Interim Decision i1549` 

Mar= or CORRAL-FRA.G080 * 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A-6127552 

Decided by Bpard January 14., 1966 ' 

A lawful permanent resident alien's return to the United States following a 

visit with his family in Mexico, during which absence he was involved ID 

criminal conduct in violation of 8 V.B.O. 1824(a) (2), for which be stand," 

convicted, made upon his return an entry on which to predicate a ground of 

deportation [Rosenberg v Mesti, 874 U.S. 449, inapplicable] and is precluded 

by the provisions of section 101(f) (8) of the Act from establishing good 

moral char-Rotor_ 

Qum : 

()Mu:. Act of 1952—Section 241(a) (13) 18 U.S.C. 1251]—Knowingly and 

for. gain encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted or 

aided any other alien to enter the United States in 

violation of law. 

This cast( is before -us' on appeal from a special inquiry officer's 

order of October •2, 1965; finding the respondent ineligible for discretionary relief and directing that he be deported from the United 

States to Mexioo' in the manner provided by law on the charge contained' in the order to 'show cause. The appeal will be dismissed. 

The respondenti•a 57year-old male alien, a. native and national of 

Mexico, was admitted to the United States' for permanent residence 

on December 8, 1926. His wife and their child are natives, nationals and residents of Mexico. He last entered the United States 

at O. Paso,' Texas, following .a -visit with his family in Juarez, 

Meiico, on or about July 1965'. 

On or about July 2, 1965, the respondent made arrangements with 

Cresencio Salas-Guevara, a native and national of Mexico, in Juarez, 

- Mexico, to take the latter to Chicago, Illinois. Cresencio Salas-Guevara told the respondent he did not have papers orb a passport to 

•See also, Matter of Corral-Fragoso, Int. Dec. No. 1564, of which the alien 

in this ease is also the subject. 

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Interim Decision #1549 

legally enter the United States. Respondent .told CresencioSalesGuevara in Juarez, Mexico, that he would have to pay the respondent $50 for taking him to Chicago. After Cresenclo Salas-Guevara 

entered. the United States illegally, he gave the respondent $50 before getting into the letter's car in El Paso for the trip to Chicago. 

On or about July 3, 1965, in Juarez, Mexico the respondent made 

arrangements to transport Arturo Alcantar-Guereca, a native and 

national of Mexico, to Chicago, Illinois. He .knew that Arturo 

Alcantar-Guereca, was only in possession of a local passport. In 

Juarez, Mexico, Arturo Alcantar-Guereca promised to pay the respondent $100 for his assistance after he arrived. in Chicago and 

found work. 

On July 4, 1965, the respondent was arrested in Alamogordo, New 

Mexico, en route to Chicago, Illinois, with the two aliens named 

above and three other aliens illegally is the United States, in his 

automobile. He had picked them up in El Paso after his return from 

Juarez and subsequent to their illegal entry into the United States, 

in accordance with arrangements made with them in Juarez. Subsequently, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, El Paso Division, the respondent pleaded guilty to 

five counts of an indictment charging him with transporting, moving and attempting to transport and move certain aliens named 

therein, including the two named above, knowing that they had not 

been duly admitted by an immigration officer of the United States 

and were not lawfully entitled to enter and reside in this country, 

in violation of 5 U.S.C. 1324(a) (2.. 

The special inquiry officer's opinion contains a. thorough discussion of the reasons why the foregoing renders the respondent deportable on the charge contained in the order to show cause, including a recitation of precedent decisions supporting his conclusion. 

Their repetition herein would serve no useful purpose. Suffice it 

to say that we concur in the special inquiry officer's conclusion for 

the reasons and on the basis of tne precedent decisions set forth in 

his opinion. The only additional comment required on. this point is 

that this aspect of the case stands unchallenged on appeal. 

The only reason given for the taking of this appeal is that the 

respondent made no "entry" within the contemplation of the immigration laws on which to predicate deportability when he returned 

to the United States at El Paso, Texas, from Juarez, Mexico, on or 

about July 4, 1965. The claim is that the facts of this case bring 

it squarely within the Scope of the decision of the Supreme,Court of 

the United. States in the case of Rosenberg v. Fiend (374 U.S. 449). 

In that case, it was ruled. by the Supreme Court that an "entry" with479 
Interim Decision #1549 

in the contemplation of the immigration laws depends upon a departure from the United States which can be regarded as meaningfully 

interruptive of the alien's permanent residence in this country. We, 

however, find that the ruling therein is not controlling here, for the 

reasons hereinafter set forth. 

In construing the term "entry" as used in section 101(a) (18) of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101), the Supreme 

Court of the United States in the Fleuti case, supra, concluded that 

it effectuates Congressional purpose to construe the "intent" exception in that definition as meaning an intent to depart from the 

United.'States in a manner which can be regarded as meaningfully 

interruptive of the alien's permanent residence here. One of the 

major factors set forth by the Court relevant to a determination 

of whether such intent can be inferred, was the purpose 'of the visit, 

for if the purpose of leaving the country was to accomplish some 

object which was itself contrary to some policy reflected in our immigration laws, it would appear that the interruption of residence 

thereby occurring would. properly be regarded as meaningful. We 

believe that the purpose of this respondent's visit, as found by the 

special inquiry officer, in the hilt of all the facts of record, appears not to have been the innocent, casual and brief trip which occurred in the Fleuti case. Clearly on the evidence of record, which 

stands undisputed in this respect, this respondent's absence from the 

United. States - preceding his last return to this country Invoked 

conduct branded criminal by the Immigration and Nationality Act, 

and for it. he stands convicted. Accordingly, we agree with the 

special inquiry officer that the facts and circumstances of this case 

vary so much from those in the Fleuti case - as to render the hOlding therein inapplicable. In other words, the purpose of this respondent's visit to Mexico, as established by the uncontested facts of 'record, 

appears not to have been the innocent, casual and brief type of trip 

necessary to'bring this case within the judicial precedent relied upon. 

Finally, we note that the respondent has not made an application 

for any form of discretionary relief. In this connection, he does 

not appear to be eligible for any such relief, as the special inquiry 

officer has pointed out. The reason is that he may not be regarded 

as a person of good moral character because of the provision in section 101(f) (3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

1101) that no person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person 

of good moral character who during the period for which good 

moral character is -required to be established, is or was a person described in section 212(a) (31) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1182). That 

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section in substance, provides that any alien who at any time shall 

have, knowingly and for gain, encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted 

or aided any other alien to enter or try to enter the United States 

in violation of law shall be ineligible to 'receive a visa and shall be 

excluded from admission into the United States. Clearly, in view 

of the foregoing, the special inquiry officer has correctly applied the 

facts of this case to the pertinent provisions of the statute. No 

claim to the contrary has been raised. 

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby 

dismissed. 

481