UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

) LA UR A E LK IN S and J OHN RO BBIN S, ) ) P laintif fs, )

) v. ) ) Civil Action No. 04-480 (RM C) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., ) ) Defendan ts. ) )
M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION Def endants, includingDenzil Noble, the Administrator of the D .C. Depar tment of Consumer and Regulatory Affa irs (“D CRA”) B uilding and L and Regulation Administ ration (“B L RA”); J. Greg ory

L ove, for mer B L RA Administrator; David Maloney , Offic er w ith D.C.’s Hi sto ri c Pr e se rv atio n O ff ic e (“ HPO ” ); and

Ins pe c tor To ni Wi lli ams- Che rr

y , a n e mpl oye e of

HPO and contr act wor

ker f or DCRA, seek r econside ration of this Court’s April 27, 2009 Opinion and Orde r g rantingin part and de nying in pa rt their motion for summary judgme nt. SeeOp. & Orde r [Dkt. ## 83 & 84] (“April 27, 2009 Opinion”). The Court clarifie s that at trial Plaintiffs may purs ue on ly

a c la im f or dama g e s ari sin gfr om t

he se izur e of

do c ume nts in v iol atio n o f t he F ourt h Amendment and not a

claim for “ invasion of privac y .” F urther, be cause Plaintiffs have pre sented insufficient e vidence to show that David Maloney was pe rsonally

involved in the constitutional violation at issue here , Mr. Maloney will be dismiss ed as a

defe ndant in this case. In all other respe cts, the motion to reconsider will be denied.The fa cts are laid out in more detail in the Court’s prior opinion. See Elkins v. District 1 of C olu mb ia , 527 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D .C. 2007). -2- I. F AC TS 1 Plaintiffs in thi s action ar e L aura Elkins and J ohn Robbins, wife and husband. They obtained building pe rmits and approva ls from the DCRA and the H PO for construc tion at their historic home on Capitol Hill. After c onstruction beg an, city officia ls believed that Plaintiffs were building in violation of their per mits, and they

obtained a w arr ant to conduct a n administrative sea

rch of Plaintiffs’ home in order to find evidenc e of illeg al construc tion. Although the war

rant did not authorize it, officials seized var ious documents duringthe sea rch. The leg ality

of both the sea

rch a nd the seizure we re litig ated be fore the D.C. Off ice of Administrative Hea

ring s (“OA H”) , and the He aringOffic er f ound that while the sea

rch w as
va lid , th e se izur e of

do c ume nts wa s n ot c on sti tut ion a lly pe rm iss ibl e be c a

us e it w a s n ot e xpre ssl y
a uth or ize d b y

the se arc h w arr ant. Th is C ourt he ld t hat c ol l a t e r a l e s t oppe l pr e c l ude d t he

r e l i t i g a t i on of

t hi s i s s ue a nd t hus t ha t Pl a i nt i f f s ’ Four t h Am e ndment r i g ht s w e r e vi ol a t e d d ue t o t he

un reason able s ei z ure o f do cum ents. See Elkins , 527 F. Supp. 2d at 46-47. P laintiff s seek nominal, compensatory , and punitive damag es for this Fourth Amendment violation. Def endants moved f

or summary

judgme nt. On April 27, 2009, the Court (1)
rec og nized that Pl aintiffs ar e entitled to nominal damag es; (2) f ound an issue of f

act r eg arding whether Plaintiffs are e ntitled to compensatory damag es with reg ard to the unc onstitut ional seizure alone; a

nd (3) grante d summary

judgme nt in favor of

Def endants on Plaintiffs claim for damag es ca

used by actions other tha

n the seizure. The Court held: Pla int if fs are e nti tle d to no min a l da ma g e s f or the vio latio n o f t

he ir Four th Amendment rig ht to be fre e fr om unrea sonable seizure.The Court g rante d the motion for summary judgme nt in favor of

the District of 2 Col umb ia and it w a s d ism iss e d a s a

de fe nd ant i n th is c a se . T he “ Ind ivi du a l D e fe nd ants ” re fe re nc e d in

the Ap ri l 27 , 2 00 9 O pin ion are the re ma ini ngDe fe nd ants in t his c a se , M e ssr s. N o b l e , L o v e , an d

M a l o n e y an d

M s . W i l l i am s - C h e r

r y. -3- Be cause Plaintiffs present a n issue of fa ct re g ardingwhether they are entitled to compensatory damag es ca

used by the seizure alone , summary judgme nt will be denied on that issue. Summary jud g me nt w ill be g ra

nte d in fa vo r o f D e fe nd ants on

Pla int if fs ’ claim for da

mag es ca used by actions other tha

n the seizure alone , e.g ., dama g e s c a

us e d b y the re vo c atio n p ro c e e din gor by the Ap ri l 24, 2002 stop-work orde r. April 27, 2009 Opinion at 21. The Court also de nied summary judgme nt on the issue of punitive dama g e s a s f

oll ow s: A question of fa ct exist s reg ardingwhether any Individual Def endant acte d with rec kless disreg ard to the f act that the se arc h 2 war rant did not authorize the seizure of Plaintiffs’ documents. A prior dra ft of the wa

rra nt application included a

reque st for seizure authorization, and y et the fina l draft did not include suc h a re quest. Ins pe c tor Che rr y se ize d d oc ume nts any

ho w. Th e se circ umstance[s] raise the question of whe ther the se izure was done rec klessly . Summary

judgme nt cannot be grante d on the issue of punit ive dama g e s. Id . at 16-17. Def

endants now move for r econside ration of those por tions of the Court’s decision deny

ing summar

y judgme nt. I n essenc e, they raise two issues. F irst, they contend that the Court imp ro pe rl y

fo un d th at Pla int if

fs have an inva sio n o f p ri va c y c la im. Se c on d, the y

c la im that th e e vid e nc e of

the De fe nd ants ’ p e rs on a l invo lve me nt i n th e se izur e is t oo sc anty to
overc ome their motion for summary judgme nt. Plainti ffs oppose. II. STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW A Rule 59(e) motion is discretionar y and nee d not be g rante d unless the district-4-

court finds that “ there is an interveningchang e of c ontrolling law , the ava ilability of new evidenc e, or the need to c orre ct a c lear err or or pr event manif

est injustice.” Fox v . Am. Airlines Inc. , 3 8 9 F. 3 d

1 2 9 1 , 1 2 9 6 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Firestone v. Fire stone , 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). A Rule 59( e) motion is not “simply an opportunity

to rea rgue fa cts and theories upon whic h a cour t has alre ady

ruled.” New Y

ork v. U nited States , 880 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1995). N or is it an avenue for a “losing party

. . . to raise ne w issues that could have been r aised pre viously .” Kat tan v . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 995 F.2d 274, 276 ( D.C. Cir. 1993). III . A NA LY SIS A. Clarification Regarding Rem ainin g Cause of Action De fe nd ants e rr on e ou sly

c on te nd that th e Court

ha s n owpe rm itt e d Pl a int if fs to
a sse rt an inva sio n o f p ri va c y

c la im i n a dd iti on

to t he ir c la im f or dama g e s f

or the vio latio n o f t

he ir Four th Amendment rig ht to be fre e fr om unrea sonable seizure. The y misconstrue that portion of the Court’s Opinion that stated:

L ike the plaintiffs in Hec tor and Townes , Plaintiffs here c an r e c o v e r d am a g e s d i r e c t l y r e l at e d

t o th e i n v a s i o no f

th e i r p r i v a c y — the illeg al seizure of doc uments — but not for injuries resulting from the se izure of evidenc e and subse quent OAH pr ocee ding. . . . [T] he constitutionally

rele vant har

m that occur

red he re w as the inv a sio n o f P la int if

f’ s p ri va c y

du e to t he ill e g a l se izur e of

the ir documents, not the discover y of incriminatingevidenc e (the unapprove d plans) and subse quent OAH pr ocee ding. Plaintiffs may rec over f or the invasion of pr ivacy alone. April 27, 2009 Opinion [Dkt. # 83] at 13-14. The Court clarifie s that if Plaintiffs can prove at tr ia l th at th e un c on sti tut ion a l se izur e of do c ume nts c a

us e d a c tua l in

jur y , th e se izur e c an s up po rt a
c la im f or c omp e ns ator

y dama g e s. Th at is , Pl a int if fs may pr oc e e d to tr ia l so le ly

ba se d o n th e ir claim for da

mag es ca used by the seizure of doc uments in violation of the Fourth Ame ndment.The “ invasion of privac y ” languag e must be under stood in contex t. The Court followed 3 the re asoningof Town es v . Ci ty of N e w York, 176 F.3d 138 ( 2d Cir. 1999) and He c tor v . W att , 23 5 F .3 d 1 54 (3 d Ci r. 20 01 ). Th e c ourt in T owne s e xpla ine d th at “ [t] hee v il o f an un re as on ab le search or seizure is that it invades privacy , not that it uncovers cr ime, which is no evil at all.” Townes , 176 F.3d at 148 ( qu ote d in Hec tor , 235 F.3d at 161) (empha sis added). -5- Plaintiffs have a lleg ed no cla im gr ounded in the law of tort, such as invasion of pr ivacy , or any other leg al theory
. Plaintiffs may not proce ed on any

claim for da

mag es ca used by actions other 3 tha n th e se izur e a lon e , f

or e xamp le , o n a

ny c la im f or dama g e s c a

us e d b y the se arc h o f t

he ir ho me including the enter ing of

children’ s rooms and the ope ning of draw ers, damag es ca

used by the permit revoc ation proce eding , damag es ca used by the April 24, 2002 stop-work or der, or damag es ca

used by any other stop-wor

k order
. B. Dam ages Caused Solely by th e Seizure De fe nd ants a lso a

rgue that no ne of

the dama g e s a lle g e d b y

Pla int if fs wa s caused solely by the illeg al seizure. “T here is simpl y no way for the Court to aw ard se parate damag es from Ms. Cherr

y ’s ac quisiti on of the notebook ( an ac t taking a fewseconds at most), in li g ht of the c la ime d e mot ion a l da ma g e s f ro m th e ov e ra

rc hin ginv a sio n o f p ri va c y a uth or ize d b y

the va lid
se arc h w arr ant. Th e fo rm e r i s su bs ume d in

the late r. ” De fe nd ants pr e vio us ly ra ise d th is i ssu e in their motion for summary judgme nt. The Court ruled that this is a fa ctual question for trial. The April 27, 2009 Opinion expl ained:

Def endants e rrone ously

argue that Plaintiffs have not presente d any e vid e nc e of

a c tua l da ma g e s c a us e d b y the ill e g a l se izur e . In f

a c t, Plaintiffs claim that as a “ direc t result of De fenda nts’ actions” the y suffe red e motional damag es. They alleg e that their r eputations wer e impaire d and that they suffe red humiliation and mental anguish. Ms. Elkins asser ts that “these e vents [have] created ong oing phy sical and e motional stress-related disorder s” for which sh e so ug ht m e dic a l c are . Pl a int if fs a lso inc ur

re d atto rn e y

fe e s, some of which w ere associate d with the motion to s uppress in the-6- OAH pr ocee ding. T here is a g enuine issue of materia l fac t reg ardingwhether

the seizure alone cause d injury to Plainti ffs a

nd r e g ar d i n gth e e x t e n tan d

n atur e o f s u c hi n j ur y. April 27, 2009 Opinion at 10-11 (inter nal citations omitted). Ag ain, there is an issue of fa ct reg ardingwhether

the seizure alone cause d injury to Plainti ffs a

nd, if so, what the e x tent and
natur e of su c h in jur y wa s. C. Indi vidu al Liab ility Def endants c ontend that Plaintiffs have f ailed to point to any

evidenc e that Messrs. L ove, Noble, a

nd Maloney

wer e per sonally

involved in the unconstitutional seiz ure at iss ue he re . A§ 1 98 3 a c tio n c ann ot b e ma int a ine d a g a ins t an o ff ic ia l in his pe rs on a l c a

pa c ity if the offic ial was not per sonally involved in the decisions af fec ting the pla intiff’s constitutional rig hts. Brown v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 5 14 F .3 d 1 27 9, 12 85 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 8) . Pu bli c of fi c ia ls
are not vicariously

liable for the actions of their subordinates; re spondeat super ior liability does not apply in § 1983 case s. Hayne

sworth v. Miller , 820 F.2d 1245, 1259 ( D.C. Cir. 1987). To implicate supervisory

liability under § 1983, a

plaintiff must establish a hig h deg ree of fa ult. Id
. at 1261. Mere neg lige nce is not enough. Int’l Action Ctr. v. United States , 3 65 F .3 d 2 0, 28 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 4) . “ A s up e rv iso r who me re ly fa ils to d e te c t and

pr e ve nt a su bo rd inate ’s mis c on du c t, there fore , cannot be liable for that misconduct.” Id . The super visor must know about the conduct a nd fac ilitate, approve , or condone it, or “turn a blind eye for fea r of what he might se e.” Id
. Def

endants a rgue that the mer e scintilla of evide nce r aised by Mr. Maloney ’s deposition testimony

is insufficient to overc ome summary judgme nt. On rec onsideration, the Court ag ree s. Defe ndants argue that Mr. Ma loney was not involved in the dec ision to seek a-7-

sear ch wa rra nt, in prepar ing the war

rant a pplication, in searc hing the house, or in seizing the documents. The Court f

ound in its April 27, 2009 Opinion t hat there was a fac tual question
re g ard ingMr . M a lon e y ’s inv olv e me nt:

Critically , he wa s involved in conversations with t he District’s attorney reg ardingthe sea

rch w arr ant and whe ther the w arr ant should authorize the seizure of doc uments. When asked why the attorney wanted to make sure that the w arr ant authorized the seizure, Mr. Malone y

responde d, “I

assumed I

g uess that it was part of the point of havingthe sea rch.” There is an issue of fa ct re g ard ingMr . M a lon e y ’s pe rs on a l invo lve me nt w iththe de c isi on to seize documents despite the la ck of a uthorization t o do so. April 27, 2009 Opinion at 20 (interna l citations omit ted). A c loser examination of Mr. Maloney ’s deposition testimony reve als that when Mr . Maloney discussed the seizure of documents with counsel f or the District of Columbia, it was counse l (and not Mr. Malone y ) who “wa nted to make sure that [t he sea rch w arr ant] was proper ly executed in orde r to cove r the seizure of doc uments.” Pls.’ Opp’n [Dkt. # 80] , Ex . 3 (Maloney Dep. at 41). When asked, “What was your under standing as to why he wa nted to have a

seizure of doc uments? ” Mr. Maloney responde d, “I

assumed I

g uess that it was par

t of the point of havingthe sea rch.” Id . at 42. This testimony

alone is insufficie nt to support Pl aintiffs’ a lleg ation that Mr. Maloney was persona lly

involved in the seizure of doc uments without a warr ant. Se e An de rso n v . Li be rty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986) (nonmovingparty must establish more than the mer e exis tence of a sc intill a of e vidence ). Plaintiffs point to no other evidenc e implicatingMr. Maloney . I t is not relevant to Plaintiffs’ claim (f or dama g es ca

used by the seizure) that Mr. Ma lon e y so ug ht t o s top wo rk

on Pla int if fs ’ p ro pe rt

y or that he so ug ht t o r e vo ke Pla int if fs ’ bu ild ingpe rm its . A nd

wh ile Mr . M a lon e y

su pe rv ise d M s. Che rr

y wh o p art ic ipate d a c tiv e ly in-8-

the se izur e of

the do c ume nts , a

me re a lle g atio n o f a

su pe rv iso ry ro le is i ns uf

fi c ie nt t o im

po se l i a b i l i ty o nM r . M a l o n e y. Se e In t’ l A c tio n Ct r. , 3 6 5 F
. 3 d

at2 8 ( t o e s t a

b l i s hs u p e r v i s o r y l i a b i l i ty, the supervisor must know a bout the conduct a

nd fac ilitate, approve , or condone it, or turn a blind ey e; neg lige nce is insuffic ient). B eca use Plaintiffs’ have failed to pre sent any evidenc e tying Mr
. Ma lon e y to t he un c on sti tut ion a l se izur e , M r. Ma lon e y wi ll b e dis mis se d a s a

de fe nd ant. Withre g ard

to M r. No ble , D e fe nd ants a g a in a rgue that th e e vid e nc e linkin ghim to the seizure is insufficient to g o to trial. In the April 27, 2009 Opinion, the Court held that th e r e w a s anis s u e o f

f a c t r e g ar d in gM r . N o b le ’ s p e r s o n a l i n v o lv e me n t w it hth e d e c is io nto s e iz e do c ume nts be c a

us e (1 ) M r. No ble signe d th e wa rr ant a pp lic atio n; ( 2) he te sti fi e d in his deposition that one of the pur poses of the se arc h war

