REF ID:A522694 

TOP SEeRET 

.... APR 2 01951 

lml»Wnlll FOR UlUADD2' .10D I. Tit9IAJf 

8*Jeftt etatt StMlQ • .. i.o·-· of l'l'Wh cc 9 m1"'1ona 

1. 'I.'M:re 1a fOl"'ftr&!Ml tor -pur tntozation a st.8N' atady 

prepered. 'b;y APSA ror -. in the :-ozitbcoadn.g U9-t1I: corit~e • 

hlpro1'•1nt or 1"J'fJaeb C« - U\t.eati=e. 

2. bl a~ rtK:'!iYM ~ '.JUSJ.0 tbe V.lr~, QC~"' 

re.-tftd. tarat v.s. view co;ncern1ng it.. on tlMt ~ be 

tm•"'*4 to arrtw Mt Lo.ter taau 22 April. t 'bellcmt tM .wr 

awq will provi4e tM W<>naat10!'1 ho a.irft. la viev of the 

•latJrt tiu avdldlo, 1 t ~ lM ~ated tr 10U wW.4 fDrVU"d 

the .wt •1fu4J' to the nu.tctcr, (JCS(, •1 SXliA'.l'n'~ ar ROCn.:x. 

l lael 

Skit 8~ on tM ?lipO'HM"t 

ot ,...... cm -1..u-., UtM 

20 Aaril 19'1. ( 3 eoti•) 

APPEfWtD oo:· :;<- -

MATERl!!,L 

TOP SECRET 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 06-03-2014 pursuantto E_Q_ 1352a 
DRAFT 

. STAFF STUDY OJt..t THE Il!.PROVF.HENT OF 

FRENCH C0?'1.ruracATimrs 

THE PROBLEM 

1. In preparation for a US-UK conference on the subject, to examine 

present French cryptographic systems and procedures, and to formulate a 

U.S. plan for improvement of the security thereof. 

FACTS BEARING ON THE ffiOBLEM AND DISCUSSION 

2. See Enclosure "B." 

CONCLUSIONS 

3. It is concluded that: 

~. The present French cryptographic organizations do not possess 

the neceesar,r cryptanalytic appreciation to insure provision of systems 

at£ording adequate cryptographic security, or, if they do possess the 

requisite knowledge, the information is not being applied or properly 

employed • 

.!:.• 'Ibis situation can be corrected only by a complete overhau1 

of the French cryptographic systems and practices. The present insecure 

French cryptographic systems an:! practices should be replaced by secure 

systems and practices, and a specific plan for such replacement should be 

EO \.3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

/ 

established. PL $6-36/50 USC 3605 

d. Positi~ measures to effect such a plan should be introduced - even to the extent or providing, at least in part, the cryptographic 

devices and associated techniques essential to security • 

.!• This will materially reduce the amount of intelligence now 

available to Ruseia from COl'INT sourcee probabl.¥ exploitable by them; it 

,_______ ___ ________,] 
EO 3 , 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL s .. 6'"'.36/ 50 use 3605 

!• Negotiations with the French should be conducted in such a. 

manner that there isl1...----------------------

.!• Ae a preliminary to entering upon any negotiations with the 

French there should be reasonable assurance that the effects of improving 

their communication security will not be nullified or diminished by' 

phy'Sical and persomiel insecurity in the French Government. It is obvious 

that without such assuranceJ 

/1...----------------------------J/without any 

canpensating gains in security. 

!!,. The bases for a 8'Uccesstul approach to the French Government 

cannot yet be indicated and should be established in the discussions at 

the u.s.-u.K. Conference soon to convene in '!':'ashington. 

-2~ 

TOP SECRET ACORN 
ENCLOSURE "A" 

PIAN FOR D;IT'ROVI\\U THE CRYPTOGRl\PHIC SECURITY 

OF FRENCH COitWJMICATIONS 

A. DIPLOMATIC: 

1. The proposal presented herein for ensuring the security of French 

Diplomatic communications considers that the various French diplomatic posts 

ehould be subdivided into three categories: 

.!:• Category I: A small group of locations t-i·ich handle the most 

critical information, such as Paris, London, am Washington. 

