[Cite as State v. Nichter, 2016-Ohio-7268.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 15AP-886 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 10CR-7383)

Daniel J. Nichter, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellee. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on October 11, 2016 

 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 

Taylor, for appellant. 

On brief: Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, David H. 

Thomas, and Kathryn S. Wallrabenstein, for appellee. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

SADLER, J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, State of Ohio, appeals from a decision of the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas granting the request of defendant-appellee, Daniel J. 

Nichter, for judicial release. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶ 2} On December 20, 2010, appellant filed an indictment charging appellee 

with 1 count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity under R.C. 2923.32, 1 count of 

theft under R.C. 2913.02, 22 counts of identity fraud under R.C. 2913.49, 20 counts of 

forgery under R.C. 2913.31, and 4 counts of receiving stolen property under R.C. 2913.51. 

The indictment alleged that appellee had held himself out as several different licensed 
No. 15AP-886 2 

residential real estate appraisers and forged appraisals in their names, resulting in a 

number of banks lending mortgage loans valued over $1,000,000. 

{¶ 3} Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellee pled guilty to three counts of identity 

fraud, each a second-degree felony under R.C. 2913.49, on November 17, 2011. The 

parties jointly recommended to the trial court sentences of four years on each count, to 

run concurrently. 

{¶ 4} On January 13, 2012, the trial court accepted appellee's plea on three counts 

of identity theft and dismissed the remaining counts. Appellee was sentenced to four 

years of imprisonment on each count, all to be served concurrently, and ordered him to 

write letters of apology to the victims. 

{¶ 5} After serving seven months, appellee filed a motion for judicial release on 

August 12, 2012. The trial court overruled the motion but indicated that it would 

reconsider the request after appellee had served one year of his sentence. 

{¶ 6} Appellee filed another motion for judicial release on May 24, 2013. The trial 

court held a hearing on November 22, 2013 to consider the motion. Appellant urged the 

trial court to deny the motion based on the seriousness of the crime. The trial court 

granted the motion and granted appellee judicial release, and appellant appealed. 

{¶ 7} We reversed, holding that the trial court had failed to make the "very 

specific set of findings" required by R.C. 2929.20(J) and to "justify its findings with an 

analysis of the relevant R.C. 2929.12 factors." State v. Nichter, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-34, 

2014-Ohio-4226, ¶ 13 ("Nichter I"). 

{¶ 8} The trial court held a second hearing on November 14, 2014, at which time 

it read the statutory language into the record and granted appellee's request. Appellant 

appealed the decision of the trial court citing the seriousness of the offense. 

{¶ 9} Once again, we reversed. State v. Nichter, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-40, 2015-

Ohio-3489 ("Nichter II"). We noted that the trial court "read verbatim" the language of 

the statute and "acknowledged the required statutory findings" but "failed to actually 

make the findings required" by the statute. Id. at ¶ 8-9. 

{¶ 10} The trial court held a third hearing on September 10, 2015. Appellant again 

asserted that granting judicial release would demean the seriousness of the offenses. One 
No. 15AP-886 3 

of appellee's victims, Dirk Reece, described the damage to his professional reputation 

caused by appellee's offenses and informed the court that appellee had delayed in writing 

a letter of apology that the court had required. 

{¶ 11} After reviewing the procedural history of the case, the trial court went 

through each of the statutory factors under R.C. 2929.12 and determined whether or not 

they applied to appellee. The court cited appellee's previous lack of a criminal record, its 

conclusion that appellee was unlikely to offend again, the restitution that appellee had 

been making, and appellee's "genuine remorse." (Sept. 10, 2015 Tr. at 17.) 

{¶ 12} After emphasizing the purposes of the felony sentencing statute, the trial 

court concluded with the following observations: 

This court continues to be sensitive to the life-changing 

challenges that Mr. Reece and the other victims in this case 

have faced and will continue to face, and does not take lightly 

the pain, shame, and embarrassment that each has suffered. 

However, this court also believes that [appellee] has learned 

an invaluable lesson from the almost two years of 

incarceration that he has served, and it should be clear to him 

based on this court's intolerance for those who fail to abide by 

its orders, that this court would have no issue or qualm with 

returning [appellee] to the institution should he fail to abide 

by the laws of the state and the conditions of his community 

control. 

This court now believes that [appellee] should be permitted to 

begin the phase of this process that is contemplated by 

statutory requirements in setting out the purposes and 

principles of felony sentencing, making restitution to his 

victims and to the community that trusted him to serve it 

consistent with the standards associated with his profession. 

[Appellee's counsel], is there anything else that you would like 

to place on the record? 

[APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, out of an abundance 

of caution, may I make an inquiry of the court, so we have a 

full record here. The court may have said this, but is the court 

finding pursuant to 2929.20(J)(1)(B), that judicial release in 

this case did not demean the seriousness of [appellee's] 

conduct, and I assume the court adopts its reasoning and its 

analysis of 2929.12 factors in making such a finding? 
No. 15AP-886 4 

THE COURT: Correct. Pursuant to Revised Code Sections 

2929.20(J)(1)(B), the court will find that a sanction other than 

a prison term would not demean the seriousness of the 

offense. 

(Tr. at 25-26.) 

{¶ 13} Appellant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court. 

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶ 14} Appellant assigns the following as error: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDICIAL 

RELEASE IN THE ABSENCE OF RECORD SUPPORT FOR 

THE NECESSARY FINDING RELATED TO SERIOUSNESS. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

{¶ 15} As a matter of right, appellant may appeal a trial court's decision modifying 

a previously imposed sentence for a felony of the first or second degree by a grant of 

judicial release. R.C. 2953.08(B)(3). The standard or review applied by an appellate 

court in reviewing a trial court's decision to grant judicial release is found in R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2), which provides as follows: 

The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of 

this section shall review the record, including the findings 

underlying the sentence or modification given by the 

sentencing court. 

