REVISED January 12, 2011

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-10553

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee 

v.

SAADIQ IBN SHABAZZ, also known as Damion Ray Johnson,

Defendant - Appellant 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

Before KING, STEWART, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

KING, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Saadiq Ibn Shabazz challenges a sentence of 12

months’ imprisonment for violating the conditions of his supervised release.

Shabazz had previously served 24 months in prison for violating the conditions

of a prior term of supervised release for the same offense. He argues that he

could not be sentenced to any additional revocation imprisonment because 18

U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) caps the aggregate amount of revocation imprisonment for

his offense at two years’ imprisonment. We hold that § 3583(e)(3) does not

require aggregation of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of supervised

release and affirm the district court’s revocation sentence.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

January 6, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 10-10553

2

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 11, 2005, Saadiq Ibn Shabazz pleaded guilty to one count of

conspiracy to utter and possess counterfeit securities, which is a Class D felony.

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 3559(a)(4). Shabazz was sentenced to 21 months’

imprisonment and two years’ supervised release. Shabazz violated the

conditions of his first term of supervised release and it was revoked by the

district court. The district court sentenced Shabazz to 24 months’ imprisonment

and one year’s supervised release as a revocation sentence.

Shabazz violated the conditions of his second term of supervised release,

and it was again revoked by the district court. At the revocation hearing,

Shabazz argued that he could not be sentenced to any additional revocation

imprisonment, because 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) capped the aggregate amount of

revocation imprisonment at two years for a Class D felony. The district court

rejected this argument and sentenced Shabazz to 12 months’ imprisonment and

no supervised release as a revocation sentence. Shabazz timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo whether Shabazz received a sentence in excess of the

statutory maximum. See United States v. Vera, 542F.3d 457, 459 (5th Cir. 2008)

(quoting United States v. Sais, 227 F.3d 244, 246 (5th Cir. 2000)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Interpretation of § 3583(e)(3)

Under § 3583, a sentencing court may impose a term of supervised release

following the defendant’s imprisonment as part of the sentence. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(a). If a district court later finds by a preponderance of the evidence that

a defendant has violated a condition of supervised release, that court may 

revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to

serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release

authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of

supervised release without credit for time previously served on
No. 10-10553

1

In United States v. Hampton, No. 10-10035 (5th Cir. Jan. 6, 2011), we decided a

similar issue: whether the language at the beginning of § 3583(e)(3) allowing the district court

to sentence a defendant to “all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute

for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release” caps the aggregate amount of

revocation imprisonment at the amount of supervised release authorized for the offense by

§ 3583(b). We concluded, as we do here, that § 3583(e)(3) does not impose any limit on the

aggregate amount of revocation imprisonment. Id., slip op. at 6. We did not address the issue

posed in this case in Hampton because the defendant in Hampton conceded that the language

at the end of § 3583(e)(3) did not act as an aggregate limit on the amount of revocation

imprisonment. See id. at 5–6.

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postrelease supervision . . . except that a defendant whose term is

revoked under this paragraph may not be required to serve on any

such revocation more than 5 years in prison if the offense that

resulted in the term of supervised release is a class A felony, more

than 3 years in prison if such offense is a class B felony, more than

2 years in prison if such offense is a class C or D felony, or more

than one year in any other case . . . .

§ 3583(e)(3). In addition to revoking the defendant’s supervised release and

imprisoning the defendant, the district court

may include a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term

of supervised release after imprisonment. The length of such a term

of supervised release shall not exceed the term of supervised release

authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the original

term of supervised release, less any term of imprisonment that was

imposed upon revocation of supervised release.

§ 3583(h).

According to Shabazz, the word “any” in the phrase “on any such

revocation” refers to all revocations of supervised release, and thus imposes an

aggregate cap on the amount of revocation imprisonment a defendant can

receive. We disagree and conclude that this language limits only the amount of

revocation imprisonment the revoking court may impose each time it revokes a

defendant’s supervised release.1

When interpreting a statute, we are bound to “follow the plain and

unambiguous meaning of the statutory language.” United States v. Kay, 359

F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
No. 10-10553

4

Terms not defined in the statute itself should be given their “ordinary and

natural meaning” and should be interpreted according to the “overall policies

and objectives of the statute.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

Shabazz argues that his reading of the phrase “on any such revocation” is

proper because the word “any” may mean “all” when “any” refers to a quantity.

See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, 53 (10th ed. 2002). In

its statutory context, however, the word “any” plainly does not refer to the

quantity of revocation imprisonment, but rather refers to the act of revoking

supervised release. The inclusion of the word “such” after “any” demonstrates

that the language at the end of § 3583(e)(3) refers to an individual revocation.

Therefore, the ordinary meaning of the phrase “on any such revocation” at the

end of § 3583(e)(3) refers to each discrete revocation of supervised release, not

to the aggregate amount of the defendant’s revocation imprisonment.

Nevertheless, Shabazz argues that this court’s prior opinion in Vera

requires us to read the phrase “on any such revocation” atthe end of § 3583(e)(3)

as a reference to all prior terms of revocation imprisonment. Vera held that

“under § 3583(h) the maximum allowable supervised release following multiple

revocations must be reduced by the aggregate length of any terms of

imprisonment that have been imposed upon revocation.” 542 F.3d at 462

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The Vera court interpreted the

word “any” in the phrase “less any term of imprisonmentthat was imposed upon

revocation of supervised release” in § 3583(h) as referring to all terms of

imprisonment imposed upon revocation of supervised release. Id. at 460–61. In

doing so, however, the Vera court explicitly distinguished the phrase “less any

term of imprisonment” in § 3583(h) from the phrase “on any such revocation” at

the end of § 3583(e)(3). Id. at 462 n.2. This distinction between the phrases is

intuitive because the phrase “less any term of imprisonment” involves a
No. 10-10553

2 Our conclusion today that the phrase “on any such revocation” does not cap the

aggregate amount of revocation imprisonment is, likewise, in tune with all other circuits to

have considered the issue. See United States v. Epstein, 620 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2010) (per

curiam); United States v. Knight, 580 F.3d 933, 937–38 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lewis,

519 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 987, 989 (11th Cir.

2005) (per curiam); United States v. Tapia-Escalera, 356 F.3d 181, 188 (1st Cir. 2004).

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quantity—time served in prison—whereas the phrase “on any such revocation”

refers to an action by the district court. Therefore, we conclude that Vera’s

interpretation of the phrase “any term of imprisonment” in § 3583(h) buttresses

our interpretation of the “on any such revocation” language at the end of

§ 3583(e)(3).

The amendment history of § 3583(e)(3) also supports our reading of the

phrase “on any such revocation.” Prior to 2003, § 3583(e)(3) stated that a

defendant “may not be required to serve more than” an enumerated number of

years in prison based on the class of the underlying offense. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(e)(3) (2000). We interpreted this language as imposing an aggregate cap

on the amount of revocation imprisonment, noting that all other circuits to have

considered the issue, atthattime, concurred. United States v. Jackson, 329 F.3d

406, 407 (5th Cir. 2003).2

Congress amended the statute in 2003, so that § 3583(e)(3) now provides

that a defendant “may not be required to serve on any such revocation more

than” the relevant term of imprisonment for the underlying felony. PROTECT

Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 101(1), 117 Stat. 650, 651 (2003) (amendment

italicized). The PROTECT Act made no other changes to § 3583(e)(3). Shabazz

would have us read the addition of this language as purely decorative. If

Congress had intended for courts to continue reading the language at the end of

§ 3583(e)(3) as an aggregate limit on revocation imprisonment it would have left

this portion of § 3583(e)(3) unaltered. Cf. Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486

U.S. 174, 184–85 (1988) (“We generally presume that Congress is knowledgeable
No. 10-10553

3 Shabazz also argues that our reading of § 3583(e)(3) unconstitutionally allows a

revoking courtto punish a defendant with additional imprisonmentfor violating the conditions

of supervised release without the benefit of a trial and that our reading is contrary to the rule

of lenity. We addressed and rejected these precise arguments in Hampton, slip op. at 11–13.

Therefore, we do not address them here.

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about existing law pertinent to the legislation it enacts.”). Therefore, we reject

Shabazz’s reading of § 3583(e)(3) as contrary to the amendment history of that

subsection.3

B. Shabazz’s Sentence

Turning to Shabazz’s revocation sentence, we conclude that the district

court’s revocation sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment was proper. Shabazz

committed a Class D felony. Section 3583(e)(3) authorizes the district court to

impose up to two years’ revocation imprisonment for violating the conditions of

supervised release for such a felony.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court revoking

Shabazz’s supervised release and sentencing him to 12 months’ imprisonment

is AFFIRMED.