United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 9, 2017 Decided June 20, 2017

No. 16-5284

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, C/O UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY'S OFFICE,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

v.

SEVENTEEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED DOLLARS 

($17,900.00) IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY,

DEFENDANT

JOYCE COPELAND AND ANGELA RODRIQUEZ,

CLAIMANTS-APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:15-cv-00368)

Christa Laser argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellants. Christopher Landau entered an appearance.

Christopher B. Brown, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee United States of America. With him on the 

brief were Elizabeth Trosman and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Assistant 

U.S. Attorneys. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, 

entered an appearance.
2

Before: ROGERS, TATEL and PILLARD, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: This is a civil-forfeiture case, which 

is why the plaintiff is the United States of America and the 

defendant is a pile of cash. The government claims that the cash

is subject to forfeiture because it is connected to the “exchange 

[of] a controlled substance,” i.e., drug trafficking. 21 U.S.C. 

§ 881(a)(6). Appellants, themselves flesh and blood, have 

intervened in this action, offering sworn testimony that the 

money is theirs and wholly unrelated to drugs. According to the 

government, that testimony is so implausible that appellants

lack Article III standing to intervene. The district court, 

deciding the issue on summary judgment, agreed. We reverse. 

At summary judgment, claimants alleging an ownership 

interest need only make an assertion of ownership and provide

some evidence of ownership to establish standing. Because 

“[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and 

the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 

functions, not those of a judge,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), we conclude that appellants met 

their burden.

I.

The practice of civil forfeiture allows law enforcement to 

seize property and then seek permanent forfeiture in a civil 

proceeding in rem—meaning, in a proceeding against the 

property—all without so much as charging the owner with a 

criminal offense. Leonard v. Texas, No. 16-122, slip op. at 2 

(U.S. Mar. 6, 2017) (Thomas, J.) (statement respecting the 

denial of certiorari). Though rooted in an English Law tradition

that operated “under the fiction that the thing itself, rather than 

the owner, was guilty of the crime,” contemporary civil 

forfeiture in the federal system is a creature of statute, the 
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Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and 

Asset Forfeiture Actions, and the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Id. at 4 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht 

Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 684–85 (1974)); see United States 

v. $133,420, 672 F.3d 629, 634 (9th Cir. 2012).

The typical forfeiture action begins when the government 

files a verified complaint against the property specifying, 

among other things, “the statute under which the forfeiture 

action is brought” and “sufficiently detailed facts to support a 

reasonable belief that the government will be able to meet its 

burden of proof at trial.” Supplemental Rule G(2). As plaintiff, 

the government bears the ultimate “burden of proof . . . to 

establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property 

is subject to forfeiture.” 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1).

Although the initial parties to the proceeding are the 

government and the property, “[a] person who asserts an 

interest in the defendant property may contest the forfeiture by 

filing a claim in the court where the action is pending.” 

Supplemental Rule G(5)(a)(i). A claim, in turn, must identify 

the property and claimant, state the claimant’s interest in the 

property, and be signed by the claimant under penalty of 

perjury. Id.

“Unlike in typical civil proceedings, the government may 

commence limited discovery immediately after a verified claim 

is filed.” $133,420, 672 F.3d at 635. Under Supplemental Rule 

G(6)(a), “[t]he government may serve special interrogatories 

limited to the claimant’s identity and relationship to the 

defendant property without the court’s leave at any time after 

the claim is filed and before discovery is closed.” These same 

rules provide that the “government may move to strike a claim 

. . . because the claimant lacks standing” and that such a motion 

“may be presented as a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
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or as a motion to determine after a hearing or by summary 

judgment whether the claimant can carry the burden of 

establishing standing by a preponderance of the evidence.” 

Supplemental Rule G(8)(c).

This case traces its roots back to March 28, 2014, when an 

Amtrak passenger mistakenly removed another person’s

backpack from a train at Washington’s Union Station. Later 

that day, he opened the backpack to find a shopping bag 

containing $17,900 in cash. Commendably, he turned the 

backpack over to Amtrak police.

In addition to the money, Amtrak police officers found 

inside the bag a student notebook and other personal effects. 

One of the papers contained the name Peter Rodriguez, as did 

the train manifest. A police narcotics dog alerted to the 

backpack, suggesting the presence of drug residue.

Using a contact number from the manifest, a detective with 

the Metropolitan Police Department called Peter Rodriguez, 

who gave a detailed description of the contents of the 

backpack—except for the money. Twice asked whether there 

was money in the backpack, Peter said no. Later, the detective 

called Peter to inform him that currency was found in the 

backpack, and that the bag—sans cash—could be recovered 

from Amtrak, though the money would remain with the MPD 

Asset Forfeiture Unit.

Shortly thereafter, appellant Angela Rodriguez, Peter’s 

mother, contacted MPD, explaining, according to the 

government’s verified complaint, that the cash belonged to her 

and her domestic partner, appellant Joyce Copeland, who lives

with her in New York City. The couple, she recounted, had left 

the money in a bag in Peter’s apartment, but neglected to tell 

him that it contained currency. When Peter later announced that 
5

he was coming to New York to visit his mother, she told him 

to bring the bag along.

Unconvinced by Ms. Rodriguez’s story, the police 

formally seized the currency and turned it over to the DEA, 

which initiated administrative forfeiture proceedings. See 18 

U.S.C. § 983. The couple participated in that process, filing 

claims of interest and providing some documents to support 

their claim. Still unmoved, the government commenced this 

case on March 13, 2015, by filing its complaint seeking 

forfeiture of the money as drug related. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).

After the couple filed verified claims asserting their 

ownership interests in the money, the government served 

special interrogatories asking them to: describe, in great detail, 

how they came to acquire the money; provide records and other 

information supporting their account; and explain how Peter 

came to possess the money. 

In their responses, sworn under penalty of perjury, the 

couple stated that they amassed the cash over time—with 

advance payments of federal tax refunds, a transfer from a 

retirement account, the sale of a pair of mink coats, and by 

other means—and stored their savings in a locked file cabinet. 

With plans to eventually move from New York to North 

Carolina, where Peter lives, and to purchase a home there, the 

pair drove south with cash in excess of $17,900. Along with 

using the money to pay for trip-related expenses like food and 

gas, they hoped to buy a used vehicle so that each would have 

a car to drive after they relocated. Once in North Carolina, they 

stayed in Peter’s home and visited several open houses. On 

February 26, the couple returned to New York, cutting their trip 

shorter than expected because one of them called her doctor in 

New York and learned that she had a medical procedure 

scheduled. Before driving back, Ms. Rodriguez decided to 
6

leave a bag holding the currency in Peter’s home “because [the 

couple] intended to return to North Carolina within a short 

period of time to continue the search for housing and a car.” 

She “did not provide Peter Rodriguez any information about 

the amount of the [cash] because [she] believed Peter might 

have taken some of it had he known it was in the bag.” It was 

on March 28, about a month after the pair left North Carolina, 

that Peter’s backpack was mistakenly removed from the train.

With the record composed of little beside this testimony 

and the verified complaint, the government moved to strike the 

couple’s claims for lack of standing under Supplemental Rule 

G(8)(C)(i)(B). The district court, finding that “no reasonable 

jury could believe the Claimants’ bizarre explanation for how 

they came to own the $17,900,” granted the government’s 

motion for summary judgment. United States v. $17,900, 200 

F. Supp. 3d 132, 134 (D.D.C. 2016). Our review is de novo. 

See Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. 

Federal Election Commission, 711 F.3d 180, 184 (D.C. Cir. 

2013) (explaining that review of a district court’s grant of 

summary judgment is de novo).

II.

When the government moves to strike a claim for lack of 

standing, a claimant has the burden to establish standing by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Supplemental Rule G(8)(c). To 

prevail, “a claimant must meet both Article III and statutory 

standing requirements.” United States v. $487,825, 484 F.3d 

662, 664 (3d Cir. 2007). In this appeal, the government 

challenges only the former.

As our court has explained, “[t]he requirements for a 

[claimant] to demonstrate constitutional standing to challenge

a forfeiture are very forgiving.” United States v. Emor, 785 

F.3d 671, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (alterations omitted). “In 
7

general, any colorable claim on the property suffices,” id.—

typically, an ownership or possessory interest, see, e.g.,

$133,420, 672 F.3d at 637. “Article III’s standing requirement 

is thereby satisfied because an owner or possessor of property 

that has been seized necessarily suffers an injury that can be 

redressed at least in part by the return of the seized property.” 

United States v. $515,060.42, 152 F.3d 491, 497 (6th Cir. 

1998); c.f. Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., No. 16-605

(U.S. June 5, 2017), slip op. at 6 (“[A]n intervenor of right must 

have Article III standing in order to pursue relief that is 

different from that which is sought by a party with standing.”).

As always, standing “must be supported . . . with the 

manner and degree of evidence required at [each] successive 

stage[] of the litigation.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 

U.S. 555, 561 (1992). At the pleading stage, a claimant need 

only allege a colorable interest in the property. $133,420, 672 

F.3d at 638; see Emor 785 F.3d at 676. “In response to a 

summary judgment motion, however, the [claimant] can no 

longer rest on such ‘mere allegations,’ but must ‘set forth’ by 

affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts,’ which for purposes 

of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true.” 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

Although our court has yet to articulate precisely “the 

manner and degree of evidence required,” id. at 561, for a 

claimant to survive the summary judgment stage of a civilforfeiture proceeding, other circuits have. For example, the 

Seventh Circuit has that held that where, as here, a claim is 

predicated on an ownership interest, “an assertion of ownership 

combined with some evidence of ownership is sufficient to 

establish standing.” United States v. $239,400, 795 F.3d 639, 

642–43 (7th Cir. 2015). The Ninth Circuit has adopted the same 

standard: “[a] claimant asserting an ownership interest in the 

defendant property . . . must . . . present ‘some evidence of 
8

ownership’ beyond the mere assertion in order to survive a 

motion for summary judgment.” $133,420, 672 F.3d at 639; see 

also United States v. $148,840, 521 F.3d 1268, 1276 (10th Cir. 

2008) (same); United States v. $81,000, 189 F.3d 28, 35 (1st

Cir. 1999) (same); United States v. $38,570, 950 F.2d 1108, 

1112 (5th Cir. 1992) (same).

Both the government and the couple agree that the “some 

evidence” standard is appropriate, and this case is a fine 

example of why.

For one thing, because the case concerns cash, it 

demonstrates how challenging it can be to document ownership 

of property seized by law enforcement. Indeed, the very 

qualities that make paper money useful for illicit activity—in 

particular, its untraceability—often make it difficult to prove 

that any cash is legitimate, no matter its source. This is 

especially true for those in our society who rely on cash to the 

exclusion of banking and other financial services. As Justice 

Thomas has recognized, it is “the poor and other groups least 

able to defend their interests in forfeiture proceedings” who 

bear the brunt of civil asset forfeiture. Leonard, slip op. at 4 

(internal citation omitted). And it is these same groups that are 

“more likely to use cash than alternative forms of payment, like 

credit cards, which may be less susceptible to forfeiture.” Id.;

see Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Survey of 

Unbanked and Underbanked Households 16 (Dec. 2009),

https://goo.gl/g3JtKe (finding that low-income, black, and 

Hispanic households, and those with a householder that is a 

foreign-born noncitizen, are more likely to be “unbanked”—to 

go without use of banking or similar financial services). So 

especially when cash is at issue, requiring more than “some 

evidence” of ownership would be onerous, unfair, and 

unrealistic.
9

A more demanding standard would also run up against the 

limited opportunity claimants often have to develop the record 

when the government moves to strike for lack of standing. In 

this case, for example, the record consists, in essence, of 

nothing more than the government’s verified complaint and the 

couple’s responses to the government’s special interrogatories. 

Although the district court treated the government’s motion to 

strike as one for summary judgment, it never held an 

evidentiary hearing, nor did the parties engage in the broad

discovery typical in civil cases. Asking for more than “some 

evidence” of ownership on such a record would risk unduly 

excluding those with a “colorable claim” on the property. 

Emor, 785 F.3d at 676.

Finally, the “some evidence” standard preserves the 

important distinction between constitutional standing and the 

merits. Although claimants bear the burden of establishing 

standing, it is the government that bears the burden to prove, 

on the merits, “that the property is subject to forfeiture.” 18 

U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). As the First Circuit has cautioned, “[c]ourts 

should not . . . conflate the constitutional standing inquiry with 

the merits determination that comes later.” United States v. 

One-Sixth Share of Mass Millions Lottery Ticket, 326 F.3d 36, 

41 (1st Cir. 2003). Where, as here, a claimant’s account of 

ownership is irreconcilable with the theory upon which the 

government seeks forfeiture, requiring the claimant to produce 

more than “some evidence” of ownership runs the danger of 

impermissibly shifting the merits burden to the claimant—

tantamount to, say, making a claimant prove that her property 

is unconnected to unlawful activity. Indeed, that is exactly what 

the government seeks to do here: at oral argument, government 

counsel suggested that the couple lacks Article III standing 

because their claimed ownership interest is undercut by “the 

record evidence” indicating that “this is drug trafficking 

money.” Oral Argument at 18:40–18:55. Understandably, the 
10

government would prefer to try its merits case against an 

inanimate object. We think it “obvious,” however, that “a 

claimant [who has shown some evidence of ownership] risks 

injury within the meaning of Article III and thus may have his 

day in court.” $148,840, 521 F.3d at 1276.

III.

Having determined what claimants must show in order to 

establish standing, we can easily resolve what remains of this

appeal by applying well-worn principles of summary 

judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant”—

here the government—“shows that there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must 

“view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party”—here the couple—and “draw[] all 

reasonable inferences in [its] favor.” Johnson v. Perez, 823 

F.3d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir. 2016). In so doing, the court “may not 

make credibility determinations or otherwise weigh the 

evidence.” Id. And “if one party presents relevant evidence that 

another party does not call into question factually, the court 

must accept the uncontroverted fact.” Id.

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly 

provides that a party opposing summary judgment may support 

its factual positions using “affidavits or declarations” and 

“interrogatory answers.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). So long 

as an “affidavit or declaration” is “made on personal 

knowledge, set[s] out facts that would be admissible in 

evidence, and show[s] that the affiant or declarant is competent 

to testify on the matters stated,” it may be “used to . . . oppose 

a motion” for summary judgment. Id. at 56(c)(4).
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In this case, the couple has offered sworn testimony 

detailing how they amassed the money, why they transported it 

to North Carolina, and how it ended up in Peter’s hands. In fact, 

there is little in the record other than their declarations. 

Certainly, nothing in the record directly contradicts the pair’s 

sworn account—no evidence that they did not travel to North 

Carolina, for instance, nor evidence that the cash had another 

source. Given our responsibility to “view[] the evidence in the 

light most favorable” to the couple and to “accept . . . 

uncontroverted fact[s],” Johnson, 823 F.3d at 705, we have 

little trouble concluding that the couple has asserted ownership 

and offered “some evidence” of ownership sufficient to 

withstand summary judgment. 

The government insists that the couple has done no more 

than simply assert ownership. In its view, they failed to meet 

their burden to produce “some evidence” of ownership when 

they “offered no evidence, beyond their own words, to 

substantiate” their story. Government Br. at 34. Had the couple 

offered only a bare assertion that they owned the property, we 

might agree. But as explained above, the two did more,

submitting extensive sworn testimony as evidence of their 

claim. Just as Rule 56 provides, a party may oppose summary 

judgment with sworn testimony, and—as we have 

recognized—that party’s own sworn testimony can alone 

defeat summary judgment, see, e.g., Johnson, 823 F.3d at 710 

(recognizing that a party’s testimony will always in some sense 

be “self-serving,” but that “parties, like other fact witnesses, 

are legally competent to give material testimony” and in certain 

contexts may be “the key, or even sole, witnesses”); Arrington 

v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 337–38 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 

(denying summary judgment where a non-movant’s affidavit 

created a genuine issue of material fact). Summary judgment 

turns not on whether a party offers a particular form of 

evidence, but rather on whether the evidence a party does
12

submit creates a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (“Rule 56(e) permits 

a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of 

the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c)”); Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(c) (listing “depositions, documents, electronically 

stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . ,

admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials”).

The government urges us to “reject” the couple’s 

testimony as “facially implausible.” Government Br. at 25. On 

this point, it bears repeating that “[c]redibility determinations, 

the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate 

inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a 

judge,” and are thus inappropriate at summary judgment.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. “This is the standard even when the 

court entertains grave doubts about” a “statement[] proffered 

by the party opposing summary judgment.” Greene v. Dalton, 

164 F.3d 671, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The government 

nonetheless contends that we can set aside the couple’s account

because it “strains credulity,” involving “numerous improbable 

elements”:

that [the couple] stockpiled thousands of dollars in 

cash in their apartment for as long as 14 months rather 

than secure their savings in bank accounts; handcarried the bag containing more than $17,900 on the 

drive from New York to North Carolina; and chose to 

pay all expenses [on that trip] in cash rather than 

utilize their financial accounts; and . . . became so 

worried about managing currency on their return trip 

that they risked entrusting their savings to an 

individual they believed would steal the money if he 

discovered it.

Government Br. at 36.
13

The government’s argument perfectly illustrates why 

credibility determinations and the weighing of evidence are left 

to juries rather than judges. Government counsel may well be 

able to convince judges that it is inconceivable someone would 

choose to keep sizeable cash savings, to travel with cash, or to

pay for routine expenses using cash rather than a credit card, 

but a jury of laypeople with different and more diverse life 

experiences might view these very same choices with 

considerably less suspicion. “Trial by a jury of laymen rather 

than by the sovereign’s judges was important to the founders 

because juries represent the layman’s common sense.” 

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343–44 (1979) 

(Rehnquist, J. dissenting). We are thus especially reticent to 

circumvent the jury process and throw out sworn testimony 

because it is out of line with our own lived experiences.

Rather, our cases describe narrow circumstances under 

which courts may “lawfully put aside testimony [because it] is 

so undermined as to be incredible.” Robinson v. Pezzat, 818 

F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2016). As we recently explained in 

Chenari v. George Washington University, 847 F.3d 740 (D.C. 

Cir. 2017), this situation usually comes into play “when a 

plaintiff’s claim is supported solely by the plaintiff’s own selfserving testimony, unsupported by corroborating evidence, and 

undermined either by other credible evidence, physical 

impossibility or other persuasive evidence that the plaintiff has 

deliberately committed perjury.” Id. at 747. Here, however, the 

record contains scarcely any evidence aside from the couple’s 

testimony, let alone evidence that undermines their account or 

suggests deliberate perjury. And while one might well discount 

as unlikely the pair’s testimony about leaving their savings in

a bag in Peter’s home, without telling him, only to later reverse 

course and ask him to bring the bag to New York, that story is 

far from “physically impossib[le].” Id.
14

The government cites a series of cases in which, it says, 

courts have thrown out analogous sworn testimony. All are 

distinguishable. Two of the cited cases concern testimony that 

was riddled with internal contradictions central to the case. See

Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 555 (2d Cir. 2005) 

(setting aside “contradictory and incomplete” testimony); Aziz

Zarif Shabazz v. Pico, 994 F. Supp. 460, 468–71 (S.D.N.Y. 

1998) (Sotomayor, J.) (same). Another dealt with a statement 

“blatantly contradicted” by video evidence. Scott v. Harris, 550 

U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

The government’s reliance on United States v. $8,440,190, 

719 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2013), in which the First Circuit dismissed 

a claimant for lack of Article III standing, is equally misplaced. 

There, a Coast Guard boat, while making chase on a suspicious 

vessel, saw “numerous bales” thrown “overboard.” Id. at 51–

52. Although some bales were never recovered, the ones that 

were contained roughly $8.4 million. When questioned, a 

crewmember on the fleeing vessel claimed that he had been 

paid to transport the bales of money. Id. at 52. But in a 

subsequent action for asset forfeiture, the crewmember 

changed his tune, filing a verified claim for all $8.4 million. Id.

at 53–54. In support of his claim, the crewmember offered only 

a “conclusory” affidavit “in which he referred to the bales as 

‘my bales’” and stated that he “intended to go back and 

retrieve” them from the sea. Id. at 58–59. Dismissing his claim, 

the First Circuit observed that the crewmember’s new story 

“defie[d] common sense,” as the bails lacked any feature that 

would keep them “floating in place,” which explains why many

“presumably s[ank] or float[ed] away.” Id. at 59. From this, the 

government asks us to read the First Circuit as holding that 

courts may set aside sworn testimony that is “inconsistent with 

common sense.” Government Br. at 26 n.6.
15

In truth, that decision falls squarely within the bounds for 

setting aside self-serving and uncorroborated testimony that we 

spelled out in Chenari: where such testimony is “undermined 

either by other credible evidence, physical impossibility or 

other persuasive evidence that the plaintiff has deliberately 

committed perjury.” 847 F.3d at 747. Specifically, (1) the 

record contained contradictory evidence that undermined the 

crewmember’s claim—namely, his prior testimony; (2) the 

change in the crewmember’s account raised an inference of 

fabrication; and (3) the claimant’s story had an element of 

physical impossibility—after all, the money sank. In addition, 

the court emphasized that the crewmember’s affidavit evidence 

was minimal bordering on conclusory, as any explanation of 

how he acquired the money and why it was on the vessel was 

missing. $8,440,190, 719 F.3d at 58–59; see Greene, 164 F.3d 

at 675 (While “statements made by the party opposing a motion 

for summary judgment must be accepted as true for the purpose 

of ruling on that motion, some statements are so conclusory as 

to come within an exception to that rule”). This case differs in 

every respect: the record is devoid of contradictory evidence, 

the couple has consistently maintained that the money is theirs,

nothing in their account is physically impossible, and—far 

from conclusory—the couple has explained how they came to 

own the money in considerable detail.

Given all this, we believe that the couple has more than 

met its burden to establish constitutional standing at summary 

judgment. Our decision means only that the pair has a right to 

contest whether the money is subject to forfeiture. Despite the 

government’s best efforts, this will remain an adversary 

proceeding.
16

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.