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Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source. 

COPY 1 

U. S. E¥ES ONLY AFSA-OCYr/ef 

26 April 19~1 

MEOORANDUY FOR DIRAFSA 

SUBJECT: 

References: 

Enclosure: 

u.s.-u.K. Conference on French insecurity 

(a) U.K. Paper DGC/1640 

(b) U.K. Paper DGC/1643 

(c) AFSA Draft Staf.f study on the improvement of 

French conmmications 

Comparison of U.K. and U.S. proposals 

l. a.. The subject. conference was initiall.J" proposed and inteinded. 

by the U.K. to dea.l with insacurity- of French diploma.tic communications. 

Upon informing the U.K. of our desire to expand the agenda to include 

insecurity of French Armed Sartlcee corr.munications, since in our view 

there was room for improvainent in both catagoriee, the U.K. accepted 

the expansion of the agenda, and prepared two ~pers: 

(1) Reference (a.): DGC/1640, "fue insecurity of 

French non-diplomatic cyphers" 

(2) Reference (b): DGC/1643, "The insecurity of 

FTench diplomatic cyphers" 

b. The two U.K. papers are of about ·t.he same length, and each 

of them is, in fact, considerably longer and more detailed than our own 

single paper. Moreover, reference (a) deals with the.c:cypt.osystems not 

only of the Fz'ench Ar.med Services, but al.so those of other Departments, 

such as Colonial and Interior. Under the Armed SeZ'Vices it deals 

separately with "Service ~.rphersn ai'ld "Service Att;tche Cyphers". '!he 

British, having accepted our proposed e~~insion of the agenda: have 

decided to cover prnctica11y the whole field in some detail. 

c. A first reading of the U.K .. papers leaves one with a 

vague feeling that. something is missing; upon considel'.'ation it dawns on 

one that t.'1ey aeem to have bean written almost in a vacuum with respect 

to what has been or is being done a.long these lines by the same or o~i;her authorities: not one m<:Jntion is made of the use of TYffiX and CCM 

for Western Union or NATO corrmunications. In fact, there is but one 

reference to NATO and that is in the statement in reference (b), 

Par. ; : n It is kncwr.o officially through ~J. A. '.r. o. channels that some 

F".rench authorities a!'e using th·'3 T .52. "° 11 : u poil1t which leads only to 

·, ,_ f f - • ~ 

ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY 

'FSP SECRET ACORN 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 06-03-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
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Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of \·ital intelligence at its source. 

a rather vague inference that NATO authorities have said something 

about French collll1'llnicationa; it certainly gives no idea that specific 

action has been ta.ken by NATO authorities to improve the security of 

one verr important segment or French communications. 

2. a. For.the sake of brevity, I have, in the Fnelosure, 

considered both U.K. papers more or less simultaneously, although, 

where necessary, reference to specific paragraph(s) in each paper is 

made. 

b. In gene1~al I believe our paper and the plane proposed b;r 

us tor improving the seourit7 or French comnunica.tione or the two main 

categories much more succinct, clear, and pra.ctica.l than the U.K. 

papers and plans. Our paper would certainl:- be much more acceptable 1 

from the point of view of drattismanahip at least, than the U.K. papers, 

it something hao to go forward to the USCIB or to the U.S. Joint 

Chiefs of start. I do not mean to criticize the U.Ko papers as to 

format; they- just do things in a different manner. Their papers were 

perhaps purpoaeq prepared. tor the consideration or technicians, 

rather than high-level executive or command authorities. 

c. '!he Enclosure sets forth details ct comparison, similarities, and differences betvnlen our single paper and t.he two U.Ko 

papers. · 

Copies to: 

AFSA-OOA 

AFSA-OOB 

AFSA-OOC 

AFSA-12 

AFSA-l23 

AFSA-14 

AFSA-o2 

AP'SA-03 

AFSA-04 

2 

ARMED FORCES SECCRITY AGENCY 

'l~OP SECRET AGOR:N 
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Utmost secrecy is necessary to prU:"~:yiMshiblf(f vital intelligence at its source. 

COUPARISON OF THE U.K. ffiOPOSAIS, AS OUTLINED IN REFERF.NCE (a) (DGC/1640) 

AND REFERF.NCE {b) (DGC/1643), AND THE U.S. ffiOPOSALS, AS OUTLINED IN 

REFERENCE (c) (STAFF STUDY ON THE n.~om.@rr OF FRENCH comruNICATIONS) 0 

l,. PhySical am. Personnel Securi~: 

a. Conclusion 3g of Reference (c) states that 11 as a prell.minaI7 to 

entering upon any negotiations with the French there should be reasonable assurance that the effects or improving their comnunication 

insecurity will not be nullified or diminished by physical ani personnel 

insecurity in the French Government." 

b. The British, howaver, have chosen to disassociate the problElll 

ot French physical and personnel inaecurity from the problem of Freneh 

COlll!lunieation insecurity, and simply do not mention the former at all in 

either Reference (a) or (b). 

CO!~: This is a fundamental difference in position between 

the U.K. and the U.S. am must be resolved before any progress is made 

by the Conference. 'This matter was oonsidered by the U.S. Subcommittee 

on Security and its report should be studied in this connection. It is 

tru t 2 of R f erence b ro ses no assistance to the French 

and~""'.""'."'~~~~~~~~~~~~~.,,..-~--=,....-.....,..~...,.......,....~~~~~....,I 

until they have agreed (1) to overhaul completely their cipher a,rra.ngementa and (2) to a.ccept the appointment or Britioh and/or u.sO/GX:perts 

to assist them; but these provisos by no me8Il21 add.Teas themeelvea to the 

.fundamental point at issue and do not answer tho point raised in the 

la.et sentence of Par. 3g of Reference (c). 

E.o 3 . 3 I h I I 2 I 

2. First Approach to the Franca: PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

a. 'lhe U.S. paper (Par. Jh of Reference (c)) states that the "bases 

for a successful approach to the Franch Government cannot ~t be indicated and should be established in the discussions at the u.s.-u.JC. 

Conference in Washington." However, Paro 6 of Enclosure B to the U.S. 

pa.per outlines in general such approach as might be f ea.sible and would 

be neceseaey, :tr the plan to discuss the COlfTh"T aecuri ty is carried 

out:" ••• it is apparent that a complete overhaul of the French Diplanatic 

and Uilitary cryptographic s tems and ractices would be necess 

This l'l'Ould involve not only 

~~ -. ·-1 ...... 

Enclosure to AFSA-OOT Enclosure 

l\'E?.'0 TO DIRAFSA, 26 Apr 51 

3 

ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY 

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Utmost secrecy is necessary to prev'· d'S:g (ftS s111flTal intelligence at its source. 

b. The British propose a first approach to the French at the 

hi~hest level an:l outline quite epecifically, in Par. 2 of Reference 

{b , the steps to be taken: · 

COMMENT: 't'!hile not differing in basic ideas as to necessity 

tor a complete overhaul of French diplomatic systems_, it will be noted 

that the British plan is already well-defined. and possibly too conEQ3.3(h)(2) crete, indicating some rigidity in British thinking on this point; the 

PL 86~36/50 USC 3605 U.S. plan still fluid. 

3. Details as to disclosures to be made technical a roach and 

gener considerations regarding e sting systems: 

Enclosure to AFSA-OOT 

l!El~O TO DIRAFSA, 26 Apr 51 4 Fnclosure 

ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. 

Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of v· al intelligence at its source. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EQ 3.3(h)(2) 

--"""'."":'---:--~~--.,....-___,.__,...--1\ vmereaa Reference (a) goes into this 

matter quite in detail, British anxiety about the matter being quite 

a.pparento It is possible that the U.S. paper fails to give sufficient 

consideration to the matter. 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 o. Both the U.S. am the U.K. agree in the deetirabillty of disI 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

closing a minimum amount of information I 

d. Reference (b) oes into coneiderable detail as to s ecitic 

weak practices in the 

paper is couched in more general terms and appears to me to give a 

much better overall picture of the situation. 

e. '!he U.K. paper dealing l'lith non-diplanatic systems (Reference 

(a)) is so long and involved that a detailed analTsia and comparison 

as to technical content 18 not possible in the time available. It 

is apparent that the British regard the problems ot improvement in 

this ephere as baing more difficult or solution, a.Di the schemes they 

propose appear to me to be too complicated, impractical, and not 

likel.7 to be accepted by the French. Before suggesting solutions, 

the U.K. pa.per (Reference (a)) sums up arguioonts am conclusions by 

stating (Par. 42): 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

e r .nder of this paper 

L...-~::n-T.:m!!'lff"'lSiri§""""fi.;;t'Esi'OO'loDinnffie'e assumption that the French are 

to be given thie.1 information." 

4. Conclusions: 

a. The conclusione in the U.K. papers (both References (a) and 

(b)) ecncern themselves mostly- with tech&'"'rl.cal details; those in the 

U.S. paper are much more general in character and, I believe, more to 

the point. 

b. One conclusion in Reference (b), that in Par. 16(i), is of 

interest: «Unless they Lf,he French diplomatic po~t!:/ are issued with 

British or American ma.chines, •• " onl.Jr hand systems vdll be available" 0 Evidently, the British have given no r;erious coneideration to 

u.s.-U.K .. providing the 1'rench vrlth the CCH or equivalent, far 

Enclosure to AFSA-OOT 

MEMO TO DIRAFSA, 26 Apr 51 5 Enclosure 

ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY 
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Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source. 

H. S. E'ffS ONlY 

diploma.tic use. Hence, the Britiah propoaals for the solution to the 

problem of what the French should use for diplomatic communicatione 

become quite complicated, involving considerations ae to types ot code 

books., subtractor eyateme, and their probable abuse, one-time pad 

aystema,, weaknesses of Fl-enoh imthods for generating the pads, lack 

ot peraonnel, etc. 

c. The foregoing differences in the U.S. and the U.K. papers 

point up the principal difference in the solutions proposed.. 'lbia is 

taken up in the next. paragraph. 

5. Recommendations as to systems to be ottered or reconmended to the 

Frem""li: 

a. Diplomatic: 

(1) '!he U.S. plan divides French diplomatic posts into three 

categories: 

Category I: a ama1l group of locations which handle 

the most important information; 

II II: all capitals not included in a plus a 

selected group or ir"porta.nt citiea; 

n III: all other diplanatic posts. 

For Category I, the CC~~ with Simplex settings is recamnended; tor II 

the :!.!-209 with special eettinga to be used with a special literal 

code; tor III, the present French s;rste.ma. In ths U.S. Plan, one-time 

pad syste.m.a would be ueed onl7 as an emergency atand-by for Category I, 

and their cumbersom.enesa is noted, lrl.th consequent comment as to its 

probable unacceptability to the French fer rapid communications. 

(2) 'lhe British plan (Par. 17 of Reference (b)) is "to put the 

major part of their /Jrenc'!.!7 important traffic on to one-time systems." 

lain centers and outstationa which would use the one-time systems are 

outlined - the set-up a.ppes.rs canplicated, and, moreover, it does 

not ''cater for" certain important traffic. In order to do so further 

complications are added. 

COMMENT: Tae U.S. plan is believed to be much more simple, 

si:ecific, and practical than the U.K. plan, which is not likely to be 

accepted b;y the French. The U.Ko is willing to offer only advice and 

technical assistance of experts; the u.s. is willing to offer all 

that and much more, viz., machines. : ,., 

~ .~ ~~ 'l r. ·~ ~: ;. ;}' i · 

Enclosure to mA...()(1! 

mil~O TO DIRAFSA, 26 Apr 51 6 Enclosure 

ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY 

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b. ]Jili"ta&: U. S. E'ffS ONLY 

(l) The U.S., plan divides the Armed Servioe comnunicat.ione 

into three similar categories: Category I (high-level) ror top-level 

military representativee of each nation of NATO; II (intermediate 

level) far French communications down to division level; and III for 

national milita.r;y communications below division. For I, the UoS• 

plan states that Dritish TY?EX i'dth Simplex systems i.a now being ueed 

and an adapted NATO CC1~ system ia proposed.; for II the CC?f is proposed; tor III, the r·-209 to encipher plain language (not code groupa 

as in the case of Cateeory II of the plan for the Diplomatic conrnunications) o 

(2) Neither Reference (a) nor Reterence {b) mentiona plana 

for NATO conmunicationa and thus the British have not coordinated 

their proposed solution with plane for security of NATO communicationso 

(3) 'lbe British propose a wider use of one-time pads, the 

placing of fixed naval cormiunications onto multi~ pa.de; and, by wayof modification of existing machine proceduros, the use of present 

machines but with double cnciphe:rment, uaine two mo.chines with different lug am pin settings; machine ayatema with underlying basic book 

instead o! plain language. Simplex settings with the &-211 are also 

considered, and improved procedures are mentioned. 

Cot!?:ENT: The British propose the use o.f one-time μids and the 

continued employment or present machines used by the French, with 

double encipherme.nt or Simplex settings. The U.S .. proposes the 

replacement of the French machines by CCM or adapted CCM. One-time 

pads are 6elieved b;y the U.S. to be too cumbersome for diplomatic and 

particularly for general military use. 

Enclosure to AFSA-OOT 

!F.!O 'ro TJIRAFSA, 26 Apr 51 7 F.nclosure 

ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY 

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