UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

N O

. 02-2382

L AR R Y D. B AR R E TT , A PP EL L ANT ,

V

.
E RI C K. S H I N SEKI , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE

.

Be fore GREENE, Chief Judge , and LANCE and SCHOEL EN, Judges

.
O R D E R

The appellant, L arr

y D. B arr ett, throug h counsel, is see king to a ppeal a n Aug ust 15, 2002, Boa rd of Ve tera

ns' Appea ls (B oard) decision t hat denied his claim for disability compensation for post-traumatic str es s d i s o rder (PTSD). The Court re ceive d his Notice of Appe al (NO A) on Dec ember 21, 2002, eig ht da y s bey ond the 120-day time limit se t f orth in 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a)

. On F e b r u ar y 2 0 , 2 0 0 3 , t h e S e c r e t ar

y f i l e d a m o t i o nt o d i s m i s s t h i s a

p p e a l a s u n t i m e l y.

I. F AC TS Even thoug h this matter is only at the thre shold question of j u ri sdiction, the proce dural h i s t o ry i s ex t en s i v e a n d

wi l l o n l y b e s u m m ar i z edh er e. T h e C o u rt o ri gi n al l y re j ec t edt h e ap p el l an t 's reque st to equitably

toll the tim e per iod for filing his NOA based u p o n h is mental condition and dismiss ed this appea l. Barrett v. Principi , No. 02-2382, 2003 WL 21321372 (June 5, 2003). The U.S. Court of Appea ls for the Fe dera l Circuit (Fe dera l Circuit) reve rsed that de cision after concludingthat the Court' s jurisdictional statute was subject to equitable tollin g d u e to mental illness. Barrett v. Principi , 3 63 F .3 d 13 16 , 13 17 (F e d. Cir

. 20 04 ). Th e Court a g a in dis mis se d th is
a pp e a l a ft e r c on c lud ing that th e re wa s in su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt the a pp lic a tio n o f e qu ita

ble to ll in g in th is c a se. Barrett v. Principi , No. 02-2382, 2004 WL1660393 (Jul y 16, 2004). The Fe dera l Circuit reve rsed a g ain and he ld that the Secre tary ' s g ener al duty "to e nsure the r eality

and
a pp e ara nc e of sy ste mic fa ir

ne ss" re qu ir e d h im t o a ssi st the a pp e lla nt i n d e ve lop inge vid e nc e to support his equitable tolling a rgument beca

use no statut e expli citly

prohibited the Secr etar

y from providing such assistance

. Barrett v. Nicholson , 466 F.3d 1038, 1044 ( Fe d. Cir. 2006).

After the Feder al Circuit' s second r emand, the U .S. Supreme Court held in Bo wle s v . R us se ll that f e de ra l c ourt s h a d " no a

uth or ity to c re a te e qu ita

ble e xce pti on s" to t

he jur isd ic ti o n a l re qu ir e me nts set forth in statutes by

Congr ess. 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2366 (20 0 7 ). S u b s eq uently in Hende rson v. Pe ake , this Court concluded that sec tion 7266 was a jurisdictional statute and, ther efor e, Bowles had abr og ated the F eder al Circuit' s equitable tolling jurisprude nce. 22 Vet.App. 217 (2008). Af ter Hende rson , th e a

pp e lla nt f ile d a su pp le me nta l bri e f, arguin g in e sse nc e that hi s d ue pr oc e ss r ig hts2

wer e violated be cause the notice VA provided was constitutionally defic ient in light of his status as a pro se claimant suff

ering from a mental illness a nd proce eding without the protec tion of a guardia n ad litem. Appellant' s Supplemental Br ief (Supp. B r.) at 1.

II. AN AL YSI S

To ob ta in r e vie w i n th is C ourt , a c la ima nt m us t " fi le a no tic e of a pp e a l wi th the Court

wi thi n 120 day s after

the date on which notice of the dec isi o n i s m ai l ed

. " 38 U .S.C. § 7266(a). The appellant attempts to di stinguis h h i s case from the r ece nt line of ca ses on equitable tolling by direc ting the Court to a se ries of Supre me Court case s that held that notice de livered by a mea ns not
re a so na bly c e rt a in t o a fford a c la ima nt s uf fe ri ngfr om a

me nta l il lne ss n oti c e of

a pp e llate ri g hts preve nts a decision from ever being acc orded finality

. See Ap p ellant' s Supp. Br. at 3-5. The Se c re tary argue s th a t th e a

pp e lla nt' s d ue pr oc e ss c la im s ho uld fa il be c a us e the a pp e lla nt wa s c a pa ble of pursuinghis appea l. Secre tary ' s Supp. Br. at 6.

The Fi ft h Amendment to the U.S. Constitut ion provides that: "N o person sha ll . . . be deprive d of life, liber

ty , or prope rty , without due proce ss of law." U.S. Const. amend. V. I n other words, " the Due Proc ess Clause provide s that cer tain substant i v e rig hts—life, liberty , and pro pert y —can no t b e dep ri vedex cept pu rsu ant to con st it ut io nal ly adeq uat e pro cedu res ." Cleveland Bd . o f E du c . v . Lo ud

e rm ill , 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). The appellant c ites to Mul l a n e v. Central H a n o v e r B a n k & Tru st , wher e the Supre me Court stated that " in any proce edingwhich is to be
acc orded f

inality ," the constitution require s "notice rea sonably calc ulated . . . to appr ise intereste d parties of the pende ncy

of the action and afford them an opportunit y to prese nt their objec tions." 339 U.S. 306, 3 14 (1950). The re, the Supreme Court noted that the me thod employ ed to deliver the notice mig ht not alway s ensure , with rea sonable certainty , that the claimant would rece ive the notice, thus givingrise to due pr ocess c oncer ns. Id. at 315. The a

ppellant then dire cts the Court to Covey
v . To wn o f So me rs , 351 U.S. 141 (1956), where the Supreme Court a ddresse d, in the context of a claimant suff

eringfrom a me ntal illness who was without the pro t ec t i o n of a guardia n, the due proce ss c onsiderations set forth in Mullane

. The Supreme Court held that the statutorily presc ribed notice re quirements, which a llowed for notice of for eclosure b y m ai ling, posting , and publication "w ould not affor d notice to the incompete nt and that a takingunder suc h circ umstances wo uld be wi th ou t due p roce ss of l aw. " Id. at 147. He a lso cites to J on es v . F low e rs , 547 U.S. 220, 230 (2006), wher e the Supre me Court note d that, for due proce ss require ments to be satisfied, the g overnme nt may be require d "to consider unique information about an intended rec ipient r eg ardle ss of whethe r a statut or y sc he me is r e a sonab ly cal c ulate d to pr ov ide no tic e in a n o rd ina ry c a se ." Th e Sup re me Court warne d that due proc ess re quired that the g overnme nt provide ade quate notice befor e taking proper ty from a c itiz en who ha d failed to pa y taxes. Jones , 547 U.S. at 234.

Th e a pp e lla nt a lso re lie s up on va

ri ou s c a se s fr om the fe de ra l c ourt s o f a pp e a l to su

pp or t hi s position. The Court notes that the case law relied upon by the appellant here g losses over the c rucia l foundation question of whe ther a n applicant f

or a g overnme nt benef

it has a protec ted prope rty rig ht in the expectation of pot entially rec eiving the bene fits. See , e.g. , Parker v . Calif ano , 644 F.2d 1199, 1201 (6th Cir. 1981). Parker a ssume s th e e xiste nc e of su c h a pr op e rt

y int e re st ba se d up on dic ta in3

Cal ifa no v . S

an de rs , 430 U.S. 99 (1977), a Supre me Court case addre ssing the c auses of action avai l ab l e u n d er the Administrative Procedur e Ac t (APA). Howe ver, a s this C ourt has noted, the Supreme Court has since stated on multiple o cc as i o ns that it has never rec og nized a protec ted proper ty interest in bene fits that have not bee n awa rded. See Edwards v. Peak e , 22 Vet.App. 29, 33 (2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Lyng v. Pay ne , 476 U.S. 926, 942 (1986), and W alters v . National

Ass'n of Radiation Su rv iv or s , 47 3 U. S. 3 05 , 3 20 n. 8 ( 19 85 )) ; se e als o Th urbe r v . B ro wn , 5 Vet.App. 119, 123 ( 1993); but see Ingram v. Nicholson , 21 Vet.App. 232, 254 ( 2007) (sug g esting that due proc ess may at the very least require that an applicant for benefits receive notice that a decision has been ma de on the
c la im)

. Ac c or din g ly , to the e xten t th a t Sa nd e rs stated that the APA doe s not lim it the power of the fe de ra l c ourt s to he ar c on sti tut ion a l c la ims , it c ann ot b e int e rp re te d b ro a dly a s ann ounc inga

pr op e rt y interest in bene fits that have be en denie d.

Even a ssuming an a

pplicant for g overnme nt benef its has a protec ted prope rt y i n tere st, we cannot ig nore the backdr op of ca selaw involvi ng equitable tolling of appea ls or the distinctions betwee n those ca ses and the one s that the appe llant relies on. Parker and its prog eny

did not involve equitably tolling the time to seek inde pendent judicial r eview of Social Security

Adminis t ration (SSA) case s in fe d er al court. Rather , Parker held that due pr ocess mig ht provide re lief whe re a mental disability resulted in " a failure to pr ocee d in a timely fashion from one administrative stage to the next

. " 6 4 4 F

. 2 d

at 1203. Se e als o Penne r v. Schweik er , 701 F.2d 256, 261 ( 3rd Cir. 1983) (rem an d for a

deter mination of whether

the appe llant was able to "pur su[e] his administrative
reme dies" ). Moreove r, equitable tolling of SSA proce eding s beca use of menta l illness based upon due proc ess is not universally acc epted by

fede ral c ourts. See Torre

s v . B ar nh ar t , 417 F.3d 276, 282- 8 3 ( 2 n d C i r

. 2 0 0 5 ) ( Ja c o b s , J. c o n c u r r i n g ) ( ar g u i n g t h a t " [t ]h e r u l e

. . . t h a t e qu i t a

b l e tol lin g is
a va ila ble oth e r t

ha n to c omp e ns a te fo r t

he a g e nc y 's mi sle a din g or c land e sti ne a c tio ns —is inc omp a tib le w i t h w h a th a s b e e nd o n e o r s a i d i ne v e r y o t h e r S e c o n d C i r c u i tc a s e , an d

s p l i t s w i th
e ve ry oth e r c ir c uit ." ); B o o c k v . S ha lal a , 48 F.3d 348, 352- 53 (8th Cir. 1995) (c oncluding that the proce dures a

vailable by

regulation to chall enge pr ior SSA decisions were adequate to satisfy due proce ss).

As in Hende rson , the Court finds the Supreme Court' s g uidance in Bowles to be instructive. The opinion in Bowles clea rly noted that there is a " distinction between c laims-proce ssing r ules and jurisdictional rules." 127 S. Ct. at 2360. As to Congr essionally established time limits for se eking judicial revie w, Bowles made c lear that they fall in the latter c ateg ory

. Id. a t 23 66 ; see Hende rson , 22 Vet.App. at 220 (conc luding that the statutory time limi t on NOAs is not a claims-pr ocessing rule). A lthough Bowles did not expl icitly addre ss due proc ess, it seems unlikely that the Court would have ig nored it if it could require equitable tolling of a fede ral c ourt' s appellate jurisdiction. For example, Bowles noted that the Supreme Court r ejec ted a petition f or cer tiorari that was one day late fr om a prisoner

who was ex ecute d shortly there afte r " without any

Member of

this Court having
even seen hi s p eti ti on ." Bowles , 127 S. Ct

. at 2365 nt. 4. Moreove r, t he appellant does not cite any de c isi on s b y

the F e de ra l Cir c uit

or any oth e r f e de ra l a pp e llate c ourt

a llo wi nga

n o the rw ise un tim e ly
a pp e a l ba se d u

po n e qu ita

ble tol lin g

. I f the fe de ra l court s hav e no t re c og nize d any pr ote c te d in te re st that r e qu ir e s e qu ita

ble tol lin g of the tim e fo r i nd e pe nd e nt j ud ic ia l r e vie w, the n it is v e ry dif fi c ult to4

say that an unre cog ni z ed proper ty interest that has a lrea dy

rec eived two se parate, non-a dversa rial revie ws by

an ag ency

would merit such prote ction.

F ina lly , e ve n if

we we re to c on c lud e that an a pp lic ant f or be ne fi ts h a s a pr ote c te d p ro pe rt y rig ht and that due proce ss c ould be extended from the administrative ar ena to indepe ndent judicial revie w, we c onclude that the a ppellant has not demonstrated that a due proce ss violation occurre d here

. Se e Hi lk

e rt v . W e st , 12 Vet.App. 145, 151 (1999) (en banc) (concluding that appellant ha d the burden of demonstrating err or on appeal). He has not sugg ested what was def icient about the mea

ns VA used to provide notice, nor doe s he sug g est that there wer e additional steps that VA should have taken in this instance. The Court also notes that, althoug h VA in all likeli h ood knew that the ap p el l a n ts u ff

er edfr o m a m en t al i l l n es s (a s h i s cl ai mwa s fo r am en t al i l l n es s an d t h e B o ar d 's decision discussed his various diag nosed mental illnesses at leng th (see L arr y D. B arr ett, BV A 96-18 258A, at 12 (Aug . 15, 2002))) , the appe llant has no t p roffere d evidenc e sug g esting that VA knew that the appellant' s condition rende red him unable to understand the notice provided. See E dwards , 22 Vet.App. at 35 (citing Covey , 3 51 U. S. at 14 6- 47 (n oti c e re ndered in su ffi cie nt whe re it i s provided to a known incompe tent)). F inally , the Court points out t hat the appe llant was re prese nted by a ve te ra ns se rv ic e or g anizatio n at th e B oa rd , a nd he ha s no t a sse rt e d that his re pr e se ntativ e did not rec eive n o t i ce and inform him of his appe llate rig hts. See Dec laration of Mark R. L ippman (" Appellant advise d decla rant that Jim mie C. Donaldson, Veterans Servic e Of fice r of the State of Al a bama , h a d r e c omm e nd e d th a t a pp e lla nt c on ta c t de c lara

nt f or po ssi ble re pr e se ntatio n. " ); se e als o Covey , 351 U.S. at 146 (sug g esting that appointment of repr esentative befor e entr y of judg ment of fore closure f

or a person "without mental capacity to handle her aff airs or to unde rstand the mea ning of any notice ser

ved upon her " mig ht alleviate due proce ss conce rns).

Whil e the Court is sy

mpathetic to the appe llant's de sire for revie w, the appel l ant has not provided a

ny evidenc e t o s upport his contention that a due pr ocess violation occ urre d here . The appellant r emains fr ee to se ek re openingof his claim with new a nd materia l evidence , to seek
rec onsideration of the Boa rd dec ision, or to challeng e the B oard de cision on the basis of cle ar a nd unmistakable er

ror.
Ac c or din g ly , it

is
ORDERED that, Mr. B arr ett ' s a p p e a l o f th e Au g ust 15, 2002, Boar d decision is DI SMI SSED.

DA TE D: May

7, 20 09 PER CU RI AM

.