NOT RECOMMENDED F OR PUBL I CATI ON File Na me: 13a0819n.06
No. 07-5280
UNI TED STATES COURT OF A PPEAL S FOR THE SI XTH CI RCUI T

DARYL SUE ROBB I

NS et al., Plaintiffs and
J OSEPH W . CHAMBERS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SATURN CORPOR ATI ON, Def endant- Appellee

.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE MI DDL E DI STRI CT OF TEN NESSEE

OPI NI ON

Before: SUHRHEINRICH, GILMA N, and WHI TE, Circuit Jud ges. RONALD LEE GILMA N, Circuit Judge. This case involves an alleg ed violation of the
Am er i cans with Disabilities Act (ADA ) broug ht by J oseph W. Chambers ag ainst his former employ er, Saturn Corporation. Chambers claims that, afte r he suffe red work-r elated injuries, Saturn failed to provide a rea sonable acc ommodation for his disabiliti es. The district court g rante d Saturn’s motion for summary judgme nt, finding that Chambers was not “disabled” within the meaning of the
ADA. F or the re asons set for th below, we AF F IRM the judg ment of the district cour t.

I. BACKG ROUNDA. F actual background

Chambers was initially employ ed by Saturn in 1990 as an opera tion technicia n in Spring Hill,
Tenne ssee. He worke d on Tea m 2, wher e he assembled quarte r panels for Saturn automobiles. His job functions included p u l l ing panels and fuel-f iller doors from the painting station, transporting panels to the sub-assembly are a, attaching panels and fuel-f iller doors to the car s , an d re p airing defe cts. Acc ording to Saturn’s “fully functional/fully rotational” policy , eac h worke r on the t eam

was re quired to rotate throug h and per form ea ch job task. Chambers sustained work-r elated injuries in 1993 and 1995. These injuries cause d a varie ty of phy sical imp ai rm en t s , i ncluding pain in his neck, shoulders, arms, and hands. His phy sicians restric ted him from cer

tain work activities, including repe titive lifting or bending , lifting more than
40 pounds, moving cy clically outside of a ne utral posture, w orking with his hands above shoulder level, using power tools, an d t wi sting. Chambers’s phy sical restric tions preve nted him from fulfilling the r otational require ments on Team 2.
To acc ommodate its employ ees with phy sical restric tions, Saturn had a “Membe r Placement
Process” (MPP). The MPP was a four- step proce ss wher eby Sat u rn s ea rched for suitable job opening s within Saturn for the restr i ct ed employ ees and place d them in those jobs. I n addition,
Saturn opera ted the MPP acc ording to the “Guiding P ri n ciples,” a neg otiated document that was incorpora ted into the Saturn/United Auto Workers collective barg aining ag ree ment. The Guiding Principles and the MPP did not per mit Saturn to “bump” a curr ent employ ee or to violate another employ ee’ s collectively

barg ained se niority

rig hts. Chambers rema i n ed o n T ea m 2 fo r the first four to six wee ks afte r rec eiving his init ial working restric tions in 1993. There afte r, Saturn assig ned Chambers to a varie ty of light-duty work

-2-No. 07-5280

Chambers v. Saturn Corp.

on a temporar

y bas i s , including monitoring car s for defe cts, small-parts work, and computer and cler ical work. I n 1995, Sat urn place d Chambers on the “coc kpit” team, a work assig nment not define d in the rec ord. Be cause of his restric tions, howeve r, C hamber s could not perf orm eac h function require d of the cockpit team on a “fully functional/fully rotational” basis. He was there fore place d on medical leave (at Step Four in the MPP ) from 1996 to 2005. Chambers did not apply for
any positions at S aturn while on me dical lea ve. I n April 2005, Saturn contac ted Chambers and returne d him to wo rk as an opera tional technicia n on the Sports Utility Vehicle cockpit team. By t h at time, Saturn had instit uted the
Acc ommodating Disabled People in Transition (ADA P T ) p ro gram, the succe ssor prog ram to the
MPP

. Chambers, howeve r, was once ag ain unable to complete all of the tasks re q u ired for the position beca

use of his phy sical restric tions. He was t h u s returne d to medical leave

. But soon there afte r, Saturn desig nated him as a quality technicia n on I on Tea m D throug h ADAPT, wher e he

was e mploy ed at the time that this appe al was f iled in March 2007.
B. P roce dural h istory
I n 1997, Chambers joined 76 other curr ent and former Saturn employ ees in filing a lawsuit
ag ainst Saturn, alleg ing that it had discriminated ag ains t them in violation of the ADA. The complaint char g ed that Saturn’s employ ment-plac ement policy sy stematically discriminated ag ainst phy sically restric ted worke rs by , among other things, failing to provide rea sonable acc ommodations

an d requiring the worke rs to underg o job rotations that included tasks they could not p er fo rm . Chambers and the other plaintiffs reque sted compensa tory and punitive damag es ag ainst Saturn, as

-3-No. 07-5280

Chambers v. Saturn Corp. well as injunctive re lief. The othe r 76 plaintiffs’ c laims were all resolved by October 2006. Only Chambers’s c laims remain. After discovery was completed with respe ct to Chambers’s claims, Saturn filed a motion for
summary judgme nt in October 2 0 0 6

. The motion was supported by a “Statement of Undisputed Materia l Fa cts” (Statement of Fa cts). The Statement of Fa cts asser ted that Chambers could perf orm the activities of dail y l i v i n g and was there fore not disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Chambers, who was by then proce eding pro se, did not file a timely response . The district court subsequently enter ed an order that g rante d Saturn’s m otion and dis missed Chambers’s laws u it on J anuar y 18, 2007.
On J anuar

y 19, 2007, the very next day afte r the judgme nt of the district court was enter ed, Chambers filed a response to Saturn’s Statement of Fa cts and a supporting aff idavit (the J anuar

y 19 filings)

. The district court trea ted the J anuar y 19 filings as a motion to alter or amend the judgme nt pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e, which it denied on J anuar y 23, 2007.
On J anuar

y 30, 2007, Chambers filed a “Motion to Alter Cour t ’s J u d gm ent of J anuar y 18, 2007 Dismissi ng Plaintiff’s Case or in the Alterna tive Asking the Court to Reconsider I ts J anuar y 23, 2007 Orde r,” acc ompanied by another aff idavit dated the same day (the J anuar y 30 Motion). The J anuar y 30 Motion was denied the following day

. On Marc h 2, 2007, Chambers filed his notice of appea l.
I n May 2009, we direc ted the parties to submit letter brie fs addr essing the following issue: Should the ADA Amendments Act, Pub. L

. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008), be retroa ctively

applied to the pre sent ca se?

-4-No. 07-5280

Chambers v. Saturn Corp. The next month, the parties notified this court that Saturn had fi l ed fo r bankruptc y . Procee dings

wer e acc ording ly stay ed until J une 2013, when Sa t u rn notified the court that its bankruptc y
proce eding s h ad en d ed

. The parties then filed a joint statement acknow ledg ing that the ADA Amendments Ac t is not retroac tive. This case is now ripe for dispositi on.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Time liness of

appeal
Be fore we consider the merits of this case , we must asce rtain whether Chambers’s appea l is timely . Rule 4(a) (1)( A) of the Fe dera l Rules of Appellate Procedur e provides that, in a c ivil case, the not ice of appea l must be filed within 30 day s afte r t he judgment or order being appea led from is enter ed. An exception to this rule applies when the party timely files a motion to alter or amend the judgme nt under Rule 59 of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e. Fe d. R. App. P. 4(a) (4)( A)(iv)

. At the t ime this appea l was fi l ed , a mot ion to alter or amend the judgme nt was ti mely under Rule 59(e) if it was filed within 10 day s afte r t he judgment was enter ed. Fe d. R. Civ. P

. 5 9 (e) (2007). (Parties now have 28 day s to file such motions.) I f a party timely files a Rule 59(e) motion, “the time

to file an appea l runs for all parties from the entry of the order disposing of the last such rema ining motion.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a )(4) (A). The district court in this case enter ed its judgme nt on J anuar y 18, 2007. The version of Rule 6(a) of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e in eff ect at that time provided that, in calc ulating a time period of less than 11 day s, the day that the j u d gm en t wa s en tere d did not count toward the time period, nor did intermediat e Saturday s, Sunday s, or leg al holiday s. Chambers there fore had until

-5-No. 07-5280

Chambers v. Saturn Corp. February 1, 2007 to file a Rule 59(e) motion. His January 30 Motion was thus presumptively a timely one under Rule 59(e), meaning that his 30 days to appeal did not begin to run until the denial of the January 30 Motion on January 31. Chambers’s March 2, 2007 notice of appeal therefore appears to be timely. But Saturn argues that Chambers’s appeal was untimely because his January 30 Motion was a successive Rule 59(e) motion that did not toll the appeal period. Saturn instead contends that Chambers’s appeal period began to run when the district court denied Chambers’s January 19 filings which the court construed as a Rule 59(e) motion on January 23, 2007. Under this scenario, the latest date on which Chambers could have timely filed his notice of appeal was February 23, 2007. Saturn relies on cases in our circuit and in our sister circuits that purportedly stand for the proposition that a successive Rule 59(e) motion, where the first motion is denied, does not toll the appeals period. See, e.g. , Charles L.M. v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist. , 884 F.2d 869, 870 (5th Cir. 1989); Charles v. Daley , 799 F.2d 343, 346-48 (7th Cir. 1986); Reed v. Toledo Area Affirmative Action Program for Constr. Indus. , 715 F.2d 253, 254 (6th Cir. 1983). But these and other cases that Saturn relies on are distinguishable because the appellants filed the second post-judgment motion beyond the time within which to seek reconsideration of the original judgment . The courts in those cases understandably determined that the second motion did not again toll the running of the time in which to take an appeal. As the Seventh Circuit observed, “[t]he time limit would be a joke if parties could continually file new motions, preventing the judgment from becoming final.” Charles , 799 F.2d
at 347. -6-No. 07-5280

Chambers v. Saturn Corp. I n contra st, Chambers’s second post-judgme nt pl ea d i n g wa s filed within the 10-day time limit then allowed for motions to alter or amend the orig inal judgme nt. Chambers thus had no need

to rely on his initial filing on J anuar y 19 to establish the timeliness of his J anuar y 30 Motion. This is not a case wher e a party is se eking to ext end the 30- day appea l period by

filing succe ssive postjudgme nt motions. Chambers filed his appea l less than 30 day s afte r the denial of a post-judgme nt motion that was filed within 10 day s of the orig inal judgme nt. Recog nizi ng Chambers’s J anuar y 30 Motion as timely filed under Rule 59(e) thus does not have the deleter ious conseque nces descr ibed in the case s relied on by

Saturn. The only rema ining question is whether a succe ssive but timely filed Rule 59(e) motion ca n toll the time for filing a notice of appea l. Rule 4(a) (4) of the Fe dera l Rules of Appellate Procedur e ref ers to the entry of an order “disposing of the last such rema ining motion,” imply ing that more than

one Rule 59 (e ) m o t i o n may be filed. Even if this lang uag e was intended to acc ount only for the possibili ty that multipl e parties may file such motions, its broad lang uag e still supports Chambers’s position.
Saturn has pointed to no authority , in this circ uit or elsewhe re, that stands for the proposition that the appea l period is not tolled when a part y files a second or succe ssive Rule 59(e) motion wi t h i n 1 0 d ay s of the orig inal judgme nt. Nor has our own rese arc h y ielded any such case s. Moreove r, althoug h the district court trea ted Chambers’s J anuar y 19 filings as a Rule 59(e) motion, Chambers’s J anuar

y 30 Motion was the first motion filed by him that addre ssed the J anuar y 18, 2007
summary judgme nt order

. The motio n asked the court to alter that order or, alterna tively , to

rec onsider it s order of J anuar y 23. To the ex t ent that the m otion was addressed to the J anuar y 18
-7-No. 07-5280

