REF ID:A43519 .,. 

·' 'f.V SECRET DINil 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY~ -

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE. MARYLAND 

!9P eBeBE BBi.AR 

SUBJECT: COMDfl' Requirements ~ 

Serial: N 19118 

12 JuJ.71961 

TO: Assistant Chief ot Statt, ~telligence 

u. S. Air Force 

The Pentagon 

Washington 251 D. C. 

Assistant Chief of staff tor Intelligence 

Department of the Army 

The Pentagon 

Washington 25, D. C. 

Director, Naval Intelligence 

The Pentagon 

Washington 25, D. c. 

Director, CentraJ. Intelligence Ageney 

2430 E street, H. w. 

Washington 251 D. C. 

1. I am concerned over the broad ilqpl1cationa inherent 

in the acceptance and fulfillment by the Ba.tional Security 

qency of the type of requirements represented by inclosure l 

and 2. It does not seem appropriate that intelligence =: 

requirements which would cause so extensive a reallocation of 

lfSA.'s proceSB1ng ettort should be submitted as supplementary 

guidance. I am aJ.ao concerned w1 th the ~urisdictional problem 

posed by the requirement for BSA to provide a large volume of 

semi-processed COMIR'l inf'or-.t1on to your organization.a for 

purposes of further processing. 'fo be specific: 

a. BSA acceptance of inclosure 2 would require the 

provision by this Agency to JOm" organizations of large 

massea--millions of itema--of ineampleteJ.7 processed COMIN'.l'. 

Such action would require virtually complete du;plication within r 

Reproduction of this docment in 

whole or in part is prohibited 

except w1 th permission of the 

issuing office 

IBA 'I'S com. BO. 61/02821 

COPY NUMBER ___,~/o!!!!'IJ __ _.....__,,,~~ 

PAOE l I OP 3- PAGES 

T' "S p- - -

• ·-· c.. I.., ~l.: I ii'-" r ; ; Y.i:;J.ca TO. r~r. ..... 

ANNUAL INVE.NiURY. ~ 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 08-18-2014 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 

TOP SECRET DINAR 
REF ID:A43519 

Tqf SECRET DI~R 

Serial: N 1948 

the community of' expensive COMD'r analysis functions which BSA 

would·have to continue to perform~ order to discharge its 

responsibilities in responding to other SIGDT requirements of' 

the intelligence community. 

b. The utilization of resources by other elements of 

DOD and the CIA is basically of no concern to RSA. HoweVer 1 I 

f'eel that I must point out that provision of the material 

requested would require extensive utilization of DOD machine 

resources in separate parts of DOD 1 and between DOD and CIA, 't6 

achieve the same resul:t1 i.e., a COMDT product. A1thougb 

there might be some differences in tJie final procblct in ea.ch 

case, I bel.ieve use of resources in this mnner to be ~cessarily duplicative and wastetal. 

c. NBA. acceptance of !nclosure 2 would result in 

increased and unreasonable demands against IfSA. manpower arJd 

ma.chine resources ·in order to resolve questions that must 

necessarily arise from diverse attempts in the intelligence 

community to analyze incompletely validated CO:IDT material. 

Requirements of the t;n>e re.presented by 1ncl.osures l arJd 2 

(i.e., stating how RSA should respond rather than statiDg 

intelligence requirements), result in a cumulative degi-adation 

of the total. capabili'tiea of NBA. to effectively respond to 

overall intelligence cOJl'IIDUD1ty SIGil'l requirements. 

d. RSCm 16 specifically places all COMIR'l' process1Dg 

activities of the United Sta.tea under the control of the 

Director, BSA. This action was taken because of the necessity 

to centralize the COMINT activities of the United states for 

reasons of "efficiency and ecoDQll'Jy in the use of' teclmical. 

resources". Provision by NSA of the material requested in the 

subject requirements would jea,pardize the central control of' 

the Director, NBA as assigned under 1'SCID 16. 

'3. COMDT information contributing to the basic intel.11gence 

need underl.1'1ng the inclosed requirementa (i.e •• 1nformation 

which m1ght' contribute to the lmowletlp &.bQUtl I> 

Dl&J' be derived f'rom a~al. poasib:l.e sources of high potential, 

among which 81"•1 I operational. cipher systems 

and plain latlguage commWliQ&tions, both printer and voice. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

BSA TS COITL 10 ~;i 61/02827 

COPY NUMBER Iv · PAGE ' 2 07 3 PAGBS ·-·-- . . - - n-~:s u<J.:..~; •.. ;;:-.:: :.? ~.:;...;.:.~r TO SEMl- ANNUA~ ~!"~VOO'ORY. 

TOP SECRET DINAR 
TQr SECRET DI~R 

.. 8erial.: N 1948 

The r~a 11hich are being clisouased bere~viz.: tile 

voluminous number of mes::es deal.~h\ _ _ / I 1 repr~nt a reivei7 iov- me ource 

ot COMIB'f which may help call attention to possible locations 

having I I asso(li,e.tions. To accel.erate and improve the 

sitting of this mass of data. f~ emal.Y&is purposes made 

desirable, among other progr.oama 1 thedevelopD141t]1t by NSA of 

an advanced machine aid. IBA. bas recently devel.0ped llpe:b, an 

aid which has been designated SROWPLOW. · PL 86-36/50 use 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

3. Representatives of your organizations were recently 

briefed on the concept and potential. ot BRO'WPLOW. A desire 

by CIA and AFCD. analysts to work with our anal.7sts in 

application of this concept is evidence& by inclosure 3. We 

have recently replied to this proposal indicating our 

vlllingnesa to arrive at a mutual arrangement in this area. 

To this end we have proposed a meeting with CIA and .APCIB 

representatives on 20 July to discuss specific arrangements. 

;c .believe an arrangement of this tJ.Pe will foster a better 

understanding on the part ot 7QU1' anal;ysts of the various 

problems aasoeiated with the exploitation of this material. 

This in turn will enable your personnel tocexpress their 

intelligence problems/questions in a manner· wktch will allow 

the most effective aaploJment of the technical mpertise 

which is concentrated in NSA.. thmecessa.ry dqpl.ication w:lll 

thereb7 be obviated. 

4. In view of the above tacts, I have f'ound !lit neces&&r7 

to arrive at the following conc1usions: 

a. The Bational. Securi t7 Agency camiot talte any 

turther action in tulfillment of incl.osure 1. 

b. !he Bational Securi t;y .Agenc7 emmot ace t 

inc1osure 2. 

3 Incla: 

a/s 

Cop)' Furnished: q_ 

L. R. FROST 

Vice Admiral, UBI 

Director 

BSA TS COl'l'L BO. 61/92821 

General G. B. Erskine, USIE-Bet, 

Asst to SecDef.. Sp Opns · con l1lMBER --,...m ____ ,,,.....,,,,,,,... ~AIJB 3 · " OF 3 ' PAGES 1.- "• . ""' .. , . ..· . . '. -·~ -~ "':· ... ,,: • .: ...... . :.- .: .... .w .. ..:.· .... .s J:O St.Ml .. ANNct\.L ~:~v~~~IO~V'. .. 

. TOP SECRET DINAR~ 
. . . 

cc: 

REF ID:A43519 

TCW SECRET DI~R 

DIR 

M6 M ·ae~ File 

P01 

P012 

p 

c 

.Ami 

D/D'IB. 

m 

D-302 

A 

A3 

A32 

c4 

(Less tnc1"i,fl,_._...,. ,..CR 

(Less Incl) 

(Less Incl) 

(Less Incl)· 

(Less Incl) 

(Less Incl) 

(Less Incl.) 

(Less Incl) 

(Less Incl.) 

(Less Incl) 

(Less Incl) 

(Less Incl) 

!

Less Incl) 

Leas·Incl) 

l.ess Incl) 

Serial.: N 191'8 

e ove er exp ns can no nger con nue wor 

ill satisfaction of incl.osure 1 and why' inclosure 2 cannot be 

accepted. The. most :liaportant reason is the tact that provision 

ot the tne information requested will result in the estab1ishment 

of duplicate COMDT procelf!l&ing acti'V'ities within DOD and CIA. 

This would be contrar)" to the respcmsibili ties of the Director 1 · 

1'SA as established in BSCID #6. The concept s~ested in · inclosure 3 is endorsed by BSA. Approved by A/Dm .PROD (Dr. Sinkov). 

10 July l 

.TOP SECRET DINi!\R 

86-36/50 USC 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 )