Filed 11/15/18; pub. order 12/13/18 (see end of opn.)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ACCO ENGINEERED 

SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiff and 

Appellant,

v.

CONTRACTORS' STATE 

LICENSE BOARD,

Defendant and 

Respondent.

 B282944

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 

 BS159740)

APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Mary Strobel, Judge. Affirmed.

Hunt Ortmann Palffy Nieves Darling & Mah, Dale A. 

Ortmann, Lisa Lawrence, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
2

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Thomas L. Rinaldi, 

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Steve J. Pyun, 

Deputy Attorney General, for Defendant and Respondent.

__________________________

Plaintiff and appellant ACCO Engineered Systems, 

Inc. (Acco) appeals from a judgment denying Acco’s petition 

for a writ of mandamus. Acco’s writ petition sought review 

of an administrative decision adopted by the Registrar of the 

defendant and respondent the Contractors’ State License 

Board (Board), finding Acco in violation of Business and 

Professions Code section 71101 for failing to obtain a 

building permit before replacing a boiler.

Acco contends it did not violate section 7110 because it 

did not willfully disregard the permit requirement. The 

company argues that both the administrative law judge and 

the trial judge erroneously interpreted the code section to 

apply to situations where a contractor inadvertently fails to 

obtain a permit. Acco further argues that even under the 

administrative judge’s interpretation, the decision is not 

supported by substantial evidence. We reject Acco’s various 

arguments and affirm the judgment.

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Business 

and Professions Code unless otherwise stated.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Acco is a large contracting company that does over 

$800 million in work a year, ranging from large projects like 

the renovation of Dodger Stadium or construction on the 

Wilshire Grand building to smaller mechanical projects 

worth a few thousand dollars. 

In 2014, the Board investigated a complaint that in 

2011 and 2012, Acco had replaced a boiler at a commercial 

building without obtaining the permits required by a Los 

Angeles city ordinance that adopts the California 

Mechanical Code’s permitting requirements. After receiving 

notice of the Board’s investigation, Acco conducted its own 

investigation as well. The company acknowledged that 

permits were required and admitted that no permits were 

obtained at the time the work was conducted. It belatedly 

applied for and obtained the necessary permits in July 2014. 

Acco attributed the failure to obtain the needed permits to 

the inadvertence of a lower level employee. 

The Board issued a citation, imposing a civil penalty of 

$500 on Acco for violation of section 7110, which provides 

that “Willful or deliberate disregard and violation of the 

building laws . . . constitutes a cause for disciplinary action.” 

Acco appealed, and an administrative hearing took place in 

September 2015. Board investigator David Dance and Acco’s 

Chief Executive Officer Peter H. Narbonne testified. 

Narbonne is the company’s responsible managing officer or 

license qualifier for six of Acco’s contractor’s licenses. At the 
4

hearing, it was undisputed that permits were required for 

installation of a boiler and a pressure vessel and that Acco 

completed the work without obtaining a permit. Both 

parties presented written briefs and oral argument on the 

key issue of whether Acco’s failure to obtain the required 

permits was “willful” within the meaning of section 7110. 

The administrative law judge made factual findings, 

which included the following: Acco had a valid contractor’s 

license, including a license for the classification of “C-4—

Boiler Hot Water Heating & Steam Fitting.” In the 2011-

2012 time frame, Acco performed work for a 

customer/building owner to replace a boiler in the building. 

Acco admitted that a permit was required before work 

commenced, and that it was responsible for obtaining the 

permit. Acco further admitted that, by mistake, it performed 

the work without a permit. Finding number 6 stated in full: 

“The mistake was that of an employee, a manager who had 

been instructed to check with [Acco’s] in-house expert on 

building permits on whether a permit was required. All 

managers employed by [Acco] were so instructed with 

respect to any project as to which the question of whether a 

permit was required might arise. In this instance, the 

manager failed to check with the in-house expert. The boiler 

project was to exchange like for like, replacing an old boiler 

with a new one. Permits are not required for many like-for-
5

like exchanges.”2 Acco became aware of the mistake when 

the Board began an investigation. The company “promptly 

sought a permit for and inspection of the work. The permit 

issued and by early August 2014, a final inspection of the 

work took place. No corrections were required.” 

In its legal conclusions, the administrative judge found 

no evidence that Acco’s failure to obtain a permit before 

replacing the boiler was “‘deliberate’ within the meaning of 

. . . section 7110;”3 however, the administrative law judge 

found that Acco’s conduct was “‘willful.’” Noting Acco’s 

argument that the failure to obtain the required permit was 

an inadvertent mistake, and therefore should not be 

considered “willful” under section 7110, the court concluded 

that Acco’s “manager who decided to proceed without a 

permit was doing so by disregarding both the law requiring a 

permit and an instruction from his employer to consult an 

in-house expert on building permits. . . . Such double 

disregard cannot be characterized as simply inadvertent, but 

 

2 The employee manager referred to no longer worked 

at Acco by the time of the hearing, no testimony from that 

employee manager regarding his actions was introduced into 

evidence, and the company’s witness, Narbonne, never 

talked to the employee and could only surmise what the 

employee was thinking. 

3 At the hearing, the investigator, Dance, testified he 

made no effort in his investigation to ask or determine 

whether an Acco representative made a conscious or 

deliberate decision not to obtain a permit. 
6

rather willful misconduct within the meaning of the statute.” 

Noting that civil penalties under the statute serve a dual 

purpose—to punish past conduct and to deter future 

misconduct—and acknowledging that Acco had made efforts 

to ensure compliance with the building laws and took 

prompt action to correct their mistake by obtaining the 

required permit, the administrative law judge reduced the 

penalty amount from $500 to the minimum civil penalty of 

$200. 

Acco then filed a petition for a writ of administrative 

mandamus pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 

1094.5 with the trial court. Acco’s petition, like the current 

appeal, asserted that the administrative decision 

erroneously interpreted section 7110 to not require a 

showing of specific intent to disregard and violate the 

building laws. Acco also argued that the Board had the 

burden to prove a violation of section 7110, and there was no 

evidence that Acco had willfully violated the building laws. 

The trial court denied the petition, reasoning that the term 

“willful” in section 7110 only requires a showing of general 

intent, not specific intent to violate the law as Acco was 

arguing. The trial court further found that the 

administrative record contained substantial evidence to 

support the administrative law judge’s finding of a willful 

violation, because Acco’s project manager made an 

affirmative decision to proceed without a permit when he 

disregarded his employer’s instructions to consult Acco’s 

permitting coordinator. 
7

DISCUSSION

Acco does not dispute that a Los Angeles city ordinance 

required permits for the boiler replacement, or that it did not 

obtain the required permits and was therefore in violation of 

the applicable building laws. Acco’s argument for why 

section 7110 does not authorize disciplinary action in this 

particular case centers on the meaning of the term “willful” 

as used in that section. Acco argues that because the failure 

to obtain the required permits was an inadvertent mistake 

by a low-level employee, it was not a willful violation of the 

permit requirement. Acco argues that willful as used in 

section 7110 must be interpreted to require a specific intent 

to violate the law. In response, the Board argues that a 

general intent to act is sufficient to satisfy section 7110’s 

requirement of a willful violation of the permit 

requirements. 

Considering the statutory scheme as a whole, we reject 

Acco’s arguments and agree with the Board that the 

Legislature’s use of the term “willful” in section 7110 only 

requires a showing of general intent. We also conclude there 

is substantial evidence to support the administrative judge’s 

determination that Acco willfully violated the applicable 

building laws. The fact that an individual employee may not 

have been aware of a specific local permit requirement does 

not excuse a corporate licensee from complying with the 

building laws.
8

Standard of review

On appeal, we review the administrative record to 

determine whether factual findings were supported by 

substantial evidence. (Handyman Connection of 

Sacramento, Inc. v. Sands (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 867, 880–

881 (Handyman) [where the challenged sanction is a fine, 

and not revocation or suspension of a petitioner’s license, the 

trial court and the reviewing court determine whether 

substantial evidence supports factual findings]; MHC 

Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 

Cal.App.4th 204, 217–220.) We review questions of law de 

novo, applying our own independent judgment. (Owen v. 

Sands (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 985, 989; Handyman, supra, 

at p. 880.) To the extent we are engaging in statutory 

interpretation, “we must give deference to the Board’s 

interpretations, but not to the exclusion of other tools of 

statutory construction. ‘[T]he binding power of an agency’s 

interpretation of a statute or regulation is contextual: Its 

power to persuade is both circumstantial and dependent on 

the presence or absence of factors that support the merit of 

the interpretation.’ (Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. 

of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 7 [(Yamaha)].)” 

(Handyman, supra, at p. 881.) 
9

Statutory interpretation of the Contractors’ State 

License Law

“Our role in construing a statute is to ascertain the 

intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of 

the law. [Citation.] Because the statutory language is 

generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look 

first at the words themselves, giving them their usual and 

ordinary meaning. [Citation.] We do not, however, consider 

the statutory language in isolation, but rather examine the 

entire substance of the statute in order to determine the 

scope and purpose of the provision, construing its words in 

context and harmonizing its various parts. [Citation.]” 

(Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1040.) “We 

interpret relevant terms in light of their ordinary meaning, 

while also taking account of any related provisions and the 

overall structure of the statutory scheme to determine what 

interpretation best advances the Legislature’s underlying 

purpose.” (Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors v. Superior 

Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282, 293.) The legislative history of a 

statute may be useful in this examination. (Dyna–Med, Inc. 

v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 

1387.) So may the interpretation of a statute by the agency 

charged with implementing it. (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th 

at p. 7.)

The Contractors’ State License Law (License Law) is 

codified at Business and Professions Code section 7000 et 

seq. The License Law is to be given a “reasonable and 

practical construction” “[i]n light of the intent of the 
10

Legislature and the purpose behind the statutory scheme—

to protect consumers and the public from dishonest or 

incompetent contractors.” (Viking Pools, Inc. v. Maloney

(1989) 48 Cal.3d 602, 607 (Viking Pools); see also 

Handyman, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pp. 881–882.) 

Reviewing the statutory scheme as a whole, we begin 

with the relevant requirements for obtaining a contractor’s 

license. (See, 9 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 

2018) §§ 3:4–3:5, pp. 31-25–31-32.) The Board has authority 

to grant licenses not just to individuals, but to business 

entities such as partnerships, corporations, or limited 

liability companies. If a business entity applies for a license, 

it qualifies through an individual who is a responsible 

managing officer, manager, member, or employee. (Id. at 

p. 31-28; § 7068, subd. (b)(2)–(4).) The individual must 

demonstrate his or her general knowledge of the building, 

safety, health, and lien laws of the state and of the 

administrative principles of the contracting business. 

(§ 7068, subd. (d).) He or she is “responsible for exercising 

that direct supervision and control of his or her employer’s or 

principal’s construction operations to secure compliance with 

this chapter and the rules and regulations of the board.” 

(§ 7068.1, subd. (a).) Failure to do so is grounds for 

disciplinary action and is a misdemeanor, punishable by 

imprisonment in jail for up to six months, a fine between 

$3,000 and $5,000, or both. (§ 7068.1, subd. (e); see also, 9 

Miller & Starr, 9 Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2018) § 31.5, 

p. 31-29.) 
11

“One of the key purposes of the contractor’s license law 

is to protect the public against dishonesty and incompetency

in the administration of the contracting business. 

[Citations.] The function of an administrative proceeding 

such as the one here is not criminal in that its goal is not to 

punish the prospective licensee but to protect the public. 

The hearing is to insure that the privileges granted under 

the license will not be exercised in derogation of the public 

interest.” (Housing Development Co. v. Hoschler (1978) 85 

Cal.App.3d 379, 388 (Hoschler), italics added [addressing a 

situation where the Board refused to grant a license].)

Disciplinary proceedings under the License Law serve 

a similar purpose of protecting the public. The purpose of 

such proceedings “‘is to determine the fitness of a licensed 

contractor to continue in that capacity. It is not intended for 

the punishment of the individual contractor, but for the 

protection of the contracting business as well as the public 

by removing, in proper cases, either permanently or 

temporarily, from the conduct of a contractor’s business a 

licensee whose method of doing business indicates a lack of 

integrity upon his part or a tendency to impose upon those 

who deal with him. . . .’” (Viking Pools, supra, 48 Cal.3d at 

p. 607.) The License Law authorizes disciplinary action 

against licensees for a wide variety of conduct, including 

willful departure from accepted trade standards (§ 7109), 

failure to maintain records (§ 7111), or overpricing after a 

state of emergency (§7123.5; Pen. Code, § 396). (See also 9 

Miller & Starr, 9 Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2018) § 31.11, 
12

p. 31-71–31-75 [listing grounds for disciplinary action].) The 

Board’s authority includes not just authority to revoke or 

suspend a contractor’s license, but also the authority to issue 

a citation and impose civil penalties between $200 and 

$15,000. (9 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2018) 

§ 31.11, p. 31-69; see also §§ 7099–7099.5.) 

Willful violation of building laws

The portions of the License Law identifying grounds for 

disciplinary action vary, and some use the term “willful” in 

describing conduct subject to disciplinary action, while 

others do not. (See Bailey-Sperber, Inc. v. Yosemite Ins. Co.

(1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 725, 729 (Bailey-Sperber).) The 

statutory scheme does not define the term “willful,” however, 

“[w]e must assume that the difference in statutory 

phraseology among the sections indicates a legislative 

determination to differentiate between conduct not subject to 

discipline where inadvertent and that subject to discipline 

even inadvertent.” (Id. at p. 729.) For example, the BaileySperber court drew a distinction between sections that 

require willful conduct and those that do not. The court 

pointed out that section 7109 only makes departure from 

plans, specifications, and trade standards a cause for 

discipline if the departure was willful. In contrast, sections 

7107 and 7113, which identify project abandonment and 

failure to complete within the contract price as causes for 
13

disciplinary action, do not require that the actions be willful. 

(Ibid., fn. 5.) 

In interpreting disciplinary provisions of the License 

Law, two later cases have referred to the definition of willful 

given in Penal Code section 7, subdivision (1),4 which 

requires only a general intent to perform an act, not a 

specific intent to violate a law. (People v. Licas (2007) 41 

Cal.4th 362, 366 [“[c]onviction under a statute proscribing 

conduct done ‘willfully and maliciously’ does not require 

proof of a specific intent”].) In Mickelson Concrete Co. v. 

Contractors’ State License Bd. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 631, at 

page 635 (Mickelson), the court cited to Penal Code section 7, 

subdivision (1)’s definition of “willfully” when it affirmed 

discipline under section 7109 based on facts showing a 

contractor’s “purposeful departure from accepted trade 

standards which may be properly characterized as ‘willful.”’ 

In Tellis v. Contractors’ State License Bd. (2000) 79 

Cal.App.4th 153 (Tellis), a contractor challenged discipline 

imposed under section 7109, subdivision (a), for substandard 

work on a home. The statutory text stated, “A willful 

departure in any material respect from accepted trade 

standards for good and workmanlike construction 

 

4 The subdivision states “[t]he word “willfully,” when 

applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, 

implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act, or 

make the omission referred to. It does not require any intent 

to violate law, or to injure another, or to acquire any 

advantage.” (Pen. Code, § 7, subd. (1).) 
14

constitutes a cause for disciplinary action, unless the 

departure was in accordance with plans and specifications 

prepared by or under the direct supervision of an architect.” 

(Id. at p. 158.) The Board’s argument in Tellis was similar 

to the one it makes in this case, that all that the statute 

requires is the willful act of performing substandard 

construction; there is no need to demonstrate that the 

contractor knew the work was substandard. (Id. at pp. 158–

159.) The Tellis court briefly discussed the Mickelson 

decision, noting the Mickelson court’s citation to Penal Code 

section 7, subdivision 1. (Id. at p. 159.) The Tellis court 

avoided deciding whether general or specific intent was 

necessary, instead assuming that section 7109 requires a 

contractor to know the work is substandard. It then 

concluded there was sufficient evidence to support a finding 

of such knowledge, given the egregious nature of the 

substandard work, including tiles falling off and a leaking 

shower stall. (Id. at pp. 159–160.) 

Acco points out that the only case involving section 

7110, the provision at issue here, rather than 7109, focused 

on the meaning of “willful” as used in Labor Code section 

227, not in section 7110. (Hoschler, supra, 85 Cal.App.3d at 

p. 389.) In Hoschler, the contractor argued that its 

managing member’s good faith belief he did not have an 

obligation to make certain payments to unions negated any 

potential violation of Labor Code section 227, which 

prohibited an employer from “willfully or with intent to 

defraud” failing to make such payments. The court rejected 
15

the argument, finding substantial evidence in support of the 

administrative judge’s conclusion that the failure to pay was 

not based upon a good faith dispute. (Id. at pp. 388–389.) 

Acco argues that instead of following the general intent 

definition of willful set forth in Penal Code section 7, 

subdivision (1), we should follow Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of 

North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174 (Kwan) and 

find that a more targeted definition of willful is needed 

under section 7110. In Kwan, a state consumer warranty act 

commonly known as a “lemon law” authorized a civil penalty 

if a car dealership willfully failed to comply with the lemon 

law’s requirements. The lemon law imposed various 

obligations on car dealers, including an obligation to replace 

or refund the cost of any new car if recurring problems could 

not be satisfactorily repaired after multiple attempts. (Civ. 

Code, §§ 1790, 1793.2, subd. (d)(2).) Under the law, a car 

buyer could obtain compensatory damages from a dealer who 

fails to comply with the law’s requirements, and the buyer 

would be entitled to additional civil penalties if the dealer’s 

failure to comply was “willful.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subds. 

(a), (c).) The Kwan court held that it was error to give a jury 

instruction defining willful as “‘simply a purpose or 

willingness to commit the act or to make the omission in 

question’” (Kwan, supra, at p. 181) because it “‘would render 

meaningless or inoperative the Act’s distinction between 

willful and nonwillful violations.’” (Id. at p. 184.) 

In Kwan, the jury imposed a civil penalty on the 

dealer, despite its manager’s claim that his failure to offer 
16

the plaintiff either a refund or a replacement vehicle was 

based on his good faith, reasonable belief that the plaintiff 

had been satisfied by the dealer’s final repair of the vehicle. 

(Id. at pp. 179–180.) The dealer argued that in light of that 

contention, the jury instruction on willfulness—modeled 

after Penal Code section 7, subdivision (1) and stating that a 

“willful” act or omission “‘implies simply a purpose or 

willingness to commit the act, or to make the omission’”—

was inadequate because it failed to distinguish between a 

dealer who believed, reasonably and in good faith, that no 

refund or replacement was required under the Act, and one 

who had no such belief. (Kwan, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 180–181.) 

But the holding and reasoning in Kwan is necessarily 

limited to the specific statutory scheme and fact situation 

under consideration in that case. The court made the 

limitations of its holding clear, stating that the defendant 

“was entitled to an instruction informing the jury its failure 

to refund or replace was not willful if it reasonably and in 

good faith believed the facts did not call for refund or 

replacement. Such an instruction would have given the jury 

legal guidance on the principal issue before it in determining 

whether a civil penalty could be awarded. The Penal Code 

definition of willful, by itself, gave inadequate guidance 

under the circumstances of this case.” (Kwan, supra, 23 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 186–187.)

Turning to the License Law, we are not persuaded by 

Acco’s argument that the term “willful” in section 7110 must 
17

be interpreted to require specific intent, meaning that the 

licensee intentionally or knowingly decided to disregard and 

violate the building laws. First, as Acco appears to 

recognize, such an interpretation would result in the term 

“willful” being given a different meaning in section 7110 

than in section 7109. (See Mickelson, supra, 95 Cal.App.3d 

at p. 635.) Second, and more significantly, the rules of 

statutory interpretation require us to “‘harmonize statutes, 

reconcile seeming inconsistencies in them, and construe 

them to give force and effect to all of their provisions. 

[Citations.]’” (Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. 

City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783, 805.) An 

interpretation of section 7110 that permits discipline when a 

licensee fails to comply with the specified laws is consistent 

with other provisions of the License Law that require 

licensees to demonstrate knowledge of building laws and 

other state laws as a condition of obtaining a license (§ 7068, 

subd. (d)), imposes penalties for failing to exercise direct 

supervision and control over construction operations to 

ensure compliance with applicable rules and regulations 

(§ 7068.1, subd. (a), (e)), and creates a rebuttable 

presumption that “construction performed without a permit 

is a willful and deliberate violation.” (§ 7090.) 

Acco argues that interpreting “willful” to only require a 

general intent as described in Penal Code section 7, 

subdivision (1), renders the term meaningless and converts 

section 7110 into a strict liability statute where every 

violation of a building requirement would be subject to 
18

disciplinary action. We disagree. Interpreting section 7110’s 

use of the word “willful” as requiring general intent does not 

result in strict liability for licensees. We can imagine the 

absence of a willful or deliberate disregard of building laws 

occurring in the following scenario: A contractor attempts to 

obtain a building permit but is unable to obtain one because 

the local permitting authority incorrectly believes no permit 

is required. Even if it is later established that the permit 

should have issued, the contractor’s failure to obtain the 

required permit cannot be considered a “willful” violation of 

the applicable laws, and therefore discipline under section 

7110 would not be warranted. (See, e.g., Rappleyea v. 

Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975 [relief from default judgment 

appropriate where litigants were initially mistakenly 

misinformed by court clerk and later by an attorney].) We 

can also imagine the absence of willful or deliberate 

disregard of building laws where a city’s permitting 

requirements are ambiguous or subject to interpretation. 

While those particular facts are not before us, we venture to 

say that such factual situations might result in a licensee’s 

challenged conduct not coming within the ambit of 

disciplinary action under section 7110, even where there was 

a finding of a violation of the building laws.

We further reject Acco’s argument that liability under 

section 7110 is precluded where a licensee acts in good faith. 

Even Justice Werdegar agreed that “moral blameworthiness 

is not a necessary element of willful conduct” under the 

provision of the Civil Code she was construing in Kwan. 
19

(Kwan, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 181, citing Ibrahim v. 

Ford Motor Co. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 878, 882–884.) Penal 

Code section 7, subdivision (1), also clarifies that an act may 

be done “willfully” without an intent “to violate law, or to 

injure another, or to acquire any advantage.” (Pen. Code, 

§ 7, subd. (1).) As the Board points out, the Penal Code 

definition of willfulness has been adopted in other cases 

involving discipline of members of licensed professions as 

well. (See, e.g., Dahlman v. State Bar (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1088, 

1093 [willful violation of rules governing attorneys “does not 

require bad faith or actual knowledge of the provision which 

is violated”].) 

Substantial evidence supports the finding of a 

violation of section 7110

Acco contends that, even if not interpreted to require a 

showing of specific intent to violate the building laws, there 

is not substantial evidence in the administrative record to 

support the finding that it willfully disregarded the building 

laws in violation of section 7110. We disagree.

Acco tries to characterize the failure to obtain a permit 

as an “inadvertent mistake” based on the failure of a single 

employee.5 But the employee’s intentional acts are 

attributable to the company. The company holds the 

 

5 Acco did not argue to the administrative law judge or 

to the trial court, and does not argue on appeal, that it is not 

responsible for actions of its employee manager. 
20

contractor’s license, and Narbonne is the “responsible 

managing officer.” As such, he is “responsible for exercising 

that direct supervision and control of [Acco’s] construction 

operations to secure compliance with” the laws and 

regulations applicable to contractors, at risk of being fined or 

even prosecuted for a misdemeanor. (§ 7068.1, subd. (a), (e).) 

Acco emphasizes that its policy and procedure is that a 

project manager is “supposed to go through the permit 

coordinator to determine permit requirements and actually 

pull the permit.” Here, the evidence supports that the 

project manager made an affirmative decision not to inquire 

about the permitting requirements, and to proceed with the 

boiler replacement having no permit. This conduct 

constitutes willful disregard of the building laws. 
21

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are 

awarded to respondent, the Contractors’ State License 

Board.

MOOR, Acting P.J.

We concur:

KIM, J.

JASKOL, J.

 

 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by 

the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.
22

Filed 12/13/18

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ACCO ENGINEERED 

SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiff and 

Appellant,

v.

CONTRACTORS’ STATE 

LICENSE BOARD,

Defendant and 

Respondent.

 B282944

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 

 BS159740)

 ORDER CERTIFYING

 OPINION FOR

 PUBLICATION

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on 

November 15, 2018, was not certified for publication in the 

Official Reports. Upon petitioner’s request and for good 
23

cause appearing, it is ordered that the opinion shall be 

published in the official reports. 

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(b), 

this opinion is certified for publication. 

__________________ __________________

__________________

MOOR, Acting P.J. KIM, J. JASKOL, 

J.*

 

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by 

the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.