NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 21-2174

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

MAURICE QUINN,

Appellant

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-19-cr-00350-003)

District Judge: Honorable Jan E. DuBois

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Argued on November 16, 2022

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Before: AMBRO*, KRAUSE, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges

(Filed: June 21, 2023)

* Honorable Thomas L. Ambro assumed senior status on February 6, 2023.
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Paul J. Hetznecker [Argued]

1420 Walnut Street

Suite 911

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Counsel for Appellant

Robert E. Eckert, Jr.

Bernadette A. McKeon [Argued]

Office of United States Attorney

615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellee

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OPINION**

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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

On appeal of his convictions for Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1), and 

for carrying and using a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c), Appellant Maurice Quinn contends (1) that insufficient evidence exists to 

sustain his convictions under both the Hobbs Act and § 924(c); (2) that the District Court 

erred by failing to provide Quinn’s proposed accomplice-liability jury instruction for his 

§ 924(c) charge; and (3) that the District Court erred by providing a Pinkerton conspiracy 

instruction for his Hobbs Act charge. For the reasons explained below, each argument is

unpersuasive, so we will affirm.

** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 

does not constitute binding precedent.
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I. DISCUSSION1

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Quinn first asserts that there was insufficient evidence at trial to sustain his 

convictions under both the Hobbs Act and § 924(c). We review the “evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution,” and will only overturn a conviction if no “rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of [a] crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Quinn has not made the requisite 

showing for either conviction.

Under the Hobbs Act, a defendant commits robbery when he “knowingly and 

willfully” engages in an “unlawful taking . . . of personal property from the person or in 

the presence of another . . . by means of actual or threatened force.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1951(b)(1); United States v. Stevens, No. 21-2044, 2023 WL 3940121, at *3 n.3, 5 (3d 

Cir. June 12, 2023). Here, the record reflects that Quinn and co-appellants Abid Stevens 

and Donnie Smith disarmed the clerk of a convenience store at gunpoint, after which 

Quinn forced the clerk to open the register and hand over $100.2 There is thus no 

question that Quinn committed a taking, and, as he actively concedes, his “actions in 

taking the money from the cash register following his demands to be compensated 

amounted to a theft.” Opening Br. 19. Quinn also indisputably threatened the use of 

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 

appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

2 Co-appellants Stevens and Smith also appeal their respective convictions—

United States v. Abid Stevens (21-2044); United States v. Donnie Smith (21-1384)—but 

we resolve those appeals separately.
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physical force: The video surveillance footage in this case reveals that Quinn repeatedly 

shoved and shouted at the clerk, making physical contact on several occasions.

Consistent with that footage, the clerk testified at trial that Quinn was “pushing [him] . . .

, hitting [him] in the chest” and “trying to . . . strangl[e him].” Stevens App. 180. In 

sum, on this trial record, a rational juror could easily conclude that Quinn committed 

Hobbs Act robbery.

To find a defendant guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the jury must find that 

the defendant, “during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . , use[d] or carrie[d] a 

firearm, or [] in furtherance of any such crime, possesse[d] a firearm.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1)(A). Here, Quinn was the sole robbery participant who did not, himself, 

brandish, use, carry, or possess a weapon, thus precluding direct liability under § 924(c). 

But the District Court also instructed the jury on an aiding and abetting theory of liability. 

Under 18 U.S.C. § 2, the federal aiding-and-abetting statute, a defendant who is not 

directly liable under § 924(c) may nonetheless be held liable if he “(1) takes an 

affirmative act in furtherance of [the underlying crime of violence], (2) with the intent of 

facilitating the offense’s commission.” Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 71 

(2014) (citations omitted). In Rosemond, however, the Supreme Court clarified that a 

defendant must also have “advance knowledge” of firearm use, defining “advance” to 

mean awareness “at a time the accomplice can do something with it—most notably, opt 

to walk away.” Id. at 78. Critically, within that definition, the Rosemond Court included 

situations in which a “defendant continues to participate in a crime after a gun was 
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displayed or used by a confederate” because a “jury can permissibly infer from his failure 

to object or withdraw that he had such knowledge.” Id. at 78 n.9.

Here, Quinn contends that “there is no evidence that [he] either intended, or 

contemplated the introduction of a firearm as reflected in the independent spontaneous 

acts of both Donnie Smith and Abid Stevens.” Opening Br. 24. Regardless of whether 

that is true, however, Quinn offers no reason as to why, immediately after Smith and 

Stevens brandished their weapons, he could not have simply “quit the crime” by leaving 

the store. Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 78. Because Quinn instead participated in disarming 

the store clerk, after which he unlawfully took $100, a rational juror could conclude that 

Quinn had the requisite “advance knowledge” for an aiding and abetting conviction under 

§ 924(c). So we will deny his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim here too. 

B. Section 924(c) Aiding and Abetting Instruction

Quinn next asserts that the District Court erred by rejecting his trial counsel’s 

proposed “advance knowledge” jury instruction for accomplice liability under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c). While Quinn concedes that the instruction given by the District Court was 

based, in part, on the Supreme Court’s “advance knowledge” ruling in Rosemond, he 

nonetheless argues that the version he proposed “more accurately sets forth parameters of 

the law as set forth by Rosemond.” Opening Br. 28. We review objections to the 

wording of a jury instruction for abuse of discretion, United States v. Gonzalez, 905 F.3d 

165, 182 (3d Cir 2018) (quotation omitted), and find none here. Simply put, Quinn fails 

to explain how the substance of his proposed instruction differed, in any meaningful way, 

from the instruction utilized by the District Court. Each instruction highlighted the 
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element of “advance knowledge”—in the District Court’s formulation, a “realistic 

opportunity to leave the scene of the robbery,” Stevens App. 1170, and in the instruction 

proposed by Quinn’s counsel, a “realistic opportunity to quit the robbery,” Opening Br.

31. Because Quinn fails to explain why this is a distinction with a difference, we deny 

this claim. Thus, we perceive no error in the District Court’s instruction given. 

C. Pinkerton Conspiracy Liability Instruction

Finally, Quinn asserts that, for two reasons, the District Court erred by providing a 

Pinkerton conspiracy instruction for his Hobbs Act charge. See Pinkerton v. United 

States, 328 U.S. 640, 646–48 (1946). He first argues that the absence of conspiratorial 

evidence should have precluded that instruction. But the District Court explicitly 

addressed this argument prior to charging the jury, explaining that, although the evidence 

of a conspiracy may have been “thin,” there was at least “some evidence [from which] 

the Government [could] argue . . . Pinkerton liability.” Stevens App. at 842. Quinn’s 

counsel offered no response at trial, and again fails to address this point on appeal. 

Instead, Quinn chooses only to reiterate his claim that there is no evidence of a 

conspiracy. This, of course, ignores that the District Court expressly found the opposite 

to be true, and our review of the record confirms that finding.

In the alternative, Quinn contends that the District Court’s decision to provide an 

aiding-and-abetting instruction for his § 924(c) charge and a Pinkerton instruction for his 

Hobbs Act charge confused the jury. Specifically, he asserts that because aiding and 

abetting under § 924(c) requires advance knowledge and Pinkerton liability does not, the 
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District Court’s failure to distinguish which theory applied to which charge led to juror 

confusion. 

This final claim fares no better. Contrary to Quinn’s assertion, the District Court 

only gave a Pinkerton liability instruction when charging the jury on the Hobbs Act 

robbery count, and after completing its instructions for that charge, unequivocally 

distinguished between the two counts. In relevant part, the Court stated that it had 

“conclude[d] the charge on Count I, Hobbs Act robbery, including aiding and abetting 

Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy,” and would next “turn to Count II, which charges a 

separate crime . . . .” Stevens App. at 1164. Because “juries are presumed to follow a 

court’s instructions,” Robinson v. First State Cmty. Action Agency, 920 F.3d 182, 186 (3d 

Cir. 2019), and nothing indicates that the jury somehow deviated from those instructions, 

here too there was no reversible error.

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will uphold Quinn’s convictions and will affirm the 

judgment of the District Court.