Reversed and Remanded and Memorandum Opinion filed July 14, 2022.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-20-00725-CV

BLAINE M. STANDIFORD AND SHERYL E. STANDIFORD, Appellant

V.

CITIMORTGAGE, INC., Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2

Travis County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. C-1-CV-17-005410

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants Sheryl and Blaine Standiford challenge a final order granting the

release of a $19,800 cash bond posted by appellants to appellee CitiMortgage, Inc.

In a single issue, appellants argue that the trial court abused its discretion by

releasing the bond. We reverse and remand.
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I. BACKGROUND1

At a foreclosure sale on August 7, 2012, CitiMortgage obtained an interest

in a property in Lago Vista, Texas.2 The foreclosure and CitiMortgage’s

subsequent attempts to take possession of the property have resulted in numerous

appeals. See Standiford v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 14-18-00061-CV, 2019 WL

3997106, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 22, 2019, no pet.) (mem.

op.); Standiford v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 03-15-00625-CV, 2016 WL 4177237, at

*1 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 4, 2016, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (mem. op.); Standiford v.

CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 03-14-00344-CV, 2015 WL 6831578, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Austin Nov. 3, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

On April 26, 2017, CitiMortgage filed a forcible detainer suit against the

Standifords in justice court in Travis County, Texas. The justice court found that

the Standifords were “tenant[s] at sufferance pursuant to the foreclosure held

August 7, 2012, and that [CitiMortgage] is entitled to judgment for possession of

the premises.” The Standifords appealed to county court, which entered final

summary judgment in favor of CitiMortgage. On November 27, 2017, the court 

amended its summary judgment order, setting a supersedeas bond at $1,100 a

month if the Standifords chose to pursue an appeal of the county court’s judgment.

The Standifords then appealed the county court’s judgment. 

In August 2019, we rejected the Standifords’ appeal of the eviction

1 The Texas Supreme Court ordered the Third Court of Appeals in Austin to transfer this

case to the Fourteenth Court of Appeals. We must therefore decide the case in accordance with

the precedent of the Third Court of Appeals if our decision otherwise would have been

inconsistent with that court’s precedent. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.

2 The facts of this case, as well as its procedural history, are well known to the parties;

therefore, we will discuss the facts of the case only to the extent they are relevant to the issues on

appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is

as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of

the appeal.”).
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judgment and affirmed the county court’s judgment awarding CitiMortgage

possession of the property. See Standiford, 2019 WL 3997106, at *1. Several

months later, in November 2019, the Standifords filed a motion to release all bond

payments to them. According to the Standifords, “[t]he purposes of the bond

ordered in this case was to protect the value of these rights in this property. . . .

Those rights now belong exclusively and solely to the Standifords.” In March

2020, CitiMortgage filed a counter-motion, outlining its claim to the bond

payments: “During the pendency of the appeal, CitiMortgage was denied the use

and possession of its property from the date of the judgment, November 17, 2017,

through the date CitiMortgage sold the Property, April 26, 2019—a total of 18

months.” Accordingly, CitiMortgage argued that it was entitled to recover

$19,800—$1,100 per month for each month it was deprived of the use and

enjoyment of the property.

On March 30, 2020, the county court signed an order releasing the 

supersedeas bond funds in the amount of $19,800, plus accrued interest, to

CitiMortgage. The Standifords filed a motion to return the bond, which the trial

court denied on May 29, 2020. The Standifords filed a timely appeal.

II. RECOVERY OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW

The release of a supersedeas bond is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Haedge v. Central Tex. Cattlemen’s Ass’n, 603 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. 2020) (per 

curiam). “Under an abuse of discretion standard, we defer ‘to the trial court’s

factual determinations if they are supported by evidence,’ but review legal

determinations de novo.” Id. (quoting Stockton v. Offenbach, 336 S.W.3d 610, 615

(Tex. 2011)). A trial court abuses its discretion “when it renders an arbitrary and

unreasonable decision lacking support in the facts or circumstances of the case,” or
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“when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without reference to guiding

rules or principles.” Samlowski v. Wooten, 332 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. 2011).

A supersedeas bond is not an unconditional agreement to pay a stated sum of

money; it imposes only a contingent or conditional liability, and its primary

purpose is security. Muniz v. Vasquez, 797 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 1990, no writ). In calculating the amount of the bond to distribute to a

prevailing party, courts must determine the damage the prevailing party actually

incurred during the appeal. See Haedge, 603 S.W.3dat 828 (“[T]he initial

calculation of a supersedeas bond for appeal is different from the final calculation

of loss or damage that results from the appeal.”); McFadin v. Broadway

Coffeehouse, LLC, 539 S.W.3d 278, 285 (Tex. 2018) (“[T]he evidence presented at

the hearing setting the bond amount was evidence of what damages the appeal

might cause Coffeehouse if its judgment were not immediately enforced, not what

damages the appeal actually did cause it.”) (emphasis in original).

B. APPLICATION

In their sole issue, the Standifords argue that the trial court abused its

discretion by awarding the full amount of the supersedeas bond to CitiMortgage

when CitiMortgage had never claimed, or proved, damages. Because this is a

transfer case, we must determine this case as the Third Court of Appeals would

determine it. See Mitschke v. Borromeo, No. 21-0326, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___, 2022 

WL 1510317 (Tex. May 13, 2022) (“Transferee courts must follow whatever law

binds the transferor court.”). Less than a year ago, the Third Court of Appeals

issued a binding opinion that addressed the same argument as raised by the

Standifords. See Adams v. Godhania, 635 S.W.3d 454, 457–58 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2021, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g).

In Adams, the Godhanias filed suit to evict the Adams from property the
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Godhanias had purchased. Id. at 456. The Godhanias prevailed, and the Adams

appealed to county court. Id. The justice of the peace set the total bond at $7,000

during the pending appeal. Id. Because of the value of the property, the Godhanias

asked the county court to set a supersedeas bond at $144,000. The trial court

believed that estimate was low, and set the total for the supersedeas bond at

$168,000, allowing the $7,000 bond posted by the justice court to be credited

towards the new amount. Id. at 457. The Adams appealed the judgment awarding

possession to the Godhanias, but that judgment was affirmed; the Adams

immediately surrendered possession of the property. Id. The Godhanias

subsequently filed a motion to release the bond. The Adams argued that the

Godhanias were not entitled to recover any amount of the supersedeas bond

because they only sought possession; the Godhanias did not plead or prove

damages at trial. Id. Additionally, the Adams urged that the court’s determination

of the supersedeas bond is not equivalent to a determination of damages. Id.

Nevertheless, the trial court released the full amount of the bond funds to the

Godhanias.

On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals agreed with the Adams “to the extent

that [the Godhanias] are required to prove the amount of damages ‘actually

incurred’ during the appeal.” Id. at 458 (quoting Muniz, 797 S.W.2d at 150). The

court then noted the following concerning the calculation of damages:

A court may not summarily ascertain the amount of monetary

damages occasioned by delay in appeal. When a judgment [holder]

claims loss or damages resulting from the appeal, the [judgment

holder] must prove the extent of the damage. Loss or damage in the

supersedeas context refers to monetary or material losses ascertainable

by proof, either by the judgment itself, or, where that is not

conclusive, by evidence relating to proof of damages generally. When

the supersedeas bond covers rental amounts that accrue while the case

is on appeal, the rental amounts cannot be determined on appeal, but
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instead must be determined by proof of facts transpiring after

judgment and during the pendency of appeal. Such a determination is

made by the trial court following the completion of the appeal.

Id. at 458–59 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, the Austin 

court agreed with the Adams that the trial court abused its discretion by releasing

the full amount of the bond to the Godhanias without hearing any evidence of the

loss or damage they actually incurred during the appeal. Id. at 459.

However, the appellate court explicitly disagreed with the Adamses’

argument that the Godhanias “‘waived’ their right to recover any amount of the

bond by failing to plead for damages incurred during the appeal and that the trial

court is prohibited from awarding appellees any amount of the bond because

damages incurred during the appeal were not awarded in the judgment.” Id. In

reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the Adams attempted to rely on

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 510.11, which provides that in an appeal of a

forcible detainer case from the justice court to the county court, “[o]n the trial [de

novo] of the case in the county court the appellant or appellee will be permitted to

plead, prove and recover his damages, if any, suffered for withholding or

defending possession of the premises during the pendency of the appeal.” See Tex.

R. Civ. P. 510.11; Adams, 635 S.W.3d at 460. The court rejected the Adamses’

argument: “However, in this case, [the Adams] are seeking to recover damages

incurred during the time period in which [they] appealed the county court’s

judgment to this Court. Thus, Rule 510.11 does not apply here.” Adams, 635

S.W.3d at 460.

The court additionally rejected the Adamses’ contention that the Godhanias

could not recover damages that they did not plead:

[The Adams] also cite to cases holding that “a judgment must be

supported by the pleadings” and that “a party may not be granted
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relief in the absence of pleadings to support that relief.” It is true that

[the Godhanias], by pleading for possession only, cannot recover any

damages incurred prior to the county court’s judgment. But [they]

may recover damages that were actually incurred during the pendency

of the appeal of the county court’s judgment to this Court. However,

such damages could not be pleaded by [the Godhanias] or included in

the trial court’s judgment because they would be incurred after the

county court’s judgment had been rendered. The judgment here

awarded possession of the property to [the Godhanias] and set bond in

the amount of $168,000 to suspend enforcement of the judgment. An

order releasing the bond to [the Godhanias], provided that it is limited

to the amount of damages [they] actually incurred during the

pendency of the appeal, is not inconsistent with that judgment.

Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Third Court of Appeals reversed the trial

court’s order releasing the full amount of the supersedeas bond to the Godhanias

and remanded the case to the trial court to hear evidence and determine the actual

damages suffered by the Godhanias during the pendency of the appeal. Id.

The case here presents the same issue as Adams. We agree with the

Standifords inasmuch as they assert that the trial court abused its discretion in

dispersing the bond funds to CitiMortgage without holding a hearing. See id. While

CitiMortgage offered evidence to support the award of $19,800, that evidence did

not reflect the damages CitiMortgage actually incurred; it only served as evidence

of the damages CitiMortgage might suffer because of the appeal. See id.

However, we disagree with the Standifords’ argument that CitiMortgage has

no right to a hearing on its damages. It is true that CitiMortgage cannot recover

damages prior to the county court’s judgment, but it can recover damages incurred

during the pendency of the appeal of the county’s court’s judgment to the court of

appeals. See id. The Standifords argue that CitiMortgage waived its right to claim 

damages because it failed to amend its pleadings to seek damages pursuant to

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 510.11. But as the court concluded in Adams,
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Rule 510.11 does not apply here; Rule 510.11 deals with damages “during the 

period from which the justice court renders judgment to the time the county court 

renders judgment” whereas CitiMortgage seeks damages during the time period in 

which the Standifords appealed the county court’s judgment to the appellate court.

Adams, 635 S.W.3d at 459–60; see Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.11. Additionally,

CitiMortgage did not waive any claim to its damages for failing to plead them

because such damages could not be plead by CitiMortgage or be included in the

county court’s judgment; the damages would only have been incurred after the

county court’s judgment had already been rendered. See Adams, 635 S.W.3d at

460.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order releasing the supersedeas

bond funds to CitiMortgage and remand the case to the trial court to hear evidence

to determine the damages actually incurred by CitiMortgage during the pendency

of the appeal—from the date of the county court’s judgment until the date the

Standifords surrendered possession of the property. We sustain in part and overrule

in part the Standifords’ sole issue.

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s order releasing the supersedeas bond funds to

CitiMortgage and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

/s/ Margaret “Meg” Poissant

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Poissant, and Wilson.