IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on April 26, 2016

LORI KAY JONES TRIGG v. RICHARD DARRELL TRIGG

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hawkins County

No. 12CV150 R. Jerry Beck, Judge

No. E2016-00695-COA-T10B-CV – Filed April 27, 2016

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme 

Court of Tennessee, from the denial of a motion for recusal filed by Richard Darrell Trigg 

(AFormer Husband@) in the parties= post-dissolution proceedings. Having reviewed the 

petition for recusal appeal filed by Former Husband, and finding no error in Trial Court=s 

ruling, we affirm. 

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B Interlocutory Appeal as of Right;

Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

D. MICHAEL SWINEY,C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CHARLES D.SUSANO,

JR., and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J.J., joined.

Richard Darrell Trigg, Rogersville, Tennessee, appellant, pro se.

Gregory W. Francisco, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appellee, Lori Kay Jones Trigg.

OPINION

The parties= have been divorced for several years. In January of 2015, this Court 

affirmed the denial of Former Husband=s motion seeking to set aside the parties= divorce 

judgment on grounds that he was under duress at the time he entered into the Marital 

Dissolution Agreement (AMDA@), which was incorporated into the final divorce judgment. 

See generally Trigg v. Trigg, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 66544 (Tenn. Ct. App., Eastern 

Division, Jan. 5, 2015). 
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In June of 2015, Former Husband filed a motion seeking to delay implementation of 

the divorce judgment and challenging the validity of the judgment on grounds that Lori Kay 

Jones Trigg (AFormer Wife@) had not be competent to sign the MDA. That motion was 

denied by Judge R. Jerry Beck, sitting by designation in the parties= divorce and postdissolution proceedings since the recusal of the Circuit Court Judge for Hawkins County in 

late 2014. 

In January of 2016, Former Husband filed a complaint with the Tennessee Board of 

Judicial Conduct against Judge Beck based upon his denial of the June 2015 motion 

challenging the divorce judgment. In March of 2016, Former Husband filed another motion 

that, among other things, again challenged the validity of the divorce judgment, sought to 

stay enforcement of certain provisions of the divorce judgment, and sought to recuse Judge 

Beck. In support of his bid to recuse Judge Beck, Former Husband relied on the complaint 

he had filed with the Board of Judicial Conduct, which he referred to in his motion as the 

Court of the Judiciary.1 In an amended affidavit filed in support of the motion, Former 

Husband asserted that Former Wife=s family had manipulated her into dissolving her 

marriage with Former Husband. Specifically, Former Husband stated that Former Wife=s 

uncle, who is an attorney, took advantage of Former Wife=s Amental health issues@ in 

convincing her to file for divorce. Former Husband then stated: AThe complaint filed with 

the Court of the Judiciary was in regards to [Former Wife=s uncle] using his political and 

legal clout in the [S]tate of Tennessee to manipulate Judge Beck.@ Former Husband indicated 

in his affidavit that Former Wife=s uncle was Aclose friends@ with Aseveral Judges.@ Former 

Husband further stated that A[s]everal decisions have been made by Judge Beck subsequent to 

me filing this complaint that lead me to believe they are vindictive, and his presiding over 

this case will prevent me from receiving full, fair, and impartial administration of justice.@ 

Former Husband then listed several instances during the course of the proceedings in which 

he believed Judge Beck=s actions with regard to rulings and enforcement of the judgment 

demonstrated his bias against Former Husband.

 

1

The Court of the Judiciary ceased to exist on June 30, 2012, and was replaced by the Board of 

Judicial Conduct. 

Judge Beck initially denied the recusal portion of Former Husband=s motion both on 

procedural and substantive grounds. Judge Beck indicated that Former Husband=s motion 

originally had not been accompanied by a properly sworn to affidavit as required by Rule 

10B, section 1.01 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, which states: AThe 

motion shall be supported by an affidavit under oath or a declaration under penalty of perjury 

on personal knowledge and by other appropriate materials.@ Judge Beck also noted that 

Former Husband=s motion did not expressly stated that it was not being presented Ato harass 
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or cause unnecessary delay@ as is also required by Rule 10B, section 1.01 of the Rules of the 

Supreme Court of Tennessee. While Judge Beck acknowledged that Former Husband had 

filed a complaint with the Board of Judicial Conduct, he made clear that said complaint 

already had been dismissed. Judge Beck also stated unequivocally that he did not know 

Former Wife=s uncle except for Awhen he appeared in court@ with Former Wife, that he had 

no knowledge of Former Wife=s uncle=s clients or family, and that he did not know Awhether 

or not [Former Wife=s uncle was] connected to the governor=s office.@ Judge Beck denied 

that Former Wife=s uncle had ever Amanipulated the judge,@ and stated that all dealings with 

attorneys occurred in open court. After Former Husband submitted his properly sworn to 

amended affidavit in support of the motion, Judge Beck entered a second order reaffirming 

his initial ruling on the motion Aexcept to say the amended motion was sworn to.@ 

ANALYSIS

Appeals from orders denying motions to recuse or disqualify a trial court judge from 

presiding over a case are governed by Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of 

Tennessee. Pursuant to section 2.01 of Rule 10B, a party is entitled to an Aaccelerated 

interlocutory appeal as of right@ from an order denying a motion for disqualification or 

recusal of a trial court judge. The appeal is effected by filing a Apetition for recusal appeal@

with the appropriate appellate court. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, ' 2.02. The petition for recusal 

appeal Ashall be accompanied by copies of any order or opinion [of the trial court] and any 

other parts of the record necessary for determination of the appeal.@ Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, '

2.03. AIf the appellate court, based upon its review of the petition and supporting documents, 

determines that no answer from the other parties is needed, the court may act summarily on 

the appeal. Otherwise, the appellate court shall order that an answer to the petition be filed 

by the other parties. The court, in its discretion, also may order further briefing by the parties 

within the time period set by the court.@ Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, ' 2.05. Rule 10B goes on to 

provide that A[t]he appeal shall be decided by the appellate court on an expedited basis upon a

de novo standard of review. The appellate court=s decision, in the court=s discretion, may be 

made without oral argument.@ Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, ' 2.06. While not explicitly stated as 

such in the rule, it is clear that the only record the appellate court generally will have in 

expedited appeals under Rule 10B is the record provided by the appellant with his or her 

petition pursuant to the mandatory language of section 2.03 of the rule. 

We have determined in this case after a review of the petition, and supporting 

documents submitted with the petition, that an answer, additional briefing, and oral argument 

are unnecessary to our disposition because the record provided by Former Husband does not 

demonstrate error by the Trial Court Judge in the denial of the motion to recuse. As such, we 

have elected to act summarily on this appeal in accordance with sections 2.05 and 2.06 of 

Rule 10B.
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Without question, A[t]he right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal is a 

fundamental constitutional right.@ Bean v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d 798, 803 (Tenn. 2009) 

(quoting State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 470 (Tenn. 2002)); see also Tenn. Const. Art. VI, '

11. This constitutional right Ais intended >to guard against the prejudgment of the rights of 

litigants and to avoid situations in which the litigants might have cause to conclude that the 

court had reached a prejudged conclusion because of interest, partiality, or favor.=@ Id.

(quoting Austin, 87 S.W.3d at 470). A[P]reservation of the public=s confidence in judicial 

neutrality requires not only that the judge be impartial in fact, but also that the judge be 

perceived to be impartial.@ Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); 

see also Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (holding that Ajustice must satisfy the 

appearance of justice@). As such, Rule 2.11(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct as set forth 

in Rule 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee requires a judge to recuse himself 

or herself Ain any proceeding in which the judge=s impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned.@ See also Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322, 341 (Tenn. 2011)(noting that recusal 

is required, even if a judge subjectively believes he or she can be fair and impartial, 

whenever A>the judge=s impartiality might be reasonably questioned because the appearance 

of bias is as injurious to the integrity of the judicial system as actual bias=@)(quoting Bean,

280 S.W.3d at 805).

The terms Abias@ and Aprejudice@ generally Arefer to a state of mind or attitude that 

works to predispose a judge for or against a party@; however, A[n]ot every bias, partiality, or 

prejudice merits recusal.@ Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 821 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). To 

merit disqualification of a trial judge, Aprejudice must be of a personal character, directed at 

the litigant, >must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on 

some basis other than what the judge learned from . . . participation in the case.=@ Id.

However, A[i]f the bias is based upon actual observance of witnesses and evidence given 

during the trial, the judge=s prejudice does not disqualify the judge.@ Id. In addition, A[a] trial 

judge=s adverse rulings are not usually sufficient to establish bias.@ State v. Cannon, 254 

S.W.3d 287, 308 (Tenn. 2008). ARulings of a trial judge, even if erroneous, numerous and 

continuous, do not, without more, justify disqualification.@ Alley, 882 S.W.2d at 821; see 

also State v. Reid, 313 S.W.3d 792, 816 (Tenn. 2006). 

As the Trial Court Judge concluded in the order on review, there are no facts alleged 

or shown in the record that would lead a well-informed, disinterested observer to question the 

impartiality of the Judge in this case. It cannot be argued that the Judge had a duty to recuse 

himself simply because Former Husband is dissatisfied with the rulings against him. 

Moreover, we agree that the Trial Court Judge need not have even reached the merits of the 

motion because Former Husband failed to include in either his motion or affidavit in support 

of the motion the assertions of fact required by the rule. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, ' 1.01 
5

(AThe motion shall state, with specificity, all factual and legal grounds supporting 

disqualification of the judge and shall affirmatively state that it is not being presented for any 

improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the 

cost of litigation.@). 

CONCLUSION

Having determined that the record provided by Former Husband does not demonstrate 

error, we affirm the Trial Court=s denial of the motion seeking recusal. Former Husband is 

taxed with the costs of this appeal, for which execution may issue. This case is remanded for 

further proceedings as necessary and for collection of the costs below.

__________________________________

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE