RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2719-15T2

K.W.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.W.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Submitted June 1, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Alvarez and Manahan.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean 

County, Docket No. FV-15-0487-16.

J.W., appellant pro se.

Jef Henninger, attorney for respondent.

PER CURIAM

Defendant J.W. is self-represented in this proceeding, as he 

was during trial. He appeals a November 16, 2015 decision denying 

reconsideration of a September 24, 2015 final restraining order 

(FRO), issued pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act 

(Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. After consideration of the 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

July 5, 2017
2 A-2719-15T2

record, we affirm based on the Family Part judge's cogent and 

detailed decision rendered orally from the bench.

J.W.'s brief focuses on his claim that the suspension of 

visitation with his children, contingent upon a psychiatric 

evaluation, is a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. He 

also challenges the judge's decision to amend the complaint the 

day before the trial began. K.W., J.W.'s wife, had filed the 

complaint in a police station during evening hours, and the court 

granted her counsel's request to correct dates and add stalking, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10, as a predicate act to the original harassment 

charge, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. The complaint was further amended to 

indicate that the parties had a prior history of domestic violence. 

J.W. was granted an adjournment as a result of this amendment. 

Finally, J.W. generally disputes the trial judge's factual 

findings. 

It is clear that J.W. mistakenly believes he is appealing the 

FRO, although it is not listed on his notice of appeal. See R.

2:5-1(f)(3)(A). No timely appeal of the FRO was filed. We will 

therefore limit our discussion to the reconsideration decision, 

the only order listed on the notice of appeal. See Campagna v. 

American Cyanamid, 337 N.J. Super. 530, 550 (App. Div.), certif. 

denied, 168 N.J. 294 (2001).
3 A-2719-15T2

During oral argument on the motion for reconsideration, J.W. 

essentially repeated that K.W. had not "proven" the allegations 

of domestic violence. His statements made clear that he did not 

understand that an FRO could result from mere stalking and 

harassing conduct, and did not require actual physical violence. 

The judge attempted to explain this point, as he had during the 

original FRO hearing. 

The judge made preliminary findings after the November 10 

proceedings:

With respect to the motion for 

reconsideration of the final restraining 

order, that motion is denied. And in summary, 

I specifically remember this trial. I 

remember how calculating the defendant was 

with respect to stalking the plaintiff and the 

various means of observing her, and the 

different technologies that were utilized. As 

counsel indicated, I placed a detailed 

decision on the record. The defendant brings 

up issues that either were or could have been 

raised in the hearing, and they're . . . 

without merit as far as I'm concerned. I'll 

deal with them in more detail in the decision 

I place on the record.

Regarding the defendant's application 

concerning custody and parenting time, that's 

also denied. Although, I'll note that it 

appears that he's moving in the right 

direction, but I will caution him as to --

he's been placed on notice that any activities 

-- he denies being at or near the plaintiff's 

place of employment. That could be subject 

of a further application in the FV docket by 

the plaintiff which will increase his counsel 

fees, and it may be subject to prosecution in 
4 A-2719-15T2

the FO [sic] docket. Plaintiff is well 

represented by counsel, and she will follow 

whatever course of action she sees fit.

On November 16, the judge placed additional findings on the 

record:

So with respect to the defendant's 

application for reconsideration of the final 

restraining order, the defendant had basically 

wanted to re-litigate. He said he never beat 

the plaintiff during the marriage. He 

indicated that there were filings in the 

divorce case that we still did things as a 

family after some of the dates alleged in the 

domestic violence complaint. That he did not 

suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. 

He said, we had separate bedrooms. 

Interestingly enough, he said, I later became 

hostile in the emails. So, he admits that at 

a certain point, he was hostile in the emails.

And the plaintiff had indicated through 

counsel the Court's detailed decision on the 

record, and I specifically remember this 

trial, and I had fined the defendant the 

maximum fine. I found the defendant's conduct 

extremely controlling, extremely calculating. 

He was stalking the plaintiff. He had placed 

listening devices in her car and in her house, 

and for the reasons that I set forth on the 

record on September 24th as well as November 

10th, his application was and is denied.

With respect to the other application for 

custody and parenting time, he had indicated 

on November 10th, that he wanted to see his 

children and was asking the Court for 

consideration. Plaintiff, through counsel, 

indicates that the final restraining order on 

September 24th indicated a road map for the 

defendant that he has perhaps begun to follow 

as far as the evaluation and counseling, but 

has not completed; and further, there was a 
5 A-2719-15T2

reference made to the fact that he was seen

at or near the employment of the plaintiff, 

despite the fact that he was prohibited from 

doing so in the final restraining order.

The defendant denied that and I indicated 

that that wasn't before the Court, but I had 

indicated to the plaintiff that that, indeed, 

would be concerning to the Court, and if that 

conduct, in fact, occurred or continued to 

occur, she should report it to the appropriate 

authorities. And I placed the defendant on 

notice that that type of conduct would not be 

tolerated. So, due to the fact that the 

defendant has not completed the counseling 

that was set forth, that application was 

denied.

Motions for reconsideration rest within the sound discretion 

of the trial court. Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging 

Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015). They are 

granted only when a judge's decision is based on plainly incorrect 

reasoning, when he or she failed to consider evidence, or when 

there is a good reason for new information to be taken into 

account. Ibid.; Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. 

Div. 1996). At argument, J.W. merely repeated many of the same 

statements he made initially, doing nothing more than disagreeing 

with the judge's conclusions. 

The judge had found K.W.'s testimony at the FRO hearing, and 

the documents she moved into evidence, established by a 

preponderance of the evidence the predicate offenses of stalking 

or harassment. See N.T.B. v. D.B.B., 442 N.J. Super. 205, 216 
6 A-2719-15T2

(App. Div. 2015) (holding that a plaintiff must establish the 

predicate acts in an FRO by a preponderance of the evidence). J.W. 

did not refute the proofs at the trial, and offered nothing new 

during the reconsideration argument. 

As J.W. explained during argument on reconsideration, he saw 

no need to testify in his own behalf because when K.W. rested her 

case, he concluded she had not proven anything. Although J.W. 

seemed to be saying that he had been psychiatrically evaluated as 

required by the FRO, the first step towards resuming parenting 

time with his children, he did not produce an evaluation.

The judge's reasoning in denying reconsideration was sound, 

based on his earlier finding that K.W. was credible and that the 

necessary predicate acts of stalking and harassment occurred. They

included implanting listening devices in the marital home, and 

elsewhere, and recording a telephone conversation between K.W. and 

her mother. We review a Family Part judge's findings of fact 

deferentially, not just because they alone have the opportunity 

to see or hear witnesses and observe their demeanor, but because 

of their specialized training and expertise. Cesare v. Cesare, 

154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). Furthermore, in the judge's opinion, 

the FRO was necessary for K.W.'s protection, thus meeting both

prongs of Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-28 (App. Div. 

2006).
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There was simply no basis in law or fact for the judge to set 

aside his decision. The reconsideration standard was not met. 

Thus the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying J.W.'s 

motion. See Pitney Bowes, supra, 440 N.J. Super. at 383. J.W.'s 

points of error are so lacking in merit as to not warrant further 

discussion in a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.