31 

·HISTORY OF CONVERTER M-134-C 

VOLUME 3 
J 

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REF ID:A523210 

.. ., 

_: .. ,~,.,. .... ~ ~ ........... , ............... ~, ~ . • ............... · .. . . ; ... ~Pt.1•~. ·:~h·.~ ••••••• ~ ••••••.•••• ~- ..• .,i ~·· ............ ~t-~·~ ••• ,_:..:.'~~~~o.UtA~:.,.,-. • • • • • • • • • • •• • • •· • • • • • • •• ·• ·• • • •·• ;. • • ~ "'"'~-~· ... • •·• .. ,_~:S'.filUS·. •f. ••• ,;1 ,, • • ••. •· •••• •., ••• .,, •• • _. ••••••'• ... , •••• ;.-;.;_-._• ~. 

· C~fs .91 Use~•·,• •••••••••••••••••• ; •• ,.,,, •••••••••••••••••••. 

l tion. .••• ~.-............................................... . ··t; .. ...• . ... · ...••• 

... ·~ •••• ! ••.• · .• : ............... f •••• i • •.•••••.•••• ··~ ~.· ·-·. •, •.·• •• •--·-~· •• 

tput ••• f f ' •..••. ~ ••••••• ! •••.•••••.••••••••••••••••.•.•••••••• ~ •• ·· •• 

s ~eei .•.•.•••••• , ••••••••••• · ••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••.•••...•••. 

p .· .r .. : r Su,J>Pl\y'. • • • • • • • • .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • • • • • • , • • • • • • • • • • • • 

, a.ions. • • •· • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ' • • • • .. • • • • • • • • • • • ' • • . • • • • • • •·• • • 

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REF ID:A523210 

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. · .. ·.· 
··.···· ... , ..... 

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1 .. 

b~ . cGll ,l(aft :tX :·~ QtJI> 1700, whloh 1' pbldoal.11. ad•1J'P" and 

· ···~~Vl~p-a~~· *t~ to~· llUk land &lao to ASAK 5 · 

· :··:(Ml'*·••>··· It ~ •e«·to a limited extent d1iring World. ~ - ' ' . ' 

- .. 

'o~ .. _~,Ju.k izl,~ithe d•~.Uoa giT~ io· .th• ar1u8h Tn>e x 

'·-ph~--Jla~.~··:,m .• -~ci;~th a 'epec.t&i o~ Unt\, tae . . 

11Tfpe X A&la-pt,er." . C<X Jl&J'k ·m 1e inteJ"Communicable with 

. ·COJl:~s·x~~ :C.: . 

~ '· ~OIUPTION. - llectromeohanical cipher machine (see figure _LA.). 

CLA&SIFICA'fI(IJ, -· 1he machine is olaositied. -CONFIDENTIAL. 

are classified sEca.ET. 

,, g. CLASS or .usus.1t - I, II, III. 

~ ,10. OIBRATial. - Kqboarcl. 

7 n. nmao. - Off lim (non-tel~t.ype_). Av../bnJnfi ./'or t1!/ o/11Gs1.fr~ttftOYIS "~ frttf-.f1c ... 

~ }Z. OUTPUT. - Pi-ihte!l tape. 

'1.~. s~. - 45 to ~words per minute. ~ . 

f; ; ..• 

,., 1:2.iV·• : ·. yi:___.....-·I .. 

.. 

':_: 

16 ·+4· • svffl,1. - A •• r;. ?l."._~. ~· ~r mlJ1 be ~ed_. lilt.. • • ..: . '"·:".· ·~ •.. -~·'...._'" . "> .. :::'.~~-.. ,. :.:~{ .. -~·:.-.). -!• ... -·~.,;;. . :, •• ~· •• • .· :.· ' •. •, •• • • • l ....... 

a.: .. A.·. l(.:. l()~Jii.~it (60 ~)f:Jiowet 9one~t1cm .2 ~r.es. . .~-r\;~,_··5 

·.·,An ;.u~;~F~ c:,~~Jn.~ ·· ; «:n~~~f~ i)ow·:~f .b. D. ~,.,_.~ ~~S_ Witt pe1Jer.~~~td.-.0:~2;~~iifl'Oompound ,., .. ; ... _ ·;. -.--.'.·H< :-· .... ·.-. .~ - .. . .~ 

-·-motor 18 -~. '; . . -

' ·.' ·. ~;';·., ::; ::>:' . . .,· -~'' .. · .. '. . · '·! It nQrmal a~·· c. ·'?t·;~.t~-·· -~.t::t.~/·tne::~t-~·:be.-op;r•t"- .:·· . . .. ·-~: :· ·'t·.~·:,··~l'i· .. ·-l~. · ... : '?.J.\· : .... ::: ::.::'.- '_. .~:·#.- ··' · .. : :· .: ·.· .: . 

by band. .if ~~l\.~.-·• -1,~\,,~~\ect t-o-91'"~J~~ iaagnete~ 

..... 

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/~-~ 

.. ;· ') .·-~'', .· 

: :·.·. " 

··., 

... # •• ·-~: • 

. . ·:.: .. : 

'. .. ·;, 

.. ·.· .. • ~ .. _ -. .. ..:.~-:·2--':. ·--· ~-:-~-~- --~ . . ; / .. ~.-
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ll. 

REF ID:A523210 

DD/!~; ~:ll f '1JS • 

.l~P ~~~H Cubic WM th Depth tie~i}t D1-1*f:c«n•nt 

c~ <>peration; l'" 19~" i2t• 2.1• 

b .. Packed in 

carryihg Cflff ir/s" f a3tt l;~n _3.,;• 

c. Packed, for lon[:~ 

tom storage: l9~fl 27~" l8ff 5.6' 

d. ''"' 1'" ( ) i.ifl l.lii- 0 UPfel:" 

SJeetionJ 217/rll 32}~' 2,2ff v" 9.05t 

•• CH-76 (lower 2l.7/8 aect..ion) n 32J" '!1- 21.;f2 10.11 

c. Va.;:,:ksd £c:r lon~ term etoras~: 19' J.Ps., 

d. CH-76 (upper section.) ~ty:i ~lbs. 

e. OR-76 (lowe.r seat.ion} «npt';)l"~ ~lbs .. 

Cl.$.u.ng Kit (for opera.tot•a); pla.~e fL!de:r.~ Ql' c;w:Jfuir:i.g table, 

!>., Iaoued. aa needed: AS.iW lii; 108697 'l'ender Kit (for n1.;J.intenauce 

pEU."SOUllel); taad«n Cable; G;wst CH-76. 

o. i?or :i.r..for.roation con.eernin~~ ti-i.e plue,etL:;le :1."'otor, see puraerap.~ 190. 

14. .Af>1JCC!J1".CSD .OOCUil.El'~T.J .. :; 

b. GlG~u-3, '

1

C?'ypto-O,Peratinc !nert.ruotiooo tor Gonwrter ~i-134-C. tt 

2. Ciie"' "inch l.eas 'ii"" stlipPscs ass...,c• . w."th upper half .• 

3. Ueoause of t.11e method of imμlm:wntta.tion used for the I-iOOtQnclature I'lan 

adopted 6 Februar1 1948, niany crypt,(,gra:phic documents have not yet been 

converted .fro.m shoi•t ·titles to nlff!'.,; n.omencla tu.re. 
< 

.. _-.,_··"-_.>._.: ..... 

-~. . . 

. . .... ,·· .r' REF ID:A523210 . . 

l~f 3RJRH· -

c. SIQKU..2, llJld.nt~ce Instruct.ions ~or Con":erter M-134-C.• ~-

. d. SIGDUllf-i, ·'•0peratini ~trucUons tor ~ined Cipher Jlachinep·~· 

e. SIGRAVO-l, •supplement Bo. l to iOpe:rating ~t~ti.Ons for 

COmbinecl Cipher·Maohinea (SIGDU•l)•. 11 . . .... ~ . 

~ - . . . . J!I• PA2.'BB1' JJm;IUIATI<ll. - S.Oret Patent Applloation serial No. 70,412 ' . . . . . 

(covering principle ot u•~g. rotors in eaa.cad• tormati~ to pro-

.duce irregUlar sequence ot keying characters) was filed 23 March 

1936 .b;y the Chief Sil9lal Officer on behalf of the. Prinoipal Crypt- ~ ·. ,,.., f; 

analyst, u •. s. Arm¥ (W. F. Frief.han), and his ~~~:~~---~~--_._.~ 

(F. B. Rowlett), jointly. For .further in.formation,, see Appendix A, 

ittl ee1 1 'J:f Historical Background.,+ <?onuert'~vs 11-iofol'ld >f-13t!--J{ &111~ ASAHI. 

a. Summary of PrCMib.t'em.ent. 

(See chart next page) 

. --_ ~ :~ .. :.. ·-

Jr -Jf: -•, ~· .. . : .' .. \ .· ·- ' 

••' \ • -.. .. ~ .N·_,:i::.,.;:;..' ·;;.. --: ··: -. . . ~ 
Contract 

., Number 

REF ID:A523210 

Ma.nuf aoturer Contract 

i Date 

ll 

Teletype ' · JUll 

Co . ration~ 0 ~· l2 

Tel.-et.ype 1 Jul 

Co ration. 

Teletype } 

Co . rationl 

Teletype 

Co ration· 

ll 

Oct 

13 

Nov 

Cost Completion 

Mar 

$201.001_.63 $1,843.66; to 

Nov 

il04, 502. ;o $1, 713.00 

l.3 .31 

Teletype Nov $1,.371.,495.23 $1,205.SO ·Mar Feb 

Co ora.tion 

Teletype l 

Oo ration 

Teletypa 

Co rationl 

i 

'l'el.etype I 

Co ration 

7 

Aug 

23 

Hov 

4~ 14 machines, ree;ister numbers 3356 through .3.369, were manufactured and distrl.1.mted in 

January and Feb~y l.945, 'lhese vi:ere not included in the .3.316 Converter "Tot.al. 

Quantity (by 

Register No. 

l-

) 
REF ID:A523210 

b. Egui?!!fl:t Included Ja Contract Total. - The difference in 

cost, as given above under "Contract. Total• and. •Per Unit, 0 

is due to the inciusion in the contract ot varying quantities 

of the following items of equipment: Rotor sets in metal containers at 365.93 each; tender kits at $21,3.34,; spare parts 

kits at $)9.40 each; gumming ta.bl.es at il2.S7 each; spare 

cipher units, with index rotors only, at $187.68 each; cord. 

vrlt.t1 plQgs . for operating t'WO .ma.chines in tanct&n., a.t ~2.00 eaah. 

c, status !! . .2! ! Jap,uarx 1::2!£l• 

(i) Number pro_oured. •• ~ ••••• , __ _ I. ' 

(2) In use by holders~ .................... __ _ 

(3) 

{4) 

(5) 

Iz1 reae..r'V'e •• ........... · ............. ~... __ _ 

. 6 Dest.royed ••• · ••.•••••• ., • • • • • • .. • • • . . . __ _ 

-Total . .... di •• ,. • • • • • • • .. • • ___ • • __ _ 

; • Record ot holders maintained by AS-82. 

6. Of this number, .,. ·have been converted to ASAI!i 5 and 

---to ASAM o. 

. Jr -(p 
REF ID:A523210 

'· 

ltlSTORt OP CONVERTER ll·l.34-0 

·voLUME 3 
! (' - .- ) . 

\ 

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'·. 

II 

x 

11 

m 

un 

m 

.. -

~·-·. ' ... 

· ...... ; : . ~ .... 

... ·• ... 

_vM_ a· ___ -_.:,. ·~ ~· ·.· 

~- <JI- 4QWRS~f ~l,Jt,.O •• * •."' •••••• • • 

~R or ~~·-·········••~!I• ~.AHO CRI~O mm:m:- ·······••11••················ fJ1 C~, -

:~ •• i •• -. ·-· ·-·· •••• ,. .-.•• ·-· .: •••••••• It..~' ••• -

- ;·~ . 

·.· .. . > .. ... . ' • ... ·. 

' ... ·· ... 

' ... 

-

. -· .. . -

.. _, · ....· ... ~ . ·:>~·;;~-~~;_:.... ·. :<- ... -~_.·:-·~ .,·,· .. ._ 

:.· .. i-~;,,~- ~_'< ::·.·:,:~!L:~2; .. , :~~~~;~fe~-~~ ~~~k~~D-~, '· .. -~=--_:,_--·~-;~~/~~~ :'--'-'"'""'' ·• ..~.· . / .. _ ............ _.::·:· .... 

- - - ';} . _· ... .:~ 

• • ,,.,.•'.,r• 
REF ID:A523210 

VOLUME 3 

PACE 

XI DEVELOPMEH1I' OF COI~'lER .M.-134...C .••• ~ •• • ••• , "•........ l 

llI. 

:nu 

A. General ................................... !11' •• «- ........ l 

:a. Invention of nstepping Mazert.••••••••••••••••·••• 2 

C. Disclosure of Friedmari-Ilcwlett Stepping 

Ua.ze te the Kavy ... ••••••••-·••••••••••••••••••• 3 

P. De"1elopment by the Navy of the Friec.tman.-

Rowlett Steppin,g Maze ............. ".............. 4 

E. Disclosur·e to the Ar'lf\v of Development.............. ; 

F. SIGM..tUG s.nd SlGl:lEK.-. ••••• , .... ,. ....................... · 7 

G. Evaluation •.••••••••. , •• .,. ••••.•••. , ................... 8 

Ii... Pa tent . • " •..••••• , ......... • ............ • •••••• ~ • • .. • 9 

PROCUliliiMElf'l' OF CONVERlEB. M-1.34-C. • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • • • • .. • • 10 

A. General ••••••••••••••••••••• , •••••••••••••••••••• 10 B~ En.rlJr Procurement and Testing .••••••••••••••••••• lO C.. Quantity Proeui·ement............................... 14 

DISTRIBUTION AND USE ........ · ........ • •••••••••••••••••• 

XIV CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURI TI •••••••••••• " • " •• • ................ . 

A, G~tneral ..................................... o •••• • •• 

FL Si.gnifieant Changes in the Keyinc Instructions for Convert.er M-134-c ••••••••••••• 

xv PliYSIOlll.. SAPEGUARDLiG OF CONVERTER u-134-c •••.•••••.• 

1..\. Gsneral •••••••••••••• fll.••· •••••••••••••••• ,. ••••••• 

B. Safegt\a:rdine Conv~rter M-l.31+-C in Foreigp 

Countries •••••••• ~ •• , ................ ., •••••••• , •• 

C.. Liaison Teams. ~ .......................... I} ......... . 

D. RevrJa.ting the Details of Converter M-lJ4-C ....... . 
REF ID:A523210 

E. Twenty....Pour Hour Armed Guard for SIGABA .. • ... ••. 

F. Transporta.tion of Convert.er. M-134...C 1n Airo.ra~f t . , . .,, •••• ~ ., .......... , ...... tt • • ._ ................ ' 

G. Chest CH-76 ............. " ............... , ••.••••• ~. 

XVI THE COU.1AR JOX.4PR01USE ........ ., ................... • ...... .. 

A. Ge11eral ..... ,..,. ..... •• .... , .... •+ • • ••. • ... • •.•• •. • ... •· .. .. 

B. How it. Happ.ened ........... •• •••,. ... "••·•• .............. . C. Finding t.:1e TL«uok ••••••• • .. , ............. ., ........ .. 

1). Oonsequ.e::.iees of the .Assumed Compromise ••• ,,.,... 

E. Fixing t."le llesponsibilli;.y •• ;, ... , ............ • ....... . 

... ~ .,..M 11rr.1;-.:1 ~ ... ;!'IV OP· l'tl\'l'tllTi't:!ll'i'r.'l'"' Ul<l '-C ~\14J::d.'0Al.·,1.t.1:t ~ \l\,llfY.wl.i.'.15~!. ~· -""' • *'ii"*"••••••••• ... ,. .. 

A. Geri.e1"'4a.1 ........... f ... " •• ~ ............ -4' ........ f:: ,, ,.. • fl • ~ • 

n. Maintenance- Training •••••• ,. •••••• ~ ....... , ••• ~ •.• 

u. Reports from Ovarsea.s Theaters oo SIGABA Maintenar.l~ce • ........ "" .... ,. ........ ~ .................. ¥ • 

D. 

E. 

!LepJ;a.eement and i:Zedesigi of. Parts ............... ~ 

0£ficial War Department Maintenance 

Documents • , .... • ••••• ., •• :. ••• • ...... • •••• • • • • • • • 

F. 

(i;. 

SE'!rviCe Reoord Cards ••• " ~ ................ "" .... ,., Dnst i-i1

esta-. , ,. ~ ••• 4'i • .•• , .... · ................. · ••••• ., ••••• 

.~ IL Rehabilitation Program ...... , •••••••• • .......... . 

XVIII 

APPENDIX I . 
TAB 

·A 

B 

c 

D 

E 

F 

G 

H 

I 

J 

K 

L 

M 

B 

0 

p 

Q 

R 

s 

T 

u 

v 

w 

x 

REF ID-: A-5-2 3210 

LIST OF TADS IN VOLUKE 3 

.Photograph - Convert.er 11-134-C (showing parts listed. beneath 

photograPh. Photograph~ - ConV&rt4r ll-134-0 ( shor.ng part$ list~ !:>enco.th 

photograp4 · . , 

Photogr•pb. - Gonve:rt.er. M-134-C ·(showing standard. cipher- c..~t 

l ehorl title: SlGIVl) in pl.aau) 

Photoz:raph - Converter M.._134...C (sholdng the thrac rotor b~ 

of the stand.'1~ cipher unit (short t,itlei S!GIVI)) 

rhotograph - Conv·ertor JA-134....C (cipher unit rem.ovac Wld interior 

ot Controller Switqh) 

Photog:i..--aph - Convert.er M-l.34-C C shO'.ring part.a listed beneath 

photograph 

Photogr•aph - Convert.er i»l-134-C (Partl,y dismantled - sae parts 

listed beneath photograph) 

Photograph - Cor1verter M-l.34·C (Partly dismantled .... see parts 

list.ea beneath photograph.) 

Photograph. - Corrverter M-134-C ( Unde1--nea.th Viev1} 

Photograph - Convert.er M-1.34-0 (Print.er Unit.) 

F.lga. 10, 17, ia .. 19 

Photograph - Converter M-134-0 (showi.i.'ig esp~oic.lly .Ma.in Shaft) 

Figst ll, 20.t .al 

Photograph ... Conver"r M-134-C (Gears and Carns on Ma:in. Shaft) 

Photograph -· <.:onverter M-1.34...C (Standard Cipher Equipnent 

(short tit.le: S!Gln) partl,r di~t.led) 

Photograph - Convert.er· M-134-C (Special Cipher Unit (short title: 

SIGAMID), partly dismantled) 

DeWJ.«i Description of' Cil•c:ul\;s and VJiring Dii:il.gram SC-D-185llA 

( Actua.:l ti;J.r:i .. ng o:t Convert.er i.A-1..34'.-C) 

Phct<>gt"aph • Plu~able Rotor {short. tit.le: SIGHEK) 

Hist..ol'S' ot Invention and. DGveloprd*1t oi the :Ja:;..·k II ECli 

Convert.er M-l..34-C £1.e~eipt and Di1.Jtritution ~iha.rt 

0.ffioial Documents Conc-emirig Ph;fs.i.cal Safegw.rding of Convert.er M-1)4-C 

E1'0~SA Rules for Gua't'din3 Convert.er ll-1;34-c 

Photogrs.phs .of Converter M-134-C lost in Col.mar, !<'ranee 

beerpta from Official Letters Cor ... c&ming Malntena.nce '.trainin.:; 

Servic(s .Reeord Card l aiort title: SlGGOEli) tor Converter M-134 ... c 

Photogra.ph of ~onvertAr M:-l3i+-C. show;J..ng F.ing~d Cover 
For detailed description and .photographa, see Tabs A, B, C, f>, I, F, 

G, B, 1, J 1 I, J,.1 JI, N, 01 P. . 

A, General 

Converter K-134-C is an electromechanical, transportable 1 cipher 

ma.chine whioh haa an extreme]¥ high degree of cryptographic security and 

an adequate epeed of 4; to 50 words per minute. It was the "backbOne" of 

Armv and Navy joint and indiVidwu cryptographic con:municationa cluring 

World War II. Itl excellent electromechanical opera.tion and its high 

cryptographic security oan. b$ consic:lerod as a culmination of many trials, 

errors,· a.nc:l struggles ot t.he finest. cryptographic teohnieians and engineers 

ot the Army and. NaVy. The developm.en t of Converter 14-134-C ma,y be said 

to have begun in the l920•s when the CJ7pt4na]¥ste ol the Army and Navy 

began t.o concentrate on making cryptography consonant with the machine age. 

All ot the ma.ehinee cli8cussed in the preceding chapters, Vol~s l and 2 .. 

ot this histoq are .te>rerunnere ot Qon~rter M ... 134...c. The exact place 

'llhich each had in the direct line of cryptographic developnent. is explained 

in Chapter I and in the separatf# cha.pt.era devoted to each model in turn 

(coneult index). In the t#ext ot this hiator1 the emphasis has been e.xcluai•l.3' on Arrq developments. Certain Navy developnents are in a 

separate line ot developnent which culminated in Converter M-l.34...C, or 

as the Na.v.y designates the same machine, ECM fl.ark IlJ these Navy·developments are explained in the lJavy "History of Invention and Develcpnent ot 

the Mark II ECM" 1 Tab Q. 

l 
REF·ID:A523210 

fff 1~~rr B. In-nt.ion of "St•J?Pleg •~•" 

Shortly before 15 June 19351 du.ring the interval ld'len preliminary 

) 1 Mr. Frank 

B, Rowlett, pnncipa.i aalie~ant, to Mr• fr~eaaan, 1 conceived t.he ide~ 

wb.ich constitutes the baaia of the •stepping maze« in Converter Jl-134-C.2 

His concept was baaed upon the principle of sending an electrical impulse 

through a rotor maze in order ~o generate a long 1rre~r sequence of 

characters whic;h could then be used. tor various purposes· such a$ keying, 

Mr. Rowlett. and .Mr. Friedman then J91ntl.y developed t.be idea tor thia 

key generator, ma.king it.·su.itable for replacing the tape-control mechaniem 

of Oonvertel" M-l,34. Mo model incorporating their ideas was built a.t. thia 

3 time, however, because the Ohi•f Signal Officer we.a committed to the 

tape-control type· embodied in Converter a-134. Despite Hr. Friedman• a 

urgent recommendations that tht new method of controlling the enciph•ring 

rot.ore (Rowlett-Friedman "stepping maze") be sube1tituted tor ta.pe-ccntrol, 

the Chief Si(;lal Officer was reluctant to me.ke a change after 90 · m.uch 

word has been done in t.he direction ot tape-control.. 'l'heref'ore, Army 

contracts were pl.aeed. for Converter U-134 (see Chapter ) and con• 

' sid.eration of the Rowlett-friedrllan stepping maze was dropped. 

l. Mr. "Friedman was principal cryptanalyst Of SifPal Intelligenc• Service, 

u.s. A:tnr3'· 2~ For cryptographic explanation.of th.e Friedman-Rowlett stepping maze, 

11eo Volume l, Oha.ptor I, pages · 

). See S.ction , page • 
" ., 

1-1-

----

REF ID:A523210 

c. . Disclosure of Fri~-Rowl•tt 

Stepping llaz• to the Rav 

! In October 193.51 Mr. Friedman and Lieutenant Weng4'r, a.asiat.ant to 

:.....-

Con:mander MacLaran, OIC ot the Code and Signal S,,otion, Navy Department, 

had a general discussion of cipher machines. In the course thereof 

Wenger ex.pressed considerabl- di,~-.~t,i$f&ction 1'1t.h the Mark I Ecu1 and 

asked Friedman whether t.he Signal Corps had ailf "good0 .ideas along th•s• 

llnee. Friedman indicated that. there werG several ideas whioh the Sicria.l 

Corps was not exploiting but which he was not at liberty to disclose; 

aj.nt;e they had been placed in the secret ~a.tegory. Friedman further 

indicated that if Wenger so desired, permission to disclose them to the 

Bavy •uld be requested. Wenger asked th.at this be done. AccordingJ.¥, 

Friedman requested and was granted permission by his superiors to dis- . close the <.Wtails of the Friedman-Rowl.ett patent application to representatives ot t.he Navy Depart.ment.~ Therefore, on 2l. October 1935, at a. conference in Friedman• a ot£ice, the details were disclosed to Commander 

lifacLaran and Lieutenant Wenger, who were shown the drawings tha.t formed 

the baois of the patent applicati~;Seria.l No, ·70,412.2 On 31 October 

1935, a second and similar discloeure was made to Commander Mac.La.ran, 

Lieutenant Wenger, and the latter•s assistant, Leiutena.nt Harper. A 

third disclosure was made on l No•ember 1935 to Lieutenant Wood and 

Dugan, also of the. Code and SilJlal Section. Friedman and Rowlett. were .. 

told very little as to the Navy Depirtment.•a reaction to the disclosures. 

l. Jor further details concerning the Mark I ECM, see "History of Invention a.ud Dnelopment of Mark II ECM11 , Tab Q. 

2. See Section , page • 

.3 
REF ID:A523210 

---After the disclosures in 1935 of the Friedman-Rowlett pa.tent 

application to the Navy (as ~le.ined. above in Section C), the principle$ lay dormant in both the Arm.¥ and Navy until the winter of 1936-

19')7, when the Navy was preparing initial specifications tor the 

ECll Mark II. .At this time tho Navy's Lieutenant Wenger1 told the new 

OIO, Commander Safford, of the Na.v Department's Code and Sien.al 

Se()tion, about. the Friedman-.Rowlett idea t'or electrical control. Lieutenant Weneer stated that the unused conoept had interesting possibilities 

and produe&d from his sate a single sheet 0£ cross section paper contain- . ' . 

ing three ele.m.'8nta.ry wiring diagrams,, 2 showing the means by which electrical control or an ECM could be achieved through a. rotor maze. Captain 

Safford immediateJ¥ recognized that such electrical control was the 

answer to many unsqlved problems and. 0 there:fore had to be incorporated. 

in the new machine n. 3 

The Navy then went ahead with their development of the Friedman-. 

Rowlett disclosure without in.for.ming the original inventors or 8113 ot 

the personnel of the Arm:f' SitJla.l Intelligence Service •. " T'ne fa.ct that 

the developnant ot the Friedman...Rowle tt concept for electrical cantrol 

was pursued unbeknownst to the ArJEJ7 Signal Intelligence Service became 

l .. Assistant to the OIC of the Oode and Si[!11al. Sect.ion, .Nav;r.Department. 

2. According to Captain Sa£tord•a memory, this paper was signed by 

Harper, Wenger, Wood, Friedman,, and Rowlett. It has been lost 

since the suamer of 1940. See page 15 ot Tab Q • 

.). "History of Inventtion and Developnent Qf the EOM Mark II, page 15, 

see Tab Q. 
' -

th• baeis tor tuture m1sund•r•ta.ndi.ngs between the two services. The 

.reason that the Signal Intelligence Service was not informed by t.he 

Navy was based on the following oireumstances. The Navy had not been 

conaulted eoncemirig the advisability of printine Mr. Friedman's tech-

- nical papers, entitled "Analysis of a 11.echa.nico-Eleetrical Cryptograph,, 

Pa.rt I and Pa.rt II11 •

1 1rhese papers were printed a.t, the Government 

Printing Office toward which agency the Navy Department entertained. 

serious apprehensions in regard to security. Therefore, the l>irector 

of Mavy Communications, considering it an indiscretion for theSieJ:'lal 

Corps· to have allowed the prL"lting of these secret papers by GPO, 

iseued an order that tne Signal Corps was not to be shown the Mark I ECM2 

or any ot its detailsi T'nerefore not until shortly after Ja.nue.ry 19401 

when the first pilot model of' ECM Mark II was delivered, was the secrecy 

order revoked and the Signal Corps made cognizant of what had been done 

with their ideas. 

E. Disclosure to the Ar& of Developpen t 

J On .3 February 1940, the Director of Naval Communications, Admiral ,_ . 

Noyes, invited the Chief Signal Officer 1 General Mauborgne, Mr. Friedman, 

Captain Cook, and other Signal Corps representatives to inspect a pilot 

model3 ot the ECU Mark II. On that occasion Captain Sa!ford acknowl•dged 

l. Sia Volume l, Chapter • 

2. For development of lark I ECM see Navy "History of Invention and J)fa~l,~pnent of ECM llark II" 1 Tab Q. · 

3. For.details concerning building of this pilot model, see "History 

of lnvention and Developimnt of ECM Uark II", 1•ab Q. 
REF ID:A523210 

to Mr. Friedman, in the })Nsenoe ot Gene;ral Yauborgne and Admiral Noyes, _ ... _,,,. 

the riavy• a use or the Friedman-ll.owlett invent.ion. I 

Later a conference waa call.ad by Oonmander Safford. In attendance 

were .ur. Reiber and Zenner of Teut,ype Corporation, Mr. F.riedma.n of the 

Signal Corps, Comna.nder Safford, Lieutenant Zern ot Na.v~ Communications, ~. 

a.nd possibly others. At the conference the blue print$ or ECK Mark II 

wero earetully examined and a general discussion of c17Ptographic features 

.followed. Four' ax~rimental. changes to the Friedman...;Rowlett circuit had 

been ma.de by Commander Sa.tt'ord and Lieutenant Seiler. These four changes 

were discussed and the following decis,ione made. 

"a. "Index Maze,,. which replaced t.he plugooard in the rriedmanRowlett invent.ion - Retained. The "Index. Maze" accomplished tne same 

cryptographic reault as the plusboard but was much more convenient to 

the operator. · 

b. Grouping of end contacts in the •.stepping Maze" and in the 

"Index Maze," which replaced the arrangement a of the Friedma.nRowlett circuit - Retained •. These groupings t.or;ether with. the .. ten 

circuits through the "Index Maze" gave 49 timtu) as many stepping 

combinations as wa.e possible with the Friedman-iiowl.ett invention 

{51855 against 120). 

· o, Subdivision of "Stepping Uaze 0 into two parts - Unanimous 

deai~icn to return to the original.Friedman...aowlett nst.epping laze." 

friedman protested the subdivision as an unnecessary complieation. 

B.ei:.:>er a.TJ.d. Zenner did not Wee it from the viewpoint of design 

and construction. 

d. St.tppini order tor the "Stepping Maze" proposed by tile r~avy was 3-1-5, t~a~ other two wheels being dead to siniplif.r construction. the stepping order i;;as changed t.o 3-4-2 upon Friedman's 

recommendation.ttl 

l. See "History and. Invent.ion of EOM .Mark 11ii', pe.ge 16, Tab Q. 

6 
1. 

REF ID:A523210 

With the above-listed cceptions "the Mark II ECM., as developed 

by th.e navy and Teletype using tht Friedrnan-Rowlatt Stepping ~ze was 

aatiatactory to and accepted by the Ar.ma. Washington Navy Ia.rd sketch _ 

RW 681201, dated 24April19401 .used as a basis for specifications ot 

the pro<luotion model, is the .earliest-dated dra:wing showing tlie "Stepping 

Haze• and associated circuits exactly in thair present form. 

The joint Army-Nav,y SIGABA system became eff ectiye l July 1941. 

Therefore the two ~ervice$ had a comnon high s~curity enciphering machine .. "'-':···' 

( 

in etf ect before the Pearl Harbor attack. 

F • SlGAllUG and SIGHE.K 

Due to the fact that Converter M.•134-0 or ECK Mark ll was designed 

with a·removable cipher basket, it. presented great possibilities for use 

of an interchangeable cipher basket operating or a di.fterent CrtPtoi;;raphic 

principle. Such a cipher basket was· d.eeigaed in order to make possible 

the conversion, at will, cf Converter Iil-134-C into an equivalent. o! the 

Combined Cipher Machine. The history of this special cipher unit (short 

title; SIGAMUG) is given in t.be "Histo:ry or the Combined Cipher Machine"• 

For a. photograph. of the apeeial combined cipher unit \short t.i tle: 

SlGAll.UG), see Tab N. 

After Converter M-134-C had. been put into service, Major Leo ilosen., 

Chief~ Development Section, Signal Security Branch; conceived, about 9 

148$ 1942, ~ pluggable rotor which could be imiert.ed into one ot the 

positions of the cipher unit for emergency use~ The pluggable rotor 

7 
(ehort t.itJ.e: SIGHEK) waa dist.ributad to all Amy and Navy holders. 

On Ba.y 19, 1943 Contract W 212.3-SC-l.2464 '8a8 placed wiih L. C. Smith 

and Corona Typewriter Oo. for 7,000 SIGHED at. $27.00 each. The cost 

of the Army SIGHllS was fl.89 1000.00. 

SIGHEK was distributed tor emergency use but no need .for it eveJ:" 

arose. on 2 July 1948 it. was requested that action be initiated to 

place on the agenda or the ASA Technical Committee a req_uest to decla.re 

SIGHEK obsolete. For further hist.cry of t.he Army pluggable rot.or 

lshort titie: SIGHSK), see "Hiet.ory ot Rotors". For photograph, see 

Tab P,. For me_thod of use, see "Instructions tor Using the Pluggable 

Rotot'1 lshort title; SIGLUR-l), l February 1945. 

G. Evaluation 

1131. Electric control of the· EOM by means of the FriedroanRowlett «stepping Maze" is the essential feature that places the 

Mark II ECM in a class by itself as regards security. Those who 

have participated in the development of the Kark II BCLt have 

always acknowledged the contributions of the Si91al Corps. The 

"Index Maze" and grouping of end contacts add to the security 

af £orded by the "Stepping Maze," but -would be worthless without 

it. The importance of electric control can OO.s:~ be estimated. by 

a oonsideration of what the Mark II ECll V10uld have been if Friedman 

ancl Rowlett had. not been per.rdtted to disclose their invention to 

the Navy~ Although the •stepping Maze"·~ppears obvious, now that it 

is in u:Je, no one in t,he Navy thought. ot it in a period 0£ 15 years, 

and no foreiL.-n machine em.ploys it; Therefore, the Navy would have 

continued the d.evel.Opment of the older methods and the new ECM 

would have used the mechanical stepping control found in CSP 90.3 

or CSP 1700~ We -.>uld have had a secure ma.chin•, superior to anything in use by foreign nations·, but definitely inferior to our 

present ECK. T'ni1 hypothetical machine ~as •ll as liSP 1700) 

would defy attempts at solution u.nt.11 such time as machine ·and 

code wheels were captured. After t.his, ea.oh dq's keya would 

8 
REF ID:A523210 

resist aolution for a long time. ."Short-cut." solutions would 

!>• impossible, due to the errat,,ia stepping or the code wheels, 

but a trial-and-error solution Would be within the range of 

pos$ibillty. We could not make the nat statement, as we do 

·tor tile Mark 11 ECU, tha.t solution would be utterly impossible. 

ln other words, the ma.chine would be ad.equate to take us through 

World War II but, because we had stopped ehort of the ultimate 

step, there would always be the desire to develop o. new machine 

a_r1<t scrap the old one" Rowl•tt. is entitled to full credit for 

iiis discovery of the principle of the key generator as embodied 

in the "Stepping Maze, n which adds so mueh to t.he excellence o:f · the Mark rl ECM, and .Friedman and Rowlett jointly are entitled 

to full .credit for their joint. invention of methods of applying 

and reducing the principle to practical form. . )2. The Siena! Corps 1 acceptane e of the .Mark II ECJl tor 

Army as well as Joint ~-Navy use reflects credit on all \':ho 

made that decision ••••• n 

H. Patent 
I ~ 

REF ID:A523210 

A, General 

Converters M-134-C were procured by the Army on nine separate 

contracts at a tot.al cost o! &lmoet s~ million dollars. Thia six 

million dol.l.ar$ bought tor the Araq three thousand three hundred and 

thirtyl SIGABAs including their cipher baskets ~SIGMs), completely 

wired index rotors, Wlwired rotors for the control and alphabet mazes, 

necessary maintenance parts, a.nd accessory equipment;. This cost total 

does not include separate rotor contracts of wh.ich theN •re several. 

Nor doe& it include the cost of wiring the alphabet and control rotors. 

This wiring was done at Army Security Agency under conditions of utmost. 

secrecy. 

All manufacturing of Converter M-1.34...C and its Nav equivalent,, 

ECM Mark II, wa.s done by secret contra.eta with the Teletype Corporation 

U400 Wright.wood Avenue, Chicago, Illinois) which aided the Navy in 

the mecmanical and electrical development of the converter .. 

B. Earlv Procuremm t and Testing 

For their first three hundred and twenty two eonvertera1 the Arav 

did not deal directly with the manufacturer but placed their orders 

through the Na.vy Department. The Navy, which 1!lae ordering many of the 

l. For explanation of tnis figure \ 3J.30) eee Procurement Chart on 

opposite page, expeciall.y note indicated by ***· 

10 
--···-- --

REF ID:A523210 

P.BOCU.RIMUT CHART 

FOR 

CONVERTER U..134-C 

(over) 

ll 
l .'" l' PBOCUDJOft' or COBJDDJtS Jl-l)li-C 

, REF ID : AS~~.~ 1:.9 I Bo. of . JlanU- Co~ I 

taetttrer Tenen. 

'11-13 c: ~eletype 

Corp,; ' 

c '!eletne ""· 

Corp. i 1266-PBI~)-21J 

W-2124-SC1 a-13 c . !eletne ~ 11 i•• · Pll '14-bl!KJ 

Corp. . , . PO 12851-PBIL-44-24 

•- 6-o -sc-llo 

.......... v .. I , Serial 

322 

2155 

nclwl1&g aeaoc1ated equipment. these f1Pre• are all approx1•te. sutficient contract data le aot aTallable in Wa 

Agenq to dete.ralne uactq the final. coat ot \he contracts. Thia le also tro.e o~ the per unit coat fipree. ·~• contract when dr&WJl up callee for 1200 CODTel'ters. ·la accordance wt th termiutt.oa at option ot Gonrmaent clause. 

the contract wae . tera111ated 15 Aug -5 tr1 th the lae\ •h1paent of coavertera reeelpted for 1 Oct 45. 

•••aoaewb.ere al.oitg"'1le llne 14 ·conTerten bearlac recleter loe. 3356-3369, which were 41etrlbuted la January aa~ J'ebru17 

1945 were aanutacWrecl.. file•• are. aot ~raclud.ed la the total 3316 converters. .Aleo, Contre.Ct W-36--039-S0-18830. P032627 ... .. ~-45-~. clat• 15 Jlar ~5. tor 112 eoDTerteJ'lll $1.228.0l Md. total cost of contract $144,~6.62 to be dellnred by 

31 Oc$ 45. ns.t caacelle4 15 Aue lf.5. 

l ' ( [ 

\ ·,, 
i 

~·.t ' . 

REF ID :A523210--------

new cc>nvert.era for its own use, included in its orders a sufficient 

number to supply·ArnJT requirements. Three Army requisitions were 

placed with.Navy for these .322 converters and the Navy obtained them ' . ' . . 

from Telet;ype Corporation on t\llO contracts. The ArJir¥ requisition• and 

Navy contracts were as follows: Requ,1ait1~ 79-0CSifP-40 dated ll June 

1940 was plac•d for 85 converters, which were obtained from Teletype 

Corporation by tiavy on Contra.ct No. 74515 dated 19 June 1940 \total . . l 

cost: $201,087.6.3). Requisition 9-00Sig0-41 _. placed wi~h Navy on 

12 July 1940 tor 149 converters (total cost; $29712i:;.oa)1 and Raquieition 56-0CS1g0-4l 11'8.S placed with Navy on ll. Oct •. 1940 for aa converters" 

C total cost: .$114,216.88)., Both these requisitions were fulfilled by 

I 

the Navy• s Contract !'lo, 7797), dated 21 Octiber 1940. 

The first ten of the 85 machines ordered on· the first requisition 

were delivered and accepted b;y Signal Intelligence Service on 17 March 

194l. Ilellwry was 'then auspended for 90 days in order that these ten 

~··~ 

ma.chines couJA. be test.ad. ·Alt.ho~ this teat bore much resemblance to an 

ordinary service t•st, OonverterM-l.34-C was ccxisidered a. modification 

. . 2 . . or Convert.er ll-134-A and there.fore did not have to go through the regular 

f I . 

I" :FJ~ ex~t-ion see Procurement Chart on ·opp0$ite page. 

2. In tact, the new conv•rter was called Converter K-134.;..c in order to 

establish it aa a modification of Convener ~l.34-A, thereb7 eliminat"" 

ing t-he long dela.v:a enc()u.ntered in the established approval. · oh~•l.s 

(~J)proval of. milit.&ry cbaraete~J.•tica 01 aero,. ~c.). Iritoxmatlen 

taken lrom note writU9.n by Kr. Friedman; tiled in ll-134...C Procurement 

(Aug 4?45); WOOAS-80. , 

12 
channels. of ••rvice te•u.ngl and subsequent standardization aa outlined. 

in AR 8So-2S. The test ot the 10 .ma.chiriee reault.ed in a req.uest tor 

very minor mod11'1cations2 which nre eaally made,; by the .manutacturer.-

Dellvery was then reaumed. 

1. · From Pi=Qposid Ptari for Handling the 10 M•l.34::0s to be dellvezoea 

in February l94J.: (actual delivery 17 Mar 4l)i The purpose of the 

test u ... to permit opportunity for en.1 modification and/or improvement in the machine before final delivery in quantity, and 

should be conattued a.1 a service teat in the meaning of AR 850-25, 

inasmuch at Converter 1.-JJ4-C is a modification of an existing 

article of equipoont (Jt-J..34-A). -Filed Folder "M-l.34-C, Procurement 

thru 1942 • . 2. Letter to Mr, Reiber ot Tel•type Corporation, tx-an Paul VI. Albert, 

lst Lt. s.c. "ln reports of service te$t on Converter M-lJ4..C we 

have noted several failures in operation and suggested moditica.tions 

in deeien which a.re proposed as a means of remed.Ying the$e detects. 

We should. like to have you coneid.er .the practicability of these 

mocliticationa and would appreciate your views. The critical. comments 

include the .t'ollowing1 1. Converter rotor pawl falling out ot 

adjuatm.ent.. Suggested. remed,y; Addition of ·a. eecond locking nut on 

the pa.wl adjacent or uae ot a apllt. or self-locking nut instead o! 

the present nut. 2. Spring pile-ups on main operating nit.ch fallifl~- eq~ ~£ adjustment. Suggested. remed,y: Addition of a 

~~fl.~~~<\P epring pile-ups, .3• Present. five ampere i'usea will 

not, ~~t t>peration of t;wo machines 1n parallel, Suggested remed,yi 

Substitution 0£ ten ampere.fuses for ttie present five ampere fuaea. 

We understand that it is doubtful it aey changes can be made in the . machines to be delivered under the fast contract since it is desired 

that nothing delay their delivery. But we would like consideration 

of all t..hese changes on the second contract. At the aam.e time we 

would like to have the matter of plywood cases reconsidered.• 

3. Answer to letter of footnote l from Reiber of Teletype Corporation . lll Jwie 41) announc• the following very simple remedies: Item l. 

W. have changed the deaign of the screw so that it. is flat on the 

end to increase area of' conta.ot.. It.em 2. More rigid 1nspection 

should correct this item. Item. 3~ We· will change to lO ampere 

fuses. r~. will change to plywood. on future contracts; cases a.re 

already made on both contract.a alre$.df placed.. 

l.3 
REF ID:A523210 

C. Quantity Procurement 

Delivery ot converters on t.he first. coutract was begun at the rate 

of 50 per month !or both Army and Navy but Teletype Corporation, With a 

little coercive persuasion,1 almost immediately raised. the delivery rate 

to 100 per month. The Army, which. after the first .322 negotiated separate 

contracts for its own converters, received 20 per month while the Navy 

·was receiving 80. Through the. yea.rs the delivery rate was increased to 

2 .· 300 per month. {These tigures constitute the combined Arms"-Navy delivery . rate; the number received by the respective services being prorated on a 

percentage basis!) 

l. From "Hist~~::'~~5vention and Development of Mark II ECJia writ ten 

by Capt.· L.F. ·sarford,, u.s.M., page 27: "The first contract called 

tor delivery at ti1e rate of 50 ECMe per month, begi.nnin.G June 1941, 

in accol"d,anoe with an earlier ai;reement. Tel.etyi;e reported inability 

to better this schedule so the l~B.M. Co. was approached and tentatively offered the second contract- the mchine to be a Chinese copy 

of the machine made by Teletype. Mr. Walter Lemmon, on behalf of 

I.B.M. agreed to do this,, it Teletype called our bluff. Teletype 

was then given an ultimatum - expedite delivery or snare future centracts. Within 4$ houre we r-coeived word that: a. A.T.&T. 11ad made 

the Western Electric Plant at Hawthorne, Ulinois, available tor 

manufacture of E<X parts or units. b. Assanbly and test. would be 

undertaken at the 1'eletype .t>la.nt at Chicago, J.lllnois, on a two-slli£t 

{and if necessary a tliree-shift) basis. c. · 1.leliv"ry would commence 

in Januaey 1941, unless unforeseen delay occurred,, and an output ot 

100 machines per month could be 6ua.ranteed by May 1941. d. Due · te 

increased labor consts for this schedule, it would be necessary t.o 

increase the contract by 5%. Taese conditions were agreed to, the 

second contract was placed., and the Navy felt happier. There was a. 

slight delay in. deliveries at first but by December 1941 Teletype was 

ahead of schedule. At. the date of writing {Oct 194.3), the output ha.s 

been increased to 300 ECMs per month: the "war effort" of Teletype's 

Production Department has been praiseworthy. Machines have been prorated between Navy and Army on a. percent.age basis except when one 

service 4ad urgent need of ma.ohines and the other agreed to relinquish · 

some of its quota. With no difference except the nameplate, it was a 

simple matter to make the switch." 

2, Ibid. 
REF ID:A523210 

After the tir8t 

Teletype Corporation through the Navy Department:., the Army pagan to 

place its 01lll contracts directly. In all, seven more contracts were 

. plaqe4 .. P'Yfitf< ~ two-19ar per19d fo~. a· r~inder ot 3008 Converters M-l,34-C: ' ·.; . ~ 

Oiil3 November 1941, Contract W..:287-so-3844 (DP 42-4272, Orde_r 

12.35-Cni .. 42) -.~·placed for 45. converters at a total cast.cf 1104,502.5().l 

On 15· August 1942, Contract W-287-ac-4758 U)P 42-S-77, Order ••••• ,,., < < l 

4688-Chi-42) was pl.s.ced for 240 converters at a total coSJt of i4l0,17l.92. 

On 13 November 1942, Contract W-2124-sc-3395 \DP 42....S-.l051 Order 

1266-Phil-42-24) was placed !or 760 converters at a total cost ot il,J7l,495.23.1 

On 5 Ma,y 194.31 Contract W-2l2J-sc-l4260 (a.PR 4.3-Ill-1662 and 2706, Order 

l 29218-Phil-43-24} was .placed tor 500 converters at a total. cost or es55,799.22. 

(h· 7 August 194.3, Contract W-36...039-sc-437 lRPR 43-Ill-.3538, Order 

. l 2639-Ph.il-44•24) was placed for 2.88 converters a.ta total cost.of $4841 280.0J. 

On 23 liovember 1943, Contract W•36-0.39-sc""408J \PR 44-680, PO 12851-Phll44-24) for ll61 converters at a total. cost; of &2,060,802,96.1 

A compa.rison1 of tbe estimated grand totals of Army and r~avy expendi-. 

tures and. number bought is as follows: (T'ne AmJr' total is eom.-wha.t ditl fe:rent fro.m the one g!.ven above because the Navy estimated these totals; 

it is nevertheless a good basis for comparing the two.) 

I. Cost approximate. 

15 
------------------- -- -- - -- ---------

--

,.--

REF ID:A523210 

Quantityl otal Cost Average Cost 

6,7;0 Mark II BClls with 3 sets 0£ t10 .. ,i76·~000 $1,507.55 

Oode Wheels per ~chine &nd · per machine 

fender Spares 

20 sets spare·Parts lits for Major $ 1,008,700 $50,435!'00 

ECM Repair Shops 

51.250 Spa.re Wheel Sets (10 per i .3,515,JOO $ 6s.59 

set in metal box) per set. 

1'ools and Special Equipnent $ 5,627;000 • i,700.00 

!or Repair Facilities 

NAVY TOTAL $14,7s2,ooo 

3,310 U.S. Army Ee.Ms with Spa.re • 5,627,000 $ 1,700.00 

Wheel Sets and Spare Parts per machine 

\Estimated cost) estima.t.ed 

10,060 GRANT TOTAL EOMs (Navy ... Arn\Y) 120,409,000 \Estimated) 

l. This chart is· copied .from "His t.or,y of Invention and Development of 

Mark II ECJI" written by Captain t. · F. Safford,, u.s.N., page 2S. 

16 
REF ID:A523210 

CHAPTER .llll. DISTRIBUTION AND USE 
CHAPTER XIV. OlUPTOGRAPHIC SEctmITI 

A. General 

Converter u ... 134 .. c is the most cryptographically secure means of 

encip.tw.rment used during World War II. Until the latter part of 1943, 

the following was the official security evaluation of Converter M-l.34-C 

ms.de by Army Security Agency: 

The Converter M-134-C is 1 to the knowledge of the cryptanalytic 

t•chnicians of SSJ)1 the most secure electro-mechanical cryptograph 

that is now in use. l.t the rules .for cryJ>1;ographing meseages are 

followed to the letter• tqe messages ••• a.re secure from any known 

l cryptanalytic a.tta.ck, 

In the latter part o! 194.3, Anal.ysi• Section of what is now 

Methods Branch began e.n intensive secarity study ot Converte_r M-134-C. / 

This study resulted in revised Qonclus1ons, a swrmary ot which follows: 

Conditions permitting recovery of cryptographic elements are as 

follows: 

l. At least 10 messages in depth or flagrant misuse of the 

indicator system are necessary before elements of the mchine 

can be :reconstructed. · 

2. Under proper opera.ting conditions, cryptanalytic recovery of 

daily keying elemen t.s to allow t.he reading of traffic is 

impractical, even it all the rotors ot a set ... all procedures 

for use, and the 'Wiring of the machine are known. By "proper 

operating conditions," it is meant that the machine is 

.t'tinctionine correctly-, established operating procedures are 

strictly observed, and that the literal plain texts of one 

or more messages are not available. 

l. Statement made to Assistant Chie! of Statf, c;....21 17 May 1943· 
REF ID:A523210 

. ).. To eotabllih the daily C?'1Ptogra.phic set-up o.f the :machine b,y 

t.he exhaustive trial method, the number of assumptions wnich 

must be made ~a.ls 20xl8xl6xll1xl2xlO:db6x.4x2 rotor arrangements, tJ.m.es 10 index iettJ.nge. This would require that . rotor wil"ings be known. · 

The detailed rep0rt.s 0£ security etudies done by Analysis Section, 

Methods Branch, Security Division are available in the files 0£ that 

Section.. A list of these repe>rts .fo~ows: 

Volume I 

l. Historical Survey of the Work Done by the Machine Anal$Sis 

Unit on the Converter M.-lJ4...C (SIGABA) ....................... 2220 

2 •. Technical Survey of the Converter 14-l,34-C ••• ~···•••••••••••• 1220 

J. Report o! Analysis ot a Five Wheel Cl7Ptogra.ph with 

ElTatic Stepping lPal'ts One an:i Two) ••••••••••••.••••••••••• 1220.l 

Volume Il 

l,. Report of Anaiysis of a Five 'Wheel Cryptogi-aph with 

Erra tie Stepping l Parts 'lhree and Four) ••.• , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1220. l 

2. Five Messages in Depth•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1220.2 

.3. Identification ot One Rotor w1 th Matched Plain and 

Cipher Text•••••••••••••••••••••••••••·•·······•···~········ 1220.3 

4. Reconstruct.ion of 11.Qtors frf>!ll Non-Random Indicators 

i.n M ... l.Jl. ..... C •••• • ••••••• s ., ••••••••••• ~ ••••••••.• •, •• • ... • • • • • • • • 1220 .4 

5. Solution of Two Identical Messages Having CW5 Ott ••••.•••••• 1220.5 

6. Ten Messages in Depth •••• , •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1220.6. · 

7. Comparison ot Arm:f and Navy Indicator Systems, M-134...a •••••• 2220.6 

8. Traffic Study on M-134....0 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2220.7 

l. From ha1storical and C17pt.oiogic Summary ot dryptosystems, VI; 

Literal Qryptomechanismsn. ·Filed CSQAS...SJ. 
:~ 

'-. 

REF ID:A523210 

Volume III 

'·, \ 

l. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

.5. 

6t 

7. 

's. 

9 •. 

10. 

Stud¥ of the Navy Indicator S7stem ••••••••••••••••••• 1220.7 I 

Analysis of the ria.v.r Modified SIGABA ei ven Complete Depth .•••••••••••••••• ., •••••••.••••••••••••••••• 1220.s 

AnalJ'ais of the Navy llodilied SIGABA given 20 . Messages in Depth ••••• •• • • ••••• , •••.• • ••• • ............ , 1220 • 9 

Recognition of Rotors :tar the Uodifi~d SIGABA from 

7 Message$ in Depth with A:a4 and AR5 Past Rotors ..... 1220.10 

Recognition of Rotors tar the Modified SIGABA from 

7 Messages in Depth with ARl and AR5 Fast Rotors ••••• 1220.ll 

.S.t.~~}>~·aeeording of Radia.tions of SlGJODO •••••••••• l.220.l.2 

Reconstruction ot a Rotor on. Modified SIG~A 

from a Possible Violation .......... , .................. l220.5l 

Solution of 1:wo Identical Messages Enciphered 

.on .M-134-C having .AR4 Ott •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1220.52 

Solution Based on Two SIGABA Isologs with AR4 and 

AR5 Otff,Set Between Two Encipherment.s •••••••••• · ••••••• 

Reconstruction of AR4. and AR5 Based on Two SIGABA 

Isologs with Only' AR4 O!tset Between the Two 

Enoipherment s .. ......................................... " • 

B. Significant Changes in the KezieB Instructions £or 

Converter 11-134-<f 

The keying instructions tor Converter M-134-C describe the policies 

and procedures tor assembling and aligning 1;he rotors. TJ1e of .ficial War 

Department keying instructions, which have been successively in effect 

through the ye&'t"s, are as .follows: 

From July 1941 - June 1945; , "Keying Instructions for Convert.er 

M-134....cn, {short tit.le: SlGQZF). , 
REF 

FrQJn June 1945 - l Nov.· 1946: llOperating Inst.ructions tor · Conve~er M-134-0" (short title: SIGQZf-2). 

From l Nov• 1946 - - - - - i n0pera.ting Instructions !or 

Converter M-134-C" (short title; SI~·;;), 

The rotors of Converter 11-134-C, the function of which is explained 

in Volume 1, Chapter I, pa.gee 6 through 12, are used in three rotor 

ba.nka of the cipher unit, (short. titlei SIGIVI) (see Tab M). The 

three rot.o~ banks of the cipher unit, SIGIVI, are the alpbabet rotors 

(see Tab D), the stepping control rotors \see Tab D), and the index 

:rot.Qrs (see Tab D) • A general expression of the policy on reassembly 

and realignment of rotors is the.tall tb:roagh the yea.rs the rotors.were 

reassembled once a da7 a.nd r.,U.igned. before the encipherasnt or every 

message.. 'this statement is not entirely accurate even in the early days 

ot use, but it is an excellent point of reference to keep in mind when 

reading the deviations from this general policy. A detailed description 

of t.he keying procedures authorized succeaeiveq by SIGQZF, SIGQZF-2, and 

SIGQZF•2 is given in Appendix I. The.important. changes in policies 

conceming assembly and alignment of alphabet., control, and index rotors 

are pointed out in the paragraphs which follow. 

According to the first keying instructions, SI~ {July 1941 -

Jqne 1945), the :rotors of.all three rotor banks (index, control, and 

cipher rotors) are reassembled dailf (see ·sample Table No. 2 from 

SIGQZF, following page). The rotor alignment tor the index rotors, which 

. ie given in the rot.or assembly table, ( aee sample Table No. 2 from 

SIQQZF, following page), remains the· sa.rne throughout the dq. The rot.or 
1'""" 

REF ID:A523210 

... "'•'(; 

'; ;;,.. 

• "' ,' M • ~ •• • • ' 

I ·'. 

; ,I ' 

. ' . -- _....,. ··r 

"le,ing lnetr\¥Jtion• for Converter. . . K-~34....cn . (~ort · t;~tl.e; · SIGQ?J') 

-· .. 1 

. ,''Operating In~ructiona for. Converter ... . M-1.34-C" (short . t1tl-e 1 SIGQU-2) · · ; 

. _(For a.ample ktlf ~t,, t~m .$1GQ.ZV-l, 

_._page .• J·· . . ···- . . . 

(over).· · . 

---------------- -
~·~ ... 

DAY 

OF 

llON'l'H 

1 

2 

. 3 

DAY 

or 

KONTH 

l 

2 

3 

REF ID:A523210 

----- -- ''. ') ff) { --- .,,,, ....... "'\ f,.,.,:j)e:, .. 

. ' . . '', ~ ' 

\

I. i ,, · . ~ ' I 

', .. ,· • .' f 

FOR COMPARISON 

SAMPlB DY LIST FROM $IGQZF 

Type used from Jul.J'. 1941 th~ June 1945 

TABLE NO. 2 

JANUARY 

DAILY BO'l'OR.ASSDfaLY 

CONTR 

(MIOOIE) 

l 0 5 

4il 8 2 

7 0 2 

• ,l 

SAKPI.8 l(EY UST. FROK SIGQZF•2 · 

Type used. trom J'.uno 1945 thi-u l'N6vember 1946 

TABLE'I -'.DilL!:~Toi ASSEJiBLY. ~D caioi GRoUP 

INDEX 1R0~1.' 

ALIGNMEN*? CONTROL 

II.ODIE 

15 20 39 4S 51 9 5R l 7 3 6 8 2 

l2 2.3 32 42 54 ; 0·3 7 9 l 2 4 

19 29 34 47 ;o l I+ 7R 0 ) 6 8 5 

INIT 

ALIGNIEN'l 

JUDPX 

SEE CA 

CEFWR 

26-.30 

·CHECK· 

GRO 

Gil X PC 

AKOL1> 

J.l.W HP I 

(continued opposite page) 

• , ·- ' <- • 

- ',,._ -·1 ...... , ... 

... -"'"";: 
DAY· 

OF 

ONTH 

REF ID:A523210 

; -

INDEX 

(FRONT) 

ALIGNMENT 

DEX ( FB.ONr) -

ALIGNMENT AS 

SHOWN IN 

TA.BIE I (PAGE 2) -

) 

T.ABIE·ll - DAILY ALIWMEN.1' 

INDEX 

(FRONT) 

ALIGNMEW? 

INIEX 

(FRONT) 

AUGNJIENT 
ID:A523210 

alignment for the eoni;rol and cipher rotors, ch is given.in the 

rotor a.@aembly table (see aam.ple Table No+ 2 trom SIGQZF, preceding 

page), remains the same throUghout the dq and is the alignment used to 

derive the message rotor alignment each t1μle a message is enciphered 

dur;ing that day. 

According to SIGQZF-2 (June 1945 - 1 Nov. 1946), the control and · 

cipher rotors a.re reassembled daiJ.i, according to Table No. l of the 

key list (see sample ta.ble,_preeeding page), but the index rot.ors are 

neve~ .rea•~~~led~· ;,SICQZJ'.·2 does not state that the i.'ldex rotors are 

never reassembled, probably because a. h$0g over of old style key lists 

might still be effective after distribution of 'Sl~-2. However, the 

new sxGQZF .... 2 onl;r gives instruct.ions for and examples of index rotor 

alignments. Obviously realignment (without reassembly) of the index 

rotors ie the new policy even though. it is not expressly a ta.bed. By 

the t.im.e SI~~.3 is p\iblished on 1 Nove.ruber 1946, this policy, which 

actually became ettecti~ w;i.~,q.sI~ZF':"'2 in June 1945, is expressly st.ated: . . . ; 

I',·· '' 

"The index rotors a.re always used in a fixed order in the five rotor 

positions ( J.Q...l 9, 20-29' 30-39.; etc.) n. The policy for realignment of 

the rotor5 o.t ~l three rotor banks (index, control, ar>..d cipher) is also 

changed in SIGQZF4. According to SIGQZF (July 1941 - Ju..'le 1945), the 

rotor alignment for the index· rot.ors (see sample Tab!e No. 2 from SialZP, 

previous page) remains the same throughout the day and the alignment ot 

the control and Qipher rotors. (see sample Table Mo. 2 from SIGQZJ'), 

previous page) used to derive the message rotor alignment each time a 
REF ID:A523210 

message is enciphered remain1 the same throughout the clay. According 

to SIGQZF-2 (June 1945), the initial alignments for the rotors or all 

three rotor banks are changed during the day· according to the clasaitioation of the ••sage (see sample Tables l and 2 from SlGQZF-2, 

page ) , The alignment 0£ the index rotors is the same for all SEOBET 

messages on any one day (see sample Table l: from SIGQZF, page ) but 

is ditterent from the alignments for CONFIDENTIAL and RESTRICTED messages 

(aee sample Table 2 frtm SI~F-2, page ); the alignment of the index 

rotors is the same on 8JJ3' one day for all CONFimNTIAL messages but. is 

different .from the alignments for SECRET and RESTRICTED messages; etc. 

the al.ie,nment of the control and cipher rot.ors# used to derive the 

message rot.or ilignmei1t :for the control and cipher rotors, is also 

changed a.eoording to the classi.fieation 0£ the message.. For SECRET 

, me$8ages, one aligpment · for the control and ciph•r rotots is used 

throughout. the dB.¥ to determine the message rotor alignment {see sa.mple 

Table 2 from SIGQZF-2, page ); tor CONFIDENTIAL messages another 

alignment. for the control a.."ld cipher rotors is used throughout the dQ¥ 

to determine the message rotor alignment (see sample Table 2 from 

SIGQZF ... 2, page ) ; tor RESTtUOTSD messages, still another alignment is . ' 

used tor the control and cipher rotors to.determine the message rot.or ( . 

alignment {see sample Table 2 from SIGQZF•2, page· ). 

According to SIGQZF-;;, (l Nov. 1946) the policy tor daily reassembl.Y 

of the control and cipher rot.ors is the same as in SIGQZF-2 (see sample 
-· ...... ,-

DAY 

OF 

UONTB 

l· 

2 

REF ID:A523210 

SA.I.PIE KEY UST FRCJl SIGQZF-3 

Type used from l Novooiber 1946 

, I1mEX (FRONT) . CHECK 

GROUP 

INDEX {FaONT) ALIGNMENT 

l ;;1 44 53 

15 ~ 32 46 56 

2 -30 

CHE OK 

GROUP 

PWVM'l' 

EHEWB 

ALIGHMENT 

RNHVC 

SEMNO 

BESTRIC'lZD 

INDEX (FRCWT) . ALIGNMENT 

17 25 43 ~ 

l¢ 27 :34 42 ;6 

:;o 

CHECK 

GROUP 

KCSD'1' 

RSTHH 
REF-..,ID :A523210 

table; preceding page). The polio.v for the !ixed a1aembly ot the 

index rotor• and realignment. ot the index rotoJ>s durine the day 

acc~rding to t.he classification of the message is also the same 

(see sample Tables land 2, preceding page). There ls no loneer any 

nec•asity, however, for a daU, rotor alignment of the control and 

cipher rotors by which to determine the m•esage rotor alignment. 

Accoi-ding to SIGQZr-J, the meaeage rotor alignment ia det.emdned in 

an ·entirely new way~ which eliminates t.he' need tor a daily rotor 

alignm$llt of the control and cipher rotors• 

According to SIGQZF and Sl~F-21 the message rotor a.lignment1 (the 

alignment on the cont.rol and cipher rotors at the beginning of ·encipherm.ent of a message) 1e derived as follows: A group of 8ll1 five let.t.ers 1 

except Z selected at random is used es the mtUHJage keying element. l t 

will hereinafter be termed the internal ffi!&Saa&! indicator... • Suppose 

the five letters selec;ted •• are XARPG. After the control, cipher, and 

index rotors are assembled and ali~ed ••• , the live letters selected at 

random will be enciphered and ~he cipher resultant printed on the tape. 

This cipher resultant will hereinafter be termed the external messae 

indicator and 0is transmitted t'lith the mesa.ago. 'I'he control rotors and 

the cipher :rotors a.re then turned by hand and a.llgned to the internal 

message in&a.tor (XARPG in· this example) by the operator. NEVER all.go 

l. Identified as the '"internal message indicator" "in SIGQZP and SIGQZF~2. 
.REF ID:A523210 

Ii JJJ _ i~t( . the rotora to the •xtemal meas~ge indicator {the letters printed on 

the ta.eJ , but always t.o the internal messam indicator. 

According to Sl~Zf .. 1 th.e mefaage rotor alignment is derived as 

follows: 

1. Select s. group ot any five letters at; r~~ (mea•age indicator). . . 

2. Z$roize the converter. 

3, Leave the controller at "R", a.nd then pressing dO\'Vll the "Blank 

and 11Repeatlt ~19 simultaneousJ.T until the 1etter non in the 

stepping control. and alphabet rotors comes to rest. at the 

re.terence mark,. 

4. Strike the numeral ke1,. 11 the number at ti.mes requU-ed to align 

the lst stepping cc:ntrol rotor (nEuct to t.he left end plate) to 

the let letter 0£ the message indicator. 

5. Align the 2nd-stepping control rot.or by striking the numerical 

key, 21 the )J;'d by strildng th·e numeral key, .3, eta. until all 

five stepping control rotors a.re aligned to the 5 letters of 

the message indicator .. 

6. It aI\Y rotor .is stepped past the correct letter or it the rotor$ 

are not·al.ign•d in proper s~u.ence, the entire process must be 

repeated from the zero1ze position. 

7. Alter the stepping control rotors have been aligned, check the 

alignment of the alpha.bet rotors to ins\tre that all five are 

not a.ligned to non, 
°REF ID:A523210 

f8P ~Off 

A. General 

Since Converter M-134-C was used by both the Arrq and Navy, any 

sateguarding requirement followed by one and violated by the other would 

have been meaningless. T'neretore, on 26 June 1942 a very important 

agreement between the two services was drawn up in order to nullify 

this possibility, This agreement, a copy of which follows,2 formed the 

basis o! many of tne specific Army regulations concerning physical safeguarding of Converter M-134-C. 

ARMY-NAVY JOINT POLICY CONCERNING DISTRIBUTION AND DISCLOSURE OF 

CRYPTOGRAPHIC DISIGN OF THE E~l34C 

"It is mutually agreed that the ECM-ll-1:340 will not be placed 

ashore in foreign territory except at auoh places where armed 

personnel ot u.s. forces a.re stationed in sufficient numbers to 

properly safeguard the physiq~ security of the machine. 

"The Army or Navy may ~ke the machine available to the Allies 

or the United States if the ma.chine is accompanied by a Liaison 

Officer. and Coromunic;ation Group. It will be i!.he duty of Liaison 

Officer to prevent the viewing of the machine or ite operation or 

associated equipment by other than authori2ed personnel of U.S. 

armed forces. 

1. The 8Biatory o! Converter U:134::C11 is, ve~y likell, the only history 

ot cryptographic equipment to contain a special chapter on phfsical 

safeguarding. Most other items of cryptographic equipmant are considered adequately protected by general rules which apply to-aategaurding all ory_".)t.ographic equipment, special rules being neither abundant 

enough nor aigniti.oa.nt enough to sponsor a whole chapter. The opposite 

is true in the case of SIGABA. "Since the cryptographic principle 

and design of Converter M-134-C is in the sole possession of the 

United St.ates and it is considered the best cryptographic device of its 

type ••• u, its physical prot.eotion constituted a unique problem which 

was aolved by means of special rules which applied to it a.lone • 

..._ 2. See also Tab ,S for photostatic copy ot the agreement with signatures 

attached. 
/--

REF ID:A523210 

"The U • s. Army and llav;y mutually agree that they will 

regard as secret i:;lforma~ion to be divulged only to the armed 

forces or t.he u. s. or to any u .. s. citizen required to possess 

this inf'orma.tion 1n the interests of t.he United States, any · 

details concerning t.he ECM-Ml.340 including rotors, wiring diagrams, keys, keying inetruotione and operating instructions. 

"If at any time either the Army or the Navy considers it 

neCeSea.ry tO deviate in any lf83 from thiS policy I the One Shall 

fully inform t.he other of the facts and. oireμmst.ances and the 

change in policy, if any, shall be by joint agree.ment.u 

/s/ frank w. Bullock 

Frank w. Bullock 

Colonel, SieJial Corps 

/s/ ·Joseph it.. Redman 

Captain, u. s. N. 

Director of Naval Communications 

The ofi'iciaJ. War .Department. regulations which. have their basis in 

the above-quoted joint. Arn\y-Nav.r agreement are as follows:· (All the 

letters here listed are included in Tab S.) 

l. "Policy concerning distribution and disclosure o! cryptographic 

design of ConVl3rters M-l.34, M-134.A, M-1340", SPSIC 461 Codes, 

24 Aug1l.st 1942. 

·2, ~Policy concerning ciist.ribut.ion and disclosure ot cryptographic 

design of Converters M-134, M-l.34A, M·l34C", AG 413.51(1 Jul 44) 

oa-s-a..u, 3 July 1944. 

1+. 

ui ollcy eonceming distribution and disclosure of cryptographic 

design of Converters M-134, .M-134A, M-134c 11 , (change letter),, 

AG 4lJ.5l (26 Jul 44) OB-S-B-14, 28 July 1944·. 

HPolicy concerning distribution and dis closure or cryptographic 

design of Convert.er Y-134-cn, AG 41.3. 51 {ll Oct 44) OB-S-B-M, 

12 October 1944.1 

0 Policy concerning distribution and d.i,.sc.losure of cryptographic 

design of Converter M-l.34-C", AG 413.51 (15 Jun 45J OB-S-B-K, 

17 June 1945. 

l. Letter, AG 413.51 {ll Oct 44) oa:S::U,, 1? Oct 44 was reseinded 

by Letter AGA0-5 Jl2.l {15 Dec 47) CSGID, ~'R.ecission of Certain AG 

Letters", 19 Dec. 1947· 
REF ID:A523210 

6. Paragraph.s 1 , a..'1.d o structions for Converter U-l.34-Ctt, \short title: SIGBRE-l), AG Jll .. 5 \21 Feb 

45) OB-S-B, authenticated 7 May 194.5; published June 1945. 

{All of t.hese publications except the last. two have been superseded 

by the one following it in the list .. 1) The next three sect.ions of this 

text are devoted. to showins in what respects the fii:•st three paragraphs 

of the joint Army-Navy agreement (see pages J remain the same and in 

what way t.hey are ela.bo:rat.ed a.'1d made more specific in the ilar Department 

publications listed in. the paragraph above. 'rhe first paragraph of the 

joint Army-Mavy agrecmi.ent., which deals v11th the subj.ect, "Safeguarding 

Converter 1:.7-134-C in Foreign Countries", is traced through these six 

publicatior1s in Section D" The second paragraph of the joint Army-Navy 

agreement, which deals with the subject, "Liaison Teams", is traced 

through the six publications in Section C. The third paragraph, wtdch 

deals with 11Revealing the Details of Converter M-134-C", is traced. through 

·the six publications in Section D. The special rules on physical sateguardirig of SIGABA which do ~ have the joi.nt Army-...~a:v7 agreement as 

their d.ireqt Eio:utc~ are discussed in Sect.ion B, »Twenty-Four Hour Armed : ' .·.··. 

Guard for SI GABA 11 ; Section 1, *'Transportation of Converter M-134-C in 

Aircraft"; and Section G, 11Chest. 76". 

l. Lett~r AG 413.51 (ll Oct 44) os-s-S:M, l2 Oct 44 wa.s recinded by 

Letter AGAO-S 312.l \15 Dec 47) CSGID", Recission of Certain AG 

Let.ters8 , 19 Dec. 1947. 
REF.ID:A523210 

B. Sateguard.!pg Converter 11 .... 134-c in Foreisn Countries 

The tirst. paragraph of th• joint Amy-Navy poller (see pages ) · 

was first brought to tne at\ention of Arm:, users by the above-listed 

SPSIO le1it-er of 24 Auguat l.942 <.Tab S). Thia letter quotes the first 

paragraph of the joint Arn\,v-Navy agreement and then adds a specific 

statement of policy! concerning who, in the Arrrrt, is to make the decision 

as to what constitutes 11 ••• sufficient numbers to properly safeguard the 

physical security of the machine •••• n2 The person so aut,horized by this 

SPSIC letter was " ••• the commanding officer of μie highest echelon 

present •••• nl The next letter on the subject \Letter AG 413.51 ll Jul 44) 

OB-S-B-K, 3 July 1944, see list. in paragraph a.bove and Tab S) expressed 

in the same policy in al.most3t.ne same words. The rescinding AG letter of 

12 October 1944 ~AG 4l:h5l \ ll Oct 44J os-:;..a ... .m, see list 1n paragraph 

above and Tab S) expressed the same poliey 1n the same words with the 

. following addition: "This policy also applies to operation and maint.enance 

instructions, rotors, wirine diagrams, and any similar associated material , 

for use with Converter M-134...C". 

· i. · Letter, SPSlC 461 Codes, Signed by order of the Chief Signal O!!icer, 

Frank w. Bullock, Col., s.c., 24 Aug 1942. The first. par. of this 

letter read as followa: (cf'. let par. joint Army-Navy agreement, page ) 

"l. It. is the policy of the War Department that Converter~ M.-134, M-l.34A, 

M-1340 will not be pla.cecl ashore in foreign territory except at such 

placea ~here armed personnel or the u.s. forces are stationed in numbers 

deemed eu:f'ticient by the commandine officer ot ~he high.est echelon 

present to properly safeguard the physical security ot t.he machines •••• " 

' 

2. Joint Arn\v-Navy Agreement, "Army-Navy Joint Policy Conce:-ning Distribution and Disclosure of .Cr,yptographic.Desi~ 0£ t.he ECM-li-lJ4C~ 26 June 1942. 

3. Same except that. the !fiit seven words are changed trom "insure the .. ph¥:il1oal security of the machines" to "properly safeguard. the physical 

seauri t.y ot the ma.chines". 
t 

l 

I 

r 

., 

/' .... , 

REF ID:A523210 

On 17 June 19451 a more specific ArIIf3' policy was publiShed concerning the placing of SI GABA shore in foreign territories. The new AG 

letter {Tab S),. still merely a clari!icat.ion o! the original. policy ot 

the Army-Navy agreement was published because it was anticipated ihat 

upon the cessation ot hostilities in.Europe, there would be an increas• 

in the number of requests for authorization to use OonvertEll' M-l.'.34-C ·in 

neutral natione, in ll'berated. and occupied countries, and in u. s. 

poaeessions and territories overs~~s. The new letter restates the general 

policy of the joint Army-Navy agreemnt and then adds a. new requirement 

for insurance of "immediate a.nd compl.ete destruction in the .event of 

imminent capture or subjection to physical compromisefl. The new elaboration of the general joitlt Army-.NaVT policy for placing SIGABA ashore in 

forei§Jl territo" does not, as does the previous AG letters (see page 

for list), give the "commanding ilfficer of the highest echelon present" 

blanket authority to approve issuance but instead provides that the 

operational c.onditions will determine the authority for approving requests 

£or installation and use or Convert.er 11-134-c. The operational conditions 

·and authority to be used with each condition are stipulated in the letter 

in question·· (AG Let.ter 41.).51·{15 Jun 45} OB-S-B-11, 17 June 1945) as 

follows: 
,~.· 

·REF 

OJ?!rational. Condition 

o. s. Al'll\Y units engaged. in tactical 

operations in foreign territory 

U. s. Army units in liberated and 

occupied countries under control ot 

tJ. s. armed forces 

or 

in U. S., or Allied territories and 

possessions within the territorial· - limita of a theater or area of Q~t.ai~ons, depar~ilent or detence ·C,~ds • . . ,_,_:i~; 

u.· S, Army units .j.n neutral natiens 

or 

in liberated or occupied countries 

·!!.21 und!r c0ntrol ot u. s. armed 

forces, · or 

in Allied nations not within the 

territorial l.1m1ts-of a theater 

or ·area or operations, department, 

or defense command. 

Authority 

Commander of the highest echelon 

of .U.S. Armed .forces present. 

during tactical operation. 

U. s. commander of the theater, 

area, depart.moot, or defense 

command concexned. 

The War Department docwmnt., "GEmeral. Instructions for Converter 

M-l.34...C11 (short title~ SIGBRE-l), June 1945, gives, in par. 17 (Tab S), 

l. An example of a request for WD appr0val and its answer li1ich rlts this . category is quoted below: Message., From Allied Force Hq., Caserta, 

Italy; To; WD, Action G-2, Into ASF. "Understand new policy governing distribution of SIGABA 1n foreign countries requires WD approval 

issue to U.S. units in territory no~ \Ulder u .. s. Forces. Request 

approval issue to Hq. U.S~ Oocupa.t.ional.' FQrces, Austria. which will be 

located in Vienna. Not yet known but is ant~oipa.ted to be at lea.at 

regimental Combat team in addition to Hq,. personnel and service troops. 

Geouaphical locat.ion of Hq and its position relative to troops of , other nations ~ot yet certain. One each signal operat.ions bat.talion 

will operate· signal center includine code room on 24 hour basis. 

Sir,nal sect.ion start includes capable and experienced signal intellleeuce service personnel. Ollests CH. 76 and incendiaries available 

for each SIGABA. Al.so request confirm.at.ion that SIGCUK mJJ:f be in-

. stalled at. same location. Answer: To: CG, Allied Force Hq., Caserta, 

Italy. Froou WAR'lV'.sO 11 lnstallation SIOABA and SIGCW in Vienna reur 

FX 97796 is approved under security conditions outlined rt, Messages 

filed in Holder File 2368. 
REF ID:A523210 

the same policy as that defined in the above-mentioned AG letter. 

(SIGBRE is current]3 in &fleet - August 1949.) 

The 17 JW\e 1945 AG lett.er and SlGBRE both a tate the additional 

req.uirem.ent. that units request.ing approval for SIGABA insta.llaUon 

"inform the approving a.uthorit,1 a.a to the volume, nature, and scope 

of the unit's communication requirements, the number and type of U.S. 

troops stationed at the proposed installation to insure its continued 

physical security, and the measures and mean.a to be employed to effect 

its immediate a.nd complete destruction in an emergency." 

Cit Liaison Teams 

The second. paragraph of the joint Army-Navy agree.ment2 remained 

the same as the original in all the Amy inst.ructions published through 

the years with the obviously necessary exception that the War Department 

(see quotation below), rather than the 0A.r.rey or Navy• (see second par. 

of joint Army-l~avy agreement, page ), was substituted as the authority. · 

The policy stated in the second paragraph of thls joint Arn\V'-Nav,r. agreem.ent $.s found in SPSIC letter (signed by o~der of the cso: Frank W. 

Bullock, Col., S.C.), 24 Aug. 1942; in AG letter 413.51 (1 Jul 44) OS..-S-13.J4, 

3 Jl1l3 1944; in AG letter 4lJ,,51 (ll Oct 44) OB-S-B-M, l2 Oct. 1944; in 

AG letter 413.51 {15 Jun 45) O.B-S-B-M, 17 June 1945; and in par. l5c of 

"General Instructions for Converter M-134-Ctt (short title: SIGBRE-l), 

June 1945, as follows: 

l. See .footnote l, preceding page. 

2. See page .. 
REF ID:A523210 

·The War Department. may make Converter M-134-C available 

to the Allies ot the United States proyided that' it is accompanied by a liaison o.fi'ice:tt; and Communication Group. It will 

be the duty of the liaison officer to prevent the viewing of 

the convert.er or it1 opera~iAA or the viewing or associated 

equipment and document•, by ~ne other than authorized per- · sonnel of the u. S;. armed torces~ 

The policy tor the f<.?l"mation of liaison teams proved to be vecyworkable. Becaus$ the most. .axt.ensive sid~by-slA~·fight.ing with forces· . ' •' . 

ot an Allied Nation waa done with British troop~,. liaison tea.ms for 

Britisn-u.s. Arm-g conmuni~ation at Corps and Division level, before 

distribution or the Combined CipheJ;" .Machine, provided. the most extensive 

use ot liaison tea.ms :«1~ &+~At The .period be.fore distribution ot I 

ti1e CCM wa• during the ~~· pf ~h~ war in which the .Med~terranean 

T.i:u~ate~ Qf Operations was particularly important. Liaison tea.ms were 

also used in the later period ot the war - that of the invasion ot 

Europe by the Allied E:kped1t1onary Forces, but t.o a lesser extent, because b7 this time use of CCU had grea.tl3" decreased the need. 

In the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, SlGABA liaison, teams 

were chief.13' organized. and dispatched by the 849t.h Signal Intelligence 

Service. Alt.hough th.is statement sounds like the iteration of an 

administrative detail, it is not, tor 849th SIS looms important in 

supplying the cryptographic needs ot their t.ll eater 1n much more th:an 

a routine way. lFor cpl.a.nation of a plan which ma.de for an adapta.b1e . 

means of supPlying ccyptograpnic needs in the Jlediterranean Theater, 
REF ID:A523210 

aee the letter quoted in footnote 1 below. This letter especia.lly 

deals with plans tor use of' liaison tea.ms.) 

l. the large part plaged b;r, 849th SlS in the use of. ll81eon teams IS 

shown bT tne tollow.tng excerpta1 

Lett.r, "Tables ot Orgaoiaation and Tables of Equipment for Cr,ypto• 

graphic Teams", Tos AG, WD t,hru channels, from T. J. Davis, Brig. 

Gen, AG (.for the CG), .30 Oat. 43. Fold.er Tables ot Organization and 

Equipment •. 

" ••• The principle has been developed that au. s. cryptogX>aphic team 

must be a.ttaQhed to each British Corps and Army engaged in canbined 

operations. In the very near future one will be attached to tlle 

French Expeditionary Corps and it is possible t.hat later similar 

arrangements will have to De made with Italian forces. . In adclit.ion 

there are a number ot special groups requiring cipher .facilities and 

others will certainly be formed in t.ne future. The following teams 

are now in operation. 

DESIGNA'fIOt1 LOCATION NO. OF SIGABAs 

u. s. Cryptographic Team Ill 

u. s. Cryptographic Team 12 

u. 5~ Cryptographic Team f}*J 

u, s, 0%7Pt.ograph1c Team fil. 

U, $, C~JPt<>graphic Team li5 

u. s. Cr,yptographic Team 116 

U, s. Cryptographic T•am 117 

u. s. Cryptographic Team f9 · 

u. S, Qryptographio Team fllO 

British Sth Arttq 

l5tb Arrq Group 

.British 1.3 l;orps AIHQ A.A.E. 

AFHQ Advance OP 

British 5 \lorps 

British 10 <;orpa 

Allied Military Mission 

tBrindisi) 

°Fable'l Group ~~nia) 

I+ 

; 

2 

3 

3 

2 

3 

2 

Manual eyst.em 

only 

~'-· ·~he organization and equipmnt. ot these teams has presented a ~ry dittieul t aeries of problems. The grades and ratings, and approximately 60% ot the authorized personnel of the Signal Ciyptographic Detachlmnt, 

AlHQ have been assigned to. the 849th Signal Intelligence Service; but 

this ·detachment has no authorized table of equipnent, nor has the Table 

of Equipnent ot the 849th been increased to allow tor the addition of 

more than lOO'.C to the original strength of the organization consequEDtly . 

1t has been nec•ssary: 

a,, To $Stimate as accurately as possible the personnel and equipment necessary tor the functioning of each team. 

b. To obtain as much of the necessary ~quipment as possible without ~~g able to show any regularly authoritative basis of issue. 

\Continued on neJ1:t page.) 
(Conti:nuation ot footnote l from preceding page.) 

In some cases essential equipment proved to be absolutely wiobtaina.ble 

under these conditions. In others, necessary equipment 111/as lent. to the 

teams from the slender resources of the 849th Signal Intelligence Service, 

and etforst were later made, frequently without success, to replace it. 

o. To cope with the continuous supply problems of teams in an 

anomalous technical position at a considerable dist.a.nae !ran t.heir organization. For instance., some types ot supplies cannot be drawn by th~ 

team in that area. because it can show no basis • . 3. • •• Experience over the past .five months indicates however that 

while minor adjustments are aom.etimes required, only 3 basic types of 

tea.ms are nec•ssa.ry, as f'ollows: 

a. Type l, One officer, 4 enlisted men, 2 SIGABAs. Designed 

primariJ,y for a British Corps serving under a British Army, when the 

hulk of communications would be handled by a British cipher unit. Has 

also been used when A:FHQ Command PoGt was operating in several echelons. 

b. Type 2. 2 office~, 15 enlisted men, 4 SIGABAs. t>esigned 

primarily for a Britiah or French Corps serv.J4g under a U.S .. Army when 

.1t must handle the bulk of eQDlmunicat.ions arid b.e capable ot operating in 

2 echelons1 Can also be used to advantage ·at such Hq as the AFHQ 

Advance Administrative Echel~n and Allied Military Mission {the teams 

now operating at these 2 hqs will certainl,y have to be increasec1 . .) ~ 

c. Type ,3. 4 officers, 25 enlisted men, 6 SIGABAs. Designed for 

Army Group and British Arrq hqs. Must be capable of handling a considerable amount of traffic in 2 or even j echelQns. 

1+. It is recommended that the types of crypto.gra.phic teams desoribecl 

in par.. J above be activated from currently operating teams of the 849th 

Signal Intelligence Service. Such act.ion would.not only make tor more 

efficient operation of existing tea.ms but would permit more rapid 

organization of subsequent ~earn.~ as they are required in this th~ter. · 

Complet,ion of ~itl.8 program would involV$ the approval of the proposed ta.l?J:e~ '<i),~ equiJJllent (inoluded as Incls. la, 2a, and .)a) indication of designa~ing ~enclature and permission to AFHQ upon application to 

activate future ~~~ ~s needed. 

5. It is b~lie~d that the policy currently in effect of having all 

cryptographic teams. in this theater sections ot the 849th SitPa.l. Intelligence Service attached to the hq. they serve should be continued 

wu:tar thf/J .proposed new programs. The consta.tit.1¥ changing proportions 

of the gen,~.al cornmunioation picture make it imperative that all 

cryptographic personnel not organically a. part· of permanent signal 

unit.a be subjected to the cont:rol. of a central agency, so that teams 

may be shirted as.needs require, and personnel reabsorbed int.o the 

cryptographic pool upon the compl.et.ion of a given mission. 

6. Attention is invited t.o the fact that the proposed activation of 

these teams as official.J.7 recognized units involves no immedi&.t.e 

~Continued on next page.) 
The use of liaison teams .as provided by the 849tJl ~ieflal Intelligence Service in the Medi t.erranean Theater of Operations, is explained 

by means 0£ the quotation g,i ven below: 

l. A crypt team.1 as oppowed.·to an organized code room which 

operates in standard u •. s. Armt Headquarters, is a sped.all.¥ created 

independent.. unit to $8Ne ae a means ot mainta.inin.:; direct ciphe:r 

eominunication between Allied f'ield units. Operations in the lledit.err&.nean Theater were such that direct, rapid, and secure cipher communications were necessary between Al'fn1 units o! various nations. The crypt 

team was t.he obvious and workable solution to this problem. 

(Continuation of footnote l from preceding pages.) 

., shipments of personnel or supplies from the U~ S, and no shi}Dlnts at 

a:tf3' t.1.me that would not bo required in an1 oase under the present 

rather in.formal program. The chief advantages 0£ regulating the 

:;it.at.us of the teams would be to make it possible to draw, from supplies 

already available 1n this theater~ auttioient equipment to enable them 

to function at maximum efficiency and. to ~elite the organization and 

equipment of new teams as the need arises. 

7. If the general plan outlined in this communioa.tiori is approved, 

this hq. requests authorization for the immediate activation 0£ the ~ollowing number and type of units. a. 2 erypt teau1s, t;rpe l; 

b,. 2 crypt teams, type 2; and c. 2 ccypt tea.me, type ;. All ot these 

excopt one Type 2 t.eam now being organized tor the French expeditionary Corps are a.lrea.dl' in operation as detachments of the 849th SIS. 

Result of letter: Quotation from Operational History of 849th SIS, 

MTO, Dec. 1943 - Sept. 45: ", •• allottment of grades and ratings amounting to 29 oti'icers and .322 EM WGre assigned to 849th which was thereby 

given the responsibility of furnishing all tef.W.l'S !or liaison with 

the British as well as meetin,g any other demands which might. arise 

tor temporary or irregular headquarters having no assigned cryptographic personnel. It was a.leo decided that. the detachment could be 

used as a replacement pool, transferring oode clerks to till TO 

vacancies and training new ones as requU'ed •••• 11 
2. During its two and one half 7ea.rs of operation, the 849tb 

SIS dispatched approximately eighteen dU'ferent· cryptographic tea.ms 

which. served under conditions varying from the luxury oi' presidential 

conferences to the mud of the Anzio beachhead. The aize of t.he teams 

varied from one officer and f'ive enlisted men to four officers and 

twenty-seven enlisted men. While the problems met by the different. • 

teams va.rifld with the headquarters to which each was assigned there 

was one unclarlying problem common to all, in addition to their _ cryptogra.phie work. 'this lm.S the problem of existence as a. small 

detached, ind,pendent unit. The history of Team 117 which went •shore 

a.t. Salerno with t.ne British. X Corps and later worked ~ the quiet of 

Rome is presented as a history of a. typicaJ.1u. s. Cryptographic Team 

in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. 

Tne introduction o! the Combined Cipher Maohine for secret communication between British and Atnerican Army units materially decreased the 

need tor liai~n tea.me alt.hough it was still necessary to keep them at 

15 Ar~ Group, Allied eonm.;asion, and OSS. 2 It ~as also necessary to 

provide teams for other headquarters in.stituted on short notice.3 

ln the invasion ot Europe by the Allied Exped1 tionary Forces, 

which began June 61 1944, exten.sive plans ~ere ma.de by the War Department tor the use of liaison teams. That the plans for such use was 

mu.oh more extensive than the aatual u:Je, is evidenced b.r a program 

instituted at Ca.mp Crowder, Missouri, 4 in the fall of 1943. Several 

1. FOr this quotation and the history of Crypt Team 7 referred to in 

the quotation, eee "Operational History 0£ 849th Signal Intelligence 

Service, M'ro, Dec. 1942....Sept. 1945~ pp. 195-200. Yiled in Historical 

Unit. 

2. tt0perational History of 849th Signal lntelligence Service", op. ci~. 

page l'.31~ 

3. Ibid. 

4. Lt. Michael Burke, who provided all the information concerning the 

Camp Crowder program, said that nemhera of the other teams who were 

accidentally met ovorsea.s were found to be functioning in other capacities~ trequently :with the orie;inal team completely broken up. 
····~ 

cryptographic language teams were trained.at Camp Crowder tor the 

specific purpose ot making SIGABA avall.al>le to our Allies 1n accordance 

with the •stabUohed policy.· French, Italian, Russian, Dutch, and . . . 

ScandinaY1an ·teams,1 each consisting ot l.S men arid 3 officers were 

organized. The onl1 teams knom to tunct.ion for their intended purpose2 

. were the French Teams. f'aese were the 7th and 5th Signal Center Detachments. The 5th Signal Center Detachment or COBlllunications team had 

several a'signrn.enta. It ws first att.ached to French Base 190 a.t. Sete 

where American. supplies were received. The .function or the attached team 

was to send rep0rts on supplies from the French to the American Delta Base 

Section at .Marseille. As 1ts.'8cond a.asignment it was a.ttaclled. to the 

First French Corpa for lateral comm\lllication between it and an .American 

Corps. Third, it was attached to the French Third Algerian Infantry 

Divi~ion.which was placed under the American 6th Corps and flanked on one 

side by th~.l.4th Am.erican Armored Divisioo. and on the other by the 36th ~· I'-· 

American Infantry Division. The attached. cryptographic team provided both 

lateral and rear intercommtuiication in this set. up, The assignment of t.he 

7th Signal Center Team was with. the French 2nd Armored Division which waa 

the division which first entered Paris. It provided t.he same type or 

service as that described. above. 

l. A Chinese team was also trained for the Pacific area. ft was 

never used.· · 2. Lt. Michael Burke, who provided all t:.he information concerning the 

Camp Crowd.er program, said. that members ot the other teams accidentally 

met overseas, were functioning in other capacities, frequently with 

the original team completel,y broken up. 
!he reason that th•.other language teams were not utilized can on)¥ 

pe supposed. Probabl.3, the expected need for some of the teams did not 

materialize. Other teams could not be used because of the security considerationa whieh developed 1n the particular situation invol.ved. The 

records shew only t;w instances of requests for liaison teams other than 

t~e British and French uses discussed above. Both of these known oecurences were only a few lilQllths before the war• s end in March 1945. One of 

these req,uests was for a liaison team to be attached to an Italian 

Diviaion,1 the other was for a.special lliison mission With the Russian 

Ground Forces.2 . Both requosts were refused tor security reasons. 

l, Message from OGSOS Mediterranean to u.s. SPSIC from Schuoratt, larch 

1945· Piled Hol.der 2368 AFHQ. "Within 10 days an Italian Division 

is to enter Une ·as part of u.s. Corps in 5th Army. Strong bid for 

U.,S. team with smABA has been received here. Request prompt 

definition of policy as to issue of machine in this case." Answer 

from Corderman to Scbucraft& *'Since problem cited in LA 175 involves 

communications for combat troops in your theater, believe decision 

must rest with theater c0lnl1'.ander who is responsible for physical 

security of SIGABA (For Schucratt from Corderman SPSIC - BA AL l.89). 

Consider hazard comparable to case of Brazilian Foroes, presume that 

special detail will be tu:rnished in addition to crypt team. Answer 

from• CGSDS Mediterranean to USA. Amfl' Rear Echelon, Caserta, Italy, 

to: Si01al Security Agency, Corderman from Sehuora.i't: On security 

srounds request for crypt team at ltalian gruppe (sic) under 5th Arrq 

baa been disapproved.It 

2. Message from Hq. Communications ETO, U~S. Army, Paris, France; To: 

SSA (For Corderman from Bieber). "Present arrangements for provision 

of cryptographic co.mmun1cati.ons with Russian Ground Forces include 

the employment of special lle.ison missions. Have you. any. restrictions 

which should be imposed on the t)rpe of cryptographic ma.terial supplied · to these missions? This inquiry particularly applies to SIGABA and 

Combined Cipher llachine.n Answer from OCSigO (initialed S.P. Coll.ins, 

Col., s.c.), S March 1945• •

1

Pollc1 of G-2 is t.ha.t SIGABA and Cal not 

rpt not to be sent with special liaison missions to Russian Ground 

Forces. (Reurad P 478 ot 22 Feb for Bioher t:rom Corderman SPSIC US 473), 

Presentl_y approved are SIGTO'l', one-time pads, or st.rip systems. 

r;1) 

iU' 
REF ID:A523210 

D, Revealing the De\ails of Conve(\!r M•l.3ft-C 

'fhe third para.graph ot the joint Arzr13'-Navy agreement (see page ) 

emphasises by mere statement that the detaUs of Converter M-1.34-<; is , 

SECRE'l' infonnat.ion. It also stat.es that these details can be revealed 

"only to the armed forces ot the u. s. or to &DJ' u. S. citizen required 

t.o poesesa this information in the interests of the tJnited Statesri. 

Thia general statement leaves much room tor the requirements to be made 

more specific. The kJ:uJ.1 makes them so by means of an SPSIC letter~ 1 , 

Thia letter reiterates the general polic1 set. forth in paragraph 3 ot 

the joint Artq-Nav agreement and adds that the details in question can 

be revealed "ONLY to properly a.ccredit:.ed. of ticers or the armed forces of 

the United States actue±lz eagaged in CUJ?t.ographic.work or specifica.p,y 

authorized u. s. citizens, of unsuestioned lozaltg whose CI7EtosraP91c 

duties nece~sitate a knowledge of these detail§·" (Underlining supplied.) 

'fnis statement concerning citizens of •unquest.ioned loyalty" is, of 

course, subject to interpretation. The interpreta.t.ion which the War 

Department intends is well defined in certain AG letters cal.led "Clearance 

or Personnel .for Cr1Ptogra.phic Duties". Since these letters deal 1fi.th all 

cryptographic personnel, with no special requirements for SIGABA operators, 

the regulations set forth therein wiiU not. be discussed. in detail here. 

The general statement of policy for determining loyalty remained the same 

through the yea.rs. The ,detailed regulations for accomplishing it became 

l. SPSIC letter, 461 Codes, Subject,: . "Polley concerning distribution and 

disclosure of cryptographic design o! Convert.e:- w-134, M-134A, and 

M-134-C,U 24 Aug. 1942. . 
more and more specitic. The AG letters on the subject are as follows: 

(Each letter was supereeded by the next letter. The hat one listed is 

currently 1n effect.) 

l... "Policy with respect to qualifications ot personnel engaged 

in duties connected with the prescribed cryptographic 

systems", AG 311,5 l.3-~41) J.[ .... B-M, 3 April 1941. 

2. "Clearance of Personnel for Cryptographic Duties", AG Jll,5 

(16 Dec. 43) OB-S-B-M, 21+ Dec. l.944· 

J. "Clea.ranee of Personnel £or Cryptographic Duties", AG 3ll.5 · l.31 Mar. 44) OB-S-B, 5 April 1944. 

4. "Clearance ot Personnel for Crypt.ographic Duties", AG 311.5 

(29 Sept. 44) OB-I-B-M, 4 Oct. 1944. 

;. "Clearance of Personnel for Cryptographic Dutiesn,· AG .311.5 

ll2 Mar. 45) OB-l-B-U, 21 Mar. 1945. 

6. nc1earance of Personnel· for Cryptographic Duties", AG 311 ... 5 

\l.6 Sept.46) 

The second publication· 'b1" the War Department of a more specific 

version of paragraph 3 of the joint ArJD¥-Navy agreement (see pages ) 

was in AG letter 413.51 (l July 44) OB-S-B-M, 3 July 1944. This letter 

adds a paragraph which was ta.ken for granted only in the SPSlC letter 

discussed above. Tile addition was as .follows: 

••• 4.. Under no cirCWllStances will United States personnel 

be granted access to these maciiinea unless authorized 1ri accordance with the policy of the War Department gQVerning clearance ot 

cryptographic personnel. 

ln the next AG letter 41.3.51 (26 Ju.1¥ 44) OB-~B-M, 28 July 1944, 

one addition to what went before was made. The policy on revealing 

details of Converters M-134, M-l)4.A1 M:-1.340 was amended to read " ••• divul.ged 

ONLY to properly accredited officers or enlisted E!rsonnel of the armed 

.. 
REF ID:A523210 

:.~ , rru ml TT 

forces of the United St.ates ••• " instead of "divulged' ONLY to properly 

accredited otticera ot the armed forces ot the United States ••• " 

The next t1io AG letters dealing with the subject ma.de no changes 

in this particular paragraph. These ·two. AG letters; which were the 

la.st two, can be identified aa:tol'lioViaf.· AG letter 413.5 (ll Oct. 44) 

()~~, sUbject: "Policy 9cm<:;em~g j')~~.tritiution and Discl.osure or ' ·O : ;, • ., . • .. "'.-'.. ,·, f ' 

Orypt.Ographic Design 91' Convef>~er -~~~.;.c•, -12 October .1944 and AG letter· 

41.3.5 '(15 Jun. 45) OS-S-B-M, same subject, 17 June 1945. 

~e treatment. of this subject in the document "Genaral Instructions 

tor Converter M-134-C" (short title: SIGBRE) is as follows: 

••• 15. ACCESS TO AND SAfEGUARDING OF INFORflATION PERTAINING 

TO CONVERTERK-l.34-0. 

a •. Only persons who are authorized in ac.cordance 

wi.t.h the policy of the War Department governing clearance 

of cryptographic personnel ls&e par. ll) will. have access 

to Converter M-l.34-C,, associated material, or information 

pertaining thereto. 

The paragraph ll referred to citea the current AG letter on clearance 

of personnel for cryptographic duties. 

B. 'i'wentg-Four Hour Armed Guard £or SlGABA 

The unwritten, sometimes even unspoken, law of the initiated. to 

regard the cryptographic principles of SIGABA with especial respect 

makes it difficult. to believe that there has not always existed a 

written, official rule that SIGABA be constantly under 24-hour armed 

guard unless it is in a permanent or semipermanent code room which is 

itseli thus protected. However, it was not until June 1945, with the 
publication of 

title; SlGBRE-1), th.at such a written Wf:U' Deplrtment rule for 

protection by 2.4-hour armed guard was ott1cially adopt.eel and prom.ul.t;ated,1 

The nearest thing to a War Department rul• requiring a 24•hour atined 

guard was a statement of policy issu~d on 6 March 1944. This statement. 

ot policy ms in anner to a. request by an inspection of .fieer who presented 

the problem a.a follows: 

"It is the belief of the undersigned that the policy of the 

War Department is t.o require units in maneuver areas to keep their 

SIGABAs under constant anned guard1 even if the machines a.re kept 

locked in their CH 76s. lf t.£1is policy is to be enforced, it will 

probabJ.s' be necessary to show written authority to some units· •.• tt2 

The anSlf8r ~eeivecl was the first written official state:nent of policy 

on t..he · subj eot. • l t. was . as .tollows i 

•••• Vihile there is no specific regulation requiring an armedt;"Uard 

.for SIGABA (underlining supplied) when locke<l in a. CH-76 it. is the 

opinion of the Chie.f Sif'Jlal Officer that an armed guard should be 

provided for this e.quipmen t a.t any ti.me when there is not a secure 

permanent or ~emi-perma.n.ent code roo.m avai.lable.3 

i. · ef>nipare this discuosion of a 24-bour a.rm.ed gtiard for SIGABA with 

the discussion of rules for 24-hour armed guard in Section of 

Chapter , 11tne Colmar Case"":; page • The ETO rules brought 

to attention there are not as definite a statement as that published 

in SIGBSE-l. 

2. · Letter, Subjeet: n.reysicnl Security of Oryptographic Va.ter.inl in 

the Fieldn, To: Chief Sigp.al. Officer, SPSIC, Frant Roberts. 

Taylor, lst. Lt., s.c., 6 March 1944. 

3. lst Ind., lSPSIC 141.?, 6 liar 44, signed For the CSO: Frank E. 

Stoner, Brig. Gen .. u .. s. Army, Chier, Army- Communications Service, 

Russel H. Horton, Capt., s,c., To: SO, 4th Arniy Director, Hq • 

.Leesville, .t..a .. .; Frcuu ASF, OC3igQ1 Washington, u. c., 22 March 1944. 1 
REF ID:A523210 

During. the period befol"e the publication in June 194.5 of tho War 

Department rule requiring 24-hour armed c;u.s.rd, there existed a feeling 

ot extreme respect for the securi t.y of the SIGABA. Th.is feeling, in 

many eases, produoed unusually secure eonditione which probably often· 

included a 21.., .. hour armed guard. At the same time, the lack of an actual 

rule allowed the .fact that maey SIGABAe were protected b.1• indi v.idual 

invention1 rather than by an unalterable stipulation for a 24-hour armed 

When a War Department rule finally appeared in "General lnGtruotion.$ 

for Converter M-134-C" (snort title: SlGBBE-l), June 19451 it wa$ 

phraaed as £ollow$:2 

••• A twenty•tour hour a.nned guard should be provided for Converter U-l,34-C and associated material at a.n;y time when it is 

not in a secure permanent or semipermanent code room, even if it 

/"°"' is locked in a CH-76.or other type ot three-combina.t.ion sa.!e. 

All code rooms in which it is inst.al.led must be under twenty-tour 

hour armed guard •••• 

l. From a report by lat it. Robert s. Taylor who was on temporary 

inspection duty with the Signal Sect.ion, Fourth Anny Director 

Headquarters, Leesville, ta., 6 March 1944: 

a. On 5 Karch 1944 it was noted that the XVIII Corps had four 

SIGABAs in a. one and one-half ton truck a.t. its command post in the 

Fourth Ar:my' .Maneuver Area. Ti1e cryptographic o:t'i'icer of the Signal 

Section, mn Corpe, told the undersigned that the chests and safes 

holding the r:iachines cont.a.ined large amounts ot high explosives 

which would.be discharged it the containers were forced, and stated 

that all personnel in the vicinity we~ responsible for seeing that 

the truck was not moved by unauthorized personnel. However, no one 

person waa stationed as a ~a.rd. At night the executive of !icer of 

the Signal Sect.ion had been sleeping in the immediate vicinity of 

t'.1e truck, and Signal Section personnel were on twenty-four \1our duty 

near-by. At all times a loaded carbine was kept in the Signal 

Section tent, a few yards from the truck. Lt. Col, Willia.ms, Sig. 

Ot'ficer 0£ the XVIII Corps, believed that the set-up was very secure, 

and pointed out that there is nothing in writing requiring an armed 

guard £or the SIOABA. 

2. Comp.3.re the rules discussed in Section of Chapter , "T1u9 Colmar 

Case", pages · • The. \-llle above is obviously an outgrowth of a 

f', la.ck in the wording ot the i·ules in existence at t:1e time of the Colmar 

loss. 
REF ID:A523210 

ment i'or a twenty-tour hour armed eua.rd when it receiveQ. two requests 

.from Hea.dy_uarters, Arrrrv ilr Forces for reconsideration of the policy. 

In answers from the Anny Security Agency and Director of Intelligence, 

the requirement was not only upheld.1 and reiterated but a tine point 

concerning what constituted a 24-hour arm.ad guard °"as made. clearer. 

This .fine point concerned whether military station guards could be eonsiclered a.a suf.tioient protection. The answer from the Director of Intelligence stated tba.t ann.ed st.ation guard sare ttnot sufficient protection 

because ma.D3' persone who are not cleared. to view the SlGABA are properly 

pennitted to pass these gua.rds".2 

The only ot,her- official rul.$s tor maintaining constant e,1.lard over 

the SIGABA appear in the transportation instructions for overseas shipnent. 

l. Let.ter, 11Polioy on Storage or COnverter M-lJ4-C0 , To: CG, AAF, Wash.,. 

D~C'~~,, At'tnf Chief t security Sf.$ction, Air Commwiications 0~.f'ice; From: 

·Otl9~ A., Bicher, Col., S.C., 9 May 1946. " .... 2. This Agency does 

not consider th.at eeasation of hostilities justifies S..'\f relaxation 

in security regulations pertaining to cryptographic materiel and 

has noted-with alarm a tendency towards auch relaxation during recant 

.months as has been evidenced ·by an inortase in the nwnber of pbyaioal · em<:i crypt.o,graphic compromises. 3. Since the cryptographic principle 

and design of Convert.er U-134-C i.s in the sole possession of the 

United St.ate.a and it is considered to be the best cryptograμiic device 

of its type, it is not adVisable to jeopardize its use or storage 

under unsatisfactory securi Qt' conditions. · lt is coosidered that elimin~ting the necessity tor a 24-hour armed guard, regardless of 

geographical location, even if the converter were stored in a CH·76 

in a locked code room, would result in such a condition, and that no 

justification exists for U.'ldergoing such a risk .••• " 

2. Letter., Poli~y on Storage or SIGABA", Toi CG, Army Air Foroea, From: 

Director of Intelligence, no date but answers letter dated 29 lfa..v 1946. 
REF ID:A523210 

I~? sm~rf These rules, which were published. in AG letter on l2 July l944l (see 

Tab S) and restated in SIGBRE-l in June 1945,2 required that an armed 

euard be maintained during transportation by rail, ship, or air. Ti1e 

·instructions concerning transportation by rail required that "even 

~hough the chests or packages containing the cryptographic material 

and equipment are transported in a sea.led oar, it \•Jill be necessary to 

maintain an armed guard a.t all times .... 11 .3 

F. Transpgrt.ation 0£ Converter M-134-C in Aircraft 

On 30 March 1943, an SPSIC letter4 was published which stated tha.t 

the Chief Signal Officer desired that SIGABA rotors never be transported 

by aircraft over enell\Y territory or over water from which the recovery 

of ~h~ ~,tt?r"'~ l?.v the ene11l3' would be possible. This letter stated. that 

althoug~ ·1t waa appreciated that transmission of secret documents by 

aircraft was permitted by A'rf:!JY Regulations,5 that the Signal 0£facers were 

urgently requested »to exercise the utmost discretion before decidina 

to take this.action. The 1'0rld-wide dislocation of co!!ll'llunioations that 

would result from the compromise of the rotora of SIGABA must be considered 

in almost every case to outv~eich the temporary advantage to be gained 

by transr.d.ssion by aircra!t.n6 

l. AG Letter, )ll.5' (l2 Jul 44) OS:S-SPSIC-¥, 11Instructions for Proper 

Packine and Handling of SIGABA and All Other Cryptographic Mat.eria.l 

for Overseas Shipnent", 12 July 1944. Rescinded by AGAO-S ,312.l 

ll5 Dee 49) CSGID dated 19 Dec 1947. Polley restated in SIGBRE-l. 

2. "General Instructions tor Converter M:-1.34.;.cu (short title: SIGBRE-1) 

June 1945• 

J. Same as footnote l. 

4. SPSIC letter, subject: "Proper Safeguarding of SIGABA Equipment, 30 Mar 43. 

5, AR .380-5, Change No. l, Par. 191 Feb. 20, 194,3. 

6. Sa.me a.s footnote 4. 
(..-...... 

REF ID:A523210 

T'ne above-stated policy laid down certain stringent conditions for 

transmission of SIGABA rotors by ai.rcra.ft but did not say anj'thing about 

. operation of SIGABA in an aircraft on the ~round. In November 1944, just 

such a problem arose. An aircraft was equipped with a. radio set1 t.o 

serve as an airborne command pest for the Chief of Air Staff, Far East 

Forces. For .flights by the Chief of Air Sta.ff, a SIGABA was kept on 

board the aircraft in a locked eontainer. At the destination, the aircraft was used on the ground as a command post and the SIG.A.BA was oper-

. • 2 . I 

·ated in the aircraft. A letter signed for the commander-in-chief by the 

ASsistant Adjust.nt. General of the Southwest Pacific Area, General Headquarters, directed the Commander 1 Allied -Air Forces to discontinue usillg 

the SIGABA in this manner, giving the reason ~~At. was "unnecessary ' I , :' ·,, 'I,' '. \ •.. ' ~. 

and contrary to the_ policy .of this headquarter~· whereby transportation 

ot SIGABA or associa.t9d ~q~~ent ~f n~t be by' air' except in ~a.r area 

remote trom enemy forces or in cases ot genuine emergency."3 When this 

use ot SIGABA in an aircraft came to the attentl~~ ~£ the Ari113' Security 

Agency, the policies of th~ above-mentioned SPSIC letterh.were published 

in an AG lett.er5 which added the tollold.ngt 

••• UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL 'lHE CONVERTER Lt-134-C BE 

OPERATED IN AN· AIRQRAFT •••• 

1. SCR-399. 

2. L~tter, AG )80.0l (19 Nov 44) S, Subject: "Security of the SIGABA", 

Signed: H. w. Allen, Col., A.G.D., for the Commander-in-Chief', To: 

ASF, Wash •. 25, D.C., 19 November 1944. 

3. Ibid. . 

4. See foot.note 4, previous page. 5. Letter, AG 3ll.5 (28 Nov. 1+4) OS...S-s...M, SlibjecU ttPolicy Concerning 

Transportation of Converter, 1* l December 1.944. 
-~ 

I -

REF ·ID :A523210 

Chest OH-76 1$ a special sate designed for housing Converter 

M-l34-C. It is a two-section aafe with an upper and lower section. 

The upper 11ect1on, which is mounted. on e.nd secured to t.he lower section, 

contains a sliding sh•lt for holding t.he converter. The lower section 

is used for storine a.s$0cia.ted .material of the co~verter~ 1 When the 

first AG letter on issue of SIGABA equipment2·was published on 9 December 

19411 a. statement Y1as included to the erteet. that it was "contemplated 

issuing a sate, spe~ial.lJ' designed £or nouaing the converter to tactical 

units at a later dat.e •••• n3 

The AG letter which announced the issue of such a safe (CH 76) was 

4 ·. 4 

published on 17 Februa17 1945 {see Tab ). This letter established 

the t'ollowing policy; 

••• Except in the case of nontactical units within the continent.al 

Unites States 1 Oonverter l-134-C and its associated material will 

always be houaed in Chest CH-76 unless authori~ed to the contrary • 

.Requests tor such authoriia.tion will be forwarded through channels 

to the Chief Si[.!1lal. Officer, Room 30340, The Pentagon, Washington 

25, D. C., At.tent.ion: SPSIC. 

ln an amendment,5 published 3 April 1945 (see Tab s), the method of 

authorization for deviating from the :i-ul.e ot always housing a SIGABAin 

le For a complete description of OH-76, see •General Instructions tor 

Converter Jil-134-C (short titler SIG.BRE-1), Jwie 1945. 

2. Letter, AG 311.5 (l2•5-4l) Mad, Subject: n1ssue of Crypt.og:ra.piic Equipment", 9 Dee. 1941. 

3. Ibid.. 

4. Letter, AG 42a (14 Feb 45) 0&-5-3-M,, Subject: "~olicy Concerning the 

Use of Chest 00-76,., 17 February 1945. 

5. Letter, AG 1+28 (.31 Kar 45) OB-S-B-il, Subjectt "Policy Concerning the 

Use of Chest CH-76", ) April 1945· 
/~ 

( 

REF ID:A523210 

a Chest. ca ... 76 was changed. 

. . 2 

(17 Feb 1945) was the. Chief Signal Officer •. In the amendment it became 

instead ~the commander oi the theater, department, or base concerned".J 

The document, "General Instruetions for Converter M-lJ4-C" (short 

. title; SIGBRE-1) 1 June 1945.t reiterat.ed the policy given in the AG, 

letter of 17 Febrw,iry 19454 as it was amended by the AG letter of 

3 April 1945. 5 

l. same as £ootnote 4, previous page. 

2. Same as f'ootnotE1 5, previous page. 3. Same as footnote 41 previous page. 4. Same as footnote 4, previous page. 

5. Same a.s footnote 5, previous page. 

,~ -· 
REF ID:A523210 

A. General 

Perhaps the most exciting incident at Arlirigton Hall Station during 

the war occurred on February 10, 1945, at about 10:00 o'clock at night, 

when the officer in charge of the War Department Code Center called 

Colonel All~opp1 at his quarters to tell him that an extremely important 

message conceming a serious compromise had. just been received. Colonel 

Allsopp went immediately to Arlington Hall Message Ce.."lter to reoei ve the · 

communication, after notifying Colonel Kuhn and Major Chittenden to meet 

him there. Upon their arrival, the .followine dramatic words began to 

. 2 

appear on the teletype: . 

Parked truck belonging to two eight infantry divisiQn containing following docwnents stolen i."l Colmar France: SIGABA, SIGIVI, 

SIGTRIG, SIGYHUG, SIGAMUG, SIGI."I~~l7, -18, ~d -19, SIGCLOE-17 1 ...is, ... 19,, SIGPJRL, SIOONSN, SIGSWG, SIG'lEMP·lS· -19, SIGESG-2 and 

) 1 SlGMAK, 51~~11 CSP l60lA1 SIGSP.IL-21 SIGUHR-21 SIGQZF 1 

SI~,-SIGtiAN~2,·s1000M~2, SIGWHY-l, SIGGAN, CCBP 0125-91 10, 

and 111 OCBP Ol.26-91 101 and ll, CCBP Ol22-Al5, CCBP Ol.2.4-1, 

CCBP 0129•1 and 2, CCBP -0121-AlO, ETWAS-15 lFor SPSIC Cite SOSSO 

signed Eisenhower {War 5799E 96921)) Use of all systems listed 

has been suspended in this theater and every possible action taken 

to restore security. CCBP 0131 has been distributed to all 

holders of SIGAMUG and is now being used by American £orce.s to 

encipher all radio transmissions. · Secure landlines and courier · being used in most cases. Full investigation of loss being made 

by Sixth Arnw Group. Will keep you informed of developnents and. 

action taken. 

The fact that SIGABA itself was lost along with its rotor basket, SIGIVI, I 

and rotor .basket, SIGAMUG, is immediately apparent from even the most 

l. Chiei', Security Division, AHS. 

2. SIGTOT message. 
REF ID:A523210 

,,---.-.._ {' 

eusory examination of the list. - This information is so overwhelming 

--

~ -

that t.he full import of the other things which were lost. is likely to 

be overshadowed. -However1 an analysis of the listshows th.'.::.t all of 

_ the Imterial1 for operating Cryptonet ~ (the Theater-wide cryptonet 

for the European Theater of Operations., including t.he rotors t SIGTiUG), 

was in the lost truck. Further analysis shows that a set o.f rotors 

(CCBP Olll: SIGYHUG), distributed to all holders of the Co;nbined Cipher 

Machine, was lost. This distribution alone involved 8500 sets of rotors. 

Although the universal combined system (CCBP 0101) based on tt1ese rot.ors 

was not in tbe lost truck,, it was affected by .t.ne loss of the rot.ors. 

The system bas~d on SIGYHUG rotors which.!!§ in the lost truck was 

Limited C0.t1bined System 5141

2 distributed to specific u. S. Army and 

.British holders. The onl.3 other specific systems were a combined strip 

stand-by,3 a combined authentication system,4 and the combined field 

code with subtractor tables.5 Also :included in the truck were all the 

l. Bo tors \ SlGTRIG, Reg. No• 276 J; rotor assembly tables OJ;di tions 17, 18, 

19) for System 2201 \SIGI:i'IS-17, -lB, -19 J; Alphabet strip system 2222 

\including keylists; SIGCLOE•l?, -19, -19 and alphabet sets: SIGPJRL · 

for 2222~17, SIGONSN for 2222-18, and SIGSJJ4F for 2222-19), Key lists 

for double transposition system 2242 (SIGTEMP-18 and -19). 

2. Rotor assembly tables tor system 514 (SIGESG-2, SIGESG-3) and rotors 

for this system: SIGYHUG were in the truck. 

,3. Strip key lists CCBP 0125-9, -10, -llJ Strips: CCBP 0126-9.; -10, -11. 

4. SIGGAN (Authentication System No. 2) and CCBP 0122-Al; (Combined 

Authentication System, Area. A only), . 5. CCBP 0121-AlO (Subtractor Tables for use with Combined Field Code, 

Area A only) 
REF ID:A523210 

~, L~J~[() _j 

·keying, operating, and maintenance instructions for the equipment 

involved. Last. but not least, ETWAS-15, the holder list of theater 

systems for ETO, and SIG.MAK, the holder list of the COmbined Cipher 

Machine, were int.he lost truck. 

The most. important question·at the moment of loss was whether or 

not this tr.uck had falle:m into enen\Y hands. As soon as the losa was 

discovered., everybody concerned \from those directly responsible in the 

·28th Di vision to' the high officials of Arlinzton Hall Station) did everything possible to find it. Even so, it v;as missing over a month (from 

the night ot Feb. 5-6 until l2 March when part of the material was found; 

the remainder was diacovereq on 2l March. (See Section C, pages 

through . ) ) Durine that time it was necessary to ACT AS IF IT HAD 

FALLEN INTO SiEMY H.A!ms. This element divides the problem into .two 

distinct parts: (1) the problem of :finding the 'truck and (2) t.he problem 

of dealing with t.he consequences of having to assume complete compromise 

of thic material. · 

B. How it Happened 

For photostatic copies of the ETOUSA rules wi,th which the man who lost 

the truck should have been familiar, see Tab T. 

For photographs or. Converter M-l.34-C after it was found, see 'Tab U. 

According to the literary outline established in the above paragraphs, 

. l. "lla.intenance Instructions for the Converter M-134-011 (SIGKKK-l), 

·"Instructions for the Combined Cipher Machine "(CSP l601A), and 

CCBP 0124-1, 11Cryptonet 221 Basic Document" (SIGSPIC-2), "Instructions 

£or Using Strip Cipher Devices (SIGUHR-2), "Keying Instruct.ions for 

Converter M-134-0" (SIGQZF), "Instructions for Usine Double Transposition Cipher System" (SIGRED-2) 1 "Cr.yptographic Communications, 1943" . (SIGMAN-2) 1 "Supplement Na. 1 to SIGNAN-211 (SIGCOM.-2}; nsupplement 

No. 2 to SIGNAN-2" (SlGWHY-1). 
REF ID:A523210 

the next subjects which should be dealt with are (l) .finding the truck 

and (2) dealine; with the consequences of the loss. However, if we 

follow the logic of comnon s~se, at this point, instead of the logic 

of literary outline, we will find ourselves next confronted with a. 

desire to kno·;: how this valuable truck came to be lost in the first place. 

In early February 1945 the 28th Infantry Division iii France was moving its location fol"lvard very rapidly. The established procedure for 

movement of a division command post ia for a skeleton stat£ to organize 

a forward echelon, go ahead of the main echelon, and set up at the new 

location in order that prepa~a.tions can be made for the arrival of the 

ma.in body of the division command post. Very shortly after the prepara~ 

tions were completed, the main echelon moves up to the new location. 

Little or no time is lost in the activity of the main echelon because of 

the advance preparations made by the forward echelon. 

In this history we are concerned with the role that. the communica-

' 

tions group plays in such a move, tor the truck in question (the· one con-

.tain;ing the SIGABA and much other valuable and secret equiμnent) 1 was 

lost during just such a move. The normal pro~edure for moving torwa.rd 

a. cryptographic team.·was as follows:· The message center chief with part. 

of the cryptographic team and equipment would move ahead with the skeleton 

for.:;ard echelon and set up eryptogra.phic ... communications in the new location. While the forward echelon was being established, the assistant. 

l, For list ot equipment in lost truck, see pages and • 
< r:-......-·--:· .·~: ·, . \.~~T""l...,. .... _-, -- • •• 

'· 

r :· · .. ' . 

:.:>. . ~ . ' 

•••. ·• ! ' 

~ . ·~ ·. . . . :-.. . . . . . . . -· ~ 

. . :'. 

. ··. :"·· ... ~ · ..... ' . . .... .. ~. : 

' \ 

\ 

'·-L 

A 

~ ros;ti~n 

e · L oc.~1 i ()(\ 

~ · •. (,fl ·. • < ~ • • 

.., 

·-~~) 

;; 

,., 

-~": 

"' Vo , ... 

•"· 
.-

REF ID:A523210 

message center chiet remained behind at the old command post location 

with the rest of the team and maintained communications. When the new · 

message ,center had been set up at the new location, the rest of the team 

moved up with the main echelon and its-attached Signal Company to the 

new location. Wnen the second hel£ of the team arrived, it went into 

reserve in preparation for t.he 'next move a.t. which time it would move 

ahead and leave the other half temporarily behind with the main echelon. 

Usually the second half or the cryptographic team moved up right along 

with the riiain echelon and the division command post's attached Signal 

Company arranged a guarded truck park for the vehicles cominc in the new 

location. 

With this description as a background we are now ready to consider 

the specific conditions under which the truck in question was lost. 

On 4 and 5 February 1945, the command post of the 28th Infantry 

-Division was being transferred from KayersburG, France to Colmar. On 

4 Feb., Lt. Viets, the message center chief of the 28th Division Signal 

Company, proceeded to Colmar from Ka,veraburg \'dth ·the advance sec.tion 

of his cryptographic team and equipnent in order to set up a messaee 

center a.t Colaiar. When he arrived, there were .no billets ready for or 

'even allotted to the Signal Company. So his men .found a house on 

Barba.rassastrabe (see map opposite), got permission to occupy it, and 

set up their message center. 

The ne>..'t day, on 5 Feb., Warrant Officer Moody, the assistant 

message center chief, left KB\Y'ersburg for Colmar with the second half of 
REF ID:A523210 

the cryptographic team and a. spare set. of. cryptographic equipment. l The 

spare equipment rode in a 2~-ton truck driven by a Private T'nompson. 

Attached to the truck was a trailer containing a couple of power tinits, 

a command post tent, a broom, o.nd other. personal equipnent. · The men 

belongine to this second ha.l!' of the cryptographic t.eam rode either in 

the truck containing the spa.re equipnen t or in .a. l~ton truck which !ollowed~ Warrant Officer Mo~dy, the assistant message center chief, rode 

in the l~ton truck which followed. 

Wilen the two trucks arrived at Col.mar at approximately 4:30 the 

afternoon of 5 Feb., the men did just as they were in the habit of doing 

on other moves or transters from one leca.tion to another. The nonnal procedure upon arrival seemed to consist of finding out by means of informal. 

questions what everyone else was doing and then proceeding to do likevdse~ 2 

On every other occasion (so far as is known) this procedure had afforded 

sufficient protection for the vehicle because a truck.park guard had 

usually been established by the Signal Company before their arrival a.nd 

informal questions had resulted in their be~e directed into it. · On most 

other ,,ccasions it was also true that the man bringing in the second half 

of the spars equipment took it into the message-center building. But this 

1. For list. 0£ equipnent~ see pages and . 4. Question asked to WOJG Moody by Lt. Col. Peterson, Inspector General, 

28th Infantry Di vision: Did you report to Lt.; Viets 1 head of the sect.ion on your arrival? Answer: Yes sir. Question: Did you receive 

instructions from him as to ~ihere you would park your vehicles or · Where yoti would set up your sect.ion that night? Answer: The only 

instructions about parking the vehicle was that any street except the 

CP street was O,K. I had only received that but it was not from Lt. 

Viets. Who did you hear that fron;.1 Generally we came j,n late and 

usually we find out from somebody and that is the answer we got. We 

saw otlier vehicle~ parked in the same area. 
REF ID :-A523210 .-

' ~ :1 !J. /, ....... ~ /,_, J'~[ & 

time the Division was .movirig fon:ard so fast that two unusual things 

happened: (1) the second half of the team. ~rived at. the new comand 

post location (in fihis case, Colmar) ahead of the Sit1lal Comp~y which 

usually established the truck park and (2) the second half Of' the team 

did not take.their newly-arrived e1uipment into the message-center build1 . ' ing as usual because they planned to move ahead the very next morning. 

Speci.fi<:ally, the following situation developed: Upon arrival at a.bout 

·4:30 in the aftemoon of 5 February, V'Jarrant Officer Moody reported to 

Lt. Viets, head of the section. He received no instructions from Lt. 

Viets, ·as to ~.here to park the vehicles, When ~oody ca.me out of the message· 

center building he saw the truck parked beside the curb along with any 

number of vehicles already parked there. Ot course, the driver, Private 

Thompson, was the man who actually parked the vehicle. Private Thompson 

. said that he "hollered a:'ld asked one of' the sergeants where to park the 

truck". The sergeant called back, "Pull it up a little bit turther along 

the curb". Although Provate Thompson testified that he did not remember 

who the sergeant was, further testimoey in the investigation brought out 

the fact that the sergeant was Frank Tetarus, T.3, trick chief and crypto1. Interview.during investigation of Colmar Compromise between Inspector 

General of 28th Infantry Division (Lt. Col. Herman T. Peterson) and 

Sergeant Tetarus: Q. Do you ordinarily park a truck with cryptographic 

equipment. in it without a guard? A. Well, most times as I can remen:.ber · we have taken the cryptographic machines into the building immediately 

upon arriving. This time we left them out in anticipation of the jump 

in the morning. ,;t. You so.y most times, how many times have you left 

the equipment in the truck overnight? A. Well, at the last area we 

were in i':e had the cryptographic material in the truck for certain 

hours, we were having trouqle with them at the time which necessitated 

them being repaired. Q. On how many occasions have you left cryptographic equipment in the truck overnight? A~ I couldn't make a 

definite answer on that, Sir- An approxioa.te answer that is quite 

definite aft.er our run thru France, wa.s · in the last month. (Sic) 

About three times, that is approxir'..ately. 
REF ID:A523210 

graphic technician, who also .arrived. with the second half of the team on 

5 Feb.. Sergeant Tetarus testi!ied that when he arrived with the team, 

he inmediately went into the Division message center and asked the of£ieerin-charge, Lt. Viets, where to_ put the truck. He also asked about quarters 

for the men •. Sergeant Tetarus testi.t'ied that Lt. Viets told him "that the 

billets were No. .16 and to park the vehicle that I had near the house." 

{Sergeant 'i'eta.rus' testimony·waa later corroborated by Lt. Viets.>1 · 

l. Interview during investiea.tion of Colmar Compromise between Horman A. 

Peterson, Lt. Col., IGD, Inspector Gener·al, 28th Infantry Division and 

Lt. Viets (Recall of Viets): t1Q. From the infonnation given by witnesses it is alleged that instructions were gi van to them by you. to -

park the vehicle on J:.his street next to the b,illet~ Is the.t correct? 

A. That is correct. · · : 

Q. Did·you realize when you instructed the vehicle to be parked on that 

street that vehicle would be without guard.? 

A. No,. I did not actually because I thought that some area would be 

given to the Si~al Company for parking of their vehicles. I 

certainly did not think that the vehicles would be left overnight, 

but when it later became apparent to me that that was the procedure .. ~ and that way everyone was p!:l.rked everywhere they could, mainl.Y along 

the streets. 

Q. Did you have any information at anytime that there would be a guard 

provided for these vehicles? 

A. I thought a guard would be provided, I knew there vv-ould be a. E,'Ullrd 

provided if they· ·:vere put in a. central area.. 

Q. It is my understanding in the past that the 28th Sig. Co. had provided their own guard ar\d their own motor pool? 

A, That is correct. · · · · 

Q. 'fhen what ofi'i~er of the 2Sth Sig. Co .• would have ·been responsible 

for providing t.he guard far that parking area? 

A_41 The motor officer,, if he were here. Q~ Do you know whether he was here? 

A. No, he was no& here. 

Q... Well then,, if ·he \'Jere not here it was questionable then whether a 

guard would be provided1 

A. That is correct. 

Q •. Then you were not certain whether a guard had been provided. Did . you realize that this truck would be left on the street unguarded 

with the cryptographic .material 1n the truck? , · A. No, I did not look at it that way, because a~ I said before, we had 

always parked Sig. Co. vehicles together near our billets or bivouac . area. 11 · 
-

REF ID:A523210 

I l"F(ffl f"fi" f C:?'11- - .: ;i ,!) I; l . I 

L l~ii1F (i h 1 :11j ·li.J ~ 

The next momine (Feb. 6) Sergeant Hill.man1 and Corporal Brookinsl 

went out about 9:00 A.M. to find the truck in order to make some needed 

repEJ,ira. r;~1en they arrived at the spot where the truck had been parked 

~he night before, the truck ms gone. Sergeant Hillman immediately 

repo:rt,ed the matter to Lt. Viets and then looked up ~he driver and asked 

him if he moved the t.ruck. Receiving a negative answer, he proceeded on. 

his own with Corporal.Brookins to look for it. Their·sole success was in 

findine the trailer, containing only unclassified material, which had been 

· attached to the truck. ·They found the trailer .on a 'dead~e.nd road. Lt. 

Viets notified the Provost Marshall and the Division Signal Officer, Lt. · 

Col. Clarence. T. UuUett. 

· c. Finding the Truck 

tc{:.find the truck, two procedures ·were established~ First, everybody looked !or it and second, mile the searci1 .waa being conducted, the 

. persona considered responsible were interviewed lsee Section E, pages J 

in order to unearth clues, to eatabl.ish evidence tor court martial, and to 

institute procedures to.prevent recurrence. 

The search for the truck wa13 very elaborate. Patrols of MP's were 

established to search roads, barns, and sheds in Colmar and surrounding 

villages. MP road blocks and special patrols were placed throughout the 

division sector.· Teams oi' CIC agents searched· Colmar systematically, 

l. Both rl.illman and Brookins were on the cryptographic team. Hillman had 

come in with the lost truck and Brookins had arrived tne day before 

with the fon78.rd echelon. 

... ,. 

' ·" 
block by block. Later this sea.rc&-1 was extended to an area with a. radius 

of approximately twelve miles of Colmar. All subordinate units were 

directed to search their own units and subndt a report. CIC established 

a network of infonn.ants throughout th.e Colmar sector. CIC also enlisted 

l , 

the aid of French units in helping with the search and examining their 

own units. Since these detailed measures2 failed to produce results, 

SHAEF was requested to conduct a complete theater search for the vehiele.3 

l.. Memo for Col. Harrison .from David G. Erskine, Col. OSC., G-2 (crj 8 Feb. 

l945s ••• 0 I then proceeded to the First French ArrD3' last night and talked 

to the Chief of Sta.tr and asked him to put out instructions that all 

units in the First French Army will check each vehicle and the Division 

corruuander concerned will presently certify that this has been done. 

In addition I told them that I wQuld like to place CIC personnel with 

the French Divisions to assist in identifying the missing property as 

well as to help direct the search, in conjunction with the SM and SA. 

First French Army sent· their cable, ~~1ich I wrote, on this matter out 

at 2 A.M ••• ·.tins morning •• ,. •• " Folder: Compromise & Loss CryptomaterialETO (Col.mar Incident) Investigation. 

2. All ·or the measures 'taken to recover the truck are NOT listed in this 

paragraph. Rather, an attempt is made to give a general, conception of 

the elaborate search conducted. For a detailed listing of tl1e steps 

taken, see Tab 8. nsteps Taken Toward Recovery of Missing 28th Division 

Sienal Truck containing Classii'ied Documents and Devices» in Folder: . ComprQmise & Loss Cryptomaterial - ETO (Colmar Inc;ident) Investigation. 

J. The following units took measures rrom 7 Feb. to 20 Feb. l945f 28th 

Infantry Division, lXI Corps, First French Army, Seventh Army, 6th Army 

Group, SHAEP'. Measures were taken subse~uent to 20 Feb. 1945 by 6th 

Army Group and SHAEF. Directives were serit out by the above wiits to 

subordinate units instituting a complete search tor the missing vehicle, 

alerting Yilltary Police and memorandums and radios were sent enlisting the a.id of the FBI, CIC, and G-2, SOLOC. Negative reports were 

filed by all ot the above units. As of 4 .March the follarr...ng units were 

also engaged in conducting an extensive sear.eh of all Alsace. Securite 

Militaire, H.egulatrice Routiere {French Road Control, lst French Army), 

CIC, Gendarmi.e - where available, Eau et. Forets (Waters and Forests), 

Ponts et Chaussees (Bridges and Highways), Railroads, Canal Authorities{ 

Postal Authoritie:;J, Potassium mines, Police Speciale, (qetecti\re Agency J, 

Rensei~ements Generaux. (Civilian Detective Agency, Doua.niers (Custom 

guards). All of the above '-'ere coordinated by Surete Nationale throughout France. 
ID:A523210 

Finally, on 12 March 1945, the top half' of t.he Chest 76 .containing the 

SIGABA, the SIGIVI, the u. s. instructional docwnenta,·the combined key 

lists, and the rotors for the local theater SIGABA system,1 were fo~d 

submerged in the Greeaen River, a mountain stream near Seiest.at, France, 

by a searching party from the Second French Corps. (For photographs 

ot the top half of CH 16, as the mud-covered SIGABA is being removed from 

it, see Tab~.) On 21 March, the other half of tbe Chest 76, c<11tajning 

the remainder ot the material, was found in the same spot. Presumably, 

the safes bad not been tampered with and the .material was, therefore, 

unoompromised.2 The only actual da.ma.ge "was from water and mud. However, 

the necessity for assuming compromise· during the period in which the safes 

were lost caused unimaginable trouble (Section D). 

/-.. 1. These rotors had been replaced with reserve set within a week after 

the compromise. 

2. Letter, 'Subject: 11Report of Losa of SIGABA rfo. 235", To: Chief Signal 

0£.t'icer, Wash. 25, .o.c., Attention: ~ignal Security AgfK!cy, Signed 

for the Chief Signal Officer: George A. Bicher, Col. s. c., OCSieQ, ,p 

Hq,. ETO: " ••• 2. In summation, the forwa1'Ci· command post of the· 28th 

Infantry Division, while in Colmar, France, had stolen from it one 

two and one-half ton truck containing a complete SIGRINO and associated 

cryptographic material, An intense search \Vas conducted to recover 

this truck and SIGABA, and .f'1nally in the bed of a mountain stream 

there was found the upper half of CH-76 and a field safe containing 

SIGAB.A end some of the cryptographic documents concerned. Later in 

the same spot there wa.s recovered the bottom half of the CH-76. A 

ca.rei'ul study was made while opening these sates and this lead to the 

unconfirmed belief of this headquarters that tilis truck had been 

stolen for the value of the truck itsle £, and that the actual thieves 

had no knowledge that this truck did contain cryptographic equipment. 

Further, the ccndition of the contents of these safes indicates that 

no unauthorized persons opened or in any way had access to the cryptographic material contained therein, It is probable that the safes 

containing the cryptographic material was dropped in this stream as a 

method of disposal and without the purpose of hiding this material. 
REF ID:A523210 

D •. 

The •••umed compromise ot the bae1c worldwide combined rotor• 

CCBP Olll (SlGlHUG) aeriouai, attected three important oystems based upon 

these rotors, namely 1 the worldwide Combined Cipher Machine system 

(CCBP 0101), the European Area Combined 87stem \COBP 0131), and the Special 

J4.mi.ted Combined system { )14-ESG). Although the keylists for CCBP 6101 · 

and CCBP 0131 were not in the lost truck, the rotors on wbieh they were 

based (CCBP Olll: SIGYHOO) were. Editions 2 and ) of System 5141 in 

addition to the Oll1 rotors on which ther were based, were in the lost 

truck. The SIGABA material in the stolen truck was the SlGABA it.self 

and all of the current material tor European Theater Ceyptonet 22 (including 

rotors: .SIGTRIG and three editions of the rotor assembly tables; 

System 2201 (SIGLYIS-17, -18, -19). 

A significant result ot. the assumed compromise of all this important 

material was demonstration of a serious lack in the emergency plan for the 

1 

Combined Coanunications Ala.chine. No reserve rot.ors were held tor the CCM 

l.· u •••• 2. The recent compromise of rotors used. with the general. worldwide Combined Cipher Machine eystem made it apparent that. t.here was 

an imperative need tor all rotors of t.he Combined Cipher llachine to 

have a reserve set of rotors on hand at all times to proVide tor M>3 

em.ergenc1. Althoue)l a ecmbined strip cipher system. ha.a been provided.. 

tor this purpose, it would be higjlly impracticabls to em.ploy a strip 

system .for &nr length 0£ time in place of the Combined Cipher Machine 

in view ot the heavy tra.ti'1c sent. in Combined Cipher Machine systems 

and the comparative slowness of strips. Lacking any other alternative, 

it was found necessary to continue using possibly compromised rot.ore •••• " 

Memorandum tor Secretar,1 Combined Communications Boa.rd; si31ed H. C. 

Ingles 1 Subject. "Plan tor Reaerve Rotors for Combined Cipher Machine 

Systems" 1 2.3 Feb. 1945. -
sysj;ems and the etrip standbys proved highly Wlsa.tia£actory1 in meeting 

the emergency. The efficacy of having reserve rotors ready for d1etribu-

. . ' 2 · tion was shown by the tact that the lost SlGTRIG rotors of Crwtonet 22 

were replaced within a week of SIGDHRD,J dis~ributed .from European Theater 

· Headquarters. Such an eaay solution tor the lost CCV. rotot"s was not in 

sight. No resene rotiors existed and even though a vigorous emergency 

wiring program, which included all five CClllbined services, was immediately 

instituted, it still required months to wire and distribute 8500 new :rotor 

sets to replace t.p.e lost worldwide combined rotors, CCBP Olll (SIGIHUG). 

fne only thing which could conceivabl.r be called good a.bout the necessity 

f'o:r this replacement was that the emergency Tlirine program did not. at.op _ 

when replacement. was etteeted. but continued. until reserve rotors also 

were provided. 

The emergency wiring program. ·as set up a.a follows; T'nree new rotor 

sets were to be wired- nameJ..T, CCBP 0211, CCBP 0.311, and CCBP 0213. The 

first and most impe>rtant rot.ors to be wired. were the new CCBP 02ll (SIGII.UT) 

rotors, which were to act as the replacement !or the lost worldwide combined 

rotors OCBP Olll (SlGlHtxi)~ The second rot.ors to be wired - namely 

l. Message from E'fO to War Department..: "~ .. CCBP 0125 and 0129 in piace of 

combined sys tern OlO.l and OlJl. believed highly unsatisf a.c tory ••• n 

2. Cryptonet 22 was the European T'neater C1'1'Ptonet. 

3. M.easage fro.au Hq., Communications Zone, E'ro 1 u.s. A;rmy, Paris,, France. 

To: w.D, MR EX 97498. "For Signal Officer cite SOSSO signed Eisenhower 

EX 97498, Book message. Make following systems effective a.t OOOlA 

13 Feb.: SIGLYIS-.20 using SIGDHRD rotors, SIOCLOE-20, SIGTEMP ... 20. . Use <ia.Y l) keys a.a first settings in these systems all ETOUSA.aystema based on SIGTRIG rotors are to be immediately converted. to SIGDHB.D. 

Destroy all editiono of systems SIGLYIS, SIGCLOE, and SIGTEMP up to 

and including edition 19. lni'orm all holders to retain SIGTEUG pending instructions as to disposal. 
'. n 1 ~ '~ J' I !i 

I I~ ' lJj 

• 

CCBP 0.311 (SIOURBY), l were reserves for the new worldwide COBP 02ll rotora. 

The third rotors to· be wired •re the new CCBP 021;3 rotors, which were to I 

become reserves !or the Pa.oif ie area CCK system, CCBP 0113. 

When on 21 March 1945, t.he worldwide basic combified rot.ors, CCBP I 

Olli (SIGYHUG) were found, 2 ·the discovery brouBtit about a change ~ the 

wiring program. However, it did not institute as great a change as · 

finding the rotors might seem to suggest. The Working Cormnittee of the 

Combined Codes and Cipher Committee gave careful ea:tsideration to the 

ettect of the recovery ot the cryptographic matEtrial lost by the 28th 

Division.3 First, all members agreed unanimously that. the detez:mine.tion 

of compromise possibilities had to be left to oompet~nt authorities in Em. 

There£ore, the committee accepted the recommendation ma.de in· message·E 24223 

to consider all the recovered combined material as uncompromj.sed. · Having 

· arrived at this agreement, the committee then considered the effect of 

the recovery on the replacement program. lt was agreed that inasmuch as 

all of the combined systems concerned had been removed and probably des .... 

troyed by most holders nothing would be gained by again disrupting t~e 

schedule of supersession. There.fore, the arrangements as modified by 

the recover~r of the documents and rotors were as follows: 

Worldwide rotors CCBP Olll (SIGYHUG) were to be replaced by CCBP 02ll 

( SIOILUT) as scheduled. When CCBP 0111 rotors had been replaced completely~ 

l. Navy short titlea CSP 2811 (A). 

2. See page · .• 

3. All of the information in this paragraph is a paraphrase ot HReport 

0£ Workine; Commit tee concerning Emerge.'lcy Wiring Program«, 31 March 

1945; written by Tho. R. Chittenden, Major, s.c., Chainnan. 
REF ID:A523210 

offices (for u. s. Arms--theater headquarters). By using COBP Olli as a 

reserve set of rotors, the ext~e necessity for producing CCBP 0.3ll (the 

set to supersede CCBP 02ll) was modified. However, the need for a reserve 

set for CCBP Oll), the Pacific area CCM system, was just aa urgent as 

before. Therefore, it was unanimously concluded that i,ach service should 

wire CCBP 0213; i.e., the set to supersede CCBP 6113, as soon as possible; 

and, that upon completion of these rotors> each service would 1romediat~ly 

start production of CCBP 0311. Although CCBP Ollls were to be p.b oed on 

reserve, it was the hope of the commit.tee that they would not. have to be 

called into use again, as this set had suffered from long usage, extremely 

heavy traffic, a Vi&ak indicator system, and. a. bad contour pattern. 

Ina:.much. as the suspected corn.promise had occurred within the U. S. 

Arm:/, the responsibility for the disruption was keenly felt by the o.s. 

Army and an offer was .made to assist. the other .four Combined Services in 

their emergency wiring program. This offer 1 extended in a. memorandum .from 

the Chief· Si~ O.ff;i.cer to the Secretary, Combined Communications Boa.rd, 

stated, 8T'ne United $tates Army is prepared to wire approximately S,000 

sets of rotora, either the first back-up set for the worldw..uie system or 

the back-up sets for such other systems as the Combined Co.mmunicati{l:ls 

Board may decide are of more value; providing tile bla..11ks £or use by the 

u. s. Uavy and the British ServiQe are furnished the u .. s .. Anny, and the 

complete plan a.s outlined above is approved and disst.mi.ru:ited to the 
intereeted services within a period of :;o daye."1 This offer, which 

was accepted, was exclmμ.ve of 1535 ~eta of COBP 02ll which the u. s. 

Arrrq wired for the .Britillh Services in order that COBP 02ll could be 

placed into use by l May 1945 in the European theater,. 

In order to meet their committment to wire 8000 rotors for the 

British Services and· the U. s. Navy, 200 enlisted men were assigned to 

the 2nd Signal Service Battalion at Arlington Ha.ll Station 1'o:r a period 

of 180 days {21 Feb to 19 Aug 1945). During the first )~ weeks after 

the oo.~promise all civilian personnel were diverted to thlJ wiring of 

CCBP 0211 rotors. In these 32 neka, completion of' the Arnur 0211 rotors 

put the rotor wi.J"ing section 1200 sets behind in their normal production 

schedule. By. about l March the .A!!!l requirement.a for the a:aergeney program 

were_completed and the r~tor 'Wiring section (compos~d of the regUlar wiring 

personnel and the temporary detail) were ready to begin on the Army' com-

.mittment to wire 8000 rotors for the other services. At the same time the 

normal production schedule (total of 8640 during this period)2 had t.o be 

maintained, the·backlog of 1200 rotors ha.d to be wirec.t, 2 and the 8000 

new rotors on the emergency program had to be wired by the last of August 

1945· 2 Tnis sche<lule, which was met, ma.de a tot.al of 17,940 rotors2 wired 

between 2l Feb and 19 Aug, 

l. Report on the Colmar Case, p. , filed in Folder, "Colma.r dise•, 

WDGAS-83. 

2. Memorandum (draft; not used) for General Bissell, "Subject.: Extension 

of Orders 11 , signed W. Preston Corderman, 6 Karch 1945. 
REF ID:A523210 

ft'hUe the emergency wiring program was lleing carried out, it waa 

necessary to .t'ind a. way to resume· temporary use of the compromised rotor& 

or else to admit almost complete paralysis of combined communica.tJ.ons. 

At a Joint Codes and Ciphers Committee meeti11g held on the morning of 

13 February 1945, it was decided that the almost complete para]Ssia could 

be reduced to partial paralysis by temporarily using the lost worldwide 

CCBP Olll (SIGIHUG) rotors with certa.1n well-detined restrictions,, T'nia 

decision was made before the rotors were found. 'fh$ restrictions imposed on 

the use of the SlGIHUG rotors were as follows: 

{l) Restrict their use t.o low eehelon or tactical traffic • 

. (2) Restrict to 100 groups (later changed to l.501 see footnote 

l on following page) the amount of traffic in any one 

rotor setting. 

(J) Inform all users that planning type traffic must be passed 

in SlGABA or fype X vilen at all possible. 

" 

(4) Inform all users that all traffic passed using SIGYHUG was 

subject to being read oryptanalyticall.7 by the enell\Y. · · 

this agreement was made at the joint Codes and. Ciphers Committee meeting in 

order to present to the British a. coordinated plan for retaining emergency 

Combined Cipher Machine communications 'in the European Area. 

At. 2:30 on the same dar (13 Feb 1945), an emergeney meeting of the 

Combined Codes and Ciphers Comnittee was held. At tnia meeting it was 

agreed that CCBP Olll rotors should be placed back into e.f f ect with the· . 

rest.r1ctions1 outlined in the paragraph above. Of course, the British 

membiers could only agree to send a "signal" conta.ining these points and 

l. aestrictions a~reed ~lX>n ~t the Joint Cod~s and 6iphers Committee. 

See {l), (2), \:~), (4) above. · · · 
REF ID:A523210 

reaomanding their adoption to the British Joint Qonmun1cat1ons Board 

in London. Such a message wa~ draf't.eci1 and the meeting ended at 41,30. 

At 5130 o'clock on the aame day (13 Feb 1945) a SlGSALY oon.t'orence 

was held between the British and American representatives of the Co.rnbined 

Codee and Ciphers Committee in Washington and the representativ~s of the 

British Joint Comnunications Board in London. During this SIGSALI conference, it was agreed that the CCM should be placed back in general Wf&ge 

in E'fO, MED, and Atlantic areas with CCBP Olll rotors and using CCBP qstems 

0101, 0131, 0132 and. all lim1ted Navy combined qstems based on rot.ors Olll, . . 2 

Special limited Combined system 514 was not to be placed back 1nto etfect 

until later because the British in London were not certain of the distribution of edition 41 editions 2 and 3 having been compromised in the lost truck. 

Accordine~ .. at 7•30 on the same dq (13 Feb 1945), messages were 

dra.fted3 t.o in.form all. holders of the CCM o:t the decision to reinstate the 

CCM and certain systems. Before the messages could be sent, however, it 

was necessary to obtain a definite statement from Col. Bicher in Paris to 

the effect that CCBP 0101, O]Jl, and 0132 were not in the truck and had 

never been issued to the 28th Division~ ~~ral. Stoner had directed that 

l~ Message to BJCB: After consulting crtptanalysts U.S. suggest foil.owing emergency arrangements to meet urgent operational need of SHABF. 

Change o! indicators after every 150 groups. Forbid use in Paeit'ic 

Area of systems based on Olll. Make fullest \1Se of altema.t.ive 

channels in 0101, OlJl, and BX 824 were held. Urge measage of lonz 

term inform.a tion and all opera~onal planning be sent in intra 

systems where possible. Subject those provisions resume use in E'l'O 

MED and Atlantic of OlOl, 0131, 01.32, all limited combined naval a.net 

l.im1ted combined A.rm3' keyliets. Do 1ou agree. u.s. Anq stopped 

using 0131 for intra use 12 .Feb. 

2. Used between u.s. Army and Air Forces and British Arnv anG. RAF. 

3. T'ne messages were drafted in Conm.ander Smith's oi'tice b~r Lt. Col. 

K. Kuhn, Commander Smith, Commander Anderson, and )4jor T.R. Chittenden. 
such a atatement be gott.en, Therefore, while the messages were being 

d~atted, Colonel K-uhn arranged through the Classified Message Center tor 

a SlGSALY contetence wtth Colonel Bicher. At 9:30 that night (l.3 Feb 1945) 

the SlGSALY confe%'9nee was held with Colonel Bicher and it. was definitely 

determined that COBP 0101, Ol.31, and 01.32 had never been issued to the , 

division at the time the truck was appropriated. Accordingly, per agreement, the messages were sent to u,s. Arm:t and Navy holders of the CCM. 

E. -'WM t..1>-te ResROnsibilitz: 

Immediately a.i'te:r the loss of the secret cryptographic ma.terial.1 at 

Colmar, two investigations of the responsible personnel were conducted. . . 

The first, conducted on 6 and 7 Feb. 19li.5 \beginning the day after the 

truck was stol.en) by Lt, Col. Herman A .. Peterson, 2 IGP, Inspect.or General, a· 

2Sth Division, wa.s d.irec~ed a.1..-nost whol.17 toward attempting to gain leads 

as to possible ?1h,ereabouta ot the truck. The second, conducted on 27 

February 1945 by Major General F. B. Prickett, Special Insptctor, was al.so 

an attA;mpt to establish clues !Qr finding the truck, but was more particular- . ' 

ly directed toward establishing the cause of the loss and toward fixing 

the responsibility. It was desired ru.>t only to court martial suspected 

individuals but to apply remedial action against the recurrence of aerioU.S 

compromise. The two investigations are interesting for different reasoos. 

The first is valuable in establishing the tacts of the case since it occurred 

the day a.t'ter the loaa at a time when the witnesses 11ere still so appalled 

l.. see pages and for list. 

2. Pursuant to VOCG, 6 Feb 1945. 
~·· ~~~tu by the 1ne1den~ that they tended to be eampletely spentaneous1 and ex.a.et 

in their deacriptiona. By the time the (Second inv•atigation occurred on 

'2:l Feb.,. the witneeaes had regain$d their self consciousness enough to 

make mere treg,uent use of the phrase 111 refuse to answer on the grounds 

that the answer ma.y tend tQ incrimioate me.•2 The second inftl'tigation,, 

although' lacking the spontana.eity ot the .t'i;-st., was valuable fQr anotber 

reason. lt established the facts concerning what rules on sateguard.ing 

of SIGABA had been promulgated. 

The first investigation (6 and 1 Feb. 1945) by Lt. Col. Peterson 

took the fOJ"m of obtaining no~ testimony from each ot the perscns 1'ho 

had anything at a.J.l to do with the truck on the day ot its loss. The 

sworn testimony was given in answer to questions by Lt. Col. Peterson 

a.s to what their own actions •re in handling the truck and the equipment. 

Thf;) persons :J.n~iewed by Lt. Col. Peters~ were as follows (the list . 

below gives a brief resume of the role played by each person involved in 

l. DUriiig the fire£ 1nvest1gatlon, Lt. Col, Peterson asked Warrant 

Officer ltoodyt .. "Did it occur to you that the truck was missing? 

A. "No sir. It ·never entered rq mind to even check . the truck. ~hing like a truck being missine never .occurred to me at all." 

2. Th.is difference in the two investigations is most forcibly brought 

out by Ool. Hullett•s ~it.terent anners to the same question. During the .first. investigation Lt. Col. Peterson asked Col. Hullett 

"Were you present. here in this area when this second section (second 

section of cryptogra.Jbic team) arrived? An~r by Col. Hullett: 

"l was. 11 During the second investigation ltajor General Prickett asked 

Col. Hulletti •On the nigtits of 5-6 February; the Divi•ion Oonmand 

Post was in Colmar. Were you on. duty wit.h t.he Command Poet in Colmar?" 

Answer by Col. Hullett: ttI retuae to answer that on the grounds that 

the.answer might tend to incriminate me." 
IJ' . . IWif~/C f . the losing ot .the truck; for a detailed e.oco\Ult or this first invest.igaUon see Folder, 11Compromi.S• and Loss Cr;yptomaterial - ETO (Colmar 

Incident.) Investigation", within the named folder see "Investigation 

ot the Loss of Secret Cryptographic S7stems by the 28th Signal ~ 

Personnel, 9 Feb .. 1945"); 

1.. Colonel Clarence T .. Bullett, Signal Officer ot the 28th Intant17 

Division. 

a. Was in the Colmar area on the night of the loss1 and 

b. Wa.1 the man Ibo had personal.]3 received suppl~aent,ary 

SIGABA safeguarding instructions from ETOUSA. 

2. lst Lt. Robert Viet.e - Message ~ter 0.f'ficer, 28th Division 

Signal Compart¥. - Told Sergeant Tetarus (who relayed the 

information to Pvt. Thompson} to park the truck in the 

spot from which it was taken. 

J. Warrant Officer {JG) Edward K. Kood3 - Aaeietant Messye Center 

.officer, 28th Signal Company. Ranking officer who came in 

with the group that brought the truck to Colmar. ·He reported 

i. Question by Lt. Col. Peterson to Col. 'Hullett: Were you present here 

in thia area when this section {second section ot cryptographic team) 

arrived; Answer: .1 was. Q. Was &n1 inquiry made a& to where the 

trucks should be parked? Answer: Major Ballentine, rwy assistant, 

·was with the advance echelon on this particular move and from the 

official report., he made every effort to obtain a suitable parking 

area through the HeadqUa.rters Conwmdant, Colonel Dugan, with little 

success, due to crowded conditions. I am not in 8.l>3' wa, blaming 

Colonel Dugan or Major Ballentine. Q. I.t seems 1 it appears that 

if a suitable place could not have been located, arrangenents $hould 

have been made to guard the Signal Company vehicles that. were left 

on the street. Do you know whether stX:h. arranganenta were made? N() 

Signal Company guard was established,, however a milit.ar,y police 

t,'Uard 8..'ld patrol system was known to exist 1n the inmediate vicinity 

of the Command Post. · · 2. The ETOUSA instructions were addreesed directly to the Division 

Signal 0.f ficer. See Tab T. ' 
ar.rival to Lt. Viets, and saw where the truck was parked 

but he neither asked Viets wherf to park it or interfered 

with 'tlh&t. Thompson did with it. 

4. Pvt. llayron H. Thompson - Truck Driver, 28th Signal Company. - Drove lost truck and parked it in the spot from which it 

was taken ot the diroction of Sgt. Tetarua,2 

5. Tee 3 Frank Tetarua - Jl.essa5e center trick chief'* 28th Signal 

Ccmenr. - Tald the driver (ifbom.pson) to park the truck in 

the apot from which it was taken • .3 

6. Tee 4 Keneth A. Hillman - Cryptographic work, 28th Signal Company .... Found the truck missing on 6 Feb. when he went out to repair 

it. Also found trailer attached to truck. 

7. Tee 5 Richard w. Brookins, 28th Signal Company. - Found the truck 

missing with Hillman on 6 Feb. v.ilen he went out to repair it. 

Also helped Hillna.n .t'ind trailer~ 

The second investigation,, conducted by the special inspector, Major 

General Prickett., sought chiefly to detennine what rules cooeerning the 

safety of SlGABA had been pro~gated and. how familiar eaoh responsible 

individu~ was with these rules. (Copies of these rules appear in Tab T.) 

To arrive a.t thia goal, Major General Prickett interviewed lO individuals: 

six who were ~ interrogated during the i'irst investigation and four who 

were. The new i>ersons brought in to the second investigation were mainly 

1. Quest.Ion by Lt, Col. Peterson to WOJG Moody: ilfihen you left the truck 

did you give fMl¥ special instruct.ions to the driver where 1ou parked it.'l 

(SIC) Answer: No,, I saw it parked there on the corner in front of the 

billets and it looked as good as any I could find, so I did not tell him 

aeything." 2. Que3tion by X..t; Col. Peterson to Pvt. Thompson; Were you given any 

instru;tions on where you were to park the vehicle? A. 1 hollered and 

asked one of the sergeants where to park the truck. He said, npull it 

up a little bit further along the curb." (The sergeant was la.t"r 

identified as T~tarus.) 

3. lbid. 
./~ 

REF ID:A523210 

the Di vision 1 ti high ranldng o£t'icers who were not directly concerned 

with the loss of the truck but who were investigated because of the 

responsibility they b.ore by virtue of their positions. 

The 10 persons interviewed byJlajor General Prickett were as 

follows: 

l. Commanding General, 28th Infantry Division - Major General Norman 

D. Cota. . 

2. Chief of Staff, 28th Infantry Division - Colonel Jessee L. Gibney. 

3. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-21 Headquarters, 28th Infantry Division - . Lt. Col. Ha.1'17 s. lessee 

4. Division Siena.l Officer, 28th Infantr,- Division - Lt.. Colonel 

Clarence T. Hullett. 

5. As!iata.nt Division S~eJ. Officer, 2Sth Infant17 Division - lia.Jor 

w. i. Ballentine. 

6. Commanding Otticer, 28th Signal Compiny. -- Captain Ray c. Layman. 

7. Message Center 0.fficer and Oqptograph1c Security Oi'ficer, 28th 

Signal Company - 1st. Lieutenant Robert E. Viets. 

8. Assistant Message Center Oi'.ficer, 28th Signal. Compan;y, - Warrant 

·. ' · · · · Of tic er JG,-award K. iiOody • . :.;··.·· 

9. Message Center Trick Chief', 28th S:i.€1lal Company - Sergeant Frank 

w. 1l'etarus · 

10. 

lO.. Chief Clerk, 28th Signal Company - Spier D. Willia.ms. 

The pertinent statements of policy on physical sa.teguarding are 

contained in the following documents: 

l. Paragraphs 3Qb, d, and e, 43 and 44& of AR 380-5, War Department, 15 March 1944. See Tab T for photostatic copy-. 
2. Letter, SUbject: "Prottection of Ceyptographic Equipment 

during 'l'raneit in all Phases ot Operat.1on11 , To: Signal 

Communication and Signal Security Otticers;l signed for 

the Chiet Signal Officer b7 George A. Bicher, Col., S. C., 

14 March 1944. · See Tab T for photostatic cow. 

3. Letter, Subject: "Code Room Physical Security in all Phases 

ot Operation", To: Signal Communication and Signal Security 0£ficer;2 signed for the Chief Signal Otticer by 

George A. Bic!ler, Col., s. c., 15 June 1944. See Tab T 

for photostatic copy. 

4,. Letter, Subject: nseourity of SIGABA", 'l'o; Signal Security Officer, signed for the Chief Signal Ofticer; George A. 

Bicher, Colonel s. c., 6 July 1944. See Tab T .for photo~ 

static copy. 

The tollowing are the ~ers Wi1ich the ten persons int.ervie"d 

during the second investigation gave t.o the questions concerning their 

familiarity with these safeguarding rules (Ta.b T): 

1. Major General Norman D. Dota, Oomm.a.nd.inG General, 28th lnfant17 

Division. - Cota stated "I am familiar with AR )S0-5, but 

evidently these instructions from RTOUSA were sent direct 

to the Si§lal Officer a.111 l am. not familiar with them." 

2. Colonel Jesse L, Gibney, Chief of Staff, 2St.h Infantry Division. - Question by J>rickett to Gibney: *'Are you familiar with the 

provisions of AR .300-5 which states t.ha.t cryptomaterial will 

be given tne most secure storage available? Answer: I have 

read the regulation which you refer to. Question: I show 

you instructions issued by the Signal Ol'ticer, ETOUSA, 

addressed to the Signal Officer of the division on t.he general 

subject: PrQtecti,e>n or Cryptographic Equipment. Had you 

seen these instructions? An5Wer: I had not. 9,uettion: 

You were not familiar with the provisions of these instructi~ 

wl'.dch required placing of guard~ anned with autcma.tic weapons 

over this equipment 24 hours a day. Answer~ I am not.. · 

l •. l50111Il to and lncl.uding Division Headquarters in Araq Groμnd Forces; 

Wine Headquarters in A1'm3' Air Forces; Ports and Depots in Services 

of Supply. 2. Ibid. . 
). Lt. Colonel Harry s. Messec, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 

Headquarters, 28th Infantry Division. - Question: Are 

you familiar with the provisions of Mt 380-5, paragraph 

44 which states that cryptographic material will be 

eiven the most secure storaee available? Answer: Yes 

sir, I am. guestion: I show -you ·various instructions 

·issued by-CSO, ETOUSA, with regard to protection of 

cryptographic equipment and subse:::uently call your ·attention to one paragraph which states t~ t guards armed r:ith 

automatic weapons will be placed at the code room entrance 

of t.h.e vehicle 24 hours a. day. Have you seen these 

instructions? Answer: To my knowledge, sir, I have not 

seen either the letter dated 11+ Mar 44 nor the letter 

dated 6 July 1944. This letter dated 15 June I have seen 

only since the loss of the vehicle and the equirment. I 

did not see it before to my knowledge now. In each case 

all these letters are addressed to the Signal Officer or 

the Signal Security Ofticer. 

Lt., Gp+~nel Clarence T. Hullett, Division Sisnal Officer;, 2Sth 

<· . Infantry Division• - Question: I hand you AR 380-5, WD 

··.···>-,entitled 11Safeguarding Military In.forma.tion11 •••• Are you 

familiar with the provisions of that regulation with 

f!espect to safeguarding cryptographic equipment.? 

Answer: I am. Ques,t.ion: I rumd you comrr.unicatidns 

issued by the Of.fice:i of the Chief' Signal Officer, ETO, 

general subject; "Protection of Cryptographic Equipment" 1

J..'ere you familiar with the provisions of those communica-

... ~J9.ns on Feb. 5, 1%.5? Answer: At the present time, I 

refuse to answer on the ground that the answer may tend to 

incriminate me. I would have to read it all through .first. 

· 5. Major W. E. Ballentine, Assistant Division Sigr!al Officer, 28th 0 .Infantry Division. - Question: I hand you some communications issued by the office of the Chief Signal Officer, ETO, 

on the ganeral subject of security of cryptograpiic equipment. 

(Commtmications were ht1.1:1ded to witness.) Have you seen 

copies of those communications? ·Answer: I have but not in 

t!le 28th Division. Question; Do you know whether copies 

of these communications were in the hands of the Division 

Signal Officer? An.swer: That, I cannot say because so much 

or the records were burned prior to m::r arrival at Division. 

Questiont W:.'len did you join the Division? Jan. S,, 1945 ••. 

6. Captain Ray C. Lay.man, Com.mAnding Officer, 28th Signal Company. - Question: Do you hn.ve any epacii'ie duties with reference to 

safeguarding cryptographic equipment? Answert No sir. 

Juestion: The personnel assi,qped to the message center are 

a part of your company. Answer: Yes Sir. Question: I hand 
you some communications {interrogator handed communications to the witness) issued by the Office o! the cso, E'l'O, 

on the general subject of security of cryptographic eq\iipment. 

Have you ever seen copies ot those communications before? · · 

Answer: I don•t recall e11er seeing thfHJe, Sir. I believe 

they did go directly to the Division message center officer. 

Question: Do you have any peJ"sonal knowledge on which you base. that statement. Answer: Well, sir, at the particular 

t.ime these letters were issued I was not company co.mmsnder, 

tqepefore, I was in no way connected with the receipt of 

these documents or in no way connected with the message 

center. Question: Yrben did you become company commander 

of the 28th Signal Comp;my? Answer: 29 September 1944. 

Question: Then you have.:.·never seen copies of these communications? ·Answer: No sir. 

7. First Lieutenant Robert E. Viets, Message Center Officer and cwtographic Securit;v: Officer, 28th Signal Company. Question: I 

hand you A.a 380-5 and ask you if you were t'amil.ia.r on .5 Feb 

1945 witn i:ar. 44a. Answeri Yes sir, l was. familiar with 

that. guest.ion: I hand you communications issued by the 

Ottice of the Chief Signal Officer, E'l'OUSA, subject: Protection of Cryptographic Equipn¥ant. Were you on 5 Feb. 1945 

fa..miliar with the contents of these commWlications? Answer: 

To my knowledge, sir, I have not seen the letter, "Security 

or SIGABAn dated 6 July 1944. Question: But. you are familiar 

with all the rest of them? Answer: With the other two, yes. 

B. Warrant Officer JG Edward K. Moody, ~sistant Message Genter Officer, 

28th Signal Company. - Question: I hand you AR 380-5, WD, 

and call. your attentiontto pa.r. 44a.. On 5 Feb. 1945 were you 

'familiar with that particular paragraph? Answer: I believe 

I was, but later I checked up on it to refresh UJ1 memory on it. 

Question: I h.a.nd you. letters from the CSO, ETOUSA, subject: 

Protection of Cryptographic Equipment.,. On 5 Feb were you 

familiar with the coriten ts of these communications? Answer: 

I was reasonably familiar with. them. · I have aeen them in 

the Signal Office at one time or an.other. 

9. Sergeant Frank Tetarus, Message Center Trick Chief, 28th SitJlal Company. 

Question: Were you charged with any responsibility for storing 

or safeguarding the secret material., Answer: Yes sir. 

Question: Have any instruct.ions been given you by Lt,. Viets · 

as to the necessity for safeguarding this cryptographic 

material? Answer: Well, sir, they were not form.al. We 

were required to read AR 380-5 which states the rules of 

safety. 

lO. Tee Sergeant Spier D. Williams, Chief Clerk, 28th Sigμal Co. - Stated 

that the documents for message center usually came through 

his desk •. He receipted for them, routed than to their proper 

destination, but did not necessarily look a.t them. He did 

not ~ember ~~~.ine r ,. t.teT~ 11~t was not likely that 

he woUld. .·· '[lJ irp r '-' i' '!rt~ "!I; l ' ,, ~ \\ ~ I ~I • ,l_ " 
The especial.l,y pertinent statements of policy on physical safe .... 

guarding from AR .380-5 and CSO, ETOOSA letters are as follows: (For the 

complete policy .from AR 300-; and the complete EmUSA letters, see Tab T.) 

From AR J§0-2J {~e also Tab T.) 

Par. 44. li:"ecaut.iona necessary ~o insure cryptographic eecuril;,y. - In order to inoure cryptographic security the following principles 

must be observed: 

a. Cryptographic material will be given the most secure storage 

available and will never be left unattended except when deposited in 

a three-combination safe or its equivalent. 

From Letter dated ±!t Uarch 12W:t= (See also Tab T.) 

•• ,Cryptographic material and associated equipment is always hiehJ,y.vulnerable to capture by the enell\V or compromise during 

transit irrespective or geographic locations. · All responsible per- sonnel operating in a static pasition must be constantly alert to 

protect er;,: ptographic equipment. from capture by the enemy and loss 

through careless handling .•• 

Section B. Mo~ile 9Jl!ratiq.p.1 

(2) In the event of a convoy move to a new headquarters., 

t.he code room vehicle should be located toward the front of the convoy 

to insure irmnediat.e cryptographic communications for ·the forward 

command poet. · 

(3) Anted cryptographic personnel should occupy the 

vehicle immediately following the code room van or truck. 

(4) Armed BUQ"ds will protect the immediate area suJTOunding the mobile cede room during temporary and overnight convo1 halt, 

E. Echelon Op!rations 

(2) The safest and moat expeditious means of transportation available will be employed in moving the S!GABA. 

1. This paragraph does not cover the exact situation of the Colmar ease 

because the truck was not being used as a .mobile code room. However, 

the type ot protection desired is evident. 
a1J ~~u,~lt ~ 

from Letter dated 6 Jm 1944• (For the complete letter, see Tab T.) 

••• 8. The SigJial Security Officer will be rosponsible for all 

aecurity matters connected with this apparatus. He shall be · lam' 1 far with t~e correct method of operating the equipment as 

outlined 1n the publiilhed instructions, and shall enforce the pro- visions of these documents as well as those or AR 38()..?. 

The of fieers "Whose positions vested them with the greatest respOnsibili ty for the Colm:ir incident were the Division Si&Ual Officer ·(Colonel 

Hullett) and the Cryptographic Security Officer (Lt. Viets}. Both 

testified that they considered. they were complying with AR 380-5 by having the equipment locked in a .3-combination sate (Tab T for AR 380-5 rule) 

in spite of a.dditiona.J. instructions issued by the Signal Officer, ETOUSA 

(Tab T). Although the lost cryptographic equipment.!!!!! locked in a .3-. 

combination safe, it was lei't unguarded in a mobile truck parked on a 

street of a eity recently captured from the OUeJ:l\V• 

The conclusions drawn in Lt. Colonel Peterson 1 s report of the i'irst 

investigation were e.s follows: 

••• V. Conclusions 

14. That the security provided for cryptographic material of 

the 28th Si~al Compal\Y ?las inadequate and not 1n compliance with 

the intent of Army Regulations 380..5 and provisions of secret letter 

instructions published by higher headquarters. 

15. That· Lt., Colonel Clarence Hullett, 28th Division Signal Officer, failed to fulfill his duties as Division Signal Oi'ticer 

by allowing a condition of negligence to exist in the 28th Sit,Jial 

Company whic;h reaulted in the los• o_t highly secret devices and. 

documents. That no standing operatlilg procedure had been prescribed which provided for tlle maximum. security of this material 

at all times. The compromise of this secret data. by ene.fl\Y' forces 

will result in grave damage to the secret communication system of 

the u. s. Army. 

l, .. i 

I' 
16. That Lt+ Robert Viets as crTPtographie security officer, 

having full knowledge of the importance for security of crypt.ographic material, tailed to exercise even ordinary security measures 

consistent with the known importance ot the secret devices and eodes. 

The concltUJions drawn in Major General Prickett•e report of the 

second investigation were as followsi 

• -.IV. CONCLUSIONS. 

13. It is concluded that: 

a. The security measures provided for cryptographic equipment of the 28th Infantry Division were totally inadequate and did 

not comply with the provisions of AR JSQ ... 5 and instructions issued 

by the Si,r.nal Officer, ETOUSA. 

. b. The lack of inspections, guards for vehicles, and 

specific instructions for security measures reflect unfavorably on 

the·etficiency of the 28th Infantry Division, 

c. Colonel Jesse L. Gibney, GSC, 0-12216, Chief of Staff, G-2, 

28th Infantry Division, .failed to perform. his duties as Chief' of Staff. 

d, Lt• Colonel Harry s • .Messee, GSC, Assistant Chief ot 

Staff, G-2, 28th Infantry Di vision, tailed to perform his duties a.a 

0-2. 

e.. Lt. Colonel Clarence T. Hullett, 015088, 28th Division 

Signal Officer, 1st Lieut. Robert. E, Viets, 01638724, 28th Pivision 

Cryptographic Security Officer, WOJG Edward K. Moody, W 2127012, 

Assistant Message Center Officer, 28th Sign.al Cotlpa.ny, and T/3 Frank 

s. Tet.arus, 36607Sl4, Or;yptographie Technician, 2Sth Signal Company, 

are guilty of gross nagleet of duty. 

t. Trw practice of the Chief Signal 0.t':f1cer, ETOUSA, in 

sendinc; security instructions direct to Division Signal Officers and 

Division Security Officers is unsound from a command viewpoint. 

g. Proper measures were and are being taken to recover the 

lost cryptographic eq\Q.pment.. 
The record ot trial. on Golonel Hullett1 indicated that he was 

sentenced to dismissal, as confirmed by Cd, ETO. . On 6 November l.945 

sentence was suspended during good behavior by action of Secreta~y of 

War Patterson. If offense under AWs ehould be committed. subseo.,uent 

to 6 November Hullett would be subject to punishment for second offense 

pl.us dismissal on original qbarges. lio .record in thia agency is available on the trial of Viets, Mooc13, or feta.rue. 

l. Tnis in.formation is contained in a note by fuk Rhoa.d:s on inside 

cover of Folder "C9mpromise and Loss Oryptomaterial-ETO ( Oolma.r . lncident.) Investigation",. · 
REF ID:A523210 

;

1 , I 1/\ 1 ~ Ui ~_,_J ~I~ 

QHAPT&R mx. !4.AIN'l'ENANC.E OF OOOVBR'l'ER •-1.34-C 

A. General 

Maintenance ot large electro-mechanical convert.era in th.e field 

W&s a. canplet.ely new problem in World War II. W:1en the war began in 

December 1941, the Arff('J had only about 1001 converters in contrast. to 

the 3030 'Whieh it would procure during the next two or more years. 

Therefore, placing contracts tor the needed converters, prodding Teletype Corporation into bettering its delivery schedule, and distributing 

them to the users were the main problems that absorbed the attention of 

S!S.2 What to do about fixir'8 the converters when they broke doTin was 

a sadly neglected problem a.a far as advanced planning was concerned. 

The i'irst maintenance school for SIG.ASA was held in March 1942, llhich 

date may not seem very belated since the U, s. had been in the war only 

about four months and the main quantity of SIGA.BA.s i1ad not yet been 

ordered. (See ChaJ.:'t, pa.go .) But it wa$ so late that the plans made 

and carried out by the War Department, for :maintenance of converters never 

caught up to the ne$d and SIGAB/l maintenance became a problem chie.t'ly 

solved by ingenious emergency expediency in the overseas theaters. 

1. Wo:rma.tion concerning the fact that s!lf I'lad received about lOO 

converters when the wo.r started wa.s remembered by Mr. Kenneth Kuhn, 

Chief, ·Maintenance Branch. A ¢areful examination of the procurement 

figures \pages and , also Chart ) reveals that the figure 

oould not have been much less than 80 nor much more than 150. 

2. Later expanded to ASA; see Cha.rt, page 
I 

/ 

REF ID:A523210 

~ ~~.~~ 

B. Maintenance Traini!!S 

l During 1941 and early 1942 the attitude which prevailed 1n SlS 

was that personnel trained in teletype maintenance could perform SIGAB.A 

maint.enance by experimenting on tneir,own with repairing SIGABAs. All 

SIGABA maintenance was perto:rmed by the personnel of SIS, 1 who, in accord-

. once with prevailing mood, had acquired their experience catch-as-oa.tch 

can. T!1is attitude toward the maint.enanoe p1-oblem is ~;ell summarized by 

the· following letter (from QCSigO, WD to the Signal Officer, 2.rid Amy). 

written in July 1941: 

1. The. setting up of a special course of instruction on the 

maintenance or Converter Type .14-1.34-C is believed. to be impra.cticabl• 

at the present time for the following reasons. 

a.. Of .322 converters now on order, only 10 have thus !ar 

been accepted despite the vital need for this device am.one various 

tactical organizations. Upon receipt of additional converters from 

the manufacturer it is intended to unke them imm.edia tely available 

to using organizations and, consequently, converters tor use in 

maintenance courses will be unavailable. 

b. Because ot the similarity in some respects of t'ie Converter M-l.34-C to standard Teletype i.~struments, it is believed that 

personnel who have been trained for Teletype maintenance can, with a 

litt1e additional experience, prov~de the necessary field maintenance 

of converters~ 

c. The storage and issu.e ot Converters M-l.34-C is a responsibility of the SIS of this.office and it is contemplated that all 

major repairs or unit replacements will be effected by the Signal 

In telllgence Service. While making such repairs serviceable converters 

will be exchanged for the un~ervioeable converters in the hands ·ot 

the tacti~ organizations. 

In March 1942, the rtiost maintenance school was organized.. . Olasees 

. were held in the evenings iri tne Munitions Building, ·where the sW. 

offices were then located. ·.:.hiS first maintenance school !'.2!:. ,lli .E!rsonnel. 

l. Later expanded to ASA; aee Ohart, page 
REF ID:A523210 

,........,, f , 1,-' 1· 

H!!k \'las all tbat existed in ma.int:.enanoe t~a;:-.c=r-"lll l . when SIS moved to its pennanent location at Arlington Hall StatiQn. 

The texts used in the first school were the manufacturer's texts. 

While the firet. school was beinc conducted at the Munitions Building, 

the first War Department maintenance instructions, namely, "Operating 

and. Maintenance Instruct:i.ons tor Oonvert.er !!-134-C (short UtJ.e: SIGKKK), 

l. Sept·. .1942, were published. 

In en.rly 194.3 the Maintenance School underwent a much-needed expansion. Letters were sent out to all holders of SIG-AB.A inviting units to 

sent perao.r.nel to Washington tor trainine in SIGABA ~intenance. Signal 

Corps Inspectors at manutacturer•a plant who had n·.:> training, but -were 

inspecting the equipment, were brought to Arlington Hall Station and 

given t.he ma.int.onance course. This training of inspectors resulted in 

their performing a much better job of aooepting or rejecting the manu-

. racturer•s product. U.nc1er the netl training proeram., the school expanded 

to tue point that it overreached the capacity of Arlington Hall and was 

moVed • to Vint Hill Farms Station at \'larrenton, Virginia in 

The m&intenance son.col was conducted at Vint Hill from until 

l May 191+9), when it wa.s moved to Carlyle Barracks, Pennsylvania.· Direct 

technical liaison is authorized between Maintenance Branch e.t Arlington 

Hall and the Maintenance School at Vint. Hill. 

During the entire war SPSIC (later SPSlS) letters were periodically 

published and distributed to all hc1ders of SIGABA, invitine units to send 

men to Washington>for trainine in SlGABA .maintenance. The length of the 

tra.1.ning period and the prerequisites for the trainees, in generaJ. 

increased ae follows& 

I. Later expanded to ASA; see Chart, page • 
REF ID:A523210 

LENGTH OF· 

LETTER TRAINIRG PERIOD PREREQUISimB FOR TRAINEES 

l. Subject; "Trained Person- 30 daya1 (l) Jfen with previous telenel tor Maintenance of type maintenance trainConverter M.-134-0, n 

6 May 1943· 

ing. . (2) Men familiar with circuit 

1'0rk and amall tools • . (3) Men who have used· &mall 

tools, such as teletypewriter repairmen. 

2. Subject a Same, l ~~ days I \l) Same as {l) above. 

l2 June 1943 (2) Men fam:tnar with circuit work and small tools, 

I such as telephone repair- ~ men or installers. 

f (.3) Same as (J) above. 

3. Subject: Sa.me, i 45 da.ys1 I (l) Same 4s (1) above. 

10 Dee. 1943 ~ (2) Same as (2) above. 

J j (J) Men who have used small ~ I tools, such as type-

( i writer repairmen, with a i baaic knowledge or elec ... trical circuits. 

4. Subject: Same, I 55 days1 Personnel selected for this 

5 Feb. 1944 . training must be qualitied ~ to peJ>i'orm the duties or 

Ji teletypewriter mechanic l 

" : { SSN-2.39) • · ' 

~ 

5. Subject: Same, '· 70 dayal : Same as above. i; 6 June 1944 ~ 

' I 

6. Subject.: Same, i 8 weeks1 l much expanded statement. o.f' 

15 Dec. l9W+ l . prerequisites: See 'l'ab V. 

lContinued on fC?llowing page.J 
(~. 

REF ID:A523210 

IENGTH or I · 

mAINIHG IERIODI PREREQUISITES FOR TRAINEES 

7, Subject: same, 

26 ~ 194.5 

8. Paragraphs 28-31 ot 

naeneral Instruotions 

for Convert.er M-1)4-C11 

(short title: SIGBRE-l), 

June 1945. · 

9. Subject: "Trained Personnel for Maintenance of 

Converter i-1.34....C,H 

2.AprU 1946 

l.O. Subject; Training of Persomel for Maintenance of 

Electro-mechanical Crn>tographic Equipnent; 9 Sept. 

1948. . 

l. see i'ootnote l, previous page. 

9 weeksl 

Approxi-1 

mately 

8 weeks 

10 weeks1 

See Tab v. 

Soe Tab v. 

f 

I I I See Tab v. 

See Tab V. 
REF ID:A523210 

1. Tr 

llr;~~[ ~ ~j:ienance school (see aboVe), one is 

impressed 111 th th$ fact that the training of SIGA.BA repalrme.n was making 

steady progress. 'l"ne school grew so large that it overreached the 

capacity of Arlington Rall; the length or_ the training period wa.s, in 

general, gr&dual.17 inoreaaed;1 the prerequisites were made more stringent. 

But this is only one side 0£ the picture. The other side is that while 

· the maintenance school was tl.1tpWld1ng, t.he war was in. progress and several 

hundred SIGABAs were alreat\v overseas. Tb.e_.f.'irst invitation to using 

units to send 1n men tor train1ng as replil"men was issued on 6 May 1943 

at v.tl'lich t.ime the North African invasion was jus~ about over. 

The effectiveness of the wax--time maintenance school suffered from 

more than just the tact that. it was behj.nd sched.~e in the early war 

years. For a..fter the school began to turn out trairied repairmen in time 

to go overseas with some of the new SIGABAs, 2 many of the men did not 

arrive overseas in the capacity of cryptographic repadrmep after all. 

The reason was that cryptographic repairmen did not appear on any of the 

Army's Tables of Organiza.t,ion and Equipment until 22 September 1944, when 

fixed and mobile cryptographic equipaent repair teams:3 appeared on the 

l. Le footnote l, page • 

2. The last and largest order was for 1165 SIGABAs, not placed untll 

23 Uov. 1+3 and not completed until l Oct. 45. 

:;. IL. - Mobile oryptographio equipnimt repair team. - Provides the required personnel, tools and spare parts for routine maintenance inspect~on ·and second and third echelon repair or electrical and mechanical cryptographic devices. This team is ca}':&ble or maintainine all 

mechanioal and electrical. cryptographic equipment authorized for service 

of t.e.ctJ.oal organizations. 

IM. - Fixed eryptograp.l'lic equipment repair teaiti. - Provides the required 

personnel, toola, and 1pare parts for maintenance and tili.rd echelon 

repair of all types of mechanical and electrical c:ryptogra{ilic devices. 

T'.ais team is intended to be used 1n rear areas of the theater to .maintain cryptographic machines used in enciphering coomunioationa !or t~1e 

theater headquarters s.nd to augment the mobile cryptographic repair 

tea.ms in repair of damaged equipment. 

~ 1 frl 'Jilli ~ 
ID:A523210 

T/O & E ot the Arn11•s Signal Service Organization (T./O & E ll-500). 

Since there was no formal place for them on the 't/O & E> there was no 

authority for preventing them from being tr&"lSferred to other dutiea 

and just such unwise and i.lnpreventabl~ tJ".atlS.,f~rs many times ocQurred. . ' I .. , ' .~ , ~ ·' '• 

Even though cryptographic repair teams . appea.Nd on T/O & K ll-500 on 

22 ~pt. 441 moet. tmit1J ~till do not carry c:cyptographic repairmen on 

their T/O & Es. 

The fa.et thrlt planning and training for repair or cryptographic 

equipnent. was faJ' behind the need does not imply as much la.ck of foresight as at first. it might purport. When the war began in December 

l941, SIGABAs were being procured at a. slow and leisurely rate. Only 

about 1001 had been rece.1 ved and onl.r 327 had even been ordered. lt 

was natural that no extensive plans were made tor repair or such a tew 

converters~ That a maintenance school was begun four months lat.er is 

rapid accomplishment judged. from the point or view of effort put to an 

emergency task but judged by results, it was too late. 

0. Re29rts from Over~eas Theaters on SI GABA Maintenance 

ASA in the European, .Mediterranean, and Pacific T'neaters trained 

most. ot their own repairmen during the war. During the early months of 

the war, SIG.ADA repair in the overseas theaters was carried on by a few. 

Later the tew repairr.ien available trained others. 

l. See footnote l, page • 
• 

REF ID:A523210 

The way in which 8.49th Signal Intelligence Service (Mediterranean 

Theater) met the problems posed by SIGABA maintenance is well swmnarized 

by the following excerpt from the History of 849th Signal Intelligence 

Service: 

From Hiaton ot AA2th SIS, ;e. 127: 

1 ••• 6. It was a fortunate coincidence that one of t.he enlisted 

men ·from the Western Task Foree who was assigned to the 849th was 

an excellent SIGABA repairman as well as a first rate all-round 

mechanic, s.ince none of the EM originally assigned to the organization had ever seen the machine. For several months this man epent 

most of his time ma.king on-the-spot repairs all over t.he t.h~ter, 

eince What. few machines there were could never be spared long enough . to send them in to headquarters for overhauling. Between trips he 

managed to train two other men on the machine, a.ft.er which a. school 

was established in which additional men of this and other ~ganizations were trained·. Some months later SSA expressed grave doubts 

as to the practicability ot attempting to train maintenance men under 

"combat conditions" and suggested that they be requisitioned (a 

process which experience shows requires an average time of approximately six months). Eventually enough SlGABAs reached the theater to make 

it possible to dispatch new or econditioned machines to units in 

. , .. ~rouble and pick up the old ones for thorough overhauling. However, 

by this time so many capable r$pairmen had been trained that such · ·· · ·•xchanges were very seldom necessary, and the principle function of · the SIGABA repairmen continued to ce that of training maintenance 

men, Wh!ch they are still doing \1945) at. the rate ot about ten a 

month. · 

The difficulties encountered because of lack o! equipment and trained 

repairmen in the. China.-Burma.-India. Theater is told in an excerpt .t'rom a 

field report: 2 

l. This man was one or the first graduates of the Mailltenance School at 

Arlington Hall Station. The excerpt quoted here shows the need for 

the taoroug.~ training which the A.H.s. school provided. 

