REF ID:A38396 

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I 

LECTURE V 

HISTORY OF THE INVENTION AND DEVELOHllENT OF CIPHER DEVICES AND MACHI.NF.$. 

Three or four years ago I was asked to give a lecture before the Communications-Electronics Division of the Air University, USAF, on the subject of 

communications security (COMSEC). 

About that time there was 'hP r "o:s..ui.i.ered into our ears over the radio a 

slogan concerned wi+~ 

..... " 

~oile traffic safety rules • 

ThE" o1iugta.n. was: "Don't learn your traffic laws by accident!" 

I thought the slogan useful. as the title of my talk but l modified it a 

little: "Don't learn your COMSEC laws by accident•" 

I began my talk by reading Webster's definition of the word accident. 

I know, of course, that this group here today is not concerned particularly 

with COMSEC duties of any sort. But the definition of the word accident will 

nevertheless be of interest 11l connection with what will be said in a moment or 

two, so I'll read Webster's definition if you'll bear with me. 

Webster: "Acc:ulent" - literally, a be:talling. ~ 

'\ 

An event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation, ) '\;r 

a. 

an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event. 

@'pp roved for Release by NSA on 10-10-2013 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 
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b Hence, often, an undesigned and unforeseen occurrence of an 

afflictive or unfortunate character, a llll.Shap resulting in injury to a person or 

damage to a thing, a casualty, as to die by an accident 

Having defined the word, I'll now proceed by relating an interesting, minor, 

but nevertheless quite important episode of the war in the Pacific Theatre during 

WWII, and I will introduce the acrount of that episode by saying that: 

During the W'lr, the President of the United States, Chief of' Sta.ff of the 

Ar1ff3'1 the Commander-in-Chief' of the U.S. Fleets, and certain other high officers of 

Government journeyed several times half-way around the world to attend special 

meetings and conferences They apparently could go with safety almost anywhere--

they met with no 11 accident". On the other hand, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief 

of' the Combined FJ.eet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, went on an inspection trip in 

April 19~3, the sequel to which may be summarized by an official Japanese Navy 

Department communique reading in pa.rt as follows: "The Commander in Chief' of the 

Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, died an heroic death in April of' this 

year, in air combat with the enemy while directing operations from a forward position." 

As is often the case, the comm.unique didn't tell the whole truth: Yamamoto 

didn't die "in air combat with the enemy while directing operations" - be met 

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with an 11 accident 11 • I don't know who first used the following terse statement 

but it's decidedly applicable in this case: "accidents don't happen--they•re 

brought about!" Our Navy communication intelligence people were reading the 

Japanese Navy's high command messages, they had Yamamoto•s schedule to the day, 

hour and minute that Yamamoto would leave Truk.,1he time he woul.d arrive at Buka 

and leave 'Buka for Ka.hill.i or Ball.a1e, they also knew what his escort wouJ.d be 

and so on. It was relatively easy to bring about the 11 accident 11 • Our top 

Commander-in-Chief journeyed with saf'ety because the communications connected 

with his various trips were secure, the Japanese CQ1D1D8nder-in-Chief journeyed 

in peril because his communications were insecure His death was no accident 

in the dictionary sense ot that word, it was brought about. 

The Yamamoto incident later gave rise to a somewhat amuaing exchange of 

top secret telegrams between Tokyo and Washington, and after the war was all over 

these telegrams turned up in The Forrestal Diaries, Chapter III, pp. 86-87. 

Extract from the "Forrestal Diaries," Chapter III, "Foretaste of the Cold 

War, 11 pp. 86 and 87. 

The formal surrender took pl.ace on the deck ot the USS Missouri in Tak.yo 

Bay on September 2. The mO()d ot sudden relief from long and breaking tension is 

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exempJ.ified by an amusing exchange a f'ew days J.ater of' "Urgent: Top Secret" 

teJ.egrams which ForrestaJ. put into his diary. In the enthusiasm at victory 

someone J.et out the story of how, in J.943, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the Japanese 

navaJ. commander-in-chief' and architect of the PearJ. Harbor attack, had been 

intercepted and shot down in f'l.ames as a resuJ.t of' the American abiJ.ity to read 

the Japanese codes. It was the first pubJ.ic reveJ.ation of' the work at the 

cryptanalytic divisions, and it brought an anguished cab1e from the inteJ.ligence 

unit already engaged at Yokohama in the interrogation of' Japanese nava1 officers: 

"Yamamoto story in "this morning's paper has pl.aced our activities in very ditticuJ.t 

position. Having meticuJ.ously conceaJ.ed our special knowledge we have become 

ridicuJ.ous. 11 They were even then questioning the Japanese atficer who had been 

responsible for these codes, and he was hinting that in face of' this disclosure 

he wouJ.d have to commit suicide. The cabJ.e continued: "This officer is giving 

us vaJ.uable inf or:mation on Japanese crypto systems and channels and we do not 

want him or any of' our other promising prospects to commit suicide until after 

next week when we expect to have millted them dry • It 

Washington answered with an "Operationa1 Priority: Top Secret" dispatch" 

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"Your lineal. position on the list of those who are embarrassed by the Yamamoto 

story is five thousand six hundred ninety two A1l of the people over whose dead 

bodies the story was going to be publishhed have been buried. A1l possible schemes 

to local.ize the damage have been considered but none appears workable. Suggest 

that only course for you is to deny knowledge of the story and say you do not 

understand how such a fantastic tale could have been invented. This might keep 

your friend happy until suicide time next week, which is about al.l that can be 

expected II 

But not many years passed before the Japanese began to realize what bad 

happened to them in the cryptologic battles of World War II. For example: 

"Rear Admiral Tomekichi Nomura, the last CNC in the Japanese Navy, said: 

•• Not only have we been beaten in the decisive battles of this 

war but also we lost the conmunications war. We f'elt foolishly secure and failed 

to take adequate measures to protect our own communications on one hand while on 

the other we failed to succeed in breaking into the eneJDiY's traffic. This is 

undoubtedly one of the major reasons f'or our losing battles, and in turn one of 

the major contributing factors to the loss Of the war. We failed in communications • 11 

It Our Navy was being defeated in the battle of radio waves. Our 

cards were bad, and the enemy could read our hand. No wonder we could not win 

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in this poker game!" 

YOKOI, Toshiyuki - The Stary of the Japanese Naval Black Chamber. 

Books recently published in Japan by former Japanese military and naval 

of'f'icers come out quite openly with statements attributing their defeat to 

poor COMS:BX: on their pa.rt and excellent COMINT on our part. 

~ f'rom Midway book 

Lest you infer that our side didn't meet with any COMSEC "accidents' 1 let 

me say that we had plenty--but these were not attributable to serious weaknesses 

in our COMS:BX: devices, machines, and ru1es but to human failure to follow the 

• 

rul.es implicitly, or--and this hurts in saying it--to weaknesses in the COMSEC 

devices, machines and rules of' some of our allies. 

Take, f'or instance, the heavy losses the U.S. Army Air Corps sustained in 

their air strikes on the Ploesti oil f'iel.ds in southeastern Europe. We lost 

several hundred big bombers because of' weaknesses we didn't realize existed in 

Russian communications. Those big raids constituted field days for the German 

fighter c()JDID8nds--because merely by T/A work, and simple at that, they knew 

exactly when and where our bombers were headed' When we found out, 1 t was too 

late! 

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This incident leads me to say that the COMSEC weaknesses of our allies and 

friends even today leads to a rather serious illness which attlicts our high-level 

authorities tram time to time. I've given the disease a name: Cryptologic 

schizopbl'enia. 

It devel.ops when one is torn between an overweening des ire to continue to 

read friendly traffic by cryptanalytic operations when one knows that that tratf'ic 

should be made secure against one•s enemies! 

Thus far, no real psychiatric or psychoanalytic clll'e has been found for 

the il.lness • The powers that be have decreed that the illness will be avoided by 

the simple ruling that COMSEC interests wil.l always over-ride suppressed COMINT 

wishes. 

You will understand that this problem is a rather serious one in connection 

with our rel.ations with certain ot our allies in NATO. I may add that U.S. and U.K. 

physicians coll.aborate very closely in treating their own patients for the 

cryptol.ogic schizophrenia and in applying remedies where possible in bolstering 

COMSEC weaknesses in NATO. 

Today we are going to see some slides which will mark and illustrate important 

miJ.estones in the history of the invention and development of cipher devices, cipher 

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machines, cipher apparatus, and, if there is time, ruJ.es for establishing and 

maintaining COMSEC. 

The need far these things arose as a conseQllence of the constantly increasing 

necessity far mare security in military and diplomatic communications, more 

especially after the advent of telegraph, cable, and radio communications 

subsequent to the discoveries of the pioneers in the field of' el.ectrical. invention 

and development. 

It soon became obvious that the so-called "pencil and paper" cipher systems--

and a little later, the so-called "hand-operated" cipher devices--had to give way 

to machines and mechanical, mechanico-el.ectrical, and now, to electronic machines 

As mechanization and automation progresses in our civilization, similar progress 

has to follow in communications, especially in mil.itary, naval., air and diplomatic 

communications 

The earliest picture of a cipher disk, from Alberti Trattati in cifra, 

Rome, c. 147"5 "Oldest tract on cryptography the world now possesses." 

45.2 

- The Myer disk, patented J.4 Nov 1865. 

45 4 - The Alberti Disk reincarnated in tlle U S. Army Cipher Disk of 1914-18 

Somebody once said that the very nice looking document with seal and red 

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ribbon that is issued when the u.s Patent Office grants a ,Pa.tent is nothing 

but a fine looking invitation to participate in a lawsuit for inf'ringem.ent. But 

the person being hurt by infringement upon his patent must be alive to file the 

suit--or at least his heirs and/or assignees should be alive I doubt however 

that Al.berti or his heirs and/or assignees were alive to contest this patent, 

issued in 1924, for a cipher disk practically identical. with Alberti's disk of 

1470! 

The cipher disk fl.Il&lly pa.tented in 1924 -- Huntington Patent. Shows that 

the Patent Ottice does not have general inf'orma.tion on cryptography because of 

the secrecy involved. 

!±.ll 

Cipher disk used by Nazis in 1936. 

48 

Original Wheatstone cipher device (invented and described in 1879). First 

important improvement on the Alberti disk 

The modif'ied Wheatstone cipher device Produced by the British Army 1917-18 

but never used because of solution by Wm F. Friedman -- story of solution. 

49.1 

The Decius Wadsworth cipbher device (invented and built in 1817 when Colonel 

Decius Wadsworth was Chief' of' Ordnance). 

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49.4 

The Ba.zeries cryptographe cylindrique {l9f/Jl) as shown in his book "Les 

chiff'res secrets devoiles". But he may have described this in his article 

"Cryptograph a 2S rondelles-alphabets" Comptes rendus, Ma.rselles, 1891. 

~ Bazeries, Etienne. 

First page at Jefferson's description of "The Wheel Cipher" 

2s.1 

Second page at Jefferson's description showing his calculation of the 

number of permutations afforded. 

J.6S.l 

Original model of Bitt•s strip cipher (The Star Cipher). 

5'4 4 ~Parker Hitt•s model of strip cipher (1916) Story of solution at Riverbank 

Laboratories at test :messages prepared by Mt-s. Hitt. 

159.l 

The first six messages and their plain texts of Mauborgne's set of 25 challenge 

messages. 

5s.2 

U.S. Army Cipher Device M-94. 

5s.5 

Early attempts to use cylindrical cipher device principle but with variable 

alphabets (M-136) 

50 6 (M-137) 

5f/J. 7 (M-138-Tl) 

2f/J.8 (M-138) 

5f/J ll (Folding M-138) -10-
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5'5 .J.2 

U S. Army cipher device, Type M-138-A {with Russian legends). Story of 

Russian legends and how they came to be there. 

European model of strip cipher 

g European model disassembled Syko strip cipher. Court awards.,..35,9J09J to 

"inventor". 

