J-S13045-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JULIO CEASAR SEGURA JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2902 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 24, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-46-CR-0000314-2021

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 25, 2023

Appellant Julio Ceasar Segura, Jr.1 appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County after 

he was convicted of recklessly endangering another person (REAP), fleeing or 

attempting to elude a police officer, persons not to possess a firearm, firearms 

not to be carried without a license, and vehicle code violations. Appellant 

claims the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion which was based 

on his challenge to the legality of the stop of his vehicle. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual background of the case as 

follows:

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Appellant’s name may be misspelled in the trial court’s caption. However, as 

it does not appear that Appellant filed any motion to correct the caption, we 

utilize the caption reported by the trial court.
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On November 23, 2020, at approximately 1:17 a.m., 

Pennsylvania State Troopers Jason Henley and Seth Heffner were 

on patrol in the area of East High Street in Pottstown, PA when 

they observed a silver Cadillac sedan (the “Cadillac”) which did 

not have a functioning registration lamp. The troopers also 

observed the Cadillac weaving within its lane of travel. The 

Cadillac subsequently approached a signalized intersection at 

Sunnybrook Road. Despite the traffic light’s display of a steady 

green light, the Cadillac almost came to a complete stop at the 

intersection. 

Trooper Henley activated his emergency siren and lights and 

attempted to effectuate a traffic stop. The Cadillac began to pull 

over to the side of the roadway but subsequently reentered the 

travel lanes on High Street and drove away at a high rate of speed.

The Cadillac proceeded to drive in the center of the roadway and 

drove through a steady red light at the South Pleasantview Road 

intersection. The Cadillac nearly drove into oncoming traffic lanes,

and traveled at speeds exceeding 115 miles per hour. The Cadillac

also drove through a steady red light at the Rupert Road 

intersection as two (2) vehicles were stopped at the light.

Eventually, the Cadillac traveled onto West Ridge Pike, 

where it spun out and crashed into a guard rail. Trooper Henley 

proceeded to execute a “PIT” maneuver which caused the Cadillac 

to come to a stop in the roadway’s grassy median. The troopers 

subsequently approached the Cadillac and the driver, later 

identified as [Appellant], who stated “I can’t stop it, it won’t stop, 

I’ve got a gun on me.” [Appellant] also informed the troopers that 

the gun was “under the hoodie” located inside the vehicle. While 

placing [Appellant] into custody, authorities uncovered a loaded 

firearm from the vehicle which was wrapped inside a hooded 

sweatshirt.

Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 1/11/23, at 1-2.

After Appellant was charged in this case, Appellant filed a motion to 

suppress the firearm seized from the Cadillac. The trial court denied the 

suppression motion following a hearing.

On July 7, 2022, the trial court conducted a bifurcated trial at which the 

jury convicted Appellant of REAP, fleeing or attempting to elude an officer, 
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and firearms not to be carried without a license. Appellant stipulated that if 

the jury found he was in possession of a firearm, he was also guilty of persons 

not to possess a firearm based on his prior burglary conviction.

On October 24, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an 

aggregate term of seven to fourteen years’ imprisonment. Appellant filed a 

timely appeal and complied with the trial court’s direction to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Appellant raises one issue for our review on appeal:

Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to 

suppress where he was seized without probable cause that he 

committed a Vehicle Code violation nor reasonable suspicion that 

he was driving under the influence because the dash camera video 

shows that Appellant’s license plate was clearly illuminated and 

that he merely slowed while approaching an intersection?

Appellant’s Brief, at 6.

Appellant’s sole claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying 

his suppression motion. Appellant alleges that the arresting officer’s dash 

camera recording does not support the finding that there was probable cause 

to stop his vehicle. We review a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion 

under the following standard:

[o]ur standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of 

a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the 

suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record 

and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as 

a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are 
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supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may 

reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. Where 

... the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns 

on allegations of legal error, the suppression court's legal 

conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it 

is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law 

to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are 

subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 146 A.3d 1271, 1273 (Pa.Super. 2016) 

(citation omitted).

With respect to vehicle stops based on suspected violations of the motor 

vehicle code, Section 6308(b) of the Vehicle Code provides:

(b) Authority of police officer.—Whenever a police officer is 

engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers 

or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring 

or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, 

for the purpose of checking the vehicle's registration, proof of 

financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine 

number or the driver's license, or to secure such other information 

as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce 

the provisions of this title.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b).

In Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285 (Pa.Super. 2010), this 

Court further explained the state of the law with respect to vehicle stops:

Traffic stops based on a reasonable suspicion[,] either of criminal 

activity or a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code under the 

authority of Section 6308(b)[,] must serve a stated investigatory 

purpose. [Commonwealth v.] Chase, 960 A.2d [108,] 116 [(Pa. 

2008)].

Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when the 

driver's detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant 

to the suspected violation. In such an instance, “it is encumbent

[sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, 

at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable 

cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of 
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some provision of the Code.” [Commonwealth v.] Gleason, 785 

A.2d [983,] 989 [(Pa. 2001)].

Id. at 1291.

This Court has further explained how to determine the quantum of 

suspicion required to stop a vehicle:

when considering whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause 

is required constitutionally to make a vehicle stop, the nature of 

the violation has to be considered. If it is not necessary to stop 

the vehicle to establish that a violation of the Vehicle Code has 

occurred, an officer must possess probable cause to stop the 

vehicle. Where a violation is suspected, but a stop is necessary to 

further investigate whether a violation has occurred, an officer 

need only possess reasonable suspicion to make the stop. 

Illustrative of these two standards are stops for speeding and DUI. 

If a vehicle is stopped for speeding, the officer must possess 

probable cause to stop the vehicle. This is so because when a 

vehicle is stopped, nothing more can be determined as to the 

speed of the vehicle when it was observed while traveling upon a 

highway. On the other hand, if an officer possesses sufficient 

knowledge based upon behavior suggestive of DUI, the officer 

may stop the vehicle upon reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code 

violation, since a stop would provide the officer the needed 

opportunity to investigate further if the driver was operating under 

the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. 

Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 993 (Pa.Super. 2015).

Section 4303 of the Motor Vehicle Code, which sets forth general lighting 

requirements, provides in relevant part that “[e]very vehicle operated on a 

highway shall be equipped with a rear lighting system including, but not 

limited to, rear lamps, rear reflectors, stop lamps and license plate light, in 

accordance with regulations of the department.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4303(b). This 

Court has observed that “[d]epartment regulations at 67 Pa.Code §§ 

175.80(a)(9)(i) and 175.66(k) provide a vehicle is not in compliance with the 
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Vehicle Code if ‘[a]n exterior bulb or sealed beam, if originally equipped or 

installed, fails to light properly,” and “the registration plate lamp shall emit 

white light and make the registration plate visible from [a] distance of 50 feet 

to the rear of the vehicle.’” Salter, 121 A.3d 993.

In this case, Trooper Henley and Trooper Heffner testified that one of 

the reasons that caused them to initiate the traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle 

was their observation that Appellant’s license plate lamp was not illuminated. 

In response, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in crediting the 

troopers’ testimony, which Appellant claims was undermined by the dashcam 

recording from the troopers’ patrol car. From Appellant’s point of view, 

Appellant argues that the video shows that his license plate was clearly visible. 

In addition, Appellant asserts that Trooper Henley should have turned

the headlights of his vehicle off to confirm that Appellant’s license plate lights 

were not working. Appellant further contends that Trooper Henley failed to 

corroborate his suspicion that the license plate light was not working after he 

had pulled over Appellant’s vehicle. Thus, Appellant argues that the troopers 

did not demonstrate that they had probable cause that Appellant had violated 

Section 4303 when they activated their overhead lights to initiate the stop.

In upholding the vehicle stop, the trial court specifically found that the 

troopers gave credible and “unequivocal” testimony that the license plate lamp 

was not illuminated on the Cadillac. Trooper Henley specifically testified that 

“you can clearly see that [the registration lamp was] out” even though the 
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patrol car’s headlights were illuminated. Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 

Suppression Hr’g, 6/30/22, at 13-14. 

While Trooper Henley admitted that he did not turn off the lights of the 

patrol car to confirm that Appellant’s license plate lamp was inoperable, the 

trial court found that this action was not required as Trooper Henley 

“steadfastly testified that he was still able to determine the lamp was not 

illuminated and turning off the headlights on the patrol vehicle would have 

created a safety issue.” T.C.O. at 7. 

The record supports the factual findings of the trial judge, who did 

review the dashcam footage and determined that the troopers’ testimony was

credible. On two occasions in the video, Trooper Henley narrated that he 

intended to pull Appellant over for having “no reg[istration] lamps.”

2 Dashcam 

video at 00:00:49-00:00:55; 00:01:26-00:01:27. At the beginning of the 

video, the Cadillac’s license plate is not illuminated and only becomes visible 

when Appellant’s brake lights are activated and the troopers’ vehicle is close 

enough to provide light upon the license plate from its headlights.

As Trooper Henley determined that Appellant’s vehicle had no 

registration lamp and Appellant’s license plate was not illuminated, Appellant’s 

license plate would not have been visible from a distance of 50 feet at 1:17 

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2 Trooper Henley also indicates that he intended to stop Appellant for 

“swerving all over the place ... [and] coming to almost like a stop at a green 

light.” Dashcam video at 00:00:49-00:00:55. We need not determine whether 

these other observations gave the troopers’ the requisite suspicion to stop 

Appellant’s vehicle, as their observation of his inoperable registration lamp 

was sufficient itself to justify the stop.
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a.m. Because Trooper Henley did not need to investigate further to determine 

whether Appellant’s license plate lamp was out, he had probable cause to 

initiate a traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle for a violation of Section 4303.3

Salter, 121 A.3d at 994 (quoting Commonwealth v. Spieler, 887 A.2d 

1271, 1275 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quotation omitted) (clarifying that “[p]robable 

cause does not require certainty, but rather exists when criminality is one 

reasonable inference, not necessarily even the most likely inference”). 

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3 While we uphold the trial court’s finding in this case that Trooper Henley 

possessed probable cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle after observing Appellant 

did not have a working registration lamp, we acknowledge that the requisite 

suspicion to justify a vehicle stop for a violation of Section 4303 varies based 

on the factual circumstances of the case.

It is possible, given the nature of this violation and the conditions 

under which plate illumination may be observed, that an officer 

may have to stop a vehicle to investigate further if a violation 

exists. Reasonable suspicion requires only that the officer have 

sufficient knowledge to believe a traffic violation has occurred in 

order to conduct a brief investigative stop. See Feczko, 10 A.3d 

at 1291 (noting an officer may, consistent with § 6308(b), perform 

a traffic stop “to secure such other information as the officer may 

reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of 

[the Vehicle Code]”). For instance, fog, rain, time of day, or 

obstructions impeding or blocking view of the plate illumination 

might prevent a clear determination if a lighting violation exists. 

If reasonable suspicion exists that such a violation is present, but 

a stop is required to confirm the violation, then probable cause is 

not needed and reasonable suspicion may be sufficient.

Salter, 121 A.3d at 994. However, if an officer observes a vehicle’s license is 

not illuminated and the officer does not need to investigate further to 

determine whether the registration lamps were out, the officer possesses 

probable cause to justify the stop. Id.
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Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying 

Appellant’s suppression motion.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/25/2023