1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

HAMID REZA AMERIFAR, Plaintiff ,

v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, et al. , Defendants

. Case No. 1:23-cv-3182 (ACR)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff is an Iranian citizen who has applied for an immigrant visa to move to the United States. In February 2023, consul ar officers at the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan refused Plaintiff’s application pending further admi nistrative processing. After eight months without further developments, Plaintiff joined th e ever-growing throng of litigants in this District challenging visa-processing delays. Plaintiff’s frustration is understandable, but his Complaint does not state any plausible claims. The Court must ther efore dismiss this case without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND A. Legal Background Certain noncitizens whose spouses have obtained lawful permanen t resident status in this country may apply for immigrant visas to move to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2)(A). The applicant’s spouse begins the process by filing an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a subagency of the Department of Homeland Security. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1). If USCIS approves the petition and th e applicant is outside the Unite d States, the agency forwards the case to the State Department’s National Vi sa Center (NVC) for processing. 8 C.F.R.2 § 204.2(a)(3). The applicant must then submit additional paperwork, including a visa application form. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 42.62-.63; 9 Foreign Affs. Manual § 504.1-2(b), ht tps://fam.state.gov/ FAM/09FAM/09FAM050401.html [https://perma.cc/E ND7-MHKW]. Once the applicant meets those requirements, the NVC coordinates with th e appropriate consulate or embassy to schedule the applicant for a required consular interview. See 22 C.F.R. § 42.62; 9 Foreign Affs. Manual § 504.1-2(b)-(d). Following the interview, the consular officer “must” generally either “issue the visa” or “refuse the visa.” 1 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a). If the consular officer determines that she needs additional information to determine the appli cant’s eligibility, she may, “in accordance with [State] Department procedures,” refuse the vi sa pending “further administrative processing.” Administrative Processing Information , U.S. Dep’t of State, http s://travel.state.gov/content/ travel/en/us-visas/visa-inform ation-resources /administrative-proces sing-information.html [https://perma.cc/6SZ5-EL3B]. B. Factual Background The Court takes the facts from Plaintiff’s Complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC , 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Plaintiff Hamid Reza Amerifar is an Iranian citizen. Dkt. 1 (Compl.) ¶ 8. His wife, Sohelia Entezari, is a U.S. lawful permanent resident. Id. In January 2019, Entezari filed an I130 petition on Plaintiff’s behalf. Id. ¶ 9. USCIS approved the peti tion and transferred it to the NVC in May 2020. See id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff submitted an onlin e visa application form in August 2020, id. ¶ 11, and interviewed with consular officials at the U. S. Embassy in Yerevan in

1 The consular officer must instead “discontinue granting the visa” if the applicant’s country is subject to visa sanctions under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(d) . 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a). No party argues that such sanctions apply to Iran.3 February 2023, id. ¶ 12. “After the interview, Plaintiff received a noti ce . . . informing him that his [a]pplication had been refused for administrative processing.” Id. ¶ 13. Consular officials “request[ed] further inform ation,” which Plaintiff subm itted that same month. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. Plaintiff’s applicati on remains in adminis trative processing. Id. ¶ 17; Dkt. 12. He has “regularly” inquired into the st atus of his application but has received no “explanation or justification for the delay.” Compl. ¶ 16. The wait “has caused [Plaintiff] and his wife . . . to suffer significant, ongoing ha rm in that they remain in legal l imbo as to whether they are able to start their lives together as a married couple in the Un ited States.” Compl. ¶ 18. C. Procedural Background Plaintiff filed this case against Secretar y of State Antony J. Blinken and the U.S. Department of State in October 2023. Compl. Citing both the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706, and the Manda mus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, the Complaint asserts that the delay in in ad judicating Plaintiff’s application is unreasonable and requests an order requiring prompt adjudi cation. Compl. ¶¶ 29-46; id. at 9-10. Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint in January 2024. Dkt. 6 (Mot.).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS Defendants’ Motion seeks dismissal both under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and unde r Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. When a defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintif f bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. E.g. , Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Where, as here, “the defendant challenges only the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations,” Phoenix Consulting, Inc. v. Republic of Angola , 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the Court “assume[s] the truth of all material fact ual allegations in the complaint and construe[s]4 the complaint liberally, granting [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged,” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. , 642 F.3d at 1139 (cleaned up). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contai n sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up). To meet that standard, a pl aintiff’s allegations must support a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but itasks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (cleaned up). “Where a co mplaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitl ement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up).
III. ANALYSIS Defendants argue both that Plai ntiff lacks standing to sue Se cretary Blinken and that the Complaint does not state any plausible claims. 2 Readers familiar with the Court’s past visadelay decisions will be unsurprised to learn that “[t]he Court rejects the first argument but agrees with the second.” Shahnia v. U.S. Dep’t of State , No. 23-cv-2337, 2024 WL 3202225, at *2 (D.D.C June 27, 2024).
A. Plaintiff Has Standing to Sue Secretary Blinken
Defendants contend that Plaintiff lacks st anding—which requires, among other things, “that a favorable decision will likely redress” Plaintiff’s injuries, City of Scottsdale v. FAA , 37

2 Defendants also argue that the consular nonreviewability doctrin e bars Plaintiff’s claims and that Defendants do not have any clear, nondisc retionary duty to act, as is necessary for a mandamus claim. Mot. at 6-18. Neither argument implicates the Court’s Article III jurisdiction, and so the Court need not address them be fore dismissing this case on the merits. See Rashidian v. Garland , No. 23-cv-1187, 2024 WL 1076810, at *5 & n. 5 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2024) (explaining why the Court may bypass these arguments).5 F.4th 678, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (cleaned up)—to su e Secretary Blinken because only a consular officer (and not the Secretary) can adjudicate his visa application. See Mot. at 5-6. “This Court, like many (though not all) others in this District, has previously re jected this argument, and it stands by that conclusion.” Shahnia , 2024 WL 3202225, at *2. “[W]hile the Secretary . . . has no legal authority to control which visa applicat ions consular officers grant or deny, nothing precludes him from di recting them to decide pending applic ations within a reasonable time, and an order requiring him to do so would likely redress Plaint iff[’s] injuries by ending the challenged delay.” Id. (cleaned up). Pl aintiff has standing.
B. Plaintiff Has Not Stated Pl ausible Unreasonable-Delay Claims The Court turns to the merits of Plaintiff’s unreasonable-delay clai ms under the APA and the Mandamus Act. “[T]he central question” under both statutes is “wheth er the agency’s delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus.” Barazandeh v. U.S. Dep’t of State , No. 23-cv-1581, 2024 WL 341166, at *6 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2024) (quoting In re Core Commc’ns, Inc. , 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). To answer that question, courts in this Circuit consider the six “ TRAC ” factors, drawn from the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Telecommunications Research & Action Center (TRAC) v.
FCC , 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984): (1) “[T]he time ag encies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason”; (2) “where Congre ss has provided a timeta ble or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason”; (3) “delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human hea lth and welfare are at stake”; (4) “the court should consider the effect of e xpediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority ”; (5) “the court should also take into account the nature and extent6 of the interests prejudiced by de lay”; and (6) “the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold th at agency action is unreasonably delayed.” Id. at 80 (cleaned up). “These considerations are of ten grouped into four basic inquiries”: First, is there any rhyme or reas on—congressionally prescribed or otherwise—for an agency’s delay (factors one and two)? Second, what are the consequences of delay if the Court does not compel the agency to act (factors three and fi ve)? Third, how might forcing the agency to act thwart its ability to address other priorities (factor four)? Finally, is the delay intent ional or due to a ny impropriety on the part of the agency (factor six)?
Khazaei v. Blinken , No. 23-cv-1419, 2023 WL 6065095, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2023) (cleaned up). Conducting these four inquiries, the Court concludes that the TRAC factors do not plausibly point Plaintiff’s way, making dismissal appropriate. See Da Costa v. Immigr. Inv. Program Off. , 80 F.4th 330, 340-46 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (affir ming dismissal of visa-delay case for failure to state a claim based on TRAC factors).
1. TRAC factors one and two The first two factors, which consider whethe r the agency is following a “rule of reason,” “congressionally prescribed or otherwise,” Khazaei , 2023 WL 6065095, at *6 (cleaned up), support dismissal. Plaintiff con cedes that “no congressional ma ndate on the t ime frame [sic] exists.” Dkt. 7 (Opp.) at 21. As a result, the que stion is whether Plainti ff plausibly alleges that there is no “rhyme or re ason” behind the delay. Khazaei , 2023 WL 6065095, at *6 (cleaned up). Plaintiff has not done so. An agency “em ploys a rule of reason” when it processes immigration applications on a “first-in, first-out” basis. Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 340-41. Plaintiff asserts in his Opposition that “Defendants are clearly not” employing such a methodology, but he cites no allegations in the Complaint—nor any outside facts of which the Court can take7 judicial notice—to s upport that assertion. 3 Opp. at 19. In the absence of such allegations, “[c]ourts in this jurisdiction often look to the length of delay as a r ough yardstick to determine whether [a] ‘first-in, first-out’ ru le is, in fact, being applied,” Khoshrou v. Blinken , No. 22-cv2859, 2023 WL 4930086, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2023); accord, e.g. , Barazandeh , 2024 WL 341166, at *8 (“Absent a congressionally supplied ya rdstick, courts typically turn to [case law] as a guideline.” (cleaned up)). Case law confir ms that the delay here is neither unusual nor inconsistent with a rule of reas on. Visa processing inevitably “t akes a baseline amount of time,” and “courts have generally found that immigration delays in excess of five, six, seven years are unreasonable, while those between three to five years are often not unreasonable.” Khazaei , 2023 WL 6065095, at *6. The delay here—roughly eigh teen-and-a-half months since Plaintiff’s interview—is similar to or shor ter than those that courts have found reasonable in other cases involving visa applications placed in administrative processing. 4 See, e.g. , Bahrami v. Blinken , No. 23-cv-1477, 2024 WL 3638200, at *7 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2024) (twenty-month delay); Barazandeh , 2024 WL 341166, at *7-8 (same). The lengt h of the delay, standing alone, thus

3 Even if Plaintiff had provided support for this assert ion, it would not necessa rily mean that the first TRAC factor points his way. A “first -in, first-out” appr oach is not the only rational way in which the agency might process applications. Af ter all, different “applic ations have different levels of complexity and present different challenges.” Jahangiri v. U.S. Dep’t of State , No. 23- cv-3029, 2024 WL 3443492, at *6 (D.D.C. July 15, 2024). But, since Plainti ff offers nothing but bare speculation, the Court does not discuss this possibility further.

4 Courts disagree as to th e details of how to calculate delay in cases like this one—for example, whether the relevant end date is the day of the case’s filing or the day of the decision. See, e.g. , Dehkordi v. Bitter , No. 22-cv-2470, 2 023 WL 5651845, at *4 n.4 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2023). Plaintiff emphasizes that the dela y here stems from his applicatio n’s placement in administrative processing and generally measur es the delay from the date of his consular interview. See, e.g. , Opp. at 17-21. The Court follows Plaintiff’s lead in treating his intervie w date as the starting point and assumes, favorably to Plain tiff, that the delay runs through today.8 does not support a reasonable inference that the agency is not processi ng applications in an orderly, rational way. The first two TRAC factors favor Defendants.
2. TRAC factor four The fourth factor, “the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority,” TRAC , 750 F.2d at 80, “carries significant weight,” Barazandeh , 2024 WL 341166, at *9, and heavily favors Defendants. The D.C. Circuit has “refus ed to grant relief, even though all the other factors considered in TRAC favored it, where a ju dicial order putting [a party] at the head of the queue would simply move all others back one space and produce no net gain.” Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton , 336 F.3d 1094, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). Plaintiff seeks precisely this sort of relief. “Consul ar processing capacity is . . . a zero-sum game, so gr anting [Plaintiff] relief would ne cessarily mean additional delays for other applicants—many of whom undoubted ly face hardships of their own.” Ahmadi v. Scharpf , No. 23-cv-953, 2024 WL 551542, at *6 (D.D .C. Feb. 12, 2024) (cleaned up); accord Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 343-44. “Any such reordering of the queue of a pplicants seeking adjudication would be inappropriate . . . because there would be no demonstrable net gain in visa processing at large.” Ahmadi , 2024 WL 551542, at *6 (cleaned up); accord Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 343-44. Plaintiff replies that this analysis “assu me[s] without any fact ual basis that . . . Plaintiff’s . . . [a]pplication [is] not already at the front of the li ne or completely ignored by . . . Defendants.” Opp. at 19 (cleaned up). If Plainti ff has already reached the front of the line, he has no need for judicial intervention. In any ev ent, he bears the burde n of alleging sufficient facts to support a “reasonable in ference that [Defendants are] lia ble for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. The Court has already explai ned why the length of the delay thus far, standing alone, cuts against Plaintiff’s claims, see supra Section III.B.1, and he cites no other9 allegations showing that Defe ndants have deprioritized hi s application. The fourth TRAC factor “weighs against judicial intervention.” Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 344.
3. TRAC factors three and five
TRAC factors three and five, which examine “t he interests prejudiced by the delay,” including the effect on “hum an health and welfare,” Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 344 (quoting TRAC , 750 F.2d at 80), arguably cut marginally in Pl aintiff’s favor but do not outweigh the other factors. Plaintiff alleges that the delay has “separated [him] from his wife” and thereby created “significant, ongoing harm,” Compl. ¶ 18; Opp. at 22, and courts in this District have concluded that similar allegations tilted these factors in other plaint iffs’ favor, if only narrowly, see, e.g. , Siddiqui v. Blinken , 646 F. Supp. 3d 69, 77 (D.D.C. 2022) (finding that the third and fifth TRAC factors “slightly” favored a visa-delay plaintif f based on an allegation that the delay “‘had a profound and negative im pact’ on his life”). But see Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 344-45 (concluding that these factors did not favor visa-delay plaintiffs absent ha rms beyond “the uncertainty that results any time an individual mu st continue to wait to secure a benefit”). But, however understandable Plaintiff’s dist ress may be, “many others faci ng similar circumstances” are experiencing the same harm. Siddiqui , 646 F. Supp. 3d at 77 (cleaned up); accord Bahrami , 2024 WL 3638200, at *7 (“[D]elays in visa processi ng separate . . . many fa milies.”). Without more pressing or unusual injuries, TRAC factors three and five do not warrant interfering with the agency’s priorities and placing Pl aintiff at the front of the line. See Da Costa , 80 F.4th at
344-45.
4. TRAC factor six The sixth TRAC factor—whether “any impropriety lurk[s] behind agency lassitude,”
TRAC , 750 F.2d at 80 (cleaned up)—doe s not favor either side. Pl aintiff acknowledges that he10 “has not alleged any impropriety.” Opp. at 24. Because the Court “need not find any [impropriety] in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed,” this factor is neutral.
Da Costa , 80 F.4th at 345-46 (cleaned up).
* * * The TRAC factors do not plausibly point Plaint iff’s way, and his unreasonable-delay claims therefore fail.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER The Court sympathizes with Plaintiff’s s ituation, but his Comp laint does not state plausible unreasonable-delay claims. The Court therefore dismisses this case. For these reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 6;
DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint, Dkt. 1, a nd this case without prejudice; and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close this case.
SO ORDERED. This is a final appealable Order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).

Date: August 22, 2024 _________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge