• y 24 

USCIB: 2!].1/26 

28 June l.954 

'lYJf Sll:CRE!l' 

Ml!HORANDUM. FCE THE MDmERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Program to Improve Communications Security of NATO 

Countries. · 

1. The following documents regarding the Program to Improve the 

Cammunications Security ot NATO Countries have been received .tram the 

Chairman or the UBCIB Ad Hoc Committee ha.ndl.ing that program and are forwarded for your information: 

a. A report or the USCIB Ad Hoc Committee on the recent 

approach to the French, prepared in compliance with the 

decision of USCIB at its 103rd. Meeting. 

b. English text ot the Standing Group Memorandum agreed to 

at the technical talks. 

2. A copy or the French text of the Standing Group Memorandum and 

a copy of the report ot the u.:rs:. technical. delegates have been tiled in 

the office of the Executive Secretary, USCIB, and are available to a:tf3' 

member who wishes to examine than. 

3. In general, the U.K. report agrees with the conclusions and 

observations of the U.S. technical delegates except that the U.S. delegates did not encounter the examples of physical insecb.rity. noted in the 

U.K. report. 

4. The Standing Group Memorandum as agreed at the technical talk:ip is substanti~ the same as that approved by USCIB with the addition of 

an appendix on· general . security practices proposed. by the French and of a 

provision tor issuance of the memorandum through the NATO Council. This 

memorandum has been introduced into the NATO Standing Group. 

Enclosures 

a/s 

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USCIB: 2!].1/26 

USCIB 

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Declassified a~d approved for r~_lease by NSA on 04-18=2014 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 
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REF ID:A61117 e 

'IOP &ORB! PR911 

usem AD HOC COMl1ffllB RnOl\'1' 

10 June 1954 

QI' 'fHI us-me APPROACH TO '1'BB PRBHOB OK 1.'DB SUUBOI . O'I PRBNOll Alf1l HATO CORSBC. 

IL. L.&li!.ra!.Chronolop and S!!J!&!f• 17 Ma.rob - i. IP• 

1. On 17 Ill.rah us Ambaeeador Aldr1ob 1n lon4on waa 

briefed on the pro3eot ao tbat be would be 1n a position to 

deal with the l'ore1gn Offiee U the need aroae tO'I.' Gohanpa 

on th.18 t;oplo. 

2. on 18 Ila.rob US Ambassador Dillon 1n Paris received 

Mr. Polpo1des and reamed pzreparat1ona tor the approach to tho 

FNn.oh.. 

3. On 19 Mal'Oh .Anibaeaador Dillon reoelved a. full 

br1et1ng on the entire pro.teot. . During th1a oonterenoe. it was 

4eo1d.ed that the prog~am ah0u14 be reviewed with the Br1t1sb 

l'.mbasay 1n order to olar1t'J' &ft1' last-minute probl•s and 1n 

ol'der to aaaure a ~11' coo:l'41nated joint approach to the :rranch 

:rowts1 lltn.iat17. It waa also suggested that Aabasaadm.- Dillon. 

meat w1th Br1t1Bb Ambassa4or_S1r Oliver HarveJ' prior to their 

.joint appr•ah. 

4. On ao Mai•h us M1n1ster JQJ'oe--who wa~ aot1ng s.n 

plaoe or US Mla1ste~ Achillea--and. Po1J'zo1dea met at the Br1t1sh 

:&abass:1 with IH.nlater Patriak Hiler and llr. Richard Owen who 

had been .designated as the Br1t1sb delegate to the proposed 

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2i 31D*YY 
e REF ID:A61117-

'!0f SBEIRE RCJ.IH 

Tr11:,artite SeourU;y Working Group (TsWG) phase of the pro.1ecte4 

opet•tion. The senenl approaoh was 41aouarsed tullJ' and some 

adjustments were made 1n a l'renoh text wh1oh summarized the 

English text ot the Aide Memoire and which the British Ambaeeador, Sir Oliver Harvq, proposed to read at the time ot tl)e 

joint approach. It was agreed at th1e meeting that Ambeseador 

Dillon would jo1n Sir Oliver at the British Em.b&881' prior to 

their depart\ll'e tor the Prenoh Pore1p M1n1st17, that M. 

Alexandre Parodi, Permanent Seoretary General at the M:l.n1etry 

of J'oroign Atf'a1ra. was the 1toat suitable person to visit 1n 

the M1n1Bt1'71 and that eveey ef'tort wou1d·be made to meet 

Parodi a11 we had ini.t:lallJ' planned on Monday, 22 March. '1'h1a 

date waa later changed to 24 llaroh. 

5. on 24 March, the meeting with Parod.1 took plaoeo 

!mmed1atel7 after that meeting, Ambassador Dillon deecr1bed 

the pr1no1pal results to Nr. PolJ"Zoides, as tollcwaa 

.a. Parodi had given a visible expreseion ot 

awaroness of the true meaning ot the Aide Memo1re 

which Sir Oliver Harve7 had read to h1m in the 

ton1. ot the aummar;r 1n Prenoh which had.been prep11rec1 at the British BmbassJ' as notsd 1n Pal°agraph 

4, above. 

-2-
e REF ID:A61117-

b. :earoc11•11 initial comment was to ask 

whether the operation desovibed 1n the Aide 

Memo1re wae 41reoted. mainly toward FJ:'&,nce. He 

was 1ntomed. ot oourae. that auoh was not tbG 

case. 

o. Parodi agreed that the matter was 

aer1ous, that he was in general agreement. that 

he would give it naerioue cons1deration 11 and that 

he "•aw no 41tt1oult7 1n reaching agveement" 

within the te1"1na o~ the Aida Memoire. 

It waa learned that the Br1t1eb Ambassador 

bad received, 1n essence,. the same 1mpress1onia. 

6. On 31 March oontaot was renewed with the Poreign 

M!nist17 through the British Bmbasey. At that time the f:t'Onoh 

pro:siaed aot1on within !18 hours and on Friday evening, a April, 

they 1ntom.e4 the US and British Embaaa1oa that a Mo Jean 

Marc Boegner had been named to the TSWO group. Since this 

' 

man was head ot the section on NATO mattera within the French 

Foreign Jll1n1atr;r,, it was quite apparent that our deliberately 

obaoUl'ft Aide Nemoire had been attractive to the !Poreign 1Un1atrv primar111' in its NATO 1nterpratat1on. After further 

d1acUAe1ons with Ambasaador Dillon. Mr. Achilles and British 

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'IOP SB9RE Pfte'l'H 
REF ID:A61117-

'IOP SBQR'lli' AGR 

Minister Rilq. it was decided to meet with Boegner and to make 

an effort at that meetins to dl'&w the operation back within th• 

planned TSWO format. 

7; On 6 April JUnieter Aoh111ea, Hr. John c. Blliott 

at the Department ot State, British Minister Riley, and Mre 

Otten of the Britiah Bmba&&J' met with M. B0981U'1' and Mo 

Christian AubOJlle&utt ot the l'renoh l'oreign 1Uniat17. The French 

opened th1a meeting b7 declaring that theJ' ha4 no spec1t1c 

objections to the plan aa noted in the Aide ilamoire but that 

for a variety ot reasons ther telt, 1n effect. that handling 

tho matter through the MATO a•ot10ft8 ot tbe Pol'e1gn Min1atr1ea 

involved seesdd desirable. The US-UK repreaentati vea countered 

with a tull and vigorous exposition ot the ~asans tor choosing 

the 'lSWG meohan1m ae the 1n1t1al·means for developing the 

teohnioal oonf'ennoe. The l'reneb were persuaded to accept thia 

Vi&WJ Boegner w1thd.ret1J and AubOJ118au and M. Adrian Gu:tlleme 

(aleo attached to the Secretariat ct the National Detense 

Niniat17) were named to me•t with Elliott and Owen 1n order to 

oom-plete the TSWO phase of the operation. 

- • -.Mpioiiitit'c Oouneelor to the Permanent Seoret&rN 

hnoeral of the Min1at17 of Nat.tonal Defense • 

.-4-

'iOi DOW PR9!11 
e REF ID:A6111. 

'1'9P SB9Ril! PRGlll 

8. On 8 April the TSWG group as described 1n 

the pNceding pare.graph met formally for the first time. 

i'urtber meetin.ge were held and on 12 April this phase of 

tile operation. me oonolu4ed to the satisf'aotion of the US 

ariid Br1t1Sh. m9iilbera. The teohn1cal talks were scheduled 

to begin on 22 April at the Invalides. 

. 9 D Meanwhile, Mr. Polysoides lett Par1a and 

arrived 1n I1ondon on 13 April where be oonaulte4 with 

Meaera. Austin and Haven of NSA. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

io. On 14 April, Ma.Jor General Ronald o. Pennev, 

Ohainaan ot the Cipher Pol103' Board, was host at an informal 

and very sat1staotol'7 oon.terenoe attended by 

.__ _ __, ot GCHQ, &.n4 Messrs. Aust1n., Raven and Polyzo1des • 

The progress ot the Paris operations was desoribed and final 

arrangement& were ma.de tor the departtare of the technical 

ocintereea. 

11. On 17 April the HSA members proceeded to 

Pal"ia. 

12. On 22 April the te~hnical talks were started 

aa scheduled and wera concluded on 1 Mal'. 

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TeP SBeRIR Pftef H 
e REF ID:A6111. 

'!'OP BEOHlfi' PRO'PH 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

B. §.umma17 ot the Technical Pro=9,!ed1pga, 22 Al?Fil - l !1!Z· 

l. The American representatives met with the 

British representatives, ....._~~~~~~~~~~~~~----' 

in London from 12-15 April to smooth out dit!'erences 1n the 

minimum standards paper and to prepare detailed pl'Ooedure 

tor the meetings with the French. These meetings mre 

successful. 

2. Ten meetings with the French were held trom 

22 April to 1 Ma7 in Paris. The tour French repreaentativcas 

were: 

Mr. Viala - Head ot Foreign Office Department 

ot "Transmission et Chiftre" 

Capt. Muller - Head ot "servioe Teohn1que Central des Ch1tfres" the 

permanent secretariat ot the 

Interminiaterial Commission 

on Cipher 

Cap1ta1ne de Corvette Ralllt • Ministry ot 

Def'enae EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

In addition. Lt. Colonel Arnaud ot the li'rench Army and an assistant were prasent at one meeting. 

3. The ostensible purpose or the talks. the 

preparation ot a memorandum tor the Standing Group to iaaoe 

-6-
REF ID:A6111. 

1n order to oorreot poor praot1oee 1n the national oommunications ot NATO nations, waa quickly and quite easily accomplished. The memorandum, which was prep~red in final French 

and English texts, is addressed to the NATO Couno11, with 

the request that it be torwarded to the nations~ The French 

prcposed an acceptable addition, an appendix concerning general 

physical security aa applied to cryptographic operations anO the 

handling or message texts. It was agreed that SECAN would 

inf'orm the Franch and British Qf the results of the Standing 

Group memorandum, and also that subsequent eventa might require 

another meeting~ Significant in the dieoussions of th0 Standing 

Group memorandum wa.e the obvioua ind1oat1on that Muller intends 

to usct the memorandum to strengthen his own position and. that 

of the Intermin1steria.l Comm1aa1on in the control ot French 

COMSECo 

... 7- EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

· 'l'Qi SBEh"H3'i' F'RO'fH 
REF ID:A6111. 

'f Of SBORE'f F'H&fH 

in oona1dera.ble d1aouas1on part1cularl7 on the Hagelin B211. 

the latest model ot which was demonstrated. 

