# IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

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# C A N T E Y 

# H A N G E R 

# , L L P , P E T IT IO N E R 

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# G R E G O R Y 

# B Y R D 

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## O N 

## P E T I T I O N F O R 

## R E V I E W F R O M T H E 

## C O U R T O F 

## A P P E A L S F O R T H E 

## S E C O N D 

## D I S T R I C T O F 

## T E X A S



### 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## Argued Dec em ber 4, 2014

J U S T I C E 

## L E H R M A N N 

## delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which J U S T I C E 

## G U Z M A N 

## , J U S T I C E 

## B O Y D 

## , J U S T I C E 

## D E V I N E 

## , and J U S T I C E 

## B R O W N 

## joined.

J U S T I C E 

## G R E E N 

## f

il e d a d is s e n ti n g o p in io n , in w h ic h C H IE F 

## J U S T IC E 

## H E C H T 

## , J U S T I C E 

## J O H N S O N 

## , and J U S T I C E 

## W I L L E T T 

## joined.

This case conce rns the scope of attorney s’ immunit y from civil liability t o n o n -c l i en ts. Following the trial court’s entry of a d i v o rce decr ee, one of the divorce litigants sued opposing

counsel fo r fr au d and rela ted claims in connec tion with the law firm’s alleg ed prepa ration of a
document to eff

ectua te t h e t ransfer of persona l proper ty awa rded to its client in the decr ee. Specifica lly , the l itigant alleg ed that th e d o cument contained misreprese ntations and that the firm

structure d the proper

ty ’s transfe r in a manner that shifted cer tain tax liabiliti es to the l i tiga nt in

## contra vention of the decr ee. The law firm moved for summary judgm en t , ar gu i n g that it was

immune f rom liability to a non-client for conduct within the scope of repr esenta tion of its c lient in

the divorce proce eding s. The trial court g rante d t h e m o t i o n , b u t the court of appea ls reve rsed, holding that the firm’s alleg ed conduct was unrela ted to the divorce litigation and that the firm had

not conclusively established its entitlement to immunit y
. We hold that the firm established its

aff irmative defe nse of attorney immunit y as a mat t er o f l aw and there fore reve rse the court of

appea ls’ judgme nt. I. Background

Phili p By rd and Nanc y Simenstad commence d divorce proce eding s in 2006. Simenstad was

repr esente d in the divorce proce eding s by Vick, Carney & Smit h, L L P, and then by Cantey Hang er,
L L P. T h e d ivorce proce eding s wer e highly contentious, but in Aug ust 2008 the parties settled, resulting in the trial court’ s entry of an a g ree d divorce decr ee.
The decr ee awa

rded Simenstad three airc raf t as her separ ate proper

ty , includi n g a P i p er
Seminole that had been owned by L ucy L easing Co., L L C, a company the decr ee awa rded to By

rd.

The decr ee also made Simenstad responsible for all ad valore m taxes, liens, and assessments on the

airc raf t. Finally , the decr ee order ed the parties to “ execute with[ in] ten day s from the entry of this

dec re e an y documents nece ssary to eff ectua te the transfe rs contemplated here in, which shall

include

. . . documents nece ssary to transfe r owner ship of airplane s and the like.” The “attorne y for

the non-sig ning party ” was order ed to “dra ft the documents nece ssary to eff ectua te t h e t ra n s fer s contemplated [i n the decr ee].” The rec ord does not ref lect, and no party assert s , that any transfe r

2

## documents reg arding the Piper Seminole at issue wer e executed within the time f rame specifie d in

the dec ree

. By rd, L ucy L easing , and PGB Ai r, I nc. (anothe r company awa rded to By

rd in the decr ee)

sued Simenstad and Cantey Hang er, alleg ing in pertinent part that, over a y ear afte r the decr ee was 1



## enter ed, Simenstad a

nd Cantey

Hang er falsified a bill of sale transfe rring the Piper Seminole f rom
L ucy L easing to a third party

. Specifica lly , the plaintiffs alleg ed that Simenstad executed the bill of

sale as “Na

ncy By rd,” a “mana g er” of L ucy L easing , even though her last name had previously been leg ally chang ed to Simenstad and she “wa s never an owner , office r, or manag er” of L ucy L easing

. They broug ht claims ag ainst Cantey Hang er for fra ud, aiding and abetting , and conspirac y , asser ting

that Cantey Hang er falsified the bill of sale in order to shift tax liability for the Piper Seminole from

Simenstad to By

rd in contra vention of the decr ee. Cantey Hang er answe red with a g ener al denial, 2



## a verifie d denial, and sever al aff irmative defe nses, including “litiga tion immunit y or other common law immunity

doctrines.” Cantey Hang er move d for summary judgme nt on attorney -immunity g rounds, ar g uing tha t
i t o wed no duty to By

rd or the other plaintiffs and that as a matter of law it was not liable to th e plaintiffs for actions taken in the course and scope of its repr esenta tion of Simenstad in the divorce

B y r d a l s o s u e d V i c k C a r n e y , b u t t h e t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t i n V i c k C a r n e y ’ s f a v o r , a n d B y r d 1 d i d n o t s e e k r e v i e w o f t h a t o r d e r

. 4 0 9 S

. W

. 3 d 7 7 2 , 7 7 5 ( T e x
. A p p

. — F o r t W o r t h 2 0 1 3 )

.

