REF ID:A5171~ 

··--- ·--q····--0 TeP SECRE-T GANOE 

99 

'fOf 8Eeft.!f 6/diOE .. SEetift!!Y !Mli'OftMA'.HON 

REPORT 

TO 

THE LONOON SIGNAL INTELLIGENJE BOARD 

AND 

THE UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS IN'l'ELLIGEOOE BOAIID 

ON 

_,., 

THE U~K:.•u.s. COOFERE:OOE ON THE COMMUNICATIONS s:rouro:TY OF 

NATO COUNTRIES 

HELD AT WASHitnTON, D. C ... 5-12 JUNE 1953 

1. As the result of an ISIB proposal of 26 February 1953, * and the 

USCIB acceptance thereo!, communicated to LSIB by letter dated 16 April 

1953,** a UK-us· Conference to consider the improvement of the communications 

securit,- or NATO countries was held in Waswllgton canmencing the 5th of 

June, 1953. 

2. The detailed conclusions and recommerxiations of the Conference, 

which were agreed by the conferees at tl:Eir final meeting on the 12th of . 

June, 19531 arxi which are set forth in the accompanying report, are 

submitted for approval by the London Signal Intelligence Board and the 

United States Cammunicatio~s Intelligence Board. 

3. Both Delegations recommend that a copy of the Report be forwarded 

-llOOC/3242 

**CIB/00045 

..--

9i:d&~ ;}j"·", -- ~-= . EI~~(l,~ 

WILLIAM .F. FRIEDMAN 

Chairman, u.s. Delegates 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-26-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

TOP, SECRET r CANOE 
·-·~· I .. I 

'_Q-,p !;Ji'CI1T';'ll1 C·"tLTC'J~ - ·111'C1Ul.I'.eI li-T~""r> 11';\'"(IIC;;·1 

-- T1""Y"' L:-a.;....,) r· J ·.1 /1;'"/' '· ;;- ··1····~ · "L .II\. ~\--.... .l. . .U.! •..-.' ___ .._.._ __ _ 

01·1 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 12 Juno 1953 PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

ID~POil'f OJ.i' T!W: 

UK-US CONF:!:~IU~NCE ON TlIF. cxm.mmICA'rIONG S:3ClnUTY OF 

:trNro comrrnms 

IIBLD :m WASIIIl-IG'IDN, 5-12 .• n.JNI<J, 1953 

TIIEl PROBLEl'. 

1. To c·onsidcr the inoccuri ty of N.A'ro comrnunico.tions a.nd of 

the no.tiona.1 communico.tiona of NA'.ro countrico, inc.luding a. review 

Of the conclu.1ions of the 1951 US/UK Conference on the Security . ofl. I Commnnico.tions, in order: 

a.. To determine whe!ther the Nl\TO Government a should be 

approached with a view to improving thcir:communitions aecurity; · 

-~ 

b. ':Co asscos the :idvnnto.i:i:ea o.nd diso.dva.nto.p;es of such ~:nppr~ch; 

Pn711oC13S 

c. To develop, if such ~n o.pproo.ch should be made, (l) a 

specific plan for improvin~ the security or NATO communications and ot: 

the national communico.tions of W\.'ro countries and (2) a specific 

pl.;.i.n for c.ppro:ichin6 the nA'ro Cfovernments •. 

F.l\.CTS BEARING 0?1 THE PROBLEH /\ND ·DISCUSSION 

I. ASSUUPTIONS AS 'ro TI-Ir!! CO?IINT CAPl\BILITY OF THE USS:ri 

2. Thia Report ia predicn.te<l upon the assumption that: 

a. The cnpo.bilities of the USSR to intercept and 

exploit radio communic~tions are ~t\el\st equiv:ilent to those of 

tiie>~nd UK • 

..... 

b. The USSR monitors all landline communications passing 

through its own or satellite territory. The possibility th•·1t it 

pas access to other commun1c~t1ons ~assed solely by landline 

.~n~ ~e excluded, but there io no evidence to assess the extent 

-~"~ . c:if· this poi>sibility. Any tro.ffic obto.incd by the USSR from 

landlines cnn be cx-~loited to the on.me extent ~s tr~ffic obtnined 

from radio tr;:.,,nsmission;;;. 

-lTOP SECRET CANOE 

,. 

i\- ·'. i.. 
· .. f. 

. l •, 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

':POP 0139~3't1 St.l!OrJ OB<Jl:fffE'fY Ilfli'OHi !Pt.~'.RHJ ",) "/i""f"·"'/··.•v/n ,,1) .> ~:.J"" .... 

OJ..l 

.Footnote 1. 

. . It should be noted thnt the.eccurity;syotem of NATO provides 

oufficicnt protection for "COSHIC" and "NAW" CamJJunications pu.sse(l. 

electrically. However the'MA'ro occurity &ystem does not provide 

protection for n~tion~l camnunications cnr:ryiI18 related informntion, I nor do al.l tho NATO countries confii>.e "!IATO" o.od "COSMIC" COODUllicntiis 

fully complied '-Tith theoc reguln.tions; There is no evidence on which 

to conclude whether or not other NA'R> countries observe the NA'R> 

procedut'ea. 

Footnote 2. 

-2-

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

P-7t'l-C13S TOP SECR.ET CANOE 
r I 

J I 

·1w.i auenu:e eAnoB . I 

DElCJ UH PH nwo m 1.°t'.PJ:OH l FINAJ .. .... ''-'r.1.· ,-1-; 3/1;•·.r/-' .J.u. .L\ 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 8.6-36/50 USC 3605 

. ~"rl •. 

-3-

TOP SECRET CANOE 
' ' 

Form 781·C13S 

'i'OP SH9RS'f 9ANOEi = SSSl:JHI'fY INPOHUA'f!ON 

(5) 

FSC53/EX/R~NAL 

_Qll_ 

4. Diplomatic conununications in wa~~~· 

' It is considered that on oμtbreak,jf a·ctiV:!: hostilities the 

valu!._!-~-.!:11~-JL&§R of the inforlll!:\tion derived from the conununications 

of NATO countries would be greatly increased. .... ~.._._..~ \llJl ., -

S. Anned Forces communications in peace and war. I 

b. In general it is thought that under peace time conditions 

Anned Forces conununications are unlikely to be an important source 

of valuable intelligence to the USSR. 

~~,:~~~~. Anned Force~ ~~mm~cati_~~s area Ille_rr~c~.t~_ t_~~ -~~-1;i?nal \,/ ... 

interests of the UK and the US and in the case /of general hostilities 

would become a real danger. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

4 

TOP SECRET CP1NOE 
•, 

FCC5J/EX/R FIN~L _Qg_ _ ··----·-· -·-. 

III. VALUE TO THE U3SU OF INTm,LIGE~!CE ON ~ATO COUN'!'RDS omu~-;o FROM 

i 

NON-c<J.IINT SOURCES. 

6. Clandestine Sources. 

a. Non-CatINT clandestine mear1s. of obtaining intelligence 

cannot ·be regarded as a complete substitute for COMINT as a source of ii\': ..., • """""""' 

intelligence. In particular, in areas where CG1INT is e!fec~ive, 

clandestine intelligence is gener~lly less timely, le~s complete and . . 

·1ess ·authoritative than COt-IINT. Information from clandestine sources 

needs a somet~mes difficult process of evaluation before it can be 

accepted; :i.s dependent on the availability of coll'IRunic~tions; and 

is frequently subject to considerable delay". before it is received by . . . the user agency. Further, the value of intelligence from clandestine 

sources can frequently be greatly increased by correlation with COMINT. 

Moreover, the capacity to sustain successful clandestine arrangements 

·1 

to obtain intelligence oft'n depends upon infonnation derived from 

.. . 

COOHT. 

b. Although! __ _;;.,. _____ it must be ...;;._ presumed ___________ that penetration .......... -ot .... -................ NATO 

nations by agents ot the USSR exists and will continue to exist,. _. rs res 

s 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SE.CRET CANOE 
I M~ W;..1\51).J.EiS ~ ;_-·t=o.3.3(h)(2) TO Pt ~Eun:rJ 1 Ul\:~ OE 

! PLB6-36/50 USC 3605 

I

i 

I 'fQP 6B0Rm 61tN0E = SE6tJRI'fY Itfti'Oft*'f!ON FSC53/EX/R FINAL I OU 

I 

l Security Survey of December, 19.52, and there remain 

significant handicaps--political and adndnistrative--

to iz4proveraent. The level of CNerall security in 

the near future. Nevertheless, the operation of ~------"7w~.,--,_...-.. --...... _.... 

___ 

clandestine sources is expected to become increasingljr __...,,..--... ... ~. -~· .. .,... .................. _.~-----~~ .......... ~--~ .. ---- difficult, and, therefore, it is felt that the USSR -----·· -- --·······-········ ··-·-······· ....... -~-····- . . could n".1t .~il'Kl: .. !4.~-'l~i!. compe~satidn for the loss ot ..... ••·· a....... • · , _. •··•• " .... , ... , .,. ..... r~_, ... ,,.,., .. ., •. 1-.-·-.-....,.,,, ..... ~....- .... 

potential CCMINT through increased clandestine activity. 

-··--..._....--....c.-_........-........__ ..... ..._.....__..,....._--""" ... ..._ .. , .... ,,. ...... ~ ~ ·· r· - ... · ,, .............. -·i.-•·-'~~•--.-...... _.,..,........, 

(2) . As ref:8rd! otne ..r .... WP ..... .£2~~~ from which the 

potential value of COMINT is'~stima.ted to be high 

there "is insufficient collated evidence available 

to this conference to assess the state of their 

security. In particular there is not avails.ble UV 

evidence it is not considered sate to asswne that 

the l~vel of overall security is higher than that J : 1~·-:;esc:~~e:·~:;:~·-··-··'rAr-··~~-···· _!!] _____ ...._.,,._ _ _......,,-.- ~ .... ~·. 

c. In time of \·iar, dua to the introduction of security 

measures which are not possible in peacetiuie, clandestine operations 

become much more difficult. Tho l'~ady neans of communication afforded 

by diploma.tic rniseions and consulate~ are also no longer available. 

It is therefoire considered that the value or info:nnation from 

clandestine sources will be substantially diminished at. least initially 

by an outbreak of hostilities. 

6 

, ... ,1 .. e1ss TOP SECRET Ci~s:NOE 
r :· .. -\ . :·.,· 

I 

.-. 

., 

. ' 

··. ;~ .. ·-~(~:'.. 

'· . ~-- ;· "·" ...... ··=·-- . 

.. . :<~· ;:," .•. :::'t..-n~111. 

F"(' r· 3/1 '"/' . " .·) .... , Li FIN.'\.L 

OJ.l 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Pl 86-36/50 USC 3605 ~,. other ·s·ourcco 

a.. It iE7 difficult to a.s1J~ss to wh.:lt extent open a~rcos 

(new131)u.pcra, tr;:i.do public::itions, public\ docwncntG a.nd Dtatcmcn·to:, etc.) 

or diploma.tic rcporta.ge could be .:i substitute for CO?!INT. It is i 

however a.greed· th..'\t COl-IINT dorived from rcacfoblc cOil!lllunica.tions of 

NA'.00 countriel!I does produce intclligcnce\not\~vailnblc to the 

USSR from other sources and th:l.t,, even during peo.~etimc,, thio 

intelligence may increase substantially in volume. ~-i value at 

any time. In w:<i.rtime, censorship o.nd other cxtraol"dino.ry security 

. measures, will reduce drasticAlly the f'l01., of \.intell,!gence from · . \ 

auch ·aoui-r..:ns, and the • :iJ.lue to the USSR of n.iV ~vailo.ble COMDT will 

. . be.correspondingly incre scd. 

b. 

sources,, 

·greatly 

e.a in the ce.se or clandestine 

igence from other souroes can be. 

ion deri vcd from COi{INT .• 

consideration the nvn11~~111ty of other sources'of the sn.me 

1ntelUe;ence o,Pen to the US o.nd the UK. 

' 9. In :idllttion it shm1ld be note'!'- tho.t, if .:1. count:cy left 

not be ,,, f:1ctcr~· if tha coun"ti-y joinccl the Gcr.mmnist Bloc, s.incc it 

is to be cxpcc"t.cd th::~t its ci::;-he1·c ::i.nd cor.i_i;·,mic;.itions procedures would 

then be r .... dic;:-.lly im~)rovc:cl in -~rr:r cu.sc. 

• 
. i· 

· .. :::: .. :·- ..... 

• f 

-~ . . 

.. , 

. \ 

.,.:-· .. 

. . 

'l'eP OHCJ.UJ'i' e.\HOTl = HF:Jetffi1'ff Ifff.'0:11 ·:,'ff.OH I•'Jl"J..\L . 

011 

I 

·10. The nature of rn1Jr llc·l;ion tnJ:cn to reduce the potcntin.1 

I 

nat:tonn.l odcudty o.l' the I lcrcn.tcd by the 

. . the comnmn:lco:tiono o:[' • lHTO count,rico will be 

From the point of view 

of intolli~cncc nnd r,en;::._1 ~cu.rity considera.tio~owcvcr, such n.ction must:i 

a. be dcsi~ncd to rectify effectively ino.dc:quo.te communico.tion 

• 

security practices of mvro count1·ics throughout. 

-8-

I 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

. . . 

TOP .. SECRET c·ANOE 
,. j • . r I 

' 

I 

'fOI' Si~ORE'f 8*NO'l!i = Sfi6tffif'i'Y fNPOltlff<'i'iON 

VI. TECHNICAL Fl~c·roRS AFFgCTIKG ACTION TO B"ft; TAKEN. 

F'.JC53/EX/il FINAL 

011 

11. Inasmuch as it appears to be impractical to attempt corrective 

l action by provision of new equipment, action should initially be aimed 

at the improvement of availablf c:ryptosystems and communications practices 

wherever possible. It is cons·.dered that such impiovement can be effective. 

12. No matter what initial approach is agreed the proper authorities ror handling issues or this nature are the communications security -..... • ...................... ~-· . __ .... ____ W' .... 

~encies or the NA~O natiofs concerne2· This consideration is re-inforced 

by that stated in paragraph 11 above. It is therefore important. to 

associate the communications ~ecurity agencies with the action proposed 

at as early a stage as possib~e. The same r~asoning applies to the use 

I 

ot communication security authpritie~ to originate the a. ction. ~rther 

factors in support of these considerations are that: 

a. ·The security and intelligence factors enumerated in paragraph 

10 •bove make this the safest procedm'e. 

b. For reasons of ~conom;y it.is desirable that existing agencies 

be used wherever possible. At least the US, UK and the Starxling Group 

have already in existence appropriate conmunications security agencies. 

c. There have already been several instances in which NATO 

countries have requested advice and assistance in improving national, 

as weli as NATO, communications security through communications seclrity 

·channels. Two examples of such instances are enclosed herewith as 

App~ndix A. 

13. The interrelationships between transmission security and 

'~ cryptosecurity are such that a completely successful program to improve '·"" .~-~·..,.~··----..., ... ..._ •• a .... ___ _

conununications security must deal effectively trith both. 

- · 14. It is considered that there is no way to deal effectively with 

disreBard or "COSKIC11 and 11Ni,T011 couununications security reeu.lations .,.,,,,,..,.... ............... _ 

.................................. 

9 EO 3.3(h)(2) 

; --= . PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

l'-711-C13S TOP SECRET CANOE 
. ' • '• 

l 

. ·~ 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

. 'feF Sl?.ell:Hf eANOl3 - SI~CtJRI'i'Y INt'Olrlvi\'fiON 

VII. OUTLINE OF 'l'HJ<~ PROPC5"1W ACTION. 

'lSC5J/F:i~/R FINAL 

011 

15. The Conference ls agreed that the factors enwnerated in para- -------- ..........._...--...-....... - ... -........ ..,~ 

·graphs 10 through 14 above can best be met by using. the existing comrnuni- ,,_ ,.....,.,-.--...___ -·-----------·--·-· ------.. -··---·-····-_......._ . .....;..---

cations - security 1na.chine~y of the Standing Group. It is realized that the 

St~i\ding Group cannot issue directives about JTBtters outside the scope ot\ "'i;. 

the military aspects of NATO, but it would seem right to use existing 

Standing Group machinery in an advisory capacity, s~nce the security or 

NATO 1~ jeopardized by insecure national communications. 

17. In order to avoid ernbarx·assment, to ensure maximum cooperation, 

and to edhere to the security and intelligence factors enumerated in 

paragraph 10 above, aey .. ____ action _._. with ~ irid.ividual pountry 'Should be as ......... --·....----- _,, .... ....__..... 

inconspicuous and private as possible • ..__ 2-wt•" 

VIII. THJ.i.! DETAIL~~D APPROACH AND SUBSFf.\UENT ACTION • 

steps to improve their co;mnunication security. 

10 

P.L. 86-36/50 USC 3605 

r-.711.C131 T'OP SECRET C1\:NOE 
I 1• Ir 

. ,.._ 7a1-C1as \ . 

-11-

P:..:c5J/Ex/n l"rill\.I, 

011 

// 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

T·op SECRET CANOE 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

l I 

I I 

I 4 

l 

l 

I'-711-C13S 

·. ':eOP f:inornw a 'tuon f il~fJ ff.1I'f¥ IJ :·,r.1_; t ·· .. ··.'PT-.;; ~ .····r• I l·.I) ,- ·=>Ji~·r/" J • I."· •. L' 

lllJ. 

// 

-12- EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
r 

r '• . 

3.3(h)(2) 

• SBct:JiU'f¥ fie_;l0RHNi1:EON FSC53/EX/R FJNJ\L 

011 

86-36/50 USC 3605 

J 

. I'.,-.711-C'll 

~. The approo.ch described above involves complicated iaeuea 

·.which raise intelligence and political, na well ll.S communications . 

security, problems. These will require special attention and 

.. rapid coordination between the US and UK until the precise 

direction and aucceaa of this program have been.assured. Among 

the several liaison arran3em~nta which exist now in these fields 

there doea not exil!it the specific informal mechanism which would 

afford the representation and flexibility requir'd for thia purpose. 

It is considered that the need would be met by the aetti:r:ig u;p in ................. -~ _ __..__-•• - ..... ~.-.............. JOS, ... I';....---.,..,....... ......... , 

Washington of a small combined working group representing intelligence . ~-· . ~---:.........____., .. 

and political as well as technical intereeta, the exact 

canpoaition and terms of reference t6 be decided by consultation 

between the cognizant US and UK authorities. 

CONCLUSIONS 

what extent national armed forces ciphers of NATO countries are 

vulnerable. If vulnerable however they also constitute a potential 

source of highly valuable intelligence for the USSR. 

. . adequately ·for 'the IJ.oss of COHINT ns a potential source of timely ....... ~--------..... .... ~.-· .. --~- -·---~ .. ,.-... - ... .-......."?""-'"'"'"'·-

.and a.tthor.±tative intelligence of high v:Uue through other sources 

·of !irif'ormation. 

The posoibilit;y that any- NATO 

country mie;ht defect from the NATO .\lliance is not estimated 

to o.ffect the ve.lidi ty of this conclusion. . 

TOP SECR~T CANOE 

• 
EO 3.3(1r))(2) ·, 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

\ 

'hO~ gJi:c~μ;i,· GHJcm Sl'i6Hllf':P¥ Hffi'OltMA'flOfc! F0C53/f'.JC/H li'INAL 

011 

28. Action should. be taken immediately to rectify all vulnerable ~.,..._,_ 

. --- ___ ....... . ..... ·-· ............. ·- - _______ ,,. ___ ,. ___ . _______ , 

e.ornmunications security practices or N/".TO countries. ......... -.. . ...-.... --.. . ····· ...... -.. ·-· ......... _ ..... ------·------- 29. Intelligence and :::iecurity considerations require that any -·-···- .. ._..... --·--~··~· ·-· ··---··· -··-- ' 

remedial action taken, Wiile deHign~d to be effective, should not ~ ............................... ' . . . ..... - ..•. • ... -· ......... ,,.., ..... -···· .. . ...... ····-·····---·--

actions taken should be calculated to prevent the leakage of effective 

communications s1.. ~urity principles to non-NATO nations. 

. . 

30. Certain technical factors and generar considerations require . . . that the action taken should: ._,,, I # 1 'I••*' ~ 

a. Attack violation of NATO conununications security 

regulations through improvem nt of the overall conununication security 

";? 

·1 \, 1

I 1 

attitudes and practices of offending NATO countries. 

'./ l 

________ I''~ 

I 

Form 7Bl·C13S 

c. Utilize the machinery of the Standing Group of NATO 

as the instrumentality for improving the security of the national 

001DD1unications of other NATO countries. 

d. Be taken through cornmw\f.cations security channels, 

using existing communications security\agencies wherever possible. 

e. Be aimed at the improvement of available cryptosystems 

~nd conununications practices rather than at the provision of new 

equipment. 

14 

I. 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
• • ., 

( 

F-78f.C13S 

REF ID:A517165 

TOV-' SECRET CAM OE 

foSC53/EX/R FINAL 

OU 

\ 

f. 

countries. 

Afford maximum privacy in dealipg with individual NA.TO 

EO 3.3(h)(2) I 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

31. The course of action outlined in paragraphs 18 through 21+ 

above meets the foregoing considerations and is .t:'easible • .-. uw..., 11 .~~~~~~•i: • r ~~"""%AS~ •m1, w·a1!"""z.~-'-.n-

.32. Upon approval of this report the follo~dng preliminary steps ~a_,,...__~~·-"~............,,.,,.\ . .,-' -~-"'•."C,.i;._,.:.,; _,.";,}-~' ___ ..._ _________ __; ___ ' 

nrust be taken: 

\\\\ 

liaison arrangements to coordinate. this examination and the drawing 

of lessons from it are adequate' and no further liaison machinery is 

required. 

15 

TOP SECRET· CANOE 
' I. •, 

ft-78M:13S 

REF ID:A517165 

TO~SECRET CAMOE 

'l'QP a\i;SRE'i' GANOK SBGl:IRI'£Y INFORHit'f ION 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

3.l+. It is recommended that: 

FSC53/EX/R FINAL 

011 

a. The foregoing conclunions be approved and supersede 

those of the 1950 Conference on the. Security- 9rJ l Communications. 

b. /The program in parag:r:apbs lS through 24 be undertaken 

in accordanc.e with the conclu~ioh.s and, in particular, · '1at the steps· 

enumerated/in paragraph 32 shbuld be undertaken inunediately. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

16 

TOP· SECRET CANOE 
" 

REF ID:A517165 

TOIMSECRET CAMOE ' , . / 

'l'OP SiCUiT CUJOi aJ&CYH.lTY IUPU~~TJ~J 

APPENDIX 1l 

Examples of Recent Instances in which NATO 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

FSC5J/EX/R FINAL 

011. 

1.2 June 1953 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
..... " .• , I 

TOP'SEC~~w,=~ 1 :lt:l!I 1 U?\:1 11 aOE j 

'fOP SFi9ftl~'f SANOR - SECffi'.f'fY IH'PelU'tfl'fIGM 

. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

FSC53/EX/R FINAL 

011 

F.,..781-C13S TOP SECRET Ci\NOE 
' • '• TOPrSECRr.; Ji¥ ,YJ;>: 

1 ~li u1~E ~ 

'f'Of SBCitl3'I' Of\:ld'OO • Sl3GUHI':E'Y IUFOFe4ATIOPf. FSC53/E:X/R1

1 FI~L 011 . '---

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
. I •, 

APPF..NDIX B 

I 

LIST OF ExAMPL~ OF DANGJ~ROUG 

~11.YPTOGRAPHIC AND COMMUNICATIONS 

PRACTICES AND PaDCEDUH.ES 

I. UNENCIPHERED CODES 

FSC53/EX./R FINAL 

011 

12 June 1953 

1. Unenciphered codes are totally inacceptable in diplomatic 

use for transrdi.ssion of classified information. In Armed Forces ,· 

cormnunications they are acceptable only when changed at very 

frequent intervals and when it is not considered essential to maintain 

the security of the information for more ;than two or three days from 

the introduction or the code. 

II, ADDITIVE SYSTEMS 

2. Any additive (or subtractor or minuend) system is dangerous 

unless special precautions are ta~'n in the construction of the e.tldit1ve 

itself.· Many procedures that may be regarded as "special precautions" 

are deceptive as to security and may even ;lp. themselves create wealalesses. 

J, Encipherment by additive can only be guaranteed to be secure 

when the additive is used on a strictly 11 one-time" basis, and systems 

that per~t depth gain little or no security from the additive. 

4, Encipherment by non-one-time additives is highly dangerous, 

but can be .acceptable in certain circumstances for limited traffic 

provided that precautions are taken to minimise overlap a.nd to prevent 

cryptanalysts from finding any overlap that may arise • 

. III. NON-ADDrI'IVE HAND SYSTEMS 

5. There are many hand methods of encipherment, not employin~ 

. additive, but few of these can be guaranteed .to be secure. 

IV. MACHINE CIPHERS 

6. 

·.afford. 

Machine ciphers vary greatly in the amount of security they 

() 

Failure to observe in every detail proper instructions for 

1 

TOP SECRET CANOE 

I 

'i ,, 
r 

' 

\; / .. , 

'• 

CBG:Y:HEE'Y IilFOHl lYf'HHT F':.iG'J3/EX/Hi li'Iflf\.L Uli ----

-----··~· 

E0~.3(h)(2) 

PL 86.::36/50 USC 3605 

12 June 1953 

Af'I'ErIDIX B(continu~cl) 

oper~tion ma.y lc.:.i.d to coznprornisc even with the best machines. 

Others, such ns tho well-k~~~,:n. l .... ___________________ ___j 

li.rc insecure unless precautions :ire to.ken over o.nd above those 

recommended by the manufacturer. Others, again, o.re basically 

insecure and should in no circumstances be used. 

V. TR/\NSMISS ION SEC UH I'rY 

8. Ciphers, however good inrUvidun.lly, are not enough to ensure 

communications security. 'l'r::Lnsmission techniques o.nd message formo.ts 

can in themselves. provide consicler.i.blc intelligence to a trn.ffic ana.lyat. 

Althou~h there are i)r~1ct::t.cal limit:.tions, th,c ideal to be striven 

for is thi\t the trn.ffic n".!ither of :cny one type (e.g. no.val, o.ir force, 

-2-

TOP SECRET CANOE 

' I 
r 

I •, 

F-711-C131 

l·'~C)J/mc/H. FINAL 

011 

12 June 195.3 

APPJi:NDIX B (continued) 

etc.), nor of miy onu n1:1.ti1m !ihouli.l bu di~tiuguir;hablo bJ external 

characterist.ics. Ae;aiu, intolligcuce can be e;a.i.ned by study of 

the organization and procod.11r~ of radio networks and by use of radio 

direction-finding. In mauy casE::ls, es11ecially in Armed ·::-orces communications, a skillful enemy can obtain valuable intellit;ence b.t collation 

or apparently uninfornwti ve messat;o texts. II.:. follows, therefore, that 

full cormnunications secw·.i ty demandn Uu .... t special precautions be . 

observed in such matters as thp jmliciouG employment of indicators, 

the selection of call siens and of .frec~ucncies; radio procedures, .. and the restriction of the use of plain language. 

' 

3 

·TOP SECRET. CANOE