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<:; ~ TOB SEe1lff5~~RN ,.\/SUBJECT NUMBER ,. . , . . . 

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Subject: 

Item ) of the Agenda for the Fifty-seventh Meeting of USCIB~ held on 10 November 19500 

French Diplomatic Cryptogre.phio Security,, 

MR., ARMSTRONG introduced this item and explained that it 

involved consideration of the SECOOM report on the subject which 

was oiroulated under date of 3 November 1950Q He informed the 

members that the Chairman or SEOCOM was present 9 and might wish 

to comment on the report., 

MRo COLLINS said that he had nothing to add to the report~ 

but would be glad to answer any questions~ 

MRo ARMSTRONG asked tor comments on the report~ 

.ADMIRAL JOHNSON said that he had several amendments to 

propose., 

MRo ARMSTRONG said that before the amendments were con~ 

sider$d he would like to ask if the Board wished that the report go to the National Security Council (NSC) nowg or be held 

until latero He explained that the discussions on the French· 

seocirit7 problem had not yet reaohed the communications phasep 

and the members might wish to have the NSC consider the report olosex- to the date that the oomm.unications problem comes before 

ito He asked if the Army was anxious to have action taken at 

this time., 

COLONRL HOWZE replied that aotion was not necessary until 

the question ot basic Frenoh security had been settledo 

ADMIRAL JOHNSON suggested that the report be sent to NSC 

in order to.acquaint them with the seriousness.or the proble111'"' 

GENERAL.CABELL said that he thought it would be best to 

leave the decision to the discretion of the negotiators who 

would be primarily oonoerned with the problem,. 

DRo CRAIG and MRo KEAY agreed with General Cabell" 

ADMIRAL JOHNSON said that he did not feel strortgly about 

having the report forwarded now~ 

MEL .ARMSTRONG then asked if it would suit the members to 

adopt this policy so that it oould become binding on the 

member agencies., 

The members agreed~ 

MRo ARMSTRONG asked Admiral Johnson to present his pro-= 

posed· amendments to the reporto 

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As a result· of' Admiral Johnson 9 s proposals and the me..n-1i1er.s'1 

comments thereon, the f'ollowing amendments 'to the report wa.s:·\'3 agreed upon: 

a., Page l - Reverse the order of paragraphs I+ and 5 

and re,:,word eacn to read aa follows: 

"4.- U"S,-=.Frenoh collaboration has become so oloa0 

aa to require;; in particular,, the improvement of' the 

security of French oommun1~at1onso Su h m rovement ' 

' t in the ·3.3(h)(2) ! 

L--------------------------"L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

"5,, Beca.11se of general French inseourity0 the immediate advantages aooruing_ to the seourity or the '\J,S~ 

by urging improvement of the security of Frenoh Diplo= 

matio traffic are likely to be of lim.1 tad value.,'' 

bo Tab .a,. su"Qpara~i:~.E!!. le., "" .Amend subparagraph to read 

as ro11ows :' . « 

"a,. Take steps to improve Frenoh security in general and cryptographic security in particular¢ Undertake im- p~ovement of French cryptographic ae6urity only.after there 

has been established a seoUl"e group ln tbe henoh Govern- , ment which would enable the UoS0 to pass to the Frenoh 

Government w1 thout risk ot compromise,," 

Following approval of the above amendments ADMIRAL STONE 

invited the attention or the members to Paragra§h __ 8,, subpara·~ 

ff!~b. b.,. and read a proposed amendment.-, He sal tlle.t he had 

ta ect informally with the British on this point ~ as a re<a 

sult of whiah he thought the French could be given technical 

advloe -0n oryptomachinery improvements~ but could not be pro- .v1ded with crypto material 11 exaept possibly some one·-,tima pads'-. 

Mau .d.RMSTRONG asked if the members would agree to acaept 

Admiral Stoner1s proposed revision or 8bAll members agreed that this paragraph would be changed 

to relld: 

"b., If the pro'viaion by the U s .ow ltoK,, of a 

cryptographic eys~•~m tor ~omm1m~: c,e,t1ona p::rovea 

to be impractical" then use by the Jl"'r·enoh ot 

their own best. t~Jryptog!'aphio ~y!itam would. bi.1 

the next most de~.d.rable solu'.t. r~on '' 

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ADMIRAL JOHNSON asked 1r this report should be forwarded 

to the Seoretary or State and tha Secretary of Defense tor · information at this time,, 

MRo AR!IBTRONG said that he thought such torwarding would 

be automatic-~ 

ADMIRAL STONE then referred to subparagraph Sdc, and said· 

that it should include a statement regarding teohnioal assiet..anoe by the Uo So and U,. _K ... to the French,, 

MRo COLLINS., in reply. to a question() stated that this 

statement in the report (Bd) meant that the Frenoh had the 

teohn1oal knowledge to know a good system from a bad one but 

that they had insufficient money and personnel to exploit their knowledge" 

ADMmAL STON.1!: expressed his opinion that without UL,s,.,...,U,,Ko 

teehnioal assistance and advioe, the use by the Franch of their 

own sy-.tems would not necessarily achieve the result we thought desirable,, 

Af'ter a brief d1scuas1on the members agreed that subpara~ 

graph 8d should be amended to reflect tha general thought express-eel by the members at this meeting,, It was also agreed that ~he Coordinator would prepare the appropriate wording for this 

subparagraph" 

D§OJ~I-UN: USCIB accepted the report of the Security Committee 

as contained in USCIB: 14/96p with amendments as indicated in 

the above discussion,, It was agreed that the decision on the ap~ropriate time tor forwarding the report to the National 

Saou.r!ty Council will be deferred tor further aotion by USCIBP 

but tbat this report be furnished now to the Stats and Detenee 

representatives who will ba engaged in detailed negotiations with ~he Frenoh on this proble.mo Theae negotiators will: at 

tbeir disoretion., f.'o!'Ward the report to thelr euper1ore._ 

This item to be dropped from the agenda,, 

The full report as rs~iaed is as follows~ 

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'OSCIB: 

'l'Hi POSITION OF THE UlUTEJJ S'.L1AT.ES REGARDING IMPROVEMENT 

ot FREMCll · Di'f5LOMA"'f'IC CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY 

PROBLEM· 

lo To review Frenoh diplomatic cryptographic seourity particularly with a view to establishing pertinent U,, So policy and to provide guidance for the U" s., negotiators in their pro- posed torthooming discussions with the French on improvement 

ot French over-all securityo 

DISCUSSION 

2... See Tab B., 

CONCLUSIONS 

)o There are no methods whereby the security of French 

diplomatic cryptographic oonununicatlons can be improved 

etteotivel~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

4 _, UuS.,=French collaboration has be¢Jiome so olose as to 

requirep in partioularg the improvement of the seourity of 

French oommunloations. Suoh improvement entails an advantage 

out.weighing thej I 

I f 

5') Beoause of general French inse~urity •. the immediate 

adYantagea aocruing to the security or the u · s ... by urging 

improvement of the security or Frenob Diplomatic traffia are 

likely to be of limited value'" 

6,. Therefore\/ steps should be taken to improve Fren@n 

diplomatic cryptographic se~ur1ty only as soon as there is 

established within the Frenoh Government a SEJC'JUl"EI group to 

I 

f 

which the Uo So may pass highly olasaified information OfEO 3.3(h)(2) I 

oombined interest without risk or oompromi. se" No steps PL 86-36/50 use 3605 

toward the .fuprove.ment of French diplomatic; cryptographic \ 1 

aeourity should be taken or discussed until this condition [ 

hae been aohievedc However~ such steps need not await a 

total improvement of over ... ail French seouri ty . 

7Q It 1s not possible~ at presantw to determine either 

(a) tbe preolse approach which should be used to undertake ~aa atana or lbl the dearee to whloh it mav ba neGesaary 

C I 

1 

80 It and when steps are taken to improve Frenoh 

diplomatic security~ the following oonditions apply: 

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ao Provision by tbe Ui, SQ or u., K" or a oryptographic 

system tor French commun1cat1one is considered to be the rn~st 

desirable solution to this problem,, 

. . 

· b<> If' the proYtslon by the UvS., or U"Kc or a arypto.,. graphio system tor comm.u.nications prov~s to be impractioal 9 

then use by the French or their own beat cryptographio system would be the next most desirable solution.-

o., Other methoda .fo:r solving this problem are not 

sat1 staotory ... · 

do It is oonsiderad that tna U .. s" or UoK-. should. a.tford 

the French technical assistance and adv!~a:1 in conneotion \'11th any method· adopted to improve oommunicationa ssouri ty ., 

RECOMMEN~ATION 

9o T.hat the National Security Counoil approve the attached 

Statement ot Policy (Tab A) .. 

"" 19 ... 

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· T()i> SEC·RET . ACP.liN 

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STATEMElfl' OF POLICY 

013: 

TEiE POSITION Ol!' THE UNIT&D s:ss RJOCJ.ARDIRG ;roVEMENT O! tJtb(lff gmepm11

1c S!L __ OORAPH:to se _tt .· 

lo Tb.a Un1t9d States in di&clJi8s1ons with the Fre.aoh on 

the improvement ot .French security should: · 

•o '-i'ake steps to improve .li'J.•".a,vn seour1 ty in general and ~rypt°'graph1c security ln p~icularo Unde~e 1.mprove.ntent of Fj:-enoh or:yptographic .seou:ri ty only at"ter there ba• · been 

esta'.bl1ahed a ·;8eoure S·rgup Jn the French GoyernmeAt .Wh1oh 

would enable the u,, s., t:o pass "to the French Government highly 

cla1Js1t1ed intormation or oomb1n.ed interest witbout .risk .of oott~romiseo · · 

: I . 

b~ Avoid plao1ng the question ot French d1plomat1o oc,nunun1cat1ons seour1ty 'On the agenda tor· the r1rat discussion 

with the Frenoh9 and on subsequent agendaQ until auoh time as 

1.niprovement ot other seaurit7 utters had demonstrated that the 

.Frenoll have made detin1te progress toward over ... all seourity <) 

c.., Postpone~ rui a .,.No- ci>mment" basis, any disouss1on 

in the event that this problem is raised by the French pr1'or 

to being plaoed on the agenda tor discussion .. 

2o Thia aspect ot the geG,eral problem ot P~n~h over~all security will be coordinated w1th the U~Ko prier to any approach 

to the Frenoh·concern1ng,improv$ment of their diplomatic crypto- graphic security., 

J,,. USCIB is charged wit.h tb~ respons1b1l1t1: 

\ \ 

a,., 'J:io des1gna te an ott!~\1al to repre~' USCIB in 

daterminingi; along with U,,S~ negotators~ the •st advisable 

approach to be used and the degree to which it.moy be neoessa:ry 

. ' 

to I I Eo 3.3(h)(2) 

, . PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

b" To dftveloP. with appropriat~_U.,Ko autborit1ea a 

combined polic7 affetitine th1e prQbleuL \\ ~ .. 

o~ To determine and 84v1se the U0S., negotiators when 

there have been established within the Frenoh Government t~se 

oonditlons which are prerequisite to U,,S,, ert~rts toward t e 

improvement ot French diplomatio oryptographio- security., No such 

efforts shall be made bt the negotiators without the adv1/ce and 

oonourrence ot the·USCIB rep~esentat1ve.. 1 

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TAB B 

DISCUSSION 

lu The threat to U,, So security which derives from the 

1naeour1ty or Frenoh communications has been a matter of deep 

concern 'o the United States for some time past~ 

au In August 1948~ USGlB considered this problem and 

subJilitted a split report ror decision by the National seourity Councilo No action toward the improvement of French arypto- graphio security was taken at that timeo 

b(l In September 1949,, USCIB11 on behalr of ths U,, S., 

Government 9 aooepted a British proposal that a British crypto- graphic device be provided to all NATO governments tor use as 

part ot the COSMIC system... This device was adopted by NATO\> 

Co Recently the problem ot French cryptographic seour1 ty has bsoome 1noreas1ngly ori tioal ,, Aa the eoope or UQB~·UoK?-Frenoh collaboration has been extended~ the French 

Minister ot Defense has approaohed UoSo and U,.K,, representatives with regard to improvement of over-all Frenoh security,, Hence a 

re-study by USCIB or the oryptographio aspects or French security is 1ndloated.. · 

; 2o An1 consideration of French cryptographic security must 

involve the questions of whether it would be advisable to take 

action toward the improvement ot French oommunioations security practices and _procedures 9 and if so 9 the nature and scope ot 

oorreotive me$Sures to this endo 

)Q Studies conducted by intelligence agencies ot the 

United Statas·indioate that Frenoh government departments and 

agencies are penetrated extensively by the Communists and 0 theretore 9 their present over-all security is very pooro It 

would thus appear that the improvement o~ cryptographio security 

at this time" without an accompanying improvement in other EO 3.3(h)(2) 

aeourity aspects, would have limited value" PL 86-36/50 use 3605 

a the exclus on 

ot uf>s,; information trom French diplomatic communications. or 

(b) improvement ot French diplomatic oryptographio security., Inasmuch as the U~S" cannot completely control French dissemination ot U.,So 1ntormat1on11 it ia clear that optimum corrective 

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users~ 14/loo · 

:m~aeures must include an improvement in Frenoh d1plolllat 11:1 • 

c r7ptographio secur-i ty., 'l'herefore ~ this study has been 

dLreoted .toward this end,, 

EO. 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 use 3605 

?. Nevertheless" early steps looking toward this improvement would entail advantage through the development of secure 

aommun1aat1ons p1·aotioes within the Frenoh Government, GoOd 

cryptographic seou:rity is not a oonQ.ttion which oan be imposed all at once,,- The physical machinery· involved might be provided 

and d1st.r1buted in a very short time._ but the intangible factors~ 

suoh as tra1n1ng 1

, technical skill (in both use and maintenance)\' 

security awarenessi, and smooth cooperation among widely scattered 

operating elements 1 oonati tute a structure which requires a groat deal of time to build,. · · 

S. Ultimately the improvement of French cryptographic se~urity may be necessary on all communication links to avoid 

leaks through retransmission to ot~er oft1oes or lower euhelons 

in poor cryptographic systemsri but. •ome advantage wiil accrue 

from progressive improvement aormnencing with specific links 

carrying important 1ntormat1on or combined interest,. 

9_, .Assuming that e. decision is ultimately made to proceed 

with the improvement ot French oryptographio security. tour 

possible methods exist whereby this 1mpro,ement ot FrenGb com· 

mun1oations security may be undertaken: ' · 

a" 'rhe eatabl1ahment or combined crypt-Ooenters tor the · reene<iphennent or all U,,S.1 9 U .. K")} and French tra:ftio passi.ng lnfermation or a combined interest~ ·Th.ls system envisages ~he -· initial enoipherment or the traffic of each nation· in the t:1rypto·= graphio systems or that nation,. 

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b0 A requirement on the Fre~o~ that they use their 

own best oryptograph1o ayatemso ~ 

~ 

Co The provision by another tore1gn country ot a 

cryptographic s1stem tor Frenoh oommun1oat1onso 

do The provision by the Uo S~ or the Uo Ko of a orypto- graph1o system tor French oommunioationso 

10 .. Joint or tooenters tor re-encl herment.. Altho h this 

method wo ear o v 

seems to be the least desirable ot the tour 

methods enumerated aboveo This method would be too complex and 

cumbersome tor efficient useo It would not be aurt1o1ently expandable to aooommodate any large number ot French ce>mmunioation 

linksu It is doubtful that this method would be acceptable operationally to t.he U,, So and the U., K., · 

llo A re uirement that the hench eJ11 lo t air own best 

wou d appear to ave t e 

--..--......-......... ---.-------....-------......... --........ --'. ~ong the adequate French or7ptograph1o s7atems 0 onl1 their m1litar7 olpher devices would appear to meet the needs ot extensive, ettioient 

oommunioations. .Eo 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

12., Provision by another 1'ore1gn country o! a or1itosraphio syat!!! tor 1i'renoh oommun.loations.. In view o? the apparent oapaOlty ot the Uo S .. and Uo Ko to provide adequate/oryptographio equipment under oc:>ntrolled oondit!ons~ it appee,rs/unneoeeaary to 

look elsewhere tor·this assistance,. 

l)o Provision bf the U., s~ or the U2 K, ot a o~tog_raphio 

e~tem tor trench oommunloatlonso of the four ma£h04i enumerated 

abOve, this me£h0Ct would appear to be the best" So tar aa oan be 

foreseen, it would have neither the l~ast nor the gre~teat adverse 

I I Although this method would involve the use ot u,, s .. oryptograph1~ equipment under oon41tlona 

which this Government cannot control directly" it 1s estimated 

that the risk ot compromise to U., So .oryptograpfU' la slight., It 

appears that the U,, So and U.,, K., haYe'..the oapac,tlty to provide adequate cryptographic eqUipment tor t~oae ~renoh oommun1cat1on 

link• which are expected to carry into~ation ot combined 1nterestolt ma1 be noted that a precedent tor thi~ method exla\p 111 the · present NATO agreement whereby a UaKr. cip~er de•1oe he.a been . issued to certain elements ot the NATO governments\' Thia prei 

oedent 9 it extended within the l'r.ench Governme.oti ". ould be 119st 

easily extended within other gover.llments it aim.1 ar problemJ' should arise with other NATO countries in the fl.ltureo· / ' ' 

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