SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2125-21 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

ZAKEEM D. BROWN, 

a/k/a ZIGGY, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_______________________

Argued November 1, 2023 – Decided November 28, 2023 

Before Judges Firko and Susswein. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Mercer County, Docket No. 17-04-0196.

Rochelle Mareka Amelia Watson argued the cause for 

appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, 

attorney; Elizabeth C. Jarit, of counsel and on the

briefs; Rochelle Mareka Amelia Watson, of counsel 

and on the brief). 

Lauren Cohen argued the cause for amicus curiae 

American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey and 

Rutgers Criminal and Youth Justice Clinic (Alexander 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2125-21

Shalom and Jeanne LoCicero, attorneys, on the brief; 

Laura Cohen, of counsel and on the brief). 

Colin J. Rizzo, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause 

for respondent (Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County 

Prosecutor, attorney; Colin J. Rizzo, of counsel and on 

the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

Defendant Zakeem Brown appeals from an August 20, 2018 Law Division 

order denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements he made to 

detectives investigating a homicide. Defendant, who was seventeen years old at 

the time of the homicide and ensuing custodial interrogation, eventually pled 

guilty in adult court to an amended charge of first-degree aggravated 

manslaughter. He argues the interrogating detectives violated his Miranda1

rights by imposing restrictions on his mother's participation in the interrogation, 

abrogating her role as a buffer and advisor. He claims, for example, that 

detectives encouraged her to remain quiet. Defendant further claims that when 

she left the interrogation room at defendant's request, she was neither offered a 

chance to monitor the electronically-recorded interrogation, nor advised that she 

could return to the interrogation room at any time. Defendant further argues he 

was not afforded an opportunity to consult privately with her after the Miranda 

1

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3 A-2125-21

warnings were administered. Nor was he informed of his right to ask his mother 

to return to the interrogation room after he asked her to step out. 

After reviewing the record in light of the arguments of the parties and the 

governing legal principles, and after carefully considering the totality of relevant 

circumstances that militate for and against a finding of voluntariness, we 

conclude the State failed to meet its heavy burden of proving beyond a 

reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda 

rights. Although no one circumstance categorically compels suppression, we 

conclude the cumulative effect of the police tactics regarding the parent's 

participation in the interrogation creates a reasonable doubt as to the 

voluntariness of defendant's incriminating statements. 

We therefore reverse the denial of the suppression motion and vacate his 

conviction. We reject, however, defendant's request—which is joined by amici 

American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey and the Rutgers Criminal and 

Youth Justice Clinic (collectively, defense amici)—that we create a new per se 

rule requiring that juveniles consult with appointed counsel before waiving 

Miranda rights. 

I.
4 A-2125-21

 In April 2017, defendant was charged by indictment with first-degree 

murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1); 

first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A 2C:11-3(a)(3); second-degree unlawful 

possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); and second-degree possession 

of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1). 

 In September 2017, defendant moved to suppress incriminating statements 

he made to police during the electronically-recorded custodial interrogation. 

The suppression hearing was convened on August 20, 2018. At the conclusion 

of the hearing, the motion court issued an oral opinion concluding that 

defendant's Fifth Amendment rights had not been violated. 

 On January 7, 2020, defendant pled guilty to first degree murder. 

However, on February 19, 2020, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. 

That motion was granted in April 2021. 

 In September 2021, the State moved to dismiss the counts charging felony 

murder, first-degree robbery, and second-degree unlawful possession of a 

weapon. The case proceeded to trial on the remaining counts charging 

knowing/purposeful murder and possession of a weapon for an unlawful 

purpose. A mistrial was declared after the jury could not reach a unanimous 

verdict. 
5 A-2125-21

 On December 7, 2021, defendant pled guilty to an amended charge of 

aggravated manslaughter pursuant to a plea agreement.2 On February 25, 2022, 

defendant was sentenced to a twenty-year prison term subject to the No Early 

Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. 

Defendant raises the following contentions for our consideration: 

POINT I 

THE POLICE OBTAINED STATEMENTS IN 

VIOLATION OF THE PROTECTIONS REQUIRED 

OF JUVENILE INTERROGATIONS AND AS A 

RESULT OF PROHIBITED INTERROGATION 

TACTICS, INCLUDING BY ENCOURAGING 

DEFENDANT'S MOTHER TO ALLOW THE 

INTERROGATION OF HER CHILD IN HER 

ABSENCE AND BY REQUESTING THAT SHE 

REFRAIN FROM INTERVENING DURING 

QUESTIONING. 

