PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4299

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM ANDREW CLARKE, 

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior 

District Judge. (1:14−cr−00246−CMH−1)

Argued: September 23, 2016 Decided: November 18, 2016

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in 

which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Motz joined. 

ARGUED: Joseph Douglas King, KING, CAMPBELL, PORETZ & THOMAS 

PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Christopher John 

Catizone, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, 

Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Dana J. Boente, United States 

Attorney, Scott Andrew Claffee, Special Assistant United States 

Attorney, William Carlson, Special Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, 

Virginia, for Appellee.
2

WYNN, Circuit Judge:

A federal jury convicted Defendant William Andrew Clarke of

one count of attempting to persuade minors to engage in unlawful 

sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and the 

district court sentenced Defendant to 120 months imprisonment 

and lifetime supervised release.

On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court erred 

in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained in an 

inventory and warrant search of his vehicle. Defendant also 

argues that the district court reversibly violated Federal Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 30(b) by refusing to provide counsel with 

key jury instructions before closing argument and failing to 

properly instruct the jury regarding the charged offense. 

Finally, Defendant maintains that the government did not produce 

evidence sufficient to support his conviction. Finding no 

reversible error, we affirm.

I.

While engaged in undercover child exploitation 

investigative work in early October 2013, Department of Homeland 

Security Special Agent Kevin J. Laws encountered Defendant on 

Family Intimacy, a social networking website centered on incest. 

Defendant’s Family Intimacy profile listed his experience with 

incest, individuals he wanted to engage in incest with, and—-

most pertinent to Agent Laws’ investigation—-his desire to 
3

engage in incest with minors. Going by the alias “Jaye,” Agent 

Laws sent Defendant a friend request, which Defendant accepted.

Defendant then messaged Agent Laws, stating that he was glad 

Agent Laws had reached out and noting that they lived near each 

other. Agent Laws messaged Defendant back, providing him with 

Agent Laws’ undercover email address so that they could 

communicate outside of the website.

On October 10, 2013, Defendant emailed Agent Laws and asked 

whether Agent Laws had experience with incest. Agent Laws, 

posing as the single father of two fictitious children, nineyear-old Amy and eight-year-old Mark, replied that he had 

molested his daughter since she was four years old.

As their conversation progressed, Defendant said that he 

had been looking for “likeminded” men close by. J.A. 253.

Agent Laws then mentioned that although he “[did not] really 

play with” Mark, Mark had helped him masturbate a few times.

J.A. 98, 254. Defendant responded: “OMG you have a son! We need 

to meet.” J.A. 98, 254.

Soon thereafter, Agent Laws invited Defendant over to his

house for the weekend, asking whether Defendant would be 

comfortable with Agent Laws watching Amy and Mark perform sex 

acts on Defendant. Defendant replied that “a get together would 

be awesome,” and agreed to come over that weekend. J.A. 255.
4

Agent Laws and Defendant then moved their discussions to an 

online messaging service. There, Defendant further inquired 

into the children’s sexual experience. In particular, Defendant

asked Agent Laws how he introduced the children to incest, if 

Agent Laws had ever “shared” the children before, and if Mark 

and Amy had ever engaged in any sex acts with each other. 

Defendant questioned Agent Laws about Mark specifically, asking 

how it came about that Mark helped Agent Laws masturbate, 

whether Mark masturbated, and whether Mark could get an erection 

and orgasm. Agent Laws said that he was more interested in Amy 

than Mark, to which Defendant replied, “[W]ell [Mark] needs me 

around LOL.” J.A. 265. Agent Laws asked Defendant if he would 

“also play with Amy.” J.A. 266. Defendant responded, “[O]f 

course.” J.A. 266.

Agent Laws eventually suggested that he and Defendant meet 

at a restaurant near Agent Laws’ house. Agent Laws and 

Defendant then spoke over the phone to discuss their plans for 

meeting and having sex with the children. Defendant asked Agent 

Laws what he had told the children about Defendant’s upcoming 

visit. Agent Laws suggested he tell the children that “Uncle

Bob’s coming over.” J.A. 110. Defendant said that it would be 

“easier” if Agent Laws referred to him by his real name--“Andy”-

-when talking with the children because that would make his 

interactions with the children “more natural.” J.A. 110. Per 
5

Defendant’s instruction, Agent Laws reported that he told Mark 

and Amy that his “good friend Andy” would be coming to their 

house to engage in sex acts. J.A. 117, 272. During their call, 

Defendant also asked Agent Laws if he thought the children would 

talk to him over the phone and if the children were excited 

about meeting someone else. Agent Laws and Defendant agreed 

that they would meet the next day, October 11, 2013. 

On the morning of their planned meeting, Agent Laws and 

Defendant discussed Defendant’s upcoming visit once more over a 

video call. During their call, Defendant asked Agent Laws “if 

it was okay if [Defendant] performed oral sex on Mark and Mark 

performed oral sex on [Defendant], and also if [Defendant] 

performed oral sex on Amy.” J.A. 116. Defendant also said 

Agent Laws should “t[ake] the lead and t[ell] [Defendant] when 

to join in.” J.A. 116.

After Agent Laws and Defendant ended their video call, 

Agent Laws and a cover team set up surveillance at the 

restaurant at which he and Defendant had agreed to meet. 

Defendant arrived at the restaurant at approximately 1:50 P.M. 

Upon approaching Agent Laws’ vehicle, Defendant was arrested and 

interviewed.

While this interview was being conducted, Virginia State 

Police inventoried Defendant’s vehicle. The vehicle was 

subsequently towed to a Virginia State Police impound lot. The 
6

government later obtained and executed a search warrant for 

Defendant’s vehicle. During their search of the vehicle, the 

government discovered lubrication, condoms, a bag of candy, an 

overnight bag, and a piece of paper listing Agent Laws’ phone 

number and the ages of Agent Laws, Amy, and Mark.

On May 22, 2015, a jury found Defendant guilty of one count 

of attempted coercion and enticement of a minor in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The district court sentenced Defendant to 

120 months imprisonment and lifetime supervised release. 

Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.

On appeal, Defendant contends that the district court made 

four reversible errors by: (1) improperly refusing to suppress

evidence obtained as a result of the purportedly unlawful 

searches of Defendant’s vehicle; (2) violating Rule 30(b) of the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to inform 

Defendant’s counsel of its jury instructions prior to closing 

arguments; (3) improperly instructing the jury as to the meaning 

of “induce” in 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b); and (4) improperly holding 

that the government produced sufficient evidence to sustain 

Defendant’s conviction. We disagree with all of Defendant’s 

contentions. 
7

II.

A.

Defendant first asserts that the district court erred in 

denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained through 

the inventory search and subsequent warrant search of his 

vehicle. In particular, Defendant argues that the inventory 

search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the evidence 

obtained through the warrant search--including lubrication, 

condoms, and a bag of candy--should be suppressed because law 

enforcement officers secured the warrant based on information 

obtained during the allegedly unconstitutional inventory search.

In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress, this Court “review[s] conclusions of law de novo and 

underlying factual findings for clear error.” United States v. 

Banks, 482 F.3d 733, 738 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Because the district court denied Defendant’s 

motion to suppress, “we construe the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the government.” United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 

586, 589 (4th Cir. 2010). 

“The Fourth Amendment generally requires police to secure a 

warrant before conducting a search.” United States v. Matthews, 

591 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Maryland v. Dyson, 

527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999)). However, a warrantless search may be 

valid if the search “‘falls within one of the narrow and well-
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delineated exceptions’ to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 

requirement.” United States v. Currence, 446 F.3d 554, 556 (4th 

Cir. 2006) (quoting Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 

(1999)). It is well settled that an inventory search is one 

such exception. Matthews, 591 F.3d at 234. “For the inventory 

search exception to apply, the search must have ‘be[en] [1] 

conducted according to standardized criteria,’ such as a uniform 

police department policy, and [2] performed in good faith.” Id.

at 235 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted) 

(quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 n.6 (1987)). 

Defendant argues that the government failed to produce 

evidence sufficient to allow the district court to find that the 

inventory search was conducted pursuant to standardized 

criteria. The government may prove the existence of 

standardized criteria “by reference to either written rules and 

regulations or testimony regarding standard practices.” Id.

(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To 

justify a warrantless search, standardized criteria must 

sufficiently limit a searching officer’s discretion to prevent 

his search from becoming ‘a ruse for a general rummaging in 

order to discover incriminating evidence.’” Id. (quoting 

Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990)).

Here, in ruling on Defendant’s motion to suppress, the 

district court considered the Virginia Department of State 
9

Police’s inventory search policy, General Order OPR 6.01 

“Vehicle Impoundment and Inventory,” pursuant to which law 

enforcement officers conducted the search, and the standard 

inventory search form signed by the law enforcement officer who 

conducted the inventory search of Defendant’s vehicle, which was 

completed in accordance with the inventory search policy. The 

district court did not clearly err in finding that this evidence 

was sufficient to establish that the inventory search was 

conducted pursuant to standardized criteria, particularly since 

Defendant does not argue that the Virginia policy did not comply 

with the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the district court 

properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress.

B.

Second, Defendant contends that the district court violated 

Rule 30(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing 

to apprise Defendant’s counsel of how it would instruct the jury 

before closing arguments, and that the violation resulted in 

actual prejudice warranting reversal of Defendant’s conviction.

Rule 30(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 

requires that a trial court “inform the parties before closing 

arguments how it intends to rule on the requested [jury] 

instructions.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(b). Rule 30(b) serves at 

least two purposes. First, by “inform[ing] trial lawyers in a 

fair way what the instructions are going to be,” Rule 30(b)
10

“allow[s] counsel the opportunity to argue the case 

intelligently to the jury.” United States v. Horton, 921 F.2d 

540, 547 (4th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Second, by informing counsel of instructions prior to closing 

argument, Rule 30(b) allows counsel to lodge objections so as to 

preserve errors for appeal and “aid the court in giving a proper 

charge in the first instance.” United States v. Guadalupe, 979 

F.2d 790, 794 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that Rule 30(b) 

contemplates the trial court “deliver[ing] a final copy of the 

charge to counsel and permit[ting] them to raise objections 

before instructing the jury whether the charge is to be 

delivered prior to or following closing arguments”).

Here, Defendant submitted to the court the following

proposed instruction regarding the requisite mens rea for the 

indicted offense--attempted enticement of a minor: “The 

government must prove that the defendant intended to transform 

or overcome the will of an individual . . . . Proof that the 

defendant merely believed that he was communicating with someone 

who could arrange an opportunity for him to engage in sexual

activity . . . is insufficient for a conviction.” J.A. 51. By 

contrast, the government asked the court to instruct the jury 

that the government must prove “[f]irst, that the defendant 

intended to commit the crime of coercion or enticement of a

minor to engage in sexual activity; and second, that the 
11

defendant did an act constituting a substantial step towards the 

commission of that crime.” J.A. 49.

At the close of evidence, the court told the parties that 

it would first instruct the jury and then give the parties an 

opportunity to object at the end of instructions. Defendant’s 

counsel asked the court if it would be using any instructions 

proposed by either party, stating that Defendant objected to 

several of the government’s proposed instructions, particularly 

with regard to attempt. The court responded: “Sometimes I do 

and sometimes I don’t.” J.A. 186. Defendant’s counsel then

requested a copy of the district court’s instructions. The 

court refused the request, stating, “You’ll be able to listen 

and you can object when I’m finished.” J.A. 186-87. The court 

also refused to recite its instructions to counsel before 

presenting them to the jury. Ultimately, the court did not give 

the instruction Defendant requested; instead, it instructed the 

jury that “[t]he terms persuade, induce, and entice should be 

given their ordinary meaning. In ordinary usage, the words are 

effectively synonymous, and the idea conveyed is of one person 

leading or moving another by persuasion or influence as to some 

action or state of mind.” J.A. 217.

By refusing to provide its instructions to counsel before 

closing arguments, we must hold that the district court violated 

Rule 30(b). This violation placed Defendant’s counsel in the 
12

difficult position of having to argue to the jury without 

knowing how the court would ultimately instruct the jury.

Additionally, the violation deprived the parties of the 

opportunity to lodge objections to the proposed instructions and 

thereby give the court the opportunity to correct any errors 

before instructing the jury.

Nevertheless, although the district court violated Rule 

30(b), we may reverse only if Defendant demonstrates that the 

violation resulted in actual prejudice. United States v. 

Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 572 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. 

Burgess, 691 F.2d 1146, 1156 (4th Cir. 1982). We have not yet 

had the occasion to consider what constitutes prejudice when a 

district court violates Rule 30(b) by failing to provide counsel 

with jury instructions before closing arguments. However, this 

Court’s decision in Horton--which dealt with the related 

question of whether a district court reversibly erred by failing 

to give counsel additional time for argument after the court 

provided a supplemental instruction--is instructive. In Horton, 

we found that the defendant was not prejudiced by the trial 

court’s error in allowing the parties only three minutes of 

additional argument after providing the jury with a supplemental 

instruction because “defense counsel made all the arguments 

essential to his case . . . in his initial closing.” 921 F.2d 

at 547-48 (finding “the factual predicates of [the original 
13

charge and new charge] so similar that the arguments to be made 

against guilt are essentially the same under both theories”). 

Like in Horton, Defendant fails to demonstrate actual 

prejudice because the district court’s error did not inhibit 

Defendant’s counsel from making his “essential” argument to the 

jury--that “the government ha[d] to prove that [Defendant] 

intended . . . to transform the will on the part of the minor.” 

J.A. 205. Defendant’s counsel further explained to the jury 

that an intent to “arrang[e] to have sex” did not satisfy this 

requirement. J.A. 205. These two statements reflected the 

instructions proposed by Defendant. Importantly, and 

notwithstanding the district court’s failure to notify the 

parties of its instructions, the instruction ultimately given by 

the district court reflected both governing law and the argument 

made by Defendant’s counsel--that the government had to prove 

that Defendant intended to “lead[] or mov[e] [a minor] by 

persuasion or influence” to engage in sex. J.A. 217; see infra

Part II.C. Additionally, the government introduced sufficient 

evidence from which a jury could conclude that Defendant 

intended to persuade Mark and Amy to engage in sex acts, not 

just arrange sex acts. See infra Part II.D.

Because Defendant’s counsel was able to make “all arguments 

essential to his case,” because those arguments reflected the 

instructions ultimately provided by the court, and because the 
14

government introduced sufficient evidence to convict Defendant 

under the correct legal standard, we conclude that the district 

court’s violation of Rule 30(b) did not prejudice Defendant. 

C.

Defendant next argues that the district court erroneously 

instructed the jury on the definition of “induce” under Section 

2422(b). This Court “review[s] de novo the claim that a jury 

instruction failed to correctly state the applicable law.” 

United States v. Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332, 351 (4th Cir. 2012). 

“In conducting such a review, we do not view a single 

instruction in isolation; rather we consider whether taken as a 

whole and in the context of the entire charge, the instructions 

accurately and fairly state the controlling law.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

A person violates Section 2422(b) if he “knowingly 

persuades, induces, entices, or coerces” a minor to engage in 

unlawful sexual activity, or attempts to do so. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2422(b). Although the terms “persuade,” “induce,” and 

“entice” are not statutorily defined, we have found that they 

are “words of common usage” and have “accord[ed] them their 

ordinary meaning.” United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405, 411 

n.3 (4th Cir. 2012). Moreover, these terms are “effectively 

synonymous,” conveying the idea “of one person leading or moving 

another by persuasion or influence, as to some action [or] state 
15

of mind.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Our interpretation of these terms accords with 

the statute’s intent to “criminalize[] an intentional attempt to 

achieve a mental state--a minor’s assent.” Id. at 419 (emphasis 

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendant contends that the district court failed to 

properly instruct the jury because it did not clarify that 

“arranging” or “causing”—-one definition of “induce”—-sexual 

activity with a minor was insufficient to support a conviction

under Section 2422(b). Thus, Defendant argues, the district 

court “impermissibly broadened the definition of the requisite 

intent and allowed for a conviction based on insufficient 

evidence.” Appellant’s Br. at 28. We disagree.

In instructing the jury, the district court explained that 

“[t]he terms persuade, induce, and entice should be given their 

ordinary meaning. In ordinary usage, the words are effectively 

synonymous, and the idea conveyed is of one person leading or 

moving another by persuasion or influence as to some action or 

state of mind.” J.A. 217. These instructions mirror Engle

almost verbatim. See Engle, 676 F.3d at 411 n.3. And, by 

emphasizing that the jury must find that Defendant “le[d] or 

mov[ed] [a minor] by persuasion or influence” to engage in sex 

acts, the district court’s jury instructions required the jury 

to find that Defendant made “an effort to alter [a minor’s]
16

mental state,” rather than “merely convey[ing] the notion of 

‘causation,’” as Defendant suggests. Appellant’s Br. at 26. 

Accordingly, we hold that the district court’s instruction

fairly and accurately reflected the applicable law. 

D.

Finally, Defendant argues that the district court erred in 

denying his motion for acquittal. In particular, Defendant 

maintains that the government failed to produce sufficient 

evidence that Defendant attempted to persuade, directly or 

indirectly, a minor to engage in sex acts.

“We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion 

for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal 

Rules of Criminal Procedure.” United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 

360, 367 (4th Cir. 2010). A defendant who brings a sufficiency 

challenge bears a heavy burden, United States v. PalominoCoronado, 805 F.3d 127, 130 (4th Cir. 2015), as “[a]ppellate 

reversal on grounds of insufficient evidence . . . [is] confined 

to cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear,” Green, 599 

F.3d at 367 (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 

(1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This Court must 

uphold a jury’s verdict ‘if there is substantial evidence in the 

record to support it.’” United States v. Bailey, 819 F.3d 92, 

95 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 198 F.3d 

467, 470 (4th Cir. 1999)). “In determining whether the evidence 
17

in the record is substantial, we view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the government and inquire whether there is 

evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as 

adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of [the] 

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting 

Wilson, 198 F.3d at 470) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A person violates Section 2422(b) if he “knowingly 

persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has 

not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in . . . any sexual 

activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal 

offense, or attempts to do so.” 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). To obtain 

a conviction under this provision, “the government must prove 

that the defendant: (1) used a facility of interstate commerce; 

(2) to knowingly entice or attempt to entice any person under 

the age of 18; (3) to engage in illegal sexual activity.” 

Engle, 676 F.3d at 411–12. If the defendant is charged with 

attempt, “the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt,

that (1) he had culpable intent to commit the crime and (2) he 

took a substantial step towards completion of the crime that 

strongly corroborates that intent.” Id. at 419-420. Mere 

preparation is insufficient to establish intent. See id. at 

423.

Defendant’s sufficiency challenge requires us to determine 

in what circumstances, if any, a defendant can violate Section 
18

2422(b) without communicating directly with a minor but instead 

communicating indirectly through an adult intermediary--a 

question that this Court has not yet had occasion to address.

In enacting Section 2422(b), Congress intended “to criminalize 

persuasion and the attempt to persuade, not [just] the 

performance of the sexual acts themselves.” Id. at 419; see 

also United States v. McMillan, 744 F.3d 1033, 1036 (7th Cir. 

2014) (“[T]he essence of [the act Section 2422(b) contemplates] 

is attempting to obtain the minor’s assent.”).

“One particularly effective way to persuade or entice a 

person to do something is to enlist the help of a trusted 

relative, friend, or associate.” McMillan, 744 F.3d at 1036.

To that end, sexual predators can and do use adults--

particularly parents, guardians, or others in positions of 

influence or power--to attempt to persuade minors to engage in 

sexual activity. See id.; United States v. Nestor, 574 F.3d 

159, 161-62 (3d Cir. 2009). For this reason, our Sister 

Circuits have uniformly concluded that Section 2422(b) 

“extend[s] to adult-to-adult communications that are designed to 

persuade the minor to commit the forbidden acts.” McMillan, 744

F.3d at 1035 (collecting cases). We agree and therefore hold 

that “communications with an intermediary aimed at persuading, 

inducing, enticing, or coercing a minor to engage in sexual 

activity fit within [the] common understanding of a criminal 
19

attempt that is prohibited by [Section] 2422(b).” United States 

v. Roman, 795 F.3d 511, 517 (6th Cir. 2015) (first alteration in 

original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Defendant argues that even if communications with adult 

intermediaries can violate Section 2422(b), the government’s

evidence is insufficient to establish that he attempted to 

persuade Mark and Amy to engage in sex acts, directly or 

indirectly through Agent Laws. We disagree. 

The government introduced multiple pieces of evidence that, 

taken together, would allow a reasonable juror to conclude that 

Defendant intended to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce minors 

to engage in sex acts and took substantial steps toward doing 

so. 

First, Defendant directed Agent Laws to use Defendant’s

name when talking to the children about his upcoming visit so 

that Defendant’s interaction with the children would be “more 

natural.” J.A. 110. Accordingly, a reasonable factfinder could 

conclude that Defendant “attempt[ed] to use [Agent Laws] as an 

intermediary to convey [a] message to the child[ren]”--a message 

aimed at persuading the children to engage in sex acts. 

McMillan, 744 F.3d at 1036. Second, Defendant asked to speak 

directly to the children over the phone. Third, Defendant asked 

Agent Laws--an individual Defendant reasonably believed was in a 

position to influence and control Mark and Amy--if he could
20

engage in sex acts with both of the children. Indeed, by 

telling Agent Laws he should “t[ake] the lead and t[ell] 

[Defendant] when to join in,” Defendant expressly relied on 

Agent Laws’ position of influence with Mark and Amy to convince 

the children to engage in sex acts. J.A. 116.

The government not only produced evidence that Defendant 

attempted to entice Mark and Amy indirectly through Agent Laws, 

but also produced evidence that would allow a reasonable 

factfinder to conclude that Defendant took a substantial step 

towards directly enticing the minors to engage in sex acts. In 

particular, Defendant brought candy to what he believed was a 

weekend visit with Mark and Amy, during which Defendant hoped 

the children would engage in sex acts. A reasonable jury could 

have concluded that Defendant intended to use the candy to 

entice Mark and Amy to engage in sex acts. Because the 

government produced sufficient evidence that Defendant intended 

to persuade minors to engage in sex acts and took substantial 

steps towards doing so, we hold that the district court did not 

err in denying Defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is

AFFIRMED.