IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS

WESTERN DISTRICT 

ADRIENNE SIDDENS, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) WD84141

)

PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY ) Opinion filed: August 10, 2021

INSURANCE COMPANY, )

)

Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BOONE COUNTY, MISSOURI

THE HONORABLE JONATHAN JACOBS, JUDGE

Division Three: Gary D. Witt, Presiding Judge, 

Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge and W. Douglas Thomson, Judge

Adrienne Siddens (“Siddens”) appeals the trial court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company (“PIIC”). In her 

two points on appeal, Siddens challenges the trial court’s legal conclusion that 

Decedent did not qualify as a “Named Insured” under the Policy. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

On May 5, 2019, Decedent was picking up traffic cones following a road race 

sponsored by his employer, Ultramax Events, LLC (“Ultramax”). Ultramax was 

covered by an insurance policy from PIIC which provided automobile liability 
2

coverage (the "Policy"). A co-employee of Decedent was driving an Ultramax-owned 

truck alongside the roadway while Decedent placed the traffic cones into the bed of 

the truck. While performing these duties, Decedent was struck by an uninsured 

motorist at a speed of approximately 70 miles per hour. As a result of the catastrophic 

injuries he sustained, Decedent was completely incapacitated for approximately six 

months and ultimately died. On December 6, 2019, Decedent’s wife, Siddens, filed a 

petition for wrongful death of Decedent against the uninsured motorist and PIIC. 

The Policy provided uninsured motorist insurance (“UM”) coverage to 

Ultramax. On page 1 of the UM coverage portion of the Policy, “USA Track & Field 

Event Directors” (“Event Directors”) is identified as the “Named Insured.” Ultramax 

is one of these Event Directors.1 

In the Policy, Section B., Who Is An Insured, provides an “if/then” approach to 

determining insureds for UM coverage. It discerns insureds by first determining if 

the Named Insured is designated as a “partnership, limited liability company, 

corporation, or any other form of organization,” or simply an individual. Based on 

this determination, the Policy identifies who is an insured. 

The Policy incorporates an amendment which adds additional insureds under 

the UM coverage, in addition to those falling within Section B. of the Policy. It states: 

 

1 The Event Directors are a collection of fourteen separate and distinct entities which sponsor 

running events. According to the schedule of Event Directors, the entities include: (1) Buffalo Erie 

Marathon Association; (2) Great Race, LLC; (3) Palm Beaches Marathon, LLC d/b/a K2 Sports 

Ventures; (4) Kinane Events, LLC; (5) Laughing Rhino Events, LLC; (6) M3S Sports LLC; (7) New 

Mexico Association of USA Track & Field, Inc.; (8) Quest Equities, LLC d/b/a Lifestyle Escapes; (9) 

Strider Events, LLC; (10) Tiburon Endurance Sports, Inc.; (11) The Woodlands Marathon 

Management, LLC; (12) Bark Eater Events, LLC; (13) Ultramax Events, LLC; and (14) Zoom 

Multisport Racing, LLC.
3

For the COMMERCIAL AUTOMOBILE COVERAGE PART, Who Is An 

Insured is amended to include USA Track & Field Event Directors 

enrolled in this program and scheduled on the attached PI-MANU-1 

(09/06) – SCHEDULE OF COVERED EVENT DIRECTORS, and their 

respective employees, volunteers or any other permissive user while 

using a covered auto with permission from a covered event director.

(Emphasis added).2 

Pertinent to this appeal, the Policy provides UM coverage with limits of 

$1,000,000 for each “covered auto.” Section D. of the Policy provides the Limits of 

Insurance. Section D.1. provides that if bodily injury is sustained by any person other 

than an individual Named Insured, the limit of UM coverage is $1,000,000. Section 

D.2. provides that if bodily injury is sustained by an individual Named Insured and 

there are two or more automobiles “covered,” then PIIC will pay “the sum of limits 

applicable to each covered ‘auto,’” commonly called “stacking.”3 Thus, for any insured

who is not an individual Named Insured, the applicable policy limit is $1,000,000. 

The parties agreed to a partial settlement of $1,248,980.36, which has already 

been paid to Siddens. This did not end their litigation, however, for Siddens argues

Decedent is an individual Named Insured who is entitled to stack the UM coverage 

limits. PIIC, on the other hand, asserts Decedent was not covered as an individual 

Named Insured, but rather as an insured, and thus, the coverage cannot be stacked. 

 

2 Further reference to the Policy in this opinion incorporates and includes the Amendment.

3 “‘Stacking’ refers to an insured’s ability to obtain multiple insurance coverage benefits for an 

injury either from more than one policy, as where the insured individual has two or more separate 

vehicles under separate policies, or from multiple coverages provided for within a single policy, as 

when an insured individual has one policy which covers more than one vehicle.” Hall v. Allstate Ins. 

Co., 407 S.W.3d 603, 607 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012) (citing Ritchie v. Allied Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 

S.W.3d 132, 135 (Mo. banc 2009)). 
4

The parties also agreed to allow the trial court to decide whether Siddens may stack 

the UM coverage available as a Named Insured. There are seven “covered autos” 

owned by Ultramax, each with $1,000,000 of UM coverage. Hence, the applicable 

policy limit for an individual Named Insured would be $7,000,000, while the policy 

limit for Decedent if he is not an individual Named Insured would be $1,000,000. 

To that end, Siddens and PIIC filed competing motions for summary judgment, 

thereby allowing the trial court to address the underlying issues related to the 

question of stacking. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of PIIC, 

finding that UM coverage had been exhausted. 

Siddens appeals. Further factual details will be provided as relevant in the 

analysis below.

Standard of Review

“Insurance policy interpretations are questions of law that appellate courts 

review de novo.” Warden v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 480 S.W.3d 403, 405 (Mo. App. W.D. 

2016) (citing Seeck v. Geico General Ins. Co., 212 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Mo. banc 2007)). 

“Where the trial court granted summary judgment, we also apply a de novo standard 

of review.” Id. (citing Long v. Shelter Ins. Companies, 351 S.W.3d 692, 695-96 (Mo. 

App. W.D. 2011)). “In construing the terms of an insurance policy, this Court applies 

the meaning which would be attached by an ordinary person of average 

understanding if purchasing insurance, and resolves ambiguities in favor of the 

insured.” Id. (citing Seeck v. Geico General Ins. Co., 212 S.W.3d at 132). “Language 

is ambiguous if it is reasonably open to different constructions.” Id. 
5

Point I

In her first point on appeal, Siddens argues that the trial court erred in 

granting PIIC’s motion for summary judgment because PIIC failed to establish that 

Decedent is not a Named Insured under the Policy. Siddens contends that by 

specifically incorporating the phrase “and their respective employees” into the 

Amendment which modifies who is an insured, PIIC has made the employees of 

Ultramax, all of whom are, of course, individuals, Named Insureds. Siddens then 

reasons that since Decedent is an individual who is a Named Insured, the Policy 

permits her to stack the UM coverage applicable to each of the six additional 

automobiles. Siddens argues that at the very least the Policy language is ambiguous 

as to who is a Named Insured.4 

To begin, “[s]everal rules guide our interpretation of insurance policies.” Hall 

v. Allstate Ins. Co., 407 S.W.3d 603, 606 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012).

The key is whether the policy’s language is ambiguous or unambiguous. 

In making this determination, we consider the language in light of the 

 

4 Siddens’ point relied on fail to comply with Rule 84.04(d). Rule 84.04(d) provides that each 

point shall: “(A) identify the trial court ruling or action that the appellant challenges; (B) state 

concisely the legal reasons for the appellant’s claim of reversible error; and (C) explain in summary 

fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support the claim of reversible error.” Rule 

84.04(d)(1) additionally sets out the specific format for a point relied on when the review is of a decision 

of a trial court: “The trial court erred in [identify the challenged ruling or action], because [state the 

legal reasons for the claim of reversible error], in that [explain why the legal reasons, in the context of 

the case, support the claim of reversible error.].” “This rule is not a judicial word game or a matter of 

hypertechnicality, rather it serves to notify the opposing party of the precise matters under contention 

and inform our Court of the issues presented for review.” Carmen v. Olsen, 611 S.W.3d 368, 371 (Mo. 

App. E.D. 2020). Siddens’ point fails to follow the format set out in the rule. It is not “concise” nor 

does it provide legal support in a “summary fashion.” Instead, it is nearly a page long, includes case 

law applicable to our standard of review, and continues to develop arguments as it flows. Failure to 

comply with Rule 84.04 preserves nothing for review. Id. at 372. However, because we prefer to decide 

cases on their merits, and because we can readily discern Siddens’ point relied on, we exercise our 

discretion to address the merits of her appeal. Cityview Real Estate Servs., LLC v. K.C. Auto Panel, 

Inc., 576 S.W.3d 187, 191 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019).
6

meaning that would normally be understood by the layperson who 

bought and paid for the policy. Further, we evaluate policies by reading 

the policy as a whole. We do not evaluate policy provisions in isolation.

Id. at 606-07 (citations and quotations omitted). 

In analyzing uninsured motorist coverage, Missouri courts have 

“distinguish[ed] between named insureds and occupancy insureds . . . .” Linderer v. 

Royal Globe Ins. Co., 597 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980). Our Supreme Court 

elaborated on these terms of art in Hines v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 656 S.W.2d 262, 

265 (Mo. banc 1983), explaining that “[t]he coverage for the named insured is not 

dependent on the presence in an insured vehicle at the time of an accident involving 

an uninsured motorist, but is also applicable if the named insured is a pedestrian, or 

is riding in someone else’s automobile.” It follows that “[f]or a named insured, and 

his or her relatives, stacking is mandatory and required . . . .” Kertz v. State Farm 

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d 39, 42 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007). However, 

[i]t does not necessarily follow that an injured occupant [an occupancy 

insured] who is not the owner must have recourse to all the uninsured 

motorist coverage the owner of the car in which he or she is present was 

required to pay for . . . The insurance company and the owner of the 

automobile should not be disabled from entering into a contract which 

confines the uninsured motorist coverage available to an occupancy 

insured to that covering the vehicle in which he or she is riding at the 

time of the accident. 

Hines v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 656 S.W.2d at 265. Thus, “[f]or all other parties 

[other than the Named Insured] injured while driving or occupying the named 

insured’s vehicle, the limiting clause of the policy controls.” Kertz v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d at 42.
7

Here, the Named Insured is identified by proper name, “USA Track & Field 

Event Directors,” in the Policy where it states “Named Insured: USA Track & Field 

Event Directors.” Hence, throughout the Policy where Named Insured is used, it 

refers to USA Track & Field Event Directors. Ultramax is a Named Insured by virtue 

of being one of the Event Directors listed on the schedule of Event Directors attached 

to the Policy. In fact, Siddens herself identifies Ultramax as a Named Insured from 

the inception of this case.5 Notably, in defining the Named Insured, the Policy does 

not identify Decedent or any other individuals by name. 

In contrast to Named Insureds, additional insureds are identified by being a 

member of a defined group contained within the policy when analyzing uninsured 

motorist coverage. An insured’s eligibility for payment under the policy arises solely 

by meeting the criteria for being an insured. See generally Linderer v. Royal Globe 

Ins. Co., 597 S.W.2d at 661. These insureds have been referred to as “occupant 

insureds” by our courts in reviewing uninsured motorist coverage cases. See Kertz v. 

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d at 42. Here, the Policy defines an 

“insured” as “any person or organization qualifying as an insured in the Who Is An 

Insured provision of the applicable coverage.” The last paragraph of the Amendment 

to the Policy adds a group of persons to the class of insureds, as follows: 

For the COMMERCIAL AUTOMOBILE COVERAGE PART, Who Is An 

Insured is amended to include USA Track & Field Event Directors 

enrolled in this program and scheduled on the attached PI-MANU-1 

(09/06) – SCHEDULE OF COVERED EVENT DIRECTORS, and their 

 

5At paragraph 22 of her petition, she states “[t]he [PIIC] policy . . . was issued to USA Track & 

Field Event Directors of which Ultramax . . . was a named insured on the Schedule of Event Directors.”
8

respective employees, volunteers or any other permissive user while 

using a covered auto with permission from a covered event director.

Hence, as an employee of Ultramax “using a covered auto with permission from a 

covered event director” at the time of the collision, Decedent fell into the class of

occupant insureds.

6 

Siddens asserts that in stating “Event Directors . . ., and their respective 

employees . . .,” the Amendment makes such employees Named Insureds because they 

are employees of the Named Insured, Ultramax. However, the Amendment 

definitively states that “Who Is An Insured is amended to include . . . Event Directors 

. . . and their respective employees . . . .” No reasonable interpretation of the 

Amendment allows an employee of a Named Insured to become a Named Insured,

himself. 

Siddens further argues that the Policy is ambiguous as to who is a Named 

Insured. In light of our analysis and determination that Named Insured and insureds 

are clearly defined and distinguishable by the Policy language, this argument fails. 

We find there is no ambiguity in the Policy as to the defined term, Named Insured. 

“The mere fact that the parties disagree as to the meaning of a term or clause in an 

insurance policy does not give rise to an ambiguity.” Hall v. Allstate Ins. Co., 407 

S.W.3d at 607 (citing Thornburgh Insulation, Inc. v. J.W. Terrill, Inc., 236 S.W.3d 

651, 655 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007)).

 

6We recognize that “occupant insured” is a misnomer for Decedent, who is an insured by virtue 

of being an employee of Ultramax, not as a result of occupying the Ultramax vehicle. However, the 

language of the Amendment results in such an employee being in the class we have commonly 

addressed as occupant insureds. 
9

Accordingly, Decedent is not a Named Insured, and the Policy is not ambiguous 

as to who is a Named Insured. The trial court did not err. Point I is denied.

Point II

In his second point, Siddens contends that the trial court erred in granting 

PIIC’s motion for summary judgment because PIIC’s interpretation of the Policy 

renders entire paragraphs and sections of its UM coverage endorsement entirely 

meaningless, contradictory, and ambiguous as a matter of law in that that Policy 

“mandates that coverage for bodily injury shall be stacked” for Named Insureds, yet 

only the Event Directors are Named Insureds, and, as organizations, they themselves 

cannot sustain bodily injury.7 

Our conclusion that Decedent does not fall within the Policy provisions which 

define a Named Insured in Point I, however, is dispositive of Point II. As Siddens 

readily admits in the conclusion of her reply brief, “[t]he only question for this Court 

to decide is whether [] Siddens, an employee of Ultramax, was a Named Insured . . . 

.” We have found the trial court did not err in its determination that Siddens is not 

a Named Insured. Hence, the stacking issue set forth becomes irrelevant as the 

Policy clearly restricts stacking to individual Named Insureds. 

Point II is denied.

 

7 See Note 4, supra.
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Conclusion

The judgment entered by the circuit court is affirmed.

__________________________________________

 W. DOUGLAS THOMSON, JUDGE

All concur.