1 U.S. Department of Transportation

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION Office of Aviation Policy and Plans Washington, D.C. 20591

FINAL REGULATORY EVALUATION

FINAL RULE
Airplane and Engine Certification Requirements in Supercooled Large Drop, Mixed Phase, and Ice Crystal Icing Conditions 14 CFR P arts 25 & 33

OFFICE OF AVIATION POLICY AND PLANS REGULATORY ANALYSIS DIVISION

December 20132 

### Table of Contents

Executive Summary

................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 3 History

................................ ................................ ................................ ............................... 4 Regulatory Background

................................ ................................ ................................ .. 5 Assumptions

................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 7 Fleet

................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 8 Benefits

................................ ................................ ................................ ............................ 20 Costs

................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ . 41 Benefit Cost Summary

................................ ................................ ................................ ... 60 Appendix

................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... 623 

## Executive Summary The FAA is adopting this final rule to revise certain regulations in Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations ( 14 CFR ) part 25 Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Airplanes and part 33 Airworthiness Standards: Aircraft Engines
related to th e certification of transport category airplanes and turbine airplanes engines in icing conditions. The follow ing table shows the estimated total
benefits exceed the estimated costs

.

* Details may not add to row or column totals due to rounding

.

These values are over the lifetime of the affected airplanes. As the lifetimes of large and small part 25 (commercial airplanes and private jets) are different we will also provide the present values over the ir analysis period

. Clearly, however we express the benefits and costs, preventing icing related accidents has
substantial benefits relative to the costs. Viewed from a breakeven analysis using only preventable fatalities , with each fatality valued at $ 9.1 million, this rule has benefits exceeding costs wi th only 7 fatalities prevented.

First , we explain the regulatory background of the requirements contained in the final rule. Next, we detail our assumptions and the accident and incident history
that led to th e final rule

. Th en , we estimate the fleet that w il l be affected by the
final rule requirements. Finally, we examine the estimated benefits and costs
associated with the final rule , and follow with a benefit/cost summary.

We have determined that this final rule: (1) has benefits that justify its cost ; (2) is not an economically “significant regulatory action” as defined in section 3(f) of
Executive Order 12866 ; (3) is “ not significant” as defined in DOT ’ s Regulatory4 Policies and Procedures; (4) will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities; (5) will not create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States; and (6) will not impose an unfunded mandate on state, local, or tribal governments

.


## History On October 31, 1994, an A vions de T ransport Regional ATR

- 72 series airplane crashed in Roselawn Indiana, resulting in the deaths of 64 passengers and four
crew members. After an extensive investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board ( NTSB ) concluded that freezing drizzle conditi ons created a ridge of ice on the wing’s upper surface aft of the deicing boots and forward of the
ailerons . T h is ridge of ice on the wing contributed to an uncommanded roll of the airplane. The atmospheric condition that con tributed to the Roselawn accident is currently outside the icing envelope for certification of part 25 airplanes

.

On June 1, 2009, an Airbus A330 series airplane operated by Air France crashed
in the Atlantic Ocean , resulting in the deaths of 216 passen gers and 12 crew members. After an extensive investigation, the Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la Sécurité de l'Aviation Civile (BEA) concluded that the accident resulted from a succession of events: temporary inconsistency between the airspeed

meas urements, probably following obstruction of the pitot tubes by ice crystals, that caused the autopilot to disconnect; inappropriate control inputs that destabilized the flight path and led to a stall; and the pilot misunderstanding of
the situation. The a tmospheric condition that contributed to this accident is also outside the icing envelope for certification of part 25 airplanes

.

We have concluded that t hese accidents would not have occurred had the requirements of this final rule been in affect at th e time of the airplane design.5 The current certification r equirements for part 25 airplanes and engines do not address the safe operation of airplanes in supercooled large drop ( SLD ) , mixed phase, or ice crystal icing conditions , and the operating rules d o not specifically prohibit operations in these conditions. The requirements contained in this final
rule are based on recommendations by both the NTSB 1 and Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) 2 , and incorporate the public ’s comments from the

n otice of p roposed r ulemaking (NPRM) 3 where appropriate. We estimate the benefits and costs associated with certifying designs to these final rule requirements in the following sections.



## Regulatory Background Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, part 25, part 25 A ppendix C , and p art 33 specify t he certification requirements for airplanes and airplane engines operating in icing conditions

. Icing conditions containing freezing drizzle and freezing rain are cur rently not considered during certification of an airplane’s ice protection systems (IPS)

. These two conditions constitute an icing environment
known as SLD. E xposure to these conditi ons can result in ice accretion that impair s the safe operation of a part 25 airplane or airplane engine

. This final rule

w il l require part 25 airplanes to either safely exit following the detection of specifically identified a ppendix O icing conditions, or safely operate without

restrictions in these SLD conditions

.

1 NTSB recommendations A

- 96

- 54, A

- 96

- 56, and A

- 96

- 58; av ailable in the Docket and on the Internet at:

http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/1996/A96_48_69.pdf.

2 Ice Protection Harm onization Working Group (IPHWG).

3 Accessible at:

http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;dct=FR%252BPR%252BN%252BO%252BSR%252BPS;rpp =25;so=ASC;sb=docId;po=0;D=FAA

- 2010

- 06366 S imilarly, SLD conditions are not currently considered during part 33 engine
certification. In addition, mixed phase and ice crystal icing conditions are not
considered for certification of airplane engine s or externally mounted probes. Exposing engines a nd externally mounted probes to these conditions can result
in hazardous ice accumulations that may cause engine damage, power loss, and
loss of airspeed indication

.

The final rule requirements will reduce the risk of accidents by including
certification requirements for : ( 1 ) SLD icing conditions for part 25 airplanes most affected by these icing
conditions ; ( 2 ) M ixed phase and ice crystal conditions for all p art 25 airplanes ; and ( 3 ) SLD , mixed phase, and ice crystal icing conditions for all turbine

eng ines installed on part 25 airplanes

.

This regulatory evaluation estimates the total incremental benefits and costs of

t he requirements contained in th e final rule. Since the NPRM, we have updated the fleet, costs and benefits to reflect the most recent data and comments submitted. The benefits are based on the expected value of reducing icing
related accidents. One of the preventable acci dents was the 2009 Air Fra nce
A 330 accident which we did not quantify in the initial regulatory evaluation as
the cause had not been determined. Now we know this rule could have prevented the sequence of events leading to the 2009 Air France A 330 accident.

We obtained the basis of our cost estimates from industry

. The manufacturers based their estimates upon accompanying a dvisory c irculars (AC) , which
describe acceptable means for showing compliance. The compliance costs are analyzed in context of the new part 25 and part 33 c ertification requirements

. We
have also re
- e valuated the operational costs based upon estimates and analysis7 f rom operators who routinely operate part 25 airplanes in SLD environments.
These costs remain small relative to the substantial benefits.



## Assumptions The benefits and costs are driven by past accidents, industry co st information,
and the projected future fleet. The benefits are based on past accidents which are evaluated as preventable fatalities valued at $ 9.1 million per prevented
fatal ity ( 201 3 Department of Transportation guidance ) 4 , cost of investigation, and the value of the airplane. The societal costs include the overhead costs that are
allocated to labor as well as direct cost s

. As in the NPRM, we use $ 77 per hour as
the burdened wage rate for engineers

. 5

The fleet forecast affects both the benefits and costs. For purposes of this evaluation, we conservatively assume that all certifications are approved one year after the rule is codified ( 201 4 ), and that production/de liveries b egin to occur the following year ( 201 5 ). The number of deliveries and the corresponding delivery years depend on the airplane type and size . We develop and explain
these numbers in the “F leet ” section of this analysis

. Th e production and
deliv ery profile create d in the “Fleet” section shows a slowly building fleet until production stops. Because the production cycles and deliveries are customized to the various (and different) airplane types, it is important for the reader to focus on present value benefits and costs.

This analysis focuses on the incremental benefits and costs that accrue to U.S. operators and manufacturers. We also acknowledge costs to foreign

4 "Revised Departmental Guidance 2013: Treatment of the Value of Preventing Fatalities and Injuries in

Preparing Economic Analyses " http://www.dot.gov/regulations/economic

- values

- used

- in

- analysis

. 5 Department of Labor; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009 mean burdened hourly labor rate of aeronautical

engineers. Recent BLS data suggests that this burdened hourly labor rate for aerona utical engineers may be somewhat overstated, thus the use of the $77/hour figure provides a conservative estimate of the labor cost attributable to the rule.8 manufacturers who choose to comply with the requirements contained in this
final r ule by delivering airplanes to U.S. operators

. 6

To ensure consistency between the costs and ben e fits of this final rule, these
values are expressed in 2012 dollars

. Current year dollars were adjusted using
the Bureau of Economic Analysis ’ Implicit GDP pr ice deflator

. 7 For both the benefits and the costs, we use a 7% discount rate as prescribed by OMB to reflect the time value of money

.



## Fleet
This section outlines the methodology which estimate s the number of designs, production rates , and delivery cycles of airplane s that will be affected by th e final
rule . Our reasoning and the underlying assumptions used in this analysis are
described below.

First, we updated the U.S. fleet deliveries to reflect the current year of available
dat a (2012)

. Next, the NPRM regulat ory evaluation (RIA) grouped airplanes into three categories, small, medium, and large ; and then estimated the costs and
benefits of the small an d medium airplane category as one. T h e RIA for the final rule groups the airp lanes into two categories; large transport category part 25 airplanes and all other part 25 airplane s. These two categories are based primarily on the size of the airplane. They have been grouped in this way for the purposes of estimating the costs and b enefits to manufacturers and U.S. operators. This methodology differs slightly from the proposed rulemaking
because we believe this approach improves transparen cy

.

6 OMB Circular A

- 4, page 15.

7 The implicit price deflator is the ratio of nominal GDP over real GDP. The nominal and real GDP values,

taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for 2002 to 2012 and IHS Global Insight Jan 2013 U.S. Economic Forecast for 2012, and were originally expressed in 2005$. To express the implicit price deflator in in 2012 d ollars, we divided the ratio of nominal and real GDP by the 2012 value.9 The large transport category airplanes have a maximum takeoff weight (MTOW) greater than or equal to 60,000 pounds and include part 25 turbojet airplanes manufactured by Airbus, Boeing, Convair, McDon n ell Douglas Aircraft Company , and the Lockheed Company

.

The other categor y approximate s business jets, regional jets and turbopr ops manufactured by Avions De Transport Regional, Avions Marcel Dassault, B eech Aircraft Corporation , Bombardier, British Aerospace , British Aircraft Corporation, Canadair LTD, Casa, Cessna Aircraft Corporation, Dassault
Aviation , De Havilland of Canada, D ornier, Embraer , Fairchild, Fokker, Grumman Aircraft Corporation, Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation , Hawker
Bee chcraft Corporation, Haw ker Siddeley Aviation , Israel Aircraft Industry,
Lear J et Corporation, Mitsubishi , North American , Raytheon Aircraft Company, Rockwell, Saab, and Shorts Brothers

. 8

We estimate the average life and production run of these U.S.

- operated part 25 airplanes by analyzing the ages of retired airplanes and the airplanes delivery
schedule using the OAG Aviati on Solutions Fleet database.

Larg e T ransport C ategory P art 25 Airplane Fleet Based upon histor ical delivery data, this section presents the methodology to

estimate the average production run, the average life of an airplane, and the methodology that gen erates the affected future newly certificated large transport category part 25 fleet. The affected large transport category part 25 airplane fleet estimated in this section forms the basis for the benefit and cost analysis.

8 Duplication results from corporate name changes, mergers or acquisitions.10 To fully account for the life cycle benefits and costs of this part 25 rule, the analysis period for large airplanes is based on the life of an airplane plus the length of an airplane’s production ru n

. The analysis indicates the average life of a large transport part 25 airplane is 28 years and a 19 year production run

. The resulting analysis period becomes 47 years ( 19 + 28 = 47 )

. We now discuss the
derivation o f these estimates.

We calculate a weighted average for t he average life of U.S.

- operated large turbojet transport category part 25 airplanes by analyzing the ages of retired airplanes operated by part 121 certificate holders using the OAG Aviation
Solutions Fleet iNet database 9 beginning with the Boeing 707 certificated in
1958. 10 To calculate the weighted a verage, we first multiply the number of
retired airplanes ( by equipment type ) by their retirement age . Next, we sum th is
series and divide it by the total number of retired airplanes. The results of this calculation shows that, o n average , U.S. part 121 certificate holders operate their airplanes for 28 years before retir ing them

. Appendix 1 shows the da ta for this
calculation.

We estimate the average production run time for newly part 25 certificated airplane models by analyzing the start and end delivery dates from U.S. operated , out

- of

- production part 25 (or CAR 4b , which preceded part 25 ) airplanes since 195 8

. 11 We look at airplanes that are currently out of production because a closed production line enables us to account for the number o f years of

9 http://www.oagaviation.com/ , OAG Aviation Solutions Fleet iNet Database

- May 2012.

10 In most cases, the retired airplanes were out

- of

- production , although i n some cases, part 121 certificate holders retired airplanes still in production.

11 http://active.boeing.com/commercial/orders/index.cfm?content=displaystandardreport.cfm&pageid=m25

062&RequestTimeout=10000 Boeing website (Commercial Airplanes U.S. Delivery Summary By Year)

- May 2012; http://www.oagaviation.com/ OAG Aviation Solutions Fleet iNet Database

- May 2012; http://w ww.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgMakeModel.nsf/MainFrame?OpenFra meSet FAA Type Certificate Data Sheet database

– May 2012.11 airplane production by equipment group

. On average, each airplane type was delivered over a period of approximately 19 years. Appendix 2 shows the start and end U.S. delivery dates for the following airplane type : Airbus A 300/310; Boeing B

- 70 7, 720, 727, and 757; Convair CV

- 880/990; Lockheed L

- 1011;
McDon nell Douglas DC

- 8, DC10/MD11 , and DC

- 9

. 12

In order to calculate the growth of the affected large transport category part 25
fleet delivered to U.S. operators , we analy z e annual airplane deliveries resulting
from out

- of

- production and currently

- in

- production FAA part 25 transport category airplane certifications for U.S. and foreign manufactures. 13 Appendix 3
shows th e number of annual airplane deliveries to part 121 cert ificate holders for the following models: Airbus A 300 , 310 , 318, 319, 320, 321,and 330 ; Boeing B

- 707, 720, 727, 737, 747, 757 , 767,and 777 ; Convair CV

- 880/990; Lockheed L

- 1011;
McDon nell Douglas DC

- 8, DC

- 9, and DC10/MD11

.

T able 1 shows the year that each U.S. manufacturer ’ s airplane group received i t s part 25 type certification (TC) , the U.S. deliveries, and years in production from
195 8 to 201 1

. We believe these models are representative of the industry and use
this data to estimate the number of fu ture certifications and deliveries

.

12 Note: Each equipment group contains every airplane series along with derivatives. For example, the

DC

- 9 equipm ent group contains every series of DC

- 9s, MD

- 80s, MD

- 90s, and B

- 717s.

13 Boeing website (Commercial Airplanes U.S. Delivery Summary By Year), OAG Aviation Solutions

Fleet Database, FAA Type Certificate Data Sheet database.12 TABLE 1

– LARGE TRANSPORT CATEGORY P ART 25 U.S. MANUFACTURED AIRPLANE TYPE CERTIFICATIONS AND DELIVERIES TO U. S. OPERATORS

Based on Table 1 data we estimate the number of future part 25 large airplane
certifications and deliveries associated with new large transport category part 25
certifications (see Table 2 for summary information) over a 10

- year certification period

.
TABLE 2

- SUMMARY DATA FOR LAR GE U.S. MANUFACTURED AIRPLANE CERTIFICATIONS

* Details may not add to row or column totals due to rounding

.

T he historical evidence shows that , on average, U.S. large transport category part
25 airplane

- producing manufacturers receive approval fo r 0. 2 ( 13 New TCs / 54 Production Years) new airplane type certificates per year , which equates to roughly two over a 10

- year period. The approximate annual number of U.S.13 produced large transport category part 25 airplane deliveries to U.S. operators per type certificate is 27 ( 7,221 airplanes/ 271 production years)

.

Consistent with OMB guidance, a Benefit

- Cost Analysis ( BCA ) conducted on a
national basis should not consider costs attributed to foreign entities. 14 However, we d o estimate the number of foreign part 25 deliveries to U.S. operators to estimate the added o perational costs and the resulting safety
benefits

. Based on past deliveries, Table 3 shows foreign manufacturers will deliver 16 large transport category part 25 airplanes annually to U.S. operators. 15

TABLE 3

– LARGE AIRPLANE FOREI GN MANUFACTURED AIRPLA NE CERTIFICATIONS

Lastly, we add 16 airplanes (produced internationally but delivered to the U.S.) to the 27 U.S. produced large transport category part 25 newly certificated airplane deliveries estimated above and arrive at 43 annual deliveries from U.S. and foreign manufacturers

. We use 2 8 years as the service life and 19 years for the average production run time for these newly certificated future airplane
deliveries (see Table 4 ).

14 OMB Circular A94 states “Analys es [BCAs] should focus on benefits and costs accruing to the citizens

of the United States in determining net present value. Where programs or projects have effects outside the United States, these effects should be reported separately.”

15 OAG Aviation Sol utions Fleet Database, FAA Type Certificate Data Sheet database, Appendix 3

.14 T ABLE 4

– FAA FORECAST OF FUTURE U.S. NEWLY CERTIFICA TED LARG E TRANSPORT CATEGORY P ART 25 AIRPLANE DELIVERIES AND THEIR RETIREMENTS15 Other Part 25 Airplane Fleet In a similar manner , t his section discusses the estimation of the average production run and the average life of other part 25 airplane s . This methodology generates the affected future newly certificated deliveries for the other part 25 airplanes not covered in the “Large Transport Category Part 25 Airplane Fleet ”

section. To develop the estimated deliveries for the se other part 25 airplanes , we analyzed historical data for the type certifications (TC) , production cycles , and
deliveries for these other part 25 airplanes.

To fully account for the life cycle benefits and costs of this part 25 rule, the analysis period for the other part 25 airplanes is based on the life of an airplane plus the length of an airplane’s production ru n

. Based on past history, the average life of the other part 25 airplanes is 30 years and has a 15

- year horizon for the production run of newly certificated air pla nes. The analysis period begins when the first airplane is delivered and ends when the last airplane from the first production is retired. The period of analysis equals 45 years ( 15 + 3 0 =
4 5 ). We will now discuss the derivation of these estimates.

We estimate the average life of the U.S.

- operated other part 25 airplanes by analyzing the ages of retired airplanes using the OAG Aviation Solutions Fleet
database. 16 On average these other part 25 airplanes were operated by U.S. operators for 30 years , then retired. We use the same methodology in computing a weighted average for the retired other part 25 airplanes as we discussed for the large transport category part 25 airplanes. Appendix 5 shows th e data for this
calculation.

