IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

July 20, 2022 Session

RAYMOND SINES v. REGINA TINNIN

Appeal from the General Sessions Court for Bledsoe County

No. 2018-DV-3220 Howard L. Upchurch, Judge

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No. E2021-01434-COA-R3-CV

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This post-divorce appeal arises from the trial court’s designation of the primary residential 

parent of two minor children. Due to the lack of a transcript or a statement of the evidence, 

we must affirm. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the General Sessions Court 

Affirmed; Case Remanded

JOHN W. MCCLARTY,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS R. FRIERSON,

II, and KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., joined.

Joseph F. Della-Rodolfa, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Raymond Sines. 

Douglas Thomas Bates, IV, Centerville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Regina Tinnin.

OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

Although we do not have a verbatim transcript of the evidence or a statement of the 

evidence, we glean the following facts from the pleadings and trial court’s orders in the 

technical record. Raymond Sines (“Father”) and Regina Tinnin (“Mother”) married in 

August 2013. Two children were born of the marriage, Chloe and Odin (collectively “the 

children”), born in June 2014 and November 2015, respectively. The parties lived in 

Pikeville, Tennessee during the last five years of the marriage. The parties work outside 

the home. Mother owns and operates a soap business. Father is self-employed. 

In early 2018, Mother left the marital residence with the children and relocated to 

Centerville, Tennessee. She refused to provide her exact location to Father but permitted 

10/20/2022
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some visitation until Father filed for divorce on March 19, 2018 and sought emergency 

custody of the children. The parties then negotiated a temporary parenting plan, providing 

equal co-parenting time pending the outcome of the proceedings. The children participated 

in counseling. The parties were divorced by order and final decree of the court on 

December 27, 2019, but reserved issues relating to the parenting plan to be heard later. 

The remaining issues pertaining to co-parenting proceeded to a hearing over the 

course of two days on January 24 and February 4, 2020. Mother, Father, a counselor, and 

an educator affiliated with Montessori testified. The trial exhibits, including what the trial 

court described as a “lengthy report which was introduced by stipulation from Dr. William

Hillner,” are not in the appellate record. Following the hearing, the trial court’s March 12, 

2020 ruling designated Mother as the primary residential parent, with Father receiving 

equal co-parenting time.1 The trial court surmised that “the marriage was defined by . . . 

repeated petty disputes” and noted that each party used his or her trial testimony “to paint 

the other in a bad light and to emphasize the other’s negative traits and mistakes that he or 

she made in the marriage.” The trial court found “significant issues” with each parent’s 

credibility “on certain matters that were addressed during his or her testimony.” In 

particular, the trial court “put significant weight upon [the factor of] each parent’s ability 

to facilitate and encourage the parent-child relationship with the other party,” finding as 

follows:

And this factor, in my mind, clearly favors the mother. And I think I have to 

look no further than the father’s emergency custody request in March of 

2018, after the mother had moved to Hickman County—I believe it’s 

Centerville where she moved to. The father secured an order based upon 

pleadings that were either incomplete or contained incomplete facts or 

exaggerated facts, perhaps even false allegations. 

 The trial court ordered the parties to jointly decide the children’s non-emergency 

medical care, religious upbringing, education, and extracurricular activities. The trial court 

incorporated its March 12, 2020 ruling into an order entered July 7, 2020. Pursuant to 

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59, Father moved the court to alter or amend its order 

arguing that the parenting plan ordered by the court was in error and contrary to the weight 

of the evidence and the statutory factors. He requested to be designated primary residential 

parent. By order entered November 5, 2021, the trial court denied Father’s motion. The 

trial court noted that during the hearing on his Rule 59 motion, Father abandoned his 

previous request to reopen the proof. Father appealed. 

 

1 The trial court ruled that the parenting time would remain equal if Father secured housing within 

seventy-five miles of Hickman County. 
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II. ISSUES

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in its 

designation of Mother as the primary residential parent. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a non-jury case de novo upon the record, with a presumption of 

correctness as to the findings of fact unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. 

See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000). This 

presumption of correctness applies only to findings of fact and not to conclusions of law. 

Campbell v. Fla. Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996). The trial court’s 

conclusions of law are subject to a de novo review with no presumption of correctness. 

Blackburn v. Blackburn, 270 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Tenn. 2008); Union Carbide Corp. v. 

Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). The trial court’s determinations regarding 

witness credibility are entitled to great weight on appeal and shall not be disturbed absent 

clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See Morrison v. Allen, 338 S.W.3d 417, 

426 (Tenn. 2011). 

Trial courts have “broad discretion in formulating parenting plans” because they 

“are in a better position to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility.” C.W.H. v. 

L.A.S., 538 S.W.3d 488, 495 (Tenn. 2017) (citing Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 

685, 693 (Tenn. 2013)). “A trial court’s broad discretion on custody matters extends to the 

question of which parent should be named primary residential parent.” Grissom v. 

