In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

________________________

No. 07-21-00088-CV 

________________________

JOHN T. GONZALES, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

ALICIA POUNDS, APPELLEE 

 

 

On Appeal from the 53rd District Court 

Travis County, Texas 

Trial Court No. D-1-FM-18-000396; Honorable Jan Soifer, Presiding 

 

February 4, 2022 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before PIRTLE and PARKER and DOSS, JJ. 

This appeal involves post-divorce enforcement matters surrounding the dissolution 

of the marriage between Appellant, John T. Gonzales, and Appellee, Alicia Pounds. 

Gonzales appeals the trial court’s Order on Motion for Enforcement entered in the 

underlying cause following a hearing on competing motions for enforcement of the parties’ 

Agreed Final Decree of Divorce. The trial court’s order found that the present unpaid 
2

balance of an “equalization judgment” owed by Pounds to Gonzales under the terms of

the original decree was $200,285.28; however, the trial court ordered that the unpaid

balance be reduced or offset by (1) $86,237.56 for Gonzales’s one-half of the parties’ 

2017 tax liability, (2) $30,572.00 for the penalties and interest accrued on the parties’ 

2017 federal taxes paid, (3) $14,220.00 for attorney’s fees paid by Pounds to Walters 

Gilbreath, PLLC, (4) $17,590.00 for attorney’s fees paid by Pounds for Five Stone Tax 

Advisers, and (5) $3,818.25 for Gonzales’s one-half of the fees paid to John Knox for 

preparation of the parties’ 2017 joint federal tax return. Via this appeal, Gonzales 

challenges the trial court’s order through eight issues.1 We will affirm in part and reverse 

and remand in part. 

BACKGROUND

Gonzales filed for divorce on January 22, 2018, and an Agreed Final Decree of 

Divorce was subsequently entered on March 7, 2019. The decree made provisions for 

the conservatorship and support of three minor children and the division of the community 

estate of the parties. Pursuant to that decree, Pounds was awarded a business; however, 

she was required to pay Gonzales for his community interest in that business. To that 

end, Gonzales was granted an “equalization judgment” in the amount of $770,000, 

secured by Pounds’s primary residence and certain other rental properties awarded to 

her by the decree. Pounds was also required to pay the equalization judgment in monthly 

installments of $23,333, with a three percent interest rate beginning February 1, 2019. 

1 Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, sitting in Austin, this appeal was transferred to 

this court by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 

73.001 (West 2013). Should a conflict exist between precedent of the Third Court of Appeals and this court 

on any relevant issue, this appeal will be decided in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court. 

TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
3

Pounds paid those installments to Gonzales until March 2020. Pounds defaulted on the 

payments and an acceleration clause in the periodic payment agreement contained in the 

decree was triggered, causing the full amount of the judgment to become immediately 

due and payable.

2

Per the parties’ agreement, an accountant, John Knox, was to prepare the parties’ 

tax returns. Knox prepared for the parties both their corporate and individual returns. At 

issue here is the 2017 federal joint tax return, the last joint tax return due for income 

earned prior to the divorce. The parties incurred a tax liability of approximately $199,000 

for that tax year. The Decree set forth that Pounds was to pay an initial $60,000, plus 

penalties and interest “arising solely out of the failure to previously make the $60,000 

payment to the Internal Revenue Service.” The parties were then to each pay one-half 

of the remaining tax liability, plus any penalties and interest. Knox prepared the 2017 tax 

return on June 10, 2019. Pounds immediately provided her consent to Knox to file the 

return. However, Gonzales did not. Due to his expertise as a tax consultant, Gonzales

requested certain documents to review before consenting to the filing of their return. 

Evidence presented at trial showed he received those documents in the summer of 20203

and within a week, he informed Knox and Pounds that he found additional medical 

expenses of $6,000 and $111,962 in standard deductions, giving the parties a tax credit 

2 Gonzales testified he attempted foreclosure proceedings but was unable to do so due to COVID19 restrictions. He told the court he had incurred over $10,000 in attorney’s fees as part of that process. 

3 The parties disagree as to which of them caused the delay. Pounds contends Gonzales refused 

to respond to inquiries regarding his consent to file the 2017 tax return, but Gonzales contends he could 

not access or obtain the documents he requested from Pounds for well over a year. After hearing evidence, 

the trial court determined it was Gonzales’s inaction that caused the delay. 
4

of approximately $58,250. Gonzales finally provided consent to file the 2017 tax return 

the day before the hearing in this matter.

Pounds testified that she defaulted on the payments to Gonzales in March 2020 

because without the 2017 tax return she could not refinance her properties and thus had 

to choose whether to meet her payroll obligations for the business or to pay Gonzales. 

