PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

THAER MAHDI, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT, a 

department of Salt Lake City Corporation; 

UNIFIED POLICE DEPARTMENT, a 

department of Salt Lake County; 

MICHAEL RAPICH, in his individual 

capacity as Superintendent of the Utah 

Highway Patrol; JED MILLER, in his 

individual capacity as a Utah State Trooper 

of the Utah Highway Patrol; JON 

THOMPSON, in his individual capacity as 

a Utah State Trooper of the Utah Highway 

Patrol; CHRIS SHELBY, in his individual 

capacity as a Sergeant of the Utah Highway 

Patrol; JOHN DOES 1-10, in their 

individual capacities as Utah Highway 

Patrol supervisors;

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 21-4102

_________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah

(D.C. No. 2:20-CV-00250-HCN)

_________________________________

Aaron C. Garrett, Nonprofit Legal Services of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Appellant. 

David F. Mull, Salt Lake City Attorney’s Office, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Appellee Salt 

Lake Police Department.

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

December 5, 2022

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court

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Scott Young, Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Appellee Unified 

Police Department.

J. Clifford Petersen, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Utah, Salt Lake City, 

Utah, for Appellees Michael Rapich, Jed Miller, Jon Thompson, and Chris Shelby.

_________________________________

Before HARTZ, BACHARACH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

HARTZ, Circuit Judge.

_________________________________

Plaintiff Thaer Mahdi was an innocent bystander. A police chase ended when 

the fleeing armed robber crashed into Mr. Mahdi’s tailor shop, where he was working 

at the time. Officers fired scores of bullets at the driver, and many hit the shop. The 

shop was badly damaged, and Mr. Mahdi was psychologically traumatized. Mr. 

Mahdi filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Salt Lake City Police 

Department (SLCPD), a department of Salt Lake City Corporation; the Unified 

Police Department (UPD), a department of Salt Lake County; and four officers of the 

Utah Highway Patrol (UHP)—Superintendent Michael Rapich, Sergeant Chris 

Shelby, and Troopers Jed Miller and Jon Thompson. He alleges (1) that the 

responding officers used excessive force in violation of his right to substantive due 

process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) that the officers’ unconstitutional 

use of force resulted from Superintendent Rapich’s failure to train and supervise his 

subordinates and from the defendant law-enforcement agencies’ policies and 

customs, including their failure to properly train or supervise their employees. The 

defendants filed motions to dismiss Mr. Mahdi’s first amended complaint for failure 

to state any claims. In response, Mr. Mahdi moved for leave to file a second amended 

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complaint. The United States District Court for the District of Utah denied the motion 

as futile and granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. It held that Mr. Mahdi had 

not adequately alleged that any officers violated his constitutional right to substantive 

due process and that in the absence of any such violation the police agencies also 

could not be liable under § 1983.

Mr. Mahdi appeals, challenging the dismissal of his claims and denial of his 

motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. Exercising jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. Mr. Mahdi’s constitutional right to substantive due 

process was not violated because the officers did not have the opportunity to 

deliberate (in the relevant sense of that term) before firing their weapons and he does 

not allege that any officer intended to harm him.

Because Mr. Mahdi challenges both the dismissal of his first amended 

complaint and the denial as futile of his proposed second amended complaint, we 

accept as true the factual allegations of both pleadings and draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party—here, Mr. Mahdi. See Doe v. Woodard, 

912 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir. 2019). 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On the morning of April 8, 2019, Harold Robinson embarked on a shooting

spree that included at least two armed robberies in the greater Salt Lake City area. He

led responding officers from the SLCPD, UPD, and UHP on a high-speed chase 

lasting some 20 minutes. During the pursuit Mr. Robinson fired multiple rounds from 

a rifle, sometimes aiming at police. The pursuit ended about 11:00 a.m. when Mr. 

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Robinson crashed into Princess Alterations, Mr. Mahdi’s tailoring shop. The shop 

was open for business, and Mr. Mahdi was working inside. 

