NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 17

- 2317

___________ MATTHEW JONES ,

Appellant

v. HARRINGTON DELAWARE POLICE DEPARTMENT; JUSTICE OF THE PEACE NUMBER 6, in Kent County , Delaware

_________

___________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware (D.C. Civil Action No. 1

- 17

- cv - 00395 ) District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Ci rcuit LAR 34.1(a)

July 12, 2018 Before: VANASKIE, COWEN, and NYGAARD , Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : July 16, 2018 )

___________ OPINION *

___________ PER CURIAM Pro se Appellant Matthew Jones appeals from the dismissal of his complaint as frivolous, and because it so ught monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full C ourt and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not2

such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (i) & (iii)

. 1 For the following reasons, we will
affirm the judgment

. Jones filed a complaint seeking $7 billion in damages against the Harrington
Pol ice Department and the Justice of the Peace Court No. 6 . He alleged that on September 23, 2016, an officer from the Harrington Police Department pulled over his
vehicle because he was not wearing a seatbelt. He maintains that he informed the officer
that he “ desperately needed medical treatment , ” and that he had been the victim of

numerous crimes , including that he was kidnapped a t birth and held captive for thirty
years by Linda C. Jones ( who is listed on his birth certificate as his mother ) , and that
th ere had been numerous attempts on his life

. The officer offered to call a “Mental Health Ambulance,” which Jones declined. The complaint alleges that the officer issued
Jones a ticket, rather than investigate the crimes against him

. Jones also alleged that the Justice of the Peace Court “completely ignored crimes committed against me , ” including that he was used as “ a sex slave for the police, law enforcement, the criminal justice system, politicians, government officials and criminals.” Jones asserts that he has suff ered injuries as a result of the crimes against
him. As a basis for his action, he lists a multitude of criminal and civil s tatutes , in cluding 18 U.S.C. §§ 594, 1583 & 1589 ( “Intimi dation of voters , ” “Enticement into slavery , ” and

constitute binding precedent. 1 Jones was granted in forma pauperis (IFP) status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915

.3

“ Forced labor ” ), and t he first fifteen amendments to the U.S. Constitution , none of which
he relates to the allegations in his complaint

. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise de novo review

over dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), see Mitchell v. Horn , 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003), and over legal determinations regarding immunity , see Dotzel v. Ashbridge , 438 F.3d 320, 324

- 25 (3d Cir. 2006)

. A complaint is frivolous where it relies on an “indisputably meritless legal theory,” such as where the defendants are “ immune from
suit. ” Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
To the extent J ones sought to impose liability on the Harrington Police Department for the acts of its police officers, t he District Court properly determined that
the claim lacks a basis in law . The Police Depar t ment cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action on a theory of respondeat superior, and Jones failed to allege facts demonstrating the existence of a municipal policy or custom that led to the alle ged c onstitutional
violation. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 690

- 91 (1978); Mulholland v. Gov’t Cty. of Berks , 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir. 2013)

. W e also agree with the District Court that Jones’ claims a gainst the Justice of the
Peace Court are b arred by the Eleventh Amendment, which protects a state or state agency from suit, unless Congress has specifically abrogated the state's immunity or the state has waived its own immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89, 1 00 (1984); Laskaris v. Thornburgh , 661 F.2d 23, 25

- 26 (3d Cir. 1981). The
J ustice of the Peace C ourt is a “court[ ] of record” in Delaware , vested with judicial4

power by t he Delaware Constitution , see Del. Const. a rt. IV § 1

. Shoemaker v. State , 375
A.2 d 431, 439 n.12 (Del. 1977). As such , it is an “arm of the state” entitled to immunity
from suit. See Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc. , 873 F.2d 655, 658 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc) (a state agency or department is an “arm of the state” when a judgment against it “would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment
ag a in s t the State itself”) (citation omitted)

. Because Delaware has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity , t he c laims against the Justice of the Peace Cour t No. 6

were subject to dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). We perceive no error in the District Court’s determination that amendment of the complaint would have been futile, as there are no factual allegations from which we can
infer that Jones could ha ve an actionable claim for relief. See Maiden Creek Assocs. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp. , 8 23 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that review of a district court’s futility determination is de novo)

. Nor, in light of the foregoing, do we find error
with its decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any alleged state
law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also Maher Terminals, LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y.
& N.J. , 805 F.3d 98, 104 (3d Cir. 2015)

. A ccordingly, we will affirm the District Court ’s judgment.