Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-775 | October 15, 2018 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jeffrey W. Elftman

Public Defender

Kokomo, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Evan Matthew Comer

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Christopher Symons,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

October 15, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-775

Appeal from the Howard Superior

Court

The Honorable William C. 

Menges, Jr., Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

34D01-1502-F4-184

Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-775 | October 15, 2018 Page 2 of 10

Case Summary and Issue

[1] Christopher Symons’ probation was revoked, and he was ordered to serve the 

entirety of his previously suspended six and one-half year sentence at the 

Indiana Department of Correction. Symons appeals the trial court’s order, 

raising only one issue for our review: whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in determining his sanction for the probation violation. Concluding 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History 

[2] On February 24, 2015, Symons was charged with dealing in methamphetamine, 

a Level 4 felony, neglect of a dependent, a Level 5 felony, and possession of 

chemical reagents or precursors with intent to manufacture a controlled 

substance, a Level 6 felony. On October 13, Symons pleaded guilty to dealing 

in methamphetamine, a Level 4 felony, in exchange for the State dismissing the 

remaining charges and Symons was sentenced to 3,650 days of which 2,190 

were to be executed with 1,960 days suspended to probation. 

[3] While incarcerated, Symons completed the Therapeutic Community Program 

and the trial court granted Symons’ petition for a sentence modification on 

March 17, 2017. The terms of his sentence modification required Symons to 

enroll in community corrections and probation. As a special condition of his 

probation and the Community Transition Program, Symons was required to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-775 | October 15, 2018 Page 3 of 10

participate in electronic bracelet monitoring, day reporting, and to enroll in the 

Howard County Re-Entry Court Program. 

[4] The Howard County Re-Entry Court Program is “a highly-supervised 

rehabilitative program available, for a maximum of three years, to individuals 

on parole, probation, and community transition, as well as those in Community 

Corrections due to a sentence reduction or modification.” Brief of Appellee at 

6. The re-entry court requires participants, among other things, to regularly 

report to caseworkers, participate in substance abuse treatment and counseling, 

comply with the terms of their case and treatment plans, abstain from using or 

possessing controlled substances, submit to regular drug testing, obtain 

employment, submit to searches of their persons and property, and refrain from 

committing criminal offenses. See id. During the seven months Symons was 

enrolled in the program, he traveled to unauthorized locations and 

misrepresented the numbers of hours he had worked. 

[5] On November 22, 2017, the trial court found Symons had absconded from the 

re-entry court and terminated him from the program. The same day, the State 

filed a petition to revoke Symons’ probation, alleging Symons’ failure to 

successfully complete re-entry court violated the conditions of his sentence 

modification order. Symons initially agreed to plead true to the violation in 

exchange for being placed on a direct commitment to in-home detention for the 

remainder of his suspended sentence. However, on January 11, 2018, his 

probation officer, Megan Enright, filed a report with the trial court 

recommending the trial court reject the plea agreement, stating:
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While [Symons] was on the Howard County Re-Entry Program 

he was on a GPS bracelet with specific rules that he needed to 

follow. [Symons] was out of place on numerous occasions while 

on the bracelet and was sanctioned for these actions. [Symons]

continued to disregard the rules after he served the sanction[s]

and continued to go where he wanted to go, when he wanted to 

go regardless of if he had permission or not.

Appellant’s Appendix, Volume 2 at 97. Enright concluded, “[Symons] is being 

set up for failure as he has already proven to the Court that he won’t follow the 

rules of the CTP/In Home Detention Program.” Id. 

[6] At a probation revocation hearing on February 8, 2018, the trial court followed 

Enright’s recommendation by rejecting Symons’ proposed plea agreement and 

Symons indicated that he would plead true to the violation without a plea 

agreement. Symons then admitted to the violation and the trial court found 

that he had violated the terms of his probation. Proceeding to disposition of the 

violation, Symons testified on his own behalf, stating:

On the Re-entry Program, I was, it was just myself and my three 

boys that I was taking care of, so, you know, a lot of this stems 

back to, you know, the out of places where, you know, a lot of 

guys being allowed to go to the gas station. I had no one 

currently to, you know, to take the vehicle in and fill and [sic] it 

up with gas. You know, I was driving a hundred miles a day, 

you know, just back and forth to work was, you know, forty 

miles there, forty miles back so . . . .

Transcript, Volume II at 24. As for the other violation of misrepresenting the 

number of hours that he had worked, Symons stated:
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There was a mishap with some miscommunication with me 

writing how many hours I had worked one week and, you know, 

that was part of the, you know, violating the rules on Re-entry

. . . .

Id. at 25. After hearing arguments regarding possible sanctions for Symons’ 

violations, the trial court concluded:

As I recall, Mr. Symons didn’t have any problem passing any of 

the drug screens during the period of time that he was on Reentry. One of the issues that we have since all substance abuse 

assessment tools are basically self-reporting, we have an 

individual who’s originally charged with Dealing in 

Methamphetamine and the question becomes is he a 

methamphetamine addict or is he a methamphetamine dealer? 

