In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 02-1919

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RAY CHARLES JACKSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

 Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 01 CR 476—Charles P. Kocoras, Chief Judge.

____________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 1, 2002—DECIDED NOVEMBER 13, 2002

____________

Before BAUER, POSNER, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit

Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Ray Charles Jackson does

not believe in following laws, rules—or orders. Convicted in

1979 of selling forbidden drugs, he was sentenced to 15

years’ imprisonment plus 25 years’ special parole. This

sentence, for a crime preceding the Sentencing Reform Act

of 1984, carried the option of regular parole too, and the

Parole Commission released Jackson in 1983. He did not

stay out long, because he failed to report to his probation

officer, failed to cooperate in drug testing, and otherwise

scorned the conditions of his freedom. A cycle of release,
2 No. 02-1919

transgression, revocation, reimprisonment, and re-release

was repeated six times between 1983 and 2000. In March

2000 the Parole Commission issued a warrant to start the

process of revoking Jackson’s parole a seventh time. The

Marshal Service was responsible for executing the warrant.

Five deputy marshals went to Jackson’s last known address. On learning that he was not there, they decided to

wait. Jackson soon arrived, but he tried to flee when he

learned that he would be taken into custody. A short auto

chase ensued, with Jackson (pursued by vehicles with lights

flashing and sirens blaring) running stop signs and red

lights but returning to his starting point, where he was

trapped by other cars. Jackson emerged from his car

screaming obscenities at the deputy marshals. Told to put

his hands over his head, he thrust them into his pockets

instead. That was a threatening move, for the officers could

not know what he might bring out. Jackson removed his car

keys, and, again defying orders, plunged one hand back into

his pocket. At this point the agents tackled him, so that he

could not use whatever was there. (As it turned out, the

pocket contained two knives.) One deputy marshal applied

a sweep kick to force Jackson face down on the ground.

Others piled on top of Jackson, who squirmed and twisted

as hard as he could in an effort to roll under the car.

Resistance was futile but did have one effect: Randy Scott,

who tried to handcuff Jackson’s hands behind his back, tore

a ligament in his right thumb during the struggle. This

required surgical repair. In response to Jackson’s effort to

impede the deputy marshals, the Parole Commission set a

longer-than-normal wait until his next release, and the

United States filed charges under 18 U.S.C. §111, which

makes it a crime forcibly to resist a federal officer. Following conviction in a jury trial, Jackson was sentenced to 58

months’ imprisonment.

According to Jackson, the evidence does not support the

judgment. Jackson denies that he violated §111(a)(1), which
No. 02-1919 3

makes it a crime forcibly to resist, impede, or interfere with

a federal law-enforcement officer. He believes that the evidence did not permit the jury to find that he acted “forcibly.” That argument is frivolous; violation of §111(a)(1) has

been established. But the maximum penalty under §111(a)

is only 36 months’ imprisonment. The higher sentence that

Jackson received depends on §111(b), which provides:

Whoever, in the commission of any acts described

in subsection (a), uses a deadly or dangerous weapon (including a weapon intended to cause death or

danger but that fails to do so by reason of a defective component) or inflicts bodily injury, shall be

fined under this title or imprisoned not more than

ten years, or both.

Jackson insists that he did not “inflict” injury on Scott and

that the verdict with respect to §111(b) is defective because

the jury was not told that intent to injure is essential.

The latter argument runs smack into United States v.

Woody, 55 F.3d 1257, 1265-67 (7th Cir. 1995), which holds

that §111(b) does not require proof of intent to injure.

Woody understood United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671

(1975), which held that the defendant need not know that

the person being impeded is a federal (as opposed to state)

officer, to establish the proposition that the only mentalstate element in §111 is that the defendant intend to resist,

impede, or obstruct a law-enforcement officer. Jackson

asks us to overrule Woody on the ground that it preceded

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Woody took

§111(b) as a sentencing factor to be applied by the judge,

while after Apprendi the circumstances that permit the

higher penalty must be ascertained by the jury beyond a

reasonable doubt. True enough, but what has this to do

with scienter? Apprendi affects the who of decisionmaking

(the choice between judge and jury) and the burden of persuasion (preponderance versus reasonable doubt) but does
4 No. 02-1919

not change what must be established to support a higher

punishment. See Curtis v. United States, 294 F.3d 841, 843

(7th Cir. 2002) (“Apprendi does not alter which facts have

what legal significance”). And there is nothing to be said for

Jackson’s position as an original matter. Section 111(b)

raises the maximum punishment when a bad consequence

ensues; this language does not state or suggest any mental

element beyond what is required by §111(a). Jackson’s

lawyer conceded at oral argument that if during the auto

chase Jackson’s car had collided with one of the pursuers

and left a deputy marshal confined to a wheelchair for life,

then punishment could be enhanced under §111(b) even if

Jackson’s goal had been to avoid a crash (and thus enhance

the chance of his escape). That settles the principle. It is a

detail that deputy marshal Scott suffered a lesser injury, or

that the force causing the injury came from a skirmish

rather than a chase.

As for the question whether Jackson “inflicted” an injury

on Scott: the jury was entitled to conclude that he did.

Jackson contends that the word “inflict” means a deliberate

plan to produce a consequence, and that an accidental harm

is “caused” but not “inflicted.” Sensible jurors could have

concluded that Jackson did want to harm the deputy

marshals. Escape was impossible once the officers’ cars

blocked Jackson’s. What could have been the point of this

skirmish other than a desire to hurt the captors? Jackson

could not have foreseen the particular injury that occurred,

but he could have foreseen (and may well have desired) that

some harm would come to the deputy marshals. But there

is a deeper problem: “inflict” does not require mentation.

See United States v. Garcia-Camacho, 122 F.3d 1265, 1269

(9th Cir. 1997). Common phrases such as “the hurricane

inflicted $100 million in damage” attest to this. Hurricanes,

earthquakes, and other natural processes do not have

minds, but they inflict big losses. Likewise Jackson inflicted

Scott’s injury no matter what was in Jackson’s mind.
No. 02-1919 5

Doubtless “inflict” is more restrictive than “cause”; if

Jackson had not resisted, but Scott had tripped on his untied shoelaces while walking over to apply handcuffs, it

would not make sense to say that Jackson had “inflicted” an

injury. But the actual injury occurred while Scott was

grappling with Jackson, who applied force directly to Scott’s

person. This satisfies the normal understanding of “inflict.”

AFFIRMED

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—11-13-02