In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐2242

KERRY ADOLPHSON,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent‐Appellee.

____________________

Petition for Review of an Order of the United States Tax Court.

No. 21816‐14L — Lewis R. Carluzzo, Special Trial Judge.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 27, 2016 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 18, 2016

____________________

Before FLAUM, MANION, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. This is a difficult tax case made

more so by the refusal of the Commissioner of Internal Rev‐

enue to engage the taxpayer’s arguments or the tax court’s

decision. Kerry Adolphson, who has failed to file a tax re‐

turn since at least 2002, challenges levies used by the IRS to

collect his unpaid taxes. The tax court dismissed his petition

for lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction because Adolphson

had not challenged the levies administratively, see 26 U.S.C.
2 No. 15‐2242

§ 6330(d), and, therefore, lacked the requisite notice of de‐

termination from the IRS Office of Appeals.  

Adolphson contends that because the IRS prevented him

from obtaining a notice of determination by failing to

properly notify him of its intent to levy, the tax court should

have declared the levies invalid. To support his argument,

Adolphson relies on a line of cases where the tax court ac‐

cepted this argument and invalidated levies despite the fact

that absent a notice of determination, the tax court lacks the

statutory authority to hear a taxpayer’s claim. While we

agree with Adolphson that his case is indistinguishable from

this line of tax court precedent, we affirm the judgment dis‐

missing Adolphson’s petition because we find that those de‐

cisions are unsound and reflect an improper extension of the

tax court’s jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

The IRS’s authority to levy a taxpayer’s property is gov‐

erned by 26 U.S.C. § 6330, which states that “[n]o levy may

be made on any property or right to property of any person

unless the Secretary has notified such person in writing of

their right to a hearing under this section before such levy is

made.” Id. § 6330(a)(1). This “Final Notice of Intent to Levy”

may be given in person, left at the taxpayer’s home or place

of business, or sent by certified mail to the person’s last

known address. Id. § 6330(a)(2). After issuance, the taxpayer

has 30 days to request a “collection due process hearing”

(“CDP hearing”) with the Office of Appeals, at which the

person may challenge both the levy activities and the under‐

lying tax debt, if there has not previously been an opportuni‐

ty to do so. Id. § 6330(b),(c). After the hearing, the Office of

Appeals issues a notice of its determination, which authoriz‐
No. 15‐2242 3

es a dissatisfied taxpayer to petition the tax court for review

within 30 days. Id. § 6330(d). We have held that the tax court

lacks subject‐matter jurisdiction to review IRS collection ac‐

tivities unless the aggrieved taxpayer has obtained a notice

of determination. See Gray v. Comm’r, 723 F.3d 790, 792–93

(7th Cir. 2013); Cleveland v. Comm’r, 600 F.3d 739, 741 (7th

Cir. 2010).  

In 2014, the IRS set out to collect $244,464 in unpaid taxes

and penalties assessed against Adolphson for tax years 2002

and 2006 through 2010. According to Adolphson, he was

unaware of the IRS’s collection efforts until May 2014, when

the agency levied on his funds held by third parties. Rather

than challenge the levies directly with the IRS, Adolphson

filed a pro se petition in September 2014, asking the tax court

to enjoin collection efforts by the IRS and refund amounts

already collected through the levies. Adolphson argued that

the levies are invalid because the IRS had not mailed him a

Final Notice of Intent to Levy as required, and so he was de‐

prived of the right to challenge the liability in a CDP hearing

before the IRS Office of Appeals. He relied on several tax

court decisions, including Buffano v. Commissioner, 93 T.C.M.

(CCH) 901 (2007), in which the tax court asserted that it

lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction without a notice of deter‐

mination, yet nevertheless invalidated levies after finding

that the taxpayer was prevented from requesting a CDP

hearing by the IRS’s failure to mail a Final Notice of Intent to

Levy to the proper address.  

The Commissioner initially responded by asserting that

the statutorily required notices had been “mailed” but said

that further investigation was needed to ascertain where

those notices were sent. The Commissioner never provided
4 No. 15‐2242

an answer to that question, however, and instead moved to

dismiss Adolphson’s petition. The Commissioner argued

that the tax court lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction under 26

U.S.C. § 6330(d), because Adolphson had not requested a

CDP hearing. Absent a CDP hearing, Adolphson could not

have received a notice of determination from the IRS Office

of Appeals. The Commissioner maintained that without a

notice of determination, the tax court had no power to re‐

view the levies or to determine whether the IRS had issued

them properly. In his motion, the Commissioner did not

acknowledge Buffano or the other decisions in which the tax

court had invalidated levies—notwithstanding the absence

of a notice of determination—based on the same argument

Adolphson advanced.  

Despite contending that the tax court lacked jurisdiction,

however, the Commissioner responded to Adolphson’s chal‐

lenge on the merits. The Commissioner noted that Final No‐

tices of Intent had been issued on March 11, 2010 and Janu‐

ary 16, 2014. While IRS records indicated that Adolphson’s

address had been updated in 2006, and then again in 2014,

the Commissioner was unable to say “with certainty”

whether the Final Notices of Intent were sent to the proper

addresses. Although the Commissioner conceded that the

Notices of Intent to Levy were invalid if mailed to the im‐

proper address, which would mean that the levies must be

reversed, the Commissioner once more reiterated that absent

a CDP letter, the Court lacked jurisdiction over the collection

matter pursuant to Section 6330(d)(1).

The only supporting documents that the Commissioner

provided were unauthenticated copies of Adolphson’s tran‐

scripts of account for the years at issue and an unauthenti‐
No. 15‐2242 5

cated computer printout listing dates on which his address

of record had been changed in the IRS system. These exhibits

corroborate the Commissioner’s account of when the Final

Notices of Intent to Levy were issued but, as acknowledged

by the Commissioner, the documents do not show where any

of the notices were mailed. Indeed, these computerized rec‐

ords are not even adequate to establish a use of the mail,

since they only state that the Final Notices of Intent to Levy

were “issued” (one in 2010, pertaining to tax year 2002, and

a second in 2014, for tax years 2006 through 2010). A post

office box in Iowa is given as Adolphson’s address on each

transcript of account (all of which were generated by the IRS

from its database after Adolphson had petitioned the tax

court in September 2014). The 2002 transcript also shows

that the Final Notice of Intent to Levy for that year, issued in

2010, was returned as “undeliverable.”

While Adolphson conceded that he lacked a notice of de‐

termination, he urged the tax court to apply Buffano and in‐

validate the levies because the IRS had prevented him from

requesting a CDP hearing by failing to send him a Final No‐

tice of Intent to Levy for any of the relevant tax years. He

further argued that although the Commissioner’s exhibits

listed an Iowa address, his “address for the last 5 years has

and always has been” in Illinois.

At that point the Commissioner conceded that the IRS

could not establish through its records where the agency had

sent either of the Final Notices of Intent to Levy. The Com‐

missioner speculated, though, that the Iowa address on the

transcripts of account is “the most likely address to which

these notices were sent.” As before, the Commissioner did

not acknowledge—much less try to distinguish—the tax
6 No. 15‐2242

court decisions relied upon by Adolphson, instead faulting

him for the agency’s floundering while continuing to insist

that the tax court lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction to inval‐

idate the levies. Nor did the Commissioner submit addition‐

al evidence, instead relying upon the assertion that IRS “rec‐

ords reflect that Notice was mailed,” which misrepresents

the strength of the agency’s evidence, since (with the possi‐

ble exception of the 2010 notice that was returned “undeliv‐

erable”) those records reflect nothing more than dates of is‐

suance.

Adolphson then produced a letter he “ha[d] recently

come across,” which the IRS sent in November 2012 to the

Illinois address where he claimed to have resided for more

than five years. This letter, he argued, proves that the IRS

was aware of his Illinois address for more than a year before

issuing (and apparently mailing to Iowa) the Final Notice of

Intent to Levy for tax years 2006 through 2010. Adolphson

pointed out explicitly that the Commissioner still had not

acknowledged Buffano and other decisions in which the tax

court had invalidated levies where the IRS could not prove

proper mailing.

