IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-11226

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

SANTOS MONDRAGON-BENITEZ,

Defendant-Appellant

Cons. w/ No. 13-11227

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

J. SANTOS MONDRAGON-BENITEZ,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:13-CR-126-1

USDC No. 4:13-CR-71-1

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 12, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 13-11226 Document: 00512730306 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/12/2014
No. 13-11226

c/w No. 13-11227

Before KING, JOLLY, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In this consolidated appeal J. Santos Mondragon-Benitez (Mondragon) 

appeals two judgments entered in two criminal cases, both arising from being 

found illegally in the U.S. in April 2013. Appeal No. 13-11227 arises from a 

guilty-plea conviction to illegal reentry after deportation, in violation of 

8 U.S.C. § 1326, and the resulting sentence of 30 months of imprisonment and 

three years of supervised release. Appeal No. 13-11226 arises from the 

revocation of a previously imposed term of supervised release. The district 

court imposed an 18-month term of imprisonment and ordered the sentence to 

run consecutively to the sentence imposed for the illegal reentry offense. 

Mondragon does not present argument challenging the revocation or the 

revocation sentence. He therefore has abandoned any such challenge. See 

United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 446-47 (5th Cir. 2010).

Mondragon argues that the 30-month sentence, imposed by the district 

court as either a variance or upward departure from the guidelines 

imprisonment range of 10 to 16 months, is substantively unreasonable and 

reversible plain error. A district court may impose (1) a sentence within the 

guidelines range, (2) “an upward or downward departure as allowed by the 

Guidelines,” and (3) “a non-Guideline sentence or a variance that is outside of 

the relevant Guidelines range.” United States v. Brantley, 537 F.3d 347, 349 

(5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The specific 

characterization of the sentence is irrelevant as long as the sentence is 

reasonable under the totality of the relevant factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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Brantley, 537 F.3d at 349-50. Courts generally review the reasonableness of a 

sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 51 (2007).

However, if a defendant fails to preserve a claim of error, this court 

applies the plain error standard of review. United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 

389, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2007). As Mondragon did not object to the reasonableness 

of his sentence, this court’s review is for plain error. See Peltier, 505 F.3d at 

391-92. To establish reversible plain error, an appellant must show a forfeited 

error that is clear or obvious and that affects his substantial rights. Puckett v. 

United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If the appellant makes such a 

showing, this court has the discretion to correct the error but only if it seriously 

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. 

In Mondragon’s case, the district court’s reasons for the sentence were 

fact-specific and consistent with the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See United 

States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2006). Further, the sentence 

imposed “was reasonable under the totality of the relevant statutory factors.” 

See Brantley, 537 F.3d at 349 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Although Mondragon argues that the district court failed to balance the 

mitigating factors, such as his nonviolent history and his benign motives for 

reentering the country, there is no requirement that a sentencing court accord 

a certain mitigating factor dispositive weight. See United States v. LopezVelasquez, 526 F.3d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 2008). Moreover, Mondragon’s 

argument that the district court should not have placed weight upon the 

number of times he previously illegally entered the country lacks merit, as an 

extensive history of reentry following deportation is a factor that may support 

an above-guidelines sentence. See id. Nor does the extent of the variance or 

departure from the guidelines range present a nonfrivolous issue, as this court 

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has upheld upward departures or variances of similar magnitudes. See United 

States v. Jones, 444 F.3d 430, 433, 442 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Smith, 

417 F.3d 483, 492 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Daughenbaugh, 49 F.3d 171, 

174-75 (5th Cir. 1995).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.

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 Case: 13-11226 Document: 00512730306 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/12/2014