IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Petrina McCall, :

Petitioner :

: No. 352 C.D. 2020

v. :

: Submitted: October 2, 2020

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (Philadelphia Parking :

Authority), :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: January 11, 2021

Petrina McCall (Claimant) petitions for review of the March 12, 2020 

order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that affirmed a decision of 

Workers’ Compensation Judge Holly San Angelo (WCJ or WCJ San Angelo), granting 

the Philadelphia Parking Authority’s (Employer) petition to terminate (Termination 

Petition) Claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits based on her full recovery from 

her work-related injuries. On appeal, Claimant contends that the Board erred in 

granting the Termination Petition because Employer’s medical expert failed to review 

her current medical records, and the WCJ erred in rendering her credibility 

determinations. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

On January 9, 2015, Claimant was injured in an automobile accident while 

working for Employer as a parking enforcement officer, when a passing vehicle hit the 
2

vehicle she was driving. On January 30, 2015, Employer issued a medical-only notice 

of temporary compensation payable, accepting that Claimant sustained contusions to 

her right hip and right knee as a result of the accident. 

On February 12, 2015, Claimant filed a claim petition, alleging that she 

sustained additional injuries in the accident. In a decision circulated on November 21, 

2016, WCJ Erin Young (WCJ Young) agreed and found that in addition to the accepted 

injuries, Claimant also sustained post-concussion syndrome with post-traumatic 

headache; lumbar radiculitis; lumbar facet syndrome; bilateral SI joint dysfunction; 

right knee contusion; right knee bursitis; bilateral greater trochanter bursitis; right 

ischial bursitis; and cervical, thoracic, and lumbar sprain and strain. (Reproduced 

Record (R.R.) at 650a, 656a-57a.) WCJ Young thus awarded Claimant temporary total 

disability benefits from January 25, 2015, onward at the rate of $573.26 per week based 

upon an average weekly wage of $859.83, pursuant to the provisions of the Workers’ 

Compensation Act (Act).1 (R.R. at 657a-58a.)

On October 5, 2017, Employer filed the Termination Petition, contending 

that Claimant had fully recovered from her work injuries as of September 20, 2017. In 

support of the Termination Petition, Employer presented Claimant’s deposition 

testimony taken on December 13, 2017, and the deposition testimony of Paul M. 

Shipkin, M.D., taken on January 24, 2018. 

During her deposition, Claimant was questioned about the independent 

medical examination (IME) conducted by Dr. Shipkin on September 20, 2017. 

Claimant acknowledged that she wore sunglasses to the IME and asked that the shades 

in the room be closed. When asked why she wore sunglasses at the time, she explained 

that, “when I’m beginning to have headaches[,] my eyes bother me and I w[ear]

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§1-1041.1, 2501-2710.
3

sunglasses.” (Claimant 12/13/2017 Deposition (Claimant Dep.), at 7; R.R. at 424a25a.) Claimant was also asked why she was not currently wearing sunglasses and did 

not wear them at two prior depositions or before the WCJ. In response, Claimant stated 

that it was not sunny in those rooms. (Claimant Dep. at 8; R.R. at 425a.)

Claimant was also asked about her appointments with Brad C. Klein, M.D. 

Claimant agreed that she stopped seeing Dr. Klein in September 2016, shortly before 

her claim petition was granted, and did not return to him for treatment until July 14, 

2017. (Claimant Dep. at 9-10; R.R. at 426a-27a.) Since then, Dr. Klein has prescribed 

her Diclofenac for pain and headaches; Relpax for headaches; and Amitriptyline for 

depression and sleeplessness. (Claimant Dep. at 10-14; R.R. at 427a-31a.)

Claimant also treats with Tony Al-Amin, M.D., once or twice a month. 

Dr. Al-Amin provides physical therapy. Dr. Al-Amin has given Claimant injections in 

the back of her head, hips, and right knee. Claimant stated that she continues to have 

pain from her work injuries, which is sometimes aching pain and sometimes sharp pain. 

(Claimant Dep. at 34; R.R. at 455a.) Dr. Al-Amin prescribed a Diclofenac gel for the 

pain. (Claimant Dep. at 35; R.R. at 456a.)

Next, Employer presented the deposition testimony of Dr. Shipkin, who 

is board certified in neurology. Dr. Shipkin related that at the September 20, 2017 

IME, Claimant provided a history of her ongoing difficulties resulting from her work 

injuries. She stated to Dr. Shipkin that, initially, her right knee and right thigh began 

to swell after the accident. (Dr. Shipkin 1/24/2018 Deposition (Shipkin Dep.), at 13; 

R.R. at 482a.) About 10 days later, Claimant stated that she began having “issues with 

[her] head.” Id. Claimant further stated to Dr. Shipkin that she “began to feel weird in 

[her] head, like seeing a cloud growing in [her] head.” (Shipkin Dep. at 14; R.R. at 

483a.) She then developed headaches, which “disappeared for a period of time . . . .” 

(Shipkin Dep. at 19-20; R.R. at 488a-89a.) However, in February 2017, she said the 
4

headaches returned. (Shipkin Dep. at 20; R.R. at 489a.) Claimant stated that she 

continued to have headaches, right thigh soreness, right buttock soreness, and neck pain 

as a result of her work injuries. (Shipkin Dep. at 20-21; R.R. at 489a-90a.) 

Dr. Shipkin then testified that he reviewed Claimant’s medical records, a 

prior IME report, her deposition testimony from 2015, and photographs of the accident

and the police report. (Shipkin Dep. at 23-24, 26; R.R. at 492a-93a, 495a.) He 

explained that he performed a standard comprehensive neurologic assessment on 

Claimant. (Shipkin Dep. at 33-34; R.R. at 502a-03a.) He stated that he did not find 

any abnormalities when examining her head, that “[h]er neck was normal, supple, 

[with] full range of movement, and [that] her spine musculature was normal.” (Shipkin 

Dep. at 34; R.R. at 503a.) Dr. Shipkin also stated that he found her responses to his 

examination to be “vague and inconsistent.” Id. For example, she would claim “[i]t’s 

uncomfortable” when he assessed certain areas, but “on the same assessment a moment 

later, she wouldn’t . . . .” Id.

Dr. Shipkin noted that Claimant wore sunglasses to the IME. He stated 

that it was typical for someone who is having a migraine to shield his or her eyes from 

fluorescent lighting. (Shipkin Dep. at 35; R.R. at 504a.) He stated, however, that when 

Claimant removed her sunglasses, she did not squint or appear to be in any obvious 

discomfort, which would have been the expected physiologic response. (Shipkin Dep. 

at 36; R.R. at 505a.) Dr. Shipkin explained that Claimant did begin to squint during 

the eye examination, making it difficult for him to do a complete examination. He 

testified that when he was able to examine Claimant’s eyes, he determined that her 

pupils, eye movements, visual fields, and cranial nerves were all normal. Id.

Dr. Shipkin further determined that Claimant’s coordination, muscle tone, 

stance, and posture were normal. Despite this, “[w]hen she walked or ambulated, she 

had a bizarre intermittently lurching gait[,] including lurching while she was heel and 
5

toe walking.” (Shipkin Dep. at 36-37; R.R. at 505a-06a.) Dr. Shipkin stated that he 

has seen this nonphysiologic quality numerous times over the years, and that “[i]t’s 

usually seen in folks who are either symptom magnifying or have other emotional 

issues in their life.” (Shipkin Dep. at 37; R.R. at 506a.) 

Dr. Shipkin opined that, based on the “objective data,” Claimant was 

“neurologically intact” and did not have any residual deficits related to her work 

injuries. (Shipkin Dep. at 39; R.R. at 508a.) He therefore concluded that she had 

recovered from her accepted work injuries. Id. Regarding Claimant’s ongoing 

complaints, Dr. Shipkin stated that post-traumatic headaches do not disappear for 

months and then return at a later date. He further opined that the reason for Claimant’s 

headaches is not work-related, and that her thigh and buttock area soreness, just like 

her headaches, is subjective in nature. (Shipkin Dep. at 39-40; R.R. at 508a-09a.) He 

found no objective evidence “to suggest either headache or a right lower extremity 

thigh or hip soreness or right buttock soreness.” (Shipkin Dep. at 40; R.R. at 509a.) 

As to her neck, Dr. Shipkin related that Claimant moved her head normally with no 

obvious discomfort, and, therefore, he could not objectively verify any of her 

complaints. Id. 

In response to the Termination Petition, Claimant testified live before 

WCJ San Angelo on June 7, 2018. Claimant testified that she began treating with Dr. 

Al-Amin at the time of her work injury. Claimant stated that at some point, she stopped 

treating with him because she felt better, and that she had not seen him for “months.” 

(WCJ 6/7/2018 Hearing Transcript (Hr’g Tr.), at 22-23; R.R. at 116a-17a.) She 

explained that she later returned to Dr. Al-Amin for treatment and that she now sees 

him monthly regarding the pain in her right buttock and right hip area, as well as for 

her headaches. Claimant testified that Dr. Al-Amin prescribed physical therapy, which 

she does weekly. She next stated that she treats with Dr. Klein for her headaches, and 
6

that she began seeing him at the time of the work injury. Claimant related that at some 

point, she also stopped treatment with Dr. Klein because she felt better. (Hr’g Tr. at 

25; R.R. at 119a.) However, she stated that she now treats with him about every three 

months. 

Claimant also presented the deposition testimony of Dr. Al-Amin, who is 

board certified in physical medicine and rehabilitation. Dr. Al-Amin testified that he 

began treating Claimant shortly after the automobile accident. He explained that 

Claimant returned to work on light duty sometime after the accident, but that her 

symptoms returned and she stopped working. Dr. Al-Amin related that, on July 7,

2015, he administered a right lateral cutaneous nerve block that gave Claimant 100%

relief from the pain. (Dr. Al-Amin 3/12/2018 Deposition (Al-Amin Dep.), at 18; R.R. 

at 168a.) However, Claimant told him that the pain returned one week later. Dr. AlAmin further explained that his physical findings at the time showed all of the injuries 

ultimately accepted by WCJ Young in the prior claim petition proceeding.

2

 

Dr. Al-Amin testified that he has continued treating Claimant for her work 

injuries, and acknowledged that there were some gaps in treating Claimant, but that her 

current complaints were the same as her past complaints. Dr. Al-Amin related that, on 

February 19, 2018, Claimant’s chief complaints were headaches, neck pain, low back 

pain, right buttock pain, and right thigh tenderness. He recommended physical therapy 

two or three times per week, chiropractic treatments, and acupuncture treatments. Dr. 

Al-Amin also did not believe that Claimant is magnifying her symptoms. He opined 

that her prognosis for recovery is fair to poor because her symptoms have continued 

over time and she is over 50 years old. (Al-Amin Dep. at 33; R.R. at 183a.) Dr. AlAmin stated that he continues to see her on a monthly or bimonthly basis. 

2 Dr. Al-Amin previously testified on Claimant’s behalf in support of her claim petition. 
7

On cross-examination, Dr. Al-Amin agreed that medical testing showed 

negative results regarding Claimant’s right thigh and lumbar area. (Al-Amin Dep. at 

55; R.R. at 205a.) Further, he based Claimant’s continued post-concussive syndrome 

on her subjective complaints of pain. 

Claimant also presented the deposition testimony of Dr. Klein. Dr. Klein 

is board certified in neurology, and his practice focuses primarily on headaches. (Dr. 

Klein 5/4/2018 Deposition (Klein Dep.), at 10; R.R. at 264a.) He testified that he began 

treating Claimant in February 2015. Dr. Klein stated that Claimant experienced daily 

headaches, along with blurry vision, light sensitivity, short-term memory loss, 

depression, anxiety, and dizziness. He noted that he prescribed Claimant Diclofenac, 

Topamax, Amitriptyline, Relpax, and Effexor.

Dr. Klein’s testimony revealed that he did not treat Claimant from 

September 8, 2016, through July 14, 2017. Dr. Klein testified that, when Claimant 

returned for treatment, she stated that her headaches were occurring twice a week. He 

explained that Claimant had been treating with Aleve, as she ran out of the Diclofenac

because of the gap in treatment. (Klein Dep. at 35; R.R. at 289a.) Over the course of 

several months, Claimant’s headaches improved with the use of Diclofenac. However, 

her dizziness and cognitive issues remained. Dr. Klein did not believe Claimant could

return to work. He suggested, however, that Claimant attempt a volunteer job to see if 

she is capable of going to work while experiencing headaches. He also recommended 

counseling for Claimant’s depressed mood. 

In her Decision issued on December 11, 2018, WCJ San Angelo

determined that Employer sustained its burden of proving that Claimant had fully 

recovered from her work injuries as of September 20, 2017. In doing so, the WCJ 

found that Claimant’s testimony was not credible, rejecting Claimant’s claim that she 

was not fully recovered from her work injuries. (WCJ Decision, Finding of Fact (F.F.) 
8

No. 8.) The WCJ also found it “telling” that Claimant stopped treating with Dr. AlAmin and Dr. Klein following WCJ Young’s grant of Claimant’s claim petition in the 

prior proceeding, and that Claimant returned to treatment “just prior to” her IME with 

Dr. Shipkin. Id. The WCJ further noted that the gaps in Claimant’s “treatment were 

15 months with Dr. Al-Amin and 10 months with Dr. Klein.” Id. 

The WCJ credited Dr. Shipkin’s testimony that Claimant had fully 

recovered from her work injuries as of September 20, 2017, and rejected the testimony 

of Dr. Al-Amin and Dr. Klein. (WCJ Decision, F.F. No. 9.) The WCJ noted that

Claimant’s examination results “were objectively normal with inconsistent and 

nonphysiologic responses[,]” and that “the diagnostic studies were unremarkable.” Id. 

The WCJ therefore rejected the testimony of Dr. Al-Amin and Dr. Klein that

Claimant’s symptoms had improved over the period that she discontinued treatment 

with them, but that she suddenly worsened many months later. The WCJ determined 

that “[t]heir testimony that there was improvement for these large gaps and then a return 

of all symptoms is simply not credible.” Id. Accordingly, the WCJ granted Employer’s

Termination Petition, and Claimant appealed to the Board. 

Before the Board, Claimant argued that the WCJ’s findings were not 

supported by substantial evidence, and that Employer did not establish a change in 

Claimant’s condition since the November 21, 2016 grant of her claim petition. The 

Board reviewed the evidence and concluded that the WCJ’s Decision was based on 

substantial competent evidence of record. In so concluding, the Board observed that 

the WCJ accepted Employer’s medical witness over Claimant’s medical witnesses and 

explained her reasons for so doing, which was proper under the Act. As such, the 

Board concluded that Claimant failed to show that the WCJ erred and, thus, affirmed 

the WCJ’s Decision.
9

Claimant now petitions this Court for review of the Board’s Order,

3

raising a general claim that the WCJ erroneously terminated her benefits. In her brief, 

she claims that Dr. Shipkin’s testimony was insufficient to support the termination of 

her benefits because he did not examine all of Claimant’s medical records; that the 

WCJ erroneously attributed the gaps in Claimant’s medical treatment to the prior 

litigation over her benefits; and that the WCJ erred in accepting Dr. Shipkin’s testimony 

over the testimony of Claimant’s medical experts. 

We begin with a review of the law in termination proceedings. An 

employer seeking to terminate benefits bears the burden of proving either that the 

claimant’s disability has ceased or that any current disability arises from a cause 

unrelated to the claimant’s work injury. Campbell v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal 

Board (Antietam Valley Animal Hospital), 705 A.2d 503, 506-07 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). 

An employer meets this burden when its medical expert unequivocally testifies that “it 

is his opinion, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the claimant is fully 

recovered, [and] can return to work without restrictions[,] and that there are no 

objective medical findings which either substantiate the claims of pain or connect them 

to the work injury.” Udvari v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (USAir, Inc.), 

705 A.2d 1290, 1293 (Pa. 1997). “If the WCJ credits this testimony, the termination 

of benefits is proper.” Id. 

Claimant argues that Dr. Shipkin failed to review many of her medical 

records. Specifically, she claims that Dr. Shipkin did not review the Termination 

Petition deposition transcripts of Dr. Klein and Dr. Al-Amin; that Dr. Shipkin did not 

read the prior decision of WCJ Young, granting the claim petition; that Dr. Shipkin did 

3 On review, we determine whether constitutional rights were violated, whether errors of law 

were committed, or whether necessary findings of fact were supported by substantial competent 

evidence. Stepp v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (FairPoint Commc’ns, Inc.), 99 A.3d 598, 

601 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). 
10

not review Dr. Al-Amin’s medical records and treatment notes from 2016 onward; and 

that Dr. Shipkin did not review Dr. Klein’s medical records or treatment notes from 

2017 onward.4 Claimant further argues that Dr. Shipkin’s testimony is insufficient

because it is based on evidence that predates the prior litigation concerning the claim 

petition. 

Claimant also asserts that the record does not support the WCJ’s finding

that she returned to treatment with Dr. Klein and Dr. Al-Amin because Employer 

requested an IME. She notes that Dr. Klein saw her on July 14, 2017, and recorded 

that she returned to treatment due to increased headaches. She also claims that she 

returned to treatment with Dr. Al-Amin on July 17, 2017, for the same reason. 

Finally, Claimant contends that the testimony of Dr. Klein and Dr. AlAmin, respectively, is more credible than Dr. Shipkin’s testimony, because she saw her 

doctors on numerous occasions and they provided consistent testimony that she 

continues to suffer from her work injuries. She points out that Dr. Shipkin merely 

examined her on one occasion for less than two hours. Moreover, Claimant asserts that 

there was no reason for the WCJ to question her veracity, as she planned to have a long 

career with Employer and she worked for Employer for almost a decade, which shows 

that she had a motive to continue her employment. 

Employer responds that Dr. Shipkin was aware of the work injuries found 

by WCJ Young in her decision in the claim petition proceeding. Employer points out, 

however, that Dr. Shipkin conducted an IME of Claimant on September 20, 2017, and 

found that she had fully recovered from her work injuries, and the WCJ accepted Dr. 

4 Claimant complains that Dr. Shipkin was shown photographs of the automobile accident and 

then asked whether the photographs indicated the likelihood of longstanding injuries. However, 

Claimant did not raise this issue before the Board, (see Board Appeal, R.R. at 27a-28a), or claim that 

the photographs impacted the outcome of the case. We therefore do not consider the issue on appeal.
11

Shipkin’s findings. As such, Employer asserts that it met its burden on the Termination 

Petition. 

The WCJ found Claimant’s medical treatment gap of 15 months with Dr. 

Al-Amin, and 10 months with Dr. Klein, troubling. (WCJ Decision, F.F. No. 8.) 

Claimant testified that she stopped treatment because she was feeling better, (Hr’g Tr.

at 23; R.R. at 117a), but, in response to the Termination Petition, she claimed that she 

had not recovered from her work injuries. (Claimant’s Answer to Termination Petition 

at 1; R.R. at 7a.) Moreover, the WCJ had the opportunity to observe Claimant testify,

and it was within the WCJ’s authority to assess Claimant’s demeanor and deem her 

testimony not credible. Amandeo v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Conagra 

Foods), 37 A.3d 72, 77 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (a WCJ may rely upon her own 

observations of the claimant’s demeanor in assessing credibility).

The WCJ also listed the records examined by Dr. Shipkin, (see WCJ 

Decision, F.F. No. 2(d)), which included, inter alia, the deposition transcript of a 

medical expert, Dr. Steinberg, dated October 27, 2015, regarding the claim petition 

proceedings; the police report regarding the vehicle accident, as well as photographs 

of the accident; two reports containing the results of Claimant’s 2015 brain scans; 

reports from Dr. Klein; reports from Dr. Al-Amin; reports regarding Claimant’s 

physical therapy; and Claimant’s deposition testimony from 2015. 

Claimant asserts that all of the above materials reviewed by Dr. Shipkin 

predate the prior claim petition proceeding in this matter, relying on Baumann v. 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Kellogg Company), 147 A.3d 1283 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2016), as support for her contention, which she claims established that a 

finding of full recovery cannot be based solely on evidence that predates the previous 

adjudication, i.e., evidence from the claim petition proceeding. However, Claimant has 

not fully articulated the holding in Baumann. What Baumann actually states is that, 
12

“although the WCJ’s finding cannot be based solely upon evidence that pre[]dates the 

previous adjudication, . . . it may be based upon a review of such evidence plus a 

post-adjudication examination.” Id. at 1291 (emphasis is original) (internal citation 

omitted). In the present case, Dr. Shipkin reviewed Claimant’s prior medical records, 

including some that post-dated the prior adjudication regarding the claim petition, and

also conducted an IME of Claimant on September 20, 2017, i.e., a “post-adjudication 

examination,” and relied on both Claimant’s medical records and the results of the IME 

in determining that Claimant had fully recovered from her work injuries. Moreover, 

the WCJ accepted Dr. Shipkin’s determination of full recovery as credible and, 

accordingly, found that Employer established a change in Claimant’s condition

sufficient to support a termination of benefits. Baumann, 147 A.3d at 1291. As such, 

Claimant failed to establish that the WCJ erred in finding that Employer met its burden 

of proving a change in Claimant’s condition based on Dr. Shipkin’s review of the 

medical evidence in this case.

5

 

Claimant’s next two allegations of error challenge the WCJ’s fact-finding

and credibility determinations. Claimant asserts that the WCJ erred in determining that

the gaps in Claimant’s medical treatment established that Claimant did not need 

medical treatment or that she only returned to treatment because Employer requested 

an IME. Claimant suggests that her medical records establish that she returned to 

treatment because her headaches increased in intensity. Likewise, Claimant asserts that 

5 Additionally, “[t]he fact that a medical expert does not have all of a claimant’s medical 

records goes to the weight given the expert’s testimony, not its competency.” Pryor v. Workers’

Compensation Appeal Board (Colin Service Systems), 923 A.2d 1197, 1203 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) 

(quoting Marriott Corporation v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Knechtel), 837 A.2d 623, 

631 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)). The WCJ, as the ultimate factfinder in workers’ compensation cases, 

“has exclusive province over questions of credibility and evidentiary weight . . . .” Anderson v. 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Penn Center for Rehab), 15 A.3d 944, 949 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2010).
13

the WCJ should not have credited Dr. Shipkin’s testimony over her medical experts. 

She points out that Dr. Shipkin only examined her on one occasion, and Dr. Klein and 

Dr. Al-Amin treated her for years and agreed she has not fully recovered from her work 

injuries.

The law is well established that “[t]he WCJ is the ultimate factfinder and 

has exclusive province over questions of credibility and evidentiary weight.” 

University of Pennsylvania v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Hicks), 16 A.3d 

1225, 1229 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). “The WCJ . . . is free to accept or reject, in whole 

or in part, the testimony of any witness, including medical witnesses.” Griffiths v. 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Red Lobster), 760 A.2d 72, 76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2000). When considering whether the WCJ’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence, we “must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party [that]

prevailed before the factfinder” and “draw all reasonable inferences which are 

deducible from the evidence in support of the factfinder’s decision in favor of that 

prevailing party.” Waldameer Park, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board

(Morrison), 819 A.2d 164, 168 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). “[I]t does not matter that there is 

evidence in the record which supports a factual finding contrary to that made by the 

WCJ. Rather, the pertinent inquiry is whether there is any evidence which supports the 

WCJ’s factual finding.” Id. 

The WCJ was not required to accept that Claimant’s headaches returned 

because that is what Claimant reported to her doctors. The WCJ observed Claimant 

testify and found that her testimony was not credible. Further, the record establishes 

that Claimant did not treat with Dr. Al-Amin for 15 months, or with Dr. Klein for 10 

months. She then returned to treatment with them in July 2017, two months before her 

September 20, 2017 IME. The WCJ found this meaningful, as was her prerogative in 

deciding the weight of the evidence.
14

Contrary to Claimant’s contentions, the WCJ also was not bound to accept 

Claimant’s medical experts over Dr. Shipkin, because Dr. Shipkin only examined her 

on one occasion. If that was the standard, the IME process would be pointless. The 

WCJ accepted Dr. Shipkin’s testimony because he thoroughly examined Claimant and 

found no objective evidence that she still suffered from her January 9, 2015 work 

injuries. Dr. Shipkin also found Claimant’s conduct during the IME indicative of 

symptom magnification. For example, Claimant walked with a lurching gait, despite 

normal posture, muscle tone, and stance; she wore sunglasses to her appointment,

claiming the bright lights hurt her eyes, but she did not squint when the sunglasses were 

removed; and her claims of pain during the IME were inconsistent and vague, as she 

claimed to have pain in certain areas upon examination, but upon reexamination, she 

did not complain of pain. 

In sum, Claimant has failed to establish that Dr. Shipkin’s testimony was 

insufficient to support a termination of benefits, or that the WCJ erred in her factfinding or credibility determinations. Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s order. 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in this decision.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Petrina McCall, :

Petitioner :

: No. 352 C.D. 2020

v. :

:

Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board (Philadelphia Parking :

Authority), :

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 11th day of January, 2021, the order of the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board, dated March 12, 2020, is hereby AFFIRMED.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge