RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3920-17T4

JOSEPH J. NORMAN,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE 

PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent.

________________________

Submitted December 19, 2018 – Decided 

Before Judges Alvarez, Nugent and Mawla.

On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.

Borger Matez, PA, attorneys for appellant (Jonathan 

E. Ingram, on the briefs).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, 

Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

MAWLA, J.A.D.

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

January 14, 2019

APPELLATE DIVISION

January 14, 2019
A-3920-17T4 2

Appellant Joseph J. Norman appeals from March 28 and April 24, 2018, 

decisions by the New Jersey State Parole Board (Board). The primary 

question raised on appeal is whether an appellant who has served his sentence 

pursuant to the Sex Offender Act (SOA), N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1 to -10, can be 

compelled to undergo a psychological evaluation for violation of certain 

conditions of parole supervision for life (PSL), and mandatory parole 

supervision (MPS), imposed outside the SOA. We hold the Board cannot 

compel such an evaluation and reverse that part of its decision. We affirm the 

Board's imposition of a parole eligibility term (PET) for Norman's violation of 

a special condition of MPS.

We take the following facts from the record. Norman was twenty-one 

years old when he committed several acts of aggravated sexual assault against 

a fourteen-year-old family member. He was arrested in September 2008, and 

in December 2008, pled guilty to one count of first-degree aggravated sexual 

assault, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(2)(A). 

Norman was sentenced in the second-degree range to seven years of 

incarceration in the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center (ADTC), subject 

to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(d)(7). NERA 

requires MPS for all first- and second-degree offenses. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c). 
A-3920-17T4 3

Norman was further sentenced to PSL following service of the custodial 

portion of his sentence, as required by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(a). 

On September 9, 2014, Norman was granted parole and discharged from 

the ADTC "by reason of the expiration of his maximum custodial sentence." 

Norman had served his entire seven-year sentence through a combination of 

jail credits and time served following his conviction. His final discharge 

stated he was "being discharged from the custodial portion of his . . . sentence 

only to commence the period of supervision as set forth by . . . [NERA]."

Specifically, Norman was paroled for five years pursuant to MPS, and also 

began PSL pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(a). Notably, he was not paroled 

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5(a), which governs sex offenders who are paroled 

before the expiration of their maximum sentence under SOA.

In pertinent part, the conditions of MPS required Norman to: 

"Immediately notify the assigned parole officer of any change in employment 

status. . . . Refrain from initiating, establishing or maintaining contact with 

any minor[,] . . . [and] [s]uccessfully complete the EMP[.][1]" Separately, PSL 

also included the same conditions. Notably, the Board stated Norman's "PSL 

status was previously continued to the [EMP] in 2016[,] and most recently 

continued to the [EMP] in February of 2017[]" because of a prior violation. 

 

1 Electronic Monitoring Program.
A-3920-17T4 4

In May 2017, Norman was arrested for violating parole by failing to 

inform his parole officer that he had been terminated from his job and for 

having unsupervised visits with his minor children. On October 18, 2017, a 

Board panel found Norman had violated the PSL and MPS conditions of his 

parole. The panel revoked Norman's PSL and directed him to serve twelve 

months of incarceration. It also revoked MPS and referred him to the ADTC 

for a psychological evaluation, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.54(i)(3) and 

10A:71-7.19A. 

On March 28, 2018, the Board affirmed the panel's determination. 

According to the Board, the purpose of the psychological evaluation was to 

"determine whether to affirm the revocation of the mandatory term of 

supervision and, if affirmed, whether . . . Norman's eligibility for future 

mandatory supervision consideration will be based on N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5(a) or 

the relevant provisions of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.45 [to -123.88]." 

Norman did not challenge the twelve months of incarceration for 

violating PSL. Rather, he requested the Board revise its determination to 

permit his release, effective May 16, 2018, having served the twelve months in 

confinement, and to resume parole. He argued neither the regulation 

governing MPS, nor the one governing PSL, granted the Board authority to 
A-3920-17T4 5

require a psychological evaluation as a condition of resuming parole, and his 

continued confinement as a result was unconstitutional. 

On April 24, 2018, the Board denied Norman's request. This appeal 

followed. 

I.