Grissom, 586 S.W.3d 387, 391 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019). On appeal, we review a trial court’s 

decision regarding the details of a residential parenting schedule for an abuse of discretion. 

Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693 (citing Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 

2001)). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court . . . appl[ies] an incorrect legal 

standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a clearly erroneous assessment of 

the evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an injustice.” Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 

350 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2011). “A trial court abuses its discretion in establishing a 

residential parenting schedule ‘only when the trial court’s ruling falls outside the spectrum 

of rulings that might reasonably result from an application of the correct legal standards to 

the evidence found in the record.’” Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693 (quoting Eldridge, 42 

S.W.3d at 88). 

IV. DISCUSSION

1.

“In choosing which parent to designate as the primary residential parent for [a]
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child, the court must conduct a ‘comparative fitness’ analysis, requiring the court to 

determine which of the available parents would be comparatively more fit than the other.” 

Chaffin v. Ellis, 211 S.W.3d 264, 286 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Bah v. Bah, 668 S.W.2d 

663, 666 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)). “In engaging in this analysis, the court must consider the 

factors set out in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a).” Id. (footnote omitted). Those 

factors are as follows:

(a) In a suit for annulment, divorce, separate maintenance, or in any other

proceeding requiring the court to make a custody determination regarding a

minor child, the determination shall be made on the basis of the best interest

of the child. In taking into account the child’s best interest, the court shall

order a custody arrangement that permits both parents to enjoy the maximum

participation possible in the life of the child consistent with the factors set

out in this subsection (a), the location of the residences of the parents, the

child’s need for stability and all other relevant factors. The court shall

consider all relevant factors, including the following, where applicable:

(1) The strength, nature, and stability of the child’s relationship with each 

parent, including whether one (1) parent has performed the majority of 

parenting responsibilities relating to the daily needs of the child;

(2) Each parent’s or caregiver’s past and potential for future performance of 

parenting responsibilities, including the willingness and ability of each of the 

parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing 

parent-child relationship between the child and both of the child’s parents, 

consistent with the best interest of the child. In determining the willingness 

of each of the parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and 

continuing parent-child relationship between the child and both of the child’s 

parents, the court shall consider the likelihood of each parent and caregiver 

to honor and facilitate court ordered parenting arrangements and rights, and 

the court shall further consider any history of either parent or any caregiver 

denying parenting time to either parent in violation of a court order;

(3) Refusal to attend a court ordered parent education seminar may be 

considered by the court as a lack of good faith effort in these proceedings;

(4) The disposition of each parent to provide the child with food, clothing, 

medical care, education and other necessary care;

(5) The degree to which a parent has been the primary caregiver, defined as 

the parent who has taken the greater responsibility for performing parental 

responsibilities;
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(6) The love, affection, and emotional ties existing between each parent and 

the child;

(7) The emotional needs and developmental level of the child;

(8) The moral, physical, mental and emotional fitness of each parent as it 

relates to their ability to parent the child. The court may order an 

examination of a party under Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil 

Procedure and, if necessary for the conduct of the proceedings, order the 

disclosure of confidential mental health information of a party under § 33-3-

105(3). . . . ;

(9) The child’s interaction and interrelationships with siblings, other relatives 

and step-relatives, and mentors, as well as the child’s involvement with the 

child’s physical surroundings, school, or other significant activities;

(10) The importance of continuity in the child’s life and the length of time 

the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment;

(11) Evidence of physical or emotional abuse to the child, to the other parent 

or to any other person. The court shall, where appropriate, refer any issues

of abuse to juvenile court for further proceedings;

(12) The character and behavior of any other person who resides in or 

frequents the home of a parent and such person’s interactions with the child;

(13) The reasonable preference of the child if twelve (12) years of age or 

older. The court may hear the preference of a younger child upon request. 

The preference of older children should normally be given greater weight 

than those of younger children;

(14) Each parent’s employment schedule, and the court may make 

accommodations consistent with those schedules; and

(15) Any other factors deemed relevant by the court.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(1)–(15).

2

 Although the court was obligated to consider 

the applicable statutory factors, “the statute does not require a trial court, when issuing a 

 

2 Effective March 18, 2022, the General Assembly has amended Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-

6-106(a) by adding a sixteenth factor for the court’s consideration: “[w]hether a parent has failed to pay 

court-ordered child support for a period of three (3) years or more[.]” See 2022 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 671 

§ 1 (H.B. 1866). It is not applicable to this case. 
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memorandum opinion or final judgment, to list every applicable factor along with its 

conclusion as to how that particular factor impacted the overall custody determination.” 

Burnett v. Burnett, No. E2002-01614-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21782290, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. July 23, 2003). 

