NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MONTI PAVATEA GILHAM,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2023-1507

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:22-cv-00728-RAH, Judge Richard A. Hertling.

______________________ 

Decided: September 8, 2023

______________________ 

JUDD JENSEN, Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry, & Hoven PC, 

Bozeman, MT, for plaintiff-appellant. 

 DINA BERNICK MISHRA, Appellate Section, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendantappellee. Also represented by TODD KIM. 

 ______________________ 

Before DYK, HUGHES, and STOLL, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM.

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2 GILHAM v. US

Monti Pavatea Gilham appeals a decision of the Court 

of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”). The Claims Court dismissed Ms. Gilham’s complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

The following facts are primarily taken from the complaint filed by Ms. Gilham in this action. Ms. Gilham is a 

citizen of Montana and an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe. Upon her father’s death, Ms. Gilham took over 

upkeep of the family’s farming and ranching operations on 

tribal land within the Blackfeet Indian Reservation. In 

2007, Ms. Gilham signed two contracts enrolling two parcels of land in the Department of Agriculture’s Farm Service Agency (“FSA”) Conservation Reserve Program 

(“CRP”). 

The CRP is a program that seeks to “conserve and improve the soil, water, and wildlife resources” of land enrolled in the program. 16 U.S.C. § 3831(a). The program 

is administered by the Commodity Credit Corporation and 

the FSA (both agencies of the federal government). 7 

C.F.R. § 1410.1. Under the program, “eligible producers”1

may enter into contracts with the Commodity Credit Corporation whereby the producer agrees to implement a conservation plan in return for payments to the producer. Id.

§§ 1410.3(a); 1410.20; 1410.40. The regulations separately 

define a “participant” as “one who participates in, or 

1 A “producer” is “an owner, operator, landlord, tenant, or sharecropper, who shares in the risk of producing a 

crop and who is entitled to share in the crop available for 

marketing from the farm, or would have shared had the 

crop been produced.” 7 C.F.R. § 718.2. It is unclear from 

the record how Ms. Gilham qualifies as a “eligible producer”—whether as an “operator” or “tenant” for instance—but no party contests her status as an eligible 

producer.

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GILHAM v. US 3

receives payments or benefits in accordance with” the program. Id. § 718.2. The participant has obligations under 

the regulations, such as complying with the terms and conditions of the contract. Id. § 1410.20. If a CRP contract is 

terminated prematurely, the participant must repay all 

payments made under the contract with interest. Id. 

§ 1410.32(e)(2). “[I]f the participant has a share of the annual rental payment greater than zero” the participant is 

jointly and severally liable for compliance with the contract 

and the regulations. Id. § 1410.20(a)(9).

The contracts at issue here were for the period between 

October 1, 2007, and September 30, 2017.2 Representatives of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) co-signed the 

contracts on behalf of the United States as trustee of Blackfeet tribal land. Ms. Gilham signed with a 100% share of 

the contract proceeds, while the BIA representatives 

signed with a 0% share. Under the agreements, Ms. Gilham agreed “[t]o control . . . all weeds, insects, pests and 

other undesirable species.” J.A. 59. The agreements also 

provided that “[p]articipants that sign the [agreement] 

with zero percent interest in the annual rental payment 

shall not be held responsible for contract performance.” 

J.A. 63.

Around 2015, Ms. Gilham fled an abusive relationship, 

leaving the farm and enrolling in school in Missoula, Montana. She did not update her address with the FSA. During 2015, the FSA tried to contact Ms. Gilham at the farm 

address regarding maintenance that needed to be done under the contracts. According to the complaint, Ms. Gilham

“did eventually receive an email . . . stating she needed to 

take care of this maintenance and that it was time sensitive. However, between being trapped in a physically abusive relationship and the emotional trauma of her attacks; 

2 For reasons not clear from the complaint, Ms. Gilham signed two contracts in 2015 enrolling the same tracts 

of land in the CRP for the same time period. 

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4 GILHAM v. US

she couldn’t possibly react or respond.” J.A. 23. Ms. Gilham admits that her “serious and traumatic life altering 

events prevented her from properly addressing the maintenance on her CRP acres at issue and the maintenance was 

not completed timely.” J.A. 23. The FSA terminated the 

contracts in November 2015. On October 20, 2015, Ms. Gilham was sent a letter notifying her of the pending termination. 

In 2021, Ms. Gilham requested equitable relief to allow 

her to retain the payments made to her under the contract

from the Department of Agricultures’ National Appeals Division based on “the impact of domestic violence and the 

resulting depression which resulted in losing her CRP contracts.” J.A. 23. Ms. Gilham was apparently awarded all 

the equitable relief she requested, including that she was 

not required to repay the CRP funds she had received before contract termination. 

In June 2022, Ms. Gilham filed a complaint in the 

Claims Court pleading two causes of action. First, Ms. Gilham alleged that the United States violated its duties under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) by 

(1) “fail[ing] to carry out its basic contractual duties under 

the CRP contracts . . . such as routine weed maintenance” 

which “resulted in the early termination of Ms. Gilham’s 

CRP contract,” J.A. 25, and by (2) “fail[ing] . . . to provide 

[Ms. Gilham with] reasonable assistance to obtain equitable relief after the contracts were terminated,” J.A. 25–26. 

Second, Ms. Gilham alleged that the United States violated 

its trust duties by failing to provide maintenance under the 

contract. Ms. Gilham did not assert a breach of contract 

claim. Ms. Gilham requested a declaration that the United 

States failed to carry out its trustee duties, damages for 

“those years of the CRP contract that she was never paid 

following the early termination of those contracts,” attorney’s fees and costs, and any other just and proper relief. 

J.A. 27.

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GILHAM v. US 5

The government moved to dismiss Ms. Gilham’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Claims 

Court granted the government’s motion, holding that “[t]he 

claims, as pleaded, do not rely on a money-mandating statute or regulation,” J.A. 3, and that part of the APA claim 

and the entire breach of trust claim was also untimely.3 

Ms. Gilham appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, 26 

F.4th 1274, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2022).

Ms. Gilham argues that the Claims Court had jurisdiction under the Tucker Act and erred by failing to apply the 

trust doctrine to the claims in her complaint, apparently 

arguing that the statute and the CRP regulations are

money-mandating and that the Claims Court accordingly 

had jurisdiction.4 

Tucker Act jurisdiction “[i]n the context of breach of duties to American Indians” employs a two-part test. Fletcher 

v. United States, 26 F.4th 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2022). 

First, a plaintiff “must identify a substantive source of law 

that establishes specific fiduciary or other duties, and allege that the Government has failed faithfully to perform 

those duties.” Id. (quoting United States v. Navajo Nation, 

3 On appeal, the parties dispute whether the statute 

of limitations bars part of Ms. Gilham’s claims. We do not 

reach this issue because there is another jurisdictional 

ground for dismissal.

4 On appeal, Ms. Gilham does not appear to be challenging the Claims Court’s disposition of her APA claim. 

Even if she were, the Claims Court correctly dismissed

those claims. The Claims Court does not have jurisdiction 

over claims premised only on violations of the APA. Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

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6 GILHAM v. US

556 U.S. 287, 290 (2009)). At this step, “[t]here must be 

specific statutes, regulations, or other sources of law that 

establish the fiduciary relationship and define the contours 

of the government's fiduciary responsibilities.” Id. at 1325 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If the 

plaintiff shows such a duty, “[t]he court must then determine whether the relevant source of substantive law can 

fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages sustained as a result of a breach of the duties the governing law imposes.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). We conclude that Ms. Gilham has failed 

to “identify a substantive source of law that establishes 

specific fiduciary or other duties.” Id. at 1324 (citation 

omitted).

Section 3831 of Title 16 of the U.S. Code establishes the 

CRP and was originally enacted as part of the Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 1231, 99 Stat. 1354, 

1509. In its current form, the statute provides that “the 

Secretary shall formulate and carry out a conservation reserve program under which land is enrolled through the 

use of contracts to assist owners and operators of land . . . 

to conserve and improve the soil, water, and wildlife resources of such land and to address issues raised by State, 

regional, and national conservation initiatives.” 16 U.S.C. 

§ 3831(a). The statute describes various aspects of the program, such as what land is eligible, the maximum acreage 

the Secretary may enroll at any given time, and minimum 

and maximum durations of contracts. The statute does not 

mention Indian tribes or tribal land.

Part 1410 of Title 7 of the Code of Federal Regulations 

implements the CRP. The regulations have some special 

provisions regarding Indian Tribes, see, e.g., 7 C.F.R. 

§§ 1410.2, 1410.62(f), though those provisions do not appear to be applicable here. In particular, the regulations 

provide for a “Transition Incentive Program” that provides 

incentives for “selling or leasing land to a . . . socially disadvantaged farmer,” id. § 1410.64(e), including “American 

Indians.” Id. § 1410.2. No party contends that the 

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GILHAM v. US 7

Transition Incentive Program is relevant to this case. The 

regulations also allow the Commodity Credit Corporation 

to authorize incentives to “foster opportunities for Indian 

Tribes.” Id. § 1410.62(f). No party has cited this provision 

either. The only regulation Ms. Gilham explicitly cites on 

appeal is 7 C.F.R. § 1410.32, which requires that the contract be signed by “[t]he owners of the land,” id. 

§ 1410.32(d)(2), in this case, the BIA as the representative 

of the United States. 

We find that the statute and regulations do not create 

a trust relationship.5 First, the statute does not mention

“trust.” “While it is true that a statute need not contain 

the word ‘trust’ in order to create a trust relationship, the 

failure to use that term gives rise to doubt that a trust relationship was intended.” Wolfchild v. United States, 559 

F.3d 1228, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Ms. Gilham also points 

to no indication in the statute itself nor the legislative history that Congress intended to create a trust relationship. 

There is similarly nothing in the regulations purporting to 

create a trust relationship.

Second, the statute is a generally applicable statute not 

specific to Indian tribes. The intent of the legislation was 

to “discourage new cultivation of fragile lands that are unsuitable for intensive agricultural production without the 

application of proper conservation practices.” S. Rep. No. 

98-296, at 2 (1983), not to protect Indian tribes. “[U]nless 

Congress has created a conventional trust relationship 

with a tribe as to a particular trust asset, [courts] will not 

apply common-law trust principles to infer duties not found 

in the text of a treaty, statute, or regulation.” Arizona v. 

Navajo Nation, 143 S. Ct. 1804, 1814 (2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Nothing in the statute 

establishes a trust relationship with Indian tribes.

5 We do not decide whether a regulation could in and 

of itself create a trust relationship.

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8 GILHAM v. US

Third, it is particularly clear that there is no trust relationship in this situation because there was no obligation 

placed on the government by the statute or regulation similar to that claimed by Ms. Gilham. There are no relevant 

“specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory prescriptions.” United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 

U.S. 488, 506 (2003). The regulations contemplate that 

participants with “a share of the annual rental payment 

greater than zero” are responsible “for compliance with the 

provisions of such CRP contract and the provisions of this 

part.” 7 C.F.R. § 1410.20(a)(9). In this case, the BIA signed 

with a 0% share, and was not obligated by regulation to 

perform on the contract. Nor is there anything in the statute or regulations that would obligate the government “to 

assist [Ms. Gilham] in obtaining reasonable relief under 

the CRP contracts.” Appellant’s Br. 18.6

We have considered Ms. Gilham’s other arguments and 

find them unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

6 To the extent that Ms. Gilham is arguing that a 

contract in itself could create the requisite trust relationship—a question we do not decide—these contracts clearly 

did not do so. The BIA signed the contracts as a 0% share 

participant. The contracts specifically provided that “[p]articipants that sign the [contract] with zero percent interest 

in the annual rental payment shall not be held responsible 

for contract compliance.” J.A. 63.

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