The issue on appeal – the Board's interpretation of statutes governing 

Norman's sentence and regulations regarding his parole – presents a question 

of law. We owe considerable deference to an agency's interpretation of its 

own regulations. US Bank, NA v. Hough, 210 N.J. 187, 200 (2012) (quoting 

In re Election Law Enf't Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 

262 (2010)). However, "an agency's interpretations, whether through 

regulations or administrative actions, 'cannot alter the terms of a legislative 

enactment nor can they frustrate the policy embodied in [a] statute.'" Williams 

v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 423 N.J. Super. 176, 183 (App. Div. 2011) (alteration in 

original) (quoting N.J. Ass'n of Realtors v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 367 N.J. 

Super. 154, 159-60 (App. Div. 2004)). "Ultimately, reviewing courts are not 

'bound by the agency's interpretation of a statute.'" Ibid. (quoting Shim v. 

Rutgers, 191 N.J. 374, 384 (2007)).

On appeal, Norman asserts he was not paroled pursuant to the SOA, and 

consequently is not subject to the provisions of N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.54(i)(3) and 
A-3920-17T4 6

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-7.19A. He argues subjecting him to a psychiatric evaluation 

when he had already served his original sentence placed him in double 

jeopardy and constituted ex post facto punishment. He also argues he should 

have been released no later than May 17, 2018, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-

3.54(i)(2) and 10A:71-7.17B(a)(2). He asserts a twelve-month PET should not 

have been imposed because he did not violate a special condition certified to 

by the Board.

II.

As we noted, the Board revoked Norman's MPS and referred him to the 

ADTC for a psychological evaluation, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.54(i)(3) 

and 10A:71-7.19A. The Board's interpretation of the regulation was mistaken.

"An administrative agency, in construing its regulations, must apply the 

same rules of construction as those guiding statutory construction by the 

courts." Krupp v. Bd. of Educ. of Union Cty. Reg'l High Sch. Dist. No. 1, 278 

N.J. Super. 31, 38 (App. Div. 1994) (citing In re N.J.A.C. 14A:20-1.1, 216 

N.J. Super. 297, 306-07 (App. Div. 1987)). For that reason, a regulation 

"should be construed according to the plain meaning of the language." In re 

1999-2000 Abbott v. Burke Implementing Regulations, 348 N.J. Super. 382, 

399 (App. Div. 2002) (citing Medford Convalescent & Nurs. Ctr. v. Div. of 

Med. Assist. & Health Servs., 218 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 1985)); accord
A-3920-17T4 7

Czar, Inc. v. Heath, 398 N.J. Super. 133, 138 (App. Div. 2008), aff'd as 

modified, 198 N.J. 195 (2009). 

"If the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then [the] 

interpretive process is over." Calco Hotel Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Gike, 420 N.J. 

Super. 495, 503 (App. Div. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting TAC 

Assocs. v. N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 202 N.J. 533, 541 (2010)). Furthermore, 

"courts should avoid a construction that would render 'any word in the statute 

to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless, or to mean something other than 

its ordinary meaning.'" Ibid. (quoting Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 157 

N.J. 188, 204 (1999)). 

Criminal statutes are subject to sharper scrutiny for vagueness than civil 

statutes because criminal statutes have greater penalties and more severe 

consequences. State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 562 (1994) (citing State v. 

Afanador, 134 N.J. 162, 170 (1993)); State v. Bond, 365 N.J. Super. 430, 438 

(App. Div. 2003). This comports with the doctrine that "penal statutes must be 

strictly construed against the State." State v. Soltys, 270 N.J. Super. 182, 188 

(App. Div. 1994) (quoting State v. Churchdale Leasing, Inc., 115 N.J. 83, 102 

(1989)). 

Strict construction is appropriate as long as it is not contrary to the 

Legislature's plain intent, State v. Anicama, 455 N.J. Super. 365, 386 (App. 
A-3920-17T4 8

Div. 2018) (quoting State v. Carreker, 172 N.J. 100, 115 (2002)), and as long 

as it would not "unduly hinder" the Legislature's "object and purpose." State 

v. Marchiani, 336 N.J. Super. 541, 545 (App. Div. 2001) (citing State v. 

Rucker, 46 N.J. Super. 162, 167-68 (App. Div. 1957)).

