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FILED

JUN 25 2015

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP No. CC-14-1351-DTaKu

)

WILLIAM MICHAEL WATSON, ) Bk. No. 2:12-bk-34557

)

Debtor. )

______________________________)

)

WILLIAM MICHAEL WATSON )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) MEMORANDUM1

)

DAVID ALAN GILL, Chapter 7 )

Trustee, )

)

Appellee. )

______________________________)

Argued and Submitted on June 18, 2015

at Pasadena, California

Filed - June 25, 2015

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California

Honorable Thomas B. Donovan, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

 

Appearances: Michael Gordon York argued for Appellant; Kevin D.

Meek of Danning, Gill, Diamond & Kollitz, LLP

argued for Appellee.

 

Before: DUNN, TAYLOR AND KURTZ, Bankruptcy Judges.

1This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 

Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may

have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. 

See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.
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Chapter 72 debtor William Michael Watson (“Debtor”) appeals 

from the bankruptcy court’s Order Allowing Administrative Claims,

Professional Fees and Expenses, [and] Trustee’s Fees and

Expenses. We AFFIRM.

I. FACTS

The Debtor filed his chapter 7 petition on July 17, 2012. 

Appellee David A. Gill (“Trustee”) was appointed the chapter 7

trustee. On the Debtor’s Schedule A, he listed a one-half

interest in “21 undeveloped acres in Louisiana” (the

“Properties”) which the Debtor valued at $10,000.00. The Debtor

claimed an exemption in the Properties in the amount of

$10,000.00, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure

§ 703.140(b)(1).

The Properties, which comprised two parcels, were co-owned

with the Debtor’s brother, Gary Sherman. The Debtor told the

Trustee that, pursuant to an oral agreement between Mr. Sherman

and the Debtor, Mr. Sherman was to receive one parcel, and the

Debtor was to retain the other. However, the title had not been

changed to reflect such an agreement. When the Trustee expressed

his belief that the Properties might be worth more than their

scheduled value, the Debtor obtained an appraisal, which valued

the Properties at $59,000.00. The Trustee concluded that the

value of the Debtor’s pre-petition interest in the Properties,

2Unless specified otherwise, all chapter, section and rule

references are to the federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-

1532, and to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules

1001-9037. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are referred to

as “Civil Rules.”

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net of his exemption, was $24,500.00.

The Trustee decided to pursue the estate’s interest in the

Properties. To facilitate this, the Trustee hired Danning, Gill,

Diamond & Kollitz, LLP (“Danning Gill”) as his general counsel. 

Danning Gill began its work for the Trustee on January 23, 2013,

but did not file an employment application at that time.

At some point, the Debtor offered to buy the estate’s

interest in the Properties. Negotiations followed between the

Debtor’s counsel and Danning Gill. On June 27, 2013,

approximately five months after Danning Gill’s employment began,

the Trustee filed a motion for authority to settle the matter. 

Under the settlement, the Debtor was to pay $16,550.00 to the

Trustee in exchange for the estate’s interest in the Properties. 

The bankruptcy court approved the settlement on July 24, 2013. 

Seven days later, the Debtor paid the Trustee as agreed. That

$16,550.00 payment constituted the entirety of the estate’s

receipts.

In November 2013, Danning Gill discovered during the

preparation of its final fee application that it never had

requested bankruptcy court approval of its employment. To remedy

this oversight, on November 27, 2013, the Trustee filed an

application to employ Danning Gill nunc pro tunc as of

January 23, 2013 (“Nunc Pro Tunc Application”). In an attached

declaration, Danning Gill attorney Eric P. Israel attributed the

failure to make a timely application to “inadvertence or

oversight.” Mr. Israel further explained that, due to the

protracted nature of the settlement negotiations, he had not

followed his usual procedure for filing employment applications.

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The Debtor opposed the Nunc Pro Tunc Application. In his

accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Debtor did

not challenge Danning Gill’s disinterestedness or any other

criterion for eligibility to serve as general counsel for the

estate. Rather, the Debtor argued that inadvertence or oversight

was insufficient to establish extraordinary circumstances

justifying nunc pro tunc approval of employment.

The Trustee filed a reply memorandum, arguing that the

application should be approved, because Danning Gill had offered

a satisfactory explanation for its delay in submitting an

application, and because Danning Gill’s work had provided a

significant benefit to the estate.

The bankruptcy court set the matter for hearing and entered

a tentative ruling (“Tentative Ruling”). In the Tentative

Ruling, the bankruptcy court proposed to grant the Nunc Pro Tunc

Application over the Debtor’s opposition and stated as follows:

[The Nunc Pro Tunc Application] should be granted

because:

(1) The delay was adequately explained,

(2) The delay was inadvertent,

(3) The delay amounts to harmless error,

(4) The services performed resulted in a significant

benefit to the estate,

(5) Indeed, the services resulted in the only recovery

to the estate,

(6) The fees requested are very reasonable in relation

to the $16,550.00 cash recovery to the estate,

(7) All requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 327 are met by

attorneys, and

(8) But for these services performed at risk to the

attorneys, the estate would have recovered nothing.

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In its Tentative Ruling, the bankruptcy court waived appearances

at the January 9 hearing.

On January 23, 2014, the bankruptcy court entered an order

approving the Nunc Pro Tunc Application (“Nunc Pro Tunc Order”). 

The bankruptcy court noted in the Nunc Pro Tunc Order that it

appeared:

that it is necessary that the Trustee employ Danning,

Gill, Diamond & Kollitz, LLP, and [that] its partners

and employees do not hold or represent any interest

adverse to the Debtor, the creditors, or the estate,

and are disinterested persons as that term is defined

in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) and used in 11 U.S.C. § 327(a),

and that Danning, Gill, Diamond & Kollitz, LLP’s

employment nunc pro tunc is justified in this case[.]

On March 5, 2014, Danning Gill submitted its first and final

fee application (“Fee Application”). Attached to the Fee

Application, Danning Gill provided a narrative of its services,

along with detailed billing records beginning on January 23,

2013. Danning Gill requested total fees of $9,157.00 and expense

reimbursement in the amount of $1,053.47.3

The Trustee submitted his final report and applications for

compensation (“Final Report”) on May 15, 2014. The Final Report

revealed that the balance of funds on hand in the estate amounted

to $15,616.27, all of which were derived from the settlement

between the Debtor and the Trustee.4 The Final Report proposed

3Danning Gill did not charge any fees for the time it spent

responding to the Debtor’s opposition to the Nunc Pro Tunc

Application.

4This figure represents the balance after payment of bank

service fees and fees of Swicker & Associates Accountancy Corp.,

whose compensation had been approved in a prior order.

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payment to the Trustee in the total amount of $2,683.55 for fees

and expenses, and to Danning Gill in the amount requested in the

Fee Application. The remaining $2,722.25 was to be paid to

priority creditors with claims totaling $28,169.41.

The Debtor filed an opposition to the Final Report on

June 17, 2014. In an accompanying memorandum, the Debtor made

two arguments. First, the Debtor argued in general terms that

the fees were unreasonably high in proportion to the estate’s

assets, but the Debtor did not specify any particular charges

that he deemed unreasonable. However, the Debtor’s main reason

for opposing the Final Report was his continuing displeasure with

the bankruptcy court’s Nunc Pro Tunc Order. The Debtor argued

that Danning Gill’s compensation should be limited to the fees it

charged for work done after the entry of the Nunc Pro Tunc Order.

In response to the Debtor’s opposition, the Trustee noted

that the bankruptcy court had already overruled the Debtor’s

objection to the Nunc Pro Tunc Application.

The bankruptcy court scheduled a hearing on the Final Report

for July 2, 2014, and again waived appearances. On July 3, 2014,

the bankruptcy court entered an order allowing the requested fees

(“Compensation Order”). In its Compensation Order, the

bankruptcy court made the following statement regarding the

Debtor’s opposition to the Final Report:

Debtor’s opposition, filed June 17, 2014, to the

Trustee’s Final Report and Applications for

Compensation is overruled, for all the reasons set

forth in the Trustee’s application and in the Trustee’s

reply, filed June 24, 2014, to the Debtor’s opposition. 

The court issued a tentative ruling to grant the

Trustee’s application and excused appearances at the

hearing scheduled on July 2, 2014 at 11:00 a.m. Nobody

appeared at the hearing.

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The Debtor filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the

Compensation Order on July 14, 2014. The Trustee filed a motion

with the BAP to dismiss the Debtor’s appeal for lack of standing. 

The Debtor argued in response that his nondischargeable priority

tax debts constituted a sufficient pecuniary interest to

establish standing. Specifically, the Debtor argued that

reversal of the Compensation Order and reduction of Danning

Gill’s approved fees would increase payments to priority

creditors and lessen his post-bankruptcy obligations. Our

motions panel agreed with the Debtor and denied the motion to

dismiss.

II. JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(A). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 158.

III. ISSUES

1. Whether the Debtor has standing to appeal.

2. Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in

granting the Nunc Pro Tunc Order and the Compensation Order.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the bankruptcy court’s award of attorney fees for

an abuse of discretion. Smith v. Edwards & Hale (In re Smith),

317 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002). A bankruptcy court’s order

approving the employment of professionals nunc pro tunc is

likewise reviewed for abuse of discretion. Atkins v. Wain

(In re Atkins), 69 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1995).

A bankruptcy court abuses its discretion if it applies an

incorrect legal standard or misapplies the correct legal

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standard, or if its factual findings are illogical, implausible

or unsupported by evidence in the record. TrafficSchool.com,

Inc. v. Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 832 (9th Cir. 2011). Only if

the bankruptcy court did not apply the correct legal standard or

improperly applied it, or if its fact findings were illogical,

implausible, or without support in inferences that can be drawn

from facts in the record, is it proper to conclude that the

bankruptcy court abused its discretion. United States v.

Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

We may affirm the decision of the bankruptcy court on any

basis supported by the record. See ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pac. R.

Co., 765 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014); Shanks v. Dressel,

540 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Standing

As a threshold matter, the Trustee renews his argument that

the Debtor lacks standing to bring this appeal. Standing is “a

jurisdictional requirement which remains open to review at all

stages of the litigation.” Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v.

Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255 (1994). Therefore, we consider the

Trustee’s standing argument here.

Standing in bankruptcy appeals exists only for those parties

who are “directly and adversely affected pecuniarily” by the

bankruptcy court’s order. Fondiller v. Robertson

(In re Fondiller), 707 F.2d 441, 442 (9th Cir. 1983); Paine v.

Dickey (In re Paine), 250 B.R. 99, 104 (9th Cir. BAP 2000). A

debtor has standing if the order would “diminish the debtor’s

property, increase his burdens, or detrimentally affect his

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rights.” Paine, 250 B.R. at 99, citing Fondiller, 707 F.2d at

442.

The Trustee argues that the Debtor’s only interest in the

appeal is “speculative” and “tangential.” Appellee Brief at 19. 

The Trustee asserts that reversal by this Panel cannot provide

any possible financial benefit to the Debtor.

We agree with the motions panel’s decision to deny the

motion to dismiss for the reason that the existence of

nondischargeable claims can suffice to confer standing on a

debtor to appeal from orders affecting the size of the estate. 

Cukierman v. Uecker (In re Cukierman), 242 B.R. 486, 488 n.2 (9th

Cir. BAP 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, on other grounds,

265 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2001). As the Trustee points out, the

primary issue in Cukierman was a landlord’s entitlement to an

administrative claim against the estate. In that case, as in

this one, the debtor’s interest in the controversy was the amount

of money that would remain in the estate to pay his priority

creditors. Id. at 488. The Panel held that this was a

sufficient pecuniary interest to confer standing to appeal. It

suffices here as well.

B. The Orders on Appeal

Section 330 provides for compensation of attorneys out of

funds of the bankruptcy estate. Bankruptcy courts may award

“reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services” rendered

by the attorney and “reimbursement for actual, necessary

expenses.” In his opposition to the Final Report, the Debtor

argued that Danning Gill’s fees were unreasonably high in light

of the amount of benefit to the estate and in proportion to the

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estate’s total assets. However, the Debtor makes no such

argument on appeal, and we do not consider the issue, as it is

waived. See Greenwood v. F.A.A., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir.

1994); Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 738 (9th

Cir. 1986). Instead, the Debtor argues that the bankruptcy court

never should have granted the Nunc Pro Tunc Application and that

Danning Gill therefore was not entitled to any compensation for

the services it provided before its employment was approved.

“Failure to receive court approval for the employment of a

professional in accordance with § 327 and Rule 2014 precludes the

payment of fees.” Shirley v. DeRonde (In re Shirley), 134 B.R.

940, 943 (9th Cir. BAP 1992). Therefore, if the bankruptcy court

abused its discretion in granting the Nunc Pro Tunc Order

authorizing Danning Gill’s employment as of January 23, 2013, it

follows that Danning Gill was not entitled to payment for legal

services prior to entry of the Nunc Pro Tunc Order.

Nunc pro tunc employment is available in “exceptional

circumstances.” Atkins, 69 F.3d at 974. To establish such

circumstances, the applicant must (1) give a satisfactory

explanation for the failure to obtain pre-employment approval;

and (2) show that its services conferred a significant benefit on

the bankruptcy estate. Id.; Law Offices of Ivan W. Halperin v.

Occidental Fin. Group, Inc. (In re Occidental Fin. Group, Inc.),

40 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 1994); Okamoto v. THC Fin. Corp.

(In re THC Fin. Corp.), 837 F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir. 1988). The

bankruptcy court considering such an application may also, in its

discretion, rely on other factors, such as those set forth in

In re Twinton Props. P’ship, 27 B.R. 817, 819-20 (Bankr. M.D.

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Tenn. 1983) (see infra at pp. 15-16). Atkins, 69 F.3d at 976. 

Of course, the applicant also must meet the criteria for

employment under § 327. Id.; Mehdipour v. Marcus & Millichap

(In re Mehdipour), 202 B.R. 474, 479 (9th Cir. BAP 1996).

1. Satisfactory Explanation

In its Tentative Ruling on the Nunc Pro Tunc Application,

the bankruptcy court announced its tentative conclusion that the

“delay [in applying for employment] was adequately explained.” 

The Debtor takes issue with this conclusion, arguing that Danning

Gill’s delay was the result of mere negligence, which the Debtor

asserts cannot be a satisfactory explanation. Although

statements in certain decisions of the Panel appear at first

glance to support this contention, a closer examination of these

decisions reveals flaws in the argument.

a. In re Downtown Inv. Club III

In Andrew v. Coopersmith (In re Downtown Inv. Club III),

89 B.R. 59 (9th Cir. BAP 1988), in reversing the bankruptcy

court, the panel commented that “a nunc pro tunc order is

improperly sought” when the delay is due to “mere negligence or

inadvertence,” and that retroactive employment is inappropriate

“where the lateness in seeking court approval . . . is

accompanied by inexcusable or unexplained negligence.” Id. at

63. The panel went on to emphasize that the applicant firm in

that case had not applied for employment under § 327 at all. Id. 

In other words, the firm’s “lateness” was a total failure to seek

authorization of its employment prior to requesting fees. In

addition, a conflict of interest precluded approval of its

application in any event, even if the firm had filed one

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properly. Id. at 64. On the nature of the conflict, the panel

noted, “[a] clearer conflict, representation of both the lender

and the borrower, can hardly be imagined.” Id.

The panel in Downtown Investment did not cite the Ninth

Circuit’s then-recent decision in THC Fin. Corp., which

established the two-part test for exceptional circumstances. The

panel did not specifically address whether the firm’s explanation

for its delay was satisfactory. It did, however, indirectly

address the second THC Fin. Corp. standard, whether the firm’s

services benefitted the estate. The bankruptcy court had

required the party opposing the application to show that the

firm’s services had not provided a benefit, which the panel noted

was an erroneous allocation of the burden of proof. Downtown

Investment, 89 B.R. at 64. In short, the panel predicated its

finding of an abuse of discretion on far more than the “mere

negligence or inadvertence” of the applicant firm in failing to

seek timely approval of its employment.5

b. In re Shirley

The Shirley panel stated in a footnote: “Mere negligence

does not constitute an exceptional circumstance justifying the

entry of a retroactive order [of employment].” Shirley, 134 B.R.

at 943 n.4, citing Credit Alliance Corp. v. Boies (In re Crook),

79 B.R. 475 (9th Cir. BAP 1987). The cited decision, Crook, was

decided before THC Fin. Corp. and Atkins, and did not apply the

5The panel also discussed other problems with the bankruptcy

court’s orders, including lack of notice of the underlying

motions. See also In re Gutterman, 239 B.R. 828 (N.D. Cal. 1999)

(describing the facts of Downtown Investment as “egregious”).

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two-part exceptional circumstances test. Thus, it is of limited

application in analyzing the “satisfactory explanation” element

of that test.

As in Downtown Investment, the Shirley panel does not appear

to have based its decision to any significant extent on the “mere

negligence” issue. Shirley was an appeal in a chapter 11 case in

which the attorney for the debtor in possession made no

application for employment under § 327. Shirley, 134 B.R. at

940. Instead, he filed a “Substitution of Attorney” in the

bankruptcy court, signed by the attorney and the debtor, for

which he neither sought nor received court approval.6 Id. The

primary issue in Shirley was not whether the bankruptcy court

permissibly could have approved the attorney’s employment nunc

pro tunc, which it did not do in any event. Rather, the appeal

concerned the question whether relief from stay was available to

the attorney to pursue his fees in state court. This appears to

have been the panel’s reason for confining the “mere negligence”

discussion, arguably as dicta, in a three-sentence footnote.

c. The current appeal

In his declaration filed in support of the Nunc Pro Tunc

Application, Danning Gill attorney Eric Israel explained that the

firm failed to make a timely application due to “inadvertence or

oversight.” Mr. Israel went on to state that the peculiarities

of the case, and in particular the negotiations over a period of

6The Panel noted that the attorney had prepared an ex parte

application for nunc pro tunc employment, but that application

had not been signed by the debtor or approved by the bankruptcy

court.

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months between Danning Gill and the Debtor’s attorney, had

prevented him from following Danning Gill’s usual procedures to

ensure timely filing. Finally, Mr. Israel declared that the

firm’s mistake was “an isolated incident.” This statement stands

unchallenged in the record on which the bankruptcy court based

its decision.

The bankruptcy court, in its Tentative Ruling, deemed

Danning Gill’s delay in applying for approval of its employment

“inadvertent” and “harmless.” These characterizations find

support in the record, as does the bankruptcy court’s statement

that “the delay was adequately explained.” The above-discussed

cases, which involved much more serious lapses on the part of the

applicants, do not preclude such a conclusion.

This is not to say that the bankruptcy court was required to

find this explanation satisfactory. If, in the exercise of its

discretion, the bankruptcy court had arrived at an opposite

conclusion, we would be disinclined to reverse. However, the

bankruptcy court, by virtue of its proximity to the circumstances

of the litigation and its acquaintance with the quality of

Danning Gill’s practice in general, was in the best position to

evaluate Danning Gill’s explanation. See Pincay v. Andrews,

389 F.3d 858, 859 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (trial court is in

best position to evaluate law firm’s explanation of its mistake). 

In these circumstances, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its

discretion when it determined that Danning Gill satisfactorily

explained its failure to make a timely application.

2. Significant benefit to the estate

There appears to be no dispute that Danning Gill’s services

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to the Trustee resulted in a significant benefit to the

bankruptcy estate. Indeed, the settlement Danning Gill

negotiated with the Debtor was the sole source of funds for the

estate. As the bankruptcy court noted in its Tentative Ruling,

“the services [provided by Danning Gill] resulted in the only

recovery to the estate[.]”

3. Other factors

The Ninth Circuit has held that a bankruptcy court, in the

exercise of its discretion in deciding whether to grant a nunc

pro tunc employment application, may, but need not, consider

additional factors, including those enumerated in Twinton

Properties. Atkins, 69 F.3d at 976. The Twinton Properties

factors are:

1. The debtor, trustee or committee [to whom or to

which the services were rendered] expressly contracted

with the professional person to perform the services

which were thereafter rendered;

2. The party for whom the work was performed approves

the entry of the nunc pro tunc order;

3. The applicant has provided notice of the

application to creditors and parties in interest and

has provided an opportunity for filing objections;

4. No creditor or party in interest offers reasonable

objection to the entry of the nunc pro tunc order;

5. The professional satisfied all the criteria for

employment pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 327 and [Rule 2014]

of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure at or

before the time services were actually commenced and

remained qualified during the period for which services

were provided;

6. The work was performed properly, efficiently, and

to a high standard of quality;

7. No actual or potential prejudice will inure to the

estate or other parties in interest;

8. The applicant’s failure to seek pre-employment

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approval is satisfactorily explained; and

9. The applicant exhibits no pattern of inattention or

negligence in soliciting judicial approval for the

employment of professionals.

Twinton Properties, 69 B.R. at 819-20, quoted in Atkins, 69 F.3d

at 974.7

Although the bankruptcy court’s Tentative Ruling did not

make explicit reference to Twinton Properties, a number of the

court’s observations correspond to Twinton Properties factors.

The bankruptcy court’s remark that “the delay amounts to

harmless error” is consistent with the seventh Twinton Properties

factor, regarding lack of prejudice to the estate or other

parties in interest. The Debtor does not argue that he suffered

any prejudice from Danning Gill’s delay in submitting its

application. Although the estate would be left with more money

in the absence of Danning Gill’s fees, it does not follow that

the delay in the application prejudiced the estate or the Debtor. 

If Danning Gill had applied timely, the situation would have been

no different for the Debtor or for the estate. Indeed, Danning

Gill did not charge any fees for its work in responding to the

Debtor’s opposition to the Nunc Pro Tunc Application. Thus, even

though the episode resulted in more work for Danning Gill, it did

not diminish the estate’s assets.

The bankruptcy court also found that Danning Gill’s fees

7The Twinton Properties court presented these nine items as

required criteria that must be satisfied before nunc pro tunc

approval can be granted. However, under Atkins, they are simply

factors that the bankruptcy court may consider in its discretion,

although some of the factors overlap with the required elements

of the two-part THC Financial Corp. test.

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were “very reasonable in relation to the $16,550.00 cash recovery

to the estate[.]” This corresponds to the sixth Twinton

Properties factor, which concerns the quality and efficiency of

the professional’s work. Similarly, the observation that “but

for [the] services performed at risk to the attorneys, the estate

would have recovered nothing” speaks to the quality and

efficiency of Danning Gill’s performance.

The ninth Twinton Properties factor, lack of a pattern of

inattention or negligence on the part of the professional, was

not discussed in the bankruptcy court’s Tentative Ruling, but it

was mentioned in Mr. Israel’s declaration. Mr. Israel referred

to his firm’s mistake as “an isolated incident.” The need to

deter attorneys from neglecting the requirements of § 327 is less

pressing when there is no reason to fear that the firm will

repeat its mistake in the future. See In re Gutterman, 239 B.R.

at 831.

The bankruptcy court was not required to consider any of

these factors in reaching its decision. However, it properly

exercised its discretion by doing so.

4. Requirements of § 327

“Applying for nunc pro tunc approval does not alleviate the

professional from meeting the requirements of § 327; the

professional still must show that it was disinterested.” 

Mehdipour, 202 B.R. at 479. After stating in its Tentative

Ruling that Danning Gill met all requirements of § 327, the

bankruptcy court found in its Nunc Pro Tunc Order that Danning

Gill and its partners and employees did “not hold or represent

any interest adverse to the Debtor, the creditors, or the estate,

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and [were] disinterested persons as that term is defined in

11 U.S.C. § 101(14) and used in 11 U.S.C. § 327(a)[.]” The

Debtor does not dispute this conclusion, and the record supports

it.

VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Nunc Pro Tunc

Order was not an abuse of the bankruptcy court’s discretion. 

Consequently, we conclude that the Compensation Order also was

not an abuse of discretion. We AFFIRM.

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