United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit 

No. 20-40182 

Adan Valdez, Individually and On Behalf of All Others 

Similarly Situated; Armando Crespo; Joshua Merril; 

Karlos Villarreal; Omar Rodriguez; Et al, 

Plaintiffs—Appellants, 

versus

Superior Energy Services, Incorporated, doing business 

as SPC Rentals; Warrior Energy Services Corporation, 

Defendants—Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 2:15-CV-144 

Before Jones, Costa, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Valdez and the other plaintiffs in this collective action appeal the 

district court order dismissing their overtime-pay lawsuit without approving 

the portion of their settlement agreement relating to attorney’s fees. We hold 

*

 Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

April 21, 2022 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

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No. 20-40182 

2 

that the district court acted within its discretion in dismissing what remained 

of the lawsuit after Valdez repeatedly failed to comply with its order to file a 

motion for attorney’s fees. The judgment is AFFIRMED. 

I. 

In early 2015, Valdez and sixty-five other oil-well workers sued their 

employer, Superior Energy Services, for overtime pay under the Fair Labor 

Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. The workers alleged that Superior 

Energy Services misclassified them as supervisors and, as a result, 

erroneously withheld overtime compensation. The parties stipulated to 

conditionally certify the case as an opt-in collective action under the FLSA.

Before formal discovery began, the parties repeatedly met to mediate 

their claims. Because Superior Energy did not keep adequate records, the 

primary dispute between the parties concerned the number of hours each 

plaintiff worked during the relevant period. Superior Energy reached its 

estimate by logging the number of hours worked after the plaintiffs filed suit 

and then extrapolating backward using those numbers. Contending that they 

all worked much longer hours during the relevant market boom period, 

Valdez and the other plaintiffs disputed Superior Energy’s methodology. 

The plaintiffs based their estimate of hours on affidavit testimony. 

Eventually, the parties reached a settlement agreement that represented a 

compromise between the two estimates. 

Under the settlement agreement, Superior Energy agreed to pay 

approximately $1.5 million to the sixty-six workers (an average of $22,299 

per worker, net of attorney fees) and a separate sum of about $1 million in 

attorney’s fees and costs. The separately payable attorney’s fees portion of 

the settlement would satisfy the plaintiffs’ contingency fee agreement.

After reaching the agreement, Valdez requested that the district court 

allow the parties to dismiss the case without obtaining court approval of the 

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settlement in accordance with Martin v. Spring Break 83’ Productions, L.L.C., 

688 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 2012). Superior Energy did not oppose Valdez’s 

request. Ultimately, the district court rejected the parties’ shared position 

that settlement could be finalized without court supervision. The parties 

submitted the settlement for court approval only after seeking to extend the 

deadline for submission five times. In November 2019, the district court 

approved the plaintiff’s payments under the proposed settlement agreement 

as a “fair and reasonable settlement” involving a “dispute over facts.”1

 The 

district court did not, however, approve the attorney’s fees portion of the 

settlement. Instead, the court ordered that Valdez’s attorney file a separate 

Rule 54(d) motion “demonstrating the reasonableness” of the agreed-to 

attorney’s fees, which the court had already instructed him to do on at least 

two occasions. 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B)(i), Valdez had 

fourteen days to comply with the court’s order. On the fourteenth day, 

Valdez’s attorney filed a motion seeking to push the deadline back twelve 

days. The district court obliged. On the day of the new deadline, Valdez’s 

attorney again requested an additional four days to file the motion for 

attorney’s fees. The district court again obliged and noted that “[f]ailure to 

file a motion for attorney’s fees and costs” by the new deadline “will be taken 

as representation that Plaintiff is not requesting fees and costs.” Valdez’s 

attorney then sought a one-day extension. The district court granted the 

extension. The next day, Valdez’s attorney requested yet another one-day 

extension. The district court granted that extension too. “[W]ith great 

1

 Insofar as this appeal relates to that portion of the settlement agreement, it is 

moot. See, e.g., In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 1175, 1181 (5th Cir. 1986) (“If a 

dispute has been settled or resolved, . . . it is considered moot.” (quoting In re S.L.E., Inc., 

674 F.2d 359, 364 (5th Cir. 1982))). 

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trepidation,” Valdez’s attorney requested a final, seven-day extension. Once 

again, the district court granted the extension, and warned him that any 

additional “unfounded motions for extension may prompt sanctions.” This 

deadline, too, came and went without the filing of a motion for attorney’s 

fees. Over a month elapsed between the court’s November order and the 

final deadline. 

Because Valdez’s attorney never filed a motion for attorney’s fees, the 

district court dismissed the case. The court’s brief order notes its approval 

of the settlement as to plaintiffs, the “several extensions” of time it gave 

Valdez’s attorney to seek court approval of attorney’s fees, and that “no 

further filings have been made in this case.” The court also noted that 

“[b]oth parties stipulated to the dismissal of this case upon approval of the 

proposed settlement.” Accordingly, the court dismissed the case. Valdez 

appealed. 

II. 

On appeal, Valdez contends that the district court erred by concluding 

that this case falls outside the exception, articulated in Martin, to the general 

requirement that FLSA settlements be court approved. Because this case 

comes within the Martin exception, Valdez contends, the district court also 

erred by asking him to submit a fee petition with additional information that 

would allow the district court to evaluate the reasonableness of the attorney’s 

fees portion of the settlement agreement. Superior Energy’s brief on appeal 

essentially agrees with Valdez’s position. 2

 Curiously, however, both parties 

ignore and fail to brief the actual reason why the district court denied 

2

 Even if the district court erred in requiring its approval of the settlement, any 

error is rendered harmless by its actual approval. We do not discuss the merits of this 

action. 

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attorney’s fees: Valdez’s repeated failure to comply with its order to seek 

court approval. 

In most instances, failure to brief an issue on appeal means the issue is 

waived. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); United States v. Stalnaker, 571 F.3d 

428, 439-40 (5th Cir. 2009). To instruct these otherwise capable attorneys, 

however, we demonstrate the importance of complying with court orders, 

even if a party disagrees. 

District courts are vested with an inherent power to “manage their 

own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” 

Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31, 82 S. Ct. 1386, 1389 (1962). 

That power necessarily includes the authority to sua sponte dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any court order. See, e.g., In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) 

Products Liab. Lit. ̧966 F.3d 351, 357 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Woodson v. 

Surgitek, Inc., 57 F.3d 1406, 1417 (5th Cir. 1995)); McCullough v. 

Lynaugh ̧835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988). This court reviews an order 

dismissing a case for failure to comply with a court order for abuse of 

discretion. McCullough, 835 F.3d at 1127. 

We cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion by dismissing 

the case without approving the attorney’s fees portion of the settlement 

agreement. This court’s In re Deepwater Horizon, 922 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 

2019), decision is instructive. In that case, a district court ordered all 

plaintiffs in a particular pleading bundle to submit certain documents. Id. at 

665. After the district court granted extra time to comply with the pretrial 

order and warned that non-compliance would result in dismissal, some 

plaintiffs inexplicably failed to comply. Id. at 666. The district court 

dismissed those plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. Id. at 665. This court 

affirmed, reasoning that “the record clearly shows contumacious conduct 

under our precedents, justifying dismissal-with-prejudice.” Id. at 666. 

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Here, on at least two occasions, the district court ordered Valdez’s 

attorney to file a separate motion seeking attorney’s fees and costs under 

Rule 54(d). In one order, the district court warned Valdez’s attorney that 

“[f]ailure to file a motion for attorney’s fees and costs by [the deadline] will 

be taken as representation that Plaintiff is not requesting attorney’s fees and 

costs.” Nevertheless, Valdez’s attorney never filed such a motion, even after 

the district court repeatedly granted extensions to allow Valdez’s attorney 

more time to do so. Even if the district court erroneously concluded that it 

needed to approve the settlement in all respects before dismissing the case, 

that error would not give Valdez’s attorney license to ignore the order. Cf.

Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 139, 112 S. Ct. 1076, 1081 (1992) (holding 

that district court had authority to issue Rule 11 sanctions for conduct in case 

ultimately dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). Thus, the 

district court acted well within its discretion when it dismissed this case 

without approving the attorney’s fees portion of the settlement agreement. 

For the forgoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is 

AFFIRMED. 

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