She admitted that at one point, she told Gonzales she was diverting the monthly payments 

due to him to the IRS but later acknowledged that was untrue. 

To secure payment of the $770,000 equalization judgment, an owelty lien4 was 

placed on the real property that was awarded to Pounds in the division of assets. At 

Pounds’s request, the trial court also ordered that any money from the sale of that real 

property be placed in a trust account. Pounds sold her primary residence in August 2020 

and the proceeds from that sale were placed in that trust account. Thereafter, the parties 

filed competing motions for enforcement of the Agreed Final Decree of Divorce and

disposition of the money in that trust was delayed until such time as the trial could

determine whether Pounds was entitled to any offsets. 

The trial court held a hearing on the parties’ motions in October 2020.5 Through 

that hearing, Pounds sought to offset the judgment owed to Gonzales by one-half of the 

4 An owelty is the difference in value that results when a court divides real property into shares of 

unequal value in partition proceedings. McNally v. McNally, No. 02-18-00142-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 

7211, at *17-18 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 3, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citation omitted). The court 

may then order an owelty payment to equalize the shares’ value and impose a lien on the greater share in 

favor of the recipient of the lesser share to secure the owelty payment. Id. (citation omitted). “Application 

of the doctrine of owelty is limited to those cases in which partition in kind is adjudged.” Id. (citing Rodriguez 

v. Rivas, 573 S.W.3d 447, 453 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, no pet.); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Nauert, 200 

S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1941, no writ) (“In case there be a partition in kind, owelty may be 

adjudged to achieve a fair and equitable partition.”)).

5 The hearing was held via Zoom in accordance with COVID-19 protocols. 
5

remaining tax liability owed as well as by other fees, including attorney’s fees. By that 

time, Pounds had filed a separate tax return for 2017 and had entered a payment plan 

with the IRS by which she paid $1,000 per month until February 2021, after which she 

was to pay $23,000 per month.6 Pounds asked the trial court to order the filing of the 

2017 joint tax return, to deduct $94,000 (one-half of remaining tax liability) from the 

equalization judgment, to hold Gonzales responsible for the late penalties and interest,7

and to require Gonzales to pay one-half of monies she paid to Knox as well as one-half 

of the attorney’s fees she had incurred.

Gonzales asked the trial court to find that Pounds failed to timely pay her 

installment payments to him and failed to cure the default by paying the full amount once 

it was accelerated. He also asked the trial court to award to him the full amount held in 

the trust account from the sale of Pounds’s residence as partial payment on the

accelerated equalization judgment. Third, he requested that the trial court award him 

reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as they related to the enforcement motions. 

Lastly, he asked the trial court to allow him discretion to enter a payment plan with the 

IRS or to negotiate and pay a lower lump sum to satisfy his tax liability to the IRS.

6 Pounds testified that Gonzales does not pay on his obligations, and accordingly, she believed a 

payment plan with the IRS was inadvisable. In the event Gonzales did not pay his IRS obligations, the IRS 

would be entitled to seek payment from her. She owned properties and other assets while Gonzales owned 

only a home and two rather invaluable vehicles. 

7 Testimony at the hearing indicated that had Gonzales consented in June 2019 to the filing of the 

2017 tax return, the parties would not have incurred the additional late penalties and interest. 
6

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court asked each party to submit 

attorney’s fees requests and written closing arguments by the Friday of the following 

week. 

Two months after the hearing, the trial court entered its Order on Motion for 

Enforcement. In it, it denied the relief Gonzales requested and stated the following:

IT IS ORDERED that the equalization judgment owed from ALICIA 

POUNDS to JOHN GONZALES under the parties’ Agreed Final Decree of 

Divorce is currently $200,285.28 (after the payment of $40,000.00, which 

JOHN GONZALES has already received).

IT IS ORDERED that the above-mentioned equalization judgment shall be 

offset by the following judgments against JOHN GONZALES:

a. $86,237.56 for JOHN GONZALES’ one-half of the parties’ 

2017 tax liability (to be paid directly to the IRS);

b. $30,572.00 for the penalties and interest accrued on the 

parties’ 2017 taxes since June 15, 2019 (to be paid directly to 

the IRS);

c. $14,220.00 for Walters Gilbreath, PLLC’s’ attorney’s fees;

d. $17,590.00 for Five Stone Tax Advisers’ attorney’s fees; 

and

e. $3,818.25 for JOHN GONZALES’ one-half of the fees due 

to John Knox for preparation of the parties’ tax returns.

As a result of the above offset, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the 

equalization judgment currently due from ALICIA POUNDS to JOHN 

GONZALES is $47,847.47. IT IS ORDERED that this amount shall be paid 

to JOHN GONZALES from the funds currently held in trust with Evans 

Family Law Group.

IT IS ORDERED that after the payment of $86,237.56 and $30,572.00 

directly to the IRS from the funds held in trust with Evans Family Law Group, 

any remaining amount held in Evans Family Law Group trust account shall 

be paid to ALICIA POUNDS.

ALICIA POUNDS is ORDERED to pay the IRS directly for her one-half of 

the parties’ 2017 tax liability being $86,237.56, as well as one-half of any 
7

and all remaining penalties and interest owed on the parties’ 2017 taxes 

after JOHN GONZALES has made his $30,572.00 payment.

Thereafter, Gonzales filed with the trial court a request for findings of fact and 

conclusions of law. The court entered its findings and conclusions on January 28, 2021. 

Gonzales also filed a motion for new trial and a request for a temporary restraining order. 

Gonzales then appealed the trial court’s order, bringing eight issues before this court. 

Pounds did not favor this court with a brief. 

ANALYSIS

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a decree of divorce, a trial court’s property division is reviewed 

under an abuse of discretion standard. Swaab v. Swaab, 282 S.W.3d 519, 524 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). Likewise, a trial court’s ruling on a 

post-decree motion to enforce or clarify a decree of divorce is reviewed under an abuse 

of discretion standard. In re Marriage of McDonald, 118 S.W.3d 829, 832 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2003, pet. denied).

In a family law case, legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are not 

independent grounds for reversal, but they are relevant factors in assessing whether the 

trial court abused its discretion. Moore v. Moore, 383 S.W.3d 190, 198 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2012, pet. ref’d). To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion 

because the evidence was either legally or factually insufficient to support a trial court’s

discretionary decision, we consider whether the trial court: (1) had sufficient evidence on 

which to exercise that discretion or (2) erred in the application of that discretion. Moroch 

v. Collins, 174 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied). We conduct the 
8

applicable sufficiency review when considering the first prong of the test. Id. (citation 

omitted). We then determine whether, based on the elicited evidence, the trial court made 

a reasonable decision. Id. (citation omitted). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if 

there is some evidence of a substantive and probative character to support the decision. 

Id. (citation omitted). 

In an appeal from a bench trial, the trial court’s findings of fact have the “same 

force and dignity” as a jury’s answers to jury questions. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 

806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991). As such, we review a trial court’s findings of fact under 

the same legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence standards used to determine 

whether sufficient evidence exists to support an answer to a jury question. Ortiz v. Jones, 

917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996). We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. 

Smith v. Smith, 22 S.W.3d 140, 143-44 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). 

In that regard, we will follow a trial court’s conclusion of law unless it is erroneous as a 

matter of law. Id. at 144.

A party appealing from a non-jury trial in which the trial court made findings of fact

and conclusions of law should direct a sufficiency of the evidence attack at specific

findings of fact, rather than at the judgment as a whole. Betancourt v. Ohmer, No. 09-18-

00121-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 323, at *7-8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 17, 2019, no 

pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Nw. Park Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Brundrett, 970 S.W.2d 700, 

704 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied)). 

A challenge to an unidentified finding of fact may be sufficient if we can fairly 

determine from the argument the specific finding of fact that the appellant challenges. 
9

Betancourt, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 323, at *8 (citing Shaw v. Cty. of Dallas, 251 S.W.3d 

165, 169 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (citing Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp., 171 

S.W.3d 857, 863 (Tex. 2005)). Although here Gonzales fails to challenge any specific

finding of fact in any of the discussions of his issues, we can fairly determine from the 

arguments which findings Gonzales is challenging.

ISSUE ONE—ABUSE OF DISCRETION REGARDING PENALTIES AND INTEREST ACCRUED

Through his first issue, Gonzales argues the trial court abused its discretion by

ordering him to pay one hundred percent of the penalties and interest that accrued on the 

parties’ 2017 tax liability from June 10, 2019, until the date of the enforcement hearing. 

He contends this order improperly modified or changed the agreed-upon division of 

property set forth in the Agreed Final Decree of Divorce. 

Gonzales argues the trial court abused its discretion in making this order 

“especially when [Gonzales’s] reasonable efforts to review the underlying documentation 

resulted in a reduction in tax liability exceeding $106,000.” He further argues that the 

Family Code is “very clear that the trial court lacks the authority to modify or amend the 

Final Decree.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.002, 9.007(a) (West 2020). See also Powell v.

Stover, 165 S.W.3d 322, 324 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (a trial court abuses its 

discretion when it fails to analyze or apply the law correctly). He says the trial court did 

so here because it “carved out additional obligations” that resulted in additional debts 

being awarded to him.

An agreed property division incorporated into a final divorce decree is treated as a 

contract and is controlled by the rules of construction applicable to ordinary contracts. 
10

Gulliksen v. Gulliksen, No. 02-20-00203-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 3493, at *6 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth May 6, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Howard v. Howard, 490 S.W.3d 

179, 184 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (citing Allen v. Allen, 717 

S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex. 1986)). “The same rules of interpretation apply in ascertaining the 

meaning of judgments as in ascertaining the meaning of other written instruments.” 

Cortez v. Chapa, No. 13-19-00193-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 284, at *15-16 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi Jan. 14, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Treadway v. Shanks, 110 

S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. granted), aff’d, 110 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2003)

(citing Lone Star Cement Corp. v. Fair, 467 S.W.2d 402, 404-05 (Tex. 1971)). Whether 

a written instrument is ambiguous is a question of law. Cortez, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 

284, at *15-16 (citing Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great Western Drilling, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d 

882, 889 (Tex. 2019)). “A document is ambiguous only when the application of pertinent 

rules of interpretation results in genuine uncertainty as to which one of two or more 

meanings is proper.” Cortez, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 284, at *16 (citing Treadway, 110 

S.W.3d at 6 (citing Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Daniel, 150 Tex. 513, 243 S.W.2d 154, 

157 (Tex. 1951)). A written instrument “is not ambiguous simply because the parties 

disagree over its meaning.” Cortez, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 284, at *16 (citing Dynegy 

Midstream Servs., Ltd. P'shp v. Apache Corp., 294 S.W.3d 164, 168 (Tex. 2009) (citing

Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. 

1996)).

If the written instrument can be given a certain or definite legal meaning or 

interpretation, then there is no ambiguity, and the court will construe the instrument as a 

matter of law. Cortez, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 284, at *16 (citing Pathfinder, 574 S.W.3d 
11

at 889; Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983)). Our primary objective is to 

give effect to the instrument’s written expression. Cortez, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 284, at 

*16 (citing URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County, 543 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. 2018) (citing Valence 

Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex. 2005)). “[T]he parties’ intent is 

governed by what they said, not by what they intended to say but did not.” Cortez, 2021 

Tex. App. LEXIS 284, at *16 (citing Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 744, 746 

(Tex. 2006) (citing Balandran v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 972 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex. 

1998)). We interpret the language of a written instrument “according to its ‘plain, ordinary, 

and generally accepted meaning’ unless the instrument directs otherwise.” Cortez, 2021 

Tex. App. LEXIS 284, at *16 (citing URI, Inc., 543 S.W.3d at 764 (quoting Heritage Res., 

Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996)).

We agree that the trial court does not have the authority to alter, amend, modify, 

or change the division of property made or approved in the decree of divorce or alter or 

change the substantive division of the property. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.007(a). The 

trial court “may specify more precisely the manner of effecting the property division 

previously made or approved if the substantive division of the property is not altered or 

changed.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.006(b) (West 2020). The question before us, then, 

is whether the trial court’s order that Gonzales alone pay the penalties and interest 

assessed against the tax liability of the couple from June 2019 to the date of the 

enforcement hearing altered, amended, modified, or changed the division of the property 

set forth in the Agreed Final Decree of Divorce or whether it merely clarified or enforced 

the agreement. 
12

The divorce decree states, as it pertains to 2017 tax liability, that Gonzales and 

Pounds:

shall be fifty percent (50%) responsible for the payment of any additional 

tax liability, including any penalty and interest remaining after the payment 

of the $60,000.00 by ALICIA POUNDS. IT IS ORDERED that John Knox, 

CPA[,] shall determine the amount each party shall pay pursuant to the 

terms of the Arbitration Award dated February 19, 2019. 

(Emphasis added). 

Taking into consideration the rules concerning interpretation of written 

agreements, we note the plain language of the decree clearly provides that Gonzales and 

Pounds agreed that each party would pay fifty percent of the 2017 tax liability, including 

any penalty and interest remaining after Pounds’s $60,000.00 payment. The parties’ 

intent is clear and unambiguous. However, at the time of the entry of the decree, the 

parties had not incurred the additional $30,572.00 in penalties and interest because the 

filing of the 2017 tax return had not yet been delayed. By the time of the enforcement 

hearing, however, the filing had been delayed for a long period of time. The trial court 

heard evidence that the delay was due solely to Gonzales’s inaction and set forth in its 

conclusions of law that “JOHN GONZALES’S inaction since June 15, 2019 caused the 

accrual of penalties and interest on the parties’ 2017 federal income tax liability in an 

amount of $30,572.00; thus, the Court ordered JOHN GONZALES to pay these penalties 

and interest.” While, based on the record before us, we can see the equities the trial 

court may have been trying to address, the agreement of the parties was clear and 

unambiguous—each party was to pay one-half of any penalty and interest remaining after 

Pounds’s $60,000.00 payment. To the extent that the trial court ordered otherwise, it

altered or amended both the agreement of the parties and the prior decree of divorce and, 
13

in doing so, it acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. As such, it

abused its discretion. Gonzales’s first issue is sustained. 

ISSUE TWO—ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING GONZALES TO PAY TAX LIABILITY 

IMMEDIATELY OUT OF FUNDS RECEIVED IN EQUALIZATION JUDGMENT

Via his second issue, Gonzales argues the trial court abused its discretion when it 

credited as an offset his one-half of the parties’ 2017 tax liability against the outstanding 

balance of the equalization judgment and authorized the Evans Family Law Group, to pay 

those sums directly to the IRS. He argues this modified the property division set forth in 

the divorce decree in violation of section 9.007(a) of the Family Code. See TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 9.007(a). In addition, Gonzales argues, the court permitted Pounds to enter 

into a monthly installment plan with the IRS that would result in additional penalties and 

interest for which he could be liable. 

Gonzales asserts that the ruling of the trial court was not an attempt to clarify the 

divorce decree but rather was “castigatory in nature” and exceeded the authority of the 

trial court, given that there was no time standard for making any payment to the IRS in 

the Agreed Final Decree of Divorce. Moreover, Gonzales contends, Pounds never 

completed personal service on him as it related to the enforcement pleading and 

accordingly, she was precluded from obtaining a contempt ruling against him. 

Here, we disagree with Gonzales’s contentions. First, the trial court’s order does 

not impose any financial or monetary obligation that did not previously exist, and, as such,

Gonzales has not identified any new obligation imposed by the trial court’s order that was 

not already present in the divorce decree. Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 274 S.W.3d 

811, 819 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). The plain language of the divorce decree 
14

indicates the parties agreed that each party was responsible for one-half of the couples’ 

2017 tax liability. Because the decree did not specifically state how that payment was to 

be made, the trial court’s order simply clarified and enforced the obligation already set 

forth in the decree. The imposition of a specific time and manner for Gonzales to pay his 

existing obligation did not alter, amend, modify, or change the underlying property 

division. Gills v. Harris, No. 11-15-00018-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 908, at *6 (Tex. 

App.—Eastland Feb. 2, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Hollingsworth, 274 S.W.3d at 

819). 

Further, it is irrelevant that Pounds had previously entered into a payment plan 

with the IRS to pay her one-half of the parties’ 2017 tax liability as she was attempting to 

fulfill her responsibility under the parties’ Agreed Final Decree of Divorce. Nevertheless, 

the trial court also ordered Pounds to “pay the IRS directly for her one-half of the parties’ 

2017 tax liability being $86,237.56, as well as one-half of any and all remaining penalties 

and interest owed on the parties’ 2017 taxes after JOHN GONZALES has made his 

$30,572.00 payment.” As such, there was no payment plan from which additional 

penalties and interest could result. Lastly, we note no contempt ruling was made against 

Gonzales. Accordingly, we overrule Gonzales’s second issue. 

ISSUE THREE—ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AWARD OF EQUALIZATION JUDGMENT 

WITHOUT THREE PERCENT INTEREST

By his third issue, Gonzales argues the trial court abused its discretion by 

modifying the property division as set forth in the Agreed Final Decree of Divorce, violating 

section 9.007(a) of the Family Code, when it determined the unpaid balance of the 
15

equalization judgment awarded to him, without including the three percent interest as 

ordered in the decree. 

During the hearing, Pounds told the court the total amount owed to Gonzales was 

$200,285.28, taking into consideration a $40,000.00 payment she previously made to 

him. Gonzales, on the other hand, told the court that Pounds owed him $223,325.11,

taking into consideration the three percent interest Pounds owed to Gonzales, as 

provided for in the decree. Because the trial court found Pounds owed to him 

$200,285.28, Gonzales argues, it erred because that figure did not include the required 

three percent interest for the period of time at issue. 

The Agreed Final Decree of Divorce included a provision concerning the 

equalization judgment that read, “By agreement of the parties, such judgment shall be 

without penalty for pre-payment and interest on such judgment shall be abated until 

February 1, 2019. Thereafter, IT IS ORDERED that beginning on February 2, 2019 said 

money judgment shall incur three percent (3%) statutory interest.”

We apply the standards of interpretation of written judgments here as set forth in 

our discussion of Gonzales’s first issue. In doing so, we find the plain language of the 

decree provides that a three percent interest should be imposed on the remaining balance 

of the equalization judgment. Because the trial court’s order failed to include that interest, 

we find the trial court erred. We sustain Gonzales’s third issue. 
16

ISSUE FOUR—ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DETERMINING INTEREST AND PENALTIES IN 

ABSENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY

In his list of appellate issues, Gonzales sets forth a statement that the trial court 

abused its discretion in determining the interest and penalties related to the parties’ 2017 

tax liability from June 10, 2019, through the enforcement hearing was $30,572.00 

because there was no expert testimony provided. Gonzales does not, however, set forth 

any argument or cite any legal authority in his appellate brief on this issue. His argument 

proceeds from a discussion of issue three to a discussion of issues five and six. As such, 

he has presented nothing for our review and has waived this issue. See TEX. R. APP. P.

38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, 

with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”); WorldPeace v. Comm’n for 

Lawyer Discipline, 183 S.W.3d 451, 460 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. 

denied) (finding waiver of appellate arguments in the absence of “argument or citations 

to the record or to authority”). We thus overrule Gonzales’s fourth issue. 

ISSUES FIVE AND SIX—ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DETERMINING ATTORNEY’S FEES

Via his fifth issue, Gonzales asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when 

it awarded attorney’s fees to Pounds for her tax attorneys in the absence of expert 

testimony or exhibits to establish the reasonableness and necessity of the fees. Further, 

he contends through his sixth issue that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 

his request for attorney’s fees despite the affirmance that he was owed money related to 

his equalization judgment and that the decree mandated that the fees be paid if default 

by Pounds resulted in legal action.
17

In Texas, each party generally must pay its own attorney’s fees. Rohrmoos 

Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 483 (Tex. 2019) (citations 

omitted). However, in some circumstances, such as when authorized by statute or 

contract, a prevailing party may recover fees from the opposing party. Brewer v. Lennox

Hearth Products, LLC, 601 S.W.3d 704, 721 n.71 (Tex. 2020). A trial court may award 

reasonable attorney’s fees in a proceeding for enforcement of a divorce decree under 

section 9.014 of the Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.014 (West 2020). A 

party seeking attorney’s fees “bears the burden of providing sufficient evidence” that the 

requested fees are both necessary and reasonable. Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 

498. The amount of attorney’s fees awarded by the trial court in a bench trial is a matter 

subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard. Ridge Oil Co. v. Guinn Invs., 

Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 163 (Tex. 2004). The trial court abuses its discretion if it awards 

expenses without legally and factually sufficient evidence that the attorney’s fees were 

reasonable and necessary. Id. 

In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient, we must consider 

evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding and indulge every 

reasonable inference that would support it. Betancourt, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 323, at *9 

(citing Bass v. Walker, 99 S.W.3d 877, 883 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. 

denied)). When conducting our analysis, we must credit favorable evidence if a 

reasonable fact finder could and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact

finder could not. Betancourt, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 323, at *9 (citation omitted). When 

reviewing a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the entire 

record, considering both the evidence in favor of, and contrary to, the challenged 
18

finding. Id. (citing Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986)). After considering all 

the evidence, we will set aside the fact finding only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming 

weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Betancourt, 2019 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 323, at *9 (citing Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986)). In a 

nonjury trial, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the 

weight to be given to their testimony. Betancourt, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 323, at *9 (citing

Tate v. Commodore Cty. Mut. Ins., Co., 767 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, 

writ denied)).

In reviewing the sufficiency of the attorney’s fee evidence set forth here, the 

lodestar analysis applies, as it does in “any situation in which an objective calculation of 

reasonable hours worked times a reasonable rate can be employed.” Rohrmoos Venture, 

578 S.W.3d at 498. Under the lodestar method, the fact finder begins the attorney fee

calculation by determining the reasonable hours worked multiplied by a reasonable hourly 

rate. Id. “Sufficient evidence includes, at a minimum, evidence of (1) particular services 

performed, (2) who performed those services, (3) approximately when the services were 

performed, (4) the reasonable amount of time required to perform the services, and (5) 

the reasonable hourly rate for each person performing such services.” Id. Obtaining such 

evidence requires “itemizing specific tasks” and “the time required for those tasks.” Id. at 

495 (quoting City of Laredo v. Montano, 414 S.W.3d 731, 736 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam)). 

The fees incurred or contracted for do not themselves establish reasonableness or 

necessity. Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 495. The result of the lodestar calculation, 

on the other hand, is presumed to represent a reasonable and necessary attorney fee.

Id. at 501.
19

In rare circumstances, the lodestar figure may be adjusted upward or downward, 

but only if specific evidence overcomes the presumption of reasonableness and shows 

that the adjustment is necessary to achieve a reasonable fee award. Milliken v. Turoff, 

No. 14-19-00761-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 4188, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

May 27, 2021, no pet.) (citing Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 500-01). The lodestar

figure may not be adjusted based on considerations that are already inherently subsumed 

within the lodestar calculation. Id. (citation omitted). Considerations that the lodestar

calculation already takes into account usually include, at a minimum, “the time and labor 

required,” “the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved,” “the skill required to 

perform the legal service properly,” “the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar 

legal services,” “the amount involved,” “the experience, reputation, and ability of the 

lawyer or lawyers performing the services,” “whether the fee is fixed or contingent on 

results obtained,” “the uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been 

rendered,” and “results obtained.” Milliken, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 4188, at *7 (citations 

omitted). 

As noted, the trial court did not hold a hearing regarding attorney’s fees. Rather, 

it requested written submission of requests for those fees a week following the hearing. 

Included in the record are invoices setting forth the rate charged, the time spent, and a 

brief description of the tasks performed. However, this information is not a substitute for 

testimony explaining the reasonableness and necessity of those fees. See, e.g., Jarvis 

v. Rocanville Corp., 298 S.W.3d 305, 319 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied) (attorney 

testified the fees were reasonable and necessary). It is no better than “general, 

conclusory testimony” that is “devoid of any real substance.” Rohrmoos Venture, 578 
20

S.W.3d at 501-02. Such evidence has been found insufficient to support an award of 

attorney’s fees. Id. Compare In re A.M., No. 02-18-00412-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 

5334, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 4, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding testimony 

of attorney regarding qualifications, hourly rate as fair and reasonable among family law 

practitioners in his area and experience, time spent on case, and travel and attendance 

at hearing sufficient to show attorney’s fees were reasonable and necessary). Having 

considered the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding and indulging

every reasonable inference that would support the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees, 

we are of the opinion that the evidence is factually insufficient. Accordingly, we thus 

sustain Gonzales’s fifth issue. In light of this ruling, we remand this issue to the trial court 

for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

We turn now to Gonzales’s contention that the trial court erred in denying his 

request for attorney’s fees. The record shows Pounds agreed she defaulted on the 

agreement set forth in the Agreed Final Decree of Divorce when she stopped making 

installment payments to Gonzales in March 2020. Gonzales testified that under the 

divorce decree, Pounds agreed to pay reasonable attorney’s fees in the event he had to 

collect on that obligation. Further, Gonzales argues, the trial court found Gonzales was 

entitled to receive the outstanding amount of $200,285.28 from Pounds. As a result, 

Gonzales argued, he was entitled to receive the attorney’s fees he requested.

However, Gonzales’s request for attorney’s fees suffers from the same deficiency 

as that of Pounds. While we agree that the Agreed Final Decree of Divorce provided for 

attorney’s fees from Pounds to Gonzales in the event of Pounds’s default, and thus is not 

of the same character as that of Pounds’s request, the decree still called for payment of 
21

reasonable fees. The record contains insufficient evidence that the requested fees were 

reasonable. As mentioned above, the trial court did not hold a hearing regarding 

attorney’s fees and thus, there is insufficient testimony or other evidence that satisfies the 

requisites for an award of attorney’s fees to Gonzales. Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d 

at 484 (“When fee-shifting is authorized, whether by statute or contract, the party seeking 

a fee award must prove the reasonableness and necessity of the requested attorney’s 

fees.”) (citations omitted). Therefore, while we sustain Gonzales’s sixth issue as to an 

award of attorney’s fees, we also remand this issue to the trial court for further 

proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

ISSUE SEVEN—ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING ALL RELIEF REQUESTED BY 

 GONZALES

In his seventh issue, Gonzales argues the trial court abused its discretion when it 

denied all of the relief he requested in his enforcement pleadings despite the fact that 

Pounds stipulated she failed to pay the installment payments toward the equalization 

judgment as ordered.

As support for his argument, Gonzales points to several instances in which Pounds 

agreed she failed to make the payments as required and wholly admitted default. Further, 

he argues, Pounds “did not have pleadings on file requesting that the trial court determine 

the balance of the equalization judgment.” 

We agree the record shows Pounds admitted her default in paying the installments 

as required under the equalization judgment. However, that admission did not require 

the trial court to find in Gonzales’s favor. Rather, the court was still within its discretion 

to determine what, if any, relief to award Gonzales. See Greiner v. Jameson, 865 S.W.3d 
22

493, 498 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied) (trial court has broad discretion in 

enforcing its judgments). Reviewing the record, we cannot say the trial court acted 

without reference to any guiding rules or principles in denying the relief Gonzales 

requested. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985),

cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 90 L. Ed. 2d 721, 106 S. Ct. 2279 (1986). 

Furthermore, we cannot agree with Gonzales’s contention that the trial court 

abused its discretion in denying his requested relief because Pounds did not have 

pleadings on file requesting the trial court determine the balance of the equalization 

judgment. Both parties made arguments concerning the balance of the equalization 

judgment and the trial court could not have made requested rulings concerning the 

judgment and other claims without determining that balance. Gonzales has not satisfied 

his burden to show how the trial court abused its discretion in doing so. We thus overrule 

issue seven. 

ISSUE EIGHT—ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING TO POUNDS RELIEF NOT 

REQUESTED IN HER LIVE PLEADINGS

Finally, Gonzales argues through his last issue that the trial court abused its 

discretion by granting the relief Pounds requested in her proposed disposition of issues 

that was not included in her live pleadings. Gonzales complains that Pounds never asked 

the trial court to offset Gonzales’s equalization judgment by an alleged balance owed to 

the IRS. Further, he contends, Pounds never pleaded in her motion that he failed to make 

a payment to the IRS relating to the 2017 tax liability. Instead, the only relief Pounds 

sought was as follows:
23

Violation 207. JOHN T. GONZALES refused to work with John Knox, CPA, 

in the preparation of the parties’ 2017 tax return. This resulted in John Knox 

having to file two returns and charging the parties $2,107.50 for his services. 

JOHN T. GONZALES has not paid his half, which amounts to $1,053.75. 

Violation 208. JOHN T. GONZALES did not have his 2017 tax return 

prepared by John Knox per the terms of the parties’ decree. 

10. Petitioner requests that for each violation alleged above, Respondent 

be held in contempt and fined up to $500. 

11. Petitioner requests that, if the Court finds that any part of the order 

sought to be enforced is not specific enough to be enforced by contempt, 

the Court enter a clarifying order more clearly specifying the duties imposed 

on Respondent and giving Respondent a reasonable time within which to 

comply.

Therefore, Gonzales argues, the trial court’s ruling in this matter served as a

substantive change to the Agreed Final Decree of Divorce, violating section 157.421 of 

the Family Code,8 and granted relief that was not specifically pleaded by Pounds. 

The record indicates that the parties discussed the potential offsets to the judgment 

at length during the hearing. At no time did Gonzales raise the complaints he now brings. 

Rather, he argued to the trial court that those offsets were not valid. As such, we will look 

only to whether the trial court’s ruling here served as a substantive change to the decree 

in violation of the Family Code. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Knapp v. Wilson N. Jones 

Mem’l Hosp., 281 S.W.3d 163, 170 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (“To preserve an 

error for appeal, a party’s argument on appeal must comport with its argument in the trial 

court.”).

We cannot agree with Gonzales’s contention that each of the trial court’s offsets 

against the equalization judgment substantively changed the agreement set forth in the 

8 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.421 (West 2014) (providing for clarification of a non-specific order).
24

Agreed Final Decree of Divorce. The trial court found the equalization judgment owed by 

Pounds to Gonzales should be offset by $86,237.56 for Gonzales’s one-half of the parties’ 

2017 tax liability, $30,572.00 for the penalties and interest accrued on the parties’ 2017 

federal income tax liability since June 15, 2019, $14,220.00 for Walters Gilbreath, PLLC’s 

attorney’s fees, $17,590.00 for Five Stone Tax Advisers’ attorney’s fees, and $3,818.25 

for Gonzales’s one-half of the fees owed to John Knox. All of those offsets were either 

items agreed to by the parties or properly determined by the trial court as discussed 

herein. The trial court did not change anything with regard to what Gonzales was entitled 

to receive, nor did it alter any agreement made by Gonzales and Pounds as to what each 

party would pay. Accordingly, we cannot find the trial court abused its discretion. We 

overrule Gonzales’s final issue. 

CONCLUSION

We overrule Gonzales’s second, fourth, seventh, and eighth issues; however, we 

sustain his first, third, fifth, and sixth issues. As such, the Order on Motion for 

Enforcement is reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for further 

proceedings consistent with our opinion herein.

Patrick A. Pirtle

 Justice