-

REF ID:A38356 

S tArV)P 1,95~ 

h'RC..Tl)~E" \Jr - ~ ~ l9SC( 

~().cJ-~ .L -

@'pp roved for Release by NSA on 10-10-2013 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 
REF ID:A38356 
REF ID:A38356 

~ 'iJ, -'3~ 

--- ,....L._ ___ ___,__.__ ~ -~ 

"l..~'d'-1 

"l3fr ').... 

')...!.&"· ~ 

J.s-:q. 

~-

~~ 

?...4} 

\ :,, 

\34 

\~) 

\4'.~~ 

~~ 

l4~ 

\'~1 

131{ 

)~O 

14-) 

144 

;tao,\ 

~(,t 

;to,.... 

~'J...l 

14.,_ 

l't ct 

lt-t1)... 

/ \ I: \ Y-7 

\ l /~""O ... -

~S-0 I 

\q ca-' \ 

14_3.l 

~4~ 

:>--1~ 

-~~ 

").-S-1 

Ys:'f 

:2..3..../ 

I 

l~-~~~~ - ) I // 

-- -L.. I 

I -r--

l -

- -- ~ ---r -r 1- -

_ 

I I I 

_._ -, ----;--

I ! 

.... .,1_. -

I I I 

-r-1 i I I 

REF ID:A38356 
REF ID:A38356 
REF ID:A38356 

REF ID:A38356 

LECTURE NOTE For principal operations of COMINT 

Principal operations of COMINT. 

l. Intercept {incl. D/F, RFP,TINA) 

2. T/A (remarks on validity) 

3. Cryptanalysis 4. Translation and emendation 

5. Large scale production or exploitation 

6. Evaluation of information (military intelligence) 

7. Collation with other sources 

S. Dissemination 
REF ID:A38356 
REF ID:A38356 

238-l. 

Graph ill.ustrating der.ivation of importarxt; intelligence by trattic anal.J'Bi8 in World War II - COl'lV"OJ'S across the Atlantic £ran. HAMPTON ROADS to 

ALGIERS. 

This chart shows a dail1' breakdom by seour:Lty 

classification of tlE traffic trom Hampton Roads 

Port of' Embarkation to Algiers, North Africa, for 

the month of April, 191'4. Tiree definite peaks :.in 

traffic volun.e are evident, each o! which indicates 

a convoy movemmt from Hampton Roads to Algiers. 

(over) 
REF ID:A38356 

2.38-2 

The approxlma.te size o£ a movement is judged from the 

totals or messages am groups in the peak period,, 

while the destination and route are given away by 

addressee cal.1 signs in the messages. Close 

impection will show the first traf tic surge 

began on 4 April,, the second on 13 April, am the 

last on 22 April. Ex:perien:e has shown that these 

tra!".tic peaks appear on the circuit a day or two 

following the actual. convoy sailing date. Tm COIT.VOJ' 

movements are therefore 11 called.I• on the 2nd,, ll th 

and 20th of April. Furthermore, the traffic study 

shows de.finitel7 the proportions of supplies and 

(See 238-)) 
REF ID:A38356 

238-3 

troops carried in each convoy. ThJ.s is due to the 

fact that all passenger messages are cl.assit:tsd 

SECRET; cargo messages are CONFIDENTIAL. Detailed 

analysis shows that there were 21,836 CONFIDENTIAL 

groups, and .3,965 SECRET groups transmitted in 

connection w:L th the 2 April convoy. The next convoJ' 

gave rise to 18,J.60 CONFIDENTIAL am ~70 SECRET 

groups. 'lbe third conv07 required 19 ,~9 OONFIDENTIAt. 

groups and 594 SECRET groups. It is apparent fran 

these figures that the major tunction of each ot 

these conv07S was to carry equipment a:n:l mpplies. 

E:nd 238 
REF ID:A38356 

~ff_ ;~} ~\ I ~ ~ lVJ1> ~~""~ ?-~b -.n- ~ ... 

·,~A tJ ~ ~ lcLtcr,c.J., 

~~ \ J)~ ~<... - ~,J~ l'...J.i 
REF ID:A38356 

Cryptanalysis -- most important steps 

1. Study external characteristics of messages 

2. Study a:rry available collateral including that obtain 

ed from previous solution "crypt-continuity" 

3. Study beginnings and ends of messages. 4. Search for repetions between and within messages. 5. Preparation of statistical counts of letters, grps.e 

6. Search for indicators. 

7. DetermJ.ne type of cryptosystem used. 

8. Separate traffic into groups of messages in same 

or related keys. 

9. Test for probable words, stereotJJPes, analogies, 

isolags, momologs 

10. Reduce to simplest terms. 

0?J 
REF ID:A38356 

LECTURE NOTE 

The rest of my talk will be devoted to a 

brief' discussion of modern, practical cryptanalytic operations and gadgetry. 
LECTURE 

TT ,the\')"\ I us ei;:;ll:mger-~i-eS .. 

REF ID:A38356 

FORSLIDE i$f" 

(His photo matches the mental picture the average 

layman has of a cryptanalyst) 

The veil of secrecy has produced an air o:f mystery. 

Before the World War II, it was possible to do much 

processing merely with pencil and paper. Now cryptanalytic work is a yery jig business -- complex, 

expensive, but pays big dividends. 

-:?~~~-~~~ ~1 

® 
REF ID:A38356 

LECTURE NOTE FOR SLIDE 131 

Cryptanalysis of modern systems has been facilitated 

by the invention, development, and application of 

special cryptanalytic aids by way of machines. The 

nature of the problem - not merely the number of permutations and combinations but the type 1s more important -- question of testing out multiplicity of assumptions and lzypotheses, commoply by statistical methods. \h~ - *e. ~ ~ "° ~it:t Earliest cryptanalytic devices at Riverbank Laboratortes 
REF ID:A38356 

LECTURE NOTE 134 

My memo begging for one set 0£ IBM, dated 30 Oct 1934. 

N<r~--- '"._._._..r ll~Y"' ~, ~c;>~2.1 

//0 

~ 

a • ~ 1.1fl ~'3 4 l'1+':i" f' - '1S°'O 

rlr'\..o-w '-- N ~ (1/ I~ &"4) - ~ I 4 

LECTURE NOTE 

REF ID:A38356 

141 

One wing of IBM installation in WW II 
REF ID:A38356 ---'--·-~-
RE-F-----rJT:-k38-S-S----6 -

\41 
--R:E-F---rD-:-A3 8 35 6 

150>\'SO,, 

The Japanese "Burple11 - our version 

•..\ 



LECTURE NOTE 

A ltbrute .force•• ma.chine 

- - - REF ID: A38356 

137 
LECTURE NOTE 

Machine for matching messages 

REF ID:A38356 

138 
LECl'URE NOTE 

The BAuto-scritcher1• 

LRod.J.n - the "Thinker!!] 

REF ID:A38356 

143 
LECTURE NOTE 

An analog. 

REF ID:A38356 

145 

(This was for JAS system (Jap JhlAtt) 
------- __ ------=:=RE~F _!_J.ID : A3 8 35 6 
REF ID:A38356 

~sq A 

~lot> ~ °J)oN\ ci,..tr1<., ~ 

~'\--~,~ 


REF ID:A38356 
___ REE__ID_:A38356 
REF ID:A38356 
REF ID:A38356 

EXTRACTS FROM PART II,, BROWNELL COMMITTEE 

REPORT 

(JUNE 1952) 

In World War II COMINT may well have been ouz 

best paying investment. Its cost cannot be 

accurately computed but an informed guess would be perhaps 1/2 billion dollars annually. 

General Handy ls reported to have said it 

shortened the war in Europe by at least a year. 

In the Pacific, COMINT located the Japanese 

fleet enroute to the Coral Sea and again enrod; 

I I (over) 
REF ID:A38356 

' I 2 to Midway in ~942, enabl~ng us to mass the 

carriers for the battlesiwhich generally 1s 

regarded as the turning ~oint of' the war 

against Japan. 1 

Extract from the report of the Joint Combat 

Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, on 

this engagement : 

"The factors that vi tally affected the 

Battle of' Midway were many and complex, but it 

is undoubtedly true that without radio inte~ligence it would have been impossible to 

have achieved the concentration of' forces and the tactical surprise that made the victory poasible. 11 {See 3) 
\ 

REF ID:A38356 

3 

In 1942 COMINT told of the critical 

Japanese decision not to join the Axis war on 

Russia (but U.S. authorities thought the 

message a 11 phony11 - meant to deceive us!) 

In 1944 it helped us to pick the soft spots for our island advance, often showing where 

the Japanese expected us to attack and where 

their troops were massed. 

The Strategic Bombing Survey mission which 

checked on shipping losses after the surrender 

discovered that COMINT's knowledge of the stize 

and location of the Japanese merchant fhlee v-J day had been more exact liha.n t e ~~cords or the Japanese Ministry of Merchant 

marine. See 4) 
REF ID: A3835..6_ 

4 

Finally, COMINT provided us with our only 

reliable measure of how fast the Japanese 

were losing their will to resist. Our leaders 

had a thorough and immediate record of the 

peace feelers which the ~apanese asked 

Ambassador Sato in Moscow to send us through the Russians and of the explanations to him of 

how decisions were being reached and on what 

points further concessions would be made. 

The principal public credit for winning the 

Battle of Britain has gone to radar and the 

"so few" to whom so many owed so much. But 

much credit is also due to another British 

"few" who rapidly deciphered the high level 

(See 5) 
REF ID:A38356 

5 

combat traffic of the Lutt-Waffe, and guided 

the airborne 11 :few11 to the defense of' the right place at the right time. 

In the war on land COMINT did even better. 

It read Rommel's intentions in Africa so well 

that the Desert Fox guessed the truth, he confided his suspicions to Berlin, only to be tol' 

by the German High Command that such things 

were not pos s1b le. 

Be.fore D-day in France, COMINT furnished 

several of von Rundstedt's periodic appraisals 

of the situation for the High Command, showing where he thought the main attack would come, 

as well as some of Berlin's replies ignoring (See 6) 
REF ID:A38356 

6 

Rundstedt's good advice, presumably in favor 

of Hitler intuition. COMINT also contributed 

Ambassador Oshimds detailed reports to Tokyo 

on his pre-invasion tour of the Channel 

defenses, which led (the Committee has been 

told), to basic revisions in our landing plans 

After the assault was launched, COMINT supplie1 

a large quantity of battle reports and battle 

orders on every level from the OKW itself down 

to the various divisions. Throughout the 

campaign in France and Germany, our estimates 

of enemy troop strengths, locations and intentions were based more on CUMINT than on any other source. COMINT was also the principal 

source of the information used to select 

(See 7) 
-- REF------I-D-: A38 35 6 

7 

strategic arif tactical bombing targets behind 

German lines; and 1t helped us to identify the 

testing of advanced weapons (such as improved torpedoes and guided missiles) in time to get 

our scientists started on suitable countermeasures, thus greatly reducing the ultimate 

tactical effectiveness of the enemy's new 

developments. 
REF ID:A38356 

REF ID:A38356 

CA1m 1 

from 11The Memoirs 0£ Cordell Hull," Vol. II, The 

MacMillian Company,, N. Y., 1948, Chapter 71, 11we 

Talk with Japan," pp. 998. 

Actually, we already knew the contents of the message. It contained a statement from Matsuoka to me that 

the German and Italian leaders were confident of 

victory, that American participation in the European 

War would merely prol.ong it and bring about the destruction of CJ.VJ.1.J.zatl.on, am that Japan could not inJure 

the position of her allies. 

(OVER) 
REF ID:A38356 ,....,.._.. ..... ... .-

We knew this because ot the ta.ct that our tlavy run 

Army cipher experts, with remarkable ingenuity, had• 

broken the Japanese code and were deciphering Govemment messages from Tokyo to Washington and other 

capitals :1 translating them and sending them to the 

state Department £or our J.Df'ormatf.on. 

These intercepts, bearing our code name 11Magic, 11 

pl~ little part in our early negotiations, but were 

of great importance dur.i.ng the final phases. They 

enabled us to know many of the instructions the Japanese Foreign MJ..m..ster was sending to Nomura and to other 

Japanese representativesJ they gave us a check on what 

Nomura was reporting to Tokyo concermng the conversations he was holding with me; and they showed that the 

Japanese Government was going ahead with its plans even 

(CONTINUED ON CARD 2) 
SECURITt VIOLATIONS 

REF ID:A38356 

OA:RD ~ 

'Wh:i.'l.e t.al.king o! peace with us. I 1.ooked upon them 

as I would upon a witness -who was testifying aga.inst 

his o'Wll side of a case. 

I naturally had to be careful never to give Nomura 

the slightest impression of this Sp:lcial knowledge. I 

had to take care to keep our conversation li:rru.ted to 

the knowledge I mght have gained from hJ.lll or from 

normal. diplomata.c sources. So as to safeguard the 

security of these messages, I named one of my 

secretaries to handle "them, keep track of them, and 

make sure they were either returned to the Navy or 

destroyed. 
REF ID:A38356 

1 A few words re organization required for effective 

CI operations. 

Interception 0£ £oreign communications and subsequen 

processing requires services 0£ large numbers of commun 

ications and specially trained personnel. In order tha 

the product may be IOOst useful operationally -- and not 

merely historically interesting, the intercept traffic 

must be forwarded most expeditiously to the processing 

center and after processing,the final results must be 

transmitted promptly to the evaluators and other intelligence personnel and in some cases directly to field 

commands by fastest means. This forward:Lng to a large 

processing center necessary now because of complexity o 

modern cryptosystems -- can't be solved in the field -

except low grade and T/A. 

~ 
REF ID:A38356 

\t) 

Some CI processing can be accomplished in the field 

as I said before - in order to meet certain immediate 

needs of field commanders. Each service provides for 

its own special needs in this category but CI process]r 

is essentially complex activity and much of it can be 

done well only at maJor processing plants where the 

limited number of highly skilled personnel can be concentrated and very specialized analytic machinery can 

be installed and maintained. •No pool in civil occupations and must train our own very largely in all 

phases. 

~~ Czj-,_J 

'~W~ @ ~J _, A\-SS, 
REF ID:A38356 

Say a few words about very great importance of coord:Lnation of COMINT activities with other intelligence 

operations and with the tactical situation. Although 

COMI.?-i"T is the most reliable, the most timely, and the 

most inexpensive kind of intelligence, it must still be 

evaluated, collated, correlated, and coordinated with 

intelligence col'lll.ng from other sources -- if for only 

one reason alibne -- to provide data for cover and protection of COMINT sources. When a decision has been .,,.. made to take action based on CI, careful effort must 

be made to insure that the action cannot be attributed 

to CI alone. When possible action must always be 

preceded by suitable reconnaissance and other deceptive 

measures -- otherwise go~is killed. 

@ 
REF -rrr:A38356 

Will give three examples of "cover" for COMINT: 

1. Tunisia (official report) - 2 German code messages intercepted several hours apart -both solved. 

1st stated intent of Germans to attack at particular 

hour. 2nd Eostponed attack and gave new time of 

jump-off. oth solved and sent to Allied tactical 

command at once. One command after receiving 2nd message made radio broadcast in clear telling story. Germans intercepted broadcast and attack again postponed. 

Information sent different way. But most important 

point: they changed all c- and Allied OOMINT disappeare 

until new ones were solved. 

This second breach col1111lJ.tted not by subordinate, 

inexperienced officer but by high ranker. He got sevei 

{i'i1)reprimand. 
REF ID:A38356 

2nd example better and from same report: "On 28 

March a ne1' German unit heard for the first time sent 

two messages. The f'1rst at 1335, revealed 2 gun positions. At 1500 a Piper cub was sent over the areas 

as a decoy for the source of information. At 1600 

Allied artillery began to lay down a concentration. The ~econd message from the German unit requested an ambulance. The unit was never heard from again. 11 

3rd example last: From Pacific Theater: 

On certain day November 1944, an enciphered code 

message was sent bya certain Japanese staff' section 

to certain Japanese Air Force units requesting air 

escort f'or two convoys carrying troops to reinforce 

~ Philippines. Message gave number of ships, taa:nkers 
REF ID:A38356 

escort vessels, date of departure and port, route, 

noon positions for next 7 days; message solved in 

Washington. Two days after the convoy left one 

report in message which was also intercepted and 

solved that it had been sighted by a B-29 with strong 

indication that other convoy had also been sighted. 

A few hours later, messges from these convoys reported 

losses: 6 ships definitely sunk, one ch.sabled, one on 

fire. Later we learned from another source, in addition, one aircraft carrier was also sunk. Did you 

notice message about B-29? It didn 1 t "just happen1

' 

to be cruising around! 
REF ID:A38356 

Of course, knowledge and experience point to 

necessity of exploiting every possible advantage a 

tactical situation af£ords and the temptation is of 

course very great in the heat of battle to use CI 

whenever and wherever it is available. This may lead 

to carelessness which quickly Jeopardizes CI sources. 

0£ course, :fUll value of CI cannot be realized unless 

operational use is made of it. However, when action 

based on it is contemplated, possible co~pronu.se of 

source nmst always be borne in mind and danger of compromise weighed against military advantages to be gaine 

Minor military advantage is never alone sufficient 

grounds for risking loss of source. Aleo must bear in 

mind that cryptosystems usually world-wide or area-wide 

(OVER) 
REF ID:A38356 

in usage. Changes ma.de as result or suspicion of 

compromise may have f ar•reaching consequences on ability to produce CI elsewhere. A commander seeking a 

minor advantage by using CI in one locality may depriv 

another commander of much greater advantages or even 

deny it to commander of a major operation. 
REF ID:A38356 

Another aspect 0£ coordination -between operations 

and CI. COMINT people should be care£ully oriented to 

give optimum coverage £or operations in progress. 

There are JUSt so many facilities and personnel available and only a part 0£ enormous traffic can be obtained and processed. Hence, essential that CI people 

be constantly informed of current and planned operatior 

so as direct attention where most needed. Also that 

information is often essential in proper interpretatio• 

of certain material and can help in solution. 

Advice against knocking out radio stations. 
REF ID:A38356 -----·---------

Re current manner of employing COMINT - can be discus sad under various headings but neither time nor 

security rules will permit. However, it is obvious 

from the Pearl Harbour disclosures alone that the 

manner of its employment during WW II must have been 

quite efficacious. I started this talk by reading 

from TIN.E and now I'll come back to it to read you 

some more of the Marshall-Dewey letter because that 

WJ.11 give you a pretty good idea of the contribution 

COfvJ:NT made toward our winning WW II. Y6u'll recall 

that TikE mentioned something about a machine which 

it called 1tMagic1t. Here is a picture of it --last z. slide~ 1 LIGHTS ON. 
REF ID:A38356 - - -a-·-- ..,. .. .-.,.w \..VCS:-JV1a::' U.&. 3"VU. 1m ... _... _ 

_ fexperienc; ~e than once in the last few months It 

hoes like this· You' re in bed trying to get to sleep 

-l,You've had a "bad day at school. and things were a bit 

j'difficult To begin nth you didn't feel so we11 when 

J;you woke up ,early from a disturbed and restless sleep -

1 ~o you were dopey all day and drank coffee or cokes to ~elp you through the day But now the caffeine is having 

fits effecli p.nd you can't seem to fall asleep even as tire~ 

as you are Things begin churning in your mind What was 

{it that VIP said about our being an easy target for a 

~surprise air attack with A- or with H- bombs'l 

Who was it that told us our radar fence protection was 

J.ridiculous Our ADC could at best knock down - what was 

}~hat figure'l - at most 10-15~ of the bombers carrying the 

'•bomb Yes, and now l.ook at al.l these columnists comments n~ +hP ~et>Orts Of these SDeCial StUd_y groups Set up tO 
REF ID:A38356 ... - ---- ... ...... .... ......... ~c: v.i. "'"""- ~~ '-' • -

inst a knock-out, sudden attack Let ii see. tiilre 

R the Lincoln Summer Study proJect at MIT It~ report 

.a.red the daylights out o:r certain of the iili~brass in 

Ahington So they appointed another group to eva1uate 

1e Lincoln report - the Kelly group The Kell.y group 

.irned in a report that seemed to be so shocking that it ~s practically been suppressed Then the brass appointen 

group to stuccy the Kelly report - the Bull Committee set 

•11 by the NSC (Read extracts f'rom Alsop) JI..'- -..e. 

Well, now sleep bas 1ef't you for good because you f'eel. 

•retty scared - not on account of your own skin - but what 

bout the gal who's asleep beside you and those kids in 

he next room? No wonder you're scared and you're worriec 

'hat thinking Anerican isn 1 t these days 2 And we recently 

earned official.ly they have set off' an H bomb What to 

•O? We11, c~er up a b,;i.t_ ~:ce'..s one more "Ooss1n1 ... 
REF ID:A38356 

answer that the Lincoln, KellY, EdwardS, HU.1.l. 'a-na. -:Bmcr--

Co:mm:L ttees di.en't get - b~u~y weren't 1et in on 

a ce~in~ret. It's tba.t~secret I'm going to ta1k 

about 1ihi:-mor--n-ing Its name is COMINT. 

\j""' I 4. f\A4T 'k--l ~ 

REF ID:A38356 

Extract. from: Citation £or 1st. Radio Sq,uad.I'on,, 'Mohl.le 

for Award of Meritorious Um t Commendation :tn Department 

o:f Air Force General Order 64 of ll Oct 1951 

11The contributions or the 1st Radio Squadron~ Mobtl.e,, 

in direct support of the UN combat effort in Korea have 

furnished the UN Forces and the Government of the Un:tted 

States with tac ti. cal and strategic intelligence,, of 

inceJ.culable value to the success of the UN mssion and 

to the secur.i. ty or the Um.tad States, and have thereby 

reflected great credJ..t on the Ulll.t and the Air Forces 

of the Um ted States. 11