United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ATLAS IP, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

MEDTRONIC, INC., MEDTRONIC USA, INC., 

MEDTRONIC MINIMED, INC.,

Defendants-Cross-Appellants

______________________ 

2015-1071, 2015-1105

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Florida in No. 1:13-cv-23309-CMA, 

Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga.

______________________ 

Decided: October 29, 2015 

______________________ 

 GEORGE C. SUMMERFIELD, JR., Stadheim & Grear, 

Ltd., Chicago, IL, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also 

represented by ROLF STADHEIM, ROBERT M. SPALDING. 

 JOHN C. O’QUINN, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, 

DC, argued for defendants-cross-appellants. Also represented by WILLIAM H. BURGESS; JEANNE M. HEFFERNAN,

AKSHAY S. DEORAS, New York, NY; LUKE DAUCHOT, Los 

Angeles, CA.

______________________ 
2 ATLAS IP, LLC v. MEDTRONIC, INC. 

Before MOORE, REYNA, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

TARANTO, Circuit Judge.

Atlas IP, LLC owns U.S. Patent No. 5,371,734, which 

describes and claims a protocol for controlling wireless 

network communications between a hub and remotes. In 

December 2013, Atlas sued Medtronic, Inc., Medtronic 

USA, Inc., and Medtronic MiniMed, Inc. (collectively, 

“Medtronic”), alleging that certain Medtronic medical 

products for monitoring a patient’s condition infringed the 

’734 patent. In a related case, the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Florida adopted claim 

constructions that, by agreement, govern the present case. 

Atlas IP, LLC v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., No. 14-21006-CIV, 

2014 WL 3764129 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2014). The district 

court in this case then issued two summary-judgment 

orders concerning claim 21, the only claim at issue here. 

It granted summary judgment of non-infringement by 

Medtronic, J.A. 2–6; and it granted summary judgment 

rejecting anticipation and obviousness challenges to claim 

21, Atlas IP, LLC v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 13-23309-CIV, 

2014 WL 5305577 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2014). Atlas appeals 

the non-infringement ruling, which we affirm. Medtronic 

cross-appeals the validity ruling, which we reverse. We 

remand for further proceedings on invalidity.

BACKGROUND

The ’734 patent, entitled “Medium Access Control 

Protocol for Wireless Network,” notes the existence of 

prior-art techniques for communication between a hub 

and multiple remotes in wireless network systems. But, 

it says, those systems presented a problem. They consumed large amounts of battery power, as the remotes 

had to leave their receivers on at all times. ’734 patent, 

col. 4, lines 56–65.

The specification describes means of conserving battery power. According to the summary of the invention, 
ATLAS IP, LLC v. MEDTRONIC, INC. 3

the hub establishes a communication cycle within which 

there are intervals for the hub to communicate with the 

remotes and separate intervals for remotes to communicate with the hub. See id., col. 5, lines 44–47; id., col. 5, 

lines 50–54. The hub also provides an opportunity for 

new remotes to join the network and, in addition, communicates with other hubs to avoid interference. See id., 

col. 5, line 67, through col. 6, line 2; id., col. 6, lines 53–56. 

In the detailed description of embodiments, the specification at one point says that the communication cycle “is 

repeated on a continuous basis as long as the hub is 

active.” See id., col. 11, lines 41–42. 

The invention summary further states that the hub 

communicates the information about the intervals within 

a communication cycle to the remotes. See id., col. 5, lines 

47–50. Based on that information, the remotes know 

when to expect to receive frames from the hub and when 

to transmit any frames they have to the hub. See id., col. 

5, lines 50–54. A remote therefore can turn off its receiver 

during periods in which it does not expect to receive 

frames from the hub, and it can turn off its transmitter 

during periods in which it will not be transmitting frames 

to the hub. See id., col. 5, lines 54–62. In that way, the 

hub and remotes can communicate but “conserve considerable [battery] power.” Id., col. 5, lines 62–66. 

Figure 3 illustrates a communication cycle, with the 

“outbound” portion containing intervals for the hub to 

transmit and the “inbound” portion containing intervals 

for transmission opportunities (TXOP) for the remotes: 
4 ATLAS IP, LLC v. MEDTRONIC, INC. 

