before any answer was filed, and thus, we consider his amended complaint

in our de novo review. NRCP 15(a) ("A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served."); NRCP 7 (listing permissible pleadings, not including a motion to dismiss) That complaint, however, fails to state a viable claim for relief. Thus, having considered appellant's appeal statement, respondents' response thereto, and the record, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed the action. See Rae v. All American Life and Gas. Co., 95 Nev. 920, 923, 605 P.2d 196, 197 (1979) (a district court order will be affirmed on appeal if supported by any of the theories presented); Nelson v. Sierra Constr. Corp., 77 Nev. 334, 343, 364 P.2d 402, 406 (1961) (upholding a dismissal for failure to state a claim, even though the district court based the dismissal on different reasons).

Appellant's first amended complaint asserted claims relating to perceived abuses of the inmate grievance procedure. Appellant has, however, no constitutional or other right to have the grievance procedure carried out in a specific manner. Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2005) ("[An inmate] does not have a federally protected liberty interest in having these grievances resolved to his satisfaction."); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure."); Massey v. Heiman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he Constitution creates no entitlement to grievance procedures or access to such procedures voluntarily established by the state." (agreeing with Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994))); Hernandez v. Bennett-Haron, 128 Nev., Adv. Op. 54, 287 P.3d 305, 310 (2012) (explaining that, with regard

SUPREME COUFtT OF NEVADA 2 (o) [947A 'repSUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA

(0) 1947A to due process protections under the Nevada Constitution, this court is

guided by federal precedent).

Further, to the extent that appellant asserted otherwise viable claims for relief with respect to prison conditions, it is unclear that he properly exhausted the grievance process for those claims. Before suing the Department of Corrections or any of its employees, an inmate must exhaust his administrative remedies, unless doing so is futile. NRS 41.0322(1); Abarra v. State, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 3, 342 P.3d 994, 996 (2015); Berry v. Fell, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 37, P.3d (Ct. App. 2015); see also Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that federal law does not require exhaustion when administrative remedies effectively are unavailable). Appellant contends that while some grievances were exhausted, with others he was prevented from exhausting his administrative remedies by respondents' "willful obstruction" and "falsified reports," in that some grievances were treated as duplicative and not addressed or allowed to be resubmitted. But it is not clear from the complaint and other papers which grievances were exhausted, in part because appellant failed to provide a "simple, concise, and direct" statement of the facts, NRCP 8(e)(1), and appellant has not sufficiently alleged that he was prevented from exhausting his administrative remedies. One of the things that appellant must show in seeking to be excused from the exhaustion requirement is "that prison officials screened his grievance or grievances for reasons inconsistent with or unsupported by applicable regulations." Sapp, 623 F.3d at 824. Here, from what can be gleaned from the record, many of appellant's grievances were properly denied as duplicative, untimely, and inappropriate. Further, appellant repeatedly grieved those issues, rather than appealing to the next level as

3

### J.

required by Administrative Regulation 740.03(6) and (8). Accordingly, appellant has not shown that exhaustion is excused. For the above
reasons, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.'

Saitta 

# P lektt. dAP , J. Gibbons Pickering

cc: Hon. Nancy L Allf, District Judge Stanley Earnest Rimer Attorney General/Carson City Eighth District Court Clerk

'In light of this order, we deny appellant's July 21, 2015, motion to supplement his civil proper person appeal statement.

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA 

### 4
(0) 1947A 

### e