.. 

I 

... 

e 

JBlift/26 June 1953 

llSA. Regulation 

llumber ----

POLICY AID HfOOBDmi POR l>ISCLOSUBE 

OF CR1PL'OGBAPBIC I!UOBMA.TIO'I m FOBEIGI BATIORS 

I. PlJBPOSE 

l. It is the purpose o:r this regulation to provide general. policy guidance 

on relee.se ot cryptographic 1Dto:rmat1c:m to foreign nations, and a UD.1.fom 

procedure tor obtaining approval. tram higb.er authority to d1sc1ose crY,Ptographic 

information to foreign nations. 

II. POLICY 

2. Several u. s. agencies are responsibl.e for matters perta.1Ding to rel.ease 

of information.. 'l'he principal agencies throup which EA. must ~..k approval '£or 

cliscl.oaure of cryptographic inf'm:ma.tion to f'oreip countries are as fol.lows: 

a. '.ft1e Sta:te-Def'ense Military Infoxmation Control. Conmittee (S-DIICC). 

'Dlis Conm1ttee estab11shes the policy of the United States governing the discl.oaure 

of classified military information to foreign governments. S-JllICC is the final 

approving authority Oil disclosure of classified security infcmnation to foreip 

nat1ms. Policies of 8-DIICC must be adhered to when 1n1 tiating and preparing 

requests for approval ot rel.ease of cJ.ass11'1ed cry,ptogra.pbic 1Dformm.t1on. 

b. Joint Chiefs o:r Sta.ff' (J.c.s.). It is the policy of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff that no .1oiDt cryptographic device or publication will be made availabl.e 

tor cm'b:.tned use w1 thout the approval of' the Joint Chiefs ot Staff. 

c. United States Ccnmmications Intelligence Boa.rd. (UscIB) • ~e United 

States Comnnmicatians Intelligence Board establiabes broad. policy with respect 

to the :aatiOD&l CCllIIT effort and has certain carmi tments pertaining to preservation of COMDfl sources. Bel.ease of cryptographic information which could 

have the ef'fect of curtailing u. S. COMDe must be reviewed by USCIB. 

3. Bxcbmge of teclmicel. crypto-inf'ormation w1 th the U. lt. was authorized 

by the Joint Chief's o-r Staff following the first US/Ult CcmmDJn1 cation Security 

(CONSl!:C) Conf'erence. U.S. crwtogE'a.phic information forwe.rd.ed to the U. IC. 111USt 

be canf'ined to the apec1f'ic itens authorized for discussion at the first 8l1d 

succeeding US/IE COMSEC cmferences. Cryptoprinciples reservecl for exclusive 

• 

U. s. use will not be disclosed. Further 4evelopnents or extensions to improve 

SECRET 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 06-11-2014 pursuant to E .0. 1352a 
cryptoprinc1pl.es el.ready d1sc1osed to the Br1 tish may be discl.osed providecl the 

extensiou is a logl.cal one to tbat cryptoprinciple, :1.nvol.ves no new concepts, 

and does not uae er.yptoprinc1pl.es logicalq related. to cryptoprinciples vhich 

bave not been disc1osed to tile Brittsh. Bew c~-ptoPrinciples Will not be 

disclosed to U.JC. authorities unless the following cand1t1ms are first 

satisfied:. 

a. The cry,ptoprinciple has been demonstrated as being feasible for 

development. 

b. '.l'he cryptoprinciple can be used to meet an approved canbined or 

BA'l'O co1111nuu1cat1on security requirement. 

c. The Chief, Office of CcEEmmicaticm Security, certifies that the 

ceyptopr1ncip1e will not be rezerved for excluai ve U. S. use. 

4. In all cases where cr.ypto-equipnents m."e to be me.de a:vailabl.G to the 

Strmding Group for 1'A'10 approval or s.dopticm., the revelation of crJPtoprinciples 

1Dvol.ved should be restricted to general sU11111&ries and descriptions, and should 

not 1Dcl.ucle specific vi.d.ng cleta.Us, drawings, etc., until or unless, the 

equipaent is in production. 

