Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 46 / Tuesday, March 10, 2015 / Notices 12649 

www.justice.gov/enrd/Consent_

Decrees.html. 

Cherie L. Rogers, 

Assistant Section Chief, Environmental 

Defense Section, Environment and Natural 

Resources Division. 

[FR Doc. 2015–05493 Filed 3–9–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–15–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[NRC–2015–0048] 

Compliance With Phase 2 of Order EA– 

13–109 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Draft interim staff guidance; 

request for comment. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is issuing for public 

comment its Japan Lessons-Learned 

Division (JLD) draft interim staff 

guidance (ISG), ‘‘Compliance with 

Phase 2 of Order EA–13–109, Order 

Modifying Licenses with Regard to 

Reliable Hardened Containment Vents 

Capable of Operation under Severe 

Accident Conditions,’’ (JLD–ISG–2015– 

01). This draft JLD–ISG would provide 

guidance and clarification to assist 

nuclear power reactor licensees identify 

measures needed to comply with Phase 

2 requirements of the ‘‘Order Modifying 

Licenses with Regard to Reliable 

Hardened Containment Vents Capable 

of Operation Under Severe Accident 

Conditions,’’ (Order EA–13–109) to have 

either a vent path from the containment 

drywell or a strategy that makes it 

unlikely that venting would be needed 

from the drywell before alternate 

reliable containment heat removal and 

pressure control is reestablished. 

DATES: Submit comments by April 9, 

2015. Comments received after this date 

will be considered, if it is practical to do 

so, but the Commission is able to ensure 

consideration only for comments 

received before this date. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comment 

by any of the following methods (unless 

this document describes a different 

method for submitting comments on a 

specific subject): 

• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2015–0048. Address 

questions about NRC dockets to Carol 

Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463; 

email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For 

technical questions, contact the 

individual listed in the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section of this 

document. 

• Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, 

Office of Administration, Mail Stop: 

OWFN–12–H08, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001. 

For additional direction on obtaining 

information and submitting comments, 

see ‘‘Obtaining Information and 

Submitting Comments’’ in the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 

this document. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Rajender Auluck, Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–415– 

1025; email: Rajender.Auluck@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Obtaining Information and 

Submitting Comments 

A. Obtaining Information 

Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2015– 

0048 when contacting the NRC about 

the availability of information regarding 

this document. You may obtain 

publicly-available information related to 

this action by the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2015–0048. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may access publiclyavailable documents online in the NRC 

Library at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html. To begin the search, 

select ‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and 

then select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS 

Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, 

please contact the NRC’s Public 

Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 

1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by 

email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The 

ADAMS accession number for each 

document referenced in this notice (if 

that document is available in ADAMS) 

is provided the first time that a 

document is referenced. The draft JLD– 

ISG–2015–01 is available in ADAMS 

under Accession No. ML15051A143. 

The ISG for complying with Phase 1 

requirements of the order (JLD–ISG– 

2013–02) was issued on November 14, 

2013 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML13304B836). 

• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and 

purchase copies of public documents at 

the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 

Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. 

• NRC’s Interim Staff Guidance Web 

site: JLD–ISG documents are also 

available online under the ‘‘Japan 

Lessons Learned’’ heading at http://

www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/isg/japan-lessonslearned.html. 

B. Submitting Comments 

Please include Docket ID NRC–2015– 

0048 in the subject line of your 

comment submission, in order to ensure 

that the NRC is able to make your 

comment submission available to the 

public in this docket. 

The NRC cautions you not to include 

identifying or contact information that 

you do not want to be publicly 

disclosed in your comment submission. 

The NRC posts all comment 

submissions at http://

www.regulations.gov as well as entering 

the comment submissions into ADAMS. 

The NRC does not routinely edit 

comment submissions to remove 

identifying or contact information. 

If you are requesting or aggregating 

comments from other persons for 

submission to the NRC, then you should 

inform those persons not to include 

identifying or contact information that 

they do not want to be publicly 

disclosed in their comment submission. 

Your request should state that the NRC 

does not routinely edit comment 

submissions to remove such information 

before making the comment 

submissions available to the public or 

entering the comment submissions into 

ADAMS. 

II. Background 

The NRC developed draft JLD–ISG– 

2015–01 to provide guidance and 

clarification to assist nuclear power 

reactor licensees with the identification 

of methods needed to comply with 

Phase 2 requirements in Order EA–13– 

109, ‘‘Order Modifying Licenses with 

Regard to Reliable Hardened 

Containment Vents Capable of 

Operation under Severe Accident 

Conditions’’ (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML13130A067). The draft ISG would 

not be a substitute for the requirements 

in Order EA–13–109, and compliance 

with the ISG would not be a 

requirement. This ISG is being issued in 

draft form for public comment to 

involve the public in development of 

the implementing guidance. 

The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station reinforced 

the importance of reliable operation of 

containment vents for boiling-water 

reactor (BWR) plants with Mark I and 

Mark II containments. As part of its 

response to the lessons learned from the 

accident, on March 12, 2012, the NRC 

issued Order EA–12–050 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML12056A043) requiring 

licensees to upgrade or install a reliable 

hardened containment venting system 

(HCVS) for Mark I and Mark II 

containments. The requirements in 

Order EA–12–050 for licensees with 

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12650 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 46 / Tuesday, March 10, 2015 / Notices 

BWR plants with Mark I and Mark II 

containments were intended to increase 

the reliability of containment venting to 

support decay heat removal from the 

reactor core and provide protection 

against over-pressurization of the 

primary containments. While 

developing the requirements for Order 

EA–12–050, the NRC acknowledged that 

questions remained about maintaining 

containment integrity and limiting the 

release of radioactive materials if 

licensees used the venting systems 

during severe accident conditions. 

The NRC staff presented the 

Commission with options to address 

these issues in SECY–12–0157, 

‘‘Consideration of Additional 

Requirements for Containment Venting 

Systems for Boiling Water Reactors with 

Mark I and Mark II Containments’’ 

(issued November 26, 2012, ADAMS 

Accession No. ML12325A704). The 

options presented in SECY–12–0157 

included continuing with the 

implementation of Order EA–12–050 for 

reliable hardened vents (Option 1); 

requiring licensees to upgrade or replace 

the reliable hardened vents required by 

EA–12–050 with a containment venting 

system designed and installed to remain 

functional during severe accident 

conditions (Option 2); requiring 

licensees with BWR Mark I and Mark II 

containments to install an engineered 

filtered containment venting system 

intended to prevent the release of 

significant amounts of radioactive 

material following the dominant severe 

accident sequences (Option 3); and 

pursuing development of requirements 

and technical acceptance criteria for 

performance-based confinement 

strategies (Option 4). The NRC staff 

provided an evaluation considering 

various quantitative analyses and 

qualitative factors related to the options 

and recommended the Commission 

approve Option 3 to require the 

installation of an engineered filtering 

system. One issue not specifically 

addressed within SECY–12–0157 was 

the importance of water addition to cool 

core debris as part of severe accident 

management for BWR’s with Mark I and 

II containments. The NRC staff 

acknowledged in SECY–12–0157 that in 

the longer-term rulemaking associated 

with any of the options presented, the 

NRC could consider adding 

requirements for the capability of core 

debris cooling during severe accident 

scenarios. 

In the staff requirements 

memorandum (SRM) for SECY–12– 

0157, dated March 19, 2013 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML13078A017), the 

Commission directed the staff to: (1) 

Issue a modification to Order EA–12– 

050 requiring BWR licensees with Mark 

I and Mark II containments to upgrade 

or replace the reliable hardened vents 

required by Order EA–12–050 with a 

containment venting system designed 

and installed to remain functional 

during severe accident conditions, and 

(2) develop a technical basis and 

rulemaking for filtering strategies with 

drywell filtration and severe accident 

management of BWR Mark I and II 

containments. The NRC subsequently 

issued Order EA–13–109 to define 

requirements and schedules for 

licensees for BWRs with Mark I and 

Mark II containments to install severe 

accident capable containment venting 

systems. The NRC staff also initiated 

development and evaluation of other 

possible regulatory actions identified in 

the Commission’s SRM for SECY–12– 

0157, including the development of a 

technical basis in support of a 

Containment Protection and Release 

Reduction (CPRR) rulemaking. 

Order EA–13–109, in addition to 

requiring a reliable HCVS to assist in 

preventing core damage when heat 

removal capability is lost (the purpose 

of EA–12–050), will ensure that venting 

functions are also available during 

severe accident conditions. Severe 

accident conditions include the elevated 

temperatures, pressures, radiation 

levels, and combustible gas 

concentrations, such as hydrogen and 

carbon monoxide, associated with 

accidents involving extensive core 

damage, including accidents involving a 

breach of the reactor vessel by molten 

core debris. The safety improvements to 

Mark I and Mark II containment venting 

systems required by Order EA–13–109 

increase confidence in licensees’ ability 

to maintain the containment function 

following core damage events. Although 

venting the containment during severe 

accident conditions could result in the 

release of radioactive materials, venting 

could also prevent containment 

structural failures and gross penetration 

leakage due to overpressurization that 

would hamper accident management 

(e.g., continuing efforts to cool core 

debris) and ultimately result in larger, 

uncontrolled releases of radioactive 

material. 

In recognition of the relative 

importance of venting capabilities from 

the wetwell and drywell, a phased 

approach to implementation is being 

used to minimize delays in 

implementing the requirements 

originally imposed by Order EA–12– 

050. Phase 1 involves upgrading the 

venting capabilities from the 

containment wetwell to provide 

reliable, severe accident capable 

hardened vents to assist in preventing 

core damage and, if necessary, to 

provide venting capability during severe 

accident conditions. Phase 2 involves 

providing additional protection during 

severe accident conditions through 

installation of a reliable, severe accident 

capable drywell vent system or the 

development of a reliable containment 

venting strategy that makes it unlikely 

that a licensee would need to vent from 

the containment drywell during severe 

accident conditions. For 

implementation of Phase 1 order 

requirements, the NRC issued JLD–ISG– 

2013–02 on November 14, 2013 (78 FR 

70356), which endorsed, with 

clarifications, the methodologies 

described in the industry guidance 

document Nuclear Energy Institute 

(NEI) 13–02, Rev. 0 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML13316A853). As required by the 

order, licensees submitted their sitespecific overall integrated plans by June 

30, 2014. The NRC is currently 

reviewing these plans and expects to 

complete those reviews by June 2015. 

The focus of this ISG is to provide 

guidance for Phase 2 requirements of 

the order. Some proposed approaches to 

implement Phase 2 requirements of the 

order include the addition of water to 

the drywell during severe accident 

conditions. Evaluations performed by 

the NRC and industry in conjunction 

with the CPRR rulemaking show that 

water addition during severe accident 

conditions provides benefits that 

include reducing temperatures and 

cooling molten core debris. In SECY– 

12–0157, the NRC discussed various 

risk assessments by the NRC and 

industry that have concluded that 

adding water to the drywell reduces the 

likelihood of release of radioactive 

materials for those severe accident 

scenarios that involve fuel melting 

through the reactor vessel. The water 

added to the drywell cools the molten 

fuel and can arrest the melting fuel’s 

progression and reduce the likelihood of 

a loss of the containment function 

through liner melt-through, containment 

over-pressurization failure, and 

containment over-temperature failure. 

In addition to the benefits associated 

with containment protection, recent 

technical evaluations performed by both 

the industry and the NRC indicate that 

including the capability of timely severe 

accident water addition (SAWA) results 

in a substantially lower drywell 

temperature for consideration in 

designing the drywell vent. Therefore, 

SAWA will facilitate implementation of 

Phase 2 of Order EA–13–109 by 

establishing the design conditions for a 

drywell vent and supporting severe 

accident water management (SAWM) for 

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 46 / Tuesday, March 10, 2015 / Notices 12651 

1 15 U.S.C.78s(b)(1). 

2 15 U.S.C. 78a. 

3 17 CFR 240.19b–4. 

4Transaction fees on Strategy Executions are 

further capped at $25,000 per month per initiating 

firm. The Exchange is not proposing to modify this 

$25,000 monthly cap. Mini options are excluded 

from the Strategy Cap. See Fee Schedule, available 

at, https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/markets/ 

arca-options/NYSE_Arca_Options_Fee_

Schedule.pdf. 

5 15 U.S.C. 78f(b). 

6 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4) and (5). 

licensees choosing to pursue that option 

as a strategy that makes it unlikely that 

a licensee would need to vent from the 

drywell. 

On December 10, 2014, NEI submitted 

NEI 13–02, ‘‘Industry Guidance for 

Compliance with Order EA–13–109,’’ 

Rev. 0E2 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML1434A374) to assist nuclear power 

licensees with the identification of 

measures needed to comply with the 

requirements of Order EA–13–109 

regarding reliable hardened 

containment vents capable of operation 

under severe accident conditions. The 

NEI document includes guidance for 

implementing order requirements for 

both Phase 1 and Phase 2, including the 

industry’s proposed approach to use the 

SAWA and SAWM strategies to control 

the water levels in the suppression pool 

and maintain capabilities to address 

over-pressure conditions without a 

severe accident drywell vent. As 

described in the draft ISG, some issues 

remain the subject of ongoing 

discussions as part of finalizing the 

guidance. These include: (1) 

Availability of power and functional 

requirements for the SAWA-related 

installed and portable equipment, (2) 

duration of time for preservation of the 

wetwell vent for the SAWM strategy, 

and (3) alternate control of containment 

conditions during recovery from the 

severe accident. The NRC intends to 

continue discussions with stakeholders 

prior to finalizing the ISG for Phase 2 of 

the order and endorsing, with 

clarifications and exceptions if 

necessary, the methodologies described 

in the industry guidance document NEI 

13–02, Rev. 0E2. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day 

of March 2015. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Jack R. Davis, 

Director, Japan Lessons-Learned Division, 

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. 

[FR Doc. 2015–05436 Filed 3–9–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

[Release No. 34–74436; File No. SR– 

NYSEARCA–2015–09] 

Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE 

Arca, Inc.; Notice of Filing and 

Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed 

Rule Change Amending the NYSE Arca 

Options Fee Schedule Relating to 

Strategy Executions 

March 4, 2015. 

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) 1 of the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 

‘‘Act’’) 2 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,3

notice is hereby given that, on February 

24, 2015, NYSE Arca, Inc. (the 

‘‘Exchange’’ or ‘‘NYSE Arca’’) filed with 

the Securities and Exchange 

Commission (the ‘‘Commission’’) the 

proposed rule change as described in 

Items I, II, and III below, which Items 

have been prepared by the selfregulatory organization. The 

Commission is publishing this notice to 

solicit comments on the proposed rule 

change from interested persons. 

I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Terms of Substance of 

the Proposed Rule Change 

The Exchange proposes to amend the 

NYSE Arca Options Fee Schedule (‘‘Fee 

Schedule’’) relating to Strategy 

Executions. The Exchange proposes to 

implement the change on March 1, 

2015. The text of the proposed rule 

change is available on the Exchange’s 

Web site at www.nyse.com, at the 

principal office of the Exchange, and at 

the Commission’s Public Reference 

Room. 

II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Purpose of, and 

Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule 

Change 

In its filing with the Commission, the 

self-regulatory organization included 

statements concerning the purpose of, 

and basis for, the proposed rule change 

and discussed any comments it received 

on the proposed rule change. The text 

of those statements may be examined at 

the places specified in Item IV below. 

The Exchange has prepared summaries, 

set forth in sections A, B, and C below, 

of the most significant parts of such 

statements. 

A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of the Purpose of, and 

Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule 

Change 

1. Purpose 

The purpose of this filing is to modify 

the Exchange’s Limit on Fees on 

Options Strategy Executions (‘‘Strategy 

Cap’’). Currently, the Exchange imposes 

a Strategy Cap of $750 on transaction 

fees for certain Strategy Executions 

executed in standard option contracts 

on the same trading day in the same 

option class. The Exchange is proposing 

to lower the $750 Strategy Cap to $700.4

The Exchange proposes to implement 

the $700 Strategy Cap on March 1, 2015. 

Strategy Executions that are eligible 

for the Strategy Cap would continue to 

be (a) reversals and conversions, (b) box 

spreads, (c) short stock interest spreads, 

(d) merger spreads, and (e) jelly rolls. As 

is the case today, Royalty fees associated 

with Strategy Executions on Index and 

Exchange Traded Funds would not be 

included in the calculation of the 

Strategy Cap, but would be passed 

through to trading participants on the 

Strategy Executions on a pro-rata basis. 

Similarly, manual Broker Dealer and 

Firm Proprietary Strategy trades that do 

not reach the $700 Strategy Cap would 

continue to be billed at $0.25 per 

contract. 

The use of these Strategy Executions 

benefits all market participants by 

increasing liquidity in general and 

allowing significant and complex 

trading interest to be brought together to 

enhance liquidity. By encouraging this 

type of business on the Exchange, the 

increased liquidity benefits all market 

participants. The Exchange believes the 

proposed change would continue to 

incentivize market participants to trade 

on the Exchange by capping option 

transaction charges related to various 

Strategy Executions. 

2. Statutory Basis 

The Exchange believes that the 

proposed rule change is consistent with 

Section 6(b) of the Act,5 in general, and 

furthers the objectives of Sections 

6(b)(4) and (5) of the Act,6 in particular, 

because it would provide for the 

equitable allocation of reasonable dues, 

fees, and other charges among its 

members, issuers and other persons 

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