W i t h r e s p e c t t o C a n t e y H a n g e r , t h e p l a i n t i f f s a l s o a l l e g e d v a r i o u s o t h e r a c t s o f m i s c o n d u c t a n d a s s e r t e d c l a i m s 2

o f d e f a m a t i o n , u n f

a i r d e b t c o l l e c t i o n p r a c t i c e s , a n d i n t e n t i o n a l i n f l i c t i o n o f e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s

. T h e t r i a l c o u r t d i s m i s s e d t h o s e c l a i m s o n s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t , B y r d d i d n o t a p p e a l t h e d i s m i s s a l o f t h e d e f a m a t i o n a n d d e b t

- c o l l e c t i o n c l a i m s , a n d t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s a f

f i r m e d t h e d i s m i s s a l o f

t h e e m o t i o n a l

- d i s t r e s s c l a i m

. A c c o r d i n g l y , t h o s e c l a i m s a r e n o l o n g e r a t i s s u e

. I d

. a t 7 7 6 , 7 8 2

. 

### 3

## proce eding

. Ex hibits to Cantey Hange r’s motion included the decr ee and aff idavits from two 3


## Cantey Hang er attorney s att es t ing that Cantey Hang er was reta ined to repr esent Simenstad in the

divorce proce eding s and that “[a]ll actions taken by Cantey Hang er with respec t to Pl aintiffs we re
made in the c ourse a

nd scope of

repr esenting Ms. Sim enstad.” 4



## The plaintiffs responde d that Cantey Hang er’ s conduct—“ [c] onspiring with an d ai ding a
client to falsify documents [and] evade tax l i abil ity ”—wa s “wr ong ful,” was not “par t of the discharg e of [C antey Hang er’ s] duties in repr esenting [i ts] client,” and t h u s was not protec ted by
attorney immunit y
. They arg ued more broadly that the claims ag ainst Cantey Hang er “shoul d be permitted bec ause the y involve fra udulent conduct.” I n an af fidavit submitted as an exhibit to the

response , By

rd testified that he had never rec eived documents from Cantey Hang er to sign in order

to eff ectua te the transfe r of the Piper Seminole from L ucy L easing to Simenstad, that he discovere d

the plane had been transfe rre d direc tly to a third party , that Simenstad had signe d the bill of sale as

manag er of L ucy L easing even though he was the sole ma nag er, that the pl ane was st ill reg istered

to L ucy L easing , and that the tra

nsaction made L ucy

L easing responsible for

the sales tax. 5



## The trial court g rante d Cantey Hang er’ s summary -judg ment motion and dismiss ed all claims

ag ainst it with prejudice

. The court of appea ls reve rsed as to the fra ud, aiding -and-ab et t i ng , and conspirac y claims rela ting to the sal e o f t h e plane. 409 S.W .3d at 782–83. The court held that,

C a n t e y H a n g e r d i d n o t f i l e a n o
- e v i d e n c e s u m m a r y - j u d g m e n t m o t i o n

. 3

O n e o f t h e a t t o r n e y s a l s o s t a t e d t h a t C a n t e y H a n g e r s o u g h t p o s t j u d g m e n t r e m e d i e s o n S i m e n s t a d ’ s b e h a l f i n 4 t h e d i v o r c e a n d r e p r e s e n t e d S i m e n s t a d i n B y r d ’ s b a n k r u p t c y p r o c e e d i n g s , b u t t h o s e p r o c e e d i n g s a p p e a r u n r e l a t e d t o t h e
a l l e g e d c o n d u c t a t i s s u e

.

T h e b i l l o f s a l e a t i s s u e i s n o t i n t h e s u m m a r y - j u d g m e n t r e c o r d

. T h e p l a i n t i f f s a t t a c h e d i t a s a n e x h i b i t t o t h e i r 5

r e s p o n s e , b u t t h e t r i a l c o u r t s t r u c k i t a s n o t p r o p e r l y a u t h e n t i c a t e d , a n d t h a t o r d e r w a s n o t a p p e a l e d

. 

### 4

## althoug h attorney s enjoy qualified immunity

from civil liability

to non-clients for actions t aken in

connec tion with repr esenting a client in litigation, Cantey Hang er was not entitled to such immunit y
. Id. at 779–81. The court conclude d that Cantey Hang er’ s alleg edly fra udulent conduct involving the “subseque nt sale” of t he plane awa rded to S imenstad “wa s not require d by , and had nothing to do
with, the divorce decr ee,” and thus was “outside the scope of repr esenta tion of a client.” Id. at 781.

The dissent in that court would have held that Cantey Hang er “esta blished as a matter of law that its

conduct was within the course of its re prese ntation of its c lient in the underly ing divorce litigation

ag ainst By

rd” and was thus entitled to summary judgme nt on its immunit y defe nse. Id. at 788, 790 (Ga rdner , J ., dissenting)

. We g rante d Cantey Hang er’s p et i t i o n for revie w to addre ss the parties’ dispute over the sc ope and a pplication of the a

ttorney -immunity

doctrine.

II. Stand ard of Review

We revie w a g rant of summary judgme nt de novo. State v. Ninety Thousand Two Hundred

Thirt y-Fiv e Dollars & No Cents in U.S. Currency ( $90,235) , 390 S.W .3d 289, 292 (Tex. 2013). A
party moving for traditional summary judgme nt has the burden to prove that there is no g enuine issue

of materia l fac t and that it is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law. T E X



## . R. C I V



## . P. 166a(c ); Mann Frankf o r t S tein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding , 289 S.W .3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). “When

revie wing a sum mary judgme nt, we take as true all evidenc e favorable t o t h e n o n m o vant, and we indulge ever

y rea sonable in fe re n ce and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor .” Valence Operating Co. v

. Dorsett , 164 S.W .3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005)

. Attorney immunit y is a n aff irmative

defe nse. Sacks v . Zimmerman , 401 S.W .3d 336, 339–40 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 2013,
pet. denied)

. There fore , to be entitled to summary judgme nt, Cantey Hang er must have proven that

5

## there was no g enuine issue of materia l fac t as to whether its conduct was protec ted by the attorney

immunit y doctrine a

nd that it was entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law.

III. Attor ney Im m uni ty

Texas common law is well settled that an attorney does not owe a profe ssional duty of car e to third parties who a

re da mag ed by the attorne y ’s neg lige nt repre sentation of a client. Barcelo v.

Elliott , 923 S.W .2d 575, 577 (Tex. 1996); see also McCamish, Martin, Brown & L o ef f l er v. F

. E. Appling Interests , 991 S.W .2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1999) (explaining that a l ac k o f privity prec ludes
attorney s’ liability

to non-clients for le g al malpra ctice) . Howeve r, Texas courts have develope d a

more compre hensive a f

f ir ma ti v e d e f e n se protec ting attorney s from liability to non-clients, stemming

from the broad decla

ration over a centur

y ag o that “at t o rney s are authorized to prac tice their profe ssion, to advise their clients and int erpose any defe nse or supposed defense, without making

themselves liable for damag es.” Kruegel v. Murphy , 126 S.W

. 343, 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ

ref ’d). T h i s at t o rney -immunity defe nse is intended to ensure “loy al, faithful, and ag g ressive

repr esenta tion by attorney s employ ed as advocates.” Mitchell v. C h a p man , 10 S.W .3d 810, 812 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pe t. denied).

I n acco rd an ce wi th this purpose, there is consensus among the courts of appea ls that, as a

g ener al rule, attorney s are immune from civil liability to non-clients “for actions taken in connec tion

with repr esenting a client in litigation.” Alpert v. Crain, Caton & Jame s, P.C. , 178 S.W .3d 398, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) ; see also T oles v. Toles , 113 S.W .3d 899, 910 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); Renfroe v. Jones & Assocs. , 947 S.W .2d 285, 287–88 (Tex. Ap p

. —For

t Worth 1997, pet. denied)

. Even conduct that is “wr ong ful in the context of t h e

6

## underly ing suit” is not actionable if it is “par t of the discharg e of the lawy er’ s duties in repr esenting

his or h er cl ient.” Toles , 113 S.W .3d at 910–11; Alpert , 178 S.W .3d at 406; see also Dixon Fin.

Serv s

. , L t d

. v. Gree nberg, Pede n, Siegmye r & Oshman, P.C. , No. 01-06-00696- CV, 2008 WL
746548, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Marc h 20, 2008, pet. denie d ) (m em. op. on reh’ g ) (“[A]n attorney cannot be held liable to a third party for conduct that require s the office , profe ssional training , skill, and authority of an attorney .” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Howeve r, other mecha

nisms are in place to discourag e and reme dy such conduct, such as sanctions,
contempt, and attorney disciplinary proce eding s. Reagan Nat’l Adve r. of Austin, Inc. v. Hazen , No.