5. For the purposes of this regulation~ classified cryptograpllic information 

is d1 vided into two classes, def11led as follows: 

Class 11A" 

The following types of ~togra.phic material and 1.Dtormaticn nmmal.J.y 

will be ass1ga.ed to Class "A": 

a. Manual cryptographic systems for which cryptologic cl.earallce of the 

user is not required. (Bxsm.pJ.es: One-time pads, double-transpos1 tim) • 

b. Codes (one and two pa.rt) tor which ceyptographic (crypto1og1c) 

cl.ea.ranee ot the user is not required. (Exam.plea: Bomber Codes, Map Coordinate 

Codes). 

c. Authentication systems. 

d. Devices for which CJ:'1Ptogr&phic cl.earaDce of' the user is not required.. 

(Examples: Strip cipher system, llA'mX) • 

2 

SECRET 
e. Instrl.lction pertaimng to use and operation ot Class "A" systems. 

t. Codes and cipb.ers which do not require cryptographic cl.ea.ranee for 

discJ.oaure. 

• g. Codes ciphers and cryptographic techniques which are defiDi teJ.y 

eatab1ished as 1D use or as hav1Dg been i:n use by the recipient country(s) • 

CJ.ass "B" 

6. The follow1ng tnes oi' cryptographic mater.Lal and infonation nozmall.y 

will be assiped to Class "B": 

a. Cnnmmi cation security equipnents, usually electro-mechanical or 

el.ectrcmic in nature. 

b. CrJPtoprinciples which J118.7 be iDcQ%lX)r&ted in such equipamts. 

c. Inatruct1cms for use and operation of such equipnents. 

d. Cz7ptopr1Dc1ples of wbich there is reasonabl.e doubt the recipient 

country bas knowledge. 

e. Security e'V8l.uat1ons and ceyptanaJ.ytic teclmiquea applicable to 

so1ut1ao of all Class "A" and Class "B" information aad material. 

III. PROCEDJBE 

7. 1!le class into which cryptographic inf'ormatim is placed governs the 

procedure to be fo1lowecl in obtaining approval for cllsc1osure of the 1Dfcmnation. 

Bomall.y) the request for d1ac1osure of a cryptopriD.cip1e shoul.d contain a request 

also f'or rel.ease of operating instructions 8Dd. other material pertinent to 

operation and maintenance of' the system. Coordination. vi thin BSA must iDcJ.ude 

both the Chief Office of Comrnnnica.t.ton Security, and the Assistant Director, 

Office of Producticn: prior to forwa.rd:ing the request for d.iac1osure to the 

Director for approval. or Si&Jl&ture 

Class "A" 

a. DiscJ.osure of Class "A" cryptographic 1Dfm:mation may be appi·oved 

b7 the Director. A request for approval. of' discl.osure abal.l g1 ve full detail.a 

including reascns for discl.oaure and benefits which the u. s. may expect to 

receive in retum for the inf'oDD&tion. disclosed, the nature of the material to 

be rel.eased, and, if pertinent, mrumer of' reimbursement if' release oi' material 

is involved and &DJ' increase in BSA COMSEC production CODtingent upon tbe rel.ease 

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SECRET 
"" " .... 

of information. AcCOUJ..P6D71ns the request will be notification to S-JHICC 

setting forth the intozmatian authorized b7 the Director for disclosure, 

the recipient nation or nations and tbe benefits e:x;pectecl to accrue to 

tbe U. s. b7 virtue of the disclosure. 

Claas "B" 

b. In the case of Class "B" iDi'omation, policies of 8-DIICC, USCIB, 

a:a.cl J.c.s. must be cCD&1dered. Ill certain instances, prior actions bJ' one or 

more of these agencies 1187 ccmsti tute appro"Val. for release, or may, on the other 

hand, prohibit rel.ease. Such previous actiCID.8 or decisions will be taken into 

account when prepariDg a request for cliscl.osure. Information similar to that 

required for Clam ,,.A" cryptographic information will be inc1uded iD the request. 

c. !he f'ollow:i.ng ccmsiderations sball guide forwarding of requests for 

rel.ease through appropriate cbannels to the agenc7vith final. authority to 

approw rel.ease: 

(l.) WhiJ.e BSA. COMSEC f'UnctiODB remaiD under the J .C .s., a request 

for release will be forwarded first to the J .c .s. for approval. If the J .. c .s. 

approves tile request will be forwarded .to USCIB and will indicate tbat J .C .s. 

approval has been obta1ned. 

(2) When J.c.s. approval for rel.ease is apparent through approval 

of previous actions, the request for approval will be forwarded to USCIB w1 th a 

notatim 1Ddicating J.c.s. approval and the circumstances of the approval. 

(3) Upon receiving both J.c.s. and USCIB approval, the request 

will be forwarded to 8-DIICC. A1ternat1 veJ.y, the request to USCIB may request 

USCIB to forward the requeat to S-lllICC upon approval. 'b7 USCIB. 

e. Wben 1 t is expected. tbat cryptographic information will be introduced 

into the Canbined Ceyptographic and Securi t7 Panel of the CAR-mt-US JCECs to be 

CODSid.ered for adopticn f'or Combined. and JIAm CMID1JD1c&ti01\S1 if &ctim ~ obtain _, 

authority to release has not previous1y been 1D1 tiated, such action must be 

1D1 tiated, vi th the f'oregoiDg procedure, at the t:lme of introducing the subJect 

into t.he CAll-UJC-US JCECs. 

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SECRET 
REF ID:A66631 

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• 
BDWIJDI FOR 'l'8E CBAIRMAB, CEB'Sf\ 

SUBcJ.ECT: DJ.scl.osul'e of Cryptogmpb.ic Inf'01'1118.tion 

to Foreip lfa.tions 

CDS.A is forw.rded for consideration at the next CIRSA 

meeting. 

Incl: 

a/a 

P. P. IBIGll, CAP.l'AD, USH 

for 

SECRET 
.. • 

.. 

e s1lt:ifif1i631 

SEMI 8l"!hiUIHt HAllWJSOJI 

for 

DISCIOSURE OF CRYPl100BAPBIC WOBllA'.m'll 

m FOiEIGB M'l?I011S 

l. There bave been several cases recentl.y 1n. which successful. cm.plet:ion 

of actions to improve the e:eyptogra.phic security of M!'O ad CCID'bined (US-t.m:) 

ccmmmicaticma he.ve been delAJ8Cl because of the necessity to obtain rel.ease 

approval. :trcm the State-Defense Jl:l.11 taey Cantrol CClllllli ttee (S-JllICC) • In sane 

cases it has al.so been necessary to receive the approval of the Ubited States 

Cmmunicaticma Intelligence Board. (USCIB) and of' tbe Jo1Dt Chiefs of Statt 

(J .c .s .) • In the latter 1Datances,, the Director, llSA.. has usuaJ.l¥ im. tiated 

the actions necessary to obtain approval.. There ha"Ve been occasians also> 

iD which the Director I BSA., has sane directl.y to s-am:c requesting autbori ty 

to rel.ease cryptographic :1Dformat1cm as has the .DC on otber occasiODS. 

2. ihe Director JITSA, is now est.abllsbing a procedure within BSA to be 

followed in obtainiDg tbe various approvals nece&S&rY' tor 4isc1osure of cryptosraitnc inf'oDBtion. to foreign nations. This procedure will, if accepted. by 

the agencies exercising approving authority, provide a means of Eterially 

ahorteDiDg the time usually required to obtain approval. 

3. As a first step 1 t is necessary to di vi(le cryptographic information into 

two classes which are defined as follows: 

Class "A" - Cl')'ptamaterial which is used iD :forward or tactical 

echelons; has ceyptoprinciples which aze wideJ.7 known 

in foreisi nations; or is of such a nature that u. s. policy 

~ not require cr.yptographic cl.ee.rence of persorme.l for 1 ts use. 

Class ''B" - AU other cryptographic inf'omation. 

4. It may be not.eel that much of the cryptosrapbic ini'orma.ticm which has 'been 

disc1oaed in the past fa.J.ls in.to Class ''A". 

5. Under the proposed procedure, the Director, BSA., would authorize 

discJ.osure of cryptographic in.formation defiDecl u Class "A" information, and. 

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SECRET 
• 

the Director, BSA., would endeavor to obtain approval. for :release of Class "B" 

CQ'Ptographic iDformaticm. frail the three cognizant autbori ties. 

6. In o1'der that 1 tems which are ill Class "A" may be acted an prcmiptl.y 

vi thou.t :first obt«1n1ng J .c .s. approval., the Director, BSA, proposes to forward 

the 1nclose4 DlelllD%'8DdUll to the J.c.s. for approval.. Similar requests will be 

au11n1 tted. to uscu a.ml s-ao:cc. 

7. It is re~ that CBllSA concur in the followiDg actions: 

!.· BSA. zepresentati ves on the Combilled 8ecur1 ty and Cryptographic 

Panel. of' the Cd-Ult-US ~a, prior to subm1 tting a pa.per which will eventuall.7 

require disclosw:e of ceyptosraphic information to foreigu nations will: 

(1) I:a.clicate tbat tbe 1ni"orma.t1on. is Class "A" ez'1Ptogr&pb1c 

inform.ticn and authorized for release 'b7 tb.e Director, BSA., or 

(2) Include a statement tot.he ettec"t tbat approval tor reJ.eaae bas 

been obta.1 Mil fraa tbs copizant respcms1ble authorities. 

(3) OD similar ;papers sul:IDitted by other agencies, BSA representatives 

an the CClllbiDecl Security 8Drl C~c Panel. be aaaiped the 

task of obtaining release approval &11d. inform the Panel. of this 

.tact in a •nner aim1 Jar to tbat described above. 

~· Forward.1Dg the incl.osed memorandum by the Director, BSA, to the J.c.s. 

for CODBicleratim. 

2 

SECRET 
REF ID:A666.ji 

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I( 

tor the 

OD 

DISCLOSUB&: OF cnP.L10GBAPBIC nm>RMA.SOll '1'0 JmEIGR llA'!I<BS 

References: J.c.s. 5127/$ 

J.. For the cmtil\Uaticm of secure combined US - UI: ccmmmicaticms, u.d to 

1mprow tbe camnmicatians security of 1IA.m forces, it is necessary traa time 

to t:t. to CODB1der a u. s. crn>togr&pbic system., device or publication which 

m1S)lt be used f'or this purpose. Bei"ore DISB7 of these items can be formalq 

proposed tor ac1opt1m by Mm forces, or for use in US-UK ccmmmice.tions (wbich 

oi'teD 1Dcl.ude Cc:llllllanwealtb. Be.ticms not members ot nm), 1 t is necessary tbat 

app.roval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff' be obta1ned. !his is required in accordaDce 

With the provisions of Joint Actions of the Armed Forces* which states that no 

Joint Cl'JPtographic device or publication will be ma.de airailable for combiDed 

use with.out approval of the Joint Chiefs ot Staff. 

2.. ID considering the nature of JD8D7 cryptographic items for which 

requirements exist 11'1 llNl'O and in US - UK cananmi cations, a di v.l.sian into two 

classes cm be made. '!he cryptma.terial in one of these cl.asses can be 

cJJaracterizecl by three properties: 

!. . It is used in :f'orwa.Td or tactical echel.oD8. 

!!.· the ceyptoprinciples geueraUy are w1de]3 mown. 

g,. •ormaJ.J.y cr,ptographic cle&rance is not required for access to the 

0Z7Ptcma.terial.. 

3.. ID general., the cr;yptosra.phic 1ni'm:ma.t1an in tbis class perta.1ns to 

' 

C1"1,P't08Ea.Pl1c systems and publice.tic:GS used ill tactical. echel.an.s, 1D aircraft. 

and iD amalJ. surface craft. 'lbe 1 tems are ot the toll.owiDS types: 

Aut.hent1cat1cm systems. 

Operations Codes. 

C&1l Sip Ciphers. 

Map Coordinate Codes. 

Certain crnto-clev.Lces of simple nature. 

4. 9.1.e crn>toprincipl.ea of these s19tems are ~well-known tbrousbout 

the world and in BCllle varia.tian are used by many mill tary forces of other countries. 

'l'he security required for intmmat1on enc~ted by means of these systems is 

SECRET 
uauall.y for a short time cmly'. 'l'he necessary conmnm catim secur1 ty is obtained. 

"b7 18SU1ng new ed1 tians of codes and m.k1ng :i'requen.t cbangea of ke1iD8 ma.terial. 

1n the case of ciphers. 'D1e cammmica.ticn security, therefore, is not clependeat 

upon keeping the geaeraJ.. nature of the system UDkDowl1 but upcn tbe keys *1.ch 

are used. It should be pointed out 1Jl this carmect1c:m that, because of the 

echelm or use, capture loss o£ aircraft over enemy terri to1'J', etc., would 

lead to illlmedia.te ccm,praaise of the cryptopr1ncipl.e even if it were mt ~ 

known.. 

5. Use of cryptograpbically cl.eared persomel for protection of cryptoma.ter1al Of the kind :mentioned in paragraph 3 above is Clesirable but cazmot be 

CODS1dered as an absolute neceaai ty. '!he cost of' investigating the large number 

of' 1D41 v!du&ls 1n J.ov echeloDs f'or access to such materia.l would be very great. 

Die tile invol."1184 for investigationa coul.cl aff'ect seriousl.1' t.he a'Vailabili ty ot 

cleared. perammel for ccmnmm1cat1cms secur1 ty purposes in these echelms. 

Purthezmore, ~ cryptaDat-....rial in this class is usually basecl upon or cl.oseq 

related to wll known cqptoprinciples. C:ansequentl.y, the added protectica 

afforded by a cryptol.ogLc cl.eara.nce is not as importaZlt for these SJStems as 

is the case for other more ad'VB.llced. crJPtoprincipl.ea. 

6. In recognit1c:m of the foregoing cCllditica.1 Department of Defense 

D1rect1w 1lumber a-5210.2, dated 5 June 1952, authorizes EA. (AFSA) to 4es1gaa.te 

certa1D tnea of cryptcmateri&J. as nm-critical fraa the security viewpoint 

ancl tor which no crn>tosraphic cl.ea.ranee is required of il1d1 v.l.4uals tor access to 

security information if various classificaticms is still required. 

7. For c~ic iDfcmDs.tion which does not fall within the category 

described in tbe foregoing paragraphs, the provisions of Joint Action of the 

A1'med Forces would be canplled. with. 

8. In llgb.t of the foregoing statements, I therefore reccllllll1W.id that the 

Joint Chiefs ot Staff': 

~. Authorize the Director, BSA., to approve release ot cr,yptograpbic 

materi&.l of' the followiDg tniea to f'o:reigu naticas, sub.ject to llaticmal polic7 tor 

discl.oaure ot classified security inf'm:ma.tion: 

(l) Mama1 cr:1Ptograpbic systems tor which cryptoJ.osic clearance of ~ 

user is not required. 

(2) Codes (one- am two-pa.rt) for which crwtCJ1og1c cl.earaDce of the 

user is not required. 

SECRET_ 
(3) Authmticaticm. systems .. 

(4) Cl'JPtosraiiaic devices an.cl mchines tor which CXl'Ptologi.c 

cJ.earaace of the user is not required. 

(S) Other codss, ciphers, and cqptcgrapbic techDiques wbic!l are 

def1D1tel.y established as in use or aa having been 1D use by 

the m.ticn(s) illvol:ved in disclosure. 

(6) Inatrt.1cti.cns perta1DiDg to use of tbe foregoing cxn>tosra.pbic 

mtena.l.. 

!! . Direct amendment of Joint Actic:m of t.he Amed Forces to cmfam to 

the fongo1ng mithorization. 

9. Coord.ina:ticm with the Director, Com!micaticms-BJ.ectrmics bas been 

ef:f'ected. 

SECRET ... 
REF ID:A6663. 
... 

SUBJECT: D1sc1osure of Ceyptograpbic Im'o:nnation to Foreign lle.t1ons 

1. 'Dlere are, at present, three agencies which may be required to 

approve rel.ease or disclosure of c1'1Ptogrs.phic information to foreign nations 

~ese are the Joint Chief's of Staff, USCIB, and the State-Defense Military 

Inf'ormat1on eontrol CClllDittee Cs-mace). 

2. At present the general national policy pe1"1111 ts release of' COIFIJBft7AL 

CrJPtograpbic inf'orma.ticm to Australia and BEr.t Zeal and and i'OP SECBE'"f crypto• 

graphic 1.nforma.tim to the United King'm and CanMa. as necessary to pemit 

1-Plementaticm of conmm1cat1ons agreements. ID the case of all llA.m countries, 

and ot the remaining CClllllllQll'wealth countries, S·IKICC policy prohibits release 

ot Cl'J'.Ptographic information except as approved. by s-macc in each instance. 

3. IJ.'he maJor1 ty of' the ccmmm1ca.t1ons agreements which are being 

tmpl.emented, either through the CAR-Ult-US JnECa or through the ~s of the 

Standing Group of WAm, require participe.tion cm. the part of the D.'l'O nations 

and the camn.onveal. th countries. Furthel'IZ!Qre 1 the maJori ty of' agreements 

ccmcem the provision of tactical codes 8l1d ciphers such9 as aircraft codes 1 

autheDticat1on systems., and the like, all of Ybich cane within the "Class A" 

catege>l'J' referred ·to in pa.ragrapi 4 below. In order for this type or material 

to be available when needed, and to permit trainiDg to be ccmclucted, it is 

necessary to have it distributed ccms1dere.b17 in advance of the time when the 

countries which require it would be participating vitb. the U.S. in actual 

canbat operations. 

4. General.J.1' speaking classified cryptographic info:rmation falls within 

one of two classes as follows: 

Class "A" 

!lhe following tn>es of cryptographic material and information normaJ.ly 

will be assiped to Class "A": 

a. lfanna.1 cr.n>togra.phic systems for which cryptologic clearance of 

the user is not required.. (ExampJ.es: One-time pads, double-transposition) • 

b. Codes (one and two pa.rt.) for which cryptographic (cryptologic) 

cl.earance of the user is not required. (Examples: Bomber Coclea., Map Coord1na.te 

Codf!s). 

SECRET 
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c. AutheD.ticatim systems. 

d. DeVicea :for which C1'1Ptosrs.pb1c cl.eara.D.ce of the user is not 

required. (lxa.i.qiles: Strip cipher S)'Stela, :IATBX). 

e.. Instruction perta1n1ng to use a'!ld operation of Class "A" systems. 

f. Codes and ciphers which do not require cryptographic c1earsnce 

for disclosure. 

g. Codes, ciphers, and cryptographic techniques which are defiDi. tely 

esta.bllsb.ecl as 1D use or as having been in use by the recipient country(s). 

Class "B" 

The followiDg types of cryptographic :material. aDc1 iDfcmnation nozmaJ.ly 

will be assigned to Class "B": 

a. Ca:mP:m' cation security equipraents, usually electro-mechanical or 

electronic 1D nature. 

b. Cryptopr1nc1p1es which may be incorporated 1D. such equipments. 

c. Instructions f'or use and operation of such equipaents. 

d. Cr;vptoprir.cipl.ea of which there is reasonable doubt the recipient 

country has Jmowl.edge. 

e. Security evalu&tiODB and crn>tmlaJ.yt1c techniques applicabJ.e to 

sol.ution of all Cl.ass "A'1 and Class "B" 1.Df'cmnatioa and material.. 

5. In estab1isbing an llSA procedure for insuring tbat the necessary 

clear&tl.ce actions are taken., I have received frail tbe Joint Chiefs of Staff' 

authority- to approve rel.ease of JoiDt cryptographic material. of the CJ.ass "A" 

type, subject to :national policy for 4isc1osure of classi:tied security 1Df'orma.t1on. 

6. The mterial 1n Class "A" consists of the tJPe of cocle or ci:pher which 

does not require ceyptographic clearance on the pa.rt of u. s. users, canta.1.ns 

no new cryptoprinciples but rather cc:ms1ats of cryptographic ideas generally 

known to all nations, and would ca.use no insecurity to u. s. comrmm1cations 

if' the cryptoprinciple is known to hoatil.e nations. Furtbermore, the 1llA1'0 

countries rece1 ving ~= material are sismtory to agreements reprding storage, 

accounting, and issue of cryptamaterial. 

7. I, therefore, recommend, in li!b.t of the foregoing statements, that 

USCIB: authorize the Director, BSA, to approve re1ease of cryptographic systems, 

2 

SECRET 
1Dfomat1on, and dev1ces to foreign nations without reference to USCIB, 

proviclecl that such systems, 1.Df'ormation, and devices are Class "A" matter 

aa cletined ill pan.graph 4 above. '!he Director, BSA will keep USCIB 

informed of the it.ems which he authorizes to be re1easecl and the recipient 

natim or m.tiODS. 

3 

SECRET 
REF ID: A66631 e 

1r 
a S £r&¥DM tfd66631 a - ~.I. "',,Lj .L -

P9'!£ - SF.CfJRift lDOPJIN'!Qll 

JBll>BA1mJM FOR BE CHAIBllAll, S-DIICC 

SU&JECT: Bel.easing Cr)'Ptosraphic Information 

l. There are, at present, three agencies wh1cb may be required to approve 

. reJ.ease or discl.osure of cryptographic 1Df'orma.t1on to :foreign mtions. 'lbeae 

are the Joint Chiefs of Staf'f', the United States Ccmmnmtcaticas Intelligence 

Board, and JOU1" ccmmittee. 

2. At present the general national. policy pel'mi ts release of CODIIBl'l!IAL 

cryptograpl11c 1ntomat1on to Australia and Bew Zealand. and 'l'OP SBCBE'l ceyptogra.phic intonation to the United K:lngdcm and Canada as necessary to penni t 

implementation of cCllil11m1 caticms agreements. In the case of all. BATO countries, 

and of the ranaining caJllDODWe<h countries, S-lllICC polic7 prabibita release 

of C1"1Ptographic 1nt"oma.t1an except as approved by s-macc in escb instance. 

3. \be maJor1ty of the communicatims agreements wbich are be1Dg 

1mpJ.ememted, either tbrougb the CAJJ-UIC-US JCECs or througb the CECS of the 

Standing Group of' :IM.'O, require participation on tbe part of the llA'l'O zaaticms 

and. the cC1111KlDWe<h countries. :ru.rthermore the 111&3ortty of agreements 

concern the provision of tactical codes and. ciphers such as aircraft codes, 

autbmticatim systems, and the like, all of lihich come within the "Class A" 

category referred to in paragraph 4 below. In order for this type of material 

to be aw.ilabl.e when needed, and to perm1 t trainiDg to be conducted., it is 

:necessary to have it distributed considerably in adwm.ce of the time when the 

countries which require it would be participating with tb.e U.S. in actual 

ccnbe.t operations. 

4. Generally speaking classified cryptographic iDfomation f'alls within 

one of tvo classes as follows: 

Class "A" 

1'he following types of CrJPtogr&phic material. and information no1'111&lly 

v1ll be assiguecl to CJ.a.as "A": 

a. llrmueJ. cryptographic systems for which cryptol.ogt.c c1earance of the 

user is not required. {Examples: One-time pads, double-transposition) .. 

b. Codes (me and two pa.rt) tor which CZ':fPtogt'aphic (crnto1ogt.c) 

clearance of the user is not required. (Exsmples: Bamber Codes, Map Coordinate 

coaes). 

c. Authentication. SJ'Stema. 

d. Devices for which cryptographic cl.ea.ranee of the user is not required. 

(Examples: Strip cipher s7stem, llA'fEX) • 

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e. Instructicm perta1D1ng to use and operation of Clase 11A" systems. 

f. Codes and ciphers which do not require cr;,ptogmphic cl.ea.ranee 

for discl.osure. 

g. Codes, ciphers, and cryptographic techniques which are detin:L tely 

estab1i8hed as in use or as having been. in use by the recipient coun.tq(s) • 

CJ.us "B" 

will be aasigued to Class "B": 

a. Ccnapm1 cation security equipnenta, usually electro-mechanical or 

el.ectrcmic 1D nature. 

b. CrJPtopr1Dcip1es which :may be incorporated 1D such equipnents. 

c. lnstructims for use and operation o:f such equipaents. 

d. Crn>topr1Dc1p1es of which there is reasanable doubt the recipient 

COUD.try baa know.le4ge. 

e. Security evaluations and cryptanalytic techniques applicable to 

so1ut1on of all C1ass "A" and Class '

1

B" 1Dfozmat1on and material. 

5. In establishing an BSA. procedure for 1Dsur1DS tbat the neces1!1817 

cl.earance aeticns are taken, I have recei'Ved frail the Joint Chiefs of Statt 

authority to approve rel.ease of Joint crntograpbic mater1a1 of the Class "A" 

tn>e, subject to natianal po11cy for disc1osure of classified security inf'ozm.ticm. 

6. Die material. in Claas "A" conaists of the tJF-l of code or cipher which 

does not require cryptographic cl.ea.ranee on the pa.rt of u. s. users, contains 

DO new cryptoprincip1ea but rather consists of cryptographic ideas generally 

lrnowD to all natioua, and vou:Ld cause DO insecurity to U. s. cc11111nu1cations 

if the crn>topriDciple is known to hostil.e nations. FurtheJ:mo.re, the D.'.l'O 

countries receiVing such material are signatory to agreements regarding storage, 

accounting, and issue of cryptana.terial.. 

7. I, therefore, recommend in View of the foregoing statements that the 

State-Defense 11111 tary Information Control. CClll!ID:i ttee authorize the Director, 

Bational Security Agenc7, to authorize rel.ease of cryptographic systems, 

information. and deVicea necessary to impl.ement cClllllUDication agreements 

prcnrided that such sys~, informatic:m. and devices are Class "A 11 material 

2 

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....=. ... 

r -

e s~l:if.£116631 

SECUJ: - mcmt!IY JBeilMA'RCll 

as defilled 1D paragraph 4 above. 'l'he Director, BSA, will keep the S-DMICC 

1Df'omecl of the items which he authorizes to be rel.eased and. the recipient 

natian ar natiODB. 

3 

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, ..