Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 52 / Wednesday, March 18, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 14027 

1 DOT Specification 111 tank cars are general 

purpose, nonpressure railroad tank cars commonly 

used to transport a variety of regulated hazardous 

materials, as well as nonregulated commodities. In 

2011, through issuance of Casualty Prevention 

Circular 1232, the Association of American 

Railroads (AAR) adopted an industry standard 

intended to improve the crashworthiness of DOT 

Specification 111 tank cars used in crude oil and 

ethanol service. These cars, known as CPC 1232 

cars, include a thicker shell, head protection, top 

fittings protection, and relief valves with a greater 

flow capacity as compared to baseline DOT 

Specification 111 cars. The leaking tank cars 

identified in this Directive include both a baseline 

DOT 111 Specification car and CPC–1232 cars. 

Transfer and Advancement Act 

(NTTAA) (15 U.S.C. 272 note). 

XI. Congressional Review Act 

Pursuant to the Congressional Review 

Act (5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), EPA will 

submit a report containing this rule and 

other required information to the U.S. 

Senate, the U.S. House of 

Representatives, and the Comptroller 

General of the United States prior to 

publication of the rule in the Federal 

Register. This action is not a ‘‘major 

rule’’ as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2). 

List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 180 

Environmental protection, 

Administrative practice and procedure, 

Agricultural commodities, Pesticides 

and pests, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

Dated: March 12, 2015. 

Susan Lewis, 

Director, Registration Division, Office of 

Pesticide Programs. 

Therefore, 40 CFR chapter I is 

amended as follows: 

PART 180—[AMENDED] 

1. The authority citation for part 180 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 21 U.S.C. 321(q), 346a and 371. 

■ 2. In § 180.960, the table is amended 

by alphabetically adding an entry for ‘‘2- 

Propenoic acid, polymer with ethenyl 

acetate, ethenylbenzene, 2-ethylhexyl 2- 

propenoate and ethyl 2-propenoate, 

minimum number average molecular 

weight (50,149 Daltons)’’ after the entry 

for ‘‘2-propenoic acid polymer, with 1,3- 

butadiene and ethenylbenzene, 

minimum number average molecular 

weight (in amu), 9400’’ to read as 

follows: 

§ 180.960 Polymers; exemptions from the 

requirement of a tolerance. 

* * * * * 

Polymer CAS No. 

*******

2-Propenoic acid, polymer with ethenyl acetate, ethenylbenzene, 2-ethylhexyl 2-propenoate and ethyl 2-propenoate, minimum 

number average molecular weight (50,149 Daltons) ....................................................................................................................... 85075–52–1 

*******

[FR Doc. 2015–06227 Filed 3–17–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6560–50–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Railroad Administration 

49 CFR Chapter II 

[Railworthiness Directive, Notice No. 1] 

Railworthiness Directive for Railroad 

Tank Cars Equipped With Certain 

McKenzie Valve & Machining LLC 

Valves 

AGENCY: Federal Railroad 

Administration (FRA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Notice of railworthiness 

directive. 

SUMMARY: Recent FRA investigations 

identified several railroad tank cars 

transporting hazardous materials and 

leaking small quantities of product from 

the cars’ liquid lines. FRA’s 

investigation revealed that the liquid 

lines of the leaking tank cars were 

equipped with a certain type of 3′′ ball 

valve marketed and sold by McKenzie 

Valve and Machining (McKenzie) 

(formerly McKenzie Valve & Machining 

Company), an affiliate company of 

Union Tank Car Company (UTLX). FRA 

further found certain closure plugs 

installed on the 3′′ valves cause 

mechanical damage to the valves, which 

leads to the destruction of the valves’ 

seal integrity and that the 3′′ valves, as 

well as similarly-designed 1′′ and 2′′ 

valves provided by this manufacturer 

are not approved for use on tank cars. 

FRA is issuing this Railworthiness 

Directive (Directive) to all owners of 

tank cars used to transport hazardous 

materials within the United States to 

ensure they identify and appropriately 

remove and replace these valves with 

approved valves consistent with Federal 

regulations. 

DATES: This Directive is effective March 

18, 2015. This Directive is applicable 

March 13, 2015. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl 

Alexy, Staff Director, Hazardous 

Materials Division, Office of Technical 

Oversight, FRA, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, 

telephone (202) 493–6245; Karl.Alexy@

dot.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Recent 

FRA investigations identified several 

DOT Specification 111 railroad tank 

cars transporting hazardous materials 

and leaking small quantities of 

product.1 One instance occurred during 

the week of January 11, 2015, and 

involved a train of 100 tank cars loaded 

with crude oil being transported by 

BNSF Railway (BNSF) from Tioga, ND, 

to a refinery in Anacortes, WA. BNSF 

discovered 14 tank cars leaking crude 

oil en route and in accordance with the 

applicable regulations, notified FRA of 

the releases. Upon discovery of the 

defective condition of these cars, BNSF 

removed the cars from the train (at 

Hauser, ID; Vancouver and Auburn, 

WA, respectively). When the train 

arrived at its final destination in 

Anacortes, the consignee, Tesoro 

Refining, discovered two additional cars 

leaking product. In all, BNSF and 

Tesoro identified 16 leaking tank cars 

from the original train consist. 

On January 15, 2015, FRA inspected 

seven of the identified leaking tank cars 

that BNSF removed from the train in 

Vancouver. The FRA inspector observed 

crude oil on the sides of each of these 

cars, and upon inspection of each tank 

car’s top fittings, found product leaking 

from the liquid line ball valves and 

around each valve’s closure plug. FRA 

also found the standalone closure plugs 

in each of these valves loose. Further 

inspection revealed that the valve balls 

had visual signs of mechanical damage. 

The mechanical damage FRA observed 

indicated that the bottom face of the 

closure plug came in contact with the 

valve ball, consequentially preventing 

complete engagement of the closure 

plug. 

A second instance involved a single 

tank car loaded with mineral spirits (a 

Class 3 flammable liquid) found leaking 

on January 15, 2015, in a BNSF yard in 

Denver, CO. FRA’s preliminary 

investigation shows that the leak 

occurred through the liquid line valve 


wreier-aviles on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES
14028 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 52 / Wednesday, March 18, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 

2As background, the Tank Car Committee is 

composed of various railroad industry 

representatives, including railroads, tank car 

shipper and owner organizations, tank car builders, 

and chemical and industry associations. FRA and 

the DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 

Administration also participate in the Tank Car 

Committee’s processes. The Tank Car Committee 

has traditionally been the body with the expertise 

to develop tank car design, construction, and 

maintenance standards in this country. DOT sets 

minimum tank car specifications at 49 CFR part 

179, and AAR approves designs meeting the 

requirements of part 179. 

3AAR Approval E–977030 (April 9, 1997). AAR 

Approval E–977030 was a renewal of AAR 

Approval E–897047 (June 21, 1989), which also 

referred to UTLX Drawing 72916. 

4The difference between a full port and standard 

port ball valve is the size of the ball’s bore diameter 

as related to nominal pipe sizes, with the ball size 

being in proportion to the bore size diameter. The 

bore size in a full port valve is that of its nominal 

pipe size, where the bore size in a standard port 

valve is that of the next smallest nominal pipe size. 

For example, the bore diameter for a 3′′ standard 

port ball valve is approximately 2.25′′, or one pipe 

size smaller, and for a full port ball valve, the bore 

diameter is approximately 3′′ in diameter (the actual 

size of the pipe). 

while the car was en route to its 

destination. 

UTLX owns all 17 of the cars found 

leaking as described above. Each of the 

leaking cars was configured with liquid 

line ball valves sold by UTLX’s affiliate, 

McKenzie, and each valve was 

configured with a 3′′ standalone plug as 

a closure. FRA identified the leaking 

valves as 3′′ McKenzie UNNR threaded 

ball valves (McKenzie valves). 

McKenzie provided FRA several valve 

configuration drawings indicating that 

the valve was a full port valve. This 

configuration requires a 3′′ x 2′′ reducer 

bushing with a 2′′ plug to prevent 

contact between the closure plug and 

the valve ball. McKenzie also informed 

FRA that it markets and sells the same 

design of valve in 1′′ and 2′′ models. For 

the 2′′ valve, McKenzie specified the use 

of a 1′′ plug and an appropriately sized 

reducer. 

At FRA’s request, UTLX provided 

FRA drawings of the top fittings 

arrangements for these cars. However, 

unlike the drawings provided by 

McKenzie, the UTLX drawings provided 

by UTLX did not include a full port 

valve with a reducer bushing. Instead, 

consistent with the physical 

configuration of the tank cars FRA 

inspected, the drawings showed a full 

port threaded valve along with a 3′′ plug 

and chain. 

On January 27, 2015, FRA conducted 

field testing of the McKenzie valves at 

UTLX’s Altoona, PA, tank car repair 

facility. FRA tested new 1′′, 2′′, and 3′′ 

McKenzie valves at the facility’s valve 

shop. The field testing included two 

cycles of application and removal of 

each valve’s plug. FRA found that the 1′′ 

and 2′′ McKenzie valves showed no 

signs of contact between the valve ball 

when a 1′′ or 2′′ closure plug was 

installed and tightened. However, when 

a 3′′ closure plug was applied and 

tightened in the 3′′ McKenzie valve, the 

plug contacted and damaged the ball. 

The damage observed during this testing 

was consistent with the type of damage 

observed on the leaking UTLX tank cars 

described above. 

FRA’s field testing further found that 

the application of downward force on 

the valve ball applied by the 3′′ plug 

resulted in the over-compression, 

damage, and misalignment of the 

inboard seal, causing the valve to leak. 

FRA also observed that once a valve’s 

ball is damaged, when the valve is 

subsequently opened, the damaged 

surface of the ball also damaged the 

valve’s top seals by tearing the seals. 

This further compromises the valve’s 

seal. Additionally, FRA understands 

that with repeated opening and closing 

(exemplifying in-service use), the 

valve’s threads will degrade, 

necessitating further engagement of the 

threads during subsequent applications 

of the plug. This continual degradation 

of the threads will require increasingly 

more tightening of the plug, 

exacerbating the damage to the ball and 

seals. In summary, FRA found that 

normal application and tightening of the 

3′′ plug in a 3′′ McKenzie valve destroys 

the valve seal integrity. 

FRA conducted a followup 

investigation at the UTLX facility in 

Altoona to perform a leak test of the 3′′ 

McKenzie valve that was field tested 

and damaged on January 27, 2015. 

Although the designed leak-free 

working pressure of this valve is up to 

500 pounds per square inch (psi), the 

leak test procedure requires that the 

valve hold a minimum pressure of 30 

psi. The subject McKenzie valve failed 

to retain the minimum 30 psi of 

compressed air test pressure. The valve 

showed signs of a significant leak. 

As required by Title 49 Code of 

Federal Regulations (CFR) 179.100–13 

and 179.200–16 of the Federal 

Hazardous Materials Regulations (49 

CFR parts 171–180; (HMR)), all valves 

applied to tanks cars must be of an 

approved design. The term ‘‘approved′′ 

is defined in 49 CFR 179.2 as ‘‘approved 

by the [AAR] Tank Car Committee.’’ 2

McKenzie provided FRA with the 

Association of American Railroads 

(AAR) approval letters for the McKenzie 

valves. While McKenzie may have 

believed these approvals were 

sufficient, the provided AAR approvals 

demonstrate clear inconsistencies 

between the type of valve design that 

AAR approved versus the design of the 

valve actually being used and the design 

depicted on the valve configuration 

drawings both McKenzie and UTLX 

provided to FRA. AAR Approval E– 

077035 (October 26, 2007) is a renewal 

of previous AAR approvals,3 and 

describes a 3′′ standard port threaded 

ball valve. The original approvals that 

AAR renewed described and referred to 

UTLX Drawing 72916, which depicts a 

3′′ standard port threaded ball valve. In 

contrast, the 3′′ McKenzie valve at issue 

is a full port ball valve. A full port valve 

is different from a standard port valve.4

The dimensions of the valve body that 

AAR approved is significantly longer 

than the bodies of the valves depicted 

on the McKenzie drawings and the 

bodies of the valves actually installed 

on the leaking tank cars. McKenzie also 

provided a copy of a September 29, 

2008, application for approval of a 3′′ 

threaded full port valve (AAR 

application number E–087016), but 

neither McKenzie nor AAR have 

provided evidence of that valve’s 

subsequent approval. 

McKenzie provided information to 

FRA indicating that from 2009 through 

the present, it sold approximately 

11,200 of the 3′′ valves to a variety of 

tank car owners and tank car facilities. 

McKenzie indicates that since 2012, its 

sales of these valves were 

predominantly to replace in-kind valves 

previously installed on existing tank 

cars. Further, McKenzie informed FRA 

that as of January 26, 2015, the company 

has stopped selling the 3′′ valves as a 

result of the noted safety concerns. 

Overall, McKenzie and UTLX provided 

information leading FRA to conclude 

that approximately 6,000 DOT 

Specification railroad tank cars are 

equipped with the unapproved 3′′ 

McKenzie UNNR valves. In addition, 

McKenzie indicates that it has sold over 

37,000 1′′ and 2′′ valves to a variety of 

tank car owners and tank car facilities. 

To date, FRA has identified only a 

small number of relatively minor 

hazardous materials leaks directly 

attributable to the identified McKenzie 

valves. FRA believes that the number of 

leaks potentially attributable to the 

identified McKenzie valves used in tank 

car liquid lines could be much higher. 

Based on FRA’s field testing, the 3′′ 

McKenzie valve appears to present an 

immediate safety issue in certain 

circumstances. While the 1′′ and 2′′ 

McKenzie valves do not appear to 

present similar concerns, based on the 

information that AAR, McKenzie, and 

UTLX have provided to date, it does not 

appear that any size of the McKenzie 

valves (i.e., the 1′′, 2′′, or 3′′ UNNR 

valves) are currently approved for use 


wreier-aviles on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 52 / Wednesday, March 18, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 14029 

5The term ‘‘tank car owners’’ is as defined in 49 

CFR 180.503. 

on railroad tank cars. Accordingly, use 

of such valves on tank cars is in 

violation of the HMR. At this time, FRA 

is not aware of any non-accident 

releases or other releases from railroad 

tank cars involving the 1′′ or 2′′ 

McKenzie valves, but since the valves 

have not been approved by AAR they 

have not been shown to be safe for use 

on railroad tank cars. 

McKenzie and UTLX have taken 

independent actions to address some of 

the safety concerns with the 3′′ valves. 

However, FRA believes those actions 

fail to adequately address the safety 

issue the valves present. 

Railworthiness Directive: Based on the 

above discussion, and acting under the 

authority granted in 49 CFR 

180.509(b)(4), FRA finds that the 

continued use of railroad tank cars 

equipped with the unapproved 

McKenzie UNNR threaded ball valves 

(including the 1′′, 2′′, and 3′′ UNNR 

valves) to transport hazardous materials 

by rail in the United States presents an 

unsafe operating condition. The use of 

such tank cars equipped with these 

valves could result in the release of 

hazardous materials. Further, the use of 

tank cars equipped with these McKenzie 

valves used to transport hazardous 

materials in the United States violates 

the requirements of the HMR. FRA is 

issuing this directive to ensure public 

safety, ensure compliance with the 

applicable Federal regulations 

governing the safe movement of 

hazardous materials by rail, and restore 

the railworthiness of all tank cars 

equipped with the above-described 

McKenzie valves. 

Upon the applicability date of this 

Directive, any railroad tank car 

equipped with an unapproved 

McKenzie UNNR threaded ball valve 

(McKenzie valve) is prohibited from 

being loaded with any hazardous 

material described in 49 CFR 172.101 

and offered into transportation until the 

requirements listed below are met. Tank 

car owners 5 of tank cars equipped with 

McKenzie valves must: 

(1) Identify the railroad tank cars in 

their fleet equipped with any McKenzie 

valve. 

(2) Provide to FRA: (a) The reporting 

mark and number of each car equipped 

with any McKenzie valve; and (b) the 

type of valve each car is equipped with. 

(3) Create and maintain for a 

minimum of 6 months from the 

applicability date of this directive a 

record of the inspection of each 

McKenzie valve. The record must 

include, at a minimum, the inspection 

date and location, as well as the results 

of the inspection (i.e., whether the valve 

was removed or not). The record must 

be made available to FRA for inspection 

upon request. 

(4) Immediately inspect the 3′′ 

McKenzie valves on each affected car. If 

any valve is configured with a 3′′ 

standalone plug, ensure that the car is 

not loaded and offered into 

transportation until that valve is 

replaced with an approved valve 

consistent with 49 CFR part 179. In 

addition, any tank car equipped with an 

unapproved 3′′ McKenzie valve is 

prohibited from being offered into 

transportation (whether loaded or 

residue) after May 12, 2015. 

(5) Immediately inspect the 1′′ and 2′′ 

McKenzie valves on each affected car. If 

any valve shows evidence of mechanical 

damage, ensure that the car is not 

loaded and offered into transportation 

until that valve is replaced with an 

approved valve consistent with 49 CFR 

part 179. Even if a valve is not damaged, 

a tank car equipped with an unapproved 

1′′ or 2′′ McKenzie valve is prohibited 

from being offered into transportation 

(whether loaded or residue) after June 

11, 2015. 

(6) Ensure that each unapproved 

McKenzie valve is removed and 

replaced by an entity permitted to 

perform such work in accordance with 

49 CFR part 179. 

(7) Ensure the valve application is 

properly qualified as required by 

subpart F of 49 CFR part 180. 

After tank car owners have inspected 

and/or replaced the unapproved valves 

on each affected tank car as required 

above, and have provided the necessary 

information regarding that car to FRA, 

tank car owners may load the cars with 

hazardous materials and offer those cars 

for transportation. Alternatively, if upon 

an adequate showing demonstrating the 

safety of the 1′′ and 2′′ valves, McKenzie 

obtains AAR’s approval for the use of 

those valves on DOT Specification 111 

tank cars, cars equipped with these 1′′ 

or 2′′ McKenzie valves may be returned 

to hazardous materials service. 

Tank car owners must send the 

information required to be submitted to 

FRA under this Directive to: 

Mr. Randy M. Keltz, Jr., Tank Car 

Quality Assurance Specialist, Office of 

Railroad Safety, Federal Railroad 

Administration, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, 

Telephone: (202) 236–7460, Email: 

Randy.Keltz@dot.gov. 

Regardless of any entity’s compliance 

with this directive, FRA reserves the 

right to seek civil penalties or to take 

any other appropriate enforcement 

action for violations of the HMR that 

have occurred. FRA will be conducting 

an investigation to ensure that all tank 

cars equipped with the valves in 

question are identified and repaired 

consistent with the requirements of this 

Directive. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on March 13, 

2015. 

Robert C. Lauby, 

Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety, 

Chief Safety Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2015–06213 Filed 3–17–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P 


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