An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-854

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 21 January 2014

IN THE MATTER OF:

D.D.D., D.D.D.,

K.D.D., K.A.D.

Cherokee County

Nos. 02 JT 59-60

08 JT 38-39

On writ of certiorari from orders entered 22 March 2013 by 

Judge Richard K. Walker in District Court, Cherokee County. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 January 2014.

Hyde, Hoover & Lindsay, by R. Scott Lindsay, for 

Petitioner-Appellee Cherokee County Department of Social 

Services.

Wyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP, by Tobias S. Hampson, 

for Respondent-Appellant Father.

Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, by Theresa M. Sprain 

and Carolyn C. Pratt, for Guardian ad Litem.

McGEE, Judge.

This matter is before this Court for the second time. We 

previously reversed the 2010 orders terminating the parental 

rights of Respondent-Father. In re D.D.D., COA11-114, 214 N.C. 

App. 560, 714 S.E.2d 866 (2011) (unpublished) (“DDD I”). In DDD 
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I, the trial court concluded the evidence supported four grounds 

to terminate Respondent-Father’s parental rights: neglect;

willful failure to make reasonable progress; failure to pay the 

cost of care; and commission of sexual assault. Id., slip op. 

at 2-3.

This Court reversed on all four grounds in DDD I. On

neglect, we held the trial court could not rely solely on a 

prior adjudication of neglect. The trial court also failed to 

make findings addressing the likelihood of repetition of 

neglect. Id., slip op. at 10-11. On willful failure to make 

reasonable progress, the trial court failed to make findings 

addressing Respondent-Father’s attempt to correct the conditions 

that led to the removal of the juveniles from the home. Id., 

slip op. at 12. On failure to pay cost of care, Cherokee County 

Department of Social Services (“DSS”) did not allege that ground 

in the termination petitions. Id., slip op. at 12-13. On 

assault, Respondent-Father’s conviction for indecent liberties 

was insufficient to support the termination. Id., slip op. at 

14-15. This Court concluded that “none of the grounds alleged 

by DSS [were] supported by the findings of fact,” and reversed 

and remanded the matter to the trial court for further findings 

of fact. Id., slip op. at 15.
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On remand, a hearing was held by the trial court on 19 

December 2011 and additional testimony was received from David 

Layfield (“Layfield”), a social worker; Donna Pendergrass 

(“Pendergrass”), a supervisor in the foster care unit for DSS; 

and Respondent-Father. Layfield testified about the lack of 

contact between Respondent-Father and the juveniles. 

Pendergrass also testified about the lack of contact between 

Respondent-Father and the juveniles. Respondent-Father 

testified about his appeal from his criminal conviction.

The trial court entered an order on 22 March 2013, 

terminating Respondent-Father’s parental rights as to each of 

the juveniles on the grounds of neglect, abuse, willful failure 

to make reasonable progress, and failure to pay a reasonable 

portion of the cost of care. Respondent-Father filed notices of 

appeal from the orders terminating his parental rights on 29 May 

2013.

Respondent-Father filed a petition for writ of certiorari

on 30 August 2013, acknowledging the following defects in his 

notices of appeal: (1) his notices of appeal were not timely 

filed; and (2) Respondent-Father failed to sign the notices of 

appeal. Untimely notice of appeal and failure to have the notice 

of appeal signed by the appellant subject an appeal to
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dismissal. N.C.R. App. P. 3.1(a); In re I.T.P-L., 194 N.C. App. 

453, 459, 670 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2008). Nevertheless, when the 

record indicates the parent desired to appeal and cooperated 

with counsel’s efforts to give proper notice of appeal, this 

Court has exercised its discretion to issue the writ of 

certiorari to review a termination order. Id. at 459-60, 670 

S.E.2d at 285. Because it appears Respondent-Father desired to 

appeal and cooperated with counsel’s efforts to enter notice of 

appeal, we allow Respondent-Father’s petition for writ of 

certiorari.

Respondent-Father argues the trial court erred in 

adjudicating neglect as a ground to terminate RespondentFather’s parental rights “where its findings were practically 

identical to its findings in the prior order[.]” The trial 

court made the following additional findings in support of the 

ground of neglect in its 22 March 2013 orders:

46. [Respondent-Father] earned a minimal 

hourly wage for work he performs while 

incarcerated in the North Carolina 

Department of Corrections.

47. [Respondent-Father] has also received 

gifts of money from relatives and friends 

since he has been incarcerated in the North 

Carolina Department of Corrections.

48. Any money earned by [Respondent-Father] 

or gifts of money received by him while he 
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has been incarcerated in the North Carolina 

Department of Corrections has been used for 

his personal needs. He has provided no 

support or gifts to his children while he 

has been incarcerated.

49. While [Respondent-Father] has been

incarcerated in the Cherokee County 

Detention Center and in the North Carolina 

Department of Corrections, he has not 

contacted the Department to inquire about 

his children or how they were progressing.

50. While [Respondent-Father] has been 

incarcerated in the Cherokee County 

Detention Center and in the North Carolina 

Department of Corrections, he has not sent 

any letters to his children or to the 

Department to inquire about his children.

51. While [Respondent-Father] has been 

incarcerated in the Cherokee County 

Detention Center and in the North Carolina 

Department of Corrections, he has not sent 

any birthday cards, Christmas cards or gifts 

of any kind to his children.

52. While [Respondent-Father] has been 

incarcerated in the Cherokee County 

Detention Center and in the North Carolina 

Department of Corrections, he has not made 

any telephone calls to his children or to 

the Department to inquire about his 

children.

53. That [the juvenile] had been in [DSS] 

custody and in foster care for fifteen and 

one-half (15 1⁄2) continuous, uninterrupted 

months prior to the filing of the Petition 

for Termination of Parental Rights on 

December 15, 2009.

54. [Respondent-Father] has neglected the 

child within the meaning of G.S. § 7B-
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101(15) not due solely to poverty and said 

neglect is ongoing and likely to continue.

Respondent-Father does not challenge the findings as 

lacking support, and our review of the transcript indicates that 

evidence does support the trial court’s findings; instead, 

Respondent-Father argues that the trial court erred by merely 

repeating its prior findings from the 2010 order. However, the 

trial court’s findings in its 22 March 2013 orders, while 

similar, are not identical to the trial court’s previous 

findings.

“The determinative factors must be the best interests of 

the child and the fitness of the parent to care for the child at 

the time of the termination proceeding.” In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. 

App. 1, 10, 618 S.E.2d 241 (2005), aff’d per curiam, 360 N.C. 

360, 625 S.E.2d 779 (2006). As a preliminary matter, we note 

that, in addition to the findings quoted above, the trial court 

also made findings that Respondent-Father has been incarcerated 

since 3 November 2008; that Respondent-Father pled guilty to six 

felony counts of taking indecent liberties with a child and was 

sentenced to two consecutive terms of imprisonment of not less 

than 21 months and not more than 26 months; and that RespondentFather is under a “no contact” order that prevented any case 
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plan being developed for him and prevented him from having 

contact with any of his children.

In In re P.L.P., the trial court terminated the father’s 

parental rights and found that the father “(1) ‘could have 

written’ but did not do so; (2) ‘made no efforts to provide 

anything for the minor child’; (3) ‘has not provided any love, 

nurtur[ing] or support for the minor child’; and (4) ‘would 

continue to neglect the minor child if the child was placed in 

his care[.]’” Id. at 10-11, 618 S.E.2d at 247 (alterations in 

original).

Similarly, in the present case, the trial court’s findings 

quoted above indicate that Respondent-Father has made no efforts 

to provide financial support for the juveniles, despite having 

the resources to do so and that Respondent-Father would continue 

to neglect the children in the future. The findings in the 

trial court’s 22 March 2013 orders regarding neglect are 

substantially similar to the findings in In re P.L.P. 

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in 

adjudicating neglect as a ground to terminate RespondentFather’s parental rights.

Because we determine there exists “at least one ground to 

support a conclusion that parental rights should be terminated, 
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it is unnecessary to address the remaining grounds.” Id. at 8, 

618 S.E.2d at 246. We therefore do not address RespondentFather’s remaining arguments on appeal.

Affirmed.

Judges McCULLOUGH and DILLON concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).