### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs O ct obe r 4, 200 5

DA RR ELL B RA DD OCKv. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. P -22352 Bernie We inman, Judge

No. W2004-02162-C CA-R 3-P C - F iled Dece m ber 14, 2005

The pe titioner, Darr ell Br addock, a ppeals the de nial of his petition for post-conviction re lief, ar g uing the post-conviction court erre d in finding he rece ived effec tive assistance of counsel. Following our re vie w, we a ff

ir m th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES and J E R R Y L. S MI TH , J J ., joined.

Dar rell B raddoc k, West Tennessee State Prison, Henning , Tenne ssee, Pro Se.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Se th P . K e stn e r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and John W . Campbell, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

. OP IN ION

F AC TS

B e c a us e the re c or d o n a

pp e a l is sp ars e , w e ha ve g le a ne d th e fa c ts f ro m th e op ini on of

thi s c ou rt on dir e c t app e a l:

On Se pte mbe r 1 2, 19 96 , a She lby Cou nty jury fo un d [th e pe tit ion e r], g uil ty
o f f i r s t d e g r e e f

e l o n y m u r d e r , c r i m i n a l a t t e m p t : t o w i te s p e c i a l l y a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y, criminal attempt: to wit murder in the fi rst deg ree , and two counts of a g g ravated assault. . . .

On J anuary

12, 1994, at appr ox imately 7:12 am, three arme d m as ked men enter ed Da n' s Big Star Groc ery Store at 3237 Winchester, Me mphis, Tennessee . At the tim e the me n e nte re d, Rob by Al le n, Jr., F e lic ia

B a ile y , Jan ic e Cox, Ange la2

Adams, Malcolm Clark, a nd J ohnny Russell, along w ith other employ ees of the store,
wer e inside t he store. When Robby Allen, who wa s working in the store' s office , saw a blac k male ru n ac ro s s the store with a g un draw n, he re ache d for his own g un. Be fore Mr. Allen could dr aw his g un, Michae l Irvin jumped over the partition be tw e e n th e of

fi c e a nd the re st of the sto re a nd la nd e d on Mr

. Al le n' s sh ou lde r. Irv in
wa s ar me d. Mr . Alle n an d Mr. Irv in str ug g le d for c on tr ol o f M r. Irv in' s w e apo n, in the proc ess the we apon fire d into the air.

Whil e Mr . A lle n a ndMr . I rv in s trug g le d, [the pe tit ion e r] had run t o c a sh reg ister number two w here Fe licia B ailey , a store e mploy ee, w as standing . [The petitioner] pointed his gun at Ms. Bai l ey and ordered he r to g et down on the f loor. Ms. B a ile y

c omp lie d. [Th e pe tit ion e r] the n tu rn e d a ndpo int e d th e g un a t Ma lc olm Clark, who also g ot dow n on the floor. Mr. Clar k identified exhibit 15, a .380 ca liber automatic pistol taken fr om [ the petitioner’s] aunt' s home, as a wea pon rese mbling the g un which [the petitioner] point ed in his fac e.
Durin g the commotion, severa l shots were f ired. One shot came f

rom the store floor. A n o th e r

c a me f r o m th e g u n o v e r

w h ic h M r

. A ll e n a n d M r

. Ir v in []
wr e stl e d. I n th e str

ug g le ov e r the g un , Mr. Irv in fe ll a ndMr . A lle n f e ll o n to p o f h im. Mr. Allen re ache d fo r a pa ir of handc uffs that we re in the of fice . As he wa s doing so, a g un was e x tended ove r the wa ll into t he off ice an d fi re d into the back of Mr. Al le n' s n e c k, c a us ing him to l os e c on sc iou sn e ss.
Once the commotion cea sed, Ms. Cox jumped over the bac k wall of the of fice
a ndran to a

ph on e loc a te d in the re ar o f the sto re a ndc a lle d 9 11 . M s. Ad a ms a lso
c a lle d 9 11 a ndpu lle d th e sto re ' s a larm

.
Mr . Cl ark c ra wl e d a lon g the fl oo r t ow ardthe of fi c e

. He sa w John ny

Rus se ll ly ing on the floor with a lar g e amount of blood on the f loor around him. Mr. Clark retrie ved Mr. Russell' s .357 Smit h and Wesson pistol from the floor in front of Mr

. Russell's body . Mr. Clark then c limbed over the w all into the office and handc uffe d Mr. I rvin and also confiscated Mr. Irvin' s wea pon, a .25 caliber automatic pistol. Mr. Clark picked up Mr . Allen' s .380 caliber Br owning pistol. Mr. Alle n rec overe d consciousness a nd g ave the store key s t o M r. Clark, who loc ked the door s to the store.

Mr. Russell died as a r esult of a g unshot wound to his back. No bullet or bu lle t f ra g me nts we re fo un d in his bo dy . M r. Al le n w a s hospit a lize d f or te n d a y s, rec overing from the wound to his neck. A bul let was removed from his body . Mr. Irvin died as a

result of g unshot wounds from a .38 or a .357 ca liber re volver.
[The pet it io ner] mad e a st ate men t t o S ergeantTi mo th y Co ok , o f t he M e mph is Police Depa

rtment, which was introduced at trial. I n the s tatement, [the petitioner]3

c o n f e s s e d t o b e i n g i n v o l v e d i n t h e a t t e m p t e d r o b b e r y o f D a n ' s B i g S t ar

G r o c e r y. [The petition er ] said he used a black .380 pistol (introduce d at trial as e x hibit 15) which belong ed to his aunt. [ T h e petitioner] also stated that Carlos Rice wa s the third perpe trator in the r obbery , and that he use d a long -bar rel ed revolver. [The petitioner] stated that he t o o k t h e revolve r fr om Mr. Rice and thre w it into a field. A Colt .38 revolver w as located by the pol ice in the field indicated by [t he petitioner] and wa s introduced at trial as exhibit 23. [The pe titioner] furthe r stated that Mr. Rice told him t hat Mr. Rice ha d shot the store mana g er in t h e back (re fer ring to Mr. Rus se ll) be c a us e oth e rw ise the ma na g e r w ou ld h a ve sh ot h im.

At t ri al Mr. Rice te stified that he had ple ad[ed] guilty to murder in the perpe tration of a robbery and related charg es arising out of the attempted robbery of Da n' s Bi g Sta

r. He a c kn ow le dg e d tha t he is cur re ntl y se rv ing a

lif e se nte nc e fo r tho se crimes, but stated that he is attempting to obtain post-conviction relief f rom his plea. Mr. Rice testified that he did not ha ve a g un during the attempted robbe ry , and denie d that he shot Mr. Russell. He sa id that he re cog nized the .380 automatic (e x hibit 15) as [the petitioner’s] aunt's g un, but said t h at [t he petitioner] used the .38 re volver (exhibit 23) during the robbe ry . He f urther te stified that Michae l Irvin planned the
ro bb e ry . H e state d th a t th e plan c on sis te d o f M r. Irv in t akin g car e of the pe op le in the offic e, he w as to be positioned at re g ister one and [ t h e petitioner] was to take reg ister two. Mr. Rice te stified that he did not shoot Mr

. Allen and did not see [t he petitioner] shoot hi m either.

The State a lso pre s ented e vidence at trial that [the petitioner’s] palm print was on the ca r used to conve y

the perpe trators to and from Da n' s Big Star. A Mr. Steve Scott of the Tenne ssee B ureau of I nvesti gati on testified that he teste d the Colt. 38, the .25 ca lib er , t h e Br owning .380 automatic, and the Smit h and Wesson .357 Ma g nu m, andof

tho se g un s, the bu lle t wh ic h wa s take n fr om Mr . A lle n' s b od y c ou ld only have c ome from the .38 revolve r. He wa s unable to state c onclusively that the bullet did come from that g un, but ruled out t he possibilitythat it came f rom one of the other g uns found at the sc ene.
State v. Dar

rell B raddoc k, No. 02C01-9707-CR-00279, 1998 WL 217897, at **1-2. (T enn. Crim. App. May

5, 1998) perm. to appeal de nied (Te nn. Dec . 28, 1998).

This court af

firmed the pe titioner’s convictions and sentenc es. See id. at **3-4. Permission to appea l was denied by the Tenne ssee Supre me Court on Dec ember 28, 1998. I t appea

rs that the petitioner then filed pe titions for post-c onviction reli ef on both De cembe r 28 and D ece mber 29, 19 99 . A s e xpla ine d by th is c ou rt in D arr e ll B ra dd oc k v . St a te , N o. W20 04 -0 09 79 -C CA -R 3- PC, 2004 WL 2439256 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oc t. 28, 2004), perm. to a ppeal denied (Tenn. F eb. 28, 2005),
re v i ew i n g the dismissal of what appa rently was his third petition for post-convic tion relief, the petitioner, pro s e , filed on Marc h 16, 2004, a petition f or post-conviction relief

, claiming ineffe ctive assistance of counse l. The post-convic tion court dismissed the petition, finding it was theT he f i rs t am end ed pe t i t i o n was f i l ed o n A p ri l 2 7 , 2 0 0 0

. A l t ho ugh t he st am p ed f i l e d at es fo r t he second and 1
t h i r d a men ded pet i t i on s a r e i l l eg i bl e, t h e ce r t i f i ca t es of s er v i ce a r e dat ed O ct ober 24, 2002, a n d J an u ar y 22, 2003,

re sp e c tive ly. F ina lly, a fo u rth a m e n d e d p e tit io n w a s fil e d o n J u ly 2 , 2 0 0 3

.

B eca us e t he order deny i ng t he pet i t i on i s dat ed i n Aug us t 200 4, we s ur mi s e t he evi dent i ar y he ar i ng t oo k pl ace 2

s omet i me i n 2004.
4 petitioner’s sec ond petition and it was time barr ed by the statute of limitations. This court, pursua nt to the State’s Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appe als, motion, affirmed the dismiss al. See id. at **1- 2. Acc ording to the opinion, the pe titioner had not appe aled the dismissal of his Dec ember 29, 1999, petition.

No w the pe tit ion e r i s b e fo re us on app e a l of the de nia l of

wh a t app e ars to be the fi rs t po stconviction petition that he filed. Acc ording to the technica l rec ord, the pe titioner, pro s e , filed the orig inal petition, which is the basis for this appeal, with the Shelby CountyCriminal Court C lerk’s office on Dec ember

28, 1999. Over

the next three and a half y ear s, four a mended pe titions wer e subsequently

filed, by and throug h post-conviction counsel. There is no ex planation in the re cord 1 fo r the le ng thy

de la y be tw e e n th e fi lin g of

the orig ina l pe tit ion a ndthe e vid e nti ary he ari ng . In f

a c t, beca use we do not ha ve a c opy of the e videntiary

hearing tr anscr

ipt, we ca nnot determine w hen the hearing w as ac tually

hel d

. T h e record on a

ppeal c ontains the post-conviction court’s Aug ust 19, 2004, order

deny ing the petitioner re lief and discussing the evidentiary hearing. I t is from this order 2 that th e pet ition e r a

pp e a ls pro s e , asserting, a mong nume rous other c laims, that he rec eived ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel.

AN AL YSI S

I. P os t- Co nvi c ti on St at ut e of Lim it at ion s a nd Suc c e ssi ve P e ti ti ons
We initi ally

a d dr e s s th eSt ate ’ s a

r g uments that we should dismiss t he post-convic tion petition as being time barre d by

the statute of limitations and because it is a subsequent post-convic tion pe tit ion . U nd e r the Pos t- Con vic tio n Pr oc e du re Ac t of 19 95 , a c la im f or po st- c on vic tio n r e lie f mus t be fi le d " wi thi n o ne (1 ) y e ar o f the date of the fi na l a c tio n o f the hig he st s ta te app ell ate c ou rt to which an a

ppeal is taken or, if no appe al is taken, within one (1) y ear of the date on which the judgme nt beca me final, or c onsideration o f s u ch petition shall be barr ed." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102( a) (2003). The State corr ectly notes that this c ourt found the petitioner pre viouslyfailed to file one of his earlier post-conviction petitions within t he one- y ear statute of limitations m andate d by the Post-Conviction Act. Bra ddock, 2004 WL 2439256, at *1. The p et i t i o n i n t hat ca se wa s dated Ma rch 16, 2004, se vera l y ear s past t h e De ce m b er 28, 1998, date in which the petitioner’s
app e a l w a s d eni ed by ou r s up re me c ou rt . T hepe tit ion wh ic h is the ba sis of thi s a pp e a l be ars a stamped file date of De cembe r 28, 1999, within the statutory time require ment. As such, we do not conclude that this claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

Ad dit ion a lly , th e Sta te arg ue s th a t th e c ur re nt p e tit ion sh ou ld b e dis mis se d b e c a us e it is a subsequent petition, corr ectly noting that the A ct5

contemplates the fi l ing of only one (1) petition for post-conviction re lief. I n no ev en tm aym o re t h an o n e ( 1 ) p et i t i o n fo r p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n re l i ef b e f i l ed at t ac k i n g a sin g le jud g me nt. I f a prior pe tit ion ha s be e n fi le d wh ic h wa s re so lve d on the me ri ts by a court of compete nt juris d i ct i on, any second or

subsequent petition shall be summarily

dismiss ed.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-102(c ) (2003) . As the s tatute provides, a subsequent petition should be summarily

dismiss ed if the origina l petition was resolved on the merits. Howeve r, since it doe s not appea r that the pe titioner’s second and third petitions were c o n s i d ered on their merits, we will do
so to this pe tit ion , a lth ou g h it app e ars to b e his fi rs t.

II. Stand ard of Review The pe titioner arg ues the post-c onviction court er red in finding that he re ceive d the ef fec tive assistance of counse l. The post-convic tion petitioner bear s the burden of proving his alleg ations by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 30

- 1 1 0(f) (2003). Where appellate revie w involves purely

fac tual issues, the appellate court should not reweig h or re evaluate the evide nce. See Henley v. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997). Howeve r, revie w of a tria l court' s application of the la w t o th e fa c ts o f the c a se is de novo , with no presumption of correc tness. See R uff v. State, 97 8 S.W. 2d 95 , 96 (T e nn

. 19 98 ). Th e iss ue s of de fi c ie nt pe rf orma nc e of c ou ns e l and p os si ble prejudice to the defe nse ar e mix ed questions of law and fa ct and, thus, subject to de novo revie w by the appe llate court with a presumption of cor rec tness g iven only

to t h e p o s t -conviction court’s finding s of fa ct. See F ields v. State, 40 S.W .3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001)

.
II. Ine ffec ti ve As sis ta nc e of C ouns e l

I n order to determine the competenc e of c ounsel, Tenne ssee courts have applied standar ds develope d in fede ral case law. See State v. Tay lor, 968 S.W .2d 900, 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (n oti ng that th e sa me sta nd ardfo r d e te rm ini ng in effe c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of c ou ns e l th a t is app lie d in fede ral c ases a lso applies in Tennesse e). The United States Supreme Court articulated t he standa rd in Str ic klandv. Was hin g ton , 4 66 U. S. 6 68 , 1 04 S. Ct . 2 05 2, 80 L . E d. 2d67 4 ( 19 84 ), wh ic h is wi d el y a c c e p t ed as t h e a p p ro p ri at e s t an d ar d fo r a l l cl ai m s o f aco n v i ct ed p et i t i o n ert h at co u n s el 's assistance was defe ctive. The standard is firmly g rounded in the be lief that counse l play s a role that is "c ritical to the ability

of the a dversa

rial sy stem to produce just re sults." I d. at 685, 104 S. Ct. at 20 63 . T he Str ic klandsta nd ardis a tw o- pr on g te st:

F ir st, the de fe nd a nt mus t sh ow that c ou ns e l' s p e rf orma nc e wa s d e fi c ie nt. Th is require s showing that counsel made err ors so serious that counsel was not fu nc tio n i n g a s t h e " c o u n s e l " g u ar a n t e e d t h e d e f e n d a n tb y t h e S i xth A m e n d m e nt. Second, the de fenda nt must show that th e defic ient perf ormanc e pre

judiced the defe nse. This require s showing that counsel' s err ors were so serious as to deprive the defe ndant of a

fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.6

I d. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. The Strickland C o u rt fu rt h er e x plained the meaning of "de ficient pe rf orma nc e " in the fi rs t pr on g of the te st i n th e fo llo wi ng way :

I n any case prese nting a n ineffe cti v en es s claim, t he per formanc e inquiry must be whether counsel' s assistance was rea sonable considering all the circ umstances.

. . . No particula r set of de tailed rules f

or counse l's c onduct ca n satisfac torily take acc ount of the va ri e ty of c ir c ums ta nc e s fa c e d by de fe ns e c ou ns e l or the rang e of l egit im ate decisions re g arding how best to repr esent a criminal def

endant.

I d. a t 68 8- 89 , 1 04 S. Ct . at 20 65 . T he pe tit ion e r mus t e st abl is h "th at cou ns e l' s r e pr e se ntatio n f e ll below an obje ctive standa rd of r easona

bleness under

preva iling prof

essional n o rms

. " H ouse v. State, 44 S.W .3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996))

.
As for the prejudice prong of t he test, the Strickland Court stated: " The de fenda nt must show that there is a rea sonable proba bilitythat, but for counse l's u n p ro fe s s i o n al errors, the r esult of the pr oc e e din g wo uldha ve be e n d if fe re nt. A r e a so na

ble pr ob abil ity

is a pr ob abil ity

su ff ic ie nt t o undermine c onfidenc e in the outcome." 466 U.S. at 6 9 4 , 104 S. Ct . at 2068; see a lso Overton v. Sta te , 8 74 S.W. 2d6, 11 (T e nn

. 19 94 ) (c on c lud ing that pe tit ion e r faile d to e sta bli sh that " the re is a
rea sonable proba

bilitythat, but for counse l's e rror s, the outcome of the proce eding s would have be en differ ent" ).

Cou rt s n e e d n ot a

pp ro a c h th e Str ic klandte st i n a sp e c if ic or de r o r e ve n " add res s b oth components of the inquiry if the defe ndant makes an insufficient showing on one." 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069; see also Goad, 938 S.W .2d at 370 (stating that "f ailure to prove either de ficienc y or pre judice provide s a suffic ient basis to deny relief on the ineff

ective a ssistance c laim")

. We note that when post-c onviction proce eding s have inc luded a f ull evidentiary

hearing, a s was true in this case, the tria l judge ’s finding s of fa cts and c onclusions of law are g iven the ef fec t and weig ht of a jury verdic t, and this c ourt is “ bound by the trial judg e’s f

indings of f

act unless we conclude that the evidenc e conta ined in the re cord pr eponder ates a g ainst the judg ment enter ed in the
c a us e .” B la c k v . St a te , 7 94 S.W. 2d 75 2, 75 5 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 ). Th e re vie wi ng c ou rt mus t ind ulg e a str on g pr e su mpt io n that the c on du c t of

c ou ns e l f

a lls wi thi n th e rang e of

re a so na ble profe ssiona l a s s is tan c e , s e e Str ic k lan d , 4 6 6 U

. S. a t 6 9 0 , 1 0 4 S. Ct

. a t 2 0 6 6 , a n d may not second- g uess the tac tical and strateg ic choice s made by tri al counsel unless those choices we re uninformed be cause of inade quate pr epar ation. See He llard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982). The f a c t th a t a s tr a te g y o r ta c ti c f a il e d o r h u r t th e d e f

e n s e d o e s n o t a lo n e s u p p o r t th e claim of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. See Thompson v. State, 958 S.W .2d 156, 165 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). F inally , a per son char g ed with a criminal offense is not entitled to perf ect repre sentation. See Denton v. State, 945 S.W .2d 793, 796 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). As explained in Burns, 6 S.W .3d at 462, “[c]onduct that is unrea sonable under t he facts of one case may be per fec tly

rea sonable unde r the fa cts of anothe r.”7

I n this case, a lthough t h ere was a n evidentiary hearing on the post-conviction petition and the record on appeal c ontains a copy of the post-c onviction court’s orde r of dismissal, the transc ript is not included in the rec ord. Our supreme court has explained the re sponsibili ty of the a ppealing pa rt y to p ro vid e a

su ff ic ie nt r e c or d o n a

pp e a l:

When a party seeks a ppellate r eview the re is a duty to prepa re a rec ord which convey s a fair, acc urate and complete a ccount of what tra nspired with re spect to the issues forming the basis of the appea l. State v. Bunc h, 646 S.W .2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1983). Where the rec ord is incomplete and do es n o t contain a tra nscript of the proce eding s relevant to an is sue pre sented for revie w, or portions of the r ecor d upon which the pa

rty relies, a n appellate co u rt is preclude d from conside ring the issue. State v. Roberts, 755 S.W .2d 833, 836 (Tenn. Cr i m

. App. 1988). Absent the
ne c e ssa ry re le va nt m a te ri a l in the re c or d a n a pp e llat e c ou rt

c a nn ot c on sid e r the me ri ts of an issue. See T.R.A.P. 24(b).

State v

. B a ll ar d , 8 5 5 S. W. 2 d 5 5 7 , 5 6 0

- 6 1 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 3 )

. T h is c o u r t h a s p r e v io u s ly e xp laine d that “[i] n the abse nce of an adequate rec ord on appea l, w e must presume that the trial c ourt' s ruling w as supported by the evidence.” State v. Bibbs, 806 S.W.2d 786, 790 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (c iting Smit h v. State, 584 S.W .2d 811 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979) ; Vermily e v. State, 584 S.W .2d 226 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979)).

Th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t a ndc on c lus ion s o f l a w a re a s f oll ow s: The pe titioner filed a Petition f or Post-Convi ction Relief alleg ing that he wa s no t pr op e rl y

re pr e se nte d b y

his a tto rn e y

a t tria l.
At trial the [petitione r] was c onvicted of F irst Deg ree Fe lony Murder , Cr imi na l A tte mpt , to- wi t: Es pe c ia lly Ag g ra vate d Rob be ry , Cr imi na l A tte mpt , to wi t: Mu rd e r i n th e F ir st D e g re e , a ndtw o c ou nts of Ag g ra vate d A ssa

ult

.
At the evidentiary hearing on this petiti on the [c]ourt heard testimony from . . . the petitioner, a nd [t rial counse l] who re prese nted the petitioner at trial.
The pe titioner testified to eig ht issue[ s] t hat he f elt made his trial attorne y ineffe ctive.
1. His attorney

failed to e stablish a defe nse of f elony murder.
2. The [petitioner] maintained that he fled w hen he he ard the first shots and the jury should have be en instructed on r enunciation.

3. Hi s a tto rn e y

ne ve r i nte rv ie we d th e wi tne sse s.8 4. He state d that his attorney instructed him to write a le tter t o the judg e and prosec utor and told him what to write in the l etter and that the letter w as used in the heari n g o n the Motion to S uppress. He felt the letter s helped prove his confession
was va lid.
5. His attorney

did not make an ope ning statement. 6. His attorney

did not challeng e the suff iciency o f the c harg e of f elony
mur de r o n a

pp e a l.

7. His att o rn ey d i d reque st some lesser include d offe nses but not all lesser inc lud e d o ff

e ns e s. 8. The pe titioner wanted se vera l parts of the jury instructions challeng ed on appea l and these instruc tions were not c halleng ed.
[Trial counsel’s] testimony was to e ffe ct that he had be en pra cticing law since 1961 and he ha d handled many murder trials. After h i s ap p o intment to [ the petitioner’s] case he had visited his client on many occa sions. He tried to work out
a ne g oti a te d settle me nt of the c a se

. He re c e ive d an a c c e pta ble of fe r b ut the famil y of the vic tim turne d it do wn

. He state d that he ha d ta lke d to the de fe nd a nt’ s f a mil y and int ended to ha ve them testify in miti g ation. He state d that he g ave his c lient
every thing he rec eived in disc overy

. He inter viewed a ll the witnesses and re ceive d the wit nesses’ statements from the State e arly in his investigation of the c ase. [Trial counsel] stated that he ne ver told his client t o send l etters to any one. An or der w as enter ed ame nding the indictment in open [c] ourt. He did not discuss the instruc tions with his client prior to the judg e cha rg ing the jury . He state d that he f elt that he thoroug hly

investigated the ca se.

I t would appea

r fr om the rec ord in th i s ca s e t hat there was ove rwhe lming evidenc e of the [petit ioner’s] g uilt. The [petit ioner] ga ve a statement that implicated him as a participant in these crimes. The [petitioner] t akes the position t hat he r an away when he hear d shots and there fore the af firmative de fense of re n u n ciation should have be en d ev el oped by his attorney . I n order to have a

defe nse of
re nu nc ia tio n the [pe tit ion e r] wo uld a ft e r ha vin g c omm itt e d a c ri min a l at tem pt, solicitation or conspirac y , would have had to pr event the succ essful commission of t h e o ff en s e a n d t h e o ff

en s e w as p re v en t ed u n d erci rc u m s t an ce s m an i fe s t i n g a complete a nd voluntary

renunc iation of th e [ petitioner’s] criminal purpose. The testimonyin this ca se taken in the best light of the [petit ioner’s] position would not ha ve c on sti tut e d th e c ir c ums ta nc e s th a t wou ld ha ve c re a te d th e a ff ir ma tiv e de fe ns e of re nunciation. The [c]ourt finds t hat the trial attorney was not ineff

ective in not pursuing the def

ense or reque sted the court to inst ruct the jury on renunc iation.9 The [c]ourt finds that [ trial counsel] interviewe d the witnesses a nd rea d the wi tne sse s’ state me nts in p re pa ratio n for tr ia l a ndthat he didno t a dv ise his c lie nt t o write letter s to the [j ]udge or prosec utor.

The de cision whether

or not to make a n opening statement is strictly a matter
o f tr i a l s tr a t e g y a n d w a i v i n g a n o p e n i n g s t a t e m e n t i s n o t n e c e s s ar i l y i n e f f e c t i v e

. In Hellar d v. State, 629 S.W .2d 4, our Supreme Court state d,

“Althoug h in B axter we adopted a highe r standar d of competenc e for

the leg al re prese ntation require d in criminal ca ses, we didno t r e qu ir e pe rf

e c t represen ta tio n. Mo re ov e r the de fe ns e attorney ’s re prese ntation, when questioned is not to be measur ed by ‘20/20 hindsight[’].”

“ Hi nd sig ht ca n alw a y s be uti lize d by tho se no t in the fr a y so as to ca st doubt on trial tactics a law y er ha s u s ed

. Trial counse l strateg y will vary eve n am o n g the most skill ed lawy ers. When that jud g me nt e xer c ise turns ou t to be wr on g or e ve n po or ly a dv ise d, thi s fac t alone cannot support a belate d claim of inef fec tive counsel.”
This [ c]ourt does not find that the wa i v er o f opening stateme nt was ineffe ctive re prese ntation.

The issue of the sufficie ncy of the e vidence to t h e ch ar ge of Murde r wa s considere d by

the appe llate court.

As to the [pe tit ion e r’ s] alle g a tio n tha t his atto rn e y didno t r e qu e st a ll p os sib le lesser inc luded offe nses, it is the [ c]ourt’s duty t o d et er m ine what a re the lesser incl ud e d o ff

e ns e s a ndto p ro pe rl y

ins truc t th e jury . T he failu re of the [c]o urt to instruct the appropriate lesse r included of fense s is plain error

and would be
c on sid e re d b y

the app e llate c ou rt s. Th e [c]o urt f ind s th a t th e app e a l in this c a se raised the appropriate issues.

I n Stri ckl and v. Was hin g ton , 1 04 S. Ct . 2 05 2 ( 19 82 )[, ] the U. S. Su pr e me Cou rt se t ou t th e ne c e ssa

ry re qu ir e me nts fo r i ne ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l,

“A c onvicted def

endant’ s claim that counsel’s a ssistance wa s so defe ctive as to re quire a reve rsal of a conviction or de ath sentenc e has two co m p o n en ts. First the def endant must show that counse l’s perf ormanc e was defic ient. This require s showing that counsel made
e rr or s so se ri ou s th a t c ou ns e l w a s n ot f un c tio ning a s th e ‘c ou ns e l’ g uara nteed the de fenda n t b y the Six th Amendment. Second, the defe ndant must show that t h e def icient per formanc e pre

judiced the10 defe nse. This requir es showing that counsel’s e rror s were so serious
a s to de prive th e de fe nd a nt o f a fair tr ia l, a tr ia l w ho se re su lts is
re lia ble . U nle ss the de fe nd a nt make s both sh ow ing s it c a nn ot b e sa id that t he con vict ion or

de a th s e nte nc e re su lte d f ro m a br e akd ow n in the adve rsary

proce ss and re nders the r esults unreliable.”
This [ c]ourt finds in this case that the trial attorne y m ade no error s that de prive d th e [pe tit ion e r] o f a fair tr ia l.
The [c]ourt finds that the advice g iven and se rv ices re ndere d by the [petit ioner’s] counsel was within the rang e of c ompetency demande d by

an attorne y in a c ri min a l c a se a ndthat [tr ia l cou ns e l’ s] re pr e se ntatio n of the [pe tit ion e r] i n th is tr ia l c omp lie d w ith the re qu ir e me nts se t ou t by the Sup re me Cou rt of Te nn e sse e in Ba x ter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930.

I T I S THEREFORE ORDERED, AD J UDGED , AND DE CREED that the relief soug ht by

the petitioner in his P et i t i o n for Post-Conviction Relief is here by denied.

Since t he petiti oner ha s failed to include in the r ecor d on appea l a copy of the tra nscript of th e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n h e ar in g , th e r e c o r d is in s u f f ic ie n t f o r u s to c o n c lu d e th a t th e p o s t- c onviction court e rre d in its di smissal of the petition. Accor dingly , that action is aff irmed.

CO NC LU SION

Ba s ed u p o n t h e f

o re go i n g au t h o ri t i es an d re as o n i n g, we af fi rm t h e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n co u rt 's denial of the post-conviction petition.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GL

ENN, JUDGE