REF ID:A38359 

LECTURE VI 

We begin now the final aeasion in nry series of talks. It will be devoted to 

four main topics: 

1. First, wbat sort of' codes and ciphers were we confronted with 

immediately before and during WWII? 

2. Second, what were we able to do with them and how did we do it'l 

3. Third, what sort of' protective measures were taken to enable our highlevel authorities and commanders to use the results of' the COMINT efforts and 

activities? 

4. Finally, wbat are the prognostications for the future? 

Let's begin with the first of the four topics • What C 's and C's, or 

technically speaking what cryptosystems were we confronted with immediately before 

·•· and during our :participe.t::k:D as a belligerent in WWII? 

A. In the European theater, there was, of course, the problem of tackling 

a multiplicity of pretty high-grade cryptosystems of tbe Germans. 

1. Take first: the dipl.omatic ones, of which there were two very 

high-grade systems. (l.) Floradora, (2) GEE (3) Agents (All this and 

heaven too) and miscellaneous. 

2. The cryptosystems of the German Webrmacht or Armed Forces: 

@'pp roved for Release bv NSA on 10-10-2013 pursuant to E .0. 1352\3 
REF ID:A38359 

(1) Low-level codes, (2) Double-PLAYFAIR, (3) Raster, (4) E a- 3 wheel b- 4 wheel 

and Uncle Dick, (5) Fish a- Tunny b- Later fishes 

B. The Italians. But these we were concerned largely only with the Diplomatic 

area. By the time our forces were in direct contact with Italian military, they 

were pretty well disorganized and what communications there were, were ·in G systems. 

C. In the Pacific Theater. 

1. The Diplomatic systems. 

·a. Codes, and codes enciphered with transposition. 

b. Red 

c. Purple 

2. Military. 

a. Attache, b. Ground forces, C. Green, d. E. machines. 

3. Naval. 

JN-25, Naval attache. 

As long as we are dealing with cryptosystems might as well show and tell a bit 

about the Russians. 

~ 

i~.l Difficulty of identifying traffic. M-21L Coleridge. Longfellow. Doubletape (Pagoda). Albatross. Scrambler. OTP. 

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Principal operations of COMINT: (1) Intercept (incl. D/F, RFP, TINA), 

(2) T/A (remarks on validity, (3) Cryptanalysis, (4) Translation and emendation, 

(5) Large scale production or exploitation, (6) Evaluation of information (military 

intelligence), (7) Collation with other sources, (8) Dissemination. 

Let•s dispose of T/A first. T/A is very important for two reasons: (1) 

Establishing networks when callsigns and frequencies change frequently, as in the 

case of the German Armed Forces, (2) In absence of decrypts, is highly useful and 

may be the only source of COMINT. 

RFP and Morse Op. Identification. 

Information from ebb and flow of traffic. 

Read from "AJ.l honorable men". 

238.1 

Graph illustrating derivation of important intelligence by traffic analysis in 

World War II - convoys across the Atlantic from HAMPl'ON Roads to Algiers. This 

chart shows a daily breakdown by security classification of the traffic from Hampton 

Roads Port of Embarkation to Algiers, North Africa, for the month of April, 1944. 

Three definite peaks in traffic volume are evident, each of which indicates a convoy 

movement from Hampton Roads to Algiers • 

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238.2 

The approximate size of a movement is judged from the totals of messages and 

groups in the peak period, while the destination and route are given away by 

addressee call signs in the messages. Close inspection will show the first traffic 

surge began on 4 April, the second on 13 April, and the last on 22 April. Experience 

has shown that these traffic peaks appear on the circuit a day or two following the 

actual convoy sailing date. The convoy movements are therefore "called11 on the 

2nd, 11th and 2fljth of April. Furthermore, the traffic study shows definitely the 

238.3 

proportions of supplies and troops carried in each convoy. This is due to the 

fact that all passenger messages are classified SECRET; cargo messages are 

CONFIDENTIAL. Detailed analysis shows that there were 21,836 CONFIDENTIAL groups, 

and 3,965 S!r!RET groups transmitted in connection with the 2 April convoy. The next 

convoy gave rise to 18,16flj CONFIDENTIAL and 4,47flj SECRET groups. The third convoy 

required 19 ,429 CONFIDENTIAL groups and 594 SECRET groups. It is apparent from 

these figures that the major function of each of these convoys was to carry equipment 

and supplies. 

RFP I & II - Two different transmitters. TINA or Morse Operator Identification. 

Cryptanalysis -"".' most important steps. 

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(1) Study external cbaract~ristics of messages, (2) Study any available 

collateral including that obtained from previous solution "crypt-continuity", 

(3) Study beginnings and ends of messages, (4) Search for repetitions between and 

within messages, (5) Preparation of statistical counts of letters, groups, etc., 

(6) Search for indicators, (7) Determine type of cryptosystem used, (8) Separate 

traffic into groups of messages in same or related keys, (9) Test for probable 

words, stereotypes, analogies, isologs, homologs, (10) Reduce to simplest terms. 

The rest of my talk will be devoted to a brief discussion of modern, practical 

cryptanalytic operations and gadgetry. 

Trithemius. (his photo matches the mental picture the average layman has of 

a cryptana.iyst) 

The veil of secrecy has produced an air of mystery. Before the World War II, 

it was possible to do much processing merely with pencil and paper. Now cryptanalytic work is a very big business--complex, expensive, but pays big dividends. 

Tell Semiramis story. 

Cryptanalysis of modern systems has been facilitated by the invention, 

development, and application of special cryptanalytic aids by way of machines. The 

nature of the problem--not merely the number of permutations and combinations but 

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the type is more important--question of testing out multiplicity of assumptions 

and hypotheses, commonly by statistical methods. High-speed testing is secret! 

Earliest cryptanalytic devices at Riverbank Laboratories. 

134 

My memo begging for one set of IBM, dated 30 October 1934. 

Navy began using IBM in 1932. Combined total 1934 - 8, 1945 - 750. Now in 

NSA (1954) - 314. 

Extract from first contract with IBM. Tell how got it put over--Q1-IZ's office 

had IBM installation for CCC accounting. Cancelled when an old-timer can't see any 

new-fangled notions. 

141 

One wing of IBM installation in WW II. 

The basic and most important analytic ma.chines we had were those for German 

Enigma. The Navy Bombes - 90 sets of 4 high speed computers each running at 18,000 

r.p.m. The Army Madame X - Electrical relays. Regret I have no slides to show of 

those. Explain why. 

150 

150.1 

Geheimschreiber. 

The Japanese "Purple" - our version. 

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Both Army and Navy had additional specialized machines but I can show slides 

only of the Army types • Don't know whether Navy took any pictures but they had as 

many and as complicated machines as Army. 

Duenna - tell of general solution not dependent on cribs. 

To find coincidence count in pair of messages, 200 letters each at all possible 

juxtapositions will require 40,000 comparisons. By hand 10 hours@l/second. 

ROBIN does it at 50,000 per second. 

70 mm comparator was first machine. Built in late 30's by British MIT, put 

in to service 1942. 85 letters/second. COPPERHEAD - to search for two group bits 

in enciphered code. Put into use in 1944--now obsolete with 701 computer. 

~ - Alcatraz - monographic and digraphic frequency counts. 

145 - Machine decipherment. 

137 - Locating repetitions - "Brute force" machine. 

138 - Locating repetitions - "slide run". 

~ - Another machine for decoding and deciphering. 

140 - CAMEL. 

145 - CAMEL Code indicator locator. 

144 - Assembly of components. 

200.l - JAS deciphering. 

201.l - Selective J-square. 

202 J-square permutor ffi.1 -

142 - Purple dudbuster. 

122 

199.2 GEE additive generator (typing) 

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198.1 - Geheimsebreiber crib-tester. 

143.1 - Auto-scritcher (Rodin) 

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248 - O'Malley - Specialized arithmetic computation. Gives summations of products 

of pairs of numbers. 

249 - DEMON II. 

250 

251 - Goldberg - Coincidence machine, general purpose, large scale. 

with magnetic drum for storage. 

g22_ - ATLAS • 

First NSA one 

New machines: CONNIE I - Teletype scrambler - 5000/second and print. 

II - teletype scrambler greater flexibility. 

VIVIAN - Comparator using.mercury delay line. 

DELLA - 5 million comparisons/sec as against ROBIN's 5000. 

ill - A "brute force" machine. 

~-A machine for matching messages. 

143 - The "Auto-scritcher~ - Rodin - The Thinker. 

145 - An analog. This was for JAS system - Jap MilAtt. 

248 - O'Malley. Specialized arithmetic computation. Gives summations of - products of pairs of numbers having up to four digits • 

~ - ATLAS. 

Assistance we had from British. 

A. I had hoped to show slides or charts of Battle of Atlantic - explain. 

B. Principal reasons for success: 

1. European theater. 

a. German lack of imagination. 

b. Failure to change rotors • 

c. Stereotypy and methodicalness of German mind so that cribs and 

cross-cribbing possible. Passing messages from one net to another 

• without paraphrasing. 

2. Pacific Theater. 

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a. Lack of technical know-how. 

b. Complexities piled on complexities and dependence thereon for 

security. 

c. Errors therefore. 

d. Methodicalness and stereotypy. 

3. Brilliance of UK-US crypt. 

What we owe to UK crypt. 

4. Money to spend on COMINT activities. 

Read from Brownell Report. 

234 

Chart showing processing steps from originator to consumer (Army}. 

Chart showing no of "bulletins" 

Navy C .I. organization. Combined C. I. organization. 

Extracts from Part II, Brownell Committee Report. (June 1952) 

In World War II COMINT may well have been our best paying investment. Its 

costs cannot be accurately computed but an informed guess would be perhaps 1/2 billion 

dollars annually. 

General Handy is reported to have said it shortened the war in Europe by 

at least a year. 

In the Pacific, COMINT located the Japanese fleet enroute to the Coral Sea 

and again enroute to Midway in 1942, enabling us to mass the carriers for the battles 

which generally is regarded as the turning point of the war against J:•pa.n .. 

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