In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-19-00260-CR

LABBERRIUS QUDON EVANS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 8th District Court

Franklin County, Texas

Trial Court No. F-9330

Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

In his sole point of error on appeal, Labberrius Qudon Evans argues that the trial court 

failed “to meaningfully consider the full legal range of punishment and the alternatives to the 

sentence finally imposed.” Because nothing in the record shows that the trial court failed to 

consider the full range of punishment, we overrule Evans’s sole point of error.

Evans was charged with continuous sexual abuse of a child. Pursuant to a plea agreement 

with the State, Evans’s charge was reduced in exchange for his plea of guilty to aggravated sexual 

assault of a child. Honoring the plea agreement, the trial court placed Evans on ten years’ deferred 

adjudication community supervision and ordered him to pay a $500.00 fine, $350.00 in attorney 

fees, and $649.00 in court costs. When the State later filed a motion to adjudicate Evans’s guilt 

based on several violations of the terms and conditions of his community supervision, including 

delivery of methamphetamine, Evans signed a judicial confession swearing that all allegations in 

the State’s motion were true. As a result, the trial court adjudicated Evans’s guilt and sentenced 

him to seventy-five years’ imprisonment. 

Evans’s complaint about the trial court’s sentence is raised for the first time on appeal. 

However, no objection is required to preserve an issue that the trial court arbitrarily refused to 

consider the full range of punishment in an adjudication hearing. See Grado v. State, 445 S.W.3d 

736, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (finding that the issue invokes a Marin,

1 category-two right). “A 

court’s arbitrary refusal to consider the entire range of punishment constitutes a denial of due 

process.” Id. at 739. Even so, “[a]bsent a clear showing of bias, a trial court’s actions will be 

1

Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), overruled on other ground by Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 

262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
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presumed to have been correct.” Brumit v. State, 206 S.W.3d 639, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); 

see Roman v. State, 145 S.W.3d 316, 319 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d)

(unless there is “a clear showing to the contrary, this [C]ourt will presume that the trial court was 

neutral and detached”). 

Here, nothing demonstrates that the trial court failed to consider the full range of 

punishment. The record shows that the trial court heard witness testimony and argument from 

both parties as to the appropriate punishment and took a break during the proceedings before ruling 

to read Evans’s presentence investigation report. The trial court fully explained the reasons for its 

punishment, which included the acts Evans committed during his continued sexual abuse of a 

young child, his lengthy criminal history, his failure to abide by the terms and conditions of 

community supervision, and neglect of “all of the opportunities” he had “to treat [his] drug 

problem.” The trial court’s comments did not indicate that it had predetermined the sentence or 

failed to consider the full range of punishment. 

Because the record does not support Evans’s contention that the trial court failed to 

consider the full range of punishment, we overrule his sole point of error on appeal. See Brumit, 

206 S.W.3d at 645. 
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We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Josh R. Morriss, III

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: February 25, 2020

Date Decided: February 26, 2020

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