* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 17, 2010*

Decided November 18, 2010

Before

JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

No. 10‐1441

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

ESTON THOMAS,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 95‐cr‐40003‐JPG

J. Phil Gilbert,

Judge.

O R D E R

A jury found Eston Thomas guilty of distributing and conspiring to distribute crack

cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and we upheld his sentence of 360 months’

imprisonment, the bottom of the then‐applicable guidelines range.  United States v. Lewis,

117 F.3d 980 (7th Cir. 1997).  In 2008 Thomas moved for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2), invoking Amendments 706 and 713 of the sentencing guidelines, which

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 10‐1441 Page 2

retroactively reduced the base offense level for most crack offenses, see U.S.S.G. supp. to

app. C, 221‐26, 253 (2008) (Amendments 706 and 713).  The district court concluded that

Thomas was entitled to a 2‐level reduction to his base offense level because he had

originally been convicted of distributing more than 1.5 but less than 4.5 kilograms of crack,

and Amendment 706 changed U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 to reduce the base offense level for this

quantity from 38 to 36.  The court imposed a reduced sentence of 324 months’

imprisonment, the bottom of the revised guidelines range.

On appeal Thomas argues, as he did in the district court, that he is entitled to a

further reduction because, as he sees it, (1) he was responsible for distributing less than 1.5

kilograms of crack, and (2) the district court erroneously increased his offense level by four

under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for his leadership in the conspiracy.  Thomas’s arguments

challenge the district court’s original sentencing decision, and § 3582(c) does not authorize a

“plenary resentencing proceeding,” Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2691 (2010); see

United States v. Neal, 611 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2010).  Instead, the district court must

determine what the defendant’s guideline range would have been with the amendment and

leave other sentencing factors unchanged.  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1); Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at

2694.  Thomas’s challenge to the increase under § 3B1.1(a) fails because Amendment 706

does not affect the applicability of that guideline to Thomas’s total offense level.  See United

States v. James, 548 F.3d 983, 985 (11th Cir. 2008).  To accept Thomas’s contention that he was

responsible for distributing less than 1.5 kilograms of crack, the district court would have

had to contradict the original determination that he was responsible for more than 2

kilograms, Lewis, 117 F.3d at 986.  Because § 3582(c) prohibits district courts from making

“findings inconsistent with that of the original sentencing court,” United States v. Woods, 581

F.3d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 2009), the district court here properly concluded that Thomas was not

entitled to more than a two‐level reduction to his offense level.

AFFIRMED.