The tax court granted the Commissioner’s motion to

dismiss, reasoning that it lacked the authority to grant relief

under § 6330(d) without a notice of determination. The tax

court acknowledged the IRS’s inability to show where it had

mailed the Final Notices of Intent to Levy, but distinguished

Buffano with the explanation that Adolphson—the taxpayer—

had failed to establish where the notices should have been

mailed.
No. 15‐2242 7

II. ANALYSIS

We review de novo the tax court’s dismissal of a petition

for a lack of jurisdiction. Estate of Kunze v. C.I.R., 233 F.3d

948, 950 (7th Cir. 2000). Although we find that this case is

indistinguishable from the Buffano line of cases, because we

find that those cases were decided in error, we will affirm

the tax court’s dismissal of Adolphson’s petition for lack of

jurisdiction.

A. The Improperly Authenticated Transcripts of Ac‐

count Do Not Affect the Outcome of Adolphson’s

Appeal

In this court, Adolphson principally argues that the tran‐

scripts of account attached to the Commissioner’s motion to

dismiss were not admissible or, at the very least, not proper‐

ly authenticated. Adolphson is correct that the Federal Rules

of Evidence apply in the tax court, see 26 U.S.C. § 7453, and

though transcripts of account are admissible if properly au‐

thenticated, these were not. See United States v. Ryan, 969

F.2d 238, 239 (7th Cir. 1992). That said, Adolphson’s argu‐

ment is a distraction; he treated the transcripts as valid be‐

fore the tax court and, more importantly, the tax court’s de‐

cision does not turn on their content.

B. Under the Reasoning of Buffano, the Tax Court

Should Have Invalidated the Levies   

The significant issue in this appeal is the one that

Adolphson has been pressing since the beginning: the tax

court should have invalidated the IRS’s levies under Buffano.

We agree that this case is indistinguishable from Buffano.

In Buffano, the IRS mailed a Final Notice of Intent to Levy

to the address listed on the taxpayer’s most recently filed tax
8 No. 15‐2242

return (an address where the taxpayer no longer lived). On

the same day, though, the IRS also mailed two unrelated let‐

ters to the taxpayer’s current address, which the agency had

obtained through a Postal Service database. The IRS’s letters

did not mention collection activity, and when the taxpayer

learned later that the agency had levied on his wages, he

promptly requested a CDP hearing. The IRS refused to con‐

duct a CDP hearing because the agency had received the

taxpayer’s request more than 30 days after issuance of the

Final Notice of Intent to Levy. The taxpayer nevertheless pe‐

titioned the tax court for review, and the Commissioner

moved to dismiss for lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction, cit‐

ing the absence of a notice of determination. Buffano, 93

T.C.M. (CCH) 901, at *2–3. The tax court denied the Com‐

missioner’s motion to dismiss, yet still entered an order dis‐

missing for lack of jurisdiction—but only after invalidating

the levies based on a finding that the IRS had mailed the fi‐

nal notice to the wrong address. The tax court reasoned that

the taxpayer’s current address, which the IRS had obtained

from the Postal Service database and used in the two letters

sent to him, had superseded, for purposes of his “last known

address,” the one listed on his most recently filed tax return.

Id. at *4–5.  

This analysis—dismissing the taxpayer’s petition for lack

of jurisdiction while still granting the very relief he seeks—is

illogical, but Buffano is not an outlier. That 2007 decision has

been relied upon to invalidate levies in situations analogous

to Adolphson’s at least seven times in published decisions

(and we cannot be sure that there are not even more, un‐

published instances). See Minemeyer v. Comm’r, 104 T.C.M.

(CCH) 616, at *4 (2012); Roberts v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op.

No. 7222‐09S, at *3 (2010); Space v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH)
No. 15‐2242 9

328, at *2–4 (2009); Kennedy v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1121,

at *3 (2008); Graham v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1504, at *5

(2008); Downing v. Comm’r, 94 T.C.M. (CCH) 319, at *8 (2007);

Schwengel v. Comm’r, No. 13979‐06L (T.C. Nov. 20, 2007).  

In other decisions, the tax court has relied on Buffano but

sided with the Commissioner, dismissing petitions for lack

of jurisdiction because the required notices had been proper‐

ly mailed and the petitions were, therefore, untimely. See,

e.g., Anson v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1504, at *4 (2010). To

further complicate matters, the tax court has been incon‐

sistent; for example, in Walthers v. Commissioner, 97 T.C.M.

(CCH) 1793, at *2–3 (2009), it cited Buffano in concluding that

the IRS had failed to properly mail notice to the taxpayer,

but still refused to enjoin collection of the (invalid) levies,

citing the absence of a notice of determination.

C. Buffano Improperly Expanded the Scope of the Tax

Court’s Jurisdiction in the Absence of a Notice of

Determination   

The outcome of this case, therefore, turns on the validity

of the Buffano line of cases. If the tax court has the power un‐

der § 6330 to evaluate the sufficiency of the IRS’s collection

activities and invalidate levies where the agency fails to

properly mail notice, then Adolphson should have pre‐

vailed. Direct evidence is required when the IRS must prove

that it properly mailed notice, and a computer printout list‐

ing a mailing date but without an address will not suffice.

Walthers, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1793, at *2. Here, the Commis‐

sioner cannot even say with certainty to what address

Adolphson’s notice was mailed, much less prove that it was

sent by certified mail to his “last known address.” And the

tax court’s ground for distinguishing Buffano is untenable;
10 No. 15‐2242

the court rejected the petition due to “the paucity of infor‐

mation,” Adolphson’s failure to state what address was

shown on his last tax return, and because, the court rea‐

soned, the address shown on the 2012 letter is “hardly de‐

terminative as to his ‘last known address’ for purposes of

section 6330.” This reasoning improperly shifts the burden

to Adolphson to prove that the IRS met its own statutory duty

to notify him before levying his assets. It strikes us as non‐

sensical to fault the taxpayer for not establishing where the

IRS should have mailed notice if the agency concedes, as it did

here, that it cannot say if notice was mailed to New York or

Los Angeles or somewhere in between.

Moreover, this question of burden‐shifting aside,

Adolphson’s contention that the IRS should have used his

Illinois address has merit. In the tax court, the agency assert‐

ed that twice it had updated Adolphson’s address using the

Postal Service database—presumably to his Illinois address,

where the 2012 letter was mailed—yet the agency conceded

that it “most likely” sent the Final Notices of Intent to Levy

to Iowa. See Gyorgy v. Comm’r, 779 F.3d 466, 475–76 (7th Cir.

2015) (noting that treasury regulations treat an updated ad‐

dress in the Postal Service database as “clear and concise no‐

tification” of taxpayer’s address); McPartlin v. Comm’r, 653

F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1981) (explaining that notice sent by

certified mail will be deemed insufficient if Commissioner

cannot produce return receipt); Pyo v. Comm’r, 83 T.C. 626,

636–37 (1984) (concluding that taxpayers were reasonably

entitled to assume, after receiving correspondence from IRS

at new address, that future mailings would be sent to same

address). In other words, had the tax court followed Buffano

and required the Commissioner to prove proper mailing, the
No. 15‐2242 11

“paucity of information” should have led to a win for

Adolphson.

Hearing the Commissioner’s views on Buffano would

have been enlightening, but, unfortunately, the Commis‐

sioner’s response brief is particularly unhelpful. Indeed,

when asked at oral argument if we should invalidate the

Buffano line of cases, the Commissioner specifically dis‐

claimed any request for us to do so. This reticence is surpris‐

ing given that it would seem that the IRS has a strong inter‐

est in asking us to overturn these decisions. Meanwhile the

Commissioner makes no attempt to justify the IRS’s collec‐

tion activities in this case and fails even to acknowledge the

agency’s inability to prove that it sent notice to Adolphson.

Instead, the Commissioner insists that Adolphson is relegat‐

ed either to an administrative claim before the IRS or a re‐

fund suit in district court, while maintaining that “whether

the IRS mailed a Notice of Intent to Levy to taxpayer’s last

known address is not relevant in this case.” The Commis‐

sioner also makes no attempt to defend the tax court’s

ground for distinguishing Buffano, stating only that Adolph‐

son’s argument is “misconceived.”

But instead of explaining why Adolphson’s reliance on

Buffano is “misconceived,” the Commissioner simply chang‐

es the subject and asserts that Adolphson, proceeding pro se,

erred by asking the tax court to enjoin further collection ef‐

forts and refund money already collected, rather than asking

the court to invalidate the levies. Because the tax court had

no jurisdiction to issue injunctions or order refunds, the

Commissioner argues, the court lacked jurisdiction to grant

the specific relief requested. This is not helpful; the issue is

whether the tax court had the power to determine the suffi‐
12 No. 15‐2242

ciency of the IRS’s mailings, not whether Adolphson knew

to specifically ask for invalidation as opposed to an injunc‐

tion. The Commissioner continues to pretend that Buffano

and its progeny do not exist, while simultaneously arguing

that the tax court lacks jurisdiction absent a notice of deter‐

mination.

Notwithstanding this unwillingness to confront the sali‐

ent issue, the Commissioner is correct that, absent a notice of

determination, the tax court lacks jurisdiction under 26

U.S.C. § 6330(d). See 14 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME

TAXATION, § 50:22 (Jane C. Bergner ed., 2016) (explaining

that a notice of determination is a taxpayer’s “ticket” to tax

court and that court lacks jurisdiction over claim by taxpayer

who fails to timely request, and receive, a CDP hearing);

Hauptman v. Comm’r, 831 F.3d 950 (8th Cir. 2016) (recogniz‐

ing that a notice of determination is a prerequisite to tax

court jurisdiction under § 6330). A decision invalidating ad‐

ministrative action for not following statutory procedures is

a quintessential merits analysis, not a jurisdictional ruling.

The Buffano line of cases therefore represents an improper

extension of the tax court’s statutorily defined jurisdiction.  

This practice of invalidating collection activity where the

tax court lacks statutory authority to proceed also violates

the Tax Anti‐Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), which (with

exceptions inapplicable here) provides that “no suit for the

purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax

shall be maintained in any court by any person.” This statute

deprives courts of jurisdiction to enter pre‐collection injunc‐

tions and “protects the Government’s ability to collect a con‐

sistent stream of revenue” by ensuring that “taxes can ordi‐

narily be challenged only after they are paid, by suing for a
No. 15‐2242 13

refund” under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.

v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2582 (2012); Korte v. Sebelius, 735

F.3d 654, 669 (7th Cir. 2013). By invalidating levies despite

the absence of a notice of determination under § 6330—a

taxpayer’s jurisdictional hook to enter tax court—decisions

such as Buffano stand in direct opposition to the Act.

We note that, as far as we can tell, this framework for in‐

validating levies through a jurisdictional dismissal appears

to have originated in a related but distinct context. The tax

court in Buffano extended (without discussion) a much older

and less problematic practice related to a different area of

the tax court’s jurisdiction. When the IRS determines that a

taxpayer (who, presumably, has filed tax returns) underpaid

for a particular year, it issues a notice of deficiency (not to be

confused with the notice of determination at issue here). The

taxpayer may then immediately petition the tax court for re‐

determination of the alleged deficiency under

26 U.S.C. § 6213(a). In other words, no agency appeal is re‐

quired—a taxpayer may go straight to the tax court as long

as the petition is filed within 90 days of the deficiency notice.  

But when the taxpayer does not learn of the deficiency

and petition for redetermination until more than 90 days af‐

ter assessment, the IRS typically moves to dismiss the peti‐

tion for lack of jurisdiction on timeliness grounds. The tax

court then analyzes the IRS’s proof of mailing to determine

whether the deficiency notice met statutory requirements. If

notice was properly mailed, the case will be dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction as untimely. See Lee v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M.

(CCH) 1634, at *2–3 (2011). But if the IRS cannot produce

records or the tax court finds that the address used is not the

taxpayer’s legal “last known address,” the court will side
14 No. 15‐2242

with the taxpayers and deem the notice insufficient (prevent‐

ing further collection activity until the IRS complies with

procedural requirements). See King v. Comm’r, 857 F.2d 676,

681 (9th Cir. 1988); Crum v. Comm’r, 635 F.2d 895, 900–01

(D.C. Cir. 1980) (reversing tax court’s dismissal for lack of

jurisdiction to give taxpayer “the opportunity, as provided

by statute, to seek in the Tax Court a redetermination of the

1969 deficiency prior to payment upon the filing of a timely

petition”). This makes sense because the Congressional in‐

tent of providing taxpayers a forum to resolve a disputed

deficiency is met, and because the jurisdictional require‐

ment—a deficiency assessed by the IRS—must exist for the

IRS to pursue any collection efforts, whether or not the tax‐

payer physically possesses the notice.  

Over time, this morphed into a practice by which taxpay‐

ers who wish to argue that the IRS never properly served

notice of a deficiency will file a petition, then immediately

move for dismissal of their own petition for lack of jurisdic‐

tion on the ground that a deficiency was not properly sent.

See, e.g., Pyo v. Comm’r, 83 T.C. 626, 631–32 (1984); Mulder v.

Comm’r, 855 F.2d 208, 210–12 (5th Cir. 1988). Although call‐

ing this ground for dismissal “jurisdictional” is a misnomer,

the logical underpinning is the same: The tax court is deter‐

mining whether the IRS has met statutory requirements to

proceed with collection, but there isn’t a question of whether

or not the jurisdictional hook exists (were there no deficien‐

cy, there would be nothing to collect).

Buffano applied the analysis long used for cases in which

a taxpayer challenges a notice of deficiency, but applied it to a

case where the IRS had never issued a determination notice,

without analyzing the significant differences between the
No. 15‐2242 15

two grants of jurisdiction. Buffano, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 901, at

*3–5. The tax court improperly transferred this longstanding

practice to a new context without considering that under

§ 6330, absent a notice of determination concerning levy ac‐

tivities, the tax court has nothing to review.

No circuit court has directly addressed the practice of in‐

validating a levy through a jurisdictional dismissal, although

the D.C. Circuit recently remanded to the tax court for it to

consider, among other arguments, whether it has jurisdic‐

tion over a claim identical to that in Buffano. Edwards v.

Comm’r, 791 F.3d 1, 7–8 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The absence of rele‐

vant case law perhaps is not surprising, however, since the

Commissioner chose not to appeal any adverse decision rest‐

ing on Buffano. Instead, the IRS’s Chief Counsel has advised

the agency to maintain better mailing records than applica‐

ble regulations require because, “if [a] taxpayer alleges that

he never received a CDP notice and the Service cannot prove

that it mailed the notice by certified or registered mail, the

[tax] court will dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction on the

basis that the CDP notice was invalid.” IRS Chief Counsel

Advice 200842042, 2008 WL 4610126.  

The framework used in Buffano to scrutinize the IRS’s

compliance with its statutory obligations does have equita‐

ble appeal; a taxpayer to whom the IRS fails to mail a Final

Notice of Intent to Levy and, through no fault of her own,

misses the 30‐day window to request a CDP hearing might

otherwise be left without an opportunity to petition the tax

court prior to seizure of her assets. This is the system de‐

vised by Congress, however, and at least one circuit decision

has rejected an argument that the tax court must have juris‐

diction to address this apparent problem. In Boyd v. Commis‐
16 No. 15‐2242

sioner, 451 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 2006), taxpayers argued that the

IRS “negate[d] Congress’s grant of jurisdiction by withhold‐

ing the very process [a CDP hearing] that is designed to give

taxpayers fair opportunity to challenge the agency’s deci‐

sion‐making.” In rejecting the argument that the tax court

has equitable power to hear such claims despite the absence

of a notice of determination, the court noted that an ag‐

grieved taxpayer unable to access the tax court has an alter‐

nate remedy: a refund suit in district court. Id. at 11. Trou‐

bling though this “remedy” may be, given the expense and

potential delays inherent in such a suit, there is no lawful

basis for expanding the tax court’s jurisdiction to resolve the

perceived problem. Absent a notice of determination, the tax

court simply has no lawful authority to hear a taxpayer’s

claim under § 6330(d).

III. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the decision of the tax court dismissing

Adolphson’s petition for lack of jurisdiction.