[Cite as Good v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2016-Ohio-8327.]

{¶1} Before the court are objections filed by defendant Ohio Department of 

Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) to a magistrate’s decision recommending an 

award of damages in favor of plaintiff Darrin C. Good in the amount of $6,025 in Good’s 

negligence action against ODRC. For the reasons explained below, the court overrules 

ODRC’s objections, adopts the magistrate’s decision as its own, and renders judgment 

in favor of Good in the amount of $6,025 on the issue of damages. 

I. Background 

{¶2} On June 27, 2014, the court adopted a magistrate’s decision in favor of 

Good on the issue of liability on Good’s claim of negligence arising from a fall down 

stairs in August 2012 when Good was incarcerated at the London Correctional 

Institution (LoCI). Subsequently, the court, through a magistrate, conducted a trial on 

the issue of damages. On August 17, 2016, the magistrate issued a decision 

recommending judgment in favor of Good, finding that Good “is entitled to damages for 

past pain and suffering in the amount of $6,000” and that he “is also entitled to recover 

the $25 filing fee.” 

DARRIN C. GOOD 

 Plaintiff 

 v. 

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF 

REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION 

 Defendant 

Case No. 2012-08885 

Judge Patrick M. McGrath 

JUDGMENT ENTRY 
Case No. 2012-08885 -2- JUDGMENT ENTRY 

II. ODRC’s Objections to Magistrate’s Decision and Good’s Response 

{¶3} On October 7, 2016, after the court granted ODRC’s motion for an extension 

of time to file objections, ODRC filed written objections to the magistrate’s decision. In 

its objections, ODRC states: “Inasmuch as Good has no lost wages or medical 

expenses, he is only entitled to recover the pain he endured for a short time after his fall 

before completely recovering. He did not require surgery and did not require an 

overnight stay in a hospital.” (Objections at 1.) ODRC “requests this Court find that 

$6,000 in damages is too high and reduce the amount of his award to an amount in line 

with Good’s temporary pain and suffering.” (Objections at 6.) In support of its claim that 

the evidence does not support an award in the amount of $6,000 for pain and suffering, 

ODRC cites to Smith v. Lebanon Corr. Inst., Ct. of Cl. No. 99-11611, 2002-Ohio-1693 

(March 4, 2002) and Smallwood v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 94 Ohio Misc.2d 47, 

703 N.E.2d 360 (Ct. of Cl.1997). ODRC has not expressly identified a legal basis for its 

objection, e.g., whether the magistrate’s decision is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, or whether it is supported by insufficient evidence, or both. Neither has 

ODRC suggested an amount that, in its view, is “in line with Good’s temporary pain and 

suffering.” 

{¶4} ODRC presents this objection: “DRC objects to the pain and suffering award 

of $6,000 because the pain and suffering lasted only a few weeks and Good quickly 

recovered.” (Objections at 3.) 

{¶5} On October 26, 2016, Good submitted a response to ODRC’s objections, 

generally contending that facts support the magistrate’s recommended award because 

they establish that Good was injured and that the recommended award is consistent 

with decisions in similar cases determined by this court. 
Case No. 2012-08885 -3- JUDGMENT ENTRY 

III. Law and Analysis 

A. Civil Rule 53—Objections To A Magistrate’s Decision and Standard of 

Review 

{¶6} Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b) pertains to objections to a magistrate’s decision. In 

accordance with Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i), “A party may file written objections to a 

magistrate’s decision within fourteen days of the filing of the decision, whether or not the 

court has adopted the decision during that fourteen-day period as permitted by 

Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i). If any party timely files objections, any other party may also 

file objections not later than ten days after the first objections are filed.” 

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii) provides, “An objection to a magistrate’s decision shall be 

specific and state with particularity all grounds for objection.” According to 

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii), “An objection to a factual finding, whether or not specifically 

designated as a finding of fact under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), shall be supported by a 

transcript of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate relevant to that finding or an 

affidavit of that evidence if a transcript is not available.” 

{¶7} Civ.R. 53(D)(4) governs a court’s action on objections to a magistrate’s 

decision. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) provides, “If one or more objections to a magistrate’s 

decision are timely filed, the court shall rule on those objections. In ruling on objections, 

the court shall undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain 

that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied 

the law. * * *.” According to Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(b), whether or not objections are timely 

filed, a court “may adopt or reject a magistrate's decision in whole or in part, with or 

without modification.” A magistrate’s decision “is not effective unless adopted by the 

court.” Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(a). 

{¶8} Recently, in Siegel v. State, 2015-Ohio-441, 28 N.E.3d 612, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.) 

the Tenth District Court of Appeals discussed the standard that applies to this court’s 

review of a magistrate’s determination, stating: 
Case No. 2012-08885 -4- JUDGMENT ENTRY 

a. “A magistrate is an arm of the court, not a separate judicial entity 

with independent judicial authority and duties.” State ex rel. DeWine 

v. Ashworth, 4th Dist. No. 11CA16, 2012-Ohio-5632, ¶ 38. The 

Court of Claims still must “undertake an independent review as to 

the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly 

determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law.” 

Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). The court retains the ultimate authority and 

responsibility over the magistrate's findings and rulings. Hartt v. 

Munobe, 67 Ohio St.3d 3, 5-6 (1993). Appellants’ suggestion that a 

magistrate, whether by individual capacity of the magistrate or by 

authorization from the court, is incapable of deciding the facts and 

weighing the credibility of witnesses, lacks merit. In any event, “the 

court remains the ultimate finder of fact, even on matters of 

credibility.” DeWine at ¶ 37. “Although the trial court may 

appropriately give weight to the magistrate’s assessment of witness 

credibility in view of the magistrate’s firsthand exposure to the 

evidence, the trial court must still independently assess the 

evidence and reach its own conclusions.” Sweeney v. Sweeney, 

10th Dist. No. 06AP-251, 2006-Ohio-6988, ¶ 15, citing DeSantis v. 

Soller, 70 Ohio App.3d 226, 233 (10th Dist.1990). 

Mindful of the foregoing law, the court now considers ODRC’s claim that the 

magistrate’s recommended pain-and-suffering award of $6,000 is excessive. 

B. Good’s Pain-and-Suffering Damage Award 

{¶9} In N. Coast Premier Soccer, L.L.C. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 12AP-589, 2013-Ohio-1677, ¶ 17, the Tenth District Court of Appeals 

discussed damages in tort actions, noting: 

b. As a general rule, the appropriate measure of damages in a tort 

action is the amount which will compensate and make the plaintiff 

whole. Pryor v. Webber, 23 Ohio St.2d 104 (1970). The 

fundamental purpose of law is to afford to the person damaged 

compensation for all of the loss sustained when faced with the 

difficulty in determining damages. Martin v. Design Constr. Servs., 

Inc., 121 Ohio St.3d 66, 2009-Ohio-1. A plaintiff “should be neither 

undercompensated nor overcompensated. Ordinarily, the injured 

party must be able to prove not only that he suffered a particular 
Case No. 2012-08885 -5- JUDGMENT ENTRY 

type of injury, but also the pecuniary value thereof.” Columbus Fin., 

Inc. v. Howard, 42 Ohio St.2d 178, 184 (1975). 

{¶10} Absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court has discretion in awarding 

damages. See Roberts v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 75 Ohio St.3d 630, 634, 665 

N.E.2d 664 (1996) (“We will not disturb a decision of the trial court as to a determination 

of damages absent an abuse of discretion”); see also Ketchum v. Hoffman, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 93APE09-1270, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2314, at *18-19 (May 26, 1994) 

(“As to defendant’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion in its damage award to 

plaintiffs, we note initially that an abuse of discretion connotes more than just an error of 

law. It exists where the court’s attitude, evidenced by its decision, was unreasonable, 

arbitrary, or unconscionable. Worthington v. Worthington (1986), 21 Ohio St.3d 73, 488 

N.E.2d 150. Also, the weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the 

witnesses are primarily for the trier of fact. State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 

227 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the syllabus”). 

{¶11} Regarding the reasonableness of an award for pain and suffering, the 

Tenth District Court of Appeals has determined: 

c. In reviewing the reasonableness of a pain and suffering award, a 

court may consider awards given in comparable cases as a point of 

reference, see Hancock v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1987), 39 

Ohio App.3d 77, 85, 529 N.E.2d 937, but ultimately must evaluate 

each case in light of its own particular facts. Id. Given the difficulty 

in calculating pain and suffering damages, reviewing courts 

generally defer such determinations to the trier of fact, [Fantozzi v. 

Sandusky Cement Prod. Co., 64 Ohio St.3d 601, 612, 597 N.E.2d 

474 (1992)], and are reluctant to substitute their judgment. 

Hancock, supra, at 85. Indeed, in no other element of damages is 

there so wide a latitude for awards as in pain and suffering. 

Drayton v. Jiffee Chemical Corp. (C.A.6, 1978), 591 F.2d 352, 370. 

Hohn v. Ohio Dep’t of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 93AP-106, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 6023, at *10-11 (Dec. 14, 1993). 
Case No. 2012-08885 -6- JUDGMENT ENTRY 

{¶12} Here, despite finding that Good exaggerated his level of pain following his 

fall, the magistrate determined: “Plaintiff was plainly injured as a result of the accident * 

* * and consequently suffered temporary pain and suffering.” (Magistrate’s Decision at 

10.) Upon review, the court finds that there is some competent credible evidence to 

support a finding that Good “was plainly injured as a result of the accident.” 

{¶13} The court finds unpersuasive ODRC’s contention that this court should 

modify the magistrate’s recommended damages based on Smith v. Lebanon 

Correctional Institution, Ct. of Cl. No. 99-11611, 2002-Ohio-1693 (March 4, 2002) 

(inmate fell while descending a flight of stairs). In Smith, this court stated: “Balanced 

against the medical testimony provided by Dr. Season, and upon review of all the 

evidence and argument presented, the court finds that plaintiff’s total damages in this 

case amount to $10,000 which include, but are not limited to, wage loss, past and future 

pain and suffering, physical impairment and inability to perform usual activities. 

Plaintiff’s total damages shall be reduced by $5,000, which represents his fifty percent 

contributory negligence.” 

{¶14} It is true, as ODRC notes, that in this case Good’s recommended damages 

for pain and suffering are $6,000 compared with an aggregate award of damages in the 

amount of $10,000 in Smith, which included damages for lost wages, past and future 

pain and suffering, physical impairment, and an inability to perform usual activities. 

Notably, however, as stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit: 

“In no other element of damages is there so wide a latitude for awards as in pain and 

suffering, in view of the individual circumstances of the victims.” Drayton v. Jiffee 

Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352, 370 (6th Cir.1978). See Hohn, supra, 1993 Ohio App. 

LEXIS 6023, at *10 (Dec. 14, 1993) (“An appellate review of the adequacy of a trial 

court's award for noneconomic damages, or pain and suffering, is difficult because no 

specific yardstick, or mathematical rule exists for determining pain and suffering”). In 

this instance, the court concludes that some latitude should be allowed in the 
Case No. 2012-08885 -7- JUDGMENT ENTRY 

determination of pain and suffering damages. While the magistrate’s exercise of 

discretion in awarding pain and suffering damages could have been exercised 

differently, the court is not persuaded that the magistrate’s exercise of discretion 

warrants modification based on Smith. 

{¶15} The court also finds unpersuasive the notion that magistrate’s 

recommended damages should be modified based on Smallwood v. Ohio Dept. of 

Rehab. & Corr., 94 Ohio Misc.2d 47, 703 N.E.2d 360 (Ct. of Cl.1997) (corrections officer 

kicking an inmate in the leg when attempting to awaken the inmate) (finding that the 

plaintiff “has suffered a disabling injury, but that such injury does not have a significant 

effect upon plaintiff’s daily activities” and awarding judgment in the amount of $10,000 

“for past and future pain and suffering”). Smallwood is factually distinguishable as it 

concerns a corrections officer kicking an inmate. The court is not convinced that 

Smallwood warrants modification of the magistrate’s exercise of discretion and the 

recommended amount of damages. 

IV. Conclusion 

{¶16} Wherefore, upon review, the court finds that the magistrate’s determination 

regarding Good’s pain-and-suffering damages following the fall at LoCI is supported by 

some competent credible evidence. The court further finds that the magistrate did not 

lose his way in determining that Good is entitled to $6,000 for his past pain and 

suffering related to ODRC’s negligence and that he is entitled to recover his $25 filing 

fee in this case. The court holds that the magistrate has properly determined the factual 

issues and appropriately applied the law. Therefore, ODRC’s objections are 

OVERRULED and the court adopts the magistrate’s decision and recommendation as 

its own, including findings of fact and conclusions of law contained therein. Judgment is 

rendered on the issue of damages in the amount of $6,025 in favor of plaintiff Good. 

Court costs shall be assessed against defendant ODRC. The clerk shall serve upon all 

parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. 
Case No. 2012-08885 -8- JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 PATRICK M. MCGRATH 

 Judge 

cc: 

Richard F. Swope 

6480 East Main Street, Suite 102 

Reynoldsburg, Ohio 43068 

Lindsey M. Grant 

Stacy L. Hannan 

Assistant Attorneys General 

150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor 

Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130 

Filed November 21, 2016 

Sent to S.C. Reporter 12/22/16