P.D.R. #

C.O.A. NO. 11-12-00319

TO THE

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

KEVIN ROYCE PEEK,
Appellant/Petitioner

VS.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

CONNIE J. KELLEY Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 1108 Lavaca #110-221 Austin, Texas 78701 State Bar Number 11199600 (512) 445-4504 (512) 478-2318 (fax) warrentucker@grandecom.net PD-0600-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 6/17/2015 4:50:21 PM Accepted 6/19/2015 12:23:06 PM

ABEL ACOSTA CLERKi IDENTITY OF JUDGE, PARTIES AND COUNSEL PURSUANT TO Rule 68.4(a) TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Party and Appellee’s C ounsel: Michael Murray Brown County District Attorney 200 S. Broadway Brownw ood, TX 76801
State’s Trial Attorney: Michael Murray Brown County District Attorney 200 S. Broadway Brownw ood, TX 76801
Party/Defendant: Kevin Royce Peek Texas Department of Criminal Justice – Institutional Division
Defendant’s Trial Attorney: Patrick Howard Attorney at Law P .O. Box 74 Bangs, TX 76832
Appellant’s Attorney : Connie J. Kelley Attorney at Law 1108 Lavaca #110-221 Austin, Texas 78701

The Honorable Frank Gri ffin presided at trial.ii TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Identity of Judges, Par ties and Counsel ....................... ............................................... i

Index of Au thorities .......................................... ........................................................ iv
Statement Regarding Oral Argument ............................. ........................................... 1

Statement of the Case ......................................... ........................................................ 1

Statement of Pro cedural History ............................... ................................................. 1

Ground for Review ............................................. ........................................................ 2

GROUND FOR REV IEW NO. ONE

IS A DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO HAVE A RESULT-OFCONDUCT DEFINITION OF “WI TH INTENT” INCLUDED IN

THE JURY CHARGE WHENEVER THE CHARGE ALLOWS FOR

CONVICTION AS A PARTY U NDER THE THEORY THAT,

ACTING WITH INTENT TO PROMOTE OR ASSIST
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE, THE DEFENDANT AIDED
THE PRIMARY ACTORS TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE, WHERE

THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT THE AID PROVIDED WAS

ESSENTIAL TO COMMISSION?
Argument ...................................................... ....................................................... 2 - 5iii Prayer for Relief ............................................ ............................................................ 5
TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.)
Page

Certificate of Service ........................................ ......................................................... 5

Certificate of C ompliance ..................................... ..................................................... 6
Opinion of the C ourt of A ppeals ............................... ................................... Appendixiv INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Page

Cases: Flanagan v. State, 675 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) ...... ........................... 3, 4
In re State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013 ) ......................... 4
Nava v, State, 415 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) .......... ................................. 3
Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) .... ................................ 4

Statutes and Rules:
Health & Safety Code, §481.112 ...........................................

............................................................... 4
Penal Code, §6.03 ..............................................

............................................................... ... 3 §7.02 ..............................................

.............................................................. 3, 4 §15.01 .............................................

............................................................... .. 4
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 66.3(b) ........................................ ............................................................. 31 STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

The issues raised herein can be adequately addressed in briefs from the
parties.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 7, 2012, after a plea of not guilty, Appellant, K evin Royce
Peek, was found guilty by a jury in the 35 th Judicial District Court of Brown
County, Texas, of possession of a controlled substance, methamp hetamine, in
amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams with the i ntent to deliver.
(C.R. at 97-99). He was sentenced by the jury to life in the i nstitutional division of
the Texas Department of Crimin al Justice on September 7, 2012. (C.R. at 97-99).

A motion for new trial was filed by trial counsel on September 18, 2012. (C.R. at
101-103). The motion was denied on October 15, 2012. (C.R. at 109). Notice of
Appeal was filed by trial couns el on October 16, 2012. (C.R. a t 110). Trial
counsel served as appellate couns el until allowed by this Court to withdraw as
attorney of record. (Suppl. Rec.). Connie J. Kelley was subse quently appointed to
represent Appellant on appeal. (Suppl. Rec.).

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The opinion of the Court of App eals was handed down on April 1 6, 2015.
No motion for rehearing was filed.2 GROUND FOR REV IEW NO. ONE

IS A DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO HAVE A RESULT-OFCONDUCT DEFINITION OF “WI TH INTENT” INCLUDED IN

THE JURY CHARGE WHENEVER THE CHARGE ALLOWS FOR

CONVICTION AS A PARTY U NDER THE THEORY THAT,

ACTING WITH INTENT TO PROMOTE OR ASSIST
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE, THE DEFENDANT AIDED
THE PRIMARY ACTORS TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE, WHERE

THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT THE AID PROVIDED WAS

ESSENTIAL TO COMMISSION?

ARGUMENT

GROUND FOR REV IEW NO. ONE

IS A DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO HAVE A RESULT-OFCONDUCT DEFINITION OF “WI TH INTENT” INCLUDED IN

THE JURY CHARGE WHENEVER THE CHARGE ALLOWS FOR

CONVICTION AS A PARTY U NDER THE THEORY THAT,

ACTING WITH INTENT TO PROMOTE OR ASSIST
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE, THE DEFENDANT AIDED3 THE PRIMARY ACTORS TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE, WHERE

THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT THE AID PROVIDED WAS

ESSENTIAL TO COMMISSION?
This petition for discretionary r eview should be granted becau se the
Court of Appeals has decided an important question of state law that has not
been but should be, settled by th is Court. See T.R.A.P. Rule 6 6.3(b).
In Nava v. State, this Court held that the words “acting with intent to
promote or assist the commission of the offense” in Penal Code §7.02(a)(2)
“clearly mean, at a minimum, that a defendant must act intentio nally with
respect to the result elements of a result-oriented offense.” Nava v. State,
415 S.W.3d 289, 298-299 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Can those word s also
mean that irrespective of the o ffense involved, a defendant who aids primary
actors in a way that is essential to the commission of the offe nse, and does
so with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the o ffense, is

entitled to a result-of-conduct de finition of “with intent” in the jury charge?
See P.C. §6.03(a). It cannot be said that it was not the “cons cious objective

or desire” of such a defendant to “cause the result” of his con duct, which

was that the offense was actuall y committed by the primary acto rs due to the
aid the defendant provided. See Id.4 In Nava this Court discussed its holding in Flanagan v. State which
construed language in the criminal attempt statute that Nava re cognized as
being similar to that of §7.02 (a)(2). Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3 d at 299, f.n.
#22, Flanagan v. State, 675 S.W. 2d 734, 740-741 (Tex. Crim. App . 1982)
and P.C. §15.01. Penal Code §15.01( a) requires that a person a ct “with
specific intent to commit an offe nse.” Id. Flanagan held that the statute
required the actor to possess intent with respect to the result even if the
object crime did not itself require intent with respect to the result. Id.
Similar reasoning applies to the issue of whether a defendant s uch as
Appellant, who allegedly supplie d aid essential to the commissi on of the
charged offense with intent to promote or assist the commission of the
offense, is entitled to a result- of-conduct definition of “with intent” in the
jury charge. See P.C. §7.02(a)(2).
A jury charge must instruct the jury on the statutory definiti ons of
terms that affect the meaning of an element of the offense. Vi llarreal v.
State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) Party liabil ity is as
much an element of the offense as the enumerated elements presc ribed in a
statute that defines a particular crime. In re State ex rel. W eeks, 381 S.W.3d
117, 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). G iven that, as the Court of A ppeals points5 out, P.C. §7.02(a)(2) has its own culpable mental state of “wit h intent”, it is

irrelevant whether Health & Saf ety Code, §481.112 is a conduct- oriented or

result-oriented crime when dete rmining whether a result-of-cond uct

definition of “with intent” shoul d be included in the jury char ge. The Court
of Appeals erred in holding that Appellant was not entitled to a result-ofconduct definition in the charge.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED , Appellant requests that this
Court grant this petition for di scretionary review and reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
Respectfully subm itted,

/s/ Connie J. Kelley Connie J. Kelley Attorney for Appellant 1108 Lavaca, #110-221 Austin, Texas 78701 (512)445-4504 (512)478-2318 (fax) warrentucker@grandecom.net State Bar No. 11199600

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoin g was served on6 Michael Murray, District Attorn ey, at 200 S. Broadway, Brownwoo d, Texas 76801
by regular mail on this 17th day of June, 2015.

/s/ C onnie J. Kelley Connie J. Kelley7 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This is to certify that the for egoing document is in 14 point font, with the
exception of footnotes, which are in 12 point font. The word c ount of the
foregoing document is 858 words, wh ich is in compliance with T. R.A.P. Rule 9.4.

/s/ C onnie J. Kelley C onnie J. KelleyAPPENDIX OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALSOpinion filed April 16 , 2015



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

__________ No. 11

- 1 2

- 00 319

- CR

__________ KEVIN ROYCE PEEK , Appellant

V. THE S TATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 35th District Court Brown C ounty, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CR21821

O P I N I O N The jury convicted Kevin Royce Peek of possession of four grams or more but less than 200 grams of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver in a drug

free zone. Appellant pleaded true to two enhancement allegations. The jury found both enhancement allegations to be true, and it assessed Appellant’s punishment at confinement for life in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice. Appellant challenges h is conviction in five issues

. We affirm.2 Background Facts Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for possession of four grams or more but less than 200 grams of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. He does challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence to establish that he committed the offense in a drug

- free zone

. We will briefly summarize the evidence at trial to provide context for Appellant’s issues on appeal. On November 9, 2011, Detecti ve Shawn Dibrell and Officer Stephanie Hale of the Early Police Department were work ing drug interdiction in an unmarked police vehicle. At about 3:15 p.m., they observed a vehicle that had an expired registration. The officers followed the vehicle. Detective Dibrell activated his lights to stop the driver of the vehicle. The officers saw three occupants in the
vehicle. Officer Dibrell observed the front

- seat passenger moving from side to side in the vehicle. Officer Dibrell believed that the passe nger might be grabbing a weapon or hiding something. Eventually, the driver pulled the vehicle to the side of the road and stopped. De tective Dibrell called for backup

. Chief David Mercer
and Officer Amanda Williams arrived at the scene.
The officers c autiously approached the vehicle and contacted the occupants.
Detective Dibrell turned on his audio recorder. Appellant was in the driver’s seat; Appellant’s brother, James Kirby Peek, was in the front passenger’s seat; and
Hector Go nzales was in the bac k seat behind Kirby. Appellant reached under his lap, removed a syringe, and dropped it to the floor. For safety reasons, the officers
had Appellant, Kirby, and Gonzales exit the vehicle, and the officers handcuffed them. The officers searched Appellant, Kirby, and Gonzales for weapons.
Detective D ibrell found marihuana and a Q

- t ip in one of Appellant’s pants pockets.
Detective Dibrell te stified that cotton from Q

- t ips is commonly used as a filter in connection with injecting methamphetamine. Officer W illiams found a bag that3

contained three small Ziploc bags full of methamphetamine and twenty

- nine empty Ziploc bags in one of Kirby’s shoes. The three bags contained about sixteen grams of methamphetamine. Testing of the substances at the Department of Public Safety Laboratory in Abilene confirmed that the seized substances were methamphetamine. Officer Hale found a pipe that contained methamphet amine
residue in one of Gonzales ’s shoes. Appellant told Detective Dibrell that he felt sick and dehydrated . Detective Dibrell said that Appellant turned “white as a ghost” and could barely stand up. Detective Dibrell gave Appellant something to drink. Detective Dibrell gave Miranda 1 warnings t o Appellant, Kirby, and
Gonzales . They all told Detective Dibrell that they wanted to talk to him. Appellant told Detective Dibrell that he had driven Kirby and Gonzales to Granbury so that Kirby and Gonzales could obtain methamphetamin e

. Appellant
told Detectiv e Dibrell that he knew methamphetamine was inside the vehicle. On the following day, Detective Dibrell took a rec orded statement from Appellant. During the statement, Appellant acknowledged that he took Kirby and
Gonzales to Cindy Webb’s trailer house in Granbury so that Kirby and Gonzales could get m ethamphetamine from Webb. According to Appellant, he believed that Kirby planned to get about four grams of methamphetamine from Webb. After the group arrived at Webb’s house, Kirby left with Webb and two men to obtain methamphetamine. Appellant and Gon zales stayed at Webb’s house. Kirby and the others returned to Webb’s house about five hours later. Appellant said that , at that time, he smoked methamphetamine at Webb’s house. Appellant told
Detective Dibrell that both Kirby and Gonzales obta ined meth amphetamine from
Webb. Appellant told Detective Dibrell that he knew Kirby had methamphetamine
inside the vehicle.

1 Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966).4

Detective Dibrell agreed that sixteen grams of methamphetamine is a “fairly substantial” amount. He said that such an amount was intended for distribution as opposed to individual use. Detective Dibrell said that sixteen grams of methamphetamine has a value of at least $1,600. Detective Dibrell testified that Ziploc bags, such as the twenty

- nine e mpty bags that were found in Kirby’s shoe,
are used t o package methamphetamine for distribution. Detective Dibrell said that
he had “no doubt” that the amount seized was intended for distribution. Kirby testified that the m ethamphetamine belonged to him. He said that Appellant did not know anything about the methamp he tamine. Kirby testified that
he planned to distribute the bags of methamphetamine to two people.
Detective Dibrell testified about the location of the stop. He said that Appellant stopped his vehicle “directly across” from Early High School.
Detective Dibrell indicated that the stop occurred less than 1,000 feet from school property. Analysis Appella nt presents five issues for review. In his first two issues , Appellant
contends that the trial court erred (1) in defining “intentionally” and “with intent”
in terms of the nature of the conduct rather than the result of the conduct in the abstract portion of the jury charge and ( 2) in failing to apply a result

- of

- conduct definition of “inten tionally” and “with intent” to the law of parties issue in the application portion of the jury charge. In his third issue , Appellant contends that
his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to request that the jury charge provide a defin ition of “intentionally” and “with intent” in terms of the
nature of the result only and to request that those definitions be applied to the law of parties as set forth in the application paragraph of the charge. In his fourth
issue , Appellant contends th at the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to impeach the credibility of Detective Dibrell by eliciting testimony related to5

Detective Dibrell’s work history and to an allegation that Detective Dibrell tampered with evidence. In his fifth issue , Ap pellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he committed the offense within 1,000 feet of the premises of a school. A. Jury Charge Issues The indictment alleged that, on or about November 9, 2011, Appellant “did
then and there k nowingly possess, with intent to deliver, a controlled substance, namely, Methamphetamine, in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200
grams. ” The indictment further alleged that “ [ appellant ] committed the above offense within 1,000 feet of the premises of a school, to wit: Early High Sch ool, 115 Sudderth, Early, Texas. ” The trial court stated in the jury charge that “[o]ur law provides that a person commits an offense if he knowingly possess es with intent to deliver a controlled substance.” The trial court included the following definitions of “intentionally” and “knowingly” in the charge :

A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in a conduct. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to the circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. The trial court also provided instructions related to the law of parties. The trial
court stated as follows:

A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by th e conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both. A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, actin g with intent to promote or assist the commi ssion of the offense, he solicits , encourages, directs, aids, or6

attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. Mere presence alone will n ot constitute one a party to an offense.

The trial court submitted a law of parties issue in the application paragraph of the charge

. Section 6.03 of the Penal Code provides that “[a] person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN

. § 6.03(a) (West 2011). Thus, with respect to the definition of “intent,” Section 6.03(a) delineates two “conduct elements” that may be involved in an offense: (1) the nature of the condu ct and (2) the result of the
conduct. See McQ ueen v. State , 781 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). As shown above, the trial court in this case defined “intent” in terms of the nature of
the conduct and not in terms of the result of the conduct

. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in f ailing to define “intentionally”
in terms of the result of the conduct in the abstract portion of the charge and in failing to apply a result

- of

- conduct definition to the law of parties. We disagree.
A nature

- of

- conduct crime, such as gambling or assault by threat, is criminalized because the nature of the act itself is unlawful, regardless of any result that might

occur. McQueen , 781 S.W.2d at 603 ; Zuliani v. State , 383 S.W.3d 289, 298 (Tex. App.

— Aus tin 2012, pet. ref’d). “[T]he act itself is the gravamen of the offense. ” Young v. State , 341 S.W

. 3d 417, 423 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). When sp ecific acts are criminalized because of their very nature, a culpable mental state must apply to committing the act itself. McQueen , 781 S.W.2d at 603. A result

- of

- conduct crime, such as murder or injury to a child, is one in which unspecified conduct is
criminalized because of its result. Id. ; Zuliani , 383 S.W.3d at 298. When

u nspecified conduct is criminalized because of its result , a culpable mental state must apply as to that result. McQueen , 781 S.W.2d at 603.7

An offense may be both result and nature or iented

. Id. ; Murray v. State , 804 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1991, pet

. ref’d). In such cases, the trial court should submit the complete statutory definition of “intentionally” and “knowingly” so that the jury can consider both the result of the defendant’s
conduct and the nature of his conduct. Murray , 804 S.W.2d at 281. However, if
the o ff ense is either only a nature

- of

- conduct offense or a result

- of

- conduct offense, the trial court should submit statutory definitions of “intentionally” or “knowingly” that are limited to the respective culpable mental state required.
Cook v. State , 884 S .W.2d 485, 49 0

- 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Murray , 804
S.W.2d at 281. Section 481.112(a) of the Health and Safety Code provides that a person commits the offense of possession of a controlled s ubstance with intent to deliver it
if he “knowingly

. . . possesses with intent to deliver a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group 1.” T EX

. H EALTH & S AFETY C ODE A NN

. § 481.112(a) (West
2010 ). Methamphetamine is listed in Penalty Group 1. See id. § 481 .102(6). Section 481.112(a) criminalizes the act of possessing a controlled substance with
intent to deliver it. The gravamen of the offense is the conduct of possessing a
controlled substance with the intent to deliver it. The act or conduct of “knowingly” possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver it is pun ished, regardless of any result. The offense focuses on the nature of the defendant’s conduct and not any result that might occur. Because the offense focus es on the nature of the conduct, we conclude that, as alleged in the indictment in th is case, the offense of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver it is a nature

of

- conduct offense. Therefore, the trial court did not err in defining “intentionally” and “knowingly” in the jury charge as those definitions related to the offense charged in the indictment.8

At trial, Appellant presented a defense that he believed the purpose of the trip to Granbury was for Kirby to obtain money from Webb so that Kirby could pay his rent. Appellant attempted to establish that he did not know Kirby and Gonzales planned to obtain methamphetamine from Webb or actually obtained it from her. Appellant essentially contends that, because the trial court defined “intentionally” in terms of the nature of the conduct, the charge improperly allowed the jury to convict him under the law of parties if the jury concluded that
he intentionall y drove the vehicle, even if he was mistaken about the purpose of the trip. We disagree with Appellant’s contention.
S e ction 7.01(a) of the Penal Code provides that “[a] person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committ ed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both.”
P ENAL § 7.0 1 (a)

. Section 7.02(a)(2) provides that “[a] person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if [,] acting with intent to promote o r assist the commission of the offense, he solicits , encourages , directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense.” Id. § 7.02(a)(2). When a party is not the primary actor, the State must prove conduct

cons tituting an offense plus an act by the defendant done with the intent to promote
or assist such conduct. Beier v. State , 687 S.W.2d 2, 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985);
Schnidt v. State , 357 S.W.3d 845, 855 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2012, pet. ref’d). Section 7.02(a) contains the culpable mental state of “intent

. ” Specifically, the statute requires the State to prove that the defendant committed an act with the “intent” to promote or assist the commission of the offense. P ENAL § 7.02(a)(2).9

In this case, the trial court’s instructions on the law of parties in the abstract
section of the jury charge tracked the language of the relevant statutory provisions. The trial court stated as follows in the application paragraph:

Now, if you find from the evidence bey ond a reasonable doubt that . . . KEVIN ROYCE PEEK . . . (either acting alone or with JAMES KIRBY PEEK or HE CT OR GONZALES, with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance with the Intent to Deliver , if any, solicited, encouraged, directed, aided or attempted to aid JAMES KIRBY PEEK or HECTOR GONZALES, to commit the offense, if he did), did t hen and there knowingly possess , with intent to deliver, a controlled substance, namely, methamphetamine, in a n amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams, then you will find the defendant “ guilty ” as charged of Pos session of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver, as set forth in the indictment

.
The la nguage in the application paragraph followed the appropriate statutory language for the law of parties. See P ENAL § 7.02 (a) (2). The court’s charge did not allow the jury to convict Appellant based only on a finding that he intentionally drove the vehicle. Instead, the trial court correct ly charged the jury on the culpable mental state : Appellant must have acted with the “intent” to promote or assist the commission of the charged offense. See i d. As to the law of parties, the charge required the State to prove that Kirby or Gonzales engaged in conduct that constitut ed the charged offense and that Appellant
committed an act with the intent to promote or assist such conduct. Beier , 687
S.W.2d at 3. As stated above, the trial court instructed the jury that “[a] person
acts intentional ly, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in a conduct.” As charged, the jury could not convict Appellant under the law of parties unless i t found that Appellant
acted with the con scious objective or desire to promote or assist Kirby or Gonzales
in the commission of the offense. If , as Appellant claimed, he did not know that10

Kirby and Gonzales planned to obtain or had obtained methamphetamine, he could not have formed the requisite intent to promote or assist them in the commission of the offense, and the jury could not have convicted him under the court’s charge. Accordingly, we conclude that the jury charge was not erroneous . Appe llant’s first
and second issues are overruled. B. Assistance of Counsel To determine whether Appellant’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, we must first determine whether Appellant has shown that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and, if so, then
determine whether ther e is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for his counsel’s errors. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Hernandez v. State , 726 S.W.2d 53, 55

– 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). We must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and Appellant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action could be considered sound trial strategy. Strickl and , 466 U.S. at 689; Tong v. State , 25 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). An allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. Thompson v

. State , 9 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
In his third issue , Appellant contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to request that the jury charge provide a definition of “intentionally” and “with i ntent” in terms of the result of conduct and in failing to request that those definitions be applied to the law of parties as set forth in the charge. Trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to make futile objections or request instructions that are not required. W ood v. State , 4 S.W.3d 85, 91 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1999, pet

. ref’d). To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim11

for failing to make an objection, an appellant must show that the trial court would have erred in overruling the objection. Vaughn v. Sta te , 931 S.W.2 d 564, 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Likewise, to show counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction, an appellant must show that he was entitled to the
instruction. Cardenas v. State , 30 S.W.3d 384, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 00). We have already held that the trial court’s instructions on intent and the law of parties

were not erroneous . Accordingly, Appellant cannot show that the trial court w ould have erred in overruling an objection to the instructions or that he was entitled to
instructions that defined intention ally in terms of the result of conduct

. Appellant has not shown that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Appellant’s third issue is overruled.
C. Exclusion of Impeachment Evidence Appellant con tends in his fourth issue that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that Detective Dibrell left the Early Police Department after being
demoted there and that Detective Dibrell allegedly tampered with evidence in another case. Appellant asserts tha t this evidence was admissible to impeach
Detective Dibr ell’s credibility as a witness. We review a trial court’s dec ision to admit or exclude evidence under an
abuse of discretion standard. Shuffield v. State , 189 S.W.3d 782, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We will not reverse a tr ia l court’s ruling unless it falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Torres v. State , 71 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
The exclusion of potential impeachment evidence touches upon an accused’s
Confrontatio n Clause rights. See Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308 , 315

– 16 (1974);
Pointer v. Texas , 380 U.S. 400 , 403

– 04 (1965); Castillo v. State , 939 S.W.2d 754, 758 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14 th Dist.] 1997, pet

. ref’d). The accused should be allowed great latitude to sh ow a witness’s bias , prejudice, or motives to testify12

falsely. Chambers v. State , 866 S.W.2d 9, 26

– 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993);
Ho dge v. State , 631 S.W.2d 754, 758 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982). The proponent of impeachment evidence bears the burden of demonstrating the relevance of the proffered evidence to the issue of bias or prejudice. Chambers , 866 S.W.2d at 26

– 27. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fa ct that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” T EX

. R. E VID

. 401. The credibility of a witness may be attacked by evidence that the witness is slanting his testimony aga inst or in favor of a party as a result of a personal interest

o r bias in the cause. Willingham v. State , 897 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The proponent of the evidence must establish a specific connection between the witness’ s testimony and t he cause that discloses an actual bias or
motive. Id. Determining the limits of cross

- examination to show bias is a matter
that rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Chambers , 866 S.W.2d at
27. Outside the presence of the jury, Appellan t’s counse l informed the trial court
that “we intend as impeachment purposes to bring up some of the circumstances regarding why Mr. Dibrell left the Early Police Department to go to work in Mills County.” Appellant’s co unsel stated, “s pecifically, Your H onor, the issue s that we would like to bring up would be basically that Mr. Dibrell quit on his own after being demo ted, and also we understand there has been allegations that Mr. Dibrell tampered with evidence.” The trial court stated that
, “if there is any allegation of tampering, we are going to take that up outside of the presence of the jury.” Appellant’s counsel stated that
, “regarding evidence to that matter, Chief Mercer will probably be our w itness.” Appellant’s counsel questioned Detective Dib rell on voir dire examination. During that examination, Detective Dibrell testified that he left his employment13

with the Early Police Department voluntarily and that he was not fired from the department. He said that he had conflicts with Ch ief Mercer with respect to the
manner in which Chief Mercer conducted the department’s operations

. Detective Dibrell made his c oncerns known to Chief Mercer. Detective Dibrell did
not believe that Chief Mercer ever questioned his honesty with respect to the
concerns that he raised. Appellant’s counsel tried to establish that Detective
Dibrell was demoted from his investigative duties to patrol duties. Detective
Dibrell testified that Chief Mercer threatened to demote him but never demoted
him. Detectiv e Dibrell said that he “[went] back to patrol” because the department was shorthanded in patrol. Appellant’s counsel also asked Detective Dibrell questions about whether anyone had ever alleged that he tampered with evidence. The following exchange

occur red: Q. Now, to your knowledge, since you left the Early Police Department, has there been an allegation regarding that perhaps you tampered with evidence?

. . . . A. Yeah, I hear it all the time. I hear stuff since I have been an offi cer. Q. Is there a specific allegation regarding a Mr. Box or a name similar to that? A. Not that I’m aware of. If you clarify who Mr. Box is, I might could be a little bit more specific with my answer. Q. So, you don’t know of any specific allegation of tampering with evidence that has been raised since you left the Early Police Department? A. Yes, I am. I mean, once I quit, the rumor was I got fired for tampering with evide nce. I mean, that comes with

-- that is the nature of the beast in narcotics.14

Q. Have you

-- has there been a specific person or event named with that rumor? A. Not to my knowledge. I haven’t been able to figure out where it stemmed from, but I would hope that if the rumor was true, I wou ld hope I would have been investigated and would have been found guilty or innoce nt, one way or another because

-- Q. So, you understand or, I guess, maybe you’ve heard the same rumors I have? A. Well, I’ve heard rumors about every narcotics officer, me included. So, I take a firm stance against dirty officers. I will be the fi rst to go after a dirty officer . . . . Q. Has there been an investigation that you know of regarding allegations made against you for tampering with the eviden ce? A. The only thing that I could think of is, one time somebody came in. We seized a cell phone, and he was a third party, saying, “Hey, my coworker”

-- “The guy, my employee, said that you used his cell phone to make a phone call,” or something like that, or added a call or something like that. But that was nothing. That is the only thing that I can think of, because that was a major case I had at the time that was pending, that did raise a big stink, because that one was tied in with a huge me thamphetamine case. Q. No official proceedings or complaints have been brought against you since you left the Early Police Department? A. No, sir, and I would like to know if you have any. [Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, we have no further questions.

