I 

I 

j 

I 

REF ID:A71138 

·CONCl!:RUlliG CAPTURE OF M-209 KEY LISTS BY GERMANS 

i. · cl.______. IF-107) 

"In June 1943 an M-209 key list for the month of June was 

captured in Sicily. The capture was not apparently reported because traffic \'fas sent and read on the captured keys during the 

entire month of June • ) 

2. ___ I Of OKH) (I-23) 

"In the Nettuno bridgehead a Battalion Commander o.f the 

45th Us Infantry Division was captured with all the Division's 

keye on him and all the call~s1gns for the month with le.ft and 

right neighbors and with the rear." 

3. 

~~\:6·· .. · .... -..... 3.··. 6tso us··.c·····.3··.6···.o···.5· .. j the 

·~.._ ___ __.I of OKM/4 SKL III)(I-95) 

"A month's tra.f.fic over one of these machines was read at 

end of the A.frican campaign because the army had captured 

the cipher sheets for that period." 

4. 4.._ _ ____.I of OKM) ( I-93) 

"The only pinch we got concerned the Hagelin machine in the 

Sicily area. This pinch was towards the end o.f July or begi.nnin 

of August 1943. 'nle captured material t'!Ts.s out of date only a 

:few days later. uve also captured some American cipher instructi 

for use with the Hagelin machine. The instructions am keys 

were valid for one month: for July. In consequence they were in 

t'orce for a .few days a.fter the pinch was made.'' 

5. ~ ..... __ __,lo:f OKH) { I-142) 

"P~V thinks th.at tl"..a Germans had captured cipher instructio1 

j in Sicily which had beer! lest by an American armored unit." 

@'pproved for Release by NSA on 05-28-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
4. Is tated that :from intercey'i...1.v ....... _ __ RE~ ID :A71138 

Air Force tra:f:fic they were able to get up to the minute weather 

reports :from monitoring the radio-telephone conversations,, and 

from traf.f'1c of the Sea Rescue aircraft which passed Syko ard 

also clear text messages. (I-109) 

5. -------------------------Ian evaluator with OKH,, claimed that in 

1942 the Germans had been able toreconstruct a very complete 

picture of the United States Army organization from their intercept o:f plain-text transmissions wit bin the United States. File 

indexes of Army officers down to Captain, names of units, and the 

lC>cat1pn of these uni ts were compiled. This in.formation was given 

to the General Staff who issued pocket manuals of the United 

States ArqJ:y. According to I .... __ I it was claimed that 95% o:f the 

informs. tion contained in these volumes came from radio intercep; • 

((NB. I do not likel .... ___ .... !statement because I have not been 

able to check his veracity. This in spite of the fact there are 

other re.ferences vvhich do mention Gerll'.an intercept of radio 

traffic w;Lthin the United States, and of several references i.vhere1 

mention is made of the existence of sucih a manual.. It is quite 

possible th.at l .... ___ lis correct, but my impression is that most of 
REF ID :A7l-138 

his information came from hear-say. It is true that he worked 

as an evaluator on the consolidation of reports from various 

Signal Intelligence units and may have been in a position to 

have accurate knowledge. On the other ham he was only a Sgt. 

in the Germ.an Anny e.nd I do not believe the average German soldic 

was in a position to have access to such knowledge.))) (I-76) 

Slidex: .__ __ ..... lmentioned our Slldex and remarked that the 

traffic 11ras broken w1 th ease every day, mainly because of the 

/ stereotyped messages, usually dealing with the weather. The 

idea was to go out and have a look at the weather and then rep[86_

36150 USC 3605 

turn to deal with the massages. (I-74) 

___ .... I (of OKH) stated that the- 117th Recon Troop of the 

VI Corps used a system similar to Slidex, having e. much larger 

card and usingcomplete alphabets on both the vertical and horizontal strips, which changed only every 30 days. This system 

differed from Slidex in that "no clear text was used". (I-76) 

Combined Assault Code: "For inter-Allied traffic in landing 

operations the Combined Assault Code was produced by the Combined Communications Board, Washington. There are presumably 

two identical series of this 3-letter code, which is used only 

j unenciphered. One of them is used in the Mediterranean and the 

second on ta, Channel coast. The 4-lettar pronouncealbe indicator of' the latter begins wl th "A", of the .former with "B". 

The ~01101.ivingindicatora appeared: ADCO, first appeared 28/4/44 .r 

in training traffic. AGOG first appeared 6/6/44. After we 
PL86"36/5Q USC 3605 

REF rn4;"A71138 

had already made good progress in interpreting it we captured it 

and it 91as thereupon prematurely withdrawn. ALBA appeared 21/6/44. 

AMID appeared 24/8/44, and AQUA appeared 28 /10/44. lJl/e succeeded 

in decoding ALBA, §Y!ID, and AQUA quit.e extensively. Tr.e messages 

contained reports or suppl'Y' convoys and organizational measures 

in the invasion areas. Recently they were largely weather reports. The volumn of traffic, which at the start of the invasion, 

was over 100 messages a day, has in the m!antime sunk to two to 

four messages a day." (D-15) 

((According to our records 1n Security, the CAC was a 3-

letter, two part, unencii;:hered cede intended to provide security 

only in the~in1t1al stages of amphibious operations. It was 

first used in the North African invasion. Different code books 

were used for each new invasion. Our security studies indicate 

sonE 4CX> messages and a crib needed for partial reconstruction.))) 

Bomber Code: Used by U S 8th Bomber Command am IX Bomber Command. 

Daily change was made at 1800 hours. t•It often happened 

that captured codes rrom air era.ft shot down at n1 g1l t were re -

covered so promptly that they were available next morning at 

the start of the 8th Air Force's operation." ( I-109) 

Rekoh: l._ __ __.I of OKL). ''In order to become familiar with the 

contents of Rekoh card messages, which were used by the Americans 

on the Atlantic Ferry routes, one day's traffic, which was 

especially favorable, and consisted of about 60 messages, was 

deciphered in mid-March of 1944 by the 16th Company of LNR 3 in 

Angers. The evaluation section was not especially interested in 
the contents ot these messages and therefore work on them was 

stopped." 

Aircra.ft :Movement Code : C 1 .... __ ..... of OKL) 

"As v1ith its British counterpart, this system was introduced 

at a relative late date and was found by the German~SIS to be 

identical with the British system. It was used for ferry flights 

over the Atlantic and West coast of Africa. Even when the sys tei1 

could no longer be deciphered because or frequent changes, the 

approximate nwnber of afrcratt being te~ried could still be determined by the evaluation section from the depth and numbers of 

groups of the messages, as well as by the\time of day at which 

they were sent. It 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Captu:re of Keys: (by l .... ___ __.I> 

"G suggested that the U S procedure for reporting capture 

of keys be tightened up. He seemed to reel that we were more 

lax in this regs.rd than the Germans, and that this was a very 

grave menace to our cryptographic secur1 ty." 

Double Transposition: (._I _ ___.I/of OKH) (I-80) 

"A key for this system was captured in France after the 

landings on D-day, but, as it had been compromised, the system 

was not used on the Western front. It was used 1n Italy in 

February of 1945. 11