03-05-00699- CV, 2008 WL 2938823, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin J uly 29, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.);

see also Renfroe , 947 S .W.2d at 287 (“I f an attorney ’s conduct violates his profe ssional responsibility , the re medy is public, not private.”)

. 6 

## Conversely , attorney s are not protec ted from liabil i t y to non-clients for their actions when they do not qualify as “the kind of conduct in which an attorney eng ag es when discharg ing his duties

to his cl i en t

. ” Dixon Fin. Servs. , 2008 WL 746548, at *9; see also Chapman Children’s Trust v.

T h e m a j o r i t y o f T e x a s c a s e s a d d r e s s i n g a t t o r n e y i m m u n i t y a r i s e i n t h e l i t i g a t i o n c o n t e x t

. B u t t h a t i s n o t 6

u n i v e r s a l l y t h e c a s e

. I n C a m p b e l l v

. M o r t g a g e E l e c t r o n i c R e g i s t r a t i o n S y s t e m s , I n c

. , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s h e l d t h a t a t t o r n e y s h i r e d t o a s s i s t a m o r t g a g e b e n e f i c i a r y i n t h e n o n

j u d i c i a l f

o r e c l o s u r e o f r e a l p r o p e r t y w e r e i m m u n e f r o m t h e b o r r o w e r s ’ s u i t f o r w r o n g f

u l f o r e c l o s u r e

. N o

. 0 3

- 1 1

- 0 0 4 2 9

- C V , 2 0 1 2 W L 1 8 3 9 3 5 7 , a t * 6 ( T e x
. A p p

. — A u s t i n M a y 1 8 , 2 0 1 2 , p e t

. d e n i e d ) ( m e m

. o p

. ) ; s e e a l s o H a z e n , 2 0 0 8 W L 2 9 3 8 8 2 3 , a t * 8 ( n o t i n g t h a t “ n e i t h e r t h e c a s e l a w , n o r t h e [ a t t o r n e y - i m m u n i t y ] d o c t r i n e ’ s u n d e r l y i n g p o l i c y r a t i o n a l e s , a r e l i m i t e d t o [ t h e l i t i g a t i o n ] s e t t i n g ” )

. B e c a u s e w e
c o n c l u d e t h a t C a n t e y H a n g e r ’ s a l l e g e d c o n d u c t f a l l s w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f i t s d u t i e s i n r e p r e s e n t i n g i t s c l i e n t i n l i t i g a t i o n , w e n e e d n o t c o n s i d e r t h e a t t o r n e y - i m m u n i t y d o c t r i n e ’ s a p p l i c a t i o n t o a n a t t o r n e y ’ s c o n d u c t t h a t i s u n r e l a t e d t o l i t i g a t i o n b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s f

a l l s w i t h i n t h e a m b i t o f c l i e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d “ r e q u i r e s t h e o f f i c e , p r o f e s s i o n a l t r a i n i n g , s k i l l , a n d

a u t h o r i t y o f

a n a t t o r n e y
. ” S e e D i

x o n F i n

. S e r v s

. , 2 0 0 8 W L 7 4 6 5 4 8 , a t * 7

. T h e d i s s e n t t h u s m i s c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e s c o p e
o f o u r o p i n i o n i n a s s e r t i n g t h a t w e “ s u g g e s t [ ] t h a t t h i s f o r m o f a t t o r n e y i m m u n i t y a p p l i e s o u t s i d e o f t h e l i t i g a t i o n
c o n t e x t

. ” P o s t a t

_ _ _ . W e c i t e C a m p b e l l a n d H a z e n m e r e l y a s e x a m p l e s o f c a s e s i n w h i c h c o u r t s h a v e a p p l i e d a t t o r n e y i m m u n i t y ( o r i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t c o u l d a p p l y ) o u t s i d e t h e l i t i g a t i o n c o n t e x t

. 

### 7

## Porter & Hedge s, L.L.P. , 32 S.W .3d 429, 442 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (noting that “it is the kind of conduct that is controlling , and not whether that conduct is meritorious

or sanctionable ”). Fo r ex am p l e, we have held that an attorney “will not be hear d to deny his liability ” for the damag es cause d by his participa tion in a fra udulent business scheme with his client,

as “such acts are entirely fore ign to t h e d u t i es o f an attorney .” Poole v. Hous. & T.C. Ry. Co. , 58

Tex. 134, 137 (1 8 8 2 ); see also Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Carter , 371 S.W .3d 366, 382 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (holding that attorney s wer e not immune from claims

that they knowing ly assisted their clients in evading a judgme nt throug h a fra udulent transfe r). And

the courts of appe als have identified examples of attorney conduct that, even if it occur red during

a lawsuit, would be actionable beca use it does not involve the provision of leg al service s and would

thus fall outside the scope of client repr esenta tion. See, e.g. , Bradt v. W est , 892 S.W .2d 56, 72 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (noting that a claim ag ainst an attorney for assaulting opposing counsel during trial would be actionable , as such conduct “is not pa rt of the discharg e of

an attorne y ’s duties in repr esenting a par ty ”).

I n this case , the parties dispute whether Cantey Hang er has co n cl u s ively proven that its alleg ed conduct with respe ct to the sale of the p l ane was part of the discharg e of its duties in

repr esenting Simenstad in the divorce proce eding s or, instead, was independe nt of the divorce and

fo re i gn t o the duties of an attorney

. I n Chu v. Hong , we rec og nized that “[a]n attorney wh o

persona lly steals g oods or tells lies on a client’s behalf may be liable for conver sion or fra ud in some

8

## case s.” 249 S.W .3d 441, 446 (Tex. 2008). To that end, some courts of appea ls have broadly stated 7



## that attorney immunit y does not extend to an attorney ’s knowing participa tion in fra udulent activ it ie s
on his client’s beha lf. E.g. , Toles , 113 S.W .3d at 911; Querne r v. Rindf uss , 966 S.W .2d 661, 666 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (“A n attorney

. . . is liable if he knowing ly commits a
fra udulent act or knowing ly enter s into a conspiracy to defr aud a third person.” ). However , o t her

courts have taken a narr ower approa ch to this so-ca lled fra ud exception, holding that an attorney ’s knowing commission of a fra udulent act “outside the scope of his leg al repr esenta tion of the client”

is actionable

. Dixon Fin. Servs. , 2008 WL 746548, at *8; Hazen , 2008 WL 2938823, at *3; Alpert , 178 S.W .3d at 406. These courts g o on to explain that an attorney ’s participa tion in “indepe ndently

fra udulent activities” is considere d “for eig n to the duties of an attorney ” and is not shielded from liability

. Alpert , 178 S.W .3d at 406 (citing Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II, Ltd. , 696 S.W .2d 468,

472 (Tex. A

pp.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ)); see also Cunningham v. Tarski , 365 S.W .3d
179, 192 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (holding that there was no g enuine issue of materia l

fac t as to whether the defe ndant’s conduct was “the ty pe of fra udulent conduct that is fore ign to the

duties of an a ttorney ”).

We think the latter view is consistent with the nature and purpose of the attorney -immunity

defe nse. An a ttorney

is give n latitude to “pursue le g al rig hts tha t he deems ne cessa ry and prope r”

prec ise l y t o avoid the i nevitable conflict that would arise if he were “forc ed constantly to balanc e

I n M c C a m i s h , w e h e l d t h a t a n a t t o r n e y c a n b e l i a b l e t o a n o n
- c l i e n t f o r n e g l i g e n t m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w h e r e “ a n 7 i n d e p e n d e n t d u t y t o t h e n o n c l i e n t [ a r i s e s ] b a s e d o n t h e [ a t t o r n e y ’ s ] m a n i f e s t a w a r e n e s s o f t h e n o n c l i e n t ’ s r e l i a n c e o n t h e
m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d t h e [ a t t o r n e y ’ s ] i n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e n o n c l i e n t s o r e l y
. ” 9 9 1 S

. W

. 2 d a t 7 9 2

. T h e p l a i n t i f f s d o n o t
a s s e r t s u c h a c l a i m h e r e

. 

### 9

## his own potential exposure aga i n s t h is client’s best interest.” Alpert , 178 S.W .3d at 405 (citing

Bradt , 892 S.W .2d at 71–72). Be cause the focus in evalua ting attorney liability to a non-client is “on

the kind—not the nature —of the attorney ’s conduct,” a g ener al fra ud exception would signific antly

u n d er cu t the defense. Dixon Fin. Servs. , 2008 WL 746548, at *8. Mere ly labeling an attorney ’s 8



## conduct “ fra

udulent” does not and should not remove it from the scope of client re prese ntation or

rende r it “for eig n to the duties of an attorney .” Alpert , 178 S.W .3d at 406 (citing Poole , 58 Tex. at 137); see also Dixon Fin. Servs. , 2 0 0 8 WL 746548, at *9 (“Char acte rizing an attorney ’s action in

advanc ing his c lient’s rig hts a s fra udulent does not chang e the r ule that an a ttorney

cannot be held

liable for disc harg ing his duties to his client.”).

