Docket No. 93370–Agenda 24–September 2002.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. JAMES E.  								RYAN, Petitioner, v. JOHN B. ROE et al., Respondents.

Opinion filed October 3, 122002.

	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:

	On July 30, 1998, the defendant, Jeremiah Pasewaldt, was

arrested and charged with predatory criminal sexual assault of a

child (see 720 ILCS 5/12–14.1(a)(1) (West 2000)) after he

attacked an 11-year-old girl in his garage. On June 8, 1999, the

defendant appeared in court to enter a guilty plea and receive a

recommended eight-year sentence pursuant to an agreement with

the State.

	The State offered, and the defendant acknowledged, a factual

basis for his guilty plea. In admonishing the defendant, the trial

judge told the defendant that the sentencing range for his offense,

a Class X felony, was 6 to 30 years. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(a)(2);

730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(3) (West 2000). The trial judge then asked

the State and the defense whether the truth-in-sentencing

provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections (see 730 ILCS

5/3–6–3(a)(2) (West 2000)) applied. The assistant State’s Attorney

did not believe that truth-in-sentencing applied to a 1998 offense.

The judge stated that, though the provisions were in effect, “the

question is whether the offense is covered.” The defendant’s

attorney was uncertain, offering, “I need to check that.” The judge

continued the defendant’s sentencing hearing to research this

issue. On June 21, 1999, the parties again appeared in court. The

trial judge addressed the defendant:

			“I have determined that truth in sentencing does not

apply to this case, so you’ll be entitled to your normal

good time credits, et cetera. I also have considered the fact

that both the [assistant] State’s Attorney and your lawyer

told me that they didn’t contemplate that it applies. That

means at the time that they entered into this agreement

relative to this sentence, they *** didn’t consider the fact

that truth in sentencing might apply. And I have written

on your sentencing order that it doesn’t apply.”

At the bottom of the sentencing order, the trial judge noted, “NOT

SUBJECT TO TRUTH IN SENTENCING.” The judge sentenced

the defendant to eight years’ imprisonment and payment of costs.

	On March 1, 2002, nearly three years later, the State filed a

motion for leave to file a mandamus complaint (see 188 Ill. 2d R. 381; Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(a)) seeking an amended

sentencing order without any language to indicate that truth-in-

sentencing should not apply. We granted this motion on March 14,

2002.

ANALYSIS

	Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy traditionally used to compel a public official to perform a purely ministerial duty. See Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 229 (1999); Madden v. Cronson, 114 Ill. 2d 504, 514 (1986). A writ of mandamus will be awarded only if a plaintiff establishes a clear, affirmative right to

relief, a clear duty of the public official to act, and a clear authority

in the public official to comply with the writ. See People ex rel. Waller v. McKoski, 195 Ill. 2d 393, 398 (2001). The sentencing provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections are mandatory, and

a mandamus complaint is a proper vehicle to force a trial judge to apply them. See People ex rel. Baker v. Cowlin, 154 Ill. 2d 193, 196 (1992), quoting People ex rel. Daley v. Limperis, 86 Ill. 2d 459, 466 (1981); see also People v. Watford, 294 Ill. App. 3d 462, 464 (1997) (a mandamus complaint is the proper means for a defendant to challenge the application of truth-in-sentencing

requirements). The sole issue before us is whether the trial judge’s

sentencing order comported with statutory, truth-in-sentencing

requirements.

	“Truth-in-sentencing” is a label applied to a change in the

statutory method the Illinois Department of Corrections uses to

calculate good-conduct credit. Under the Unified Code of

Corrections, an inmate normally receives day-for-day good-

conduct credit. See 730 ILCS 5/3–6–3(a)(2.1) (West 2000).

Section 3–6–3(a)(2)(ii) of the Unified Code, however,

unambiguously mandates that a defendant convicted of an

enumerated violent crime, including predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, “shall receive no more than 4.5 days of good

conduct credit for each month of his or her sentence of

imprisonment.” 730 ILCS 5/3–6–3(a)(2)(ii) (West 2000).1 That is, such a defendant must serve at least 85% of his or her sentence

and does not receive normal day-for-day good-conduct credit.

	Here, the defendant does not dispute this interpretation of the

statute, but he contends that the State is estopped from attempting

to modify a sentencing order which comports with the plea

agreement. We recognize the important role that plea-bargaining

plays in our criminal justice system. See generally Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978); People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996); People v. Boyt, 109 Ill. 2d 403, 416 (1985). This case, however, is not about a promise made

and broken by the State; it is about a sentence agreed to by the

parties, and imposed by the trial court, in violation of a statute.

	As the State correctly notes, a sentence which does not

conform to a statutory requirement is void and may be corrected

at any time. See People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995). Here, the trial court had no authority to order, and the State had no

authority to agree, that the defendant’s eight-year sentence was not

subject to truth-in-sentencing. See People v. Brown, 296 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1043 (1998) (mandatory supervised release requirements

may not be bargained-away by the State during plea negotiations).

Accordingly, we award the writ and order the Ogle County circuit

court to issue an amended sentencing order without language exempting the defendant from section 3–6–3(a)(2)(ii). Because the

trial judge who sentenced the defendant has retired, the writ is

issued to the court. See People ex rel. Barrett v. Sbarbaro, 386 Ill. 581, 593 (1944).

	Application of section 3–6–3(a)(ii) to an eight-year sentence

results in a prison term of at least 6.8 years. When the defendant

agreed to enter a guilty plea, however, he likely contemplated a

prison term of four years–eight years less day-for-day good-

conduct credit. The defendant does not intimate that he may have

gone to trial if faced with an additional 2.8 years’ imprisonment;

rather, he offers an alternative to minimize penal consequences of

granting mandamus relief. The defendant suggests that we use our supervisory authority to reduce his sentence to the minimum for a

Class X felony, six years, with truth-in-sentencing requirements to

apply. Assuming he receives the maximum good-conduct credit

allowed under section 3–6–3(a)(2)(ii), the defendant would serve

5.1 years. The State has no objection to this alternative, and we

find it to be an equitable solution because neither party

contemplated truth-in-sentencing requirements when negotiating

toward a guilty plea. Accordingly, under Supreme Court Rule

615(b)(4) (see 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4)), we reduce the defendant’s

sentence to six years’ imprisonment.

CONCLUSION	

	The Illinois truth-in-sentencing provisions of the Unified

Code of Corrections applied to the offense of which the defendant

was convicted, and the trial judge lacked the discretion to order

that the defendant was not subject to the Actprovisions. A writ of

mandamus is awarded to the State, and the Ogle County circuit court is ordered to issue an amended sentencing order. Further, in

the exercise of our supervisory authority pursuant to Supreme

Court Rule 615(b)(4), we reduce the defendant’s sentence to six

years’ imprisonment.

Writ awarded.