RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3931-17T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v. 

W.L., 

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________

Submitted September 16, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Messano and Vernoia.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 08-05-

0808.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (John Vincent Molitor, Designated Counsel, 

on the brief).

Andrew C. Carey, Middlesex County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Patrick F. Galdieri, II, 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 7, 2019
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Defendant W.L.1appeals from an order denying his post-conviction relief 

(PCR) petition challenging his 2010 convictions following a jury trial for firstdegree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a), second-degree sexual 

assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b), and second-degree endangering the welfare of a 

child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). Based on our review of the record, we are convinced 

the PCR court correctly found defendant's petition is time-barred under Rule

3:22-12(a)(1), defendant failed to establish either excusable neglect or that 

enforcement of the time-bar will result in a fundamental injustice, R. 3:22-

12(a)(1)(A), and defendant failed to present a prima facie case of ineffective 

assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and 

State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987). We therefore affirm. 

I.

We set forth facts supporting defendant's convictions in our decision on 

his direct appeal, State v. W.L., No. A-4938-09 (App. Div. Mar. 15, 2013) (slip 

op. at 3-11), and briefly summarize the pertinent facts here. In January 2008, 

defendant resided with his wife, Miranda; their twenty-month-old daughter;

Miranda's eight-year-old daughter Sarah; and Miranda's grandmother Marjorie.

 

1

 We employ initials and pseudonyms to protect the victim's privacy. 
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On January 4, 2008, Sarah played with two other children in the family's 

living room. Marjorie entered the room and was told by the other children "that 

defendant took Sarah upstairs because '[h]e wanted to show her something.'" Id.

at 4. Marjorie went upstairs, saw the door to defendant's and Miranda's bedroom 

door was closed, and "saw no light coming from beneath the closed door." Ibid. 

Marjorie opened the door, turned the light on and saw defendant "roll[] off his 

bed onto the floor." Ibid. "Sarah was on the bed under the covers." Ibid. 

Defendant said he was "looking for directions to assemble a telescope." Ibid. 

Marjorie took Sarah downstairs. Ibid.

That evening Sarah told Marjorie "defendant was going to put something 

in [her] mouth" and he "touch[ed] [her] down there." Ibid. Sarah said she was 

"afraid" to report what occurred and "defendant told her that it was their secret." 

Id. at 5. The following day, Miranda and Marjorie reported the incident to their 

priest, who later reported it to the police. Ibid.

On January 11, 2008, a Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office detective

interviewed Sarah. Ibid. A video recording of the interview was played for the 

jury at trial. Ibid. Sarah testified at trial and detailed four separate incidents 

during which she was sexually molested and assaulted by defendant. Id. at 6-7. 
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David Rottman testified that during time he spent with defendant in jail,

defendant said that "on two occasions . . . 'he stuck his thing in [Sarah's] mouth.'" 

Id. at 6. Rottman also testified that defendant said the "'grandmother . . . found 

out[,]' when '[s]he walked in when [he and Sarah] were in the room.'" Ibid.

Defendant testified at trial, denied Sarah's allegations, and explained that 

on January 4, 2008, he brought Sarah upstairs to show her a telescope as a 

surprise and told her to "'close her eyes and open her mouth[,]' intending to give 

her a candy truffle." Id. at 8. He also explained he shut off the light in the 

bedroom because his eyes did not "focus in the light the same as in the dark." 

Ibid.

The jury convicted defendant of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, 

second-degree sexual assault, and second-degree endangering the welfare of a 

child. On February 19, 2010, the court sentenced defendant and entered a 

judgment of conviction. On defendant's direct appeal, we affirmed his 

convictions and remanded for resentencing. Id. at 30. The Supreme Court 

denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. W.L., 216 N.J. 8 (2013). 

The trial court resentenced defendant and entered an amended judgment of 

conviction on July 3, 2013. 
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On June 27, 2017, more than seven years after entry of the original 

judgment of conviction, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition. Defendant's 

assigned counsel filed an amended PCR petition and a twenty-nine-page 

supporting brief. The court heard argument, found Rule 3:22-12(a)(1) requires 

the filing of a PCR petition no more than five years after entry of the judgment 

of conviction, and determined defendant's petition was time-barred because it 

was filed seven years and four months after entry of the February 19, 2010 

judgment of conviction. The court further found defendant was not entitled to

a relaxation of the five-year time-bar under Rule 3:22-12(a)(1)(A) because he 

did not present evidence demonstrating either excusable neglect or that 

enforcement of the time-bar would result in a fundamental injustice. The court 

rejected defendant's claim that the PCR petition was timely under Rule 3:22-

12(a)(1) because it was filed within five years of the entry of the amended 

judgment of conviction.

Although the court found the petition was time-barred, it also addressed 

and rejected defendant's claim he was entitled to PCR because his trial counsel 

was ineffective. The court noted defendant claimed his counsel was ineffective 

by failing to object to: the prosecutor's cross-examination of defendant about 

sex toys found in defendant's bedroom; admission of the portions of the 
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recording of Sarah's interview during which she referred to defendant striking 

Miranda; the prosecutor's disparaging remarks concerning defense counsel's 

cross-examination of Sarah; and an investigator's testimony that defendant 

"invoked his right to defense." 

The court explained that the testimony and prosecutor's comments were

challenged on defendant's direct appeal, and this court determined that neither 

deprived defendant of a fair trial. The court also found defendant could not 

relitigate the issues because they had been addressed on direct appeal, R. 3:22-

5, and defendant otherwise failed to demonstrate that but for his trial counsel's 

alleged errors, there was a reasonable probability the result of his trial would 

have been different. The court found defendant did not establish a prima facie 

case of ineffective assistance of counsel and entered an order denying 

defendant's PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant offers the following arguments for our 

consideration:

POINT I

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL

COURT'S DECISION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S

PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 

BECAUSE CSAAS EVIDENCE DEPRIVED

DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.
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POINT II

PCR COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE HE 

DID NOT OFFER ANYTHING DURING ORAL 

ARGUMENT[.]

POINT III

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL

COURT'S DECISION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S

PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AND

REMAND THE MATTER FOR AN EVIDENTIARY

HEARING[.]

A. DEFENDANT'S TRIAL ATTORNEY FAILED TO 

OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR'S REFERENCE TO 

"SEX TOYS"[.]

B. DEFENDANT'S TRIAL ATTORNEY SHOULD 

HAVE OBJECTED TO THE PROSECUTOR'S 

DECISION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO 

CHARACTERIZE [SARAH] AS A LIAR[.]

C. DEFENDANT'S TRIAL ATTORNEY DID NOT 

CHALLENGE THE ADMISSION OF BAD ACTS 

EVIDENCE AND DID NOT DEMAND A CURATIVE 

INSTRUCTION[.]

D. DEFENDANT'S TRIAL ATTORNEY SHOULD 

NOT HAVE PERMITTED THE PROSECUTOR TO 

DISPARAGE HIM AND HIS ARGUMENT[.]

E. DEFENDANT'S TRIAL ATTORNEY SHOULD 

NOT HAVE [PERMITTED] THE PROSECUTOR TO 

ELICIT TESTIMONY ABOUT DEFENDANT'S 

DECISION TO INVOKE HIS RIGHT AGAINST 

SELF-INCRIMINATION [.]
8

A-3931-17T1

II.

We "conduct a de novo review" of the court's order because it denied 

defendant's PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing. State v. Jackson, 454 

N.J. Super. 284, 291 (App. Div.) (quoting State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 421 

(2004)), certif. denied, 236 N.J. 35 (2018). Under that standard, we first address 

the court's determination that the petition is time-barred under Rule 3:22-

12(a)(1). Defendant does not challenge the court's conclusion that he failed to 

timely file his petition as required under the Rule and did not present any 

evidence showing either excusable neglect or a fundamental injustice permitting 

a late filing under Rule 3:22-12(a)(1)(A). Thus, defendant has waived any claim 

that the court erred by dismissing the PCR petition because it is time-barred. 

See Jefferson Loan Co. v. Session, 397 N.J. Super. 520, 525 n.4 (App. Div. 

2008) (explaining that an issue not briefed on appeal is waived).

Nonetheless, we have reviewed the record and are satisfied the court 

correctly determined that defendant's PCR petition is time-barred under Rule

3:22-12(a)(1)(A). In pertinent part, the Rule provides that:

no petition shall be filed pursuant to this rule more than 

5 years after the date of entry . . . of the judgment of 

conviction that is being challenged unless:

(A) it alleges facts showing that the delay beyond said 

time was due to defendant's excusable neglect and that 
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there is a reasonable probability that if the defendant's 

factual assertions were found to be true enforcement of 

the time bar would result in a fundamental injustice....

[R. 3:22-12(a)(1)]. 

The prescribed five-year period "commences when the judgment of conviction 

is entered and is generally neither stayed nor tolled by an appellate or other 

proceeding." State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 249 (2000). 

Defendant filed his petition more than seven years after his February 19, 

2010 judgment of conviction. He argued before the PCR court that the petition 

was timely because it was filed within five years of the July 3, 2013 amended 

judgment of conviction entered after his resentencing. The court correctly 

rejected the argument because "a petition for [PCR] must be filed within five 

years of entry of the judgment memorializing the conviction even if further trial 

proceedings relating to the sentence are conducted during the interim period." 

State v. Dugan, 289 N.J. Super. 15, 20 (App. Div. 1996); see State v. Cann, 342 

N.J. Super. 93, 102 (App. Div. 2001) (noting that "in considering [Rule 3:22-

12(a)(1)]'s time-bar, the date of the judgment of conviction controls even if there 

are subsequent sentencing proceedings"). Thus, defendant's PCR petition was 

filed beyond Rule 3:22-12(a)(1)'s five-year time-bar.
10 A-3931-17T1

A court may review a PCR petition filed more than five years after the 

date of the judgment of conviction in the narrow circumstance where the petition 

"alleges facts showing that the delay beyond said time was due to defendant's 

excusable neglect and that there is a reasonable probability that if the defendant's 

factual assertions were found to be true enforcement of the time bar would result 

in a fundamental injustice." R. 3:22-12(a)(1)(A). To satisfy the Rule's 

requirements, "[t]he petition itself must allege the facts relied on to support the 

claim." State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 577 (1992).

Defendant's submissions to the PCR court are bereft of any facts showing 

excusable delay for the late filing of his petition. Indeed, defendant did not 

address the late filing of his petition in any manner other than by erroneously 

arguing it was filed within five years of the entry of the amended judgment of 

conviction. "Ignorance of the law and rules of court does not qualify as 

excusable neglect," State v. Merola, 365 N.J. Super. 203, 218 (Law Div. 2002) 

(citing Murray, 162 N.J. at 246), aff'd o.b., 365 N.J. Super. 82, 84 (App. Div. 

2003), and an otherwise untimely PCR petition "is time-barred if it does not 

claim excusable neglect, or allege the facts relied on to support that claim," 

Cann, 342 N.J. Super. at 101-02 (citing Mitchell, 126 N.J. at 577); accord State 

v. Norman, 405 N.J. Super. 149, 159 (App. Div. 2009) ("[T]o overcome the 
11 A-3931-17T1

procedural bar in [Rule] 3:22-12, defendant must show that the delay in filing 

the PCR petition was attributable to excusable neglect."). 

Defendant also failed to establish there is a reasonable probability that 

enforcement of the time-bar would result in a fundamental injustice. R. 2:22-

12(a)(1)(A). There is a fundamental injustice "when the judicial system has 

denied a 'defendant with fair proceedings leading to a just outcome' or when 

'inadvertent errors mistakenly impacted a determination of guilt or otherwise 

wrought a miscarriage of justice.'" State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 546 (2013) 

(quoting Mitchell, 126 N.J. at 587). Thus, to satisfy the fundamental-injustice 

prong of the Rule 2:22-12(a)(1)(A) standard, a defendant "must make 'some 

showing' that an error or violation 'played a role in the determination of guilt.'" 

Id. at 547 (quoting State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 10, 13 (1990)). Defendant made 

no such showing here. 

We are therefore satisfied the court correctly denied the PCR petition as 

untimely under Rule 2:22-12(a)(1) and that defendant did not present any facts 

permitting a late filing of the petition under Rule 2:22-12(a)(1)(A). As noted, 

defendant does not argue to the contrary. For those reasons alone, we affirm the 

court's denial of defendant's petition.
12 A-3931-17T1

We also are convinced the record required a denial of the petition for the 

separate but equally dipositive reason that defendant failed to present facts 

establishing a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel under the 

Strickland standard. Under Strickland, a defendant first must show that his or 

her attorney's handling of the matter "fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness." 466 U.S. at 687-88. A defendant also must show that there 

exists a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A defendant 

must establish both prongs of the standard to obtain a reversal of the challenged 

conviction. Id. at 687; Nash, 212 N.J. at 542. 

Defendant argues his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to 

the prosecutor's closing argument that was critical of defense counsel's crossexamination of Sarah. Defendant also claims his counsel was ineffective by 

failing to object to the prosecutor's cross-examination of defendant about sex 

toys found in his bedroom, defendant's opinion about the veracity of Sarah's 

statements, and defendant's relationship with a woman who was not his wife;

Sarah's statements in the recorded interview that defendant struck Miranda in 

the past; and a police officer's testimony that defendant "invoked his right to a

defense."
13 A-3931-17T1

"Although a demonstration of prejudice constitutes the second part of the 

Strickland analysis, courts are permitted leeway to choose to examine first 

whether a defendant has been prejudiced . . . and if not, to dismiss the claim 

without determining whether counsel's performance was constitutionally 

deficient." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012). We follow that approach 

here.

Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object 

to the same prosecutor's statements and witness testimony that defendant 

challenged on his direct appeal. We concluded that although the statements and 

testimony were improper, they were neither singularly nor collectively capable 

of producing an unjust result and did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. W.L., 

No. A-4938-09, slip op. at 18-25. Based on our finding on direct appeal that 

there was no reversible error in the admission of the challenged testimony or the 

prosecutor's closing argument, "the failure of trial counsel to object . . . could 

not lead to the conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the 

errors of trial . . . counsel, the outcome would have been different." State v. 

Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 361 (2009). Because defendant did not sustain his burden 

under the second prong of the Strickland standard, his PCR was properly denied

and we need not address the claim that his trial counsel erred by failing to object 
14 A-3931-17T1

to the challenged testimony and prosecutor's statements. Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 700. 

We also do not address the merits of defendant's contention that his trial 

counsel was ineffective by failing to object to testimony about Child Sexual 

Abuse and Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) offered by the State's expert. 2 

Our review of alleged trial court errors "is not limitless" and is "bounded by the 

proofs and objections critically explored on the record before the trial court by 

the parties themselves." State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 19 (2009). Where, as 

here, the "issue never was raised before the [PCR] court, . . . and . . . its legal 

propriety never was ruled on by the . . . court, the issue was not properly 

preserved for appellate review." Id. at 18-19. Defendant's argument does not 

"go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public 

interest," warranting an exception to the general prohibition against deciding an 

issue on appeal that was "not properly presented to the trial court." Id. at 20

(quoting Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)).

 

2

 Defendant did not challenge the admission of the expert's testimony on direct 

appeal. See generally R. 3:22-3 (providing that a PCR proceeding is not "a 

substitute for an appeal from conviction"); R. 3:22-4 (barring the assertion of a 

claim in a PCR proceeding that was not raised on an appeal from the conviction 

unless one of three enumerated exceptions apply).
15 A-3931-17T1

Moreover, at defendant's trial counsel's request, the expert's CSAAS 

testimony was properly limited by the court to the permissible scope of such 

testimony under the law existing at the time of trial.3 Defendant does not make 

any claim to the contrary. Instead, defendant argues his trial counsel erred by 

failing to object during his 2009 trial to the admission of portions of the expert's 

testimony concerning CSAAS that our Supreme Court first determined was

inadmissible in its 2018 decision in State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265 (2018). In 

J.L.G., the Court determined that CSAAS evidence, except as to delayed 

disclosure, is not sufficiently reliable to be admissible. Id. at 272. 

In J.L.G., the Supreme Court announced a new rule of law that has 

pipeline retroactive application. State v. G.E.P., 458 N.J. Super. 436, 444-48 

(2019); see also State v. Burstein, 85 N.J. 394, 402-03 (1981) (explaining a 

court's options in determining the effect of an announcement of a new rule of 

law). The new rule of law therefore is inapplicable to defendant's case because 

he exhausted the direct appeals of his conviction in 2013, six years prior to the 

Court's decision in J.L.G. See G.E.P., 458 N.J. Super. at 444-48. Defendant 

cannot obtain relief from his conviction through a PCR petition where the new 

 

3

 The trial court expressly limited the expert's testimony concerning CSAAS to 

the parameters established in State v. P.H., 178 N.J. 378 (2004), and State v. 

J.Q., 130 N.J. 554 (1993). 
16 A-3931-17T1

rule of law upon which he relies is not retroactive to his conviction. See State 

v. Cupe, 289 N.J. Super. 1, 11 (App. Div. 1996) (explaining that "a case decided 

after a defendant's conviction and sentence has become final may not provide 

the basis for [PCR] if it announces a new rule of law" unless it is determined the 

new rule of law applies retroactively to the defendant's conviction and sentence). 

Additionally, defendant's trial counsel's performance was not deficient under the 

first prong of the Strickland standard by his reliance on the law defining 

permissible CSAAS testimony extant at the time of defendant's trial. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (finding "the reasonableness of counsel's challenged 

conduct" is judged "on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of 

counsel's conduct"); see also State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 366 (2008) ("In 

gauging whether a valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has been 

presented, 'the court must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged 

conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's 

conduct.'" (quoting State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 314 (2006))). 

Any arguments asserted by defendant that we have not addressed are 

without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(2). 

Affirmed.