For First Al'flJT pereonnel, this course COTerecl two dap. Dlereatter it wa1 

abortenecl t• one clQ', encompasalng tour to six hours ot lectures and 

discuaaion. 

The general outline 1188 u followa: 

PIBST HOUR ('l'bia generalJ..y ran over the time, to maximum of 11 hours}. It was uamecl that none ot the otf icers taking the course were cleared tor 

ULTBA uterial., altheugb 1n point of fact several otticen were cleared, R 

ultiMte]T cleared, fer receipt ot auch 1nf'ormatlon through their reapectin 

SLU•a(Special L1a1aon Units, Britiah atattad, with direct radio communication 

t• the United ling.. Qnq •terial of CIRO PEARL classificat1cm(aad. lowezi 

was covered, •terial banclled b7 the u.s. field signal int;elllgence uni.ta. 

'l'he discussion was opened with a brief 81llllDUU7 of aignal intelligence 

aucceaeea in the &lropean 1heater up te that tiM. 'lbe priM.17 purpose ot 

this introduction as to arouse interest in the subject and to point out 

that such intelligence could be,avaUable for each .American Artq and Corps. 

!hen so.me 15-20 minutes were devoted to a cliacuaaion of aecurit7, olassitication 

and the techniques invelved in handling clasait1ed aateri&l ot a Sigint; 

nature. Bach student was given copies of the Clirectives governing 

clasaiglcation and handliDg. !he meaning of the code word.a THUMB, PEARL 

and CIRO PEARL was apla1rled, as well as the aipiticance of naidelinecl • ., . 

entries in routine G-2 reports. llllpbasia •• placed on the tact that such 

intelllgeace could not be diaae.minated. to a level i.wer than Corpe unlese 

its aourca were disguised. -

Priur'h ampbuis was placed upon the fact. that poor 0-2 seeurit7, or 

millbandl1ng could etfectivel,y cmapramise the source of the intelligence, 

and prevent future success. 

The following example wa.a used as an example of bad bandlings 

~ In 19431 toward the close of the Horth Atrioan campaign, the II u,s. ~ Corpe was mov1Dg on Biserte. A low grade code Maaage, sent b,y a Ge:rman. 

armored division, was intercepted and broken. The message gave detaUs as 

to time and. location for a German attack on the u.s. lat Division sector. 

It was broken late. Time •s short.. 'fhe intelligence •s passed b7 radio 

in an insecure a19tem to the regiment and battalions concemed. The attack 

tailed. German 

However, tram. that time on low grade tactical army codes were drasticalll' 

revised, making solution much more difficult. Throughout the North African 

campaign the,y had been a prime source of allied intelligence. IA general, it is 

aafe to siq that from the time of tbe S1c1l1an invasion, a more secure 

medillDl grade cipher was general.l.T used tor messages of this nature. 

QUESTION: Was it better to stem off the attack and compromise the source 

of the 1nt.el.11gence? Was it batter to aufter a setback, and safeguard the 

source ot the inte114 ... ence tor future use? Dh·zne'ag 'clr.,,.1 J_ ~ ~ I 

Thia discussion was tol.lewed by a bti.ef outline of Sigint techniques as emplo.ved 

1n the Earopean 'l'heatera 

(1) Garman callsign s711tems. A aimpq 110rded discussion ot the callaign boou in use, which assigned •row numbers• to each German unit. 

('ftd.a •s natura.11-T eliminated after November 11 1944) 

(2) The signiticance of this &Tatem from the point ot view of d/t and 

traffic anal.7a1a. Significant O.B. deductions could frequently be 

made without c17Ptanal.,ysis, part;icularlT with mobile formations. 

(3) l!rltction findin&. What it could do and what it could ~ do. 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-28-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

'• 
REF ID:A71141 

(4) Crn>tanal.Jrsia. Brief d1scussion ot codes and ciphers 1n leneral ' 

b7 the Germana 1 and bow respo.naibU1t7 for solution was divided. 

lladium grade cipher(double pla.Yf~ done at A.G. level and decodes 

sent forward to armiell. low grade a,yatems(cedes, simple 

substitutions and transpositions, plain text) done at An.tr am 

Corps. Decodes sent as tar forward as Corps. 

••••••••••10 minute break••••••••• 

2. 2al hour. 

