SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

989 

CA 16-00139 

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., PERADOTTO, NEMOYER, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ. 

 

JEAN GREFRATH, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MICHAEL A. DEFELICE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND DOING 

BUSINESS AS MICHAEL ANTHONY’S SALON, EVELYN MAGER, 

INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF 

LEO S. MAGER, DECEASED, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS,

ET AL., DEFENDANT. 

 

SHAW & SHAW P.C., HAMBURG (BLAKE ZACCAGNINO OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.

RODGERS LAW FIRM, BUFFALO (MARK C. RODGERS OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT MICHAEL A. DEFELICE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND DOING 

BUSINESS AS MICHAEL ANTHONY’S SALON. 

NASH CONNORS, P.C., BUFFALO (JAMES J. NASH OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT EVELYN MAGER, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS EXECUTRIX OF

THE ESTATE OF LEO S. MAGER, DECEASED. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Genesee County (Robert

C. Noonan, A.J.), dated May 20, 2015. The order granted the motion of

defendant Michael A. DeFelice, individually and doing business as

Michael Anthony’s Salon, and the cross motion of defendant Evelyn

Mager, individually and as executrix of the Estate of Leo S. Mager,

deceased, for summary judgment. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion and cross

motion are denied, and the complaint and cross claims are reinstated

against defendants-respondents. 

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages

for injuries she allegedly sustained when she tripped and fell from a

step near the front entrance to commercial premises rented by

defendant Michael A. DeFelice, individually and doing business as

Michael Anthony’s Salon, and owned by Leo S. Mager, who is now

deceased. Plaintiff contends that Supreme Court erred in granting the

motion of DeFelice and the cross motion of defendant Evelyn Mager

(Mager), individually and as the executrix of Leo Mager’s estate, for

summary judgment dismissing the complaint and any cross claims against

them. We agree. “[W]hether a dangerous or defective condition exists

on the property of another so as to create liability depends on the
-2- 989 

CA 16-00139 

particular facts and circumstances of each case and is generally a

question of fact for the jury” (Trincere v County of Suffolk, 90 NY2d

976, 977 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Hutchinson v Sheridan

Hill House Corp., 26 NY3d 66, 77). In view of the pertinent “factors

that may render a physically small defect actionable” (Hutchinson, 26

NY3d at 78; see Trincere, 90 NY2d at 977-978), we conclude that

DeFelice and Mager (defendants) failed to sustain their burden of

establishing as a matter of law the absence of any defect with the

step (see Lupa v City of Oswego, 117 AD3d 1418, 1419; Belsinger v M&M

Bowling & Trophy Supplies, Inc., 108 AD3d 1041, 1042; Powers v St.

Bernadette’s R.C. Church, 309 AD2d 1219, 1219). In any event, we

conclude that, in opposition to the motion and cross motion, plaintiff

raised a triable issue of fact concerning the existence of a defect by

submitting evidence that there were no markings on the step or

differences in color between the step and the sidewalk (see Saretsky v

85 Kenmore Realty Corp., 85 AD3d 89, 92-93; see generally Belsinger,

108 AD3d at 1043; Rachlin v 34th St. Partnership, Inc., 96 AD3d 690,

691). Furthermore, the step was located in or very near a doorway,

“where a person’s attention would be drawn to the door, not to the

[step]” (Tesak v Marine Midland Bank, 254 AD2d 717, 718; see generally

Belsinger, 108 AD3d at 1043; Powers, 309 AD2d at 1219).

We further conclude that the court erred in determining that

plaintiff’s inattention to the step upon exiting the premises was the

sole proximate cause of her injuries as a matter of law inasmuch as

defendants “failed to establish that plaintiff’s fall was unrelated to

the alleged defect” (Powers, 309 AD2d at 1219; cf. Geloso v Castle

Enters., 266 AD2d 849, 849). Thus, “while plaintiff may have been

comparatively negligent in failing to observe the step or in failing

to remember that the step was there, any such comparative negligence

would not serve to ‘negate the liability of the . . . landowner[,] who

has a duty to keep the premises safe’ ” (Powers, 309 AD2d at 1219-

1220; see Vereerstraeten v Cook, 266 AD2d 901, 901).

Entered: November 18, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court