E• Cateeory II: All capitals not included in .!:· plus a selected 

group of important cities t'Those communications freouently include information of considerable intelligence value. 

,g,. Category III: All other diplomatic posts. 

2o The systems recommended, respectively, for the three cateeories 

listed above are: 

!.• For Category I: The Combined Cipher !~chine with Simplex 

settings. 'lhe word Simplex is used to mean s. procedure whereby each message 

has its mm rotor arrane;ement and alignment provided by means of a special 

key list. The liste are prepared for point-to-.point use so that each station 

can read only those messages specifically ad.dressed to it. For the exceptional cases of multiple-address messages, a multiple holder key list is 

provided. A one-time pad system should be provided a.s an emergency stand-by 

in this category. 

_2. For Category II: The r~209 v:ith s:pecial settings used to 

encipher messages set up in a literal code.· The code book used should be 

a new book specially designed for this sole purpose. Each holder in this 

ca.tee.;ory should be provided ltlth three dis~inct systems; one for use solelytdth Paris, one for use laterally on a limited regional basis, and one for 

use laterally on a VTorld rlde basis • 

.!!.• For Category III: Present French systema would continue to be 

used. 

,3. The stations in each catep,ory v:ill be included as holders in the 

catep,ories below them. 

!OP S'SGF.E'f ASORN 

TOP - .,. '=t .. SECRET 

F.ncl.osure "A" 

ACORN 
4. The localization introduced by Simplex procedures in Category I 

and by special or area sett:ngs in Category II has a double advantagee I 

First, it increases the cryptose¢urity generally; and secondly, if there 

should be an ins)t.a.nce of penetra~on by the Russians which grants access 

to cryptographic infomation, the dangers resultinr. from such penetration 

are confined to the single cryptonet involved.. This results in minimizing 

the consequent loss or information. 

5e The merit of these propose.ls is the provision of a fairly high 

degree of security for French Diplomatic and highest-level NATO conmunications, together with a minimum disclosure to the French of systems am 

ideas with which they are not already familiar. For the transmission of 

international Diplanatic or highest-level JJilita.ry traffic dealing with 

r.restem Union and NATO affairs, they have been provided with TYPF.X 

machines and they are presently using a Simplex procedure with these 

ma.chines in the highest echelons of NATO; the Combined Cipher ihchine is 

also being offered to them, as well as to other NATO signatories, for NATO 

communications; French Ann;r, Navy, and Air Force personnel are familiar 

with and have some copies of the M-209, so that they have experience in 

the preparation of M-209 settings and can instruct French diplomatic 

officials in the use of the lf-209. Adequate training in the new systems 

will therefore be greatl.y simplified as a result of the already-existing 

familiarity with them. 

6. The establishment of appropriate communications security procedures 

will be facilitated by the issue of JANAP l22(B) (the U~S. Joint Manual on 

Communications Security), which is presently under consideration for use in 

connection with NATO cryptographic systemee 

B. ARMED SERVICES: 

7. Authorities concerned \'dth NATO conmunications have already 

established two categories of such conmunications: 

§• category 1 (High-level): This category embraces the top-level 

military representatives of each nation of NATO, For this level, the British 

TYPEX ma.chine, wi.th Simplex settinge is being used. Consideration is being 

given to adapting that ma.chine to ill. NA'?O CCU system. 

!9P SEa!.i'f A90RN - t,. - Enclosure "A• 

TOP SECRET 2" .. CORN 
E_. Category II (Intermediate-level): This category embraces 

military headquarters down to and inclttding Division headquarters or equivalent. For the level the U.S. and the U.K. have proposed the CCM, and the 

proposal is now under consideration by the other NATO rovernments. 

8. There remains for consideration purely French national military 

(Army, Navy, Air Force) communications of a level below that of 7,2 above. 

For this level, which would constitute Category III, the use of M-209, to 

eneipher plain language {not code groups as in the case of Category II or 

the plan for the Diplomatic canmunications provided for in paragraph 2£ 

above) m>uld probably' be acceptable to the U.S. 

~p SPBRF.i'i' A60RN - 5 - Enclosure "A" 

TOP SECRET l~s:CORN 
\. 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL S6-36/50 USC 3605 

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLErT AND DISCUSSION 

2. In regard to the current French Diplomatic communications, observed 

French practices in cryptographic system design and distribution provide 

direct evidence that the present cryptographic orea.nization in the French 

Diplomatic Service does not possess the necessary cryptanalytic appreciation 

to insure provision of systems affording adequate cryptographic security, ar, 

if it does possess the requisite knowledge. the information is not being 

applied or properly employed, either in the Foreign 1~inistry or in Diplomatic 

posts. F.xcept as regards certain systems, which may be one-time pad, none 

of the French Diplomatic cryptographic systems nossesses sufficient inherent 

security to permit its improvement to a. point where it might be considered 

acceptable. It would therefore be necessary to discard the current systems 

.-· .. 
. 

and replace them with other systems based on sounder cryptographic princi.ples. 

It would also ~e necessary to provide technically sound associated procedures 

EO \~. 3 ( h) ( 2) 

and training i.J:1 the proper use or the systems <lild procedures. PL e6-36/5o use 3605 

4. Although a tradition or sound communication security doctrine did 

exist in France, the current cryptographic practices observed in French 

Diplomatic traffic indicate that the French have fallen far behind the u.s. 

and the U.K. in matters pertaining to cor.mrunication security. The situation 

is less serious in the Army, but there too there is much room for improvement. 

'Iherefore, technical assistance from outside the French cryptographic 

services is deemed essential for the success of an,y canmunication security 

program. 

5. From an over-all consideration it may be stated that if the security 

of French Diplomatic am r.~ilitary communications is to be improved it would 

be necessary to: 

TOP 

- •.J . -

SECRET 

Enclosure "B" 

ACORN 
iii ' I • 

.!· Replace the eurrent French cryptographic systems vd.th secure 

systems for use in all im~ortant diplomatic posts and in the headquarters of 

all hieh-echelon military units. 

£. F.stablish technically sound communications security procedures. 

,g,. Insure adequate training in the use of the new systems and 

procedures. 

g. Insure careful technical supervision over French communications 

to maintain communication security. 

6. In view of the foregoing, it is apparent that a complete overhaul 

of the French Diplomatic and J!.ilitary cryptographic systems and practices 

would be necessary. This v10'.1ld involve not only informing the French that 

their present systems are insecure but also est.ablishinr; a basis on which 

the French would be provided with appropriate technical assistance to enable 

them to reorganize their cryptographic systems and practices to insure 

secure cor.imunications. 

7. It is obvious that in ai::sisting the French in improving the security 

of their cryptographic communications 

L-~~~~~~~~~~~~__. 

H01vever, (a) the necessity 

for removing those handicaps to proper diplomatic discussions and negotiations between the U.S. and the French Governments which arise frompresent 

insecurity o:f French 1Jiplama.tic communications, and (b} the irnpartance of 

denying to Russia this source of COl'.INT, make it in the interest of the n.s. 

and the U.K. and 

also to provide, at least in part, the cryptograpl~ic deyiees and associated. 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

techniques essential to security. PL 86-36/50 use 3605 
I 

.... 

• 

I 

9. The possibility of Russian penetration of some or all of the French 

services, both diplomatic and military, cannot be ignored. Penetration may 

"8 wi&'il:c1 cs npl2 t:a u p8!1"9ie:i, ettt& JI&'!! extend into ~ the sources of 

(\) ~ (_CJ)J~. . ~...,__ - in. formation or AHll;,a. t~e cryptor,raphic servicesJ G41111:p;L.e\e .Eenetration of ~ ... / ~ ~ 

~ .*4 \)"Lo ... 9 O'f' " ~ . a.i;t.hy typ,-would . rrt' plan for improving crypto-

.· ~ .... p~~~ ~ ¢.,~ ~ l"llft~em1H-ett'IT:i :np; infonnation to .the Russians. Th.erefore, befdre \) 

" 

any steps are taken, there should be reasonable assurance of adequate 

physical and personnel security in the French Foreign orfice, the French 

Armed Services, and the offices which control the cryptologic servicee. In 

addition to this, it is important that any plan proposed should pro"'1.de the 

.r.ia.x:Unum possible protection against the effects of partial penetration of 

either type • EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

10. Properl.7-constructed one-time pad systems would provide the 

necessary security but it does not appear feasible to recommend such a solution even for the French Diplomatic communications alone. 'Ihe cumbersome 

operational characteristics of such systems and the labor required to prepare 

and distribute the pads in the required. quantity would probably make a 

proposal of this kind unacceptable to the French. Likelri.se, the provision 

of modern secure rnn.chine systems in the quantity required for use in the 

Foreien i~inistry and in all important diplomatic posts would probably be 

beyond the financial capacity of the F'rench Government at this time. Nor can 

the United states undertake the supplying or materials or equipment on the 

req'..lired scale. 

11. The AFSA plan proposed in F.nclosure "A" is a reasonable and 

economical proeram for providine adequate cryptoeraphic security for the 

various levels of French Oiplanatic and l"ilita.ry con-.munications. The plan 

will, if' properly executed, effectively prevent the production of a significant amount or collllllUnication intelligence therefran. The plan is divided 

'1'9P SBSRE':P .~S€11Ul F.nclosure "B" 

TOP SECRET i\:CORN 
' 'IC· ,, • 

into two parts: A- For ryiplomatic communications, and B- For the communications of the Armed Services. Part P. has been coordinated with the plan now 

under study by authorities concerned l'li.th NATO communications. The latter, 

horever, have thus far concerned themsel'V'es only ''1. th communications of tvro 

levels directly connected with NATO matt-er~; they have not concerned themselves \'Tith purely national carummications having at present no bearing on 

J\~ATO matters. The purely riatior.al cor.imunications may be regar-1ed as constituting a third level of communications. which in the case of France would 

also require increased security protection in war time, and which are therefore also provided for in the present AFSA plan. 

12. The bases for, and th.e steps to be taken in approa.chine the French 

GoverrJnent, with a view tov!ard improving the security of French cor.inunications, will constitute one of the important matters to be discussed at the 

forthcominp; U.S.-U.K. conference in r.•ashinp,ton. 

TOP S:Beffi3'f AGOPPr -10 - F.nclos"Ure 11B1t 

TOP SECRET ACORN 
! 

DRAFT 

-- STAFF STUDY 01\r THE DLPROVBMEJl..111 OF 

FRENCH C0?'11llrICATIQl.!S 

THE PROBLEM 

1. In preparation for a US-UK conference on the subject, to examine 

present French cryptographic systema and procedures·' and to foTmulate a 

U.S. plan for improvement of the security thereof. 

FACTS BEARING ON THE FROBLEM AND DISCUSSION 

2. See Enclosure "B." 

CONCLUSIONS 

3. It is concluded that: 

,2. The present "French cryptographic organizations do not possesQc 

the necessary- cryptanalytic appreciation to insure provision of systems 

affording adequate cr._vptographic security, or, if they do possess the 

requisite knowledge, the information is not being applied or properly 

employed. 

~· This situation can be corrected only by a complete overhaul 

of the French cryptographic systems and practices. The present insecure 

French cryptographic systems and practices should be replaced by secure 

systems and practices, and a specific plan for such replacement should be 

EO \3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

// 

established. PL ~6-36/50 USC 3605 

Positi~e measures to effect such a plan should be introduced 

even to the extent of providing, at least in part, the cryptographic 

devices and associated techniques essential to security. 

e. This will materially reduce the amount of intelligence nO'i'1 - . 

available to Russia fr0111 COJ'INT sources probabq exploitable by them; it 

-1-

'I'OP SECRET :tl1CORN 

• 
TOP S~~\~~691 C~RN 

!· Negotiations with the French should be conducted in sucb a 

marmer that there ii .... ________________________ _. 

.S• As a preliminary to entering upon any negotiations With the 

French there should be reasonable assurance that the effects of improving 

their communication security will not be nullified or diminished by 

physical and personnel insecurity in the French Goverr.ment. It ts obvious 

that w.i. thout such assurance J 'L-----------------------' 'Without any compensating gains in security. 

,h. The bases for a successful approach to the French Government 

cannot yet be indicated and should be established in the discussions at 

the U.S.-U.K. Conference soon to convene in ~ashington • 

• 

-2~ 

TOP SECRET 1A1CORN 
\ 

\ 

,,, 

i,i 

TOP sw:F:ttt>,,.~ 69' C~RN 

ENCLOSURE n A tt 

PIAN FOR. U~PROVING THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC SF.CURITY 

OF FRENCH C0111-~1JNICATIONS 

A. DIPLOUATIC: 

1. The proposal presented herein for ensuring the security of French 

Diplomatic communications considers that the various French· diplomatic posts 

should be subdivided into three categories: 

!• Category I: A small group of locations vt:·ich handle the most 

critical information, such as Paris, London, am Washington • 

.2_. Category II: All capitals not included in !.• plus a selected 

group of iJnportant cities whosa communications freouently include information of considerable intelligence value. 

s_. Category III: All other diplomatic posts. 

2. 'lbe systems recommended, respectively, for the three cateeories 

listed above are: 

!.• For Category I: 'lbe Combined Cipher iachine with Simplex 

settings. '!he word Simplex is used to mean a procedure whereby each message 

has its 0\"1?1 rotor arrane;e.ment and alignment provided by means of a special 

key list. The lists are prepared for point-to-point use so that each station 

can read only those messages specifically addressed to it. For the exceptional cases of multiple-address messages, a multiple holder key list is 

provided. A one-time pad system should be provided as an emergency stand-by 

in this category. 

_!?. For Category II: The 1f-209 r:ith special settings used to 

encipher messages set up in a literal code; The code book used should be 

a new book speciall.y designed for this sole purpose. Each holder in this 

catep,ory should be provided l'dth three dis~inct systems; one tor use solely 

Ydth Paris, one for use laterally on a limited regional basis, and one for 

use laterally on a world l'!ide basis. 

~· For Category III: P"~esent French systems would continue to be 

used. 

3. The stations in each catep,ory v:i.11 be included as holders in the 

cater,ories below them.. 

TOP SFJeP.Fj'f ACOJU.l - ;.!. - Fnclosure 11A11 

TOP SECRET :t'1CORN 

• 
' -

4. 

and by special or area settings in Category II has a double advantage. I 

First, it increases the cryptosefurity generally; and secondly, if there 

should be an ins~ance of penetra~on by the Pussians.which grants access 

to cryptographic inforr.ation, the dangers resultinp from such penetration 

are confined to the single cryptonet involved. This results in minimizing 

the consequent loss of iri.f'ormation. 

5. The merit of these proposals is the provision of a fairly high 

degree of security for French Diplomatic and highest-level NATO communications, together with a minimum disclosure to the French of systems and 

ideas with 'Which they are not already familiar. For the transmission of 

international Diplanatic or highest-level Pilitary traffic dealing with 

l'.Testern Union and NATO affairs, they have been provided with TYPF.X 

machines and they are presently using a Simplex procedure with thes~ 

machines in the highest echelons of NATO; the Combined. Cipher 1!achine is 

also being offered to them., as vrell as to other NATO signatories, for NATO 

communications; French Arm:r, Navy, and Air Force personnel are familiar 

with and have some copies of the M-209, so that they have experience in 

the preparation of 11.-209 settings and can instruct French diplomatic 

officials in the use of the 11'-209. Adequate training in the new systems 

will therefore be p:reatly simplified as a result of the already-existing 

familiarity with them. 

6. The establishment of appropriate communications security procedures 

will be facilitated by the issue of JANAP 122(B) (the u.s. Joint Manual on 

Communications Security), which is presently under consideration for use in 

connection \'Tith NATO cryptographic systemeo 

B. AR.MED SERVICES: 

7. Authorities concerned with r~ATO co.rmnunications have already 

established two categories of such communications: 

a. Category I (High-level): This category embraces the top-level - military representatives of each nation of NATO. For this level, the British 

TYPEX machine, with Simplex settings is being used. Consideration is being 

/\i ~ )..V.;, ,, given to adapting that machine to II! NA'rtJ ~CU system. 

~ ~ ACOIUT - 4. - Enclosure n A11 

TOP SECRET i"~CORN 
' ·,. 

~. Category II (Intermediate-level): This category embraces 

military headquarters down to and including Division headquarters er equivalent. For~ level the u.s. and the u. K. have proposed the CCM, and the 

proposal is now under consideration by the other NATO p:overnments. 

S. There remains for consideration purely French national military ~ ~ib~-r-·-~ 

(Army, Navy, Air Force) communications of,.,• level/\'&e1ow, btmti a# 9,! ekio:vro 

For this level, which would constitute Category III, the use of 1~209, to 

encipher plain language (not code groups as in the case of Category II of 

the plan for the Diplomatic communications provided for in paragraph 2,2 

above) lYOuld probabJ.7 be acceptable to the U.S. 

'9P SBSRi!l' f.COmT - 5 - Enclosure "A" 

TOP SECRET ~1CORN 
' ' \ 

I. 

\ 

, .... 

· EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL S6-36/50 USC 3605 

"FACTS BEARil\~ ON THE PROBLEH ANlJ DISCUSSION 

2. In regard to the current French Diplomatic communications, observed 

French practices in cryptographic system design and distribution provide 

direct evidence that the present cryptographic organization in the French 

Diploma.tic Service does not possess the necessary cryptanalytic appreciation 

to insure provision of systems affording adequate cryptographic security, or, 

if it does possess the requisite knowledge, the information is not being 

applied or properly employed, either in the Foreign 1·'inistry or in Diploma.tic 

po eta. F.xcept as regards certain systems, ·which JDD.y be one-time pad, none 

of the French Diplomatic cryptographic systems POSsesses sufficient inherent 

security to permit its improvement to a point where it might be considered 

acceptable. It would therefore be necessary to discard the current systems 

TOP SECmi:T .t.GORJJ 

TOP 

-6-

SECRET 

Enclorure "B" 

i\CORN 
and replace them with other systems based on sounder cryptographic principles. 

It \"IOuld also be necessary to provide technically sound associated procedures 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

and training in the proper use of the systems and procedures. PL\.86-36/50 use 3605 

4. Although a tradition of sound conununication security doctrine did 

exist in France, the current cryptographic practices observed in French 

Diplomatic traffic i~dicate that the French have fallen far behind the U.S. 

and the U.K. in matters pertaining to co.r.ununication security. The situation 

is less serious in the Amur, but there too there is much room for improvement. 

'Iherefore, technical assistance from outside the French cryptographic 

services is deemed essential for the success of an.y canmunication security 

5. From an over-all consideration it may be stated that if the security 

of French Diplom,a.tic and rilita.ry communications is to be improved it would 

be necesSa.ry to: 

- 'w,J .. - Enclosure "'B" 

TOP SECRET ACORN 
a. Replace the current French cryptographic systems with secure 

systems for use in all :important diplomatic posts and in the headquarters of 

a.11 hir,h-echelon military units. 

E· F.stablish technically sound communications security procedures. 

~· Insure adequate training in the use of the new systems and 

procedures. 

g. Insure careful technical supervision over French communications 

to maintain communication security. 

6. In view of the foregoing, it is apparent that a complete overhaul 

of the French Diplomatic and J!.ili tary cryptographic systems and practices 

would be necessary• This WO'.tld involve not only informing the French that 

their present systems are insecure but also establishinr, a basis on which 

the French would be provided with appropriate technical assistance to enable 

them to reorganize their cryptographic s;rstems and practices to insure 

secure cor.ununications. 

7. It is obvious that in assisting the French in improving the security 

of their cryptographic communications 

Hm'lever, (a) the necesQity L-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--' 

f or removing those handicaps to proper diplomatic discussions and negotiations between the U.S. and the French Governments which arise from present 

insecurity- of French 1Jiplomatic communications, and (b) the importance of 

denying to Russia this source of CO?:~Il!T, make 1 t in the interest of the U .s. 

and the U. K. to accept a complete loss of CO~~n T from French sources and 

also to provide, at least in part, the cryptographic devices/and associated 

EO 3.3(h) (2) 

techniques essential to security. PL .86-36/50 use 3605 

TOP SECRET ACORN - a - Enclosure "D" 

TOP SECRET ACORN 
3605 

9. The possibility of Russian penetration of some or all of the\ French 

services, both diplomatic and military, cannot be ignored. Penetration may 

be either complete or partial, and may extend into either the sources 0£ 

information or into the cryptor,raphic services. Complete penetration of 

either type would make totally ineffective any plan for improving cryptoeraphic securit • 

vrithout denying information to the Russians. 'Iflerefore, before 

L-----' 

any steps are taken, there should be reasonable assurance of adequate 

physical and personnel security in the French Foreign orfice, the French 

Armed Services, and the offices which control the cryptologic services. In 

addition to this, it is important that any plan proposed. should provide the 

.r.w.x:l.mum possible protection against the effects of partial penetration of 

either type. 

10. Properly--constructed one-time pad systems would provide the 

necessary security but it does not appear feasible to recommend such a solution even for the French Diplomatic communication3 alone. '!he cumbersome 

operational characteristics of such systems and the labor required to prepare 

and distribute the pads in the required quantity V!ould probably make a 

proposal of this kind unacceptable to the French. Likewise, the provision 

of modern secure machine systems in the quantity required for use in the 

Foreign i1nistry and in all important diplomatic posts would probably be 

beyond the financial capacity of the 'Ji'rench Government at this time. Nor can 

the United states undertake the supplying of materials or equipment on the 

req11ired scale. 

11. '!he AFSA plan proposed in F.nclosure "A" is a reasonable and 

economical proeram. for providing adequate cryptoeraphic security for the 

various levels of French Diplana.tic and Yilitary co.rr.municationa. The plan 

will, if properly executed, effectively prevent the production or a significant amount of communication intelligence therefrom. The plan is divided 

'f6P ffi!l0REl'f A60R:H F.nclosure "B" 

TOP SECRET t'1CORN 
into two parts: A- For Diplomatic communications, and B- For the communications of the Armed Services. Part B has been coordinated ~Tith the plan now 

um.er study by authorities concerned ·with NATO conununications. The latter, 

ho, .. ever, have thus far concerned themselves only rlth communications ot two 

levels directly connected with NATO matt-er~; they have not concerned themselves with purely national cOMmunications ha~ing at present no bearing on 

NATO matters. The purely national COJ11l1lunications may be regar .. 1ed as constituting a third level or conununications, which in the case of France would 

also require increased security protection in war time, and 'i'lhich are therefore also provided for in the present AFSA plan. 

12. The bases for, and the steps to be taken in approachine the French 

Government, with a view tm.rard improving the security of French cor.u:iunications, will constitute one of the important matters to be .discussed at the 

fortheominp; U.S.-U.K. conference in l''ashinp,ton. 

'J.'OP SEBRE'f' ACO~N -10 - F.ncloaure "B" 

TOP SECRET 2A1CORN