Supreme Court of Florida

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No. SC21-18

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JEFFREY G. HUTCHINSON,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

June 16, 2022

PER CURIAM.

Jeffrey G. Hutchinson, a prisoner under sentence of death, 

appeals the circuit court’s order summarily denying his second

successive motion for postconviction relief, filed under rule 3.851 of 

the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.1 For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm.

I. Background

In 1998, Hutchinson shot and killed his girlfriend, Renee 

Flaherty, and her three children: four-year-old Logan, seven-year1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
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old Amanda, and nine-year-old Geoffrey. We have described the 

events surrounding the murders as follows:

On the evening of the murders, Hutchinson and 

Renee argued. Hutchinson packed some of his clothes 

and guns into his truck, left, and went to a bar . . . [,]

arriv[ing] [there] around 8 p.m. Hutchinson told the 

bartender that “Renee is pissed off at me,” drank one and 

a half glasses of beer and then left the bar muttering to 

himself. . . .

Approximately forty minutes after Hutchinson left 

the bar, there was a 911 call from Hutchinson’s home. 

The caller stated, “I just shot my family.” Two of 

Hutchinson’s close friends identified the caller’s voice as 

Hutchinson’s. Hutchinson said to the 911 operator, 

“there were some guys here.” He told the operator that 

he did not know how many people were there, he did not 

know how many had been hurt, and he did not know 

how they had been injured. Deputies arrived at 

Hutchinson’s home within ten minutes of the 911 call 

and found Hutchinson on the ground in the garage with 

the cordless phone nearby. The phone call was still 

connected to the 911 operator. Deputies found Renee’s 

body on the bed in the master bedroom, Amanda’s body 

on the floor near the bed in the master bedroom, and 

Logan’s body at the foot of the bed in the master 

bedroom. Each had been shot once in the head with a 

shotgun. Deputies found Geoffrey’s body on the floor in 

the living room between the couch and the coffee table.

He had been shot once in the chest and once in the head.

The murder weapon, a Mossberg 12-gauge pistol-grip 

shotgun which belonged to Hutchinson, was found on 

the kitchen counter. Hutchinson had gunshot residue on 

his hands. He also had Geoffrey’s body tissue on his leg.

Hutchinson v. State, 882 So. 2d 943, 948 (Fla. 2004).
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The State charged Hutchinson with four counts of first-degree 

murder. Following trial, a jury found him guilty as charged on all 

four counts, and he proceeded to waive a penalty-phase jury.

Ultimately, after the bench penalty phase, the trial court sentenced

Hutchison to death for the murder of each child and imposed a life 

sentence for the murder of his girlfriend.

We affirmed Hutchinson’s convictions and sentences, which

became final in 2004, see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1)(A). Since that 

time, Hutchinson has sought postconviction relief in both state and 

federal court but has had no success in either forum.

See Hutchinson v. State, 17 So. 3d 696, 704 (Fla. 2009) (affirming 

denial of initial postconviction motion); Hutchinson v. State, 243 So. 

3d 880, 884 (Fla. 2018) (affirming denial of first successive 

postconviction motion).

Hutchinson has now filed his second successive 

postconviction motion asserting four claims for relief. All four 

claims involve witnesses, Joel and Deanna Adams, who testified at 

trial that they recognized Hutchinson’s voice to be that of the 911 

caller.
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Prior to Hutchinson’s trial, Mr. and Ms. Adams testified before

a federal grand jury regarding their possible involvement in two 

bank robberies unrelated to the murders. Relying on this FBI 

investigation, Hutchinson’s defense counsel sought to impeach both 

witnesses at trial on the theory that each was biased toward the 

prosecution in hopes of obtaining favorable treatment from the 

State in relation to the unrelated robberies. Partially accepting 

defense counsel’s argument, the trial court allowed counsel to cover 

this topic when cross-examining Ms. Adams.

More than ten years after Hutchinson’s murder convictions 

became final, he submitted a request to the FBI regarding its

investigation into the bank robberies. In his second successive 

postconviction motion, he claimed that the records received from 

the FBI constituted newly discovered evidence under Jones v. State, 

709 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1998). He further claimed that the State 

committed a Brady2 violation by not disclosing those records to the 

defense. In addition, he asserted that the State violated Giglio v. 

United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and that a new trial was 

2. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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warranted based on cumulative error. According to him, his four

claims were timely as a result of equitable tolling. The circuit court 

summarily denied all of Hutchinson’s claims and found equitable 

tolling inapplicable to the facts of this case.

This appeal follows.

II. Analysis

Hutchinson argues that the circuit court erred in denying his 

postconviction motion without first holding an evidentiary hearing. 

We disagree.

“A circuit court should hold an evidentiary hearing on a rule 

3.851 motion ‘whenever the movant makes a facially sufficient 

claim that requires a factual determination.’ ” Rogers v. State, 327 

So. 3d 784, 787 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Pardo v. State, 108 So. 3d 558, 

560 (Fla. 2012)).3 In contrast, a circuit court may summarily deny 

a claim that is legally insufficient or refuted by the record. Id. at 

787-88; McDonald v. State, 296 So. 3d 382, 383 n.2 (Fla. 2020). 

With this framework in mind, we now turn to Hutchinson’s claims. 

3. “The standard of review here is de novo.” Rogers, 327 So. 

3d at 787 n.5.
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We first consider Hutchinson’s newly discovered evidence 

claim. To be facially sufficient, a claim of newly discovered evidence 

must meet the two-part Jones test. We have described that test as 

follows:

First, the evidence must not have been known by 

the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, 

and it must appear that the defendant or defense counsel 

could not have known of it by the use of diligence. 

Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such 

[a] nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on 

retrial.

Long v. State, 183 So. 3d 342, 345 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Tompkins v. 

State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1086 (Fla. 2008)).

We agree with the circuit court that Hutchinson cannot prevail 

on his newly discovered evidence claim. Even before his trial in 

2001, Hutchinson knew of the FBI’s investigation of Mr. and Ms. 

Adams. Attachments to the second amended postconviction motion 

demonstrate that the FBI records were available—upon request to 

federal authorities—at least by 2007. However, Hutchinson failed 

to request them until 2017. Accordingly, since Hutchinson raised 

his newly discovered evidence claim over a year after the records 

became available through due diligence, the claim is untimely. See
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Dailey v. State, 329 So. 3d 1280, 1287 (Fla. 2021); Dillbeck v. State, 

304 So. 3d 286, 288 (Fla. 2020).

However, even if we assumed Hutchinson’s newly discovered 

evidence claim was timely, we would still affirm. Based on our 

review of the record, we conclude that the FBI records would not 

likely produce an acquittal on retrial. This is so for two main 

reasons. One, the FBI records do not bolster Hutchinson’s defense 

that someone else committed the murders or seriously call into 

question that he made the 911 call.4 Two, the State presented 

overwhelming evidence of his guilt—including evidence that the 

victims’ blood and body tissue was on Hutchinson’s leg and 

clothing; that gunpowder residue was on Hutchinson’s hands; that 

Hutchinson had no defensive wounds consistent with a struggle 

with unknown intruders; and that he owned the murder weapon, a 

Mossberg shotgun, which police found at the scene of the crime. 

See Hutchinson, 882 So. 2d at 952-53 (characterizing State’s 

4. Mr. and Ms. Adams’ testimony was not the only evidence 

that Hutchinson was the 911 caller. Such additional evidence 

includes the words used by the caller and the fact that the cordless 

phone that officers found near Hutchinson was still connected with 

the 911 operator when they arrived.
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evidence of guilt as “overwhelming”); see also id. at 948-49; 

Hutchinson, 17 So. 3d at 698 (discussing trial evidence).

Accordingly, the record refutes the second prong of 

Hutchinson’s Jones claim. Cf. Bogle v. State, 288 So. 3d 1065, 

1069 (Fla. 2019) (finding second prong of Jones not satisfied where 

additional evidence only amplified evidence already presented at 

trial and there was overwhelming evidence of guilt). Thus, 

Hutchinson’s claim of newly discovered evidence does not warrant 

relief.

Hutchinson’s Brady claim fares no better. To prevail on this 

claim, Hutchinson must demonstrate that (1) favorable evidence 

which is exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was suppressed by the 

State, and (3) because the evidence was material, he was 

prejudiced. See Sweet v. State, 293 So. 3d 448, 451 (Fla. 2020). 

Even assuming that the FBI records were exculpatory to some 

extent, Hutchinson fails to allege specific facts showing that the

records were in the possession of or suppressed by the State. 

See Allen v. State, 854 So. 2d 1255, 1259 (Fla. 2003) (finding that a

defendant must allege specific facts that, if accepted as true,
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establish a prima facie case that the State possessed evidence

favorable to the accused). Thus, Hutchinson’s Brady claim fails.

Hutchinson’s Giglio claim fails for a similar reason. To obtain 

relief under Giglio, Hutchinson needs to demonstrate, among other 

things, that a State witness gave false or misleading testimony at 

trial. Valentine v. State, 47 Fla. L. Weekly S105, S107 n.5 (Fla. Apr. 

7, 2022) (citing Jimenez v. State, 265 So. 3d 462, 479 (Fla. 2018)). 

However, in his motion below, Hutchinson failed to identify with 

specificity any false or misleading testimony by a State witness at 

trial. Accordingly, we agree with the circuit court that the Giglio

claim is legally insufficient. See Jimenez, 265 So. 3d at 479.5

Though less than clear, Hutchinson also appears to have

claimed entitlement to a new trial based on the cumulative effect of 

the alleged Brady and Giglio violations. However, since we have 

found no Brady or Giglio violations, we have no occasion to consider 

5. On appeal, Hutchinson renews his argument that equitable 

tolling renders his claims timely. Generally, a motion to vacate a 

judgment of conviction and sentence of death must be filed within 

one year after the judgment and sentence become final. Fla. R. 

Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1). However, based on our resolution of 

Hutchinson’s claims, we need not reach his equitable tolling 

argument.
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the cumulative effect of any such violations. See Diaz v. State, 132 

So. 3d 93, 118 (Fla. 2013) (applying similar logic in rejecting a

cumulative prejudice argument). Thus, like his other claims, this 

claim also fails.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s 

summary denial of Hutchinson’s second successive motion for 

postconviction relief.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, 

COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 

AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Okaloosa County,

John Jay Gontarek, Judge

Case No. 461998CF001382XXXACX

Robert S. Friedman, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Candace 

Rechtmann, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, North 

Region, Tallahassee, Florida, and Stacy R. Biggart, Special Assistant

Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Gainesville, Florida,

for Appellant

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Charmaine Millsaps, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellee