REF ID:A43063 

HARRY' HYLIR 

MacArthur Is Not to Blame 

COLLIER'S HAS NEVER TRIED to run General Douglas MacArthur for President. Nor, on 

the other hand, has it ever called him ''Dugout 

Doug." This magazine has admired his courage 

and his demonstrated ability, both military and 

administrati-Ye. But beyond that it hasn't run a 

fever about him, one way or the other. That is, 

until now. 

Now, we at Collier's think he's been the victim 

of a low and dirty trick in the form of ·a whispering campaign. We don't know how far the whispers have penetrated. But we know dia.t they 

have been heard along the Eastern seaboard, 

especially in Washington, where they have been 

as pieValent and oppressive as the humidity. 

They have obviously reached Japan. For 

General MacArthur found it necessary to send 

a message to the President disclaiming responsibility for our unpreparedness for the surp~ 

attack :in Korea. In it the general said that ''the 

Far East Command, until the President's great 

pronouncement to support the epochal action of 

the United Nations, had no slightest responsibility for the defense of the free Republic of 

Korea." 

90 

Later, after his command had been assjgned 

the defense of Korea and Formosa, General 

MacArthur 8.ew to Formosa to confer with 

Chiang Kai-shek. A rumor was promptly spread 

from Washington that the trip ·was unauthorized 

and unknown to the President and other· high 

officials. 

The general had to issue another statement. 

And he was backed up by W. Averell Harriman, just back from Tokyo, who said that 

"General MacArthur went to see the generalissimo to carry out his instructions from the President," and that the President, the Secretaries of 

State and Defense, himself and others had 

known about the journey in advance. 

We don't know what the motives are behind 

the determined campaign to discredit the Far 

Eastern commander. But one thing is certain: 

General MacArthur was not responsible for the 

defenselessness of Korea. Maybe no one person 

was. But there are several candidates for that 

unhappy distinction. 

Among them are the various and badly ~ 

ordinated intelligence units of the government, 

and the persons who evaluate th~se units' information. H their advice contribbted to some of 

the embarrassing statements ahd decisions by 

the Secretary of State, it is hatdly fair to hold 

him solely and personally at faiilt. Yet Mr. 

Acheson can scarcely escape some of the onus 

of blame. Neither can Secretary of Defense 

Johnson, with his weakening ecbnomies and his 

now-famous blustering talk of what we'd do to 

Joe Stalin at 5:00 A.M. if Joe started soDlething 

an hour earlier. 

An examp~e of conflicting opinions and dubious conclusions was last yeat's decision that 

Formosa wasn't worth defending. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff wanted at least td send a group of 

military advisers to Formosa. Mr. Acheson 

thought otherwise, and sold his views to the 

President. 

A few days later, after Mr. Acheson had testified at a closed session of the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee, chairman Tom Connally 

told reporters the gist of what had been said. 

Mr. Acheson had been asked whether he had 

sought the views of General MacArthur and 

Admiral Radford on the strategic importance of 

Formosa. The secretary had answered that 

he wasn't reporting on their views, and that he 

4kfn't necessarily know them. He also said he 

had not talked to the Joint Chiefs and didn't 

know their views in detail. Strategic importance, 

be said, was a military questiob. and not a diplomatic one. ·: 

· "Three days after the committee meet.ml; Mr. 

Acheson made the apparentlY. diplomatic announcement that America's military defense line 

in the Pacific ran from the ·Aleutians to the 

Philippines, including Japan ahd Okinawa but 

skipping Korea and Formosa. 

It seems safe to say, from tbis evidence, that 

America's policy in the Far Eait, including K.omi, was determined tight where it should hav.e 

· been---at \he seat of the Ameriean government. 

It also seems safe to say that General MacArthur, far~ shaping any of that policy, was 

not even consulted on some of. its most important military phases. His repeated requests for 

more and heavier equipment for his command 

~to be turned down becaUie of that policy. 

H they had not been, the Kotean story might 

have been a ditierent and happier one. 

General MacArthur has played a triple role 

in Japan. He has been military conqueror, military governor and a sort of superamb&Ssador. 

But in all three roles he has been }lllder orders 

from his superion in Washington, who include 

the President, the Secretaries bf State and Defense, the Joint~ of Staff 2'.nd Congress. Do 

the rumor spreaders consider all of them entirely 

blameless? Does the fault lie with one man, 

7 ,000 miles remote from the city where grand 

strategy is ·planned, diplomatic policies are decided, and money approprialed to make the 

strategy and policies effective? 

·1s it General MacArthur who determined to 

withdraw our forces from Korea and leave an 

ill-equipped constabulary in their place? Is it he 

who ignored repeated reports of armed taids by 

Communists across the 38th parallel, and the 

urgent warnings froin Korean government om-

·cials that heavier attacks were immbient? 

The answers to these questions are as obvious 

as the Whispered charges against MacArthJII' are 

ridiculous. The wrong guessing was done in 

Washington. And if any of the wrong guessen 

are respi>nsible for the attempts to smear and 

slander the general, their cowardly behavior 

deserves thorough Congressional investigation 

and public exposbre. · 

eau1 .. •,. far Sep1e111her 16, 1950