COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-16-00362-CR

JESUS A. PERALES APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM 371ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 1440835D

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

On August 29, 2016, as part of a plea-bargain agreement, appellant Jesus 

A. Perales pleaded guilty to the third-degree felony offense of evading arrest or 

detention, which was enhanced to a second-degree felony for punishment 

purposes by his plea of true to an enhancement paragraph. Tex. Penal Code 

Ann. §§ 12.42(a), 38.04(a), (b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2016). In accordance with the 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

agreement, the trial court sentenced Appellant to twelve years’ confinement.

2

 

The trial court certified that Appellant had no right to appeal because the 

imposed sentence comported with the plea-bargain agreement and that 

Appellant had affirmatively waived his right to appeal as part of his guilty plea. 

See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.14 

(West 2005).

On September 16, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal in the trial 

court. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a). On September 22, Appellant’s counsel filed 

a motion for new trial in which he acknowledged the “legal basis” for a new trial 

“might well be thin” and conceded that Appellant pleaded guilty under a pleabargain agreement, was sentenced pursuant to the agreement, waived his right 

 

2The plea-bargain agreement was conditioned on Appellant committing no 

new offense before the sentencing hearing. If Appellant did not commit a new 

offense, the State agreed to a twelve-year sentence and to waive a second 

enhancement paragraph. If Appellant had committed a new offense and 

persisted in pleading guilty, the plea would have been an open plea to the court. 

But because Appellant did not commit a new offense before the sentencing 

hearing, the trial court accepted Appellant’s guilty plea, adjudged Appellant guilty 

of the offense, and sentenced Appellant in accordance with the State and 

Appellant’s agreement. This was a “split” agreement, but did not render 

Appellant’s plea one that was not entered under a plea-bargain agreement. See 

Rogers v. State, No. 02-10-00363-CR, 2011 WL 2651917, at *1 n.2 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth July 7, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(explaining “split” agreement); see also Moore v. State, 295 S.W.3d 329, 332 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“A trial court may conditionally agree to follow a pleabargain agreement, but only by delaying the unconditional acceptance or 

rejection of the agreement until after the condition of acceptance has been 

fulfilled.”)
3

to appeal, and, therefore, was not entitled to an appeal.3 On September 28, we 

notified Appellant’s trial counsel and Appellant that Appellant had filed a pro se 

notice of appeal, that the trial court had certified that he had no right to appeal

and had waived his right to appeal, and that we would dismiss the appeal unless 

Appellant or any party desiring to continue the appeal filed a response showing 

grounds for continuing the appeal no later than October 10. See Tex. R. App. P. 

25.2(d), 26.2(a), 44.3. Neither Appellant nor his counsel responded. 

The record before this court does not show that Appellant’s sentence 

exceeded the State’s recommendation, that Appellant desires to appeal a matter 

that was raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, that the trial court 

granted Appellant permission to appeal, or that Appellant’s waiver was 

involuntary, unknowing, or unintelligently made. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. 

art. 44.02; Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2); Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694, 697–

99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Thus, in accordance with the trial court’s certification

and Appellant’s express waiver of his right to appeal, we dismiss the appeal. 

See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 43.2(f); Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2006). 

 

3This motion was deemed denied. See Tex. R. App. P. 21.8(c). 
4

/s/ Lee Gabriel

LEE GABRIEL

JUSTICE

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; GABRIEL and SUDDERTH, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: November 17, 2016