J. S20023/17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

MALIK COLLINS, : No. 3815 EDA 2015

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the PCRA Order, December 4, 2015,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0015549-2010

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 27, 2017

Malik Collins appeals pro se from the December 4, 2015 order 

dismissing his petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief 

Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.1

The PCRA court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of 

this case as follows:

On October 10, 2005, at approximately 

8:42 p.m., Philadelphia Police Officers Pollack and 

Hand received a report of a shooting at 20th and 

Diamond Streets in Philadelphia. Upon arrival, they 

found decedent Hassan Bentley lying in front of 

2046 N. 20th Street with multiple gunshot wounds to 

the head and buttocks. Eyewitnesses Jose Briggs 

and Clarence Milton testified at trial about their 

observations of [appellant] and accomplices. 

 

1 The Commonwealth filed a brief indicating that it was relying on the 

rationale set forth in the PCRA court’s June 28, 2016 opinion. 

(Commonwealth’s brief at 2.)
J. S20023/17

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Specifically, Jose Briggs, a resident of 2046 N. 20th

Street, testified that he, along with several other 

people including Clarence Milton, Steve Brown and 

Mr. Bentley, had been outside on the street engaged 

in drug activity. Positioned at the entrance to the 

alleyway which opened up next to 2046 N. 20th 

Street, Mr. Milton was able to see who entered and 

exited the block from both directions, as well as 

anyone present in the driveway. Clarence Martin 

observed Vincent Segers, also known as “Waters,” 

driving a blue-green Grand Cherokee through the 

section of 20th Street where everyone was gathered. 

A man identified as Yaku Walls, also known as “P.L.,” 

was in the front passenger seat and [appellant] was 

in the backseat of the vehicle as it drove up 

20th Street and paused in the middle of the block at 

20th and Page before turning the corner.

Mr. Segers had previously spoken to Mr. Milton 

about resuming drug sales in that area, but was told 

that he was not welcome on that corner, as 

Mr. Milton, Mr. Brown and Mr. Bentley were 

conducting their business there. A few minutes after 

Mr. Segers drove through the crowded block, 

Mr. Milton observed [appellant] and Mr. Walls 

emerge from the driveway wearing baseball caps and 

dickey suits. Mr. Bentley emerged from the 

alleyway, walking right behind Mr. Brown, as 

[appellant] and his accomplice approached and fired 

a barrage of bullets toward everyone standing 

outside. Mr. Briggs, standing at the base of the 

steps in front of his home, observed a man dressed 

in all black, wearing a black baseball cap with a gold 

“P” emblazoned on the front and pulled down low on 

his face, walk from the driveway and open fire before 

he fled on foot. Everyone in the area ran away when 

the shots rang out and they later gathered around 

the home of Mr. Brown. The group quickly realized 

that Steve Brown suffered a gunshot wound to his 

arm and that Mr. Bentley was no longer among 

them. Several people returned to that area to find 

Mr. Bentley dying and police officers on the scene. 

Officers arrived on the scene within minutes of the 

shooting, and noticed shell casings on the ground 
J. S20023/17

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from at least two (2) different caliber weapons, a 

.9 millimeter and a .22 caliber, in the area where 

Mr. Bentley was slain. It was pouring rain that 

evening, however officers subsequently recovered 

fired cartridge casings from a .9 millimeter handgun, 

but they were unable to find any .22 caliber casings.

On December 16, 2005, Mr. Briggs gave a 

statement to police, wherein he described the 

shooter as a black male, about 5’9”, who weighed 

about 140-165 pounds, brown complexion, about 

22-years-old, but was unable to identify the 

perpetrator. Without additional witnesses, this 

matter became a “cold case” and remained unsolved 

for many years. Between June and September of 

2008, while facing state and federal charges, 

Clarence Milton came forward with information. 

Mr. Milton identified [appellant] as the shooter and 

gave a statement to police outlining the events that 

led to Mr. Bentley’s death. Based on this 

information, police interviewed Mr. Briggs again, and 

on October 2, 2008, he was shown a photographic 

array wherein he identified [appellant] as the 

shooter. In that interview, Mr. Briggs went on to 

state that Mr. Brown was the intended target, 

purportedly in retaliation for a separate shooting 

allegedly committed by Mr. Brown. Based on the 

information gathered during the investigation, an 

arrest warrant for [appellant] was prepared by 

Detective Kelhower and [appellant] was arrested on 

January 21, 2010.

PCRA court opinion, 6/28/16 at 3-5, quoting trial court opinion, 5/9/13 at 

1-4 (citations to notes of testimony and footnote omitted).

On November 20, 2012, appellant proceeded to a jury trial and was 

found guilty of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and possessing an 

instrument of crime.2 On November 26, 2012, the trial court sentenced 

 

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502, 903, and 907, respectively.
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appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, followed by a 

consecutive term of 221⁄2 to 50 years’ imprisonment. On November 7, 2013, 

a panel of this court affirmed appellant’s judgment of sentence, and our 

supreme court denied his petition for allowance of appeal on May 13, 2014. 

See Commonwealth v. Collins, 91 A.3d 1275 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 91 A.3d 1238 (Pa. 2014).3

On December 2, 2014, appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition and 

Stephen T. O’Hanlon, Esq. (“PCRA counsel”) was appointed to represent him. 

PCRA counsel did not file an amended petition on appellant’s behalf. On 

August 10, 2015, PCRA counsel filed a “no-merit” letter and a petition to 

withdraw, in accordance with Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 

(Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) 

(en banc). On October 30, 2015, the PCRA court provided appellant with 

notice of its intention to dismiss his petition without a hearing, pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). Thereafter, on December 4, 2015, the PCRA court 

granted PCRA counsel’s petition to withdraw and dismissed appellant’s 

petition without a hearing. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal on 

December 10, 2015.4

 

3 The record reflects that appellant was represented at trial and on direct 

appeal by Michael E. Wallace, Esq. (hereinafter, “counsel”).

4 The PCRA court did not order appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Nonetheless, appellant has attached a Rule 1925(b) statement to his 

appellate brief, although the docket is unclear as to whether this statement 
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On appeal, appellant raises the following issues challenging the 

ineffectiveness of counsel:

1. Did the PCRA Court error [sic], denying 

[a]ppellant an evidentiary hearing 

Ad Subjiciendum---where [counsel] rendered 

deficient, where counsel failed to [ad]equately 

[in]vestigate and challenge the Probable 

cause?

2. Did the PCRA Court error [sic], denying 

[a]ppellant a Writ of Habeas Corpus for 

evidentiary hearing Ad Subjiciendum---where 

[counsel] rendered ineffective, where counsel 

failed to object and [pre]serve the 

Commonwealth’s recharging Appellate [sic] 

without arrest or Miranda warnings?

3. Did the PCRA Court error [sic] where it denied 

[a]ppellant an evidentiary hearing 

Ad Subjiciendum---where [counsel] was 

ineffective; where the trial [c]ourt abused 

it’s [sic] discretion denying [a]ppellant an 

arrest of judgment pursuant to the conviction 

of, Murder in the first degree; Possession of 

Instrument of Crime, and Conspiracy; where 

the evidence introduced was based on pure 

speculation and conj[e]cture?

4. Did the PCRA Court error [sic] in not affording 

appellant an evidentiary hearing, where 

[counsel] rendered deficient; where counsel 

had failed to challenge and [pre]serve the 

Commonwealth’s Prosecutorial Misconduct; 

where the Prosecuting Attorney failed to 

(est)ablish the mens rea for first degree 

Murder and related charge(s)?

 

was ever filed. (See appellant’s brief at Exhibit A.) On June 28, 2016, the 

PCRA court issued an opinion addressing appellant’s claims.
J. S20023/17

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5. Did the PCRA Court error [sic] in not granting 

[a]ppellant an evidentiary Ad Subjiciendum 

where, [counsel] rendered ineffective; where 

he failed to raise and [pre]serve the 

Prosecution[’]s witnesses’ testimony’s [sic] 

being inconsistent and of perjury?

6. Did the PCRA Court error [sic]---denying 

[a]ppellant an evidentiary hearing 

Ad Subjiciendum where [counsel] was 

ineffective; where he failed to [ad]equately 

cross-examine the Prosecution’s 

witnesses’ [sic] Clarence Milton, who’s [sic] 

testimony was based on perjury of what he 

observed to [a]ppellant being the SHOOTER, 

which if counsel would have thoroughly 

[in]vestigated the tier [sic] of facts, it would 

have been seen that Mr. Milton was 

incarcerated on the [date] in question?

7. Did the PCRA court err in not affording 

[a]ppellant a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

Ad Subjiciendum for evidentiary; where 

[counsel] was ineffective; where he failed to 

investigate, find and call character 

witnesses’ [sic] of, Willie Bell, whom [sic] was 

incarcerated in Philadelphia County Prison at 

[C.F.C.F.] on the [date] that, Clarence Milton 

testified too that he had observed [a]ppellant 

SHOOT the victim?

8. Did the PCRA Court error [sic] not granting 

Appellate [sic] an evidentiary Hearing 

Ad Subjiciendum---where [counsel] failed to 

raise and [pre]serve the Prosecutor’s witness 

Jose Briggs, whose testimony was that, 

[a]ppellant was not at the scene. This was 

why the case was originally dismissed?

9. Did the PCRA Court error [sic] not affording 

[a]ppellant a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

Ad Subjiciendum for evidentiary hearing 

---where [counsel] rendered deficient on 
J. S20023/17

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Appellate review in not raising the 

aforewith [sic] [claims] (1-9)?

10. Did the PCRA Court error [sic] not affording 

[a]ppellant an evidentiary hearing 

Ad Subjiciendum---where [counsel] was 

ineffective on Appellate review, where counsel 

deficiently LIED stating; [J]ose Briggs stated, 

appellant was not present at Murder, when 

Mr. Briggs testified initially quite oppositely and 

where charges were initially dismissed?

Appellant’s brief at 4-5 (internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted; 

capitalization and some bracketed text in original).

Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition 

is limited to the examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is 

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s 

findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in 

the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa.Super. 

2014) (citations omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings 

of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the 

record could support a contrary holding.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 

799 A.2d 136, 140 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citation omitted).

Where the PCRA court has dismissed a petitioner’s petition without an 

evidentiary hearing, as was the case here, we review the PCRA court’s 

decision for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 
J. S20023/17

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A.3d 595, 604 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 56 (2014) (citation 

omitted). Moreover, 

the right to an evidentiary hearing on a 

post-conviction petition is not absolute. It is within 

the PCRA court’s discretion to decline to hold a 

hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous 

and has no support either in the record or other 

evidence. It is the responsibility of the reviewing 

court on appeal to examine each issue raised in the 

PCRA petition in light of the record certified before it 

in order to determine if the PCRA court erred in its 

determination that there were no genuine issues of 

material fact in controversy and in denying relief 

without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338 (Pa.Super. 2012) (internal 

citations omitted).

Instantly, all ten of appellant’s claims challenge the effectiveness of 

counsel. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the 

PCRA, a petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence 

that counsel’s ineffectiveness “so undermined the truth-determining process 

that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Specifically, a petitioner must establish that 

“the underlying claim has arguable merit; second, that counsel had no 

reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and third, that Appellant was 

prejudiced.” Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 1020 

(Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 523 (Pa. 2014) (citation 

omitted). “[C]ounsel is presumed to be effective and the burden of 

demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on appellant.” Commonwealth v. 
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Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 30 A.3d 

487 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). Additionally, we note that “counsel 

cannot be held ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim[.]” 

Commonwealth v. Hall, 867 A.2d 619, 632 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal 

denied, 895 A.2d 549 (Pa. 2006).

After a thorough review of the record, including the briefs of the 

parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the PCRA court, 

it is our determination that appellant’s ineffectiveness claims warrant no 

relief. The PCRA court comprehensively discussed the ten ineffectiveness 

claims briefed by appellant and concluded that they were either meritless or 

not properly developed. (See PCRA court opinion, 6/28/16 at 6-15.) We 

have reviewed the record in its entirety and have considered the merit of 

appellant’s arguments. Following our careful consideration, we find that the 

PCRA court’s conclusions are supported by competent evidence and are 

clearly free of legal error. Accordingly, we adopt the PCRA court’s June 28, 

2016 opinion as our own.5

 

5 We recognize that in addressing appellant’s claim that his counsel was 

ineffective for failing to investigate, find, and call character witnesses on his 

behalf, the PCRA court indicated that appellant failed to attach to his petition 

an affidavit from each possible witness. (See PCRA court opinion, 6/28/16 

at 11.) However, in Commonwealth v. Pander, 100 A.3d 626, 640-642 

(Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc), this court held that a request for an 

evidentiary hearing under the PCRA did not require affidavits from 

witnesses. Rather, this court held that statements from a pro se petitioner 

or his attorney as to the substance of each witness’s testimony would satisfy 

the PCRA. Notwithstanding the PCRA court’s error, we find that the 
J. S20023/17

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Based on the foregoing, we affirm the PCRA court’s December 4, 2015 

order dismissing appellant’s petition.

Order affirmed.

Ott, J. joins this Memorandum.

Bowes, J. concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/27/2017

 

dismissal of appellant’s claim was proper given the fact that appellant has 

provided no statements of any potential witnesses.
JUN 2 8 2016 

Criminal Appeals Unit 

First Judicial District of PA Commw. v. Malik Collins Page 1 of 15 

intent to dismiss on October 30, 2015. This court also granted counsel's motion to withdraw. The 

FILED 

and independently determining that there were no meritorious issues, this court issued a notice of 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988). After reviewing counsel's Finley letter 

as counsel. On August 10, 2015, appointed counsel filed a letter in accordance with 

Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). Shortly thereafter, Stephen T. O'Hanlon, Esquire was appointed 

On December 2, 2014, petitioner filed a pro se petition seeking relief under the Post 

for allowance of appeal was denied by the Supreme Court. 

affirmed petitioner's judgment of sentence on November 7, 2013. On May 13, 2014, his petition 

in accordance with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a). The Superior Court 

petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the Superior Court. On May 9, 2013, this court filed an opinion 

imprisonment for twenty-two and one-half (22 Yl) to fifty (50) years. On November 28, 2012, 

sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, with a consecutive term of 

criminal conspiracy, and possessing instruments of crime (PIC). On that date, petitioner was 

On November 26, 2012, a jury convicted petitioner Malik Collins of first-degree murder, 

Byrd, J. June 28, 2016 

OPINION 

1111111111111111111111111 3815 EDA 2015 

7466315421 

MALIK COLLINS 

SUPERIOR COURT CP-51-CR-0015549-2010 Comm v. Collins. Malik v. Opuuoo 

COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA CP-51-CR-0015549-2010 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY 

CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION 

Circulated 05/30/2017 09:41 AM
Commw. v. Malik Collins Page 2 of 15 

I The following is a verbatim recitation of the issues raised in defendant's prose PCRA petition. 

7. Trial counsel Mr. Wallace was ineffective for failing to investigate, 

find and call character and defense witness, Willie Bell, who was 

incarcerated in the Philadelphia County prison(s) of CFCF on the 

[date] Clarence Milton testified too that he had observed the 

petitioner shoot the victim on the [date] of, [ l Oil 0/05]. 

6. Trial counsel Mr. Wallace rendered ineffective where counsel did 

"not" properly cross-examine the Commonwealth(s) witness 

Clarence Milton, who(s) testimony was based of perjury of what he 

had observed in reference to petitioner being the shooter, in which 

if counsel would have investigated; the true tier of [fact] would have 

demonstrated that the Commonwealth(s) witness, Clarence Milton 

was incarcerated on the [date] of the "alleged" crime on; 

[ 1 Oil 0/2005]. 

5. Trial counsel Mr. Wallace was ineffective where counsel had failed 

to raise and preserve the Commonwealth(s) witnesse(s) testimony 

being inconsistent and of perjury. 

4. Trial counsel Mr. Wallace rendered ineffective, where counsel, in 

his deficient performance "failed" to challenge, and preserved the 

Commonwealth(s), prosecutorial misconduct where the 

Commonwealth failed to [ est]ablish the required and necessary men 

rea to have [est]ablished that petitioner had committed [first] degree 

murder and related charge[s]. 

3. Trial counsel was ineffective, where the Court had manifestly 

abused it(s) discretion inasmuch as to deny petitioner an arrest of 

judgment in regard to the conviction for murder in the [first] degree, 

and possessing an instrument of crime, and criminal conspiracy, 

where the evidence introduced was based on speculation and pure 

conjecture. 

2. Trial counsel Mr. Wallace was ineffective, where counsel "failed" 

to object, argue and (raise) the Commonwealth re-charging 

petitioner without arrest, or Miranda-warning(s). 

1. Trial counsel Mr. Michael E. Wallace who subsequentl was 

petitioner(s) appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance where 

counsel "failed" to thoroughly investigate and challenge probable 

cause. 

pro se notice of appeal. Here, petitioner has raised the following issues: 1 

petition was formally dismissed on December 4, 2015. On December 10, 2015, petitioner filed a 
Commw. v. Malik Collins Page 3 of 15 

On October 10, 2005, at approximately 8:42 p.m., 

Philadelphia Police Officers Pollack and Hand received a report of 

a shooting at 201h and Diamond Streets in Philadelphia. (N.T., 

11/20/12 pp. 51-52). Upon arrival, they found decedent Hassan 

Bentley lying in front of 2046 N. 20th Street with multiple gunshot 

wounds to the head and buttocks. (N.T., 11/20/12 p. 52). 

Eyewitnesses Jose Briggs and Clarence Milton testified at trial about 

their observations of defendant and accomplices. Specifically, Jose 

Briggs, a resident of2046 N. 20th Street, testified that he, along with 

several other people including Clarence Milton, Steve Brown and 

Mr. Bentley, had been outside on the street engaged in drug activity. 

(N. T., 11120/12 pp. 91-92, 196). Positioned at the entrance to the 

alleyway which opened up next to 2046 N. 20th Street, Mr. Milton 

was able to see who entered and exited the block from both 

directions, as well as anyone present in the driveway. (N.T., 

11/20/12 p. 223). Clarence Martin observed Vincent Segers, also 

known as "Waters," driving a blue-green Grand Cherokee through 

the section of 20th Street where everyone was gathered. (N.T., 

11/20/12 p. 192). A man identified as Yaku Walls, also known as 

"P.L.," was in the front passenger seat and defendant Malik Collins 

was in the backseat of the vehicle as it drove up 20th Street and 

paused in the middle of the block at 20th and Page before turning 

the comer. (N.T., 11/20/12 p. 198). 

The following facts were summarized in this court's May 9, 2013 l 925(a) opinion: 

ST A TEMENT OFF ACTS 

10. Trial/appellate counsel Mr. Wallace rendered ineffective at 

appellate [review] where he had erroneously lied by stating at his 

[mae] and filed brief stating; Jose Brigg(s) stated petitioner was 

present at the murder. when the testimony of Mr. Brig[s] was 

opposite and the charge]s] were initially dismissed. 

9. Trial counsel Mr. Wallace, who was appellate counsel rendered 

ineffective representation where on appellate [review], counsel had 

"not" [raised] the forewith [issie]. Mr. Wallace had [raised] one 

single [issue]. 

8. Trial counsel, Mr. Wallace was ineffective at trial where counsel 

failed to raise and preserve witness Jose Brigg(s), who(s) testimony 

was; "the petitioner" was not at the scene of the (said] crime. 

Subsequently, this was the reason the case got dismissed the first 

time. 
Commw. v. Malik Collins Page 4 of 15 

2 At trial, Mr. Briggs denied that he in fact signed the photo array. (N.T., 11/20/12 p. 126). However, Detective 

Kelhower, who took Mr. Briggs's statement, testified to his identification. (N.T., 11/21/12 p. 161). The jury was 

given the opportunity to view the signatures above and below the photographs on the array and determine Mr. Briggs's 

credibility regarding his denial. 

Mr. Segers had previously spoken to Mr. Milton about 

resuming drug sales in that area, but was told that he was not 

welcome on that corner, as Mr. Milton, Mr. Brown and Mr. Bentley 

were conducting their business there. (N.T., 11/20/12 pp. 217-19). 

A few minutes after Mr. Segers drove through the crowded block, 

Mr. Milton observed defendant and Mr. Walls emerge from the 

driveway wearing baseball caps and dickey suits. (N.T., 11/20/12 

p. 204). Mr. Bentley emerged from the alleyway, walking right 

behind Mr. Brown, as defendant and his accomplice approached and 

fired a barrage of bullets toward everyone standing outside. (N.T., 

11/20/12 p. 204). Mr. Briggs, standing at the base of the steps in 

front of his home, observed a man dressed in all black, wearing a 

black baseball cap with a gold "P" emblazoned on the front and 

pulled down low on his face, walk from the driveway and open fire 

before he fled on foot. (N.T., 11/20/12 pp. 94-96). Everyone in the 

area ran away when the shots rang out and they later gathered around 

the home of Mr. Brown. (N.T., 11/20/12 p. 98). The group quickly 

realized that Steve Brown suffered a gunshot wound to his arm and 

that Mr. Bentley was no longer among them. (N.T., 11/20/12 pp. 

99, 204). Several people returned to that area to find Mr. Bentley 

dying and police officers on the scene. (N.T., 11/20/12 p. 99). 

Officers arrived on the scene within minutes of the shooting, and 

noticed shell casings on the ground from at least two (2) different 

caliber weapons, a .9 millimeter and a .22 caliber, in the area where 

Mr. Bentley was slain. (N.T., 11/21/22 p. 111). It was pouring rain 

that evening, however officers subsequently recovered fired 

cartridge casings from a . 9 millimeter handgun, but they were unable 

to find any .22 caliber casings. (N.T., 11/21/12 p. 113). 

On December 16, 2005, Mr. Briggs gave a statement to 

police, wherein he described the shooter as a black male, about 5'9", 

who weighed about 140-165 pounds, brown complexion, about 22- 

years-old, but was unable to identify the perpetrator. (N.T., 

11/20/12 p. 104). Without additional witnesses, this matter became 

a "cold case" and remained unsolved for many years. Between June 

and September of 2008, while facing state and federal charges, 

Clarence Milton came forward with information. (N.T., 11/20/12 

pp. 185). Mr. Milton identified defendant as the shooter and gave a 

statement to police outlining the events that led to Mr. Bentley's 

death. (N.T., 11/20/12 pp. 185-90). Based on this information, 

police interviewed Mr. Briggs again, and on October 2, 2008, he was 

shown a photographic array wherein he identified defendant as the 

shooter. (N.T., 11/21/12 pp. 156, 161).2 In that interview, Mr. 
Commw. v. Malik Collins Page 5 of 15 

assistance of counsel amounts to constitutional malpractice where counsel's incompetence 

Clayton, 572 Pa. 395, 816 A.2d 217 (2002). Under the PCRA, an allegation of ineffective 

ineffectiveness claim, not the underlying error at trial, which is reviewed. See Commonwealth v. 

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. 42 Pa. C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). It is the 

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable 

a conviction or sentence resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the 

A petitioner may be entitled to relief under the PCRA if he is able to plead and prove that 

PCRA). Commonwealth v. Ligons, 601 Pa. 103, 971 A.2d 1125 (2009). 

circumstances found at 42 Pa. C.S. § 9543(a)(2) (setting forth the eligibility requirements of the 

the evidence that his conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the enumerated 

9545(b )(3 ). A petitioner is eligible for relief under the PCRA if he proves by a preponderance of 

petitioner's judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa. C.S. § 9545(b )(I); 42 Pa. C.S. § 

PCRA petitions, including second and subsequent petitions within one ( 1) year from the date 

Commonwealth v. Rivers, 567 Pa. 239, 786 A.2d 923 (2001). A petitioner is entitled to file all 

they are not merely direct appeal claims that are made at a later stage of the judicial proceedings. 

Claims pursuant to the PCRA are extraordinary assertions that the judicial system failed, however, 

convicted of crimes they did not commit and to those serving illegal sentences. 42 Pa. C.S. § 9542. 

The Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") affords collateral relief to those individuals 

DISCUSSION 

Briggs went on to state that Mr. Brown was the intended target, 

purportedly in retaliation for a separate shooting allegedly 

committed by Mr. Brown. (N.T., 11/21/12 p. 157). Based on the 

information gathered during the investigation, an arrest warrant for 

defendant was prepared by Detective Kelhower and defendant was 

arrested on January 21, 2010. (N.T. 11/21/12 p. 183). 
Commw. v. Malik Collins Page 6 of 15 

deprived a defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668 (1984); Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517 (2001). 

The law requires the presumption that counsel was effective unless the petitioner can fulfill 

his burden and prove otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Payne, 794 A.2d 902 (Pa. Super. 2002). 

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, petitioner bears the burden of 

demonstrating: "(l ) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable 

strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, 

there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different." 

Commonwealth v. Kersteter, 877 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super 2006). Furthermore, counsel's choices 

cannot be evaluated in hindsight, but rather should be examined in light of the circumstances at 

that time. See Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 549 Pa. 450, 701 A.2d 541 ( 1997). Even if there 

was no reasonable basis for counsel's course of conduct, a petitioner is not entitled to relief if he 

fails to demonstrate prejudice. See Commonwealth v. Douglas, 537 Pa. 588, 645 A.2d 226 (1994). 

In this case, petitioner first claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing "to 

thoroughly investigate and challenge probable cause." Petitioner's December 2, 2014 PCRA 

Petition. However, there was probable cause to arrest Collins based on evidence obtained from 

eyewitnesses who were present when the shooting occurred. In Commonwealth v. Rogers, 615 

A.2d 55 (Pa. Super. 1992), the court explained that "[tjhe test in this Commonwealth for 

determining whether probable cause exists for the issuance of an arrest warrant is the 'totality of 

the circumstances.' " Id. at 62 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). The court further 

noted that "[i]n determining whether probable cause exists, a magistrate is not required to find a 

showing of criminal activity; mere probability of such criminal activity is sufficient for probable 

cause." Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Gray, 469 A.2d 169, 173 (Pa. Super. 1983)). Moreover, "the 
Commw. v. Malik Collins Page 7 of 15 

Thus, petitioner was not prejudiced as a result of counsel's alleged inaction because there was no 

In this case, the record does not reflect that any statement was elicited from petitioner. 

To safeguard an uncounseled individual's Fifth Amendment privilege against 

self-incrimination, suspects subject to custodial interrogation by law 

enforcement officers must be warned that they have the right to remain silent, 

that anything they say may be used against them in court, and that they are 

entitled to the presence of an attorney. Juveniles, as well as adults, are entitled 

to be apprised of their constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda. If a person is 

not advised of his Miranda rights prior to custodial interrogation by law 

enforcement officers, evidence resulting from such interrogation cannot be used 

against him. A person is deemed to be in custody for Miranda purposes when 

[he] is physically denied of his freedom of action in any significant way or is 

placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action 

or movement is restricted by the interrogation. 

In re R.H., 568 Pa. 1, 5-6, 791 A.2d 331, 333 (2002) (plurality) (citations and quotation omitted). 

Petitioner's December 2, 2014 PCRA Petition. In relation to Miranda warnings: 

preserve the Commonwealth's re-charging petitioner without arrest or Miranda warnings given." 

Petitioner's second claim is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to "object and 

existence of probable cause). Thus, petitioner's claim lacks arguable merit. 

"[t]here is a substantial basis for crediting the information of an eyewitness" in determining the 

See also Commonwealth v. Irving, 485 Pa. 596, 601, 403 A.2d 549, 551 (1979) (holding that 

Mack gave a description of the shooter that matched Collins's physical appearance. Id. at 183. 

a car in the area where the shooting took place. (N.T., 11/21/2012, at 94-95, 175). Further, Selena 

11/20/2012, at 118, 121; 11/21/2012, at 161). Michael Fontaine stated that Collins was riding in 

11/20/2012, at 202-205, 228-229). Jose Briggs identified Collins as the shooter to police. (N.T., 

484 A.2d 1383 (1984)). Clarence Milton identified Collins as the shooter to police. (N.T., 

nontechnical, ungrudging and positive manner." Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 506 Pa. 262, 

information offered to demonstrate probable cause must be viewed in "a common sense, 
Commw. v. Malik Collins Page 8 of 15 

action that would have achieved a favorable result to petitioner in this context. Accordingly, 

petitioner's claim is without merit. 

Petitioner's third claim is that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel 

"where the Court had manifestly abused its discretion-inasmuch as to deny petitioner an 'arrest of 

judgment' in regard to the conviction for murder in the first-degree, and possessing an instrument 

of crime, and criminal conspiracy, where the evidence introduced was based on speculation and 

conjecture." Petitioner's December 2, 2014 PCRA Petition. In ruling on a motion in arrest of 

judgment, the court must evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. 

Meadows, 471 Pa. 201, 369 A.2d 1266 (1977). In evaluating whether the evidence was sufficient 

to sustain a conviction, the appellate court "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth as verdict winner, accept as true all the evidence and all reasonable inferences 

upon which, if believed, the jury could properly have based its verdict, and determine whether 

such evidence and inferences are sufficient in law to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 

Commonwealth v. Tate, 485 Pa. 180, 182, 401 A.2d 353, 354 (1979). In applying this test, "the 

entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered." 

Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574, 582 (Pa. Super. 2001) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Hennigan, 753 A.2d 245, 253 (Pa. Super. 2000)). In Commonwealth v. Costa-Hernandez, 802 

A.2d 671, 675 (Pa. Super. 2002), the court recognized that the "question of any doubt regarding 

the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth is for the fact-finder to resolve 

unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can 

be drawn from the combined circumstances." The appellate court may not weigh the evidence and 

substitute its judgment for the fact-finder. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 831 A.2d 661 (Pa. Super. 

2003). Further, "it is for the fact finder to make credibility determinations, and the finder of fact 
Commw. v. Malik Collins Page 9 of 15 

may believe all, part or none of a witness's testimony." Commonwealth v. Mack, 850 A.2d 690, 

693 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

This issue was decided by the Superior Court when it affirmed petitioner's judgment of 

sentence on November 7, 2013. Indeed, the Superior Court reviewed petitioner's sufficiency 

claims on appeal and determined that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence proving 

beyond a reasonable doubt Collins was guilty of committing first-degree murder, criminal 

conspiracy, and possessing an instrument of crime. See Superior Court November 7, 2013, Docket 

No. 3300 EDA 2012. In Commonwealth v. Howard, 553 Pa. 226, 280-281, 719 A.2d 233, 240 

( 1998), the court held that a petitioner "is precluded from raising a claim of post-conviction review 

that was previously and finally litigated on direct appeal .... Further, an appellant cannot obtain 

collateral review of previously litigated claims by alleging ineffective assistance of prior counsel 

and presenting new theories of relief." In light of the Superior Court's affirmance of petitioner's 

judgment of sentence, there is no basis for the contention that the conviction was based on 

speculation or conjecture. Therefore, petitioner's claim of ineffectiveness has no merit and must 

be rejected. 

Petitioner's fourth claim is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing "to challenge, and 

preserve the Commonwealth's 'prosecutorial misconduct,' where the Commonwealth had 'failed' 

to establish the required and necessary mens rea to have demonstrated that petitioner had 

committed Murder in the First-Degree and related charges." Petitioner's December 2, 2014 

PCRA Petition. "It is well-settled that counsel is presumed to be effective .... " Commonwealth 

v. Busanet, 618 Pa. 1, 18, 54 A.3d 35, 45 (2012). In Commonwealth v. Wharton, 571 Pa. 85, 86, 

811 A.2d 978, 986 (2002), the court noted that "[ c [laims of ineffective assistance of counsel are 

not self-proving; thus, appellant's undeveloped arguments respecting counsel are insufficient to 
Commw. v. Malik Collins Page 10 of 15 

Petitioner's sixth claim is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to "properly crossexamine the Commonwealth's witness Clarence Milton, whose testimony was based on perjury of 

what he observed to petitioner being the shooter, which if counsel would have investigated; the 

true trier of fact would have demonstrated that the Commonwealth's witness, Mr. Milton was 

incarcerated on the date of the crime." Petitioner's December 2, 2014 PCRA Petition. Again, this 

claim is factually incorrect. The record shows that Clarence Milton was extensively crossexamined as to inconsistency, bias, and motive to lie. Id. Further, petitioner has failed to develop 

this claim. See Wharton. Therefore, petitioner's sixth claim is without merit. 

Petitioner's seventh claim is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing "to investigate, 

find and call character witnesses, particularly Willie Bell, who was incarcerated in the Philadelphia 

prove an entitlement to relief." These are arguably three separate claims that petitioner has failed 

to develop. There is no basis in the record that any prosecutorial misconduct occurred. Therefore, 

trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the prosecutor's alleged misconduct. 

Accordingly, petitioner's claim has no basis in fact. 

Petitioner's fifth claim is that trial counsel was ineffective for failure "to raise and preserve 

the Commonwealth's witnesses' testimonies being inconsistent and of perjury." Petitioner's 

December 2, 2014 PCRA Petition. There is no support in the record for this claim. Trial counsel 

thoroughly cross-examined the witnesses. Jose Briggs was cross-examined for over twenty (20) 

pages as reflected in the notes of testimony. (N.T., 11/20/2012, at 130-147, 157-158). Clarence 

Milton was also cross-examined extensively as to inconsistency, bias, and motive to lie. (N.T., 

11/20/2012, at 215-252, 254-255, 256-257). Indeed, all the Commonwealth witnesses were 

similarly aggressively cross-examined. As petitioner's claim is factually incorrect, it is without 

merit. 
Commw. v. Malik Collins Page 11 of 15 

County Prisons at, CFCF on the date that Clarence Milton testified too that he had observed the 

petitioner 'shoot' the victim." Petitioner's December 2, 2014 PCRA Petition. Counsel is obliged 

to '"conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues 

leading to facts relevant to guilt."' Commonwealth v. McCaskill, 468 A.2d 472, 478 (Pa. Super. 

1983) (quoting American Bar Association, Standards for the Defense Function§ 4-4.1 (approved 

1979)). However, "trial counsel's failure to conduct a more thorough investigation or to interview 

all potential witnesses does not constitute a per se ineffectiveness." Commonwealth v. Wallace, 

500 A.2d 816, 818 (Pa. Super. 1985). In Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 511 Pa. 299, 319, 513 A.2d 

373, 383 (1986), the court explained that the "[t]he reasonableness of counsel's investigative 

decisions depends critically on the information supplied by the defendant." To prove that counsel 

was ineffective for failing to call a witness, petitioner must show: "(1) the witness existed; (2) the 

witness was available to testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of, the 

existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify for the defense; and (5) the absence 

of the testimony of the witness was so prejudicial as to have denied [appellant] a fair trial." 

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 615 Pa. 477, 496, 44 A.3d 12, 23 (2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 600 Pa. 329, 351, 66 A.2d 523, 536 (2009)). Accordingly, petitioner has not properly 

established this claim. Indeed, petitioner did not attach affidavits from any proffered character 

witness to his petition. As a result, his claim is a bald assertion of ineffectiveness as he has failed 

to meet any of the five prongs. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 661 A.2d 390, 396 (Pa. Super. 1995) 

(holding that "[i]neffectiveness for failing to call a witness will not be found where a defendant 

fails to provide affidavits from the alleged witnesses"). 

Additionally, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to call character witnesses because 

petitioner has a criminal record, does not have "good character," and there is nothing on the record 
Commw. v. Malik Collins Page 12 of 15 

3 See CP-51-CR-0011195-2007 (convicted of first-degree murder on September 18, 2008); CP-51-CR-0005885-2007 

( convicted of first-degree murder on October 23, 2008); CP-51-CR-0004480-20 IO ( convicted of first-degree murder 

on August 24, 2011); CP-51-CR-0004481-2010 (convicted of first-degree murder on August 24, 2011). 

In Commonwealth v. Brady, 510 Pa. 123, 507 A.2d 66 (1986), we held that 

otherwise admissible prior inconsistent statements of a declarant who is a 

witness in a judicial proceeding and is available for cross-examination may be 

used as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein. 

Id. at 131, 507 A.2d at 70. We set forth in Commonwealth v. Lively, [530] Pa. 

[464], 610 A.2d 7, also decided today, that otherwise admissible prior 

inconsistent statements were limited to a statement that had been given under 

oath at a formal legal proceeding; or a statement that had been reduced to a 

following: 

Commonwealth v. Reid, 533 Pa. 508, 626 A.2d 118 (1993), the Supreme Court restated the 

Petitioner was not at the scene of the crime.'" Petitioner's December 2, 2014 PCRA Petition. In 

preserve the Commonwealth's witness, Jose Briggs, whose testimony was; 'that Malik Collins, 

Petitioner's eighth claim is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing "to raise and 

witnesses. 

Kersteter, 877 A.2d at 468. Therefore, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to call character 

there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the jury trial would have been different. See 

petitioner has failed to demonstrate that, but for trial counsel's failure to call character witnesses 

would rest his case without calling any witnesses. (N.T., 11/26/2012, at 4-12). Accordingly, 

did not state he intended to call any character witnesses. Instead, petitioner confirmed that he 

without calling said witnesses, this court conducted a colloquy of petitioner who participated but 

defense counsel informed this court of his failed attempt to locate witnesses and that he would rest 

Petitioner also did not establish any evidence of good character in his petition. Additionally, when 

evidence would have refuted any claim that Collins was a non-violent and law-abiding individual. 

letter, petitioner had prior criminal convictions, including four murder convictions.3 Thus, this 

indicating petitioner wished to call character witnesses at trial. As counsel stated in his Finley 
Commw. v. Malik Collins Page 13 of 15 

counsel had lied in Appellate Brief, stating that 'Jose Briggs had saw Mr. Milton at the Murder 

Finally, petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective at appellate review "where 

merit. 

Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 865 A.2d 761 (2004). Accordingly, this claim is without 

ineffectiveness. In general, trial counsel cannot raise his own ineffectiveness. See, e.g., 

on appeal. Here, petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise his own 

Next, petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the above issue 

of identification has no merit. 

petitioner's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to contest Jose Briggs's recantation 

123, 507 A.2d 66 (1986); Commonwealth v. Lively, 530 Pa. 464, 610 A.2d 7 (1992). Therefore, 

from the photographic array. (N.T., 11/21/12, at 153-64). See Commonwealth v. Brady, 510 Pa. 

Detective William Kelhower who testified to Jose Briggs's prior identification of the petitioner 

was read to the jury. (N.T., 11/20/12, at 106-126). Further, the Commonwealth presented 

Briggs's recantation, his statement identifying Collins as the shooter from a photographic array 

claimed that he did not know the identity of the person who shot decedent. Id. As a result of Jose 

identify the defendant at trial. At trial, Jose Briggs denied signing this photographic array and 

in admitting the witnesses' prior identifications of the defendant notwithstanding their failure to 

Commonwealth v. Doa, 5 53 A.2d 416, 422 (Pa. Super. 1989), the court held that there was no error 

concerning his statement to police and his identification of Collins in a photographic array. In 

In this case, Jose Briggs was subjected to direct examination and cross-examination 

A.2d 11, 14 (1992)). 

wntmg signed and adopted by the witness; or a statement that is a 

contemporaneous verbatim recording of the witness' statement. 

Id., 533 Pa. at 514, 626 A.2d at 121 (quoting Commonwealth v. Burgos, 530 Pa. 473, 478, 610 
Commw. v. Malik Collins Page 14 of 15 

when testimony by Mr. Briggs was quite opposite and where the charges were initially 

dismissed.' " Petitioner's December 2, 2014 PCRA Petition. Petitioner's tenth claim is without 

merit because it is unintelligible and undeveloped. In his petition, Collins fails to logically establish 

his claim that trial counsel lied. Therefore, this claim provides no basis for relief under PCRA. See 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 223, 732 A.2d 1167, 1175 (1999) (acknowledging 

"unavailability of relief based upon undeveloped claims for which insufficient arguments are 

presented on appeal"). 

Furthermore, Collins has failed to establish how a different course of action by counsel 

would have achieved a different outcome. As the court held in Commonwealth v. Fisher, 572 Pa. 

105, 116, 813 A.2d 761, 767 (2002), "[s]peculation by hindsight that a different strategy might 

possibly have been successful is not the test which establishes ineffectiveness of counsel." In 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984), the United States Supreme Court instructed 

that "[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate 

the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged 

conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." The court has further 

declared, "A chosen strategy will not be found to have lacked a reasonable basis unless it is proven 

'that an alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than the course 

actually pursued."' Commonwealth v. Williams, 587 Pa. 304, 312, 899 A.2d 1060, 1064 (2006) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Howard, 553 Pa. 266, 274, 719 A.2d 233, 237 (1998)). 

Even if petitioner had made an arguably meritorious claim, he is still not entitled to relief 

because the introduction of any such evidence would not have contributed to a different verdict. 

See Commonwealth v. Polk, 500 A.2d 825, 829 (Pa. Super. 1985) (holding that"( c ]ounsel will not 

be deemed ineffective for failing to assert a defense that would not have been beneficial or for 
Commw. v. Malik Collins Page 15 of 15 

BY THE COURT, 

failing to interview witnesses whose testimony would not have been helpful"). Indeed, the 

evidence that the Commonwealth adduced at trial proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Collins 

was guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted. Nothing about prior counsel's representation 

or trial strategy would have changed this outcome. Thus, petitioner was not prejudiced by 

counsel's alleged errors. As the court held in Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 46, 720 A.2d 

693, 701 (1998), "[i]f it is clear that [petitioner] has not demonstrated that counsel's act or omission 

adversely affected the outcome of the proceedings, the claim may be dismissed on that basis alone 

and the court need not first determine whether the first and second prongs have been met." 

Consequently, Collins is not entitled to PCRA relief under any of the ineffectiveness of counsel 

claims raised in his petition. Moreover, there is no basis for Collins's claim that this court abused 

its discretion. This court acted within the bounds of the law and rendered its decisions throughout 

the course of this case only after careful consideration of counsel's arguments and an independent 

review of the record, pleadings, and applicable law. 

Thus, based on the foregoing, it follows that Collins's ineffectiveness of counsel claims 

must fail. See Commonwealth v. Hall, 582 Pa. 526, 872 A.2d 1177 (2005) (holding that threeprong standard for reviewing ineffectiveness claims applies to the performance of counsel at any 

level of representation); Busanet, 572 Pa. at 545, 817 A.2d at 1066 (ruling that "failure to satisfy 

any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim"). 

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the dismissal of petitioner's PCRA petition should 

be AFFIRMED.