BLD-036 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 16-3117

___________

DARRELL PARKS,

Appellant

v.

A. JORDAN, DISCIPLINE HEARING OFFICER

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 1-13-cv-02912)

District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell

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Submitted for Possible Summary Action

Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

November 3, 2016

Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 21, 2016)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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Darrell Parks, a federal inmate, appeals an order of the District Court denying his 

motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to reopen habeas proceedings 

brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily 

affirm. 

In 2013, Parks filed a § 2241 petition alleging that his due process rights were 

violated in connection with a disciplinary hearing at which he was found to have 

committed the violation of “Engaging in a Sexual Act.” Although the disciplinary 

hearing did not result in the loss of any good time credits, Parks alleged that the sanctions 

imposed resulted in the denial of parole. The District Court denied the petition on the 

merits. Parks appealed. We concluded that the District Court should have dismissed the 

petition without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, and we affirmed the judgment as 

modified on that basis. Parks v. Jordan, 573 F. App’x 233, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2014) (not 

precedential) (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005), for the proposition 

that an attack on parole proceedings does not lie at “the core of habeas corpus” where 

success “does not mean immediate release from confinement or a shorter stay in prison” 

but rather, “at most [means] new eligibility review, which at most will speed 

consideration of [parole].”).

In May 2016, Parks filed a motion to reopen, citing Rules 60(b)(2) and 60(b)(6). 

He asserted that a decision denying parole on November 9, 2015, constituted “newly 

discovered evidence” and that the District Court should have treated his petition as 

raising civil rights claims. The District Court denied the motion, holding that it was 
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untimely under Rule 60(b)(2) and that Parks failed to demonstrate extraordinary 

circumstances under Rule 60(b)(6). Parks appealed.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review is for abuse of 

discretion. Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008). We may 

summarily affirm if the appeal presents no substantial question. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 

I.O.P. 10.6. 

A Rule 60(b)(2) motion grounded on newly discovered evidence must be filed 

within one year after judgment is entered. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(c)(1). Here, the 

District Court’s judgment was entered on February 7, 2014. Parks filed the Rule 60(b) 

motion over two years later, in May 2016. Under these circumstances, we conclude that 

the District Court properly determined that Parks’ request for relief under Rule 60(b)(2) 

was time-barred. But even if the motion were considered timely, Parks would not be 

entitled to 60(b) relief based on the November 9, 2015 decision denying parole. As we 

explained in our prior decision, the “fact that the disciplinary infraction may affect Parks’ 

chances at parole is insufficient to bring his due process claims within the ambit of 

habeas.” Parks, 573 F. App’x at 235. Notably, the November 9, 2015 parole decision 

was based on three disciplinary infractions, only one of which Parks seeks to challenge 

here. 

We also agree that Parks was not entitled to Rule 60(b)(6) relief based on his 

assertion that the District Court should have construed his § 2241 petition as raising civil 

rights claims. According to Parks, the District Court failed to adjudicate claims in his 
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§ 2241 for “retaliation, freedom of speech, and the constitutionally of 28 Code of Federal 

Regulation § 541.8(f).” Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is “available only in cases evidencing 

extraordinary circumstances.” Martinez-McBean v. Gov’t of V.I., 562 F.2d 908, 911 (3d 

Cir. 1977) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Parks’ contention that the 

District Court misconstrued arguments raised in his habeas petition was a matter for 

appeal, and is not an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 

We note that we previously advised Parks that “[d]ismissal [of his § 2241 petition] should 

be without prejudice to [his] ability to pursue his claims in a civil rights action pursuant 

to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).” Parks, 573 F. App’x at 

236. Parks does not indicate whether he filed such an action. 

Because we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Parks’ motion for reconsideration, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 

judgment.