10/20/201 0 09:1 3 FA X 202493514 2 FA A -DM S iOOI/02 0 

### oEPARTMEN T O F ArasPORTAIlO N U . S . DEPARTMEN T O F TRANSPORTATIO N p f HPERATIOM

S FEDERAL AVIATIO N ADMINISTRATIO N

WASHINGTO K

D,c . : q p^^ i ? 0 A 10

= 2 ^ I n ih e Matter

of : GRHB N AVIATIO N MANAGEMEN T CO. , LL C F A A Orde r

No . 2010- 4 Docke t No . CP07EAOOO3 FDM S No . FAA-2007-2698 9 APPIACANT' S RESPONS E T O ORDE RFO RFURTHE RBRIEFIN G COME S NOW , Gree n Aviatio n Managemen t Co. , LL C d/b/ aGree n Ai r ("Gree n Air") . Applican t

herein , b y an dthroug h undersigne dcounsel , an dhereb y respond s t o th e Administrator' s Order

fo r Furthe r Briefin g serve do n Jun e 14 , 2010 . Furthermore , pur.suanti o §14.2 6 o f

the Procedura l Rule s (1 4 C.V.R . Par t 14) , Applican t

hereb y rcspectfvUl y request s that

th e Administrato r

order furthe r proceedings , suc h a s a n infoi-ma l conference , oral argument , additional writte n submissions , o r a n evidentiary hearing , i f necessary fo

r afull an dfai

r resolutio n o f

th e issue s arisin g fi-o

mth e application . Sinc e th e Agenc y di dno t

challeng e whethe r

Applican t

i s financiall y qualifie dto receiv e a n EAJ A award ; whether

th e claime dattorney.-!; ' fee s an dexpense s ar e reasonabl e under th e circum.stances ; o r

whethe r specia l circumstance s make a

n EA.T A awar dunjusr ; thos e challenge s hav e bee n waived . A s aresult , th e sol e remainin g issue s ar e whethe r Applican t i s th e prevailin g party an dwhether th e Agenc y wa s substantiall y justified .10/20/201 0 09;1 3 FA X 202493514 2 FA A -DM S @!002/02 0

ISSUE S PRESENTE D I . Whether

Gree n Ai r

i s aPrevailin g Party ? II . Di dth e ALJ' s dismissal o f

th e proceeding s with prejudic e i n thi s cas e afte r th e FA A withdre w it s complain t resul t in amaterial alteratio n o f th e legal relationshi p o f

th e partie s a s require db

y Buckhannon ? ill . Di dth e dismissa l wit

h prejudic e hav e th e "judicia l imprimatur " require d unde r Buckhannon ? IV . Mus t

a"crewmember " under

Sectio n 135.8 5 he an "employee " o f th e certificat e holder ? i . I f so , ho w i s "employee " define di n thi s context ? ii . D o th e regulation s permi t acertificat e holde r

t o transport crewmembcr s wh o are independen t contractor s o r

employe db y independen t

contractors ? ARGUMEN T 1 GREE N AI RI S A PREVAlLIN G PART Y I N THI S PROCEEDING . I n thi s case , th e dismissal wa s wit h prejudice , whic h som e court s hav e foun d sufficient fo r "prevailin g party " statu s under Buckhanno n Boar dan dCar e Home . Inc . v . Wes t Virgini aDepartmen t

o f Healt h an dHuman Resources , 53 2 U.S . 59 8 (2001) , whe n re s judicat awil l preven t

aplaintif f fro mrefillin g aclaim . Se e e.g . Hif^hwa y Equip . Co . v. FECO , lAd . 46 9 F.3 d1027 , 103 5 (Fed . Cir . 2006) ; Claiborn e v . Wisdom , 41 4 F.3 d715 , 71 9 (7t h Cir . 2005) ; Mile s v. California , 32 0 F.3 d986 , 98 9 (9t h Cir . 2003) ; Mothe r

& Fathe r v . Cassidy , 33 8 r.3 d704 , 70 8 (7l h Cir . 2003) . Ihcs e case s hav e hel da s muc h precisel y becaus e avoluntar y dismissal wit

h prejudic e "effect s amaterial alteratio n o f10/20/201 0 09;1 3 FA X 202493514 2 FA A • > DM S @l003/02 0

Lthe ] legal relationshi p wit

h th e othe r

parties , becaus e it

terminate s an y claim s [th e plaintiff j ma y hav e ha dagains t

[th e defendants ] arisin g ou t o f thi s se t o f operativ e facts. " Claiborne , 41 4 F.3 da

t 719 ; se e als o Noxel l Corp . v . Firehous e No . 1 Bar-B-Qu e Restaurant , 11 1 F.2 d521 , 52 5 (D.C . Cir . 1985 ) ('T n contras t to aplaintif

f wh o establishe s onl y aright

t o procee dfurther , defendan t Firehous e ha s her e achieve dan endurin g victory . Noxell' s sui t stand s dismissed , an dNoxel l i s forever barre dfi-om rcinsiiiutin g th e actio n i

n th e Distric t

o f Columbia.") . Here , Gree n Ai r

achieve dajudiciall y sanctione dalteratio n i n tii c parties ' relationship : i

t obtaine dcourt-ordere dterminatio n o f th e proceedin g an

da n abandorunen t o f al l claim s by th e FAA in th e pendin g action . Th e abandonmen t o f federa l claim s wa s given preclusiv e effect

i n the pendin g action , an dwa s neve r reversed , dissolve do r undone . A s aresult . Gree n Ai r achieve dfina

l preclusiv e judgmen t

o n th e merits . Nevertheless , arul e whic h woul dallo w th e FAA , throug h voluntary dismissal , t o moo t th e preclusiv e effect

o f ajudicial orde r

canno t b e square dwit

h th e Suprem e Court' s holdin g i n Buckhannon . II . IH E ALJ' S DISMISSA L O F TH E PROCEEDIN G WIT H PREJUDIC E I N THI S CAS E RESULTE D I N A MATERIA L ALTERATIO N O F TH E LEGA L RELATIONSHI P O F TH E PARTIE S A S REQUIRE D B Y BUCKHANNON . Althoug h th e Nationa l Transportatio n Safet y Boar d(NTSB ) ha s hel dtha t th e Buckhanno n standar dapplie s t o case s arisin g fro mcertificat e suspension s by th e FA A (Application s o f

Turne r an dCoonan , NTS B Orde r No . E-546 7 a

t 5) , th e D C Circui t Cour t o f Appeal s holdin g i n Turne r an dCoonan v . N.T.S.B. , 60 8 F . 3 d12 ; 201 0 U.S . App . LEXI S 1164 8 (D.C . Cir . 2010 ) ha s n o bindin g effec t o n th e presen t

cas e sinc e th e fact s ar e clearl y distinguishable . Th e EAJ A applicatio n file db y Captain s Tume r

and10/20/201 0 09:1 3 FA X 202493514 2 FA A * DM S 0004/02 0

Connan aros e under

th e National Transportatio n Safet y Board' s Rule s o f

Practice , 4 9 C-F-R . Par

t 82 1 andPart

826 . Ih e presen t

cas e i s controlle db y th e Rule s o f Practic e codifie da t 1 4 C.F.R . Pan s 1 3 and14 . Furthermore , followin g avoluntar y withdrawa l o f

th e Complaint s by th e FA A i n Turne r an dConnan , th e DC . Circui t Cour t specificall y foun dtha t

th e case s wer e no t dismisse dwit

h prejudice . B y contrast , in the presen t case , followin g vohmtary withdrawal b

y th e FAA , th e Complain t wa s dismisse dwit

h prejudice . Therefore , th e case s ar e factuall y distinguishable . Th e major distinctio n betwee n th e NTSB' s Rule s o f Practic e an dth e FAA' s Rule s o f Practice , involv e th e specifi c way i n whic h acas e ma

y b e voluntary dismisse db y th e Agency . In th e presen t

case , 1 4 C.F.R . § 13.21 5 entitled , Withdrawal o f complain t

o r reques t fo r hearing , state s th e following : At an y tim e before o r

durin g ahearing , a

n agenc y attorne y ma

y withdra w a complain t o r apart y ma y withdra w areques t

fo r ahearin g withou t

th e consen t

o f th e administrativ e la w judge . If a n agenc y aitcmiey withdraw s th e complain t or a part y withdraw s th e reques t

fo r ahearin g an

dth e answer , th e administrdiiv e la w judg e shal l dismis s th e proceeding s unde r thi s subpar t

wit h prejudice . 1 4 C.F.R . § 13.21 5 (emphasi s added) . Furthermore , 1 4 C.F.R . §14.20 , entitle dWhe n a n applicatio n ma

y b e filed , state s th e following , i n part : (a) A n [EAJA l applicatio n ma

y b o filedwheneve r

th e applican t

ha s prevaile di n th e proceeding , bu t

in no cas e later

tha n 3 0 day s afte

r th e FAA Decisionmaker' s final dispositio n o f

th e proceeding , o r

servic e o f

th e orde r o f th e Administrato r

i n aproceedin g unde r

th e AMS . (c ) Fo r purpose s o f

thi s part , fina

l disposifio n mean s th e late r of : (5 ) Issuanc e o f

afina l orde r o r an y othe r fina l resolutio n o f

aproceeding , suc h a s asettlemen t

or voluntar y dismissal , whic h i s no t subjec t t o a petitio n fo

r reconsideration .10/20/201 0 09:1 3 FA X 202493514 2 FA A ^ DMS 0005/02 0

1 4 C.F.R . §14.2 0 (emphasi s added) . Thus , i t i s clea r tha t th e Rule s o f

Practic e concernin g Civi l Penalty proceeding s conside r a''voluntar y dismissal " t o b e a"final disposition " triggerin g th e tim e t o file a n Applicatio n unde r

th e EAjA . Notwithstandin g th e above , th e Agenc y canno t cit e t o an y authorit y i n support

o f it s positio n tha t

avoluntar

y dismissal , wit

h prejudic e unde r

Rul e 13.215 , i s no t

insufficient

to til e a n EAJ A applicatio n unde r Rul e 14.20 . Th e Buckhanno n Cour t

Di dNo t Expressl y Hol dTha t

Onl y Judgment s o n th e Merit s Qualif

y aPrevailin g Party , In Buckhannon , th e Suprem e Cour t articulate dthe tes t

fo r determinin g whe n a litigan t qualifie s a s aprevailin g part y unde r certai n federa

l fee-shiftin g statutes . Unde r Buckhannon , th e inquir

y fo r dcTemiining th e prevailin g part y require s a

n examinatio n o f whethe r th e party seekin g fee s ha s experience dajudiciall y sanctione dmaterial alteratio n in th e legal relationshi p o f th e partie s i

n th e lawsuit . Se e Id . a

t 605 . Th e Suprem e Cour

t considere dwhethe r

aplaintif f wh o ha s failedto secur e afinal judgmen t o n th e merit s o r

a court-ordere dconsen t

decree , bu t

ha s nevertheles s achieve dth e desire dresul t becaus e th e lawsui t brough t abou t avoluntar

y chang e i n th e defendant' s conduct , ca n b e deeme da prevailin g party fo

r purpose s o f

warrantin g afee award . I n rejectin g th e "catalys t

theory " for

determinin g prevailin g party fe e awards. , th e Suprem e Cour

t distinguishe dcourt-ordere do r judiciall y sanctione drelie f fromfavorabl e outcome s tha t

resul t fromavoluntary , extra-judicial chang e i n th e defendant' s conduct . Th e Cour t cite dfinal judgment s o n th e merit s an dcourt-ordere dconsen t decree s a s example s o f

judiciall y enforceabl e relief , whic h stan di n contras t

to relie f obtaine da s a resuh of defendant' s unilateral acts . Sue Id . a t 604 .10/20/201 0 09:1 3 FA X 202493514 2 FA A -DM S 0008/02 0

