_.) 

DRAFT 

• 

24 Juq 1951 

Minutes ot Fifth Meeting ot Ad Hoc Committee on Portuguese Communication 

Security 

HEID: Pentagon, 23 J~ 1951 at 1030 hours 

PRESENT: 

Kl". Willi am F. FRll!DMAN, AFSA, Chairman 

Colonel Gordon E. DAWSON, USA, m 

Mr. Winston SCOTT, CIA 

CDR Mark T. LITTIE, USN, NATO 

Ml". Robert PACK.ARD, State 

Review ot Minutes ot Fourth Meeting: Mr. FRIEDJIAN opened the meeting 

by asking members o£ the corrmittee tor their carments on the mirmtes of 

the fourth meeting o£ the !S, !!22, committee. CDR LITTIE noted that the 

penultimate paragraph on the last page contained the sentence: 

" ••• it was also agreed that the first step should be the 

pranulgation ot a document setting forth minimwm securit7 

st&Ddards tor NATO countries ..... 

CDR LITTlE said he presumed that this ref'erred. specifical.l1' to cOIDJlUDica-

~ securit7matters, since the document dealing with aecurit7matters in 

general had long since been published. Mr. FRil!DMAN agreed that this 

reference was specifical.17 to ccmmunication securit7 and that this word 

should be inserted b&tween minimum and securit1. 'l'here wre no .further 

cClllJlents from the carmd.ttee on the minutes. 

Correction to Minutes ot Fourth Meeting: llr. FRIEDMAN then remarked 

that the minutes of this meeting should contain a correction regarding the 

ccmpilation b.r NATO countries ot their own national books ot TrPEI settings. 

Further investigation tollari.ng the last meeting had revealed that the 

J, 

: 

,, 

1 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 11~ 17-20_14 purs~ant to E.O. 1352a 
REF ID:A6721~ 

TO~ SECRET • 

' 

Sta.ming Group had approved the recommendation Qt' the CammmicationsEl.ectronice Coordinating Section (CECS) that Signat0l7 Nations of the North 

Atlantic 'lreat7 Organization should be permitted., in addition to constructing their own pl.ugboard setting keys, to prepare National Books of Settings 

in order still further to preserve the discreet nature ot the channels 

provided for National use. Thie approval had been transmitted to all 

member NATO nations on 25 April 1951 as SG»-616-51. Mr. FRDDMAN also 

noted that SG 7/39, the report. of moos to the Staming Group had added 

that the U. K. had prepared a memorandum describing a secure method far canpilation ot simplex settings tor 'l'!PEX am. that a copy of this msorand.um 

would be made available to member Natione it desired. Mr. FRil!DKAN asked 

whether his impression that no member Nation had availed itself of thie 

privilege was correct. and CDR Lmr.E conf'irmed this impression. In reP4" 

to Mr. FRIEDMAN•sJ>que:1' !fh7 this was so, CDR LITTIE stated that no~ ~~~~~~""' lad: eee~.b.J:--t.a• ·naM:rm th91-='Simpl:riwi made-mr--etfort=- to--empile 

the:b own !fll:hiutud iiiittbJgs. Col. DAWSON remarked that perhaps this matter 

should be followed up. and Kr. FRIEDMAN agreed that it might be made a 

part ot a program to be elaborated step by step for the improvement ot the 

c0J1JD.unication security of member Nations. He suggested that the !!l, ~ 

committee consider this matt.er among the recanmendations tor remedial 

measures to be umertaken in the case of Portugal. 

Program for improvement ot Portu8uese phl'sical and personnel. securit1: 

'Jhe subject of a program tor the improvement of physical am personnel 

securi t7 was then introduced by the CHAIRMAN. Mr. SCOTT referred to the 

2 
B••R:•; APBJMJy=:Oli with regard to the request of the Portuguese International and st.ate Security Police (PIDE) that it be al.lowed to send 

personnel to the United States for training in cryptographic security. He 

pointed out that this might be a stepping stone to further action at this 

time, although the request had been turned down by .AFSA at the time of its 

proposal, approximate~ one year ago. In repq to Mr. FRIEDMAN• s inquiry 

as to measures which might be taken to improve l.&xity in physical security, 

confirmed. by CDR LlTTIE fran personal experience with the Portuguese. Mr. 

FRIEDMAN asked whether an approach should be made on a Tripartite Level. 

as was the method in regard to France. It VBS the general view of the 

committee that the Portuguese approach should be kept, it possible, on a 

bipartite level, ex.eluding the British. CDR LITTLE reiterated the suggestion which he had made at the fourth meeting that an American team be sent 

to Portugal to talce up matters of ph;,ysical am personnel security, and Mr • 

.3 

0 
OGA • 

L...----------------------'' llr. Fl!lEDIWf stated 

that he thought the British should be consulted in this matter, particularly since he felt that they would be haPP7 not to have to undertake the 

apense of such a visit and would probabq not insist upon participation 

on a working level. Th.ere .toll.owed a brie.:r comparison ot British and 

American atan:iards of security, from which it was agreed that if possible 

an American four-man ieam consisting of representatives ot the Department 

ot Defense,, CIA, state Department and the FBI should be sent to Portugal.. 

Col. DAWSON believed that such a team could accomplish its task quickly' 

and easily, since there was in the Portuguese situation nothing of the 

canplexi.ty" encountered in the French,, and since the Cnmmnrrist Party was 

illegal in Portugal. Mr. FRDDJWl then proposed that the tollow:Lng 

recanmendation be considered by the cODIDittee: 

IT IS REx::OMMENDED THAT AN APPROACH BE MADE TO THE PORTUGUmE 

ON PHYSICAL AND PERSONNEL SECURITY DJ ESSENTIALLY '!HE SAME 

MANNER AS WAS MADE IN THE CASE OF THE FRENCH,, WITH THE 

CONCURRENCE AND POSSIBIE PARTICIPATION OF THE BRITISH lF 

THE! INSIST. IT IS RECOMMENDl!D THAT A 'lEAll GO TO PORTUGAL 

<E '!HAT THE POR'l'OOUESE GOVERNMENT Sl!IID A '1'EAM TO '!HE UHrr.ED 

STA'IES AND THAT THIS 'IEAll, HAVDD ACQUmED A BACKGROUND Dl 

SEX:URITY PROCEDURES,, RE'l'tJRN TO LISBON TO SET UP MINDLUJl 

STANDARDS Cl SECURITY, AS WAS DONE JM '1HE CASE OF FRANCE. 

--'"""" - I \tr 

, ' 

' ......... ~ - ..... r-- -

~I , ,. , .... .,\\ i .~Ill ; V -=:ii .. "-"!-"' ,•- r 

4 
Question tran. state Department representative: Mr. PACKARD posed 

three questions with regard to the proposed approach: 

(1) Whether it should be regarded as an indirect appro~ toward, and 

l.qing a background torf\ 

~~~~+o~ 1she :hapzuocau2b the camm.unication security of 

~rtugalj L' ~ 

(2) Wh1' Portugal had been selected" ~*~~ from. among the various nations .tor 

this improvement; am . (3) Was Portugal thought to be receptive to the improvement of its 

security? 

In reply to the .f'irst question, Col. DAWSON pointed out that this 

approach was a supplement to a general approach being .made by NATO to 

improve the over-all security ot the member Nations; in repq to the 

second question, Mr. FRil!DMAN stated that ~rtugal had been selected upon 

the insistence of the military members ot USCIB who felt that much militar,y information regarding NATO matters was leaking from Portuguese 

conments on NATO meetings and on military information .made available to 

NATO. I 

With regard to the third question, CDR LIT'.17.E pointed out that it "llB.S 

believed. that Portuguese insecurity rested more upon ineptness and ignorance than upon indifference. He added that Portugal was believed to 

have made good progress in security after proper procedures had been 

pointed out, and particular)J in regard to COSMIC matters there was good 

reason tor believing that the Portuguese were eager to compq with Vlestern 

demands with regard to security. 

. ' I - ,.., 

l. ' 

r ' .I 1 I '\ ~ ,._ ~:-'" 

~ ? I ll •~Pi " 

OGA 
PossibillV of establiahing a training school for securit1 under 

SHAPE: 1be possibility of establishing umer SHAPE a school or training 

section tor aecurit7 was then raised by Mr. FRIEDMAN. Col. DAlVSON was of 

.the opinion that the scope o£ the training should be broader, encompassing 

aecurit7 method.a and procedures in general. CDR LITTLE said he was not 

sure what the curriculum of the militaey college to be set up under SHAPE 

was to be, but that it was possible that a course in security procedures 

might be included. Col. DAWSON said that in his opinion a course in 

security procedures should be larger than that contemplated. by the college, 

should include civilians, and should be a short course of perhaps three 

weeks. llr. FRIEDMAN suggested that reconmendatJ.ons for a personnel and 

pb1'sical. security NATO training course might be un:lertaken when the document outlining physical., personnel, and industrial security which had 

been prepared. by' the Tripartite Group had been accepted by' the three 

Governments concerned. 'l.'his document could then be distributed NA'l'<r.-1ri•• -

a suggestion with which the Camnittee.concurred. Col. DAWSON remarked 

that the standardization being carried out in other NATO matters could be 

extended to securit7methods 8IJd practices. CDR LITTIE reminded the 

Camnittee that the responsibility of the Sta.ming Group did. not ext.em to 

national systems but only to NATO matters within the various NATO 

countries. Mr. FRIPDJIAN then suggested that the Conmittee consider the 

tol.low:Lng recormnendation: 

THAT PHYSICAL, PERSONNEL AND DIDUSTRIAL STANDARDS OF 

SJOOURITY ELA.BORA'.tm> BI THE TRIPARTI'm GROUP BE COMMUNICATJ!D 

TO THE STAM>OO GROUP WITH THE Rl!X:OMMENDATION THAT iH:ESE 

1 \ . --; I If ' (. - lJ' -' 6 - .j I I -
- - - - - - - 

, - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---

STANDARDS BE ADOP'IED FOR ALL NA.TO COUNTRIES 1 .AND '!HAT IN 

ORDER TO AFFORD INSTRUCTION IN THE APPLICATION OF THOSE 

STANDARDS 'llnmE BE SET UP UND1!B SHAPE A '!RAINING COURSE OF 

APPROXIMATELY THREE WEEKS FOR DIDIVIDUAIS TO BE SEI.m'l'!D 

BI THE DIFFERENT NATO COUNRIES; SUCH A COURSE TO INCLUDE 

NOT ONLY THOSE THREE ELEMENTS OF SECURITY BUT AI.SO THE 

BASIC EIEMENTS OF COMMUNICATION SECURITY AND CRYPTOGRAPHY, 

PARTICULARLY Dl RmARD TO THE APPLICATION AND USAGE OF THE 

AUTHORIZED NATO CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYS~. 

Mr. PACKARD recommended that the recommendation be amended b,y prefixing npQLU>WING APPROVAL OF '!HE COUNCIL OF DEPUTIEsn iM.amuch as SHAPE 

would be used by the Council of Deputies as an executive agent tor providirJg location, facilities, and faculty. He also pointed out that this 

phase would follow the approval ot 'lriparti te Standards. Col. DAVISON 

remrked. that since prompt action in regard to Portuguese insecurity was 

desirable, it was advisable to proceed bilaterally with the Portuguese 

first. In the first place the tripartite at&Ddards in regard to France 

had taken a long time to evolve, and in addition the recommendations 118l"e 

largel1' the result of situations peculiar to France. :Each countr;r provided. its own peculiar problem.a and should be treated individually. He 

thought that in the long-range plan tor the improvement ot security a 

school should be considered, but that meanwhile a direct approach to 

Portugal on a bipartite basis was indicated. Mr. SCO"rr agreed with this 

point ot view. Mr. PACKARD said that he believed the gamut of COSllIC was 

'' .. ./ ·~ ..... - ~-

7 
broad enough to include representatives f'ram all levels of' government in 

phy'sical, personnel, and illdustrial securit7 which f'ound their 'W&7 into 

COSMIC channels; OOSMIC therefore gave the basis tor education in 

securit7. Col. DAWSON' replied that COSMIC procedures were broader; the 

present issue was whether the pl\fsical and personnel securit7 was adequate. 

Possibilit.f of establishing a training school tor securit1 under U.S. 

auspices: Ml'. FRIEDMAN raised the question whether the United States 

might not set up a school Pl"ior to that set up by SHAPE, and it so, under 

what auspices. ME-. PACKARD was of' the opinion that it might not be 

advisable to start such a course until NATO had adopted the Tripartite 

Standards ot Security. lll". FRD!DMAN then returned to the original Pl"Oposition whether it was advisable to reconsider the request ot the Portuguese 

to send personnel to the United states to study' securit7method.s. Mr. 

PACKARD replied that he thought SHAPE was a good place to start a school 

for training in security methods it it was not limited to military 

personnel. CDR UTI'IE indicated, however, that SHAPE is al.in.oat entirely' 

military, the only civilian representative being the Political .Ad.visor ot 

the state Department. Mr. FRIEDMAN then broached the question whether the 

United States should set up an interim school to which NATO authorities 

could sem representatives, either milit&rT or civilian. Col. DAWSON 

......... remarked that under the JJl#lll program it was possible to send foreign - military men to U .s. service schools am that this was trequentq done. 

He questioned., hawever, whether a similar procedure could be used in 

regard to civilians. 

. ' 

8 

OGA 
----------~CDR LITTLE added that the United States would 

have to defr~ the eJq>enaes of those trained. 

In reply' to Mr. PACKARD' s query how long it would take to put through 

the Tripartite Standards of Security, Col. DAWSON estimated one year ani 

said that the standards finall7 evolved were like]¥ to be much modified.. 

!Ir. PACKARD said he believed. that the security people must be dealt with 

direct]3; CDR LITTLE agreed and added that the fact that security 

personnel and the political personnel in the various countries were often 

the same made it advisable to treat direct]¥ with them. Some discussion 

followed concerning the security practices and procedures ot the various 

Western nations; NC>l"WB1' was pointed. out as a country in which security was 

direct]¥ under Defense. There was, however, much diversity in this regard 

among the various nations. Ml • PRBLMAff' a fl'IBB~en= wbetliez• tlll acbeoi ... 

Ml'llll; ~.:"""!f"ACC1UUWD:1~ .. 11a-. .. :-••!!1d?!=Be!'ltrttl!lfi!Ml•:tf••llt!J: Mr!'= 

Recommendation for approach to Portugal: Col .. DAWSON suggested that 

specifically in regard to Portugal. the bilateral approach should be 

pursued., and that at the same time the Security Coordinating Conmittee of 

the Standing Group up.lore the possibilities and methods tor the extension 

of the 'lripa.rtite securi"t.7 standards ot all NATO countries, up to the 

Council ot Deputies level. Mi-. PACKAHD suggested that the school might be 
placed under the authority or the NATO Council or Deputies; Col. DAWSON 

added that this bocQ' could then designate SHAPE as the administrator. 

Thia was the long-range solution to the problem; meanwhile a reCOJ1111.emat1on could be made that the Security 0 fUn Coordinating Committee, 

with a technical assistant, go to Lisbon and give practical instruction 

with regard to proper use and security ot TIP.EX. Such an approach cml.d 

include general instruction on the method of compiling plug settings am 

national books or settings tor TIPEX. 

Discussion ot use ot 'l'IPEX: Mr. SCOTT raised the question whether 

this solved the real problem or security, inasmuch as the use or T!PEX 

was presentq confined. almost entirely to the various Departments ot 

Defense. It was his opinion that more T!PEX machines should be distributed on a diplomatic level so that more use could be made of this method 

of handling NATO information. <DR LIT'l'IE pointed out that it had been 

the policy to tr,y to keep the distribution of TYPEX. to a minimum., largelJ' 

because ot the inadequate rmmber of machines available. He indicated 

that in his opi.lld.on it was not so much the CI7Ptographic clerks who should 

be educated as the Ministers who ordered the use or national systems tor 

matters for which they thought T!PEX should not be used because the 

British might read the traf"fic. Mr. FRIEDUAN asked that the .minutes show 

that the committee was in favor of giving a sufficient number of machines 

to NATO nations and particularly to the various Foreign Offices so that 

this means of encipherment might be used on a broader basis. CDR LI'I'1'IJ!: 

interposed that he thought this might be exteming the problem.; Mr. 

FRD!DJIAN replied that the distribution of more TYPEX .machines should be 

10 
coupled with proper indoctrination of their use in connection with nation-

&J.4r-prepared settings. Mr. PACKAim pointed out that the approach must be 

made through the National. Securit7 Authorit7 in each coUDt17, who would in 

turn instruct its .Ministers. 

Definition ot COOMIC material: Jlr. PACKARD .raised the problem 

whether what constitutes COSMIC intormation had been clearl.1' enough stipulated, that is, whether the regulations clearl.7 defined ccmac, NATO, and 

purelJ' national information. As an eDIJl,p].e, he cited the transmisa:i.on, by 

. national systems, of messages which referred to COSMIC papers by number but 

which did not themselves contain COSMIC intormation; he raised the question 

whether this was a breach of securit7. CDR L1TTIE read from D.C. 2/7 the 

definitions of 11COSMIC11 and 11NAT011 : 

n4. Definitions 

!.• "COSMIC". The word COSMIC has been designed as a 

securit7war.ning onJ.T. '!his designation shall, in addition to 

the appropriate security classitication, be placed on all 

joint and national papers tabled at meetings of mr bod7 or 

conmittee set up U?Jder the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

which contain and reveal: 

(1) Strategic or operational .military appreciations, 

plans or decisions. 

(2) Political-military appreciations, plans or 

decisions. 

(3) Econanic planning based on strategic military 

plans and decisions which could lead to disclosure ot such 

plans and decisions. 

", -\ ""1 .,, I 

> t'- > _,:"'I 

..J I 

. ' 
• 

(4) Classified information of one country tabled 

or circulated b,r another country,, unless the "owner'' 

countr.r agrees otherwise. 

b. "NATO". On all other joint or national documents - - . tabled or circulated within the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization the word "NATO" shall appear, together with 

the appropriate security classification. This "NATO" marking,, however, does not require the special band.ling or 

accounting provided for "Comacn documents,, other than as 

warranted by the security classification,, and no special 

screening (as required for 11COOMIC" personnel) is necessB.l"J" 

tor access to NATO docu.ment.s. 11 

Mr. PACKARD still questioned the clarity of the definition in relation to 

what JD&7 be termed "COSMIC fringe traffic", and asked whether it was made 

clear at NATO meetings exac~ what material was COSMIC. .Ba thought that 

much ot the confusion of classiticationmight arise from a lack of clear 

definition. Jtr. FRIEDD.N agreed that it might be wise to look into the 

definitions and rules regarding COSMIC fringe traffic. Co1. DAWSON 

pointed out that national. camnent on COSMIC documents had. been specilicall.7 

excluded fran the definition of COSMIC at the request of the State Department,, which did not wish its own representatives hampered in regard to this 

matter, am. at the same time did not wish to 11cheat11 by having its diplomatic representatives use U.S. qstems contrar.v to agreement,, for :national 

comment on NATO matters. Jtr. FRIEDMAN pointed out that if members had 

. ... . • !1 

\1Ji~ 

'\, I .--• 

1 '" I I I I LI I I I 
\ • 

• 

their own National books of settings for TIPEX, th97 would feel free to 

use that method of encipherment for national comment whereas they now P'BB 

such inf'omation on national qstems which are known to the u.s. to be 

insecure. 

Possibility of a NATO courier service: Kr. PACKARD then raised the 

question of the establishment ot a separate courier service tor NATO, 

indicating that it •s unlikel,y that member Nations would use to &n1' 

great extent U.S. courier service for national comment on COSMIC matters. 

CDR LITTIE estimated the cost at $100,000 a month., a tairl,y sizable amount 

with a tar-flung system which was becoming larger with each additional 

NATO country. Mr. PACKARD thought this amount not too great in view of 

the importance of keeping certain mat tera secure. Ml". FRIID.Mi\N remarked 

that in his opim::i.on a better answer might be to furnish more TYPEX 

machines with indoctrination in their proper use. 'Ibis would be tar 

cheaper than a NATO courier system which member Nations might not trust 

U\Y more than they did the U .s. courier system. 

Time and place of next. meeting: ME-. FRD!DKAN adjourned the meeting 

after it had 'b!ien decided that the committee would reconvene '.l'hursday, 

26 Jul,y., at 1400 hours. Col. DAWSON agreed to arrange a conference roam 

in the Pentagon, the conmittee assemble at his office, 'ZE479. Mr. 

FRIEDMAN urged the members to consider be.tore the next meeting (a) the 

question whether the definition of COSMIC as contained in n.c. 2/7 was 

detailed enough for use by member NATO nations; the problem of the definition and transmission of ccmac fringe traffic; and (b) the possibility 

of a more ext.ended use of T!PEXwith instructions as to its use and the 

compilation ot National settings. , ' . 

. I