... - ~ '. .. 'I' • " 

~ - ·-

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 11-20-2013 pursuant to E .0. 1352a 
.. 

PAGE SLIDE NO. 

6 

8 

-11 

~ 229 

.j< 255 ~254 

"f- 234 

/.. 235 

--12 

-13 

~16 

./is'.$ "#lfo~ 

/6.11/J 

/139 

-- ./·145 

./l37 

...- 17 v" .:.:..138 

~ ./-¥-141 - /~l_.5t/J )((l?t/J-5 

2.)4t 

17-A y._ I-1 

~ I-2 

'?'-. I-3 

18 'i.. X-1 

'K. X-2 

X. X-3 

-,(. X-4 

~ X-5 

)(.. X-6 

..,._ X-9 

,c. X-lt/J 

. . ' 

·- REF ID: A63359 

SLIDEs FOR SECOND PERIOD 

Marsha1l-Dewey 

BFP 

Morse Op. 

TITLE 

:--

-

hart showing bulletin production, average daily volume 

of daily messages l Dec 1941-31 Aug 1945 

hart showing progress of a message • 

]J:P!:tshemi~ ~~ 

. Dlandol 

Analog deciphering ma.chine 

Another deciphering machine 

Brute Force 

Slide Run Unit 

Section of Wing of IBM, Arlington Hall, 1945 

Purple 

Purple dudbuster 

Antenna field at Hof, Germany 

Intercept position 

Intercept position 

ABNER 

AI.WAC 

ATLAS 

ATLAS & BOGART 

BOGART 

DUCHESS 

SOLO 

IBM 7f64 

.- " "' i .. - .J 

- . - ll •. . 

,.· -
. ,.. 

The title of this,itii•wMMKl< :period Of m:f talk, might well be 11The 

_ - -_ -__~ ~ 1~~~~t~ 11 l"""' M~!;, 91; 

Influence of C-Power on History"; anti- lest some of you jump to the conclusion 

I\ 

that I've suddenly gone psychotic and am suffering from a delusion that I'm 

a reincarnation of the great Admiral Ma.ban, I hasten to ex:plain that the "C" 

~-.. _ ... "~ - in 'Qiiac1a a title tm; 1f" ilial.k is not the word 

stands for the word CRY~LOGIC. 

"SEA" but the letter "C" and it 

The 'full title_Of/\*ee ~-~1~~ -~ woW.d therefore 

be: "The Influence of Cryptologic Power on History." As a sub-title I would 

offer this: "Or..>how to win battles and campaigns and go down in history as a 

great tactician, strategist and leader of men; or, on the other hand, how to 

lose battles and campaigns and go down in history as an incom_petent commander, 

e. military •no-good-nik' ." 

At this point let me hasten to deny that I'm casting any reflections 

b~c~ upon certain~~~eaa&f~~~1¥ successf~comma.nders; names will occur 

to you without ~ ~·l~~ ;:.~m.~ lofRt.4111t:Wrn.~e 'W'ill--be. .names~ot' 

" 

!Jl&J;I .in. eactl-·t)f'·-the two ca:tegories--"how ta- rin'!-and '

1hOW' to lose" battles -and 

caapaisae••l!m'd -entire wars ;-f'cn!' ""that ·'lllatter • 

In his recent book Eisenhower: Captive Hero (Harcourt, Brace & Oo., 

New York, 1958, p. 55) Marquis Childs says: 

~'t't "Any examination of the relationship between Eisenhower and Marshall 

is handicapped by the fact that Marshall has never told his own story. 

Repeated efforts bave been ma.de to-persuade him to write bis account of 

the great events in which he played such a decisive part. He has replied 
REF ID:A63359 

SE·e.RET 

more often than not that no honest history of any war has ever been 

written, and since he woul.d not write unless he coul.d tell the truth he 

meant to keep silent. 11 ~~"t;, 

~ Coul.d it be that1

among other reasons why Seae:iial.-.M&r~ held the belief 

~M~ 

that "no honest history of any war has ever been written';~ felt that if the 

COMINT facts were included in the history the laurels of~comma.nders 

~ ot\,.the 

winning side mightn •t look so shiny as they generally appear'l I am here 

reminded of a story that came to me from a pretty reliable source a couple 

of years ago about a military figure much in the current news. I think the 

story quite apropos in connection with what I've just said. 

~ -?' (Story about General Montgomery if there's time.) 'I~-·-

/ 

Sometimes the course of history is materially changed by the amount and 

;.. -- ~ ....6 - -

quality of the COMINT_~ available to field comma.nders and also how 

:J:.. 

well they use "lihese Oi'f'ens:We-and def'ensive·"Weapons"""'_ Sometimes it is materially 

~ . changed by the absence of COMINT mie, 90!f8B& where it had previously been a 

~ . O"YV2- r i & "&.e BM and used. We have already noted" incident' e:f iie ~!i:!tei6-~,.-..:lihcse 

~o::t; ~ W'O.¢ 

in which lots of first-class COMINT was available, iaelwlh!s~:the COMINT~available 

/' L .. before the attack on Pearl Harbor~ We may now take note of an incident ef ~he 

qape2&~ype.,-~in which the consequences of a lack of COMINT plays the most 

prominent role. 

I have reference here to the' Battle of the Bulge, wherein a serious 

catastrophe was barely averted because our G-2's had come to rely too heavily 

-2-
REF 'ID :'·A63359 secREtf_.. 

on COMINT, so that when it was unavailable they seemed to lack all information 

o.c:la. 

or at J.east they ~ that way. I sa:t.d that a serious catastrophe was barel.y 

averted but even so the l.osses were quite 

I 

"A..ccording to Jlisenhower • s ,/ 

officer, American losses in 

--1\ 

/ 

the Battl.e of the Bulge totall 75,89s men, ~t-whom a,6~t_were killed, , ,.,,. ·/ / 

,'' .,,..,.~ ~ 

47,139 wounded, and 21,144 missing. 

, .. -

Over 8,SS~ of these casualties were .,,..1~' \ 

in the 1S6th ~ivision. ~ Because of heavy German attacks, ' 733 tanks and 

tank ~·~:::rs were \Qat. Two divisions, ~ 28th ~16th, were 

- ' ' ' ~ , "--, '-, 

nearly completely annihilatea., although the 28th Div~sion did subsequently / ~.. ' 

/' 

/ 

enter combat after being rebuilt. 111 

1Robert E. Merriam, Dark December, 1947, p. 211. 

What happened? Why? 

In an article 'M:t h a entitled "Battlefield Intelligence: The Battle of 

the Bulge as a Case History", -and ltbi:cb: watt published in the February 1953 issue 

of Combat Forces Journal., Hanson Baldwin said: 

~ "Intelligence deficiencies and an astigmatic concentration upon our 

own plans with an a'.lmost contempt~ous indifference for the enemy's, set the 

stage in Decem~er~ 1944 f'°: the German successes in the Battle of the 

I • 

Bulge--a case history in the 1 dds and don •ts 1 of intelligence. 11 l' 

;3-

- S:~QL'c~·r 
-

, 

--. ·~ - "In General Sibert• s words, •we may have put too much reliance on 

certain technical types of intelligence, such as signal intelligence ••• 

and we had too little faith in the benefits of aggressive and unremitting 

patrolling by combat troops 

1 Dependence upon 'Magic ' , or signal 

intercepts, was maJor, particularly at higher echelons; when the Germans 

maintained radio silence, our _sources of information were about halved." ~ ..... crtL 

~ha~-eea:.fi"'"om-'P-IME-1.n=tbe -fi:rs"b-~perim·,-the ·110rd --0MAGIC"- .seemed t 

~ ~lie lllSChine 1ihat we .r...,.,.,..to:'uc"ted .far . .11clv:l.1Jg Ja;ilane•e FtOffice- c icati..aD.s. -In reality the ward MAGIC was used as a sort -~ 

~ . .AJ.- . . 

~ 

.z;;;i.. . .. ... • .._..,.,._ .:-.:-.,. • ... 

.. the initiated and ··indoctrinatesl-~rsons wjl~ _ . __ . _ _,, 1;g_-~~ve ,.6JIYJJ1'-i 

t~ aecr~.infarmation· that'~ fran the solu1iion· o:r G._,...Ita:Yaa, - l' . / 

...,.,,. .. _,, - . . / 

- o!istw~et r . .._ t""'"' "'.'"" 4.nk"4'Jl'~a ;to .rw-lQC IJ•H!rl-

. . . -· I 

,,. 

wl\en we besan -'M-·PlaY..-t~~~-~~ypwl-0gic ~B; -we found it U!efulr 

•• and aaeptett·-it,-too.--La.ter-~we came..-;:to._use ~--"ecret-worde to designate--

. . . . :' / 

t" 

.:tbii II l!let t I~ 'llit'l!ll.i~"Ce 1md t~· \~-~~,lords ~¥ :ie.~me "to time, "l"""'O?" security 

-=.~ .T ...C'Ul"rently, _ .COMI~-- is ~omp~.,.,t three-types. ·t:Jl'." 1!a:tegories of intelli-

. A·._· , -- . \ 

B'!ncer e.nd by far the greatest pa.rt· of i'\""~oml!s from intercepting, record:LtJ.g, 

. - '· .. , 

anr3 s~ying enemy radio tra.ff'1c .·-•The three 't~s or categories are: 

r '•'\, 

(;L) S;gec.ial ;ii;i;~~ll;t.genc~} which comes from the solu\ion and processing of the 

,r \ 

.e,w:rypted messages 4!F=Jl1Sel.ma. and the res'Ul. t is inf~tion of highest-reJ.iabiillY 

F/ "\. b~ca~. J.t c/' JJQ.. "140 pp~ak., ·~righ~ .. O\.lt ~LJJ;le l}..Q!:_!=Je'Q ~~h". (2)-~~c 

~ ' . / ' 

i;ritelligenc.e;.which comes from the study of what are called "the external.e~-of 

-4-

r;; ~-.,~ .. ?'-·-.r::.--::'"'"t'~ ct. t •• ,, - ~ ,. ........... __ ... -~ ........ _ 
·. 

the frenuencies ":L __. 

./ ... th~ssssages' data applic:,a.ble to such things a:s t~eir callsigns' 

. \ .. ,, ~, 

employed, th2:S:ireb'tion or rou:Ci~~s, and _;::.,o on and tr~ this comes inf'orma.tion '"' ,,,.., .. ·· · . . ,,,. ,,,,..:... ·~ 

/11 illference "'e.n .be a:_~; arid. l~~ '.:'1~μ1.ienc~,--::ch comes 

tram tbe "•tin;:_ or ~--~ther ~:·-~·· ~ wartime a.llli ~_n in 

peacetime to 8s -~tain degree, ar~C~YJ?ted. In this audienc~·it's hardly ........... ,h··'' '•.. ~ .... - -~ ....... ...,.- •,, .- ,,,..,...,,. ' ~ ,, / ' 

necu ;y: -~~ ~=~; !Jcnr' ~~t a roJ.e / ~her plays in tbe c~uct or 

var. ::;:.';l!>tl:)-~s also beed as~ over-all. resp "~ ELDiT, 

o~ctronic intelligence, b~on't go into that in t~alk. ~ ~~ }o ,k CA«Lt_ V\J!)~I(. .&J. ~ \11.1.~"""i'Nui.L"'fo~ There is hardly need for me to give you a definition ofACOMINT, but 

perhaps I should cite its three principal objectives. First, to provide 

authentic information for policy makers, to apprise them of the realities of 

the international situation, of the war ma.king capabilities and vulnerabilities 

of foreign countries, and of the intentions of those countries with respect to 

war. Second, to eliminate the element of surprise from an act of aggression by 

another country. Third, to provide unique information essential to the 

successf'ul prosecution, and vital to a shortening o~the period of hostilities. 

It was in response to this third and last objective of COMINT that World 

- - - .. - War II gave a brill~ant answer. f ~m sure you would find the detailed story 

of the 

1ku.s.A~ ~~\).~. N~- ~t"o..,,,,J,.6M L<\)~~Ju7 

successes of"Ne!'P,n 2\r-m;,-,,..-and Army- Air Col'p~ ~:_yptapalyats~:,.~f'-~· "' 

............ -=-------'· 

1::::.--· 

~~es sages 

think the 

in World War II highly 

contents of ·the Marshall-Dewey letter, from which I read a bit in the 
---------~---------~ .. ------

first period, will have to suffice. However, it in itself is sufficient to 

give you a pretty good idea of the contributions COMINT ma.de toward our winning 

World War II. It is unfortunate that General Marshall's letter was disclosed 

during the Congressional Hearings)for it's now in the public domain and its 

contents are undoubtedly now ~own in_~l~ the important chanceries and war 

. . - - _;, 

offices of the world. General Marshall, you'll remember, in his letter to - . -

Governor Dewey, sent during the hot political· campaiSn of 1944, was asking 

~ 

the Governor not to use certain ini'ormation~Dewey got by surreptitious channels. 

~~ \'l\~QQ. 8~ COM\N"r ~,.t. ~ ~~"\U...>-~ w~ ~&Pe some excell.ent illustrations of ~r ·-Qf-.emplo,mee.t-of-COMINT~ ' 

~.wa.~ ~ J>~ ~o=t- )\-o ~ ~~- .~ "Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone 

ahead with this business of deciphering their codes until we possess 

other codes, German as well as Japanese, but our main basis of informa.-

tion regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's 

messages from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other 

officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes 

involved in the Pearl Harbor events. c 0~~ ~ ,to W,o.:..tCrra-.f 'i ~) 

'1"'1.~"f "To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would 

be 'W"~ipea. 1 out almost in an instant ii' the least suspicion were aroused 

regarding it, the Battle of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered 

messages and therefore our few ships were in the right place at the 

right time. Further, we were able to concentrate on our limited forces 

to meet their advances on Midway when otherwise we almost certainly 
would have been some 3,~~~ miles out of pl.ace. 

P"°""'". "We had f'ulJ. information o-.r the strength of their forces in that 

advance and al.so of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians 

which -.finally landed troops on Attu and Kiska. 

f>O)l.O... "Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we 

obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various 

garrisons, the rations and other stores continuing available to them, 

and what is o-.r vast importance, we check their fleet movements and the 

movements of their convoys. 

~. "The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain 

by reason o-.r our submarine action largely results -.from the fact that we 

know the sailing dates and the routes o-.r their convoys and can notify 

our submarines to lie in wait at the proper point. 

~· "The current raids by. Admiral Hal.sey•s carrier forces on Japanese 

shipping in Manila Bay and elsewhere were largely based in timing on the 

known movements of Japanese convoys, two of which were caught, as 

anticipated, in his destructive attacks. 

*********** 

a~Jl ~'l4..· "The conduct of General. Eisenhower Is campaign and of all operations 

in the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the 

information we secretly obtain through these intercepted codes. They 

contribute greatly to the victory and tremendously to the savings of 

-7-
American lives, both in the conduct of' current operations and in 

looking toward the earl.y termination of the war." ~rot:;_. 

~ f>t\..r~ . ..ti.c: - ~ ~ ~-._,_ 'A.1-d~ 

It will be helpful. to list in sequence the steps involved in the production 

. . 

•,-

of COMINT. First, of course, "il7ieM comes -.. intercept--you•ve got to have 

.., 

the traffic and getting it is no small trick. Modern'eiectrical high-speed 

-- ~ 

cpDDnunication systems used by ~ l.arge governments re~uire higb.-p 

y .shif'ti~ of fr~quenc~SJ·....ftO. · · · .-

/a / ....,_. , T / ._,;.>•" - --- ...=. f' ) 

e"l.tiMK'-¥4h'e<>tiQI!- _m~--~ 

.1;:u:i81!!'111'-"l"llfi!-" ~.~. ~ ~-;~U:-~~r~iDg, viii~ takes lUlvant 

7 I j-· I\/ / !~· 1/ .'\ , : 

that every transmitter,emits el~e(ro-ma.gne~~ r iations c 

~-·· ~/ / \ 

of that 

~ 

tran ·tfu; and it is possible t~:ref'ore to,..;dentif'y a\-transmitter by 

,. ; ~ 

~udzing the c~teristics Of its .,.,;;;,;.:t~. ·'~ t~e-"head~\ers served 

~ ' --- -, . / .. by th~i transmitter ~4. the t;ansmitting stati~~ mo;es, the move can be 

.J 

" /., .. ~ ,,• ·" . " \ 

f'o owed by ~ans _.-;f' the. transmitter's 'fing;~print" >so to speak. It is ihao 

// \.\ ..... ,• -" ~ ...... 

pos,;.J-bl-...,o iden fy operat-~.• -~:Marse telegraph commun/~. --'that is, 

\. . \ ~ \ 

every operat~has cbarac~eristics of' his own, and 1ou can by studying their 

' ,.,,'.;.( \ _ ............. / 

,,./ ' "'.. ..,,,,. transmissions i entify them wherever o~ whe"never they move. This is very 

\y~ .. :- / \\ L'' usef~ ~ work ~7ma.Lins to be done in dir~~tion finding, in radio finger-

~ ' \ ~ ¢nting and i~ Morse ·.perator identification.]' 

- :.8-

<=_ • .r ..... ~ - - : .I 
The interception of the traffic is not only a complicated but also a very 

expensive enterprise, costly in numbers of personnel. and equipment. If there 

were time I'd show a few slides of typical intercept stations and intercept 

' -· 

positions. You surely must realize that the business of intercepting a message; 

J,..:.. 

$1 Je ail&lJilat.,.4ie. is hardly identical. with· that of receiving a message when the 

,t.~~~~-~~~~~- ·-·· - ~ 

wfi:rie~-?& legitimate meM>er,s.of the radio net. The intercept operator ~ ~ -

th'\~~)2~~ o--1~~~ 1~ ~ ~(... ~ 

hardly break in and say: "Hey, bud, I didn't get that last group. Repeat it, 

" 

~tan'9-·'1!Jteplli-and Wetting the intercept copy back to where it can be worked 

on, that is, getting it there in good time, is also compl.icated and highl.y 

important. Much of the traffic bas to be forwarded el.ectricall~ ite--lse ef• 'E-·-

__ ...,.__,.,.. ~M --~ ns mo!O'e"-tfte.n: -bisterica:l --inter.es;t., ~ - if" requires the Armed Forces to 

· ~L~~S~~~"~· allocate •M:J:·NSA special communication channels and facilities~tPell:~NSALB'-

'-
REF ID:A63359 

Si:1CrtaT 

as those Tucted bT 11J3Y lar;, .\rganiza~ion ~~ providiDg cOD1DUI1ica)",'?" 

systems /th~_ is, systems a-¢ means for getting messages from cert n people '\ . \ 

ertain other ~opl call them originators ·~ address The only 

. \ and tbe principal. iftll('ence between this ordinary ~or comnunications and 

what goes the prod~tion of COMINT is that w int~rpose ourselves between 

\ \ ~~WO'~ originators and ~~ended addressee of the mess~ges~~t:-1.a., wit~out 

'.> ~. ~ 'J..x, ~ ~\ permission and often "\_7-lmowl.edge we in\.\oursel.ves on 

-~distribution list. Of course- ... we•re not furnished the keys and cryptoteriel that the ~~ ed addr sees \ ~e provided """~~ wi"t~ •e malie un~uttoning o5 

sy process; ~ have to -. .,... vorlt out~ keys, 

~ ' 

and:;;: oi'ten ver ,aifficuJ.t but it has ~n done in the past and~ ~ \\ 

pro <].~ in futlB!e wars , ... ere' s the .Job Qt .tra.nsl.ati~ 

usually involves making the neces y corrections-end~ 

expl.a.Da: ..iiotes. --The?"!" ·'is -an important corollary· to-what -l:-'m 

-~ ~: ~~ .. ""'t, ~~~it~ ~J.~~o+~ ea,:ing..-bere-mid i.t iv-tbatAthe real key to success in the production of COMINT 

• "C"" r ,. ... 

is excellence in our own communication systems. Unless we can get the traffic 

. 

' quickly and accurately back to where it can be worked on by the analysts and - . -

i::l5" unless we have rapid and secure communications ~as the various analytical 

stations and also to those authorized to receive the final COMINT, you're conducting a mere exercise, not a real operation. 

The next step after interception is traffic analysis, that is, the 

\~t~ct.w..~ reconstruction of the radio nets of the enemy and the~~ation of their 

transmitter stations. This gives very important information on two counts. 
radio 

battle, which is very important. The. reconstruction of ililf:-networks is not .aa ~ "" -. ·. . ~ . 

easy g ? when the ca.11signs and frequencies are changed rapidly. It is c:l.> 

_6}~!:1~~ ~l through Worid War .II ~~~aJ,(llo~A.~~ a f:W- ~· ~a¥ae-Gumlilas --•eemed--t~ -·tM:ir =eal±s~gns 

. . ~~-~°""""~ ~ ~o.~ocd- a.nd frequencies without tao much trouble!z-~~"1m-Wli-ilar.lk~ a goea 

• • ()"M.. ~ ~- ~g ~ft 1-'t'O.~ deal of trouble and we had to keep a 8 l many people working ~$ all the , 

time. 

The second good reason for engaging in traffic a.nal.ysis is that every 

~'-14 "'"f ~ ~ ~'pJa.t>~ ~ once in a while your crypta.na.J.ys-t's ~; a roadblock and Yjl'Pden 1-t·-h8.ve·mIJ 

COMINT, in which case the onl.y thing you have to fall back upon are non-COMINT 

.... ,- -....L _.___ 

.,e- _..,.........., •""-•__._.. ........ - ,().-- - • ..-. T • 

sources of information1 llrifiel · 2 ··-=--3 y:.but you still can get 

good information from traffic analysis from simply watching the ebb and flow 

of traffic, changes in routings~ etc., from which you can make inferences of 

~~~4.~b/ what is happening or going to happen. Now these, mind you, are"~a-· 

a-~~ ~~tt: ~ ~· ~ ~~~"C&.l ~ ~')~.ti.u1L 

~;_~~ .. ;~~~t:x,g~~..__~. -=-....i . -c:l D ·~ · P...t!.-~t-~~ The next step, of course, is cryptanalysis, · .iJ:!~n ·:f:.n,e. . ~ 

~~)~ J\.o..u1"" ~ ·~ ~ '{!.oM\ NT'~ ~eA,, f'..ew. moment&,.~:t&l'--~ ve -ou"tl.ined briei'J.y~the succeeding s.teps .iD. COMINT 

ID!'eilt.Cr&!:ar. It is obvious that the decrypts, if they are in foreign language, 

have to be translated into good English.'and with the translation there is . "\.- - - I r ~ 

always a certain amount of emendation, because of errors in transmission or 

l 

"tv..o.!A.. ..... 

in reception, _...errors by cipher clerks and so on. iiew•ho•w•ii'wilildl1ta · A ~ . You must bear in mind that all this business is conducted as a very large-scale 

X•xgJP**'•iie :i:lllbt:mmx:x~ mt'lCiblKU~ \ 

production or exploitation operation. You are not 

.. dealing with ~e--ar 

Just a few messages a day--there are thousands of them. i!•lli show you by'lt· 

/ 

"') 

~ , 

- - - ,,_ . --. - ~ . 

...,. 

,,. • P- • 

. =bl-= __....-- .:!: ·- fl • I' -. ,., bx - = 

. 
REF ID:A63359 ~-,--.~·----=-

ci~\f;:;~~ I 

~~~s.-~· The next step is the evaluation of the information and ~-~-i'¥e 

+ )o ~~ti..~ o-4 C()M,NI ~CM A.,,.,,-~· 

been otal:lriag-abeu;IF-1Jile...COMIW1 .pro0uet· ,a&- inf'orma.ti:on. This is something which 

the intell.igence people are most insistent about, saying that it's their job 

-· ~ ik~,~~~ ~ ~~t"' to evaluate the A QQ&Hi' and to collate and check r<_ ~ information from other 

~Q,G,.~ 

sources. And I suppose that this is· a ·•e.,."' necessary. tlaiae .. It is conceivable 

that an astute enemy might actually mislead you by sending out a phoney or 

two, in which case the intelligence people should be able to detect the spurious 

message by collating what it says with what there is from other sources. 

And then there comes finally the dissemination of the COMINT product and 

this has to be very, very carefully controlled, Fer· this purpose there are 

\ 

~ 

special cry:pto-s~tems and special security officers, and the decrypts are 

...... _kept out of the normal. communication er message centers, so as to keep the 

-~~-+o~a:t: . number of persons .e~ifi@ =them: to an absolute minimum. 

~ p.ivu.e.¥..~ All el "4ifiem have to have 

~ ' . a "special clearancef ~~1a.l·-mth'S'''"Or.rS'1.gning.-on and off. 

. A.~ ctfNow I will go back to COMINT processing and give you ~ information about 

cryptanalytic techniques and gadgetry. I venture to say that you all know the 

~~ mental picture the average citizen has of a cryptanalyst. ~.....:the-~pictUl'e-i-s..a 

/\ 

----------:~.~~-~ w ~ 

~~.JJJ~Qlil~oo;Ll.ate-.tli..®.C& .• .sm.e .I . .JlOW show you,... of 'fr:tthemlus, -Whom I-mentioned before. 

egg-head; €ears thick .spect~ has long whiskers, with 

' l ~ ~a:t~l. I 

crumbs in them, he has grimy fingers and finger nails, and)...~· This chap 14.-

~u.\ .. ~ti.i'cl ~ ~ ~ ~ into a huddle all by a:Mn•F.i.th himself~ the cryptogram and sooner or later 

,'f::::. :-:-:-: . - -- • :-- ::-=:.Mia 

""'.. ~;\'~i"t .. ,a" L• ~ ..... .:.:a ~ 
I I ' -.i,._' -- he comes up with the_ ~wer, __ shouti~ ~ekal Gr, as a aevelopmeht the siilaf't 

- oloW• Well, that picture~= is fa.r 

~from the truth these days, for~~ J.fr is "big business~' 

;) ~t,..~~~ ~-~ 

now--very big business indeed• -Beee:me-u&•!'e"""e~~lf~ 

wdut.. ~~ /) .Jo,. • ~ 0 ~ Mlliort'itall:are on ~t every year now_~ ot.W A. J.~t; b ~· 

Cryptanalysis of ID:od.ern crypto-systems_ bas been facilitated, if not ~ 

- Jr -

:'~ made possible~·by the use and application ofnspecial cryptanalytic aids, :4 •. 

- lat>-~ ~~~~~)-¥;.d-'W)J 

including the,, .... hhigb speed electronic-machinery and digital computer~~./ 

r 

liome g,f w.)lj cb ..I.!.J J -show-· in &lidee -W-.'CO!lle. Some are standard machines, but 

mostly we deVise aM ltlle mod.if'icatio.ns of' them. Mel!'e iapol:tanirly·,--we. • .Rave 

.:recea;t;i.,o I!._ 4Mc-tlle--..a1>i<m, -Aevelopnent, f-producti<0roof'-~ Si!eeiiaH'Hd electronic. ;.~tanalyt1-c g&dge'try. At this point I must take 

a few moments to clarify the picture and in simple language tell you what ~ 

gadgets do f'or us. M-I--=...said before;-& mere- number of' permutations"'-and 

invt>1ve in terms of cryptogr~phi_g mea.ningf'ulness .. and 

/ty. , .,._ l.,,pditrJWilJ1;te stto:cks Oll'j.- ct ;ypto-cammmioations of 

~~ ~maerna "What- you ar.--up.--aga.inst are -usmnly -quite· complex 

=~tt~o--.v~~~~~ »4A ... ,o~ ~~~~00# .aryptosystems wll!i!eB generally involve,,..._ taei-3!1 BO'lii{ioa.,-the making o£ • 

k 

great multiplicity of hypotheses each of which must be tested out, one after 

the other, until you find the correct one. _-'Phe ~ob of the cryptanalyst is 

,Jio. deyiae short cuts for testing ~he hypotheses, short cuta-often based upon _.,... .... i .. 

the use of statistics and statistical theories having to do with the relativ.,e 

-J.13-

.... I:~- • - .-1 

0-::aii ·...= u "t' .. '----~ .... 

-
_,,V=equency of letters, pairs or sets Of letters, vords, sets of- words, and so 

. - on-. ~.Once having devised t~ proper test or tests for each hypothesis, or for 

0£-~~' . several -concurrent-""!!ypothese~ human labor could be set to work making the 

millions of tests in order to find the correct hypothesis or to cast out the 

L. r-.. ~ - vast majority of incorrect one~ Wbln~"4taob-test -is ·-complicated, or lengthJZ:, 

~~-is ·;v-;_o:-;i:,-;;~~~d have to have, as we used to say, factorial n Chinamen ~ - ~~ to do the ~ob, or else the Job would take eons of time· ~ 2 

eJ!!tHifteDce_.. tJ;Bt. ~:y .tes:t which can. be· made-by' -1\and can -be mec.banized, and # 

-· 

i:t 's ..S:la-41~~ ~-~~:-~:·:st cases. it is practicable to build 

machines which will make the tests. I don't have to tell you that machines 

don't tire as rapidly as humans, they don't need much sleep, or time out for . ' 

meals, or for recreation or for s~ch things as s~opping, love-making, etc.--

in short, the "care and feeding ~ of,..~chines" is a Mlat:JveJ.y _ __. more simple 

.... '" 

matter than the "care 

other macll:Gies· wh ~h apply the r-ec"OVeNJ'd 

-- ""' 

' k~S JM) &lile.~:J.fic measages and produce the plain tesi11 from tlll!ln~a.l,!;. 
.._.._..._~,4 

.:.. ··-· 

ieit<-me 

~ ;'. 

e~pbasi&A.l\'iil& 

!_ ·~ t3ut~~- machines .can ~ 

do only one thing: they can 

... 

l9llf perform, at a high rate of speed, proce1ses which the human brain and 

hand can perform but only at a much slower rate. Let me emphasize that these 

machines don't, they can't, replace the thinking processes involved in . . 

cryptanalysis. .. ~.. · ... ... - - .. - • . This may be a good place to read a :paragraph or two from a very recently 

4-star 

published book by retired/General Albert C. Wedemeyer to show you what misconceptions about cryptology can be entertained even on the highest levels, when 

·the information comes, as the Navy letter I read you at the beginning of the first 

.period states, via channels of gossip. · 

General Wedemeyer states, in connection with his discussion of U.S. culpability 

in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,1 that President Roosevelt had ample 

lwedemeyer Reports, Henry Holt & Co., New York, p. 43(6. 

time to broadcast a warning, and he goes on to say: 

~~ "The argument has been made that we could not afford to let the 

Japanese know we had broken their code. But this argwnent against a 

Presidential warning does not hold water. It was not a mere matter of 

having broken a specific code; what we had done was to devise a machine 

which could break any code provided it was fed the right combinations by 

our extremely able and gifted cryptographers. The Japanese kept changing 

their codes throughout the war anyway. And we kept breaking them almost 

as a matter of routine." 

Would that we had had such a ma.chine then--or that we had it now, for it 
\3'f 

,. 

.I 

/ 

e thoughts. It i~·to be hoped that the rest of General Wedemeyer•s book 

is ure.te +..,,,, :r.eapects ~.it is in regard to cryptologic ones. 

~&.n. X-&- • / ""'. .... l)"t..~ ~ o ..... ~~ > Ne~~-wa.n;...' to show you what ~-et. these machines look like; Hel"e--is-a' .. 

~~!~1 ~~ £.~o-/J.01~ ~~~~ .. ~~. li · ~~·.war-rr·"1!1Sl!l'l:Pne :rorl!ec1phef'1-ng111esssges-;-we-call7· 

' " . 

"a.ne.t ~·'~e.use e.J.though ""t does what the ~•s cryptosystem does, e.ey; 

e between it e.nd ~-en"""'" machine is ~el;y coincident~o 

e"xiu.e.in, I' 11 • e.y this: In/ ~~C processing ::,,\.,.., ~y t; dupl.icate 

/ . . - I . of~~' s::t::,encipher e.nd d ~ l messages of the D8llY 

irN~.fed ~~--~OPUllllllication. ~'tliese messages, or most of 

them ""'in1/'Cepted, they all ~into °"" /Pj&ce ,_ e.nd you ce.n only have a 

certain ~r of peop1e to process-~ 'If you b8.ve the key or keys, then it 

of production-line dlcisring; so we devise special machines 

I J 

~ / 

~o decipher the mes \es. As I/s~ before, t '\°hines may / have any 

\ .. /, resemblance wbatsoever·.~o the/enemy's cryptographic·.ma.~chin;,.s, but they duplicate 

~I / 

what their machines do, anij1do so at a high rate of spc;t ~. Here's a picture of 

m•••.A&wiw 

another such device. 

In this :next 

, / \ 

slje you see a tabuJ.8.tor, 

// 

a s 

~ andard tabulator . / 

with a special 7~t devise \Your 7 'ineers susceptf le of doing what 

we call "bru,,·'f'orce" operations, where 'You are 

/ \/ 

~" ~ / 

basis of which are few and scattered over a large volume \messages. 

.,; 

~/ 

we;l, if you've and millions of letters, or code groups, the'\ 

~cation of those repetitions is a pretty laborious thing if you have to do it 

<..._ -- -- I 
!4\ 

l s-o. $" 

by d, so we speed the search up. A machine of this kind will locate these ... -" /' 

say, one-ten-thousandths of the time tlia.t it would take to do ~/ .. -

it by band. a speciali~ed ma.chine/ again a tabulator, with an attachment, 

/' 

here, that is used for passing th~ text of one message against the text of ,,,.... 

another message in order.to find c 

/,; 

/ 

or perhaps differences, 

or maybe homol~ts:' and it does it autom4~ally. These relays are set up 

/" ~ 

Z

cardi 'to certain circuitry; you start the mach~ow and behol.d, it 

Oduces a printed record of the message repetitions or what"n.ot. 

w!&.Q..~~~ - -a ma.chj.i(e whic"h I personally call "Rodin", after ~~~ piece of 

~ ,/r 

/ / work by the gI".eat French sculptor Rodin, who sculpted a p+ece of engineering \/ / _/\ /"' 

known as 11The Thinker." This ma.chine almost thinks. What it does is this: , ' ~-

you {e~ into i~ certain number of lcypot~s.{..-8.lld you tell it, "Now, you 

/' \ /"' .. \ ,! 

· examine these hypothes\s and come up yith one which will answer all the 

''\. /" 

following conditions. 11 The Yh1ne takes the first hypothesis, let's say, 

,;"' ........ 

..,. '· examines that, and as soon as it·comes to a contradictio:p. it says, "Rell, that's .; .. """, ,.,- ... , /. -....-; t _. 

no good; I'll go back and take up the :dext one." ,And so on. It tests the /,/ ··~.. -~ /< ,,, -- hypotheses,, one after.the other, at a high_;4t~ of speed, at electronic speed. 

/ - . ~ . ;.."' ' ~ ,,""~ ~ one· sllltll:,m:tron, or==tne ~ii~~ ', . - ./" 

o ~e an idea of size of ma.chine talla~ion a 

wet? 

1945--one wing. 

----- show you 

7 ' jue~ ai"ter ple machine--~econstructed ."-. ........... 

entirel_y by cr~si faulty Purple messages 

a.nd-ltec:Lpher ~:m· 

-17- - ~'~·- ·- ::..:... 

~- - r= E _.. ·-··· ;-;:; I 
Before sb~ng you a few of our newer ma.chines I want to switch-to another 

. ""' ,../ projector and this gives me a chance to show a f~ slides ref;.ted to intercept 

I-1 work. Here's an antenna ~at Hal', Germany sh~:: t;ypes of masts and ' ....... /' /' .... ....,_,,.,,..-

I-2 mobile intercept vans. Next, an intercept operating position at a Navy station .. ...,.,- --.. ... .;/"" .......... .. 

I-3 on Skaggs Isl.and and one a~ :ar;;~rhaven.- Practic::J:ly al.l the equipment is specia11y 

designed and deve.ld~-or far BSA, and a ~eat deal ~cept is taken 

-~· /' 

in record form, on magnetic tape as a rul.e. 

17-A- -. . ' ..... €:~ F~-7' .~- -.. R G .• 
X-l. 

X-2 

X-3 

X-4 

X-5 

X-6 

..: . ..,,,· ~ i 

'(• I 

X-9 

x-10 

REF ID:A63359 

SECRET I·~ now show a few of' our newer machines, which for ~he most part 

spec~\i.es~ high-speed electL-~ digital comp.i~:. \ / ,/ 

ABJIER ll, wbi"\ uses a mere~,, tank :tar st~. ,or, memory. Next ~/ ,l,uiM; III 

\ ~ • ~ I 

which is one of' a·-,x: of' four J?S.Chines re~~ely \ontrolled so iaat four analytic 

units can ~all ~ ~~ine ~iito action to sql.ve ·t~ s~ or {ifferent but already ,. ,.., ' I \ I 

/ . . - / ,, I \ / 

programmea.-:ror probl.ems., This is a ma.chine which ca.k?. l;>e used when a Job is too / \ , x· ,.. I \ 

I~ ' " ; " ,• ~ .. / \ big for hand work and too small. for one of our J.arge machines buiJ.t to handl~ , \' I / \ 

. y ./' -· \ - • ,J \· ..--,--';I: ,._ 

really big and complex jobs; such as ATLAS 2, Serial l, which has a magnetic-drum ·,\ . \ 

. . . . :. - : \ \ . . / '\ 

; ·,· . . / \ . . \ 

and ala~ an el.ectrostatic-:tube st<>fage SJStem, the f'ormer for high-speed memory I ' •I I \ \ 

operations. ' \ 

I · · i / . .,, . \ 

A newer ATLAS using magnetic cores for memory is n~.under / / ..... \ 

.-/ \ \ 

? \ 

struction. I~ this next slide you'll see how the substitution of solid .,, ,. f \ \ 

.,/ - \ r ' '\ 

constate 

l' ' , °\ ' diodes puch as ~etic cores permits miniaturization. The slide shows ATLAS 

'• I \ ' 

.. \ / \ \ 

it BOGART, which does ev~rything that ATLAS does but is muc~· .. l \ ' \ ,,l "\ and alongside 

\ 

smal.ler and faster. A'iLAs will be the J.ast of the '\J.d style machines using 

J ~ 

f \ 

electronic tubes. Here's a J.arge view of BOGART; and hext I show you DUCHESS 

' I \ . .....__ which d~s certa;tt quite compl.ex mat~hing and cryptanalytic operations with 5-digit . I . \ 

\ I \ \ 

code group~ J the rate of 5'1J,f6S9J groups .per second. Next I s~~ you SOLO, a 

~ . \ 

transisto?ized machine which has the general capa.biiity of ATLAS and can operate 

. I \, '.... '\ .. I \ ' ,\ '- . at meg,cycle spee~--a million pulses a second. I,may add that NSA has.f of course, 

I \ . \, \ 

I \ ' \ 

a nymber of other tYl\s of computers, incl.uding IBM's ~~4; in fact, NSA ~~ the 

. \ \ \ J \ • • 

lrgest collection of ei~~~onic computers and data proces.~ing machines in th~'. 

,'1orld. It must have them ~.order to handle the very J.arge and complex analyti~ . \ ' 

pr6-biems which i1L ;Ls expected to handle. 

'~ 
REF ID:A63359 

SS-Ott ET 

Because of the complexity of modern high-grade crypto-systems, the great 

~ 

:maj9riyy of them cannot be solved in the field, either at the intercept site 

or a.ta 

, 

rear headquarters.A.'-!taiB 

~~~ low-grade systems a.nd a certain amount of 

t..arfic ~is ~ be per:t'armed by :t'iel.d ;:; , Ae-I--..IreaAly _sai<Lsome 

eOM:aft' precessi~can·be'--done in the fie1d to meet certain immediate needs 

of :eld _: base commands, or forces a.f'21oat• Mt ---~' ~-ytri:eila ge1> 

l.'19Pe.t~~ate4- I am heg:i.mt..i.ng7 :cubtf'ul•··how' fa.r~s--can be pushed, 

~-~ £._ ... -·--···-~ 

Ea.ch Service ~L f'i1:~. Prue 

provides for its own special needs inA~his eategor~-·~J 

COMINT processing is essentially a complex activity a.nd much of it can be 

done well only a.t major processing centers where the limited numbers of highly 

skilled personnel can be concentrated a.nd very specialized analytic machinery 

can be installed.am!. maintained. ~ /\..Zt is not enough"to ~ install them-~ 

they have to be ma.intaine~and that's not easy. There is no pool in civil 

occupations for cryptanalytic engineering and maintenance personnel--this is 

an important fact to remember. We •v~ got to train our own in pretty nearly 

-. all cases. 

I want to say a. few words about th;e great :l,plportance of coordinating 

COMINT activities with other intelligence operations a.nd with the tactical 

situation. Although COMINT is the most reliable, the most timely a.nd, in the 

long run, the most inexpensive kind of intelligence, it must, as I've said 

before, still be evaluated, collated, correlated and coordinated with 
intelligence coming from other sources, if for only this reason: to provide 

data for cover and protection of COMINT sources • When a decision has been ma.de 

to take action based on COMINT, careful efforts must be ma.de to insure that the 

action cannot be attributed to COMINT alone. This is very, very important. 

When possible, action must al-Ways be preceded by suitable reconnaissance and 

.· 

other deceptive measures, otherwise the goose_ that lays the golden eggs will 

be killed. I am going to give one exa.m;Ple of what is meant by COMINT cover. 

On a certain day.in November 1944, an enciphered code message was sent by . - "\" . 

a certain Japanese staff section to a certain Japanese Air Force unit, requesting 

' .. " -- ~ . air escort for two convoys carrying troops to reenforce the Philippines. The 

message gave the number of ships, tankers, escort vessels, date of departure, 

port and route, and noon positions for the next seven days. The message was 

solved in Washington. 

one convoy c()JDJMDder reported in a 

Two days after the convoy left,/('9 rracnif...,..lllc 

that his~ 

message which was also intercepted and solved,.-... ..a .. ~ .. .-; had been sighted 

by a B-29, with strong indications that the other convoy had also been sighted. 

A few hours later, messages from these convoys reported losses as follows: 

six ships definitely sunk, one disabled, one on fire. Later we learned from 

another source that one aircraft carrier was also sunk. But did you·**•r 

- That B-29 ~ notice that message about the B-29? ~ just didn't happen to be cruising 

areund there; it was sent there to be observed. ~oJ: ~ ~ eoMLNT' ~. 

Of course knowledge and experience point to the necessity of exploiting 

every possible advantage a tactical situation affords, and the temptation is 

naturally very great, in the heat of battle, to use COMINT whenever and wherever 

.. 
it is available. This may lead to carelessness which quickly jeopardizes 

COMINT sources. Of' course, the full value of' COMINT cannot be realized unless 

operational use is ma.de of' it; however, when action based on it is contemplated, 

possible compromise of' source must always be borne in mind and the danger of' 

. compromise weighed against the military advantages to be gained. A minor 

military advantage is never alone sufficient grounds f'or risking the loss of' 

c.a~~~ 

the source--this is a· ~ardina.1 principle Mv /\Co MI H'r° ~ • 

Also we must bear in mind that cr~tosystems are usually world-wide or 

area-wide in distribution and changes made as a result of suspicion of 

W.,J 1n'\&- ~ 

compromiseAmay therefore have a far-reaching consequence on the ability to 

produce COMINT elsewhere. The Commander seeking a minor advantage by using 

COMINT in one locality may thus deprive another Commander of' much greater 

~ advantage or even deny it to I\. Commander of a major operation. 

Finally, another aspect of' coordination is that between the operations 

officers and the COMINT officers. The COMINT authorities should be carefully 

oriented to give the optimum coverage for operations in progress. ~ ~ ~t.L~i~~ ~ ;:;etr eo-ma'V f'acili~ies ;and personnel" available, and only a part of' the 

enormous amount of traffic can be obtained and processed. Therefore it is 

essential that the COMINT producers be constantly informed of current and 

planned operations so as to direct attention where most needed. 

very, very important point to get across. 

I 

~ 

This~ a 

because commanders in charge of large-scale operations are naturally leery of' 

-~-
- • M .. . Q ~~-g_ J • ~· ~...._. ...... • ••• 11"'"!"' __ ~~. ~- - - Ct_,-"'">'-~- ' ~ 

telling any outsiders what they were ple.miing to do, and the how, when, and where 

~ 

of 1Jj\e impending operation. Mutual confidence must be established, so that the 

~~~OJZQ. 

COMINT producers learn what the ~tions-&t-df i& 

OJWlbther. 

'O'"fl.C.. 

planning; they support eaEHiThis isn't the only or the most important kind of cooperation that 1s absolutely 

vital for success in COMINT production, which nowadays is done on a really world-

·wide scale and requires a great deal of cooperation of all sorts 1 among many 

thousands of skilled personnel scattered practically over much of the earth's 

surface and separated by hundreds or thousands of miles. The integration and 

direction of the COMINT effort is a truly huge military enterprise and requires 

a high order of managerial ability and intelligence. Let me close 1~ this part11 by 

saying that not only does NSA have a large number of workers in COMINT endowed 

[ ~ ~ ~'Jr "'°'"'"""'po~ A\'-'. 

with great intellectual capacity but it also has available to it and uses the 

/\ 

brains of some of the greatest scientists of this country. They come as 

consultants and advisers; they work on NSA contracts, and they help NSA in other 

ways 1 for instance 1 by moral support. w.Qea it c;;QJl'lfils m rea.cl:li ns..-into-.-high-~l-eeea 

This ends the COMINT portion of my presentation. In the next and final 

.... 

period we'll devote our attention to COMSEC • .. • 3'." 't . 

... 

-22-

,r:·--c, ---· -- ~- ·-·-- ~ 

,_.,..,,.T ~·; ~---=-- .J~::.. ,.