SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4030-16T1

ARTHUR RICHARDSON, 

Appellant,

v. 

NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD, 

Respondent. 

________________________________________ 

Submitted May 30, 2018 – Decided 

Before Judges Carroll and Mawla.

On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole 

Board.

Arthur Richardson, appellant pro se.

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney 

for respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer, 

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Erica 

R. Heyer, Deputy Attorney General, on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant Arthur Richardson appeals from the April 19, 2017 

final agency decision of the New Jersey State Parole Board (Board) 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

June 18, 2018
2 A-4030-16T1

denying him parole and imposing a ninety-six-month future 

eligibility term (FET). We affirm. 

In January 1987, a jury convicted appellant of murder and 

unlawful possession of a weapon. On March 27, 1987, appellant was 

sentenced to life imprisonment with a thirty-year mandatory 

minimum period of parole ineligibility. 

Appellant became eligible for parole for the first time on 

June 22, 2016. However, a two-member panel of the Board denied 

him parole and referred his case to a three-member panel (panel) 

to establish an FET. The panel determined a ninety-six-month FET 

was appropriate. 

In a comprehensive decision, the panel noted: (1) the serious 

nature of the murder offense; (2) appellant has a prior criminal 

record that is both extensive and repetitive; (3) the nature of 

appellant's criminal record was increasingly more serious; (4) 

prior opportunities on probation and parole and previous 

incarceration failed to deter his criminal conduct; (5) on January 

29, 2009, during his incarceration for the subject offenses, 

appellant committed a disciplinary infraction resulting in 

sanctions; (6) insufficient problem resolution, including 

appellant's lack of insight into his criminal behavior, minimizing 

his maladaptive behavior, and his inability to "communicate any 

understanding or change in his criminal thinking and lack of 
3 A-4030-16T1

emotional control;" and (6) his risk assessment evaluation score 

of twenty two, which denotes a medium risk of recidivism. 

As mitigating factors, the panel noted: (1) appellant's 

participation in institutional programs; (2) institutional reports 

reflected favorable institutional adjustment; (3) appellant 

attempted to enroll and participate in programs but was not 

admitted; and (4) appellant had achieved/maintained minimum 

custody status. 

After considering the applicable factors in N.J.A.C. 10A:71-

3.11(b), the panel determined a substantial likelihood existed 

that appellant would commit a new crime if released on parole, and 

that a FET of ninety-six months was appropriate. Because 

appellant's present offenses were committed prior to August 19, 

1997, the panel observed the ninety-six month FET, which commenced 

on June 22, 2016, will be reduced by any commutation, work, or 

minimum custody credits appellant earns. Accordingly, appellant's 

projected parole eligibility date is January 2021. 

 Appellant filed an appeal with the full Board. On April 19, 

2017, the Board upheld the recommendation to deny parole and to 

impose a ninety-six-month FET. This appeal ensued. 

 On appeal, appellant argues, among other things: the Board 

acted unreasonably in denying his parole request and imposing a 

ninety-six-month FET; because he has a murder conviction, the 
4 A-4030-16T1

decision to deny parole or impose an extended FET should have been 

made by the full Board, rather than two and three-member panels; 

and the Board failed to consider various programs appellant 

completed in its parole deliberations. 

We have considered these contentions in light of the record 

and applicable legal principles and conclude they are without 

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(D). We affirm substantially for the reasons 

expressed in the Board's comprehensive written decision. We add 

only the following brief comments.

We must accord considerable deference to the Board and its 

expertise in parole matters. Our review of a Parole Board's 

decision is limited. Hare v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 368 N.J. 

Super. 175, 179 (App. Div. 2004). "'Parole Board decisions are 

highly individualized discretionary appraisals,' and should only 

be reversed if found to be arbitrary or capricious." Id. at 179-

80 (citations omitted) (quoting Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 

166 N.J. 113, 173 (2001) (Trantino VI)). We "must determine 

whether the factual finding could reasonably have been reached on 

sufficient credible evidence in the whole record." Id. at 179 

(citing Trantino VI, 166 N.J. at 172). In making this 

determination, we "may not substitute [our] judgment for that of 

the agency, and an agency's exercise of its statutorily-delegated 
5 A-4030-16T1

responsibilities is accorded a strong presumption of 

reasonableness." McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 

544, 563 (App. Div. 2002) (citation omitted). Accordingly, "[t]he 

burden of showing that an action was arbitrary, unreasonable or 

capricious rests upon the appellant." Ibid. 

Where, as here, the crime for which an inmate is incarcerated 

occurred before August 19, 1997, "the Board panel shall determine 

whether . . . by a preponderance of the evidence . . . there is a 

substantial likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime under 

the laws of the State of New Jersey if released on parole." 

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.10(a). Thus, when an inmate becomes eligible 

for parole, there is a "presumption in favor of parole," In re 

Trantino, 89 N.J. 347, 356 (1982) (Trantino II), and the burden 

is on "the State to prove that the prisoner is a recidivist and 

should not be released." Trantino VI, 166 N.J. at 197 (quoting 

N.J. State Parole Bd. v. Byrne, 93 N.J. 192, 205 (1983)). This 

is a "highly predictive" determination, Thompson v. N.J. State 

Parole Bd., 210 N.J. Super. 107, 115 (App. Div. 1986) (quoting 

Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 359 (1973)), 

which must take into account "the aggregate of all of the factors 

which may have any pertinence." Beckworth, 62 N.J. at 360.

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b)(1) to (23) contains a non-exhaustive 

list of factors that the Board may consider in determining whether 
6 A-4030-16T1

an inmate should be released on parole. Among the pertinent 

factors are "[s]tatements by the inmate reflecting on the 

likelihood that he or she will commit another crime; the failure 

to cooperate in his or her own rehabilitation; or the reasonable 

expectation that he or she will violate conditions of parole[]" 

as well as "any other factors deemed relevant[.]" N.J.A.C. 10A:71-

3.11(b)(17). "[T]he Board [must] focus its attention squarely on 

the likelihood of recidivism." McGowan, 347 N.J. Super. at 565. 

 An inmate serving a minimum term in excess of fourteen years 

is ordinarily assigned a twenty-seven-month FET after a denial of 

parole. See N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(a)(1). However, in cases where 

an ordinary FET is "clearly inappropriate due to the inmate's lack 

of satisfactory progress in reducing the likelihood of future 

criminal behavior[,]" the Board may impose a greater FET. N.J.A.C. 

10A:71-3.21(d). 

 Here, we discern no basis to disturb the Board's decision. 

The Board considered the relevant factors in N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11. 

Its decision is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the 

record and is entitled to our deference. Contrary to appellant's 

contention, there is no evidence the panel or the Board failed to 

consider his completed programs or other appropriate mitigating 

factors in their parole deliberations. 
7 A-4030-16T1

 As noted, because appellant's offense was committed in 1986,

pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.10(a), the proper standard is that 

an inmate shall be released on parole unless, "by a preponderance 

of the evidence . . . there is a substantial likelihood that the 

inmate will commit a crime under the laws of the State of New 

Jersey if released on parole." The Board correctly applied that 

standard here. 

 Finally, appellant's contention that his case should have 

been heard by the full Board rather than a two or three member 

panel because only the full Board has the authority to grant parole 

is without merit. As the Board explained in its April 19, 2017 

decision, N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.18(c) does not permit a Board panel 

to certify release in the case of an offender serving a term of 

imprisonment for murder. Rather, if the panel determines release 

is appropriate, the matter is automatically referred to the full 

Board for a hearing. Ibid. Here, as the Board correctly noted, 

the two-member panel did not recommend appellant's release. 

Rather, it determined parole was not appropriate and consequently 

it referred the matter to the three-member panel to impose an 

extended FET. 

 In sum, we are satisfied the decision to deny parole and 

impose a ninety-six-month FET was neither arbitrary, capricious 

nor unreasonable. See McGowan, 347 N.J. Super. at 565 (affirming 
8 A-4030-16T1

the imposition of a thirty-year FET based on appellant's high 

likelihood of recidivism). 

Affirmed.