Father takes issue with the trial court’s permanent parenting plan. Father requests 

reversal of the trial court’s designation of Mother as the primary residential parent, 

claiming that the court’s analysis was flawed. Father claims that the factors listed in 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106(a) at the time of the hearing either weigh in

his favor or should be equally weighed. Mother disagrees and defers to the trial court’s 

order. 

As to the first factor, the trial court found that because each parent performed “an 

inordinate amount of parental responsibilities,” this factor did not favor either parent. On 

the second factor, the court found that it “substantially” favored Mother and “work[ed] 

against” Father. The trial court found that Mother “will do her very best to facilitate the 

relationship that the children have with [Father],” but was unconvinced that Father would 

do the same. The trial court found that the third factor did not apply and that the fourth 

factor favored Father to some degree. The trial court found that because “the parties pretty 

well equally divided parenting responsibilities and obligations,” the fifth factor did not 

favor either parent. As to the sixth factor, the trial court acknowledged that Chloe “may 

have a closer relationship with [Father] than with [Mother],” but did not weigh this factor 

heavily. The trial court found that the seventh factor did not apply to its analysis because 

the children were “excellent” and did not display “significant emotional or developmental 

needs.” As to the eighth factor, the trial court found that it weighed in Father’s favor due 

to Mother’s past drug use, but also kept in mind testimony concerning Father’s abusive 

treatment toward Mother. The trial court found that the ninth factor did not favor either 

party because each parent lives near relatives. On the tenth factor, the trial court found as 

follows:

These children have lived in Hickman County, in Centerville, now for two 

years. One child is 4 years of age, and one child is 5 years of age. So that’s 

half their lives . . . . Packing these children up and moving them to another 

location, another area, is just simply not in their best interests. Now stability 

and continuity, a lot of courts describe that as the alpha and omega in 

parenting decisions. And I do put a great deal of weight on that, and I find 

that stability and continuity can and will be achieved by allowing these 

children to remain with [Mother] and [Mother] being the primary residential 

parent. And I find that’s very important for these children. 

On the eleventh factor, the trial court found that Father exaggerated his testimony about 

emotional abuse by Mother and noted Father’s tendency to “make such a huge deal about 

the smallest things.” The trial court found that this factor “might slightly favor [Mother],” 
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but did not apply to the case to any significant degree. As to the twelfth factor, the trial 

court found that both parents have “wonderful” families. Concerning the thirteenth factor, 

the trial court did not place weight on the evidence of the children’s preference made to 

their counselor when they were “very young.” The trial court found that the fourteenth 

factor favored Mother to some degree. As to the fifteenth factor, the court found that it had 

addressed all relevant factors. 

Again, no transcript or statement of the evidence relating to the trial was provided 

in the appellate record. This significantly hinders our ability to determine whether Father 

is entitled to the relief he seeks. “The absence of either a transcript or a statement of the 

evidence significantly ties the hands of the appellate court.” Chandler v. Chandler, No. 

W2010-01503-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 2393698, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2012). It 

is Father’s duty as the appellant “to prepare the record which conveys a fair, accurate, and 

complete account of what transpired in the trial court regarding the issues which form the 

basis of the appeal.” In re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); see also

Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b), (c) (“[T]he appellant shall have prepared a transcript of such part 

of the evidence or proceedings as is necessary to convey a fair, accurate and complete 

account of what transpired with respect to those issues that are the bases of appeal.”). As 

noted in previous cases, the lack of a transcript or statement of the evidence is generally 

fatal to the party having the burden on appeal. Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 1992). It is well settled that, “in the absence of a transcript or statement of the 

evidence, there is a conclusive presumption that there was sufficient evidence before the 

Trial Court to support its judgment and this Court must therefore affirm the judgment.” 

Brown v. Christian Bros. Univ., 428 S.W.3d 38, 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting 

Outdoor Mgmt., LLC v. Thomas, 249 S.W.3d 368, 377 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)); see also

Word v. Word, 937 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). With these considerations in 

mind, we affirm the trial court’s ruling designating Mother as the primary residential 

parent.

2.

At the conclusion of her brief, Mother seeks to recover her attorney fees incurred 

on appeal. However, this request was not presented in the statement of issues or supported

by argument in Mother’s brief. A request for attorney fees is waived if not included in the 

statement of issues. See Keeble v. Keeble, No. E2019-01168-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 

2897277, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2020) (citing Killingsworth v. Ted Russell Ford, 

Inc., 205 S.W.3d 406, 410–11 (Tenn. 2006)). Accordingly, Mother’s request for attorney 

fees on appeal is waived. 

V. CONCLUSION

We affirm the decision of the trial court. The case is remanded for such further 
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proceedings as may be necessary and consistent with this Opinion. Costs of the appeal are 

taxed to the appellant, Raymond Sines. 

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, JUDGE