SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2898-19

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

ESTATE OF AUGUSTIN

NGWE MANDENG.

Argued January 27, 2022 – Decided February 4, 2022

Before Judges Alvarez, Haas, and Mawla.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Essex County, Docket No. CP0192-2006.

Anthony Scordo argued the cause for appellant 

Tebeyene Mamo (Lento Law Group, attorneys; 

Anthony Scordo, on the brief).

Jeffrey T. Kampf argued the cause for respondent

Estate of Augustin Ngwe Mandeng (Javerbaum 

Wurgaft Hicks Kahn Wikstrom & Sinins, attorneys; 

Jeffrey T. Kampf, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Tebeyene Mamo appeals from a February 26, 2020 order 

dismissing her claims against defendant, the estate of Augustin Ngwe Mandeng 

and its administratrix Elizabeth Mandeng, with prejudice. We affirm.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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We set forth the factual and procedural history in two prior appeals. In re 

Est. of Mandeng (Mandeng I), No. A-2143-07 (App. Div. Feb. 24, 2009) and 

Mamo v. Est. of Mandeng (Mandeng II), No. A-2577-13 (App. Div. Apr. 16, 

2015). Augustin1 was formerly employed at the United Nations (UN). Mandeng 

I, slip op. at 3. Plaintiff alleged she was his legal wife; however, Augustin was 

legally married to Elizabeth at the time he purportedly married plaintiff. Id. at 

3-6. After Augustin's death, Elizabeth was paid widow's benefits from his UN 

pension. Id. at 5.

In Mandeng I we affirmed the Probate Part's declaration that Elizabeth, 

not plaintiff, was Augustin's lawful surviving spouse. Id. at 9. However, 

plaintiff was not foreclosed from pursuing equitable relief in the Family Part on 

grounds of implied contract. Id. at 12 n.1. In due course, plaintiff filed a 

palimony complaint, which was dismissed because the Family Part judge was 

persuaded any judgment entered would be an advisory opinion because the 

estate lacked sufficient assets to satisfy the judgment. Mandeng II, slip op. at 

8-9. In Mandeng II, we vacated and remanded the order and directed the judge 

to hear the matter on the merits. Id. at 14. 

1

 We utilize Augustin and Elizabeth's first names because they share a common 

surname. We intend no disrespect.
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Ultimately, the Family Part judge found plaintiff was entitled to palimony 

and granted her a judgment totaling $238,220.59. Plaintiff served the judgment 

on the UN Joint Staff Pension Fund and requested satisfaction of the judgment 

by having the fund recognize her as the surviving spouse, thereby directing the 

pension funds to her. The fund denied the request, noting Elizabeth was 

independently entitled to the benefit as Augustin's widow. The fund cited 

Article 34 of its regulations:

A widow's benefit shall . . . be payable to the surviving 

female spouse of a participant who was entitled to a 

retirement . . . at the date of his death, . . . if he was 

separated prior to his death, she was married to him at 

the date of separation and remained married to him until 

his death. 

Plaintiff filed a second complaint and order to show cause in the Probate 

Part seeking an accounting from the estate; removing Elizabeth as 

administratrix; holding Elizabeth personally liable for "defalcations from the 

[e]state . . . for breach of her fiduciary duties as administratrix", and ordering 

the estate to satisfy the palimony judgment and pay counsel fees. The parties 

entered a consent order in lieu of a subpoena for discovery from the fund. 

An attorney representing plaintiff vis-à-vis the fund, served the consent 

order on the fund, and according to the record requested "'an audit of the residual 
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[settlement]'[2]. . . including the 'date of the complete depletion of the residual 

benefit.'" The fund denied the request for discovery noting it "enjoy[ed] the 

same privileges and immunities as the [UN], and [was] not subject to the 

jurisdiction of [the Probate Part]." Notwithstanding its sovereign immunity, the 

fund explained that pursuant to its regulations, "a residual settlement is payable 

'if, upon the death of a participant . . . the total amount of the benefits paid to 

and on account of the participant is less than the participant's own 

contributions.'" It further explained that, upon retirement, Augustin elected to 

receive one-third of his pension benefit early in a lump sum, Elizabeth was being 

paid a widow's benefit, and no further funds or pension benefits remained 

payable. 

The trial judge held a hearing, at which the parties stipulated the evidence 

into the record. Plaintiff argued all the funds paid to Elizabeth belonged to the 

estate and should be used to satisfy the palimony judgment. Plaintiff asse rted 

Elizabeth never established an estate account and instead deposited the funds 

into her personal account violating her role as administratrix; therefore, 

Elizabeth was personally liable to satisfy the palimony judgment. 

2

 The residual benefit is separate from the widow's benefit and governed by 

Article 38 of the fund's regulations.
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The judge made oral findings and recounted the history of the case and 

the evidence. He concluded the evidence showed funds paid to Elizabeth 

constituted "a widow's benefit and these benefits were not payable [to the estate] 

as a residual benefit or residual settlement . . . [because] the residual settlement 

is only payable if upon the death of a participant, the total amount of benefits 

paid is less than the participant's contribution[s]." The judge noted Augustin 

contributed over $191,000 and received a lump sum payout of $399,000. 

Further, he concluded the funds paid to Elizabeth belonged to her because 

[t]he [UN] widow's benefit unlike the residual 

settlement . . . is specifically not payable to a . . . 

beneficiary designated by the participant but to the 

participant's surviving female spouse and clearly in the 

probate court, in the appellate court[,] and in the [UN] 

administrative agency hearing and decisions the widow 

here was determined to be [Elizabeth.]

The judge also rejected plaintiff's claims on grounds of comity, noting the UN 

"as a foreign state, has [its] own set of rules and regulations with respect to the 

benefits that will be paid to its employees and designates how those benefits will 

be paid . . . . " 

Plaintiff cited Vasconi v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 124 N.J. 338 

(1991), and argued the judge could fashion an equitable remedy by requiring 

Elizabeth to return the funds she received to the estate to satisfy the judgment. 
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However, the judge found Vasconi distinguishable, noting the case involved a 

divorce proceeding in which a deceased spouse's estate sought to recover life 

insurance proceeds improperly paid to the former spouse where the parties had 

entered a property settlement agreement and relinquished all claims to each

other's property. The judge noted here, Augustin and Elizabeth were not 

divorced, had no agreement relinquishing their claims, and Augustin had no 

power to change the beneficiary designation on his pension because "[t]he only 

power he had to make that change was to effectively and legally divorce 

[Elizabeth,] which he never did." 

The judge concluded Elizabeth "has properly been receiving payments 

pursuant to the [fund's] ruling and finding and application of the rules and 

regulations in the UN." He entered an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint. 

Plaintiff raises the following points on appeal:

I. THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION AND ABDICATED ITS 

RESPONSIBILITIES BY REFUSING PLAINTIFF 

EQUITABLE RELIEF IN THE FORM OF A 

SURCHARGE AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATRIX 

AT LEAST IN THE AMOUNT OF PLAINTIFF'S 

PALIMONY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE 

DECEDENT'S ESTATE.

A. The evolving public policy of this state, as 

implemented by statute and common law, is to 

honor the intent of the decedent with respect to 
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the distribution of non-probate assets, including 

employer pension plans. As such, a court of 

equity's duty is to ascertain that intent where the 

formalities of designating beneficiaries may not 

have been followed to the letter. This duty was 

not fulfilled here.

B. The lower court reversibly erred by relying 

solely on the lack of a divorce decree in 

ascertaining decedent's intent thereby (1) 

violating the law of the case doctrine completely 

ignoring the factual findings and legal judgment 

of the same-level Family [Part], and (2) ignoring 

other facts presented by plaintiff including 

decedent's designation of plaintiff as recipient of 

a residual settlement, later claimed by the [f]und 

[to] have been exhausted prior to decedent's 

death.

C. Extraordinary circumstances existed 

requiring the lower court to grant equitable relief 

to plaintiff, given the lack of fairness and lack of 

reviewability of the [f]und or the UN Appeals 

Tribunals' proclamations, which are (a) not 

subject to federal or state oversight, and (b) not 

entitled to international comity considerations.

D. The proper remedy rendered below should 

have been a surcharge by the [e]state against the 

defendant [a]dministratrix in the amount of the 

palimony judgment.

Findings of fact by a judge sitting without a jury will not be disturbed on 

appeal unless "they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the 

competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests 
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of justice[.]" Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011) (alteration 

in original) (quoting In re Tr. Created by Agreement Dated Dec. 20, 1961, ex 

rel. Johnson, 194 N.J. 276, 284 (2008)). The judge's findings are binding on 

appeal if "supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Ibid. (quoting 

Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). However, an appellate court 

owes no deference to a trial judge's "interpretation of the law and the legal 

consequences that flow from established facts." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. 

Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

Having considered plaintiff's arguments pursuant to these principles, we 

affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the trial judge. We add the 

following comments to further address plaintiff's claims that the judge should 

have crafted an equitable remedy, and that he improperly relied on comity and 

deferred to the fund's rules rather than satisfy the palimony judgment from the 

pension.

"In the event that a court finds unjust enrichment, it may impose a 

constructive trust." Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 288 (2016). The 

court must find "that there was some wrongful act, usually, though not limited 

to, fraud, mistake, undue influence, or breach of a confidential relationship, 
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which has resulted in a transfer of property." Id. at 288-89 (quoting D'Ippolito 

v. Castoro, 51 N.J. 584, 589 (1968)). 

In Seavey v. Long, the decedent participated in the Police and Fireman's 

Retirement System (PFRS). 303 N.J. Super. 153, 155 (App. Div. 1997). He had 

been supporting the plaintiff, his former spouse, pursuant to the terms of the 

parties' divorce agreement. Ibid. He later remarried, and after his death, the 

trial court imposed a constructive trust on defendant's widow's benefit paid by 

PFRS to continue satisfying the decedent's obligations to the plaintiff because 

she was disabled and "needy." Id. at 155-57. 

We reversed and held as follows:

While a court of equity is indeed empowered to 

achieve substantial justice between the parties and to be 

innovative in effecting this result, there is an additional 

principle that "equity follows the law," although this 

maxim is not slavishly followed. . . . [T]hat doctrine 

must yield if extraordinary circumstances or 

"countervailing equities" call for relief. . . . Because 

contractual and property rights of the parties are not to 

be infringed upon without an appropriate basis in either 

law or equity, we must examine whether defendant's 

pension benefits were correctly taken from her by the 

trial judge.

[Id. at 156 (citations and internal quotations omitted).]

We concluded the trial judge had taken the defendant's property by 

"impos[ing] an obligation on [her] to share her statutory widow's benefits and 
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to support the first wife" where defendant was not the wrongdoer. Id. at 157. 

There was "no authority for the court to accomplish this end. The court cannot 

merely designate the pension as subject of a constructive trust and provide for 

the first wife." Id. at 157-58. We reached the same conclusion in a different 

context, rejecting the imposition of an equitable remedy against a veteran's 

disability pension to satisfy his obligations to a former spouse because federal 

law preempted the States from treating the pension as marital property. Fattore 

v. Fattore, 458 N.J. Super. 75, 84-86 (App. Div. 2019). 

Here, the record is devoid of wrongdoing by Elizabeth as administratrix 

to justify the imposition of a constructive trust. Therefore, plaintiff's ability to 

satisfy the judgment was limited to claims made against Augustin's estate, which 

no longer had assets. Elizabeth's widow's benefits were not an asset of the estate, 

but rather her separate property as Augustin's legal spouse. For these reasons, 

the trial judge did not err in declining to employ an equitable remedy because 

doing so would usurp Elizabeth's lawful rights. 

International comity "is neither a matter of absolute obligation on the one 

hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will upon the other." O.N.E. Shipping, 

Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 830 F.2d 449, 451 n.3 (2d Cir. 

1987) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895)). Rather, it is "the 
11 A-2898-19

recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, 

executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to 

international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of 

other persons falling under the protection of its laws." Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz 

AG, 270 F.3d 144, 160 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164). 

In Shamsee v. Shamsee, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate 

Division, denied a wife's claim to sequester funds from her husband's UN 

pension to satisfy a state court judgment and reversed the trial court's ruling 

holding UN officials in contempt for failing to comply with its sequestration 

orders. 428 N.Y.S.2d 33, 36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980). The appellate court stated: 

[T]he pension fund is an organ of the [UN], subject to 

regulation by the General Assembly, and . . . its assets, 

although held separately from other [UN] property, are 

the property of that international organization. The 

funds which [the wife] seeks to sequester, therefore, are 

impervious to legal process under both section 2 of the 

convention[3]and section 288a of title 22 of the United 

States Code (the International Organizations 

Immunities Act). 

3

 The Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Art. II, 

§2, Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U. S. T. 1422, T. I. A. S. No. 6900, establishes the UN's 

immunity from legal process, and states: "The [UN] shall make provisions for 

appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) Disputes arising out of contracts or other 

disputes of a private law character to which the [UN] is a party. . . ." This treaty 

was acceded to by the United States on April 29, 1970. See Shamsee, 428 

N.Y.S.2d at 35. 
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[Ibid.] 

The federal statute cited in Shamsee reads as follows: 

International organizations, their property and their 

assets, wherever located, and by whomsoever held, 

shall enjoy the same immunity from suit and every form 

of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign 

governments, except to the extent that such 

organizations may expressly waive their immunity for 

the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any 

contract. 

[22 U.S.C. § 288a(b).]

Immunity issues aside, the UN enjoys foreign sovereign status. For these 

reasons, the trial judge did not err by applying the doctrine of comity and 

upholding the fund's decision to deny plaintiff the widow's benefit or attachment 

of the benefit to satisfy the palimony award. 

Moreover, a thorough review of the judge's findings reveals his ruling was 

also based on an independent review of the fund's provisions. The judge's 

conclusions that, pursuant to the fund's rules, there were no remaining funds 

available for payment of the residual settlement to plaintiff and she did not 

qualify as a widow are unassailable. Finally, to the extent we have not addressed 

an argument raised by plaintiff, it is because it lacks sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.