2004 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

4-7-2004

USA v. Watson

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 01-2617

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Watson" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 864.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 01-2617

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 

v.

 

ANTHONY WATSON,

 Appellant

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

(Dist. Court No. 00-CR-313-05)

District Court Judge: Honorable J. Curtis Joyner

Argued March 29, 2004

Before: ALITO, FISHER, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion Filed: April 7, 2004)

JEREMY H.G. IBRAHIM

14th Floor

121 South Broad Street

The North American Building

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Counsel for Appellant
2

KATHY A. STARK (Argued)

Suite 1250

Office of the United States

Attorney

615 Chestnut Street

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from a judgment in a criminal case. Because we find Watson’s

claims to be without merit, we affirm.

First, we hold that the District Court was not clearly erroneous when it found that 

Watson had a managerial role in the conspiracy. Witnesses testified that Watson ran a

corner in the conspiracy, that he hired at least one worker to sell crack, and that he was

frequently seen with the leaders of the conspiracy. Furthermore, the District Court was

not clearly erroneous when it found that the use or possession of a firearm in the

conspiracy was clearly foreseeable. As a manager in a sizeable crack cocaine distribution

ring, in which two members had already been shot, the use of a firearm by a member of

the conspiracy was more than reasonably foreseeable. See United States v. Ramos, 147

F.3d 281, 286-287 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Dixon, 982 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1992).

Second, we find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it
3

admitted the government’s charts and exhibits summarizing the electronic

communications between the conspirators. The government, through a witness and a

public record, was able to properly establish that the telephone and beeper numbers on the

charts and exhibits were properly attributed to Watson. See, e.g., Supp. App. at 133-135;

184-185. Furthermore, the charts and exhibits were accurately explained by a

government witness, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding them

more probative than prejudicial. See Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 1006; United

States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 768 fn. 14 (3d Cir. 2000).

Third, the District Court correctly denied Watson’s motion to suppress the money

and drugs found at the time of his arrest. The surveillance officer saw Watson engaging

in three transactions that, based on her experience as a narcotics officer, she knew to be

drug deals. Each time, Watson would talk to a customer, go into an abandoned lot

nearby, emerge with an object, and exchange the object for money. The police stopped

Watson for an investigatory stop, an action that he admits was valid. Upon stopping him,

one officer looked in the abandoned lot and saw a McDonalds’ plastic cup filled with

crack. The police officer found the cup almost immediately upon entering. Thus, the

seizure of the cup was legal because it was in plain view. See Horton v. California, 496

U.S. 128, 133-134 (1990) (“If an article is already in plain view, neither its observation

nor its seizure would involve any invasion of privacy.”) Upon finding the crack, the

police arrested Watson, and the money was obtained through a valid search incident to
4

Watson’s arrest. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 911 (1980).

Fourth, the District Court properly determined Watson’s relevant conduct. As

stated above, significant evidence supports the conclusion that Watson was a manager in

the drug conspiracy. Furthermore, several witnesses placed him in the conspiracy for its

entire two-year existence.

For the above reasons, we affirm.