In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 19-2129

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SEVON E. THOMAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.

No. 4:17-cr-13 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JUNE 1, 2020 — DECIDED AUGUST 14, 2020

____________________

Before RIPPLE, WOOD, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Sevon Thomas found himself 

charged with possessing a firearm in connection with a drug 

trafficking crime after he agreed to sell methamphetamine to 

a government cooperator. Once Thomas drove to the prearranged delivery time and place, the police arrested him and 

searched his car. When police opened the glove compartment, 

out fell two firearms and a bag of methamphetamine. At trial 

Thomas claimed that he used the guns for lawful purposes 
2 No. 19-2129

unrelated to drug dealing and therefore did not possess them 

“in furtherance of” a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). A jury disagreed and found Thomas 

guilty. On appeal Thomas argues that the district court made 

two errors at trial: improperly admitting so-called “dual-role” 

(both expert and lay) testimony from a federal agent and bungling the jury instructions. But Thomas raised neither challenge below, so he had to show a plain error necessitating reversal of his conviction. He falls short, so we affirm.

I

Sevon Thomas came to the attention of law enforcement 

through a government informant. At the police’s direction, 

the informant called and ordered several ounces of methamphetamine from a source known as “Eric.” After arranging for 

delivery, the informant told law enforcement that Eric would 

bring the drugs to a McDonald’s in Georgetown, Indiana, in 

a black Chevy Impala with Kentucky plates. Sure enough, the 

delivery took place as planned, and the driver turned out to 

be Sevon Thomas. The police arrested Thomas and searched 

his car. When a detective opened the glove compartment, 160 

grams of methamphetamine and two guns fell out.

A grand jury charged Thomas with possessing with the 

intent to distribute methamphetamine (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) –

Count 1) and possessing a firearm in connection with a drug 

trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) – Count 2). 

Thomas proceeded to a jury trial, where he admitted that the 

drugs and guns were his. He urged acquittal on the firearm 

charge on the basis that he possessed the guns for the lawful 

purpose of personal protection and thus not in connection 

with his peddling of methamphetamine as required for conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Seeking to refute any 
No. 19-2129 3

nexus between the guns and the drugs, Thomas and his girlfriend both testified that he had a concealed carry permit. His 

girlfriend added that he stored the guns in his car to keep 

them out of the house and away from their two children. 

For its part, the government attempted to prove that 

Thomas had the guns to further his drug dealing by introducing the testimony of FBI Special Agent Paul Meyer. The government seemed to call Meyer as a lay witness, not an expert. 

Yet on direct examination Meyer nevertheless drew on his 

training and experience to offer expert testimony in the form 

of an opinion about the connection between gun possession 

and drug dealing. Meyer told the jury that “a firearm is a tool 

of the drug trade” that drug dealers use “for personal protection against others in that particular business, whether it’s to 

protect the drug proceeds that they may have on them or a 

combination of drug proceeds or drugs, the supply of drugs 

that they may be dealing at the time.” He added that a gun 

could also be used “for intimidation” because a customer who 

knows a drug dealer is armed “may be more apt to pay his 

bill.” 

The government then questioned Meyer about his 

knowledge of Thomas’s case, most of which he had learned 

from the agent who searched Thomas’s car:

Q: And in this case, were there firearms found?

A: Yes, ma’am, there was.

Q: Okay. Were they—were the firearms found in a locked 

case?

A: No, they were not.
4 No. 19-2129

Q: Where were the firearms found in relation to the methamphetamine?

A: They were co-located with the methamphetamine. As 

reported to me, they had been in the glove box. However, 

when the glove box fell open, they had fallen on the passenger 

side floorboard area.

Q: And were both firearms loaded?

A: They were.

Thomas never objected to any aspect of Meyer’s testimony.

During closing arguments, the prosecutor relied on 

Meyer’s testimony to establish a connection between the guns 

and the drugs. She argued to the jury that Thomas had guns 

“[b]ecause he’s a drug dealer.” She then added, “You heard 

from Special Agent Meyer that drugs and guns go hand in 

hand and they’re dangerous. Where does the defendant do his 

drug deals? Not at his house. He does them at his car.” 

