--

c!OM":EM.lfff !Nh 

REF ID:A44724 

9CONFIDENTIAL9 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 

Serial: N 4702 

19 NOV 1960 

MElilORJ\lIDUM FOR TilE DJRECTOR OF DEFENSE BESEARCH AND ENGINEERING 

SUBJECT: Draft Department of Defense Instruction, Subject: "Policies 

and Procedures for Communications Security Research and 

Development (U) 

l. On 7 November 1960 the following personnel met to discuss 

connaents on the subject Instruction forwarded to DDR&E by the 

Secre'l:;aries of the Military Departments: 

Mr. H. Sta.dermann 

Mr. D. Wolf'and 

Lt Col J, Anderson, USA 

Lt Col L. Brownfield 

Mr. R • Scott· 

C:\PT R. Cook 

Mr. J. Boyd 

:Maj D. Mowakoslti 

DDR&E 

NSA 

NSA 

OCRD, USA 

OCSicsO 

MSG 

NSG 

ARDC 

2. All differences were resolved and the following asreed to by 

those ·present: 

a. Early pu1;>l:i:ca.tion of the document is essential. 

. . 

b. The n~f draft would not require a. second review by the 

Secretaries. Instead, the normal review by the Arined Forces Policy 

Council would suffice. 

c. Coordination with the AWn.inistrati ve Assistant to Secretary of Defense would be required to approve the existence of crone • 

This coordino.tion would be accomplished by Mr. Sta.derma.nn. 

3. A new dra.ft of the subject Instruction dated 16 November 1960 

and i·evised in accordance with the resolution of comments from the 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 10-28-2013 pursuantto E .0. 1352\3 

CONFIDENTIAL 
REF ID:A44724 

FIDENTIAft 

Serial: N 4102 

SecretaFies of the Military Departments, is forwarded ror appropriate 

action in accordance with agreements outlined in Paragraph 2. 

4. This correspondence may be declassif 

I11clo Gure • 

Incl: 

a/s (6 cys) 

Copy Furnished: 

General G • B • Erskine, USMC-Ret / 

Asst to SecDef, Sp Opns (2 cys of Incl) 

JCS (J-6) 

Read, NSG (2 cys of Incl) 

OCSic-O (3 eye of Incl) 

Hq, USAF, DCS/Development {2 eye of Incl) 

2 

C6NFIDEN'fIAl:J 
.. - IC ~· 

REF ID:A44724 

cc: D~~ 

.AG 

Reading File . R/D Reading File · 

CSEC-04 (2 cys of Incle) 

R/D-02 { J 

e!'ED-02 '-1 

Serial: N 4702 

M/R: Draft Department of Defense Instruction, Subject: "Policies 

and Procedures for Communica.tion!5 Security Research and Development" 

has been revised in accordance with resolution of COllllllents obtained 

from Secretaries of the Military Departments by DDR&E. Attached· 

correspondence forwards revised dra~ to DDR&E for further coordination in DOD and with Armed Forces Policy Council. Coordinated with CSEC-04 

(LtCol J. Anderson). ~ ..... ~ !Jlt~f 

D~a~v~i~d~W~olf:!-::-a~n~d:-:r.::e::~:::i-.,'::':"'::T.""'.r-':""T.::-7"""='"'~~-
REF ID:A44724 

e CC>NFIDENTIALe 

DRAFT 16 November ~960 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 

SUBJECT: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR COMMUNICATIONS SEcmtITI 

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMEN'l' (U) 

I 

References: (a) Department of Defense Directive C-520o.5, Subject: 

"Communications Security (COMSEC)", dated 27 Oct 1958 

(b) Department of Defense Directive S-5100.20, Subject: The 

National Security Agency, dated 19 March 1959 

I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 

l. This Instru.ction establishes policies and procedures concerning Communications Security (COMSEC) ~esearch and development within the 

Department of' Defense. These procedures encompass the aspects of 

(l) generalized and detailed requirements and determination of Joint 

interest, (2) program development-budget presentation and (3) program 

implementation, review and control. In establishing such policies and 

procedures it is the intent that they be of benefit to :the Military 

Departments and the Director, NSA in their mutual endeavor to attain 

the objectives of the Secreta17 of Defense as outlined in Section III 

of reference (a) as these concern cryptosecurity research and development. These procedures are further intended to enable the Director, 

NSA to diacharge his responsibilities (reference (b)) in connection 

with the dOMSEC research and development portion of the Department of 

Defense crypto1ogic program. 

2. Maximum mutual bene~i t cannot be derived by adherence only to set procedures. It is considered highly desirable for Senior COMSEC personnel 

of NBA and the Services to convene as required for formal discussion of' 

1 

CONFIDENTIAL 
REF ID:A44724 

e6NFIDENTIAL 

NSA-Service COMSEC R&D problems. Furthermore, it is considered 

essential that a continual exchange of COMSEC R&D information be 

effected primarily, but not excusively, via an NBA-Services CO.MSEC 

Research and Engineering Con1mittee (CREC). 

II. DEFINITIONS 

The following definitions apply herein: 

l. Research and Development (R&D) - Includes research, development, testing, evaluation and engineering occurring in a period which· begins 

with th~ initiation o.f a project, and which ends with the project 

termination or completion of user tests, whichever is earlier. 

2. COMSEC - The protection resulting .from all measures designed to deny 

to unauthorized persons in.formation of value which might be derived 

from the possession and study of telecommunications, or to mislead 

unauthorized persons in their interpretation of the results of such 

a study. Communications security includes: (l) transmission security, 

(2) cryptosecurity, and (3) physical security of communications secur~ty 

materials and information. 

a. Transmission Security - Transmiss~on security is that component 

of communications security which results from all measures 

designed to protect transmission .from unauthorized interceptions, 

traffic analysis, and imitative deception. 

b. Cryptosecurity - That component of communications security 

which results from the provision of technically sound cryptosystems and their proper use. 

c. Physical Security - !l'fhat component of security which· results from 

2 

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REF ID:A44724 

e CONFID£NTIALe 

DRAFT 

all ·physical measures necessary to safeguard classified equipment, material and documents from access thereto or observation 

thereof by .unauthorized persons. 

3. COMSEC Equipment - Equipment designed to provide security to telecommunications during transmission by converting information to a form which is 

unintelligible to an unauthorized interceptor and by reconverting to its 

original form for authorized recipients, as well as equipment designed 

specifically to aid in, or as an essential element of, the conversion 

process. COMSEC equipment is crypto-equipment, crypto-ancillary equipment, cryptoproduction equipments and a~thentication equiPillent. 

a.. Crypto-equipment - Any COMSEC equipment which converts information for transmission to a form which is unintelligible to an 

unauthorized intercept~r, or which reconverts such information 

to its original form for authorized recipients. 

b. Crypto-ancillary equipment - Equipment designed specifically 

to facilitate efficient or reliable operation of crypto-equipment but which does not perform any of the functions of cryptoequipment, and equipment designed specifically to convert information to a form suitable for processing by crypto-equipment. 

c. Cryptoproduction equipments - Equipments, and components thereof, 

that are specifically designed for, and used in t~e manufacture 

and associated testing of COMSEC materials. 

d. Authentication equipment - Equipment designed to provide 

protection against fraudulent transmissions or to establish 

the authenticity of a message or communication system. 

3 

CONFIDENTIAL 
REF ID:A44724 

C:ONFIDEN'FIAL 

4. Cryptomaterial - All material, including documents, devices and/or 

equipment or apparatus essential to the encryption, decryption or 

authentication of telecommunications. 

5. Cryptoprinciple - The characteristics of the elements involved in, 

and the fundamental rule of operation, motion or activity inherent in 

a cryptosystem. 

6. Cryptosystem - The associated items of cryptomaterial which are used 

as a unit and which provide a single means o:f' encryption and decryption. 

III. CRYPTOMATERIAL R&D REQUIREMENTS AND DETERMINATION OF JOINT INTEREST - See 

Appendix I. 

IV. PROGRAM FORMULATION ··- BUDGET PRESENTATION - See Appendix II . 

V. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION, REVIEW AND CONTROL - See Appendix III. 

VI. CLASSIFICATION 

This document may be reproduced in whole or in part :f'or convenience in 

implementation. For appropriate protection, the paragraphs of the document which are classified are so identified. The classification of the 

various portions of the Instruction i's· ~as .,follows-:; 

1 •. Cover document - Unclassified, FOR O~CIAL USE ONLY. 

' 2. Append.ix I - Unclassified, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. 

3. A.pperi.dix II - Unclassified, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. 

4, Appendix III - CONFIDENTIAL 

VII. EFFECTIVE DATE - The effective date o:f' this Instruction is 1960. ------ 4 

tONFJ.DENTIA~ 
REF ID:A44724 

• 

DRAFT 

APPENDIX I 

CRYPTOMATERIAL R&D REQUIREMENTS AND DETERMINATION OF JOINT INTEREST 

I. RESPONSIBILITIES 

It is the responsibili~y of each Service to determine its own needs 

for the application of COMSEC in connection with (its o~) separate communications means---communications systems, terminal equipments and trans-

' 

mission means---and in connection with communications means which are a 

part of a "weapons" system or other electronic system. It is also the 

responsibility of the Military Departments to formulate and submit to 

the Director, NSA long-range generalized and more detailed current 

cryptomaterial R&D requirements. Responsibilities for determination of 

need for application of COMSEC to a Joint or common DOD communications 

system will be assigned when directives for such a system are published. 

The Director, NSA is charged with the responsibility for formulating 

long-range R&D pl~s and integrated R&D programs to ensure (the existence 

of a capability for) the security of military telecommunications~ The 

requirements submitted to the Director, NSA thus form the basis for 

the above-mentioned plans and programs. 

II.' OBJECTIVES 

l. Long-range generalized cryptomaterial R&D requirements are those in which 

the Services describe a need, in the form of objectives, for various 

cryptosecurity means to be associated with planned means of communications. 

The more detailed cryptomaterial R&D requirements are formulated as the 

• 

communications art matures and funds become available to implement the I 

development of planned communications means. 'nlese detailed cryptomaterial 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

5 
REF ID:A44724 

J 

.. ,. DRAFr APPENDIX I 

R&D ·requirements. I!18Y be described, for example, in the form of an 

operational requirement (OR), Operational Support Requirement (OSR), 

General Operational Requirements (GOB),.Qualitative· Material Requirement 

(QJ>m) an~ military (MC) or development characteristics (DC). 

2. The availability of consolidated, up-to-date long-range cryptomater1al 

R&D requirements to the Director, NSA enables him to plan the effective 

use of his resources to conduct research with the objective of having 

available new cryptoprinciples and techniques to meet future specific 

military requirements. Si.Diilarly it is essential that detail~ cryptomaterial R&D requirements be presented to the Director, NBA at an early 

stage iQ the development of new communications means. The objectives to 

be met in this case are: 

a. Attainment of' a capability for early NBA-Military Department 

' agreement on how best to use the combined R&D resources of NSA 

and the Military Departments to meet the requirements. 

b. Increased assurance of timely availability to the Services of 

cryptosecurity means which are compatible with their communications means. 

III. SUBMISSION OF REQUIREMENTS 

1. Long-range Military COMSEC objectives and cryptomaterial R&D requirements (National Crypto-Equipment Requirements, NCER) have been formulated 

in the U. S. COMSEC Plan as a coordinated effort among NSA and the 

Military Departments. These have been reviewed by the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense and forwarded to USCSB to form the basis for 

F0R OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

6 • 
REF ID:A44724 

• 

DRAFT APPENDIX I 

national COMSEC objectives. To provide the necessary background and 

understanding of military communications and weapons systems. objectives 

as they relate to COMSEC requirements, documentation including this 

information will be forwarded by the Military Departments to the Director, 

NSA. Examples of the t~s of documents considered pertinent are the 

Army Combat Development Objectives Guide (COOG), Navy Master Program 

Objective Plan (MPOP) and Air Force Applied Research Pla~ing Documents 

(ARPD's). Provision of three copies of these and other pertinent 

documents, on an "as-revised" basis, will be considered satisfactory. 

2. To insure consideration of COMSEC in the inception stages of communications developments, no requirement for separate communications means, 

or for communications means which are part of a ''weapons" system or other 

electronic system, will be approved by a Military Department or the JCS 

(J-6) without a statement that COMSEC has been considered, and that it is 

or is not a requirement during the useful life of the system. 

3. If consideration of COMSEC, as outlined above, results in a stated need 

for cryptosecurity, then the requirement will be forwarded for appropriate action, to the Director, NSA in three copies, in its earliest 

(OR, OSR, GOR, QMR) and subsequent (MC, DC, development plan) stages of 

apprpval by the Military Department or the J-6, as appropriate. This 

is not intended to preclude any in:formal discussions between Service 

and NSA personnel at any stage of requirement generation. In describing 

a cryptosecurity requirement, the following information will be provided 

at the earliest practicable time in addition to explanatory information 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

7 
REF ID:A44724 

DRAFT APPENDIX I 

concerning the re:quirement· fG>r the cemmunicati0ns means: I 

.. \ 

a. The approocimate time peried, after transmission, during which 

inYormation passed 0ver the system will require protection 

against enemy expleitation. 

b. The nature and type of information to be processed (including 

any unusu~l characteristics) and, if known, the expected traffic 

load per cryptonet per cryptoperiod. 

c. The preposed structure of the communications comple~, including 

signal_ types, interc0mmunication capability (netting requirements), 

switching methods and eperational precedures. 

d. Any limitations ef' size, weight, cost or availability which, if 

exceeded, would abselutely preclude the use of cryptosecurity 

with the proposed cemmunicatiens means. 

4. If consideration of COMSEC, as eutlined above, results in a statement 

that cryptosecurity is not required, then the operational requirement for 

the communications means (systems er sub-systems) will be forwarded, fer 

information, to the Director, NSA in its finally approved form. 

IV. REVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS 

1. Review of NCER's must be a continuing process in each Service. It is 

essential that a Joint periodic review of these requirements be assured. 

2. Beginning in Fiscal Year 1961 and annually thereafter, the Director, NSA 

will initiate a review of the NCER's. This will be accomplished via the 

COMSEC Research and Engineering CoDIDittee primarily by means of an .Ad Hoc 

subcommittee, and will include representation by the Joint Staff. 

Subsequent to agreement by CREC, the ~nded or revised requirements will 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

8 • 
REF ID:A44724 

• 

DRAFT APPENDIX I 

be forwarded by the Director, NSA to each Military Department and to the 

Jeint Sta:ff for official approval. Upon receipt of the officially approved 

requirements, the Director, NSA will forward these to OSD and USCSB for 

information. 

3. Detailed military cryptomaterial R&D requirements will be reviewed 

annually by the COMSEC R&E Committee to detemine if changes have 

occurred. If it is determined that changes have occurred, the Director, 

NBA will then take the necessary formal action to determine the extent 

of the change and the subsequent technical action required. 

V. IMPLEMENTATION 

Each Service will establish a procedure for inclusion of COMSEC considerations to coincide with the procedure now used for formulating 

requirements for means of communications. A copy of each document 

i~lementing this procedure will be forwarded to the Director, NSA. 

VI. JOINT INTEREST 

l. Consideration of J0int interest in the long range cryptomaterial R&D 

requirements is assured in the procedure outlined in par. IV 2. above. 

2. It is essential that an indication of Joint interest in cryptomaterial 

R&D requirements be available as soon as practicable. Therefore, after 

an affirmative requirement of a Military Department is ma.de known per 

III above, the Director, NSA will use the COMSEC R&E Conmtlttee to obtain 

an unofficial indication of Joint interest. This will be done with the 

full realization that subsequent official action by JCS could ch.ange this 

initial informal information. When appropriate the Director, NSA will 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

9 
REF ID:A44724 

DR.AFT APPENDIX I 

cerrespond officially with the JCS, as provided by reference (a), 

to ascertain the extent ef Joint interest. 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

10 

• 
REF ID:A44724 

DRAFT 

APPENDIX II 

• 

COMSEC R&D PROGRAM FORMULATION AND BUDGET ESTIMATE PRESENTATION 

I. RESPONSIBILITIES 

1. By reference (a}, the Director, NSA is required to formulate an 

integrated R&D program to ensure the continuing security of military 

telecommunications. By reference (b}, the Director, NSA must submit 

to the Secretary of Defense a consolidated DOD COMSEC RDT&E budget 

together with his recommendations pertaining thereto. The Military 

Departments on the other hand are responsible for the preparation and 

justification of their proposed COMSEC R&D budgets, and for appropriate 

coordination of their COMSEC R&D programs with the Director, NSA. 

2. While the Director, NSA is required to advise the Secretary of Defense 

concerning all phases of COMSEC R&D as these appear in the programs of 

the Military Departments, his primary responsibility will lie in the 

cryptosecurity R&D effort as delineated in reference (a}. 

II. COORDINATION 

1. A semi-annual technical assessment of the COMSEC R/D programs of NSA and 

the Military Departments will be submitted by the Director, NSA to the 

Director, Defense Research and Engineering. Primary emphasis in these 

assessments will be placed on current programs; however, future planning 

will be given consideration. In addition, to the semi-annual assessments, 

a consolidated COMSEC R/D program and budget estimate, with appropriate 

rec0mmendations, will be submitted annually by the Director, NSA to the 

Director, Defense Research & Engineering. Prima~y emphasis en this will 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. 

11 
REF ID:A44724 

•'' ~ ' ' 1 DRAFT APPENPIX II 

be on the program fer the fiscal year follewing the ene in which the 

. . submission was accomplished. 

2. To permit coordination of the COMSEC R&D programs and an understanding 

of their content, a propesed schedule of ceordination is outlined below. 

Specific times are referred te a current fiscal year C. 

a. April, Fiscal year C - NSA holds informal conferences with Military 

Department representatives t0 discuss progress on C-iear programs 

and plans for (c,t1) year programs. Primary emphasis will be placed 

on those programs which did not receive recent or sufficient 

discussion in the COMSEC R&E Committee. 

b. May, fiscal year C - NSA prepares assessment of the Defense-wide 

COMSEC R&B programs. 

c. June, fiscal year C - NSA forwards assessment of b. to DDR&E. 

d. August, fiscal year (C,ll) - Military Departments submit approved 

programs and budget estimates for fiscal year (C/2) to NSA: 

e. September, fiscal year (C,il) - NSA submits consolidated COMSEC R&D 

pregram/bud.€;et es~imate, with apprepriate recommendations, to DDR&E. 

f. October, fiscal year (C,tl) - NSA h0lds informal conferences with 

representatives of Military Departments to discuss progress and plans 

on (Cfl) year programs and proposals on (c,t2) year programs. 

Emphasis is placed on programs which did not receive recent or 

sufficient discussion in the COMSEC R&E Committee. 

g. November, fiscal ;Year (C,tl) - NSA prepares assessment of the 

Defense-wide COMSEC R&D pr~grams. 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. 

12 

• 
REF ID:A44724 

J • 

DRAFT APPENDIX II 

h. December, fiscal year (C!l) - NSA forwards assessment of g. to 

DDR&E. 

3. In the field of cryptosecurity R&D, a program approved in the formulation 

stage is not necessarily one approved for implementation. A separate 

procedure is delineated in APPENDIX III for the pursuit of such programs. 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

13 

Reverse (page 14)Blank 
I. POLICY 

REF ID:A44724 

·e CONFIDENTIALe 

DRAFT 

APPENDIX III 

IMPLEMEN'l'ATION, REVIEW AND CON'I'ROL OF . COMSEC R&D PROGRAM 

l. One of the objectives of reference (a) is te improve the utilization 

of cryptologic research and development resources. In t~is connection 

the National Security Agency has been assigned the responsibility, 

under the ~upervision of DDR&E, for formulating an integrated cryptesecuri ty R&D p~ogram and coordinating that portion of the cryptosecurity R&D cenducted by the Military Departments. It is imperative, 

however, that participation by the various departments be established 

only under cenditiens which are consistent with the basic aim of 

centralized responsibility, viz., ecoi¥ild1cal and effective use of . , 

resources. 

2. A number ef different factors must be considered in arriving at a 

determination as to where a specific cryptographic R&D project should 

be conducted and these factors will vary from one project to another. 

Therefore, in order to assure the best utilization of available 

resources in every case, this determination should be made on an 

individual basis. In general, however, there are three circumstances 

in which decentralized development will usually be desir~ble. 

a. In those cases where communications systems with integrated 

COMSEC features are required, th~re are practical advantages ,f' 

to be gained by having the developer of the basic comm:unications systems design and engineer such features into the 

overall system. 

15 

CONFIDENTIAL 
REF ID:A44724 

CONFIBEN'fli\~ 

DRAFT APPENDIX III 

b. In those cases where an individual department or agency has a 

unique requirement for specialized cryptographic equipment, 

such a requirement may often be satisfied efficiently and 

economically if the development is undertaken by that organizati.on, provided that the deveiopment is based on approved 

cryptoprinciples. (Centralized R/Dl'acilities may be more 

effectively utilized for work on new principles and on meeting 

requirements of bread.er interest and application.) 

c. In these cases where secur.e communication systems must include 

components .. which are not basically cryptographic in nature, 

but which are necessary to facilitate the cryptographic process, 

the develepment of these components can often be most efficiently 

done by the developer of the communications system. 

3. On the other hand, there is no authority and there appears to be no 

advantage to decentr83:-1zing the responsibility for determining the 

security of cryptoprinciples and the security provided by specific 

' 

applications thereof. The assignment of responsibility and the guide-

'1· lines for the cPnduct of crypto-equipment devel~nt herein outlined 

are based on these general concepts. 

II. NON-CRYPro COMSEC R&D 

1. Non-Crypto COMSEC B&D is exemplified as follows: 

' ' ' 

a. Physical Security - Destruction or cryptozeroizing devices; 

enclosures, such as safes, primarily or specifically for protection of cryptematerial. 

16 
REF ID:A44724 

e CONFIDENTIALe 

DRAFT APPENDIX III 

b. Transmission· Security· - Secure cable; spurious radiation 

detection and elimination; communicatiens means, the primary· 

purpc>se of which is to minimize or av0id iQterceptien. 

c. Crn>ta>-ancillary equipment. 

2. When development planning has begun, subsequent to requirement approval 

within the Military Department, the National Security Agency will be 

included as an Interested Agency in all such documentation. Three copies 

of final documents in this connection will be forwarded to the D~rector, 

NSA. When such R&D is part of a larger program, every attempt will be 

made to identify the COMSEC aspects 0f the program. Documentation 

forwarded to NSA will identify, as far as possible, the relationship to 

requirements documentation, estimated costs and whether this is part of a 

previously submitted program. 

3. In some i~stances, a low detectability, anti-Jamming, er "anti-control" 

characteristic is required in a communications system. In arder te 

obtain this characteristic, techniques are utilized which, in order to be 

successful, depend on a resistance to analytical reconstruction. Where 

such techniques, namely sequential coding techniques, are utilized, it 

will be considered in the national interest for the developing agency to 

~onsult NSA, in the early development stages, to obtain assistance in 

determining the susceptibility of the system te analysis. 

4. Initial program documents will be brought up for discussion at an appropriate meeting of the COMSEC R&E Committee to permit the members to be 

aware of current activities. 

17 

CONFIDENTIAL 
REF ID:A44724 

€0NFIBEN'f,IA1' 

eOtf.P!BEIN'I'IM. DRAFT APPENDIX III 

5. In the conduct of such R&D by the Military Departments the Director, NSA 

wi11 be provided with the following documentation, in three' copies: 

a. Contractor progress and special reports as required by the 

contract. 

b. Annual project and/or change-in-status report required by 

current Military Department R&D procedures. 

c. Special test reports produced by the Service organization 

directly responsible for this R&D. 

6. The National Security Agency, in its conduct of such R&D will make 

reports available to the Services as is now provided for or as may 

be agreed in the COMSEC R&D Committee. 

III. CRYPl'OSECURITY R&D 

1. When development planning has begun, subsequent to requirement approval 

within the Military Department, the National Security Agency will be 

included as a coordinating Agency. Cryptosecurity R&D will be 

coordinated with the Director, NSA prior to implementation. Such 

coordination may occur concurrently with development planning within the 

Military Department. 

2. If a Military Department desires NSA cooperation in the preliminary 

planning phase of a communications system development, such a request 

should be made to the Director, NSA outlining the type of NSA participation required. That ~ency will provide any assistance within its 

capabilities • 

3 .• When a Military Department proposes to conduct cryptosecuri ty R&D, the 

18 

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REF ID:A44724 

.. e CONFIDENTIAL • 

OONf'IBER'fI:AL DRAFT APPENDIX III 

following procedures will be followed: 

a. A formal request will be made to the Director, NSA to provide 

a cryptoprinciple (or, alternatively, to approve a proposed 

cryptoprinciple) for use in conjunction with the planned 

communications system. A separate request for provision or 

approval of a cryptoprinciple will be required for each 

separate equipment or system development and/or application 

envisioned. 

b. To permit proper evaluation, each request must be accompanied 

by three copies of a description and development plan for the 

proposed secure communications system. Preferably this information should be supplied on a Form DD-613 completed in 

accordance with the latest issue of the DOD R/D Project Card 

Manual. In preparing this document the relationship of the 

proposed R&D to previously expressed requirements, to earlier 

I 

program documents and to the program of which it is. a part 

should be identified to the greatest practicable extent. 

In addition to the development plan, and if not included as 

part of this plan, specific information relative to the security 

r~quirement should be provided as it becomes available and 

should include those items listed in Appendix I, Section III, 

pars. 2 and 3. 

4. Upon receipt of the above information, the Director, NSA will make a 

preliminary evaluation of the cryptographic aspects involved and indicate his concurrence in the development proposal or provide alternative 

19 

CONFIDENTIAL 
REF ID:A44724 

CONFIDE·N'fli\~ 

DRAFT APPENDIX III - recommendations to the interested Military Department. In so doing, he 

will take the following factors into consideration: 

a. Whether the cryptoprinciple involved is to be integrated 

into a communications equipment or system already under development cognizance of that Military Department. 

b. The extent of possible or expressed Joint interest and method 

for insuring f'ull coordination. 

c. Related developments. 

d. State of the cryptographic art. 

5. If it is mutually agreed that the cryptodevelopment proposed for conduct 

by a Military Department is in the best :interests of national security, 

then the Director, NSA will: 

a. Provide a cryptoprinciple to the developing agency in one of 

the following forms, as appropriate: 

(1) Logical design and block diagram of an appropriate 

crypto-unit. 

(2) Schematic drawings of the crypto-unit. 

(3) Operating model of the crypto-unit in early developmental form. 

b. Alternatively, evaluate any proposed cryptoprinciple submitted 

to him. If found satisfactory for its intended application, he 

will approve its continued development. If found unsatisfactory, 

he will so advise and endeavor to provide a suitable substitute. 

6. At the time of provision of a cryptoprinciple or tentative approval of 

a proposed cryptoprinciple, the Director, NSA, will specify minimum ~ 

20 

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REF ID:A44724 

e C0NFIDENTIALe 

CONP IDEN~E[:Jre DRAFT ,APPENDIX III 

physical security requirements and any other special requirements 

applicable to the particular project. In the usual case, he will 

assign an NBA representative to the project who will thereafter 

conduct all necessary working-level liaison and technical coordination 

with the developing agency •. 

7. Proposals by a Military Department for cryptosecurity R&D will be 

presented to the COMSEC R&E Committee. A.ii informal expression of 

/ 

opinion regarding the extent of interest of other Services can thus be 

obtained and the groundwork laid for formal determination of Joint 

interest. 

8. In the subsequent conduct of this R&D by a Military Department the 

responsibilities assumed by that Military Department for the various 

aspects of the program are delineated below: 

a. Coordination with NSA of specifications for the crypto-unit 

of a hardware development. 

b. Coordination with NSA of Security Requirements Check List, 

DD Form 254, prior to bid solicitation in contractual proceedings. 

c. Continued technical liaison at project engineer level. 

d. Meeting Joint requirements to the mutual satisfaction of the 

Military Department conducting the development, other interested 

Services and NBA. 

e. Provision of reports, in three copies as follows: 

(1) Bi-monthly activities report from the developing 

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Agency directly responsible for the project. 

(2) Contractor progress and special reports as required 

by the contract, within 30 days after receipt by the 

Contracting Agency. 

(3) Change-in-stat~s, quarterly management and annual 

project report required by current Military Department R/D procedures. 

(4) Special test reports produced by the developing agency. 

f. Notification to NSA of any logic design changes required of the 

crypto~unit or design changes of the system which will affect 

the internal design of the crypto-unit. 

g. Performance of tests required by NSA for security evaluation 

of the cryptosystem. 

h. Preparation of maintenance and operating instructions based 

on mutual agreement between NSA and the Military Department. 

1. Preparation of all drawings and furnishing NSA · wi,th at least 

one complete set. 

j. Training of all personnel of the Military Department conducting 

the development and cadre personnel of interested organizations. 

Training of personnel, beyond cadre, of other interested ~rganizations will be based on mutual agreement with the Military 

Department conducting the develo:Pment. 

k. Procurement of all models of equipment for test including those 

required by NSA and other interested Services and Agencies. 

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Suitable financial arrangements will be made between the 

Mi~itary Department accomplishing the procurement and other 

interested Services and Agencies. 

9. The responsibilities of NSA in connection with Cryptosecurity R&D 

conducted by the Military Departments are as follows: 

a. Responsibility for COMSEC aspects throughout the program. 

b. Technical assistance within the limits of available manpower. 

c. Provision of final evaluation of paper design of cryptoprinciple no more than six months after initiation of the 

project. 

d. Provision of specifications for and/or performance of tests 

required in .connection with COMSEC evaluation of the hardware. 

e. Provision of nomenclature. 

f. Timely preparation of maintenance and operating instructions 

by.NBA-Military Department agreement and timely provision of 

cryptokeying materials. 

g. Maintenance of an office of record for drawings, specifications 

and design changes for all crypto-equipment. 

10. In the event the Director, NSA is of the opinion that the cryptosecurity 

R&D proposed for conduct by a Military Department is considered to be 

unnecessary or undesirable, then the Director, NSA will make his opinion 

known to the originating Military Department with a copy of the corres·-

pondence forwarded to the Director, Defense Research and Engineering. 

The Military Department in order to initiate the program, will be required 

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to appeal the case to the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, ' ' 

with a copy of the correspondence forwarded to the Director, NSA. The 

Director, Defense Research and Engineering will make his decision known 

to both .the Director, NSA and the originating Military Department. 

IV. IMPLEMENTATION 

The procedures of this Appendix will be implemented by each Military 

Department in the most practicable manner to include appropriate 

action levels. A copy of each implementing document will be forwarded 

to the Director, NSA. 

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