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Gentlemen, we will begin the final session in my series of talks. It will be 

devoted to four ma.in topics First, what sort of codes and ciphers were we 

confronted with immediately before and during World War II'l Second, what 

were we able to do with them, and how did we do it9 Third, what sort of 

protective measures were taken to enable our high level authorities and 

commanders to use the results of the COMINT efforts and activities? Finally, 

what are the prognostications for the future? 

Let's begin with the first of these four topics What codes and ciphers, 

or more technically speaking, what cryptosystems confronted us immediately 

before and during our participation as a belligerent in World War II? In the 

European Theater, there was of course the problem of tackling a multiplicity 

of pretty high grade cryptosystems of the Germans. Take first the diploma.tic ... 

ones of which there were two Ve'fY high grade systems One of them we 

called by the code name, which the British used, FLORA -DORA It consisted '-J 

of an additive system, applied to a basic codebook with numerical code groups 

WG4 .... ~ ~a-tiL ~. 

The code group was large to begin with,and the additive system'7'! think you 

~~ ~~~''- ~ allvunderstand what is mean~~\, you add numbers from a book or list to 

the numerical designations of the 

" 

code 

A 

groups and 

~~~ 

(MTl..;t~ -/,ecomes the 

~~,wi "a~t.u-4 ~ k ~o.~f-w.- ~ ... LVl a.~~ enciphered code text~ ln the FLORA~ORA system thelfierma.ns had two separate 

a.....!..,~ two ~0-,"4 WC..'-&. ~""' ~-

additive books, each one consist~of l~,~~~ five-digit groups). ¥ou can J.aa&- ~. 

\J ~~IJI,~~ -μiat ±.h1.s prod.UC.~ .J.a.rge_nllJliber Qt~~whe:o. you -0an take any one of the 

s~~rt~ fTiJ ~~ i... ~to~ " l~,00~~of -011a-~ as a starting point~and an1one of the 10,000 groups of the 

w. t.J.. Ltok..; ~ ~C) ~~ second book as the starting point,..and these are adeed together and the sum of 

@'pp roved for Release by NSA on 10-11-2013 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 
REF ID:A38363 

~~~ ,,~:.t ~~ ~~~ 

the two additives is th~ ~~~~~M" applied to the c'J: group We were a'b~w::tth cl!e 

---

l~~ f' • ' A. . ~ 

~~ the British f~A. .. read most of the messages in that 

system ...... .. 

There was another high-grade system used by the Germans which was a onetime system, so called Everybody thought it was a one-tune system. By this 

I mean a system of the sort which I have JUst described but using the additive 

once and only once Now these messages passed from Berlin to all of the 

diploma.tic posts a.broad in quantity by radio and for a couple of yea.rs the 

messages were simply put a.side They were considered hopeless They gave 

every evidence of being in a one-tl.Ille pad system One day a man travelling as 

an ordinary traveler, passing tbrough the Panama Canal, was questioned and 

there was reason to suspect that he Illl.ght be a German secret a.gent Secretly 

his belongings were searched and sure enough there were discovered among 

those belongings some one-time pads which he was carrying for some destination 

These were separated from the gentleman in question and were brought to 

Washington. They were set aside too because they gave every evidence of 

being the ordinary sort of one-time pad--you use a page, tear it off, and 

burn it af'ter you have used it But the:re happened to be one or two people 

in Army Security Agency at that time who looked at these pages of pad additive 

rather intently for some time and they came to the conclusion that those .,_ 

additive groups were not made by some random action, machineof some sort 

: 

using electronic noise It was ~oon apparent that the pages of additive 

were derived by the action of some sort of ma.chine which gave evidence of 

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being a generator of one sort or another To make a long story short we 

discovered the way in which this ma.chine operated to produce the groups on 

each :page but there rema.J..D.ed one difficulty It seems that the Germans in 

ma.king up these ;pads bad the ma.chine print these pages in duplicate and these 

pages, single sheets, were then put on a large table and somebody went around 

and took a page from one pile and then a page from another pile and JUst 

walked at random over and over--wbat you would call a random-walk in ma.thematics 

and in this way the pads were ma.de in duplicate What was the problem then2 

We bad been ab1e to reconstruct the ma.chine but how to find out which page of 

• 

a given stream of characters or groups was used for a specific message. We 

.,, 

developed a ma.chine for ta.king a message and passing the code groups of that 

message against the product of tbe machine generator at a very high rate of 

. 

\. -t . .; 

• speed and determining in this way ~he page that was used for the encipherment 

of the code groups of' a specific message Tbis involved a lot of work but 

it pa.id great dividends We were able to read pretty nearly all of the 

messages after the elements of the system had been reconstructed 

After the war was over, and we had teams going around following the 

victorious armies, we captured some records of' one of the cryptologic agencies 

of the German forces and there we found a complete description of this 

ma.chine Curiously it had been offered by the ma.nuf'acturer for sale to the 

British on the open market sometime in 1935 

We come now to the cryptosystems employed by the .AJ:omed Forces of the 

Germans There were low-level codes, I think we could start now with the 

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'7 .. first slide That's an example of' what was called the ALKA, an Air Force 

system I won't go into that It changed everyday but through careful 

following the codes were r~ad from day to day 

Next they had a system called t)l~ double PLAYFAIR I won't undertake 

to go through tbat--it is a little complicated, fairly secure, but most of' 

the traffic in that was read and they bad a thing called RASTER, 11Rasterschluessel 11 

It was a matrix with holes in it, disposed randomly and you had to know where 

to begin There was a k:y, an indicator, and you began a certain place and 

you wrote the letters of your message in the open spaces a.nd took them out from 

columns and the roster changed very :f'requently--I don't remember at the moment 

if it was daily or not, but it changed very frequently We didn 1 t have too 

much luck with it It was a pretty complicated thing but it was used for the 

medium level communications 

Then, of course, we had the ENIGMA, used by the Army and the Air Force--

a tbree wheel ma.chine, I think I showed a picture of that with the plugboa.rd 

or stecker as they called it The Navy version of the ENIGMA was a four-wheel 

ma.chine and toward the end of the war, when the Germans began feeling a little 

bit uneasy about the ENIGMA, they proposed to make a reversing wheel which 

would , that is, the 13, the 26 contacts in that reversing wheel could 

be plugged at random and changed daily or more often This we called UNCLE DICK 

and was a very serious threat but the war ca.me to an end before they actually 

got the thing going 

Now the Germans also hhd a series of machines which went by the general 

codename of the fishes The first s~ch ir-chine was called TUNNEY It was a 

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teleprinter ciphering machine and they called it the HANDSCBRIEBER. There 

were about five different models progressively increasing in complexity They 

were solved at the beginning as the result of finding of messages in depth, 

that is, the setting points, I think this is, oh, that is JUSt a German key 

list for the ENIGMA--they had many of those captured This is a HANDSCHRIEBER, 

a rather complicated looking gadget I won't undertake to go into it but we 

read a good deal of traffic in that particular machine and its descendents 

The Italians didn't count for very much They bad codes, codebooks and enciphered codes By the time our forces were in direct contact with the Italian 

military forces, thtey were pretty well disorganized and what there were in the 

way of secret communications were German--ENIGMA 

In the Pacific Theater the Japanese for their diplomatic systems used 

simple codes, one for, purely for, econo~ purposes Another encipherei code 

using a basic code which was changed every so often and the code groups of 

which were then subJected to a transposition and the transposition key changed 

daily We were able to keel?. up with t~t particular type of system Just 

before the war, our participation in it, the Japanese Foreign Office used 

a ma.chine which we called the RED It was a cipher machine Oh, I forgot to 

tell you about that one That was the German SG-41, a ma.chine which they 

proposed to put into use but never actually did I doubt very much if there 

was any traffic They stole Mr Hagelin's ideas and had a fixed pinwheel and 

a cage with sliding bars What they added was a keyboard and the printing 

mechanism It was a tremendously heavy thing, very unwieldy and I don't ZkkJtk 

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think they could have operated it successfully 

This is what we used to read the Japanese diploma.tic messages in the RED 

cipher machine We never did see a RED machine It was .reconstructed, the 

system was reconstructed without having knowledge of its actual physical • 

means of 

embodiment but we could duplicate what the machine did by/a celluloid disk 

which was stepped irre~rly going to certain keys I think that this 

-. 

picture represents the Japanese Navy version of the RED cipher ma.chine captured 

sometime shortly after the WaJ1 was over 

Then the Japanese had, well that is the Navy's equivalent to solve the RED 

Japanese lU!:ID{ Naval Attacbe messages--tbis was the Navy's version of their 

analog 

We come now to that famous PURPLE thing used by the Foreign Off ice for 

its highest level communications You all know that the basis for the solution 

of ciphers is the principle of frequency Frequency of the use of letters, 

characters This means that the distribution of the characters in normal 

plain text is not homogenous, it is rather ragged, high spots and low spots. 

Now, the Japanese who designed their ma.chine figured that since :fequencies 

were the keystone of cryplw.a.lytic solution, they would build a. machine which 

would suppress frequencies in other words, within a certain length of text, 

it was impossible that any letter could be represented by the same cipher 

equivalent This means that in their PURPLE ma.chine which was a 26-character 

machine, in every line of 26-letters of text, there could be no dual ortriple 

representation of the same plain text letter. This was the fatal flaw This 

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is what enabled us to get our fl.l'st wedge into tbe system It was soon after 

that this phenomena was discovered that we were on the trail and we had some 

help from cribs that consisted of portions of text that we felt would be 

found in Japanese diplomatic notes to our Government The work was slow and 

painfUJ., very arduous This was done by the Army crew and there came a day 

when we had about exhausted our resources We had recovered some several I 

hundred letters of text and it ma.de sense but at the end of that period there 

was a series of messages which appeared to me to be the English text of a 

long note which the Japanese Government had banded to our Government, our 

Secretary of State, dealing with the announcement of the Economic Treaty 

that had been in effect for severaJ. years The Japanese were very anxious 

to have that treaty kept in effect Well, I worked with my colleagues on the 

messages and I came to the point where I felt pretty sure that there was a 

message and it must be in the Department of State's files. Now, at that 

tJJne, we were under very strict instructions not to go ourselves to seek 

collateral. information but always to work through a designated representative 

in G-2 and I went to this chap and I asked him to look for a message, such and 

such a date dealing with the Economic Treaty Re said he would A couple of 

weeks passed by, I didn't hear from him. We were struggling with the thing 

We would get maybe half a dozen letters out in one day's work I asked him, 

well, what about that messageY And he said, there is no such message Well, 

I felt disheartened and went back to my lair and continued to work, a few more 

letters, another week, and I became a little bit more sure that there must 

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be such a message so I went to him again and I said, "MaJor, will you please 

check and verify that there is no such message " And he said, "I'll do that " 

And a week went by and he didn't come to see me I went to see Jdlxim him 

"What about it MaJor" -- "I assure you there is no such message" Well, I was 

very much disheartened but I went back, assured my people that we ought to 

keep ga:ig, it was important Reluctantly, they continued and we got a. few 

more letters. By that time, I ma.de up my mind that there must be the message 

so in violation of my very clear-cut instructions, I went myself to the Chief r 

of the Communications and Records Division of the Department of State and it 

happened to be a friend and I sat down. "Wha.t can I do for you toda.y"'l "I 

think there is a message here which I would like very much to see in your 

files " He said, "Well, if' it is here, I will be glad to try to find it 

Give me some data " I gave him the date, subject He pushes a button and 

this girl comes in and within two minutes, that book with the text of that 

message was opened before me And I said,"Dave, I need this " He said, 

"You know what my instructions are, you know you can't have it," I said, 

"Dave, for goodness sake, don•t you have to go out to the can " He said, "Yes, 

by the way, I do" I copied the message That gave us an IUl.f awfully great 

push forward From then on we were well on the way We constructed by hand 

a very simple device which we could use to duplicate the workings of that 

ma.chine, fairly complicated I have shown you the front of it, back of it 

full of wiring We never did see a Japanese PURPLE machine They were 

destroyed by instructions Just before the attack on Pearl Harbor The only 

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thing we ever did see was a vvry badl.y beaten up ma.chine burnt and so on in 

the basement of the Japanese Chancellery in Berlin. Oh, we did have a few 

pieces I don't know whetJaer I should :Ka tell this or not After the Army 

and the Navy got together a.nd played in the cryptologic garden, there ca.me a 

.. 

day when we had reconstructed this PURPLE machine and then I had a telephone 

call from the Head of the Laboratory of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 

they had a cipher unit too He called up and said, "I got something here that 

might interest you 11 I said, ''Well, I' 11 come over 11 So I went over and he 

told me this story in his off ice That on the day of the attack on Pearl 

Harbor, a couple of their operatives were watching the Japanese Embassy in 

Mexico City and a couple of Japanese gentlemen ca.me out carrying two suitcases 

and they got into a black limousine and they dashed oft to the city dump The 

operatives followed as closely as they could and watched The Japanese put 

something on the city dump and returned to their automobile and after they 

had left the operatives went to see what there was and they came across a 

*•xge: lot of parts that had been pretty badly beaten up and they assembled 

them, shipped them in a box a.nd they are in the next room, he said I put 

them on the table. Well, I went there and I took one look and I aaw that it 

had the type of stepping relays that were used in this Japanese PURPLE machine, 

it must have been We had to duplicate the relays, telephone relays 

and there I was confronted with a problem What to say'l Well, I stalled, went 

back and we had a little talk with our friends in the Navy and this is what 

we decided to do. The FBI was very anxious to reconstruct that ma.chine. We 

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! 
REF ID:A38363 

were very anxious that they not so we sent two men, one from the Army and one 

from the Navy, our very best technicians, to make sure that they didn't put 

it together properly 

Question. 

Well, they had no functions in the field of diploma.tic military communications Their functions were purely in the area of domestic counter espionage 

and we thought that they should stick to their knitting. They did, as a matter 

of fact, after we had an agreement worked out ma. among us, the three organizations 

Now, so much for the Japanese d;i.plbmatic people When I opened my talks 

.. - I read you something about the meaning of the solution of that thing This 

is our reconstruction after we got underway This probably doesn't look at all 

like the Japanese machine did but that•s our reconstruction I think maybe 

there's another picture--shows some of the wiring in the back--there were three 

sets of equivalent to commutators 

Now we take up the Japanese mlitary things The Attaches had an enciphered 

code, a complicated thing You remember my telling you about how we were very 

much discombobulated when the OSS without authority or rather without the 

knowledge of the military and naval authorities ma.de that raid in Lisbon and 

put us out of business for a while. The Naval Attaches used a ma.chine I think 

was 

that that has something to do with it--well that XK the ma.chine, the set of 

ma.chines that we used, to read the Japanese military enciphered code systems 

We always tried wherever possible to reduce these hand-operated systems to 

ma.chine operations so that we could save time and people The ground forces 

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REF ID:A38363 

had proposed to use a machine that we called the GREEN. It was captured 

in action and shipped to Washington immed~ately. I~ was on field testwhen A 

.. ... • 'i .... 

it was captured And we decided that if they were going ~o use the machine 

we ought to get ourselves in position to decipher messages in a hurry There 

is the keyboard for that thing and so we built machinery to solve GREEN cipher 

ma.chine messages if they came in None did The machine was not successful 

It was really a very poor piece of engineering The Germans furnished the 

Japanese with some ENIGMA ma.chines and we thought for a while that they were 

It would 

going to go in for ENIGMA and fortunately they didn't ~ have ma.de 

life a good deal more difficult to be confronted with that 

The Japanese Navy used--well, that is a code, a Japanese code which was 

used by the Ground Forces and they enciphered it by complicated gadgetry, I 

mean complicated hand-operated things, additives and they disguised the 

indicators--! used the word additive, I shouldn't have because they didn't 

actually after a while use the code groups as additive, they used the code 

groups of the keying table as key groups to encipher them by means of a square 

of this nature so on. 

The Japanese Navy used a system which was an e\.ia.boration and quite an el.aboration on the strip cipher, called the JN-25 and to the glory of our Navy, they 

were up on top of it most of the timeexcept when somebody spilt the beans 

and would publish something like how' Midway happened to be won and that sort 

of thing I think Marshall Hall could pr?bably tell yoy a good deal about that 

~ 

and also Dr Tompkins would have ~re direct contact to that than I. I mentioned 

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the Japanese Naval Attache ma.chine which was a good deal like the PURPLE. 

AS long as we are talking about ma.chines and enenu.es, we might as well talk 

about some of the machines used by the Russians. 

In the first place, Russian traffic nowadays is difficult to identify, 

I mean by that externally very often you can't tell from the message itself 

whether it is Air Force or Navy or Ground Force or diplomatic It's all one 

so you have at the very beginning a problem of isolating the traffic into 

systems Now soon after World War I was ended, the Russians built a ma.chine. 

There I show you the old B-211 of' Mr Hagelin•s, the Swedish inventor and this 

is the inside of that machine which I showed just immediately before I want .. 

- are 

you to take note of cave, that is with the sliding bars __ and here :u: the ,.. 

,,. . . . commutators, these are not actual rotors that were "USed in the ENIGMA but - t..1'11 - ___ .. -

they are somewhat like rotO!'s What the Russians did was to build a ma.chine 

coJ)ll.ng that B-211 and modifying it only to the extent of ma.king it a 3g_ 

character ma.chine instead of the 25, which the old Swedish ma.chine was and 

box 

they added a black/to the side so that they could change the connections to 

those commutators That machine was in use for about a year or so--we had 

no difficulty with it There were other systems that they used which we were 

fortunate to find answers for--one called COLERIDGE and one called LONGFELLOW, 

OUR COde designations They had one which was of particular interest to me. 

It was called PAGODA and it was a teleprinter enciphering system which they 

had copied absolutely, literally from a pa.per which was published in the 

Proceedings of the IRE in 1922 It was a double tape system JUSt exactly like 

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REF ID:A38363 _,. .. ... 

• w , . I showed you in one of the slides yesterday where you bad two tapes revolving, 

producing by their inter-action a key which was then applied to the text--the 

plain text 

Now, the Russians even with that very simple system couldn't work it. In 

the first place, they gave lots of depths and in the second place, after they 

found they couldn't work :rt two tapes, they worked one tape and they couldn't 

even work that and they had many, many depths They gave it up. I imagine 

that they had some people studying their cryptography nt••txnq intensively 

because it wasn't very long before we found ourselves up against some very 

difficult things. They studied hard and they have produced somet~ing which 

thus far is quite baffling They use one-time pads At one period of their 

history, they used these one-time pads twice--this is What they did 

was to use say pad 14 between Moscow and Buenos Aires in September to December 

1944. Now that same pad would turn up, say three or four yea:rs later, 1957 

between say Moscow and Ottawa The trick was to find the double use Why 

they used a book, a pad, twice and not three times, I don't Jmow and nobody 

can give me the answer to that So far as our investigations have gone, they 

never used one more than twice and sometime in 1948, 49, I forget now, the 

double use ceased and we have since t~en not even been able to prove whether 

.. they are using them twice Dr. Engstrom mentioned _:t;he ~CRAMBLER problem and 9' • • 

~ - the difficulties we were having with that and the immense amount of money that 

it is taking to get into these high-level Russian things. Of course, if war 

should come and it shouldn't be over in ten days or twenty days, the Russians 

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REF ID:A38363 

would not be able to operate their one-time pad systems because we think, we 

hope, that they would not be able to get new pads distributed There is a 

limit to the number of pads that you. can store and therefore they would have 

to use something else. At the moment the Russians have not any one of their 

two important cipher ma.chines anyplace outside their own territory with the 

exception, you can call East Germany their territory I suppose There is 

something in Berlin but that is all They don•t use their ma.chines for 

communications abroad. This does not necessarily mean that they don't have 

them. They might have them in readiness but nobody can tell 

Now, I'm going to--I th11l4 tpat•_p""t_D~ ~nP,,_qJ.. that .. ~e.ri$s, let•s see--weil:l ... ' .... 1 .... ~ ~· •• , 

that's the inner workings of that ~-211, as we called it, the Russian ma.chine, 

I think that's the last of the series 

briefly 

I•m going to talk~ about some general principles and then we will 

have a break and then we'll resume Now some of this will be "old hat" to 

some of' you but for the newcomers, perhaps it•s wise to mention the principal 

operations upon which communication intelligence activities are based. First, 

of' course, there comes the intercept--you•ve got to have the material. This 

is no small trick The modern electrical high speed communications require 

high-speed intercept operations and together with the intercept, there must 

bedirection finding, when you a.re working on the communiaations of' armed 

forces of a government The Russians, for example, have complicated callsign 

systems, complicated shl.f'ting of frequencies, so that it is important to be 

able to identify transmissions either by direction finding or by one o~two 

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REF ID:A38363 

= "' -

other types or operations One is called radio fingerprinting, which simply 

means that every transI11J.tter emits electro-magnetic radiations which have 

characteristics that are analagous to the characteristics of a fingerprint and 

it is possible therefore to identify a transmitter by studying the characteristics 

of its emanations It is also possible to identify a ha.nd-opeaa.ted Morse 

telegraph communication That is, every operator has characteristics or his 

own hands and wrists and you ~ can by studying the transmissions of Morse 

operators, identify them. This is very useful Much work remains to be done 

in Direction Finding, in Radio Fingerprinting and in Morse Operator Identification. I think that that slide I cut off is an RFP test shot showing a 

recorded transDD.tter and one that you have in the record and compare it to a 

new transmission to see if the shape of the waves is very very similar There 

is another one. Here is Morse Operator identification dots, 

the length of dots, the difference between dots and dashes and lengths of 

dashes, the characteristics of each operator (Now cut the lantern off, I 

think we will go on for a moment.) 

The next step after interception is traffic analysis, that is, the 

reconstruction of the radio nets of the enemy and the location of their 

transmitter stations This gives very important information on two counts ... ' 

"' 

First of all, establishing or reconstructing the nets gives you order of 

battle which is very important. The reconstruction of the networks is not an 

easy thing for when the callsigns and frequencies are changed rapidly It is 

a curious thing that the Germans seemed to be able to change their callsigns 

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REF ID:A38363 

and frequencies without too Dlllch trouble--it gave us and the British a good 

deal. of trouble to begin with We had to keep people working at it al.l the 

time but I contrast vhat with the situation in our own Armed Forces, our ground 

forces at least It has not been possible to get our Army to adopt a sensible 

system of callsign changing They say, you will either have communications 

or you will have callsign changing, you can't have both. When it is pointed 

out to them that other arm.es do it and have done it, they have apparently 

no answer The Navy changes i~s ~allsi~; and_ch~31 _i~s frequencies--ma.ybe 

their problems are a little bit less difficult/ 

Now the second good reason fQr engaging in traffic analysis is this. 

Every once in a while your cryptanalysis meets a roadblock and you don't have 

any You don't have any COMINT from decrypts so the only thing you have to 

fall back upon are these other sources of information, aerial observation, 

pictures and that sort of thing but traffic analysis from simply watching the 

ebb and flow of traffic and the direction you can make inferences of what is 

going to happen. Now these, mnd you, are inferences -- they are not right 

out of the horses mouth as decrypts are. 

The next step, of course, is cryptanalysis Solution of the messages 

and, if they are in foreign language the translation and with the translation 

emendation 

there is always a certain amount of DnriniJpJr, you've got to make corrections 

Errors in transmission, errors in reception, erros on the part of the cipher 

clerk and so on. Then the next thing is large scale production or exploitation 

You a.re not dealing with single individual messages a day--there are 

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REF ID:A38363 

thousands of' them I"ll show you a. graph later on--what this mea.ns. 

The next step is the evaluation of the J.llf'orma.tion a.nd :dll.nd you, I've 

been talking about the COMINT product as inf'orma.tion. This is something which 

the intelligence people are most insistent a.bout The C<J.UNT people don't 

produce intelligence they say, they call. it information, communication 

intelligence information, if there is such a expression It's 

their job to evaluate it and to collate it with information from other sources 

to check it a.nd that sort of thing. And I suppose that this is a very 

necessary thing. It is conceivable that a.n enemy, an astute enemy, might 

actually mislead you by sending out a phoney or two in which case the intelligence people should be able to detect this character by collating what it 

says with what it has from other sources 

And then there comes finally the dissemination of the product and this 

has to be very very carefully controlled. 

Now, I think we have reached a goad stopping place and we will have a 

break of' about five minutes, no more, ~s we l'.!ave a good deal of terr.itory to 

-- - cover and we want to finish here by 4.00 O'clock at the latest, I'd like to 

• 

make it 5 :mJ..nutes to 4:00 so that those of you who want to attend the other 

ta.lk will have time to walk over to the building. 

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