5o It 1s felt that the UK/US delegates got through 

to the French on the need tor improvement. This waa made evident in a private session which Mro Austin had With Mr. V1ala 

and capto Muller. called by Mr. V1ala to d1aousa the A3AM 2-1 

which Austin had demonstrated to h1m in Washington. At the 

oloae ct the discussion Vial.a made a short speech, al1ghtl7 

emotional, ot thank8 and appreciation and ended 'b7 saying 

(these are his exact words as nearly as oan be remembered) 

"Be assured that we believe and undeNtand evel'Tthing that 

you told us and also what you did not tell us. This 1a a 

delicate bws1nesa. but believe that we do underatandv" This 

remark wa.a repeated more or lea• bJ' Muller. Then, when Mu1ler 

had lef't the room, Vial.a told Austin. "I have only been in this 

job for a short time. but already I have found muoh that is bad. 

Believe me that I have been doing eve17tb1ng that I oan. and now 

I will renew 11J7 ettorts." 

6. The u.s. representatives in addition. as authorized, 

revealed the prinoiples ot the AFSAM-7 to the French. Thetre vae 

-8-

'!'0f SBORH':P FflO'Pf I 
" REF ID:A611. ,._,. 

als~ some d1acuss1on ot the ASAM 2-1 and its mod1f'icat1on. 

Viala brought up" with soma alight reluotanoe. and atter 

some lll'g1ng. the French request to tha u.s. tor aid. A 

British otter ot possible help was politely received but 

not disowsaed in l1D1' detail. 

7o It 1a poaaible to draw these oonclua1orws 

a. A better group of French could not have 

bean toundo Amongst them they had the teobn1cal ability, the 

administrative positions, and the sincere desire to improve 

seour1tJ' that ware neoeaaa1'7 to the suooeas of the ta.lka. 

b. The main pu19pose ot the talks were achieved o 

It will be some time betore it 1s lqlown whether 1mprove~nts 

in F~ench COMSEC Will aotuall7 resuit. but there 1a little 

doubt that a sincere attempt will be made. 

Co The Frenoh are, up. to a point,, teohn1aall7 

oompotent and knowledgeable in the field ot COMSECo The7 

appear to have only a naive concept ot the oapab111t1ea of 

machine ana17aiaJ other than th!a tha7 are good. 

d. They are handicapped by the lack ot a 

centralized organization to deal with COMSEC matteraJ and 

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WOP SEeRH'f Fft6'l'H 
,,, . • REF ID:A611. ...... 

by the laok of the authority neces11ar,v to 1nf~roe auoh regulations aa they promulgate. The regUlations themaelves are 

good. 

e. ThQ" are also handicapped by a lack of 

knowledge as to bow their systems are actually being uaeda 

and abueed,, in the t1eld. Time and again the:v insisted they 

would not tolerate certain usages which are nevertheless known 

to be current. 

t. The relationships among the various Frenoh 

departments engaged in COMSEC work. wb:lle oordial, are not 

at all intimate or even oand1do 

go AlthOugh not diaouased. renewed requests . . 

tor material aid are to be expected. 

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'P9P SBeRB! 

MPMORANDUM FRCM THE STANDING GROUP TO 'DIE NATO COUNCIL 

1. Regulations at present in force (DC 2/7 (Final) and STAND 474 as 

amended by STASECS 1508, 15.35 and 1588) ensure that all CCHSEC telegrams 

and all NATO TOP SECRET and SECRET telegrams, whether they are national 

or intemational, are eneyphered in c:eyptos79tm.s authorized by the 

Standing Group. But all nations ot NATO are also originating and transmitting in their.own national cryptosystems a quantity ot telegrams both 

civil and military which, although they are the private concem of the 

nation in question, must be expected to contain information which affects 

NATO as a whole and the loss of which to a non-NATO nation harms the 

security of NATO. 

2. Further STAND 474 allows NATO telegrams graded CONFIDENTIAL or 

RESTRICTED to be encrypted in national systems, and it is high~ Wldesirable that information of' such.grading should become available to nations outside NATO • 

.3. 'lbe Standing Group therefore feels considerable concem at the potential danger to the security of NATO which may arise from the insecurity of' the national ccmnllllications of individual nations: the insecurity of one can endanger the security of all. 

4. 'lbe Standing Group has had prepared two papers, one of which enumerate examples of cryptographic and coaanunications practices and procedures 

which endanger security, and the other, general security considerations. 

'lbese papers are attached. as appendices A and B. The Standing Group 

TOP SECRET 
urges the NATO Council to reqttest each mm.ber nation to examine these 

papers and take action to ensure that its own communications are tree f'.r<lll 

the practices and procedures mentioned in appendix A, and that the 

principles or appendix B are applied. 

5. Further the Standing_ :Group urges that each BATO nation be requested to designate or establish a Communications Security Agency which 

shall be authorized to CODDDunicate on communication security matters both 

civil and militar:y direct with the standing Group COllDllunications Security 

and Evaluation Agency Washington (SECAN). 

6. The Standing Group also urges the RA.TO Council to invite 8l11' manber nation, which requires advice and technical assistance towards the 

improvement of the security of its national cryptographic and cClllllllunicatiOhS 

practices and procedures whether civil or militar:y to app:cy through 

their Camnunications Security Agency direct to the Standing Group 

C011111.unicati0ns Security and Evaluation Agency Washington. It D1B:f subaequentq be round more convenient that SEC.AH arrange tor discussions 

arising out ot this tirst approach to be held with appropriate authorities 

in Europe. 

2 

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TlftE~E~IfE+6 111 7 --

APP E.H DIX A 

LIST OF EXAMPLES OF DARGEROUS CRYPTOGRAPHIC AND 

CCJOOJNICATIOBS PRACTICm AID PROCEDURES 

I. tnmlCIPHERED CODES. 

1. Unenciphered codes are total]Jr inacceptable in diplomatic use 

tor transmission or classified. information. '!hey are oni,. acceptable 

in special cases for Armed Forces comm.lU'lications when.it is not considered 

essential to maintain the securit7 of the information for more than two 

or three days fran the introduction of the code. It follows that such 

codes must be changed at· ver'Y frequent inteM"&ls. 

II. ADDITIVE SYSTJ!HS. 

2. Any additive (or subtractor or minuend) qstan is dangerous unless 

special precautions are taken in the constructian and method of emploplent 

or the additive itself'. Many "special precautions", however, are 

deceptive as to securit7 and 1181' even in themselves create wealmeases • 

.3. Fncipherment .b;y additive can oni,. be guaranteed to ~e secure when 

the additive is used on a stricti,. "one-tiine" basis. 

4. l!hcipherment by non-one-time additive is highlY" dangerous, but can 

be acceptable in certain circumstances for limited traffic provided 

that precautions are taken to minimize overlap and to prevent C1'"1Ptanalysts 

from finding any overlap that may arise. 

S. In general, poi,.alphabetic substitution systems whether actually 

additive in nature or not, are subject to the same dangers as are additive 

systems. 

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--

III. NON-ADDITIVE HAND .SYSTJ!HS. 

6. There are maey hand s7st•s ot encipherment t.hat do not empl07 

additive. Veey tew ot these can be guaranteed to ·be secure, even though 

they mq be veey complex and apply both substitution and transposition 

to code or plain language. 

IV. MACHiliE SYSTEMS. 

7. Machine ciphers vaey greatly in the amount ot security they attord. 

Failure to observe in eveey detail proper instructions !or operation 

Jll&7 lead to compranise even with the best •chines. Others, such as the 

well-known Hagelin "C:eyptotelmik" ot the old "C" series (see para 8 below), 

are insecure unless precautions are taken over and above those reconimended 

by the manufacturer. Others, again, are basically insecure and should in no 

circumstances be used. 

8. Special attention is drawn to the dangers inherent in the use ot 

the Hagelin 11Cryptoteknik11 machines or the "C" and "CX" series: 

a. Since the encipherment is essentially by additive, it follows 

that it the same or a neighboring message setting is used more than once 

the intemal set-up can be recovered. on the overlap; a single mistake 

by an operator using a message setting a second time can.thus compranise 

the machine set-up. 

b. The additive generated by the machine is never truly randan and 

there are circumstances in which this tact can be used to recover the machine 

setting, even though no message setting is repeated. 

2 

TOP SECRET 
.- ~1117-

c. With proper precautions some ot these machines can give 

adequate security tor a limited amount ot traffic, but in view or the 

number of different dangers that can arise in varying conditions ot 

use, tor which it is impossible to legislate in advance, member nations 

who wish to make use ot these machines are especially urged to consult 

SEC.AR. 

V. TRANSMISSION SECURITY. 

9. Ciphers, however good individually, are not enough to ensure 

communications security. Transmission techniques and message formats can · 

in themselves provide valuable intelligence to a traffic analyst. Although 

there are practical limitations, the ideal to be striven tor is that the 

traffic neither or any type (e.g., naval, air force, etc.) nor of any 

nation should be distinguishable b,y extemal characteristics. Again, 

intelligence can be gained b,y study of the organization and procedure ot 

radio networks and by use or radio direction-finding. In many cases, 

especiall.T in Armed Forces communications, a skillful eneJl\Y can obtain 

valuable intelligence by collation ot apparently uninformative message 

texts. It follows, therefore, that tull communications securit7 demands 

that special attention be paid in such matters as the judicious employment 

ot indicators, the selection o:t call signs and of frequencies, radio 

procedures, and the restriction of the use ot plain language messages and 

suppression of plain language chatter • 

.3 

TOP SECRET 
A. P P E N D I X B 

GENERAL SECURITI CONSIDERATIONS 

I. PERSODEL SECURI'l'I AND mA.IIOO. 

l. In addition to the security of cryptographic systems themselves, 

the security of cryptographic personnel must be considered. an essential 

part of cryptographic security. It is no use having a secure ceyptosystem. 

and special conditions of physical security if the personnel responsible 

for such tasks as the printing of documents and· the typing or cr,iptographic 

instructions are not thE1DSelves completely secure. 

2. Personnel employed in conmunication security matters, and this 

includes cipher staffs, must be thoroughly investigated. Their instruction must be as complete as possible; mistakes by cipher clerks,· and 

even operators• "ch&t", often result in canpromise of security • 

.3. In short, personnel must be guaranteed to be competent, loyal, 

and trustwortey. 

II. SECURITI OF CLASSIFIED MESSAGES BEFORE EllCIPHERMENT AID AFTER DECIPHERMENT. 

1. Ir security of classified messages is to be achieved, it is not 

enough to encr;ypt and transmit them. secureq. It is necessaey to follow 

strict]¥ the general security rules which apply to all classified 

documents, both before and after encryption. Special measures must be 

t8.ken in the processing of messages, in their reproduction, distribution 

and storage. 

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T~~~JR~,a.61111_ AIJLCl\C I 

'f6P SEeRET 

2. Originators and addressees of messages must have impressed 

·upon them the f'act that their carelessness or indiscretion can result in 

can.promise of' not onl.7 message texts, but also, and as a consequence, 

on the cipher s;ystans used to encipher the message texts. 

). It is essential: 

a. To destr07 caref'ull.7 all rough drafts of messages, and all 

work sheets. 

b. To reduce to a minimmn the number of people who handle a 

message between its origination and enciphermerlt. 

c. To deliver message texts, before encipherment and after decipherment, securely wrapped and by sate hand. 

d. To use only cleared personnel tor typing and otherwise 

processing message texts. 

e. To restrict the dissemination of the plain texts of encrypted 

messages to those who have need to know their content. 

f. To insure careful and secure storage of the plain texts of 

encrypted messages. 

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. l'OP SECRET 

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