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~-'""' "' Bii - RECOBDS CRABGBOUT 356~ "1 .. - U8BD OJ'il-- .1.IR'O&m - OllLT, DQ ll0'1' BmlO'Vll •Al'Dll . I 

NOa RJIV3AL COllTD'1'8 'l'O VII• , Da.'nlOI'- lll9EllllE IMft ~ 

AU'l'BORIZBD l'ml80B(8J ~ 25 Jan 1961 -10 Feb' 6J. I 

• 

-\ I - PILE OR From File ot Special Consultant (Friedlian) I 

- . I 

. 8ERIAI. - l - NUM8ER I, ..( 

' Lecture Qards &. Notes consiD ting or 364 Cards used tor lec~ure , -AND purposes. . 8UBJIECT . I 

- RAMa AND lllt'l'lllf8ION OI' l'BR80N RllQVl8TINO PILB I OBOAIDZA.'l"ION, BtJJLDDIO, AND ROOlll ll'UllBB 

TO Mr. Will:lam Friedna.n LI-6-8520 310 5econcl Street, SE., Wash, o. c. . . 

RIETURN . DA'l'B RlrrND I .U'lll'MUa 11811 L\ 

TO · Mrs.· C. Christian, AG-24, NSA, Ft. Geo. G. Meade ' I 

, INSTRUCflON• 

W11BN ~ Jl'ILB TO ANOTllBR l'BRSOR, COMPLll'rB Sl!:LP-ADDR.1118BD TRAN8PllR COU.POll' BSl.oW, 

ll'1'l'l'OB TO BLUIK. LJrrl.9-BJZll •ARBB AND PLACll IN OUT·CIOINO llAIL BBRVWS >' • 

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REF ID:A62870 Cl"1J>tograph.y and ;:jcypt.anai.,-~s go back to the dawn 

ot the invention ot 111'1.ting,, but we won• t have time here 

to go back quite that tar,, even though the story is ver,y 

interesti.ng. But I DIUst tell you right otf' that these 

two subjects,, cryptography and cryptanalysis, are,, of 

course, very closely related - in fact, they ma7 be 

regarded as the two f'aces or the SB.llB coin. /!zPlai& 

,,,,. -i 

, Now may we have the first slide, please? er-.:.:.:- _.... 
TBITBEMIUB REF ID:A62870 

245 
REF ID : A62 ~°ar.mE 6•21 

The syllabary used by Thanas Jefferson (Extract 

frail decoding section) 

/!!hat all 'round genius also~ be regarded as 

being the first .American inventor of cyptographic 

devices -- as wiU be discussed JSJ.ter:.f 
LECTURE NOTE -~~lfNs2181f!I I -- and COBlINT 

Recall I said when U.S. entered in 1917 had no 

cryptologic organization. The French, German, and 

Austrians had organizations which had been functioning 

1IJBZV' years. Russians had, too, but coordination was 

poor! Tannen)lerg -- British had none but buillt up 

•Room 4on -Earl ot Halifax evaluated its work: 

"To Room 40 the country" owes an immense debt or 

gratitude -- a debt which at the time, at least, could 

never be paid. Secrecy was of the very essense of its 

work, and never was secrecy more successfully observed 
REF ID : A62 8 7 f§LIDE 169 

(Portrait - Collange) 

Cryptanalysis and the average lqman•s 

imaginative picture of a cryptanal.ystl 
REF ID:A62B70 

Marshall - Dewey correspondence - TIME Magazine 
LECTURE NOTE REF ID : A62 8 7 0 SLIDE 150 

Magic Machine 
REF ID : A62 8 7 G'OR SLIDE 131 

The Riverbank "Poqalphabet" -- the f'1.rat cryptanaqt1c aid. 

IJi¥ use ot AT&!r .mac.hinea to caapile D.FC 's (l921-2fil'l 
SLIDE 134 REF ID:A62870 

l(y' memo begging for one set ot IBM, dated 30 Oct 1934. 
REF ID:A62870 135 

The IBM contract, dated 12 Nov 1934: 

Just one halt .month later - a remarkable record. 

The memo must have been prett7 pbtent medicine: 
REF ID:A62870 

lU 

One Ying of' IBM installation in W II 
-------------

REF ID:A62870 

An analog. 

('l'hia was tor JAS system (Jap MllAtt) 
- CAml l ll - • 

Extracts fl'Oms no~ ~~H.elligence, 

dated April 1$146. 

----------- ------- ---------- nSignal intelligence was a chief source or inform. ti.on 

Jin the German Amy. In the eastern theater, where there , was offensive warfare priurily, the signal intelligence 

servioe was well-organized w1 th well-defined purposes, 

\efficient personnel, and adequate equipment. In the 

course of the campaign, it was reorganized to exploit to 

the fullest the su::cess alread7 axperiemed, and, by 

194.3, there existed a compls te and smoothly tune tioning 

machine sufficient to meet all demanda. n 

******** 

(OVER) 
"Most ot their ~ ~~09ss came trom low 

echelon tratt:Lc. A:::or=! := :... .......... sr".; radio nets passing operat.1.onal traffic were followed. closely and were 

one or the chief sources or signal intelligence. 

Art.1.llery- radio nets were given :first coverage priority. 

Apart from ns ssages intercepted in code or in clear,, 

signal procedure, peculiarities of transmitting, and 

characteristics ot Allied radio operators provided 

enonnous assis'tirmle in helping to evaluate signal 

intOrJDation. The Germans noticed that call signs were 

often the same tor a unit aver long periods and that even 

frequencies remained unchanged tor weeks at a time. 

Much tactically :import.ant intormation was drawn frari 

the enmv Air Force liaison net. It was assumed that an 

.. (CON~ QN CARD 2) 
1 REF ID:A62870 

independent net seft'aci all Air Force liaison officers 

attached to the various headquarters and once one ot 

these stations had been picked up and identified, it 

could be used to trace all other stations over a considerable area. Air Poree traffic dealing with bombing 

targets vas intercepted by' Air Force units, and was sent 

through liaison channels to Westem Theater Comnand. 

From here, over a network going down to divisions, the 

inform.ti.on wuld. be flashed to all Army format.ion headquarters. Recei Ying sets at all levels 1 including 

division, were tuned in continually to this broadcast 

frequmc7. n 

******** 

(OVER) 
During the invasion, the G-2s in the West drew about 

60 percent of the operationally important information 

from signal intelligence. The remaining 40 percent was 

derived from all other fields of intelligence. 'l'he 

anaolDlt of inforna. ti.on decreased during the months ot 

mobile warfare. During the retreat, al though the possibilities of obtaining intonnation became less freqUClt, 

the amount of information from signal intelligence 

remained high. Most of the information was deduoed from 

the organization of enmv radio traffic netwrka, fl"Cl'll 

decoded messages, and from the radio nets of the en8111J' 

Air Force liaison officers who were attached to ground 

.. .. ( COHTINUID ON CARD .3) 
CJ.RD 3 .. .. REF ID:A62870 

troops. Based upon tl"'J..s iu.f'cnm.ticn t..'&a evaluation 

center of signal intelligence often came to conclusions 

which1 at tirst1 sounded hJpothetical. to the operational. 

command and were therefore doubted. In 90 percent of all 

these cases the events verified the signal intelligence 

information so that eventually more credence was given 

to its conclusions." 

(THE DU>) 
REF ID:A62870 195 

The Analog for Jap "Green" 
REF ID :A62870 137 

A "brute force" machine. 
-----------RB-F~D:A62870 

138 

Machine tor matching messages. 
REF ID:A62870 14<> 

The "Came1" 
REF ID :A62870 143 

The "Auto-acr:ttcher" 

(Rodin - the "Thinker") 
REF ID:A62870 

•Camel Code Indicator" 
REF ID: A62870 1.39 

Unit for deciphering message texts. 
------------~~~D:A62870 

142 

The 11Dud buster" 
nzmportance of secrecy has been long known tor it is 

quite obv.l.ous, but its real significance is not 

well appreciated. The wU of sElcra07 cannot be 

removed simply because events are long past.• 
EJttitact!I trom.1 •aetsulta or Axis Jnal.ysia ot (C.Alm 1) 

' Uiilted States C'1ll!llll.J?iCfM·orw 62 ~Bled b7 

TICOM and other ... ~-=-==~ ;.t ~t:l:i!;=ce. n - Vol. C - German Traffic Analysis of United States Conmunicatl.ona 

dated 16 August 1946. 

"'•• "Colonel FRIEDRICH, head or the Signal Intelligence Agen07 ot the Air Force High Command (OKL/LB), bad 

a veey poor opinion of allied securi t7, and said that 

Allied signals were careless to a degree that wuld not 

have been tolerated by' the German Armed Forces. He 

agreed that, with the material superiorit7 in possession 

ot the Allies, this lack of securi11Y did not make any 

ditterence in the out.come or the war. He telt, however, 

that it the Allies had not been in that partl.cular 

(OVER) 
position. the story 11Duld haYe been'""CU!ite different. n 

(Chapter.III, p~3J~gi.fj~70 

******** 

nc. From the ::Intercept ot plain text and other 

traffic ot the United States Arlff71 the Germans had a 

complete picture of our a.my organization and even 

names of otficers down to Captain, their uni ts an:l 

locat:lms. Ninet,v-tive percent of the intormatim 

contained in a DBDual issued to the German troops on 

the organization of the American A1'117 was gained from. 

radio intelligence. American nets were identified by 

solving traffic, by operators• characteristics, and by 

captured. Signal ()pirating Instructions (SOI' s). Up 

until December 1944 our Al"D\V' Call Sign Book had bean 

. almost compl.etel7 reconstructed with the aid of 

· c co1mUED oN CARD 2) 
• CARl>2 

captured sequence~tsliD : ~£i1 ~II, paragraph 14, 

page 21.) 

******** 

•d. 11Colonel MET'l'IG, cipher expert ot the Signal 

Intelligence Agen07 ot the Supreme Comand Armed Forces 

(OKW/Chi), stated that it was not at all surprising that , some Converter M-209 and Amrican Strip traf'tic was read · b;y the Germans, si:nce mistakes in the use of these 

systems were made in one out of every- three nessages.n 

(Chapter III, paragraph 14, page 22.) 

******** 

•t. Al though the trartic transmitted by Allied 

observation posts was sent in clear and transmitted by 

radio sets using low power, it was f'requentl7 audible 

(OVER) 
to the Germans am intel'Cepted by them. This trattic ' 

was concentrated UJXl!IG::FT -~~~@rat.ors, tor 

then the Germans had. 'timlli w iuliW.tute •Tasive acticm,.n 

(Chapter III, paragraph 14, page 23.) 

.******** 

•g. American radio and radio-telephone traffic 

afforded a greater aount of data to German traffic 

anal.7sts than did the British traffic. Colonel GRUBE, 

chief of TelecoJJlllUDications ot the Signal Intelligence 

Agency or the Supreme Commam Armed Forces (OICW/Chi) 

stated that United States radio securitJ' was generall.7 

good on tactical :nets but that suppl.J' am liaison nets 

gave everything avq, including United States order ot 

battls and intentions.n (Chapter III, paragraph 14, 

page 23.) ******** (CONTINUED ON CABD 3) 
. CARD 3 

"1. From the caEJissLliblni.t6&.6\Hlch the United 

States 8th Air Force haDtlled 1 ts radi.o traf'tic 1 Lt. 

Martin LUDWIG, an expert on Allied air order of battle, 

said •It can be stated that no attack of the 8th Air 

' Force came as a surprise. General advanced warnings 

were given sane hours before the raids'·" (Chapter III, 

paragraph 14, page 2S.) 

********* "t• Lt. Colonel METTIG 1 ot the Signal Intelligence 

Agmc7 of' the Supreme Cormwd Armed Forces (OIW/Chi) 

said that trattic anal.7sis by tbe Germans during the 

landings by the Allies in North Africa was not successful. and c:lld not reveal the approach of the iam1ng 

forces. The approach was carried out in cc:mplete radio 

(OVER) 
silence and took the Germans completely b7 surprise. 

The German Navy, sa~~~:1162'B'J!©·me tor the lack 

ot success, but he did &u:;t a.1.Jain just how the Navy was 

responsible. n (Chapter V 1 paragraph 28, page 109. ) 

******** "u• • • • • • • • • • • • 

•••••••••••••••••• 

The greatest au.ccess achieved b7 Col. MUEDGE in the 

whole African campaign occur.red in March 1943 when he 

intercepted an American order to some SJll&ll .Amer.Lean 

uni ts to ma:in tain complete radio silence lD'ltil 2200 

hours on 17 March. Col. MUEGGE real.1.zed that this meant 

preparations tor a big IDOVt!J so he promptl7 went to 

KESSELRING's Chief of Statr, who 11>Ul.d not list.en to 

him. 'l'he Chief of Staff had no faith in radio 

( CONmrnED 01 CARD 4) 
• 

CA.Rn 4 

intelligence. Col~BC~i;2·a.till11 to convince 

the Chief of Staff am.returned to his station, where 

he heard a second, arid later a third message, ordering 

radio silence untl.l 17 March. He went back to KESSELRING• s headquarters, this time forcing his W81" into 

KESSELRING1 s own office to report to him in person. 

KESSELRI:NG listened to him and the next dq flew from 

SicilJ' to Africa and made complete plans for a defense 

in case the Allies did make a mo'V8. Col. MUEDGE said 

he actual.l.J" prayed the Allies 110uld. attack, and on the 

night of 16 March th97 did attack. This was the great.es 

German success achieved by Col. MUJ!XJQE• s outfit, am in 

his estim ti.on was derived solely from careless All:led.) radio procedure. n (Chapter v, paragraph 26, page. l.I.cr; 

******** (OVER) 
ttv. A Russian raessage amiottt1.c:l.ng the p~sence ot the 

.American planes at ~~!lliiS@lS.1© intercepted and 

decoded by his lllli t{sit,: Paul RAATZ: a unit. He was a 

German A1'1.17 radio intelligence man), resulting in. a 

hidll7 successtul operation against the air base on the 

part ot German aircratt. 

From newspaper sources it •s .round out that 

actually OD 21 June 19441 a group of 17$ planes of the 

8th United States Anq Air Force in England arrived at 

the Pol tava base on a shutt.le run from their English 

bases. There •re P-Sl• s in ad.dition to the above 

B-17 rs in the torma ti.on. 0£ the B-171 s, SJ were 

destroyed." (Chapter V, paragraph .33,, page 133.) 

******** "x. (Concerning German knowledge ot preparations tor 

airborne operations in the Western front in the last 

• • ( CONTmJED OR CARD S) 
.. days or the war, 4U:BheI~2Bt7b 82nd and lOlst 

Airborne Di ri.sions iziom Englalli to tile Continent. ) 

The f'irst indication or a planned operation as the 

trlU\Sf'er ot the S2nd and S3rd Wings trom Engl.and t.o 

France. At the same time, the German Ararr picked up a 

Military Police massage which revealed that both the 

known airborne divisions, the 82nd and lOlst, had been 

pulled out or operatl.ons at the f'ront, am ll8l'e in rear 

areas prep1.ring tor new operations. One of' these divisions, the Germans knew, was stationed. on the militaey 

maneuvers reservation at Mourmelon, near Rheims. The 

Mili ta.17 Police message from which the Gel'm!Uls obtained 

this inf'ormation read approximately as tallows: 

1THE ROAD FB>M MOU.HM!LON m .RHEIMS IS TO BE 

BLOCKED TO ALL TRAFFIC TOMORROW MORNDlG EARLY 

(OVER) 
BECAUSE 1HE 8aEM~Sl';I(I) WILL BE MOVIHG 

TOWARDS MOURMELON w"'Iiii APPROA.J.pjATliJ.sY 11 000 

V!HICLES.'" (Chapter V, paragraph 38, page 139.) 

(1HE END) 
.------------

:-rroO- 11The Achiev~ cf~~~Wl; War II", pp.18-19 

Berlin (Oshima) to Tolqo, serial number 988, parts 1-J, 

SSA Bullentill Ho. H-134920, 10 Aug lab, translated 12 

.August 191&4, sent ill the JAD (diplomatic) systan. This 

•&sage, reproduced in tull, has been described bJ' 

officers in MIS as •wrth alltha expenses ot maintaining the SSA.• The text describes conversations vi.th 

the head ot the Todt organization, Albert Speer, in 

'llhicb the la'tter revealed to the Japanese, and, thus 

to us, h1gh17 important information concerning the 

prcduction of munitions in uerm.&117. See Appemix, No.6 
• From· 11The AchievtMp ~~ ~~ War II, p.18 

Berlin to Tokyo, aerial number 878, parts 14-17 1ncluai 

SSA B\1l.letin lo. D-3348, 9 Hov 43, translated. 4 Dec 43 

sent in JAS (Militar.r Atta.cha syatsm). The •&saga 

tram which this sample is taken consisted. or 32 parts, 

all of vhicb were ultimataq translated. The fUl.l text, 

too long tar reproducticn here, is a report ot a Visit 

made in the tall ot 1943 b;y a subordinate or Baron 

Oshima to tbe Ga:raan •stern fortifications. 'lhe 11111-

'tal"J' intormtion cmta.ined in this message ns ot 

incalculable advantage to the p].aming of the invasion 

of France. (See Appendix S) 
. ~"!be Ach~J~M~lg.ld War II11,p.19 

Hanoi to .Lo1qo, no serial nwnber, SSA S14l•tin Ho. H16b499, 22 Jan 45, translated 1 Feb 4S, sent 1n the JBB 

(diploatic) syst•. Tbis message is important because 

it reveals that the Japanese were interested in obtaining uranium. See Appmdix, No. 7. 
.. From.•Tbe AcbieTm&\U" o1f.~§i7\Jibrld War IIJp.19 

MoscefJ(Sato) to Tokyo, serial number lh761 SSA Bulletin 

Ho. Spec. Oll, 29 July 194S, translated .30 July 194S, 

sent in the JAA-2-JAJ (diplomtic) systems. This 

three-part •ssage, the translation ot vllic h as 

available to Prem.lent :Crmnan dUl"ing the Potsdai 

Conterence, reTeals the actiTit7 ot Sato, Japanese 

"mbassador to Moscow, at the ti.Ju of the ccnterence. 

See Append.ix, Ho. 6. 
FOR SLID£ 129 

REF ID:A62870 

D.. -"' ., .... "'° '-D out some J------- Clo,!llliUul.llliii'iilV ._,...,W.'tiiJ --.a- --•--a_, ill&Q UVA-.1.~ alleged to ha:- 1'11JV 

been destr019d. 

/fJ.s. delayed report: 7 Jul I.di. Saipan, 2Bn CPs ot 

toSth Reg near Tanapag Harbor overrun b;r powertul J. 

attack which 111.ped out eveeything and ever,body' in 

sight. When area was recaptured a Salvage Co. recovered 

what could be, and when all reporiis were in three Cl"JPto 

documents were not accounted for except to as81Dl'l9 the 

Japanese got them. lOSth reported to Hq 27th Div. but 

the Div. HQ sent a report to AG Washington b;y letter 

noting the loss and sQ'ing merely nour records have been 

changed." News reached CSO on 16 Aug, one month after 

the loss. Documents were Joint A:nv-Nav;r key lists tor 

(OVER) 
M-209 and covered -~e_pe:M.od or 1 June to 31 July' -

the last 24 dqs ~cS:lil111rAfi!tir7 Qie loss. The 

Japanese undoubtedlJ" read conslderab-ie traffic. The 

fact that S 1 000 Dl8D later lost their lives in the 

Saipan campaign cannot be attributed entirely to this 

incident but it seams more than a coincidence tiJa t most 

of these casual ties were suffered through well-planned . 

Japanese counterattacks after 7 July1 i.e. atter the 

da7 the first Uio battalions of the 10$th were overrun.