After closing arguments, the district court turned to the 

jury instructions. A superseding indictment had charged 

Thomas with violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), which imposes a five-year minimum sentence on “any person who, 

during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm.” By its terms, 

then, § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) can be violated in three ways: by (1) possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, or 

by (2) using or (3) carrying a firearm during and in relation to 

such a crime. See United States v. Haynes, 582 F.3d 686, 704 (7th 

Cir. 2009) (abrogated on other grounds).
No. 19-2129 5

At trial the government sought to prove the § 924(c) count 

by focusing on only the first way of violating the statute—by 

showing that Thomas “possesse[d]” the guns “in furtherance 

of” a drug crime. The trial court so instructed the jury, explaining that a conviction on Count 2 required finding beyond 

a reasonable doubt that Thomas (1) possessed methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it, and (2) knowingly possessed a firearm (3) in furtherance of the methamphetamine 

possession. In conveying this instruction, the district court did 

not define or otherwise explain what it meant for the gun possession to be “in furtherance of” possession of the methamphetamine. But the district court did define “carry,” “during,” 

and “in relation to”—terms Congress used in parts of § 924(c) 

but that were not any part of the government’s approach to 

proving Count 2. Here, too, Thomas lodged no objection.

The jury returned guilty verdicts on Counts 1 and 2, and 

the district court sentenced Thomas to a total of 15 years’ imprisonment—ten years for the drug charge plus five consecutive years for the firearm offense.

On appeal Thomas contends that the district court failed 

to follow the correct procedures for admitting Special Agent 

Meyer’s testimony because it included both expert and lay 

opinions and thus amounted to “dual-role” testimony. 

Thomas also argues that the jury instructions confused and 

misled the jury by omitting any definition of the statutory “in 

furtherance of” requirement but including definitions of statutory terms not relevant to the precise § 924(c) charge in 

Count 2. Together, Thomas says, these errors warrant reversal 

of his conviction on the Count 2 § 924(c) gun offense.
6 No. 19-2129

II

We start with the admission of FBI Special Agent Paul 

Meyer’s testimony. Ordinarily we review a district court’s decision to admit testimony for an abuse of discretion. See 

United States v. Parkhurst, 865 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 2017). We 

apply a more deferential standard here, though, because 

Thomas never objected to Meyer’s testimony during trial. In 

these circumstances, Thomas needs to show that the admission of the testimony amounted to plain error—an error so 

profound that it compromised Thomas’s substantial rights 

and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 

725, 736 (1993); see also United States v. Resnick, 823 F.3d 888, 

896 (7th Cir. 2016) (applying the same standard).

Thomas focuses on the difference between lay and expert 

testimony. “[L]ay testimony results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life, while expert testimony results 

from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by 

specialists in the field.” FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee 

note on 2000 amendments (internal quotations omitted). Lay 

testimony may be admitted if it is based on personal 

knowledge and helpful to determining a fact in question. See 

FED. R. EVID. 701. Meanwhile, to admit expert testimony, a 

district court must first ensure that the witness is qualified to 

offer the opinion at issue. See FED.R. EVID. 702. A district court 

should admit expert testimony only if it will help the factfinder understand the evidence, finds support in sufficient 

facts or data, and reflects the product of reliable methods or 

principles, reliably applied to the facts of the case. See id. 

Sometimes a witness offers both lay and expert testimony—what the case law calls “dual-role” testimony. See 
No. 19-2129 7

United States v. Jett, 908 F.3d 252, 267 (7th Cir. 2018). Imagine 

an engineer who testifies in a products liability case. The engineer may give lay testimony from firsthand involvement 

designing a consumer product—say, a lawn mower—alleged 

to be defective. The same engineer may also be qualified to 

give an expert opinion about the design of a competitor’s 

product—for example, testimony about the alternative design 

of the shutoff handle on a competitor’s mower.

The setting here is law enforcement. All agree that Special 

Agent Meyer provided both lay and expert testimony at 

Thomas’s trial. Meyer testified that, “[a]s reported to [him],” 

the firearms found in Thomas’s car were loaded and “co-located with the methamphetamine”—lay testimony based not 

on his specialized knowledge but instead on his personal familiarity with the case. Earlier in the questioning, though, the 

government asked Meyer to offer a view “[b]ased upon [his]

training and experience” about the connection between gun 

possession and drug dealing. He replied that firearms are 

“tool[s] of the drug trade” used “for personal protection” and 

“intimidation.” This description fits squarely within the type 

of specialized knowledge—in this case rooted in a law enforcement officer’s experience investigating drug offenses 

over many years—that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 considers expert testimony. 

Our case law emphasizes the care district courts must take 

in admitting dual-role testimony. We most recently underscored the point in United States v. Jett, explaining that the admission of dual-role testimony, while permissible, risks confusing the jury. See 908 F.3d at 267 (collecting cases). More 

concretely, a jury “may unduly credit the [case agent’s] opinion testimony due to a perception that the expert was privy to 
8 No. 19-2129

facts about the defendant not presented at trial” or “may be 

smitten by an expert’s aura of special reliability.” See id. (internal quotations omitted). And where the officer provides expert testimony about criminal methods, as Special Agent 

Meyer did here, juries should be cautioned “that the opinion 

is based on the expert’s knowledge of common criminal practices, and not on some special knowledge of the defendant’s 

mental processes.” United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1242

(7th Cir. 1994).

Sound trial procedure helps mitigate these risks. Foremost, the district court should “encourage the government to 

present the expert and lay testimony separately” because the 

risk of confusion is greater for “[a] witness who careens from 

one type of testimony to the other.” Jett, 908 F.3d at 269. When 

the expert portion of an agent’s testimony begins, the court 

should “allow the government to lay its foundation and establish the agent’s qualifications,” then “instruct the jury that 

the testimony it is about to hear is the witness’s opinion based 

on training and experience, not firsthand knowledge, and that 

it is for the jury to determine how much weight, if any, to give 

that opinion.” Id. at 269–70. 

Here the district court did not follow the procedures we 

outlined in Jett. That almost certainly happened because the 

government failed to adhere to its obligation to identify 

Meyer as an expert in advance of trial. See FED. R. CRIM. P.

16(a)(1)(G). Nor did the district court take affirmative steps to 

vet Meyer’s qualifications and opinion once it was clear that 

he would offer expert testimony. See Gopalratnam v. HewlettPackard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that 

before admitting expert testimony the district court “must determine whether the witness is qualified” (internal quotations 
No. 19-2129 9

omitted)); see also FED. R. EVID. 702 (describing an expert witness as one qualified “by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education”). We have consistently emphasized that the 

district court must fulfill this gatekeeping responsibility. See 

United States v. Tingle, 880 F.3d 850, 854 (7th Cir. 2018). 

Equally important is the district court’s duty to limit the risk 

of jury confusion when admitting dual-role testimony. See 

Jett, 908 F.3d at 269–70.

But the district court’s error in Thomas’s trial was not 

plain and so does not warrant reversal. Had the government 

disclosed and offered Special Agent Meyer as an expert, his 

testimony would have been unobjectionable. Meyer testified 

that he had 23 years’ experience in law enforcement, including with firearms and drug trafficking crimes. He had the requisite qualifications to inform the jury, based on his training 

and experience, how and why drug dealers often possess and 

use firearms. It is well-established that such testimony falls 

into the category of specialized knowledge (and thus expert 

opinion) and can help a jury determine whether a defendant 

like Thomas possessed a gun in furtherance of a drug crime. 

See United States v. Blount, 502 F.3d 674, 680 (7th Cir. 2007) 

(“The average juror does not know how a drug business is 

run, and to that extent [a law enforcement expert’s] testimony 

was useful in showing the link between crack and guns.” (internal citations omitted)). 

Even setting aside Meyer’s testimony, the government had 

ample evidence to show that Thomas was using the firearms 

found in his car to facilitate his drug dealing. Detective Stephen Coleman testified at trial and explained the search he 

conducted of Thomas’s car. He described opening the glove 

compartment only to see two guns and a significant amount 
10 No. 19-2129

of methamphetamine fall out. On these facts we have little difficulty seeing how the gun possession could have furthered 

Thomas’s drug dealing: the guns and drugs were stored together and both were within arm’s reach of the driver—

Thomas—who had driven to a pre-arranged location to deliver methamphetamine. 

We reached a similar conclusion in Jett, even though our 

review there was merely for an abuse of discretion. See 908 

F.3d at 265. The district court did not follow the proper procedures for admitting dual-role testimony, but we nevertheless held that the error was harmless given the strength of the 

government’s case. See id. at 270. 

We follow suit here. Not only was the evidence against 

Thomas substantial, but he bears the more demanding burden of showing plain error to boot. On the evidence presented 

at trial, we cannot say that the district court’s handling of Special Agent Meyer’s dual-role testimony amounted to plain error under the demanding standard the Supreme Court announced in Olano. See 507 U.S. at 736.

III

Thomas next challenges the jury instructions on Count 2. 

In the ordinary course we review a district court’s decision to 

give a jury instruction for an abuse of discretion, reversing 

“only if the instructions, taken as a whole, misled the jury.” 

United States v. Erramilli, 788 F.3d 723, 730 (7th Cir. 2015). 

Again, Thomas did not raise his challenge below. Quite 

the contrary. His counsel told the district judge that he had 

“no objection” to the jury instructions, raising the question 

whether Thomas altogether waived appellate review. See 

United States v. Johnson, 874 F.3d 990, 1000 (7th Cir. 2017) 
No. 19-2129 11

(explaining that traditionally “approval of a jury instruction 

in the district court extinguishe[d] any right to appellate review of the instruction”). In recent decisions, however, we 

have “recognize[d] the harshness of waiver” in the context of 

challenges to jury instructions and “hesitate[d] to determine 

blanket approvals ‘knowing and intentional decision[s]’” 

where counsel merely engaged in a “rote call-and-response 

colloquy with the district judge.” Id. Here we assume that 

Thomas only forfeited his challenge to the jury instructions 

and therefore review them for plain error. See id. at 1001.

Thomas contends that the jury instructions wrongly conflated multiple provisions within 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). 

Recall that the indictment charged Thomas with violating 

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), which makes it a crime for someone to (1) 

possess a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, or 

to (2) use or (3) carry it during and in relation to the crime. See

Haynes, 582 F.3d at 704. The government urged the jury to find 

Thomas guilty only if he violated the statute the first way—if 

his “possession of the firearm was in furtherance of the possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine.” To 

obtain a § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) conviction based on possession, the 

government had to “present a viable theory as to how the gun 

furthered the drug possession or distribution (e.g., being 

available to protect the drugs or drug dealer)” and “present 

specific, non-theoretical evidence to tie that gun and the drug 

crime together under that theory.” United States v. Castillo, 406 

F.3d 806, 815 (7th Cir. 2005).

Thomas underscores that the jury received no instruction 

on what it meant to the possess a gun “in furtherance of” a 

drug offense—a statutory requirement mandating the showing of a “critical nexus between the particular gun at issue and 
12 No. 19-2129

the drug trafficking offense; a nexus that . . . serves to eliminate the possibility of a conviction for innocent possession of 

a gun, such as when a gun is merely present at a crime scene.” 

Id. at 820 (emphasis omitted). In the same vein, Thomas says 

the instructions unnecessarily defined the word “carry.” He 

insists that this definition was especially prejudicial because 

it said that a person can “carry” a gun even if it is in a container “such as a glove compartment”—exactly the place 

Thomas’s guns were found. Finally, Thomas quibbles with 

the fact that the jury was given definitions for “during” and 

“in relation to.” Like “carry,” those terms are relevant to other 

ways of violating § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), but not to the exact charge 

alleged in Count 2—possessing a firearm in furtherance of a 

drug crime. Taken together, Thomas says, these flaws in the 

jury instructions amounted to plain error.

Imperfect as they were, the jury instructions were not so 

confusing or misleading as to warrant reversal under plain error review. To be sure, we agree that the more prudent approach is to include some elaboration on the meaning of the 

phrase “in furtherance of.” Better yet, the district court could 

have drawn on our court’s pattern jury instructions, which expressly “recommend[] that courts instruct jurors on the meaning of ‘in furtherance of’ a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.” PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE 

SEVENTH CIRCUIT at 242 (2012 ed.). 

Still, we cannot say that leaving out the definition compromised Thomas’s substantial rights. We observed in Castillo 

that the phrase “in furtherance of” has a plain meaning that 

“naturally and necessarily connotes more than mere presence 

or innocent possession; as its natural meaning suggests . . . it 

requires that the gun be possessed to further, advance or help 
No. 19-2129 13

forward the drug crime.” 406 F.3d at 821 (emphasis omitted). 

Put differently, it was not reversible error to fail to define the 

phrase “in furtherance of” because its apparent meaning 

“render[s] any definitional instruction perhaps helpful but 

not necessary.” United States v. Morris, 576 F.3d 661, 673 (7th 

Cir. 2009). Omitting that definition here was not plain error.

Nor was the district court’s choice to define the terms 

“during” and “in relation to.” In United States v. Harvey, 484 

F.3d 453 (7th Cir. 2007), we concluded that although an indictment was defective because it replaced “in furtherance of” 

with “in relation to,” the error did not warrant reversal because those phrases “are close enough in meaning that [the 

defendant] knew the essence of the charges he was facing”

when he opted to plead guilty. Id. at 457. Our reasoning follows a similar path here: the jury was instructed to find 

Thomas guilty if he possessed a firearm “in furtherance of” 

the drug crime, a phrase with a readily understandable connotation. We cannot conclude that the superfluous inclusion 

of definitions for “during” and “in relation to”—terms with a 

similar significance to “in furtherance of”—distracted the jury 

from its task to determine whether Thomas used the guns to 

advance his drug dealing. 

Even where a jury instruction altogether omits an element 

of a crime, we decline to reverse under plain error review if 

the jury heard overwhelming evidence proving that element. 

See United States v. Maez, 960 F.3d 949, 964 (7th Cir. 2020). Not 

only was the error here less grave, but the state’s case was 

strong. The jury heard unmistakable evidence showing a connection between the guns recovered from Thomas’s car and 

the methamphetamine he planned to deliver to the government informant—the two guns and drugs literally fell out of 
14 No. 19-2129

the glove box together. The factors we use to distinguish between mere possession of a gun and possession in furtherance 

of a drug crime include the time and circumstances under 

which the gun is found, the proximity of the gun to the drugs 

or drug profits, the accessibility of the gun to the defendant, 

and whether the gun was loaded, among others. See United 

States v. Seymour, 519 F.3d 700, 715 (7th Cir. 2008). With its 

burden framed this way, the government had sufficient, if not 

surefire, proof that Thomas was using guns to enable his drug 

dealing: he arrived with the methamphetamine at exactly the 

time and place the informant said he would, the drugs and 

guns were located together, all the contraband was within 

Thomas’s reach, and the guns were loaded. The jury had ample evidence to conclude that Thomas possessed the firearms 

to further a drug crime. 

IV

Finally, Thomas urges us to consider the dual-role testimony and the jury instructions in combination. In assessing 

whether a conviction should be upheld despite two or more 

mistakes made at trial, we assess cumulative error, or “the 

harm done by the errors considered in the aggregate.” United 

States v. Santos, 201 F.3d 953, 965 (7th Cir. 2000). To show cumulative error, Thomas had to establish that “considered together along with the entire record, the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied [him] a fundamentally fair trial.” United States v. Groce, 891 F.3d 260, 271 

(7th Cir. 2018).

Whether we consider them individually or together, the 

errors at Thomas’s trial do not undermine his firearm conviction. The jury had more than enough evidence to find beyond 
No. 19-2129 15

a reasonable doubt that Thomas possessed the two guns in 

furtherance of his sale of methamphetamine. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM.