II 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2019 

To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United 

States, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 10, 2021 

Mr. MARKEY (for himself and Mr. MERKLEY) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons 

to the United States, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Hastening Arms Limi5 tations Talks Act of 2021’’ or the ‘‘HALT Act of 2021’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress makes the following findings: 

8 (1) The use of nuclear weapons poses an exis9 tential threat to humanity, a fact that led President 

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1 chev to declare in a joint statement in 1987 that a 

2 ‘‘nuclear war cannot be won and must never be 

3 fought’’. 

4 (2) On June 12, 1982, an estimated 1,000,000 

5 people attended the largest peace rally in United 

6 States history, in support of a movement to freeze 

7 and reverse the nuclear arms race, a movement that 

8 helped to create the political will necessary for the 

9 negotiation of several bilateral arms control treaties 

10 between the United States and former Soviet Union, 

11 and then the Russian Federation. Those treaties 

12 contributed to strategic stability through mutual and 

13 verifiable reciprocal nuclear weapons reductions. 

14 (3) Since the advent of nuclear weapons in 

15 1945, millions of people around the world have stood 

16 up to demand meaningful, immediate international 

17 action to halt, reduce, and eliminate the threats 

18 posed by nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons testing, 

19 and nuclear war, to humankind and the planet. 

20 (4) In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera21 tion of Nuclear Weapons done at Washington, Lon22 don, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483) (com23 monly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

24 Treaty’’ or the ‘‘NPT’’) entered into force, which in25 cludes a binding obligation on the 5 nuclear-weapon 


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1 states (commonly referred to as the ‘‘P5’’), among 

2 other things, ‘‘to pursue negotiations in good faith 

3 on effective measures relating to the cessation of the 

4 nuclear arms race . . . and to nuclear disar5 mament’’. 

6 (5) Bipartisan United States global leadership 

7 has curbed the growth in the number of countries 

8 possessing nuclear weapons and has slowed overall 

9 vertical proliferation among countries already pos10 sessing nuclear weapons, as is highlighted by a more 

11 than 85-percent reduction in the United States nu12 clear weapons stockpile from its Cold War height of 

13 31,255 in 1967. 

14 (6) The United States testing of nuclear weap15 ons is no longer necessary as a result of the fol16 lowing major technical developments since the Sen17 ate’s consideration of the Comprehensive Nuclear18 Test-Ban Treaty (commonly referred to as the 

19 ‘‘CTBT’’) in 1999: 

20 (A) The verification architecture of the 

21 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Orga22 nization (commonly referred to as the 

23 ‘‘CTBTO’’)— 

24 (i) has made significant advance25 ments, as seen through its network of 300 


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1 International Monitoring Stations and its 

2 International Data Centre, which together 

3 provide for the near instantaneous detec4 tion of nuclear explosives tests, including 

5 all 6 such tests conducted by North Korea 

6 between 2006 and 2017; and 

7 (ii) is operational 24 hours a day, 7 

8 days a week. 

9 (B) Since the United States signed the 

10 CTBT, confidence has grown in the science11 based Stockpile Stewardship and Management 

12 Plan of the Department of Energy, which forms 

13 the basis of annual certifications to the Presi14 dent regarding the continual safety, security, 

15 and effectiveness of the United States nuclear 

16 deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing, 

17 leading former Secretary of Energy Ernest 

18 Moniz to remark in 2015 that ‘‘lab directors 

19 today now state that they certainly understand 

20 much more about how nuclear weapons work 

21 than during the period of nuclear testing’’. 

22 (7) Despite the progress made to reduce the 

23 number and role of, and risks posed by, nuclear 

24 weapons, and to halt the Cold War-era nuclear arms 

25 race, tensions between countries that possess nuclear 


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1 weapons are on the rise, key nuclear risk reduction 

2 treaties are under threat, significant stockpiles of 

3 weapons-usable fissile material remain, and a quali4 tative global nuclear arms race is now underway 

5 with each of the countries that possess nuclear 

6 weapons spending tens of billions of dollars each 

7 year to maintain and improve their arsenals. 

8 (8) The Russian Federation is pursuing the de9 velopment of destabilizing types of nuclear weapons 

10 that are not presently covered under any existing 

11 arms control treaty or agreement and the People’s 

12 Republic of China, India, Pakistan, and North 

13 Korea have each taken concerning steps to diversify 

14 their more modest sized, but nonetheless very dead15 ly, nuclear arsenals. 

16 (9) Former President Donald J. Trump’s 2018 

17 Nuclear Posture Review called for the development 

18 of two new nuclear weapons capabilities, which have 

19 the effect of lowering the threshold for nuclear weap20 ons use: 

21 (A) A low-yield warhead on a submarine22 launched ballistic missile, which was deployed 

23 before the date of the enactment of this Act. 


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1 (B) A sea-launched cruise missile, still 

2 under development on the date of the enact3 ment of this Act. 

4 (10) On February 3, 2021, President Joseph R. 

5 Biden preserved binding and verifiable limits on the 

6 deployed and non-deployed strategic forces of the 

7 largest two nuclear weapons powers through the 

8 five-year extension of the Treaty between the United 

9 States of America and the Russian Federation on 

10 Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation 

11 of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, 

12 and entered into force February 5, 2011 (commonly 

13 referred to as the ‘‘New START Treaty’’). 

14 (11) In 2013, the report on a nuclear weapons 

15 employment strategy of the United States submitted 

16 under section 492 of title 10, United States Code, 

17 determined that it is possible to ensure the security 

18 of the United States and allies and partners of the 

19 United States and maintain a strong and credible 

strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a 1 20 ⁄3

21 reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level 

22 established in the New START Treaty. 

23 (12) On January 12, 2017, then-Vice President 

24 Biden stated, ‘‘[G]iven our non-nuclear capabilities 

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1 sion a plausible scenario in which the first use of nu2 clear weapons by the United States would be nec3 essary. Or make sense.’’. 

4 (13) In light of moves by the United States and 

5 other countries to increase their reliance on nuclear 

6 weapons, a global nuclear freeze would seek to halt 

7 the new nuclear arms race by seeking conclusion of 

8 a comprehensive and verifiable freeze on the testing, 

9 deployment, and production of nuclear weapons and 

10 delivery vehicles for such weapons. 

11 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

12 The following is the policy of the United States: 

13 (1) The United States should build upon its 

14 decades long, bipartisan efforts to reduce the num15 ber and salience of nuclear weapons by leading inter16 national negotiations on specific arms-reduction 

17 measures as part of a 21st century global nuclear 

18 freeze movement. 

19 (2) Building on the successful extension of the 

20 New START Treaty, the United States should en21 gage with all other countries that possess nuclear 

22 weapons to seek to negotiate and conclude future 

23 multilateral arms control, disarmament, and risk re24 duction agreements, which should contain some or 

25 all of the following provisions: 


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1 (A) An agreement by the United States 

2 and the Russian Federation on a follow-on trea3 ty or agreement to the New START Treaty 

4 that may lower the central limits of the Treaty 

5 and cover new kinds of strategic delivery vehi6 cles or non-strategic nuclear weapons. 

7 (B) An agreement on a verifiable freeze on 

8 the testing, production, and further deployment 

9 of all nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for 

10 such weapons. 

11 (C) An agreement that establishes a 

12 verifiable numerical ceiling on the deployed 

13 shorter-range and intermediate-range and stra14 tegic delivery systems (as defined by the INF 

15 Treaty and the New START Treaty, respec16 tively) and the nuclear warheads associated 

17 with such systems belonging to the P5, and to 

18 the extent possible, all countries that possess 

19 nuclear weapons, at August 2, 2019, levels. 

20 (D) An agreement by each country to 

21 adopt a policy of no first use of nuclear weap22 ons or provide transparency into its nuclear de23 claratory policy. 

24 (E) An agreement on a proactive United 

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1 pands access by the International Atomic En2 ergy Agency to any country found by the Board 

3 of Governors of that Agency to be noncompliant 

4 with its obligations under the NPT. 

5 (F) An agreement to refrain from config6 uring nuclear forces in a ‘‘launch on warning’’ 

7 or ‘‘launch under warning’’ nuclear posture, 

8 which may prompt a nuclear armed country to 

9 launch a ballistic missile attack in response to 

10 detection by an early-warning satellite or sensor 

11 of a suspected incoming ballistic missile. 

12 (G) An agreement not to target or inter13 fere in the nuclear command, control, and com14 munications (commonly referred to as ‘‘NC3’’) 

15 infrastructure of another country through a ki16 netic attack or a cyberattack. 

17 (H) An agreement on transparency meas18 ures or verifiable limits, or both, on hypersonic 

19 cruise missiles and glide vehicles that are fired 

20 from sea-based, ground, and air platforms. 

21 (I) An agreement to provide a baseline and 

22 continuous exchanges detailing the aggregate 

23 number of active nuclear weapons and associ24 ated systems possessed by each country. 


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1 (3) The United States should rejuvenate efforts 

2 in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament 

3 toward the negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Mate4 rial Treaty or Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, or 

5 move negotiations to another international body or 

6 fora, such as a meeting of the P5. Successful conclu7 sion of such a treaty would verifiably prevent any 

8 country’s production of highly enriched uranium and 

9 plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. 

10 (4) The United States should convene a series 

11 of head-of-state level summits on nuclear disar12 mament modeled on the Nuclear Security Summits 

13 process, which saw the elimination of the equivalent 

14 of 3,000 nuclear weapons. 

15 (5) The President should seek ratification by 

16 the Senate of the CTBT and mobilize all countries 

17 covered by Annex 2 of the CTBT to pursue similar 

18 action to hasten entry into force of the CTBT. The 

19 entry into force of the CTBT, for which ratification 

20 by the United States will provide critical momentum, 

21 will activate the CTBT’s onsite inspection provision 

22 to investigate allegations that any country that is a 

23 party to the CTBT has conducted a nuclear test of 

24 any yield. 


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1 (6) The President should make the accession of 

2 North Korea to the CTBT a component of any final 

3 agreement in fulfilling the pledges the Government 

4 of North Korea made in Singapore, as North Korea 

5 is reportedly the only country to have conducted a 

6 nuclear explosive test since 1998. 

7 (7) The United States should— 

8 (A) refrain from developing any new de9 signs for nuclear warheads or bombs, but espe10 cially designs that could add a level of technical 

11 uncertainty into the United States stockpile and 

12 thus renew calls to resume nuclear explosive 

13 testing in order to test that new design; and 

14 (B) seek reciprocal commitments from 

15 other countries that possess nuclear weapons. 

16 SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR NUCLEAR 

17 TEST EXPLOSIONS. 

18 (a) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds authorized to 

19 be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 

20 2022 or any fiscal year thereafter, or authorized to be ap21 propriated or otherwise made available for any fiscal year 

22 before fiscal year 2022 and available for obligation as of 

23 the date of the enactment of this Act, may be obligated 

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1 plosive nuclear weapons test that produces any yield until 

2 such time as— 

3 (1) the President submits to Congress an ad4 dendum to the report required by section 4205 of 

5 the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2525) 

6 that details any change to the condition of the 

7 United States nuclear weapons stockpile from the 

8 report submitted under that section in the preceding 

9 year; and 

10 (2) there is enacted into law a joint resolution 

11 of Congress that approves the test. 

12 (b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Subsection (a) does 

13 not limit nuclear stockpile stewardship activities that are 

14 consistent with the zero-yield standard and other require15 ments under law. 

Æ 


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