~---" e S6'i~1319 Office Memorandum • uNITEn sTATEs GOVERNMENT 

TO Mr. W. F. Friedman DATE:22 March 1954 

FROM Mr. L. D. Callimahos 

SUBJECT: Security Classification of Training Materials 

1. Reference is made to message "P 091446z" from GCHQ to SLO Washington, 

addressed to Brigadier Tiltme.n from DD. 

2. The British object to par. 6.54 of :RSA-72's "Current Cryptanalytic 

Techniques" being included in a CONFIDDTIAL document. I can see no reason why 

any of the subparagrapha 6.54a through 6.54t merit a classification a.rq higher 

than COBFIDEEIAL according tO our standardi. It is true that all of these subparagraphs have at one time or another covered operatio:cal systems; but is it also 

true that lllEUlY portions of other cryptologic training texts, CONFIDENTIAL or unclassified, have or have had operatio:cal applicability. 

3. There is no question in l'Jt3' mind that 1 in subparagraph 6 .54, all the 

items but b and f are straightforward cryptographic aspects • Item f is but a 

slight depirture-from the obvious; but item b has been used time and again when 

other faster means of generation have not been employed. The entire substance 

of paragraph 6.54 deals with the cmtograpj of sources of additive, without one 

word on cryptanalysis; there is not the sli test indication that these sources of 

additive can be exploited. I realize that the obJection to 6.54 must be item b 1 

because of its "applicability" to certain sensitive problems--are we then to put 

psychological random.'s head in the sand and deny its existence'l 

4. AB for the general statement in GCHQ 's message that "this is a particularly striking example of the tendency to include in this handbook information 

that ought to be graded TOP S~RET Codeword" 1 I have read carefUlly through the 

entire three ml1nnes of the NSA-72 work and I cannot find anything which to our 

mind would warrant exclusion from the standpointilra COBFIDERTIAL document. A 

5. In paragraph 4 of GCHQ 's message is is stated that the syllabus of the 

Military Ceyptanalytics series shows that "Parts I through IV are correctly graded 

CODFIDDTIAL since the1 are concerned vith techniques that have repeatedly been 

described in tiblished literature. 11 Is it the British view 1 then, that items appearing in the pu lie domain are automatically classified COB.F~IAL'l It happens that 

Parts I-IV vill contain~ material t~t has,!!?! appeared in the public domain, 

but this material is not expected to transcend information to which we normally ascribe 

the classification of CONFIDENTIAL. AB tor the British conq>la1nt that the syllabuses 

of Parts V and VI "seem to us to cover secret processes that are currently in use at 

GCHQ for production of Category III COMINT and are therefore technical material within the meaning of Note 1B to Appendix B requiring the grading TOP smRET Codeword," 

vhat I ha:v'e planned for Parts V and VI will include information at the CONFIDENTIAL 

and smRET levels, respectively. However, vhen the time comes for the ».reJ>vation 

of these two texts, it might be necessary to raise the classification oY e"1ther one 

or both of them, dependent upon the treatment of the information contained. I disagree, however, with the apparent British inference that the solution of codes and 

enciphered codes, for e:x:a.mple, is automatically in the highest classification category 

because of the a: licab111ty of these techniques in operational problems. 

eclassified and a roved for release b NSA on 05-05-2014 ursuant to E.O. 1352 

4. "- 47..-..:...-e.. 

Lambros D. Cal.l.imab.os