PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 14-2808

_____________

PAULA JENSEN,

 Appellant

v.

PRESSLER & PRESSLER; 

MIDLAND FUNDING LLC; DOES 1-100

_____________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

(D.C. No. 2-13-cv-01712)

District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton

_____________

Argued

March 18, 2015

____________

Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, RENDELL and FUENTES, 

Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: June 30, 2015)

______________

Sergei Lemberg, Esq. [ARGUED]

LEMBERG LAW, LLC

1100 Summer Street, 3rd Floor

Stamford, Connecticut 06905

Attorney for Appellant
2

Mitchell L. Williamson, Esq. [ARGUED]

PRESSLER & PRESSLER, LLP

7 Entin Road

Parsippany, NJ 07054

Michael J. Peters, Esq.

PRESSLER & PRESSLER, LLP

7 Entin Road

Parsippany, NJ 07054

Attorneys for Appellee Pressler & Pressler

Lauren M. Burnette, Esq. [ARGUED]

Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin

100 Corporate Center Drive, Suite 201

Camp Hill, PA 17011

Attorney for Appellee Midland Funding LLC

______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

______________

McKEE, Chief Judge.

We are asked to decide whether a false statement in a 

communication from a debt collector to a debtor must be 

material in order to be actionable under a provision of the Fair 

Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 

1692e. We conclude that materiality is required, as it is 

subsumed within the “least sophisticated debtor” standard that 

has traditionally governed FDCPA claims. Because we do 

not find the misstatement at issue in this case material, we 

will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to 

Pressler & Pressler and Midland Funding, LLC. 

I.

The facts of this case are largely undisputed. 

Appellant Paula Jensen defaulted on a Bank of America credit 

card, and her debt was eventually sold to Appellee Midland 

Funding, LLC (“Midland”). Midland retained the law firm of 

Appellee Pressler & Pressler (“Pressler”) to help collect 

Jensen’s debt. Midland obtained a default judgment against 
3

Jensen in the Superior Court of New Jersey in the amount of 

$5,965.82. Pressler then attempted to collect on that 

judgment by serving an information subpoena and written 

questions on Jensen.

The information subpoena and accompanying 

questions sought personal and financial information from 

Jensen in aid of collection. It advised that “failure to comply 

. . . may result in . . . arrest and incarceration.” The 

information subpoena was issued pursuant to Rule 1:9-1 of 

the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey

(“New Jersey Rules”), which allows New Jersey attorneys to 

issue subpoenas in the name of the clerk of court. 

Information subpoenas issued under this rule properly bear 

the signature of the clerk, even though the clerk herself did 

not sign the subpoena and likely does not even have 

knowledge of it. The information subpoena here was based 

on the sample “form” in the Appendix to the New Jersey 

Rules. That form provides space for two electronic or typed 

signatures: one for the issuing attorney, and one for the clerk. 

Because Pressler sought to enforce a judgment from the 

Superior Court of New Jersey, the Superior Court clerk’s 

name should have appeared on the clerk’s signature line.

Instead, Pressler listed “Terrence D. Lee” on the 

clerk’s signature line. Lee had never worked as a clerk of the 

Superior Court, and although he had been the County Clerk of 

Warren County, he left that position six years earlier. 

Ironically, Jensen knew Lee, and she also knew that he was 

not a clerk of the Superior Court. Roughly one month later, 

Jensen sent a letter to Pressler explaining that she was aware 

that Mr. Lee was not the Superior Court clerk and calling the 

subpoena “fraudulent.” However, she also answered the 

questions that accompanied the information subpoena. 

Thereafter, Jensen moved to vacate the state court 

judgment against her, but her motion was denied. She then 

filed a putative class action against Pressler and Midland 

(together, “Appellees” or “Collectors”) in the U.S. District 

Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging a violation of § 

1692e of the FDCPA, which prohibits making false, 

misleading, or deceptive statements in the collection of 

consumer debts. The District Court granted summary 

judgment in favor of the Collectors and denied Jensen’s cross 
4

motion for summary judgment. It concluded that, because the 

misuse of Lee’s name was not a material false statement, 

there could be no liability under § 1692e. See Jensen v. 

Pressler & Pressler, LLP, No. 13-CV-01712, 2014 WL 

1745042, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2014). This appeal 

followed.1

We have not yet had occasion to decide whether § 

1692e contains a materiality requirement. For the reasons 

that follow, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that 

misstatements must be material to be actionable under § 

1692e. Accordingly, we will affirm. 

II.

“This Court exercises plenary review over a district 

court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same 

standard employed by the district court.” Trinity Indus., Inc. 

v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2013).

Summary judgment should only be granted where, after the 

close of discovery and viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party, the movant establishes 

that no genuine issue of material fact remains. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “A 

factual dispute is material if it might affect the outcome of the 

suit under governing law.” Lupyan v. Corinthian Colls. Inc., 

761 F.3d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Doe v. Luzerne 

Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2011)).

III.

“To prevail on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must prove 

that (1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt 

collector, (3) the defendant’s challenged practice involves an 

attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as the Act defines it, and (4) the 

defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in 

attempting to collect the debt.” Douglass v. Convergent 

Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 2014). Only the 

fourth prong is disputed here. As noted, Jensen asserts that 

the subpoena violated § 1692e, the provision of the law 

 

1 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291.
5

dealing with communications from debt collectors to debtors. 

She also claims that the subpoena violated two more specific 

subsections, § 1692e(9) and § 1692e(10). Those provisions 

provide:

A debt collector may not use any false, 

deceptive, or misleading representation or 

means in connection with the collection of any 

debt. Without limiting the general application of 

the foregoing, the following conduct is a 

violation of this section:

* * * 

(9) The use or distribution of any written 

communication which simulates or is 

falsely represented to be a document 

authorized, issued, or approved by any 

court, official, or agency of the United 

States or any State, or which creates a 

false impression as to its source, 

authorization, or approval.

(10) The use of any false representation or 

deceptive means to collect or attempt to 

collect any debt or to obtain information 

concerning a consumer.

15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Jensen argues that Pressler’s use of 

Terrence Lee’s electronic signature was a “false . . . 

representation” in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Jensen is 

obviously correct as a factual matter, insofar as using 

Terrence Lee’s name is a “false representation” in the most 

technical sense of the phrase. The subpoena represents Lee to 

be the Clerk of the Superior Court of New Jersey, but he was 

not the clerk and had never held that post. 

However, Appellees argue that this technically false 

representation is not actionable under the FDCPA because it 

is not material. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

first addressed this issue in Hahn v. Triumph Partnerships 

LLC, 557 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2009). There, the court adopted 

a “materiality” requirement for false, misleading, or deceptive

statements under the FDCPA. Id. at 757. A number of our 
6

sister Courts of Appeals subsequently adopted such a 

requirement. See Elyazidi v. SunTrust Bank, 780 F.3d 227, 

234 (4th Cir. 2015); Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 

1027, 1033–34 (9th Cir. 2010); Miller v. Javitch, Block & 

Rathbone, 561 F.3d 588, 596 (6th Cir. 2009). No Circuit 

Court that has addressed this issue has disagreed with Hahn 

and held that an immaterial false statement made during the 

collection of a consumer debt is actionable under the FDCPA. 

This dispute presents our Court with its first opportunity to 

decide if “false, deceptive, or misleading” statements must be 

material to be actionable under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.

2

 

Jensen correctly argues that the word “material” does 

not appear in the statute. However, that is not necessarily 

outcome determinative. Congress’s intent guides our 

interpretation of statutes. See Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle 

Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 2011). Our 

interpretive task begins and ends with the text of the statute 

unless the text is ambiguous or does not reveal congressional 

intent “with sufficient precision” to resolve our inquiry. Id. 

However, “[w]here the statutory language does not express 

Congress’s intent unequivocally, a court traditionally refers to 

the legislative history and the atmosphere in which the statute 

was enacted in an attempt to determine the congressional 

purpose.” In re Lord Abbett Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 

248, 254 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Jensen’s reliance 

on the precise wording of the statute here ignores the fact that 

materiality requirement is simply a corollary of the wellestablished “least sophisticated debtor” standard, which 

courts have routinely applied to alleged violations of § 1692e 

 

2 The sub-parts of § 1692e comprise a non-exhaustive list of 

debt collection practices that violate the prohibition on false 

or misleading representation. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e 

(“Without limiting the general application of the foregoing 

[general prohibition on false, deceptive or misleading 

representations], the following conduct is a violation of this 

section . . . .”). Most of the examples of prohibited behavior 

involve a statement or affirmative representation by a debt 

collector, but § 1692e(11) involves an omission: the failure to 

disclose relevant information. When we refer to § 1692e’s 

prohibition of some statements or representations, we refer to 

all acts and omissions covered under the provision. 
7

in order to advance the congressional intent of the FDCPA. 

Indeed, the parties do not dispute this standard’s validity and 

application to this case. Yet, that standard, like the disputed 

materiality requirement, appears nowhere in the text of the 

statute. As we will explain, we are satisfied that both the 

least sophisticated debtor standard and the materiality 

requirement supply a necessary analytical framework and are

consistent with the FDCPA’s purpose and legislative history. 

Because we agree with the District Court that the Collectors

did not violate § 1692e, we will affirm.

A.

As the FDCPA is an explicitly remedial statute, passed 

by Congress “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices 

by debt collectors,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e), “we construe its 

language broadly, so as to effect its purpose[,]” Brown v. 

Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation 

omitted). Courts routinely employ a “least sophisticated 

debtor” standard when deciding if debt collection violates the 

FDCPA. See Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 

(3d Cir. 2008) (“We use the ‘least sophisticated debtor’

standard in order to effectuate ‘the basic purpose of the 

FDCPA . . . .’” (quoting Brown, 464 F.3d at 454)). Although 

the least sophisticated debtor standard is “lower than the 

standard of a reasonable debtor,” it “preserv[es] a quotient of 

reasonableness and presum[es] a basic level of understanding 

and willingness to read with care.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. 

Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354–55 (3d Cir. 2000)). In 

so doing, it “give[s] effect to the Act’s intent to ‘protect[] the

gullible as well as the shrewd.’” Campuzano-Burgos v. 

Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 550 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2008)

(second alteration in original) (quoting Brown, 464 F.3d at 

453). 

The standard is an objective one, meaning that the 

specific plaintiff need not prove that she was actually 

confused or misled, only that the objective least sophisticated 

debtor would be. See Pollard v. Law Office of Mandy L. 

Spaulding, 766 F.3d 98, 103 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[T]he FDCPA 

does not require that a plaintiff actually be confused.”); 

Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 62 (2d 

Cir. 1993) (“We apply an objective test based on the 
8

understanding of the ‘least sophisticated consumer’ in 

determining whether a collection letter violates section 

1692e.”). Thus, “the FDCPA enlists the efforts of 

sophisticated consumers . . . as ‘private attorneys general’ to 

aid their less sophisticated counterparts, who are unlikely 

themselves to bring suit under the Act, but who are assumed 

by the Act to benefit from the deterrent effect of civil actions 

brought by others.” Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 

516 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2008).

As noted earlier, the phrase “least sophisticated 

debtor” does not appear in the text of the FDCPA. 

Nevertheless, the standard is almost universally employed by 

Courts of Appeals in interpreting that law.3 Indeed, the

standard was first used more than three decades ago in 1981, 

a mere four years after the FDCPA was enacted. Bingham v. 

Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 864, 870-71 (D.N.D. 

1981) (explaining that the standard historically used to 

analyze Federal Trade Commission Act claims, that courts 

“should look not to the most sophisticated readers but to the 

least[,]” should also be used in the FDCPA context (quoting 

 

3 The overwhelming majority of Courts of Appeals have 

employed some form of the standard, though it is sometimes 

referred to as the “least sophisticated consumer” or 

“unsophisticated debtor” standard. See Pollard, 766 F.3d at 

103; McMurray v. ProCollect, Inc., 687 F.3d 665, 669 (5th 

Cir. 2012); Wahl v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 556 F.3d 

643, 645–46 (7th Cir. 2009); Strand v. Diversified Collection 

Serv., Inc., 380 F.3d 316, 317 (8th Cir. 2004); Terran v. 

Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1431–32 (9th Cir. 1997); United 

States v. Nat’l Fin. Serv., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 

1996); Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 

1993); Smith v. Transworld Sys., 953 F.2d 1025, 1028–30 

(6th Cir. 1992); Jeter v. Credit Bureau, 760 F.2d 1168, 1175 

(11th Cir. 1985). The Tenth Circuit appears to have never 

explicitly embraced—but certainly never disclaimed—the 

standard. See Dikeman v. Nat’l Educators, Inc., 81 F.3d 949, 

954 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that “the [FDCPA] is . . . 

designed to protect such consumers as may not have the 

sophistication to appreciate the significance of debt collection 

communications”). The D.C. Circuit has apparently not had 

occasion to decide the issue.
9

Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 873 (2d Cir. 

1961)). The first Court of Appeals to adopt this standard did 

so a year later, in 1982. See Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677 

F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1982). 

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has 

given a thorough and a compelling explanation of why the 

reasonable person standard is not appropriate under the 

FDCPA. See Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168 

(11th Cir. 1985). As Jeter explains, prior to the passage of 

the FDCPA, the least sophisticated debtor standard was used 

to analyze claims that deceptive debt collection practices 

violated the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”). Id. at 

1173. At that time, regulations issued by the Federal Trade 

Commission under the authority of the FTCA banned 

deceptive practices. See id. However, in enacting the 

FDCPA, Congress explicitly found that “[e]xisting laws and 

procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to 

protect consumers.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b). Thus, the Jeter

court reasoned, “[i]t would be anomalous for the Congress, in 

light of its belief that existing state and federal law was 

inadequate to protect consumers, to have intended that the 

legal standard under the FDCPA be less protective of 

consumers than under the existing ‘inadequate’ legislation.” 

Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1173–74.

Based on its legislative history, the context of its 

passage, and its statutory purpose, the Eleventh Circuit 

concluded that Congress intended courts to view FDCPA 

claims from the perspective of the least sophisticated debtor. 

Id. at 1175. The court reasoned that “the FDCPA’s purpose 

of protecting [consumers] . . . is best served by a definition of 

‘deceive’ that looks to the tendency of language to mislead 

the least sophisticated recipients of a debt collector’s 

[communications].” Id. (second alteration in original) 

(citation omitted)). As noted, the Courts of Appeals have 

nearly universally embraced Jeter’s reasoning and employed 

the least sophisticated debtor standard to help effectuate the 

FDCPA’s purpose. 

B.
10

We regularly apply the least sophisticated debtor 

standard to claims under § 1692e. Specifically, we focus on 

whether a debt collector’s statement in a communication to a 

debtor would deceive or mislead the least sophisticated 

debtor. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, 

LLP, 756 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 135 S. 

Ct. 487 (2014) (explaining that the debtor collector is 

“responsible for [a communication’s] content and for what 

the least sophisticated debtor would have understood from 

it”); Rosenau, 539 F.3d at 223 (determining whether a letter 

was deceptive by asking “whether under the least 

sophisticated debtor standard, [the debt collector’s] letter to 

[the debtor] ‘can be reasonably read to have two different 

meanings, one of which is inaccurate’” (quoting Quadramed,

225 F.3d at 354)). 

As quoted earlier, § 1692e prohibits the use of any 

“false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in 

connection with the collection of any debt.” While it is 

impossible to know whether a statement is misleading or 

deceptive without reference to the person being misled or 

deceived—here, the least sophisticated debtor—the same is 

not true of falsity; a statement is either true or false. This 

presented a challenge to courts trying to view false statements 

through the eyes of the least sophisticated debtor. For 

example, in Wahl Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 556 F.3d 643 

(7th Cir. 2009), the court was asked to determine if Congress 

intended false communications to be treated differently than 

misleading or deceptive communications under the FDCPA. 

That court’s explanation for uniformly analyzing the three 

categories of statements laid the foundation for a materiality 

requirement: 

Where a plaintiff alleges that a collection 

statement is false (rather than deceptive or 

misleading), Wahl contends, the only 

determination for the court is whether the 

statement is in fact false. “It is unnecessary to 

determine whether the unsophisticated 

consumer would be deceived or misled or 

confused by the alleged false statement.” That 

could not be further from the truth.
11

In deciding whether collection letters violate the 

FDCPA, we have consistently viewed them 

through the eyes of the “unsophisticated 

consumer.”

Id. at 645. The Wahl court stressed that the state of mind of 

the debtor is always relevant, and that debt collection 

communications must be assessed from the perspective of the 

least sophisticated debtor regardless of whether a 

communication is alleged to be false, misleading, or 

deceptive. See id. at 645–46. 

In Hahn, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

simply expanded on Wahl’s reasoning. The court explained 

that materiality “is the upshot of [the] conclusion in Wahl

that, ‘[i]f a statement would not mislead the unsophisticated 

consumer, it does not violate the [Act]—even if it is false in 

some technical sense.’” Hahn, 557 F.3d at 758 (second and 

third alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Wahl, 

556 F.3d at 646). The Hahn court recognized that the 

FDCPA was designed to give debtors reliable information so 

that they can make informed decisions about how to address 

debts, and that “by definition immaterial information neither 

contributes to that objective (if the statement is correct) nor 

undermines it (if the statement is incorrect).” Id. at 757–58. 

Accordingly, a false statement is only actionable under the 

FDCPA if it has the potential to affect the decision-making 

process of the least sophisticated debtor; in other words, it 

must be material when viewed through the least sophisticated 

debtor’s eyes.

It is therefore clear that the materiality requirement is 

simply another way of phrasing the legal standard we already 

employ when analyzing claims under § 1692e, so that the 

same analysis can be applied to communications containing 

false statements. See Donohue, 592 F.3d at 1034 (“[T]he 

materiality requirement functions as a corollary inquiry into 

whether a statement is likely to mislead an unsophisticated 

consumer.”). Because we view the materiality requirement as 

a different way of expressing the least sophisticated debtor 

standard, we are satisfied that adopting a materiality 

requirement for claims brought under § 1692e is consistent 

with Congress’s intent in this regard. Indeed, refusing to 
12

adopt this materiality requirement would be inconsistent with 

decades of our own jurisprudence employing the least 

sophisticated debtor standard. 

We realize, as we noted earlier, that the FDCPA is a 

remedial statute designed to curb abusive collective practices, 

and that it must therefore be read liberally. However, our 

recognition that an element of materiality is subsumed in our 

analytical framework does nothing to dilute the protection 

Congress intended. A debtor simply cannot be confused, 

deceived, or misled by an incorrect statement unless it is 

material. 

C.

We stress that this materiality standard does not turn 

on what an ordinary individual might reasonably understand 

from a debt collector’s communication. See United States v. 

Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (defining a material 

statement as one that has “a natural tendency to influence, or 

[is] capable of influencing, the decision of the 

decisionmaking body to which it was addressed” (quoting 

Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988)). Because 

the materiality requirement is a corollary of the least 

sophisticated debtor standard, the relevant “decisionmaking 

body” here is the least sophisticated debtor. Thus, a 

statement in a communication is material if it is capable of 

influencing the decision of the least sophisticated debtor. See

Elyazidi, 780 F.3d at 234 (“To violate the statute, a 

representation must be material, which is to say, it must be 

‘important in the sense that [it] could objectively affect the 

least sophisticated consumer’s decisionmaking.’” (alteration 

in original) (citation omitted)).

As our jurisprudence in this area has shown, this is not 

a particularly high bar. For example, we recently held that 

debt collectors may not, consistent with § 1692e, represent 

estimates of the amount that the debtor would ultimately owe 

as the actual amount owed as of the date of the 

communication. McLaughlin, 756 F.3d at 246; see also 

Kaymark v. Bank of America, N.A., 783 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 

2015). In McLaughlin, we noted that the conduct plainly 

violated § 1692e(2), which forbids the “false representation of 

. . . the character, amount, or legal status of any debt.” 756 
13

F.3d at 246. Thus, the materiality requirement, correctly 

applied, effectuates the purpose of the FDCPA by precluding 

only claims based on hypertechnical misstatements under § 

1692e that would not affect the actions of even the least 

sophisticated debtor. See Rosenau, 539 F.3d at 221 (noting 

that the least sophisticated debtor standard “prevents liability 

for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection 

notices” (quoting Quadramed, 225 F.3d at 354)). 

IV.

It is therefore obvious that the inclusion of Lee’s name 

itself on the information subpoena here is simply not material. 

It could not possibly have affected the least sophisticated 

debtor’s “ability to make intelligent decisions.” Donohue, 

592 F.3d at 1034.4 Thus, the subpoena is not a 

communication that violates the prohibitions on false 

statements or representations in § 1692e or § 1692e(10).

Perhaps it is not surprising, given our discussion, that 

one of Jensen’s main arguments is that the inclusion of an 

incorrect signature on the subpoena rendered it invalid in 

violation of § 1629e(9). Specifically, she argues that the 

subpoena falsely represented itself to be a valid legal 

document, when in fact it was an invalid legal document. 

Section 1629e(9) prohibits “[t]he use or distribution of any 

written communication which simulates or is falsely 

represented to be a document authorized, issued, or approved 

by any court, official, or agency of the United States or any 

State, or which creates a false impression as to its source, 

authorization, or approval.” This argument is also without 

merit.

The information subpoena is not “falsely represented 

to be a document authorized, issued, or approved by any court 

 

4 The Collectors urge us to look not to a purely objective 

standard, but rather to look to what an objective debtor in 

Jensen’s situation, who (like Jensen) knew that Lee was not 

the proper clerk, would have thought or done. We need not 

consider whether this is a proper framing of the least 

objective debtor standard, because the error still would not 

have been material under either scenario. 
14

[or] official.” Id. Under the New Jersey Rules, the clerk’s 

signature does not verify that the clerk has seen or even knew 

about the document. Rather, under New Jersey practice, 

“[t]he preparation and sealing of a summons and most other 

writs is the duty of the attorney issuing the writ, who is, for 

that purpose, considered as the agent of the clerk of the 

court.” Stanley v. Great Gorge Country Club, 803 A.2d 181, 

190 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002) (quoting GEORGE S.

HARRIS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN NEW JERSEY 37–38 

(Rev. Ed. 1939)) (emphasis omitted); see also N.J. Ct. R. 1:9-

1.

We are not persuaded that the information subpoena 

bearing Lee’s name is actually invalid under New Jersey law. 

Though the issue does not appear to be frequently litigated, 

particularly in modern times, New Jersey courts have 

repeatedly declined to invalidate similar documents based on 

hypertechnical errors. See Stanley, 803 A.2d at 190 (“A 

summons is not void notwithstanding irregularities in 

omitting date, seal, and clerk’s signature, or the attorney’s 

address.” (quoting HARRIS, supra, at 37–38)). 

In Hirsch et al. v. De Puy, the New Jersey Supreme 

Court was faced with a “summons [that] was not dated, . . . 

carried no seal, and . . . although the name and title of the 

clerk were typed in the space usually occupied by the 

signature, there was no actual signature.” 166 A. 720, 721 

(N.J. 1933) (per curiam). The court noted that each of these 

errors violated state procedural rules, and it acknowledged 

that “there must be a point at which the accumulation of 

irregularities in a paper that assumes to be a writ deprives that 

instrument of authenticity.” Id. However, in part because the 

intended recipient would know “with certainty that [the 

summons] is a court process,” the court held that the 

summons was not void. Id. Certainly the information 

subpoena in this case was less error-ridden than the one at 

issue in Hirsch. Thus, it is inconceivable that the single small 

error here somehow made the information subpoena invalid.

Moreover, where the state courts have remarked on the 

importance of compliance with technical requirements, the 

mistake at issue had the capacity to prejudice one of the 

parties. For example, Jensen cites to Cavallaro v. Jamco 
15

Property Management, where the court noted that “the 

subpoena power is a significant one which must be exercised 

in good faith and in strict adherence to the rules to eliminate 

potential abuses.” 760 A.2d 353, 359 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 

Div. 2000). However, there, a plaintiff’s attorney’s failure to 

include the defense attorney in communications with a 

deponent resulted in the disclosure of privileged materials. 

See id.; see also Crescenzo v. Crane, 796 A.2d 283, 284 (N.J. 

Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (“An attorney failed to comply 

with the provisions of the [New Jersey subpoena] Rule, and a 

doctor, improperly responding to a discovery subpoena, 

forwarded privileged records of his patient without notice or 

authorization.”). There is no basis for this Court to conclude 

that this subpoena is actually invalid under state law. 

Therefore, Jensen’s argument that the error is material 

because it misrepresents the nature of the subpoena, or that 

Collectors violated § 1629e(9) by mailing her an invalid 

subpoena, must fail. 

Jensen’s remaining arguments are similarly unavailing. 

Jensen tries to rely on a thread of federal case law holding 

that, in some situations, actions taken by attorneys as debt 

collectors are subject to more intense scrutiny than the acts of 

ordinary debt collectors. See Campuzano-Burgos, 550 F.3d at 

301 (“Under the [FDCPA], attorney debt collectors warrant 

closer scrutiny because their abusive collection practices ‘are 

more egregious than those of lay collectors.’” (quoting 

Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 570 (3d Cir. 1989)). 

This reliance is misplaced, as these cases arise out of 

situations where attorneys improperly use their status as 

attorneys to pressure or coerce debtors. See id.; see also 

Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1320 (2d Cir. 1993)

(explaining that the use of a lawyer’s name and signature on 

mass mailings in that case gave “the impression that the 

letters were communications from an attorney” although the 

letters “were not ‘from’ [the attorney] in any meaningful 

sense of that word”). The Pressler attorney who signed the 

information subpoena in this case was not using her status to 

wrongly imply that legal action may be taken. She was 

merely issuing a valid subpoena under New Jersey Rules. 

Finally, we are unmoved by Jensen’s argument that

summary judgment was improper because materiality is a 
16

mixed question of fact and law that must be presented to a 

jury.5 Summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record 

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find 

for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). No 

reasonable juror could find that the mistake in this case was 

material. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s grant 

of summary judgment to the Collectors. 

V.

For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 

District Court. 

 

5 We have noted that whether contradictory language in a 

notice would “confuse or mislead the ‘least sophisticated 

debtor’ as to his statutory rights under the [FDCPA] to 

validate and dispute the debt” is a question of law. 

Quadramed, 225 F.3d at 353 n.2. However, we recognize 

that at least one Court of Appeals has remarked that 

“materiality is a mixed question of law and fact” and 

explained that “often ‘whether a letter is misleading raises a 

question of fact.’” Gillie v. Law Office of Eric A. Jones, LLC, 

No. 14-3836, 2015 WL 2151755, at *14 (6th Cir. May 8, 

2015). Though the parties dispute whether materiality is a 

question of fact or law, we need not decide the issue, as the 

Collectors would be entitled to summary judgment under 

either standard.