Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 16-1325 

VALERIE PAGE, 

Plaintiff, Appellant, 

v. 

AMTRAK, INC., 

Defendant, Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE 

[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Thompson and Kayatta, Circuit Judges, 

and Barbadoro, District Judge. 

Anthony J. Sineni III, with whom Law Offices of Anthony J. 

Sineni III was on brief, for appellant. 

 John J. Bonistalli, with whom Jennifer Lee Sage and Law 

Offices of John J. Bonistalli were on brief, for appellee. 

November 18, 2016 

 



 Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation. 
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THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. This wrongful death case 

arises from the death of Sean Page, who was struck by Amtrak's 

Downeaster train on April 16, 2012, while he was crossing railroad 

tracks in Biddeford, Maine. Faced with a lawsuit filed by Valerie 

Page ("Page"), decedent's wife and personal representative, Amtrak 

moved for summary judgment. Although Page labored to convince us 

-- and the district court -- otherwise, the legal issues are 

straightforward, and the district court appropriately granted 

summary judgment in favor of Amtrak because Amtrak did not owe a 

duty to this pedestrian. 

Page appealed the district court's grant of summary 

judgment, arguing, inter alia, that Sean Page had a superior right 

to use the area in which the accident occurred ("the premises") 

regardless of who owned it, and that there are material disputes 

of fact regarding negligence. 

But having carefully reviewed the papers and Maine's 

old, but still controlling, case law and statutes, we see no reason 

to disturb the district court judge's well-reasoned and thorough 

decision. And "when lower courts have supportably found the facts, 

applied the appropriate legal standards, articulated their 

reasoning clearly, and reached a correct result, a reviewing court 

ought not to write at length merely to hear its own words 

resonate." In re Brady-Zell, 756 F.3d 69, 71 (1st Cir. 2014) 

(citing cases). We therefore affirm the entry of summary judgment 
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substantially on the basis of Judge Hornby's comprehensive opinion 

with respect to the lack of a duty owed, adding only a few of our 

own thoughts for good measure. 

In our view, this case begins and ends with the first 

principle of negligence: there must be "a duty of care owed to 

the plaintiff." Bell ex rel. Bell v. Dawson, 82 A.3d 827, 831–32 

(Me. 2013). Here, Amtrak owed no such duty: Maine law explains 

that "[a] person may not, without right, stand or walk on a 

railroad track . . . except by railroad conveyance."1 Me. Rev. 

Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 7007(1) (2015). Page tells us that § 7007 

does not apply because Amtrak has not established ownership of the 

premises, but § 7007 does not require Amtrak to prove ownership. 

Moreover, as Judge Hornby well explained, Page failed to show any 

right on the part of Sean Page to cross, stand, or walk on the 

premises. So it does not matter whether Amtrak owned the premises 

-- under § 7007, Amtrak did not owe Sean Page a duty. 

Like the district court, we think it is "unnecessary to 

make th[e] distinction" between trespasser, licensee, or invitee; 

even if Amtrak was the owner of the premises, Maine case law makes 

it plain that Amtrak is not obligated to stop trains to accommodate 

pedestrians crossing the tracks, especially at undesignated 

crossings. "It is the duty of the traveler on the highway to wait 

 

1 "Conveyance" here means some mechanism that would carry an 

individual. 
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for the train. The train has the preference and the right of way." 

Smith v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 32 A. 967, 970 (Me. 1895) (citations 

omitted). A traveler or would-be traverser of the tracks "should 

not venture upon the track or crossing until it is made reasonably 

plain that he can go over without risk of collision." Hesseltine 

v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 154 A. 264, 266 (Me. 1931); see also Ham v. 

Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 116 A. 261, 263 (Me. 1922) ("It is the duty of 

the traveler on the highway to wait for the train."). And "[i]t 

is common knowledge that people frequently walk on railroad tracks, 

and, if locomotive engineers were bound to stop or decrease speed 

every time they saw a person on the track, the operation of the 

railroad would be greatly hindered, to the detriment of the 

public." Copp v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 62 A. 735, 736 (Me. 1905). 

We need not address Page's other arguments -- that Amtrak 

created an unreasonable hazard and had a duty to warn, or that 

Amtrak operates its trains so fast that they cannot stop for 

pedestrians -- because Judge Hornby's analysis correctly disposed 

of each. 

Meanwhile, we decline to address Page's implied-invitee 

argument because it was not raised below.2 See McCoy v. Mass. 

Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing cases) 

 

2 As Judge Hornby observed, "[t]he plaintiff has taken the 

definitive position that this is not a case of an implied invitee." 
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(“It is hornbook law that theories not raised squarely in the 

district court cannot be surfaced for the first time on appeal.”). 

Finally, we do not weigh in on the topic of a duty being 

owed by Sean Page, which the district court took as established. 

True, "[a] collision at a railroad crossing is prima facie evidence 

of negligence on the part of the traveler[,]" Hooper v. Bos. & Me. 

R.R. Co., 17 A. 64, 65 (Me. 1889), but this component of the 

analysis is of no moment because Amtrak owed no duty in the first 

instance. 

Affirmed, and each party shall bear its own costs.