IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs January 29, 2014

MILDRED JOAN PANTIK v. MARTIN JULIUS PANTIK

Interlocutory Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County

No. CT00609806 Karen Williams, Judge

No. W2013-01657-COA-R9-CV - Filed March 10, 2014

This appeal involves the jurisdiction of the Shelby County courts over a petition for an order

of protection. The petition was originally filed in general sessions court, but it was

transferred by consent to circuit court, where another matter was pending between the parties.

Thereafter, the circuit court denied a motion to transfer the petition back to general sessions

court but sua sponte granted permission to seek an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9

due to a perceived conflict between two statutes addressing the courts’ jurisdiction. We

granted the application for an interlocutory appeal and now affirm the decision of the circuit

court. This case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed and

Remanded

ALAN E.HIGHERS,P.J.,W.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DAVID R. FARMER,

J., and HOLLY M. KIRBY, J., joined.

S. Denise McCrary, Holly J. Renken, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Martin Julius

Pantik

Rachel L. Lambert, Arlington, Tennessee, for the appellee, Mildred Joan Pantik
OPINION

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 6, 2012, Mother filed a petition for an order of protection in the general

sessions criminal court of Shelby County. Mother claimed that she had reason to believe that

Father had placed a video camera in the trees outside of her apartment “in an attempt to allow

him to monitor her comings and goings.” Mother’s petition stated that, due to past physical

and verbal abuse, she feared for her safety and desired that Father be ordered to have no

further contact with her. However, Mother’s petition expressly stated that the parties’ two

minor children were not in need of protection from Father.

Shortly after the petition was filed, on January 11, 2013, the parties consented to the

entry of an order of transfer from the general sessions criminal court of Shelby County to the

circuit court of Shelby County, and the petition for order of protection was set to be heard

in circuit court. Mother and Father had been divorced by decree of the circuit court years

earlier, and in 2010, Mother had filed a petition to relocate with the parties’ minor children.

The petition to relocate was still pending in circuit court when the petition for order of

protection was filed in general sessions criminal court.

Two months after the petition for order of protection was transferred to circuit court,

however, Father filed a motion to transfer the petition for order of protection back to general

sessions criminal court where it was originally filed. Following a hearing, the circuit court

entered an order denying Father’s motion to transfer, but the court,sua sponte, granted Father

permission to seek an interlocutory appeal regarding whether the circuit court hasjurisdiction

to hear the petition for an order of protection in light of what the court perceived to be a

conflict between Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-15-5014 and section 36-3-601(E).

II. ISSUE PRESENTED

This Court granted the application for permission to appeal on September 18, 2013.

The issue presented is whether exclusive jurisdiction over the petition for order of protection

was vested in the tenth division of the general sessions court of Shelby County, or whether

the circuit court could also exercise jurisdiction over the petition for order of protection.

For the following reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s order denying Father’s motion

to transfer, and we remand for further proceedings.

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In this appeal we are asked to resolve a perceived conflict between two statutes. Our

review of the construction of a statute is de novo, with no presumption of correctness given

to the lower court’s conclusions. State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tenn. 2007)

(citing State v. Denton, 149 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tenn. 2004)).

IV. DISCUSSION

The trial court concluded that there is a conflict between Tennessee Code Annotated

section 16-15-5014 and Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-601. The latter statute is

part of Tennessee’s Domestic Abuse Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601, et seq. See Clark

v. Crow, 37 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Victims of domestic violence may seek

judicial protection pursuant to the Act. Kite v. Kite, 22 S.W.3d 803, 804 (Tenn. 1997); see

also Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-602(a) (“Any domestic abuse victim, stalking victim or sexual

assault victim who has been subjected to, threatened with, or placed in fear of, domestic

abuse, stalking, or sexual assault, may seek a relief under this part by filing a sworn petition

alleging domestic abuse, stalking, or sexual assault by the respondent.”). The Domestic

Abuse Act was “enacted by the legislature to ‘recognize the seriousness of domestic abuse

as a crime and to assure that the law provides a victim of domestic abuse with enhanced

protection from domestic abuse.’” Cable v. Clemmons, 36 S.W.3d 39, 41 (Tenn. 2001)

(quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-618). It also serves to promote uniform law enforcement

intervention, whether the crime is domestic or committed by strangers, and it communicates

a position of intolerance to domestic abuse perpetrators. Kite, 22 S.W.3d at 805.

“When the legislature created orders of protection in 1979 it provided that they could

be issued by other courts in addition to the ones that traditionally hear domestic cases.” State

v. Wood, 91 S.W.3d 769, 773-74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); see also State v. Gray, 46 S.W.3d

749, 751 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that the legislature “extended the power to issue

orders of protection to courts that otherwise would not have had it”). In its current form, the

Domestic Abuse Act provides that upon the filing of a petition for an order of protection,

“the courts” may issue an order of protection in accordance with the guidelines set forth in

the Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-605. There is a lengthy definition of a “court,” for

purposes of the Act:

(A) “Court,” in counties having a population of not less than two hundred

thousand (200,000) nor more than eight hundred thousand (800,000),

according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census, means

any court of record with jurisdiction over domestic relation matters;

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(B) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (3)(A), “court,” in counties

with a metropolitan form of government with a population of more than one

hundred thousand (100,000), according to the 1990 federal census or any

subsequent federal census, means any court of record with jurisdiction over

domestic relation matters and the generalsessions court. In such county having

a metropolitan form of government, a judicial commissioner may issue an ex

parte order of protection. Nothing in this definition may be construed to grant

jurisdiction to the general sessions court for matters relating to child custody,

visitation, or support;

(C) “Court,” in all other counties, means any court of record with jurisdiction

over domestic relation matters or the general sessions court;

(D) “Court” also includes judicial commissioners, magistrates and other

officials with the authority to issue an arrest warrant in the absence of a judge

for purposes of issuing ex parte orders of protection when a judge of one of the

courts listed in subdivisions (3)(A), (3)(B) or (3)(C) is not available;

(E) In counties having a population in excess of eight hundred thousand

(800,000), according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal

census, “court” means any court of record with jurisdiction over domestic

relations matters or the general sessions criminal court. In such counties,

“court” also includes judicial commissioners, magistrates and other officials

with the authority to issue an arrest warrant in the absence of a judge for

purposes of issuing any order of protection pursuant to this part when a judge

of one of the courts listed in subdivisions (3)(A), (3)(B) or (3)(C) is not

available. Nothing in this definition may be construed to grant jurisdiction to

the general sessions court, both criminal and civil, for matters relating to child

custody, visitation, or support[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601(3). Because this case was filed in Shelby County, Tennessee,

we are concerned with subsection (E) of the statute, and a “court” for purposes of the

Domestic Relations Act “means any court of record with jurisdiction over domestic relations

matters or the general sessions criminal court.” Id. (Emphasis added). However, the statute

provides that nothing in its definition should be construed as granting jurisdiction to the

general sessions court “for matters relating to child custody, visitation, or support.” Id.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-15-5014 became effective in 2009. It provides:

(a) In order to maximize and concentrate limited prosecutorial, counseling and

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other social resources to victims of domestic violence, the tenth division of the

Shelby County general sessions court shall serve as the domestic violence

court for Shelby County.

(b) Provided that the caseload of the domestic violence court does not exceed

the capacity of the tenth division to hear all such cases, the tenth division of

the Shelby County generalsessions courtshall have exclusive jurisdiction over

mattersinvolving domestic violence, orders of protection, domestic assault and

all other cases incident to domestic abuse as defined in § 36-3-601; provided,

however, that the tenth division may retain concurrent jurisdiction over other

types of cases. The determination whether the tenth division of the Shelby

County general sessions court has exceeded its capacity to hear all domestic

violence cases shall be made by the presiding judge of the tenth division in

consultation with the chief judge of the Shelby County general sessions court.

(c) If it has been determined pursuant to subsection (b) that the caseload of the

domestic violence court exceeds the capacity of the tenth division of the

Shelby County general sessions court to hear all such cases, then the excess

cases shall be distributed among the remaining divisions of the Shelby County

general sessions court to be heard.

(d) The general sessions court shall commence as the domestic violence court

for Shelby County no later than September 1, 2009.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5014. Relevant to this appeal, then, section 16-15-5014 provides

that “the tenth division of the Shelby County general sessions court shall have exclusive

jurisdiction over matters involving domestic violence, orders of protection, domestic assault

and all other cases incident to domestic abuse as defined in § 36-3-601” of the Domestic

Abuse Act. Id. (Emphasis added). Upon entering the order granting Father permission to

seek an interlocutory appeal, the circuit court stated the following reasons for its action:

There is a need to develop a uniform and consistent body of law. It is common

practice in Shelby County to automatically transfer a Petition for Order of

Protection from General Sessions Court to Circuit or Chancery Court if there

is an open case between the parties, married or previously married, regardless

of the subject matter. This practice seems to be in direct contradiction to the

language of TCA § 16-15-5014 which grants the tenth division of general

sessions court “exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving domestic

violence, orders of protection, domestic assault and all other cases incident to

domestic abuse as defined in § 36-3-601.” (Emphasis added).

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“Our role in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's

intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute's coverage beyond its intended

scope.” State v. Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d 121, 131 (Tenn. 2013). We begin by focusing on the

language of the statute, presuming that each word has its own meaning and purpose, and if

the language is clear and unambiguous, we need look no further. Id. (citing Keen v. State,

398 S.W.3d 594, 610 (Tenn. 2012)). A statute is ambiguous if it “susceptible of more than

one reasonable interpretation.” Memphis Housing Authority v. Thompson 38 S.W.3d 504,

512 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Carter v. State, 952 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tenn. 1997)).

In this case, we find that Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-15-5014 is ambiguous

as to whether it vests the tenth division of the Shelby County general sessions court with

“exclusive” jurisdiction over matters involving domestic violence, orders of protection,

domestic assault and all other cases incident to domestic abuse only to the exclusion of the

other divisions of general sessions court, or also to the exclusion of the circuit, chancery, and

juvenile courts in Shelby County. On the one hand, the statute states that the tenth division

of general sessions court “shall serve as the domestic violence court for Shelby County”

(emphasis added), which seems to suggest that the legislature intended the tenth division to

have exclusive jurisdiction over these matters to the exclusion of all other courts. On the

other hand, the statute provides that the remaining divisions of general sessions court will

hear excess domestic abuse cases in the event that the tenth division exceeds its capacity to

hear such cases, which suggests that the legislature was simply concerned with designating

which division of the Shelby County general sessions court would handle domestic abuse

cases. Thus, we conclude that the statute is susceptible of more than one reasonable

interpretation and therefore ambiguous.

When the language of a statute is ambiguous and does not yield a clear interpretation,

the courts may consult the legislative history for additional interpretive guidance. Carter,

952 S.W.2d at 419 (citing Storey v. Bradford Furniture Co., 910 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Tenn.

1995); Carr v. Ford, 833 S.W.2d 68, 69-70 (Tenn. 1992)). At a hearing before the House

Judiciary Committee on April 29, 2009, the sponsor of House Bill 1212, Representative Jim

Coley, introduced a member of the Shelby County Commission, Mike Carpenter, who spoke

in favor of the bill and explained the need for the designation of a domestic violence court

in Shelby County. Commissioner Carpenter explained that Shelby County had, at that time,

about 20,000 cases a year related to domestic violence, and, considering that most of these

litigants had no representation, there were “a limited number of advocates who were spread

out over ten divisions, and a limited number of prosecutors spread out over ten divisions, so

the idea [was] to put them in one court.” There was some further discussion about whether

the ten general sessions judges could simply agree to transfer all of the domestic violence

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cases to a single division, obviating the need for a statute declaring one division as the

domestic violence court, but according to Commissioner Carpenter, there were some judges

who simply did not agree with the model being proposed. There was no mention of the bill

divesting the jurisdiction of other Shelby County courts, be it circuit, chancery, or juvenile,

to adjudicate domestic violence issues.

“Statutes relating to the same subject or sharing a common purpose shall be construed

together (‘in pari materia’) in order to advance their common purpose or intent.” Kite, 22

S.W.3d at 805; see also Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d at 927. “We are entitled to presume that

our General Assembly is knowledgeable about its prior enactments and knows the state of

the law at the time it passes the legislation under construction.” Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d

at 927 (citing Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706, 707 (Tenn. 1997); Wilson v. Johnson County,

879 S.W.2d 807, 810 (Tenn. 1994)).

As noted above, pursuant to the Domestic Abuse Act, in Shelby County, a “court”

with authority to enter an order of protection includes “any court of record with jurisdiction

over domestic relations matters or the general sessions criminal court.” Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 36-3-601(E). We interpret Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-15-5014 as vesting the

tenth division of the Shelby County general sessions court with “exclusive jurisdiction over

matters involving domestic violence, orders of protection, domestic assault and all other

cases incident to domestic abuse as defined in § 36-3-601,” to the exclusion of the other

general sessions courts. Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5014(b). However, the statute does not

impact the jurisdiction of the circuit, chancery, and juvenile courts in Shelby County to

adjudicate such matters. Thus, in our case, the Shelby County circuit court had jurisdiction

1

over the petition for order of protection filed by Mother, and the circuit court did not err in

denying Father’s motion to transfer the matter to the general sessions court.

V. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court and remand

for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellant, Martin Julius Pantik,

for which execution may issue if necessary.

_________________________________

ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J., W.S.

Our conclusion is supported by the fact that, as the trial judge noted, the circuit, chancery, and 1

juvenile courts in Shelby County continued to adjudicate domestic abuse matters after the passage of

Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-15-5014, and the legislature took no further action.

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