NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 16a0612n.06

No. 16-3442

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

CRYSTAL L. RUSSELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 

OHIO

BEFORE: COLE, Chief Judge; BOGGS and SILER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Crystal L. Russell appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the 

denial of her applications for disability-insurance benefits and supplemental-security-income 

benefits.

In 2011, Russell filed applications for disability-insurance benefits and supplementalsecurity-income benefits, alleging that she became disabled on September 1, 2010 due to anxiety 

attacks, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, multiple 

personalities, and depression. After the Social Security Administration denied the applications, 

Russell requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ determined that 

Russell was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, and the Appeals Council 

declined to review the case. The district court affirmed the denial of Russell’s applications.

On appeal, Russell argues that the ALJ’s disability determination is not supported by 

substantial evidence because it is based in part on testimony from a vocational expert (VE) that is 
No. 16-3442

Russell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

- 2 -

ambiguous concerning whether Russell has the residual functional capacity to perform her past 

relevant work or other jobs in the national economy. “Our review of the ALJ’s decision is 

limited to whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings of the 

ALJ are supported by substantial evidence.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 

(6th Cir. 2009). Substantial evidence exists if a reasonable mind might accept the relevant 

evidence as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. at 406. We review de novo the district court’s 

conclusions on each issue. Id.

At the administrative hearing, the ALJ asked the VE whether a hypothetical individual 

with Russell’s age, education, and work experience could perform Russell’s past relevant work, 

which included being a medical cleaner, assuming that the individual had certain limitations, 

including that she was “hesitant to ask questions or ask for help.” The VE gave the following 

response:

I think you could do the cleaning job within the profile. I mean, as far as 

hesitancy to ask questions, the main issue I would see there is you know, is she 

going to not know how to do her work or you know, do it incorrectly. That could 

be problematic, but if it’s not happening all the time and she’s not proceeding 

with incorrect, you know, then I think she could do the cleaning job.

The VE then testified that the hypothetical individual could also perform other jobs such as

laundry worker and marker/ticketer. The ALJ incorporated the proposed limitations into 

Russell’s residual functional capacity and relied on the VE’s testimony in concluding that 

Russell could perform both her past work as a medical cleaner and other jobs in the national 

economy.

The ALJ properly relied on the VE’s testimony because it was not ambiguous concerning 

whether Russell retained the capacity to work. Rather, when viewed in context, the VE’s 

testimony is reasonably understood to mean that, if Russell were entirely unable to ask questions 
No. 16-3442

Russell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

- 3 -

about how to do her work properly, it could affect her ability to perform her past job as a medical 

cleaner or other jobs, but the fact that she is hesitant to ask questions or ask for help does not 

preclude her from performing those jobs. The VE unequivocally stated that a person with 

Russell’s limitations “could do the cleaning job” and other jobs in the national economy.

As the district court correctly held, even if the VE’s testimony was ambiguous, there was 

substantial other evidence that she could perform her past relevant work as a medical cleaner. 

An ALJ may, but is not required, to use the services of a vocational expert. See Wright-Hines v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 597 F.3d 392, 395 (6th Cir. 2010); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2). In this

case, the ALJ explicitly found that the VE’s testimony as well as the totality of the other 

evidence supported a finding that she could perform past relevant work. The evidence shows 

that Russell had substantial prior experience as a cleaner in a nursing home, that she had no 

trouble understanding simple instructions, that she would not forget simple instructions from one 

day to the next, and that she had completed high school and some college. Even without the 

VE’s testimony, there is substantial evidence that Russell could perform past relevant work, 

which supports the ALJ and district court’s finding that Russell is not disabled. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.