United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 92-7529.

MAGNOLIA BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Roy Noble LEE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

July 9, 1993.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, KING, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.

KING, Circuit Judge:

The plaint iffs in this case filed suit against various o fficials of the State of Mississippi, alleging

that Mississippi's current method of electing supreme court judges violates section 2 et seq. of the

Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. The district court rejected the plaintiffs' section

2 claim and dismissed their complaint. The plaintiffs now appeal. For the following reasons, we

affirm the decision of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

The Mississippi Supreme Cour t is t he state's court of last resort in both criminal and civil

matters. It currently consists o f nine judges who are selected for eight year terms in partisan

elections. Vacancies are filled by the Governor, with special elections held for the unexpired term.

Candidates for the Mississippi Supreme Court must meet age, residency, and professional

qualifications, which are set forth in the Mississippi Constitution. S ee M ISS

. C ONST

. art. VI, § 150.

The st at e o f Mississippi is divided into three east-west districts for purposes of electing

supreme court judges. That is, three judges are elect ed from t he Northern District, the Central

Dist rict , and the Southern District of the state. In each of the three east-west districts, then,

Mississippi Supreme Court judges are chosen in at-large, partisan elections.

On August 17, 1990, the Magnolia Bar Association, the Mississippi State Conference of the

NAACP, the Rainbow Coalition, the Mississippi Association of Black Supervisors, the Mississippi1 The Plaintiffs also asserted claims under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, under the

Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and under Mississippi

law. On September 24, 1991, a three-judge panel granted the Defendants' motion for partial

summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' section 5 claim. And, by pre-trial order, the Plaintiffs

voluntarily dismissed all claims except their section 2 claim. Conference of Black Mayors, and four black citizens and registered voters of Mississippi (collectively,

"Plaintiffs"), filed suit against various state officials (collectively, "Defendants"). The Plaintiffs

alleged, among other things, that Mississippi's method of electing s upreme court judges violates

section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. 1 As a remedy, the Plaintiffs sought

single-member election districts, or in the alternative, an election scheme using limit ed or cumulative

voting.

The Plaint iffs' section 2 claim proceeded to trial on February 25, 1992. During trial, the

Plaint iffs advanced several theories of section 2 liabilit y. First, they presented evidence designed to

challenge the current mult imember election districts—i.e., evidence suggesting that the mult imember

election districts, as currently drawn, dilute black voting strength. They also levelled a "vote

fragmentation" challenge to the current election scheme, arguing that the current east-west district

lines impermissibly fracture black voting strength, which is concentrated in the western segment of

Mississipp i. Finally, the Plaintiffs offered evidence designed to prove a "hybrid"

line-drawing/multimember section 2 claim. Specifically, they presented evidence designed to show

that Mississippi's mult imember districting scheme, when combined with the east-west districting lines,

operates to cancel out or minimize black voting strength.

The district court rejected each of the theories of section 2 liabilit y advanced by the Plaint iffs.

See Magnolia Bar Ass'n v. Lee, 793 F.Supp. 1386 (S.D.Miss.1992). With regard to the Plaint iffs'

straightforward challenge to the current mult imember election districts, the court first determined

that, in the Northern and Southern Districts, the Plaint iffs had failed to adduce evidence sufficient to

satisfy the first threshold requirement of T hornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92

L.Ed.2d 25 (1986) (i.e., they failed to demonstrate that blacks would constitute a majorit y of the

voting age population in any of the proposed single member districts). S ee 793 F.Supp. at 1401-02.

The court also concluded that, in the Central District, the Plaint iffs had faile d t o satisfy the thirdGingles threshold requirement (i.e., they failed to demonstrate a pattern of legally significant white

bloc voting). S ee 793 F.Supp. at 1405-07. As for the Plaintiffs' straightforward vote fragmentation

claim, the district court determined that it also failed on the first Gingles threshold requirement. The

district court specifically concluded that, even if north-south districts were drawn, blacks would not

constitute a majority of the voting age population in any of the three proposed mult imember districts.

See 793 F.Supp. at 1414-15. Finally, with respect to the Plaintiffs' hybrid challenge, the district court

determined that, although the Plaint iffs had satisfied the Gingles threshold requirements, their claim

failed under the totality of the circumstances inquiry. See 793 F.Supp. at 1415-18.

Ultimately, the district court concluded that the Plaint iffs "failed to prove by a preponderance

of the evidence any violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965." 793 F.Supp. at 1418.

The district court accordingly entered judgment in favor of the Defendants and dismissed the case.

The Plaintiffs now appeal.

II. GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A. The Section 2 Framework

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, pr o hibit s states and political

subdivisions from employing any "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice,

or procedure

... in a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the

United States to vote on account of race or col or." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). Section 2 further provides

that

A violation

... is established if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the

political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are

not equally open to participation by members of [a prote ct ed class] ... in that its members

have less opportuni ty than other members of the electorate to participate in the political

process and to elect representatives of their choice.

Id. § 1973(b). Finally, section 2 instructs that, although courts should consider "the extent to which

members of a protected class have be en elect ed to office in the State or political subdivision," the

protected class has no "right to have members .. elected in numbers equal to their proporti on in the

population." Id.

It is settled in this circuit that section 2 claims must be analyzed under a two-part framework.To prevail on such a claim, a class of minority voters must first satisfy certain threshold requirements

set forth by the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d

25 (1986). Minority voters must then offer evidence of the circumstances of the local political

landscape—many of which Congress specifically listed in the 1982 amendments to section 2 as being

re levant to the inquiry. Ultimately, the G ingles threshold inquiry and the broad, totality of

circumstances inquiry are designed to probe whether the challenged election practice "has resulted

in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote based on color or race." C hisom v. Roemer,

--- U.S.

----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 2363, 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991).

1. The Gingles Threshold Inquiry

The Gingles threshold inquiry, which was first formulated in the context of a challenge to a

mult imember election scheme, is a relatively narrow one. To satisfy it, the minority group must prove

by a preponderance of evidence that (1) it i s sufficiently large and geographically compact to

constitute a majority in a single member district, (2) its members are politically cohesive, and (3) the

white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to ena ble it—in the absence of special

circumstances—usually to defeat the minority group's preferred candidate. G ingles, 478 U.S. at 48-

51, 106 S.Ct. at 2765-67. Failure to establish any one of the Gingles factors precludes a section 2

violation, because "[t]hese circumstances are necessary preconditions for mult imember districts to

operate to impair minority voters' abilit y to elect representatives of their choice." I d. at 50, 106 S.Ct.

at 2766.

Although form

ulat ed in t he context of a challenge to a multimember election scheme, the

Gingles threshold inquiry also applies to other types of secti o n 2 claims. In G rowe v. Emison,

---

U.S.

----, 113 S.Ct. 1075, 122 L.Ed. 2d 388 (1993), a unanimous Supreme Court held that the

minority plaint iffs, who were alleging that si ngle-member district lines, as currently drawn,

fragmented their voting strength, had to satisfy all three of the Gingles threshold requirements. And,

in Voinovich v. Quilter, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1149, 122 L.Ed.2d 500 (1993), a case in which the

plaint iffs alleged that the existing district lines diluted minority influence over elections, the Supreme

Court reiterated that the G ingles threshold factors have relevance not only to challenges tomult imember districting schemes, but also to other types of sect io n 2 challenges. Writing for a

unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor stated:

Of course, the Gingles factors cannot be applied mech anically and without regard to the

nature of the claim. For example, t he first G ingles precondition, the requirement that the

group be sufficiently large to constitute a majority in a single district, would have to be

modified or eliminated when analyzing the influence-dilution claim we assume arguendo to

be actionable today. The complaint in such a case is not that black voters have been deprived

of the abilit

y to constitut e a m ajority, but of the possibility of being a sufficiently large

minority to elect their candidate of choice with the assistance of cross-over votes from the

white majority.

Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1157.

2. The Totality of Circumstances Inquiry

Once the minority group satisfies the Gingles threshold inquiry, it must then offer evidence

of the circumstances of the local political landscape—evidence demonstrating that "its members have

less opportuni ty than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and elect

representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). In the Senate Report accompanying the 1982

amendments to section 2, Congress listed several factors that will typically be relevant to the totality

of circumstances inquiry. S ee S.R EP

. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at 28-29, (1982), reprinted in

1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07. These include:

a. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that

touched t he right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or

otherwise to participate in the democratic process;

b. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivisi o n is racially

polarized;

c

. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually la rge election

districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisio ns, or other voti ng practices or procedures that may enhance the opportuni ty for discrimination against

the minority group;

d. whether members of the minority group have been denied access to [any candidate slating]

process;

e. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear

the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which

hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process;

f. whether political

campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;

[and]

g. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in thejurisdiction.

Id. at 28-29, 1982 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 206-07 (footnotes omitted). In the same report, Congress also

listed two "[a]dditional factors that in some cases have had probative value ... to establ i sh a

violation." Id. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 207. They are:

h. whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected o fficials to the

particularized needs of the members of the minority group; [and]

i. whether the policy underlying the state o r po lit ical subdivision's use of such voting

qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.

Id. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 207. Finally, Congress noted that, "[w]hile these enumerated factors

will often be the most relevant ones, in some case s o t her factors will be indicative of the alleged

dilution." Id., 1982 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 207.

Ultimately, a district court can find a section 2 violation only if, "in the particular situation,

the [challenged] practice operate[s] to deny t he minority plaintiff[s] an equal opportunity to

participate [in the political process] and to elect candidates of their choice." I d. at 3 0, 1982

U.S.C.A.A.N. at 207. The Senate Report instructs courts not to become bogged down in

"mechanical "point counting'," id. at 29 n. 118, 1982 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 207 n. 118, but rather, to make

a "searching practical evaluation of the [locality's] "pa st and present reality ,' " i d. at 30, 1982

U.S.C.A.A.N. at 208. "[T]here is no requirement that any particular number of [the Senate] factors

be proved, or that a majority of them point one way or another." Id. at 29, 1982 U.S.C.A.A.N. at

207.

B. Standard of Appellate Review

Because a district court's findings in a section 2 case are "peculiarly dependent upon the facts

of each case" and re quire "an int ensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the contested

electoral mechanisms," we review those findings under the clearly erroneous standard of review. S ee

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79, 106 S.Ct. at 2781. If the district court applies the correct legal standards,

we wil l not set aside its findings under the G ingles threshold inquiry, the totality of circumstances

inquiry, and the ultimate vote dilution inquiry unless we are "left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed." A nd erson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 1052 In particular, we do not reach the Plaintiffs' arguments that (a) the district court erred in

failing to discuss relevant contrary evidence on three critical factors under the totality of

circumstances inquiry; (b) the district court erred in finding that "the extent to which black

citizens fail to exercise their obligation to vote diminishes the weight to be given the history of

official discrimination," 793 F.Supp. at 1408; (c) the district court erred when, considering

minority electoral success, he took into account the "considerable electoral success ... [which was,

in part,] attributable to the Voting Rights Act and the Mississippi litigation under it," 793 F.Supp.

at 1410; (d) the district court erred in finding that the state policies for maintaining the current

east-west, multimember districts are not tenuous; and (e) the district court erred in concluding

that the state policies for maintaining the present district lines foreclose the Plaintiffs' section 2

challenges. Of course, by refusing to reach these arguments, we do not mean to express our

approval of the particular actions and conclusions about which the Plaintiffs complain.

In this regard, we also deny the Plaintiffs' motion requesting us to take judicial

notice of the fact that the Mississippi legislature has enacted a law which establishes an

intermediate appellate court. This request was made in connection with the Plaintiffs'

argument that the district court erred in assessing the weight of the state interests

underlying the current electoral system. Because we are not addressing this argument,

there is no need to take judicial notice of a statute which possibly calls into question the

strength of Mississippi's interest in the current electoral scheme. S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). That is, "[i]f the district court's account of the evidence

is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety," its findings will not be reversed. I d. at 573-

74, 105 S.Ct. at 1511-12.

III. ANALYSIS

The outcom e of this appeal turns on the district court's application of the Gingles threshold

requirements. As explained below, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the Plaintiffs

failed to demonstrate legally significant white bloc voting in supreme court elections in the Mississippi

Central District. Nor did the district court clearly err in finding that, if the district lines were drawn

from north to south rather than from east to west, blacks would not constitute a majority of t he

voting age population in any of the hypothetical mult imember districts. These two findings under the

Gingles threshold inquiry effectively foreclose the Plaint iffs' straightforward challenges to the current

mult imember districts and the current district lines, as well as the Plaintiffs' hybrid

line-drawing /multimember challenge. Accordingly, we do not reach the Plaintiffs' arguments with

respect to the district court's findings under the totality of circumstances inquiry. 2

A. The Straightforward Multimember District Challenge

The district c o urt first rejected the Plaint iffs' straightforward challenge to Mississippi's current3 Dr. Lichtman analyzed three different kinds of election contests pitting black candidates

against white candidates: judicial elections throughout the state of Mississippi (including Circuit,

Chancery, and Supreme Court elections); elections in the Second Congressional District; and

numerous city and county elections. His analyses covered approximately a twenty year period

and included a wide range of local state, and federal offices. His conclusions were based on these

studies. mult imember districting scheme. With respect the Northern and Southern Districts of Mississippi,

the district co urt det ermined that the Plaintiffs could not satisfy the first G ingles threshold factor.

That is, they could not draw a single-member district in either of these areas in which blacks would

constitute a majority of the voting age popul ation. And, with respect to the Central District, the

district court found that, although the Plaint iffs satisfied the first two Gingles threshold factors, they

could not satisfy the third Gingles factor—legally significant white blo c voting. In making this

finding, the district co urt relied primarily on the fact that the only two blacks who had run for the

Mississippi Supreme Court in the Central District, Judge Anderson in 1986 and Judge Banks in 1991,

defeated their white opponents with significant support from white voters. S ee 793 F.Supp. at 1405-

1407.

The Plaint iffs a rgue on appeal that the district court clearly erred in finding no legally

significant white bloc voting in the Central District. They argue specifically that the dist rict court

clearly erred in finding "that the e lect ion of Anderson and the election of Banks to the Mississippi

Supreme Court were not aberrational but evidence that whites will not necessarily vote as a bloc for

white candidates hav ing black opponents in Mississippi Supreme Court elections so as to "usually

defeat the minority's preferred candidate.' " 793 F.Supp. at 1407 (quoting, G ingles, 478 U.S. at 51,

106 S.Ct. at 2767). They contend that the only evidence that the election of these two black judges

was not aberrational is the testimony of the Defendants' expert witness, who they contend was not

qualified to render such an opinion. The Plaintiffs point instead to the testimony of their expert, Dr.

Lichtman, who stated that (a) white bloc voting in the Central District is legally significant and (b)

the election of the two black candidates, who were both incumbents, was aberrational. They reason

that, based on his uncontradicted testimony and the evidence of racially divergent voting patterns in

other elections, 3 the district court was required to find legally significant whit e bloc voting i n theCentral District. We disagree.

The Plaintiffs have not offered any authority, and we can find none, for their assertion that

the district court may only rely on expert conclusio ns in det ermining whether white bloc voting is

legally significant or whether elections in which whites do not vote as a bloc are aberrational. Indeed,

it seems entirely reasonable to permit the district court to examine the election results offered by both

sides, as well as the circumstances surrounding those elections, and det ermine for itself—with or

without expert conclusions as to which elections are aberrational—whether the white majority votes

sufficiently as a bloc so as to usually defeat the minority-preferred candidate. The Plaintiffs' argument

that the district court was required to accept their expert's conclusion that the election of two black

judges to the Mississippi Supreme Court was aberrational is, therefore, without merit.

Although a close call, we t hink that the district court could reasonably conclude that the

election of two black judges from the Central District was not aberrational, but rather, probative

evidence that whites would not vote as a bloc so as to usually defeat the preferred supreme co urt

candidate of black voters. Judge Anderson, the black candidate who defeated a known white

segregationist in 1986, received 58% of the white vote. Judge Banks, who narrowly defeat ed a

well-known, white chancery judge in 1991, received approximately 3 0% of the white vote and

virtually unanimous support from blacks. Given this evidence, as well other evidence offered by the

Defendan t s suggest ing that black and white voters do not generally prefer different candidates in

Mississippi judicial elections, the district court's finding that the election of Anderson and Banks was

not aberrational is plausible in light of the record. Therefore, it is not clearly erroneous.

We also reject the Plaintiffs' related argument that the election of Anderson and Banks had

to be discounted because of their status as incumbents. We recognize that, in G ingles, the Supreme

Court stated that incumbency may be a "special circumstance" that explains isolated minority success

in a community polarized a lo ng racial lines. S ee 478 U.S. at 57, 106 S.Ct. at 2770. The problem

wit h t he Plaintiffs' argument is that the district court had valid reasons for not considering the

incumbency of the black candidates as a "special circumstance." As already noted, both of the

elections were high profile and involved well-known white candidates. Moreover, neither of the twoblack candidates had been incumbents for very long. Anderson was appoint ed t o t he Mississippi

Supreme Court in January 1985 and ran for reelection the next year. Banks had to run in a special

election less than a year after he was appointed. Had we been sitting as trier of fact, we may well

have reached a different conclusion about the weight t o be given these two elections; however, it

cannot be said that the district court clearly erred in refusing to discount the two Mississippi Supreme

Court elections involving black candidates merely because those candidates were incumbents.

Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not clearly err in finding no legally significant

white bloc voting in Mississippi Supreme Court elections in the Central Dis trict. This court has

repeatedly stated that , when st at istical evidence is used to establish legally significant white bloc

voting, the most probative elections are generally those in which a minority candidate runs against

a white candidate. See, e.g., Westw ego Citizens for Better Government v. City of Westw ego, 872

F.2d 1201, 1208 n. 7 (5th Cir.1989). It also follows that elections involving the particular office at

issue will be more relevant than elections invo lving other offices. At the time of trial, there were only

two supreme court elections in the C ent ral District where a black candidate had opposed a white

candidate, and in both of them, the black candidates, who were also the candidates preferred by black

voters, received substantial support from white voters and won the elections. In light of this

evidence, the district court could reasonably conclude that the Plaint iffs did not meet their burden of

"demonstrat[ing] that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it

... usually to defeat

the minority's preferred candidate." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51, 106 S.Ct. at 2767 (emphasis added).

B. The Straightforward Line-Drawing or Vote Fragmentation Challenge

The district court also rejected the Plaintiffs' straightforward vote fragmentation challenge.

It noted that, even if district lines were drawn so as to create three north-south mult imember districts,

the Plaint iffs would not be able to satisfy the first Gingles th reshold factor. The district court

specifically determined that blacks would not constitute a majority of the voting age population in any

of the north-south multimember districts proposed by the Plaintiffs. See 793 F.Supp. at 1414-15.

On appeal, the Plaint iffs do not challenge the district court's findings on their straightforward

vote fragmentation challenge. Indeed, the Plaintiffs' own expert on this question, Senator Kirksey,4 We note that the Plaintiffs have not alleged an "influence dilution" claim. That is, they have

not argued that the current east-west district lines operate to minimize their ability to influence

elections. Compare Voinovich, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1157. Rather, the Plaintiffs have

consistently maintained that they are being deprived of the ability to constitute a majority in a

Mississippi Supreme Court district. Therefore, we need not decide today whether an influence

dilution claim is cognizable under section 2. conceded at trial that blacks would not constitute a majority of the voting age population in any of

the proposed north-south mult imember districts. Even in the proposed Western District, which

would contain the greatest concentration of blacks, Senator Kirksey opined that the voting age

population would only be 48-49% black. Therefore, on the record before us, the district co urt

c orrectly held that the Plaint iffs failed to satisfy the first Gingles requirement with respect to t heir

straightforward line-drawing or vote fragmentation challenge. 4

C. The Hybrid Line-Drawing/Multimember Challenge

Finally, the district court rejected the Plaint iffs' hybrid line-drawing/multimember challenge.

In doing so, the district court disagreed with the Defendants' argument that such a claim is not

cognizable under section 2. The district court then concluded, however, that even if Mississippi were

divided into three north-south districts, and the proposed Western District were further divided into

three subdistricts, the Plaintiffs still could not demonstrate a section 2 violation. The district court

found that, although the Plaint iffs satisfied all three Gingles threshold factors in the proposed Western

District, see 793 F.Supp. at 1415-16, their claim failed under the totality of circumstances inquiry.

The district court specifically found that Mississippi's "valid state policies"—in maint aining east-west

districts and in preserving county lines—foreclosed the Plaintiffs' hybrid claim. S ee 793 F.Supp. at

1417-18.

We affirm the district court's decision to reject the Plaint iffs' hybrid line-drawing/multimember

challenge, but on other grounds. In particular, we conclude that the district court, having rejected

the Plaint iffs' challenge to the at-large or mult imember feature of the Central Supreme Court district,

should have rejected the Plaint iffs' hybrid challenge as seeking to circumvent its finding of no legally

significant white bloc voting.

It is important to understand the implications of the Plaint iffs' hybrid challenge in the context5 According to the Supreme Court's opinion in Gingles, the "inquiry into the existence of vote

dilution caused by submergence in a multimember district is district specific." 478 U.S. at 59, 106

S.Ct. at 2771.

6 Having held that the Plaintiffs cannot satisfy their burden under the third Gingles factor by

pointing to voting behavior in a hypothetical district which encompasses the entire state of

Mississippi, we need not decide (a) whether minority plaintiffs challenging an existing

multimember election district can add seats to the elected body or (b) whether minority plaintiffs

challenging the existing district lines can draw extra lines in order to satisfy the first Gingles

requirement. We recognize that the Seventh Circuit, in McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 851

F.2d 937, 946 (7th Cir.1988), cert denied 490 U.S. 1031, 109 S.Ct. 1769, 104 L.Ed.2d 204

(1989), held that minority plaintiffs cannot hypothetically expand the elected body to satisfy the

first Gingles factor. One might argue, however, that the considerations implicated by the first

Gingles requirement, which specifically contemplates the creation of hypothetical districts, are

distinguishable from the considerations implicated by the second and third Gingles

requirements—both of which require, in the context of a challenge to the at-large aspect of an

election scheme, a district-specific analysis of voting behavior. In any event, these questions

about hypothesizing more seats or drawing more lines to establish the first Gingles requirement

are best left for another day. of their challenge to the at-large or mult imember feature of the current election districts. The hybrid

challenge would allow the Plaint iffs to effectively get around their inabilit y to meet the third Gingles

threshold requirement in the existing Central District, see supra Part III.A.—specifically, by using the

entire state of Mississippi as the challenged election district in order to demonstrate legally significant

white bloc voting.

In our view, the Plaint iffs' inabilit y to show legally significant white bloc voting in the Central

District defeats their hybrid challenge. After all, t heir proposed subdistrict in the hypothetical

Western District encompasses almost all of the area in their proposed subdistrict in the existing

Central Dis t rict . Thus, the Plaintiffs are effectively attempting, by casting their claim as a

line-drawing challenge, to attack the multimember aspect of the existing Central District; however,

rather than relying on voting statistics from that district, as required by Gingles, 5 the Plaintiffs seek

to rely on statew ide voting statistics to establish legally significant white bloc voting.

Accordingly, we ho ld that the Plaintiffs cannot obviate their failure of proof on the third

Gingles factor in the Central District by looking at some hypothetical district—in this case the state

as a whole. This is the sort of bootstrapping that section 2 does not permit. 6

IV. CONCLUSION

The district court did not clearly err in finding that the Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the Ginglesthreshold requirements on their straightforward challenges to the current mult imember districts and

the current east-west district lines. As for the Plaintiffs' hybrid line-drawing/multimember challenge,

we hold that it is a n at t empt to recast the Plaintiffs' challenge to the existing Central District, an

attempt that must fail under the third Gingles factor. We do not reach the Plaintiffs' arguments that

the district court erred in assessing the totality of the circumstances. For these reasons, the district

court's decision dismissing the Plaintiffs' complaint is AFFIRMED.