Chambers v. Saturn Corp. judgme nt, it was a proper Rule 59(e) motion. The district c ourt reje cted the J anuar y 30 Motion on the merits, not beca

use it was considere d as a succe ssive Rule 59(e) motion. Chambers’s appea l is there fore timely

and prope rly

befor e us. B. Appropriateness of su m m ary judgm ent 1. Application of law On September 25, 2008, Congr ess amende d the ADA to r ejec t the narr ow interpre tation of what constitutes a disability as set forth in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. , 527 U.S. 471 (1999), and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky , Inc. v. W illiams , 534 U.S. 184 (2002). Congr ess expressed its intent that the ADA b e co n s t ru ed in favor of broad cover ag e, effec tive J anuar y 1, 2009. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L

. No. 110-325, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008). Among other things, the Amendments Act direc ts that “[a]n impairment that substanti al l y limit s one major life activi t y n ee d n o t l i mit other major life activities in order to be considere d a disability .” Id. But beca use the alleg edly discriminatory events in this case took place befor e the Amendments Act took eff ect, the Amendments Act does not apply to the prese nt case . See Donald v. Sybra, Inc. , 667 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that, wher e the events at issue took pla ce befor e the eff ective date of the ADA Amendments Act, the prior ver sion of the ADA a pplies); Milholland v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ. , 569 F.3d 562, 565 (6 t h C i r. 2009) (holding that the ADA Amendments Act did not
g overn the case “bec ause its application would have the ty pe of impermissibly retroa ctive eff ect that require s a clea

rly -stated cong ressional intent.”). The parties are in ag ree ment that the Amendments Act does not a

pply retroa ctively

to this case.
2. Stan dard of rev iew
-8-No. 07-5280

Chambers v. Saturn Corp. We now turn to whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Saturn. This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Huckaby v. Priest , 636 F.3d 211, 216 (6th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is proper where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In considering such a motion, the district court must construe the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Kuhn v. Washtenaw Cnty. , 709 F.3d 612, 620 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). “The central issue is ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251 52 (1986)”.
3. Chambers’s ADA claim To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, Chambers had to show that 1) he or she is disabled; 2) otherwise qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation; 3) suffered an adverse employment decision; 4) the employer knew or had reason to know of plaintiff’s disability; and 5) the position remained open while the employer sought other applicants or the disabled individual was replaced. Timm v. Wright State Univ ., 375 F.3d 418, 423 (6th Cir. 2004). Saturn does not dispute that Chambers has physical impairments with regard to his neck, shoulders, arms, and hands that make it more difficult for him to engage in a number of activities. “Nevertheless, the existence of a physical impairment alone is insufficient to support a finding of a disability for the purpose of the ADA.” Anderson v. Inland Paperboard & Packaging , 11 F. App’x 432, 436 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc. , 110 F.3d 369, 373 (6th
-9-No. 07-5280

Chambers v. Saturn Corp. Cir. 1997) (“[N]ot ever

y impair m en t q ualifies as a disability protec ted by the ADA.” )). “An individual is considere d disabled under the ADA,” as rele vant to the prese nt case , if he or she “has a phy sical or mental impairment that substantially limit s one or more of the major life activities.” Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc. , 542 F.3d 1099, 1105 (6th Cir. 2008) (interna l quotation marks omitted).
B e f o r e th e ADA Amendments Act, the Equal Employ ment Opportunity Commis s io n d e f in e d “major life activities” to include “func tions such as car ing for oneself , p er fo rm ing manual tasks, walking , seeing , hear ing, speaking , brea thing, lear ning, and working .” 29 C.F.R. § 1 6 3 0

. 2 ( i) (2007).
Be ing “substantially limit ed” in such activiti es m eant that an indi vidual was “[u] nable to perf orm

a major life activity that the aver ag e person in the g ener al population can perf o rm ” o r was “[s] ignif icantly restric ted as to the condition, manner or duration under wh i ch an individual can perf orm a particula

r major life activity as compar ed to

. . . [ an ] aver ag e person in the g ener al population.” Id. § 1630.2(j)(1) ; see also W illiams , 534 U.S. at 198 (holding that the proper disability deter mination is whether the individual “ha[s] an impairment that preve nts or sever ely restric ts the individual from doing a ctivities that are of centr al importance to most people’s daily lives”). During Chambers’s 1998 depositio n , a t w h ic h ti me he was repr esente d by counsel, Chamber s testified that his injuries have cause d neck pains that occa sionally limit his ability to drive, lift cer tain weig hts, look up and down, rea ch up and g et objects off a shelf, a nd walk in a mall. He admitted, howeve r, that on most da y s he is a ble to dr ess himself, shave, walk, stand, climb stairs, and drive. During Chambers’s second deposition in 2006, he testified that he is able to walk, shop for g roce ries, do laundry , prepare meals, and g o to the movies. I n a 2005 medical evalua tion, Chambers’s
-10-No. 07-5280

Chambers v. Saturn Corp. phy sician Dr. Fr eder ick Wade opined that Chambers “may continue/re turn to light duty perma nent. No lifting more than 20 pounds. No work at or above shoulder level. No repe titive wor k motion.
No power tools, torque g uns, or lift with arms outrea ched.” Dr. Wade did not comment on Chambers’s a

bility to car e for

himself or eng ag e in routine da ily activities. Chambers states in the aff idavit attache d to his J anuar y 30 Motion that he “ ca n n o t b at h e without assistance ,” “ca

nnot manually scrub, clea

n, or otherwise use modera te forc e,” “ha[s] serious difficulty using cooking utensils and handling pots and pans and washing dishes,” and “ca nnot run, lift weig hts, do aer obic exercises, swim, do sit ups, chin ups or push ups.” He also alleg es that his injuries limit his ability to “do a wide rang e of d ail y life activities including[] driving , parking , sleeping , flossing te eth, g roce ry shopping, a

nd ty ing my

shoes.” Chambers has not explained why this post-judgme nt aff idavit was not submitt ed in a timely fashion. Moreove r, Chambers raised for the first time in the aff idavit his difficulty bathing , which he never mentioned during his two depositions. Other statements in the aff idavit are also in tension with his deposition testimony , in which he stated that he was able to attend to his bodily functions, walk, drive, shop for g roce ries, and prepa re meals. Finally , his asser tion that he is not able to bathe without assistance , use cooking utensils, or clea n is uncorr oborate d by any medical evidenc e in the

rec ord.
“A party may not cre ate a fa ct u al issue by filing an aff idavit, afte r a motion for summary judgme nt has bee n m ad e, which contra dicts [hi s] ear lier deposition testimony .” Reid v. Sears, Roebuc k & Co. , 790 F.2d 453, 460 ( 6th Cir. 1986). Be cause Chambers has not e x plained why we

-11-No. 07-5280

Chambers v. Saturn Corp. should consider the information set forth in his post-judgme nt aff idavits, we decline to do so to the extent that these new fa cts contra dict Chambers’s e arlier deposition testimony

. We now turn to whether Chambers’s impairments constitute a disability under the ca selaw interpre ting the prior version of the ADA. “The deter mination of whethe r an individual has a d i s ab ility is not nece ssarily based on the name or di ag nosis of t he im pairment the person h as , b u t rathe r on the eff

ect of that impairment on the life of the individual.” Sutton v. United Air Lines , 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j)). A lthough suc h an inquiry is

nece ssarily highly fac t-intensive and case -spec ific, we find instructive a number of case s previously decide d by

both the Supreme Court and by this court. The most rele vant S upreme Court decision is Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky v. W illiams , 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). I n W illiams , the employ ee could not perf

orm “re petitive work with h an d s and arms extended at or above shoulder levels for extended periods of time.” Id. at 192. Her car pal tunnel sy

ndrome also cause d her to “avoid swe eping , to quit dancing , to occa sionally seek help dressing , and to re duce how often she play s with her children, g arde ns, and drives long dista n ce s . ” Id

. at 202. The Court noted that Wil liams could, howeve r, “brush her teeth, wash her fac e, bathe, tend her flower g arde n, fix brea kfast, do laundry , and pick up aroun d t h e h o u s e.” Id

. After holding that the appellate court should focus its inquiry on those activities as “ac tiviti es that are of centr al i m portanc e to most
peo p l e’ s daily lives,” id. , the Court reve rsed the appellate court’s decision that Wil liams was disabled as a

matter of la

w. De ci s i o n s fr o m t his circ uit have likewise held that plaintiffs with simil ar (t h o u gh n o t identical) phy sical impairments to Chambers wer e not disabled under the ADA. This court has held,
-12-No. 07-5280

Chambers v. Saturn Corp. for example, tha t r estrictions on the amount of weig ht tha t one is a ble to lift is not, in and of itself, a dis ability

. Gaye r v. C ont’l A i r lines, Inc. , 21 F. App’x 347, 350 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[F]ederal case law supports that a maxi mum weig ht restric tion is not a disability as define d by the ADA.” (interna l quotation marks omitted)). We ha ve also held that foot, leg , and shoulder injuries that preve nt the plaintiff from running , jumping, bending , and wor king mor e than e ight hour s a day do not “ rise to the level of a disability under the ADA.” Anderson v. Inland Paperboard & Pack aging , 11 F. App’x 432, 436-37 (6th Cir. 2001). Simi larly , a person who was unable to “re sume normal work activities

s uch as lifting, rea ching , stooping and twisting” was deter mined not to be disabled. R o s s v. Campbell Soup Co. , 237 F.3d 701, 703, 706 (6th Cir. 2001). Finally , we have held that an employ ee who was restric ted from lifting weig hts of less than ten pounds, pushing or pulling, using vibrating tools, and making repe titive motions with her rig ht hand was not disabled under the ADA. McKay

v. Toyota Motor Mfg. U.S.A. , 110 F.3d 369, 370-71, 374 (6th Cir. 1997). This court noted in McKay that the “plaintiff was not limited in the ‘major life activity ’ of car ing for herse lf beca use ‘the only household function McK ay claims to be substantially limit ed in is mopping.’” Id. at 371-72.
We find ample evidenc e in the rec ord to show that Chambers i s ab l e t o ca re for himself. Chambers’s injuries d o n o t s i g nificantly preve nt him from walking , standing , climbing stairs, dri v i ng , dressing himself, doing laundry , and shaving

. Chambers admitted during his two depositions that althoug h his neck and shoulder pains have chang ed the manner and fre quency with which he perf

orms cer tain activities, he is a

ble to e ng ag e in all of them. Although he claims in his
J anuar y 30, 2007 aff

idavit that he cannot bathe without assistance , cook, or clea n, he alleg ed these fac ts only afte r the district cour

t gr anted summary

judgme nt.
-13-No. 07-5280

Chambers v. Saturn Corp. Chambers’s rema ining arg ument, which h e d o es n o t d ev el o p on appea l, is that he is substan t i al l y l i m i t ed in his ability to work. Both 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2007) and the Supreme
Court have acknow ledg ed that “wor king” may be considere d a major life activity

. Sutton , 527 U.S.

at 4 92. But this court’s pre- ADA Amendments Act case law repe atedly held that the major life activity of working is not substantially limit ed s i m p l y beca use an employ ee’ s phy sical or
psy cholog ical im pairment prevents hi m from perform i ng a particular job. See Black v. Roadway Express, Inc. , 297 F.3d 445, 454-55 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that the plaintiff’s knee injury did not
preve nt him from perf

orming a broad class of truck-dr iving jobs); Mahon v. Crowell , 295 F.3d 585,
591-92 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the plaintiff’s b ac k problems did not substantially limit his ability to work in a broad class of jobs); McKay , 110 F.3d at 373 (holding that the plaintiff’s car pal tunnel sy ndrome, which preve nted her from perf orming only a narr ow rang e of assembly -line jobs,

was not an impairment that substantially limit ed her g ener al ability to work); Jasany v. United States Postal Serv. , 755 F.2d 1244, 1250 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding t hat t he pla i n t i ff was not substantially limit ed in the life activity of working wher e the plaintiff’s ey e impairment, althoug h a perma nent one that preve nted him from perf orming the functions of a postal distribution cler k, did not interfe re with his ability to work other jobs). “To be substantially limit ed in the major life activ ity of working , then, one must be prec luded from more than one ty pe of job, a specia liz ed job, or a particula r job of choice .” Sutton , 527 U.S. at 492. The claimants must, at a minimum , alleg e that they are unable “to perf orm either a class of jobs or a broad rang e of jobs in various classes as compar ed to the aver ag e person ha ving c ompara

ble training , skills, and abiliti es.” Id. at 491.

-14-No. 07-5280

Chambers v. Saturn Corp. Chambers has not demonstrated that he is unable to perf orm a class of jobs or a broad rang e of jobs in various classes. Moreove r, Saturn proff ere d unrebutted evidenc e from an vocational expert that, during the period when Chambers was on leave from Saturn, there was an aver ag e o f 336,388 available jobs in the Middle Tennesse e are a that Chambers was qualified to pe rfor m w ith his restric tions. I ndeed, at the time that the briefs wer e submitt ed in this matter, Cha m bers was employ ed with Saturn as a quality technicia n, and he perf

ormed temporar

y jobs at Saturn befor e he

was p u t o n medical leave

. Chambers has there fore failed to show that he is substantially limit ed from wor king.
We conclude that Chambers has not car ried his burden of proving that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA as it exis ted befor e the ADA Amendments Act. Acc ording ly , we have no need to consider the other fac tors require d to establish a prima fac ie case of disability discrimination.
C. Denial of

the post-judgm ent m otion Finally , we turn to the question of whether the district court prop er l y denied Chambe rs’s motion to alter or amend the judgme nt. The circ umstances unde r which a district court may

g rant a Rule 59(e ) motion are limited. “A dist rict court may g rant a Rule 59(e) motion . . . only if there is: (1) a clea

r err or of law; (2) newly discovere d evidenc e; (3) an intervening chang e in controlling law; or (4) a need to preve nt manifest injusti ce.” Hende rson v. W alled Lake Consol. Schs. , 469 F.3d 479, 496 (6th Cir. 2006) (interna l quotation marks omitted). Chambers has not established any of the four alterna tive showing s. First, he did not ide ntify
any clea r err or of law made by the district court in his motion t o alter or amend judg ment, nor does he arg ue one now. Second, his two late-f iled aff idavits do not contain any newly discovere d evidenc e
-15-No. 07-5280

Chambers v. Saturn Corp. beca use, “[t] o constitute ‘new ly discovere d evidenc e,’ the evidenc e m u s t h ave been previously unavailable .” Genc orp, Inc. v. Am. Int’l Underwriters , 178 F.3d 8 0 4 , 8 3 4 (6 t h Cir. 1999). “[A] district court does not abuse its d i s cr et i o n i n deny ing a Rule 59 motion when it is premised on evidenc e that the party had in his control prior to the orig inal entry of judgmen t

. ” E mm o ns v. Mclaughlin , 874 F.2d 351, 358 (6th Cir. 1989). Cha m bers’ s late-f iled aff idavits do not constitute
“new ly disc o vere d evidenc e” beca use he had persona l knowledg e about his own activities that he could have submitt ed to the district cour t prior to the entry

of summary

judgme nt. Third, Chambers ha s not arg ued any intervening chang e in the contr olling law. F inally , we do not find any manifest injusti ce in the district co u rt ’s entry of summary judgme nt for Saturn. Chambers had an opportunity to file a timely response t o S at u rn ’s summary judgme nt motion but failed to do so. B oth his J anuar y 19 filings a

nd his J anuar

y 30 Motion were a dequate ly considere d by the district court befor e they wer e denied. Be cause Chambers made none of the showing s require d for the g rant of a

Rule 59(e) motion, the dist rict cour t did not err in deny

ing the same.

III. CONCLUSION
For all of the re asons set for

th above, we AF F IRM the judg ment of the district cour t.

-16-