J-A19022-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

BREHON LA-VAAN RAWLINGS

Appellant No. 1597 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 9, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0002086-2013

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OTT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2016

Brehon La-Vaan Rawlings appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered March 9, 2015, in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas. 

The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 25 to 50 years’ 

imprisonment following Rawlings’s jury conviction of rape, robbery, 

kidnapping, criminal conspiracy,1and related charges for his participation in 

the kidnapping and sexual assault of the victim on Christmas night in 2012. 

On appeal, Rawlings challenges the trial court’s denial of his pre-trial motion 

to suppress the victim’s out-of-court identification and his confession to 

police, his challenge to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121, 3701(a)(1)(ii), 2901(a)(3), and 903, respectively.
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his convictions, and his post-sentence motion for a new trial based upon a 

Brady2violation.3 For the reasons below, we affirm.

The facts underlying Rawlings’s conviction, as gleaned from the trial 

transcript, are as follows. At approximately 11:30 p.m. on December 25, 

2012, the victim was sitting alone in her car in the parking lot of George’s 

Water Ice on Marshall Road in Upper Darby, Pennsylvania. She was looking 

at her cell phone when three unknown black men approached her car door 

and put a gun to the window. The victim described the man holding the 

gun, later identified as Rawlings, as wearing a blue hooded sweatshirt with 

“Aero” written on the front and carrying a backpack. She also stated he 

wore tan gloves and a mask that covered the lower half of his face, although 

she was able to see his eyes and his complexion.4 See N.T., 11/5/2014, at 

89-92, 113. 

When the victim tried to leave the car, Rawlings hit her in the face 

with the butt of the gun and told her to “move over.” Id. at 92. He forced 

her into the passenger seat, and sat in the driver’s seat. The other two men 

____________________________________________

2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

3 We have reordered Rawlings’s issues on appeal for purposes of disposition.

4 While she was able to see her attackers during the first few minutes of the 

ordeal, the victim acknowledged that shortly after the men entered her car, 

she pulled her hooded sweatshirt over her face and cinched it so they would 

think she did not see their faces. See N.T., 11/5/2015, at 138.
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entered the back seat of the car. The victim described one attacker, later 

identified as co-defendant Kewon Matthews, as a dark-skinned male, 

wearing a scarf around the lower part of his face, and a hooded sweatshirt 

and jacket. She described the other male, later identified as co-defendant 

Kevin Jones, as having very light skin, and copper-brown hair.5 See id. at 

92-95.

Rawlings demanded money from the victim. When she told him she 

had no cash, he started driving towards Cobbs Creek, intending to have her 

withdraw money from an account using one of her debit or credit cards. 

See id. at 95-97. About 20 minutes later, Rawlings pulled over and 

Matthews moved to the front passenger seat, forcing the victim into the 

back seat with Jones. See id. at 99-100. Jones told the victim she “was 

going to have to perform oral sex on all of them if [she] ever wanted to see 

[her] daughter again.” Id. at 100. He then forced her to perform oral sex 

on him, while Matthews held the gun to her head. The victim stated that 

she repeatedly vomited, causing Jones to briefly stop, and then force her to 

continue again. At some point, Rawlings pulled the car over, and Matthews 

____________________________________________

5 Both Jones and Matthews entered guilty pleas, and testified for the 

Commonwealth at Rawlings’s trial. Jones’s account of the incident largely 

corroborated the victim’s testimony. See N.T., 11/5/2014, at 226-244. 

Matthews’s statement to police corroborated the victim’s account, but he 

denied making that prior statement at Rawlings’s trial. See N.T., 

11/7/2014, at 156-166.
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and Jones switched seats. See id. at 100-101. Matthews then forced the 

victim to perform oral sex on him, while Jones held the gun to her head. 

The victim continued to vomit, forcing Matthews to stop and start again. 

See id. at 101-102. Finally, Rawlings pulled off the road again, and he then 

entered the back seat, while Jones drove the car. Rawlings, too, forced the 

victim to perform oral sex, however, when she continued to vomit, he 

“pulled [her] pants down and raped [her] vaginally.”6 Id. at 102-103. She 

claimed he told her, “You’re the first white girl I’ve ever had.” Id. at 103. 

The victim stated Rawlings attempted to enter her anally, but he stopped 

when she cried. See id. at 103-104.

The men continued to drive around for several hours. They used the 

victim’s cell phone to make calls, and stopped to purchase marijuana. The 

victim stated: “At one point, they were smoking marijuana and asked me if 

I were to smoke [it] if it would calm me the F down.” Id. at 104. She 

refused. They also forced her to speak briefly to her mother, who kept 

calling her cell phone to find out where she was. See id. 105-106.

____________________________________________

6 At trial, the victim testified she was unsure whether or not Rawlings wore a 

condom, or ejaculated while he raped her. See N.T., 11/5/2014, at 115-

116, 157. However, Rawlings introduced into evidence a Rape Information 

Sheet, completed by the investigating officer, which indicated the victim 

stated Rawlings did not use a condom and did ejaculate when he vaginally 

raped her. See id. at 157-160, Exhibit D-1, Rape Information Sheet, dated 

12/26/2012. See also N.T., 11/7/2014, at 5, Exhibit C-26, Sexual Assault 

Nurse Examiner (SANE) Notes, dated 12/26/2012 (victim reported assailant 

ejaculated vaginally).
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At approximately 5:00 a.m., the victim smelled kerosene and saw the 

men wiping down the inside of her vehicle. Before leaving, Rawlings told 

her:

[W]e’ve had a fun night. If you go to the police, we will kill you 

and your family and then he said now you can go home and take 

care of your kid and we’ll throw the keys under the car.

Id. at 111. The three assailants then left the scene with her Coach handbag 

and wristlet, containing her credit cards and identification, her cell phone, 

camera, GPS, and various items of jewelry. After waiting a short time until 

she believed it was safe, the victim retrieved her keys and drove to a nearby 

gas station to call her boyfriend. See id. at 111-112. When he did not 

answer the call, she drove to his house. After the victim told him about the 

ordeal, her boyfriend drove her directly to the police station. See id. at

117-118.

While the victim was at the police station, the officers received a 

report of a disturbance at a home on Radbourne Road in Upper Darby. The 

female homeowner reported she overheard “some kind of argument ... 

between her son and his friends and they said something about there being 

a gun.” Id. at 200. When the officers arrived, the homeowner let them in 

the house and they encountered four young males, one sleeping on the 

couch and three others downstairs in her son’s room. The homeowner also 
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told the officers that one other male had left with a bag before they arrived.7 

The homeowner then asked the officers to go downstairs and look for a gun. 

Although they did not recover a gun, they did find a Coach purse that 

seemed out of place in a boy’s bedroom. See id. at 201-202. 

After confirming with the homeowner that the purse did not belong to 

her, the officers sent a photo of the handbag to headquarters to see if it 

matched the purse stolen from the rape victim. The victim identified the 

purse as the one stolen from her earlier that evening, and the police 

transported her to the Radbourne Road address to see if she could identify 

any of the four males as her attackers. When the victim arrived, the police 

brought out the men one at a time, and the victim positively identified 

Jones8and Matthews, as two of the three men who kidnapped and assaulted 

her. She stated the other two young men were not involved. See id. at 

202-206. 

Both Jones and Matthews, who were 17 years old at the time of the 

incident, were arrested and provided statements to the police admitting their 

____________________________________________

7 See N.T., 11/6/2014, at 87-88. Both Jones and Mary Novoa, the 

homeowner, identified Rawlings was the male who left the home before the 

police arrived. See N.T., 11/5/2014, at 248-249; N.T., 11/7/2014, at 85-

86.

8

Jones was wearing a scarf that matched the description provided by the 

victim. One officer noticed Jones tried to discard the scarf when they 

brought him out of the house for the show-up identification. See N.T., 

11/6/2014, at 91.
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involvement in the kidnapping, sexual assault, and robbery of the victim. 

During the interview, Jones implicated Rawlings, whom he knew as “Bre.” 

Id. at 261. He also took the officers to Rawlings’s home. Id. Thereafter, 

the police created a black and white photo array of Rawlings and seven other 

men with similar facial characteristics to show to the victim on the evening 

of December 26, 2012. Without prompting, the victim positively identified 

Rawlings as the man who vaginally raped her. See N.T., 11/6/2014, at 125-

127, 247-249. See also N.T., 10/25/2013, at 100 (victim testifying during 

the suppression hearing that she was “[p]ositive” the man she identified in 

the photo array was one of her attackers). 

The police subsequently obtained both an arrest warrant for Rawlings 

and a search warrant for his home. When they executed the warrants, they 

recovered the black backpack, mask, and tan gloves he used during the 

robbery. See N.T., 11/6/2014, at 128-129, 136-138. Rawlings later 

provided a statement to police admitting his involvement in the crime.9 See 

id. at 269-272. During a break in the interview, he led police to a property 

in East Lansdowne where he hid the gun used in the incident.10 See id. at 

274-276.

____________________________________________

9

In his signed statement, Rawlings admitted he used a condom when he 

assaulted the victim. See N.T., 11/6/2014, at 271.

10 The officer who accompanied Rawlings testified the gun was secreted 

inside a used Cheetos bag that was hidden under leaves. Id. at 274-275. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Rawlings was subsequently arrested and charged with 40 crimes 

including rape, robbery, kidnapping, and criminal conspiracy. He filed a 

pretrial motion seeking suppression of the victim’s out-of-court 

identification, as well as his statement to police. Following a hearing 

conducted on October 25, 2013, the court denied the suppression motion. 

The case proceeded to a jury trial on November 3, 2014. Prior to trial, both 

Jones and Matthews entered guilty pleas and both, consequently, testified 

for the Commonwealth at Rawlings’s trial. On November 19, 2014, the jury 

returned a verdict of guilty on all charges, namely, robbery of a motor 

vehicle, rape, kidnapping, robbery, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, 

theft, indecent assault, terroristic threats, possession of a weapon, and five 

counts of criminal conspiracy.11

On March 9, 2015, Rawlings was sentenced to an aggregate term of 25 

to 50 years’ imprisonment, followed by five years’ probation.12 On March 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

The officer emphasized the police would not have found the gun if Rawlings 

had not led them there because “[t]he bag was not visible.” Id. at 275.

11 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3702(a), 3121(a), 2901(a)(3), 3701(a)(1)(ii), 3123(a), 

3912(a), 3126(a)(2), 2706(a)(1), 907(b), and 903, respectively.

12 The court imposed the following consecutive standard range sentences: 

(1) rape, 72 to 144 months’ imprisonment; (2) robbery, 48 to 96 months’ 

imprisonment; (3) IDSI, 72 to 144 months’ imprisonment; (4) kidnapping, 

48 to 96 months’ imprisonment; (5) conspiracy (rape), 60 to 120 months’ 

imprisonment; and (6) possession of a weapon, five years’ probation. The 

trial court imposed concurrent terms of 36 to 72 months’ incarceration for 

robbery of a motor vehicle, and six to 12 months’ incarceration for terroristic

threats. All of the remaining charges merged for sentencing purposes. We 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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19, 2015, he filed two post-sentence motions, one seeking to reduce his 

sentence, and the other challenging the weight of the evidence supporting 

the verdict and seeking a new trial based on after-discovered evidence. 

Following a hearing, the court amended Rawlings’s sentence so that his 

probationary term for terroristic threats would run concurrently with his 

prison term. In all other respects, the court denied Rawlings’s post-sentence 

relief. This timely appeal followed.13

In his first issue, Rawlings contends the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to suppress the victim’s out-of-court identification. Rawlings argues 

the photo array the police showed to the victim was “unduly suggestive” 

since Rawlings was the only person in the array wearing a hooded 

sweatshirt. Rawlings’s Brief at 24. He insists his “unique attire, matching 

the type of shirt worn by the complainant’s attacker on Christmas night, 

made his photograph stand out more than the others contained in the 

array.” Id. at 23. Because the victim only saw a portion of her attacker’s 

face, late at night, for a brief period, Rawlings argues the suggestiveness of 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

also note the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board determined Rawlings did 

not meet the criteria for classification as a sexually violent predator under 

the Sexual Offenders Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 9799.10-9799.41. See N.T., 3/9/2015, at 4. 

13 On May 27, 2015, the trial court ordered Rawlings to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Rawlings complied with the court’s directive, and after receiving an 

extension of time, filed a concise statement on September 11, 2015. 
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the identification procedure “created a substantial likelihood for irreparable 

misidentification.” Id. at 24. Moreover, because the search warrant for his 

home was prepared based on the victim’s identification, he further asserts 

the warrant was “constitutionally defective and invalid.” Id. at 26. 

Our review of an order denying a motion to suppress is wellestablished:

We may consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence and so 

much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted 

when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the 

record supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are 

bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal 

conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

An appellate court, of course, is not bound by the suppression 

court’s conclusions of law. However, it is within the suppression 

court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of 

witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.

Commonwealth v. Davis, 17 A.3d 390, 393 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 29 A.3d 371 (Pa. 2011).

When considering a challenge to a photo array, 

[o]ur Supreme Court has instructed that a photographic 

identification is unduly suggestive if, under the totality of the 

circumstances, the identification procedure creates a substantial 

likelihood of misidentification. Commonwealth v. DeJesus,

580 Pa. 303, 860 A.2d 102, 112 (2004) (citation omitted).

Whether an out-of-court identification is to be suppressed

as unreliable, and therefore violative of due process, is 

determined from the totality of the circumstances. We will 

not suppress such identification unless the facts 

demonstrate that the identification procedure was so 

impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very 

substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
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Commonwealth v. Burton, 770 A.2d 771, 782 

(Pa.Super.2001) (citations and quotations omitted)[, appeal 

denied, 868 A.2d 1197 (Pa. 2005), and overruled on other 

grounds, Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617 (Pa. 

2002)]. The variance between the photos in an array does not 

necessarily establish grounds for suppression of a victim’s 

identification. Id. “Photographs used in line-ups are not unduly 

suggestive if the suspect’s picture does not stand out more than 

those of the others, and the people depicted all exhibit similar 

facial characteristics.” Commonwealth v. Fisher, 564 Pa. 505, 

769 A.2d 1116, 1126 (2001). “[E]ach person in the array does 

not have to be identical in appearance.” Burton, 770 A.2d at 

782. The photographs in the array should all be the same size 

and should be shot against similar backgrounds. 

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 394 Pa.Super. 316, 575 A.2d 921 

(1990).

Commonwealth v. Kendricks, 30 A.3d 499, 504 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal 

denied, 46 A.3d 716 (Pa. 2012). 

Here, the trial court found the photo array prepared by the police was 

not unduly suggestive. The court opined:

[Upper Darby Police Detective Brad Ross] generated a 

random computer photographic array through the Pennsylvania 

Justice Network [(JNET)] that contained photographs of eight 

black men who appeared to be of similar age and had similar 

facial features and facial hair as [Rawlings]. The victim selected 

[Rawlings’s] picture quickly without prompting. At the 

suppression hearing, [Detective] Ross’ testimony was 

uncontradicted. [Rawlings] presented no evidence or testimony 

that would establish that the identification procedure was so 

impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial 

likelihood of irreparable misidentification.

* * * *

Here, [Rawlings’s] picture does not stand out from the 

other pictures in the photographic array; thus, there was no 

substantial likelihood of misidentification.

Order Denying Motion to Suppress and for Severance, 12/4/2013, at 12.
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Upon our review of the record, we find no reason to disagree with the 

trial court. Upper Darby Police Detective Brad Ross testified he used JNET to 

randomly place Rawlings’s photo among photos of seven other young men. 

See N.T., 10/25/2013, at 112. All of the men in the black and white photo 

array are of comparable age, with similar hair and facial characteristics. See 

id. at Exhibit CS-1, photo array. Although Rawlings appears to be the only 

suspect wearing a hooded sweatshirt, that fact alone is not controlling. See 

Burton, supra, 770 A.2d at 782 (defendant’s assertion that he was the only 

person in the photo array wearing a white t-shirt, the attire worn by the 

perpetrator, did not make the array unduly suggestive when all of the men 

in the array were close in age, “with short haircuts and facial hair,” and 

wearing light colored t-shirts, and one was wearing a white turtleneck). 

Further, the victim testified that when the officers showed her the photo 

array, they simply asked her “if anybody looked familiar.” N.T., 

10/25/2013, at 100. She stated she identified Rawlings, and she was 

“positive” of the identification. Id. Because we agree Rawlings has failed to 

demonstrate the identification procedure was “so impermissibly suggestive 

as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 

misidentification,” Rawlings’s first issue warrants no relief.14 Burton, 

supra, 770 A.2d at 782.

____________________________________________

14 Likewise, because we conclude the photo array was not unduly suggestive 

and the victim’s identification of Rawlings was, therefore, proper, we need 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Next, Rawlings argues the trial court also abused its discretion when it 

denied his motion to suppress his confession. Our review of the admissibility 

of a defendant’s confession is well-settled: 

A confession obtained during a custodial 

interrogation is admissible where the accused’s right 

to remain silent and right to counsel have been 

explained and the accused has knowingly and 

voluntarily waived those rights. The test for 

determining the voluntariness of a confession and 

whether an accused knowingly waived his or her 

rights looks to the totality of the circumstances 

surrounding the giving of the confession.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 546 Pa. 161, 170, 683 A.2d 

1181, 1189 (1996) (citations omitted). ‘The 

Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing whether a 

defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda

‘rights.’ Commonwealth v. Bronshtein, 547 Pa. 460, 

464, 691 A.2d 907, 913 (1997) (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Davis, 861 A.2d 310, 317 (Pa.Super.2004), 

appeal denied, 582 Pa. 708, 872 A.2d 171 (2005).

When deciding a motion to suppress a confession, the 

touchstone inquiry is whether the confession was 

voluntary. Voluntariness is determined from the totality of 

the circumstances surrounding the confession. The 

question of voluntariness is not whether the defendant 

would have confessed without interrogation, but whether 

the interrogation was so manipulative or coercive that it 

deprived the defendant of his ability to make a free and 

unconstrained decision to confess. The Commonwealth 

has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the defendant confessed voluntarily.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

not address Rawlings’s contention that the probable cause affidavit 

supporting the search warrant of his home was tainted by the improper 

identification. See Rawlings’s Brief at 24-27. 
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Commonwealth v. Nester, 551 Pa. 157, 162–163, 709 A.2d 

879, 882 (1998) (citations and footnote omitted).

When assessing voluntariness pursuant to the totality of 

the circumstances, a court should look at the following 

factors: the duration and means of the interrogation; the 

physical and psychological state of the accused; the 

conditions attendant to the detention; the attitude of the 

interrogator; and any and all other factors that could drain 

a person’s ability to withstand suggestion and coercion.

Id. at 164, 709 A.2d at 882 (citations omitted). “The 

determination of whether a confession is voluntary is a 

conclusion of law and, as such, is subject to plenary review.” 

Commonwealth v. Templin, 568 Pa. 306, 310, 795 A.2d 959, 

961 (2002), citing Nester, supra. 

Commonwealth v. Harrell, 65 A.3d 420, 433–434 (Pa. Super. 2013), 

appeal denied, 101 A.3d 785 (Pa. 2014).

In the present case, Rawlings contends his confession was involuntary 

based upon the five factors listed above. With regard to the first factor 

(duration and means of interrogation), he argues that while the interrogation 

lasted only “slightly over an hour,” he denied all involvement in the robbery 

and sexual assault for the first ten to fifteen minutes until he was pressured 

by Detective Ross to confess. Rawlings’s Brief at 29. He notes his initial 

denials were not included in the statement, and he provided only one-word 

answers when he finally acknowledged his involvement. Id. With regard to 

the second factor (physical and psychological state of accused), Rawlings 

emphasizes he was only 19 years old, and had been forcefully removed from 

his home, where the police broke down his front door, before being 

transported to the station. See id. 
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Rawlings asserts the third factor (conditions attendant to detention) 

also “strikes against the voluntariness of [his] confession.” Id. at 30. He 

explains he was alone in the police station after being “forced from his 

home” and informed “that people he knew were now implicating him in the 

crime” and the victim had identified him. Id. Moreover, with regard to the 

fourth factor (attitude of the interrogator), Rawlings insists Detective Ross 

“had no interest in hearing [his] denial about his involvement in the robbery 

and rape of the [victim].” Id. Indeed, Rawlings described himself as a 

“[p]sychologically distraught” 19-year old who tried to explain to the 

detective that he was not involved in the incident. Id. at 31. However, he 

claims when his denials “f[e]ll on deaf ears, [he] felt he had no choice but to 

confess to the crimes charged.” Id. at 31.

The suppression court did not credit Rawlings’s testimony about the 

custodial interrogation. Based on the judge’s 53 Findings of Fact, she 

concluded as a matter of law that Rawlings was provided with his Miranda15

warnings, which he knowingly and voluntarily waived. See Order Denying 

Motion to Suppress and for Severance, 12/4/2013, at 1-13. The court noted 

Rawlings “is an adult and had familiarity with the criminal justice system.” 

Id. at 13. Further, the trial court opined:

The ensuing interview was neither long nor overbearing, 

lasting a little over an hour. There is nothing in the record to 

____________________________________________

15 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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indicate the relentless grilling generally associated with coercive 

questioning. Rawlings gave absolutely no indication during the 

interview that he was unable to comprehend his rights or the 

significance of his waiver; he was not under the influence of 

drugs or alcohol; he was never denied food, drink, or the use of 

a bathroom; and he appeared cooperative.

Finally, Rawlings’s statement itself amply demonstrated his 

ability to answer all questions put to him, concerning both his 

rights and the circumstances of the crime, in an intelligent, 

responsive fashion, demonstrating that he had sufficient 

perception and intelligence to appreciate his rights and the 

significance of his waiver. Additionally[,] Rawlings testified at 

the suppression hearing. On examination by his attorney, 

Rawlings admitted that the gun he led police to was the gun 

used in the incident.[16]

Id.

Our review of the record reveals no basis to disturb the ruling of the 

trial court. During the suppression hearing, Detective Ross acknowledged 

that before he began questioning Rawlings, he explained to Rawlings why he 

was arrested, that is, both his co-defendants and the victim identified 

Rawlings as the third assailant. See N.T., 10/25/2013, at 149. Although 

Rawlings initially denied his involvement, Detective Ross stated the denial 

was short-lived, noting, “I think maybe we went back and forth for 10 

minutes, maybe.” Id. Moreover, the detective testified he did not bring his 

firearm into the interview, and Rawlings was not handcuffed. See id. at 

151. Further, Detective Ross also denied ever telling Rawlings he could go 

____________________________________________

16 See N.T., 10/25/2013, at 241-242 (Rawlings admitting the gun he led the 

officers to was “the gun that was used” in the crime). 
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home if he confessed or that things would be easier for him if he admitted 

his involvement in the incident. See id. at 159. 

While we recognize Rawlings’s testimony differed from the detective’s 

testimony,17 we remind him “it is the suppression court’s prerogative to pass 

on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their 

testimony.” Commonwealth v. Hudson, 92 A.3d 1235, 1241 (Pa. Super. 

2014), appeal denied, 106 A.3d 724 (Pa. 2014). Because the court’s 

findings are supported by the record, and its legal conclusions are correct, 

Rawlings is entitled to no relief on his second issue.

In his next claim, Rawlings challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his conviction. Specifically, he argues “the Commonwealth failed 

to provide evidence at trial that was sufficient to enable the jury to find that 

[he] was the third attacker beyond a reasonable doubt.” Rawlings’s Brief at 

35. 

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 

conviction, 

____________________________________________

17 Specifically, Rawlings testified during the suppression hearing that the 

officers who arrested him called him a “rapist” and banged his head against 

the wall. See N.T., 10/25/2013, at 200. Further, he claimed Detective Ross 

told him “if you didn’t confess you won’t see the day of light no more,” and 

insisted the police had DNA and surveillance footage linking him to the 

crime. Id. at 205. Rawlings also stated Detective Ross told him it would be 

easier for him if he confessed to the crime, and that he was not entitled to a 

lawyer since he was “grown.” Id. at 206, 209. 
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we consider whether the evidence presented at trial, and all 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, support 

the [fact finder’s] beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth 

v. Murray, [623] Pa. [506], 83 A.3d 137, 150–51 (2013). 

Whether sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict is a 

question of law; thus, our standard of review is de novo and our 

scope of review is plenary. Id. at 151.

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 91 A.3d 55, 66 (Pa. 2014), cert. denied, 

135 S. Ct. 1400 (U.S. 2015). Furthermore, “the trier of fact, while passing 

upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence, is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence[,]” and an appellate court will not 

substitute its credibility determination for that of the jury. Commonwealth 

v. Cousar, 928 A.2d 1025, 1033 (Pa. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1035 

(2008).

Preliminarily, we note that in his concise statement, Rawlings 

presented this issue as follows: “The evidence was insufficient to support a 

verdict of guilty on all the charges.” Concise Statement of Matters 

Complained of on Appeal, 9/11/2015, at ¶ 5. Because Rawlings failed to 

specify how the evidence was insufficient or “which element of the charges 

the Commonwealth has failed to prove,” the trial court implied that we could 

find this claim waived. Trial Court Opinion, 10/14/2015, at 6. See 

Commonwealth v. Tyack, 128 A.3d 254, 260 (Pa. Super. 2015) (finding 

vague Rule 1925(b) statement was insufficient to preserve issue for appeal). 

Nevertheless, rather than waiving the issue, the trial court discussed 
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Rawlings’s sufficiency claim on the merits. Accordingly, we too decline to 

find Rawlings’s claim waived.

The trial court addressed Rawlings’s sufficiency argument as follows:

[T]here is overwhelming evidence supporting [Rawlings’s] 

convictions. The victim identified [Rawlings] from a photo array 

the day of the incident. The victim at trial also made a positive 

in-court identification of [Rawlings] as the male who approached 

her car with a weapon, hit her with the gun, shoved her into her 

car and then drove her car away with her in it. The victim 

thoroughly detailed [Rawlings’s] involvement in the crimes that 

night including his sexual assault and vaginal rape of her. The 

victim’s testimony was corroborated by the testimony of Kevin 

Jones, a co-defendant in this case. Mr. Jones admitted his 

involvement in these crimes and also testified about [Rawlings’s] 

involvement. The testimony of the victim and Mr. Jones was 

consistent as to what transpired that night and each actor’s 

involvement.

Furthermore, [Rawlings] after his arrest provided a signed 

statement admitting his involvement in the crimes. During his 

initial interview by the [p]olice, [Rawlings] led them to a 

property in Upper Darby Township where he stated the gun used 

in the incident could be found on a lawn in a “Cheetos” bag. The 

police recovered the gun exactly where [Rawlings] said it was 

located. [Rawlings] testified at his suppression hearing. On 

examination by his attorney, [Rawlings] admitted that the gun 

he led police to was the gun used in the incident. Accordingly, 

[Rawlings’s] claims that the evidence was insufficient to support 

a verdict of guilty on all the charges is patently meritless.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/14/2016, at 7-8 (record citations omitted).

On appeal, Rawlings does not contend the Commonwealth failed to 

prove any of the specific elements of his convictions. Rather, he argues the 

evidence was insufficient to prove he was the third assailant. First, he 

reiterates his claim that the photo array was suggestive and his confession 

was involuntary. See Rawlings’s Brief at 35. As we have already concluded 
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these claims are meritless, we need not address them again. See supra at 

9-17.

Second, he maintains both Jones and Matthews “had a material 

interest in implicating [Rawlings] before and during trial.” Rawlings’s Brief 

at 35. Notably, he states Matthews admitted he did not like Rawlings, and 

Jones agreed to testify only in the hope of receiving a favorable plea deal. 

Id. The jury was well aware of the possible motives both Matthews and 

Jones had for testifying against Rawlings. See N.T., 11/6/2014, at 21-23; 

11/7/2014, at 172. As the finder of fact, the jury was permitted to believe 

all, part, or none of the co-defendants’ testimony. Cousar, supra. Simply 

because a witness had a motive to testify falsely does not render the 

evidence insufficient. Here, the victim’s testimony and Rawlings’s confession 

were more than sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. 

Third, Rawlings contends the victim’s testimony that he was the third 

attacker is controverted by the physical evidence. He points to the victim’s 

statement on the Rape Information Sheet, which indicates the rapist 

ejaculated and did not wear a condom. See N.T., 11/5/2014, at 157-160, 

Exhibit D-1, Rape Information Sheet, dated 12/26/2012. However, the 

vaginal swabs from the victim’s rape kit produced none of Rawlings’s DNA. 

Rawlings also emphasizes the police were never able to locate the distinctive 

sweatshirt the third attacker wore, even though they recovered a black 

backpack and face mask from Rawlings during his arrest. See Rawlings’s 

Brief at 36. Moreover, one of the Commonwealth witnesses, who saw 
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Rawlings both before and after the attack, described Rawlings as “wearing a 

grey thermal shirt and red Nike jacket while carrying a green backpack.” Id. 

See N.T., 11/7/2014, at 70-71. 

Nevertheless, despite these apparent inconsistencies, the jury was 

presented with the victim’s positive identification of Rawlings, both Jones’s 

and Matthews’s statements implicating Rawlings, and Rawlings’s own 

statement admitting his culpability for the crimes. Furthermore, Rawlings 

led police to the exact spot where the gun used in the robbery was hidden. 

The fact that none of his DNA was recovered from the victim’s clothing, the 

sweatshirt he used in the crime was never found, and one witness testified 

he was wearing different clothing is not dispositive. As this Court has often 

stated: 

[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth 

need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts 

regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder 

unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter 

of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 716, (Pa. Super. 2015), 

appeal denied, 125 A.3d 1198 (Pa. 2015). See also id. at 721 (“The 

victim’s uncorroborated testimony is sufficient to support a rape 

conviction.”). Accordingly, upon our review of the record, we agree with 
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the conclusion of the trial court that Rawlings’s sufficiency claim is 

meritless.18

Rawlings next argues the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence. Our review of a challenge to the weight of the evidence is wellsettled: 19

A weight of the evidence claim concedes that the evidence is 

sufficient to sustain the verdict, but seeks a new trial on the 

ground that the evidence was so one-sided or so weighted in 

____________________________________________

18 Furthermore, to the extent Rawlings contends the evidence was 

insufficient to support his conspiracy convictions, we again disagree. 

Rawlings acknowledges the testimony of Jones and Raquan Burgess, if 

believed, was sufficient to demonstrate he entered into an agreement to 

commit robbery. See Rawlings’s Brief at 37-38. See also 18 Pa.C.S. § 

903(a). However, he claims there was “no testimony presented regarding 

any conspiratorial agreements to rob the [victim’s] motor vehicle, to rape 

her, to commit involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with her, or to kidnap 

her.” Rawlings’s Brief at 38. We remind Rawlings:

The conspiratorial agreement can be inferred from a variety of 

circumstances including, but not limited to, the relation between 

the parties, knowledge of and participation in the crime, and the 

circumstances and conduct of the parties surrounding the 

criminal episode. 

Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 67 A.3d 19, 26 (Pa. Super. 2013). Here, the 

three cohorts specifically sought out a victim to rob, entered the victim’s car 

together while pointing a gun at her, drove off in her car together, and took 

turns sexually assaulting her while one of the others held a gun to her head. 

Moreover, the victim testified Jones told her she “was going to have to 

perform oral sex on all of them if [she] ever wanted to see [her] daughter 

again.” N.T., 11/5/2014, at 100 (emphasis supplied). This evidence was 

sufficient to establish the co-defendants entered into an agreement to 

commit the crimes charged.

19 We note Rawlings properly preserved his weight of the evidence challenge 

in a timely filed post-sentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1).
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favor of acquittal that a guilty verdict shocks one’s sense of 

justice. On review, an appellate court does not substitute its 

judgment for the finder of fact and consider the underlying 

question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence, but, rather, determines only whether the trial court 

abused its discretion in making its determination. 

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1067 (Pa. 2013) (citations 

omitted), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 1792 (U.S. 2014). 

Rawlings’s weight claim is a restatement of his prior arguments on 

appeal. Namely, he asserts his confession was involuntary, and the victim’s 

out-of-court identification was tainted by a suggestive photo array, 

particularly since she admittedly saw his face for only a few minutes in the 

dark before “she cinched the hood of her sweatshirt tightly around her face 

to prevent her from seeing the attackers for the majority of the night.” 

Rawlings’s Brief at 44, 45. He also, once again, claims his co-defendants 

had “vested interests in accusing [him] of committing these crimes[.]” Id. 

Furthermore, he emphasizes the “crucial lack of [Rawlings’s] DNA in the 

[victim’s] rape kit,”20 as well as the failure of the police to recover the 

sweatshirt worn by the attacker. Id. at 45, 46. 

Here, the trial court denied Rawlings’s weight of the evidence claim, 

finding “the evidence against [Rawlings] does not shock the Court’s sense of 

justice.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/14/2015, at 9. Rawlings provides us with 

____________________________________________

20 Although Rawlings acknowledges his DNA was found mixed with vomit on 

Jones’s pants, he contends that fact is irrelevant since “this DNA could have 

gotten on the pants at any time.” Rawlings’s Brief at 46.
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no basis to conclude the court abused its discretion. Although some of the 

evidence presented was contradictory and incomplete, the jury’s credibility 

determinations were supported by the record and do not shock our 

conscience. Once believed, the victim’s identification of Rawlings as the 

third attacker, and his inculpatory statement to police, clearly supported the 

jury’s verdict. The lack of DNA evidence and the unrecovered sweatshirt do 

not undermine the jury’s determination that Rawlings was the third 

perpetrator.21 Accordingly, Rawlings’s challenge to the weight of the 

evidence fails.

Lastly, Rawlings argues the trial court erred when it denied his postsentence motion for a new trial based on a purported Brady22 violation. 

Specifically, Rawlings claims the Commonwealth withheld from him at the 

time of trial “material, impeachable statements” made by the victim, namely 

the Victim Impact Statement submitted during the sentencing hearing. 

____________________________________________

21 Indeed, there are many explanations for the lack of DNA evidence, 

including the victim may have been mistaken as to whether or not her rapist 

wore a condom. See N.T., 11/5/2014, at 115-116 (victim admitting she did 

not know whether Rawlings wore a condom when he raped her vaginally). 

In fact, in his confession, Rawlings stated he did wear a condom. See N.T., 

11/6/2014, at 271. Further, the fact that Rawlings was observed wearing 

different clothing before and after the robbery is immaterial since he clearly 

attempted to disguise his appearance when he approached the victim 

wearing a facemask. Moreover, particularly damaging to his claims, is the 

fact that Rawlings knew exactly where the gun used in the robbery was 

hidden. 

22 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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Rawlings’s Brief at 39. See also N.T., 4/21/2015, at 4-5. Rawlings claims 

the victim averred in the statement that her attacker ejaculated during the 

vaginal rape. Rawlings’s Brief at 40. He insists this statement was material 

and exculpatory because (1) “it provides further contradiction to her in-court 

testimony and could have led to her impeachment[,]” and (2) “the credibility 

of the [victim’s] testimony and identification of [Rawlings] was vital to the 

jury’s determination in this matter.” Id. at 41.

Our review of an alleged Brady violation is guided by the following:

To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate 

that: (1) the evidence was suppressed by the Commonwealth, 

either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the evidence was favorable 

to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material, in that its 

omission resulted in prejudice to the defendant. The burden 

rests with the defendant to “prove, by reference to the record, 

that evidence was withheld or suppressed by the prosecution.” 

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 747 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(internal citations omitted), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014). Indeed, 

“[t]he withheld evidence must have been in the exclusive control of the 

prosecution at the time of trial.” Commonwealth v. Haskins, 60 A.3d 

538, 547 (Pa. Super. 2012).

Significantly, here, the Victim Impact Statement, upon which Rawlings 

bases his Brady claim, is not included in the certified record on appeal. We 

remind Rawlings: “Our law is unequivocal that the responsibility rests upon 

the appellant to ensure that the record certified on appeal is complete in the 

sense that it contains all of the materials necessary for the reviewing court 

to perform its duty.” Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 7 (Pa. 
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Super. 2006) (en banc). Accordingly, because we cannot review the 

statement, which he claims is crucial to his case, we are unable to determine 

whether the victim’s statement was favorable and material to the defense.23

Moreover, Rawlings has also failed to establish the statement was in 

the Commonwealth’s control at the time of trial. Although he acknowledges 

he does not know when the statement was written by the victim, he asserts 

the Commonwealth all but admitted it possessed the statement during his 

trial. See Rawlings’s Brief at 41. Indeed, he bases this assumption on the 

fact that, during the post-sentence hearing, the Commonwealth did not deny 

the statement existed at the time of trial but rather discounted its 

materiality. See id., citing N.T., 4/21/2015, at 6. This circular logic based 

on assumptions and non-statements is simply insufficient to establish the 

Commonwealth either willfully or inadvertently withheld exculpatory 

evidence from Rawlings. Accordingly, Rawlings’s Brady claim fails.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

23 Assuming, however, the written statement is the same as the Victim 

Impact Statement read by the prosecutor at Rawlings’s sentencing hearing, 

we note that the victim made no mention of whether her rapist ejaculated. 

See N.T., 3/9/2015, at 5-7.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/17/2016