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Intervieir,,"Mr. WHHam F. Friedman, lvt:,l 1!JC 

16 February 1961 

Hr. Friedman spoke of government security classification practices 

in general. He ls inclined to believe that much material ls overclassifi ed by timorous or over-zealous military and civilian officials. 

He points out that there ls no penalty for over-classification, but 

rather severe ones for under-classification. 

In this connection he shares the historians• frustration that the 

pre-Pearl Harbor cryptographical work of the SIS has not been permitted 

to be published in official Army histories. The Sigml Corps has nothing 

to hide. But the omission of what ls general kncmledge to a large 

segment of the public creates the suspicion that the Signal Corps, or the 

Army as a whole, does have skeletons it wishes to conceal. 

He assigns tremendous importance to the pre-l::Ja.r breaking of the 

various Japanese codes and to cryptological activities during the l;:la.ro 

He says many thousands of American and Allied lives ~ere saved because of 

our knowled,,ae of enemy intentions as revealed in intercepted and decoded 

messages. L Ed. Undoubtedly true, if Navy and British efforts are included, 

as JU'ir. Friectman no doubt intended.J , 

Mr. Friedman's career in government cryptology work began in the 

World War I period when he joined the staff of Colonel George Fabyan at 

the Riverbank laboratory, Geneva, Illinois. F~yan•s library, which 

General Mauborgne described as "fabulous", was really not so fabulous, 

says Friedman. It contained almost everything that had been printed on 

the subject in older books, but contained little new or up-to-date 

material. Parker(Hltt•s manual was the last work on the subject at the 

time. The Fabyan school, established to train Army crypto officers in 

WW I, was more extensive than Mauborgne indicated. Friedman could not 

estimate total numbers, but there were several classes and the last one al~me totalled 75~ Be bad served as an instructor and took the course 

himself in this last class. A picture of the class hangs on the wall of 

his library. The picture contains a cryptogram, constructed by the position of the men and the various directions in which they face. The message reads "Knowledge is power". (See article in Time (?) as of date of 

publication of Friedman's book on Shakespeare). -----

Friedman added that the governmeni!J which benefitted greatly from 

Fabyan•s patriotic contributions,, made no acknowledgment at all and gave 

Fabyan no recognition. He thinks this liclS a grave injustice. 

After being commissioned and serving overseas in the AEF,, Friedman 

returned to Fabya.n at the end of the war. He 1i1as approached by 

Mauborgne, who wanted him to accept a Regular Army commission in the 

Sigral Corps. A physical examination disclosed that he had a heart 

condition that prevented his acceptance. /:fJJ query - He did retain 

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a Reserve COT.l17lission, right up to WW II ~ was there a difference in 

standards?7 1-lauborgne said that if the SigC could not have hie as an 

officer, Tt wanted him as a civilian, and in January 1921 both Mr. and 

Mrs. Friedman came to the Signal Corps as civilian employees. Mrs. 

Friedman, also an expert cryptographer, stayed only six months, then 

went to work for another government agency. Mr. Friedman stayed with 

the Signal Corps (and ASA, the successor to the Signal Corps SIS) 34 

years, until 1955. Incidentally, Fabyan never forgave the Friedmans 

for leaving him. 

Mr. Friedman had a number of corrections and explanations to make 

concerning some of the equipment - refer to GRT's notes for this. 

Friedman obviously feels that the transfer of SIS to ASA. was unnecessary and perhaps even harmful. He felt that the questions or 

personnel, administration, etc., were not important and that SIS did not 

suffer any handicaps by being under the Signal Corps. He, too, points 

a finger at Carter Clarke, as Code does, and as do other former Signal 

Corps officers having knowledge of the circumstances. His analysis of 

Clarke agrees with Code's - an extreJ11ely ambitious officer who apparently 

engineered the transfer of SIS to G-2 at least in pa.rt to further his 

own ambitions. Friedman says Strong and other G-2 chiefs reflected 

Clarke's viewpoints. But the transfer need not have occurred if the Signal 

'Corps had had a strong Chief Signal Officer. Friedman had prepared a 

strong rebuttal to the proposal, but Ingles was not interested in j 1 

fighting it. Friedman thinks there have been no strong Chief Signal / 

Officers since Mauborgne. 

He believes we should stress the close Navy and British cooperation in our manuscript. He describes both as perfect. The development of Slgaba, for example, should be called a truly joint effort. One 

day before the war one of his Navy counterparts came to him to talk over 

the inadequacy of existing crypto equipment. He asked if Friedmn had 

any ideas. Friedman said "Yes, I have an idea." The Navy officer said 

"Can you tell me?" Friedman replied "I don't know whether I can or not - it's secret." He checked with Mauborgne and Mauborgne said "Go ahead 

and tell the Navy~" The Army, in the person of Friedman, had the idea, 

but no money to develop it. The Navy had the money, but not the idea. 

The two services together built the intricate and wonderful ma.chine that 

became the Sigaba. The Army Sigaba. and the Navy ECM were identical. 

The goverlll'llent held licenses under all of Friedman's patents. All 

were under secrecy orders. He retained his commercial rights, but under 

the circumstances could not exploit the potentially very valuable 

patents. In the 19SO's {date ?) the government purchased his coJ1U11ercial 

rights for $10.Q,ooo. Technically it ls not correct to speak of it as 

"an award." /Ed Note: It seems fairly obvious that in a sense it l:Bs an 

al:lard, a recoQnftion by means of a legal device, of a very great contribution to the government.~ 

In connection with pre-MJar activity, Friedman said his greatest 

handicap w.s· lack of intercept material. Lt. Col. Z.-ia.uborgne when he was 

Signal Officer for ~hj. Gen. Halt.n Craig at the Presidio, in 1932 set up 

a radio station in the basement .of his home and equipped it with reels of' 

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paper tape able to make a record for 12 hours stra!ght9 to intercept 

messages sent at high speeds. 11".ir. Friedrran mentioned only l'!auborgneVs 

station, but 3.ccording to earlier info from l'auborgne, Capt Clay I. 

Hoppaugh ran a similar station in southern California. Also,, other 

secret monitoring stations operated in Manila, Ha.wail and Fort Monmouth. 

Mr. Friedman did mention an arrangement with the Coast Guard, whose 

cutters patrolled the coastal waters east and west on the trail of rumrunners bringing in illegal liquor. (The Eighteenth Amendment was still 

in effect, of course). The coast Guard, intercepting radio messages 

from the rum-runners• boats, also occasionally intercepted other traffic. 

The coded messages they passed on to Friedman. 

Later on, Friedman said, the SIS had succeeded in having organized 

the 2d Signal Service Company (Provisioral). A detaclunent of this unit 

was sent to Hamil under Captain Mark Rhoads to perform RI functions. 

But the local commander,when he heard of lt, uould not tolerate a unit 

operating under orders directly from Washington. Rhoads became ill, 

came back to Washington in 1935, and resigned his commission, but after 

a long recuperation came back to SIS to serve in World War II as a 

civilian. 

Friedman made a vague, rather general allusion to his ol:m library 

of material, saying it had alw.ys been his hope tra.t after his death the 

collection Nould become the property of "the people of the United States." 

It would be interesting to knov what plan he has in mind and whether on 

some future occasion he would welcome our suggestions. I inagine he has 

the details already well-worked out. 

DIXIE R. 'BARRIS 

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