[Cite as State v. Williams, 2016-Ohio-7782.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 104202 

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs.

ANTOINE D. WILLIAMS

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-15-597808-C 

BEFORE: Boyle, J., Kilbane, P.J., and Celebrezze, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 17, 2016 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

James R. Willis 

1144 Rockefeller Building 

614 West Superior Avenue 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: John Farley Hirschauer 

 Gregory J. Ochocki 

Assistant County Prosecutors 

Justice Center 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
MARY J. BOYLE, J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Antoine Williams, appeals his convictions. He raises 

two assignments of error for our review: 

1. The court erred when it denied the pretrial motion to suppress, and in 

doing so failed to state its essential findings on the record as required by 

[Crim.R. 12(F)]. 

2. The court erred and due process was denied when the court refused to 

allow the accused to plead no contest to the charges in this indictment. 

{¶2} After review, we find merit to Williams’s second assignment of error, 

vacate Williams’s guilty plea, and remand for the trial court to hold a new plea hearing 

with instructions for the trial court to consider the facts and circumstances of Williams’s 

case before deciding whether to accept Williams’s no contest plea. 

I. Procedural History and Factual Background

{¶3} Williams was indicted on four counts, including one count of illegal 

conveyance of drugs into a detention facility in violation of R.C. 2921.36(A)(2), a 

third-degree felony; drug trafficking in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), a third-degree 

felony, with schoolyard and forfeiture specifications; drug possession in violation of R.C. 

2925.11(A), a fourth-degree felony, with forfeiture specifications; and possessing 

criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A), a fifth-degree felony, with forfeiture 

specifications. 
{¶4} Williams moved to suppress evidence against him, asserting that his Fourth 

Amendment rights against an unreasonable search and seizure were violated. After a 

hearing, the trial court denied his motion. 

{¶5} Williams subsequently entered a guilty plea to the indictment after the trial 

court judge would not accept his plea of no contest. The court, however, accepted 

Williams’s guilty plea “with a full understanding” that the plea was conditional upon 

Williams reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. 

{¶6} The trial court sentenced Williams to nine months for each of the four 

counts and ordered them to be served concurrent to each other for a total of nine months 

in prison. It is from this judgment that Williams now appeals. 

II. Plea

{¶7} In his second assignment of error, Williams argues that the trial court erred 

when it refused to allow him to plead no contest. Because the trial court did not permit 

Williams to plead no contest as a matter of policy, and not based on the facts and 

circumstances of Williams’s case, we agree. 

{¶8} Pursuant to Crim.R. 11(B)(2), a 

plea of no contest is not an admission of defendant’s guilt, but is an 

admission of the truth of the facts alleged in the indictment, information, or 

complaint and such plea or admission shall not be used against the 

defendant in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding. 

Unlike a guilty plea, a plea of no contest does not prevent the defendant from appealing 

from the trial court’s ruling on a pretrial motion. Crim.R. 12(H). The trial court has 

discretion to accept or reject a no contest plea. Crim.R. 11(A). Absent an abuse of that 
discretion, the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. See State v. Mehozonek, 8 

Ohio App.3d 271, 273, 456 N.E.2d 1353 (8th Dist.1983). 

{¶9} This court has held, however, that a trial court abuses its discretion when it 

rejects a plea agreement by relying on a blanket policy rather than considering the facts 

and circumstances of the particular case. State v. Fitzgerald, 188 Ohio App.3d 701, 

2010-Ohio-3721, 936 N.E.2d 585, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Switzer, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 93533, 2010-Ohio-2473. Other courts have held the same. See State v. 

Graves, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 98AP-272, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5608 (Nov. 19, 1998) 

(finding an abuse of discretion after trial court refused the defendant’s plea based upon its 

blanket policy of not accepting no contest pleas); State v. Hunt, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 1536, 

1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 8937 (Oct. 22, 1985) (finding abuse of discretion when the trial 

court refused to accept a plea agreement because it had a policy of rejecting agreements 

after jury cards were mailed to prospective jurors in a case); State v. Beasley, 1st Dist. 

Hamilton No. C-150431, 2016-Ohio-1603 (“there is little doubt that a trial court’s blanket 

policy to refuse to accept no-contest pleas is error”). 

{¶10} At the beginning of the plea hearing in this case, the parties advised the 

court that they had reached a plea agreement. The state and defense counsel informed 

the court that Williams wished to plead no contest to the indictment. The trial court 

responded, “We don’t do no contests up here. * * * He would have to plead guilty.” 

Defense counsel responded that Williams would plead guilty then, but with the condition 
that he could preserve his right to appeal the motion to suppress. The court responded, 

“absolutely.” 

{¶11} In State v. Carter, 124 Ohio App.3d 423, 428, 706 N.E.2d 409 (2d 

Dist.1997), the court explained: 

We find that the trial court’s policy of not accepting no-contest pleas 

constituted an abuse of discretion in that the trial court arbitrarily refused to 

consider the facts and circumstances presented, but instead relied on a fixed 

policy established at its whim. Although the trial court has the discretion 

to refuse to accept a no-contest plea, it must exercise its discretion based on 

the facts and circumstances before it, not on a blanket policy that affects all 

defendants regardless of their situation. In short, the trial court must 

exercise its discretion in each case. Cf. Billington v. Cotner (1972), 32 

Ohio App.2d 277, 280, 61 Ohio Op.2d 344, 290 N.E.2d 862 (“It is within 

the appellate ambit to determine that a trial judge must exercise his 

discretion though refraining from telling him how to do it.”), reversed on 

other grounds (1974), 37 Ohio St.2d 17, 20, 66 Ohio Op.2d 9, 305 N.E.2d 

805. 

{¶12} Thus, we agree with Williams that the trial court abused its discretion when 

it arbitrarily rejected his no contest plea based on its blanket policy of not accepting pleas 

of no contest. Williams’s second assignment of error is sustained. 

{¶13} Based on our disposition of Williams’s second assignment of error, we find 

Williams’s first assignment of error to be premature. 

{¶14} Judgment reversed and remanded. We vacate Williams’s guilty plea and 

remand for the trial court to hold a new plea hearing with instructions for the trial court to 

consider the facts and circumstances of Williams’s case. 

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee the costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

 

MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR