REF ID:A62842 

Lecture No. 5 

For a half' century following the close ot the C1v11 War, c:rntology in 

the Uni:ted States enJ019d a period ot hibernation from which it awoke at long 

last, about 1914, not zetreabed, as did B1p Van Winkle, but weaker. Thia ia 

.perhaps understandable it we take into account the tact that the United States 

was able to enjoy a long era ot :peace, broken only briefly b;y the short war with 

Spain, in 1898. For over three decades there vaa little or no need tor c1'1.Ptograpby 

in tbe United States Government, ezcept for the comrmmications ot the Department 

at State. The military and naval 1erricea apparently felt that in time ot peace 

there was no need tor either cryptography or cryptanal.ysia, and since it looked 

as thouah the us was S'Oins to enJoy peace tor a long, an 1ndetimtely long time, 

those services did not think it neceasary or deai:rable even to engage in theoretical 

cryptologic studies. Of course, the War Department and the Army still had those 

route ciphers and cipher diaka/ described 1n the pzeceding lecture; the Navy 

Department and the Navy had cipher disks tor produc1Dg simple mcmoaJ.phabetic ciphers; and 

the Department ot state had a code more or leas apec1t1cally designed for,1ts 

communications. Separated tram Europe by the broad Atlantic, and mindtul of 

General Washington's policy ot non-involvement in the problems ot Europe~ 

' . \ diplanacy, America followed the traditional and easy course of 1aolat1on1~ 

\ 

The quarrels among the countries in Europe were noae or our business and Ame~tca 

stood aside tor a half century, not even interested in.those disputes. 

There was, however, in this long hibernating period in u. S. cryptology one r 

I 

episode ot particular interest. It concerned a Presidential election in which the 

circumstances paralleled the election ot 19601 when the very amall popular-vote 

maJority ot the Democratic candidate suggested a possible upset in the electoral 

college voting. The episode to which I :refer here occurred nearly a century ago, 

in the presidential election ot 1876., in which Democratic candidate Samuel J. Tilden 

was pitted against Rftpubl1can candidate Ruthel!f'ord B. lJa)'ea. On the basis of early 

evening election returns Tilden seemed to be eaail.y the Wimier. Indeed, just bef'ore 

going to bed on elec't1on night, 8 November 1876, ~s conceded the election to 

Tilden., and, in fact the newspapers next morning reported a Tilden Victory. But 

when final tallies began caning in they showed that the closeness ot the popular 

vote made Tilden'a victor)' not so sure as his suPJOrtera bad calculated, and they 

l 

t"pproved for Release by NSA on 12-17-2013 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 

' 

\ 
REF ID:A62842 

therefore began to became appiiehenaive about their candidate's victory. Their 

apprehensions wre valid because ot our peculiar s71tem at electing a pzeaident, 

peculiar because it ia the electoral and not the popular vote which determines who 

1• to be the next occupant of the White Bouse aa President. Two da.)'11 atter the 

people had voted it became clear that Tilden would have 184 electoral votea, .1uet 

one vote short of insuring victory, 'Whereas Jfa1e8 would have onl.J 163, thus needing 

22 more. !he Tilden aupporten began a frantic canp.1.gn to get that one addi.ticmal 

vote theJ" needed and theJ' didn't heeitate to try ever:1 poaaible l'U8e to obtain it, 

including bribery, a rather serious piece ot businees and one obv1ousl.)t requiring 

a good ~eal of aecrec71 especially in caamunicationa. ot course, JllBD1' telegrams 

had to be exchanged between the Tilden headquarters in Nev York City and confidential 

agents who had to be sent to certain states where one or more electoral votes could 

perhaps be purcbaaed; telegnms aleo had to ·be exchanged among thoee aecret agents 

~ 

in the field. About 400 telegrams- were e:xcbanged and some 200 ot these1\1D 

cryptogra})llic fOJ'll. I feel sure that you W1ll be 1ntensted to learn that because 

ot camnurlication d1tf1cultiea two almo8t-consummated bribel"Y' deals tell through; 

a third deal tailed because the electors pZoOYed to be honest Republicans not 

susceptible to monetary tenq>tation. '1'he eXiatence ot these telegrams,however, remained 

unknown to the public tor months and we shall come to them later. Despite the ettorta 

I 

ot the Tilden supporters, the outcome ot the election remained in doubt because 

four states, Florida, South Carol.1nl., Louisiana and Oregon, each sent two gl'C?ups 

ot electors, an event not to:reaeen and pl'OV'ided tor in the Constitution. A crisis 

arose and tbe country seemed to be on the verge ot another civil war. By au Act at 

29 January 1877, Congress cnated a special electoral cammis•ion to investigate and~ l 

I' 

decide upon the matter ot the ~aputed electoral. votes 1n the four states. Recount~ 

ot vctes in certain election p:recincts were made, sametiues aided by soldie~ ot 

.... 

the Pedel'&l .ArrrJ;y. The camniseion voted in tavor ot the !fa1es electors in each eas~ 

and.>having obtained the needed 22 electoral vote~ 116,es entered the White Bouse. · 

It was only sane months afterw&l'd that the telegxams to which I have nf'erred were -.... 

bl'Oligbt to light and a situation arose which Congress tel.t it had to look into. 

SC111ehow or other, in the summer ot l.878,, copies of' thoae telesrams had cane into 

the posseos1on ot a Republican newspaper in New York City, The Tribune. Interested 

only 1D ascertaining the tl'Uth, the editor put two .mbers ot his etatt on the job 

and they Succeeded 1n solving those telegrams which were in C:.\.t~:ie~. 

2 
REF ID:A62842 

Various books dealing With the political upecta of this intriguing story 

ue available in public libraries, but those ot you who are interested only 1n 

its cryptologic aspects will find excellent material in the following thfte 

documents: 

(1) ''The Cipher Dispatches", The New York Tribune, Extra No. 44, 

New .York, (14 January) 1879. 

(2) Hassard, John R. G., "Cryptography in Pol1t1ca", The North 

American Review, Vol CXX\TIII, No. 268, March 18791 pp 315-325· 

( 3) Holden, Edward S. 1 The Cipher Dispatches,, New York; 1879. 

{4) u. s. Bowie Misceuaneous Documents, Vol 5, 45th Congress, 3rd 

Session, 1878-79. 

'rhe last-mentioned item, that put out by the Congressional Bouse Camnittee 

'Which bad been designated to conduct the investigation and which waa named ''The 

select Commit~ on alleged trauds in the Pl'esidential Election or 1876, 11 is of 

special interest. In the course of the 1nVe1t1gat1on, the COJllD:lttee solicited the 

technical assistance ~ Prof'easor Edward s. Holden,, ot the United states Naval 

,,)l.,o 

Obael'Y'&tory 1n Washington, the author of the third item listed above, I believe ~- A , 

a was acaptain in the Navy and had specialized in mathematics. The Tribune had 

brought him into the picture by asking h1a help when aolution seemed hopeless but 

it turned out that Mr. John R. G. Hassard, the cb1et of The Trib\n'le atatt, and his 

-....;:.. colleague, ·colonel William M. 0Tosvenor1 also ot that etatt, 801.ved the ciphers 

independently • and, in tact, shortly before Prof. Holden solved them, although 

1.t was the latter that the CongressiOD&l. Ccmmittee called upon to explain matters, 

as would only be natural under the circumstances. 

Professor Holden's testimony, in which he set f'orth his ao1ut1on ot the nearly 

200 cry:ptograms entered 1n evidence, is presented in the form of letter to t.be Camnittee,, 

dated 21 February 1879. In it '/,he described and e:x;plained all the cr,ytoeystems 

uaed, together with their keys and tull details of their application. In that 

letter, Prof'easor Holden makes the following statement: "By September 7,_ 1878, 

I w.a in possession ot a rule by 'Which any key to the most ditticult and ingenious 

at these {Cipheri} could infallibly be f'ound. n Holden worked out the transpoai tion 

ke7& but in this he had been anticipated by the Tribune cryptanalyst&. There 

-were in all 10 different keys, two for messages of 10 words, two for messages at 

15 words, etc., up to and including two tor meseages of 30 words. Here is the 

ccmplete "Table ot Keys": 

3 
- -€. 

\ 

REF ID:A62842 

'1'M3LI Of KB!S 

10 Words 15 Worda 20 Worda 25 Words 30 Words 

I II m IV v VI VII VIII IX x 

9 J,. 8 3 6 12 6 18 17 4 

3' 7 4 7 9 18 12 12 30 26 

6 2 1 12 3 3 23 6 26 23 

l 9 7 2 5 5 18 25 1 15 

10 6 13 6 4 4 10 14 11 8 

5 3 5 8 13 l 3 l 20 27 

2 8 2 4 14 20 17 16 2, 16 

7 10 6 l 20 16 20 u 5 30 

4 1 ll u . 19 2 15 21 10 24 

8 5 14 15 12 19 19 5 29 9 

9 9 17 13 8 15 27 5 

3 ... 14 1 10 2 -2 19 19 

15 5 11 6 24 17 28 17 

l2 10 15 7 5 24 24 25 

10 13 18 l!f. 11 9 4 22 

8 17 T 22 7 28 

16 11 13 7 13 l 

2 15 1 4 18 18 

10 9 25 10 12 12 

7 8 22 8 22 6 

9 23 21 2l 

16 20 15 20 

21 3 3 29 

14 13 9 14 

4 19 lJa. 7 

2 3 

6 ll 

16 13 

23 10 

8 2 

f';t.' 

You mq be wondering Wh7 there are two transposition Reys ~or each length 

of aaaage hm 10 to 30 vol'd.s, in multiples of 5. The two keJ'S constituting 

a pair are related to each other, that is, they bear a relat1cmsh1p which 

Mr. Baeaard, one at the Tribune cl')'ptanal.111te, termed "correlative", but which 

w nov would call an "e:ac1pher-dec1pher" or a ''verse-inverse" relationship. 

Either sequence ot a correl.aj;:Lve ~rat sequences may be wsed to encipher e. meaaage; 

,' J 

the other,1~~ c8'- then be wsedto deciphe:r the message. Por 

J I 

e'X'Nlq>le, key III consists ot the tollawiJ.18 aer:l.ea ot numbe": 8-4-1-7-13. · •• etc; J \ \ 11 I t \"I 

6 . ' ' and the correl.Ji't.i,...,, a..,. rv, i• 3 .. 7 .. 12-2 ..... etc. A aipher ••aase ot 15 

' 

= :-=::-::rt~:;:~: :7 w::::-=~\D 3-7-12-2·6· ••• above the wards n~ the cipher meeaage and then aaaembl1ng the ~ -, \ 

numbered words according to the sequence 1·2·3-4-5. • • Thua, there ve:re, 

in realit;r, not ten diffezent tnmspoaition keys but only f'ive. In the caae ot 

each :pai'i' of keJ& Jone ot them must have been the buie sequence, tbe other the 

1nverae ">f :it, or at least aonie derivative thereot. 

4 
REF ID:A62842 

I suspect that the basic or "verae 11 sequences ot numbers were not drawn up 

at random but were derived f'n>m words or phrases; and I think that the odd-numbered 

ones are the "verse", because, u you will notice, it is in the odd-numbered keys 

that the positions at sequent d1g1t• reflect the presence ot an underlying key 

word or phrase; this is not true in the even-numbered keys. I have not seriously 

attempted to reconstruct the key words but perhaps aome ot you may like to tey and 

J ;' •Will succeed in doing ao. / 

In addition to1ranapoa1t1on, this system invCll.ved the use ot "a:rbitrariea" to 

rep:reaent certain vords, the uamea ot inl>ortant ptJ'aona and places, numerals, etc. 

!rhe:re we:re aleo a few nulls. 

Proteaaor Rold.en addaaae comnenta about thia ayatem which are vortb·quoting: 

'1'he essence ot this 1ngenioua and novel a79tem cona1ata :tn taking apart 

a sentence written in plain English (dismembering it, aa it were) and again 

wr1 ting all the vorda in a new order, in which the1 make no sense. 'l'he 

problem ot dec1ph&ring it consists in detemining the order according to 

which the worda of the c1pber should be written 1n OZ'der to produce the 

origtnal message. 

There ia one va7, and mU.7 one wa7, 111 which the general problem can be 

solved, and that is to take two meesagee, A and 81 ot the aame number ot words, 

and to number the words 1n each; then to arrange •••ase A With 1ta words in 

an order which will make sense, and to arrange tbe words ot meaaage B inUle 

same order. There vill be one order - and onl7 one - in which the two 

message• w:l.U •imultaneoual7 make aense. Thi• :ta the ke7. 

A,.,,. .. .,,s [-~- - lleni, in a -11, ve find tlle baaic th8oz:y ~ eolTing trans110a1 tion !-\; &- t ciphers by a.nagramning messages ottbe same l•nsth;explained in a moat r ..:.{.'_ succinct manner. 

'Ju~,Y "t It appeara 'that Prateasor Bolden, clever aa he undoubtedly wae 1 did not note 

the verae ... inverae relation in each pair of sequences, or, it he did, tie f'aU.ed to 

mention it in his testimony. However, Hassard in his article (:reference No. 2 above) 

specif'ically points this out. 

There were enough meaaagea 1n Wa syetem to make it possible to aCll.vef\worda 

uaed1 as well aa to recognize a tew nulls which weze oceaaional.17 added to canpl1cate 

;-\le.. 

matters. Hence 1 most complicated ot tbe cryptoayatems involved 1n this bizarre 

A 

political episode, were solved. 

Another &78tem used by the conajirators empl.oJed a b111teral aubatitution, 

that 1&1 one in which a pair ot cipher letters represents a ainsle letter. Thia 

substitution vaa based upon a 10 x 10 checkerboard. Apparently neither Professor 

Holden nor the Tribune ceyptanalysts recognized the latter principle, nor did they 

find that the coordinate a ot the checkeri>O&l'd emplo)'ed a ke7 phrase, nor did the7 

realize that the same checkerboard, with numltr1cal coord1nate11, was used tor a 

numerical substitution alphabet in which pairs ot digits represent letten ot the alphabet 

5 
REF ID:A62842 

Here me two ot the meaaagea exchangecl by the consp1raton, one in the letter 

cipher, the other 1n the tigme cipher. The •••sea me long enough tor solution. 

'1!17 to solve tbem, reconstruct tbe •trix and find the keJ phrase t:rcn which the 

co0l"d1mltes ot the atrl.x vere denwd. It should amuse 70\l by its approprtateneaa. 

The maaage 1n letter cipher is ae tollov.s: 

Jacksonvw.e, Nov. 16 (1876) 

Geo. R. RaDe7, 'lall ahaasee: 

I' _y ,, ti 

\ "'7 -

wnnm~nn*n•n~ftDMD9Emm~••nna 

WDAAfiU~D&UEUnnnanm~DHAAftttE9n 

~nnsnEttmmn•mmnnmm~nRnnaM~D 

AAmeEnnmmmm•wsnsanemmn~•nmn 

YY MN RS 1Y SS 1'l SP n: PE BP PP MA AA YY PI I'? L 'Jingle goes up tomorrow. 

(S1p4 Daniel 

'l!he exmQple in tigure cipher is as follow: 

s. Pasco and s. M. L'lngle: 

Bl,. 55 ar.. 25 93 34 82 31 

31 75 93 82 77 33 55 52 

93 20 90 66 77 65 33 84 

63 31 3l 93 20 82 33 66 

52 4£3 " 55 42 82 48 89 

42 93 31 82 66 75 3l 93 

( S1gaed) Daniel 

JackaonvUle, NOV', 17 ( 1876) 

'!here wze several other aya1-ls iDYolved 1n this episode ot pol1t1cal 

sl(ulldugge17 but I am going to have to pass them by because the7 hardl7 deaene 

attention in this brief' bietor,v. I do, however, VBDt to call JDU1" attention to the 

Yer17 close :resemblance between the word-tranapoa1t1on ctphera characterized b7 

Pratessor Bolden as the ''moat d1tt1cult and iDpniOW!I" ot tlJe ciphers he solved, 

and the USDrrC route ciphers deacrlbed 1n the preceeding lectme. Yet, not 

onl7 he but also the 'lrlbune amateur cr.vptanal.19t1 aolved those ciphers v1thout 

too much d1tt1cult7, even though the7 were technically more camplex. I think their 

vork on the 'l'il-cl.en ciphers clearly conttms 'llJ7 own appraisal or the weakDesa and 

or the route ciphers uaed b7 the oarro 111 the Civil War. 

6 
REF ID:A62842 

After this digression into the realm ot what may be called political cr,yptology, 

~.t.h"'°"\ let us now So on with ourl\ c~oSic history. I have already told ;you that the 

Departme~t ot State used a code for cryptographic COUIJllmications in the ,ears 

tallowins the Civil war, but I do not know what it was like. It lllQ' even have been 

an adaptation ot same commercial. code. But in an article entitled "sec:ntt writing'', 

which appeazied in Centu17 Ma.gazine, Vol LXXXV, November 1912, Ro. l, a man named 

John B. lfuwell, appuentl7 at tbat time a code clerk in the Department, nterred 

to a new cccle ot the department in the follov:l.ng tenu: 

The cipher ot the Department at state 1a 1he most modem of all 1n the 

ee:r'lice ot the Gove:rnment4 It embraces the valuable teatuns ot its 

pzedecessors JI.pd the merits ot the latest inventions. Being used to~ fl'ler:/ 

species ot d1planat1c coneapondence, it is necessarily copious and 

unrestricted in ita capabilities, but at the same time it 1s ec~c 1n its 

tems ot expresH.on. It 1a simple and speed)r in. 1 ta operation, but so 

ingenious aa to secme absolute secrecy. ':he conetruation ot this cipher, 

like l8J'l1' ingenious devices whose operations appear e1mple to the e19 but 

aze ditt1cult to explain in writing, would actually iequize the key to be ~Jr!liahecl tor the purpose ot an 1ntell1g1ble deacription ot it • ... __ .,. __ ... 

. Only tour ;years later a certain telegraph operator and code clerk of the 

State Department proved how vulnerable the Department' a •11ttem at enciphered 

code really was. Kia name wu Herbert o. Yardle7 and any ot you may know a bit 

about him as the author ot a famous or infamous book ( dependins upon whose aide 

~on) entitled The Amrican Black Chamber, published 1n Ind1anapolis by tbe 

Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1D 1931· So far u I know it 11 the only book vllich cannot 

leplly be :reprinted in the United States because a apec1.al. law paaaed in i93i. 

makes it a cl'ind.nal otrenae to do ao. That 11 quite a ato17 in 1tae~ but I 

cannot tell it now. It )'OU haP,P&D to own a copy ot the f'int and only American 

edition, don •t let it set away trcm you, because you can only obtain another cop;y 

ot 1 t by a mme or lees "under the table" deal; but 10'1 may be able to purchase 

a· British edition, or a translation 1n French, in Japanese, or in other l.auguagea, 

tor the book was eenaat1onal. But to return to that State Department crntoa19tem, 

which waa cona1de1'9d by Baavell as giv1n8 abaolute secrecy and which waa readily 

' 

aolved by Ya:rdley, here 1s •t appears on the cover page ot Yudley'a 21-pqe 

tnewntten aml.1&1• and solution of' the system: 

'".rBBORr .AD PRAC'l'ICI 08 INCIPB&Itm com 

State Deputment Problems 

I, ll, and III 

NOl'E: The tollOWing was wr1 tten 1n Much 

1916 and, so tar as I can learn,, is the 

tint aucceaaful attempt to solTe a problem. 

in enc1phe:red code. 

(Signed) B. O. Yardley'~ 

7 
REF ID:A62842 

Yardley waa quite Wl"ODg in thinking that hi• was the tint eucceaatul 

attempt to eolve a problem 1n enciphered code, tor in Europe more complicated cues 

f"w..o-~ 

we:re often solved and I 1mag1ne that/\:iri\tl'll cryptanal.y&ta could haVe react,..-

1'1zl.,.:414 . ...-, State J>epa.rtment meaaage1 as a more or leas routine .matter. I 

think I em warranted in auum1ng that what 1 have just aaid ia true because, :l.n 

Europe, ceyptanalytic atuclie• wre going on apace during the ,ears ot .Amer1can 

neglect at auch atud1&a. The tundng point from neglect to a zena1s1ance ot interest 

in crntologtc atudie• in Europe 1a ea1ci by same authoritiea to have been about 

the year 188o; but we must cont:lne ounelvea 'tor the most part to developments in 

America, ... is .. 9'.)in oraer to keep tbia lecture within bounds or what can 

be told within a peri.od ot an hour or so. 

In our R'&V7 :lt seems tbat a111;>le monoalpbabetic ciphen continued iu use 

untUjthe middle ot the e1gb't1es, when several naval of'ticen W1'9 deaisJted to 

prepare a DlOl'e su1 table 1yatem1 baaed ~on a code particularly designed tor naval 

canmun1cat1ons.. The BJ'Stem the7 -worked out •• embodied in a very large codebook, 

18" long, 1211 wide and 2" thick, which had tbe otf'icial title The u. s.. Navy 

Secret Code. There was alao an accarapany1.ng b~ separate cipher book, almost 

aa large, and dea1gaated as The Sook ot IC"eyWorda. In addition to these*-' 

b 1 rl IT wae a third large book called 11 0eneral Oeop»J;!.1cal Tables". ~ system 

waa placed into effect on l Deceniber 1887. Later I vUl show J'0\1 a most historic 

message sent 1n the.t-s~em. of aec:ret c~cat1on, which t~ 1mp1'9ase1 one 

In our Anr:/1 in the middle eighties, a code was al.llo prepared. It is no 

pleasure to have to tell 1011 tbat 1 ite cmposition and toimt hardl.7 ehed laurels 

I O/'. 

\\ 

~those responsible tor 1ts reprocluct1on, because it waa mereq/\~~~ and 

acknowledged adaptation ot a cOJDR.erc:tally avail.able amaJJ. code tor uae 'by the . . general public.>t1rst published 11f 1870 With the title TelefP!ph1C Code t'o Bnaure I I \ ' I I \ I 

- Secnez 1D the 'l'ransm1aa1on {)f Teles:reu ~ It had been compiled by the Secret~ey 

, / I i ' 

~at tbjt l're:nch T:nma .. Atl.antic Tel,graph Com,pauy, a snan named Robert Slatet, and\~ 

, I \ 

became known everywhere as "S~~r' a Code". As to the nature ot the code, I Will ' .JI I~ J I I 'uote /~rom Slater's own "Sh~/expl.&natS.on ot the mode ~ using thi~ work,"in a sort., 

~~ pretace to the 2nd 'Bd1t1maf , J 

/ 

' I 

I \ ' - I . , ' 

' 1 - -rt- la a numbered '!eleSziaphic J>ic.cmar;y ot the EDgUsh J.ansuase 1 of which 

: 

I ' 

each word bears a d1at1nct,.ve ?lo. (fZ'Q\IL 00001 to 25000, With exactly 100 vords 

per page), and the •thod1ot Wling it JI b7 an interchange at Nos., in 

accol'dance With a priva~ unders~~ between coZTespondents that a further ~ 1 : . 1' 

I 

I I 

/ ! 

/ ' 

'I 

'I 

} i rB 

! ' ' ~ 
REF ID:A62842 

lo. 1• to be ad4ed to or deducWd ti-m tbe 1lUllbtt :LD the co4e, ot the woz'4 

telqraphed o:t vri.~1 to iDcUcate the nal.·'80J\l SDtemled, thus a 11SJmbalic" 

or "Dmq Void" s.a telell'Qhed, the ..Ung of *1cb can onl7 be read b7 

those who hue tbe kq to the aecat ot how maQY llhoul4 be a44e4 to ~ 

cleducW traa the D1111ber 1D tbt Co4e, ot 1lae ~ Wold" to tim tbe word 

.ant. (PuDctuat1cn u in tblt OJ'1siul.) 

Bea w have a aen.t.ence ot U6 words. Dlougb S.' 1• rathar long an4 a bit 

JllU'1q I think )'OU 'Will gather its ilp>:rt. The a,18t.ell u tbua tar cleacl'1be4 1• 

;{".a,. 

vbat ,•.now call /\ad41Uve or aubtftettve •thoi. But in the ctetaUed inat:ruct1ons 

' ' 

Slater ggee one atep turt.bltr -4 •uueata tbat, 1nat.ead ot telegre.:pbina the coae 

number nault:t.ns .traa addition or aubtracUon ot a ke7 number, tbe vmd ltan4tns 

aloapi&t the atn (or cU.ttezence) ot thl •thaatical opeat!oa be tent • tbe 

telegrapldc ~o4e vord. 

Slater'• coae nmst. haft mt wl~ popular accl.ai11 'beomaee by 1906 it _. 1D · 

its fifth edi~ion. You •7 like to eee the title »&se ot the •ecOD4 edition (1879), 

a caw ot which 1• in 813 Qollectlc:m. As .tor a con~ the ftl7 f'll'St .iitlon, 

not even the Librar.y ot Congreas i.. om, that'• hov •arc• it 11. '1'o an oa vJ.\b I , 

the st017, in 1885 the Var Depa'tmeDt p:ibUUed au acl&ptation at Slater's eoae 

I 

ror it• ue and tbJ use ot the Azfq. Be:re :la a picture ot it• title pap, ':ta ,,, 

onl7 d1tterenc:e betwen it and that ot Slater•• Co&t being in the epel;i1Da of ti. 

V01'd t•aecn:c7", as YO\l ce.n easil.7 - 1n tba picture I lhov JOU next. It would I 

appeal' t:bat the "caJ6)ller11 or tl:d.e code, Col. OregoQ, wa .just a bit deficient 

in 'ma1at1on, bec&\188 not on.17 41d he •iel.7 bonow the bu1c 1~ and tonat 

ot Slat.er'• Code, but even when it cam to ezplainS.ng and gt.Ying e • ot 

eoc1pbe1'1Dg the coda 81'0\G'•, the Colonel used not onlJ' the idau.t1cal. 

also the ve17 ..._ vol"41D8 encl nn tba VU7 ... t.Jtt of·~· ot tnn oma.tions 

that are tound 1n Slater• s ol'igf.nal. Let Jiit ahov an eDllple in Slater• a code 

b7 a:laa 1dth tbe sea e8llQ;lle hClla Ch'9go17'a; 

\ 

9 
REF ID:A62842 

You will note that Col. C:regor,y Just couldn't uae the same text tor hi• 

ezamples ot enciphe:zmnt that Slater uae4,, which was: ''The Queen is the supreme 

power in the Realm." Instead he used the em91U&tic text: ''War is a punishment 

whe:reot death is the meximmD. "* 

All the! other methods and eXBl@l.es ot enciphe1"Dlltnt in the two codes aze 

pract1call7 identical. Colonel Gregor)" givea credit in the tollow1:ng terma to 

a civ1Uan 4 in his greet work: '"l'he labor of compiling the new vocabulary 

has been pe!'t'o:med b7 Mr. w. c. Spottawod." What did the 1at.tef do! Well, Mr. 

Spot1;swood 'a w:rk ccmsiated 1n casting out f'ram Slater' a liat such words as 

ABATIS. !fh:l.s sort ot work muat indeed have been arduous. I'm 801'1"7 to aP}lear 

to be ao critical ot and aatiric&l about the pertoniance ot my predecessors in 

the construction o£ codes and code systems for War Department and AnI:f usage, but , 

I feel eure you will agree that more 1pgtnat1on and ingenuity could have been 

emplo~d than w:re used by Colonel Gntgory and Mr. Spottswood. 

Col. Grego17 prepared a confidential letter addressed to Lieut. General 

Sheridan, "Commanding Artfl3 of the u.s. 11 , to e~la1n t.be advant-aea of the nev 

code. But in this letter Col. Gregor,y quotes ver,y l.U'g&l-7 from Holden's little 

brochure and deals almost solely with the •YB in wh1.ch additional security 

may be gained by chang1.ng the additives to the code number• in Slater'a Code. 

For e.am.ple, tor all messages sent in Januaz')" add lll; for all messages aent in 

/ Februart add 222, in March 333, etc. Another auggeated way: Send out a alm.Ple 

message in ol"d.1Dary English: "Add 1437 to all ciphers until further orders." I 

Believe 1t or not, this was the code that the War Department and the Artlf3 

used during the Spauieh-Amer!can War. It vaa apparently uaed with a simple 

additive, because in a cop:r 1n my collection the additive 1a VZ'itten on the 

~\ inside of the front cover. It._. 777; perhaps 1t 'WU the additive tor the month 

of 'J\il.71 but t~ nlmlber 777 vas written in ink, so it may have been the permanent 

additive for the whole ot the var. In pages 41-42 ot 'I.be .American Black Chamber I 

the author tbrowa an interesting sidelight on this code sJStem; . ' 

*I wonder what that sentence means. It aouuda sort ot "anti-American" to me. 

Punishment to Whom'l 1ro the 11oldien and sailors and ai:men who defend our 

countm It not to them, then to whom? 'lo the people ot a. whole nation fighting 

tor li'bf.rti? I Just don't understand the sentence. Do you'l 

10 

I 

\ 

I 
REF ID:A62842 

The c~Jit1on ot codes and ciphers was, by General Orders, 

a Sipal. Corps, f\mctioa, but the war /_1911] reYeal.ed the unprepal'ednesa ~ t~ department in the United states. How much so is 

indicated by a talk I had with a high otticer ot the Signal Corps who 

had just been appointed a military attachet' to an Allied country. It 

was not intended that attllChes should actually encode and decode their 

own telegrams, but aa a part ot an :lntel 11gence courae they were 

required to have a superficial knovleage ot both processes 1n o1'der 

that they might appreciate the illportance ~ certaf.n pl"eeautions enforced 

1n aateguarding our cOlllllUl'l1cationa. 

When the new attache, a "Yete1'811 ot the al.d Army, appeared, I 

bended h1m a brochu:re and rapidly' vent over acne ot our :mthoda ot 

secret cc:mmmtcationa. To appreciate his attitude, the reader should 

understand that the so-called ad41tive or aubtraet1ve method tor 

pii>ling a code telegraa ( ued durJ.ns the Spaniah-Amertca war) 1• 

about as effective tor maintaining secnc7 aa the •1-Ple substitution 

cipher which as children we ftad in Poe's The Gold By. 

Ile listened im,pat1entl.7, then povled: '-rh&t 'a a lot ot nonaenae. 

Whoever heard cl So1Da to all that tl'ouble? During the Spaniah·Amrican 

War ve d1dn 1 t do all those things. Ve Just added the tiguJ"e 18t)8 to au 

our tigUl'e code word.a, 111'14 the Spaniarda never 41.d t1nd out about it." 

Although the Amel'ican Slack Chlmiber abounds v1th exaggerations an4 . 

climtorticans, vhat tbe author tells about the 1Dadequsc1ea ot United State~ c~a 

. and ciphers in the )'e&?'8 just betOl'e our entl";'f 111to Vorld war I ue true enOJ18b 

i 

and Yarcll.e7' a 1mpat1ence and atir1c camnenta 1n this iegud, , it grievaifme to 

l ...,., a:re untortunately fully wrranted. 

Dur1Dg or{ perhaps shortly after the end ot the Spanish-American War, the 

};> ~ 

War Department llUSt have jt'gun to realize that theft wre ahortcamings in the cotle 

I 

baaed upcn Slater's Code, the one which vu 1n cUl"l'eDt uaqe and \q>oD which I haYe 

already dwlt. On 16 Jan'IJ&.%7 1898 the publication ot a new War Departmen~ Telegraphic 

' Code vu authol'izecl b;y General Olden No. 9. The code 1iB8 to be prepazed mii!er 

the direction or Gener&l A. W. Gl'eel.y, tmn Ch1~t Signal Ottieer ot the A7:my. 

The cited Gemral Or&w makes it quite clear that the War Dettal'tuent veraton ot 

Sl.atel'' e Code ws still in UM, but the Western Union Telegraphic Code vu. to be 

\ 

usec1 in ccmnecticm vi th' Slater• a until the new War Department Code vu c~d, \ 

vhicb apparentl;y ws ready 1n December 18«)9, when Slater• a vu vitbdrnn tra!I '·~ \ 

\ Vith this atatement in Genenl or4ers No. 203: "By direction of the Secret&l7 ~ 

., \ \ 

War1 the 'l'elegn,P!!ic Cede to Insure Secrecy in the Transmiealon ot 'l'eleigr!!I!!, will 

en and '1'ter Januar;y 151 1900, cm17 be uaed tar correepondence in llUCh cues as~ 

be epeciall7 ordel'ed by the Secz.oeta17 ~War.A On 12 December 1899 the new 

War.iDepartment Code was 1uued. It canpneed a spec1al.17-compiled list ot tables,. I , 

1 phnaes and aentences to vhich code numbers and code vorda wt'e usigned -'.. J L 

/ 

~~ speciftc use in War Department and .Arrq cammmtcatiana. The coae ,numben 

I . 

be&m with 78201 end vent to 95286; tbe ace~ code wo:rda •:re to:re1sr:t. I 

I 

' outland1;$bl.y unusual real vorda, and artir1cial vords1 beginning vitb KOPDKIES, i I -

'' :· '1 

. ll 
'- ·-

REF ID:A62842 

KOPIRKLBlJRS, KOPBIM:>Lll, etc, etc., down through the L's, M1 1, and ending with worda 

auch as NAZWILGBN; NIWf?BB, BBAPILGBLB, etc, etc. Yau 1IJA'1 VS.ah to know why the 

code numbere didn't begin with 00000 and f!P to 99999; or w_v the code srouP• began 

with K and writ tor thouaands aud 'thou9and8 ot WOl'da flown to I'. 'I'he anner ie tbat thl• 

bnnd nev war Department Telep!fhiC Code,.. to be used;• Slater'• Coc!e-.. wied, 

:ln ccoJunctian with the Veatem Uoicm !eleF'!J?hiC Code, a code ot 78,200 groups 

beg:!lming wlth n\lller.lcal. cote gragpa 00000 accm.penied by literal coOe vm'da 

beg:tnntns with BIBRK'AR, BJ!3RK'.ARRlm, BD.RCJ>B • • • and 8o1nS to KOal!.JONGBB, KDC1lKRUID, 

.KOO'l'SP&. 

'lhe ::t.ntroduct1on. to this code eJCpla:lna thl• pussling tac't, ·~ 

lack ot Ume 1t baa been 111\Pouible to :lncOlllon.te 1n the VAR DBPAHl'Mllif.r m.scmAPBIC 

CX>JZ all doa1ftble phl'Uea, and in COQaequeDCe 'the ti:rst 47]. papa of the Western 

Union ~elepghic COde :now in uae by the Ariq wiil continue in uae aa a 1\q)p].ement&J7 

code. ~· attOl'da the Arrq the telegraphic uee of 1001 000 code wo!'d.s, of which 

mnbera l to 78,201. .. tnclunve, an in the Western Union 'relepaphic Cocle and 

numbers 78201 'to 1001 000 ue in the War Department '.relegrapbic C04e". 

:tt thus bec<ne• clear that tor aevenl Jean the new War Department Code 

vaa to be used :l.D ccmJunct1cm with the ccmmerciall.y available public Western 

Union TeleSJ'!Ph1C Code. '!bia ._. stated to be tor the purpoae ot econan;r. :ror 

aeczecy the aclclitive or aubtnet1ve method waa to be U11ed. '1'he tutU1ty ot aucb 

an old and eilqple method tor achieving cammmtcation aeeur.1.t7 needa no ~nt. 

I elc:zg'C.;>.p\\'~c:. 

I vilh the:re -~ time 1;o nad 10U the mat:ruct1an11 :1D th&t new War Department *Coda 

I C 

u regu'da the use or these ciphel'I tor secrecy. 'rhe;r an practically the mane •• 

those :1n the 1885 vend.m ot Slater' a Code and are unbelievab~ :tut:Ue, but 

what elee could be e,JWeeted when C1"1Ptalogy 1• relegated to a poaiticm at mU1tary 

acience tar:1nter1or to 'that ot teaching the use ot a rUle orb~, subject• 

which ue taught, as a rule, by esperta'I Why wu. crn>tology lett to :lne.xpel"ienced 

amateurs during all those 19an about which I• tel,ttng JaUf Waa it att;>idity'l 

No, Just a J.aak of appZ"eCiatiou or the iDq>ortance GE aecUl'e cmnmicat1ana 1n 

military ope:rat:laD.11. 

How long thia ca.ab1nat1on ot two code• continued to be used I dao't lmow. 

Sane t1me dur.lng the yean 1900 to 1915 th1a abaurd Qlltem must baYe prayed 1taelt 

entil'el.7 un•t1atactoey, for f.n).1915 another brand new War Deputment Telel1'!J?h Dode 

WU put O\Zt1 um1er d1NCt1on ot BrigaClier General George P. Scr1TeD1 the Cb:let 

Signal Officer ot the Army who eucceeded Greeley. 'J!he boak bean no eecu:rtt7 

clas11ficat10ll,, for even as late u in 1915 there waa no claaat:t.S.catim aystem 

tor eecurtt;y purpoaea. The inatructicma reconnmded certain precautions. '"!he 

12 
) 

REF ID:A62842 

war Department !elegnph Code," ~ pangraph 5 ot the instN:ticm8, "vbUe not 

absolutely eoat1dential,, will be guarded with tae greatest e&1'9 and vJ.ll. never be 

out ot the :bmdiate poaae1111oa or control at the atn.cer to wbaD issued or at his 

confidential aaent. Care v1ll. be taken to preventttiett, loss, uee., or inspection 

ezept by those vhoae duties nqu:l.ft them to -1.GG' the code. Speci&l pains v.U1 

be taken to pl'eV'ent the code tJQll falling into the hand• or UQ&Utboriled penoo.• 

or ot' the eneiq. '' 

This 13eW code, as the cue ot its p1"edeceaeor 'II&&,, "intended to 9el"'V'e two 

,, 

purposes: l'.lrst, secrecy, llDd 1!1Con4, econ~. When eecncy 1a desired it ia to be 

I 

used as & cipher code; as 1e e=r,plained in subsequent pansraphs under •Eneiphered 

Code•." But there ue no subsequent paragraphs in vh1ch tbia is explained. 

Appaientlf sane chanae 1D th1a rejlU.'d .a decided, because I h*Ye Ileen, as a 

separate peiqphl.e't, & set ot cs.mer tebl.ea tor use With tb1a coae. 

The code itselt embodied S(Be ot the lateat :ldeaa ot code compilation • . It had over 113,000code srcu»s, and these wre both~ groups and_,tor the 

tint time1 5-letter groups. The latter enl>o41ed the prineipl~ ot the 2-J.etter 

dif'te:rence, but the instn¥lt1ona do not mentlOll this f'act and no permutation table 

-.a. included in the code itself. '?he book bas a very extensive vocabul&r.Y ~ 

words, phmses, end eentencea.. I ~eel SUl'e that a great deal r4 thought and effort 

vent into the productic:n ot this code but I BlU8t tell~ two tbinsa about it. Pint, 

I must tell you that my immediate ~deceseQr in the O c Sig O told me en my ret.um 

trcn Fmnee in l.919 that that p&l'tieular ~ ot the V.r Department Telesr'lliPh 

Code had been printed in Cleveland. by a camm:1al printer, and second, that, vben 

the United Ste.tea became a belligerent in Wcrlcl War I our British Allies tound 1t 

0-W.-~ 

Jeeirable to notity l!'8 that our war Department Telegraph Code was not aate to uae, 

even With its siwerencipberment tablea. The 1Dl)lic&tims ~this notification 

are rather obvious and hardly zequ:lre <;:CBllDellt. The caapUatton ot a new code 1n 

-1917 vu initiated but th1a time tbit:.work-. dODe .. :within and under the dil"ection 

ot the Military Intelligence DiV$.sion of the General statt, and 1n pvt1cular 

vithin the section devoted to cryptanalysis. 'l'hia undertaking, which indubitably 

ws a direct attront to the ~al Corps of the Azrq, met vi.th no objection, it eeems, 

1'rau that Corps; ~8 it deeened the intended 1naul.t becau.ae ar its lc:agstanding neglect ot its cle-.r responeibilitiea for cryptography and cr.n;>togtaph1c 

opera.tic.m in and. tor the Amy. 

Ve have noted h~ inadequately the ~ and tbe war Department wre equipped I 

for cr;yptocommm1cations in tbe years traa 1885 to 1915. Let .ua aee how -well 

13 
REF ID:A62842 

equipped the lfllV7 and the N&V7 DepartJent wze. ror thia purpoae I have an 

excellent example and one of great hiatorical s1gnit1cance and intenat. You Will 

recall IQ' mention ot the appointment of a board ot N&YJ' otticen to prepare a suitable 

cr;ypto179tem tor the NaY)' and I told JOU about the larse basic vocabul.ar7 and 

tabular content• ~the codebook and it• acccapan)'ing two large books, one tor 

enciphering the code groups, the other tor geographical nmnea. Por the 1t0J7 

ve go back to the t:lae ot Pnaident McK1nle7, whose election brousht Theodore Roosevelt, 

a fol9r Elliber ot the Civil Semce Comm1aa1on, back to Waahington u Aaaietant 

Secretu7 of the Ra'f7· 'l'e4d7 was an ardent a4Yocate ot m111t1117 and naTa1 pnparedneaa. 

Ile torthr1shtl.7 and hank1.7 favored a atl'Oll8 tonip pol107, backed by adequate 

1#"4 ~ 'M.~'ttO 

m111taz7 and mval strength - "speak softly \t.ut ca.rr.r a big st1ck"ft Be vu lookiDg 

c. · torwud, in tact, to folJ'inl •the ult1Date withdrawal ot the luropeeD powers fl'Oll 

tlJe Westen Hem1aphe1'8. With Tigor, he aet to vork to mke the N1W7 ready. When 

tbe Battleship Maine vu blown up in Havana hal'bor, on 15 l'ebru&17 1898, Roosevelt 

ebal'perled hia efforts. Dur1ns a "tempor&l'J' abaence ot his chief, R&VJ' Secretary 

John :o. Long, be took it upon himaelt to initiate the pnparationa which he had 1D 

vain tried to persuade the Secretary to make. Be ordered peat quantities ot coal 

and ammunition, directed the aaaemblJ.ns ot the Pleet, ad. stirred the araen&l.a and 

naT7 ,.ma into aat1vtt1. On a SaturU7 atte:moan, tell dq8 atter the u.s. Battlelhip 

Maine wa blown up, and atUl 1D the absence ot SecretU7 Long, Tedq •t down and 

wrote out a cablesram to 80 to Ccmnodon Oearge )ewe:y, at Hong Kong. He:re it 1a, 

with his bald atgnatuze at the bottcm: 

That 1a the nov hiatonc •aaage which alerted Dew:y ancl 1lb4Cah naulte4 in 

ourt.'ialdDg over, \Dlder U. S. pl'Otect1on 1n the var which WIB declared ten days later 

cm Spain, the Pb111pp:lne Illl.an41. I I&'* tatail-19 NJllp .. Vlllltetl tll•· 

--Y~-~ll note tbat tbe me•aaee bean m tta tee,/. eecurit:y cluaiftcation, but 

the cluaiticatlon, "Secnt ancl Ccatident1al ", -. croeaed out. That 111W1t have been 

8117 ;yean later, for thoae thne wol'da appear in the plain text ot the cleCiphe:red 
-~ 

- REF ID:A62842 

amt aecoaect cablegram. Here 11 a picture ot the oo4e aablegna Vith ita 

stnnge end outlandilh cocle VOl'U, u it•• received 1D Bong Kong: 

l 

I • I 

And now I abcnr JOU the dea:lphend. and decoc1ed text, which I vu tortuna1ie 

in be1D8 able to produce b7 cOlll'tee7 ot the Cbi!et ot the If&'YJ' Securit7 Group, Who 

penn:ltted • to cmault and ue tbe nece1eary code book• which I tomd were atill :ln 

NM}' Secur1t7 archives. To tnnalate a ••M8'! 1D the code then 1n use three etepa 

are necea11U7. Firat, t!Ja cable WOJ'da (tbe peculiar, outlan4iab VOl"4a :l.n line 2 -

WASSDRBIP, PAUSM'UM, BADARADOS, 1 a I . Y ; etc. ) are eougbt 1D the cipher book, 

and their aeoCllllJ8D11q Ctlble-vol"4 nmbers • down. WAS811111llP Jields 9'055; 

PAUSNl'URA. ,,.! ..,,.:'~'"'''':- ·---~; __ )'ielcla 62399, BADANADOS, uoo~ etc.. The next etep 

l/' _,,.. • 

.£--· , ia to a,ppend the ti.Jtat digit. of the aeeand <lllble-~rd ~er to the laat cliglt ot 

the tint cable·WOl'd number to ma1m the latter a a1z""4:1.g1t number. Thus 99055 beccmea 

990556. The •tz·d1S14' ocde group number, 990556, ia then aought 1n the b&aic code book 

and :lt1 mamng 18 found to be "Secnt and Confidential." The tnnater ot the 

ftnt digit, 6, ot the eeccad cable-wmd number, 62399, mlata :l.t became code-number 

2399, to which lllU8t now be appended the f'irat two digit• ot the third cable-word 

' 1 number, ll.005, thus making tbe aeccmd co4e group ct the coc!e •••aae 239.U, which 

"' 

15 
V,\ 

REF ID:A62842 

ia sought 1D the basic coa. book end Jield1 the maning "Ol'der the aqua4J'cm. 11 And 

"on. It'• pa1nfull.y el.ow vork, and I havml't tal.d JOU about 8am& ot the cli.tticul.tie1 

I encauntend in the procea1, :lncludlng h&Ving to reter to the third book, the, 

General GeoP'Qhical 'l'ablea. It took an hoUr to t191111ate thia one relativel.7 abort - ~ 

llooanelt meaaage. I feel auze a naval -~~-• 1' •• 1n World war II or 1n WIJZ'l4 

Var I, ror that •tte:r, coul.4 neYer have been executed befOl'e a ••llllP ot the length 

ot the Boolevelt one could be deciphered IUSd decoc!ed b7 thi• cumberacme ayatem, even 

it all the d1g1ta had been traumitted and nceived coneetlJ. General.17 apeald.Dg, 

naval battles en t1e:rce and quickly over. For instance in two m1Dutea, on 4 June 1~2, 

tl'Clll 10:24 to 10:26, the •r v:l.th Japan wu dee1de4 vhen the u.s. PacU'ic Fleet 

under Mmirale Nimitz, Fletcher and 8pl"*1Ce won the Battle ot Mid~, tn which the 

Japmm1e lost tour taat carnere, tcsether with their entia ccaplement ot plan.ea, , 

and almost &11 their f1rst-atr1Dg av1aton. WMn our Navy entend World War I a 

much more practical a1atea ••put into ettect, using a cdpher dertce known aa 

the NCB, standing tor "N&VJ' Cipher Box",, to encipher 5-letter gl"OUPIB ot a basic code. 

<'l Later, I'll show 10u a piatun ot thia box, probably the very pratotne ot what 

r' w now often call a ''black box. " 

. We came now to luro}iean event• ot importance 1n this crwtologic history. 

During the decades tram the en4 ot the Civil War 1n Amr1ca to the tint decade 

at the 20th Century then vu same progreaa in oJ:'1Ptolog1c science :ln Europe but it 

i 

vu not ot a atart"ing nature. aew Army M&Jor Kuiakl' a demonatration ot a 

' atraigb.tto:rd, •themtioal. method ot aolvtng the Y:lgenere cipher vaa publ1ahed 1n 

Berlin during the mid-peli.ocl of the C1Vil War 1D Amnca. It' the book created an 

1mprenion in Europe :lt vu altogether unapec~ul.ar; in Amr1ca it ftained unheard 

ot until after the advent ot the 2oth CentUJ')'. Although Kuiaki'a method 11 eZ9la1ned 

sutte eccun.tely 1n the tirat Americen text an cryptoloa,* the nmne Ku1&k1 doe1n't 

even appear 1n it. other booka in cl')'ptologS.c aubjeeta appeared 1n Europe during -tmta 

period, and two ot them de•rve lfl"l!Cial. attention. The "tint, by oanmanaant Bazenes, 

1• a book notable not tor it• seneftll contente, which are preaen•d 1n a ;rather disorp.ntzed, illogical eequence, but tor ita preaentat1on ot a cipher device invented 

by the author, the ae-called cylindrical cipher device, a picture of which I now show 

you. But our own Thomae Jette.non anticipated Baeriea by a century, and here ue 

two slides describing Jetteracm'• ''Wheel Cipher", copies tran the origiDal 

manuscript among the Jette:nan Papen in the 

*&pt. Parker B1tt 'a Manlal tor the aalutim c4 mllitar.v c1phera, Fort Leavenworth, 

Kanaaa: Arrq Service SChoola Presa, 1916. 

16 
REF ID:A62842 

Lt.brar;y ot Congress. '!'be aeconc! book wbich deserves special attention 

1a one by another Prench cryptol.ogl.at, the Marquis de Viaria, in vblch he 

presents methoc1s tor solving ceyptogrmas prepU"ed by the Bazer1e• cipher 

01Under, and, although unknown to b:l.m, the ciphers ot Jetterson'a Wheel 

Cypher. 

It was :ln the period during which book8 ot tbe foregoing nature were 

written and published tbat the chanceries ot Daropean Governments operated 

ao'called 11Black Chalibera", orpn1zec1 tor solV'iDS one anothv 'a secret 

cannnmi cations. Intercept vu unnecessary because the governmente1 owned 

I 

an4 operated the telegraph Q"Stems and trattic eoul.c! be obta1nec1 atmp~ by 

mald.og copies ot meeaages arriving or depal't1J21 from telegraph ~cea or 

\ 

passing :ln trand t through them. 'fb1a vu true in the case of- eY£1'. I 

country in Em'ope v1 th one very 1mportant exception: Creat Britain. 'l'be 

l 

staey, Vldcb is glven in 4et&il in a :recently publ111hec1 and veq tully 

doeumented book! la highly interesting but I mat condense tt to a fn 

sentences. 

In Jibgland., trom about the year 1540 onward unt:ll 1844, there vas a 

''black chamber 11 l9-1n constant operation. It wu composed ot three 

collaborating organtzat:lona vith:ln the Poat Ottice respectively called "'!'be 

Secret ott1ce", the Private Of'ftce", and. "'l'be Deciphering Branch". 

In the t1rat ot these bigb~ secret orsBD:lsat1ons, letters vere opened, 

copies ot them were made, the letters replaced, the envelopes resealed, an4 

it the wax seal.8 were intact thl(Y' were merel;r replaced. It the aeal.a were 

not replaceable, 4upl1catea vere forged and affixed to the envelopes. 

Copies al letters in cipher vere amt to the "Deciphering Branch" tor 

solution and the results, it auccesaf'ul., were then 1ent to the J'oreign 

Ott'1ce. A flllllOUll mathematicia, John Wall1s, took part in the letter 

act1'V1t1ea. 'l'he_ ''Private Of'tlce" took care ot similar activities but only 

*Eula, Kenneth L. '1'he Post Ottice in The E1.Eteenth Centun: A stya.y 1n 

.Adnd.nietrattve Bistoq. Iona.on: Oxf'ord Un1Ters1ty Press, 1958, PP• 176. In 

conJunction vi th this book one abOUld by all means also read the tollovlns 

extremely interesting and revelatory article by the same author: ''Br1 tish 

1 commmications and d1plOJl.l&C1' in the eigbteantb centuey'", Bulletin ot the 

Institute ot Historical Research, Vol. XXXI, No. 84, Bov 1958, PP• 159•167. 

,-

17 
REF ID:A62842 

in connection wt th internal or domestic ccqnnnm1cat1on~. In l.8441 a 

scandal involving these aeeret officea caused Parl1mnent to close them 

down completely, ao that from 18114 until 1914 there vu no black chamber 

at all in. Britain. Aa a consequence, when World War I broke M on the 

t1m ot Auguat 1914 England' a black chamber had to start tram scratch. 

But w1 thin a few months Br1 t1sh bratne amt 1ngenu1 ty built a cryptologic 

organization lmcnm .. "Room lfo o.B. It I wb:lch contributed very greatl.1' to 

the Allied '9\tictory in 1918. Al.though the British Oover.nment bas nwer 

1esue4 a ail\gle official publication on the aat1v1t1ea and accompliahmen.ts ot ''Room Ito o.a. n' several books by' private authors bsv'e pushed 

asi4e the curtain ot secrecy to ll'l8ke a most fascinating ator,f too long to 

tell 111 We lecture. But I must tell 70U at least aomatlWJg about what 

was perhaps the single greatest achievement ot "Room 40 o .B.", an 

ach1twement vbS.oh just in the Dick ot time 'brousbt this countrJ 1nto 

World War I as an active belligerent on the All1ed aide and saved &:lslan4 

from complete destruction, u well as l'Jtence. '1'he operation 1nvolve4 tbe 

interception anc1 solution ot a message known as the Z1mmermann Telegram, 

c!ese:rv~ called the moat important aiagl.e cryptogram in all bf.story. 

On 8 September 1958 I gave bet'ore an NBA aua:t.ence a detailed account of 

.. thia amazing cryptogram. I tolcl lbout its interception and solution; I 

told hov the solution vu bau4eci over to the United States; how it brought 

America into tbe VIII" OD the Br1 tiah aideJ an4 how all tld.a WU done 

v:l thout cUaclosing to the Germans tbat the plain text ot the Zinmermarm 

~legrlllll had been obtained by interception an4 eol.S1oa lat ~·• 

tbat 1a,.. by~aeS.ence llD4 not 'bJ' treason. lb' talk vu gt.Ten under the 

auspices ot the EA. Ceypto-Mathematics Institute, was recoH.ed, 8114 1s 

on tile ao that, :lt you w:l.ah, you can bear 1 t. It took two 8114 a halt 

hour" to clel1ver and at that I aic!n't quite auac:eel in telling the whole 

ator)r. But you JDl!ll,Y' read an excellent account ot th1a epiao4e, set tO]:th 

in sreat detail in a bOok. ent1 tled '!he '4.maermann '!elsem, by Barbara 

'l'\iehmn, published :l.n 1958 by- the V1ld.ng Presa, Rew York. Alao, J'OU aboulci 

consult a book entitled 'l'he :spa ot the B!f!l, by Admiral Sir William James, I 

published in 1955, by Methuen • Co., lDn4on. Both boQks deal at length 

18 
REF ID:A62842 

with The Zimmermann Telegram and tell how astutely Sir William Reglnal.4 

Bal.11 DJ.rector or British Raval Intelligence in World War I, mmeged the 

atta1r 80 as to set the maximum possible advalltage from the t•t 

accomplished by ''Room 4o o.B~, that is, the British Bleck Chamber. 'lo 

BUDID&'l"ize, as I DJUSt, this fascinating and true tale of a very important 

cryptanalytic eonqueat, let me eh.ow you again the telegram as it pusecl 

trom Wuhlngton to Mexico Ci 'tJ', tor it you WS.ll remember I shoved 1 t to 

you in the very first lecture ot th:S.a series, u Pig. 1 

' 

I ' ....... 

I 

\ 

\ ' .... 

\ 

\' 

\ •,\.' ' 

•, . 

thereot, an4 promised to tell 7011 about it later. Here I show S.t to you 

\ 

~ \ 

\ ~ 

< \ 

I \~ I '~' 

,, "' I\ ' 

~ 

once again, and as you can easily see, the code groups are composed ot three, 

tour, and five-cU.gtt groups, moa~ the latter. Here 1a the English 4eco4e4 

translation ot the message as trazusml tted by our Ambusador Page in London 

to President Wilson. 

19 
REF ID:A62842 

From the ~ that Ambassador Page sent hie cablegram to President Wilson 

on 28 February 1917, quoting the English translation ot tbe Z1.Jmnermann 

Telegram in the form 1n which 1 t bad been :torwvded by' German Ambassador 

von Bernstortt 1n Washington to German Minister von Eckhardt in Mexico 

,~ 

City 1 the entrance ot the United states into the var aa a bell1~ent on 

the side of tbe Allies became a eertas.nt}!:;. Under big black beadllnea tbe 

EngUsh text eppeared in our newspapers 1 because after assurl!lg htmaelt ot 

the authenticity ot the telegram bended over by the British, and that it 

had been decoc!.ed and checked by a member ot Ambassador Page •s ow atatt, 

President Wilson M.rected that the text ot the message be released. to the 

Associated Presa.. Its publication the next d2'V was the first ot a 1DOmentoua 

and eenaational series ot reports and. accounts of the Zimmermann Telegram and 

its contents. 

But there were plenty ot members ot Congresa vbo diabelieved the stoey. 

Here are a few ot their comments. 1:1It vu too tantaetic"; "it wu a British 

plot, unproved"; ''Wilson wu beins taken 1n", etc., etc. But when Zimmermann 

biJDSelt foolishly acknowlec1ged that he had indeed sent such a telegram, 

disbelief changed quickly into vehement anger. Thus,it came about that 

Ameri.eans in the Middle West and Far West, wbo had thus t&I' been quite 

unconcerned about a War that vu_ going on 1n Europe, thousands ot miles ~ 

and wanted no part of it, suddenly awoke when they learned that a toreign 

power vas making a deal to turn over some rather large slices ot u. s. real 

estate to a then hostile neighbor a.cross the southern border. They were 

aroused to the point where they, too, as well u millions ot other Americar:is 

in the East, were ready to tight. SUrely var would now be declared on -
REF ID:A62842 

Rotvithatan41ng all the turar that th• 41.aol.oau:re ot the Z1mnermnu 

Telegram created 1D America, President Vil.eon still ba1tate4. Ile vu 

atill 4et.-mlne4 tbat Ameriea voulc1 not, 11USt not, tJ.gbt. It Wll8 not 

until more than a mntb later, amt after several .American lhi2! were auck 

v1 tbout varnipS on 11.8 !£eh, that a nov tullY &l'OUle4 Preaic1ent got Congres• 

to declere var on Oe~ and her al.U.ea. 'l'lle aate vu 6 April 1917. 

In the War l>epartment aud in the BBYy Deparbent the pace set ~or 

preparing tor active VU' operations quickened. It ta c11fticult to believe, 

but I asaure you tkat lt wu true, that there vaa at the mommt 1n ne1 ther 

~ tbose depart.men.ta 1 nor in the Arrrq or 1'&'171 81>1' organ1zatiou or technical 

groups vhatever, et ther tor intercepting ~ conmun1cat1ona or tor stud:fing 

them, let al.one ao7°1ug "' such comimnicatioua. There vu, it is 1#rue since 

the autumn~ 1916, a very tmall group ot eelt-trained ~ata, 

sponsored and eu,pparted by a private cit1un ntU»ec1 Colonel George Fabymi~ 

vho Qper&ted the :Riverbank Iebon.tories at Ceneva, lllinoS.11. I Hr'Y"ed u 

leac!ar ot the group, in aMition to other ~tlee as a geneticist ot the 

Laboratories. Riverbank, tbr0\1gb Colonel hbyen, bad ini t1ated ~ established 

an anotticial or, at nest, • quui-otttcial relationship with the autbor1t1ee 

in w.ahlngton, so that it received b'om t1JDe to Ume copies ot cryptographS.c 

measagea obtained by var1oua and ent~ au:rrept1t1oua DIH1l8 trom tel.egraJh 

and cable attieea :l.n. Wubiagton md el.Mwhc'e in the u. S. At that period 

in our biatory 41plamatie rel.at1ons Vi1ih Nm.CO were 1D 8 Ad state 1 IO that 

u. s. attention wu 41recteil mouthW&rd, an4 not tlUtvard acroaa the Atlantic 

Ocean. 'Dleretore1 practic~ au the mesages sent to Rl.Tel"bamt tar solution 

were thOse ot the Mexican Gonrnment. Riverbank vu suoc-esstul in aolVins all 

or near~ all the Mexican cryptograms it vu gi.ven, usually returning the 

aoluti~ to Wubington very promptly. ..rb.e great maJority of them were ot the 

v1genb eype but using m1Xed HqW!tlces with relatiTely long kq pbrues. 

Riverbank vu &l8o auocessf'Ul Yi.th certain other cryptogr'Ulll with a background 

ot the var 1n Europe but I cannot deal w.t tb them now because there Juat isn't 

time. Soon after the u. s. decl&'l'ed war on Oeuoany Col. Pabyan at Riverbank 

established a acbool tor train1DS aa4 he 1nrtted the Serrlces to send him 

;-;I. --~ - -- - - - -

*Honorary title conferred by the Governor of Illinois for Fayan's participation 

as a member of the Peace Conmdssion that negotiated the Treaty of Portsmouth, 

which followed the Russo-Japanese War in 1906. 

21 
/ 

/ 

REF ID:A62842 

Arrq and Ifavy,otticera to learn 80methiag about crntolo&Y, in formal 

COUl'les eatabliahed tor the purpose. Each course lute4 abcNt a1x weeks, 

tull time. 

You 1118¥ like to know what ve novicH used ror training ouraelTea tar 

tbia unwmal tuk, aua. 'What w 1111e4 later on tor traimng the at'dent 

ott:lcers aent to us tar cryptologlc: 1natruct1on. All repr48 our aelt• 

1nstructton training maters.a'l, there vun't much available 1n Inglish but 

81lllmS tb.e vrr:r &pU'ae llterfiture there vu a small book entitled Manual 

a 

~or the Solution at •Utez CS.1hera, which he4 been prepared by/U., S. ArllfS 

Captain ~ IntantZ'y named Parker Bi tt am vbicb he4 been printed 'b7 the Press 

ot the Anq Senice Schools at fort Leavenworth, S.n 1916. Colonel hbyan 

manase4 to get a caw at that Manual tar uae to atwlY. t'he Sisnal Corpe 

School was then one ot the Arrq Service Scbools and there a ~- lect.ul'es 

vere stven by tvo or tbree oft1cers who 1 when Worl4 Var I broke out 1n 

August 191a., took an interest in the sUbject ot military cr,yptograp)V'. They 

toresav that sooner or later there wul.4 be a need for knowledge in that 

inportant branch ot militaey technology. Ca;pt. B:ltt'a Manual., was then, and 

st1ll is, a mo4e1. ot eonpactnesa and praeticali t7. Let me ab.ow ;you the title 

page ot tbe first ed1 t1on. Here 1 t is. 

It was tbe aucclnctnesa ot Parker Hitt• a Manual that caused ua much vork 

and perspiration in our aelt-traS.ning at Jtlverbank, an4 ve later came to know 

ID4 a&d.re 1 ta author 1 whose photograph I nov show 7011 u he looked when be 

became a Colonel in the Signal Corps. 

'lbere was one otber item ot training literature 'Vbich we also atua1e4 

avi~. It vu a Tflr7 amal.1 panpblet ent1tle4 An A4vanced Problem ,:l.n C!zetoES\\Y an4 its Solu~,on, an4 it too wu put out by the same Le&vemrorth Presa 

in 1914. Here :I.a ite title page. Yau will note that its author was then 

lat Lieut. J. o. Mauborgne; he advanced to 'become a M&Jor General and Chief 

Signal Ott:lcer o~ the Arm:!· '!he "advanced problem" dealt v.lth in tbat 

pamphlet vu the Plewta:l.r Cipher, about wh:lch I •hall 84'Y only that at the time 

Mauborpe wrote about that psttoular cipher it vu cone14ereci much mre 

dlttlcult than 1t nov is resarcled. 

22 

\ 
= 

REF ID:A62842 

Returning nov to vhat our self-trained ~c group vu .i>le 

to do 1n a pract1.cel v..., 1n the training at othera, there eoctet in BSA 

archives copies ot the man;y exerciaes and problems prepared at R1verbank 

tor this purpose. They are still ot much interest historieall.1'· 

In L9cture II I ahowed ;you a picture ot the last at tbe several 

cl.uaea sent by Dae Adjutant Ceneral ~ tbe Aftiril to Jtlverbank tor tra1ntng. 

- It should be noted and it g:tves me considerable pleasure to tell you that 

tb1a instruction vu conducted at Colonel Pabyau' • own expense u bis 

patriotic contribution to the u. S. va:r ettort. I can't in thi• lecture 

8&¥ JD\JCh mre about thta than that it involved the expenditure ot mao;r 

thousands ot doll.ans, ?lfNer repaid by the ~ernment-not neu by some 

decofat1on or aimllar sort at recognition. 'OJ,>on completion ot the laat training 

courae l vu comaia81oned a first lieutenant in M111tal"1 IntelUgence, General 

Statt, an4 ordered 1mmeclia~ to proceed to .American General Bea4quartera in 

--- Prance, where I became a member or & group ott1c1all3 reterred to u the 

~o Intelligence Section. But. it vu the German Code and Cipher Solving 

Sect1on ot the General Statt 1 a designation tbe.t vu abbrerl.ate4 u G-2, A-6, 

GHQ-AW. Aa the expandecl designation 1mpUe., the operat1ona were con4ueted 

in two principal sectiODa, one devoted to working on Geman Arrq field 

cipher'&, the other, to working on Geman Army field codea. There were also 

Vf!r'Y small g:l'O\lpa vorldng on other material euch u meteorologic mesugea, 

41.reCtion-tinding 'bearings, and what w nmr call trattic aualys1a, that 111, 

the etui5;y ot what ve call "the externals t• ot ~ mueages in order to 

determine el1eJr\1 order ot battle and other Vital intel 1 tgence from the at~ 

ot D.I'. beari:nss.t the direction, ebb and :t1ow ot eneDV traffic,, an4 other 

data sent back from our intercept and radio clirect1on-t1mling operations at 

or near the .front line ot the comat zone. 

In connection w1 th the last-mentioned operations you Will no dOubt be 

interested to see vhat f.s probably one ot the earliest, 1t not the very first 

chart in cryptologic history, that abovs the intelligence tbat could be derived 

:f'rom a consideration ot the l"'esul.ts ot trattlc &rl&lyaia. Its utility in 

deriving intelligence about enemy intentions trora a mere at,. at the ebb and 

tlow ot eneJey" traffic, without being able to solve the traffic, was ot_ 

unquestionable Talue. Here's that historic chart, which I muat tell you vaa 

c1ravn u;p tram data baaed solel.1' upon the ebb and now ot tntt1c in what ve 

23 
REF ID:A62842 

.. -- --- --- - - -------- ·- cal.led the All'GVX cipher ,La__cl_ever cryptosystem which was devised by ; 

German cryptographers and vh1ch vu reatricte4 in 1 ts uaege to German B1gb 

Commmd. cormnm:lcationa 1 principal]¥ those between anc1 amo12g the headquartere 

ot Mviaions and &1"nrf carps. Its reatrict1on to aucb b1sh conmand messages 

made a atuq ot 1 te ebb and flow very important. 'lheoretically, that cipher 

vu extreme~ secure. It combined both a good aubst1 tuts.on end an excellent 

'transposition principle in one anc1 tbe aame mthod Without being too 

complicated tor cipher clerks. Here 1• a 41•sram whichwlll g1Te a clear 

understan41ng ot its method ot usage. (llx:plain el1cle.) It- you wish further 

details I auggeat ycu conault documents available in the Tre.tnS.ng L.1. tcature 

Division ot the ISA Ottice ot !'raining. In thia lecture tbere 1• o~ time 

to tell you that although individual or 1dlate4 messages in the ADiGVX 

aystem appeared. at tist to be absolut~ i~regnable ep.tnst solution, a great 

man.v messages tranam1 tted in it were read by the Al.11ea. You _,. be aatonlahe4 by \ 

the toregoing atatement and therefore ~ deatre aome enli:sbtenment here and 

now on tbis point. In brief, there were 1n those dalYB three and o~ three 

clifterent methods ot attacking that cipher. Vnaer the first method 1t vu 

necessary to find, u the first step, two or mre messages with identical 

pl.&1n-text beginnings because the7 could be Wied to uncover the tranapoait1on1 

wbich vu the second step. Once tbia ba4 been c!one, the ceyptaDalyat bad tho/ 

,,., 

to deft w1 th a 11Ubst1 tution cipher in which two-letter combinations ot the 

letters A, D, P, G, v, and X represented single pl.&1.n•text letters. The 

messages were uaua.lly of suft1a1ent leasth ~ this purpoae, vbich amounted to 

aolv1ns a mnoal.pha'betS.c substitution. Under the 1econ4 metbocl, tvo or mre 

' 

messages vi tb ident1cal pla1n-text; eucU.nga eoul.4 be used to uncover the 

tranapoatts.on. i'hie vu easier even tbau the cue ot messages with 1dentical 

begluninge. You might think that cases ot meeaages vi th :14ent1cal 'begt.DDinp 

or endings would be rather rare, but the a44ict1on to stereotypic pbrueology 

in mllitar.r conm1mcat1ona i• 80 prevalellt in all mllita:ey communlcattona, and 

eapeci~ in German measagea, that cues were almost invm1.ab~ touncl, in each 

48¥'s tre.tt1c, ot meeaegea with similar beginnings or endings, and sometimes 

Wfn1t1al~ th1a cipher eupl.OJ'ed ~the letters A, D P, 0 1 and X, tor a matrix 

-5 x 5; later., the letter wu added, 'for a matrix ot t x 6, tor the 26-1ettera of 

the alphabet plus the ten 4ig1 t•. 
REF ID:A62842 

both. !hie system :tirst came into use on l March 1918, three weeka before 

the last and greateat otteneive by the eterm.-.n Arm:r. Its appearance was 

coincident with that ot other new cod.ea and ciphers. The number ot meaaeges 

in the AiltWX cipher varied from about 25 e. day 1 When the sy•tem tirat vent 

1nto use, to as matq' aa about 150 at the end ot two months. It took about a 

month to figure out a method of aolutton, an4 th11 vu ~irat done by a veey 

able cr,r.ptamalyat named Capt. Painvin ot the French Arrrq'• Cipher :Bureau. 

The ADIGVX cipher wu used quite extensively on the Western Prout with 

daily chimglng Jmya during~ and June or 1918 but then, tor reasons somewhat obscure, the number ot neasegee ciropped wrry considerably.. Hov many 

ditterent keys were solved by the Allies during the tour mnthe f'romp. March 

to the end ot June? Not man;r-10 in all; that 1•, the keya for ~ 10 • 

difterent ~were solved. Yet, because the tratnc on those dqa vu Vf!rY 

heavy, about ~ ot all meangea ever eent in that cipher, tram its inception 

to its di•card, were read, and a great deal ot valuable 1ntell1gence we.s 

derived from them. On one occe.sion solution vu so rapid that 1111 important 

German operation disclosed by one message was completely frustrated. 

Although the ADFGVX cipher came into use tirat on the Western Front, 1 t 

later began to be employed aleo on the Eutern Pront, w1 th keys that were 

first changed t!l'lery two daiYa but later f!V&ry three dqa.. On 2 Ifavember 1918 

the key' tor that and the next 49'Y waa solved v1th1n a period at an hour and a 

b.al1' 'because two meeaeges Vi.th identical endinga were found. A 13-part message 

1n that key gave the complete pl.an ot the Oerman retreat trom Roumania. 

During the whole year ot the l.Ue ~ the AD1IC'IX cipher, solution depended 

~ the three rather &iec1al cues I mentioned. No (!!!eral solution tor 1 t 

was though up by the Allies d6sp1 te a great deal ot atuay. However, members 

ot our own Signal Intelligence Service, in 19331 and vb1le Btill •tudente 

undergoing in.etruction in cryptanalysis, derlsed a general solution llZ1d. proved 

its etticaey. Pride in their achievement was not diminished when, in the 

course of writing up and deScribing their method, I happened to find a similar 

one' .. in a book by Preneb General Givierge (coura de £mtoE!P,bie, published 

in 1925). Givierge vas by then the head of the French Black Chamber, which was 

~~ 

em~ "Deuzieme Bureau", corresponding to our "G-2". 

,, 

\ 

I 
REF ID:A62842 

'l'he .AJltWX cipher vu not the~ one used b7 the. Germen k1:Jq 111 

World War I, and there will be time to mention very br1et]1' ~ two 

other•. !he first at the•• vaa a polyalphabet:lc subati tuUon cipher call 

the "Wilhelm," 'lib1oh used a cipher square vi th cliamTanged alphabets and with 

a aet ~ 30 talrly lengtb;y keywords. Here 1• the cipher ware JUat ~ 

the •qu&l'e oontain8 ~ 22 ran iutead ot 26 1• probably connected VS.th 

tbe tact tbat German can get al.oDg veey vell With fewer tban 26 letters. 

Certa1n]7 the rowa v.ltbin the square ere not random ••cpences, u you can see, 

tOl' ~he letters v1tb1n them manltest pernuted UTmigemen'ba ln aeta or five 

letters. Ancl here i• a aliu •bowing the keye wsed·-31 ot them. !he key 

sequences are not compoae4 or ranaam lettera.. I leave it to you to ~ to 

~ reconltrUct the r~ square, if 110aaibleJ you should be a:bl.e to reconstruct 

the real keys. '1'he latter problem should be rel.ative]3 easy .. 

'l'he other German Arrq cipher to be mentioned 1s the &>uble tran11Poaition, 

an example ot which 1a ahown in this next alide. Die process coneista 1n 

applying tbe a•e tranapo11t1on key- twtce to the aame matrix, once horizont~ 

and once vtll"tic~, u seen in tbia allele,. Solution or the true aouble 

tranapoeitton ~ depen4s upon f11l41Dg two or more messages ot :ldenticel 

length. (You ¥111 remember vbat I told ,-au about Capt. 1tolden in thi• 

comiect:l.on.) No general solution vu known to the Allie• during World WC' I, 

and meaaegea of identical length were few indeed. But 1t hlppenH tbat 

occasionally a ~ operator would app:cy- on11' the t:lr•t 'tl'anspoaition end 

when tht.11 fortunate situation occurred eolutlon vu easy, bec1m11e the ke,y 

thwl reoav ... e4 from tbe single traupoat t1ou could be used to decipher other 

met1segea wtd.cb had been c01Tectly enc1pber«l b7 the 4ouble tranapoa1t1ou. 

Again, the Signal tntelllgenae Service AevS.eed a general 

' I 

I '' 
REF ID:A62842 

solution tor the double truspoa1t1on cipher and durlng Worl4 War II were able to 

prove that auch ciphers could be solTed without having to tind two mesaagea ot 

identical length. I think the devising ot a general solutiOll for the t:rue double 

transposition cipher represents a real landmark ot progreaa ill ceyptanaqs1a. 

We caae to the code a7atema used. by'tbe belligerents ill World War I. An4 

tirat, let us clitterentiate those used tor cUplcllat.:tc comawDicat:tcms frcm thoae used. 

tor m1llt817 cOllllllUD1cations. What aorta did the Ge:rmu Fore1p Office uaeT We 

have noted that the British Black Chamber, "Roca 4o O.B." enJo;red anonilhing 

'Z., 

success with the code used tor the truam1sa1oa ot the ;7'1mmermann Telegram. 

I 

Excessive pride 1n German aehievem.ents in SCience, a vholely unjuat1tie4 cont14ence 

1n their communiaat:l.ona crntoaecurit7, and a discla111 for the/~ .. ot ••8Dl1' 

I \J 

crypt;analysta la'ld Oel"maD d.lplomstlc conmud.aationa open to solution bJ' the Allie• 

to the point where there c•e a time when nothing the Oermall Foreign Ott1ce vaa 

telling its representatives a'brOll4 'b7 telegraph, cable ,or radio rem•'ned secret 

I . 

trom their cryptologtc protagon1.sts. For those or 1at1 vho would like to learn some 

details, I refer J'OU to the following monograpb on the subJeat b7 'l1J'1 late colleaaue 

captain Charles J. KeDdelaolm: Studies 1D. German D1ploma't1c Codes 1DJ?loze4 D!!r1ng 

the World War, Ooverllllent Pr1zat1ng ottice, 1937. Copies ot it aftilable 1D the 

Office ot Tratning, BSA. Sqa Dr. Mendelsohn: 

"At the time ot America's entrance into the var GerlUa Codes v~ an. 

unexplored. field in the United. states. About a 79ar later we received fl'oll 

the British a copy of a partial reeonstrw:tion of the German Code 13o4o. 

(about hal.f' of the vocabul.a17 ot 191200 vor4s and 800 of the poasibl.1' ·r,~ 

proper names). This code and 1ta Yal"1at1cms of mcipherment had been in use · between the GermaD l'oreign ottice and the Genal\ !m'busy in Washington up to 

the time ot the rupture tn relations, and our tiles contained. a eonm14era'ble 

D1111Lber of messages, some of' them historical 1.Dtereat, which were uw read 

with the aid ot code _book. " -...:::=.---

'l'he vocabulary of the German diplamatic codes cmprised l.89 pages each having 100 

words or express10DB to the ])88e, arranged 1n two columns of 50 each, acccmpanied 

by numbers trm 00 to 99. llw• '8 a-•ew of a.,_CIC:Jllle•~'"'..l~ In 

each columD the groups were in bloc'ka of 10. In the lef't-ban4 colmm, tor inatace 

were the tive blocks trom 00·091 10·191 etc., to -.0-~J then 50-591 60-691 et.c. 1 

were in blocks ot 10 1a the right-baud col'UDID. 1'he pages 1n the balic cod.fl were 

numbered and from tb11 co4e several codes were made by the ue of conversion tables. 

Tbls enabled the original signal 'bu1o code to serve aa the tramevork for apparentq 

unrelated and ext~ 41stiJlgU1shable cod.ea tor several ditterent communication 

nets. What the nmnber ot 'tho basic code was ia unknown, but ve do know that trom 

the code designated as Code.13040 c•e codes 5950,. 26o4o., and othere., derived 

mer~ by aeans ot tables for converting the page numbers in tme basic code into 

\ 

27 
.. 

REF ID:A62842 . ' 

different page numbers in the derived code. These conversions were s79tematic, 

1n blocks of toura. Tbua, for example, pages 15-18 ill code 13o>.o became pagea 

65-68 1n code 59501 etc. Then there were tables for converting line numbers tram 

one code into d1ff erent line numbers in another version ot the basic code, and this 

vu done in blocks of 10. ror eDJl.l'le, the fU"th block (penult1mate figure 4) became ~' .1 

the first (penultimate figure O), and the lst, 2nd, 3rd, ad 4th blocks were moved 

l!oVD one plaae. 'l'b.e other nve blocks (on the right-hand. side of the page) were 

' 

r'!arranged in the sae rammer. 

It is obvious that codes derived 1n such a mmmer from a basic cocle by renumbering :pages and shitting about "11e contents ot pages 111 blocks can by no meBDS 

be considered as be1Ds ditterent, and. entirely unrelated. codes, and once a relationship between two exte~ 41.tteren.t but illternal.1¥ related cod.ea vaa discovered 

the two could. be.-lltm414!4 as equivalents ot one another. Also to be mentioned ia 

the tact that 1D certaiD cases numbers were a.4cle4 to or substrm!ted. tram the code 

numbers ot a message and this gave rise to what seemed to be still 41tt1cult to "' - - ~ 

determine the ad41tive or .subtractive and tliua get-'bo--the bu.19 code numbers .. \ I _.-1. • I I \ 

In none of the cases or cod.ea-mentioned thus tar was there oae that could be 

''hatted,!' ar true two•:pe.rt code, sf.Dee the same 

book served for bot.h encod1ng and decoding. Howeyer 1 the Germau Foreign Ott'1ce 

later on did compile and use real two-part, trul.7-:randamized codes ot to,ooo 

groups numbered f'rom. 0000 to 9999. One such code ha4 as its indicator the mimber 

7500. And that there were several others like it I have not doubt. 

When one reviews Dr. Mendelsohn' a monograph me becomes overwhelmed by the 

multiplicity of the codes and variants thereof used 'bJ' the German Foreign Office. 

Bame were basic codes but many were derivatives, or superencipherments thueof. 

It is even hard to ascertain the exact number ot ditterent codes and superencipherment 

methods. Yet a great deal ot the tratf'1c in these codes was read. Cona1d.ering 

the rather small number ot persons on the crntanal)'tic staff ot G-2 in Washington 

and 1D the British counterpart orgam.zat1on 1a Iond.on., :Ln the British Black Chamber, 

one can only be astonished by t.he great achievements of the ef'forts of' these two 

collaborating organizations that worked on German diplcmat1c cod.es during World 

\ 

War, I. 

I 

28 
REF ID:A62842 

So much tor German d1pi.omatlc secret ccmmuaicationa. What about Otmasa military 

crypto.caanwu.cationsT In this area it is nece•&U"J' to mention a situation vh1c:h is 

somewhat unique. When World War I CC111D.enced the GermaD Anq vu ver7 poor~ prepared 

to meet the requirements tor secure cCIDIJlUDications. It seems that up until the 

:Battle ot the Marne in 1914 several German Anq radio stations waat into the tielcl 

without ~ provision hav1Dg bem made or even foreseen for the need for apee1.i7 

and secure crypto-comun1catima. lumeroua complaints were registered b7 German 

comanders concerning extensive loss of time occasioned by the tar too compllcated 

methods official~ authorized for use and. the consequent necess1t7 tor aencling messages 

i:a the clear. Mat ODl1' did. th1e reveal intelligence ot :lmp>rtance to their opponents 't' .. 

but what is equalq 1mpol'taDt tbe practice permitted. the British and the French to 

become thoroughly familiar with the CJermaa telegrapii.c procedures, methods ot 

expression, terminol.081 and style, and the knowledge gained about these items became 

ot great importance 1n crntaaal.7&1a vben German crntos;vstems improved. The 

/ 

German Anq learned by hard experieace aometb1Dg about its ahortcomiDgs 1n this area 

of warfare and not cm11' soon began to improve but it did so to tae point where we 

muat credit the Germana with ~ing the initiators ot new and important d.evelopnents 

1n field military c!"1Ptograpey. ID tact, the developnuts lm4 impl"ovement.s 'began 

not long atter the Battle of the Marne and contlr&ued stead.1~ lmt11 the encl ot the 

war. When on U Rovember 1918 the erm1st1ce end.eel active operations, OermaB military 

cr,yptography had attained a remarkably high state of etf1c1e~y. 'l'he aston4..shing 

fact, however, 1s that1 althou&h very p.ro1'ic1ent in arntograpb1c 1nvent1ona1 they 

were apparently quite deficient 1D the science and--pr-act1ce of GZ'J'Ptanalysia. Ia 

au the years siace the end of World War I no books or articles telUDg of German 

succees w1th Allied ra4:1o trattic during that var have appeared; one Austrian 

crypt~, a man naaed Fis\, attempted to publish a book on CZ7Ptaul.7e1• but 

it seems to have been suppressed. One could of course assume that tbe7 kept their 

successes very vell bidden but the German archives taken at the end of World War II 

contain noth1Dg significant 1n regard to crntanalys1s during World War I although 

a great deal ot important 1:ntormat1on 1D this field during World War II was found. 

A detailed. account ot the cr;vptologic war between the Allied and German f'orces in 

World War II \JOUld req,u1re scores ot vol'UDllts, but there is one source of information 

which I can h1ghl¥ recommend to those ot you who would like to know more details ot 
-la 

'' 

REF ID:A62842 

., -

the c~olog1.c warfare between the belligerents ill World War I. 'B1at source is 

a book written and. published 1n Stoctho.111 in 1931 by a SVedish cryptaalJst, 

Yves Gy.lden1 under the 'title Ch1ttermaenaa,Iuatser I Varldsllriset Till Lada, 

a traaslat1on or which, with scae ccmmenta ot ~ own in the fOl'lll of footnotes, 

7011 will. 1'1Dd on tile 1D the ottlce ot 'l'l"aim.q1 BSA, under the title 

2be Con~i'Dution ot the 991toaraptc Bureaus 1n the World. War, Government 

Priutiag Ottice, 1936. 

In this lecture, however, we are pr1nc1pal]o¥ concernecl vlth German m1llt81'7 

crntosra~ d'uriag World War I, m.14 I have alread7 told :JOll aomething abo\rt the . 

cJPner qstems tbat were u.aed.. 1here remains "° be di1auaae4 the t1el4 caclea. It 

was the Geraan Arlq vhicb first P"OVed tbat, the ol4 id.ea that co4ebooka were 

impractical for use 1n the combat zone for tactical ommmn1cat1ons vu wrong. fbe7 

had two types ot f'1e14 cod.es a one wbicb thq called. the SCllWESSELBEft bat which 

we oalled the "tbree-DUlllber cod.e "1 the other which tbq aalled the SAftlUCB but 

which ve calle4 the "three-letter code 11 • '"9le former was a small staa4ant1ze4 code 

vtth a vocabulary ot exaetq 11000 frequently uaed words and u.prese1ons, 41g1ts, 

letters and syllables, etc., 'Ear which the code eiutvalell'ta were 3-41gtt numbere. 

A cipher was applied onq to tbe f'irn_two 41g1ts ot ~ code numbers ud th1a 

cipher consisted o'f 2-digit groups taken traa a io-"iflO' ~r~ t~ ·~1pher1ag 

the DUllbers from 00 to 99. !h:l.s ta'ble was aalled the GEBEDIKLAPPE or '"'Secret Ke,y", 

and here•a a picture r4 one. ~e last digit of a Gode srOUJ nmalned unenc1phere4. 

Thus, code group lf.79 voul4 became 629. J:aab 41Y1a1on aomplle4 u4 issued its 

own secret key table, which was ill two parts, or sectlona, of eourae, one for 

wnc1phermezrt tihe other f'or decipherment. '1'be three-number oode aa 1Dtelide4 tor 

' 

use 1D all terms ot cC111111&un1catiou within, or to ~-from, a -3;.'kilometer txcnt-11ae 

danger zone. Although this code was CO!Ql.eted b)' the eD4 ot J'&DU8.TJ' 1918, it vu 

not distributed or put into use unt.11 the opmirlg 4q ot the last aD4 greateat 

Oenum ottenaive, 10 March 1918. OUr code sol~ilg _ section, -througb. good fertune ..... "' 

-.&~-~-::.::._- r 

ud caretul attention, ascertalaed the -natlizie ot tbe aev code anc1 a tev groups , 

iD it wve solved. the WJr7 same - the co4e was put into effect because a Oermaa 

cipher operator who we.a unable to translate a message 1D the aev code requested 

and. received repetltian 1n another code wbicb had. been solved. to u extent which 

made 1t possible to 1dent1f1 hcmologoua 
REF ID:A62842 

code grOU]NI in both esaagea. The tbree-mmber code itroved rather eaa7 to aolve on 

a da1~ basia because cmq the encl:pher-deci»her table wa changed. lluch useful 

illtelligenee vu obtained trcm the daiq aolut1on ot this tq. 

'l'be aolution ot the SA'H'JAal or three-letter code, however, proved to be a 

mw:h 1llOl'e difticult :problem. ID the t1rat place, it bad a much larger voca'bul.&17, 

with l11llla an4 JlalQ' Tarianta tor trequently-uaed vorda, letter&, a7llablea and 

number•; ln tbe aecond place, and vbat constituted the real atumbling b1ock to 

solution, vu the tact that it was a true tvo-prt raudamized or •batted• code; 

am 1n the third place, each aectar ot tbe front uaed a clitterent edition ot the 

code, so that traffic not ~ bad to be 14eatil'1ed as to the aector to which it 

belonged but alao 1t waa not poaa1ble to combine all the measages fmo the pJrpoae 

ot building u.p trequenc1ea of usage ot cocJe groupe. Working with the &J&l"ae ~ 

ot traffic within a quiet sector of tbe tront and. t171ng to aolve a tew •aaegea 1n 

I 

this code vu reall3 a pa1nful.l7 111.oV, very difficult and ~ d1acouraging 

experience. On rq zre,Porttug tor duty to Colonel Frank lloenan, who was Chief ot the 

lihole unit and whose JhotograJh I ahov you here, I waa uted 1lbether I viahed. to be 

aaaigned to the c1Jber section or to the code section. Bartng bad coaaiderable 

experience vitb the sol.utima ot the toner tnea ot cryptoantema but none with the 

I 

latter, and being deairou ot gaining auch experience, I uked to be aaaigned to the 

code solving un1t, 111 ol'der to broaden sq :protessional. Jmovledge am practice 111 

ceyptol.OfD'• Little did I realize What a pWlful and truatrating l'U'iod ot learn1Dg 

am tra'fn1ng I had undertaken, but my choice turned out to be a veey viae and 

wef'Ul one. It 8Jt1 of JOU vould lik.e to read about IJ13 eqer1ence 1D thia area, let 

- me refer you to rq monograph, written in 1918-19, entitled J'ield Codes Uaecl 'bl the 

German Ar!.y during tbe World Var, copies ot which are on tile in the Office at 

Train1Dg1 BSA. I will quote tbe last t.vo J&l"&gr&pha traa m:1 •eat!mate ot the 

three-letter code• (on pge 65 ot tb&t. monosraph) and will rem1D1 you that. al.though 

' 

tbeJ' were written over 40 years ago they are atill applicable: 

•Ia the light of tb1a liaitecl eqerience (ot l.ess than ailc aontha 

vith tbe 3rletter code) it 1a impoaail\le t.o •IQ' abao1ute~ what the 

degree ot ·aecur1t7 ottered by such a bigbl;y develo:ped ayatea really u. 

There 1a lto doubt but that it 1a Yf!fr7 great• 'fbere ia DO doubt but that 1 

vith t1- :pzQJer ~iou~ earetul aU)er'Viaion aDd. ccmtrol the -.101-

ment ot such a code b7 t.ra1ned aen otters the highest poulble security 

far aecret ca1111md cation on the field of battle. 

llat no code, no matter hov caretully constructed, 'Ifill be aafe 

without a tra1Decl, intelligent ,enOIUlel.. A JOC>rl7 coutructed code ~ be 1D reality more sate when uaed b7 Bil eziert than a -rery wll 

cO.tncted oiae vheD uaed b7 a carel.e8• operator 1 or one iporaat at 

-the 1dUgera'ot :l:mpro)e?'l;y encoded masages. ihia point c&DD.ot be 

, / ovei"emJhaaized. It ia hardl7 aeceaaaey to itoint out, tberetere, that 

the itrOJel" training ot the )el"somael which 1a to be pit iD charge ot 

the voi-k of coding •uage& 1a aa essential requiaite to the maintenance 

of secrecy ot O]lel'&tiona, and thua ot •ucceu on the field ot battle.• 

31 
REF ID:A62842 

So mch tor the German An:! f1elcl codea., al.lout Which a great tleal more eou14 

be said. but w mat hurry on to the cryptoayateu ot acme ot the other armie• in 

World Var I. 

What aorta ot crntoa)'8tema did the French Anlt ue! Fi.rat, aa tor e1.-ra, 

they put mch truat 1D tr&DQOait1on Ethcxla and here ia an ~le ot one t;ne. 

Perhapa you remember one ot those a:pecial route c1Jhera I ahowecl :vou ill the 

prececU.Dg lecture, the one With the diagonal that ,roduced cam)llezitiea -that aade 

the uae ot that route too i\1ff'1cult for the c1J)ler O)lel"atora ~ tbe USlfl'C.. 11'h1a . French trau:tOS1t1aa ci)ber vu llUCh 1lm'e complicated by thoae d1agoaals aD4 I 

' VOJJ4er haw nch uae vu made ot thia cipher by the l'rem:h. 

Aa tar cod.ea, like the Cermana they ued a mll., i'rcmt·llne booklet ce.JJecl 

a •Carnet Beduit•, or an • .Abbrn1.ated. Cade~·. Varioua aectara ot the front l1ad. 

dittererrt e41tiona and I abov 1ou DOW a iticture or one ot thea. Then, 1n ~tion, 

\ tbere ~ a auch :more eztenaive code vhlch na. not aalT a tvo-»U"t, rNMlom'z-1 

book, ot 10,000 fOIJl'-digit code groupa but a au»ereac1)lhe!'llent was anl1ed t the 

code maaagea 1'ben tranai~ by radio or by -us•, tbat is, •telegr.-pbie :par ao1•, 

or earth t.el.egrap?Q'. Here ta one ot the tablea ued. tor enci}lheriag (am dect 

tng) the code groups am here 1a the exaqle ot aqerenci:phelwut giftll 1n the - . 

a rather cJ.eYer wanner by enc1)her1Dg the f'irat digit ot the t1rat code grouv 

~tel¥; the aecoml and third digita ot the t1rat grou,P are enciphered aa a 

:pair; then the lut digit ot the tint group aDd. "t!Mt tint 41g1t ot the aecOlll. cede 

group are eaciprect aa a JA1r, aD1. ao an.. Thia :.roeadure aceeu 1n breaking 1Q 

the digital code grOQa in such a manner u to reduce very great~ the breQ.uetlC7 

ot rqetition or i..-a.igit groups repreaentiJlg vorcla, mmbera, :pbl'uea, etc., ot 

very caaaoa .occurrence 111 .Uitaey ••aase•· 11¥ a:nnJ,aal ot th1a French An:! 

f'ield crnt087Stea 1a that, theOl'eticalq at leaat, it~ waa the most 

secure at all tbe f1e14 ayatema uaed b7 the belligereata. 

Bov half about the ~esyatema uaed by the ltritiah Arm,J1 1'1rat, thq uaed 

the ~air Ct:pber, a ayatea ot d1grairhic 11Ubat1tuticm cona1c1ered in thoae clqa 

to be goOd. enough ~or mea••• in_ the cQtlbG zone. M tailay, ot couru, ita 

aecurit.y 1a Jmmm to be ao low that it ~ 11erita eontidem:e fer seriou . ' , 

uaage.' 4lhe Br1t1ab &lao ued a field cede. It eoataimd 8U:8 ccmnon m111tar,y 

" expreu:tom and aent~ea, groaped. under various heallinga or categoriea, ad 

• I 
REF ID:A62842 

ot eourae, aver, amall YOC&bulary ot frequent~-uaed words, mmbers, pmctuaticm, 

etc. It as al~s used with superacipherment.1 tbe nature ot which vu not a.111-

closed even to tbeir Allies, ao I a not 1n a position to describe it. Ve did not 

even bave a co:w ot their code .. -onl.1' a typewritten trameript which vas hrniahecl 

ua quite rel.uctant.J.y. !his next slide was Jl8de b7 sRtiDg up 1D pr1nt a typical 

page thereof'. 

Vhat about the cryp'tQS7Steu used by the Itallan Anq 1n World War IT ~ 

- general level ot cryptologic work in Itaq dur!Dg that period vas quite l.ov, a 

tact tlhich is all the JID1"e reaarlr.able when ve consiier that the birthplace of llo4enl 

cryptolog 1188 1D It~ aevera1 centuries before.. There appe&l'S to have been 1a 

- I~ a greater knowledge of cryptologic techniques 1D tbe 15th and 16th Centllljitt• 

than in the 19th, paradoxical aa th1a m:t aeem to us t~. Perhaps this can be 

considered aa one at the eome11.uencea or the 11ee4 tar aecreey vhieh requires -tilJ.ng 

away 1D d.uat7 archives records ot CZ')'Pt~ic aucceasea; bat i.t is to be considered also that this pre.vents those who Jd.ght have a rlair tor cey,ptol.ogiy vork 

tram ~itting i'l'om the progreaa ot predecesaora 1lbo Jaave been auccesatul tu s\&Cb. 

work. Ve should.+~ not be too aatoDished to learn, therefor, tbat ...ln , 1

;-r· ' \ 

\ 

Italy entered World W&'l" I the Italian Arrq put its trust in a very simple variation 

\ ' 

ot the ancient V~e cipher, a system called the •cifrario mll1taire taacab~•1 

\ 

or the·~ m1l1t&Z7 cipr.• It~ as val.l aa several others dev1sed by tbe 1\ 

\ 

same Italian •ezpert•, were aolTed very easil1' by the Auatriall. ~ta duriitg ·. \ 

tile ....... !!be ltal1all Anq lllao - codes, no doubt, bat slace ~ or \ '-', 

1, 

such coc1ea COD1Jia.tecl in adding or subtracting a umber traa the page mmber on \\ 

1lb1ch a glffll code e;rc>llP _..a, the aecarity ot auch QStem - tuite ilblaoey. ~ 

.As late as in l9'Z/ the same Italial'l •expert• anDGUDCed h1a invention ot an \\ 

' I ' 

absolute~ 1Ddec1pberable cipher a;ratea which, fqlden sap {page 23) •atill farther ' 

demonstrates the aston1sb1Dg luk ot ccaprehensicm ot modern C'l"1Pt~1c methods 

OD bis pa.rt•• 

Wbat about Busaian cr;vptoloQ 111 World War It As :regards cryptographic vork, 

it is lmcnm that there vu, during t.be era of tbe last ot the Czar1at1c rulers, an 

' 

appa.reutl3 well Ol"ganized aui ef'tect1Ye bureau tar conatrw:tlng and cQmpiling I 

. diplomatic cedes and ciphers, tihich bad been organised b7 a Bussian D8Ed Se.vimslq, 

formerly Russian KiDister to Stockholm.. Be aaw to it that all codes and cipher . in use vere imprOYedJ he introcluced strict regulatiOD& ror their use; and he kept I 

cl.ose watch OYer tbe c:ryptographic service. Be also was bead at a crypianal.Jtic I 

\ 

\ 

33 I 

\ 

\ 

\ 

' I 

\ 

I' 
- --- REF ID:A62842 

activity am. it 1a JmovD that 'l'urld.ah, lr1tish, Austrian aml Swedish diplomatic 

meaaapa were sol'V8d. After tbe Bolsbe.vik revo1ution ot 1916 same ot the Ruaaia11 

- ~ta managed to eacape fMll their hameland and I hid the pleanre ot 

meeting am talking vith one ot the beat of them d'8"iJJg hia serrtce vtth one ot our 

Allies in World War II. Be is no lOBpi' alive but I v1v1413 recall tbat. he wore 

with great pr:lde on tbe index finger ot hie right hand & ring in 11h1Cb. vas mounted 

a large rub7. When I showed illtereat ill thia unusual sea be told me the ring had 

been preaa.ted. him as a taken ot recogn1t1on aDd. thanks tor h1a c:rntanal.Jtic 

successes 1i1h1le 1D the service o:t Czar Bichol.aa, the last ot the llDe. 

Bat the ato.ry is al.together ditterent aa rega;rda erntoJ..081 in the Russian Anq. 

Tbe Military CryptQgraph1c, SezTice was poorq o:rgan1zed and, beaid.ea, 1t bad adopted. 

a cryptographic ayatem 11hicll proved to be too COQlicateq. tor the poorly trained 

Basaian cipher am radio operators t.o use when it vaa placed. into ettec& tovarcl 

the encl ot l9:L4. Here 1a a pct11l'e ot that cipher, 'llh1ch vas coapoaed ot two table•~ 

one ar.ranged tor convenieDCe ill enciphering alll the other arranged to convn1enc:e 1D 

dec1pheriDg. ID the enc1pher1Dg table the letten ot the Russi.mt alpbabet (33 1D all) 

appear in the 'topaost rov of cll&racters, the 2.oel!git groups, 1D :rud.om order within 

each o:t the 8 rova below tbe top. ra11,. are their cipher equivalents. Tbeae rows 

therefore conditute a aet of 8 cipber alphabets, these &l:pbabets be:lJlg preceded by 

key DlDl'bers f'rca l to 8 ill nmtcm cmler. Both the cipher et1,u1Yalente and the 

iaUcatora wve aub3eet to change. Indicators- were used to tell hov 1IJAD'1' ~ter• 

\ 

wre enciphered cansecutively 1n ea.ch~' the 1D&l1cat.m:_ conaisti'D8 ot ~ ot - ~\ , .. the digits frCJ!l l to 9 repsted f'ive times. ~alphabets wre then ue4 1n \ 

Jre7-mnber aecpmce, enciphering tbe first set ot letter& (5, 7, etc., accord~ 

to the 1Ddic&tar) 'bJ' &lpbabet 1, the next set by a.1pbabet 2, am. ao cm. .After t 

8th aet ot J.etten, which was enciphered by cipher alphabet 8, return 1a made to 

eipher alphabet. l, repeating 1;be sequence 1a th1a aanneJ' until tbe ea.tire aeasage 

had been enciphered.. In enc1pber1Dg a long message the cipher operator eou.ld. chuge · \ 

alpbabeta. !'he cipher text vu then sent in 5-cl1g1t groups. 1'1le use ot the 

4ec1pber1.ng table~ requirea explanation but. this question -.r be 1D. ori.er: I 

- the aversion to the wse ot zero and to the use o:t dou'bl.e digits such aa i1, 22, 

331 etc.! Thia probab~ was thought to be helpful to the telegraph operato;s as 

well as to the cipher cJ.erks in straighteniDg out errors in trammission ariJ. \ 

reception. 

i 

I 

I 

I 

\ (I 

\\ 

\ 

I \. 

\ 

I 

\ 

\ 
REF ID:A62842 

I baTe tolcl you that th:ta cipher 87Stea pr0Ye4 too ditticult t~ the Buaa1ans 

to use, and I th1Dk 7ou caa see wtQ". It vu ao ditticult that messages bad to be 

repeated over and aver, VS.th grea\ loaa ot time. Xt 18 vell knan to all hiat.or1aDs 

b)' th1a tm that. the Ruaalau lost the •ttle ot ~bers in the autum ot 1914 

lat'gel.7 because ot faulty ec-nmications. Poor ~ and :rauure to uae 

even the moat aiaple ctpra proper:q on the tield ot battle, and mt brUJ.1.aD.t 

atrategJ on the part aE tbe enemy, vaa the cause ot Buaaia's deteat in that and in 

au'baeq,uent battles.. '!'he conteats ot BwssiaD ccmnm1 catiDDa becane known to the 

Germn amt Austrian Jl1gh Ccpwmds Within a few hours atter tran-1as10lll b,y ndio. 

'l'be cliapoaition and movemeats ot BauiaD troopa, aDl Hussian strategic pla.U wre 

no secrets to the mell\Y. ne detallet.\ and absolute~ reliable into.rmatioa obtaimd. 

' 

b7' ititercepting alld remU:ag the .Rwsa1ml camrmmicat1ona ll84e it Yetr¥ eas1 for th:e 

Germn and Austrian co-ear!«ra not ODl1' to take JrOJel' cOUDter-meuures to ~t 

the execu"t1oa. of Buasian plaDa, but also to lalJncb. attaca on the eakeat parts of 

the Hussian tront. Al.though the Rusaian ciphers were ~ not complicated their 

cipher clerks and radio operators ~ound t~1ves unable to acttange messages with 

accuracy am speed.. Aa a matter ot tact the7 wre so inept that not ~ wre their 

c1~ msaagea eu~ ao1ved bat. aJ.ao they m4e so ~ errors that the 1ntealed 

reciplenta tbemelvea hat. conaiderable clltt1culty 1D decipheriug tbe •aaagu even 

- with the correct. .teys. In ~ cuea thia lecl to tbe uae ~ pla1a language, ao that 

the Germu am Austrian forces d1cJ. Dc$ even have to do ~iJJg mt intercept. the 

•aaages and traulate tbe Rwsaian. '!o aeD1 out diapoa1t.1ona111QeDU.Dg movements, 

inmediate am long-range plans in pJ.a1n language was, ~ course, ODe c&l.'diDal error. , 

Another was toiencipber only vorda aDl p!Duea clemed the 1IQortaDt onea,, leariDg 

the reat in el.ear. .Another car41Jlal error, Dl8de 'llhen a cipher was auperaede4, aa 

' to send a measage to a UDit that ba4 not pt received the netr tq and on lea1\B1llC thia 

then repeat the :14entical •aaase 1D the old .tq. I suppose the Busiana c 

9V8r7 error 1D tbe catalog ot czn>tograph1c crimiDel.ogJ. •o wDl1er tlle;J lost 

' Ea.ttle ot Tarmenberg, vbich one .U1t&r7 critic aa14 wa not a. battle but a mass 

because the Busslams loat 100,000 JleD 1D tba 3-4&7 ~, QD the la&t daJ' or\ 

\ 

vbich the Buasiau co-e""er-in-chief ccsaitted a\d.c14e. Daree web later another\ 

high Rl•s'M comma.nder toll.owed auit and the Buaa:laD An7 began to tall apart, eaa-\ 

ple~ disorganised, without .leadership or pl.aDs. Rasia itself began to go down \ \ 

in ru1Da 1lben 1ta km:f, •Y7 am. GoYerma.ut failed ao e~, am tbia ma4e 1flQ' \ 

\ 

tcr the October revolution, ushering 1D a regtm that na too wak to put th1wga 

together again aD1. to _hold thea together. !he remnauta picked ap ~ a amall ~ 

\ 

35 

' I 

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REF ID:A62842 

ot tmt1ea 111th military and adm2ntatrat1ve ability, with treacbery, Yiol.ence and 

c:amn1ng, vel.ded together vbat bas nov become a aighty 11&1.Yeraary of the Western 

World, the USSR. 

I. have left to be treated laat in th1a lecture the crntoaystema used by tbe 

American .BJtpea.ition&l'Y' l'orcea in Europe during our participation in World Var I. 

When the first contingents ot the AB'I arrived 1n. Prance ill the S1m1Sr ot 1917, 

there were am 'able ~or secret cCJW1m1 cat.ions within the lilfl but t'bree authorised 

mew. ~ tirst 1IBS that eztensive cede tor Mminiatrative telagraphic eorres,llOndenc:e, 

the 1915 ed1t1cm ot the Var Department ~legraph Code about vhich I've ~ tol4 

you aamething. Al.though it was fairly well adapted. tor that type ot c,_am1 catlm, 

it was not at all suiable tor rapid am etticient atrateg1c or tactical cOPMmica .. 

t10lllS in the f'1el4, DQl" vas it aaf• to use without a clums7 superenci:pherment., 'lhe 

second Cl"JPtoayatea available ms that Jmcnm. aa the reptatiDg-ke7 cipher, which 

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used tbe Signal Corpa Cipher Disk, the baaic JriDcipl.e.s ot which were descri'lled aa 

:tar back aa. abont the year ]500. !rhe third QBtem aY&1lable was the Plarf'air Cipher, 

vh1ch had been :tr~ copied traa tbe British, who bad uaed it aa a t1.eld. cipher 

tor mD¥ yeara betore World War I am continuecl to uae it.. Iil adcl1t.icn to these 

authorized means there were trom time to time cmTeDt i1l the Jill/I apparmtq aenralhov 111m1, no one knowa--unautborized, 1ocaJ.l¥•imprOV'iaed "codea• ot Yal"J"iD8 depieea 

ot security, :most]¥ nil.. J: ab.ow one ot tbeae in thia slide and 1l'1ll let you auesa 

its security yoursell. 

Seen in retrospect, 1iheD the A1fl vaa firat. organised it ns certainly unprepared 

ror bamJ ing secret cmmm.ications in tbe field; but it is certain that it vaa no 

more unprepared in this re.a~ than vu aiq ot the other belligereD.ts upon their I 

·' respective entries into World War 11 aa I've indicated previousq 1n this lecture. 

1'h1s is rather st.range because never before in the histor,y ot warfare had cryptology I 

~ so ·.illportant a rol.e as a conaequence of ad.VBZLCea iJJ electrical ccmmmicat1ou I 

the Mii m its arrival 1a Eu.rope whole~ unprepared aa to .secret ca-un:l.cation wns 

and methods and as to eryptanal781a, but tor a limited tia it seemed alaost Jlotleles• 

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that ~ A1fl coul4 eatch up with tile t.ecbnical advances both sides ha4 ma4e1 'because I , 

their' Brltish and FreDch Al.llea were at first moat reluctant to discl.ose much ot 

their bard-earned in:formation about these vital ~ttera. 

Bevertbeless, and d.esl'ite ao 1Dauspieioua a coamencement, by the time ot the 

Araia.~ice, 1D Xovember 1918, not only bad the AEf caught u.p Yith their allies but I 
REF ID:A62842 

tba7 bad surpassed tbea ill "the preparation ot SOUDd codes, u mq be gathered. from 

the _fact that their allief ha4 by then dec1cled to .a.opt the KO system ot tieJ.a 

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cedes ud ~ t~ their preparation, printing, 41str1butdon, and l188&e· 

. Jus.t u the im'elltion ot Morse vire tel.egra~ bad a remarkable effect upon 

militaey coammications during the American CivU Var, as related in the preced1Dg ' 

lecture, so the invention tJf radio also p~ed & ye-q illportaut role ~field 

c.ommun1eat1ona during World War II. ~, al~ it can hardly be said that .a:u 

C01181na.e'rs trca the very earliest days Of the uae of radio iD military COP•m1 cat.1ona 

acutel.y reccwi1zed one of the most important disadvantages. ot radio--DBDlll~ 1 the tact 

that radio signals -my be more or lesa eaaiq intercepted. 'b7 the ~--it was not 

iong before tbe consequences of a COQplete disregard ot this obvious fact impressed 

themselves upon 110at co-mvJers, With the reault that the transmiuion ~ pJ.aiD 

laDguage becam the exception rather than the ruJ,.e. Thia. gave the most !IOlllentous 

st11mlus to the developnent and increased use ot cr.yptology that this service b8d 

ever experienced. 

Let us review some or the &CC<Dplishraents or the Code COJrq>ilation SerTice 

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under the S1gnal. COl"P•, A'lfl. It was organized in Jarm&.17 191.8, and conaiated ot 

one captain, three lieutenauta and one ealiated man. Until this service wa 

orge.niZed, tbat is, frOIJIL tbe ammier ot 1917 until the em ot tbat year the XIII bad. 

· nothtag tor C!')'Ptoc:mmm1cat1ons ezcept. those three 1Da4eq,uate means, tbat I've 

ment1.oned. When it has been dete1'111ned that t1eld codes were needed, little tSae 

waa lost 111 getting on With the job that had to be done. S1.n.ce I bad no part. 1a 

this ettort I can sa,y, without 4anger ot 'being charged with impropriety 1 that tbe 

Code CCQilat1.on Sen'iee executed. the aoat.. remarkable .1ob iD the 'history ot llilitazy 

cryptograplJ1' up to t?1e t1De ~ World War n. 

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- The fitat work entrusted 'to it was the ccnpilation ot a ao-cai Jed •irreD.Ch Code•, 

or which J.cioo copies vere printed,, tcgether with wbat were then caJ.led •distortion : I 

' tablea•. ifbeae wre a!mple JIODOalpbabeta for enciphering t.be 2-letter Sl"OIJlll ot 

the ~· I vU.l show 7011 a picture ot a page of this code and ot one of the 

•distortion tablesa. 1'he danger of capture of these codes was recognized aa being 

such that the books were not issued below battalions. Benee, to meet the needs or 

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the tron~ UDe, a -.ch na.l.ler book was prepared aDCl printed, called tbe 11Jrront 

Line c~·. Distortion tables., 30 of them 1n all, were issued to~ this 

coc1e ~ wbich an edition ot 31000 copies vu~. lll1t the cede was not dis-

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tributed, because a studiy ot its security showed detects... The truth is that MW 

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REF ID:A62842 

erntograpbers VS.th perscmel 1.Dezperiem:ecl 1D ~is wre graping 1D the 

dark, with, little or no bel.p tran allies. Pinal 17, the light broke through: the 

Cade Compilation Service begaa to see tbe advantages ~that Cermn 3-letter 

nmdmtged 2-part code X've told ,.cu abcut, the one Cll1lecl tbe Satzbuch. Bere, 

then, was the or1g1a ot the Trench Codea vhich were ffnall7 adopted and ued 'bJ' tbe 

ABf, when it was decided that copJil:lg and benetitt1Dg trom the experience ot OermaD 

code compilation vaa no 41 abonor. '!be al' then Wilt tha one better, as :JOU shall 

nov learn. '1'be :tuat cccle or the new aeries ot the A1ll field ccdea vas Jmom as 

tbe •potamac Code•; it vu the t1rat ot tbe so-cal.led •American River Series,• 

am. it appeared on 24 June 1918, in an eclitiOD at 2,000 copies. It con.taiBed. 

approximate~ 1,.700 vords and phrases amt, as the ctf'icial report ao succiDctlJr 

states, ""vas mde up vith a coding and 4ecod1Dg section in order to reduce the work 

ot the operatOl'S at the r.ront. • !'he desigDatiaD •tvo-pal"t, • •ram.Cllised, • or, least 

or all, the Britiah nomenclatu:re "hatted• code waa stlll UDknown--but the prS..iple 

was. there nonetheless.. U!t us aee vb.at. the ott1cial repe>l"t goes on to Sa,' on tJa1a 

po1nt; let us listen to aome souml CCllllClll sense: 

•!he •in point ot dif'terence tram other Arfll3 cedes lay in the 

principle ot reprinting these books at. ~nt iDten'a1s and depemliJlg 

largeq apon the rapid.it~ of the reisawmce tor the secrecy ot the codea. 

1lh1a methocl did ~ with tlle dcmble vor:t at the f'ront ot ciphering am 

4ec1pber1Dg (Siel), ml pit the burden ot work upon gaeral heedqwtera, 

1fhere it proper~ belmtgeil. 11Dder this •TStem cae issue ot cod.ea could 

be cliatrib1Ited. down to regillents; another 1saue hell at A:nq lleadpartera,; 

aDll a third iaaue beld at General BeaclQ.uarters. As a matter ot reemd 

this first book, the Potomac, VU captured by the ~ OD ~ 201 Just 

one JDODt.h atter isanance, but '11'1th1D two asp, it had. beeD replaced 

throughout the entire Artq 1D the field.• 

~ replac•rt cccle wu the Smnmee, the nezt. in the ItiYer Series, f'ollo11ed 

'b1 tbe Va.bash, AJlegbe!Qr, aid. the Km.soil, all far the Amer:lcaD. Pirat Anr¥'· In 

October 1918 a departure in pl.a wa :made aDl d.1tterel\'t coc1es were issued a1Jmltaneous~ to the First and Second .Al'JD1ea. 'fb1a vu done 111 order not to '3eopardize 

UDDecessariq the lite of the codes b7 .PUttiRS in tbe :tield at one time 5 ,ooo 8Dll 

61000 copieS ot 8zr:/ one issue. ~ the Chaplaln, the :tirat ot 11hat came to be 

cauea the •Jake Series," ~or the SecoDll Arrq, was iasued with the Co1orado of' the 

"lliver ~1es• tor the First .Ar'JQ'; these wre tollo1fed 'b7 the Huron aDl the Oaage, 

the~ am the Biagara, in edit.iom ot 2 1 500 each. 

In addition to the :toregoiDg serf.ea ot eodea were eerta1D others that ahoul4 

be men.tiom4,. aa tor exn.ple., a short oode ot 2-letter eode groups to be u:sed b7 I 

front Um troops aa an emergency code; a short code list tor reporting caaU<iea; 

a telephone cocle t.or disgaiailJS tbe DBE& or cCWllU'ldtng otticers aD4 their units, 
REF ID:A62842 

and so on. Du.t there we.a in addition to all the toregoitlg one la;rge code that DD.lSt 

be mentionecl, a code to meet the reqllirementa tor aecure tnmamission of aesaage~ 

among the h:f.gber ecwnama in the field and betwen these and GHQ. This waa a task 

~ considerable magnitude and required several months 11 study ot maaages, contidentiaJ. 

papers concerning organization, replacement, operations, and ot .W.tary documents ot 

all sorta. The code was to be knotntaa the A1'I st&tt Code. In ll8iY 1918, the mamt• 

script of this code waa sent to press and the printing job was done in one JllOllth 

by the printing facilities ot the AW Adjutant General. C011S1dering tba:t. the code 

contained approx1-te:q 301000 words and phraaes, accanpanied bf eode groups conaiati.Dg of 5-tigure groups am 4-letter groupa, the t~k completed represents a remarkable 

achievement. by a field printiDg organization and I believe that th$s vaa the largest. 

&Zld moat com:prehenaive codebook ever compiled and printed b7 an a.m;J in the tield.. 

Mare than 50,000 telegraphic. eClllbinatiODS were sent 1D tests 1n order to cast out 

:COJDblnationa liable to error 1n tral!Sll1as1on. ODe tb.owsand copiea of this code ~ 

printed and bound. With th1a cede, aa a auperencipb.erment. &J"Btea,.- there were issued 

tran time to time •diatortion tuiea.• There remaina only to be aaid that ~ba war 

vaa over betore this code could be given & good work-out, but I have no G.oubt that 

during the tev months it vas in etfect. it served a very useful purpose. Moreover 1 

the excellent vocabulary vu later used as a skeleton far a Dell' Var Depe..rtment 

Telegraph Code to replace the edition of l.915. 

One more code rezm1ns to be mentioned: a. •Radio Service coa.e,,• the f'irat of 

!ta kind in the AllericaD. Arflrtl. !l'hia was prepared in October, to be used instead or 

a French co4e ot" &i•ilar nature. Fina-Jly, antieipe;ting the possible r~ment 

tor codes tor use by the Arrrq ot Occupation, a series ot three Sll&ll codes, i.dentic:al. 

in format. with the war-ttm trench codes ot the river and lake series, vaa prepared, 

and printed. ~ were namd s~ Fie.14 Codes Bo. l, 2 and 3 bat were mver 

issued because there turned out to be no nee4 far tbea iJl the quietUde in Germn1 

after the Arwy- or Occupe.tion marehed in.to toner tmell'l.Y 1 but nav very f":riendly 

territor,y. 

I vill bring this lecture to a el.ose nov by referring those of you. 1lho Ilight 

wish to learn more about tbe succeues and expl.01.ts ot the crntograpb.1.c orgard za .. 

tion ot the AEF in World Var I to Jrj monograph entitled American Ar!j' Field Codea 

in the.· Anlerican BX,pediti0!!8Z'Y Forces during the Firat Wm-ld War, Govermaellt Printing 

otfiee, 1942. Copies are on file 1D tbe Oi'tice ot Training. In that monograph you 

Vill f'iDl ~details ot interest Wich I have had to omit in this talk, together 

39 
REF ID:A62842 

with~ photographJ ot tbe cGde& and ci}lbers produced am. used not ~by the Mii 

but. als0t by Oll1."' alliell am. eneates 4ur1Dg tba't conflict. I 

In Lecture Jlo. 4 two uar1'C ci)fher meaaages wre given am. I sa14 that. their 

ao1ut1ou would be }U"Uelltea at tbe ccmclus1.cn ot the next lacture. Here theJ' an, 

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both being t.rcm llllJ<r General &Jell to General 1D Chief Bal leek,, relating to the 

relief ml rei.Dstat-=nt ot a.u. 
REF ID:A62842 

Maj. Gen. Bal.leek,~ General 1D Chie:r: 

I have receiYed 70U1" orders ot the 24th inat., requiriZlg •to turn 

over sy CO'PMDd to llaJ. Oen. G. II. 1'hmaa. I bave ~turned 

over the cowand to him, am 1D further obediem;e to pour iutrm:tions, 

I shall repair to Indi&Dapolla am await further orders. 

D. C. bll, 

llaJor-General 

Louiavw.e, ~., September 30, 1862 

General Halleclu 

I received lest evenblg your dispatch suspellding ~ removal traa 

ccwpanrl. <Nt ot a aeme ot pul>Uc dut1, I shall continue to d.iaeharge the 

duties ot ~ ccmnand to the but ot 'm:f ability Wltil otherv1se ordered. 

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D. C. lJaell, 

Jla.jor-Gener&l 

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