* Pursuant to L ocal Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

1 Double G. is a corporate joint venture between National Steel

Corporati on and Bethlehem Steel Corporation, each of whom owns

fifty percent of Double G.’s stock.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

___________________

No. 96-60485

Summary Calendar

___________________

EDDIE HARRIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DOUBLE G. COATINGS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson Division

(3:95-CV-478-LN)

-------------------- May 5, 1997

Before GARWOOD, JOLLY, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. *

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:

Eddie Harris appeals the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to Double G. Coatings, Inc., in his Title VII and 42

U.S.C. § 1981 employment discrimination lawsuit. We affirm.

Facts and Proceedings Below

Double G. is a continuous process steel coat ing mill which

operates year-round on a twenty-four hour basis. 1 In June of 19952

Harris, who is black, was employed by Double G. as an Electrical

Maintenance Technician. Joe Bagwell, who is white, also worked for

Double G. as a Mechanical Maintenance Technician. Both men had

been hired by Double G. in 1993, shortly after its Jackson plant

began start-up operations.

On June 8, 1995, Double G. posted a notice advising that, due

to the promotion of Mike Meadows from Mechanical Engineer to Plant

Manager, there was an opening available for the position of

Mechanical Main tenance Coordinator (MMC). This notice stated in

pertinent part the following:

“ Qualified Mechanical Maintenance Coordinator Candidates Must

Possess:

- A 4-year B.S. college degree in a related technical

field, preferably in mechanical engineering; or a 2-year

technical college degree and 10 years of mechanical

maintenance and supervision; or no advanced degree and 20

years of mechanical maintenance and supervision,

- Excellent technical knowledge of the coating line,

- Good communications and interpersonal skills,

- Leadership ability, and

- Solid team orientation.”

The notice did not set forth any additional qualif ications or

criteria to govern how the promotion decision would be made.

Four Double G. employees applied for the position; of these,

only two, Harris a nd Bagwell, met the minimum requirements

established by the job notice. Both Harris and Bagwell were

interviewed by Meadows, who ultimately decided to give Bagwell the

promotion.

Harris, upset with this result, filed this lawsuit on July 7,2 Double G. has an established policy against employment

discr imination and a procedure whereby a human resources manager

receives complaints regarding violations of the policy. Harris

opted to forego Double G.’s internal grievance procedure.

3 1995, asserting violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII.

Harris alleged that he had been denied advancement in the company

due to his race and thus was a victim of Doub le G.’s allegedly

discriminatory employment practices. 2 Double G. moved for summary

judgment on January 3, 1996; the district court granted this motion

on May 10, 1996. Harris moved on May 28 to alter or amend the

judgment, or “for relief from judgment,” or for reconsideration,

and on May 29 to amend his complaint. Both motions were denied on

June 25, 1996. Harris timely noticed an appeal from the district

court’s final judgment of May 10 and the May 25 order denying his

post-judgment motions.

Discussion

In reviewing a district court’s grant of summary judgment we

consider the record de novo

, applying the same legal standards

which governed the district co urt’s determination. W ittorf v.

Shell Oil Co.

, 37 F.3d 1151, 1 154 (5th Cir. 1994). We first

determine the applicable law in order to isolate material factual

issues a nd then review the admissible summary judgment evidence

bearing on those issues, viewing all facts and infe rences drawn

from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. M acMillan v. United States

, 46 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir.3 The elements of unemployment discrimination claims under Title

VII and section 1981 are identical. A nderson v. Douglas & Lomason

Co., Inc.

, 26 F.3d 1277, 1284 n.7 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations

omitted), cert. denied , 115 S.Ct. 1099 (1995).

4 1995) (citations omitted).

In a failure to promote case under Title VII and/or section

1981, 3 the plaintif f bears the initial burden of demonstrating a

prima facie case of discrimination. Gonzalez v. Carlin , 907 F.2d

573, 578 (5th Cir. 1990), citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs

v. Burdine

, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093 (1981). If the plaintiff is able

to make out a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to

the employer, who must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for not promoting the plaintiff. W illiams v. Time Warner

Operations, Inc.

, 98 F.3d 179, 18 1 (5th Cir. 1996). If the

employer articulates such a justification for its action, the

burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s

proffered reason(s) are pretextual; this final burden merges with

the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of persuading the court that he or

she has been the victim of intentional racial discrimination.

Burdine , 101 S.Ct. at 1095.

For purposes of this appeal we assume, as did the district

court, that Harris was able to establish a prima facie case.

Furthermore, we find Double G.’s stated reasons for promoting

Bagwell over Harris to be both legitimate and nondiscriminatory.

Thus, we turn to an assessment of whether Harris produced4 Our inquiry is limited to the existence vel non of a racially

disc riminatory animus on Double G.’s part. Consequently, we

decline “to weigh the wisdom of any particular employment decision;

Title VII does not aut horize federal courts to sit as a superpersonnel department that reexamines an entity’s business

decisions.” R uby v. Springfield R-12 Public School Dist.

, 76 F.3d

909, 912 n.7 (8th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Stated another way, “[Harris] must create an issue

as to whether the employer honestly believes in the reasons it

of fers, not whether [Double G.] made a bad decision.” S ample v.

Aldi, Inc.

, 61 F.3d 544, 549 (7th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

5 sufficient evidence of pretext to render the alleged discriminatory

intent of Double G. a triable issue. See Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil

Tools , 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

Double G.’s proffered reason for promoting Bagwell is in

essence a submission that it considered he was better qualified for

the job than was Harris. Harris counters that, based upon criteria

established by Double G., it was he who possessed the superior

credentials. The nature of this dispute obligates us to engage in

a comparison of the two men’s qualifications at th e time of the

promotion to de termine whether any disparity in those

qualifications supports an inference of purposeful discrimination.

We emphasize, however, that the issue in this case is not which man

was in fact more qualified, 4 but rather whether Harris’s objective

qualifications for the MMC position so clearly exce eded those of

Bagwell that a reasonable juror could affirmatively conclude that

invidious discrimination, rather than an assessment of

qualifications, was shown to have in fact played a part in Double5 Obviously, our review is concerned with evidence bearing upon

the relevant qualifications of the men that were known by Double G.

at the time the employment decision was made. Harris argues in

brief that Bagwell’s two prior criminal co nvictions and his

involvement in a gas leak which occurred several weeks after he was

promoted serve to undermine his qualifications for the position.

The record reveals that the convictions were not known to Double G.

until Bagwell was deposed for purposes of this lawsuit, and of

course the leak occurred a fter the employment decision had been

mad e. These matters are therefore irrelevant to the issue

presented, their consideration being a proper matter for Bagwell’s

supervisors at Double G. and not this Court.

6 G.’s promoting Bagwell ove r Harris. A mburgey v. Corhart

Refractories Corp., Inc.

, 936 F.2d 805, 813-814 (5 th Cir. 1991);

Thornburgh v. Columbus & Greenville R. Co.

, 760 F.2d 633, 647 (5th

Cir. 1985). This approach is based upon the straightforward view

that “[e]veryone can make a mistake——but if the mistake is large

enough, we may begin to wonder whet her it was a mistake at all.”

Amburgey

, 936 F.2d at 814, quoting Thornburgh

, 760 F.2d at 647.

Accordingly, we exa mine the competent summary judgment evidence

adduced to determine whether Harris was “clearly better qualified”

for the position of MMC than Bagwell. 5 E EOC v. Texas Instruments,

Inc.

, 100 F.3d 1173, 1184 (5th Cir. 1996); Nichols v. Loral Vought

Systems Corp.

, 81 F.3d 38, 42 (5th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Louisiana

Office of Community Services , 47 F.3d 1438, 1444 (5th Cir. 1995);

Odom v. Frank

, 3 F.3d 839, 845-846 (5th Cir. 1993); Walther v. Lone

Star Gas Co.

, 952 F.2d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1992); Amburgey

, 936 F.2d

at 813-814; Thornburgh , 760 F.2d at 647.

As a threshold matter, we must determine what criteria Meadows6 This reading is supported by the deposition testimony of

Meadows and Moore, who testified that educational background was

listed first because they understood that to be the convention in

formulating job notices.

7 This reading accords with Moore’s deposition testimony, which

relates that satisfying the listed qualifications, including any of

7 and Double G.’s president, Sam Moore, devised to govern the

promotion decision. Harris argues that the notice posted by Double

G.’s management provides the exc lusive criteria; in so doing he

seeks to present himself, through a bizarre calculus based upon the

education and work history criterion set forth disjunctively in the

first subpart of that notice, as the most qualified candidate by

virtue of a mathematical fait accompli

. We disagree with Harris’s

reading of the notice, finding instead that the qualifications

contained therein are minimum qualifications, i.e.

, qualifications

which competent candidates “must possess,” designed to limit the

pool of pr ospective applicants. 6 As such, the notice, while it

might have functioned as an indicator of factors Meadows would

c onsider, did not necessarily prescribe the exclusive criteria

governing Double G.’s decision.

Turning to the language of the notice itself, we observe that

the requirements set forth in its fir st subpart are stated

disjunctively. Unlike Harris, we do not discern from this any

priority to educational achievement ; rather, possession of the

requisite education or work experience suffices to qualify an

indivi dual under this subpart. 7 Additionally, the first subpart,the three set forth in the first subpart, entitled the applicant to

an interview. In addition, Moore and Pat VanDomelen, Double G.’s

human resources manager, both testified that the notice for the MMC

position was based upon an earlier notice seeking candidates for a

Team Coordinator position, a production line job which required

more in the way of traditional management skills than the MMC

position. Both Moore and Mike Meadows stated that the promotion

decision was based on “the entire package” that the applicants

brought to the table.

8 Harris did state in his deposition that the subject position

was merely an ordinary “s upervisory” position, but provided no

specific details or ex amples to support this quite general

conclusion. Given the copious amount of specific and detailed

information provided by Double G., particularly in the affidavits

and deposition testimony of Ezio DiFrancesco and Meadows, regarding

the “continuous improvement” approach underlying Double G.’s “minimill” concept, Harris’s self-serving conclusory statements are

insufficient to create a triable fact issue on this point. L ittle

v. Liquid Air Corp.

, 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).

8 while typically the most plainly discernible froma resumé,

comprises only one of five listed criterion. The notice does not

expressly assign to any of these criterion a place of pre-eminent

importance and we decline to imply such a hierarchy.

We review the qualifications of the two men based upon the

factors set out in the notice as they relate to what the record

reveals are the actual requirements for the job at issue. While

Harris is certa inly entitled to challenge Double G.’s

characterization of the industrial philosophy underlying the

subject position, he has failed to present any competent evidence

rebutting the affidavits and deposition testimo ny discussing the

role of the MMC in the context of Double G.’s “mini-mill” scheme. 8

See EEOC

, 47 F.3d at 1445-1446 (“we decline to substitute our9

judgment for the employer in evaluating what types of experience

are most valuable for an employee in the new position in the

absence of proof that the standards were not consistently applied

or were so irrational or idiosyncratic as to suggest a cover-up”);

Odom

, 3 F.3d at 847 (“as a general rule judges are not as well

suited by training or experience to evalu ate qualifications for

high level promotion in other disciplines as are those persons who

have trained and worked for years in the field of endeavor for

which the applicants under consideration are being evaluated”).

Accordingly, we compare the two men’s backgrounds and demonstrated

abilities in light of what the record reveals are the actual

parameters of the MMC position and decline to speculate concerning

hypothetical job descriptions extrapolated from the promotion

notice.

In June of 1995, Harris, the plaintiff, held a Bachelor of

Science Degree in Industrial T echnology Management from Jackson

State University and an Associate Degree in Electronic Technology

from Hinds Junior College. He testified during his deposition that

he had worked at Siemens-Allis for nine years; during his first

four years there he tested circuit breakers, and the remainder of

his time he spent as a senior engineering technician. Harris then

moved to Vickers, Inc., where he worked from 1980 until 1993 as a

“maintenance supervisor.” Harris asserts that his duties at both

Siemens and Vickers required him to engage in both mechanical and10

electrical maintenance, but concedes that after 1990 he performed

almost exclusively electrical maintenance work.

In June of 1995 Bagwell had over twenty years of experience as

a mechanic, having worked as a millwright for Connor Steel

Corporation, in Birmingham, Alabama, from 1970 through 1983, and as

a hydraulic technician for Bayou Steel in LaPlace, Louisiana, from

1983 through 19 91. During his last two years at Bayou Steel

Bagwell was “lead man” in the Hydraulic Department, a supervisory

position. From 1991 to 1993, when he was hired by Double G.,

Bagwell worked as a repairman, fixing and refitting mobile homes.

Bagwell had minimal acade mic qualifications, having attended a

junior college, in an industrial engineering curriculum, for only

one year.

Turning to the other competent record evidence, we consider

first the affidavit and deposition testimony of Ezio DiFrancesco,

an operation consultant for Bethlehem Steel-Homer Research Lab who

assisted in the start-up phase of Double G.’s Jackson plant. In

his affidavit, DiFrancesco averred that he has trained numerous

supervisory employees for p ositions like Double G.’s MMC and

discusses the technical adaptability and basic mechanical know-how

require d of the position. DiFrancesco tied this job description

into the “mini-mill” concept underlying Double G.’s operation. The

mini-mill concept is charac terized by a lean management team and

production and maintenance teams exercising a significant amount of

autonomy. Essential to this approach is the “team concept” wherein11

team coordinators must take a “hands-on” approach and lead their

team to focus on improving production parameters by redesigning

out, rather than simply patching over, problems which occur on the

line. This emphasis on “continuous improvement” is the means by

which the plant is to remain competitive by reducing the duration

and frequencies of delay due to mechanical breakdown.

DiFrancesco also recounted his seven months of experience in

setting up the Jackson operation. Having worked with both Harris

and Bagwell, DiFrancesco noted Bagwell’s proven ability to

implement mechanical improvements, providing six separate examples

of particular mechanical problems r esolved by Bagwell during his

time in Jackson. DiFrancesco criticized Harris for lacking

initiative and persistence, as in Bagwell’s case providing specific

examples illustrating the basis f or his opinion, and stated that

Harris would have needed additional training to bring him up to

specification for the MMC position.

David Hair, a project engineer for Double G. during its startup phase who worked with both men, observed that Bagwell worked

better with subordinates and possessed a more detailed mechanical

knowledge of the machinery on the line. Hair also stressed

Bagwell’s problem-solving skills and his ability t o communicate

effectively with other mechanics. Hair noted that Harris did not

typically work overtime and had a tendency to do only wha t was

required, while Bagwell was willing to work for as long as it took

to fix mechanical problems. Hair did not observe Harris manifest9 Harris suggests in brief that the MMC position was essentially

the same as that of Mechanical Engineer, the position Meadows had

prior to being promoted. Harris urges that because the MMC was

therefore a classical management position his greater supervisory

experience should have made him front-runner for the job. Both

Meadows and Moore related during their depositions, however, that

when Meadows was promoted to plan t manager the position of

Mechanical Engineer was abolished and that of the MMC was created.

This was because at that point the “start-up” pha se of the plant

had ended and the actual production phase had begun; thus, there

was less need for a supervisory engineer an d more need for an

innovative team leader familiar with the day-to-day functioning of

the equipment on the line. Meadows connects this job function to

the “conti nuous improvement” concept, where problems are not

patched up but corrected through mechanical innovation.

12 even adequate mechanical maintenance skills, Harris’s duties being

confined largely to electrical work. Hair echoed DiFrancesco’s

statements concerni ng the “mini-mill” concept and the employment

criteria prompted by it.

Mike Meadows, who actually made the decision to promote

Bagwell, stated in his deposition that he decided to go with

Bagwell based upon his twenty-one years of mechanical “hands-on”

e xperience, his steel background, his rapport with the other

mechanical main tenance technicians, and his initiative. Meadows

also noted approvingly that Bagwe ll had successfully assumed

Meadows’ position in the past when Meadows was required to be out

of the plant. 9 Meadows related that Bagwell had been instrumental

in helping the plant get up to speed during its start-up phase,

helping sol ve mechanical problems that arose and intimately

familiarizing himself with new equipment. Meadows emphasized

Bagwell’s familiarity with the furnace and the welder, items13

essential to the pl ant’s production and maintenance functions.

Meadows conceded that Harris had more formal education and formal

supervisory experie nce than Bagwell, but countered that he found

Bagwell’s experience superv ising mechanics at Bayou Steel more

pertinent than Harris’s generalized supervisory experience, which

involved electrical and mechanical personnel in a non-steel

setting.

Meadows observed that while he wanted the MMC to have some

supervisory experience, this qualification was not as significant

as the candidate’s ability to take a “hands-on” approach to

addressing the mechanical maintenance needs of the plant. This was

becau se, under the “continuous improvement” doctrine, it was

essential that the MMC be able to solve mechanical problems as they

arose. Intangibles such as teamwork, drive, and initiative were

also involved in his deliberations, as the MMC must not only

diagnose complications on the line but also rapidly and effectively

implement repair schemes to remedy problems as they arise, all

within the context of the “team” concept.

Nick Kincaid and Ray Davis, Electrical Maintenance Engineers

for Double G. and Harris’s immediate supervisors, submitted

affidavits and provided deposition testimony. Both Kincaid and

Davis emphasized Bagwell’s ability to solve problems and Bagwell’s

stellar performance as fill-in maintenance supervisor on occasions

when Meadows was out of the plant. Additionally, both men observed

that Bagwell was more willing to put in overtime hours than was14

Harris and assessed Harris’s job performance as mediocre. Davis,

who is black, als o asserted that Harris lacks sufficient

experience, most of his career having been spent in electrical

maintenance, to handle the mechanical maintenance position’s

demands. Davis noted that of four contemporaneous promotions from

hourly-wage to sa laried status, three of those positions went to

black persons, with Bagwell being the only white person promoted.

Harris countered Double G.’s evidence with his own deposition

and accompanying affidavit, and the de position testimony of Joe

Cowart, a mechanical technician at Double G. Harris posited that

he was better qualified than Bagwell and that, contrary to Double

G.’s belief, he in fact possesses extensive mechanical knowledge.

Harris was able to give one example of a mechanical modification he

h ad made which had improved the efficiency of the line. Harris

also suggested that his electrical experience would have made him

a better supervisor because of his superior ability to deal with

elec trical as well as mechanical problems. Harris claimed that

“many” employees felt he should have received the promotion, but is

able to name only one, Joe Cowart.

Cowart testified during his deposition that had he made the

promotion deci sion Harris, who is his good friend, would have

received the promotion. Cowart also submitted an affidavit in

which he averred that “I do not believe that Eddie was not promoted

because of his race.”

We observe initially that Harris’s generous and largely15

conclusory appraisal of his own abilities vis-a-vis Bagwell is for

the most part unsubstantiated. The evidence proffered by Double G.

contains numerous detailed accounts of Bagwell’s mechanical

ability, drive, and initiative; Harris’s submissions do not negate

or otherwise controvert t his evidence, nor do they provide

comparable evidence on Harris’s behalf. Harris’s contention that

his electrical experience would make him more valuable is

inapposite; as we have already stated, it is Double G., not Harris

or this Cou rt, which determines the parameters of its job

positions. Cowart’s unsubstantiated opinion is probably

inadmissible lay opinion and is in any case negated by the contents

of his affidavit.

Based upon the evidence adduced, we conclude that the district

court did not err. While Harris attempts in his brief to exalt his

(largely inapposite) academic achievement and greater supervisory

experience over Bagwell’s practical mechanical experience, the

record makes it clear that the position concerned was not a

classical manag ement position but rather a hybrid of supervisory

a nd technical elements. It is also evident that Bagwell’s

mechanical knowledge, steel background, and related attributes

carried more weight, in light of the MMC’s duties and

responsibilities, than the limited mechanical and generalized

supervisory experience offered by Harris. C ompare EEOC

, 47 F.3d at

1446 (“we cannot say that it is irrational for an employer to give16

less weig ht to general supervisory experience than actual field

experience where field experience is rele vant to the position”);

Odom

, 3 F.3d at 846 (“[t]he fact that [plaintiff]’s primary

experience did not match the position sought was legitimately

relevant and significant to the [employer]’s determination”).

Bagwell’s experience in the areas most relevant to the performance

of this job, particularly his demonstrated kn owledge of the

machinery on the line and his problem-solving abilities, combined

with his drive, initiative, leadership, and communication skills

made him well-suited for the position of MMC. Even with all

reasonable inferences construed in his favor, Harris may at most be

viewed as possessing similar qualifications, but not superior, much

less clearly superior, qualifications, for the position of MMC.

In sum, our record review convinces us that Harris was not

“clearly better qualified” than Bagwell for the job. In so

stating, we decline Harris’s invitation to fine-tune or otherwise

vary the criteria which Double G. chooses to govern its promotion

decisions. S ee Odom

, 3 F.3d at 847 (“we judges should be reluctant

to substitute our views for those of the individuals charged with

the evaluation duty by virtue of their own years of experience and

expertise in the field in question”). We reiterate that Title VII

“was not intended to be a vehicle for judicial second-guessing of

business decisions, nor was it intended to transform the courts

into personnel managers.” Thornburgh , 760 F.2d at 647 (citation17

omitted). This argument must fail.

Our conclusion that Harris was not “clearly better qualified”

than Bagwell does not end our consideration of Harris’s claim, as

it is possible that Harris may be able to establish discriminatory

intent by other evidence indicating purposeful discrimination.

Amburgey

, 936 F.2d a t 814; T hornburgh

, 760 F.2d at 647. We thus

turn to the other points raised in Harris’s brief as indicators of

discriminatory animus.

Harris po ints out, perhaps in an attempt to undermine

Bagwel l’s qualifications for the position, that Bagwell was

dismissed from Bayou Steel in 1991 for “theft of company work time”

arising out of excessive use of the company phone, that Bagwell has

two prior criminal convictions, and that Bagwell stated in his

initial letter of interest to the company that he had twenty-three

years of experience, when in fact he had worked as a mechanic for

only twenty-one years. Assuming arguendo that Double G. had some

knowledge of these incidents at the time th e employment decision

was made (see note 5, supra ), Harris has not directed our attention

to any policy or practice of Double G. regarding such matters.

Double G.’s decision to forgive some or all of the past sins of its

employees’ is purely an internal matter as long as such practice is

administered in a fair and non- discriminatory manner. Because

Harris’s alle gation does not suggest any instance of disparate

treatment, it cannot bolster his failing case. S ee Thomas v.18

Metroflight, Inc.

, 814 F.2d 1506 (10th Cir. 1987); Jackson v. City

of Killeen

, 654 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981). Insofar as

Harris suggests that Doubl e G. m ust negatively consider such

matters in reaching its employ ment decisions, the contention is

without merit.

Harris next argues that discriminatory intent may be inferred

fromthe fact that two unqualified white applicants were

nonetheless intervi ewed for the MMC position. Mike Meadows’

deposition testimony recounts that these interviews were merely

“courtesy” interviews and that those interviewed were not seriously

considered for t he position. Nothing in the record controverts

Meadows’ declaration, and of course these men did not receive the

promotion. Harris’s argument is insubstantial.

Harris also cites in his affi davit an incident unrelated to

his ap plication for promotion to MMC as evidence of invidious

discrimination:

“I was discriminated against when I was told by Pat Van

Domele n

, Human Resources Manager that Double G. was

looking for a deg reed Electrical Engineer to supervise

the Electrical Maintenance Technicians. However, Nick

Kincaid, a white male was hired for the position and he

has no degree of any sort. Furthermore, I have more

years of Electrical Maintenance and supervisory

experience than does Nick Kincaid.”

There is no record evidence that Harris ever applied for the

position or followed up in any way his alleged conversation with

VanDomelen.

During her deposition, Pat VanDomelen, who had not worked in19

the industrial field prior to her employment with Double G., did

not recall this particular conversation. She did state that her

initial impression had been that the company was seeking a degreed

engineer; and that this initial belief that a degree in electrical

engineering was required was due in part to her misapprehension of

the term “electrical engineer.” Until otherwise informed by Robert

McHenry, the company’s first president, VanDomelen labored under

the mistaken belief that in the industry this term denoted a

degreed engineer rather than a person with relevant work experience

in the field. Both she and Sam Moore testified that when the

company began receiving resumes McHenry and the project engineers

were looking for an individual with relevant work experience, and

that Kincaid, with t hree years towards a degree in electrical

engineering and a significant background in the field, fit the

bill.

Harris has presented nothing which controverts VanDomelen’s

admission that her statement to Harris, if it actually occurred,

was based upon her mistaken belief. Such an honest mistake cannot

support an inference of purposeful discrimination. S ee Kralman v.

Illinois Dept. of Veterans’ Affairs

, 23 F.3d 150 (7th Cir.), cert.

denied

, 115 S.Ct. 359 (1994); Waggoner v. City of Garland, Tex.

,

987 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, Harris’s contention is

meritless.

Harris next asserts that discriminatory animus may be inferred

from the fact that he was forced to take a Management Aptitude Test10 Two other applicants, both black, were selected for this

position over Harris.

20 as part of the prom otion process, a test which Bagwell was not

required to take. The record reveals that Harris took this test as

part of the application process for a Team Coordinator position, a

production line job that, unlike the MMC position, requires more in

the way of classical ma nagement skills. 1 0 All candidates for the

Team Coordinator position were required to take the MAT; there is

no evidence that a ny of the applicants for the MMC position we r e

required to take this test. Given the total absence of any

indication of disparate treatment, this submission cannot form the

basis for an inference of purposeful discrimination. T homas;

Jackson

.

In addition to his claim arising from being denied promotion

to MMC, Harris also contends that the district court erred by

viewing Double G.’s decision not to promote him to the position of

Electrical Maintenance Engineer only as general evidence of Double

G.’s discriminatory animus and not as a separate and distinct claim

for relief. The district court relied on Harris’s deposition

testimony that this lawsuit was based on the mechanical maintenance

position in finding that this prior incident was at best arguable

evidence of discrimination and not a separate and distinct claim.

Our review of the record also reveals statements by Harris’s

attorney during a deposition conveying the same imp ression.

Contrary to Harris’s contention, it was not t he district court’s11 Although our conclusion is sufficient to defeat Harris’s

claim, we have already noted that the record does not indicate that

Harris ever applied for the posit ion of Electrical Maintenance

Engineer. S ee Bernard v. Gulf Oil Corp. , 890 F.2d 735, 745 (5th

Cir. 19 89) (failure-to-promote plaintiff must prove, i nter alia

, that he or she applied for an available position), cert. denied

, 110 S.Ct. 3237 (1990), quoting Burdine

, 101 S.Ct. at 10 94. Even

had Harris applied for the position, however, we have no record

evidence regarding the criteria Do uble G. used in making that

decision. Given Kincaid’s three years of college courses towards

an Electric al Engineering degree and his extensive experience in

the electrical engineering field as related by the deposition

testimony of Sam Moore, Harris has not demonstrated he was “clearly

better qualified” for this position. Additionally, we reiterate

that there is nothing in the record to indicate that Pat

VanDomelen’s alleged imparting of false information was anything

other than a mistake. Assuming arguendo that Harris’s failure to

be promoted to the position of Electrical Maintenance Coordinator

is a separate claim, this record would not allow a reasonable juror

to find the discrimination Harris perceives.

21 job to extrapolate all possible causes of action latent in his

pleadings; rather, once Double G. had presented sufficient evidence

to negate an element of Harris’s discriminatory employment

practices case, i.e. , the existence of discriminatory intent, the

burden then shifted to Harris to go beyond the pleadings and

designate specific facts showing a genuine issue for t rial.

Little , 37 F.3d at 1075. This Harris failed to do. Accordingly,

we reject his submission. 11

Finally, Harris challenges as error the dis t rict court’s

refus al to allow an amendment to his pleadings. Harris moved to

amend his pleadings on May 29, 1996, long after discovery had ended

and nineteen days after summary judgment had been rendered and his12 Harris’ motion to amend his complaint was filed a day after

his Rule 59 motion.

22 lawsuit dismissed. 12 Affirming the district court’s grant of

summary judgment, we find no abuse of discretion in the district

court’s denial of Harris’s motion to amend his complaint. M oody v.

FMC Corp. , 995 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1993). See also Little , 37 F.3d

at 1073 n.8.

For the preceding reasons, the judgment of the district court

is

AFFIRMED.