Within seconds, at least 15 officers—employees of SLCPD, UPD, and UHP—

surrounded Mr. Robinson’s vehicle and began firing in his direction, discharging 196 

bullets in 20 seconds.

Dozens of these bullets entered Mr. Mahdi’s shop. His inventory and machines 

were destroyed. Further, Mr. Mahdi—who came to this country from Iraq, where he 

faced physical threats from insurgents after working as a tailor for the United States 

military—continues to suffer psychological distress because of the shooting. Now

psychologically unable to enter the shop, he has been forced into premature 

retirement and has lost significant income. 

II. DISCUSSION

We begin with the law governing the liability of Sergeant Chris Shelby, and 

Troopers Jed Miller and Jon Thompson of the UHP, three officers sued in their 

individual capacities who, we will assume, fired shots that hit Mr. Mahdi’s business.

A. Qualified Immunity 

The three officers raised the defense of qualified immunity. “The doctrine of 

qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages 

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 

U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). To withstand a motion to 

dismiss based on qualified immunity, a complaint must satisfy two requirements: (1) 

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the facts alleged in the complaint must make out a violation of a constitutional right,

and (2) the right at issue must have been clearly established at the time of the alleged 

misconduct. See Leverington v. City of Colorado Springs, 643 F.3d 719, 732 (10th 

Cir. 2011).

In this case Mr. Mahdi’s claim against the officers fails to surmount the first 

hurdle. As we proceed to explain, his Fourteenth Amendment substantive-dueprocess claim does not meet the requirements established by the Supreme Court.

B. Fourteenth Amendment Substantive-Due-Process Claims

Claims that police officers have used excessive force are usually brought under 

the Fourth Amendment, which requires that law-enforcement seizures be reasonable. 

See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 774 (2014) (“A claim that law enforcement 

officers used excessive force to effect a seizure is governed by the Fourth 

Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’ standard.”). But sometimes the victim has not been 

seized in the constitutional sense, and Mr. Mahdi has raised only a claim that he was 

denied his right to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See 

Clark v. Edmunds, 513 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff’s claim falls under 

Fourteenth Amendment (and not the Fourth) when there was no “intentional 

acquisition of physical control” by the police (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Such claims “find their basis in the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections 

against arbitrary government power.” Lindsey v. Hyler, 918 F.3d 1109, 1115 (10th 

Cir. 2019). To bring a substantive-due-process claim of excessive force under § 1983, 

Mr. Mahdi must show that the complained-of action “shocks the conscience.” 

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Woodard, 912 F.3d at 1300. “[O]nly the most egregious official conduct” will satisfy 

the shocks-the-conscience test. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 

(1998). 

In cases of alleged excessive force by a state actor, we use two different 

standards to apply the shocks-the-conscience test. Selection of the appropriate 

standard turns on whether the state actor had time to deliberate before engaging in the 

complained-of conduct. 

When the state actor has the opportunity “to engage in actual deliberation, 

conduct that shows deliberate indifference to a person’s life or security will shock the 

conscience.” Perez v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cnty., 432 F.3d 1163, 1166 (10th 

Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). But if there is no such opportunity, 

conduct will shock the conscience only if it is done with the intent to harm the 

injured party. Id. Mr. Mahdi proposes that we apply the deliberate-indifference 

standard in his case. We disagree. 

Time to engage in actual deliberation means time to really deliberate. Actual 

deliberation means “more than having a few seconds to think.” Id. at 1167. It “do[es] 

not mean ‘deliberation’ in the narrow, technical sense in which it has sometimes been 

used in traditional homicide law.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 851 n.11. Rather, it implies “the 

luxury . . . of having time to make unhurried judgments, upon the chance for repeated 

reflection, largely uncomplicated by the pulls of competing obligations.” Id. at 853. 

Thus, there are two elements to the requisite deliberation. The first is time—time for 

“unhurried judgments” and “repeated reflection.” The other is the opportunity for 

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attention—with no substantial “pulls of competing obligations.” In other words, the 

intent-to-harm standard “is not limited to situations calling for split-second 

reactions”; instead, it applies more broadly to scenarios where state actors make 

decisions “in rapidly evolving, fluid, and dangerous situations which preclude the 

luxury of calm and reflective deliberation.” Perez, 432 F.3d at 1167 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “[W]hen unforeseen circumstances demand an officer’s 

instant judgment, even precipitate recklessness” will not shock the conscience. Lewis, 

523 U.S. at 853.

In Lewis the Supreme Court applied this analysis to a police chase. While 

responding to a call about a fight, a deputy “saw a motorcycle approaching at high 

speed.” Id. at 836. The operator of the cycle refused to stop in response to the 

deputy’s commands and warning lights and sped off. See id. at 836–37. The chase 

proceeded at speeds up to 100 miles per hour. See id. at 837. The motorcycle crashed, 

killing the passenger, whose estate brought suit. See id. The Court noted that the 

deputy had to act quickly while facing competing obligations: “A police officer 

deciding whether to give chase must balance on one hand the need to stop a suspect 

and show that flight from the law is no way to freedom, and, on the other, the highspeed threat to all those within stopping range, be they suspects, their passengers, 

other drivers, or bystanders.” Id. at 853.

Thus, we apply the intent-to-harm standard to resolve substantive-due-process 

issues arising from police motor-vehicle pursuits. See id. at 854 (“[H]igh-speed 

chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight do 

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not give rise to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment, redressable by an action 

under § 1983.”). There may be police-chase cases in which the deliberateindifference standard applies—and we do not rule out the possibility—but we are 

aware of none.

Mr. Mahdi argues that the responding officers and their supervisors at 

headquarters had an opportunity for actual deliberation. Although officers opened 

fire on Mr. Robinson just one or two seconds after arriving on the scene, Mr. Mahdi 

argues that officers during the 20-minute pursuit could (and should) have been 

deliberating “about how to proceed at the conclusion of the chase.” Aplt. Br. at 13.

But Mr. Mahdi does not plead that any officer had sufficient information to predict 

that the chase would end with Mr. Robinson crashing into the premises of an open 

business. Perhaps that was one reasonable possibility; but officers pursuing an armed 

suspect at high speed while facing gunfire cannot reasonably be expected to 

simultaneously consider and plan for all reasonably possible outcomes. Besides the 

obvious time constraints, officers pursuing a suspect who is shooting at them must 

focus on the immediate threats. They are certainly subject to the “pulls of competing 

obligations” that preclude the luxury of deliberation. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853. The 

officers’ decision to open fire following the crash was a direct response to the 

circumstances they faced at that particular moment. They had only one or two 

seconds after arriving on scene to act and, as a matter of law, two seconds is 

inadequate for “unhurried judgments [and] repeated reflection.” Id. As for 

supervisors at headquarters, they may not be burdened by the moment-to-moment 

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decisionmaking necessary while engaged in the pursuit; but they would be burdened 

by the lack of reliable information concerning ongoing events and the locations of the 

officers under their command. They, too, could not anticipate how the chase would 

end or create a decision tree addressing all reasonably possible scenarios, much less 

communicate it to over 15 officers engaged in the pursuit. 

Mr. Mahdi relies on our opinion in Waugh v. Dow, 617 F. App’x 867 (10th 

Cir. 2015), to argue that the officers had time to deliberate, but this reliance is 

misplaced. We need not decide whether to endorse the nonprecedential opinion in 

that case, because the case before us is readily distinguishable. The plaintiff in 

Waugh brought a substantive-due-process action after he was shot by a private citizen

whose brother, a sheriff’s deputy, armed and recruited him to help find and arrest the 

plaintiff. See id. at 869–70. The deputy said that he had only three minutes to 

deliberate before arming his brother, but there was evidence suggesting that the time 

between the dispatch call and the deputy’s decision to provide his brother with a 

firearm may have been closer to 24 minutes. See id. at 873. Also, during that time the 

deputy was not preoccupied with a dangerous chase. Our determination in Waugh

that the officer may have had 24 minutes in which to deliberate hardly supports the 

inference that the officers here had a similar opportunity to deliberate. Indeed, Waugh

explicitly distinguished the facts of that case from a situation in which a police 

officer “engages in a high-speed pursuit of another vehicle—the paradigmatic 

example of the absence of actual deliberation.” Id. at 874.

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Mr. Mahdi also argues that the court should apply the deliberate-indifference 

standard rather than the intent-to-harm standard because the police chase “ended”

after Mr. Robinson crashed his truck into Mr. Mahdi’s shop, leaving Mr. Robinson 

“effectively subdued” and eliminating the urgency that justifies application of the 

intent-to-harm standard. Aplt. Br. at 12. He invokes Plumhoff, where the Court held 

that there had been no constitutional violation but noted that it “would be a different 

case if petitioners had initiated a second round of shots after an initial round had 

clearly incapacitated [the suspect] and had ended any threat of continued flight, or if 

[the suspect] had clearly given himself up.” 572 U.S. at 777. But Plumhoff is of only 

limited relevance here because it was a Fourth Amendment case, reviewing the use of 

force only for reasonableness. See id. at 774. More importantly, this is not the 

hypothetical “different case” contemplated by Plumhoff. Nothing in Mr. Mahdi’s 

complaints supports an inference that Mr. Robinson had been “subdued.” He had a 

firearm with him as he was driving, and he had shot at pursuing police officers. There 

is no allegation that he had indicated he was surrendering or was rendered dead or 

unconscious by the crash. And, in a statement in the memorandum decision and order 

that was not challenged on appeal, the district court said that a bystander video of the 

shooting (which the parties agreed to have the district court consider in resolving the 

motion to dismiss) “makes clear that Mr. Robinson was not incapacitated by the 

crash.” Mahdi v. Salt Lake City Police Dep’t, 550 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1200 (D. Utah 

2021). The court said that the video shows that Mr. Robinson “was able to get out of 

his car.” Id. It also said that the video showed that after the shooting stopped the 

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officers still “remained in high alert as they cautiously approached Mr. Robinson’s 

truck with weapons drawn,” and that they showed their concern about there being 

another shooter in the vehicle when, “after quickly opening the [passenger-side] 

door, the officers jumped back defensively.” Id. If there is any relevant language in

Plumhoff, it is the statement that “if police officers are justified in firing at a suspect 

in order to end a severe threat to public safety, the officers need not stop shooting 

until the threat has ended.” 572 U.S. at 777.

Mr. Mahdi next argues that even should we find that the intent-to-harm 

standard applies, his proposed second amended complaint states a cause of action 

because the extent of force used by the responding officers “indicates a vengeful, 

vindictive, or otherwise malicious intent to harm that goes well above and beyond the 

legitimate objective of arrest” and that “it does not matter that [he] was not the target 

of arrest.” Aplt. Br. at 15. He suggests that the officers’ intent to improperly harm 

Mr. Robinson was clear and that this intent should suffice for liability here.

Our precedent, however, requires that the intent to harm be directed at the 

plaintiff, not a third person. In Childress v. City of Arapaho, 210 F.3d 1154, 1155

(10th Cir. 2000), the plaintiffs were carjacked by two escaped prisoners who then 

held plaintiffs hostage. Attempting to capture and arrest the prisoners, police fired at 

the vehicle and inadvertently struck the plaintiffs. See id. at 1155–56. We held that

the plaintiffs had no Fourth Amendment claim because the officers’ intent was to 

seize the vehicle and the fugitives, not the plaintiffs. See id. at 1157. We also 

concluded that the defendants did not violate the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment 

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rights because they did not have the intent to hurt the hostages. See id. at 1157–58.

We do not foreclose the possibility that in some exceptional circumstances (shooting 

at someone in a parade?) an innocent bystander inadvertently harmed by force 

directed at a suspect could have a cause of action under § 1983. But this is certainly 

not one of them. See id. at 1158 (“Nowhere do plaintiffs present specific facts 

suggesting that the officers harbored an intent to harm them. Thus, there is no 

constitutional liability under Lewis.” (emphasis added)); Perez, 432 F.3d at 1168 

(“[A] bystander hit by an emergency response vehicle in the process of responding to 

an emergency call cannot sustain a claim under the substantive due process clause 

without alleging an intent to harm [the bystander].”); Radecki v. Barela, 146 F.3d 

1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 1998) (survivors of innocent bystander killed during policesuspect struggle have no Fourteenth Amendment claim because they did not allege 

that defendant officer acted with intent to harm the bystander); cf. Huff v. Reeves, 996 

F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2021) (distinguishing Childress by noting, “Childress

would be highly relevant, indeed dispositive, if the evidence established that 

[defendant] was shooting only at [the suspect] and the wounds to [plaintiff] were just 

the unfortunate accidental effects of otherwise lawful conduct.” (ellipsis and internal 

quotation marks omitted)).

We conclude that Mr. Mahdi was required to, but did not, allege that the

officers intended to harm him. Therefore, neither his first nor his second amended 

complaint states a claim of a violation of his substantive-due-process rights.

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C. Supervisory and Municipal Liability

There remain the claims against UHP Superintendent Rapich and the two local

law-enforcement agencies. But those claims fall away once it is determined that none 

of the officers on the scene violated Mr. Mahdi’s substantive-due-process rights.

Mr. Mahdi’s complaints do not allege that Superintendent Rapich played any 

role in the actual pursuit of Mr. Robinson. He is sued for his failure to properly train 

and supervise his subordinate officers. But a supervisor cannot be held liable for 

deficiencies in training and oversight if his subordinates did not violate the plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights. See Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1092 (10th Cir. 2009).

As for the law-enforcement agencies, we assume that Mr. Mahdi did not sue 

UHP itself because it enjoys sovereign immunity as a state agency. See Pettigrew v. 

Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 722 F.3d 1209, 1212 (10th Cir. 2013)

(state department of public safety “is an arm of the State of Oklahoma and therefore 

is treated as the state for purposes of sovereign immunity and the Eleventh 

Amendment”). SLCPD and UPD, however, are suable as municipal entities. See

Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Agric. Ins. Co., 507 F.3d 1250, 1253 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Eleventh 

Amendment immunity extends to states and state entities but not to counties, 

municipalities, or other local government entities.”).1 But ordinarily a plaintiff cannot 

recover “against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers 

1

The district court noted that the proper defendants should have been the Salt 

Lake City Corporation, rather than SLCPD, and probably Salt Lake County, rather 

than UPD, but did not need to resolve that issue. See Mahdi, 550 F. Supp. 3d at 1196 

n.1.

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when . . . the officer inflicted no constitutional harm.” City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 

475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam); see also Crowson, 983 F.3d at 1191–92

(absent indication of a systemic failure, municipal liability requires violation of an 

individual’s constitutional rights by one or more municipal officers). The district 

court dismissed Mr. Mahdi’s claims against SLCPD and UPD because Mr. Mahdi 

failed to allege a constitutional violation by any police official. In his opening brief 

Mr. Mahdi fails to respond to this conclusion, neither raising nor arguing theories for 

imposing liability on the two agencies under § 1983. We therefore have no occasion 

to consider whether there might be some theory supporting their liability despite the 

absence of any constitutional violation by an officer. See Tran v. Trs. of State Colls. 

in Colo., 355 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Issues not raised in the opening 

brief are deemed abandoned or waived.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

III. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the district court’s order dismissing Mr. Mahdi’s Fourteenth

Amendment claims and denying his motion for leave to file a second amended 

complaint.

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