USCIB: 29 .18,.2 

-476. 

APPEHBl!IB BOOl:J!fBN'f CON'l'AINS 

00BBi'ORB MA MIA:b 

12 May 1954 

EO 3,3(h) (2) 

'IDP ffi!iORB'f • t::J. S, M'm OlfL'! 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

PL 86-~6/50 USC 3605 

Subject: UKUSA Conference on/I._ ______________ ____. 

(a) USCIB 29 .18/lid.ated 27 April 1954. (b~ USCIB 29.17/9 dated 28 April 1954. 

References: 

Further to the ref'erences, the enclosures hereto are forwarded for 

consideration in connection with Item 2 of the Agenda of the 103rd 

Meeting of' USCIB scheduled/for 14 May 1954. 

Enclosure 

Report of Chmn.. WG for UKUSA 

Con. on COMINT Relations with 

I t 

USCIB: 29 .18/2 

aptain, U. • Navy 

Ex.ecutive Secretary, USCIB 

APPENBEB B90UMEili'f CON'fAINB 

G9BEWORB MA'ffiRIAb 

TOP SECB:Ef' 

eclassified and a roved for release b NSA on 10-21-2014 ursuantto E.O. 1352 
CIC'!\ 

-

BO 3.3(h) (2) 

PL S6-36/50 USC 3605 

1,1 May 19511-

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, USCIB 

SUBJECT: (ennrt 0£ the I.Iorkina Committee op IIT<JI$/\ :onfe:rc:ccl on 

l. The Working Committee met on 7 May 1954 to consjder.the 

preparation of U.S. position papers for the forthcoming UKUSA 

Conference on~I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---~~~--' 

2. The NSA representative tabled for consideration by the 

Working Committee the two papers inclosed with o. letter from the 

Director, NSA, published as attachments with USCIB 29.18/1, (1.atcd 

27 April 1954. These two papers are attached hereto as Inclosures 

l and 2. 

3. The CIA representative tabled a paper entitled 11u .. s. 

Policy for COMINT Arrangements 1ri th I 

This document is attached hereto as~I-n_c_i~o-s-ur~e ........ 3-.~~~~~~~~~ 

4. Detailed discussion of these papers revealed basic points 

of difference which require resolution by USCIB. A statement or 

these basic dissimilarities between the NSA and CIA positions is 

attached as Inclosure 4. 

5. The members of the Working Cammi ttee asked for more facts 

which would substantiate the positions assumed by NSA on the one 

hand and by CIA on the other. Attached a.s Inclosures 5 and 6 a.re 

the supporting papers prepared by the tvo Agencies. 

6. It is recommended that the Members of USCIB consider the 

attached documents and provide policy guidance to this Working 

Connnittee. 

6 Incls: 

a/s 

1lri{.f.I~ 

~("-:i 

~.Je 'I'QP s;g~~ CONTROL NUMBER SJ-1--1315 

COPY "!f ~OF 45 COPIES 

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES 

T6P SE€RE'F FRO~II NSA Farm 781-ClOS 1 Jul 52 
'£811 SEeRLV!'16

PR(W711 

EO 3.3(h) (2) 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

BASIS OF PROPOSED US COMINT RELATIONS WITH 

1. In order to improve the quality r-md quantity of COM:[lfr 

available to the us, the ultimate objective of US policy is to 

establish COMINT collaboration wit~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--' 

designed to exploit exhaustively their COMINT potential. Such 

collaboration should be ne13otia.ted with Third Party Governments , or their COMINT authorities nesotiating on an official basis. 

Such collaboration should be conducted directly between the 

national COMINT organizations concerned but is no~ to exceed the 

then existing capability of each nation, and must not operate to 

the detriment of current US COMINT relations with other governments. 

2. The arrangements which may ultimately be concludecl with 

these countries, either individually or collectively, will probably extend beyond the limitations of paragraphs 4 and 5 of Appendix 

P to the UKUSA Agreement, but would not be as extensive as those 

provided for between the UK and US. 

'f'OP SBOR!ff CONTROL NUMBER ....-..:--..;;;.....;..._, 

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'FSP SECRET FROTII 
'f()D. • SElfB'> GI'°L ~'""I oSuD£fll .L .L'-~ 

E;O 3 . 3 ( h ) ( 2 ) 

• • Pb 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SECRET ~~I tJ.S. FJ1'JS::l ON!Jl 

TERMS OF REF'ERENCE FOR U 

·ro Uh.1JGJ\. CONl•'l!!RENC.:E ON 

1. The U.S. considers that. in the exent it \ts agreed that 

tripartite discussions withl • • :are\of' advantage 

to the U.K./U.S. COMINT eff'ort, it should be .J?ermissible to reveal 

to these countries the existence of' the techn:l.cal CO~NT \.exchange 

between the U.K. and u.s. 

2. U.S. COMINT collaboration with the ----~~~~~--~~~- should be conducted directly between the national COMINT organizations concerned, but is not to exceed the.then existing technical 

capability of each nation, and must not operate to the detriment of 

current U.S. COMINT relations with the U.K. and Canada. 

3. The U.S. considers it desirable• in order to develop COMINI' 

relationships with thel • I to wovidef \\ 

~:-:---=~-:-:--:-~~~-=-~..,........,.........,=--___,=--...-~~'in order~o exp!oit exhaustively their COMINT potential. Such collaboration should be negotiated with th~ I or Co.MINT authorities 

negotiating on an official basis. 

'!'QP SESRi'i CONTROL NUMBER 54-l.315B 

COPY c?)! OF 45 COPIES 

PAGE l OF l PAGES 

N~b~1.'6os I Jul 52 

l18P SE€RE1' FR01'11 
EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

... _ -----

U.S. POLICY FOR COMINT ARRANGEMENTS WITH 

l. In order to insure that the U.S. has access to the fullest 

possible coverage~ ~t C'::l!Ttar""J~ ... ' the objective or U.S. policy vis-a-visl ·.is to exploit insofar 

as is profitable t el\l'reftor s orthose ·.countries. 

2. The basic ~inciple underlyill!l the Qevelopment of COl!IN'l' 

arrangements withl lis that maximum utilization should be ma>e of cash, equipment and non-COMINT information 

which shall be supplied those countries in exchange for their Co.MINT 

products. Hovever, when USCIB deems it necessary in order to effect 

the maximum profitable exploitation of the COlv.IINT potential of those 

countries a minimum amount of technical COMINT information as deter- , mined by USCIB may be released. 

3. Due to the highly sensitive nature of NSA and the existence 

of established channels for the conduct of' secret intelligence operations and negotiations, USCIB deems it essential that negotiations 

and liaison with foreign intelligence organizations except in the 

case of the U.K. Canada and Australia, be conducted by another U.S. 

intelligence agency acting as the executive agent fo~ USCIB. Normally, 

this executive agent will be the CIA, but in cases where USCIB considers it to be definitely to the advantage of hhe u.s. Government, 

the State Department, the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force may be 

selected to act in such a capacity. The Director, NSA, will provide 

such technical support, advice, and assistance as m..~y be required 

for the development of the~e arrangements. 

4. In order to maintain the max:l.mtUn amount o:r autonomy and the 

f'ullest freedom of action USCIB feels it necessary that all such U.S. 

negotiations be conducted between the u.s. and the country concerned 

without direct participation of a third nation. 

TOP Si:cg;gr CO~frHOL NUI1ll3ER 54-1315 a 

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PAGE 1 OF l P/i.GEG 

TOP SECRET 
.J,,,_c..f, ~. , NSA Form 781-CIOS I Jul 52 

REF I~AQ_Q-'Jk 'FOP: SECRE·1· t4tt II 

l. BSA: 

-

CIA: 

-

2. NSA: · -

CIA: 

-

3. BSA: 

-

CIA: 

-

4. BSA: 

-

CIA: 

-

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

STATEMENT OF DISSIMILARITIES . 

" ••• objective of U.S. policy is/toestabli$h C<:m:NT 

collaboration ••• designed to exploit exhaustively 

their cao:NT potential." 

" ••• objective of' u.s. policy •· •• •is to exploit insofar 

as profitable the COMINT efforts of' those oountries." 

"The U.S. considers it desirable •.••• to provide technical assistance ••• not/to exceed the then existing 

technical capability of each nation, and (it) must not 

operate to the detriment of' current U.S. CCJ.tIN'l' relations 

with other governments • /. • The arrangements which may 

ultimately be concluded./ •• will probably extend beyond 

·the limitations of' paragraphs 4 and 5 of Appendix P.to 

the UKUSA agreement, but would not ·.be as extensive as 

those provided f'or between the U.K. 'l'-nd the U.S." 

''When USCIB deems it necessary in order to effect the 

maximum prof'ita.ble e:xploitation ot the COMI:NT potential 

of these countries a/minimum appropriate amount of technical COMINT information as determined by USCIB may be 

released." 

~.'..1:: ~t r is agreed that ~ .... ripartite discussions with [ countries are of advantage to the UK/us 

C(>Mir . or ,. • • " 

" ••• fee~ it necessary that all such U.S. negotiations .. be c~d.μcte(l.=~etween theu.s. and the country concerned without di;rec1;, pru:t:lcipation of a third• nation." 

"U.s. COMtNT collaboration with the.__ _________ _ 

should be· conducted directly between the national COMINT organizat~ons concerned ••• " 

" ••• negot1.at1ons and liaison with foreign intelligenceorganizations except in the case of the U.K., Canada, and 

Australia, be conducted by another (other than NSA) u.s. 

intelligence agency acting as the executive agent for 

USCIB ••• The Director, NSA, will provide such technical 

support, advice, and assistance as may be required f'or the 

development of these arrangements." 

'r()l> Sii:ClUi.!l' cormOL 'NUMBER 54-l315D 

COPY z.y OF 45 COPIES 

PAGE I OF 2 PAGES 
NSA Fmm·781-C10S 1 Jul 52 

REF ID: A.§.P,l7 ~,....... 

T()f' SEeRET t4ttLJ:ll 

5. .!§!: 

CIA: 

- 6. MS.A: 

-

CIA: 

-

"Such collaboration should be negotiated with third 

party governments or their CCl4I:NT authorities negotiating on an official basis." 

(No direct statement). 

(No direct statement). 

''The basic principle underlying the development of 

COMI:NT arrangements • • • is that maximum utilization 

should be made of cash, equipment, and non-COMIM 

information ••• in exchange tor.· • • Ca«lf.r products." 

'?OP SF-CRRI' CONTROL NUMBER 54:131.JP 

COPY: 2Cf OF 45 COPIEs 

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGF.s 

'l10P SECRET FR6'fll 
f!.,r Ifl 

1'1; ,,., r ti II 

REF ID:A60476 

'FC¥9 SEERET FRf"FII 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

EL 86-36/Sti USC 3605 

NSA CONCEPl' OF THIRD PARTY A'RRANG~ 

l. Appendix P to UKUSA established principles governing US and 

UK Ca.llNT relations with Third Parties. Essentially, two distinct 

type of formal Third Party arrangements a.re descri'hed: 

a. An arrangement whereby ca.sh, equipment and a. minimum am°'1Jlt 

of' rudimentary technical information may be furnished by\ a member of 

USCIB in return far COMINT materials/provided by the third\ party. This 

arrangement need not be of a permanent nature, but should\not be contused with covert arrangements under which the material 9btained is 

treated·as collateral. In such arrangements the US must be\a.ssured of 

a fair return on 1 ts investment. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of App.end.ix P 

apply; theJ !arrangement is an ex~ple of'\tbis type. lformally,SA should not conduct such arrangements directly;\ rather, 

RSA would provide target lists of desired materials•. in priorit)' order 

tor guidance and would indicate the monetary or equ!pment val.ue of 

desired COMINT materials. 

b. An arr ement which entails the exc e between\.US or 

UK and 

as described in paragraph 6 of· ~Ar-p~p~e~n"'l"'l"'x~i==-.--:::The~-e-x...,c-;ha"'""'T".hg-. -e-i':""s---::1:-:i;-m-:;'i-.-t-ed-;' only by the technical level of 

canpe'tence manifested by the Third Party. Within the 11m1 ts of established policy, these arrangements should be conducted between the. CCMI.NT 

·agencies concerned, as discussed in paragraph 10, below. A measure of 

·permanency is essential in such arrangements 1 and it is desirable \t'bat 

··wherever possible, official governmental agreements be negotiated. The 

objective of such arrangements is the exhaustive exploitation of the 

Third Party's CQ.fiNT capability on those problems on which collaboration 

is entered into. 

