2015 UT App 138

_________________________________________________________

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

SCOTT C. WADSWORTH,

Defendant and Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20130510-CA

Filed May 29, 2015

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Vernice S. Trease

No. 031908633

Debra M. Nelson and Nisa J. Sisneros, Attorneys

for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Tera J. Peterson, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this Opinion, in 

which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and JAMES Z. DAVIS concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:

¶1 Scott C. Wadsworth appeals from the district court’s 

restitution order imposed after he was convicted of and 

sentenced for sexual exploitation of a minor, unlawful sexual 

activity with a minor, and enticing a minor over the internet. The 

district court ordered Wadsworth to reimburse the victim for the 

lost wages she incurred several years after Wadsworth’s crimes

‚due primarily to the depression, sleep issues, emotional pain, 

and an inability to interact with others that was caused by the 

psychological trauma from being victimized by [Wadsworth].‛

Wadsworth claims that the causal connection between his 

criminal conduct in 2003 and Victim’s lost wages in 2009 and 
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2010 is too attenuated to support an award of restitution and 

that Victim’s lost wages due to depression and psychological 

trauma are more akin to unrecoverable pain and suffering 

damages than to pecuniary damages. We conclude that the 

causal connection between Wadsworth’s conduct and Victim’s 

lost wages is clear, that any attenuation resulting from a delay in 

ordering restitution was caused by Wadsworth absconding

before his initial sentencing hearing in 2005, and that Victim’s

lost wages are economic pecuniary damages specifically 

recoverable by statute. We therefore affirm the district court’s 

restitution order.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In July 2003, Wadsworth met Victim, then a minor, in an 

online chat room. Over the next three weeks, Wadsworth and 

Victim chatted online and on the telephone. During their 

conversations, Wadsworth sent Victim numerous pornographic 

images and video clips. On one occasion, Wadsworth went to 

Victim’s home and she performed oral sex on him. In December 

2003, Wadsworth was charged with over twenty offenses arising 

out of his misconduct involving Victim.

¶3 In October 2004, Wadsworth pled guilty to sexual 

exploitation of a minor, unlawful sexual activity with a minor, 

and enticing a minor over the internet. The remaining charges 

against him were dismissed. The district court set sentencing for 

April 8, 2005. However, Wadsworth failed to appear at the

sentencing hearing, and a warrant was issued for his arrest.

¶4 Wadsworth evaded authorities until July 2009 when he 

was arrested on the outstanding warrant. Wadsworth was 

finally sentenced for his crimes in December 2009. At the time of 

sentencing, the court ordered ‚that *Wadsworth+ pay full and 

complete restitution‛ to Victim, and took the amount of 

restitution under advisement, to be decided at a later date.

¶5 On November 19, 2010, the district court held a restitution 

hearing. At that hearing, Victim was the only witness to testify. 

Victim testified that Wadsworth’s original criminal conduct and 
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the reminder of his crime after his 2009 arrest caused her 

‚psychological problems, difficulties and depression‛ that 

negatively affected her both personally and professionally. 

Victim also submitted a written statement signed by her work 

supervisor, which the court read into the record:

As a result of the arrest in December [that] has 

brought up past memories and caused me to go 

into a deep state of depression, [I] had to cut down 

my hours at work to deal with past issues and I’ve 

missed out [on] 940 hours. I make $13.76 an hour. 

It is totaled up $12,934.46 and has negatively 

affected me financially.

Victim’s counselor also submitted a letter to the court stating 

that Victim would likely need weekly counseling sessions for at 

least one year to deal with issues related to the case. The court 

took the matter under advisement and continued the restitution 

hearing until December 2010.

¶6 On December 9, 2010, the court resumed the restitution 

hearing. At the December restitution hearing, the district court 

found that Victim’s lost wages in 2009 and 2010 were the result 

of Wadsworth’s criminal conduct in 2003. In the district court’s 

written order, the court found that the ‚re-appearance of 

[Wadsworth] after that significant amount of time‛—between 

his failure to appear at his 2005 sentencing and his arrest in 

2009—‚brought back bad memories and caused mental anguish 

to *Victim+.‛ The district court further found,

As a direct result of *Wadsworth’s+ criminal 

conduct, [Victim] was unable to work full-time as 

she had been doing before. This was due primarily 

to the depression, sleep issues, emotional pain, and 

an inability to interact with others that was caused 

by the psychological trauma from being victimized 

by [Wadsworth].

The court ordered Wadsworth to pay restitution in the amount 

of $6,500 for Victim’s counseling costs and $12,934.40 as 

recompense for Victim’s lost wages. Wadsworth now appeals 
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the restitution order regarding the court’s determination on 

Victim’s lost wages.1

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 ‚*I+n the case of restitution, a reviewing court will not 

disturb a district court’s determination unless the court exceeds 

the authority prescribed by law or abuses its discretion.‛ State v. 

Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ¶ 10, 214 P.3d 104. ‚‘[T]he exercise of 

discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal 

judgment of the court and the appellate court can properly find 

abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would 

take the view adopted by the trial court.’‛ State v. Corbitt, 2003 

UT App 417, ¶ 6, 82 P.3d 211 (alterations in original) (quoting 

State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). Whether an 

award of restitution is proper in a particular case ‚depends 

solely upon interpretation of the governing statute, and the trial 

court’s interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, 

which *this court+ review*s+ for correctness.‛ State v. Brown, 2009 

UT App 285, ¶ 6, 221 P.3d 273 (alterations in original) (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

¶8 Wadsworth argues that the restitution award to Victim 

for lost wages was improper for two reasons. First, Wadsworth 

contends that the causal connection between his conduct in 2003 

and Victim’s lost wages in 2009 and 2010 is too attenuated to

support an award of restitution. Second, Wadsworth claims that 

Victim’s lost wages are more appropriately classified as pain and 

suffering damages, which are not awardable pursuant to the 

restitution statute.

 

1. Wadsworth does not challenge the portion of the district 

court’s order of restitution relating to Victim’s counseling costs.
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I. The Causal Connection Between Wadsworth’s Criminal 

Conduct and Victim’s Lost Wages Is Sufficiently Established to 

Support the Award of Restitution.

¶9 The Crime Victims Restitution Act (the Act) provides, 

‚When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has 

resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence 

it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make 

restitution to victims of crime . . . .‛ Utah Code Ann. 

§ 77-38a-302(1) (LexisNexis 2008). Pecuniary damages are ‚all 

demonstrable economic injur[ies] . . . arising out of the facts or 

events constituting the defendant's criminal activities.‛ Id. § 77-38a102(6) (emphasis added). Criminal activities are defined as ‚any 

offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal 

conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the 

sentencing court with or without an admission of committing 

the criminal conduct.‛ Id. § 77-38a-102(2). Thus, to obtain an

order of restitution, the State must prove that the victim has 

suffered economic injury and that the injury arose out of the 

defendant’s criminal activities. See id. § 77-38a-102(6); see also id.

§ 77-38a-102(14)(a) (defining a victim as ‚any person whom the 

court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of

the defendant’s criminal activities‛ (emphasis added)).

¶10 ‚Utah has adopted a modified ’but for’ test to determine 

whether pecuniary damages actually arise out of criminal 

activities.‛ State v. Brown, 2009 UT App 285, ¶ 11, 221 P.3d 273. 

Utah’s modified ‚but for‛ test requires that (1) the damages 

‚would not have occurred but for the conduct underlying the . . . 

[defendant’s+ conviction‛ and (2) the ‚causal nexus between the 

[criminal] conduct and the loss . . . is not too attenuated (either 

factually or temporally).‛ Id. (alterations and omissions in 

original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶11 Wadsworth admits that his conduct in 2003, for which he 

pled guilty, satisfies the statutory definition of criminal activity. 

