United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 96-3081EA

_____________ William H. Johnson, * * Appellant, * * v. * * City of West Memphis; Al Boals, * in His Official and Individual * Capacity; Joe Brasfield, in * His Official and Individual * Appeal from the United Sta tes Capacity; Thomas Burroughs, in * District Court for the Easter n His Official and Individual * District of Arkansas. Capacity; Al Felton; Roberta * Jackson, in Her Official and * Individual Capacity; Bill * Pollard, in His Official and * Individual Capacity; Dan Scott, * in His Official and Individual * Capacity, * * Appellees. *

_____________ Submitted: March 10, 1997 Filed: May 14, 1997

_____________ Before FAGG, HEANEY, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

_____________ FAGG, Circuit Judge.
In January 1995, newly elected mayor Al Boals fired William H. Johnsonfrom his job as the general manager of the utilit y commission in West Memphis, Arkansas. Despite Johnson’s repeated requests, Mayor Boals refused to hold a termination hearing or to offer any reasons for his decision. Johnson asked the city council to intervene, but his request was denied. See Ark. Code Ann . § 14--2-

42-110 (Michie 1987) (unless v etoed by two-thirds of city council, city mayor can appoint and remove all department heads). Be lieving he was entitled to a hearing, and that he was fired because h e declined to support Mayor Boal s’s election campaign, Johnson filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against Mayor Boals, the members of the city council, and the City of West Memphis (collectively th e City). The district court granted the City’s motion for summar y judgment, and Johnson appeals. We affirm.
The Due Process Clause requires the government to provide an employee with procedural due process if the employee stands to lose
a co nstitutionally protected property or liberty interest. Se e Board of Regents v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972). For a propertyinterest to exist, the public employee must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment. Se e Skeets v. Johnson , 816 F.2d 1213, 1215 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc). An employee’s liberty interest s are implicated when, in connection withthe employee’s discharge, a government official make s
accusa tions that seriously damage the employee’s standing in th e community or foreclose other e mployment opportunities. See Shands v. City of Kennett , 993 F.2d 1337, 1347 (8th Cir. 1993). Johnson lacked a property interest because he was not entitl ed to co ntinued employment as the utility commission’s genera l manager. Under Arkansas law, Johnson was an at-will employee who could be terminated at any time without cause. See Skeets , 81 6 F.2d a t 1215. The Arkansas Supreme Court recognizes certai n except ions to its employment-at-will doctrine, see Mertyris v

. P.A.M. Transport, Inc. , 832 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Ark. 1992), bu t Johnson does not fall within any of them. Johnson had no written
employment contract covering a definite term, and although th e city ’s personnel manual states employees will not be terminate d “without being offered a pre[]termination hearing,” the manu al does not expressly provide that employees will only be dismissed for-3-

cause. See id. Contrary to Johnson’s view, the longstandin g custom of providing all city employees with a due process hearing before they were terminated does not affect our analysis. Se e Packett v. Stenberg , 969 F.2d 721, 724-25 (8th Cir. 1992) (newl y elected officials may change an earlier administration’s emp loyment practi ces). Besides, like the terms of the personnel manua l itself, the past mayor’s willingness to grant a hearing merel y creates an expectancy of review, and not a legitimate claim t o continue demployment with the City of West Memphis. See Stow v
. Cochran , 819 F.2d 864, 866-67 (8th Cir. 1987).

Like wise, Johnson lost no liberty interest during the cit y
co uncil’s public debate on whether the council should overrid e Mayor Boals’s termination decision. Rather than making accu sations that would stigmatize Johnson’s protected liberty interest, se e Shands , 993 F.2d at 1347-48, councilwoman Roberta Jackson simpl y expres sed her view that it was inappropriate for the utilit y commission to do construction work on private property, and stated
some anonymous commission employees had complained to her abou t being “harassed” at work. Hav ing rejected Johnson’s due process claim, we turn to hi s conten tionthat he was fired for exercising his First Amendmen t rights. Johnson correctly points out that a public employee ma y not be discharged for political reasons unless the employee’ s politi cal views are an appropriate qualification for the job i n question. See Branti v. Finkel , 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980) ; Billingsle yv. St. Louis County , 70 F.3d 61, 63 n.1 (8th Cir

. 1995); O’Connor v. Steeves , 994 F.2d 905, 909 (1st Cir. 1993)

. Assumi ng Mayor Boals based his termination decision on Johnson’ s refusal to support his candidacy, we conclude personal loyalty to the mayor is an appropriate requirement for the general manager’s position. The general manager reports directly to the mayor an d his duties include public relations and responsibility for the-4-

util itycommission’s long-range planning. We believe Johnson’ s planning responsibilities, which encompass areas of cit y decisionmaking that could be influenced by his partisan viewpoints, put a premium on his allegiance to the mayor. See Branti , 4 45 U.S. at 517-19; O’Connor , 994 F.2d at 910-11; Bauer v. Bosley , 802 F.2d 1058, 1061 (8th Cir. 1986). Indeed, Johnson admits that he did not see eye-to-eye with Mayor Boal s’s view that it would not be in the city’s best interest to convert the utility commission into a n indepe ndent governmental body. Under the utility commission’ s current structure, the city council has the final say on settin g customer rates, and the city r eceives substantial revenue from the commission’s operations. Not only is Johnson at odds with Mayo r Boals about the impact a conversion would have on the city, he is also i n a position to lobby his agenda with the city council an d the public as well in his role as the utility commission’s highly visible spokesman. See Branti , 445 U.S. at 518. Also, we cannot overlook Mayor Boals’s concern that local elections often turn on
a utility commission’s ability to deliver low-cost, high-qualit y municipal services. See O’Connor , 994 F.2d at 910-11. Th e district court thus correctly decided that Mayor Boals was free to replace Johnson with someone h e believed would willingly carry out his plans for the utility commission. Because Johnson failed to establish any constitutiona l vio lations arising from his discharge, we affirm the judgment o f the district court. We also grant the City’s unopposed motion to addthe transcript of the relevant city council meeting to th e record.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.