I 

USCIB: 23/55 

REF ID:A517796 

TOP SECRET 

H'F~f;'f_1HJ DO~ti':~; NTS CDN HU't 

'Cl ·,~'..,r~~ Mf.EirAL 

a:> Mq 1953 

'fOP SIGH&' - S&:URITY INFORMATION 

MFXORANDUM FOR THE Mf!X8DS C:I USCIB: 

Subject: Allied (NATO) CoaauaicatiOD8 Security. 

1. The enclo8U.1"9 contains the tinal report ot the ad hoc 

ca.:5.ttee established. bT USCIB to eymaine t.he subject problea. 

This report, is scheduled tor cansidention at a special meeting 

of the Board. 

2. Attentioo is invited to the tact that the "U.S. Personnel Onl.7" clusiticat1on 11 required 'b7 a limited number ot 

apecitic commenta, ltbich oan be excised or amended without undue 

ditficulty in the ennt f . deci&1cn to torward the report to 

24 

3. Pursuant to agreement hT members or the ad hoc coamlttee 

the distribution ot this rep:Qrt is llmited to the number ot copies 

indicated below. This dietributicn ia baaed upco the requirement. 

expressed to the Secretariat by 1nd1 Yi.dual USCIB members. For 

purpoeea ot record a normal diatributian ot this cOYering memorandua is being made: 

Number of Copies of tbe\.R!port. Distributed 

.lncloeure ,... '"" 

Cop;r H\lllber (_ U 

ot subject report. 

USCIB: '23/55 

State 

Detenae 

FBI 

NSA 

Anq 

Nav 

A:U Poree 

CIA 

Eci3.3(h)(2) 

PL:t36-36/50 USC 3605 

3 

4 

3 

1 

4 EO 3.3(h)(2) 

I .. ~ Acting BXecutive Secretar,y11 USCIB 

lf'Pf};'Df D DOCUMENTS CONTAlN 

UJL:E WOfiD MATERtAl 

eclassifi ed and a ursuantto E .0. 1352 
.. 

Washington 25, D.C. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

U.S. PERSONNEL ONLY 18 May 1953 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN 9 USCIB 

SUBJECT: Report of Ad Hoc Committee 011 Allied 

[NATO] Cou:munications Security. 

1. Transmitted hereW'ith is the final Report of the 

Ad Hoc Committee established at the 82nd meeting of USCIB 

to ex.amine the problem of Allie;j (NATO] communicatiema 

security. 

2. The Report incl uf' :: e re,,~:: ae n;eu1 ans IISCTB 

actions with reference to_ 1 

communications security ma ers.s rev ew ~as prepare by the Chairman of the Security Committee, USCIB at the 

request of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee and is 

presented as a convenience to the Board membera in their 

consideration of the entire subject. 

3. This Report has been approved unanimously by the 

members of the Ad Hoc Committee. 

One enclosure, with 

Tabs A through E , and 

Exhibits 1, 2 and 3. 

___/L;_ o. 

71/!11$9,.) ~,.) T. ~chilles Polyzoidas Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee 

TOP 3ECRB'f GAP\(,\16 

JOP SECRET SECURITY lt~FORMATl6N CANO~p:y No •. d_o 

i 

I I 

i 

.~ 
REF ID:A517796 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL86::-36/50 USC 3605 

l. There are tvo queat:fonalfhich require to be answered, the second 

depending on the anawer to the !~st. 

a. Can we cut off .uppl;y o~._ _____ ..... 1 consumers! 

b. U so, what steps do " t&k• to illprto•• comau.nioation security 

;> 

in the national c~mj catiol18 of NATO countries• 

2. Thia report in its concluaionl appears.to give a negative answer to 

the ti.rat question • 

..3.lndeed, throughout the report there is evidence tb4t al.though the."leaked" 

to the U.S. 

5. In other words ce111.pliance with the recamendationa will result\in 
REF ID:A517796 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

to the tact that 11&11Y l .... _________________ ...... I only because or bad procedures. 

We remove the bad procedures and thoae J I As 

we increase c17Ptographic knowledge, a.a ve certainly will as we improve 

procedure, other systell8 basically insecure will be reexamined and removed 

from use. We will probably be asked to\ evaluate sane of them and then will 

have to reccmnend against their use. 

6. Thia report therefore se918 to argue ag&inat\itaelt and we still 

haven't the answer to the first question. I I It the 

answer is ~ the recommendations are valueless, and it would also be !Utile 

to go on with the BRUSA. conference. 

7. It the answer is yes then the recom.endations are val.id. The report 

should be changed to make this perfectly- clear, and the conference must by 

all means proceed in order to map out the details of illlple:nentation of the 

recom.endations. 

9. One aore point in the report. It fails to mention that on the 

military aide NATO countries have been provided NATO crypt.oaystas in sane 

quantity, and that that is the reason why the military pict"ime is relatively 

2 

--~------' ~----
. REF ID:A517796 -Eo ~.3(h)(2) 

PL.86..:36/50 USC 3605 

r 

,-~- _,d/ 

•• -There ia, however, alliraye the one NATO CCJISIC security regulation 

that i• a to be broken and that. is~~! N~~o •teu instead ot 

10. It seem.a that :their• are two possible courses. 

a. Modity the report to rec~d apin.st .... I ____ .... Ito the U.S. 

and call off the UK confer.nee, or 

b. Modify the report to admit the loss of l .... _______ ___,~•t the 

rec~dationa stand, and let the con!erence proceed. 

I rec~end the latter courM. 

3 
REF ID:A517796 

( ; ··; SEr.RfT ~i.i;url\Y Information 

.. •!'!! 8ICOIIft Ul1Clflltt!Plal 

J!RAl'T 

U. 8. fOSiftQI PAlll OI 

J!EO 3.3(h)(2) 

tpL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

CCIU'ERDCB OI TB S&'UlUft °!I.__ _____ _ 

l. Three issues are involved in the forthcomingU. S .... U. I:. C0nfereuce on 

a. Review of proposed tactics governing ati! approa.dl to the 

2. Only item la will be con.eidered. in this paper. The general u. S. 

position on this item was establ.ished. when the Fresident approve<! the report 

of the u. s. - lJ. JC. Conference on the Security o~L-----------' 

thi• approval, the U. s. TJ&si committed, ev.bJect to an .improvement in the 

pner&l aecuri ty of the I r to an approach "to the IL.... __ ..... 

IUniatry o:r Foreip At'faira (JO'A) on tbe insecurity 01·1 ~am.unicatiou. 

UICD obaerved tol ltaat an approach to t.he I lsbould not be made 

until the Tripartite Securit;y Report waa approved by each o:f tbe participating 

countriea' and thel r had ~rtaken det'ini te implwnting action 

to carry out the reccmaendatiODB of the report. 

3. The three govenaenta have aubeequently formal.l.y subscribed to the 

prineipl.es and sta.nde.rds of security pl"Qposed by the Tripartite Working Group, 

u4 tM rec- •pendat.1ona vitb reapeet tbereto are being progressively implemented. 

'Dl.e U. S. and U. I:. de.leptiona to a ~ecent conference of' the Tripartite Working 

Gl'Oup have agreed., in apit.e ot' reaenationa about Civil Ministries, that positive 

etepe are being t&keA by th~ put into effect tbeee principles and 

standards. !he U. 8. must decide whether the ",positive stepau already taken 
REF iC.f6~}..;7796 

Ull JC\ihll 

Set'UI ltY lnftmn3tion 

·J;o 3.3(h)(2) 

p PCl!f .. SIWIIft mmllmOI 

.PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

by tb.e I .... __ _.I are adequate; the State J),ep&l'tment ~r ~ be in a :poei ti on 

to certify the fincUap of the tJ. S. deleption to the.Tripartite Working 

Group. 

4. The condit1cma postulated by USCIB rega,z"ding ~ ap:proaeh to the llPA 

have been f'uli'i.11.ed to some degree . Addi tional.ly, the I ~r;yptan&lytic 

orpnization recently expressed to thel f:i.ts concern over the insecurity 

cf the I .... _....,..... _____ ..... lor KA'l'O nations, particularly those ot1._ _ ___.,.....lan4 

___ ___.land during 1952 there was a marked improvement f.n. the behavior of the 

.__ __ ..... Ion cipher security matters. 

6. Recommended actiona: 

a. If the improvement o~._ __ ..... f general security 1is confirmed, 

UIC11' agree that the condi tioas which deterred action on thet._........_,______.lcommunicatioaa security probl• have been removed.. 

b. USCIB accept the method o:f approach to the MFA suggested by the 

u.x. ill its letter ot lO Deceaber 1951 (kb 8 in .folder), and aomiute a Hnior 

repreaentati ve, together w1 th a technical adviser, to meet vi tLJ repreaatati vea in Paris a.t. a s~cified date. 

c. State Depart.meat member brief' the U. s. Ambassador ~ the 

propoHd procedure of' approach. 

fdP SECREl 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Pl- 86-36/50 USC 3605 

PROBLEM: 

REF ID:A517796 

18 Ksl' 1953 

fl.EPORT CF AD HOC COMMITTEE ON EXAMINATION 

= ~:tEI..FroMMUNICATIONS CF NATO NATIONS 

1.. To e::wnlno the available telecommun1 cations tra.ttic ot NATO 

members in oi'dor t.o ms.a.sure (a) tbe incidents ot violations ot NATO 

comm.mica.tieno aecurl.t7 regulations; and (b) the axtct ot pot.ential 

SCOPE A.i.'lD ME:.l]QP....Qf._THE INmTIGATION: 

2. Th:ls C<'mJtlttae was eatabliehed at the 82nd meeting of USCIB 

m 13 Fabrwu:r 1953 to examine the problem ot coamunicaticna aecurit7 

Yiolations b;y NATO l'! ~era. The Ccmmittee tiled a report dated . 

.3.0 Apr-11 1953 mich aet:. forth certain findings pertaining to seeurit7 

'Vi.ola.tion.'l det~ec:tOO. in the aYail.able traffic and cantered principa.l.11' 

~--.L-____________ __,jl During 

the period of tM.s :initial stu~ • arrangements were made to hold a 

BRUSA ccmterence en t;he entire probl• ot NATO communications 

security. W:i;th ·that fact in mind• USCIB decided at ita 84th meeting 

m S MB,}" 1953 th.at ·t.his Ccm:s:ai.ttee should continue its inveatigaticn 

en broader linas ~nch voul.d include not co]¥ a conaideratiCID or 

securit7 Ylolst.:S.ona but also an ef'tort to determine the extent of 

pot;rmtial d.am&,ge to us interests resulting from leakage or 
REF ID:A517796 

EQ3~3{eh)(2) !10P sm 8~tffl.IT! llfl'CtUlh\'d CkNf2 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

com.11runicstiona secul'i t,y pract1ceat' This report crn1ra all phases 

of the expanded problem .. 

3o The original dire-.·:tive called fo!" reprN;<lntt.tives of the 

1n preparing a report. . ., It soon becuie app3.rent tl::,,t t,t:a inve~tigation 

would touch areas in which all member depar·tments ood agencies ot 

USCIB have an interesto Consequentl.1"i the Departments of Navy and 

Ai~ Force 9 the Cer.t~al Intelligence Agency &nd the Federal Bu.reau 

of Investigation were asked to participate 1n the survey and thei.Tr 

representatives hs.ve joined in various phases of the investigation 

and the prepai·ation of this reporlo 

4" The results of this lllUJ'Vef are presented in the four Tabs 

attached herstoo Tab ! praseuta the investigation into security 

violations and ie ln substance the initial report presented to USCIB 

under date of 30 April 19530 Tab B is a statement of the situation ~r 

as it pertains t.o military traffic~ Tab £. represents a substantive 

\ Tab £? repreeents '--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---' 

a o:ir•yptologic evaluation of the NATO nations under consideration(> 

So There is a.loo at.tached a Tab ! which consists of a brief 
E6~.3(h)(2) 

PL 86:::36/50 USC 3605 

• -3-

!hi• Tab ie not 

a direct product ot the Comittee 8 e 1Dvaat1gat1oo bat ie preamted u a 

cmveniance to the -bars ot tbe Bl>ard in their oonaiderat1on of th• 

entire probl•o 

60 Each phaae ot t.b• Comit-t.ee~ • work 1a subject to particular 

limitations which are deocribed in the relevant attachments to th• 

report.., However, certain general restrictions in C(JYerage were 

necest!lar;y to make the Coianit,tee' :! worlt manageable and :re QPplicable 

to all the attaohmsnts, as tollows1 

(a) The traffic exaained was limited to maaaagee aent 

between l November 19S2 and l llq l9S3o Although a tew 

messages tre.nsmitted prior to 1 Hovent>er 19$2 are included in 

thie report, the;y are items which were brought to the attention 

of the Committee primarily as examples of the type of material. 

desired and their incluaion here doe• not mean that the period 

prior to 1 November 1952 was ex8111ned thoro~o 

In no phase of the Committee 0 a investigation ~an it be stated that 

all of the available traffic during this period has been examinedo -

The Committee endeavored to cover all major circuits. and through 

thie search and by cheeking the file a of the departments and agencie a 

represented on the Committee, it ia estimated that an accm"ate total 

appraisal. hae been a.c:hievedo The inability to examine every message 
REF ID:A517796 

• 

("' 'f6P fi!ll.fil't' Si0UR!'ff IN¥9RMIA'iQ ~QI 

-3.3(h)(2) 

86-36/50 USC 3605 

means, of courN~ that s:>me items have been overlookedo However'1 

the Committee doee not believe that the number or quality of such 

messages would be such as to alter the principal conclualons ot 

this reporto 

7o The CoDIDittee~s conclusions must be qualified b7 certain 

ass\111J)tione which were made 1D order to center the focus of attention 

on the content or the traffic and to avoid inquiries beyond the 

:)C)mpetence of the Committeeo It was &881.Jlled that 

'fOP SEeRE'f 31?.0l:JftI'fi INPE>RJIATIEfi 0ANE>B 
I REF ID:A517796 

r- TOP 8Eeftft Siletmf'i'Y DPeBM!t=' 

j,.. 

CONCLUSI~Ss EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Pl 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Ao On security violationea 

v~·· 

11 

It 

' 

\ 

,Jp 7o The proper USc-UK authorities on NATO should be tul.11" 

\ -~ ~ .- informed of the securit;:r violations with respect to NATO matters ? ·~d be urged to develop a pn>gra of at.rict ob88rY&nce ot llATO 

TOP SEC!BT :EeUftlft IHF6HMl'i'i9N GANQI 
7 ---

I. 

I ' 

·~ 

REF ID:A517796 

TOP SICnT SUBft'I INftJB&t() GAS 

E03.3(h)(2) 

',~.~·~"' Pl 86:c36/50 USC 3605 

w. -t(J.. 

regulationao Initial ettorta aloag this Un• lbould nOt. inwlTe 

f\ 

~...._____ ____ _____. 
.· 

E03.3~~ . PL86-~TI u~P3~ 17796 

0 I) 

-7-

appraise, -~ in ldnddcbt• The a..ltt• bu llld• 

flftr1' ettort to be acaal'&te u w1l aa objective in aam1rrlng 

this trattic but th• mlllber ot .,...1. found ill W. nzwr 

cann• be pr8119ltecl u u abRJ.ute tiguN. Revvt.beleU• 1lhm 

cme tlk• into aaoouat tbe huge nml:ller ot w...- .,.maect b.r 

all the naluatill& aa-01• ill th• courae ot thld.zt DOl'll&1 Opel'-

atiam clur1n& the test ~ ob09• tor tb1a 9UJ'ftl', and th• 

1ntma1:n ettort, cm the pert, ot the reprueatatifta ot th•• 

-.mc1• wli:l.Da ill oam.tt• to ic:11Dtif7 em:Mlpl ee ot iDtormatioa leakage illjurlom to US interest•~ it 18 eddet that the 

leakap. 1D8otar aa guaptitz 111 oapoensect. 18 Tflf'I ..u. 

6. Deeplt• the quatit.atln 1MiaDifiomce ot the tore-

&01n& 81'Mplee. 

Tlda nz•9., baa brought out a reucmMl,- · 

CClltmiDc tact :lD the •CH tim t• d-c:fnc ...,, .. """ 

11DC09ered• but t.bia mst be balaaoed. apinet, th• poeaibilit7 

that at m:r .. .,. arit:loalJT 4-gSng intomation could appear 1n the._. tne ot traffic. Tb• latter aapect ot th• 

ai.tuatiall 1• 001_.ed in tile •eot.lan :1·1d1ateli" tol.low:lng. 
REF ID: A517796EO 3.3(h)(2) 

P1-...86-36/50 USC 3605 

'f0P SERI! SIG'lllI'l'f Bl-RBIA'l'i91 GAD 

,.,a...' 

TOP Sl!i!kE'l' SECORlTi IillullllAT!Oll etdfCB 
.• 

REF ID: ASl 779~0 3.3(h)(2) 

P~6-36/50 USC 3605 

-9-

7 o An etfort. to 1mproye naticnal cl7¢ograpbio and ocamunicat~1ons prs.cticea could reduce appreciabl,y the total cammartcations aecurit;r probl• under cansideratioa and should be made 

prior to eJJ1' etfort". to improYe apt;- or to mcourage the ue ot 

more acmpllcated cr,pt,ograpbio equipllllt .. ) 

8. A substantial iaproramt in the gmeral situation lllgbt 

result frcm tbe instituticm ot a eecur1t7 daaustratica amaag the 

NATO cauntriaa. 

E. at.her ccmclusicms: 

3. The eddence brought out in t.h1a :lnYeatigation doee not. 

indicate that serious damage has ocoured clur1ng the period covered 

bJ" this aun97. HOW9Yer, such damage has ocaurred in the put and 

_. occur again in th• Mure. 
REF ID:A517796 

tEO 3.3(h)(2) 

-10- PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

RECOIMERDATIONS: 

1. The US-UI author1t1ea in NA1'0 eb<Juld be fill1' 1.ntol'Md 

ot the eecurit7 violatiaaa witb reapect;/to NATO matt.ere tor the 

purpose ot developlng a program at strict obeerTa11ce .ot the NATO 

cammm1cationa aecurit7 regW.aticna. 

2. An ettort abould be/undertake jointq with .the Britillb 

to impJove the naticmal cr,pt.ograpbic •and ommm1oat1.- pract.icea 

ot the NATO countries b7 aid...,t,ratiaa ot proper tecbniquea. ezplanaticm at I .... ___ __.. __ ___.f and at.her means abort ot direct 

at this tim. Such dmanatrationa and axplanationa mat be'CCID8iderabq detailed nen to a 

point that Id.Pt be expected to permit reasonable suppoe1t1ms aa 

t~'-------' ). Hachine17 should be established joiatq with th~,___ _ ___. 

tor the continuing _.., natian ot the trattic ot BATO countries 

and tor the snal,J'sia ot their ~m.1 oatiGDS practices in order 

to eupplamt this 8UJ"'NT • to judge the ettect ot the ettort-a to 

improYe their aecur1t7 and t.o proride a basis tor tut,ure action. 
REF ID:A517796 

r" ~ 

'l!OP SIC&a' ~URrTT J:IWOJUL\i'IOll CANOE 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

SBCURITY VIOLATIONS 

lo 'l'bia phase or tbe Committee~ s investigation ot traffic was 

undertaken prior to and •parately from. the investigation covered b7 

Tabs ! and ,2 and is limited to a coneideration of security violat1onet"I 

For the purpose of this report the Committee detineKI a eecuri ty violation 

u any message violating NATO_ communications security regulationao 'l'he 

definition waa adopted because those regulations constitute the onl.7 

standard agreed upon by the NATO countries., 

\\\\\\ 

"COSMICo 'l'ne word COS11!0 has been designed as a eecurit.J 

warning onlyo 'lhia designation ehallp in addition to the 

appropriate security claas1f1cation, be placed on all Joint 

and national papers tabled at meetings of any body or coDDittee 

set up under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which 

contain and reveal& 

(1) Strategic or operational military appreciations, 

plane or deoisionso 

(2) ~olitical-ailitary appreciations, plans or decia::lonery 

(3) Economic p.lanning based on strategic m:i.litary plans 

and decisions which could lead to disclosire of euch 

plans and decisions,,. · (4) Classified information of one cow::r.t.cy t.at>leci or 

circulated by another country9 unless the '011De:r• 

country' agroes othemsa_,. 

TAB l 

'!'OP S!CftE'f Sf;etJRP1'Y ~TOH CAN<J! 
REF ID:A517796 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Pt 86-36/50 USC 3605 

'toP SECRE'I' SEC om: r l INl"OltU'A:t!Ol'f e:aH OB 

"NATOo Ck1 all other joint or na.tional. documenta tabled or 

circulat.ed wit.bin the North At.lantic Treaty Organization the 

word "NATO" shall appears together with the approp:r:tate 

eecurity class1ficat1ono· '?hie 1tNAT011 marlcJngi however, doee 

not require the apecial handling or accounting providt'd for.' 

"COSMIC" do~umente, other then aa warranted b7 the secw.·ity 

elassii'icationD and DO/!p!cial scl'eening (aa :irequired foir 

"COSMIC" personnel) ia/neeesaary for access to NATO document.so" 

3o The investigation o.t securit7 wiol.ations was subject to tho 

assumptions described 11)/paragraph 7 of' tbe :l"'eport aid to the time 

limits described in .paragraph 6 It did not cover the traffic of 

I ....________ .... !but was concentrated on /be I 

L..I ________________ ___, _____ __.\ cue to the 

attention of the Committee,but the traffie of those countries was not 

examined in detailo 

4o In examining tratfic for se"urity violation• the Committee 

considered 119 individual messages which wer~t submitted prima:P:"ily b7 

The Committee screened this list 

to eliminate messages which clear:i,- did not conatitute security violationao 

\\\\ 

So In the COUl"l!e or thil!I phase of the investigation the Ccaaittee 

encountered certain nieseages which contained information damaging to the 

TAB 1 
.. r 

~~(h)(2) 

REF ID : AS 1 'pf~g-3~0 USC 3605 

·. 

· .. ·. · .. · .. ·. 
REF ID : ~%~~USC 3605 

(' """ 

'i'0P SISRB!' SEGYRI'!Y BfPOmlATIQll SA.ta 

· 4o 1'herefore, no categorical statement can be made to the ettec't 

that there has been or has not been any "leakage" to the USSR ot 

information damaging to US interests~ 

TAB B _.. WWW 
• 

•'-

E03~3Lh)(;2) 

0 REF w~~(j~e 36os 

'f~ sse:RBf S.660RM !Wf!ORMA!l'IOM CANOE 0 

oomprom.iae might bo ir:;Ju.;.•:J.~ue to US ir.t11restao A message was con8idered 

•• to af'feot US interest-s if it r"lated t.c; matt.ere :1.n\which the US we.s ta.ld.ng 

ao"f~ion or to a poli~y whi~h the US was suppc11.·t.ir11., \A message was 

considered deaging it the USSR c:ould ua191 the information eit.,.lier (::n a. 

lDn1 or mort term bas:t.s to thwart. or hamper ac-twn taken by the us or t.fi8 

policies support~ed by :t to llessage1 ocri.taining lntormation a.f'ffJeting US 

interests were not considersd damaging it time}T information were available 

to the USSR through open eour'.!88 auch as newspapers Cl" public release of 

,government intormation o 

2c The materie1 st.udied during this phase of the investigati.~-m fall~ 

into the following ea:i:.cgcrl es1 

TAB C .......... 

:! ; I 
EO 3.3(h)(2) REF ID:A517796 PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

of this repori} were checked bJ' the Comittee under the\terma 

ot reterence manticned in Paragraph 1 aboYe. 

3. On the basis ot investigating the tour categor.I.• not.ed.. 

1n the paragrapi iDmediatel1' preceding, the Caaaittee accept.eel tb• 

evaluations ot the various specialist panels to the etteot that 

-2- '?AB C 

•• 
. = 3.3(h)(2) 1~ - . :::> 86-36/50 USC 3605 SEC LJ Ff , TY ' " - . i ~ . H~ 1 

,:~ ~- u (- d ~- 1U~ ~"'AT I i 0 ' N 

Some geaeral remrks on each countr;r are here pret8.Ced to the tsbu.l.ation~ 

Form 781·C13S TOP SECRET CANOE TAB D 
' 

. 

I 

Form 7Bl·C13S 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

~---I~ ~17J..9~ e U P·L··· ... 86-36/50 USC 3605 TOP· SEtttt!>t tA1'1 £J 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
REF ID:A517796 

TOP SECRET C?iJ'1 0E 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Form 781-ClJS TOP SECRET CANOE 
~~3(h)(2) 

REF ID : A5 l~1 ~~6150 USC 3605 . - -- -

----~~-----S:!SO 

V> 

M 

'--! 

<XI 

" E 

0 

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REF ID:A517796 

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{l) 

(2) 

(3) 

{4) 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

"' M 

u 

. 

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..... 

E 

0 

u.. 
,..E0.3.3(h)(2) 

REF ID: A51779tpl 86:c3p/50 USC 3605 

e 

II> 

M 

u 

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.., 

,.... 

E 

0 

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REF ID: A51 P~a'~3q/50 USC 3605 

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,... 

E 

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LL 
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problem at thE reqiu·1i:i~; of St':cretary Marehall;ii kllt waa w..able to 

'l'.lB E 
report to tbe ISC an J~ Auguet 1948 ud m 2 Septmaber U. l8C 

accepted tbe -Jari'Q' viev 1D WCD Ualt.t tbeea B'Mpe ..,,.]d Dot be 

taJam o Secsret.17 Narshal1 replied pencmll.y to PGl'9J.p IUlliater 

Bev1D izatormillg h1m GE tbia deo1e1cm. 

2o .l ~ later, 1D September and Ootober ot 19491 USCIB, aotuc 

Gil 'behalt or tbe us Oov6l'Dl8Dt, accepted a Bri t18b propoeal. tbat • 

Sri Ueh 017Ptograpbio device (t.be TJpex Nark II) be prOYided to tbe 

Western 11D1• powen ~ ud aubeequmtq to all J1ATO gofti"IWDta, •tor 

tm e:xicluaiw enoipbel'Mllt of METRIC and COSMIC teleo,...moaUaaa. 

Thia dnioe lU nbeequent]T adopted bJ' IATO ~or tb1e pmpoae • 

.30 Dal"ing tbe tallowing ew ot 19SO tbe British Aabaswlar iD 

Washingtcn ra1aecl vitb tm ~t of State the generaliprobl• 

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stepa to this end '\id.thout a;.mit:f.ng either the G:stablishmant ot "aecurc 

cammmicatione organizations and deEigned to assure adequate guara11tees 

ot seourit7 at. each step ot the approach. This Department or State 

proposal w.a considered b;v t.he Board at its meeting ot 9 March and 

w.s witbdram bJ the state member in the f'ace ot a majority view 

tbat the Board should adhere to the more rigid policy which it bad 

already adopted. The specitic praposals for the scope and agenda 

ttr the 1'orthcoming conference vere approved, however, and were torw.rded to I.Sm on 1.3 March 1951 (14/128). 

8. The BRUSA Canterence was held 1D Mq 1951 and its Roport (14/132) 

-..o submitted to USCIB cm 15 May. USOIB approved the Report. at 1 ts 

meeting cm 24 Hq and decided also to refer it to tbe NSC tor approval 

and to perpetuate the 1JS conf'erence delegation as an Ad Hoo CCl!mdttee 

ot the Board to keep this problem under continuous revievo !SIB 

notitied. us of its approval ot the Report by letter of 7 June 1951 

(13/188).. The Report was forwarded to the liSC on 8 June 19.51 (14/1.37) 

and was approved b:r the Special Candttee ot the NSC and tho PresidEint 

an 11 JanU&17 1952 (14/189). 

9. Tbe priDcipal results ot this BRUSl Conference were 1 

(a) The preparation ot a specj.tic cryptographic pl.an vhich 

could accomplish the desired improvement in tb!t eeautit;r 

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(d) The eetablisbnent of general securityconditions or 

criteria vbicb must. be met to the entistact1on ot both 

LSIB a!ld uscm prior to taktng action. 

It m&¥ be noted that the work or thie Conf'erenoe was ba~ed on a prior 

assumption that the need to take direut action to improve\the s0ourity 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 
1:10 3.3(h)(2) 

PL<8~/5Q~~~~5ID: ASl 7796 .") 

!SP s:;o!'!.::%' fESEJfl!'i'r DlFOR!:M!ION Ofo..'.JQS 

eeou.rity should not be l:l.l!de unt.il the\Roport ho.d bean approved by 

each ot the participating couot1•iea and ~had taken definite 

action cm the basis of the Report. The Ad Hoc Caraittee was ordei"'ed 

to etud7 the specific plr.iJJ proposed by the British. These views 

were ocmnunioated to LSIB i!l a letter or 24 Je.nuary 1952 (14/196)0 

Tho Ad Boe Comittee renccred its report on l.3 Febr\Jacy 1952 (14/200) 

1D which it endorsed the reply 'Which USCIB bad made to LSIB and 

recocnsnded further that 110 approach should be made unt.il r.notber 
1

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the Department ot St.ate :i.n t..'hich the Bri.tish Er:.!gger.ited that Secretary 

Acheson might be prepa:-od to endarse immediately tlireet action and 

that USCIB lllight, therefore, rav~:r..·ae its deoiaion of the preceding 

JBlluary. In a meas.~ge of 27 June 1952 Mr. Armstr~g advii::ed Mr .. Jori.ea 

that the ns position in thia rnattor bad not been cbQ.ngedo 

10¢ 

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140 The next and latest British ettort to obtdn our agreement that • 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 
REF ID:A517796 

USCIB has adrlsed.LSIB that it has agrceJ to cu.ch a ccn£erenc0, now 

achedul.ed to CCliJUlleJ:JCe in Washington OD 4 June 195). 

u. 

lS. In preparation fcrr tM.s conferenoe U5CJB reconsidered the general 

problem ot the 1Dscicurit7 ot the ccm:nmico.tions of NA.TO countries at 

its meeting ot 13 Febl'uary 1953 and eatabliobed a new Ad Hoc CClilE.Dittee 

to reriev the risk to tM :::ecurity ot US classified ini"ormatian created 

b,y violations or IU'l'O ocnnu.i"lioatioas seourit;y- practices and b,y the 

iDBecurit;y- ot the national oaumunicati0110 of NATO countz-iea o A report 

w.s eubmitted by th1u .Ad Hoc Car:mittee cm 4 May 1953 (23/Sl) and was 

d1ecuaeed bJ tbe Board at its meeting ot 8 May 19520 This Report 

dealt principe.lly 'With violations or WATO oCIIllllUlliaations security 

practices. USCm (a) noted the :ln1t1al report b7 the Ad Noc Committee 

and decided that the Camnittee should continue its study of the 

additional phases or tbe problem as outlined byl .... _____ __.~th 

a view to eubmittiug a re;iort tor the consideration ot the Board 

at a special meeting to be held in advance ot.ths 4 June BRUSA Conferences (b) agreed to dater consideration ot a presentation of th.is 

entire problem to NSC until the Ad Hoc Coomittee Report had been 

reviewed. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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~,Q s':~.~hJ(2) PL 86-36/SOUSC 3605 

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l2. 

16. %,be problem ot risk tQ the 1eourit7 ot the United States created 

b7 tbe{ lo""'1n.udQia~1.ons was first considered by118CD 1D thesmiper or 1951 shortly after the BRUSA~~erence on 

LJcmmnmicaUone securit7. The matter vas raised b7' t~­

ber\at tbe meeting of USGIB OD 22 June 19'1 in ocmneotion \lith several 

or t.be ..... sa request ot the us ariglnatore ot the 1nf'ormat1ono 

OSCIB clireoted that the Ad Hoc CCllllllittee, camposect ot members ot the 

Oer1.ou Delegation to the recent BRUSA Ccmterepce a11i .... __ .... lcomnnm1-

oatiom aeaurit7,\St1Jd.7 and evaluate tbe problem otJ rommunioatioDa aecuriv. 

17. \ Tbe tirat Bepm-t, ot tb.18 Ad Boo CCD.lllittee (23/18) we eubmitted 

to USCIB at its meet.tng CIG 1.3 Jul7 19.51 and was accepted. USCIB . \ I 

directed that the Committee continue its stlldy with particular regard 

to the\probl• ot oorrectingl rbwle ot IA.TO OOlllllunioations 

aecurif-7 procedures. ID this ti.rat Report the Ad Hoc C<alittee ba4 

ocnoludecl tbata 

(a) ··1_ -----------~t tliat ca the vhole, ao tar aa liATO or US political and 
h() 3)(h)(2) 

PL86::-36/5Q. USC 3605 

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eoClDCllic polic7vas concerned, the 1ntonaat1on diacloeed through ineec:llr~ loamnunicationa ws 

not hi&bl1 detrimental to tbe security ot the us. 

(b.) TM level ar] r• 110 lov 

.. to .rtord little libl:t.boocl that an illlprovment 1n 

tl:aeir cOllllD\ID1caticms security would errectiveq prevent 

lea'ta.p ot 1Df'ormat1on atteot1Dg the security ot the us. 

(o) 'flJere •• no assurance that. all availabi. author1Hd 

meane vithln the lllTO.organizatiou have been applied 

toard the carreotlOD otl labuse ot NATO 

ccmmnm1cat1ons s.ecurit)' procedures. 

(d) Direot acticm toward the improvement ot over-all 

I bcmunicat1ons aecuri t7 w.a, therefore, not i 

jutit1e4 at that tiae. 

i 

Tbe Ad Hoc Camlittee had reocmaencled\.tbat their atu~ be continued 

ud tbat ao dir.t aotiGD Da1-D! tbel ~ cantemplated 

UDtil USCIB er the .. RSC bad decided wbether euch acticn. should be 

tuea· m-a-m ~ 

18~ The t1Dal Report\ot the .Ad Boe CClllDittee (23/22) was eullaitted 

on 7 Auguat 19'1 and 'WU considered b7 USCIB at ita meeting an 

10 .lupat. In tbia Report the Canmittee re-affirmed ita irevioua 

reotwtendaticm that no direct action ahcNld be taken at that t1-

beJQDCI an effort· to correctJ ~buse ot RATO oomunioations 

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REF ID:A517796 

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aecurit;y procedureao The Ccmmittee recammended both a plan for an 

1mediate approach to tbel Ito this end and several longruge propoeale directed tollll'd eventual over-all improvement ot 

L...-___ ...... lcom.. unioations eecurit7. 

(a) Th9 plan tor immediate aoticm envisaged a unilateral 

US approach to the I I •t the 

ambusadorial level wherein ue vould adV1ae tbe I .... ---

.___ ..... It.bat va had bean apprised ot • I .... ----..--.,... 

violatiC)D\ot NATO cammunioaticns securit)' proc•dwea 

and would\roquest categorical assurance that tbe7 

vould correct this abuse. It vas proposed alaCI> that w 

would otter OUl" assurances as to the eecuri ty • .ot the 

IA.TO C17Pto-qet• (t'Jpex Mark ll) and o~Ul)icatiou 

procedures and that ue vould otter such technical 

assistance or adviee\as ~ghtdeeire 

'° aseure tbansel vee \.along these liDea. • Thl• approach 

vaa to be baaed on the\ocmtent and .handl.iDg•ot a 

CD 6 lul.7 1951J our poaaeaaion ot this lntormat1Qll 

being attributed to an agent\re~1-1 _____ ___,._ _ ___,.__, 

actidt)r. USCIB apprcmtd the\recamnenda.ti.ons ot 

the Ad Hoc Canmittee and designa'ted tl:le St.ate Depart-

•nt and CIA to deulop the particulars ot this approach. 

(b) USOIB baa taken no action o.u the lClbg-.tiUJge/prOJ>OBala. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

140 
REF ID:A517796 

(\ ~ 

T6P 'Bf.eflE? BBffiJRI'i'Y DP0IUh\'fieM GA!IQ& . 

20. Betwen A11£U&t alJC1 lovember ot 1951 there were aewral ••bazagea 

betvea USCIB and LSIB in the course of obt.1ntnJ !approval 

~OI" tb1a approach to~ I The tinalUSCIB 

M Boo CClllAittee Report·vaa forwarded to I.SIB an 17 August, and the 

detaila ot tbe proposed• plan developecl b7 State and CIA vwe explained to 81r Edward Travis, alJd f'OJ'\IU'Cled b7 him/tct I en 

1. loveaber. Meanwhile• LSIB bad considered the USCIB proposal and 

W adrtaecl USCIB, b,y a message of S lovember/ (2.3/28), that this 

plan vu not acceptable to them. The7 felt. that the approach vaa 

too riaJr;r and voald not ael"98 to acoaapli&h the cmtr...U impraveaent 

in the security otl lcanmunicat1cma llhich tbe7 considered 

111.parative. At the urging or .Sir Edward Travis LSIB reconsidered 

tM detailed plan ~, b7 a Jl8S&age ot 8 lovember and a subsequent 

letter of 19 Rowaber (23/40),/tdtbdrw their obJectiane en the 

111Jderatand'lng t.bat (a) tbe approach voW.d be addressed eolel.T to 

correctinaj .... _____ labus• ~ RlTO cmmunications eecurit7 practices 

! 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

15. 
REF ID:A517796 

Tll' SECRE'l' SEGURI'.11! D!'OmtleN eJ:HeE 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

and (b) vculd be tollowd by further consideration or the Bri.tiab 

euggeation that stepa should be taken to improve over-all.I......_ ___ ___, 

communioatiOIUI aeourity. By letter ot 23 No-o/ellber (23/41) mclB 

actri.eed WIS that the apμ-oach would be made shortIT o.f'ter 1 December. 

'I 

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REF ID:A517796 

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l'8P ~ sgQmQTI Di!OJl'fATIOll O&ROE l?o 

otl ~esponse and recommend1ng that it would be best 

to oonaider the •t.ter\oloeed mitil f'ul'ther instanc•a orl .... ____ __, 

abuse ot IATO cClllDU!lioattons security procedure• a~eclo 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 use 3605 
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REF ID:A517796 

through the pi·ovieion of the i::ombined cipher machine 

(GCH)i; bu·t stated -that there ,.,ere only 10 CCM3 s which 

could ba ma.d'1 e.va.ila.ble at tha·I:. time and that it was 

not possible to anticipate ¥Ihen further equipment 

19~ 

would be available to satisfy the entirel request~ 

The DmAFSA stipulated that this equipment. could be mD..de 

available only on a free loan or rental basis and that 

thel krovernment would have to e.g:rree to cer·!iain 

stipulations covering the physJcal protection and 

di spo si tion of i to 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 
3.3(h)(2) 

86-36/50 USC 3605 REF ID:A517796 

r 0-:r? ~&C~'.iT S"iCYlUTI l:..Fi'Oili1UTIO:tJ .tJQE 
REF ID:A517796 

't'0SEGRE'P F;EGBRB'Y DWQRW1'1'ION CACJ 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 
REF ID:A517796 

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that,c. in reaching a decision in ·this case., it had been 

impelled by the "prolonged US=UK discussions on this 

general problem in t.he pasttt to feel that "the impor·tancc 

to the US and UK of the security of the communications of 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 
•,' 

REF ID:A517796 

~ ---- t et' sseH! SS0UIUH INPGRMMIQN uANOI 

EXHIBIT 1 

SECURITY VIOLATIONS 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

./ 

Tef SBeftB'f 3168ftfff IMPOftltNl:£6N 61dl6E 
REF ID:A517796 

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DBIBIT 2 PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

STATUS 01 llTO CR!PTOSISl'KllB 

Ao n.ret level (high 11illt8l7 am diplollat1o ).1 

lo 1)pex with S111plex eettJ.nge., 

2o Some one-time pads (approTed b7' stand~ group). 

I ~te of ~· 20 ~ mo.r 

HOTEt lon=BRUSA coutriea were .f'urniebed full 

technical details tor 119k1ng op their own nation-1 

Simplex eettinge but no intormat.ion is available 

as to whether the7 are doing llO.o 

Bo Second level (.mil1tar;r onl¥ - high comand to d1Tisions)a 

lo CCII. 

Date ot approTlll.1 10 lovmbel- 19$12 

2o latex (back up to CCll)o 

Date at aoprgyala 25 Julx 12522 

________________ !September 19S2o 

Co Third level (low eohelonh 

Date or approvals 2S J~ 19S2o 

No systems yet providedo 

2 o French modified J&-209. 

Date ot approval1~i9s­

:srtect1ve only b11.._______Jeo taro 
Do 

Bo 

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REF ID:A517796 

'tUP SJ!LRE1' SECtl!UTr MemtA'fieti eiNe! 

3.3(h)(2) 

86-36/50 USC 3605 

EXHIBIT 3 

JIESSAGES CCflTAINIHG DAllAGING INFOIUIATION 
REF ID:A517796 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

-2-