16 http://www.oagaviation.com/ , OAG Aviation Solutions Fleet iNet Database

- May 2012.16 We estimate the produc tion run time for other part 25 airplanes by analyzing the start and end delivery dates of U.S. operated out

- of

- production part 25 (or CAR 4b) airplanes from 1958 to 2011. 17

In order to not introduce bias into estimating the average future certifications and deliveries, s ome of the other part 25 airplane models were not included in this analysis because only a small number of airplanes from these models were delivered to U.S. operators over only a couple of years and this would have biased the averages. T hese are airplane models with only a few U.S. deliveries , such as : the Canadair C

- 44, DeHavilland DHC

- 7, Fokker F

- 28, IPTN CN

- 235, British Aerospace 146 and 4100, and Dornier 328 turboprop and turbojet s

.

After removing these airplanes, we estimate , on average, the other part 25 airplane production run time was approximately 15 years. We use the same methodology in estimating the production run time for other part 25 airplanes as
we discussed above for the large transport category part 25 airplanes. Ap pendix
6 shows the start and end delivery dates of the out

- of

- production other part 25
U.S. airplane deliverie s used in the 15 year calculation

.

In order to calculate the growth of the affected fleet of other part 25 airplanes delivered to U.S. operators, we analy z e annual airplane deliveries resulting from
all (out

- of

- production and currently

- in

- production) airplane certifications for U.S. and foreign manufactures. 18 Appendix 7 shows th e number of annual other part 25 airplane deliveries to U.S. operators . A s mentioned above , in order to not
introduce bias into estimating the future affected fleet for this analysis, we have
removed th e sparsely

- delivered air planes from the delivery of other part 25 airplane calculation

.

17 OAG Aviation Solutions Fleet Database, FAA Type Certificate Data Sheet database.

18 Ibid.17 T able 5 shows the year that U.S. m anufacturer ’ s airplane group received their part 25 type certification , the U.S. deliveries, and years in production from 195 9
to 2011

. 19 We use this data to estimate the number of future certifications an d
deliveries associated with a new part 25 certification for the other airplanes

.
TABLE 5

– OTHER U.S. MANUFACTURED AI RPLANE CERTIFICATIONS

Table 6 summarizes the data from Table 5 to estimate the number of future other part 25 airplane certifications and deliveries associated with new other pa rt 25
certifications over a 10

- year certification period

.
TABLE 6

- SUMMARY DATA FOR OTHER U.S. MANUFACTURED AI RPLANE CERTIFICATIONS

* Details may not add to row or column totals due to rounding

.

19 Due to the extensive mergers and acquisition history of the other part 25 airplane manufacturers; we

determined a U.S. manufacture by their headquarters being locat ed within the U.S.18 T he historical evidence shows that , on average, the other U.S. part 25 airplane

producing manufacturers receive approval fo r 0.2 (12 New TCs / 5 3 Years) new airplane type certificates per year , which equates to roughly two over a 10

- year period. The approximate annual number of U.S.

- manufactured other part 25 airplane deliveries to the U.S. operators per type certificate is 21 ( 6,904 airplanes/ 328 production years)

.

A s discussed above, we do not estimate the certification cost to foreign
manufacturers , but we do need to estimate the number of foreign deliv eries to U.S. operators for the benefit and cost impact. Table 7 shows foreign
manufacturers will deliver 12 other part 25 airplanes annually to U.S. operators. 20

TABLE 7

– OTHER FOREIGN MANUFACTURED AIRPLANE CERTIFICATIONS

* Details may not add to row or column totals due to rounding

.

20 OAG Aviation Solutions Fleet Database, FAA Type Certificate Data Sheet database, Appendix 7

.19 Lastly, we add 1 2 airplanes (produced internationally but delivered to the U.S.)
to the 2 1 other parts 25 newly certificated future airplane deliveries and arrive at
3 3 annual deliveries from U.S. and foreign manufacturer s. We use 30 years as the other part 25 airplane service life and 1 5 years for the average production run
time for the se newly c ertificated future other part 25 airplane deliveries . Table 8
shows these results.

T ABLE 8

– FUTURE OTHER PART 25 AIRPLANE DEL IVERIES TO THE U.S.20 

## Be n efits
Accidents in icing conditions tend to be associated with stalls, loss of contro l, and catastrophic outcomes. The purpose of this final rule is to prevent such
outcomes in the future. Without a new rule, it is likely that future icing related
accidents will occur on part 25 airplanes similar to what has happened in the past. The industry and the FAA analyzed the historical icing related events for airplanes certificated under part 25 a nd engines certificated under part 33

. The

FAA evaluate d all events (accidents plus incidents) for applicability and preventability in context with the requirements contained in this final rule. An
event is defined as a n accident or incident that could have been prevented had the requirements in this final rule been in effect during the certification process

. The FAA describe s each event, provide s the basis for benefits , and estimate s the probability of a future event for three categories of benefits th at directly align with the requirements.

• Benefits from averting events involving large transport category part
25 airplanes ,

• Benefits from averting events involving other part 25 airplanes , and

• Benefits from averting part 33 engine events

.

**Benefits from Averting Large Transport Category Part 25 Airplane**  **Events** Based on previous in

- service experience, SLD poses a smaller risk to large transport category part 25 airplanes , when compared to smaller, other transport category part 25 airplanes

. Due to the low er risk , the FAA has removed the requirements proposed in the NPRM for large airplanes to demonstrate performance and handling in Appendix O SLD conditions

. T he final rule will only include system design requirements for large transport category part 25 airplanes

. Although large airplanes have less risk in SLD, an accident to a large transport category airplane did occur following operation in ice crystal icing
conditions , and could have been prevented by this rule. On June 1, 2009 , an Air21 France A330 c rashed. Two hundred and twenty eight people died and the airplane was destroyed

.

On July 5, 2012, France’s aviation accident investigation bureau (BEA) released its final report for this accident. A ccording to the BEA, the accident resulted
from a succession of events that began with “Temporary inconsistency between the measured airspeeds, likely following the obstruction of the pitot probes by ice crystals that lead in particular to autopilot disconnection and a reconfiguration to alternate law,” a nd “inappropriate control inputs that destabilized the flight path”. 21

Th e benefit analysis for this rule is based on the fact that large transport category part 25 airplanes have a positive risk of an icing event

. This section of the benefit analysis d iscusses the FAA’s quantitat ive estimate for preventing an accident like
the Air France A330 accident on future newly certificated large transport category part 25 U.S.

- operated airplanes

. Appendix 4 shows our estimate of the
total expected benefit s for newly certificated large transport category part 25 U

. S

. operated airplanes

. While the historical lives and property loss are a public
record , determining the rate of future annual risk is subject to a wide range of possible outcomes

. However, given the catastrophic A330 accident, all mitigated outcomes have substantial potential benefits. Appendix 4 shows the present
value w hen we estimate benefits with the date the A330 accident occurred and spread this risk over the future United States fleet

. W e now discuss the
derivation of the final rule benefits for large transport category airplanes

.

In the NPRM the FAA discussed the Air France A330 accident, but did not include this accident in the quantified benefit analysis. Upon further review and

21 Final BEA Report, http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/flight.af.447.php

.22 with more information from the BEA final report of the accident, the FAA now
believes this rule would prevent a similar accident from occurring in U.S. operations . The Air France A330 accident likely occurred because of an icing obstruction in the pitot tubes caus ing the cockpit instruments to malfunction. The crew apparently had difficulty understanding the malfunctioning instruments which led to an improper response and ultimately resulted in the catastrophic accident. The sequence of events leading to the acci dent began with icing in a pitot tube which this final rule will resolve. This final rule adds new SLD, mixed phase, and ice crystal requirements for pitot tubes.

A ll large part 25 airplanes have pitot tubes, which have not been qualified to operate in t he ice crystal and mixed phase conditions described in part 33, Appendix D of this final rule. While this accident did not occur to a U

. S

. operator , currently there are about 5 ,000 large part 25 airplanes flown by U.S. part 91, 135, and 121 operators

. 22 The FAA expects that accidents similar to the 2009 A330 will continue to occur on large part 25 airplanes unless this final rule
is in effect.

We now discuss the component benefit of an averted accident which forms the quantitative bases for future bene fits.

In estimating benefit values for avoided fatalities and injuries, the FAA follows the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) recently

- issued document “Revised Departmental Guidance 2013: Treatment of the Value of Preventing Fatalities and Injuries in Preparing Economic Analysis.” That document estimates the value for preventing a fatality in 2012 at $9.1 million (in 2012 dollars), while preventing a serious injury in 2012 is valued at $1,264,900 (assumed to be the

22 http://www.oa gaviation.com/ , OAG Aviation Solutions Fleet iNet Database

- May 2012.23 average of economic costs for severe , serious, and moderate injuries), and preventing a minor injury in 2012 is estimated to have an economic value of $27,300. As recommended in the recent DOT guidance document identified above, these values are then escalated at 1.07 percent per year to ref lect the effect of growth in real income levels on the value that society collectively places on avoiding accidental fatalities and injuries. 23 See Appendix 9 for more details.

The FAA estimated the average airplane replacement for a destroyed large par t
25 two

- engine wide body at the airplane ’ s weighted average market value of $ 46 .3 million

. 24 The BEA accident investigation reports provided the number of fatalities. The FAA estimates the average value of avoiding an icing

- related accident, where a larg e transport category part 25 A330 airplane is destroyed, to
be about $ 2. 1 b i llion.

We believe this final rule could have prevented a similar large part 25 airplane
accident in the U.S. Further, we expect future accidents in conditions conducive to icing could also occur. Herein, the methodology is presented to substantiate the basis for increasing the value of preventing icing related accidents that could

o ccur over the analysis inter val to all newly certificated large transport category part 25 U.S. operated airplanes in the absence of the final rule:

1. Based on the casualty losses from the 2009 A330 accident , we calculate three separate accident and casualty rates. These acciden t and casualty rates are calculated by dividing the total losses per category (fatality, investigation and

23 "Revised Departmental Guidance 2013: Treatment of the Value of Preventing Fatalities and Injuries in

Preparing Economic Analyses" http://www.dot.gov/regulations/economic

- values

- used

- in

- analysis

24 Aircraft values used in the analysis are estimated per the discussion found in Appendix 8 and are

subsequently expressed in 2012$.24 airplane accident) from the 2009 A330 accident by the total number of large transport category part 25 airplanes delivered worldwide from 1998

- 2011

. 25

T he results of this derivation are exhibited in Table 4

- 1 in Appendix 4

.
2. The historical accident and casualty rates calculated in step 1 are multiplied by the annual number of projected newly certificated large transport category part 2 5 affected U.S. operated deliveries from 2015 through 20 60

. Table

4 above shows that 43 newly certificated large transport category part 25 airplanes will be delivered annually to U.S. operators

. We use 28 years as the airplane’s service life and 19 years for the average production run time for these newly certificated airplane deliveries.

3. After totaling the estimated number of future accidents and casualties over the analysis period, we use the averted event values discussed above , and shown in Appen dix 9 , to quantify the total potential benefits of the final rule.

The FAA estimates that the total benefits of avoiding one large transport category part 25 airplane accident from newly certificated deliveries over the 2015 through 2060 analysis interv al are shown in Table 9 . T he details are shown

in Table 4

- 2 in Appendix 4

. 26

25 OAG Aviation Worldwide Inc.’s Fleet data product shows 1998 as the first A330 delivery.

26 The FAA notes that we rounded up the value of the number of investigations and accidents but used the

quantified fractional value to quantify these benefits.25 TABLE 9

– ESTIMATED BENEFITS

– 2012 $

* Details may not add to row or column totals due to rounding

.

Although the FAA is not aware of any other accidents of this type involving other large part 25 transport category airplanes , there is no reason to believe that the risk of such accidents is limited to Airbus airplanes

.
Benefits from A verting Other Part 25 A irplane Events T he FAA now examine s historical related SLD events for the other part 25 airplanes. Based on past accidents the accident risk to the other part 25 airplanes is higher than the large category transport airplanes. The FAA include s some basic in formation on each accident and th e justification for applicability. Since the NPRM, there has been a final report issued on another preventable icing

related event and accordingly, this event has been added.

1 ) Embraer 120 Accident
NTSB Identification: FTW93MA143

Event Description: O n 4/29/1993 a n Embraer EMB

- 120 was substantially damaged when it collided with rough terrain during an overrun following a forced landing. The forced landing was executed following a stall and loss of26 control at 17,412 feet during climb , which resulted in damage to the left engine and propeller. Thirteen individuals received minor injuries.

Probabl e Cause: The NTSB found that , in combination with other factors, ice accretion led to an aerodynamic stall, loss of control, and a forced landing.

Justification for Revised Rule Applicability: The meteorological report indicated the possibility of SLD icing in the area of this accident. 14 CFR 25.1420 will require a means of detecting a ppendix O conditions for which the manufacturer
has not certifi cated the airplane and will also require that the airplane be capable of operating safely within those conditions for the purpose of exiting when conditions are encountered which are beyond which the airplane has been
certified

.

2 ) ATR

- 72 Accident
NTSB Id entification: DCA95MA001

.

Event Description: On 10/31/1994 a n ATR

- 72 struck the ground after the flightcrew lost control of the airplane during an adverse roll event at 9,200 feet causing a total of 68 fatalities

.

Probable Cause: The NTSB found that the probable cause of the accident was the loss of control, attributed to a sudden and unexpected aileron hinge moment reversal that occurred after a ridge of ice accreted aft of the deice boots while the airplane was in a holding patte rn. The airplane intermittently encountered supercooled cloud and drizzle/rain drops, the size and water content of which exceeded those described in the icing certification envelope.27 Justification for Revised Rule Applicability: T he stall and los s of control a fter encountering large droplet icing conditions may have been consistent with

a ppendix O

. 14 CFR 25.1420 will require the airplane to be able to safely operate

in a ppendix O conditions or have a means of detecting a ppendix O conditions
and be ca pable of operating safely within those conditions for the purpose of exiting when conditions are encountered which are beyond which the airplane
has been certified

.

3 ) Cessna 560 Accident
NTSB Identification: CHI96FA067

.

Event Description: On 12/30/1995 two fatalities occurred as a result of a Cessna 560 colliding with the terrain at the Eagle River Airport, Eagle River, Wisconsin.

Although the ice accretion was not described as consistent with large droplet icing, a sheriff’s deputy reported freezing rain and sleet were falling at the time
of the accident.

Probable Cause: The NTSB determined the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the pilot to maintain airspeed while executing the circling approach. Factors were the descent below minimu m descent altitude, the fog, the low ceiling and the icing conditions.

Justification for Revised Rule Applicability: Existing airplanes have not substantiated that they are capable of safely operating in a ppendix O (freezing drizzle and freezing rain) co nditions. 14 C FR 25.1420 will require the airplane be able to safely operate in a ppendix O conditions or have a means of detecting

a ppendix O conditions and be capable of operating safely within those28 conditions for the purpose of exiting when conditions a re encountered which are beyond which the airplane has been certified

.

The FAA notes that during the comment period, the validity of this accident in the benefit analysis was b rough t into question because the stall warning system of the Model 560 has since been modified to provide greater stall war n ing margin in icing. The FAA reviewed the request and we determined that the Cessna Model 560 Eagle River event should be included in the benefit analysis
because t his rule w ill require that the new conditions (SLD) be considered when designing the stall warning system, as well as other systems, to ensure the airplane can be safely operated following encounters with SLD conditions.

4 ) Embr aer 120 Accident
NTSB Identification: DCA97MA017

Event Description: O n 01/09/1997 a n Embraer EMB

- 120RT crashed while being vectored for approach to runway 3R at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, which resulted in 29 deaths.

Probable Cause: The NTSB attributes the probable cause to t he FAA ’s failure to establish adequate aircraft certification standards for flight in icing conditions,
the FAA's failure to ensure that FAA

- approved procedure s were implemented at Centro Tecnico Aeroespacial for the accident airplane's deice system operation, and the FAA's failure to require the establishment of adequate minimum airspeeds for icing conditions, which led to the loss of control when the airplane accumulated a thin, rough, accretion of ice on its lifting surfaces. Contributing to the accident were the flightcrew's decision to operate in icing conditions near the lower margin of the operating airspeed envelope (with flaps retracted) and
Comair's failure to establish a nd adequately disseminate unambiguous29 minimum airspeed values for flap configurations and for flight in icing
conditions.

The investigation revealed that it was likely that the airplane gradually accumulated a thin, rough glaze/mixed ice coverage on the l eading edge deicing boot surfaces, possibly with ice ridge formation on the leading edge upper
surface.

The NTSB determined one of the probable causes was the failure to establish adequate airplane certification standards for flight in icing conditions.

Justification for Revised Rule Applicability: Existing airplanes have not substantiated that they are capable of safely operating in a ppendix O (freezing drizzle and freezing rain) conditions. 14 CFR 25.1420 require s newly certificated airplanes safely operate in a ppendix O conditions or have a means of detecting and exiting a ppendix O conditions.

5 ) Embraer 120 Accident
NTSB Identification: DCA01MA031

Event Description

– The accident o ccurred on 3/19/2001 which resulted in
neither deaths nor in juries.

Probabl e Cause : The NTSB determined the cause of the accident as t he failure of the flight crew to maintain airspeed during an encounter with severe icing conditions, which resulted in an inadvertent stall, loss of control, and structural damage to the airplane.30 Justification for Revised Rule Applicability: The airplane encountered SLD icing. The flightcrew delayed exiting the conditions. Th i s final rule will require a means of detecting a ppendix O conditions for which the manufacturer has not certificated the airplane. It will further require that the airplane be capable of operating safely within those conditions for the purpose of exiting when conditions are encountered which are beyond which the airplane has been
certified

.

6 ) Jetstream 41 Event

Event Description: On 1/24/05 the flight declared an emergency due to an icing
condition that would not allow the airplane to maintain altitude. The emergency landing did not result in fatalities or injuries.

Justification for Revised Rule Applicability: The icing conditions exceeded the capabilities of the airplane and appendix O defines conditions (freezing drizzle and freezing rain) that are more severe than current certification standards. 14
CFR 25.1420 will require that newly certificated airplanes safely operate in appendix O conditions or have a means of detecting and exiting appendix O
conditions.

7) SAAB

- 340 Incident
NTSB Identification: LAX06IA076

Event Description: On 1/2/2006 the fl ight encountered icing conditions. The airplane was at 11,700 feet mean sea level (msl) when it departed controlled flight, and descended to an altitude of about 6,500 feet msl. The pilots recovered control of the airplane, and continued to their schedul ed destination. The two31 flight crew members, one flight attendant, and 25 passengers were uninjured, and the airplane did not sustain substantial damage.

Probable Cause: An in

- flight loss of control due to ice accreted in SLD conditions, and the flight c rew's failure to maintain the specified minimum airspeed in icing conditions. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew's decision to climb the airplane in known and forecast icing conditions using an autopilot mode contrary to that specified in the operator's Airplane Operations Manual for climbs during periods of ice accretion or when ice was present on the airframe.

Justification for Revised Rule Applicability: Reports have shown that there were icing conditions present which likely exceeded tho se for which the airplane was originally certificated. Had the airplane been certified in accordance with this
final rule , it would have had a means of detecting appendix O conditions and would have been capable of either operating safely within those con ditions or exiting when conditions are encountered which are beyond which the airplane
has been certified

.

8 ) ATR 42

- 320 Accident
NTSB Identification: CEN09MA142

Event Description: On 1/27/09 Avions de Transport Régional ATR 42 320, N902FX, operating as Empire Airlines flight 8284, was on an instrument approach when it crashed short of the runway at Lubbock Preston Smith International Airport, Lubbock, Texas. The captain sustained serious injur ies, and the first officer sustained minor injuries. The airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to Federal Express Corporation and operated by Empire Airlines, Inc., as a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 supplemental cargo f light. The flight departed from Fort Worth Alliance Airport,32 Fort Worth, Texas, about 0313. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed.

Probable Cause: The flight crew's failure to monitor and maint ain a minimum safe airspeed while executing an instrument approach in icing conditions, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall at low altitude. Contributing to the accident were 1) the flight crew's failure to follow published standard operating procedures in response to a flap anomaly, 2) the captain's decision to continue with the unstabilized approach, 3) the flight crew's poor crew resource management, and 4) fatigue due to the time of day in which the accident occurred and a cumulative sleep debt, whic h likely impaired the captain's performance.

Justification for Revised Rule Applicability: It has not been substantiated that existing airplanes are capable of safely operating in freezing rain and freezing drizzle as described in appendix O. This final rule will require that airplanes be capable of safe operation in appendix O conditions or have a means of detecting appendix O conditions and safely exiting when conditions are encountered which are beyond which the airplane has been certified.

Table 1 0 summarizes the above other part 25 airplane events and their fatalities and injuries.

TABLE 1 0

- OTHER PART 25 AIRPLA NE ACCIDENTS33 As shown in the above historical events , SLD accidents tend to be associated
with stalls , loss of control , and catastrophic outcomes. We examine d the se historical events that c ould have been prevented with the requirements in this
final rule. W e acknowledge that some SLD events have not resulted in passenger
deaths . However, narrowly averting a catastrophic SLD event with an airplane that has not been certified to the appropriate standards in this final rule puts
passengers and crew at risk.

FAA icing certification experts also estimate the risk of an accident on other part
25 airplane s is positive. We now d iscuss the component benefit of an averted accident on other part 25 airplanes.

The benefit of avoiding an accident includes averted fatalities, injuries, aircraft replacement or repair, and accident investigation costs. To estimat e benefit values, the F AA use s the same fatality values, injury values , and accident investigation costs as we did for large transport category part 25 airplanes above.
The FAA estimated the average airplane replacement for a destroyed other part 25 at the airplanes wei ghted av erage market value of about $ 9 .2 m illion. 27 The
NTSB accident investigation reports provided the number of fatalities and injuries. The FAA estimates the average value of avoiding an icing

- related accident, where the airplane is destroyed, to be about $ 122.2 m illion

. Table 1 1
shows the results of this calculation.

27 Aircraft values used in the analysis are estimated per the discussion found in Appendix 8 and are

subsequently exp ressed in 2012$.34 TABLE 1 1

– AVERAGE BENEFIT OF P REVENTING ONE SLD AC CIDENT TO AN OTHER PART 25 AIRPLANE

* Details may not add to row or column totals due to rounding

.

We believe this final rule could have prevented similar icing

- related accident s on other newly certificated part 25 airplanes in the U.S. Further, we expect future accidents in conditions conducive to icing to also occur. Herein, the methodology is presented to substantiate the basis for increasing the value of preventing icing related accidents that could o ccur over the analysis interval to other part 25 airplanes in the absence of the final rule:

1. Based on the 1993

- 2009 casualty losses listed in table 1 0 , we calculate three separate accident and casualty rates. These accident and casualty rates were calculated by dividing the averag e losses per category (fatality, investigation and accident) by the average number of other part 25 airplanes operating in the U.S.
since 1993

. 28 The results of this deri vation are exhibited in Table 1 2

.

28 We use the average number of other part 25 airplanes operating in the U.S. because all of the events on

other part 25 airplanes occurred in the U.S.35 T ABLE 1 2

– DERIVATION OF ACCIDE NT AND CASUALTY RATE S

2. The historical accident and casualty rates, calculated in step 1 , are multiplied by the annual number of projected affected other U.S.

- operated part
25 future deliveries from 2015 through 20 58

. Table 8 above shows that 3 3 other part 25 airplanes wi ll be delivered annually to U.S. operators

. We use 30 years as the service life and 15 years for the average production run time for these newly certificated airplane deliveries as discussed in the “Fleet” section above

.

3. After totaling the estimated number of future accidents and casualties over the analysis period, we use the accident event values from Table 1 1 to quantify the total potential benefits of the final rule.

Table 1 3 shows the benefit calculations, estimate d from 2015 to 20 58 , produce approximately one avoid ed accident with 18 fatalities and two minor injuries on newly certificated other part 25 airplanes.36 TABLE 1 3

– DERIVATION OF BENEFI TS FOR OTHER PART 25 AIRPLANES

* Details may not add to row or colum n totals due to rounding

.
Benefits from Averting Engine Events As examined in the NPRM, f rom 1988

- 2003, there were over 100 documented cases of ice crystal and mixed phase engine power loss events. These events are directly related to the engine requirements contained in this final rule

. Of these events, there were eleven total power loss events from flameouts

. 29 The FAA views these events as accident precursors. One of the events occurred when a Beechjet 400 , with PWC JT15D engines , had a total power loss at top

- of

- descent

29 Total power loss events are events where all engines lose power at the same time.37 and could not relight the engines. That event resulted in a dead

- stick forced landing at Jacksonville airport. Having engines flameout during a flight is a

serious event , which can result in an accident. The FAA has examined these
historical events and has found that the y resulted in about a 12% diversion rate. 30

Similar to the other design requirements contained in the final rule, we have
included five of the most significant recent events and include some bas ic
information on each event and the justification for applicability. Each of these

events w ould have been mitigated by the part 33 requirements contained in this
rule had they been in affect at the time of cer tifi cation

. 31 We did not include engine damage events where power loss did not occur, but there was core damage. We believe these damage costs will be averted once the final rule is
effective

.

1) Beechjet Incident
NTSB Identification: ENG04IA021
14 CFR 91: General Aviation
Incident occurred Monday, July 12, 2004 , in Sarasota, FL Probable Cause Approval Date: 12/20/2007 Airplane : Raytheon Corporate Jets Beechjet 400A, registration: N455CW
Note: Continued Airworthiness Assessment Methodologies ( CAAM ) 3 32 due to
loss of >3k feet with both engines out.

30 FAA Engine and Propeller Directorate

- The 12% diversion rate comes from 17 known diversions out of 141 known power loss events. The list includes the following engine models: JT8D, JT15D, Tay 615/620, CF6

- 80C2, Trent, and ALF502.

31 P art 33 focuses on mixed phase and ice crystals as the new feature, in addition to having a ground based icing test that includes SLD. In addition to the events listed, there are also u nscheduled landings that are preventable with the requirements. The FAA conservatively d oes not estimate these additional benefits
, but note s that operators will realize cost savings whenever these events are averted.

32 CAAM ENGINE HAZARDOUS LEVEL 3

- SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES

a. Substantial damage to the aircraft or second unrelated system

.38 S ee NTSB web site for narrative: http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20040804X01143&key=1 Event Description: The Hawker

- Beech Beechjet 400A was descending through flight level 390 when both of the engines flamed out and lost all power while operating in instrument meteorological conditions with convective storms in the

area. The pilots, after several attempts, were able to get one engine restarted as the airplane was descending through 10,000 feet and diverted to a nearby airport. High

- altitude ice crystals had accreted on the compressor vanes and were ingested into the high pressure compress or when the pilots retarded the power levers causing compressor surges and flameouts of both engines. Justification for Revised Rule Applicability: Revisions to 14 CFR 33.68 will require turbine engines to demonstrate acceptable and safe operation in the mixed phase and ice crystal icing environment of part 33, appendix D.

2) Beechjet Incident
NTSB Identification: DCA06IA007

. 14 CFR 91: General Aviation Incident occurred November 28, 2005 , in Jacksonville, FL Probable Cause Approval Date: 6/30/2008

A irplane : Raytheon Corporate Jets Beechjet 400A, registration: N691TA
Note: CAAM 4 33 due to forced landing with both engines out.

b. Uncontrolled fires. c. Rapid depressurization of the cabin. d. Permanent loss of thrust or power greater than one propulsion system. e. Temporary or permanent inability to climb and fly 1000 feet above terrain. f. Any temporary or perm anent impairment of aircraft controllability. g. Malfunctions or failures that result in smoke or other fumes, delivered through the ECS system that result in a serious impairment.

33 CAAM ENGINE HAZARDOUS LEVEL 4

- SEVERE CONSEQUENCES

a. Forced landing

. b. Loss of aircraft (hull loss).39 S ee NTSB web site for narrative: http://www.nts b.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20060104X00004&key=1 Event Description: The Hawker

- Beech Beechjet 400A was descending through flight level 380 in visual meteorological conditions in the vicinity of cumulonimbus buildups. Upon reducing power to initiate descen t the crew
heard a “ popping ” noise , and both engines rolled back. The crew declared an emergency, elected to divert to Jacksonville a irport, and initiated emergency procedures. All attempts to restart the engines were unsuccessful. The crew
executed a s uccessful emergency dead

- stick landing. Justification for Revised Rule Applicability: Revisions to 14 CFR 33.68 will require turbine engines to demonstrate acceptable and safe operation in the mixed phase and ice crystal icing environment of part 33, appe ndix D.

3) Beechjet Incident
NTSB Identification: ENG06IA020

. 14 CFR 91: General Aviation Incident occurred Wednesday, June 14, 2006 , in Norfolk, VA Probable Cause Approval Date: 1/31/2008 Airplane : Raytheon Corporate Jets Beechjet 400A, registration: N440DS Note: CAAM 3 due to loss of >3k feet with both engines out.
S ee NTSB web site for narrative: http://www.ntsb.gov/nts b/brief.asp?ev_id=20060712X00929&key=1 Event Description: The Raytheon Beechjet 400A was cruising at flight level 380 when both of the engines flamed out after the pilots had reduced power prior to turning on the engine anti

- ice systems. The airplane was in visual meteorological conditions, but was approaching clouds that were known to

contain remnants of a tropical storm. The left and right engines restarted on

c. Serious injuries or fatalities.40 their own as the airplane descended through flight levels 300 and 240, respectively. Justific ation for Revised Rule Applicability: Revisions to 14 CFR 33, § 33.68 w ill require turbine engines to demonstrate acceptable and safe operation in the mixed phase and ice crystal icing environment of part 33, appendix D.

4) MD

- 82 Incident
NTSB Identification: CHI02IA151

. Scheduled 14 CFR 121: Air Carrier SPIRIT AIRLINES INC. Incident occurred Tuesday, June 4, 2002 , in Wichita, KS Probable Cause Approval Date: 1/28/2005 Airplane : McDonnell Douglas MD

- 82, registration: N823NK
Note: CAA M 3 due to loss of >3k feet with both engines out.
S ee NTSB web site for narrative: http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20020612X00866&key=1 Event Description: The airplane experienced a roll back of engine power on both engines and subsequently stalled while in cruise flight at flight level 330. The weather conditions were consistent with the presence of ice crystals at the cruise
altitude. The engine inlet probes became blocked due to the ice crystals , resulting in a false engine pressure ratio (EPR) indication and subsequent retarding of the throttles by the auto

- throttle system. The NTSB stated that factors included the presence of ice crystals at altitude, and the ici ng of the engine inlet probes resulting in a false engine pressure ratio indication. Justification for Revised Rule Applicability: Engine inlet probes and engine inlet systems are addressed in the revisions to 14 CFR 33.68 , which will require turbine engi nes to demonstrate acceptable and safe operation in the mixed phase and ice crystal icing environment of part 33, appendix D.41 In addition on January 5, 2004 , a Fokker 70 a ccident occurred n ear Munich (Germany) Airport , causing t hree minor injuries and severe airplane d amage after a prolonged exposure to moderate mixed phase icing conditions.

The continued incidents, accidents, diversions , and power losses demonstrate the
need for the engine requirements in this final rule. The above events are precursor events that , if not addressed through rulemaking , could result in an unrecoverable power loss and consequent fatal accident.

Benefit Summary Table 1 3 shows the other part 25 airplane benefits for both the nominal and present value cases. Similarly, Appendix 4 shows the large part 25 transport category airplane benefits. In the “ Benefits from Engine Requirements ” section,
we discuss qualitative benefits for engines. Table 14 summarize s these results

.
TABLE 1 4

- SUMMARY OF BENEFITS

* Details may not add to row or column totals due to rounding

. 

## Costs
This section provides the estimated incremental societal costs for the United
States that will result from the requirements contained in this final rule. Accordingly, we estimate costs to U.S. manufacturers and to U.S. operators.
International manufacturer costs are not include d in the overall compliance costs of this regulation because these costs are not incurr ed in the United States.

The total estimated costs of this final rule are $ 61.3 million ($ 42.3 million present value)

. This section discusses how these costs are developed. We first discuss the final rule revisions and new regulations to part 25 and 3 3. Next we discuss42 the cost

- related industry comments to the NPRM and the changes the FAA has made, based on those comments, to the final rule. Then, we estimate the fixed ( certification ) costs and recurrent (fuel) costs to part 25 large transport category airplane manufacturer s and operators

. Next , we estimate the fixed costs and

recurrent costs to the other part 25 airplane manufacturer s and operators

. The FAA defined the large part 25 transport category airplanes and the other part 25 airplanes in the “Fleet” section above. Lastly, we analyze the additional cost s for engine certification and hardware.

We incorporate manufacturer cost estimates detailing certification and testing

costs and , where appropriate, we incorporate changes in the costs of compliance
as a result of the public comments to the NPRM

. For the analysis, the
manufacturer

- estimated costs were adjusted for inflation, our assumptions , and
the specified labor rates.

The FAA is adopting this final rule to revise certain regulations in Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25 (Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Airplanes) and part 33 (Airworthiness Standards: Aircraft Engines)
related to the cer tification of transport category airplanes and turbine engines in icing conditions.

To improve the safety of part 25 transport category airplanes operating in supercooled large drop (SLD) , mixed phase, and ice crystal icing conditions, these regulations will:

• Require airplanes most affected by large drop icing conditions to meet certain safety standards in an expanded certification icing environment that includes freezing drizzle and freezing rain. These safety standards include airplane performance an d handling qualit y requirements.43 • Expand the engine and engine installation certification, and some airplane component certification regulations (for example, angle of attack and airspeed indicating systems), to include freezing drizzle, freezing rain, m ixe d

p hase and i ce c rystal i cing e nvelope ( d eep c onvective c louds ).

Several commenters to the NPRM stated that available engineering tools (icing wind tunnels and tankers, ice accretion prediction codes, and other analysis methods) are inadequate for showing compliance with the new rule. The FAA recognize s that the current engineering tools available to show compliance with the new SLD rule have not been validated in every aspect and have some
limitations. At the request of industry members of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee, t he Ice Protection Harm onization Working Group ( IPHWG ) evaluated the current capabilities of these tools during a review in
2009. The FAA recognizes that reli ance upon available simulation methods combined with engineering j udgment will be required for finding compliance
with these final requirements. For freezing rain conditions, engineering judgment may allow for other methods of compliance, even though not validated, when used in a fashion similar to that recommended for freezing
drizzle. In February 2012, Flight Global reported that EADS recently opened a dedicated cryogenic wind tunnel for anti

- icing studies. The wind tunnel has the capacity to investigate the crystallization process of supercooled liquid droplets
and find ways to minimize in

- flight ice buildup. 34 The FAA concludes that even with the limitations to the engineering tools, there is enough capability to demonstrate compliance to the new and revised requirements of this final rule.

The FAA has concluded that a nalytical methods used to determine SLD ice accretions on radomes have shown considerably higher ice mass accretions than

34 http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/eads

- opens

- dedicated

- cryogenic

- windtunnel

- for

- anti

- icing

studies

- 367673/

.44 past experience has indicated for other icing conditions. For t he § 25.1093 compliance of affected airplanes , analysis may be used for the radome as a potential airframe ice source. Applicants may use qualitative analysis of the design supported by similarity to a previous design that has shown successful service history to demonstrate confidence that the histo rical methodology for certification is appropriate.

Some comment er s questioned the validity of the high costs to large airplanes and their low risk due to the large droplet icing accident history. The FAA requested
clarification of these comments from t he manufacturers of large airplanes. In response, the FAA eliminated future newly part 25 certificated large airplanes
from considering Appendix O SLD conditions for compliance with the § 25.1093
NPRM engine induction system ice protection requirements. This action significantly reduced the fixed system design certification costs of this final rule
and the recurrent fuel costs to newly certificated large transport category part 25 airplanes. 35 While large airplanes will not need to consider Appendix O SLD conditions for compliance with engine inlet or performance and handling requirements , the final rule will still add some costs due to system design
certification requirements for newly certificated large part 25 airplanes delivered
to the U.S.

We now discuss the costs to the large transport category part 25 airplane
manufacturers

.
Large Transport Category Part 25 Airplane Certification Cost s During the comment period, we received comments from large air plane
manufacturers that claimed an addit ional cost not included in the NPRM RIA

. The industry cost estimates were partially based on assumptions that an ice

35 § 25.1093(b)(3).45 protection system was required for the radome and an accompanying change to the ice detection system would be necessary. We do not agree with the assumption that either a radome ice protection system is required or that changes to an ice detection system are necessary in consideration of the icing conditions defined in part 25, appendix O for large airplanes . As such, the cost estimates of
a radome ice protection system and associated ice detection system provided by large airplane manufacturers should not be attributed to requirements contained in this final rule. As noted in the preamble for the final rule and in the response to comment, to demonstrate compliance, analysis may be used for the radome as a potential airframe ice source. Applican ts may use qualitative analysis of the design supported by similarity to a previous design that has shown successful service history to have confidence that the historical methodology for certification. As a result of these comments guidance material has b een revised
which clarifies the use of in

- service experience, similarity, and breakup of in

flight ice accretions.

In addition, the FAA eliminated the large transport category part 25 airplane requirement s from § 25.1093. This significantly lowered the certification and operating costs for future newly certificated large part 25 airplanes. While large airplanes will not need to consider Appendix O SLD conditions for compliance with engine inlet or performance and handling requirements for newly
certific ated large part 25 airplanes, the final rule will add system design requirements for these airplanes delivered to the U.S. Therefore, the final rule
will only add certification costs for system design requirements to large part 25 airplane manufacturers who deliver airplanes to U.S. operators

.

Ice detection technology to distinguish between various icing conditions will likely be developed for airplanes required to demonstrate safe operation following encounters with SLD conditions in ac cordance with § 2 5.1420.46 Specifically, airplanes with a maximum takeoff weight less than 60,000 pounds or equipped with reversible flight controls. Changes to existing ice detection technology are not necessary for large transport category part 25 airpl anes since § 25.1420 do es not apply.

In response to the public comments and conversations with industry , we incorporate the additional estimated large transport category part 25 airplane
certification cost the final rule adds . Initially a manufacturer indicated a total of $ 35

- $49 million per la rge airplane certification

. Technical and cost clarification s

were obtained and ranges were provided. As a result, we use point estimates within the ranges that were provided and have adjusted and removed the

app roximate cost related to the radome ice protection system , the ice detection system, and the flight and wind tunnel tests

. Table 1 5 shows t he estimated cost to be in compliance with these final requirements.

TABLE 1 5

– FIXED CERTIFICATION COSTS PER AIRPLANE TYPE

For the NPRM, manufacturers provided the additional amount of time required to show compliance with the rule. M anufacturers informed the FAA that additional amount of time required by the rulemaking is for system architecture, integration, and analysis so that the pilot i s given information on the speed of the airplane, the angle of attack and the ability to safely operated the airplane in icing condition s

. The additional cost per certification equal ed the fixed47 validation cost plus the additional compliance hours multiplied by the burdened hourly cost for engineers. Table 1 6 summa rizes these costs

.

TABLE 1 6

– CERTIFICATION COSTS PER AIRPLANE TYPE NOT INCLUDED IN THE NPRM

For the NRPM, i ndustry rep resentatives provided estimated additional
certification costs for derivative airplane programs

. A certification cost for a derivative airplane program is expected to be less because, overall, the derivative process is less complex than for a new design. As such, manufacturers have provided a range based upon the complexity of the project. For the final rule, t he

FAA adjusted the certification cost for derivative airplanes by removing the approximate costs related to the radome ice protection system, the ice detection system, and the flight and wind tunnel tests and estimated a total cost for a large airplane derivativ e of about $ 1.5 million per certificate

.

When the additional cost of roughly $1.6 million is added to the previously
estimated large part 25 airplane certification cost of $4.0 million , the total cost is about $ 5.6 million per large aircraft certification

. Derivative airplanes are not included in our estimate of new airplane certifications. To account for derivatives and produce a conservative estimate, w e front

- loaded the $1.5
million airplane certification cost of future derivatives of new airplanes by adding it to the $5.6 million per large airplane certification. This brings the total costs the final rule adds to the certification of large transport category part 25 airplane s to about $7. 1 million per certificate.48 We then multiply the total cost of a large transport category part 25 airplane
certification by 2 certification s we estimated in the Large Transport Category Part 25 Airplane Fleet” section

. The results of these calculations equal about $14.1
million over the 10

- year c ertification perio d.

**Recur rent**  **Hardware and Fuel**  **Costs**

**– Large Airplanes**  A significant cost factor received during the comment period involved the additional hardware and recurring cost that manufacturers w ou l d incur on large airplanes as a result of this final rule.

The commenter estimated the total additional costs with assumptions that the addition of radome ice protection and increased engine inlet ice protection, as
well as new ice detection systems would be required to comply with the final
rule

. As discussed earli er, the commenter incorrectly assumed that design changes associated with a new radome ice protection system as well as changes to the ice detection system would be necessary to comply with this rule for large airplanes. Not all of these costs are attribu table to this final rule because

a pplicants may show compliance by using qualitative analysis of the design supported by similarity to a previous design with a successful service history.

We also received comments regarding fuel consumption costs for large airplanes, which our initial analysis did not include. Since the NPRM, the manufacturers have identified additional weight associated with the design changes for the engine inlet anti

- ice protec tion system. In response to comments, the FAA
revised § 2 5.1093 (b) to remove consideration of appendix O icing conditions for large airplanes. This eliminated the requirement for additional hardware on future newly part 25 certificated large airplanes. As such, there will be no additional weight on large airplanes because of the elimination of the hardware, and therefore, no additional fuel costs.49 As such, for this final rule, there are no additional recurrent costs for large airplane operators

.

We now discuss the fixed and recurrent costs to manufacturers and operators of other part 25 airplanes.

Other Part 25 Air plane Certification Co sts We use the same costs for the other part 25 airplane certification s as we did in the
NPRM for the small and medium airplane certifications . For the NPRM,

m anufacturers provid ed the FAA with hourly estimates for the certification cost
across the summary categories shown in table 17

. For the final rule, we have
combined the small and medium fl eet analysis into one category , other part 25 airplanes, for transparency and clarity

. Based on their information, the estimated

cost of this rule for each new other part 25 airplane design is shown in table 17

. Commenters stated these costs are somewhat low but sufficiently accurate for the purposes of this evaluation. Multiplying this new certification cost by the
number of other part 25 airplane certifications calculated in the “Fleet” section ( 2 ) yields the t otal new cost for other part 25 airplane certifications

.

TABLE 1 7

– TOTAL OTHER PART 25 AIRPLANE CERTIFICATION COST S50 We now discuss the derivation for each of the cost categor ies from Table 1 7

.

**Other P**  **art 25 Airplane**  **System Design, Certification**  **and Analysis**  **C osts**  As shown in table 18, m anuf acturers expect to incur design, certification , and supporting analysis cost s per design

. They provided detailed hourly estimates for design, certification , and analysis to be in compliance with this final rule.
Table 1 8 shows t he se detailed estimates with the system design and certification

cost breakdown of what the manufacturer might do to show compliance with the requirements contained in this final rule

.
TABLE 1 8

– OTHER PART 25 AIRPLANE SYSTEM DESIGN, CERT IFICATION AND ANALYSIS COSTS

**O ther**  **P art 25**  **Airplane Aerodynamic Wind Tunnel Tests**  **C osts**  Wind and icing tunnel test s are frequently done to reduce the amount of flight tests in natural icing conditions because flight testing in general is costly. Wind and icing tunnel testing would be performed in order to demonstrate and certify to the requirements and confirm the ana lysis results. The cost s per design for
wind tunnel tests are shown in Table 19

.51 TABLE 19

– OTHER PART 25 AIRPLANE TUNNEL TESTING

**O ther**  **P art 25**  **Airplane Analysis**  **Cost** There will be some variability in the various manufa cture rs’ methods for
certification , and each manufacturer typically uses a variety of analysis and test methods to optimize the airplane and ice protection systems design . The
additional analysis cost for compliance with the requirements is shown as “Analysis Subtotal” in Tab le 17

.

**O ther**  **P art 25**  **airplane Flight Testing**  **C osts**  M anufacturers expect to perform flight testing to show compliance with the requirements contained in th is final rule

. The primary purpose of flight testing is
to determine that the design is effective and performs its intended functions during flight as predicted by analysis. The flight testing is also used to evaluate any degradation in performance and flying qualities, to verify the adequacy of
the flightcrew procedures and limitations , and to confirm that the power plant installation perfor ms satisfactorily while in icing conditions. The costs are based

upon the initial industry estimates for the approximate number of hours required to demonstrate compliance with the requirements. As i n the NPRM RIA , w e use the hourly cost of labor as a n estimate when appropriate. An airplane52 manufacturer commented that they found the hourly costs of flight testing to be somewhat low, but sufficiently accurate for the purposes of his final rule
evaluat ion. For hourly unit costs that differ from our standard labor rates, we have updated industry estimates

. The details provided by the industry are shown below and comprise the largest estimated proportion of certification costs because they require severa l additional items that suppo rt the actual airplane testing (such as but not limited to icing tanker rental, renting a chase airplane , and flying the airplane to required location). Table 2 0 lists the estimated cost elements with the total estimated cost for the flight testing accompanying each certification of roughly $5.3 million.

TABLE 2 0

- FLIGHT TESTING53 **Other Part 25**  **Airplane Hardware Costs**  As in the initial regulatory evaluation, we continue to use the industry

- provided
SLD ice detector cost estimate of $10,000 . A pproximately 50% of the affected
deliveries of other part 25 airplanes will need SLD ice detectors because we
estimate r oughly 50% of airplanes would be certified using visual cues and the remaining would already be certified with detectors. When the ice detector costs of $10,000 are multiplied by the estimated fleet per year and summed cost over the period of analysis, table 2 1 shows the total estima ted hardware costs

.
TABLE 2 1

– OTHER PART 25 AIRPLA NE HARDWARE COSTS

* Details may not add to row or column totals due to rounding

. **Other Part 25 Airplane**  **Fuel Costs** This rule will result in additional operating costs , from the hardware required by this final rule, and accompanying weight changes on each of the other part 25 airplane s

. In this analysis, we incorporate the recent cost of fuel forecast using data from the FAA Aerospace Forecast from 2011 . We use this forecast along
with t he fuel consumption methodology as explained in F AA’s guidance , Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory Decisions
, 36 the annual flight

36 http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/policy_guidance/benefit_cost/54 hours per airplane , 37 and the annual FAA fuel cost forecast per gallon 38 in order
to estimate the additional cost of fuel per affected other part 25 airplane s

.

Again, as in the NPRM w e use the 50% factor to account for our fuel consumption cost estimates as only that portion of the other part 25 fleet w ill incur the cost of carrying the additional SLD ice detectors.

For the other part 25 airplanes, t he additional incremental weight impact is first multiplied by the average fuel burn factor per airplane. Th is product is then multiplied by the flight hour s and then by the cost of fuel to estimate the annual additional fuel consumption cost.

As in the NPRM, w e calculate the annual additional cost of fuel by multiplying
the estimated additional industry

- provided hardware weight of approximately 19 pound s by the fuel burn factor of 0 .005 gallons per hour per p ound to arrive at
0. 095 gallons per hour per airplane. T his product is then multiplied by the
annual average weighted flight hours per airplane of 2,245 hours and finally by
the annual FAA fuel cost forecast per gallon to arrive at the annual estimated
additional cost of fuel for each of the other part 25 airplane s

.

The estimated annual additional fuel cost per airplane, is multiplied by the
affected other part 25 fleet. The industry ex pects roughly one half of the
estimated affected fleet will not incur such costs. When multiplied by the
affected annual fleet of airplanes that will incur cost because of this final rule ,

37 http://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviati on_data_statistics/general_aviation/CY2010/ 2010 GA Survey

-

Business Turbo Jet Table 1.1 and 1.4
, http://www.oagaviation.com/ , OAG Aviation Solutions Fleet iNet Database

- May 2012.

38 http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/aviation_forecasts/aerospace_forecasts/

FAA Aerospace Forecasts 2011

- 2031 , Table 18.55 and summed over the period of analysis , table 2 2 shows the total airplane fuel

cost

.
TABLE 2 2

– OTHER PART 25 AIRPLA NE FUEL COSTS

* Details may not add to row or column totals due to rounding

. Engine Certification Cost s The engine requirements contained in this final rule will increase costs to engine
manufacturers. Similar to the NPRM RIA , we analyze and evaluate the part 33 engine certification c osts separately. Manufacturers provided data based upon
revised AC 20

- 147, Turbojet, Turboprop, and Turbofan Engine Induction System Icing and Ice Ingestion
, which shows a cceptable compliance methods. The part 3356 engine manufacturers did not object to the costs estimated in the NPRM RIA . As such, we use the same cost estimates that were originally provided. The total additional costs for part 33 designs are s hown in table 23

.
TABLE 2 3

- ENGINE COST SUMMARY

We now discuss the derivation for each of the cost categor ies from table 2 3

.

The final revisions for engine certification will change the environmental requirements to evaluate engine protection and operation in icing conditions. The effect of the change will require an evaluation of safe operation in the revised icing environment through either test or analysis. The rules will require engines and engine installations to operate safely throughout th e SLD conditions defined in new part 25, appendix O, and the newly defined mixed phase and ice crystal conditions in new part 33, appendix D.

Industry has provided data for several different engine “sizes,” and we aggregated this data to determine an aver age cost per engine certification. The
data was further sub

- divided into certification and capital costs. Table 2 4 shows the estimated certification costs per program. These costs are expected to occur once for every new certification program.

TABLE 2 4

– ENGINE COSTS PER CER TIFICATION57 From 1996

- 2005 , there were 16 new part 33 turbine engines, or 1.6 engines per year. For this analysis, we conservatively assume all 16 engine certifications will

occur at the end of the first year of analysis

. With c ertification costs of $496,000 per certification, the total estimated “E ngine C ertification C ost ” is shown in
Table 2 6

.

In addition to these certification costs, there will be additional capital costs to modify manufacturer facilities in order to provide an ice crystal cloud (as way of showing compliance with the requirements). The estimated cost is $1 million per engine manufacturer. We expect all 6 manufacturers of part 33 engines to incur
this cost in 201 5. T he total estimated “E ngine Capital C ost ” is shown in Table 2 6

The capital cost plus the certification cost equals the ”T otal E ngine C osts ” shown
in Table 2 6

.

**Additional** Airplane Operating Costs In the NPRM RIA , th e FAA originally asked ARAC to estimate other operational
costs b eyond the additional hardware and fuel consumption costs . Accordingly, ARAC provided this data to the FAA. However, a s we neared completion of our

cost analysis for these requirements in the NPRM , we queried individual operators , and the Chief Pilots informed us they were already in compliance and
there were no a dditional operational costs beyond fuel and hardware.

W hen asked about the existing operations in SLD , Chief Pilots and operators
referenced AC 91

- 51A , Effect of Icing on Aircraft Control and Airplane Deice and
Anti

- Ice Systems , where:58 “...Pilots can minimize the chance of a roll upset by being sensitive to cues that identify severe icing conditions before control or handling characteristics of the airplane are degraded to a hazardous level

. ”

In additio n to the guidance document s and crew training , operators referenced airplane flight manual s that require the flightcrew to exit severe icing conditions ; which could include SLD icing conditions

. Everyone in the industry that was queried recognize s the dangers of operating in SLD conditions and intends to
avoid these conditions. O perators routinely, and on a regular basis , incur SLD operational costs from diversions by exiting SLD conditions, diverting to alternate airport s , and cancelling flights

. O perators continue to acknowledge
th ese as existing cost s and agree there might be only minimal incremental costs as a result of the certification requirements contained in this final rule

. An airplane manufacturer disagreed and commented that there would be additional costs. An association indicated that one operator would incur operational costs
but did not give specifics. We made several attempts to validate these claims but
were not able to do so. Similar to th e NPRM, we do not attribute these operational costs to the rule because opera tors are already incurring them and
there will not be significant costs beyond what operators currently incur.

Airplane Certification Cost s - International Impact While we estim ate international compliance costs, we do not include these costs in the overall cost of compliance because the se costs occur outside the U.S . As discussed in the fleet analysis, it was necessary to estimate the number of designs by foreign companies to d etermine the number airplane deliveries from foreign
manufacturers to the United States.

As described earlier in the “ Large Transport Category Part 25 Airplane
Certification Costs ” section, the cost per large airplane certification is about $4. 0
million , plus about $1.6 million as described by industry in the NPRM59 comments , plus the $ 1.5 million cost for large airplane derivatives

. W e assume

one new certification over the next ten years

. T he total estimated international impact to large part 25 airplane foreign manufacture rs is shown in table 25

.

As estimated earlier in the “Other Part 25 Airplane Certification Costs” section , each new other part 25 airplane certification will be about $ 9.5 million. During a
10

- year certification period, ther e w ill be roughly 3 foreign new other part 25 airplane programs as identified by manufacturers. As such, table 25 shows the
international cost to the other part 25 airplane foreign manufacturers.

We then add the cost of large transport category part 25 airplane s to foreign
manufacturers to the international cost to the other part 25 airplane
manufacturers , and table 25 shows the total estimated future cost to foreign
manufacturers over the 10

- year analysis interval

.

TABLE 25

– INTERNATIONAL PART 2 5 AIR PLANE CERTIFICATION COSTS

Cost Summary T able 2 6 shows t he estimated total cost s for the period of analysis by category.60 TABLE 2 6

- COST SUMMARY

* Details may not add to row or column totals due to rounding

. The present value costs are compared to the present value benefits in Table 27 in
the “B enefit C ost S ummary ” section

.


## Benefit Cost Summary
The affected fleet and categories of benefits and costs are analyzed over different time period s due to different production and life cycle a nd are customized to
each fleet and to the requirements of this final rule

. Due to the different life cycles i t is important to focus on present value benefits and costs

. Just averting
one fatal accident with seven averted fatalities is sufficient to jus tify this rule. The accident risk is high enough that the estimated benefits for both the large and other transport category airplanes has increased since the publication of the
NPRM.

T able 27 shows the breakout of the benefits and costs by large transpo rt category part 25 air planes and other part 25 airplanes ; clearly the benefits exceed the costs

.61 TABLE 2 7

– BENEFITS AND COSTS B Y AIRCRAFT TYPE

* Details may not add to row or column totals due to rounding

.62 

## Appendix63 Appendix 1 U.S. Operated Retired Large Turbojet § 2 5 Airplanes64 Appendix 1 (continued)65 Appendix 2 U.S. Operated Large Turbojet § 25 Airplane Average Production Run66 Appendix 2 (continued)67 Appendix 3 U.S. Operated Large Turbojet § 25 Airplane Annual Number of Deliveries68 Appendix 3 (continued)69 Appendix 4

T ABLE 4

- 1

– DERIVATION OF ACCIDE NT AND CASUALTY RATE S

* Details may not add to row or column totals due to rounding

.70 Appendix 4 (continued)

T ABLE 4

- 2

– DERIVATION OF BENEFI TS

* Details may not add to row or column totals due to rounding

.71 Appendix 5 U.S. Operated Retired Other § 25 Airplanes72 Appendix 6 U.S. Operated Other § 25 Airplane Average Production Run73 Appendix 6 (continued)74 Appendix 7 U.S. Operated Other § 25 Airplane Annual Number of Deliveries75 Appendix 7 (continued)76 Appendix 8 Estimated Market Value of Air Carrier Aircraft
In August 2008, APO update d the 2003$ aircraft residual values in Table 5

- 1 from the “Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory Decisions, A Guide” 39 because the FAA wanted a more current estimate of aircraft values based on 2008 economic market conditions.

The FAA updated Table 5

- 1 using two proprietary industry database s. The first industry database was the OAG Aviation Solutions Fleet database 40 and reported the number of aircraft operated in the U.S. The second industry database was the Airliner Price Gui de 41 and provided aircraft value s by equipment type. We aggregated the aircraft values into the aircraft value categories from Table 5

- 1 and calculating a weighted average for each economic value category using the number of aircraft operated in the U.S.

The following table shows the updated of values for passenger and cargo air carrier aircraft by economic value category

.

39 http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/policy_guidance/benefit_cost/media/ECONOMICVALUESFOR

FA AINVESTMENTANDREGULATORYDECISIONS10032007.pdf

. 40 OAG Aviation Solution, 3025 Highland Pkwy, Suite 200, Downers Grove, Il 60515, July 2008

41 Airliner Price Guide, 568 Waterloo Road, Suite 102, Warrenton, VA 20186, July 200877 Appendix 9 Value of Statistical Life78 Appendix 9 (continued)