I 

It 

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19l:!J!!!!!!. 

MDt'l\AllOOM FOR COLOIC!t LMSm.1, C!lll*, ISA 1UrAllOJf LIA?80B Ol\OW 

IUILJ!CT• at.au J>epLrtment. P.ropopt\ hbl1eat1on Of U11Clu•if1e4 Document.N7 

littoey of World War XI Coot•rtnlCe•· 

1.. !ha plllt)t proota f\lnl!tJbed ~ ~c't1oft with the aubject cQJltain ~<JI '"° S.V.t.rcepted tmd 4eolphared lapuwM _.la.Pl ot l9. dUly 49i.5 

• jJ:i/_ud ll ""lJ' 1~5 f!.o. 'Jl:!/7. ('l'be pl.l.Q' 1U'oot ot • th11'\ ..... 

• &lbtl" ... »O'thing ttO 40 vith th. IUbJ•ct u4 ... probably lncludtd .ID .. 

id.v•rientl.7. ~r" tbax. are other ..aaa,sea vbio.h do perte.in to the IUI& 

.-u.bJ.ct.,. -"> io.:. 91¥ atld '11 taut ~ ap~tl¥ *lOt "° 'bo in.cluhd in the 

torthcOl!dn& pabltoa'\ion, tor ~ 41.f'ticult '° 41ac•:r1l· Ia 11. »091i'bltt 

th&~ thly .re Oil 1&11-7 tbnt• *"' .-nt u.t) 

•• It i• tnvs that tlw tut• of the tw J'w.;peneiio Miii(tell (lo•· 9lx ~ 7) are in the p:ablie 6aM1n, bav11l8 ltff:n ,.a.1t•hlt4 1n the ~nt.a ot 

the Iateme.t1oaa1 Mll1t&r7 Tri'b\sm.l £or the ra.r z..t imtJ. Mte.rred. w tn 

Aetail in tM rorre•tal J:>i&l"tea. le 'flh1• ~ation, lAc:l.01Ure l. nu i. 

err i.tere•t. !bore u auo on ~ • ratio broa.dout b7 Ill". nr.il' h&raon - 13 *rch 1947' • aow tit ... HmlU"k• Oil tba tU,bJect •tter ~ '\bell$ 

••AP• t• &'\\ached u Xnclbaun •~ nitn r--.ru, u all .. 1.bo•• in the 

hrre•tal Dt..tie•, .ua4 tbe propl:)Md toot.note to lo. ~ls .. .au 1t perteotly 

•l.M:r "\hat U .s. autbok'it1e• at ti. Pot.a4u Cotlt'•renca kzlw ot tn. approach 

-4e bf t.be J'apmtae J'oreip Mic.i•tel' to tM Jtwsaiaue •1& Sato, the Ja~ae 

181bullii4or U. llo9cx·r.1, aJ1\\ ~t tbe7 wa1i.4 1n vain '\o Me U tho ~U.•ianlJ 

WOUld fia¥ anything a))out the •PFC.Cb tbl.t _. -49 to 'them. 

3~ !tie t.c:t that t.be ••MP• a.re in ~ pibl1a 4crain U qu1i. 

ol:Jv1ou•* ...,.•.rtbe-le1,, vhethcl:r the &ta.te :Department .mould 1.aolud.- tbl 

~· ot thti ••~• ta tba torthcomtnc 1"\lblicat1oo becauee ot thi• tact 

s.. not &lo~ a •cur1t;r or teehn1C4l q\M•U.on. lt .ao 1twolvea que•tlona 

.t poliq. tor --~ t l 4o not Ml141ft tbt.t tht .. <.?Ut1ve ll.ra.nch of t.ba 

GoY•rnaatnt m.. 4Mtr aelmov~ 1n pr1ut tm.t Japanese ....... _.,.. 

ilrtercepted W ~ bef'ore and 4Uril2g Worl4. V&r llt althou&b1 fi4 QOW." .. , 

the Y&riau.a board.a ur1 t.:Ol'lll21ttec• whieb im'oatiptttd tbe atta.ek on 'Plarl 

Jlar'bor iuuad report.a 1ih1ch .uo AN &io\f 1Jl tbe piblto 4czrain Uld. vbich 

tnclUde the t.ellte or~ ot tntereepWd. and eolwd ••ISO'• •.-ta'bll•h· 

1lll oonclu.eivell' that tl'Mt u.a. ~ s.n eq)i1tam..11t1c act1v1t1••· I• 1-

wt only "P0••1bl• wt ~ quite probable that t'OHllfl' Polia:t VOUl4 prwl•r 

to •11ain&te fralll 'the propo1~ State DepU"tomt publlcat1on all. ottics1&l 

...,..lations at u.a. •uec•ss 111 the 0X7ptaall.ytic field. for inlt..uic., to 

TQP SECREF 

eclassified and approved for release by NSA on 06-19-2014 pursuant to E.O. 

3526 

.. 

!" 
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REF ID:A63913 • 

~ investigated the attack on Pearl Harbor issued reports which are now in the 

A 

.. public domain and which include the texts ~f hundreds of' intercepted and 

solved messages establishing conclusively that the u.s. engaged in cryptanalytic 

activities. It is not only possible but indeed quite probable that COMINT policy 

would prefer to eliminate from the proposed State Department publication all 

official revelations of' U.S. success in the cryptanalytic field. For instance, 

to quote from USCIB Directive No. 16, approved 29 December 1954: 

"III. POLICY 

It is essential that all reference to the existence of any CO?~INT 

activity, either direct or indirect, be avoided except among those to 

whom the knowledge is necessary f'or the pro:per performance of their duties." 

4. In your original teletype note it was also stated that the forthcoming 

State Department publication "would include article describing the u.s. success 

in intercepting and decoding Japanese traffic before and during the war." It 

~&Wt- a-~~ ~Jo~'~""' is ff' understanding that this part of' the project has been dropped ~ut"if t~is 

is still being contemp~ted the text of such a.n article should by all means be 

submitted~or clearance.~ - :to the appropriate --------- authoritie_;;,.-1 

5. For reasons such as the foregoing this matter should, in my opinion, be 

brought before USCIB for determination and I suggest that this be the answer given 

to JIG, who can take it up with the appropriate officials in the office of the Secret 

of Defense. Such action would be consonant with Para. III, 3 of the Directive 

referred to above, which is as follows: 

"3. Public Utterances 

Maximum feasible administrative action will be taken to require that 

all public utterances which may contain information about COMINT are submitted, 

for review and advice, to the cognizant USCIB member prior to such utterance. 

In the event that such information already publicly revealed is included in 

a document submitted by a private source for review, a.n attempt by persuasion 

should be ma.de to either eliminate such information or express it in such 

general terms as to conceal, to the maximum degree possible, specif'ic 

associations with COMINT activities. 11 

~-\,\ }III.LIAM F. FRIEDMAN 
. '' -:.a. I , ~ '• 

REF ID:A63913 

-. - ~,-..' .-...--.... -;., . . ' ,, -;::>Ill ' ) 

,_ . - '';,) 

The S'tat., Dopartznetut vill .con l8k4' pi'blic the wartime Hem 

~nta cd here la rq predioticnl :rep.rdil>g one impor'tMt at:tr;:rei.; 

atte~t1na the peace ot the worJ.4. ':l:Mt Yaltft. ~nt~ 1 predict, 

Vill lbov that fl'aQklin AoQaevolt w:'&ed lta.11.A to tnter tbe J&pa.Mh 

Var Just u eoon •a OeX'Jllit.D¥ aurnnd~red. In ardor to pt •UCh a 

prom.tee tram St.allA, ilooffV•lt and Church1ll .f'lml l;r p."'1 ?tus•1* 

the- folloving territoqa 'the l.\u'ile X.land.s, au or Ou.ter Mongolia, 

am. two~ leapOrt• in lf&nchuriA1 tlairen, ani! 'Port A;rthl,lr. 

Despite thia parantee that RU1•1a wul.4 tanter t.lle Ja~ae \lar1 

I predict that h11tocy vill obov that Stalin came to the Pota&m 

Con:rercenc• with a Japl\lleee peace ptOp!)aal in b.ia pocket but a. d.14 

lllOt 41•cloae thi• Joytul Sltl'iil to Cb.\U'ch.ill an.<t 'trwlle.n. Actua.U.)r, 'thq 

lmev he had a. .fapane1& ottor bee&Uff ,,. ad been docodina Jaian•• MC:ret 

eablee £l.1ld. liO ~and Churchill aited MYexal 49¥• tor Stalin to 

ate lmo'Jll the Japanese ,ropoaal. loitOVer, vhen Stali~ e&id. .nothina 

~ and ChurcbiU ~grettully conolutled that lulaia. d.id. not van't 

the J'apaneH war to .na and I pre41crt that hi•to:t'7 vtll •how thia 

_. vlq Trurae.n and Churchill tiaell.y Aeaided to O.rop tz. attn b«:lb" 

13 M&r/1 J>·•· 

..,,, -