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USCIB: 13.5/74 

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ME:MJRANOOM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USOIB: 

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Gom'AIN 60BB\10R:B Mld'BR!kb 

29 June 1954 

Subject: Compromises of COMINT Information 

Reference: USCIB 13.5/67 dated 24 May 1954 

Attached for your information is a summary of eighteen cases 

evaluated by NSA as compromises of COMINT information. Sixteen 

of these compromises were due to ineffective communications 

security practices, one was due to removal of a COMINT document 

from COMINT channels, and one was due to a combination of the 

above causes. 

Enclosure - NSA Serial 000289-S 

dated 18 June 1954 

USCIB: 13.5/74 

H: ' JONES 

Deputy Executi e Secretary, USCIB 

1WPENBl!IB B008Ml!IN!S 

CON'fl\IN 66mMee MA'ffiRikL 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-12-2014 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 

TOP SECRET 

24 
!ef' SEeftB! 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 

MEM)RANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB 

SUBJECT: Compromises of COMINT Information 

Serial: 000289-S 

18 June 1954 

Reference: NSA l tr, Serial 000142-s, Subject: Reporting 

of Compromises of COMINT Information, dated 

25 Mar 54 

l. A summary of previously unreported compromises of 

COMINT information occurring before or during the first 

quarter of 1954 is inclosed for forwarding by you to the 

members of USCIB. 

2. Copies of the inclosure have been forwarded to 

SUSlD, London, for distribution to GCHQ authorities. 

FOR THE DIRECTOR: 

Al'l'~ OOC'tlME!f TB OON!tiff 

CO:DEweRB !!it'Hlai.U. 

(signed) 

L. H. FROST 

Captain, US Navy 

Chief of Staff 

TOP SECRET 
T~ REF ID:A59407 

SECR.ET FR8TH 

'fOF SEOREH' P:R:O'f'II 

CO:MPROHISES OF COMINT INFORHATION 

1. The following reports of compromises of COHINT informal:,ion 

cover the period between 9 November 1953 and 31 Harch 195/.i.. 

a. On 9 November 1953, a portion of a. message classified 

TOP SECRET CODE.JORD, was inadvertently transmitted in clear text over 

communications circuits composed of radio and wire links from the 

10th Radio Squadron Uobile, Chicksa.nds, Priory, England, to the 

6910th Security Group, Darmstadt, Germany. The subject violat.ion, if 

intercepted would compromise the TOP SECRET CODEWORD used wit.h communicat.ions intelligence material and result in the association of this 

codeword with Air Defense Technical Swmnaries. Also, it would 

compromise such technical information on one Russian case notation as; 

time on the air, frequency, and the actual case notation itself. 

b. On 27 November 1953, portions of three messages, one 

classified TOP SECRET CODEWORD and two clasoified SECRET COD:ID:iORD, 

were enciphered in depth and transmitted over conununications circuits 

composed of radio and wire links from the 3/+th Radio Squadron Mobile, 

Wheelus Air Force Base, Tripoli. The material compromised consisted 

entirely of raw traffic and if intercepted and read would indicate 

US abilit,y to intercept and ca.ta.log certain Russian transmissions. 

The association of the codeword ·with this type material is involved. 

c. On 9 December 1953, a portion of a message, classified 

TOP SECRET COD.Ei:JORD, was inadvertently transmitted in clear text over 

communications circuits composed of landline teletype links from the 

10th Radio Squadron Mobile, Chicksands, Priory, England, to the 37th 

Radio Squadron Mobile, Kirknewton, Scotland. The subject violat.ion 

if intercepted would result in the association of the codeword with 

the classification TOP SECRET. 

d. On 20 December 1953, a cormnunications security violation 

occurred at the 333rd Communications Reconnaissance Company, Nome 1 

Alaska. On that date two messae;es classified SECREI' CODE.JORD were 

inadvertently enciphered in depth, and transmitted over cornmunications 

~ircuits composed of radio and wire links vulnerable to interception. 

There is a good' probability that the messages can be read if the 

depths are located. The subject violation, if intercepted and 

deciphered 1 would indicate US interest in, and ability to intercept 

Russian transniissions. No association o:r the codeword with this type 

material is involved. 

'feF OE6RE'f 66lff'ReL ffiJMBElR 54-155$13 

COPY OF 53 COPIES 

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TeP SECREl1 FROTII 

NSA Form 781-CIOS I Jul 52 

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'!'913 S~' Flt0'£'II EO 3.3(h) (2) 

PL .86-36/50 USC 3605 

e. On 1January1954, two complete messa~es and.portiona 

of fifteen addiLional messae;os,, classified COr.JFID~Jl'IAL and. Sl!':CRET 

were enciphered in depth and l;ransmitted over corrununications circuits 

composed of radio and wire links from the 327l;h Connnunicat;ions 

lleconnaissance Group, Kyoto, Japan, t.o t.he Director, Hai~ional Security 

Agency. The subject violation if intercepted and read would divul&te 

L--~--~~~~~~~- I 

f. On Li January 195l1-, one messaee, classified,\ SECRET was 

inadvertently transmitt.ed in clea.r text over corrnnunications circuits 

composed of radio und landline links from The Army Security Agency 

Europe, Frankfur-t., Germany, to the United St.::i.tes Army Prirnary Relay 

Station, New Ostheim, Germany. In addjtion to the possibility of 

successful interceJl;ion the 1luin text information was viewed b 

at least 

g. On 11 Januar.r 1954, pert.ions of four messages, classified 

CONFIDENTIAL, were inadvertently enciphered in. depth and transinitted 

over conununications circuits composed of radio and wire links from 

the Na.val Communications Station, Walrl.awa., Oahu, T .H., to the D~ector, 

National Security Agency. The subject; violation consis·l:.ed of ra"\'T 

traffic throughou·t:. o.nd if intercepted and reacl., would result in the 

compromise of several 

h. On 21~ Jo.nuary 1954, portions of thirteen multiple address 

messages; two classified CONFIDENTIAL and eleven classified SECRET 

CODE:TORD, were enciphered in depth and transrrd_tted over communications 

circuits composed of radio and wire Jinks by the 37th Radio Squadron 

Mobile, Kirknewton Royal Air Force St;at;ion, Scotland. Association 

of the codeword with the :material compromised is involved. The subje.ct 

violation, if inl:,erce tcd and read would result in the substantial....__ 

com romise of the 

i. On 30 January 1954, a portion of a message, classified 

TOP SECRET CODEIIIORD, was inadvertently transmitted in clear text over 

landline circuits from the connnunications center, SSO, 3rd Air Force, 

South Ruislip, England, to the 10th Radio Squadron Eobile, Chicksands, 

Priory, England. Association of the codeword with the material compromised is involved. The subject violation provides a cross-section 

2 'l1QP ~EC~ Q9:N±'iil9L WUUB~ 54-155SB 

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TOP SECRE'f FRO±H 

NSA Form 781-ClOS 1 Jul 52 

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REF ID:A59407 

'TOl1 SECR:E'T FR8TII 

TQP S:U:Ci~ mQTfl E03.3(h)(2) 

PL 86 .. 36/50 USC 3605 

of US CO].ITNT success insofar as l::nowled e of 

j. On 1 February 195h, a portion or a messae;e., classified 

CONFIDEN'l'IAL, was inadvertently transm.:ttLed in clea.r te.xt. over 

communications circuits composed of radio and 1.rire links\from USN-39,, 

Kaml Soya, Japan to t.he United States Naval Radio Stat.ion.,, Guam, 

Harlana Islands. 'l'he subject violation if inlie::rcepted\ and. read,, 

would t.encl t.o indical;e US abililiy to intercept and ca.ta.log certain 

Hussian transmissions. 

k. On 4 I•'ebruary 195h, a port.ion or a message, classified 

CONFIDEN'L'IAL, was transmitted iu mono-alphabetic substit;ution. cipher 

over co11m1wtlcat.ions circuits composed of radio and wire links \from 

the 3rd Radio Squadron Hobile, Elmendorf Air Force Base, \Alaska., to 

The D::..rect.or, National Security Ar:,oncy. The subject v:i.ol.ation \consisted entirely of raw traffic and would tend to indicat.e US ability 

to intercept. and catalog ccrto.in Hussian transmissions. 

1. On lh February 195lb a portion of a message, classified 

SECllli'r CODi!:IVOlID, was inadvortent.J.y tre..nsmitted in clear text, over 

landline circuits from the JJlst. j::omrnunications Reconnaissance Group, 

Giessen, fXerma.ny, to the 502ncl Co'nummications H.econnaissance Group, 

Heilbrorm, Germany. AssociaLion of t.he codeword with this type 

material is not involved. 1110 mih ject y1 al atj on j f j nterce\ed wnld 

m~ On J.Li. February 1954, n. 1•ortio11 of three messages, two 

classified ':COP SECH.ET CODill:/OHD, and one class if lod SECRJt.;T CODE1tTORD, 

were enciphered in depth and transi.LLtl:.ed over connnwtlcations circuits 

composed of radio and wire linlcs from the 12th Radio l:iquadron Mobile, 

Landsbere, Germn.ny, to 'l'h~ Director, Nal:,ional Security Agency. 

Association of the codewords "\llt,h tho material compromised is not 

involved. The subject violn.t.ion, if intercept.ed and read, would 

indicate US ability to intercept. and catalog certain Russian tra.nsmissions. 

n. On 20 February 195l1, a portion of a message classifi..ed. 

SECRE'r CODE'110RD, was inadvert.ently transmitted in clear text over 

landline circuits from The Army 3ecurity Ae;ency, Austria, to the 

502nd Connnunications I?.oconnaissance Group, lieilbronn, Germany. 

Association of the codeword lrlth this type material is nol; involved. 

iolat.ion if interce ted uould reveal the abil:Lt of the 

'I'QP SI!lGHm' OOfff':RffiJ ~Ett 54-155l!B 

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±C>P SECRE'"f FRC>'"fll 

NSA Form 781-CJOS 1 Jul 52 

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'fOf Si!lCitt!l'f ffiO'i'H EO. 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-.36/50 USC 3605 

o. On 3 March 1954, two messages, classified SECHET 

CODE;lORD, were mistakenly transmitted in cl~.ci.r text over an Army 

Connnand and Administration Network by the 502nd.Connnunicutions 

Reconnaissance Group, Heilbronn, Germany. This pa.J'.'ticular circuit 

is composed. of German commercial landline links anda~such are 

vulnerable to interception. Association of the codewort:L.with this 

type material is involved. The subject violation would restilt in 

the substantial compromise of the 

the fact that collaboration be ween the US a e 

P• On 7 March 1954, a port.ion of a message, classified 

SECRET CODEJORD, was inadvertently transmitted in clear text over 

connnunicat.ions circuits composed of land.line links from the Army 

Security Agency Pacific, Tokyo, Japan, to the B612th Arnry Administrative Unit, Chitose, Japan. Association of the codeword with 

this type material is involved. The subject violation, if intercepted, would compromise the salient features of our case notation 

system. · 

q. On ll March 1954, a communications security violation 

occurred at the 696lst Communications Squadron, San Antonio, Texas. 

On that date, a portion of a message classified SECRET CODfil10H.D was 

inadvertently transmitted in clear text over a cormnunications circuit 

composed of radio and Wire links to the 69201:,h Security Group, 

Johnson AFB, Japan. Since the information was vulnerable to intercept, it is considered compromised. The subject violal;ion, if 

intercepted, would indicate US interest in, and ability to intercept 

Russian transmiss~ons. 

r. On 23 March 1954, a connnunications security violation 

occurred at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia. On that date, a 

message classified. TOP SECJ.U.'T COD11WORD was inadvert.ently accepted 

from the Air Force Security Service Office of Production for relay, 

and subsequently transmitted by the National Security Agency, 

Special ~leather Communications Center, Arlington Hall Station, to 

the U.S. Air Force \leather Control (Special Weather Intellieence 

Section), Washington, D. C. Consequently, ·t.he codeword and the 

associated information was viewed by four persons no-I:; authorized. 

access to TOP SECR~T CODEi.10RD information. Aside fr01n the compromise 

of the TOP SECRET CODEVORD, it is considered that the subjec·t. 

violation did not, however, result in any compromise of CO~lINT 

information. 

TQP e&Q~Eg? QG~P:PHGfi NUM336R 54-1558B 

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'FSP SEERET FR()TH 

NSA Form 781-ClOS 1 Jul 52 

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2. In each of the particular cases involved, the circuits over 

which the violation occurred are vulnerable to interception, consequently, successful interception must be presuraed and the information 

exposed considered compromised. 

3. Appropriate instructions have been issued in each of these 

cases to prevent a recurrence of violations of this type. 

~OP SEOHB'i' 00ff.FReD ?flJM:BE~ 54-1558B 

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'T{)P 8EGREt FR()tll 

NSA Form 781-ClOS 1 Jul 52 

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