Specifically , th e Suprem e Cour t held : A defendant' s voluntary chang e i n conduc t althoug h perhap s accomplishin g wha t th e plaintif

f sough t to achiev e b y th e lawsuit , lack s th e necessary judicial imprimatu r

on th e change . Ou

r precedent s thu s coimse l agains t holdin g tha

t th e term"•prevailing patty " authorize s a n awar do f

attorney' s fee s withou t a correspondin g alteratio n i n th e lega l relationshi p o f

th e parties . Id . a t 60 5 (emphasi s i n original) . lli e Suprem e Court

surveye dit s pas t

holding s awardin g attorney' s fee s where plaintif f obtaine dajudgmen t

o n th e merit s or

acourt-ordere dconsen t

decree , an dit s refusa l t o awar dfee s where aplaintil f

faile dt o obtai n an

y judicia l relie f

o n the jnerit s but , instead , simpl y survive ddirecte dverdic t o r secure dajudicia l pronouncemen t - withou t an y accompanyin g judicial relie f - that defendan t

violate dth e Constitution . Se e Id . a t 605-606 . Th e Court' s focu s a s reflecte di n Buckhanno n ha s bee n th e judicial natur e an dcourt-ordere dgenesi s o f th e relie f obtaine dwhic h i n tur

n effectuate s achang e in th e parties ' legal relationship . Thus , whil e Buckhanno n recognize dthat "[njeve r hav e w e awarde dattorney' s fee s for ano n judicia l 'alteratio n o f actual circumstances,' " th e Cour t di dno t expressl y hol dtha

t only judgment s on th e merit s qualif y aprevailin g party . Id . a t 60 6 (citatio n omitted) . Nowher e i n Buckhanno n di dthe Suprem e Cour t expressl y requir e immunity fro m futur e sui t a s aconditio n t o a

n awar do f fees . Id . (citatio n omitted) . Instead , th e tes t tha t th e Cour t establishe di s broa denoug h t o encompas s acourt tjrdere dterminatio n o f proceeding , a s i n th e presen t case : "[A

J 'prevailin g party ' i s on e wh o ha s bee n awarde d some relie f

b y th e court. " Id . a

t 603 . fhus , th e questio n i s whethe r some court-ordere drelie f i s obtaine di n th e lawsui t (a s oppose dt

o b y virtu e o f

amer e chang e i

n circumstances) , no t

whethe r afull y litigate d10/20/201 0 09:1 3 FA X 202493514 2 FA A -DM S 0007/02 0

preclusiv e judgment

i s entered . Se e Id . a

t 615-619 . H L TH E DISMISSA L WIT H PREJUDIC E HA D TH E "JUDICIA L IMPRIMATUR " REQUIRE D UNDE RBUCKHANNON . A . Th e Judicia l Imprimatu r Standar dUnde r

th e Prevailin g Part y Requiremen t

o f th e EAJA . Th e Suprem e Cour

t se t th e general standard s fo

r definin g th e term"prevailin g party " i n federa l attorneys ' fee s shiftin g statute s in Buckhannon , 53 2 U.S . 598 , acas e concerne dwit

h fe e statute s other

than th e F.AJA. ' "[T]h e Suprem e Court' s reasonin g in 'Buckhanno n i s prestime dt o appl y generall y to all fee-shifiin g statute s Tha t us e th e prevailin g part

y terminology.' " Do e v . Bosto n Pub . Schs. , 35 8 F.3 d20 , 2 5 (1s t Cir . 2004) ; se e als o M av

. Chertqff , 54 7 F.3 d342 , 344 (2 dCir . 2008) . I h e Suprem e Court

hel dtha t mer e succes s i n accomplishin g aparty' s objective s i s insufficient

to b e aprevailin g part

y fo r afe e award . Buckhannon^ 53 2 U.S . a t 606 . Th e Cour t rejecte dth e "catalyst " theory whic h ha dbee n accepte db y many circuits . Th e Suprem e Court

note dtha t us e o f th e catalys t

theory woul dhav e th e advers e effec t o f discouragin g th e governmen t fro mvoluntaril y settlin g case s (pre-sui t or post-suit) . Se e Id . ai 60 8 (notin g th e "disincentiv e that th e 'catalys t

theory ' ma

y hav e upo n adefendant' s decisio n t o voluntaril y chang e it s conduct") . Th e Cour t state dtha t

it s plai n languag e approac h serve dth e purpos e o f avoidin g th e resul t

o f asecon dmajor

litigatio n ove r attorneys ' fees . Se e Id . a

t 609-11 . Buckhanno n explicitl y identifie dtw o an donl y tw o situation s whic h mee t th e judicia l imprimatu r

requirement : wher e plaintif f ha s "receive dajudgmen t o n th e merits " o r "obtaine dacourt-ordere dconsen t decree. " Id . a

t 605 . Th e Cour

t wa s clea r that

' Buckhanno n involve dprovision s o f th e Federal Housin g Amendment s Ac t o f 1988 , 4 2 U.S.C . § 3613(cX2 ) an

dth e Americiin. s wkh Disabilitie s Act o f 199 0 ("ADA") , 4 2 U.S.C . § 12205 .10/20/201 0 09:1 3 FA X 202493514 2 FA A ^DM S ^008/02 0

"settlemen t

agreement s cnlbrce dthroug h aconsen t decree " ma

y b e th e basi s for

fee award s andth e resultin g chang e i n th e lega l relationshi p betwee n th e partie s mus t b e "court-ordered. " Id . a t

604 . Th e chang e i

n th e lega l relationshi p mus t b e a"judiciall y sancfionc dchange. " Id . a t 605 . fhc Suprem e Cour

t ha s describe dwhat

i t meant b y a"court-ordere dconsent decree. " It

disfinguishe dsuc h consen t decree s fro

m"private settlements " (a s to whic h fee s ma y no t b e awarded) , statin g tha t

"[p]rivat e settlement s do no t entai l th e judicia l approval an doversigh t

involve di n consent

decrees. " Id . a

t 604 . Buckhanno n contraste dfina l judgment s on the merit s andcourt-ordere dconsen t decree s wit

h situation s whic h faile dt o mee t th e judicial imprimatu r

test : fo r example , securin g th e reversal o f

adirecte dverdict , acquirin g ajudicia l pronouncemen t that a defendan t ha s violate dth e Constitutio n unaccompanie db y "judicial relief, " o r

obtainin g a non-judicial "alteratio n o f actua l circumstances. " Id . a

t 605-06 . Th e Suprem e Clour

i emphasize dthre e relate dfactors . Th e first wa s tha t th e chang e i n legal relationshi p mus t

b e "court-ordered. " Se e Id . a t 604 . Second , ther e irius t b e judicia l approval o f

th e relie f i n relatio n t

o th e merit s o f

th e case . Third , ther e mus t b e judicia l oversigh t

an dabilit y t o enforc e th e obligation s impose don th e parties . Se e Buckhannon , 53 2 U.S . a

t 60 4 n. 7 (notin g tha

t judicia l oversigh t

i s inheren t

i n consen t decree s bu t

no t i n privat e settlements) . However , th e Supremo Cour t in Buckhanno n lef

t open th e questio n o f

whethe r dispositio n other

than afinal

judgmen t o n th e merit s ca n confe r prevailin g party status .10/20/201 0 09:1 4 FA X 202493514 2 FA A ^DM S 0009/02 0

B . I t Make s N u Differenc e Thu t

th e AL J wa s Require dt o Dismis s th e Cas e Wit h Prejudic e Unde r 1 4 C.F.R . §13.215 . Wit h regardt o th e ALJ' s requiremen t t o dismis s th e cas e with prejudic e pursuan t t o Rtil c 13.215 , a5suinin g arguend o tha t ther e i s avoi di n th e regulation , any suc h voi d mus t b e filledb y rulemakin g under th e Administrativ e Procedtu- e Ac t an dno t throug h thi s adjudicator

y proceeding . Se e Unite dState s v . Frontie r Airlines , Inc . (56 3 F.2 d100 8 (10t h Cir.)) . I n Frontie r

Ai r line.s . Inc. , the lOt

h Cir . Cour

t o f Appeal s addresse da.situatio n i n whic h th e us e o f

aircral l fligh

t recorde r dat afo r investigation s an dnon-acciden t incident s wa s "simpl y no t

covere db

y th e regulations" . Accordingly , th e Cour t foun dtha

t "i t i s a n are ain whic h th e FA A ha s no t exercise dit s rtilemaking authority. " Th e cour t further foun dth e circumstance s ver y much lik

e thos e considere din Pik

e v. CAB , 30 3 F.2 d35 3 (8t h Cir.) , where th e matte r

sough t t o b e regulate dwa s als o i

n a""gap" . Accordingly , th e Pike cour t hel dtha t th e CA B coul dno t

clos e th e ga

p b y implicatio n o r

pohcy . Th e Frontie r Airline s cour

t agreed , an

dstate dtha

t "th e voi dca

n onl y b e fille db y rulemakin g unde r th e Administrativ e Procedure Act. " Moreover , th e Suprem e Cour t i n NLR B v . Wyman-Gorda

n Co. , 39 4 U.S . 759 , 8 9 S.Ct . 1426 , 2 2 L.Ed.2 d70 9 stated : Ther e i s n o warran t

i n la w fo r th e Boardt o replac e th e statutor y schem e wit

h a rule-makin g procedur e o f it s ow n invention . Apar

t fro mth e fac t

that th e devic e fashione db

y th e Hoar

ddoe s no t compl y wit

h th e statutor

y command , i

t obviousl y fall s shor t o f th e substanc e o f

th e requirement s o f

th e Administrativ e Procedur e Act.. . NLR B V . Wyman-Gorda

n Co. , 39 4 U.S . 759 , 8 9 S.Ct . 1426 .10/20/201 0 09:1 4 FA X 202493514 2 FA A -DM S iOIO/02 0

i n th e presen t

case , i f th e Administrato r

seek s t o avoi dpaymen t

o f a n EAJ A awar dmerel y becaus e th e Af

J dismisse dth e proceedin g with prejudic e (b y complyin g wit h Rul e 13.215) , rathe r

tha n intendin g t o confer

prevailin g party statu s upo n Gree n Air, the n th e Administrato r

mus t see k nilc-changin g throug h th e Administrativ e Procedur e Ac t an dno t throug h thi s adjudicator

y proceeding . C . Severa l Unite dState s Circui t Court s o f

Appea l Hav e Recognize dTha t Prevailin g Part y Statu s Doc s No t Requir e Fina l Preclusiv e Judgmen t o n th e Merits . Several federa

l circui t court s hav e expressl y recognize dtha t under Buckhanno n disposition s othe r

tha n final judgment s o n th e merit s can confer prevailin g part

y status . Mor e significantly , several circuit s hav e confcrte dprevailin g part y statu s o

n plaintiff

s wh o obtaminteri mrelie f even whe n plaintif

f ultimatel y fail s o

n th e merit s o f

th e case , fail. s to obtai n permanen t

relief , o r th e underlyin g claim s are rendere dmoot . Th e Secon dCircui t

i n Vacchi o v. A.<;hcroft

. 40 4 F.3 d66 3 (2 dCir . 2005) , expressl y rejecte dth e contentio n that plaintif f i s considere daprevailin g party onl y i f th e cour t finally adjudicate dth e merit s o f plaintiffs claim . I

n finding plaintif

f th e prevailin g party , th e Secon dCircui t

foun dth e material alteratio n tes t applie s t o "an y interi mjudicial relie f tha t alter s th e parties ' lega

l relationship. " Id . a

t 673 . I n tha t case , th e court

stated : Buckhanno n doe s no t

limi t fe e award s to enforceabl e judgment s o n th e merit s o r t o consen t decrees . Whil e thes e order s wer e cite db y th e Cour

t a s example s o f

th e type s o f action s tha

t woul dconve y th e judicia l imprimatu r necessary t o afee award , broade r

languag e i n Buckhanno n indicate s tha t thes e example s arc no t

a n exclusiv e list . Id . a t 67 4 (quotin g Fres . Coalitio n v . Fed . Transi t

Admin. , 35 6 F.3 d444 , 45 2 (2 dCir . 2004 ) (quotin g Buckhannon . 53 2 U.S . a t 604)) . Applyin g thi s reasoning , th e Secon dCircui t foun dplaintif

f wa s aprevailin g party lo r havin g obtaine da

n interi morde r

grantin g hi mreleas e pendin g appeal , eve n absen t 1 010/20/201 0 09:1 4 FA X 202493514 2 FA A * DM S iOll/02 0

preclusiv e final judgmen t o n th e merits , becaus e th e rulin g "involve da n assessmen t

o f th e merits , [and ] unquestionabl y materiall y altere dth e existin g legal relationshi p betwee n th e parties. " Id . Furthermore , i n Roher.w n v . Giuliani , 34 6 F.3 d7 5 (2 dCir . 2003) , th e Secon d Circui t expressl y rejecte danarro w readin g oi ' Buckhanno n that woul dlimi t

relie f t o final judgment s o n th e merits : W e therefore joi n th e majorit y o f court s t o hav e considere dth e issu e sinc e Buckhanno n i

n concludin g tha

t judicia l actio n othe r

tha n ajudgmen t

o n th e merit s o r aconsen t

decre e can suppor t

a n awar do f

attorney' s fee.'; , s o lon g a s suc h actio n cartie s with i t sufficient judicia l imprimatur . Id . a t 81-8 2 (emphasi s added) ; se e als o Pere z v . Westcheste r Count y Dep' t o f Corr. , 5S 1 F.3 d143 ; 150

- 15 1 (2 dCir . 2009 ) (rejectin g contentio n tha t Buckhanno n limite dprevailin g party statu s t o final judgment s o n th e merits , consen t decree s o r

court-ordere d settlement s andstating : "Althoug h th e Suprem e Cour t specificall y mentione d merit s decision s an dconsen t decrees , i t

di dno t sugges t tha t on e o f thes e t^' O condition s wa s necessary fo r apart y to prevail . Indeed , i t

referre dt o the ma s 'examples ' o f

sufficient outcomes." ) (emphasi s added) . Th e majorit

y ol " circuit s t o hav e considere dth e issu e hav e refiise dt o constru e Buckhanno n a s restrictin g prevailin g part y statu s to litigant s wh o obtai n fina l judgmen t o n th e merits . See , e.g . Dearmor e v . Cit y o f Garlan d51 9 F.3 d517 , 52 1 (5t h Cir . 2008 ) (''Althoug h an enforceabl e judgmen t o n th e merit s an dacourt-ordere dconsen t decre e hav e sufficient

judicia l imprimatur , thes e example s are not exclusive.") ; JV

. Cheyenn e Trib e v . Jackson . 43 3 F.3 d1083 , 108 5 (8t h Cir . 2006 ) (notin g ope n questio n whethe r cour t orders , suc h a s declarator y judgment s an dpreliminary injunctions , may creat e judiciall y sanctione dmaterial alteratio n i n parties ' relationship) ; Smalbei n v . Cit y o f Oayton aBeach . 35 3 r.3 d901 , 90 5 (11t h Cir . 2003 ) (concludui g that "judicia l actio n wit

h sufficient judicia l imprimatu r

othe r tha n ajudgment

on th e merit s o r

acourt-ordere d consen t decre e ma

y allo w fo

r a n awar do f attorney' s fees.") ; TD . v , Lagrang e Schoo l

1 110/20/201 0 09:1 4 FAX 202493514 2 FA A ^ DM S @012/02 0

Disl. . 34 9 F.3 d469 , 47 8 (7t h Cir . 2003 ) (" alitigan t

mus t hav e obtaine dajudgmen t on th e merits , aconsen t

decree , o r

som e simila

r for mo f judiciall y sanctione drelief") ; se e als o Bell V . B do f Count y Comm'r s o f

Jefferso n County , 45 1 F.3 d1097 , 110 3 (10t h Cir . 2006 ) (privat e settlemen t

agreement s can qualify) ; Truesdel l v . Philadelphi aIIous . Autk , 29 0 F.3 d159 , 16

4 (3 dCir . 2002 ) (judiciall y enforceabl e settlement s can suffice) . Ih e Nint h Circui t ha s expressl y rejecte doverl y narro w interpretation s (^ f Buckhanno n andha s hel do n numerou s occasion s tha t "judgment s an

dconsen t decree s ar e example s .. . hut

they ar e no t

th e only examples'" ^ o f

judicia l actio n sufficient t o conve y prevailin g party stams . Watson v. Count y o f Riverside , 30 0 F.3 d1092 , 109 6 (9t h Cir . 2002 ) (emphasi s added) ; se e ah o Carhonel l v . INS , 42 9 F.3 d894 , 89 9 (9t h Cir . 2005 ) (recognizin g tha

t litigant s ca

n prevai l fo

r purpose s o f

fee s "a s aresul t

o f judicia l actio n othe r

tha n ajudgment

on th e merits") ; Richar dS . v. Dep'i o f Developmenta l Servs. , 31 7 F.3 d1080 , 108 6 (9i h Cir . 2003 ) ("prevailin g party statu s i s no t determine db y th e degre e o f

succes s achieve d. . , [it] i s determine dby inquirin g whethe r th e party' s "'actua l relie f

o n the merit s o f

[their ] clai mmateriall y alter s th e legal relationshi p betwee n th e partie s b

y modifyin g th e defendant' s behavio r in away tha t

directl y benefit s th e plaintilT.'" ) (citatio n omitted) ; Tipton-Whittingha mv. Cit y o f LA. . 31 6 F.3 d1058 , 106 2 (9t h Cir . 2003 ) (Buckhannon' s example s o f judgment s an dconsen t

decree s ar e "illusU'ativc , no t

exhau-stive " type s o f

relie f capabl e o f

conferrin g prevailin g party status) . Thes e case s demonstrat e tha t circui t court s uniforml y confer prevailin g party statu s o n plaintiff

s wh o obtai n interi mrelie f withou t securin g afinal preclusiv e judgment . B y definition , preliminary injunction s an dstay s are no t preclusiv e in th e pendin g actio n an dare accorde dn o preclusiv e effect i n futur e action s betwee n th e parties . Prelimi.nar y

1 210/20/201 0 09:1 4 FAX 202493514 2 FA A -DM S @013/02 0

relie f canno t immuniz e plaintiff

s fromth e ris k

o f futur e .suits , no r

foreclos e th e possibility tha t defendant s wil l recommenc e th e offendin g conduc t an dinvit e asecon daction . Yet , plaintiff s are no t require dt o obtai n preclusiv e judgment s a s aconditio n o f awardin g fees . Circui t court s confer

prevailin g part

y statu s no t

becaus e plaintiff

s obtai n apreclusiv e final judgmen t

on th e merits , but , rather , becaus e the y obtai n ajudiciall y sanctione d chang e in th e parties ' legal relationshi p fo r th e pertinen t

tim e perio ddurin g the pendin g action . D . Th e FAA' S Interpretatio n of Buckhanno n i s Unreasonabl e iin d Overreaching . A pe r s e rul e requirin g tha t

EAJ A applicant s mus t

obtai n immunit

y fromfutur

e enforcement

actio n by th e FAA , notwithstandin g amaterial alteratio n o f th e parties ' legal relationshi p i n the pendin g action , i s tantamoun t t o requirin g th e applicant s t o first obtai n a n enforceabl e judgmen t

on th e merits . Such acategorical rule , however , ha s bee n expressl y rejecte dby severa l circui t courts . A rul e tha

t allow s th e FA

A t o depriv e a

n bAJ A applican t

o f prevailin g party statu s b y avoluntar y wiJidrawa l o f

it s actio n i n order t o avoi djudicia l dismissal , fundamentally undermine s Buckhannon , whic h rejecte dth e ide atha t parlie s throug h thei r

ow n action s coul dconfe r prevailin g party status . I n essence , thi s woul dpenni t th e FA A t o unilaterall y nullif

y amaterial alteratio n o f the parties ' lega

l relationshi p b

y withdrawin g it s claim s i n th e fac e o f imminent

judicia l action , andt o annu l th e impac t o f judicia l order s b y dismissin g at th e elevent

h hour . It i s difficult t o imagin e tha

t th e Supreme Cotir

t intende dsuc h aresult . Accordingly , th e Administrato r shoul dgrant

th e Applicatio n fo

r fee s an d expen.se s under

the EAJA .

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E . A Voluntar y Dismi.<i$a l Wit h Prejudic e i s aComplet e Adjudicatio n o f th e Claims . I n th e presen t

case , th e FAA' s volunur y withdrawa l i s analogou s to avoluntary dismissa l b

y aplaintif

f under th e Federa

l Rule s o f Civi l Procedure . Sinc e avoluntar y dismissa l wit

h prejudic e "i s acomplet e adjudicatio n o f th e claim s an daba

r t o afurther actio n o n the m. .. , i t

ha s bee n hel dtha

t [th e tria l court ] ha s n o discretio n t o refus e suc h adismissal an dcanno t

forc e a n unwillin g plaintif

f t o g o t o trial, " Se e Zhengzho u Harmon i Spic e Co. . Ltd. , e t al . v . Unite dStates , e

t al. , 201 0 Ct . Intl . Trad e Lexi s 7 ; SLIP OP . 2010-0 8 (citin g 9 Wrigh t & Miller , Federal Practic e an dProcedure : Civi l 3 d§263 4 a t 551) . Other

federa l circui t court s hav e foun ddismissal wit h prejudic e sufficient

t o awardattorne y fees . See , e.g. , Rivier aDistrib. . Ina . v. Jones , 51 7 F.3 d92 6 (7'' ' Cir . 2008 ) (dismissal wit

h prejudic e satisfie s Buckhannon , eve n absen t adjudicatio n o f

merits) ; se e also , Mile s v. California , 32 9 F.3 d986 , 98 9 (9'* ^ Cir . 2003 ) (dismissa l withou t prejtidic e sufficient wher e federa

l clai mforeclosed) . I n th e presen t case , th e FAA' s voluntary withdrawa l wa s "conclusiv e in practical effect " sinc e th e Agenc y wa s unabl e t o brin g furthe r sui t agains t Gree n Air , concernin g th e sam e allege dregulatory violations . IV . A "CREWMEMBER " UNDE RSECTIO N 135.8 5 I S NO T REQUIRE D T O B E A "DIREC T EMPLOYEE " O F TH E CERTIFICAT E HOLDER . fhc Federal Aviatio n Regulation s (FARS ) defin e th e termcrewmembe r a s follows : Crewmembc r

mean s aperso n assigne dt o perfor mdut y i n a n aircraf t durin g flight time . 14C.I-.R . §1.1 .

1 410/20/201 0 09:1 4 FA X 202493514 2 FA A -DM S 0015/02 0

Th e regulation(.s) , interpretation(.s) , an dFA A Polic y d o no t

specif y whethe r a n employe e under

Sectio n 135.8 5 i s require dto b e adirec t employe e o f

th e certificate holder . Nevertheless , th e practical wa y in whic h th e Par

t 13 5 "on-demand " ai r

carrie r industr y work s i n reality , dictate s tha

t crcwmember s (i.e. , pilots , mechanics , andcabi n attendants ) frequentl y wor k a s direc t employee s or

by contrac t

eithe r part-tim e o r

"o n call " when needed . A s aresult , man y Par t 13 5 crevvmember s wor

k fo r mor e tha n on e ai r carrier a t atime , dependin g up<i

n whe n andwher e th e deman darises . Certai n crewmcmbers , like Ms . Dal y (th e cabi n attendan t

in thi s case) , wor

k othe r fbll-time job s an dac t onl y a s acrewmembc r

(b y contract ) only whe

n th e nee darises . It

woul db e unreasonabl e t o assume that 1 4 C.F.R . §135.8 5 applie s onl y t o full-time direc t employee s o f a n ai r carrier . A . Ho w i s '"employee " define di n th e contex t o f 1 4 C.F.R . §135.8 5 ? Althoug h th e FARdoe s no t define th e ter

memploye e in th e contex t o f 1 4 C.F'.R . §135.85 , th e FA

A Chie f Counsel' s Opinio n i s ver

y instructiv e o

n th e matter . Specifically , by FAA Chie f Counse l lette

r date dMarch 19 , 1986 , Joh n H . Cassady , Assistan t Chie f Counsel , Regulation s andEnforcement Division , provide dth e followin g legal interpretatio n concernin g 1 4 C.F.R . §121.547(a)(1) , whic h state dth e following ; (a) N o perso n ma

y admi t any perso n t o th e flight

dec k o f a n aircraf t unles s th e perso n bein g admitte di s (1 ) acrewmember . I n hi s legal interpretation , Mr . Cassady state dth e following : A "crewmembcr " i s define di n Sectio n 1. 1 o f

th e FARa s " aperso n as.signedto perfor maduly in a

n aircraf t durin g flight

time. " You r

questio n concern s on e airline' s polic y o f

assignin g a

n FA A certificate dmechani c employe e to rid e th e jumpsea t on arevenu e passenge r

trips . You sa

y tha t suc h person s shoul dno t

b e 1 510/20/201 0 09:1 5 FA X 202493514 2 FA A + DM S 21016/02 0

permitte dt o ride th e jumpsea t pursuan t t o Sectio n 121.547(a) ( i ) becaus e the y are no t "crcwmembers. " To suppor t thi s view , yo u point

ou t tha t Par t 6 9 o f th e FAR , whic h provide s fo

r mechani c certification , refer s t o thema s "airman othe r than flight crewmembers. " However , w e do no t believ e thi s languag e preclude s certificate dmechanic s fro

mbein g "crewmcmbers " unde r Par t 121 . Par t l. l define s "tligh t

crewmember " a s a"pilot , flight engineer , or

flight navigato r assigne dt o dut

y durin g flight

time. " Thi s definitio n is , o f course , more narro w than th e definitio n o f "crewmember. " It

doe s no t include , fo

r example , flight attendant s althoug h the y ma y clearl y b e "crewmembers. " Thus , i t i s clea r that person s other

than "fligli t

crewmembers " ma

y b e "crewmembers " i f

the y ar e assigne ddut

y durin g flight

time . I n th e ."Situatio

n yo u describe , th e statu s o f th e mechani c employe e a s a "crewmember " woul ddepen do n whethe r the mechani c wa s actuall y assigne d dut y durin g fligh t

time . I f thi s i s so , th e mechani c i s a"crewmembcr " an dma y ride th e jumpsea t

pursuan t t o Sectio n 121.547(a)(1) . O n th e othe r hand , i f th e mechaiu c i s onl y ridin g th e tri p t o b e availabl e fo r dut y o n th e groun dinstea do f durin g flight, Sectio n 121.547(a)(1 ) i s no t applicable . FA A Chie f Counse l Interpretatio n date dMarc h 19,198 6 (emphasi s added) . Th e regulation s ol " 1 4 C.F.R . Par t 12 1 air carrier s are more stringen t tha n th e regulation s fo

r 1 4 C.F.R . Par

t 13 5 ai r carriers , like Gree n Air . Therefore , i f th e FAA Chie f Counse l opine dtha

t a n employe e ma

y ride i n th e jumpsea t

durin g aPar

t 12 1 revenu e passenge r

trip , a s lon g a s sh e i s actuall y assigne dduty durin g fight time , the n likewise , Part

13 5 ai r carnt i employee s shoul db e permitte dsimila r jump.sea t privileges . In th e presen t

case , there i s n o questio n tha t Eri n Dal y wa s "actuall y assigne d dut y durin g fight

tune. " She rod e in th e jumpsea t an dwa s presen t

durin g th e flight

in orde r to provid e assistanc e t

o th e flight

cre w concernin g custome r servic e t o tli e passengers . Therefore , accordin g t o th e FAA Chie f Counsel , Eri n Daly wa s authorize dto occup y th e jumpsea t

durin g th e passenge r

carryin g revenu e flights i n question . B . D o th e regulation s permi t acertificat e holde r

t o transpor t crewmember s wh o ar e independen t contractor s o r

employe d b y independen t

contractors ?

1 610/20/201 0 09:1 5 FA X 202493514 2 FA A ^DM S 0017/02 0

Th e FA Ra t issue , 1 4 C.F.R . § 135.85 , authorize s a n employe e o f

th e certiticat e holde r t o b e carrie daboarda

n aircraf t withou t complyin g wit

h th e passenge r

carryin g requirement s o f

1 4 C.F.R . Par

t 135 . Specifically , §135.8 5 .state s th e following , i n part ; § 135.8 5 Carriag e o f

person s withou t

complianc e wit h th e passenger carryin g provision s o f

thi s part . fh e followin g person s ma y b e carrie daboarda

n aircraft : withou t

complyin g wit

h th e passenger-carryin g requirement s o f thi s part : (a ) A crewmembe r

o r other employe e o f

th e certificat e holder . 1 4 C.F.R . § 135.85(a) . Althoug h Par

t 13 5 doe s no t

provid e adefinitio n o f

th e ter mEmployee , arevie w o f 1 4 C.F.R . Par

t 12 1 (Appendi x T

, Sectio n II - elTectiv e a

t th e tim e o f

th e allege dviolation) , provide s th e followin g definition : Employe e i s aperso n wh o i s hired , eithe r directl y o r

b y acontract.. . 1 4 C.F.R . Par

t 121 , Appendi x 1 , Sectio n I I (emphasi. s added) . Therefore , i t

i s onl y reasonabl e to assum e tha t th e FA A ha s established , througl i regulation , tha t

th e ter mEmploye e shal l includ e crewmembcr s wh o arc independen t contractor s o r

employe db

y independen t

contractor s (i.e. , aperso n wh o i s hired , eithe r directl y o r b y acontract) . If

th e Administrato r

wer e t o no w attac h adeferen t definitio n t o th e tera i Employe e solel y fo r th e purpos e o f

enforcin g 1 4 C.F.R . §135.85 , th e resul t woul db e unreasonabl e an dcontrar y to establishe dlaw , preceden t an dpolicy . Firs t o f all , if th e regulatio n i s interprete ds o tha t onl y direc t

employee s ar e qualifie dfo

r purpose s o f

occupyin g ajumpsea t

durin g passenge r

carryin g revenu e flights under 1 4 C.F.R . Par

t 135.85 , suc h aHmite

dinterpretatio n woul db e contrary t o th e plai n meanin g o f

th e regulatory language . Second , afactual determinatio n o f whethe r aperso n

1 710/20/201 0 09:1 5 FA X 202493514 2 FA A - DM S @018/02 0

work s ("o r a n ai r carrie r a s adirec t

employe e or

b y contract , doe s no t

involv e asafet

y o f flight issu e fo r whic h th e Federa l Aviatio n Administratio n .shouldb e concerned . Lastly , ifonl y direc t

employee s (wit

h o r withou t full employmen t

benefits) , are eligibl e unde r \ 4 C.F.R . §135.85 , i t

woul dcreat e a

n undu e burde n upo n th e FA A i n it s oversigh t

o f fliglit operations , requirin g adeterminatio n o f th e employmen t

statu s fo r eac h crewmember . Suc h alimite dinterpretatio n i s unrelate dt o safety , unreasonable , an dtherefore , illogical . Accordingly , th e resuh woul db e anonsensica l approac h t o regulatory cnlbrcemen t

under th e circumstances .

CONCLUSIO N Fo r th e foregoin g reasons . Applicant , Gree n Ai r re.spectfully reques t

tha t th e Administrato r

gran t th e Applicatio n fo

r attorney' s fee s an dothe r

expense s pursuan t

t o th e FAJA . REQUES T FO RFURTHE RPROCEEDING S Th e Administrator' s Orde r fo r Further Briefin g addresse donl y th e limite dissue s discusse dherein . Th e remainin g issue s involv e whether th e FAA wa s substantiall y justifie di n chargin g Green Air

wit h aviolatio n o f

1 4 C.F.R . § 119.5(1) , §135.434 , an d §91,13(a) ; andwhethe r

th e Agenc y wa s justifie di n seekin g a$33,00 0 civi l penalty . Therefore , pur.suan

t to §14,2 6 o f

th e Procedura

l Rule s (1 4 C.F.R . Par

t 14) , Applican t hereb y rospectfiill y request s tha t th e Administrato r

orde r further proceedings , suc h a s a

n informa l conference , ora

l argument , additional writte n submissions , o r an evidentiar

y hearing , i f necessar y fo r aful l an dfai r resolutio n o f

the issue s arisin g fro

mth e applicatio n an dconducte da s promptl y a s possible .

1 810/20/201 0 09:1 5 FA X 202493514 2 FA A + DM S @|019/02 0

TOTA L FEE S AN

D EXPENSE S SOUGH T ANALYSI S OF ATTORNEY FEE S AN D EXPENSE S INCURRE D A S OF OCTOBER 11 , 2010 , REQUIRE D T O RESPON D T O THE ADMINISTRATOR' S ORDE RFO R FURTHERBRIEFING . Descriptio n Lega l Service s Descriptio n o

f work : Amoun t

16. 4 EAJ A Rat e

$12 5 Tota l

$2,050.0 0 10/5/201 0 - Revie w Order fo r Further Briefing ; Revie w file; Researc h law ; Begi n Draf t Brie f 10/6/201 0 - Researc h law ; Revis e Draf t Brie f 10/8/201 0 - Revie w andRevis e Brie f lO/n/201 0 - Revie w an

dRevis e Brie f Time : 3. 7 Time : 5. 3 hrs . Time : 5. 2 Time : 2, 2 $6.0 5 Expense s Copie s andpostage . Tota l addition-.l l fee s an dexpense s a s o f Octobe r 11,2010 : $2,056.0 5 I hereb y certif

y under penalty o f

perjur y tha t th e infonmation provide di n thi.s^^'^ / applicatio n i s tru e andcorrect . Dated : Octobe r

11,201 0

GREOO^i Y S

- 'WINTON , ESQ . Th e At?iation La

w Fir m On e Researc h Court , Suite 45 0 Rockvine,M D 2085 0 Tel : 301-294-855 0 Fax:301-294-252 5 Attorney s fo

r Applican t 1 910/20/201 0 09:1 5 FA X 202493514 2 FA A DM S 1020/02 0

CERTIFICAT E O F SERVIC E T hereb y certif

y tha t I hav e thi s dat e serve db

y regula r U.S . mail , postag e prepaid , a n origina l an don e (1 ) cop y o f th e foregoin g Applicant' s Respons e to th e Administrator' s Orde r fo r Furthe r Briefin g addresse dto ; Attention : Hearin g Docke t Clerk , ACTC:-43 0 Federa l Aviatio n Administratio n 80 0 Independenc e Avenue , S.W . Roo m924 A Washington , D. C 20.59 1 And , further , that

I hav e thi s dat e serve db y regula r U.S . mail , postag e prepaid , acop y o f th e foregoin g Applicant' s Respons e t o th e Administrator' s Order fo r Furthe r Briefin g addresse dto : Chri.stia n Lewercnz , Esq . Offic e o f Assistan t Chie f Coimse l FAA Eastern Region , AEA- 7 1 Aviatio n Plaza , Roo m56 1 Jamaica , N Y 1143 4 Tel : 718-553-325 8 Fax : 718-995-569 9 Dated : Octobe r

11 , 201 0 ESQ . GREGORYS ^ 

# J Aviatio n Liw4t+ 1 r

m ; Researc h C:ouri , Suit e 45 0 ;kville , MD 2085 0

._. : (301 ) 294-855 0 Fax:(301)294-252 5 Greg(ip,AviationLawExperts.co m

2 0