,_ 

REF-ID:A71142 

!SP BBEJBB! UIRBA 

OUTLID OP COUBSB -.... 

(Pour perioda ot 50 minutea each) -

Pirat Period - • - 50 JUnutes 

EatS..ted 

Time Required 

(Jlinutea) 

~1. ~MAGIC" .,nfhe Ettect• ~'(A recital of about 10 or 12 dramatic incidenta and 

caaea wherein the results obtained b7 aignal intelligence or commun1cat1ona aecU1'it7 pla7ed the principal ~ole). 15 

II. "The Cause" - or hov it's done. 

1. Signal intelligence - the central clue. Reaaona 

for v1thhold1ng publicit7. 

2. Ver7 brief hiatorJ ot Cl'JPtograp117 and CrJPt&nal7aia. 

but going back onl7 to World War I. 

'· Hov the responsibilities and activities vere scattered 

through several agencies after World War I. 

4. Beceaa1t7 tor integration -

.. ~b:) a. 

f:?"1 b. 

In respect to CrJPtall&l7tic activities. 

In respect to crJPtographic activities. 

c. In reapect to both activities. because ot interaction on each other. 

d. Brier statement or hov the neceaaarr integration 

vaa brought about b7 6 Sept. 1945 directive. 

III. Signal Intelligence Operations - General 

- I 

1. I~tro~:l ~ ~ °'trtl'--" 

.b J'. Signal intelligence 1• onl7 one ot the several 

ldnda ot intelligence. , c-'f'J. Comparison ot reli&b111t7, t1mel1neaa, an4 coat 

ot aignal intelligence v1th the aame tactora in 

the C&ae ot other kinda ot intelligence. , J...jJ• Beo61ait7 tor oecaeicm&l cheo~ing V1th 1ntormation 

trom other aoUl'oeJ. • 

' J.., ~ ~4-~h.O\'J IY\) _,.,..~ .. ~~ 

2. ~pera~iona -involved 1n obtaining aignal 1nt•ll1gence. ~~ I 

- ... 

I ~ 

, " 

... Declassified and approved for release by NSA2n 05-2§52_014 pursuantto E.O. 13§l_a ___ _ 
'· 

REF ID:A71142 'fOP BBeftft ~ 

Bsti•ted 

Time Required 

1111.nutea) 

a. Interception b. Traffic anal7aia 

c. Crf'Pt&n&l711a 

4. Tranal&tion 

e. Proceaaing on large scale ("Aaaembl7-line" DecrJPt1on and tranalation). 

t. Publication 

g. Evaluation and d1aaem1nat1on-the reapona1b111t7 and tunct1on ot Intelligence. 

"Fusion• or "Regenerative" ettects ot the respective operation• - hov the7 attect one another. ~)... ~--:......- ft~o...u..~ h. f ,.,.~i .. 1.- P--~-

\. Total Minutes 

20 

50 

'""-'---# _ .... ____ _....__ -- .... -----=--- ----- .. - "------- - -- - - ----
I 

IV. 

-r- --- - \. -.61~ ......... 

REF ·l:D:A71142 

IQP .ROllJ§' UHM 

Second Period • • - 50 Ktnutee 

Batimated 

!1• Rt·· ..... tu1r•4 IU.nutea) - . , ~- ' ~Intercept Operations. < 

\ 1. OeneMl or 1ntroductoJT--(Operat1ng-da~-fl'eq, calla, 

1cheduleai tne• ot nets and worldq•J radio Pl'ocedur••J operator• chatter J D/P, RPP~ !'iD&J other 

collateral 1ntormat1on). ' 

Btre.tegio and taotioal intercept. (Ditterenoea and 

•1m11.&r1t1ea. Ditficultiea in t1Xing line of demarcation between tunctiona and activ1t1ee at fixed and 

mobile ~tat1ona). ~ 

J>ltimal'J baaee ot and factor• 1n interception ett1-

c1enc7. 

4. Bov the ASA Officer and the Intelligence Otticer can 

be ot a1e1atance to each other in thia pbaae. 10 

v. Tratt1c Anal7a1a 

1. Introductor7-an analog to -.ke clear vhat it 1• about. 

2. Techniques. 

'· Bow trattic anal7sie and crn>tanal7ai1 aaaiat and 

attect each other. 

4. The importance ot trattic &JJ&l7s1a Yb.en Cl'JPt&Dal711a 

ia unaucceaatul. 

5. The intelligence derivable trom trattio a.na17a1a--1ts 

11m1tat1ona, dangers, and poaa1b1l1t1••· 10 

VI. C1'7Pt&nal7aia 

1. Introd.uctort remarks - Progress made 1n l&at 25 7eara. 

2. High level \or strategic) va medium and low-level (or tactical) Cl'J'Pt&tlalJt1c operations. '·. Size and nature ot organi&&tiona required tor ett1oienc7. 

Ji. Requirements in regard. to apace, comuntcationa taoil1-

t1ea. apec1&1 maohinel'J', and apec1al1at P.ra0JU1el. 

5. Priorities &Ad intercept control. (Bov pr1or1t1ea are 

detel'llined. bJ the rel&t1onab1pa among 1ntel11gence, 'J!/A, C/~) • ~ . -- 6. Bpeo1&1 role p1&7ed bJ rapid oommunica tiona in aucceaatul aignal intelligence operations. 7. Bov t.he .ASA Ott1oer and the Intelligence Ott1cer can be 

ot mutual aaa1atance 1n the pro4uot1on an4 moat effect! ve uae of a1gnal 1n\el11genoe. _.3..,0.._.._ 

Total Jlinutea 50 

i - ,0 

,, 

·- .~ t 
I JI 

VI%. 

REF ID:A71142 - ~--

...... "'to .... 

Third Period - • • 50 111nutea .... 

• 

r :=.::r 

- ,ltf .._ Q~ca.t1ona Securit7-Tbe oth81' of the 81ame1e 'lv1D1. 

'(" .,. ~ "v,._, 

Ii ... >: .... i J 

1. - ~~~oduoto171 scope. d.et1n1t1ona and oomponenta ot . c~cation• atovit7. 

2. ?mPortan9e ot oolllllltln1cat1on1 aecur1t7 in modern 

e1gnal 001111RU11oat1on•J and a tev examples of 1naecur1tJ and their conaeq11ence1. ~ • 

'· QJmBUD.ic&t1ona aeouritJ 1• a reappona1b111t7 ot 

..oo-.ii,d. t 

-· Reapons1b111t1ea ot Intelligence Otticer. 

5. Reepona1b111t1ea of ASA Officer. 

6. Security mea1ure11 ph7111c&l aecUl'it71 cryptographic 1ecurit7-author1aed codes and cipher• vhen properl7 ueed give adequate aecur1t11 tranamiaaion aecur1t7. 

7. Ditterent levels ot aecurit71 higb-grad•J medium.-

grade; lov-grade. 8. Kodern OrJPto-mecbaniamsJ their poaa1b111t1ea and 11-

JlitationaJ ettecta ot m1auae1 neceaa1t7 tor 1ndoctr1-

nat1on and tra1n1ng. Problems ot plain l.&D.guage tranam1ea1ona and approved circuits. 

Problems ot coordination 1n Joint and Combined communications. 

latimater 

Tille Re-

!Uired 

IU.lmte_a) 

Evaluation of our aeoui-1t7 as aeen through TIC0.11 opera- tiona. 

Tactical tratt1c ot small Wlita-vhere moat of preaent- da7 1naecurit7 ar1aea. 

Bov the Intelligence orr1cer can assist. 40 

VIII. Pr1end1J traffic an&l7a1a, cover, and deception. 

1. Bttect ot our knowledge ot T/A tecbniqttea on our ovn 

1ecur1t7. 

2. Btr&teg1cal and tactical 'l/A,, 

'.· CoYer and 4ecept1oa. ~ Ooor41.J2at1on required. 5. BX&Dl)>lea ot acoomp11abmenta. ' 

10 

Total IU.nutea 50 

{ - • 

-

• ~ ~~ OJ) lbl!l!J~ ll~ f ~ L?TRA> ; 

•' t 

'"I ._-... - "' 

t,;;.. ','{!., -. •' 
REF ID:A71142 

Fourth Period - - - 50 Minutes 

IX. The A'l!l!f3' Security Agency 

x. 

1. Functions and responsibilities. 

2. How 1 t operates 1n Z/I. 

3. How it operates in theaters. 

4. How it coordinates and integrates. 5. Liaison activities. 

Summary, conclusions, and informal discussion 

l. Emphasis on limitations, pitfalls., and dangers, but 

assurance or value and validity or successful signal intelligence operations. 2. 1

The role pla.yed by good evaluation and d1asem1nat1on. 

}. Necessity for protection or sources or signal intelligence; effects of poor commun1oat1ons security on 

signal intelligence success. 

4. Sectll'ity regulations for protection or ultra. 

5. Security regulations tor protection of our own 

communications. 

Total Minutes 

Estimated 

Time Re· 

~uired JUnutea) 

20 

30 

50