Filed 1/17/23 In re P.V. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re P.V., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

2d Juv. No. B319622

(Super. Ct. No. 2021020959)

(Ventura County)

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

P.V.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

P.V. appeals the juvenile court’s order sustaining a 

wardship petition after finding that she aided and abetted the 

crime of arson. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602; Pen. Code, § 451, subd. 

(c).)1 Appellant contends there is insufficient evidence to support 

the juvenile court’s true finding because she lacked the requisite 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 

unless otherwise indicated.
2

intent to aid and abet and took no affirmative action to assist her

friend in starting the fire. We affirm. 

Factual and Procedural Background

In July 2021, during the early morning hours between 1:00 

a.m. and 2:00 a.m., appellant, who was 15 years old at the time, 

engaged in a series of destructive acts together with her friend,

E.S., including setting fire to an elementary school that destroyed 

three classrooms and caused over $1 million dollars-worth of

damage. Appellant memorialized her actions that night by 

recording several videos and uploading them to her Snapchat 

account under the caption, “‘It be like that.’” 

For example, appellant recorded a video of herself and E.S.

hanging out at a local middle school near E.S.’s house, drinking

Malibu Rum with a filter that showed the girls with devil horns 

on their heads. Appellant also recorded a video of herself and 

E.S. breaking into an elementary school by throwing large rocks 

through the classroom window. After the girls entered the 

classroom, appellant set her phone up to automatically record as

they destroyed equipment, knocked over a filing cabinet and 

threw paper around the room. Appellant also dumped hand 

sanitizer on the countertops and threw the fire extinguisher 

outside the door of the classroom.

Shortly thereafter, appellant recorded and posted a video of 

E.S. holding an American flag and lighting it on fire as pieces of 

the burning flag fell to the floor igniting the paper that appellant 

had earlier thrown about the classroom. Appellant then took 

“selfie” videos that showed the girls smiling and dancing to music 

as the piles of debris burned on the classroom floor. Appellant 

also recorded and posted an image of the moon, followed by a 
3

video clip of the elementary school engulfed in flames that she

had taken from E.S.’s backyard. 

A fellow student who saw the videos and recognized 

appellant and E.S. reported them to school officials. The student

also provided officials with a copy of the Snapchat videos that she 

had recorded from her cell phone. 

During an interview with the Director of Student Support 

Services for Ventura Unified School District, appellant initially 

denied knowing why she was there, but eventually admitted that 

she and E.S. had broken into the classroom and vandalized it. 

Appellant claimed it was E.S. who started the fire when 

appellant had her back turned. Appellant provided the director 

with a written statement and was later arrested.

In August 2021, a petition was filed against appellant

alleging she committed felony arson of a structure (§ 451, subd. 

(c), count 1), felony burglary with the intent to commit larceny (§ 

459, count 2), and felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(1), count 3). 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) 

During the contested hearing, appellant testified that she 

had only met E.S. the day before, and although she knew that 

E.S. had vandalized the elementary school on a prior occasion, 

appellant claimed she had no knowledge that E.S. intended to 

vandalize the school or start a fire in the classroom that night. 

Appellant testified that she only discovered E.S. had a lighter 

after she used it to light a cigarette while they were at the middle 

school. 

According to appellant, she just wanted to hang out, listen 

to music, and make videos. Appellant testified that she and E.S.

decided to walk over to the elementary school to find the 

playground, but appellant was soon cold and wanted to warm up. 
4

E.S. tried to open the classroom doors, but they were locked, so 

the girls took turns throwing rocks at a classroom window until it 

broke. After appellant kicked the broken window in, E.S. climbed 

inside and let appellant in through the classroom door. 

Appellant testified that after they had been inside the 

classroom for approximately 10 minutes, she and E.S. began 

“destructing” things, throwing papers around the room, and 

dancing. Appellant claimed she threw the fire extinguisher out of 

the classroom because it was “just another thing to throw.” 

Although she claimed she was surprised when she discovered 

that E.S. had started the fire, she acknowledged that she took no 

action to stop E.S. or to call for help, even after the fire grew out 

of control. 

After the hearing, the juvenile court found true each of the 

allegations, declared appellant a ward of the court, and ordered 

that she be committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice. 

Discussion

Appellant only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting the juvenile court’s true finding that she aided and 

abetted the crime of arson of a structure in count 1. 

Standard of Review

When a minor challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting the juvenile court’s true finding of the criminal 

allegations contained in a Welfare and Institutions Code section 

602 petition, we apply the same standard of review that applies 

in adult criminal cases where a defendant challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence. (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 

1026.) We review the entire record in the light most favorable to 

the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial 

evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that 
5

a reasonable trier of fact could find appellant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. (Ibid.; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557,

576-578.) 

We presume in support of the judgment the existence of 

every fact the trier of fact could reasonably have deduced from 

the evidence. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of 

fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the 

circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a 

contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. (In 

re V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1026.) We resolve neither 

credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. (People v. Manibusan

(2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.)

Sufficient Evidence of Aiding and Abetting Arson

“A person is guilty of arson when he or she willfully and 

maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or who 

aids, counsels, or procures the burning of, any structure . . . or 

property.” (§ 451.) “All persons concerned in the commission of a 

crime . . . whether they directly commit the act constituting the 

offense, or aid and abet in its commission . . . are principals in 

any crime so committed. (§ 31.) A person aids and abets the 

commission of a crime when he or she, “acting with (1) knowledge 

of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or 

purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the 

commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, 

encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.” (People v. 

Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560-561.) 

“Among the factors which may be considered in making the 

determination of aiding and abetting are: presence at the scene of 

the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the 

offense. [Citations.] In addition, flight is one of the factors which
6

is relevant in determining consciousness of guilt. [Citation.]” (In 

re Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094-1095.) “Whether a 

person has aided and abetted in the commission of a crime 

ordinarily is a question of fact. [Citations.] Consequently, ‘“all 

intendments are in favor of the judgment and a verdict will not 

be set aside unless the record clearly shows that upon no 

hypothesis whatsoever is there sufficient substantial evidence to 

support it.”’” (Id. at p. 1094.) 

Here, appellant acknowledges that she vandalized the 

classroom with E.S. and was present when E.S. started the fire. 

However, appellant contends there is insufficient evidence that 

she knew of E.S.’s intent to start the fire, that she intended to 

assist E.S. in starting the fire, or that she took affirmative action 

to assist E.S. in starting the fire. 

But appellant’s contentions are not supported by the 

record. As the juvenile court observed, appellant’s actions that 

night cannot be viewed “independently in a vacuum.” For 

example, the videos showed appellant and E.S. engaging in a 

series of destructive behaviors together in which both girls 

danced and enjoyed themselves as they intentionally destroyed 

property and threw papers around the classroom before E.S. 

started the fire. 

Appellant also intentionally threw the fire extinguisher out 

of the classroom. Shortly thereafter, she recorded E.S. lighting 

the American flag on fire with the lighter and continued to record

as embers dropped to the floor littered with paper. The juvenile 

court emphasized that appellant knew the paper was there, and 

appellant testified that she knew it was combustible, yet she 

continued to take “selfies” with E.S. and make videos of the fire 

as it grew from only inches to approximately four feet in height.
7

As the juvenile court observed, the circumstantial evidence of 

appellant’s aiding and abetting liability is “strong.” We agree. 

The general rule is that “neither presence at the scene of a 

crime nor knowledge of, but failure to prevent it, is sufficient to 

establish aiding and abetting” liability, even where a person later 

expresses approval of the crime, so long as he or she takes no 

action to aid or encourage it. (See People v. Campbell (1994) 25 

Cal.App.4th 402, 409; In re K.M. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 323, 329.) 

In this case, appellant’s presence at the scene coupled with her 

conduct, both before and after E.S. started the fire, is strong 

evidence that she intended to encourage and promote E.S.’s 

actions. 

Moreover, even if appellant did not know that E.S. 

intended to start a fire when they entered the classroom, she

would have known the moment she saw E.S. light the flag on fire. 

But appellant made no attempt to stop E.S. or disassociate 

herself from the situation. Instead, she decided to record E.S. 

lighting the fire and immediately post the video to her Snapchat 

story. Appellant’s actions are also inconsistent with her 

testimony that she was surprised when she turned around and 

realized there was a fire on the floor of the classroom. (See In re 

V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1031.) 

Based on this evidence, the juvenile court could reasonably 

infer that appellant intended to encourage and promote E.S.’s 

actions in starting the fire, even without prior knowledge of her 

intent. “‘Aiding and abetting may be committed “on the spur of 

the moment,” that is, as instantaneously as the criminal act 

itself. [Citation.]’” (People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th

1126, 1148; People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 531-

532.) 
8

Appellant’s conduct in fleeing the scene with E.S. afterward 

without calling for help and continuing to record the fire from 

E.S.’s backyard further supports a finding that appellant took 

affirmative action to promote and encourage the commission of 

arson. (See In re Lynette G., supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1094-

1095.) Considering the totality of appellant’s actions that night, 

the juvenile court did not believe she was “just a bystander.” Nor 

did it find her testimony credible. As the juvenile court opined,

appellant’s “self-serving statements . . . do not support all [of] her 

claims.” Indeed, “[t]he court’s decision to sustain the petition 

indisputably reflects its conclusion appellant was not a credible 

witness.” (In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 5-6.) 

Accordingly, we conclude sufficient evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s true finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 

appellant aided and abetted E.S. in the commission of arson. 

Because we so find, we do not address the natural and probable 

consequences theory of vicarious liability.

Appellant makes several arguments in response. First, 

she contends the Snapchat videos are insufficient to 

“retroactively infer” an intent to aid and abet E.S. in the 

commission of arson because she took those videos 

“indiscriminately” and are more reflective of “bravado” and a

desire to be perceived as “cool.” However, we will not disturb the 

juvenile court’s findings merely because the circumstances might 

also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. (In re V.V., 

supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1026.) 

Second, appellant contends that evidence of her “severe 

intoxication” suggests that she lacked the intent to aid and abet 

arson. But arson is a general intent crime. (People v. Booker

(2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 177, citing People v. Atkins (2001) 25 
9

Cal.4th 76, 87-89.) An aider and abettor of arson need only to 

intend the encouraging or facilitating of the arson, as well as the 

arson itself. (Atkins, at pp. 86, 93.) Here, the juvenile court 

questioned appellant’s recollection of events based on her 

intoxication, but nevertheless found she acted with the requisite 

intent to find her liable as an aider and abettor. 

Finally, appellant contends there is not a sufficient nexus 

between her actions and the commission of arson. However, for 

the reasons we have already discussed above, this contention is 

unpersuasive. 

Disposition

The judgment (findings and order) is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

BALTODANO, J.
Manuel J. Covarrubias, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Richard B. Lennon, Executive Director, and Olivia Meme, 

under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy 

Attorney General, and Stefanie Yee, Deputy Attorney General, 

for Plaintiff and Respondent.