16-3227 In re Thomas R. Heavey UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AF TER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERM ITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROC EDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPEND IX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATAB ASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMM ARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Cour t of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courth ouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 25 th day of January, two thousand eighteen. PRESENT: RORBERT A. KATZMANN, Chief Judge , ROBERT D. SACK, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges

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---------------------------- ---------------------------- -------------- I N RE : T HOMAS R. H EAVEY , No. 16-3227 Debtor

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---------------------------- ---------------------------- -------------- J OHN S. P EREIRA , as chapter 7 trust ee for the Estate of Thomas R. Heavey, Trustee-Appellant ,

v. 397 R EALTY LLC, Creditor-Appellee

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---------------------------- ---------------------------- -------------- For Appellant: J OHN P. C AMPO , Akerman LLP, New York City, New York. For Appellee: D AVID H. S INGER , David H. Singer & Associates, P.C., New York City, New York.2 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Cogan, J. ). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment ente red on August 17, 2016, is AFFIRMED

. Trustee-Appellant John S. Pereira, as chap ter 7 trustee (the “Trustee”) for the estate of Thomas R. Heavey (“Heavey ”), appeals from the district court’s decision reversing, in part, a decision by the bankruptcy court find ing that Creditor-Appellee 397 Realty LLC’s (“397 Realty”) post-petition actions violated the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4). Before the bankruptcy court, the Trustee moved for summary judgment asserting that 397 Realty violated the automatic stay when 397 Realty’s counsel “contacted the Kings County Clerk” to inquire why 39 7 Realty’s timely filed but inexplicably undocketed lien extension orde r did not appear on the King s County Clerk’s docket. App’x at 126, ¶ 17. “When a bankruptcy appeal reaches us after district court review of the bankruptcy court order, our review of the bankruptcy c ourt order is plenary. In undertaking this plenary review, we independently review the factual determinations and legal conclusions of the bankruptcy court, evaluating the bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” In re N. New England Tel. Operations LLC , 795 F.3d 343, 346 (2d Cir. 2015) (interna l citation and quotation marks om itted). In so doing, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decisi on to affirm the district court’s decision.3 The bankruptcy court found that 397 Rea lty’s inquiry to the Kings County Clerk resulted in the post-petition docke ting of a lien against estate property and constituted a sanctionable violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4 )’s automatic stay of “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate.” The district court disagreed, holding that a creditor violates § 362(a)(4) only if it is “reas onably foreseeable” that its act will result in the creation, perfec tion, or enforcement of a lien ag ainst property of the estate. App’x at 534. Because it was not reasonab ly foreseeable that the Kings County Clerk would act on 397 Realty’s inqu iry by docketing the extension or der, the district court held that 397 Realty’s inquiry did not violate the automatic stay. This case, however, does not turn on reasonable fore seeability. 397 Realty’s reflexive response did not viol ate the automatic stay because it was not an act to create, perfect, or enforce a lien against Heavey’s pr operty. Pursuant to the automatic stay provision, the filing of a bankru ptcy petition “operates as a stay of . . . any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4). While the adjective “any” suggests that Section 362(a )(4) paints with a broad brush, the statute also contains the descriptive in finitives “to create, perfect, or enforce.” These infinitives describe the types of “acts” that the automatic stay prohibits. In other words, only acts to create, perfect, or enforce a lien against property of the estate violate the automatic stay. Based on the facts that formed the ba sis of the Trustee’s motion for summary judgment, 397 Realty’s counse l merely asked the Kings Coun ty Clerk what happened to his timely filed extension order. On the fact s before us, there is no indication that 3974 Realty demanded that the Kings County Clerk correct its mistake, nor is there any evidence to suggest that 397 Realty engaged in anyt hing more than a simple factfinding inquiry. Section 362(a)(4) does not prohib it all acts which coincidentally set in motion the creation, perfection, or enforcement of a lien. Rathe r, the prohibited, and thus compensable, act must be an act to create, to perfect, or to enforce a lien. Because 397 Realty engaged only in factfinding and did not attempt to create, pe rfect, or enforce its lie n, 397 Realty did not violate the automatic stay. In urging otherwise, the Trustee cites In Re Parr Meadows Racing Ass’n , 880 F.2d 1540 (2d Cir. 1989), for the proposition that a vi olation of the stay “need not even be an ‘act’ at all, but can be tri ggered without any action by th e lienholder.” Appellant’s Br. at 9. The facts of In Re Parr Meadows Racing Ass’n are distinguishable from the case at hand. Tax liens in favor of government en tities that arise by operation of law are sui generis , carrying with them their own treatment a nd exemptions as government interests under Section 362. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b). Furthermore, our holding there rested on our conclusion that the tax liens “d id not come passively into being ‘by operation of law’; rather, they were created and perfected as a direct result of the county’s assessment and taxation process, which consists of several ‘affirmative acts’ by county, town, and school district officers, administrators, and agents.” In Re Parr Meadow s Racing Ass’n , 880 F.2d at 1545. Accordingly, In Re Parr Meadows Racing Ass’n does not upset our conclusion that 397 Realty did not take an affirmative act to create, perfect, or enforce a lien against Heavey’s property.5 We have considered the Trustee’s remaini ng arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk