2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

9-18-2012

William Staples v. Howard Hufford

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-1573

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Recommended Citation

"William Staples v. Howard Hufford" (2012). 2012 Decisions. Paper 428.

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BLD-267 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-1573

___________

WILLIAM STAPLES,

Appellant

v.

WARDEN H.L. HUFFORD, Warden at FCI-SCH

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 12-cv-00184)

District Judge: Honorable William J. Nealon

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action 

Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

August 23, 2012

Before: SCIRICA, SMITH AND CHAGARES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed September 18, 2012)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

William Staples appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 
2

U.S.C. § 2241. For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the 

District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

In May 2005, Staples pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Wisconsin to one count of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and one 

count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1); 924(g). At 

sentencing in October 2005, the District Court classified Staples as a career offender 

under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), based on four 

Wisconsin state court convictions. He was sentenced to 200 months of incarceration. 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Staples’ 

contention that three of his Wisconsin convictions had been discharged, and therefore 

should not have been used to enhance his sentence under the ACCA. United States v. 

Staples, No. 05-4037, 2007 WL 1140286, at *1 (7th Cir. 2007) (not precedential) (noting 

that “Staples presented no evidence that his rights were restored”). Next, Staples filed a 

motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, again alleging 

that he was improperly sentenced under the ACCA because Wisconsin, in discharging his 

convictions, had restored his right to possess firearms. The District Court denied the

§ 2255 motion and Staples did not appeal. Thereafter, Staples filed numerous § 2255 

motions in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, all of which were dismissed for lack of 

jurisdiction because Staples did not have the required authorization to file a second or 
3

successive § 2255 motion. When Staples requested such authorization from the Seventh 

Circuit, it was denied. 

Staples filed the instant § 2241 petition in January 2012. The District Court 

dismissed the petition, holding that Staples failed to demonstrate that a motion under 

§ 2255 would be an inadequate or ineffective remedy. Staples filed a timely notice of 

appeal. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review 

over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its 

findings of fact. See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).

A motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court is the presumptive 

means for a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence. See

Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). A petitioner can seek relief 

under § 2241 only if the remedy provided by § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test 

the legality of his detention. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249-51 (3d Cir. 1997). A 

§ 2255 motion is not “inadequate or ineffective” merely because the petitioner cannot 

meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of § 2255, Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120, or 

because the sentencing court does not grant relief, Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 

290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Rather, the “safety valve” provided under 

§ 2255 is extremely narrow and has been held to apply in unusual situations, such as 

those in which a prisoner has had no prior opportunity to challenge his conviction for a 
4

crime later deemed to be non-criminal by an intervening change in law. Okereke, 307 

F.3d at 120 (citing In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251). For example, in Dorsainvil, we 

allowed the petitioner to proceed under § 2241 because an intervening change in the law 

decriminalized conduct for which he had been convicted, and he had no earlier 

opportunity to challenge that conviction. Dorsainvil, 119 F. 3d at 251.

Staples claims that he was improperly classified as a career offender under the 

ACCA because three of his predicate Wisconsin convictions had been “discharged” and 

his right to possess firearms had been restored. In support of this allegation, Staples 

relies on United States v. Vitrano, 405 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 2005). In that case, the Seventh 

Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defendant challenging an ACCA sentencing 

enhancement must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his right to ship, 

transport, possess, or receive firearms specifically has been reinstated. Id. at 510 (stating 

that an ACCA sentence enhancement is not permitted where a state “creates . . . a false 

sense of security” by “employ[ing] language in discharging a prisoner that will lull the 

individual into the misapprehension that civil rights have been restored to the degree that 

will permit him to possess firearms.”). We conclude, however, that Staples’ challenge to 

his sentence under Vitrano is not the rare situation rendering § 2255 inadequate or 

ineffective. Importantly, we note that Vitrano, which was issued several months before 

Staples was sentenced, cannot represent a change in law made after his § 2255 motion 

was adjudicated. Thus, we conclude that the exception identified in Dorsainvil is 
5

inapplicable here, and Staples may not evade the gatekeeping requirements of § 2255 by 

seeking relief under § 2241.1

Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 

affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 

 

1

To the extent that Staples argues that he is innocent of the underlying § 922(g) firearms 

offense, we similarly conclude that the narrow “safety valve” provided under § 2255 does 

not apply. In addition, we conclude that none of the other arguments raised in Staples’ 

§ 2241 petition entitle him to relief.