the judge may enter an order directing the appellant to 

file of record in the trial court and serve on the judge a concise 

statement of the errors complained of on appeal (“Statement”).

...

(3) Contents of order.--The judge’s order directing the filing and 

service of a Statement shall specify:

...

(iv) that any issue not properly included in the Statement 

timely filed and served pursuant to subdivision (b) shall be 

deemed waived.

...

(4) Requirements; waiver[.]

...

(vii) Issues not included in the Statement and/or not 

raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph 

(b)(4) are waived.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iv), (4)(vii).

To effectuate these provisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 

set forth a bright line rule that, “in order to preserve their claims for 
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appellate review, appellants must comply whenever the trial court orders 

them to file a Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Any issues not raised in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement will 

be deemed waived.” Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 775, 780 (Pa. 

2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1998). This 

bright line rule applies even when the trial or PCRA court has filed an 

opinion. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 509 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“If an appellant 

does not comply with an order to file a Rule 1925(b) statement, all issues on 

appeal are waived--even if the Rule 1925(b) statement was served on the 

trial judge who subsequently addressed in an opinion the issues raised in the 

Rule 1925(b) statement.”), citing Commonwealth v. Schofield, 888 A.2d 

771, 774 (Pa. 2005). See also Greater Erie Indus. Dev. Corp. v. 

Presque Isle Downs, Inc., 88 A.3d 222, 224 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) 

(“our Supreme Court does not countenance anything less than stringent 

application of waiver pursuant to Rule 1925(b)[.]”); Commonwealth v. 

Dozier, 99 A.3d 106, 110 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 628 Pa. 637, 

104 A.3d 523 (Pa. 2014) (finding issues waived for failure to present them in 

concise statement). Accordingly, we conclude all of Brockington’s 

arguments are waived.5

____________________________________________

5

 We note the PCRA court, and the Commonwealth, did not address 

Brockington’s lack of a concise statement. Nevertheless, “we may affirm the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Assuming arguendo that Brockington had properly preserved his 

claims, we would find no error in the PCRA court’s decision to deny him 

relief. When reviewing an order dismissing a PCRA petition, we must 

determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by evidence of 

record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 

1267 (Pa. Super. 2010). “Great deference is granted to the findings of the 

PCRA court, and these findings will not be disturbed unless they have no 

support in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 A.3d 680, 

682 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 72 A.3d 600 (Pa. 

2013). 

Furthermore, “[c]rucial to the determination of any PCRA appeal is the 

timeliness of the underlying petition. Thus, we must [] determine whether 

the instant PCRA petition was timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 35 

A.3d 766, 768 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 53 A.3d 757 (Pa. 2012).

The PCRA timeliness requirement ... is mandatory and 

jurisdictional in nature. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 

1035, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 715, 951 

A.2d 1163 (2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa. 

1, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (2000)). The court cannot ignore a 

petition’s untimeliness and reach the merits of the petition. Id.

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 

134 S. Ct. 2695 (U.S. 2014). 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

PCRA court’s order on any basis.” Commonwealth v. Reed, 107 A.3d 137, 

144 (Pa. Super. 2014).
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A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date the 

underlying judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment 

is deemed final “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary 

review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(3). Here, Brockington’s judgment of sentence became final on 

March 14, 2001, when the period for Brockington to file a petition for writ of 

certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(3); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13(a). Therefore, Brockington had one year 

from that date, or until March 14, 2002, to file a timely PCRA petition. See 

Taylor, supra. The instant petition was not submitted until June 15, 2015, 

making it patently untimely.

An untimely PCRA petition may, nevertheless, be considered if one of 

the following three exceptions applies:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 

to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 

this section and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively.
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42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). Furthermore, a PCRA petition alleging any of 

the exceptions under Section 9545(b)(1) must be filed within 60 days of 

when the PCRA claim could have first been brought. 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(2).

In rejecting Brockington’s arguments, the PCRA court opined as 

follows:

In this case, [Brockington] has failed to demonstrate any 

exception to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA. In his 

PCRA petition, he cited the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 

decision in Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766 (Pa. 2014) 

as a case which create a new constitutional right held to be 

retroactively applicable. However, Walker was decided on May 

28, 2014, over a year prior to [Brockington]’s instant PCRA 

petition, which places it outside the sixty day requrirement.2 

Accordingly, [Brockington]’s PCRA petition was untimely and did 

not entitle him to relief.3

______________________

2

 Walker also did not include any reference or indication 

within the body of the decision or any subsequent 

decisions that it applies retroactively. Absent some 

indication that Walker is retroactively applicable, even if 

[Brockington]’s PCRA petition had been filed within sixty 

days of the date Walker was decided, it would not afford 

[Brockington] any relief. See Commonwealth v. 

Copenhefer, 941 A.2d 646, 649-50 (Pa. 2007) (language 

in the PCRA statute “has been held” requires court to 

recognize a new right and hold that it is to be applied 

retroactively).

3

 In [Brockington]’s response to the Court’s Notice of 

Intent to Dismiss, [Brockington] cited the Superior Court’s 

recent decision of Commonwealth v. Burton, 121 A.3d 

1063 (Pa. Super. 2015). The Court notes that Burton was 

decided after [Brockington]’s PCRA petition was filed. The 

Court further notes that [Brockington] misconstrues the 

impact of Burton, which discussed the after-discovered 
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evidence exception to the timeliness requirements of the 

PCRA. [Brockington]’s characterization of Burton is 

misplaced because the basis for his requested relief in this 

case was Walker, which falls under the exception of a new 

constitutional right. The creation of a new constitutional 

right is separate and distinct from after-discovered 

evidence. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(ii), (iii).

______________________

PCRA Court Opinion, 12/17/2015, at 4-5.

After reviewing Brockington’s arguments, the record, and our case 

law, we would affirm on the basis of the PCRA court’s opinion. Brockington

has not established any of the timeliness exceptions to the PCRA 

requirements. As such, we would agree with the PCRA court that it lacked 

jurisdiction to address Brockington’s claims, and we would discern no abuse 

of discretion by the court. Accordingly, we affirm.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/17/2016