Moreove r, char acte riz i n g fraudulent conduct as an “exception” to the attorney -immunity

defe nse bring s unnece ssary confusion and complexit y to the analy sis. I n this case , for example, the parties ag ree that Cantey Hang er bore the initial burden of proof to establish its immunit y defe nse, but dispute the effec t of t he plainti ffs’ fraud alleg ations on that burden. Spec ifically , they dispute

whether n ega t i n g the alleg ations was part of Cantey Hang er’ s evidentiar y burden, or whether the

burden shifted to the plaintiffs to prese nt sufficie nt evidenc e to raise a fac t issue on the fra ud claims. 9

W e n o t e d i n C h u t h a t f r a u d c l a i m s “ a g a i n s t a n o p p o s i n g a t t o r n e y i n l i t i g a t i o n ” g e n e r a l l y a r e n o t a c t i o n a b l e 8 b e c a u s e “ r e l i a n c e i n t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ” i s n o t j u s t i f i a b l e

. 2 4 9 S

. W

. 3 d a t 4 4 6 n

. 1 9 ; s e e a l s o M c C a m i s h , 9 9 1 S

. W

. 2 d

a t 7 9 4 ( “ G e n e r a l l y , c o u r t s h a v e a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t a t h i r d p a r t y ’ s r e l i a n c e o n a n a t t o r n e y ’ s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s n o t j u s t i f i e d

w h e n t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t a k e s p l a c e i n a n a d v e r s a r i a l c o n t e x t

. ” )

.

T h e d i s s e n t i n t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s o p i n e d t h a t “ o n c e C a n t e y H a n g e r e s t a b l i s h e d a s a m a t t e r o f l a w t h a t i t s 9

c o n d u c t w a s w i t h i n t h e c o u r s e o f i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f i t s c l i e n t i n t h e u n d e r l y i n g d i v o r c e l i t i g a t i o n a g a i n s t B y r d , i t
e s t a b l i s h e d i t s a f

f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e o f i m m u n i t y a s a m a t t e r o f l a w a n d

. . . t h e b u r d e n s h i f t e d t o B y r d t o p l e a d a n d p r e s e n t
e v i d e n c e r a i s i n g a f

a c t i s s u e r e g a r d i n g t h e f r a u d e x c e p t i o n

. ” 4 0 9 S

. W

. 3 d a t 7 8 8 ( G a r d n e r , J

. , d i s s e n t i n g ) ( c i t i n g H a z e n , 2 0 0 8 W L 2 9 3 8 8 2 3 , a t * 8

– 1 0 )

. T h e d i s s e n t t h e n e f f e c t i v e l y c o n c l u d e d t h a t n o e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t s t h e p l a i n t i f f s ’ f r a u d
c l a i m

. I d

. a t 7 8 8

– 8 9

. B u t a n o
- e v i d e n c e r e v i e w r e n d e r s t h e a t t o r n e y - i m m u n i t y a n a l y s i s w h o l l y u n n e c e s s a r y
. A s n o t e d

a b o v e , C a n t e y H a n g e r d i d n o t m o v e f o r a n o
- e v i d e n c e s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t o n t h e p l a i n t i f f s ’ c l a i m s , a n d w h e t h e r t h e


### 1 0

## But we see no rea son to eng ag e in a burden- shifting analy sis. Fr aud is not an exception to attorney

immunit y ; r ather , the def

ense doe s not ex tend to f

raudule nt c onduct that is outside the scope of an
attorney ’s leg al repr esenta tion of his client, just as it does not extend to other wrongf u l co nduct

o u t s i de the scope of repr esenta tion. An attorney who pleads the aff irmative defe nse of attorney
immunit y has the burden to prove that his alleg ed wrong ful conduct, re gar d less of whether it is

labeled fra

udulent, is part of the discharg e of his duties to his client. E.g. , Dixon Fin. Servs. , 2008

WL 746548, at *9; see also Alpert , 178 S.W .3d at 408 (holding that a claim ag ainst an attorney for conspirac y to defr au d wa s n ot actionable wher e “the complained- of actions involve the filing of

lawsuits and pleading s, the providing of leg al advice upon which the client acte d, and awa rene ss of

settlement neg otiations—in sum, acts taken and communications made to fac ilitate the rendition of leg al servic es to [the client] ”). IV. Appli cation Cantey Hang er is entitled to summary judgme nt on its immunit y defe nse i f i t conclusively

established that its alleg ed conduct was within the scope of its leg al repr esenta tion of Simenstad in

t h e d i v o rc e p roceeding s. We hold that it did. The rele vant alleg ations in By rd’s petition may b e
summarized as follows: (1) the divorce decr ee awa rded Simenstad the airc raf t at issue and assig ned responsibility for the plane’ s ad valore m taxes, liens, and assessments to Simenstad; (2) the decr ee
direc ted Simenstad’s attorney s to prepa re nece ssary d o c u

me n ts to e f

f e c tu a te th e plane’ s transfe r from

L ucy L easing to Simenstad; (3) Cantey Hang er assisted Simenstad in executing a bill of sale of the

p l a i n t i f f s h a v e r a i s e d a f

a c t i s s u e a s t o t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h o s e c l a i m s i s n o t b e f o r e u s

. 

### 1 1

## plane from L ucy L easing direc tly to a third party ; (4) the bill of sale was signe d by “Na ncy By rd,” 1 0


## a “manag er” of L ucy L easing ; (5) Si menstad’s name had been l eg ally chang ed from By rd b ack to

Simenstad befor e she signe d the document, and she had no authority to act on L ucy L easing ’s behalf ;
and (6) by transfe rring the plane direc tly to a third party , the bill of sale shifted liability for the taxes on the plane to L

ucy L easing (and thus to B y

rd) in contr avention of the decr ee.
The court of appea ls conclude d that, based on these alleg ations, “[t] he subsequent sale of the airplane to a thi rd party

afte r it had alre ady

been a war ded to [S imenstad] in t he ag ree d decr ee w as

not r equire d by , and had nothing to do with, the divorce decr ee.” 409 S.W .3d at 781. The dissent

ag ree s with this cha

rac terization; we do not. By rd esse ntially

complains that the manne r in which Cantey Hang er car

ried out a specific responsibility assig ned to it by the divorce decr ee—tr ansfe rring

owner ship of t he plane awa rded to Simenstad—caused tax liabi lities to be im posed on the parties

to the divorce in a way that violated the decr ee. Meritorious or not, the type of conduct alleg ed falls

square ly within the scope of Cantey Hang er’ s repr esenta tion of Simenstad in t h e d i v o rce

proce edin gs

. Alpert , 178 S.W .3d at 406 (“The immunit y focuse s on the t y pe of conduct, not on 1 1



## whether the conduc t was meritorious in the conte x t of the under ly ing la wsuit.”).

T h e n a t u r e o f C a n t e y H a n g e r ’ s a l l e g e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e s a l e o f t h e p l a n e a n d t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t i n g i t 10

a r e u n c l e a r

. A g a i n , h o w e v e r , a n y s h o r t f a l l s i n t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t i n g t h e p l a i n t i f f s ’ c l a i m s a r e n o t b e f

o r e u s

.
T o t h e e x t e n t t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s w e r e n o l o n g e r a d v e r s a r i a l , a p p a r e n t l y m e r e l y 11 b e c a u s e t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e h a d a l r e a d y b e e n e n t e r e d , w e d i s a g r e e

. A s n o t e d a b o v e , t h e p a r t i e s e n g a g e d i n p o s t j u d g m e n t
e n f o r c e m e n t p r o c e e d i n g s r e l a t i n g t o o t h e r a s p e c t s o f t h e d e c r e e , c o m p l i a n c e w i t h w h i c h c o n t i n u e d t o b e a s o u r c e o f d i s a g r e e m e n t

. I n d e e d , a t t h e t i m e t h e b i l l o f s a l e w a s e x e c u t e d , C a n t e y H a n g e r w a s w e l l p a s t t h e t e n
- d a y d e a d l i n e t o p r e p a r e t h e t r a n s f

e r d o c u m e n t s

. B y r d c o u l d h a v e f i l e d a m o t i o n t o e n f

o r c e o r f o r s a n c t i o n s a t a n y p o i n t , b u t c h o s e n o t t o

. 

### 1 2

## I ndeed, the court of appea ls stated, and we ag ree , that “Cantey Hang er’ s prepa ration of a bill

of sale to fac ilitate transfe r of an airplane award ed t o its client in an ag ree d divorce decr ee was
conduct in w hich an attorney eng ag es to dischar g e his duties to his client” and was not “ fore ign to
the duties of an attorney .” 409 S.W .3d at 780. Yet the court went on to hold that the complained- of

conduct—intentional misrepre sentations in the bill of sale made for t h e p u rp o s e of shifting tax liability from Simenstad to L ucy L easing and By rd—wa s outside the scope of Cantey Hang er’ s
duties to its client. This simply does not follow. The type of co n d u ct d es cr ibed in these two

statements is the same; the only differ ence is the added detail in the latter descr iption that makes the

conduct “ wrong ful.” Aga in, an attorney ’s conduct may be wrong ful but still fall wit hin the scope

of client repr esenta tion. E.g. , Renfroe , 947 S.W .2d at 287–88 (holding that attorney s wer e not liable

to oppo s ing parties for filing a wrong ful g arnishment action). We hold that Cantey Hang er has conclusively established that its alleg ed conduct was within the scope of its repr esenta tion of

Simenstad in the divorce proce eding s, was not fore ign to t h e duties of an attorney , and is thus
protec ted by

attorney immunit y
. 1 2



## We note that the court of appea ls rema nded the plaintiffs’ fra

ud claims ag ainst Simenstad to
the trial court. To the extent L ucy L easing is deter

mined to be leg ally responsible fo r taxes that

T h e d i s s e n t r e f

e r e n c e s t h e j u d i c i a l

- p r o c e e d i n g s p r i v i l e g e a s s u p p o r t f o r i t s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a t t o r n e y i m m u n i t y 12 d o e s n o t a p p l y t o C a n t e y H a n g e r ’ s a l l e g e d c o n d u c t

. P o s t a t

_ _ _ . T h a t p r i v i l e g e i n s u l a t e s “ [ c ] o m m u n i c a t i o n s i n t h e d u e
c o u r s e o f

a j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g ” o r i n “ s e r i o u s c o n t e m p l a t i o n ” o f s u c h a p r o c e e d i n g f

r o m d e f a m a t i o n c l a i m s

. J

a m e s v

. B r o w n , 6 3 7 S

. W

. 2 d 9 1 4 , 9 1 6 ( T e x
. 1 9 8 2 ) ; S h e l l O i l C o

. v

. W r i t t ,

_ _ _ S

. W

. 3 d

_ _ _ ,

_ _ _ ( T e x
. 2 0 1 5 )

. T h e p r i v i l e g e i s
n o t l i m i t e d t o a t t o r n e y s , b u t c o v e r s “ a n y s t a t e m e n t m a d e b y t h e j u d g e , j u r o r s , c o u n s e l , p a r t i e s o r w i t n e s s e s , . . . i n c l u d i n g
s t a t e m e n t s m a d e i n o p e n c o u r t , p r e
- t r i a l h e a r i n g s , d e p o s i t i o n s , a f f i d a v i t s a n d a n y o f

t h e p l e a d i n g s o r o t h e r p a p e r s i n t h e
c a s e

. ” J a m e s , 6 3 7 S

. W

. 2 d a t 9 1 6

– 1 7 ( “ T h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e r e q u i r e s f u l l d i s c l o s u r e f

r o m w i t n e s s e s , u n h a m p e r e d b y f e a r o f r e t a l i a t o r y s u i t s f o r d e f a m a t i o n

. ” )

. T h e p r i v i l e g e i s a n i n d e p e n d e n t d o c t r i n e s e r v i n g i n d e p e n d e n t p u r p o s e s , a n d i t h a s n o t b e e n r a i s e d i n t h e s e p r o c e e d i n g s

. 

### 1 3

## Simenstad rig htfully owes, it s reme dy is ag ainst Simenstad, not Cantey Hang er. See Dixon Fi n. 1 3



## Servs. , 2008 WL 746548, at *9 (holding that the attorney s of a preva iling party in a rbitration wer e

not subject to persona l liability to the opposing party for alleg edly misrepre senting the scope of the

arbitra tion a

war d to a third party in a

n attempt to sa tisfy the awa rd); see also Re nfroe , 947 S.W .2d at 287 (“ I f an a ttorney ’s conduct violates his profe ssional responsibility , the remedy is public, not private.” ).

V. Conclusion

C an tey Hang er has conclusively established that it is immune from civil liabili t y t o t h e plaintiffs and that the trial court’s g rant of summary judgme nt was proper

. Acc ording ly , we reve rse
that portion of the court of appea ls’ judgme nt rela ti n g t o t h e fraud, aiding -and- abetting , and conspirac y

claims ag ainst Cantey

Hang er a nd reinstate the trial court’ s judgme nt.

_________________________________ Debr a H. L ehrma

nn J ustice

OP INION DELIVERED: J une 26, 2015

T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s h e l d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s ’ c l a i m s a g a i n s t S i m e n s t a d “ a r e n o t e n f o r c e m e n t c l a i m s f

o r w h i c h 13 t h e d i v o r c e c o u r t h a s e x c l u s i v e , c o n t i n u i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n

. ” 4 0 9 S

. W

. 3 d a t 7 7 6

. S i m e n s t a d d i d n o t f i l e a p e t i t i o n f

o r
r e v i e w , a n d w e t h e r e f

o r e e x p r e s s n o o p i n i o n o n t h i s h o l d i n g

. 

### 1 4