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6B0Rft 14 July 1952 

Ml!MORANDUM FOR MR. FRIEIMAN 

1. At your request, I have prepared this memorandum setting !'orth 

my views on the ad hoc camnittee report on release of CSP 2900. 

2. I cannot, ot course, quarrel with the idea of release of the ECM 

to the British, since I have been in favor of such release for about seven 

years. I do believe, however, that the ofter canes much too late to be of 

any value, and 'fif3' opinion is that the British are likel.y- to reject the 

ofter unless at least one ot the following is true: 

a. The release will be extended to NATO and will include CSP 1600 

(Sigamug) adapters. 

b. The number of machines available tor loan is enough to outfit 

completel.y- the UK Navy, and there are also enough CSP 1600 adapters. 

This would then release many CCX:a for NATO. use. 

c. There are sane very limited special requirements which might be 

taken care or by a limited number of machines. 

3. With regard to 2.a, and also to 2.b, the British have expressed to 

me several times that they believe the day of"' UK/US camnunications to be ·.: ..... .u~~ 

caning to an end. Their opinion, which I share, is that NATO traffic is 

now of paramount importance. There is an ever decreasing amount of traffic 

now which is confined to UK/US channels. There will always be sane, ot 

course, but the UK, the US, and Canada are no longer a triumvirate entire 

unto themselves, but are rather the leaders in a larger all.1ailca, NATO, 

and nearl.y- all of their important traffic (outside of Korea) deals with the 

affairs or that larger alliance. NATO, too, is where we are hurting the 

most, as tar as cipher machines are concerned, and this release of ECM to 

the UK does not help NATQ. There are several ways in which ECM distribution 

to NATO or to the British could be worked out, but I lmow ot none that 

would be satisfactory on less than about 1200 machines. 

4. In addition to not easing the NATO ditf'iculty, limited distribution of ECM to the UK forces them into the always annoying requirement of 

holding two different machines. They don't like this, especially Navy-wise, 

even at the high levels. However, there are perhaps sane requirements 

which might be eased by issue of ECM in limited quantities and might make 

the matter worth pursuing. I am thinking of' the COMINT communications 

problem and particularly SSO and BLO traffic (on which I have another memo 

on the way to you) • 

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;. I have these specific camnents on the report ot the ad hoc 

camnittee: 

a. As a report, it does not provide a basis tor decision on the 

question of turnishing any real help, since it does not say how 

many machines will be available. The implication is that it will 

be a small number, but the report doesn't say, even though it 

obviously is not intended to be anything as broad as 1200 machines. 

I have heard that the tigure/50 was the one that seemed most 

sensible to the committee. Furthermore, the report does not 

consider the requirements tor additional CSP 2900s for US use, 

which the US Services have stated to be so large as to require 

that canpletely new equipments be manufactured. (Nevertheless, 

when approaching the British ve must be able to give them a 

definite figure.) 

b. The report calls this release an "interim solution to the 

replacement or the CCM. 0 It obvious]Jr is not, unless it's to 

be on a very wide scale. 

c. Although paragraph J.c is correct, it is misleading and should 

be changed to read: 

"Assuming that an enemy might have the ability to construct 

a high-speed analogue tor solving a UK/US machine, the US 

must be protected against the possibility of his extending 

use 0£ this analogue to the reading ot US BACCHUS damnunications. For this reason, it is not desirable to provide the 

CSP 2900 in its present form to the UK." 

d. The canment to be added to AFSAC 63/63 as quoted in the last 

sentence of paragraph 2 ot the report is total]Jr unrealistic and 

virtually impossible or canpliance. Cryptanaterial is not on]Jr 

released or made available to NATO; it must also be accepted by 

NA'.l'O. It is impossible to get NATO approval of a crypto-equipm.ent, 

particularly the new crypto-equipnents, without releasing the 

cryptoprinciple tor study and acceptance, and it we wait until 

the equipment is produced and distributed betore releasing the 

principle, we create delays of months, perhaps even years, in 

euppl.l'ing NATO. I think I know the intent ot this camn.ent, and 

I believe it should read: 

"In all cases where crypto-:-equipments are to be made available 

to NATO, the revelation of cryptoprinciples involved should be 

restricted to general summaries and descriptions and should 

not include specific nring details, drawings, etc., until 

after the equipment is in production." 

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6. To summarize, I have the following recanmend.ations to make: 

a. Find out how many equipments will be offered by each Service 

and when. 

b. Ir the number is about 1200, broaden this report to include 

release to NATO. 

c. It this is totally unpalatable, proceed with the idea ot issue 

to the UK navies, and prepare specific proposals to be sent to 

the British. 

d. If the number is no where near 1200, rewrite the paper to include 

specific ideas as to how to best make use of the limited quantity-, 

then make specific proposals to be sent to the British. 

•· In any event, re-do the paper to ~'Se rtI:f camnents in 

paragraph 5. 

FRANK C. AUSTIN 

Chief, A.nalysis and 

Evaluation Division 

-SECRE+ 

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