A. The State Failed To Establish That The 

Waiver And Subsequent Statements Were Made 

Knowingly, Intelligently, And Voluntarily Under 

Presha And Its Progeny.3

B. Alternatively, This Case Demonstrates That 

Juveniles Must Be Provided Counsel During 

Custodial Interrogations In Order To Fully 

Protect Their Constitutional Rights. 

2

 As part of his guilty plea, defendant preserved the right to appeal the denial 

of the motion to suppress his statement to police. See R. 3:9-3(f). 

3

 State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304 (2000). 
6 A-2125-21

POINT II 

RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE 

COURT'S REASONS FOR FINDING 

AGGRAVATING FACTORS LACKED BASES 

GROUNDED IN ANY EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD, 

AND THE REJECTION OF MITIGATION 

EVIDENCE IS CONTRARY TO SETTLED LAW. 

Amici raise the following contentions: 

POINT I 

DUE TO THEIR DEVELOPMENTAL 

IMMATURITY, YOUNG PEOPLE FACE UNIQUE 

AND SIGNIFICANT RISKS DURING CUSTODIAL 

INTERROGATIONS. 

A. Ongoing Brain Development Negatively 

Affects Adolescents' Judgment And DecisionMaking, Especially In Stressful Situations. 

B. Young People Are Less Able to Understand 

And Knowingly, Intelligently, And Voluntarily 

Waive Their Legal Rights Than Adults. 

C. Developmental Immaturity Breeds False 

Confessions. 

D. Youth Of Color Are More Vulnerable to 

Standard Police Interrogation Techniques And 

More Likely To Waive Their Constitutional 

Rights Involuntarily Than White Youth. 

POINT II 
7 A-2125-21

IN LIGHT OF THESE VULNERABILITIES, YOUTH 

MUST BE AFFORDED ACCESS TO AND 

CONSULTATION WITH COUNSEL BEFORE 

BEING ASKED TO WAIVE THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS. 

A. Parental Presence Is Inadequate Protection For 

Children Subjected To Police Interrogation. 

B. Consultation With Counsel Is A Sine Qua Non

Of Valid Miranda Waivers By Youth. 

II. 

We discern the following facts from the suppression hearing. Because we 

must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether defendant 

knowingly and voluntarily waived his right against self-incrimination, we 

recount the facts in considerable detail. The State relied on the testimony of one 

of the interrogating officers, Detective Robert Booth, the electronic recording 

of the stationhouse interrogation, see R. 3:17, and a recording of the police 

colloquy with defendant's mother after she left the interrogation room. 

On May 11, 2016 at approximately 9:50 p.m., the victim, Ricardo Montalvan 

Jr., was shot and killed while sitting in a vehicle in the area of Whittaker Avenue 

in Trenton. Police officers responded to the scene and located Divon Ray hiding 

under a car nearby. Officers obtained security camera footage near the scene of 

the crime that showed two individuals, later determined to be Ray and defendant. 
8 A-2125-21

Ray admitted to police that he and another individual were in the vicinity of 

the shooting. Initially, Ray refused to name the other person. After being shown 

photographs, he identified defendant as the other individual. Ray told police 

that after spotting the victim sitting in his vehicle, defendant used a gun to take 

the victim's cell phone while Ray stood nearby. 

 On May 16, 2016, defendant and his mother, Latoya Brown (Latoya)4

were brought to the homicide task force office. Once at the office, Detective 

Booth and Detective Nancy Diaz initially spoke privately with Latoya. Booth 

informed Latoya that they wished to speak with defendant and told her, "because 

he's a juvenile, we want to – we need your permission to speak with him." 

 The following exchange then occurred between Latoya and the detectives: 

Detective Booth: [W]hat we want to avoid, is—is us 

talking to your—to your son without your knowledge. 

That being said, when we do speak with him, he—he 

has every right, just like an adult, as far as it goes with 

[Miranda]. You know, right to remain silent and ̶ and 

all the enumerated [Miranda] rights. However, because 

he is a juvenile . . . you're his guardian. Correct? 

[Latoya]: Yes, I am. 

Detective Booth: So you'd have to speak with him. And 

we'd let you explain those rights to him, if—if you 

wanted to. 

4

 Because defendant and his mother share the same last name, we use her first 

name to avoid confusion. We mean no disrespect in doing so. 
9 A-2125-21

[Latoya]: Yes. 

Detective Booth: Okay. We'd like to interview him. 

Sometimes I've had experience where it goes—where 

it's more fruitful when a—a guardian is in the room and 

sometimes better— better when a guardian is not there. 

(Inaudible) 

[Latoya]: No, it's going to go better with me in the 

room. And I'm going to tell him if he did something, 

he need to own up to it or if he knows something, he 

need to tell it. Because he know I don't play. I don't 

play. 

Detective Booth: The only thing I—I'd ask is, when we 

do start speaking with him, you—we'll bring him in. 

You'll be sitting right there. He will be present. When 

we do start speaking with him, if you let us 

Detective Diaz: Yeah. Just 

Detective Booth: do our job. 

Detective Diaz: Right. As much as you can contain 

yourself to try to—you know, allowing us to speak to 

him, but let us do the interview. I mean, honestly, 

you're going to be there, but let us talk to him. Okay? 

Detective Booth: Okay. You said last week— well. . . 

we'll get to that when we get to that. Let's—let's step 

out. We'll get him to come in and then I'll read to—

there's a form I got to read to him and to you and I'll 

have you both sign those rights that—that I was talking 

about. 

[Latoya]: Okay. 

Detective Diaz: Then we'll talk about it. Okay? 
10 A-2125-21

Detective Booth: Do you have any questions before we 

start? 

[Latoya]: Uh-huh. I have none. 

Detective Booth: Okay. All right. Give me a minute. I 

appreciate your cooperation, too. I know this is—this 

is a difficult situation, but right now, you know, we'll 

—we'll do what we can right now to . . . minimize this 

situation and go from there. Okay? 

[Latoya]: Uh-huh.

Detective Booth: If at any time you do have a question 

or anything, just let me know. 

[Latoya]: Uh-huh.

Detective Booth: All right. Thanks. 

Defendant was then brought into the interrogation room and informed of 

his rights in the following colloquy: 

Detective Booth: All right, guys. Sorry to (inaudible), 

you know, wake you up like this and to disturb you on 

this morning. I was just explaining to your mom that I 

wanted to speak with you about a few different things. 

In order for me to do that, because you are 17, your 

mom has to be present or she has to sign off on—on a 

form that says that I can speak with you without her 

permission (sic). She's elected to be present so there's 

a couple—there's a little bit of paperwork that goes 

along with that. We are going to get through that and 

then I'm sure you guys are—are anxious to see what we 

want to ask you about. 
11 A-2125-21

[Latoya]: Uh-huh. I'm sure he is. 

. . . . 

Detective Booth: Okay. [Defendant], before you—

yeah. I'm going to read you these rights, these Miranda 

rights. At any time if you have any questions or you 

don't understand anything, either of you, please let me 

know. Okay. Before we ask you any questions, you 

must understand your rights. You have the right to

remain silent. Do you understand that? 

Defendant: Yes. 

[Latoya]: Uh-huh.

Detective Booth: Okay. Anything you say may be 

used—used against you in court. Do you understand 

that? 

Defendant: Uh-huh.

Detective Diaz: Okay. 

Detective Booth: Yes. Okay. You have the right to talk 

to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions 

and have him with you during questioning. Do you 

understand that? 

Defendant: (Inaudible). 

Detective Booth: I need you to say yes. 

Defendant: Yes. 

[Latoya]: Yes. 
12 A-2125-21

Detective Booth: Okay. If you cannot afford an 

attorney, one will be appointed for you before any 

questioning if you wish. Do you understand that? 

Defendant: Yes. 

[Latoya]: Yes. 

Detective Booth: Okay. If you decide to answer 

questions now without a lawyer present, you will still 

have the right to stop answering at any time. You also 

have the right to stop answering at any time until you 

talk to a lawyer. Do you understand that? 

Defendant: Yes. 

[Latoya]: Yes. 

Detective Booth: Okay. All right. This one says I

acknowledge that I've been advised of the rights listed 

above. I understand my rights and am willing to waive 

them and speak with the police. Are there any 

questions that you guys have? 

[Latoya]: Nope. 

Defendant: No. 

Detective Booth: Okay. What I'm going to do is I'm

going to have [defendant] sign this. If you guys wish 

to waive your rights, I'm going to have him sign it and 

I'm going to have you sign it right below. Okay? 

[defendant], I'm going to have you sign that right there. 

And, mom, I'm going to have you sign that there. 

[Latoya]: Underneath him? 

Detective Diaz: Right here. 
13 A-2125-21

Police eventually revealed to defendant that they were investigating a 

shooting, and that there was a "video of [defendant and Ray] walking from this 

location intermittently to that location. . . . [a]nd . . . there's a video camera that 

captures the incident. . . . it looks like a robbery that goes bad." 

 Defendant claimed he was not in the area of Elmer and Whittaker, but 

rather was on Hamilton Avenue walking towards the vicinity of Monmouth 

Street when he heard shots that he believed at the time were firecrackers. 

Defendant was unclear if he was by himself or with a person whom he identified 

as Roman. 

 The following exchange then occurred: 

Detective Booth: Okay. Okay. [Defendant], what you 

just told me is moot. Here's the thing. We talked to a 

lot of people. That's my job, I talk to people. Right. 

And, unfortunately or fortunately, a lot of times when I 

talk to people, they don't tell me the truth right away. 

And I understand that. 

However, after talking with so many people, you 

kind of get to learn who is telling the truth and who's 

not. And right now you're not telling the truth. Okay. 

I'm pretty sure mom knows this, because mom 

probably knows—

Detective Diaz: That—you better than anybody. 
14 A-2125-21

Detective Booth: —if you're—you're telling the truth 

better than—than we do. Right? But that's—that's the 

issue that we have. Now from what I can tell, okay, 

whatever happened that night probably got out of hand. 

All right. Whatever happened, you probably didn't 

mean it to happen, but it happened. Okay. Now the 

question isn't what happened or who did what. The 

question is where do we go from here. All right. 

Detective Diaz: Uh-huh.

Detective Booth: How old are you? 

Defendant: Seventeen. 

Detective Booth: You are [seventeen] years old. 

You've got the rest of your life –

Detective Diaz: Your whole life ahead of you. 

Detective Booth: —ahead of you. 

[Latoya]: Uh-huh.

Detective Booth: Okay. I don't want this incident or 

you not telling the truth about this incident to affect, 

you know, the—the rest of your life. Do you 

understand what I'm saying? So it's real important that 

you—you know, I'm not going to lie to you. Okay. I 

don't want you to lie to me. All right. We already know 

what happened. 

Detective Diaz: Uh-huh.

Detective Booth: We already know, basically, 

everything about it. Right now we want to speak with 

you and we want you to clarify a few things. Okay. 

And we want to—we want to get this, you know, to 
15 A-2125-21

where I can say you came in here and from that point 

on, you know, mistakes were made, but here the truth 

came out. Okay. And we can move on with this and 

put this behind us. Do you understand what I'm saying? 

Can you tell me exactly what happened that night? 

Defendant: Um. Me and . . . Divon met up with —

[Latoya]: Hold on. Would you like me to step out? 

Defendant: Huh? Yeah. 

Detective Booth: Is that what you want? 

Detective Diaz: (Inaudible). Do you (inaudible) 

[Latoya]: If he's—if this is what's going [to] happen, 

then I don't—he don't want to hurt me. 

Detective Booth: I understand. 

[Latoya]: I know he don't want . . . to hurt me. 

Detective Booth: I understand. 

[Latoya]: So I don't want him to hurt me either. 

Detective Diaz: And let me say something 

Detective Booth: Okay. 

Detective Diaz: —to you before, I think that you're 

going to do the right thing. It sounds like you're going 

to tell us the truth, like he said. This woman has

sacrificed a lot for you. Okay. And the fact that you 

see her hurting here, you owe her that. Okay. You owe 

her to—to tell the truth. Not to sit here and lie because

I don't think that's the way she raised you. Correct? 
16 A-2125-21

Defendant: Uh-huh.

Detective Diaz: Okay. So . . . tell us what really 

happened that night. Because we already know. We 

just need you to tell us and clarify some things for us. 

Okay? 

Defendant: Uh-huh.

Detective Diaz: She doesn't want to be here anymore, 

I'm going to step out with her. I'll come back in, but 

give her that respect. Okay? 

Detective Booth: Do you want to—

Detective Diaz: Give me a second. 

([Latoya] escorted out of room by Detective Diaz). 

Detective Booth: Listen, I know this is tough. 

Whatever I can do to help you out in this situation, 

okay, I'll do. All right. That being said, I wasn't lying 

when I said we need to know the truth about what 

happened. 

 Following this exchange, defendant made numerous incriminating 

statements. He claimed, for example, that on a prior occasion, the victim along 

with other assailants "jumped" him. 

 Defendant then admitted: 

We stopped right there. Divon was like that's Ricky 

right there. I was like where. And he was like right 

there, whatcha gonna do. I'm like I'm going to scare 

him. As soon as I said that, Divon—I'm like, bro, 
17 A-2125-21

remember me. And he was like, oh, shit. And then 

when I said that, Divon said—yelled my name, and it—

it startled me and like, boom and the second time boom. 

I hurried up and put it down, like I threw it down 

because I ain't really mean to— I ain't mean to shoot at 

him or nothing. I was just trying to just scare him, like. 

Like, oh, yeah, stop messing—you're gonna stop 

messing with him. Boom. Because he jumped me 

multiple times and he keep jump—he jumped me every 

other—every chance they get. And I'm not running. I 

don't be running from them, so. 

III. 

Following testimony and arguments from counsel, the judge issued an oral 

decision from the bench. The judge summarized defendant's contentions. First, 

"defendant argue[d] that the detectives improperly told [Latoya] that she 

should—she should not interfere or interject herself into the interrogation." 

Next, "defendant argue[d] that [Latoya] was also not separately advised of her 

rights as a parent to act on her son's behalf . . . . [and] the detectives improperly 

used [Latoya] . . .to clarify certain facts." Defendant also contended that 

"detectives improperly 'pounded on the opportunity' to question defendant 

without [Latoya]'s presence after she offered to leave." Finally, defendant 

contended that Latoya failed to give consent to detectives to speak to defendant 

without her present when she went into another room, prior to defendant's 

confession. 
18 A-2125-21

 The motion judge rejected those contentions and found defendant made a 

knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. The judge found "the 

detective's instruction that [Latoya] not interject too often had little to no bearing 

on the defendant's ability to understand his rights or to waive them." 

 The judge also considered the impact of Latoya leaving the interrogation 

room, explaining: 

[Latoya] clearly offered to leave the room so that her 

son might feel more comfortable telling the truth. It 

was just after this that the defendant finally gave a more 

detailed account of his role and ultimately confessed to 

the shooting. This [c]ourt is required to take in[to] 

account the fact that [Latoya] left the interrogation 

room as a highly significant factor in its analysis of the 

totality of circumstances. However, similar to cases of 

Q.N. [5] and Presha, [Latoya] left the room after which 

she enabled her son to tell the truth. As such, the [c]ourt 

takes no issue with this in this case. 

This appeal followed. 

 IV. 

 We begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles governing 

this appeal, starting with the foundational principle that the scope of our review 

of a suppression hearing is limited. See State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44-45 

(2011). We "must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's 

5

 State ex rel. Q.N., 179 N.J. 165, 173 (2004). 
19 A-2125-21

decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence 

in the record." Id. at 44 (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). 

"An appellate court 'should give deference to those findings of the trial judge 

which are substantially influenced by his [or her] opportunity to hear and see 

the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot 

enjoy.'" Elders, 192 N.J. at 244 (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 

(1964)). 

In contrast to the deference we owe to a trial court's factual and credibility 

findings, we review a trial court's legal conclusions de novo. S.S., 229 N.J. at 

380. Because issues of law "do not implicate the fact-finding expertise of the 

trial courts, appellate courts construe the Constitution, statutes, and common law 

de novo—with fresh eyes—owing no deference to the interpretive conclusions 

of trial courts, unless persuaded by their reasoning." Ibid. (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting State v. Morrison, 227 N.J. 295, 308 (2016)); see also 

Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) 

(noting that appellate courts are not bound by a trial court's interpretations of 

the "legal consequences that flow from established facts"). In the event of a 

mixed question of law and fact, we review a trial court's determinations of law 
20 A-2125-21

de novo but will not disturb a court's factual findings unless they are "clearly 

erroneous." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 185 (1997). 

Turning to substantive legal principles, the right against self-incrimination 

is "[o]ne of the most fundamental rights protected by both the Federal 

Constitution and state law. . . . " State v. O'Neill, 193 N.J. 148, 167 (2007). It 

is well-settled that "[c]onfessions obtained by the police during a custodial 

interrogation are barred from evidence unless the defendant has been advised of 

his or her constitutional rights." State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 461 (2005). A 

waiver of the constitutional right against self-incrimination must be voluntary, 

knowing, and intelligent. Ibid. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). 

The standard for reviewing the validity of a waiver is especially strict 

under New Jersey law, which provides criminal suspects greater protections than 

are afforded under the United States Constitution. In State v. Erazo, our 

Supreme Court reaffirmed that "[w]ith respect to the trial court's admission of 

police-obtained statements, . . . an appellate court 'should engage in a "searching 

and critical" review of the record to ensure protection of a defendant's 

constitutional rights.'" 254 N.J. 277, 297 (2023) (quoting State v. Hreha, 217 

N.J. 368, 381-82 (2014)). Importantly, moreover, our law requires the State to 

prove a valid waiver beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. O.D.A.-C., 250 N.J. 
21 A-2125-21

408, 420 (2022). Federal law, in contrast, requires proof the waiver was valid 

by the much lower preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. Ibid. (quoting 

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986)). 

When determining whether the State satisfied its burden that a waiver was 

knowing, intelligent and voluntary, a court must consider the "totality of the 

circumstances," which includes factors such as the defendant's "age, education 

and intelligence, advice concerning constitutional rights, length of detention, 

whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature, and whether 

physical punishment or mental exhaustion was involved." Knight, 183 N.J. at 

462-63 (quoting State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 654 (1993)). Additionally, a 

court may consider the defendant's "previous encounters with law enforcement, 

and the period of time between 'administration of the [Miranda] warnings and 

the volunteered statement.'" Id. at 463 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. 

Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 614 (1999)). 

 Importantly for purposes of this appeal, the standard for establishing a 

valid waiver of Miranda rights is heightened when juveniles are subjected to 

custodial interrogation. State in Int. of A.A., 240 N.J. 341, 354 (2020). Our 

courts recognize that "juveniles – teenagers and children alike – are typically 

less mature, often lack judgment and are generally more vulnerable to pressure 
22 A-2125-21

than adults." Ibid. (citing J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 546 U.S. 261, 272-73 

(2011)). Consequently, "the greatest care must be taken" to assure that 

a juvenile's statement during custodial interrogation is voluntary, "in the sense 

not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product 

of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair." In re Gault, 

387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). 

In Presha, our Supreme Court held that juvenile interrogees have the right 

to have a parent or guardian present when Miranda warnings are administered. 

163 N.J. at 322 (2000). The Court explained, 

[w]hen younger offenders are in custody, the parent

serves as a buffer between the juvenile, who is entitled 

to certain protections, and the police, whose 

investigative function brings the officers necessarily in 

conflict with the juvenile's legal interests. Parents are 

in a position to assist juveniles in understanding their 

rights, acting intelligently in waiving those rights, and 

otherwise remaining calm in the face of an 

interrogation. 

[Presha, 163 N.J. at 315 (citing Gallegos v. Colorado, 

370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962)).] 

 In A.S., the Court further commented, "'[t]he role of a parent in the context 

of a juvenile interrogation takes on special significance,' because '[i]n that 

circumstance, the parent serves as advisor to the juvenile, [and] someone who 
23 A-2125-21

can offer a measure of support in the unfamiliar setting of the police station." 

203 N.J. at 147 (alterations in original) (quoting Presha, 163 N.J. at 314). 

In A.A., the Court recently confirmed "[t]he protections outlined in Presha 

remain good law." A.A., 240 N.J. at 358. The Court announced further

guidance, ruling that "[t]he police should advise juveniles in custody of their 

Miranda rights – in the presence of a parent or legal guardian – before the police 

question, or a parent speaks with, the juvenile." Id. at 358. Furthermore, the 

Court instructed that police should then "give parents or guardians a meaningful 

opportunity to consult with the juvenile in private about those rights." Ibid. The 

Court emphasized that "[i]f law enforcement officers do not allow a parent and 

juvenile to consult in private, absent a compelling reason, that fact should weigh 

heavily in the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the juvenile's 

waiver and statements were voluntary." Id. at 359.

 However, our Supreme Court has never announced a categorical rule with 

respect to the participation of a parent in a custodial interrogation of a seventeenyear-old interrogee. The absence of a parent or legal guardian will not 

automatically render a statement inadmissible, particularly when the juvenile 

providing the statement is over the age of fourteen. See Presha, 163 N.J. at 308, 

317; see also State ex rel. A.S., 203 N.J. 131, 148-49 (2010). Instead, an 
24 A-2125-21

interrogation may be conducted without parental participation so long as the 

officers act with "the utmost fairness and in accordance with the highest 

standards of due process and fundamental fairness." Presha, 163 N.J. at 317 

(first quoting S.H., 61 N.J. 108, 115 (1972); then citing State v. R.W., 115 N.J. 

Super. 286, 296 (App. Div. 1971)). 

We add that the parental participation rule announced in Presha, and 

recently restated in A.A., does not displace the totality-of-the-circumstances test 

but rather is a critical part of it. The A.S. Court stressed that point, explaining, 

"the presence of a parent is a 'highly significant factor' in the totality of the 

circumstances analysis contemplated by Presha . . . ." 203 N.J. at 154 (emphasis 

in original). 

 V.

We next apply these basic Fifth Amendment principles to the matter 

before us. We first address defendant's contention the detectives' preinterrogation discussion with Latoya functioned to abrogate her role as a buffer 

and advisor to defendant. 

While speaking to Latoya, Booth commented that while he needed her 

permission to speak to defendant and she could be in the room, it was 

"sometimes better -- better when a guardian is not there." Furthermore, Diaz 
25 A-2125-21

instructed Latoya that while she could be in the interrogation room, she must 

"contain [her]self to try to -- you know, allowing us to speak to him, but let us 

do the interview. I mean honestly, you're going to be there, but let us talk to 

him." (emphasis added). 

We conclude the admonition to "contain yourself" and "let us talk to him" 

improperly encroached upon her role as a buffer by limiting her participation, 

suggesting she should be a mere spectator and refrain from interrupting police 

questioning. We acknowledge from the context of the conversation that the 

detectives may have been concerned that Latoya might assume the role of 

interrogator and that their instruction that she "contain herself" and "let us do 

the interview" was meant to safeguard rather than denigrate defendant's Fifth 

Amendment rights. See State in the Int. of M.P., 476 N.J. Super. 242, 267 (App. 

Div. 2023) ("The actual role played by a parent during a stationhouse 

interrogation—whether as a "buffer" or instead as an adjunct law enforcement 

interrogator—is a fact-sensitive question to be determined on a case-by-case 

basis."). But we do not focus on the officers' subjective intent. See State v. 

Diaz, 470 N.J. Super. 495, 523-24 (App. Div. 2022), leave to appeal denied, 251 

N.J. 8 (2022) ("We emphasize that under the analytical approach we follow in 

this case, we do not focus on the detectives' subjective intent but rather on the 
26 A-2125-21

reasonably likely impact of their overall conduct on defendant's understanding 

of his true status and predicament."). Rather, we consider the potential effect 

the detectives' comments might have had on Latoya's understanding of her role 

in the interrogation room. 

We are troubled the detectives' instructions to Latoya before the 

interrogation could have discouraged her from intervening and posing questions 

to the interrogating detectives, and not just to refrain from posing substantive 

questions to her son. We conclude the detectives essentially asked her to be 

more passive during the interrogation without clearly explaining that she was 

under no obligation to "let [the officers] do the interview." Indeed, they failed 

to convey that in her role as a buffer and advisor, she had the right throughout 

the interrogation to protect her son from the questions posed to him. Given the 

allocation of the burden of proof, moreover, we construe any ambiguity as to the 

meaning and impact of the detective's pre-interrogation remarks to Latoya 

against the State, leading us to conclude that the pre-interrogation discussion 

militates against a finding that the ensuing waiver of constitutional rights was 

knowing and voluntary. 

We are even more concerned that the detectives did not provide an 

opportunity for mother and son to discuss privately whether to waive Miranda 
27 A-2125-21

rights after they were administered. We reiterate and stress that the Court in 

A.A. held that "[i]f law enforcement officers do not allow a parent and juvenile 

to consult in private, absent a compelling reason, that fact should weigh heavily 

in the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the juvenile's waiver 

and statements were voluntary." 240 N.J. at 359. Here, the State offers no 

compelling reason to excuse the failure to allow for a private consultation. 

We add that in M.P., we determined the guidance announced in A.A. has 

retroactive effect, noting, 

[t]he guidance provided in A.A. was a logical extension 

of Presha. Furthermore, as the State acknowledges, the 

Court did not create a per se rule requiring police to 

allow for the interrogee and parent to consult privately 

after the warnings are read but before Miranda rights 

are waived. Instead, the pronouncement in A.A. was

stated as "guidance" as to what police "should" do. 240 

N.J. at 358. Relatedly, the Court held that the failure to 

provide an opportunity for private consultation after 

Miranda warnings are administered is a relevant 

circumstance that "should weigh heavily" in a 

reviewing court's totality-of-the circumstances 

analysis. Id. at 359. The Court did not suggest, much 

less hold, that any such failure automatically triggers 

the exclusionary rule as if, for example, the police had 

omitted a warning. Identifying a particular factor to be 

considered as part of an inherently holistic test hardly 

"breaks new ground." See Teague [v. Lane], 489 U.S. 

[288,] 301 [1989]. To the extent A.A. amplified the 

existing totality-of-the-circumstances test, rather than 

mandated a new rule of police procedure, its rationale 
28 A-2125-21

should be given retroactive effect. See [State v.] Feal, 

194 N.J. [293,] 308 [2008]. 

[M.P., 476 N.J. Super. at 293.] 

At oral argument before us, the State acknowledged this portion of M.P., stating 

it would not argue against retroactive application of the A.A. guidance in this 

matter. 

 We thus conclude the failure to afford an opportunity for private 

consultation following administration of the Miranda warnings "weigh[s] 

heavily" against a finding that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his 

Miranda rights. See A.A., 240 N.J. at 359. 

 We turn next to the circumstances concerning Latoya exiting the 

interrogation room, leaving defendant to face interrogators alone. We begin by 

acknowledging the detectives did not initiate her decision to exit the room. 

Rather, Latoya herself first broached the subject by asking defendant, "[h]old 

on. Would you like me to step out?" Defendant responded, "[h]uh? Yeah." 

In other words, this is not a situation where police deliberately excluded 

Latoya from the interrogation room, at least at the moment she elected to excuse 

herself from the ongoing interrogation. Cf. Presha, 163 N.J. at 318 (noting it 

would be "difficult for us to envision prosecutors successfully carrying their 

burdens in future cases in which there has been some deliberate exclusion of a 
29 A-2125-21

juvenile's parent or legal guardian from the interrogation"). The case law is 

clear that a parent or guardian may decline to be present at the interrogation. Id. 

at 317. Presumably, that decision may be made at any time, including during 

the course of an ongoing interrogation. 

In Q.N., the Court provided helpful guidance on this question, stating: 

[i]n sum, the record demonstrates that [the parent]

voluntarily absented herself from the unrecorded 

portion of the interview. That circumstance qualifies 

as an exception to Presha's bright-line rule concerning 

interrogations of juveniles under the age of fourteen. 

We trust that, with the benefit of this opinion, the police 

in future situations will not suggest that the parent or 

legal guardian depart an interrogation area but will 

allow that suggestion to originate, if at all, from the 

accompanying adults themselves. Similarly, we 

assume that the police will inform the juvenile that, 

once gone, the adult is available to return to the 

interrogation area during any part of questioning at the 

juvenile's request. 

[Q.N., 179 N.J. at 179-80 (emphasis added).] 

In the present matter, defendant was not advised that he could ask for his 

mother to return to the interrogation room. Nor did the detectives advise Latoya 

she had the right to return. To the contrary, Diaz took her to another room and 

advised her to sign a consent form memorializing that she was waiving her right 

to participate in the interrogation. We note that while the form acknowledges 

that "my child can stop answering questions at any time," it does not advise that 
30 A-2125-21

the parent has the right to withdraw consent and either participate in the 

interrogation or direct that it be halted.6 We add the detectives did not afford 

Latoya an opportunity to monitor the electronically-recorded interrogation, as 

occurred in Q.N., 179 N.J. at 169. 

Aside from the consent form's deficiencies, Diaz's comments to Latoya 

after she exited the interrogation room effectively precluded any further 

opportunity for Latoya to serve as a buffer and advisor. Diaz told Latoya, 

[t]hey're still in the investigation like I said—I 

mentioned it when you were crying in there—and there 

was a reason why I said what I said because he 

obviously knows that what he's gonna say is gonna hurt 

you. And you knew that so you decided to get out of 

the room so now it's up to him to fess up and explain 

the reasons why this happened on the 11th, okay? If 

things got out of hand, then--then he's gotta pretty much 

say it. Okay? 

Far from advising Latoya of her right to return to the interrogation room, 

the detective's comments endorsed Latoya's decision to exit the room to avoid 

being hurt by her son's admissions. Worse still, rather than reaffirming Latoya's 

role to safeguard defendant's right against self-incrimination, Diaz stated 

6

 Although the signed consent form is part of the record before us, the record 

does not indicate whether that form was drafted or approved by the county 

prosecutor or the Attorney General. It would be prudent, in our view, for the 

county prosecutor and Attorney General to review the form to address its 

deficiencies. 
31 A-2125-21

unequivocally, "so now it's up to [defendant] to fess up." It is hard to conceive 

advice more contrary to defendant's right against self-incrimination, or contrary 

to Latoya's role to safeguard that right. We conclude that the circumstances 

surrounding Latoya's decision to leave the interrogation room and the discussion 

she had with a detective in another room militate against a finding of 

voluntariness. 

We note by way of summary that other circumstances that are relevant 

under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, such as age, whether the 

questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature, and whether physical 

punishment or mental exhaustion was involved, see Knight, 183 N.J. at 463, do 

not support defendant's contention we should reverse the denial of the 

suppression motion. However, the cumulative effect of the police missteps 

regarding Latoya's participation in the interrogation process is enough to create 

a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived 

his right against self-incrimination. We conclude the State did not meet its 

heavy burden of proof, thus requiring suppression of defendant's incriminating 

statements made after his mother left the interrogation room. We reiterate and 

stress no one circumstance is dispositive; rather it is the cumulative effect of the 
32 A-2125-21

limitations imposed on Latoya's participation that creates a reasonable doubt 

requiring suppression. 

 VI.

 We need only briefly address the request made by defendant and defense 

amici that we revamp New Jersey's existing juvenile interrogation jurisprudence 

by adopting a new categorical rule that juveniles must be provided counsel prior 

to waiving their Miranda rights. The thoughtful and comprehensive arguments 

raised by defendant and defense amici are substantially identical to the ones that 

were made in M.P. We decline to create a new per se rule barring uncounseled 

juvenile interrogations for the reasons we recently explained at length in M.P., 

476 N.J. Super. at 256-57, 265-70. 

 Moreover, in light of our decision to reverse the denial of the suppression 

motion and vacate defendant's guilty-plea conviction, we need not address his 

sentencing argument. 

Reversed and remanded for entry of an 

order vacating the judgment of conviction. We do not retain jurisdiction.