The Kryha cipher machine. 

A German mathematical dissertation on the Kryha 

Merely number of permutations and combinations a given machine a.f'f ords like --

bas nothi.Dg to do with the case or at least not much. Depends on nature of 

permutations and combinations, what they are cryptographically. For instance, the 

principle of' monoalphabetic substitution as in Gold Bug - 26! cipher alphabets 

or the large number:- ~9J3,291,461,J.26,69J5,63~,5811-,9J9J0,9J9J0 

quad/trillions/billions millions 

(Four hundred and three quadrillions, two hundred ninety-one thousand, f'our 

hundred and sixty-one trillions, 

One hundred twenty-six 1housand, six hundred and f'ive billions, 

Six hundred thirty-f'ive thousand. five hundred and eighty-four millions--

"and a frew" • 

Estimated would take 1000 million men working a thousand million years to do the 

major part of writing these alphabets out -- scroll would reach from earth beyond 

the planet Mercury• 

All the preceding examples of cryptographic aids are in the category of what 

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may be termed "pencil and paper" or 11ha.nd-operated" aids. These, ot course, had 

to give way to more rapid and more secure means f'or crypto-camnunications, and this 

meant machines of one sort or another. There was pressing need in the mlitary and 

naval. services for ~ machines: 

1. A sma.11 ma.chine for low echelon or field use. 

2. A larger machine for rear echelon and high-command use. 

Let•s take up the first of these two types. 

171.l 

J.71 

- M-161 Signal Corps model made at Fort Monmouth (Efforts to develop :field 

machine and tell story re obtuse director aJ: S .C. Labs • Note power source. 

Boris C • W. Hagelin 

1s.i 

~ Converter M-209. 

l 

1LI. 

Does a "hysteron-proteron" in inventing C-36. 

Example of' American resourcefuJ.ness and skill under difficul.ties Two GI 1 s in 

Italy mechanize the M-2s9. (The cartoon, showing a couple of' GI's with a home ma.de 

still, and the legend: "Yes, but will it work'l") 

26,.l 

Bagelin CX-52. Double tape-printing. Key wheels removable. Irregular 

stepping. Non-guaranteed cycle 

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Hagelin CX-52 {and its fundamental weakness) 

The big problem in the use of devices and ma.chines which are of the keygenerator or additive {or subtracter) tnie is the tact that when the alpha.bets 

involved are known alpha.bets, solution of a depth of two is genera.ll.y possible. 

261-A 

Example of solution of polyalphabetic encipherment with book key and known 

alphabets, in this case reversed standard. 

261-B 

Continuation. 

g§g Bagelin (M-299) Solution: "A depth of two" 

We come then to the so-called rotor machines, which are not based upon keygenerator principles but are permutation machines. We come now therefore to the 

history of rotor machines. 

58.1 

The Swedish electrical machine B-21. (Original Aktiebolaget Crypt;ographe 

B-21. Mention Boris C. W. Ragelin.) 

Swedish machine connected to el.ectric typewriter. 

The keyboard electrically-operated B-211 Swedish machine (Self-contained, 

instead af separate typewriter.) 

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The original (commercial.) Enigma cipher machine. (Later used with one 

improvement by Germans in World War II.) 

1!... 

Come now to American deveJ.opments. FA.ward B. Hebern. How he became interested 

in cryptography and invented a cipher machine. 

The f'irst Hebern machine. (Manufactured f'or use by the Ku KJ.ux Kl.an.) 

1!__1 

The first Hebern printing model.. Still. a one-rotor machine! Where did he get 

the idea of cascading rotors? 

71.2 

71..3 

Hebern rotors -- variable wiring possibilities! 13 to one side and 13 to 

other. 

172.J. 

72 

Ib5 

3-rotor Hebern 

The 5-rotor Hebern machine. 

172.2 

(Story of' soJ.ution) 

First Hebern machine built in accordance with Navy specifications. 

172.x 

Hebern model S.I.S. Solved on challenge by Navy. 

172.J.fiJ 

One of' Hebern's developments tor the Navy, after his release. Solenoid 

operated design built according to Navy specifications. (This is the one that 

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wouldn't work--but Hebern said the contract didn't specif'icall.y state that it had 

to work. He insisted on being :pa.id--and was' It was the last job he did for the 

Navy. (One Navy f'il.e insisted tbat Navy bad an Admiral. in Navy District HQ in 

San Francisco Just to keep Hebern out of Jail so he could finish the Navy contract!) 

Navy has enough of Hebern and goes in far its own development. 

Fifteen years later Hebern Co. and heirs institute suit in U.S. Court of 

Clauns far $5f6,f6f6f6,f6f6f6! Probable settlement by now tor few thousand dollars. 

Collaboration and cooperation between the Army and Navy on cryptographic 

research and devel.opment notabl.e tor its absence in those days. Each service had 

its secrets! 

l7f6A 

- U.S. Army Converter M-134-Tl. Basic principle -- external keying element. 

]. 7f6 2 

Converter M-134. Rear view. 

17'6-7 

Converter M-134 - with printing! 

17fl-9 

U .s. Army Converter M-134-A. 

172.4 

Original Navy Mark I ECM with Boudin wires! Only 15 starting points! 

172.5 

First production model of Navy Mark I 

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m Army and Navy f'Jnally collaborate! SIGABA-OOM. 

SIGIVI or Basket. 

SIG.ABA-ECM witlibeld from British. Battle to give to British. Finally given 

in 1953. But during WWII had to intercommunicate. Theref'ore--the CCM. 

74 

74'.1 

742 

- The German Armed Forces cipher ma.chine of WWII. Effects of solution. German 

lack of imagination! High speed machinery could do it but they lacked the ima.gination' 

Say few words about American developments Hebern. 

German 8-wheel printing Enigma. Captured in 1945 at Mittelfels. A failure! 

German Naval Enigma -- differences between it a.nd Army a.nd AJ.r Force enigma.. 

With growth of teletype communications the need for an practicability of 

automatic encipherment became obvious. The first attempt--the ma.chine developed by 

the AT&!r Co. ( 1918) in coJ.J.a.boration with the Signal. Corps • 

2§ 

The AT&T Co. printing telegraph cipher machine (1918) (The original. SIGTOT) 

Story of solution 

Problems of manufacture of tape. Our electronic tape production ma.chines solve 

problem -16-
REF ID:A38396 . . 

Tbe IT&T Co. teletype cipher attachment. 

With the growth of teletype communications, cipher teletypewriter attachments 

were invented. 

SIGCUM 

SIGCUM - cover removed. 

SIGCUM with B-131 set and teletype machine. SIGHUAD - a form of SIGCUM with 

one-time key features. Dangers of electrical radiation Dangers of depth 

SIGNIN Wartime devel.opment. Lots of 'bugs' • 

183 

SIGMEW - CIFAX. 

l.86 

IBb 1 

Ciphony. SIGJIP - Bell Telephone lst development. 

Ciphony and cifax me.chines. SIGSALY. Vocoder types. 

New developments in cipher ma.chines. AFSAM-7, AFSAM-9, AFS.AM-15 1 AFSAM-36 and 

AFSAM-D2l.. "Integrated" equipments. Cipbony and its problems. SIGSALY. 

Recognition and identification. Call.sign. Telemetering. Television. 

The professional cryptologist is always amused by the almost invariable reference 

by the layman to the "German code" or the "Japanese Code" or "the U.S code". To give 

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an idea as to the miltiplicity of systems -- show next two slides. 

236 

Number of cryptographic systems in effect 7 December 1941 - October 1945. 

U .s Army and Army Air Forces only. 

237 

Number of holders of cryptographic materials. December 1941 - October 1945. 

U .s. Army and Army Air Forces only. 

Keeping track of crypto-material and accounting. Japanese incident of certifying to destruction by burning. 

I wiJ.:J, bring this tal.k to a close now by repeating the importance of the 

slogan we try to inculcate: "Don't learn your COMSJOO laws by accident!" 

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