NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT EARL JOHNSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

SARAH KARIKO, M.D., DOC’s Chief 

Medical Officer; FRANK LONGANO, 

M.D., DOC’s Deputy Chief Medical Officer; 

PAMELY SAARI, ARNP and SARAH E. 

LANDIS, PA-C, DOC’s Care Review 

Committee & Chair Persons; JONATHAN 

NEAU, PA-C; STEPHEN SINCLAIR, 

Secretary of Department of Corrections; 

JOHN TURNER, Sgt., CRCC Mail Room; 

REBECCER HOFFARTH, CRCC Mail 

Room,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22-35918 

D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05514-BHS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 13, 2024**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

SEP 13 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 22-35918 

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, KLEINFELD, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Robert Earl Johnson, a Washington state inmate at the Coyote Ridge 

Corrections Center (“CRCC”), appeals pro se from the district court’s summary 

judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his 

safety and serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

We review de novo, Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2016), 

and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Sinclair 

because Johnson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

Sinclair was deliberately indifferent to a serious threat to Johnson’s safety if he, a 

high-risk prisoner with other medical conditions, contracted COVID-19. See 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (explaining that prison official 

violates Eighth Amendment if official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to 

inmate’s safety; the official must have been aware of facts from which inference 

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed, and must have 

drawn that inference); id. at 844 (explaining that official who actually knew of 

substantial risk of harm may not be liable if they reasonably responded to risk, 

even if harm ultimately was not averted). 

The district court also properly granted summary judgment to the medical 

provider defendants because Johnson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material 
3 22-35918 

fact as to whether these defendants were deliberately indifferent to Johnson’s

medical needs regarding his knee. See Hamby, 821 F.3d at 1092 (requiring a 

showing that chosen course of treatment was medically unacceptable under the 

circumstances, and was chosen in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to 

prisoner’s health); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(explaining that a difference of medical opinion concerning what medical care is 

appropriate does not establish deliberate indifference). 

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised in the 

opening brief. Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 986 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Johnson’s motion for an extension of time to file the reply brief (Docket 

Entry No. 18) is granted. The reply brief has been filed.

All other pending motions are denied as moot.

AFFIRMED.