### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT J une 7, 20 04 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK

Honora ble Norma

n H. Stahl, United States Circuit J udg e for the Fir st Circuit, sit ting by * desig nation. [PUBLIS H]

IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 03- 1149 7

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D . C. D oc ke t N o. 01- 0795 1 C V -W JZ CORAL SPRI NGS STREET SYSTEMS, INC., a Fl or ida c or por at ion , Plaintiff-Appellee, ve rs us CITY OF SUNRISE, aF l o r i d amun i c i p a l i t y, D ef en dant- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (J un e 7, 200 4) Be fo re H U L L , MA RC U S an d S T A H L , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. * MAR CUS , C ircuit Judg e:2

Inthi s si gn o rd inanc e ca se , the Ci ty of S unr ise ( the “ Ci ty ”) appe al s th e district court’ s grant of final sum m ary j udgm ent in favor of the plaintiff, Coral Sp ri ngs Stre et

S y ste m s, I nc . ( “ Co ra l S pr ing s” ). C or al S pr ing s pe tit ion ed f or equit ab le r el ie f in the U nit ed S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt f or the S outhe rnD istri ct

of Fl or ida , c la im ing that A rt ic le X IVof the Ci ty ’ s L an d D ev el opm ent C ode ( the

“ Si gn C ode ”) w as unc onst itu tio na l i n it s e nti re ty a t the ti m e that C or al S pr ing s applied for and was denied a sign perm it. A fter thorough review, we are convin ced the case is m oot and th eref ore nonjusticiable. Before suit was even brought in this case, the old Sign Code wa s replaced by the Ci ty w ithan “ A m en de d S ignCo de ” that e lim inate d m ost of the co nst itu tio na lly

inf irm pr ovi sio ns; but

the ne wCo de unque sti ona bly pr ohi bit ed

the sig n th at Co ra l S pr ing s w an ts t o e re ct . Mo re ove r, the re is no h int the Ci ty of Sunr ise ha s any

int en tio n of

r ee na ct ing the old

S ignCo de . A nd, a s w e re ad the lawof F lor ida , Co ra l S pr ing s a cquir ed no v es te d r igh t i n ape rm it to b uil d th e sig n, both be ca use it ha s no t r el ie d de tr im en ta lly on the lawa s it

e xis te d un de r the old S i g n C o d e an db e c au s e th e C i t y h a s a tn o p o i n ta c t e di n b a df a i t h . F i n a l l y, portio ns o f the A m en de d S ignCo de that m ay be unc onst itu tio na l are f ull y s e v e r ab l e f

r o m th o s e th a ta c tu a l l y c au s e dth e p e rmi tt o b e d e n i e d . Ac c o r d i n g l y,3

w e re ve rs e the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t and r em an d w ith ins tr uc tio ns t o di sm iss f

or la ck of sub j ec t m atte r j ur isd ic tio n.

I

T he f ac ts o f thi s c as e ar e not

in dis put e. C or al S pr ing s S tr ee t S y ste m s is en ga ge d inthe bus ine ss o f co nstru ct ing bil lbo ar ds o n r ea l e state that i t buy s or leases. On March 17, 1999, Str eet Infor m ation Sy stem s, I nc., another billbo ard co m pany not inv olv ed in thi s c as e, e nte re d in to a le as e ag re em en t w ithS aw gr as s Fo rd , I nc . , ac ar

de al er loc at ed in the Ci ty

of S unr ise . U nde r the te rm s of the agreem ent, S aw grass Ford agree d to lease land on its property to Street In fo rm at ionS y ste m s f

or tw en ty y ears , so tha t S tr ee t I nf

orm at ionS y ste m s c oul d e r e c tab i l l b o a r do v e r l o o k i n g ab u s y th o r o u g h f a r e , th e S a w g r a s s Ex p r e s s w a y. Severa l provisi ons of the agreem ent violated th e Sign Code. Am ong o ther thing s, the agre em ent providedfor the construction of a “pole sign ,” which w as pr ohi bit ed

und er the S ignCo de . Mo re ove r, the S ignCo de a llo w ed onl y one sig n to b e er ec te d one ac h pi ec e of pr ope rty , and S aw gr as s F or d a lr ea dy ha d asig n, so the construction of another one plainly violated the Sign Cod e.Section 16-252 pre scribed tha t the normal “H eig ht Max imum” for sig ns was “6 f t.” and 1 that “[i] f a sign is to be located be hind an exist ing r equire d hedg e or if visibility of an e x isting sign is blocke d by

an existi ngrequire d hedg e and the hedg e has a minimum require d heig ht of thirty (30) inche s or more, the n the g round sig n may have a maxi mum height of

eig ht and onehalf (8 1⁄2) fee t.” Specifica lly , under § 16- 252 , the “ A re a m ax im um ” fo r sig ns w ith“ 200 ft . or 2 m or e of f ro nta ge ” w as “ 60 s q. f

t. , ” an d th e m ax im

um f or sig ns w ith“ le ss than 20 0 ft. of frontage” w as “ 36 sq. ft.” But for signs blocked b y existing required hedges as de sc ri be d a

bove , “ the sig n are a sha ll not e xc ee d f if ty -o ne ( 51) squ ar e fe et

and fr ont ag e le ss than tw o hundr ed ( 200) f ee t, or e igh ty -f ive ( 85) squ ar e fe et

f or frontage two hundred (200) feet or greater .” 4 O n Augus t 1, 200 0, S tr ee t I nf orm at ionS y ste m s a ssi gne d it s r igh ts, ti tle , and interest in the lease to the plaintiff Coral S prings. On S eptem ber 6, 2001 , C oral Sp ri ngs ap pli ed

f or ape rm it to e re ct

an “ of f- pr em ise s” out door

a dve rt isi ng s ignon a pol e. A t the top of

the pol e Co ra l S pr ing s in te nde d to pla ce atw o- sid ed , illum inated, 672-square-foot sign face. O n Septem ber 18, the C ity

verbally denied the appl ic at ionand, on N ove m be r 13, the Ci ty

c onf irm ed the de nia l i n w ri tin g, obse rv ing that the pr opos ed sig n w oul d vi olate the S ignCo de in no l es s th ansix dif fe re nt w ay s: 1. § 16 -2 52 o f the S ignCo de a llo w ed no s ignto ex ce ed

8. 5 f ee t i n height. T he sign Coral Springs appli ed for w ouldhave been 65 feet

1 ta ll. 2. § 16 -2 52 f

la tly pr ohi bit ed

any sig n th at e xc ee de d e igh ty -f

ive square fee t in total su rfac e ar ea. T he proposed s ign would h ave had 2 anare a of 672 squ ar e fe et .“ T h e f o l l o w i n gs i g n s ar e p r o h i b i t e d anyw h e r e i nth e c i ty: 3

. . . . (7) Pole sig ns.” Sign Code § 16-248( a). “L andsca ping of g round sig n. I f a ground sig n is not placed in an a rea of re quired 4 land sc a pin ga s c onta ine d in

art ic le VI I I , th e n a

pla nti ngbe d at le a st two (2 ) f e e t in de pth sh a ll surround the sign. This bed shall contain shrubs a nd supplemental g round cove r, and sha ll be sh own o n th e sit e pla

n. I f t he ba se of

the sign is le ss t

ha n th ir ty (3 0) inc he s, the land sc a

pin gmus t be equa l to the heig ht of the base , subject to approva l by the planningand deve lopment depar tment. In no case shall the plantingbe less than e ighte en (18) inches in height.” Si gn Co de § 16 -2 55. The Code de fined a

n “off -pre mise sign” as “[a]ny

sign a dvertisinga commer cial 5 establishment, activity , product, ser vice or enter tainment, which is sold, produce d, manufa cture d, available or fur

nished at a pla ce othe r than on the pr operty on which the sign is located.” I d. § 16-247(b) (24). 5 3. § 16-252 said th at the “ Num ber m axim

um ” for “ Nonresidential district perm anent signs ” w as “ 1 per parce l with m ain street fr ont ag e. ” T he pr opos ed sig n w oul d inf

ac t have be enthe se co nd sig n onthe parc el . 4. § 16-248(a)(7) included “pole sign s” on the list o f “prohibi ted signs .” T he proposed s ign would h ave been m ount ed on a pole.

3 5. § 16-255 m andated specific landscaping desig ns for signs. Coral 4 Springs’ propos ed sign in cluded no land scaping whatsoever. 6. § 16 -2 48( a) (6 ) pr ohi bit ed “ [o ] ff -p re m ise c om

m er ci al sig ns o r billb oards except bus shelter or bench sign s, and tem porary proje ct sig n [ sic . ] . ” Co ra l S pr ing s’ pr opos ed sig n w as an of

f- pr em ise co m m er ci al sig n no t f

al lin g w ith in any

of the e xc ep tio ns. 5 The C ode also contain ed a num ber of other noteworthy

provisio ns, not cited as rea sons for the r ej ection of Coral Springs’ application, but oth erw ise attackedFor example, § 16-248(a) of the Sig n Code said that “[t] he followingsigns a re pr ohibited 6 any wher e in the city : . . . Animated or fla shing signs . . . Ba nner signs . . . Bunting s and flag s . . . t e mp o r ar y an d p e r m an e n ts i g n s , o th e r

th anp u b l i c i n t e r e s ts i g n s , p l a c e [ d ] o nany p u b l i c p r o p e rty .

. . [an d] [a ]ny

sign n ot p re sc ri be d a s a

pe rm itt e d s ign b y

thi s a rt ic le . I d. § 1 6- 24 8( a ). B ut § 16-248(a ) also excepted c erta in signs fr om its prohibit ions, including a nimated or fla shing signs that display

the time or temper ature ; temporary grand ope ning or

specia l event banne r sig ns; the United States flag ; bus shelter or be nch sig ns, and tempora ry projec t signs; and tempor ary and perma nent public intere st signs. I d. § 16-248(a )(2) , (3), ( 4), (6) & ( 12). Section 16-250 per

mitted certa in “Public interest sig ns,” including“sig ns place d on bus benche s[,] . . . [d] irec tional signs for churc hes, schools or other like institutions[ , and] [ s]uch sim ila r s ig ns a s th e c ity

c omm iss ion

de e ms a pp ro pr iate .” I d. § 1 6- 25 0( a ). Se c tio n 1 6- 25 0 a lso permitted “[s]t ree t signs, tra ffic signs, directional a nd locational sig ns and roa dside memorial signs plac ed by

g overnme nt ag encie s or with g overnme ntal approva l”; “[i] nterior sig n[s] within a lobby or cour ty ard not visible from public r ight of way”; and “ [n] o-trespa ssing or no-dumping signs.” I d. § 16-250(b) . Section 16-253(a ) per mitted certa in “[t] empora ry signs,” including “[g]rand ope ning ba

nner sign[s] ,” “[m]odel si g ns,” “[p]ol itical sign[s]” (for 60 da y s befor e an elec tion and 14 day s after), “[r]eal estate sign[s],” “[c] ontrac tor sign[s],” “[g]arag e sale sign[s],” “ [p]r oje c t si g n[s], ” “ [s]pe c ia l e ve nts sign[s], ” and “ [r]o a ds ide me mor ia l si g n[s]. ” Withc e rt a in exceptions inapplicable to Coral Spring s, the Sign Code a lso provided that “it shall be unlaw ful fo r a ny pe rs on to e re c t, c on str

uc t, e nla rg e , mo ve or

c onve rt any sign in the c ity , o r c a

us e the same to be done, without first obtaininga sig n permit for e ach suc h sign f rom the De partment a s require d by

the Code.” § 16- 261(b)( 1). Notably , the Sign Code ne ver la id out the specific grounds on which the City could re ject sign pe rmit applications, nor did it contain any provision requiringthe City to make dec isions on pe rm it a pp lic atio ns wi thi n a

sp e c if ic tim e lim it. 6 by Co ra l S pr ing s a s be ing unc onst itu tio na l. I n r es pons e to the Ci ty ’ s li st o f 6 pur porte d tr an sgr es sio ns, Co ra l S pr ing s’ a tto rn ey w ro te the Ci ty

on N ove m

be r 25, 2001 , c la im ing that the Ci ty ’ s S ignCo de vio la te d th e Fi rs t A m en dm en t. Jus t six te enday s late r, on D ec em be r 11, the Ci ty

a m en de d th e Si gn C ode , a dopt ing O rd inanc e N o. 402 -0 1- K , § 1 (the “ A m en de d S ignCo de ”) , e lim inatin g m an y of the allegedly

unconst itutio nal provisi ons of the oldSign Code. T he Am ended Sign Code sub stantivelyretained all the provisions of the Sign Code that we re7

ci te d in the r ej ec tio n of

Co ra l S pr ing s’ sig n a

ppl ic at ion . T hus, § 16 -2 52 o f the A m en de d S ignCo de pr ohi bit ed sig ns o ve r 8. 5 f

ee t hi gh, or

ove r 85 s quare f

ee t i n area , or m ore than one sign p er par cel. Sec tion 1 6-248(6) prohib ited “ pole sign s.” Se ct ion16- 255 se t f

orth the e xa ct

sam e landsc ap ing r equir em en ts c ont ai ne d inthe Si gn C ode . S ec tio n 16 -2 47( b) (2 6) de fi ne d an “ [o ] ff -p re m ise sig n” a s “ [a ] ny

sig n adve rt isi ng a

c om m er ci al e sta

bli shm en t, a ct ivi ty , pr oduc t, se rv ic e or en te rt ai nm en t, w hic h is sol d, pr oduc ed , m anuf ac tur ed , a va ila

ble or f ur nis he d a t a p l a c e o t h e r

th an o n th e p r o p e rt y o n w h i c h th e s i g n i s l o c a t e d ” - - e x a c t l y t h e s a me de fi nit iongiv ento an“ of f- pr em ise c om

m er ci al sig n” in the S ignCo de . A nd § 16 -2 48 pro hi bi te d s uc h “ [o ]ff-pre m is es si gn s ex cep t t em po rary pro

ject s ig ns .” The A m ended Sign Code didm ake som e significant changes. T he new Co de sa id tha t “ [n ] otw ith standi ng any pr ovi sio ns o f thi s art ic le to the c ontrary , to the e xte nt tha t this art ic le c ont ai ns a sig n c ont ai nin g c om

m er ci al c opy , it

sha ll pe rm it a non- co m

m er ci al sig n to the sam e ex te nt. ” A m en de d S ignCo de § 16 - 247( a) . T he pr ovi sio n a llo w ing te m por ar y pol iti ca l si gns im

pose d ti m e lim its on pol iti ca l si gns onl y

“ [i ] f the c opy

is re la te d to an e le ct ion . ” I d. § 16 -2 53. T he A m en de d S ignCo de a lso spe ci fi ca lly pr ovi de d th at

the Ci ty “ sha ll ap pr ove or de ny the sig n pe rm it ba se d onw he the r it co m pli ed w iththe r equir em en ts o f thi s ar tic le , ” Id . § 16 -2 61, and i t r equir ed appr ova l or

de nia l of pe rm it ap pli catio ns7

Th e a pp lic ant m ay

fi le a wr itt e n n oti c e of

a pp e a l to the c ity

c omm iss ion

wi thi n fi ft e e n ( 15 ) d ay s a ft e r t

he re c e ipt of the de pa rtme nt’ s wri tte n n oti c e . T he c ity c o m m i s s i o ns h a l l h e ar

th e a p p e a l an d r e n d e r a d e c i s i o nw i th i nth i rty ( 3 0 ) d ays afte r the date of re ceivingthe written notice of appe al. I f the c ity commission does not g rant the a

ppeal, then the applicant may seek r elief in the Circ uit Court for B rowa

rd County , as provided by law. Amended Sig n Code § 16-261. 8 w ith in 3 0 day s a ft er

r ec ei pt o f anappl ic at ion . I d. F ina lly , the ne wCo de e xpr es sly pr ovi de d f

or pr om pt a ppe llate r ev ie wof

appl ic at ionde nia ls b y

the c ity c o mm i s s i o n an db y th e C i r c u i tC o u rto f B r o w a r dC o u n t y. 7 Notably , C oral Springs never rea pplied for a perm it und er the A m ended Si gn C ode . I nst ea d, it

f ile d su it in f

ed er al dis tr ic t c ourt onD ec em be r 31, 200 1. I ts argum ent essentially

wa s that the Sign Code was unconstit ution al on its face when Co ra l S pr ing s a

ppl ie d f or the pe rm it on S ep te m

be r 6, 200 1; tha t the unc onst itu tio na l pr ovi sio ns o f the S ignCo de c oul d no t be se ve re d f ro m the co nst itu tio na l part s, m eanin g th e en tir e statut e w as unl aw fu l and the re fo re voi d; an d c onse que ntl y , that the re w as no e nf or ce ab le S ignCo de in pla ce a t the ti m e of th e ap pl ic at io n. In sh or t, t he pl ai nt iff sai d, t he ap pl ic at io n s at is fie d a ll st at e la ws an d th e Ci ty

ha d no va lid

ba sis f or r ej ec tin g it , and, und er

F lor ida law , it s r igh t t o t h e b u i l d i n g p e rmi tv e s t e da tth e mo men ti ts ub mi t t e dan ap p l i c a t i o n . F i n a l l y,9

Coral Springs claim ed, par ts of the Am ended Sign Code rem ained unc onst itu tio na l. The C ity responded that th e law suit was m oot because the City had am ended the challenged Sign Cod e and Coral S prings h ad never re applied for a perm it und er the newlaw . Furtherm ore, the City argued, the old Sign Code wa s constitu tional anyway , and to th e extent that parts of it m ay not have been, they w er e none the le ss s ev er ab le f ro m the r em ai nin g va lid

part s, w hic h in cl ude d a ll of the pr ovi sio ns c ite d by

the Ci ty in de ny ing Co ra l S pr ing s’ appl ic at ion . F ina lly , the Ci ty sa id, Co ra l S pr ing s ha d no ve ste d r igh t t o th e ap pr ova l of it s pe rm it. O n F eb ru ar

y 21, 200 3, the dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d sum m ar y j udgm en t i n f

av or of Coral S prings o n all counts. See Coral Springs St. Sy s., Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1313 (S.D . F la. 2003 ). Bef ore deciding whether it had j urisdictio n, the district court first r uled that the oldSign Code was uncons titutio nal. T he court rea soned th at the original Code favored com m ercia l spe ec h ov er

non -c om m er ci al spe ec h by

pr ohi bit ing c er

ta in k ind s of non-comm ercia l signs , but not prohib iting any kind o f com

m ercia l sign. Id. at 1319 . I n a ddi tio n, the c ourt f ound that the Co de im

pe rm iss ibl y

r es tr ic te d si gns on the ba sis of

c ont en t, be ca

use som e nonc om

m er ci al m es sa ge s w er e pe rm itt ed w hil e oth er s w er e not . I d.10

As f or m ootn ess, the district court held that the case w as j usticiable. It wr ote: T he Ci ty

arg ue s th at

Co ra l S pr ing s’ c la im s are m oot ed by the en ac tm en t of

the A m en de d S ignCo de . T he E le ve nthCi rc uit ha s he ld that “ w he n an a

ppl ic at ionf

or ape rm it sa tis fi es a ll ex ist ing and pe ndi ng l aw s, the pe rm it m ust the n is sue : a

ne wlawpa sse d a ft er

the ap p l i ca t i o n wa s fi l edh as n o ef fe ct o n th e mat t ero f i s s u an ce ,” Na t ’l A dve r. Co . v. Ci ty

of F ort L au de rd al e, 8 F . 3d 3 6 ( 11th C ir . , O ct . 26, 1993 ) (per

curiam) (unpublis hed table decision No. 92-4750). H ere, Co ra l S pr ing s a

ppl ie d f or ape rm it pr ior

to the e na ctm en t of

the Am ended Sign Code. T he enactm ent of the Am ended Sign Code, the re fo re , doe s no t [ a] ff

ec t the iss ue of

w he the r Co ra l S pr ing s ha s a v es t edri g h ti n th e p er m i tfo r w h i ch i tap p l i ed . Th u s , t h e c i t y’ s ar gum en t tha t C or al S pr ing s’ c la im s are m oot f ai ls. Id . a t 13 19- 20. T he dis tr ic t c ourt c onc lud ed that be ca use the unc onst itu tio na l po rt ion s of the Sign Code could n ot be severed fr om its consti tutio nal parts and because Coral Sp ri ngs’ r igh t t o th e pe rm it cate gor ic al ly ve ste d a t the ti m e it subm itt ed it s ap p l i c a t i o n , C o r a l S p r i n g s h a dar i g h tt o th e p e rmi t . I d . a t1 3 2 0 - 2 1 . Ac c o r d i n g l y, it gr an te d sum

m ar y j udgm en t i n f

av or of Co ra l S pr ing s, or de ri ng the Ci ty to iss ue the pe rm it. I d. a t 13 21. T he Ci ty the n to ok this appe al . II11

Moo tne ss i s th e thr es hol d qu es tio n inthi s c as e. A rt ic le I II of the Co nst itu tio n li m its the j ur isd ic tio n of f ed er al c ourts t o “ ca se s” and

“ co ntr ove rs ie s. ” L uj anv. D ef en de rs of W ild lif e, 504 U . S. 555 , 559 , 112 S . Ct . 2130 , 213 6, 119 L . E d. 2d 3 51 ( 1992 ). “ Be ca use the j udi ci ar

y is une le ct ed

and unr ep re se ntativ e, the A rt ic le I II c as e- or -c ontro ve rs y li m itatio n, a s e m

bodi ed in j usticiabili ty

doctrine, pre sents an im

portant restriction on th e power of the feder al co ur ts .” So ci al is t Work ers Part y v. Leah y , 14 5 F .3d12 40 , 12 44 (11 th Cir . 19 98 ). As the Supre m e Court has put it, “ the ‘ case or c ontroversy ’ requirem ent defines w ithr es pe ct

to the Jud ic ia l B ranc h th e ide a of se paratio n of

pow er s onw hic h th e Fe de ra l G ove rn m en t i s f

ound ed . T he se ve ra l do ctri ne s th at have gr ow n up to el ab or at e that r equir em en t are ‘ fo unde d inc onc er n a bout the pr ope r -- and pr ope rl y li m ite d - - ro le of

the c ourts i n ade m oc ratic soc ie ty . ’ ” A lle n v. Wri ght , 468 U . S. 737 , 750 , 104 S . Ct . 331 5, 332 4, 82 L . E d. 2d 5 56 ( 1984 ) (quot ing W ar th v. S el din , 422 U . S. 490 , 498 , 95 S . Ct . 219 7, 220 5, 45 L . E d. 2d 3 43 ( 1975 )) . T he pow er fu l l im itatio ns tha t A rt ic le I II pla ce s onthe f ed er al j udi ci ar

y - - inc lud ing the m ootne ss d oc tr ine - - re la te to a ce nturi es -o ld “ ide a . . . about the c onst itu tio na l and pr ude nti al li m its to the pow er s of an un el ec te d, unr ep re se ntativ e j udi ci ar y in our kindof governm ent.” Vander Jagt v. O 'N eill, 699 F. 2d 11 66, 1179 (D. C. Cir. 19 83 ) (Bo rk , J., co nc urrin g) .12

Pl ai nly , if asui t i s m oot , it

c an not pr es en t an A rt ic le I II c as e or c ontro ve rs y and the federa l courts lack subject m atter j urisdictio n to entertain it. Se e A l Na jj ar v. A shc ro ft , 273 F . 3d 1 330, 133 6 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ( pe r curi am) (“ [M ] ootne ss i s j urisdictio nal. Any

decision on the m erits of a m oot case or issue would be an im pe rm iss ibl e advis or

y opi nio n. ” ( int er

na l qu otatio n m ar

ks and c itatio ns om itt ed )) ; S oc ia lis t W orke rs P ar ty , 145 F . 3d at 12 44. Mo otn es s c anoc cur due to a ch an ge in ci rc um stanc es , or , a s he re , ac hange in the law . A s w e ha ve sa id,

“ [w ] he n asub se que nt l awbr ing s th e ex ist ing c ontro ve rs y to ane nd the c as e be co m es m oot

and s houl d be tr eate d a cc or din gly . ” Co al iti on f or the Abol iti on o f Mari j uanaP ro hib iti on v . Ci ty of A tlanta , 219 F . 3d 1 301, 131 0 ( 11th C ir . 200 0) (c iti ng C hur chof

S ci en tol ogy

F la g S er v. O rg . , I nc . v. Ci ty

of Cl earw at er , 777 F . 2d 598, 605 (11t h Cir. 1985 )) ( internal quotatio n m arks om itted). T herefor e, we are re qui re d to a ddr es s th e j ur isd ic tio na l qu es tio n be fo re w e m ay c onsi de r the m er its of the case. W e re vie wthe que sti on o f m ootne ss d e novo . C hr ist ian C oa lit ionof A la ba m a v. Co le , 355 F . 3d 1 288, 129 0 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) ( ci tin g U nit ed S ta te s v. Fl a. A za le a Sp ec ia lis ts, 19 F . 3d 6 20, 621 ( 11th C ir . 199 4) ). A s w e ha ve not ed , the Ci ty of S unr ise arg ue s th at

thi s c as e is m oot

be ca use it a m en de d th e Si gn C ode soon after the plaintiff com

plained abou t its const itutio nality , and, notably , bef ore13

an y law sui t w as f

ile d. C or al S pr ing s r es pond s w ithtw o ba sic arg um en ts: f ir st, it say s th at ade fe ndant’ s vo lun tary

c es sa tio n of

an il le ga l a ct ivi ty

c an not m oot a law sui t be ca

use the a ct ivi ty

c anbe r es um ed

a s so on a s th e ca se is dis m iss ed ; and se co nd, it c la im s th at , und er

F lor ida law , it s r igh t t o ape rm it ve ste d up on subm itting its origin al application, and that we m ust therefore deter

m ine whether the old Sign Code wa s constit ution ally valid in order to decide whether C oral Sp ri ngs w as e nti tle d to ape rm it. W e ar e pe rs ua de d by ne ith er arg um en t and, ac co rd ing ly , hol d th at

thi s c as e is m oot . A . V olu nt ar y C es sat ion As f or volun tary

cessation, “ [i] t has long been the rule that ‘ volu ntary ce ssatio n of

a lle ge dly il le ga l c ondu ct

doe s no t de pr ive the tr ibuna l of pow er to he ar and d et er m ine the c as e, i. e. , doe s no t m ak e the c as e m oot . ’ ” Se c’ y of L ab or v. Burg er K ing Co rp . , 955 F . 2d 6 81, 684 ( 11th C ir . 199 2) ( quot ing U nit ed S ta te s v. W .T. GrantCo ., 34 5 U.S. 6 29 , 63 2, 7 3 S . Ct. 8 94 , 89 7, 9 7 L. Ed. 1 30 3 (1 95 3) ).

“ Be ca use of the pos sib ili ty

that the de fe ndant c oul d m er el y r et ur n to his old

w ay s, [t ] he te st f

or m ootne ss i n c as es suc h a s th is i s astr ing en t on e. . . . Ac as e m igh t be co m e m oot

if sub se que nt e ve nts m ad e it ab sol ute ly c le ar that the a lle ge dly14

w ro ngf ul b eh av ior

c oul d no t r ea sona

bly be e xpe ct ed

to re cur. ” I d. ( al te ratio n in original) (internal quotatio n m arks and citation om itted). H owever , governm ental en tit ie s and o ff

ic ia ls h av e be engiv enc onsi de ra bly m or e le ew ay

than pr ivate parties in the presum

ption that they

are unlik ely

to resum e illegal activities. S ee Ra gsda le v. T ur

noc k, 841 F . 2d 1 358, 136 5 ( 7thCi r. 198 8) ( “ [C ] es sa tio n of the allegedly illegal conduct bygovernm ent officials has been treated with m ore solicitu de by

the courts than sim ilar ac tion b y private parties. ”). G en er al ly , a

c ha lle nge to the c onst itu tio na lity of astatut e is m oot ed

by re pe al of the statut e. I n C oa lit ionf or the Abol iti on o f Mari

j uanaP ro hib iti on, f

or ex am ple , apane l of

thi s C ourt sa id tha t “ whe n an or din an ce is re pe al ed by the en ac tm en t of

asup er se din g st at

ute , the n th e ‘ supe rs ed ing statut e or r eg ulatio n m oot s ac as e onl y

to the e xte nt tha t i t r em ove s c ha lle nge d f eatur es of the pr ior law . ’ ” 219 F. 3d at 13 10 ( quot ing N at ur ist S oc ’ y , I nc . v. F ill y aw , 958 F . 2d 1 515, 1520 (11th Cir. 1992)). Moreover, on num erous occasions, the Suprem e Court has he ld tha t the r ep ea l of

or a m en dm en t t o c ha lle nge d le gis la tio n r en de re d m oot a pla int if f’ s r eque st f

or inj unc tiv e re lie f. S ee , e . g. , L ew is v . Co nt’ l B an k C or p. , 494 U . S. 472 , 474 , 110 S . Ct . 124 9, 125 2, 108 L . E d. 2d 4 00 ( 1990 ) (h old ing that a Co m m er ce Cl au se -b as ed

c ha lle nge to Fl or ida

banki ng s ta tut es w as r en de re d m oot by am endm ents to the law); Ma ssachusetts v . O akes, 491 U. S. 576, 582-83, 109 S.15

Ct . 263 3, 263 7- 38, 105 L . E d. 2d 4 93 ( 1989 ) (h old ing that an ov er br ea dth ch al le nge to a ch ild

por nogr ap hy laww as r en de re d m oot

by a m en dm en t t o th e st atut e); Pri nc et on Uni v. v . Sch m id , 45 5 U.S. 1 00 , 10 3, 1 02 S. Ct. 8 67 , 86 9, 7 0 L. E d. 2d 8 55 ( 1982 ) (p er

c ur iam ) (h old ing that the c ha lle nge to a uni ve rs ity regulation was m oot because the regulation h ad been substant ially am ended); K re m en s v. Bart le y , 431 U . S. 119 , 128 -2 9, 97 S . Ct . 170 9, 171 5, 52 L . E d. 2d 1 84 (1 977) ( hol din g m oot

ac onst itu tio na l c ha lle nge to a state statut e gove rn ing the invo luntary

com m itm ent of m entally

ill m inors, because the lawhad been replace d w ithadif fe re nt s ta tut e) ; D if

fe nde rf er v. Ce nt. Ba

pti st C hur ch , I nc . , 404 U . S. 412 , 415, 92 S . Ct . 574 , 576 , 30 L . E d. 2d 5 67 ( 1972 ) (h old ing m oot ac ha lle nge to a Florida tax exem

ption for churc h property when the lawhad been repeale d). An im portant exception to this g eneral r ule applies if there is a substantial lik el iho od tha t the c ha lle nge d st at uto ry langua ge w ill be r ee na ct ed . T hus, in Ci ty of Me squi te v. A la ddi n’ s C as tle , 455 U . S. 283 , 102 S . Ct . 107 0, 71 L . E d. 2d 1 52 (1982), the Suprem e Court denied a m ootn ess claim even thoug h the challenged laww as no l onge r in e ff

ec t. I n th at

c as e -- avoi d- fo r- va gue ne ss c ha lle nge to a ci ty statut e -- the or din an ce ha d be ena m en de d and the c ha lle nge d langua ge rep eal edby the ti m e th e cas e was de ci de d b y th e Co ur t o f App eal s. Id . at 2 88 . T he S upr em e Co urt no ne the le ss c onc lud ed that the c as e w as not

m oot , be ca

use16

“ the c ity ’ s r ep ea l of

the obj ec tio nable langua ge w oul d no t pr ec lud e it fr om reenac ting p recisely

the sam e provision .” Id. at 289. T he Court observed that

“ [t ] he re is no c er

ta inty ” that this r ee na ctm en t w oul d no t oc cur. I d. I nde ed , in contrast to the cases cited above, in Mesquite, the Court noted th at the City had expressly announ ced an intention to ree nact the old langu age if the Court vac ated the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s ho ldi ng tha t the langua ge of the statut e w as unc onst itu tio na lly va gue . I d. a t 28 9 & n. 11. P la inl y , Me squi te dif fe re d f ro m L ew is, O ak es , and the oth er s be ca

use the Co urt f

ound that i f it he ld the re w as no j ur isd ic tio n to e va luate the c as e on the m er its , the n th e ch al le nge d laww oul d be r ee na ct ed . Sim ilarly , in N ortheastern Florida Chapter of Associated G eneral Co ntr ac tor s of

A m er ic a v. Ci ty

of Ja ck sonv ill e, F la . , 508 U . S. 656 , 113 S . Ct . 2297 , 124 L . E d. 2d 5 86 ( 1993 ), the S upr em e Co urt de cl ine d to f ind m oot a challenge to a m inority

set-aside program

even thoug h the challenged law had been repeale d, beca

use it had been replaced w ith a law that, although so m ew hat narrow er, still had th e potential to di sadvantage the plaint iff: “ Ther e is no m ere ri sk tha t Ja ck sonv ill e w ill r ep eat i ts a lle ge dly w ro ngf ul c ondu ct ; i t ha s a lr ea dy done so. ” I d. a t 66 2, 113 S . Ct . a t 23 01. Inge ne ra l, the n, the S upr em e Co urt ha s de cl ine d to hol d m oot ac ha lle nge to a r ep ea le d lawonl y

w he n th e lawis re as ona

bly li ke ly to be r ee na ct ed

or w he n it17

is rep la cedby ano th er co ns ti tu ti on al ly sus pe ctlaw. See als o 1 3A Wrig ht et a l., Fe de ra l P ra ct ic e an d P ro ce dur e § 35 33. 7 ( 2d e d. 200 4) ( “ T he de te rm inatio n w he the r dis co nti nuanc e m oot s ac as e is a pt t o be a ff

ec te d by the dis tin ct ion be tw ee n publi c an d pr ivate de fe ndants . Co urts are m or e ap t t o tr ust pub lic of fi ci al s than private defendants to desi st from future violations .” ). L ikewise, this Court has repeatedly

held that the doctrine of volu ntary cessation does no t apply in cases w he re c ha lle nge d law s have be enr ep ea le d un le ss the re is som e re as on t o be lie ve that the lawm ay

be r ee na ct ed

a ft er dis m iss al of

the sui t. T hus, f

or e xa m ple , in Je w s f or Je sus v. H ill sbor oughCo unty A viatio n Auth or ity , 162 F . 3d 6 27 ( 11th Ci r. 199 8) , w e he ld tha t whe re apub lic a ir port ha d li ft ed

apr ohi bit ionon dis tr ibu tin g li te ratur e af

te r a co m pla int ha d be enf

ile d, the iss ue of

w he the r the pr ior pol ic y w as c onst itu tio na l w as “ a pur el y a ca de m ic poi nt” and w as a cc or din gly m oot , pr ec ise ly

be ca use the re w as “ no r ea sona ble e xpe ct at ionthat the c ha lle nge [w oul d] r es um e af

te r the law sui t [ w as ] dis m iss ed . ” I d. a t 62 9 ( ci ta tio n and quot ation m arks om itted). In rea ching th is conclusi on, w e considered the fac t that th e ch an ge d p ol ic y

was t he res ul t o f “ su bs ta nt ia l an d c on sc ie nt io us de li be rat io n,” an d ha d be en“ co nsi ste ntl y appl ie d” sin ce it s e na ctm en t. I d. W e re ce ntl y

c am e to the sam e re sul t i n C hr ist ian C oa lit ionof A la ba m a v. C o l e , 3 5 5 F . 3 d1 2 8 8 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 2 0 0 4 ) . T h e C h r i s t i a n C o a l i t i o n o f A l ab a ma18

ch al le nge d an a dvi sor

y opi nio n f ro m the A la ba m a Judi ci al I nqui ry

Co m m iss ion (“ JI C” ) re gard ing pub lic state m en ts b y c an did at es f

or j udi ci al of

fi ce . I n r es pons e to the S upr em e Co urt’ s de ci sio n inRe publ ic anP ar ty of Mi nne sot a v. Whit e, 536 U. S. 765, 122 S. Ct. 2528 , 153 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2002), the JIC withdrewits adviso ry opi nio n. T he dis tr ic t c ourt i n C hr ist ian C oa lit iongr an te d th e de fe ndant’ s m oti on to d ism iss be ca

use the c as e w as m oot , and the E le ve nthCi rc uit a ff irm ed . Apane l of

thi s C ourt sa id tha t “ [o ] nly w he n ‘ the de fe ndant c ande m onstrate that “ there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be r epeated”’ are fe de ra l c ourts p re cl ude d f ro m de ci din g th e ca se on m ootne ss g ro unds . ” I d. (quotin g W .T . G rant Co. , 345 U. S. at 633, 73 S. Ct. at 897 (quoti ng United States v. Al um in um

Co . of Am ., 14 8 F .2d41 6, 4 48 (2d Cir . 19 45 ))). In th atcas e, we fo und the pos sib ili ty

sli m ind ee d: “ [T ] he JI C m em

be rs have state d no int en tio n to re en ac t the ir

A dvi sor y O pin ion . I nst ea d, the JI C m em be rs have pr of

es se d th e contrary intent, stating in a pleading subm itted to th e district court that they

‘ he re by r ep re se nt tha t the JI C w ill not f ile c harg es a ga ins t any

j udge in co nne ct ion w iththe CC Aque sti onna ir e. ’ ” Id . a t 12 92. T his w as e spe ci al ly the c as e sin ce , in l i g h to f t h e S up re m e C o u rt ’s ru l i n g i n Whi t e, th e A l ab ama S up re m e C o u rt ’s Com m ittee on the Canons decided to ree valuate the Canons on which the JIC ba se d it s a dvi sor

y opi nio ns. I d. F or

that r ea son, w e w er e fu lly sa tis fi ed that “ theWe rea ched a simil ar r esult on a cha lleng e of a sign or dinance in Revolution Outdoor 8 Adver tising, Inc. v. City

of Casselber

ry , No. 00-10863 (11th Cir. 2000) ( unpublished opinion). The plaintiff c halleng ed the City ’s sig n code, a nd four months afte r the filingof the c omplaint the City amende d its ordinance, de signe d to remedy the alleg ed constitutional problems of the old sign c ode. The City

then moved for

summary judgme nt, and the district cour t gr anted it on mootness gr ounds. The district cour t did not apply

the voluntary

cessation doctrine, obser ving th at“ P l a i n t i f

f o f f e r s n o e v i d e n c e s h o w i n gth atD e f e n d an t ’ s c o ur s e o f

c o n d u c ti s a c tu a l l y a str ate g ic plo y

de signe d to de fe at juri sd ic tio n in thi s c a se . Ins te a d, the e vid e nc e e sta bli sh e s ju st the opposite.” Revolution Outdoor Adve r., Inc. v. City of Casselber

ry , No. 98-01344 (M.D . Fla. 2000), at 6-7. T he cour

t rea ched this conc lusion because the City had plac ed a mor atorium on the old sign or dinance prior to the commenc ement of the litigation, bec ause the new sig n code was the pr oduct of “ substantial deliberation,” and bec ause the City adopted a

formal r esolution that it would not readopt any aspec t of the old sign c ode that mig ht violate the Fir st Amendment. I d. at 7. The Ele venth Circuit aff irmed, say

ing simply

that “[t] here is no indication from the rec ord that the City

has any intention of ree nactingthe cha lleng ed portions” of the re peale d ordinanc e. Revolution, No. 00-10863 at 2. We a dd that ou r v ie w o f t

he law a s to vo luntary

c e ssatio n b y

g ov e rnme nta l a c tor s is 9 altog ether consonant with that of e very other F eder al Circuit to addre ss the issue. The fe dera l courts of a

ppeal ha ve virtually

uniformly

held that the re peal of

a cha lleng ed ordina

nce w ill moot a plaintiff’ s reque st for injunctive re lief in the abse nce of some evidenc e that the or dinance has be e n o r i s r e a so na

bly lik e ly to b e re e na c te d. Se e , e .g ., F e d’ n o f A dv e r. Ind us . Re pr e se ntativ e s, Inc. v. City

of Chicag o, 326 F.3d 924, 930 ( 7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a suit became moot when the cha lleng ed ordina

nce ha d been r epea led and sa ying that “we ha

ve re peate dly

held that the co mp l et e r ep ea l o f ach al l en gedl aw re n d er s a c as e m o o t , un l es s th er e i s ev i d en ce cr ea t i n g a rea sonable e x pectation that the Cit y will reena ct the ordina

nce or one substantially

simil ar” ); Citi zens for Responsible Gov’t v. Da vidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000) (c oncluding th ata c h al l en ge t o th e c o n s t i tu t i o n al i ty o f c ert ai ns ec t i o n s o f t h e C o l o ra d o Fa i r C amp ai gn Pr a c tic e s A c t w e re moo t be c a us e tho se se c tio ns ha d b e e n r e pe a le d, and sa yingthat “ [i]n g e ne ra l, 19 CCAhas every

rea son to believe that the JIC’ s representation is genuin e, and can reasonably

expect that the JIC w ill not is sue another opin ion preventin g judges fr om answ er ing the que sti onna ir e at iss ue in thi s c as e. ” I d. a t 12 92- 93. 8 Whe the r the r ep ea l of

alaww ill le ad

to a fi ndi ng tha t the c ha lle nge to the lawis m oot

de pe nds m ost

sig nif ic an tly on whe the r the c ourt i s su ff ic ie ntl y convin ced that the repea led law will not be brough t back. In N ational 9the re peal of a cha lleng ed statute is one of those eve nts that makes it absolutely clea r that the alleg edly wrong ful behavior . . . could not rea sonably be expected to r ecur ” (inter nal quotation marks omitted)); D.H.L . Assoc. v. O’ Gorman, 199 F .3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 1999) (examining the c la im o f a pr op e rt y owne r who ha d b ro ught a state c ourt

a c tio n a g a ins t to wn

and town o ff ic ia ls, challeng ing a

zoning ordinanc e that re gulated adult ente rtainment businesses, a nd holding the su it m oo t, b e c a

us e c ha lle ng e s to re pe a le d la ws are no rm a lly

moo t, a nd the c ourt fo un d th at “ it would be unre asonable to presume that the T own would re turn to its prior zoni ngplans afte r the conclusion of this litigation”) ; Nat’l B lack Police Ass’ n v. Dist. of Columbi a, 108 F .3d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holdingthat a cha lleng e to the constitutionality of a vote r initiative restricting campa ign c ontributions for local political ca ndidates wa s mooted by

the passag e of le g islation incre asingcontribution limi ts, beca use there was no “ evidenc e indicatingthat the cha lleng ed law likely will be ree nacte d”); Ky . Right to L ife, Inc. v. Te rry , 108 F.3d 637, 645 ( 6th Cir. 1997) (holdingmoot a challeng e to a c ampaign financ e law be cause the law ha d been r epea led and the state had a

nnounced no intention to re enac t it); Native Villag e of N oatak v. B latchfor d, 38 F.3d 1505, 1510 (9th Cir. 1994) (holdingthat “[a]s a ge nera l rule, if a c halleng ed law is re peale d or expires, the case become s moot” except where “it is virtually cer tain that the re peale d law will be ree nacte d”); Assoc . Gen. Contrac tors of Conn., Inc. v. City of Ne w Have n, 41 F.3d 62, 66 ( 2d Cir. 1994) (holdingmoot an action cha lleng ing the constitutionalit y of a c ity ordinanc e setting aside a perc entag e of c ity

contra cts for w omen-owne d and disadva ntag ed business ente rprises beca use the ordina

nce ha d expired and there was no e vidence it would be ree nacte d). 20 A dve rt isi ng C om

pany v. Ci ty of F t. L au de rd al e, 934 F . 2d 2 83 ( 11th C ir . 199 1) [h erei na fte r “Nati on al I”], we eval ua te d ach al le ng e to a ci ty’ s re pe al edsi gn co de . National, another outdo or advertising com pany , f iled suit agains t the City

of Fort La uderdale, challenging its sign ordinance on First Am endm ent ground s. I d. at 284. A ft er

f ili ng s uit , it

appl ie d f or pe rm its to er ec t tw en ty

bil lbo ar ds c ont ai nin g both c om m er ci al and n on- co m

m er ci al m es sa ge s. I d. T he Ci ty ’ s si gn c ode specifically

prohibit ed billbo ards, and the application s wer e re j ected the sam e day the y w er e subm itt ed . I d. N at ion al the n so ught r ev ie wby

the Ci ty ’ s B oard

of A dj ustm en t, w hic h c hara ct er iz ed the a ct iona s ar eque st f

or avari an ce und er

the21

Ci ty ’ s z oni ng r eg ulatio ns. I d. F oll ow ing se ve ra l st ep s inthe appl ic at ionpr oc es s, N at ion al ’ s r eque sts w er e re j ec te d by the Bo ar d. I d. About six w ee ks a ft er

it w as sue d, the Ci ty

of F ort L au de rd al e am en de d it s si gn co de to rem ov e th e co ns ti tu ti on al ly objec ti on ab le pro vi si on s. Id . at 2 84 -8 5. T he ve ry ne xt d ay , it

f ile d asug ge sti on o f m ootne ss and a m oti on t o di sm iss on the ground s that the am endm ents rem edied any constitu tional in firm ities which m ay ha ve dis ab le d th e or igi na l or din an ce . I d. T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d th e m oti on, but apane l of

thi s C ourt r ev er se d and r em an de d. A ddr es sin g w he the r the am en dm en t t o th e sig n or din an ce r en de re d th e ca se m oot , w e state d: T he Ci ty pr es en tly pos se sse s th e pow er

and a uth or ity to am en d th e sig n c ode . I t r em ai ns unc er ta in whe the r the Ci ty

w oul d r et

ur n th e sig n co de to its or igi na l f

orm if it m an ag ed to de fe at j ur isd ic tio n inthi s ca se . N ei the r the Ci ty

nor the dis tr ic t c ourt ha s e sta bli she d th at

the lik el iho od o f furthe r vio la tio ns i s su ff ic ie ntl y r em ote to dis m iss Nati on al ’s cla im s. Id . a t 28 6. W e the re fo re r ej ec te d th e de fe ndant’ s su gge sti on tha t the sui t w as m oot be cau se th ere was a no t-i ns ub st an ti al ch an ce t ha t t he law wo ul d b e ree na ct ed . This finding was undou btedly inform ed by

the tim ing of the change in th e law-- w el l a ft er sui t ha d a lr ea dy

be enbr ough t, w hic h r ea sona bly le d th e Co urt t o do ubt t h e C i t y’s s i n c e r i t y.We note in passing that on numerous occ asions, appellate courts have made this critica l 10 deter mination of whether

ree nactment of

the cha lleng ed law w as likely , without remand or defe renc e to the district cour ts. See, e.g ., Christian Coaliti on, 355 F.3d at 1292-93 (“[T]he [pl aintiff] has ever

y rea son to believe that the [defe ndant]’s repre sentation is ge nuine, and c an rea sonably

expect that the [defenda

nt] will not is sue anothe r opinion preve nting judg es fr om answe ringthe questionnaire at issue in this case.” ); J ews for J esus, 162 F.3d at 630 (“The district 22 T he e sse nti al dif

fe re nc e be tw ee n th e ci rc um stanc es w e fo und in the Je w s f or Je sus , Ch ri sti anCo al iti on, and R ev olu tio n c as es and those in N at ion al I is that i n the first three c ases, there w as no reasonable chance that the challenged policy would be reinstated. In Jews f or Jesus, w e w rote that “ volu ntary cessation of a ch al le nge d pr ac tic e re nde rs ac as e m oot onl y if the re is no ‘ re as ona

ble expe ct at ion ’ that the c ha lle nge d pr ac tic e w ill r es um e af te r the law sui t i s dism issed.” 162 F. 3d at 630 (citing Countyof L os Angeles v. D avis, 440 U. S. 625, 631, 99 S. C t. 1379, 1383, 59 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1979); W .T . G rant Co. , 345 U. S. at 633, 73 S. Ct. at 897). I n m aking th is clear f indin g, w e expressly

distin guish ed the f ac ts i n Je w s f

or Je sus f ro m tho se e nc ount er ed

in N at ion al I , c hara ct er iz ing N at ion al I a s havin g he ld t ha t tha t c as e w as not

m oot “ be ca use the re w as a re as ona ble e xpe ct at ionthat the c ha lle nge d c ondu ct w oul d r ec ur . ” I d. Jus t a s th e ci rc um stanc es in Je w s f or Je sus , Ch ri sti anCo al iti on, and Revolutio n convin ced us of the genuineness of the defendant’ s representation that the challenged law or a dviso ry opini on would no t be ree nacted, w e ar e persuaded tod ay that the Ci ty

of S unr ise w ill not

br ing ba ck

the S ignCo de . I n th e fi rs t 10c ourt

fo un d th at th e re wa s n o r e a so na ble e xpe c tatio n th at th e Tampa Inte rn atio na l A ir

po rt wo uld re tur n to its pr ior

po lic y . We a g re e . . . . B e c a us e the re is n o r e a so n to thi nk that th e a ir

po rt wi ll chang e its policy

at the conc lusion of this l awsuit, we a ffirm the district c ourt’s dismissal of the suit as moot.”); Revolution, No. 00-10863, at 3 (“T here is no indication that the City has any int e nti on of re e na c tin gthe c ha lle ng e d p or tio ns of the 19 92 Or din anc e .” ). On the pe c uli ar f

a c ts and c ir c ums tanc e s o f t

his c a se , w e c an d isc e rn

no re a so n n ot t o ma

ke a de te rm inatio n o f t

his kind. 23 pla ce , a t or al arg um en t, c ouns el f or the Ci ty e xpr es sly

dis av ow ed

any int en tio n of defending th e old Sign Code, and the City ’ s brief re peatedly repre sented that there w as “ no i ndi catio n w ha tso ev er that the Ci ty

w oul d r ee na ct

the S ignCo de in the fu tur e. ” D ef

. Br ie f at 19. Mo re sig nif

ic an tly , he re the Ci ty

pr om ptl y a m en de d th e Si gn C ode in re spon se to a sin gle le tte r fr om the pla int if

f, and, not ab ly , be fo re it ha d e ve r be ensue d. T he Ci ty ’ s be ha vio r stands in s tark c ontra st t o th at

of the de fe ndant i n N at ion al I , w hic h di d no t c hange the of fe ndi ng l awunt il six w ee ks af te r it ha d be ensue d, and m ove d to dis m iss the day a ft er the c hange . I nde ed , the City of Sunrise alter ed its Sign Code with nary a whim per of protest afte r Cora l S p r i n g s ’ c o u n s e l s e n tth e C i t y al e t t e r o b je c t i n g t o i t . I td i ds o wi t h i n s i x t e e n d a ys of rec eiving th e letter. O n this record, w e can discer n absolu tely

no ind ication -- an d C or al S pr ing s do es not e ve n tr y to ar gue - - that the Ci ty

r ep ea le d it s ol d S ign Code in bad faith, intending to reinstate it later, j ust as soo n as the threat of a law sui t ha d a

ba te d.24

Mor eo ve r, if

the Ci ty of S unr ise did

som eh ownurtur e the int en tio n of reinstating th e old, purportedly unconst itutio nal Sign Code, and actually adopted the A m en de d S ignCo de a s ate m por ar y m ea sur e w he ne ve r an oth er law sui t ap pe ar ed on the hor iz on, w e w oul d pl ai nly f or bid it f ro m doi ng s o. I n Je w s f

or Je sus , 162 F . 3d at 63 0, w e spe ci fi ca lly w ar ne d a ga ins t the pos sib ili ty of thi s ki nd of “ flip-flopping .” A ccordingly , the voluntary cessation doctrine is inapp licable, an d w ill not

save thi s c as e fr om

am ootne ss d et er

m inatio n.

B. Ve sted Rights Coral Springs also say s that its lawsuit has no t becom e m oot because, under Florida law , its right to the sign perm it vested at the tim e of application, so that any subsequ ent changes to the relevant law would not affect whether it is entitled to the perm it. N ot surprisin gly , vested rights are not created ea sily . A “ vested ri ght ” ha s be ende fi ne d a s “ [a ] r igh t tha t so c om ple te ly and d ef ini te ly be lon gs t o a person that it cannot be im paired or taken aw ay

without the person’s consent.” Bl ac k’ s L awD ic tio nary

( 7the d. 199 9) . Whe the r the r igh t t o ape rm it ha s ve ste d is a que sti on o f state law . A s th e Su pr em e Co urt ha s sa id, “ [p ] ro pe rty int er es ts, of co ur se , are not

c re at ed by the Co nst itu tio n. Rathe r the y are c re at ed

and the ir25

dim ensions are defined by existing rules or understanding s that stem from an ind ep en de nt s our ce suc h a s st at e law- - ru le s or und er standi ngs that se cure c er ta in be ne fi ts and tha t su

ppor t c la im s of

e nti tle m en t t o th ose be ne fi ts. ” Bo ar d of Re ge nts v. Ro th, 408 U . S. 564 , 577 , 92 S . Ct . 270 1, 270 9, 33 L . E d. 2d 5 48 (1 972) ; se e al so R es er

ve , L td. v. T ow n of

L ongb oa t K ey , 17 F . 3d 1 374, 137 9 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 4 ) . I n a s c e rt a i n i n g F l o r i d al a w , w e l o o kt o b o t h th e s t a t e ’s S up r e me Co urt and, w he re ne ce ssary , it s D istri ct Co urts o f Appe al . S ee V ea le v. Ci tib an k, F. S. B. , 85 F . 3d 5 77, 580 ( 11th C ir . 199 6) ( “ Inm atte rs of state law , f

ed er al c ourts are boun d by

the rulings o f the state’ s high est court. I f the state’ s high est court has not r ule d onthe iss ue , af

ed er al c ourt m

ust loo k to the int er

m ed ia te state appe llate co urts. ” ( ci tin g H uddl es tonv. D w y er , 322 U . S. 232 , 236 , 64 S . Ct . 101 5, 101 7- 18, 88 L . E d. 124 6 ( 1944 ); F ide lity U nio n T ru st C o. v. F ie ld, 311 U . S. 169 , 177 -7 8, 61 S. Ct. 176, 177-79, 85 L. Ed. 109 (194 0))). The re i s n o q ue st io n t ha t an un co ns ti tu ti on al st atut e is vo idun de r st at e la w. Se e Bh ool a v. Ci ty

of S t. Augus tin e Be ac h, 588 S o. 2d 6 66 ( Fl a. D ist . Ct . App. 1991 ) (holding th at a city ordinance passed in vio lation of law “ is not v oidable, -- it is voi d”); see a lso Jo sephso n v. Autrey , 96 So. 2d 784 , 789 (Fla. 1957 ) (e n banc) (s ta ti ng th atan un la wfu l o rd in an ce “ can ha ve no effe ctwhat so ev er”) . It fo ll ows that a c ity m ay not w ith hol d an a

ppl ic at ionon the ba sis of avoi d or din an ce , andA re view of F lorida’s c ase la w sug g ests littl e distinction amongthe rig hts enjoy ed by 11 a pp lic ants fo r c on str

uc tio n p e rm its , th os e e njo y e d b y a pp lic ants fo r s ig n p e rm its , a nd tho se e njo y e d b y

a pp lic ants fo r l iqu or

lic e ns e s. Th e c a se s c ite e a c h o the r a s if the re le va

nt e nti tle me nts we re mor e or

le ss i nte rc ha

ng e a ble , whic h s ug g e sts that th e same c a se law a s to ve ste d r ig hts a pp lie s e qu a lly

to a ll. 26 unde r ce rt ai n c ir cum stanc es , thi s c angiv e ri se to a ve ste d r igh t i n th e pe rm it. T he qu es ti on , th en , is when su ch a ri gh t i s cr eat edun de r Fl or id a la w. Alon g li ne of

F lor ida c as es ha s e va luate d th e que sti on o f w he n aparty ac qui re s ave ste d r igh t t o su chthi ngs as sig n pe rm its , bui ldi ng ( co nstru ct ion ) perm its, and liquor licenses. T he overarc hing pattern in Florida’ s case lawis that 11 vested rights can be created - - thus creating an enforce able entitlem ent in the face of subsequ ent changes in the law -- only in two circ um stances. T he first and m ore co m m on w ay ave ste d r igh t i s c re at ed

oc curs w he n aparty

ha s r ea sona

bly and de tri m en ta ll y

rel ie d o n e xi st in g l aw, crea ti ng th e co nd it io ns of e qu it ab le est op pe l. In the second, less com

m on case, a vested right m ay be cre ated in the absence of a show ing of

de tr im en ta l r el ianc e w he n th e de fe ndant m uni ci pa lity

ha s a ct ed in a cl ear dis play

of ba d f ai th. A s be st w e can te ll, abse nt e ith er af ind ing of e qui ta ble es top pe l or

ba d f ai th, no F lor ida

c ourt ha s e ve r fo und a ve ste d r igh t t o e xis t i n a sig n pe rm it or

sim ilar en tit le m en t. I n th is c as e w e can f ind ne ith er e qui ta ble estoppel no r bad faith, and, ac cordingly , C oral Springs does no t have a vested ri ght to a sig n pe rm it.27

1. Eq uitable E stoppel Inthe m aj or ity

of F lor ida c as es f ind ing that a

party hol ds a ve ste d r igh t t o a construction perm it or sim ilar entitlem ent, the conditions of equitable estoppel w er e m et . T he F lor ida

c ourts h av e m ad e it ab undantl y c le ar that whe n apr ope rty ow ne r inc ur s asub stanti al inv es tm en t of ti m e or m one y in re as ona

ble r el ianc e on ex ist ing law s and w ithno r ea son to k nowthat the law s are li ke ly to ch an ge , he m ay a cquir e a ve ste d r igh t i n abui ldi ng p er m it. T hus, und er

F lor ida law , the doc tr ine of

e qui ta ble e sto ppe l m ay

be inv oke d a ga ins t a

loc al gov er

nm en t “ w he n a pr ope rty ow ne r (1 ) in g ood fa ith( 2) upo n so m e ac t or om iss ionof

the gov er

nm en t (3 ) ha s m ad e suc h a

sub stanti al c hange in posi tio n or ha s in curr ed

suc h e xte nsi ve obl igatio ns and e xpe nse s th at it w oul d be hig hly

ine qui ta ble and unj ust

to de str oy the r igh t he a cquir ed . ” Ci ty of H oll yw ood v. H oll yw ood Be ac h H ote l C o. , 283 S o. 2d 8 67, 869 ( Fl a. D ist . Ct . App. 197 3) ( ci tin g S ak ols ky v. Ci ty of Co ra l G ab le s, 151 So . 2d 4 33 ( Fl a. 196 3) ), a ff ’ d inpart and r ev ’ d inpart

on o the r gr ound s, 329 So. 2d 10 (Fla . 1976). More broadly , the S econd District Court of Appeal de sc ri be d e qui ta

ble e sto ppe l, quo tin g th e low er c ourt, in the se te rm s:

“ Stri ppe d of

the le ga l j ar gon w hic h law y er s and j udge s have obfuscated it with, the theory of estoppel am ount s to not hing m ore than an a ppl ic at ionof

the r ule s of f ai r play . O ne party

w ill not be perm itted to in vite another onto a w elcom e m at and then be perm itted to s na tc h th e m at

aw ay to the de tr im en t of

the party ind uc ed or28

pe rm itt ed to stand the re on. Ac iti ze n is e nti tle d to r el y on the as sur an ce s or

c om m itm en ts o f a zo nin g auth or ity and i f he doe s, the zo nin g auth or ity

is boun d by

it s r ep re se ntatio ns, w he the r the y be in th e fo rm of wo rd s o r de ed s . . . .” T ow n of L ar go v . I m

pe ri al H om es Co rp . , 309 S o. 2d 5 71, 573 ( Fl a. D ist . Ct . App. 1975 ) (a lteration in origin al). Thus, f or exam ple, in H ollywood Beac h Hotel Co. v. H ollywood Beac h H ote l C o. , 329 S o. 2d 1 0 ( Fl a. 197 6) ( pe r curi am), the pla int if fs spe nt a lm ost $200 , 000 an d ni ne or

te n m onths o f tim e in p re paratio n f or c onstru ct ionof

alarg e re sid en ce bui ldi ng, in good f ai th r el ianc e on a

r ez oni ng and p er

m it. I d. a t 12 . B ut then the City

(af ter political upheaval that resulted in th e elec toral defeat of every Co m m iss ionm em

be r w ho h ad

vot ed f or the or din an ce ) re co nsi de re d it s r ez oni ng, an d th e pla int if

fs e ve ntu al ly

sue d f or ape rm an en t i nj unc tio n to c onstru ct the bui ldi ng. T he F lor ida

S upr em e Co urt c onc lud ed that the Ci ty ’ s a ct ion s in de la y in g t he pl ai nt iff

s’ abi li ty to b eg in co ns tru ct io n c on st it ut ed“ un fai r de al in g,” an d th er ef

or e inv oke d th e pr inc ipl e of e qui ta ble e sto ppe l. I d. a t 18 . Likew ise, in Sakolsk y , a

plaintiff becam e interested in constructing a lux ury ap ar t m en tb u i l d i n g i n Co ra l Gab l es . 1 5 1 So . 2 dat4 3 4 . He m et wi t h th e C i t y’ s m ay or to dis cu ss h is p lans, and the n bo ught atr ac t of land. I d. Upon not ic e an d a publ ic he ar ing , the Ci ty

Co m m iss ionvot ed

to iss ue ape rm it fo r the c onstru ct ionof29

a 12- sto ry

apartm en t bu ild ing on the pr ope rty . I d. A cc or din g to the F lor ida Su pr em e Co urt, it

w as “ unc ontro ve rt ed

that pe tit ion er

c hange d hi s po sit ion m at er ia lly

and i nc ur

re d ve ry sub stanti al e xpe nse in re lianc e uponthe pe rm iss ion gr an te d and p er

m it iss ue d by

the r es pond en t C ity . ” I d. a t 43 4- 35. B ut at a m ee tin g he ld s ev er al w ee ks a ft er the pe rm it ha d be eniss ue d, the Ci ty Co m m iss ion , uponm oti on b y

am em be r w hose opp osi ng v ote ha d a t the D ec em be r m ee tin g be en ov erri dd en , pas se d a n o rd in an ce re sc in di ng pe ti ti on er’s p erm it . Id. at43 5. A ft er los ing in the low er

c ourts, S ak ols ky

appe al ed to the S upr em e Co urt of Fl or ida , w hic h a ga in h el d th at “ [t ] he lawis cl earl y

e sta bli she d th at

the doc tr ine of equitable estop pel m ay

prevent arbitrar

y rescission of a perm it by a m unicipalit y .” Id . T he Co urt c onc lud ed that “ [S ak ols ky ] a ct ed

in good f ai th and s houl d no t be denied the benefit of the estoppel do ctrine upon which his com plaint is fou nded.” Id . a t 43 6. Si m ilar co ndi tio ns o f re lianc e an d e sto ppe l have be en f ound in the va st ma j o r i t y o f th e o t h e r F l o r i d ac a s e s . S e e , e . g . , T e x a s C o . v . T o w n o f M i a mi Sp ri ngs, 44 S o. 2d 8 08, 809 ( Fl a. 195 0) ( hol din g th at be ca use oil c om

pany spe nt $12,500 to buil d gas station s, the ca se wa s “ pregnant with equity ,” and “ a ty pical case of e stopp el”); B regar v. Br itton , 75 So. 2d 753 , 756 (Fla. 1954 ) (plaintiff spe nt a bout $28 , 000 to b uil d dr ive -i n m ovi e the at er , thu s gi vin g r ise to equit ab leFe dera l courts, sitting in equity and eva luating F lorida law on ve sted rig hts, also have 12 g e n e r a l l y i n v o k e d

th e d o c tr i n e o f

e qu i t a b l e e s t o p p e l . S e e , e . g . , R e s e r v e , L t d . v . L o n gb o atK e y, 17 F.3d 1374, 1380- 81 (11th Cir. 1994) (findingthat under F lorida law the plaintiff had a vested pr op e rt y ri g ht t o a bu ild ingpe rm it b e c a

us e it p os se sse d s uc h a

pe rm it a nd e xpe nd e d la

rg e sums of mon e y in r e lia nc e on it, and s ay ing that the F lor ida c ourts “ ha ve c onsi ste ntl y he ld that a landowner has a property right in a build ing perm it where the landowner poss es se s abui ldi ng p er

m it an d w he re the c ir cum stanc es that gi ve r ise to the doc tr ine of

e qui ta ble e sto ppe l are pr es en t” ( em pha sis a dde d) ( int er

na l qu otatio n m ar ks o m itt ed )) ; A . A . P ro fi le s, I nc . v. Ci ty of F t. L au de rd al e, 850 F . 2d 1 483, 148 8 (1 1thCi r. 198 8) , c er

t. de nie d, 490 U . S. 102 0, 109 S . Ct . 174 3, 104 L . E d. 2d 1 80 (1 989) ( in a

takin gs s uit , hol din g th at alandowne r ha d pr ope rty r igh ts i n a propos ed developm ent, in part bec ause of the substanti al expense incurred af ter the gr an tin g of

the pe rm its ); H en nig er

v. P ine lla s C ounty , 7 F . S upp. 2d 1 334 (M . D . F la . 199 8) ( hol din g th at e qui ta ble e sto ppe l a

ppl ie d, c re at ing ave ste d r igh t in a build ing perm it after the plaintiff had reasonably relied on the issuance of a p e rmi tt o b u i l dap o o l h o u s e an db e g u n c o n s tr u c t i o n ) ; De c a r i o n v . M o n r o e C o u n t y, 853 F. S upp. 141 5, 141 8- 19 ( S. D . F la . 199 4) ( fi ndi ng a ve ste d r igh t whe n th e p l ai n t i ff s h ads p en tan do b l i g at ed$ 2 m i l l i o n i n re as o n ab l e r el i an ce o n th e c o u n t y’ s final approval of its develop m ent plans); Hy Kom De velopm ent Co. v. Manatee Co unty , 837 F . S upp. 118 2, 118 7 ( M. D . F la . 199 3) ( fi ndi ng e qui ta ble e sto ppe l t o be pr es en t i n a§ 19 83 s uit a lle gin g vi olatio ns o f due pr oc es s and e qua l pr ote ct ion when the county

invalidated a developer’ s build ing perm it, aw arding a developer a property right in a build ing perm it after it spent $2 .5 m illion in reasonable reliance on the perm it to bu ild a condom inium apartm ent build ing). 30 es top pe l) ; I m

pe ri al H om es , 309 S o. 2d at 57 2- 73 ( pla int if f spe nt o ve r $379 , 000 in re lianc e on e xis tin g z oni ng l aw s) ; E qui ty Re sour ce s, I nc . v. Co unty of L eo n, 643 So. 2d 1112, 1119 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1994 ) (holding a vested right to exist when

“ the c ounty

c ont inu ousl y

iss ue d pe rm its f

or the unr es tr ic te d c onstru ct ionof the pr oj ec t ov er

ape ri od o f 18 y ears w ithkno w le dge of e xpe ndi tur es f

or im provem ents to be m ade for the benef it of” the plaintiff’ s land). 1231

Th e c o n v er s e i s eq u al l y t ru e: i n th e ab s en ce o f e qu i t ab l e e s t o p p el , F l o ri d a’s co urts h av e co nsi ste ntl y

de nie d ve ste d r igh ts. S ee , e . g. , Ci ty of G ai ne svi lle v. Cone, 365 So. 2d 737, 739 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (deny ing claim for vested rights in existing zoning laws because “ [a] n owner of pr operty acquires no vested rights in the continu ation of existin g zoning or land use regulations as to such pr ope rty unl es s m atte rs c re at ing an e sto ppe l a ga ins t the z oni ng a uth or ity have ar ise n” ); Ci ty

of F t. P ie rc e v. D av is, 400 S o. 2d 1 242, 124 4 ( Fl a. D ist . Ct . App. 1981 ) (holding th at $4,000 that the plain tiff spent, m ost of it after the plaintiff had notice of the City ’ s intent to change, w as not enou gh to trigg er e quitabl e estoppel).

2. Bad Faith Fl or ida ’ s c ourts a lso have c re at ed ave ste d r igh t i n asm al le r num be r of ca se s, in the abse nc e of

e sto ppe l, w he re the de fe ndant m uni ci pa lity

a ct ed in blatant an d ob vio us b ad

f ai th i n de ny ing ape rm it or li ce nse . B ad

f ai th w as e vin ce d by

the fact that the m

unicipalit y

did no t change the relevant lawuntil after the plaintiff ha d bo th s ue d and o bta ine d aw ri t f ro m astate c ourt of

ge ne ra l j ur isd ic tio n, or be ca use the c ounty

de lib er at el y

w ith he ld a

pe rm it it oth er

w ise w oul d have aw ar de d un til a ft er

avot er -a ppr ove d m or at or ium

w en t i nto e ff

ec t.32

Inthe e ar ly

day s of the auto m obi le , the F lor ida S upr em e Co urt e va luate d th e cas e o f Aik en v. E.B. Dav is , Inc ., 14 3 S o. 6 58 (Fl a. 19 32 ) (en ba nc ) (p er cu ria m ). The plaintiff a

pplied for a perm it to bu ild a “ filling statio n” in an area wher e there w as no r el ev an t z oni ng l awin ef fe ct . B ut a ft er

he appl ie d, the town c ounc il of Bo ca Ratonpa sse d an “ em er ge nc y or din an ce ” (l at er

m ad e pe rm an en t) pla ci ng the lot of land i nto ar es ide nti al z one that pr ohi bit ed the c onstru ct ionof

af ill ing statio n. T he pla int if

f the n ob ta ine d ape re m

pto ry w ri t of m an da m us t o c om pe l the City to issu e a per

m it, w ith the lower court say ing th at “ the m unicipalit y

acted unr ea sona

bly and arb itr ar ily . ” I d. T he S upr em e Co urt of F lor ida a ff irm ed . O ne concurrence (speaking for four j ustices) said that changin g the zoning lawwa s “ an attem pted judicial decr ee by

the legislative power of the city against the then ex ist ing r igh ts o f the r el at or , and the re fo re that su chor din an ce a s a ppl ie d to re la tor , is unr ea sona

ble and arb itr ar

y . ” I d. a t 65 8- 59 ( D av is, J. , c onc ur ri ng) (e m pha sis om itt ed ). A nothe r co nc ur re nc e sa id tha t the town’ s m oti va tio n intr y ing to p ro hib it a fi lli ng s ta tio n w as pur el y a es the tic in na tur e, w ithan “ obvi ous la ck of any em ergency

existing in the interest of public health o r convenience” and w as therefore not a proper use of the town’ s police power to pass zoning laws. I d. at 659 (Ellis, J. , c oncurring).33

T he ove rr idi ng p ri nc ipl e of A ike n is that a

ve ste d r igh t w as c re at ed

be ca use the town w ro ngl y

sin gle d ou t the pla int if

f an d ha sti ly

pa sse d ane wor din an ce f or the pur pose of pr ev en tin g th e co nstru ct ionof af ill ing statio n de spi te no e vid en t publ ic be ne fi t i n th is c hange . T he Ci ty ha d no z oni ng o rd inanc e in p la ce , and i t de ci de d, onl y

a ft er r ec ei vin g th e ap pli catio n to bui ld a f ill ing statio n, to sudd en ly p u tan e wl a wi n t o e f

f e c tth a tw o u l db a r

i t s c o n s t r u c t i o n . T h e F l o r i d aS up r e me Co urt de te rm ine d th at

thi s po st- hoc c hange in the lawc oul d no t st an d. T he F lor ida

S upr em e Co urt r ea ch ed

asim ilar re sul t f

if te eny ears late r, in H ar ri s v. S ta te e x r el . W eb ste r, 31 S o. 2d 2 64 ( Fl a. 194 7) . W eb ste r ap pli ed f or and w as de nie d ali quor

li ce nse . I d. a t 26 5. H e the n pe tit ion ed f or aw ri t of m an da m us ch al le ngi ng the va lid ity

of the Ci ty ’ s li quor

li ce nsi ng o rd inanc e unde r the state liquor law . I d. T he tr ia l c ourt a gr ee d and i ssu ed the w ri t, and i n r es pons e, the Ci ty c hange d th e or din an ce , r ep la ci ng i t w ithava lid one that w oul d have dis al low ed

the ty pe of li ce nse W eb ste r ha d in iti al ly sou ght . I d. a t 26 6. T he Florida Suprem e Court ordere d the City to grant him

a liquor license, c iting Aiken as havin g he ld: [T ] he rights of a relator in a m andam us sui t, c laim

for which was as se rt ed by an a lte rn at ive w ri t gr an te d and s er ve d pr ior to ac tio n take n by the r es pond en t c ity

and i ts o ff

ic ia ls i n an e ff

ort t o avoi d having to com

ply with its com

m ands, w ouldbe aff

ected by any such subs eque nt a ct ion , and tha t a pe re m pto ry w ri t w oul d is sue in34

ac co rd an ce w iththe a lte rn at ive w ri t thoug h th e ac tio n take n, ha d it occurred bef

ore the issuance of the alter native writ, would have been a good defense. Id . a t 26 6 ( em

pha sis a dde d) . T he state S upr em e Co urt thus sa id tha t a c hange in lawthat t ook pla ce be fo re ac ourt or de r co m pe lli ng the gr an t of

the pe rm it w oul d ha ve c onst itu te d ade fe nse a ga ins t the c la im . S ee a lso Br oa chv. Y oung , 100 S o. 2d 41 1, 414 (Fla. 1958 ) (D rew , J. , dissenting) (“ The A iken and Harr is cases place thi s C ourt w iththo se that ho ld tha t i f the appl ic at ionis unr ea sona bly r ef use d or de lay ed and the sub se que nt o rd inanc e en ac te d inba d f ai th, the lawa t the ti m e of the appl ic at ionsho uld

be appl ie d. ”) ; C ity

of Marg at e v. A m oc o O il Co . , 546 S o. 2d 1 091, 109 2- 94 ( Fl a. D ist . Ct . App. 198 9) ( af fi rm ing an or de r fo r inj unc tiv e r e l i e f i n wh i c h th e tr i a l c o u rtf o u n dth a tth e C i t y a c t e d“ ‘a r b i t r a r i l y, c ap r i c i o u s l y, dis cr im inator ily

and i lle ga lly ’ in de ny ing the pe rm it” to bui ld a ga s st at ionbe ca

use

“ the Ci ty il le ga lly de nie d ape rm it that sh oul d have be eniss ue d and the n tr ie d to pass ordinan ces that w ouldauthorize a denial, ” thus exhib iting “ bad faith and an av oid an ce of

duty , suc h th at

e sto ppe l sh oul d a

ppl y ”) ; D ad e Co unty

v. Ja son, 278 So . 2d 3 11, 311 -1 2 ( Fl a. D ist . Ct . App. 197 3) ( pe r curi am) (o rd er ing the Co unty to gr an t the pla int if

fs abui ldi ng p er

m it that the Co unty

ha d de lib er at el y

w ith he ld unt il a bui ldi ng m or at or ium w en t i nto e ff

ec t, be ca use “ the Co unty

ha d a ct ed

in35

Ba d f ai th i n de lay ing the iss uanc e of the pe rm it an d, the re fo re , the appl ic an t sh ou ldha ve be en en ti tl edto a pe rm it ”). Ine ac h of

the se c as es , the de fe ndant m uni ci pa lity

c hange d th e lawin a la stdit che ff ort t o avoi d gr an tin g ape rm it or li ce nse to a pla int if

f. Whe the r thi s to ok the f orm of an “ em er ge nc y

or din an ce ” pa sse d w hil e the appl ic at ionw as pe ndi ng (A iken), or a

change in the law a fter a wr it had already

been issued bya court (H arris), or selective and er roneous enforcem ent of an arguably unconst itutio nal provisi on of the law ( Margate) , or, finally , deliberate delay of the issuance of a p er m i tu n t i l af

t era b u i l d i n g m o ra t o ri u m we n ti n t o ef

fe ct (J as o n ), th e g o v ern m en t ’s behavior was entirely

differ ent from

the City of Sunrise’ s change in the law, which was m ad e p ro m

pt ly, aft er t he Cit y

rece iv eda si ng le let te r an d b efo re i t was su ed . Co nve rs el y , in the abse nc e of ba d f ai th o r re as ona

ble r el ianc e on e xis tin g la w, Flo rid a’s co ur ts ha ve co ns is te nt ly refus edto fin d ave st edrig ht . See, e.g ., D av ids on v . Ci ty

of Co ra l G ab le s, 119 S o. 2d 7 04, 708 ( Fl a. D ist . Ct . App. 196 0) (p er c ur iam ) (c iti ng H ar

ri s and A ike n a s havin g he ld tha t a r ep ea le d li quor lic en sin g law , r athe r than ane wone , c anappl y to a pla int if

f onl y “ w he n th e officials or governm ental bodyto whom an application for a liquor license has be enm ad e, and a ga ins t whom sui t i s f ile d to e nf

or ce it s is suanc e, a ct

arb itr ar ily

to av oid the ir duty , ” an d th at

“ it is a que sti on f

or the c ourt a s to w he the r the36

subs equently

enacted lim itations or regulations were m ade ar bitrarily or in bad fa ith ”) ; C ity

of Mi am i v. S ta te e x r el . E rg en e, I nc . , 132 S o. 2d 4 74, 476 ( Fl a. D ist . Ct. App. 1961 ) (per

curiam) (in a z onin g variance ca se, deny ing th at the plaintiff ha d ve ste d r igh ts i n az oni ng v ar ianc e al low ing it to co nstru ct

aga s st at ion because “ [w ] e do not vi ewthe circum stances in this case as constitu ting arbitrary or ba d f ai th a ct s onbe ha lf

of the c ity a s w as the c ir cum stanc e in [ A ike n, H ar ri s, an d B ro ac h] ”) ; C ity

of Mi am i B ea chv. 870 1 C oll ins A ve . , I nc . , 77 S o. 2d 4 28, 429- 31 ( Fl a. 195 4) ( de ny ing e qui ta ble e sto ppe l i n pr ev iou s z oni ng r eg ulatio ns ev entho ugh the pla int if

f ha d sp en t $2 50, 000 in r el ianc e on the m , be ca use the Ci ty h a dn o kn o w l e d g e o f

th e s e e x p e n d i tu r e s w h e n i tc h a n g e dth e l a w ) ; C i t y o f M i a mi Be ac h v. Jon athon Co rp . , 238 S o. 2d 5 16, 519 -2 0 ( Fl a. D ist . Ct . App. 197 0) (r ej ec tin g th e cl ai m

that a ve ste d r igh t i n ape rm it w as c re at ed a t the m om en t of application regardless of later ac ts by the City , in the absence of a showing of bad fa ithor arb itr ar ine ss) ; C ity

of Bo ynto n B ea chv. Ca

rr oll , 272 S o. 2d 1 71, 172 -7 3 (F la . D ist . Ct . App. 197 3) ( w he n th e pla int if f tr ie d to r

ush thr oughabui ldi ng pe rm it ap pli catio n be fo re the Ci ty ’ s ne wz oni ng o rd inanc e too k e ff ec t, kno w ing that the ordinance would forbid him from build ing th e desired seven-story retirem ent hom e, the court said that “ Florida lawsince 1945 has been clear that poss es sio n of

abui ldi ng p er

m it doe s no t c re at e a ve ste d r igh t, and tha t a pe rm it37

m ay be r ev oke d w he re the z oni ng l awha s be ena m en de d su bse que nt t o th e iss uanc e of

the pe rm it in the abse nc e of . . . e qui ta

ble e sto ppe l” ); S m ithv. Ci ty of Clear water, 383 So. 2d 681 , 688-89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980 ) (noting an interplay betwee n “ those sit uations in which the city is estopp ed because the property owner has spent large sum s in reliance on the city ’ s original po sition and those in which the c ity r ef use s to iss ue ape rm it fo r a use w hic h is pe rm iss ibl e unde r ex ist ing zoning ,” and deny ing th e plaintiffs a right to their developm ent plans because they previousl y

had notice of the im

pendin g changes).

3. A pp lic at ion of

F lor id a L aw to T hi s C ase Si m ply put , an e xte nsi ve c an va ss o f Fl or ida ’ s lawe sta bli she s th is: aparty w ill be f ound to ha ve ave ste d r igh t i n ape rm it or in a sim ilar en tit le m en t on ly if (1 ) it ha s in curr ed

sub stanti al e xpe nse in re as ona ble r el ianc e on e xis tin g law ; or (2 ) the c ity

ha s pa sse d asub se que nt o rd inanc e in a ba d f ai th e ff ort t o pr ev en t the property owner from

obtainin g a perm it. N either circ um stance is present here. Fi rs t, the re w as c le ar ly

no e qui ta ble e sto ppe l, be ca

use Co ra l S pr ing s incurred no sign ificant expenses in reliance on the previous law -- indeed, under its lease, no m oney

is paid to Sawgra ss Ford until the billbo ard gets built. Coral38

Springs do es not even try to argue that equitable estopp el is present, and we see noth ing in the rec ord that would sug gest otherwise. Se co nd, the Ci ty

ha s no t di spl ay ed

ba d f ai th. F ac ing an ob

j ec tio n to it s S ign Co de , the Ci ty

did e xa ct ly w ha t i t sh oul d have don e: it a m en de d th e Co de to el im inate c onst itu tio na lly que sti ona

ble pr ovi sio ns. I t di d so not f or the pur pose of resolving pending litigation , bec ause no litig ation existed at the tim e the A m ended Sign Code was passed. A nd the change in law did not arbitrarily single ou t Coral Sp rin gs in th e way

th atth e d efen da nt s i n Ai ke n, Harris , Marg at e, an d J as on di d. In fac t, the situation here is nearly the oppo site, beca

use in passin g the Am ended Si gn C ode , the Ci ty

did not m ak e an y

c hange s to the pr ovi sio ns o f the old S ign Code that actually

caused the denial of Coral S prings’ a pplication . The A m ended Sign Code prohib its sign s that are m ore than 85 squ are feet, 8.5 fe et tall, offprem ise com

m ercia l signs , and so forth -- j ust as the oldSign Code did. Indeed, as w e se e it, the a lle ge dly

unc onst itu tio na l a spe ct s of the old S ignCo de ha d no thi ng w ha te ve r to d o w iththe r ej ec tio n of the pla int if

f’ s a ppl ic at ion . Notably , in re spon se to the passage of the Am ended Sign Code, Coral Sp ri ngs did

not r ea ppl y f or asig n pe rm it -- ind ee d, it kne wit c oul d no t ( at

le as t f or the sign it wanted to erect), because the provision s of the Sign Code that caused the denial of its init ial application were constitu tionallysound , and were retained39

in the Am ended Sign Code. Instead, Coral S prings cho se to sue in order to force the appr ova l of

asig n th at

it kne ww as im

pe rm iss ibl e unde r vari ous pr ovi sio ns o f both versions of the Sign Code. N o Florida court has ever held or even hinted that unde r ci rc um stanc es li ke the se ave ste d r igh t c oul d be c re at ed . T he di str ic t c ourt, a gr ee ing w ithCo ra l S pr ing s’ c la im of ave ste d r igh t, re lie d onour

unp ubl ish ed

opi nio n inN at ion al A dve rt isi ng C om pany v. Ci ty of F t. La uderdale, 8 F.3d 36 (11th Cir. O ct. 26, 1993) (per curiam) (table) [here inafter

“N at ion al I I” ] , alate r ap pe al of the c as e at

iss ue in N at ion al I . I n th at c as e, asig n com pany had filed suit arguing that Fort L auderdale’ s sign code contained unc onst itu tio na l pr ovi sio ns, that those pr ovi sio ns w er e not se ve ra ble f ro m the co nst itu tio na l pr ovi sio ns, and the re fo re that the c ode w as unc onst itu tio na l a s a w hol e. S ix w ee ks a ft er

the c om pla int w as f ile d inf ed er al dis tr ic t c ourt, the Ci ty am ended its code and elim inated the allegedly unconst itutio nal provisi ons in an ef fo rt de sig ne d to m oot

the law sui t. W e ru le d t he su itwas n ot m oo t i n l ig ht of t he vo lu nt ary ces sa ti on do ct rin e. Se e N at ion al I . A ft er

r et ur nin g to dis tr ic t c ourt, the sig n c om pany w on o n th e m er its of the c as e, de m onstratin g th at the old sig n c ode w as unc onst itu tio na l a s a w hol e. N ev er

the le ss, the dis tr ic t c ourt r ule d th at the c om pany ha d no ve ste d r igh t to its orig inal perm it. O n appeal, a panel of this Court reversed, holdi ng that40

“ [w ] he n an a

ppl ic at ionf

or a pe rm it sa tis fi es a ll ex ist ing and p en din g law s, the pe rm it m ust the n is sue : a

ne wlawpa sse d a ft er

the appl ic at ionw as f

ile d ha s no ef fe ct on the m atte r of

iss uanc e. ” S lip op. a t 6. W e ad de d th at [ t] he r ule is the sam e w he n th e ex ist ing lawpur porte dly pr ohi bit s th e de sir ed

use , but the e xis tin g lawis la te r de cl ar ed

unc onst itu tio na l. I d. ( ci tin g H ar ri s, 31 S o. 2d at 26 6; Marg at e, 546 S o. 2d at 10 94) . T he Co urt di sti ngui she d be tw ee n tw o si tuatio ns, on e whe re re li an ce i s re qu ire d t o c reat e a ri gh t, an d o ne wher e it is no t re qu ire d.

“ Abse nt r el ianc e, alandowne r ge ne ra lly ha s no r igh t t o e xis tin g z oni ng; the m un ic ip al it y

can ap pl y

a ne w law t o d en y

a us e th atwas l eg al un de r an ol d l aw, unl es s th e ow ne r ha s r el ie d ( usua lly by spe ndi ng m one y ) on the old law . ” I d. a t 7 (c iti ng C one , 365 S o. 2d at 73 9) . “ Bu t whe n am uni ci pa lity

de nie s an a

ppl ic at ion fo r a bui ldi ng p er

m it, the appl ic an t i s de pr ive d of af ai r ch an ce to re ly

on e xis tin g law . Whe re the m

uni ci pa lity

ha s w ro ngf

ull y de nie d an a

ppl ic at ion- - thu s wr ongfull y

deny ing th e applicant the right to rely on the law then existing -- re qui ri ng a

sho w ing of

r el ianc e w oul d a llo wthe m uni ci pa lity

to ga in an a dvanta ge fr o m i t s o wn wr o n g fu l ac t .” Id . a t7 -8 (c i t i n g Smit h , 3 8 3 So . 2 dat6 8 8 ). We the re fo re gr an te d th e sig n c om pany ape rm it. Nati on al II, ho wev er, i nv ol ve d ave ry di ffer en t s etof c irc um st an ces . As we ha ve not ed , the Ci ty

of F ort L au de rd al e did

not a m en d it s si gn o rd inanc e unt il six41

w ee ks a ft er

it ha d be ensue d. T he ne xt d ay , it m ove d f or dis m iss al , m ak ing pla in its r ea son fo r the be la te d c hange in the c ha lle nge d or din an ce . T his se que nc e of ac tio ns i ndi cate d ala ck

of goo d f ai th, and i t thus cam e as no s ur pr ise that w e he ld the pla int if

f poss es se d ave ste d r igh t i n th e sig n pe rm it. N at ion al I I thu s f it int o the pattern of state ca ses such as Har ris, where the m

unicipalit y

hastily changed the law at the last m inute to d efend itself, we ll after a legal challenge had been br ough t. A ga in, by c ontra st, in thi s c as e, the Ci ty pr om ptl y c hange d th e Si gn C ode af te r re ce ivi ng a

sin gle le tte r fr om

pla int if f’ s c ouns el , be fo re it

ha d be ensue d by Co ra l S pr ing s or , f

or that m atte r, by

any one e lse . A nd a s w e ha ve not ed , the re is ab sol ute ly

no r ea son to b el ie ve that the Ci ty ha s any int en tio n of

r es ur re ct ing the old Sign Cod e. N or is there any hint th at the am endm ents to the Sign Cod e w ere pr om pte d by ade sir e to s ing le out

Co ra l S pr ing s un fa ir ly , ina sm uc h a s th e sig n it w an te d to put

up w as und oubt ed ly

im pe rm iss ibl e unde r both th e old and the Am ended Sign Code, and the rea sons the old Sign Cod e m ay have been uncons titutio nal wer e w hollyunrelated to the reasons the perm it application wa sIn our unpublished National I Iopinion, we cited the D istrict Court of Appea l’s decision 13 in S mith v . Ci ty

of Cle arw ate r f

or the pr op os iti on

that r e lia nc e wa s n ot r e qu ir e d f

or a c ourt to find that an a

pplicant has a

rig ht to a permit notwithstanding subseque nt chang es in the law. A s we re a d it , h ow e ve r, the Smith c ourt did no t sa y that ve ste d r ig hts are a lw ay s c re ate d in applications for

permits. Rather, Smith said that vested rig hts may be cr eate d in the absenc e of re lia nc e on ly un de r v e ry

sp e c if ic c ir c ums tanc e s. 38 3 So . 2 d at 68 8. An d in fa c t, t he Smit h c ourt ’s atte mpt

to d e lin e ate the c ir c ums tanc e s in wh ic h in jun c tiv e re lie f s ho uld

be g ra nte d it se lf fell short of f

ully expli catingthe state of F lorida law, be cause it did not consider the clea r and extensive pattern of F lorida ca ses that have found vested r ights or the ir equivale nt in non-relianc e c a se s o nly

wh e n th e re wa s e vid e nc e of ba d f a ithby the mun ic ipa lity , a

nd an a rb itr ary atte mpt to single out the applicant. We ther efor e re ject the sug g estion that vested rights may be cr eate d under F lorida law in the a bsence of equitable estoppel, detrimenta l relianc e, or ba d faith. To the extent som e district cour

t opinions have found other wise, see Fl a. O utd oor

A dve r. , L L C v . Ci ty of Bo ynto n B ea ch , 182 F . S upp. 2d 1 201, 120 9 ( S. D . F la . 200 1) ; W ilt on Manors St. Sy s. v. City

of W ilton Manors, 2000 W L 3391233 2, at *5 (S .D . F la. 2000 ), w e co nc lud e that the y have m isa

ppr eh en de d F lor ida

lawon this sub

j ec t. 42 rej ected. In short, unlike in National II, we can discern no bad faith or ar bitrary b e h av i o r o n th e p a rto f

th e C i t y. 13 Our holding is also com

pelled because we are sitting as a c ourt of equity . It is a be dr oc k pr inc ipl e of

c ourts o f equity

that the y m ay im pose the sub stanti ve rem ed y of i nju nc ti ve rel ie f on ly whe n fu nd am en ta l fa irn es s an d ju st ic e d em an d i t. See 27A A m . Jur. 2d Equity § 110 (200 3) (“ The c ourt [of equity ] will grant r elief onlywhen f

airness and goodconscience dem and it.”). Indeed, courts of equity are loath to allo w loopholes, technicalities, or gam e-play ing to dictate re sults when tho se r es ult s w oul d vi olate ba sic not ion s of e qui ty and f ai r play . “ Whil e a co urt of equity e nde av or s to pr om ote and e nf or ce j ust ic e, goo d f

ai th, upr igh tne ss, f

ai rn es s, an d c onsc ie nti ousn es s onthe part of the part ie s w ho o cc upy

ade fe nsi ve pos iti on43

in j udi ci al c ontro ve rs ie s, it no l es s stri nge ntl y

de m an ds the sam e fr om

the li tig an t parties who com e before it as plaintiffs or actors in such controversies.” 2 Pom eroy , E quityJurisprudence § 398 , at 93 (5th ed.). A s th e U nit ed

S ta te s S upr em e Co urt e xpl ai ne d lo ng a go: “ It is a pr inc ipl e in ch an ce ry , that he w ho a sks r el ie f m ust have a ct ed

in good f ai th. T he e qui ta

ble powers of this court can never be exerted in behalf of one who has acted fr au dul en tly

or w ho b y de ce it or any unf ai r m eans h as ga ine d an a dvanta ge . T o a id a party in suc h ac as e w oul d m ak e thi s c ourt the abe tte r of ini qui ty . ” Be in v . H eath, 47 U . S. 228 , 247 , 6 H ow . 228 , 247 , 12 L . E d. 416 ( 1848 ). O r as the Su pr em e Co urt l at er

f ram ed the ide a, “ [c ] ourts o f equity f re que ntl y de cl ine to interfer e on behalf of a c om plainant whose attitud e is unconscienti ous in respect of the m atte r co nc er

nin g w hic h it

se ek s r el ie f. ” N at ’ l F ir e In s. Co . of H ar tf or d v. T hom pson , 281 U . S. 331 , 338 , 50 S . Ct . 288 , 291 ( Me m . ), 74 L . E d. 881 ( 1930 ) (c iti ng D ew ee se v. Re inh ar d, 165 U . S . 386 , 390 , 17 S . Ct . 340 , 41 L . E d. 757 (1 897) . A s on e Fl or ida

S upr em e Co urt j ust ic e put it , “ [o ] ne of

the m ost el em en tary

and f undam en ta l c onc ep ts o f equity j ur isp ru de nc e an d auni ve rs al r ule w hic h a ff ec ts the e nti re sy ste m

of e qui ty j ur isp ru de nc e is the m ax im that ‘ H e w ho co m es int o e qui ty

m ust c om e w ithc le anhands. ’ T his pr inc ipl e is f ound ed upo n44

co nsc ie nc e an d go od f

ai th. ” Ry anv. Ry an , 277 S o. 2d 2 66, 276 ( Fl a. 197 3) (Roberts, J., dissenti ng). Inthi s c as e, w e ha ve f

ound that the de fe ndant C ity

pr oc ee de d ingoo d f

ai th, prom ptly addressing and repealing th e offe ndin g statute -- before any suit had be enf ile d, and w ith out

havin g si ngl ed

out any pla int if f fo r spe ci al tr eatm en t. A nd the plaintiff Coral Springs never applied for a perm it against the backdrop of a ne w Sig n C od e whi ch ha d e ss en ti al ly elim in at edth e u nc on st it ut io na l p ro vi si on s. In ste ad , it appare ntl y

sawan op portun ity

to take a dvanta ge of

ar etro ac tiv e application o f the lawto secure a right to bu ild a sign th at plainly violated the new or din an ce in the sam e w ay it did the old one . I f fundam en ta l no tio ns o f equity re qui re us t o or de r the Ci ty to gr an t C or al S pr ing s th e sig n pe rm it it se ek s, tho se re as ons es ca

pe us - - an d w e can di vin e no s ignthat the F lor ida c ourts w oul d ho ld oth er w ise . I nde ed , e ve n th e dis tr ic t c ourt, w hic h r ule d inf av or of Co ra l S pr ing s, not ed that “ oth er

c ourts h av e expr es se d c onc er ns a bout suc h law sui ts a s th is o ne in w hic h apla int if

f subm its an a

ppl ic at ionf

or a pe rm it to b uil d abil lbo ar d th at w ill as sur ed ly be de nie d be ca

use it doe s no t c om

ply w iththe or din an ce a t i ssu e, onl y to challenge the constitu tionalit y of the ordinance as a whole.” C oral Springs, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 1319 ; see also Fla. Outdoor Adver. v. City of Boy nton Beac h, 182 F. Su p p . 2 dat1 2 0 6 (c al l i n g “ u n s et t l i n g ” t h e “st ra t eg i c” u s e o f t h e S up re m e C o u rt ’s45

co m m er ci al spe ec h do ctri ne in thi s m an ne r) ; G ranit e St at e O utd oor A dve r. , I nc . v. Ci ty of Cl earw at er , F la . , 213 F . S upp. 2d 1 312, 133 3 ( M. D . F la . 200 2) , a ff ’ d in part & r ev’ d in part on oth er grounds, 351 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting th at

“ [m ] any courts, like this one, and m any com m entators, ar e concerned that local gove rn m en ts h av e be enpla ce d inate nuou s and n ear im poss ibl e posi tio n in dr aft in g aco ns ti tu ti on al or c on te nt -n eu tra l s ig n o rd in an ce”) ; Fl a. Out do orAdv er., LL C. v. City

of Boca R aton, Florida, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1376 (S.D . F la. 2003 ). T he arg um en t that a

sig n c om pany som eh owpos se sse s an ir re voc ab le vested right in a sign perm it whenever it applies for one und er an illegal ordinance, e ven if the lawis fixed im m ediately thereaf ter, m ay lead to an an om al ous re sul t i f take n to it s lo gic al c onc lus ion . T hus, a cc or din g to thi s re as oni ng, be ca

use the or igi na l S ignCo de w as unc onst itu tio na l, vir tua lly any ap pli catio n to bui ld a

sig n be fo re the pa ssa ge of the A m en de d S ignCo de w oul d ha ve c re at ed

ave ste d r igh t. T his w oul d m ean th at if the pe tit ion er

ha d a ppl ie d f or a pe rm it to b uil d asig n th at w as not j ust 672 squ ar e fe et

( its el f al m ost

e igh t tim es larg er

than th e pe rm itt ed

siz e of any sig n un de r ei the r the old or the Am ended Sign Codes), but even one that was a thou sand or five thous and or ten thou sand squ are feet, it would be entitled to a perm it long after a constitutio nal or din an ce pr ohi bit ing suc h si gns ha d be endul y e na ct ed . A n a

ppl ic at ionf

orIn Florida Outdoor Adve rtising, L L C. v. Cit y of B oca Raton, Florida, 266 F . Supp. 2d 14 13 76 (S .D . F la . 2 00 3) , th e dis tr ic t c ourt re a c he d a

sim ila r r e su lt. Th e fa c ts w e re sim ila r t o th os e befor e us: “[t] he now f

amiliar strate g y

is to apply

for a permit for e rec tion of a billboard knowing full well that the per

mit will be denie d under the city ’s exist ing sign ordinanc e but also aw are that the ordinanc e is subject to leg al attac k.” I d. at 1379. The c ourt went on to explain that “the c a se is r e a lly

a bo ut t he us e of the c on c e pt o f v e ste d r ig hts to c re ate a wi nd owof

op po rt un ity to build a larg e . . . and va luable billboard whic h would not be appr oved under the old or the ne w ordinanc e.” I d. (empha sis added). B elievingthat the plaintiff wa s wrong ly trying to take a dv anta g e of

a te c hn ic a lity

in t he law, the City

fo ught f ir e wi th f ir e and fo un d a te c hn ic a lity

of its own, pointing out that the plaintiff’ s application for a per mit had not strictly

complied with the old sign ordina

nce’ s notarizing re quirements. See id. The court a g ree d and rule d in favor of the City , in larg e pa rt be c a us e the e qu iti e s o f t

he c a se we ig he d s tr on g ly in f avo r o f t hat r e su lt: “ if equity is to be invoked, and the Ele venth Circuit’s dec ision in [ National I I ] i s premised on no tio ns of

fa ir ne ss a nd e qu ity , th e se c on sid e ra

tio n [si c ] cut a g a ins t F lor ida Outdo or . Pa

rt ic ula rl y wher e the c ity ’s denial of the per mit was not based upon the de ficienc ies of the or dinance subject to challeng e and where the anticipate d denial wa s part of a strategy to construct a nonc onforming sign, it does not see m unfair to expect F lorida Outdoor to abide by other re quirements of la

w.” I d. at 1381 (c itation omit ted). 46 lit er al ly any sig n of any siz e, sha pe , or he igh t w oul d have c re at ed ave ste d r igh t i n a pe rm it, and n oth ing that C ity did a ft er the appl ic at ionw as sub m itt ed c oul d have taken it away . Absolutely nothi ng in Florida in th e case lawgives any hint th at v e s t e dr i g h t s c a n b e c r e a t e d s o e a s i l y. 14

C . C on cl us ion on M oot ne ss W e se e no r ea sona

ble pos sib ili ty

that the Ci ty

w ill r ee na ct

the old S ign Co de . F urthe rm or e, Co ra l S pr ing s ha s in curr ed pr ec iou s li ttl e expe nse in de tr im en ta l r el ianc e on the Ci ty ’ s S ignCo de , and the Ci ty ha s e xhi bit ed

non e of47

the ba d f ai th o r ar bitrary be ha vio r pr es en t i n e ve ry F lor ida c as e w he re it s c ourts ha ve f ound ave ste d r igh t i n th e ab se nc e of de tr im en ta l r el ianc e. G ive n th ei r pa st ru lin gs - - an d th e obvi ous im pli catio ns o f a co ntr ar

y r es ult - - it se em s hi ghl y unl ike ly that F lor ida ’ s c ourts w oul d f ind that C or al S pr ing s a cquir ed ave ste d r igh t un de r th e ci rcu m st an ces of t hi s ca se , andwe can see no reas on to do so . A cc or din gly , w e do n ot s ee howthe pla int if f m ay r el y on e ith er the doc tr ine of vol unt ar y c es sa tio n or

the a cquis iti on o f a ve ste d r igh t t o c onve rt am oot c as e int o a j usticiable one.

III

H av ing f ound that the Ci ty

ha s no int en tio n of

r ee na ct ing the S ignCo de and that C or al S pr ing s po sse sse s no ve ste d r igh t i n asig n pe rm it, the c as e sti ll m ay not be m oot if the A m en de d S ignCo de c ont ai ns the sam e co nst itu tio na l de fe ct s a s it s pr ed ec es sor . “ [A ] sup er se din g st at ute or r eg ulatio n m oot s ac as e onl y to the e xte nt that i t r em ove s c ha lle nge d f eatur es of the pr ior law . T o th e ex te nt tha t those feature s rem ain in place, and changes in the lawhave not so fund am entally altere d the statut or

y f ram ew ork a s to r en de r the or igi na l c ontro ve rs y am er e ab str ac tio n, the c as e is n ot m oot . ” N at ur ist S oc ’ y , I nc . v. F ill y aw , 958 F . 2d 1 515, 152 0 ( 11thSee Amende d Sign Code § 16-248 ( “The followingsigns a re pr ohibited any

wher e in the 15 city : . . . . (5) Of

f-pr emises sig ns . . . .”). Se e Am e nd e d Si g n Co de § 1 6- 24 8( 2) -( 5) (e xemp tin gtim e -a nd -t e mpe ra

tur e signs , 16 temporar y g rand ope ning signs, special e vent sig ns, and tempora ry projec t signs fr om ge nera l prohibitions on si g ns); I d. § 16-253 (sa ying that “[o] nly

the followingtemporar

y signs a re permitted”: grand ope ning ba nner signs, model signs, political sig ns, rea l estate sig ns, contrac tor signs, g ara g e sale signs, pr oject sig ns, and roa dside memorial sig ns); I d. § 16-261 (sa ying that “ [a] p e rm it s ha ll n ot b e re qu ir e d f or ” c e rt a in k ind s o f s igns , in c lud ing , amon goth e rs , “ re a l e state signs,” “wa

rningor notice- ty

pe sig ns,” and “ political signs”) .

48 Cir. 1992 ). T hus, if the A m ended Sign Code contain s the sam e unconstit ution al pr ovi sio ns a s it s pr ed ec es sor , thi s c as e m ay not be m oot . T he A m en de d S ignCo de c ont ai ns s om e of the sam e pr ovi sio ns a s th e old Si gn C ode that C or al S pr ing s ha s a lle ge d vi olate the F ir st A m en dm en t by : ( 1) favor ing c om

m er ci al spe ec h ov er

non co m m er ci al spe ec h; and ( 2) f av or ing 15 certa in ty pes of noncomm ercia l speech over other kinds o f noncomm ercia l spe ec h. H ow ev er , a ft er c ar ef ul r ev ie wof

the A m en de d S ignCo de and the 16 relevant law , w e find that the Code does not , in fa ct, favor com m ercia l speech over nonc om m er ci al spe ec h. Mo re ove r, som e of the pr ovi sio ns tha t a lle ge dly f av or ce rt ai n ki nds of

non co m m er ci al spe ec h ov er

oth er s are not

in the A m en de d S ign Code and therefore the challenge to them is m oot. O ther challenged provisio ns are in the A m en de d S ignCo de ; ho w ev er , w e ar e sa tis fi ed that the y are not r el at ed to, an d are f ull y se ve ra ble f ro m , the pr ovi sio ns o f the Co de that are a ct ua lly re spon sib le f

or the de nia l of

Co ra l S pr ing s’ appl ic at ionf or asig n pe rm it, and49

the re fo re ne ed

not be r ev ie w ed

be ca use doi ng s o w oul d have utt er ly no i m pa ct on the outcom e of this case.

A . Favoring Com m ercial Over N oncom m ercial Sp eech First, Coral Springs argues that the Sign Code uncons titutio nally favored com m ercia l speech over noncomm ercia l speech by prohibit ing off-site com

m ercia l signs . Specifica lly , the old Sign Code prohibi ted “ [o] ff- prem ises com m ercia l sig ns o r bil lbo ar ds. ” § 16 -2 48( a) (6 ) (e m pha sis a dde d) . S ec tio n 16 -2 48( 5) of the Am ended Sign Code likewise prohibi ts “ [o] ff- prem ises sign s,” which are spe ci fi ca lly

de fi ne d a s be ing “ [a ] ny

sig n a dve rt isi ng a

c om m er ci al e sta

bli shm en t, ac tiv ity , pr oduc t, se rv ic e or e nte rt ai nm en t, w hic h is sol d, pr oduc ed , m anuf ac tur ed , av ai la ble or f ur nis he d a t a

pla ce oth er

than onthe pr ope rty

on whic h th e sig n is loc at ed , ” § 16 -2 47( b) (2 6) ( em pha sis a dde d) . C or al S pr ing s su gge sts that the se pr ovi sio ns s om eh owdis cr im inate a ga ins t no n- co m m er ci al spe ec h, e ve n th oughthe re str ic tio ns a

ppl y onl y to co m m er ci al spe ec h. T his c la im is ba se d ona m ischaracter ization of the off-site ban as apply ing to noncomm ercia l speech, when it pla inl y doe s no t.50

InMe tr om ed ia , I nc . v. Ci ty of S anD ie go, 453 U . S. 490 , 101 S . Ct . 288 2, 69 L. E d . 2 d8 0 0 (1 9 8 1 ), th e S up re m e C o u rt s t ru ckd o wn ce rt ai n as p ec t s o f aci t y’ s bil lbo ar d or din an ce f

av or ing c om

m er ci al ove r nonc om

m er ci al spe ec h and c er

ta in kin ds o f nonc om

m er ci al spe ec h ov er

oth er s, but

a lso pe rm itt ed

c iti es to dis tin gui sh re as ona bly be tw ee n on sit e an d of

fs ite c om m er ci al a dve rt isi ng: [W ] he the r onsi te a dve rt isi ng i s pe rm itt ed or not , the pr ohi bit ionof of fs ite a dve rt isi ng i s di re ct ly r el at ed to the state d ob

j ec tiv es of

tr af fi c safety and esthetics. T his is n ot altered by the fac t that the ordinance is unde ri nc lus ive be ca

use it pe rm its ons ite a dve rt isi ng. S ec ond, the ci ty m ay be lie ve that of

fs ite a dve rt isi ng, w ithit s pe ri odi ca lly ch an gin g c ont en t, pr es en ts a m or e ac ute pr obl em

than do es ons ite adve rt isi ng. T hir d, S anD ie go h as obv iou sly c hose n to va lue one kindof com

m ercia l speech -- onsit e advertising -- m ore than another ki ndof c omm erci al sp eech -- o ffs it e ad ve rti si ng . Id . a t 51 1- 12, 101 S . Ct . a t 28 94- 95 ( ci ta tio n omitt ed ). T he se w or ds are e xa ct ly on poi nt i n th is c as e, w he re the Ci ty ’ s su spe ct pr ovi sio n di sti ngui she s be tw ee n on -s ite co m m er ci al and o ff

-s ite c om m er ci al a dve rt isi ng, but

m ak es no r ef

er en ce to no nc omm erci al sp eech . Mor eo ve r, th e Am en de d S ig n C od e ex pr es sl y all ows nonc om m er ci al m es sa ge s a t l ea st a s m uc h le ew ay

a s c om m er ci al one s:

“Notw ithstand ing any

provisio ns of this article to the contrary , to the extent that thi s art ic le pe rm its asig n c ont ai nin g c om m er ci al c opy , it

sha ll pe rm it a noncom m ercia l sign to the sam e extent.” A m ended Sign Code § 16 -247(a).51

If the e xplicit wording o f this ordinance wer e not enoug h to m ake clear that the Ci ty ’ s bans o n of

fs ite sig ns d o no t c ove r nonc om m er ci al spe ec h, thi s C ir cu it ha s he ld tha t no nc om

m er ci al m es sa ge s are inh er en tly ons ite . O ur

de ci sio n in So uth lake P ro pe rty

A sso ci at es , L td. v. Ci ty

of Mo rr ow , G eo rg ia , 112 F . 3d 1 114 (1 1thCi r. 199 7) , is on p oin t. I n th at c as e, w e ev al ua te d ac ha lle nge to a sig n ordinance that prohib ited billb oards, which it defined as any “ sign which adve rt ise s ac om

m odi ty , pr oduc t, se rv ic e, a ct ivi ty or any oth er pe rs on, pla ce , or thi ng, w hic h is not

loc at ed , f

ound or sol d onthe pr em ise s up on whic h su chsig n is loc at ed . ” I d. a t 11 17. I n de te rm ini ng the e xte nt t o w hic h th is r eg ulatio n prohibi ted noncomm ercia l m essages, it becam e necessar y to kno w the a ctual “ site” of non co m m er ci al spe ec h: T he or din an ce pr ohi bit s si gns w hic h se ek to attr ac t atte nti on t o any pe rs on, pla ce , sub

j ec t, or thi ng n ot l oc at ed

on the pr em ise s w he re the person, place, subject, or thing is found. Noncom m ercia l speech usuallyexpresses an idea, an aim , an aspiration, a purpose, or a vie wpoi nt. Whe re is suc h an id ea loc at ed ? Wha t i s th e sit e upon w hi c h t he a sp i r a t i oni s f

ound ? Id. at 1118 . W e concluded that a noncomm ercia l m essage is inherently onsite, whatever its location. “ An idea, unlik e a product, m ay be viewe d as located w he re ve r the ide a is e xpr es se d, i. e. , w he re ve r the spe ak er is loc at ed . U nde r thi s al te rn at ive vie w , a ll nonc om m er ci al spe ec h is ons ite . Asig n be ar ing aContrary to the Coral Spring s’ claims, our r ece nt decision in Café Er otica of F lorida, 17 Inc. v. St. J ohns County , 360 F.3d 1274 ( 11th Cir. 2004), is consistent with thi s analy sis. I n that c a se , w e str

uc k d own th e St. John s Co unty sign o rd ina

nc e that w e int e rp re te d a s e ff e c tiv e ly limit ing the maxi mum siz e of political messa g es to roughly one-se ventee nth that of commerc ial on e s. Se e id. at 12 80 -8 1, 12 91 -9 2. B y c ontr a st, the Am e nd e d Si g n Co de in t he City of Sunri se expli citly allows the same e x pressive r ights for noncommerc ial signs, includingpolitical signs, as it does for c ommercia l signs. Amende d Sign Code § 16-247 (a) . 52 nonc om m er ci al m es sa ge is onsi te w he re ve r the spe ak er pla ce s it . ” I d. ( fo otn ote om itt ed ). W e thu s a gr ee d w iththe Ci ty of Mo rr ow ’ s own in te rp re ta tio n of it s or din an ce and c onc lud ed that “ [t ] he de fi nit ionof

bil lbo ar d a s an of

fs ite a d v e rt i s i n g s i g n d o e s n o ti n c l u d e n o n c o mm e r c i a l s p e e c h a s s u c h s p e e c h i s a l w a ys onsi te . ” I d. a t 11 19. Co ra l S pr ing s ne ve rthe le ss i nsi sts that the S ignCo de tr eate d on sit e sig ns m or e favor ab ly

than of fs ite sig ns, e lid ing the f

ac t tha t, a cc or din g to the lawof thi s Circuit, noncomm ercia l m essages are by definition o nsite sig ns and therefore certa inly not treated unfavorably

com pared w ith comm ercia l signs . W e thus are unpe rs ua de d by

Co ra l S pr ing s’ arg um en t tha t the S ignCo de - - in e ith er it s original or Am ended form -- im perm issib ly

favors com

m ercia l over nonc om m er ci al spe ec h. 17

B. Cont ent Discrim ination A m ong Types of N oncom m ercial Sp eechSe e , e .g ., Am e nd e d Si g n Co de § 1 6- 24 8( 2) -( 5) (e xemp tin gtim e -a nd -t e mpe ratur e signs , 18 temporar y g rand ope ning signs, special e vent sig ns, and tempora ry projec t signs fr om ge nera l prohibitions on si g ns); I d. § 16-253 (sa ying that “[o] nly

the followingtemporar

y signs a re permitted”: grand ope ning ba nner signs, model signs, political sig ns, rea l estate sig ns, contrac tor signs, g ara g e sale signs, pr oject sig ns, and roa dside memorial sig ns); I d. § 16-261 (sa ying that “ [a] p e rm it s ha ll n ot b e re qu ir e d f or ” c e rt a in k ind s o f s igns , in c lud ing , amon goth e rs , “ re a l e state signs,” “wa

rningor notice- ty

pe sig ns,” and “ political signs”) .

53 Co ra l S pr ing s’ se co nd p er tin en t arg um en t i s th at

the S ignCo de im pe rm iss ibl y

f av or s so m e fo rm s of

non co m m er ci al spe ec h ov er

oth er s. A ga in,

18 we are unpersuaded. In Metr om edia, the Suprem e Court ruled that cities ar e lim ited in their authorityto disti ngui sh am ong v arious ty pes of noncomm ercia l speech. 453 U.S . at 515, 101 S. Ct. at 2896 (“ W ith respect to noncomm ercia l sp eech , th e ci ty m ay

no t ch oo se th e ap pr op ria te su bjec ts forpu bl ic di sc ou rs e: ‘ To al lowagov er

nm en t the c hoi ce of

pe rm iss ibl e subj ec ts f

or pub lic de ba te w oul d be to a llo wthat go ve rn m en t c ontro l ov er the se ar chf

or pol iti ca l tru th. ’ ” ( quot ing Co nsol . E dis on C o. v. P ub. S er v. Co m m ’ n, 447 U . S. 530 , 538 , 100 S . Ct . 232 6, 2333 , 65 L . E d. 2d 319 (198 0))). Co ra l S pr ing s arg ue s th at the S ignCo de vio la te d th is p ro hib iti on i n a num ber of w ay s, including: (1) per m itting publi c interest signs bu t not ot her nonc om m er ci al sig ns o n publi c pr ope rty ; ( 2) pe rm itt ing te m por ar y pol iti ca l and ro ad sid e m em or ia l si gns but not oth er te m por ar y non co m m er ci al sig ns; ( 3) perm itting tem

porary “ special event” signs bu t not tem porary signs for other54

nonc om m er ci al e ve nts ; ( 4) pr ohi bit ing anim at ed sig ns, e xc ep t f

or tho se dis play ing the ti m e or

te m pe ratur e; ( 5) pe rm itt ing pol iti ca l c am pa ignsig ns c onne ct ed

to el ec tio ns b ut p ro hib iti ng p oli tic al sig ns unr el at ed to el ec tio ns; and ( 6) e xe m pti ng ce rt ai n no nc om

m er ci al sig ns s uc h a s e le ct ionsig ns f ro m the pe rm itt ing pr oc es s re qui re d of

oth er non co m m er ci al sig ns. Ina ddi tio n, Co ra l S pr ing s say s th at the old S ignCo de vio la te d th e Fi rs t A m en dm en t by

la ck ing pr oc ed

ur al sa fe guard s ne ce ssary f or aspe ec h li ce nsi ng plan. I t a lle ge dly

did so i n tw o w ay s. F ir st, Co ra l S pr ing s c la im s, the S ignCo de ga ve “ unbr idl ed

dis cr et ion ” to g ove rn m en t of fi ci al s c onsi de ri ng p er

m it ap pli catio ns, by

f ai lin g to nam e spe ci fi c cr ite ri a fo r ap pr ovi ng o r de ny ing applications , and byfailing to includ e any m echanism

for prom pt judicial re view of appl ic at ionde nia ls. S ee F W/P BS , I nc . v. Ci ty of D al la s, 493 U . S. 215 , 225 -2 6, 110 S. Ct. 596, 605, 107 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1990); Freedm an v. Mary land, 380 U. S. 51, 85 S . Ct . 734 , 13 L . E d. 2d 6 49 ( 1965 ). S ec ond, the S ignCo de im pose d no spe ci fi c tim e pe ri od b y

w hic h th e de ci sio n m ak er m ust appr ove or

de ny ap pli catio ns. E ve n if any of the se a spe ct s of

the old S ignCo de w er e unc onst itu tio na l, the ch al le nge is m oot

if the y w er e not r et ai ne d inthe A m en de d S ignCo de . S ev er al of the se c ha lle nge s are , in fa ct , m oot be ca use the A m en de d S ignCo de r em ed ie d th e55

al le ge d de fe ct s. F ir st, the part s of the old S ignCo de that pe rm itt ed pub lic int er es t sig ns b ut n o othe r nonc om m er ci al sig ns h av e be ena m en de d. T he r el ev an t provisi ons of the oldSign Code wer e em bodi ed in § 16-24 8(a)( 12), which pr ohi bit ed

“ [t ] em por ar y and p er m an en t si gns, oth er

than publi c int er es t si gns, pla ce s [ sic ] on p ubl ic pr ope rty ”; and § 16- 250, w hic h de fi ne d and d el ine at ed the pr ope r use s of

“ Pu bli c int er es t si gns. ” N ota bly , how ev er , the A m en de d S ignCo de el im inate d th e ex em

pti on f or pub lic int er es t si gns. T he pr ovi sio n no wsim ply prohibi ts “ [t] em

porary and perm anent signs , plac ed on any publi c property .” Am ended Sign Code § 16 -248(11). More over, § 16-250 of the Sign Code was repeale d in its enti rety . Plainly , then, the challenge to these provisi ons has b een ren de redm oo t b y

th e ch an ge in th e la w. W e add that plaintiff’ s claim that election-based politi cal signs are favored over other political sig ns is also m oot. T he old Sign Cod e said that “ Political Si gns” c oul d be dis play ed “ 60 d ay s pr ior

to el ec tio n; u

p to 14 d ay s a ft er

the el ec tio n, ” an d w as sil en t onpol iti ca l si gns not c onne ct ed

w ithan e le ct ion . S ign Co de § 16 -2 53. B ut the A m en de d S ignCo de c hange d th e ru le , im posi ng the aforem entioned ti m e lim its onl y “ [i] f the copy

is related to an elec tion.” A m ended Si gn C ode § 16 -2 53.Th e Am e nd e d Si g n Co de say s: 19 The a

pplicant may

file a written notice of a

ppeal to the c ity

commission within fifteen ( 15) day s after the re ceipt of the depar

tment’s written notice. Th e c ity c omm iss ion

sh a ll h e ar t

he a pp e a l and re nd e r a de c isi on wi thi n th i rty ( 3 0 ) d ay s a f

t e r th e d at e o f

r e c e i v i n gth e wr i t t e nn o t i c e o f a p p e a l . If the city commission does not gra nt the appea l, then the applica nt may seek relief in the Circuit Court for B rowa rd County , as provided by law. Amended Sig n Code § 16-261. “The depar

tment shall approve or

deny the sig n permit within thirty (30) da y s after 20 rec eipt of the a

pplication.” I d. 56 Also now m oot is th e view that the old Sign Code lacked procedural sa fe guard s. T he A m en de d S ignCo de doe s no t gr an t unbr idl ed dis cr et ionto of fi ci al s r ev ie w ing appl ic at ion s f or sig n pe rm its . T he A m en de d C ode spe ci fi ca lly pr ovi de s th at

“ [t ] he de partm en t sh al l a ppr ove or de ny the sig n pe rm it ba se d on w he the r it co m

pli es w iththe r equir em en ts o f thi s art ic le . ” § 16 -2 61. T he de ci sio n m ak er s are thu s bo und by the spe ci fi c pr ovi sio ns o f the statut e’ s r eg ulatio ns i n re nde ri ng the ir

de ci sio ns. I n a ddi tio n, the A m en de d S ignCo de pr ovi de s f or ti m el y j udi ci al r ev ie wof

de nia ls o f pe rm its , and i t i m pose s aspe ci fi c tim e lim it by 19 w hic h pe rm it ap pli catio ns m ust be appr ove d or

de nie d. 20 Co ra l S pr ing s’ c la im

that the Ci ty ’ s si gn o rd inanc e sti ll im pe rm iss ibl y dis cr im inate s am ong ce rt ai n ty pe s of spe ec h by

e xe m pti ng s om e kin ds o f nonc om m er ci al sig ns - - suc h a s po lit ic al sig ns - - fr om the pe rm itt ing r equir em en ts im pose d onm ost

sig ns, is not

m oot , be ca

use thi s e xe m

pti on w as r et ai ne d inthe“Section 26-17 of the Doug lasville sign c ode exempts five ty pes of sig ns from 21 permitting r equire ments and/or per mit fees: 1) one wall sig n per buildingside announc ing the bu sin e ss a

nd atta c he d to the sid e of

the bu ild ing , 2 ) o ne re a l e state ‘f or sa le ’ s ig n p e r p ro pe rt

y frontag e, 3) one bulletin board located on re ligious, public, cha ritable or e ducational pr emises, 4) one construc tion identification sign, a nd 5) direc tional traff

ic sig ns containingno adver tisements.” I d. at 1511. 57 Am ended Sign Code. Se e A m ended Sign Code § 16 -261. T his challenge, how ev er , f

ai ls o n th e m er its . Apane l of thi s C ourt e xpl ic itl y

r ej ec te d ane ar ly ide nti ca l c ha lle nge in Me sse r v. Ci ty of D ougl as vil le , G eo rg ia , 975 F . 2d 1 505 (1 1thCi r. 199 2) . Me sse r atta ck ed asig n or din an ce e xe m

pti ng f ive kin ds o f sig ns fr om pe rm itt ing r equir em en ts. W e expli ci tly dis tin gui she d be tw ee n e xe m pti ons 21 from perm itting requirem ents and exem ption s from

outright prohibit ions s uch as t h o s e i n M e t r o me d i a : “[ T ]h e D o u g l a s v i l l e e x e mp t i o n s ar e n o te x e mp t i o n s f r o m a ge ne ra l ban of

a ll of f- pr em ise bil lbo ar ds, but

f ro m pe rm itt ing r equir em en ts and perm its fees. Messer has not challenged the perm it process as an unconst itutio nal re str ic tio n onspe ec h. T hus, the D ougl as vil le sig n or din an ce stands on a dif fe re nt footing from

the com plete bans on sp eech in [Me trom edia and National A d v e rt i s i n g C o . v . O r a n g e , 8 6 1 F . 2 d2 4 6 ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 8 8 ) ]. ” I d . a t1 5 1 3 . T h e s a me dis tin ct ionappl ie s to the pe rm itt ing e xe m pti ons in the old

S ignCo de and the A me n d e dS i g nC o d e . S i mp l y p u t , ap e r mi tr e qu i r e me n ti s w h o l l y d i f f e r e n tf r o m aThe pe rmitting exemption for political signs is par ticularly important for the pr otection 22 of political speec h, which enjoy s the hig hest level of F irst Amendment protec tion. See, e.g ., M c In ty r e v . O h i o E l e c t i o n s C o m m ’ n , 5 1 4 U . S . 3 3 4 , 3 4 6 - 4 7 , 1 1 5 S . C t . 1 5 1 1 , 1 5 1 8 - 1 9 , 1 3 1 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1995); B uckley v. Valeo, 424 U .S. 1, 14, 96 S. C t. 612, 632, 46 L . Ed. 2d 659 (1976); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S. C t. 1304, 1308, 1 L . Ed. 2d 1498 (1957). Ex empting political sig ns, particular ly those whose r eleva

nce is subjec t to the time pressures of impending e lection, from pe rmitting re quirements is not only constitutionally

permissible, but may well be c onstitut ionally

require d. See Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of Miami, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1375-76 (S.D. F la. 2003). Se e , e .g ., Am e nd e d Si g n Co de § 1 6- 24 8( 2) -( 5) (e xemp tin gtim e -a nd -t e mpe ratur e signs , 23 temporar y g rand ope ning signs, special e vent sig ns, and tempora ry projec t signs fr om ge nera l prohibitions on si g ns); I d. § 16-253 (sa ying that “[o] nly

the followingtemporar

y signs a re permitted”: grand ope ning ba nner signs, model signs, political sig ns, rea l estate sig ns, contrac tor signs, g ara g e sale signs, pr oject sig ns, and roa dside memorial sig ns). 58 ban, and exem

ption s from

the form er are c orrespondin gly differ ent from

-- and far less susp ect than -- exem ption s from

the latter. 22

C. Sever ability

E ve n th oughsti ll oth er

part s of the A m en de d S ignCo de m ay be unc onst itu tio na l, w e ne ed not - - an d do not

- - co nsi de r the m er its of

the c ha lle nge 23 to the ir va lid ity sin ce any

de ci sio n onthe m er its c anhave no b eari ng o n th e ca se be fo re us. I t i s by

nowc le ar

that i f ch al le nge d part s of the A m en de d S ignCo de w er e se ve ra

ble f ro m the part s of

the Co de that a ct

ua lly c au se d th e de nia l of

the pe rm it ap pli catio n, the re w oul d be no p oin t i n e va luatin g th e pla int if f’ s arg um en ts as to tho se pr ovi sio ns. I nde ed , if w e w er e to e va luate the va lid ity of c er ta in59

provisi ons of the Am ended Sign Code, knowing that the result of this inqui ry co uld have no e ff

ec t onthe r es ult

in thi s c as e, our

pr onounc em en ts w oul d be essentially

advisory in nature. Se ve ra bil ity of aloc al or din an ce is a que sti on o f state law . C ity of L ak ew ood v. P la in D ea le r Pu b. Co . , 486 U . S. 750 , 772 , 108 S . Ct . 213 8, 215 2, 100 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1988). A nd Florida law c learly favors (where possible) severance of the inv al id p ortio ns o f a lawf ro m the va lid one s. A cc or din g to the F lor ida Su pr em e Co urt, “ [s ] ev er ab ili ty is a j udi ci al doc tr ine r ec ogni zi ng the obl igatio n of the j udi ci ar

y to upho ld the c onst itu tio na lity of le gis la tiv e en ac tm en ts whe re it is poss ibl e to s tr ike onl y

the unc onst itu tio na l po rt ion s. ” Ray v. Mo rtha m , 742 S o. 2d 12 76 , 12 80 (Fl a. 19 99 ) (ci ti ng Sta te v. Ca lh ou n C ou nt y , 12 6 F la . 37 6, 3 83 (19 36 )). T he doc tr ine of

se ve ra bil ity is “ de ri ve d f

ro m the r es pe ct

of the j udi ci ar

y f or the se paratio n of

pow er s, and i s ‘ de sig ne d to sho wgr eat de fe re nc e to the le gis la tiv e pr er ogativ e to e na ct

law s. ’ ” I d. ( quot ing S ch m itt v. S ta te , 590 S o. 2d 4 04, 415 (Fla. 1991 )). Se ve ra bil ity is not pos sib le , how ev er , w he n “ the ta int of an il le ga l pr ovi sio n ha s in fe ct ed

the e nti re e na ctm en t, r equir ing the w hol e uni t t o f ai l. ” Sc hm itt , 590 So . 2d at 41 4. Whe the r a statut e is s ev er ab le is de te rm ine d by “ its r el at ionto the overall legislative intent of the statute of w hich it is a part, and whether the statute,60

le ss the inv al id p ro vis ion s, c ansti ll ac co m pli sh this int en t. ” Mart ine z v. S canlan, 582 So. 2d 116 7, 1173 (Fla. 1991 ) (quoting E. A ir L ines, Inc. v. D ep’ t of Revenue, 455 So. 2d 311 , 317 (Fla. 1984 )). T he doctrine of severability , thus, “ recognizes that f ed er al c ourts h av e ana ff

irm at ive duty

to pr es er ve the va lid ity

of le gis la tiv e en ac tm en ts whe n it

is at a ll poss ibl e to d o so . ” F la . O utd oor A dve r. , 182 F . S upp. 2d at 120 9 (citing Ray , 742 So. 2d at 128 0). T he F lor ida

S upr em e Co urt ha s su gge ste d th is t es t f or dis ce rn ing se ve ra bil ity in Sm ithv. D ep ar

tm en t of I nsur an ce : Whe n apart

of astatut e is d ec lare d un co nst itu tio na l the r em ai nde r of the act w ill be perm itted to stand provided: (1) the uncon stitut ional pr ovi sio ns c anbe se parate d f ro m the r em ai nin g va lid

pr ovi sio ns, ( 2) the le gis la tiv e pur

pose e xpr es se d inthe va lid pr ovi sio ns c anbe ac co m pli she d in de pe nde ntl y

of tho se w hic h are voi d, ( 3) the goo d an d th e ba d f

eatur es are not

so i nse para

ble in subs tanc e that i t c anbe said that the Legislature w ouldhave passed the one without th e other an d, ( 4) an a ct

c om ple te in its el f re m ai ns a ft er the inv al id p ro vis ion s ar e str ic ke n. 507 So . 2d 1 080, 108 9 ( quot ing Cr am p v. Bd . of

P ub. I nstru ct ion , 137 S o. 2d 8 28, 830 (Fla. 1962)). A ccording to Florida law, then, the unconstitu tional part of a challenged statute sho uld be excised, leaving the rest intact and in force, when doi ng s o do es not

de fe at the pur pose of the statut e an d le av es in pla ce alawthat i s com plete.61

W e ar e fu lly

sa tis fi ed that the pur

pose of the A m en de d S ignCo de is not de fe at ed by the r em ova l of

the pur porte dly unc onst itu tio na l pr ovi sio ns ( suc h a s th e ex em pti ons in § 16- 248( 2) -( 5) and § 16- 253) , w hic h m ak e up b ut a sm al l part

of the w hol e. T he A m en de d S ignCo de sti ll m ak es pe rf ec t se nse w he n stri ppe d of it s sus pe ct pr ovi sio ns - - the arg um en t tha t the gr am m ar of som e of the pr ovi sio ns o f the sig n C ode be cam e nons en sic al w he n stri ppe d of the ir of fe nsi ve a spe ct s is sim ply inc or re ct . T he a lle ge dly

pr obl em at ic a spe ct s of

the A m en de d S ignCo de can be e as ily

e xc ise d w ith out

sa cr if ic ing e ith er

the gr am m ar or str uc tur e of the or din an ce , or

it s ov er al l st at ed

pur pose , w hic h is to “ cr eate ac om pr eh en siv e sy ste m of str ee t gr ap hic c ontro ls, the re by f ac ili ta tin g c le ar

c om m uni catio n, re duc ed tr af fi c or str uc tur al ha zard s, and an e nhanc ed a es the tic appe ar an ce of

the city .” § 16-247(a). The r egulatory

purpose of the und isput ed sections of the Sign Code -- av oid ing pub lic e y es or es and tra ff ic dis ru pti on - - w oul d no t be de str oy ed by the el im inatio n of

the sus pe ct

c ont en t r eg ulatio ns. C utt ing out the pr obl em at ic part s of § 16 -2 48 ( w hic h e xe m

pte d c er ta in ty pe s of sig ns f ro m ge ne ra l pr ohi bit ion s) and § 16 -2 53 ( w hic h a llo w ed c er ta in ty pe s of te m por ar y sig ns and b an ne d a ll oth er s) st il l l eav es in pl ace a co m pr eh en si ve an d c oh eren t s y st em of s ig n re gu la ti on . E lim inatin g th em

doe s no t de fe at

the or din an ce ’ s purp ose , nor doe s it r en de r the62

Am ended Sign Code as a whole logically or gram m atically nonsens ical. N or does the ir e lim inatio n a ff

ec t the portio ns o f the A m en de d S ignCo de that are a ct ua lly ge rm an e an d r el ev ant t o th e Ci ty ’ s r ej ec tio n of Co ra l S pr ing s’ appl ic at ion : the pr ohi bit ionof

pe rm an en t of

f- pr em ise s si gns, § 16 -2 48( 5) ; the pr ohi bit ionof pol e sig ns, § 16 -2 48( 6) ; the r eg ulatio ns o n th e siz e, he igh t, and num be r of non re sid en t dis tr ic t pe rm an en t si gns, § 16 -2 52; the landsc ap ing r equir em en ts f or sig ns, § 16 - 255; and the appr ova l pr oc es s f or sig n pe rm its , § 16 -2 61. W e fi nd i t whol ly

im pla usi ble that the Ci ty

w oul d have pr ef

er re d no sig n or din an ce a t a ll to o ne that c ont ai ns a ll the c ur re nt p ar ts o f the A m en de d S ign Co de oth er

than th e sus pe ct

c ont en t r eg ulatio ns. A nd e lim inatin g th ose portio ns doe s no t i n any

w ay a ff ec t the oth er

part s, w hic h are ind isp uta bly de sig ne d to facilitate c lear c omm

unication , r educe traf

fic and structural hazards, and enhance the City ’ s aesthetic appearance. The plaintiff has e xpressed alarm that questio nable provisi ons were

“ sc at te redth ro ug ho ut th e Si gn Co de .” Co ral Sp rin gs , 28 7 F . Sup p. 2 d a t 1 32 0. Bu t i n f ac t, the F lor ida

S upr em e Co urt ha s e xpr es sly a llo w ed f or se ve ranc e of ind ivi dua l se nte nc es or

e ve n ph ra se s w he n it

w as pos sib le to do s o w ith out de fe at ing the pur

pose of the statut e as aw hol e. S ee , e . g. , S tate v. W ill iam s, 34363

So . 2d 3 5, 38 ( Fl a. 197 7) ; C ram p, 137 S o. 2d at 83 0- 31; se e al so J one s v. S m ith , 4 7 4 F . S up p . 1 1 6 0 , 1 1 6 9 ( S . D . F l a . 1 9 7 9 ) ( n o t i n g th a t“[ t ]h e F l o r i d aS up r e me Co urt ha s stri ck enase nte nc e, and e ve n asin gle phr as e, w hil e pr es er vin g th e re m ai nde r of

the statut e” ( ci ta tio ns o m itt ed )) ; G ranit e St at e O utd oor A dve r. , I nc . v. Ci ty of Cl earw at er , 213 F . S upp. 2d 1 312, 132 6- 27 ( M. D . F la . 200 2) ( str iki ng down anum

be r of c ont en t- ba se d pr ovi sio ns i n ac ity ’ s si gn o rd inanc e but le av ing in p la ce num er ous va lid

pr ovi sio ns o f the law ); G . K . L td. T rave l v. Ci ty of L ak e O sw eg o, 200 4 W L 817 142, a t *9 ( D . O r. , Mar. 29, 200 4) ( “ T he str ic ke n po rt ion s of the S ignCo de are m ino r ex em pti ons or e xc ep tio ns t o m aj or

portio ns o f the S ign Co de ( e. g. , r eg ulatio ns g ove rn ing te m por ar y sig ns) [ an d th e] r em ai nin g part s of the Sign Code are not dependent on the stricken portion s and can be executed ef fe ct ive ly w ith out the m . ”) . W e w oul d have no p ro ble m doi ng the sam e w iththe Am ended Sign Code. If these r easons wer e not sufficient to m ake clear that parts of the A m ended Si gn C ode are r ea dil y

se ve ra ble , the Ci ty ’ s L an d D ev el opm en t C ode e xpr es sly provides for the pos sibili ty that parts of it m ight n ot pass cons titutio nal m uster: Sh oul d any

pr ovi sio n of

thi s or din an ce be de cl ar ed by ac ourt of co m pe te nt j ur isd ic tio n to be inv al id, the sam e sha ll not a ff ec t the validityof the ordinance as a whole, or any part thereof

, other than the part de cl ar ed to be inv al id.64

Land Dev. Code Ar

t. X VI II, § 16-291 . Clear ly , then, the City ’ s expressed le gis la tiv e de sir e is t o ke ep a s m uc h of it s or din an ce s a s it

c an . Mo re ove r, F lor ida lawsay s th at , “ [a ] lbe it not bin din g, ale gis la tiv el y

e xpr es se d pr ef

er en ce f or the se ve ra bil ity of voi de d pr ovi sio ns i s pe rs ua siv e. ” Mo re auv. L ew is, 648 S o. 2d 12 4, 1 27 (Fl a. 19 95 ) (ci ti ng Sta te v. Ch am pe , 37 3 S o. 2 d 8 74 , 88 0 (F la . 19 78 )). T his hol din g, and m or e br oa dly the doc tr ine of

se ve ra bil ity , w ei ghs ag ai nst

the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f

ind ing that the c ha lle nge d pr ovi sio ns w er e not se ve ra ble f ro m the re st o f the S ignCo de . T o r ule oth er w ise w oul d se ri ousl y

inf ri nge on the not ionof l e g i s l a t i v e au t o n o my

an di g n o r e F l o r i d a ’s d o c t r i n e o f s e v e r ab i l i t y. Fi na lly , e ve n if

w e w er e to r

ule the r em ai nin g c ha lle nge d po rt ion s to be unc onst itu tio na l, it

w oul d no t m ak e a w hit

of dif fe re nc e to C or al S pr ing s; i t w oul d not have ar igh t t o asig n pe rm it w he the r the se pr ovi sio ns o f the A m en de d S ign Co de are va lid

or not . W e thu s have no r ea son to d ec ide on the ir c onst itu tio na lity be ca use doi ng s o w oul d have no i m pa ct on the pla int if

f’ s in te re sts . C f. Cr ow el l v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62, 52 S. Ct. 285, 296-97, 76 L. Ed. 598 (193 2). W e co nf ro nte d asim ilar sit

ua tio n inH er she y

v. Ci ty of Cl earw at er , 834 F. 2d 93 7 (11th Cir. 1987), a civil rights action in Florida wher e the plaintiff challenged a city ’ s crim inal ordinance that m ade it illegal “ to lod ge or sleep in” a65

m oto r ve hic le park ed

on the str ee t. I d. a t 93 9. H er she y sa id tha t the pr ohi bit ion on s le ep ing w as unc onst itu tio na lly ove rb ro ad . B ut w e de ci de d th at be ca use ( 1) the

“ or sleep” provision of the lawwa s severable fr om the rest of it; and (2) ther e w as sti ll pr oba

ble c au se to ar

re st H er she y

f or “ lod g[ ing ] ” in h is c ar , w e ne ed not and di d n ot pa ss on th e co ns ti tu ti on al it y of t he “ orsl eep ” cl au se . Id. at93 9- 40 & n .5 (“ [W ] e do n ot r ea chthe que sti on o f w he the r the or din an ce a s w ri tte n - - that i s, inc lud ing the pr ohi bit iona ga ins t sl ee pin g - - is unc onst itu tio na l . . . . ”) . I n th is sig na ge c as e, the re is ev enle ss r ea son to d ec ide on the c onst itu tio na lity of the challenged provis ions. In H ershey , at least, the c hallenged part of the law wa s am ong the r ea sons f

or the pla int if

f’ s arr es t. H er e, by

c ontra st, non e of

the c ont en tba se d pr ovi sio ns whose c onst itu tio na lity Co ra l S pr ing s c ha lle nge d have anythi ng at a ll to d o w iththe r ej ec tio n of it s pe rm it ap pli catio n. Wha t w e fa ce tod ay is a statut e fr om

w hic h th e co nst itu tio na lly sound whe at

c anr ea dil y

be se parate d f

ro m the constitu tionallysuspect chaff, and both state and local lawexpress a clear pr ef er en ce f or doi ng j ust

that. T he pos sib ly

unc onst itu tio na l pr ovi sio ns o f the A m en de d S ignCo de have no b eari ng o n th e m ootne ss o f thi s su it, pr ec ise ly be ca use the y ha d no thi ng t o do w iththe pr ovi sio ns o f the lawthat c au se d th e66

re j ec tio n of the sig n pe rm it in the f

ir st p la ce , and the ir

r em ova l w oul d do nothin g to a ff ec t the latte r pr ovi sio ns. A cc or din gly , w e hol d th at the c ha lle nge to the S ignCo de is m oot , be ca use the or igi na l S ignCo de ha s be enr ep ea le d, and the re is no r ea sona ble li ke lih ood the City will re enact the old Sign Code. More over, a s we read F lorida law, Coral Springs ho lds no vested right in th e sign perm it. F inally , portions of the Am ended Si gn C ode that arg uably

m ay be unc onst itu tio na l are f ull y se ve ra ble f ro m the r es t of the law , inc lud ing the pr ovi sio ns tha t l ed to the r ej ec tio n of

Co ra l S pr ing s’ application for a sign perm it. T he constitu tionalit y of these provision s is therefore of no i m portanc e to the r es olu tio n of thi s m atte r, and a cc or din gly w e w ill not weig h i n o n t hi s q ue st io n t od ay . RE V E RS E D and RE MA

N D E D , w ithins tr

uc tio ns t o D IS MI SS f

or la ck of subj ec t m atte r j ur isd ic tio n.