13466 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 49 / Friday, March 13, 2015 / Notices 

dollar deals related to Venezuelan 

corruption and represented that 

connections with BPA would facilitate 

these transactions. 

For example, a TPML (‘‘TPML 4’’), 

who has worked with the Sinaloa cartel, 

facilitated the transfer of bulk cash 

derived from narcotics trafficking in the 

United States and facilitated financial 

transactions involving the proceeds of 

other crimes. TPML 4 intentionally 

bolstered connections with BPA to 

attract money laundering clients and 

requested that clients send smaller 

transfers through accounts at other 

institutions and to only use accounts at 

BPA for large transactions. In 

communications with co-conspirators, 

TPML 4 advertised a relationship with 

BPA in attempts to attract potential 

money laundering deals. TPML 4 told 

clients that this relationship with BPA 

and other government officials would 

ensure that their transactions would not 

be scrutinized by the financial 

community. In addition, TPML 4 also 

marketed services to potential clients by 

providing specific wire transfer 

instructions for accounts at BPA. 

TPML 4 used many methods to avoid 

detection by law enforcement, including 

planning to increase operations during 

the U.S. government shutdown in 2013. 

TPML 4 used many Panamanian, 

Spanish, and Swiss shelf corporations to 

attract clients. Several of these shelf 

corporations had bank accounts, 

including at BPA. 

BPA’s failure to monitor transactions 

for apparent red flag activity attracts 

TPMLs. Many third-party money 

laundering transactions conducted 

through BPA lack an apparent business 

purpose and would be identified as high 

risk by a bank with sufficient AML/CFT 

controls. For example, BPA processed 

millions of U.S. dollar transactions that 

listed BPA’s Andorran address for the 

originator’s or beneficiary’s address. 

Although there may be rare occasions 

when use of the bank’s address as a 

bank customer’s address of record is 

legitimate, the processing of a high 

percentage of transactions not 

containing accurate customer address 

information indicates failure to conduct 

sufficient due diligence on a customer, 

failure to adequately monitor 

transactions, or possible complicity in 

money laundering by disguising the 

origin of funds. BPA also attracts TPMLs 

by knowingly providing services to shell 

and shelf companies and unlicensed 

money transmitters. As noted above, 

TPMLs rely on shell and shelf 

companies to shield the identities of 

their clients engaged in criminal 

activity. BPA’s facilitation of this highrisk business allows TPMLs to obscure 

the beneficial ownership of these 

accounts. 

BPA accesses the U.S. financial 

system through direct correspondent 

accounts held at four U.S. banks. 

Between approximately 2009 through 

2014, BPA processed hundreds of 

millions of dollars through its U.S. 

correspondents. These transactions 

contained numerous indicators of highrisk money laundering typologies, 

including widespread shell company 

activity, unlicensed money transmitters, 

and other high-risk business customers. 

For example, BPA processed tens of 

millions of dollars on behalf of 

unlicensed money transmitters through 

one U.S. correspondent. The U.S. 

correspondent requested that BPA sign 

an agreement to discontinue processing 

these transactions through its account. 

After these concerns arose, the U.S. 

correspondent closed BPA’s account. 

In addition, 62 percent of BPA’s 

outgoing transactions through one U.S. 

correspondent bank involved only four 

high-risk customers. These customers, 

deemed high-risk by the U.S. 

correspondent bank, included a shell 

company, an Internet business, and two 

non-bank financial institutions. 

Between approximately 2007 and 2012, 

BPA also used its U.S. correspondents 

to send or receive wire transfers totaling 

more than $50 million for Panamanian 

shell companies that share directors, 

agents, and the same address. These 

transfers involved large, round dollar 

amounts and did not specify a purpose 

for the transactions. When U.S. 

correspondents requested additional 

information, BPA either failed to 

respond or provided extremely limited 

information. 

IV. The Extent to Which BPA Is Used 

for Legitimate Business Purposes 

It is difficult to assess on the 

information available the extent to 

which BPA is used for legitimate 

business purposes. BPA provides 

services in private banking, personal 

banking, and corporate banking. These 

services include typical bank products 

such as savings accounts, corporate 

accounts, credit cards, and financing. 

BPA provides services to high-risk 

customers including international 

foreign operated shell companies, 

businesses likely engaged in unlicensed 

money transmission, and senior foreign 

political officials. Because of the 

demonstrated cooperation of high level 

management at BPA with TPMLs, BPA’s 

legitimate business activity is at high 

risk of being abused by money 

launderers. 

V. The Extent to Which This Action Is 

Sufficient To Guard Against 

International Money Laundering and 

Other Financial Crimes 

FinCEN’s March 13, 2015 proposed 

imposition of the fifth special measure, 

pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(5), 

would guard against the international 

money laundering and other financial 

crimes described above directly by 

restricting the ability of BPA to access 

the U.S. financial system to process 

transactions, and indirectly by public 

notification to the international 

financial community of the risks posed 

by dealing with BPA and TPMLs. 

Dated: March 6, 2015. 

Jennifer Shasky Calvery, 

Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement 

Network. 

[FR Doc. 2015–05911 Filed 3–12–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4810–02–P 

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 

Internal Revenue Service 

Proposed Collection; Comment 

Request for Forms 9779, 9783, 9787, 

and 9789 

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 

Treasury. 

ACTION: Notice and request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: The Department of the 

Treasury, as part of its continuing effort 

to reduce paperwork and respondent 

burden, invites the general public and 

other Federal agencies to take this 

opportunity to comment on proposed 

and/or continuing information 

collections, as required by the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. 

L. 104–13 (44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A)). 

Currently, the IRS is soliciting 

comments concerning Forms 9779, 

9783, 9787, and 9789, Electronic 

Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS). 

DATES: Written comments should be 

received on or before May 12, 2015 to 

be assured of consideration. 

ADDRESSES: Direct all written comments 

to Christie Preston, Internal Revenue 

Service, Room 6129, 1111 Constitution 

Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20224. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Requests for additional information or 

copies of the forms and instructions 

should be directed to LaNita Van Dyke, 

Internal Revenue Service, Room 6517, 

1111 Constitution Avenue NW., 

Washington, DC 20224, or through the 

internet at Lanita.VanDyke@irs.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 49 / Friday, March 13, 2015 / Notices 13467 

Title: Electronic Federal Tax Payment 

System (EFTPS). 

OMB Number: 1545–1467. 

Form Number: Forms 9779, 9783, 

9787, and 9789. 

Abstract: These forms are used by 

business and individual taxpayers to 

enroll in the Electronic Federal Tax 

Payment System (EFTPS). EFTPS is an 

electronic remittance processing system 

the Service uses to accept electronically 

transmitted federal tax payments. 

EFTPS (1) establishes and maintains a 

taxpayer data base which includes 

entity information from the taxpayers or 

their banks, (2) initiates the transfer of 

the tax payment amount from the 

taxpayer’s bank account, (3) validates 

the entity information and selected 

elements for each taxpayer, and (4) 

electronically transmits taxpayer 

payment data to the IRS. 

Current Actions: The total burden 

hours have decreased. The burden hours 

have changed from 4,470,000 to 

4,350,000 with a decrease total of 

120,000 hours. The decrease is due to 

each Spanish form becoming obsolete. 

Type of Review: Revision of a 

currently approved collection. 

Affected Public: Individuals, business 

or other for-profit organizations, and 

state, local or tribal governments. 

Estimated Number of Respondents: 

4,350,000. 

Estimated Total Annual Burden 

Hours: 726,450. 

The following paragraph applies to all 

of the collections of information covered 

by this notice: 

An agency may not conduct or 

sponsor, and a person is not required to 

respond to, a collection of information 

unless the collection of information 

displays a valid OMB control number. 

Books or records relating to a collection 

of information must be retained as long 

as their contents may become material 

in the administration of any internal 

revenue law. Generally, tax returns and 

tax return information are confidential, 

as required by 26 U.S.C. 6103. 

Request for Comments: Comments 

submitted in response to this notice will 

be summarized and/or included in the 

request for OMB approval. Comments 

will be of public record. Comments are 

invited on: (a) Whether the collection of 

information is necessary for the proper 

performance of the functions of the 

agency, including whether the 

information has practical utility; (b) the 

accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the 

burden of the collection of information; 

(c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, 

and clarity of the information to be 

collected; (d) ways to minimize the 

burden of the collection of information 

on respondents, including the use of 

automated collection techniques or 

other forms of information technology; 

and (e) estimates of capital or start-up 

costs and costs of operation, 

maintenance, and purchase of services 

to provide information. 

Approved: February 23, 2015. 

Christie Preston, 

IRS Tax Analyst. 

[FR Doc. 2015–05660 Filed 3–12–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4830–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 

Office of Foreign Assets Control 

Sanctions Actions Pursuant to 

Executive Order 13224 

AGENCY: Office of Foreign Assets 

Control, Treasury. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: The Treasury Department’s 

Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) 

is removing the name of 1 individual 

and 8 entities, whose property and 

interests in property were blocked 

pursuant to E.O.13224, from the list of 

Specially Designated Nationals and 

Blocked Persons (SDN List). 

DATES: OFAC’s actions described in this 

notice were effective February 26, 2015. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Associate Director for Global Targeting, 

tel.: 202/622–2420, Assistant Director 

for Sanctions Compliance & Evaluation, 

tel.: 202/622–2490, Assistant Director 

for Licensing, tel.: 202/622–2480, Office 

of Foreign Assets Control, or Chief 

Counsel (Foreign Assets Control), tel.: 

202/622–2410, Office of the General 

Counsel, Department of the Treasury 

(not toll free numbers). 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Electronic and Facsimile Availability 

The SDN List and additional 

information concerning OFAC sanctions 

programs are available from OFAC’s 

Web site (www.treas.gov/ofac). Certain 

general information pertaining to 

OFAC’s sanctions programs is also 

available via facsimile through a 24- 

hour fax-on-demand service, tel.: 202/

622–0077. 

Notice of OFAC Actions 

On February 26, 2015, OFAC removed 

the following 1 individual and 8 entities 

from the SDN List. 

Individuals 

1. NADA, Youssef (a.k.a. NADA, 

Youssef M.; a.k.a. NADA, Youssef 

Mustafa), Via Per Arogno 32, 

Compione d’Italia CH–6911, 

Switzerland; Via Arogno 32, 

Compione d’Italia CH–6911, Italy; 

Via Riasc 4, Compione d’Italia CH– 

6911, Switzerland; DOB 17 May 

1931; alt. DOB 17 May 1937; POB 

Alexandria, Egypt; citizen Tunisia 

(individual) [SDGT]. 

Entities 

1. ASAT TRUST REG., Altenbach 8, 

Vaduz 9490, Liechtenstein [SDGT]. 

2. BA TAQWA FOR COMMERCE AND 

REAL ESTATE COMPANY 

LIMITED (n.k.a. HOCHBURG, AG), 

Vaduz, Liechtenstein; formerly c/o 

Asat Trust reg., Vaduz, 

Liechtenstein [SDGT]. 

3. BANK AL TAQWA LIMITED (a.k.a. 

AL TAQWA BANK; a.k.a. BANK 

AL TAQWA), P.O. Box N–4877, 

Nassau, Bahamas, The; c/o Arthur 

D. Hanna & Company, 10 Deveaux 

Street, Nassau, Bahamas, The 

[SDGT]. 

4. NADA INTERNATIONAL ANSTALT, 

Vaduz, Liechtenstein; formerly c/o 

Asat Trust reg., Vaduz, 

Liechtenstein [SDGT]. 

5. NADA MANAGEMENT 

ORGANIZATION SA (f.k.a. AL 

TAQWA MANAGEMENT 

ORGANIZATION SA), Viale 

Stefano Franscini 22, Lugano CH– 

6900 TI, Switzerland [SDGT]. 

6. WALDENBERG, AG (f.k.a. AL 

TAQWA TRADE, PROPERTY AND 

INDUSTRY; f.k.a. AL TAQWA 

TRADE, PROPERTY AND 

INDUSTRY COMPANY LIMITED; 

f.k.a. AL TAQWA TRADE, 

PROPERTY AND INDUSTRY 

ESTABLISHMENT; f.k.a. HIMMAT 

ESTABLISHMENT), c/o Asat Trust 

Reg., Altenbach 8, Vaduz 9490, 

Liechtenstein; Via Posero, 2, 

Compione d’Italia 22060, Italy 

[SDGT]. 

7. YOUSSEF M. NADA, Via Riasc 4, 

Campione d’Italia I CH–6911, 

Switzerland [SDGT]. 

8. YOUSSEF M. NADA & CO. 

GESELLSCHAFT M.B.H. (a.k.a. 

YOUSSEF M. NADA AND CO. 

GESELLSCHAFT M.B.H.), Kaernter 

Ring 2/2/5/22, Vienna 1010, Austria 

[SDGT]. 

All property and interests in property 

of the individual and entities that are in 

or hereafter come within the United 

States or the possession or control of 

United States persons are now 

unblocked. 

Dated: February 26, 2015. 

John E. Smith, 

Acting Director, Office of Foreign Assets 

Control. 

[FR Doc. 2015–05771 Filed 3–12–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4810–AL–P 

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