NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

LISA LYNN ANDREWS, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0566 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2011-127769-001

The Honorable Joseph C. Welty, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Susan L. Luder

Counsel for Respondent

Lisa Lynn Andrews, Goodyear

Petitioner
STATE v. ANDREWS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Margaret H. Downie joined.

N O R R I S, Judge:

¶1 Lisa Lynn Andrews petitions this court for review from the 

summary dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. We grant 

review but deny relief.

¶2 A jury convicted Andrews of possession of dangerous drugs 

for sale, possession or use of marijuana, and possession of drug 

paraphernalia. This court affirmed her convictions on direct appeal.

¶3 In her petition for review, Andrews argues the arresting 

officer lacked probable cause to arrest her and, therefore, the officer’s search 

incident to the arrest was unlawful. Because these claims could have been 

raised on direct appeal, we do not address them here. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(a) (defendant precluded from post-conviction relief based upon a 

ground that could have been raised on direct appeal); see State v. Shrum, 220 

Ariz. 115, 118, ¶ 12, 203 P.3d 1175, 1178 (2009) (“Rule 32.2(a) precludes 

collateral relief on a ground that either was or could have been raised on 

direct appeal . . . .”) (citation omitted). 

¶4 Andrews also argues her trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to challenge the arrest and subsequent search in the superior court.

Reviewing the superior court’s dismissal of Andrews’ petition for 

post-conviction relief for an abuse of discretion, we reject this argument. See 

State v. Martinez, 226 Ariz. 464, 466, ¶ 6, 250 P.3d 241, 243 (App. 2011) 

(appellate court reviews denial of post-conviction relief for an abuse of 

discretion). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must show, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient and, 

second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 686

(1984). A defendant must satisfy both elements to prevail on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Febles, 210 Ariz. 589, 596, ¶ 18, 115 

P.3d 629, 636 (App. 2005).

¶5 Applying that framework here, Andrews has not shown that 

she was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to challenge the search. “To 
STATE v. ANDREWS

Decision of the Court

3

make a warrantless arrest, a police officer must have probable cause to 

believe both that a crime has been committed and that the person to be

arrested committed the crime.” State v. Keener, 206 Ariz. 29, 32, ¶ 15, 75 P.3d 

119, 122 (App. 2003). As the superior court noted in its dismissal of 

Andrews’ post-conviction petition, the arresting officer knew that Andrews 

was involved in an altercation where another woman sustained injuries. 

“[W]hether probable cause exists depends on all of the facts and 

circumstances known at the time of the arrest.” Id. at 32, ¶ 15, 75 P.3d at 122.

Thus, the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest Andrews for assault 

and, in turn, conduct a search incident to the arrest. Because the arresting 

officer had probable cause, Andrews’ trial counsel was not ineffective for 

failing to challenge the search.

1

¶6 For the foregoing reasons, the superior court properly 

dismissed Andrews’ petition for post-conviction relief. Thus, although we 

grant review, we deny relief.

 

1Subsumed within her ineffective assistance of counsel 

argument, Andrews also argues the arresting officer lacked probable cause 

because she was the alleged victim—and was acting in self-defense—in the 

altercation that led to her arrest. The arresting officer’s police report, 

however, indicated that he arrested Andrews based on the injuries to the 

other woman involved in the altercation and statements made by other 

witnesses. Although Andrews disputes the information contained within 

the report, probable cause is determined, as noted above, “on all of the facts 

and circumstances known at the time of the arrest.” Keener, 206 Ariz. at 32, 

¶ 15, 75 P.3d at 122. Thus, Andrews’ factual dispute with the police report 

does not negate probable cause and the officer’s subsequent arrest and 

search.