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USCIB: 9.2/6 

~~~8119--

APPElffBEIB BOOUMEN! OON!AINS 

SOBEiWORB MAq?BRIMi 

22 October 1954 , t' 24 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

COUNT Capability to Provide Early Warning of Chinese 

Communist Attack on Formosa and the Off-shore Islands 

Occupied by the Chinese Nationalists 

USCIB 9.2/5 of 14 October 1954 

Further to the reference, the enclosed report of the Chairman, 

USCIB Intelligence Committee is circulated for information and consideration in connection with item. 5 of the agenda for the 21st 

Meeting of USCIBEC and item 2 of the agenda for the 109th (Special) 

Meeting of USCIB, the latter to be held Tuesday, 26 October 1954. 

Enclosure 

INT # 0007 dtd 22 Oct 1954 

USCIB: 9.2/6 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-07-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

TOP SECRET 
INT # 0007 

22 October 1954 

M!MlRANDUM FOR THE EXECUl'IVE SECRETARY. USCIB 

Subject: 

Reference: 

COMINT Capability to Provide Early Warning of 

Chinese Communist Attack on Formosa and the Offshore Islands Occupied by the Chinese Nationalists 

USCIB 9.2/5 dated 14 October 1954 

1. The Intelligence Committee met in special session to prepare 

findings and make specific recommendations as requested by the reference. 

The enclosure contains a report on the factors involved and recommendations for action, and is BUbmitted in light of the critical situation 

that continues to develop as a result of the Chinese Connnunist threat 

to Formosa and th~ off-shore islands occupied by the Chinese Nationalists. 

2. The 1'1SA representative outlined the extent and status of the 

current COMINT collection and production effort on the Chinese Communist 

problem. It was concluded that NSA is exploiting current Chinese 

Communist communications to the maximum extent feasible within existing resources, other requirements and technical limitations. The 

NSA representative then provided the following estimate or current 

COMINT capabilities and limitations: 

// 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SECRET FROTH 
INI' II 0007 

ii ii/ 

_:;f- (!. ~ ~~'.,,.._...~,.........~ 

H. C. SIMM:>NS 

- ·2 -

Lt. Colonel, USAF 

Chairman, INTCOM 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SECRET FR:OTI I 
'±'0P OEeRE'f' ntOTfl 

A. Should we attempt a site survey of the off-shore islannA · v"ew to establishment of U.S. 

--~~~~___.intercept position or positions to handle ow 

level traffic and DlF operations? 

B. Should we attempt further site surveys of Formosa and the EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Pescadores, recognizing that a site survey has already been PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

undertaken for Formosa? Would it be desirable to undertake 

a new survey in light of changed conditions? 

Recommend: That no further site surveys or Formosa or of the 

Pescadores be undertaken at this time. 

o. Is there a possibility of establishing intercept facilities on 

special Navy vessels? Recognize need for special protection of 

such a vessel or vessels which probably could not make up a part 

or the fleet. Presumably this would require special protective 

measures. Has the Navy now got the necessary facilities to 

undertake such a plan~ 

;.._. 

Enclosure with INT #0007 

TOP SECRET FROTH 
D. 

1. A U.S. intercept activity in close proximity to the China 

coast would be valuable in the production of useful COMINT 

provided that its intercept potential were substantial (15 to 

20 positions), its missions could be easily assigned and m.odi-

.fied, and it were capable of certain early processing and 

analytic tasks. In the event a substantial close-in intercept 

effort is not feasible, it is believed a continuing search 

effort on a sm.a.11 scale (2 to 5 positions) might be valuable 

in developing both low level exploitable traffic and other 

valuable Chinese Communist tranmniseions. 

2. The Navy Member submitted the following statement with 

respect to the above question: 

"Without comsideration to the operational feasibility 

or National policy, the following is presented: 

111. It is possible to establish intercept facilities 

on special Navy vessels. 

"2. It would appear neceesary for any U.S. vessel 

operating in the close proximity of the Chinese 

Communist coast to have su.f'fioient protective measures 

afforded such a unit. 

113. The Navy does not now have a special type vessel 

to undertake such a plan for close proximity Chinese 

Communist intercept." 

Recommend: That the forthcoming Navy report on the operational 

feasibility of establishing intercept facilities on a special 

Naval vessel and placing such a vessel in close proximity to the 

East China coast be expeditiously provided to USCIBEC for early 

consideration. 

.· .· .· .· .· .· .· 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

-2- PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SECRET FllOTl I 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Pt 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP Si~ Ji!R()'ff I 

E. Should NSA explore the possibility of making an al.l out "crash" 

effort on Chinese Communi3t traffic with material and personnel 

now available? Has NSA now got on its :staff experts with experience on the Chineee problem, who might be transferred to this 

problem from other tasks? Would the community suffer from such 

an effort? 

Beginning with the Korean action, Chinese Conmunist 

communications have been accorded high priority by NSA for 

personnel and facilities in accordance with the objectives 

of the Master Requirements List. Chinese communications 

are handled in NSA as 11The Number Two Problem", exceeded 

in importance only by the attack on Soviet communications. 

Special procedures have been laid on for expeditious 

forwarding and handling of exploitable material, and 

wherever possible, production of such information is 

accomplished in the field close to the eource ot i:rrl;ercept. While virtua,lly any COMINT "problem" can make use 

of additional people and intercept, there are in general 

no promising avenues or attack on Chinese Communist 

communications that are not being given the attention 

which is commensurate with the high priority attached to 

this problem. If special circumstances did require a 

further diversion of experienced analysts to this effort, 

the general effect would be to decrease sharply inf'ormation 

I I 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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.. 
Further, the nonoIDDilllll.s pro ems are no s ed with personnel who 

could make any appreciable contribution to this type or 

analysis without con3iderable training and on-the-job 

experience. Because of the serious impact that such a 

readjustment would have on other priority tasks, a "crash" 

effort should not be undertaken without serious consideration 

by the USCIB intelligence agencies of its overall implication5. 

Recommend: That unless. priorities are modified or technical 

advances reveal additional areas of potentially fruitful 

exploitation, NSA continue its effort on Chinese Communist 

communications substantially along the present lines. 

F. Increased pressure for U.S. base on Formosa. 

1. In order to expand the COMINT attack on those Chinese 

Communist communications which bear directly on early 

warning of an attack on Formosa or the off-shore islands, 

and in order to provide continuing COMINT information on 

an important segment of Chinese Communist communications, 

the immediate establishment of U.S. intercept sites on 

Formosa is of great importance. In thil! regard it is noted 

that CO:MINT units are now available in the Far East which 

could be deployed to Formosa within a relatively short 

period after base rights are obtained. 

2. The Air Force requirements for intercept faciliti$e 

on Formosa were sent to .Ambassador Rankin in May 1954. 

Action on these bases was held up pending resolution of 

the U.S. position on jurisdiction over these forces. The 

Army requirements were forwarded to Ambassador Rankin by 

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TOP SECRET FROTH 
letter dated 17 September 1954. At the same time he was 

instructed to proceed with the negotiations and to attempt, 

at the beginning, to obtain permission for mobile operations 

by 50 to 60 Air Force personnel. On 19 October the Ambassador 

informed the Department that the draft note containing the 

proposed agreement covering these facilities had been discussed with the Chinese Foreign Mi.nilStry. The Chineee wished 

to change certain parts or the proposed note. Among the points 

raised by the Chinese was the desire to cover the jurisdiction 

matter merely by reference to the MAAG Agreement, a treatment 

previously considered undesirable here. The Chinese indicated 

that they thought they should receive some of the information 

oduced b these facilities 

The Ambassador.did 

no men: ion the Chinese reaction to the initiation of.m6bile 

operations by the Air Force group and is being queried on 

this point. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

3. As its next step the Department or State intends to discuss 

the bases with Chinese Foreign Minister Yeh who is visiting 

Washington from 20 to 27 October. The Department intends to 

ask Yeh to see it' these negotiations can be expedited, particularly with respect to obtaining permission for the mobile 

operations, provided, however, that there is no indication 

that such an approach to the Foreign Minister :will risk greater 

delay in the whole negotiation. Additional pressure will be 

applied to the extent and in the manner indicated by the talks 

with Yeh. 

Recommend: That, in view o:r the importance of establishing 

immediately intercept facilities on Formosa, high priority be 

given to increasing the pressure on the Chinese Nationalists as 

may be necessary to obtain their agreement to granting intercept 

base rights. 

G. Should we undertake i'urther development1"of present Okinawa or 

Philippine bases? It is understood that the site survey in 

Formosa two years ago indicated that certain promising Chinese 

Communist low level material was available in Formosa. Might 

this also be available from the Philippines or from Okinawa? 

Has NSA explored possibility of expanding these bases to cover 

all possible Chinese Communist low level material which might 

be available there? 

The COMINT potential of the Philippines and Okinawa as 

intercept bases is already considerably developed. In the 

Philippines, there a.re an Arrrry' COMINT unit, an Air Force 

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.. 

H. 

unit which is undergoing expansion, and a recently installed 

Navy unit. The existing programs call for almost doubling 

the intercept potential of that area. On Okinawa there is 

an Army COMINT unit which performs the significant first 

analysis of East China military communications, and NSA 

technicians are en route to insure continued production of 

useful informati~n. The intercept of low and medium level 

communications (including voice) has been attempted from 

both Okinawa and the Philippines with little success because 

of the distances involved. If necessary, any further 

increases in the COMINT potential of either location can 

be quickly accomplished by transfer of an available ArmyCommunications Reconnaissance Company in Japan. 

Recommend: That, in view of the technical limi tatioms, the 

development of Okinawa and the Philippines beyond that now 

planned not be undertaken. 

.· 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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Recommend: That the l.J'ationaJ. Security Agency continue its EO 3-

3(h)(2) 

examination of po5sible additional commllllication raoilitiel!I PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

with a view to being prepared to handle any additional priority 

traffic. 

- 7 -

TOP SECRET FROTll 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

./ 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

-8- PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SECRET FROfH 
• rop l:AJ.U.l.J ~i"D JR:= .. ~~liP11 .. -!.'-'-' J. J. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

J. Can NSA give us some estimate of the scale of effort needed to 

attack the Chinese Communist low level traffic? Ie the scale 

so large that there is no real likelihood of valuable result 

from any- one or more of the above expedients? 

The nature of the "low level" traffic !"oblem will 

obabl best be known after some result 

are race ve • "nl::"7"'1'~:cT-'"~~~~~-=--r::~~11""""::1~i~s~pr~o".'."'l'."'lre~m~cannot now be 

EO 3.3(h)(2) estimated with any certainty, U.S. capabilities to handle 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 the type of Chinese material formerly encountered in 

Korea are good. There are over 100 ArTII:f voice personnel 

now in Japan immediately available for such exploitation, 

and the Air Force capability along these lines are also 

considerable. The U.S. COMINT efforl can cope more easily 

with a mass of Chinese Communist low level traffic than 

any other. 

Recommend: That the Director, NSA, inform USCIB of any significant 

change in the above assessment occurring as a result of examination 

of the expected material, loss or personnel, or other pertinent 

factors which may require Board attention. 

TOP S!@J:lE1 .. FROTH