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COIWIBP.N'f':EAfi = SE!Cl:JRI'f'Y IN.FOHMA:'f'IQN 

DRAFT 9 December 1953 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

SUBJECT: Implementation of National Security Council Directive 

on Communications Security 

Reference: Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Representative 

US Communications Security Board subject as above, 

dated 18 November 1953 

1. In compliance with the provisions of the referenced memorandum 

there is submitted herewith a tentative draft of a directive implementing 

within the Department of Defense the provisions of the National Security 

Council Directive on Communications Security, hereafter referred to as 

NSC 168. 

2. The working group designated by the referenced memorandum 

is in substantial agreement except on one important point of principle. 

This point is raised in the final sentence of paragraph 3 of the draft, 

·which reads as follows: "With respect to the military departments, the 

Director, NSA, will perform his COMSEC functions under the immediate 

direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." 

The Director, NSA, disagrees with the other members of the Committee 

I 

on the ground that this statement does not reflect the proper mission 

and function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to NSA operations 

in the field of COMSEC. .For the reasons set forth in detail in Incl #2 

he recommends that the controversial sentence in the draft be replaced 

by the following: "With respect to the Military departments, the D1rector, 

·NSA, in performance of his COMSEC functions, will be under the immediate 

direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for joint doctrine and for matters 

relating to joint strategic and operational planning." 

3. The Navy representative is unable to agree with the wording 

of the draft adopted by the majorit;y- in paragrapha 6a, g, and k. The 

wording preferred by the Navy representative and the reasons therefor 

are set forth in Incl #3· The Joint Chiefs of Staff representative 

on this committee supports the Navy position with respect to paragraphs 

6g and k. 

4. Upon receipt of your instructions concerning the proper function 

of the JCS, and the other non-agreed items, the Committee will draft a 

final directive for your signatur~. 

NOTE: To be signed ~Y the principal representatives-on this committee. 

3 Incle: 

1. Draft of NSC 168 Implementing Directive 

2. Dissenting Views of Director, NSA ; ~ 

3. Dissenting Views of Dept of the Navy (.,,t" ,,,e/u/~H '1er11f) 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-04-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

CONFIDENTIAL 
·~ 

eefiPiffflN'.fft<L - SHetlfU'fY IN.rOflMft'fieN 

MBMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Draft version revised on 

basis of meeting with 

representatives of OSD, NSA, 

JCS, Army, Navy and Air Force 

on 9 December 1953 

DIREC~OR 1 NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

SUBJECT: Implementation of NSC Directive on Communications Security 

(NSC 168) 

References: (a) NSC Directive on Communications Security, (NSC 168) 

dtd 20 Oct 53 

(b) SecDef Memorandum: Interim Responsibility for COMSEC, 

dtd 5 Dec 52 

(c) NSCID No. 9 Revised, dtd 24 Oct 52 

(d) Secretary of Defense Directive: Implementation of NSCID 

No. 9 Revised, dtd 5 Dec 52 

1. This Directive is issued for the purpose of implementing within 

the Department of Defense the provisions of reference (a) and supersedes 

reference (b). All-directives, orders, or instructions relating to CO~ISEC 

matters issued by any authorities within the Department of Defense ~hich 

are inconsistent or at variance with the provisions of this Directive 

will be rescinded or revised in consonance therewith. 

2. The Department of Defense has been designated by reference (a) 

as Executive Agent of the Government for all COMSEC matters. 

3. The National Security Agency (NSA) was authorized by reference 

(c) and established by reference (d). Reference (b) assigned to the 

Director, NSA, on an interim basis, the responsibility for COMSEC 

activities and related matters previously assigned to the Director, 

Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA). The Director, NSA, has now been 

designated to act for the Executive Agent in all COMSEC matters set 

forth in paragraphs 2d(l) through 2d(l3) of reference (a) and any others 

which may be sp_ecified by the "Special Committee of the National Security 
. COltl"IDZN'rIAL - SFIJIJRI'fi INB'ORMA'fiOM 

Council for COMSEC Metters", or the "United States Communications 

Security Board" (hereinafter referred to as the Board). With respect 

to the military departments, the Director, NSA, will perform his COMSEC 

functions under the :lJDmediate direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

4. In fulfilling his COMSEC responsibilities, the Director, NSA, . ' 

will be governed by the provisions of reference (a), and in the fields 

of cryptosecurity, ~transmission security, physical· security, and cover and 

deception, it shall be his responsibi~ity: 

a. To obtain f~om the Joint Chiefs of Staff and/or military 

departments such in:f"ormation as he may require in performing his fUnctions, 

as authorized in this directive or any other directive subsequently issued. 

b. To prescribe, or review and approve, the cryptoprinciples 

incorporated or to be incorporated in any telecommunications equipments 

and systems and in any COMSEC equipments and systems. 

' 

c. To prescribe, or review and approve, crn>tosecurity ruies 

regulations, and instructions applicable to the operation and use of any 

crypto-equi~ments and systems and of any COMSEC equipments and systems. 

d. To perform technical analysis of military telecommunications 

for t..~e purpose of determining the degree of COV.i.SEC being provid~d by t~e 

cryptopr1nciples 1 materials and procedures used, as well as the effect on 

COMSEC of the communications procedures and practices being utilized.; ma.king 

arrangements with the military departments to obtain t~e material required 

for such analysis. 

e. To reviev and evaluate communications procedures developed 

by the military departr.ients to determine whether sue~ procedures will 

2 

CON FI DENT I AL 
COffli'I:a:BN'i'fftfi = 'SF;emu'!'Y Ilif'OftMz'c!3:0N 

provide and mointain·transmiaaion security; and to recommend revisions 

and additional rules and procedures as required. To accomplish this,· 

the Direct.or, 'BSA, :may perfonn technical analyses of military teleconmrunications and shall make the necessary arrangements with the military 

departments to obtain th~ material required for analysis. 

f. To prescribe minimum standards for ·the phy'sical security 

of cryptomaterial, in collaboration with the military departments as 

appropriate. 

g. To assist 1n the preparation of or to review the communications 

portions of all.non-tactical cover and deception plans. To formulate and 

promulgate the basic policies used 1n such portions. 

h. To receive from the military departments their research 

and development programs and/or requirements for crypto-equipments and 

materials, and provide for review, coordination, and approval of all such 

research and development programs. In so doing, he will ascertain from 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff the extent of joint or common interest in the 

programs and/or requirements. 

1. In consonance with the policies of the Department of Defense 

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to formulate an integrated program for 

cryptosecurity research and development to meet the requirements of the 

military departments in order to ensure the continuing security of their 

telecoI!Dl'lunications. 

j. To provide for the conduct of an integrated research and 

development program adequate to achieve a satisfactor1 state of cr;:r.ptosecuri ty. 

3 

€ON FIDENTll&L 
.• 

• 

e6lfti'IBE!f'f!1di • SEeUftf'f'f JIWeftMz\'f!eif 

~· To inform any military department which bas expressed 

interest in cryptosecurity research and development projects of the 

progress being made. 

1. To receive :from the military departments their quantitative 

requirements for crypto-equipments and materials, and provide for review, 

coordination, and approval of all crypto-equipment and material production 

arid procurement programs. 

m. In consonance with the policies of the Department of Defense 

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to formulate an integrated program f'or the 

production and procurement of crypto-equipments and materials. 

n. To produce cryptomaterial necessary to meet the requirements 

of the military departments and to ensure that there is adequate capacity 

to meet these requirements. In so doing, the Director, NSA, by mutual 

agreement will authorize the military departments to en.gage in the 

production of' cryptomaterial. Such production will be conducted in 

accordance with technical cryptologic criteria prescribed by the Director, 

NSA, and he will be kept informed of the production accomplished. 

o. In meeting operational requirements, ~ ensure the necessary 

compatibility and, insofar es practicable, the standardization of cryptoequipments and material in order to promote a maximum of' efficiency and 

economy in their procurement, operation, and maintenance. Determination 

of the acceptability of' an equipment in meeting the operational requirements 

is the responsibility of' each military department. 

p. To furnish services and materials for the COMSEC program 

of th~ military departments under mutually agreeable fiscal arrangements. 

4 

CONFIDENTIAL 
fj>NilitBE~M9 COHFJ:J;!i:N!PY.t SESYRI'FY IN:P0flMA'fION 

q. To provide technical guidance and support for cryptosecurity 

training conducted by the military departments. 

r. To arrange with the authorized representatives of a 

military department for required liaison with subordinate elements of 

that department. 

s. To refer violations of COMSEC instructions to the authorized 

representatives of the military department concern~d for such action as 

may be deemed necessary, and if appropriate corrective action is not taken, 

refer the matter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for resolution or referral 

with appropriate recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. 

5. The Director, NSA, shall discharge his responsibilities with 

respect to the military departments in accordance with his own judgment, 

subject to the directives of the Board and other higher authority. 

6. In COMSEC matters, it shall be the responsibility of the 

military departments: 

a. To organize and conduct their COMSEC activities as they see 

fit subject to the provisions of law, the directives of the President, 

the providions of reference (a), the provisions of this directive, and 

any other directives issued by competent authority. Nothing in this 

directive shall relie~e the military departments of their responsibilities 

for executing all measures required to assure the security and efficiency 

of their own telecoil'Ul'lunications. 

b. To provide all lawful assistance required by the Board. 

c. To provide the Director, NSA, with such information end 

logistic and other assistance as he may require in the performance of 

his functions, as authorized in this directive. 

CONFIDENTIAL 
~ ~N1FIDEff!!ifAlt 

90NPIBBN'HA:Ei 6B9eHI'fi INPomYlf:E0N 

d. To furnish in a mutually agr!!eable manner to the Director, 

NSA, the materials necessary for his technical analysis of military 

telecommunications. .•. 

e. To submit all research and development requirements for 

crypto-equipments and material to the Director, NSA., and to keep him 

currently advised of any changes therein. 

f. To accomplish in a mutually agreeabl~ manner such COMSEC 

research and development projects as may be authorized by the Director, 

NSA.. Subject to prior notification to and approyal by.the Director, NSA, 

to initiate and conduct such research and development projects as may be 

necessary to support their COMSEC activities. 

g. To determine the acceptability of crypto-equipments in 

meeting their expressed oper~tional requirements. Military departments 

will furnish the Director, NSA, timely notification of service test 

findings. When equipment developed to meet joint or common requirements 

is service tested, the departments concerned will arrange to conduct 

coordinated service tests so as to achieve maximum results with the 

procurement of the minimum number of service test models. 

h. To submit all quantitative requirements for crypto-equipments 

and materials to the Director, NSA, in accordance with procedures ~stablished 

by him. 

i. To organize, train, equip, operate, administer, budget for, 

and provide logistic support to their respective COMSEC activities. This 

will include provision.of reserve programs to meet emergency or wartime 

requirements. 

6 

CONFIDENTIAL 
,. 

j. To perform, under mutually agreeable arrangements, such 

COMSEC tasks and. functions as may be requested by the Director, NSA. 

k. To provide the necessary COMSEC facilities and resources 

for the support of the military effort, in accordance with assigned 

responsibilities. 

7. The Director, NSA, will arrange with the appropriate authorities 

of departments and agencies of the Government outside the Department of 

Defense for the exercise of the authority over COM'SEC matters granted 

in paragraph 2 of reference (a)-. 

· 8. In accordance with the policies established by the Board, and 

in behalf of the Executive Agent of the government for all COMSEC matters, 

the Director, NSA., will conduct the lia_ison on technical COMSEC and related 

matters with the cryptologic authorities of foreign nations and inter-

. national organizations. The military departments shall be invited to 

. . . participate in any international conference called for the purpose of 

determining the crypto-equipments, procedures, and/or materials to be 

used to provide security to coDDUunications between the military forces of 

the United States and those of other countries. 

9. Appeals from any decision of the Board by the Director, NSA, or 

by the representative of any of the military departments, shall be filed 

only with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. In the event that a 0 

military department objects to any decision of the Director, NSA, that 

depart::nent will call the matter to the attention of the Director-, USA. 

If the mstter in question cannot be resolved after consideration by the 

Director, NSA, ·and the department concerned, that department will refer the 

7 

CONFIDENTIAL 
.. GGNFIBEN'HA'Ei SElGURI'i'Y IN.FORMPd'ION 

~~tter to the Joint Chiefs of Starr for resolution or referral with 

appropriate recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. 

10. If in the implementation of COMSEC directives or requirements 

it becomes apparent that the primary mission of a military department will 

be adversely affected or its budgetary authorization vill be exceeded, 

such directivc!s or requirements will be implemented to the greatest extent 

practicable while the conflict is being resolved. The military departments 

shall not be required to disclose to the Director, NSA, the Board, or _any 

of its committees the contents of any official cm=runications conceniing 

its ectivities, if, in the opinion of the head of the department, the 

disclosure would be contrary to the national interest. Nothing in this 

directive shall be construed to give the ~oard or any of its representatives 

the right to inspect the operation of COM.SEC in any military departr.ient 

without approval by the head thereof. 

ll. Special tert:lS used in this direc~ive shall have the oeanir.gs 

ossif;:1ed by refe:-ence (a). 

CONFIDENTIAL 
- .. --

• 

1. In the early drafting stages of NSC 168 it was suggested 

that the COMSEC responsibilities of the Director, NSA, with respect 

to the military services should be exercised under the direct 

supervision of the J.C.S. Since this proposal was in consonance with 

the responsibilities then exercised by the J.C.S. in connection with 

unified commands, I reluctantly agreed to it despite my fear that 

serious practical difficulties would result from placing the J.C.S. 

in the line of commend for COMSEC matters. 

2. Prior to the actual promulgation of NSC 168 the proper role of 

the J.c.s. was carefUlly reviewed in connection with a study of the 

over-ell Defense Establishment undertaken by the Rockefeller Committee. 

That Committee found that in practice the J.C.s. had been exercising 

command. functions contrary to the provisions of the National Security 

Act of 1947, as amended. which constituted the J.C.S. as a planning and 

advisory body without command authority. This finding of the Committee 

was adopted by the President in his message of 30 April 1953, presenting 

to Congress Reorganization Plan No. 6. In his message the President 

carefully delimits the role of the J.c.s. The President further indicated 

that the so-called Key West Agreement would be revised to limit the J.C.S. 

to a planning and advisory role in connection with the establishment and 

direction of unified commands. 

3. Immediately following the effective date of Reorganization Plan 

No. 6 to 1953, the Acting Secretary of Defense, on 2 July 1953, in a 

memorandum to the J.C.S., requested that certain reyisions to the Key 

West Agreement be prepared, including a revision "to clarify the command 

status of the J.C.S. so as to insure that that group does not exercise 

command and to assure its advisory and planning role." Recommended 

revisions, endorsed by the J.C.S., are contained in JCS 1478/45, and 

eliminate command functions previously assigned to the J.c.s. 

4. In my.opinion, it would be inconsistent with the role of the 

J.c.s., as re-defined, to provide that they should exercise "direct 

supervision" over the Director, NSA, in the performance of hie COMSEC 

functions. I am, therefore, unable to concur in the language which the 

three services wish to have incorporated in paragraph 3 of the directive 

which it is proposed that you should issue to implement NSC 168 within 

the Department of Defense. Accordingly, I recommend that the final 

sentence of paragraph 3 be rewritten as follows: "With respect to the 

military departments, the Director, NSA, in performance of his COMSEC 

functions, will be under the immediate direction of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff for joint doctrine and for matters relating to joint strategic and 

operational planning.''" 

Inclosure 2 

CONFIDENTIAL 
•.;;---- « jQN1Jfl J~.~ SElCURffY INPORMA'fION .... .&. ..._, ...,,,. ...L " ..;,. ,.;. .I. -9' 

5. I believe that with this change and the other, agreed, provisions, 

the draft directive will correctly describe and adequately provide for 

the discharge of the planning and advisory function for which the J C S 

is responsible 

Inclosure 2 (Continued) 

2 

CONFIDENTIAL