However, Wadsworth claims that this criminal conduct and 

Victim’s lost wages are too attenuated because ‚*s+everal years 

[had] passed between the conduct at issue and the pecuniary 

loss.‛ Wadsworth states, ‚Rather than a direct nexus like a 

physical injury causing missed work days or a valuable item 
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missing from a home after a burglary, this case involves a sexual 

crime’s psychological damage and the measure of that damage’s 

resulting negative impact on the victim’s ability to perform job 

duties (six years after the fact).‛

¶12 We agree with the district court that Victim’s lost wages 

in 2009 and 2010 were connected closely enough with 

Wadsworth’s criminal acts to be recoverable as restitution. First, 

while several years did pass between the criminal conduct in

2003 and the beginning of Victim’s decreased work hours in 

2009, the four-year separation between Wadsworth’s scheduled 

sentencing and the onset of Victim’s damages was due entirely to 

Wadsworth absconding before his original sentencing in 2005. 

Utah law provides that the victim of a crime has ‚the right to a 

speedy disposition of the charges free from unwarranted delay 

caused by or at the behest of the defendant‛ and to a ‚prompt 

and final conclusion of the case after the disposition or 

conviction and sentence, including prompt and final conclusion 

of all collateral attacks on dispositions or criminal judgments.‛ 

Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-7(2) (LexisNexis 2008). Here, 

Wadsworth should not be rewarded for fleeing and depriving

Victim of her right to a quick and prompt resolution of the case. 

Cf. State v. Verikokides, 925 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1996) (refusing 

to order a new trial for a defendant whose trial record was 

destroyed after he fled the country for seven years and 

observing that ‚convicted criminals should not be rewarded for 

fleeing the jurisdiction before sentencing‛). Thus, while Victim 

continued to suffer damage years after the original criminal 

activity, any lack of temporal proximity between the criminal 

acts and the ultimate problems faced by Victim arose entirely

from Wadsworth’s absence from his sentencing, which delayed 

full resolution of the case for years. The district court did not 

abuse its discretion by refusing to penalize Victim for the delay 

caused by Wadsworth.

¶13 Second, the events are not factually attenuated. Complete 

restitution is that amount necessary to compensate the victim 

‚for all losses caused by *a criminal+ defendant.‛ Utah Code 

Ann. § 77-38a-302(2)(a). The Act ‚should be liberally construed 

to accomplish the purpose of making crime victims whole for the 
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20130510-CA 7 2015 UT App 138

harms they suffer because of a defendant’s criminal conduct.‛ 

State v. Ruiz, 2013 UT App 166, ¶ 18, 305 P.3d 223 (Christiansen, 

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). District courts are 

granted flexibility in determining damages in order to ‚fashion 

an equitable award to the victim,‛ see State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT 

App 417, ¶ 14, 82 P.3d 211, and the court may consider ‚all 

relevant facts‛ in arriving at an appropriate complete restitution 

award, see Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(b). Wadsworth 

argues that the causal nexus between his criminal conduct and 

Victim’s pecuniary loss is not ‚readily apparent.‛ We disagree.

¶14 Here, the district court found a causal nexus between 

Victim’s damages and Wadsworth’s criminal conduct. As 

evidence of the causal connection, Victim testified that beginning 

in December 2009, she had to decrease her work hours due to 

depression, sleep issues, and an inability to interact with her 

coworkers, all arising from Wadsworth’s criminal acts. Victim 

stated that these problems began ‚*r+ight when *the case+ started 

back up again,‛ near the time that Wadsworth was arrested and 

sentenced. When asked what she believed has been the cause of 

her inability to continue full-time work, Victim stated, ‚It’s 

everything to me of what has happened when I was 14. I had six 

years to forget about it and then all of the sudden it just comes 

right back up right in the middle of my life.‛ The district court 

found that Victim’s testimony was credible, and that, but for 

‚being a victim of the crimes that Mr. Wadsworth has pled 

guilty to,‛ Victim would not have suffered from the 

psychological issues causing her her inability to work. The 

district court considered Wadsworth’s failure to appear at his 

sentencing in 2005 and that his reappearance ‚after that 

significant amount of time brought back bad memories and 

caused mental anguish to *Victim+.‛ The court stated that Victim 

suffers from . . . depression or some psychological 

or mental health issues related to this case that 

require counseling, that according to her testimony 

she has suffered from depression that has affected 

her ability to work and [that she] has not been able 

to work full-time when prior to that she was able to 

and that is supported primarily by her testimony.
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Based on Victim’s testimony and the statements and letters in 

evidence, the court concluded that ‚*Victim has+ indicated that 

the depression and therefore her inability to work and how it has 

affected her work is because of the psychological issues that 

have arisen because of being a victim of the crimes that Mr. 

Wadsworth has pled guilty to.‛

¶15 Victim was the only witness to testify at the hearing and

Wadsworth presented no evidence or witnesses at the hearing to 

rebut Victim’s testimony that her depression and inability to 

work were caused by Wadsworth’s criminal activities. On 

appeal, Wadsworth identifies no record evidence showing that 

Victim’s testimony ‚was so lacking that no reasonable person 

would take the view adopted by the trial court.‛

2 State v. Hight, 

2008 UT App 118, ¶ 6, 182 P.3d 922 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). The court appropriately relied on the 

testimony at the hearing, the exhibits, and the pleadings and 

arguments of counsel. See id. Thus, in light of Victim’s testimony, 

her actual loss, and the deference we must accord the district 

court and its authority ‚to fashion an equitable award to the 

victim,‛ Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ¶ 14, we hold that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion or exceed the authority 

prescribed by law in determining that Wadsworth’s criminal 

 

2. Wadsworth argues that the State failed to show that Victim’s 

marital problems were not the cause of her depression and 

consequently her lost wages. But the district court found that 

Victim’s ‚psychological trauma *caused by Wadsworth’s crimes+ 

was manifest by . . . marital intimacy disruption‛ and that these 

marital problems were not intervening causes, because 

Wadsworth’s criminal conduct ‚was the direct cause of the 

psychological trauma to *Victim+.‛ On appeal, Wadsworth 

provides no evidence to rebut the district court’s determinations

and only offers the same speculation presented to the district 

court that Victim’s marital problems could be intervening 

factors. Thus, Wadsworth has not shown that the district court’s 

findings amounted to an abuse of discretion. See State v. Laycock,

2009 UT 53, ¶ 10, 214 P.3d 104.
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20130510-CA 9 2015 UT App 138

conduct was the ‚but for‛ cause of Victim’s lost wages, see State 

v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ¶ 10, 214 P.3d 104.

II. Victim’s Lost Wages Are Pecuniary Damages

Recoverable by Statute.

¶16 Wadsworth argues that even if his criminal conduct 

caused Victim’s damages, her lost wages are more appropriately 

classified as pain and suffering damages that are not recoverable

under the Act. In evaluating this claim, we first examine the 

plain language of the restitution statute, and we will ‚apply 

other methods of statutory interpretation only when the 

language is either ambiguous or inconsistent.‛ State v. Mast, 2001 

UT App 402, ¶ 10, 40 P.3d 1143 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). ‚When examining a statute’s plain language, we 

strive to give meaning to each section of the statute in order to 

give effect to all of the statute’s terms.‛ Id. (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

¶17 The Act explicitly provides for victims to receive 

restitution for lost wages. The Act defines pecuniary damages as 

‚all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet incurred, 

which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the 

facts or events constituting the defendant’s criminal activities‛

and encompasses ‚losses including lost earnings.‛ Utah Code 

Ann. § 77-38a-102(6) (LexisNexis 2008) (emphasis added). The 

Act specifically excludes ‚punitive or exemplary damages and 

pain and suffering.‛ Id.

¶18 Wadsworth argues that although ‚[Victim] identified a 

precise monetary amount she lost,‛ her lost wages result from 

her cutting back her hours ‚because of her emotional issues and 

her own determination of how much she could or could not 

work.‛ Wadsworth asserts that Victim’s claim for lost wages is 

therefore ‚a proxy for pain and suffering.‛ But the Act only 

requires that a victim’s damages ‚aris*e+ out of the facts or 

events constituting the defendant’s criminal activities.‛ Id. And 

‚*i+f readily ascertainable costs associated with emotional injury 

arising directly from a crime were not within the scope of 

restitution,‛ then ‚restitution would not cover reasonable 

counseling expenses for victims of crime.‛ State v. Shepherd, 2012 
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20130510-CA 10 2015 UT App 138

VT 91, ¶ 11, 60 A.3d 213; see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a302(5)(b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2008) (explaining that a court’s 

restitution determination should take into consideration the 

‚cost of necessary medical and related professional services . . . 

relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical 

care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of 

healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment‛).

¶19 ‚The focus in awarding restitution to a victim is not the 

type of injury sustained, but rather the link between the 

damages and the crime.‛ Shepherd, 2012 VT 91, ¶ 11. In Shepherd, 

the Vermont Supreme Court addressed the issue of an award of 

restitution for a sexual-assault victim’s relocation expenses. Id.

¶ 1. The court stated that the victim’s ‚emotional injury and 

ostracization . . . were the natural and probable consequences of 

the sexual assaults, thereby necessitating relocation.‛ Id. ¶ 9. 

Though the victim suffered emotional injury, the court held that 

his relocation expenses had a specific monetary value, were 

based on ‚the disruption of the family’s life, not some subjective 

emotional harm,‛ and were appropriately recoverable as 

restitution because there was a direct link between the crime and 

the costs incurred. Id. ¶ 12. Here, Victim’s lost-wages claim was 

based on the total number of hours she could not work because 

of the psychological trauma directly caused by Wadsworth’s 

criminal acts and reignited by his arrest in 2009. 

¶20 Wadsworth also argues that the Act typically provides for 

lost wages in two instances: (1) when the victim incurs lost 

wages because the offense caused bodily injury to the victim, 

and (2) when the victim’s tools or equipment items of her trade 

are damaged or stolen and those items are essential to the 

victim’s current employment. This argument appears to 

interpret the Act as limiting lost-wages restitution to those types 

of cases. But such an interpretation is inconsistent with the plain 

language of the Act. ‚In determining the monetary sum and 

other conditions for complete restitution, the court shall consider 

all relevant facts, including,‛ among other things, those 

categories of lost wages Wadsworth has identified. See Utah 

Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(b) (emphasis added). ‚[W]hen any 

statute uses the word ‘includ*ing+,’ it ‘means that the items listed 
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20130510-CA 11 2015 UT App 138

are not an exclusive list, unless the word ‚only‛ or similar 

language is used to expressly indicate that the list is an exclusive 

list.’‛ Mallory v. Brigham Young Univ., 2014 UT 27, ¶ 14, 332 P.3d 

922 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(1)(f) (LexisNexis 2014)); 

see also Boyle v. Christensen, 2011 UT 20, ¶ 27, 251 P.3d 810 

(‚When ‘including’ precedes a list, its common usage is to 

indicate a partial list.‛).

¶21 The Act contains no express language limiting the list of 

relevant facts a court must consider when awarding restitution. 

In fact, we note that Utah Code section 77-38a-302(5)(b) instructs 

courts to consider ‚all relevant facts,‛ indicating that a court 

must consider all facts that are relevant to the case, including 

ones beyond those listed in that section. Moreover, applying the 

statutory meaning of ‚including‛ to section 77-38a-302(5)(b) 

yields results consistent with the Act’s purpose ‚of making 

crime victims whole for the harms they suffer because of a 

defendant’s criminal conduct.‛ State v. Ruiz, 2013 UT App 166,

¶ 18, 305 P.3d 223 (Christiansen, J., concurring in part and 

dissenting in part). Thus, a plain reading of the restitution 

statute supports the district court’s conclusion that Victim 

suffered ‚pecuniary damages‛ in the form of lost wages as 

contemplated by the Act. The district court therefore correctly 

determined that Victim’s damages included her lost wages and 

that such damages were appropriately awardable pursuant to 

the Act.

CONCLUSION

¶22 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion or exceed its authority in determining that Victim’s 

pecuniary damages were caused by Wadsworth’s criminal 

activities for purposes of the restitution statute. Nor did the 

district court abuse its discretion or exceed its authority in 

determining that Victim’s damages included her lost wages. We 

affirm the district court’s restitution order.