Claim 21, the only claim at issue in this case, states:

21. A communicator for wirelessly transmitting 

frames to and receiving frames from a[t] least one 

additional communicator in accordance with a 

predetermined medium access control protocol, 

the communicators which transmit and receive 

the frames constituting a Group, each communicator including a transmitter and a receiver for 

transmitting and receiving the frames respectively, the medium access control protocol controlling 

each communicator of the Group to effect predetermined functions comprising:

[a] designating one of the communicators [o]f 

the Group as a hub and the remaining the 

[sic] communicators of the Group as remotes;

[b] the hub establishing repeating communication cycles, each of which has intervals during 

which the hub and the remotes transmit and 

receive frames; 
ATLAS IP, LLC v. MEDTRONIC, INC. 5

[c] the hub transmitting information to the remotes to establish the communication cycle 

and a plurality of predeterminable intervals 

during each communication cycle, the intervals being ones when the hub is allowed to 

transmit frames to the remotes, when the remotes are allowed to transmit frames to the 

hub, and when each remote is expected to receive a frame from the hub;

[d] the remotes powering off their transmitters 

during times other than those intervals when 

the remote is allowed to transmit frames to 

the hub, by using the information transmitted 

from the hub;

[e] the remotes powering off their receivers during times other than those intervals when the 

remote is expected to receive a frame from the 

hub, by using the information transmitted 

from the hub;

[f] the hub transmitting two frames containing 

information to establish the plurality of predeterminable intervals during each communication cycle, the second frame containing the 

information to established [sic] the plurality 

of predeterminable intervals occurring before 

the intervals in which the remotes are allowed to transmit frames to the hub.

Id., col. 50, line 39, through col. 51, line 9 (bracketed 

letters added for convenience; emphases added to highlight language central to the issues on appeal). 

In this case, Atlas alleged that certain of Medtronic’s 

cardiac defibrillators and insulin pumps infringed several 

claims of the ’734 patent because of how certain components communicated with each other. Medtronic asserted 

counterclaims requesting a declaratory judgment of 
6 ATLAS IP, LLC v. MEDTRONIC, INC. 

invalidity of all the claims of the ’734 patent under 35 

U.S.C. §§ 102, 103(a), and 112. 

In Atlas v. St. Jude Medical, the district court construed claim terms that appear in several claims, including claim 21. It held that “the hub establishing repeating 

communication cycles”—in clause [b] of claim 21—means 

“the hub defining in advance the starting time and duration for each repeating communication cycle.” And it held 

that “the hub transmitting information to the remotes to 

establish the communication cycle and a plurality of

predeterminable intervals during each communication 

cycle”—in clause [c] of claim 21—means “the hub transmitting to the remotes information necessary to know in 

advance the starting time and duration of the communication cycle and of each of two or more predeterminable 

intervals during each communication cycle.” Atlas v. St. 

Jude Medical, 2014 WL 3764129, at *5–8 (emphasis 

added). 

Medtronic moved for summary judgment of noninfringement of the asserted claims, and the district court 

granted the motion except as to claim 21. The district 

court then reconsidered its ruling as to claim 21 and 

granted summary judgment of non-infringement of claim 

21 as well. Only claim 21 is at issue on appeal.

The district court’s ruling rested on the “in advance” 

portion of the claim construction. The parties disputed 

whether, under the “in advance” construction, the endpoint of a communication cycle must be communicated to 

the remotes before the cycle begins, as Medtronic argued, 

or merely before the remotes transmit to the hub, as Atlas 

argued. The court concluded that the accused devices do 

not infringe “under either party’s construction.” J.A. 6. 

 Separately, Atlas sought summary judgment rejecting 

Medtronic’s anticipation and obviousness challenges to 

claim 21. (Medtronic cross-moved for summary judgment 

of anticipation, but its cross-motion was dismissed as 
ATLAS IP, LLC v. MEDTRONIC, INC. 7

untimely, and that dismissal is not challenged on appeal.) 

The district court granted Atlas’s motion. Atlas v. Medtronic, 2014 WL 5305577. The court rested its holding on 

a new claim construction of language in clause [b] of claim 

21: “communication cycles, each of which has intervals 

during which the hub and the remotes transmit and 

receive frames.” The court held: “The plain meaning 

necessitates the hub and the remotes transmit and receive frames during each communication cycle, not that 

the hub and the remotes simply may do so during a 

communication cycle.” Id. at *3 (emphasis in original).

After the court’s two summary-judgment rulings as to 

claim 21, Medtronic’s counterclaims for invalidity of the 

rest of the ’734 patent’s claims remained pending. Atlas 

and Medtronic submitted a joint motion to dismiss the 

counterclaims without prejudice, which the court granted. 

The district court then entered an amended final judgment reflecting the dismissal.

Atlas appeals the district court’s summary-judgment

order of non-infringement. Medtronic cross-appeals the 

district court’s summary judgment of no anticipation or 

obviousness. 

DISCUSSION

We first consider this court’s jurisdiction, as we are 

obliged to do even though neither party disputes it. 

Wawrzynski v. H.J. Heinz Co., 728 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. 

Cir. 2013). We have jurisdiction over an appeal from a 

final decision of a district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 

Here, the district court entered judgment on the merits 

rejecting all of Atlas’s claims in its complaint and entered

judgment rejecting one of Medtronic’s counterclaims, 

which asserted invalidity of claim 21. Then, based on an 

agreement between the parties, it dismissed without 

prejudice Medtronic’s other counterclaims, which asserted

invalidity of the ’734 patent’s other claims. For this court 

to have jurisdiction in this appeal, we must find that 
8 ATLAS IP, LLC v. MEDTRONIC, INC. 

there is a final judgment before us, no other basis of 

appellate jurisdiction being invoked or apparent.

The legal question is whether the district court’s 

complete adjudication of some claims followed by a consented-to dismissal without prejudice of the remaining 

claims—what has been called “manufactured finality”—

produces a final decision under § 1295(a)(1). The answer 

hinges on whether we apply our law or the law of the 

regional circuit, here the Eleventh Circuit. Under Eleventh Circuit law, the district court’s decision strongly 

appears not to be final. See Hood v. Plantation Gen. Med. 

Ctr., Ltd., 251 F.3d 932, 934 (11th Cir. 2001); State 

Treasurer of State of Mich. v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 11 (11th 

Cir. 1999). But our court has held that a final judgment 

exists when a district court fully adjudicates some claims 

and by consent dismisses all remaining counterclaims

without prejudice. See Doe v. United States, 513 F.3d

1348, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Nystrom v. TREX Co., 339 

F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

Our own law, rather than regional-circuit law, governs on this issue. We apply our own law to issues unique 

to patent law and regional circuit law to issues unrelated 

to patent law. See Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc in 

relevant part). The statute governing our appellate 

jurisdiction, § 1295, including in particular the language 

giving us jurisdiction over an appeal from a “final decision” in a patent case, § 1295(a)(1), is unique to this court. 

Although our interpretation of “final decision” is informed 

by similar language in § 1291, which governs “courts of 

appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit),” § 1295 sets out the exclusive 

jurisdiction of our circuit, and only our circuit. We therefore apply our own law to issues of finality under 

§ 1295(a)(1). Nystrom, 339 F.3d at 1349–50. For that 

reason, the district court’s order dismissing all pending 

counterclaims without prejudice, after fully adjudicating
ATLAS IP, LLC v. MEDTRONIC, INC. 9

some of the claims, is final, see id. at 1351, and we have 

jurisdiction here under § 1295(a)(1).

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Myers v. Bowman, 713 F.3d 1319, 1326 

(11th Cir. 2013); Serdarevic v. Advanced Medical Optics, 

Inc., 532 F.3d 1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008). We review the 

claim construction rulings of the district court de novo 

where, as here, there are no underlying factual issues. 

See In re Papst Licensing Digital Camera Patent Litig., 

778 F.3d 1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

A 

Atlas does not dispute that the judgment of noninfringement of claim 21 must be affirmed if, under the 

“establishing” and “transmitting” limitations of clauses [b] 

and [c], the endpoint of the communication cycle must be 

communicated to the remotes before any remote transmits frames to the hub. Infringement therefore turns 

entirely on a claim-construction issue. When construing 

claim terms, “[w]e generally give words of a claim their 

ordinary meaning in the context of the claim and the 

whole patent document; the specification particularly, but 

also the prosecution history, informs the determination of 

claim meaning in context, including by resolving ambiguities; and even if the meaning is plain on the face of the 

claim language, the patentee can, by acting with sufficient clarity, disclaim such a plain meaning or prescribe a 

special definition.” World Class Technology Corp. v. 

Ormco Corp., 769 F.3d 1120, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see 

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 

2005) (en banc). Following that approach, we reject 

Atlas’s challenge to the district court’s construction. 

Atlas attacks aspects of the threshold claim construction adopted by the district court in Atlas v. St. Jude 

Medical, supra. It asserts that the ordinary meaning of 

the word “establish” in the two limitations at issue is

merely “initiate,” so that the hub need not define the start 
10 ATLAS IP, LLC v. MEDTRONIC, INC. 

and duration of communication cycles and their intervals, 

let alone transmit that definitional information. Atlas 

Opening Br. 15–16. But, although “establish” might 

mean “initiate” in some contexts, it must mean more in 

this context, which is all about setting a schedule for 

various communication devices to follow where coordination is important. A principal definition of “establish” 

that most naturally fits this context is: “set up (an organization, system, or set of rules) on a firm or permanent 

basis.” The New Oxford American Dictionary 580 (2001). 

And although it is not clear that Atlas argues otherwise 

independently of its “establish” contention, the context 

also makes clear that the schedule thus established must 

be “transmit[ted]” in advance of the start of the intervals 

set up for remotes to transmit information to the hub.

Claim 21 states that first the hub establishes communication cycles, which consist of three intervals: (a) when 

the hub is allowed to transmit frames to the remotes, (b) 

when the remotes are allowed transmit frames to the hub, 

and (c) when each remote is expected to receive a frame 

from the hub. ’734 patent, col. 50, lines 52–62. And then 

the hub transmits information to the remotes to establish 

those intervals. Id., col. 50, lines 55–62. If the hub does 

not define the intervals when the hub will transmit to the 

remotes and when each remote will transmit to the hub, 

multiple communicators (e.g., the hub and a remote or 

two remotes) could transmit simultaneously and their 

signals would collide. See id., col. 3, lines 4–10. Thus, the 

hub-sent information must indicate both the start and 

end time of the intervals of each communication cycle. 

To fulfill the core claimed function of power saving, 

each remote must know when its receiver and transmitter 

can be off and must be on, which naturally, perhaps 

necessarily, calls for the scheduling information to arrive 

before any remote transmissions begin. The claim confirms that the transmittal of information must allow for 

this power-saving function when it indicates, in language 
ATLAS IP, LLC v. MEDTRONIC, INC. 11

mixing the plural and singular, that a remote powers off 

its transmitter for times other than when it is allowed to 

transmit, and similarly for the receiver for times when it 

is expected to receive, “by using the information transmitted from the hub.” Id., col. 50, line 63, through col. 51, 

line 2. And the claim confirms the centrality of the timing 

of the information transmittal when it adds a further 

limitation requiring that the crucial information be 

transmitted twice before remote transmissions begin: the 

hub “transmitting two frames containing information to 

establish the plurality of predeterminable intervals 

during each communication cycle, the second frame 

containing the information to establish[ ] the plurality of 

predeterminable intervals occurring before the intervals 

in which the remotes are allowed to transmit to the hub.” 

Id., col. 51, lines 3–9. All of this makes clear that the hub 

must set up a schedule of intervals and send that schedule to the remotes before the transmission-opportunity 

slots for the remotes arrive. 

The specification confirms that the interval allotment 

must be defined (and communicated to the remotes) 

before the remote-transmission opportunities begin. The 

summary of the invention states that “[t]he hub transmits 

control information to the remotes to establish the communication cycle and to establish a plurality of predeterminable intervals during each communication cycle.” ’734 

patent, col. 5, lines 47–50. That control information 

“define[s] the starting times and durations of the subsequent intervals of the present communication cycle.” Id., 

col. 27, lines 57–61. Because the hub conveys those

“defined intervals” to the remotes, they are able to power 

off their transmitters when they are not scheduled to 

transmit and their receivers when they are not scheduled 

to receive, and thereby achieve the significant batterysaving power of the invention. Id., col. 5, lines 54–66; see 

also id., col. 13, lines 12–14, 23–28, 29–36. 
12 ATLAS IP, LLC v. MEDTRONIC, INC. 

Atlas does not seriously dispute that the specification 

validates the district court’s construction, but instead 

argues that the medium access control protocol, rather 

than the hub, defines those intervals. Atlas Response/Reply Br. 5. The specification indicates, however,

that the hub uses a medium access control protocol as 

part of its functionality, not that the medium access 

control protocol performs any independent function. See

’734 patent, col. 11, lines 28–30 (describing the hub as 

“control[ling] the communications to and from the remotes, using a MAC protocol”); id., col. 13, line 67, 

through col. 14, line 2 (noting that one of the functions of 

the hub is to serve as a “medium access control”). Thus, 

both the claims and specification must be understood to 

mean that the “establishing” and “transmitting” limitations require the hub to define and transmit the start 

time and duration of each communication cycle and its 

constituent intervals in advance.

Atlas invokes the doctrine of claim differentiation, 

pointing to independent claims 1, 12, 14, and 34 as containing more explicit references requiring the hub to 

define intervals in advance. Atlas Opening Br. 16. Although sometimes that doctrine (which counsels against 

constructions that render some claim language superfluous) is important in claim construction, it cannot support 

Atlas’s position on claim construction here. The claims 

invoked do not at all suggest any notion of establishing as 

mere initiating. Moreover, each of the invoked claims 

contains language that, under Atlas’s arguments, avoids a 

conclusion of superfluousness under the construction of 

the “establishing” and “transmitting” limitations at issue 

here.1 In any event, we have been cautious in assessing 

1 Claim 1 adds a requirement that “a frame” contain relevant information. ’734 patent, col. 45, line 20. 

Claim 12 adds requirements that further define how 

 
ATLAS IP, LLC v. MEDTRONIC, INC. 13

the force of claim differentiation in particular settings, 

recognizing that patentees often use different language to 

capture the same invention, discounting it where it is 

invoked based on independent claims rather than the 

relation of an independent and dependent claim, and not 

permitting it to override the strong evidence of meaning 

supplied by the specification. See, e.g., World Class 

Technology, 769 F.3d at 1126; Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Int’l 

Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Here, 

claim differentiation is not significant enough to alter our 

conclusion on whether the claimed scheduling information 

must be sent before remotes begin transmission. 

The district court did not decide in this case whether 

the scheduling information (specifically, the starting time 

and duration) must be sent before the communication 

cycle begins or before the remotes begin transmitting. For 

the reasons we have stated, that information must be sent 

before the remotes begin transmitting, even apart from 

the claim limitation requiring duplicate transmission 

before remotes start transmitting. See ’734 patent, col. 

51, lines 3–9 (“the hub transmitting two frames . . . , the 

second frame containing the information to established 

[sic] the plurality of predeterminable intervals occurring 

before the intervals in which the remotes are allowed to 

transmit to the hub”). The district court in this case 

concluded that, as long as the information must be sent 

before the remotes transmit, as we conclude it must, 

Medtronic’s devices do not infringe. Atlas does not argue 

certain transmission opportunities are allocated. Id., col. 

49, lines 1–22. Claim 14 adds requirements about the 

“length” of the communications cycle, id., col. 49, lines 63–

68, which Atlas has asserted differs from duration information, J.A. 59–61. And claim 34 is similar. ’734 patent, 

col. 54, lines 28–32. 

 
14 ATLAS IP, LLC v. MEDTRONIC, INC. 

otherwise. For that reason, we affirm the summary 

judgment of non-infringement. 

B 

A distinct issue of claim construction is presented by 

the district court’s summary-judgment rejection of Medtronic’s invalidity challenges to claim 21. The court held 

that language in clause [b], “communication cycles, each 

of which has intervals during which the hub and the 

remotes transmit and receive frames,” ’734 patent, col. 50, 

lines 52–54, requires, as a matter of “plain meaning,” that

“the hub and the remotes transmit and receive frames 

during each communication cycle, not that the hub and 

the remotes simply may do so during a communication 

cycle as Medtronic argues.” Atlas v. Medtronic, 2014 WL 

5305577, at *3 (emphasis in original). We reject that 

claim construction. We therefore reverse the grant of 

summary judgment of no anticipation or obviousness, 

which rested on the district court’s incorrect claim construction. 

We note first that the district court’s construction is 

ambiguous on its face. It might be read to require that, in 

each cycle, every remote transmits a frame or, more 

narrowly, that at least one remote does so. But neither 

party suggests that the district court’s construction has 

the every-remote meaning, and Atlas itself does not 

suggest that the claim language can have that meaning. 

Rather, both treat the district court as having agreed with 

Atlas’s reading, expressly acknowledged by the district 

court, id., that, during each cycle, at least one remote must 

transmit a frame. See Medtronic Opening/Response Br. 

26 (“The district court agreed with Atlas . . . .”). We 

therefore focus on the at-least-one-remote interpretation. 

But the reasons we reject that interpretation also require 

rejection of the every-remote interpretation that no party 

here attributes to the district court or defends as correct. 
ATLAS IP, LLC v. MEDTRONIC, INC. 15

The district court relied entirely on what it viewed as 

the “plain meaning” of the claim language. Atlas v. 

Medtronic, 2014 WL 5305577, at *3. The court thought 

the meaning so plain that it did not even discuss any of 

the contextual considerations that are often central to 

claim construction. That was erroneous. The claim 

language does not have the decisive plain meaning the 

district court found, and contextual considerations point 

compellingly the other way.

The claim language at issue—stating that each cycle 

“has intervals during which the hub and the remotes 

transmit and receive frames,” ’734 patent, col. 50, lines 

52–54—is the kind of phrase that is often used in ordinary speech to set a general framework and not to communicate precise relations among its components. Here, 

context must determine the relations of the intervals, the 

hub and remotes, and the receiving and transmitting. 

The imprecision of the language is apparent on its face. 

For example, context aside, the plural “intervals” could 

mean that what follows must occur “during” each interval: 

both transmitting and receiving by both hub and “the 

remotes.” It is context that precludes that interpretation: 

hub actions and remote actions occur in separate intervals. The plural “the remotes,” on its face, could mean 

that all the remotes must perform the actions indicated. 

But both parties agree that, in context, that reading 

would be wrong. 

Ordinary usage of comparable expressions indicates 

that the language here does not have a “plain meaning” 

requiring some remote to transmit a frame in each cycle. 

A statement that “each school day has classes during 

which the teacher and students ask and answer questions” could easily be understood to describe what the 

classes are set up to permit, even what generally goes on, 

rather than that some student must ask a question in 

each class. A statement about a multi-defendant trial 

that “the trial has periods in which the prosecution and 
16 ATLAS IP, LLC v. MEDTRONIC, INC. 

the defendants put on and cross-examine witnesses” 

would not necessarily mean that at least one defendant 

must put on a witness. So, too, here: the claim language 

does not “necessitate[ ]” that at least one remote must 

transmit in each cycle. Atlas v. Medtronic, 2014 WL 

5305577, at *3. Context must determine whether that is 

a sound interpretation.

The need for context-based interpretation is confirmed 

by the imprecisions about plurals and conjunctions found 

in claim language other than clause [b]. Clause [c] describes the intervals within each communication cycle as 

“being ones” [1] “when” the hub is allowed to transmit 

frames to the remotes, [2] “when” the remotes are allowed 

transmit frames to the hub, [3] “and when” each remote is 

expected to receive a frame from the hub. ’734 patent, col. 

50, lines 55–62. The claim language is imprecise about 

the conjunction “and”: the first two items in the threeitem list might or might not be mutually exclusive; the 

first and third presumably are not mutually exclusive. 

Only context resolves the facial uncertainty. In a similar 

vein, clause [d] alternates between the plural “the remotes” and the singular “the remote” for no discernible

reason. It states, for example, that “the remotes power[] 

off their transmitters during times other than those 

intervals when the remote is allowed to transmit frames to 

the hub.” Id., col. 50, lines 63–65 (emphases added). 

Mixed use of singular and plural language is a recognized 

source of likely ambiguity. See Robert C. Faber, Faber on 

Mechanics of Patent Claim Drafting § 3:11 (7th ed. 2015). 

Again, context is needed to obtain clarification. 

