10-733-bk In re: Heating Oil Partners, LP UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

## SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Ci tation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a docu ment filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (wit h the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United St ates Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street , in the City of New York, on the 16 th day of May, two thousand eleven.
PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, GUIDO CALABRESI, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges

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_______________________________________________ IN RE: HEATING OIL PARTNERS, LP, Debtor.

_______________________________________________ CHURCH MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., Appellant, v. 10-733-bk AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

______________________________________________ FOR APPELLANT: J AMES M. N UGENT , (James R. Winkel, on the brief ), Harlow, Adams & Friedman, P.C., Milford, Connecticut.
FOR APPELLEE: E DWARD M. K AY , (Don R. Sampen, on the brief ), Clausen Miller, P.C., New York, New York.2 Appeal from a judgment of the United Stat es District Court for the District of Connecticut (Haight, J. ) affirming the order of the Unite d States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut (Shiff, J. ). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION , IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED , that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED

. Appellant Church Mutual In surance Co. (“Church”) appeal s from a judgment of the district court affirming the bankr uptcy court’s order declaring C hurch’s default judgment entered in New Jersey Superior Court against Beac on Oil Company (“Beacon”) and Beacon’s successor in interest, debtor Heating Oil Partners, LP (“HOP”), void ab initio . We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal. “On an appeal from the district court’s a ffirmance of a bankruptcy court’s order, we review the decision of the bankr uptcy court independently, assessi ng its conclusions of law de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” In re Dana Corp. , 574 F.3d 129, 144-45 (2d Cir. 2009). A brief discussion of the proceedings below is warranted. The debtor’s insurer, appellee American Home Assurance Co. (“AHA”), moved in bankruptcy court for an order declaring the New Jersey default judgment against Beacon an d HOP void because it was entered in violation of the automatic stay trigge red by the filing of HOP’s Chap ter 11 bankruptcy petition under 11 U.S.C. § 362, the confirmation order, and the discharge injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 524(a). The bankruptcy court declared that the default judgment was void ab initio because it was entered in violation of the sect ion 524(a) discharge injunction and the confirmation order. On appeal, the district court affirm ed, holding that the state court ac tion and entry of the subsequent default judgment were in violation of the sect ion 362 automatic stay and, therefore, were void ab3 initio . According to the district court, AHA had standing to move for a declaration that the default judgment against the de btor was void because it was a “party in interest” to the bankruptcy proceeding as the debt or’s liability insurer. On appeal to this court, Church cont ests AHA’s standing to bring a motion in the bankruptcy court seeking an order declaring the default judgment void. Church argues that AHA is a third-party and lacks standi ng to invoke the protections of the discharge injunction or the automatic stay provision. The district court’s holding w ith respect to standing is s ound. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) states that “[a] party in interest . . . may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under [Chapter 11].” Even so, section 1109(b ) does not abrogate constitutional standing requirements

― a party in interest must still demonstrate that it meets the general requirements of the standing doctrine, including whether it has al leged a personal stake in the outcome of the proceedings and whether it is assertin g its own legal rights and remedies. Etuk v. Slattery , 936 F.2d 1433, 1440 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975)); see also In re Quigley Co. , 391 B.R. 695, 702-03 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008). Turning to section 1109(b), we note that “‘ party in interest’ is not defined in the [Bankruptcy] Code”; when interpreting the mean ing of that phrase “we are governed by the Code’s purposes.” In re Comcoach Corp. , 698 F.2d 571, 573 (2d Cir. 1983); see also In re Quigley , 391 B.R. at 702; In re Johns-Manville Corp. , 36 B.R. 743, 747 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) . Whether a party qualifies as a “party in intere st” is determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration whether that party has a “su fficient stake” in the outcome of that proceeding, which can include having a pecuniary interest di rectly affected by the bankruptcy proceeding. In re Stone Barn Manhattan, LLC , 405 B.R. 68, 74 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also In re4 Standard Insulations, Inc. , 138 B.R. 947, 950 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (concluding insurers exposed to claims against the debtor were “parties in interest” unde r section 1109(b)). AHA’s pecuniary interest here is the de fault judgment against Beacon and HOP, for which it will indemnify HOP in full or in part. Chur ch does not dispute that it s sole interest is to satisfy its claims against Beacon and HOP with the insurance coverage provided by AHA. AHA’s motion has a direct impact on the enfo rceability of a $856,874.40 default judgment against the debtor, for which AHA will be held re sponsible to satisfy in whole or in part (depending on whether the $250,000 self-insured re tention clause applies). Without a doubt, AHA, which has a personal stake in whether the de fault judgment is void, is a party in interest pursuant to section 1109(b). The next issue on appeal is whether the de fault judgment violated the automatic stay provision that went into effect upon the filing of HOP’s Chapter 11 petition. Notwithstanding the fact that the district court affirmed th e bankruptcy court’s orde r declaring the default judgment void ab initio on the ground that the New Jersey ac tion proceeded in violation of the automatic stay provision, Church disputes whethe r this case involves a viol ation of the automatic stay provision at all and instead maintains that the default judgment is an undischarged claim because Church never received notice of the bar date for claims. We disagree. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) provides th at the filing of a bankr uptcy petition creates an automatic stay against “the commencement or c ontinuation . . . of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding agains t the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title.” The automatic stay provision is considered “‘one of the fundamental debtor protection s provided by the bankruptcy laws.’” Eastern Refractories Co. v. Forty Eight Insulations Inc. , 157 F.3d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-5 595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296-97). “The stay is effective immediately upon the filing of the petition, and any proceedings or actions described in section 362(a)(1) are void and without vital ity if they occur af ter the automatic stay takes effect.” Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann , 21 F.3d 522, 527 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The stay takes effect automatically and without the requi rement of notice to affected parties; “[b]y its very terms, no action by any court is necessary for the stay to take effect.” In re Colonial Realty
Co. , 980 F.2d 125, 137 (2d Cir. 1992); see also In re Marine Pollution Serv., Inc. , 99 B.R. 210, 217 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“[A]cti ons taken in violation of the stay are void even where there is no actual notice of the existence of the stay.”). The automatic stay re mains in effect until the granting of a discharge injunction pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 524(a). See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2); In
re James , 285 B.R. 114, 116 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 2002). Here, the di scharge injunction did not take effect until the plan’s effective date of August 6, 2006. We conclude, first, that because HOP listed “Beacon Oil” as a name under which it was conducting business in its Chapter 11 petition, B eacon is a common entity with HOP so that the automatic stay applied to all actions against Beac on as well. Thus, Church’s initial suit against Beacon violated that stay when the suit pro ceeded after the September 25, 2005 petition filing date. We further conclude, that when Church filed its amended complaint on June 29, 2006 to add HOP as a defendant (noting that HOP was a successor in inte rest to Beacon), that filing violated the automatic stay, rendering that pr oceeding and all subsequent actions, including the default judgment, in that cas e void and without vitality. On appeal, Church has not confronted the i ssue of the automatic stay in any meaningful way, skipping right to its argumen t that its claim (the default j udgment) was never discharged by the discharge injunction because it never receive d notice of the bankruptcy. That argument6 presupposes, however, that Church has a claim . The effect of the automatic stay provision is to render that default judgment void ab initio because the suit commenced and/or continued while that stay was in effect. Church having no viable claim in hand, it is not necessary for us to reach the issues raised by Church with respect to the sec tion 524 discharge injunction. We have considered all of Church’s remain ing contentions on this appeal and have found them to be without merit. The j udgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk