SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3913-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CHRISTOPHER M. KRAFSKY,

a/k/a CHRISTOPH KRAFSKY,

and C-MONEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________

Submitted May 5, 2021 – Decided May 25, 2021

Before Judges Fuentes and Firko.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Somerset County, Indictment No. 14-11-

0769.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Brian D. Driscoll, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief).

Michael H. Robertson, Somerset County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Lauren E. Bland, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3913-19

Defendant Christopher M. Krafsky appeals from a December 20, 2019 

order of the Criminal Part denying his post-conviction relief (PCR) petition

without conducting an evidentiary hearing. We affirm substantially for the 

reasons expressed by Judge Anthony F. Picheca, Jr., in his comprehensive 

written decision that accompanied the order under review.

I.

On November 20, 2014, a Somerset County grand jury returned an 

indictment against defendant charging him with strict liability for drug induced 

death, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a) and 2C:35-9(a) (count one); and third-degree 

distribution of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) 

and 2C:35-5(b)(3) (count two). A jury found defendant guilty on count one and 

count two was dismissed. On January 11, 2016, defendant pled guilty to 

violations of probation for third-degree distribution of CDS. On February 5, 

2016, defendant was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment subject to the No 

Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. We affirmed defendant's 

conviction and sentence on direct appeal, State v. Christopher Krafsky, No. A2961-51 (App. Div. Mar. 20, 2018), and the Supreme Court denied his petition 

for certification, 235 N.J. 353 (2018).
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These are the facts that led the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, 

that defendant was strictly liable for the drug induced death of Richard Johnson. 

Johnson died from a heroin overdose in the basement of his mother's home the 

night of December 23, 2013. His parents were divorced and living separately

and apart. She discovered his body at 5:00 a.m. when she awoke and notified 

the police. The investigating officer, Robert Meszaros, found Johnson had 

communicated by text with an individual named "MAT" the night before, and 

defendant was the service subscriber for MAT's number. Sprint phone records 

identified defendant having a P.O. box address in Irvine, California. Because 

the cellular phone referenced a 908 area code, the officer was able to track 

defendant down through the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Agency and locate him 

in Bridgewater.

Meszaros testified that he arranged a meeting with defendant in a 

shopping mall. Defendant admitted to the officer that on December 23, 2013, 

he had sold Johnson $50 worth of heroin, which defendant obtained from "Toot." 

After Meszaros tried to take defendant to the patrol car to record a statement, he 

invoked his right to remain silent. At trial, defendant testified that both he and 

Johnson together went to see Toot, who sold heroin to each of them on that date. 
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Johnson's father testified that on the night of December 23, at about 11:00 

p.m., he took his son to see another man and a quick exchange occurred between 

the two men on the street. Thereafter, the father took his son back to his mother's 

house. The father was too far away to identify the other man.

On December 10, 2018, defendant filed this pro se PCR petition alleging 

ineffective assistance of his defense counsel. The court assigned counsel to 

represent defendant in the prosecution of his PCR petition. PCR counsel 

submitted an amended PCR petition in which he claimed trial counsel was 

ineffective "for not conducting any investigation whatsoever pre-trial through 

trial and sentencing,"1 failing to procure Johnson's phone records, and failing to 

move for a mistrial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant 

sought to vacate his conviction and sentence. Alternatively, defendant requested 

an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised.

On October 22, 2019, oral argument was heard on defendant's PCR 

petition. Judge Picheca rejected defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel. In his December 20, 2019 written statement of reasons pursuant 

to Rule 1:6-2(f), the PCR judge held that defendant did not present a prima facie 

1

 PCR counsel's brief is not included in the appendix.
5 A-3913-19

case of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to obtain additional phone 

records. Judge Picheca elaborated:

Here, [defendant] was required to assert the facts 

that an investigation would have revealed, supported by 

affidavits or certifications based upon the personal 

knowledge of the affiant or the person making the 

certification. [State v.] Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 

154[,] 170 [(App. Div. 1999)]. First, [defendant] failed 

to support his claims by either an affidavit or 

certification as required under Cummings. Ibid. 

[Defendant] asserts the victim could have made 

multiple purchases that evening to satisfy his drug 

addiction; however, there is no proof of this and there 

is no guarantee this would be found within his text 

message records. [Defendant] failed to present any 

evidence of what those possible text messages would 

have shown; in essence, he presents only bald 

assertions that additional investigations would have 

revealed exculpatory information. [Ibid.]

Additionally, this [c]ourt believes trial counsel's 

failure to investigate for more text messages was used 

against the State and is considered to be trial strategy. 

[Defendant] argues the messages without further 

context were devastating, and that counsel should have 

known better to retrieve those messages. Counsel, 

however, referred to the lack of messages in the 

summations and even said, "[w]e don't have any other 

texts." . . . Because this was used against the State, this 

[c]ourt concludes it was a strategic decision.

Under the second prong of Strickland, there is not 

a reasonable probability the results of the proceedings 

would have been different had other text messages, if 

any at all, been recovered during investigation. 

[Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984).] 
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Nothing is offered to suggest they may have directly 

negated [defendant's] guilt. In fact, it is possible 

additional text messages could have been even more 

inculpatory.

Judge Picheca also addressed and rejected the balance of defendant's 

arguments attacking defense counsel's performance at trial and declining to 

object or seek a mistrial after closing arguments. Defendant's request for an 

evidentiary hearing was denied.

Against this record, defendant raises the following arguments in this 

appeal:

POINT I

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING TRIAL 

COUNSEL NOT INEFFECTIVE IN HIS FAILURE 

TO INVESTIGATE THE PHONE RECORDS.

POINT II

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 

FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR'S 

SUMMATION DID NOT PREJUDICE DEFENDANT.

POINT III

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT TRIAL 

COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING 

TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS THE TESTIMONY AND 

REPORT ON THE QUESTIONING OF 

DEFENDANT.
7 A-3913-19

POINT IV

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 

CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE DID NOT 

PREJUDICE DEFENDANT AND WOULD NOT 

HAVE CHANGED THE RESULT OF THE TRIAL.

II.

As our Supreme Court has reaffirmed, "[t]o prevail on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must . . . show both: (1) that 

counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficient performance 

prejudiced the outcome." State v. Pierre-Louis, 216 N.J. 577, 579 (2014) (citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987)).

We have considered defendant's arguments raised in this appeal in view 

of the record, the applicable legal principles, and our deferential standards of 

review, and conclude his contentions lack sufficient merit to warrant further 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We discern no legal basis to 

disturb Judge Picheca's factual findings in his written statement of reasons 

pursuant to Rule 1:6-2(f) attached to his December 20, 2019 order. Based on 

these findings, we reject defendant's arguments and affirm substantially for the 

reasons expressed by Judge Picheca. Under these circumstances, defendant was 

not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 461 

(1992); see also R. 3:22-10.
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Affirmed.