ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT (MOTHER): ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

MARIANNE WOOLBERT GREGORY F. ZOELLER 

Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT (FATHER): ROBERT J. HENKE

CHRISTINE REDELMAN

WESLEY D. SCHROCK Deputy Attorney Generals

Anderson, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF THE )

TERMINATION OF THE PARENT- )

CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF: )

)

A.C. (MINOR CHILD) )

AND )

E.C. (MOTHER) AND R.C. (FATHER) )

) No. 48A02-1310-JT-875

Appellant-Respondent, )

)

 vs. )

)

THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF )

CHILD SERVICES, )

)

Appellee-Petitioner. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MADISON COUNTY

The Honorable G. George Pancol, Judge

Cause No. 48C02-1305-JT-16

May 28, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MATHIAS, Judge

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
2

E.C. (“Mother”) and R.C. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the 

involuntary termination of their parental rights to their child, A.C. Mother and Father 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s judgment. 

We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

Mother and Father are the biological parents of A.C., who was born on June 5, 

2010. On December 27, 2011, when A.C. was one and a half years old, the Department 

of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that Father was incarcerated1 and Mother, 

who was caring for A.C. alone, had recently suffered a nervous breakdown requiring 

hospitalization.2 The report also stated that Mother had attempted suicide by drinking 

household cleaning liquids in July 2011 and again in November 2011 and suffered from 

mental health problems and drug abuse. 

On December 28, 2011, DCS Family Case Manager Russell Beatty (“FCM 

Beatty”) visited Mother’s home. Mother admitted to FCM Beatty that she had attempted 

suicide twice that year and had suffered a nervous breakdown. Mother showed her 

prescription medication to FCM Beatty and told him that she had been diagnosed with 

PTSD, anxiety, ADHD, panic attacks, lumbar/back pain, and possibly bi-polar disorder. 

Mother also told FCM Beatty that Mother’s parental rights had been involuntarily 

 1

 Father was incarcerated on a probation violation for a diluted drug screen. Father’s probation was part 

of his sentence for a 2006 conviction for domestic violence committed against his ex-wife. 

2

 Mother and two of her older children were victims of a house fire on December 19, 2003. On 

December 18, 2011, police found Mother lying on the ground in the middle of a public street, screaming. 

Mother’s hospitalization was apparently prompted by the impending arrival of the anniversary of the 2003 

house fire, as well as Father’s recent incarceration. 
3

terminated with regard to her other four children.3 FCM Beatty observed A.C. to be 

“happy, healthy, and content.” Appellant Father’s App. p. 3. FCM Beatty also visited 

Father in jail. Father told FCM Beatty that he was concerned for the safety of A.C. in 

Mother’s care. 

Two days later, on December 30, 2011, DCS detained A.C. on an emergency basis 

and placed her with her paternal grandparents (“Grandparents”). On January 3, 2012, 

after the trial court’s authorization, DCS filed its affidavit of probable cause for A.C.’s 

detention and a verified petition alleging A.C. is a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”).

The petition alleged that Mother had twice attempted suicide in 2011, that Mother 

reported that she had suffered a nervous breakdown in December 2011, that Mother 

reported various mental and physical health problems, that Mother’s parental rights to

four other children had already been terminated, that Father was incarcerated on a 

probation violation, that Father was on probation due to his conviction for domestic 

violence against his ex-wife, and that Father was concerned for A.C.’s safety while she 

was in Mother’s care. The trial court held a detention hearing on January 4, 2012. 

Parents appeared at the hearing, were found to be indigent, and were appointed counsel. 

Parents admitted the allegations in the CHINS petition and A.C. was adjudicated a 

CHINS. 

 3

 Mother entered into a program of Informal Adjustment due to allegations of medical neglect and 

hygiene issues with four of her other children and her home in 2006. In December 2006, DCS detained 

the four children after Mother was arrested for Neglect of Dependents for Operating a Motor Vehicle 

while intoxicated and leaving the scene of an accident. The children were adjudicated as CHINS in 

December 2006. As ordered by the trial court, Mother completed a substance abuse program but relapsed. 

She neither completed a psychological evaluation nor secured suitable housing or stable employment and 

was arrested several times while the case was pending. She also failed to visit her children for more than 

a year. Her parental rights were terminated to those four children on May 29, 2009. 
4

On February 8, 2012, the trial court held a dispositional hearing. At the hearing, 

the court approved DCS’s permanency plan of reunification, removed A.C. from Parents’ 

care, and maintained A.C.’s placement with Grandparents. The court also ordered 

Parents to: (1) participate in counseling; (2) complete a drug and alcohol assessment and 

follow all of the recommendations of that assessment; (3) complete a psychological 

evaluation and follow the recommendations of that evaluation; (4) obtain and maintain a 

legal and regular source of income; (5) visit with A.C. regularly; (6) abstain from illegal 

drug use; (7) submit to random drug screens; and (8) obey the law. 

Pursuant to the court’s order, Mother received substance abuse treatment at Aspire 

Indiana (“Aspire”), a local mental health center, from April to August 2012. However, 

during and after her participation in the therapy program, she tested positive on four of 

ten random drug screens for medications for which she had no prescription, including 

oxycodone, oxymorphone, hydrocodone, and Xanax. Mother also participated in a 

cognitive-behavioral group therapy program at Aspire beginning in March 2012, but she 

missed most of her appointments and sometimes failed to take her prescribed medication. 

Her prognosis for this therapy program was guarded and poor. Eventually, she was 

discharged from Aspire due to her withdrawal from services.4 

Father completed substance abuse and mental health evaluations at Aspire. In 

August 2012, he also completed a substance abuse and mental health group therapy 

program at Aspire, although he regularly failed to test positive for his prescribed mental 

 4

 Both Mother and Father stopped participating in services at Aspire after DCS filed its petition to 

terminate parental rights. 
5

health medications and although, while he was in the program, he had a positive drug 

screen for unprescribed hydrocodone, temazepam, oxycodone, and oxymorphone and 

Xanax. In September 2012, after Father completed that group therapy program, he began 

participating in an anxiety and depression group therapy program. He was discharged 

unsuccessfully after he stopped attending in April 2013.

On July 11, 2012, the trial court held a review hearing. At the hearing, the court 

found that Parents had not “enhanced their ability to fulfill their parental obligations,” 

“participated in services consistently,” or “maintained contact with DCS.” DCS Exhibit 

13. Some six months later, on January 2, 2013, the trial court held a permanency hearing. 

At the hearing, the court approved DCS’s permanency plan, which was still, at this point, 

A.C.’s reunification with Parents.

During the six month period between July, 2012, and January, 2013, Parents were 

permitted supervised visits with A.C. at Grandparents’ home. However, Parents visited 

A.C. inconsistently. In November 2012, the supervised visits were moved to Aspire’s 

offices. Parents began visiting there with A.C. consistently but were at least twenty 

minutes late to nearly every visit. Beginning in the winter of 2012-2013, Parents were 

permitted to visit with A.C. in their own home, but those visits were often cut short when, 

usually without any apparent provocation, Mother would begin to act inappropriately and 

childishly in front of A.C., screaming, crying, throwing objects, and crawling under 

furniture. Approximately a month after the home visits began, FCM Weir discovered a 

“very thick furry mold” covering the walls in several rooms of Parents’ home. 

Thereafter, Parents’ visits with A.C. returned to Aspire offices, where Parents missed 
6

many of their scheduled visits. The visits ended in April 2013, after a visit supervisor 

determined that Mother’s agitation and outbursts during the visits upset and endangered

A.C. Parents were permitted to visit A.C. at Grandparents’ home, but Parents’ only visit 

with A.C. after the Aspire supervised visits ended was on A.C.’s birthday. 

On May 16, 2013, DCS filed a motion to modify the February 2012 dispositional 

order and, two weeks later, on May 31, 2013, filed a petition for involuntary termination 

of parental rights. After a June 26, 2013 hearing on DCS’s motion to modify the 

dispositional order, the trial court granted DCS’s motion, finding that, since entry of the 

dispositional decree, Parents have “continue[d] to have substance abuse problems,” had 

to end visits early due to Mother’s behavior, had stopped visiting A.C. altogether, and 

had “been very evasive with DCS,” moving several times and not reporting their change

of address to DCS. The order stated that reunification services would no longer be 

provided for Parents. 

On September 3, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on DCS’s petition to 

terminate parental rights. On the date of this hearing, both Mother and Father were 

unemployed with no stable source of income, were separated, and both were without a 

home of his or her own. Mother was living with her former landlord, and Father was 

living with his daughter and granddaughter. At the hearing, FCM Weir testified that 

Parents “never reached the point that it was safe [to visit with A.C.] unsupervised.” Tr. p. 

19. She stated that there were no overnight visits between A.C. and Parents because “it 

just wasn’t a safe situation . . . with [Mother’s] mental health issues and her behavior.” 

Id. She stated that A.C. is “doing very well” in Grandparents’ care. She testified that the 
7

circumstances which prompted A.C.’s removal from Parents’ home have not been 

alleviated “at all.” Id. at 20. She opined that continuation of the parental relationship 

was a threat to A.C.’s well-being because “she sees you know mom screaming and 

car[ry]ing on and then [A.C.] becomes upset and [A.C. has] made the statement in visits 

several times that mom’s sick and she [gets] upset when mommy gets like that.” Id. 

Court appointed special advocate Kelsey Antrim (“CASA Antrim”), was

appointed by the trial court on August 1, 2013, and after reviewing all of the court reports 

from A.C.’s CHINS case, testified that her recommendation was that parental rights be 

terminated. CASA Antrim stated, “I think it’s important for especially as young as she is 

to have that stability and permanency in her life.” Tr. p. 85. 

Following the hearing on DCS’s petition to terminate parental rights, the trial

court issued an order terminating Parents’ parental rights. The court’s findings of fact 

provided, in relevant part: 

10. Father received substance abuse group therapy at Aspire, but had 

positive drug screens after completion of his recommended therapy. 

11. Mother received substance abuse group therapy at Aspire, but had 

positive drug screens before and after completion of her recommended 

therapy. 

12. DCS administered ten (10) random drug screens to Father. He tested 

positive on five (5) of them for medications for which he had no valid 

prescription, including hydrocodone, temazepam, oxycodone, and 

oxymorphone. 

13. DCS administered ten (10) random drug screens to Mother. She tested 

positive on four (4) of them for medications for which she had no valid 

prescription, including oxycodone, oxymorphone, hydrocodone, and Xanax. 
8

14. Father made only moderate progress during his depression/anxiety

group therapy at Aspire. He attended roughly half of his scheduled 

meetings, and his prognosis was guarded. However, once DCS filed its 

petition to terminate parental rights, Father failed to return to Aspire and 

was discharged due to his withdrawal from services. 

15. Mother made no progress in her dialectical behavior group therapy at 

Aspire. She attempted to engage in the recommended therapy on three 

separate occasions, but was unsuccessful each time. She missed most 

appointments, was occasionally medication noncompliant, and her 

prognosis was guarded and poor. Eventually, Mother failed to return to 

Aspire and was discharged due to her withdrawal from services. 

16. On three occasions, a supervised visit had to be stopped due to 

Mother’s agitation and vocal outbursts upsetting the Child. Once DCS filed 

its petition to terminate parental rights, Mother failed to return to Aspire 

and she was discharged due to her withdrawal from services. 

17. On the date of final hearing, Parents were still able to have supervised 

visitation with Child in the pre-adoptive home, but Parents maintained only 

minimal contact with Child. 

18. On June 5, 2012, Mother plead[ed] guilty to public intoxication and was 

sentenced to 363 days probation. 

19. On August 6, 2013, Mother plead[ed] not guilty to operating while 

intoxicated, her license was suspended, and her case was set for trial. 

20. Mother’s parental rights were terminated to four (4) prior children in 

2009. 

21. Parents have never had an overnight visit or a trial home visit with 

Child due to a general lack of stability. 

22. On the date of final hearing, Parents were unemployed and had no 

stable source of income with which to support and maintain Child.

Appellant Father’s App. pp. 22-25.

The trial court made the following conclusions of law:

Based on the foregoing and pursuant to Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2), the 

Court determines that the child, [A.C.], has been removed from the care and 
9

custody of her Parents, [] for more than six (6) months under a dispositional 

decree. The Court also finds that there is a reasonable probability that the 

conditions that resulted in Child’s removal from Parents, and the reasons 

for placement outside the home, will not be remedied as Parents did not 

successfully complete the positional orders issued by this Court. At this 

time, Parents are not in a position to provide the care that Child requires. 

Child has been in relative care since December 30, 2011—more than 

twenty (20) months—and Parents are not any closer to having Child return 

to their care than when Child was first removed. As such, this Court finds 

that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the 

well-being of Child. Specifically, Parents have failed to demonstrate that 

they are ready, willing, and able to care for Child. The Indiana Department 

of Child Services has never been in a position to recommend that Child be 

reunified with Parents. Termination is in the best interest of Child. Finally, 

the Indiana Department of Child Services has a satisfactory plan for Child, 

which is adoption. 

Appellant Father’s App. p. 28. 

Mother and Father now appeal.5

Standard of Review

On appeal, Mother and Father both argue that DCS failed to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the conditions that resulted in A.C.’s removal would not be 

remedied, that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to A.C., or that 

termination of parental rights is in A.C.’s best interests. Father also challenges the trial

court’s findings of facts. 

We begin our review by acknowledging that when reviewing a termination of 

parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. 

In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider 

 5

 Mother and Father filed separate appellate briefs. We admonish Father’s appellate counsel that 

counsel’s deliberate ommission of certain facts important to our analysis fails to comply with Indiana 

Appellate Rule 46(A)(6)(b), which requires that appellate briefs provide a narrative and fair statement of 

the facts in a light most favorable to the judgment. 
10

only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. 

Moreover, in deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will 

set aside the court’s judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly 

erroneous. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

Here, in terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, the trial court entered 

specific factual findings and conclusions. When a trial court’s judgment contains specific 

findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. 

Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). 

First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we 

determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly 

erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by 

inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and 

inferences support the trial court’s decision, we must affirm. L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

Discussion and Decision

“The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is 

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In re M.B.,

666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, a trial court must 

subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the 

circumstances surrounding a termination. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child’s emotional and 

physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one’s own child 

should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, 
11

parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her 

parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur in Indiana, the 

State is required to allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted 

in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home 

of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a 

child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).

“The State’s burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases is one of ‘clear 

and convincing evidence.’” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting 

Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2). If the trial court finds that the allegations in a petition described 

in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. 

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a). 

Initially, we observe that Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) requires a trial 

court to find that only one of the three elements of subsection (b)(2)(B) has been 

established by clear and convincing evidence before properly terminating parental rights. 

See L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 209. Because we find them to be dispositive, we limit our review 

to Father’s challenge of the court’s findings of fact and to Parents’ allegations of error 

pertaining to subsections (b)(2)(B)(i) and (b)(2)(B)(ii) of Indiana’s termination statute, 
12

namely, whether DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable 

probability that (1) the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal will not be 

remedied and (2) the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the 

well-being of the child. 

I. Findings of Fact

Father challenges the trial court’s findings that Father’s progress in therapy is 

“moderate” and his prognosis is “guarded,” arguing (1) that Aspire employees who 

testified at the termination hearing stated that he completed his services and (2) that those 

witnesses did not use the words “moderate” or “guarded.” However, Father’s argument 

amounts to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See In re D.D., 

804 N.E.2d at 365. Father ignores the fact that the trial court also considered 

documentation submitted by Aspire which indicated that Father attended approximately

half of his scheduled depression and anxiety group therapy sessions and was ultimately 

discharged unsuccessfully from the program with a prognosis of guarded. Furthermore, 

the evidence shows that, once DCS filed its petition to terminate parental rights, Father 

abandoned the services altogether. Because the record contains facts that support the 

challenged findings, we conclude that Father has not shown that these findings are clearly 

erroneous. 

II. Conditions Remedied

Mother and Father argue that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that the 

conditions justifying A.C.’s removal are not likely to be remedied. When determining 

whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child’s removal
13

and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court must 

judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination 

hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 

509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. In so doing, the trial court may consider the 

parent’s response to the services offered through the Department of Child Services. Lang 

v. Starke County Office of Family and Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2007), trans. denied. Additionally, DCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of 

change; rather, it need establish “only that there is a reasonable probability that the 

parent’s behavior will not change.” In re Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2007).

Mother argues that her own behavior does not indicate that “she is unwilling to 

cooperate with [DCS]” and, therefore, the trial court improperly terminated her parental 

rights. Appellant Mother’s Br. at 13. She attempts to excuse her lack of compliance with 

the ordered reunification services by contending, “At the time of the termination hearing 

Mother did not complete all services due to the fact DCS had stopped paying for them 

and she did not have the money to pay herself to continue.” Id. She maintains that she 

“want[s] to get her life straightened out,” and emphasizes that she obtained counseling on 

her own after DCS stopped paying for the services and that she completed a substance 

abuse evaluation at Aspire. Id. at 15. Finally, she argues:

Mother was not given sufficient opportunity to heal from her trauma. She 

was held to the same standard for completion of services as people who had 

not been through what she had that deeply affected her. She was treated as 

if there were no serious issues she had survived and that she should respond 

as a typical person who had not been through what she had would. 
14

Id.

Father argues that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

conditions that resulted in A.C.’s removal would not be remedied because there was “no 

evidence at trial that Father had disobeyed the law,” he “completed his [substance abuse] 

group therapy,” he “never missed a visit” with A.C., he “followed the recommendations”

of the drug and alcohol assessment by Aspire; he completed a psychological evaluation, 

submitted to random drug screens, and because “there was never any testimony from any 

witness suggesting that Father used illegal drugs.” Appellant Father’s Br. at 12-13. 

Father admits that he has not obtained or maintained a regular source of income but 

argues that his “failure to comply with this one item is not enough upon which the Court 

could base its conclusion.” Id. at 14. 

The record demonstrates that neither Mother nor Father completed a psychoparenting evaluation and only participated in home-based therapy services for about a 

month. Both Mother and Father were unemployed, with no source of income or home of 

their own. After A.C. was removed from Parents’ home, Parents visited A.C. 

inconsistently, were often late, and eventually stopped visiting A.C. altogether. Both 

Mother and Father have criminal histories,

6 and Mother’s parental rights were terminated 

with regard to her four other children, even after she was offered services for three years. 

 6

 On June 5, 2012, Mother pleaded guilty to public intoxication. She was sentenced to 178 days, 

suspended to 363 days of probation. On August 13, 2013, Mother pleaded not guilty to Class A 

misdemeanor and Class C misdemeanor operating while intoxicated and Class A misdemeanor driving 

while suspended. Mother’s license was suspended and her case was scheduled to be tried in October 

2013. 
15

FCM Weir testified that Mother and Father have moved frequently in an attempt to evade 

DCS. FCM Weir also testified that Mother and Father never exercised any unsupervised 

visits with A.C. because they “never reached the point that it was safe [A.C.],” and that 

the reasons that prompted A.C.’s removal were “not at all” alleviated. Tr. pp. 19-20. 

The trial court made numerous and detailed findings indicating that both Mother 

and Father have a history of serious substance abuse and mental health problems. Both 

Parents failed to complete their behavior therapy programs. Even after receiving 

substance abuse counseling, Mother and Father tested positive for unprescribed 

medication and failed to test positive for prescribed mental health medication. Despite 

the extensive services offered to them since A.C. was removed, including substance 

abuse treatment, mental health treatment, counseling, and supervised visitation, Parents 

were not able to remedy the circumstances which led to A.C.’s removal, to the degree 

that even an unsupervised visit with A.C. would have been unsafe. Therefore, Parents 

failed to adequately demonstrate that the trial court erred in concluding that there is a 

reasonable probability that the conditions necessitating A.C.’s removal will be remedied. 

See In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming trial court’s 

determination that there was a reasonable likelihood that conditions which led to 

placement of children who had been removed from their mother’s home in foster care, 

rather than with their father, would not be remedied, so that termination of father’s 

parental relationship was warranted; father had not provided housing or support for his 

children, at time of termination hearing had not obtained facilities to house his children, 

had failed to appear for numerous hearings, had not sought any services, and had visited 
16

children only three times); see also Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 372 (“[A] pattern of 

unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing 

social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support[s] a finding that there 

exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change.”)

Although we recognize that Father and Mother did participate in some services, 

simply going through the motions of receiving services alone is not sufficient if the 

services do not result in the needed change, or only result in temporary change. “Where 

there are only temporary improvements and the pattern of conduct shows no overall 

progress, the court might reasonabl[y] find that under the circumstances, the problematic 

situation will not improve.” In re A.H., 832 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

Under these facts and circumstances, we conclude that DCS presented ample 

evidence to support the trial court’s determination that there is a reasonable probability 

the conditions resulting in A.C.’s removal from Father’s and Mother’s care will not be 

remedied. The parents’ arguments to the contrary amount to an invitation to reweigh the 

evidence, which we may not do. See Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 149 (stating that trial court is 

vested with responsibility of resolving conflicting testimony and an appellate court may 

not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility).

III. Threat to Child’s Well-Being

Termination of parental rights is proper where the child’s emotional and physical 

development is threatened. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. 

denied. The court need not wait until a child is harmed irreversibly such that her

physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired. Id.
17

A trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or her child at the time of 

the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re 

J.T., 742 N .E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. The trial court must also 

“evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future 

neglect or deprivation of the child.” Id. Pursuant to this rule, courts have properly 

considered evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history 

of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. 

A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2002), trans. denied.

Here, the record shows that Mother has a history of serious mental health issues 

and has repeatedly behaved inappropriately in front of A.C., causing A.C. to become

upset. The record also indicates that Mother and Father have failed to take initiative to 

address their mental health problems by taking their prescribed medications or 

completing mental health treatment programs. Furthermore, positive drug screens 

indicate that Mother and Father have failed to address their substance abuse problems, 

despite having received counseling. Both Mother and Father are unemployed, with no 

housing of their own. 

Parents’ arguments here amount to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which 

we will not do. Thus, based on the record, we are satisfied that the facts support the trial

court’s conclusion that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to 

A.C.’s well-being. 
18

IV. Best Interests of Child

Finally, both Mother and Father argue that the trial court’s conclusion that 

termination was in A.C.’s best interest was clearly erroneous. In determining whether 

termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to 

look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. In re 

J.C., 994 N.E.2d 2778 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “A parent’s historical inability to provide 

adequate housing, stability and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the 

same will support a finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the 

child’s best interests.” Castro v. State Office of Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. “Additionally, a child’s need for permanency is an 

important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of 

the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child’s best 

interests.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

We have already noted both Parents’ financial and housing instability, failure to 

successfully complete a majority of the court-ordered reunification services, and 

unresolved substance abuse and mental health issues. Furthermore, both FCM Weir and 

CASA Antrim testified that terminating the parent-child relationship would be in A.C.’s 

best interest. Based on the totality of the evidence, we conclude that there is sufficient 

evidence to support the trial court’s findings and ultimate determination that termination 

of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights is in A.C.’s best interests. See In re B.J., 879 

N.E.2d 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming trial court’s conclusion that termination of 

mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests; evidence showed that, at the 
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time of the termination hearing, mother had not completed court-ordered services, which 

included intensive outpatient program for her substance abuse problem and mental health 

treatment for her depression, and children were progressing well in their new home); see

also In re Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2004) (evidence supported conclusion that termination of mother’s parental rights 

was in child’s best interests; evidence demonstrated that mother had history of substance 

abuse and mental health problems; despite extensive services offered to mother, including 

substance abuse treatment, psychiatric evaluations, psychiatric care, medications, 

counseling, housing, and financial assistance, mother failed to adequately demonstrate a 

change in the conditions that necessitated child’s continued removal, and, during 

therapeutic visitations between child and mother, child’s counselor had concerns that 

mother placed child in an adult role and made inappropriate comments in front of child).

Conclusion

The specific findings set forth above clearly and convincingly support the trial 

court’s determination that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions leading to 

A.C.’s removal will not be remedied and that continuation of the parent-child relationship 

poses a threat to A.C.’s well-being. These conclusions, in turn, support the trial court’s 

ultimate decision to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to A.C. For all of 

these reasons, we find no error in the trial court’s termination of Mother’s and Father’s 

parental rights.

Affirmed.

FRIEDLANDER, J., and PYLE, J., concur.