REF ID:A63360 

' / 

, .. 

- : - J; - -: ~ .. • .. 

:t. I .. I. 

•' 

-. 

,. " .i I . ;.. ..... • if - ._ ~ 

. - . g- .. ·r .. --r'!'~r .... _"' - " .... 

~-!. ·- u:rju ............... ~ 

,_ -41 ..,...::: -' "- Lt-.::rm . 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 11-20-2013 pursuant to E .0. 1352a . -
·, . ' . - • - -t" 

... _._ REF ID:A63360 

SLIDES FOR THIRD PERIOD o' pCJsi.1! _μ..u-l 

PAGE SLIDE NO. TITLE 

1 " 45 Alberti disk 

.; 45.1 Porta , 45.4 U.S. Army disk 

./ 47 Cipher disk finally patented 

" 48 Wheatstone 

8 , 49 Wheatstone - modified 

.( 49.4 Bazeries Cylindrique 

9 11 16s Colonel Hitt ~ 16S.l Hitt•s original strip 

I 5S.4 Hitt•s wooden strip model 

.I' 159 Mauborgne .. , ,..,n_, ...... ,...,. 

.; 5s.3 M-94 

10 ., 5S Je:f'f'erson•s Wheei Cipher 

t 5s.1 Page 2 of sa.me 

./ 50.11 M-138 

, ./ 54 Kryha 

11 I 55 Dissertation on Kryha 

12 ' 171 M-161 (Sig. c. Labs machine) 

12A / 164.l Hagel in 

13 (' 68 C-36 

14 .; 70 .3 G.I. model of M-209 

J( 'f.. 260.1 CX-52 

15 ./ 59 B-21 

16 ~ 65 B-211. integrated ., 57 Enigma 

./ 71 Hebern 

17 ~"172 First Hebern model ,,. 71.l. First Hebern printing model 

1( x. 71.2 ) Connectable wirings 

""' 7( 71.3 ) 

o/ 172.1 3-cascade Hebern 

v'72 5-rotor Hebern 

I ~73 5-rotor with rotors removed 

?- 20 165 Solution of Navy test messages I 

,.. v 21 ... ~72.10 Hebern•s ~t ~chine for the Navy 

---- i"'i 7'6. 7 Converter M-l34-T2, and electrical. typewriter I 

" 22 ·;e 172.4 Original model of the Mark I, ECM. 

-- 23 . li'13 SIGABA 

25 x 177 CCM 

26 'X 74.1 The German Steckered Enigma, with box of rotors 

27 V-56 The AT&T Co. Printing Telegraph Cipher Machine 
'· 

.. . _ ... 

PAGE 

29 

31 

SLIDE NO. 

·~58 ./178 

~179 

"/. 183 

)<'. 185 

-x. 236 

34-A YX-27 

35 ~ X-28 

36 j X-29 

><- X-3S 

:rX-31 

~X-33 

~ X-32 

REF ID:A63360 

TITLE 

One-time tape production equipment 

SIGCUM Unit (external view) 

SIGCUM Unit (internal view) 

SIGMEW - Cif'ax 

SIGJIP 

Number of cryptologic systems in effect - 7 December 1951-

0ctober 1945 

"- KL-7 

x KW-9 

>< KW-26 

><. KL-36 

,t, KL-17 

·-

.· 

KW-3 

KW-37 

KY-3 

KY-8 

KY-9 

SIGSALY terminal of World War II days. 

KY-l.l. 

. ;_ 

••' 

- ! ;. 

-2-
.... ,, ~ . .. .... /' 1 ••• , .. t ••• ., •• 1, ...... . 

COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY 

GSitJ:emen, ,_this P!riod wiJJ..-be._.devot.e,Ug.JiJi~ ... sy.bject ..of -communications 

tSecnz:-1 ty, . bear., :it can "be .eetab"li"shed an.d "lil;i;ilrtained. 

~~Q_ 'Pm'ee~~ :tOUll years ago there was being hammered into our ears over the 

' . radio in Washington a slogan concer~d ,w.~ ~h. automobile traffic safety. The 

slogan was: 

useful as a 

-

"Don't learn your traffic laws by accident. 11 ·I think the slogan /\ 

J ...• \ ~ .- 1<:1tN Cbr-H'l\J~\CA"T'10NS SEC. U~\T'(, 

sub-title fort, my talk Abut I'll modify it a J.ittJ.e-- 11Don 1 t learn 

. , ... ··~' your COMSEC laws by accident." ~ llugP"-.-llQf, talk~ by read.mg the- Webster 

n 

~ODa?:"yiief'inition of the word "accident". I know, of course, that~ 

only a few of you will ever be directly concerned with COMSEC duties, but as 

a.. ~t:""~ .. potential future commanders of fighting units '4;he def'initf&n of the word . ~ 

11\1~9-4.:l.~..e~:..:..., "accident" should be of~ interest in connection with ~-*=t•=eaia. 111 

a.·maue.p.t. or ~wo, se I will read Webster's definitionJif you will bear with me. 

"Accident: Literally a befalling; an event which takes place without 

one's foresight or expectation; an undesigned, sudden and unexpected 

event, hence, often an undesigned or unforeseen occurrence of' an 

affJ.ictive or unfortunate character; a mishap resulting in injury to a 

person or damage to a thing; a casualty, as to die by accident." 

I will now make the definition relevant by reminding you of a minor Jim"img~~anmtμ:bx~xnmcq~aeh11:aammaciklimD!Jlim:i~tkXlm 

but nevertheJ.ess quite 

G' I ... c-.. __ , L· ·-:-:--• '"":~· ;· •'' FY -
LM.J 

important episode • 1119-:wm o:f'A the Pacific during World War II,. aBti I will 

~~itM..L ~~~ ~~~-~p~~t;\~Ww ~e the account of that episode byJ\.aw.irill@ .. ,tih1t:#'i A-i.1.1g-'tt.Mrwar--theWc.Jd.. WOAlt ~ 

-~ 

-~ 

---· , -

I ••Ml journeyed several times half-way around the world to attend special 

·~conferences. They apparently could go with safety almost anywhere. 

They met 

with no accidents. On the other hand, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief of the 

Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto went on an inspection trip in April 

1943, the sequel to which may be summarized by an official. Japanese Navy 

I . 

communique reading in part as follows: .,. .. ~ 

. ... 

~\;. "The Comma~der-in-Chief of the C~bined .F;t.eef; .Admiral Isoroku . . ~ 

Yamamoto, died an heroic death in April o~ this year in air com.bat with 

the enemy while directing operations from a. forward position." ~r 

I 

Ae-li:a· ofte"D ±.he ·ease.:; :the- communique did·· not ·te.ll. .tbe ..... w.hoJ.a.-:truth. 

~f"W\Lj{J~~o'd ~~ ~~ ~ Yamamoto didn't die in air combat with the enemy while directing operations--

" 

he met with an accident. I don't know who first used the following terse 

~t--wa& ~HlllY-..wal.ker, • then.-..Mayo:r:- ~ New---<York<·C-:t::tyi;, 

statemenyoui:; it is decidedly applicable in this case: "Accidents don't happen, 

they are brought a.bouty .. • lilll•s Q~, -ll!ftia!t"IV~''"'"'eHSG111Ellllllnnice.tions····i:fttelJ.igence -experts""'1lere qui'be 

pa~~~~--~~ic&lly a11 beeense its oryptosyst~ :t;he _Jap&nese Navy'&· JIM11i"ra1lill 1 ••mllli!l JDeol!t188es /w •, s were not secure • 

...!..::.' ~~do~ case of Yamamoto•s inspection trip our Navy had bis schedule~c].gwn_i;at; 

-. ; . ~- ~ ) 1'.£ ·. :~. ·, .. ~ ,. ' ~ r •• tr ~ ·. ~ . .,_.' . ~· . to the day, hour and very minute. 
REF ID:A63360 

4WllilMlll8"'C_.a.,+etl¥ They also knew what his air escort would be,. aad-

~. It was relatively easy to bring about the "accident" Yamamoto wa.s to 

suffer; a5=Ut:n M!i+::i:cu& "'thai& his death was no accident in the dictionary sense 

of that word--it was brought about 

communications were insecure. The Ya.ma.mote incident 

later gave rise to a somewhat a.mμsing exchange of TOP SECRET telegrams between 

Tokyo and Washington, and after the war was all over certain of them turned up 

in the Forrestal Diaries, from which I wil.l. now read (Page 86): 

~ "The formal surrender took place on the deck of the U .S.S. Missouri 

off Tokyo Bay on September 2nd. The mood of sudden relief from long and 

breaking tension is exemplified by an amusing exchange a few days later 

of urgent TOP SEC.REI' teJ.egrams which Forrestal. put into his diary. In 

the enthusiasm of victory someone let out the story of how in 1943 

Admiral Yamamoto, the Japanese Naval Commander-in-Chief and architect 

to the Pearl. Harbor attack had been intercepted and shot down in flames 

as a resul.t of the American ability to read the Japanese codes. It was 

the first public revelation of the work of the crypta.nal.ytic division 

and it brought an anguished cable from the intelligence unit already 

engaged at Yokohama. in the interrogation of Japanese Naval officers. 'lh .... Co.be... 

-3-

:_ ___ .. -· . - -.. ·~ 'T e: ~1.::,;......,'C.~j a._• _1 
(~r '., "Yamamoto story in this morning's paper has placed our activities in 

' " 

very difficult position. Have meticulously concealed our special 

Ne ~ ~:F~~~~ieJ: knowledge, we now become ridiculous.",._ They were even then questioning 

the Japanese officer who had been responsible for these codes a.nd he was 

hinting that in the face of' this disclosure he would have to commit 

suicide. The cable continued: 11This of'f'icer is giving us valuable 

information on Japanese cryptosystems and channels and we do not want him / 

or any of' our other promising prospects to commit suicide until after next 

week when we expect to have milked them dry •••• 11 ~'G. . 

Washington answered with ~ operational priority TOP SECRET dispatch. 

~~ "Your lineal position on the list.of those who a.re embarrassed by the 

Yamamoto story is 51 692. A1l the people over whose dead bodies the story 

was going to be published have been buried. All possible schemes to 

localize the damage have been considered but none appears workable. 

Suggest that only course for you is to deny knowledge of the story and 

say you do not understand how such a fantastic ta.le could have been 

invented. This might keep yori:r friend happy until suicide time next week 

1'9 cia.pmese 

~hlD1mt~:~m111mdlmltd:~rlltmdocmiir:tettx~J« 

_.:.4_ 
A 

~ Navy officers come out quite openly with statements attributing their defeat to 

poor COMSJOC! on their pa.rt, and excellent American COMINT and COMSOO. For example, 

~u.~~0...~\~~ ~J'e·.i:s Captain Fuchida•s boo:K enti~le~ Mi~way: The Battle that Doomed Japan, 

Chapter VIII, p. 131: 

~ "If Admiral Yamamoto and his staff were., vaguely disturbed by 

persistent bad weather and by lack of information concerning the doings 

of the enemy, they would have been truly dismayed had they known the 

actual enemy situation. Post-war American accounts make it clear that the 

United States Pacific Fleet knew of the Japanese plan to invade Midway 

even before our forces had started from home waters • As a result of some 

amazing achievements of American intelligence, the enemy had succeeded 

in breaking the principal code then in use by the Japanese Navy. In this 

way the enemy was able to learn of our intentions almost as quickly as we 

had determined them ourselves. 11 ~ta,. 

vJ&-·-7 So~~~ ~th~ ;to~~'""'" C!oM~E"C:.,~~ cJ<rl~ 1:fBere as----e&i.-a&We wM:t Wenger- -to1-d-mt -to·-di:t!beJ:ie:r-.tn •df!t!r-ypts....~ 

~~~-;to*~'"'°"~~. 

1f It is hardly necessary to tell you that with the advances made in the 

-5-

~. ~ ..,.._.~ ,, ... - P- - i • ~ • .. r • .,. + J I ' • I 
~- -

REF ID:A63360 

' 

~ 

, 

invention and devel.opment of :il*Ul 1 m11cm:i,1ip:11t=;PlllllPPBBa!'ID .. •. IJlll•41b_ a1:11MilMJMaoi .. •11!111•1EZ1-4111\," weapons of warfare, 

old 

including communication systems, the/so-called "pencil-and-paper ciphers", the 

and 

hand-operated small cipher devices,/the codes lw>aztrr••jlalb&aa: of' former days became 

- completely inadequate. Military, naval," ~.n.ti·--d~ti~Y:1?tssrs.phiLc... 

. Le«. ~10-i>~ ~ communications J;lad to be speeded up; and obviously :the laliJ. .W.-eng -whie-b ... ~o-

~~~ ~·-; =~..i.1:~:.oit:::~~ ' ' -.. --~ 

11!1H4i! e ~haft~ ;.:-~ed-in:~to-::~ica~~o:~

1 .. -~-~~-~~a.st begin '• ,,. 

to approach the ever-increasing speed of' electrical communicat ons. 1&11iraDaHl!JQdJc1AD 

~ 7•tt......,...,. --~uiaxw.ac~:xc:r1wix And let me remind you that the impetus for 

devising and developing better -..SS:i'allltllR means for crypto-c unication came 

not only from the need for speedier crypto~apparatus but also--and perhaps more 

importantly--from the need for much greater security in those ommunications, 

which were now largely by radio and were therefore susceptible of interception 

and study by the enemy. ~~-- Qreater security was eeded because -·-

:Hr •pa+• "-cryptanai~is had been ma.de~b :mQre efi'ecti ve b advances. in ,, 

~ -

.~t science~ aided-by. new- cryptanalytic tools • 

A brief history of the invention and development of' ary::ptQ Q&~i.ees. 

~in&r~ crypto-apparatus will therefore be of so interest • We 

.. will proceed now with some al.ides. 

·~-
REF ID:A63360 

SC~i~~ET 

Aside from the much earlier Scytale used by the ancient Greeks, the earliest 

4S' cipher device known to history is the cipher disk, first described by an Italian 

cryptographer named Alberti, who wrote a treatise on ciphers in Rome about 1470. 

The next slide shows a similar sort of wheel which appeared many years 

later in a book oy another Italian cryptographer, Porta, who recommends the 

~ use of the cipher disk with keywords. I have the Porta~with me. 

The next slide pictures the U.S. Army Cipher Disk, which was used in the 

period 1914-1918, and which follows exactly the same principles that Alberti 

.. 

c 

recommended. It seems to have taken a long time for the Signal Corps to get 

caught up with Alberti! 

41 Now I know it takes a long time to nurse a patent through the United States 

: . ' . Patent.Office, but Alberti 1 s device was finally patented in i924. Here it is. 

-

48 Next is a picture of the Wheatstone Cryptograp~, the first real improve-

~~ o -

ment on Alberti 1 s device. I have the only ~ in the United States, maybe in 

• 

f·\μJiP-- the world, and I've brought it with me. Sir Charles Wl•eet.stons interested himself 

in cryptography and invented his device in the latter pa.rt of the decade 1870. 

~ is .fl&t .. ju.st a 84-mple-cipher dis-k.. It consists of the ordinary aJ.phabet on 

the outside and 

~ 

a'J\alphabet on the inside; 'tihe J:a:'ti'tieI being-a mixed "SeqUence1 

~ 

but there is one additional~important feature--the alphabet on the outside contains 

27 places, the one on the inside, 26. There is a differential gear in the device 

so that as you encipher a message and turn the big or "minute" hand to the letters 

'o§ the plain text,, the small or "hour" hand advances one step for each complete 

r-· _. -I.-· ·- tl:!o:!o • ..... . . .:...F ~ - ... : "'"' .. -r4_ '!I -- -- .... '\.,. ~ :I 
. ~WA.~~~ v revolution of the "minute"-, Just as in.a c1ock. • -.'tllf-tl!ia-.p8.-i0or" 

~~ OL.o ~O'\tw ~O ">~'- ~ .... >~ • 

tlaQse Q£.. :y-0\rwho-WOul.d .1.i1'e---:to~examine-.-the·dev-ice ma;y "do sa • 

..,.. In 1917, in casting ab~ut for a field cipher device for use on the 

Western front, our British allies res~citated Wheatstone's principle, embodied 

- p,:r>>b it in a J.ittJ.e different mechanical. form, and ma.de thousands of them. Here is 

49 one of them and here is an American copy of the British model.. It bas a 27-unit 

49.4 

~ 

aJ.phabet on the outside and a 26-unit one on the inside; but there is now one 

addi tionaJ. and very important feature. You will notice that both alphabets can 

now be ma.de variable mixed sequences, whereas before, in the original Wheatstone, 

onl.y the inner aJ.pha.bet could be varied. ~ 1~~ b~1.-)... ill fae'4;.,. a good ma.nyAwere just about 

1 - ' 

11Cryptographe Cylindrique", or cylindri~aJ. .c~pher. His device consisted of 

a series of disks with a central hoJ.e so that they can be mounted upon the 

shaft; each disk bears an alphabet (of' 25 letters in this case) in disarranged 

I 

{ 

I 

I 

I 

I 

' I 

-8'- - ,.. "~~iA.~~~ c • 

... ..,.. J -,, ___ • -· f' 
9 -i • I If• •' J 

REF ID:A63360 

.---. __ ....... --lt"trt.Zf. £~-.~ .... &;; - 8iiS¥.•.11 ~~ T 

... 

sequence, and the mixed alphabets a.re all different, each bearing an identifying 1etter or number for assemb1ing them upon the shaft in some key order, so 

.tbat the correspondents have the same sequence of disks on their cylinders. 

~t.R"-' .You ~ your message :fa'4.,..i-pber 2S letters at a time (because there are 20 

rings), by rotating the rings to align the letters of your plain text 

horizontally, whereupon for the cipher text you can choose any ~ one of 

the other 24-rows of cipher text. (Bazeries used a 25-letter alphabet.) 

This principle seemed to be a very good one and messages in it appeared to 

be quite safe, but Bazeries never got anywhere in his attempts to get the Army 

" •• ,, ... ~~d 

to ~op: any of' his ciphers.) ~u;t,:.,. ~ +-~'-(1 ~· 

-w11jo mkpie+M+M 

\ b 0 In 1915, an American Army officer, Captain Parker Hitt, -.wt whom I have 

~-fA'.o,,~ .kto-U.,) 

l\tel:d ,.ott, conceived the crypto-principle of' the cipher cylinder independently. 

100·\ He knew nothing about Bazeries. His device, however, took the form of' strips, <NY 

you see. This was Hitt•s ~ very crude first shot _at it, and, as a gift 

the interesting items in~ r.~l'o. 

SC•."' from him, it is amon(• • ' collection. Here is a better model, ~ 

,,, made in 1915, with the pa.per strip§ molll.lted on wood--wooden sliders. That 

.. .,. v.s.A~ 

device was brought to the attention of' the then"Signal Corps Major Maaborgnl!:_, 

~~ 

• r • ' 

in Washington, who ~t he'd thought up s~thing new when he made a 

cylindrical form of the thing, going back/ unknowingly to Bazeries' model. 

~· Here is Mauborgne•s model; it is made of brass and is very heavy. -And here's 

'50.~ -the final form of the device, as adopted in 1922 by the U.S. Army. It became 

-9-
wf!ai8 we ca~l Cipher Device 

REF ID:A63360 

Cj;~:!D;;;,,.-·I"'" -=i.~. 

type M-94, used by the Army, /\ 

the Navy, the Coast 

Guard, and the Treasury. A couple of years after the M-94 was put into service 

a friend showed me a write-up of something he'd come across more or less accidentally 

in the Library of' Congress, among the papers of Thomas Jef'f'erson. Jefferson was 

the first to invent the cipher cylinder principle, and he anticipated the Frenchman, 

5f/J Bazeries, by a century. Here is the first page of his description of his device, 

50.1 

which he called "The Wheel Cypher." Here is the second page. You see his calculation=; 

giving you at the bottom the number of permutations that his :particular device 

af'fords--a whale of' a 1.a.rge number because Jefferson proposed a set of' 36 disks. 

