J-S70026-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SHAWN MOSES

Appellant No. 185 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 4, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003521-2012

BEFORE: OLSON, J., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2016

Shawn Moses brings this appeal from the judgment of sentence 

imposed on December 4, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 

County. Moses was found guilty by a jury of firearms not to be carried 

without a license, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1), a felony of the third degree, and 

carrying firearms on public streets or public property in Philadelphia, 18 

Pa.C.S. § 6108, a misdemeanor of the first degree. The trial court 

sentenced Moses to three to six years’ incarceration on the charge of 

firearms not to be carried without a license, and four years of reporting 

probation on the charge of carrying firearms on public streets or public 

property in Philadelphia. The sole claim raised by Moses is a challenge to 

the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his firearms convictions. Based 

upon the following, we affirm.
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The facts underling this appeal were summarized by the trial court:

On March 2, 2012, around 10:30 P.M., [Moses] was arrested on 

[the] 100 block of Edgewood Street in the City and County of 

Philadelphia. Under his clothing [Moses] had a 9 millimeter 

Glock handgun which contained ten (10) 9 millimeter Luger 

rounds of ammunition at the time of his arrest. A stipulation by 

and between counsel allowed Exhibit C-11, the Firearms 

Identification Unit (FIU) report, to be moved into evidence. The 

FIU report stated that the handgun had a four (4) inch barrel 

and was operable. A certificate of non-licensure from the 

Pennsylvania State Police was also stipulated to and admitted 

into evidence as Exhibit C-12. At trial, [Moses] testified that he 

purchased the firearm in Georgia and went through a 

background check and registry. [Moses] confirmed he did not 

have a license to carry a firearm in Pennsylvania nor Georgia.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/22/2016, at 2.

Our review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is well 

established:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [this] test, we 

may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the 

fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt 

may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so 

weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of 

fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, 

the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually 

received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while 

passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the 

evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the 

evidence.
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Commonwealth v. Lopez, 57 A.3d 74, 79 (Pa. Super. 2012).

Moses’s sufficiency challenge rests on his claim he believed the gun he 

purchased in Georgia did not require a permit and therefore he believed he 

was excused from obtaining a license in Pennsylvania. Specifically, he 

asserts:

[Moses] testified that he purchased the gun in Georgia. He 

maintained that the gun was legally purchased in Georgia. He 

maintained that according to Georgia law, he was entitled to 

possess the gun without a license. [Moses] testified that he had 

brought the gun to a photography and recording studio where he 

worked. The gun was used as a prop for a photograph. At the 

time of his arrest, he was returning to his home. He kept the 

gun at home for protection, but he was going to store it in a 

safe.

[Moses] testified that he believed that as a matter of fact the 

gun was legal.

Moses’s Brief at 15.

To address Moses’s argument, we turn to the Pennsylvania Crimes 

Code provisions at issue, 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6106 and 6108.

Section 6106 of the Crimes Code provides: “A person who carries a 

firearm in any vehicle or a person who carries a firearm concealed on or 

about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of business, 

without a valid and lawfully issued license under this chapter commits a 

felony of the third degree.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1). Therefore, the 

Commonwealth must prove (a) that the weapon was a firearm; (b) that the 

firearm was unlicensed; and (c) that where the firearm was concealed on or 
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about the person, it must be outside his home or place of business.

Commonwealth v. Lopez, 565 A.2d 437, 439 (Pa. 1989). Section 6106(b) 

enumerates sixteen exceptions to Section 6106(a). 

Moses was also convicted under Section 6108 of the Crime Codes, 

which provides:

No person shall carry a firearm, rifle or shotgun at any time 

upon the public streets or upon any public property in a city of 

the first class unless:

(1) such person is licensed to carry a firearm; or

(2) such person is exempt from licensing under section 

6106(b) of this title (relating to firearms not to be carried 

without a license).

18 Pa.C.S. § 6108. 

Because neither Section 6106 nor 6108 provide the requisite intent, 

the specific mens rea is that which is provided in 18 Pa.C.S. § 302. Section 

302 states that “[w]hen the culpability sufficient to establish a material 

element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if 

a person act intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(c). 

Pursuant to Section 302(b)(3):

A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an 

offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and 

unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result 

from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree 

that, considering the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct

and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a 

gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable 

person would observe in the actor’s situation.

18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(3). Recklessness may be demonstrated by 
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circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Hogan, 468 A.2d 493, 496 

(Pa. Super. 1983).

Moses asserts that his testimony demonstrates a “mistake of fact” that 

disproves the required element of criminal intent, and therefore the 

Commonwealth has failed to prove all the elements of the crimes charged 

against him. However, because this sufficiency challenge is based on 

Moses’s own self-serving assertions, which the jury was free to disregard, it 

is unavailing. See Commonwealth v. Sinnott, 30 A.3d 1105, 1110–1111 

(Pa. 2011). 

Furthermore, Moses’s belief “that the gun was legal”1is a mistake of 

law, which is not a defense. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 304, Official Comment 

(“Generally speaking, ignorance or mistake of law is no defense.”); 

Commonwealth v. Henderson, 938 A.2d 1063, 1067 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(“[I]it is axiomatic that ignorance of the law is not a defense.”). 

Here, Moses does not claim, for instance, that he believed a document 

he possessed was a valid license, when it was not — which would be a 

“mistake of fact.” Rather, Moses’s claim is he believed he did not need to 

have a Pennsylvania gun license, because he believed he did not need one in 

____________________________________________

1 Moses’s Brief at 15.
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Georgia.2 Even if reasonable, Moses’s subjective belief that he was excused 

from obtaining a Pennsylvania license is a “mistake of law” that does not 

provide a defense to the charged firearms offenses.

While Moses relies on Pennsylvania’s reciprocity agreement with 

Georgia, his reliance is misplaced. Section 6109(k) provides that “[t]he 

Attorney General may enter into reciprocity agreements with other states 

providing for mutual recognition of each state’s license to carry a 

firearm.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6109(k) (emphasis added). Further, Pennsylvania’s 

reciprocity agreement provides that Pennsylvania will recognize “valid 

permits to carry concealed firearms held by Georgia permit holders while 

said permit holders are present in Pennsylvania,” and that “[r]eciprocity 

applies only to the carrying of firearms by valid license holders and not to 

other types of weapons.” Attorney General’s Letter Re: Handgun Permit 

Reciprocity between Pennsylvania and Georgia, 10/28/2002 (emphasis 

____________________________________________

2 Moses cites Georgia statutes, O.C.G.A. 16-11-126 and 16-11-129, in 

arguing he believed a permit was unnecessary under Georgia law. However, 

the statute permits the carrying of an unlicensed handgun on a public street 

only if the firearm is enclosed in a case and unloaded. See O.C.G.A. § 16-

11-125(c). Here, Moses’s conduct of carrying a loaded handgun without a 

case would violate Georgia law.
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added).3 Here, because Moses did not have a Georgia license, Section 

6109(k) is inapplicable. 

Likewise, Moses’s citation to the exception set forth at Section 

6106(b)(15)4fails. That Section applies to a person “who possesses a valid 

and lawfully issued license or permit to carry a firearm which has been 

issued under the laws of another state,” which is not the situation presented 

here. 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(b)(15) (emphasis added).

Finally, even if Moses had possessed a valid Georgia gun license, he 

still would have needed a Pennsylvania gun license. This Court has held that 

“a Pennsylvania resident who does not have a valid Pennsylvania license 

issued under the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act may not carry a firearm 

____________________________________________

3https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/Media_and_Resources/Firearm_Reciprocit

y_Agreements/

4 Section 6106(b)(15) provides an exception to Section 6106(a):

Any person who possesses a valid and lawfully issued license or 

permit to carry a firearm which has been issued under the laws 

of another state, regardless of whether a reciprocity agreement 

exists between the Commonwealth and the state under section 

6109(k), provided:

(i) The state provides a reciprocal privilege for individuals 

licensed to carry firearms under section 6109.

(ii) The Attorney General has determined that the firearm 

laws of the state are similar to the firearm laws of this 

Commonwealth.

18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(b)(15).
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in a vehicle or concealed on or about his person in Pennsylvania under the 

authority of a permit issued by another state that has reciprocity with 

Pennsylvania.” Commonwealth v. McKown, 79 A.3d 678, 687 (Pa. Super. 

2013). 

Here, Moses admitted he was a Pennsylvania resident and that he did 

not have a Pennsylvania gun license. He was carrying a concealed firearm 

on the streets of Philadelphia. As such, the evidence was sufficient to 

convict Moses of violations of Sections 6106(a)(1) and 6108. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/17/2016