### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 247 -CR

Cha unc e y Eug e ne Wil so n , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B ELL COUNTY , 27TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 6094 9, HO NORAB LE JO E CARROLL , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A jury convicted a

ppellant Chauncey

Eug ene Wilson of the murder of Roy L ee Ta pli n. Wils on

wa s se nte nc e d to li fe in pr iso n. He c on te nd s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in (1) de nying his re quest for mistrial base d on a ju ro r’ s al l eged involvement in the murder i n v e s t i g a t i o n ; an d

( 2 ) o v e r r u l i n g h i s o b

j e c t i o nt o c e rt a i nt e s t i m o n y a s i r r e l e v an tan d

i n f l a m m a t o r y. We affir m the judgme nt of conviction. As Wil son does not challeng e the sufficie ncy of t he evidence, we provide only a brie f summary of the fac ts. Wil son was involved in a dating relationship with J asmin Alexander. Be fore dating Wil son, Alexander had be en invol v ed i n a dating relationship wit h Roy L ee T aplin. Even afte r the re lationship between A lexander and Ta plin had ended a

nd while Alexander w as dating Wil son, Taplin continued to visit Alex ande r. These visits wer e sometimes sexual in nature and
re su lte d i n s e v e r a l a l t e r c a t i o n s b e t w e e n T a p l i n an d W i l s o n . O n M ar c h 1 6 , 2 0 0 7 , T a p l i n c a me to2

Alexander’s house while Wils on was ther e. When Taplin ente red the house, Wilson fatally shot Taplin in the fac e and ne ck with a shotg un.

Wil son was indi cted for m urder
. A jury convicted Wilson as char g ed and a ssessed
a punis hme nt o f l if

e in p ri so n. Wils on

a pp e a ls. I n h is f ir st p oin t of

e rr or , Wil so n c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt erred in den y ing his
re qu e st fo r a mis tr ia l f

oll ow ingthe dis c ov e ry

that on e of

the jur or s h a d a lle g e dly

be e n invo lve d in the invest i gat i o n o f t he ca se and w as, ac cordingto Wi lson, a potential witness in the ca se. Acc ording to the State, the district c ourt proper ly denied Wilson’s mist rial re quest bec ause the juror had no per sonal knowledg e of the case and wa s, theref ore, not a potential witness in the case
. Wil son complai n s o f J uror No. 20 ba sed on information revea led af ter voir dire
. During voir dire , J uror No. 20 r aised he r hand to indicate that she ha d “hea rd” somethingabout the ca se. When questioned fur ther, she stated that she wor ked as a sec reta

ry for the T emple Police Depa rtment. She indicated that she had hear d about the murder but worked in a

differ ent depa

rtment and, ther efor e, “didn’ t hear any of t he specifics on the c ase.” She further indicated that she thought she could be fa ir , th a t “ w it h my jo b , If e e l l ik e Ic o u ld

b e e v e nmo r e [f

a ir ] b e c a u s e Id o kn ow y ou have to listen to a ll of the evidenc e and y ou have to ha ve all of the fac ts to hav e a n o p i n i o n .” J uror No. 20 w as selec ted t o b e on the jury without objection. I n the eve ning a fter voir dire a nd be fo re tr ia l on

the me ri ts co mme nc e d the ne xt da y , J oe Ad c oc k, wh o wa s an em plo y e e of the Te mpl e Police Depa

rtment and a ssisti ng in the investigation of the murder, informed the prosec utor that he had measure d the foot of Juror No. 20 to compare the measur ement to a photo of a footprint he had taken at the crime sc ene. A ccor ding to the pr osecutor:3

He [Adcoc k] went down and g ot he r and said, “He y , I need to use y our foot. Can I measure it for a murde r case? ” She said, “Oka y .” He measure d it and sent her on he r wa y , a nd that w a s th e e xten t of

his inv olv e me nt.
I n light of this infor

mation, de fense counsel objected to having Juror No. 20 sit on the pane l on the basis that “she’ s part of the investigation and would have some bias.”

Article 35 of the Te x as Code of Criminal Proce dure g overns jury selec tion. A juror can be challeng ed fo r ca u s e i f he or she is a witness in the ca se. Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 3 5
. 1 6 (a )( 6) (West 2006). Ac cordingto the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the test for de te rm ini ngwh e the r a

pe rs on is a wi tne ss i n a case is no t wheth e r t he pe rs on is a c tua lly

c a lle d to the wi tne ss st and bu t w he the r t he pe rs on “ sa w t he c omm iss ion

of the of fe ns e or wa s so c los e ly
c onne c te d to the e ve nts of the of fe ns e or su bs e qu e nt i nv e sti g a tio n a s to be a ‘w itn e ss’ to t

he c ri me and its incidents” or if he or she “ has pers o n al k n o wl ed ge of facts of the case .” W y le v . S tate , 777 S.W .2d 709, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).

There is nothing in the re cord de monstrating t h at J u ro r No. 20 ha d persona l knowledg e of the fac ts of the ca se. As she state d in voir dire, she knewthat a murde r had ha ppened
on Marc h 1 6, bu t kn e w n on e of the de ta ils . A n inve sti g a tor ’s m e a suri nghe r f oo t f or so me undisclosed purpose, w ithout more, reve aled nothing abou t the details of the c ase or

its investigation. There is no evidenc e in this rec ord t hat J uror No. 20 lear ned any thing a bout this case base d on the
c on ta c t w iththe inv e sti g a tor. With ou t pe rs on a l kn ow le dg e of the c a se , Jur or

No . 2 0 w a s n ot a potential witness in the case . Acc ording ly , we ove rrule Wilson’s first point of err or.

I n h is s e c on d a

nd thi rd po int s o f e rr or , Wil so n a rgue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in
overr uling his objec tion to the admission of certain testimony . Wil son firs t co m plains about theOther witnesses also testified to obse rving the argument betwee n Wil son and Ta plin. 1 Acc ording to the testimony of those witnesses, Wilson made threatening statements to Taplin.

4 testimony of L aquisha W audby , who t estified that she had g one to visit Taplin at hi s house t he day befor e the murde r and he ard “ [a] lot of loud arg uing a mongst men.” She testified that she re cog nized Taplin’s voice and that a thr eat wa s made by another male—“I ’m g oing to kill y ou”—but that she did no t r e c og nize the vo ic e of the pe rs on

makin g the thr e a t. Acc ording to Wi lson: 1 [W audby ’s testimony ] was not releva nt beca use she [W audby ] was unable to identify the Appellant a s being involved in that incident. . . . T h e testi mony of L aquisha Waudby was not rele vant t o the previous relationship exi sting be tween the acc used and the de cea sed nor the c ondition of the m i n d of the a ccuse d at the time of the offe nse. At trial, when Waudby testified as to what she had he ard, de fense counsel made the following interjec tion:
Yo ur Ho no r, if it p le a se - Yo ur Ho no r, if it ple a se the Court , we ne e d to hav e he r, if we c an, identify

who it was that alleg edly made these utteranc es, plea se.
The trial c ourt responde d: “I ’ll overr ule.” Wil son also co m p l ains about the admission of Waudby ’s testimony reg ardingher fee lings whe n she lea

rned that Taplin had bee n killed: Q. When y ou hear d that, what did y ou think? A. Iwas in shock. I

couldn’t believe it. But it kind of came ove r me that -5

D e f e n s e c o u n s e l : Yo ur

Ho no r, we fe e l th is i s o bje c t i o n a b l e fo r h e r to char acte ri ze any

fee lings that she ha d conce rning the sh oo tin g , p le a se , a

nd we ob je c t. Court: All rig ht. I ’ll overr ule, let her

answe r the que stion.
Wils on argue s tha t def

e ns e c ouns e l’ s obje c tio n to this te sti mony sh ou ld h a ve be e n s us ta ine d b e c a us e t h e t e s t i m o n y w a s i n f

l a m m a t o r y. I n o rd e r t o p re se rv e an is su e fo r a pp e llate re vie w, a

tim e ly and sp e c if

ic ob je c tio n is
re qu ir e d. Te x. R. A

pp . P. 33 .1 (a )( 1) (A ); Te x. R. E vid . 1 03 (a )( 1) ; Gi lle nwa te rs v . S tate , 205 S.W .3d 534, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Objections must be specif ic, first, to inf

orm the trial judg e of the
rea son for the obje ction and af ford him an oppor

tunity to rule on it and, second, to aff ord opposing counsel the oppor

tunity to r espond to the complaint by removingthe objection or supplying othe r testimony
. Sa lda no v . S

tate , 7 0 S
. W
. 3 d

8 7 3 , 8 8 7 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g Zill e nd e r v . S tate , 557 S.W .2d 515, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)). A par ty ’s objection is ade qu at ely specific if the objection i nforms t he trial judge what the pa rty wants and why

he is entitled to it. Lan k

sto n v . S tate , 827 S.W .2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). In Lankston , th e Te xas C ourt of Cr imi na l App e a ls explained: As reg ards spe cificity , all a party has to do to a void the forf

eiture of a complaint on a pp e a l is to l e t th e tr ia l judg e kn owwh a t he wa nts , w hy he thi nk s h ims e lf

e nti tle d to it, and to do so cl ea rl y

enoug h for the judg e to under stand him at a time when the tr ia l c ourt is i n a pr op e r p os iti on

to do som e thi nga

bo ut i t. O f c ou

rs e , w he n it

se e ms from conte x t that a par

ty failed eff

ectively to c ommunicate his desire, then r eviewing courts should not hesitate to hold that appellate complaints arising from the e vent hav e b e e n l o s t
. B u t o t h e r w i s e , t h e y s h o u l d r e a c h t h e m e r i t s o f t h o s e c omp la int s without requiring that the p ar t ies rea d some specia l script to make their w ishes known.6

Id. In b o t h i n s t an c e s r e l e v an th e r e , d e f e n s e c o u n s e l f

a i l e d t o s t a t e an y

g r o u n d s f o r h i s o b j e c t i o n . In the first instance, in f

act, althoug h the district c ourt appa rently interpre ted counse l’s statement as a n objection by

overr uling it, it is not clear that, in telling th e co u rt “we need to have her , if we c an, ide nti fy wh o it wa s tha t alle g e dly ma de the se utt e ra nc e s, ple a se ,” that c ouns e l w a s o bje c tin g a t a ll, much less t hat counsel was objec ting a s to releva nce. I n the sec ond instance, de fense counsel made it clear that he wa s objecting to the wit ness’s st atement, but did not make clear why the statement was objec tionable under

the rules of

evidenc e, an d t h e rec ord g ives no indication that either the district court or opposingcounsel unde rstood that the g rounds for the objection was that counsel believed the testimony

to be inflammatory
. Cf., e.g. , Gi lle nwa te rs , 205 S.W .3d at 538 (motion for new tria l was suff

i cient to conve y

movant’s “unc onstitut ionally vague as a

pplied” cha lleng e eve n though the word “ vague” a ppear ed nowhe re in the motion bec ause mova nt’s consistent complaint throug hout trial was that statute wa s too va g ue to be enfor cea ble; motion was insufficient to conve y “unconstitutionally overbr oad as applied” challeng e where the word “ove rbroa d” appe are d nowher e in t he mot ion , an d mova

nt ha d not ch a lle ng e d the statut e on tho se g ro un ds duri ngtr ia l) ; Lankston , 8 2 7 S. W. 2 d

a t 90 9 , 9 1 0

- 1 1 ( h e ar s ay o b je c ti o n s u f

f ic ie n tl y s p e c if

ic w h e r e “ it is c le ar

f r o m c o n te xt that both judge and prose cutor unde rstood” the ba sis for the objec tion).

I n th e a bs e nc e of su ff ic ie ntl y sp e c if ic ob je c tio ns , the pr os e c uto r ha d n o o pp or tun ity to res p o n d b y removing the objec tionable testimony or supplying othe r testimony
. See Saldano , 7 0 S
. W
. 3 d

at 8 8 7 (c i t i n g Zi lle nder , 557 S.W .2d at 517). Wilson failed to prese rve a ny potential
err or with re s p ec t t o t h e testimony at issue. Acc ording ly , we ove rrule Wilson’s second a nd third points of error
.7 Wil son’s points of err or ar e over ruled, a nd the judg ment of convic tion is affirmed.

__________________________________________ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Waldrop and H enson Affir med Filed: Apr il 17, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh