IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-0369

Filed May 1, 2019

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF BRYANT WILLIAM AYALA

AND LAURA WALKER AYALA

Upon the Petition of

BRYANT WILLIAM AYALA,

Petitioner-Appellant,

And Concerning

LAURA WALKER AYALA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William P. Kelly, Judge.

Bryant Ayala appeals the property division provisions in the dissolution of 

marriage decree. AFFIRMED.

Andrew B. Howie and James R. Hinchliff of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud 

& Weese, PC, West Des Moines, for appellant.

Ryan D. Babich of Babich Goldman, PC, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Tabor and Bower, JJ.
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BOWER, Judge.

Bryant Ayala appeals the property division provisions in the district court’s 

decree dissolving his marriage with Laura Ayala. He claims the court should have 

set aside additional amounts to him as premarital assets and erred in its valuation 

of some property. We affirm the court’s decree.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings

Bryant and Laura were married on July 9, 2001. They had three children 

together in 2003, 2006, and 2007. The parties purchased their marital home in 

Bondurant in 2000. 

Laura is forty-seven years old. Laura had her college degree prior to the 

marriage and earned a master’s degree in 2011. Laura was a teacher when the 

parties married. In 2008, Laura resigned and began running an in-home daycare 

business from the marital home. Laura returned to teaching in 2014, and in 2017 

moved to Oskaloosa as a science teacher. She has a salary of approximately 

$47,000 per year.

Bryant is forty-seven years old. Bryant has a high school education. Since 

2004, Bryant has worked out of the marital home as the manager of an apartment 

building rental business and a car rotisserie business. The parties added a shop 

building to the marital property for Bryant’s businesses. The apartment business 

is discussed below in further detail. The car rotisserie business involved Bryant 

making and selling car rotisseries used in the restoration of old cars. The rotisserie 

business had been decreasing in profitability since 2009. He estimated he should 

earn around $25,000 per year at his rotisserie business, working approximately 

twenty hours per week.
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The parties are joint owners of three S-corporations, each of which holds a

multi-unit rental property in the Des Moines area. Two of the properties are 

mortgaged, with Laura’s father acting as mortgagor. Bryant performs maintenance 

and upkeep for the properties and is the primary contact for the tenants, working 

approximately twenty hours per week. Each corporation has a separate checking 

account. Twice a year Bryant makes disbursements from the business accounts 

into a joint account from which Bryant pays himself. The rental properties’ income 

was taxed half to each Bryant and Laura during the marriage, but Bryant 

considered the profits his. Bryant averages $36,000 to $38,000 per year in profit, 

though the tax exhibits show net profits over $40,000 for multiple years.

On May 12, 2016, Bryant filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. In July, 

the court issued an order to preserve assets. In October, the parties entered a 

mediated temporary joint stipulation which required Bryant pay $900 per month for 

child support. Between June and August of 2017, Bryant withdrew approximately 

$18,000 from the joint checking account subject to the preservation order. In July 

Laura moved to Oskaloosa, taking furniture from the marital home. A trial was held 

on August 8, 2017. 

The court entered its decree on October 19, 2017. Laura was granted sole 

legal custody and physical care of the three children, with Bryant paying child 

support. Bryant was awarded all three S-corp. rental properties and the marital 

home. Both parties were found to have violated the preservation of assets order. 

The court ordered Bryant pay an equalization payment to Laura of $343,606.63, 

giving him until January 30, 2020, to refinance the marital home and business 

properties and make the payment.
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On October 24, Bryant filed an Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) motion 

for the court to reconsider several provisions in the decree and stay the order 

relating to three checking accounts. Laura also filed a rule 1.904(2) motion 

requesting the court accelerate the timeline of refinancing and the equalization 

payment, specifically regarding premarital assets. On February 5, 2018, the court 

denied all of Bryant’s motion, and denied Laura’s motion except for a personal 

property provision not applicable here. Bryant appeals.

II. Standard of Review

The standard of review for an action dissolving a marriage is de novo. In re 

Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 690 (Iowa 2007). While our review is de 

novo, the district court is given latitude to make determinations which we will 

disturb only if equity has not been done. In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 

260, 263 (Iowa 2005). We give weight to but are not bound by the district court’s 

factual findings. In re Marriage of Mauer, 874 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa 2016). 

Because the district court is in a unique position to hear the evidence, we defer to 

the district court’s determinations of credibility. In re Marriage of Brown, 487 

N.W.2d 331, 332 (Iowa 1992). 

III. Analysis

On appeal, Bryant requests the equalization payment he is to pay Laura be 

reduced by over $53,000 to a total equalization payment of $289,902.28. He 

calculates this change through setting aside additional premarital moneys to him

and altering the valuations used by the court in its division of assets. 

A. Inclusions. First, Bryant identifies additional premarital assets he 

believes the court should have set aside from the property division. Bryant claims 
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proceeds from the sale of his premarital home should have been set aside and not 

included in the equalization-payment calculations. The other inclusion Bryant 

claims was erroneous was a 1968 Pontiac GTO which, even though purchased 

during the marriage, he claims was purchased using the proceeds from a car sale 

prior to the marriage whose funds had never been commingled. Bryant did not 

identify a specific account or asset where he kept the house proceeds separate 

from the marital assets.

The court expressly found in its decree “that based on the property 

settlement, the court will not treat premarital assets separately from the marital 

assets” except for specifically identified items on the distribution chart. Premarital 

assets for both Bryant and Laura not treated separately included proceeds from 

premarital homes owned by each party, the GTO, and premarital IPERS retirement 

accruals by Laura. The court noted both parties contributed cash from the sales 

of their premarital homes toward the down payment of the marital home and those 

funds had been commingled. 

Our case law is clear that “the property included in the divisible estate 

includes not only property acquired during the marriage by one or both of the 

parties, but property owned prior to the marriage by a party.” In re Marriage of 

Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d 97, 102 (Iowa 2007) (citation omitted). “The trial court may 

place different degrees of weight on the premarital status of property, but it may 

not separate the asset from the divisible estate and automatically award it to the

spouse that owned the property prior to the marriage.” In re Marriage of Sullins, 

715 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Iowa 2006). Indeed, the court’s statutory obligation is to 
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“divide all property, except inherited property or gifts received or expected by one 

party, equitably between the parties.” Iowa Code § 598.21 (2016).

We find the court acted properly by including the parties’ premarital property 

in the division of assets. The inclusions and resulting division of property are 

equitable under the circumstances of this case.

B. Valuations. Bryant challenges the district court’s valuations of 

various business and personal accounts, property, inventory, motor vehicles, and

equipment used by the court in its property division. 

“Ordinarily, a trial court’s valuation will not be disturbed when it is within the 

range of permissible evidence.” Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 703. “In ascertaining the 

value of property, its owner is a competent witness to testify to its market value.” 

Id. “Although our review is de novo, we ordinarily defer to the trial court when 

valuations are accompanied by supporting credibility findings or corroborating 

evidence.” Id.

The district court accepted some of Bryant’s valuations and some of Laura’s 

valuations. The court looked at exhibits submitted by the parties supporting their 

valuations. When making its valuation determinations, the court also considered 

the dissipation of assets by both parties in violation of the court’s order during their 

separation. The court further clarified its decree and valuations in the ruling on the 

parties’ rule 1.904 motions. The court specifically noted that it was winding up a 

corporation between partners when one partner was receiving the businesses and 

the associated physical assets and trying to ensure the partner being bought out 

obtained her share of the profits from 2017 as well as appropriate equity for her 

half-ownership in the corporations.
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Bryant has not established the court’s valuations were outside the range of 

permissible evidence. We find the district court’s valuations were each well within 

the range of permissible evidence, and we decline to disturb the court’s credibility 

findings relating to the valuation of assets. See In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 

N.W.2d 671, 679 (Iowa 2013).

We find the court’s valuations and distribution of assets to be equitable. We 

affirm the district court’s division of property.

C. Appellate Attorney Fees. Laura requests an award of appellate 

attorney fees. She has submitted an affidavit showing her attorney fees for this 

appeal are $5869.00. An award of appellate attorney fees is not a matter of right, 

but rests within the court’s discretion. Sullins, 715 N.W.2d at 255. We consider 

“the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay, and 

the relative merits of the appeal.” Id. We determine Laura should be awarded 

appellate attorney fees of $3000.

AFFIRMED.