NOT RECOMMENDED F OR F ULL-TEXT PUBLICATION F ile Nam e: 11a0591n.06 No. 10-3438 UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE S IXTH CIRCUIT

GREGORY BLAZ Y, P laintif f-App ellant,

v. J E F F E R S O N C O U N T Y R E G I O N A L P LANNING COMMISSION; JOHN S. F ABIAN, Defendan ts-Appellees. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP PEAL F ROM THE UNITED STA T ES DISTRICT COURT F OR THE SOUTH ERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Before: G IBBO NS, ST RANCH, and ROTH, Circuit Jud ges. * JULIA SMITH G IBBO NS, C ircuit Judge. Plaintiff-appe llant G reg ory M. Bla zy serve d

as the Direc tor of the J eff

erson County Reg ional Planning Commi ssion for a two-y ear term. When his contra ct was not rene wed, he filed suit ag ainst the Commi ssion and its president, J ohn S. Fa bian, alleg ing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of proce dural due proce ss and under state law for brea ch of contra ct and decla ratory relief

. The district court denied Bl az y ’s m o tion for partial summary judgme nt and g rante d the defe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt on the g rounds that Bla zy ’s contra ct did not cre ate a proper ty interest in continued employ ment en t i t l i n g him to due proce ss protec tion and, in the alternative, that Ohio law provided an adequate reme dy for his brea ch

The Honora

ble J ane R. Roth, United States Circuit J udg e for the Uni ted States Court of * Appea ls for the Third Circ uit, sit ting by desig nation. -1-No. 10-3438

Blazy v. J efferson Cnty. Reg’ l Planning Comm’n, et al. of contra ct claim. The district court also decl i n ed to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his

rema ining state law cla ims. W e af firm. I

. Bla zy is a reside nt of J eff erson County , Ohio, and wa s hired on April 28, 2006, to se rve as the Direc tor of the J eff

erson County Reg ional Planning Commi ssion (“Commission”). The Commi ssion is org anized under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 713.21 and operates in acc ordanc e with the Articles of Cooperation and By laws adopted by the Commi s s i o n . Bl azy ’s two-y ear , written employ ment contra ct was eff

ective retroa ctively

from Mar ch 27, 2006, until Marc h 28, 2008, and stated that, “[u] pon the approva l of the Commi ssion, this ag ree ment may be extended for a specific period as deter

mined by the Commi ssion.” The contra ct further provided that the “Commissi on may exercise the option of non-re newa l .

. . by providing a thirty

(30) day advanc e written notice to the Di rec tor.” As Direc tor, Bla zy serve d “at the pleasure of the Commi ssion” in an unclassi fi ed employ ment status. During his two-y ear term, Bla zy ’s working rela tionships with other County Commi ssioners and state office s alleg edly deter iorated. On J anuar y 17, 2008, in light of these problems, t h e Ex ecutive Commi ttee of the Commi ssion convene d, voted not to rene w Bla zy ’s contra ct, and place d him on paid admin i s t ra t i v e leave from J anuar y 22, 2008, until the ex piration of hi s contra ct. The Ex ecutive Commi ttee informed Bla zy of its decisions by hand-de l i v ere d corr espondenc e dated J anuar y 18, 2008, which stated that his c ontrac t w ould e x pire by its ter ms on Marc h 28, 2008. On J anuar y 23, 2008, when the Commi ssion convene d for its schedule d monthly meeting , J ohn Fa bian,

-2-No. 10-3438

Blazy v. J efferson Cnty. Reg’ l Planning Comm’n, et al. the P resident of t h e Commi ssion, alleg edly stated t hat t he Ex ecutive Comm ittee’s determinations as to Bla zy ’s non-re newa l were final and not subjec t to review, modifica tion, or approva l. Severa l provisions of the Ohio Revised Code and the Articles of Cooperation empower the Commi ssion to establish and deleg ate authority to an Ex ecutive Commi ttee. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 713.21(C) provides tha t the Commi ssion may establish committees with the power s it finds nece ssar y t o ca rr y on its work, including an executive committee to make final deter minations, decisions, finding s, rec ommendations, and order s as provided in the commission’s rules. All actions of these committees shall be repor ted in writing to the members of the reg ional planning commission no later than its ne x t me eting or within thirty day s from the date of the action, whiche ver is ea

rlier. Article of Cooperation 6.01 provides that “[a]ll of the power s and duties of the

. . . Commi ssion

. . . shall be possessed and may be exercised by the Ex ecutive Commi ttee, but alway s subject to revie w by the Commi ssion at any regular monthly meeting .” I n additi o n , Ar t icle 9.01 authorizes the Ex ecutive Committee to selec t a Dire ctor of the Commi ssion. On December 2, 2008, Bla zy filed sui t in fede ral dist rict court, alleg ing claims ag ainst the Commi ssion and Fa

bian for (1) a violation of proce dural due proce ss, (2) brea ch of contra ct, and (3) decla ratory relief. He argued that notice from the Ex ecutive Commi ttee alone was inadequate to satisfy the non-re newa l clause of his employ ment contra ct; that he was not aff orded an opportunity to be hear d by members of the Commi ssi o n ; t h at the Commi ssion, as a whole, never ratified the Ex ecutive Commi ttee ’ s n o n - r e n e w a l decision; that Fa bian acte d with malice and ill-will ag ainst him; and that the Commi ssion failed to act in confor mity with Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 713.21(C) or with the Article s of Coopera tion and By laws.

-3-No. 10-3438

Blazy v. J efferson Cnty. Reg’ l Planning Comm’n, et al. On Marc h 3, 2009, the defe ndants moved for judgme nt on the pleading s on the g rounds that Bla zy did not have a proper ty interest in his continued employ m en t an d thus was not deprive d of proce dural due proce ss; that Fa bian wa s en t i tled to qualified immunit y ; and that Bla zy was not entitled to reinstateme nt beca use “B lazy was an at-will employ ee who rec eived proper notice of nonrene wal.” The defe ndants also noted that Bla zy was desig nated as an unclassified employ ee and thus had neither a proper

ty interest in his employ

ment nor any en t i t l ement to proce dural due proce ss protec tion. Bla zy opposed this motion on May 4, 2009, and moved for partial summary judgme nt ag ainst the def endants, a rg uing tha t he had a protected property interest in hi s continued employ ment and that, pursuant to the Articles of Cooperation, the Ex ecutive Commi ttee lacke d the capa city to

au t h o ri z e the non-re newa l of his contra ct. He maintained that, althoug h Article of Cooperation § 9.01 deleg ated g ener al authority to the E x ecutive Commi ttee to selec t the Direc tor of the Commi ssion, this article was “ silent as to the authority of the Ex ecutive Commi ttee to dismiss the Direc tor or to decline to rene w his

. . . con t ra ct

. ” T h u s , absent timely notice from the full 1 Commi ssion of its dec ision to exercise the non-re newa l option, “the contra ct would automatica lly

rene w for a

n additional term bey ond the ‘initial term.’” On J uly 31, 2009, the defe ndants rene wed their motion for judgme nt on the pleading s and, in the alternative, soug ht summar y judgme nt on the same g rounds. They disputed Blazy ’s alleg ed proper ty interest in continued employ ment bey ond th e t wo -y ear term and noted that, even if the

Bla zy also contests whether the Co mm is s io n d e le g a te d a uth o r it y to th e E xe c uti ve Commi ttee 1 to make hiring decisions and c ontends that the full Commiss ion hired him. -4-No. 10-3438

Blazy v. J efferson Cnty. Reg’ l Planning Comm’n, et al. contra ct cre ated a proper

ty interest, Bla zy was timely notified by the Ex ecutive Commi ttee, which

was e mpowere d to make hiring and firing decisions. On Marc h 12, 2010, the district court denied Bla zy ’s motion for partial summary judgme nt and g rante d the defe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt, finding that there “[was] no independe nt basis from which [Blazy ] [could] claim a protec ted proper ty interest.” Although acknow ledg ing that a written contra ct, s uch as an employ ment ag ree ment, could create a p ro p er ty interest entitl ing an employ ee to due process protection, the court found t hat Blazy ’s contract create d a two-y ear term that expired on Marc h 28, 2008, and that did not automatically rene w in the absenc e of written notice by the Commi ssion. Thus, Bla zy ’s unilatera l e x pecta tion of rene wal was “insuffic ient to establish

a rea sonable expectation in continued employ ment.” See, e.g. , Bd. of

Rege nts v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The court also conclude d that, even if the co n t ra ct provided a proper ty interest in continued employ

ment, Bla zy had an adequate remedy for breac h of contract under Ohio law and there fore could not asser

t a § 1983 claim on this basis. Finally , having disposed of Bla zy ’s fede ral claim, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his rema ining state law claims. The c ourt enter ed its final judg ment on Marc h 16, 2010, and B lazy timely appea led. I I

. We revie w a district court’s gr ant of s u m m ar y j u d gm ent de novo

. Allen v. Mich. Dep’ t of Corr. , 165 F.3d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 1999)

. Summary judgme nt is proper “if the mova

nt show s that there is no g enuine dispute as to any materia l fac t and the movant is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law.” Fe d. R. Civ. P. 56(a)

. We must construe the evidenc e, fac ts, and all rea sonable infere nces draw n from them in the light most favor able to the nonmoving party

. Allen , 165 F.3d at 409 (citing -5-No. 10-3438

Blazy v. J efferson Cnty. Reg’ l Planning Comm’n, et al. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp ., 4 7 5 U.S. 574, 587 (1986))

. I n answe ring a proper ly supported motion for summary judgme nt, the nonmoving party must demonstrate that there is a g enuine issue for trial, which exis ts “‘if the evidenc e is such that a rea sonable jury could return

a verdic t for the nonmoving party .’” Holloway v. Brush , 220 F.3d 767, 772 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

I I I

. Bla zy arg ues here , as befor e the district cou rt , that the defe ndants infring ed his rig ht to proce dural due proce ss by violating his employ ment contra ct’s non-re newa l provision. He contends that, beca use the termination clause of the contra ct stated that “[t] he Commi ssion may exercise the option of n o n -r en ew al

. . . by providing a thirty (30) day advanc e written notice,” the contra ct “ther efor e confe rre d upon Bla zy a rea sonable expectation that his employ ment would rene w automatically from term to term unless official action taken by the Commi ssion in a timely and proper fashion fore closed any such rene wal.” Althoug h B la zy a c k n o w le d g e s rec eipt of the Ex ecutive Commi ttee’s non-re newa l decision on J anuar y 18, 2008, he argues that this notice was insufficient beca use the Ex ecutive Commi ttee was not empower ed to make this decision on behalf of the full Commi ssion and beca

use the committee’s written decision was not prese nted for revie w at the Commi ssion’s J anuary 23 monthly meeting

. He seeks “re instatement with back pay and the restoration of all perquisites of e mploy ment and rig hts of tenure .” The Four teenth Amendment’s du e p r o c e s s c la u s e in cludes a g uara

ntee of proce dural fairne ss, assuring that a depriva tion of life, liberty , or proper ty must “be prec eded by notice and opportunity for a hear ing appropr iate to the nature of the case .” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill , 470 U.S. -6-No. 10-3438

Blazy v. J efferson Cnty. Reg’ l Planning Comm’n, et al. 532, 542 (1985) (internal quotation marks omi tted). When evaluating a claim for the violation of due proce ss rig hts, “[t] his court undertakes a two-step analy sis.” Mitchell v. Fankhauser , 375 F.3d 477, 480 (6th Cir. 2004). At the first step, the plaintiff must, as a threshold matter, establish that he h ad a protec ted proper

ty interest in his continued employ ment entitling him to due proce s s protec tion. See id. ; Leary v. Daesc hner , 228 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir. 2000). As the Supreme Court has explained, a plaintiff cannot establish a proper ty i n t er es t i n a benef

it, such as continued employ ment, by demonstrating mere ly “a unilatera l expectation” or an “abstra ct need or desire for it”; he mus t demonstrate “ a leg itimate claim of entit lement t o it.” Roth , 408 U.S. at 577; see also Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales , 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005). At the second step, “if the plaintiff has such a protec ted proper

ty interest, this court must then deter mine what proce ss is due.” Mitchell , 375 F.3d a t 480 (internal quotation mar ks omitt ed). Pro p erty interests are not cre ated by the Constit ution but rathe r “ar e cre ated and their d imensions are define d by exis ting rules or understanding s that stem from an independe nt sourc e such as state law.” Roth , 408 U.S. at 577; see also W omen’ s Med. Prof’l Corp. v

. Baird , 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006). “A property interest can be cre ated by a st ate statute, a fo rm al contra ct,

or a contra ct implied from the circ umstances.” Singfield v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth. , 389 F.3d 555, 565 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Perry v. Sindermann , 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972)) ; accord Dorian v. Euclid Bd. of E duc. , 404 N.E.2d 155, 158 (Ohio 1980). I n this c ase, we must look to Ohio law and to the t erms of the employ

ment contra ct to deter

mine whether Bla zy had a “leg itimate expect at i o n o f continued employ

ment.” Johnson-Taylor v. G annon , 907 F.2d 1577, 1581 ( 6th Cir. 1990).

-7-No. 10-3438

Blazy v. J efferson Cnty. Reg’ l Planning Comm’n, et al. A. Bla zy claims that the Commi ssion infring ed his Four teenth Amendment rig ht to proce dural due proce ss b y “fa il[ ing] to g ive timely and proper notice of non-re newa l.” He states that the Commi ssion’s “fa ilure to follow regulations g overning the proce ss by which it takes officia l action” provided the “indepe ndent b as i s ” s u p p o rting § 1983 liability

. The defe ndants argue, in turn, that there is no independe nt basis on which Bla zy can claim a protec ted proper ty interest in employ

ment bey ond the two-y ear

term. We ag ree . The d efe ndants note that Bla zy , as Direc tor of the Commi ssion, is desig nated as an unclassified employ ee who “ser ves at the pleasure of the Commi ssion” and thus is not entitled to the statutorily -base d due proce ss protec tions aff orded to classified civil serva nts under Ohio law. I ndeed, we have rec og nized that “[t] here are critica l differ ence s betwee n classified and unclassified civil serva

nts” in Ohio: wher eas classified employ ees have tenure during “g ood behavior ,” can be discharg ed only for cause , and may not be deprive d of t h ei r p roper ty interest in continued employ ment without due proce ss of law, see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 124.34, unclassified employ ees “have no proper

ty rig ht to continued employ ment.” Christ ophel v. Kukulinksy , 61 F.3d 479, 482 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Vodila v. Clelland , 836 F.2d 231, 232 (6th Cir. 1987)). Bla zy does not contest his unclassified status. Howeve r, an employ ee may claim a proper ty i n t er es t in continued employ ment based upon contra ct, and Bla zy contends that his contra ct’s non-re newa l provision

cre ated suc h an intere st. The defe ndants also contend that, althoug h Bla zy ’s employ ment contra ct contemplated the possibili ty of s u b s equent terms, the contract does not cre ate a leg itimate expe ctation of continued -8-No. 10-3438

Blazy v. J efferson Cnty. Reg’ l Planning Comm’n, et al. employ ment bey o n d th e tw o - y

e a r te r m. Bla zy challeng es this interpre tation, arguing that the contra ct

cre ated a p roperty interest in continued employ ment by providing for automatic rene wal in the ab s en ce of notification to the contra ry by the Commi ssion. L ooking to the plain lang uage o f t h e contra ct, we conclude that the defe ndants have the better of the arguments. The contra ct’s “Te rms

o f Ag ree ment” set forth a fix ed two-y ear term of employ ment, starting on Marc h 27, 2006, and ending on Marc h 28, 2008. The contra ct also makes clea r that any extension “for a specific period

as deter mined by the Commi ssion” is “[u] pon the approva l of the Commi ssion.” Thus, contra ry to Bla zy ’s arg

ument, the contra ct does not provide for au t o m at i c re newa l in the absenc e of written notice. Nor

did the Commi ssion approve a subsequent term of employ ment. Bla zy ’s expectation of automati c re n ew al i s unsupported by the terms of the contra ct and insufficient to establish a proper ty interest in continued e mploy ment. Bl az y als o challeng es t he dis trict court’s reliance upon Roth , in which R oth, an untenu re d teac her, soug ht relief for an alleg ed depriva tion of proce dural due proce ss afte r the university notified him of its de cision not to rene w his contrac t for the next ac ademic y ear without pr oviding

a s t atement of rea sons or opportunity for a hear ing. 408 U.S. at 568. The Court reje ct ed R o t h ’s claim on the g rounds that his “‘pr operty ’ interest in employ ment

. . . was cre ated and define d by the terms of his a

ppointment”; tha t the se terms provided a define d ending date, with “no provision f or

rene wal whatsoeve r”; and that, despite his “abstra ct conce rn in being rehire d,” neither the contra ct terms nor university policy secur ed any leg itimate entitlement to r e-e mploy ment the next y ear . Id. at 578.

-9-No. 10-3438

Blazy v. J efferson Cnty. Reg’ l Planning Comm’n, et al. Bla zy argues that his case is distinguishable from Roth : while Roth was aff orded proper notice and was employ ed subject to a contra ct that included “no provision for rene wal whatsoeve r,” Bla zy ’s contra ct alleg edly contemplated rene wal absent written notice by the Co m m i s sion. He further arg ues that the Ex ecutive Commi ttee’s timely written notice of its non-re newa l decision was defe ctive beca

use the committee failed to prese nt its written decision to the full Commi ssion at the J anuar y 23 meeting , as require d by Ohio law. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 713.21(C) (“A ll actions of

. . . committees shall be repor ted in writing to the members of the reg ional planning commission

no later than its n ex t m ee t i n g . . . .”). Bla zy there fore maintains that he was entitled to automatic

rene wal to a se cond ter

m as Direc tor. Howeve r, even if his argument that the Ex ecutive Commi ttee failed to abide by the require ments o f § 7 1 3

. 2 1 (C) is meritorious, Bla zy ’s analy sis of his alleg ed proper ty interest in 2 continued employ

ment is misguided. He states that, if the full Commi ssion had issued proper notice, “[he] either would have had a chanc e to convince the Commi ssion to allow his contra ct to rene w or

. . . would have been g iven an opportunity to confr ont his acc users . . . or meet any evidenc e of perf ormanc e defic iencies

. . . throug h further discussions

. . . with the Commi ssion as a whole.” This arg ument is incorre ct. I n Rot h , al though university policy require d written notification of nonrete ntion decisions, the Supreme Court made clea r t h at R o t h wa s not entitled to a hear ing or a statement of rea sons following notification beca use he lacked a protec ted proper ty interest in his

Be cause it is an issue that we need not decide , we express no opinion as to whether the 2 Ex ecutive Commi ttee’s notification of its nonrene wal decision viol ated the require ments of Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. § 713.21(C). -10-No. 10-3438

Blazy v. J efferson Cnty. Reg’ l Planning Comm’n, et al. employ ment follo wi n g t h e expiration of his contra ct. Her e, for the same rea sons, Bla zy was not entitle d t o a hear ing or other proce ss reg ardle ss of whether he was notified by the Ex ecutive Commi ttee or the full Commi ssion: he was an unclassified employ ee; his contra ct provided for a fix ed ending date on Ma

rch 28, 2008; a

nd the Commiss ion did not elect to extend his contract. Although he contends that the contra ct’s notice of n o n -r enew al provision established an implied proper

ty interest i n co n t i n u ed employ ment, Bla zy has not identified any case law in this circ uit or in Ohio supporting his argument. Moreove r, our case law supports the defe ndants’ arg ument that an unclassifie d em p l o y ee does not acquir e a proper ty interest in continued employ ment mere ly by virtue of proce dural protec tions aff orded to him. See McClain v. NorthW est Comm. Corr. Ctr. Judicial Corr. Bd. , 440 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that an unclassified employ ee had no proper

ty interest under the Four teenth Amendment in continu ed em p l o y ment, notwithstanding a state reg ulation that provided s o m e due proce ss protec tion); Lake Mich. Coll. F ed ’n o f T eachers v. Lake Mich. Comm. Coll. , 518 F.2d 1091, 1095 (6th Cir. 1975) (noting that teac hers who were terminated under Mi chig an’s Publ ic Em ploy ment Relations Act (“ PERA”) for partici p at i n g i n an illega l strike did not acquir e a protec ted proper ty interest in continued employ ment “mer ely beca

use t he P ERA require s the employ er to follow cer tain proce dures when discharg ing the employ ee” ); see also Nigro v. Va. Commonwealth Univ. Med. Coll. , No. 5:09-CV00064, 2010 WL 2262539, at *6 (W.D. Va. J une 4, 2010) (stating t hat not ice procedur es relevant to the non-re newa l of a one -y ear contra ct did not “imply

a thre e-y ear

proper ty interest” g iven “the express lang uag e re g arding the contra ct’s ter m”).

-11-No. 10-3438

Blazy v. J efferson Cnty. Reg’ l Planning Comm’n, et al. Bla zy ’s claim, at its essenc e, is a brea ch of contra ct action as to whether , pursuant to Article of Cooperation § 6.01, the Ex ecutive Commi ttee was empower ed to make the non-re newa l decision; whether , pursuant to Ohio’s Open Meeting L aw, Ohio Rev. Code A nn. § 121.22, eac h member of the Ex ecutive Comm ittee was proper ly notified of t he J anuar y 17 meeting , in which B l azy ’s nonrene wal decision was made; and whether , pursuant to § 713.21(C), the committee failed to proper ly prese nt its decision in writing to the full Commi ssion at its J anuar y 23 meeting

. And, Bla zy cannot seek federa l re l i ef p ursuant to § 1983 for this alleg ed brea ch of contra ct. I n Ramsey v. Board of Education of W

hitley County , 844 F.2d 1268, 1273 (6th Cir. 1988), we stated that “[w]hen a person is hired for a fix ed per iod of time or pursuant to a c ontrac t providing f or employ

ment ‘at will’ . .

. and that person is dismiss ed prema turely , no fede ra l ca u s e o f action lies under section 1983 to redr ess what is best char acte rized as an ordinary brea ch of contra ct.” We explained that “a nontenure d employ ee’ s proper ty interest in co n t i n ued employ ment is cre ated and define d by the employ ee’ s contra ct” and that “the depriva tion of that finite interest can be compensa ted adequately by an ordina ry brea ch of c ontrac t action.” Id. at 1274. 3 Bla zy was not d i smissed prema turely from his two-y ear term as Direc tor, and he was compensa ted t hroug h the ex piration of hi s contra ct. W e af firm t he dis trict court’s determinations that Bla zy lacke d a proper ty interest in employ

ment bey ond the contr ac t ’s M ar ch 28, 2008,

Bla zy disputes the applicability of Ramsey

. Ho wever, in doing so, he quotes portions of 3 Ramsey perta ining to tenure d employ ees and there fore misunderstands his status as an unclassified, untenure d em p l o y ee wh o serve d “at the pleasure of the Commi ssion.” He also contends that his contra ct provided f

or “just ca

use” te rmination. The re cord doe s not support this i nterpre tation.

-12-No. 10-3438

Blazy v. J efferson Cnty. Reg’ l Planning Comm’n, et al. termination date and there fore is not entitled to r elief under § 1983 for a depriva tion of proce dural due proc ess. 4 B. Bl az y al s o contends that the district court err ed in declining to exercise sup p l em en t al jurisdiction over his state law claims for brea ch of contra ct and decla ratory judgme nt and in dismiss ing these claims without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (3). “This court reviews a district co u rt ’s d ec i sion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim for abuse of discretion.” Unger v. City of Mentor , 387 F. App’x 589, 591–92 (6th Cir. 2010) (c iting Carlsbad Tech., Inc . v. HI

F Bio, Inc. , 129 S. Ct . 1862, 1867 (2009))

. As Bla zy acknow ledg es, “[r]esoluti on of

. . . [hi s] substantive claims turns on questions of law involving the interpre tation and application of the written employ ment ag ree ment and rele vant statutory and corpor ate g overna nce provisions that condition and define the limit s” of the Ex ecutive Commi ttee’s authority

. Given that the alleg ed brea ch of the contra ct’s notice provision hinge s upon various provisions of Ohio and local law, including Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 121.22 and 713.21(C) and Ar ticle of Cooper ation § 6.01, the district c ourt acte d well within its discretion in dec lining to revie w this claim. I ndeed, we have stated that “if the fede ral claims are dismiss ed befor e trial, . . . the state c laims [ g ener ally ] shoul d be dismissed as well.” Saglioccolo v. EagleIns. Co. , 112 F.3d Having deter

mined that Bla zy lacke d a proper ty interest in continued employ ment bey ond 4 his two-y ear term and thus cannot seek relief under § 1983 ag ainst the Commi ssion for a depriva tion of proce dural due proce ss, we also conclude that Bla z y ’s p roce dural due proce ss claim ag ainst Fa bian, in his persona l capa city , is withou t m er i t

. Fu rthermor e, beca use Bla zy had no proper

ty interest in c ontinued employ ment, and ther efor e no basis for seeking relief under § 1983, w e nee d not addre ss Blazy ’s ar g ument conce rning the ade quacy of a r emedy

under O hio law. -13-No. 10-3438

Blazy v. J efferson Cnty. Reg’ l Planning Comm’n, et al. 226, 233 (6th Cir. 1997) (intern al q u o t ation marks omitted) (alter ations in orig inal). The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction over Bla zy ’s claims for brea ch of c ontrac t and dec lara tory judgme nt. I V. For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the district court.

-14-