Docket No: F AA-20 15-5806 

Directorate ID: 20 15-SW-083-AD 

Originating Office Tracking No.: 

Disposition Comments 

Next Step: OFRAN 0 SNPRM 

0 These comments are in 

response to an SNPRM 

D No Comments/OnJy Supportive Comments Received -ljlhis box is checked, no signatures are 

required. 

Has the referenced service information been revised since the NPRM was issued? 

If yes, list latest revision and attach a copy. Note that changes beyond !he scope of the 

previously published NP RM will require a new notice. Contact the Directorate focal point 

for guidance. l.ak -;L ,·i~ion. 

Instructions: Summarize all comments by issue (not by commenter) and provide your recommended resolution of 

each issue. All comments relating to the same issue should be discussed together. Do not list all of the issues 

from one commenter together. If changes to the AD are required based on the comments received, explain why and 

describe in detail what change(s) you recommend. Reference FAA-IR-M-8040.1C Chapter 9. 

ISSUE 1: Select one of the following: other 

lf other, explain: compliance terms 

Commenter(s): Stephen Stafford 

What change to the AD action is requested? 

The current AD reads as follows: 

(f) Requjred Actions 

Before further flight, insert a copy of this AD into the 

rotorcraft flight manual, Section 4 Normal Operating Procedures, or 

make pen and ink changes to t~e preflight and post-flight procedures 

as follows: 

(I) Stop performing the yaw load compensator check (ACCU TST 

switch) during preflight procedures, and instead perform the yaw 

load compensator check during post-flight procedures after rotor 

shut-down. 

(2) The yaw servo hydraulic switch (collective switch) must be 

in the "ON" (forward) position before takeoff 

The AD SHOULD reads as follows: 

(1) Required Actions 

Stop performing the yaw load compensator check (ACCU TST switch) during preflight 

procedures, and instead perfonn the yaw load compensator check during Engine and 

Rotor Shut DOWl1 Procedures, with the throttle twist grip in the Idle position. 

Why is rhe change requested or how is it justified? To properly conduct the T/R Accumulator check. the 

hydraulic system must be pressurized and the tail rotor spinning to at least idle RPM. The test is use less 

when performed "after rotor shutdown. Per Air Bus insh·uctions. when checking the accumulator. the 

collective yaw servo cut off switch should be in the OFF position, thereby "removing" hydraulic pressure 

Page I of8 
from the tail rotor servo. 

Once the yaw servo switch is OFF, the pedals should "stiffen," but should still be moveable by the pilot 

(at this point you are actually checking to see that the accumulator pressure is sufficient to overcome the 

centrifugal loads of the spinning tail rotor and boss weights). Next you depress the ACUM TEST button, 

which bypasses the accumulator and the pedals then become so "stiff', they cannot be moved by foot 

pressure (no hydraulic boost; no accumulator pressure). The ACUM TEST button then is released and the 

collective yaw servo cut off switch is moved back into the ON position, at which point the pedals should 

feel normal (hydraulically boosted) again. 

If this test is perfonned after rotor shut down, you would only be confirming that the test button works 

and accumulator pressw·e is sufficient to change tail rotor pitch, with no centrifugal loads present on the 

tail rotor, which effectively defeats the purpose of the system check. The ACUM TEST button is 

normally only used after the rotor is shut down to take the pitch out of the tail rotor blades to reduce 

prolonged twisting moments of the tail rotor spar while at rest. 

UnfOJtunately, I have found there are a number of Astar pilots out in the field who do not fully understand 

how the T/R accumulator works and how it is tested. This comes from those pilots who fly I have flown 

single AS350 Hydraulic systems. When they test the three main rotor single servo accumulators, they are 

actually testing the accumulators with a series of fore and aft and lateral movements that eventual bleed 

down the accumulators to a point where no boost is felt. When they restore the system, the accumulators 

recharge and are ready to assist during a real, in flight, single hydraulics failure. This is NOT how the T/R 

accumulator works, as it is closed loop accumulator and only bypasses when the test button is actuated, 

not when it is used in tlight after a T/R malfunction. 