The judge then stated that, “[f]rom what I have heard, unless you have other evidence to put on, then I am not going to allow the questions. ” Appellant’s counsel stated that “we would like to bring th is evidence up in the trial regarding impeachment of Mr. Dibrell. We believe that it does affect his credibility.” The judge ruled, “ I’m not going to allow the evidence, unless you have further proof of an actual event or events, other than just speculat ion and rumor.” Appellant did15

not call Chief Mercer to testify on the issue. Nor did Appellant present any other
evidence on the issue. Appellant contends in his brief that Detective Dibrell could have believed that the more helpful he was in obtaining convictions in Brown County by giving testimony that was favorable to the State, the less likely it was that the district attorney’s office would investigate the tampering allegations against him. Based on this contention, Appellant argues that the exclu ded testimony showed a potential bias or motive on the part of Detective Dibrell to provide testimony that was favorable to the prosecution and that, therefore, the testimony was admissible to impeach Detective Dibrell’s credibility. We disagree.
As the trial court concluded, Appellant presented nothing more than “specula tion and rumor” on the impeachment issues. Appellant did not present any evidence that identified any person who had made a tampering allegation or that showed the details of any tamperi ng allegation. Nor did Appellant offer any evidence that Detective Dibrell had been investigated on a tampering allegation in the past or that he faced a future investigation. Additionally, Appellant did not
show that Detective Dibrell had been demoted a t the Early Police Department for any reason, much less because of a tampering charge. Based on the speculative nature of the proffered evidence, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Appellant failed to meet his burden to demonstrate the r elevance of the evidence to the issue of bias or motive to testify falsely. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence. Appellant’s fourth issue is overruled.
D. Su fficiency Challenge
In his fifth issue , Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
establish that he committed the offense in a drug

- free zone. Specifically, Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding16

that he committed the offe nse within 1,000 feet of the premises of a school. See
H EALTH & S AFETY § 481.134(c)(1) (West Supp. 2014)

. In response to a special issue, the jury found that Appellant committed the offense within 1,000 feet of Early High School. We review a challenge t o the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State , 337 S.W.3d 286, 288

– 89 ( Tex. App.

— Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under that standard, we examine all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and any reasonable inferences from it, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State , 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In conducting a sufficiency review, we defer to the jury’s role as the sole judge of the witnes ses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded. Brooks , 323 S.W.3d at
899. Detective Dibrell testified regarding the location where he stopped Appellant’s vehicle. He said that the stop occurred on Early Boulevard, “directly
across fr om the high school.” He then testified as follows in answer to the prosecutor’s questions :

Q. And, so, when we say directly across from the high school, can you give the jury an estimation of approximately how far away they would have been from the school property? A. 50 foot maybe

-- four lines, including the left turn lane. Then right on the other side of that is school property. Q. All right.
A. Or

-- I don’t know if it actually belongs to the school, because you have some occupied space between it and the school, but. Q. Well, can you safely say that it was fairly close to the school?17

A. Oh, yes, yes, for sure. I mean, just right there across the street. There may have been like a building or something else, but right behind that is the school. Q. All right. So, if I was to ask you specifically about, you know, from where they were stopped to where the school was located or school property, the edge of the school property and so forth, would it have b een less than a thousand feet?
A . Oh, yes, definitely. Q. No doubt about that?
A. No , no question about it. Q. Okay. Now, the school we are talking about, that is the one that is located there at the 115 Sudderth Drive in Early, Texas? A. Yes, sir.
Kirby testified that Detective Dibrell pull ed Appellant over by Early High School. Kirby said that Appellant s topped the vehicle right by Early High School. Based on the evidence, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that Appellant committed the offense within 1,000 feet of the premises of a school. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to support the finding that Appellant
committed the offense in a drug

- free zone. Appellant’s fifth issue is overruled. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY April 16 , 2015 JUSTICE
Publish. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., Willson , J., and Bailey , J.