[Cite as State v. Handyside, 2019-Ohio-2329.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 107586 

 v. : 

JOHN HANDYSIDE, III : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 13, 2019 

 

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-18-627283-A 

 

Appearances: 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, and 

Michael Lisk and Erin Stone, Assistant County 

Prosecutors, for appellee. 

Patrick S. Lavelle, for appellant. 

 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.: 

Appellant-defendant John Handyside, III (“Handyside”) appeals his 

conviction and asks this court to reverse the judgment of the trial court. We affirm 

the trial court’s decision. 
After a bench trial, Handyside was convicted of abduction, a thirddegree felony in violation of R.C. 2905.02(A)(2); and assault, a first-degree 

misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A). Handyside was sentenced to a total 

of 18 months imprisonment. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

On March 26, 2018, Sarah Vidmar (“Vidmar”) went for a run. As she 

was running, she noticed Handyside crossing the street towards her. Once Vidmar 

realized that Handyside was running towards her, she tried to get out of his way and 

tripped over an obstruction. When she fell, Handyside jumped on top of her and 

held her down. Vidmar repeatedly told Handyside to stop, but he continued to hold 

her down, grabbing, pushing, and hitting her in the face. Vidmar broke free, and 

attempted to run, but Handyside grabbed her again and pushed her back down. 

Vidmar began yelling for help. Justin Frankmann (“Frankmann”), who was out 

walking his dog, heard Vidmar yelling for help, and ran to assist. Frankmann 

pushed Handyside off of Vidmar. Without saying a word, Handyside walked away. 

Galen Fuller (“Fuller”) and Veronica Rose (“Rose”) witnessed the 

attack from their car. Both saw Handyside dart across the street and punch Vidmar 

in the face. Fuller, who was driving the car, turned around and drove to the location 

of the attack. He jumped out of the vehicle and confronted Handyside along with 

Frankmann. Rose called 911, and Fuller followed Handyside in his vehicle while 

Rose was on the phone with 911, giving updates on Handyside’s location. 
Two police officers responded to the emergency call and interviewed 

Vidmar. She told them that while on her daily run Handyside attacked her. The 

officers were then notified of Handyside’s location and detained him upon their 

arrival. Handyside told the officers that he saw a woman fall and tried to help her. 

The officers brought Handyside back to the scene of the incident, where Vidmar was 

waiting. Vidmar and the other witnesses identified Handyside as the man who 

attacked her. 

Handyside was charged with kidnapping, with an attached sexual 

motivation specification, abduction, gross sexual imposition, and assault. 

Handyside, pursuant to Crim.R. 29, asked the trial court “to direct verdicts of 

acquittal” as to the sexual motivation specification contained in Count 1, kidnapping, 

as well as Count 3, the gross sexual imposition; the court granted the motion as to 

both specifications. (Tr. 95-96.) The trial court found Handyside not guilty of 

kidnapping, but guilty of abduction and assault. The trial court sentenced 

Handyside to 18 months imprisonment, and Handyside filed this appeal of his 

conviction of the abduction charge only. He assigns two errors for our review: 

I. The [trier of fact’s] determination in lower court was against the 

manifest weight of evidence; and 

II. There was not sufficient evidence presented to the trier of fact in 

the lower court proceeding to convict the appellant of Count 2 of 

the indictment. 
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

A. Standard of Review

Claiming insufficient evidence, 

raises the question whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support 

the verdict as a matter of law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 

386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, “[t]he 

relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph 

two of the syllabus. 

State v. Herring, 2017-Ohio-743, 81 N.E.3d 133, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). 

B. Whether there was Sufficient Evidence Presented to 

Convict the Appellant of the Crime Charged in Count 

Two of the Indictment 

Handyside argues that there was not sufficient evidence to convict 

him of abduction because he did not knowingly use force or made threats towards 

Vidmar. 

“‘The test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the 

prosecution met its burden of production at trial. State v. Bowden, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92266, 2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 13. An appellate court’s 

function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to 

determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the 

average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 

at ¶ 12. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), 

paragraph two of the syllabus.’” 

State v. Carter, 2018-Ohio-2238, 114 N.E.3d 673, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. 

Pridgett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101823, 2016-Ohio-687, ¶ 15. 
Handyside was convicted of abduction, in violation of 

R.C. 2905.02(A)(2). The statute reads as follows: “No person, without privilege to 

do so, shall knowingly do any of the following: By force or threat, restrain the liberty 

of another person under circumstances that create a risk of physical harm to the 

victim or place the other person in fear.” R.C. 2905.02(A)(2). In State v. Barry, 145 

Ohio St.3d 354, 2015-Ohio-5449, 49 N.E.3d 1248, ¶ 23, the Ohio Supreme Court 

defined the term “knowingly” as follows: 

A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is 

aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or 

will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of 

circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances 

probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is 

an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person 

subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence and 

fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning 

the fact. 

Handyside argues that he saw Vidmar fall to the ground and was only 

trying to assist her. Handyside does not dispute that Vidmar’s liberty was restrained 

or that she was in fear for her safety; however, Handyside argues that there is no 

evidence that he knowingly used force or made threats toward Vidmar. Handyside’s 

version of the events is completely different than the victim’s and witnesses’ 

accounts. Vidmar testified that Handyside held her down, punched her, grabbed 

her, and when she broke free, pushed her down again. 

Additionally, three witnesses saw Handyside attack Vidmar and 

punch her in the face. Vidmar testified, “[b]ut like I said, at that time once I was 

down, I was trying to get back up and the individual was making it so that I either 
couldn’t get back up or I couldn’t get away from him despite struggling.” (Tr. 33-

34.) 

Force is defined as: “any violence, compulsion, or constraint physically 

exerted by any means upon or against a person or thing.” 

R.C. 2901.01(A)(1). In State v. Gregg, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 

91-CA-15, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 5481 (Oct. 26, 1992), the court 

explained: “O.R.C. 2901.01(A) does not provide for any measure of the 

physical exertion that might constitute force, but instead looks to the 

purpose for which the physical exertion, however slight, has been 

employed. If that purpose is to overcome a barrier against the actor=s 

conduct, whether that barrier is in the will of a victim or the closed but 

unlocked door of a home, the physical exertion employed to overcome 

the barrier may constitute force.” See also, State v. Austin, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 20445, 2005-Ohio-1035; State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga Nos. 81692 and 81693, 2003-Ohio-3241. Furthermore, 

“force may properly be defined as ‘effort’ rather than ‘violence’ in a 

charge to the jury.” 

Johnson, supra, citing State v. Lane, 50 Ohio App.2d 41, 45, 361 N.E.2d 535 (10th 

Dist.1976). 

The evidence demonstrates that Handyside knowingly restrained the 

liberty of Vidmar and placed her in fear. 

Under R.C. 2905.02(A)(2), a person commits abduction if he 

knowingly, “[b]y force or threat, restrain[s] the liberty of another 

person under circumstances that create a risk of physical harm to the 

victim or place the other person in fear.” The element of restraining 

another’s liberty may be proven by evidence that the defendant has 

“limit[ed] one’s freedom of movement in any fashion for any period of 

time.” State v. Wright, 8th Dist. No. 92344, 2009-Ohio-5229, at ¶ 23 

(citations omitted). 

State v. Badgett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95146, 2011-Ohio-1245, ¶ 12. The state 

presented sufficient evidence that Handyside, regardless of his stated purpose of 

assisting Vidmar, restrained her liberty by holding her down, hitting her about the 
body and face, was aware that his conduct would cause a certain result: a risk of 

physical harm and fear. 

If believed, the evidence and testimonies submitted to the trial court 

would convince the average mind of the appellant=s guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict Handyside of 

abduction. Therefore, Handyside=s second assignment of error is overruled. 

III. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

A. Standard of Review 

In State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 

1264, & 25, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the standard of review for a criminal 

manifest weight challenge, as follows: 

The criminal manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard was explained 

in State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). In 

Thompkins, the court distinguished between sufficiency of the 

evidence and manifest weight of the evidence, finding that these 

concepts differ both qualitatively and quantitatively. Id. at 386. The 

court held that sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy as to 

whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a verdict as a 

matter of law, but weight of the evidence addresses the evidence=s 

effect of inducing belief. Id. at 386-387. In other words, a reviewing 

court asks whose evidence is more persuasive C the state’s or the 

defendant’s? We went on to hold that although there may be sufficient 

evidence to support a judgment, it could nevertheless be against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at 387. “When a court of appeals 

reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a 

‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of the 

conflicting testimony.” Id. at 387, citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 

42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). 
In our manifest weight review of a bench trial verdict, we recognize 

that the trial court is serving as the factfinder, and not a jury: 

“‘Accordingly, to warrant reversal from a bench trial under a manifest 

weight of the evidence claim, this court must review the entire record, 

weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the 

credibility of witnesses and determine whether in resolving conflicts in 

evidence, the trial court clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new 

trial ordered.’” 

State v. Strickland, 183 Ohio App.3d 602, 2009-Ohio-3906, 918 N.E.2d 170, & 25 

(8th Dist.), quoting Cleveland v. Welms, 169 Ohio App.3d 600, 2006-Ohio-6441, 

863 N.E.2d 1125 (8th Dist.), citing Thompkins at 390. See also State v. Kessler, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93340, 2010-Ohio-2094, & 13. 

B. Whether the Trial Court’s Verdict was Against the 

Manifest Weight of Evidence

Handyside argues that the same reasoning to determine that the 

evidence was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict can be used to determine that 

the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We note that “[w]hen 

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence the court does not weigh the credibility of 

the witnesses. State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 2002-Ohio-2126, 767 N.E.2d 

216, & 79.” State v. Marrero, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-344, 2011-Ohio-1390, 

& 10. When looking at the evidence and determining whether the state’s evidence 

or Handyside’s evidence is more persuasive, we must weigh the evidence and 

consider the credibility of the witnesses. 

Although, we review credibility when considering the manifest weight 

of the evidence, we are cognizant that determinations regarding the 
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the testimony are primarily 

for the trier of fact. The trier of fact is best able “‘to view the witnesses 

and observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and use 

these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered 

testimony.’” State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 

N.E.2d 1264, & 24, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio 

St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). 

State v. Bridges, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105440, 2018-Ohio-1388, & 12. 

Vidmar=s testimony was corroborated by three different random 

bystanders. All three witnesses saw Handyside attack Vidmar. There is no evidence 

to support that Handyside was merely helping Vidmar up from the ground. Vidmar 

testified that while she was running Handyside came right up to her. She stated, “I 

saw the individual coming right at me and I noticed that they were getting down in 

a crouch, almost getting ready to tackle me as if in a football stance, which I 

recognized because I used to play football in a co-ed league.” (Tr. 32.) Vidmar also 

testified about the force that Handyside exerted to keep her down on the ground. 

She testified, “Initially I was pushing him off trying to break his grip at one point, 

because I couldn’t get him to let me go, so I tried to turn my back and run. He 

grabbed me by the back, as you see right there, to pull me back towards him. * * * 

because every time I would try to stand, he would push me back down.” (Tr. 44.) 

We find that the trial court was in the best position to determine the 

credibility of each witness. We do not find that the trial court clearly lost its way and 

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed 

and a new trial ordered. 

Handyside=s first assignment of error is overruled. 
Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

 The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant=s 

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

_____________________________ 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, A.J., and 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR