[Cite as State v. Osborn, 2017-Ohio-8228.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 105196

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

TREVON A. OSBORN

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED 

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-16-606185-A 

BEFORE: McCormack, P.J., Stewart, J., and Blackmon, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 19, 2017 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Paul A. Mancino, Jr. 

Mancino, Mancino & Mancino 

75 Public Square Bldg., Ste. 1016 

Cleveland, OH 44113-2098 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Michael C. O’Malley 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Anna Woods 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

Justice Center, 9th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, OH 44113 
TIM McCORMACK, P.J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Trevon A. Osborn appeals from his conviction 

following a guilty plea. After a thorough review, we affirm. 

I. Procedural History 

{¶2} Osborn was charged in a 12-count indictment as follows: Count 1 — 

aggravated burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1); Count 2 — aggravated burglary 

in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(2); Count 3 — aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 

2911.01(A)(1); Count 4 — grand theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1); Count 5 — 

theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1); Count 6 — kidnapping in violation of R.C. 

2905.01(B)(2); Count 7 — aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1); 

Count 8 — kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(B)(2); Count 9 — aggravated 

robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1); Count 10 — kidnapping in violation of R.C. 

2905.01(B)(2); Count 11 — improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle in violation 

of R.C. 2923.16(B); and Count 12 — impersonation of certain officers in violation of 

R.C. 2921.51(E). All charges contained one- and three-year firearm specifications as 

well as a forfeiture specification. The incident from which the charges stem involved 

three victims. 

{¶3} Osborn entered into a plea agreement, whereby he pleaded guilty to the 

charges contained in Counts 1 and 3 (and the three-year firearm specifications), Counts 

4–6 (amended to delete the firearm specifications), Counts 7–9 (amended to delete the 

firearm specifications), and Counts 11 and 12 (amended to delete the firearm 
specifications). Osborn also pleaded guilty to the forfeiture specification. The 

remaining charges and firearm specifications were nolled. The court accepted Osborn’s 

plea and found him guilty. The court then referred Osborn for a presentence 

investigation report (“PSI”) and scheduled the matter for sentencing. 

{¶4} At the sentencing hearing, the parties agreed that Counts 3, 4, 5, and 6 

merged, and Counts 7 and 8 merged. The state elected the defendant to be sentenced on 

Counts 3 and 7. The court then sentenced Osborn to three years in prison on the 

underlying offense in Count 1 as well as three years for that count’s firearm specification; 

three years on the underlying offense in Count 3 as well as three years for that count’s 

firearm specification; three years each on Counts 7, 9, and 12; and 18 months on Count 

11. The court ordered the underlying offenses in Counts 1 and 3 to be served 

concurrently to each other but consecutively to the respective firearm specifications. The 

court also ordered the sentences in Counts 7 and 9 to be served consecutively, while 

Counts 11 and 12 would be served concurrently. The aggregate prison sentence is 15 

years. The court then ordered the forfeiture of weapons and it waived all fines and costs. 

II. Assignments of Error 

{¶5} Osborn now appeals, assigning five errors for our review. We will address 

several of the alleged errors together and out of order. The assignments of error are as 

follows: 

I. Defendant was denied due process of law and equal protection of the 

law when he was sentenced to a maximum sentence for a third 

degree felony and a minimum sentence for a first degree felony. 
II. Defendant was denied due process of law when the court imposed 

consecutive sentences based upon judicial factfinding which denied 

defendant his Sixth Amendment right. 

III. Defendant was denied due process of law when the court imposed a 

consecutive sentence without making the proper necessary findings. 

IV. Defendant was denied due process of law when the court accepted 

pleas of guilty to various offenses without determining that the 

defendant understood the nature of the offenses. 

V. Defendant was denied due process of law and subjected to 

unconstitutional multiple punishments when he was sentenced 

consecutively on firearm specification[s]. 

III. The Guilty Plea 

{¶6} In his fourth assignment of error, Osborn contends that the court erred in 

accepting his guilty plea without determining that he understood the nature of the 

offenses. 

{¶7} When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, “the plea must be made 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders 

enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and 

the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). 

To ensure that a defendant enters a plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, a trial 

court must engage in an oral dialogue with the defendant in accordance with Crim.R. 

11(C). Id. The underlying purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is to convey certain information to 

a defendant so that he or she can make a voluntary and intelligent decision regarding 
whether to plead guilty. State v. Schmick, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95210, 

2011-Ohio-2263, ¶ 5. 

{¶8} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) requires that a trial court determine from a colloquy with 

the defendant whether the defendant understands (1) the nature of the charge and 

maximum penalty, (2) the effect of the guilty plea, and (3) the constitutional rights waived 

by a guilty plea. State v. Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104095, 2017-Ohio-184, ¶ 5, 

citing State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621. 

{¶9} The reviewing court conducts a de novo review to determine whether the 

trial court accepted a plea in compliance with Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Cardwell, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92796, 2009-Ohio-6827, ¶ 26. Where the issue concerns a 

nonconstitutional requirement, such as whether the defendant understood the nature of the 

charges or the maximum penalties for the offenses, we review for substantial compliance. 

See State v. Jordan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103813, 2016-Ohio-5709, ¶ 46, citing Veney

at ¶ 14-17. “Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances 

the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is 

waiving.” State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990); State v. 

Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977). 

{¶10} Moreover, when a nonconstitutional aspect of a plea is at issue, a defendant 

must show prejudice before the plea will be vacated for a trial court’s error involving the 

court’s compliance with Crim.R. 11(C). Jordan at ¶ 47, citing Veney at ¶ 17. The test 
for prejudice is whether the plea would have otherwise been made. State v. Malenda, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 104736 and 104829, 2017-Ohio-5574, ¶ 5. 

{¶11} Osborn alleges that “no determination was made that [he] fully understood 

the nature of the offenses.” In support, he claims that he was not aware that he was 

pleading guilty to the three-year firearm specifications because of the numerous counts, 

multiple victims and “different versions of the same offense,” and several one- and 

three-year specifications, and that because of this alleged confusion, the court should have 

made the determination. Thus, as Osborn contends, the court’s failure to make such a 

determination denied him due process of the law. 

{¶12} After a thorough review of the record, we find that the trial court did, in 

fact, find that Osborn understood the nature of the charges, and the record supports the 

court’s determination. 

{¶13} Here, after the parties put the plea agreement on the record, the court noted 

that the minimum sentence would be nine years due to the felony offenses and the firearm 

specifications involved, and Osborn indicated that he understood. The court specifically 

asked Osborn if he reviewed the indictment and understood “all those charges against 

[him], to which he replied, “Yes, your Honor.” The court also asked Osborn if he was 

satisfied with the services of his attorney, and he replied that he was satisfied. The court 

encouraged Osborn to ask questions should he have any questions during the proceedings. 

{¶14} Thereafter, the court engaged in a colloquy about the medication Osborn 

was taking: 
Court: So you’re on medication that helps [you]? 

Osborn: It helps me maintain. 

Court: Okay. And you take that every day? 

Osborn: Yes, your Honor. 

Court: And how long have you been taking that? 

Osborn: I [have] been taking that since I was 12 or 13. 

Court: So that helps your mental health situation. Right? 

Osborn: Yes, your Honor. 

Court: But does that affect your ability to understand what’s 

happening in court today? 

Osborn: No, your Honor. 

Court: So do you, in fact, understand what is happening today? 

Osborn: Yes, your Honor. 

{¶15} The court then thoroughly reviewed the constitutional rights that Osborn 

was waiving and ensured that Osborn understood that he waived those rights by pleading 

guilty. The court reviewed all of the charges to which Osborn agreed to plead guilty, 

including the three-year firearm specifications accompanying Counts 1 and 3, as well as 

the maximum penalties involved with each charge. 

{¶16} Specifically regarding the firearm specifications, the court engaged in the 

following colloquy: 

Court: Now, since you’re pleading guilty to a firearm specification 

— two firearm specifications — obviously you already know 

that prison is mandatory in this case. But pleading guilty to 

two firearm specifications means that the three-year firearm 
specifications must run consecutive to one another and to the 

underlying offense. So that means that you face a minimum, 

with just the firearm specification, on the underlying offense 

of 9 years in prison. 

Osborn: Just the firearm specifications? 

Court: Two firearm specifications that have to be run consecutive to 

each other. And then they run consecutive to the underlying 

offense, so the two firearm specifications together is 6 years. 

 And then the underlying offense of Count 1, aggravated 

burglary, * * * the minimum is 3 years. So running 

consecutive to that, that adds years on so that makes it a 

minimum prison sentence of 9 years. 

Osborn: I understand, your Honor. 

Court: That’s the minimum. However, if all of your counts are run 

consecutive to one another * * *, then you are looking at a 

maximum sentence of — do you know that number, 

[counsel]? 

Prosecutor: * * * If everything were to run consecutive to each other with 

no merger, it would be 123 years. If the kidnapping and the 

robbery were to merge, he would be looking at a sentence of 

90 years, your Honor. 

Court: * * * Do you understand that? 

Osborn: Yes, your Honor. 

{¶17} During this exchange, the court repeatedly asked Osborn if he understood, to 

which he replied in the affirmative. The court continued to explain the other 

consequences of his plea, including court costs, mandatory fines, restitution, fees, and 

postrelease control. Osborn again stated that he understood. 

{¶18} Finally, Osborn confirmed that no threats or promises were made in 

exchange for his plea. When asked if he understood that there is no promise of a 
particular sentence, Osborn answered, “Yes.” The court then accepted Osborn’s guilty 

plea, satisfied that he “understands the nature of the charges, the effect of [the] plea, and 

the maximum penalties [that] may be imposed,” and the court found Osborn’s plea was 

made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 

{¶19} In light of the above, we find that the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11 

in ensuring that Osborn’s plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered, and 

the record shows, that Osborn did, in fact, understand the nature of the charges and the 

implications of his plea. Osborn has failed to identify any part of the record that 

demonstrates otherwise. Moreover, Osborn fails to demonstrate how the court’s alleged 

failure to determine that he understood the charges would have caused the plea to have 

otherwise been made. 

{¶20} Osborn’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. 
IV. The Sentence 

{¶21} In his remaining assignments of error, Osborn takes issue with several 

aspects of his sentence. He contends that the court improperly sentenced him to the 

maximum sentence for a third-degree felony while imposing a minimum sentence on the 

first-degree felony; the court failed to consider the purposes and principles of felony 

sentencing mandated by R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12; the court’s alleged improper 

considerations did not warrant consecutive sentences; the court failed to make the 

statutorily mandated consecutive sentence findings; and the court’s imposition of 

consecutive firearm specifications resulted in unconstitutional multiple punishments for 

the same crime. 

A. Standard of Review 

{¶22} In reviewing felony sentences, we do not review the sentence for an abuse 

of discretion. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); see also State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 

2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231. Rather, we may increase, reduce, modify a sentence, 

or vacate and remand for resentencing if we clearly and convincingly find that the record 

does not support the sentencing court’s statutory findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) or the 

sentence is contrary to law. State v. Wenmoth, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103520, 

2016-Ohio-5135, ¶ 12, citing R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). 

{¶23} A sentence is contrary to law if it falls outside the statutory range for the 

particular degree of offense or if the trial court fails to consider the purposes and 

principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors set 
forth in R.C. 2929.12. State v. Pawlak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103444, 

2016-Ohio-5926, ¶ 58. Additionally, the imposition of consecutive sentences is contrary 

to law if a trial court fails to make the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). State v. 

Morris, 2016-Ohio-7614, 73 N.E.3d 1010, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Bonnell, 140 

Ohio St. 3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 37; State v. Primm, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 103548, 2016-Ohio-5237, ¶ 66. 

{¶24} A trial court has full discretion to impose any term of imprisonment within 

the statutory range, as long as it considers the sentencing purposes in R.C. 2929.11 and 

the guidelines contained in R.C. 2929.12. State v. Ray, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101142, 

2014-Ohio-4689, ¶ 14, citing State v. Holmes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99783, 

2014-Ohio-603, ¶ 8. Therefore, a sentence imposed within the statutory range is 

“presumptively valid” if the court considered the applicable sentencing factors. State v. 

Collier, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95572, 2011-Ohio-2791, ¶ 15, citing State v. Foster, 109 

Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, paragraph seven of the syllabus. 

B. Purposes and Principles of Sentencing and Judicial Factfinding 

{¶25} In this case, Osborn does not dispute that he was sentenced within the 

statutory range for his offenses. He contends in his first assignment of error, however, 

that in imposing the maximum sentence for a third-degree felony (three years on Count 

12, impersonation of certain officers) and a minimum sentence for a first-degree felony 

(three years each on the aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery charges in Counts 1, 

3, 7, and 9), the court failed to properly consider the purposes and principles of felony 
sentencing. Additionally, in his second assignment of error, he contends that the trial 

court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial when the court engaged in judicial 

factfinding. He argues that rather than basing his sentence on the statutorily mandated 

considerations, the court based his sentence on facts not alleged in the indictment or 

admitted by him at the time of his plea. 

{¶26} R.C. 2929.11(A) provides that the overriding purposes of felony sentencing 

are (1) to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others; and (2) to 

punish the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish 

those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government 

resources. Further, the sentence imposed shall be “commensurate with and not 

demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact on the victim, and 

consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes by similar offenders.” R.C. 

2929.11(B). 

{¶27} The court that imposes a felony sentence has the discretion to determine the 

most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing as outlined 

above. R.C. 2929.12(A); State v. Switzer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102175, 

2015-Ohio-2954, ¶ 10. In exercising this discretion, however, the sentencing court must 

consider a statutory list of factors regarding the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and 

the likelihood of recidivism, as well as any other factors relevant to achieving these 

purposes and principles of sentencing. See R.C. 2929.12; Switzer. 
{¶28} Although the trial court has a mandatory duty to “consider” the statutory 

factors under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, the court is not required to engage in any factual 

findings under R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12. State v. Combs, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99852, 

2014-Ohio-497, ¶ 52; State v. Bement, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99914, 2013-Ohio-5437, ¶ 

17. Nor is the trial court required to explain its analysis of those factors. Switzer at ¶ 8. 

“While trial courts must carefully consider the statutes that apply to every felony case, it 

is not necessary for the trial court to articulate its consideration of each individual factor 

as long as it is evident from the record that the principles of sentencing were considered.” 

State v. Gonzalez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102579, 2015-Ohio-4765, ¶ 6, citing State v. 

Roberts, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89236, 2008-Ohio-1942, ¶ 10. 

{¶29} Here, the court heard from Osborn, his counsel, and the state. Defense 

counsel urged the court to consider the fact that this case is Osborn’s first conviction as 

an adult and his client was “not the main perpetrator.” Osborn then offered an apology 

to the victims, stating that he “did wrong,” he “wasn’t thinking,” and he made a mistake. 

The court then discussed with Osborn the facts of the case as summarized in the PSI: 

The victims told the police that they were in their bedroom when they heard 

loud banging on the front door. Two males yelled Cleveland police, open 

up and then proceeded to break down the front door. The males, one 

identified as Osborn, ran into the bedroom and hit [the victim] on the head * 

* * with a handgun and told him to get on the ground. 

One of the males put a pillow on the victim’s head and said don’t— using 

bad language — move or I’ll kill you. The victim could hear the other 

male rummaging through his property before they exited the home. * * * 
[T]he other victim said she ran into someone’s room to hide and a male put 

a gun to her head and screamed do not open your eyes and do not open the 

covers or I’ll shoot you. The defendants proceeded to fill garbage bags of 

items and place [the bags] in the back of their vehicle. 

{¶30} The court noted that Osborn’s actions were not “a mistake,” rather, they 

resembled “a thought-out criminal plan to terrorize people.” The court stated that in 

looking at Osborn’s record as a juvenile, the record showed he had a prior burglary and a 

prior robbery, as well as charges of disorderly conduct, drug possession, and unauthorized 

use of a motor vehicle. The court noted that Osborn’s conduct as an “active participant” 

in pretending to be a police officer, breaking down the door, and “terroriz[ing]” the 

victims “is so violent and reprehensible.” 

{¶31} The court then heard from the prosecutor, who provided a brief outline of 

the facts that the court had previously reviewed. Thereafter, prior to imposing sentence, 

the court stated that it reviewed the PSI and “all of the facts of what occurred,” reiterating 

that it found Osborn’s actions “extremely violent and reprehensible.” The court noted 

that it considered all of the relevant seriousness and recidivism factors, and in assuring 

“that the public is protected from future crime and that [Osborn is] punished,” the court 

found Osborn not amenable to community control and imposed a prison sentence. 

{¶32} Based upon the foregoing, we find the trial court did, in fact, consider the 

principles and purposes of felony sentencing outlined in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing 

factors outlined in R.C. 2929.12 prior to sentencing. Although Osborn disagrees with the 
trial court’s imposition of a minimum prison sentence on his first-degree felony offenses 

while imposing the maximum prison sentence on his third-degree felony, we are mindful 

that trial courts have broad discretion in fashioning felony sentences. State v. Long, 138 

Ohio St.3d 478, 2014-Ohio-849, 8 N.E.3d 890 (O’Connor, C.J., concurring); State v. 

Anderson, 2016-Ohio-7044, 62 N.E.3d 229, ¶ 1 (8th Dist.) (“There is arguably nothing 

more unassailable than the trial court’s discretion to fashion final sentences.”). “The 

General Assembly has afforded judges great discretion in fashioning proper sentences, 

constrained only by guideposts that require the sentencing judge to consider certain 

factors that help determine the seriousness of the crime and the likelihood of recidivism.” 

Long at ¶ 36, citing R.C. 2929.12. And in this case, the record demonstrates the trial 

court considered such guideposts. 

{¶33} To the extent that Osborn disagrees with the court’s consideration of the 

sentencing factors, how the court weighed the factors, or the type of sentence imposed, 

we have no jurisdiction for review. See Switzer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102175, 

2015-Ohio-2954, at ¶ 12. The trial court has the “‘discretion to determine the weight to 

assign a particular statutory factor.’” Id., quoting State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215, 

2000-Ohio-302, 724 N.E.2d 793; see also R.C. 2929.12(A). And a defendant’s 

disagreement with the trial court’s discretion and the manner in which it weighed each 

factor does not make a sentence contrary to law. State v. Ongert, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

103208, 2016-Ohio-1543, ¶ 14; State v. D.S., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-790, 

2016-Ohio-2856, ¶ 15. 
{¶34} We also find no impermissible judicial factfinding in this case. The Ohio 

Supreme Court has held that judicial factfinding necessary to impose consecutive 

sentences does not violate the Sixth Amendment. State v. Ruvolo, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 102569, 2015-Ohio-5417, ¶ 13, citing State v. Hodge, 128 Ohio St.3d 1, 

2010-Ohio-6320, 941 N.E.2d 768; Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 

N.E.3d 659. 

{¶35} Here, before imposing consecutive sentences, the trial court noted Osborn’s 

juvenile record containing similar offenses and commented on the facts as summarized in 

Osborn’s presentence investigation report. It found Osborn’s conduct of breaking into a 

home while pretending to be a police officer, assaulting individuals in the home, and 

causing great fear to be “a horrendous violent crime,” and therefore found consecutive 

sentences proper. 

{¶36} First, the court may consider Osborn’s prior record in determining an 

appropriate sentence without engaging in improper judicial factfinding. State v. Lewis, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102939, 2015-Ohio-5267, ¶ 29. Second, the court’s comments 

regarding the facts of the incident that gave rise to the charges were gleaned from the 

presentence investigation report the court had ordered and reviewed prior to sentencing. 

The trial court may consider “any reliable evidence in the record” when sentencing a 

defendant, including a PSI. State v. Holt, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103772, 

2016-Ohio-5246, ¶ 10, fn. 1, citing State v. Hinton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84582, 

2005-Ohio- 3427, ¶ 12; R.C. 2929.19(B). 
{¶37} We therefore find the trial court considered the appropriate statutory factors 

before sentencing Osborn. Further, we find the trial court did not engage in improper 

judicial factfinding. Osborn’s first and second assignments of error are overruled. 

C. Consecutive Sentences 

{¶38} In his third assignment of error, Osborn contends that the trial court failed to 

make the proper findings before imposing consecutive sentences. He also contends, in 

his fifth and final assignment of error, that the court subjected him to unconstitutional 

multiple punishments by ordering the firearm specifications to be served consecutively. 

{¶39} In order to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court must make findings 

set forth in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and incorporate those findings into the journal entry of 

sentence. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, at ¶ 37. R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4) provides that the trial court must find that consecutive sentences are 

necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender, that such 

sentences would not be disproportionate to the seriousness of the conduct and to the 

danger the offender poses to the public, and that one of the following applies: 

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while 

the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction 

imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the 

Revised Code, or was under postrelease control for a prior offense. 

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one 

or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of 

the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no 

single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of 

the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the 

offender’s conduct. 
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that 

consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future 

crime by the offender. 

{¶40} Compliance with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires the trial court to make the 

statutory findings at the sentencing hearing, “and by doing so it affords notice to the 

offender and to defense counsel.” Bonnell at ¶ 29. “Findings,” for these purposes, 

means that “‘the [trial] court must note that it engaged in the analysis’ and that it ‘has 

considered the statutory criteria and specifie[d] which of the given bases warrants its 

decision.’” Id. at ¶ 26, quoting State v. Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 326, 715 N.E.2d 

131 (1999). Further, the reviewing court must be able to determine that the record 

contains evidence to support the findings. State v. Davis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

102639, 2015-Ohio-4501, ¶ 21, citing Bonnell at ¶ 29. 

{¶41} We find in this case that the record demonstrates the trial court made the 

requisite R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings in support of consecutive sentences. Upon 

imposing sentence, the court stated as follows: 

I’m also advising you that a consecutive prison term is necessary to protect 

the community and punish you, the offender. And it’s not 

disproportionate. And I find the harm is so great or unusual that a single 

term does not adequately reflect the seriousness of your conduct and that 

your criminal history shows that a consecutive sentence is necessary to 

protect the public. 

First, as I’ve already placed on the record, you have a juvenile record of the 

same offenses, one of each, burglary and robbery. In addition to that, I find 

that this was a horrendous violent crime and that you broke into someone’s 
house pretending to be a police officer. Once in the home, you, with 

weapons, assaulted individuals in the home and caused great fear from what 

I’ve read through the presentence investigation report. Therefore, I find 

that a consecutive prison sentence is necessary to protect the public and to 

punish you, the offender. 

{¶42} Although the trial court did not recite verbatim the second finding that 

consecutive sentences “would not be disproportionate to the seriousness of the conduct 

and to the danger the offender poses to the public,” the trial court is not required to give a 

“talismanic incantation” of the words of the statute, provided the necessary findings are 

found in the record. Bonnell at ¶ 37. When making the consecutive sentence findings, 

“a word-for-word recitation of the language of the statute is not required, and as long as 

the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and can 

determine that the record contains evidence to support the findings, consecutive sentences 

should be upheld.” Bonnell at ¶ 29. 

{¶43} Here, the court stressed the seriousness of the crime in articulating that two 

of the three given bases warranted its decision, where the statute requires only one of the 

findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c). The court found that “the harm is so great or 

unusual that a single term does not adequately reflect the seriousness” of Osborn’s 

conduct, under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b), in addition to finding that Osborn’s criminal 

history demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from 

future crime by Osborn, the offender, under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c). 
{¶44} Additionally, the court emphasized the “horrendous” and “violent” nature of 

the crime whereby Osborn instilled great fear in his victims by invading their home in 

such a violent manner under the guise of being a police officer. The court’s remarks, 

viewed in their entirety, reflect that the court engaged in the appropriate analysis and 

placed the finding on the record. State v. Jackson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104991, 

2017-Ohio-7167, ¶ 13; State v. Amey, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 103000 and 103001, 

2016-Ohio-1121, ¶ 16 (stating the court’s finding that consecutive sentences “would not 

be disproportionate” complied with the statute when considering the court’s additional 

remarks). We therefore can discern the trial court found that consecutive sentences are 

not disproportionate to the seriousness of Osborn’s conduct and to the danger he poses to 

the public. State v. Blevins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105023, 2017-Ohio-4444, ¶ 25. 

{¶45} Osborn’s third assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶46} Osborn also contends that the court erred when it sentenced him to 

consecutive sentences for the two, three-year firearm specifications. He argues that 

because the same firearm was used in the same incident, the firearm specifications ought 

to have merged. This argument is without merit. 

{¶47} Ordinarily, a trial court is prohibited from imposing more than one prison 

term for firearm specifications “associated with felonies ‘committed as part of the same 

act or transaction.’” State v. Nelson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104336, 2017-Ohio-5568, ¶ 

81, citing R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b). The statute provides an exception, however, to this 

general rule: 
If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to two or more felonies, if one 

or more of those felonies are aggravated murder, murder, attempted 

aggravated murder, attempted murder, aggravated robbery, felonious 

assault, or rape, and if the offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a 

specification of the type described under division (B)(1)(a) of this section, 

[i.e. a specification of the type described in R.C. 2941.141, 2941.144, or 

2941.145], in connection with two or more of the felonies, the sentencing 

court shall impose on the offender the prison term specified under division 

(B)(1)(a) of this section for each of the two most serious specifications of 

which the offender is convicted or to which the offender pleads guilty and, 

in its discretion, also may impose on the offender the prison term specified 

under that division for any or all of the remaining specifications. 

R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g). 

{¶48} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g), therefore, the trial court must impose 

prison terms for the two most serious specifications and it has discretion to impose a 

sentence for any other specification. State v. Nitsche, 2016-Ohio-3170, 66 N.E.3d 135, ¶ 

53 (8th Dist.), citing State v. James, 2015-Ohio-4987, 53 N.E.3d 770, ¶ 41 (8th Dist.). 

And the multiple terms for the firearm specifications must be served consecutively: 

“While the General Assembly did not include the word ‘consecutive’ in 

R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g), it nonetheless carved out an exception to the general 

rule that a trial court may not impose multiple firearm specifications for 

crimes committed within a single transaction. The mandatory language of 

the statute (‘the court shall impose’) also indicates the General Assembly’s 

intention that the defendant serve multiple sentences for firearm 

specifications associated with the enumerated crimes, such as murder or 

felonious assault. Had the Legislature intended a per se rule that sentences 

for firearm specifications must be served concurrent with one another, it 
could have stated as much. Or, the Legislature could have chosen not to 

codify R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g), which serves as an exception to the rule that 

multiple firearm specifications must be merged for purposes of sentencing 

when the predicate offenses were committed as a single criminal 

transaction.” 

State v. Vanderhorst, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97242, 2013-Ohio-1785, ¶ 10, quoting State 

v. Isreal, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2011-11-115, 2012-Ohio-4876, ¶ 73. 

{¶49} Here, Osborn pleaded guilty to two or more felonies, including one count of 

aggravated burglary and three counts of aggravated robbery. He also pleaded guilty to 

the three-year firearm specifications in violation of R.C. 2941.145(A) that accompanied 

Count 1, aggravated burglary, and Count 3, aggravated robbery. Under R.C. 

2929.14(B)(1)(g), the court was therefore required to impose consecutive sentences on 

each of the firearm specifications. Nelson at ¶ 81; Nitsche at ¶ 53; Vanderhorst at ¶ 10. 

Thus, the trial court’s imposition of consecutive three-year sentences on the firearm 

specifications was not improper. 

{¶50} Osborn’s fifth and final assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶51} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

________________________________________ 

TIM McCORMACK, PRESIDING JUDGE 

MELODY J. STEWART, J., and 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR