Filed 3/4/13 P. v. Salinas CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JONATHAN CESARIO SALINAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 H037171

 (Santa Clara County

 Super. Ct. No. CC953249)

Defendant Jonathan Cesario Salinas was sentenced to state prison in May 2011 for 

his 2009 offenses. He contends that he is entitled to additional conduct credit under the 

expressly prospective-only version of Penal Code section 40191that took effect in 

October 2011. We reject his contention and affirm the judgment.

I. Background

The facts of defendant‟s offenses are not relevant to his appellate contention. All 

of his offenses occurred in August 2009. In April 2010, defendant pleaded no contest to 

leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury or death (Veh. Code, § 20001, 

subds. (a), (b)(1)), possession of a billy (former § 12020, subd. (a)(1)), misdemeanor 

battery (§§ 242, 243, subd. (a)), and felony battery causing serious bodily injury (§§ 242, 

 

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Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
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243, subd. (d)). He also admitted that the felony battery count was a serious felony 

because he had personally inflicted great bodily injury. (§§ 667, 1192.7) In May 2010, 

the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation 

conditioned upon, among other things, a one-year jail term. At that time, he was given 

credit for 239 days of actual custody and 118 days of conduct credit for a total of 357 

days of credit. 

In November 2010, his probation was revoked. Defendant admitted violating his 

probation. In May 2011, he was committed to state prison to serve a three-year term. He 

was credited with 333 days of actual custody and 166 days of conduct credit for a total of 

499 days. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal. 

II. Analysis

Defendant claims that he was entitled to additional conduct credit under the 

version of section 4019 that took effect in October 2011.

Until January 2010, section 4019 provided that a defendant would receive two 

days of conduct credit for every four days of actual custody. From January 2010 until 

September 2010, section 4019 temporarily increased this to two days of conduct credit 

for every two days of actual custody, but this increase did not apply to a defendant who 

was being committed for a serious felony. (People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 317-

318 (Brown); Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess., 2009-2010, ch. 28, § 50.) In September 2010, 

section 4019 was again amended and section 2933 was also amended with regard to 

presentence conduct credit. These statutes also provided that a defendant being 

committed for a serious felony would receive two days of conduct credit for every four 

days of actual custody. (Stats. 2010, ch. 426, §§ 1, 2; former § 2933, subd. (e).) A new 

version of section 4019 became operative in October 2011. This version provided for 

two days of conduct credit for every two days of actual custody, and it did not exclude 

from its ambit a defendant who was being committed for a serious felony conviction. 
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(Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 482; Stats. 2011, ch. 39, § 53; Stats. 2011, 1st Ex. Sess., 2011-

2012, ch. 12, § 35.) However, the October 2011 version of section 4019 provided that it 

was prospective only: “(g) The changes in this section as enacted by the act that added 

this subdivision shall apply to prisoners who are confined to a county jail, city jail, 

industrial farm, or road camp for a crime committed on or after the effective date of that 

act.” (§ 4019, subd. (g).) 

Defendant argues that the trial court violated his right to equal protection by 

failing to apply the October 2011 version of section 4019 to him. He contends that even 

though his crimes occurred prior to the October 1, 2011 prospective date upon which 

conduct credit was increased by the Legislature, he was entitled to have the two-for-two 

conduct credit scheme applied to him. 

Both the federal and state Constitutions guarantee the right to equal protection of 

the laws. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) “ „ “The concept of the 

equal protection of the laws compels recognition of the proposition that persons similarly 

situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment.” ‟

[Citation.]” (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253.) Since the 

amendments to section 4019 do not involve a “ „ “ „suspect classification‟ ” ‟ ” or a 

“„“„fundamental interest,‟ ” ‟ ” courts apply the rational basis test to determine whether 

the “distinction drawn by the challenged statute bears some rational relationship to a 

conceivable legitimate state purpose.” (In re Stinnette (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 800, 805.) 

Defendant maintains that he is similarly situated to a defendant whose crime was 

committed after October 1, 2011. In Brown, the California Supreme Court rejected a 

similar argument with respect to a previous version of section 4019. It found that 

prospective only application of the new version of the statute did not violate equal 

protection because the purpose of the statute was to create an incentive for good 

behavior, which could not be done retroactively. (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at 

pp. 328-330.) “[T]he important correctional purposes of a statute authorizing incentives 
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for good behavior [citation] are not served by rewarding prisoners who served time 

before the incentives took effect and thus could not have modified their behavior in 

response.” (Brown, at pp. 328-329, italics added; see also People v. Lara (2012) 54 

Cal.4th 896, 906, fn. 9 (Lara).) In his reply brief, defendant concedes that Brown dooms 

his contention, that we are bound by Brown, and that he is not entitled to additional 

conduct credit. We appreciate his accurate concession and accept it.

III. Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.

_______________________________

Mihara, J.

WE CONCUR:

_____________________________

Premo, Acting P. J.

_____________________________

Márquez, J.