USCIB: 12./15 

24 May 1955 

SiQREi! 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Cryptographic Assistance I.__ ____ __. 

Reference: USCIB 12./10 of 26 October 1954. 

1. Enclosed herewith is a copy of the recommendations of the 

Director, NSA with regard to the reference. The S-DMIOC has concurred 

in the assumptions and proposed action set forth in paragraphs 6 and 7 

of the enclosure. However, the USCSB has not yet agreed to the enclosed 

recommendations, the Anrry member having commented as follows: 

NSA~rs to favor a refusal of 

" · g adherence to the policy ad.optede?o 

reques , since on intra•L.._'"_Jrequirements (no inter-US 

requirements) are involved. Sue;:~ a~~ion would not t.ake •. n 

account other important aspects of the problem. as indicated below. 

b. Our interests with respect to c~ic:a_tions security of 

our SEATO allies correspond to those with respeet,to .NATO (although 

SEATO, unlike NATO, is purely a political organizatiQP., it could 

,-, 1 L... '-"! 

change overnight into a military organization). /Eo 3. 3 (h) (2) 

P4 86-36/50 USC 3605 

c. We should consider establishment o:f a Com.bin$d Working 

Group (US-Australia-UK) to study COMSEC problems of S:a;ATO,\with a 

view to protecting classified information which may atf ect 

seriously U.S. security if leaked through faulty comm\lnications 

of SEATO nations. 

a Tmmedi de CtJ¥SEC assistance to the •. • .....__ _________ ] .... for intra as well as inter cOJIIJil\lnications is 

considered in the best interests of U.S. The U.S. should adopt a 

policy of such assistance, even though shortage of equipment and 

priorities may make fulfillment of requirements difficult. 

e. This problem should also be discussed by USClB in view of 

their interests in certain aspects of a:rry effort to improve SEATO 

COMSEC. There is also a requirement to notify the U.K •. of any such 

arrangements that may be contemplated. 

f. The policy with respect tol - I should be 

changed to permit immediate strengthening of their COMSEb, intra as 

well as inter, as the situation in l ... ________ _,lcould change 

ver-y suddenly." 

USCIB: 12./15 II:A:Nffi:d!l r;IA eOMIN'f eH:A:Nlf.1!1LB ONLY 

SECRET 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-12-2014 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 
USCIB: 12./15 

BEeRE'I' 

Subject: 

2. The Chairman, USCSB would be grateful for the views of USCIB on 

the above prior to consideration of the matter in the USCSB. In this 

connection attention is invited to the fact that USCIB has not as yet 

informed USCSB of the purpose and activities of its Combined Working Group 

and Ad Hoc Committee for the Improvement of NATO National Communications 

Security. This occasion may be opportune for that purpose. 

3. Owing to the heavy agenda of USCIBEC and the need for early 

consideration of the major policy aspects of the above quoted comment by 

the Army, this matter will be placed on the agenda for discussion at the 

next regular meeting of USCIB. In order to assist USCIB in arriving at a 

decision, comments by the State Department and NSA members of USCIB are 

requested for circulation to the rest of the members by Friday, 3 June 

1955. 

Enclosure 

Copy of NSA Serial 2965-A 

of 3 May 1955. 

USCIB: 12./15 - 2 -

SECRET 
Serial: 2965-A 

J May 1955 

MEMORANDUM FUR THE.MEMBERS, USCSB 

BUl3JECT: Cryptograp~~c ~si~tance to th~ 

l. In October 1954, the Assistant Chie:f ,of\ Sta:r:r, 0-21 !rntelligence0

, • 

u. s. Arm:r, f'orwarded to the Director for appropr.iate actiott' a message 

request f'rom the Chief, JUSMA.G,1 l :for cryptographic assistance 

to the II~. Copies of this request were cir.cuJ.ated to the members 

ot USC~ USC1Jl.under cover of COMSEC 2..,18/1(USCIB12./10), dated 

26 October 1954. 

2. As you no doubt obsenrf!d, the, request was mu.oh too general to 

permit an evaluation of the nature Qr extent of tber----1-equirement. 

Consequently, on 5 November 1954 theDir~ctor reque~t further 

details be furnished, specificall.y: 

a. Were the ciph'er device~ publi~13.~i~·······.t··.· .. ···o ... · be used between United States an~ita, or byt==j units onl.yt ···· ./Eo 3. 3 ( h) ( 2) 

RL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

b. What were the expected echelons ot. use? 

c. What specific cipher devices, JANA.P's.,/ and···ACP's were considered appropriate, and 1fhich· or those considered/ appropriate cou1d 

be :furnished by the u. s. ArmyT 

3. In response to this request 1 a ,represet:l .. ·· ··. A:raq SecurityAgency, Far East, visited Headquarters 1 JUSMAG1 1n December 

1954 to obtain the necessary information. H.is repo ed\17 Februaey 

l.955, which was :forwarded to this J\gency by/the Chie:f', Army6ecurity 

Agency-, letter, file GAS24413.46,<lated17March 1955, is summarized 

below :for your information; ' 

a. - r, 4e I lhave 11 tt1e knowledge or cryptoSlj'phic I 

principl.es, and any requirement whichJDa.t be generated f'or the Army 

Jl1U8t ot necessity inc1ude not only the provision of' cryptosystems and 

operating instructions, but also cOD!DlWlications security training. 

b. At the present t:tmr. /tly' requirement for enciphered·. com.-

cunications exists o~ between! i J military units, primarily Ar-my units. 

There is a possibility, however •. that a requirement may be developed for 

conmnmications between the L:J units and United States units in ··1 .... ___ .... 

-SECRE'f. • 
sttNEfD: A660.if 

.. 

SEera!Yf Serial: 2965-A 

D 3 May 1955 

c. Although. the provision of security on Army circuits 

is desired onl.y on those from Headquarters dawn to and including division size units, it appears that 1~ ... ed se~urity .... is required also in 

the lower tactical echelons of thel___J f0rces. Multilingual operations 

codes vould be a. proba.b1e solution. 

d. It will be very ·dif"i"icult'to adapt standard communications 

security equitJment for the enciphermexit of th!!!c:J language. Attempts. 

to convert thel Ila. nguage to phonetic \.equiw.. len .• · ts usin.~ English alphabet have been unsuacesaf'ul, since only ab()'\t; 25'{o ofl___Jmilitary 

personnel are able t,o read English characters. • Arabic numbers, hOlrever, 

are generally underi:ltood., and it is suggeoted tbs.ti !characters or 

words be converted to numerical equivalents priox- to encipberment. 

e. No teletype equ;l.pment is ,current:cy- being used by II 

military units, although it is planned that a ee:rtain amount~s equipment will be ma.de avail.a.bl.a through the Mutual Defense/Assistance 

Program (MDAP) • It is not kn;own w.ha.t ~ystelll·. rll. re.·•• devi.· sed for the UBof this type of equipment with re1:1pect to the • language. 

4. In forwarding this report, the ,Chiet,•Armr Security Agency, 

observed that the language problem and the lack qt teletypewriter communications limit cryptographic assistance at the present time to simple 

pencil and paper systems. Based on this\ deternrl.llation, he listed the 

fol1owing requirements: 

<") poso1b4' t;te!1 nmltil~~~ f=••••c~t~~I:~~ b. c=:=:lrumerical one-time pt:l,d~ FL. 86-36/50 use 3605 

c. Authentication systems. 

d. JANAP's, ACP's and other publications containing operating 

instructions and :f'ormat required/for the cryptosysteJ11(s)\released tor 

use to the c:::::::J Aney. /, 

5. In addition to the above statement of requirements,\Ohief, Army 

Security Agency 1 inquired as to t.he extent of encourageinent and/ or 

assistance to be~ in the d.·evelopment of teletypewrit ..e .. r equi:pme·· .. nt ~dapta.'ble to the L __ Jlanguage, 

6. The Director feel.a that in this matter he shou1d be guided.by 

the policy recently approved by USCSB in connection with a Similar rea hie assistance to the 

This/policy established the principle tba.t the United 

stres wnnl d not tmde~ke to provide cryptographic assistance ~e 

in_ _ intra-governmental coDDDunications. The L__J 

requirement, as stated in subparagraph 3b above, exists at this time ~ · 

I 

. 2 

SECRET 
" ' \ " 

\ 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

SICRBT Serie.1:2965-A 

3 M.<ty 1955 

'tor D~ intel'tlal communications. It is a:•wned tbat us·····.. C$B······ ... vilil apply the same uol.iey tol I as tol _ ~ and the 

Director has so infonned the Chief, Arrq Securi y Agency. 

7. Should a 'requirement develop, either as a result o:t1 

participation in the Manila Pa.ct or other circumstance, tor .,..in_,t_e_r,....1-----'ll 

u. s. secure comm.unicat1ons,.1t is asrumed tha.t USCSB will consider the 

Director authorized at that time to r J.'OVide low-echelon OPCODES, onetime pads, authentication systems and necessary publications, including 

ACP's. It additional requirements develop or assistance other than the 

above is requested, the matter will be referred to USCSB tor consider• 

ation. · 

8. Confirmation and approval by USCBB ot the assumptions and 

proposed action in this matter are requested. 

JO ACKEHIMAN 

Ma.Jor General, US Air Poree 

Acting Director 

SECRET