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19 March 1951 

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN DYER 

1. I am forwarding to you for inclusion in the files or the AFSA 

Technical Li.brar,y a brier historical note on the closing ar the "Black 

Chamber", the files of which, I understand, are now in your custody ..... 

2. I have also sent a copy or this note to the Historical 

Section of the A.~my Security Agency (CSGAS-22A) for inclusion in the 

official ASA historical files. In sending the material to that 

section, I stateci that I would pref er that the correspondence with 

Mr. William P. Bundy and the reply from his brother, Mr. McGeorge 

Bundy, not be use'd in any way except as an inclosure to the official 

history. I am sttre that you will agree that, at least for some years, 

no reference to the correspondence or our interest in it should come 

to the attention of' the wider public, even in a restricted publication 

like that of the ASA Review. 

.I 

sa 

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I 

. Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-23-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

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... 

.. REF ID: A99Ef~P..:;? t••• 

A HISTORICAL NOTE ON THE CLOSING OF THE "BLACK CHAMBER" 

For many years there has been doubt as to who was really responsible 

for closing the "Blick Chamber" -- the World War I cryptologic bureau of' 

the War Department. ~us, in n A brief history of the Signal Intelligence 

Service", prepared by me in 1942, there appears the following footnote: 

11 (1) A n:lllilber or years later (19U) Yardley told me 

that he had been misinformed as to Mr. Stimson's 

attitude and that it was really the President (Mr. 

Hoover) who 'killed' the bureau, not Mr. Stimson. 

There may be some grounds for believing this, and it 

would be interesting to know the truth .. 11 • 

In Volume III of' ttThe historical background. of the Signal Security Agency", 

prepared in April 1946, there appears the following footnote, based in part 

upon the previous reference: 

1111. later, Yardley told Yr. Fried.man that the fundamental objection to the policy of MI-S arose from the 

attitude or President Hoover, rather than from that or 

Secretary Stimson. The real reason, therefore, remains 

obscure. It should be pointed out that the strong 

attitude shown by Secretary Stimson at the time of the 

first Japanese aggression against China in 1932 supports 

the vie'W· that Mr. Stimson himselt may have been less 

opposed to such activity than his decision no longer to 

support MI-S would seem to indicate. In view of the 

.f'act tha.t ten years later Mr. Stimson, in his capacity 

of Secretary of' War, was daily the recipient of the 

product of the cryptanalytic activities 0£ the SSA, it 

would be. of great interest to lmow the truth in this 

connection. As Secretary of War, his enthusiastic 

support of' these activities was never lacking." 

No doubt there are1 one or two other places in the ASA history which deal 

Yd.th this same poj.nt. 

'lhe recent publication of' Mr. Stimson's memoirs, "On Activ;e Service 

in Peace ~d War" (New York, Harper Brothers, 1949), throws considerable 

light on the matte1r. This book, which was written with the collaboration 

of: la-. McGeorge Btmdy, has fixed quite definitely the responsibility for 

the closing of' the1 "Black Chamber" on Mr. Stimson. Ur. Bundy (or can it 

be Mr. Stimson referring to himself in the third person?) remarks on the 

- 1 '!he bureau was e>fficially designated "M!-S", one of the branches of G-2. 

It was supported jointly by the War Department and the Department of State, 

the major portion being provided by the latter. 

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·. 
~-··· REF ID:A998~ ~; 

ncurious irony" in the ra~t that Mr. St:iJn.son in 1940 was so largely dependent upon the development of the very operation which he had banished from 

the State Department in 1929. The pertinent passages are: 

"These two years were years of peace and trust, and Stimson 

adopted as his guide in foreign policy a principle he always 

tried t.o follow in personal relations -- the principle that 

the way to make men trustworthy is to trust them. In this 

spirit he made one decision for which he was later severely 

criticized: he closed down the so-called Black Chamber - the State Department's code-cracking office. This act he 

never regretted. In later years he was to permit and indeed 

encourage similar labors in another Department, but in later 

years 1;he situation was dii'ferent. In 1929 the world was 

strivi.rig with good will for lasting peace, and in this effort 

all the nations were parties. Stimson, as Secretary of State, 

was dealing as a gentleman with the gentlemen sent as ambassadors and ministers from friendly nations, and, as he later 

said, •Gentlemen do not read each other's mail.'" -- p. 188. 

"Anotht~r section of the War Department to '\'.-hich his personal 

attention was frequently directed was Jlilitary Intelligence. 

By a curious irony, the matter of principal importance here 

was the development of the very operation of attacking foreign 

codes and. ciphers which Stimson had banished from the State 

Depart.Jnent in 1929. In 1940 and after, the l'torld was no longer 

in a condition to be able to act on the principle of mutual 

trust which had guided. him as Secretary of State, and as 

Secretary of \'far he ful4r supported the extraordinary operations ·that were later revealed to have broken the Japanese 

codes." -- pp. 454-455. 

Thinking that, Mr. McGeorge Bundy might have some background to add to 

his statement as ·to the closing of the Black Chamber, I addressed a letter 

to Mr. William P. Bundy, the brother of the co-author and a friend of mine 

from World Viar II days, asking if he could without inconvenience consult 

his brother on this question. Photostatic copies of my- letter to Yr. 

William P. Bundy and of his reply are attached. 

These extracts and the letter from Mr. Bundy quite definitely eliminate any question as to who ordered the discontinuance of cryptanalytic 

activities supported by Department of State funds. However, this did not 

me(Ul the death of all cryptanalytic activities in the U.S. - f'or M.I.-8 

remained in existence and the activities simply had to get along with such 

support as the War Department could provide, without assistance from any 

other department. It managed to do so. 

Wn.t..IAY F. FRIEDMAN 

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REF ID: A9980 ·: ~-· 

... 

y 

.. CONSTRUCTIVE BEGINNINGS 

quelling a military revolt against its authority. ''Ve have reestablished the sensible practice of our forefathers as to the 

recognition of new governments in conformity with their 

rights to regulate their own internal. affairs, and, in view of 

the economic depression and the consequent need for prompt 

measures of financial stabilization, have accorded to them 

recognition under this policy with as little delay as possible 

in order to give them the quickest possible opportunities for 

recovering their economic poise. We have co-operated with 

the Latin American states in their efforts to restore peace 

among their numbers in the Chaco and on the Amazon. We 

have completed the settlement of Tacna-Arica. And in social 

and intellectual ways we have endeavored to establish the 

nations of Latin America as our associates and our friends in 

intellectual and commercial intercourse. !\.Ir. Hoover, as President-elect, visited them in a journey through South America 

for the very purpose of dissipating the fears and antagonisms 

which had grown up amongst some of them as to the intentions 

and policies of this Government. Subsequently, we have entertained as national guests the Presidents-elect of Mexico, 

Brazil, and Colombia. We have enlisted our great institutions 

in the undertaking of systematic intellectual exchange with 

them; and together with them the United States has beco!Jle 

officially represented in many '''orld conferences upon scientific and welfare advancement. These acts have all been designed to impress them, as well as the other nations of the 

world, that the United States is aiming for progress by the 

creation of good will and human advancement, and not by exploi ta ti on." 

The London Treaty and Latin American policy were typical constructive undertakings of the sort that Stimson had 

anticipated when he left l\1anila in March, 1929. Taken together, they represented a substantial achievement for his 

first two years. But these two years are separated by the two 

that followed as light is separated from darkness, and we shall 

do weII to stop here for a last look at the situation of the world 

as it appeared from the State Department between 1929 and 

1931. 

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~ ... ~~-

ON ACTIVE SERVICE 

. ';' 

- -----~ 

These were the last two years of Stimson's life in which he 

was able to think of peace as reasonably well assured, and 

international good will as something more than a brave hope. 

In later years he remained a believer in the ideal of peace and 

the objective of .good will, but after I 93 I he faced, with all 

other men of good will, the lengthening shadow of rising lawlessness among the nations. Even in I93 I the great depression 

had begun to overturn governments and rekindle ancient 

grievances, but in the early months of that year it still seemed 

possible that the postwar settlement might not be seriouslv 

shaken. · "' 

These two years \Vere years of peace and trust, and Stimson 

adopted as his guide in foreign policy a principle he always 

tried to follow in personal relations-the principle that the 

way to make men trustworthy is to trust them. In this spirit 

he made one decision for which he was later severely criticized: he closed down the so-called Black Chamber the 

State Department's code-cracking office. This act he never 

regretted. In later years he was to permit and indeed encourage simi1ar labors in another Department, but in later 

years the situation was different. In 1929 the world was striving with good will for lasting peace, and in this effort all the 

nations were parti•~s. Stimson, as Secretary of State, was dealing as a gentleman with the gentlemen sent as amba"ssadors and 

ministers from friendly nations, and, as he later said, 'Gentlemen do not read each other's mail.' 

In a similar spirit, the spirit of peacemaking and mutual 

good will, Stimson had made one other move which brought 

him some criticism. In the summer of I929 a serious issue 

arose benveen China and Soviet Russia over their conflicting 

interests and rights in North Manchuria. In the course of this 

dispute the Russians sent troops into Chinese territory, and for 

a time there seemed to be danger of either war or annexation. 

Stimson, undismayed by the fact that the United States had 

no diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, took the lead in 

organizing an international demm·che invoking the KelloggBriand Pact and pleading with both nations to avoid a breach 

of the pact, and of the peace. This demm·clze greatly annoyed 

fhe Russians, whose self-righteousness in foreign aff~irs makes 

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•' CONSTRUCTIVE BEGINNINGS 189 ··· that of all other nations seem mild i~deed, but it was notable 

that their troops were quickly withdrawn and a peaceful settlement was reached. The Kellogg-Briand Pact and Stimson's 

initiative .may have had very little to do with this gratifying 

result, but the fact that the peace was kept seemed encouraging at the time. It was the first invocation of t]le pact, and 

from its apparent succes1; believers in the new order of peace took courage. 

It was only in 193 l that the weakness of the economic and 

political underpinnings of the postwar peace began to make 

itself apparent. Almost overnight, in May, 1931, the whole 

tenor of the· State Department's work and of Stimson's own 

activities was radically changed. 

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0:-\ ACTIVE f-iER\.ICE 

In other cases, the acti,•ities of the Secretary were the result 

of some nonmilitary aspect of the matter. The appointment of 

a Surgeon General, or a Chief of Chaplains, for ex.unple, involved a decision in the Secretary's office because, especially 

in wartime, these ofiices attracted the close interest and attention of civilian doctors and clergymen, who felt that the normal method:; of military selection could not be counted on to 

produce men with the desired standing as professionals. The 

.l\1edical Department, furthermore, was a matter of special 

interest to Stimson lm account of his personal experience in 

the tropics, and particularly after the appointment of ~lajor 

General Norman T. Kirk, "l10m he had first known in the 

Philippines, he took an active part in supporting its labQrS. 

Another department to which Stimson's attention was given, 

in accordance with the requirements of the law, was that of the 

Judge Ad,·ocatc General. As wartime pressure increased. he 

was gradually released by new statutes from much of the labor 

of reviewing court-martial records, but throughout his years . .......:os--

in the \\"ar Department he was forced from time to time to 

give his close attention to specific cases, particularly those invoking the death sentence. In spite of the strong tendency of 

a humane reviewing authority to exercise leniency, Stimson 

fully understood the close relationship between military justice and mili,tary discipline; it was not easy, for example, to 

appro,·e the dismissal of proved combat fliers who, returning 

from battle, insisted on disregarding the safety regulations of 

the continental United States, but he cheerfully accepted General l\larshall's recommendation that mercy should be sub-

-

ordinated to justice-and the public safety. -

Another section of the \Var Department to which his personal attention was frequently directed was l\1ilitary Intelligence. By a curious irony, the matter of principal importance 

here was the development of the very operation of attacking 

foreign codes and ciphers which Stimson had banished from 

the State Department in 1929. In 1940 and after, the world 

was no longer in a condition to be able to act on the principle 

of mutual trust which had guided him as Secretary of State, 

and as Secretary of \Yar he fully supported the extraordinary 

operations that were later revealed to have broken the J apa-

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THE WARTI:\IE AR:\IY 

~-· 

455 

nese codes. In early 19.:i-2, with McCloy's assistance, he established a special unit for the analysis and interpretation of this 

sort of material. This unit, under the direction of Alf red l\kCormack, a New York lawyer turned colonel did its work 

with remarkable insight and skill. As investigati~n of the Pearl 

Harbor catastrophe later revealed, such a unit, if it had existed 

in I 941, might well have given warning of the degree of 

Japanese interest in the fleet at Hawaii. It was not Pearl Harbor, however, but the natural development of studies begun 

months before that led to the establishment of the unit, and if 

it came into existence too late to help in the prevention of that 

calamity, it made invaluable contributions in other matters of 

·: at least comparable significance during the war. 

Stimson also· did what he could to insure the effective exchange of military information among different branches of 

the Government and with America's allies, particularly the 

British. He backed General :Marshall's efforts to break down 

American resistance to co-operation with the British, and he 

was insistent that no impatience with its occasional eccentricities should deprive the Army of the benefits of co-operation 

with General Donovan's Office of Strategic Sen·ices. Throughout the war the intelligence activities of the C nited States 

Government remained incompletely co-ordinated, but here 

again it was necessary to measure the benefits of reorganization 

against its dislocations, and on the whole Stimson felt that the 

American achievement in this field, measured against the conditions of 19401 was more than satisfactory. A full reorganization belonged to the postwar period. 

3. THE PLACE OF SPECIALISTS 

Stimson inherited, from the comments of his father on the 

subject of the t'bon:ibproof:' officers ~f the Civi_I \V~r'. ~nd 

from his own experience with 'the uniform-wearing civilians 

doing morale dl;lty in the back areas' of \\'orld \Var I. a str?ng 

feeling that the dignity of the uniform should as for as possible 

be reserved for those who in fact did the fighting. It was true 

that this com·iction flew in the face of the developing complexity of war; perhaps not half of the men who served use-

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REF ID:A99~J ......... 

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... DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

ARMED fORCES SECURITY AGENCY 

WASHINGTON 2B, D. C. IN RIEl"LY RIEP'll:ll TO 

jor William 11

• ~. 

Union. Truat Building. 

Washington, D. c. 

. . .. ...... 

10 Jlcmnmer 11&0 

... 

\ 

\ 

Sincerely yours. 

P.s. Your offic:e is close by the Cosmos Club• 

there ror lunch some ruq l!loon. 

Wil~ F • Frie 

Teohnical <fODBul 

I hope you wi 11 }job me I 

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UNION TRUST BUILDING 

WASHINGTON 5. D. C. 

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l'he e.•:S:V<er i.& th.1'!.t l..olonel ... ti'l!son 11.i":'Self orr.l<;rec. t!1E. t;.h,-

·..,,..r.tl°i'1i:" .;,f the .L}lFtCit L-.:ia.mber; he TH.I h1:ve: .one ~ o r.fter c ~.sWtinE'.' ... r. u.:,,•.JV· .. r, but the L"litiP.tive \H11:1 :i:!.s, t::.nr;. ~e h ... s ril ... E •• ·.- b•~e!"l .rrvud 

of i,t. ..L .think this CP.n !-!"O~~bly be cocu,.entea !'ro:'!I the: wis.rh but 

.L n.., not si,re -- ,it m.ay we.!.... ----- .:~o, n .. ~·. tt-.v~t ...1. thi:'lk v. it, i. t 

1'11lf. done before he he~P..n to keep e rJ::iily aif1ry at .:.t,;..te, r!lC: .L aun 1t 

tbin< we cr.n r.rove it fro""'· thPt. .cut f-OTe:v:ne: e l tnbr. .I. hAv-:- t!'J.e 

~ tc.!'lo!'re.1-hic record of e cunve:rH·ti Jn . e hAci in .i94f', i:'l ~· !-:i.ch he 

toli:: me how .i:hocked he vi·:o.~ t · ler.rn :fro:: .Joo C..otton th"t bt<ch p thin"' 

~ta; .. he .,.ho 

O'!"le O.I. 

to me. 

v.·r>-::: ~.,fnE" on, ''P.o:i how they both P.tr~eri, e.t Q!'lc'=', t!mt it must 

l'here certainly wn. no quet·ti.:m tn ioiis ov."!'l !!'i!ld th.ei.t it wr.~ st .... p. ed it. tieh lnd that l hPve !lever '1one, because it wri:: 

those cases i?"l wnicn his own recoll.ect.io!l v.·F..s. qi.;,i te ,.f:#r~u'·s h•e 

.tot" obvi. 0.ms re11sons, this ae:.cisiori v.!:i.l: one th!'. t J. un·~ertoot: to Ji..,..p-.ie v;ith the <..o.Lonel, more thPn once, pointin~ o-.t thF-t tnese 

activitfes ha.a t!leir ve..lu-:: l.ater, .ana th~:t he- n"ic. himself t.ri~en r;rent 

i.~te ... e~t in the?!!. ne e.m.v.erea that wr.e.t yo .... ao in \\er a.no -..·h~t .You 

do il'l pe:-Pce A.re tv:o C!ltire.ly dif ... \.rent thinf"i;:, a.nil thst the \'.'h01€ 

effort of 13~9 Wf'~f. tc• live on tne bP.sis 1.1£ !'!'Utual tr"ust and h.)"'lvr. 

i. oi coi;rse tried tv l·U.Sh hi'?! into c. corn~r v·i th the point t1e. t 1940-'a 

na.s tech:'licr~lly a. ti::-e f ~eace., but he '\'.ould not be persUP.dtci. J.be 

rro~t ne.-woulo say ••s that ii such t :inps he.a to be done, a.nd l think 

he relu"tentl;r P..~ret:o t.h~t they oici, even in p~e.ct>, e& he S:<-Jr it in 1946, 

. they shoi..16 not be done in the- ote.te ue;..e.rtB???ent. ~his I ., cu.Le r.o?: SP..,'{ 

wos."' t.fI ... ical e::x.a.m}Jle of the Wf!.;r in wi:ich :!'vEt a1 .s hP.ve tri'=-d to senarete 

the 1:n•ts Of ;,.eae. frorri th.JS~ Of n,.ti..mel sei::·.rit.r, r:ntj .i don't l"J,j•~elf. ftnt:: it i;e-:"".: .. ~rSUP..bive, bu"t. t.hn.t. 1

f> the: VJe.y he sa,, it, "'no yo. J?re quite 

rirht. in quo,inp. his t.r,.icz:.l J..hre&e P.bout rerc.i~~ otn~ }tleo1le 1t ?l"f'-11; he