RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 17a0283p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

RICHARD E. JACKSON; SIERRA N. JACKSON, 

individually and as the personal representative on 

behalf of the Estate of Bruce D. Jackson, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 17-3120 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Ohio at Dayton. 

No. 3:14-cv-00041—Walter H. Rice, District Judge. 

Argued: November 28, 2017 

Decided and Filed: December 13, 2017 

Before: GILMAN, SUTTON, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ARGUED: Joshua Bachrach, WILSON ELSER, MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKER LLP, 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. James D. Brookshire, DUNGAN & LEFEVRE CO., 

LPA, Troy, Ohio, for Appellee Sierra N. Jackson. Eirik Cheverud, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae. ON BRIEF: Joshua 

Bachrach, WILSON ELSER, MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKER LLP, Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania, for Appellant. James D. Brookshire, Glen R. McMurray, DUNGAN & LEFEVRE 

CO., LPA, Troy, Ohio, for Appellee Sierra N. Jackson. Stephanie Lewis, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae. Richard E. Jackson, 

Boise, Idaho, pro se. 

>
No. 17-3120 Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Jackson, et al. Page 2

_________________ 

OPINION 

_________________ 

 SUTTON, Circuit Judge. Bruce Jackson married Bridget Jackson in 1993, and Sierra 

Jackson, their only child, arrived in 1995. They divorced in 2006. In their separation agreement, 

Bruce and Bridget agreed to maintain any employer-related life insurance policies for the benefit 

of Sierra until she turned 18 or graduated from high school. At the time, Bruce had an employersponsored life insurance policy that listed his uncle, Richard Jackson, as the sole beneficiary. 

Bruce never changed the beneficiary of the policy to Sierra before he died in 2013. Litigation 

ensued, and the district court ordered Sun Life to pay the life insurance proceeds to Sierra. 

Because the divorce decree suffices as a qualified domestic relations order that “clearly 

specifies” Sierra as the beneficiary under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 

29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C), we affirm. 

I. 

 In 2003, Bruce Jackson signed up for a life insurance plan sponsored by his employer, 

Samaritan Health Partners, and governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 

better known as ERISA. Sun Life Assurance Company took over management of Bruce’s 

insurance policy in 2008. Bruce died in 2013. At his death, Bruce was insured for $48,000 in 

basic life insurance and $191,000 in optional life insurance. The question is whether Richard 

Jackson, Bruce’s uncle, or Sierra Jackson, Bruce’s only child, receives the money. 

When Bruce signed up for the life insurance policy in 2003, he listed Richard as its sole 

beneficiary. When Bruce and Bridget divorced in 2006, their divorce decree incorporated the 

following provision: 

Article IX: Life Insurance 

In order to secure the obligation of the parties to support their child during her 

minority, Father and Mother shall maintain, unencumbered, all employerprovided life insurance, now in existence at a reasonable cost, or later acquired at 

a reasonable cost, naming their minor child as primary beneficiary during her 
No. 17-3120 Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Jackson, et al. Page 3

minority; and the obligation to do so shall continue until she . . . reach(es) the age 

of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school, whichever occurs last . . . . 

R. 29-1 at 29. 

 Bruce never changed the beneficiary designation in his policy to account for the terms of 

the divorce decree. At the time of Bruce’s death, Sierra was still in high school. Richard and 

Sierra, as one might expect, made competing claims to Sun Life for the policy’s benefits. After 

learning of both Richard and Sierra’s claims, Sun Life decided to pay all of the proceeds to 

Richard, and litigation involving Sun Life, Richard, and Sierra followed. 

 Sun Life sought a declaratory judgment that it properly paid the proceeds to Richard. 

Sierra filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that she was the lawful beneficiary. The district 

court issued a decision in Sierra’s favor and ordered Sun Life to pay $239,000 plus interest to 

Sierra. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Jackson, No. 3:14-cv-41, 2016 WL 4184444, at *14 

(S.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2016). Sun Life appeals. 

II. 

 In deciding whether Sierra or Richard is entitled to the proceeds of this life insurance 

policy, we must resolve two questions. One: What is the test for determining whether a 

qualified domestic relations order permissibly changed the beneficiary of an ERISA-covered life 

insurance plan? Two: Does this divorce decree satisfy that test? 

A. 

The “clearly specifies” test. Subject to certain exceptions, ERISA mandates that an 

employee benefit plan’s assets are to be “held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to 

participants in the plan and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses.” 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1103(c)(1). The plan administrator must determine participants and beneficiaries “in 

accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan.” Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D). 

ERISA preempts “any and all State laws insofar as they . . . relate to any employment benefit 

plan.” Id. § 1144(a). Before 1984, this provision arguably would have prevented the 

enforcement of the court order at issue in this case. See Hawkins v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 
No. 17-3120 Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Jackson, et al. Page 4

86 F.3d 982, 988 (10th Cir. 1996) (describing the “judicial rift” about preemption of domestic 

relations orders that existed before 1984). 

 In 1984, Congress amended ERISA to provide greater protection for spouses and 

dependents after a divorce. See S. Rep. No. 98-575, at 1, 3 (1984); H.R. Rep. No. 98-655, pt. 1, 

at 1, 30–31 (1984). One such protection was an exemption from ERISA’s general preemption 

provision for “qualified domestic relations orders.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7). A qualified 

domestic relations order includes any state “judgment, decree, or order” relating to the provision 

of “child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights” that recognizes an “alternate 

payee’s right to . . . benefits” and meets a number of other requirements. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)–

(ii). 

This case turns on those requirements. Here they are: 

A domestic order meets the requirements of this subparagraph only if such order 

clearly specifies— 

(i) the name and the last known mailing address (if any) of the participant 

and the name and mailing address of each alternate payee covered by the 

order, 

(ii) the amount or percentage of the participant’s benefits to be paid by the 

plan to each such alternate payee, or the manner in which such amount or 

percentage is to be determined, 

(iii) the number of payments or period to which such order applies, and 

(iv) each plan to which such order applies. 

Id. § 1056(d)(3)(C). 

 In adding this provision to ERISA, Congress provided that plan administrators could treat 

a domestic relations order entered prior to the Act’s effective date (January 1, 1985) “as a 

qualified domestic relations order even if such order does not meet the requirements of such 

amendments.” Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–397, § 303(d), 98 Stat. 1426, 

1453. As a result, we have held that domestic relations orders entered before 1985 need only 

“substantially comply” with this provision. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 119 F.3d 415, 422 

(6th Cir. 1997). But Marsh cabined this relaxed standard to pre-1985 orders. “As the divorce 

decree was written before the REA amended ERISA in 1984,” Marsh explained, “we should not 
No. 17-3120 Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Jackson, et al. Page 5

demand literal compliance.” Id. When the Second Circuit adopted Marsh’s substantial 

compliance test, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Bigelow, 283 F.3d 436, 443 (2d Cir. 2002), it likewise 

limited its application to pre-1985 orders, Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Nicholls, 788 F.3d 79, 85 

(2d Cir. 2015). 

 The Jacksons divorced long after 1985. The divorce decree dates from 2006, meaning 

that, to be a qualifying plan, Sierra must meet the standards of § 1056(d)(3)(C) and thus must 

show that the Jacksons’ divorce decree “clearly specifies” the required information. 

 While a “clearly specifies” standard demands more than a “substantially complies” 

standard, that does not mean it requires Simon Says rigidity or demands magic words. One may 

“clearly specify” something by implication or inference so long as the meaning is definite. See 

Oxford English Dictionary 159 (2d ed. 1989) (To specify means “to mention, speak of, or name 

(something) definitely or explicitly”); Webster’s New International Dictionary 2415 (2d ed. 

1934) (“to mention or name in a specific or explicit manner”). 

A few everyday examples illustrate the point. A cashier asks the grocery store customer: 

“paper or plastic?” The customer could signal his preference for plastic bags by saying “plastic.” 

But he could just as clearly specify his choice by saying “not paper.” 

So too of a sports fan asked this question: Who is the greatest basketball player of all 

time: Michael Jordan or LeBron James? He might respond “LeBron James,” which clearly 

specifies the answer. Or he might respond “Number 23,” which does not clearly specify the 

answer. But if he responded “Number 23 of the Cleveland Cavaliers,” no one would be 

confused. The sports fan did not state “LeBron James.” But he did specify him. And clearly so. 

A similar approach, informed by common sense and context, applies to the naming of the 

beneficiary of a life insurance policy. The statute does not require that a particular provision of 

the divorce decree clearly specify the relevant details. It requires the entire “domestic order” to 

do so, examined in full, not silo by silo. See Russell v. Citigroup, Inc., 748 F.3d 677, 681 (6th 

Cir. 2014). After all, plan administrators act as fiduciaries and must follow reasonable 

procedures in distributing benefits. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(G), (I). It would not be 

reasonable for a fiduciary to fail to consider the entirety of the decree documents being 
No. 17-3120 Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Jackson, et al. Page 6

interpreted. All of this demonstrates that the statute’s “clearly specifies” test does not require, as 

Sun Life argues, any “strict” method of compliance. See Brief for Appellant at 10–11. 

 Sierra and the Department of Labor, as amicus curiae, argue that this legal standard 

frustrates Congress’s purpose of protecting spouses, ex-spouses, and dependents. No doubt, the 

words of the law seek to allow participants to alter their employment benefits more easily in 

response to changes in family status. But Congress rarely legislates to effectuate a single 

purpose. And it rarely pursues any given purpose at all costs. The essence of legislative choice 

is to decide how much of a particular objective to achieve at a particular cost to other interests. 

See Contract Courier Servs. v. Research & Special Programs Admin., 924 F.2d 112, 115 (7th 

Cir. 1991). 

Two competing considerations were at play in this instance: flexibility and 

administrability. The new law gave family members greater flexibility in changing the 

beneficiaries of an employee plan. But it poured that new idea into an old scheme, one that 

demanded uniformity and a standard procedure for how to process claims and disburse benefits 

easily without undue risk of delay and litigation. Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. 

Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 300–01 (2009). 

Congress balanced these twin aims through § 1144(b)(7) and § 1056(d)(3)(C). Those 

provisions protect spouses and dependents by allowing a state order, outside of the four corners 

of the employee benefit plan, to modify the distribution of the plan’s benefits. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1144(b)(7). At the same time, the provisions protect plan administrators by requiring the order 

to be clear about the identity of the alternate payee and the benefits to be redirected. Id.

§ 1056(d)(3)(C). To lighten the load on one side of the tradeoff is to increase the burden on the 

other. 

We realize that this Court appeared to slip Marsh from its statutory mooring and applied 

the “substantially complies” test, rather than the “clearly specifies” legislative test, to post-1985 

orders in two unpublished opinions. Mattingly v. Hoge, 260 F. App’x 776, 780 (6th Cir. 2008); 

Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 159 F. App’x 662, 665 (6th Cir. 2005). But Clark went on to 

conclude that the divorce decree at issue was not only in substantial compliance but also in 
No. 17-3120 Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Jackson, et al. Page 7

“literal compliance” with the statute. 159 F. App’x at 665. And it is difficult to tell whether 

Mattingly relied on the relaxed standard and thus whether the standard made any difference to 

the outcome of the case. See 260 F. App’x at 780. Unpublished decisions of this Court in any 

event are non-precedential and bind only the parties to those cases. FDIC v. Dover, 453 F.3d 

710, 715 (6th Cir. 2006). 

The Department of Labor also claims that the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have 

adopted a “substantially complies” test and urges us to follow them. But neither the Seventh 

Circuit nor the Tenth Circuit mentions that phrase. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Wheaton, 42 F.3d 

1080 (7th Cir. 1994); Hawkins, 86 F.3d 982; Carland v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 1114 

(10th Cir. 1991). In Wheaton, to the contrary, the Seventh Circuit concluded that “the literal 

reading of ERISA as amended by the Retirement Equity Act . . . makes more practical sense than 

a flexible reading” and emphasized that the “clearly specifies” language of § 1056(d)(3)(C) is 

“explicit and emphatic.” 42 F.3d at 1084. And the Tenth Circuit in Hawkins likewise concluded 

that “accept[ing] anything less than what [§ 1056(d)(3)(C)] expressly requires would . . . read 

language out of a statute” and thus refused to do “violence to the plain meaning of the statute.” 

86 F.3d at 992. And although the Ninth Circuit has stated that it “require[s] substantial 

compliance” with the statutory requirements, it also cautioned that “an overly expansive 

interpretation may render the specificity requirements toothless,” and concluded that “[t]he 

pivotal question is whether the dissolution order ‘clearly contains the information specified in the 

statute.’” Hamilton v. Wash. State Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. Pension Plan, 433 F.3d 1091, 

1097 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Stewart v. Thorpe Holding Co. Profit Sharing Plan, 207 F.3d 

1143, 1154 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

To the extent these courts undertake a contextual inquiry that examines the decree in its 

entirety when applying the statute, we do not disagree. That indeed is required. And to the 

extent any court means to adopt a “substantially complies” test for post-1985 orders, it neglects a 

congressional directive that, to borrow a phrase, is clearly specified. 
No. 17-3120 Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Jackson, et al. Page 8

B. 

Application of the “clearly specifies” test. In assessing whether the Jacksons’ divorce 

decree “clearly specifies” the information required by the statute, we may consider the divorce 

decree and the two other documents it incorporates: the Jacksons’ separation agreement and 

their shared parenting plan. The three documents, taken together, satisfy each of the relevant 

requirements, entitling Sierra to the benefits. 

 Name and mailing address of participant? The statute first requires the order to clearly 

specify the name and last known mailing address of the plan participant. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1056(d)(3)(C)(i). Article IX of the separation agreement notes that “Father and Mother” shall 

maintain life insurance. R. 29-1 at 29. These terms unambiguously refer to Bruce Jackson and 

Bridget Jackson, who are identified as the parents of Sierra Jackson on Page 1 of the agreement. 

That page also lists their respective mailing addresses. 

 Name and mailing address of alternate payee? The statute next requires the order to 

clearly specify the name and mailing address of each alternate payee from the payee identified in 

the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(i). Article IX requires Bruce to maintain life insurance 

“naming their minor child as primary beneficiary.” R. 29-1 at 29. Page 1 states that “[t]he 

parties have one (1) child born the issue of this marriage, namely: Sierra N. Jackson, born 

February 9, 1995.” Id. at 24. The agreement thus clearly specifies Sierra Jackson as the 

alternate payee. 

 As for the mailing address, the shared parenting plan designates Bruce and Bridget 

Jackson as the shared “residential parent[s] and legal custodian[s]” of Sierra Jackson. Id. at 20. 

The decree also states, as a court finding, that the “parties will be spending near equal time with 

the child.” Id. at 16. And again the mailing addresses of both Bruce and Bridget Jackson are 

listed on the front page of the separation agreement. 

Amount or percentage of benefits? The statute next requires the order to clearly specify 

the amount or percentage of the participant’s benefits to be paid to each alternate payee. 

29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(ii). Article IX specifies that Bruce shall maintain “all employerprovided life insurance . . . naming their minor child as primary beneficiary.” R. 29-1 at 29. 
No. 17-3120 Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Jackson, et al. Page 9

Because the agreement identifies all employer-provided life insurance and names no other 

beneficiaries, Sierra plainly is entitled to 100% of the benefit proceeds. 

Number of payments or applicable period? The statute next requires the order to clearly 

specify the number of payments or the period to which such order applies. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1056(d)(3)(C)(iii). Article IX says that 

the obligation . . . shall continue until [Sierra] (a) reach(es) the age of eighteen 

(18) or graduates from high school, whichever occurs last; or (b) is otherwise 

emancipated, or (c) some other event occurs which relieves the parties of the 

obligation of child support, and provided, however, that the duty of child support 

shall not continue past the age of nineteen (19) unless ordered by a court. 

R. 29-1 at 29. This language plainly identifies the period during which Sierra is the alternate 

payee. 

Plan identity? The statute next requires the order to clearly specify each plan to which 

the order applies. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(iv). Here too Article IX speaks unambiguously by 

referring to “all employer-provided life insurance.” R. 29-1 at 29. 

Sun Life offers a number of competing arguments. They are unpersuasive. Sun Life 

points out that Article IX in broader scope says that Bruce “shall maintain . . . all employerprovided life insurance, now in existence at a reasonable cost, or later acquired at a reasonable 

cost, naming their minor child as primary beneficiary.” Id. Sun Life argues that this creates 

ambiguity as to which plans are at issue. But the reasonable cost qualification most naturally 

speaks to the extent of Bruce’s obligation to maintain life insurance in the first instance. There is 

little dispute that, once Bruce entered into a life insurance plan, Sierra would be the beneficiary. 

There was thus no need for the plan administrator to conduct an open-ended inquiry into whether 

a life insurance plan was acquired at reasonable cost. It is no coincidence that, in the litigation 

below, no one ever asked whether Bruce’s payment for the policy, $16.82 per pay period, was 

reasonable. 

Sun Life faults the order for not specifying whether it pertained to Bruce’s basic or 

optional insurance. It also points out that it did not begin managing Bruce’s plan until 2008, two 
No. 17-3120 Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Jackson, et al. Page 10

years after the decree was executed. But “all” means all—basic and optional coverage, no matter 

who manages the plan, and no matter when they assume those duties. 

Sun Life also argues that Bruce’s optional life insurance is not “employer-provided life 

insurance” under the agreement because Bruce, rather than his employer, paid the plan 

premiums. True, but the optional life insurance plan was a group policy offered only through his 

employer. And there would be no reason for the agreement to specify “employer-provided life 

insurance now in existence at a reasonable cost” if “employer-provided life insurance” covered 

only policies completely paid for by Bruce’s employer. R. 29-1 at 29. 

Even if the divorce decree and accompanying documents satisfy these specificity 

requirements, Sun Life argues that the remedial clause of the decree precludes Sierra from 

obtaining relief. “The parties’ minor child,” that provision reads, “shall have a valid claim 

against the probate estate of a non-compliant party.” R. 29-1 at 30. But this provision does not 

state that the child has a claim against only the probate estate to the exclusion of everybody else. 

It just provides an alternate right of action. Sierra at any rate does not seek relief for a breach of 

the decree. She seeks relief because the decree amounts to a qualified domestic relations order 

under ERISA that entitles her to the life insurance proceeds. 

In a variation on this theme, Sun Life argues that Bruce and Bridget failed to comply with 

the decree’s requirements to change the name of the beneficiary and monitor the beneficiary 

designation and thus extinguished any rights Sierra may have had against Sun Life. Cut from the 

same cloth, this claim fails for much the same reason. These shortcomings may have entitled 

Sierra to take action against the probate estate and perhaps those rights now have been forfeited. 

But today Sierra brings a claim under ERISA, not a common-law contract claim. Her parents’ 

(alleged) non-compliance with the decree does not limit Sierra’s rights under ERISA. As long as 

the order suffices as a qualified domestic relations order, she deserves the proceeds of her 

father’s life insurance policy. 

Sun Life’s argument that Sierra cannot pursue her claim because it was not timely 

notified of the existence of the order also fails. Sun Life does not dispute that Sierra’s attorney 

provided Sun Life with a copy of the order well before the payment was issued to Richard; this 
No. 17-3120 Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Jackson, et al. Page 11

notice was sufficient to preserve Sierra’s claim despite being received after Bruce’s death. 

See Nicholls, 788 F.3d at 86–87 (upholding the validity of posthumous nunc pro tunc orders as 

qualified domestic relations orders); Files v. ExxonMobil Pension Plan, 428 F.3d 478, 489 (3d 

Cir. 2005) (holding that a qualified domestic relations order may be pursued posthumously); 

29 C.F.R. § 2530.206(c)(2) (noting that a qualified domestic relations order may be issued 

posthumously). 

Richard Jackson, the unfortunate victim of this saga, has filed a pro se brief in which he 

seeks damages for loss of income related to this lawsuit. The district court rejected these claims 

below as meritless. And Richard never filed a notice of appeal challenging that ruling. We thus 

have no authority to address it. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a). 

For these reasons, we affirm.