In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-1300

EDITH MILESTONE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF MONROE, WISCONSIN,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 09-cv-199—Stephen L. Crocker, Magistrate Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 15, 2010—DECIDED NOVEMBER 21, 2011

Before MANION, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Edith Milestone was banned from

entering the Senior Center in the City of Monroe, Wisconsin, because she repeatedly violated the Center’s

Code of Conduct. She sued the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claiming that the expulsion violated her free-speech

and due-process rights and that the Code is facially

unconstitutional. A magistrate judge granted summary

judgment for the City. The judge held that the Senior
2 No. 10-1300

Center director, who imposed the expulsion penalty, and

the Monroe Senior Citizens Board, which promulgated

the Code and approved the order, were not final

policymakers for the City, so there was no basis for municipal liability. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Milestone appealed.

We affirm, although on a somewhat expanded analysis.

We agree that the Senior Center director and the Senior

Citizens Board were not the City’s final policymakers for

purposes of enforcing the Code of Conduct. Under state

and local law, Milestone had the right to ask the

Monroe Common Council to overturn the expulsion

order, and her failure to do so precludes municipal

liability under Monell to the extent that the claimed constitutional violations stem from the imposition of the

ban. This result does not impose a requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies under § 1983, but

follows from the Common Council’s role as the relevant

policymaker for the sanction imposed on Milestone.

Milestone’s facial challenge to the Code rests on a

different foundation, however. By Monroe ordinance,

the Senior Citizens Board has the authority to make

rules for the Senior Center; the Code itself is therefore

city policy. But Milestone’s facial challenge is flawed on

the merits. The Code consists of reasonable “time, place,

or manner” restrictions, and is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.
No. 10-1300 3

I. Background

Edith Milestone, a senior citizen, lives in Monroe,

Wisconsin, a small city that claims the title of the “Swiss

Cheese Capital of the U.S.A.” Prior to 2008 Milestone

often visited the Behring Senior Center, operated by the

City of Monroe. The Senior Center is open to the

55-and-over community from Monroe (a/k/a the “cheese

city”) and the surrounding area. Among other activities,

the Senior Center offers classes, meals, exercise programs,

and card games.

The Monroe Senior Citizens Board, comprised of nine

citizen volunteers, is empowered to adopt rules and

regulations to “secure the suitable use and enjoyment” of

the “cheese city social center building . . . by senior citizens

of Monroe.” MONROE, WIS., CODE §§ 2-12-1, 2-12-3(A), (C).

Pursuant to this authority, the Board promulgated a

Code of Conduct for visitors to the Center. Among other

things, the Code prohibits “abusive, vulgar, or demeaning

language,” “physically threatening” conduct, and disrespectful behavior toward patrons, the Center’s staff, and

outside instructors. The Code provides that “[v]iolations

of this code of conduct will be acted upon by the

Senior Center staff or Board of Directors.” Copies of the

Code of Conduct were posted throughout the building.

Milestone’s visits to the Center were fraught with

turmoil. Her file included a number of “incident reports”

alleging the following disturbances: She engaged in a

shouting match at a card game (February 2002); she tried

to get the Center’s director fired (December 2005); she

filed frivolous police complaints about other patrons
4 No. 10-1300

There are some factual disputes about what happened during 1

this incident. Because we are reviewing an order granting

summary judgment, we recount the facts in the light most

favorable to Milestone, the nonmoving party. Turner v. The

Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2010).

(January 2006); she yelled at patrons and staff (February

2006); she advised another patron to go to confession

(February 2006); she accused other patrons of spreading

rumors about her (October 2007); and she threw playing

cards across a table (December 2007). In February

2006 the Monroe city attorney wrote Milestone a letter

informing her that the City might have to seek a

restraining order against her if she failed to “conform

to reasonable standards of decorum while at the Center.”

The City never followed up on this letter.

In October 2008 Milestone was involved in an incident

that led to her expulsion from the Center. While playing 1

cards, Milestone began loudly complaining about the

scoring of the game. When the game was finished, Milestone angrily refused to accept the one-dollar prize she

had won because she thought that the game had been

scored incorrectly. Tammy Derrickson, the Senior Center

director, approached Milestone and told her that her

behavior was not acceptable. The two got into a heated

discussion, which escalated when Milestone wagged her

finger in Derrickson’s face and threatened to sue her.

Derrickson reiterated that Milestone’s behavior was

unacceptable and told her that she was no longer

allowed to visit the Center.
No. 10-1300 5

The next day, Derrickson sent Milestone a letter informing her that she was “no longer welcome to attend

Senior Center Programs” based on the following violations of the Center’s Code of Conduct: “(1) [n]ot treating

other participants with respect[;] (2) [a]busive language[;]

(3) [n]ot treating Senior Center staff in a respectful

man[ner; and] (4) [p]hysically threatening conduct.” Before

sending the letter, Derrickson reviewed it with the

mayor, the city attorney, and the chief of police, but not

with any members of the City’s Common Council.

Milestone’s attorney wrote to the Senior Citizens

Board and requested a copy of the Code and any documentation regarding the incident that precipitated her

expulsion. An assistant city attorney provided the documents and also informed Milestone’s attorney that Milestone could appeal Derrickson’s decision to the Senior

Citizens Board via a “due process hearing.” Milestone

exercised this right.

The Senior Citizens Board convened a hearing and

heard testimony under oath from Milestone, Derrickson,

and other witnesses. In a written decision, the Board

affirmed Derrickson’s action but modified the ban to

remove its apparent perpetual duration. The Board said

it would “consider a petition for reinstatement by Edith

Milestone upon proof of successful completion of an

accredited ‘Anger Management’ program.” The Board

also advised Milestone of her right to take an administrative appeal to the City’s Common Council within

30 days and that if she failed to do so, the Board’s decision would “be treated as a final determination” for
6 No. 10-1300

purposes of judicial review. See WIS. STAT. §§ 62.12(2),

62.13.

Milestone did not appeal the Board’s decision to the

Common Council or seek judicial review. Nor did she

enroll in an anger-management program. Instead, she

filed this § 1983 lawsuit against the City alleging violations of her free-speech and due-process rights under

the First and Fourteenth Amendments. A magistrate

judge, proceeding by consent, granted the City’s motion

for summary judgment, holding that Derrickson and

the Senior Center Board were not final policymakers for

purposes of municipal liability under Monell. Though

he did not reach the merits, the judge noted that the

City had “a legitimate interest in minimizing disruption

and keeping the [senior] center a pleasant environment

for its visitors.”

II. Discussion

This case comes to us from an order granting summary judgment for the City, so our review is de novo;

we construe all facts and reasonable inferences in favor

of Milestone, the nonmoving party. Ogden v. Atterholt,

606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). Milestone argued

below and reiterates here that Derrickson’s decision

to expel her from the Senior Center amounts to

viewpoint discrimination in violation of her right to free

speech. She also claims the Code of Conduct is unconstitutionally overbroad in that it sweeps in too much

protected speech, subjecting it to the threat of punishment.

Finally, she alleges several due-process violations. She
No. 10-1300 7

claims that: (1) the ban was imposed without a hearing,

violating her right to due process; (2) the Code deprived

her of fair notice because it does not prescribe specific

penalties; and (3) the decision to expel her from the Senior

Center violated her right to move about in public places.

The magistrate judge did not reach the merits of these

claims but instead entered judgment for the City after

finding no basis for municipal liability. To the extent

that Milestone’s claims relate to the expulsion order, we

agree. Milestone sued the City, not Derrickson, who

imposed the ban, or the members of the Senior Center

Board, who affirmed it. There is no respondeat superior

liability under § 1983; the Supreme Court “distinguish[es]

acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479

(1986); City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818 (1985);

Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; see also Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496

F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Misbehaving employees

are responsible for their own conduct, [but] units of

local government are responsible only for their policies

rather than misconduct by their workers.” (quotation

marks omitted)). For municipal liability under § 1983,

the constitutional violation must be caused by (1) an

express municipal policy; (2) a widespread, though unwritten, custom or practice; or (3) a decision by a municipal

agent with “final policymaking authority.” Darchak v.

City of Chi. Bd. of Educ., 580 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2009);

see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

Only the third theory of Monell municipal liability is at

issue here. Milestone argues that Derrickson, or alterna-
8 No. 10-1300

tively, the Senior Citizens Board, were final policymakers

for the City. Whether an entity has final policymaking

authority is a question of state or local law. Jett v. Dallas

Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989); Kujawski v. Bd.

of Comm’rs of Bartholomew Cnty., Ind., 183 F.3d 734, 737

(7th Cir. 1999). Not every municipal official with discretion is a final policymaker; authority to make final policy

in a given area requires more than mere discretion to

act. See Darchak, 580 F.3d at 630; Gernetzke v. Kenosha

Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 274 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2001).

Whether a public official has final policymaking

authority often turns on whether his decisions are subject to review by a higher official or other authority. See

Gernetzke, 274 F.3d at 469 (“[T]he cases limit municipal

liability under section 1983 to situations in which

the official who commits the alleged violation of the

plaintiff’s rights has authority that is final in the special

sense that there is no higher authority.”).

Here, Derrickson imposed the initial punishment of

expulsion, and the Board affirmed her decision with a

modification as to its duration. For the City to be liable

for these actions, Milestone must first establish that

Derrickson or the Board had final policymaking

authority with respect to imposing punishments for

violating the rules of the Center. It’s clear that Derrickson

was not a final policymaker. The City never delegated

final policymaking authority to the director of the

Center; the City Code does not even refer to the position. All of Derrickson’s decisions are subject to review

by the Senior Citizens Board. She lacked independent

authority to impose discipline, let alone the authority to
No. 10-1300 9

set general policy on this issue. See Darchak, 580 F.3d at

630. Accordingly, Derrickson’s actions did not subject

the City to liability under § 1983.

Whether the Board is the final policymaker is a somewhat closer question, but we agree with the magistrate

judge that under state and local law, and based on the

structure of the Board itself, the Board did not have

final policymaking authority. Chapter 68 of the Wisconsin Statutes prescribes a general procedure for

review of initial administrative determinations like

Derrickson’s decision to ban Milestone from the Center.

See WIS. STAT. §§ 68.08, 68.09(1). Specifically, chapter

68 provides that the official who made the initial determination may conduct the review, or “an independent

review of such initial determination by another person,

committee or agency of the municipality may be provided.” Id. § 68.09(2). The City empowered the Senior

Citizens Board to review the initial determination, and

following a full hearing, the Board issued a “Decision

on Review” affirming Derrickson’s decision.

Importantly, however, Milestone had a statutory right

to appeal the Board’s decision to the Common Council.

Because she “did not have a hearing substantially in

compliance with § 68.11 when the initial determination

was made,” she had an automatic right to this additional level of administrative review. Id. § 68.10(1)(a).

Indeed, the Board fully advised Milestone of her right

to appeal to the Common Council. Id. § 68.09(5). In bypassing the Common Council, Milestone deprived the

City’s final policymaker of the opportunity to review the
10 No. 10-1300

Because the Senior Citizens Board issued its decision follow- 2

ing a hearing in compliance with chapter 68, if Milestone did

not appeal to the Common Council, the Board’s decision

would be considered a “final decision” for purposes of

judicial review. Milestone had the option of filing an

action in state court seeking review by certiorari. WIS. STAT.

§§ 68.12(2), 68.13(1).

acts of municipal subordinates, including their compliance with city policy and even the wisdom of city

policy itself.

2

Apart from state municipal law, the Monroe City Code

confirms that the Board is not the final authority for

purposes of reviewing the director’s decisions. By ordinance the Board has the following powers:

(A) To govern, manage, control, improve and care

for the cheese city social center building and

grounds and secure the suitable use and enjoyment thereof by senior citizens of Monroe.

(B) To oversee professional employees having responsibility for senior citizen programs and

activities subject to policies and procedures adopted

by the city for supervision of such employees.

(C) To adopt rules and regulations to promote the

purposes for which the board has been created.

(D) To acquire in the name of the city for senior

citizen purposes by gift, devise, bequest or

condemnation, either absolutely or in trust,

money, real or personal property, or any right or
No. 10-1300 11

privilege. Gifts to the city of money or other

property, real or personal, either absolutely or

in trust for senior citizen purposes shall be

accepted only after they shall have been recommended by the board to the council and

approved by the council by resolution. Subject to

the approval of the council, the board may execute

every trust imposed upon the use of property

or property rights by deed, testament or other

conveyance transferring the title of such property

to the city for senior citizen purposes.

(E) Subject to the approval of the council, to buy or lease

land in the name of the city for senior citizen

facilities within the city, and buildings for senior

citizen activities, and, with the approval of the

council to sell or exchange property no longer

required for its purposes.

(F) To acquire and maintain such equipment as may

be necessary to properly carry out its purposes.

(G) To promote senior citizen activities within the

city as it may deem advisable and its budget may

permit. (5-15-1990)

MONROE, WIS., CODE § 2-12-3 (emphases added).

As the provisions we have highlighted attest, the Board

has discretion to act in some discrete areas and in others

is subject to oversight and control by the City, usually

through the Common Council. At issue here is subsection (B) of the ordinance, which gives the Board the

authority to oversee the actions of the Center’s em-
12 No. 10-1300

ployees—subject, however, to policies set by the City.

The Common Council’s explicit retention of ultimate

policymaking authority is key; it confirms that when

the Board reviewed Derrickson’s decision, it was not

acting with final policymaking authority. See Pembaur,

475 U.S. at 483.

Finally, the Board’s structure suggests that it does not

make final policy for the City. Although a creature of

municipal law, the Board is not a subcommittee of the

Common Council. Of its nine members, only one

is also a member of the Council. MONROE, WIS., CODE § 2-

12-1(A)2. Up to three may be nonresidents of the City, id.

§ 2-12-1(A)1, and all must “serve without salary or other

compensation,” id. § 2-12-1(B). In short, the Board is a

small group of citizen volunteers tasked with guiding

the Center’s activities, not an administrative body

charged with making final policy for the City. Because

neither Derrickson nor the Board were exercising final

policymaking authority when they imposed and

approved the expulsion order, the City cannot be liable

under § 1983 for their actions.

To the extent that Milestone’s claims are premised on

the Code itself, however, a different analysis applies.

The Monroe Common Council empowered the Board

to make rules for the Senior Center. See id. § 2-12-3(C)

(“The senior citizen’s board is empowered and directed . . .

[t]o adopt rules and regulations to promote the purposes for which the board has been created.”). The Code

of Conduct, though not promulgated by the Common

Council, is city policy for purposes of municipal liability

under § 1983.
No. 10-1300 13

In this kind of First Amendment claim, Supreme Court 3

doctrine calls for stricter or looser judicial scrutiny depending

on the nature of the “forum” in which the regulations apply.

In a traditional public forum, governmental restrictions on

speech get strict scrutiny; regulations must be narrowly

tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Good News

Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001); Christian Legal

Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 865 (7th Cir. 2006). Traditional

public fora—like streets, sidewalks, and parks—are public

places that have traditionally been open for all manner of

constitutionally protected speech. Christian Legal Soc’y v.

Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 n.11 (2010). Strict scrutiny also

applies to regulations in a designated public forum, which the

government creates when it “designates” or opens a traditionally nonpublic forum for public discourse. Walker, 453 F.3d

at 865. A limited public forum (sometimes called a “nonpublic

forum”) is a place the government has opened only for

specific purposes or subjects; speech restrictions in a limited

public forum need only be viewpoint-neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum. Id. at 865-

66 & n.2.

Milestone’s First Amendment challenge to the Code

itself consists of two distinct arguments. First, she

claims that the Code impermissibly discriminates among

speakers based on their viewpoint. Second, she contends the Code is overbroad in that it chills too much

protected speech. Regarding the first argument, the

parties spend considerable energy debating how to

classify the Senior Center under First Amendment

forum analysis. What is dispositive here, however, is not

3

the nature of the forum but the nature of the regulation
14 No. 10-1300

in question. If the Code is a content-neutral “time, place,

or manner” regulation, it can survive as a reasonable

exercise of governmental authority, regardless of which

speech-forum category applies. Frisby v. Schultz, 487

U.S. 474, 481 (1988); Ovadal v. City of Madison, Wis., 416

F.3d 531, 536-37 (7th Cir. 2005).

The Code contains a mission statement, several objectives, and nine provisions comprising the actual “Code

of Conduct.” (We have attached a complete copy of the

Code in the appendix to this opinion.) The Code is generally aimed at conduct not speech, but three of its provisions arguably touch upon speech or expression: the

requirement that patrons treat everyone with respect

and courtesy; the prohibition against abusive, vulgar, or

demeaning language; and the requirement that patrons

treat Center personnel with respect. In Milestone’s view

these provisions are viewpoint-based regulations in

that they subject any person who disagrees with the

director’s decisions to permanent ejection from the Center.

We disagree. “Government regulation of expressive

activity is content neutral so long as it is ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’ ” Ward

v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting

Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293

(1984)). That is, “[a] regulation that serves purposes

unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral,

even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or

messages but not others.” Id. The Code’s mission statement and objectives make it clear that the purpose of

the Code is completely unrelated to the content of any
No. 10-1300 15

speaker’s message. Rather than focusing on what the

Center’s patrons say, the Code focuses on the manner in

which they say it. Nothing in the Code provides a basis

for punishing patrons for disagreeing with other visitors

or the Center staff.

Even in a traditional public forum where restrictions

on speech are viewed with greatest suspicion, contentneutral time, place, or manner regulations are constitutionally acceptable if they are narrowly tailored to

achieve a significant governmental interest and leave

open ample alternative channels of communication.

Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481; Ovadal, 416 F.3d at 536-37. The

Code of Conduct meets these requirements.

First, the Code’s stated purpose is to establish a “ ‘home

away from home’ ” for visitors to the Senior Center, an

environment that is “positive,” “dynamic,” and “pleasant

and upbeat.” Considering the specific clientele the

Senior Center serves, we think this qualifies as a significant governmental interest. By analogy, in Stokes v.

City of Madison, 930 F.2d 1163, 1170-71 (7th Cir. 1991),

we upheld an amplified sound restriction on a mall

adjacent to a library, recognizing that the City’s interest

in maintaining a quiet library environment and protecting library users from unwanted noise justified the

restriction. Similarly here, the City’s interest in protecting

the patrons of the Senior Center from vulgar, abusive

language and disrespectful or demeaning treatment by

other patrons justifies these provisions.

The Code also satisfies the narrow tailoring requirement. In “time, place, or manner” cases, “narrow tailoring”

does not mean that the government must use “the least
16 No. 10-1300

restrictive or least intrusive means” to achieve its end;

rather, in this context “the requirement of narrow

tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as the . . . regulation

promotes a substantial government interest that would

be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.’ ” Ward,

491 U.S. at 798-99 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472

U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). Rules requiring the Center’s visitors

to treat others with respect and to refrain from vulgar,

abusive language easily satisfy this standard. The City’s

interest in maintaining a hospitable place for senior

citizens to gather would be seriously undermined

absent basic civility requirements.

Finally, the Code leaves open ample channels of communication. Regulations may fail this part of the analysis

when they prevent speakers from reaching their target

audiences. Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029,

1040 (7th Cir. 2002). The Code prevents Senior Center

patrons from yelling at others or using abusive

language, but it does not prohibit respectful disagreement or inhibit complaints. This is hardly a case in

which a speaker’s “ ‘ability to communicate effectively

is threatened.’ ” Id. at 1042 (quoting City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984)). Accordingly,

the Code passes constitutional muster as a contentneutral and reasonable time, place, or manner regulation.

Our conclusion on this point also bears on Milestone’s

claim that the Code is impermissibly overbroad in

violation of the First Amendment. See Grayned v. City of

Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-21 (1972) (rejecting overbreadth

claim where ordinance was reasonable restriction, narrowly tailored to further significant governmental inter-
No. 10-1300 17

ests). “[A]n overbroad statute must reach a ‘substantial

number of impermissible applications’ before it may be

considered facially invalid.” United States v. Fletcher, 634

F.3d 395, 402 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting New York v. Ferber,

458 U.S. 747, 771 (1982)). As we have explained, the

Code regulates public disturbances and is narrowly

tailored to further the City’s significant interest in

ensuring that the Center remains a welcoming and peaceful place for senior citizens to gather. The Code does not

allow punishment based on viewpoint or prohibit respectful criticism or disagreement.

Finally, Milestone makes a due-process void-for-vagueness claim. A law is unconstitutionally vague if it fails

to sufficiently define the conduct it prohibits; the point

of vagueness doctrine is to permit individuals to

conform their conduct to the law’s requirements and to

guard against arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.

Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09; United States v. Dimitrov, 546

F.3d 409, 414 (7th Cir. 2008). The Code of Conduct is a

poor fit with this doctrine because it is just a set of rules

of decorum for the Senior Center; it is neither a statute

nor an ordinance, and violations do not result in arrest,

incarceration, or even a fine. Where the penalties for

noncompliance are less severe, a high level of clarity

generally is not required. See Gresham v. Peterson, 225

F.3d 899, 908 (7th Cir. 2000). Indeed, Milestone points to

no case in which a similar local rule was invalidated

on vagueness grounds.

To the extent that any analogy can be drawn, the Code

is akin to statutes prohibiting disruptive noises, see, e.g.,

Grayned, 408 U.S. at 107-14, disorderly conduct, see, e.g.,
18 No. 10-1300

The ordinance at issue in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.

4

104, 107-08 (1972), provided:

“[N]o person, while on public or private grounds adjacent

to any building in which a school or any class thereof is

in session, shall wilfully make or assist in the making of

any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb

the peace or good order of such school session or class

thereof . . . .”

Ovadal, 416 F.3d at 535-36, disturbing the peace, see, e.g.,

United States v. Woodard, 376 F.2d 136, 140-42 (7th Cir.

1967), or abusive personal behavior against others, such

as “aggressive panhandling,” see Gresham, 225 F.3d at 908-

09 (citing cases). All of these laws withstood vagueness

challenges. In Grayned, for example, the Supreme Court

looked to the ordinance itself and its preamble to

conclude that it prohibited, in clear enough terms, “deliberately noisy or diversionary activity that disrupts or

is about to disrupt normal school activities.” 408 U.S. at 4

110-11. Similarly here, the Code prohibits disruptive

behavior that interferes with other patrons’ ability to

use the Senior Center for its intended purpose. A person of reasonable intelligence would understand this

meaning. Gresham, 225 F.3d at 908 (“Laws must contain a

‘reasonable degree of clarity’ so that people of ‘common

intelligence’ can understand their meaning.” (quoting

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984))). To

the extent the Code is subject to vagueness analysis at

all, it is not unconstitutionally vague.

AFFIRMED.
No. 10-1300 19

Appendix—Senior Center Code of Conduct

MISSION STATEMENT

The Behring Senior Center of Monroe is a “home away

from home”, not negative and defeated, but positive and

dynamic, looking for the brighter things in life. 

It is a place where Senior Citizens have the opportunity

to meet on a local level. 

The Center will offer to Monroe, the surrounding

area and out-of-town guests, recreation, education, information, social services and health services and

encourage service to fellow citizens and the community

in general.

OBJECTIVE

1. To foster pride and respect in the Behring Senior

Center of Monroe facility, along with all equipment

and furnishings there in.

2. To keep the Behring Senior Center environment

pleasant and upbeat at all times.

3. To create a “home away from home” atmosphere for

all who come to the Center.

4. To provide services, assistance and support to anyone

55 years of age or older.

5. To promote exemplary personal habits and cleanliness.

6. To create Senior credibility and integrity in the community.
20 No. 10-1300

CODE OF CONDUCT

1. When in the Behring Senior Center of Monroe, all will

be treated with respect and courtesy regardless of

age, race or gender.

2. Use of abusive, vulgar, or demeaning language is

prohibited.

3. Any physically threatening conduct is prohibited.

4. Members of the Behring Senior Center staff, outside

instructors and Green County personnel will be

treated in a respectful manner.

5. Thievery in any form will not be tolerated.

6. The possession or use of alcohol, illicit drugs or weapons of any kind is strictly prohibited.

7. The Behring Senior Center is a non-smoking environment.

8. Attention to personal hygiene is expected and appreciated by all who use the center.

9. Violations of this code of conduct will be acted upon

by the Senior Center staff or Board of Directors.

11-21-11