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-7.19A(a) states "[t]his section applies to offenders who 

were sentenced to confinement in the [ADTC] under N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1 [to -10]

for an offense committed on or after December 1, 1998; who were paroled 

under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5(a); and who violate parole." Such 

individuals are subject to a psychological examination. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-

7.19A(b). The purpose of the examination is to:

determin[e] whether the violation(s) of the parole 

conditions reflects emotional or behavioral problems 

as a sex offender that cause the offender to be 

incapable of making any acceptable social adjustment 

in the community and, if so, to determine further the 

inmate's amenability to sex offender treatment and, if 

amenable, the inmate's willingness to participate in 

such treatment. 

[N.J.A.C. 10A:71-7.19A(d).]

[I]f the report of the examination conducted pursuant 

to . . . [N.J.A.C. 10A:71-7.19A(d)] above reveals that 

the inmate's violation(s) of the parole conditions 

reflects emotional or behavioral problems as a sex 

offender that cause the inmate to be incapable of 

making any acceptable social adjustment in the 

community and further reveals that the inmate is 

amenable to sex offender treatment and is willing to 

participate in such treatment. The inmate shall be 
A-3920-17T4 9

eligible for parole pursuant to the provisions of 

N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5(a).

[N.J.A.C. 10A:71-7.19A(i).] 

By its plain language, N.J.A.C. 10A:71-7.19A(a) contemplates an inmate 

who was paroled, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5(a) before completing his 

sentence and committed a parole violation. Indeed, the entire rubric of the 

aforementioned regulations contemplates the inmate's return to the State's 

custody and an evaluation to determine whether he can safely serve the 

remainder of his sentence in the community. These regulations are 

inapplicable to an inmate who has served the entirety of his sentence under the 

SOA. 

Our conclusion is further supported by the fact N.J.A.C. 10A:71-7.19A 

was enacted to codify our holding in State v. Dalonges, 128 N.J. Super. 140 

(App. Div. 1974). In 1957, Dalonges pled non vult to sexually assaulting a 

fifteen year old. Id. at 143. He was incarcerated in 1958 and paroled with 

conditions in 1962, before completing his sentence. Id. at 143-44. In 1967, he 

violated the conditions of his parole by leaving New Jersey without permission 

and attempting petit larceny in New York. Id. at 144. Once he was returned to 

custody, a psychological evaluation was performed and revealed no issues or 

concern he would reoffend as a sexual predator. Ibid. Thus, Dalonges 
A-3920-17T4 10

challenged the revocation of parole where he had committed a non-sexual 

offense. Id. at 145.

On appeal, we held the intent of the SOA was to treat sexual offenders. 

Id. at 145-46. We concluded Dalonges' parole violations did not relate to his 

original offenses and did not justify keeping him in custody for further 

treatment. Id. at 147-48. Most importantly, Dalonges' violations occurred 

while he was paroled and before he served his sentence. Id. at 143-44. 

In contrast, Norman had already served his sentence. Thus, the facts and 

outcome of Dalonges underscore that N.J.A.C. 10A:71-7.19A does not apply 

to Norman. Moreover, we note MPS and PSL did not exist at the time of our 

holding in Dalonges.

2

 Therefore, we reject the Board's assertion these parole 

supervision and monitoring regimes fall within the SOA, and thus constitute a 

continuation of Norman's SOA sentence. 

Furthermore, we reject the Board's argument that it can compel a 

psychological evaluation in order to determine Norman's future parole 

eligibility under MPS based upon N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5(a). The statute states: 

"Any offender committed to confinement under the terms of this chapter shall 

 

2

"The 2003 Amendment to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4 'replaced all references to 

"community supervision for life" with "parole supervision for life."'" State v. 

Hester, 233 N.J. 381, 394-95 (2018) (quoting State v. Perez, 220 N.J. 423, 429 

(2015)). N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.54 codified mandatory supervision cases effective 

August 3, 1998. 30 N.J.R. 2920(a).
A-3920-17T4 11

become eligible for parole consideration upon referral to the State Parole 

Board of the offender's case by a special classification review board appointed 

by the commissioner." N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5(a). Thus, by its plain language, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5 does not apply to Norman because he served his SOA 

sentence, and is no longer subject to its provisions, and because the PSL and 

MPS requirements operate under a different statutory framework. 

Therefore, the Board's argument that N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.54(i)(3) applies 

when an MPS term is revoked, and authorizes the Board to order the 

psychological evaluation, misreads the regulation and N.J.S.A. 2C:47-5. In 

pertinent part, the regulation states:

(i) If a term of parole supervision imposed by a court 

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 is revoked by the 

appropriate Board panel and the offender returned to 

custody for violation of a condition of supervision the 

Board panel shall determine:

. . . .

3. Whether the offender, if originally sentenced 

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1 [to -10] and eligibility 

for parole consideration required the recommendation 

of the Special Classification Review Board, shall be 

eligible for parole consideration pursuant to the 

provisions of N.J.A.C. 10A:71-7.19 or 7.19A, as 

appropriate.

[N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.54(i)(3).]
A-3920-17T4 12

The plain language of the regulation demonstrates it does not apply to 

Norman. In Norman's final discharge document dated September 9, 2014, the 

Board acknowledged he had been released from ADTC because of the 

"expiration of his maximum custodial sentence." Furthermore, the Board 

stated: "This offender is being discharged from the custodial portion of his . . . 

sentence only to commence the period of supervision as set forth by . . . 

[NERA]." Thus, the Board acknowledged MPS was not a continuation of the 

SOA sentence, which had already been completed. Moreover, for reasons we 

have already discussed, N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.54(i)(3)'s reference to N.J.A.C. 

10A:71-7.19A does not apply to Norman.

For these reasons, we reverse the Board's finding Norman was required 

to undergo a psychological evaluation.3 We hold that where an individual has 

already served his sentence, he cannot be required to undergo a psychological 

evaluation pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.54(i)(3) and 10A:71-7.19A. Absent 

further comment by the Legislature, these regulations only apply to individuals 

who have been released on parole before completing their sentence. 

 

3 We decline to address Norman's constitutional arguments because the plain 

language of the regulations resolve the issue. "Constitutional questions should 

not be addressed unless they are imperative for the disposition of the 

litigation." Grant v. Wright, 222 N.J. Super. 191, 197-98 (App. Div. 1988)

(citing State v. Salerno, 27 N.J. 289, 296 (1958)). 
A-3920-17T4 13

III.

Finally, Norman argues that under N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.54(i)(2) he should 

have received a term of nine months PET, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10:71-

7.17B(a)(2), and no more than twelve months under N.J.A.C. 10A:71-

7.17B(a)(3)(viii). Norman asserts the Board failed to state its reasons for 

imposing a twelve-month PET. He argues the PET could not have been 

established for a violation of a special condition, under N.J.A.C. 10A:71-6.4(e) 

or (f), because the former provision only applies when the Board certifies to a 

special condition, and the latter concerns a violation where an individual fails 

to notify an employer of his parole status and criminal record. Norman argues 

neither provision applies here.

We find no error in the Board's imposition of a twelve-month PET. The 

Board has broad discretion in parole release decisions. Trantino v. N.J. State 

Parole Bd., 296 N.J. Super. 437, 470 (App. Div. 1997) (citing State v. Lavelle, 

54 N.J. 315 (1969)). N.J.A.C. 10A:71-7.17B(a)(3)(viii) requires the 

imposition of a twelve-month PET for a violation of a special condition of 

parole imposed under N.J.A.C. 10A:71-6.4(e). The Board's March 28, 2018 

decision stated as follows: "The Board finds that . . . Norman was placed on 

the [EMP] on February 15, 2017[,] as a result of a Board panel Notice of 

Decision dated January 18, 2017[,] that imposed the special condition that . . . 
A-3920-17T4 14

Norman successfully complete the [EMP]." Thus, contrary to Norman's 

claims, the Board panel had imposed special conditions when it adjudicated a 

prior parole violation in 2017 and decided to continue him on parole. 

Separate from the SOA, Norman was subject to MPS as a part of his 

original sentence, which he violated. Therefore, the imposition of a twelvemonth PET, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-7.17B(a)(3)(viii), for violation of the 

special condition was valid. 

Reversed in part and affirmed in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.