COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Fe lton and Senior Judge Willis

LORISA F. WILLIS MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record Nos. 1873- 05-3 and PER CURIAM 1874-05-3 FE BRUARY 28, 2006
HARRISONBURG ROCKINGHAM SOCIAL SERVICES DISTRICT

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY James V. Lane, Judge (Kathleen M. Mizzi Todd, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. (Kim Van Horn Gutterman, Assistant County Attorney; Benjamin H. Carr, Jr., Guardian ad litem for the minor children, on brief), for appellee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting on brief. 1

Lorisa F. Willis, mother, appeal s the trial court’s decision, da ted July 6, 2 005, terminating her parental rights to her two children. She conten ds the evidence was insufficient to support the termination of her parental rights pursuant to Co de § 16.1-283(B) and (C)( 2) and argues the trial court erred by terminating her parental rights ba sed on her refusal to take her medication. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that these appeals are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the d ecision of the trial court.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.

1 We grant appellee’s motion to extend the time to file its brief; the brief is considered filed.- 2 - Background We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prev ailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fair ly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of
Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). So viewed, the evidence established that the Harrisonburg Rockingham Soci al Services District (HRSSD) first became involved with this family when investigating a sexual abuse complaint involving one of the children and the child’s father. The father was adjudicated to have sexually abused this female child. Through this involve ment with the family, it became clear that Willis needed se rvices. The HRSSD directed her to undergo a psychological evalua tion by Dr. Joann Grayson, and then the court ordered her to comply with the doctor’s recommendations. Dr. Grayson found that Willis suffers from “serio us and chronic ment al illness.” Willis acknowledged that she had been hospitalized seven times between 1985 and 1999 and that these hospitalizations were “p receded by paranoid and confused thinking, bizarre behaviors, and sometimes runa way behavior and/or suicide attempts .” Willis had been pr eviously diagnosed as having “Schizophrenia, paranoid type and as Majo r Depression.” Dr. Grayson diagnosed Willis as having Schizoaffective Disorder, in remission, and R/O Paranoid Persona lity Disorder and wrote in her report that regardless of the exact diagnosis, “Willis is coping with a serious and chronic mental illness.” Dr. Jeffrey Lightner co nducted a separate a ssessment of Willis an d diagnosed her as having “probable schizoaffective disorder” with “psychotic feat ures” and “significant paranoid features.” Dr. Grayson assessed Willis’s risk of harm to her children and found that she is “at risk for abusive behaviors towards her children” and a “hi gh risk for dysfunctional parenting and/or abuse and neglect.” Dr. Grayson assented that Willis “can over-react and physi cally harm her children while attempting to discipline them,” that her frequent use of physical discipline can emotionally- 3 - harm the children, and that the “recurrence of the depressive symptoms has the potential of danger for the children.” Willis’s paranoia disorder manifested itself se veral times to the mental health professionals involved in her case. W illis tried to control ever ything that happened with her children, a typical symptom of paranoid disorder. For example, she wanted to be pres ent during her child’s counseling session with Dr. Rhonda Weber, only wanted her ch ild to play with certai n toys during therapy sessions, and quizzed the child abou t everything that happened in the session. Although Dr. Weber advised Willis not to fight with her parents in the children’s pres ence to decrease the children’s anxiety, Willis would not cooperate. Willis refused to tell the soci al worker what state her children were born in, whether she was in counseling, what her ph one number was, or just generally how she was doing. Willis refused to sign most consent forms, and of the four consent forms she did sign, she changed them to limi t the information provided so that HR SSD could not measure her progress. Between the fall of 2001 and the spring of 2002, HRSSD beca me aware that Willis’s mental illness was negatively impacting th e children and filed a petition re questing emergency custody of the children. Willis ha d shown increasingly erra tic behavior, ou tbursts, and paranoia, and the juvenile and domestic relations di strict court (JDR court) found th at the children were abused or neglected and removed the children in March 2002. Meanwhile, from July 2001 through June 2005, HRSSD offered and provided reasonable and appropriate services to Willis to assist he r in managing her mental illness, including the evaluation by Dr. Grayson previous ly mentioned. Dr. Grayson noted that if Willis “is going to function as a single parent, it is imperative that she confront her illness and develop a management plan.” Dr. Grayson made a series of recommen dations on how Willis could manage her mental illness. Dr. Grayson re commended a medica tion evaluation to inform Willis about medication management choices; use of a case manager to a ssist in monitoring symp toms, teach management- 4 - skills, assist with parenting issu es, locate resources and offer assi stance; that Willis attempt to qualify for social security disa bility which could help maintain her family; that Willis attend parenting classes due to her high risk for dysfunctional and harmful pa renting; that she follow up on her expressed interest in counseli ng; and that she find a place to live that included support from others with a possible future goal being independent living. Dr. Lightn er stated that Willis’s type of mental illness is usua lly treated with c ounseling and me dication throughout th e patient’s lifetime, although people with paranoid symptoms tend to be more reluctant to take their medicine. Willis refused to take her recommended medication. Willis previously had refused to take the prescribed medication each time she had been discharged from psychiatric hospitalizations, and had refused to take her medication despite the JDR c ourt’s termination of her face-to-face visitation with her children until she did so. Willis also refused soci al worker Sara Kiser’s offer of management services because she “didn’t want th em involved in her life.” In November 2002, Willis began working with a case manager but no longer had a case ma nager at the time of trial. Willis refused to apply for social se curity because she “didn’t want to be part of that system.” Prior to the children’s placem ent in foster care, Kise r referred Willis to a pare nting class through the Family Life Resource Center, but Willis never attended class. Ki ser offered In-Hom e Services, but Willis refused them. Ev entually, in 2003, Willis completed a parenting cl ass. Although Kiser referred Willis to counse ling in 2001, Willis did not begin counseling until January 30, 2002 but stopped going when the ch ildren were removed in Ma rch 2002, having comple ted only five to seven sessions. Willis said sh e stopped going to counse ling because it was not he r choice and “[i]f I was going to deal with my pr oblems the way I wanted to deal with them I wo uld choose someone who I felt I could have complete, have no disclosure.” Willis did not go to counseling for six months, until just before the Foster Care Review when she chose to go to Harvey Yoder because “Social Services wasn’t running it.” However, Willis sa w Yoder “more than once or twice” but not “as- 5 - much as ten” times before she st opped seeing him. Willis saw a nother counselor, Sara Zimmerman, on an “off and on basis” and ac knowledged missing several of her scheduled appointm ents. Lastly, Willis acknowledged that she had “moved lots of times” after her children were removed from her custody, that she had mo ved to a single room that was unsuita ble for her children, and said her “interest right now is not setting up for [her] children , it’s saving money.” Willis lived alone without support, contrary to Dr. Grayson’s recommendations. W illis said she did not seek advice from her family but got advice from others by “do[ing] a lot of book reading.” Analysis When considering term ination of a parent’s residual rights to a child, “the paramount consideration of a trial court is th e child’s best interests.” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 12 8, 409 S.E.2d at 463. On review, “[a] trial cour t is presumed to have thorou ghly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory require ments, and made its determinat ion based on the child’s best interests.” Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). “The trial court’s judgment, when based on evidence heard ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463. Code § 16.1-283(B) provides that a parent’s pa rental rights to neglected or abused children may be terminated if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the children’s best interests and that (1) the neglect or abuse presented a substantial threat to the child ren’s life, health, and development, and (2) it is unlikely that the cond itions that result ed in the neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated such that th e children can return to their parent’s care within a reasonable period of time. Proof that the parent, without good cause, has not responded or followed through with appr opriate efforts by the various agencies designed to reduce, eliminate or prevent the neglect or abuse is prima facie evidence of these co nditions. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) requires proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the terminatio n is in the best interests of- 6 - the child, (2) “reasonable and appropriate” services have been offered to help the parent “substantially remedy the conditions which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement,” and (3) despite these services, the parent has failed, “without good cause,” to remedy those conditions “within a reasonable amount of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child was placed in foster care.” “[T]ermination of residual pa rental rights is a grave, drastic, and irreversible action,” Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev. , 12 Va. App. 877, 883, 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991), and we “‘presume[] [the trial cour t has] thoroughly weighed all the evidence [and] consid ered the statutory requirements,’” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 12 8, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (citation omitted). HRSSD proved by clear and co nvincing evidence that terminat ion of appellant’s parental rights was in her children’s best interests. The ev idence is undisputed that Willis is a paranoid schizophrenic and has a depressive disorder and that Willis has failed to follow through with recommended treatment alth ough it has been offere d. Willis “simply picks and chooses” what she will do with “no r hyme or reason or ex cuse given for this.” The ev idence proved that Willis has failed to confront or manage her mental illness within a year afte r the children’s removal and that her mental illness has negatively impacted her children and led to their abuse and neglect, presenting a serious and substantial threat to their health, lives, and well-bein g. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a ch ild to spend a lengthy peri od of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capa ble of resuming his responsi bilities.” Kaywood v. Hali fax County Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. , 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). In addition , the evidence proved that the termination was based on Willis’s inability to control her mental illness, not on her refusal to take medication. The record supports the trial court’s finding that HRSSD proved by clear and convincing evidence that Willis’s parental rights should be terminated pur suant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and- 7 - (C)(2) and that the termin ation of Willis’s parent al rights was in her children’s best interests. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. On February 2, 2006, appellant filed pro se a reply brief. Becaus e the filing was untimely, we have not considered the brief. Affirmed.