2. Field Report on SIGABA, To: Cl1iet, Signal Officer, From: Adam E. 

Doge.n1 1st Lt., SC., Unit leader, S11C. Supplj" Su:rve-r Theater Unit, 

3 Jan. 1944. 
.~· 

.... 11. SIGABA ma.chines he.-ve been maintained by one te 

three maint..enanoe men tor about 18 mont:!le in the entire CBI 

Theater. Four SlGABA maintenance men arrived one month ago,. T'nree maintenance men. arrived without. tool kit.s to 1110rk on 

SIGABA machines. Thero are not enough tools available tQ 

equip theoe SIGABA maintenance men or the additional can who 

hatte been requisitioned from the U. s. Tools have been requisitioned for these men. 

A detailed. report of the SIGABA maintenance problems met by 849th 

Signal Intelligence Service is presented in the following excerpt. from 

a History of Cipher Machine Maintenance Sect.ion:l 

Hi~tou of Ci@•r Machine. ~~.~:eenance Seat.ion ~Part II) ot §lt9th s~. 

SI GABA 

... 1~ GENFRAL. Early in 1943 the Cipher Machine Maintenance 

Section i,r\a.ueurated a sQhool tor the training of SIGABA maintenance 

·personnel in the Morth African Theater. , Newls' trained personnel 

first served as the instructors to?> a. ten day course, which has been 

repeated appro.x.ima.tely every two weeks to the present date, During" 

this period 7 officers and 193 enlisted men of both the Arrrq and Navy 

were trained. Tue tollming paragra.Jils discuss the activities ol the 

SIGABA personnel of the Gipher Machine Mai.n~ance Section,· and tell 

or the problems enoountered. , 

••• 2. SIGABA UAIMTENANCE COURSE. The program of the school is 

a condensed version of the course 1n SIGABA maintenance, ottered by 

the Second. Signal Service Regiment, Washington, D, c. New studento 

a.re !irst processed and thoroughl.y checked for or,ypt.ographic clearance. 

The schedule of the ten day oourse provides three days tor circuits, 

tlU"ee days for meehani.cal adjustments and lubrication, and four days 

for t.roublee. The explanation in document SlGKKK-l is follow~. in 

studying circuits. T'ne student. is oholl?l how to follow tn• diagram 

in all positions Of the ooo.trol RitChl?B• All hit-or-miss methods 

in finding troubles are discouraged, and the apt pupil readi.J3 sees 

the value of a systematic use of the ohrneter in localizing the 

trouble to a definite portion 'Of t.he complex wiring, the ewitches, 

or the mechanically act..ivated·conta.cts. Next the student ia shown 

l. 'hiis report was written by Theodore o, ietcill, Capt., Signaf ~orpa 

Cipher Machiile Section, 849th SIS. His complete report lan excerpt 

of which is given here) is incorporated in the History ot 849th SIS. 
REF ID:A523210 

now t,o diamantle the entire machine, which is studied in.sections 

in order to avoid contusion, He is taught to reassailble and adjuot 

the unit, memorizing the measurements and critical lJpring tensions. 

An explanation ot the propei- wag t~ clean, oil, and grease the 

machine is giyep J.~~:.,.~his time. The student is ohown 'NOJ"n parts which have had to.be replaced because, 9£ improper care or the unit. 

'tandem operation and operation with batteries .are explained. Every 

<tU.t'~c;ult;y that. th• inet:ru,ctor has. experienced in field nia.intenance· . i• Pl!'Quettt -t.Q th4t st~enta. a,ttention. following this, a machj.ne ia uiigned to each- atμd~h and a, series.0£ thirty-five tr0ubles, one 

at a time, are pla.oed. on the unit. After the el.eotrical or mochan• 

ica.l maladjustment is placed on the unit,. the student. is recall.ed into 

the -room and timed until he has located and repaired the trouble. A 

record ot this kind assists the instructor to observe the student's 

technique, t.Uthougtl particular emphaeis 1.s placed on thoroughness 

rather than on speed • 

• • • 3. (a) AODITIONAL ACTlVITIES Of' THE SECTIO~. AS a number of 

SIGABAs and the maintenance trouble!<l arising therefrom increasecl., the 

need for a central agency for the supp}3 of spare parts •s soon 

recognized. This section assumed the responsibility of filling 

orders in the field, and in turn ordered parts tor its supp.lg tran 

Washington. 

(b) AdGquate tQOls and equipnent are not available in the 

.t'ie.ld for the repair of SIGABA motors~ Faulty motors are forwarded 

to this section for repair where they are exchanged for , new or 

rebuilt motors, thereby eliminating any long delay at the operating -unit. · 

••• 4. (a) MAIN DIFFIO\!l:mS ENCOUNTERED. The most serious 

operational failures encountered in this theater are caused by taUlty 

power supply. Voltage changes are f.requen t throughout t.ne day and 

night. Voltage drop retards tl;le make and "break ol a moving cent.act, 

induoing sparking,,. and thereby causing t.he part to becone worn and pitted~ The e.f.feQt of tau1ty power suppl;- on cipher macbinea and 

teletype units was oO.erved early in the North African campaign, and 

r.:i&J'\V holdera were influenced te> use only' power from army power units. 

These holders he.ve experienced a m1n1mwn of failures due to electrical 

break-downs. Other holders using pQWer generated loeall,y have ha.d 

cone;iderable difficulty. '?he answer to this problem is not 1n the 

smo.U power units of the indi vidua.l machine, since these units will 

not atancl up under constant operation. Tae better solution has 

proved to be tile provieion of large power units !or continual opera-- tion with sufficient output to provide for the entire needs ot a messa.~ center and code room. 

__ t 
,---, 

. 1 

(b) Additional ditf!culty was once enooWlt&red in :keeping 

_the machines clean due t.o the impalpable character of the dust in 

Nort.h Africa. This situation was .improved materially when the CH-76 

became available tor issue to all holders. 

( c) Ht.unerous complaints were received that. SIGABA.s were 

.causing interi'ereno@ with radio reception. To meet. this obat.a.cle 

a spark suppressor unit was.developed and distributed to some of 

'the holders. A detailed description and drawing of the Wlit was 

submitted to Wash1ne;ton tor approval only to find that a simU&r 

unit had been devised there and had become available for distribution • 

~ ... 5, CONOLUSlON. lt-·a.s the opinion of this section that the 

SIGABA ls a. most practical and efficient cipher device. Simplicity 

-0f operation, facility of maintenance, and its suitability to field 

conditions have mad& it invaluable in signal conmunica.tions. ~l 

meoh.anical refinements suoh as automatic ribbon reverses, hinged. 

cover-lids, and eopy holders would be w•leome improveimnts trom 

the operator's stand:point. 

D. Replacement and.1 Redesiss of Parts 

Another repair problem was obtaining necessary replacement parts. 

FrOin 1942-45, procurement of' replac'ement parts from the manufacturer ·was 

extremely difficult. Therefore, parts which wore out with little use 

constituted a desperate problem. Excessive trouble with any of the pa.rts 

of the converte1•s instigated work on 'redesisn to eliminate the detects. 

This research on perfecting design of parts, on which detective reports 

had been received, became one of the chief functions of Maintenance 

Branch• Arlington Hall Station, during the \W.r. Untold man ;hours of trial 

and error and testing were spent in order to perfect by redesign any parts 

reported as giving excess trouble. In order not to delay production of 

redesiljled parts, Maintenance Branch, Arlington Hall, found it necessary 
REF ID:A523210 

-~Fnrru ~ ·1 {''.,._J' ~\~ • • \\I I ; I I ; ~ 

. ~; ' __ , ~ L 

l ' to assign an ofticer to the .manufacturer's plant ·from March 1943 to 

January 1946 for the purpose of answering the manufacturer•s technical 

questions immediatelt. 

Durine the African invasion, excessive trouble was encountered with 

the clutch-trip magnet. oonta.cta and replacement part<J eould not be 

obtained. Finally, 1n October 1943 the clutch-trip circuit and aasemblf 

. l 

was completely redesigned.~ thereby eliminating the trouble. All convertere dEtllve1'$d by the manufacturer aft.er l January 1944 we.re equipped 

with this deai,,i change. 2 

During the war many suggestions and recommendations were received. 

at A:rn\Y Security Agency tor an automatic ribbon reverse oecha.nisra. It 

was impossible then to place emph.a.sis on such a development.. However, 

in early 1947, design of a.n automatic ribbon-reverse mechanism was begun 

and in January 1948, procurement was initiated. They were received in 

Julyl.948 and made available for field installation. 

Listed below are the major design changes made by the ma.nutaoturer 

on the new SIGABAs coming off t.be assembly line after field use o! the 

earlier ma.chines had proved the changes desirable: 

l. Verbal int'c)rmation from Mr. i. KUhn, Chier, Maintenance Branch, 

May 1949. 

2. Change No. l to ROpera.ting and Maintenenoe Instrt\Ction$ for Converter M-134-C" (short title: SIGKKX-l), 15 Nov. l94J, p. 2, 

: ; , ~­ .. J 
I 

-

REF ID:A523210 

NOTE• The quantity figure in the right hand column is the number of 

units built which did.~ inclOO.e the change. It. is probable 

that a percentage of these uilit1. were subsequently modit'ittd in 

_the field. · 

108778 

108787 

108319 

100162 

108684 

108680 

100970 

100971 

100972 

108694 

108695 

108696 

1006$1 

100991 

108776 

Right. hand main shaft bearing {Replaced 100271 bearing to permit easier 

removal of main shaft) 

Left hand main sha.£t bearing . ';_<> ,-, 

(Replaced 100577 bearing to permit ·~1 

bearing distortion) · 

Axial wiok t<>~ ~ s.bAtt _ (Added £or improved lubrication) 

Type1dl-eel shaft gear h\lb 

lKey added tq tir~vent slippage) 

Typewheel 8.ha.f~ and bub 

tReplaeed 100069 shaft and hub alter the 

· first l,4l7 units, but hardened ate.el huhs 

not $n e!tect ·until after l, 708) 

Typewheel shaft tri~tion disc 

\Replaced. 100086 disc. 108680 has two large · £lats. 100086 had amall. key. 

Approx. 500 

1,821 

l,708 

Approx. 100 

(These parts replac;ed ~~ ··leaf type typelfheel 

!riction c).~tch parts 100088, 100089 and 76086.) 

Trip lever (Replaced 100279) · Reset lever (Replaced 100525) ~ 

Non-repeat lat.ch {Replaced 100262) 

(The above parts provided increased margin 

tor the non-repeat mechanism) 

Hold-down tor motor plug 

(Added. to prevent bounce-out of the plug~) 

Insulator 

(Added under stepping mf!1lets to prevent 

shorti.ng of terminals) 

Approx. 11 )00 

Approx. 300 

Shield for clutch magnet (Added to prevont dam.a.ea to magnet lead wires.) 

-------- .- --- -~-------------- --
100121 

1002.36 

108717 

100212 

108310 

108309 

100100 

l00ll7 

108818 

100817 

REF ID:A523210 

Print haumer insert 

{Top of insert widened to provide better printing.) 

Detent lever-tor rotor 

(Oil hole added) 

Receptacle 

{Added t,o l•ft side of eovcr for bookl.et 

atorag••) 

Clutch thrmrout lever 

(This part mod.itied. several times. 2J6Q 

represents t. he tigw:. •e to:r units not having the final design.) 

Stainless steel stepping ·mag. arm pivot 

Magn<et bracket {Replaced 100266) 

(The origina.l pivot, 1002971 wa.s replaced. in 

all units after 370, but the final delign of 

100)10 \'m$ not in units until a.tter 2 1823. In 

between, aevel"al different. materials were tried. 

Hl08)ll nut and U0743 lock washer a.re U$ed to 

mount each 108310 pivot. The 108309 brackets 

will take all types of 100310 pivot.). . 

l,850 . 

2,360 

2,82.3 

370 

Over (Centeri.11g arm tor ribbon feed. Approx. 31000 

Riveted design changed to an aasembly consisting of 0108873 a.rm and. 11108874 

hardened, replaceable post. 

Tape chute assembly Approx. .31000 

(Reinforcing bands added to supplement.. 

spot welding.) 

Tape chute assembly No units had this 

(This design, in which the reinforcing bands were integral, was released just 

as production ot units stopped,) 

Switoh bracket and switch assew.bl;y No units had this 

( Tais design, Whioh replaced the 

100316 braeket and 9175.S switch, was 

al$o released just.. as production of 

units stopped.) 
108967 

100595 

REF ID:A523210 

Retaining ring for stop Pin• 

{This rine; which replaced. 100061, had 

welded pQete tot the ribbon gt4,de to 

provide more tlu-ead tor the ribbon guide 

mtg. senrws. t'.no change was released 

just. as unit. production stopped.) 

No units had· t,hia 

Controller switch ca.at~g and bearings Uo units h"-d this 

(Becauae or wear of the top bearing, and 

seizure of the lQWtr, the 100332.top plate 

ms replaced with 108965 plate having an 

oilit.e bushing, and the lower bronze bushing · BSl78 was replaced with. 108966 oilit~ bushing. These cnanefl!s can be made in the field it 

proper .taeilitie.o are availabl•.t or new style 

l00595 assemblies ean be used to replace the 

old style.) 

Clutch magnet contact. assembly 

(The 6100280 "let close" design replaced the 

original. 0100270 "push cl9ise" design and 

our records indicate that replacement of 

all 1002'70 assemblies wae ma.de. Later, a 

two-spring "l•t. cloee8 assemblg, f/108712, 

having riveted and ha.rd-soldered contact 

points w:as released. Because of the com- · plexity ot the sequm.ce ·ot these changes, 

.no accurate estimate .of the number ot units 

invol,-ed can be :made. HoweveJ">, the replacement of the original /1100270 assembly by 

tho #108280 should provide aa.t.isi'actory 

operation... -

E. Otfic!al War Department Mainte11agce Docwnents 

; · Through the years, two trpeia of writt.en official maintenance instructions were provided by the War D&p!lrtment. One type was the 

detailed document for guidance of thE"t ekllled maintenance man. The 

other type consisted of.certain pages in the operating or keying 

instructions which instructed. the operator in n:aking minor repairs and. 

in care of the convert.er. 
REF ID:A523210 

as folle>ws: 

1, ffOperating and Maintenance Instructions for Converter 1i·l34-C" 

(short t.itle: SIG!Kl), l Sept. 1942. 

2. "Operating and Maintenance Instructions tor Comrerter K-134-C" 

(short tit.lei S.IGKKK-1), 15 Nov. 1943. 

). "Operating and Maintenance Instructions for Converter M ... 134-cn 

(short title: SIGKKK-2}, J W'le 194!5. 

"freventive maintenance" instructions for the operator appeared in 

the eal"Uest. otfioia.l document on the use ()f ~IQ4BA, naro.ely "Operating 

Instruct.ions for Converter M-l.34-C (short title: SIGBf!J), Oct,. 1941· 

'I'his document told the operators that '*onl.Jr repairs of a. very minor nature 

should be attempted in the field.". It also instructed then to send all 

damaged parts to the Chief Signal Officer tar replacement and in case ot 

"serious d.a.ma.ge, rn.a.jQr repairs or .faulty operat.ion" to· notify the Chie~ 

Signal Officer and a.wait instructions. According to SIGBWJ the repairs 

which the operator could pertonn without difficulty were as follows: 

replacing the printer wheel, rewiring e. burned out rotor, changing a fuse, 

replacing a burned out capacitor or resistor, and changing the motor. 

Included were brief instructions on how to accomplish these minor repairs 

and a page and a half of instructions_ on haw to lubricate the converter. 

T1'Aese tirst instructions stated that the converter should be lubricated 

once a month. From Jul.3' 1941 until September 1942, when SIQKKK was 

published, these SIGBWJ instructions on minor repair and lubrication 

were all that existed concerning maintenance. It is interesting that 
I 

-

REF ID:A523210. 

al.tho~ SIGBWJ pro'li.dea detailect inatruction ot lubrication, NOT ORS 

WORD WAS WRITTEN CONCERNING H OPERATOR•S CLEANING 'mE CONVERmR. 

When detailed maintenance instructions 1n the form of SIGKnl 

appeared in Sept. 1942, this new docwnent superseded SIGBWJ• SIGKIK 

did not give simple preventive maintenance instructions for the operator 

as SIGBWJ had done.. Therefore, f'rom Sept. 1942 until June 19451 when 

"Operating Instruct.ions for Converter M-J.34-C" (short ti,..le: SIGQZF-2) 

was published, no instructions on preventive maintenance were provided 

for the operator, SIGQZF-2 contained three :i;:ages ot information "Maintenance Responsibilities ot the Operator," Which not only inati-ucted. the 

operator on lubrication (as did SIGBWJ) but included a detailed description 

. (neglected in SIGBWJ) on how.!£ clean th_e_ converter. 

No definite schedule £or lubrication was provided in SlGQZF-2. This 

was in contra.st to the prescription in the superseded SIG3WJ for lubrication once a month. The new policy on lubrication schedule stated in 

SIGQZF-2 was as follows: "No d•finite schedule or lubrication can be 

provided~ The trequ~nc:y. o~ lubrication periods will depend on dust, 

humidity, and temperature conditions as well a.a volume of traffic ••• " 

When ~he next edition of SIGQZF (SIGQZF•3)2 was published on l Nov. 1946, 

it contained approximately the same cleaning and lubrication instructions 

l. ''Operating and ilaintenance Instruction$ for -eonverter M.134-cli · (short title: SIGKKK), l Sept. 1942. 

2. ~rypto-OtJerat.ing Inatruetione tor Converter 14-134-C" (short title i 

SIGQZF-3), l Nov. 1946. 
f' 

ID:A523210 

for the operator as did SIGQZF-2. Instructions for the operator on 

minor repair were included in neither SIQQZF-2 or SI~-.3. 

In Aug. 1946, an AG letter was published which outlined the "Policy 

on Maintenance of Orypt.ogr~phic Equipment".1 (See Tab F.) This policy 

prescribed that maintenance would be performed under the nF!ve Echelon 

System". (For explanation of t.he "Five :gchelon System, see Tab F ~) 

Changes in the 11Five Echelen System" were published in a new s,_-ecial 

regulation which superseded. the AG letter (Tab F) on 28 Maren 1949. 

This new special regulation is SR 750-445-l, ''Maintenance Supplies and 

Equipnent", 28 March 1949 {see Tab G}. 

r. Service Ra.cord Cards 

On 2 August 1944 a. letter2 announcing the issuing ot a new service 

/-, record. card (short title: SIGGOlW) was sent oo all holders. The card 

was designed for the purpose of keeping a more accurate record ot maintenance work done on Converter M-1.)4-C, A special holder was designed 

for the card, the holder to !it on ~be lett aide of the converter cover 

by drilling six •078 holes (/i47 drill) in the cover, When .filled t.hese 

service-record cards were returned to the Signal Security Bra.rx:h {later 

expanded to Arfn¥ Security Agency).· For photoeraph.ot the service record 

card 1n pla.ee, see Tab W. 

l. Lett.er, AGAO...S-B-M Jllt5 \>l July 4'6L Subject& iiPollcy on Maintenance of Cryptographic Equipment., tt 5 Aug; 1946. 

2. SPSIO Letter Mo. 446, Sq.bject; Service Record Caf.d tor Converter 

M;;:;.134...C, To: AU holdei'd ot Converter M-134 ... c, Signed for the CSO 

by Ftank 84 ·Ston~X:~; ~BriglJ,dier :~t«t~; Ohief, ~(loimm.id.i\,'tiBstanch 

Service and Russel H. Horton, MajQ.r., .s.c., Signal Security Branch-. · 
REF ID:A523210 

G. Dust Tests 

In •a.rly l945 a series or tests were conducted to determine whether 

leaving the cover off the SIGABA increased maintenance problems by .allowing 0 clust and dirt. to settle on the rotors, resultintr in unnecessary 

friction and waa:r6 •

1 It. was reported1 by an AACS station lto ASA thru 

channels) th.a.t lea~ the cover off the SIGABA increased maintenance 

problems, and it was suggeated by this same stat~on th.at a hinged cover 

be desiened to facilitate replacing the cover and thereby to encourage 

operat,p~~. t,o keep the SIGIVI enclosed at all possible times • 

. ·In order to determine whet.her a change from the detachable SIGABA 

cover to a hinged. type would "reduce the 'out-o.f-service 1 periods", a 

series of dust tests were conducted. In a.coord.ance with a decision2 

of the Executive Committee of Security Division# ASA# a letter-3 was sent;. 

to seventy-nine holders of Convtrter fi{-134-C requesting them to "Conduct 

a. test substantially as tollcwsi 

a. A qualified .maintenance mah to thoroughly clean and 

lubricate two convert.era as indicated in Section VI 

ot 110perating and Maintenance ln$t.ruc tions for Convert.Etr M-l.34-C (ahort title: SIGKKK) 11 • 

(1) The first ot the two converters to be operated tor 

.30 days with the 100730 cover lid completely rEmoved. 

l. Letter to CG, Army Air Forces, Attn. 60nmunicatioris Security Officer, 

Office of Air Communications Officer, From: Francis. T. Fogatq, Major, 

Air Corps, Deputy Assistant £or Chief of Staff, Intelligene$, Stationary Letterhead; Headquarters Army Airway-a Comm.unica.tions System, 5 Dec. 

1944. Folder: Dust Teets, M-134-C, CSGAS--00 

2 •. Memorandum, Acttion l. To: CO, Subject: Recommendations on U.odi.f'icatioi'l 

of SIGABA Cover Lid into hinged-type lid. Signed Allsopp. 3. Letter, 'fo: Selected Holders of Convert.er M-134-C, Signed: For the Chief 

Signal Officer by Frank E, Stoner, Major General, U.S. Army, Chief, 

ArmT Communications Service and Kenneth. Kuhn, Lt. Col., s.c., Signal 

Security Branch, 14 Mar. 1945. 
REF ID:A523210 

(2) The second caiverter to be operated tor ti1e same 

period or time; operating personnel to be carefully 

1nstruo ted to keep the cover lid on the converter 

at all times exiept. wnen actually setti.11g or changing th~ ~tors. . 

0£ the 79 atati0ns eonducting the dust test, 49 reported that it 

helped to keep the cover on and 30 reported that.it did not. 

While the tests were being conducted, Ma1nte11ance Branch of Arrq 

Security Agency deaigned a hinged cover and installed it on a Converter 

M-134-0. For a. p?lotograph of this hinged.cover, see Tab • T'ne results 

of the dust tests indicated that the resulting iraprovement would not 

condone manufacture distribution of a hinged cover. Therefore, the project 

was dropped. 

Ht Rehabilitation Program 

Currently {May 1949), all SIGABA.s that are rehabilitated contain 

th~-~~e~t design ot parts. ·All of this rehabilitation work is done 

by. m&intenanee pere,onnel at Arzrq Seeurit1 Agency, However, these I:.'.,.' C 

:rehabilit.at.ed SIGABAB will pNbab4' not be used in quant.ity due to the 

fa.ct th.at, as fast a.a possib~e, all Convert.ors M-134...C are to be convert.edto ASAM is•s. 

1. Same as footnote 3, previous page. 
REF ID:A523210 

CHAPrER lVIIl. THE ZERO MACHINE 

In earl,y 1942, a special Washington-London circuit was established 

for the aeeret communioation of President Roosevelt and Prime Miniater 

Churchill. The equipnent which provided this communication has become 

known as the zero machine and the circuit as POTUS-PRIME, meaning President of the u. s. and the Prime Minister. All. POTUS-PRIME messages bore 

the special preetdence desi~ation xxxc which ~ higher than the higheat 

nomal precedence designation, Urgent. The arrangnents made for the use 

u 

of the zero equipment were quite complicated but. the resu.lt.s were so 

speedy that the British, who had no access to the equipnent, never ceasecl 

to be amazed e.t the very tn moments required. to report the POTUS.-PRIME 

traffic "R'ECElVED". 

POTUS-PR.tllE messages were sent via Westem Union trans-Atlantic 

cable by means of on-line SIGABAs. The SJ;GABAs of the send: circuit from 

Washington to london were located in Naval Conmunication1s code room in 

Washington and in the code room of the Naval At.ta.cha in London •. The 

SIGABAa of the send circuit trom London to Washington were located in 

the code room of the l.Uita:ey Attache in London and the War Department 

code room in Washington. By means of· this arrangement:. only Navy code 

roo,m personnel Gaw .messages from the President to the Prime Minister a.nd 

onl,y A.rtq code room peracnnel saw messages from the Prime Minister to 

the President. Delivery to the Prime Minister and President. was accoJUoooo 

plished by means or special secret telephone 8nd. tel~type lines from 
/ 

, ...... 

, REF ID :A523210 

·· 11 . ;re 

u.' ~~L. 

the code roODll to th•ir respective otticea at Ro .• 10 Downing Street 

in London and at the White House in Washington. 

The messages W$r(J transmitted a.er<>•• the Atlantic by the on-line 

SIGABAB via cablf!I as follows: The on•lln• SIGABAs 1n tlle code room 

were connected t.o'a special relay b0x1 in the Western Union oi'f'ice. As 

soon as a. trans-Atlantic cable circuit waa tree., the Western Union 

office would patch in the sending SIGABA. The enciphered signals from 

the SIGABA went directly to a transmitter distributor 1n the Western 

Union ottice, and from that point direotlf over the cable so that the 

lli@lalS were received almost .immediately on the deciphering SIGABA across 

the Atlantic as plain typed text. Tne maximum transmitting speed ot the 

cable circuit was 250 letters per minute. The speed available on the 

cryptographic keyboard was 325 letters per minute. To .compensate tor 

this difference in speed, storage transmitters were provided within the 

circuit in order to store up 60 letters. It was therefore possible to 

operate the ABA .keyboard for short perieds at a speed. erea.ter than the 

cable speed. "E;xce:ss" letters were stored. It howver, the storage 

capacity was exceeded, the machines lost synchronism. 

In March 1943, the Western Union trans-Atlantic cable wa.s changed 

to Variplex opera.t.ipn. This change meant that more than one subscriber 

could send w~ssages at the same time but the number of letters of the 

same message goine over the cable would be slowed down in accordance with 

l.. fh1s specia1 re~ box was designed by Westem Union Telegraph ao. 
ot the cable was oompleteq tree;·the·eehding ·ot a POTUs-PRIME meeaage was al.moat inltant.aneous. The delays encountered were caused by 

more subscriber& neeQing tho cable than the capacity or the cable 

could allow. 

During the £irst. few months of use 11 an imperfection in the eero 

equipnent. caused suoh serious trouble t,hat it was necessary to discontinue its use until an improvement could be developed. The trouble wae 

ca.used b1 the fa.ct that the maohimta in London and Washington were dependent upon perfect syncnronism. Fe.lee signals sometimes occurred 

whioh proctuced £a.lee stepping of tne.d•cipheri.ng ma.chine, t.hereby, 

gettine the machines out of pbue and giving garbled text. Therefore, 

an~ unit called a "ldck ellm1na\or" •• introduced. in the fall of 

1942 in order to elimin~te this faln atepping of the d•cipherina machine. 

The perfection reaclle4 by introduC:tion of the 11kick eliminator" ma.de 

t.he zero equipment. the most seoure and rapid in the world. 

Durine the interim in which the zero equipment could not be used11 

tho POTUS-PRIME messages w•r$ enciJ>here~ by nom.tal means, name.1¥, Convert•r 11-134-A, and were t~l,l!limdt.\itd by means of normal teletype circuits. 

Uuring this period. t,he only difference between POTUS-PIUllE messages and. 

'normal traffic wae that their .xxxc. precedence gave them preferential 

iwicUJ.ng. '!'he introduction of th• flJd.ck. eliminator" into the xxxc 

circuit ma.de poasible':r&S:umption of using the zero equipnent. 
----- - - ----

REF ID:A523210 

' ~: 

·~G''-\. AJA. ORIQ)l ,,., ., 

ACS rn .. vi.r -

ADI UATGZ. 

13() DINOY 

AGU AWSJG 

A.HI JSGUF 

EOA ZIQBR 

- CNATB 

EFI RSPHJ 

EGO KGHOA 

.BffU. BPCIV 

EJI SKOJQ 

IDA CILBU 

IF! SWKOI 

IGI mHl) 

mo DJBLT 

&JU EDVIW 

Ill UYNKE 

Of A JlllWR 

OGE Otl'ZO 

OHl XH'J:LF 

OJO llPIGR 

OIU HZAFX .-

OLY QUIHP 

UGA EMDQH 
REF ID:A523210 

The indicator syatAm uaed. tor PO?US-PRDE trattic over t~e zero 

· circuit •• d.ifferent from the normal SIGABA indicator o.rotem. A 

table l1$ted tl.'irM-l•tter combinations tollowed by · i'ive-let.ter groups. 

(See sample table on opposite page.) The operator chose t1t0 of t.he 

three letter gro~ from the table, tor uample1 IHO and EHU. Ti1e 

indicator transmitted 'WQUld thereto.re be lltOSHO which would indicate 

(see table opposite) tbo.t t.he control rotor setting wa.s J>JSLT and the 

alphabet rotor setting was BJ>OlV. 
) 

Control. cipher. 

and ind.ex roton 

REF ID:A523210 

) 

APPllDIX 

kch Mehlne le pn'ri.ded with lach conTerter la proYided with 

10 large control or cipher rot.ore,, 5 .... 11. rotors to be ueed. in the 

to be ueed in the control aD.d ind.ex (front) poelt1on and 10 

cipher po•1 tion1 of the cipher large ro·tore to be uaed 1n the 

unit.; and 5 oall or iJ!du l'Ot.ore. e~epping control (middle) aa4 

!he rotor aaeembly ehu«•e 

4&117 1• accordance •1th Table 

lo. 2 fl"O• SlGQZr of the ·qatem 

empl01ftd. The term rotor aeeem-

' bl7 11 1ntend.ed to cover (1) the 

comb1na\lona of 5 rotors ••lected as control rotors. ( 2) The. 

coabiDAt1on of 5 rot~rs selected 

ae cipher rotors. (3) The lndex 

rotora and (4) The perm.tation 

or order ln which the rotors are 

to be lnaerted ln the oo_ntrol. 

elpher. and ladex poeltiona. 

alphabet. (rear) poet tlon. 

'l'he Key ltiat.. - The key list 

(see euple D811'*at7le key 11et 

from SIGQU-2)• contains the · 

arr~ement ot the etepplng control and alphabet ?"Otora tor each d~ of the month and the.allgriaente ot the ind.ex rotore for 

each of the several aec:ur1 t7 

class1f1eat1one for eYery d~ of 

the aonth. The arrangement of 

·the stepping control and alphabet 

rot.ore remains the same througbou\ the Cl7Ptographlc period for 

all security elas•ificationa. 

fhe altgnmen t. of the index rotors 

differ for each security claa1ittcatlon. · 

I ) 

Sue ae SlOQU-2. 

Sue ae SlGQ0-2. (See 

aample key llat from SI~-3)• 

•fhe aariple key ltet \ables refel"?'ed to above are found in Volume 3, Chapter XIV, 

Section B, pages 
Selection ot Contro l and Cipher 

Rotors 

----------

REF ID:A523210 

) ' ) 

stOQZl--===-~.-----~~"""'""'=-=~·~~.,~si~~~==----~--~-~~"-~<iQu::~·''"'"'" 

IQ; ~.!L~~-~-~-1-"'~----·~~~ ~~'2C"'~~~.L-,.s;.~:;,~--==~~~~~~ 

ligu.rea in the eol'WIJI,; marked J'tpreR tn the colwme aarlted figures tn the coluan aarlted 

8COftROL• and 9 Cl1BJ!'l of the COftaOL {MlDDI&) and CIPDR (UAll) IO!Oll ARJWtGDIDT (JOB A.LL 

rotor asaembl7 t.able (see Table ot tfable l ( aee Table I from SIG- CLASSI:rICA'flOIS) apeclf7ing 

I trom SIG~., p. ) refef' to QZJ'-2)• refer to the un1 h 41gi ts which etepp1ng control and althe unite dlglta mi'rked on the' marked en the control and cipher phabet rotors are io be ueecl 011 

contl"'>?. rotora and oii the cipher rotors. A aet of rotore 'bearing a epeclflc d.a:y of the aonth and. 

rGtore._ A eet ot rotors bG$1'1Dg the nwaben 21 to JO lneluatve., the poeitione ot theee roton 

the muabere ll to 20 1.nclueive, tor •X&1D.P1•. -111 be regarcled as ln the conv•rter. Burlbers in tbe 

_for example. trill be regarded. ae being urked 1,2.,3 •••• o. ~e tene \able reter to the 2nd dlglt of 

belng marked l,2.3 • ..;---0. fte .. teaa digits will be dtsrecarded when the of the rotor awaber. A aet 

dip\.a will 'be 41aregard.ed when as1eablln« 'he rotors in accord- ot rotors bearing the 11UJ11bere 21 

uaeabling the rotor• la accord- ance with the daily rotor aaaemblJ: to 30, incluelTe. for example, 

&llce wt th the daily key. flRtt in , ,•11• ln the table indicates that will be rep·rded aa being aarked 

the table 1ad1cates that the par.. the rotor ao de11-ignated. is to be 1.2.3 ... o. 9 R" in the table lntiettlar rotor ia to be inserted _inserted. in the reveraed position. dicates that the rotor as det1g1n a reTer-eed. pod tion. ait::ample: kample: On the eemnd. da;y of the r nated is to be inserted in the 

Jan l the rotor assembly table · month, Table I ( aee 'fable I from re'fersed poet Uon. The ~tors 

(aee fable lo. 2 from SIGQ,ZJ')• SlGqZJ'-2)• deeiguatee 5-0-3-7-9 w1ll be inserted lo their ree- _. de&igiiate 3-1-0-5-6 for the for the contNl rotors and 1-6.:a-s pectiTe post tlons in order from 

control rotor• and 9-2-7-4Jl.;..8 tor -2 .. 4 for the clphe.:r rotors.. Roms left to l"ight ae 'the operator 

the eipher rotors. lotors marked 'marlt«l 5.0.3.7, and 9 (d.hreca.rd.- ' faces the eonYeJ"ter. lxample: 

· 3,1.0.5 and 6 (dleregarding the , ing tens digits) will be inserted On the 2nd dq of the aonth, the 

tens dlgl ta) will be 1naerted in , 1n the control post tion in that sample extract troa a ke7 lie t. 

the control rotor position in 1 order, from left to rlght as the ' designates 2-JR-9B-l-5 tor the 

that order. trom left to right, _,operator faces _the conver\er. !he~ stepping control rotors an4 6-~ll 

ae the operator tacea the machine. remaining 5 rotora. marked 1,6,S, : -S-7-0 for the alphabet rotora. 

The :rnatnin.g 5 rotore, llU'ked § 2, and 4 will be inserted 1n the (See sample table from SIGQP'-3)• · 

9,2. 7,48 and S will be 1neerted ~cipher poelUon 1n that order, l llotore marked 2.3,9,.1 and 5 (die- . 

ln the cipher rotor poet tlons in 'from lett to right. w:1 th rotor f regardiag tens dlg1ta) will b_ e 

'1lat order, from lett. to right, nw1ber 6 reTened. ~ inserted ln the control rotor 

wt th rotor number 4 reveraed. ~ position ln tbat order, from le:tt ~ to rtght as the operator tacea 

n 

•The euple -ke7 llet tablee ref~~~~~ 

Section B, pa.ges 
Selection ot coa\rci 

P..nd cipher rotors 

(cont111uett) 

· lndez. Jlo'°re 

REF ID:A523210 

) ' \ 

I 

the converter. w1 th mmb•r• 3 - . and 9 re•eraed. !'he reuinlng 

tlve rotors aaritel 6,4,8.7 and O, 

will be lnsenee la the -1.phabet 

poaltioa ln that order trom left 

to rlght 1t1 th rotor number 11. 

HT&:t'aK •. 

'lhe n. ret eet or numbers 1 n the The set ot QDbere under ~IJ)lll ~e e•t• of aW1ben under 

rotor aeeembly '*able ff1ll designate (fROft) ~lGUJGift SICBET of Table UU>lll (J'BOH) ALlG&BllT dewlpate 

the combination and alignment of I ( eee eaaple table, SIGQ,Z7-2)• I the altgaent or the inlex rotoH 1 

the lid.ex rotort. Exupla; On , cloa1pates the daily allgmnent of used for enciphering u4 d:eelphel'-1 

Ju l the :rotor assemblT table ·the index rotor• w be used when 1ng.aesaagea on a specific dq 

(Table 2) ltsts 58-10-45-22-36. the rotor ae1•nabl7 1s chedt.t by of \he month. In three eepara.te 

I (See !able 2. SlOC(ZP)• '?ha index ·tho 26-;-30 check group ( eee below. eolUlUls. eaCh headed IRDBX 

rotor 'bearl.ng the sequence 50 to 59 26-30 check). In three eeparat• (J'B')JIT) ALIGlldft, t.he ke7 Uet. 

will be luei-ted !n the first poe- columns .. each headed llDIX (J'IiOllT g1Yea the daily el. lgnment of the 

ltlon on the left. The. l1Umbe:r 58 ALIGJr~, fable U (see aaa:ple index rotors for each el&ee1t1eah alt.gnee on the :reference mark. table, SIGQD'-2) g1Yes the d.aily tion ( •ee eaaple ke7 lht from 

etc.. OONllDElllflAI. and :uslflUC«tllD allgn- SIGQZP-3}• The al1guen\ of the 

In QZf. the arrangement of the fdllts of the index rotore and index rotors ia dete!"lline4 by the 

lndex rotor• waa changed eacll dq. raters to 'l'able I for the SJCIB'f claes1flcat1on of the meesace amt 

l• Q,0-2. only the alignment was allgnm&nt. Bxample: According the day ot the 110nth. huple: 

cbanged each d&iT. !he alignment to 'fable II. on the 2nd day of According to the ke.7 lht aen-: 

t (accoriing to ~-2) was different the wontb the inde)!. rotors &bou.lcl tloned above,. on the first dq 

!tor each elasslftcatlon. 'fhe order·be allg11ee at 12-23-32-42--54 for of the li!Onth the 11Wlbere of the 

f>f the index rotore Carter new-style Sli.1CRl'l messsgea; at 11-29-37-43• iadex rotors should be al1ped 

keyliets became etteeti ve) wa.e ai.... ~5$ :for CODllllftlAL messages; and from left to rlght on the- wbi te 

wqs 10-20-3o-40-50. !l'b.ie order a' 12-23-31-42-59 tor DSTlllOTBD reference llla1"k ai 10 23 31 49 50 

•• not et.at.ad in QZl'-2 but. aJ.w&¥• ·messages. ~or SJICKJlf •••aces; at 12 28 31 

appeared. in the keylht•• · 44 5:5 for COll'IDll'l'I.AL meesagee: 

1 aa4 at 17 25 36 43 5S for Dal, 1!BIC'tlD •••a«••· r.,-----~---...1:>..:;;>=•••••••::1..o:i<:,1=:::=":'.~l<:.1·~_;;~<u-~~~N"4'»i;';<O~~~~J\.-.-C.:O~:"'°J~,.-:.:;.·.-.,r--.4_i.tl·~JN!'t'K::=".~~-~=:.."i'l'\l':i?"I'¥_~~=~- ....... ·-~·~ ;:;,.o;w«:"C;JC;...._~-"'~ '='"" .=-.~~-~~~~"""""'II<:=~~~~~-, 

•!be s81Dple keJ' lia t. tablea re::t.1~-1'.eii,, ~~~IA~l~ Chap\•~ nv. 

Sec\lon B. pages 

I 

.' 
REF ID:A523210 

\ 

J 

$10Q21' -~~~SiOQii-2~~~~ =-=-"~~~:3-

\ 

J 

~""""'---'----------------·~-··-+-~=~ct"-=-~~~"'llJC!'!'r.cri.~~= -..,. __ .r.:;-~-::'..=·~~~~----~ziu.~~~~"tlr~'"'t~;'Jt'"V'~~~~'-.~ 

JJot included in SIGQ,Zlr. 

I 

!he 26-JO cheek: groups provt.ded. !'lJe ·26-30 check groups providecl. in 

ln 'lal>le I are used to check the the· key 11 st are uaed to check the 

correctness of the daily rotor eorreetne•• of the dally rotor a1'l'aftge·· 

asaembl7 and of the stepping of the •nt and 1mex aligmien\ and the etep- . 

control and cipher rotors. 1lhe ping t:if the stepping control and aleheek is accomplished ln the fol- phabe' rotor&. ·flte 26-30 eheclc le 

I

i lowing manner: iltga the ind.ex perform.r:d as follows: ( l) .Arrange 

rotors and ass~r•ble the control the stepping eontrel and alphabet 

rotors in aceordruice with fable I. rotOJ"" and align the lndez rotors tn 

I (See sample .lfa.'ble 1 :from Q.ZJ'-2)• a.ceol'denee with the key 11et and the 

'lhrow the 1erohe-ope:rate key to security claaa1ficat1on to be checked. ! 

I nzerotH•. and turn the controller i ( 2) Zeroise the converter. (3) Set '. 

to 111.•; then pnss down the •:s1ank" the stroke counter at zero. (4) 

and •.Bep~t• lr:eye tdml tineouely Swl tch the seroi 1e-operate ke7 to 

ft until the lettel" •o• on the ('IO~t-rol "Opemte• end thus turn the COQtroller 

I Md cipher rotore appears at the t.o •o•. ( 5) Pren down th• "Repeat• i reference mark. Set the stro!!:e I .?.nd •A• keys: td mltaneouely and hold. i counter at zero end th.e zerohe- until JO letter-a a:re printed• (6) 

operate key at "Operate• and tu.r.n The 26th. 27th. 2!th. 29th, and 30th 

t.he controller to 918. l01r pre'SS [letters t.hus obtained ohou.ld agree 

, down the 'Repeat• and •A• .keyn exactly 91 th the 26-30 cheek group 

simultaaeoualy and hold. until JO given in the key lh;t .... 

lettere are printed." 'lhe ?.6th, 

27th. 28th. 29th and. JOth letten 

thus obtainee ahould. egree exactly 

w1 th the 26-30 check group for the 

dat gt ven in Ta'ble I. I 

•The eaaple Jcet llat table• referred 

Section :B, pages 
REF ID:A523210 

) \ 

J 

i-----~-~-"'"""*·~~~~_.,_~::i..~ ... ~.,...-"'fn~~~,,o;:~~::,ll(_••~!'''"r"~""'~~- ~ ~ 81~-3 ~-~-···si&Qif~-=~~~n;0-·~~si· -2 ·- ~-~-=--=~,,,.J 

(Accorcllng to SIGQU, t;he lal~i~ - Da1~~~7;;:~~~~ ~ -;~-;"-=···•o 4~~;;;~:~7;~ allgnaent of the index rotors remains table ls used to allgn all rotors l:>e- t .. 

the aame throughout thtt dq and e1nee fore beglmiiag the enclpherment or de- 11 

the im•x ro\ore do not atep. lt 1• cipheraent ot a iaessage. Allguaente ~ 

neceeaa17 \o allp \ho onl7 once at correapon4lng to 'he SKCRl'l'. COlfi»D- 4 

the beglmdng of the day. Por allgn- TIAL .. and. US'l'lUCTID claea1t1cat1one ~ meot ot ind.ex rotors, eee abo•e: are giTen for each dflT. ror method of~ •uma llO'l'ORS. •) !he control and 4a1ly a.ligmien.t of index l"Otore tor ~ 

cipher rotors to be used on a gi'•en each claaaU'ica.tlon •. see •tndex llotore•K 

dq. ba"f'lng been selec~ed and inserted •• under SIGQ.Zr-2 abo••· !he control ud ~ 

11n19t be aet to an 1n1tial alignment be- cipher rotors to be. ueed. on a gt.Ten ~ 

fore en.ciphering or deciphering a mea- d.q ~ having been selected and inserted ~ 

aage. Dally in1U'1 allgnmeut k97'• ln the clpher ult mus• be set to an ~ will be found ln fable Ko. 2 of the · tnltial horizontal alignment before ~ 

878 te11 eapl6J'ed ln the column aark:ed ·~enciphering or 4~pher1ng a meeeace. ~I'·· •1BI'PlAL ALIGRJlll'.l'.• '!he letters of Daily int tial allgn•nta tor each 

this ltqing eleaent are brought into j clasaification. will. be t~und ha the 

alignment along whl te rete:rence marke ~ eolumna o~ !able II ma.rited 1111'.l'IAL 

extending across the end.plates a1ld. ~ .ALIGlllllft ( COft&>L ABD CIPBD). TM·· ~ 

eeparator assembly. CQn&ml anA Q1Rb!t H letters ot thifl keying element are 

rotors aa alignea to the • ..., kez. ~ broqht into aligwaent oa the white 

&xallple: On Jan i the imttal allgrunent~reterence marka of the control and 

gl•en ln fe;ble lo. 2 of the sample U.ble~clpher poeltione. £o;trol, ntor1 M4 

ia JW>PX (see ~able 2 or SlGQZJ'}! the ~cipher rotors will tnvartablz: be 

control rotors are turnee by hand so. ijaliped to the. aame k&· ii'.&lap1e: On ~ that the letters JUDPX U'e allga«i i; the second dq of the month. the R 

horhontally on the reference 1118l"k• ~int tial aU,gD11en t gl Yen tn Table II, 1· 

The cipher rotors are also turnei b7 ~ (see Table II from SIOQU-2)• for , 

haD.4 ao that the letters JUDPX are 1SJIO&m •••acea le BSGUT; to:r COJfJ'IDEll- _. 

aligned horizontally on the reference ~~Tl.AL menages. J'.BllVD; and tor DS!JUCTJCD!. 

mark. J'or ue ot dai!z; l:ni ti al al1e- ; messages. P¥nL. Id tial ellgn:aent wlll~ qe Mft!IQ Jsezlu eJemen\ below. ;,be determined 'b7 tti. claaeification o~ t 

]the meeeage. Por use of dailr blltial r; 

~a11pment 1 . aee meeaye kertgg eleaeato · ~ below. · ~ ~W':~~,.~~~/lf&"""IF.'F--"l•~~;p1;<:10~~~~'..)~~.4.~~--~r~_n.i·~z.~~~~~<YL.~~~~~·-';<'t-.-..,"""" 

*'fbe ~le kQ" lbt tablea rete:rre41 . .;~~r~ .fol,_ J. CbaPJtr XIY. · ---- --- kct.lon a. pages ' l ., l-·J ,. ---l1J--Ul-~~~~·~·-~-+1~-~f~--Ht1,~~-

11: 

(' '. 
I 

' 

REF ID:A523210 

\ 

) 

~~ ~~~~"1=<'=·~·c::~.·e.::::;;:!l':C:;':;l6t':~~~r;.~.i,~~~;:;- ~~~~~_,!;!,,"";;;.~..'.!£::4~"""----=~-~""""""-"""""''"""' 

•••sace lqlng r ~~.:o: ::~ ~~~~~4=-S-m~•=a~s-S=l~=G=;,~-- JD..-ent I

. the' •eesage keying elemeat. lt w1ll 

be hel'eina.f'ter termed the lAtei:pal 

I ••HK• 1nd1catoi:.. . StlPJ>Ose '11• 5 

1 

l•ttere selected are XUPG. .After 

l tbe control. clpher. •d index rotors 

i.l· are asnemb led and altpetl. • • the 5 

letters eeleetee at nmdom will be 

i enciphered anQ.. the cipher neultant I printed on the t&P'9• 'lhis cipher 

resultant will hereinafter be ter.ned !. . the external ••!8'! lndicaior. !he 

j eontl'Ol rotors arid the cipher rotors 

! are t.hea turnee 'by hand and al. lgnee 

I to the internal message indlcator I

·. (XADPG tn thie example) by the operator. · DVD. a.lie the rotor• to the 

r utv..Mi iiisiie~nd;igator l th! ' 

! }e,tte:n printed on· the !!J?e2, but 

f alm• tg \be \nternal ••sage &n- ~ 41cato:r. 

I . I I 

lf'l I 

I 

SlG~-3 ~l'l!ll~-T!'.~'""'"D"''"•nf!!t~~"~G~~~r.-~~-r.~..r~;!f 

the •••ace rotor aligne:nt la 

deri.YeA and altgn9' on the •UJ>plng 

control and alphabet rotors aa follows: a. Select a group of UT 5 

letters at randoa ( meeaage indicators) 

b. Zerotze the conYe:rter. 

e. LeaYe the controller at "R.9. and. 

then pressing do1'n the •B1ant• and 

•Repeat• k8{s dnl taneou-17 untl l 

the letter o• on the stepping control and alphabet rotors comes to 

rest at the reference mark. · d. Strike the numeral ire,. l~ the 

! number of times Ftflqulred to align 

the lat atepptng control rotor (next 

to the left end plate) to the let 

letter of the ••••ace 1nd.1cator. 

e. Align the 2114 atepplng control 

1 rotor b7 etrlklng \be mmeral. :te7 2, 

U the Jrd by atr1klng the numeral ke7 3, ~until all tt ve stepping control , 

rotors are al1gnee to the 5 lettera 

! ot the •seage 1-ndteator. 

f. lf an)" rotor ls stepped past the 

correct letter or lf the rotors are 

, not allgnee ln proper ••qtt.enee. the 

entire process mu.at be repeated from 

'the serotze poaitlon. 

; g. .After the eiepplng control rotors 

ha•e been aligned. check the alignment, 

. ot the alphabet rotors to lnsure that 1 

· all ti ve are not aligned to •o. • 
REF ID:A523210 

,, 

I ) 

..Length ot Message l! the cryptographecl; text ••• I 1' the CJ7P\ographeA text ••• 

will exceed 350 5-letter grou.pe. 

the plain tezt met be diYlded 

1nto 2 or more equal pa.rte so 

that no part will .exceed 350 

clphel"-tex\ croups. J'or each 

part a nn internal me9s8ge 

1n41cator will be aelected. 

I 

i 

I 

I 

~ 

I 

l 

will exceed 100 5-letter groups. 

the plain text 1'111 be divided 

into 21 01' more equal part• a:ad 

ea.eh par\ will be treated. aa 

thoqb. 1 t •ere a ••pante meelage. 

I 

' ) 

Sue as SJ;O~l'-2. 
REF ID:A523210 

' 

TAB A 

Converte,r ii-134...C 

(shovd.n~ parts 11t?ted beneath photoera.ph). ---r-
\ 

REF ID:A523210 

. - ---.,.-

: : ' -

, /r; 

' .. '.~~;': .. )~.~~\) ·~ )i,, '_. '. 

Detailed Descri¢ion ot Converter K-134-C 

Converter M-134-C is as~embled from subunits such as the keyboard, 

printer unit, rotor magnet and drive bar assemblies, controller, cipher 

unit and motor unit, all of wbioh are mounted on one base. 

Controller. (See Tab D £or interior of controller switch.) The cont.roller (3) mi be turned nanually to any one of five positions, thus con- nect.in~-~ the operating circuits and regulating the spacing of the tape to 

meet any of the following op!)ratins conditions: 

a. Controller i£l "2" :pgsit.ion. - Power switch· turned off. 

b. Controller i!}. !f." f!2Sition - ;elain tzyin5. (1) Key-lever contracts for nu;..'1.erels and l.ett.ers o.re connected 

throucn control switch pileups direct.J..1 t.o the correspond- . ing print mc.ne t.s. · (2) Tape feed pawl oppooite twelve-tooth ratchet for regular 

spacing of tape. 

c. Controller in "!tt pooition. 

(1) Zeroizlnr rotors ( zeroize-oE,2rato key !U "Zeroizen pooition). 

(a} Tape feed pawl is opposite the two-tooth ratc:.i.et, preventing tape feedinG• 

(b) No~ l print suppress magnet is energized tor each revolution of the oa.in ohaft to block printing ti'len tho "Bla."lk11 

key is depressed. · (2) Steppin0 control ·rotors numbers 2. ,!e ~ inclusive (zero:h1Go~rate k.e.v ,!!! "OJ?!rate 11 pgsit.ion. (a The control rotors numbers one to .five inclusive ~be 

individua.llg stepping by operatlng the numeral keys 1,2, 

J,4, or 5, respectively, 

(b) £fo. 2 print suppress magnet is energized ea.ch time the 

ooin oiloft, revolves to blocl;: printing, 

d. Controller ,!a "!" posit.ion - ancip51erins text. 

(l) The eireuito of the iixn and Hzii key-lever contcota are connected 

in parallel. 

(2) The circuit. v'IDich was disconnected from the letter "Z" is connected to the 0Space." 

(3) Circuits frQ'I]. the e.lphabet key-lever contacts are l"Outed through 

ti1e ~ipher Ulf).it from 1eft to ri,eht. 

\4) Tape feed pawl is opposite the ten-toot.i:l ro.tchet to insert an 

e,..<t:..ra space after each five-letter group. 

e. Controller ,!!! "12" J!?sit.ion - decipi1ering ~· 

(1) Circuits from tt1e alpnabet keJ-.lever contacts aro routed throuch 

the eipi0r unit from rl¢lt to left. 

( 2) Tape .feed pawl is opr.Ji..s.ltO the twelve-tooth :ratchet for regular 

spacing. (3) Circuit t'rOJ'il nzn position on tile left. cipher distributor Of 

the eipl'le:r unit is switched to print suppress :nagn!3t Ill. 

Keyboard. - See Tab I. 

(Continued L"A Tab .!:!.B'------...:.,.,.-..,.:....---.l.-:---- ; ', 

'! ' .. 

I.• 

' ~ .. ' ' ;:J' . , 
--------------- --

--------------- , 

1. 'fa;pe chute 

2. cover lid 

3. Controller 

4. 'fape retainin~ arrn 

f\G. \ 

5, Side tave chute 

G. Stroke counter 

7. Nalll• plate .,;th ,egister '"'"''oe' 

s. print n.arnrner 

--------

-----------

4 
REF ID:A523210 

Converter M-134-0 

(showing parts listed beneuth photo~ap'a) 

,/ ·, 
REF ID:A523210 

(Continued from Tab A) 

i;." · I I -

' 

; - f 

\,<.. 1, j 

'' ' ,', ; f '.'', 

c~'1 ;__':~~I ~~;. 

Print Suppression. - Under certain cc:nd.itions, such as spaces between 

words, and stepp.ine the rot.ors to zeroize them, it is necessary to suppress 

printing. W11en the printing .is to be suppressed., one of the two print. 

supprees magnets is energized and the corresponding stop pin is moved into 

the patch of the print hammer and blocks printing. When th~ controller is 

1n the 11.D" position, the circuit from the letter nzn position on the left 

cipher distributor is transterl"$d from the uzn print. .magnet to print suppress 

mgnet #l (paragraph lla{2)), · 

Motor~· - The motor unit consists 0£ the m.otir, motor fan, motor 

pinion, mounting plate, and motor plug. Two types ot motor units a.re 

available as outlined in paragraph. 8a, of ''Maintenance Instructions for 

Converter u-134-C" (SIGKKK-2). The correct procedure in substituting motors 

. 18 outllied 1n paragraph ll3c ot the same manual. 

"Blank"~ "Reeeat" Kez Levers. 

a. W.o.en the nBlank" key lever 1s depressed, a circuit. through print 

suppress magnet Ill is completed. This blocks printing but permits the main 

shaft. to make one revolution. 

b. If the 11Repeat•t and any operative key lever are held depressed 

simultaneously, the dlutch trip magnet lock~p eirouit will be held open, 

and the clutch trip magnet will be energized. f!SVery time the car.i ttA11 closes it.s 

print ( 11A11 ) contact. Repeated operation will result a.s long as these two 

key levers are held depressed. The "Repeat." key will ~ operate i! depressed 

after any other key. 

Hand-lever Operation. 

a.. The hand lever can be used, as a substitute for the motor, to furnish 

energy to the main shaft. Teeth which are arranged. in the hand-lever ratchet 

mesh with a pinion known as the hand-lever pinion. This pinion is located 

on the rig.'lt. end or the main shaft. The hand-lever pawl disc with its pawl 

is fastened to the main shaft at. the left end of the pinion in au.ch. a WS3 

that the hand-lever pawl can engage' with th.e t.eet;h or the pinion. When the 

pinion is engaged by t.he pawl, a. downward stroke of the ·hand lever will 

cause the main shaft to rotate. On the upward stroke the hand-lever pawl 

rides over the pinion teeth without engaging them. 

b. A hand ... lever slip ring w;·lich oan be slid to left or right :f'ita over 

part, of the hand-lever pinion. When the motor is used, this hand-lever slip 

ring is positioned so that the pawl rides in a channel in its periphery, thus 

disengaging the hand-lever pawl from ti.1e pinion. 

(Detailed description continued. ¥1_ Ta.l;) 1).-,) --;~ --- ... ~ :-.:.-- ' 

\ ~4 '· 

'I I 

'• .. 

~: .. ;:,t~ .. ·.1 ~ .. .v/ .. .; . : 

. _,,_ -~-:'"". ' ) 

~ >: ~-'"' (;:; 

.,. 
REF ID:A523210 SECRET 

FIG. 2 

9. Ribbon shift lever 11. Tape feed roller 

10. Type wheel 12. Zeroize-operate key 

SEGRET 
REF ID:A523210 

·TAB C 

Converter M-134-C 

(showing stcuxlard cipher unit 

(short title: SIGIVI) in place) 
REF ID:A523210 

('.;'°~c~···I 

' . . ~ ~ 

. '. . ' . ' ; ~ 

for detailed description, see Tabs A, B, 

D, g, !, J, K1 L, Y, O. 

! ......... ·:-~· '":,-·,. 

... 

«., 

,, ' 'r . 

. ) ... •' .. , 
REF ID:A523210 SECRET 

14 

16 

FIG. 3 

13. Cipher unit hold-down thumbscrews 15. Right tape release 

14. Cover screws 16. Left tape release 

SEGRE'f 
REF ID:A523210 

TAB D 

Converter M-134-C 

(showing t~e three rotor banks of the standard 

cipher unit {short title: SIGIVI)) 

. -, 

- - - -- --- --- ----
REF ID:A523210 

(Continued from Tab B) · 

For explanation of rotor stepping, see Tab E. 

~eroizi.ns ~ Rotors. 

a. With the controller in the "R" posit.ion and the zeroi~e-opera.te· 

key in the "Zeroize" position, circuits from the steppine contact 68" a.re 

routed through each 0£ the ten rotor stepping contact. assemblies and each 

ot the rotor ma.enete. 

b, With the f'oregoint; condition set up and the 11Bla.nk" and "Repeattt 

keys held depressed, an impulse .from the stepping contact "B" will be 

applied to all ten rotor magnets {t'or each revolution ot the main shaft). 

This will cause the rotors to be advanced to their zeroize positions. When 

the rotors rea~n their zero positions, the rotor stepping contacts are 

opened by studs on the rotors, preventing any further stepping. 

For description of cipher unit, see Tab M. 

(Continued in Tab E) 

: '~ 

-------------------~ - ---- -----------------
REF ID:A523210 SECRET 

FIG. 4 

17. Index rotors 

18. Control rotors 

19. Cipher rotors 

~'&CRET 
REF ID:A523210 

1l'AB E 

Convert.er M-134-C 

(cipher unit removed 

and 

interior of Controller Switch) 
REF ID:A523210 

-: .... ;~ (·-~·,-: .--,-~-~ :~:~l 'rr=-~ -:_:-:-:.· ~ 

(Continued from Tab D) · · -' ·;_); 11/' :;1 .

1

• 1 

' ~ ,,. 

, c : : : , : ''. : :~ I; I '. ,,', ~ 

Rotor kgnet !!!9_ Bbt&r Dr'ive·!!f Assemblies~; 

a. The· rotors in the cipher and control mazes are advanced or stepped 

ahead by pawls on the rotor drive bar assembly. This assembly is moved back 

and forth, by the action of the channel cam, once tor each revolution of 

tha main shaft The rotors to be advanced are selected by energizing their 

rotor magnets, rfaen a rotor magnet is energized, the rear po~tion of its 

armature moves upward, tripping its associated rotor pawl latch. This releases 

the corresponding rotor pawl so that its front end moves up to engage a 

notch on the rotor. Waile the rotor drive bar asselbly is being moves forward, those rotors that are e~gaged by t;1eir p.!!.wls will be advanced one atep,_ 

When the rotor drive bar assEUJbly return.a to the inoperative position, the 

rotor pawls will be reset on their latches by their reset screws. 

b. The positions and wiring of the rotors in the control and index 

mazes determine which ot the rotors in the cipher maze are to be advanced 

'r(lth the operation of a key lever. For each revolution of the main shaft, 

an impulse from tha stepping con·,,aet ·"B" is routed t:1rough a. m:ln1mum of 

one and a maximum of tour cf the cipher rotor magnets. 

c. Another circuit is routed from the stepping contact •

1

B0 to the 

number three rotor magnet, of the control maze, so that. it advances its 

rot.or once for each revolutio~ of the main shaft. •. Every time the letter "0" 

of this ti'lird rot.or is aligned with the wi1ite reference marks on the cipher 

unit, a stud on its periphery close!$ a. pair of contacts, complet.ing a circuit to the number four rotor magnet~ VJhen the letter non of this fourth 

rotor 1e aligned with the white reference r:iarks on t.he cipher unit, a /'\ 

similar stud on its periphery closes a contact. When contacts at the third 

and fourth positions al"e closed, a circuit to the nuraber two rotor magaet is completed.. That is to say, the third rotor is advanced once for each 

revolution of the main shaft, the fourth rotor is advanced at least once 

for every 26 revolutions of the ma.in shaft., and the second rotor ia advanced 

at least once tor every 676 revolutions ot the main shaft. t:.~e first and 

fifth rot.ors in the control maze are not. advanced dUl"ing plain, encipher. 

or decipher operations. 

S~ePRtAA lndiv1ctual Rotors .!!:, 2, Control Maze. - With th~ control.la r 

in t:1e "R" position and the zeroize-operate key in the "Operate" position, 

circuits from the upper contacts of the ntimeral key levers l to 5 are connected ·to their respective print magnets in the regular wa;r. However, a 

circuit from the stepping contact "B" is routed to print suppress magnet 112. 

This blocks printing during the stepping operation. The lower con tacts of 

the numeral key levers l to 5 complete circuits from. the st,epping contact "B" 

to· each of the .five rotor magpet.o in the control maze. With each operation 

of a numeral key lever (l to 5) the corresponding rot.or magnet of the control 

maze will. be energized, permitting its associated rotor to advance one step. The cipher rotors also advance during this operation·:tn an unpredictable 

manner. 

--~ -:-_ ;1 .,_; '• . ,,-~. ~ -:_:'°\ ... _: ~ .-• : . .''I 

(Detailed· description contint.ied :J.ri 'fab J ).' 
REF ID:A523210 ggcRE'f 

FIG. 5 

20. Rotor pawl 23. Place finder outlet 

21. Rotor drive bar 24. Motor plug 

22. Power fuses 25. Dummy plug 

SECRE'f 
REF ID:A52S210 

JAB l 

Converter M-134-G 

(showing po.rts listed beneath photo~raph) 
.REF ID: A523210 

:--~: -: ~· - ·.:;' ,' :·,~ ~ 1~;~':'!;. 

:J '' t : ,'. f ! //) 

' ' 1 I ~ 

~~ ~ '.,;_~-·;) 

for detailed description see Tabs A, B, 

D, E, I, J, K, L, ll., o·. 
REF ID:A523210 

F\G. 6 
REF ID:A5:23210 

TAB G 

QQnvert~.r K-134-Q 

(Partly dismantled - see Pa.rts listed 

beneati1 photo graph) 
REF ID:A523210 

\ ·. '' . " '--· ' .. " 

For detailed ·deacript.io.n see· Tabs A, B1 D, E, I, J, K, L, M, O. 

~·p:;,·. ,.-.-· •. - . '. 

d; 

"' 

',I' 

, . 
SECRET 

REF ID:A523210 

34 

33 31 30 

FIG. 7 

30. Grounding clip 32. Motor mounting plate 

31. Power plug 33. Hand-lever ratchet 

34. Hand lever 

r 

SECRET 
REF ID:A523210 

Convert.er M""'JJ4-C 

(Partl.3' dismantled - see parts listed 

beneath photograph) 
IJ; 1, 

REF ID:A523210 

;r-,,·~ i f';;-c~·' ('_.-.: 

,, 

For detailed description see Tabs A, B, 

D, E, I, J, K, L, M, O. 

,, ' I' i 

• ' I ~ '~- ~· :.;;.~ \ .. 

I ; 

, I ' .~ 
REF ID:A523210 

FIG. 8 

35. Cover retaining stud. bolt 37. Tandem cable with plug 

36. Filter condenser 38. Resistors 

SECREI 
REF ID:A523210 

TAB I 

Converter M-l3lrC 

(Underneath View) 
REF ID:A523210 

(Continued from Tab E) 

Keyboard. - (See also Tab A) -

a. The keyboard key levers are pivoted on a cross l!ihaft located 

on t.he underside ot the base. A projection on each key lever (extending dowmnu:d) closes a.set of contacts whenever a key lever is depressed. These contacts close circuits to the print magnets and to the clutch 

trip magnl!lt. The clutch trip magnet controls the starting of the main 

she.ft, which supplied power for operating the mechanism. 

b. The key levers !or the number keys,· l,, 2,, 31 4 and 5, close an 

extra pair of contacts whenever they are depressed. These additional 

contacts may be used in connection with aligning the initial setting of 

letters on the rotors in the control maze, but are not used in the present ~ operating procedure. 

c. A bar called the universal bar extends beneath all: the kei leve;rs. 

This bar permits a pair of contacts {called the universal contacts) to 

close eaoh time a key lever is depressed. 

. .. f 

.. ' _; ( 

/ ,.~~::; ::~:~~-~· 

I ', ! 

:• ' : 
REF ID:A523210 S"SCR"ST 

40 

FIG .. 9 

39. Key-lever contacts 

40. Clutch trip magnet 

41. Universal contacts 

SECRE:'f' 
REF ID: AS-232 lfJ · 

TAB J 

Con'lerter -...134-0 

{Print.er Unit) 

Fig$. l.O, 17, 18, 19 
(Continued from Tab.;l) 

' 

Printer· Unit.. 

REF ID:A523210 

! '' 

, ,I 

. '' 

i 

I 

', 

a. The printer unit (£1gs. 10 and 17) c<>naists esaentiall.¥ 

of a print magnet, an armature, a latch and fStop pin for each 

oharacter; a type-wheel she.ft with stop arm; type.wheel; print 

hammer; tape feeding mechanism; and two friction olutc21es. 

b. The chCil"acter to be printed is determined by the selection 

of a print magnet. Wiu~n the print magnet armature is attracted, 

it. will move the $top pin latch away from the tOQth on its associated 

stop pin, perm1ttin6 the stop pin to be pulled by its spring into 

the patb of the st.op arm (fig. 17). 

c. The type-wheel shaft is driven by the printer drive gear 

on tile main shaft, through the medium. of a friction clutch. 'lhe 

type-wheel aha.tt is stopped 1n the correct position for the printing 

of tile selected cha.:ra.cte:r t1ilen the stop arm contacts the selected 

atop pin. 

d. The print ha.mme:r follower (fig. lS) ie moved up a.nd down 

by the action of it.s cam and spring. The forward end of this print 

hammer follower., in turn, movea the rig~1t end of the print. ha.mm.er 

arm down, causing the le.tt end to strike the paper tape against the 

;oibbon and type wheel, printing t.he oha.ractel". 

e. After printing or the character has ta.ken place, the printer 

reset cam will move the reset yoke and reset collar toward the rear, 

resetting the st.op pin in its lateiied position {tis. 17). 

f.. The ribbon tiachaniarn {fig .. 19}, located above the type wheel, /"\ 

is actuated by t.he ribbon shitt. lever which rides on an accentrie on 

the· type-wheel shaft at the rear of the type· wheel. As the e.ecentric 

raises and lowers the ribbon shift lever, a. tooth on one side of this 

lever engages one of t.he ribbon ratichets,. winding the ribbon on the 

associated spool. traen t.he ribbon is unwound from one spool, it oan 

be rewound by moving t~e ribbon shift lever manually to\'VB.l'd tnat 

spool. 

·I' 

, I 
REF ID:A523210 

FIG. 10 

42. Printer unit 

43. Type-wheel shaft friction 

clutch assembly 

44. Tape feed shaft gear 

45. Tape feed ratchet assembly 

SEGRET 

8BGRBT 
REF ID:A523210 

TAB I 

Conver~r 1-134...C 

(Showing eep,teially Main Shatt.) 

liga. ll, 20, 21 
REF ID:A523210 

~ -~ .. 'I, .-•:_-. ( '~.,,. .... 7. 

(Continue'd from_T_a_.l>._ .. ...i.~ .... ) ...:.....--...,..:...,.'. ·~~;_,, --'· -;....·~'-......:..--- 1 " 

Main Shatt, ;l1 . - - . '' ;'1, 

a. · The m.aiii shaft assembly (fig .. 20) includes the driving clutch, 

gear hub, counter cam, tape feed ca.ni1 print ha.mm.er cam, cam 8A,tt oam 

"B, 11 printer drive gear, printer reset eam, channel cam, clutch reset 

lever reset cam., hand-lever pinion, and hand-lover slip ring.. . b, T!1e power for operating the mechanism or the converter is 

supplied b:~' the motor o:r by the hand lever. The mot.or pinion meshes 

with the motor dr-iven gear. This gear i,a mounted on the gear hub, with 

the tape feed drive gear and. the drive manber of the drivine clutch . {f'ig. 20). The gear hub revolves conM.rt'Ually while the ootor is running. · c. In the nonool in~pei-ative position, the main shaft e.sse.mbJ.¥ 

(except the cear hub) is held stationary, because the driven memb$r of 

the driving clutch is held out of mesh with the drive 1.r.eraber, by t.he 

clutch throwout. lever (fig. 20 end 21). When the clutch trip lever 

latching extension releases the clutch reset lever lower extension, the 

clutch throwout lever will be moved awa.1 :t'rom ti1e ca.mmin:~ surface of 

the elu'tch driven member permit ting the clutch to· engage and the .mtdn · a11at't to revolve with the gear n~. 

d. When any key lever ie depreeaed., .the following operations 

are performed.: · · · · · 

(l) The universal eontaots close \Tab I, 141). 

(2) !he. key-lever eGnta.cts close, e<npleting a circuit. 

throuch one of the print magn~ts, and the el.uteh trip 

magnet. (Circuit$ covered 1n Tab o.) ' 

(.3) The oluteh trip IM,.gnet ia energized, a"ld is held 

energized, through ti1e closing of its locking contacts 

and the universal contacts, operating the clutch trip lever. 

l4) iU'ien t.he clutch trip lever is aetua. ted t figs. 20 ood 21}, 

its latching e;~tension will be raised, permitting the 

cltitci.1 reset lever lower extension .forward and move the 

adjusting ae?'ew down against the clutch throwout lever. 

As the clutch reset lever continue$ to i:nove, tQ.e :forward. 

end of the eluteh thrQwout lever is a.L't.ed out of engage--

ment with the ca.mming surface or the driven clutch 

member, pe?'f'...it.ting the main shaft to revolve. Uear the 

end of the revolution of the main aha.ft, t.he elutch reset 

lever reset cam moves the clutch reset lever reset ext.en• 

sion and returll6 the ·clutch re•et. lever lower extension 

to i.ts lat.c:1ed position, permitting the clutch th.rowout 

lever to move down to and in the path of the caroming 

surface of the clutch driven member, caroming it out of 

r.:iesh with the drive member. 

··,., 
REF ID:A523210 

(Tab K, continued) 

(5) The nonropeat latah is provided to prevent mre than 

one operation with eac..~ depression of a key lever, 

regardless of the length ot t,ime a key lever is held 

depressed ( t1g. 21). Should the key lever be held 

depressed !0~ a period longer than that required for 

one revolution of the main sh~i't 1 the clut~t-i· ~eaat 

lever lower extension will engage the tooth on t.he 

non:repe3.t. latch, and the clutch throwout lav~r will .be 

held a.ga.im3t, the camm.:ine surface of t.:1e ·clutch d''iven 

member.. VJllen the key lever is released., t#he clutch 

trip lever will assum.e its inoperative position, and 

it.s latching ex.tension will push the nonrepeat latch 

down out of engagenent with tha clutch resat. lever 

lower extension. This will permit the latching ~tension of tile clutch trip lever to ene~e the lower 

extension or t.he clutch reset lever. The olut.eh 1"eset 

lever id.U be held in this position until the clutch 

trip ma.r;.i.et is energized again by the depression 0£ a. 

k$y lever. 

------....... ----~------------="""'....,-.,... _______ _,..,,,., __ ,,,._ =-·· -~--,,~_ 
REF ID:A523210 SECRET 

46 

47 

48 

49 

FIG. II 

46. Main l>haft 49. Main shaft driving clutch 

47. Motor pinion 50. Hand-lever pawl 

48. Clutch throwout lever 51. Hand-lever slip ring 

SllCRBT 
REF ID:A523210 

TAB L 

Converter M-l.34-C 

( Gears and Cams on llain Shatt} 
REF ID:A523210 

~--:;7:.- i <~I-·•: (('..~1- ,rl'=-~-~:--~~~ ._, 

\Continued fromi:"""J~~~trb 15K:)")--:----i~-~·. 7

1 

;;;!.. 12 -~· · "'":, 1-i.-: ~~· -

Ta;ee Fe~ing or sacing.. . 

a. Tape .feeding or spacing is aCCQJ.plished by rotating the 

tape teed shaft clockwise the equivalent. of one or more let.ter spaces 

as required. The tapo teed $haft is rotated by the to.pe teed drive 

gear l on the main shaft gear hub) through the medium of & friction 

alutch \Tab J, Fig. 18]. The tape io fed between tl'O knurled rollers. 

The pressure roller is attached to the tape chute and is held up against the tape feed roller by a sprinc. T'.ue tape feed· roller :ts 

attached to the tape teed shaft. A gear is fastened to the rear of 

each of t.tie rollers. As the t.a.pe feed shalt is rotated, the tape 

teed roller and c;ear will rotate cloch."Wise and t:.1e pressure roller and ge~r will rotate counterclockwise, cauaing the tape to be fed th:roueh 

the rollers and t.ape chute. . Spa.cine of the te.i:e is regta.ated by a 

tape f e•d pawl and a ratchet a.aselbly. The t.niie .feed pawl is mounted 

on a. shat-t, just below t!1e tape .teed shaft.. The t:.ape feed ratc;1et 

assembly is made up of tnree :ra.t.c .. ets and is mounted on the tape feed 

shatt. 

b. The ta}la feed :pawl is operated by the tape teed pawl follower 

and tape feed car:i.. With each operation ot the rr.sin eh~i't, the tape 

feed pawl moves away from a ratc.1et tooth just long enow::h to permit 

the tape feed shaft a.nd ratc'.1et to turn until stopped by the nez.t ratc~1et tooth. Tht1$ the ta.pe ·uill be spaced out in the proper amount. 

o. The front to rear position or the tape .t'eed pawl is controlled 

by the position of tile controller so that the tape feed pawl will 

operate in oonjuncti.on w.1t.b one of the three ratchets. 'l'he rear_ 

ratchet has twelve teeth; the middle ratchet has two teeth; and the 

front ratchet has ten teeth which a.re spaced the same as the ttfelvetooth ratchet, with the except.ion that one tooth is mis.sing after eac:h 

group of.five teeth. Each tooth on the two-tooth ratchet lines up 

with the £irst toot.11 of each five-tooth group on the front ratchet. 

d. When the controller is moved to the npn or "Dtt posit.ion, the 

tape feed shift a.rm. will move the tape feed shift lever so that the 

t.ape feed pawl will be in line with the twelve-tooth ratchet. The 

spacine of the tape will be regular. 

e. vr.1en the controller is in the 11!" position, the tape feed 

pawl will be in line with the ten-tooth rotc!let and the t.ape will be 

advanced an extra space after every five-letter grou.p. 

t. The purpose ot the two-tooth ratchet is to start. the spicing 

of each five-letter enciphered group on the first letter. Wllen the 

controller is moved tl1rough the "R" to the 0En position for encipher ... 

ment, the tape feed pawl moves aaross a tooth on the two-tooth ra.te1et 

to a position v1here one of t.he teeth. is missing on the ten-tooth 

rat.cnet~ TM.s will then be the proper position t.o st.a.rt. spacing for 

a five-letter enciphered Bl"OUP• When the egu position of the contro:Uer 

is used, the t.ape feed pawl is opposite the two-tooth rat.c~H~t. Toe 

teeth of the. two-toath rat.e:he~ 'are long~~Q\igh to prevent. s~eing 

in the "R" position;~ . · : : .. 

~;- ·"' ._-. 
REF ID:A523210 8BCRKT 

52 

53 

54 

55 

FIG. 12 

52. Tape feed drive gear 57. "A" (print) contact 

53. Counter cam 58. Printer drive gear 

54. Tape feed cam 59. Printer reset cam 

55. Print hammer cam 60. Main shaft 

56. "B" (stepping, contact 61. Channel cam 

SKCRBT 
REF ID:A523210 

Convert.er K-134-C 

(Standard Cipher EquilJll:lnt (short title: SIGIVl) · partly diama.nt+ed) . 
i"' ,·,. 

(Continued from Tab L) 

Ci@er Unit. 

REF ID:A523210 

. I 

r-..... _, r.::.~·; ' . 

! I 

a. The cipher unit is designed to use five cipher, five 

control, and.five index rotors. The cipher and cmt.rol rotors fJB:1' 

be .used interchangeably in the cipher or cont.rol maze. The five 

index rotors can be used only in the index maze. 

b. Th~ ~ipher and control rotors are the larger size with 26 

contacts while the index rotors a.re smaller and have 10 contacts. 

Each large rotor is made ~P of a steel ratchet wheel assembled between 

two bakelita sides. Each index or small rotor is made up of' t.wo 

bakelite sides but does not use the steel ratcfoet wi1eel. Each large 

·rot.or has 26 connections or "buttons" molded into each of its tYO 

aides, and ·ea.eh index rotor has 10 buttons. The connecting buttons 

.on each side of each :tot.or are wired to the connecting buttons on 

the other side in a predetermined manner. When positioned in th.e 

cipher unit, the conneoting buttcns on the face ot one rotor are 

connected to those on the adjacent rotors through the contact 

plungers mounted in the cipher unit separators. The outer connecting 

buttons on the end rotors are connected by t."le separators to the left 

and right end distributors. The right and left end distributors of 

the cipher ma.ze are connected to tr1e control switch pileups at the 

control cam; the right end distributor of the control juze is wired 

to contact ftBtt; the le.t't end distributors of the control and inde.."'t 

mazes are wired toget.irier; the rig!1t end distrib.ltor of the index 

maze is wired to the zeroize-operote key. When the converter is set 

for typing plain text, circuits from the key-lever contacts are connected at the control switeh pileups of the control. column to the 

corresponding print magnets. Wt1en the converter is set for enciphering, the circuits from. the key-lever contacts are routed at the 

control column through the contacts and wiring of the cipher maze 

in a left-to-right direction. When the converter is set for deciphering, the circuits are similar except tnat the7 pass t~u'Ough the cipber 

maze in a reverse direction lright-to-le.tt). The angular position of 

one or more of the rotors in the cipher maze are changed by advancing 

them one step with each operation of a key lever. This is accomplished 

by means of the rotor magnet assembly and the rotor drive bar assembly. 

, .. : 
REF ID:A523210 

Fl G. 13 

62. Cipher unit 64. Index rotor 

63. Rotor shaft 65. Cipher and control rotors 

66. Name plate with register number 

SEGRE'f 

SECRE'f 
REF ID:A523210 

TAB I 

Converter 1.t-134....C 

(Special Cipher Unit (short title: SlGAMUG), 

parti, disma.ntled) 
REF ID:A523210 

, -- .~ ~-:-' ('- .... 

'1 

The special cipher.unit. (short title: SIGAMUG) can be used in 

th}' place of the ngul.ar cipher unit (short title: SIGIVI) in 

order to make Converter M-1.34-C the equivalent of the Combined 

Cipher Machine. The stepping of the SIGAUUG rotors is con trolled 

by the contours cut at irregular intervals on the perl,.phery of the 

rotors. Only five rotors are used in ~IGAMUG at one time. The rotors 

in the Standard cipher unit \snort title: SIGIVI) ARE NOT lNTERCHANGEABLE with those used in the special. cipher unit. . More detailed 

information in reference to the use of SIGAMUG may be obtained from 

the document 110perat.in~ Instructions for Combined Cipher Macbinestt 

(short title: SlGDUBNJ. . 

"' < ---.~- ·~ I,•:;.,''> 

_:;:,-' 

'\ 

·\. 
REF ID:A523210 S~CRET 

73. Special cipher unit (short title: 

SIGAMUG) 

74. Contact operating arms 

FIG. 16 

76. Contours cut in periphery of rotors 

'16. Name plate (removed to permit view 

of contact,operating arms) 

SECRET 
REF ID:A523210 

', .. 

TAB 0 

Detailed n.script.ion of Circuit• and. 

Wiring Diagram SO-D-l.SSllA 

· (Actual Wiring of Conv49rter u-134-0) 

• ,r . 
REF ID:A523210 

- ,_ /'~ - ~ 

'' 

Deaoription or. Oirg~ts. · a. The electrical lrl.ring of t.he converter ma.v be divided into 

several different circuits. 'l'he two primary circuits are the "printin6" 

and "stepping" circuits. Secondary circuits consist ·ot motor, spark 

suppreeeor, and power distribution circuits. 

b, To change from a.c. to d.c. operation or vice versa; the only 

change neceasary in the inst..allat.ion of the proper motor (par. 1.3.301 

· ''Maintena.no• Inatructions tor Oon-verter M-134-C" (short title: SIGKKK-2)). 

o. All ch~gea in the wiring of the power distribution circuit.a 

necessitated by a change of power are accomplished by the internal wiring 

of the motor and duamy plugs. d. In tracing the circuits described in pa:ragraphs below, the 

actual wiring circuit, Sc-D-185llA,, should be used., All circuits have 

bean traced assuminc a..c. power. 

Print 2i.rcuit. controller in npn position. - This paragraph traces. 

the circuit of the letter 11A"; the zero,ize-operate key must be in t.he 

"Operate" position. One aide of power at R of terminal. block ... R wire to 

!use - thru fuse - R wire to pewer swi. tch .... tht"U power 8Wi t.ch - Y wire to Y 

on termi.~e.l block - Y wire to R-1 awitch - closed contacts of R-l switch - BR wire t.o common side ot key ... lever contacts ... letter "A" key-lever cont.acts - Y wire to #l o! receptacle A-Y wire t;o letter "A" control switch 

pileup - thru closed contact• of upper and lower pileups - Y wire t-o #l of 

receptacle B-Y wire to Ill of plug C - t.hru letter rtA11 print. magnet - 122 

ot pluc C - W wire to operate contact$ ot zeroize-operat.e key - made cont.a.eta - Y wire to contact A - thru contacts - G wire to cont~ct of clutch 

trip magnet - 0 wire to clutch trip .magnet - thru magnet ·- R wire to .300-

ohm resistor - R wire t.o R terminal .- strapped. t.o G thru motor plug - G 

wire to G on torm:J.nal block - G wire to power switch - thru power switch - BK wire to fuse - thru fuse - BK wire to BK on terminal block - other aide 

or power. 

Print circuit, controller in ttE" i2sition. . a.. With the controller in the iii position the selected letter is 

enciphered.. T:1is means' that the energized magnet in the printer may not 

correspond to the key lever operated. T'nis is caused by the printing circuit going throue}l the cipher rotors from distributor B to distributor A. 

b. This subpa.raerapn traces the circuit of the letter "A11 ; the 

zeroize-operata key must be in the "Operate" position. One side of power 

at R of tenninal block - R wire to fuse - thru fuse - R wire to power 

switch - thru power ·switch - Y wire· ·to Y on t.erminal block - Y wire to R-l: 

switch - closed contacts or R-l switch - BR ~ire to common side of keylev0r contacts - letter "A" lever contacts - Y wire to Ill of receptacle A - Y wire to upper control awit.ch pileup of letter "A" - closed cont.acts ot 

upper pileup .. lower pileup - BR Wire to distributor D - thru maze - At 

this point the circuit. to distributor A is deter.mined by the wiring of the 

five cipher rotors. For purposes of tracing the circuit assume it tenninates 

. I ;', 

...,.,., .. ,,..,_.,,......,.. 

··-. ·_·. ;---.r 1 

' ! ,,; I, 
REF ID:A523210 

'l 

(Circuits, continued)_., 

on the lettOr "Btt ot :distributor A - PK wire' to u.pper.:ccntrol switch 

pileup of letter nan :.:.. lower pileup .. mad.f ~onta.ct.a - G wire t,o f/2 . of recept.acle B · ~ a Wire to Hl of pl.\Jg l). ~ thru print magnet of 

letitfr "B" ~ 12'2. ot plug o· - PK Wire to #'24 ·or Plug· C' - w wire to 

operate contacts of zeroize-opera.te key - JI111de contact' - Y wire to 

contact A - thru cont.acts - G wire to oonta.ct or clutoh trip magnet -

0 wire to clutch trip magnet - thru roa&net - R wire to 30()..ohm resistor - R wire to R terminal - strapped to G thru motor pl.ug - G wire to G on 

terminal block - 0 wire to power ewitch-thru power 8"1itch - BK wire t.o 

fuse - thru ruse - BK wire to BK on te:mdnal block - other sid.9 of 

po\fer. 

Print·cit~lt, contllller in npn J?9&itis.n. · , • · · a. , Wirhh• contr0 er in the ".0" posfuon, the converter will· 

decipher a· previously enciphered character. If. the pro~r operating 

procedure has been followed, all rotors 0£ the ciphGr maze will be '· 

in the same position as when ,the character wa.e •nci.phared. To 

decipher the cha.racteJ;", it. is only ~ecessary to reveres the ei. rcuit · tl1J;'()ugh the rotors of the cipher maze. · 

b. This subpa.rauaph traces the circuit of ·the letteJ," nsn; the zeroize-opera~ key must b4l in the "Operate" position. One side of, 

power at R of terminal block - ii wire- to fuse - thru fuse - R wire to 

power ...O.toh - t.hru power swit.ch - Y wire to Y on termiruil ·block .;. Y 

wire to R-1 switch • closed contacts of R-1 switch - BR wire to common 

side or key-lever contacts - letter "B1 key"'."lever contacts - G wire 

to /12 of receptacle A- G wire to upper control ant.ch pileup of letter 

11Bn .. made conta:cta of upper pileup - Pl wire to distributor A ...;. thru · wirine of five cipher rotors, ·terminating a.t "A'1 on distributor B (as 

assumed in parae;raph above) - BR wire to lower control switch pileup 

ot il.etter "A·" - olosed cont.acts ot lower pil,up - Y wire to #l o!· . receptacl-. B - · Y wire to Ill 'Of plug C • thru bitter 11A• print magri•t -

#22 ot plug C - W wire to operate contact• ot z11ro1~e""1>pJra.te key - made contacts - Y wire to contact A - thru contacts - G·w:i.re to eontack ot clutch trip nagnet - 0 wire to clu:~oh trip ma~et - t.hru .. · . magnet - R wire to JOO-ohm resistor - R, wire to R .terminal - etrll.pped 

to G thru motor plug - G wire to G on terminal block - G win ,to pqwe.r 

switch - thru ~r switch - BK wire. t.o Ilse - .thru fuse - ,Blt wire to 

BK on te~minal block - other ~id• or pawer. · 

\Continuea on reverse side) 
REF ID:A523210 

/ 

., . . h 

(Circuits, continued) r .---

b. The number of cipher rotor magnets energized is controlled by 

the number or circuits completed. through the .control. and ind~ rotor• .. Four contact but.tons in: the right distributor. o! the· conttol. ma~e are 

wired togethe~. -These··.totll'' dircltits, atttU- ~oing. through ~li~: rot.ors of 

the control. maze, terminate at-contact Q\lttons on. ti:le left 'control dis- • 

tributor. As detenUinect·bythe wiring of the control rot.ors and the 

left control distributor. it. is pOS'aibl.8 to have ·a minimum of one and a 

maximum. of tour circuits cori.t.inue on trom this point. In the index ma~ it is also possible t6 reduce the number ot circuits. On the incomin~· (left) side of the· hVlze there are nide available e_ircults (ll is 

blank).· Due to·the strappin:; ot the contacts on tn.e out-going (right} 

side ot the maze, only five circuits continue. The actual paths ot the 

circuits would be determined by the wiring of the index rotors. 

c. One aide of powel" at. R et t.enn!aal blffk - R wil"e to tuse - thru 

fuse .... R wire to power switch - t.hru power s\fitch - Y wire to Y on tem.ina.l 

block - I wire to R-1 switch • Y strap. to P slllitch - internal strap and 

closed contacts to BE ot P, switch - Bl wire to "B" contacts \l'D" contacts 

close when the main shaft starts to revolve) - R wire to right side of 

control .maze - {for the purpose o! tracing the circuit assume all terminate 

on #3} - 113 _on left or· control maze ;.. BR wire to 13 of index maze - thru 

rotors of index maze - (for the. purp·ose ot tracing the circuit assume it 

terminates on IS at the right side ot the index maze) - R Wire to operate 

contacts. of zeroize-operat.e key - 81'.> to SS contact - BR wire· to- contact · 6 o:C rotor magnet assembly: outlet. - prong 8 ot plug - R wire t.o magnet fS 

- thru magnet - common strap - R wire to prong 12 ot plug - contact 12 of 

outlet • R wire to resistor - thru 25 ohms ~si.stance - Y wire .to Y 

tei'mi:nal - strapped to G thru motor plug - G wire to' G on tenunal block - G wire · to power ni tch - .tnru :Power ewi tch - BK wire to tuse - thru flise - BK wire to BK on terminal block "'.' other side ot power. 

Ste ciJ:'cmit. control rotor ma ets controll.ei" in "E." or "D" 

osition zeroize-c> te k rate" , osi on. 

a. Ma et • one side ot power at R o! terminal. block - R wil·e to 

fuse -·thru .ruse - R wite to power.switch - th.ru power switch~ Y wite to 

Yon terminal block - Y Wire to.R-l switch - Y strap to P switch - internal 

strap and. closed contacts to BK ot P switch - mt wire t.o "B" contact• ( ttBn 

contacts close 'When main shaft starts to revolve) . ..;. R wiro to R-2 ant.ch - 'closed contacts of &-2 switch - I wire·to swinger contact spring of #3 control rotor steppine; contacts - R wire to contact 3 ot rotor magnet assembly 

outlet - prong .3 of plug - BR wire to magp.et #3 - thru rna.~et - common 

strap - BK-wire -to· p!"et\g 34· et plng - eentact U of outl'e\ - ·BK wire to 

resistor - thru. 25 ohJ1ua H.tliftan.c• - R wire to R. tert1d.na.l - etn.pped.·to 

R a.ncl 'G terminal.a thru motor plug -. G wire to G on . terminal block ._ G 

wire to power switch - thru power switch - BK wire·to fuse - thru tuse - BK wire to BK on terminal block - othe~ Si.de ot power. 

b. Magnet. 114. To energize magnet. #4, the outer contact 0£ rotor 

stepping contact assembly #3 must close. The closing of t.ais cont.a.et 

places magnet #4 in parallel with magnet #J. One side-of power·a.t,R ot 

\. 

' 

i ': J' '.; 

--·--·. -~==~- -----=='=>=--~~---~~~-------.--------
{Circuits, continued) 

tenninal. bloek to swinger contact ~ring of IJ') control ~tor stepping 

contacts aa 1n A above. Thru. ~d~ n;inger and outer contact• of 113 

control rotor stepping cont.acts - G wire to 11-:Z ewit9h - closed contacts of R-2 switch - Blt wire to ninger co~ta:ot apring of 114 con\rol 

rotor stepping contacts - BK wire to contact 4 of rotor tnaePet outlet - prong 4 of plug - PK wire to magnet #4 ·-: thru magnet - co.lllllOn atr4\p "':' 

BK wire to· prong ll·ot plug·-·aaita.Ct"ll 1)! out.let.· Ciroi.il.t aont.1.ilμe• f'rom. thie point a.s · 1n A above to other- a!d.--or· p<>Wir • · · · · ·· · · · ·· 

~~· Maro'1t 12. To_ energiz_• magnet l/21 the out.el" contacts 0£ rotor .. steppmg contact assemblies 113 an<i 1/4 mut be closed. The closing ot · thea• contact.a place• ma.gnat 112 in parallel with 'magnets #3 and #4. 

One aide o! power at R 0£ t.erm1nal block to swinger contaot epl'ing or 

114. control rotor steppirig contacts as 1n .! and ,2 above. Thr\1. nw.de 

ninger and outer contact of 114 control rotor ateppine; OOZ\tact.s - o 

wire to R-2 switch - closed. contacts of R-2 switch - S 'Wire to nmger 

contact aprinz ot #2 control rotor stepping contaeta - S wire to 

contact 2 ot rot.or magilet outlet - prong 2 of plug - G wire to 112. I!1$gnet - thru nagnet .,,;, contnon strap - BK wire to prong ll of plug - OCl'lta.ct ll 

ot outlet. Circuit continues from this point a.a in!, above to otber 

,side of power. · 

et controller 

zeroize-o ate e in Zero ze" sition. · a. et use :f'or i ustra.Uon of ci er roto circuit'. :_ 

One side o power at R of terminal block - R wire to tuse - tbru fμse - R wire to power switch - ·thru power switch - l wire to Y on terminal b 

block - Y wire to R-1 switch - Y strap to P sld.tch - internal strap to 

closed contacts to BK or P switch - BK wire to 11B11 contacts ("B" contacts 

close when main shaft starts to revolve) - R wire to zeroizfti-Operate key 

(ten eontaots ot the zeroize-operate key are strapped to route circuits 

to t~1e ten rot.or 1118.gnets} - thru·#S set of rotor s~pping contaeta -

B. wire to #8 set of cipher rotor. stepping contacts .;.. thtu _cl.Oijed C9nta.cts - B~ wire to contact 8 0£ rotor:~t asaembfy outlet - prong 

8 of plug - R wire t.o magnet #8 - thru magnet - common strap - B wire 

to prong 12 of plug - contact 12 of outlet - R wire to resistor~ thru 

2,5 ohms re:sist..anee - Y wire to Y terminal -. str.apped to G thru. mot.or . 

plug - G wire to G on terminal. block - G Yd.re to. power switch - thru 

power nitch - BK wife to fuse - t.hru fuse - BK wira to BK on tend.nal. 

block - other side of power. . . · b. Magnet ll used £or illustration Of C.al.trol row:r fi£Cuj.t. - One side ot power to the ten strapped contacts of the ~eroize-c,~•t• 

key.as in 3l above - thru 113.set of rotor stepping emtacts "'." aa l'd.r.e ~o inner contact .. apring ot II~ control rotor. step~ contacts - th1;"1J. 

closed contacts - R wire to contact 3 of rotor ma.:e;n.t ae~lt- outlet. - ·prone J of plug - BR wire to magnet 113 - thru magf\et - · conmon atrap - BK wire to prong ll of plug - contact ll of outlet - BK wi~e to 

(Continued on reverse side) 
. ~ ; 

(Ci~its, continued) 

REF ID: A52321-D- -

- .. · .. --·· (:;~ 

., ,"-:°' -~, ' ._ .;,:-;," 

. 

" . I 

res18tor - t~u 25 ·¢hms .. reaist&nce - R wire to R terminal - strapped to R 

and G .terminals thru motor plug - 0 wire to · G on terminal block - G wire 

to power switoh - thrU nit eh - BX rue to 'fuse - thru tuse - BK wire. to 

BK on terndnal block- ether aide of power. . 

StG in oii-cuit control rotor ma ets · · contro r in •an s tion, 

zeroiz•-• rate ke in •o rate" sition. • Magnet 3 used illustrate 

control rotor circuits. One $ • 0£ power at a ot terminal block - R 

wir• to fuu - thru 'fuse '."' R wire to power switch - thru power switch I 

wir& to I on terminal block - Y wire to R-1 switch - I strap to P switch ... 

internal strap and cloa8d contacts to BK of P switch ...; BK wire to 11B" 

contact.a ( '"Btt contacts cloee when main shaft ata.rts to reiiolve) .;.. R wire to 

lower oont&ot ot number 5 key lever - common $trap to lovrer contact. of 

number" 3 kf>Y lever (key ·lever operated) ·- thru con tacts - R wire to contact 

3 6! rot.Gr magnet assembly outlet - prt>ng 3 ot plug - BR wire to magnet #3 - t.llru magnet - common strap .:. BK wire · ~o prong ll of plug - oont4et ll of 

outlet - BK wire to resistor - thrU: 25 ohms reaistance - R ld.re to R terminal - $trapped t.o a and G terminales thru mot.or plug - G wire to G on 

terminal block - G wire to power switoh - thru power switch - BK wire to 

fuse - thl"l.1 fuse - BK wire to BK on terminal block - other side 0£ power. 

Spark auppreaaor oircuita. . a. Spark suppressor circuit• are used acroaa t.he •,An (print.) contacts and acro1s th• eont.aota of th• control and oipher rotors. . · b. The "A" (print) contact suppressor circuit c.cnsists of one 1-microfa.rad condenser and 400 ohms ot resistance in series, across the "A• contacts. 

c. A spark protection circuit containing one 2-re.ocrofarad condenser 

is connected aoroea the series circuit which includes the contacts of the 

control and index rotors ruid t:1e windinrs of the cipher rotor magnets. 

liacellaneous circuits. 

a. Cl11tch triR magnet loekμp circuit. · - One side ot power at R of 

terminal block - R wire to fuse - thru &e - R wire to power switch - thru power switch - Y 'Wire to t on terminal block - strapped to Y on terminal block - Y wire to "Repeat" key contacts - thru cl0sed contacts of 

"Repeat" key - PK wire to uni,tersal contacts - thru made universal contacts - S wire to #27 ot reeeptacie A - to #Z7 of receptacle B -. S wire to locking 

contact of clutch trip magnet - thru made eontscta - 0 wire to clutch trip 

::;i.a.c;aet - thru magnet - R wire to 300-ohm resistor - R wire to R terminal - strapped to G thru moto.r plug .~ G. wire to G on termina.l bloc:ik - G wire to 

power awiteh - thru power switch - BK wire to !use - thru ruse - BK wire 

to BK on terminal block - other side of power. . u. Line filter circuits. -·connected across the incoming power line at 

the. tuse:s· a.re two I:microf'arad condensers, one from each side of the power 

line to a corillnon zround. · 

' -- ':-p:~··'-::.~ ~:..---. 

'·, 

.····i. 

. ' / • I ,;. , ~ 

f ! . ~ 
(Circuits, continued) 

c. Power distribution. - Changes in power distributior.1. circuits when using llO-v., a.c. or d.c., or 24-v. emergency power: 

Circuits 

Print Suppress Magnet 12 

Print Circuit 

Stepping Magnet, Control Rotors 

Stepping Magnet, Cipher Rotors 

llO-v a..c. 

JOO ohms in series 

None 

25 ohms in series 

25 ohms in series 

.300 ohms in series 

300 ohms in series 

100 ohms in series 

lOO ohms in series 

When operatine on 24-v. emergency power supply, all the above resistors 

are short circuited. In addition a 3<'.X>-ohm resistor is shunted across 

the windine of the clutch trip me.gnat .. d. The circuit changes outlined in ,,g, above a.re accomplished automatically ti1roujl the internal wiring of tite motor and dummy plll(;s 

when insert;ed in. their proper location. 
.E[:D:[ 
REF ID:A523210 

Pluggable Rotor 

(short title: SIGi-iEK) 
69 

REF D·A523210 I · - -----__ 

69. Metal container 

70. Patch cords 71. Engraved alphabeis 

72. Pluggable rotor (short title: SIG1f£1{) 

------------ ----- ------------------- -------------- ----- -------------- -----

71 
e. 

~~CRET 

REF ID:A523210 

----- IA2B RING PLATE COVER SCREW 

11 0----

-= = IA2A RING Pl.ATE CO\IER 

.., II ~ 

IA6A JACK WIRE-LONGi--------MIAI RING BRACKET ASSEMBLY 

IA6 JACK ~--IAOA NAlllE PLATE SCREW 

IAJ JACK PAllEL 

IA&\ olACIC P~NEL SCREW 

THESE LETTERS ARE RED 

c:ic:::t[===Jtz,•-~~~·:!:?-~-<~_· ~-~'='~·~:=•~;~:=·~:;::,=:>~:;::.=::::::·=-:;?..=::!::'=~=·~'=· ~-~<=':·~:=•~,;<='~~·_:::·_-:::;._.~;_•~:;::,_z~~~::::;(==M=IA=6=C :ER - COMPLETE 

0 

0 

FIG. 81 

2MIAB CASE COMPLETE· EXCEPT 

, NAME PLATE 

SRCRR"f 
REF ID:A523210 

TAB Q 

History of Invention and Development 

ot the Jlark II ICM 

Submitted by Captain L. F. Safford 

of the 

United St.ates Uavy 

30 October 1943 
REF ID:A523210 

TAB R 

Converter l!-134-C 

Receipt and Diatribu"..ion Chart 
ID:A523210 
r 

I 

I 

r 

\ ,. 

r 

lj 

I . . , 

t 

' I 

\' 

I 

\ 

i. 

r. 

r l ....... I . , 

' t . 

! 

r .·· ~. e.:• 

1 .•. \· 

f \ 

I.: .. ' 

I .:" ,'• 

.. 

~. . . ' ' 1 •, ' I' 

r 

t 

t REF ID :A523210 

I 

~ 

j 

.. , . 

\ ' 

T~~:/r~st vo;Jcher executed by the Custodian, Arlington Hall Station, asswning responsibility for 

.~he.co~~erte~~ is dated March 1942. This voucher consolidates all converters delivered by the 

"manUfacturerf. p to this date. It is stated that vouchers covering individual deliveries for 

the'280 conv:' rters were not available. ... ' . 

I 

! 

! 

* The followi~ !.~U be noted: .l 

II 28 

11 2 

II " 

II 501 II 

II 601 11 

II 801 II 

II 901 II 

II 1101 II 

500 II ti 

600 II.: II 

700 " "• " 

900 II . II 

1000 II 

"t 

II 

1200 11 ti 

·I 

" It 

II " 

, I 

1 1 ' I 

I ,:,1 ·, 

., . ~ 

-._./ 

·-· 

'. r l 

; 

I 

i 

I· 

I 

l 

1 

l 

I 

I 

i 

l 

I." 

\ 

I 

,. 

i 

.:i' ' 

J (:I \.I 

·\ 

" I 

I 

! j . 

i 

I ' ' ,. :· j' . ,• ·. ,. ', " .. 

. · . - ,__;,_. ---->.-:--~........-:- ~· :-~~~.,,... ... -- I 

nwnber of converters delivered 

/ .. :'·' 

'', •, 

in a good n:umber of instances for the earlier I i 

1 
REF ID:A523210 

TABS 

Official Documents Concerning Physical Safeguarding of Converter 1-l~-O 

\See Chapter XV) 

l. Ar~-Navy Joint Policy Concernir.g Distribution and Disclosure of 

Cryptographic Desien of the ECM-Jl~l34-C. 

2. 0 Policy Concerning Distribution and D1$cl.osure 0£ Cryptographic 

Design of Converters U-1341 M-l.34-A, 14 .... 134-cu, 3PS!C 461 Codes, 

24 August 1942. 

3. Same title, AG 413.51 ll Jul 44J OB-S-..B-M, 3 July 1944. 

4. Same title, lChange letter), AGU.3.51 (26 Jul 44) OB-S-8-li1 28 July 1944. . 

5. 11Policy Coneeming Distribution and Disclosure of Ceyptographi,c 

Design of Converter u ... 134-c," AG 4l.J,.5l (ll Oct 41+) OS-S-~M, 

l2 October l 944 .. 

6. Same title, AG 4lJ.51 \15 Jwi 45) O:S.-S-B, 17 June 1945• 

~ 7. Paragraphs ll, 15, and 17 of "G«leral Instructions for Converter 

ll-lJ4-C" (short title; SIGBRE-l), AG Jll,5 \21 Feb 45) oa-s..-B, 

authenticated 7 May 1945; published June 1945. · 

.a. "Instruct.ions for Pr0per Packing and Handling of SIGABA and All 

Other Cryptographic Mat$rial for Overseas Snip:nent", AG 311.5 

\12 Jul 44)0B---S-SPSIC-M,.12JuJ.y1944. 

· 9. "Proper Sa£eguarding ot SIGABA Equipnent", SPSlS 461 Codes, 30 

Ka.rch 1943. . 

10. "Policy Concemin.g Transportation of Converter M-134-C in Aircrat't", 

AG 311.5 \28 Iiov 44) OB-5-B-M, l December 1944. 

ll. "Policy Concerning the Uee of Chest CH-76°, AG 42S (14 Feb 45) 

OB-3-B-M, 17 February 1945. 

12. Poli~y Concerning the Use of Chest CH-76", AG 428 \ 31 Mar 45) 

OB-S-B-M, 3 April 1945. 
* 

REF ID :A5232l·O 

LJ1:J i·Ll~L~ W 

Paragraphs ll, 15 and 17 ot flQeneral 

Instructions for Converter M-134...0" 

(short title: SlGBRE-l), AG 3u.5 

(21 Feb 45)0B-S-B• authenticated 

7 »ar 194.S; published June 1945 

ll. Cl&ssification and SafeguarcU.ng. 

* 

a. Converter M-134-C, exclusive of rotors, ,is classified CONFIDENTIAL. 

b. The cipher unit, exclusive of rotors, i.s claasified CONFIDENTIAL. 

c. The index rotors are classified CONFlDmJTIAL. 

d. 'lhe cipher and contt'Ql rotors,· including the pluggable rotor, a.re 

classified SECRET. 

e. The combined adapter (short title: SlGA!OO), ox.elusive of rotors, 

is clasaitied CONFI.t>m TIAL. 

f. Converter M-l.34-C and associated material will be handled in 

accordance with t.he provisions oi All .380-5 1 15 March 1944. Information pertaining to Converter 11-134-C and associated material 

will be divulged on .... y to those duly authorized m$1bers of the 

U. s. amed forces and specii'ical.ly authorized u. s. citizens 

whose cryptographic duties necessitate a knowledge of such inf ormation and who have been olet!l"ed in accordance with letter AG 311.5 

(12 Mar 45.) OS-I-B-M, 2l March 1945, Subject; Clearance of Personnel tor Cryptographic Duties. 

* . * * ·* * 

15. Access t.o and Safeguarding of Information Pertaining to Converter.M-l,34...C. 

a. Only persons who ·are authorized in accordance with the policy 

of the War l>epa.rtment governing clearance of cryptographic personnel (see par. ll} will have access to Converter M-l.34-C, 

associated. ma. terial, or inform t.ion pertaining thereto. 

b. All information eonceming any details of Converter ·M-1.34-C, including rot.ors,, wiring diagrams, key llats, keyinc instructions, maintenance instructions, and opera.ting instructions, will be regarded. 

as classified information a.nd will be divulged only in ~ccordance 

with pe.raara.ph ll above. 
REF ID:A523210 

!l. ] 

c. 'lhe War Departme make e ... ...c available to the 

Allies of the United States provided that it is accompanied by 

a liaison officer am Comnunicati<m Group. It ydl.l be the duty 

of the liais9n officer to prevent the viewing of the converter 

or its operation, or the viewing of associated equip:ient and 

documents, by anyone other than authorized personnel of U~ s. 

armed forces. 

* * * 

17. Safeguarding Convert-er M-134-C in Foreign Countries. 

a.. Converter M-134-C will not be taken into areas which are liable 

to imminent capture by the enell\V'• Converter M~l.34-C and associated materia1 will not be placed a.shore in territories outside 

the continental limits ot the United. States except at such 

places v.here armed personnel of U. s. :f.'orces are stationed in 

sufficient numbers to insure the continued physical security of 

the converter, and to effect its immediate and complete destruction in event of imminent capture or subjection to physi.oal 

compromise. Provided that these minimum physical security safeguards ha.ve been adequately e.f.f'ected and a.re rigidl.y enforced, t.he 

followins operational conditions will determine the authority for 

approving requests for installation and use of Converter M-134r.-C 

in such areas: 

(1) In cases involvine U. s. Army units engaged in tactical 

operations in .foreign territory, requests for authorization 

for the installation and use of the converter by such units 

will be referred tor approval to the oornma.nder of the nighest 

echelon or lJ. s. armed forces present during such tactical 

operations. 

(2) _In cases involving u. s. Army units in liberated and occupied 

countriea under t.he control of u. s. armed forces,· or in 

u. s. and. Allied territories and possessions within the 

territorial limits of a theater or area of operations, department, or defense command> requests for the issua.noe or the 

converter to such units will be .forr1arded through military 

channels to be approved by the u. s. commander of the theater, 

area, department, or defense cow.wand concerned. 

(3) In eases involving u .. s. Army units in neut.ral nations, in ~iberated or occupied countries ~ under the control of 

U. S. armed .forces 1 or in Allied na. t.ions !l!?! w1 thin the 

tGrr1tor1al limits of a theater or nrea of operations, 

department or defense command, requests for the issuance of 

the converter to such units will be submitted through military 

channels to be approved by the War Department. 
REF ID:A523210 

(4) In all eases, units requesting approval for the use of the 

Converter under any of the above operating conditions will 

inform the approving autnorit.y as to the volume, nature, and 

scope of the unit• s communication requirements, the number . and type ot U. s. troops stationed a.t the proposed installation to insure its continued physical securitq, and the 

measures and means to be employed to effect its immediate 

and complete destruction in an emergency. 

(S) In all. cases 1n which approval has been granted by the 

appropriate authority for use of the converter by U. S, Army 

units opera.ting under r:my of the above conditions, commanders of 

such units will be responsible for informing the approving 

authority 0£ any change in statue of the itans cited in subparagrap."l \4) above which would remove the military necessity 

for continued use of the convert.er or which would jeopardize 

its ph,y~iaal security under such.operating co~ditions. 

b. Prior to overseas shipment Converter M-134-C and all associated 

oaterial should be installed in a CH-76. If a CH-76 is not 

available, Converter !t-lJ4-C and associated material will be 

handled in accordance with t.he provisions of paragraphs 25a, 27a, 

and 30, AR 38~5, 15 !Aa.rch 1944. 

c. Unless authorit?.cd to the contrary ~see par. l2d above), units 

outside the continental United States will not transport, operate, 

or otherwise handle Converter U-1J4...C unless it is installed in 

Chest CH-76. . 

' . I 
REF ID:A523210 

TAB '1' 

ETOUSA Rules tor Guarding Converter M-lJ4-0 

These are t.he rules which the Army 

personnel who lost the Converter 

M-134-C in Colmar, France should 

have been faro! l ia~ with. 
REF ID:A523210 

.-

ARM!' DGtJLA.TIONS RO. 380-5. 

war Departmmt, 1:5 uarcm, 19'4. 

Par. ~. Storage ot Cl1111t1ed Docwmnt1. 

b. Stores- ot :reg1•tere4 4ooWDmlt•. 

(l)Regi•terecl dooUMnt• w111 be atorecl in the moat ••oue apaoe aYa1lable, preterabl.7 th• equ1Yalent ot a thr••-OOlll»l.Da,1oa 

aate. It a three aomb1nat1on •ate 1• Aot ••a1labli9, b9Ja tn. 

cloowunta ahoal4 be kept oonatantlJ C1Acler ar•4 ....... ftel4 

look •ate• Will be ooll814ered the equi•alent ot ,...,.. ••• 

bination eatea tor tile atOJ:.age of reg11tered 400= tu 

an1t• aeni.ng in tile t1el4 oata14e ot poata and ---•••• . . . . ~ 

4. DailJ inapeotioA.--At eYery aaclqaartera an iupeot1oa 9'U. lte •4• eaoh cl•J hMclia~•lJ before the oloa• ot. buaima1 to iAl&aN -... · a·11 ola•a1t'1•4 doocmaAt• aid orntographio 4ev-1oe• ba•• beeA pro~Ji'" 

p11t na1. 

•• Seoar1tJ 1A t1el4.--IA. tactical operatioll8, aotgal·or aiaaia .... ta. aollll8Jl41Jlg ottioer ot th• wilt oonoer11ecl·i• r••P<>naible that all 

c100D.1111nt• are &1YIA the .maxiawa .. ou.ritJ poa•ible ander the oiro11111t..a .... Ho aeoret cloow11t Will be ta.ten into area• ll•bl• to 1m1unt oap\a.re 

bf £hi •D.•Jl1· 

Par. t3. Crntograpll1c aeou.r1tJ ott1oer.··•· At ••oh be•cl<!uarter• maintaining a •••age oen ter the oo.maancler w111 appoint a oomiaaioucl ottioer aa 01"7Ptograpll1c ••ouitJ ottioer, who 01'Cl1.Jlaril7 will be the ottioer 1A charge ot tm •••age center. He w1 ll b• th• owatocUan ot 

Ol'J'f!:graphic aaterial &A4 11111 be r••ponaible tor all •••u.r•• uo•••ar~ to ~ CZ7ptographio aecarity and phJaioal aeou.rit7 thereof. 

Par. "· Preoa11tiou neceaaery to inaare Ol'J'ptqgraphio ••oarity.--ID. 

or«er to 1naure Cl'J'ptographio aeogritT the following pr1Ao1pl•• .1a11at be 

.obHrYe4: 

_ a. C17ptograph10 .raaterial will be giYen tile ila9t ••oare atorap aYailabla an4 will neYer be lett 11Dattencled ezoept when 4epo•1te4 in a 

tb.ree-oOllb1Aat1oA ••t• or it• eq«liYalent. 
COPY 

----

REF ID:A523210 

- .... ·- l 

liEMD~iTJH,i 

l!XmOPOO: 'JH&i~ OF OPE&i'IOIB ma~ ~~ .tta.'Y 

O.B'.lICE OF '1¥..l: CJms:l' SiatW. OJ'b~CD 

14 ~rch 19416 

SOB..JX:'l's .Pl'Ot.oUon ot Cz:rptographio Aqu1J;ID8Jlt liur111g i'rfl1la1t in all phaaee o~ Operation. 

'l'O s SigDa.1 Cowma.ioation, ~ "'ipal S.ourity Cttloere da.n to and 1Dcl\141Dg 

l>1naioD headquarters 1A ~ GroWld l'arcee; 'lbg Head~uarlen ill ~ 

M.1r lorcu1 l>orh and l>tpou 1D ~c .. ot ~pply. . 

I-t 1• intaded that this publication will iroucie aped.tic 1.D1'onnat1on 

perta1Jl1Da to pqa~oal Hour1t7 praotio•• 1.me>lTed 1D the i\-otectloD or 01'11*0-

, t e;r.phic ~ipuDt during 'l'huit 111. th partloular respect to the :tbllolliag phaa• ~ operaucmr 

&. ~ta tic Uparatlcm 

B. J.obU• Operation 

a. i.uauJ.t Operation 

». lcd111g Operatioa 

L lo.belcm Operation 

A. S!dlo Oetratioa 

017Ptosnpb1c .aa"tttrial 8114 aaeooiated equlPQDnt 18 alWllV• ~17 wl.mrable 

to C1Ptur• bJ' th• •DM1' or ooapl'OIDiae aurill6 tl'dltit lrreapeotln at pogra,phio 

location. AU ru,ponsible peraoDD81 ope1'11.t1~ 1D a static peal tlon mat b• ocm-

•tall'tl7 al.en to protect c ~ptcsre.phio ecpipmnt tmm capture bJ the •97 ad 

loss througb oareleH haDl.11Jlg. Die tollowlllg .. cv1v .masur .. should. be ob•enecl 

bJ' all conoe:mecS a 

•w2w am Paclc1n11 ' 

(1 AU Secret and ContidenUal ciyptogrephic doGUDent• •d •terlal 

m~ handled by the u~~. ~Dll!f .&'mtal l;;ernce. Cll~ waamger o>erYice, or ottloer 

Cauriel' .>enlce "111 be aeourel7 ~peel w1 th an 1Dner and outer ooYer. The iDDll' 

OOTer 1'111 contain the ol.E.es1t1oot1on cl-.rb at•ped •1th the tlOl"Cls, •ror ~iSDal 

BeourU7 Otftcer•. lD a441t1011 to ed4rea• that appears on out•!'. oo.-r. '1'be outer 

ooHr will •hClr! no claaaUicatioo Bild ahOull: be addnaaed 'ID th• Ccm"'u1dU8 

Jeaeral, CcmneDdiDg ottloar, or ~ignal Otticar l!llld in llO oase 1411 the t~m 

Ol"JP'osrapbio, oode, cipher or ecpiftl.tmt. te1'Dl llJ)pear Ol1 1'h• outer coyer. 

(2) a llUlllberecl paolap noeipt attached to th• outside of the Imler OOTG' 

-4 ea origllaal ID4 duplSoat• dooameDt reo·a1pt atottne 0011tentt1. lnUoat111g mart 

'ltle•, cop7 maben blld qW&AUt7 Oft ••ab U• aboul.c. be imlu4ed 1A each package. 

(~) ll•YJ 017ptagnphio ecplpmu't not DGl'llally tl'm9pc:rtacl by u.s. 

J>Qa'al Ol' MleMDger tlienloe •ill b• pmperb paolal4 or orated to wtthataad tb 

parUoul.ar ..u ot tl'Dll'Qr~Uoa. ~ tollOlfias protectl•• •aaurea '411 be 

ot.•Z"'NI la prepalillg the dieWDIO tor Al,__. Gr tnDapcrtatiOAI. 

a. ~el.1 bel't t.be ~ipk \CJ be.•• ot 1110od bu. (Use ' 

Jaat1D8 bOlt• ID4 .,od paa1£1Ds nnpal. · 

.2.ill 
COPY 

----

REF ID:A523210 

( CONFICiNTLAJ .. 

b. Cl.Mig;I tliOp Gr 'box fllO base and waterproof' OODMCtiJlg e4p wi'tit. 

hot tar or wax. 'l'M latter trill be done oul.7 Wh8ll •• maablD• 

will be trmmported by •t•r• 

o. PJ.aoe box 1n top halt at Cli-7& Cmat am lock ao.mb111&ticm. 

4. Rlaoe al.1 rotorli, ~"' D1ll. ~idemiel writter uaters.i, ood••· Oipllerar etc. iA lcmer halt at Cl:l-'16 '-'lla•t lllCl lock 

ooab111aUoa. 1'he •bcW• 1tm 11111 be aeal.84 w1 tb a nterp~ -••rS&l wh• trm8JClll'ted l>J' wa'-r.) . 

. . 

•• llc9' top -4 bottoa m.lna ot Obeat 1d. th apeolal 14eat1f11DI 

-~ • •• 1D41oatias ooat~•· 

t. Proteot OOllbiDatiOJl Oheat loca w1 th .att • terial to aot u 

ouablcm. ~ .. 1oca become illOperaun 11Uh· 11ttl• pmalC..at. 

• 'i'M Illoen4ia17 Sde l>Htron.DS ac.b "MI" aboal.4 be 1utalled 

la laser u4 UPPJtr lalT .. at CB-76 bat u 1l:IC.loate4 1D par 

•, lbulge Ho. 8 (Siglll'•l). · . 

~ Vlll•r ao oirwtuoe 1l1U tll• 81gHDIO b• tzimqoned 111tllft! ftJlr°i!ecJ •mt s<tio• oow•r •4 • •!!!4 eal'f• !Ile 

111.11 .11!U. M left 1111Attm4e4 wllll• la tnult • 

<•> · J!P.l!;'o@p~fuRS!{!RJM =•e't;...tund tm• OAe 

llMtflllU'hn -1D uni.r w1 WP th• lJ .L, or 11ltb a i.94qnrt•ra om at •• tJ .x • 

.Siii.i,; 111. ~ tlle toll•• atllariaatloD. 1 · · 

•· BT autbcrisat1011 ~ bater ~ieJl&l Otftoer. 

b. B7 .WS.14 ~l'der. 

(D). Jtol.t.o1 ooaoemU.S 'l'reuporkU.011 ot ~lgRINo allll -~lt:Clll bJ' !5!d. 

.ll&l, ..... .Dill.· 

Di. taU.atd.Dg MOU.£1'1 preoaUam ·an ecpa11J mppl1oalal.e to tile 

~U• • a1.,- aDll ::11&'Ql, m4 11111. be TI.Slla'tl.7 cbaerncl ">' ai.1 

111111•1'1.e tor tiwaapartlJlg •1 tb9r 4mo•• · 

AU S-tnotloJlll amU.4 la SecUoa A(a) abDTe •J>.lJ' iG tm ate 

Ill ... • tile liS&RJJll 54 Sig(Dl wlaD. trmapted b7 .m, ... • 

. ...,,,, ... ., !ot4 

a. Meqaate oan ahoulcl be tak•D to lmun thai t.h• aboT.....at10M4 

.. ,,..., la ~17 loadecl la th• 'Hbiele llM1 \he te11 pt• 18 1ooke4 111 the 

"l'rilM ,.u,~ 

· b. Per:l.OCU.O olaMlm 81'cNl4 be ma4• to 4 et•mim aeour1t7 ••mr• 

~~·· •· Valer 110 aS.rau.mtwu 1dll · .,_ be a1lare4 to r1c1• la the 

ftlaiole u a ....a:L pa• .. ger •. 

~e~~~~~.f~~~~J~~~p~rt~-T~f~JU,T~· i~Z~ 
• 

REF ID:A523210 

COPY ( \,;ON FI !:II Cl• I , ,. .. 

----

;l'Jrn•rlt!j,011 b1 ~h1P 

•• i}ie ahlp'a at1'0D8 mom in ooem S>iDs .... ela will be u..s to aat~l"Cl the l:JisaDlO and. digCviu • 

b •. 'l'he mod ae=.re Ba4 aoo .... bl.e looaUon IA ·ahum.l 8Jl4 riTU'. 

boat• 11111 ·be oho•• tor Mf•&1&l"IU.D8 thia •qQii-at. An armd. 8lud forntoln,pbilr J 

11111 be PQ9ted "1th tihe dftio• H houra a dQe 

':be SiaBDO llJl6 Sigall with '1cRor1a -., be trmaponed b7 uronn 

iroYi4e4 'II.at 1 

a. . A1rorat't 11Ul not. be AmD oHr a.-. occupied t•rr1 tGrJ • 

o. Alrcratt 11111 DOt be tl.Oldl ewer nwtral temt017. 

o. Alroran will not be tl~ ewer water tram 111b1oh, 111.th• net 

at toroed laDUng ar ora::lb, tm en9111 aould. capture th• 4n1o•• 

~·• Atuntlcm la 1nT1"d 1lo Par. 8&1, ~ 380-CS fbr 1Dtonation md 9l1dcce 

CDDOUDiDe dutruoUon at 017Ptognph1o •Cllliimat in th• e'l'at a fbroed laiM!inc · ia -4• 1n •197 oooupied ·or neutrlJl t•rr1t017'• 

B. Mobil• Op!rattoa · 

(1) •"•t1011 11 · l•lted to letter, th18 bH4quar&era, dated 15 lw 

19", aubJecta Ood• Hoom Pb,veioal Securt~ in all Pba .. a at Operaucm, tor 1.D.to~ 

aaUon ed 8l14moe •mernlllg oout:ruotlon, eiplpoent, operation. 8Dd dut:ruoUoa 

ot. a mobile oode l'OOll 1D all plases Gr operation. 

(aJ la the ·eyent; ot a COD'tO~ JDOTe t.o .- m• ileadquarters, 11le code 

mca Tlb1ole 8l1Dul4 be looated 11oward th• tmn.t ot the 0011101 1lo 111&ure s..ie41at• 0!7Ptograph1c aomnmicaUone tor th• t'Ol"WU'd OC?wlld poet. 

(sj Anlld orntogrephio per.oDDel mould ooc:up7 ah• Ytiaiol• s.me;,. 

UaHJ.7 tbllodng ti. cod• rocm ._ ar tnot. 

(6) A.mDd 8'UU wlll pmteot ti. 11D941at• &Na mrrowdlag th• mobile 

eod.• roca 4arlltl t-.,ara17 lll4 oHl'll1gbt 0011101 llalt. 

(I) c.n llloulcl b• tUlln 1lo protect '11• damlt oo4• wid cipher• 1llL th 

a •terimact _,er:lal prlar 1iO •bariation. 

(a) •c oznt~r ftl90!181ble tor trmspon1ns aDc1 •las ti. aasault 

oo4• ad oi)lllln td.11 be lmtmcted 1ll tu p~oedure tor eMrgac7 4enm.cuoa, 

· 111111 pl'Oftdecl wUh· tile nee•~ 1t .. to 00111>1.et• tbat 4eatmot1on. liatdl•• 

llaoald be CUT1e4 ill a •terpl"Oct ODDGllff• 

(6) 1'119 dig&M .., be -.plo194 Oil madquar&er ahlps tor ao-.tcatlca 

... !'ear ••lAlll ~. 
• • 

. ' 

1n 

10 

... 

lt'4 
, 

I. 

COPY 

----

REF ID:A523210 

CON Ff DENTIAt: 

•• AmJ Hea4quarten- Bear •beloD QoeneD' J>Nt 

Qommnd Pmt m4 

'orwud g. ... Poat. 

be CcrP19 Bea4qaarte~ B9ar Bell e1ou aa.m.11111 Poat a4 

Qcmend Poet. 

o. Dl'ri.S.oD Bea4quarter8- Rear JloheloD Ocwnea' Pwt. 

(2) The ..reet end .. t ezpedltioua •ca ~ tn.u_portatica awaUabl• 

111.ll be mplo194 1D .w1Dg tb• ~~ 

(3) £iron.ft tdll be uaecl to transport the asp& to the Il1y1e1oa »Mr 

~loll Cannencl Poet ~ alllller excepUoml 01Nlmltm.oee • ar wh• all otller -... ~ tremeportatloD are 1Da4eqUate to ••t the ext.gao7 ~ the dtmtloG. 

J'ar tb• ciu..t ~lgDal ottloers 

CON Fl DCN"flAL 

-·-
REF ID:A523210 

R.~!.l 

•BDDta Ood• JJoca l'Qaloal tieouritr ill all Iba• .. ~ O,.nttGll. 

1'0 1 Steal, Caa Hioatlo•, all4 Sigml. decur1'7 otn.oere, 4am to 111111 

s-11111111 DlneiOlt llMA.-rt•n ill l4a7 Oromll! l'aro•; -.. Bea4qanen 

la C:., Air Jbroea; Porta a4 Dtlpota ill 8e"1o• ~ .... . 

ft1e 4o=•nt nao11111• Beaclcpaner~ a.rfta.a ot *PPl.7, ~ l>lreoUTH, 

•bjeota "lh181aal ~urit7• elated 19 Ootober, 1~3, "Seoar1'7 haOUo•• 4atecl 

1:5 .1Q17, 19-3, u4 Direoti ft thle hea4quartera, 4ated 3 Warm 19'~ aojeot a• •boT•· 

Jt ia Jm...Sed tlaat tlala pW>lioatiOJl WUl Jll'0~4e tpeolftc btomattoa 

PH'Hiaia'· to pbpla-1 aeour1'7 tactora u.d lll'liOUo•• ... oolate4 "1Ul Ule Cocle 

·ao. 1a all Jha•• ot operaticm; part1ewarl1 fbr PeNU1Ut Ull 8-1-Penaamt, 

Mobile aDd hq. Ccabat Cede liloca wltb respect to i 

A. Cocl• aocrn Coaatruaticm. 

B. Colle Boaa SqlllJllR' • 

o. Cbl• &oclDl o,erauoa. 

J>. Oat• Boan De9tnot1oa. 

•• ~ OOMmlJCTimI 

aRoClll1iiil be louted a oo•truotell to pJ'O'tHe oo..i.ete Jll'lT&OJ' 

u1 proteot1•· 'Die tollanaa lt- 8hCMllc1 be glna atriot CDmHemuoa la ooad:Natloa pleut111 ar 1a dloom.ac a Cede 1locm 111.t~ Ull•r •arlom pm•• ot open.Uoaa 

i. Penamnt a !i!N-Perr•nt '-'od• Ho- •• be aout:naoted w iDOCS'pCll'ate ti. 1bll.Clr11g tao1m'a1 

(1) aall41D& ateriala (Briak, CoAOl'ete1 Ual.Yaiae4 Metal 0'1' 

e<pinlct). · 

ta> earn.um lllt•rnl .,.oe to pemit t!'e•m• ot .,,._. ot per•m.l llld OJ01'atloa at .,.,_. praa•tlr ctllaria.S 

tbl uait wi t.h N8ft'ftt10U plallm4 tor 1btare OllPaUion. 

(Beter to paragnph 10 at le"•r, 1bia liead111&rtere, mbjeot 

•a.oar1t)' ot 'l'ele'7pnriter Prinq ~1.Plllllt• 4ah4 

l.'1 111118, 1~). 

(3) O. mtnm• bJ a &1111• ma'fJ' aoar, l01lmcl tma 1mld9 

ot * Cod. ioam. 

(6) Bo 1d.Dlm• or *J'li~t •· It wiJlllm• are preee:r&, th• 

llloal.4 be ael• opaque am prori4e4 w1 th ban. 

(O) .aeqaate .atilatioia. lt pauible, tr98h lllr • be 4na 

troa ouSei.4• tile baildbg atber t!aa flD• .. jolDglJIC •• 

er hall_,. 

.£ill 
e. 

REF ID:A523210 

\ ..:,.! ... !if! 

•• 

(6) Meq1ate 110.tilll tMl.llUea plaaad to pro-tlde a:dllltl' tor eperaton. 

(9) Sattleie• 91111bU' ot JCllU' ou&l8t;a (UO wolta) tor•"'-

a11u11ria•4 ecpiimat operaUoa. 

(8) Blan ..ii. ot brick ar _... .... loeatecl ao& leaa ti.a *• 

ten or aore t;!wl •ix t•t hem all utual Ooc!e iDca -1.la. 

(9) A nat.i.oa%7 bl1Jd -11 •nat;raotecl •Uhlll tu Cal• ao. 

lll&naa• to aona .,..,_ am operaU111 per•llllll tma 1ib• 

la4Y•n•t m• ot 1U181ltbar1M4 Jll'ID•· 

(10) ~. Bola .U.la wNu be •4• .oul-proot. 'lJt.18 ... 

ettectiY~ be aooot191lahe4 '1 lalilhs bla~ olctlt. 41Q9• 

oa ta •11• ti. OOI!• zoo• aoaU be '-Md ror •aalJrOofDIH Wiiie Yarie4 otr-..i..e1 ·a1 opera'1oa. 

.. •• !!oMtf.~ .,,. IDca mmtaetect la a wm • t.-k _,, ot --••1'Q, 

be • plaanet a• 1ID illlcrparate •otal pronaiom • ml'Oi..e atnot wurl'Q 

praouo... l111 tou.iag .. 11r1,, ~- llboul.d be ..a.4194 ia th• ••tzmUoa 

apetp.f.tioatlom 1 

(l) Looa'e ...... to all• tO/t etpt- -.wna '6 JilH'•JUlll.• 

(a) ho'f14•. tor HOMJll mav 017Ptcign.Jb10 ecpti-at to mm 

tala'L••· It &tigRDO 18 •Ploi-41 •eou.re to tnok ~. 

(S) Om ••nu• 1111.th door, 1ID .be i.eaca t'IDa lnai4• or OUU14• 

-4 lloltetl f1'0a tmlae llaell ool• l'D• U ill ••• 

(4.) Jlo 1'11140• or opHillga to tile enenar Of nbiole. 

(D) ~· tar tm'oecl 4n.n ••'U•t10D t~ •i4• or top ~ ftb1ole. Im14• lilllt• w1ll be 4lttwed 11u.-O .. .mU• 

latH& 4eY1oe. 

(6) Imorparate nttioiem taoUiU• tar P1"0Plr ll@bUD8. u ... quate elaotrlo pmrer. ack• •d •ml• .. tbr pl'OteotlY• i..i.mmta. · 

('I) Prepare acleflUah oa.ourJ.ap •HiJIS tor ft1'184 eomltlou 

ot open.Uon. 

a. M•t Cede !!o• .. Li&"bua1111lt111 a Code ileoa 1D the Cod»at Al"ea will 4.,.Dd pnanit 

upaa eustiJlg aolldlU.om eDd taelllt1••• Ho.ner~ oenalll fUllotemn'liL Hcar1'7 

pnotloea _, be abHrncl: 

(l) C!looH Cede doClll 11t• 1D close pl'Ozi.111'7 1ID lieaaap ~e. 

(2) o:Mdeot tile .-t MOUN looation. ID• luiWag, etc; 

oou1d•r mtrucN. exit•. 11Lllllon. aoiroe at oo-l'Gial 

ei.oirtc pmer, ad t'lre lasarda· 

COPY 

----
• 

REF ID:A523210 

(3) PN;an to aa• a bl•*•oat wall 'mt 1.11 Um ot DOD•ulnlnc 

lu1ld1- tacll1U••• 

B. COD& IQ~ pmm 

CenalD Cod• Booa eqaipma' mppleMmal 1D ozrP'ognphSo Qd,_. aD4 

clnic•• -t, tor •ttlcleat operation and MOurit.7 cllaolpllu, be a part ot the 

Code doCID. ~'he fbllowlng ••.Uhl ltew9 are comldend mo••S&l)' to aiatain a 

hi@ta lenl ot COQ8 mam ettlC1fUID7 ~ MCV1t7: . 

l. Pl!"'nirpt ap.ci ::91-P•ranent Code lio(9 

•· ~ three aomblm.Uon Real lat'• er ecp1Talen.t 1D be looa'&ed ill 

the cod• roaa. 

. b. File oablmt lprttterabl1 a\eel ). ..._ aclO.eci HourltT preo11&Uon 

&J:loul.d. be added b7 proftdiDS a aetachlibl.e iron QI' ateel rod to paH t.brougb the 

rile l:alldl.98 wMi .••curel7 locad to the cabin.t. 

c. ~-machine ~ fDl .~ calibre :rewl••r• or pistol.a 11i.th 

..-ltloa. ..i.1 peraom:iel ahoul4 be thorougbl7 lnatl"\lcted lD ~he use ot th••• 

... pom. 

4. DutNctl•• ecpi:p11111Lt iml\111118 ~ plloa ca a/I pml.iiw er./ar 

keroHDa, them.it• bcabs ll1Ci other •itabl• uploain•, au, llaav aimer, imll 

l'Oda, ho braaier• with •lr• nuUng, two pair.; ~ Wire cmtera (long mlp ACJM) 

ad atchea. 

•· Mdeqlat• reaene ot paper, nee•••~ terms ano paper ta.-. 

t. ::iuppl7 ot Claaolticatlon at&pa, aolar pencils, pencil •barpeur 

looate4 in the Code 61oam, wire stapler, tape sticker alld ta]l9 ollpa. 

g,. Secret trash be.slmts. 

h. Sutticient d17 cell batteries to produce 24 10lt per supp17. 

2. l!obll! Code Moe 

a. ~ saall three•ooa.blDa ti OD at.:al. are ar eCJ.&1Talent. 

b. D.atruct1Te eqiipmnt mentlomd in a.ctt.on D, Paragraph 1.4. 

abon. ~ia equiJDBD' abovld be .llllde .Hew-• 1n i:aclm taild easily aoce;·sible :fbr uae. 

c. Detoa1T• weapcma mant1oned lD "'9Ct10D .i;;., Paragraph le, 11,bo••· 

d. "'JleCial reaene ot paper tiDd paper ta]l9. 

•· ....ii eu.pplS.a Dntiomd ln ~ctlon '1•, Pa~b l.t., aboTe. 

t. J.n .. rgeDO)' por;er oource tor eacb _,l~ 

g,, 'l'ID QO teet CD-4.U» •iature proaf' ei.otriO oorcla. 

ia. Won table• ••C1.&ncl to bod7 · r1 ftlb iole • 

1. autr1o1en cll'J o•ll 'ba\terle• to produce 2-6 10lt poser aap:;ll)' • 

. l~ COPY .---- - z -
, 

I 

REF ID:A523210 

OVlliB 

---- a. 9-bat ~od• .ipca 

•• 'l'b9 lc.•r !alt or Cme\ Ch-76 dlould be ueq•te •ate 8Jl&H• 

b. ~chi• 8lD8, .45 calibre tire &J.W, • otber :pl'Otec'1T• 

napom cl--4 uo•MJ)' coua1d•r1DE> tile urgenc1 ot comb&\ colllblom. 

•bot'•· o. .i1 d•~rucun •Caa1Jlll8Dt Usteci in beotloii a., Parainph 1.4. 

4. .Sequa\• n•ene a:ppq d PL"rer, :recess~ r... 811 l'Qer -... 

e. All applies 11111catecl ill Seot1oii B., ~h 1.t. 

t. M -rgeDCJ :pQter source tcr each ~ 

g. Four 50 teet CD-'15 moisture proot electric oor4a. 

h. ~ f'ol.clins fleld tables. 

1. ~!"1cieut dr,' call batteritis to produce 24 10lt pc11er •a~. 

c. cXmK !! ClPAdA'4'1<11S '& Y.> er C17Ptogniphic o>ecuriQ ottlcer 8hall be rupoml·bl• tor tt.• 

eat'cro-m er oarret reD&latlons t.ld lmt.ructiom pertaim.as to tm ••ur1t7 ot 

ozntognphic pers1u1ml, crJPtasr1Ph1c ciaoutllt• (1ml'°"1118 cod .. Wl4 Glpben), 

017PS0gnpbio ecp1JmeDt 1 ol')'ptographio operattom, aJll al other •thra :peztallliDC 

to th• HCVU~ ot co-.m.cauo11a operaH4 aDd llaiaalmd Wld•r ~ IRlPH'ft'OJl ot 

Uae Sicml. or ComnDi oaUou ottlcer. 

l. ;r:,•n\ •d .;;.i-Penaamnt Code Bocxn • · . 

follOPilng aecurl 1;)' practlc •• cxu:icemlng Code ioca J19rmWl, rep.-

latiomi, blnmctiona, and operatiom soul4 be thar0'1e;kll7 umera11Dod. Qd obaenecl. 

bJ all comermd& 

· a. AU1ihor1zat1an to lhOlll, 1aam, 4ucr1be, er 4S.-a ornrtognplWt .,..,_ to Uatted States ciYUiam ar mU.lt~ psraoDDel. Sa owned 'bJ' the p1"0Tla1om ot ...il S0-5, 15 .l.udl, 19". 

(1 J OpeOlal aHatlOD 1D tibia GDUfOUOA la 41reote4 to ~ 

grapba 11 MDd l~, Ml 380-51 15 ._rah, 19H, *io!l aJPl.7 

wl.tbout ne..,ect 1ID im 1'Uka cr SNA• fl JIU'IDU lmolTecl, 

aD'I. a!IOald be atrlc\l~ edmncl to ill U.l ..... 

(2) W&r i:.s-rta.ent u4/cr 1011* --~~., c17ptcanphio qd-, 

1mlu41111 · kllJ li•'• lllltruc'1om 8lld clftloH, 11111, llllll•r • 

oirc'llllldtco•• be lb.own, u 8U941 4•ol'1be4 to or 411C1118 H4 

1ll th clriUau ar mi.lit~ psreWl ~ ., OQ•r at.191 ul•• prier mpec1t1c mt:bm'1zatloa 1• obtlllmct tma '1ae 

Var Dlpartmut in each lmteoe. 

b. AU oamia•ionecl all4 mlia'94 cl7P'CSJ'lllhiC per.oJlll81 U.11.olml• ornt~£111hio .maid•mno• perimllMl) 11lll be ill'rHtlgated aoocrlllna to prona1 .. Dr J:1'0UU. leUer Mil :.511.5 •GB, 4ate4 12 .T•uaz:r, 19C.4'1 nbjeot "OlMl'IDOe ~ 

hJWDMl tor CrJPtogn.phio IGUe••· '-ll pereouel 'ld.11 be •thtaotorU.7 •le .... 

bJ ala 1urentga'1011, prior tD -.aglsg ill <Uti•• er trailltJg u 017ptcsNpbH• • 

OJ7PWCJ'IPIUo •1 Jl~e •• • 

-·- i!lI 
• 

eREF ID:A523210 

( 

o. /1 aoUo• ~i ... MM lball • poatecl on th• .mr111oe to tu 

Cod• lioca. ·• wiw •c1pllarca • ~P'opapMo Qtf'soe•, eta., lllllould aot 1c1atlt), Gr be \llecl aa Ill a&ide lllSiOdCll' to tM Cocle io•• 

4. a nst.n•r pc19tecl lJUd.4• t.be Cod• Boca ••DC .-, looa'1oa, 

4ate, am U.. ot arrlal Gil 4•iar11lr• lll4 m.ture at 'lldt at all pH"IDDI, otll•I' 

&a morMl operator• UM! •P•nia017 permmael, mtllarisecl 1D mater the Cod• Atom 

Oil attiolal YU ita • 

e. Secret traah 11111 be bm'Ded at le.at cmce each 24 laoura. (4uriq 

clQllgbt boure 1t' burmd 1D th• open) 1D t.tie p:rannoe at • att1oer eel th• aah• 

oai-eftlll7 •lttea. 

r. Sat• combilatlona lbould be cbqed *••nr pel"IDnnel, co Ian 

bad acoees to claas1t1ed at.rial, l•n tile argalaation, Cll" in •7 o ... , OM• a 

acatb. Under DD ciram.tano•• willl ate COlllb1mtiom be wi"it.ten u a r-S.Dder, or 

oOl".b1mtton data carrS.d cm the peraon. 

So a .t!llz ~pactlon or th• Cede i1oan to iuun that aecurit7 neilatlou are DeiLg obeel'Ttiu 8Dcl a clack to de'81"1111D8 U.t all dOO\lllJllDta aD4 n8'"•ten4 

mat•rSal an preaent. 

b. leno&el tharoughq acquainted with all •;,at•• to be 1D attm4._• aa lO!lf aa 111• Cede Boom 1• 1D o,.rauon •. It, •oma• at lilliWcl trattlo, the 

Cad• 1'toam cloe• ~ operaw a .. bo\lr ahit'ts, •t41l>• aboW.4 be tum to Illar• tbat th• 

.tiJ.aDal ~uri'.Y Qtftoer ar ,119rtt0mial. 4ea1gmteci bJ him •7 be r.eaolled tor SllnelU.au 

411'7 at all Un•· 

1. a.11 Code lioom persGDDel to be acqualnt•d with the proy1a1011a at 

..a 380-5 mt. otter re8J,llat1om so cUrecUTes co11eem1Dg eecur1~ u wall a• the 

imt.mctiou aonte.1md ill all ~icationa concen:a111g 1itle 01>9raticm at -t;be •J&t-.. 

j~ i'he iieHage Center f.IDC "ale ~am opera-t;10D8 &ou.ld be Gr@llUllaed 

ao •• 1lO al.l.o. tb• abf)l!4• ''P''!U!!! »• to JIHe trat't1o ~• ~· taleprlmer and 

a41o rooc.a to the Code Bom 8114 noe ftrBB.. 'lbla 0. beat be acooapl1&e4 by 

_.ftl1s1J:lg 1ih• .. zooa a11d ut1l1zlag nll slots tar iaal!liag .119Hagea, by 1Dtm- . 4UC111& a ti.. eomdulit tor paa~ng ••aapa ar e!i1pulat•4 DUlllb•n or g:mupa. Oon-

•Sd•r eUailatloR ot UDll80•llal7 nei:-, taater •tbod or reoor41r.g~ H"1a11l8 ti•, 

-4 all al.ota tor 1nooa111£ md outfJ)tng normi.l Code Boan tratno. 

. t. In th• net that cl.ear 'text OOPJ ~ ~ont radio _. landline 

trat'tlo 1a oarr1a4 t'm• one milciizie; to motbe r, Maled mwal.ope• or apec1ally 

prnided laou4 poucbea ahoul.d. be ued. 'l'h9ae 0011h1nera &ou.ld be reoeiptecl. tor. 

Similar pzo•eo•n &oul.cl be attcr4e4 .,._ teat· under _. alrmmattanoea. h 

oOI .. nftllcm mil cl .. r wxt oopS.• 111111 Jl8Ter be tiled Cir tnc.pcrt•d together. 

2 •. liob1le Cod• Bpc9 . . 

Specl-1 aecwlt7 !Jreo&Utlcma muet mc .. ear~ 17 be mt'Cll'oecl ill operating 

a A.oblle (;ode doca. lt -t be GOUt11Dtl7 borat ID m1al tba\ the mobile tJ'pe cl 

aoG• BDca MJ be acre wlmrable to inaecure practices, ooneequeDU.7 to direct 

attaak. lt 1a 809\ lmpartant tbat etrtct dis~iplin• be ento:rceci ooncemillg the 

tollaring Hour1•1 ••aur••: 

a. Ouarda u.94 1IS. u. aatoaa tic ... pons to be •tationecl at tb9 Cocle 

Bl»ca em ruc e at th• ftlb ~le 2t houn a 411,f. 

-o- • ~it. , _ _, -· ,... ,-, 111 II i.il • ._.. 
----------- -- ·---- --· 

REF ID:A523210 

.. 

b. &Jeetal ••'• ot llanm 1D Co4e Boa operator• lD&Uoating bClll.bing, 1U1 parubm• or 111>111Ml attaalt. 

o. AU Co11• io• u4 other mtbarlaed pel'IODMl. will Gbplq a 

•peo1"1. Co4• Bo• 1*8• 1D the CJuN betare cter111g Oo4• Boca. 

Tllbiole. 

• Speclal pnoauUom 8hould be t.an to Ja"eYCt lpptl. g1Y1l1g 

iahabitpu F4 •• •• tm• Jmow111g the ezaot location ot the Code Boca. 

t. It op9rat111g 1A open ooum17, apecial p:reoau'Uoa17 MUQ"9 

eou.14 be earci•ec! to c•outlage the Tcicle to the 1-41at• mrrota112ias .. 

g. J'oRpatlle, wmel tracb llld lead-in Wire• indicate acUnQI 

•J.aoate' th• Cede Hoom ••hlole pe.d.~loall1 .Cu operat1- in 110oded 01' opm 

ooaai17. -

h. 'i'bl iutructioDB CX>ntaim4 1A b90t1on c.1. Parall'l'Pta a,b,c,4,t, 

1,h,i, alm a,ppl.J to "obil.• 99\e Hoe operation lllld mould b• nnoU1 coaPl.i•G 

w1 th b7 .i.l COllC H"De4. 

l. S.Ont tram mould E. be el.lo!ed M •ll19t. a otfioer will 

apeniae &e barUJll at ul Moret tralb at regalar lllternl.e. 

J• l>m care a4 protection llloul4 be gl•• th• ftbiole to profta• 

tar etttai.ai operatiOA ill• -rs-DOT.,.. •• 

Jc. lt 1- •tl'OD81J' reOU118Dl!•d tbet the 4r1••r at the Mobile Cod• 

.._ TlllS.1- be • athar1&e4 smg.q :!11•¥ •1nHMDoe •p ca a reae:ne ornwlflPMr. 'lh18 Jeft«a llboul.d be aftilable at ilrlecU.ate aoUc• 

So ~at· Code !!?oll · Operating CDDllU1om ot the Cclllbat Cale Boca wlll ola .. e per10-

4ioall.7 4..-•UDa oath• pmgr .. • at tbe Cmpalga. Bawner, the t\lDdamatal. 

..... 1_. pziDDl~• nm.ill constmt, a1Jd lboul.4 l>• rtgilUUJ' ob•VftA• 

a. .Meqate Ulll84 guards to be nratecioallJ 1C1Date4 at ti. Ca!• 

- •'199• Ull 1-dlat• ar-. 2• hour• • 4111 • 

'9 '1'be iaa'ac\lom oontaim4 ill Section 0.1. Paragnpba a,b,o,cS,g, 

1, ... S.Ot&oa c.2. Pansrapu b,c,4,e,1, an pecul1arl7 applicable 1tio a Call>at 

Cole 8-Gll &114 llaould be gha parUoular oonaldere.tion. . 

Jj. ~rJ1Jmm, · i · T ~ 11a. d:.rect napom1bil1'7 ~ •1 permn c!ar,..S 11lth 'trmaai-S.a, •Jlnialoa or operation ~ olaesUie4 uaterlal to tKe all pncmtlona 

me•ai:r to Dip •Oll •terial tzoa capture b1 th• me.111. 'n. pou1b1lit1 at llDUJ 

aotloa bJ' 4Q or Digk& 18 al•QB i.ntrwnt, oomequmtl7, th• al.location at r•IPOD• 

•1-llltJ' tor oCllle N• 4utiuctlon ~oul.4 be b7 41rt7 rather thaD b7 --• ~t•l"llll't• 

uo'&lld be 4•npateG 1A •nl'Y cue. 
REF ID:A523210 

COPY 

----

apeciric ~ties as part ot 11 l!sa• It 1a important that " aimulated exerciae be 

enterec: imo at regular 1.Dtenals by all Code Hoam persoD.Del. 'lhe tbll.c.1ng 

meaaires !lloul.d be cons1aered in any Code ncan destNction pl.au: 

a. The tBOuut at ecp1pment ~ be destroyed in ti.;.e ot Emergeucy 

Ghould be the br:.als tor,. mintaiDing deatructhe it&ns memioned in SectiOJl B.l. 

Pr!ragrepb 4. 

b. iiestricted ecpip1111lt will be dest:royed beyolld poaSibil1ty d 

rep&ir or reclaaation ot pa.rte. 

recogDi ti on. 

contidential. 

destroyed to 

c. Secret am ~Dtidential equiplDIJnt 1111.l be destl'OJ9cl ~OJld 

.jucb destniction llBY be limited to tboee part10#9 ot a secret ar 

device 11bich show principles or design. Other components will be 

an enct t.bat .:>u.ld pn:vent f'Urtber use or recla1111t1on. 

d. In au. casea. docU111Bnts o:- devices R9t Dt in force are considered 

ot grefatest importance. 

e. ·~'he !'bllowi.Dg preceacce of destiuction shoul.Q be ii.corporated 

in any Code Boan destruction pl.e.ul: 

(J.j 

(2) 

(3/ 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

(9 J 

(10) 

.ttecoeDition lu111· l.ists aDti asorau:ia. 

Cipher 1111.chi.nes end l!IPJy Uata. 

~trip alpbeoets and my lists. 

J'oi&t recipbering 8lld. recorciing "bi.••· ~cret CClllllllW1ication tiles .... nd operation 

Signal cip~re. 

Comact COdee i>Dd cipU.rs. 

Authentication systans. 

Call sign cipt.1 rs and ~ lists. 

Other codes and signal publications. 

orders. 

t. Clessifie:d 1111te:-ial of higt.est importance should be Jllbrke4 in a 

clearly distinctive tllllDner, i.e. 't.oi tl:i re<: .'.lllriting 1n an obvious place. This shoul.d 

be done locally in pursue.nee of the destruction plan, and 11Ul be in a4ctUioA to 

tl::e resilar clasdf'yiDig stamp or i:Brkiog. 'roP o).ECHE'l', SliC.rtET aDd OONl'IDTM aDcumen1is Ettould be sorted and tiled ~r ea• access, und 11.st l!J!lpt Of exact l.ocatiou 

1'bere aicb documents ere belci elsevbere on tbe :.tation. 

g. ~ volume or classified material which would re<111re dest!Uction 

in eTent or emergencies should be kept to an ab9'lute minimum. 'Lbus, U is 1mportent that ·au routine dest1uct1on be ocmpletee promptly. .J.l personnel shall be 

cautioned against tendency of. pe:imitting papers to accullllllb te in tiles. 

ho .CO~ docwmnts or unboWIC sheets ot paper pressed together Will 

not burn to be uniaent1fiable or unrea<luW.e evEm in a oig tire. lt is best to tear 

covers off book, tear or cNJDple pr.gee, sepe.rating sheets as lllllch as possible. :Sou 

papers t'4.th keroeeDe or gasoline at 1uterv....ls ts they are placed intc brazier. Place 

wtre netUiig over top to prevent paper blOl'ling away. ~onstantly stir n.re um ashes. 

i. It i.6 of u~at 1.m.portance 'tt...t m adeque.te number ot persona be 

designated as e. team to aeatroy all eloctrically oper~t•li c~ptographic devices. 

acL l!lllllllber ot tbe teea. must be 1borou~j:.ly 1n.stmct8'1 in his ~t1cific task to 

1yure speeci ima ettect1ve.oess. 

.: 'I ~ COPY 

----
... 

COPY 

----

REF ID:A523210 

/'""'··cl 

v:::>O~..ca sE· ·--1~ Jf\C L.: 

J. To e!'fe'!tlv~ly 4est:oy St&AM rotors and 1.n:!ex rotors, rem.ewe 

trom Cipher linit (StgIVl) md aompletely rcove all wir1D£ by c11Uing with long 

snip-nose wire cutters. riep~ce Cipher Unit cd place Wires aDd all rotors on top 

ot Cipher Unit. Do not replace glass aoTer. Pl.ace rotors in SllCb a m&Dner that 

they lie tla t and not on top or one an-:ther. P1.1:10e Incend ia17 Sa.t'e DestroyiJJS BOmb1 

Type "iZIOOl", ,on top of the rotors \11. th appro:xlmtely tm sane le~th extending onr 

each end. ( .... ttentio::o. is directed to Cba.nge lfo. 2 t.c .:>iglCKX-l tor detailed iDStmcticm• 

on installation 1:1.Dd use ot Incendiary .;ie.te Destroying ~ 'fype "M-1•). 

k. To ettectival.7 destroy the Com-ertor ZU-209, place all lmyiDg elemeots in neutral positioDS by cbanslag all. lug settings to zero am moTing all lmT 

'illeel piml to the lett pos1t1on. Render the aaehim u.nserviceable to the ene1111 bJ 

stamping with boot heel, strilcillg with rock, ballmer, axe, or b;r tirill6 iuto it 1d.~h 

r1.fle at" pistol. 

2. &::o b1 le Cod e BoOID 

1'be operators o.f a "4b1le ~. :noom must be aomtant.l.7 alert and 

prepared to destroy c~pt~rti.phic .1111.terial at a moment's notice. 'l'he tollowing 

secur1t7 precwtiona should be seriously considered in any destruction plm fbr 

this t;rpe tbd e Hoac: 

a. 41.1 destructive ecpiPmBnt .mentioned in Section j).l. Paragraph 4. 

'lbese itena amst be ao located within the veb~lo as to be iamlldiatelz accesnble. 

b. Provision ahould be made to deatroy M:.l cryptograpblo mterial 

iDSide the Code Boom. .il10id use or incinerators in open spaces aere pereonml 

might be e:iposed to memy fire. 

c. °ijbere time does not pemiit ao11111UDicot1on with the Conrnending 

Clt'I'icec, every individusl aoncemed .must act on his arm initiative. 'llle importance 

ot beginnirig the des true t ion scheme ait'fic iElll tg earlz cm not be Ol'er ampha sized. 

~curate reports of emereency destruction will be mde to higher authcrity as 

soon as practicable. 

d. The in.stzuc tiona com; ained in .';iecti on D.l. -·aragrap.bs b,o,d,e, t, 

g,h,i,J,k, also apply to L..obile Code Hoom procedure. 

3. Coail at Cod e 3oom 

a. All destzuctive equipment mntionod in .;iection d.l. Pare.graph d, 

mu.st be a'nlilable for illfltant use. .-ch ita sholll.d be prC1a1Untl7 located near 

tbe equipment or material it "is intended to destroy. 

b. The instructions oonta1oed 1D ,.iYr. Paragrepbs, Section D.l. and 

Paragraph b.c, .::1ection D.2. are parUcwarl.y applica'ble to an ettic1mt deoitruction 

achece tor the Coimat Coae Boom tllld should be complied With. 

For the "h1et ;jignal otncer: 

e/ leorg• Ae diOl»r 

u.l'J)RG.i ~ ~Qi&i , 

Cololl81, ~igpal Corps 

•!DE t JT/Af.2 COPY 

----
. . -

REF ID:A523210 

SECRET •• 

01'1'1<3 

~ 

OF 'IEE CHIU Sl<liAL C.1'.ll'ICIR 

CCWilJBICATICtiS 2»HI 

lllJBODA5 ~ 07 CJPDAi'IQHS 

lDll'dD ST&TJ:s ~ 

Al'O 88f 

SUB1lllf I houri t)' ot SiaABA-

'1'0 a Sipal Seouri1iJ otnoer. 

1. 'fble letter reac1Acls Head.quarten, SerrioH ot Sappl1, ~ i.tte, 

Abject ••• u abOTe, 4a1ie4 15 lul1, 19'3. 

2. la ord•r to ..Utalll ad.eqmt• Hcurity ot SigABi and ita olfPt08ftP)do 

117•t- :aow la ue, it 1a nec .. u.l)' that the tollon11g aeour1t7 ft811AUou be 

thoraugbl.J ma4enwoci alld Ob•eneda 

3. •• S~ ad SiglVI &N olaH1t1e4 ae 00NnI>JRaIAL 11114 .. , be 

8atesuarde4 aooordlng to the prorte1cma or Paragrapba JO& ad 30b ot .u 380-0, 

dated l~ ~. li4h SlglM .muat be ao.reaed withiD t!le rom troa the Yin ot 

unautbor1&e4 peracma 8D4 00.m.pletel.7 COYereci wben c1-e.D1Dg persoi:aml an preact. 

b. 1119 111at-.. taDd ro~s tor use "1th ~i~ are ol&HU1•4 u 

SIDRJill' ftSlate.d dooumenta. 1'l8J' should be apt 1D the mOfJt aeoure apao• 

anilable, pretea'bl1 a three-oamoim.tiu locUd. eate or 1ts ecpi•alent W1~1A 

th• ood.e mca. Sino• tile equipment 1a claes1t1e4 aDCi C81Ulot read.lb be eo-ncl, 

... urea •baul.4 be taken w prorid• adequate eeour1iy tor ti. 1'0om 1n 11b1oh 1' 

la lutalled, 1A aoaordaoe with letter, l!Ubject "aode Roam Ptcyeioal Seourit7 

la all Pbaau ot Operation•, 4ated 16 1WUt, 1964. 

'- Puagraph 11 ot AR 380-6 statu that "no peraon 18 enutie4 to olaH1-

fte4 aillta17 1zatormat1on •lel.7 bf Tlr1A• ot his oOllDiealon or ottiolal poe1Uoa. 

8QGll llltarmaUOD wUl be atl'Ullted ~ to thoee mo require Ui ill th• pertormaaoe ot tlleir ottiolal dutiea, ud to aaur• t .. wor.lc Bild ettioient iutNO Ucm 

ot penollUl, proper plallAiug or aalm•uu• ot ecplpnnt•. Spec1t1oal.l.7 tibia 

__. tbat ao-om •ZHpt the tbllolliag 1e 1D aee or haTe ~ knowledge couemiJ:ll 

G7 OJ'7PWSJ'llPh1o aater1al 1 

'1'he Ua.U Sienel. Otticer. 

1'be Code Room Ottio er. 

Supeniecry PersollD81. 

OperaUag Peraollll8l. ~1t1ed MeJ.nt8DllDCe Persollllel. 

l:Jllloe •e CCmnmcUng Gmeral or Oc:llllmall41og Otticer is responsible tor ell ti. 

aot1Tlt1ea of hie comeTM', aooorcUDg to ;...rrq 1'e91lationa, he aq d-111! the right 

to ••• 017ptogrephic m&terial. ActiDf!: only upon such a spec1t1c req•at, the 

s~ Otttcer •11 al.le. the Comnwldins Gceral or CommaDd1D6 ot'ticer to Ti•• 

aU or,"ptOgJ"aphiO nahrial ill his posaeslJLon. Suob 11lspeot1on will DOt be . . 

1.llrited, nor wUl ~ 1AfaraUon be wlunteered. Th1:1 abOTe proTI.s1ons appJ.7 •Uh 

eqiaal force to all mm'bers of the vlli ted ..>tatea .IU'med .!forces regardless of 1"8D.k 

or politlon. 

-1-

~~CRfT 
.e .. . , 

. ~ 

·e 

REF ID:A523210 

R.!!1 • 

5. ~ aUeDUOD 1• llslhd 1;o War Departmct letter M 313.6 liOB 4ate4 

18 1 .... 17, 19", 8D4 entitled •Deat:motlon ot Clasalt'lecl Matter 111 anergcole• 

cm i.m, •. am ill ille Mr•. 

6. All regletered olusltled docu.mama -..Oiate4 with the ecp1~ eball 

be haDd.lecl la aooorduo• w1 th the prov1s1ona at AR 380-5 claSecl 15 Jiaroh 194-6, m4 

ohangea tbereto. Attatlcm ls apecU'icelly 1DY1 teCi to ParasrQhs 2,,,5,6,9,11,16, 

29,30,al,3'1,38 encl Sects.on IV.~ All perdDDnQ\. recpired to baDdle reg19terecl 4oou111BDta 11111 be IZlld• 1'&11111ar with the pl'OT1sioas at AR 380-5, elated l5 laaroh 1~. 

7. 'l'be opera~ peraonml should. be pl'Operl1· qualltied 1D aooordano• 'with 

th• proT1s1o• ot Paragraph 42(e) at AB 380-5 end AOO letter dated.12 .laDUU'J' 

19',, 'ref. Ml 311.5 MGB, subject "Clearunce ot PeraoDnel tor Cryptographic Dmiea•. 

a. Tbe Sipal &;jeour1 v ~no er will be reapou1 ble tor all aecurltf .m Hen 

oonneoteci 11111th th18 eppantas. He shall be tem1Uar vd. th the correct methal ot 

operat1D.g the 9Cll1JIGl8Dt as outll.Ded 1D the publialied imtruoUona, and shall 

a.teroe the p:r"OY1s1ou ot theee doOWll9nta aa well as 1ih08e at "2 ~o-8. 

9. InqutPie• aoacemi~ ncurity .aauur•• shall be reterre4 1'o the Ohiet 

Slp81 otnoer, liq. K'1ww. itRQ 887, Arrl:Jl~O!H SU>. 

hr the Ohiet Si@Dtll. Ottioert 

SECRET 

-aGB.>ROE A. SOID 

Ooloml, S16Dal Corp• 

OOPY 

----
REF ID:A523210 

TAB V 

Photographs of the Converter 1'-134-C lost. 

at Colmar, France. These pictures were taken 

a.a the m~-covered converter was being l"emOV'ed 

from the top--half o! a Ches~ 76 in which it 

had been submerged in the Greesen rtiver near 

Seiestart, France. For details, see Chapter 

XVI, Sect.ion C. 
REF ID:A523210 

S-EGRET 

APPDDIX BO. 1 

TO EXAilll\TATION OF SIGABA NO. 235 

Below sre listed photographs showing chest, contents, 

&nd condition of contents as they were found by investigators from 

Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Hg ETOUSA, APO 887, U. S. Army. 

Photo No. l 

Thia photograph shows the upper half of the Chest CH-76 

No. 293 before being opened for investigation by Office of 

the Chief Signal Officer, Hq ETOUSA, APO 887, U. s. Army. 

- 1 -

;eCREl 
r .,. 

~ f*': ... :.. ~ _,.. 

~ ~ ..... ;; 

• . .,..rl""' •.• 4 

' . 

Photo No. 2 

The view in the photograph above shows the upper half of the 

Chest ~J.I.r~6 No. 293 immediately a~er the door had been 

opened-Oefore any attempt had been made to break the mud seals 

or remove the machine. 

- 2 -

SE~nRE\f _ .~-- -- _J 
REF ID:A523210 

5E€REJ. 

' ~- ~ 

. ~·~:=-~~ ~~ 

·,:c:~i4~ 

Photo No. 3 

This photo was taken after the machine had been partially removed from the chest. This view gives some indication of 

the condition of the machine and the chest and the amount of 

mud in the chest. 

- 3 -

I . SEC:RET 
Photo No. 4 

A top view of the machine after it had been almost completely removed from the chest shows the position of the power switch 

and the position and condition of the SigIVI as it was found 

by the investigating personnel. 

SECRE .. T 
REF 

Photo No. 5 

The position of the machine in the chest as it was being removed is indicated in the above photograph. The marks on 

the side of the base board of the SigABA give some indication 

of the amount the board had swollen during the time it was 

in the water. 

- 5 -

SEC:REt 
REF ID:A523210 

"' . ' 

-

Photo No. 6 

The above photograph shows the SigIVI as it was removed ~rom the machine prior to any washing or cleaning. 

- 6 -

SEGRE'F 
e. 

Photo No. '1 

The condition of the SigIVI after washing is shown in the 

photograph above. Upon close inspection the rotor setting 

can be seen. These are the settings that were on the rotors 

when the SigIVI was. removed from the SigABA. 

- 'I -

SEC.RET· 
Photo No. 8 

The method used in gaining entry into the ~ield safe after 

it could not be opened with a key is shown above. 

SEC:R.ET· - e -
REF 1:q:~~-~~ 

.. -..... ~ 

Photo No. 9 

The contents of the field safe are shown in the photograph above. A close inspection will show the condition of the 

contents of the safe as they were found by the investigators • 

... 9 ·-
REF ID:A523210 

TAB V 

Excerpts from 

Official Letters concem.ing Maintenance Training 
REF ID:A523210 

SPSIS-4B 15 December 1944 

Letter No. 518 

SUBJECT: Training Personnel for Maintenance of Converter .tl-13/r~· 

TO: All Holders of Converter :U-134....C. 

* * * * * * 

3. The following information is £umished for the gu.idence of units 

requesting t.1.1is office 'to ti•ain · persoMel aasicned. to such u."lit.s. 

* * . * * * 

d. Personnel selected for this traininc; mu.st be fully qualified 

with the subject matter t~ru previous experience or schooling as indicated 

below: 

(1) Shop \\ork: A full knowledge of the proper care a.nd use 

o.f miscellaneous tools for measuring, gauging and making 

r;iec:1anica.l adjustments, correct oolderiri;:; technique as 

ernployed in soldering splices and small connections; 

and i.i'1. the preparation or cord u.1d plug assemblies. For 

reference see 'JM 11~453. 

(2) Principles of Electricity: Those basic principles of 

electricity &i.~d roagnetion which enable tbc student to 

fully understand the use and care of 0atteries and 

electrical ueaSUj,"'ing instruraento, the solution of circuits, schematic and actual wiring diagrams, as well as 

the ti1eory a.nu p:racticn.J. a.pplicstio1.1 of AC and DC motors. 

For reference see TM l-455. 

e. It is suggested that personnel qualifiesi to hold the following Military Occupational .Specialties \.1.103) or 3pocii'ication Ge.rial J:Iumbers 

tSSN), if i'ully qualified as indicated. in subparagraph Jd above, arc 

eligible .for such training.-

(1) Officer Personnel. 

No £.;OS 

Assigned 

~eletypswriter Equipr~nt Ua.ir t, :iance 

and Repair 0£.ficer. \Officer must 

hav<:ll previous experience or sc:2001-

1ng which qualifies him in the same 

.w.annar t;.;·1a t an ez1l:bted ;r;.:..,n .is qualified to be a Telety~ !lechanic SSN 239.) 

~~--~---------~-..,..,..,.=~-- -- _:::,,.. 
REF ID:A523210 

llOS 0145 

MOS 0.260 

liOS 441.5 

?,;!OS 9606 

00\l~l\8\Till Radar Maintenance and Repair Officer. 

Telephone and Telegraph Maintenance 

Officer. 

Signal Equipment M:aintenanee and Repair Officer. 

Cryptographic Equipment Ma.intena,:'.)ce and 

Repair Officer Class 1 'l:vpe Equipment. 

{2) Enlisted Personnel. 

SSN 076 

SSN 095 

· $.S.N '097 

SSN 115 

SSN 232 

SSN 239 

SSN 384 

SSN 648 

SSN 801. 

Electrician. 

Central Office Repairman. 

Installer-Repairman, Telephone and 

1'elegraph. 

Automatic Telephone System Maintenance: Man. 

Switchboard Installer-Repairman, Manual. 

Teletype Mechanic. 

Installer, Toll Telephone and Telegraph. 

Radio Repairman. 

Cryptographic Repairman Class 1 Type 

Equipment. 

4. Inclosed is one ccpy of the pre-entry examination, \SSCE-2) 

27 November 1944, to determine elegibility for training. As many copies 

may be reproduced as are necessary. It is requested tilat these examinations 

be given by field units or training centers under the supervision of an 

officer and tha. t no training a.ids, manual.a, wiring dia.erams, ete., be 

available to the person beinr; examined. It is further requested that the 

officer supervising the examination certify in writing that trte examinees 

took the examination without receiv.ing a:ny aid from such officer, other 

individuals, or the items mentioned in the pruceding sentence •. T;1e completed, 

ungraded pre-entry examination will be submitted with the training request. 

5. 1

1

menever it is deterrained that an .individual is not fully qualified 

for this assigneent on the basis of t;1is examinatlon, or due to la.ck of previous experience or schooling, arrangements will be made by Military Training Branch, OCSigO, for necessary pre-requisite training upon request • . 
REF ID:A523210 

AGAO-S-B-M 311.5 {27 Mar 46) EM/go ID-863 Pentagon 

2 April 1946 

SUBJECT: Training Persormel for the Maintenance of Converter 11-134-C 

TO: All Holders of the Converter M-134-C 

* * * * * 

4 •. The following information is furnished for the guidance or 

units requesting the Army Security Agency to train personnel assigned to 

such units. 

* * * * * *" 

d. Personnel selected for this tra:ining must be fully qualified 

and capable of meeting !!,!. prerequisites for enroll.oent indicated below: 

(1) Officers, through civilian background or military 

experience, must be qualified to perforra duties 

equivalent to that of a Teletype Mechanic ( SSN 239). 

(2) Enlisted m.en must have an AGCT score ·or 110 or higher 

and be fully qualified as a Teletype Mechanic (SSN 239). 

\3) All selected personnel should have a thorough knowledge of the tollovdng subjects and the ability to 

w..a.ke practical application thereof: 

(a) SHOP VJORK: Basic knoviledr,e of the proi;:er case 

and use of miscellaneous tools for measuring, · gauging and maJdng nechanical a.djustru.ent. Correct soldering technique as employed in soldering splices and small connections, and in the 

pre.raration of cord and plug ass<~blies. For 

reference see TM ll-453. 

(b) PlUNCIFLES OF SI.£CTRICITY: Those basic principles 

of electricity and magnetism which enable the 

student to understand .fully the proper care and 

use of batteries, electrical rr.easuring instru-· 

ments, the solution of circuits, schematic and 

actual mrinc diagrams as well as the theory 

and practical: application of AC and DC motors. 

For reference see TM 1-45~· 
le) TELETYPE FUNDAMENTALS: A thorough understanding 

of basic teletype knowledge and the practical 

application thereof. For reference see TM ll-35J. 

(d) 'l'EIETIPEmUTER EQUIPMENT: Must be fully qualified 

to install, inspect, maintain and repair the following t.eletype\>Jriter sets and units of equip:nent. 

Ml5 Teletypewriter 3et 

Ml9 Teletypewriter Set 

1ll4 Keyboard Perforator ~14 Transmitter Distributor 

M14 Non-Typing Reperforator Set 

1114 Keyboard Typing ileperforator Set 

Teletype P1~mter Sets ES 97 and EE 98 

Power Unit PE 75 

Power Unit PE 77 

Tel€gi•aph Switching Central TC-.3 

(4) Must be capable of passing {with a rating of Satisfactory 

or better) a pre-entry eJl'..amina tion to determine qualif ications for enrollment. 

(5) Must not be ·~olor blind. 

{6) Must comply lrl th the requirements of letter AG Jll.5 

\12 Mar 45)0B-I-B-ll, 21 March 1945, subject: "Clearance of Persormel for Cryptographic Duties." 

5. Inclosed is one copy of pre-entry examination, (SSCE-2A), 8 riarch 

1946, to determine eligibility for training. As many copies :na.y be reproduced as are necessary. It is desired that these examinations be given 

by field units or training centers under the supervision of an otficer and 

that no training aids, text manuals, wiring diagrwus, etc., be available 

to the person being exainined. It is furtt1er desired that the officer 

supervising the examination certify in writing that the e.xaminee took the 

examination without receiving any aid from such officer, other individuals 

or the items mentioned in the preceding sentence. Tiae completed unsraded 

pre-entry examination, rdth it.s attached certification will be submitted with 

the training request. 
REF ID:A523210 

, ; 

AGAO-S 35.3 

(2 Sept 48) OSGID M 

9 September 1948 

SUBJECT: Training of Personnel for the Maintenance of Electro-Mechanical 

Cryptographic Equipment 

TO: Commanders-in-Chief 

Far East Command 

European Command 

Commanding ~nerals 

US Army, Caribbean 

US Army, Pacific 

US Army, Alaska 

Trieste US Troops 

Armies,· ZI 

Military District o! Washington 

Independent Commands under the Dept of the Army 

Chief, Army Field Forces 

Chiefs, Technical & Administrative Services 

* * 

J. The following information is f'umished tor the guidance of commanders who may request. the Aril.l¥ Security Agency t.o train personnel of 

their commands: 

* * * * 

b. Personnel selected for this training must be capable of meeting the prerequisites tor enrollment indicated below: 

(1) Officers, through ci vllian background or military experience, must; be qualified to perform duties equivalent to 

that of a Teletype Mechanic (SSU 239). 

(2) Enlisted men must have an AGCT Score of llO or higher 

and be fully qualified as. Teletype Lilechanic \SSN 239). 

\3) All selected personnel should have a ¥nowledge of the 

following subjects and the ability to make practical 

application thereof in the degree indicated: 

(a) SHOP WORK; Basic knowledge of the proper care and 

use of miscellaneous tools !or roeasur ing, gauging, 

and .in r,.'.aking mechanical adjustments. Correct 

soldering technique as eraployed in soldering 

splices and small connect.ions, and the preparation 

of cord m1d plug a.sse.m.blies. For reference see 

TM ll-453. 
REF ID:A523210 

(b) PRINCIPLES OF ELECTRICITY: Those basic principles 

o! electricity and magnetism which enab1e the student to unders~and fully the pro ~r care and use 

0£ batteries, electrical measuring instruments ' 

(Voltmeters, ammeters, o!h~~etersJ, .the solution of 

circuits, schematic and actual wiring diagrams as 

well as the theory and practical uses of AC and DC 

m.et.ers. For reference see 'DJ 1-455· 

\c) TELETYPE FUNDAMENTALS: Familiarity with teletype 

fundamentals as set forth in 'I'M 11-353. 

\d) TELETYPEWRITER EQUIPMENT: Must be fully qualified 

to install, inspect, ma.into.in and repair the .following teletypewriter sets and units of equipment: 

COMMERCIAL DESIGNATION 

M 15 Teletypewriter Set 

ARM.Y DESIGNATION 

Teletypewriter TT-5/FG 

Teletypewr-.i.ter TT-7/FG 

Ifone 

M 19 Teletypewriter Set 

M 14 Transmitter Distributor 

M. l4 Non-Typine Reperforator ~t Teletypewriter TT-15/FG 

M 14 Keyboard Typing Reperforator Set Teletype-v;riter TT-16/FG 

(4) Must be capable of passing with a rating of satisfactory 

or better, a. pre-entry examination to determine qualification to:r enrol.lrnent. 

· t5) Must have true color i:erc,eption. 

{6) Must be cleared in accordance with the requirements of 

letter, AG .311.5 (16 Sep 46) AGAO-S-B-M, 18 September 

1946, subject:' "Clearance of Personnel for Cryptographic 

Duties," as a.mended. 

c. The following table presents a summary of course information. 

The suffixes Cl, C2 indicate the type of equipment on which the specialist 

is qualified. to perform maintenance: 

SSW OBJECTIVE 

OF COURSE 

(1) 801-Cl 

{2} 801-C2 

(3) 801-Cl-C2 

COOR.SE 

ASAM 2 (Converter M-228) and ASAM 3 

{M-228(M}. Teletypewriter equipment · and special equipment used in conjunction with cryptographic systems employing one time tapes. 

ASAM l l Converter M-134-C). Included 

are Converters M-209-( ), and ASAM ; 

(MX 78.3/U.') 

ASAM 2 (Converter ll-228); ASAM l (Converter M-1.34-C); and ASAM 5 l Converter 

MX 783/U.) (Combined course). 

·,tDUJi'\Mt~DE~T~ll 

APPROXIliATE 

LEl~GTH 

15 weeks 

.10 weeks 

· 2.3 weeks 
REF ID:A523210 

4. Inclosed is one copy of pre-entry examination, dated 4 June 1948 

which will be administered to applicants in order to determine ellgib~lity 

tor training. As many copies may be reproduced as are necessary. It is 

desired that these examinations be administered by field units or training 

centers under the supervision of an officer and tha.t no training aids, text 

manuals, wiring diagrams, etc., be available to individuals being exa.ndned. 

Officers supervising the exa.m1nation will certify in wribing that the examinee took the e.xa.mina.tion without assistance. A sample certificate is 

attached to the inclosed e.xamination~ 'l'he completed Wlgraded pre-entry 

examination, with its attached certJ.ficate will be fAthmitted with the training request. 
~;: SPSIS-4B 

Letter No. 597 

REF ID:A523210 

26 May 1945 

SUBJECT: Training Personnel for tm Maintenance of Converter M-134-C 

TO: All Holders ot SI GABA 

* * * * . ~. The :following information is furnished for the guidance of 

units requesting this office t.o train personnel assigned to such units. 

* * * * * 

d. Personnel selected !or this· training must be fully- qualified 

and capable of meeting all the prerequisites for enrollment indicated 

below: 

(l) Ar'fIJ3' General Classification Test Score ot 110 or more. 

(2) Selected personnel, through previous experience or 

schooling must be qualified to perfonn the duties of 

a Teletype Mechanic \. SSN 239) or have a thorough knoVlledge of the followin~ subjects arid the ability to 

make practical application thereof: 

la) SHOP WORK: Ba.sic knowledge of the proper ca.re 

and use of miscellaneous tools for ::iea.suring, 

gauging and making mechanical adjustments. CoITect 

soldering technique as employed in soldering splices and small connections, and in the preFaration of cor<l and plug assemblies. For reference 

see TM u-4;3 • 

. (b) .f!lINCIPLES OF ELECTRICITY: Those basis principles 

or electricity and magnetism which enable the 

$tudent to understand fully the proper care and 

use of batteries, electrical measul'ing instruments, 

the solution of circuits, schematic. and actual 

wiring diagrams as well as the theory and practical application of AC and DC motors. For reference 

see TM 1-45 5. . 

(3) Must be capable of passing a pre-entry examination to 

determine qualifications for enrollment with a rating 

of satisfactory or better. 

\4) Must not be oolor blind. 
REF ID:A523210 

(5) Must eompl1 with the requirements of Confidential 

Letter, V:ar Depa.rtmen t, The Adjutant General's 

Office, Washington, D. c., dated 21 Ma.reh 19451 

file No. AG Jll.5 {12 March 1945) OB-I-B-M, 

Subject: Clearance of Personnel for Cryptographic 

Duties. 

e. It is suggested that such personnel who, through previous 

experience or school:ing, are qualified to be the holder of any one of the 

following Military Occupational. Specialties tMOS) or Specification 

Serial Nu.mbers tSSI'J), would be eligible for such train:ing providing they 

are capable of passing the preserib~d pre-entry examination with a rating 

·of satisfactory or better. 

\l) Officer Personnel. 

.No MOS 

Assigned 

-

MOS 0145 

MOS 0260 

MOS 9606 

Teletypewriter Equipment Maintenance 

and Rep::dr Officer. \Officer must 

have previous experience or schooling 

which (iUali!ies him in the same manner 

that an enlisted man is qualified to 

be a Teletype Mechanic SSN 239J. 

Radar Maintenance and Repair Officer. 

Telephone a.nd Telegraph !~ten.a.nee 

Officer. 

Cr,yptographic Equipnent Maintenance 

and Repair Of i'icer Class 1 Type Equipmen t. 
.~ 

---

'' : ... ' 

REF ID:A523210 

CONFIDEN'fIAL 

*SR 750-445-1 

1-2 

f'P~Xl.U. REG.llT.ATJONR} ' 

No. 7!i0-44ii-l 

DEPAR'l'l\IENT OF THE ARMY 

WAsH.I!XGTON 2fi, D. C., 28 Mnrch 19.~9 

MAINTENANCE OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT 

CRYPTO-EQUIPMENT ISSUED BY ARMY SECURITY AGENCY 

Paragraph 

General· _______ _. ___ ----------- ____ ----------------- _____ ________ _ ___ 1 

Maintenan('e serYire o.: _____ --------· ----------,---~ _ ------·-~ --'----·-'-- _ __ 2 

Main te11a11('e opera tiorn;L __ . __________________________ ----··------------- 8 

Maintenance i nstrnctions _____ ------- _____ --·· ________ ·-- -------~- _ _:.____ 4 

Uesponsihili ty _________ _: ___ -------~ ________ ~-::.~-- _ -~--·--------·-- ___ __ li 

Requisitioning _____ ---~-- _____________ :.:_ -----~-'- --- --~-------- ______ () ' ' 

1. GeneraL-All organizations of the Army usii~g any crypto-eqnipment issued by the Army Security Agency will become familiar with 

the basic principles of mainte1iance 'of 'such equipment and' with the 

channels of maintenance support and supply as administered under 

the staff supei.'visioJ1 of the Army Security Agency. Training of 

m'liintenance personnel wiU be ·ear1:ied out in accordance with CONFIDENTIAL D.c"" letter (AGAO-S !15!1 (2 Sep 48) CSGID-M) 9 

September 1948, subject: Training of Personnel for the Maintenance 

of Electro-Mechanical Cryptographic Equipmei1t. 

2. Maintenance seryice.-;-Maintenance service will be performed in 

accordance with the system of division of maintenance ftinctions into 

the three categories of organizational, field, and base maintenapce as 

described below. 

a. Organfrational maintenance· is divided into two echelons as 

follows: · · 

( 1) Fint. echelon maintenance is that perfo1'rned by· the operator. The limits of first echelon maintenance are defined in 

th~· maintenance manu:d ap.plicable t~ · the equipment. In 

general, it includes cleani;1g, lubrication, and changing. of 

such minor parts as tape, ribbon,: fuses, etc. · . . 

(2) Second eclwlon maintena:,We is that performed by specially 

trained maintenan:ce personnel assign~d to the organization'. 

Second echelon maintena1ice is limited to that maintenance 

which the skill of the assigned maintena~ce man and the 

facilities at his disposal jlermit. Normally, second echelon 

maintenance will include all maintenance actions necessary 

to keep the equipment in operating ~ondition. 

•These regulations supersede WD le~ter (AGA<>-S:-B-M 311.5 (31 Jul 46)), 5 ·August 1946, 

subject: Policy on Maintenance of Cryptographic Equipment. 
SR 750-445-1 

2-4 

REF ID :-A-523210 

2 

b. Field rnaintenance consists of third echelon maintenance which 

is performed as a service to subordinate organizations by specially 

trained personnel from a higher headquarters or from appropriate 

Army Security Agency headquarters. Third echelon maintenance 

may be per:formed on a regularly scheduled basis and/or on a request 

basis and may be considered as a supplement to or substitute £or 

second echelon maintenance. 

c. Base maintenance is divided into two echelons, as follows: 

( 1) Fourth echelon maintenance is that performed at' an Army 

Security Agency headquarters as a servi_ce to using organizations. Fourth echelon maintenance comprises all major_ repairs short of a- complete overhaul of the equipment. It is 

characterized by a complete range of spare parts, subassemblies, and assemblies, highly skilled personnel, and machine 

shop type tools. Oversea organizations will submit requests 

for this service to the Chief, Army Security Agency, Europe, 

Pacific, or Hawaji, whi~hever is applic;ahle. - Organizations 

in the zone of interior will be serviced by the Chief, Army 

Security Agency, Washington 25, D. C., Attention: CSGASSfi. Oversea organizations outside of the European, Far 

East, and Pacific Commands may direct requests for _maintenance service to the nearest _command Army Security 

Agency headquarters or to the Chief, Army Security 

Agency, Washington 25, D. C., Attention: CSGAS-85. 

(2) Fifth echelon maintenance is that performed by .the Army 

Security Agency, Washington 25, D. C., anq. is characterized 

by maintenance operations (such as a major overhaul or rehabilitation) requiring skills, parts, supplies, _and tools of 

industrial caliber. · 

3. Maintenance operations.-Efficient maintenance dictates that 

the various maintenance opt:1rations which must be . performed on 

crypto-equipment be allocated normally within certaip organizational 

levels as outlined in the system described above. However, the level at 

which any given operation.is performed will be influenced by the tactical situation, nature of repairs, time available, skill of maintenance 

personnel, and availability of tools and parts. When maintenance operations normally performed at ·a particular level cannot be performed there because of any of these factors, maintenance service will 

be requested from an organization capable of performing higher echelon maintenance. · · 

4. Maintenance instructions.-Instructions for all echelons of 

maintenance for the various kinds of crypto-equipment will be found 
" ~F ~D:A523210 

j •• 

3 

SR 75().;..445-1 

4-6 

in the registered documents pertaining to maintenance which are issued by the Army Security Agency to all custodians of the cryptoequipment concerned. 

5. Responsibility.-a. Commanders will hold officers or other super" 

visory personnel in charge of operation of crypto-equipment responsible that instructions and procedures for preventive maintenance 

operations published in maintenance manuals are strictly followed. 

b. It is the responsibility of the officer in charge of the operation of 

erypto-equipment to prevent the abuse of equipment under his control. 

Evidence of abuse will be investigated and appropriate action taken 

thereon. Some common abuses are-

( 1) Improper, careless, or negligent usage or operation 0£ cryptoequipment. . , . . . . . . 

(2) Lack of lubrication, over-lubrication, or use of unauthorized 

lubricants. 

(:-1). Lack of inspections. 

( 4) Deferred maintenance, including lack of proper servicing 

and adjustments. 

( 5) The attemp~ing of ~·epairs by unqualified personnel or by the 

use of improper or inadequate tools and equipment. 

6. Requisitioning.-Replacement parts for crypto-equipment may 

be requisitioned from the appropriate command Army Security 

Agency headquarters or direct from the Chief, Army Security Agency, 

Washington 25, D. C., Attention: CSGAS-85. Spare parts lists for 

equipment supplied by the Army Security Agency are published in 

ihe maintenance manuals furnished with the equipment. Specific 

instructions pertaining to the requisitioning of maintenance spare 

parts are contained in CSGAS-85 letters published from time to time 

on the subject of requisitioning maintenance spare parts for cryptoequipment issued by Army Security Agency. 

[AG 311.r. ( 14 Mar 4!l)] 
SR 750-445-1 

6 

REF ID('{A52:3210 

4 

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY: 

OFFICIAL: OMAR N. BRADLEY 

EDWARD F. WITSELL Chief of Staff, United States Army 

Major General 

The Adfutamt General 

DISTRIBUTION : 

Army: 

s· 

GS USA (5); SS USA (2); Adm Sv_ (2); Tech Sv (2); except 

11 (25); ASA (800); AFF (10); OS Maj-Comd (25); Base 

Comd (10); MDW (10); A (ZI) (10); C & GSC (5); Dep 

11 (5). 

-Air Force: 

USAF (10) 

For explanation of distribution formula, see SR 310-90-1. 

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRrNTrNG OFFICE: 1949 0 - 830775 

C<Jl\lFlBBZtl'FlAL 

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