IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-1403

Filed June 30, 2021

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MICHAEL JONATHAN PHELPS,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Celene Gogerty, Judge.

A defendant appeals his indeterminate forty-four-year prison 

term. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Ahlers, JJ.
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TABOR, Judge.

Michael Phelps appeals his sentence—a mix of concurrent and consecutive 

terms not to exceed forty-four years—for sixteen counts of sexual exploitation of a 

minor. He alleges the district court abused its discretion by concentrating on the 

serious nature of his offenses at the expense of mitigating factors. Because the 

district court acted reasonably in balancing the protection of the community with 

Phelps’s need for rehabilitation, we affirm the sentence.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

Police received a “cybercrimes tip” that Phelps was uploading child 

pornography in an online chatroom. Acting on that tip, they obtained a search 

warrant for Phelps’s residence and electronic devices. When officers arrived at 

his residence, Phelps confessed to possessing and transmitting child 

pornography. According to the minutes of evidence,

[Phelps] gave the officers his login and password for his cloud 

storage, aka his “mega” account. Officers conducted a forensic 

evaluation of [Phelps’s] electronic devices and online storage 

account. They were able to recover hundreds of movies and videos; 

thousands of pictures and images; and numerous folders labeled as 

“CP” (child pornography); all containing children engaged in 

prohibited sex acts.

This examination showed that on seven separate occasions, 

[Phelps] distributed thousands of videos and images of child 

pornography to unknown individuals through his mega account. The 

examination also showed that on seven separate occasions, [he]

transmitted images and videos containing child pornography to 

unknown individuals while chatting in an online forum. All of these 

events are separate and distinct, meaning [Phelps] has distributed 

and transmitted thousands of videos and images on fourteen 

different occasions. When [his] devices and online storage were 

seized by law enforcement, [he] was in possession of thousands of 

videos and images containing child pornography.
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The State filed a trial information charging Phelps with sixteen counts of 

sexual exploitation of a minor: seven counts for distributing, seven counts for 

transmitting, and two counts for possessing child pornography. See Iowa Code 

§ 728.12(2), (3) (2020). Phelps reached a plea bargain with the State, agreeing to 

plead guilty to all counts. Under the bargain, Phelps was free to argue for a 

deferred or suspended sentence. 

At the plea hearing, Phelps admitted using “an app called SnapChat to find 

other people that were interested in the same types of images, and [he] would send 

those pictures to them and try [to] get some back in exchange.” He described the 

images as “preteens or children engaging in sex acts either with an adult or with 

just themselves.” Along with his SnapChat activity, Phelps admitted file-sharing 

pictures from a “MEGA account app.” The court accepted his guilty pleas.

At sentencing, defense counsel sought a deferred judgment for his 

twenty-two-year-old client. Counsel emphasized Phelps’s employment and his 

embrace of sex-offender treatment. Counsel also noted Phelps “moved back in 

with his parents to distance himself” from peers who were a bad influence. In his 

allocution, Phelps apologized for his actions and discussed seeking professional 

help to overcome his “inappropriate sexual thoughts.” To that end, the defense 

presented reports from therapist David Greenwood, who found Phelps was a “low 

moderate risk” to reoffend sexually online with minors. Greenwood believed 

Phelps would be a good candidate for outpatient sex-offender therapy.

The State disagreed that Phelps could be “safely supervised in the 

community.” The prosecutor pointed to the presentence investigation report that 

recommended incarceration. From there, the prosecutor lobbied the court to 
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impose consecutive five-year terms on the seven distribution counts (thirty-five 

years), concurrent five-year terms on the seven transmission counts (five years), 

and consecutive two-year terms on the two possession counts (four years). The 

prosecutor asked the court to run those terms back to back for a total indeterminate 

sentence of forty-four years. 

The district court accepted the State’s sentencing recommendation. Phelps 

now appeals.1

II. Scope and Standards of Review

We review sentencing challenges for correction of legal error. State v.

Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). Because Phelps’s sentence falls 

within statutory limits, it is “cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor.” Id. We 

will reverse only if the district court abused its discretion in picking the punishment,

or if the sentencing hearing was defective. Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 103. Under 

this standard of review, we do not “second guess” the selected sentence. Id. at 

106. Rather, we verify the court did not rely on untenable or unreasonable 

grounds. Id. Because of the discretionary nature of sentencing, we afford wide

latitude to the district court. State v. Fetner, 959 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Iowa 2021).

III. Analysis

When imposing the sentence, the district court told Phelps:

I have read Dr. Greenwood’s evaluation and his updated 

report, and this Court knows Dr. Greenwood to be an excellent 

provider. This Court cannot ignore the extensive nature of the—of 

the actions of this defendant regarding child pornography.

 

1 Phelps satisfies the “good cause” requirement in Iowa Code section

814.6(1)(a)(3) by challenging his sentence rather than his guilty plea. See State

v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2020). 
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You distributed child pornography, you possessed it, and you 

transmitted it over a course of years. This Court must protect the 

community. That is a factor. And based on the information that—all 

the information I’ve been provided, I don’t think a suspended 

sentence is appropriate in this case and that prison is warranted.

Viewing those statements, Phelps claims the court “failed to seriously

consider any factors other than the nature of the offense in reaching its sentence.” 

He insists, “The fact that the court superficially referred to the other statutory 

factors, without more, is little better than oral boilerplate and cannot serve as a 

basis for finding the court gave serious consideration to the minimal essential 

factors.”

No doubt, the district court highlighted Phelps’s extensive involvement with 

child pornography. But it did not do so without weighing other relevant sentencing 

factors. See Iowa Code § 901.5 (requiring courts to consider all pertinent 

information in selecting sentencing option that provides “maximum opportunity for 

the rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the protection of the community”); see 

also id. § 907.5(1). For instance, the court studied Greenwood’s evaluation that 

included Phelps’s mental-health and substance-abuse history and treatment 

options. But the court viewed the timing and the volume of Phelps’s sex offenses

as more important. See State v. Wright, 340 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Iowa 1983) 

(recognizing “right of the individual judge to actually balance the relevant factors in 

determining an appropriate sentence inheres in the discretionary standard”).

Contrary to Phelps’s argument, the court did more than give lip service to 

mitigating factors. It acknowledged Phelps’s age and his lack of a prior criminal 

record. Likewise, the court confirmed its consideration of his employment and 

family circumstances, as well as his mental-health history. Granted, the court did 
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not discuss these factors at any great length, but that terse treatment does not 

signal an abuse of discretion. See State v. Russian, 441 N.W.2d 374, 375 (Iowa 

1989). In communicating its rationale for rejecting probation, the court permissibly

focused on “the extreme nature of these offenses, the extreme length of time, [and 

the] extreme amount of child pornography possessed and exchanged.” We are 

confident on this record that the court evaluated the panoply of factors and reached 

an allowable sentence. We decline to disturb the court’s exercise of discretion.

AFFIRMED.