Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

Order 

October 11, 2013

147175

TOWNSHIP OF RICHMOND,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 147175

COA: 304444

Macomb CC: 2006-001054-CZ

RONDIGO, L.L.C., 2006-004429-CZ

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 5, 2013 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, there being no 

majority in favor of granting leave to appeal or taking other action.

YOUNG, C.J. and VIVIANO, J., would grant leave to appeal.

MARKMAN, J. (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. In my judgment, the Court of Appeals erred by holding that 

defendant could not receive attorney fees and costs pursuant to MCR 286.473b absent 

compliance by defendant’s farm or farm operation with “generally accepted agricultural 

and management practices” (GAAMPs). 

MCR 286.473b states:

In any nuisance action brought in which a farm or farm operation is 

alleged to be a nuisance, if the defendant farm or farm operation prevails, 

the farm or farm operation may recover from the plaintiff the actual amount 

of costs and expenses determined by the court to have been reasonably 

incurred by the farm or farm operation in connection with the defense of the 

action, together with reasonable and actual attorney fees. [Emphasis added.]
I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 October 11, 2013

s1008

2

Clerk

MCL 286.473(1) states in part:

A farm or farm operation shall not be found to be a public or private 

nuisance if the farm or farm operation alleged to be a nuisance conforms to 

generally accepted agricultural and management practices according to 

policy determined by the Michigan commission of agriculture.

The Court of Appeals held that “the plain language of MCL 286.473(1) expressly 

conditions [Right to Farm Act] immunity from characterization as a nuisance on a farm’s 

or a farm operation’s conformance to [GAAMPs].” Richmond Twp v Rondigo, LLC, 

unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 5, 2013 (Docket 

No. 304444), p 6. I disagree. The provision in MCL 286.473(1) that a GAAMPscompliant farm or farm operation is immune from characterization as a “nuisance” 

constitutes one way, but not the only way, in which a defendant farm or farm operation 

can prevail in a nuisance action and thus receive costs under MCL 286.473b. 

Furthermore, MCL 286.473b states that a defendant farm or farm operation that prevails 

in any nuisance action in which that defendant is alleged to be a nuisance is entitled to 

expenses. MCL 286.473b contains no language limiting the award of fees and costs to 

defendants who are compliant with GAAMPs. Simply, if a farm or farm operation is not 

compliant with GAAMPs but prevails in a nuisance action, nothing in MCL 286.473b 

suggests that the farm or farm operation cannot receive costs. Because there was no 

dispute that defendant’s composting activity constituted a “farm or farm operation,” and 

because defendant prevailed in the litigation of the township’s failed nuisance claims 

pertaining to defendant’s composting activities, defendant should have been permitted to 

recover costs and expenses reasonably incurred “in connection with the defense of the 

action, together with reasonable and actual attorney fees.” MCL 286.473b. Accordingly, 

I would reverse this portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals and award attorney 

fees and costs to defendant.

ZAHRA, J., did not participate because he was on the Court of Appeals panel at an 

earlier stage of the proceedings.