16-358 

Singh v. Lynch 

BIA 

Christensen, IJ 

A201 291 500 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

16th 4 day of November, two thousand sixteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 GUIDO CALABRESI,

8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

9 GERARD E. LYNCH,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 BALWINDER SINGH, 

14 Petitioner, 

15 

16 v. 16-358 

17 NAC 

18 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

20 Respondent. 

21 _____________________________________ 

22 

23 FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Jackson Heights, 

24 N.Y. 

25 

26 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

27 Assistant Attorney General; Paul 

28 Fiorino, Senior Litigation Counsel; 

29 Judith R. O’Sullivan, Trial 

30 Attorney, Office of Immigration 

31 Litigation, United States 

32 Department of Justice, Washington, 

33 D.C. 
2 

1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

4 DENIED. 

5 Petitioner Balwinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, 

6 seeks review of a January 6, 2016, decision of the BIA, affirming 

7 a May 20, 2014, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying 

8 Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and 

9 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re 

10 Balwinder Singh, No. A201 291 500 (B.I.A. Jan. 6, 2016), aff’g

11 No. A201 291 500 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 20, 2014). We assume 

12 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 

13 procedural history of this case. 

14 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both 

15 the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 

16 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of 

17 review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); 

18 Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). 

19 For asylum applications like Singh’s, governed by the REAL 

20 ID Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the 

21 circumstances,” base a credibility finding on an applicant’s 

22 “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the plausibility of his 

23 account, and inconsistencies in his statements and evidence, 
3 

1 “without regard to whether” those inconsistencies go “to the 

2 heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. 

3 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. “We 

4 defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from 

5 the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no 

6 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility 

7 ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. As discussed below, 

8 the adverse credibility determination rests on substantial 

9 evidence. 

10 The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies in Singh’s 

11 testimony and other record evidence concerning his Shiromani 

12 Akali Dal Party (“SAD”) membership—the heart of his claim of 

13 persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see Xian Tuan Ye 

14 v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A] 

15 material inconsistency in an aspect of [an applicant’s] story 

16 that served as an example of the very persecution from which 

17 he sought asylum . . . afforded substantial evidence to 

18 support the adverse credibility finding.”). 

19 As the IJ found, Singh’s “vacillating testimony” 

20 concerning how he came to possess a letter from SAD’s president 

21 undermined his credibility. Singh submitted the letter to 

22 confirm a matter central to his claim—his SAD membership. 

23 Singh testified that he obtained the letter at the SAD office 
4 

1 on March 31, 2009, the same day he officially joined the party, 

2 and asked for the letter because “his life was in danger.” The 

3 IJ reasonably concluded that Singh’s testimony was implausible 

4 and inconsistent: it strains credulity that Singh would have 

5 feared harm based on his political opinion before he had joined 

6 the party, particularly given his testimony that he had not been 

7 harmed in any way before December 2009. See Wensheng Yan v. 

8 Mukasey, 509 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that “IJ is 

9 entitled to consider whether the applicant’s story is 

10 inherently implausible”). Moreover, the letter was dated 

11 September 2012, and lists Singh’s New York address, making it 

12 impossible for Singh to have personally obtained it in India 

13 in 2009, as he testified. Finally, the letter does not describe 

14 any of the three beatings Singh claims he had suffered; rather, 

15 it is a generalized form letter that mentions Singh only in the 

16 first and last paragraphs. The agency reasonably found these 

17 discrepancies significant because the letter was the only 

18 evidence of Singh’s SAD membership, and the omission of any 

19 incidents of persecution undermined his credibility. See Xiu 

20 Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 n.3 (“An inconsistency and an omission 

21 are . . . functionally equivalent.”). 

22 Singh argues that the agency erred in finding the letter 

23 implausible, explaining that his family was threatened by 
5 

1 members of the opposition party before 2009. The agency was 

2 not required to accept this explanation because it failed to 

3 account for the fact that the letter was generalized and omitted 

4 any incidents of persecution. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 

5 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer 

6 a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to 

7 secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable 

8 fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” 

9 (quoting Zhou Yun Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 77, 76 (2d Cir. 2004))). 

10 The IJ’s adverse credibility determination was bolstered 

11 by additional inconsistent and evasive testimony related to 

12 Singh’s family members in the United States. “Evasiveness is, 

13 of course, one of the many outward signs a fact-finder may 

14 consider in evaluating demeanor and in making an assessment of 

15 credibility.” Tu Lin v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 395, 400 (2d Cir. 

16 2006). Singh first testified that he had no family members in 

17 the United States. When pressed, Singh admitted that his 

18 sister used to live in the United States and that he still has 

19 one aunt residing here. Id. When confronted with his 

20 application, which listed a brother residing in the United 

21 States, Singh confirmed the accuracy of the information. The 

22 IJ was not required to credit Singh’s explanations of confusion 

23 and forgetfulness given that he included his brother’s 
6 

1 residence in his application and was asked multiple times about 

2 his family in the United States. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80. 

3 Having questioned Singh’s credibility, the agency did not 

4 err in concluding that Singh’s corroborating evidence was 

5 insufficient to rehabilitate his testimony. See Biao Yang v. 

6 Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s 

7 failure to corroborate his . . . testimony may bear on 

8 credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general 

9 makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has 

10 already been called into question.”). The agency reasonably 

11 accorded diminished weight to letters from another brother and 

12 Singh’s father-in-law in India, as well as the letter from a 

13 nursing home in India stating that Singh was treated there in 

14 January 2011. The letters were prepared for the purpose of 

15 litigation, the family letters were from interested parties not 

16 subject to cross examination, and the nursing home letter was 

17 written in 2012 and thus was not contemporaneous with the 

18 treatment Singh allegedly received. See Matter of H-L-H- & 

19 Z-Y- Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (B.I.A. 2010) (agency can give 

20 little weight to document drafted by interested witness not 

21 subject to cross examination), rev’d on other grounds by Hui 

22 Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2012). “We defer 

23 to the agency’s determination of the weight afforded to an 
7 

1 alien’s documentary evidence.” Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 

2 334 (2d Cir. 2013). Last, the IJ reasonably found 

3 “particularly striking” the absence of testimony or written 

4 statement from Singh’s brother in the United States in light 

5 of Singh’s testimony that his brother knew what happened to him 

6 in India. See Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273. 

7 Given the multiple inconsistencies, Singh’s evasiveness, 

8 and Singh’s failure to provide reliable corroboration, it 

9 cannot be said “that no reasonable fact-finder could make such 

10 an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. 

11 That finding is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, 

12 and CAT relief because Singha’s claims for all three forms of 

13 relief are based on the same factual predicate. Paul v. 

14 Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 

15 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

16 DENIED. 

17 FOR THE COURT: 

18 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk