alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 5.2

Certification of Steven Douglas, Chief Financial Officer

In connection with the Annual Report of Noranda Inc. (the "Company") on Form 40-F for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2004 (the "Report"), I, Steven Douglas, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to
§906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



Date:
March 24, 2005

| |  |     |                                                        
| |  | --- | -------------------------------------------------------
| |  | By: | /s/STEVEN DOUGLASSteven Douglas
Chief Financial Officer

---
REF ID:A39701 

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4 Cl-PHE~
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of the Interior

###### Bureau of Land Management

          - [ES-956-1420-BK ES-047171, Group 152, Wisconsin]

                    On March 23, 1995 there was published in the                     **Federal Register**                    , Volume 60, Number 56, on page 15301 a notice entitled “Filing of Plat of Survey; Wisconsin.” In said notice was a plat depicting the survey of two islands located in Township 7 North, Range 22 East, Tracts 37 and 38, Fourth Principal Meridian, Wisconsin, accepted March 13, 1995.                

The plat, specifically the portion identified as Tract 37, has been cancelled effective December 11, 2014.

Dominica VanKoten,

Chief Cadastral Surveyor.

[FR Doc. 2015-05901 Filed 3-13-15; 8:45 am]

 BILLING CODE P
Exhibit 32.2

                    Certification of Chief Financial Officer
                           Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350
                 (Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)

         I, Bill Rozakis,  Chief Financial Officer of Implantable  Vision,  Inc.
(the  "Registrant"),  do hereby certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350 as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, that, based
upon a review  of the  Quarterly  Report on Form  10-QSB  for the  period  ended
January 31, 2008 of the  Registrant,  as filed with the  Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"):

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

         (2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Registrant.


                         By: /s/ Bill Rozakis
                         -------------------------------
                         Name:  Bill Rozakis
                         Title: Chief Financial Officer

March 24, 2008

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


         This  certification  accompanies each Report pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 and shall not,  except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the  Registrant  for purposes of
ss.18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

         A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been  provided to the  Registrant  and will be retained  by the  Registrant  and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
NO. 07-01-0363 -CR IN THE COU RT OF APP EALS FOR THE SEVENT H DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMA RILLO PANE L B OCTOBER 11, 2001

______________________________ ROYCE L. WELLI NGTON, APPELLANT

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

_________________________________ FROM THE140 TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY; NO. 2001-435768; HON ORABLEJIM B OB DAR NELL, JUD GE

_______________________________ Before BOYD, C.J., and QUINN and JOHNSON, JJ. Pending before the Court is a “Motion for Appeal of Conv iction,” filed by appell ant Royce L. Wel lington, and a Clerk’s Record as to Cause Num ber

2001-435,768 in the 140 th District Court of Lubbock C ounty. We dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Byhis Motion for

Appeal appellant sought the trial court’s approval to appeal from hi s conviction pursuant to a plea-bargained guilty plea for Aggravated Perj ury. The2

judgm entwas s igned on June 1, 2001; sente nce wasimposed on June 1, 2001; no Motion for New Trial was f iled ex cept to the ex tent appellant’s Motion for App eal could be construed as an unt im ely M otio n fo r New Tria l; appellant’s Motion for Appeal w as filed on August 28, 2001.
In a criminal case, ap peal i s perfected by ti mely fili ng a notice of appeal. T EX . R. A PP . P. 25.2(a). The no tice of appeal m ust be filed within 30 days after theday sentence is imposed or after the day the tr ial cour t en ter s an app eala ble o rde r, u nles s a tim ely mot ion for

new tria l is filed. TRA P 2 6.2 (a) . A m otio n fo r ne wtria l may be filed by a criminal defendant

no later tha n 30 days after the date sentence is imposed in open court
. TRAP 21 .4 (a ). Th e t i me for filing a notice of appeal may be ex tended for 15 days under cer tain circumsta nc es. TRAP 26.3. If the tim e for filing a notice of appeal is to be extended, both a notice of appeal and a m otion for extension of time which com plies with TRAP 10.5(b) m ust be filed within the 15 day period. TRA P 26.3; Olivo v. State , 9 1 8 S.W.2d 519, 523-25 (Tex.Crim. App. 1996).
An unt im ely -fi led notice of appeal will not invoke the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. See Sta te v. R ie we , 13 S.W.2d 408, 4 11 (Tex.Crim .A pp. 2000). Thus, if an appeal is not timely perfected, a court of appeal s does not have jurisdi ction to addr ess the merits of the appeal, and can take no action other than to dism iss the appeal. Slaton v. State , 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex.Crim .App. 1998); Olivo v. State , 918 S.W.2d at 523-25.3

To the e xt ent

app ella nt’s Motion for Appeal is a Motion for New Trial it was not tim ely to extend the time for filing notice of appeal; to the extent appellant’s M otion for Appeal is a notice of appeal, it wasnot timely filed. A m otion to extend ti me to file notice of appeal was not fil ed. Accordingl y, this court do es n ot have jur i sdic tion ove r th is proceeding. Slaton , 981 S.W.2d at 210; Olivo , 918 S.W.2d at 523. The mat ter is dismissed for w

ant of j urisdiction. TRAP 39.8, 40.2, 43. 2.

Phil Johnson Justice Do not publish.
Amendment No. 5 dated May 6, 2011 to Registrant's Universal Life Plan



 EXHIBIT 10(j)(4) 

AMENDMENT NO. 5 
 TO THE 
 XEROX UNIVERSAL LIFE PLAN 

W I T N E S S E T H: 

WHEREAS, Xerox Corporation (the “Company”) has established the Xerox Universal Life Plan which is presently set forth in the “Xerox
Universal Life Plan”, as amended by Amendment Nos. 1 through 4 (hereinafter referred to as the “Plan”), and 
 WHEREAS, the Company desires
to amend the Plan, 
 NOW, THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended as follows: 

 

	1.	 Effective May 29, 2003, in Sections II and III of Schedule B for Participants in CLIP, the name of the Plan shall be amended each time it appears to
replace the words “Xerox Executive Life Insurance Plan” with “Xerox Universal Life Plan”. 


  

	2.	 Effective May 29, 2003, in Sections II and III of Schedule B for non-CLIP Participants, the name of the Plan shall be amended each time it appears to
replace the words “Xerox Executive Life Insurance Plan” with “Xerox Universal Life Plan”. 


 This Amendment is
effective as of the date set forth above. In all other respects the Plan shall remain unchanged. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this
Amendment to be signed as of the 6th day of May, 2011. 
  

			
	XEROX CORPORATION
		
	 By:
	 	/s/   TOM MADDISON
	 	 	Vice President of Human Resources
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                          24,305
<SECURITIES>                                     1,349
<RECEIVABLES>                                  133,782
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,010
<INVENTORY>                                     90,890
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               284,032
<PP&E>                                         121,794
<DEPRECIATION>                                  70,163
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 363,649
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           94,038
<BONDS>                                        113,168
<COMMON>                                           160
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                     152,984
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   363,649
<SALES>                                        291,381
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               341,586
<CGS>                                          171,935
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  200,453
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               122,982
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 1,427
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,646
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 15,099
<INCOME-TAX>                                     5,854
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              9,245
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     9,245
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .57
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .57
        


</TABLE>
Order filed, November 17, 2016.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-16-00528-CR

____________

JOSE MARIA PELAYO, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Co Crim Ct at Law No 12

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1932164

ORDER

The reporter’s record in this case was due August 22, 2016. See Tex. R. 

App. P. 35.1. On September 02, 2016, this court ordered the court reporter to file 

the record within 30 days. The record has not been filed with the court. Because 

the reporter’s record has not been filed timely, we issue the following order.

We order Laurie Buchanan, the official court reporter, to file the record in 

this appeal within 30 days of the date of this order. No further extension will be 
entertained absent exceptional circumstances. The trial and appellate courts are 

jointly responsible for ensuring that the appellate record is timely filed. See Tex. 

R. App. P. 35.3(c). If Laurie Buchanan does not timely file the record as ordered, 

we may issue an order directing the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine 

the reason for the failure to file the record.

PER CURIAM
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman

, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Kurtis T. Wilder

Elizabeth T. Clement

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

October 2, 2018

a0924 

# Order

Clerk October 2, 2018

156935

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 156935

COA: 339124

Berrien CC: 2013

- 015338

- FC

DEREK LERON BISHOP,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 27, 2017

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
#### Lee vs. Buckheit.

*Demand, for change of place of trial.*

After notice of retainer, defendant’s attorney also served a demand for a change of venue, in the following form: “ I demand that the place of trial of this action be changed,” etc., signed “X. Y., Defendant's Attorney.” *Held,*that this must be regarded as the *demand of the defendant,*and was sufficient.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for *Dane*County.

The plaintiff appealed from an order changing the place of trial on defendant’s motion. The ground of the appeal will sufficiently appear from the opinion.

*J. If. Carpenter,*for appellant.

Brief for the respondent by *Harlow*Pease, and oral argument by *E. E. Bryant.*

*247Cole, J.

After tbe title of tbe cause, tbe demand for a change of venue in this case was as follows: “ I hereby demand that tbe place of trial of this action be changed to tbe proper county, to wit, Jefferson county, in this state. Dated May 16, 1878. Yours, etc. Hablow Pease, Defendant’s Attorney.”

Tbe sole question on tbe appeal is, whether this was a sufficient demand to authorize tbe change which was granted by the circuit court. The statute provides that if the county designated by the plaintiff in the complaint be not the proper county, the action may, notwithstanding, be tried therein, unless the defendant, before the time for answering expire, demand, in writing, that the trial be held in the proper county. Sec. 4, ch. 123, Tay. Stats. Now it is claimed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, that this provision secures to the defendant the personal privilege of having a change upon his own demand; that it cannot be had on the demand of another; and that the above demand must be considered as the personal demand of the attorney himself, not that of the defendant. It seems to us that this view is incorrect. In this case, the attorney had already given notice of retainer in the action. Eor the purposes of the suit, he represented the defendant therein, and in whatever he did in the management of the suit, we must assume he was acting for his client. If he had said that the defendant made a demand for the change, or that he, as attorney, on behalf of the defendant, made it, there would be no question as to its sufficiency. *We*think the demand should be treated as equivalent to a demand in that form, and as really the demand of the defendant.

But it is said by the same counsel, that generally when the statute allows a motion to be made, or a step to be taken, in the cause by a person other than the party, it so states; and we were referred to a number of sections where it is provided that the party, or attorney, or authorized agent, may do the act. In many cases, doubtless, out of abundant caution, such language is used. But still, without intending to lay down *248any general rule of construction which must be applied in all cases, we merely hold, on the question before us, that the demand, in the form in which it was made, must be deemed the demand of the defendant in the action.

*By the Court.*— The order of the circuit court is affirmed.
*

 Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________________

No. 96-11126

(Summary Calendar)

_________________________

LINDA NIRSCHL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

HARRIS METHODIST HOSPITAL,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________________________________________

Appeal from United States District Court

from the Northern District of Texas

(4:94-CV-717-Y)

__________________________________________________

April 23, 1997

Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, AND STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This judgment is AFFIRMED, essentially for the reasons set forth in the district court’s

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS on August 7, 1996. The plaintiff sues for quid pro

quo and hostile environment sexual harassment by a lesbian supervisor under Title VII. Plaintiff’s

claimisforeclosed by this court’s holding in Garcia v. Elf AtochemN. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th
Cir. 1994) that same-sex harassment claims are not viable under Title VII. Though plaintiff argues

that a very different claim is presented here than is covered by the Garcia holding, we are bound by

the determination of subsequent panels which have recognized Garcia as binding precedent on the

issue of same-sex harrassment. See Blake v. City of Laredo, 58 F.3d 637 (5th Cir. 1995) (per

curiam) unpublished and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996).

AFFIRMED.
#### The State ex rel. Houp, Appellant, *v.*Transpersonnel, Inc.; Industrial Commission of Ohio et al., Appellees.

[Cite as *State ex rel. Houp v. Transpersonnel, Inc.*(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 218.]

*219(No. 97-1868

Submitted July 28, 1999

Decided August 25, 1999.)

*Butkovich, Schimpf Schimpféc Ginocchio Co., L.P.A., James A Whittaker*and *Stephen P. Gast,*for appellant.

*220
      *Betty D. Montgomery,*Attorney General, and *Cheryl J. Nester,*Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.

*Per Curiam.*

Claimant contests the commission’s denial of TTD. The court of appeals upheld that denial and we affirm that decision.

A finding of maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) precludes TTD. *State ex rel. Peabody Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm.*(1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 639, 641, 614 N.E.2d 1044, 1045; *State ex rel. Ramirez v. Indus. Comm.*(1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 630, 23 O.O.3d 518, 433 N.E.2d 586; *Vulcan Materials Co. v. Indus. Comm.*(1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 31, 25 OBR 26, 494 N.E.2d 1125. Contrary to claimant’s representation, commission authorization of a weight-loss program does not preclude a finding of MMI. *State ex rel. Williams v. Cincinnati Country Club*(1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 284, 699 N.E.2d 505.

We further find that claimant has failed to sustain his burden of showing a causal relationship between his alleged inability to return to his former position of employment and his allowed conditions. C-84s from Dr. Rison attribute claimant’s disability in part to a nonallowed degenerative disc disease. Dr. Schmitz— in a C-84 devoid of any subjective or objective findings — attributed the claimant’s disability simply to “back pain.” Given Dr. Schmitz’s reference in his 1991 report to nonallowed upper back pain, the commission did not abuse its discretion in refusing to assume — as claimant wishes — that the term “back pain” necessarily referred to claimant’s spondylolisthesis.

Accordingly, the commission did not abuse its discretion in denying TTD, and the judgment of the court of appeals is hereby affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., concur.
United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 97-2802ND

_____________ Kent Laber, individually and by Phyllis * Laber, his guardian ad litem, * * Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the District v. * of North Dakota. * Heritage Mutual Insurance Company, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellee. *

_____________ Submitted: February 11, 1998

Filed: February 20, 1998

_____________ Before FAGG, JOHN R. GIBSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

_____________ PER CURIAM. Ke nt Laber, individually and by Phyllis Laber, his guardian ad litem, appeal s fromt he adverse ruling of the district court in this diversity-based dispute about th e s c ope of Laber's underinsured motorist coverage. The district court concluded that a non-a irborne plane was not a motor vehicle for the purposes of interpreting th e underinsuredmotorist coverage under North Dakota law. Because this is a diversity action, we review de novo questions of state law. Having considered the record and the parties' briefs, we are satisf ied the district court correctly applied the relevant state law and the record supports the district court's ruling. We also conclude a-2-

comprehensive opinion in this diversity case would lack precedential value. We thus affirm on the basis of the district court's ruling without further discussion. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. A true copy. Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
.{ ... --~-

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