2. The US necessarily proceeds from a selfish basis in its dea].jngs 

with Third Parties. Any arrangement entered into must provide definite 

advantages to this country. The principal factors which make a Third 

Party arrangement attractive are ordinarily geographical location and . tecl:mical competence. The basic COMINT association between the US and 

UK is mutually beneficial as a result of the pooling of intercept from 

various sources, and the complementary skills of the!r CCMI:NT personnel. 

An examination of other countries e aged in the COMINT business indicates 

t 

.._~~~~~~-=-.....1bave demonstrated cops1derahle COMTjT competence and in 

sane cases are in a position to obtain! ~ot otherwise available to the US or UK. 

3. It must be recognized that those countries possessing a considerable C<J.ilNT competence will not, at least after initial satisfaction 

'l0P BECl\ET CONTROL NUMBER 54-l.315E 

COPY .3fi_ OF 45 COPIFS 

TOP SECRET Fit<f'ttF PAGES 

~m rios 1 Jul 52 
TO;q 

':POl' SBGRE1i' FHQ!PU 

of t.hcir equipment needi:;, l)c willing to make ave.U.b.bl.e. al.l.\of the+7 

COIUN'r results <lesircd by ·t;he US or to continue to rovide. COMINT 

m~1teriul without some e::<o::hnnGe in kind. 

have indicettec1 ~to the UK) their :i.ndividual d.issa.tisfaction\w 

arrangements l)y which they nro.:? limited ~/and e __ .qui.pment __ \ __ 1n __ ' 

return fm4 the materials they fnrninh. L_ ___ J has ind:Lcate(l \its 

desire to ent·~r into tr:i.pt1.r.ti.te GOMIN'r collaboration with the\ Q'S and 

UK. Similnr demands upon the Ufj for payment in kind are overdlle ahd 

USCIB policy should antidp;i.te thf;m. 

4. The possilJilHy of extendin~ CO?-'IINT relations ,.,ith Thim 

Parties suc;Gests thc:i.t a review is necessary of the complex and ·~:i:'oba.bly 

expanding inter-relationships •1raoprr ::;uch nations in the. COf.lINT field. 

For example, it ls known tbatl ~n.s at vari -aged \in -

some form of COMnrr o.ssocin-tion with the US UK 

It is known tha L...,,.ar=e.,,.....c.,,.....o~s~e~" r--~i'.""';tl;-.;l;:;i:-:e:-:;d;-_ -:;i~n their COf.ilNT efforts. extent of the 

....._ ___ _. relationship is not known; but it exists • 

5. Obviously, a mo.jor factor in any decis_ion to e~end COMINT 

relations with any Third Party is the state of security.of that country. 

It must be rea.li zed, however, that m3 national •secrets in the COMJ:NT 

field are not truly secrets if other countr:l.es a.re able to produce 

identical COMINT by their own efforts. The technical level of compepence achieved byl !collectively is known to 

}:>e fairly high. Their representatives have deliberately demonstrated 

their COMINT success to UK representatives to support their r ues~s 

for technical assistance.· The material now received from the ..._ ______ ..,1 by the UK and US does not reflect their true potential 

in the COMINT field, because of the limitations placed by the US and 

UK on the return quid pro quo. The philosophy underlying past US 

policy in regard to Third Party relations was to obtain as much as 

possible for as little as possible. This principle would still be 

satisfactory if the US were assured of getting what it needs by this 

method, but the reluctance of ther Ito operate on 

this principle, as manifested in ~iscussions with the UK, forces the 

US to examine the other policy: A full exchange of CC>r.1INT materials 

(!>etween the US and selected Third Parties on specified problems, at a 

\level not to exceed the Third Parties• known technical competence. The 

i qual~fying clause regarding technical competence would thus differentiate 

) such· agreements from the CJ\NUSA agreement. The level of technical I \ability can be established on a continuing basis from products provided 

:by these Third Parties after evaluation by qualified US or UK technicians. L.... ; : •. 

6. Considerable difficulty has been encountered in obtaining 

possession of Third Party COMINT materials at the same time that comparable US and UK material is received. This complicates its processing, 

NSA form 781-ClOS 1 Jul 52 

'l'OP SB8FH3'f' COIITROL NUMBER 54-1315E 

COPY .::ld. OF 45 COPIES 

PAGE-r-""OF 5 PAGES. 

TOP S~CRET FR8TII 
, TC>P TEO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

~L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

makes its use annoying and expensive, andgreatly.reduces the value of 

the product. Maximum assistance may be/expeG'ted in solution of these 

delivery problems when payment in 'kind is./ ma.de since the Thi.rd Party 

nation involved will also be interes.ted in ex;peditil'l8 the reciprocal · :flow of COMINT material needed in prepa.rat:l.on ot its product. In 

addition, the provision t~ L for/ exatnpl.e, · .• of keys and trinomes 

of type B Call Signs used within the syi;itemwould further improve the 

quality of its valuable early warning reports. o·· ·.·.cements are 

within the demonstrated technical .·compet.·enc···e··· of o\d·. erive and 

use, but are not made in their volumes because e derived by 

UKUSA collaboration fran analysis ot material. from other areas at 

other times of similar usage. 

7. It is recognized that/some nations with only primitive CCMI:NT 

organizations by virtue of their geographic location possess limited 

but unique COMINT collection/capabilities which should be exploited 

and that this can be arranged satisfactorily by payment in cash and 

equipment or, at most, limited raw material.. It i$ also recognized 

·that in some cases, all desired COMINT materials may be obtained from 

a nation in return for pr;i;yment in cash a.nd equipment only. Full advantage, of course, must be taken of such opportunities • 

..-----------

8. It should also be noted that m st -c e 

does not compare favorably 1n •quality with that of Third 

"""=pa,r-t,....,i .... ~-~---='i-n-g""'~ // Where US I • • I has been provided to a 

Third'. ··P,arty {L__J), acute dissatisfaction has been the r:e~ult in· 

several 'instances. A similar reaction may be anticipated from othE:!r 

nation~ ~o whom ourr f may be delivered. Our problems in 

this r~s~~c~'are maAe more difficult by th~ further reduc~ion of the 

value of'.US material resulting from the prohibition against retention 

of UKUSA 'case numbers on I !handed over to Third Parties. 

This latter prohibition stems directly from established policy designed 

to safeguard know~edge of the existence of UKUSA Co.MINT collaboration. 

9. It is felt, in view of the discussion above,. that Third Party 

arrangements cannot be conducted satisfactorily on a variety of bases 

established by USCIB in each instance and continuously modified to 

reflect changing situations. It is believed that such an approach will 

lead to unmanageable complexities and difficulties and is unsound in 

that no sufficiently firm terms of reference will exist at any given 

time to enable maintenance of a satisfactory relationship with each 

Third Party involved. It is suggested, instead, that USCIB should, in 

light of all the facts then available, decide as necessary in which of 

these two ways it wishes to deal with each Third Party: 

a, purchase of maximum C<>IINT material in return for minimum 

payment in cash, equipment and rudimentary COMINT material aa specified · under paragraphs 4 and 5 of Appendix P, or 

TOl' SEam'r CON'H{OL :NUMBER 54-1315E 

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l'OP SECRET FR6TII 

NSA form 781-ClOS 1 Jul 52 
,. 

-?c ~ - ..l.L ,4 

rr c... 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

'i'0P OECRft PRM'H 

b. technical collaboration up to the Third Party's level of 

canpetence on selected problems. 

10. Tbe technical nature of an arrangement permitting\ the exchange 

of COMINT data between COMINT agencies supports the view that NSA must 

conduct such collaboration. In the pa.st, other members of \USCIB have 

acted as executive agents in order to provide an "insulation" between 

Third Party COMI:NT authorities and NSA. In the case of arrangements 

where no exchange of COMINT is involved, this "insulation" should continue to exist. In the second type of arrangement, an "insu.lation" 

would, in fa.ct, impede the timeliness and effectiveness of technical 

collaboration. The contacts and correspondence necessary for\successfUl 

technical exchange may, however, be conducted under suitable <:.over when 

necessary or., with the understanding that surveillancf! of technical 

collaborati must, of necessity, be a function Qf NSA. Frequent use 

of a military officer, diplomatic official or CIA employee as the 

established means of contact is foreseen, especially when this.will 

preserve or enhance other non-COMINT international relationships 

parl. l~ularly in the intelligence field. Utilization of existing\ communicat:lnn channels maintained by USCIB membe'.E"s is contemplated also.. From 

a realistic viewpoint, the fiction ot' NSA ano~ty should be dislelled. 

DIRNSA is the US contact on SHAPE "Y" matters; _ \ _ are 

members of :NATO and will sc;on become familiar with. this fac.t, asl l 

DOW' is. 

11. The mechanics ot carrying on COMINT collaboration on an ex~hangein-tind basis must be deyeloped af'ter tJSCIB'has formulated policy governing 

the exchange. Details of communications,. C1t liaison, of sanitization, of 

the many items which will have to be covered will eventually be mutually 

agreed on, as in the case of UKUSA, CANUSA, and SHAPE ''Y". In partial 

clarification of HSA vievs, however, it may be stated that: 

a. The exchange with Third Parties of liaison personnel is not 

contemplated. 

b. Face to face technical discussions a.re not contemplated, 

except during initial negotiations and, possibly, during infrequent subsequent technical conferenceafor purposes approved in each instance by 

USCIB. 

c. The Director, BSA, will accept full and unique responsibility 

for monitoring technical relations to assure conformity with established 

USCIB policy governing such Third Party collaboration. 

d. No arb1 trary upper limit of collaboration should be set in 

Po1r1( IA in A terms· ot cr)'pt system or classification level. To Nation x, for example, 

NSA Form 781-ClOS 1 Jul 52 

!9P SBSliUH' CONTROL NUMBER 54-l.315E 

COPI ,:J.~ OF 45 COPIES. 

P.AGE~OF 5 .PAGES: 

'FOP SE€RE'F FROTII 
Po111~ lit ft l 

-m:. -::: ' 

TCV) SER! ~P.;A6tG4ihTll TU-- ttt:r; 1 r :ft:\ T 

which bas achieved solution of a major Soviet military system and which 

provides fUll technical details and end-products, NSA would provide any 

complementary technical material and end-products on this particular 

system. NSA would not provide data. on another Soviet system falling 

within the area of collaboration which Nation X had not demonstrated its 

ability to exploit. Within a problem worked on a collaborative basis, 

NSA would, however, provide to Nation X decryption information on a. 

system of comparable or lower grade not solved by Nation X if this would 

materially improve Nation X's unique take of material or production of 

information on the major military system above. 

12. It may be necessary to accept the possibility of combined 

UK/US arra.ngements with Third Parties, in order to prevent deterioration 

of US relations with the UK. In this connection it is noted .,hat what 

requires to be guarded as a secret is not the existence, but the extefit 

of~ C: col::i.a· .. tion. It is noted that initial UKUSA contacts 

with .were conducted by the UK, under limitations 

imposhy B. ~ sequently, direct us negotiations with these two 

countries were opened by t.he us. As a. result, the UK has lost the fruit· 

of its original ef.f'orts in\.this direction, and is dependent on the US 

for material it used to t"urnish the us. The desire of the US to exercise 

independence in its COMINT re.lations, except for restrictions imposed 

by Appendix P, ~·.a···.r···.e. d by··· ... the UK. This may particularly be the 

case insofar as~s concerned. 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP BEefelC.e CONTROL NUMBER 54-1315E 

COPY 9l/1= OF 4 5 COPIES 

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES 

TOP SECRET FRS~II NSA Form 781-ClOS 1 Jul 52 
REF ID:A60476 

TOP SECRET eoN I ROL 

11 S, 0Ffl.6h\tS ONtV · 

-

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

~L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

CIA M!MBER1S CCMMElf.t'S ON PROPOSA.LS FOR camrr 

BILl1'IQIS W.!Til INTw..tGENCE SIRVICE 

".__I -------

1. Attached heNto are the CClllll8nta ot tbe CIA maaber or the 

Ad Hoc Ccmmi t.tee Np1'd:S.rc the dltf81'8nCM betwen the t1IO poliq 

propoul• 'llhiab are b8lng aubm1t'teci t.o USCIB. It •ould be noted 

that t.m CIA wber1 a propoaal apl'888nta no adlcal dlparture trm 

Board practice or stated poliq, although the CN1'NDt. met.bods upon 

11bicb it. is buad prori.da the neoea8a17' tlaz1bllit7 tor extemion ot 

caan aft"8J21•arta v.s.t.b I I to art/ dagx9 

deld..nd by USCIB. 

2. !he attaahed dl.80\Jll8ion, ll8t :tort.b under t.he six •.1or 

dltte1'9IJD8ll betwen the two proposed policiea, elaborates the ll101"8 

1mportant. upecta c4 the CIA poait,icm. 

TOP SE:CR~T CO~JT~OL 

tJ. s. 0ffl61ALS er~LY 
,-.. EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

POINT NO.Is 

!§!: 11 ..... objective of u.s • .P-.Qlicy is to estabJish COO!fl collaborationo .... dasifmed to glloit Elllhaustivel.l/their CCMINr potential. 11 

CIA: 

-

CIA: 

-

• 

"When USCIB deems '·t necossaq in order to etf'ect the maximum 

protitab1e expl~.:tation ot the CCMJNr potential of these 

countries a minimllll awrrrte amount ot technical CCMJ:lfl 

iia'omation as detal"lllined USCIB mq be r!leased. ii · 

.. * * * 
,,,--. . 

B. CL~. concurs that no tld.rd B:31 ~ent ahOllld operate 

to th8d8ti"Llant of current u. ~~tiom with the u.1. 

or Caii8dil. 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

POINT NO.III: PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

BSA.: 

- 11 ..... in the event it is :Jead tbat t;r.l~te c:U.scussiona L1; are 0£ adiijli to tile WQDs 

ittort ••••• 0 

CIA1 

--

4. ,:.;.q.tr._... I"'" ~ · -·-(-\·: ,- \.,. A. ed·to th U.K 

!· **** 

~-~ ·\' . _ in vi th these oountrJ.ea !be present prod.• 

r-". sicme ppendl.X aJ.'8 adaquate to ~ the areas of muliml 

-~ ~\:''- . \ · · · , US/UK 1nte1'ests wlth_out 1DldulT tJing u.,s. bands. Ari¥ turtb.-. 

·,_ ·· .r;..• -;, ~- restr.lct.1.ans requiring coo~d:i.ration with the U.K•. voUl.d hamstring 

'fa: ~., ~- .... 

• '· - '\ 1 __ tbe u.s. in lllalJ1' 1181'&)· far ·8Dlllple. in mak:tng Prelim:l.na17 

unUatanal ·ezplor•:tionsJ in utilising Qm" super.Lor econantc - barp1D:lng POWllJllJ and in conducting 8D1 a..S.'tive Purel.7 

Ar"• '-"". ~ ,_ clanc:Jaat1De ~tians for Prcc:uramarit of CCHIH! mater.tals. 

f,/eT ("' :' 

4.f ,-/ /; _-- .. - ,., i-./ ::; 

A::: fi-:>N, .r:.e.. ................ hc7"~ :J... .;··r.n..:w;..:.) 

t- " ; .:''< I ")..- ) 
REF ID:A60476 

Jf)f' SECRET CONTROL 

1:1. S. 6FFtelALS ONt'i 

-, E;o 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

dlaCUBaicme in \hie .tiald. Tripart4.te ~a ill certain 

covert h81d8 &m TM"'proved to be embartaa#irlg\to all 

ccmcemecl. The naticmal interests of these countr:les baa lead 

to a deal.re to d88l. unUateTa.l.q 111.th the u.r. and tlle\u.s •• 

mt.her t.han to deal en a tr.t.partl.te ar multiparU.w basia. 

POift HO.IVs 

'ISA1 

-

CIA a 

-

9, f'-f"<-- /O,J 

~- ~T (,. 

,.,.... •. __ ,.J" ~. \

' ,. 

("<" \~··''· 

, ...... } 

C-c-. }>,,..~ ... JO ; I). 

£ '~. i' l-r.-t ...,,~-~~,..(.( .. ""' I tj 

,;_._~;._~··~ I ~t' ~;t...4-.,_...J;;. 

f.>_~.f! ('(' .•.• -t 

7 

  

-JTOP SECRET CON I ROL 

tJ. S. OFFICIALS ONLY 
(f. ~~r..- lo ,4....K- . \l ) 

~-~ 

\~,.-,~.J- .... ~ II b 

:aF ID: A604 76 "'" r"rnni--r ,...,,..,"T"'~,..,_.,,.-- ~ 3.3(h) (2) 

dEbffe:f bU~}HUL PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

II S Qffl~~~ILY -- · qaallt.J' o£ thel / //l~P ·rs apeo"d to improve upon. 

~al.cm of' ~~cal assiatame alreac:\y authol"J.sed b1' USCIBJ 

tbal !output ·could be ·81.miJarJ.7iaproved11hen USCIB cona:l.dered 11; du1nbl.e to provide such aaat.atama. 

I 

~ 

t thq are not. nuo11Bll' dlrling 

with t.he ul.tiate U.S. producer of Camtr o ISA. baa 

gtTeD di.NC\ and indirect taohm.cal a111d.stance •o en without 

un~ a:poai.ng RSA operations to acraitizv or questioning• 

r. IBl---~UIM!erCIA«:-:. Lft!fi neoaeaai=h~jfi c;~; Ju 

COft1" ~ar parti.cd.paticn in techmQ&l dl.acussiom ... _ 111.tb maaben 

ot th- COORl' eem.cea. In the past, this method has allowed 

dlrect pal'U.cipation o£ t ecbnical axpel'ta w.l.thout. the ocmcclld:tmt 

aeour.ltq r.lllk of a:po11112g the vork ot the Ba\ioml saouri.v Al91'1C1'• 

aa •uab• to a faral.gn illta111geme 118l"lice. 

POINT NO. Va 

BSla 

-

CIA= - (Bo dlreot atatanant) 

** ** 

-4-

T6f SECRET CONTROL 

U, S, OFFICl'1 S ON! V 
',,f ··c,,.-~ 

.-.. 

. UIUSA. .. nt tor third party arramement.s as 11 nei?Rt.iated 

vlth 0 NT author! ties on an otticial. ba8is." ot course, these agreanema are '6etween iiitelltgence•semces, rather 

than tonal EmJCutive agreements binding the heads of stateso 

B.· More formal· agreements, as .envisaged bx ?t>A, would be · . 

poli'l:d«wlllf. dUTicult, it novrn;nble, fran the u.s. point 

of T.1.•• t is understood that . 1'0 mEIDbers are enjoined not 

to ma& bilateral arranganents among themselves; therefore• 

cODOUl'Nnce ot the u.s. Jc¢nt Chiefs of Statt mul.d doubtl .. 

be ii::::~te t.o ;J~rtak.· ing ~ more __ •· fOl'lll&l agreements w1 th Vthe ipalit1ca1 opinion o£ the Department of~e cons~redr and the approval of the Naticmal. 

Secvit7 Council might/be iequ:Lred. 

E. Fomal &gft!lllent8 would be more dlff'icult to terminate or 

alter tban the pl'98mt ~-ant~. If secur.l.ty or otber 

comd..dir&ticms so req\iired, the present arrangement~ could be 

teminated wit.bout political difficulty or diplana.tic 

embanaasment. If the arrangElllenta wre more toniaJ.1 thi8 

would not be poaaibl.eo 

P<lIN'l' NO. VI I 

RSA.s 

- (Bo direct atatEIDBnt) 

CIA: 

- "The ~r.tncipl.a undm'lling the devel.olnent ot CCMM Frarli •••• oiu !fliat mulmum utluidiOii ih01iid 6e •de of 

TOP SEGRtfira CONTROL 

U. S, OfflGIAtS ONLY 
_ .... 

... 

- ..