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WS(fJltoRfR(4) (Pinal) ~th ovanber, 1953. 

uKJgs COMMUNICATIONS SECU-.tUTY CONFERESCE 195J. 

Reeort of the Operational Requirement.a Sub-Committee 

to the 

Zxecuti ve Oonuni ttee.· 

UKJUSJNA!rO Operational Reguirement for Off ~Line Cryptosystems, 

Section I - Off-Line Machines. 

A. Replacement of the C9mbined CYpher Machine, . . . 

1. The Operational Requirements Sub-CoQlDlittee' censidere~ the replacement .of the 

existing Combined Cypher ayatem in the light of the d·:;ci13ions reached at the 

1951 .and 1952 Conferences and the exchanga of telegrams. between the U.S. J,c.s. 

and the U.K.C.O.S. which has token place si:tic$ ~he'.' las'b· Confi:;rence. ~ . 

2. The :fpllowing f co tors were tcl<:en into acc.ourrt: 

• 

.. 

u, All U,K. nnd U,S, 5ervices agree ·t·o· .id.opt. ·~he.'Aool:'iIS ~ryptosystems 

for Combined EJnd NATO use as soon us suitable equipments are 

o.voilable. ·· · · · · · · · 

b. The U,K, ~ervices do not· consider that the .AFSA;M 7·provides all the 

.user facilities desirable in an off-lin0 cypher machine but 

·nevertheless; they are prepared to. adopt it for Gombined ~d 

NJ..TO working until the U,K. replacement machine is avcil~ble aiid 

provided that certain fa.ults which were ·discovered in the .i.FS.lJII 7 \ 

during the user trials are remedied • 

c. The u.s. Services agree to adopt tha i:F~~M 7 for Combi;ned c.nd NJ·ao 

use provided that the deficiencies disco.vere·d during the user trials 

ere remedied. Efforts to remedy thes·e deficiencies are under way but 

if these are not successful, implementation of.the programme mey be 

deleyed, To cover this eventuality a. contract to develop another 

il)QNIS equipment (llF~~ 41B) has been initiated, 

d. 1~1 U.K. and U.~. ~ervices agree that for higher echelon use there is a. 

requirement for a ma.chine embodying the d)ON'IS priI).ciple which wil,l be. 

capable of five unit code tape. operation, poth input end output • 

e. :The Committee noted that an .iJ!'Si..M i. produc·tion cont·ra.ct has bc.:en placed 

. mid tha.t the output is presently approaching 400 equipments per month. 

It considered that the known deficiencies probab:cy- _can be.corrected by 

introducing design changes in the production line. · ~.s soon as the 

design of the ma.chine is f'inal.ised, pr.eduction con be st0pped up to 

600 per month and it is estimataa tht1.t sufficient equipments will be 

nvaila:ble to meet ~he U-.t<'/US/N..i"..TO second level requirement by Ju:cy 1956. 

f. The contrect calls for the produ6tion of' sp[.re 9o.rts coricurrently 

with the production of main equipm1.mts and these spa.re parts normally 

will be issued at the s~~e time a.a the equipments • 

g. The UK/US e.greed security estinm.te of the life of the i.DONIS 

orypto?rinciple is at least 10 year~ from this date. 

/3. 

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3. The Operaticnal Requirements Sub-Committee recommend that: 

a. l:DONIS be ad.opteii as the new cry-rtoprinciμle for combined and N.i:.TO 

cff-line use. 

b, 1st July, 1956, be agreei't as the implementation target date fer 

replacing the ~resent CCM with an .iJ)()NIS equipment regarrlless 8f 

the equipment which embodies the principle. 

c. Provided the corrective action be~ng taken is·successf'ul, the 

U,K, accept the KFS.fJ/i. 7 with U,S,-rrovided ·raters f-::-r usage 

during the period interim to the ··aevelo~me.nt ~nd ;::ror.,uctiC"'n ·:--f e. 

national U,K, equipment ca.i.ryable _pf ,.!'J>ONIS·. operation. 

d, Qonsideraticn be given to providing .un equipment embodying the 

.ADONIS CI"T:1toprinciple and having ·.:facilities for five-"ilnit tape 

operation, both input and ::iutput, .. · · · 

e, The e.bove agreement sunersede the 1950 BRUS.A.. agreement to 

adopt "the BRUTUS cryptopri~ciple __ as the COM replacement'! 

B'. Tbir.d Level Requirement for a. .i:'ower Operated Mac.hine. 

4.. The Sub-Committee reviewed the requir~ment.s f 0r a. vower operated off-line 

cypher machine tor Third Level Combined and N..;TO use. It was a.greed that: 

a.. There is· a major requirement fer a machine for Combined anti. 

NATO Naval Third Lr~vel use. · 

b. There is a smell requirement for o. machine for Combined and 

Nj~O Air Third Level use, 

c. There is no requirement, at present, f0r a. machine for Combined 

NMO Army Third Level use • 

5• The Sub-Committee recommend: 

a. That ultimately, the power operated equipment adopted for second 

level Combined and NATO use be adopted for third level Combined end 

N.MO use • 

b, That until such an equipment is available . the current interim 

arrangemen~s should continue in force • 

o. -'lhi'rd Level Requirement f'or a Machine 

§quiring No E.X.t.ernal Power Supoly. ' . . . . 

·6. The Sub...Committee reviewed the requirement for a ma.chine requiring no 

'external power supply for Comb:tnea. and NLTO use at the Third Level. The u.s. 

Services restated their view that a machine requiring the use of dry batteries, 

.· ituoh as l?ORTEX, is unsuitable for such a _purpose; t·he U,K. ~ervices stated that 

_they would be prepared to use such a machine. 

7. It was agreed that:-

There is a requirement for a small machine requiring no 

external power SU'9ply fer use at the Third Level when 

international forces are employed. in the 11.ssault Fhaae Qi' 

an ·operation. /b. 

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b. There is no equipment presently available 

which will meet this requirement but the D.17 appears 

to provide a possible ultimate answer to this ~roblem.. 

8. The Sub-Committee recommend: 

a~ That selection of' an equi·rment· requiring no external 

power fer Combined. and. N.1'.TO use at the Third. Level be 

~ef'errerl. 

b. That, in the interim perio~, since t·hey are likely to be the 

major parties in any international assault group,, the U:.K. 

and u.s. should accept respo1:;u~ibili.ty for .providing to such 

NATO elements as may be co-op~rating w;i..th them such 

cryptographic equipme~t as may be avai~able at the ti.me. 

Section II - Third Level Hand Systems. 

9. The Operationa,l. Requirements Sub-Committee re-affirmed ·the decision of the 

1952 Conference that NP.TEX is re'}uired:.- · · -- · 

n. .n.t the Second Level as a be.ck up ·to COM owing to the shortage 

ot machines. · 

b. As an interim low echelon o:cyptosystem. 

10. The Sub-Conunitte.e ag~eed that although theoretically, and in conformity 

with the above policy, there should be a. Nid'EX key for. COSMIC traffic as a. 

ba.ak-up tor the CCM COSMIC key list ( .. ~MSP 294), the preparation o:f.' such e. key 

was not justifiable since all posts requiring to handle COSMIC traffic were 

equipped with CCM most of them having· more than one machine. 

Ken Re9uired • 

11. The Sub-Committee agreed· that the following N.i.T.EX ·keys ere required for Ni'..TO 

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b. 

Feace '.rime 

(1) Three Services World Wide (ACPs 270/2) .... 

(2) Small Ships World Wide . (1~lSPs 27 3/5) ii 

(3) Classroom Training (AMsPs 288/290) 

War Time 

( 1) Naval General Area 1 (JOO:>Ps 279/281) · 

·{2) Na.val General .Area 2 (.AMSPs 282/284.) 

(3) Small Ships 11.rea 1 (.i~s 273/5)K 

(4) SmaJ.l .:lhips .L:rea 2 {4lMtll?s 27-6/8) ii 

• Note: There will be no Small Ships World Wide key in war. / 

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Def'iniU.on ot .Areas. 

1·2·. The ,Sub..Comrnittee agreed: 

that it was desirable that areas should be provisionally agreed to 

enable correct quantities to be estimQted and to facilitate 

stockpiling of w&r reserves at overseas distributing authorities 

and that cryptographic ereas shquld conform to Operational areas. 

Use of NATEX with Basic Book. 

1}. The Sub-Committee took note of the tiecurity·Corrunittee 1s statement that, if' 

use~ with a basic book, the security of N.:d'.E'f. would be consider·ably improved. 

There would be the following advantages -

a. longer messages .couid be sent without. change of indicator 

b. higher traffic loads could be.permitted 

a. variable· spacing need not be used 

d. the basic book might be expec:ted to condense the length of the 

encrypted text. 

14.. The S~b-Comm.ittee accorciingly agreed that the u.K. should ce:rry out trials 

ua~ a. basic book with NATEX to detemine its practicability,. bearing in mini 

particularly the possibility 0f on increased number of. garble·s and greater 

difficulty :In solving them. 

Sa,eplitied Indicator Procedure for Third Level Use • 

.. 15. The Sub-Cormnittee took note that, at the request of Belgium, the U.S. had 

prepared a. simplified N:·TEX indicator procedure for intra-national low echelon 

use. 

16. The Sub-Committee agreed that the U.K. shoula study the new procedure from an 

operational standpoint and report on its p~ssible use for Combined and Nl:.TO third 

'level oommunioations • 

B.· Transport Aircraft Code. 

17. The bub-Conunittee took note tha.t in· accordance with the agreement reached at 

the 1952 Conference that there· is ~ Combined tr.iC/uS and NJU'O requirement for 

a Transpo;rt .lurcraft Uqde, the prcblem had been considered by the Ci.N/UK/US 

J. c.-;.JB.cs and a draft code. prepared, Since t hia !3,raft. co.de was not yet available 

for study in the Air Ministry no f'ur~her.progress.cn.th~s·iteni was. possible at 

this time. · · · · · : · 

c. it.U-orai't Movement Code. 

·1·a: The Sub-Committee took note thn.t the ·requirement for ~ l.ircrnft Movement 

Code hail recently been referred 'by the CJu"'{/uK/US j. C • ..:ii;_. Cs. to the l~ir 

Standardization Co-ordinating Committee for compil,a.tion of the information 

requir~d to b·::: included in aircraft movement pro-formaa.· 

1·9. 

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a..' ··t4at when the aircraft movement -pro-f~··rma.s were. available it 

wr··Uld be necessary to consider a code cf ccmbat type for encoding 

them for use when the aircraft mc•vem~nt. messages could not be 

·:·ncryptea on standard on-line or off-line cryptosystems available on 

the communication circuits concerned. 

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b. that, in order that preparation of' the necessary crypta 

systems mo;y begin, the urgent need for the provision cf aircraft 

movement pr~--f'c.:rraas should be reprcse• .. ted to the .A.s_c_c. 

through the J.C.-K,Cs. 

D.- Maritime and Maritime Aircraf't Code. 

·.20. The Sub-Committee tcok note that the maln requirement for a. Maritime and 

Maritime li.iroraft Code for tcctical inter-communication between ships and· 

.aircraft had been met and the necessary publications -were ln course ct' 

production. . · -

21. The Sub-Committee however agreed -

that there was a requirement for Maritime and Maritime 1:..ircra.ft 

Code to be used in routine exercises in uea.ce t_ime since this 

traffic might rev.:.al informa.tio~ 'ct1·-A/s·.:war.r~re··techniques to a 

potential ene.!l\Y; .. 

that G. C.H.Q. should complete --th~ir exmnin:at_ibri of routine exercise 

traffic a1ready sent in 'by the .hdmir~tY:· axj.d . .&tir Ministry; 

c. that a.s a result cf this exarrdna.tion· G.O.H •. Q. s·hould recom."llend e.. 

suitable rate of' change for an edit:,.:ori. used, .-w!'.',rld wide for routine 

exercises in peace time; .- . : ... : · .. · .. : .-:· ._:· ·.-

a. that in the interim period before thisedit;ion was available," 

increased security for this traffic cQUld in maey cases be p:r-ovifled 

by a more rapid change of tre u.K. Maritiine Aircraft Reporting Code, 

and that action should.be taken to effect this; 

c. that the practicability of using AfJP 178 .recoded instead of 

Maritime and Maritime 1.ircraft Code should be examined by U.K .. 

and u.~. 

22. The Sub-Committee confirmed that there wa.s- an operational requirement for 

Ke.rit1me and Maritime Aircraft Uode to be carried ·by. Carrier-borne aircraft in 

air a trikes over enell\Y ~erri tory, arid t_hat. t her.e . 1tl'as· t_her~fore a big risk of 

pl\YB,iaal compromise, 

23. The Sub-Oommitt'ee therefore e:.:.reed - . 

that Me.ritime and Ma;itirrle .Airc~aft Gode ·was unsuitable for passing 

to and from maritime aircraft information of long.' term iritellieence 

value; 

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b. that t~re was a requirement tor a .rapid and secure system suitable 

for this purpose; 

c. that the suitability of J:FSl.M 7 for this purpose should be 

investigated by the U.K. and u.·s· • 

e. . Bomber Code. 

24. The Sub-Committee took note that the fuain r~quirement for Strategic and 

Theatre Bomber Codes had been mt::t and that the necess·ary public;Jations were in 

course of production. -

25. The Sub-Committee however a~reed -

a. that there was o. req,u~.rement for Bomber Code to be useP, in routine 

exercises in peace time since this traff'ic might reveal information 

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b. that the U.K. and U.S. should exa~ine the requirement in 

deteil to determine thb number of editions required and the 

rate of change of editions necessary if adequate security 

was to be p·rovided. 

F. Naval Tactical Cod.es. 

26. The Sub-Committee reviewed the requirer.ient for naval tactical codes. 

Representatives qf the Royal Navy and U.S. Na:vy propounded. the respective 

merits of a book. system, such as Fleet Code·, anJ. of' a high gra.d.e machine 

cryptosys tern. 

27. The Sub-Com.mittee took note -

a. that ciphcny would be the ultimate answer to a· large part of the 

problem; 

b. that for CW -

(1) the Royal Navy considered that the requirement could best be 

met by a book system suqh.as Flee~ Code. Fossibly revised and 

made a g~)od deal smal.J,err. · · 

. (2} the u.s. Navy consL:'lered ·t~t the requirement could best be 

met·by· a high gr8.a.e-maohine cryptosystem and that security 

considerations demanded such a system. 

28. The Sub-Committee agreed -

a. that the Royal Navy should re-examine ·the use of a high grade 

machine cypher with a view to its eventually meeting the CW 

requirement; · 

b. that ·~oth the Royal Navy· and U .s. ·Na~ should consiner the 

requirement for o. tactical ooa.e 1 small enough to enable the code to 

be· changed daily 1 for UK/US fmd N.ATO use in the interim period until 

a suitable machine cry!::,tosystem and ciphony are available. 

· ~ection III - Submarine Communications. · A. Normal Duty. 

29. The ·~ub-Committee agreed -

a. that for normal duty submarines shquld carry the me.chine cryptosystem in gEmeral use for seccnd level canmunicaticns; 

b. that !!10 long as LUCil'.ER remains in use separate rotors and key 

lists should be provid~d for use by submarines; 

c. that when I.DONIS replaces .LUCIFER it will no longer. be necessary 

for submarines to carry special rotors 1 but speci,al key lists will 

still be required. 

B. Haaardous Duty • 

'°• The Sub-Committee agreed -

a. tha.t- for hazardous duty, submarines shoul.cl carry the maohine 

cryptosystem in general use for second level communications using 

normal duty rotors 18 in paragraph 29 above; 

b. tha.t special he.zartlous duty submarine key lists should. be p:rovided; 

c. that submarines sh.oul•1. destroy normal duty key lists before 

entering hazrap:tSEGRH . 10• 
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O. Ba.ck-:-up System • 

. 31 • The Sub-Cammi ttee agreed -

b. 

c. 

cl. 

e. 

that there was a requireme.nt for a secure hand back-up system; 

that trials should be carried out u~ing ~ spe"ially prepared besic 

bock with garble-free letter group~ Tecyphered. by letter one-time 

pa.a.; 

that the basic book should be preparea. by N.S • .A. in conjunction 

with the U.S. Navy; 

that since the basic bc'Jk will be used only with cne-time pads it 

can be com~iled as a one part bock (i.e. having combined code 

and decode); . 

that copies· of the basiQ book should be surmlied t.o the u.K. to 

enable trials of the system· to be·oarried out •onoi..irrently 

~.-the .Royal ~a.VJ e.nd tJ.S~ Navy. . .... 

D. Change from WCil!"'.clR ·to .. :DONIS. · .. 

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32. The Sub-O~minittee took note that, since submarines ·can carry only one 

m~hine, it would be necessary to bear this fact in mind when· the time came to 

o~ge from WCIFER- to .l.OONIS for submarine communications. 

Section IV - ~eather Security 

.33. The Sub-Committe~ wished to record that ·in ~he past weather cc-nmnmications 

security requirements bA.:ve too freque·ntly been considered as different from and 

handled differently· from operational c~ications security requirements. This 

separation was illogical and cften l~d to weai.her.requirements being overlooked 

in the compilation of' general ·crypto-r~quireme.nts. · .BeC?aus.e ·of tlfe· long time · 

required to f'inanc~ and manufacture cr,Ypto equipment, failure to include all 

requirements at the proper time co'ul!i mean failure to provide essential 

security. · · 

,34.. The Sub~omrnittee therefore· recolilll'.lendeq that in the future weather 

communications securi"ty requirements should be·. incorporated, as part of the 

complete operational communications security requirement for·crypto equipment~ o I • '",.,• • • ' 

Section V.- :Merchant Ship ·co~i~~ti~~. 

· .A,. Merchant Ships Crotosystem~ 

35, The Sub~0mmittee agreed.-

~ . that, since no machine system and n0 better hand system than 

MERSEX was available for general and convoy merchant ·ship 

conununica.tions, .MERSEX should continue to be used for these 

purpcses9 

b~ that, as a general guide, the merchant ships cryptosystem (.MERSEX) 

shculn be held by merchant ships of 500 ton~ gross or over fitted 

with W/T. 

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36. The Sub-Committee tor;k ncte that U.S. prcpos&ls f'or a new cry"'."'tosystem 

designed to replace the MEH.S:EX Independent Keys woulr1 be ?Ut forward shortly and 

·would be considered by the U.K. in Que course. 

B. C;yptosyste~ f'or Merchant .:Jhip Contr:;,l Traffic. · 

37. The Sub-Cocmnittee aereed that there was rio we:y of' m.eetillb- the 

communications security requirement for Merc_hant Ship Contr0l Traffic unless 

Chapter 5 of' MP 2 was much modifien.. It was however underst-:Jo1i that u • .:). 

proposals- to amend this cha.?ter were to be expected shortly 1 and that the st. 

proposals were designed greatly ·t'.J decrease the v0lume· or· sil:':nallin.:~ by ·eooh 

NCSO. Until these amendments were ·a.. __ ;re·:d no action to plon the c:yptosystems 

required· for this tra£f'ic could be taken. · 

38.. The Sub-Committee however considered that a mo.chine cryptcsystem was 

probably required at the larger ports, but that traffic oribinated nt the minor 

ports could be carried by hand ·systems; pos-sible systems were one-time r.iar1 or 

NATU. .. 

c. Other Merchant .Ship 'fre.ffio,· 

39~ The Sub-Committee took note of the requirement to encrypt a larce volume of 

> traffic origina.terl by shinping ·companies and their ~ents and that this would 

pr.obably be encrypted par"tly by naval and riartly by censn~ship authorities,· 

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