USCIB: 7. /13 

10 February 1955 

MEMORANDllM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

References: 

SACLANT Y Program. 

(a) USCIB 7./7 of 18 June 1954. 

(b) SAC/E/R/(6) FINAL of 14 November 1952 

(see USCIB 14/260 of 1 December 1952). 

(c) TRI 53/2 FINAL of 25 March 1953 

(see USCIB 3/99 of 8 April 1953). 

24 

1. In rlew of the action that may be taken on reference (a) and 

considering the possibility of a misunderstanding arising out of the 

several papers approved for SACLANT Y planning, reference (b), corrected 

in accordance with reference (c), is enclosed herewith as a re-issue for 

current information and file. 

2. The enclosure (a corrected version of reference (b)) is a 

shortened version of Annexure P2 and Exhibits l and 2 thereto of 

Appendix P to the UKUSA Agreement. It is to be used as a guide by 

SACLANT in any approach to Third Parties • In this connection particular 

attention is invited to the fact that the substance of paragraphs 20 and 

21 of Exhibit 2 to Annexure P2 of Appendix P does not appear in the 

Security Appendix (App. B) to SAC/E/R/( 6). 

Enclosure 

SAC/E/R/(6) Final 

dtd 14 Nov 1952 

(corrected version) 

USCIB: 7./13 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 03-13-2014 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 

SECRET 
SAC/E/R/(6) Final 

3EeREi' 

REF ~li218 

14 November 1952 

CCJOO.JNICATION INTELLIGENCE (Y) ARRANGEMENTS FOR SACLAN'lI 

I 

- GENERAL 

1. It being recognized that some aspects of Communication Intelligence (COMINT) will remain purely national secrets, nothing in these proposals 

should be construed as suggesting compulsory disclosure of information 

hazardous to national security or vital interests. It is at the same time 

considered that cooperation in war between the Communication Intelligence 

units provided for the direct support of the forces under SACLANT (hereinafter called Y units) is an essential requirement. 

2. Detailed planning for this wartime cooperation should be initiated 

as soon as possible. 

3. The following principles are suggested as the basis for this 

planning. 

~: Pertinent definitions are given in Appendix A hereto. 

SACLANT Y Structure 

II 

DETAILED PROPOSALS 

4. The SACLANT Y Structure should have the following elements: 

a. A senior Y officer at SACLANT Headquarters (SACLANT Y Officer) 

assisted by a Y staff. 

b. Y Officers and Y Staffs, where required., at headquarters of 

major subordinate Commanders under SACLANT. 

c. National Y units provided for support of SACLANT forces. 

5. It is recommended. that the responsibility for formulating and implementing SACLANT 1s Y policy lie with A.C. of S. (I), SACLAN~. 

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SECRET 
REF ¥!9fi21a 

Participation in SACLANT Y Structure 

6. Participation in the SACLANT Y Structure, including Y staffs, 

should be open to all nations contributing combat forces to SACLANT command, 

together with Y units, adequate for their direct support or contributing Y 

units for general support of the SACLANT Command. It shall be a condition 

of participation that these nations undertake to enforce appropriate 

security measures as set forth in Appendix B hereto, and also undertake 

to apply the principles set forth therein, as a minimum, to all other 

COMINT activities under their control. 

7. Participation in the activities of the SACLANT Y Structure will 

be limited to those nations whose geographical location and Y units can, 

in SACLANT 1s opinion, contribute to the over-all effectiveness of the 

structure. 

8. Participation only in the shore-based direction finder operations 

will not necessarily entitle a nation or its nationals to receive other 

types of Y information. 

9. Only nationals of those nations participating in the SACLANT Y 

Structure may have any detailed knowledge of the Y plans or other Y 

arrangements made. 

10. Each participating nation should provide and maintain its own Y 

units contributed for the support of SACLANT, or forces under his command, 

and should ensure their operational efficiency. 

Functions of the SACLANT I Staff 

11. The functions of the SACLANT Headquarters I officer and Y staff 

should include: 

a. effecting any necessary general coordination of the SACLANT 

I effort; 

b. establishing as far as national differences perm.it uniform 

operational procedures between Y units of different nations; 

c. giving technical advice as required to the SACLANT Headquarters 

Intelligence Staff on the interpretation of' I information received by 

SACLANT Headquarters, and arranging for the SACLANT Headquarters Intelligence 

Staff to receive all the I information available in the SACLANT Command 

which may be of value to it; , 

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SECRET 
RE~218 

d. formulating and supervising compliance with security regulations 

and policies governing the production, handling and dissemination of Y 

material within the SACLANT Conunand in accordance with the agreed security 

principles in Appendix B hereto; 

e. arranging for Y units to receive such technical material and 

end-products, whether produced in the SACLANT Command or received from 

national sources, as may be necessary for efficient conduct of their operations; 

f. subject to security regulations, 

with other activities, such as radio warfare, 

the discharge of his COMINT responsibilities. 

paper do not include radio warfare.) 

maintaining effective liaison 

which may relate to or $ff ect 

(The arrangements in this 

g. arranging within the procedures stipulated for NATO, for 

material of technical Communication Intelligence interest, including prisoner 

of war interrogations, prisoner of war reports, and captured documents and 

equipment to be made immediately available as appropriate to the elements of 

the SACLANT Y Structure and to national Communication Intelligence authorities; 

h. establishing and stating to the appropriate authorities requirements for such special communications and crypto-channels as necessary 

to meet operational and security requirements of the Y effort within SACLANT 1s 

Command. 

Functions of Y Staffs at Subordinate Commands 

12. Y officers and Y staffs at subordinate commands should perf ozm 

functions corresponding to those of the Y staff at SACLANT Headquarters. 

Functions of Y units 

13. Y units should intercept and process material and provide D/F information to meet the requirements prescribed by SACLANT. Any combination of Y 

units of one nationality with those of another nationality will be subject to 

agreement of the cognizant national Communication Intelligence authorities if 

required. 

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 

14. International cooperation in Y within SACLANT 1 s Command is expected 

to consist of: 

a. Coordinated shore-based direction finder operations, by national 

nets and stations organized and controlled as mutually agreed among the 

participating stations. 

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SECRET 
REF ~~S218 

b. Direction finder and intercept operations in allied vessels. 

c. Interception and processing by national Y units of enemy 

communications of tactical interest to SACLANT. 

Communication Intelligence Units in the SACLANT Area not Engaged in Support 

of Forces under SACLANT 

15. Each nation with forces serving under SACLANT may individually 

arrange to operate in SACLANT 1 s area national Communication Intelligence 

units not provided specifically or exclusively for support of the forces 

under SACLANT. These units will not operate as part of the SACLANT Y 

Structure, and will not be subject to the arrangements for inter-allied 

cooperation - unless agreed by the ~ations providing them. 

16. It is recognized that certain Communication Intelligence units at 

the higher levels would be directly supporting both SACLANT and their 

national Communication Intelligence organizations. Each participating 

nation would have discretion about such matters as the right of access of 

other nationals to these units. 

Cooperation within SACLANT Y Structure 

17. Cooperation within the SAGI.ANT. Y Structure should be that necessar,y 

to meet the essential Y needs of SACLANT and the forces under his command. 

18. The Y units and Y staffs of the participating nations will be 

at liberty to pass to their own national Communication Intelligence 

organizations and to other participating nations, but to those nations 

only, the technical material and traffic produced or received by themselves. 

The national Communication Intelligence organizations of the participating 

nations should in turn provide such technical support both to their own Y 

units and through the SACLANT Y staff to the Y units of other participating 

nations as they may consider would be appropriate and of assistance to the 

Y effort under SACLANT. Such material shall be handled in accordance with 

the regulations in Appendix. B hereto. 

19. For security reasons, the technical material and end-products 

released to Y units in the SACLANT Y Structure must be limited to the 

details essential to enable them to provide to the commands and formations 

they support the immediate service that is required. 

20. Exchange of technical material and end-products within the Y 

structure will be limited by the need of individual units to receive such 

material and by their ability to make use of it. 

21. In order to ensure a degree of uniformity in operation of Y units 

it may be necessary to introduce certain common operational procedures. 

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SECRET 
Planning Requirements 

22. In order to carry out his planning task, and in order to advise 

participating nations, the SACLANT Y officer will require'pertinent information on the subjects listed below. The nations concerned should each 

designate the authority with whom he may communicate on these and other Y 

matters. 

Types of Y units 

Number of units planned 

Administration 

Basic operational organization 

Manpower complements (by .function) 

Number of int~rcept positions 

(in broad categories, e.g., H/F Voice, D/F) 

Frequency ranges of intercept equipment 

Communications equipment of Y units 

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8ECRE'f 
1. COMMUNICATION 

INTELLIGENCE: 

2. COMINT ENDPRODUCT 

3. PARTICIPATING 

NATIONS: 

4. PROCESSilm: 

5. RAW TRAFFIC: 

6. TECHNICAL 

MATERIAL: 

7. TRAFFIC: 

8. != 

9. Y UNITS: 

REF ~~~a21a 

DEFINITIONS 

Appendix A to COMMUNICATION 

INTELLIGENCE ARRANGEMENTS FOR 

SACLANT 

Information and technical material resulting from 

the interception and study or telecommunications 

for intelligence purposes. (Conmmnication 

Intelligence includes Y, q.v.) 

Intelligence information produced by Communication 

Intelligence activities. 

Nations contributing Y activities to the SACLANT Y 

structure and entitled to receive the results of 

the COMINT arrangements for SACLANT. 

The action required to produce Communication 

Intelligence from traffic. 

Traffic showing no evidence of processing for 

Communication Intelligence purposes. 

Data concerning cryptographic systems, communications procedures and methods of target countries 

and related information. 

Intercepted telecommunications activity (including 

messages, chatter, procedure, etc.). 

Communication Intelligence derived from the timely 

processing of traffic procured by listening to enemy 

communications for the purpose of providing tactical 

intelligence for the commanders of the combat forces. 

COMINT units engaged in the production of Y. 

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SECRET 
INTRODUCTION 

Appendix B to COMMUNICATION 

INTELLIGENCE ARRANGEMENTS FOR 

SACLANT 

SECURITY PRINCIPLES FOR THE HANDLING OF Y 

1. These principles shall be the basis in peace and war of all 

security regulations and policies governing the production, handling, and 

dissemination of Y. 

DEFINITION 

2. Y is Communication Intelligence derived from the timely processing 

of traffic procured by listening to enemy communications for the purpose of 

providing tactical intelligence for the commanders of combat forces. It 

includes raw traffic, end-products, technical material, working documents, 

and captured material used in its production. It also includes intelligence 

reports and summaries based on Y unless the information is so generalized 

that it cannot be traced back to a particular item of Y or to Y in general. 

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION 

3. Nations participating in the SACLANT Y effort must, as a condition 

of participation, agree to accept and adhere to these principles. 

4. Each country participating in the SACLANT Y effort will designate 

a national authority to deal with all questions of Y security and enforce 

these principles. 

5. Each national authority will designate a Y Security Officer to 

whom Y materials and connnunications relating thereto shall be addressed. 

6. SACLANT will formulate and supervise compliance with security 

regulations and policies for Y within the SACLANT command. 

7. Before an individual in any capacity has access to the knowledge 

or results of the SACLANT Y effort, he must be screened and cleared as 

being of unquestioned loyalty by his national authority. The screening 

must be as thorough as possible and at least as thorough as that given to 

individuals having access to COSMIC information. In addition to such clearance, these individuals serving under SACLANT 1 s Command must be specifi- cal~ nominated to receive Y either by SACLANT or by the concerned national 

authority. In the latter case the nomination must be approved by SACLANT. 

In exceptional circumstances under operational conditions the above 

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SECRE'f 
requirements for screening, clearance and nomination may be waived for 

those individuals appointed to certain key posts, a list of which should 

be drawn up by SACLANT. Such personnel may be given access to Y upon the 

authority of the appropriate commander. 

8. Prior to being given access to Y, each individual will be Y 

indoctrinated by a special warning on the sensitivity of Y sources to 

compromise and be required to sign a document drawing attention to his 

special responsibility for safeguarding Y and to the consequences which 

the law or administrative or executive order of his country, or order of 

SACLANT, provides, if either by intent or negligence he allows Y to come 

to the notice of unauthorized persons. It must be stressed that there 

is no time limit in that the information must be safeguarded indefinitely. 

9. Distribution of Y must be on the need-to-know principle, i.e., 

each item of Y shall be made known only to those Y indoctrinated individuals 

who require it in the performance of their duties. SACLANT will maintain 

control lists of indoctrinated Y recipients in forces under his command 

other than those engaged in the production of Communication Intelligence. 

He will ensure that the number is kept to the minimum consistent with 

essential intelligence and operational needs. National authorities will 

maintain similar lists of their own nationals and apply similar restrictions. 

10. Y indoctrinees must not be allowed to run a greater risk of 

capture or interrogation by enemies or potential enemies than is absolutely 

necessary for the efficient performance of their duties. This must also' 

apply to a period of six months after they have ceased to receive Y material 

except during active operations in cases of impelling necessity. 

11. The greatest care must be taken not to betray Y success by actions 

based on it. Efforts should be made, if at all possible, to devise suitable 

cover, such as reconnaissance. The source should on no account be needlessly 

risked. 

12. SACLANT will determine the level to which Y will be disseminated. 

In exceptional instances, where it is essential for immediate operational 

purposes, information based on Y may, as specifically authorized by a Y 

indoctrinated commander, be disseminated below the normal level to unindoctrinated individuals provided the source is not disclosed. Where possible, 

names, times, positions, and other data identical with that from the 

original text must be omitted, or, if the retention of such an item or items 

is essential, must be carefully paraphrased. Such information must be passed 

by a secure courier service, by a secure line, or in a cipher system 

approved by SACLANT. It must not be passed in clear by radio (including 

radio telephone). 

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REF ~591§a21a 

13. Knowledge of the methods and scope ot, and the technical material 

resulting from, the SACLANT Y effort will be restricted to the nationals 

of the nations which participate in the SACLANT y· effort. Access to the 

Y end-products should, as tar as possible, be similarly restricted. 

14. All Y resulting from the SACLANT Y effort will be classified 

SECRET and designated by a cQdeword (except as provided in paragraph 19 

below). The classification and the codeword shall appear on every sheet 

of paper which contains or discloses the existence of Y, except that, at 

the discretion of the unit commander, this provision need not be applied to 

purely working documents within a Y unit. The codeword indicates that the 

material must be handled in accordance with regulations based on these 

principles and when used in its codeword sense will also bear the classification SECREr. The codeword and its implication shall not be made known 

to persons not indoctrinated in Y nor shall it be used in its codeword sense 

in the presence of such persons. 

15. In peacetime, if Y document.s are to be transmitted by bag within 

SACLANT•s Command, the route and procedure must be specially authori~ed by 

SACLANT, having regard to the adequacy of the security of the route and 

procedure. Documents should be double-wrapped and addressed to a Y 

indoctrinated officer (by name, not function); the inner envelope should 

bear the appropriate security classification but not the codeword. In 

wart:ime,, discretion will be lei't to the local commander to make the most 

secure arrangements possible. As a minimum, documents must be sent by 

hand of officer or by a secure courier service. 

16. Except in the exceptional instances described in Paragraph 12,, 

if Y is transmitted within SACLANT•s command by eleQtrical means or by 

any physical means not completely secure, it must be encrypted in a 

secure cryptographic channel reserved exclusively for this requirement. 

Participating nations must additionally ensure that when Y is transmitted 

into, out of,, or externally to the SACLANT command it is encrypted in a 

cryptographic channel specially approved by SACLANT for this purpose. 

17. The highest standard of physical security must be applied to 

the custody of Y by national authorities and within SACLANT•s command. 

Normally, except when in transit under conditions prescribed herein, Y 

materials and communications relating thereto must at all times be: 

a. under the direct surveillance or a Y indoctrinated person 

responsible for their sate-keeping, or 

b. locked in a three-combination safe accessible only to Y 

indoctrinated personnel, or 

c. stored in a locked compartment which is under constant 

surveillance by an anned sentcy and which is accessible only to Y indoc~ 

trinated personnel. 

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SECRET 
18. Y documents must be destroyed as soon as they have ceased to 

be of use. This is particularly important under hazardous conditions. 

19. In order that necessary operational use can be made of certain 

types of low-level tactical Y (such as Direction finder results and 

plain text messages) on which immediate action must obviously be taken 

in combat operations, SACLANT may permit the dissemination of such Y, 

without a codeword and at a classification not below Confidential, to 

unindoctrina.ted recipients who need ta know. 

20. National authorities and SACLANT must expand these principles 

into a set of regulations adapted to local conditions. Copies of the 

Y security regulations of each national authority will be forwarded to 

SACLANT through Y channels. 

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SECRE"l=-