The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify 

a sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate 

the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court 

for resentencing. The appellate court’s standard for review is 

not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The 

appellate court may take any action authorized by this 

division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the 

following: 

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's 

findings under * * * division (I) of section 2929.20 of the 

Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant; 

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 
No. 15AP-886 5 

{¶ 16} Appellant's assignment of error alleges only that the trial court's findings 

regarding the factors listed in R.C. 2929.12(C) are clearly and convincingly unsupported 

by the evidence in the record. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a). Appellant does not challenge the 

trial court's decision as being clearly and convincingly "contrary to law" under R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2)(b).1 Accordingly, we will confine our analysis to the argument made by the 

assignment of error. App.R. 12(A) and 16. 

{¶ 17} In State v. Marcum, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 22, the Supreme 

Court of Ohio recently construed R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) in the context of an appeal from a 

trial court determination regarding judicial release. The court held that "R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2)(a) compels appellate courts to modify or vacate sentences if they find by 

clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support any relevant findings 

under '* * * section 2929.20 of the Revised Code.' " Id., quoting R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a), 

citing State v. Belew, 140 Ohio St.3d 221, 2014-Ohio-2964, ¶ 12 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting 

from the decision to dismiss the appeal as having been improvidently accepted). 

{¶ 18} "Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is 

more than a mere 'preponderance of the evidence,' but not to the extent of such certainty 

as is required 'beyond a reasonable doubt' in criminal cases, and which will produce in the 

mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be 

established." Id., quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of 

the syllabus. 

IV. ANALYSIS 

{¶ 19} When considering a defendant's request for judicial release, R.C. 2929.20(J) 

dictates the trial court's analysis. The statute provides as follows: 

(1) A court shall not grant a judicial release under this section 

to an eligible offender who is imprisoned for a felony of the 

first or second degree, * * * unless the court, with reference to 

factors under section 2929.12 of the Revised Code, finds both 

of the following: 

 

1 In the context of felony sentencing under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b), "[a] sentence is contrary to law when it 

imposes a sentence that is not within the statutory range," State v. Scott, 8th Dist. No. 103696, 2016-

Ohio-5929, ¶ 6, citing State v. Younker, 2d Dist. No. 26414, 2015-Ohio-2066, or when the sentencing 

decision " 'manifestly ignores an issue or factor which a statute requires a court to consider.' " State v. 

English, 2d Dist. No. 26337, 2015-Ohio-1665, ¶ 21, quoting State v. Lofton, 2d Dist. No. 19852, 2004-

Ohio-169, ¶ 11. 
No. 15AP-886 6 

(a) That a sanction other than a prison term would 

adequately punish the offender and protect the public from 

future criminal violations by the eligible offender because the 

applicable factors indicating a lesser likelihood of recidivism 

outweigh the applicable factors indicating a greater likelihood 

of recidivism; 

(b) That a sanction other than a prison term would not 

demean the seriousness of the offense because factors 

indicating that the eligible offender's conduct in committing 

the offense was less serious than conduct normally 

constituting the offense outweigh factors indicating that the 

eligible offender's conduct was more serious than conduct 

normally constituting the offense. 

(2) A court that grants a judicial release to an eligible offender 

under division (J)(1) of this section shall specify on the record 

both findings required in that division and also shall list all 

the factors described in that division that were presented at 

the hearing. 

{¶ 20} As set out above, in Nichter I, we ordered the trial court to make the "very 

specific set of findings" required by R.C. 2929.20(J) and to "justify its findings with an 

analysis of the relevant R.C. 2929.12 factors." Id. at ¶ 13. In Nichter II, we ordered the 

trial court to "actually make the findings required by R.C. 2929.20(J)(1) " and "consider 

the factors in R.C. 2929.12(B) and (C), which address the seriousness of the offender's 

conduct." Id. at ¶ 9. By its assignment of error, appellant concedes that the trial court has 

complied with this court's remand order by making both of the findings required by R.C. 

2929.20(J)(1) and by considering the factors in R.C. 2929.12(B) and (C), which address 

the seriousness of the offender's conduct. Appellant argues, however, the record clearly 

and convincingly fails to support the trial court's finding under R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(b), that 

a sanction other than a prison term would not demean the seriousness of the offense. 

More particularly, appellant claims that the statutory mitigating factors that the trial court 

found to exist in this case are clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. 

Accordingly, appellant maintains that the trial court committed reversible error in finding 

that statutory factors indicating that the eligible offender's conduct in committing the 

offense was less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense outweighed the 
No. 15AP-886 7 

factors indicating that appellee's conduct was more serious than conduct normally 

constituting the offense. We agree. 

{¶ 21} R.C. 2929.12 lists the factors that a trial court must consider in determining 

the seriousness of the offender's conduct. R.C. 2929.12(B), which sets forth the "more 

serious" factors, provides as follows: 

The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that 

apply regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim, and 

any other relevant factors, as indicating that the offender's 

conduct is more serious than conduct normally constituting 

the offense: 

(1) The physical or mental injury suffered by the victim of the 

offense due to the conduct of the offender was exacerbated 

because of the physical or mental condition or age of the 

victim. 

(2) The victim of the offense suffered serious physical, 

psychological, or economic harm as a result of the offense. 

(3) The offender held a public office or position of trust in the 

community, and the offense related to that office or position. 

(4) The offender's occupation, elected office, or profession 

obliged the offender to prevent the offense or bring others 

committing it to justice. 

(5) The offender's professional reputation or occupation, 

elected office, or profession was used to facilitate the offense 

or is likely to influence the future conduct of others. 

(6) The offender's relationship with the victim facilitated the 

offense. 

(7) The offender committed the offense for hire or as a part of 

an organized criminal activity. 

(8) In committing the offense, the offender was motivated by 

prejudice based on race, ethnic background, gender, sexual 

orientation, or religion. 

(9) If the offense is a violation of section 2919.25 or a 

violation of section 2903.11, 2903.12, or 2903.13 of the 

Revised Code involving a person who was a family or 
No. 15AP-886 8 

household member at the time of the violation, the offender 

committed the offense in the vicinity of one or more children 

who are not victims of the offense, and the offender or the 

victim of the offense is a parent, guardian, custodian, or 

person in loco parentis of one or more of those children. 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 22} The trial court found that the first, seventh, eighth, and ninth factors were 

not present. Regarding the second factor, R.C. 2929.12(B)(2), concerning "serious 

physical, psychological, or economic harm as a result of the offense," the trial court stated: 

Without question, that factor is present. I have been honored 

to hear from Mr. Reece on several occasions indicating the 

hardship that he has endured because of [appellee's] choices. 

The court will find that there has been both psychological and 

economic harm that the victim has suffered. 

(Tr. at 18-19.)2

{¶ 23} The trial court found the third factor, R.C. 2929.12(B)(3), which asks 

whether the "offender held a public office or position of trust in the community, and the 

offense related to that office or position," to be relevant. The trial court stated: 

[Appellee] was a licensed real estate appraiser and mortgage 

broker in this state and had been permitted by state executive 

agencies to perform work within certain professional 

standards. He did hold a position of trust in the community. 

(Tr. at 19.) 

{¶ 24} The trial court found the fourth factor to be relevant as well. This factor, 

R.C. 2929.12(B)(4), concerns whether "[t]he offender's occupation, elected office, or 

profession obliged the offender to prevent the offense or bring others committing it to 

justice." The trial court stated: 

Based on the facts of this case, it is clear to the court that 

[appellee] had access to these electronic signatures that 

allowed him to prepare these fraudulent appraisals, and as a 

licensed broker and appraiser, the court would find that he 

would have an obligation to prevent that kind of an offense. 

 

2 Mr. Reece closed his remarks by stating: "on behalf of myself, the other victim in this case, the other 

unknown victims, all of these legal minds in here agreed that four years was a reasonable time for 

[appellee] to serve for adequate punishment and rehabilitation. On behalf of all of the victims in this case, 

I ask Your Honor to impose the original sentence." (Tr. 6-7.)
No. 15AP-886 9 

(Tr. at 19.) 

{¶ 25} The fifth factor, R.C. 2929.12(B)(5), which asks if appellee's "professional 

reputation or occupation, elected office, or profession was used to facilitate the offense or 

is likely to influence the future conduct of others," was found partially applicable. The 

trial court stated: 

While the court will not find that [appellee's] conduct is likely 

to influence the future conduct of others, the court will find 

that his occupation is what allowed him to have access to 

those electronic signatures. 

(Tr. at 20.) 

{¶ 26} The trial court found the sixth factor, R.C. 2929.12(B)(6), concerning 

whether "[t]he offender's relationship with the victim facilitated the offense," to be 

relevant: 

In the presentence investigation report there is a statement 

that [appellee] was working with them. The court is unclear 

whether that statement means that he worked directly with 

Mr. Reece and Ms. Goldsbury, or whether they worked in the 

same profession. But, again, we do know that [appellee] had 

access to those electronic signatures. 

(Tr. at 20.) 

{¶ 27} After this analysis, the trial court turned to consideration of the "less 

serious" factors under R.C. 2929.12(C). The statute provides: 

The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that 

apply regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim, and 

any other relevant factors, as indicating that the offender's 

conduct is less serious than conduct normally constituting 

the offense: 

(1) The victim induced or facilitated the offense. 

(2) In committing the offense, the offender acted under 

strong provocation. 

(3) In committing the offense, the offender did not cause or 

expect to cause physical harm to any person or property. 
No. 15AP-886 10 

(4) There are substantial grounds to mitigate the offender's 

conduct, although the grounds are not enough to constitute a 

defense. 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 28} The trial court found that the first factor was not present. However, the trial 

court found that the second, third, and fourth factors were present. Regarding the second 

factor, R.C. 2929.12(C)(2), which asks whether the defendant "acted under strong 

provocation," the trial court stated: 

From the defendant's perspective, that is present. He stated 

again in his presentence report that he was in dire financial 

straits, and while the court would never find that this was a 

right choice to make, from [appellee's] perspective, he 

believed that he was acting under strong provocation based on 

his dire financial straits. 

(Tr. at 22.) 

{¶ 29} With regard to the third factor, which applies if "the offender did not cause 

or expect to cause physical harm to any person or property," the trial court found that it 

was also present. R.C. 2929.12(C)(3). The trial court found that there was "no physical 

harm to any of the victims involved in this case." (Tr. at 22.). Finally, the court 

considered the fourth factor, R.C. 2929.12(C)(4), which asks whether "[t]here are 

substantial grounds to mitigate the offender's conduct, although the grounds are not 

enough to constitute a defense." Without identifying any particular grounds for 

mitigation, the trial court found that this factor was "present." (Tr. at 22.) The trial court 

then concluded as follows: 

Again, after balancing the factors, the court finds and 

concludes that the defendant's conduct is less serious than 

conduct normally constituting the offense. 

(Tr. at 22.) 

{¶ 30} In order for the trial court to find that a sanction other than a prison term 

would not demean the seriousness of the offense, the trial court was required to weigh the 

factors indicating that appellee's conduct in committing identity fraud was less serious 

than conduct normally constituting identity fraud against the factors indicating that the 

his conduct was more serious than conduct normally constituting that offense. R.C. 
No. 15AP-886 11 

2929.20(J)(1)(b). In this instance, even though the trial court determined that four of the 

statutory "more serious" factors were present, the trial court concluded that those factors 

were outweighed by the three mitigating factors that were present. As noted above, the 

trial court listed three statutory mitigating factors in support of a finding that appellee's 

conduct was less serious than the conduct normally constituting identity fraud: the 

absence of physical harm, strong provocation, and "substantial grounds to mitigate the 

offender's conduct, although the grounds are not enough to constitute a defense." (Tr. at 

22.) Based on these factors, the trial court found that a sanction other than prison would 

not demean the seriousness of the offense. Appellant argues that this finding is clearly 

and convincingly unsupported by the evidence because the statutory mitigating factors 

identified by the trial court were either not present at all or were of dubious value in 

mitigation of appellee's conduct. We agree. 

A. Strong Provocation

{¶ 31} The trial court relied on a statement attributed to appellee in the 

presentencing report as the factual basis for its finding that appellee committed identity 

fraud under "strong provocation." The statement reads, in relevant part, as follows: 

I was in dire straights [sic] financially and could not afford my 

monthly bills. I used someone else's electronic signature on 

appraisals. I did it to make money. 

(Presentence Investigation Report at 4.) 

{¶ 32} R.C. 2929.12 does not define the term "strong provocation"; however, under 

Ohio law, "serious provocation" may reduce the degree of certain violent offenses. See

R.C. 2903.03(A); 2903.12(A). For example, "[a] defendant on trial for murder must show 

by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she acted under the influence of sudden 

passion or in a sudden fit of rage, brought on by the victim's serious provocation, in order 

to be convicted of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder." (Emphasis added.) State 

v. McKinzie, 10th Dist. No. 00AP-1182 (June 5, 2001), citing State v. Rhodes, 63 Ohio 

St.3d 613, 619 (1992). " '[S]erious provocation' " is provocation that is " 'reasonably 

sufficient to bring on extreme stress and * * * reasonably sufficient to incite or to arouse 

the defendant into using deadly force.' " Id., quoting State v. Deem, 40 Ohio St.3d 205 

(1988), paragraph five of the syllabus. 
No. 15AP-886 12 

{¶ 33} Under R.C. 2929.04(B)(2), the existence of "strong provocation" is one of 

the factors the trial court may consider in mitigation of the death penalty. R.C. 

2929.04(B) provides that when certain statutory aggravating circumstance are found, the 

court: 

[S]hall consider, and weigh against the aggravating 

circumstances proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the nature 

and circumstances of the offense, the history, character, and 

background of the offender, and all of the following factors: 

* * * 

(2) Whether it is unlikely that the offense would have been 

committed, but for the fact that the offender was under 

duress, coercion, or strong provocation. 

{¶ 34} The statutory law authorizes a trial court to consider provocation as a 

mitigating factor in cases where the conduct of the victim has incited or aroused the 

offender to commit an offense of violence. Black's Law Dictionary defines "provocation" 

as "[t]he act of inciting another to do something, esp. to commit a crime." Black's Law

Dictionary 1421 (10th Ed.2009). 

{¶ 35} There is no claim by appellee that any of his victims caused or contributed 

to his dire financial straits and inability to afford his monthly bills. Rather, the evidence 

in the record clearly and convincingly supports a finding that appellee's financial 

difficulties were caused by his own chronic overspending. The presentencing 

investigation contains the following information under the heading "Finances": 

In 06/11, the offender declared bankruptcy and approximately 

$200,000.00 was dismissed in Franklin County. He reports 

two prior bankruptcies, one in 1990 in the amount of 

$100,000.00 and the other approximately 8 years ago in the 

amount of $300,000.00. Currently, he states he is struggling 

financially and worries about finances regularly. 

(Presentencing Investigation Report at 9.) 

{¶ 36} In the absence of any evidence suggesting another cause of appellee's 

financial problems, the only reasonable conclusion to draw from this record is that 

appellee caused his own dire financial straits by engaging in chronic overspending. See

State v. Bodkins, 2d Dist No. 10-CA-38, 2011-Ohio-1274 (at sentencing, a defendant is 
No. 15AP-886 13 

entitled to introduce evidence contradicting negative information in the presentencing 

investigation). Even if it were permissible on this record to infer that appellee's dire 

financial straits and inability to afford his monthly bills arose from circumstances outside 

of his control, appellee pointed to no information in the record which would show that he 

was provoked by the victims in this case or by any other third party. Nor has appellee 

cited a single Ohio authority holding that a finding of "strong provocation" may arise from 

the conduct of the offender, and this court has not found any such authority. 

{¶ 37} Additionally, in determining whether provocation is reasonably sufficient, 

Ohio courts "first apply an objective standard by determining whether a reasonable trier 

of fact 'would decide that an actor was reasonably provoked by the victim.' " McKinzie, 

quoting State v. Shane, 63 Ohio St.3d 630, 634 (1992). Then, "[i]t is only when the 

objective standard is met that the Deem test of the 'emotional and mental state of the 

defendant and the conditions and circumstances that surrounded him at the time' must 

be considered." Id., quoting Shane at 634. 

{¶ 38} Here, the trial court found as follows: 

From the defendant's perspective, [provocation] is present. 

He stated again in his presentence report that he was in dire 

financial straits, and while the court would never find that this 

was a right choice to make, from [appellee's] perspective, he 

believed that he was acting under strong provocation based on 

his dire financial straits. 

(Emphasis added.) (Tr. at 22.) 

{¶ 39} The trial court's finding that appellee acted under "strong provocation" is 

based solely on his subjective belief that his financial difficulties compelled him to commit 

the offenses. Consequently, even if it were permissible for the trial court to consider 

appellee's self-induced financial difficulties as "strong provocation," appellee's subjective 

belief that he acted with provocation does not establish the existence of legally sufficient 

provocation. 

{¶ 40} Finally, appellee has not cited any Ohio authority holding that an offender's 

dire financial straits and inability to afford monthly bills qualifies as provocation to 

commit any offense, let alone "strong provocation." At most, appellee's statement at the 

presentencing investigation establishes that he was motivated to commit identity fraud by 
No. 15AP-886 14 

his own selfish need to obtain funds to cover his monthly expenses. The existence of a 

motive to commit the offense is not one of the mitigating factors listed under R.C. 

2929.12(C). 

{¶ 41} Based on the foregoing, we find that the record clearly and convincingly fails 

to support the trial court's determination that in committing identity theft appellee acted 

with "strong provocation." Thus, the trial court erred when it considered provocation as 

one of the factors indicating that appellee's conduct was less serious than conduct 

normally constituting identity fraud. 

B. Absence of Physical Harm

{¶ 42} The trial court also found that the mitigating factor listed in R.C. 

2929.12(C)(3) existed in this case because, in committing identity fraud, appellee "did not 

cause or expect to cause physical harm to any person or property." Though the facts 

underlying appellee's crimes show that the mitigating factor listed in R.C. 2929.12(C)(3) 

exists, we find that this factor is largely irrelevant to the analysis in this case because the 

conduct normally constituting identity fraud creates no risk of physical harm to any 

person or property. R.C. 2913.49. The fact that appellee, in committing identity fraud, 

did not cause or intend to cause physical harm to persons or property does not mean that 

his conduct was less serious than conduct normally constituting that offense. See, e.g., 

State v. Smith, 9th Dist. No. 11CA0115-M, 2012-Ohio-2558, ¶ 7 (for a conviction of a 

single count of trafficking in drugs, none of the mitigating factors under R.C. 2929.12 are 

relevant); State v. McClusky, 6th Dist. No. WD-03-018, 2004-Ohio-85, ¶ 25 (where 

defendant is convicted of cocaine possession, whether or not physical harm was intended 

by appellant's drug abuse was not a relevant mitigating factor for sentencing). In our 

view, the factor listed in R.C. 2929.12(C)(3) is of dubious value in mitigation of appellee's 

conduct. 

C. Other Substantial Grounds

{¶ 43} The trial court employed the catch-all provision of R.C. 2929.12(C)(4) when 

it found that other substantial grounds to mitigate appellee's offenses existed in this case. 

Under the applicable standard of review, this court must determine whether the record 

supports a finding that a sanction other than prison will not demean the seriousness of 

the offense because factors indicating that the eligible offender's conduct in committing 
No. 15AP-886 15 

the offense was less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense outweigh 

factors indicating that the eligible offender's conduct was more serious than conduct 

normally constituting the offense. This court cannot conduct a proper review to 

determine whether the record supports the trial court's finding under R.C. 

2929.20(J)(1)(b), where the trial court fails to identify one of the mitigating factors it 

relied on in conducting the statutory analysis. 

{¶ 44} Nor do we consider it appropriate for this court to assume that the trial 

court treated appellee's financial problems as a mitigating factor under the catch-all 

provision in R.C. 2929.12(C)(4). The trial court expressly stated that it considered 

appellee's dire financial straits as "strong provocation" under R.C. 2929.12(C)(2) and did 

not identify the other "substantial grounds" on which it relied. 

{¶ 45} The Supreme Court recently observed that "R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) compels 

appellate courts to modify or vacate sentences if they find by clear and convincing 

evidence that the record does not support any relevant findings under '* * * section 

2929.20 of the Revised Code.' " Marcum at ¶ 22, quoting R.C. 2943.08(G)(2)(a), citing 

Belew at ¶ 12. There is no dispute in this case that four of the "more serious" factors listed 

in R.C. 2929.12(B) are present in this case. Because we have determined that the record 

clearly and convincingly fails to support the existence of "strong provocation" under R.C. 

2929.12(C)(2), and because the existence of the factor listed in R.C. 2929.12(C)(3) is of 

dubious value in mitigating appellee's conduct in this case, it is difficult to conceive how 

the trial could have found, on this record, that the mitigating factors under R.C. 

2929.12(C) outweighed the R.C. 2929.12(B) factors. Nevertheless, because the trial court 

expressly relied on other "substantial grounds to mitigate [appellee's] conduct," in making 

its finding under R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(b), but did not identify those grounds, rather than 

modify or vacate the trial court's judgment, this matter shall be remanded for the trial 

court to expressly identify the other substantial grounds mitigating appellee's conduct on 

which it relied and to reweigh the statutory factors in light of this decision. (Tr. at 22.) 

{¶ 46} We note that appellant has expressed concern with comments made by the 

trial court indicating that it has no intention of reversing its ruling on appellee's motion 

for judicial release regardless of this court's review. The law of the case doctrine compels 

the trial court to follow the mandates of this court, regardless of any previous statement to 
No. 15AP-886 16 

the contrary. See Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 5 (1984); Hawley v. Ritley, 35 Ohio 

St.3d 157, 160 (1988). Moreover, a court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to rule on a motion 

to recuse a trial court judge or to pass on the disqualification of a trial court judge. See

R.C. 2701.03. 

{¶ 47} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain appellant's sole assignment of error. 

V. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 48} Having sustained appellant's sole assignment of error, we reverse the 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas and remand the cause for 

further proceedings consistent with this decision. 

Judgment reversed;

cause remanded.

LUPER SCHUSTER, J., concurs. 

HORTON, J., dissents. 

HORTON, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 49} Although the majority cites R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) and the definition of "clear 

and convincing" found in State v. Marcum, __Ohio St.3d. __, 2016-Ohio-1002, the 

standard of review it applies falls far short of the deference required by the authorities 

cited below. In fact, I believe that the standard that the majority actually applies is not 

only insufficiently deferential to the trial court but, as explained below, contrary to the 

Supreme Court of Ohio's controlling interpretation of the language of R.C. 2953.08. For 

the following reasons, I respectfully dissent. 

{¶ 50} The standard of review that this court must apply to appeals of felony 

sentences and sentence modifications arising from judicial release is set forth under R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2): 

The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of 

this section shall review the record, including the findings 

underlying the sentence or modification given by the 

sentencing court. 

The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify 

a sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate 

the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court 

for resentencing. The appellate court's standard for review is 

not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The 

appellate court may take any action authorized by this 
No. 15AP-886 17 

division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the 

following: 

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's 

findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division 

(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 

2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant; 

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 

(Emphasis added.) 

"Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of 

proof which is more than a mere 'preponderance of the 

evidence,' but not to the extent of such certainty as is required 

'beyond a reasonable doubt' in criminal cases, and which will 

produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or 

conviction as to the facts sought to be established." 

Marcum at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of 

the syllabus (construing R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) on appeal of a felony sentence). 

{¶ 51} The Eighth District Court of Appeals explained the deference required by 

the R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) standard of review as follows: 

It is important to understand that the "clear and convincing" 

standard applied in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) is not discretionary. 

In fact, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) makes it clear that "[t]he 

appellate court's standard for review is not whether the 

sentencing court abused its discretion." As a practical 

consideration, this means that appellate courts are 

prohibited from substituting their judgment for that of the 

trial judge. 

It is also important to understand that the clear and 

convincing standard used by R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) is written in 

the negative. It does not say that the trial judge must have 

clear and convincing evidence to support its findings. 

Instead, it is the court of appeals that must clearly and 

convincingly find that the record does not support the court's 

findings. In other words, the restriction is on the appellate 

court, not the trial judge. This is an extremely deferential 

standard of review. 
No. 15AP-886 18 

State v. Venes, 8th Dist. No. 98682, 2013-Ohio-1891, ¶ 20-21 (remanding for 

resentencing after trial court's failure to "make separate and distinct findings" required 

by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before imposing consecutive sentences). 

{¶ 52} First, a word about R.C. 2953.08. The first subdivision, R.C. 2953.08(A), 

enumerates the grounds under which a defendant may appeal a felony sentence. The 

second subdivision, R.C. 2953.08(B), does the same for the state, but also allows the state 

to appeal a sentence modification due to judicial release granted under R.C. 2929.20. In 

contrast, the statute does not grant a defendant the right to appeal a denial of a request 

for judicial release. See R.C. 2953.08(B); State v. Hedgecoth, 1st Dist. No. C-060190, 

2007-Ohio-4462, ¶ 9. However, the state may only appeal a sentence modification based 

on judicial release if the original sentence "was imposed for a felony of the first or second 

degree." R.C. 2953.08(B)(3). This distinction demonstrates an elementary jurisdictional 

principle: "the state may appeal in a criminal case only when a statute gives the state 

express authority to do so." State v. Thompson, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-841, 2004-Ohio3229, ¶ 11, citing Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2). Thus, the scope of the 

state's right to appeal a sentence modification extends only as far as the statute describes. 

{¶ 53} The Supreme Court of Ohio addressed the scope of the state's right to 

appeal a sentence modification based on judicial release in State v. Cunningham, 113 

Ohio St.3d 108, 2007-Ohio-1245. In Cunningham, a defendant was sentenced to 

community control after pleading guilty to a felony of the fifth degree, theft under R.C. 

2913.02. Id. at ¶ 2. After the defendant violated the terms of the community control 

sentence, the trial court imposed a one-year term of incarceration. Id. Two months after 

the sentence began, the defendant filed a motion for judicial release under R.C. 2929.20 

but withdrew the motion before the trial court could rule on it. Id. at ¶ 2. After filing a 

second motion for judicial release, the defendant also moved the trial court to "reinstate" 

the first motion. Id. at ¶ 3. The trial court granted the motion and modified the 

defendant's sentence. Id.

{¶ 54} The state appealed, asserting that the second motion was untimely and, 

therefore, a judicial release determination that it was entitled to appeal as "contrary to 

law" under R.C. 2953.08(B)(2). Id. at ¶ 12. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding no 
No. 15AP-886 19 

grounds for the appeal based on the plain language of R.C. 2953.08(B). The statute 

allows that the state: 

"[M]ay appeal as a matter of right a sentence imposed upon a 

defendant who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony or, 

in the circumstances described in division (B)(3) of this 

section the modification of a sentence imposed upon such a 

defendant, on any of the following grounds: 

* * * 

(2) The sentence is contrary to law. 

(3) The sentence is a modification under section 2929.20 of 

the Revised Code of a sentence that was imposed for a felony 

of the first or second degree." 

Id. at ¶ 7-10, quoting R.C. 2953.08(B). 

{¶ 55} In its analysis, Cunningham first observed that: 

[T]he plain language of R.C. 2953.08(B)(3) does not include 

any reference to a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree. 

By including only felonies of the first and second degree 

within the text of (B)(3), the General Assembly has excluded 

all other felony offenses of a lesser degree because "the 

express inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of the 

other." 

Id. at ¶ 20, quoting Myers v. Toledo, 110 Ohio St.3d 218, 2006-Ohio-4353, ¶ 24. 

{¶ 56} Cunningham also rejected the state's argument that it could appeal a 

sentence modification under the "contrary to law" prong of R.C. 2953.08(B)(2): 

Finally, we recognize that the state, relying on R.C. 

2953.08(B)(2), contends that it has a right to appeal a 

sentence modification that is contrary to law. Here, it urges 

that the court acted contrary to law in permitting 

Cunningham to reinstate a motion that had been withdrawn 

and that would have been untimely if it were refiled. A 

careful examination of R.C. 2953.08(B)(2), however, reveals 

that it does not refer to the modification of a sentence; 

rather, it authorizes the prosecuting attorney to appeal, as a 

matter of right, a sentence imposed on a defendant on the 

grounds that "[t]he sentence is contrary to law." Thus, it 
No. 15AP-886 20 

does not apply to a modification of a sentence that is 

allegedly contrary to law. 

(Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 22. 

{¶ 57} For two reasons, the majority's decision is inconsistent with the holding and 

analysis in Cunningham. First, the majority's predominant rationale for reversal is that 

the trial court applied a legally incorrect definition of "strong provocation" under R.C. 

2929.12(C)(2). Yet, Cunningham holds there is no right to appeal a sentence 

modification that is contrary to law. The majority has allowed the state to bring such an 

appeal by entertaining and accepting the argument that the trial court's definition of one 

of the "less serious" factors under R.C. 2929.12(C) that led to the sentence modification 

was contrary to "Ohio law." (Appellant's Brief at 47.) 

{¶ 58} Second, the Supreme Court's act of statutory interpretation in Cunningham

applies with equal force to the language defining the standard of review under R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2) for appeals of sentences and sentence modifications. The consequence of 

applying that interpretation is that the R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) standard of review does not 

allow an appellate court to reverse a sentence modification if it is contrary to law. In 

setting forth the standard of review, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) states that the appellate court 

must "clearly and convincingly find[] either of the following: (a) That the record does not 

support the sentencing court's findings under * * * of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code 

* * *; [or] (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law." The statute's failure to 

"refer to the modification of a sentence" in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) is identical to the 

omission in R.C. 2953.08(B)(2) that led Cunningham to hold that the provision did not 

apply to sentence modifications through judicial release, only appeals of original 

sentences. Id. at ¶ 22. Further indication that the standard of review for sentence 

modifications extends only to whether "the record does not support the sentencing court's 

findings" is the explicit reference in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) to 2929.20, the judicial release 

statute, which is not referenced in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b), the "otherwise contrary to law" 

prong. 

{¶ 59} Recognizing that the standard of review of sentence modifications based on 

judicial release determinations is confined to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) is only logical. If the 

standard of review of judicial release determinations extended to whether they were 
No. 15AP-886 21 

"otherwise contrary to law," Cunningham's holding that the state has no right of appeal 

arising from a judicial release determination that is "contrary to law" under R.C. 

2953.08(B)(2) would be rendered a nullity. The applicable standard of review cannot 

enlarge the scope of the state's right of appeal.3

{¶ 60} For the foregoing reasons, I believe that the majority is precluded from 

applying a standard of review that allows reversal of the trial court on the grounds that the 

judicial release determination resulting in a sentence modification was "otherwise 

contrary to law." R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a). Based on the reference in the assignment of 

error to the "record," the majority states that the state "does not challenge the trial court's 

decision as being clearly and convincingly 'contrary to law' under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b)," 

and accordingly "confine[s]" its analysis to the question of whether the record supports 

the trial court's findings under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a). (Majority Decision at ¶ 16.) 

Regardless of the reference to the "record" in the assignment of error, the state's 

argument that the trial court applied a definition of "strong provocation" that is legally 

incorrect under "Ohio law" is, in effect, a stealth attempt to seek review of that finding 

under the "contrary to law" standard of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b). (Appellant's Brief at 47.) 

And, in spite of its assurances to the contrary, the majority's analysis amounts to an 

application of that standard. The majority is careful to couch its criticism in terms of the 

record and avoid use of the term "contrary to law," as when, for example, it states that 

"the record clearly and convincingly fails to support the trial court's determination that in 

committing identity theft appellee acted with 'strong provocation.' " (Majority Decision at 

¶ 41.) Yet, this is the standard the majority actually applies when it rejects the R.C. 

2929.12(C)(2) definition of "strong provocation" applied by the trial court. The majority's 

 

3 In light of the analysis in Cunningham, I believe that this court's decision in State v. Williams, 10th Dist. 

No. 10AP-55, 2010-Ohio-4519, ¶ 10, improperly applied the "contrary to law" standard to the state's 

appeal of a judicial release determination when it accepted the state's assertion that the "trial court's 

decision [was] contrary to law because it did not comply with R.C. 2929.20(H) when it failed to mention 

the factors listed in R.C. 2929.12 and how they factored into its decision to grant judicial release." In such 

a situation, however, it is unnecessary to reference or apply the "contrary to law" standard under R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2)(b) when a trial court fails to make the findings required by R.C. 2929.20 because a 

separate provision of the statute expressly addresses this error. R.C. 2953.08(G)(1) requires the court of 

appeals to "remand the case to the sentencing court and instruct the sentencing court to state, on the 

record, the required findings" for failure to make them in accordance with R.C. 2929.20. 
No. 15AP-886 22 

entire analysis flows from the principle that the definition applied by the trial court was 

contrary to law. 

{¶ 61} Even if this were grounds for reversing the trial court, the definition of 

"strong provocation" that the majority faults the trial court for not applying is 

unpersuasive. Conceding that "R.C. 2929.12 does not define the term 'strong 

provocation,' " the majority looks to several other sources to support a definition of 

provocation that necessarily involves an affirmative act by a third party. (Majority 

Decision at ¶ 32.) It cites the use of the term "serious provocation" as an element of 

several violent offenses, voluntary manslaughter under R.C. 2903.03(A) and aggravated 

assault under R.C. 2903.12(A), where the term describes an attendant circumstance not 

found in the more serious counterparts of those offenses (murder and felonious assault). 

While the similarity of the terms "strong provocation" and "serious provocation" makes 

this a superficially appealing comparison, both offense statutes specifically refer to 

"serious provocation occasioned by the victim." (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2903.03(A) and 

2903.12(A). In contrast, the R.C. 2929.12(C) factor in question contains no reference to a 

victim or third party. It simply states "[i]n committing the offense, the offender acted 

under strong provocation." R.C. 2929.12(C)(2). This broader, more general use of the 

term "provocation" should not be limited by reference to a more restricted use of it in a 

completely different statute. 

{¶ 62} Furthermore, the majority selectively quotes the dictionary entry on 

"provocation" from Black's Law Dictionary. It only quotes the first definition: "1. The act 

of inciting another to do something, esp. to commit a crime." Black's Law Dictionary 1421 

(10th Ed.2009). The majority omits the second definition: "2. Something (such as words 

or actions) that affects a person's reason and self-control, esp. causing the person to 

commit a crime impulsively." Id. The second definition is substantially broader and, 

although it includes "words or actions," is not limited to them. Rather, it recognizes that 

"something" may provoke the offender. The trial court's findings comport with this 

definition. 

{¶ 63} Further demonstrating that the majority is actually reviewing the trial 

court's decision under the "contrary to law" standard, it admonishes Nichter for not citing 

"a single Ohio authority holding that a finding of 'strong provocation' may arise from the 
No. 15AP-886 23 

conduct of the offender, and this court has not found any such authority." (Majority 

Decision at ¶ 36.) Even if it were proper to apply this standard–which, for the reasons 

discussed, it is not under Cunningham—Nichter does not bear the burden on this appeal 

to show that the definition applied by the trial court was correct. The burden to show 

error belongs to the state. See, e.g., State v. Costlow, 8th Dist. No. 89501, 2008-Ohio1097, ¶ 15 ("The standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) places the burden on 

the state to make an affirmative showing of error by clear and convincing evidence"). 

None of the cases cited by the state in its briefing holds that "strong provocation" under 

R.C. 2929.12(C)(2) must, as a matter of law, arise from the action of "someone else," as 

the state asserts. (Appellant's Brief at 47-48); see State v. Davis, 11th Dist. No. 2003-L027, 2004-Ohio-2076, ¶ 16 (affirming the trial court's refusal to consider an informant's 

offer to sell the defendant cocaine as "strong provocation" under R.C. 2929.12(C)); State 

v. Reissig, 6th Dist. No. WD-03-019, 2004-Ohio-1642 (rejecting the argument that a 

wife's extramarital affair was "strong provocation" to induce the defendant to commit 

domestic violence offenses under R.C. 2929.12(C)(2), where the wife had "admitted to the 

affair several months before the incidents"); State v. Almon, 2d Dist. No. 19929, 2004-

Ohio-1027, ¶ 10 (holding that "[t]he trial court reasonably rejected [the defendant's] 

suggestion that visiting with his family amounted to 'strong provocation' pursuant to R.C. 

2929.12(C)"). Bearing in mind the state's burden, it would be proper to fault the state for 

not citing "a single Ohio authority" holding that the definition of "strong provocation" 

must arise from an affirmative act by the victim or third party to qualify as a mitigating 

factor under R.C. 2929.12(C). (Majority Decision at ¶ 36.) 

{¶ 64} Instead, the majority has cobbled together such a definition from two 

statutes that contain express references to "provocation occasioned by the victim" not 

found in R.C. 2929.12(C), the factors mitigating the death penalty under R.C. 

2929.04(B)(2), and a partial reading of a Black's Law Dictionary entry that omits the half 

of the definition of "provocation" that actually supports the trial court's definition. It was 

within the discretion of the trial court to apply a general definition of "strong 

provocation," where, as the majority admits, R.C. 2929.12(C) does not define the term. 

Considering the deferential standard of review, it is improper to fault the trial court for 
No. 15AP-886 24 

failing to limit a term with multiple definitions to the restricted one advanced by the 

majority. 

{¶ 65} Even accepting, for the sake of argument, the majority's definition of 

"strong provocation," its view of the record is untenable in light of the standard of review. 

The majority asserts that "the evidence in the record clearly and convincingly supports a 

finding that appellee's financial difficulties were caused by his own chronic 

overspending." (Majority Decision at ¶ 35.) The only source provided for this "finding" is 

the Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI"). The PSI mentions three bankruptcies and 

Nichter's description of financial difficulties: "Currently, he states he is struggling 

financially and worries about finances regularly."4 (PSI at 9.) Two of the bankruptcies 

occurred so far in the past that they cannot plausibly be connected to Nichter's financial 

difficulties at the time of the offense conduct. From this, and the "absence of any evidence 

suggesting another cause of [Nichter's] financial problems," the majority believes that 

"the only reasonable conclusion to draw from this record is that [he] caused his own dire 

financial straits by engaging in chronic overspending." (Majority Decision at ¶ 36.) 

{¶ 66} The relationship of Nichter's bankruptcies to the majority's analysis is 

unclear, but it has chosen to cite them when finding that he acted out of "selfish" motives 

stemming from "self-induced" financial problems. There is no evidence in the record 

regarding the cause of his bankruptcies. A study conducted between Nichter's second and 

third bankruptcies concluded that "62.1% of all bankruptcies in 2007" were medical. 

Himmelstein, Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a National 

Study, 122 Am.J.Med. 741 (2009). Another study found that "job loss, family breakup, 

and medical problems" caused over 80 percent of family bankruptcies, and that "[a]ll the 

other reasons combined - acts of God, calls to active duty for military reservists, car 

wrecks, personal profligacy, and so on - account for just thirteen percent of families in 

bankruptcy." (Emphasis added.) Warren, The New Economy and the Unraveling Social 

Safety Net: The Growing Threat to Middle Class Families, 69 Brooklyn L.Rev. 401, 411 

(2004). In no way do I suggest that Nichter's bankruptcies arose from medical debt. My 

 

4 This statement refers to Nichter's financial problems at the time of the report's preparation. This does 

not qualify as evidence relevant to his state of mind during the period he committed the offenses, much 

less clear and convincing evidence, as required by the standard of review under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). 
No. 15AP-886 25 

point is that when statistics show that the majority of U.S. bankruptcies arise from 

medical debts, and there is no evidence at all in the record to explain the cause of a 

debtor's financial problems, even statistics make it less likely than not that the problems 

arose from selfishness or "chronic overspending." Thus, the majority's assumption is not 

"the only reasonable conclusion to draw from th[e] record," as it asserts. (Majority 

Decision at ¶ 36.) Rather, it is simply guesswork contradicted by basic facts. Thus, the 

majority's finding is irreconcilable with the clear and convincing standard, which requires 

a " 'measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere "preponderance of the 

evidence." ' " Marcum at ¶ 22, quoting Cross at paragraph three of the syllabus. For these 

reasons, there is absolutely no support in the record for the majority's speculative 

"finding," much less evidence that would "produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm 

belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established," as required under the clear 

and convincing standard. Marcum at ¶ 23. 

{¶ 67} Similarly, the majority states that the PSI's paraphrase of Nichter's 

statement regarding his financial difficulties "establishes that he was motivated to commit 

identity fraud by his own selfish need to obtain funds to cover his monthly expenses." 

(Majority Decision at ¶ 40.) Where the PSI actually quotes Nichter, he states only the 

following: "I was in dire straights financially and could not afford my monthly bills." (PSI 

at 4.) The PSI is silent as to the cause of Nichter's financial difficulties and attests only to 

their severity. Yet, the majority repeatedly refers to his problems as "self-induced," 

stemming from "chronic overspending" based on his "selfish" motives. The insistence on 

such utterly baseless and unsupported factual conclusions contravenes the applicable 

standard of review. There is no clear and convincing evidence for any of these findings, as 

the standard of review demands. 

{¶ 68} Under the R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) standard, "appellate courts are prohibited 

from substituting their judgment for that of the trial judge." Venes at ¶ 20. It is difficult 

to explain the majority's analysis without concluding that it has done just that. For the 

foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 

____________________