Specific information as to the units to be allocated te each 0-2 taking the course. Tables of organization, names ot units oommanders. (In the case 

•t VIII CoJ'pa and 1# Corps, as I recall, the G-2 staff were not aware et 

the existence of such uni.ta, and had made no arranpmenta for cross channel 

lift. In the latter case, the Signal Officer had assumed that a-2 would 

take care of it. Specific administrative problems and questions were left 

to the encl of the lectures, when all students cont erred with Colonel B1cher 

about these matters• 

-------------,-- Fell.owing this, students were given a tour ot the operatioaa l"Ooms. 'Dlq 

started 1n the telepr1n.ter room., where thq could see II aerial.a chalked up on 

the board and equated with German divisions, and see traffic coming in 

tram the intercept stations. 1'hey were shown the map et intercept stations, 

the D/1 stations, and units in training. Then the7 proceeded to the D/P 

plotting room. The cue here was to throw in a tew words about poor u.s. 

mobile D/P equipmeat. The.nee to traffic aaal3&1s and log reading, Where 

th97 aaw loga ot Germ.an networks, and network reconstruetiona baaed upon 

the call sign sTS\81D8 prniousq discussed. Fu.au,, they were taken 

into the code section, where they saw cr;n>taoal7a1s in progress. 'l'he 

emphasis here was on the import.ance of dept.h. One message in a new a7st• 

was general.lT insoluble. 

•••••••• 10 minute break •••••••••• 

3. 3rd hoar. 

Since at that time trattic aaal,ysia, aided b7 the German call sign a7ate11S, 

was all import.ant, this session conmenced with a & reiteration ot German c/sa 

uaagea 1 and another explanation of the book&. All student.a g1 ven a call sign 

book te see, and each one looked up a call aign. · 

D1scuea1on then tumed to types ot networks uad. ...- the Germans. :&lpbuia 

here was on "Star•(stern) and 11Line11 (L:ln1e), the net t7Pes moat commonl3 used 

trem division down. ll'Dpbuised the importance of "single call sign procedure• 

in these s,ystema, in which one call sign onl.T was used tor cOJmWd.cation 

between the control or aenior station, and the outstation. Showed how eu~ 

errera could. be made, what. sine could be conmitted b7 inexperienced interc:ep\ 

eperators, hew D/t bearings could be .made on the •nae staUon, and how 

low grade messages, generalll' unsigned and witheut address, could be 

miainterpreted 11Dder such a apt-. . Then each atwlent was given a 11canned. •probl• in network redoastruction. 

The probl• given was one which bad actuali, been done ib operations. A aeries 

of mesaagea from networks of the 19th Germn Air Poree DiTis1on(approx. 1.5 in 

all) compromised the entire division T/O, most unit. location.a, and the 

relationship of the units to the •sector11 (Alachnitt) defensive a7stem. taTOred 

by the Germans fer coastal defense units• All enors and garbles were 

ellm1nated., •asages were carefulll' )raaslatecl, and messages with a 

doubtful clirection were eltintnated. lfap references wre inserted in messages • 

•••••••••• 10 111av.\••·········· 
REF ID:A71141 ' '· Fourth hour. 

The entire period was devoted to a discussion of G-2/ sigaal irltelligeAce 

unit relationabips. Each student was given a list of thiags which bis 

signal intelligence 11Dit~ would. need from h1a. ~buia •• placed 

upon the tact that the Sigaal intelligence unit could not mrk alone. 

Without background 1Dtormat1on, and constant briefing Ira G-21 the 

unit could not function efficiently. A partial list tollon: 

(1~ All possible 1.ntormati.Gn en Ord.er ot ~ttle and personalities. 

(2 Should receive all 0-2 reports. 

(3 Should have illlnediate, prior1t7 access to-all captured docnaenta 

relati.ag to e.D81V call signs, frequencies, codes and ciphers, 

map • .,.t ... (4) Should get a chance at captured ene.r signal and c17Ptographic 

perso.nnal. 

(S) Would be belptul in interrogations ot en_,. signal int.elligenoe 

personnel. Would certainl,y be 1'andHar with techniques and the - the language. 

(6) Above all, the siOint unit needed G-3 information as well aa G-2 

intol'lll&tion. the intelligence officer can be trusted with detaile 

as te intended friend.l.T action. Onl¥ 1a this •T can he direct 

set COTel"&p te get the max1ll'Rlll intelligence for G-2. 

••••••••• 10 mimate break••••••••••• 

4. Fitth hour• ' ' ~~lee, the fourth eyer generally ran over the allotted time. BJ' tbia 

time, the students were apt te be pttlna tirecl, mt, increaainaJ.T euriou 

about the results achieved. by a1gnal io.telligence. B.r the end ot the fourth 

hour, the wbole claaa waa generall3' grouped about the OB map which SD> 

maintained .troa Sig1nt sources al.one, talk1q shop with the instructors. 

In general, the inatruptere were e.nt.huaiastic about their work, and were 

apt to•overaelln their product.. !he final hour ot the session •s 

therefore dented to aaq,em.ng student enthWliaa aid. and attempting· 

to secure a SOlllfthat aore realistic appraisal of signal intelllgence, 

ita advantages, aai its more signiticant lim1tat1Gna. Too optbd.atio 

apectatiom could. o.ai, handicap tile relat1oraa which the G-2'• were 

to bave with their field units. 'nley would expect the 1mpoaa1ble 

(and in aomeJ cases, did). 'ftle general approach to this pro'bl.• 1a 

outlined 1n APPEHDIX I. In a course euch u 1a proposed in the 

future, t.he material outlined in APPENDIX I might perhaps be given 

aoaewhat earlier in the course. 

s. At the conclusion ot the course, all the students aet 111.th Colonel Bieber 

tor apecitic questiou as to personnel, the state ot unit training, etc. 

6. !he C01U"S81 given to First and Third A'J!ll1I personnel lasted two da7s, aal 

cowrecl approximate]¥ nine boura. In these courses, a coq>lete problea 

•s given. Situation reports were prepared, our 011D troop diapositiona 

were oiltlined iD. detail, and •canned.8 messages covering a three ci8I' 

period were prepared.. The exercise na designed to show how signal 

intelligence could. function uader ideal 8'r&dit1o.ns. It was felt that 

this exercise was not overly effective, and it was abandoned. 
Material covered 6D"lim1tat1ona ot aigaal intelligence•. 

Aa can be aeen, this covered onll' divisions and beln. 

Successful signal intelligence work is illpeeel~• wl•llla d1tticalt er 

1mpessible, Wllesa three basic conditiena are present.: 

(1) 'l'he •D8111' will use the radio u a means ot comnmoicatiw. 

(2) That enough traffic can be intercepted, without excessive 

garbllag or corruption. 

(3) That, 1t coda or cipher be •ed, the a7stema mployed U 

permit of practical solution, ie, a solution which can be made 

with available personnel and facilities, in a period of time 

abort enough so that the deciphered material will still be 

or intelligence value. 

'1'hia, tb8181 er variations and elaboration& en it, was the basis of the 

lecture on lJmitations of signal intelligence. PoiDta cnered, as I 

raem.ber, wnt about aa tel.lo118: 

(1) Signal 1ntelllgence is inoperative and ine!f ectual 1t the eneJq' iaposea rada sllenae. 

a. Where ad.equate landline tacllltiea exist, radio mq be little used. 

b. When such facilities have been overloaded, or rendered inoperative, 

then a resort to other means of coamunicat1-n(radio) is necessary. 

c. Radio operators and crn>tographic personnel require ate.osive 

training. It can therefore be assumed that in most instances, 

acme millt&rJ" radio traffic will be found., 1t onl3' of a practice 

nature for training purposes. 

• 

(2) The Fm-opean elCIJerience was that German armored. formationa#-/I made tu 

more use ot radio ccmmmnioatiene, than infantry units. Their verr 

mobillt7 ruled out an extensive reliance on atatic(landllne) cOlllllWlications. 

Verr little traffic was taken from intantrr tn>e units. 

a. In other cases, where good static ccmmanicat1ons were lacking(ex. as 

betweeD 11th Air Force Pield Div, on the Greek islands) radio tratfic 

might be extenaivell' amployed.(Ditte Jap occupation forcea). 

(3) It is uaaed that autticient traffic in one CJ7'P1;ographic aJ'Si;• can 

'be intercepted, else aolut1on'lllAT be cl1tficult er illlpoaaible. 

a. Bad atmospher14 conditiGDB 1 unsuitable intercept. sites (ex. periodic "blackouts• in Iceland), mountainous terrain limitiq 1'acters. 

'b. Good seouritr implies the lowest possible power outiut on 

transmitters. Goed intercept equipmnt, high]¥ trained and 

experienced intercept operators a sine qua non. It baa been sa1cl 

that through improvement in intercept equipment and aerial.a, that 

SO% of the no intercept waa intercept which was theoreticall,r 

impossible to cop7. 

(4) It enemy transmissions are not sent in plain text, then the cOde and 

cipher srsteme-usecl must be aolva'ble. 

a. Certain cede er cipher s79tema are inselvable in theo17(one time 

pads). Ot.ber are insolvable in practice( certain tn>•• of transpos1t1on1 

But.er a good example). Others, due te the great expenditure ot personnel 

time and Mchinerr involved, can onJ, be handled at the nrr highest 

level.a 
', 

I 

\ 

•, 

I 

I 

\ 

I 

I •' '• 

APPENDIX I- Page 2 REF ID:A71141 

(5) Complex canmnnications procedurea9 daiJ3 cha,(nging, wyatematic callaigaa1 changing frequencies, network organization desiped to hamper traf.fic 

anal3ais and accurate direction fiJlding- can abarpll' llmit signal 

intelligence results. The unit network on highest. G-2 intercept 

prioritr can be "lost" tor clap 1.t trequenciea and callaigna are 

frequently changes, &Dd it there are no security violatioDB to give 

a aigint aergS.ce clues as to the net•a identitr. German usage of 

single callaign procedure in un.r networks sharpq reduced the 

accuracy of allied d/f bearings, and conpllcated the anaJ.yais of 

message routinga. 

a. ?Alwa.ya put 1n a 110rd about,D/f at this point. llaqy G-21a aeanecl 

to haft misconceptioDs u te accuracy and reliability et D/I. 

Often expected pinpoint locationa. 

(6) Once intercepted and aelncl, with an interesting message contjat1 garbles 

aa.d corraptiena can .Mke a message worthless. (See example of corrupt 

•saage sent b,r German lat Para Arl\r-ULTRA). 

(7) S.rstama wbicb can be read at once 1111q bave an intelligence content of no 

1nt.ereat tG a ~. 

(8) 11th particular reference to the E'l'OJ--On• um.Y or corps unit might be 

get,t1ng a stead,y flow et intelligence, while itw flanking unit got little 

or not.bing of interest to G-2. Beth units were axperMnced capable units. 

The answer here had to be sought from the Genian Order of Battle 1n 

the two sectors. One unit bad opposite it several talkative German 

divisions 1 whose co1mmn' cations security wu pocar. The other unit 

ccnere4 a sector held b7 eecurit7 coaecioue units, which made little 

use ot radio. Die seventh u.s. A.l'Jl\r signal intelligence organ111atie11, 

perhaps the best trained and meet experienced units in the ETC>,~ 

operated under this handicap, while First u.s. Aray •s neTer without 

at least ene unit wbich kept it. in buiness. 
smm IRTILLIGIRCE SCOOPS PR<ll '1'llE no 

1. ULTRA. In the apring ot 19441 mt 1-g , •• M befo:re D-Dq, General Oadman, Impactor ot aaran Armracl Troopa /1 Tieited all au.a 

um:recl cl1T1aiam lecated 1n Pnnae. A aeaaage outlJned the General'• 

itineruT 1n detall. It gan the unit maber and location et all 

the armred tol'lll&tiou then in Prance, a well u the location of 

, .. cli'ri81oral o._ad poet1. 

2. ULTBA't Tile counterattack muntecl b.r the a..n. agai•t the .. rtaiaA~• 08lT1dor 1n .Aagut, 1944, •• kno1ID trca signal inteW,gence aourc• 

app:rmdmateJ.y 36 boUl'll beto:re the blow tell. The attackiq tore• were 

knolm, u wl1 as the area concemed. la a reault, General Bradle7 ••• 

able to make the nece••U'J' :re1ntoroementa. !be attack -. made on u.s. 

VII Corpa, inol»d'na the 4th, 9'11 and 30th u.s. Inf Dinaiaaa, backed up 

by the 3rd Azimred. DiTiBicm and. part. of the 2nd .U.nd Diruloa. aid]• 1'11• b1'eaktbro1lgh attempt tailecl. 

3. CIRO P.Ullt Ia Ja11U17, 1945, a.r1ag the olodag pbaaea of the Aldaw ~ 0811P&!ID decipberecl aesaages tram a Germ u.nd. dl'ri.sion(Pamer Lehr 

~ ~ 'Di'ri.aionS 1Ddicated tbat (1) it wu witbdrawiDg 0011Plet•ll' troll northern ~# l..mmboarg, ac:roa1 the r,11 riftl" into the .lltel area of Oermalv'I 

6' (2) Olli, tw lri.dps aOl'eas the r,11 •re iatact, om ued tor eaatboWld 

and one tor wat'bcnmd tratfilJ (3) the d11'ia1ou lrefuelinl points, 

and ntion cluq>a wre apecitied tor a period aneral dqa in advance. 

DWI •• concrete evidence that. the Genlana had giwn up UV hope 

ot fart;her progress 1n the Ardennea. Iltll A1f bl'Ce attaoka blew the 

two key br!dgea. A clala of la>O Tehiclea destreyed was made bT tile 

air tore•• 

r; J ~4. PBARL. During the German retreat at.l'Oaa rraaoe in Auguet, 1944, the ' 

;fl C~ Beconnalasance Battalion ot the Oe1'man 2lat Pamer Division ..... M trequea\q acttil u the •.-n tor OOJ1>8 and U'IV• Daill' it aent back detaUecl report• to 

the d1Y181oa CClllllaDd post conoarrdng tbe seotoN bald by Gel'J8D 

lntantry d1Tie1w1 the locatiom of their -Md posta, and wbere 

ala l1neB of Na1atance wre to be •tabliBhed. Di•• report• wre sent 

in a low srade oed8, and wre aenerall.r' readabl.8 • 

. 't:l 'v ~l'(r 1!UJ1Bt ID late April UMI earq ._,., 1944~ d./t 'bea1ap oa an 'IUd.dentitied 

/.V ,.11~ OenaD fonut1on(u1ng »-35,»-36) llhne4 a moYe trm tbe Rema area in \ ,, \! BrittaDI' m:rUaeutward into the Caen area. Oromd scnarc•• had carried 

\' ~, • th• Gezman 2lllt rs. DiT in tlala area. ~ 

< ..,,hi~~ Wlrd#/#1. 

Die indicated •• "RS r.•J!C?rted u a Td 2lat Ps DiT into the 

Caea area. 'NN#Hl#lfmM/1./##l rm~l#/~/'JI# 

--
REF ID:A71141 

BUMPL!S mrurm r; Tim r.r-rrTATIOIS c. 

SIGIAL DTILLIGllCB. 

(1) PN'bl.9m ar1a1Dg froa conupt or garbles •••1&88• 

ULTRA. In 1945 Oenaral ~ Studd, Co-•mer ot the Fint Q8l9ll 

Pan. -., 1a Rolland, •• ordered to mount a. comterattack against General 

Jrentgaa..,.•a mrlihern tlaat. 118 repq •• •a. •• interpreted u bniDg 

read tbat the area tor the attack bad bean •abittecl u tlae mrt.h•C.U 

)prel!P "fV•ohe'ben). In realitT 1 t.h• atttet bad 'be8ll llpoet.pomcl dtr ~·c•.aut 11trpn 'ftl'llcbo'ba). t1ae cwrapt Ge:rmD tm, *• 

deaiplaere41 had read aa tellne1 

- Cornot Yen1oa1 

First Versicm I 

Incorl'ec\ Yenima1 

• Ai. ll>BGll VEBSCHOBEI 

.1 ., • •'•• """"' -iCll>•I TIECBOBDI 

OCH 11>11>.DI VIBSCBOIBI --- - (2)Pl'ob1- arild.Dg fna prac\1ee or t1Ud.ag trattia, er trattlo •-' 'b7 tbe 

--.r for deaeptiu. Jnll"P9••• 

CIBO PBABL. Prior to the at;an of land eperatiam la F:ranoe, the am.a 

Am, crn>tograpld.o .and --omaat.191111 puwomael eapged 1n com1derable 

pn.cU.oe tnttio ba'Ying a apoot ceat.em. PiaU.Uoua 11111.t .... and 

dpatmea wre ued. llDat boll& tide ol"cler of battle 1clent1tioat1ona had 

thentore to be accepted with reaenatioa, pending oo.atimatim .frca other 

aOlll"098. Per •apl.•, 7 d1Yiaioml m:l approxlmteJ, lS ngimental llllllben wn 

meationed in the pl'&CT.io trarflo paaaed b.r the 24Sth Iaf • DiT 1a tile Dieppe 

Ooaltal. sect .. nr1Dg th• math ot April, 19Jtl. 

ULTBl. Ia 19~5, b1gh pwle cipber 'tnft1o 1Dt.eraepted ill 1\al.J' 

ooat&ed re.fel"9DC8a to a•UIJI eozp.•, not tl'Wioul.r. -~aatit1ed. It aa felt 

that,nah wu the reliabW.tT ot ULDA iatell!pace,*1$/V. pau' •was et # the 1dentitlcat.t.ara C01ll.cl not be que&imed. Oai, aft.er a GM t1m 

had elapsed aa it d.etemined that •- of tile •nap• referriag to t.m 

mw OOl'P8 wre p-efaced b,J' mt.unl.ag ••aage•(tenl Spncla, er Tuupnab), 

Uld t.hat Ula 1clent.lticatt.m aa apoef. 

'\ 

•