Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 

Lemons, JJ., and Compton,∗ S.J. 

THOMAS RANDOLPH LEWIS 

v. Record No. 051349 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 

 April 21, 2006 

COURTENAY MUNFORD LEWIS 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 A panel of the Court of Appeals of Virginia decided 

that a circuit court’s interlocutory decree dismissing a 

cross-bill for annulment of a marriage “adjudicat[ed] the 

principles of a cause” and was thus appealable under Code 

§ 17.1-405(4)(ii). Lewis v. Lewis, Record No. 1807-04-2, 

slip op. at 3 (May 10, 2005). Because the interlocutory 

decree did not “respond to the chief object” of the 

domestic relations dispute and did not determine “‘the 

principles’ that are necessary to adjudicate the cause,” we 

conclude that the decree was not appealable to the Court of 

Appeals. Erikson v. Erikson, 19 Va. App. 389, 391, 451 

S.E.2d 711, 713 (1994). The Court of Appeals therefore 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. 

For those reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 

Court of Appeals. 

 ∗

 Senior Justice Compton participated in the hearing 

and decision of this case before his death on April 9, 

2006. 
2

RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

 The appellee, Courtenay Munford Lewis, filed a bill of 

complaint in the Circuit Court of Powhatan County in March 

2004. In that pleading, she sought a divorce a vinculo 

matrimonii from the appellant, Thomas Randolph Lewis, and 

an equitable distribution award. Thomas answered the bill 

of complaint and denied that the parties are married. He 

also filed a cross-bill for annulment of the marriage under 

Code §§ 20-38.1(1) and –89.1.1

 Thomas alleged that his 

marriage with Courtenay was void on the grounds that, at 

the time of their marriage on March 1, 1976, Courtenay “was 

then married to and not validly divorced from Frederick 

Latimer Wells, whom she had married on July 6, 1963.” 

 Courtenay subsequently filed a motion in limine to 

preclude Thomas from introducing into evidence certain 

documents pertaining to her divorce from her former 

husband. She asserted that Thomas lacked standing to 

attack the validity of a September 25, 1975 divorce decree 

between her and Wells entered by the Circuit Court of the 

City of Richmond. Thus, Courtney claimed that Thomas could 

 1

 In pertinent part, Code § 20-38.1 prohibits “[a] 

marriage entered into prior to the dissolution of an 

earlier marriage of one of the parties.” Pursuant to Code 

§ 20-89.1(a), a marriage “alleged to be void or voidable 

for any of the causes mentioned in § . . . 20-38.1 . . . 

shall be decreed void by a decree of annulment.” 
3

not introduce into evidence, with regard to either the 

divorce or the annulment, a decree of divorce entered on 

August 30, 1979 by the Circuit Court of Powhatan County in 

a suit styled Courtenay Munford Wells a/k/a Courtenay 

Munford Lewis against Frederick L. Wells, nor could he 

introduce the bill of complaint that she filed in that 1979 

proceeding.2

 During a hearing on the motion in limine, Courtenay 

orally moved the circuit court to dismiss the cross-bill 

for annulment. After considering the parties’ memoranda 

and argument, the circuit court concluded that Thomas 

lacked standing to attack Courtenay’s 1975 decree of 

divorce and thus granted both the motion in limine and the 

motion to dismiss the cross-bill for annulment. 

 Thomas appealed the circuit court’s judgment to the 

Court of Appeals of Virginia. The only question Thomas 

presented to the Court of Appeals was “[w]hether the trial 

court erred in dismissing the [c]ross-[b]ill for 

[a]nnulment and ruling that the marriage between the 

parties was valid and not void ab initio.” The Court of 

 2

 In the 1979 bill of complaint filed in the Circuit 

Court of Powhatan County, Courtenay alleged that the 

previous decree granting a divorce between her and Wells, 

entered in 1975 by the Circuit Court of the City of 

Richmond, was “null and void for lack of jurisdiction.” 
4

Appeals, however, asked the parties to also address whether 

the circuit court’s dismissal of the cross-bill was an 

appealable order. Lewis, slip op. at 3. 

 With regard to that question, the Court of Appeals 

concluded that the circuit court, “[b]y holding that 

[Thomas] cannot attack [Courtenay’s] former marriage and by 

dismissing his suit for annulment, [had,] by implication, 

determined that a valid marriage exists between [Thomas and 

Courtenay].” Id., slip op. at 3-4. The circuit court’s 

holding, according to the Court of Appeals, “respond[ed] to 

the chief object of the suit because it determine[d] the 

status of the parties’ marriage” and thus “adjudicate[d] 

the principles of a cause.” Id.

 In deciding that the decree dismissing the cross-bill 

was appealable, the Court of Appeals distinguished its 

decision in Erikson. There, the trial court entered a 

decree finding that the parties’ marriage was valid. 19 

Va. App. at 390, 451 S.E.2d at 712. The decree did not 

grant or deny a divorce, spousal support, or any other 

relief. Id. at 390-91, 451 S.E.2d at 712. The Court of 

Appeals concluded that the ruling that the parties were 

validly married did not “adjudicate the principles of a 

 

Courtenay filed the 1979 bill of complaint after her 

marriage to Thomas. 
5

cause” because the ruling did not determine whether a 

divorce would be granted or upon what grounds, nor did it 

“determine the rules or methods by which the ultimate 

decision in the divorce [would] be adjudicated, thereby 

requiring only the application of those principles to the 

facts of the case to decide the issues.” Id. at 391, 451 

S.E.2d at 713. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that 

the interlocutory decree in Erikson was not appealable 

under former Code § 17-116.05(4) (now Code § 17.1-405(4)) 

and that the Court of Appeals was therefore without 

jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Id. at 391-92, 451 

S.E.2d at 713. Because the interlocutory decree presently 

at issue actually dismissed a cross-bill for annulment 

whereas the interlocutory decree in Erikson merely held 

that the parties’ marriage was valid, the Court of Appeals 

in the case before us concluded that Erikson is factually 

distinguishable and not controlling. Lewis, slip op. at 4. 

Thomas then petitioned for an appeal to this Court. 

Concluding that the decision of the Court of Appeals 

involved a matter having significant precedential value, 

see Code §§ 17.1-410(B) and -411, we awarded Thomas this 

appeal. Contrary to the position that he asserted before 

the Court of Appeals, Thomas now claims that the Court of 

Appeals erred in deciding that the circuit court’s order 
6

dismissing the cross-bill for annulment is an appealable 

interlocutory order under Code § 17.1-405(4)(ii). That 

assignment of error frames the dispositive issue before us. 

ANALYSIS 

 “The Court of Appeals of Virginia is a court of 

limited jurisdiction.” Canova Elec. Contracting, Inc. v. 

LMI Ins. Co., 22 Va. App. 595, 599, 471 S.E.2d 827, 829 

(1996). Unless a statute confers subject matter 

jurisdiction to that court over a class of appeals, the 

Court of Appeals is without authority to review an appeal. 

Id. As pertinent to the case before us, the provisions of 

Code § 17.1-405 grant subject matter jurisdiction to the 

Court of Appeals over “[a]ny final . . . decree of a 

circuit court involving . . . [a]ffirmance or annulment of 

a marriage; . . . divorce; [and a]ny interlocutory decree 

. . . entered in [such] cases . . . adjudicating the 

principles of a cause.” Code §§ 17.1-405(3)(a), (b) and 

–405(4)(ii). 

 Relying on Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Wilson, 

110 Va. 571, 573, 66 S.E. 836, 837 (1910), Courtenay argues 

that the cross-bill was a pleading that alleged new facts 

and prayed for affirmative relief, and would therefore 

remain for disposition if the bill of complaint were 

dismissed. It must then follow, according to Courtenay, 
7

that the decree dismissing the cross-bill was an appealable 

order as the “ ‘chief object’ of [Thomas’] suit was for the 

court to determine the status of” his marriage to 

Courtenay. She also asserts that all the cases cited by 

Thomas, including Erikson, are inapposite because in each 

case only a bill of complaint for divorce had been filed. 

 Courtenay’s argument, as well as the decision of the 

Court of Appeals, turns on the fact that Thomas filed a 

cross-bill seeking affirmative relief in the nature of an 

annulment. 

The primary purposes of a cross-bill are to 

obtain affirmative relief on behalf of the 

defendant . . . filing such a bill, and to obtain 

in the course of one proceeding a full and 

complete determination of all issues which arise 

out of, or which are connected with, the subject 

matter of the original bill. 

Brewer v. Brewer, 199 Va. 626, 628, 101 S.E.2d 516, 518 

(1958); cf. Shevel’s, Inc. v. Southeastern Assocs., Inc., 

228 Va. 175, 184, 320 S.E.2d 339, 344 (1984) (if a 

defendant presents a claim for affirmative relief in a 

defensive pleading, the trial court may in its discretion 

treat the answer as a cross-bill). Because Thomas sought 

affirmative relief in the cross-bill, as opposed to filing 

a merely defensive cross-bill, it is correct, as Courtenay 

asserts, that dismissal of the original bill of complaint 

would not necessarily result in a dismissal of the cross-
8

bill. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 110 Va. at 573-74, 

66 S.E. at 837. Even so, neither the fact that Thomas used 

a cross-bill to seek affirmative relief in the nature of an 

annulment nor the tenets associated with a cross-bill 

resolve the issue before us. We must, instead, apply the 

well-established principles setting the parameters of an 

interlocutory order that adjudicates the principles of a 

cause. 

 Many years before the establishment of the Court of 

Appeals of Virginia, this Court, in addressing our own 

jurisdiction, see Code § 3454 (1887), recognized the 

difficulty in defining the phrase “adjudicating the 

principles of [a] cause” in such a manner as to fit every 

case, but we, nevertheless, stated 

it must mean that the rules or methods by which 

the rights of the parties are to be finally 

worked out have been so far determined that it is 

only necessary to apply these rules or methods to 

the facts of the case in order to ascertain the 

relative rights of the parties with regard to the 

subject matter of the suit. 

Lancaster v. Lancaster, 86 Va. (11 Hans.) 201, 204-05, 9 

S.E. 988, 990 (1889); accord Lee v. Lee, 142 Va. 244, 252-

53, 128 S.E. 524, 527 (1925); Vinson v. Vinson, 41 Va. App. 

675, 683, 588 S.E.2d 392, 396 (2003); Pinkard v. Pinkard, 

12 Va. App. 848, 851, 407 S.E.2d 339, 341 (1991). The 

phrase “refers to principles which affect the subject 
9

matter of the litigation and the rules by which the rights 

of the parties to the suit are to be finally determined.” 

Thrasher v. Lustig, 204 Va. 399, 402, 131 S.E.2d 286, 288 

(1963). 

 The subject matter of the litigation in the suit filed 

by Courtenay and the cross-bill filed by Thomas is a 

domestic relations dispute. As the Court of Appeals noted 

in Wells v. Wells, 29 Va. App. 82, 509 S.E.2d 549 (1999), 

“[a]n interlocutory order that adjudicates the principles 

of a domestic relations dispute ‘must respond to the chief 

object of the suit,’ . . . which is to determine the status 

of the parties’ marriage and the custody of the parties’ 

children, and, if appropriate, to award spousal and child 

support.” Id. at 86, 509 S.E.2d at 551; see also Erikson, 

19 Va. App. at 391, 451 S.E.2d at 713 (an “interlocutory 

order that adjudicates the principles in a divorce case 

must ‘respond to the chief object of the suit which [is] to 

secure a divorce’”) (quoting Pinkard, 12 Va. App. at 352, 

407 S.E.2d at 341-42). 

 In the cross-bill, Thomas alleged that, at the time he 

and Courtenay were married, she was not validly divorced 

from her former husband. Based on his allegations, the 

question whether Thomas was entitled to an annulment turned 

on the validity of Courtenay’s 1975 divorce. See Code 
10

§ 20-38.1 (a marriage entered into prior to the dissolution 

of a prior marriage of one of the parties is prohibited). 

Relying on this Court’s decision in George v. King, 208 Va. 

136, 138, 156 S.E.2d 615, 616-17 (1967), the circuit court, 

however, concluded that Thomas lacked standing to attack 

the validity of Courtenay’s 1975 divorce from her former 

husband. For that reason, the circuit court dismissed the 

cross-bill. 

The circuit court’s decree did not “respond to the 

chief object” of the domestic relations dispute nor did it 

determine the “‘principles’ that are necessary to 

adjudicate the cause.” Erikson, 19 Va. App. at 391, 451 

S.E.2d at 713. It did not determine the status or validity 

of the parties’ marriage; it did not award spousal support 

or make an equitable distribution of marital assets. 

Instead, the circuit court merely determined that Thomas 

could not obtain an annulment by attacking the validity of 

Courtenay’s 1975 divorce. Thus, the interlocutory decree 

dismissing the cross-bill for annulment did not “determine 

the rights of the parties” and it would not “of necessity 

affect the final order in the case.” Pinkard, 12 Va. App. 

at 851, 407 S.E.2d at 341; see also Erikson, 19 Va. App. at 

391, 451 S.E.2d at 712-13 (decree ruling that the parties 

were validly married did not adjudicate the principles of a 
11

cause because it did not determine whether a divorce would 

be granted or upon what grounds). Unlike the decree at 

issue, an interlocutory decree that adjudicates the 

principles of a cause “must ‘determine the rights of the 

parties’ and ‘would of necessity affect the final order.’ ” 

Pinkard, 12 Va. App. at 851, 407 S.E.2d at 341; accord

Erikson, 19 Va. App. at 391, 451 S.E.2d at 713. “ ‘[T]he 

mere possibility’ that an interlocutory decree ‘may affect 

the final decision in the trial does not necessitate an 

immediate appeal.’ ” Polumbo v. Polumbo, 13 Va. App. 306, 

307, 411 S.E.2d 229, 229 (1991) (quoting Pinkard, 12 Va. 

App. at 853, 407 S.E.2d at 342). 

In contrast, a decree entered in the domestic 

relations dispute in Crowder v. Crowder, 125 Va. 80, 83, 99 

S.E. 746, 747 (1919), did adjudicate the principles of a 

cause. There, the wife filed a suit for divorce on the 

grounds of desertion and also asked the trial court to set 

aside as fraudulent the sale of certain real estate and “a 

stock of shoes” by her husband to his brothers. Id. In 

the decree, which was the subject of the appeal to this 

Court, the trial court had not granted the divorce, but it 

had found that the husband’s brothers were not guilty of 

fraud in the purchases from the husband. Id. In holding 

that the decree appealed from, while not final, did 
12

nonetheless adjudicate the principles of the cause, we 

stated: 

This [decree] was an adjudication of all the 

questions raised by the complainant’s bill. She 

claimed that she was entitled to a divorce on the 

ground of desertion by her husband, and this 

claim was in effect sustained. She further 

claimed that the sales from her husband to his 

brothers was [sic] in fraud of her marital 

rights, and that she had the right to have them 

set aside and the property subjected to her 

demands. This claim was overruled, and the sales 

declared to be free from fraud. 

Id.

 Unlike the decree in Crowder that did determine the 

rights of the parties and the principles necessary to 

adjudicate the cause, the circuit court’s interlocutory 

decree dismissing Thomas’ cross-bill did not do so. Thus, 

the decree was not appealable under Code § 17.1-405(4)(ii).3

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated, we conclude that the Court of 

Appeals erred. Since the interlocutory decree before us 

did not adjudicate the principles of a cause and was 

therefore not appealable, the Court of Appeals lacked 

 3

 To the extent that Courtenay suggests that the decree 

was a final order and thus appealable on that basis, see

Code § 17.1-405(3), we find no merit in that argument. See

Brooks v. Roanoke County Sanitation Auth., 201 Va. 934, 

936, 114 S.E.2d 758, 760 (1960) (“A decree is final only 

when it disposes of the whole subject, gives all the relief 

that is contemplated and leaves nothing to be done by the 

court in the cause except its ministerial execution.”). 
13

subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.4 Thus, 

we will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals of 

Virginia and dismiss the appeal.5

Reversed and dismissed. 

 

4

 Whether the dismissal of the cross-bill for annulment 

was appealable under the “severable interests” doctrine has 

not been raised in this appeal. See generally Safeway, 

Inc. v. DPI Midatlantic, Inc., 270 Va. 285, 619 S.E.2d 76 

(2005); Maitland v. Allen, 267 Va. 714, 718 n.2, 594 S.E.2d 

918, 920 n.2 (2004); Thompson v. Skate Am., Inc., 261 Va. 

121, 540 S.E.2d 123 (2001); Dalloul v. Agbey, 255 Va. 511, 

515 n.*, 499 S.E.2d 279, 282 n.* (1998); Hinchey v. Ogden, 

226 Va. 234, 236-37 & n.1, 307 S.E.2d 891, 892 & n.1 

(1983); Wells v. Whitaker, 207 Va. 616, 628-29, 151 S.E.2d 

422, 432-33 (1966). We express no opinion on that issue. 

5

 Our decision today allows Thomas to take a position 

before this Court that is inconsistent with, and contrary 

to, his position before the Court of Appeals. We do not 

condone such behavior, but the issue before us involves the 

subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals which 

cannot be created by the action of a party. Furthermore, 

the issue of subject matter jurisdiction can always be 

reviewed by this Court sua sponte. See Board of 

Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Board of Zoning Appeals of 

Fairfax County, 271 Va. 336, 344, 626 S.E.2d 374, 379 

(2006). 

The present disposition is without prejudice to 

Thomas’ option to challenge the circuit court’s ruling with 

respect to his annulment claim in a future appeal after a 

final judgment is entered. See Smith v. Woodlawn Constr. 

Co., 235 Va. 424, 429, 368 S.E.2d 699, 702 (1988) 

(recognizing the general rule that an “adverse 

interlocutory adjudication may be the subject of appeal 

from the final adjudication”); Alliance to Save the 

Mattaponi v. Virginia Marine Res. Comm’n, 43 Va. App. 724, 

726-27 & n.2; 601 S.E.2d 684, 685 & n.2 (2004). 

In light of our decision, it is not necessary to 

address the remaining assignment of error.