And a lot of folks are claiming that they are addicts and they 

want a chance to deal with their addiction and so we send them 

to the Therapeutic Community where instead of serving a prison 

sentence that they might otherwise deserve as a drug dealer, they 

get out upon successful completion and go into the Re-entry 

Program. One of the things that I’ve noticed during the course of 

the Re-entry Program is that addicts are much more successful 

than drug dealers because drug dealers are there solely because of

criminal thinking and their drug use has been incidental to that

and generally speaking, that sorts itself out pretty quickly. And 

in fact, in Mr. Symons’ case, he was violated before he even

completed the CTP. I think what that shows is that the State of

Indiana was correct back in 2015 when they charged him with

Dealing in Methamphetamine, that he is a methamphetamine 

dealer, not a drug addict. And, you know, we gave him a 

tremendous opportunity by letting him out of prison when he still 

had 2,691 days hanging over his head. It’s no reason to believe 

that there’s anything that we can offer in this community that’s

going to be of benefit to Mr. Symons. Accordingly, I’m going to

impose the balance of the Defendant’s suspended sentence, 

which the court finds . . . as of today, is 2,408 days . . . .
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Id. at 27-28. Symons now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision 

I. Standard of Review

[7] It is well settled that:

Probation is a matter of grace and a conditional liberty which is a 

favor, not a right. The trial court determines the conditions of 

probation and may revoke probation if those conditions are 

violated. The decision to revoke probation is within the sound 

discretion of the trial court. And its decision is reviewed on 

appeal for abuse of that discretion.

Ripps v. State, 968 N.E.2d 323, 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). “An abuse of 

discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the 

facts and circumstances before the court.” Id. We consider only the evidence

most favorable to the judgment, and we will not reweigh the evidence or judge 

the credibility of the witnesses. Cox v. State, 850 N.E.2d 485, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2006).

II. Probation Revocation

[8] Probation revocation is a two-step process. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 

(Ind. 2008). First, the trial court makes a factual determination that a violation 

of a condition of probation actually occurred and then, if the violation is 

proven, the trial court must determine if the violation warrants revocation of the 

probation. Id. “However, even a probationer who admits the allegations 
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against him must still be given an opportunity to offer mitigating evidence 

suggesting that the violation does not warrant revocation.” Id. And, if the trial 

court finds that a violation occurred, the court may impose one of the following 

sanctions: 

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying 

or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person’s probationary period for not more than 

one (1) year beyond the original probationary period. 

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was 

suspended at the time of initial sentencing. 

Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). A defendant is entitled to challenge the sanction a 

trial court decides to impose after revoking probation. Stephens v. State, 818 

N.E.2d 936, 939 (Ind. 2004). 

[9] Symons does not contest that violations actually occurred: he admits that he 

was unsuccessfully discharged from the Howard County Re-Entry Court 

Program in violation of the conditions of his sentence modification order. 

Instead, Symons argues the trial court abused its discretion by “neglecting to 

examine the circumstances involved in this case, . . . it simply decided that any 

violation, irrespective of the specific facts, warrants revocation.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 9-10. Specifically, Symons argues:

The trial court’s statement that violation of re-entry leaves no
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other options for community supervision as lowering the 

supervision would merely lead to a person not getting caught for 

criminal behavior shows a predetermination prior to the 

presentation of mitigating evidence, and an abuse of discretion. 

The abuse of discretion is further shown by the trial court 

applying as an aggravating factor the Defendant’s passing of drug 

screens. The trial court seemed to use this sole piece of

information to issue a fully executed sentence.

Id. at 10 (citations to transcript omitted). 

[10] This, however, is the entirety of Symons’ argument and it is left unsupported by

cogent reasoning or adequate citation to authority. “Indiana Appellate Rule 

46(A)(8) provides that the argument section of the appellant’s brief must 

‘contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by 

cogent reasoning,’ along with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of 

the record relied upon, and a clear showing of how the issues and contentions 

in support thereof relate to the particular facts under review.” D.H. by A.M.J. v. 

Whipple, 103 N.E.3d 1119, 1126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). Symons has therefore

waived this issue for our review. See, e.g., Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 297 

(Ind. 2012) (“Failure to comply with this rule results in waiver of the argument 

on appeal.”).

[11] Waiver notwithstanding, even expanding Symons’ arguments to their logical 

conclusions, we would still conclude the trial court acted within its discretion. 

First, contrary to Symons’ assertion, we do not read the trial court’s statement 

of reasons for revoking Symons’ probation as evidencing “a predetermination 

prior to the presentation of mitigating evidence[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 10. 
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Nothing in the record suggests the trial court employed such a policy and we 

have routinely held the violation of a single condition of probation is sufficient 

to revoke probation. Richardson v. State, 890 N.E.2d 766, 768 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2008). 

[12] Secondly, we do not read the trial court’s statement as weighing Symons’ 

passing of drug screens as an aggravating factor. We do, however, caution trial 

courts against injecting their personal philosophical views into their reasoning 

for one sanction or another, and we have explained that within the context of 

original sentencing, “it is improper for a trial court to impose a harsh sentence 

on the basis of the trial court’s desire to send a personal philosophical message 

about the general severity of an offense, rather than focusing upon facts that are 

peculiar to the particular defendant and offense.” Puckett v. State, 956 N.E.2d 

1182, 1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). But we do not find that to be the case here. 

Although the trial court discussed Symons’ underlying conviction of dealing in 

methamphetamine, it did so in the context of Symons’ probation violations and 

their relation thereto. Moreover, the trial court showed considerable grace by 

not only ordering a portion of his original sentence to be suspended, but then 

again by granting Symons’ petition to modify that sentence. “Once a trial court 

has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the 

judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed.” Prewitt v. 

State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). And although such discretion “is not 

boundless and it may be abused[,]” Puckett, 956 N.E.2d at 1188, we find 

nothing so egregious as to warrant reversal here. 
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Conclusion

[13] Concluding the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering Symons to 

serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentence at the Indiana 

Department of Correction, we affirm.

[14] Affirmed. 

Baker, J., and May, J., concur.