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TQP SE8Rb"i' O\FOE S:SOURP:PY BIFOR!i:'t'±'TOH 

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l\.:PFEI'IDIX B 

,\7WEXURE Bl 

TIIE A.SSI (}JMENT 0F COUINT 

DPC53/D/ 

046 

Final 

19 N3.rch 19 53 

TO CA'rEGORIES AliD SUB - CATEGORIES 

1. .This Annexure delineates the basis for (a.) tho establishment of 

Sub-Categories, (b) the assignment of COMTITT to Categories and SubCatcBories, ( c) the classification of COUmT assigned to Category I 

:tnd ( d) the applic :.it ion of codewords to designate Sub-Categories, as 

provided in parngraphs Sc, 5-8, 14 a11.d 15 of Append.ix B respectively. 

This Annexure is not j_ntendod to specify or accomplish the detailed 

categorization of all C01IDiT. However, along with the criteria 

described in paragraphs 9 and 10 oi' Appendix B, it governs the prepa.r::rt:.ion 

and maintenance of current, mutually agreed lists, which arc required 

under para~raph 11 of ippendix D, to indicate the precise assienment of 

all COlIDrT to Gategories and Sub-Categories. 

2. Category I shall contain: 

a. Tr::i.ffic intellieem e relating to D/F mission assignments, 

bearing reports and fix reports (i.e.: target frequencies, 

call-signs, 11 piped sit;nals 11 , other signal information, 

bearines and fixes), provided that no interpretations or 

complex changing call-sign systems are included. This material 

sh:ill normally be classified CONFIDE!'JTIAL. 

b. Plain-text tactical or operational traffic provided that no 

interpretations of complex changin6 call-sign systems, enciphered 

i::iap rei'erences, or results of advanced traffic analysis are 

included. 'l'his mterial shill ir.clude local procedural and 

local grid nnci zone systcr:s used for artillcrJ direction, 

tactical cor..trol :i."'ld 1·.ovemcmt of front line units, early 

1rarning ar.d exercise of tactical conbat control of aircraft. This 

NS.A Form 781-C13S 1 Jul 52 
L- 'b'Gi' SE~rl'f'@Jl_f1fj1~fifA@~ ··- 19 March 1953 

c. Traffic IntelliGence or Crypt IntolliGonco from an'llysis 

of radar trackine reports and visual observation reports as 

round in tacLical or operational traffic, provided that 

enciphered aircraft type designations or interpretations 

of complex changing call sign systems are not included. 

Inclusion of local grid or zone references, local proced~ral 

codes used for brevity and plain-text interspersed with 

cover words is permissible. '£his material shall normally be 

classified GO?IFIDE!!TIA.L. 

d. Crypt Intellir,ence from naval tactical maneuverine codes, 

when us od as such, and from jargon codes. This material 

shall normally be classified CIJNFIDENTIAJ ... 

3. Category: II shall contain 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

a. Traffic Intellieence (including freely available privacy 

and brevity syste, I except where 

specifically assigned to other Categories. Category II plaintext which qu'3.lifies for exceptional handling under 

paragraph .35g of Appendix B shall include only such of the 

following as is not assigned to Category III under subparagraphs 4d and '•e belO\v: 

[i)·I ________________ ___, 

b. Crypt Intelli~<mce spccif'fually assigned on the basis of 

crypto-syDtc111s. lTSCIE and LSIB shall have supplomcnt.<J.ry lists 

of a.Jl cryptosystm:is :nutuaJ.ly adjudged suitable for inclusion 

in this Category l:cpt jointly in current statuD by their 

respective technical ~roups. These lists shall bo based upon 

the criteria in sub-p~r~graphs 9a, b, c, ~nd d, and 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

NSA Form 181-C 13S J Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
( - TOI SE~·kif5 tj~liOE 

!Of 81!lenmrf e.'dfCE SBEH:HlH'Y BlFORMft'fIOM 

DPC53/B/ Final 

046 

19 March 1953 

paragraph 10 of ~ppondix n. Ei"l;her I arty mey, aftc·r 

consideration of advan l:.agcs and risl<:s as provided in subparagraph 9e of Appendix D, assign a1y crypto-systc-m 

currently so listed to Category II. The other Farty shall 

then be notified immediately throu~h the technical channel 

used in mainto.ining the joint lists, and sh:ill similarly 

assign the orypto-sys~em involved. 

4. Category III shall contain: 

a. Crypt Intelligence except where specifically assigned to 

other Categories. 

b. Traffic Intelligence involving call-signs or message 

headings encrypted in codes or ciphers of high security 

grading. 

c. 'l'raf.fic Intelligence involving such o ombination ("fusion 11 ) 

of separate Traffic Intelligence or other Category II 

sources as produces information whose value is so ;:.reat that 

security of content becomes the overriding consideration. 

d. 

...····/··· / .. ·· 

c. l·laterial involving sensitive collection p.;;. ocedures or tho 

revelation of suc(:ess aeainst unμs'l.l.al,, sensitive or coraplox 

tr:msmissi on procedures and doviccs. 

EO 3.3b(3) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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NSA Form 181-C 135 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
':POP SEl9R:Elq? SMJOS 8T5St::f:R±'f'Y BJFOHMSc'i''FSif 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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BPC53/B/ Final Ql~6 

19 l.thrch 1953 

NS.A Form 7SJ-CJ3S I Jul 52 TOP SECRET C1\:NOE 
a- TOI SEei\WP ~At)-iOE TOI' ~eflfl'f OA:H0B - SBOUR:E'!'Y INFeftfltAl"l:ON BPC 53/B/ FJ nFl l 

o'-~6 

·19 March 1953 

APPENDIX B 

ANNEXURE B2 

SECURITY PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF COMINT ACTIVITmS IN 

EXPOSED AREAS 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

l. INTRODUCTION PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

It is recognized that effective interception of foreign connnunications and effective support.of fiel.d commanders may require the establishment of CO~n:NT activities in locations which may suddenl.y fall under uni'riend1y control with consequent loss of COMINT personnel and/or associated 

classified materials. It is agreed that, in addition to the pertinent, 

general provisions of Appendix B, the specific provisions which follow 

shaJ.l govern the conduct or COMINT activities in such locations. 

2. DEFINITIONS 

Exposed areas are those which are susceptibl.e of' being quicltly overrun 

by eneIIzy" forces or those wherein the local. political or military situation 

is such as to pose a distinct threat to the security of COMINT activities 

conducted therein. At present they comprise primarily countries under 

.._~~~~~~~~~~~__.fnd areas adjacent to these countries which 

a.re beyond defense l.ines expected to be tenabl.e. In proportion to the 

risk of loss of COMINT personnel and/or classified material located 

therein, such areas involve three situations: 

a. Protected situations 1 i.e.: those in which there is no 

reasonable expectation of such a loss. 

b. Risky situations,1.e.: those in which it is likely that 

complete evacuation or COMINT personnel and removal or 

effective destruction of classified material will. be 

accomplished. 

c. Dangerous situations 1 i.e.: those in which it is unlikely 

tha:t complete evacuation of COMINT personnel and removal 

or effective destruction of classified material will 

be accomplished. i 

NS.A Form 781-C13S 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
. -

r••, I • "'::. ',' ci "\' .. ; Pi 1.iG'q.)I1:FY JjlfPFf·1 ., ... FI•l ·-·-·--- I• • -• - ........ _ ''" -0.IO ... -IOloo .. -·--:----.... ,--.. .:.- ~-L.~ .. --- -1 '" , . . l ) .... J) • -· I j ... 

3· EVALUN.rION OF SITUATIONS ~m EXPOSED AREAS 

The d.eciaion whether a ("1ven s:L tuation is protected, riolcy- or 

dangerous shoJ.l be made by uscm or IBIB, or by such other authorities aa I 

a.re responsible for the security of the COMINT activities concerned, and 

shall be made in the light ot the political, military, and other !actors . ., 

a.ff'ect:tng the sa.f'ety of the COMINT personnel and materie.ls involved • .1 

I 

' . 4. FACTORS AFFECTING DECISIONS TO CONDUCT COMINT ACTIVITIES IN 

l 

RISKY OR DANGEROUS SITUATIONS 

I 

COMINT activities shaJ..l be conducted :l.n risky or dangeL~us 

. . situations only after due consideration of the COMJNT losses which may result 

if the area concerned 1~ suddenly attacked, and of the probable effect 

of such losses upon the conduct.of COMINT activities elsewhere." 

I 5. SAFEGUARDS FOR RISKY SITUATIONS 

In the case 0~°COMINT activities established in r!sky situations, 

the following safeguards shall be applied save as exceptions to them 

are specit'icaJ.J.y approved by USCIB or IBIB: 

a. Only intercept, anedytic and reporting tasks which cannot 

be perfornied satisfactorily in safe or protected situations 

shaJ.l be assigned. 

b. No Category III COMINT or related documents and technical. 

materiaJ. shall be held except those essential to the 

assigned task and of current appiication thereto, and the 

latter shall. be maintained in such condition as to insure 

immedia:te destruction, if necessary, ~on sudden threa.t of' 

seizure. 

c. No person in Group D, as defined in sub-paragraph 3oa. of 

Appendix B, shaJ.l be assigned, unless required by technicaJ. 

considerations. 

a. Facilities shall be provided with which of the com.plcment can 

be expected to destroy effectively, if necessary, a.J..l classified 

COMINT rna.teriaJ.s within a tiD1.e limit commensurate with 

cxist:!..ng dangers, and unit personnel shall be okilled in the 

use of these :facilities. 

NSA. Form 781-C13S 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
13PC 5.3/a/i Final Q/~6 . 

19 ?.lurch 195.3 

A.EJ1,endix B 

lrnnexure B2 . 

e. Appropriate steps shall be taken to insure that adequate 

arrangements are me.de for sa.f e evacuation of all. personnel 

whose loss wouJ.d be damaging and tha.t the unit in question 

is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis. 

6 • SAFmUARDS FOR DANGEROUS SITUATIONS 

In the case of COMINT units established in dangerous situations 

the f ollow:Lng sa:f'eguards sliaJ.l be applied save as exceptions to them are 

l:'pecifica.l.J.y approved by USCIB or !SIB: 

a. Only unique intercept tasks which cannot be accomplished 

elsewhere shall be assigned, and only such analysis as is 

locally required to support these ta.ska and permit essential 

technical reporting shall be performed. 

b • Only COMINT documents or technical aids essential and of 

current application to these tasks shall be hel.d. 

c. No Category III COMINT or related documents and technical 

material shaJ.1 be held. 

d. Personnel technically informed in COMINT of a higher level. 

or broader scope than is required for the l.imited mission 

of the unit should not be assigned if avoida.bl.e. 

e. No person in Group C as defined in sub-paragraph 3oc 

of Appendix B shall be assigned unless his presence is 

vita.;t for the effective fUnctioning of the unit. 

f. No person in Group D e.s defined in sub-paragraph 30d 

of Appendix B shal.l be assigned in any circumstances. 

3 

NSA Form 781°C13S 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
'i'9P SEl9ff:iJCJ? 9MIGS - SF.l9U'Rf9?Y Bf.li'9HJ.tit!I6M nro 53/n Ii Final 

NSA Fann 7Bl-Cl3S l Jul 52 

046 , .. 

19 ?farch 195.3 

Appendix B 

Annexure B2 

g. Facilities shall be provided with which the minimum number 

of persons on duty at a:ny one time can be expected to destroy effectively, if ,necessary, all classified CO!.!INT 

materials within a time limit commensurate with existing 

dangers, .and unit personnel shall be skilled in the use 

of these facilities. 

h. Appropriate steps shall be taken to insure that the unit 

in question is kept infonned of evacuation plans on a 

current basis. 

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TOP SECR·ET CANOE