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, REF ID:A65575 

llELl>RARIUt FOR .RHOADS .. 

#'J. 'ftle detioitan •f B/I is !!!! that d the ANT Navy Descriptive 

dictillnary or crypt•lltgic terms • . fJ6. Where ~ the appeal.ix l "Gl9ssary ef 'B/I T-0 and 11bat will it 

adhere t• Wllen and. 11'" finished? 

#10-b The Badi• Traffic anal¥&1s t. ... apparent.4' dees evar,rthing: T/A 

pl.as evaluation. Sb•ul.dnt it be a p,rrua:ld ! Bralaatien * * *Cellat<sral Inf•. 

• • • • • m~· ... ·Crn?t 

DF --iiitercept 

(Traffic and intercept cont.nl) 

lbat d~ee 10-A de? Adcin:istl'llte onl.Y'? Froa description t lle7 aeQ to alee 

ev~luate. It th~y decide as te what will be d~ne they are above the 

evaluatien phase 11herener it is dem. 

IJ]J. ~hat ab.Lit .radar1 guided miesilea,facsizdle etc ad naueam?. Qhat 

I' 

am wbe will intercept th• er is the para.a det1n1t1en er •ao.r I1Dde •f 

radi• translli.seienn ambig110W1. Leaving ollt radar,guided. llissilee ett: . Wbich is a rdltalce but apparently eBtabllshed peliOT, tbia should read 

"radi• cxmcwlicatiens" which iatludes facsimile and radio telephone • 

• - .. In connection with facsild.le please note a HIS Technical D 4 gest 

talked aboat use et plane beqrne facsUdle t•r aendins in pheterecce 

results 11h1ch ms in upericental stage over tn para age. 

In first sentence of this paragraph should.•radie intelligence 

eqllipaent" rl..ad. "radi• intercept e quipm.ent"? I theuyit intelligence was 

0 function et the J.ntellect with rw cscha.-Ucal eqw.pment ac a substitute. 

#15. Directien timers. Te ae beth "P•rtable" and "mblle" 1.11:pi_y the 

idea of tranepertabillty. Is "Pixed~ andnabile" a better distinctien •r . ~ "long range" and "sbert re.rip• even better. Within abert range D/F eqllipcent 

79a. will have variation in else as fer exaaple the Gema.n Radie Defense C-.rps 

roved for Release b NS on 05-28-2014 ursuantto E.O. 1352 
• 

used both D/I.. ( ~ ID:A65575 __ ~ 

cov-o~ ti'u.cks with ~uol>illlmJ sets inside) and suite~ 

and even coat packet sets toraxt.receJ,v oloao range t=>rk ago.inst aaents. 

The entire probleo of agent rad o traffic requires serious consideration 

am should cartainlg' be included in 81\V tactical R/I Jllanual. The 

Geroans started i~ rld war II l'Ji.th both Abwebr, G .. st.ape· ard regular police a 

(lrpo) GrBanize.tions tor deali~ with agents. A special "Radio Defense Corps 

bad o be creatsd with several CMJpanles of sienal corp specialists in 

D/r ,1nterc~tion, t/a,and. cryptanaysis tait.hin the Olm ( OKrl/Ago;NV/fu. III) 

to deal with 9e;ent traffic in Gemaqy and occupied territer.r in 

France, P'-land., Scandinavia etc. !vcm so in 1944. it ms necessary to pull 

on<a entire siDlal i telligence reg!.cent. ou.t of the Gel'tl8n ArD8 Signal !ntelligenc 

oraa.nization on the (l!J-J't~-J/ eastern front. (itOBA 6 ) aod assign it exclu.sitell' 

tQ Jtu.esian agent trattic beca11ae of t.he extreceq large scale use of 

agents by the Russians. As Russia is the assuced potential enq for 

t.be parposes of this R/ I canual the entire r:i.atter of asent traffic 

should be C0fE idered in the f'llllest detail. Wnitoring of agent traffic 

u 

co:.ve the Gero.ans t.act!.cal intelligcance on R ss:lan intent, tu.tu.re areas ot 

" 

nnjor attack etc. 

a third 

{}16. Is the ~~~~#. sentence:. Bru.::ia.tical? And mo is the assuoed 

eneqr here. And isnt this ontire r.anual contused. on distinction 

bet~een ~i~,b level(strategic) co~~unications inLelligence operations 

and loo level(operation or tactical.) radio intellicence activities? 

. #17 ~ore questions ariae as to distinction battroen strataJiCa.l. 

and tactical aod. nill not be l!lentiora d turt.her in those co:.::cents. Shollld 

it be 3~mte:11c,Operational, and. Tactical ·uith operational and tactical 

b3lonsing ti'll th<l :?icdd of the radio intalli~ence teaos (.for t"Jhoo r.his 

oa..'lllal is int.ended) and strgtegica.l and operational( ,ves, thore is overlap--

overlap am continu.it,y are equall.¥ i.l'.lportant tor co:::r::iLmications intelligence) 

inteJJ.iaence Tmich the "fixed stat.ions and J.\.SA itself are charge1 id.Gb? 
t·--r .J 

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e ¥F ID:A65575 e 

f/'Jtt-a Does the a/I cor::pBl\Y suppl,y Arey Group or does the Theatre ~ 

liSA feed theater and Arr:g Grogp and the '8/1 corpaqy \tork froo division-up 

throllBh Arqy? 

· Doesnt this iripq that the R/I Cor.pan.v is onl8 concormd with ground 

foNe traffic? lJtiat 11bo11t a.ir-eround liaisGn nets, and the eotira field 

ofoverlapping i.ritell!gcnce tro.u. arqr air and naval nets to sa,,y nothinc of 

the Pci>lice (if tha enq- is Russia?) I get the feeling theso R/I teacs 

a.re goin5 to be working in a littl<!I vao11um all b thscselves and not 

gettioa anywhere. 

17-1a.-l Doos the last eentenc 1op4' that ASA is aesi3flina the cissioo 

tor front line B/I coq>anies? 

17-a-4 \jhat is "further co11t1terintolligence ot our 0t1n rJio 

cocciunications?•Io it cocaunicatioas securit:r, duaqy traf'tic,take traltice, 

etc? 

17-b S~a remrks about Arr:q Nav,y Air and Police aa ware raised 

for 17-a. The Gem.as said that !lr)nitoring Russian internal corr.iercial net.a 

gave their operational forces ver.r little intorcation although it 'i1as ot 

val.Lie to stre~th esticates-and the Gercans did ne»t have a tr11e 

st1•ategic airforce. I qwastion it it should be inciluded 1n an operational level 

f!anual.1 h0l1ever. Should there by T/Osand T/Bs for each t.JP8 otB/I 

outfit 9entiened hez:e and elsewhere'? And wouldnt tablas of T/OardE 

el.5.cinate the need for a lot. of this text"l 

It again sacs witortune.te that &ll eq>hasis is placed on eneoy ground force 

nets without indication of inter relationship bet.ween gound air and police 

and P,ossibll' naval apd partisara or agent nets. 

liurtber fD re 18-b-1 yea dct not obtain and evalaate radio intellicence inf'ercatio1 

solely by lf.-M'f.#}'1ntercepting and fitding locations of ene[\Y coa:iercial 

and Arr:, high a chelon radio cCClCllnications", each intorcation is ... . presucabl,r availablemong before the B/l coq>anios get into the field. 
t1'-t 

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RE1:-ID:A65575 --

18-b-4. Aside frou tho hope that trainina \7:)Uld ba cooplated before the 

R/I coPpan.v gets to the field, shouldnt s11ch t rainlng as this be listed as 

the eesponeibilit.r of: the C3c.oandins officer,partic ulal.17 the: liaison aspect, 

rather than as a part ot the general ci~sion of· the entire cc-.pal\V? 

19. This sounds like bad.l,y tJritten persoMel mnageoont-the field 

R/I coapan.y Vlill be AO e Cuitary unit and b) too 'bu8J' for the excellent 

sugseations contained here. The very level(l.aw echelon) of tmaffic and the 

na.ture of the w&rk will force a close connection between the intercc..!:t 

operator and the T/A people Sl.\YW'1• I QC1 still contused on the difference 

betwee.'l intercept. control, t/a and cr,ypt in decidine what to cover etc •. 

For exaa. >le, both the TA section in p&ra 19 b 3 &\nd the operation contTr~ 

section in 19 are directing coverage? an.cl cr91>L and G-2 requ1reo0nts are 

not 7et included.'. Again TA and opera.ticln nd co!ltrol a:re. ev'1laat1ng1 assigning 

nissions etc. In 19-b-2 we hear of data troo 11 ~ pGtssible sources" fail.ins 

an.,y other oenticn in this CL"Ulal of captured. d.ocWJents, p/w interrogation 

investigation of ene 03' e?niip.cent etc is t.his where such collat.eral 

nat.erial is scanned? And 11ho (:"ets it for thee, through what e&"lennels or 

do ther hope an eneqy tank crashes over an antenm and they loot the 

contents .. -if a plane crasbGd on their antenne. the1 wollld presucabl,y not 

be interst~d in the contents since the. are only ground force •. Nuts. 

19-c 3 r11ises the linguistic proble1 vJhere uill they get dictionariea,new 

vocabulary itecs etc? c-4 indicates cryp report& to TA for t'orwardine t• 

G-2 and :tor evnl uation-does this nean the TA teao does the evalwition 

and the 0-2 can accepts it. or \'Vill the hi gher level G-2 not get the decode 

withoat cormnt fer his own evaluation? 

IJ. ASA interests age.in-in conflict with field G-2 requireaent.s'l 

25.2 "The radio spectruc is scanned for traffic 11 .~;hat kind of traffic , 

r/t or i;/t,uha~ abo~t a.a.ythlng else. ct Geraan definition of signal intelligence 
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e REF ID:A65575 e 

-Sas "coacerned with ~g; manifestation ia the rGdio spectrum"• 

And also, what about wire tapping at the frant 11.ne level. 

25.b.2 ls this sample message proper in a restricted ma.llllal? 

26. The man11al is forever talkine ab:.ut the ASA sub-sectionbu.t the ASA-subsection is n&t described until Sec II-shouldnt it. be 

described at. the first it it is the 011,oerier organization? 

30-A Hurrah. Intercept nran-m11rse.! 

.36. Tbe ASA-s11b-section. Only a general cri t.1cism here-but 

in general the duties and tunctians are very vague. Would a f iel.d conrander 

tr e>m. r eadi.ng, this know what the tew individuals who turn up as his ~'ASA 

sub section" are supposed to be doing? The descri~tion in para 37 appears . contused-is this ASA sub sectien to w0rk at Arey Gr"11P.Ar.cw, theat.er 

• division or \'lbat level? What rank will the off1ce~s hGld etc? 

38. Fwnctir.ns of .ASA s11b-sectian are pretty general. but "What t1.bout ' I 

collateral ~'nrorma.tion to be passed to ASA and down te AI co.1!2p&flies as Rf 

interrogation, captured. docueenta, ene.!!W' equipment and oo on--sholll.dnt this . 

I 

all cece tlwd>ugh the ASA sub sect.ion? 

39. A 

,, ain we have G-2 and ASA desires being fom.11lated. This is alr.ioet 

solely on the i!ltelligence side-who will c0rrelate c~;pto security 

and the needs and requ1renents (Jf the signal of'f'icer at th smue level? 

Generally, the N3.\ sub secti•n appears· t-o be concerned soleq \'lit,b l 

ground farce l·e u.ireents. lsnt the .ASi~ sub section the place to look fer 

co0rdinating 'Air and Pllice nets and. exchanging information on m.val it the 

' 

BI cc:l})anies are only .going to be concerned with ground.? 

42. C~ifls for radio intelligence advanced here can raise plent,r 

of eyebrows,particularl3 since RI has lll!>t been integrated Di.th other 

sov.rces of i telligence even tor brictlna purposes. I think there 

should be son.e discuseion ot the rcle ot radio inelligenca in relation 
REF ID:A65575 e 

-6-6 l 

other soc.irces of intelligence- if onl,y to irdlcate hat they are &rd 

indicate what mutt1al benefits will be derivable b.r each from anmcchange of 

.· 

results. l'"or ex.m,,.1e, fr.;,B the LN Abt 353 papers there are illustrations ef 

signal intelli~ence, by D/F, atteopting to lacate radar transraitters, to 

correlate wj.th TA information en radio circuits core emed with 'H / rartalt beari.rg 

sets in 0peration. Radar search results, ;ieasuring the lticpulaee used, the 

tone or note ef the transmtter concerned were coordi •ted with the signal 

intell1gence results and photo reconnaisance Daterial, which slwws 

typical radar.sites clearly, was also integrated. PW statements about 

new radar equ.1ps.ent (IFF 1n planes) \llere cited, and crashed. air crd't were 

e.xsmi!led for any eqaipcent co.ntai.ried1 the end prodw:t was presented 1n I 

a single "signal Intelligence 11 report on Russian "'adar. 

44 and following deals with £!Dve.aent of RI co.cpanies in attack 

etc. I should think that the ETO histories of RI Units w:>u.ld have 

interesti illustra ive mterial. iJhen "island hopping" is mentioned 

ya11 •nder jllSt which war t.ic.e canual is being copied ~ rbatis? Or will 

.. we island bop to Moscow? Ad here,too, in a combinec operatienwith be " . 

na\7 -there is no indicat..ion that aqy e~ a.val circ11its wL 11 

be of &J'\1' interest to -signal intelllgence. 

46 and. 47. The saddest paragraphs et the paper for wbat is unsaid • 

. On liaison and ccoperation coapare the frequent and eec1.11•ring r eca.rks 

p 11t in above.