REF ID:A62848 

Ilft'OOIRX.'71<11 ~ CRlPJ.'OLOOI IV 

BY WILt.IAN p • l'RDIJCQ 

Cbdftdeutial: 

Crzptology 1n the C1Y1l War 

A detailed account ot the codes and ctpben ot the C1TU War 1n the 

United States ot America can blLrdly be tol4 without begimdng v1th a b1t 

or biosraph1' about tbe 9D. vho became the tint aigul. otticer in h18'o!7 

and the tint Chie:t SiSJl&\ otticer ~ the United state• Amy, Alben J. 

Myer, the mn in vhoM -..ors that lOYel.y' 11"1.e U.S. Arrq post adJacent 

to ArlJ.ngton Cemeteey was ~. Myer aa bOJ'D on 20 September 1827, and 

af'ter an apprent1ce8h1p in the then quite new 10ieme ot el.ecrtr1c telegraphy 

he entered Hobart. College, Geneva, Bev Yol"k, fl'QI 11hich he ,.. gredl.m.ted. 

1n 181+7. l'rta early 10\Rh be had exhibited & pl941l.ect:l.ou tor artistic 

and ecient1t1c at~, an4 ,.,on 1eav1ng Hobart he entered Bu1'falo Medical 

College, receiVing the M.D. depee tour 19ara later. !11 gnduati011 the•1s, 

"A Sip :tanguap ~or De.at Mutea, 11 contained the aena ot the idea be waa to 

develop uveral. J9U8 later, when, ill 1854, he wa coad.••1cmed a lst 

Lieutenmit 1n the Regular A:r:my, .ae an Aaliatant Surgeon, and ordezed to 

j lln Meld.co tor duty. lie had pi.nty ot tt.1n '111• tar-avq outpostJto 

think about develo;iD& an ett1c1en't •zatem ot llil1t&u7 "aer1&l 'telegapby, 11 

vbich vu vb&t Tiaual aignal tng wa then called.. I emphu1Se the word 

"•ystem" becawle, etnmse to 9q, <houah 1natance• ot the use or light• 

and other Yia\Bl •1gnal• can be totmd throughout tbe history ot -.rtaft, 

and their UH between abips •' _. bad been p1'8e'\1eed by arinen tor 

centuries, yet down to the 'Siddle ct the 19th CentUJ7 aurpna1nsJ,7 little 

progresa had been m4e in &nel.oping metb.oda and instrument• tor the , 

syRemtia emban&e ~ mUitar,r 1nt01'9.tion and 1nstNlt1one by Jll98D• ot 

signal.a or~ kind. Mone'• practical •:vat.a ot elecUic telegraphy, 

developed in the "'an 1832-35, 1el'ftd to :tocus a~tion Y.f.thin the Jlilitu'J 

upoo .,.atem and •thod• tJt 1nter-caaunicat1on by man at both Yi8\.&l 

and electrical. sigDa].e. ID. 'the ;yware 1 !ilately pneecling the CiTil war, 

the u.s. Army took n.p. to 1.zJtroduce and to dinelO.P a syatem ot viaual 

sign•ling for general UN 1n the tteld. I't wa A•ai•taDt Surgeon ~r 

who ~shed ti:. 1nitiat1Ye in this atter. 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA bn 12-17-2013 pursuant to E.O. 1352B 
REF ID:A62848 

In 1856,. two '9&ft atter be w ccaaiaaicned uuatant surpcn, ~ 

c1n.rted a wrand\lll oa a Dh' QStB ~ nl\&l. a1saa>tna and obtained. a 

patent cm it. 'l'wo ,.an later, a board 1191 appoJnted by the War Department 

to ·~ M;:fer' a ayatm. It 1A inte:reatSna "° note_ that_ one or the otttean 

vho aerred as 1111 *8e1naut to M)er in demaastrattns hU •'8'tem be:ton the 

bcud .a a Lieut. B. P. AleMnc'er, Corpe or Bng1DMr1. \fie ah&1l bear .on 

aboui hill preaentl.J', but at the ..-nt I w.Ul ~ that on the outb:NU. at 

wr, AleXIDder organii&ecl tbe Contedemte Signal COl'JI•• After aaae aucceaatul 

c1escnlt.rat1cme b;y f(yer ad h1• anistenta, the Var Depu'tmnt toatered a bill I 

in Congrea, 111hich fJl&'l8 it• am>total. to his 1cteu. !uti what 1• more to 

the 1>0int, Cmgnu ·~an. initial. -.ount o:t '2,000 to enable the 

Az:rq u4 ~ Var ~ to c1eTltl.op the 8l'ftem· lfhe ... 7, u stated 

111 the Act _. to be U8ed "tOI" aanutactuie ~ purchue ot appamtua and 

equi.»laent tor field a1gn&l11J&•" The act al.so cc:nt;a1nec\ .other important 

p:roY1aions 1' author1hd the~' m tba ~ atatt, ot one S1gDal 

otttcer v.tth the l'Wonk, pq, end &U0118r1Cea ot a Jm3or ~ c&Y&J.r.y. On 

2 Jul7 l860, "Aatdetea.t Surpca Albert J. MJer (wu QpOtnted) to be Stp1 

Otticer, Y.l~ tlJe 1'SDk ot Ma..1ol', 27 June l86o, to till an 01'l&tnal. 'NC11D071 /\ 

and two weu lat.r MaJOZ' ~ ,,.. OJ'&tftd to nport to the ecw.raJng 

General or the Depat tuent ot lw MeXico tor stgnal ins duty. !rile _. 

De~ al.so d1rected that tvo otticen be tSetailed u bis uaietant•. 

During a eve~ 1IOlltha' cap91p apinst hoat1le le:YaJoa, u exteuive test 

ot Jityer'• nev S)'Stell, USiDg both tla,p lln4 tofthe•, .. cc:mdueted With llUCh 

•uccesa. In Oetoba 1860, a L1eut. J. B. :a. St:ua'rt1 later to becca taous 

aa a ecnt•rate oaftl.r;r leedar1 tendltnd h1• Rnioe• to aid 1D a1gnal 

1UUuct1on.. 

Leu thm a J'MI' after M&Jor ~r .. ap,pointed u the tint and, • 

that time, the cnJ.7 Sipll. Otticer ~the u.s. A:N:r, Fort Smpter,.. 

a"8clatd atld, atter a 36-hou:r bambal"dment1 ~nt. The' bloo41 tour-

)eal" war beu.en the llarth u4 the Scnl\b be-. '!he date vu 14 April 1861. 

~r· • aystem ot •rial telegnphy _. aoca to undergo~· nal beptia un4er 

tin, rather than b7 t:tre. 8'lt With the OU'Wb~ or 111.r, another new - ... , 

•;yatem or m1li:iar;y ~i&Ul j ec•nmtcaUoa, aignal 1'88 b)' the electric tele;raph, 

began to undergo 1ta fi.nt. thaiough teat in ctllbe\ ope:ratsons. '?hi• in 

.... ' I 
REF ID:A62848 

itself is vel'1111ponant 1n 'the binary ot cl'J'jl'tology. But :tar .me 

a!gr:d.ficant 1n that h1sto1"7 1a a tlct that I •ntioaed at the eloee ot \he 

last lecture, Ti¥, thai tor the first tim 1n ~ conduct ~ oraan1sed 

wartan, rapid and secret ailitaq ccmunicationa en a l.!rp scale becam 

pncticable, becauae crntol.oa and electric tel•&ft1Ph1' wn now to be 

Joined 1n a luting wdl.ock. ror when the wr besim, the electric telepaph 

b&d been 1n use :tor le•• ~ban a quarter ot a centuq. Althaugh the tint 

\Ille or electric telegnplJ7 in military oper&tioaa ws in the C1"1mnn W&r in 

Bu.rope (1854-56)1 ita emploJaUt was restricted to ccnmnnication1 el'L'hapd 

llllO'O& headqlartera ot the Allie•, and am. obeeners wre ft%'7 doubttul about 

1 u ut1li t7 ..,.n tor th1• lim:ted UA811 • It my aJ.eo be noted thl.-t in- the 

amiala of that war "1M!N 1• no weld of the aplQJMDt ot elactric telegraphy 

toge~r YS.th mnu tar protecting the •seaaea apiDn ~1r 1Dtel'Uept1oa 

and solution by the •Dell1'• 

On the Union aide in the Civil war, 111111tary aip&l ope:ration• began 

with Jfa3or llf3er's ani:nl in Vaahinstm m 3 June 1861. Hi• basic equi:pmnt 

consisted or kiv conta1Dtng a white tlag with a red square 1n tbe center 

tor use aga101t a dark background; a red nag vJ.th a white aquan tor u• 

aeatnet a light background; sad •o:rcbea tor night UM. It is mternc.i,ng to 

aote that the• are the el.emellt• which uke up the t-mJtar 1n91g1Ua ot our 

AftJ7 Signal Co:rp1. '!'he aost. Pft••!Dg need which t.ced Major lf1er _. to get 

am.can and •n detailed to h1la vheftftr •1gnal.e sight be requind, ad to 

train 'them in what bad OClll 'o be called the "111.pag a,..a., " 1 the aotiou ot 

Which an depicted 1n :rtg. l. Thi• training included learrWsg eamatb1ng about 

? -->· ftg. 1 4--2 

,, 

But there vu RUl 1IO smll Dp&rate entity .. a S1SD&}. Corps ot tlMt 

t! 

~. otticera IDld al.:l.sted •• wn •l"el:r detailed. tor aemce vith MaJor 

it;,.r tor aigna'Ung d\1t7. It .a not until two 1"l'8 after the wr •tarted that 

the 81snal. Cori>• wu otticall.7 eetabliehed and oraanized as a 1epuate bnnch 

or 'the Arrq, by app:rop:r1&1ie Ccnanaa1onal. action. 

In the meantime, another sigD&l.ing orglBUat:l.cm,.. coming in'<> being--

l And, ot coune, the G.I. '• ot those c2aJ11 bad a pe-t mm tor the uaera ot the 

s,-.tem. The7 called them "flag tloppen." 

? 

·' 
REF ID:A62848 

at the comml'Cial. '9leO'll'h cmpenin 1n the United StaWa CD 25 Pebl'\m7 1862. 

Tbere wa th.a a:al7 thne h amber: the .AmerJ.eaa, the West.en Uaicm., -4 

the Sou\hwnen. !he telq;ra;pb Una• 8tMl"al.l.1' tollowd the risht-ot .. _,. 

ot the a&<l'f:'Cl9da. !be ~ Secmary ot Vv, Sillon Cwl"OD, SOQ&h\ ~ aid 

of 'rha.t A. Seott., ot the Pe11Qyl'11111a Ra11.road, who bJ'OUght ._ ot hi• 

'M'll to W.ahinpoa tor ra1l.zioad &acl tel.egn.phic d~a v.lth tbe J'edenl. 

GcwerDlllDt. hm a nuolaus ot tour ~ ~lagraph (11J18.l'aton snw • :ra"1ler 

1ar!11 mlitary telegraph ~atton which ws not given toa.J. atawa \DRU 

on 28 October 186J. Pn•14nt Ltnoaln _,,. Secl'etar,r C..J"OJl authoft~y to 

at iw a "1.s. Mllltar.J' ~le8"lPh Deparimnt" under a .. um.cl Juan stapr, -

11bo,. u sennat supe~t ot the Venera Uld.oa ,... called w ~, rJ 

cQllld.aeioud a 08Jt&1D (1.atu a cal.oal) 1D the Quaf'tlel'mfter Ool'j>8, tmd 

made aupe~'\ or the Mtlita17 Telegraph Departmnt. ~~ about a 

4odA at the _..n at '\he llepllrtwn becw c~Hicmd ottieen, act 

, .tiwT wa mde ott:leen ao ti.at •he7 could mce1Ye ad d1ebuzw tuads, ad 

I 

---~ -~1'J all the rest Wft civilian•. The u.s. MUital".Y Telegraph "Col'pa," 

aa ii~ cw to be &tld.pe+«l1 Y.lthout wriaut, ._. $echa1c&Uy under 

~ Qenenl. *1p, bu\ for all practical ;purpoMa 1t wu ua&tr 

the 1-cliate amt ~ contJ."01 or tbe Secretary ot War, .J a1tlat10n ,. 

&4m1ttecll,y accapUible to ltllip. Thea wze now two OZ'pld.satiODa b- a1gnaJ fq 

in tha Anr:f1 and it .. hard11' W be QlleOted that DO clitt1crult1es wuld 

enaue 1:rcm the duali'Q. In hc\1 the ditf1cul'tiea began "n»ry aooa, as can 

be aoM4 in the toUOldas otnct hm & lec'Wre be:t'oi. the WUbington CiTU 

war Boum 'fable, ..,.17 1n 1954, b7 Dr. a.oree R. !hcnpaoa, Chiet tst '\he 

Binorical J>.tv181on ot tblt Ottiee or the Chiei- S1fPI&]. Otticer ot the u.s. 

The- tint need tor mU1ta.17 •18Ml • a.m.. .-t the 1llportaut 

J'acSaraJ. tortn•• u. t.ba l01er a.~ ~ a Jtort Mauoe. 

:larly 1D Jmt, Jbier Uri.ftd. thin, obtaimd a d9taU ot otn.cera 

find •n a4 1-SIB achool.ing thea. 8ooa h1* ~11.a Wnt Y1&· 

wgpng .......- t1'm a -.U b~, ~ t1N at Uni<ln 

batteries l.oaaM4 • en 1&1.et m lflllptoD. Boaa.e •seiut 

Cantedel"ate tnUn.c&'tiaa. Mflr Jlortolk. Ver.1 llQCD' too, M1ar 

beSBll 9DC~ trouble with ee1Wni&l Y.l.ft tel.egnlphen 

1n ~ w. OeDe:ral Sm ~l.U~ a.a s 14Sng the J'edeml. l'.>eJIU't• 

mat iA IOlil\bMst V1rg1n1&, ardand tba win telegn.ph :t'ac1U:U.es 

and t.beiZ" c1v:UJ.eD V01"kua be placed un&til-r ~ rigaal. otticer. 

'!'he ciTU:lans, proud ad Jealous o:r their ak::f.U. in el..ctric&l. 

mgtc, ob~11ed 1Jl DO uncertain tena &ad ahortl.7 an order 

am.Ted ttan the Secft'tar7 ot war ldael.:t 1lho counwzmHtd 

BuUer•• 1ut2"Ullt1<ma. The Aft7 •igaal atncer .. to keep 

haD4a ott the ciTiU.. tele&l"&l'h nu ,._ 1• Mned tlJe Arrq. 

.' 

;:/ 
REF ID:A62848 

I haYe PUJ'll09el.1 eeleoted '1111 utftct ~Dr. ~IOD'8 pft...w.tiOll 

becaua in 1t w ca clarl.7 bur tba ftnt rumblilap at ~t l~ flD4 

ecr.baoftioua ~ betwea t1IO stguJ1ns orpad&.ntou whose uncoordinated 

operations and r1val.r:Y ~ ieduced \bt etticienc7 ot &U fdgnaUq 

o.peattaa• ot the l'edarel A1ST· u ~ indicated, cne ~ the• 

oraanuatio:l8 ,,.. the u.s. Mil1t&l7 Telegraph "Cor.Pe1 fl heft1n&tteJ' abbreviated 

aa 1i.be USMre, a ciY111aa orgaisatlon vhich opera\ed the ex1at1Dg camt:rcial 

telesraph systems tor ti. War Deputlnt, UD<Wr 1;be diftct aupeM.•iOD ot 

the Secfttal'7 ot war, ld1dn M. Stanton. The ~J' oi-em:lz&tion .. ,ot 

course, tba 1nhn't Sigaal Corps at the United states Anry, 1fb.ich Vllao\ 

~t ewn eatabllllhed as a .. puaw Brach, vbenu the U9!fC had been 

established 1n Ootober l.86l.1 u noted llbOYe. I""w, the Msnal Co~ bad_ 

to wit until Much 1863, two pan after the cMi>nek ot s bef'Oft being 

eatabllshed atticia.Uy. In this connact1cn it ahould be Dot.eel that the 

Contedemte S1.ga&l Corps bad been esw.blS.sMtd & 1"ull ,.ar earlier, 111 April 

1862. Until tl:ml, u I''" aid betore, tor a1gncl tns dut7 CID both ltima, 

the.a wre ency ott'icen ..to ven lDcU:rtd~ and .tpee~1cally a.tailed 

tor 8U!b duty trom othar branches ot the napect.ift Ami•• ot the lonh 

and the South. 'boul>le bet11een the tam: aud tm Signal Corps ot the Union 

A%'ffl3 bepn vben the Sip.l. Corps became inteNated in aip•l 1ng by electric 

telegnphy and bepn to ecq\d.re tacil1titls thaftf'or. 

All early aa 1n June 1861, Chiet Signal Otticer M)9r had 1Jl1.t1ated ectioa. 

tov&l'd acq~ or obt.a1njng electrical telegraph tac1llt1•• for use in 

the t1e1d but with one exce»t1cm. not.bing happened.. The exception ns ill 

tbe oue ar ti. epiao&t 1n tbe militar;r department in souttean Virginia, 

CC!JJIDAnded by General Benjam1D Butler, an episode that cleaJ'J.7 tonabadowed 

the Mure road ~or the Signal Cor.P• 1D nprd to Ctlectrical. ngna:Ung: the 

road 1fa8 to be cloaed llDd b&rftd,. In .Augat 1861, Col. ~r t.ried aga;tn 

and 1n lfcmmber ot the llW )'Ml' he ncomu.ded in hie annual npoJ"t that 

*30,000 be awropriawd to eatablilh en el.:tric •1gn&11ng branch iD the 

SigD&l. Corps. The pl"Opoa&l. h.Ued to m.t the approT&l. ot the Secl'etaey ot 

Var. Om telegraph train, howwer, Vhich bad been ordered by ~i- m:rq 

months bef'on, ,... delivend in JanU&17 1862. !he tn.in vu tried out in 

a ~tal tuhion, and under ccnaideftlble ditticultiea, \be most disheartening~ 11h1®....., ~ active opposition ot pencma in Vub:l.ngton, 

pa'ticularl.y the Secretary ot War. So, tor practically the vhola ot the tint 
REF ID:A62848 

two ~ of ~ war, •1-1 artioeft m the 1'0lthera ~ b8d. ..S.ther 

el.41Ctr.tcal. telegraph ~WU.. 1'02" Mor-. optJIUon-tbeJ' had to ftl7 

entirely en ti. vs.s-vae S)'Stal. Bowwer, by -tbt m1d4la ot 1863 tbaft wen 

~ "fl.11q ... teJ.egn.ph" u.iDa 1Ja UM in the fedn9l Anq. Bere 1 8 & 

pictutw ot sueh a train. '!'ha noJlal length ot tleld '*1egrapb l.1ma ws 

:tive to right mil.ea, though in ._ cue• "119 iDatrmats W vo:rb4 n 

41stancea .. great ae twm;y Jl1l••· But 9ftJl bdon the Signal Car.pa W&SA 

Pig. 3 4 ... 3 

to uquint tblse t.:Wtiff, theft 1-!. ben e<atioa \o h8"t them, u wll 

.. ~ 8,lgrsal Cor.P• optlSt.lq pt!'90mlel., all -tumec! OYer 1;o the tan,'C, -~ 

traa Sec~ ot WW stu.toa~ ,.. • eoa.t1equuoe, tu talfC hd 1u ..,. 

In the tall ~ 1863, it took cnv au. the •lec\l'ic t.J.esnipb racrutt.• .a 

telegnph openton cl ta 81ga&l. COJips. Col.oael Jb-*r ~ 1fr0ff: "With 

the lo9s ot it• •Iectr1c line• the Sipal Coipe ,.. utppl.ed." 

So nov theft Wft two c:aa;etiJag aipa.1. Ol'IMil*tiou ca 'the lfortben 

eide: '?be U,S. AJ'lv'a Sipal. Cor,pa, which-.. CQllto.984 ~ ~ .ui"t;Uy 

penoaul. with DO electri.c telegn.ph tacil1"1ea (bu\ .. eq~ Wi\h.... _/ 

tor TS.tnal. •1paling), ad the tJSM!C, which._. not a pan at th9 Anq, beins 

Hatted alaost ent1ftly Yl\h c1Ytl1Ma1 ad 11bich W elecUic 'telegraph 

heil.1tie• IDSd ekilled Mora opea\on (but .-o .._.or 1'HJQllib1lit1•• tor 

naual ldgnaltng or "MJ"J.al telApapby" "llb1e:h,. at CCNZW1 .._·old nutt=>'-

"Bl.ectnc WleP'&PhT" .. aow ~ ~ 1'he tJEleC bed no auu. -to share 

el.eet:d.e ~g:raphy 'With ._ S1guJ. Corpa, a ~:ton in 11htch the1 

i'I 

•n JIOSt ably anitAed by ~ ot Var staatca, ~ar reuou that tall 

oute1de the ecope at thlt pre.-At ~. 

JJowvU, .tJica. a trhntca.1. pat.at ot Vin i' 1• wonh I01»c i!RQ tJaU. 

l'tva.1.J'y Just a b1t,, 1t OAl.7 to not. tla't the Jlenouel CD both "1"Pft:lla\:1ou1 

the 111lltuy ad the c1"filiaD.1 ,... not •n.1.1' aign&lM» and telegraph 

~: they a"9d also • c~ and wa ~01'9 a'trusted 

v1tb the mceuuy eipblr boob .a. ci.JMI" -,.. !fecawle c4 tM.a, the7 

•tunll.7 becam priTT to the ~ eecrets conn,.a. in ~osr&Ph1c 

camun1c&Uau imd 1;be;y thenton QJo)'ed ..._ u VIP'•· rue _. 

pvttculA1.rl.7 true ot m8!1iben ot the taae, 1*laum t.t.7, ad only the71 WN 

•ut.hor!sed to be euatoJiana and uaen ot t.i. oiphttr booka1 !Jot ewn the 

; 

v 
1 

--=----

REF ID:A62848 

cc wrs ot th9 W11w the7 MrN4 had acceu to '\hem. ror iUtmlce, 

on the' one and only OCCUica 1lban Oeneftl. Grat taziced hi• ctim.r operator, 

a c1Tilian mmed Beckw1tb, to t'ID'D Oftl' the cunen't cipher book to a 

qolcnel cm Clmt'• atatt, !eckvith ns ~ d11cbarpd b;r the 

SecfttarT ot War el Grant..,.. np~ A t'ev dqs l.atei', Grlll:rt ipOlogiaed 

and ~kwith,.. ftRon4 to hU poa1t1on. But On:a.t never again d!fMMed 

tht' cipher book 1-ld b7 b11 telegraph o;per&tor. 

The Gru.t·B9cklr1tb attair al.one 1• auttictent to indicate the length• 

to which S.Czetu't ~Var Stantcia. wnt to retain control ewer tbe USHl'C, 

1nclu1Ung its cipher~, -4 it.IJ cipher books. In 'tact, ao stroq -

a posit1cn 414 he take that on 10 Novenibei- 1863, :tallowing a di11asn-ent OYer 

WO ahou1.d open.te and coatl'ol. aU the JIU1tary tel.egJ9pb Une1, M39r, bT 

. then. tull Colonel.,. uc1 bear.tng the impoain,g Utle uChlet Signal Ottieer ot 

the United Stat.a Artq," a titla he had enj~d ~~ cnl.y two moaths, W.. 

peremptorU.y rel.1eved tl'Ol1 tbt;t poe1ticm and put cm. the lhelt. ti loag after· 

~' and tor a •1Ddlv num, ~r•a aucoe••or, U.~. Col. 1'icodemua1 ,,.. 

11kn1H ~ rel.iewd u Chi.et S1w1&1 or.tieer by Secnte.ry stutc:m; 

,-

indeed, he we not onl.7 Wtll0"4 tzm tha't »OS!ticm-he ws d1sm1aeed lb"cn . ~ 

the Serr.lee without 4lftn '\he t0l"lllJ.1t.7 ot tZ"1&1 by court martial. Stanton 

gave "phoney" reuons tor dim:lning Cat. Jficoaau.a, but. I a glad to say 

that the l..&tta' ._. natond his cQlnisaicm in M!Lrch 1865, b7 dil'ee'Um. ot the 

President; also b1 dinetion ~the Pfta1&m.t, Colcmel M)t9:r-.. ~stoftd 

to hi• po'1t1on .. Chief' Signal ott1c•r at the u.s. kr.ftt:r QZl 25 l'ebl'Uaey' 1867. 

When Col. ltfer _. nliewd hall duty u Chier Signal otficer 1n 

• ' I 

'flovtmlbe1t 1863, he was orcleftd to Ce.iro, Ill.Uoia, to aw.it ordera ~or a new 

assigmnent.. Very aoon thereafter he as either O..s1e;nated ( ar he 111q haft 

hilmle:lt decided) to prepa1"9 a field man,,.l en atgnaH.ng ad then soon 

tq>pearad, with a pret'&'toq note dated Jum.r;r l.864, a pempblltt ot 148 

pagea, a oaw ot which 1• na.r 1n the Rue Book Roam or the L1brart ar 

~··· 'the title page !HU a roll.ow: 

"A Mm\ual at Sigaal.!: f'or the UM~ 91p.l atticen 1D the tield. 

By CCii. Alben J. ~, Signal Officer ot 'the Amy, Wub.ington, 

D.c., 1864." 

EYen 1n this tint edition, printed on an Artq pnsa, MJ9r devoted 

nine page1 to a rwprtnt at an article tl'Cll Barp!r'a !f!!kll entitled 
-----..:.-::-

REF ID:A62848 

"Curiodti•• at Cipher1 ff• Md 1a the MCoad. .aition, 1866, he •:JPUAed I 

tbe secti<m m c~ "° a.xt;y paen. JltJl9 ediUcna tollowd .net I 

tldnk w W«I wll _,. that W,.r'• Mini.al., 1n it. Mft-1. .Utiana, ,.. the 

ptowr Amrican text oa 111.Uta17 af.gne.ling. But I'• IO"n.7 to~ that 

u nauQ c~ it wa :rathu a poor thina. Poe had dCllMt better twst.7 

)9Hn beton that 1:A hi• eaaq ell\itled "A tn 1I01"ds aa ucret m.t:lng". 

:Becw ot S.ta h1Abrlc ~, you 8;P' like to - 'What. 1419r'• 

orJ gf.naJ. "viS-WS co6li' wa un. It _. called "a 'ho-41.wnt code ff 

becauae 1t epl.OJ94 oal7 two d1glt1, lad 2, in ptl"mt«ti<m• ot 11 2, 3 

a4 4 SJ'OU.PS• Fo:- .-.Pl• .. A WI repreMDWd b7 the ]ileftlUtat:ton 22; B., 

b)' 2122; -4 o, by 121, etc. Isa flag a1&M1Sna, .. ''l." .. 1n<Uu.W by-

• ~ion to the Wt, and a "2" b7 a aoti.Oll to~ J!'lgb.t. Later tbe• 

*7ti(llU •a ZWNJ'M'd.1 for i.llOU which llUft haft bMa SoOC!. but U. DOW 

llOt obYioas. Btft 1• !f1n''• ~t ooa. 1'h1oh ~oatillued to be UMd 

uatll 1912: 

.l'. .. " 

B • 2122-

C - 121. 

D .. I 2221 

:a - l2 .., - 2221 

G - 22ll 

B • 122 

I- 1 

J - 1122 

K .. 2J2l 

L - 221 

B • 11 

0 - 21 

p - 1212 

Q .. l2ll 

a ... 211 

s - 212 

'l .. 2 

u - ll2 

v - 1222 

v - ll.21 

x .. 2122 

z - 2222 

• - llll 

iD8 - 2212 

t1on - lll2 

Xnd at word - 3 ' Bldot-~ ... 33 

I.a ot ••&88t - 333 

Attinative - 22,22.22.3 

RepU -121.121.121 ~ -2)2121 

Bota: lfo. 3 (enis. or void) ... m4a b7 a rozw.ra dow.wd mt1ca, called 

"treat.". ~n -wea &:1..l't a dClllMa llOJ.'9 llipal.a, tfllf nmbe:rala, tor 

t'ftquotly u.d 9hcrt ......., etc. 

W• llUlt tun our attentic. 110Y w tba •1tun:S.oa u •llU'da the orpa1z&ti.cm 

tor fl8n&ling 1D tm Conte4araw >.zq. It- 1• ot coaa14anbla ilrteffft to llOte 

1ba\ bl the tint snat noer•nt c4 tbe War,, that cl the tint Bull,J:Ebt 

' 

batUe, the Coatedentie S:l.pal otticer _. that 70UDg ~, B. P. 

Alem&tr, itho W wiaW 1Jt. 4ellcmtntiag ~ 111&--s QSta Wan a 

boatd appoi.ated by -ti. Vu' ~t to at'U41' lfJV' • •>•*· Alenwler, now 

•~is grrwr, UMCl tertr•a •78t*a dur1q '\be ba'ttl.a, whieh e.*1ed in 41.n.r 

-ror the uaton t'Ql'Ce•J .a 1~ 1• "14 tha't Ale•n•'• ccat.ribution b7 ettecUtt 

aipa\1Da ... - ~ '*°"*' 1a the ~ v1nor,y. J>r. '!bcnpaoa, 

whm I have Q.UC1ttt4 blllo1re1 _,. at tb1a ba'"1.ei 
REF ID:A62848 

The only ccmmnmicat1011 QSt.em which 4ucceeded in a1gnal. vork tor 

-the Union Mlq 1BS the illtant USMl'C. But ta Cantederate system under 

Aluandctr; ott to a good atvt at Bull Bun, tlu'Qughout the llBZ" o;perated. 

vith both Visual and electric telagraphy, $1.d the Ccmtederates tbousht b1gh1y 

onough ~then siGMl service to establish :tt c:m. an atticial basis, on 19 

Apr.U 1862, leS3 than ~ ~ artier that battle. Thus, although the ' I , 

Cont$de:mte Sigoal Cor,ps' ?l8Vll%' becGme a distinct. and independent bnmch ~ 

tbe Azrq as did the Union Sigoal::Corpa, it. nceived much earlier ~ognit1on 

haa the Ccmtederate Govei'mnDnt than- did the Signal Corps err the ~ 

. cavermmmt. '?in quoting nr. 'fhcqpson: 

!ehG Confeclez'ate Sigaal Cmps wa thus eatabliahed nearly a 

,._.earlier than its Fede$!. cmmterpart .. It we nearly aa large, 

mnber:f.DG scme J.1 500, moat ot. the number, however-, serving on detail. 

The Ccmtedqmte S1SQ&l Corps used Myer's system~ tlAgs end. tcm:hea. 

'l!he men Wft tl'Sined in WS.:re telegraph, too, and 111Jp:rened wire 

tac1llttes as pee<led. Bui; there ws nothing in R1cbmond or 1D the 

field ccu.parable to the extensive and 'tight)¥ contl'olled c1\'Uian 

mUt-taa-;r tqlegl"aph ~1cm 'Which Seerete.ry stantc:m ruled ld.th an 

17= !Jar\~ f .rail tlash1ngton. ' 

We cane now t.o the coctee and ciphers used by both sides 1n the war,-

and 1n doing so we must take into consideration tho ftlct that on the Union 

eide, there wre, aa I have ind1ca.ted, two aepante. orVJm1zations for 

signal carrmmicationG; one tOP visual Signaling; the other ~or electric. 

We should tberefon not be too astcmisbed to find that the· cr:mtoeyatem 

utJed by tbe two cmpeting ~aticns wre ditterttnt. On the other hand, 

1 

co the Conf'~te 111.de, as Just noted, there 11as ODl.7 one organization tor 

signal c:anmw:aications, the S1gna1. Corps ot the Confederate States~' WS.ch 

I 

used both·v1sua.1: and electric telegraphy, the latter 'facilities being taken < I I 

over awl emplo,ed when and when they wre ava.1l&ble. There wn teuoua 

tor tbia Dlfl.l$ad ditterenc:-e be\'wen the way in which the Un1on and the 

' f 

COD:tede:rate.· aisnal open.tioruJ wre orsan!zed and aam:tm.atewd but I do not , 

\i, wish to go ~<> them now. One reuon., strange to al!T, had to do Y.1 th the 

dittGl'ence between the cr:mto-eanmunieation ar.re.ngements .1n the Union end 

in the Contederate Al'm:lea. 

tJ I 

'We vUl. discuss the CZ'JP'tosy$tems used by the Federal Signal Cor.Ps first 

and then thoae at the Conte&trat• Signal Corps. Since both corps used visual 

signals as their pl'1mary means,, • t1nd them employing ).tyer's V1sual-a1SDalJ,ns 

code sham above. A~ fil:'St both sides sent unencipbered. 1DQSs&ges,; but soon 

~er .leam:lng that their e1cnaJ.s ~ being 1ntueepted aud -were being r$ad 

by·t.be GJlf!lq, each side deoided to do sanetb1ng to protect its mes118G9s. 

Init:tal.ly both decided on the same artifice, viz, changing the viswLL-s1gnaling 

,•, - 0 
r. 

REF ID:A62848 

equiwlents for the letters of the alphabet, ao that, to::r instance, "22" 

was not always "A," etc. This sort of ch&nglng-about ot values soon became 

1mpract1cal, since it prevented memorizing the wig-wee; equivalents once and for 

all. The difficulty in the Union Army's Signal Corps was solved by the 

introduction into usage of a cipher disk invented by Myer himself. A f'ull 

description or the disk in its various embodiments will be found in Myer's 

Manual, but here's a picture of three forms of it. You can see how :readily 

Fig. 3 4-4 

(Leave half-page) 

the visual wig-wag equivalents for letters, figures, etc., can be changed . according to some:pre-arranged 1.ndica.tor for juxtaposing,concentric disks. 

In my Fig. 3 the top left disks (Fig. l of ).\yer's Plate XXVI) show that the 

+~-·/ 

letter A is represented by ll2, B, by 22, etc. By moving the two circles to 

a different Juxtaposition a ne'W aet of' equivalents will be established. Of 

course, if the setting is kept fixed for a whole message the enciphe:rment is 

strictly monoalpbabetic; but Myer recommends changing the aettiDB in the 

middle ot the message or, more specifically, at the end of each word, thus 

prodUe:lng a sort of pol.yalphabetic cipher which would delay solution a bit. 

An alternative W&lY, Myer states, would be to use what he called a "countersign 

word, 11 but whii?h we call a keyword, ea.ch letter ot which would determine the 

setting of the disk tor a single word or tor two consecutive words, etc. 

Myer apparently did not realize that retaining or showing externally, that is, 

in the cipher text, the lengths ot the words of the plain text very seriously 

impairs the security of the cipher message. A bit later we shall discuss the 

security afforded by the M,yar disk in actual practice. 

In the Confederate Signal Corps, the system used tor enc1pherment of visual 

signals was apparently the same as that used tor encipheri11g telegraphic mesBages, 

captured a number of times, it was apparently disdained by the Confederates, who 

preferred to use a wholly different tne of device, as Will be described 

presently, for both visual and electric telegraphy. 

So much for the cryptosyatems used in connection With visual signal.a by 

the Signal Corpe of both the North alld the South, systems which we may 

designate as "tactical ciphers." We come now to the systems used ~or what ve 

may call "strategic ciphers, 11 because the latter were usually exchanged between 

the eea.t of Government and field cOllllDNldere, or among tbe latter. ID the 

case of these cODD11unications the cryptosystems employed by each side were 

quite dif'fe:rent. 

I 
1 

REF ID:A62848 

On the Northern side the USMTC used a system baaed upon what we now call 

transposition but in contemporary accounts they wen c~d "route ciphers" 

and that name has stuck. The designation isn't too bad, because the processes 

of encipherment and decipherment~ though dealing not with the individual letters 

ot the message but with entire words, involves the follOWing prescribed paths 

or routes 1n e. diagram in which the messase is written. I know no simpler or 

more succinct description of the route cipher than that given by one of the 

USM'l'C opera.tors, J. E. O'Brien, in an article in Century Magazine, XXXVIII, 

September 1889, entitled "Telegraphing in Battle": 

The principle of the cipher consisted in writing a message With 

an equal number ot words in each line, then copying the words up and 

down the columns by various routes, throwing in an extra word at the 

end of each column, and substituting other words for important names 

and verbs. 

A more detailed description in modern technical terms would be as 

follows: A system in which 1D encipherment the words of the plain-text 

message are inscribed within a matrix of a specified number of raws and 

columns, inscribing the words 'Within the matrix from left to right, in auccessive 

lines a.rid rows down'W8l'd as in ordinary writing, and taking the words out or 

the matrix, that is, transcribing them, according to a pre&rra:Jged route to 

form the cipher :message. The specific routes to be followed were set f'orth in 

numbered booklets, each being labelled "War Dlpartment Cipher" followed by 

a number. In referring to them hereinafter I shall use tbe term "cipher books," 

or scmetimes, more simply, the term "ciphers," although the cr,yptosystem 

involves both cipher and code processes. It is true that the basic principle 

~ the system, that of transposition, makes tbe system technically a cipher 

s+,tem a.a defined in our modern terminology; but the uae of' "arbi~ries, •• 'l 

as they we-re called, that is, words arbitrarily assigned to represent the 

names of persons, geographic points, important nouns and verbs, etc., makes 

the system technically a code system as def'ined incur modern terminology. 

There were in all about a dozen cipher books used by the USMTC throughout 

the war. For the most part they were employed consecutively, but, it seems 

that sometimes tvo dif'f'erent ones were employed concunently. 'l'hey contained 

not only the specific routes to be used but also indicators for the routes and ,.~, 

for the sizes of the matrices; and, of course, there were bits of code vorde, I 

with their meanings. These route ciphers were supposed to have been the 

invention ot Anson Stager, whom I have mentioned before in connection with the 

establishment of the USMrC, and who 1s said to have first devised such ciphers 

for General. McClellan's use in West Virginia, in the sUllllBr ot 1861, before 

McClellan came to Washington to assume command of t.he Anr:f ot the Potomac. 
REF ID:A62848 

Anson Stager and m.ny othera thought that he was the original. inventor 

of the s19tem,, but 11Uch a bel1et was quite in error because word-transpoa1 ti on 

methods a:1m1lar to Stager's wen in use hundreds ot years before his time. 

For instance, 1n 1685, in an unsuccese:tul attempt to 11\Tacle Scotland in a 

conspiracy to set the Duke of Monmouth on the throne, Archlbald Campbell 1 9th 

·- FArl ot Argyll, suffered· an untortunate "accident11 • Be vu taken prisoner 

o.nd beheaded by order of James the Second. 'l'be caamUDicaUODB of the poor 

Earl were not secure, and when the;r fell into govenment band.a they we.re soon 

deciphered. The method Argyll wsecl vas that or word transpoaition, and it 

J I you are interested. in readillg a contempore.27 account ot how it was solved, 

J 

'"look on pages 56-59 of that l1ttle book I mnt1oned before aa being one ot 

the very ti:rst 'boob iD Engl.tab dealing Vi th the eubJect of c:r;yptoloa, that 

_ by James Fal.comr, entitled gmtomenysis Patefac'ta! Or the Art ot Secret 

Intonation Di.aclosed Without a Kez, published in London in 1685. 'l'hel'e you 

Will 1"1Dd the progenitor of the route 01pbers employed by tbe UOO'C, years 

aft.er Argyll's abortive rebellion. 

1'he route ciphers amplo,ed 'by the USltflC &N fully described 1n a book 

;· 

• , 11 

' 

entt tled '!'he M111 ta.ry 'l'elegrs.ph during the Civil War, by Colonel William R. Plum, 

' ' I 

published in Chicago in 1882. I th1Dk Plum's description of them 11 of 

ccmsiderable interest and I zecCllllller.d his book to those ot yo.u 'Wo m.7 w1ah 

to learn more about them, but they an pret"t7 much all alike. It I show you 

one e:xazqple ot an actual message and explain ita encipherment and deciphel'Dlent 

I will have covered practically tbe entire guut ot the route ciphers used b7 

the tafl'C, so basically verr •iJD.Pl.e and unitom were tbe7. And yet, belien 

it or not, legend baa it tbat the Southern aignnJ.men vere unable to solve 

aey o:f' the •H•saps tra.umi tted by tbe USM'l'C. Thie lang·held legend I tind 

bard to believe. In all the deacnptions I bave encountered in the 11 terature 

not om ot them, save the one quoted above tran O'Brien, tries to IBke these 

cipbere as simple as they really were; somehow, it seema to 8' a subconscious 

realization on the pa.rt of' Northern writers, usually ex-USM'l!C operators, of 

the system's eimplic1ty prevented a presentation which would clearly ahov baW 

utterl)" devoid it vaa o'f tbe daP'ff or sophiat1ca't1cm om would be varranted 

in expecting in the secret cOllmn1.ce.t1ons or a grea~ modern anq in the decade 

1860-1870, three hundred years atte:r the birth or modem cryptography in the 

papal states of I~. 
,/ 

REF ID:A62848 

Lat us take the plain text ot a message which Plum (page 58) wsed 1D 

an example or the procedure in enciphel'IDl!lnt. itle cipher bodt inVolved is 

j No. 4 and I bapper1{ to have a copy of 1 t so ve can eu1ly check Plum's vom. 

Here's the maaage to be enciphered: 

Washington, D.c. 

Ju.1.y 15, 1863 

For Simon C&meron 

I would g1TB much to be relieved of the impression that 

Meade, Couch, Smith am all, since the battle ot Gettysburg, 

have striven cml7 to get the etJ.Ol!3' over the river v1:thout 

another tight. Please tell me it you know who wo.a the one . corps commander who was for :fighting, in the council or var 

on Sundo.y night. 

{Signed} A. Lincoln 

Plwn shows the word-.for-vord encipherment in a Jllltr.1.X of seven columns 

and el~n rova. He ta.Us to tell us why a :snatrix or those dimensions ws 

, selected; prosuma.bly the Gelection was made at random, whlch vas certainly 

permissible. 

l 

(heavy) 

(null) 

2 

Incubus Stewart 

Waah1ngton, D. c. July 

sigh 

S1mon 

3 

Brown 

15th 

Norris iB 

Ca.nmier on 

Cameron 

5 

(county) 

(null) 

6 

(aqua.re) 

{null) 

Mlldison 

3 

flea I 

• {period) I 

7 

ror 

wood 

would 

give 

give much 

much ~oby 

to be 

tl"Bllmlod serenade 

re.lined 01~ the 

impl"'SBiOD that 

impression that 

vilJ.ase 

the enelrtf 

Plea.ea 

Please 

for 

f'or 

on 

OD 

bear WC 

7TcolllDB) Couch 

cat children 

;-f CODIDB) Smith 

awl 

all 

since 

since 

the 

the 

knit 

battle 

of 

of 

get ties 

ass have 

, (ccmm.) have 

striven 

striven 

skeleton turniE without 

over tbe r _ ver without 

tell 

tell 

me 

DIQ 

H!U::Y 

one 

if' 

it 

Madrid 

corps 

OP1)l"eSBiD§ bitch quail 

fighting , {co.mzrin) in the 

to 

to 

Gettys 

another 

another 

optic 

1'1gb.t 

you no 

you know 

locust who 

ccmmnnder who 

counsel. 

council 

or 

ot 

tzler 

Sunday 

Rustle 

ni@it uprig!it .r'\drio.n blesa 

Signature A. Lincoln (null) 

(Mollkey) 

{null) 

(silk) 

(null) 

(Martyr) 

(null) 

get 

get 

hound 

• (period) 

vho 

Vho 

was 

was 

him 

(null) 

(suicide) 

(null) 

3RW.ed paper was provided to aid in accuracy. In the diagram the upper of each 

pJ.ir or lines of writing i• the cipher, tba lover one, the plain text. 
( 

I 

.. 

REF ID:A62848 

Simon Cameron was Lincoln's Secretaey of War until Jan 

1862, vb.en he was replaced b;r Edwin M. Stanton. If this 

message cited by Plum is authentic, am tbe:re is no .rea .. son to doubt this, then Cameron was still in :f'r1endly 

contact with Lincoln, possibly aa a special observer. 

Note the seven "nulls" (non-significant, or ''blind" words) a.t the tops 

and bottoms of certain columns, these beiJ:lg added to the cipher text 112 

order to contuse a woul.d·be decipherer. At least that was the theory, but 

how effective this subterfuge wae can be surmised, once it became known that 

employing nulls was the usual practice. Note also the two nulls (bless and him) 

- a.t the em of the last line to complete that line of tbe matrix. 

~cipher message is then copied1down}follow1ng the route prescribed 

by the indicator "BLONDE," as given on page 7 of C~pher Boolt No. 4. 'l'he 

'·- indicator -could have al.so been "Lm:IMEN'r." 

Fig. 5 page 7 No. 4 photograph 

To explain the diagram at the top of Fig. 5 I wiU show you the 

"D1recti~ for Use" which appear on the reverse side of the title page of 

"~e.r Department Cipher No. 4," because I'm afraid you wouldn't believe me 

if I merely told you wblit they say. In Fig. 6 is·a picture ot the title page / 

and I :follow it With Fig. 11 a photograph of wba.t's on its reverse side of the title 

page: 

[Title page No. 4--back of the page--photos--Direction for uae::J 

Figs. 6 & 1 

Do YoU imagine that the chap who waa reaponsib1e for getting tbia 

cipher book approved ever thought about what he was doing when he caused 

those 0 Directions for Use" to be printed? It doesn't seem possible. All he 

would have had to ask himself' was, 11Why put thia piece of information in the 

book itself'? Cipher books before this l'lave been captured. Suppose this one 

:falls into enemy hands; can't he read, too, and at once learn about the 

inte~ed deception? Why go to all the trouble or including 11 ph.oney" routes 

an~t the book doesn't ta.ll into enemy bands What good are the "pbanay" 

routes anyway? ~ not just :fmd.icate the routes in a straightforward manner, aa 

had been done before? Thus: "Up the 6th column (since 11611 is the tirst 

number at the left of tbe diagram), down the 3rd, up the 5th,, down the 7th, 

up the lat1 down the 4th and down the 2nd. Tb.is matter is so incredibly 

f'atuous that it is bard to understand hov sensible man--and they were sensible--

cou1d be so 1Uogical 1n their thinking procesae11. But there the "Direction• 

for Use" stand, tor all the world to see and to Judge. 

. .. 
REF ID:A62848 

Haw for the tr.m.spoai ticm. atep. The 1Jldicator "BLOIJB'' 11gnif'1es a 

matrix or seven colums and eleven rows, Vi.th the :route aet forth above, Via, 

up the 6th colum, dawn the )rd, etc., so that the cipher text vi. th a 

"phoney" address aud signature, If. become• as follova: 

TO A. HARDER CALDWELL, Wasbi.Dgton; D. C. 

Cipher Opera tor, A1."llq ot the Potcmac: 

Blcmda bleaa ot vbo 11.0 optic to get u.D1 1m,preaeion I Mt.dison 

aq\ll.U"e Brown cuar 1'oby ax the have t.zmip me Barry bitch rus$ 

ailk Adrian counsel locust you cnother only of ch1ldren aere~ 

flea Knox County tor wood that awl. t1ea pt houlld who was var ~ 

suicide co for was please Tillage large bat Bunyan give 11gh 

1.ncubu heavy Horris on traaaeled cat knit atriwn Without u· 

Madrid quail upright martyr stevari man mucb. beo.r • iDce us skeleton 

tell the oppressing 'l':/ler DIODkey. 

(Signed) D, mJIER BADS 

Note that the text begins vi th the illdicatoi- "BLOJrllB". ID. decipb.el'Blent 

the atepa a;re silqply reversed. 91e indicator tells what size matrix to 

outline; the vorda 'beg1m1:1ng "bleea of who no op'Mc ••• " an- inscribed. 

vith1n tbe mtrb:: up the 6th colU11111; tben, omitting the ''cback word" or ' 

"null." (which in this cue ia the vo:rd "square") down. the 31"4 column, ate. 

b f'inal. result ahabld correapond to what 1a shown iD Fig. i.. 1ha:re then 

toll.oV8 the step ot inter»ret:l.ng orthographic deviat1ona, auch as inter-

/ preting "sigb.11 , "man,'' "camer," and "on" aa Simon C8111tron; the vol'd "wood" 

tor "would", etc. The timl step repl"Oduces the orig11'lal plain text. 

Save for one-uception, all the route ciphers used b;r the tJSNl'C conf'ormd 

to this bas.Le pattern. IJ.'he tb1nga that changed f'rom om c1pher book to 

the next were the indicatore .tor the d.imenaicma or the mtrices and for the 

routee, and the "arb1traries" or code equivalents fa..- the various item 

compriaing the "voae.'buJ.ary," the number of them 1.nc:reas!Dg f'l'Clll one edition 

to the next, Just as might be expected. Dia sole exception to this 'be.Ille 

po.ttem ia to be seen in Cipher Book No. 9 o.ud on 0D]¥ one page of the book. 

I will show 10u. that page: 

Fig. 8 

P• 12 - Cipher lk1ok Ro. 9 

Wbat we have he:re ia a deT1at1on tram the atraishtforwazd route 

t.ranaposi tion, up the. • • column, down tbe. • • coltmi, etc. By 1ntraduc1Dg 

cne diagonal path in tbe route (the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, loth words in a 

message of' f'iw colums, and the 1st, 2nd, 3Zd, 4th, 5th, and 6th vorda in a 

message ot stx colmms) the t!llnpl.e up am. down roate no longer holds true. · "1• 

'°It vu the usual practice to use tor addn•s and signature tbe names o'f tbe 

USH!C operators concerned. 

•• \I 

ti 
REF ID:A62848 

vorda on the diagonal interrupt the nollBl up and dmm. putha aDd introduce 

complexities in the •tbod. In tact., the c0Jqplexitie•1 e._d to be a bit 

too much tor the USlrl'C c1pher optratora becawse, u tar as o.vailable :records 

shaw, theH ccm:pUcated J:Outes \lere never uaed.. 
... REF ID:A62848 

I DOV wish to mke a number ot general ad a few specific ccmaeAts 

CG Plum's de1criptim ot the cryptogatea used by the USMre. 

First, we bave learned tbat although Anson Stager bas been credited 

with inventing the type of cipher UD.der ccmai4erat1on 1D this atudy, 

he was ant1c1pated 1D the ilweDtiOD by about 200 :years. Also, be 18 

given the lion'• share ot the credit tor devie1Dg those ciphers although 

he 414 have a DUllber ot collaborators. Plum names tour ot them, preawab]¥ because he thought tbm worth¥ of being singled out tor partieu· 

lar attentiou. Plum and others tell us tbat copies or •ssagea handled 

by the umm:: were scmtimea iAtercepted by the enell7 but Dot solved. 

Be cites no authority tor this last atatemnt, •re}¥ sqing that such 

1Dtercepts were publ.ished 1D the newspapers ot the Ccmtederacy with 

tbe hope tbat smebody voul4 cane up with the1r solution. And it uybe noted that Done ot the Confederate accounts ot var activities cite 

:l.DStancea of the soluticm ot 1Dtercepte4 USMrC messages, although there 

are pl.ellty of citaticma or 1Datancea o'f 1Dtercept1m 8114 aoluticm ot 

enciphered visual tr&DSlliasiCDB of the Federal ArlQ''s Sipal Corps. 

Plum states that l2 different cipber books vere employed by the 

Telegraph Corps, but I think there were actuaJ.1¥ ~ eleven. The 

f'irat ou was not numbered, Biid this ia good evidence that a long var 

was not expected. 'Ible :first cipher book ba4 l6 printed pages. But 

for some reascm, now impossible to tathaa, the sequence of numbered. 

books tbereatter waa •• follova: loe. 6 and. 7, which were mu.ell like 

the first (unnumbered) cme; tlleD cw Koe. 12, 9, 10-·in tbat strange 

order; then came Nos. l 8114 2; f1Dall¥ came loe. 3, 4, and 5. (Apparut~ there vas no Bo, 8 , or Bo. U - at laaat they are never •ntioued.) 1, 
REF ID:A62848 

It voul4 be ridiculous to thiDk tbat the irregularity in muaberiag the 

&ucceasive booka was for tbe purpose of cammmicaticm-securit;y, but 

tbere are other thillg8 abwt the books ad the cryptos)'St• tbat appear 

equally ei~. 1.'bere may bave bes goocl reaaou tor tbe ¢ot1c 

Dwnber!Dg of tbe books, but it so, vbat they were is DOV UDJmown. 

Plull atatea that lo. 4, the last one used 1D the war, vaa placed into 

effect cm 23 March 1665, and that it alld all otber ciphers were discarded on 20 June l.865. However, as Doted, there was a Bo. 5, which 

Plum says was given a limited distribution. I bave a c01>7 of it., but 

vbether it was actualq put into use I 4o DOt mow. Like lo. 4, it 

bad. 4o pages. Abmt 20 copies were amt to certa1D _.bera ot the 

USM'lC, scattered among 12 states; all4, ot course, Waahillgtcm must have 

had at least-one copy. 

We my- assume with a tair amouDt or certamty tbat the ttrat (the 

unmunbered) cipher book used by tbe USMTC was mre~ an elaboration ot 

the one Stager produced tar the cC111111UD.icaticma of the gDV'ernora of 

OHo, Indiana 8lld Ill1Do1s, and ot which a copy is given by cmq one 

ot the writers who bave told us a'bOllt these ciphera, 11a11ely, David H. 

Bates. Bates, 1D his aeries ot articles entitled 0 L:l.Dcol.D 1D tile 

Telegraph Office" ('l\w Cea.tury Mapz1De, Vol. LXXIV, Boa. l-5, May-Sept, 

1907)* shows a facsimile thereof (p. 292, June 1907 issue), e.D.d I 

have bad aa good a reprocluctim mde ot it as is possible f'raa the 

rather poor photographic tacs1111la. Tbe f'oregoillg cipher is the prototype upoa. which all raubaequent cipber books were baaed, the first of' 

the War DepartmeDt aeries being tbe one 1howD by Plwa. 

* ibe aeries •a then put out 1D book fora wader the same title by the 

D. AppletCD-Ccmtury Caapa11.y, Nev York, 1907, repr1Dte4 ill 1939. 

' \.' 

/( 
~-

REF ID:A62848 

Fig 9 'lbe t1rat Stager list tor governers 

When the•e cipher• c- into use it vaa not "tbe practice to m1sepell 

certain words intenticma~; but •• the meaben ot tbetSMrC {who, as 

I've told you, not ~ aerved as telegraph operator• but alao as 

cipher clerk.a} developed expert.Deaa, the practice of usiDg nonstandard orthography wa1 trequently employed to make aolutim ot 

:messages more ditticult.. Yoo. bave already seen ex.plea ot this prac• 

tice, and cae can find lnmdrada of other examples of thia sort of 

j ' 

1 artifice. Then, further to 1Dcreaae security, more and more code 

equivalents were added to repreaent auch thinga a• ordinal &ad cardinal 

numbers, months of the year, days ot the week, hours of the day, punc• 

tuation, etc. As a last atep, add1t1CJD&l code equivalents tor :f'requ.ert.t~ 

used words and pbrasea were introduced. Q:le good exaaple ot tvo typical. 

pages trcm one of the•• books will characterize thea all. 

Fig 10 Photo of P• 14-15 frcm Ro. 12 

You will notice that the code equivalents lire printed. but their 

meaaiDge are written 1D by tum.d. 'lhia vu ua~ the caae, awl the 

reasOD is obv1ouet tor eCODOllQ' in prilltiDg coeta, because the printed 

code equivalent• of plain-text items in cipher booka belcagiag to the 

same series are 14-ltical; ~ their aeaainge change traa one book to 

aDOtber, &Dd of' courae, the t&:aDSpos1t1m routea 1 their 1Dd1catora 1 

&Dd other variables change trca oae book to another. I am tortUDate 

1D bav1Dg •ix ot tbeae cipher booka 1D Jq private collectiai, •o that 

oc:mparia008 aaong them are readily made. 1be tirat feature to be 

noted is that the cede equivalents are &ll geed Eaglisb dict1mary words 

l8 
':.-• REF ID:A62848 

(or proper DOUD8), ot not lei• than three nor aore than eevem (re.rely 

eight) letters. A careful serutia¥ ahowa that in the earl.¥ e41t1cma 

the code equivalents are 1uch u are Dot veey like1'Y to appear aa 

worda in the plltn-text messageaJ but in the later editions, beg1DD1Dg 

with Mo. 12, more tbaD 50f of the words used aa code ewi1valenta are 

such a.a might well appear 1D tbe plaiD•text of me a ayes. For example, 

words such aa Am, AIJ., ARMY, ARTILLERY, JUllCTIGI, COl.IFEDERATE, etc., 

baptismal names of persooa, and namea of c1t1ea, rivers, 'b'ays, etc., 

appear -as code equivalents. Among names used as code equivalents are 

SHERMAB, t.mcotn, THOOS, STANTON, and tboae ot ~ other prcmiDeDt 

off'1cera and oft1cial.8 ot the Unioa Arrq and tbe Federal GovernmeDt, 

a• veil as ot the CODf'ederate Army al1d Government; and, eve aore 

1Dtr1gu1Zlg, sw:h nam. were employed aa 1Dd1catora tor the Dumber of 

col'mm• and the routes uted - the so-called. "e0111DB11oement Words." It 

would seem that DBJDea and word.a such as those I •ve ment toned might 

occasi~ have brought abc.ut iDetancea vbere difficulty 1D dec1pher1Dg 

messages aroae traa this source of contusion, but the literature doean 't 

mentioo tbem. I think you already realue why such camDonJ~·used 

proper names and words were not excluded. There was, indeed, •thod 

iD this maduaa • 

But wbat 18 illdeed &atcm1ab1Dg to Dote is that 1D tbe later editicna 

or these cipher books, in great 11&Jority of cues the vorda used as 

"arb1trar1ea," dti'fer traD ODe another by at least two letera (tor 

example, IADY" BDdW!m, LARK, and I.AWi, ALBA 8Dd ASIA, LOOK and WICK, 

MIQt and MINT), or by aore than tvo (for example MYRTLE end MlBTIC, 

CARBOI and CANCER, MiJliS and ATLAS). One haa to eee.rcb tor caeea UL 

19 
REF ID:A62848 

vhicb tvo vorda dif'fer by cnly one letter, but they can be found it 

you aea.rch l.oDg sough tar tb.erJ, aa, tor exampl.e, QUINCY and QUINCE, 

PINE and PIKE, NCSE and ROSE. Otten there are words v1th the nae 

initial trigraph or tetrqrapb, but theD the reat ot the letter• are 

aucb that errors 1J1 tr8DSJlli11a1on or reception would eaaiq aaniteat 

tmaaelves,u, for exsmple,in the cuea ot MONSTER and M<JlARCH, MAGNET 

and MAGIOLIA. AU 1n all, it ia iJllpartant to Dote that the ccspiler 

or ccmpilera of cipher books bad adopted a principle mow t~ aa 

the "two-letter ditterential," a feature found CDly in codebooka 

ot a much later date. In brief, the priDciple involves tbe use, 1D 

a given codebook, of code groups dif'tering fran one another by at 

least tvo letters. Thie pr1Dc1ple 1• employed 'by knowledgeable code 

ccapil.ers to this very day, uot only because it eD&blee the recipient. 

ot a meaaage to detect errors 1D trusa1H10ll or reception, but also 

to correct them. 'Ibis is made posaibl.e it the perautaticm tables uaed 

in cODatructing the code words are printed in the c:odsbooka, ao that 

most errors caa be corrected without call1D& tor a repet1t1c:a ot the 

tranaa1aa1on. It is clear, theref'ore, tbat the ccapilere ot tbeae 

cipher books took into consideration the tact that error• a.re to be 

expected iD Morae telegraphy, and by incorporating, but ~ to a 

J.1m1ted extent, the priDaiple ot the two-letter ditterential, they 

tried to guard agaiDst t~ poasibility that errors a1gbt go undetected. 

Had artif'ial 5-l.etter group• been used as code equivalents, iDStead 

ot dicti<mary vorda, poas iblp the cipher booka would aleo have ct111-

taimt4 the prea.itat10D tables. But it 11USt be noted. that permutation 

tables made their first appearance ~ about a quarter of a century 

20 
REF ID:A62848 

atter the Civil War bad ended, &Dd theJl ~ ill the mo.t ad.vanced 

types ot ccm1ercial coclea. 

There ie, however, another feature about tlle vor4a the ccmp1ler• 

of these book.a chose aa cede equivalenta.. It 1• a feature tbat mani· 

fest• real perspicacity cm their part,and 7ou.. probab~ alllady have divi.Ded 

it. A tew moaenta ago I said that I voul4 explain 'Wb7 1 in the later 

and improved editims of theae books, varda which aight veil be 

vorda 1D plain•text meangea were not excluded f'raa the lists ot code 

equivalents: it 1Jlvolve• the fact that tbe basic nature ot tbe cryptoayata in which theae cede equivalents were to be used wae clearly 

recognized by those vho caapil.ed the book&. SiDce the cryptoayatem 

vu based upon ~ traupoeitiou, what could be more ccmtua1Dt; to a 

vould•be cr;yptanaJyat, vork1Dg with meaeagee 1D euch a 1yatea, tbazl 

to find himael.t unable to decide whether a word 1D the cipher text 

of a aesaage be is tryiDg to aolve is actually 1D tbe original pla1n· 

text message aad. bu ita llormal meaning, or 18 a code word vith a 

secret a1gnU1cance--or evea a D.Uilial, a nou•a1gnU'1ca.nt word, a "blind• 

ar a "check word..'' u those elements were called 1n those clayeT 'l'bat, 

no doubt, is 1d:ly there are, 1D these books, •o many code equivalents 

wb1cb might veil b7 "good• words 1n the plaiD-text ••sagee. Arid ill 

thia comiectim I have already' noted an additiczal illteresting teaturer 

at tbe top of each page devoted to indicators for a1.pal.1Dg the nuliber 

ot columDB or rows in the spec U'ic matrix tor a m1&age are printed 

the ao-callecl "c~cement word.a," or vtaat ve now call •s.m1catora•. 

low tbere are DiDe such vorda, in set• ot three, aD¥ cae ot which could 

actua.J.4r be a real word or -.. iD the plaiD•text -•aage. Su.ch vor4a 

21 
REF ID:A62848 

wbn. uaed as iDd.icatora could. be ft'Q cmtuaiDg to eDtll1 crntaaal¥at1, i 

espec1all1' after tile trwpo91t1cn aperat1m. Be~ tor exew.ph, are 

tbe "c~ncement wor4e• m page S ot cipher book lo. 91 A1:q .Aucu, 

Actic:m, Astor, Advance, Artillery, Anderaca, Allbush, AgreeJ an pap 7 

of Bo. 10: Cairo, Cv.rtiD, Cavalry, Caage1s, Chil.48, Calhoun, Cburch, 

Cobb, etc. Moreover, iD Bos, 1, 3, 4, 51 aDC1 lO tbe "line iDdicaors," 

that is, tbe word• 1D4icat1.Dg the number ot boriamtal rova 1D the 

mtr1x, are alao varcla such as coW.4 eaaiq be var4s iD the plaiD•text 

message•, ror example, ill lo. 11 page 3, the 11.De iD.Clicatora are as 

tollowr 

A44r••• 

AclJuat 

Anaver 

Appear 

Appeal 

1 hitb 

2 Favor 

3 Caaf1De 

4 Bed 

5 Beet 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

BeD4 

Avail 

Active 

Absent 

Accept 

Rote two tbillgs :lD tbe toregoiDg list 1 f1rat, there are nriaDt••• 

there are tvo 1D41catora tor each cue; &D4 aecCD4, tbe 1mUcatora are ---..... ... _ 

aot 1D etrtct alphabetic aequencr, 'Dlie departure trcm atriet alpbabeticity is even more obvioua in tbe pagea cleToted to vacabular7, a _..J 

tact ot J1D1Cb 1Jlportance cryptazaai,tic~. lote this feature, tor 

eXS11ple, 1n Fig. 10, which shows pagea 14 and 15 of cipber book lo. 12. 

ID tbi1 respect, therefore, tbeae boob partake ac:aevbat of the 

nature ot tvo·part or 'rudmized • coclea, or, ill Brit1ah tera1Dolo11, 

"batted" codee. ID tba eecmd lecture ot th1a aeries the physical 

ditterace between one-part and two•part coclea waa br1etq explained, 

but an 11a41cat1cm of the technical crpptanal.ytiediftermce between 

theae two typea of codes SIB¥ ~ uaetul. at tbia poiDt. Two•pa:t co4ea 

---------------------· are aucb more 41tt1cult to solve tbaD me-part code•, 1D which both 

tbe plaiD•text elemnts and their code eq,u1Y&lenta progreea 1D parallel 

22 

... 
REF ID:A62848 

sequences. ·tn the latter type ot detera1Dat1ca ot tbe Malling ot one 

code group quickly and rather eaa~ leads to the detera1Datioo or 

the Man1Dga of other code grou.pa abwe or below the me that baa been 

aolved. For example, 1D the fol.lowiDg 1hort but illustrative exapl.e, 

if the meaning ot '/:N code group 1729 baa been determined to be •then" 1 

the MAAiDg ot the code group 1728 could well be 11the11 , aa4 that ot 

1728 -- the 

1729 •• tbeD 

1730 -- there 

the code grrup 1730 1 "there". But iD a two-part code, determ1D1D& the 

meaning of the code group 0972 to 'be "then" 1 gives no clue wbateYer 

7621 -- the 

0972 .... then 

1548 ...... there 

u to tbe meanillg ot the groups 7621. or 1548. For eue iU decod 1Dg 

message• 1D auch a code there llWlt be a aectioo 1D which the code 

groups are listed in ll\llleric&l. aequence, and are accaapanied b7 their 

meanings, which, ot eourae, will be 1D a randca sequence. ni. com· 

pilers ot the USlfl'C cipher b~ lll18t haYe had a veey clear idea ot 

vb.at I bave_Juat explained, b\lt tbe7 -.de a caapraaise of a practical 

m.ture betweea a atrictly one-part aJ:&d a strictly two-part code, beeauae 

t they__.rolicecJ . .tJJ.at ,...,_code ot tbe latter aort 1e twice aa bulky u a:ae 

ot the former aort, bes idea being much acft laborious to ccapile and check 

the ccatents tor accuracy. 1be arrangemeut tbeJ chose vun 't too bad, 

so tar ae cryptl-aecurity wu concerned. Aa a utter ot tact, and 

speak1Dg frca persoaal experience in decodiAg a r&er lcmg message 

addreased to General Grant, I bad a difficult time ill locatins ll8llY ot 

the code words 1n the book, becauae ot the 4eparture tran strict alpa· 

23 
r:i~c~ f l ~ i 1 ~ i I ~ ' J ~ i I I u l i ! ~ ~1 f i ! I § I t i ~ ! II i I I :t t ~ 

i~· t Q i ; ; ~ ; ; t ; i I 1 ~ I l ~ ~ 

• ~~&:ti i I ~ r ' a ' ~ ; ! . f I ! ~ ~ I • ' E 

O\• • i I f1 • • s I : i t ~ 

:+it I t c g- • i . i I 0 i; 1· ,~ & ! . ' ! ! ~ I i i . I f I ! 

;;f' l !4 ( l t;' ~ . - I 8 i I I 

f !~l· t i u .. ~ f : - i ~ c ' 
REF ID:A62848 

Cipber, WJ.oh ~ 1U 'b o1Ji*r ~ 1!l c ott1cW •••' ~ 

lq' Capt J. 1. Al...-.Z. P 1i1lie )9t1.a1 equ1 ftlat o~ l(Jw• • ...,,,_ ot @pal!• 

You 1Q'l •t t1Dt tblt nm. ~ 1a cz:r ot the wit.t.np ot coa~ aipl. 

otts.een of either tbe lorth or t¥ South~ !bl as.-1wen ot tbo• dqs e&Ue4 

1.t 1-: ttcourt Cil>ber", thi.• "-- referring to the ~ ill eo cm ua t~ tip.lo• 

•ttd or "ooun" aeeret ea atea~iou about W• perlo4 1n bieto17. I~ 1• 'that 

c1itier 'Wb1ch eawlo1'1 tlle ao.cslltd Y:l~~ v:J;th a repeating lllr;y.* Bin 

is the •quare which Plull cal.le tile "Caif'ederate States Cipher Key" aad which is 

followed by hi• deacriptiCD of it• llBDller of et1ployment1 

Fig 12 

,. 

To put 1.llto c1pller the first •aaage, whicb .a put up b7 ueiDg ')tu .. 

cheater Blutt" as the ke7, aad the aeccmd by tbe key tera, "Complete Victory", 

f1Dd at tbe le:tt-b&Dd •ide ot the table tbe tirat letter ot the firat vord. 

to be ciphered, and colu:aa in wb1ch theae letter• are ao :tOUDd, will be 

seea the arbitrary letter vitll,.,.... ll&iACCeaaift letter ot the ... •&&• and 

key tera, repntiag on tbe la:btu :bj.U 1'Uisbe4. Thus, •a.run i• Tictorioua," 

put 1D cipher by uaillg the ti.rat key, vcul.4 read, as ahcnm by tbe eapitala, 

C•o-a•p•l-e•t•-W••1-C•t•o•r•y. C-o-m-p•. 0t COm"H1 &Uy cba.Dge 1D tiae uy 

UVQGXEG MR DX:VHJP KCGB 

ward, tora or pbrue chanaea the vbitrariea, ucl it uttlae?' ae l"!sl •••AP 

Dor tbe ke;y i• mown, it voul.4 be aa.e'fbat vexatioua vorkUl& it out, unleaa 

there were •ane auch auage•tiff word.a u occur UL l>aY1•'• ••MP abon, 

which indicate tlt.e ciphered worda very clearl.¥J •·l•i 

"By which you. •Y effect" o tpqgeJeylt •a'bcwe tbat pct" bJ opa kllllct 

. a croaaing ot tbe river 

Tb1s meaniDg occurred to the autllor, at tirat sight, and doubtlau voW.d be 

to any one taailiar with ailltary atfaira 1D that aectta:a. BaTing gueaae4 

real words, it ia very easy to vork out the letters ot the ke7. 'Dle folloYiDg 

two illportant cipher• were traua1tted as divided below.; 1 .. e., each vor4 waa 

seat ••parately, Dot all 111xe4, u in the Pemberton cipher. Thia d1via1ca 

does aQ't facilitate traaalat1cm. by the key at all, but Dter~ uaiata 

without it, and vaa, therefore, bad practioe. We give below, u.cb -•age, with its tranalati011, becauae these telegraM were Yery illportant. 'Dae curious 

reader my, at hi.a leisure, by uaiDg tbe ke7 board, atudy cut the key term, 

aae of which will be found entirely nev aDd quite apropoe, 1a the light ot 

What speec!~ tollovwd. 

CONFEDERATE BTATl'S 01 AMIRICA, KILITARY T&LlrllaA1Jl, Date4 lead· 

quartera, February 25 1 1865, ReceiTed at Riclll&aAd, Va., 12:25 Ml. 

TO HC8. J. C. IREICllRll>Glii Sec '7 ot War S••I rec• m•a4 tbat tbe 

taya•e tn q.ou.twp rtat~ ubvaqbqta extnJ and iavaqJru Jr:tatl are Rot 

ot iJDedi&te uceaaity, UY kpqtabpgr mpc tbaltl •b.cul.4 be laqhtap. 

(81.glse4) ft. I. ID 

'1Mi9If'l'IQ1.-·I reccwad tbat the raov&l ot public prc>pert7, -.chinery, 

store• ud arcl:aivea wta1cl:a are aot ot 1.Wdiate aceaaity, be cc-aneed. 

All powder ahwl.4 be •ecure4. 

* A k.eyward 1a employed to cbua• the alptaabeta cpclica.ll1' 1 thua ll&kiDg tbe 

cipher wbat ia called tod.ay a periodic or multiple-alphabet cipher cic.utrol.l.ed 

by the 11ldiY14ual letters ot a key, which Jla1' coneiet ot a word, a phraae, or 

~ ot a aentence, :repeated u ~ tiMa u nec•••&l'Y· 

25 
REF ID:A62848 

BUD~ C. 8. ARIUE, Marela 2i., J.865. 

GD. I. KIRBY Slll'l'B, cmttg. Trau..-11a. llept., Geas--

Vvg ecil.11,ympa rvcog •1 Uumt.14ea ktcll k4t WU:Ptf ua t.tct•to 

abxc bJx azJkbmgJs11111Ybceq, q,b Ddel uei•u ht kt& auhcl egh 

opca llts ·v&.1Wll Ja79COC1 yu 4d4xtlJ;pt 1u icJgkpxt e1 wJau 

mvrr twhtc lr.bxc iu eoieg o rdep en ucr pv atiptyxec l'-t'f&rinb 

razq ppx rkaJcph ptu_.rap ekes raecd1trspt --•b acg MfqYYf 

... __ ·~g abe ttrt vb iaYv klr&• pyla feta cktrli•Jt:vxl xJ Jtb'blc 

rq, htx4 wbbz aWVT t4 acgg aYXVZn ye iag oe uytet 1gxa acull. 

I a mo1t re1pecttul.q JCJJr obdt. 1ent. 1 

(S1pe4) R.1. 1U 

T.RABSIATiaf ... ..Qea: ibe presideat de- it a4T1Able that 

you ahotild be olMlraed vitb the ailitar;ycperaticaa m both banks 

ot tbe M111., ad tbat you. •bould. ucleaYor u prm,ptl.1' as 

pos1ible to c:rosa tbat r1ftr with u larp a force u ._.,be 

pruden.tq vitbclrawn tree your praent Dept. Yau will accor4~ 

exteml YCMJ!. cc zm to tlle eut bult of tbe Kiss., m4 mka 

arrenpM"ts to brillg to thi ... 14• 1uch ot 7aur prea•t farce 

u you ay de• be1t. 

I aa aoat re1pecttul.q JCN.r obedieDt aernnt. 

'lbere are certaill c~t• to be made m the toresoiD& •••ace•· ID tu 

tirlst place, aote tut 1D tbe t1r1t •••as• certatq. words are lett u11•1Upbere4J 

1D tbe 1ecca4 place, ill both tbe tirat aDd secmd. •••aa•, tbe cipber• reta1D 

and clear}¥ show the lagtha ot the wards vbich bl.Ye beea a.ciphered. Both ot 

these faulty practice• gr•tl3 waka tbe aecur1t7 ot ciphers because they 

leave good clues to tbeir cmteat1 &Del can eaa1)¥ result 1D tacUitatiDg solution 

of the •1aage1. We know tcdq tbat cipher aessegee mat leave ll0tb.111g 'la tbe 

clear. IYen. tbe add.re•• aDd the aigDature, the date, tillll &114 place of or1&1D1 

etc., should 1f pos•1ble be biddeaJ aac1 tbe cipher text abwld be 1D cmplateq 

regular grwptags, :first, so aa aot to disclose tbe leDgtb.s ot the plaia-text 

word.a, and aecelld, to prcaote accuracy 1D traaea181iCD all4 recepticra. 

So far u s:f studies have gme, I bave Dot tOUlld a a 111gle exa11ple of a 

Ccmfederate Vtgenm cipher W.icb showa aeither of these two fatal weaJmeseea. 

The aecODCl ot tile two •Dll.Ple• 11 the eD]¥ caae I bave tCWld Sa wb.ich there are 

DO unenc 1phere4 words ill tbe text ot tu message. AD4 the cal1' example I bave 

g 

bes able to tiDd 1D which word lea,~ are not ahOWD (aave tor cme worcl) 1• 1D 

the case of the followiD& ••-•. 

Vicksburg, Dee. 26, 1862. 

GER. J.E. JOlUISTO!I, JACIBOR: 

I prefer oaavvr, it bu reference to xhv,kJqcbttabpzelrevs~k 

to prevent aauzeyxewtpJY at tbat poillt, raaelpap:nlvtztautlilult 

lh1fDa1gta..itgccaJd. 

(Sigtle4) J. C • .PIMBIRml 

Lt. Cell. Ca.lg. 
REF ID:A62848 

enabled our mn Plum to tiDI tM DJ" u4 •olft tbe •••ace. It took acme tillf, 

howver, llD4 tu •t0!7 1a worth telling. 

Accori1Dg to PlUJJ, the torego1D& cipher •••aae vu the vert f1nt cae 

c4pture4 b7 umm:: operatara, ~ it was obta1u4 4villg the -eiep ot Vicbb\P'a, 

which •urrendered cm a. Juq l.B63. Bllt aote the date ot the •••aae • 26 ])ecellber 

1862. What wa• done with the captured •••age cluring the aOllt'b8 fraa tbe em of 

Decaib•r l.862 to ~ 1'63T Apparentq nothillg. Bere 18 vbat Pl• report•: 

~t effort• General Graat cauae4 to f. ma4e to l;llD"avel thi1 ••aaae, 

we lmov not. It wa• Dot wrtil October, 1864., tha't it and others o- 1Dto 

the tumaa ot tbe telep-a~ cipberer•, at Jlew Orleau, for tranal&tim •••• 

'l'be lew Orlaam aper~~· Vho worke4 out thi.8 Jre7 (Nancbeater lilutt) 

were aided by the Peabertm dpher aD4 tlw origilaal telegr•, vh1cb vu 

tc::mul •ons that geaeral'a papera, atter the eUl"ftader ot Vicbburg; alao 

by the following cipher d.1epatcll, u4 aae other. 

Plwa give• the •ssagea iDYolfttl, tbair aolutim, am the ke;ya, tbe latter 

beiDg the three c 1ted above. It woul4 •e• that it the captured Pemberton 

•••ap bad been brought to General Grut'a attention aa4 he 414 nothing abwt 

1t, be wu aot mch interested 1D illtellipace. Secc:edq, the aoblt1on o~ the 

Peabertan •••aae aD4 the ane •••aae with tta plain text (tba Pellbertm •••age) 

aD4 tvo ••••P• DO\ cnq with 1Dteraparce4 plaill-text vortla but alao vith 1pacea 

1 

ahav1D& word. lengths. But Plua d.oea not 11Mlcate hov lma it took for solutice. 

Note that he Mr•l.J aays that tbe •••ace• c- into tbe haD4a ot tbe telegraph 

c 1pberers in October l.864; ~be 4oea "ot teU vbeD eolutim was reached. 

ID the varioua accaun.ta ot theae Ccnte4erate cipher• there u me 8114 ClDly' 

one vr1tter wbo -.kea a detai:i.4 cament en the two fatal practioea to wli1cb. I 

refer. A certain Dr. Cbarlea E. Ta7lor, a Caatec1erate veteran (ila an article 

entitlad •The SigDal arid Secret Service ot tbe Ccate4erate States", publ1alled 111 

tbe Cante4erate Veteran, Vol. XL, Aug-Sept 1932) 1 after g1vmg u •XllllPle or 

encipherment aocont1Dg to th• "cou.rt cipher" aa191 

It hardly Meda to be aa14 tbat the 41viaicn bet•• tbe wor4s of the 

oriaiDal •••aae as 11vea abOYe vas Dot retaiDed. 1D the cipbar. 11"ber the 

letter• were ra taptber ccatilluowaly or break.a, u it tor vor4a, nre 

made at rudaa. U.tl!' the folly of the •tha4 vu reveala4 by experinae, ODl¥ a tn apecial word.a 1a a •eaage were put mto cipher, while the re•t 

was sent 1D plain J.ug-.iap. 'Dais •• I tllink it my be said tbat it wu 

iapoasible for well preparect oipher to be correctq i"•e4 by uy me wb.o 414 

not know tbe ay-vcrd. Smetmes, 1Dttact, we cm.14 Rot decipher our on 

••sapa vb.en tbe;r c- OY•r telell'apb wire•. Aa tbe a,peratcra bad. ao 

•anillg to guid• thell, letter• easiq bee- cbllllp4 ud particae, at leut, 

of -.aape reDllered urmeanind1' (aic) tbereby. 

27 
JI' -

REF ID:A62848 

Fraaklt, I dee 't belieYe Dr. Taf'lor '• cammts are to be taken u ct&aracter1a 1Dg tbe practices tllat wre uaual.q tollOIA!d.. lo other ex-1ipalmu. wbo 

baa vrittu al'lmt tbe cipbera uaecl ,,. tu Cc;atederate 81pal Corp• -.tea auch 

obaenatima aD4 I thillk ve 818t aillpl7 41acrNDt what Dr. '1'&71.ar says ill tllis regard. 

It wouJ.4 certaill~ be aa uuvarraate4 exagpratim to •a¥ tbat the two 

wakr.aeaaea 1D tl'le Caate4erate CJ'1Ptm19tea coet tlle Cmte4er&07 tbe V1ctQ1'7 ~or 

vbich it touNb.t so aightil.J, but I 4o feel varraate4 at ttda .-.t 1a aytDg 

that turther research my well abow that certaia bettlea aD4 capaipa were loat 

becaue of 1Dllecure crypto-c~1cat1Cll8• 

A tev acaeata ago I aa14 that, aave tor aa exceptim or two, there vu 1a 

tbe Ccate4erac1 me and aal1' 01le crntoa79tea to aene tbe aee4 tor aecure tactical •• well u strategic cc.mamieattcaa. One of tbeae excepticu ccacenaed the 

c1pllar uaecl by Geaeral Beauregarcl after the battle of Skiloh (8 April 1862). 'Dli• 

cipber vu pureq mmoalpbabetiC 1a aature &114 vu 41.scarcled. as aoca u tu official 

dpher s19t• vu preacribecl 1D AlexaDl•r'a llallllal. It 1a 11ltereatiag to Dote that 

th18 vu 4c:ae after the 4ec1plaereC •••aae c- to tl:le attel&ticm of Ccntenrate 

authorities 1D RicbacDd. via a 11orthera DeVBpaper: It 1a alao iatereat:lllg to aote 

tbat the Federal War Departaent bad be&UD us1Dg the rou.te cipher u the otticial 

119tea tor USllTC •••&p• nr1 prmptlJ atter the cnatbrak ot var, vtaereaa not 

until 1.862 414 the Cmte4erate States War Depa.rt.at prepare u otf101al cr1PtO• 

a19te11, aad tbeD it 114opte4 the •com-t otpher". 

The otber exception involved a •11ta ued at leut cace betare tb.e ott1c1al 

•JSt• vu dopte4 aD4 it vaa ao d.utereat trm tbe lAtter tbat it shO\lld. be 

mntic:med. CA 26 March lB62, tba Caa.teclerate States PruideDt, Jetteram Davu, 

aet General JohDatcm by mpecial •••8D88r a d1ct1aD&17, vi th tlle 1'ollovillg accma-

~1Dg imtru.cttaai* 

I sem you a 41ct1mar,y Of vbioh I ban t1ae Auplicate, so that 7w aay 

c~icate with me by cipher, telegrapbtc or vr1ttea, u toUOWI: rs.rat 

give tile pap bJ its mmberJ aecc:m4 tbe colum bJ' tbe latter L, Mor R, as 

it 97 'be, 1A the lett.-baD4, a1d4le, er riabt•bUd colllmaJ th1r4, tbe mm• 

ber ot ttae word. ill 'tl:le co~, couat111g trca tb.e top. Tlaua, tbe vorl. 

3\metim vat.al.4 be 4eaipate4 b;y 1Jt6, ~. 20. 

The tore101111 aa ym ao 40Gbt have aJnll7 realiu4, 1• me ot the tne• ot 

ceyptoayaW. uecl bJ' both aides 4villg the Amertou BevollitiC1D&Z7 Perio4 al.lloet 

a cctv.r7 before, except tbat 1A thta case the 41ctimar7 bad. three col\mu to 

the pap imtead. ot tn. I --.•t tried to t1114 tba 4tot1Cll&Z7 but it shoul.4D't 

take lc:ma to locate it, •1Jlc• the cede equivalent ot the word. ".1UCtim" •• 

*Battle• an4 Leaders ct tbe CiYU War, lev Yorks Tbe CeatU17 Co., J.8811., Vol./ 

p. 581. 

I I ,/ 
REF ID:A62848 

give: J.J.6, L, 20. Moreover, there 1• exta:at at leaat one tairlJ lcmg mea1age, 

vitb it• decode. Hov ~ other •••ace• there •Y be 1D Naticmal Archives I 

doa 't know. 

Cc:ming back aov to t'be "court cipher," 70u will probably tincl. it JU.st as 

har4 to believe, u I t1:D4 it, that according to all accOWlta three ud cml.7 

three U,.. vere used by the Ccmte4eratea during the three aD4 a halt ,.ears ot 

warfare trm .l.862 to •14-1865. It ia true tbat Soutbern 11gnalmea ate Maticm 

ot frequent cb.aaga 1a key but onq the toUOliing three are apecit1c~ cited: 

l) CCICPLETE VICTORY 2) MAKCHISTER BLUFF 3) C<JE RETRIBUTICIJ. 

It aeeaa that all were uae4 ocmcurreDt]¥. Tbere 97 bave been a fourth key, 

III GOD WE TRlET, but I have ana it c:al7 once, aD4 that 1a 1n a book expla1n1Jlg 

the "aourt cipher". lfote tbat each ot the three ke,a liate4 abore couiata ot 

exact~ 15 lettera, but vby thia length .vu chosen ia not c.i.ar. Had the rule 

ben to make tbe ctpher ... •a&•• cmtatn a:al1' 5-letter sroups, tbe explanaticm 

voul.4 be eu7: 15 i• a mltiple ot 5 u4 tb.ia wOlll.4 be ot practical value 1D 

checkiDg the C?'l'Ptograpbic WQt'k. But, as bu been clearl.7 atated, clispiaing 

word lagtha vaa appareDtq l\ot tbe practice eva 1t it vu preacribed, so that 

there VU DO adnmtage 1D Ch0091Ja& U11 vlltob. CCGtaia a multiple ot 5 lettere. 

' ADA, b7 the way, 4oeen't the ke7 C()Mg RETRIBUTIOK sound ratlaer mi.nous to you 

nen theae dayaT 

29 
REF ID:A62848 

SoOM2" ~ later a Com"eaerat& a.ipl ott1eer .. bour14. to eom up With 

& 4eTic• to sim;plltr cipbn1.as QjMd&t.iou, -a. a pqitt diitYl-4 D;r a c.pt&1n 

Wil 11 u •. Jarilu' • rme4 to met tbit med. JCye:J-' • !!!mfi tbeN 1• a p1ctw:e 

ot OM tom ot the 4-v1ce, lh::nm ban ill 11.S. lS • I don't t2rl.ak 1 t xaece•-.r:r 

to explain bov it .:>r1194, 'far it 11 al.lion .. it .. 'd.dmt. 8eve"1 ot these 

&nicea wn cqt\22."ed 4ur1n.a the 111.1', ono of the ~ uaona tbe 1 teas 1n the 

lfSA M.uieua (11.a • ~) • Jklt hlir6' • & ~' l'1.i • 1', Of tbe OU .fCNDd. in 

the ottice ot Conh4en.te Becft'tar;r Qlf St&t. ~ p. leujsm.1A ~ the oapture 

ot Biclmrmd. 

OIW WflCI 7:1.g. 15 

lbv ~ ~ tbeee deTicea WJ"e in ~ or UM: is \111lcDoe, tor tlleir 

coutruc::UQ1 _. m in41.Y14ual •t~q it•• not~ item of r&IUl&r 

?.il pnctical.q e'YQ7 ~ o-L the cod.ea and cipber• ot tblt Civil Var 

,.ou will tin4 retenncea to e1:pMra UMd 'by Contederate MCret Mrrtc• aemte 

engaged in espio!.p in tM Sortll u wll u 1a Cua4I.. In }IU'ticUlar much 

attentioa ta g:t.wn to a Mt or l.ettv1 in cipller WU.eh wre illtet'cept.d by" the 

lev York City Poirtalter aucl. *ich wre :tnvolwd. 1a a plot to pri:At Coutedan.t• 

currenc;y and. ~. lb:h &&:> ,.. ma about tM 80l.ut1oo. ot the• dpher• by 

cipbm' opei'&ton ot tha Ullr.fC in Wuh.Utcton ud the conMq\Mmt brMld.ng v;p ot the 

plot • !ut l von • t IP into tbeae e1»ben tor two JWJK)Jl8. l'irst, 1i2la al.pbabets 

wre all ot the •illpl.e ~bet.io ~, a total of six <q.tbar being' Uaed.. 

B~ they wre ~ ot ""*'°1•1 a 41tte1eat •rie"'s f'or Heb al}iaabet, it wa 

poaaiba to oz z He a cU.»bu ~ b,J' jmptng tro. eD1l lft'i•• to u.other vitbout 

~ exterlW. iDIU.cation ot the llh1t\. 1bwner, .,:>oct .,.up\ aa4 a, bit ot 

p&tience VIM ell t.Aat .. ~ tar IOluUcm. in thi.1 C&N 'becaalM at the 

inept wner 1A *1.ch the 91•tea vu uted.i Wc>a 110l"t, eOMtim• Mveral 

~••ive wrda~ wre encipherel. 1q th• ._ eJ.Pwl>et. :But the Mcon4 reuon 

tor JrJ' not fPin& into the stoq 1• that '11¥ coU MC'• lttw1n c. Filhal., --. I 'Ye 

..ticaed before, i.. 4cme .om J"eteaz'U arxJC tbe ncol"da in our Katiooal 

Archieft• dealin1 Yith thi• c-.se ur1. !aie ba• tom4 8099th1.ng ldtlcla 1• ot grea.t 

atentn end "ICb1c!l I teel. ~ to la:ve ~ him to tell at ~ future tim, 

aa that 1• hi• ~, not lliDe. 

REF ID:A62848 

they V1We :pnc:ticallJr all. baMcl llJIOD .i,.i. monoalphebetiG cipben, or TU'iat1on• 

tbereot, u tor in•tanoe, 1*an. -.i. 1IOl"d.a were mwipbend. lo' the ._ alphabet. 

1l'bere 1s platy ot evidence that Ccm.h6trate aiplam "9re 8:)l'e or leu z-e&Ql.arly 

re.dtng ml 10lvina thoae aipal•. ll:&at oen be 11&14 Qog,t tlle secrurity ot tb$ 

l"O~ cipbera UM4 11,y tM09ft'C tor atratq;Lc or hiP'= rnd ctmnadaat1.c:c• in tbe 

sone ot tM interior? It ht.a~ belCi 112idic&ted that, acco:rdina to w:C0\11lt1 

o,. ex·USll1'C 111n, IUCh ~itMra wre ~the ~to ftll&bil1t1•• or 

~t. ~at•, ~ oau • really believe that tade _. truet Oou14er1ng 

the slllplicity of tl»M l'OUtA Ciphua and the tm4ov.bted intelhct\1al ~1tiel 

o~ ~ oftice:ra Cid 90l.41era, W;q shoQl.4 •• .... •in theM qst.u ht.ft 

resisted c:eyptwlytic attackf In Jllal;1' euea the .-eral hhjftt •tter ot a 

119...._ W. pm.il&p• & number ot ~Uic item ot ~tioo coa1cl be ~ted 

by quick iU,pecti011 or the • .._. ~, u it are zaot tor tbe eo-o-11*f 

"arbi trarle•"' the paeral. ._.. ot the ...... eoul4 be f'OuD4 117 & tw llimttee 

wrk, •~ the basic &,)".tea *8t U.w 'been JrnoilD. tb.rQ\1ah tbe ~tun ot cipher 

book.I, & tact .nt10Dld. NYU'&1 U.a in ti. U terature • C&pt\l:re of but one 

book (t.ha7 wn all~ al.U:a) liO'Wl htft UAI. ~te •1 .. lma exactly 

hov the .,-st- ~ksd. azl4 thia 1'0ul.4 -~Ii• aw:r tM bUic eee1et o! the 

au;per-11n& book. Bow muet ... tbat W.tna 4apft o.t }tt'Otecrtiosa the• route 

cipher• attol"d.ed, ••-.. aeourity 4epe4ed atwo.t lll'tirel.7 up::m tb!r male ot 

.. arbitrari&111 actually 'Uld. in l'l'*ltiee. .A hT.f..ev or 9UCh • ...,.. aa an a-11&01• 

a.bow w14- 41.ft?'genc1•• in tM UN o~ "arbitrviea". ?:n "1q eYmt tbe mllbeJt 

w:t>ae11,. pruent in tba11e boolta mat haft t&llen tar tb:>rt ot tbe maber needed 

to c:t-.e th9 real pioot.ect1on that a wU-eoutw.:te4 ~ oen gift. !t=a tt 

9MlllS to • that the appl.1.cation or u.u.,. aw.111pnce, 1d.tll 10mt p.t,1-H, lhoul4 

ha-ye been. sutf'1.ciftt to IOl.'ft QllCB? ........ -or IO 1t 1'0UJ.4 be quite l.Olinl. 

to u-. bt such u autDl;Pt1on 1• wll w.n:MW 11 reed' 11' ~. 

It -.., eur1~ coqt>, at about t.hi• point in ~ thia i..ture 

tbat rq trand Gd coll•p ot rq BSA dap, Mt> .. Wn c. 11.ael, PW - ~ 

tht ri&ht attt1&l t'or such a .,. mnrati.on. In ~ ~ 1960, 11r. J'ilbal w 

giTen Mr. ""1.lllp lrldpa, 1l1lo 1• a1ao a ~r ~JIU. D.4 'Ibo kMw DOtb1na about 

tb$ route Ci.»):lerl of tJa tJSlt.lC, ~ foll.oYing autbctic ...... 9ettt CID l ~ 1863 

~ Oenenl a.er .. Cl. Kne.4e, at !la.rr18b\ara, Junqi"91lia, to Ollne:rd. Cweb at lfMb.1Dgton1 

(Me ..... to be turniaMd) Jb. 11 
1 • =i r: ~ Q ~ g ~ ~ ~ ia ~ Jll i: l 

tr ~ n ~ ! r ~ ~ 1 I ~ 8 i i ~ f : ~ t i r I I [ r r 11 fi... ~ r c I; f rt • :1 t ! f f f ~ ~ f i Ii ~ I ! ~ ' :I' i Jilt'!! Utl l i 1 

~ 2 u ~ u i ~ T i ~ f i ~ ~ ~ ( f i f ~ i J i j § i i ;, ~. i ~j; H ~ ! 

• ,. 1 · l · I " t 1 J "" J : t r ~ ~ · ~ -

t l : · ~ ts l f . I . i .; ~ ! 5 i ~ ir~liu ';< · • e l t s " f t f ~ i - i I - h , t 

i I i 1 e 1 i J I e ! t i : : r ; i f 1 1 _ 

~ 

~ hj 

1-1 

t:I 

.. 

~ 

"' h) 

m 

.. 

m 
REF ID:A62848 

!:Mber thm gL ve ;yosa tt:. .P.\a11l•tat ~ '111• - .... , Jedlllpl )'ml "'°"14 lUlt 

to w:>rk it out tor JOll?'-1.,.., n.r with tile ~cm ~·w ~ received. 

tbl aolut1.o11 ~4 .not be cUttiC\1lt. 2be ••-. coa'ta1Jl1 om error, llbich •• 

made 1n it• oril1Dal prepa;ra.tion: one -..ms. •• ami tted. 

'Die second telegnl&, ~ OM ~ later, was al.IO rrca Major General bll, 

to Major General a.lleck, but it•• in ClOtber c1}iler book-appe:rent]T the two 

booka !n-.olved-... uH4 ~· Here it ill 

Cll<llGB 0. *1JWU>, lluh1.ngtoA: 

Blgu.1.ara ordered of sv to public out IU.8p8lk\1ng rece.1 m. J.862 

apoihd thirty I di.s;atch .:~v'l ot contima of beat otb9nr11e wrst 

Arabia JIG" CC I nd 41~ dJ.tt1' at 1q laat far I.4.ncolJl kptember 

per1ocl ~ f'J'Oa MnM llaall <iea the until ~ abUity to the I a 

twJDYal evmllila Ma. hera.14 tri'bu:D.e ... 

.b before, I Y1U giw JOU the a.pportuait7 to sol.ft thi• ••nee tor 

youraelves. (At the begilm:lng ot the nut lectur.t I aba1l p.reeent the pla1ntext of both ...... ) 

llext 70U Me a photograph ot an 1Jllport.nt •• ._ *1oh JOU. 1m\V villh to 

eolw youraell. I~,.. Mnt 'b7 Prenmnt Jettenon l&Ti• to Olmeral .Jabnston, 

on a wr.r •1gn1t1cant date, ll April ~. J'orl- eue 1a V01'tdna on 1 t I &i 'ff 

also a tnucnpt1on, sine• the pbotoanph 1• ft17 oldi and. in :poor state. I 

b9lieve that th1• imasaae doe• DOt eppu.r 1n vrr or tba account• I've NIUl. 

Pig. 18 

'1'o rttturn to J. w. la-own, wbl:J$ I'• mnt1me4 before an4 'Who give• ua IW)Bt 

ot 11hat little sound ~tioa there 1• about tM c17Ptanelytic succe••• ot 

both atdea.. J'irst, let•a Me -.i the tm1.c:in sigu)wm could 4o with rebel 

ciphftrs. Bir& are IOlll ••tewt• he mlm• {it. m)' 

~ firA dec1Jtier:f.Dg ~•rebel ei.p&l coda ot llbich I 

find any record wa that _.. 'bJ' Cl.Pt. J. 8. Bill and Capt. R. A. 

'1'8¥lor, reported Kev. 25, l86e. 7our daiY• later, MtJ • N.Yer Yl'Ote 

to Capt. Culhing, Chie:r SigDal Ottieer, Anq o-r the ~, 

not to :pen.it it to beccw public: "tbat - t:nnlllate the agml 

•a._1 ot the rebel. &nt\Y" • 

.AjprU 9, 1863, Capt. fishar, ueu- hlaouth, reported tll&t one ot hi• officer• 

bad rea4 a rebel. ••laP llh1oh ]IS'Owcl that the i"e~ ~ in :po.1•••1oa of 

our code. 'l'he DeXt - he -.. intormd that the rebel oo4e talatR ( tnm) a 

rebel aignal. otticer n• 14estic-.l with one ta1ran preY!louq at Yo.rktom. 

Be received. :traa Maj. l(yer tbe folloving order•: 

•A curioue co1Deia.nce--or wa it a :tortultou f\n'e8b&4ovine ot a ewnt tv 1D. 

the tuture'l•-can. be Hen in the nquace ot 'tlM lut hio 11t>rb ot t.be cipher 

text. The ••A&9 i• dated. ~r 30, l86e; ti. In York ~d. and the 

:lev l'airit Tribune cOlllbiMd to .a the JJev '!OJ"k ~b\IM on Jlaroh 19, l~ 

6Q ,are later~ 
I 

REF ID:A62848 

"lencl oftr ,.om- .llasa, t:raa tbl to tiait, ....... lllbloh, tt 

it 1• in the po-..:r Gt \M...., to IM1Jlaer t.Ma, Y.ll.11...i 

thMl to llil11eft ...., • camot atrt _,. clAv to tDl1r 11..-,i.." 

"8-4. a1.o ooeaatt«-117 ••••P• _...., ill n1'•JW• t.o t•c:t-V 

Jlillt&17 aoftMDtl, u f't>r iJlstance,--"!lae 8ixth Col»• ia orar.4 to 

reiDtoroe JGl;re• at Yorktown." 

Uncloub~, what w l:aaft here ue reterenn1 to the pnenl. oipber qsta 

UM4 b;y the Conhderatea 1». their elecrtr1c~ co micationa, tor note 

the n;praaaion "8en4 owr ;your lina•". Thia ocn44. ~ ft1\tr to nwal. 

c,._micaticma. Bare w also have Yeq ear]¥ innwu, 1D tel.esra»hic 

coam.mieationa, ot ~ • call cowr tlDd. deception, 1.e., apl.ofiDI o•rtain 

rule• to t17 to hic!a the tact that eQtllV lipJ• ~be read., .a. to tq to 

4eoe1w h1a bT aenc1'nl lplrloua .. .._. tor b1a to rewlJ hopt.ng the fraud 

Vill. not be &.teoted. 

Brown.' 1 accomst ~ UAion o~ic naceaaaa coatimJH (I'. 21.S): 

ID October, 1863, (!Qt. llnTU!a JU"ty dea1',Jlbue&. a oodl, an4 

dee1)1bera4 

ill •ovm'ber 

uotbar 

of tb.e ._ 

ia V1.rstaia· 

.,._ Capt. 2hickn• fllMl o..t• ~ 

Lieut. Bowpte and U.etR. J'look, 1n Ml.nh, l8Q, daoipher94 

a code 1D the V.Pen Anl:f, Di at tbe w tim Lint. Jlarmetr tCNDd 

one at Al•undria, '1r11Dia· 

Capt. :hul Babcock, Jr .. , th.a Chief 11.,,.:i Ottioer, ~t 

ot the Cumberlan4, 1n a letter 4ata4 ObattaaoctDa, Tama._, .-ri1 

26, lSQ, tnmmttinc a CO'J1T ot the rebel 11..,i ooa., sept 

capt. Gol.e *1a4 Li-.t. Bowpte, actf.Jag Sio-J. Gtticers, 

OC4l\l.P1 & station ot o._..m1eat1cm ant o'blU"V'&tion on White 

Cla1t Jl14p at ts..,,., Ga •••• OD '\lle ~ ~. tM nbel• 

cbanp4 their co4e to ta.a one celoa«., an4 on tile .._ dlQ' 

the 

in t:taD8latiq 

abaft·•mtf.ODlld 

ta an 

ottioere 

co4tt, 

bJ' 

ln4 

uzatiriq 

the• offlcea 

s-.1 -4 

haft 

eMJ'Cf 

'bHC 

~ 

ewr 

aince rudtng flftrJ' - ... • MDt o?ft' tbe rebel ~. Jlu1' ot 

tnae • ...,.. Jaw ~"*1 m\:IUl• Utomt.tS.. to ti. -r&l. q.,....,.,1nc ~· 

h tollow!Dg i• &180 trca k<Ml (:p. 2T9) s 

About the firat ot "-e (~), 8erat. Cal.TiD •• staUODl4 

at ror't Strona, Oil Jbrrie h1M4, 1'1 th the M'RNl oodae bentofOft 

uM4 by the nbel•, tor the JUl"JOM ot l"'Mding t.M -.r•a eipale 

it po11ibl.•. Far M&r.17 two weka aotbJ.ni cou14 be -. out ot 

their atsna1a, but b,y' Jft'Nftring M :tinall7 weetd ill l.Hminc 

t!Mtir code•. lie•...._• wre read b7 Jl1ll troll 81aola lal.et, Ja•teq 

:.t:, a4 J'ort .Jolmeoa. Qaa. Z. Q. Poater, who W UIRW'l "'l"8lanA 

of the Departmat ot tM brth, J11;r 26th, _.., w1l plaand 1'1~ 

Serat. Colv1n'• vorl:, that, iD a letter Hi:treaaeA to Om. Jml.laok, 

he t"Momimd.e4 •that he lMt ftw.rd.ed b,- promtion to IJ.wtema't in 

tM 11gm.1 Co~, Qr by a 'br9ftt a. 8'C1&l. of boGol"." !hie HeaaMnbUon _. w~ &C'tea upon, lN\1 thl"oqh eongruaic:aal. 

Cid offlcUl. Vl"IZlgling Oftr 11pp01Dt.D.t• in the Corpe, he ,.. not 

~••ioned until-. 13, l.865, ll1• comaiutoe d.a'Uq t1'Cll h'b. l~, 

1865. 

(p-281) Darin& tbt *>Uth, Sergt. Colvin ll448d acW.tiooal 

laurel• to the tam Jae ha4 earned a.a a suece••tul interpreter ot 

rebel ligaala. !be ...., Jla4 ..topted a new cipber ror the tnmamiasion of i.mpoitant ....... , an4 the labor ot 4ec1pblrilte it 
REF ID:A62848 

4e'tol,_ \IJOl'1 tbe llft'8••t· Contiaud atchfulmu P 1Ut aeeured 

the 4-•1"4 ruul,, .... be ..... ill able - tnMJ.t.te ~ 1Jl,o. 

portent 41~ ot t1la ~ tor * be6atit ot our e·T wt ate. · • 1.Dt'Ol"lll&'Sion tlWa p1lael _. h'~ ot special va1:ae la ovr 

opentiou, an4 the peculiar abW 't7 .ai'DiW 'b7' the Hrgeu1i led 

Gen. 1oater once mre to "°"'' spt hi• )IZ'O&C)tion. 

U.-266) Abou.t the ._ time a a;peti ti.on uoder Gen. Potter ,.. orpirhe4 to ut 1J>. coin.1-..tian ldtll tbe nav in the vicinit)r 

of .U 1 • lllQ'. Lieut. rtabar _. witll thi• e<Jrrm4, a4 by ahl· 

tdlitq ccc-m1cattna 1-twen the l.W all naval 1'1'rcea ftcWtate4 

~the fl°'1Joiaetl ee.ticm ot the eOllMTJiCl. ~ ewry MaDS 

... ..,1oy.d to mteroept rebel----·· lerp. Co1Y1n, aaaipe4 

to W• pertieular 4llt7, ru4 all tlle ••--• Yitbin ailbt, and. 

1dlu tba •'VUla'tion of Cllat-1.elton ,.. atend-4 \fllOll by th8 ~, 

the ttrn notif'ication ot tM Acrt um 1a tbia _,. betore the rei.r.t W ~ eowmoe4. All• rnv4 tor COD.,iftlOU.a MrVice• ~re4 in Wa eapaeiv, Capt. llarrill rec31m1DCSed. tlat tAe 

Mr&eUt 'be allow4 a m4&1., hi• seal, eAerfO" Cl4 labors tuiq 

wrrat;iq the hallor. 

Attar tb.e oenpat1on ot ODrleatcm., oo 1 1t1o.at1on1 was •atablillW 

by •1 pal• wt tb. l'ort Strong, on lbrz1• Ia1an4, J'orl .Jobnaon an4 Jma• 

Xa>an4, libmt P'J.M1u.t, -4 IQDM1n 'a MUla. A line _. a1ao 

opene4 w1 th V. po•l tlen OCQ\1Jie4 by tbe troop• on the IOuth 114e ot 

t1le Albl.q r1 ft1' • 

llith reaaz'd to Conte4erate rea4iag Of tmiOD 1'iaual. 11pal•, Bro1fD .... 

the tollow1ng 9b8en&tiona of aaiaid.erable tnte:reat b .~) : 

I 

!be ao.ol.ute w.u1v o~ U9iD& a cipr ..._ a.,.1unc in 

the preeence of tu __,. -. 6-:>nstratei 4url.q theM autuia month• 

b7 the ..... witll cielt. tM l"Wbel• r.e4. our -·--·. 1'h1• led to the 1N\l1na ot 8l1 ar4er tbnt lkll. ~ ...... lboul4 be Ha'\ in 

c1J)lar. .AmcDa ti. --ml.ti~ ot •uaae• interc~ b;J the enn;r, the 

:!ollow1nc wre ~ at "8• ~ i.1lportMt t ... 

.Jlro1m therw;xm cite• 25 auth .,,....but. he g2.ft• no ial1cation whatever 

aa to the llOUl'C• troll whieh he olrta:Lne4 theee um;plea or hov he kneY the7 

bac1 bee intercepted.. !hq all -near w be taotioal. ••aap• 11ent ~ Y11U&l 

' 

sipala. 

ID...,. ot the caeea oitet bJ' lro1ll\ it 1• d1tt1cult to tell Vhf!tbier 

w18·'WI& or .iectric tel.eerQb ....... vere involftd.. Jut ill om cue, 

(evac\l&tion ot Charleston) it 1• petfeetl.7 clear that Y1aul. ••-.• ,_.. 

in'Vol ve4, 1lben .Brovn llaTfl that 8ct. Colvin "real all tha ••HP• v1 thin si&bt. n 

JUrther Yith reprd to re'bel ~ic .ua• .. With Onion ....... , 

Brom bu this to A:/ (p .213) I 

~ ~· o~ Ueut. frMk lfukoe, 81--1 Otticer at Cbeleaton, 

ab.ow tb&t 4ur1n& t.U •i• tho\\lan4a or ....... wre unt hca '8le poat 

to a.othm', m4 rra.. ou.tpona to he.a4.t\11.rten., most ot Vhioh c.oul4 have 

been sent in DO 4"&er ,,.,. , anl Jl8D,1 wre ot cre&t iJQortaaee to the 

Cont'ederate .wtllor1 tte•. 

U.9Ut. llartoe _,... iba'\ lle rM4 near~ ewey ...... w MDt. Be 

vu tol'ftU'f18d ot our &t'beck on tM 18th ot J\117, 1863. • a44a regret• 

tuJ.l3, howwr, tb&t ~ eaftleame•• ot tbe staff otticen at 

biead.q1*rtertl it lea•4 avt \hat laie •• reading our • .._.. Our otf'icera 

then 'bepn to ue t!t• cipMw 4.Uk • Ia ~ he 1ntercepte4 tU toll.ow1ng ••IJ88t• "lad. • a ~ ~ rebel coa. 1 tUately, it JOU have one in 

;your poaaeaaicn". & ~ ctw .. 4 h11 •ode. . . . A 11ttlQ later our 

otticer1 used a- cipher 1lh1ch Ueut; .. ~koe &qi he va.s utterl.Jr 'mabla 

to t.mrawl.. 
REF ID:A62848 

It ia untortunate tb&t neither Id.wt. llarkoe, the Confederate ceyptanal.7st, 

nor Brom, tbe thion -1palnan, tall ua ldlat 80J"t or cipher thi• wa that 

cOUldn't be unr&ftlled. I U8\Slt that it -.. the 1'rer disk used properly', 

with a .key phraee ot IOm9 length and Yi th eucces•1 'ftt lettere, not 'Whole V01'4s, 

being enciphered by 8UOce1111ve lettera of the by. But tlii• 1• ~ u &a8\JlllPt1on 

and ~ be entil"ely erroneous. 

In the torgoing citations at cr,ypt.anal~ic euccee1ea it 11 a1gn1tic:ant to 

note, that visual mesaage• wre intercepted an4 read b7 bath aides; second, 

that Conte&trate telegraphie ....... protected by' the Vtpner• cipher wre 

read by Union personnel~ IRlCh measap1 wre intercepted; and third, 

tbat t.JSMl'C telesrapb. ••M&e• protected. by tba route cipher appe.rentl.J' intercepted occasionally but mwr solwd. later I DU_. 8CIM c:amment• on 

this laat •tatemnt, but at ti. ..ant let ua note tb&t teehnicall¥ tm Vipnere 

cipher 1e t:heoretic~ muoh stronaer than the route cl)ber, ao that w have 

here en interesting aitu&tie11, Viz, the user• ot a tecJmically interior 

ceyptoayatem. 'W9re able to reed. enem;y- m11tsnae• proteotM by a techni~ 

wperior one, but the uaera or a technically 8\tpftior cr;yptoaystem. wre not 

able to read enezl\Y me•S881• protected by a teclm1~ interior one-a curiou 

situation indeed. 
REF ID:A62848 

"Send over your lines, from time to time, messgges which, if' 

it is in the power of' the enemy to decipher them, will lead 

them to believe that we cannot get any clew to the:f:r signals." 

"Send al.so occasionally messages untrue, in ref'erence to 

imaginary military movements, as f'or instance, --"The Sixth 

Corps is ordered to reinforce Keyes at Yorktown'." 

Undoubtedly, what we have here are references to the general. cipher 

system used by the Cpntecterates in their electric-telegraph communications. 

Note the expression "Send over your lines". This could hardly refer to visual 

communications. Here we also have very early instances, in telegraphic 

. communications, of' what we callcover and deception, i.e., employing certain 

ruses to try to hide the fact that enemy signals could be read, and to try 

to deceive him by sending messages for him to read and be misled by undetected 

spurious messages. 

Brown's account continues: 

In October, 1863, Capt. Merrill's party deciphered a code, and 

in November of' the same ,ear Capt. Thickstun and Capt. Marston 

deciphered another in Virginia. 

Lieut. Bowgate and Lieut. Flook, in March, 1864, deciphered 

a code in the Western Army, and at the same time Lieut. Benner found 

one at Ale:xandria, Virginia. 

Capt. Paul Babcock, Jr., then Chief SignaJ.. Officer, Department 

of' the Cumberland, in a letter dated Chattanooga, Tennessee, April 261 1864, transmitting a copy of the rebel signal code, says: 

Capt. Cole and Lieut. Bowgate, acting Signal. Officers, 

occupy a station of canmunication and observation on White 

Oak Ridge at Rl.nggold11 Ga.. • • • On the 22nd inst. the rebels 

changed their code to the one enclosed, and on the same day 

the above-mentioned officers by untiring zeal and energy succeeded 

in translating the new code, and these of'f'icers have been ever 

si:cce reading every message sent over the rebel lines. Many of 

these messages have f'urnished valuable inf'ormation to the general 

commanding department. 

Brown continues with the following observations of considerable interest: 

The absolute necessity of using a cipher when signalling in 

the presence of the enemy was demonstrated dmring these autumn months 

by the ease with 'Which the rebels read our messages. This led to the 

issuing of' an order that all important messages should be sent in 

cipher. Among the multitude of' messages intercepted by the enemy, the 

following 1'rere same of the more important. • • 

Brown thereupon ci tea 25 such messages but he gives no indication 

whatever as to the source :f'rom which he obtained these examples or how 

he knew they had been intercepted. They all appear to be tactical 

messages sent by visual signals. 

The following is also f'rom Brown (p. 279): 

About the first of June (1864) 11 Sergt. Colvin was stationed 

at Fort Stron, on Morris Island, with the several. codes heretofore 
- REF ID:A62848 

used by the rebels, f'or the purpose of' reading the enemy's signals 

if' possible. For nearly two weeks nothing could be made out of 

their signals, but by persevering he finally succeeded in learning 

thier codes. Messages were read by him f'ran Beach Inlet, Battery 

Bee, and Fort Jolmson, Gen. J. G. Foster, who had assumed command 

of' the Department of' the South,, May 26th, was so much pleased with 

Sergt. Colvin's work, that in a letter addressed to Gen. Halleck, 

he recommended "that he be rewarded by prqmotion to Lieutenant in 

the Signal Corps, or by a brevet or medal.lof' honor." This recom.-

mendatio:a. was subsequently acted upon, but,, through congressional 

and otticial wrangling over appointments in the Corps, he was not 

commissioned until May 13, 1865, his commission dating f'ran Feb. 14, 

1865. 

(p-281) During the month, Sergt. Colvin added additional 

laurels to the f'ame he had earned as a successful interpreter of' 

rebel signals. The enemy had adopted a new cipher :6Br the transmission of' important messages111 and the labor of' deciphering it 

devolved upon the sergeant. Continued watchfulness at last secured 

the desired result, and he was again able to translate the important d!l:spa.tchea of' the enemy f'or the benefit of our commandants. 

The information thus gained was frequently of' special value in our 

operations,, and the peculiar ability exhibited by the sergeant led 

Gen. Foster once more to recommend his promotion. 

(p-286) About the same time an expedition under Gen. Potter 

was organized to act in conjunction with the navy in the vicinity 

of' Bull's Bay. Lieut. Fisher was w1 th this command, and by maintaining communications between the land and naval forces facilitated 

greatly the conjoined action of' the command. Meanwhile every means 

was employed to intercept rebel messages. Sergt. Colvin, assigned 

to this particular duty, read all the messages within sight, and 

when the evacuation of' Charleston was determined upon by the enemy, 

the first notification of' the fact came in this way before the retreat had actually camnenced. As a reward for conspicuous services 

rendered' in this capacity, Capt. Merrill recommended that the 

sergeant be allowed a medal, his zeal, energy and labors fully 

warranting the honor. 

After the occupation of' Charleston, communications was established 

by signals with Fort Strong, on Morris Island, Fort Johnson and James 

Island, Mount Pleasant, and Steynmeyer's Mills. A line was also 

opened w1 th the position occupied by the troops on the south side of 

the Ashley r:Lver. 

In man.y of' the cases cited by Brown it is difficult to tell whether 

wig-wag or electric telegraph messages were involved. But in one case, 

(evacuation of Charleston) it is perfectly clear that visual messages were 

involved, when Brown says that Sgt. Colvin''read all the messages within sight." 

Once before in this lecture it was mentioned that the visual signalmen 

of each side were reading the visual signal.a of the other aide. Thia led to 

the use 1 by both aides, of ciphers to protect the signals tranami tted by the 

visual method. But in addition, discovery that Confederate operators were 
REF ID:A62848 

intercepting messages by tapping the telegraph lines when possible (which, it 

is to be noted, certainly represents one of the earliest, if not indeed the very 

earliest instances of intercepting electrically-tl"B1lamitted messages), let to 

the adoption of curious subterfuges to thwart such interception yielding good 

intelligence. The following account of an episode of this sort is taken from 

a book published in 1907 entitled Lincoln in the Telegraph Office, by David H. 

Bates, one of the members of the Military Telegraph Coz:ps: 

During Burnside's Fredericksburg campaign in 1862, the War 

Department operators discovered indication of an interloper on the 

wire leading to ht.s headquarters at Acquia Creek. These indications 

consisted of an occasional irregul.ar opening and closing of the 

circuit and once in a while stl"B1lge signals, which were evidently 

not made by any of our awn operators. It is proper to note that the 

characteristics of each Morse operator's sending are Just as 

pronounced as easily recognized as are the characteristics of ordinary 

handwriting, so that when a message is being transmitted over a wire, 

the identify of the sender may readily be known to any other operator 

w1 thin hearing who has ever worked w1 th the sender of such signals. 

/jere we have the earliest reference to what we nov call "MorseO,Perator Identification".J A samewhat similar means of personal 

identification occurs every day in the use of the telephone. /jfe must 

remember here that Bates was writing in 1907. Alexander Graham Bell 

invented the telephone li..1decade after the close of the Civil War.:] 

At the time referred to, therefore, we were certain that our 

wire had been tapped at an unguarded point. In same way or other 

the Ccmf'ederate learned that we suspected the presence on the wire, 

and he then disclosed to us the f'act that he was from Lee's army and 

had been on our wire for several days, and that 1 having learned all 

that he wanted to know, he was then about to cut and run. We gossiped 

with hd:m for a while and then ceased to hear his signals and knew, or 

believed, that he had gone. {jibat shall we say about the naivete of 

these early intercept operations and operators~ 

Meanwhile, we had taken measures to discover his whereabouts by 

sending out linemen to patrol the line; but his tracks were well concealed 

and it was only atte:r the intruder had left that we f'ound the place where 

our wire had been tapped. Re had made the secret connection by means 

of fine-silk-covered magnet wire, so-called, in such a manner as to 

conceal the Joint almost entirely. Meantime, Burnside's operator was 

temporarily absent f'ran his post, and we were obliged to have recourse 

to a crude plan for concealing the text of' telegrams to the Army or the 

Potanac, which we had followed on other samewhat similar occasions when 

we believea the addressee or operator at the distant point (not provided 

with the cipher-key) was particularly keen and alert. Thi.a plan consisted 

primarily of sending the message backward, the individual words being 

misspelled and otherwise garbled. We had practiced on one or two dispatches 

to Brunside be£6re the Confederate operator was discovered to be on jihe wire, 

$.D.d we were placed to get this prompt answer, couched also in the same outlandish language, which was, however, intelligible to us after a short study 

of the text in each case. The general and ourselves soon became quite expert 

in this home-made cipher game, as we all strove hard to clothe the dispatches in strange 1 uncciuth garb. 
REF ID:A62848 

In order to deceive the Confederate operator, however, we sent 

to General Burn.side a number of' cipher-messages, easy of translation, 

and which contained all sorts of bogus inf o:nnation f'or the purpose 

of misleading the enemy. General Burnside of bis operator at once 

sumised our purpose, and the general thereupon sent up in reply 

a lot.,of' 1'balderdash, 11 also calculated to deceive the uninitiated. 

ffere we have an early instance of' "cover and deception" in electrical 

COJllJilmications.J 

It was about th:ts time that the following specially important 

dispatch from Lincoln was filed for transmission: 

November 25, 1862. 

MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE, Acquia Creek, Va. : If' I should be in 

boat off Acquia Creek at dark to-morrow (Wednesday) evening, 

could you, without inconvenience, meet me and pass an hour or 

two with me.--A Lincoln. 

Al though the Confederate operator had said good-by several days 

before the date of this message, we were not sure that he had 

actually left. We undertook therefore to put Lincoln's telegram in 

our hane-made cipher, so that if' the foreign operator were still on 

our wire, the message might not be readily made out by the enemy. 

At the same time extra precautions were taken by the Washington authorities to guard against any accident to the President while on the visit 

to General Burn.side. No record is now found of the actual text of this 

cipher-dispatch, as finally prepared for transmission, but going back 

over it word for word, I believe the following is so nearly like it 

as to be called a true copy: 

Washington, D. C., 

November 25, 1862. 

BURNSIDE, Acquia Creek: Can Inn Ale me withe 2 oar our Ann pas 

Ann me flesh ends N. V. corn Icn out w1 th U cud Inn .heaven day 

nest Wed roe Moore Tom darkey hat Creek Why Hawk of abbott Inn 

B chewed I if .--Bates. 

By reading the above backward, observing the phonetics, and bearing 

in mind that flesh is the equivalent of meat, the real meaning is easily 

found. It cannot be said that this specimen exhibits especially clever 

work on the part of the War Department ste.tf' 1 nor is it likely that the 

Confederate operator, if he overheard its transmission, had much 

ilirouble in unra.ireling its meaning. As to this we can only conjecture. 

Burnside readily translated this cryptogram, if it may be 

dignified with so high-sounding a name, and replied in similar-gibberish 

that he would meet Lincoln at the place and time specified. At this 

meeting on the steamer Baltimore was discussed the plan of a movement 

against Lee's intrenchments which was made three ·weeks later, and which 

resulted in our army being repulsed with the loss of many thousands of lives. 

Another special transposition of this type was used in 1865 when 

Lincoln was staying at City Point and Richmond. After 6 April the route 

transposition ~iphers were no longer used for presidential dispatches. 

/jJid they continue to be used for military communications'l Plum states 

that "No. 4 and all other ciphers were discarded after 20 June 1865," 

but he goes on to say that No. 5 was sent to about 20 u.s. Military 

Telegraphers, so presumably that cipher book may have been used for a short 

time. Plum adds that the books were retained by these recipients "until 

they were discharged 11;} The reason for this abondoment of cipher is not 

clear: the operator may have felt that now that the war was believed 

practically cwer--Lee surendered three days later--cipher communications 

was less imperative. In any case, telegrams were sent in plain text thereafter. 

ffi'ammmications security discipline became very lax, now that the war was oveiJ. 
REF ID:A62848 

For an important message sent by Lincoln on 3 April a special type 

of cipher was used, clbsely resembling that to Burnside. The reason for 

the unusual encipherment was a desire to conceal the news f'ran cipher 

operators who might happen to see it while relaying it to Washington. 

The ruse resorted to was surprisingly simple: the order of' the words 

was merely reversed and nonstandard spelling adopted~ The text is as 

follows: · 

City Point, Va., 8:30 A.M., April 3, 1865. 

Tinker, War Department: A. Lincoln its in f'une a in hymn to start 

I· a.my treating there possible if' of cut too f'oreard pushing ils 

Be is so all Ricbmond aunt con:l"ide is Andy evacuated Petersburg 

reports Grant morning this Washington Secretary War. Beckwith 
/ -- REF ID:A62848 

intercepting •••aae• by tapping the telegn.ph line• vhen poaaible (which, 1 t . 

11 to be noted, certainl.J' repre1enta one ot the earlle1t, 1t not indeed the very 

earlieat inatance1 ot 1ntercept1ng electnca.Uy-tramattted me••ase•), let to 

the adoption ot cur.Loua aubte~• to thwart auch 1.nterceptiau ;yield1ng good 

intelligence. !rhe f'ollowing account ot an episode ot tbi• 1ort 11 taken trcm 

a book publ18hed in 1907 entitled L1ncoln in the Telepaph ottice, by Dsvicl R. 

Batea, one ot the memben ot tile M1lit&J7 'lelegaph Corp1: 

During Burna14e '• :hederickaburg cuspaip 1n 1862, the War 

Dep&J"tmnt operator& d1acove1'9d 1n41cation ot au interloper on the 

v1re leac11ng to his headquarters at Acquta Creek. The1e 1n41cat1ont 

conaiated ot en occu1onal 1 rragu.lar OJ>eniDB and clo11ng ot the 

c1icu1t llD4 once 1n a wt.J.ld atnwge aignal.1, which were evidently 

not made by any ot our ~ opea1-on. It 1• proper to note that the 

cban.ctel'istic1 or each Mone operator'• ending ue 3uat u 

pronounced u easily ncop.iaed. a1 are the cb&l'lletertatica ot oJ'dinary 

handvrtting, ao that when a ••uge is being tranllllitted over a vin, 

the identtty ot the aender ~ readily be known to any other open.tor 

within hearing who ha• ever woZ"ked with the sender ot euch •isnall. 

/jiere we have the earl1e1t ~eftDce to 'What we nov call "MoneOperator Ident:tt1cation ";/ A 1amevh&t e1mt lar mew at penonal 

identlftcation occurs ever, dq in the uae ot the telephone. ~e muat 

remember hen that Bate• ,,.. mt1ns :l.n 1907. Alexander Grabam Bell 

1nvented the telephcme e. decade after the close ot the CivU War;} 

At the time zetenee to, theftfore, we wel'e certain that our 

' win had been tappe4 at an UDgUll.l'ded point. In acne wy 07 other 

the Ccmteaerate learned that we auapected the pzelleDCe on the win, 

and he then d1acloeed to ua the tact that he vu fl'Clll Lee'• U"Jq and 

had been m our 1d.ze t~ eeveal a.ya, and 'that, having leamec1 all 

that he wanted to know, he•• then about to cut and run. We goaa1ped 

with him tor a while 11114 then cea1ed to hear hia aiga&l.• and knew, or 

belien:d1 that he ha4 gone. J!ibat .lhall we S&7 about the naivete ot 

these early intercept opentiona and open.tony 

Meanwhile, we had taken :meuuma to d1Rover hi• vhen&bouts by 

aending out linemen to J&trol the line; but hi• tl"acka -were well c:oncea.led 

and it vu only atte:r the 1."ltruder had le:f't that w tound the place where 

our wire b•" been tapped. Be had 1111.da the 1earet connection by means 

ot fine ai.lk-c.avel"ed nagnet win, ao-call.ed, in auch a mrmer u to 

conceal. tlr..: j~1.Dt al.moat ent:lftly. Meantime, Bum1ide'• operator waa ~absent tram hi• poat, and we wen obliged to have ncOUJ'le 

to a crwle pl.an tor concealing the text of tele8JUJ8 to the Arrq ot the 

Potanac, which we had followed on other 1CID9Wbat 1sm11ar occasions when 

we believed the &ddre•aee or operator at the distant point (not provided 

with the cipher-key) vu particularly keen and alert. Thia pl.an consisted 

primarJ.ly or sending the me11age backwud, the ind1vtdual words being 

m11apelled and otherwise garbled. We had praat:f.ced on ace or two dispatche1 

to B:runaide before the Contederate operator wu discOV'eftd to be on the vs.ze, 

and we wen placed to get 'thil praapt an1wer, couched also 1n the same out .. landilh language, wh!ch waa, however. 1ntell1g1ble to 'WI after a short atudy ~the text in each cue. '.rhe general and ouraelve• aoon became quite expert 

:l.n this hane-mde cipher ,_.., •• we &l.l •trove ~ to clothe the dispatchea 

in atrange, uncouth gub. 
REF ID:A62848 

In ozder 'to 4ece1Te the Confederate open.tor, hcMtftr, ve ..nt 

to Genenl BUJ'Dlide a nllll>er ot c1pher-••AP•1 eu7 ot t:renalat:l.on, 

llDd vbich con"1necl &11 1ort1 ot bogus :l.Dtozmt:l.on tor the JN11>08e 

ot mlleadiDg the amv. General Burn11cle ot bi• operator at once 

aumi-4 our purpoM, and tb8 pnenl. thereupm Mnt up in raply 

a lot. ,of "balc2el"duh," &110 calculated to deceive the unin1t1&ted. 

/jiere w baTe an earl7 1.Datance ot "cover and dacep-\1on" 1n electrical 

ccmmmicatlon•.J 

It wu about thls time that the tolloving apeciall7 import;ant 

diapatch trcm Lincoln .. tiled tor tnzmd.••1cm: 

Rovember 25, 1862. 

MAJOlt-GIDRAL BURHSIDI, Acq,uia Cleek, Ya.: It I llhould be :1n 

boat ott Acquia Czeek at dark to-aorrov (Veb8C!q) even1ng, 

coulcl '°"' without incODYenteme, •8' • and pua an hoUI' ol' 

two with m. -·A Ltnaoln. 

AlthouSh 'the Ccmtederate operator hac1 •a14 goo4-b7 aeve:ral. c1ayll 

beton the date ot W• •••ap, w weze Dot wze that he had 

actl&ll.7 left. Ve undertook 'bftatozie to put Lincatn' 1 telegna 1n 

OUI' haae--4e c1pher, ao tha't tt the torelgn opeator wre atUl m 

our win, the ••A&W nd.ght not be nad117 made out b:r the •neJQ"• 

At tbe •-ts- extra p:ft!Cautiona wze taken b7 tbe Vuhington author1-

t1ea to &uud ageinet &117 acc:lden to the Prea14ent vhUe on the vs11t 

to General Bul"D.atde. Bo aaozd 11 now tound ~the ac"1&1. text ot th11 

c1pher-d1apatch, u flnal' 7 Pftpuied tor tl'IUllDl1111an, but going back 

over S.t wmd tor wom, I belieTe ti. tollow1Dg :ls 10 nearJ.7 like :1 t 

aa to be c&ll.ed a tZ"U8 c0P7: 

Vu~cm, D. e., OT.mer 25, 1862. 

BUBlfSD8, Acqu:la Oftek: can Inn Ale • Vithtt 2 oar our Arm pu Q'l 

Ann • i'leah en48 B. V. co:rn Im out with U cu4 Inn heaven aq 

neat Vecl roe ~ Tan c1&rke7 hat Creek Wh7 lr&Yk ~ Abbott Im 

B chellacl l if .··Bate•. 

B7 reacliDg the above baclawald, ob•ntnc tile phcmetic1, amt bear1ng 

in mind that tlelh 11 the eqUS.valent ot •at, the ml man1ns 1• eu117 

found. lt cannot be 18:1.d that thi• apecmn exb.1b1t.• eapec:t.al.17 cleYer 

voJ'k on the JlU't ot the war J)epN"tment atatt, DOI' :la it likel.7 that the 

Confederate operator, 1t he 0'98rbeu4 it• tftnlm1••1on1 had much 

t1'ou1)1e 1n unnveling 1t• .antng. As to th11 w can cml.7 c0D3ecture. 

Buna14e fta4U7 tftDal.&ted th1• cr,ypt;ogna, :lf' it 181' be 

d:l.anf.ftecl with •o high-aoUDCUng a nw, cut replied 1n 1smnar g1bber11h 

that he wuld meet Lincoln at tlle place and t:lm apecif:led. At th.1• 

meting on the atewr Bal.tillore wa diacuaed the plan ot a movemnt 

ap:l.nn Lee• a :lD'tftnOlmmlt• which w ..ae three weeks later, and vhich 

resulted 1n our &1'117 being npul.184 'VS.th the 1011 ot .aq th0\llllnd1 ot 11vea • 

.Another mpeclal t.anapoa1t1on ot t.hi• tne ,.. uaed in 1865 when 

L1Dcoln wa a'ta11ng at City Point au4 Mchllcad. Afte:r 6 A;pril the l'OUte 

tl"llmpoaiticm cipben wn no longer UINtd. tor P1'9•1dent1&1 dtapatehe1. 

ffe.4 they continue to be Wle4tor111l1tu7 cowmscat1on•'I Plm atatea 

that "Ro. 4 and ~ other ciphen wre 411CU'C1ed after 20 June 1865," 

but he ac:ie• cm to ~ tliit lfo. 5 was aent to .i>out 20 u.s. MU1tar.v 

'!elepapben, ao pna'Ullably 1-hat cipher book 97 have been Wied 'for a ehort 

time. Plm &dda tha-t the boakll Wft reta1ned b7 theae recipient• "until 

the7 11eJ'e d11Charge4 ":7 Tb9 ftUOD fol' thil abondment ot cipher ia not 

clear: 'the open.tor ay have felt that now tha't the var va1 belieTed 

practicall7 over--Lee aUl'enaend ~ 4IQ'8 late•--cipher ccwnmtcatiou ,.. lee• ~Z'Uift. In D3 eue, telepa1 wn Ant t.n pla1n. tezli the:reatter. 

Lic-nmtcat:lona 1eeur1t7 cU1e1pline becam ve17 Jax, nov that the var_. oveif. 
REF ID:A62848 

ror au important. ••aae 1ent b:y Lincoln on 3 April a spec1111 t;ype 

ot ciJber wu 111114, cloeeJ.y nlellbl:lng that to Bumlide. 'rbe reuon tor 

the unusual enc1phel'lllent waa a de•1ft '° ccnce&l the new fl'Cll cipher 

open.i;on vho might happen to Me 1t while nla11ng 1t to Vaahingtan. 

lfhe Nae n•orted to -.a •uzpr111Dgl.7 111Qle: the order ot the worda ,,.. merel7 l"eYeraect and DOl18tandUd •palling aclopted! ~text 1• aa 

tollova: 

CS.t7 Point, Va., 8:30 A.M., April 31 1865. 

!inker, Var Depu'tment: A. Lincoln 1ta 1n fme a in~ to atart 

I U1Q' tzeating there poa1:lble 1f' ot cut too toze&ld puahinl :I.• 

He 1• 10 all Richmond aunt ccmtide 11 ~ encuate4 Petenburg 

reports Gl'llDt momiDg th11 WUhingtm Sec1'e'ta17 Var. Beckvit.h 

' 
- _ _. 

I can hardly leave the subject of the cryptosystem used by the 

USMl'C without citing a couple of' messages which appear iD nearly every 

account I've seen of the codes and ciphers of' the Civil War. These 

are messages which were sent by President Lincoln under circumstances 

in which, allegedly, the usual cipher could not be or, at least was 

not, e~loyed. The first of the two was sent on 25 November 1862 from 

the White Hause to Major General Burnside, Falmonth, Virginia. The 

circumstances are so bizarre that if I merely presented the cipher 

message to you without some background I doubt if you would believe 

me. And after I've presented the background, I'm sure you won't know 

what to think - at least, I dcm.'t really know what to make of the incident. Let me quote frm an account of' it in the book by David Homer 

Bates 1 one of' the first members of the USMlt! 1 in his Lincoln in the 

Telegraph Oi"f'ice (D. Appleton-Century Co., New York, 19391 pp. 58-61); 

"During Burnside's Fredericksburg campaign at the end of 

1862, the War Department operators discovered indications of 

an interloper on the Wire leading to his headquarters at Al[uia 

Creek. These indications consisted of' an occasional irregular 

opening and closing of the circuit and once in a while strange 

s 1.gDals, evidently not made by uur own operators • It is proper 

to note that the characteristics of each Morse operator's sending 

are Just as prcm.ounced and as easily recognized as those of ordinary band.writing, so that when a message is transmitted over 

a wire, the identity of' the sender ms;y readily be lmown to any 

other operator within hearing who bas ever worked with him. A 

somewhat similar means of personal identification occurs every 

day in the use of' the telephone. 

"At the time refereed to, therefore, we were certain that 

our wire had been tapped. In some way or other the Confederate 

operator learned that we were aware of his presence, and he then 

informed us that he was frE>Dl lee's arDliY and had been on our wire 

for several days, and that, having learned all that he wanted to 

lmow, he was then about to cut- out and run. We gossiped with him 

for a while and then ceased to hear his signals and believed that 

he had gone. 
REF ID:A6284R 

CONFIDENTIAL 

"We had taken measures, however, to discover his whereabouts 

by sending ou.t linemen to patrol the line; but his tracks were 

well ccmcealed, and it was cmly after the intruder had left that 

we found the place where art wire had been tapped. He had made 

the secret connection by means of fine silk-covered magnet wire, 

in such a manner as to conceal the joint al.most entirely. Meantime, Burnside's cipher-operator was temporarily absent from his 

post, and we bad recourse to a crude plan f'or concealing the text 

of telegrams to the Arrq of the Potomac, which we had followed 

on other somewhat similar occasions when we believed the addressee 

or operator at the dimmt point (not provided with the cipher-key) 

was particularly keen and alert. This plan consisted primarily of' 

sending the message backward, the individual words being misspelled 

and otherwise garbled. We had practised on one or two despatches 

to Burnside before the Confederate operator was discovered to be 

on the wire, and were pleased to get his prompt answers, couched 

also 1D similar outlandish la.Dguage, which was, however, intelligible 

to us after a short Etudy of' the text in each case. Burnside and 

ourselves soon became quite expert in this home-me.de cipher game, 

as we all strove hard to clothe the despatches in strange, uncouth 

garb. 

"In order to deceive the Confederate operator, however 1 we 

sent to Burnside a number of' cipher messages, easy of' translation, 

am. which contained all sorts of' bogus information for the purpose 

ot misleading the enemy. Burnside or his operator at once surmised 

our purpose, and the general thereupon sent us in reply a lot of' 

balderdash also calculated to deceive the unUlitiated. 

"It was about this time that the following specially important 

.despatch tran Lincoln was filed for transmission: 

Executive Mansion, Washington, 

'November 25, 1862. 11:30 At4. 

MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE, Falmouth, Virginia: If' :r should be in 

boat off' Aquia Creed at dark to-morrow (Wednesday) evening, could 

you, without inconvenience, meet me and pass an hour or two with 

met A. Lincoln. 

"Although the Confederate operator had said good-byr.several 

days before, we were not sure he had actually left. We therefore 

put Lincoln's telegram in our home-made cipher, so that if .the 

foreign operator were still on our wire, the message might not be 

readily made out by tbe eneJQ". At the same time extra precautious 

were taken by the Washington authorities to guard against any 

accident to the President while on his visit to Burnside. No 

record is now found af the actual text of' this cipher-despatch, as 

finally prepared for transmission, but going back over it word for 

word, I believe the following is so nearly like it as to be called 

a true copy: 

~ 

CONFIDENTIAL ' 
~~~A62848 CO r-1uENTIAL 

Washington, D.C., November 25, 1862 

BURNSIDE, Falmouth, Virginia: Can Inn Ale me withe 2 oar our Ann 

pas Ann me flesh ends N. V. Corn Inn out with U cud Inn heaven day 

nest Wed roe Moore T01Dl. 'darkey bat Greek Why Hawk of Abbott Inn B 

chewed I if'. BATES. 

Tb.is sort of' subterfuge is hardly worthy of' becoming embalmed in 

the official records of' the war - and apparently it wasn't. But several 

years later, one of' identical nature did become so embalmed, for the 

message appears an Page 236, Vol. 45, of "Telegrams received 'bJ' the 

SecretBry of War": 

Hq. Armies of the U.S., City Point, Va., 

8:30 a.m., AFil 3, 1865 

TINKER, War Department: A Lincoln its in fume a iD hymn to start 

I army treating there possible if of cut too forward pushing is 

He is so all Richmond aunt conf'ide is Andy evacuated Petersburg 

reports Grant morning this Washington Secretary War. Bl!X:KWITH 

Both Plum and Bates cite the foregoing telegram and their ccaments 

are interesting if not very illuminating. Plum says merely: "By reading 

the abDV'e backward with regard to the phonetics rather than the orthography, the meaning will be appaeent". Bates says : 

"The probable reason for adopting this crude form was to 

insure its reaching its destination without attracting the special 

attention of watchful operators an the route of the City Po1DtWash1Dgtan wire, because at that crises every one was an the Qa! ~for news from Grant's advancing army, and if the message had 

been sent in plain language, the important information it conveyed 

might have been overheard 1D its transmission and perhaps would 

have reached the general public in advance of its receipt by the 

War Department. 
REF ID:A62848 

CONFIDENTIAL 

"It is not necessary to give the translation of this ciphermessage. To uee a. hanel.y term, 'Any one can read it with his eyes 

shut. ' In :fact, the ea.a iest way woul4 be for one to shut the 

eyes and let some one else read it backward, not too slowly. The 

raa.l wording then becanes plain. 

Can you imagine for one moment that a "cryptogram" of such simplicity could not be read at signt by any USMI'C operator, even without 

!mv:l.Dg someone read it to him backwa.rd'l Such a "cryptogram" is 

hard!¥ wm:tby of a. schoolboy's initial effort at preparing a secret 

message. But I assure you that I did not make this story up, nor 

compose the cryptogram. 

Rum1Dating upon what I have shown and tol4 you about the cryptosystems used by both sides in the Civil War do you get the feeling, as 

I do, that there was, even for those days, mu.ch room for imprOV"ement 

and that the cryptologic achievements of neither side can be said to 

add lustre to its\Ddoubtedl.¥ great acccmplishments on the battlefield'l 

Perhaps this is a good place to make an appraisal of the cryptologic 

efficiency of each side. 

First, it is fair to say that professional cryptologists of 1961 

can hard!¥ be impressed with the cryptosystems used by either side. 

In both the Union and the Confederate Armies, their respective Signal 

Corps at first transmitted by visual signals messages whole!¥ in plain 

language and such messages were often intercepted and read straight-away. 

Tb.en both sides began enciphering such messages, the~ Signal Corps of 

the Federa1 Ar1ISY usiDg a cipher disk invented by the Chief Signal 

Officer, the Signal Corps of the Confederate Army using the Vigen~re 

cipher. In both cases the use of cryptography for tactical messages 

was quite inept, although it seems that from time to time the Federal 

._;oNFID1£NTIAL 
REF ID:A62848 

CONFIDENTlj!\ L 

signalmen had better success with the Vigenere-enciphered """"' visual 

messages of the Confederate signalmen than the latter had with the 

disk-enciphered messages of the Union signa.lmen. 

With regard to the cryptosystem used by the Confederate Signal 

Corps, although there may initially have been cases in which monoalphabetic substitution alphabets were used, such alphabets were 

probably drawn up by agreement with the signal officers concerned, and 

changed from time to time. Nowhere have I come across a statement 

that the Myer disk or something simple and similar was used. In any 

event, messages transmitted by visual signals were read from time to 

time by Union signalmen, the record showing a number of' cases in which 

the latter "worked out the rebel signal code" - meaning, of cxrurse, that 

the substitution alphabet involved was solved. When did the Confederate 

Signal Corps begin using the Yige~re cipher? The answer seems to be 

quite clear. In a letter dated 6 June 1888 from General J. H. Alexander 

(brother of General E. P.) to J. Willard Brown* we find the following 

statements: 

"At the first inauguration of the Signal Service in the 

Confederacy, I, having received 1n the first place the primary 

instruct ion from my brother, Gen. E. P. A. 1 then a colonel cll1 

Beauregard's staff near the Stone Bridge at Manassas, was assigned 

the duty of preparing a confidential circular of iDStruction for 

the initiation of officers and men, in this branch. I did prepare it, in Richmond, in early spring, 1862, and surrendered the 

copy to Hon. James A. Seddon, the then Secretary of War at Richmond. It was issued 1n form of a small pamphlet. I had attached 

a table for can,pili.Dg cipher dis;patches - which was printed with 

the rest of the matter - and the whole was issued canfidentia 

to the officers newly apt>ointed for signal duty. ~ emphasis 

* Op. Cit. , p. 206 

~ 

CONPIDENTIA I,. S"~ 
REF ID:A62848 

CONFiDENTiAL 

I have italicized the last sentence because I think tbat the 

"table for compiling cipher dispatches" can refer only to tbe Vige~e 

square table, for that and only that sort of table is even mentioned 

in accounts of' the ciphers used by the Confederacy. One could, of 

course, wiflah that the writer had given some further details but there 

are none. However, the statement about the table is suf'f'iciently 

explicit to warrant the belief that _it was Gen. J. H. Alexander who 

officially introduced the Vigewe square into Confederate cryptography; although he may have obtained the idea fran his brother 1 since 

he stues that be "received in the first place the primary 1nstrUC"lion 

fraa my brother". 

In the Federal Signal Corps it is quite possible that the polyalphabetic methods Myer cites 1n his Manual for using his cipher disk 

(changing the setting With successive words of a message) were used 

1n same cases, because there are found 1n the record several instances· 

in which the Confederate Signalmen, successful with ~ monoalphabetic 

encipherments, were ccmpletely baffled. One is warranted 1n the belief' 

that it was not so much the complexities introduced by using a keyword 

to encipher successive words of the plain text as it was the lack of 

training and experience in cryptanalysis which hampered Confederate 

signalmen who tried to solve such messages. In World War I a German 

Army system of somewhat similar nature was regularly solved by Allled 

cryptanalysts, but it DDlst be remembered, in the first place, that by 

1914 the use of radio made it possible to intercept volumes of traffic 

entirely impossible to obtain before the advent of radiotelegraphy; 
REF ID:A62848 

CONFIDENTIAL 

and, iD the second place, would-be cryptanalysts of both sides iD 

the Civil War had nothing but native wit and intelligence to guide 

them in their work on intercepted messages, for there were, so far 

as the record goes, no t:mining courses iD cr;y:ptana1ysis on either 

side, though there were courses 1n cryptography and signal1.Dg. To 

cryptanal.ysts of 1961, a century later, native wit and intelligence 

nevertheless should have been sufficient to solve practically every 

message intercepted by either side, so simple and inefficient in 

usage do the cryptosystems employed by both sides appear today. 

No system employed by the Federals, either for tactical messages 

(Signal Corps transmissions) or strategic messages (USMTC tr~smissions) 

would long resist solution today, provided, of course, that a modicum 

of traffic were available for study. A1thougb. technically far less 

secure 1n actual practice than properly or even faultily enciphered 

Vigen~e messages, the route ciphers of' the USMTC seem to have eluded 

the efforts of inexpert Confederate cryptanal.ysts. Ex-USMTC operators 

make the statement that none of their messages was ever solved and 

that thecConfederates published intercepted messages iD Southern newspapers iD the hope that somebody would come forward with a solution; 

yet it must be remembered that those operators were Northerners who 

were very naturally interested 1n making the acHevements of the Union 

operators, both in cryptography and in cryptanalysis, appear more spectacular than they really were. And it is probable that they wrote without having made a real effort to ascertain whether the Confederate& 

did have any success. A "reaa. effort" would have been a rather imposing 

undertaking then - as it still is, I fear. Now it must be presamed 

~ 

CONFID~NTl,AL ~s 
. · fiiF ID: A62848 

eor-.-=-10Er~Ti~ L 

that if Confederate operators had succeeded in solving intercepted 

traffic of the USMIC they would have recorded the facts to their own 

credit. But in his seven volumes an the campaigns of Lee and his 

lieutenants, Douglas S. Freeman does not mention a s 1Dgle instance of 

interception and solution of telegraphic messages of the Union. Perhaps 

Freeman was seeking 10~ confirmation, which is too much to expect in 

a field of such great secrecy. This failure of the Confederate cryptanalysts is the more astonishing when we know that copies of the 

USMro cipher books were captured and tbat, therefore, they must have 

becane aware of the nature of the route ciphers used by the USMIC, 

unless there was a lack of appreciation of such captures and failed to 

forward the books to the proper authorities, who could band them over 

to their experts. In those books the USMI.'C route ciphers would have 

been seem in their naive simplicity, canplicated only by the use of 

code equivalents but sometimes hardly to the degeie where a message 

would be entirely unintelligible because of their presence. It seems 

to me tbat there can be only four possible explanations for this failure. 

Let us examine them in turn. 

First, it is possible tbat there was not enough intercept traffic 

to permit solution. But this is inadequate as an expl.e.nation. The 

route cipher is of such simplicity that "depth" is hardly an absolute 

requirement - a single message can be solved, and its intelligibility 

will be determined to a large degree by the nwnber of "arbitraries" it 

contains. Where there are many, only the dim outlines of wbat is being 

conveyed by the message may become visible; where there are few or even 

none, the meaning of the messages~becomes fairly evident. But the 

CONFldifNTIAL 

S°"b 
• 

abundant records, although they ccmtain many references to intercepts, 

fail to disclose even cme instance of solution of a USM1'C message. 

Thus we are forced to conclude that it was not the lack of intercept 

traffic which accounts for lack of success by the Confederates with 

USMl'C messages, but some other factor. 

Seccmd, the lack of training, experience, and patience cm the 

part of Confederate cryptanalysts might have been at the root of 

their failure to solve the messages. This sounds plausible until we 

look into the matter with a critical spirit. 'lbe degree of intelligence possessed by Confederate officers and men was certainly as high 

as that of their Union counterparts who were up against a technically 

far superior cryptosystem, the Vige~e, than that under~ing the route 

ciphers used by the USM'IC. We may safely cooclwie that it was not l.alik 

of intelligence that prevented them fran solving messages Aenciphered 

by the U8MI'C route ciphers. 

Third, it is possible that Ccmfederate high commanders were not 

interestediin communications-intelligence operations or in gathering 

the fruits of such operations. Such an explanation seems on its face, 

fatuous and wholely unacceptable. We mow~ of the high estimate of 

value minor commanders placed upon the interception and solution of 

tactical messages transmitted by visual signaling; but an appreciation 

of the extraordinary advantages of knowing the contents of' enemy com-

- munications on the strategic level may have been lacking. My colleague 

Mr. Fishel thinks that "intelligence ccm.sciousness" and "intelligence 

sqmistication" were of a very low order in the Union Army, and of a 
REF ID:A62848 

) CONFIDENTIAL 

markedly lower order in the Confederate Army. But to us, in 1961, to 

disregard the advantages of' a possible reading of strategic messages 

seems almost incredible and I am inclined to discount this sort of' 

explanation. 

Fourth, it is possible that Confederate cryptanalysts were far 

more successful in their efforts to solve USMro transmissions than 

present publicly-available records indicate; that Confederate commanders abta1Ded great advantages f'ran their cammmications-1Dtelligence 

operations; that they :t'ul.ly recognized the supreme necessity of keeping 

this fact and these adsantages secret; and that the Confederate States 

Government adopted and enforced strict camnunications-intelligence 

security regulations, so that the truth concernillg these matters has 

not yet emerged. Let it be noted in this connection that very little 

information can be found in the public danain today about Allied 

cryptanalytic successes during World War I; and were it not for the 

very intensive and extensive invedit.gations in the matter of the Japanese atVac:k on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, very little, if' any, 

in:f'ormation would be known to the public about British and American 

successes in cammmicationa-intelligence during World War II. Immediately f ollowi.ng the capture of' Richmond and bef'ore Canf'ederate records 

could be removed to a safe place, a great fire broke out and practically 

all those records were destroyed. It is possible that this is the 

reason why the records of their communications-intelligence successes 

have never come to light and that Confederate cryptanalysts kept their 

secrets to themselves'l We know that the :i: ;ecords possessed or taken by 
.. REF ID:A62848 

CONFIDENTIJA L 

certain Confederate leaders have been gone over with great care and 

attention, but what happened to those retained by other Confederate 

leaders such as the Secretary of War Seddon, or his predecessor 

Judah P. Benjamin who later became Secretary of State, etc, etc? 

Here is a fascinating speculation and one which might well repay 

caref'ul., painstakiUg research. I shall leave the delving into this 

speculation to some of you younger aspiring professional cryptanalysts 

who may be interested in undertaking such a piece of research and 

with this thought I briDg this lecture to its close. 

~ 

CONi"ICENTIA1ZE 
.. - coNF'~w~Y\h­ ~ ha.-1-

I ce.n hardly leave tb.e subject ot the c~yptosystem used. b;y ·the 

OSI·ID:: without cit112g a c;ouple of messages wbtch appear 1D nearl_y eveey 

account I've seen ot the codes and ciphers ot the Civil War. 'lheee 

are measages which were sent by President Lincoln under cirewutancea 

1D which, alle~dJ¥1 the usual cipher could not be or, at least was 

not, eal'loyed. The t1rst ct tbe two was sent on 25 November l.862 tr an 

the White House to MaJor General Burnside, Falmonth, V1rg1D1a. The 

circumstances are so bizarre that 1f I merely presented the cipher 

message to you without aome baekgrOUDd I doubt if you would believe 

me. And after I've preaente4 the background, I'm sure yau wcm't know 

Wbat to tbink - at least, I dm't r~ know v.h8t to Eke ot the 1Dc1-

deut. Let me quote f'rcm &D account ot it 1D the book by David Haner 

Dates, .one of tbe first members ot the USMTC, in his Lincoln in the 

Teles;raph Office (D. Appl.etm-Centuey Co., New York, 1939, pp. 58-61): 

"During Burnside' a Fredericksburg cam.paigll at the em ot 

1862, the War Department operators discovered 1Qdicatit11s of 

aQ interloper m the v1re leading to ht.a headquarter• at Acuia 

Creek. Tbeae indications cau1sted ot aa occasional irregular 

o,peniDg and closing of the circuit and cnce 1D a wbile strange 

• tpals,. evideJltly net Ila.de :t>:v mr mm operators. It ta proper 

to Dot.$ t.bat the cbar&cterieties ot each Morae operator's aext411Jg 

are Just as prc:mounced and as eas~ recoe;nized as those of ordi.nary baDdwr1tUlg1 so tbat vben a mesaage 1s trL\DSaitted over 

a wire, the identity of the sender my rea41~ be lm0WZ1 to any 

other operator Vi.thin heari.Dg who bas ever worked with him. A 

sanewhat sillilar means ot pereaaal identification occurs every 

day in tbe use ot the telepllcne. 

"At tbe time refereed to, tberefore, we were certain tbat 

our wire bad been tapped. . In acne way or other tbe CCDtederate 

operator learned that ve were aware of bis presence, aDd he.tb.eu 

ioformed us that be was trcm tee•s army and bad been an our wire 

tat' several d&Jll, and that, having learned all tbat he vented to 

lmov, he was tben about to cut out and nm. We. gossiped with bill 

tor a wbile and tbeD ceased to hee.r hie s igMl.s and believed tbat 

he be.d gone. · 
"We had takeD measures, however, to 41sccwer his wberea'bouta 

by sendillg out l1DelleD to patrol the l1Be; but his tracks were 

veil cmcealed, 8114 it vaa CDli1' a.tter tbe tntruder ba4 left that 

we found tbe place 'Where ~ wire bad been tapped. He bad ud.e 

the secret cc:anect1ca by means of fine a11k--c~e:re4 -.guet v1re, 

1D auch a 'lJ!aDDAr as to ccmceal tbe joiQt almost entirely. Mean• 

time, BQrnside•s cipher-operator was teapo.rari~ abaeat traa his 

post, and ve had reowrse to a crude plaD for coaceiUiDg tbe text 

of telegren to the Amy of tbe P~taaac, which we bad foUOwed 

oo other eaaevbat similar oco&aiOQB 1ltleA we believed tbe a44ruaee 

or operator at the dittant point (XU>t provided v1tb the cipher-key) 

was particular~ keen end eJ,ert. Thi• plaD oon.aiated primar1J.¥ of 

se:nd'1Dg tho message backward, the 1Dd1v14ual ward.a be1Dg misspelled 

a.Dd otbenriae garbled. We ba4 practised on me ar two deepatcbea 

to Burnside before tbe CODf'ea..rate operator 'Wa8 d1soovered to be 

on the wire, emd were pleased to pt bis praa;pt anavers, coucbe4 

also 1n oimilar wtlan41sh J.aaguage, vbtch was, however., intelligible 

to us after a abort &ud¥ or the text 1D eacb case. DuniS14e ad 

ou.raelves soeQ becaae quite expert 1D this b<lllt-made cipher ga1119, 

a• we all strove bard to cl.otbe the 4e.epatcbes in strange 1 un.cwth 

garb. 

"In order to deceive the Cc:ratederate operator, hoVever, ve 

sent to Burnside a nuaber ot a:lpber meaeaosa, eaay of trauslaticm, 

aDl1 wb.icb cCDtaiDed all sorta ot bogua 1nf'Ol'llat1m tar tbe purpcee 

of mielead1Dg the ~111¥· Burnside or hie. •rator at. CJIQe aurat.eed 

our purpose, and the general tbereupon sent us 1D repl¥ a lot ot 

balderdash also calculated to deceive the UUUl1t1ated. 

· 1'It ws abwt tbia time that tbe tollov1Dg apec~ 1-POl"tlmt 

, 4espatch frc.a LiDcolD was filed tor transm1sa1cau · 

Executive Mauim, Washingtc:G, 

November 25, 1862. 11:30 All. 

MAJOR4(Jm~ERAL BUrulSIDB, Falmouth, Virginia: l:r' l shculd be 1n 

boat ott Aquia Creed at dark to-GO?Tow (WedMeky) even1Dg, could 

you, Withwt 1neoaYeDienee1 meet me and pus ao hour m: tvo with 

111tT A. Lmcoln. 

"Althoggh the Conteder&te operator ba4 eaid good-by aeveral 

daya before, we were not sure be had actually left. We tt.retcre 

put LiDcolD's telegram 1D wr bale•mde cipher, ao tbat 1t the 

foreign· operator were still CD our Wire, tbe lllU&ago lll18bt not be 

read1]¥ ll84e out b7 tho ellea\Y• At the 881111 tille extra precauticas 

were takma by the Wubillgtco autboritiCJS to gUard ap1Ut aay 

'®14at to tbe President While CXl b1s visit to Burnaide. lo 

record ia acrv tound of the actual text of tbia cipher-cleapatch, as 

fillally ~ tor transata•1c:n, but going back aver it word tor 

word, I believe the follcwiQg is $0 nearq like it u to be called 

a tt'Ue copy: ~ . 

. ~.' .o·~.., ri~th ;~~r:.21 ~~Tt A_ L . "-" n , ~, ~ ., ?::.._.G' ~ ~ -""@ ~ 

~o 
• .. ' . 

0 

REF ID :A62B4·B 

cONFiOENT&AL 

W~h1.ngta1, D .c. 1 Noveli'ber 25; l862 

BURNSIDE, Falmouth, Virginia: Can Ina Ale me witbe 2 oar our .Aun' 

pas Alm me flesh ends N. V. Corn Iml out with U cud IDil heaven day 

nest Wed. roe Moore T~Ldarltey bat Greek Why He.wk ot Abbott I2m B 

chewed I 1f. BATES • 

. Th1s-.scrt Of subterfuge .is hardly worthy ot beccai.Ds embalmed 1D 

the official records ot the Ya1" - and apparently 1t wasn't. But aevf!ral 

years iater 1 one of identical nature did beeane ~o embalmed, fOJ." tbe 

message appears i:o Page 236, Vol. 45,, of "Telegrams recei~ 'by the 

aeCretBrY o:r War 11 : 

Hq. Armies of the U.S., C1ty Point, Va., 

8;-30 a.m., •u 3, 1865 · 

TmKER, War Department: A t1Dcoln its 1n fume a. 1D hymi:i to start 

I army treating there possible it of cut too torward pushing ts 

He is so all Richmmd aunt confide is Andy evacuated PeterablU"g 

reppna Grant mom.ing this Washingtco Secretary War. BF.CKWl'IH 

Both Plum and Bates cite the foregoing telegram and tbeir c~nts 

are interesting if uot very 1ll1mainat1Dg. Plum says merely: 0 By read!Dg 

. . 

tbe above backward With regard to the phcmet1ca rather than the ortbo-

. - - -- grapby, the meaning wiJ:l._~ anuent". Bates ee.ya: 

"Tbe probable reuoa. tor adopting this crude fora was to 

1Dsure ·1ta reacb:ing its destination without attracting the special 

attent1~ of watchful operators cm the rau.te of the City Point• 

Washingtcn wire, because at that crises eveey cae was en the ~ · 

!!'!!?. tor news trca Grant'e adva.D.ciDg e.rm,y, and 1t the message had 

been sent 1D plain lmlguage, the illlportaDt 1ntormat1ao it cco.veyed 

might have been overheard 1D its tr8128111ssicm and perhaps would. 

have reached tbe general public: 1D advance of its receipt by the 

War Department. 

• 

:~ 
"It a not necessary to give the 'translatioo ot this cipher• 

message. To uee a haaely term, 'Any one can resd it with hiQ eyes 

shut.' In f'act, the easieet vay would be for one to shut the 

.eyes 8lld let acme one else read it backward, not too slov.cy. '1be 

r8al word:l.Dg then becomes plain• 

Can you 1mag1De tor ~ manent that a ''cryptogram" of such simpl1-, ' . . . . 

city coul.4 not be read at sisb.t by any USMrC operator, even Without 

having scmeoue read ·it to him ·'baekwardt Such a "ceyptograa'" is 

bardl,y wrthy ot a schoolboy's initial effort e.t preparing a secret 

-.esssge. But I assure you that I did. not make 'this story up, nor 

ccmpoae the cryptogram. 

Rwl1Dat1Dg up(ll what l have shown and told yw about the cryptosystems used by both s·ides 1D the Civil War do you get the teeliJlg, as 

I do, that· there was, even for tbose days, DJ.Cb. roca tor ill,provement 

and tbat the cryptologic achievements ot neither side can be sat4 to 

add lustre to itsl.lldoubtedly great accmpliabments en the battletieldf 

Perhaps this 1• a good· place to lllake sn appraisal of the cryptologic 

eft1ctenc1 of'._eacb side. 

First, it is tair to &QY that prot~asional cryptologists of 1961 ( . . . 

can bardlY be i.nqlressed with the ceyptcsystems used by either.· aide. 

IA both the Union and the Ccnf.Serate Armiea, tbeir J."e&pectiv'e SigDal 

Corpa at tint transaitted by visual signals messages wllole~ ill plain 

language and auab meseagee were e>:ften intercepted 8Dd read straight-away. 

1ben both aides began encipberiDg such messages, tbe .: Sigbal Corps ot 

tbe federal Anq usSDg a cipher disk illveated b7 the .Chtet SigD8l 

Officer, the S1&Dal Corps ot the. Ccmtederate Army UiS~ the· Vtge~re 

cipb.er~ In bctb cues the use of cryptography far taet1cal messages 

was quite inept, although it seema that trca time to tille the Federal· 

~o~~;~i;;:~i~NTIAL 

~v 
sigDalaeD had better euccesa with the Vige~re-encipb.ered v18ual 

ineasagee of the Ccmtederate sigbalmen than the latter bad with the 

disk-enciphered messages-·of the un1cn sigDal.Mn. 

With regard to the cryptosystem- used by the Confederate SigDal 

Corps, altbausb there 1118.¥ init~ have been caaee -11'.1 wbich mmo• 

alphabetio subst1tut1ai alphabets ware used, such alphabets were 

probabq dra'WD up by agreement vitll. the sigDal. officers cmcened, and -

changed fran time to time. Nowhere ~ve I came e.croaa a statement 

that the Myer disk ar saaetbiJJg simple and similar was used. Ia-any 

event, meaaagea traDQ1tted b7 visual s1gn&ls were read trcm time to 

time by Un10D etgnalmen, the record shcnring a number _or aaaco ill which 

tlle latter "worked out the rebel signal code" .. meanil:lg, of CDUrSe 1 that 

the eubatituticn alphabet involved vas solved •. When did tb.e Ccmtederate 

S1gllal. Corps begin usi!Jg the Y~~ c3,pberT The answer seems to be 

quite clear. In e letter -dated 6 Ju.De 1888 ·from General J. H. Alexander 

(brother · ot General E. P.) to J. Willard Brown* we tiDd the follow:iJIS 

statements: 

"At the first illauguratiOD of tbe SigDal B<U'Vice 1D the 

Ccnfederacy, I, haviDg reeeived 1il the first place the pri.mllry 

instruction trcm ~ brother, Oen. E. P. A., then a colcnel 6n 

Beauregard• s staff near the Stcme Bridge at Manassas, was asa iglled 

tile duty of prepar1ng a ccmf'idential circular of -1Dstruct1aa for 

the 1Dit1ation of ottioers aJld men, 1D this branch. I did prepare it, 1D ntcbamci_, 1n ear~- epr1Dg, 1862, and surrendered the 

copy to Ben. JlllleS A. Seddon, the then Secretary ot War at Rich• 

mend. It wu issued 1D form of a small pamphlet. I had attached 

!-.table tor cazm111D6 cip!ler dispatches - vhich was pr1Dted with 

the rest ot the •tter - 8Dd the whole vu ieaued cODfidat 

to the officers DeVb &PJ?Ointed tor sif31!!!l: dutz. !i\}r emphasis 

* Op. Cit. , p. al6 

~/ 

co~F~~e-NT•P. L 

' \ .3> . 
I baYe 1talic1ze4 the last sentence because I thiDk that the . 

"table for canpiUDg cipher diape.tcbes" can reter ~to tbe Vigene're 

square table, for that and .~ that· s~ of table is even meuticmed 

1D accounts of the ciphers used b1' the Contederacy. ~ cou.14, ot 

course; v:i.ab tbat the writer bad given sane fUrtber d~ils but there 

are naae. However, tbe•statement about the table is sufficient]¥ 

explicit to warrant the belief that it vu Gen. J. H. Alexander vho 

ott1c1a~ introduced 1;he vs.senere equare :l.Dto CODf'ederate cryptograp~J although he my have obtained the idea frm bis brother, since 

be atuea tbat he "received in the tirst place the prtma.ey 1llstruc\10D 

traa .rq brother". 

ID the Federal 31goal Corps it is quite possible that the polyalphabetio methodS Mier Qitea ul bia Manual. for usms hia. cipher disk 

(~hal!giDg tbe setting With successive words ot a message) were used 

1D ac:ae cases, because there a.re tounc1 1n the record se-teral Uetances 

iD wbicb the Confederate S1QnE>lmen, succ:esstul. with ~·llDDoalpbabetic 

encipber11er1ta, were c~teq baffled. Ckae is warrante4 ia. the belief 

that it vu not so aich the c~lelt1ties iDtroduced by using a keyword 

to encipher successive words of the plaiO text a~ it was the lack of 

trailltng aD4 experience :l.D cryp~io wb.iOh heapered Ccmf'ederate 

s1gaal.llen w?lo tried to solve such -.esaagea. ID World War I a Ge1"ll8D 

. AISI eyatea of scaeVbat similar nature vu regular]¥ solved by Alli.ed 

c~sts, but it must be res.mered, in the firat place, that by 

1914 tbe use ot radio made 1t possible to intercept vol.unN ot traffic 

entirel.1' 1111poss1ble to obtain before the adverit of radiotelegraphy; 
REF ID:A62848 

CONFEOE~·'T.~A. L 

and, 1D the aecaad place, would-be c~ts ot b¢h sides 1D 

the Civil War bad Doth1Dg but native wit aad tntelligeme to guide 

tbul ill their work en intercepted me•sage;, tcsr there were, so tar 

as tbe record goes, DO t.aainillg courses in cryptanalpis on either 

' . ~1de, thoush there were coura~a iD cryptography and s1gDal.mg. To 

crn>tanaly&ts ct l.961, a etmtur;v later, native Vit aDd intellJ.gence 

nevertheless sbOuld. bave been autf1c1ent to solve practica1J¥ every 

me.sage intercepted by either aide, ao simpl~ aod metticient iD 

usage do the cryptcs)'$tems employed by both sides appear .today. 

No system em.Ployed by the Federal&; either for tactical messages 

(Stgrial. Corps transmtsaiaia) .or strategic messages (um.tre transmiss10DS) 

waild loag resist solutim toda7, provided, of emrse, tbat a modicum 

of traffic were available t"or stl1d7. Although teobD1cal.J¥ tar less 

secure 1n actual practice thaD properly or even faultily enciphered 

Vtgenel:-8 ••sages, tbe ~cute c1pbere of the USMro seem to have· eluded 

the efforts of tneltpert Confederate ceyptenaly&ts. Ex•USH!'C · operators 

make the statement that mme ot their meesagea was ever oolved and 

that .the _CCDfederatea published intercepted mesaages . in Soutbern DeQ• . ' . . 

paper• 111 the hope tbat sc:cebody voul4 ecae forward with a solution; 

yet 1t llD&t be "remembered that th.ose o.pera.tors were tfartberuera who 

vere very natural.4r interested iD making the acbeve1ents of the UA1m 

· operators, both iD ccyptagrapby aAli 1n eeyptana]¥e ie, appear eore spec ... 

tacular tbaD tbe1 rea.14r were. And it 1a probable. that they wrote without having made a. reel. effort to ascertaUi vbether the C~eder~~ 

414 bave &D1' auecesa. A "rea:l effort" Y0'1ld bave been a rather 1mposiag " ' 

uadert&ki.Dg then .. ae it ~till zear. Now it ~t be presaEd 

·~ONF'~DENTIAL )')-
I . 

tbat if Conf'~te operators bad succeeded . in solvins. intercepted 

· trattic o:f the.~ they would have recOrded the facts to tbair ovn 

credit. But 1D his seven volumes m tbe campa.1.gu of lee an4 his 

11eutenants,Douglas s .. Freell8.D does uot mention a single 1.Data.nce of 

1ntercept1m .and soluticn of tel.egi.aphie messages of tbe UDicn. Perhaps 

Freeman ¥88 seeking 100'/.> confirmation, which is ·too mw:h to expect 1D 

a field of such great secrecy. Tbis failure ot tbe Canfederate cryptana~ta is the more astmishtog when we know ·that capies ot the 

USM.re cipher 'booka were captured aD4 tbat, tberetore, they 1a1St bave 

beccae aware.of' the.nature of the route cipbera uee4 by the USMIC, 

unless there was a lack of appreciation of such captures aD4 tailed to 

forward the books to the proper authorities, who could bBDd. tbea over· 

to their experts. Ia thoee books the USMrC route ciphers would have 

been aeea 1D their. D&ive sillpltcity, ccilpl1cated (mly by the use of 

code equivalents mt ecmetiDlea hardl.1' to the degn where a message 

would be entire~ wi111tellts1b1e because of their pres~. It ~ 

to me that there can be ~·tour poasible axplaDat1CJDS tor this failure. 

Let us examine tl'lell 1D turn. 

First, it is poesible that there was not enough 1Atercept traffic 

to permit soluticn. · But this· is i,Gadequate as an explanation. Tbe 

route cipber 18 of au.ch siapltcity that "depthf' is ~ au absolute 

requ1T8EDt •a sillg].e meaaage can be solved, end its 1Dtelligibilit7 

· will be determtned to a large degree by the number of "arbitraries" 1~ 

cmtains. · \'here there are J1aD¥ / m]¥ the dia oatliD.es of vbat is being 

cmveyed by the me1eege may bee~ visibleJ vbere thei"e are tew or even 

D<ae, the 11eaDiD8 of the messages bec<*es fair~ evident. .But the 

·CONF'~OB'ITIAL ')'(p 
' ·, REF ID:A62B48 

bON~~iDEJr~~t~iAL 

abundant recor4a, although they caitain mmy references to tntercepts, 

rail to disclose even one illstance of ee>luttcc ot a USMre message. 

'J.bus ¥e are farced to CCIDOlude tbat it waa not the lack ot 1JlterCept . 

tr&f'tic · wb.ich ·accounts for lack or success by tbe CClllfederates vitb 

USMre message&, but acae Qther 1'actor .. 

Second, the lack of training, experieiice,· and patience on tbe 

part of Cmtederate c:rn>taal¥8ts migbt have been at tb.e root ot 

their failure to solve tbe messages.. Thia eounds plausible until we 

look into tbe atter With a critical spirit. '!be degree of 1Dtell1• . ' 

guce poase8ae4 by Canfederate otticera and aDeD was certa~ as high 

as that of "Weir th.lien cpunterparta Who were up agaiut a tecbnicall.7 

1· 

tar l!up&r1or crntoeystea, the Vigenere, tb&D tbat uraiterlyiDg the route 

ci]jlllera used by the USMro. We 11!Q' sate}3 conclude that it was net lack. 

ot inteUigeDce tbat prevented tbell traa solving messages j.encipbered 

by the USMl'C route cipbers. 

Third., it is p0$s1bl.e that COQtederate bigh c,._ndera were aot 

interested · .1D CClllllUDicat1cma-1DtelligeQCe ·operations or in gatber!Dg 

the fruits of ~uch .operatioa.s. Such an explqation seelas CD its tace~ 

tatu°'1a Bild wholely unacceptable. We know~ ot the b1gli eatiaate ot 

value 111.nor ccemMera place4 upon the 1Dtercept1m and solution Of 

tactical 111tasages traDSmitted b~ visual sigual:J.Dg; 'but an appreciatim 

ot the extraordinary advaotagee of katnr1ng tb8 contents ot en- caa• 

l.IWlications on the atrategic level ay have 'beeD· lacking. 1\1 colleague 

Mr. Fishel tb113ks tbat "illtelligeDee CCDSC:lousneaa" am nintelligence 

sophistication" were ot a veq low order 1D tbe tJnica i.rrq, and of a 

' ,. . 

' ,,;w-

·'.,,_O· NFlOENTtAL . ~ . - . . ' ,· ~1 ' 

/ (. 
L 

. REF ID :A62848. 

·coNFIOEf,tfl.lAL. 

markedly lover order iD the Ccmtederate Ar111 •. But .to us, in l~l, to 

disregard the advaotages of a poasible reading·of strategic measages 

seems almost .incredible and I ara inclined to d~acount thil!I sert of 

explallat1on. · 

Fourth, it is possible that COllfed.ere.te cryp~sts were far · 

more auec:oss~ 1D their efforts to solve USM!"C tre.nslliss1ons tb&D ,·_,, 

present public1J-available recorda indicate; that Confederate canmanders a'btained great advaDte.geo fr.an the1r cc:mmmicatiC:as•illtelligence 

operaticos; . that they f'ul:cy recognized .the supreme -necessity of keepiDg 

this tact Q4 thes_e ad11antagee secret; and that the Confederate States 

Goverlllllellt adopted ud enforced strict c·OlmlDic::aticns-intellige11ce 

aecurityregulatic:as; eo that the truth ccmcern~ these mttera W.S 

not yet emerged. I.et it be Doted in this camecticn that very little 

inf'armtioa can be tound in the public dc.ain tpday about Allied 

cryptualytiQ suaeesses during World 'War I; and were it not tor tbe 

wry intenaive &14.extenstve UweJtl.gati~ in the aa.tter ot the Japanese attrack mPearl Harbor ca 7 I>ecember 194~, Vtrey l~ttle, it.any, 

inf'orU.ticm .would be known to the public abmt British and American . 

succesae1 :t.rl c~1catiala•intell1gence 4uril:\S World War II. · Imediate:cy toliowuig the capture of Richmond and before Confederate records 

coW.d be rellOW'ed. to 8 Ate place, . 8 great fire broke out am pra.ctic~ 

all those·recorda were destroyed. It is possible that tl'lis is tbe 

reasOD vhf 'the reco1'da of their c~icaticms;..intelligenee 8UCCUSe8 . . 

have aever cme to light and tbat·Cc:mteclerate cryptaaalysts kept their 

·secrets to the'lllSelveaT We lmov that the : records posse.ind or taken by 

~­

r--oN.~"~ OE.NTI AL 

' . . ·. . . ~~ 
: .. 

·REF ID :A62848 

.. CONFI . -~ .. 

. certa.in Confederate leaders have been gone over with. great ca.re and 

·attention, but what happened to those retained by other Confederate 

leaders such as ~he Secretary of· War Seddon, or. his predecessor . , ' 

JWi.m.h P. Benjamin·wholater b~eame Secretary of' State, etc, etc'l 

. ~ . . 

_Here is a tascinat~ .~peculation and cme w~icb might well repay 

careful, painatak~ research. · I shall leave the delving into this . . . . . . ' 

. speculatian to .s~ 6r you. yOUDger aspiring professional cryptaualyste 

who may be interested in_ undertaking such a piece ·of research and 

with th18 thought I bring this lecture to its close. 

·~ 

coNFiOENTl.AL 

'>-( -
' ..... ,.,...· .. ~ ... -· ~ 

REF ID:A62848 

beticity. I came across tliat message iD e. work-book in my collection, 

the.work-book of one· of the iml>ortant mem~rs of the USMrC --.none 

other than our. friend .. Pluip, from whose book, The Military Tel.egraph • • • • p 

duriDg the Civil War, comes much of the d8.ta. I've presented 1n this 

· · lecture. On. the fly· leaf of Plum's work-booJ:t there appears 1 presumably 

. ·~ . . .· 

in his own handwriting, the legeDf "W. R .• Plum Chf Opr with Gen. G. H. 

li.ere's one of the messages he enciphered iD cipher book No. l,. 

the book 1n wbicb, he ~Y\1, more important telegrams were sent than 1n 

any other: 

Fig 1l 

Note bow many "e.rbitr~ies II appear 1n the plail:L·text message.. tbat is 

before transposition.:· After ~ransposition. 

·, •· 

· .... / ·-
REF.· ID :A.62848 

. . . 

book of one o-r the ~rtant members or the ml·li'C - none other tho.n. o\ll" b:'iend 

Pl'Ul!l, from. '41Qse bo(Jk; '1be !·lilitary Telegraph during the Civil War, come$ much 

ot th& data I've. presented in thio lecture.. ()1 the ~~leaf of Plum's wrk-book 

th.ere appears, preouinab:b° 1n bis 0\11'l ~t1ng, tM legend uy. R. Plum Chf' ~. 

with Gen~ a. n. Thoniasn.. Here's one of the messages he enc1ph,ered ·in cit>her book 

No~ l, the bOOk in ~ch, he SEcy'B, ~ ~~t telegremc ~l."'e ~t than 1n m:iy 

other: 

Fig ll 

llote hov many "arbitra..~eorr ~o.r :ln the· pla.1n•te:ct mes~, that. is before . 

trmisposition. ~r t~sition the ~lenge ot pla.1n•text,. code wrds,; 1l¥li• 

inscrutable as :tt$ usero ~tly ti..~t? It :la to~ ronem.'bered, of' .colirsa, 

that messeges were t~ trans.m1.tted. bl~ telegrapW, not by radio, so-~~ 

eJlell\V ?IJ!S~a ooulA be !)bte.ined on.1.f by "t&l>P~ tele~ ~a or capturillg 

'; 

l 

. couriers or he~uartere with the:Lr files intact. Opportunities tor these methOdo 

of a.¢qu.1.r.lng ~ tratf'ic \ere not f'.requeD.'l;, but they 414 occur trolU timo to 

time, end 1n one cace e. Cont"ederate . s~:J.1.mN1 hid in a :~ f'or severai weeks and 

tap;pec1 .a .Fedenil. ~graph _lille, obte.1ning a good many measa@=s. Wha.t. success, 

if aey, did Confederate ·Cl7Ptena:cy'Sts ~ve 1n tlleU' atten¢s to solve wch.:": · 

m.nic c~ogrm!!.S as they did intercept? We ShaU tey to w:uiwer this question 1n 

ctue time. 

As indicated earlier, ~ ~re no caqpet~ sJ.snaJ,. organizations in the 

Conf'e~ra.cy as there -were on the Ulion &:$ide. Theioe -was nothins at· the center of 

gove~t in Ri~ ~in the com.bat. zone c:onq".ia.rab~ .to the extensive t:nd 

tight:J.y-contro1.led c1 v11io.u mili tc.ry telegro._ph or~zation Wich Secretcry 

sta.uton ~ vlth G\1Ch an iron lla,ud from ~hi:l)gton. Alm:>st a.s c; concomitmlt . 

it would oeem, thel."e llaS. in the~' save for tw exceptional ce.seo,. omt 

and only on.e ottic~ established cryptosysteti to cone the need for protecting 

tactical at 'Well as strategic eonrmmications, and tba.t ws. the so-called, Vige~re 

*iii search.ins tor a good example ey eye caught tbb wrds "Ltncoln shot" at the left 

of' the matrix e.ncl I ilmnediate,Q' thought that the mes~ hs.d to do With Booth' a 

o.saaesination of the Presi(lent. M after b.urrie~ tnmnlatimg the mesaa.ge and 

tind:lng nothing in it ho.v:tng anything to dQ with the shootins it occurred to me to . look up the ·indicators tor a matrix of' six row mid esght columns. They turned out 

to be Lmcom (nessage of 8 colUn?nG), SRO? '· ( 6 row) • '.the . word BUA.LL beneath the . . 

"Lincoln shot" is a variapt for S.KOT, elso meaning n6 rows11 • . . 

24 

I 

I 

. ! 
REF ID:A62848 

Ci!Jher~ \lhich. ~tl.y ~the oipher authorized in an otticinl rna.nual. prepared 

by Ct@t J. H. A,lexaDder as the partial. equivalent of ?Ver'o !·fe.tru81 of s1e;m.;s. 

You won •t find -'c;he ~ Vigene're in any of the v.ritil'lgG of c~ sigmU 

o'ff'icera of either tlie ITorth or- tlm GoUth~ 'lhe s:lgna.'lmen of those ~ called 1 

it the "Court Cipher", tbis term referr:i.ns to the system. in common use tor 4iplo- -

ma.tic f'l:" ''court" BOC?'et comm.unications a'bout tbia periocl in bisto.ry. It is the.t 

_.l 

ci:Pb,er uhich employe .the so-called Vi~~Squa.re vi.the repeating key.* Here 

is the square which Plum calls the "Confederate States Cipher Key" and which is 

followed by his description of its manner of employment: 

Fig 12 

. To put into cipher the first message, which is put up by using 'kanchester Bluff" as the key, and the second by the key term, "Complete Victoey", 

find at the left-!uind side of the table the first letter of the first word 

to be ciphered, and columns iD which these letters are so found, will be 

seen the arbitrary letter with each successive letter of the message and 

key term, repeatillg an the J.atter. till :finished. Thus, "Sherman is victor1:ous," 

put iD cipher by using the first key, would read~ as shown by the- capitals, 

c-o-m-p-1-e-t--ev--i-c-t•o-r-y. c-o-m-p- Of course' any change in the key 

UVQGXEG MN DKVBFP KCGH 

word, term or phrase changes the arbitraries, and if neither the real message 

nor the key 1s· known, it would be aane~~t vexatious working it out, unless 

there were some such suggestive words as occilr 1n Davis's message abcive, 

which indicate the ciphered words very clearly; e.g., _ "By which you may effect" o tpqgexyk "above that part" bJ opg kwmct 

a crossing of the river 

This meaning occurred to the author, a.t first sight, and doubtless would be 

to any one. familiar with military affairs in that section. · Havirig guessed 

real words, it is very easy to work 'out the letters· of the key. '!be following 

two important ciphers were transmitted as divided below; i.e., each word was 

sent separately, not all mixed, as 1D the Pemberton ~ipher. This division 

does not facilitate translation .by the key at all, but materialJ.¥ assists 

without it, and was, therefore, bad practice. We give. below, each message, 

with its translation,, because these telegrams were very important. The curious 

.reader may, at his leisure, by using the key board; study out the key terms,. 

one of which will be found entirely new and quite apropos, 1D the light of 

what speedily followed •. 

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA,, Mn.ITARY TELEGRAPH, Dated Head· . 

quarters, February 25, J.865, Received at Richmond, Va., 12:25 AM. 

TO HON • J ~ c • BREX::I<ENR mGE' Sec • y of War : --I rec attmend that the 

tsysmee fn qoutwp rfatvvmy ubwaqbqtm extvxJ· and iswaqjru ktmtl are not 

of immediate necessity, uv k.pq:t'mbpgr mpc thnltl should be lJrlqhtap. 

(Signed) R. E. LEE 

TRNfSI!ATION.-•I recommend tbat·tbe removal of public.property, machi.uery, 

stares and archives Which are not of immediate necessity., be commenced. 

All powder should be secured. · 

* A keyward is employed to change the alphabets cpelical.l.y, thus making the 

cipher what is called today a periodic or multiple-alphabet cipher controlled 

by the individual letters of a key, which may consist of a word, a phrase, or 

even of a sentence, repeated as many times as ~ceseary. 

25 

I 
REF ID :A62848·· 

·· HEAD-QUARTERS ·c. s. ARMlFS, March 24, 1865. -GEN. E. KIRBY SMITH, comdg. Trans-Miss. Dept·., Gen:-• 

Vvg ecilmympm rvcog ui lhomn1des kfch kdf wasptf us tfcfsto 

abxc bJx azJkhmgJsiimiv'\:>ceq qb ndel ueisu ht kf'g auhd. egh -. 

opcm mfs uvaJwh xrYll'.lcoci yu dddxtmpt iu icJqkpxt es vvJau 

. mvrr twbtc_ abxc iu eoieg o rdegx en ucr pv· ntiptyxec _rqva.rlyyb 

rgzq rspx rksJaph ptax.rsp e~ raecdstrzpt mzmseb acgg nsfqvvf 

me ·kfg smhe ftrf wh mvv kkge pyh fefm ckfrlisytyxl xJ. Jtbbx - -

rq htXd wbhz a.wv td-acgg avxwzvv ycia.g oe nzyfet igxa scl.th. 

I am most respectfully your obdt. servt., - (Signed) R.E. LEE 

TRANSIATION. --Gen: 'lbe president deems 1 t advisable that 

you should be cbarged with the military cperations on both banks 

of the Mies. 1 and . that you should endeavor as promptly as 

possible to cross· that river W:ith e.s large a force as may be 

prudently withdrawn from your present Dept. You will accordingly 

extend ycur command to the east ba.Dk of the Miss., and make 

arrangements to bring to thi-side such of your, present force ;' 

ae you may deem best. . 

I am most respectfU.lly your obedient servant. 

There are certain colliments to be made on the foregoing messages. In the 

first place, note_ that iD the first message certain words are left unelldiphered; 

in the second place, in both the first and second message, the ciphers rete.iil 

and _clearly show the lengths of the words which have been enciphered. ·Both of 

t~se faulty practices greatly weaken t~ security of Ciphers beCal.lSe they 

leave gqod clues to· their_ contents and can easily- result 1D 'facilitating solution 

of the messages. We know today tba.t cipher messages must leave nothing 1D the 

--

clear. Even the address and the signature, the date, time -and place of- origin, 

etc., should if possible be hidden;· and the cipher ~ should be in canpletely 

regular groupings~ f'ir~t, so as not to disclose the lengths of the pl.sin-text 

words, and second, to promote accuracy in transmission and reception. 

So far as my studies have gone, I have not found a single example of a 

Confederate Vigenere ci~her which shows neither of these two fatal weaknesses • 

. -

The second of the two examples is the on_ly case I have found in which there are 

no unenc iphered words ill the text of the message. And the only example I have 

. g 

been able tq find ·iti which word lenxhs are not Bhown (save for one word) is in 

the case of the folloving message. - Vicksburg; Dec. 26, l.862. 

Gm. J.E. JOHNSTOa.~, JACKSON: 

I prefer oaavvr, it has reference to xhvkJqch~fabpzelreqpzwnyk 

to prevent anuzeyxswstp,jw at that point, raeelpsgbvelvtz,fautlilaslt 

lbifilaigtsmmlfgccaJd. 

(Signed) . J. C. PEMBER!ON 

Lt. Gen. Comdg. 

26 
' -,, . ·:..·· 

-REF ID.:A62848. 

Ev~D in tbis case.there are unenciphered words which afforded 8 clue Which . . ~ . ~ . 

enabled our man Plum to find the _key and solve the messag~,. It took some timfl, 

however, and the story is worth. telling. 

' ' 

According to Plwp, the -forego:!.Dg cipher message was ~the very first oD.e 

c4ptured by; USMTC operators, and it was obtained durillg the .Siege of Vicksburg, 

which surrende~ed on _4 July ~863. But ~ote the date ~f t~ _message: 26 DeceiDber 

l.862. What was done· with the captured ~asage during the months frOIQ the end of 

December 1862 to July Jll63t Apparent4' nothing. He~e is wat Plum reports: 

What efforts General Grant ·caused to be made ·to Ull?'a.vel this message, · 

we know not. It_ was not until October, 1864, that it ~d others came into · 

the hands of t'be telegraph e1pherers, at Kew Orleans, for translation •••• 

The New Orleans opera.tors who varked.out this key (f4anchester Bluff) 

were aided by.the Pemberton cipher and the or151Dal telegram, which was 

found amorig that general's papers, after the·surrender of Vicksburg; also 

by the following cipher d 1SP$tch,, and one other. · 

Pl~ gives the messages_ ~volved, their eol.Utiou, and the keys, the latter 

being the three cited above. It would seem that if the captured Pemberton 

message had been brought to General Grant's attention and he did nothing about 

it, he was not much interested 1n :intelligence. Secondl.¥1 the soluti~ oi' the 

Pemberton .message and the one message ~1th its plain text (the Peml>ert_on message) 

and two message_s not. only with 1ntersparced plain-text wards but als·o with spaces 

. 1 

showing word lengths_. But Plum does not :lndcate ~ow long it took for solution. 

Note· that he merely says that the meosages came into the bands of the telegraph 

cipherers in October ·1864; he does ~ot tell when solution was: reached. 

ID the various accmints of the~e Confederate ciphers there ~ one and only 

one writter who makes a detailed camnent on the two fatal practices to Which I 

refer.· A certain Dr. Charles E. 'l'.6Ylor, a Confederate veteran (in· an article 

entitled "The SigDe.l and· Secret S~rvice of the Confederate States", published in . . . 

thf:_ Confederate Veteran, Vol. XL, Aug-Sept 1932), after givirlS an example of · 

encipherment according to the "court cipher" says: 

It hardly needs to be said that the divisiOD between the words of the 

original message as given. above was not retailied in the cipher. Either the 

letters were run together cont inu~ly or breaks, as · 1f for words, were 

made at randan. until tht;! folly of the method was revealed by experience, 

cmly a few special words in a message were put into cipher, while the rest 

WQS sent in plain .la.nguage. 'Ihis •• I think it ma1 be said that it was 

impossible for well prepared cipher to be correctly read by any cne who·did 

not know the key-ward. Sometimes, in .. fact, we eoul.4 not decipher our own 

messages lthe1;1 they came.· eve~ telegraph wires. As tbe operators bed no 

meaning to guide them, letters easily became changed and porticma, at lee.st, 

of messages rendered unmeuing~ (sic) thereby. · 

27 
REF ID:A62848 

(. 

Frankly, I.don't believe Dr. Taylor's comments are'to be taken as characterizing the practices that were usua~l.y followed. No other ex-signa.lmELn who· 

has written about the ciphers used by the Confederate Signal Coi-ps makes such 

observations end i think we must simply discount what Dr. Taylor says in this regard. 

It would certainly be an unwarranted exaggeration to say that the two 

weaknesses 1n the Confederate cryptosystem cost the Confederacy the victory f'or ' . 

which it f'OUJ{gtit so mightily, but I do feel warranted at this moment i~uByiDg 

that further_ research may well show t~t certain battles and campaigns were lost 

because of insecure crypto-communicati011$. · 

A few moments ago I said that, save for an exception or two, there was in 

the Confederacy one and only one cryptosystem to serve the need.for secure tacti-

. Cfl.l as well e.e strategic communications~ One of' these exceptions concerned the 

cipher used by General :Beauregard after the battle of Shiloh (8 April 1862). This 

cipher was purely monoalphabetic in nature and was discarded as soon as the official 

dpber system was prescribed in Alexander's .manual. It is interesting to note that 

this was done after the deciphered message came to the attention· of' Conf'eierate 

' ' 

. authorities in Richmond via a northern newspaper: It is also interesting to note 

that ·the Federal War Department had begun using ·'the route cipher· as the ot':fic ial . . -. . ' . 

system for USMTC messages very promptly after the outbreak ·or var, whereas not 

until 1862 did the Confederate States War DepartmeQ.t prepare an of'f'icia~ cryptosystem, and then it adopted the 11 court c·ipher". 

' ' 

The- other exception involved a system used at least once before the official 

system was adopted and -it was so different from the letter tbat it should be 

mentioned. On 26 March 1862, the Confederate States President~ Jefferson Davis, 

_ sent Gener~l Johnston by special messenger a dictionary, with. the f'ollowiDg accom:-

paμying instruction:* .. 

I send you a dictionary of which I have the duplicate, so that.you may 

cammmicate with me by cipher, telegraphic ·or written, as follows: First 

3ive the page by· its number; second the col.umn by the letter L, Mor R, as 

it may be, in the left-hand, middle, or right-hand columns; third, the num- · 

ber of the word in the column, counting from the top. Thus, the wora · 

junction would be designated by 146, L, 20. 

The foregoing as you no doubt have aleady realized, is one of' the types of 

cryptosystems used by both sides during the American Revolutionary Period almost 

a century before, except that in this case the dictionary bad three columns to 

' 

the page instead of two. I haven't tried to find the dictionary but it sbouldn 't 

take long to locate it, since the code equivalent of the word "junction" was 

* Battles and Leaders of' the Civil War, New York: The Century Co., 1884, Vol. L 

p. 58L 

28 
"REF- ID: A62848 

given: 146, L, 20. Moreover,· there is extant at least one fairly long mes_sage,. 

witb. its decode. How many other messages there may be in Natianal Archives I . I . 

don't know. ·, 

Com~ back llOW to the "court cipher I II you will probabl.v find it Just ~8 

hard to believe, as I find it, that according to all accounts tbree and only 

three keys .were used by the Confederates during the three and a half. years ·of . 

warfare from i862 to mid-J.865 ~ It is true that Southern signalmen make mention 

<i• . 

. of frequent -changes in key but only the followillg thre1a a.re specifically cited: 

. l) COMPLETE VICTORY 2) MANCHmTER BLUFF 3) COME RETRIBUTION. 

It seems that all were used_ ccmcurrently. There may have been a fourth key, 

IN GOD WE TRUST, but I have seen· it only once, and that is in a book expl.a.in1.Dg 

the ''court cipher". Note that each of the three k~ys listed above· c0nsists .of 

exactly 15 letters, but why this length was chosen is not clear. Had the rule. 

been to make the cipher messages contain ~ 5-letter _groups, the explanation 

would be easy: 15 is a mUltiple of 5 and this wauld" be of 'practical v8.iue 1D 

checking the cryptographic work. But, as h8s been clearly stated, disguising 

word lengths was apparently not the practice even if it was prescribed, so that 

there was no advantage in choosing keys whdch contain a multiple of 5 ~tters. 

And-, by the way, doeenit the key COME RETRIBUTION sound rather cmiDOUS to you . . . ' 

even these days'l 

29 
·-REF ID :A62848 

Soon.er or l.o.ter a. Coni'edero.te siguaJ.. officer ws bound to ~ome ~'With 

a &!vice to ~fy ciphering operations, and a ~t ,~vised by a Captain 

WU.li em N. ~ker seemed to meet the ~ed. ~r • ~ lbnua.J. there is a picture 

of oD,e forin ot -the device, show here ~ Fig. 13· I don't think it ttececsa:ey 

to explo.in hov it wrked,, for it is ~st self-ev.tdent. Several o~ these 

de'Viees iwere captured dUJ;1.ng the war,· one ·or them being among the itens in tlle 

NSA Zrllsetml (Pig. 14). But here's e. photograph, Fig. 15; of the- on~ found 1n 

the ottice of Confede:rate Secretary ~ state · J\iaah P. SJ=njemin stter the capture 

ot Ri.cbmond. 

Cll'RER lEVICE Fig. l.5 . 

1tolT ~Of theoe ®v:tces w~· in exis~e or use is 'UDk:tlOW, fe>r their 

eo~ruction ·'Was an inclivl.Ctual matter-apparently :f.t ws not o.n item of regula,r 

/, . 

,issue to members of the corps. 

Jn prs.ctigally eveey aecOlmt of the c~s and. ciphers of the Civil. .War 

you vtll find references to ciphers used by Confederate se,cret service a.gents 

engaged: in .eapioilage 1D. the l1ol'th as mil as 1n Canada. In particul.sr much 

attention io Biven to · s ~t of' letteio.s 1n e1~r Wich liere intercepted by the . 

ltev York City Postm.ster and Wich. "Were. involved in a. plot_ to .print Confederate 

t:Urrenc~ and bonds. l"11cb. ado ws made about tm solution of these ciphers by 

cipher ope;:ators ot the W.f.00 in .. 1'1ashington· a.rut· the consequa»;t breaking U.P of the . . . 

plot. But I won't go iJlto these ciphers for tw reaoons. First, the alphabets 

11ere au ot the simple monoa,lphabeJ:.1c type, a totaJ. of six altheether being used .. 

Since they wre composed of symbol~, . a different serie.,s :!?or each ~bet,· it we 

possible to compose s cipher wrd. by jumping trom one series to another without 

. any external indication. of th~ shift. HoRver, good eyeeight end a bit of 

patience -were au that ws required tor solution in tbis case becauee of' the 

. . . 

inept ~er in 'Whj.ch the eyetem w.a used: whole wrct, sOIJDtimes several. .. 

eucccssiw wrd.8, vere enciphered by the same nl.phabet.· :Bu:t the second reason . . 

for m;r.not going into the oto17.1s- that 1rJ3 colleague Ed.win c. Fishel, \lb.om I've 

1:1e111;tioned before, bas done some :re~ among the records in otir national 

Archieves deaUng with this .ease and he has f;'Ound something Which 1a of great 

interest and Wich I feel bound . to l.eaw ·for him to teU at sonva tuture time, 

as that is his story, ~t mina. 
REF ID:A62848 

So ve:ry ~tary was the. ecount of cr:vptologie ini'Ormtion know to the 

genem1. public ill the$e ~that We1l there '18.S found on John tlilkea Booth's 

~ o. ci»Iter Squa.Te wtμ.ch, 'WaS almost identical with the cipheJ;i' eque.re 'Which ~d 

been mounted on the ci:Ph.er reel found in Confederate_ Secretary of State Judah P. 

:BenJ~' s office in R:t~. The ·Federal authorities in Wa.olrl.ngtcm attempted 

to prove that this necco~ nna.nt tho.t the Conteclerate leaders were. 1mpllcated 

in. the plot to asoasDinate Linpoln, a.n,d. had been Si~ Booth instructions in 

cipher. Here'& a picture ot the cipher square tO'Und. 01' Booth, end. a.lsc;> 1n a 

tru;nk ~ his hotel room 1n l·Tas~?l· 

Fig. l5 

!lhe tollov:f.ug is quoted :from "Philip Van lbre~ Ste>."ll' s book enti'i;led Secret 

Missions of the Civil. War. (Rand Mcla.14" and. Co., Nev York, 1951, p~ 320): 

Eve170ne in the "War Department· ~O \ia$ famil.iar with Crn>tography 

knew that th& Vi~re ws the cuatomar;y Contedei-ate oipher mid that 

tor c. Confederate agency (WW.ch Booth 1e lmown to haw beeJl) to 

J>Oscess a CO'JN of a. variation ot it meant no more than it e. telegJ;aph 

operator -was capt~ ~th a co-w ot the ?-Jorae CoQ.e. ltundreds--and 

perhap$ thousands of people -were uSiJlg the Vigenere. But the 

GoverllllV!nt was desperately seek:lng cvldence against tl:ie Confederate 

lenders so they took advantage ot the atmosphere of ~steey 'Which 

has alw.ys surrounded ceyptogra~ mtcl used it to confUse the public. 

and the p.rees. 1'bis shabby ~!ck sa:tnecl nothing, tor the leaders 

of the Confecteracy eventuell;y bad to be let go for lack of evidence • 

. · To the foregoing l v.U1 eotment that I dou,bt ve.r:t much wh.ethe:r ncveeyone 

in the ll~ Iepertment TMho ws ft!milia.r 'With ceyptograpey· -knev that the V:lgenere 

we the custOIQfll'Y Confederate cipher." l'roba'bl,y not one of th.em llad even he8.rd • 

the name Vigen.ere or had even :seen a. copy of the table, except those captured 

in opetations. I doubt 'Whethe1· a.qone on either side even lmev that tlle· cipher 

used by the Confederacy had a name; or lee.st of ell, that ·a German Arm:/ reseniat 

named. .Ka.siski, in ~book pu.bliGhed in 31)63, eh.owed how the Vigenere cipher coul.tl 

be solved by o. stra113btforwa.rd mathemticeJ. method. 

I h$ve devoted e. ~od deal l!lOre attention to the me~ c.lld nen.nS for 

c~tO""Comnnmice.t:.tons in the Civil War tbtm they cleserve, because prot'essional 

cryptolo~sta of 1961 can ha1°d4" be. impressed. either bJ'. their e:ff1cacy from the 

point ot vtev ot e~. and. rapid.tty in the ceypt~c· processing, or by the 

degree ot the teahnictll security they.1.Dxge.rted to the nessages they were intended 

to protect.. Not much. can be ca.id for the security of the visual aignal ins systems 

\Wed ill the cotubat .zone by the Fedete.l Signal Corps for tactical. purposes, 'bocatule 
REF ID:A62848 

they <were practi~ sU ba.~ upon ~ mDnoalphabet1c ~1phers, or variations 

thereof, as for instauce, 1ihen lllole wrds 1iere enciphered by the same aipha.bet. 

· There 1s :plenty ot ev.ldenee that Contederate sigqalmen wre more or less regular~ 

rea41na and solving those. siSQ.B-ls.. What con be said about •the eec"Q.1'1ty of the 

route cipbers used. by ~mtro for: strategic o.- hieh~OI!lllmd c~:ica.tions 1n the 

· zone of the interior? lt has al.re~ been· indicated that,. acCOl."ding· to accounts 

by ex"'~ m!ll, ouch ciphers wre bqond the c~ie capabilities ot 

Confederate ~ts, but can we ~ believe that this was tnie? Cons1derin$. 

the s1Jlq)lic1ty of these route ciphers mid the undoubted. :f.Dtel.lect\Jal cD.1)8Cit1es 

'". ' . 

. ot Confederate officers and soldiers, ~'should messages in these systems have · 

resisted c~ic attack? l'n mezv- eases the general subject matter of a 

mese&ge end perhaps a number of specific items ot intcmnation could be detected 

by quick inB,peeti011. ot the message. ~, it it wre ~t tor tJl.e '3o-called 

uarbitrarl.es" the genere.1. senee of the message could 'be toim.4.·'by a few minutes 

work, since the basic wstem· Qllst ha.Ve been lmQW. ~· the capture of cipher 

·books, a tact 11Jmti~d several. tims in the literature. Capture of but one . 

book (th.et 'W9re ell sene~ ·alike) ~ bs..ve told Confederate si(gla.1am exact~ · · 

hov· the system worked a;mci thio wul4 na~ give ~ the ba.eic secret or the 

' . 

supersedins book. So -we mwrt. see that vhatever degree ot protection these route 

cip'bGrs e.ttorded., message oecurity depeMed alJIK>st entirel.y upon the number <>t - ~ . . 

1

'erbitraries0 sctunl.:b used 1n practice. A review of such messages as are a\'eJ.l.able 

sho1is v.tc!e· divergenciea in the use of "al'bitranea"·· In 8JJ:1 event the numl>er 

act~ present in these books must ~w teJlen ftr.r' short ot the numbe~ neecle(l .. 

to give the real.' protection that e. well.constructed code ean give. ~it 

seemo to me· that. the application of native tnteu.1,genee, with some patience, shou1d 

have been sutticient to solve Uml'C nessages .. •or so it wuld be quite 1ogical 

to asaume. bt such as e.s~tion is wll ~· 1s ree4.'l:ty. de!l¥)nstra'ble. 

It was, curion8]$ anough, at abo11t this point iD preparing this lectm-e 

that 11\Y' Mend and colle~ ot ~ NSA ~, Mr. Edv1n c. Fishel, go.ve me jllat 

tho right matcrtai ~r ~ a demonstration. ?n JUne ot· 1960, Mr. Fishel. bad 

given Mr. l'h1ll.ip lb:i.dges, vho is el.so a membe;r ot NSA. and Who 1mow nothinS about 

the l"OUte ciphers of tbe um.rm, the tol,lowing ~thentic · :rooesage sent on .:t ~ 1863 

by General George G~ iJeade, at. J.Ie.tTiobura, PeDneyl:vaniil., to General Couch ~t Waehington: 

(Message to be ftimiabect.) F:i.5. 17 
REF ID:A62848-

It took Mr. Bridges only e. few hours, five or six, tO solve the ceyptogram, 

end he handed the following plain-text to Mr. Fishel: 

Thomas been it"9 ......... _uNulls" 

For Parson. I ehaJJ. try and get to you by tomorrow morning a 

reliable gentlemen·'; e.n.d. some scouts. w.o a.re acqua.inted. with a 

country you Wish to knov of. . Rebe.ls this "JaY have a.ll concentrated 

in direction of Gett.ysbUrg and Chambersburg. I -:JeCUJ?Y Carlisle. 

Signed Optic. Great battle wry Soon. t·ree much deal "Nullsu . 

The foJ;"egoing solution is correct, save for one ·pardonable errori 

tl1homas" is not a "nullu but an indicator for the ~nsions of t~ matrix and 

· the route. "Parson" and "Optic~ are code ~'Ialnes·~ and. I i.Jna31ne that Mr· Bridges . 

recognized. them as &uoh but, of course, · he he.d. no wey of interpreting theI!l, · ·except 

Pel"haps by me.kins e. i:O.retu.l stuay of the events and command.era inwl ved in the 

impendi,ng a.otion, a. study· he 'Wa.Sn •_t ceJJ.ed upon to l.Dld.ertake. 

'lb.e foregoing iooosage \18.S enciphered tzy" Cipher Book No. 12, in -which the · 

indicato~ TRCMAS Eiprecifies a "Mesaa.ge of 10 lines and 5 columns". 'l'he route w.a 

quite simple and atraightforwaid: uDown the ist (coiunm), u.P the 3rd; dow the 

2ncl; up the 5th down the. 4th. 11 

· It is obvious· tbst in .this example the absence ot many 0 arbit:re.r1eG," made 

::io1ution a. relati vo1;Y' easy matter. What Mr. lridges would have been e.b1e to 

do rr.1.th the cryptogram hail there .been me.uy of them i'S problematical. Judging by 

·his worksheets, it seemed to ·IQe that Mr. l3ridges d.1d not realize 'When he w.s 

solving tbe mceeage that a transpostion matrix vn.a invo1ved; and on» questioning 

. . 

him on this point his answer l$.S in the negative. He realized this only later. 

A minor drama in the fortunes ot· Major Generai l>. C. _Bueli, one of the hish 

commanders of the Federal ~, is quiet:&.y end tersely Outlined in tw ciphers 

,· telee;rams. The first one,. sent ()ri 29 Sept. 1862, from Unlisville,Ken~ucey, was 

in one of the USMl'C cipher. books, e.n,d ws · exterrial.ly addressed to. Co1onel. .Anson· 

Stager, head of the UEMre, but the internc.l. addressee l'IS.S Major General. R. W • Ifail.eck, 

. "General-1n-chief1' [ oU.r present day "Chief of Staff'] ~ The- mess8ge \mG e~rnally 

signed. by WiU1am H. D.ra.Im, Buel.l's cipher operator, but the nmte of the aci.tUDJ:. ' ' 

sender, BUeU, ws 1ndi<!ated internally. Here's the telegram: 

COLONEL ANSCl1 STAGER, 'Washington: 

. AUatrie. a.wit. I is over to requiring orders rature blissf'Ul 

for your instant connnand turned and :t.nstrμetiona end. rouc91 looking 

fUrther shall further the Camden me·of ocee.n September poker twenty 

I the to I commancl obedience repair orders quickly pret:ty. 

Indiana.polis your him accor~ ~ fourth received 1862 'WOU?ld.ed 

nine be.ve twenty tum have to to to alvord hasty. . -

\ 
REF _ID :A6284B 

Rather then 31~· ;you ·the. pleJ..n-text of'" this mes~, perlls,pa yqu ~uia. like 

to wrk it out .for· ~oolves, to~ vith tbe inf'Ol'IDation youive ~ receiwd . . . 

the ~olUtion .abould not:~ clitticult. ~- nesease contains C>M en-qr, wtch -.s. 

I:l$f;e :1D.1tt:J ~ pre~tion: ~ wra ue.B 01n1:t~. 

· ·~· second telegtem, · ~ one aa.y later, ~ at.ao· ~ r~or Oene,ra1 BueU, 

to ~jor Oenerel.1I&lieck, bUt it ws· ill e.nQther cipher boQk•~t~ thtl t'WO 

booke invol~ -were UBed ®n¢urrentJ..v. ~ it is: 

GEORGE c .. MAJNAnD, Wn,sbington: . · . . . 

Begu.1.ars ordeted o~ m;v to publlC out -~ ·.rece1 ved 186a· .spoi~ thirty'· I dt~ c~ of eont1:nue et best othe.rwlee WJ$t 

.Ara.bia Il\Y ~a di~ duty ·Qf· rq last tor IdlicQ;in .September . · 

peri<:d your·-~ se.nae Sba.11 dut1~e ·~ untu ~-1e.rd abU.it;r to the r a ~e~~bereli!trJ.Wne. .. •:: · 

~-lUUtNEB 

As· before, l vill..g.tve ·you -the· ~unity to tlOJ.W·'l;his mes~_ for 

yourselves. (At the -beg!~ .of the next- lectu:;.oe I .oh$11 present tlle plain""' 

text ot 1»th me~a.) 

· . Next you ·'3ee a photo~· ot ;Q.'n impc>rtant miJsege llhich vou !tJti3 'Wish to 

solve ~~l:t. It we -~ 1;J:f J:Tes14ent. Jetter~ ~vis· to General. JObnston, 

on a vety significant elate_. U •11 1865" Fol'< ease. in ~lting on it I give 

al.so a trsnscript!,on; since th~ photo~ is vaey .ol.a.~ :tn po<>r state. I 

bel:i,~ve' that. ~s mas~ does net appear in e:tl'1 tit tbs ~ounto t1 ve rend. 

F!g, lS 

!1'o re~~ J •. \1 •. ~llll, 'Whcm l:'ve ment1ened before-·~ imo ~ves ua mst 

ot 'What little- eou;nd.1nforme.t10ri. there is a.bout·. the c~ic auccensea of 

ootb sicles. ~' l,et•e me '\Gt the union sigual~'_; coUl.d do Vlth ~bi!l 

ctpb.era. · ·Jtere 8.1"e sa:ie at$tements he ~a·(!,. 214)~ · 

~ fl.J'Eit -<lec1pnerins ot $rebel. $ignal ccXle of Wicb ! 

f'1hd ~record w,s, that ·!?ll!de by' Capt. J~ s; ~end Capt. R. A. 

i'fqlor) ~ Nov. 25, 1862,. Four -diJqs· later, M$3. l-t/er wrote 

to Capt. ~, Chief Si!J1a1 Oi't1.eGl", ·Arrq of the Potcmac, 

not to pemit it to beci>me publi~ "t~t \lle' trs.nalate tJle s1gnaj. 

mes~s of the_ rebel. ~''. . . Ap:rU 9~ 1863, Ct.q)t. Fisber1 ~r FalmOuth,· reported that one of bis officers 

bad ;-end a rel>el .mes~ 'Which prOVed. that the rebels wz-e in possession of .. ~ e¢<l.e. 1be ~ dttQ he \BS 1ntormed that the l"ebel cocle tal«m (trom) a 

rebel. sigrml officeir ~ iclenti~d. with one taken prov.I.~ et Yorktown. 

lf,e recei ve4 f'rclll MBj. ?4Y'er the foUoW!ne orders~ 

*A curious coiiiC14ence-or \BS. :t~ e. to~uitoue toreabaclow1ng of an event f'ar 1n 

· the MU\"8?--ctm be· seen. 1n the sequence of_ the last two 'W'O:rds. ot the cipher 

text. t).he. ~ssage is <ed Septembel" 30, 1862J the Nev York liere.l.d ~ the 

Uew York 'ai.lmne ccmibined to~ the Nev York lbraltl•!tri.bunc on lli:rch 19, 1924 .... 62. ~s later~ 
REF ID:A62848 

Rath.tr than :fl1~ · .10" the platn ... text; ot tbia me:sssae, ~~s yo"U ~ l:tlm 

to 110rk it. out· for ~vesJ. for With the ii'Ltormat1on ~u've· -~ recef.vad. 

the solution~ JJOt be ~cult .. ~ .meseege CQQtatns·on.: .eJ."rO~(J iJh1¢h ws 

mtu1e in its~ p,re~ttm: Q1leo Wrd-ws omitted. 

!l!Mt second td.esrati, <:mJt'. enc ~ l.atel", -.a al.So from Jib,jor· GezMtre.1 Blell, 

to M&Jor GelalJral_lr&l.leok, but it 1Bfl. Ul another etpher book~ti, the te 

. books 'inwl.ved W?e used cone~~. trere it 1EU 

atooaa Q. M:AJNAlU>, ~: . Be~s · ~ or 11\V' to pUbllc out ~ reeeived 1862 

S!>Otled thbV I dis.patch ccxnmd of CQDtime ot -~~otherwise VOl"t3t 

Arab!& av COlliDQtld 41.scbarse ~ ·t>t ST 1"t t0%" Lin<:oln ~­

period ~- tran, IHm.fJe· il'AJ,l ~ies the until ~ ability to- the l a 

remo'Vl\1 eft>:YY.:o, Mam ~ tribune .. • · 

mLI.PUm:a 

u berOJ'e, . .t '411 stve y¢'"..t the.a.PJ?Ortuntty to. .aolve this nessase tor 

~ws. (At the bcginntns ot the next lee~ l GbL\l.1. present the pla1.u• . . 

tut ot both masaee-s.) 

·Next you see a photograph ot an ~rtent •asa(J: which 1011.• "1.sh to 

eolve 10lJr.U• It \111.\S ·S!nt by be.oitlent Je.tterson .~vis to Oeneral Jo1maton, . . 

on a very ~Ca:nt aa.te, · u A,prl.l ·l.86S. F~ ~aee in wrlc1ng on 1t I glw 

a1.so a t~ripti0l1, $tnce the ~ 1s W:ry ol& d in poor Gte.te.. I 

beliew, that this ILY:ssaae does not e.ppent" in an.Y ot the t\C<?c:Q'lts I've l'\eOd. 

Pis· lS 

~return to· J. w. Brow, '4lol:i X've mentianed before and Who gtwi,; us sm>$t 

of 'dlat little .ciound itlfome.ts.on ~re 1u abc>Ut. the Cr.n>~io succeuses ot 

both aides. Fkat, 1et•s eee 'Wb.&t tbe Vnton s1gna1meu·; c~ do Yith rebel 

ct~era. Sere a1'e rm· sta.~ts he ·~s (p .. Zl.4): . . 

~ f'irst decil,'henns of a rebel signal code ot vhieh :t f1n4U\Y~ord11aS ~ 11184e· })y Capt .. J. S. Bell DJMl capt.- n. A. ~lor,. repo;'ted 'Itov .. ta;, 1862. . Pour ~s later,, leJ. f.tyer 'Wl'Ote · 

to Capt. Ollab1ng, Chief' Sisna1 Ott1eeJ:, Ar.Ju~ the Potomac, 

1'0t to ~t it. to become- in'J>lic 0 tbat ~ translate the siszmj. 

messages of the rebel ~,. · · · ~U 9, lB63, C«pt. Fisher, mar i?a1moutb1 l'ep0rte4 th.at one o~ his officers baa;~ a. nb&l. mossaae ~ch proved that. the rebel.S -wezoe in :po-.asiou ~ 

our code. !1'he »Xt d6'1 he .a !ntol'mecl that the rebel C.o4e t.icen (trm) a 

rebel sl,graal. offlc.er i8S 14ellt1cal llith one t-.ken prertousq at Yorktown. 

lTe .received from Ma.J. ~:r the fol.lmt!rls ~t 

*A eunous coinci&m.¢e-o~ ieo 1t • :f'ortu,itous f'~~ -ot an ewnt tar 1n 

the tutU.re'l--can be sef!n 1n the .seciuence of the la.st two wrds ot the cf.:pber 

texi;.. 'lbe meu•sase in 4ated ~l" JG, 1862; the Nev Yark Bera1d end. the 

Hew York ~bWJe .eOJllbimd to make the nev York &raJ..d ... Tribune on HlTch 191 1924-- ~ years later! 

'I