In studying the degree of' security provided by the M-94 both .Army and Navy 

cryptologists soon ca.me to the conclusi~n.that security'would be much increased 

... ' 

by the use of changeable" ~stead of' fixed alphabets. Among other versions, I had 

one ma.de which used metal rings on which we could mount slips of paper and fasten 

them; thus we could change the alphabets as often as was felt necessary. Navy 

~~~\..N~- tried other versions. ,.._ 'i'he.:t-wa.liil tae lleg!~-~"bhe various forms of strip 

Wf.11..f... ~~.:t J.. o.-A,. c....,...,q. fo k 

cipher devicesAused by the Armed Forces, and later by the State Department and 

u.s. 

5f/J.ll the Treasury Department. Here is a picture of' the final/\Ar:my strip cipher device. 

The strip ciphers carried an enormous amount of' trat':f'ic ~ 4M.!. ~t.J.~ W4 T. 

~4:;:~ MlVIL >o~.,~°'""'d..-~' fl\,11~~ ~~·~;~,~~we, 

~ ~ t.e a ma.chine. called the Kryha, invented by a German, in about · 'F'~ A-4C.. 

the year 1925. According to its inventor the Kryha was the last word in the way of 

mechanical cr'Y]?tographs, and he tried to interest various governments in his 

machine. There isn't time to explain the ma.chine, but 

-lf/J-
- here is a dissertation on the number of pe~tations and combinations the 

- Kryha J?l.Chine affords, written by a German mathematician. All I have to say 

about it is that in this case, a~ in many others, merely the number of 

• 

permutations and combination~ which a given machine affords, like the birds . - .. nothing or 

that sing in the Spring, often have/little to do with the case. Much depends 

upon just what kinds of alphabets are employed and exactly how they are 

employed. Large numbers of permutations and combinations don't frighten the 

cryptanalyst at all. For example, to give you a simple illustration, take a 

simple monoalphabetic substitution cipher. The number of alphabets that can 

be produced is factorial 26--that's a large, large num.ber--4S3 quadrillions, 

291,451 trillions, 126,6S5 billions, 635,584 millions and a few more,but you 

know as well as I that you don't solve 1ille monoalphabetic substitution ciphers 

/J~ .. ,~. 

by an exhaustion method. There are very much simpler ways of ~~-- make 
REF ID:A63360 

8 ti;CJ~~fEtn~ 

p bets for / in encipherm.e~, that is, the _:;!11abets are 

/ \ ......... sivd'.y in a fixed sequence. Such a ~chine would give poor 

e :~ .. vy traffic ,.:.,/~ •• d(~d be enci~: the 

~"" / \ / 

at: al.phabets) prod,,.~i~ a comiition ~ch ~cryptol.ogist cal1.s 

is the~ )le ~;:;eeds to sol.~"set at: messages 

\, ,...,/-· .......... / "\\ 

vertically, ~ol~ "by column, and w~ he's~.finished he can read the messages 

A . x· -. ~ anci'eureka! the business· is ''fUccessfully termina~. When 

~~ \ ,' "" ~ 

~~~ al.phabets are \sec1 ~ tr~e.n be dcme with Just two mess~. 

j{' 

~~~~~~~~. ret.n.rp. now to ,ow: seae:.al~~~ crypto-ma.chines Ji t became cl.ear 

tbat there was a pressing need in the mil.itary and naval services for two 

types of automatic ma.chines• ~t ±1!1, •chi nea- A~otid ·set-out·· of.....:the 

~ ~~Ji.. retia- ~ ... hand-operat-ed'·-gadget&... First_, we needed a small /\machine for l.ow 

echelon or fiel.d use and 8'slt 111Be8aai~ second, we needed a large;~ 

high-security, 

electrically-operated machine tor1r • MllJ&a•t high-command use. Let us take 

up the first of these two types and see what happened. 

~~\\.. \ 1 \ I eee.r- Xot1 neat a ee telopne!!'t mode-l:-ef a machine constructed by the 

~193-f Signal Corps LaboratoriesA i•o••eped. without guidance from Washington. The 

Director of the Laboratories at that time was a great believer in autono~ 

. and he wasn't going to have Washington tell him anything about how things were 

~~~~ 

to be done. When it came to devel.oping a' cipher ma.chine, he decided that he 

" 

and his staff could produce a reall.y good machine without the hel.p of the W~ ?f.,.., 

·cryptanalysts. So he proceeded on this basis ~o use up the tiny bit of money 

~ 

that was available--$2,888. .,.,, 

not permitted 

We in Washington were Di even to know what 
was being built until the floitlal. model was completed and ready to be delivered 

to us • When we finally went to pick up the ma.chine, I talked to Colonel So and 

So, who told me with some pride that his ma.chine was all mechanical and that there 

was nothing in the way of' an electrical ma.chine or operation that you cou1dn't 

do mechanically. I asked: "Colonel, can you light a room mechanically?" To 

which he replied: "You've said enougb--get out. There's the ma.chine, take it 

The Colonel never was given the opportunity to improve his model, 

with you." ~ · • 

- '.A-0 ~~~~j;,k~ ~"""'~&. because the crypto-principle was f'au1ty ._ "fhe laboratories development 

came to a sudden and ignominious end. 

~~~ 

#!t:i":sS ia.Sted what little money we had f'or such business"' - ; -

I', 

Now we come to a development which is of' considerable interest to us. 

Here's a picture of a gentleman named Boris c. w. Ha.gelin, a Swedish engineer, 

who was responsibl~ for the invention and development of one of' the ma.chines 

~ -u'o.Q,\... ~~ 

that all theAeePviGes used in World War II in great quantities. MP-. Hagel.in 

I 

i:___._, 

was opposed 

.. -/ 

to 

~ 

~ngw&i Hagelin's 

~ ~ ~ ..________ l I 

device ~llU"fSIL-illf1illl._.ea:sc.ia-:·~~--pui~~cmie. .. .c.li'ir;t ,.lt wasn't a case 

~~~~- ~~t~ of' NIB--~not invented here"A. m:rt 'Jhe decision to ,\:he.¥e-them -made-~ •'8BQ' used. 

-12A-
~ "'Mt1.da ~ 19~ o.t" ~...States Army..-:.wa&.a.-.dec.isi..- ~a level higher than my own, and 

~~ it turned out. 'SIE*t that my superiors were right, for 

our troops at least had something for low-echelon crypto-communications, whereas 

if I'd had my way they'd have bad nothing but pencil-and-paper ciphers, or the 

. ot~~~ M-94 device,. or the strip cipher device--a111 too slow. · ~ . -- . ~ . 

Now just a bit about Mr. Hagelin: -He- did what A best describetl,as a 

l • 

hysteron-proteron. That's a four-bit-word from the Greek meaning to do a thing 

"ass-backwards". I mean that usually you go into cryptographic work and then 

~~J.. 

you have a nervous breakdown. He did it the other wayA. He had a nervous 

x WQ..\.I ~ .. ~ - ~ 

breakdown and ,,.,w1 1 •41ewaevfeoo¥e~invented this ma.chine-a.3. l:fe ma.de 

~'"\Mn swe~3: million U .s. dollars from his invention.. That 1 s not at all a poor sort 

of hysteron-proteron if you're going to do one. 

~~- Here's a picture of Hagelin's very first ma.chine1• I've brought J:~ 

r-------·~ .... ---·-,, -· -- -... --~·-- - :fiI M·.eefie.J:&, in fact, number one, ~ r>ur-'d;n&pecti-on"' -. .:: I=t· .. wae a present 

from Mr. Hagelin, for my museum. ~~~ From that 

prototype he built better models and interested the Signal Corps in them. As 

a consequence we built in America, for World War II, this six-wheel Hagelin 

w,.~°"~~ machine, which many of you no doubt know a.a Converter M-2"9· J!D -~ I ~Je+h~~«ORX -~ I 

I ~cmi:tdlls:~d~--·h +l•••i!!dc~~· 

~---... & --- 111!~-tohe IM!l9 ac.~· 

'fi'U~;.c:l!:!!..,;!;!l5'iJJ.oollft8ELSl.liP6111&ll- <ipeeifi~,. ~riQ/1.-· + 

-13-

c. ~·I""; --- .... - ..... -· '" .---=r ... 

-=--- C I cc ,_14. J-.e! .. ::»,. .... 

~ ,. ·'.--·· ~ iJ ~ ~-== . .... ..........- . -
REF ID:A63360 

of them--over one hundred and ten thousand,~· b-o.J:: .. ~ w-e..u.~ ~ ~ 

~~ \ ~ ...r~, ,o-.A.. ~ t'\~"' ~~. Maeyi ef-you-may ]Wow that tlu:t..M..-219 had"a-!n!!'1ous;-a-very- serious securi'ty 

~.-whkh :!-"'1:1 sa:y a:• rev wor:>ds· later.,p This is a picture of one 

cwr.. M • 20,, . ~ \f"\I,..~ 

of ~ Hage!:!n machines as modified by ~ o~ ;ur"' GI' s in Italy. The M-2f/J9 

. . B . 

has no printing mechanism and you know h~-resourceful GI's can be. Ai?'~~a 

parts here and there ~ 8:Jrl- improved their ma.chine to make it 

a printing model. See, here's the keyboard, and here's the printing mechanism. 

~.+~ Inside the cover 1' a cartoon of a couple of GI 1 s getting ready to test a 1~ 

home-made still for the production of you-know-what. The caption at the bottom 

of the cartoon says: "Yes, but will the damned thing work'l" 

~~ ~ ~·c.R.cl/tlQ .. ~-ro.t ..._. Mr. He;gelin ~ to improve his machine an.d"'5'ai:.e ~--eiden·vi-ew 

'm.~~ 

~ ~ ene Q£-~.....l.a:1'ee·~.~model:s--=the-·-OX~Qz ~ print; not only the plain text but 

.. . . ~ o\)~k~ ~~~&Nik., also the cipher tex~ laRCl A~ wzch .~mprOli"eQ. • .o-ipheP-ing-··meehanism, 

~ ~~~'4\.-"rAAAe..~~~ ..... ~.~~>~ 1~~7~~~ b~@l§e tQe .~s~,-;mtg«'Q:,f being ~r~l!il¥ . .f..U:ed upon. -the sha'tt';-..--sre 

d~tab-1.e -~'98.!'r ~ ·'!"earranged in 72f6 diff~~. ways • · ·The -stet>ping :mat!,O t ~ 

I ~/ 

f.ea- theee41fheelf!~~·c0111.1511eated. ---We 1 ve . ..a:tudieQ. t}l.is -~ for some 

moment. ~~-~!-k!!.<?.'!-r·~-_'\iM<...,..loil:V:e ciphers-·-p!'Oduce"lr by •• C I 

,-:.____ . ---..:I... 

--'"J ~ ,.. . ~j 6 11as::tU..Pe. ~ il'tl a"M:il::.i .. ha1 tbe .. ..-l!ip serious weakness. "tth!rt when two messages " .. ~ 

are in depth, that is, as ;!;ih11e-exp-lained earlier-1 when they are enciphered by 

the same keying se,quence, they are~ solvabl.e. 

-14-
REF ID :'~63360 

c::~&--t:g=r - . 

. .. ' 

When there ar;i.-sioveral messages in depth the srilut~cOllJes even 

tJu:-~ par~ this :frS"Jl the standpoi/. COMSJE is that with 

a sril~ b depth the recover~~ key--the whole- setting of the machine--

of't$Il ".., / 

~ot at all dif course~~ ~r:;,_tion of all other messages 

keyi ig~nts is an easy matter. 

That is theZat 

~oblem i - omiection with the 

r the t~~-2~9 and is the big 

f' what we call key-gen~r ~··&t~, , 

cipher ma.chine which has bee.._n built and proposed -Bpic:ipl~" .IMIJCCK~~ 

' 

the 

types of' 

~ the Marine 

a ~ouble M-2!a9 

no source 

<S ,,__ °'" r......,...t-~ 1.. . ...e.. .Qal.c.,... 

and":!: t ' improvemeu~ security-wise over 

s:y tha~t too has the ,.ar;;; weakness of an 

/hink we will have ? ~;xa..,.,,..lqaimlm*u 

show you. It doesn't have 

. .i}dillPld;~Dtlsecurity. Moreover, . -~ 

eve~ a dry ce~ it produces 

Now f'or a quick review of' the development of' what we call electricalrotor ma.chines. The first one I show--also a product of the Hagelin Company 

in Stockholm--was not a real rotor device of the type we use today but I 

don't want to go into details. I merely want to show the device, which is 

...., connected to a_ Remington electric typewriter, so that instead of writing 

down letters one by one you can make much more sP_!!ed by having a printed record. . . ' 

Up to that time devices of' this sort were only of the lamp-indicator-type of 

You'd a.t~~-ouc.. ·~you'd machine. ~ press a ke~Aand a light would light,; ,...,.u &"AR have to write down 

~~Ow~~~~~-- the letter flashed on the light bank.and then"'tae--o-ipber, .&iee1s wnnld .. -&tep. 

-15- ,..._: 

""''Ji~~;£ ·~' - ~ ...... t·v ·- ~+ _, ~ ... ~ . ',_~ 
REF ID:A63360 

~ .--:,! ~ -- .... ;.~ .._;=f 

The next forward step was taken when Hagelin ma.de the printing mechanism 

~ S" an integral part of the machine itself. Here is the keyboard,, the printing 

mechanism is in here, and now the whole assembly is very much smaller and more 

com.pact. 

~ 

Now I show a German ma.chine known as the Enigma.,, "- commercial model, 

~~~~\~c~·wlo'~. 

~:cve~ei· and---pit-Clft ... the·merka:IP-4.n ... about-~j~. It comprised a keyboard, a 

light bank,, a set of ~~~ ~ect;ii.g- tri!ee"bl called rotors, and a~ dry cell for 

power. In this case the enciphering-deciphering circuitry is more complicatedt 

Je\R..~ t; 

1'(. goes from a key of the keyboard,, ~a contact on a fixed entry 

o.u.A.~w~~ plate or statorA:ilMllG these stepping rotors-1111i,.,. mesmr-lil a reflector or 

plate ~'~~d.4 ~ ~ c.(,id:. ~o.. ~~ ~~ reversing 1P--• back through the cipher rotorsAto one of a bank of lights• ae 'ih&t 

}he current goes through the rotors twice, which complicates things a good deal. 

·Each time a key is depressed at lea.st one r'ot~ steps forward and~~ ~ 

(t.be stem;i:i ns ~he rotors is such" that. the- machinrimS "l!"""'!'ai;'tmr-·sbort-e¥.Ql e.....;.s 

~;t'k Jiect ~ ~ ~~. ~ Wnflcl l.J,v,.. ir ~ ~~ 

1511cb tb;J.nge- ~so-,-~=-tbaa 263.;.. ,j..t,...a;S' -a; -11 ttreJ.es s than 233 beca'fllfie '"01"~a1n 

\Mt~«.. -~~ ~Ak ~~~4..-l J,,.;t ~ ... i 12~~ n.a.. ~~»· i"p.ctara-;inw"11'h':t.-ch -it isn 11i11'ecesfJUy :to go. 

i ne*e.- ll&Cllines 

;··m !•i:IJl8 to-tm 'em!-Varibad .;level.opments of.. . ...-.. a••-th1!6'dg!t "Wc:IM:d ~ ~ 

Wm: Ii. :At. -~-moment...., axiQ ta period . .ot'·-:time'·-to anticipate- Oermatr'd'@Velt>15ftl!?l'ts· 

'h.~ 

ia "9iUt8 fie~ I want to go directly to the American developments in rotor 

'1\ machines. First, I show a picture of the late Mr. Edward H. Hebern, a 

Californian, who seems independently to have thought of' rotor ma.chines. I 

asked Mr. Hebern one day how he happened to get started on such things and he 

said, "Well, you see I was in jail11 • I said: "In jail, what i"or'l" He said: 
"Horse thievery." I asked him: "Were you guilty'l", whereupon he said: "The 

jury thought so". It was while he was in jail., then, tbat Mr. Hebern conceived 

the idea of a cipher machine. Here is his very first model.. It is possible 

tbat he built it as an item of occupational therapy while in jail.. ~-~t-hifik-, 

i..1-..,. mox:e 1 ~ke;!J ;t'.bet,..-be._:Quil.-5-i;t -after he got ottt '01' jaiJ..-. It bas a keyboard, 

a left-hand stator, that is, a ring of 26 stationery contacts arranged in a 

circular fashion to one of which the current goes when a keyboard key is 

depressed; a rotor of 26-points, and an exit stator of 26 contacts on this 

'-

side. It is important to note tbat there was no reflector rotor; the type here 

is what we call a "straight through" rotor machine. You-press a key and a 

J.amp lights. There was just one rotor in his first model, which he built in 

~ 

1922 ~ for the ·~ Kl.ux Klan. Here is the first printing model ma.de by 

1\, \ Mr. Hebern--still a one-rotor macbine--with a keyboard and, now, an electric 

typewriter connected thereto. 

sot'lit~1y·r1xed wiring, as in the-German 

~ 

~ En;;gme wires, showing tbat. at an. early date 

- This is an extremely 

m-fm'T-k1na ~Of"-anigh-eecur-fl· b-..,....~...-.tll!l?!'l'iine. 

4;mgrtam:;.r.eaturs; --JiiU1811 i!eimk !lfxaxmdi!llllXXllll..ar:bbul~ 

\"(i.\ Now we have three rotors in cascade. This, too, was a very important step--

the cascading effect was a great advance in connection with rotors. Here I 

1 r(. show his next development--a 5-rotor machine. Here--are- the rotors removed. 

~ .from the machine-ttr ishaw "YOU what they .look ...J..ike. _They wer.a ..... s:t.111 -varmble 

...... - 11-

-17-
.! ~ 

c~eticm:-ehangere-·y~.could .:take~~-~ .rear:r:anse tbem -a& and ..Mben you 

p;teoaeQ. There is an interesting •t\>'"Y connected with that mod~~..,­

Dep!tl!'tifll8at. l19S ~ry ~,-igt~rested-~~~~P~~-me.eh~~esv~~-.&o taa.i:i 

.,.. .... ~ . . - . . -· r-r -. -. 

tme 1\11_,. i.;i ±b0 sA-sdayS'ji\llee&li6etliey.-ahsolnj;eliV ,JJa4...txi~hav.e....se.cum._means for _,.,.,.... 

.-'" -- fPE!"d:tt!' eOBllllUDi"CSti-orm-:f".?-om Wa.shi:ag~~n.. i;Q __ :tJl~ FJ.ee.t Commanders- and,- of course, 

'l'/r :f~'6!a•fl:eet COBlillUDieat-icm&. The Navy thought this Hebern model a suitable 

DBChine and they ;:-~ t.~f".., ~:t::=. a large sum or money 

for those days, $75,000. They proceeded then to negotiate with Mr. Hebern. 

I was asked by the President of the Naval Board tbat had been appointed to study 

the Bebern machine to give him 11rJ personal. opinion ~ --

IPBCh:IJJe egg -"the Na.V1'-had'- =onl;r_~~2i""::JlQtll _'Ul¥J.ergo1.D8_. service -teste .' ·~:-&t ~ 

~r- D'\l\L. 

~ persuaded the War Department to purchase Y\ machine from Mr. Hebern. -d: ea;t; 

a:ml: ...,_ t~ !oP · s......--.- "".f'.our ........., ~ outfit 1f'-u 

consisted of myself and a World War I veteran, an ex-prize fighter, with 

crossed-eyes, pug-nose and caulifl.ower 

_____ 

ears; the only thing he couJ.d do was 'ID .,,_, ·- ____ _..--/ 

~ I--my-&&y~ tbat ~ou:l~rom. dra.t't J.etters. Ql'··-cipher·text with 

. J~~ ""~~~. E~~~ "19eol\lte.. accu;cacy,.,_.bu+ '6hat '"S-="al:l ·he-eettl.-d~oA lfhe=•1 ei!'ts "0£ ~ was up to me. 

~~~a"'~~~~~r~1 "'9 ii-- ea')'\J I studied the Heberif machine ~ an idea for a soJ.ution.cwd•o 

~u.dA· .. -'d· ~ ~ to~.~~-il:~~~-t«' ~~-~l., ~ whereupon I went over to the Na~ Section, which was then in charge of a 

Lt. Struble, ._. now ilia Vice Admiral Strll:ble, Retired, with an enviabl.e service -

..& - ..3 - -

record. I said to S~ruble, "Lieute~t, I don•t think that me.chine is quite 

., as safe as you think it is • 11 He said:· "Oh, you're crazy!" I said: "Does 

'~ ......... "r ~·.. ---
REF ID:A63360 

.-- ·--·- ~ . . -. "T - t:;;·== ~..-:. .• ........ ....._ ... -'!I 4.o...../its=...,;;;...- ....... ~ 

this mean that you challenge me?" whereupon be said, 11Yes 11 • So I said: 

"I accept." He asked: "Well, what do you want ln the way of messages?" 

J~ ~ ~~.W.t/\./J~~~ I said: "How about ten messages put up on your machine'l" He gave me the ten 

" 

messages and 'WitJa uu:::1'nb8 aelp tum "tbaiJ-ex"91L iza ftgh'tie!:• I worked on them 

until I got to a place one day, 

~-P~ofr the t~t of/\one of the messages 

at the close of business, when I bad reduced 

to sillqllest terms: I knew :;!a~ illll't 

~i\tj~ LMe letters which were the same,...but I didn't 

know what the letters actually were. Let us say, for 

.. . • 

• 

: . 

._-

- r- "T 

-19-
.. 

i:aaMai.111•·1!1118*l"bl•uJxa•11NM>1B111•--;!bi••m•m•m1•-•? •m•m'11Pm•mmta:Dlbmllacncrw•ctmleidtMW'":,...Jertw•11a&e•1 xlmt 

'"'"~ . '~"' +~~rt.. instance, that the first, the seventh, the ni~~h ietters were the same, wbatq 7<._ I -Jt... I ~ ~ ..;..J...~ " >---t"'-

ever they were; the second, the seventeenth and the twenty-third were the same, 

'0 '5' and so on. That's aJ.l I ha.d when I left for home that evening. We were going 

irJ:~~~~~~j _v 

to some sort of a party, r9" :E me "bhee~-e'ttte!'e-:in JUT·mind,--e-t ,:fh.s1i-..:the-.QJJ.es 

~at 

~~~~~. we11e-iden1Pi.oal aild--thei.r- posi tione. As I was t~ing a black tie, it 

suddenly came to me, and I can't tell you to this day just how or f'rom where, 

but the whole line of text fell into place with all the repetitions in the proper 

place: "President of the United States." I could hardly wait to get to the 

~ ~I office iit\:t.be morning,~ to my intense gratif'icationjI found that my subconscious guess was correct. I reconstructed the ten messages, turned them 

over to Lt. Struble, and there was a considerable amount of excitement after I 

showed him how I'd reasoned out a solution. The Navy Department cancelled the 

order that they had placed,; the Hebern Company, which had been selling stock 4~~~ 

~b~i ""'~a """-t-'c~~ Jr~~ \\("""a-~UCM;J. ~ t-... o -~!l~~-t- on the basis of great prospectsA went to pieces. Mm• 1 lillJlliiiLii_.,mu••tr4r' 

Hebern, trying to recusitate what he could from his unfortunate encounter with 

).\.J,e..'""'"" e~ ..... .:d' 

an unknown cryptanaJ.yst, bought stock in the Southern part of California at 

" 4~¢ and sold it in the northern pa.rt of t_he ~tate at about $2.(6~. Tbe 

California Blue Sky Laws didn't like that sort of conduct and Mr. . ·. ·' 

giving him lots-~ of tim~ and 

1(. year in pr is on,/ J=swa:aai:~~<* Jieml*ilreccbll:lm:mlmbac:xfA:liclal: 

ments on his ma.chine. 

. . ~ 

' '::-2~-

·; _;.,__ "' ,,.I ._ -~ .... ,. 
REF ID:A63360 

£E.Ci~!r""T 

Despite my solution we thought that the Hebern principle was still a 

~Ae.-~n'l.O'~~~... • 

good oneJ and/\Navy went ahead with Mr. Hebern after he got out of prison. \.le.-6~ 

~~;.-A..~+~~~.~J't~~~ :172.10 ~e •s...a...p;is;tu:r:e.~~ the_ .la&1; m:ehine--M-.bailt fO"£- ;the. Balcy .. 1'1Iebern_.wan'ted 

__;_ __ • -~ • ~r ""-'k.· 

J.7fllt1 

~..;. .. to get paid for ~itj~~ but there was just one hitch--the ma.chine '· ' 

wouldn't work.~ when this was pointed out to him he said: "Show me where .. 

it says in the contract it has to work", and when they couldn't, he was 

" 

paid off. The Navy then decided that they had had enough of Hebern and 

~~·--w~~ .. · .. went into research and development themselves 'A. a Iaboratory 'being esta'9l·:l:slaed L ,... 

~~~-1~~ 

."'-/\the Navy Yard. Years later the Hebern heirs brought suit in the United . . .. ... - .. ,. 

States Court of CJ.a~ against the U~it~d_States for $5fll,fllfllfll,fllfllfll, which was 

J 

~ (:(.. c:f ~~..\°'Ao • - J_ ~D • .il'l ·.~ settled,fas ..uw at a 1!onsiderable discount, $30,Sf/JSJJ~T ;u (J' 1'.IAM.t ~ flll..l;l.Vl - • 

cPm 

~&a..~~~ g91 r ~.ou--now a 'few- .&J.ides.....of =.:6he Army developments in rotortype crypto-ma.chines. ~,4.fter the debacle I've told you about, we:e-t.he -first 

.. ·--...... \ .. r 

i .. 

quite errati.,....and -tha"fr'MOs 't>W.' ~1.rst -shot at. it ... 

,, 

, -· . .. 
172.4 

I-:tla.ink. :tbe principl.e 1.ia st;1.ll quite ~ate, especial.l.y if the tapes aren't ; 

. :.. 

' .:ta:Pe-ztransmitt.e;r:.,.~be..J:ot.ors, the J~ey_board, _an electromatic typewriter, ...etc .. 

~1.ns Pccum~nt, .~.R..e."[.~ous pcac.tical weakneee 1 of course, va.s the necess-ity 

'fer !Q"OO!!QtiQB Wit! ttistribut'!.on Of'·~tape&. 

~ ~machines functioned aJ.l right 

but before even ten of them had been produced we had hit upon a new principle 

for the control of the rotor stepping. I tried my very best to get p0tgmrl ~ 

~ 

~ to change the development right there and then, and shift to the new ty:pe 

~ . -~:t:.~ 

of' control. I was practically thrown out of ~:.~chief·~of·-£ 

iiui11~ with the remark, "Go back to your den--you inventors are all alike. A 

new and better idea every day. If we listened to you inventors we'd never 

get anything out. 11 So we had to put the idea on ice, that is, in secrecy {tt1. ~ ~, 

~.~~~N~~:tr l'l~'t ;'C.MJ~ I w1 J 1 suitd!h: Nw._.to tia. llavyi---MAR*--! ~H,. tae electric cipher ma.chine, 'liHi.L~ 

developed and built_~ tae ::;iNwy without any help from Mr • Hebern. *:t.-·-had -a· 

• 

-22-

. - ' . 

.. ""! - ; 

.. . 
REF ID:A63360 

SEeR!ET ~uced-·a­

'Qw.t ever··and·-eeY'Olld-:tbat the,.-ma.cbine ba.Q. •. a. :fatal. secur-iiiy weakness .1--...U ~ 

../ 

dt@~..a:""Of ~:0.°ktlf ·but'"'Vi'th-only-15 d~j.3~- starting poinils . 

.. ~:t-remeiilber..,tiat· I said abottt such-a situa'tion.,.,$..-fe.-m:tmrt:es-'tlgO. 

/ llbw thi9-·~-be--the·esse-"'-:E-~do not. kllo.r.j.'1m 1here wasn't any ee81iia::crb'!O&" 

,. collaboration in those days ~N~~ ~ Army cryptologists--we didn't even know that 

such a ma.chine had been 

:t• •M* -· · c built by Navy. Ea.ch service went its own way. When 

_there.came a change in command in the Navy ~ode and iignal :ectio~the new head 

~~ ~~ M~:t E"CM ~~- decided i~~ '9bs't- -developnent had-·gone--fu enough and he wanted some help from 

the A:r~ if he could get it. He came to see me one day and told me that they 

J>~~\..~°O? were in difficulty and needed new ideas. 'Ml we had'.._,.. I said: "Well, we 

or I 

have a good idea but it's secret." He ask~d: "Well, what do you/have to do to get 

it released so that you can 

/tell me'l" I told him: "I'll have to get permission from the Chief Signal 

O:fficer", which I proceeded to do. I mention this specifically and ask that 

you believe that this 

-_ 

was the situation . in those - days--there were ~~~ A:rmy~secrets 

~A· and Navy" secr'ft":, and never the twain did meet. When I told the Chief' Signal. 

Officer what Navy wanted, he promptly said: "Of course, let them have it". 

\"'4.. - q...~- . • 

So A told the Navy about ta" Ai!'~ idea for rotor control;W£, showed them the 

~-~~iX~-\'af~-~~~~-'-~bl~ circuitry #\~~-.some de!iay :the..t'f$ig was Ae.Qept;,eiJ.·.· ... ~ w'h:Ji¥1q was. ea.~J>Lhy 

Na:v3 aoabts that; auffie!ettc-et1rJPea.t 

'"• «• *lrwewu& • • 9.-~.Q.YJ.4. 'ba---Qhtained tl;l:co~ uta,. of, lf ..,....!Mllf\. 

to "d'o wbab - ~!£-~ wor:tt··-h&d ·to-be- QQD&.I 

~ilif==~:a....baY i-ngi ~ontac't'""troubles ·-w.1.tho t:be:l.J"_ rS!F_~~../ -~ \,;:n1nes .. .wer.e.....,_bW.lt 

~~~N~~i<;..~4--~ ·-~~~ 

(\by the Teletype Corporation, a veey competent organization, .al2d 1rM>e--higbl.y. ~ ~ ~~~ wcu..~-R~ ,. f 13 . /\successful. Here is a picture of the MARK II ECi?, Navy terminology, or the 

SIGABA, Army terminology. If it hadn't been for the fact that we got together 

~-tJ~~~~~ before we became belligerents in World War II, ~ would have been extremely 
REF ID:A63360 

4t.J qcc~r=·T .-': 9-= 

•• 

DIJllQllKlimd:~~-Jl!!IUatilkX~:xlati:~ .,.,. 

The ECM-SI~ABA ca.me into use just in good time, and it was used 

.... 

; -1 ~. l.VOTU. tJo.,.f" r. 

~ 

with great satisfaction an both ~desl\ I might add, in closing that incident, 

that, to the best of my knowledge, this is the onl.y gadget that was withheld 

~t:! w~ LJ4'r r. 

from our ~itish Al.liesA • 'lb.ey knew that we bad a ma.chine of this 

character and although we knew all about their type of ma.chine, in fact, the 

Navy was using it for communication with the British,lllllimllll!l':tdlmllllKllc*dllJX~!IOQIS: 

it was U.S. policy on the highest 1eve1 in both the .Army and the Navy to 

&)ieliwif,, s+ll++rasicamcXIJll!llc:k:xJ:X'ADhtaexlP-1~ 

~- wi tbhold our ma.chine troni F-BP-iti slJ. 

an this point until. the.recalcitraut ~up in both servi 6oubl.e that when the tec:bnicians. 

1: ./ - : "-... / 

ma.chine couldn't be read without ~~t~e current key list--

see 

_':../ ... ~., _,-·· /. ...,. ,' 

thatze o s ves, . Army as well as Navy,, bad tried very b~ to do .. so and 

/ ,.,r""' ' ~.,,.,./ ~-........... ~i ed--they just wouldn't b@.~lieve it. One reason fo~ .. this adamant pol.icy was 

/ // 

t they were daily getting_t e ec~~s that were being produced from Gjl'~ 

L / / 

Japanese ag s and they Ju~t d Q 1 t feel like te,k.~any c~e. 

/ ~ ....... _ 

.. , n~ans bLe so slll"e as they say th/ a;-e " ~. asked over and 

°"..... / perhaps_ent _ ly needl~ssly, I don't kn~ !=JW many millions of 1iollars were spent:gan-•t..bDll~ 

./' - ' ,J 

•tablishing -··far inter-c~With the BritG!i':- -B,y~-I mea.n , 

- -: .'• 
-· 

for our ma.chine so ~t~ it 

. Jh'itish ~-had to~ the 

ma.chine to But by the 

there were time to explain the crypto-principles of the ECM-SIGABA but suffice 

. ~~~~~-·x it to say that we know of no case of solution o'f:/\ 'tiS.is wfi~.wand system 

throusheu:t...-'l;he-~, and it is still in service as a high-grade of'f:-line ma.chine. 

During its use in World War II there was one possible compromise which raised 

1\ II 

quite a storm when it was discovered that some Frenchman had liberated a U.S. 

Army truck and trailer--the latter carrying all the 28th Division's HQ cipher 

machines and materiel. But the stuff was soon found where it had been dumped 

~~~~ ~ ~°Tit&0.~1«.. ~,4~~~~to. A. by the Frenchmen .. --1 n a neerw i:μe:-}( The episode was one which caused the 

Signal Of'f:icer and other officers to be tried by court martial. We had and 

still have very strict rules indeed about safeguarding this gadget, and in 

mentioning this point I should say that we weren't worried by the thought that 

our messages could be read if the Germans would capture one. We were worried 

by the thought that they would learn how good it was and would copy it--thus 

cutting off our COMINT. I can.hardiy refrain from telling you one o'f: the funny 

~~~~ 

things about our not giving the ma.chine to the British when they needed it so . II. 

desperately. I mentioned the strict ~ules about sai"eguarding it--who could see 

-25-

yr.;±; : -- .1 ..: 1' I 

·-_, 

•• 
REF ID:A63360 

the thing, who could service it, and so on, and we saw to it that these rules 

were strictly enf'orced. But there came a time in North Africa when al.1 our 

maintenance men were knocked off and there was nobody to service the ma.chines. 

However, a very skillful British RAF Officer, an electrical. enginee~ was pressed 

into service and he maintained our SIGABAs there for a while. I'm sure you 

won't be astonished to learn that when he got back to London he built for the 

RAF a ma.chine based upon the ECM-SIGABA principle! 

I "'fbu next the cipher machine which was 

,_,,,..~ ,- ~-~ 

Armed~Ferces in Wor1d W ·II. This was 

.. ::26- f7· ~--- " ...... .._.= 

,, I 

used very extensively 

-~ 
C1111llllillllkx:m11ma:Hllllllllbd~R1B1CJDBxDi:nec:D.JR~acilmpciaatuutxmm~IX:BlllXlDaacc~ .~ 

•r 

/¥ . 

. . \ 

' \ 

the rotoFs--they are .11· .~ 

.• . ~·~ \ .. \,. .. 1~ .. 

i"Qli:::r=-see.~i:ti exactly 'b\!!t ter '"ml/hlr ·e~idfl ~ Here are 

the s,ame physically as they "lft!'e on the\.pommercial ID.Olfel, but with different ', /. . : ' . \ ~,.,·.,.... . ~ \ " ./ -- . ~ ·~ ,,../ \ 

wirings 07co se. Now l.et's see what the''2¥i:fication was--the -.,addition of' 

\, , . ~- \ 

' . / \ \ ' ,,,~ \ 

a plug )Joard by means of which one could change the connections bet'~en the 

/ \. / \ . 

. , fu,,,..·"" \ ' . \ ' <lieys of the keyboar~ and ~~- ps on the lightbank\ 13 plugs and 

'\., ,• \ 

··. 

:.. 

jacks and this n/r WI(~ chosen!>¥ acciden-t:; t \ently had 1111.thematicians 

figure out ~psolutel.y the b~~t number ing arrangerrtents for this particular 

/ \ \ ~~hμie·~ ' s in the German Military Enigma but the 

a~~e'v \....., fatal weakness was-i>bat th\couldn•t.or " at least t~iih.;~~~harlge .... '"· \ " \ ~/ \ 

their rot~ings at 1 throughout the~. -~i~-~~ the rotor wi.r~~ 

couldn •t bave e aeytb1ng w:lth their .. ~~!~t w:l th them .7.able to 

read/a ical.ly al. of it. T3 Rwa "••••M•·-.·7_ ,..,....HE 7 7 • 4"chr 

:i.y;..r 

• r#' 

wJaaxk 

the rotor wirings 

~==•iu:..a&.11r. ~o!#lillil·-En:i.~n the tififiits. ~od. ~ 

Now we come to the devel.opment of cipher ma.chines for~teleprinter 

~~ communications ::-Wi~J:~ •1'11$ ·"l'!R!d-·tJr ""-1""11i<>DB, ·1.-t was neees._,...11o 

-!--" 

. · ·~eting 1'he--..coo.ten:tlil pf UlftA'l:~a._by ~aphy-~ --- ~~~-A~~rwt-""' ~ W~w .... ~. Kb-iii ua& ;r;iego@G:i&-a-]cng.time....ago. In l.919, for example, the A.T. & T. Company 

engineers, in collaboration wltn tne Signal Corps, devised this modification of ~ 

the then standard printing-telegraph machim to make it a printing-telegraph . . . 

s~~ ~ ._.. . -·-·· .. ·~·~-::a I . 
, 

cipher machine, using circular key tapes of random characters. Great faith 

• was placed in this-machine but it was _not_pU.t into use until the war was over. . , . . . ' . . By that time I had come back from France, rejoined the Riverbank Laboratories 

and accepted a challenge to solve this kind of cipher system. It's too long 

a story to go into right now but as a result of the solution the Army dropped the 

~,)\o.1£~ 

project. I think it was)in a wa~ too bad, because when we had a 1-eed for 

tel.eprinter ciphering in the early days of 1942 we actually had nothing except 

this thing. The big trouble7of course_,was the production and distribution of 

these key tapes, and it is a problem which is still with us. Here's an early 

model of a ma.chine for ma.king key tapes. We improved such machines very greatly 

in the next year or two, so that we could produce hundreds of thousands of good 

This is a rotor .ma.chine, the SIGCUM, which the Army devel.oped in 1942-43 

~ .. ~ Lo\tO-d ~ :\i&o·tC.. ~~ and~used very successfullyAto encipher teletype communications. It uses not 

pe:rfarated tapes but rotors w'b~ch step in an erratic faslnon.~89 err~c 

a~ 1p "tlae-i!ICM~ itt4' meu.....W1le ·-ill iten'~&, it had weekrne.ss.uf every once 

in a while~ when we discovered new cryptanalytic techniques, we found that SIGCUM 

had weaknesses which could be exploited; whereupon we would proceed to tighten up 

things by changes in the method of usage or the method of stepping the rotors, . : 

and so on. The machines are still in use, doing valiant service because we were 

able to incorporate more and more improved features in it. J±s oew .. .desiisnat10B. :. ~ ~ 

- -28- l!t---.... _ ... 
Now we have to say ~ few words about certain other types of ciphering 

- apparatus. For example, it is necessary to send, with security, weather and 

oituation ma.ps .. ~~1 .. iaa· <ieoimbla-to have-& ·"""hi!l8 vhi<>h· can"l!!ll!ipl!er -4'lld 

d~~11!rl.1e. The generic name we gave to ma.chines for ciphering facsimile 

was cifax. ~ere li ®e IUl~h-~~i.n~. tbM.~DS .developed by· A:n.r:f -f'ar .•. the purpo~~, 

'\l telephone 

caJlad.....$IGM&W. We also had need for machines for enciphering/conversations, 

~~.w-t. ,,.~ machinesl\~ the generic name ciphony equipments, 1&- the.i'.irst--s~t-&t-~U..--

~ a de¥8J.cpmant-. by_ tbe -Bell· Telephone --.I.a~::e~ 

{ 

~ a 'W'lii"•••i+, gava .you .much_mor . f'eeling -of" s~1:ty than was warrao.t.ei:L by_~ 

... -----

The"Telephone Company)~eetect·"Wi'bk ±t&-·-wor}\, in collaboration with engineers 

~ - ·_ . • f. ~ = . - ·~ft pa .a. 

from the Signal Intelligence Service a.nCi. the Signa.1 Corps, ~ a very high-grade • 1.~ 

i • , r ~ ,..u.n:a.4 cipbony system which became known as SIGSALY ,._WM-finally d~oped and was 

~ ~~~We.>ta.~ ~xtremely successtulJ k.Aach terminal_."cost over a million dollars,, a~d thei'e 1Pe!!'e 

The professiona1 cryptologist is always amused by the almost invariable 

reference by the la~ to 11~ German code", 11~ Japanese code", "the U.S. Navy 

code", etc. To give an idea as to how fallacious such a notion is, I will say 

that there are hundreds of systems ~*y4Q.. in simultaneous use in t;\9 communication services .. 

c# aJJ ilarge government.a.. You not 1~-a~ .. --~ only have to have different ki~s~to meet specific 

types of communications but you have to divide up the traffic for two reasons: 

-29-
REF ID:A63360 

f'irst, so as not to over1oa.d one system beyond the saf'ety limit, and second, so 

~ ~ ~ o.2Q -atwe. 1~ )1.MMA ~~~ .._,,~~ "ba~1,\\ I 

that not everybody can read everybo3y else's messages," .wea ift-.the·1'mne"~ily~ . 

~~ ,,__ ~ ~ c.o-~ ~~ iC. f\J~ ~~~ 'l!G 6 .. "'d& 1 \°v\~~~J..j- ~ Hiiway-laak happened primarily because this last principle wasn•t in effect 

at that time in U.S. Naval communications. 

• • 

. . ·- . ~ , 

·. 

-391-

ct::.... , ;...:. __ ... - -- - • _ ........... ...._~~""' "'-, .... .,J..;.., 
REF ID:A63360 

~Q~~~-1'~ 

~il.a-"S:lide 6h0"8 lfhe number of A.cryptographic systems in effect ea 1 Decem°beP 

w.. wa,o~ ~ 10"9jj•..;. ~ ~ ""llM-~ October 1.945 in the U.S. Army al.one/\" 'l'WP& .we.re--.,41.1.y -hundreds 

r-------··~r ----~--· . . a! them- aw ~ el.:i.Cle. a.bows the number of holders of cryptographic ma.terial.s • .. -J 

• 

t

1 ~ ~;-\--- 6',ovoJ f.tJ. ~- W'04 fJ" ....... '~ 41.w.9-i.Dg the same- perim,-·December -l.94-1...ec:tooer·"~" and, mind you, this *8 Y..S. 

~~ 

\.).S.Army and U.S. Army Air Corps al.one. It does not consider U.S. Navy,whieh hl!Mif\ 

.. nor 

&Et g%ee.t or---pe~p&~~tep..Uffrtt"1bU't1.._;~the State Department, the Treasury, - '- .If • ~ 

v.s.~~ , 

and the many other,...agencies that use crjyp~ography. 

. . 

- - Keeping track of crypto-ma.terial. and accounting for' it is a big headache. 

There is no way of getting around this that I know of and it is important that 

the rul.es for the protection of the material. be followed absol.utel.y to the 

al.so 

1.etter. Mnegnhaad:mxs~~ The Japanese/had very 

definite and detail.ed rul.es for accounting for crypto-ma.terial.. They were I I 

.SZ(l~~ 

~ to burn the codebooks, the cipher keys, the cipher tabl.es, and so on. 

They were enjoined to scatter the ashes and then make a certificate, witnessed 

by a fel.1.ow officer~ as to the complete destruction of the material.. .Qooar;; iena1i¥ 

c." peR7"we ~ * ; ,.._ea. -ee-t'"'' t"""1'*"f1 .... e'""d ·'th~-aestrwrt..i cm.....b~ .. imr~ JiUlQ.~:tlle-.Q.9~t:t~r.!~ 

one chap ()V>A ~o ~-

'liae •sbgs~ 'Bl2t ~ was observed by binoculars when he took a spade and dug a 

in 

hole, dumped the codebooks and the tables in that hole, and poured/ !Same water. 

into the 

ilw••W•&•.._ W<M.l, Tn due time, some of our people sneaked out, dug /t" * 

~-- ~~ ~ hole, got out the materia:,- brought it in zuuw-~~.~ dried,._ out. 

Ao-ct: cf;-

ThisArecovery of crypto-ma.terial helped a great deal because it saved us an 

and labor and set of tables. 

enormous amount of' time/to reconstruct that particular codej 'ila.111e- were• 

·""'"""~- -.:7- , •• ,,, -- - .=> I .-.;; ~ ,. ,., ... ;is 1::z · .... ...._ .... E!:J 
REF ..ID: A63360 

.. e?!f!:C~u:i.T ~ - ~~~~~~~ :bls taneee-~of thi-s sort ever,y now and thell.. --:By- -the wa;;p,._ the Japanese were 

- - ~tio- ~~ ~~-4~ worried about tai:a wrinee&-4 their security. ~~'?..fsometih:lng 

~~....A.~ a.Qe"Yo~~-.eeerecy- systems~ ~~i(~t.e~y.-r~ was wrong arid the only thing .,_. they ~μ~ coul.d imagine 

/\ " w"" ~o.Mi. weA&. ~~d. ~~f was that there were spies al.l •round them. ~&Jle .wwar 1aesl!J~!3 n-1---t-he-~tillerequiring the commands to go through their quarters and look under the beds 

and into all closets, hwiting for spies. Of course, that wasn't the case at 

al.l; we were solving their codes and ciphers because they were not secure. 

/J~ 6-r 

You have seen~tbe important World War II developments in crypto-apparatus 

and now it's time I~ you a bit~e new ones, conceived, developed 

and in some cases produced by the now central.ized cryptologic agency of the 

'iftlltWWJUIJWwc88iaee (i+•m++ti qxDi* l ti;,.:d ;kWX:iM+&M M XJirnrleReDPi;++t+et•l&M ++ci llilllml 

Armed Forces, the National Security Agency. In general the trend bas 

been toward these things :(1) ma.king the ma.chine more manageable as to size and 

weight, by miniaturization, the use of transistors and other solid state com-

(-i.) 

ponents, and by better packaging; a"-~JJ&t41& ma.king the machines more secure, by 

(~ 

incorporating better or more advanced crypto-principles, and~~laI"1y by 

simplifying the procedures. The aim of "8eie laet.. :ae'9 ef itiipIOft:mea'1;.a., simplificatiojl is accomplished)~herever practicable, by ~liminating as many features 

and procedures which,because of operators' error~ lead to crypto-security - I • . -

weaknesses. That is'., we •ve been trying to ~e the machines as nearly 

autaaat;'! tT.i ::i ~e ,.,. ~~ir-Jre,ying- am fw>cti<mns, 

so as to eliminate weaknesses caused by human error. We must take into accowit 

weo 

the fact that the machine~ have to be operated by human being~~ be-i:ags 

~)JJ~ 

occasionally eed- l;Q!¥f~bly make mistakes/\ ~ are prone to errors of omission . ·-

-3~-

-·-~ I .. 'L. i:--:..-:; 
and cOJJDD.ission. Experience has proved tha.t in the pa.st it ha.s been these 

erraro ~91;..aa JQllOh teobnie<d·-- in 1;he~ and mehineo 

tliaaaai11ree that have ma.de sol.ution on a. regular be.sis possible. 

simpler, 

.i,,_ 'f ~o1Ji!e,~"4--&lltamati7 concerns the' lmma.n operator and 

U'leJ' ot the ,.....IW>e 7.&0u!Pl ex11'1e& can~ introduced; inCllt'poI'ato!d, 

~-ied:--at ~, where- there ..w:e extremely we~t.rained and experienced crypto- .,,,. r-h<dpera.• 

You understand, I'm sur? that we depend for crypto-security not on 

keeping the construction or design of the machines deep secrets. This means 

tha.t the ma.chines must be based upon crypto-principl.es such that even if the 

ma.chines f'all into enemy hands, by capture or otherwise, without possession of 

the exact key for the day, for the period, or for each individual message itsel.f', 

the enemy can never learn by cryptanalysis the contents of' the messages, or at 

least he can't for a very l.arge number of years. At the same time there is a rea.1 

point in keeping the ma.chine~~t.efa itself' in a classified status 

as long as possible, because in the case of' well-designed crypto-apparatus if 

you don't ~know what the machine looks like, or its general principles of 

ciphering, you can't even make a. sta.rt at cryptanalysis, or, to be more accurate, 

it will take a considerabl.e length of' time and more or less involved study to 

. tr;,$ 

ascertain what you must know before you can ~ an attack on the messages with 
long as real. attack on the 

• • •J "" I ~ ~· #I ,,.,.. ,..., • 1.:1 - r I 

~ se-,- tbere'e-~ethcw, reaeoo~i·_•:,',c.il, )~ J"_.r~·· .<> f\ / I 

to prevent a potential. e my rrom copy}ng our machines 

f / -~ ., , ~ 

against us. . \ / 

/ ';< 

./ /\ ~~ O::. tlJe __ JJeW -apparjrtus-, which wil/l "Efoon be ~, .,,. 

y I 

.. ' 

~-have in place ~ Converter M-2~9 a s~'. off-line 

. \ 

and 

For 

Kt-. \ 

~( l\1gh security machine the ~-7· It has a '&ey7 BJJd pr~~ the 

c~ text. For el.ectri power it uses \'DY 24-vol.t s=r:Je. This machin\ is 

\ . I \ 

now t~ work-horse for cryptocommun:l,cations, and, by the way, several 

\ \ I \ '\ I 

J 

thousa.ndg ·~ tllem have been issu to our liA!IO ~~· 

)>-,~- Next we\~ve the KW-9, e or off-li7 \letype eqcipherment machine 

' that uses ratai-~ instead ~ key tapes ~ is ty muJi safer than the old SIGCUM 

: ' \ \ . ~~?I° KW-2 I showed tpu. Here we have the nez-26, which ~s in fact becoming 

I - ·'- \ \ I ' \ 

I \ ' the work-horse of fixed station telet/ ong-r~e communica~~on systems. It is 

. / \ 

an on-line synchronous teletype ciphel' system with link-encryption, that is, so 

\ / \ 

" / \ far as ~nemy intercept is concerped it is impossible ~o tell when the circuit 

,I' .""' 

is idle ~ when it is a message. 

\ This .m·,the next ;il"de are bit out ~ order but I d\t have gl.ass 

slides for them ~ve to use the' \mall 35 .... ones. This \bowing the 

j,Br-36lKi.-36 is the 7 I -;~Oiled before as ~ving been deveJ.oped far t\ Marine Carps. 

The next~ is the pneumatic rotor machine that we think wou1d serve\~he needs 

/ \ ( ~~tter than the KL-36 and be far safer. '· . I 

\ 

( 
REF ID:A63360 

~--- •• ll:ro~ 

![".:" ~s. -. -- t:::.J w 'C .:..= 

~~7 -- Here's a~ designated the KW-3, now /~st. It is an ott-J.ine 

tel.eprinter cipher mac~ a.J..l.~onveniences ~ ~ on-l.ine macbine 

and iminates some of the' weaknes e~ the 1atter. The ma.chin~· g~~era.tes the 

for messages. """ ~the opera.tor bas to ~ d}.is to 

~ '\.._ 

a starting key on the machine, ~hen proceed to type 

.•. ~ 

• 1 

- .. ~ 

. .. . 

-34-A-

& .. -.,. .. Ct'-: ' -

. -

... -
REF ID:A63360 

s=o~~,~T 

otf the pl.a.in text of the messages, whereupon a cipher tape is produced, which 

\ 

can ~\t on "":! teJ.eprinter circuit for transmission. At tile recdv/ ~;,,ter 

the opera~ puts the cipher tape into a reading head, the start but_:tO'n is 

pushed, tile ~ sets up its iJJdicatar and key, and tile tape pi:'~uced is tbe 

\ / pl.a.in text of the origina1 message. The KW-3 will become the ·real. work-horse of 

\\, / 

our Armed Forces high-command cryptocommunications. 

/ 

Next I show the KW-37, esigned tor Navy Fox or {road.cast transmissions, 

~/ I 

and now: undergoing service test. ·"\It is a ma.chine which embodies a teletype 

/ 

, 

printer Slid uses an IBM csrd far Tes. So far as tile ship is 

concerned, the radio operators aboard /n t even see the cipher--the messages 

~- ~ within the communication center aboard will be" in pl.a.in language; the ciphering 

' ~ '\ ~ .- \. 

is done elsewhere on the ship. The system is a synchronous one, meaning that 

bath ends of tile circuit '¢.; :onstantl.y and autooati~ kept in step; also, 

.f/ ~ and rel.a.ted to this f~t is the fact that the system is sue~ that the intercepting 

J. "" 

.!'_ • - - _; ': 

/• .. • :. r .. . - :ii~· 

enemy can •t tell ,'When a message is being transmitted and ·when the circuit is 

/ ~ ' \ 

idling, giving what we call "link security", a v~ry important element in 

/',..,..., 

communication security. 

-35-

.~.:.::. --.'A 
N~ have the KY-3, a ciphony or telephone security equipment. It bas 

\ . very high sec'{,1'ity and excellent quality, and is not a push-to-talk machine. 

It• s range is ~\l.~ \ mil.es but this can be extended with good ~ re aters. 

~- Here's the KY~~a smaller version of the KY-3, occupying less than one '\ 7 

cubic foot space and we~ghing between 10 and 15 pounds.;' It's for 'ir-to-air and 

\ J 

air-to-ground talk with hil?1 security. 

\ 

\ 

i 

; 

Next we see the KY-9,a'great improvement over its predecessors, one of 

\ . \ I 

" which was the SIGSALY I mentione~ a few minutes. "ago. It uses the vocoder 

\ I 

\ I 

principle, which yiel.ds talk that is 'inte/ible but of poor quality. What it 

lacks in that respect it makes up by ~v/P8 excellent reliability. Moreover, 

;you can use it on any COlllllel"C:ta.l tA.l.i\circuit in the U.S. or circuits of 

~~quivalent quality abroad. For cT' ison ~ to size. I show you again a SIGSALY 

\ . terminal of' World War II days, wllich cost over'\,000,000 •. The KY-9 gives . I . . .- ' . equal security and costs only/'bout $60,000. ', 

I . . \.~ 

F1Dall;y, I show ;your KY-ll, the crypto-partion\\>f a microwave t;,.lephone 

system. We have this b~Jween Fort Mead.e and our former hf\adquarters at the Navy 

I

. \ 

;. 

Security Station in 7shington ;here our COMSEC operations \ conducted, and 

where also is loc7·~d the Navy Security Group. The telephone ~cro-link is rented 

\ 

i'rom. the telephone company. We also have a similar link between t:q~ Navy Security 

. I 

Station and ~lington Hall Station where the headquarters of' the Army Security 

I Agency are located. 

_-:>t:.._ 

~· 
REF ID:A63360 
.. - a -

security devices and systems, and on automatic teleprinting systems. The days 

of band-operated devices is over, and those of semi-automatic off-line cryptographic machines are drawing to a close. And, last to be mentioned, NSA cryptoengineers are doing development work in civision systems--enciphered television--

which will doubtless come into use within a few years. 

But with all these modern improvements I don•t think the day has yet 

dawned when it can be said that human factors that make for crypto-insecurity 

have been altogether eliminated. Perhaps it•s true that at the moment COMSEC 

it .)..1\. '~~- ~ technology can be said to be ahead of COMINT technologyJ but/\~,U~ag 

· ~ C.OMlN\_~ ~ s:pee"i' ~~c. • ..appara"liw3 tae gal' eem-'f!tnd.-~hap;.-w~ be closed,, 

age-old battle between armor and armor-piercing projectiles. In the meantime, 

communicators must keep their guard up and enforce the rules supplied them for 

operating their crypto-equipments. ~~Olring thil!"~to&. ~t me remind you,~"' 

~:lewiag.fl (l) that the establishment and maintenance Of communications 

security is a responsibility of crnnmand; (2) that there aren•t any short-cuts to 

t '; 

achieving communications security; and (3) that the rules of' COMSEC must be 

followed to the letter by "eve~ybody c~nnecteO. .:with COMS~;but most especially 

by crypto-operating personnel. If' these reminders are followed, the chances are 

~~ good that you won't learn your COMS:IOO ~s by accident! 

-37-
If there is any last word or impression that I would like to leave with you 

let it be that, in my opinion, COMSEC, though less spectacular and less interesting 

r •• '~~&~p~c~. than COMINT, is ¥1• the more important. Of the two,. There are two reasons for 

this opinion. The first is that illll!lllA'aey in the conduct of modern large-scale 

..ct.ll-4\ $ E" <t. -~ 

military operations, ground, sea, air, a.lld para-military,;s of the highest 

~ca... importanceJ~~ without secure communications 'tM!lere--.ean· be --little 

AJWDO-·a~q.,...-aBCi- wi'tlhou:t- &ecJ.t.ecy nearly every such operation is doomed. The 

second reason is one that is not so obvious. It is that your COMINT successes 

will soon be eliminated unless the communications over which the traffic and the 

final results must pass to reach those who can use them are secure. Therefore, 

COMSEC is doubly important, _., ... am, first, to protect our own plans and movements,, and QB:ee 1@aiDJ'S'e!!' second,, to protect our COMINT product and sources. I• d 

therefore like to present f~ your consideration and rumination the following 

.. .. •1 

statement of what I•il immodestly call Friedman's Law--something patterned after 

~ Parkinson's Law: Your cryptologic coin, like any other coin, has two 

. . faces. If you're up against equal or ev;en_superior forces, and if' the COMINT face .. Ir J. .... 

! ,.. .. 'T .. e. • .... C' ' 

of the coin is bright and .~hiny, your chances of winning are good--ma.ybe ...i at 

·' , 

.. ,. . times excellent; but if you let the COMS~ face of' your coin become tarnished and I 

dull, you'll sure as hell lose. 

~~ Jer f'i anlt~ you for your patience in listening to my rather lengthy 

discourse and for your courtesy in paying such careful attention to what I 

-38-

S E~C n·~&z::T 
REF ID:A63360 

SECRET 

have presented for your information. J.et.~me--iB¥i~ )hose of you who care to 

0-M..~ 

examine some of my exhibits,.. to come up to t~e tabl.e here and we can look at 

t~em as long as you wish. 

489.-