United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 99-3874

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Lylalele, Inc., Nebraska Corporation, *

* Appeal from the United States

Defendant, * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska

Larry W. Hoyt, individually and as *

Co-Trustee of the Lylalele Trust, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant, *

*

Leanna L. Schwasinger, individually *

and as Co-Trustee of the Lylalele Trust, *

formerly known as Leanna L. Hoyt; *

Lynda L. Woodard, in capacity as Co- *

Trustee of the Lylalele Trust, formerly *

known as Lynda L. Hoyt; Lanae L. *

Wilson, in capacity as Co-Trustee of *

the Lylalele Trust, formerly known as *

Lanae L. Hoyt; Leila L. Koetter, in *

capacity as Co-Trustee of the Lylalele *

Trust, formerly known as Leila L. Hoyt; *

Leah L. Rowe, in capacity as Co- *

Trustee of the Lylalele Trust, formerly *

known as Leah L. Hoyt, *

*

Defendants, *
1The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the District of Nebraska.

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*

Agri-Affiliates, *

*

Receiver, *

*

Patsy C. Brown, *

*

Interested Party. *

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 Submitted: April 24, 2000

 Filed: May 30, 2000

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Before McMILLIAN, LOKEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Larry Hoyt appeals from the final judgment entered in the District Court1 for the

District of Nebraska, granting summary judgment to the Farm Service Agency (FSA)

in its foreclosure action. For reversal, Hoyt argues that genuine issues of material fact

preclude summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment

of the district court.

Upon careful review, we conclude summary judgment was proper. The FSA

offered unrebutted evidence that Hoyt and others received documented loans which

were delinquent and which were secured by a mortgage in favor of FSA on the property

against which FSA sought foreclosure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (when motion for

summary judgment is made and supported, adverse party may not rest upon mere
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allegations or denials of adverse party’s pleadings but must set forth by affidavit or

otherwise specific facts showing genuine issue for trial); United States v. Kimbell

Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 718 (1979) (while federal law applies, since national rule

is unnecessary to protect federal interest underlying FHA loan programs, priority of

liens is to be determined under state law); West Town Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v.

Schneider, 435 N.W.2d 645, 648 (Neb. 1989) (requirements for party seeking to

foreclose on mortgage). Although Hoyt argues on appeal that his signature does not

appear on the loan instruments, he did not raise this argument in opposition to the

summary judgment motion. See Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 734

(8th Cir. 1993) (this court does not consider arguments made for first time on appeal).

Hoyt also complains that the district court struck several pleadings from the

record, but we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in doing so: Hoyt

executed and filed the pleadings, pro se, on behalf of the borrower corporation of which

he was president and on behalf of a trust; however, corporations and trusts cannot

appear in federal court without legal representation. See Knoefler v. United Bank, 20

F.3d 347, 348 (8th Cir. 1994) (trust); United States v. Van Stelton, 988 F.2d 70, 70

(8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (corporation).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.