The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., United States District Judge for the

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Western District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 96-3539

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Jeffrey E. Samuels, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Regina Hawkins; Jackie Robinson; *

Mark Boucher; James McCoy; Charles * [PUBLISHED]

Megerman, *

*

Appellees. *

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Submitted: April 6, 1998

Filed: September 22, 1998

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Before BOWMAN, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD,

Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Jeffrey E. Samuels appeals from the adverse grant of summary judgment by the

District Court in Mr. Samuels's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional

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violations against employees of the Jackson County Detention Center in Kansas City.

Having carefully considered the record in this case, we affirm without discussion the
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judgment of the District Court as to Mr. Samuels's claims against Captain Jackie

Robinson, Officer Mark Boucher, Manager of Detention James McCoy, and Director

Charles Megerman. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

We also affirm as to Officer Regina Hawkins, against whom plaintiff asserts an

Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff, who at the time of the incident in question was

serving a life sentence for first-degree murder and armed criminal action, was

incarcerated at the Jackson County Detention Center awaiting transfer to the Missouri

Department of Corrections. On May 24, 1994, Officer Hawkins reported that while she

was making her regular rounds plaintiff threw a cup of liquid (which she identified as

urine) on her. As a result of Officer Hawkins's report, plaintiff was placed in restraints

for a period of approximately four hours. During that time, Officer Hawkins

approached plaintiff's cell and threw a cup of liquid (she says it was a cup of water) into

the cell. Plaintiff claims that some of the liquid splashed into his eyes and caused

damage. Though plaintiff was examined by the medical staff, no evidence of any

damage of any kind was discovered. For her part, Officer Hawkins was counseled on

controlling her anger and a formal letter of reprimand was placed in her file. The

foregoing facts are the basis for plaintiff's cruel-and-unusual punishment claim against

Officer Hawkins.

When "prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm,

contemporary standards of decency always are violated." Hudson v. McMillian, 503

U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Here, however, there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury

could conclude that Officer Hawkins acted maliciously and sadistically toward plaintiff.

Plainly, her response to plaintiff's provocative actions, which were aggravated by the

harassing remarks of other inmates, was unprofessional and inappropriate. But to say

that throwing a cup of water (and there is no evidence the substance was anything but

water) at plaintiff was, in the circumstances of this case, malicious and sadistic would

be an Orwellian distortion of the meaning of those terms. In addition, if one can say that

Officer Hawkins used any force at all against plaintiff, it was de minimis in
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amount, and not of a sort "'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'" Hudson, 503 U.S.

at 9 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). Finally, despite plaintiff's

elaborate claims of serious injury to his eyes, when plaintiff was examined by the

medical staff shortly after the incident they found nothing wrong with his eyes. There

being no evidence of any actual injury caused by the water that Officer Hawkins threw

into plaintiff's cell, we conclude that the injury, if any, cannot be regarded as more than

de minimis.

For the reasons stated, the order of the District Court granting summary judgment

in favor of Officer Hawkins is, like the summary judgment in favor of the other

defendants, affirmed.

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 

I concur in the affirmance of the district court&s judgment as to Mr. Samuels&s

claims against Captain Jackie Robinson, Officer Mark Boucher, Manager of Detention

James McCoy, and Director Charles Megerman. 

As to Mr. Samuels&s Eighth Amendment claim against Officer Regina Hawkins,

however, I respectfully dissent.

Although the facts are contested, I recount them most favorably to Mr. Samuels,

the non-moving party. See Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir. 1997).

On the evening of May 24, 1994, Officer Hawkins reported that Mr. Samuels, then a

Jackson County Detention Center (JCDC) inmate, had thrown urine on her, and Mr.

Samuels was placed in restraints. He was shackled to his cell bed on his back, and his

arms and hands were chained and handcuffed at his sides. 

Four hours later, Officer Hawkins was admitted to the module in which Mr.

Samuels was housed. Officer Hawkins went directly to the open doorway of Mr.
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Samuels&s cell. With her hands behind her back, she asked Mr. Samuels whether he

was serving a life sentence; stated, “I&m gonna make sure you never see, again!”; and

brought a cup out from behind her back and threw a clear liquid at Mr. Samuels, which

caused him to experience a slight burning sensation in his eyes and on his face. Because

of his restraints, Mr. Samuels was unable to avoid the liquid or shield his face. Officer

Hawkins then ran from the area. Other inmates, hearing Mr. Samuels yell that Officer

Hawkins had thrown a liquid on him that seemed to be burning his face, called for help.

Mr. Samuels was examined by a JCDC nurse, who found his vision was intact, but told

him to apply cold compresses to his eyes. 

After the occurrence, Mr. Samuels experienced sleeplessness, nightmares,

flashbacks, extreme stress, paranoia, and vision problems, and doctors diagnosed him

with “reactive anxiety” and “post-traumatic stress disorder.” He was prescribed antidepressant and anti-anxiety medications.

The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain is cruel and unusual punishment

forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992).

Where an inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim is based on excessive force, the “core

judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or

restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” See id. at 6-7.

Considerations relevant to this determination include the threat prison officials

reasonably perceived, the need for force, the efforts made to minimize the force used,

the relationship between the need for using force and the amount of force used, and the

degree of injury inflicted. See id. at 7; McLaurin v. Prater, 30 F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir.

1994).

 

Based on the Hudson considerations, I conclude that Mr. Samuels offered

sufficient evidence that Officer Hawkins’s conduct was malicious and sadistic to survive

summary judgment. Because Mr. Samuels was fully restrained and posed no threat to

anyone, no force was necessary. His subsequent symptoms and psychiatric
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treatment demonstrated a cognizable injury under the circumstances of this case. Cf.

Hobbs v. Lockhart, 46 F.3d 864, 869 (8th Cir. 1995) (inmate&s emotional distress was

sufficiently serious to support Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim; citing

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 16 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“#[p]ain& in its ordinary meaning

surely includes a notion of psychological harm”)).

I disagree with the district court&s statement that Officer Hawkins cannot be liable

because “de minimis” force was employed. “De minimis” uses of force are not

excluded from the Eighth Amendment&s prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment where the use of force is of a sort “repugnant to the conscience of

mankind.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10 (quotation marks and quoted cases omitted). Here,

viewing the evidence favorably to Mr. Samuels, Officer Hawkins intentionally and with

premeditation approached Mr. Samuels while he was on his back and fully restrained

to the bed by chains and handcuffs, reminded him of his life sentence, threatened him

with permanent blindness, while throwing a stinging liquid into his eyes, and then ran

from the area without providing any aid. I believe that such conduct, when examined

in its totality, would have placed Mr. Samuels, who was helpless to assist himself, in

reasonable and immediate fear of permanent blindness, and I conclude that such conduct

is “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” 

Consequently, I would reverse the judgment entered in favor of Officer Hawkins

and remand that claim to the district court for further proceedings. I would affirm the

judgment of the district court in all other respects.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.