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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

September 2017 Term 

_________________ FILED 

November 8, 2017 No. 16-0672 released at 3:00 p.m. 

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK __________________ SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA 

IN RE: GUARDIANSHIP OF A.C. 

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Berkeley County
 

The Honorable Michael D. Lorenson, Judge
 

Civil Action No. 16-CIG-19
 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

Submitted: October 11, 2017 

Filed: November 8, 2017 

Kimberley D. Crockett, Esq. Patrick Morrisey, Esq. 

Crockett Law Attorney General 

Guardian ad Litem for A.C. Lee Niezgoda, Esq. 

Falling Waters, West Virginia West Virginia Department of Health and 

Counsel for the Petitioner Human Resources 

Fairmont, West Virginia
 

Counsel for the Respondents
 

Ashton Bias, Esq.
 

Lynn Ranson Law Offices
 

Charleston, West Virginia
 

Guardian ad litem for Father, K.W.
 

E.B., pro se
 

Respondent
 

JUSTICE WORKMAN delivered the Opinion of the Court. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
 

1. “When this Court reviews challenges to the findings and conclusions of the 

circuit court, a two-prong deferential standard of review is applied. We review the final 

order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the 

circuit court’s underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard.” Syl. Pt. 1, 

McCormick v. Allstate Ins. Co., 197 W. Va. 415, 475 S.E.2d 507 (1996). 

2. “‘“The exercise of discretion by a trial court in awarding custody of a minor 

child will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion has been abused; however, where 

the trial court’s ruling does not reflect a discretionary decision but is based upon an erroneous 

application of the law and is clearly wrong, the ruling will be reversed on appeal.” Syllabus 

point 2, Funkhouser v. Funkhouser, 158 W.Va. 964, 216 S.E.2d 570 (1975), superseded by 

statute on other grounds as stated in David M. v. Margaret M., 182 W.Va. 57, 385 S.E.2d 

912 (1989).’ Syl. Pt. 1, In re Abbigail Faye B., 222 W.Va. 466, 665 S.E.2d 300 (2008).” 

Syl. Pt. 2, In re Antonio R.A., 228 W.Va. 380, 719 S.E.2d 850 (2011). 

3. “Pursuant to the plain language of W. Va. Code § 44-10-3(a) (2006) (Supp. 

2007), the circuit court or family court of the county in which a minor resides may appoint 

a suitable person to serve as the minor’s guardian. In appointing a guardian, the court shall 

i 
 

 

 

 

give priority to the minor’s mother or father. ‘However, in every case, the competency and 

fitness of the proposed guardian and the welfare and best interests of the minor shall be given 

precedence by the court when appointing the guardian.’ W. Va. Code § 44-10-3(a).” Syl. 

Pt. 6, In re Abbigail Faye B., 222 W.Va. 466, 665 S.E.2d 300 (2008). 

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Workman, Justice: 

This is an appeal by a twelve-year-old girl, A.C.,1 through her guardian ad 

litem, Kimberley D. Crockett (hereinafter “the Petitioner”). The Petitioner contends the 

Circuit Court of BerkeleyCountyerred in awarding guardianship of A.C. to her grandmother, 

A.H. The Petitioner argues the circuit court’s placement of A.C. is not in her best interests 

and fails to include an appropriate evaluation of the Guardianship Screening Factors 

enumerated in Rule 10 of the West Virginia Rules of Practice and Procedure for Minor 

Guardianship Proceedings. Upon this Court’s review of the parties’ arguments, the record 

presented for appellate consideration, and pertinent authorities, we reverse the decision of 

the circuit court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I. Factual and Procedural History 

The child’s mother, T.C., died of a heroin overdose in the presence of the child 

on February 24, 2016. In March 2016, E.B., the godmother of A.C. and a resident of Florida, 

filed a petition for guardianship of A.C. The mother and E.B. had been friends since 

childhood, and the mother and child had lived with E.B. in 2005-06 and again in 2015. 

E.B.’s request for guardianship included a “Temporary Guardianship Agreement” executed 

1

Based upon the sensitive facts of this case, we protect the identities of those involved 

by using initials rather than full names. See State ex rel. West Virginia Dep’t of Hum. Servs. 

v. Cheryl M., 177 W.Va. 688, 689 n.1, 356 S.E.2d 181, 182 n.1 (1987); see also W.Va. R. 

App. P. 40. 

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by A.C.’s mother in August 2012, naming E.B. as A.C.’s custodian “[f]or as long as 

necessary.” E.B. testified that the mother had executed the agreement to provide for A.C.’s 

care and that “[i]f anything ever happened to her, she wanted me to take care of [A.C.].” 

According to the “Report and Recommendation of Guardian ad Litem,” the child’s father 

also contacted E.B. immediately after the death of the child’s mother requesting that she seek 

custody of the child. E.B. left Florida to come to West Virginia within hours of the mother’s 

death. 

A.C.’s father, K.W., did not know of her existence until she was five years old 

and was incarcerated for most of her life. He was released from prison in 2016 after serving 

a sentence of eight and one-half years for conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance. After 

her mother’s death in 2016, A.C. lived in a home with her grandmother A.H., greatgrandparents, and another man who was a boyfriend of A.C.’s aunt and a registered sex 

offender. 

On March 8, 2016, the Petitioner was appointed as guardian ad litem for the 

child, and the Department of Health and Human Resources (hereinafter “the DHHR”) 

received a referral from the circuit court, providing as follows: “Court ordered assessment, 

16-JAA-18, Mother notarized temporary guardianship in 2012. Mother is deceased and 

child’s father is incarcerated.” According to the DHHR, it completed a family functioning 

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assessment focusing on the biological father and the petitioning godmother, E.B. It found 

no maltreatment by the father and found that appropriate provisions had been made for the 

care of the child in the father’s absence. The DHHR had no further involvement in the case 

until it received a referral from the Petitioner in October 2016 regarding possible drug abuse 

in the home, and it did not ultimately find any maltreatment of the child. 

The child’s grandmother, A.H., also filed a petition seeking guardianship of 

the child on March 14, 2016. In her petition, she included a “Temporary/Permanent 

Guardianship Agreement” in which A.C.’s father, while still in prison, had granted 

guardianship rights of A.C. to her grandmother, A.H., with specified dates of March 20, 

2016, to December 12, 2016. 

Subsequent to extensive investigation in her role as guardian ad litem, the 

Petitioner recommended that the child be placed with E.B., the godmother, with whom the 

child had previously lived for substantial periods of time. The Petitioner based her 

recommendation, in part, upon the Guardianship Screening Factors enumerated in Rule 10 

of the Rules of Practice and Procedure for Minor Guardianship Proceedings.2 The Petitioner 

2

Rule 10 of the West Virginia Rules of Practice and Procedure for Minor 

Guardianship Proceedings provides specific Guardianship Screening Factors to be utilized 

in ascertaining appropriate placements. The rule provides as follows: 

The court, when determining an appropriate guardianship appointment over 

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found that A.H. would not be a fit guardian for the child based upon various concerning 

factors such as A.H. permitting a sex offender to reside in the home with her and the child; 

abusing alcohol, driving on a revoked license subsequent to two DUI convictions; driving 

while intoxicated; and permitting other familymembers who abused illegal substances to live 

in the home. 

On April 27, 2016, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing and conducted 

an in-camera interview with A.C. and the Petitioner. A.C., age eleven at that time,3 informed 

the person of a minor, shall ascertain and consider, among other pertinent 

matters, whether any proposed guardian:
 

1) Is required to register as a sex offender under West Virginia Code, Chapter
 

15, Article 12;
 

2) Has a record of any misdemeanor or felony convictions;
 

3) Has ever been subject to a restraining order or final protective order;
 

4) Has ever been the subject of any substantiated report alleging child abuse, 

neglect, or molestation made to any child protection agency, other law 

enforcement agency, or court in any jurisdiction; 

5) Habitually uses any illegal substances or abuses alcohol; or 

6) Has another person living in the home that involves any of the matters stated 

above. 

W.Va. R. Prac. & P. Minor Guardianship Proc. 10. 

3

This Court has observed the rights of children to express their preferences in certain 

situations. In syllabus point two of Rose v. Rose, 176 W.Va. 18, 340 S.E.2d 176 (1985), this 

Court held: 

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the circuit court that she had been repeatedly and frequently exposed to alcohol and drug 

abuse in A.H.’s home and that A.H. was “drunk all the time,” allowed drug use in the home, 

and had not attempted to prevent A.C.’s mother from abusing drugs. A.C. specifically stated 

that she did not want to live in the home with A.H. because her mother had died in the home 

and the family abused drugs there. She further explained she would prefer to live with E.B., 

felt safe in E.B.’s home, had previously attended school there, and had personal possessions 

in E.B.’s home. A.C. informed the circuit court that A.H. had pressured her to testify that 

she wanted to remain with A.H. in West Virginia. A.C. also testified that her grandmother 

drove a vehicle while intoxicated. 

A.C.’s cousin, J.S., age nineteen, testified that A.H. was not a fit parent and had 

physically attacked J.S. after she read a report by the Petitioner regarding A.H.’s alleged 

unfitness for guardianship. J.S. also testified that she had witnessed A.H. driving her vehicle 

with the child in the car on multiple occasions, despite her loss of a drivers’ license based 

upon her DUI convictions. 

“Where there is a child under fourteen years of age, but sufficiently 

mature that he can intelligently express a voluntary preference for one parent, 

the trial judge is entitled to give that preference such weight as circumstances 

warrant, and where such child demonstrates a preference for the parent who 

is not the primary caretaker, the trial judge is entitled to conclude that the 

presumption in favor of the primary caretaker is rebutted.” Syl. pt. 7, Garska 

v. McCoy, 167 W.Va. 59, 278 S.E.2d 357 (1981). 

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On June 14, 2016, the circuit court awarded guardianship of the child to the 

grandmother, A.H., over the objection of the Petitioner. The circuit court noted that the child 

would be permitted to maintain contact with E.B. through the use of her cell phone. 

Observing that the registered sex offender had moved out of the grandmother’s home, the 

circuit court further held that the child “is 11, and permanence and distance to Florida is 

unrealistic and looking at the long term, the least amount of harm will be placed upon the 

child if she remained with family in Martinsburg. She lived in Florida only a couple months 

and then only with her mother.” 

The circuit court also stated the DHHR had not made a finding of abuse by the 

grandmother, the father wanted the child placed with family, E.B. lives over a thousand miles 

away, and it 

would create an unreasonable burden on the biological father 

and given that no guardian ad litem had been appointed to 

permit the respondent father to attend [the hearing], the only 

final result that could be achieved in this hearing would be to 

award guardianship consistent with the wishes of the biological 

father. 

During the course of the proceedings, grandmother A.H. requested that a guardian ad litem 

be appointed for the father. The circuit court noted the request and responded: “[the] request 

for a Guardian ad Litem on behalf of [the father] is taken under advisement pending decision 

on the merits given the distance that the original petitioner [E.B.] traveled to attend the 

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hearing and given than [sic] the Respondent Father did express his preference in writing.” 

The circuit court did not ultimately appoint a guardian ad litem for the father. 

On October 24, 2016, the Petitioner filed an appeal with this Court, contending 

that the circuit court’s award of guardianship to the grandmother, A.H., was not in the child’s 

best interests and should be reversed.4 While this appeal was pending, the child’s father filed 

a petition for termination of the grandmother’s guardianship. In September 2017, this Court 

entered an order finding that the circuit court no longer had jurisdiction over matters involved 

in this case because this Court had assumed jurisdiction. Further, this Court appointed 

Ashton Bias to represent the father’s interests. On October 4, 2017, Ashton Bias, as guardian 

ad litem for the father, filed a brief indicating that the father agreed with the placement with 

the grandmother during the circuit court proceedings below. He alleged, however, that the 

circuit court abused its discretion in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem for the father to 

allow him to be actively involved in the proceeding below. 

II. Standard of Review 

4

The grandmother, A.H., did not make an appearance or file any briefs with this Court. 

The godmother, E.B., appeared pro se before this Court during oral argument and has 

indicated her desire to join the Petitioner in arguing that the circuit court erred in awarding 

guardianship to the grandmother. While not included in the record, reference was made to 

a home study of E.B.’s residence in Florida, indicating that her home would be fit for the 

child. 

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In syllabus point one of McCormick v. Allstate Insurance Co., 197 W. Va. 415, 

475 S.E.2d 507 (1996), this Court held: 

When this Court reviews challenges to the findings and 

conclusions of the circuit court, a two-prong deferential standard 

of review is applied. We review the final order and the ultimate 

disposition under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review 

the circuit court’s underlying factual findings under a clearly 

erroneous standard. 

We have also held the standard of review applicable to custody decisions, including 

guardianship decisions, is as follows: 

“‘The exercise of discretion by a trial court in awarding 

custody of a minor child will not be disturbed on appeal unless 

that discretion has been abused; however, where the trial court’s 

ruling does not reflect a discretionary decision but is based upon 

an erroneous application of the law and is clearly wrong, the 

ruling will be reversed on appeal.’ Syllabus point 2, Funkhouser 

v. Funkhouser, 158 W.Va. 964, 216 S.E.2d 570 (1975), 

superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in David M. v. 

Margaret M., 182 W.Va. 57, 385 S.E.2d 912 (1989).” Syl. Pt. 

1, In re Abbigail Faye B., 222 W.Va. 466, 665 S.E.2d 300 

(2008). 

Syl. Pt. 2, In re Antonio R.A., 228 W.Va. 380, 719 S.E.2d 850 (2011). With these standards 

as guidance, this Court addresses the arguments of the parties. 

III. Discussion 

The standards governing the appointment of guardians for minors are 

enumerated in West Virginia Code § 44-10-3 (2014). West Virginia Code § 44-10-3(h) 

provides, in relevant part, that “in every case the competency and fitness of the proposed 

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guardian must be established and a determination made that the appointment is in the best 

interest of the child.” Addressing the requirements of the statute,5 this Court explained as 

follows in syllabus point six of In re Abbigail Faye B., 222 W.Va. 466, 665 S.E.2d 300 

(2008): 

Pursuant to the plain language of W. Va. Code § 44-10­

3(a) (2006) (Supp. 2007), the circuit court or family court of the 

county in which a minor resides may appoint a suitable person 

to serve as the minor’s guardian. In appointing a guardian, the 

court shall give priority to the minor’s mother or father. 

“However, in every case, the competency and fitness of the 

proposed guardian and the welfare and best interests of the 

minor shall be given precedence by the court when appointing 

the guardian.” W. Va. Code § 44-10-3(a). 

We further evaluated the statutory scheme in Antonio R.A., noting as follows: “West 

Virginia Code § 44-10-3 grants authority to family and circuit courts to appoint guardians for 

minors and gives courts discretion in determining when such appointments are necessary and 

who to appoint as a guardian in an individual case.” 228 W.Va. at 387, 719 S.E.2d at 857. 

We observed the critical significance of an analysis of the best interests of the child in In re 

K.H., 235 W.Va. 254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015), reasoning as follows: 

This Court addressed these requirements in the specific context 

of a termination of guardianship in In re Haylea G., 231 W.Va. 

494, 745 S.E.2d 532 (2013), and has consistently required 

analysis of best interests and changed circumstances in matters 

involving custody of children. Id. at 498, 745 S.E.2d at 536. A 

5

West Virginia Code § 44-10-3 was rewritten subsequent to this Court’s decision in 

Abbigail Faye. The significance of examination of the best interests of the child, however, 

remains a key component of the statute. 

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child’s best interests have been heralded as the paramount 

consideration by which all custody determinations should be 

made. We have repeatedly held that “[i]n a contest involving 

the custody of an infant the welfare of the child is the polar star 

by which the discretion of the court will be guided.” Syl. Pt. 1, 

State ex rel. Cash v. Lively, 155 W.Va. 801, 187 S.E.2d 601 

(1972) (internal citation omitted); see also Syl. Pt. 3, in part, In 

re Katie S., 198 W.Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996) (“Although 

parents have substantial rights that must be protected, the 

primary goal . . . in all family law matters . . . must be the health 

and welfare of the children.”); Syl. Pt. 5, Carter v. Carter, 196 

W.Va. 239, 470 S.E.2d 193 (1996) (“In visitation as well as 

custody matters, we have traditionally held paramount the best 

interests of the child.”). 

235 W.Va. at 259, 773 S.E.2d at 25. 

In the instant case, the Petitioner contends the circuit court erred by failing to 

adequately evaluate the best interests of A.C. She asserts that the circuit court failed to 

properly analyze the Guardianship Screening Factors in its decision to grant guardianship of 

the child to the grandmother and also failed to provide appropriate consideration to the 

suitability of granting guardianship to the godmother, E.B. See W.Va. R. Prac & P. Minor 

Guardianship Proc. 10. The Petitioner emphasizes that the circuit court’s hesitancy to award 

guardianship to E.B. was based upon her location in Florida, rather than any concern with 

her caretaking skills or other qualification issues. 

This Court’s review of the record reveals the child’s well-reasoned, concise, 

and articulate expression of her preference to reside with E.B. Although a child’s decision 

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is obviously not the only consideration in a determination regarding guardianship, the basis 

for this child’s decision in this case reveals the profoundness of the difficulties inherent in 

the proposed placement in the grandmother’s home. The grandmother allegedly abuses 

alcohol and possibly drugs, drives the child while inebriated, drives on a revoked license, 

smokes an unknown substance out of a soda can, and permits individuals with various and 

sundry drug and other issues to live in the home. When the child texted a photograph to the 

Petitioner of a container of what appeared to be marijuana, the Petitioner referred the case 

to child protective services and law enforcement. Officers investigating the grandmother’s 

home located what appeared to be residue of marijuana, but no arrests were made. The child 

also reported that the grandmother confiscated her cell phone, allegedlybecause the child had 

revealed familymatters to a social worker at school, and thereafter prohibited communication 

between the child and the Petitioner. According to updates filed by the Petitioner during the 

pendency of this appeal, the grandmother also allegedly prohibited the child from contacting 

E.B., despite the circuit court’s ruling allowing such contact. 

The Petitioner argues that the circuit court clearly disregarded this 

overwhelming evidence of unfitness and resolved the guardianship matter in a manner that 

does not serve the best interests of this child. Our review of the record reveals the accuracy 

of the Petitioner’s assertions. While the circuit court’s attempt to preserve a continued 

relationship with family members is laudable, the proximity and convenience for family 

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members does not take precedence over the best interests of the child. Moreover, the circuit 

court appears to have undervalued the Guardianship Screening Factors; those factors require 

courts to consider whether the proposed guardian has convictions, abuses drugs or alcohol, 

or has allowed a registered sex offender and drug abusers to live in the home. See W.Va. R. 

Prac & P. Minor Guardianship Proc. 10. Children have a substantial need for continuity of 

care and integration into safe, drug-free, permanent homes. Decisions regarding 

arrangements for guardianships and child custody are certainly some of the most challenging 

cases this Court encounters. There are no obvious answers to the questions posed in such 

crucial cases, and “[f]ormula[s] or computer solutions . . . are impossible because of the 

unique character of each case, and the subjective nature of the evaluations and decisions that 

must be made.” Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 967 (Md. 1986); see also Waters v. Magee, 

877 A.2d 658, 664-65 (R.I. 2005) (“No one factor is determinative; rather, the trial justice 

should consider a combination of and an interaction among all the relevant factors.” (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

We find that the circuit court erred in awarding guardianship of A.C. to her 

grandmother. The best interests of the child would be better served by awarding 

guardianship to E.B., and the Guardianship Screening Factors, when applied to the facts of 

record in this case, prominently indicate that the grandmother is not a viable candidate to 

serve as guardian to A.C. We consequently reverse the circuit court’s decision and remand 

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this matter for entry of an order awarding guardianship to E.B. Furthermore, upon remand, 

the circuit court is charged with the task of fashioning an expedited transition of A.C. from 

West Virginia to her home with E.B. in Florida.6 The emotional and educational needs of 

the child must be paramount, and all involved parties must cooperate to ensure the success 

of these new guardianship arrangements. Visitation among all family members and A.C. 

must also be arranged. As we have consistently explained, this is not an uncomplicated task, 

and all adults must collaborate and coordinate their efforts for the benefit of the child. “[I]t 

has been long understood that the law governing child custody directs that a child’s best 

interests are best served by a gradual transition to a new home.” Kristopher O. v. Mazzone, 

227 W.Va. 184, 194, 706 S.E.2d 381, 391 (2011); see also syl. pt. 11, In re Jonathan G., 198 

W.Va. 716, 482 S.E.2d 893 (1996) (“A child has a right to continued association with 

individuals with whom he has formed a close emotional bond, including foster parents, 

provided that a determination is made that such continued contact is in the best interests of 

the child.”). Because the child is already well-acquainted with E.B. and has in fact lived in 

her home previously, such transition should be a very expedited one. The goal should be for 

A.C. to be relocated to E.B.’s care and custody at the end of her current school semester, if 

possible. The court, on remand, should also endeavor to fashion an order which 

contemplates visitation and/or continued relationship among family members, including the 

6

See W. Va. Code §§ 49-7-101 to -02 (2015) (outlining requirements of Interstate 

Compact on the Placement of Children, as also discussed herein). 

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grandmother and the father. 

We further note that although A.C.’s father filed a petition to terminate the 

grandmother’s guardianship during the pendency of this appeal,7 the record is clear that he 

supported the circuit court’s conclusions regarding the grandmother’s guardianship while this 

case was pending in circuit court. In fact, he specifically granted the grandmother 

guardianship rights. The apparent basis for the circuit court’s decision not to afford him 

representation through a guardian ad litem while he was imprisoned was the fact that his 

interests had alreadybeen made known through his execution of that document. Specifically, 

the circuit court noted that the father “did express his preference in writing.” He “submitted 

his nomination of [the grandmother] in writing, and his interests aligned with [the 

grandmother].”8 While we find that the better practice would have been to appoint a 

guardian ad litem for the imprisoned father, he was in no manner prejudiced by the circuit 

court’s decision in this case and, in fact, the position he advocated prevailed below. If the 

father desires to seek custody of the child or modification in guardianship arrangements in 

the future, he may petition the lower court.9 

7

The father was released from incarceration in August 2016. 

8

The circuit court further reasoned: “Since the court ultimately concluded that [the 

grandmother’s] petition would be granted, the court finds the procedural defect in failing to 

appoint a guardian ad litem for [the father] harmless.” 

9

Although a biological parent’s rights are significant, the circumstances here are 

unique. According to the Petitioner, the child has had a very limited relationship with her 

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Additionally, although the parties did not raise issues regarding the Interstate 

Compact on the Placement of Children [hereinafter “ICPC”], we note that the process of 

out-of-state placement of a child must comply with West Virginia Code §§ 49-7-101 to -02 

(2015). That statute enumerates the requirements for out-of-state placement, and the circuit 

court, on remand, must incorporate those provisions into the process of placing A.C. in 

Florida with E.B. See Kessel v. Leavitt, 204 W.Va. 95, 162, 511 S.E.2d 720, 787 (1998). 

As set forth in West Virginia Code § 49-7-101, “the sending agency shall comply with each 

and every requirement set forth in this article and with the applicable laws of the receiving 

state governing the placement of children therein.” W. Va. Code § 49-7-101. This includes 

financial responsibilities for the child, as explained in West Virginia Code § 49-7-102. 

Continued jurisdiction is also contemplated, as stated in Article V, section (a) of the ICPC: 

The sending agencyshall retain jurisdiction over the child 

sufficient to determine all matters in relation to the custody, 

supervision, care, treatment and disposition of the child which 

it would have had if the child had remained in the sending 

agency’s state, until the child is adopted, reaches majority, 

becomes self-supporting or is discharged with the concurrence 

of the appropriate authority in the receiving state. The 

jurisdiction shall also include the power to effect or cause the 

return of the child or its transfer to another location and custody 

pursuant to law. The sending agency shall continue to have 

financial responsibility for support and maintenance of the child 

during the period of the placement. Nothing contained herein 

shall defeat a claim of jurisdiction by a receiving state sufficient 

father, based upon his incarceration for the majority of her life. He is allegedly currently 

living with friends and visits the child a few times per week. In her in camera interview with 

the circuit court, the child was adamant that she did not want to reside with the father. 

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to deal with an act of delinquency or crime committed therein. 

W.Va. Code § 49-7-101. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth herein, this Court reverses the circuit court’s 

appointment of the grandmother, A.H., as guardian and remands for the appointment of E.B. 

as the child’s guardian.10 

Reversed and Remanded with Directions 

10This Court appreciates the diligence of the guardian ad litem in her zealous advocacy 

on behalf of this child. We are also grateful to Ms. Bias for her representation of the father’s 

interests in this appeal. 

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