The district court did not rely on anything for its construction except the claim words understood in isolation. 

Neither has Atlas, in this court, identified any substantial 

basis in the usual contextual considerations—notably, 

other claim language and the specification—to support 

the claim construction on which the district court’s validity ruling rests. In fact, as soon as the analysis widens its 
ATLAS IP, LLC v. MEDTRONIC, INC. 17

focus to examine the context, the answer to the claimconstruction question here becomes clear: the language 

sets aside times in which things are allowed to happen, as 

in the sentences about classrooms and courtrooms noted 

above. In particular, the claim language requires only 

that each cycle have one or more intervals in which remotes are allowed to transmit. 

The other language of claim 21 strongly supports this 

reading. It speaks of “intervals” “when the remotes are 

allowed to transmit frames to the hub.” ’734 patent, col. 

50, lines 58–61 (emphasis added). Again: “those intervals 

when the remote is allowed to transmit frames to the 

hub.” Id., col. 50, lines 64–65 (emphasis added). And 

again: “the intervals in which the remotes are allowed to 

transmit frames to the hub.” Id., col. 51, lines 8–9 (emphasis added). Many other claims of the patent are 

similar.2

The specification does not contain any requirement 

that at least one remote (much less all remotes) transmit 

a frame during each communication cycle. Instead, the 

2 At oral argument, but not before, Atlas made a

claim-differentiation argument to the effect that its 

construction of the language at issue here, which appears 

as well in claim 14, would improperly give dependent 

claim 17 the same scope as its independent claim (14). 

That argument comes too late and is unpersuasive even 

aside from the familiar cautions about claim differentiation. Claim 17 refers to “length,” which Atlas has distinguished from duration, see note 1, supra, and requires 

that the hub allocate transmission opportunities to the 

remotes and adjust the length of the communication cycle 

based on the number of transmission opportunities allocated. Claim 17 is different from claim 14 regardless of 

the claim-construction dispute concerning clause [b] of 

claim 21.

 
18 ATLAS IP, LLC v. MEDTRONIC, INC. 

specification explains that the remotes request transmission opportunities, which are “amount[s] of time during 

which the remote may transmit one or more frames to the 

hub.” ’734 patent, col. 12, lines 22–23 (emphasis added). 

The specification clearly indicates that, if a remote does 

not have any information to send, it may leave its transmission opportunity unused. Id., col. 35, lines 9–11; id., 

col. 39, lines 18–20. Nothing in the specification precludes a full communication cycle in which no remote 

transmits a frame because no remote has information to 

send. The specification does not preclude that situation 

expressly or by implication from the contemplated operation. 

In particular, no such requirement can be inferred 

from Figure 19, which depicts a procedure according to 

which remotes send control frames in the absence of 

pending frames. Id., col. 44, lines 15–19. Figure 19 

depicts only one embodiment. Indeed, that embodiment 

has each remote sending a control frame each cycle—

which Atlas’s construction would not require. But the 

specification makes clear that sending a control frame—

for various purposes—is optional. See id., col. 35, lines 9–

11 (“In the absence of any frames awaiting transmission, 

the remote 66 may leave its [transmission opportunity] 

unused, or may send a control frame.”); id., col. 39, lines 

18–20 (same). 

Nor does the specification’s discussion of the hub going into an idle status imply the need for some remote to 

transmit a frame in each cycle. The specification states 

that the hub may go into an idle state “[i]f no transmissions are received for a predetermined period of time 

which is much longer than a communication cycle.” Id., 

col. 39, lines 63–67. By its terms, that discussion contemplates cycles with no remotes transmitting—indeed, 

contemplates that there can be such cycles without the 

hub going inactive.
ATLAS IP, LLC v. MEDTRONIC, INC. 19

We therefore reject the district court’s construction of 

the clause [b] claim language on which it relied to reject 

Medtronic’s invalidity challenge to claim 21 on summary 

judgment. We reverse the grant of summary judgment of 

no anticipation or obviousness and remand for further 

proceedings in light of the proper construction, requiring 

only (as relevant here) that there be intervals in which 

remotes are permitted to transmit frames.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district 

court’s finding of non-infringement, reverse the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment of no anticipation or 

obviousness, and remand.

Costs awarded to Medtronic.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED