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eclassified and approved for release by NSA on 12-02-2014 

ursuantto E.O. 13526 

FROM NAME OR TITLE 

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION . 

Replaces DA AGO Form 895, 1 Apr 48, and AFHQ 

Form 12, 10 Nov 47, which may be used. 

DATE 

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16-48487-4 GPO 
REF ID:A4158803 

PARAPHRASED EXTRACTS FROM A PAPER 

by the HON. H. STRWE HENSEL* 

(Substitutions in the original article indicated by cancellation of original word(s), 

underlining of word(s) substituted) 

The fundamental principles, which must be identified and appreciated before 

any start can be made on the organization chart, are: 

(1) SiviliaB Miiitary control may be of two kinds -- active or passive 

and each kind requires an entirely different type of organizational structure. 

(2) Military decisions cannot be separated from ciyilian decisions. 

*** 

Under the passive concept, while eiviliaae military officers do hold the 

highest positions and "influence," the mili:taPy civilians really control. 

A few eiviliaae officers at the top have the power to decide; they outrank all 

militapY-effieepe civilians and can, if they so desire, take command. But it 

is deemed irrelevant whether they actually do decide as long as the eiviliaa 

military signature is the final word. Since these eiviliaRe military officers 

are more interested to know what has been decided than to have the data needed 

to make decisions, the fact that all the information they receive comes through 

a single militapY civilian channel makes no difference. 

Such a system cannot work without a HlilitaPy civilian chief to sit in the 

center of the web -- innnediately below the eiviliaBe military but above all the 

others. Through this single mili~Py-eeH11BaBaep civilian head all information 

passes up and all o~aers pass down. The militaFy civilian chief must and 

does "run" the ae17aFtme19.i;. agency. The eiviliaB-Beepei;a:eiee top military officers 

are thus more like a board of directors than top executives. 

*** 

On the other hand, the active concept is that, if they really wish to 

control, eiviliaae the military must participate actively in the daily business 

of the ae17aPtmeat agency. They must have not only the power to decide but also 

*HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW - January-February 1954, Vol. 32, No. 1 
REF ID:A4158803 

the ability to decide indepen~ently and intelligently -- that is, on the basis 

of thoroughly informed judgment. There is no place under this concept for a 

single m3:l3:i;apy-ee1H!l!al9.0.eP civilian chief with power to "run" the 8.e~aFtmeB.i; agency. 

The eiviH:aR-Beepei;a:Py military Director does the "running, 11 and any H!.H.itaPy 

civilian head is onl.Y one of several top advisers and consultants. 

* * * 

It is readily_ apparent why a choice must be made between these two concepts 

of eiviliaR military control.. They are mi1es apart in philosophy, principle, and 

implementation. They demand quite different types of personnel in the key 

positions. And just as eiviliaB military control cannot be part active and 

part passive, organizations must follow one pattern or the other. 

*** 

there still remains a force~iiil:. body of thought in favor of the passive 

concept. It is a workable approach -- or at least it has worked in the past. 

It offers an antidote for the weak-eiviliaR-Beepei;a:Py inexperienced military 

Director. It also offers some cure for the lack of continuity in office of 

the eiviliaRe military. It has considerable appeal to many in the career milii;al'y 

civil service. 

*** ' 

Not only is there much more to Wal' theccryptologic business than any single 

" specialist skill; it is also clear that all the necessary specialized knowledge 

and experience must be blended into a single decision by "generalists" rather 

than by "specialists." And the expressions of specialist opinion must flow to 

/the generalists unimpeded by any milita:Py civilian or other specialist filters. 

The favorite justification for having a specialist as top executive is 

the assumption that, unless he has a "personal wealth of miHi;apy cryptologic 

experience" and "continuity of office," a person will not be capable of interpreting wa:rb±tne COMINT situations or of making the proper decisions. Yet 

2 
REF ID :.A41SBB03 

commercial and industrial experience has indicated that it is far more satisfactory 

for the top executive to be a generalist. 

* * * 

Men with a "personal wealth of Hii3:.:i:i;apy cryptologic experd:ence" are in 

the ma.in specialists. While there are exceptions, specialists do not normally 

develop into generalists. This comment is not pointed solely at Hii3:.itaPy-mea 

civilian cryptologic technicians. Accountants and lawyers are also specialists 

who as a rule ma.ke poor top executives, the exceptions being so few that they prove 

the rule. Furthermore, P.ii3:.:i:i;apy-mea civilian technicians are seldom developed 

for over-all executive direction; rather, promotion to top mi3:.itaPy-Pa:ak civil 

service grade often depends on proficiency in a well-defined special field. 

There is such a professional as an "executive generalist." This type of 

man is far more effective in the top executive position than is the specialist 

because he not only develops more objective qualities ofmind but also has more 

skill in weighing diverse factors and coming to a conclusion on the basis of the 

several specialist points of view. The generalist can and should be appointed 

to the top executive position. He will usually be found in e:i:vi±:i:aa-3:.i~e among 

military line officers. 

3 
--TOP ~t'~:fl~o3 ~ \/"\~\: %t.""·"· -n1~0~ -

BROWNELL COMMITTEE REPORT 

p. 111-113 

"The Connnittee can advise without qualification that communications 

intelligence has been in the past, and still is, of vital importance to the 

Government. There was a tendency on the part of certain witnesses from the 

three Services to emphasize that its primary importance is 'military', and 

\ that the primary :justification for our great COMINT effort should be to 

furnish the three Services with intelligence which.is necessary in connection 

with the conduct of a war and in preparing to meet attack if a war starts. When 

one considers the fact that in the past most of the specacular examples of 

its success have been directly connected with our military effort, this view 

is not surprising. On the other hand, there is no question in the Committee's 

mind that at this stage of our country's history communications intelligence 

is also of primary importance to the successful operations of certain of the 

civilian agencies, particularly the State Department, the Central Intelligence 

Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These civilian agencies today 

play a vital part in the national. security of the. United States, and it is 

apparent to us that COMINT has an essential part in our entire effort to protect 

that security and not only in that large part of the effort which is the direct responsibility of the Military Services. This principle should govern our COMINT 

organization to a greater extent in the future than it has in the past ... 

"Information obtained through COMINT is of importance in a nEJllber -of 

ways, but it is not too much of an oversimplification to divide its importance 

into two main categories. The first of these relates to the direct support of 

our military units in the field through communications intelligence pertaining 

to order-or-battle, movements of the enemy, enemy plans and intentions, and so 

forth. The second includes the longer-range military information, and intelligence relating to diplomatic, political, economic and scientific matters. 

While the two interlock, the former is unquestionably of primary importance 

to the Services and is indispensable to them. The latter is of importance to 

the Services and the civilian agencies alike. The two-fold characteristic of 

the finished product is the source of one of the difficulties in the organization 

of a central connnunications intelligence effort. The difficulty is compounded 

by the fact that, although it is possible to se~arate to the extent indicated the 

use of the finished product, it is not at all possible to segregate to an equal 

extent the functions of collecting and processing the material which is the 

source of the information. Some information in the first category can be 

ebtained directly at a forward intercept station. Other such.information, very 

probably of even greater importance, can be obtained only by compiling at 

AFSA itself all the bits and pieces derived from all COMINT sources, and by 

using the complicated cryptanalytic machinery located at.AF'SA. This is but 

( ~ne of the factors that leads us to the conclusion that ·coMINT is a national responsibility {as distinct from the responsibility of any particular Service, department or agency) and that as ~ consequence the activity must be so managed 

and organized as to exploit all available intelligence resources in the partici-. 

pating departments and agencies 1n order to obtain the optimum results for 

each and for the Government as a whole." 

Declassified by NSA/C55 

Oeputy Associate Direct~r for Policy and Records 

onJ.Q ·3oc143 by_.J;;:L..;:m'l~;r=--;E - .... ~"""' -1'.ij ~J 

eclassified and approved for release by NSA on 

2-02-2014 ursuantto E.O_ 13526 
p. 125-126 

.. . . REF ID: A4158803 

TOP S~CRE8F ·~< 

"Below the directorate level, senior positions should be filled by individuals, whether officer or civilian, who have a career interest in the field of 

communications intelligence. We do not believe that these positions should I be limited to civilians, because we are impressed by the testimony given by 

many witnesses as to the importance of familiarizing the Service organizations in the field with AFSA organization and operations by rotating officers 

from AFSA into field positions and then back again. Also, the long experience 

of several Navy officers is one of the great assets of the activity today. On 

the other hand, it would be a major mistake to limit the senior positions to 

officers, because it is of the greatest importance.to encourage civilians to 

make careers in the COMINT field by clear demonstration that senior 

positions will be available to them if their talents merit promotions." 

p. 129 

" We are more concerned over the fact that the present top level control 

of AFSA is in a three-headed group, each member of which often has in mind 

the interests of his own Service, than by the fact that the group is military. 

Although it is our opinion that the 1949 experiment whereby AFSA was placed 

under the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be terminated, we woQ!-q not adopt the 

plan urged on us by some witnesses that, following the British precedent, it 

should be placed directly under a civilian agency, such as the Central Intelligence Agency. We reach this conclusion not so much on.the theory that the 

COMINT product is more important to the Services than to the civilian agencies 

as because (1) the Services are practically the sole collectors and transmitters of the raw intercepted material, and (2) the product is used to so 

important an extent in combat activities in time of war as to dictate the desirability of preserving lines of command through established defense channels. 

We have received no conv.incing evidence that it is necessary to put AFSA outside the Defense establishment in order to assure that the needs of civilian 

agencies are properly taken care of." --

P· 138-139 

"Greater civilianization, according toSCAG, is absolutely necessary in 

that branch of AFSA which is charged with the conduct of technical research. 

Many scientists and mathematicians in recent years have felt the appeal of 

the importance and mystery of the COMINT effort, only to draw away upon 

developing closer contact because they l;lave felt it impossible or frustrating 

(whether rightly or wrongly makes little difference) to work within the military hierarchy. " ,