*

    The appellees notified this court that they were never served with process in the

district court and would not be filing a brief or otherwise participating in this appeal.  After

examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  The appeal is submitted on the appellant’s brief and the record.  See FED. R.

APP. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Submitted November 7, 2007*

Decided June 25, 2008

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 07‐1294    

PERCY E. MOORE,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of

Wisconsin.

No. 06‐C‐697‐S

John C. Shabaz,

Judge.

O R D E R

Federal inmate Percy Moore tendered in the district court a civil complaint under the

Freedom of Information Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), claiming that the FBI unlawfully

withheld records from him and seeking to compel disclosure.  Screening the complaint

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the district court dismissed the action with the explanation that

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 07‐1294              Page 2

Moore’s complaint fails to state a claim because it does not allege that his requests for

information were “specific.”  Moore sought reconsideration of that judgment, which the

district court denied.  Moore appeals, and we vacate the judgment and remand for further

proceedings.

We note at the outset that, although the district court’s order says that the dismissal

is “without prejudice,” the court’s entry of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

58, along with its denial of Moore’s motion for reconsideration, show that the court is

“finished with the case.”  See Taylor‐Holmes v. Office of the Cook County Public Guardian, 503

F.3d 607, 609 (7th Cir. 2007); accord Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763‐64 (7th Cir. 2003).

We proceed, then, to the merits.

FOIA “generally contemplates a policy of broad disclosure of government

documents.”  Solar Sources, Inc. v. United States, 142 F.3d 1033, 1037 (7th Cir. 1998).  Under

the Act, “each agency, upon any request for records which (i) reasonably describes such

records and (ii) is made in accordance with published rules . . . shall make the records

promptly available to any person.”  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A).  A reasonable description of

records is one that would allow an agency employee to locate the records “with a

reasonable amount of effort.”  Marks v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 578 F.2d 261, 263 (9th Cir. 1978).  

If the requesting person does not receive the records, the district court in the district where

he resides has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to

order the production of any agency records improperly withheld.  See id. § 552(a)(4)(B); U.S.

Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142 (1989).

Moore alleges that, six months prior to filing his complaint, he requested the

following information from the FBI: (1) records of electronic surveillance and warrantless

eavesdropping conducted by the Rockford Police Department, the FBI, the DEA, and the

CIA from 1991 through 2006; (2) documents concerning efforts by those agencies to drug or

“brainwash” Moore from 1991 through 2006; (3) reports from those agencies, written during

the same period, about Moore’s anti‐government book‐writing; and (4) reports of any

criminal investigations of Moore, particularly any reports of potential plea or cooperation

agreements.  He further alleges that the FBI did not timely respond to his requests and has

stalled by asking for further information.

Even after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct.

1955 (2007), complaints in federal courts still are subject to the notice‐pleading standard of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).  Limestone Dev’t Corp. v. Village of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797,

803 (7th Cir. 2008); Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th

Cir. 2007).  Notice pleading requires only that a complaint contain “enough facts to state a

claim that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1974; accord Limestone, 520 F.3d
No. 07‐1294              Page 3

at 803.  In other words, Moore’s complaint must provide enough detail to give fair notice of

what his claim is and the grounds upon which it rests, so that the FBI may respond.  See

George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 2007); Airborne Beepers, 499 F.3d at 667.

Moore’s complaint does that, and thus it states a claim under FOIA.  And Moore has

not, as the district court implied in denying his motion for reconsideration, “pleaded

himself out of court” by submitting a letter from the FBI that says his request to the agency

did not contain sufficient information to conduct a search.  The district court apparently

relied on the content of that letter as evidence that Moore had not made a “specific” request.

But in submitting that letter Moore did not vouch for the truth of its content.  See Simpson v.

Nickel, 450 F.3d 303, 306 (7th Cir. 2006); Carroll v. Yates, 362 F.3d 984, 986 (7th Cir. 2004).

Moore filed suit because he contends that the FBI, as evidenced by its letter, is stonewalling.

He may be wrong, but whether he can prove his claim has nothing to do with whether he

has pleaded it satisfactorily.  See Pratt v. Tarr, 464 F.3d 730, 733 (7th Cir. 2006); Walker v.

Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2002).

True, if Moore’s claim rested entirely on his request for agency records of electronic

surveillance and warrantless eavesdropping—apparently of anyone in the preceding 15

years—it might appear on the face of the complaint that he did not reasonably describe the

records he seeks.  See, e.g, Voinche v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 983 F.2d 667, 670 (5th Cir.

1993) (noting that an agency may seek amendment of overly broad requests for

information); Marks, 578 F.2d at 263 (noting that “broad, sweeping requests lacking

specificity are not permissible”).  In that case, Moore’s complaint could warrant dismissal

on the ground that the facts he pled “cannot result in any plausible relief.”  See Segal v.

Geisha NYC LLC, 517 F.3d 501, 505 (7th Cir. 2008).

But Moore’s relatively standard demand for records from the FBI’s criminal

investigation of him is not obviously deficient.  See, e.g., Patterson v. IRS, 56 F.3d 832, 834

(7th Cir. 1995) (request for all materials related to IRS’s investigation of requester); Wilbur v.

CIA, 355 F.3d 675 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (request for any records maintained by CIA relating to

requester); Morrow v. FBI, 2 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 1993) (request for documents and

photographs concerning requester’s arrest).  Indeed, so standard is a request for records or

information compiled for law enforcement purposes that FOIA outlines specific exemptions

for records of this type if, for example, production “could reasonably be expected to

interfere with enforcement proceedings.” See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A); accord Solar Sources, 142

F.3d at 1039 (affirming grant of summary judgment based on government’s assertion of this

exemption).

A search for documentation showing that Moore was drugged or brainwashed, or

for any FBI commentary on his anti‐government book‐writing, may be so obviously fruitless
No. 07‐1294              Page 4

that it is unnecessary.  See Patterson, 56 F.3d at 841 (“[T]o avert summary judgment, the

requester must show some reason to think that the document would have turned up if the

agency had looked for it.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  But fulfilling those requests

would not require a wild‐goose chase; the FBI could locate the records—or explain that the

records do not exist—“with a reasonable amount of effort.”  See Marks, 578 F.2d at 263.

In the end, a lack of specificity to Moore’s requests may be one of many defenses the

FBI will assert to justify nonproduction.  See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm’n for

Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 754‐55 (1989) (explaining that it is agency’s burden to sustain

its action); Ruotolo v. Dep’t of Justice, 53 F.3d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1995) (agency must show that

requested information either has been produced, is unidentifiable, or is exempt); Ferri v. Bell,

645 F.2d 1213, 1219‐20 (3d Cir. 1981) (explaining that documents may be denied only if they

are exempt or were not reasonably described).  But whether or not the FBI was justified in

failing to provide these records is a question that cannot be resolved without first directing

that the agency be served with Moore’s complaint.

Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for further

proceedings.