-•UUrn up Ar'.-'-1 '-'/•> c i^:- 

# WSfPlS AMJO: 3o

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON In the Matter ofthe Marriage of ) ) DIVISION ONE SANDY S. OU, ) ) No. 70790-6-1 Appellant, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) HUNG K.CHEUNG, ) ) 

### Respondent. ) FILED: September 15,2014 ) 

### Dwyer, J. —Sandy Ou appeals from the denial of her petition to modify a 

### child support order. Ou sought to obtain for her son substantial educational postsecondary supportfrom Hung Cheung—herformer husband and the 

### biological father of her son. Finding that the trial court, in denying Ou's petition, did notabuse the ample discretion conferred byRCW 26.19.090(2), or otherwise
err, we affirm.
I 

### In 1994, Ou and Cheung were married. The following year, the couple 

### had a son—Henry Cheung.1 By 1998, however, Ou and Cheung haddivorced. In 1999, Henry resided a majority of the timewith Ou, and Cheung was ordered to make child support payments, which he diduntil Henry turned 18.
1WerefertoHenry by hisfirst namein ordertodifferentiate between father and son. No disrespect is intended.No. 70790-6-1/2


### Before marrying Cheung, Ou obtained a postsecondary degree. She then worked as an interpreterfor a number ofyears before becoming a self-employed real estate agent in Florida. In2013, she estimated that her income for the year
was $18,000.00 and listed her monthly net income as $1,671. 

### Cheung does not have a postsecondary degree. He worked as a cook in 

### the bakery of a grocery store where his annual income is around $28,000. He also remarried. His current wife's dependent child and her two parents live with Cheung. 

### Henry excelled in school. During his final year of high school, he earned 

### college credits at the local community college and was granted admission by the 

### University ofFlorida, Virginia Technical Institute, Penn State University, and 

### Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. His first choice was to attend EmbryRiddle and study aerospace engineering. The annual cost of attending EmbryRiddle is over $46,000. However, through various scholarships and financial aid 

### awards, Henry was capable of paying forabout half of the annual cost. Several months before Henry's 18th birthday,2 Oufiled a petition to modify 

### the child support orderin order toobtain postsecondary supportfor Henry. After Cheungfailed to respond, a default order was entered in which Cheung was ordered to pay postsecondary support forHenry. Nevertheless, on July 18, 

### 2013, a hearing was heldin King County SuperiorCourt, which resulted in a

2Henry turned 18 on January 6, 2013.
-2No. 70790-6-1/3 

### denial ofOu's petition.3 Additionally, a written orderwas entered on the same day memorializing the denial of Ou's petition. 

### Ou appeals.4
II 

### Ou contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her petition. This is so, she asserts, because the trial court failed to consider the statutory factors in RCW 26.19.090(2). We disagree. "When considering a request for postsecondary educational support, RCW 26.19.090(2) directs the superior court to determine whether the child is infact 

### dependent and relying upon the parents for the reasonable necessities oflife." in
re Marriage of Morris. 176 Wn. App. 893, 904, 309 P.3d 767 (2013). Once the 

### superior court has made this determination, it "may then exercise its discretion in determining whether and for how long to award support." Morris, 176 Wn. App. 

### at 904. Factors it may consider include, but are not limited to, the following: Age ofthe child; the child's needs; the expectations ofthe parties for their children when the parents were together; the child's 

### prospects, desires, aptitudes, abilities or disabilities; the nature of the postsecondary education sought; and the parents' level of education, standard of living, and current and future resources. Also to be considered are the amount and type of supportthat the child would have been afforded ifthe parents had stayed together. 

### RCW 26.19.090(2). However, because the trial court is not obligated to enter written findings of fact, "we review the record to determine whetherthe court
3Ou states that Cheung successfully moved to vacate the adverse default order. However, there is no evidence in the record supporting Ou's explication of the procedural history between the entry of the default order against Cheung and the denial of her petition. 4Respondent's briefwas untimely filed. Appellant's motion to strike respondent's briefis granted. -3-No. 70790-6-1/4 engaged in the appropriate analysis," which includes a presumption "'that the court considered all evidence before it in' reaching its decision." Morris, 176 Wn. App. at 906 (quoting In re Marriage of Kelly, 85 Wn. App. 785, 793, 934 P.2d 1218 (1997)). Our review ofthe trial court's determination is for an abuse of discretion. Morris, 176 Wn. App. at 905. Ou contends that the record does not show that the trial court properly considered all ofthe factors in RCW 26.19.090(2). However, the parties 

### presented both evidence and argument with regard to all ofthe factors, and the 

### trial court explicitlyconsidered and made specific findings with regard to certain factors on the record. Several ofthese specific findings were memorialized inthe trial court's written order. In the absence ofevidence to the contrary, we 

### presume that the trial court in this case considered all ofthe evidence that was before it in fashioning its order. 

### Moreover, the record reveals that the trial court considered the particular factors that Ou avers were not considered.5 The trial court was aware of Henry's 

### age6 and his needs.7 Itwas furtheraware of Henry's prospects, desires,

5Ou also argues that thetrial court erred bycalculating Cheung's income in disregard of the evidence. However, Ou failed to designate as part of the record any evidence ofCheung's income. Pro se litigants are held to the same standard as attorneys and mustcomplywith all procedural rules on appeal. In reMarriage ofOlson. 69Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993). "The appellant has the burden ofperfecting the record so that the court has before itall the evidence relevant to the issue." In re Marriage ofHaugh, 58 Wn. App. 1, 6, 790 P.2d 1266 (1990). Due to Ou'sfailure toinclude all theevidence relevanttoresolving this issue, wedecline to consider her argument. 6The Court: When does Henry turn 18? Has he already turned 18? Ms. Ou: He already turned 18 in January 6th. 71 think the amount that was indicated was for the tuition or the costs of EmbryRiddle was about $46,000 a year. The total net income of both parents together is $35,000 a year, and even—evenwith the—what Ms. Ouindicated that the—No. 70790-6-1/5 

### aptitudes, abilities, or disabilities,8as wellas the nature of the postsecondary education that he sought.9 Finally, the trial court was aware ofthe amount and type of support that Henry would have been afforded if his parents had stayed 

### together.10 Nevertheless, Ou contends that itwas incumbent upon the trial court to make specific findings as to the cost and availability of a postsecondary education at a publicly-funded institution before denying her petition. In support of her contention, she cites to In re Marriage of Shellenberger, 80 Wn. App. 71, 

### 906 P.2d 968 (1995), in which we held that a trial court must "make specific findings as to the cost and availability ofcollege education inthe child's chosen field at publicly funded institutions before ordering an objecting parentto support


### a more expensive private college education." 80 Wn. App. at 85. We reasoned 

### that an objecting parent of"modest means" should not be required "to pay for private college where the childcan obtain a degree in his or her chosen field at a publiclysubsidized institution." Shellenberger, 80 Wn. App. at 85. Given thatthe trial court did not order Cheung to pay postsecondary support, both the rule and the rationale set forth in Shellenberger are inapposite. Our review ofthe record reveals that the trial court did not abuse its

that the amount after grants and scholarships is about $26,000 a year, that's still two-thirds of the parents' net income. 8"And—and we have to be realistic about what our means are, unfortunately, because this may be a very [good] school and a very good opportunity for a good student." 9"[T]he other [question] is whether or not [the parents] can afford toprovide the Mercedes ofeducation and pay for a university such as Embry-Riddle." 10 "The total net income of both parents together is $35,000 a year, and even—even with the—what Ms. Ou indicated that the—that the amount after grants and scholarship is about $26,000 a year, that's still two-thirds of the parents' net income."No. 70790-6-1/6


### discretion pursuantto RCW 26.19.090(2) and did not otherwise err.11
Affirmed.

We concur: 

# Tr\M ^

11 Ou cites to our decision in State ex rel. Stout v. Stout, 89 Wn. App. 118, 948 P.2d 851 (1997), in support of her argument that a minimum need standard isimposed byRCW 26.19.065(2), unless a court deviates for reasons specified in RCW 26.19.075. Neitherthe 

### statutory provisions cited by Ou norourdecision in Stout relate to the issue ofwhetherthetrial courtcomplied with RCW 26.19.090(2). Thus, theyprovide Ou no basis forthe reliefthat she requests.