1 

14-4761-cr 

United States of America v. George S. Crandall 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 18th day of November, two thousand sixteen. 

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 

BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 

Circuit Judges. 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 14-4761-cr 

v. 

GEORGE S. CRANDALL, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

 

FOR APPELLEE: Cyrus P. Rieck, Rajit S. Dosanjh, on the 

brief, Assistant United States Attorneys, for

Richard S. Hartunian, United States 

Attorney for the Northern District of 

New York, Syracuse, NY. 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Ryan Thomas Truskoski, Office of Ryan 

Thomas Truskoski, P.A., Harwinton, CT. 
2 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

New York (Frederick S. Scullin, Jr., Judge). 

UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 

Defendant-appellant George S. Crandall (“Crandall”) appeals the December 17, 2014 

judgment of the District Court, finding pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) that the defendant 

violated the terms of his supervised release by driving while intoxicated (“DWI”). On December 17, 

2014, he was sentenced to twelve months imprisonment followed by one year of supervised release.1

 

On appeal, Crandall argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the District Court’s 

finding, even under a preponderance of the evidence standard. We assume the parties’ familiarity 

with the underlying facts, procedural history of the case, and issues on appeal. 

BACKGROUND 

On June 28, 2011, Crandall was found guilty following a jury trial in the District Court in the 

N.D.N.Y. on one count of possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon and one count of 

possession of ammunition as a previously convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 

924(a)(2). On August 9, 2012, Crandall was sentenced primarily to thirty three months imprisonment 

followed by two years of supervised release. See United States v. Crandall, 748 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2014). 

Following his release, Crandall was arrested by the Sheriff’s Office of Hamilton County, 

New York and charged with a felony DWI on November 2, 2014. The U.S. Probation Office for the 

N.D.N.Y. subsequently filed a petition for revocation of Crandall’s supervised release, alleging 

Crandall engaged in new criminal conduct, namely the felony DWI. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (“The 

court shall order, as an explicit condition of supervised release, that the defendant not commit 

another Federal, State or local crime during the term of supervision...). 

On December 10, 2014, a final revocation hearing was held at which Crandall was found to 

have violated his supervised release. The District Court later sentenced him to twelve months 

imprisonment followed by one year of supervised release. Crandall filed a timely appeal. 

 

1

 Both parties agree that the issue is not moot because: (1) Crandall is in prison until November 

2016 for violation of supervised release; and (2) Crandall has yet to be sentenced for two unrelated 

violations of supervised release and this ruling could affect his sentence as they represent breaches 

of the court’s trust.
3 

DISCUSSION 

Whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a violation of supervised release is a factual 

question, which we review for clear error. See, e.g., United States v. Carthen, 681 F.3d 94, 99, (2d Cir. 

2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 837 (2013). It is well-settled that a District Court may revoke a term of 

supervised release if it “finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a 

condition of supervised release.” Id. at 99–100. Because of the lower standard of proof applicable to 

revocation proceedings, a District Court may find that a defendant has committed another crime 

even in the absence of a conviction for that crime. United States v. Carlton, 442 F.3d 802, 810 (2d Cir. 

2006). “The constitutional rights afforded a defendant subject to revocation of supervised release for 

violation of its conditions are not co-extensive with those enjoyed by a suspect to whom the 

presumption of innocence attaches.” Id. at 802. 

 Crandall argues that the government did not present sufficient evidence at his final 

revocation hearing on December 10, 2014 to support the District Court’s finding, even under a 

preponderance of the evidence standard. We disagree. The District Court relied on at least four 

items of evidence. First, Sergeant Kevin Branius of the Sheriff’s Office of Hamilton County testified 

that Crandall’s “eyes were bloodshot, he was slurring his words, he was moving his arms around, 

inconsistent with... someone that’s sober.” Appendix at 85. Second, Crandall’s probation officer, 

Jay Driscoll, testified that he received a fax saying that Crandall was involved in a car accident “due 

to a Doe and her fawn jumping out in the road”—an explanation of the accident that is inconsistent 

with what Crandall told Sergeant Branius, namely that “he had a tire blowout, causing him to crash.” 

Appendix at 84. Third, Crandall evaded taking a blood test at the hospital, despite being asked at 

least twice. Fourth, the government entered Crandall’s prior DWI conviction from June 30, 2009 

into the record. While there was no field sobriety test or corroborating evidence from the hospital 

record, the evidence is sufficient for the District Court to make a finding of “more likely than not” 

under a preponderance of the evidence standard. Accordingly, we find that there was no clear error. 

CONCLUSION 

We have considered all of appellant’s claims on appeal and found them to be without merit. 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk