NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CHAD CARTER,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,
v. RENT
- A
- CENTER, INC.,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 16
- 15835 D.C. No. 2:15
- cv - 00178
- GMN
- CWH
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Gloria M. Navarro, Chief Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted October 20, 2017 San Francisco, California Before: WALLACE and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, ** Judge. Plain tiff, Chad Carter (Carter) , appeals from the district court’s decisions compelling arbitration on an individual basis and denying Carter’s motion for reconsideration of an order dismissing Carter’s complaint, including his class

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the U nited States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation. 

# FILED
DEC 12 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2

claims. We affirm. 1 1. A n order to compel arbitration is not ordinarily appealable, see 9 U.S.C. § 4, but we have appellate jurisdiction where the district court compels arbitration and dismisses the action. See Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc. , 755 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir . 2014)
. Although the dismissal here was “without prejudice,” the district court’s orders and their context “sufficiently show that the court intended to close this case without precluding the parties from bringing a new action after completing arbitratio n. It is only in this sense that the dismissal was ‘without prejudice.’” Interactive Flight Techs., Inc. v. Swissair Swiss Air Transp. Co. , 249 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the argument that the court lacked appellate jurisdiction because t he district court’s dismissal was without prejudice)
. 2. The decision to grant a motion to compel arbitration, including the determination of the validity of an arbitration agreement, is reviewed de novo. Casa del Caffe Vergnano S.P.A. v. ItalFlavors, LLC , 816 F.3d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 2016). Carter does not challenge the district court’s decision to compel arbitration , but only the decision to compel arbitration on an individual basis . That decision is based on the district court’s ruling that the class action waiver provision in the

1 The facts are familiar to the parties and are restated here only as necessary to resolve the legal issues of the appeal.3

“Lease

- Purchase Agreement” is enforceable. Carter argues the class action waiver provision is unconscionable under Nevada law. Carter’s argument is foreclosed by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion , 563 U.S. 333 (2011) . We h ave interpreted Concepcion as foreclosing any argument that a class action waiver , by itself, is unconscionable under state law or that an arbitration agreement is unconscionable solely because it contains a class action waiver. See Kilgore v. KeyBank, Na t. Ass’n , 718 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (plaintiffs’ argument that a class action waiver in a promissory note is unconscionable under California law “is now expressly foreclosed by Concepcion ”); Johnmohammadi , 755 F.3d a t 1074 (noting that plaintiff, who challenged the enforceability of a class action waiver in her employment contract, could not “argue that the class

- action waiver is unenforceable under California law”) (citing Concepcion , 563 U.S. at 347

– 48). Nevada courts are in accord
. See Tallman v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. , 359 P.3d 113, 122 (Nev. 2015) ( “ Concepcion teaches that the FAA protects class waivers in arbitration agreements, even when requiring individual arbitration hampers effective vindication of statutory claims. ”). Carter’s rationale for applying Nevada’s unconscionability doctrine to invalidate the class action waiver is indisti nguishable from the California Supreme Court’s rationale in Discover Bank v. Superior Court , 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005), a4

case expressly overru led by Concepcion
. 2 3. Even if Carter’s unconscionability argument were not barred by Concepcion , his argument of procedural unconscionability is unavailing. The Lease
- Purchase Agreement, together with the arbitration agreement, is not a classic “take

- it

- o r - leave

- it” contract. The arbitration agreement sets forth a procedure for opting o ut of the arbitration agreement and states this option in prominent bold lettering near the top of the first page of the agreement. Carter was thus free to do business wit h defendant, Rent
- A
- Center , Inc. (Rent

- A
- Center), without being bound by the arbitration agreement. See Kilgore , 718 F.3d at 1059 (concluding the arbitration provision was not procedurally unconscionable because it allowed students obtaining loans to reje ct arbitration within sixty days of signing the promissory note); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed , 283 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]his case lacks the necessary element o f procedural unconscionability.

2 To be clear, Concepcion does not for eclose application of state unconscionability doctrines to arbitration agreements generally
. See Sonic

Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno , 57 Cal. 4th 1109, 1142

– 43 (2013) (“[A]fter Concepcion , unconscionability remains a valid defense to a petition to compel arbitration.”). However, Carter’s unconscionability argument is directed at the class action waiver provision only. He does not contend the entire arbitration agreement

— or any aspect of it other than the c lass action waiver

— is unconscionable. Our decision does not provide a “sweeping reading of Concepcion ” as asserted in the concurring opinion. Rather, our decision is based on the ground that Carter’s argument is foreclosed by Concepcion because, as the c oncurrence states, the “argument is materially indistinguishable from the rationale underlying the Discover Bank rule invalidated in Concepcion .”5

Ahmed was not presented with a contract of adhesion because he was given the opportunity to opt

- out of the Circuit City arbitration program by mailing in a simple one

- page form [within thirty days].”). 4. The denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Smith v. Pac. P roperties & Dev. Corp. , 358 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004). Carter, concerned that the district court might have dismissed his class claims with prejudice, argues the district court abused its discretion by not clarifying whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. The order dismissing the complaint clearly states the dismissal was without prejudice, which Rent
- A
- Center concedes. Carter has not shown an abuse of discretion. AFF IRMED.C

arte r v . Re nt-A-C

e n te r , No. 16-15835 W ALLAC E , C irc uit Judge , c onc urring in the re sult: I c onc ur in the re sult, but write se pa ra t e ly to e xpre ss m

y disa gre e m e nt with the m a jority ’ s re a ding of C

onc e pc ion . Unlike m

y c o lle a gue s, I do not re a d C onc e pc ion a s c a te goric a lly

fore c l osing C a rte r, or a

ny othe r c o nsum e r, from
a rguing tha

t c la ss a c t ion wa ive rs in a rbitra tion a gre e m e nts a

re unc onsc iona

ble unde r sta te la

w. I. The issue in C

onc e pc ion wa s whe the r the Fe de ra l Arbitra tion Ac t (FAA) pre e m pte d C a lifornia ’ s judge -m a de Disc ov e r Bank rule tha t c la ssifie d m ost c la ss
a c tion wa ive rs in c onsum e r c ontra c ts a s unc onsc iona ble
. AT & T Mobility

LLC v . C onc e pc ion , 563 U.S. 333, 340 (2011). The Supre m e C ourt a

nswe re d this que stion in the a ffirm a tive , a nd stre sse d tha t the Disc ov e r Bank

rule

— whic h provide d tha

t
c la ss a c tion wa ive rs we re unc onsc iona ble whe n the y

involve d c ontra c ts of
a dhe sion, sm a ll a

m ounts of da

m a ge s, a n d dispa ritie s in ba

rga ining powe r be twe e n
c om pa nie s a nd c ustom e rs— disfa

vore d a rbitra tion. Id. a t

341–42. The C ourt
e xpla ine d the rule c o uld not sta nd be c a use it e ffe c tive ly

c onditione d the
e nforc e a bility of a rbitra tion a g re e m e nts on the a va ila bility of c la sswide a rbitra tion proc e d ure s, the re by

inte rfe ring with funda

m e nta l a ttribute s of a

rbitra tion. Id. a t 344. 

# FIL ED
DEC 12 2017 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U

. S. CO URT O F APPEALSThe holding in C onc e pc ion re fle c te d

a nd re a ffirm e d the c ore princ iple of the Supre m e C ourt’ s a

rbitra tion jurisprude nc e : tha t “ c ourts m

ust pla c e a rbitra tion
a gre e m e nts on a

n e qua l footing with othe

r c ontra c ts.” Id. a t 339 (c iting Buc k e y e C he c k C ashing, Inc . v . C

arde g na , 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)). This princ iple a lso is
re fle c t e d in se c tion 2 of the FAA itse lf, whic h provide s tha t a rbitra tion a gre e m e n ts

“ sha ll be va lid, irre voc a

ble , a n d e nforc e a

ble , sa v e upon suc h grounds a s e xist a t la w or in e quity

for the re voc a tion of a

ny c ontra c t.” 9 U.S.C . § 2. Unde r this sa ving
c la use , a rbitra tion a g re e m e nts m a y be inva lida

te d by “ ‘ ge ne ra lly a

pplic a ble
c ontra c t de fe nse s, suc h a s fra ud, dure ss, or unc onsc iona bility ,’ but not by

de fe nse s that a pply only to a rbitra tion or tha

t de rive the ir m e a

n ing from the fa c t tha

t a n
a gre e m e nt to a

rbitra te is a

t issue .” C

onc e pc ion , 563 U.S. a

t 339 (quoting Doc tor’s Assoc s ., Inc . v . C

asarotto , 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)). In othe r words, the FAA
re c o gniz e s the a

p p lic a bility of sta

te -law ba s e d c ontra c t de fe nse s, inc luding
unc onsc i ona

b ility , but pre e m

p t s sta te -law rule s tha

t disfa vor or ha ve a disproportiona

t e im pa c t on a rbitra tion. Id. a t 343–44. C onsiste nt with this e qua l footing princ i ple , the C ourt in C onc e pc ion inva lida t e d the Disc ov e r Bank rule be c a use the rule a

pplie d unc onsc i ona

bility la w in a wa y tha t wa s hostile to a

rbitra tion. Se e id. a t 343 (“ Although § 2’ s sa ving
c la use pre se rve s ge ne ra lly

a pplic a ble c ontra c t de fe nse s, nothing in it sugge s ts a n 2inte nt to pre s e rve sta te -law rule s tha

t sta nd a s a n obsta c le to the a c c om

plishm e nt of the FAA’ s obje c t ive s.” ). B ut the c a se did not c a ll into que s tion the a va ila b ility of sta te -law ba se d unc onsc iona bility doc trine a s a

m e a n s of c ha lle nging c la ss a c tion
wa ive rs unde r a

ppropria t e c irc um sta

nc e s. Inde e d, to re a d C

onc e p c ion a s doing so would turn the e qua l footing princ iple on its he a d by inoc ula ting c ore provisions of
a rbitra tion a gre e m e n t s from c ha lle nge . I do not think C onc e pc i on c a n be so re a d, nor do I think the

FAA c om

pe ls suc h a

re a ding. II. The c a se s m

y c olle a gue s c ite to support the ir swe e ping re a ding of C onc e pc ion a re e i the r distinguisha ble or do not dire c tly

support the proposition for whic h the y

a re c ite d. In K

i lgore v . K e y Bank , N at’l Ass’n , 718 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th C ir. 2013), we sta

te d tha t C o n c e pc ion “ e x pre ssly fore c lose d” pla intiffs’ a rgum e nt that a c la ss a c tion wa ive r wa s unc onsc iona ble unde r C a lifornia

la w. B ut tha

t de te rm i na tion re fle c te d the fa c t tha t the distric t c ourt ha d re lie d on the Disc o v e r Bank rule to hold the wa ive r a t issue unc onsc iona ble . Our sta

te m e nt tha

t pla intiffs’
unc onsc i ona

b ility a rgum e n t wa s “ fore c lose d by C onc e pc ion ” sim

ply re c ogniz e d the i m p a c t of C o nc e pc ion on the c ontinue d va lidity of the Disc ov e r Bank rule . W e did not use K

ilgor e to hold tha

t a ll sta te -la w unc onsc iona

bility c ha lle nge s to c la ss
a c tion wa ive rs we re ba

rre d by C onc e p c ion
. 3The m a jority a lso c i te s J

ohnmohammadi v . Bloomingdale ’s, Inc

. , 755 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th C ir. 2014), in whic h we sta te d in dic ta , c iting C

onc e pc i on , tha

t pla i ntiff c ould not a

rgue the c la ss a c tion wa ive r in tha t c a se wa s une nforc e a

ble unde r C a lifornia

la w. B ut the pla intiff in J

ohnmohammadi did not c ha lle nge the
wa ive r a t issue on unc onsc i ona

bility grounds. R a the r, the issue in J ohnmohammadi
wa s whe the r fe de ra l la

b o r la w re nde re d the wa i ve r une nforc e a ble . Our dic ta

in tha t
c a se should not be

re a d a s a ffirm ing a

n inte rpre ta t ion of C

o nc e pc ion tha t wa s
ne ithe r a d va nc e d by the pa rtie s, nor re le va

nt to the disposition of the c a se . Fina lly , the m a

jority c ite s Tallman v . Eighth J ud. Dist. C

t
. , 359 P.3d 113 (Ne v. 2015), whe re the Ne va da Supre m e C ourt a c knowle dge d tha t C onc e pc ion
ove rrule d a

pre vious Ne va da Supre m e C o u rt de c i sion holding tha t c la ss a c tion
wa ive rs in a

rbitra tion a gre e m e n ts we re une nforc e a b le be c a use suc h wa ive rs viola te d Ne va da ’ s public polic y . B ut this a spe c t of the Tallman de c ision wa s sim ply a na tura l a pplic a tion of the “ e qua l footing” princ iple

— i.e ., tha t sta te la w (in this c a s e , Ne va da ’ s public polic y fa voring c la ss a c tions) c ould not bea pplie d in a
wa y tha t disfa vore d a rbitra tion. No pa

rt of the Tallman de c ision e sta b lishe d a rule that C onc e pc ion c a te goric a l ly

ba rs unc onsc iona

bility c ha lle nge s to c la ss a c tion
wa ive rs in a

rbitra tion a gre e m e n ts. III.

4The m a jority ’ s re a ding of C

onc e pc ion a lso fa ils to ta

k e into a c c ount the dive rsity of the c om

m on la w. Sta te unc onsc iona

bility doc trine s va

ry in subtle but im porta nt wa y s, a nd C o nc e p c ion wa s not pre m ise d on the a ssum ption tha t a ll suc h doc trine s we re a s e qua lly hostile to a

rbitra tion a s the Disc ov e r Bank rule . R a the r tha n e sta b lish a n e x antepre c lusion rule fore c l osing unc onsc iona b ility a rgum e nts
a ltoge the r, C

onc e pc ion provide s a princ iple to whic h sta te -law rule s m

ust a dhe re to survive fe de ra l pre e m

ption. This m

a k e s se nse give n tha

t not a ll sta

te
unc onsc i ona

b ility doc trine s re se m

ble the D isc o v e r Bank

rule inva l ida te d in C onc e pc ion
. A brie f hy

pothe tic a l illustra

te s the point. Assum e tha

t a c onsum e r signs a

n
a rbitra tion a gre e m e n t

c onta ining a

c la ss a c tion wa ive r, a nd tha t W a shington la

w gove rns dispute s ove r e n forc e a bility of the wa ive r. Assum e a lso tha t the c onsum e r subse q ue ntly se e ks to inva lida

t e the c la ss a c tion wa ive r by a rguing the wa ive r is
unc onsc i ona

b le unde r W a s hington la

w. On the se fa c ts, C

onc e pc ion would not
ne c e ssa rily re quire pre e m

ption of the sta

t e -law rule . This is be c a

use W a shington la w pe rm its a

finding of unc onsc iona

bility on the ba sis of proc e dura l
unc onsc i ona

b ility a l one , Gande e v . LDL Fre e dom Ente rs., Inc

. , 293 P.3d 1197, 1199 (W a sh. 2013), whic h m a y be pre se nt whe n the m a

n ne r in whic h the c o ntra c t
wa s e nte re d, a

nd the form a t a

nd pre se nta t ion of the c ontra c tua l te rm s, indic a te s a

5pa

rty la c ke d m e a ningful c hoic e , Zuv e r v . Airtouc h C o mmc ’ns, Inc

. , 103 P.3d 753, 759–60 (W a sh. 2004) (e n ba nc ). Also, unlike

the Disc ov e r Bank rule , W a shington’ s proc e dura l unc onsc iona bility doc trine ne ithe r “ de rive [s] [its]
m e a ning from

the fa c t tha

t a n a gre e m e nt to a

rbitra te is a

t issue ,” nor is form

ula te d in a wa y tha t disfa vors a rbitra tion. C

o nc e pc ion , 563 U.S. a

t 339. A hy

pothe tic a l
c onsum e r pre sum a

bly c ould c ha lle n ge a c la ss a c tion wa ive r unde r W a shington la w by a rguing the wa ive r wa s pre se nte d in fine print or wa s e xpre sse d in c o nvolute d la ngua ge , or by

a lle ging som e othe r form of proc e dura l unc onsc i ona bility not a t issue in C onc e pc ion . Suc h a

c ha lle nge would be e ntire ly c onsiste nt with C onc e pc ion ’ s holding a

nd ra tiona le . Tha

t m y c olle a gue s’ re a ding of the c a se would ba r suc h a va lid c h a lle nge highlights the e rror in the i r inte rpre t a tion. IV. I ha rbor no de lusions a

bout C onc e pc ion ’ s fa

r-re a c hing im

pa c t on
c onsum e rs’ a

bility to c ha lle n ge c la ss a c t ion wa ive rs on the ba sis of
unc onsc i ona

b ility
. In holding tha

t the FAA pre e m

pte d the Disc ov e r

Bank rule , the Supre m e C ourt m a de c le a r tha t som e of the m ost c om

m on fe a ture s of a

n
unc onsc i ona

b ility c h a lle nge
— in pa

rtic ula r, the a dhe s ive na ture of c onsum e r
a gre e m e nts a

nd the va st dispa

rity in ba rga ining powe r be twe e n c om p a nie s a nd the i r c u stom e rs—

will not inva

lida te c la s s a c tion wa ive rs in a rbitra tion a g re e m e nts. 6In pra c tic e , this m a ke s it e xtre m e ly diffic ult to inva lida

te c l a ss a c tion wa ive rs on the b a sis of unc onsc iona

bility . Tha

t re sult, howe v e r, doe s not justify the c onc lusion that C onc e pc ion c a te goric a l ly

fore c lose s a l l suc h c h a lle nge s. Although C onc e pc ion
m a ke s c le a r tha t ge ne ra lly a pplic a ble c ontra c t de fe nse s will not survive fe de ra l pre e m ption whe n those de fe nse s a re hostile to a

rbitra t ion, for the re a sons sta te d
a bove I do not think the

de c ision e lim ina t e s unc onsc iona bility c ha lle nge s to c la ss
a c tion wa ive rs a l toge the r. None the le ss, I a gre e with m y c olle a g u e s tha

t C a rte r’ s unc onsc iona

b ility
a rgum e nt fa ils on the m e rits. C a rte r a rgue s, ba se d upon Ne va da la w, tha t the c la ss
a c tion wa ive r in this c a se is unc onsc iona b le be c a use the wa ive r is a

one -side d
c ontra c t of a d

he sion tha

t wa s pre se nte d by

a pa rty with supe rior ba

rga i ning powe r. This a rgum e nt is m a te ria lly

indistinguisha

ble from the ra tiona le unde rly i ng the Disc ov e r Bank rule inva l idate d in C

onc e pc ion . The re fore , while I disa gre e with the
m a jority ’ s swe e ping re a d ing of C onc e pc ion , I c onc ur in the re sult re a c he d he re .

7