REF ID:A489034 

Certain Aspects of "MAGIC" in the 

Cryptological Background of the 

Various Official Investigations 

into the Atuack on Pearl Harbor 

by William F. Freidman 

SECRET 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 11-01-2013 pursuant to E .0. 1352a 
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,. REF ID :A489034 

Director 

?lat1cmal Sec:uritJ' Apr¥7 

~25 D.C. 

Attn: Chief 1 Ce:itral ottJ.c:e ar ~e:nmce 

Sir: 

Reference 18 made -to Cc:ctx'act Jio. !».~9-il.70 -ac-.1739, .File Bo. 6_11; SSA-56, 

56-TM/PR-210, *1.c:A .a e=tc:1:ad into u of l. A'UgUS't 1955 b;1' and between the 

tm:lted states o-r Amer1ca am tbe ~ aDd 'Wb1ch was mdU1ed cm.Q' as 

to date or dellverr at all the 1tw ,.., , m for under 8&1d c:oatract. In 

acca:rdimce vi th the prtTV1a1aml ar Art1cl.e n (Deli ver.r) or aa14 ccutract, I 

om sel'd1ne; J'OU herevit.h (a) approd!Ste~ 150 catalog cards ~ to 

those sent Wld.er ?roject l, !.rticle I, ~ b(.l} at ee.id contrs.ct; ~ 

('b) the CClllpleted RBDTw=r.i.pt called for UDOer ProJect 3 ot tbe SW Article, 

~ 

viz. I 8 spetieJ report ~ '8zrt.at1 vely' enti.tl.ed The Cryp'tel agi eel 

or tbe Va.r1otls Ottid.al Invest1i2N1cms into the Attack an ?ea.r1 

~'rbe &&id teot&t.i.ve title or the ital cal] ed ~or under ProJect 3 i.a 

nov not q\d.te suitable and I baw de •el it e4Yisable to amend it b7 pre1'acir..g it vi th tbe wa:rd.a "Certain upecta or ~Magic. ft, mk2 ng tbe caqpl.ete title 

'

1

Certain sspects ~ 'Me&1!=' in the C;zptQiopeaJ.. ~UZld of the Yariaus 

Of'fici.al In!eatipticma into tJie Attack Oil Pearl 5.9.rbor." 

! haw edqilted & ratber inf't;nswJ style vb1ch 187 ped8i>e make tbe broelmre more~. Scnex&l 1.deDa 1ibere1D can a new 11.ght, I think, ca 

cert.a1n aspects o:r t:be 1Dveatiggt1ons and tbe quest1cca raised by a •::atesn".Y ~ histor1ans \Ibo have .much to 8111:/ about the ~ on Pearl Barbor and. vbo 

m"e knOWZl 88 '

1

revi.sionista. n l•b" brochure m.y tberef'are be use.~ in a ~ 

of ~ PcaJ:>l Harbor w.:i.astcr, espec1&l.ly for h.1.stor'....m.lS v:ho ta.ire a more 

ree.l.iotic view oi"' vllat ~ and. why the U. s. forces in Il:l.\m11 7ere 

caught by a~. It is ~ u:li'~ that I bBd to u:ae a SEal.l 

BillOUOt ~ materia.J. \lbic:h is still. claasU'L-4 and therefore tbe brochure as 

u. vhoJ.e bu had to be clBsaified. 

I ree-1 i zc ori.l3' too veil that the prese:at brochl.11"e can ~ be 

1.:lproved by f'urt.ber work b\it the time ll:d.t 3J ! ~ Wice extended-pemi.ts 

~ no additiana.J delay in t.be deliver,- c4 th1.a 1tem. Let 1 t. be CODSidered, 

in the~ at the prniom Dllector ar the lat1c:n•J Securi~ Agt'!D.q, as 

")bdeJ Jo. l. ... 

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REF ID:A489034 

TO: Di.rector 

N6tiooal Security ~ 

\.~251 D. C. 

Attention: Ccmt:actiDg Ott1cer, ?;St. 

In aecardBnce v1 th Article II (Dell ver;r) on Contra...""'t fie. 

DA49-rro-ec-l739, File So. ~-56, 56-nsr~m.-c.~, 

this invoice 1.9 sul:K:n~~ !o:r ~ 

~ 

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~ 

I cert1r.y 1ibat the aboTe bill 1a conec:t and Just md. tbe.t 

therefor has ;cot been received • 
REF ID :A-489034 

OF TBB VARIOUS OFFICIAL IIVESTIGA.TIOtiS 

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REF ID.:A489034 

·Certain Aspects ot QMagic" in the Cmtologiea.l Be.ckgmund 

o:r the Venous. Ot'fic!Al Investipt.ions 

l. 

2. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

8. 

into t.be Atta.ck on Pearl Barbor 

Introdl1ction. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

The Ree.l. Essence a! the Problem • • • 4 $ • • • • 

A New Look at the Re'rl.sionists Allegations o! 

Ccm.spira.q 'to Keep K1rmnel and Short in the 

Dm"k • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

Was KlGIC Wi~eld f'roul. KimDlel Gd Short and, 

tt so, ~ •••••••••••••••••• 

The "Winds Code Messages" • • • • • • • s • • • • 

• • • • • • • • • • • • 

Conclusions • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 

'EpilogtJe • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • $ • • • • • 

APPENDIX l: '-Pearl Harbor in Perspective," 

by Dr. Louis Morton. United States Naval 

Institute Proe~VoJ.. Si, No. 4, 

April 1955; PP• . 

APPENDIX 2: "Pearl Harbor and the Revisionists," by 

Prof. Robert H. Ferrell~. The Historian, Vol. XVII, 

No. 2 1 Spring 19551 PP• 215-233 

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More than 15 ;rears have passed since the Japanese, vitb unpe.raJ.leled 

good luck, good luck t.hat nov seems asto1md1ng, and with a degree of 

skill unanticipated by the United States, executed their surprise attack 

on Pearl Barbor during the morning hours of 7 December 1941. It was an 

attack that constituted. a momentous disaster for the United States; it 

ma.de our Navy's Paci.fie Fleet, for al..l. practical purposes, hors de combat 

for ma.:ay months. In the Tiew of Mark s. Watson, in a volume written !or 

the A.raiy series on the history of the U. S. Army in World War II 1 Chief 

of Statt: Prewar Plans and Preparations (1950), the disaster was the 

result o:t a "f'&td'ul series O'! mischances" among which be listed those 

vb.ich be considered the most important. He did not list them all; to 

do so would make the disaster partake of the character of an enormous, 

and almost incredible Greek tragedy-so JD.8.ey' big and little things vent 

wrong to make the disaster possible and to prevent its being averted vi th 

little or no damage. 

The Battle of Pearl Harbor is still being fought but the adversaries 

this time are e.11. Americans; and though the battle is bloodless, because 

the weapons are now words, not bullets or bombs, it is quite a.crimon.ious 

and intense, as internal. or civil vars generally are. This time the 

battle is intended to capture, by a sort of literaey °brainvashing," the 

minds of a large segment of the American people vho more or 1.ess dimly 

feel that the truth, the who.le truth, bas not :ret been told. Mal3y' 

Americans, I am sure, are still undecided in regard to who or what vas 

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REF ID:A489034 

responsible tor this most momentous and most humiliating naval disaster 

in our histoey. 

Fi:tteen mill.ion words,, more or less, have been written concerni.Jlg1 

expla1ning1 or attempting to assess and fix responsibilities for the 

Pearl. Harbor disaster, e.nd to show ~ the u. s. forces at Honol.ul.u were 

caught napping-in the early hoμrs ot what President Roosevelt referred 

to as that "d.&7 o'! infamy" when he appeared before Congress on 8 December 

1941 to declare var on Japan~ The Report and Hearings Before the Joint 

CO?IID.ittee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Atta.ck (79th Congress, 

2d Session, Government Printing Office, WMbington, 1946), hereina:t'ter 

referred to as PHR, al.one contain 15,000 "transcript pages; the over..e.11 

final report o! the Committee comprises some ten million words and fills 

~ Ycilumes of closely printed text. Thus fe.r, in addition to this vast 

&ilDOUU't o1' material there must be at l.ea.st five million words in the 

writings of private 1.ndividuaJ.s.. Same of them defend the Findings, 

Conclusions 1 and Recommendations of the Major1 tr' in the PHR; others 

def'end the Findings and Concl.usions of the Minority in the PER; still 

others disagree and. violently attack both vh.at the Majority and the 

Minari ty said. Even representative Keefe / a Republican who signed the 

Majority Report found it necessary to add to that report some addition.al 

views of his CJWll where he could not agree with those of the Ma.jority. 

It is obvious that in this brochure it Yill be impossible to deal with 

all that has been wrl tten on the sub Ject. Even to list by ti tJ.e the 

books, brochures, articles (not to mention the thousands of newspaper 

accounts, letters to ed1 tors, etc. } which have someth1ng to add to the 

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etory would be a !airl)' large task. A bibliography COYerl.ng the it.ems 

on Pearl Ra.rl:>or in '1J1:f private collection v1ll be found in the "Subject 

:file" nov in the NSl Librar;r. But it is a stra:ige, 1.ndeed.1 it is a 

rema.rk:25l:>l.e t'act that not a single nev item of 1.nt'ormation having a direct 

bearing upon attempts to expl.e.in why the Pearl Harbor attack could have 

~ or did ecne as a complete surprise to the U. s. he.s been turned u,p 

since 1946, when the Joint Congressional. Committee comp1eted its task. 

One may veil assume / therefore, that since no new facts have come to light 

it. must be something else tha.t is keeping the Battle Gt Pearl Harbor 

going. The assumption is true: the ta.eta d.eYel.oped ill the various 

lnvestigations ~ 19441 1945, and 1946 are being scrutinized llOV through 

different sorts of speotac.les and by d.itterent obserrers; this results 

in new "interpreta:t.ions" ~ the old, veil-known facts. 

It is the purpose or this brochure to me..ke a few observations and 

coments on the current Battle ot Pearl Barbor. They are directed at the 

writings of certain historians vho call themselves or are known a.a 

"revisionists," and who find much support in two recently published books, 

both by high-ranking officers of the U. s. Navy. These charges a.....-e very 

serious-indeed they are t.ant.emount to imputing e.t lea.st very questione.bl.e behavior by persons o:f' such stature a.s the late President Yra.nkl.1n 

D. Roosevel.t, the Army's Chief' of StaN', General George C. Marshall, e.nd 

the Navy's Chief or Naval Operations, Admiral Haro.ld R. Stark. The 

charges are really not new; their antecedents, or nuclei of them or 

carefully veiled h.1nts at them, can be tound 1n scme of the early writ1ngs of the more re.bid Roosevelt-haters, and even in same parts o! the 

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reports made by various otticial u. s. investigating bodies appointed to 

look into the matter during the last phases ~ Worl.d Wa;-. II or soon af'ter 

that var had been van. -· 

,c, ', 

the genesis ~the suspicions vhich a.roused the' Roosevelt batersand 

_,:.--.: 

vbich kept them. "needliDg" the-President and his /ulministration tor an 

explanation ~ how it was possibl.e that the u. s. was taken so compl.etel7 

by surpri.ae when the Japanese atte.cked Pearl. Harbor; to introduce the 

explanation at this point I -think would be eonf'using. All that C8ll. 

logicall.y be said right here is that the President, his Adm1n1 stration, 

and the Chiefs of the two :military services simply coul.d not a.ttord to 

pem.it the true explanation to be broadcast while the war was still in 

progress. 

A very 1mpa.rtia.l bibliographical survey of the principal items in the 

literature of the su.bJect bas been prepared by a. historian of recognized. 

st.a.nd1Dg1 Dr. Louie Morton, Chief of the Pacti'1c Section of the u. s. 

Arsy•s ottice ot Milltary History. Ria survey, entitl.ed "Pearl. Harbor 

in Perspective," was published in the April 1955 issue of the United 

States Naval Institute Proceedi.J15s (Vol. 8J. 1 No, 4, Whole No. 626, PP• 46J.. 

468) • A CCJIJY of Dr. Morton' a survey :forms Appendix 1 to this brochure. 

A second recapitulation of the Pearl Harbor story and also a source 

cd material which uq interest the reader in what the present brochure 

&iJl.s to do is found in an article by Robert R. :Ferrell, Assistant Pro-

:tessor ~ H1sto?'7 at Indiana University, published also in 1955, in 

The Historian, under the tit.le "Pes.r::l. Harbor and the Revisionists" 

4 

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REF ID:A489034 

(Vol. XVII, No. 2 1 Spring 19551 PP• 21.5-233). Pro!. Ferrell 'a article 

{ g1 Ten comp1etel.T in Appendix 2 to th13 brochure) begins as tollovs: 

It. vaa perhaps inevitable that atter the second Worl.d War, 

as e.f'ter the var O'f 1914-18, theN s.hould. e.ppea.r in the United 

States a school CJ'! b.istoria.ns queationing the purposes o£ the 

l."m" 2.nd the motives or the -wartime statemen. The cost o:f both 

world wars, in hUll?B.n lives end in peys1cal resources, va.s ve-q 

high; and 1 t i:.13.S only n&tural that a cae in.di viduo.l.a should ques -

tion _such expenditure. Yet the new school. of nrevisionism" 

a.:ppearl.ng after the s~nd. World War ha.a und.eri.aken a line of 

investigation which 1 it' success:ru.1. 1 will force the rewriting o'f 

a.n entire era in American history. The revisionists hope to 

prove that in 1941 President Franklin D. Roosevelt purposeJ.7 

e:;r;;poaed. the Pad.fie Fleet at Pearl. Harbor 1 a.nd goaded the 

Japanese into attacldng it, thus brfo.g:'ng the United States 

into the war on the side ar the Allies. AI3 Professor Harry 

Elmer Ba.mes ha.s put the case, in ~ ple..in English, "The 

!let result of reYiaioni~t scholarshl.p applied to Pearl Harbor 

boil.s dovn essential.l.y to this: In order to promote Roosevelt's 

political smbiticms and his mendacious 1'oreign policy some 

three thousand .American bcqs we.re qui t.e needlessly butchered. 

• • • 

Proi'es sor Ferrell :f'ol.JJTws this extra.ct !rem Prof' essor Barner. w1. th 

t.he f'olloving words (in a :footnote) : 

no:r course, they vere only a drop 1n the buck.et compa..-red to 

those who were ul.timately slain in the war that resulted, which 

wa.s as needless, in terms of vital Ain.eri can interests, as the 

surprise attack on Pearl Harbor." R. E. Barnes, ed. / Pe~tua.l. 

'W<lr for Peryetual Peace (Caldvell, Idaho, 1953), Cb. 101 Strne.ry 

and Conclusions, 11 p. 651. 

Strong language, isn't it? Very strong, I think, coming f!'Om a vellknown historian such ea Barnes. What substance is there to the strident 

c] a1 ms of those prot'essions.1. historians / some o:t them very well-know and 

able men, who are the spokesmen tor the rev1B10Dists? What is it that 

Barbor disaster? First, they wish to prove that there ve.s no need at all, 

" -,,'k terms of Tital American interests," for the u. s. to enter into World 

5 

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REF ID:A489034 

War II as one of the 'belllgerents. Some ot them no doubt believe that 

we ~ought on the wrong side / vi th the wrong al.Ues: With this phase at 

the sub.ject I shall not concern m;ysel:r 1n W.S brochure / since I make no 

pretence vbatsoever c4 being a historian competent to deal vi th such au 

1mportant sub,jecta lien, some of the revisionists cla1m r:tr believe that 

they have proof 1;bat the di.saster at Peari Harbor was no •acc1dent," tbs.t 

it was brought about ~b7 Presi.d.ent Boosevel.t .. ~believe 

that what they call oUr *back-door" entry into the ccm!llct ws based 

upon an erroneous view, held by Jiidm end his Administration, as to what 

the U. S. role should be in ¥orld attain; el.so 1 they want us to believe 

that our entrT into World War n was for the personal pol.itical advantage 

r4 .President Roosevelt and his :f'ollowers u the Adm1 m stration. They 

contend, ill tact, that be goaded the Japanese into maldng the attack, 

that he enticed them into doing so bf using the U. S. PacUic Fleet as a 

"lure;" that he ~ from the so-call ed. "MlGIC" / the Japanese secret 

comaumications which Arrq and Nav;y cryptanalysts had solved, the exa.et 

time the attack would be made and the exact place where they were going 

to make it; that the President sensed that such an attack was the only 

thing which would unify American opinion end bring the peopl.e ot the 

United States to a pitch ~ excitement and resentment su:f'ticiently high 

to lead them to accept vith equanimity U. s. entry into World War rI on 

the side of the British end the French, thereb7, as Roosevelt te1t and 

as turned out to be the case, assuring the complete defeat ot the Axis 

powers; that President Rooseve1t should and could have &YOided the 

disaster at Pearl Harbor but delibera~ chose not to do ao, for t.he 

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~ona cited above; end that he purpos~ withheld MAGIC intelligence 

tram Admiral Kimmel 1 Comnander-in.chiet' of the U. S. Pe.eific Y1eet1 and. 

General Short, CCJ!l!llNid1ng General ~ the Bawa1ian Department, the two 

highest-ranking ea;manders in Hawa11 llho aboul.d have been but were not 

g1 ven this i.ntormation and vbo 1 therefore 1 were perm1 tted. by him. to be 

deliberatel.f mis.led as to the real situation, 'll.sled to the point, in 

ta.ct 1 that 'When the attack came they vere entirel;y unprepared e~ to 

meet it, let alone repulse it. In Yitllholding this 1.n!ormation, one or 

the proponents o~ this theory, e. retired admiral O'f the regular u. s. 

Na"fY, Rear Admiral Robert A. Tbeoba.l.d., implies in his book, The Final 

Secret a! Pearl Harbor (Bew York: The Devin..Ad.air Co., 1954), that to 

nake 1 t quite certain that the Japanese attack would be a complete surprise, so ts:r as General Short end Adlliral Kimmel vere concerned, the 

President had to have and did have as reiuctant partners in hi.a conspira.c;y, ) 

the A:rmy, and Admiral Stark, the Chiei' or Naval Operations I ~ regul9.r 

ofi"icers of highest integrity and repute. Am although Admiral. K1xmnel 

in hia own book Ad:miral K1rmnel's Storz (Chica.go: lienr;y Regoery Co., 1955) 

does not go quite so far as does Adm1.ra1. Theobald as to make charges 

tantamount to conspi.racy, he does go quite a long distance along the asme 

route. There is a degree o~ con:t'usion 1n regard to this point, however. 

'?be tolloving, tor example,, appears on the inside flap or the dust cover: 

Admiral Kimmel sticks to his own end or the storr. He tel.la 

us ebout the materieJ. he was d..enied.1 the warniDg messages be di.dn 1t 

get. He ~ no motives, he makes no deductions ti-om Wlproved 

hypotheses • L "Is this a slap at Theobald?':] Birt the book is 

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su:N'ic1eut to nail dawn the inescapable point: the blame for the 

loss ~ the PaeL~c F1ee't battl.esh.1ps rests equa.re11' on We.sh1ngton 

not on the men &t. Pearl. 

But on the back ot the dust Jacket, repeated. trom the la.st chapter of bis 

book (p. J..86), Adm1ral Kimmel seys: 

Ags.in and ~ 1:n mr mind I have reviewed the events that preceded. the Je.paneae attack,, seeking to determine 1i' I was llllju.st1.fied. 

in drsving i'rc:m the orders, d.trectives and information that were 

forwarded to me the conclusions tha.t I did. The fact that I then 

th.ougat and now think 1!If amcJ.usions 'W'el"e sound when based. upon the 

in:rormation I received, has sustained me during the years that have 

passed since "the first Je.psnese bomb :fell on Pearl Harbor~ 

When the information available in \iashillgton prior to the attack 

was finally disclosed to me long after, I was appalled. Nothing in 

my experience ot nearly torty-two yea.rs service in the Navy had prepa.""ed :aie for the s.cUons or the highest otticial.B in our govenmten't 

vhich denied this vi tali: intormation to the Pearl Harbor commanders. 

Ir those in authority wished to ~ in power policies, the 

least that they shoul.d have done va.s to e.dvise their naval Md mllitar," eommanders vha.t they were endeavoring to e.ccam;plish. To 

ut:ili~ the Paci..f'ic Fl.eet and the Army forces at PearJ. Ha.t'bor a.a a 

lure ~or a Japanese attack 'Without ad.vising the comma.nder-in-chie:f' 

~ the tleet and. the carvnander of the kr:m::f base at Ha.va.11 is -eomet.hing I em wholly una.bl.e to et:mprehen.d .. 

Wh1le I am still able to do so, I :reel that I must tell the 

st.or)" so that those 'WM follov may f'ul.1y realize ·the imperative 

necessity ~ f'urn:i.s.hi.ng the nave.l a:id military ccmaa.nders at the 

:rront vith f'ull end clee.r i!If'ormaticn. Cl?:.lJ" in this ;Jay can the 

future security o:f our country be preserved. 

Afurl.rsJ. Kimmel •s caae rc-__sts upOll the sJ..l.egation that he was 1

delibe:rately denied in:rormation a"mila.bl.e in Washington. Had he 

had this information, he seys, he vou.l.d. have known the Japanese 

intended 'to strike Pearl Harbor e.nd. could have adopted measures 

to mee"t the atta.ck and m1n1mize t.he losses. These measures, vhich 

he outl 1nea1 a.re o!' eons1dera.bl.e in+"...erest 1 though one 'WOnders to 

vbat extent they are guided by b.inds.ight. 

Dr~ ~ eontinUee M foll.mm! (:P. 462) 

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~F ID:A489034 

To support his case, Admira:l Kimmel drava on the evidence 

presented during the inveetigations ot the Pearl Harbor attack. 

This ertdence, he c111.1ms vas not onl7 obsoured at the time but 

vas evaluated to produce a desired result. Inconsi1ftencies in 

the ~timouy were 1.gn.ored., and important questions raised d\11"• 

ing the hea.r1ngs l.efi unanswered. He charges bias on the part 

ot inTestigating officers and. a dellbera.te effort to vhite-waah 

the adm1n1.st;ration end block en impartial s~ !or the tr\ith. 

~ Congressional 1.nTestigs.tion," Kimmel declares, "was governed. 

by the ma.Jorit.Y pe.rt;y, the Democrats. The huge volumes ~ 

testi..moey in that inquiry aerved to eom'nae the public mind es 

to the significance of the :racts e.nd. to smother test~ damag ... 

1ng to the admin.istrat.ion." 

Responsibil.iey tor Pearl Harbor, JCtmeJ charges, rests 

a~ upon the shc:DJ.d ers or hl.s SlZpeX'1orB 1n 'Washington and 

ultima~ on the Camme.nder-1n-chie!1 President Roosevel.t. 

"Until this ~ 1 " he writes, "I ha:ve kept silence on the subject 

ot PearJ. liax'bor • • • Now, hoverer 1 I deem it 'rtI1' duty to speak 

out. What took place in i1asb.ington must be so cl.early pl.aced 

cm the public record that no group ~ persona in .8dnrl ni strati ve 

power will ever dare again to invite another Pearl Harbor and 

place the blame on tbe otticers in the neet and in the field.1'! 

The charges that . .A.dmir&l K1urneJ makes are not nev end were 

being c1..rcul.a.ted even bet' ore the end. of the var. The Jgpaneae 

attack on December 7 bad unified the country and ended tenporarily the d.eba.te between the "Isola.Uonists" and the "interventioniata" vhich bad marked the preve.r 1ears. All cla.sses end 

parties cl.osed ranks ~or t.he duration o-r the struggle. BU\ eyen 

during the var, there had been e. recognition o:f. the political 

implications involved in the question of responsibility !or 

Pearl Harbor, and the administration had ~en steps to preserve 

t.he record. Six investigations had been conducted. even vhile 

the COllf'l.ict raged. 1 e.lJ.. but one o:r them by the Ar:IrJ and Na-vy. 

As a result, a :large voJ.ume o£ testimony and documen~ that 

might otherwi.se have been lost vas e.ssembl.ed. But the requirements at va.rt1me security and. a unU'ied. national effort made 

public debate impossible. 

The var over 1 pa.rti.san d.U'f"erences reappeared, end critics 

o~ President Rooseve1t began to cbs.J 1 enge ~ the views so 

wid.el.)" held during the var years. The cooling or passions and 

disillusion vith the postwar world ra1.sed turther questions 

about American participation 1n the var. Hiatorisns and 

publicists, as they have done aft.er every w.r, sought to 

ree.asess the causes ~ the var and. to pJ.a.ce Roosevel. t 's pollq 

in the larger perspeati ve o:r kaeria&l hi.stoq. Thus, 1n the 

years 'f~ the end of the conflict, a ?le'll interpretation of 

the events that bad preceded the var and ~ the cond..uet of the 

var itself emerged. 

1.:.-::.:-c:::.y· 

9 
REF ID:A489034 

The toregoi.Jlg t1Dal. pe.ragreph of the ex\ract trom Dr. Morton• s 

article briJ3gs us direcrtly to the principal revisionist coniienticm which 

v1ll be evnn1 ned in the present ~.· The COlriient1on1 as ·noted ·above 1 

was first stated in l.945 by John T. Flynn, one of the early aud most; 

vitriolie revilers of President Rcosevelt, in a pamphlet entitled '!'he 

Final Secret o£ Pearl Harbor_, in which he revealed the tact that U. S~ 

~t.s bad soJ.ved t.he Japa.nese diploma.tic codes and ciphers before 

the Pearl Barbor attack. His contention va.s that "the int.elligence 

derived. or deriT8obl.e rrom the soJ.ved a.ud transiated messages, the socalled MAGIC 1 .told exa.c& vbere and when the Japanese vere going to 

strike; that this priceless information Roosevelt dellbera.tel.7 kept tram 

Admiral K1mte1 and General Short, with the resul.t that the Japanese vere 

able to make their ~ with complete surprise; and that the loss or 

men and ships that resulted tberefrom, however mxf'ortunate it va.s for 

the U. S. and a £ew American .f'aailles, un:U'ied the countr,y. That, claims 

Flynn, ves Rooseve1t's aim. At any rate, as Dr. Morton indicates, the 

Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor ended the debate between the "isolationists" and the "interventionists." 

l.O 

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2 • THE RF.AL ESSENCE C1F THE PROBLEM 

Dist.UJ..ed doVll to its essence, theret'ore, the first question is: . Did 

MAGIC ~ eonta1n clear and Ulle'f.d.vocal indications as to exactly where 

and 'When ve would be hit b7 the Japaneae in the W!U' vhich Roo11evel.t knew, 

or vas expect1Dg1 or at least :te1t w.s in the o!'fing7 

indeed., mi 11 i ans of words 1 in f~--have been published on the question in 

a.u attempt to ansver it ei~ attll'matiTelJ" or negst1veJ.y. It' some 

Americans now seott at the vbol.e business and sa:r that all that eoul.d be 

said an the point vas a.aid years SBO-wb:T not stop f'l.ogg:fng a dead. horse?-

let them note tha.'t in ~ staid and unsensationel a newspaper as The WaJJ. 

Street Journal there appeai-ed. a· .long review of Adm:1ra.l Kimmel' s S'torJ: 1n 

the iaaue for 14 Jamae.rr 1955, ac~ied. cy a lengthy editorlal. entitled 

"Pearl Harbor" 1n the same issue; let them note, too, another J.engtlq 

editorial entitled ~ of the broken cod.en in the issue of the same 

newspaper tor 21 Januarr 1955; let then read. also the baker's dozen 

"Letters to the Editor" in the issues tor 21 Ja.nuary, 31 January, 4 February 1 and 6 Februa.17 19551 a.lJ.. ccmnenting upon the two edi tori.ale and 

the book review mentioned above. The question therefore can by no means 

be said 'to be "dead Wld. buried;" in ~a.ct, even to thia day references to 

the "MAGIC" that vas availabl.e and was DO'\ used at the time ar Pearl Harbor 

keep popping Vjp in the daily newspapers 1 in periodicals I and in books• 

For instance, there are t;vo "Letters to the Editor" in the Washington Post 

on Pearl Harbor aa recentiT as 3l. December l.956 and 4 Janus.t7 1957. And 

ll 

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REF ID:A489034 

as I \!I"ite this brochure word has just come that the Chicago Tribune 1a 

about to publlih miothu (:rerlsionist., no doubt) article on the subjeet. 

Let me theret'ore repeat the quesUon: Did MAGIC real.ly contain cJ.es:r 

and lmequi TOce.l indications as to exactly \lhere and Wen ve voul.d be hit 

&._the Japanese in the war vhich Washington knev, or '1§8.S expecting, crr at 

least ~elt ~ ;probeb~ soon to come7 

In this 'brochure l shall attempt to d.i.Bpose ~ tids basic question 

ii:i. a rather simple end., in m:r opinion, a. definitive manner by attaeking 

1\ in Wat may seem to be a round-about way,. But just bef"ore getting 

right dawn to 1 t I vill. p1.e.ee before the reader a a.ho..~ ext.raet :from a 

book published late in 1956 by a x-ecently-d.eceased and &. h1.gb.ly-reapected 

(by ~ Americans 'Who kDev him.) Japanese whose words vere such- he 

died. in prison-s.s to :indicate that he had no particular reason ror hi.di.Ilg 

the truth. I re:rer here to the book vritten by Shigenori Togo, the mnn 

Pearl Harbor and across whose desk there certa.inly mu.st have P8SSed the 

most 1c:portant of the C:?ss~s to mid from the Foreign Office and Japanese 

ambaa sad.ors , I!d!listers, and. con.sul.s abroad •1 

It is to be noted, and indeed emphasized, before goil:g into thi.s 

phase or the subject, that at the time of the s.tta.e.k the only er;ptogrsphic 

S7Btems which the U. So ~c agencies hAd solved and were eh.le to 

eystems used by the Foreign Ot'fiee. 'WbateTer intelligence the U. S. 

l 'l'he Cause o'f .ra;pan. New York: Simon and Schuster I 1956. 

12 

--
REF ID:A489034 

va.a clear~ ~ ved. :tram Japanese dipl.a:aatic comznmice.Uons. With t.b.is 

t'act in mind let us take a look at an 1 tea c4 auch interest in Togo• s book 

(pp. 118-J...19 and 197): 

lt.is not difi1eult 'to conceive the extent~ the t;rrBnn;r ~ 

the milituy power trm the tact that on the eve of the Pe.cific 

war such a t'undame!'ital de.tum as the total tonMge of Japanese 

naval vessel.a-not to speak of the d1spl.aeement ~ the gi.gsnt.i_e 

battleships Yamsto and Muaa.shl., or the p.:'..3n to attack Pearl He.rborve.s ~ Vitbheld trai the knowledge of the civilian 'cabinet 

. ministers. General Togo even told me in Sugamo Prison th.st 1 t vaa 

on11' at the Dm'E that he bad first l.ec.rned that the J~ task 

force vhicl:l carried out the ~ on l>e8rl Harbor bad. assembled 

at Hi~ Bq rm 10 November 1 and ve1ghed. a.uchor for Ra.vai1 on 

the ~ c:4 the 26th! The high camnand did not divulge 1 ts 

secrets even to the tull general vho was Premier and M:1.nister of 

War; it is easy to coneei-re hov other ll1n1sters were treated. 

~ . . . . . . . " .. . The var dec.:1a1on was thus ma.de, end. various ~ which 

vould. srl5e vi.th the opening of the va:r vere submitted to meetings 

o:r tbe L:1.ai5on ccmr~. ODe thing Wich-needle5s to say-w.e 

not discussed ill the Lia.:taon con:rerence wa operational. aspects 

Gr the impending honi.llties. It. was d.1.sc.1.osed. at the IM1'FE that 

the nsval task rorce under Admiral Negumo bad eeiled. ti'Cmt Hitokappu. 

B~ on 26 Noveml:>er under orders to strike Pearl Harbor, s.nd in its 

Judgment the tribun&l ma.de the absurd finding that tJle scheduled 

attack was tree1y discussed at the meeting of the Liaison Conf'erence on 30 November. We had, of course, no knowledge o'f t.he pl.an; 

1 t was the 1..nvariable practice o:! the high cammena not to di vu1ge 

to eiv:U.ian otticl.al.s 1 such as us, e:a;/' scrap of information bearUig cm these hlgbl7 secret operations, and 8Z!)"One f'am111ar with 

the syrt.em will reM1J7 UDderstand our total lack of knowledge o!' 

them. (This cond1 tion is sufticiently well illustrated by the 

fact, llhich I have mentioned el.sewhere, that Tojo told me that 

it was only at the IMrFE trial. itseli that he first :lea.med any 

operationaJ deta.il.e of the Pearl Harbor attack; s. ma.as o~ additional evidence vas adduced at the trle.l showing that the civilie.n 

members ~ the Cabin.et bad. no prior l!:no\f ledge even of the existence of 'Ule ~ to attack Hawaii.) 

·..::\ 

tel Jing the 'truth, i.e. 1 that the c1 vi.liJm Jlellbers a! the Japwse Cabinet 1 

1nc.ludillg Prime MiniBt.er To jO Nld the Foreign Minister himseJ.1', h.e.d no 

13 
.. · •. /REF ID :A4B9034 

/:i::. 

r;:;;n; 

\"":":,'::-:-.-

prior knavledge ot the plan, including ~ course the exact date on which 

the Pearl Bar'ocr attack was to take place (as set 'b7 the Japanese h1gb 

oamaand) then ~ MAGIC messages themselves in the cammuni cations trcn 

aDd ·i;o tbe Foreig!1 ottice could ~ possi~ have contaiDed m:sy def'1ni te 

intormat~~ let al.one a cl.e&r-cut ~. on this ve:q bQ?ortaut 

point. And. it the MAGIC messages did not contain t.bis il!f'ormatian or 

ata1;ement how coW.d President Rooaevel.t or fJZJ7 1'l!ftYUer8 of b1a immed1.ate 

otticial. :t~, ~the beads or U. S. Ar.q aud U. S. l'iaTT ;1nte1Ugence 

statts ~ :trm the MA.GIC messages exaetJ:r where and Yhen the attack 

vu coming? But t.h1.a question ~ arise: clid If ego tell 'the trut.h 1n 

his book? U he did., hav are ve to explain certain~ the MAGIC messages 

the records ot PHR contain? 

After re-reading the h1md.redB ar MAGIC messages 'that were exeba.nged 

'between the Foreign Ministry e.nd. 1 ts offices abroad in the 7fJ8::t' 1941 1 t 

seems fantastic1 1t stra1Ds our credullt;y1 to believe that '?ago did not 

~ vhat vas being plamted. To menUon onq one set o'f messaaes, the 

~dead line" messages-after which 0 tbi ngs are automatically goizlg to 

happen" -haw couJ.d Togo ~ know what was beiDg pl e.nned? How are we to 

explain 'them1 ~ he didn •t know that the U. S. vas goil1g ~ be attaekedY 

But let it be remembered that we are now re-reading the :messages from the 

~point o:t h1nds1.girt. There is not a single message ~t can be 

S&id to contain categorica.l evidence provillg that Minister Togo must •ve 

kDovn that Pearl Barbol" was to be the target. In 1946, and even now 

'wben ye re-read t.hose mease.ges 111 P~ 12 or the :PBR, I rea.lize tb&t it 

I 

I~ ' '...: ' 

is :te.ntastic that somel>odf in U. s. Inte1J..1cence did not or cou.ld nat 

see tb&'t the blow ws being :preps.red against Pearl Harbax'. But if ve 

14 

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REF ID:A489034 

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ocmel n!e tbat he .and his: eloseat aaaociates 1n the 1'areip Ott1ce ft:e DO . 

Ntter a't iJrtel 11gence thml. our. own 1ntei] tpnce authoriUea i nq knew 

or ~ pesaed tlb&t ~ was gn1 na. -~ bappen after 29 lknember 1941, 

b'3 the7 didn •t know 'eX!Ctlz 1ihere or wbenl Or sbB.ll ve assume 1iba~ sameboq in the JspSDese ·F~ Ottiee; soae. s~ or Togo, \he Foreign 

Mlniater1 1ras ~in· au the aecret"-and.'it w&s be that 1iook care ot·all the. 

mesaapa that po1n1;e4 to Peazol llal'box'1 . Could bel. Could eas~ bel Rav 

1W1l" aeasagea go1»6 °"'·or WIT oae at our .own .JArse execttUve departments 

and aigDed. b7 the Sec:re1la.r7 thereof are ~ seen by 'the Secreta.rTI 

But I do J¥>t 1d.sh to bel Mor the po1n1;. Le\ us mere17 &&'¥ tbat it 1s 

' . 

qui~ poaa1bl.e that ~. sav none at the c:nciAl. aeaaagea ·or~ WAt is 

ao:"e probable, -tba't be saw 'the& but, not be1Dg "in on the searet.s" ~ the 

Japanese high ••cmnd, did noi draY the cor.rect deduct1cms-that the u. s. 

was to be .attac:lted1 vitbout, varn1ng, 8$ Peul. Rcbor in 'the ear~ hours 

ar 7 December 1941, and that the object o-r the attack va8 to desVo;r the . . . 

u. s. PncUi.c Fleet 1:f pOesible. But let us e.1.so remember that ~1ng 

the MAGIC messages 1n 1946 or 1n l.956 is analogous ~ read.1ng the t1nal. 

chapter at a detecti ..e tale-before the precediJlg chapters, vi th ·their 

.. 

the t1n&l. chapter often makes tbe reader ~eel interior, even s~, that 

he COl1ld not see ii.he truth, the real elements at the ~ right rram 

the 1>q1nn1ng. ~ Japanese ' were getting iJrtel l 1 gence ~-call 

s._ --i:," .:~· 

~ 

U' 70U vill, "ord.ina:rT ErW zieparts" trca ~ra.1. u. s. m:U1taey bases 

15 

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'besides Hawaii, such as the Philippines, Panama Cmial, Seattle, and San 

Fmacfsco. I~ ia true that Japanese ir...erest in Pearl Harbor seemed. to· 

be &1ld aetuaJ.:cy vaa much greater than at -~ other base; but one could 

aJ.&o ~that. tb.ia pe&t.er in"'8rest atmmed tram a perhaps Justifi.8ble 

tear by the J'apaaeae that the t1. S. Pac:ific Fleet J!dght sortie acme dark 

D1gb.t and strike the first blow at Ja,pan. ~ as well as the u. B. 1 

did not vazxt to he taken b)' fNlprl.se t Perb&.pa ea i.Dtel l 1 gence spec:ial..1.si; 

with the proper ld.JJd of :Jmag:fnaticm might have hit ~ the t'eS.l res.sen 

.. 

ror the greater Japanese 1nterest in Pearl. Barbor, but who can be cerlain 

r4 this? All that can safe]Jr be said in ~ to the Togo statement is 

' W.S: Both he end Prime M1nis'ter ~c~ ~ have been told, or they may 

baTe gaessed1 tb&1; Japan ws going to strike-but not exactl7 1dlere Emd 

itsel:t even a.f'ter the task force left Japanese waters. And ~or those 

revi.sionis1;s who th1Dk the u. s~ note at Zl November 1941 was an ultimatm 

and that it vas that note vhich triggered. off tbe attack on Pearl, let 

them rumin&te on the fa.ct that the Jape:iese task force vhieh attacked. 

Pearl. l.ei't Jcq>a.nese waters the ~ bet'o:re that note w.s -sent ott by 

Secretar,y of State Hull. Bis note may have constituted an ul.~-

but it did not bring on the e.tta.ck. The attack was plamled very carefully, 

months bel:'ore tba"t1 and.1 to :repeat,~ ~ lmmc:bed. to t.he point ot 

ha.ving departed. i'rtU Jepan.ese va~. 

But there is e.not.ber revi.sion1st prop / end. a. very 1mporta.u1i one, I 

mun empMsize I which I wish 1;o undenl1De I tar 1t should be greatl1 vea!t· 

ened when consideration 1s given to another argwt 'Wbich 18 so obvious 

16 

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and siDJ,pl.e that it has been a source~ ~sbment to me that~ revisionists themselves ba've not thought at it. (Parenthetical.11 I wat t.o 

p:retace the argmaent b7 a~ tbai aq hesitancy I might bave in stating 

it :melts f11tlfJ:1' when I .t1nd that aevera.J. ~ abl.e =.w.J. b.istorim1s 'With 

'Whom I have discussed. it a;pressed aatonishment that it hc.d not hitherto 

been lllm"tioned. One at them said a! 1:t in a recent persona.'l letter: 

"In ~ I real.1ze tba.1; some ~ 'the ideas 7CJU menti.oned a})(r.tt the 

events l.eed1.ng up to the af;tack on Pec.rl Harbor (like Col.umbus ' egg 

trick!) are startling 1n their simplicity tmd obviou...~ss-vhich is probably vb;y no one bas heretofore recognized their imports.nee." My earl• 

tentian., I think, warrants ta.k1ng a. nev 1ook &t e. certtdn phase of the 

:P~1 ~ ~-tr iDdeed there is e;rq ~ about the taetors 

entering into our beiJ16 '\;s.ken b7 surprl.se. 

17 

. . . . ~ 

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REF ID:A489034 ---- ---- ----

I·- --

3. A NEW LOOK AT THE REVISIONISTS A!.IEGATIONS OF CONSPIRACY TO KEEP 

KIMMEL AND SHORT IN THE DARK 

The rerl.sionists' argument, vhich I herlt&te to repeat (since it has 

already been stated in th1a brochure; but 1 tis repeti ~on J:m?.Y' make vb&t I 

have to say cr,ysta.l el.em:) runs as tol..l..ovs: President Roosevelt desperately needed e. good reason tar just.1.tying AmeT!ca' B entry into WorJ.d. War 

ll. Re needed it 1n order to save the British 1'ran utter det'eat b7 Ge~; 

France was al.ready d.ovn and out! Brita.in VB.S next on ru.tler's l.1.st-a.nd 

then the TJrd ted States. (The revisionists deny this most vehemently, but 

everythi.ng that Hitler had done thus far vas strictly in accord.a.nee Yi.th 

the pl.ens be ollt11ned in Mein K.e.s>;• In this eomi.ection, and. as I write 

tt>1n; there has Just come out a book vhich must be regarded as authorltatiye and vhicll is called The German Weapons and Secret Weapon.a o! World 

;.tar II, by Rud.oli" Luaar. Lusa.r waa head ~ the Tec:lmical Arms Department 

of' the Wehmar..ht. He d.iscl.oses that Ger.msny was al.so bni J ding the Heinkel 

34 3, a bcmlber capable o:t rea.ch1 ng the lh:d tea. States and returning Yi thout 

!"e).°'uelling. Several o£ the planes vere ~ at the end o£ the var. The 

book also says that 1 t vas orig:j naJ J y pl.mmed to s ta.ge the first air raid 

on the United States in May 1945. So much tor the revi.aionist contention 

that the benign Herr Hitler had. no designs vhatsoever on the United States; 

for it is very clear that he planned to bomb this eotm.try Just as soon as 

he bad !i.n.ishetl. off E:ig.lN>o • ) The Preaident wanted t.c get the U. S • into 

the con:!l.ict not only to save Brita.in but / ultims:t.el.y, al.so to save the 

U. S. Timely a.ct.ion was needed. He bad goaded Hitler 'b7 several 

tmneutral acts 1n the Atlantic, as veil as in establ.ishi.ng certain U. S • 

18 
REF ID:A489034 --- -- ----- -- -- -

-- t·:-;,.:, 

l.ogistical rel.atians vith Britain ("lend-lease," the trenst'er ~ 50 JJ. s. 

destr(vm ,· etc·.); but. Bi tl.ei." was too cl.ever ·to be puahed to the polltt. 

ti:eman action V01lld ~ a American decl.a;:ation ~ var on Ge111ADJr -~ 

before Ge?!BZ!1' vss readl' tar such action. R1t.ler realized, as well as 

~ Roosevelt,· that what American did held the aztsver to G«rmaiv's 

problem. .President Boos"evel.t knew that 'the America.t, people were ~ &'t 

all amdous 'to be dravn into the European varJ but he :tel.t that it va.s 

a.bsOJ.uteq llece&S8Z'7 that scmeth1ng be "engineered," so to speak, in order 

that the Uo S • vallJ.d, wilJ.:'~ I °be drawn into the con:t"l.ict. This I the 

revisionists contend, as I b&ve reiterated, Roosevel.t felt. was neeesaar,r 

~save England; it vas -~al.so intended, \bey contend, .to 

divert· at'te?lUcm from ·1-he te.U.ure of the Bew Deal to bol.ster the ~ 

sagg1 ng eCOJ'OZl1' as a resul.t of defective manetal7 policies end other 

~ difi"ic:W.ties. u. s. participa'U.on was also a Demoaratic obJec- • i 

ti ve 1 t.he;y say 1 -tor Roosevel. t • s reelection; and 1 o'f course, it was desirable to preserve the Rooseveltian prestige. The long-d.rmm out arguments 

vitb the Japmiese D1.ght1 in viev of the Tri-partite pact o'£ the German, 

Ita.lie.n, and J'~e AJd.&1 8:ld despite Hitl.er's ~ s"trategr er not 

succumbing to .Amer1can provox::&tion 1n the A 'Ua.utic 1 serve his purpose. 

Americe.ns did not like the Japanese ~and. were distrustful ot' these 

Oriental.a. Japanese ambitiaD& in the Far Ea.st. and distrust of the 

Jepm>ese kept popping up evel"J"Wbere 1n the American press and public 

op1n1on. BU\ Rooaflel.~ tel.' 1lba.'t ~vu o= sine qua non t.o ~ 

into a shooting wm- vith the Japanese. 1'.n the words of Mr~ Stimson, his 

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Secretarr O't Var, ~oztunate words one JIZUSt MN admit, it was all a . 

-~~haw the Japanese_ "could be maneuvered 1irto the poaiUan ot . 

firing the ttrst shot,"~~ tbe .bericmi people would be l.ukewa.m 

~ a war nth ·tbea. MAGIC, -tmt is, the MCret; intell1gence iah1ch the 

eolution or tbe Jap\?lese ~lamatic ennzmtn1eation& made availshle to the 

Roosevel:t AdmiJrl.stration 1n great elnmdance, prtrVided e. golden opportun. 

i'tiT-eo .iibe. ~oni.sta, isir:.l.uMnc Admiral. ~; terventl.7 believe. 

I have .~ and more thea onoe stated 1n this brochure that 'the revia.1.onists are ~ that MAGIC told 1-be Presidea't ~ vb.en .ani 

vhere their at.tack vu going to be launehedi in the ea.?'~ hours of '11e 

mrn1ng ~ · 7 December J.941. at Pear1 Harbors ~· Y.f:t;hhol d 1 gg t1"t1Ill the . 

U~ Ss canJ!l'lllders at Pearl~ th1e prl'V8iie. knoYl.edge which Preaident 

Roos~t p.1ned f'1'0m J.Wl!C-tbe horse •s ~, so to spe&k--ena.bled the 

President to accoq>Uab .hU beart•s deetre. nth '1ds bigbly secret inf'oi-• 

mat1on he could .aneuver \be Japanese so t.ba't they would. fire the fint 

Ei.!td ships, of course, e.s so ee.J.l.ousl.y stated in the extra.ct from Professor 

Barnes vhich was qUOted above, but these losses, t.b.ey contend., he vould 

regard u justified in the long run by aaving England, France, e:id.1 la~ 

on, Amerlca:·from the Axis Powers-and 1t vou1d 1.ncid.enta.icy save his own 

prestige and inB.u:re his reelection. 

~,. to quote f'rm Se~ st1mson•a .d.1C7 a bit, Japan :was to be 

~ intoc~--Position ~ t:1.rl.ng the first e~." '?be aeneuver, 

20 

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Pacific Flee$ as a lure; '\ha~ is wb71 ~argue, Roosevel.1; 1.DBined cm 

having tmt fleet baaed on Pec-1 Barbar instead~ oa the vest. eou\ ot ")).. -

' '\\\'\ 

the u. s .. , as Acbdral Ricbardson1 K1We1 •a pred.eceaaor, wisbed. ~let 

I 

-ror the men end. otticers or the :neet. (Adm1ra.l Richardaan had no\ tbe 

sJ 1 g}rte~ idea ~ keepi.Dg the nee-t. at Pearl. 'WOUld deter the Japanese 

tram doing -1lhe.t the7 w1shed to do in the Far East. In f's.et, he thought 

keeping the tJ..eet on the West Coas" would be mre ettective. Well, the 

Pres1den't.1 the Cammander-in.cbiet 1 d1dn •t. agree with Adm1ra.l Richardaonand tba1; 1s all there vas to it. It turned. out, unfo~, ~ 

Adm1raJ. R1ehard.Ban 1s v1.ev vaa more nearq co:s:re~ 'then the Presi~•sbut does that mean that the President bad ulterior motives in keeping the 

tl.eet at Pea.r1? I don't 1i.b.1Dk so at all.) 

argument is va.Ud., 

why don •t tbej" go .tun one step further1 It e.U that President Roosevelt 

~ necessar;r ~or his purposes, 11' all tba-t he was seeki.ng1 was "to 

mmeuver t.he Japanese into firins the tirS't shot," and if MAGIC contained 

all that 1ibe revis1aa1 ats Cla1m it conta.1.Ded, voul.d it not have been 

poasibl.e, b7 D!?8.11S of tb.a1i verr MAGIC to aecampl.iah his purpose Vi1'hou.t 

such a :terrible loss ot American lives and, vi~ loss ot ezq of the 

ships~ consti~ ~apple of the President;'a qe,-~_ Bav's big 

ba'"1eships'l I.t Roosevel:t was so cl.ever a pollUcian and ao wwMaveJJ 1u. I 

21 

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1n bia atra\ea7 as to W.U Up a Vtq ~ ~ the Japeaese into & 

position 1lhere1n '1lq voal.d. 'be enticed or maneuvered 1mo t1r1ng <\he tint 

aho\1 ahould one d..o'db\- t.b&\ he ·l.Mked the i.Jwteu1gence 1io have sane one 

step ~ in his Wnkinte am. aer1Da a~ like tbe ~olloriJll -

himael:t: "ElrrelmJ. I'w p it. MlGIC vUl. proT.1de the golden oppornn• 

. . 

1\7' I''" sovpt rar ao J111Jq moatb.s. I 1 w· hit ·upon a per.t'ectl.7 maneJ.aus 

idea and opp0rtmd:t;,y! An ab~ and amazh,gl7 vondertul. opporW!d:'7l 

'fhe Japanese have "°' ~ "° Pearl ~ 1;o llllke their BUrprise attack,, 

an attaclt ~ 1ndicated bJ theae MAGIC messages. 'l'be7 have to travel 

aeverai thousuO miles, in tact, to set._:to Bawa.11 ~Japanese waters. 

It we caught 'tbea red....lmaded, so t.o Bpeak1 near Bawa:11 and pret~ 

Jun 'before ~ .a."8ck.1 ~ CoQ1d. poaaihJ1' claim t.bq. vere oil a aimpl.e~ 

ba.mless reconna:lssance mission-or on aBDeUYera. WlJ71 Vith J&pa.neaeA:mei"icaa relat1ons eo \ense1 even if "11q were rnmgb\ as J18U7 aa 500 mUes 

t1'Cll Pearl ·Hanor everr \IDbiased. criUc VO'Ul.d stq that t.beT real.11' fired 

:tirstl . So I'll 'bl'ing K1npeJ and Short ~ into the picture-I'll tell 

them the stor;y MAGIC is teJ ling us. I'll ~ order them here right 

a.var (N~ 26th, ~or exampl.e) and I'll have Ma.rshaJ..l and Si;a.rk corae 

in. I'll show K1nnel and Short the cruc1al messages. Then I '11 t.el.l 

them amaething like 'this : Look, rq 'bo7s 1 70'1 see nav, don •t 1'0Ui wba.1; 

,-our're in an exeell~ position to do to the Hips? You see, don't )'OU 

t.bat tb1s iDsid.e and absol.~ authentic iD.fomaUon A1B that thq are 

conrtng tram Jape.n ~ a'"8.clt Pearl Barbo?' lq' n:rpriae n seven o'clock on 

the JIOJ."Diq ~ 7 December; tbq•:re ccw1 ng Vith a task force wbich will 

~be a preLQ' bic one, )'OU 111a7 be nre. It vill ccapr1se aeveral 

22 

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REF ID:A489034 

a1rcJ.oaft carriers; ~·u ha\fe ~ as mazq as 350 e.1.rcraf't, 1nclm'n1 

dive 'bombers, ek., ~course. llov aa Corrallmder-iJ:l~, I direct 10U 

w d.o ~ tba$ will. be necessa%7 to meet 'them vhen or pref'erabl1' 

Just before t.he:f' a-tri:ve to. launch thei:" -attack• I d.1rec:t )"OU to c1eGtrc:r7 

them; knock oU'b the wbOle task :torce / carriers, planes 1 aUcl. all, Ju.st 

,f, 

l.lefare thq reach oab.u,.it _70U caa. I ~ 70111 K1IIJDel.1 W get. eJJ. your 

~ps·-.nd., of ·Courae1 )'Om' ~""S ou\ al t.be1r 'berthing positions 

at ?earl. He.r'bar SQlle '1me durl.ng the Diaht, ao that there won•t be e:q 

ships there -ror them to bomb. And I van$ all TQUr plane$1 incluH l1g 

those on ~ ~, the Lex:1Jlgton and 'the EnterprU.e, ~ in ~ air 

~ore sevea o'clock; 70U'd better ge't arr mes~ a'C ance to liaJ..sey, 

Bevton, aad Brr:m:i to alert their task t'orces; if 1;;b.e)r're llOt m.~ .Pea-t1 get 

1ihem back aa· aocm aa )'OU can; mape J"OU'll vent~ ge-t the Sare.toga. back 

tram the Wen ·eoa.n w Join J'OUr other Ca:'?'ierB ir 1'lJe1"e •s still time, 

' 

shm'e to be~ manned and with live ammunition a.'t band., ~~or use; 

I vaut you to wipe out as ~ c£ their a1rcra.ft as poss.ibJ.e vith 'libat 701.1 

have. Forget tbat Sere'WT message you sent about being prepared. ~or 

~t the Japs are after Om' nee\ Md tJ:1e p~OD or the ~ while 

at Pearl 11 ~ job, J'OU know .. Be Slll'e 70ur 2:'8ds.:' is working~~-

24 lwurs a da'y. I ~JOU, Kimmel, to get J'OU%' carriers and bs.t;tl.ewagons 

out Were they can d.ea~ the JaptrDese carriers and e~ ships Wile 

'their a1rcran are· be1Dg Bhat dmm jl1st ~ore they reach Petl.rl., 'l.'h:h1 

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· .., lads, it dcme veil vill go dawn in bisto17 as ~ most ~ &nd 

~ 'battle flt all timt· ETeD ll1ICb ml"e 1q;lar~ 1a b he\ tlsa1; 

:11' 70ll knock att. tbeU' ~force &Dd ~ ~'ll. baye mntmal losses 

ve 'll came out tm- abee4 ill DB.val s1;rength became right mnr our Pacific - ., . ' . 

Fleet 1B no aatch tor the Japanese C.ombined ~-tbe;r've SD\ mre 

abips,.; .f'e.Rer ships, and. Yi'\h l.cmger ... reage gmia thBD ve have, I Im 80%'1'7 

. . 

'to..,-~ .. ··• Bow .I don''t. lnSZlt. JOU to. tell~ 1•~ alerted 70'1 became c:4 

.~~.is telling•• We're restUng '11e1r ~ secre1; diplomatic 

codes and etphent . ldd.ch &re all 1;hat ~ l!OW flZQ'bov right. DOV 1 and it *a 

verr im,portsnt that tbe7' &m 't set smpicious about the securitJ ~ their 

Foreip ott1ce epmm1 caUOPG • I want tibea iio cc:mUnm \181.Dg those 

~ &)Stews beC&lllSe 'the int~on ve'l'e ~ out at '\hem 

nDt1 :la prlceless and will be mm mare so ill the VB.?' '4d.ch vUl vitbout 

questltm enne Vben you •ve des'tiraJed. theU' task rorce tor Peari. ~ 

von •t; get. susptC!ou it JOU w1ll act exaotJ.T u '1aough 7afJr Qp«t'S'\;1ans 

and -.neuvers ·ue a rtftl'tine mst;ter-tra.1?d.ng~ I W&l1't )"OU 1;o be on 

Alert No. J.. Don'~ f"co¢get; tba:t on 17 Jtme 19401 when we ~the Japa 

and the ~ were about to gang ViP on us 1 ve sent messages cll.recti:.Dg 

aar eammBltders to put our forces at Pearl on a ~ a.lert, and you did 

-1~---: 

ao; that time, tortunatel.7, noth1Dg happened.. We vere probe.bl¥~ 

at ccmcJ.usicms then, but nov it's dittereut-nov we've got W.S MAGIC~: 

You •11 ba"Ve to go &'\ this earet\1ll7, at came, so e.a not to al.am tbe 

Japs &rid. lead -. 1do ca.J, 1nc ~ . Vhole 1aJ.1Jlg ott, vhiah tbq nui can 

do, as ve UDd.e1"nand ~. ;plaa. But the ~ thing is t.o keep t%Ul 

doing ~ that v1ll &]Am them and -.ke '\ihea call '\be whole ~ ott. 

24 

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t I _± 

I -=t tbea to fire '\be ~ shot. I •m. ~ JOU can th1Dlt VtP vsqs to 

¥OX"k .U» to a cmsd!Ucm. ar hll. a.ten so ~ ~'ll no\ get Sl1SP1cicnm. ,._ 

~ m:1gb;t ;Prec::l.pita'Ge ea u1.nc1de~11 and glve ~ Japs an excn&ae 1;o 8tq 

-~we ccmitted the :fint overt act. llesides ve doD'" want to alAl.2_ -~:~{j~ :: 

the ciY.U~~Uan, of course. ~bows that relat:taas between 

~-f~~-. 

Japan and ourael.vea aJ'e 'Vf'lr7 tense ri8lxt -now 1 ao ~ exerci&ea &1ld 

maneuvers ~ a defensive ~ will certa.i.JllT be ~ es cmlT J.ogi.cal. 

and. ~ natural thing to do.. Bow I sugest that 70U get back w 70'Ur 

posts e.a tut as JOU can-10t1 "Ve got ODl¥ a rev daT& to prepare a real 

aur.Pl'iae tor the surprise theJ' · t.h1J3k t.be7 're going to spring on us. 

i 

Let• s see bow veil J'OU ca.ra lmoi:k •ea oft. Give 'em. helll So J.cmg, 8Dd 

the best c4. l.uck to )'o11. .About l.50 m 111 an Americw will. probabJ.T DSVer 

know how mu:h t.hq will ove 10U two far what I tm sure 7011 'll be ahl.e 1oo 

4o1 eVtm with llbat lltue 10U h&ve. I v1sh 10ll had more-buS 10U know 

what the trou'bl.e is. I doit't have to tell 1'0ll• I't 's ~ mereJ.T to 

remind J13U that the Selacti ve SerTiee Act was extended in the House Just 

a few months asa b7 a ma.Jori'V' of Just one vote."' 

On 3 December the President (in this imag:!native acccnmt) sends e. 

message to Kimel e.ud. Sbort ~111 ng them that we've decipbered e. long 

messase t"::-m the Japu.neae ConsuJ.1 Kita, ill Honolulu to Toqo. ~ta. is 

the Jap whose been giving them the dope ~ ships in harbor; he 1s t;he 

one whose been sea11ng Toqo the detailed. storJ- of vhat ~ps are enehored 

vb.ere. :am :tram 'this 3 December measage it's cl.ear that somehow Kit& bas 

figured mrt-, or J1E9be aoae~ ill Tokyo bas figured out~ ~~ 1~ wo1tld 'be 

a ~le deDOllll1eD't to came all the ~ from J'apaa to make their surprise 

25 

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a'"8ck ~ to find that the 'birds bad tl.own the coop. ' So Ki ta baa 

figured out a plan vherebJ be and bis spies. iD and around Pearl can send 

last word to the ~se Attack Force Cc:mnNlder tba.t ever,tbing is OK1 

that the important .elements of' the u. s •. Fleet are still in their .l>erthiDg 

pos1 tiona, sad haven't el!ddenlJ' .departed Jus1; a -tew houra before the 

attack is sc.hedul.ed to CZ m 1nience." (See Message ~ Ki ta to Tolqo 1 . 

3 December 1941, P• 267 of Pe.rt 12, PHR, ,a.mes.sage vhieh by the vq vaa 

not processed~ ll December 1941 but lrhich it there realJ.7 was a conspiracy would ce~ have been done before 7 December.) ~ta doesn •t 

even have the slightest 1nkltng1 of course, that I'm telling you, Kimmel 

the ~ .. task ~orce .1;bat. ~birds baven't fiovn the C:oop. You arraDge 

',·'· 

1°' 't' .~ 

vi th Be.val Intelligence, Arrq Intelligence and the FBI at Honolulu to 

grab Ki ta and Ki ta IS spies 011 Saturday azid bold 'theJR in cold storage 

~ - ~'l 

imtil after ~ ~ tor attack has come off-and has 1 of course, ',l ;' 

failed, because it will fail, 11' )"OU 've done 70ur part." 

Ir W1;f reader of this brochure Wnks tha\ the f'oregoing f'SDeil'uJ. 1 

:I ma.g1ns.tive 1 or conJectura.l account ~ ld:la.t. might have happened is too 

bizarre tor serious consideration let me ca.ll his attention to vhat 

Admiral Kimmel sqa he could and would have done-U' only he'd been "let 

in on" MAGIC / or at least bad been tol.d what was 1n those messages. Let 

Bo one bad a more direct and immediate interest in the 

securit1' or the neet 1n Pearl Harbor than its ca"""'mder-inchie:t_f-- Do one bad a greater right than I to know that Japan 

bad ca.rved up Pearl Barbor into sub-e.reas 8lld. was seeking and 

receiviq reports as to the precise 'berthings in that harbor 

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ot the ships o:t the :tl.eet. I had been Ben't Mra Grew's report 

ea.rller 1n the Tear With positive ad.Tice 1'rca the Ne.-q Depart• 

t2ellt that no credence vas to be pl aced 1n "the nuoo:ed Jape.nese 

plans -rar an attack on Pearl Harbor. I va.s told then, that 

no Japanese mve against Pearl. Harbor appeared. "imminent or 

planned for in the toreseeahle tuture." c~ I va.s entitled 

'5o know 'When in:tomat.icm in the Navy Department ccepl.ete1y <ered the i.nr~ and. ad.Tice previ~ g1 ven to me. SureJ¥, I 

wa entitled to know of the 1nte?"eei>t4d ~ between croqo 

and Hm10lulu on &rid e.f'ter September 2¥~941, whi.ch "indicated. 

that a Jepe.uege move aga1nst Pearl. Harbor was pJ...&med in Tolcyo. 

Knoir1edge or the&e intereepted Japanese,-ili_spatches vould 

· have radicaJ.J.:' cbulged the estimate c4 the sitmtion made by 

ma and rJ1' sta..tt • It vould. have mzgg:eated e. re-orients.ti.on ot 

our plN!Iri operaUcm.s at the outset a! ·hostilities. The war 

plans o:f the Na.v,r Department and. o:! the Pacific Fleet, as vell. 

as our directives and information frcm Wa.shingtan p:rlor to the 

attack, indicii.ted that t.be Paeifie Fl.eet could be moat ettecti vely empl.oJed ~ nst Japa.n through di versianary raids on 

the Marslml.ls when the J5FDeee strw:k &t the Mal.air Barrier. 

Knovl.edge of a proba.bl.e Japanese e."8.ck on Pearl Harbor voul.cl 

have afforded sn oppori;unity to ambush the Japanese striking 

force as 1 t "fe'Jltfared to Bawa.ii. It would have suggested the 

rtsd.om of concentrating our resources to that end, rather thml 

COD1'.3ervil18 them ~r the Marshall Islands expedition. 

Admiral Kimnel cit.es :1nstanee atter instanee, message a:rter message, 

\drl.c.h canta.1Ded W'omaticm vhich, he ~, vouJ.d bave been o:f vital 

1mporta.nce to him end. would have prevented the disaster U' only he had 

in-Chie! of the u. s. Pa.c.Uic Fl.eet. i~, may'be he 'a right in his 

contenti.on~ His proximity to the scene might have led him to make the 

to the aatoundi.rlg story that MAGIC wss un:tolding. 

Tui;agS na.Uon bogs down vhen one cana.1.den ~t lluch a. picture as I 

he.Te conjured up mi.ght b&ve ~ painted t'rca 'Wbat the Japanese :messages 

were aqing-or vha\ the revisionists cl.aim they e.learly said. 

L .. :.: 

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REF ID:A489034 

( -:. _-_--

It is true~ ia Hmm.ii there vere fewer fighting aircratt1 ~ 

~ aJld Ne.17, 'tJ;um were released tram 'the JaplUl'!!ee carriers when the 

&ttack va.s lalmcb.ed. But the a:trcran 021 the u. s. ?fa"Q' carriers Lex1JJgton 

and Enterprise, bad t.be&e carriers been positioned. on the basis ~ the 

in:romaticm the rev1s1onist,a cla1m President Rooaevel.t bad, vould have 

made 'tq) tar the l.ack ot a1rcl'a:rt on Bawa.ii a.t the t1llle at the attack. 

question at We'\ihc b.1a account represents e.ctioll that he m1glrt have 

taken •. But let it be ~that what he B8.7B is based on hindBight; 

and. the Adm:t.-al ~ admits this poin'\. Re contenr:W that had he bad 

the benefit o:r the intelligence which was in 'the MAGIC messages and which 

he 'aeVer reeei-red. the ~ would baye been ~ different {pp. 109-lll) l 

'The ~an will arise in )"Om' mind.81 as 1 t has in mine: 

Would. the receip-t ot this int'ormation bave BB.de e. diti'erence in 

the ewuta ~ Dece:llber 77 No ma.%3. ean nav state as a :f'~ that 

he would have taken a cerla:1n course a:t ae1;1.on ,-ean ago had. be 

knmm 'facts Wich vere then unknown to him~ All he can give is 

his preaen't ccm:rl.ation, d.ivorcin& b.imeil frcm hindsight SS te.r 

as hlmlB-nl 1 poasibl.e, e.nd. re~ting the atmosphere o:! the past 

nnd the taeto.-s Wich then. 1.D:nueneed him. I give TOU my views, 

fon=ed in t.his manner. 

Red I J.ea.rned these vit&l fa.eta and the "shl.pa in ha!':xir" 

messageG on NoveDber 28th, 1 t is 1lff present conviction that I 

YOUld have rejected the Navy Department'& suggest.ion to send 

carriers to Wake BAd M1dvey. I would have ordered the third 

CSJ.Tier 1 the uSa.rs.toga, " back tran t.he West Coast. I 'WCUl.d 

have gone to sea vi.th the 1'1eet and endeavored to keep it in 

an il1tercepting position at sea.. This vould have permitted 

the d18p(wal of. the strik1Dg power o:t the n.eet 1;o ~ Nl 

attack in the naw.1 i an area. 'rbe requirements of keeping the 

neet tuel.ed1 hawever, wul.d baYe mde necessaey the presence 

in Pearl 1W'bor tram time to ~ ~ ~ ot various 

units ~ the :ma1Jl 'bod1' ~ tM neet. 

oa Deceiber 4, maple time rema.1ned ~or the Nav,y Department w :f'orva.rd 'So me the 1.n:f'cn:mation wb1.ch I ba-re outlined, 

28 

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REF ID:A489034 

,,..cr'-'l.• 

C'.i~; 

ana. in additicm tbe follow1Dg sigrd.ficaa\ facts, wbich the mav 

Depart;men1i l.eazDeCi be\lleea BO"f8mber 27 and. '1?at a.ate: . 1) Jspan W. iat'cmmd lt11il.er ~war with t.be Anglo-Bax.on 

~ W011ld break out sooner than UQ'Cme ~; 

2) Japan had broad.caa't her vinda coc1e sigDaJ. using the vorda . 

~ 

"east v1Dd rs.in, u mee:ning 118%' or a 1"\W'm"e af dipl~c 

vit.h t;be Uni~ state&. 

~ the't ~or. the first time on December 5 I had ~ tb.e 

iniJ?o:tEwt in:f'or:mst• an iaben available in t.be Bav Depa.riment.1 1~ 

is '111¥ pZ'eSeat ccmdction tbs.t I wuld. have sane to sea with the 

tl.eet, ·incJ\lding 't.be ·carrier "LexiDgt;ouu -and arra:aged ·a-~ .. 

vous at, sea vi till ReJ sq• a csrr1.er force, e.nG. been in a good. 

position to~ the Japanese aNtack. . 

At some time prior to December 61 1941, the ccuuanders ar 

liawa1i could have been .ilttormed of the· pram:ise ot eJ..1led stippOrt. 

as detailed b7 tbe War Department in Iaadcm to Air Ma.rsha.l Brooke 

Pophaal. in s~. 'l1hiB vi te.l ini'=mation was denied w the:a .. 

On December 61 ~ hours before the attack, szapl.e time 

still rems.1aed ~ar the Bav.r ~to give me all the aip.i .. 

f'.lcaD.$ taets vb:ich I !lave outl1Ded and vbich ·were not aw 1@1.e 

w me in Hava:S i. In addition, 'the lia'VJ" Department could then 

have e.dvi.sed. me ii.hat thirteen parts ~'the J'opN1ese ~to 

the Amer1ca:l1 proposals bad. been recei:ved.1 tbzt.t t.he 'tone and 

~ af t.h:l.s message indicated a break in dip) ~c relaticms 

or var vi th the Uaited States, and that the Japaaiese repl1' w.s 

to be f'arrne.1 ly prerent.ed to this gr;nez tnetr\ st a special baur 

soon to be fixed.. Bad. I reeei Ted W.S int'orJJatiau on ~ 

af'terncxm of December 6, it i8 'JllY present. ccmvictioD. tba.'t I 

would have ordered all n~ units in Pee.rl. Harbor to sea, 

e.rranged. a rend.eZVOlZS vi. th Bal.sq• s task force returm.ns rram 

Wake, and 'been ~ to 1nterccpt the Japl!2tese force by the 

time fixed. for the outbreak of war. 

Even on 'the llOl'n1ng at December 7 1 four or five hours before 

the attack, had the Nev Depa.rtaent for the first time seen fit 

to send me all 1::.h1.s signifieszrt infol"m3tion1 and the a.dditional 

:fact that l.: 00 P .M., Washington til:le, had been fixed for the 

dell veq of the Japanese ultiaatum to the United Sta.tes, rq 

l1sh" :.foroe:: couJA. have moved out; al Pearl Barbor 1 all ships 

ill ~ ba.rbor YOUl.d. have been at general. quarters, &t1.d. eJ..1. 

resources of the neet in 1n.nant readtnesa to repel. an Bttack. 

For same years I, too, bave vODdered 1fo what ~ Dmmel 's state-

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ree.d his book ~ I feel. the.t 1 t is quite poasibl.o 't.hat be is 

va.rrmited 1n wldng hiB ~. The d.etease ~ Pearl Barbor vu ~ 

bi.a responaibilltT, er coarse-1 t was GeneraJ. Short• so B~ between 

and the greater amount of time they bad to Wilk about their duties and 

responsibilities vi 'th respect to aategua.rdiJlg the Pacific F1eet m1s" 

t.1ona to aTOid a sudd.e!l attack on Pearl llarbar. 

revisionists sa;y we got tram MAGIC, all the su'bmarllles, destroyers 1 

ea.r:ders md 'battl.eships in a large task rorce of the U. S. Paeific FJ.eet, 

ar even the vbole ~ the ~ bOO. been ~ in va1 t tor the Japanese 

task force sent iio make the ~ on Pearl H&rbor there would have been 

strength enoush, I think, to vipe out the 'Whole Japanese ta.ak torce. It 

is tree that the Japanese task torce 1ncluded onl.T tvo be.ttl.eahips, but 

~ a mmiber c4 sllhmarl.nes, about :five, some at vhich carried. midget subma.ri..nes • (Ca.pt. Harley Cope 1 USN in "Climb Mcntire H.ii taka ,'' U. S. Na val 

Institute Proce7dings, voi. 72, No. 12, December 1946.) I sa:r this on 

t.be aasum;pticrn that Admiral K1mme) would have tilled his counter-move so 

basis O'! Url'onus:td.Cll the revisionists claim vas cl.ear~ in WLGIC the 

Japanese 361 plNOes vould aJ.read7 have d.epc"'ted on their ziaaJ.on. ~ 

I regard ae a poiltt ~ cansidereble im;po~. There 1a reason to 
REF ID:A489034 

..c-.. ..~: : . -

Ice:·.'. 

believe that bad~ a task tarce ~the u. s. Paeific Fleet gone au\ to 

enssge the Je.paneae taak force in. Dattl.e cm the higA Seas 1 the U. s. -~ 

~orce would~ have ta.red verr badl1' because ot the fact tha' the 

J"Eq)Mese not onlT did bave six ce.rriers to our two but also ~battleships were :taster and had lOZJger 1"8llge guns. Also 1 il even the whol.e 

U. s. Pactti.o F1eet_.bad ~ out, on the basis of MAGIC-as MAGIC is conceived 'by the "revisionists"-to ~t the Japanese task :torce Wich wae 

to attack Pearl ~r, and had the tvo D&Vies met on the bigh aea.s 1 vi th 

t.he Js;panese earrien still aa1J1 ng with t.be1r entire complement of airplanes, the u. s. Pe.cific Fleet would probel:>J.7 b&ve suffered e. ~...ble, 

beeme at ~ I ha.-re -~ 68.id--tmqYlmd six carrien to our 'Wo, 

their :t'irst-line battleships ~ speedier W1d. bad longer-range gum th.l.Zl 

a:rq or our own batuesb:ips had. Wot onlT vould there haw beeJi a grea't 

l.oss of AmeriCtlll lives 1 but al.so none ~ our battleships or carriers could 

ha"Te been raised. and ~· As it vas, snd. quite tortuitously, there 

vere no ~..era at Pearl on 7 Deceuber; and vi.th one exceytion the batt.leships dawiged. er sunk at ?ea.rl Harbor vere soon ba.cl: ill MT!?!1!1 es ion, tMnks 

have but they tailed to destroy t.he dry docks, machine shops, and the 

repair hcillties at Pearl.! wey the Japanese overlooked this rat.her 

obvious point is DO\; too cl.ear; it show thea w be not -;oo good as nava.l 

strategists • ODJ.7 one Japanese na'Vl!J. officer has thus h.r tried to 

ex,pla.i.n this irtrategic error. They 1 or ~ least Admiral Yaaam:no had the 

:Imagination to ree.lize that vith the U. s. Fl.eet ill being in ~ Po.cific 

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REF ID:A489034 

theretore 1 t YU neee:ss=:y to deatl'O'J' the U • S • Fleet• Dr• LouiJJ Mar\on 

ill his -&.rti.c1e ~ Japanese decision 'lar var" (u. s. Naval Innitute 

Proceed.i§a, VoL Cb, no. 12, I>ecembfe...r 1954• p. 1329) 5878: 

Again.st the a.lmoot lmrurlmmw opposition o-£ the navai pJNmP?"S, 

Admiral Y~ l""'PAj ne:l edBmfmt.. Unless the American Fleet 

could be destrO)ed. at one bl.av at the .start o:! the var, he 

insisted, the Japanese would pl"Ob8h~ :tail 1.?1 their ef'tort to 

seize 'the Itetherlazl.i Tudies and~. Al1d even it' tl::\ey were 

auccesat'ul.1 be predicted iiba~ they voul.d be \tllal:)le to hold azq 

at their gains 'Zar l.ong .... ~ A deter;dned ettort b1' 'the 

Pecl.fic Fleet might veil result in d..:iSABter.. • • • ~ JapBJleae 

l;elleTed it neeessarr to d.esia"vJ or neutraJ.ize the American 

Fleet at Pearl Harbor and to deprive the United Ste.tea at its 

base in the Ph1lippines. * America's line of co"tlmzni cations 

across the Pacific was to be cut b7 the seizure ~ Wake 8Zld. 

Guam • 

. ~rt that vas as f'e.r u 1mag1 natia!l o'£ Japanese lfav strategists ca.r.rled. 

them: the onl1 tlrl.ng the)" thought neees.sarT w.s to de~ the U. 8. 

Pacitic F~. On the other hand, althoagh the u. s. war pl.Bns elaborcontemplated 

a.ted in the :f'irst ~ of 1941 (iin ~ of that ~) took into aeemmt 

th>.~ pos5ibW:tf that the Japanese m:1gtrt, (as they bad three t.1lnes before 

&nd. successi'u1.J.y) begin a war on an enem;y vi th.out a preceding d.ecl.aration 

of var, that is, by e. surprise attack, end. although t.his possibility va.s 

placed first on the list of con~es, With Pearl Harbor wi the focal 

point of' the attack, emd alt.hough the var plan.B even envis.ioned 't.'\y\t sucll 

an e.ttaclt eou1d cane tram a1rcrtU't flow. f'rm carriers, it is an al.moot 

inexpllcable tac't that. al.l this vas s1.mpl;r !or-gut;ten y the end. or the 

same ;rear. The U. Ba high ca:mand in 'Wash:i.Dgt;on ~ t'~ this 

* Scne Ameri.can naval. historians aad. strategists di.Bfl.gree w11ih Dr• Monon 

on this point~ thq' insist that the Japanese Navy needed a epeetaeular 

victory-the A.rtJq was get;ti.ng too mucll publicity, and that is vcy 

Yamamoto inaisted cm the Pearl Harbor attack. It was not necessary for 

their pl.ans w ~ a.U that could be "8ken in soli'tfuifiSi Aaa. 

·_:·.-.u. 

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REF ID:A489034 

c:ontingeuq; and. the two principaJ. oCWWQders 1n Hawaii, b7 December 1941, 

also ~ :t'orgot it-or did t.bq l.aclt the :!magi nation that the 

JB.llUSl'J' to Ma:r 1941 waio pl.e.?men used. in tbi nki na u;p the th1 ngs that the 

J~e m:lght d.o 2 In WashiDgtcm thay were ~hi nld ng only ot deterrents 

to Ja;psaeae expansion 1n ~Fer Eust. They 1-ag;tned that as long as the 

u. s. Pa.e.U'ic F1eet re:wained intact in tbe P&eific it vou.ld. serve a.a a 

JRp8-nese i=t.'f;t.a..ctk Pee.rl. Ra.r"Par 1 om- greates"t overseas bas'Uon'l llov e.h1n:lrdl 

Washington, by December 1941, just silu;pzy could not ima,gine that the 

.Tspa.neae would be foollla:rdy enough to attack Pearl Barbor and. try to 

destrcy the ahiy~ o:f Pacilic Fleet in their bert.h1ng poei tions in that 

' 

ll&.rbor. Excepi here SDd. there among the junior otticers ot the ?ia.Y,Y the 

possiblli ty of e. surprise air atte.ck on t.be .Fleet was kept in m:i.Dd. "A 

group of the ;younger ottil'!el"S (on the 'ilesi; Virgi.n.1a) • • • antic:ipaUns 

an air attsak on the Fleet, had discussed eaong themselves what to do in 

case it came, and mev exactly bow to a.et .. " (Morison, s. E. The risin.g 

smi 1n the Paci:ric, Vol. m ~ His~ c;r United States Ne.w.l Operations 

:tn World. War II, Little Brawn and Co., :Boa"tcm, 1953, p. l.03). Their 

foresight, sqs Pre!$ Mar1Bon, saved the West Virginia. To repeat, it 

is true the.'t. thi.s cont.:1.Dgen.cy a.bout which I have alread;r said a good d.eal. 1 

vsa eJq>lic.itl)" stated ill w.r plans-but apparentJ.y nobody seri~ 

bel1ered. that 1 t eou.ld. 'be done, or tha't the Japanese vould be ao foolish 

as to tr.r it. Indeed., Pro!'. Morison says or 'the a.ttack on Pearl JI.a.rt>or: 

(P. 132) 

33 

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REF ID:A489034 

Thus, ~ surprise attack on Pearl liar'bor, tar trao. being 

a "strategic necess1t;r, ... a.a the Japanese claimed. even e.tter the 

war, wa a strategic imbecili tT. One can search mil1 W;r histcJ17' 

in 'Vain !or an operation more :t'e.ta.l to the aggressor. On tAe 

tactica.l J.eve.11 the Pearl Harbor attAck WB vrongly eonc.entrated. 

cm ships rather than penna.r>ent inst.al J aticms a.nd. oil tanks. On 

the strategic .level it was id.ioUc. On the high politica.l level 

it vas di&astraus. 

34 

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REF ID:A489034 

4. WAS MAGIC WITllf1EJ1) FROM mt.ml. AND SROBT AND, IF SO, 'WHY? 

We come not to another very 1mporte.nt question lihieh bas been raised 

in revi.Bionist circles• ~ did not the commanden! at Pearl Harbor get 

MAGIC; wey d.1.d t.bq not bave the mach1 nes and facilities !or deciphering 

''Purple" cey-pto-qstem'? Prat'. Ferrell says: "The Br1 t.ish and. General 

MacArthur received t.bfr ,Purple decoding msrb1nes tram Washington; ~not 

"' 

the c<s1wtl81'liiers at Pearl Harbor? (p. 225) This 1a a good quesUon, and 

,oot a.a f oollsh as it might be made to appear b7 the usual ansver that the 

authorities in Washington conlln 1t prevent the Pearl Harbor e.tta.ck, even 

{ 

w"ith the code, BO what vould Kt;vnel and biB Army opposi'te at Rava.ii, 

Ueutenant General Walter C. Shon have done vith. it." 

' Let us agree tha.t the question raised is not a t0oJ 1 sh one but l.et h 

us consider it in two parts. First, as to why the British got tM PurpJ.e 

~...em. In the autumn or l94o u. s. millta.ry and naval. ~ties on 

the highest level agreed that there should and could. be saae exchmlge ~ 

inte.lllgence between the U. s. a.nd the u. K. Included in the I!!£?.t.eri.al to 

'be exchNJ.ged was camnunieation i!ltel Ji gence. It was ascertained that the 

U. K. cammm1cation intelligence experts bad not succeeded. in solvillg the 

highest-leveJ. Japanese diplomatic cryptosystem and the machine 'Which vas 

:1.nvol.ved in enciphering and. deciphering the messages in that S7Stem• 

!Jiar, parenthetically, bad the German experts J Cr:pta.n.alysts of the 

TJ, 3 • Arrq • s 8igna..1. Intel J 1 gen.ee Serrlce 1 bowe y er, b.a.d. a.ccompliBhed. this 

task and vere rea<l1ng the Japanese 11essasea in that ~, vbich 

35 
REF ID:A489034 

t::-:. ·.";.-, \_:.·..;.·:.:..: 

~~:;:: 

they ba4 raemeA, · t~·'hrevi·· as well as t0r disgtli.se, the "Purpie" qsi;em, 

1 ta p1"edecesaor / al.so a !!1Mb1 ne •1'8~1 ha'Ving been ttamed ~ "Red u 

qatem.. On the ~ band.1 it l:lad. been .ascerta:1Jled that t.he u~ K. c::t'JPt• 

~I alt.boush thq had. been ~ with the "Purple" ~, 

bad been qU11;e successtul vi th cer1;a.1n Ge3:.'Jll!!m 8Zld. Ital 1 e..n dip~ 

~ the ~ ~~had ODl:f receat.J.7 been~ b7 

u. s. ~., .. it $herefore seemed. ·that Doth the u. s. end. u. K •. 

coul.d ~:t bT sca:e sort or excha;ap. A team of ~ovr ~, two 

t%"alll the Ariq and. two tram the lfav, was sEmt to I<mdOD in J~ or 

1941 to discuss 1i.be teclmi ce.l aspects ot BZL exchMge o:! ma.teria.1.. 'fhe 

u. s. ~ took with it a recentl.;r-eampl.ned "Purpl.e" machine and the 

data~ to use :t:i iJ1 d.eeipherlng 'the Japanese JDeS&ages• It is 

wrr ~ to ~ that the British had not onJ.Jr edensive 

'tacillties 'frn ~ D:Dd. f~ ~ diplamat1c trattic 

to London. wt thq also had a corps or verr ccupeteut erntatw:t.rsts end 

Japa.nese transl.atQrs-vi:tibout whcm1 possessicm. at the "Purpla" machine 

would have been of little ar no val.ue. The British also vere able 'to read 

and. traZJ.slate other~ ~ Jepenese dipl.amatie traffic-and they 

did so not only in I.anrlO'l but also at Sinppore and IiOllg .Kong, am. possib~ 

1.n ~ or t;wo other strategic spots lmder the British Crown. 

In t.he exc:lumge of tbe '?urpl.e" mechi ne and in:rorme.tiona..1 details 

concern1ng 1;be Purple qstem ~~ specific teclmicaJ. c!ata. on certain Ge%'m8D 

and. Ital 1 an ~ (pr1noil'8J Jy d.1plaat:1o) both the u. s, ~ the 

U., K. gained advaZltagee c4 inestim9ble "f&l.lie. On 1;.b.is ~ iohare aetez 

baa been an;r doUbt on ei'ther s14e. MoreoTer, this exclwlge paved. the 'W8.1' 

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to a. later cta,p1ete u. G~ -- u. K. coJJe:t>oratian 1n ~c opera.-

Ucma at'ter the U. S., entl:7 intO llorld. War II a6 one of the belHv..:rentos. 

The value or this eellabo1"&titm can ~ be ov~ted b~ thia 

b1"ochure v:tll no\ deal wi ~ this ~ 

As l.oDg as ve are deal 1 ng with the croaestion about the U. S. dell ye-q 

~ tbe British at a t1purple" secMne &nd the~ vhich used 1.-t, 

ve l:llA1" well go iJ:rto a rel&1;ed question ~ which ll tue bas been 

as.id in the torrent ot vord.s about the Pearl Ba.rbor d.isa.ster. The llrlti.sh 

acquired the ~le" in Ja:tlua.ry 1941, and were able from the very nm 

to uae it.-no strings were att.e.c.hed to this usage, except that the searet 

vouid be treated vith the care that it d.esened in order to keep ham 

~ knmrledae the l'act that ve bad ao.1 ved it. (There have al.v8p 'been 

very detailed emd rlrict regulatione goverx:dlzg 1-he band.l.iJJg o:t cammmi cat.ices :inte1Hgen~ end. in ti.me the u .. s. end. u. K. regal..'"'tiona became 

identical) • '?he reaaon tor mentioning t.bat. there were no ~ attached 

to the u. s. g1:f't to tbe British iB to forestall a revisionli-; allegation 

that President RooseTtlt must have pel"!!ti. tt.ed the gift to be ms.de oo.1y on 

is ts do not aJ..vatys e.rgue in a logica.l manner. Exe.ct17 vb;r the Br1 ti.sh 

would, even U they could ba.ve agree0.1 to keep t1purple" in~ traa 

37 

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vaa no d1rec:\ c••m1m1ca"1on, bei;veen "11ese CCl'llMders 8Zld. the British, 

~. 1ibere vaa_ .. c;;w11m1cation. between British qt Azaerl.CSZl 1ntel.li· 

gene.e rm\horitiea ill 1ibe ~ Es.st. In the second place# J.et 1~ be nated 

t.bai; 1;ibe.British ha4 'been able .W read lmd. vere reading JepNlese diploma-tie JQ"Btems other tmm Pu:ple; 1J1 tact, 1flBl1T ot the .messages vhi.ch the 

reviaiom.ata elafm ll08t def'in1~ 1D4J.cate4 tbat a surprise air &$iack 

vu to be made a't Pearl.~.-wre 1n ~ oiiher thaa Purple. 

For example 1 1-be so-called "bmbbg plot" message vas not in n.Purple" 

at all ba in a ~ held lq' CODSUJAt;es 1 a Q'riem des~ by u as ,. J-1.9; mid several. otbEa' mes.sages related to the bambiJJS pl.ot message vere 

.,, ' 

Whst bu 111.l 1'he foregoing 1;o do with '11e British? Simpl.7 this: ia 

it conce1 wbl.e ioba$ the British, too, would lave part1cipa.ted in a cans;d.raq of silence so as w ~ 1ihe J~ destra7 'the u. s. Pe.cific 

~, the~~ was~~ p~ou against J~e 

yression in the Fer East? ~. Is i~ not cl.ea:- ~ ~ 'Y8riowl 

messages in Purp1e aml in the other Japauege systems conveyed to the 

British no det1nite s~ a.s '° an 1mjpend1Jlg a'ttack cm the Ameriea:I. 

supposed. to bave the finest am. most~ tioained. 1ntell.1gen.ce experb 

1n 'the worl.d.. Ia 11- Jike~ th&\ the ~ s1m'f o:t an irlq>eDd.i.Dg a"8.ck, 

i:t reveaJ.ed 'bl' MAGIC, would. b&ve been~ overlooked by ~ir 

experts? Is it ecmcei'f&ble tba't they vould., it tbq saw the mzUines of 

the ator,r / have ~ 1~ to 1ibemael.ves? ~t ~ vould have kept i't :rram 

their U. S. friends? i'h&t tbq would have seen 'Go it that DO W01"d. of it 

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protect British ~ in the Far Ea.n. 

In the toresoiDI pen.graphs it vu stated that certain J~se 

things: (l) there were so msiey- messages to be forwarded tram u. s. 

~ s1iaticms ~ U. s- radio h.cilities vere then not equal to 

the task ot e&n'7in8 tbs& a.ll; ~ bad to be sent b7 air mail pouch or 

even ~ ord1.na.r)' U. S. Jail pouch; ( 2) there were so :za.D)" messages a.nd 

so few persons capable ~ processing t.hal in WashilJgton-let us not i'orget 

that e. ~ev dozens c4 persons in Waallillgton vere tr7iDg to keep ~ vith 

·what hlmdreda / perhaps thousands / ot Japanese vere doing in Japeneae 

messase centen 1a J~ae embassies, le;&tians, and consul.ates all over 

the vorld; ( 3) there "...ere .me.a;y Umes 'When 1 t vas impossible to solve a 

nev key imtil a sutticient emmmt at t:ratfic bad acClDUlated; { 4) there 

mission or interception; (5) there were only a. hand:f'ul of persons in 

both the A:r'11q and the Navy cryp~c tmits who could transle.te 

I,• 

Japa.nese-a.nd no pool in tbe u. s. from much trained and trustworthy 

Japanese trans1.ators could be selected., as 1.8 the cue in other foreign 

languages such aa French, Genian, Span1s.h1 etc.; and until the Ja:pa.ueae 

was converled into Engl 1sh1 the messages contai n1 ng usefuJ. 1IItellige.nce 

about J&pml Jlight just as vell be filed in the waste basket. 

While we chrell v;pon the f~ el EW'Dta 1n the starT it llight be 

39 

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REF ID;A489034 

ordez' ~ u a"8ck "'"'* be carried on could bardJ.T e.ttord to risk 

~ COllttnge*dea• · ·. F:-~, 1~ vau1.a. .he essential, would i't ~.t · 

that & higt1 _degree ~ ot prior.11i7. 1a proceas1 ng be accorded all Je:ganeae 

Gove.rmen't imsaagea sn1»& 'to or carrtng b"am Ranol:ttJ:u, so that the a]Jeget 

carmp1ratars tbemsdves m1gh't ~ _be cauatrt ·mqJping? But it is .a fact 

'tibat several.. ve:q 1mporta.1n messages haviDg ~ direct bearing on 1:iba sitaUcm were .=t .proeesaed UD.Ul· .several ~ e;t\ex' the ~. ~ verr 

hct that 'the ·processi.ng o:t .!:!! messages to and tram Hanolulu was not 

given the h1gbest or e-ren a high prioriV 1~ coasUtutes an argamestt 

aga.1~ iihe &lleged coupiraq beiJJg obJec:Uve-e.nd JlOt coqpletel.T sub· 

i .... •; Let m DOV 1iaJat 1W the .. qUeSt1on about the vi tJmo1 ding Gt MAGIC ·fi"Cll 

Adm1ral K1*'1eJ. mid.~ Shon~ viewed b7" the highest J.ewJ. author• :.-::._ ·;; 

1'1es in 'Washington. FirR ~ .&ll it :1s easy- w admit the ~ t.bat 'the 

criticsJ. Ma\GIC -=asages o:t the early' 8UtiumD ot 1941 and~ to tbe d.a7' ot 

a.bout this tact. But the 1mportan't po.int is ~ The revisionist.a say 

that it was necess11iia1;ed bT the Roosevel~-Stark conspriaey to 

br-'..i..ng a.bout the e."8.ck on the l!'l.eet at P~l Barbor. A dispa.asiom:te 

rlew, howewar, ~take into consideration quite ditt~ mid. more 

log1cal :rae~. First, es the Pw:ple messages continued to be read in 

~ iobe stirateg;tc "l&lve of our BOlJtUoa of that ~tea 

became 1m:reaainslT appa.reJl't. 1'his is a pod. place to insert _ wbat GeDere.l 

Me.rsllall. had. to SA7¥ on 'the BUbJen ~ 'the 'Yt\lue ~ MAGIC, which_ be described in detail in a h1gbl7 seare't l.et'ter he wrote $o GoverDor Dewey, e. 

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',., 

'j. 

Bep\lbllcan, who bad~ aDout MAGIC (~ knovB hov or tra:a vbca). 

Marsh&l.l. bad l.earned. ~ })ewe;y ve.a ~to use this bighl7 expl~tve :r.-l ,\' " .. idormaticm in the 1944 Bepl1blicsn Praid=Ual cam:paign aas-1nst a ~om-th 

1;em tor Roosevel~ '?be var va.s not mer l Here it is 1 in extenao: 

Extr&eted .tram COiiGRESSIONAI. IliVESTIGAnOli PF.A.RI. HARBOR AT'l'ACK, 

Pan .3, PP• 1132-1133• 

For Mr, Dewey' 11 qes only. 

~ dear Governor: Colonel Clarke, my messenger to you ~ ,-esterds::r, September 26th, has reported the resuJ. t or his dell verr ~ "Jq 

letter dated September 25th. As I UDderstw:>.d him ;rou (e.) irere umdlling to ea:i:mit yourse1:t to e:II3' e.greezent regs.rd.1ng "not eammmi~ 

1-ts conten~ to e;q other person" in new C1f t.he h.ct that you f'eJ.t 

you alreaq lalev certain c4 the t.h1np ~ rei'erred to iD the 

letter 1 M suggested to J'OU b:r see1 ng the word "cryptogra:ph," and 

(b) J'OU cou1.d no\ teal tba'i such a letter aa this to a presid=Ual 

o.andidate eould. have been addressed to )'OU by an otticer in m:r pooiUon Vithout. the knowledge of \be ~. 

As 'to (3) it.bcve I ma quite v.f.Uing to have you read vb.at comes 

heree.tter vi.th the ~ that 1011 are bound not to ccmunm1 -

eate to m:rr ~ peraan ~ ~ on vhieh 70U do not 1lO'll have 

or later rece1 ve tactual koovledge trcn scce other source than ~ell". 

As to (b) above 70-u have rq vord. that neither the Secreta.ry ~ War 

nor the Preaident has a.rq in'ti=t~ion ~~ that such a l.etter 

haa been addressed. to you or that the preparation or send1ng of such 

a commun1 cation va.a being considered.. I assure you that the only 

persans vho saw or l::nov of the ex:1stence of either th1B letter or my 

letter to you dated September 25th are Admiral King, seven key 

officers rezponsible '!or &ecuri ~ o:r :m:ll1 ta:ey cornm;imi cations 1 e.ud 

Jil3' secretary who t)'ped these ~. I ma try1Dg '1Jil' best to make 

plAin to you th&t thie le"tte?' is beillg addressed to ycu solely cm 

'tJIY ini tiaU ve, Ad:miraJ. K1Dg having bee» consulted ~T e.:rter ~ 

letter was drat'ted., and I ma persist1ng 1n ~ matter because the 

Jaillta.ey ~ involved. are ao serious that I teel. aca:ie &CU~ 1s 

neeessarr to protecii the interests ~ our armed. :rorces. 

I ~ hs.w much vrf4t:rl"ed. to talk to ;you in person but I 

could not d.erlae a method that vould wt be subject to press and 

radio reactions as to vby the Chief ot Staff of the ArI1l1 vould be s~ an 11lterview vith JOU ~t this :pa;rticula.r momeu\f. Tberef'ore 

I h8YS turned to the method ar this .le'tter 1 with w%1.ich Adm.1.reJ. King 

41 

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REF ID:A489034 

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concurs, to be deliYere4 b7 hcmd. to )'OU b;r ColODel Clarke, who, 

inaidentall7, baa Charge rA the moat secret documents of the Wa.ia 

e.nd ?iav;r Depa.rtmenta. 

In bri~, the m1ll tarT dileum is this: 

The DOS'f; vital evidence in the Pea.rl. Harbor matter C01l.5i.sta o:f 

our 1n't;ereepts ot the Japanese d.1_pl.omatie cant3nn1 cat.ions. Over ~ 

period at 1'88l'B our C%j'ptograph peaple ~ the c:hara.cter of 

the machine the Japauene were millg ror en:x>d.ing their d.ipl.om&.tic 

messages.. Based on this e. correspandirJg IQl\Cbine ve.s built b7 us 

vhich declpheru their messages.. The~ore 1 i.<e possessed. a weal.tl:2. 

of inf'ormetion regard1ng their moves in the Paci-~, vhich 1n 

turned. w.s :tm-nished the s+..ate D~-ra.the?' ~ ~ is 

popul.a:-~ supposed, the Sta~ /J.9F1(&J Depa.rtment providing us vi th 

the infonaation-but Wich \lll.fortunately :made no referenee vbatevcr 

to intentions toward. Bava11 until 'the lA8t message 'be!ore December 

7th, Tlhic.h did not reach our hands UttUl the following dLy 1 .DeccZber 

8th. 

Sav the point to the present di.leI:aa iu that ve have gone ebead 

vith this 'business of deciphering their cod.es until w-e PQSseas other 

codes, Geman as well aa Japanese, ~ our main basis ot in:f"m::aation 

regarding R1 tier• s intentions in E'crcpe !.s obta.; ned. :f'rau Baron 

Oshima 's messages trom Berlin reportillg his intervievs ~"'1th Ilitl.er 

and other ~c1B.l.s to the Ja:p.snese ~t. These a.re sUll in 

\he codes involved in the Pearl ~or events. 

'l'o expla.1.n ~ the cri Ucal ¢.,a.re of tlrl.s set-up which 

would be viped ~ ~st in z.n .1.mr..a.nt 1.t' the J..east suspicion vere 

aroused regarding it, the battle of the Coral Sea vas based on 

deciphered l'l!easeges and thc>...ref'ore our fzv shl.ps w:re in the right 

place at the right time. Furt.her, ~ were a.bl.e to concent.rat.e ou:r 

l.i!o.i ted :forces to meet their ;c.s:val a.d.-s.nce on Hid.way 'When oth--°I'\t=.se 

ve a..lm:>st ~ vou1d have been G(;lillle 3, 000 l!d.les out o:t place. 

We bad :full information o:r the strenstJ1 of the'..i..?" i'orces 1n ths.t 

advance and. sJ..so o:f the TM1.ler force d1rected agajnst the Al..eutirms 

'Hhi ch final J -sr 1a!lded. troops on A ttu and Kiaka.. 

Operations in the Pacific a.re lA..-gely guided by the information 

we obtaill of Japanese dep~. We know their streilgth in ve.r1oua 

garri60ll8, the rations a.nd other stores conttmrlng a.vail..Ei:ble to ~' 

and ~ is ~ vast ~ ve cheek their :neet movements and 

the movements ~ their conteys. The heavy losses reported. fia:n time 

to t1l!e which they sustain by reason of our submarine s.etbon 1 J..arsel¥ 

reaul.t b'om 'the ;tact tihat we know "the dailing ~fl and ro1.1teE ~ 

tl::ullr caxroya end caD noUf)" our submi.ri.De:s to lie 1n V&it at the 

~ points. 

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~ 

The cnzrrent raids 'b7' Admiral Hal 8fJ1' * • c:an1.er :tarces on Jspaaeae 

m 111m11a 1q Biid. elsetdlere were l.arpl.7 l>aaed 1D tsmna an. 

1t;be knom J10tdll5A'b ~ Japaaese CODtOJB,; tvo t4 which were causht1 

as mlti~, in bis clealia'L-tiw a"1iacka. 

You v1l.l understand tram the toregotng '\be utter'.cy' ~consequences it' tbe cpreseni; political d.ebnes ~ Pearl B8z'bo:' 

disclose to the eueq, German or Jap, flZIS' suspicion o:t the Tital. 

IJ0\1Z cea al 1D:toriim1on . ve poasess. 

The Rolm'ta' ft'.pCJr\ cm Pear1 B81'bar had to have Yitbdrawn tmm 

it all. :reteres:ace 1;o 1'b1s b1gb17 Becre1i -~, thererare 1J1 portions 

i't; neees~ appea;red 1Jl0Clq?J ete. ~ same :reasou vhich dicia1;ed that 

COU1"Be 1a even mare ~ tomq because oar sources have 'been 

grea.tlT elUarated. 

~J As another exaaq>le ot the 4ellcaq ot the s1W&tian1 

same of Dcmowa •s people (the OSS) vi~ 'M!' 11ng us 1 inst1 Wted 

a sec:ret search aE the Japanese ~S7 ~ees 1n Portugal. As a 

result 1:be entire mU1tm:7 &ttacbe J~ code all aver the world 

vaa changed, and.~ this occurred over a iear ago, we .have not 

yn beea abl.e to break~ nev co&e aad Jiave 1ihllB lost t.b.1.s invaluable source ~ ~,·~~-\he European si~ '-.. '~"' : 

A recent speech 1n Congress bf Representative Barness would 

cl.earl¥ auggen 1;o the J~se that we have been reading their 

codes, though Mr. He.mess B:ld. t.he American pUblic voul.d ~ not 

draw azq such conclusion. 

The conduct at GeDeral EiseJJbover • s campaign &Di ar e.U peraUons in ~ Pacttic are clos~ relA'\;ed in eoncepUon and t1m1 na 

to the int'orma"1an ve s~ obtain through 'these 1ntercey\;ed 

cod.es. Thq ccmtribute sree.tl.1' tc the victo:Q' and tremendousl.7 

to the saving in American lives, both ill \be conduct of current 

operaticma and in looldn& towa:-ds iihe ea.r~ temtnat.ion ot ihe 'Wal'. 

I aa ~ tlda -.~ to··'J'gu in "'1le hope 'tba1i J'O'U. vill··aee 

70ur YaT clear "'1 avoid the 1:irag1c resu:Lta Yith which we are now 

threatened in 't.be ~ political. carcpa1 ID• .. ....;.; . 

Pleaae retturA tb1s ·J.erier bJ' beat'et. I v1ll bold 1°' ill rq mc>n 

secret :rue sulaJecn to ~erence Bhatlld ~JJO des.ire. ~' : l ~-~ • • ~~~-~) 

Fat~~·~ ( Sgd.) G. C • WlRSHALL. 

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REF ID:A489034 . -. --:;--·------· -----,.·.-;·:·. 

It seems to me-that the foregoing letter goes a long~ toward 

t--:- ansver1..Dg 'the question aa to why K\GIC waa vitbheld ft··K1nne1. eoa.d Short. · 'l~·· 

stated bri~ 1 the author1 ties in Wasb.1.ngtan were :te8.rtU:l. that U' MlGIC 

cont1mled to 1:>e sent ·tllea the secret that ve were able ~ read all their - diplomatic CX'7.Ptocomomnicaticms, 1.ncl.ud.1.Dg "Purple", their most secure 

system, would soon find its vq to the Japanese. The wbole ot the island 

ot Os.bu had thousSDda ot Japanese nationals, among whom it we.a natural 

to assume there were~there mu.st have been-plenty o£ spies. The Arrq 

and. Navy authorities in Wash.1.ngton felt that it was becora1ng too dangero~ to the continued secrecy ~ the i'act that we had solved and vere 

reading messages in Purpl.e to send~ more of the messages to K1mnel 

and Short. ot course the7 could have been sent some gists-as bad been 

~ in the first ba1.:t ~ 1941-but General Sherman Miles, the then 

Assistant Chief of Stat! for Militaey IntelJigence, stated before the 

Joint Congressional. Committee that sending even gist.a would have been 

dangerous, b;y overloa01ng the ra.di.o circuits; a.ud he vent on to say tbat 

vhil.e the Navy ceyptosystems could have been used, because they vere 

\ ·.~·. 

more secure than the Anq1s, even that vould not remove the danger altogether. /J will interject at this point the statement that General Miles 

was not too well-in:f'ormed. on these practical matters, b~~e the Navy ' .. \ 

bad adopted and was using an Arrrr:r er,ptosystea and a machine invented b;y 

A-rrq persorme1g Both the A'Dq and the Nav's cryptosystems could and 

would have stood up under the strain of sending all the 1mporta:rt MAGIC 

aesaages to Ummel and. Short and 1n extenso. 

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But, insist the revisionists, the Dav turnished. a MAGIC J!!11\Cb1ne e.nd 

information OU: boY to use 1t to the CcsrmtMder ~ the l.6th Naw.l Districtthe Philippines. Wh7 not to K1mmeJ and Sbort1 There were veey good 

reaaona for this; but at this point we ahal1. ~ ask: did possession 

of .KWIC preYent General MacArthur tram beini taken by surprise and 1os1ng 

all his planes a\ one fell swoop more than 12 hours e.t'ter the General knew 

~ the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor? General M3.cA.rthur blames his 

chie:t' o! the Arrq Air Corps :t'orces in the Philippines, General Brereton, 

ror being caught n&pping; and Brereton blames MacArthur. Possession of 

the Purple machine alone obvioualy was not suff'icient-tbe interpretation, 

~reciation, and evaluation o! MAGIC ls Just as important. It might be 

11Se:tu.l to quote wh&t General Willoughb)'", .MacArthur. s G-2, said on this 

latter point in sn e.tt'adavit dated 8 May" 1945 (PER, Part 35, P• 87) in 

protecting the ?ia'f)"'s aonopol)- o! MAGIC: 

In 1941 the l'ia-q obtained and. maintained a highly ett1cient ~;:;·ypto-anaJ.ytical service, specialirlng in Japanese material; though 

t.h0 Arm:r had notably participated in the development of this subject, 

the Navy appears to baVe obtained a lead; consequently, it can be said 

th&t the Navy enjoyed on almost monopolistic privilege. In e.n otherwise meritorious desire for security (though every modern nation 

knovs that crypto-e.nalysis is &Oillg on) 1 the Na;q has shrouded. the 

whole enterpri.se in myat.eey 1 excludil:lg other services, and rigidly 

centraliziDS the whole enterprise. At this d.at.e, for example, this 

same system is still in vogue: as far as SY/PA is concerned., the 

crypto-ana.lyais is made in Melbourne, forvarded. via 7th Fleet D.N.I.; 

the Melbourne station ia under direct orders of Washington, is not 

bound by azq- l.oca.l. responsibilities, :forwards what "they select, and 

when it suits them. The possibility ar ClTCIDeOUB or incompJ.ete 

sel.ecti.on is as evident nov a.a it vas in 1941... The ~ excuse the 

Navy bas is that its field is Pri.ma.ril7 naval intercepts, but there 

is a lot or Arrq traffic or other incidental traffic. This collateral 

t?n.f!1c is not BJ.~ understood or correctly interpreted b)' the Na"fY, 

ill 'llIS opinion. 

45 

i ' 
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REF ID:A489034 

The so1ut1on to this vexing and dJm&erou8 problem is a canpl.eteJ.7 Joint, inter-lcx-k1ng 1ntercept am crn>to-analJ't.ical 

service, on the highest level, with the freest interchange ~ 

messages and interpretation. 

The sequence ~ messages referred to, bad they been known 

to e. ~ intelligence ofi'icer, vith Batt.le Order and 

tactical background, beginning vitb NoTember 14th, vould have 

l.ed instantly to the inescapable conclusion that Pearl Harber 

naval installations were a target tor attack, vith November 

25th ar Noveml>er 29th as the deM11nea, suggesting irresistibly 

that elapsed time va.a invol.ved, !or some sort of' naval sea.borne 

sortie .. 

C • A. Willoughby 1 

C. A. Willoughby 1 

MaJor General, G. S. C. 1 

A.ssst.Chi~ o£ Sta-~, G-2, 

General. Headquarters, SWPA. 

The re.ct is that ski 1 led ceypte.nalytic help and skilled Japanese 

t.rausl.at.ors vere not in su:tticient aupp17 to perm.it either the Army' or 

the Navy to me.intain ma::iy au.ch people El.J:l1llbere outside the U. s.-t.hey 

were ~ neec1ed 1n Wa.shington. And besides, nol>ody thought or even 

1 ma.gt ned tba"t they were so bad..J..)" needed at Pearl Barbor as e.t Mani J athe Je.pe.nese vould ne-rer be so foolha....-dy a.s to a.~ Pearl.! The U. S. 

Navy authorities believed th.at the Philippines might be cut ott-but oot 

ccmmnmications peraozinel at Pearl were assigned the :c:issian ot tl"'Yine 

get 'What 1nf ormation could be gleaned f'rom traffic a.ne.l.ysis ot Japanese 

CCl'f2Jm1 cations j the ArJ1rf had ~ signe.1 intelligence or ctyptane.J.ytic 

personnel. at all in Ha.vs.ii after 1939-thc very small unit 1~ did have 

in Honolulu WM brought ba.ck to Washington after but one year's operati011S there-because the few trained. persons of that unit were thought 

l 

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to 'De much JI01'e UIJehl in V&shington. Jiava1! seemed to be the last place 

· .thft J~se ~ trT ·tQ. ~ttackJ. Wb7 keep the tew .trained ~c 

personne1 there when. they .could be ao auch 1lJl1re use1'ul in W~? 

What the Arsr had., therefore 1 was s~ an intercept unit 41rected. to 

lis1;en 1D on certa1D assigned Japanese ell'cuita and to torvard the 

~c to WashiJ3gtcm tor ~ .. 

ID thi.a decision to ln'1ng back .. to Wasb1Dgtcm that small ~ crnrtaaal7tic unit_ .{two or three persous a1; mostl) I am quite eure .t.Mt t.be 

Chief Signal Otticer consulted no higher autborityr-and, I em sure too, 

the CODJllBM1 ng General ~ the Bawa:Ua.n ~ at that 'time, General 

Short's predecessor, was glad to get rid of the unit-its mai.ntemmce 

caused him d1.ttieult log:lst1cal. problems. The secrecy ct 1ts opera.Uons 

certaiJJl.1' was a source or. irritation to hi.a and his staf't-they never 

got to see tbe results. The trained SignBJ. Corps officer the Signal 

Intelligence Seniee 1n_W&ah1ngtan Bent to Bavn.11in1940 per:tormed no 

s1.gnal intelligence hDctions; b7 direction or the l.ocal commender he 

was soon given "more necessar;r" duties, such as devisi.12g and supervising 

t.his decision I can take no exception-the C01!1!S8.nd1ng General on the 

spot knew best vbat he needed.& I knO'v tor a tact that when the SigneJ. 

Corps sent a very small unit to Corregidor it. vaa onlJ with the greatest 

clitticult7 that the Ccnmn.nd1ng General there vas fi.nall7 persuaded to 

l.et the unit do vbat it vas sent out to do-but ~ tor a eh.art time. 

The me.mbera al mr:r 81.gn&l IDtell1geDce \Dl1 t ( SigDal. Corps personnel) were 

~ needed for ordinal7 SigDal Corps tlme'tiODS. Washington could do 

47 

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ver,y little about tlrl.s-the local. camzw.niier decided. In all that I baYe 

8&1d above 1 boweTer, . the ilost 1mpo1"taut _point b7 far vas, ao h.r as 

concerned both the Phil1ppinea end Hawaii, \hat an e.ttaclt b7 the Japeaese 

was too fan1;astic to van-ant much t.houglrt, so preparations tor a possible 

attack were somewhat neglected .. 

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Me.zq" thousands ot vorda have beeJ1 expended in discussing and writing 

the stor:r of the so-cal.led "WiDds Code Messages," and.1 1D particular, 

vb.ether there were 8ZJT &U'thentic ~ Code Execute" messages. 

There vere two "Winds Code" s~-upa / vbich vere intended, tor :res.-

BODS pecul.1ar $o 1obe Oriatal. mentaJ.1:~ 1 to g1 Te a certain kind ~ :warnins but ~t exactl1' what kind~ a warning is a.clea.r because bot.h ~ 

these "~-ups" were, t.o sq the least, 1mpractieal, indeed quite 

foolish, beewse 1ohe7 vere so susceptible of being contused vi th ordi-

»ArT weather ami news ~. And.1 indeed, W.s is ~ what 

~ bappen vi th regard ~ the one a! most inerest to the U. 8. A weather 

broadcast-now temed the false "Winds Code Execute" message vaa inter· 

cepted-and tor a fev hours at e:rrr rate was ta.ken 1oo be the real thing. 

But it wasn't "the real McCOf"-it resembled. WhG the Execute message 

might have been but when~ scrutiDized it Jwrt didn't meet!::!:!, 

the conditions specified. in the code 1n.struct1ons. 'fbe alarm it set off 

subsided as soon as the discrepancies vi.th vhat a real Execute should be 

were recognized. 

investigation b;y several ~ the Pearl Harbor boards, incl.uding that o! 

the Join't Congressional. Cammiti;ee: the Japanese never did send out an 

authentic "WiDda Code Execute" message which cl.ea.rq indicated that Japan 

vas going to at'tack the u. s. It indeed the Foreign Ministrr intended to 

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it had not torgotten, the mon the message could have conveyed was that 

there was goiDg to be a break in relations between Japan and the countrJ 

signified. by the particular "'Winds Code Exeaute" message. The other 

th1Dg which seems to be certa1n is that be.vi.Ilg forgotten to send out the 

"Execute 11 mesn1 ng a break between Japan and the U. S., somebody seems to 

have remembered to send out after the attack on Pearl Harbor a. 1'iinds 

Code Exeeute" si.g:rl..1';ying that Japan va.s bree.k1ng relations with Britain 

but not with 'the u.s.s.R. Even t.his one the Japanese who were interrogated. a:f'ter the Bu:rrender of Japan deW.ed havillg transmitted but all the 

evidence I have exera1 red. iDd.ieates that they were not tel.ling the truth. 

One might ssy, i! they didn't tell the truth about that one ve should. not 

put arq- credence in t.he1r denial that a "Winds Code Execute" was sent out 

on 3 December, the one ind.ice.ting e. break in rela.tions (or var) with the 

u. s. Certain a! the Je.pa.nese i.nt.errogated on t..be point denied ever 

setting 'Up the "Wi.m.s Cod.e" in the :first pl.ace • Thia point is exmn1 n ed 

in great detail in Appendix E t.o PER, pp. 467-486 a.n.d.. there is co~t.e 

skill in this exsmin&tion~ The PHR arrived at the following conclusion, 

vb.ich I think represents the la.st vord that Cw:J. be said on this subject 

(p. 486): 

CONCLUSION: From consideration of all evidence relating to 

the villd.s eode, it is concluded that no genuine message, in 

execution ~ the code and applyillg to tbe United States, was 

received in the War or Navy~ prior to December 71 l94l. 

It a.ppee.rs, hovever, that .messages vere received. which vere 

init1e.1Jy thaugbt possibly to be in execution o-r the code but 

were determined not to be execute messages. In view cf the prepoud.erate veight ~evidence tot.he contra.?71 it is believed.that 

Captain Safford is hones~ mistaken when he inilsts that an 

exeeute messe.ge was received prior to December 7, 1941. Consid.ering the period o:f time that has elapsed, t.his mistakeA 

1.mpresaicm is ~le. 

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Gre.ntiDg tar -~ ot diacua1cm \bat a genn1ne execizte 

message appq1ng w tbe v1Dd8 code was intercepted Detore Dec-

• ember 7 I it ia ccmcl.uded. that nch .hc't vould have added nothi:ag 

to vbat vas a.1..reaq blown conceraiDg the critical. character~­

our rela$iona vi~ the Em.Pi.re o£ Js.pa.u •. 

'?his ecmcl.usian reached in l91Mi rems.1 ns ""Shaken to W.S da:T-noth• 

1Dg ·bas tui'neel up to make a change in 1t d.ea1.rQble 1 so tar as concems 

arrr "Winds ·Code Execute~ 11easeae tba~ ·might. have been .transmitted. -cm 

3 December, as Captain Safford ~ •.. Onft could ~ 'Vish ~ the . 

concJ uian bad stated ca.tegorical.lT that there vaa such a aessage 1n . 

:repri. i;o a b1'eEllt in rel&Ucms bet.ween Japan and the Bri t1.Qb. (and also 

the Dut.c:h East Indies) becau&e the evidence is clear that such a 6igna.l. 

!!:!. sent~~ then, by that 'time, 8 December, the a.ttack on Pearl Barbor 

-~!be "reviaicmi.R81 " hove'rer1 still believe in C~n Sa.ttord-the 

.so.le- person V.bo s1;uclt to his sta.tescnt 1obat :iibere !!!a a 3 December wa.rning, and that· all copies of that message were deliberate:cy- destro;yed. 

The illteresting thiDg e.bout th1s ~ tempes1t-in-a.-1;e&pot is that even 

i£ there had 'beezi an autbent:tc u. s • ...Ja.Ps,n exec:u'te message it vou1d have 

not 

told us nothing whatever tb&t vaa/ aJ.re&q kncnm on 3 December. Moreover, 

and -this I thilUt is veq ~, the attac.k on Pearl va.s prepared tor 

vi.th so much secreq I vould doubt~ much that the Japanese would take 

8Jll cha.nee 'What.eve?' 1n sending out a message which might "tip their handn. 

It Just doesD •t 1"1.°' in 1;;b.e picture at alli 

it is ~ to note tha'\ Admiral TIDRM1, while he mentions 

the nwiDis Code" atf&1r and cites {p. l.00) viaat the Baval Court 0: 

Inqui.%T said about it-later~ 'to be wrong-does not press tbe 

51 

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matter 1m seriollS~. I thiJlk. the Adm1ra.l 1& very dubious that a real 

E.xeeute ws ever sent out .on 3 December aa cJajmed b7 Captain Sattord, 

although he does say (p. 101): ~ findings of the Na~ Court of 

Inqu:l.r,y on this sW,Ject are conf1med b)' the evidenee presented to the 

Joint congressional. i.nvesUgatillg eomn1 ttee." The Admiral does not 

not tranami tted to him or to at.her connnanders a.:noa:t;. 

Senators Ferguson and Brewster in their Minority Report say (p. 526): 

~ il the wind execute message they saw va.s a !a.J..se one they believed 

it true at the tine e.nd. should have e.eted accord.1ngl)r." A good point, and 

I think, one that should be emphaaized; it is too bad it ve.sn 't fol.loweO. 

52 

... 

I 

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REF ID:A489034 

6. THE QtESnO?I OF SABa.WlE 

wmn led Oeaeml Short t,o prepare tor sabotage rather tbaa tor 

militaq action bT the Japeneae? 

ln -ay opinion tJ:i.e reason tor General Short 9a ~ brief answer to 

the var ve.rnllig message sent him after the · 26 November 1941 American 

reJoi.00.er to Ja;paneae proposals for arriTI.Dg ~ s. modus vivendi vas not, 

as WJJJY peopl.e believe, u.tter nonsense. Shon sa.id merely th.st he vas 

appa.rantJ.y, a.1so in Ronol.ulu had but t\m th"'ngs in mind as to possible 

or probab1$· Japaneae action. First, the Japanese march vs.a ·-certatDJ.y to 

be to the southward (to ~I 'fba.11 Nld I Ind.o-china. 1 :Borneo I or the 

--- Dutch East IDdies; indeed ~ their actions seemed to point in those 

directions) and Short vas not able to do an;ything at ell about that. 

Then, aecondl:f 1 there w.s incessant talk in Americ&, incl.uding ill the 

radio broadcasts and in the v.rl tinas of' coJ.umniats, sabotage was wba~ 

ve had to guard. against. 'l'he generally4leld viev v:is that the Japanese 

were tricky, tba:t attempts to tmrart their march vou1.d be countered by 

the various mechBlti sms a£ sabotage. This I remember veey vividly. And 

I feel sure that when General Gerov received General Short's message 

stating that all steps ~ prevent sa.b~ bad been ta.ken and that he 

vas in lia.iaon vith the Nav, General Gerov probab~ thought "Fine 

business~' a on the job." So auat have the others in Waahington 

\.IW saw 1 t-GenereJ. Marshall 1.ncJ 1w3ed. BJ' hindaight Short' 13 message 

lieem& ~ unresponsive to the meas.age sen-; him. But the matter or 

53 

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REF ID:A489034 

sabotage was in the air~ That's what ve bad to l.ook out tor., Confirmation ~ this att1 tude can be seen 1n various messages. Even the lla"fY' • 

strong message beg1nn1,iag "This ~ 1s to be ccmsid.ered a WU' varn:ing" 

! 

ends vith "ConUnen"tal Districts Guw:i Samoa. directed to toke a.ppropriate 

aeasures aga.1 nst sabotage." ~ had forgotten &ll about the war 

t1ngency a surprise air atts.clt on the Fleet at P~arl Harbor. Parenthetically ! ~add that those whose memories of World War I incJ.uded the 

tvo great acts ~ sabotage b;r Germ9.ll a.gents in this eouatr;r (the BJ.ack 

Tom explosion and the Kingsland Fire) before the U. S. beceJne a belligerent 

in that var vill perhaps agree vi tb me that Japanese sal>ota.ge was the 

th.iD8 Americens thought was most to be teared in regard to Junerictm 

~tor,y. Let us not :t'orget that th1.s tear qui~ expressed. itsel.f 

very cl.ear~ a:id heartl.easlJ" 1D Wa.~ waa done w thousands or Japa:neseAmeric:an cl. tizens ( 1.ncl.ui.1.ng Nisei) in C~orn.ia. the mcvnent ve deel.ared 

war on Ja.pan.. Why did they move them out of the port eities7 What were 

the authorities a..."'ra.1.d o'f? Sa.b~: ?or thif:, reason I, f'or o?le, ti.r!5.. 

it difficult to c_""iticize General Gerov in his handling ~ Genere.l Short's 

message 1n response to the 26 November messe.ge trom Wash.1.ngton. 

But what about the vi.ews hel.d by u. s. intelligence auth=ir1t1es or:. 

this question ~ sabotage? Were they the same e.s those ~ the average 

Americq c1 t1zen, nthe man-in-the-street"'? I think they were-and Just 

as the views of "'the man-in-the-street" ~ those days were wrong, so it 

never have paid t.oo much attention to 1ntelligence. After several 

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aeea to psr less ~tian to 1.ntel 11 F"'?9 1iban 1io l.ogisUca, for iDstaacet 

. . . ,, 

Wh7 does !!rte', 1 gence ..,. to Pl.IV' 1ihe role or ne,p-cb11 a in the ccm4ue't 

of varh;re? Whn 1a there aboG izrliel 11gencs: iibat makes it leas 4esirable 

as a career t.baz1 an1.ller7, ror ~T . The reascms are clear men one 

' . . . . . ' . 

A.dmira1 'nleobal d la,ra great emphasis cm Tolqo t.o Bonol.ulu message 

mmbeJ' 83 ~. 24 ~ 1941 ( t.be so-c&ued "Bc=bing Plot Messa8ea) 

and Sap (p. i.6) : 

· Attar s~ 'folqo dispatch, #831 no mili '75 intel 11 rt= 

orga:rd?ticm cCNld tail to reach that deduction ~. it vas . · prepare the detaUed pl.Ba for a svp%'1se attack on t.Ae DJ&Jor 

' ~-.wi'ts ~ the Fl.eet moored. 'tbereJ. .. '. - ' . . ' . ' . 

_ Here I Wnk is. t.be kerDel. ~ 'the ~ aJecret rd wJ:or the U. S. 

was taken b1' surprise. I have uaderliDed. the phnee "no milite.rJ' intelligence orpttt •a:tion" in 1;be tmiegoing extirBc:t ~ I tbink that our . ~ 

rnill't&ry and naval. 1Jrt;el 11 genee orptdzatioDs ba4 serious defects at 

that time....ead. I think they still b&ve. (Theobald does not mean just 

milita:t";Y, u. s. Arsq Intelligence, but a..tso u# s. Bav Intelligence.) 

I thiiak that serious defects in our mil1 t;ar1' and. naval i.Jltel 11gence ma.de 

it possible for the Japanese ~ take us by surprise s.t Pearl Harbor. 

A strong statement'? Yes, but I tb1Dk it 1B warra.nted. I lrill vi'tb some 

d1tt1deXlce go into 1'ld.s quest1oa 'becawse I 4o not kDov too much ~ 

the si tl.laiiicm aa of 1957. I did kDov what it was like in 1940-41 and 

in 1950, f'aur J'e8.%'8 after 'the PHR vas rele&aed. It is cJ.ear ~ 1ibe 

:f.nteJHgenee aituaticm in the u. s. vas dehc:t.ive in 1940-41 and in 

1950 I when 1l,be Korean "police action n broke out vi thout 'Wa?'ll.ing. Where 

55 

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~i. BJ' l.950 ve W ~,· . What hel.p "88. CIA? ... -·.- ~- -·.. - . 

. Four reara a:ttezo .t;be PBB vu released.1 MaJor General BhemN' Miles I 

Assistant Chi.et of Staff ~or I1ttell1gence of the War ~ General 

sta:tt, b'aa April. l.940 -4'o ~ ).9421 in~ scae people J11A7 repz'd 

as an apologi&, baa JDBZ21' things to aa.-r in an endeavor to explain ~ 

appeal" to have })ea~ at himself and his sta.ttl-.. .It was .en 

attempt to 8bfJol. ve G-2 traa its respoDS1bilitil' far the debacle oa 7 

Dece:mher 194-l.. For the most part he does u good a Job ot this / ~, 

as could be dona to ex.cuJ.p&w G-2 n-am 1 ts tail.urea, omissions, and lack 

at the kind c4 1:mag1.DatioA vbich 1Z!.1.gh\ be.w 'toreaee.rJ. and :torestall.ed the 

diaaster caused b7 ~ JapRllPae sYr,Pri.se attack. A salient paragraph 

~ msq ldlich coul4 be ·quoted 1s t.he :t'o.llovbg (p. 71) : 

'?he pla:ln ract is 'that tDe var warn1Dp s~ out 'bJ' the 

highest militar,y authorities nine c1qs and more before Pearl 

H.a:rbor were taz mare autboritati Te and more ~ tive of vhat 

the Hava11an oc@Wlfids might t:a;peet, and. what vas expected ~ . 

tbem1 tbe.n ezq informaUon or interpretations tram "magic" 

tbs.t Milita.'ey or B&vs.:l !JlWlHgence could possibq have e~. 

Complete reliance w.s p)aced on the ettect those varn1llgS 

should have had-and did have everywhere except in Rmm:li. 

But 'foeyo ~ belieYed that the incredible might 

happen and Hawa.11 be surprised: washll2gton did not. 

Genera..l Miles takes 1~ for gra.uted. tba't the W&.rDil3gs sent ou:t 'b1 

Wa.shington proper~ ~ all our ove1"8eas c~ except the ooe in 

Hava.11. one .wrmden ~ tbe _basis for the Genel'a). 's ~ in 

W.s regard.. Indeed, ~one case, ~ Jlen'tioned, even 12 hours aner 

l ~ "Pea.r.l Barl>or in~" 1n the AUmrtiic Monthlz for J'UlT 1948, . pp. 65.72. 

56 

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surprise attack at Pearl Harbor his cC"l!!!ftlll.DI vaa nevertheless taken 

~lete11 b7 surprise, when the Japanese destroyed all his plan.es ~ 

the ground., Just as they did in Hawaii. General Miles, notvithstanding 

his statement that (p. 70): 

"The Havai.1an commands later ccmpl.Ained. that this ~c" 

in:tormation vs.s not transmitted to them-this in spite of their 

failure to react to the authoritative warning orders sent theta 

when the situa.tion was commonly k:novn to be !ar more critical. 

Br·comparison, it 1IJA'f be noted tba.t General MacArthur, who bad 

access to "magic," could not later id.enti!'y the more important 

"magic" messages; he apparently took no action on them, but 

alerted his command for war on Wash.ington's varn.ing orders. 

Thus assumes that General Mac.Arthur "alerted his command !or var on 

We.sb.1..ngton Is warn1ng orders." What does n alerting" mean, a.nybov, il a 

commander loses all bis planes by vhat I think was inattention? 

General Miles admits (pp. 70-.+i) that "there vere tvo "MAGIC" 

messages • • • which have subsequently been hel.d. to have been signposts, 

ii.BO. we so read them, to Pearl Harbor." The General devotes many vords 

tr, these two cases and concludes that the signposts pointed to a hal.fhea.rt.ed. proposal, admittedly discussed in Washington, that the British 

and 0. S. occupy the Netherland Indies before the Japanese did so-and 

he thus tried to expl.a.in away the famous clue contained in a Tokyo message 

to Berlln tel.ling General. Oshima, the Japanese Am.ba.ssador to Germa:.v, to 

tell the Germans : "Say very secretly to them th.at there is extreme 

danger that var ma:r suddenlJ' break out between the Anglo...SS.Xon nations 

and Japan through acne clash or arms, e.nd. &id t.b.e.t the time o:f the breaking out ~ this var 111/q came quicker than 8ZJ)"Olle dreams. 11 The explanation of Miles (or, better perhaps, the lack ~ 1mf!.ginat1on) on the pa.rt 

57 

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of u. s. 1.ntel.llgence agend.es appears to me (even by hindsight, ot course) 

I ; . 

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Here a.re tvo more paragrapbs fro& Genere.l Miles ' article, both of 

vhich I think are of ccm.sidere:bJ.e signit1cance: 

The last twenty-:tour hours in Washl.llgton before the banbs 

fell have cane in for much scrut1.Dy. Why did the President, 

vith most-of the Japanese final answer ~ore him, concl.ude 

that it me&At war and then, after a tit:tul. attempt to reach 

Adm:1.ra.l stark-'a7 ·tel.ephone, qui~ go to bed'? Wb7 -·was he -. · 

in seclusion the following morning'l Wby was no action taken 

on the Japanese repJ.7 by the Sec:reta.ries of State, War, and 

Na'Y)" vben they met on thats~ morn1ng'l Why did they not 

consult the President, or he send for th.em? Where was e-reryboCcy', incl.uding '111¥ humble ael.1'7 -Why, in short, didn't someone 

stage a. last-minute rescue, in good Western style? 

The picture undoubtedl.7 is one of men still working under 

the, psycbology o£ . peace. . They vere, to quote Secretary Stimson 

1 again, "under a terrific pressure in the face of a.· slobal var 

which they f'eJ:t was probe.b~ 1mm1l"lent. Yet they were surrounded, outside o~ thei.r ~ices and almost throughout the 

countey, by a spirit of isolationism and. disbelief' in danger 

which now seems incredibJ.e." They were men who thought they 

bad done their possible to prepare ~or impending "w--ar 1 and who 

bad DO 1ciea that there vas an innocent maiden 1n need ot rescue. ":,~ 

I vill e.dd another extract·~t mA7 be helpful 1n seeing things 1n 

vb.at I regard as their proper light. This e:.tract comes from Secreta..7 

Stimson' e statement With respect to the report of the A'riq Pearl Harbor 

Board, repeated as a :footnote (p. 239) to the PER: 

As expressed by Mr. Stimson: "A keener and more ima.ghmtive 

appreciation on the pa.rt of some of the officers in the We.r and 

Nav,- Departments of the significance of some of the 1Dtorma.t1on 

might have l.ed t,;o a suspicion of·a.n attack spec11'1cally on Pearl 

Harbor.. I do not think tbat certain otticers in the War Department :f'unctioned in these respects vith su:N'icient skill.. At All 

times it must be borne in mind, hovever, that it 1a easy to 

criticize iDdividuals 1n the light or hindsight, and very difficul.t to recreate f'&irl.1' the entire situation and 1ntomation with 

vhich tl!e officers were required to deal at the time o:t the 

event." See statement of the Secretaey ~ War with 'respect to 

the report o:t the Ariq Pearl Harbor Boa.rd, com:dttee ·eJCb.ibit 

No. 157. 

58 

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'MT own explanation ot: the failures and derelictions ~ U. s. 1ntelll-

··.· gence. can~ st&Wi-in :tev,:vords1 I do uot think there were aio,r imagjne.-~ ' ' . . r ' ' . ,... ~ 

· t:s:• ottieera 1n G-2 or in Rawl. Intel Hgence; but more important there : -\~ .. -

vu -.DC>bodl in ei ~ the Ar:q ar the llaV iJltelllgence statts in Vasb1llgton 

whose most important 1 il not sol.e dut7 1 vaa to stlJdT the Wol.e stor,y which . . . .- . ~ . , .. ' . . ·' 

t.be MAGIC meSsages were unfolding and which pJ.a7ed so important a. 'P8.?'t in · 

our 'pi:ilure to deduce that 'the Japanese vere -p}e.nn1ng a surprise attack on_ 

the u. s. Fleet at Pearl; there was nobodz whose responsibility it was to 

,\: 

try to put the pieces ot the Jig-sav puz:le tcijether. Certainly there 

· was nobodJ' 1n the Arrq's Signa.l Intelligence Service who ve.s assigned to 

or avsil.a:ble ~or this purpose-even if the respon.sibi.lltT for this sort 

o:t work_ bad been fixed on that organiz.atian, which-it wasn't. This was 

llkevise true ot the equivalent Ii&VT organization. This important phase 

of 1ntell.1gence was a responsibility- which in both services was Jealously 

held by the Intel J 1 genee statts. And tbe distribution of the MAGIC 

messages was so rigidJ.7 controlled that there was nobc><V 1n either ot 

these Intel.l.igence sts.ffs whose duty it was to stuay the messages from 

a long-range point or view. The persons, officers and civilians, in 

1ntelli.genee, as well as in the White House, bad the messages only tor so 

short a time that each message represented only a single trame, so to 

speak, in a long motion pidUre film-a. film vhieh should have been shown 

and ahoul.d have been ateu~ studied. a.a -a. coutinuoW> serie6 ot pic:turea, 

because they vere tellillg a story. But the film was si.mplz not there to 

be studied and this vu a ve17 serious weakness, I think, 1n ~ intelligence organizations of the two Services. It ma:r ba.ve been that thq 

59 

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aimpl.7 did not have.toe people to devote.to such work. . ,_ ~. - : ·~, -. . ·-·' .. 

-~·course, 'tb8re are~ihose -critics "Vbo point to the message which · · . ,,. - - ,.: - . . . ' ' 

l'i&V7 Captain McCollum. testified that he thought should be sent to Adm1ral. 

K1mmel, and to the one which the Anq''s Colonel Sad.tier testified that he 

thought sbanl.d be sent to General Short. ~' it seemed, sensed that 

MAGIC was tel11ng a story and vas pointing toward a surprise attack, the 

most likely target being Pearl Harbor. But both eftorts came up aga1nst 

stone valls-t.heJ.r su;pperior otticers claimed enough bad been sent to put 

'ef Kimmel and Short on full alert: To send more woW.d only confuse them, 

or Vorse than tbat, irritate *m· But the latter were obviously' 'Wl'Ollgor so it seems to us now-again by the a.id at hinds1ght. Admirals Theobald 

a.ud Kimmel bave made the most o'f' this :f&Uure on the part o:f those above 

Captain McColl.um and Col.onel Sadtl.er to realize hoY inadequate the varni.llgS 

that had been sent to Short a:id Kimmel real.17 vere. 

The Joint Congressional Committee (MaJority Report) clear~ f'e1t that 

vb.at Kimmel. and Short vere sent by way o:! 1n:forma:tion left mw:h to be 

desired. One thing seems certain, as I have already said: the intelligence arrangements in both Services vere inadequate. The C01'11lli. ttee reached 

certain concl.us:ions a.nd. ma.de but f'ive ma.Jor recommend.a.t10llS 1 the second of 

vhich is as follows : 

· That there be a complete integration of Army and Navy 

1ntelligence agencies in order to avoid the pitfalls o! diVided 

re&pQDS1b1l1V which experience baa ms.de so &nmdantly appa:ren't; 

that upon ettecting a un:if1.ed. intel..llgence, ottieers be se.lected 

tor 1ntelli.genee work who possess the background, penchant, and 

ca.pa.cit)' tor such work; e.nd tbat they be ma.1ntai.ned in the work 

for an extendecl period o-r tiJle in order that they may bdame 

steeped ill tbe ram1ficat1ons and ret'1nement,s o! their f 1eld and 

employ thi.s reservoir ~ lmovl.edge J.n evaluating material received. 

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The assignment ~ an officer having 8Z1 aptitude for such work 

should not 1.llpede his progress nor &tteet his promotions. 

Et'tieient 1ntelligence services are Just as essential in time 

of peace as in var, and this branch o:r our armed services must 

e.lVB.7B be accorded the important rol.e wbich it deserves. 

What baa been done about this recomaPDdation by the Services? Very 

llttl.e; in hct, I think it can be 58.1.d that nothing has been done. ~ 

course, we bave the Central Intelligence Agency; but. is that establishment 

reaJ.17 responsive to the Joint Com::nittee'a reccmnendation'l I ba.rd1.1 

tbink so. The three services no doubt can cite good reasons why they 

have not Zade e. prdressiona.l career ill intelligence possible or attractive 

to its officer personnel; no doubt they can cite at length factors and 

d!..fficulties that would ha..-e to be overcome. All I can say is that Jud.gi:!lg by what the Arrq bss done the attitude tovard intelligence seems not 

w have changed very mucb1 as is i.Ddica.ted by t.be :fol.lowing ed.i toriaJ. 

which appeared in the Wash1.ngton Post on 5 December 1955 and which states 

the case in succl.nct terms : 

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. ··. i~~,:;,t.~~~7±£:i~!!~S£t Staff leaves the Military Iμtelligence· Service in an 

ambiguous and rather humiliating position. Al· 

-:_ though directors .. of the other m~)or staff divisions 

· have been designated as Deputy . Chiefs . of Staff 

· ··with the ·rank of lieutenant· general, the Chief of 

lntelligence remains a major general with the sub· 

-ordinate title- of ·Assistant Chief of Staff. · 

· · The extraordinary thing .about all this is that not 

lo11g ago the special task force which investigated 

the intelligence problem for the Hoover Conimis-

&ion strongly recommended . that in the case of . 

those units associated with the three armed services 

their chiefs "be evaluated in . the organizational 

·structure to level of Deputy ·chiefs of Staff in the 

Army and Air Force, and Deputy Chief of Naval 

Operations in the Navy." This was a rather 

prolix way of saying that they ought to have a 

. little :more :prestige and influence, along with a 

little more gold braid, than they now enjoy. Why, 

_. · . r · ·, .~ .. jri the case of, all three services. was this recom-

·' ,.mendation ignored by the Department of Defense? 

The chief function of military intelligence is to 

collate and interpret the information provided by 

the attaches abroad and by other agencies, such as 

it.he CIA, the FBI and its own counterespiOnage 

-service. Correct interpretation requires more than 

the accumulation of relevant facts; it also requires 

a considerabl'i! knowledge of the psychology of the 

potential enemy, and this in turn requires an 

extensive study of his language, history, culture, 

customs and philosophic tradition, since these 

afford the keys to such an understanding. But all 

this, together with the secrecy in which their activi· 

ties are necessarily cloaked, seems to have made : 

intelligence officers somewhat suspect t-o ·a certain 

sort of politician. Even professional military men 

are often inclined to discount the · valu·e of the 

critical function exercised by intelligence officers 

in the di.s.cussion of pet military projects ·or' pians. 

The question raised by the reorganlzation is 

whether we can realistically expect to increase the 

quality of military iiltelligence by deemphasizing 

its significance. It is hard to see how a career in 

intelligence can be made to appeal to capable officers when the importance of intelligence is so 

obviously downgraded in comparison with other 

staff functions. 

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High-level Artq authorities o"btloual.1' don •t think that Int.el 11 gence 

-· J.s as important aa Penmmel.1 Suppl.1', and s1m11 er services. Rov lmig 

Yill it take before it becomes quite c.lear to them that Intell1gence can 

be ~ the greatest hel.p in fighting a. var? For too martr years intelligenae .1n the Arm:t and in the Nav.r bas been a "deMend" for ~icers vho 

shoved an interest in it, or an aptitude tor 1t~ Is this to continue 

1.ndefini te1Tf Do the Ansed Forces think that the Central Intel.11gence 

Agency vill. or can do the Job? Of course, CIA representatives can be 

assigned to the headqmrlers of m1llt&r1 rommMds-but Vill that fill the 

need'? I doubt it, I doubt it TerY :much. 

'fbe intrcductory statement ~ the "SlJiPe?"rls017, Adm1n1stra.tive, and 

Organizational Deticiencies in our Mil1 tary' and liaval Eatabl 1 shments 

revealed by the Pearl Harbor Investigation" (p. 253) the Pim begins as 

.tollovs: 

The Camittee ha.a been 1ntr1gued throughout the Pearl Harbor 

proceedings b7 one Pid gmatical and paramount question: wey, with 

some o~ the finest 1.ntel.ligence avall&ble 1n our historz, with 

the almost certain koovled.ge that var va.s at ha.nd1 with ple.ns that 

contemplated the precise type of attack t.he.t was executed by 

Je.pa.n on the morning of Dece:aber 7 -Why was it possible for a 

Pearl Harbor to occur'/ The e.nsver to this question and the 

cause.ti ve conaider&t1ons regarded as having any reasonably proximate bearing on the disaster have been set forth in the boCcy 

of this report. Funoruneut.a.l.ly, these considerations rei'l.ect 

supervisory, Mm1n1strative 1 and organizational deficiencies 

vhich existed in our Military e.nd Naval esta.bliahlilents in the 

days be:tore Pearl Harbor. In the course oi' the Ccmmiittee's investigation still other def'i ciencies, not regarded. as be:rlng a direct 

bearing on the disaster, have presented themselves. othendse 

stated, all o:t these def'iciencies reduce themae1ves to principles 

vhich are set forth, not for their novelty or profundity but tor 

the reason that, by their very sel.t-evident simplicity, 1t is 

difiicult to belie..-e thq are ignored. 

63 
t lt ~ 'REF ID:A489034 

; . '·-~ -

It is recognized that JDall1' of the deficiend.es revealed b7 - our iJlvesUgatiou ~ ,'Ver'/ probeb~ have e.J..reacQ" been corrected 

as a 'l."eSUlt · ot the experiences or the· var. We desire, however, 

to subm1 t these prine1ples, which are grounded in tbe evidence 

adduced 'b7 the Cami ttee 1 tor the CODSideration ot our Arzq and 

Ba'7 establishments in the earnest hope that something eoustructi ve w.q be acccmpliahecl ·that v1ll aid our national defense and 

prec1ude a repetition ot the disaster~ December 7, 1941.. Ve 

·do this &tter careful. and long consideration ot the evidence 

deVe1.oped through one ot the most 1.mportail"t investigations 1n 

'the b.istor;r of the Congress. 

. -

-What b&Ve the"Services done to ~liorate the deficiencies JneDtioned? 

In 1117 op1ntcin, verr little. Maybe it would be correct to sq "nothing~ It 

As a colleagu£ said to me recently "Nothing will be done-until var breaks 

out. Then, of course, intell.igence is no longer treated a step-child." 

Is that vbat we wa.ut'l - The chances are that there von tt be time to use 

.iDtelligence after a war breaks out: maybe the U. s. will be down and 

out by that time. 

64 

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7• COB:LUSIOliS 

A:rter reading some but not all the llilllcms o:r words alluded to at 

First, I llUSt coni'ess, I think that K1mnel and Short vere not as cul· 

pa.bl.a as I :first thought they were back iA l.91.,..l.-19421 despite all the 

~" sent them. The Washington authorities were culpable, too-

~e a lot more culpable than vere these two officers. Both the Major! ty 

and the Minori t,- Reports make good sense. The Report of the Ma.Jori tr 

contained sc:ae very pertinent ree<tt@W!'Ildaticm.s-but nobody seems to be doing 

important 

veey much about 1.m,pleaenting the second and perhaps the :most/~ these 

on the Conclusions o! the Minority, Senators Ferguson and Brewster. In 

19)~ I thought the latter two senators were "hitting below the belt" but 

tcday / in l.957 1 I think they hit closer to tJJ.e truth tban the Ma.Jori 'ty. 

I think Mr. Keefe 's "addi tione.l views" on the Majority Report make good 

sense-K1mmel a.nd Short, he said, were not the sole cu.l.prita. I think 

that the Intelligence Services came ofi rather easily-too easily in t.he 

tixlllg of responsibility and pointing out derelictions. I think the 

1.l:rtelligence statfs might have used more imagination but this waa not 

because they vere atatted. with obtuse officers or persons o£ low-grade 

int.ell.igence. J.s a matter of cold ta.ct, I thi:ck, they were badly under-

::ita.tt'ed.1 because ill both the .Army and the Na!l "intel.1..1gence., didn't 

count-for much at any rate 1 then. This raises the question: d.oee it 

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count~ much more~ in the Armed Serd.ces? I think that Kimmel 8Dd. 

Short should. haft 'b8en sat Bore informti.cm-even ~ tbq vere sent cmq · 

"gists" at MMUC-to let. them evaluate for themselves the sign1fica.nce at 

vbB:t the Japanese were s&7ina• General. Miles ~ that the va.rn1ng 

mesaages sent them were of far more 1mportance tban azqth1ng they could 

have got tram "Magic". I don •t agree. Thq might have had more time to 

ruminate; they m1.ght even have guessed-as Ac1mi.ral Kimmel hints-what t.he 

Japanese vere pl8Jm1ng; our commands might therefore have been much more . 

prepared than they vere to meet 'the atta.ck. 'fh1s, one must admit, could · 

have been done even wit.bout their having a. P12rpl.e &Mbine or a c:ryptanalytic staff to solve 8Dd translate messages in that or 1n the other 

. ' 

Ja.panese dipl.ama:tic !lste!s. 

I think that AdmireJ. Stark was wrong 1n va.1 'ting ~or General Marshall 

to be tound before sendi»a off a message to Kimmel a:id Short-and to the 

o~r overse&B ~n-as soon· as the last part of the 14-part ~ 

to Washington message 'became ave.ilable--espee1ally when he knew tram 

nMa.gic" that Kurusu and Iiomura were told exactly to tb.e minute wen to 

present the whol.e message to Secretary Hull. (That we knew the conten'ts 

~the last part of that message E'delivu this who1e message exactly 

at 1:00 p.m.'J before the Japanese Embassy code clerks had them is e. 

credit to tbe etticienc:y o:r Arrq aud IiaV ceyp~c s1;a.tts.) 

I th1nk tbat Colonel Edvard French, Chief' ~ the 81.gDal. Corps Message 

Center, used Teri' poor~ When he sent Marshall's mess.age via 

sure he thought it vas infra dig to ask a "sister" government radio 

66 

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service ( e~ the. ?laT.r) to do (at a critical moment) 80IDe1i.hing that . . 

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Arrq l'8dio couldn't d.o. Or mape ColoDel French didn't realize the gra.Yit7 

ot the situation, or was not told so in impressive eDO"Ugh language. 

The Fel"g'..ason-Brevster MiDorlty Report does not point the finger at 

all the high ranld ng orticials who shoUl.d share the responsiblli v but 

it does say (p. 573) "Both in Washington and in H&va11 there were numerous 

and. serious h.ilUt"eB ot mea 1n the lover c1 vil and 1IZ1li ta:ey ecbel ems to 

per.t0nt their duties 8Dd discharge their responsibilities. ·'fhese are 'too 

numerous to be treated in detail and 1nd.i vi dual 1 y named. n I vou1.d. have 

liked them to have named the Directors of Intel J 1 gence in the Arrq and in 

the Na..,,. / speeificaJ.l7 1 because I think poor in~ll.igence work pl19'ed such 

2 lArge part in the debacle. 

And, o'f course, although 1t is cl.ear that MAGIC !!!:!, vithheld f'rom 

K1mmel a.ud Short a:tter the summer ot 1941t I do not think (sad ot this I 

am quite sure) that it was dellberateJ.7 vithheld ~or the specific Purpose 

f:lf brj;iging on the attack at Pearl! Except for the most rel>1d a! the 

revisionists this is ~ f'a.nta.atic a thesis; but there is e. stronger 

argument against such a thesis: it is not su;pported by the tacts. 

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8. EPILOOUE 

Wha'\ vas 11' that so aroused the auti-B~~, leaif 1 ng them to 

suspect. that it was "slrnllauggeey"'·'and gross negllgence 1n waah1Dgton 

that was responsible tor the Pearl Harbor disastezrt 

illl1' did the President, his closest associates in the White House, 

a.nd the officers in the top-leve1 positions ~ the Arm;r and in the Na.VJ, 

generate so imah suspicion in tbe minds ~ the Republicans? ~ such 

reluctance to have an investigation to explain why the u. s. :forces vere 

ce.ught by surprise a.t Pearl :iiarbor'l This is a. point 'Which I do not think 

is expl.Ained ill the literature and vhich ought to be.. Why' did the President and his adad n1 strati.on allov so much suspid.on to grow u;p in the 

minds ~ the Republicans by the questions which the latter raised af'ter 

Could this have been avoided'? It is '11l3' opinion that it vas this refusal 

to explain, this subJection to continued "needling" af the President and 

the Democrats by the Republicans throughout the w.r that aroused. the 

sravest suspid.on.a that there was indeed gross negl.1.gence 1n the Yll:dte 

Bouse and at the highest executive l.evels / a.nd maibe greater derelictions 

to be hid.den. The edewtnt resistance the President e.nd the Democratic 

Administration ~to maintain aw>1nst Republican pressure for Congressional hearings on this point and the reasons tberef'or were quite obvious: 

we now know that such bearings would b&ve "~ the oat out at the ba.S"-

the Foreign Ottice end it.a embassies, legati.ons 1 and consulates abroad. 

The Japanese would he.ye cba.Dged their Purple S)'Btem vi thout dela)r. It 

68 

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iB 1neonce1 vable, the Adm1 n1 strati.on believed, that the secret COlJld have 

been kept e-ren U all the bearlngs vere 1n Executive Sessions. They f'elt 

and we.-e varra.nted. in teellng that Rea.rags on the subject would be disa.strous during the war: too much vital in:f'OnDB.tion on the subJect woul.d 

have leaked out. It 1s true that the Japanese bad been e.lerted cl.u:r1Dg 

the war by the Germani;. they vere told, in tact-and no~ knave to this 

day Just. how the Germana f'oimd out.-tbat we were reat11ng Japanese dipl.omatic messages. All this appears in the PHR and makes interesting readi'Q&. 

But :!.t is aston:!sh1ng that even after they vere told the J~se Just 

simply retused to believe the stoq and continued to use the Purple 

system. (Neither, tor that matter, did the Germans put much credence in 

the suspiciODS 1 f orw.rded. by' Marshal Rame.J. ~at Mrica, that the Br1 tisb. 

must be rea<l i ng his me a sages ; Rommel :rei t 'that. th:is e.nd only this coul.d 

account for his continuing defeats in North Mrica after 19431 Rave these 

two episodes e.rq lessons for us? Yes, 1.ndeed! CI'7Ptographers becane 

enamored o'f their inventions and their mind.a become pole.rized in a sort 

of' ccnviction t"5tlDll that the systems they b.s.ve concocted a.re invincible. 

It happened to us, tool I can remember the mental shock I had when 

indubi tabl.e evidence vas placed bef'ore me showins that the Germans were 

rea.ding the enciphered code system we vere using f'or eommm1 cations between 

U. s. Arary Obserrer with the British Expeditionary Forces in North l.i'rica 

in 1942-3 and liashi.ngton ! That i.s why I believe 'that some body~, 

~ course-outside the one that thinks up e.nd produces our ovn cryptosystems but within IiSA shoul.d be ca.lled in t'requent..ly t.o take a good .look 

at those systems to make sure that, some era.ck in the strong C%7P'tosecurity 

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