The reason this AD was issued in the first place, was to put the test at the end of the fight, during engine 

cool down at idle speed, so if a distracted or dim witted pilot failed to place the collective yaw servo cut 

off switch back in the ON position after the test procedure, he would most likely not attempt take off 

while at idle and during the engine cool down phase (flight over). Note that the Air Bus AD "before start" 

checklist now asks the pilot to confirm the collective yaw servo cut off switch is the "ON" position, just in 

case some distracted or dim witted pilot left it off during the last cool down accumulator check. 

l don't often worry about losing my tail rotor hydraulics after the rotors have shut down. I do however 

worry about losing T/R hydraulics in flight at I 00% rotor RPM. The fact that there were a few distracted 

or dim witted pilots who did not follow a simple check list step and failed to move the collective yaw 

servo cut offswitch (on the back to the "ON" position after the T/R accumulator test and then took off 

and crashed, should not rob all pilots fi·om conducting an T/R Servo Accumulator test during engine cool 

down at "Idle rotor" RPM. 1 believe a change to this AD is critical to flight safety. 

\ pt·opos<.•d Ch('<.'li Lil't listing th<.• proper sequenc(• oftlu.• test is attached. 

Do we agree? No 

If YES, we agree because ln-;:;.' 11 jt.'"li l'i ~.:.tti~~n Make the following changes to the AD: I i-..1 ~~~~~ 

! /

1 • - '· ' 'll \f) 

If PARTIALLY AGREE, we agree with l·l'-~rl •c.\t because ln:-.t:rl j .-.tiJkalhHl We disagree with 

r .. ' because ln ·, ~.·J l )ll'-.titi~,;tiiHn Make the following changes to the AD: Li l ;.my 

l hll!!L.. t• 1 · '\ I> 

lfNO, we don 't agree because: 

Page 2 of8 
The efficiency of the yaw load compensator is linked to a sufficient accumulator pressure which 

is checked during regular maintenance action. 

The test of the yaw load compensator, whether performed before flight with the rotor turning or 

after flight with the rotor stopped, checks the correct function of the ACCU TST system which 

can depressurize the yaw load compensator. It also checks whether a pressme builds up in the 

yaw load compensator when the hydraulic system is in nominal configuration (absence of 

significant leaks and presence of a nitrogen pressure in the accumulator). This test cannot assure 

that the nitrogen pressure in the accumulator is at its nominal level which is a maintenance task 

that cannot be replaced by a pre-flight test with the rotor turning as such a test would require 

nearly full application of the right pedal with the helicopter on the ground. 

ISSUE 2: Select one ofthefollowing: other 

If other, explain: compliance terms 

Commenter(s): Christopher Hart, NTSB, on behalf ofLaSean R McCray 

What change to the AD action is requested? The NTSB supports the AD but is concerned that, beyond 

changes to the RFM, these c11itical changes may not be incorporated into operators' relevant checklists. 

While operators should update their checklists to reflect the modified procedures found within the RFM, 

the FAA is not obligated to confirm that the new procedut'es have been jncorporated into the appropriate 

checklists. Given the importance of these checklists to ensuring pilot compliance with the AD action, we 

encourage the FAA to work with operators who fly these helicopters to ensure that the AD is not only 

incorporated into the RFM bt.lt also in the relevant checklists. 

Why is the change requested or how is it justified? ( hd: hen:: h1 ~o:nkr II.:.'\ I. 

Do we agree? Yes 

If YES, we agree because while having checklists is at t he operator's discretion- they are not 

mandatory and subsequently, cannot be mandated in an AD. We agree with encouraging these 

changes being incorporated into relevant checklists. ( ltcJ.. hue 111 ctll<:r t~A.t.. Make the 

following changes to the AD: I i:\t an~ chungc!l h• 01.: . \f) 

If PARTIALLY AGREE, we agree with ln!->t"lt 1L '\l because lnseT11U-,ltlicuL1nt We disagree with 

ln~ert text because lnsu1juslifi.;~nion Make the following changes to the AD: l.t->1 ,m) 

changes Ln the AD 

If NO, we don't agree because 

ISSUE 3: Select one of the following: Other 

lj other, explain: compliance tenns 

Commenter(s): Christopher Hart, NTSB, on behalf of LaSean R McCray 

What change to the AD action is requested? The NTSB has concerns regarding the options of inserting 

a copy of the A D into the RFM or making pen and ink changes as methods of compliance. In the first 

case, the NTSB is concerned that a pilot may not read through the AD each time the preflight 

procedures are performed an~ could perform the yaw load compensator check at that time. In the 

second case, we are concerned that transcribing the changes to the RFM could potentia lly lead to 

Page 3 of8 
errors. As a way to avoid either possibility, the NTSB believes the AD should provide for 

replacement in the RFM a copy of the relevant pages that contain the required changes. 

Why is the change requested or how is itjustified? Click here to ~nter text. 

Do we agree? No 

If YES, we agree because lns\.'rt. j u .... li l"icLtl ion Make the following changes to the AD: List an~ 

~ t,llll!~" l~- th~: AD 

If PARTIALLY AGREE, we agree with lnsL"rt t~xl because lnsert Justification We disagree with 

• -..~.:rr ~-xt because ln ~ertjuslifi~.;atinn Make the following changes to the AD: List any changes luth~ 

\1) 

If NO, we don't agree because The FAA has evaluated the contents of the cun·ent AD and found the steps 

and procedures contained within are sufficient to minimize the risk of performing a takeoff with no 

pressure to the tail rotor hydraulic actuator 

ISSUE 4: Select one ofthefollowing: Other 

If other, explain: compliance terms 

Commenter(s): Christopher Hart, NTSB, on behalfofLaSean R McCray 

What change to the AD action is requested? The NTSB notes that the AD does not address the lack of 

any aural or visual warning panel indications for when the yaw servo hydraulic switch is placed in the 

''OFF" (aft) position or when there is reduced or no hydraulic pressure to the tail rotor hydraulic system. 

Following the incident involving the loss of tail rotor control during takeoff (NTSB case number 

CEN 14lA329), the pilot recalled looking at the caution and warning panel for any indications. Although 

the actions required by the AD are a positive step toward reducing the risk of taking off without hydraulic 

pressure in the tail rotor hydraulic system, a complementary aural or visual indication to alert pilots about 

the actual condition of the tail rotor hydrau lic system would provide more robust protection against a 

known hazardous condition. 

Why is the change requested or how is it justified? Click here tu ~ntcr lc>.;t. 

Do we agree? No 

If YES. we agree because . Make the following changes to the AD: I isl 11 11 ~ l·h~mgl!s to thl' t\D 

If PARTIALLY AGREE, we agree with ln~ctt text because ln~~tt lll!-.ltlicatinn We disagree with 

I , ,. ll" because I , .... ~,..•rt Jlhl i 11'-:..tll lllMake the following changes to the AD: l.tst ~ITl) changt.:s ln I Itt..• 

\T 

If NO, we don't agree because For the comment regarding the lack of any aural or visual wru11ing panel 

indications for when the yaw servo hydraulic switch is placed in the "OFF" (aft) position or when there is 

reduced or no hydraulic pressure to the tail rotor hydraulic system, this design change is beyond the scope 

of the current AD .. This topic has been forwarded to the helicopter manufacturer to incorporate these 

features in future designs. The FAA has evaluated the contents of the current AD and found the steps and 

procedures contained within are sufficient to minimize the risk ofperfonning a takeoff with no pressure 

to the tail rotor hydraulic actuator. 

ISSUE 5: Select one ofthefollowing: Other 

Page 4 of8 
If other, e>.plain: various 

Commenter(s): Elodie Peneau 

What change to the AD action is requested? See changes presented below. 

Why is the change requested or how is it justified? Airbus Helicopters has made some comments here 

under. lfyou agree with these comments, will you update the Emergency AD too? 

Comment 5.1 Page I: Background: 

AD extract: This AD also requires the yaw servo hydraulic switch to be in the "ON" position ... 

AH comment: This sentence can be misunderstood: The request to check that the yaw servo hydraulic 

switch is in the "ON" position before engine struting (so before taking oft) AND the displacement ofthe 

yaw lever system pre flight check in the post flight check procedure are both on the SB and on the EASA 

AD. The word "also" let think that there is something more in the FAA AD. Are we in line on the fact 

that AH SB, EASA AD and FAA AD require the same actions? 

Comment 5.2 AD extract:.. before taking off 

AH comment before engine start 

Comment 5.3 AD extract: This AD is prompted by two accidents and one incident of Airbus Helicopters 

Model AS350B3 helicopters. 

AH comment: equipped with dual hydraulic 

AD extract: From preliminary investigations, loss oftail rotor (T/R) control during takeoff was evident in 

each event. 

AH comment: and was link to an unproper application of the FLM by the pilot (take off without hydraulic 

assistance) 

Comment 5.4 Page 2, Discussion 

AD extract: On October 28,2015 we issued Emergency AD 2015-22-52 for Airbus Helicopters Model 

AS350B3 helicopters with a dual hydraulic system that prohibited performing the yaw load compensator 

check (collective switch) durirtg preflight procedures and instead required petforming it during post-flight 

procedures 

AH comment: The yaw load compensator check is performed using 2 buttons: 

- hyd cut off on the collective grip 

and 

- accu test on the control board 

-> To be sure that there is no misunderstanding: The whole run up yaw servo hydraulic check procedure 

is being removed (yaw servo collective switch AND ACCU TST switch) 

Comment 5.5 AD extract: Emergency AD 2015-22-52 also required the yaw servo hydraulic switch 

(collective switch) to be in the 1'0N" (forward) position before taking off. 

AH comment:- This sentence can be misunderstood: 

The request to check that the yaw servo hydraulic switch is in the "ON" position before engine starting (so 

before taking off) AND the displacement of the yaw lever system pre flight check in the post flight check 

procedure are both on the SB and on the EASA AD. 

The word "also" let think that there is something more in the FAA AD. 

Are we in line on the fact that AH SB, EASA AD and FAA AD require the same actions? 

- before engine start 

Comment 5.6 AD extract: From preliminary investigations, loss ofT/R control during takeoff was 

evident in each event. 

AH comment: and was link to an unproper application of the FLM by the pilot (take off without hydraulic 

assistance) 

PageS of8 
Page 3, Discussion 

Comment 5.7 AD extract: events. The conditions in the events are indicative of takeoffs without 

hydraulic T/R assistance caused by a lack of pressure in the T/R hydraulic system. When taking off 

without T/R hydraulic assistance with the switch on the collective grip in the "OFF" (aft) position, the 

yaw load compensator remains discharged and degrades the T/R hydraulic system, which significantly 

increases the pilot T/R control load and prevents sufficient T/R thrust for takeoff. 

AH comment: To wrrte "taking off with the switch on the collective grip in the "OFF" (aft) position, the 

yaw load compensator remains discharged" is wrong. 

The yaw load compensator remains discharged if it has been discharged by pushing the push button 

ACCU TST" after having switched off the collective switch. 

Proposal: 

When taking off without T/R hydraulic assistance with the switch on the collective grip in tbe "OFF" (aft) 

position, the yaw load compensator remains discharged if the accu test has been engaged after having 

pushed the switch on the collective grip in the "OFF" (aft) position. This can degrades .... 

Notice: You will have the same result if the accu test switch is depressed (and not desengaged) before 

switching the switch on the collective grip to the off position 

Comment 5.8 AD extract: to correct an unsafe condit ion 

AH comment: AH do not agree with the Unsafe condition. 

Comment 5.9 AD extract: Activating the collective switch after rotor shut-down will have no effect due 

to the absence of hydraulic pressure in the system. 

AH comment: and so is no more requested in the new FLM procedure 

Do we agree? Pattially Agree 

If YES, we agree because 

If PARTIALLY AGREE, we agree with ln~ert te'<l because Insert jlJ<;Uiiculion We disagree with 

r • 1 r, I because 'l~d·t iu · tl11:attnnMake the following changes to the AD: None. The FAA agrees 

with Comments 5.1 and 5.5, 5.2, 5.7, and 5.9; however these changes are not substantive enough to justify 

proceeding with additional rulemaking. 

Comments 5.1 and 5.5: The FAA agrees with the following wording in the Background information with 

the sentence ''The request to check that the yaw servo hydraulic switch is in the "ON" position before 

engine statting (before taking off) AND the displacement of the yaw lever system preflight check in the 

post flight check procedure." 

Comment 5.2: The FAA agrees with the wording "before engine start" instead of " before taking off." 

Comment 5.7: The FAA agrees with the wording "When taking off without T/R hydraulic assistance 

with the switch on the collective grip in the "OFF" (aft) position, the yaw load compensator remains 

discharged if the accu test has been engaged after having pushed the switch on the collective grip in the 

"OFF" (aft) position. This can degrade ... " 

Comment 5.9: FAA concurs. 

If NO, we don't agree because ''"-~ 1"1 n11t' l';tl inn~) k 

Page 6 of8 
Comments 5.3 and 5.6: The FAA disagrees with modifying the text since the NTSB has not concluded 

that the cause of the accidents is due to improper use of RFM procedures. It is speculated that improper 

procedures lead to the accidents. 

Comment 5.4: This comment is accommodated in AD 2015-22-53 with added discussion on page 2 

under Related Service lnfonnation "To mitigate this potential error, the yaw load compensator check has 

been moved from preflight to post-flight procedures." •'" ... Comment 5.8: The FAA believes that an unsafe conelltion exists if the pilot doesn't follow the applicable 

RFM procedmes, followed by the lack of any visual or aural ale1t to indicate lack of hydraulic boost to 

the tail rotor flight control. 

For additional issues, double-click here 

Page 7 of8 
Signature Section 

Signature indicates concurrence with this action. 

Originating Office Tracking No.: 

Date 

Page 8 of8 
N85KJ - AS350B3-2Bl 

BmJB£~ 

DOORS, SEATS, HARNESSES ........... SECURE 

CYCLIC ..................... CENTERED, FRICTIONED 

COLLECTIVE .................. LOW PITCH, LOCKED 

THROTILE .................................. IDLE DETENT 

COL HYDR SWITCH .................. CONFRIM ON 

HEAT & DEMIST CONRTOLS .................... OFF 

AC SWITCH & FANS .................................. OFF 

ROTOR BRAKE.. ....................... OFF, PARKED 

EMERGENCY FUEL CUTOFF .......... GUARDED 

START SELECT.. ............... OFF, GUARD OPEN 

MASTER CUTOFF ...................................... OFF 

EXT PWR BAT & OCT BAT SWITCHES ...... ON 

VEMD .... TQ-7.0, BLEED OPEN, GAUGES CHK 

BATIERY VOLTAGE ......................... CHECKED 

GEN SWITCH ............................................... ON 

FUEL BOOST PUMP ........... ON, MIN 30 SECS 

PED HYD TEST... ON, CENTER PEDS+l, OFF 

COL TO LIMIT LIGHT(BFF) ...... THEN LOCKED 

WARN PANEL TEST... ......... OBSERVE PANEL 

SERVO TEST SWITCH .... LIGHT EXTINGUISES 

FUEL FILTER TEST ......... LIGHT ILLUMINATES 

ENGINE OIL TEMP ............... NORMAL RANGE 

FUEL GUAGE ..... MISSION FUEL CONFIRMED 

ANTI COLLISION LIGHT.. ............................ ON 

!!M1iJHE'lmRV!1:f!RI'S 

GOV (RED & AMBER) UGHTS .................. OFF 

MAIN & TAIL ROTORBLADES .............. CLEAR 

DC VOLTS ......................... CONFIRM 24V MIN 

STARTSELECT...ON, 15+VLTS, MONITOR T4 

FLI ON VEMD ............ START GUARD CLOSED 

FUEL BOOST PUMP .............................. OFF 

&R!fl!ffilf!UFP'J!l'Y 

AVIONICS MASTER .................................... ON 

SERVO TEST.. ..... PUSH, LIGHT ILLUMINATES 

NAVS & RADIOS ........................................ SET 

RECOG & NAV LIGHTS ............ AS REQUIRED 

AHARS ........................... UP AND STABILIZED 

THROTILE .............................. FLIGHT DETENT 

LOW ROTOR HORN ................... ON, AUDIBLE 

PITOT HEAT (IF NO SPACECAM) ............... ON 

FIRE TEST SWITCH ....... ON, GONG SOUNDS 

WARNING PANEl ................................ CLEAR 

CONTROL FRICTIONS ................ AS DESIRED 

PRESSURES & TEMPS ..................... NORMAL 

FUEL GUAGE.. ... MISSION FUEL CONFIRMED 

NR & NP GUAGE ......................... GREEN ARC 

COL HYOR SWITCH .................. CONFRIM ON 

me!fJW 

CRUISE POWER (ABOVE 40 KTS) .... MAX TQ 

ENGINE & INSTRUMENTS ............. NORMAL 

WARNING P/INEL... ............................. CLEAR 

BMBi'~ 

ENGINE & INSTRUMENTS .............. NORMAL 

WARNING PANEl ................................ CLEAR 

EN!Ii!Ne"SfWfi!WW 

CYCLIC ................... CENTEREO, FRICTIONED 

THROTILE .............................. IDLE DETENT 

LOW ROTOR HORN ......... RESPONDS, OFF 

COL HYO SWITCH .... OFF, PEDALS STIFFEN 

PEOISTAL HYD TEST ..... ON, PEDALS STIFF 

PEOISTAL HYD TEST ............................... OFF 

COL HYOR SWITCH ... ON,PEDALS NORMAL 

PITOT HEAT... ........................................... OFF 

AVIONICS M~TER .................................. OFF 

RECOG & NAV LIGHTS ............................ OFF 

AFTER 30 SECS .......... START SWITCH OFF 

GEN SWITCH ........................................... OFF 

ROTOR BRAKE.. ................. BELOW 100 NR 

ROTOR STOPPED ........ ANTI COlLISION OFF 

HYD TEST... .......... ON.CENTER PEDALS. OFF 

V.E.M.O. FLIGHT REPORT... ............ RECORD 

EXT PWR BAT & OCT BAT SWITCHES ... OFF 

ENGm'E'FJHEW!IJNG fltlGlW 

AUTOROTATIVE GUOE ........................ ENTER 

EMERGENCY FUEL CUTOFF .................. PULL 

FUEL BOOST PUMP ................................. OFF 

CRANK SWITCH (10 SEC) ......................... ON 

EXT PWR BAT & OCT BAT SWITCHES .... OFF 

LANDED OR GROUNO .................. EVACUATE 

.W.~!WW'flmmm!NR§)' 

WARNING PANEL TEST ................. OBSERVE 

NO "ENG p• LIGHT.. ....... SHUT DOWN, AUTO 

ON "ENG p· LIGHT .......... LAND !MEDIATELY 

£!)~~ 

LOW SPEED OR HOVER FLIGHT... ....... LAND 

SHUT DOWN ............... CHECK COOLING FAN 

IN FLIGHT ..... SO KTS MIN, REDUCE POWER 

NO REDUCT 11'4 TEMP ...... LANO IMEDIATELY 

£0WSftm$imE1i'J5W!aS~Itr~ 

HYDRO & SERVO ......................... LIGHTS ON 

PEDALS ................................................... STIFF 

QffERtO;;ysJEM'fi]W FJ(RtORF 

HYDRO, SERVO & LIMIT ............. liGHTS ON 

PEOALS ........................................... NORMAL 

JUR0NRCiQRlm![~ 

SYMPTOMS ... PEDAL JAM & CONTROL LOSS 

ATIEMPT.. ................ RIGHT QTR HEAD WIND 

CYCLIC & COLLECTIVE ..... AOJUST TO 70 KTS 

YAW HYDR SWITCH ................................... OFF 

HYDR TEST SWITCH ............. ON TO DEPRESS 

SHALLOW APPROACH ........................ 70 KTS 

IF YAWING LEFT ........... INCREASE AIRSPEED 

IF YAWED RIGHT.. ....... DECREASE AIRSPEED 

£(i.E f!liWEif-JIJUTL !WWR.~ 

ROTATION ............................. TWIST GRIP OFF 

COLLECTIVE .............. CUSHION TOUCHDOWN 

0\G.E 80W!f-J.Ii&mmJR'E.(!SS 

COLLECTIVE ........................................ REDUCE 

CYCLIC .......... FORWARD TO GAIN AIRSPEED 

AIRSPEED ......................... ADJUSTTO 55 KTS 

~R!.tGt!Y mt !WlMILCSS' 

CYCLIC ............................... ADJUST TO 55 KTS 

COLLECTIVE ...... REOUCE TO AVOID SIDESLIP 

BEST LANDING SITE ............................ SELECT 

TWIST GRIP .............................................. .IOLE 

AUTOROTATIVE LANOING ............. COMPLETE 

~~StZJD£'yXI!.OE'se!@)RE 

HOVER ROTATING ............... TWIST GRIP IDLE 

HOVER NO ROTATION ........ LAND NORMAL.LY 

CRUISE .................. REDUCE TO 40 TO GO KTS 

~ 

YAW HYOR SWITCH .................................... OFF 

UNKOWN SOURCE ........ HEAT & OEMIST OFF 

EMER SWITCH ................... ON. AFT POSITION 

EXT PWR BAT & OCT BAT SWITCHES ...... OFF 

GEN SWITCH ............................................... OFF 

AVIONICS & RADIOS .................................. OFF 

WHEN SMOKE CLEARS ......... ALL USERS OFF 

EMER SWITCH ................. ON, FWD POSITION 

EXT PWR BAT & OCT BAT SWITCHES ....... ON 

GEN SWITCH ................................................ ON 

DC ANOMOL Y ....... GEN SWITCH OFF & LAND 

AVIONICS & RAOIOS ........ ON ONE AT A TIME 

CONSIDER. ...................... CONTINUED FLIGHT 

V.EM:t!Jl FMrQBE' 

100 KTS ........................ NOHOVER LANDING 

~!2.E:FJI"t®V 

HYDR TEST SWITCH ..... , ...... ON TO DEPRESS 

RT X·WINO .... TAIL RTR VORTEX RNG STATE 

RT QTR WINO .... MAIN RTR VORTEX TO TAIL 

TAIL WIND .................... .WEATHER COCKING 

LT X·WINO .... LOSS OFT AIL RTR AUTHORITY 

STRONG WINO .... RIGHT PEDAL TIJRN FIRST 

gMsa:0RJ'W~~ 4153 

Aei TOWER Am Ami 

SBA 119.70 1.32.65 125.40 

SMX 118.30 121.15 11.9.05 

VGB 124.95 121.15 11.9.05 

CMA 12B.20 126.02 124.70 

OXR 1.34.95 118.05 124.70 

NlD 124.85 125.55 124.70 

VNY 11.9.00 127.55 134.20 

BUR 118.70 118.75 134.20 

WKT 135.00 135.00 120.40 

SBA 11.9.70 132.65 .125.40 

SMX 118.30 121.15 11.9.05 

VGB 124.95 121.15 11.9.05 

SMO 120.10 11.9.15 134.90 

LAX 11.9.80 133.80 1.34.90 

HHR 121.10 118AO 134.90 

TOA 124.00 125.60 127.20 

LGB 119.40 127.75 124.65 

SNA 126.80 126.00 121.30 

VNY 11.9.00 127.55 134.20 

BUR 118.70 118.75 134.20 

WKT :136.00 135.00 120.40 

FUL 11.9.10 125.05 124.65 

EMT 121.20 118.75 125.50 

ONT 120.60 124.25 127.25 

rom mJ!IIYI'rW 

FULL FUEL ................................ 143 GALLONS 

FULL FUH ......................................... 956 LBS 

EACH BAR ............................... 14.2 GALLONS 

EACH BAR ........................................ 95.6 LBS 

EACH 8AR ................................... 15 MINUTES 

LOW LEVEL.. ........................... 15.8 GALLONS 

LOW LEVEL.. .......... 15 MCP MIN REMAINING