rant wa s to seize documents; and (3) a prior draf t of the sea

rch w arr ant af

fidavit written for

Mr. Noble’ s signature include d a re quest that the
war rant a uthorize the seizure of docume nts. SeeAp ri l 27 , 2 00 9 O pin ion at 19 . D e fe nd ants ’ attempt to reha sh the arguments reg ardingMr. Noble is to no ava il. Pl aintiffs have raised a g enuine issue of

fac t reg ardingwhether

Mr. Noble wa s persona lly involved in the violation of the ir F ourt h A me ndme nt r ig ht. Def endants a lso argue that ther e is insufficient e vidence of the pe rsonal involvement of Mr. Noble ’s pre dece ssor, Mr. L ove. The Court found that this presented a g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f

a c t a s f oll ow s: There is some evidence that Mr. L ove wa s involved in the decision to seize Pl aintiffs’ doc uments. SeePls.’ Opp’n, Ex. 10 (Ford Af f. ¶ 2 0) (I n M ay 20 02 , “ Mr . L ov e ins tr

uc te d me to “ fi nd

a wa y ” to sto p w or k at #2 0 9 th S tr e e t, N .E . a nd fo rc e Mr . Ro bb ins and

Ms. Elkins to go bac k to the Offic e of H istoric Preser vation for r ea pp ro va l of

the ir wo rk .” ); id ., Ex . 2 (ema il dated 10/28/02 from counsel to Mr. L ove and othe rs re g ardingtopics for Oc t. 29, 2002-9- meetingsuch as wha

t “additional info” w as nee ded and what “steps” to take next). Thus, there is an issue of f act r eg ardingMr. L ov e ’s po te nti a l li a

bil ity fo r d ama g e s. Id . at 19. Def

endants a rgue now that the F ord Aff idavit refe rs only

to the revoc ation of the permits and not to the seizure of doc uments and should be g iven little weig ht. Weighingthe evidenc e is for the jury , not the Court, as is the interpre tation of Mr. F ord’s testimony . Plaintiffs have pr e se nte d a

n is su e of fa c t r e g ard ingMr . L ov e ’s pe rs on a l invo lve me nt. Def endants do not ar g ue that Ms. Cherr y was not per sonally

involved in the
un c on sti tut ion a l se izur e . A ft e r a ll, sh e a c c omp anie d th e Di str ic t’ s atto rn e y to S up e ri or

Court to apply for the w arr ant, she wa s prese nt at the sea rch, a nd she ac tually

seized documents. Instead, they argue that she c annot be liable in the f irst place be cause she ac ted pursuant to a va lid searc h
war rant whe n she seized evidenc e in plain view, a nd beca use Plaintiffs consente d to turning ove r the documents. The Court alrea dy held that Def

endants a re c ollatera lly

estopped fr om relitig atingthe findingby the Hea ringOffic er that the seizure of the doc uments was not constitutionally

permissible. See E lkins , 527 F. Supp. 2d at 46-47. And the Hea ringOffic er fo un d th at th e pla in v ie w a nd c on se nt e xce pti on s to the wa rr ant r e qu ir e me nt d id n ot a pp ly beca use off icer s opened f

urniture dr awe rs in order

to obtain documents and they seized the documents without consent. Pls.’ Opp’n [Dkt. # 80] , Ex . 7 (OAH Orde r on Mot. to Suppress at 1 5 & 2 1 )
. R e c o n s i d e r at i o nw i l l b e d e n i e d w i thr e g ar d

t o M s . C h e r

r y. IV . C ON CL USI ON For the re asons explained above, D efe ndants’ motion for par tial rec onsideration [Dkt. # 85] will be g rante d in part and de nied in part a s follows: The Court’s April 27, 2009 Opinion is clarified a s descr ibed her ein. Fur ther, the motion for r econside ration will be g rante d-10-

in favor of

David Malone y

beca use Plaintiffs have f

ailed to pre sent more than a scintilla of evidenc e demonstrating his per sonal involvement in the unconstitutional seiz ure. Mr . Maloney wi ll b e dis mis se d a s a

de fe nd ant i n th is c a se . T he mot ion fo r r e c on sid e ratio n w ill be de nie d in a ll other re spects. A memor ializi ngorder acc ompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: July

20, 2009 _____________/s/___________________ ROSEMARY M. COL L YER Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge