REF ID:A517797 

28 May 1953 

TOP SECRET~~ tANO-: 

D 'feP SB3flB:e 

COMMENTS ON POSITION PAPER SECURITY INFCEMATION 'Eb ~.3(h){2) 

Pl 86 ... 36150 USC 3605 'SECURITY INFORMATiON 

l.>The subject paper is noteworthy not so mucht'Ql' its convincing 

nature, a.s for itEj evidence of a completely crystalized and rigidj position. .__ ___ _. 

2. The portions dealing "W:1th mechan:i.Sm can be ignored at this time, 

since they are secondary to the ma:Ln question which is whether or not 

thi.s step should be taken~ 

3. It appears from.the p!,'lperas a whole that the U.K. is convinced: 

A. That the insecurity o~ I is of more 

value to Russia than the r .... e_s_ul,,...t,...a....,n...,.·~,...--__,.l..,..i_s_t,...o ..... ~thLJ and 

u.s. 

•~ That Russia could obtain the inf'ormation l k I by no 

other means. 

C. =t this requires that we uneguivocal·· .. ly sacrifice a.11 I ~ I "(probably forever)" without further 

delay. 

4. Point 3':\ above is elaborated upon at length in Appendix A, in 

a tmrVey s.omewhat similar to that pre.pared by the Adl!oc. Cammi ttee of USCIB. 

The surveys are different in that theirs is based primarily 01 I 

products and ours oz:r--1 products, and in the lack of any spec fie span of 

time in ther--1 s~ereas the U.S. study covered a six month period. 

Exa.mination~ited examples reveals that their selection is considerably 

less rigid in terms of what is damaging. I think it probabl~ that examination of the complete texts vould reveal many instances of messages which 

sound serious in the extract but are rather trivial in the whole. Some 

are highly questionable even from the extract, as for example: 

Annexure 2 item 4c 

4d 

4e 

4f' 

.5b 

5c (30 Jan 53'·) 6b 

6d 

Annexure 4 item 4c 

Annexure 6 item 4c 

Annexure 7 item 3b 

Nevertheless there is no doubt that a gua.ntitat~vely small but 

nevertheless real leakage of intelligence is ta.king place. With respect to 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-12-2014 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 

TOP SECREl .CANOC 

U.S. EVES o~iv 
~~8,3(h)(2) REF ID: ASl 7797 

Pt?~6~36/q0 USC 3605 TOP SECRET CANOE 

u.s~ EYES ONLY ~~RM INFORMATION 

SECURITY INFORMAT~ON .__------------······ ...... ···. I goes< B•O far as "to sta~ that the amount is 

small. In thiel apd in<tb.e ~ppraisal .or poteritifll, thel I are 

essentially agiieed. The divergences are in estima.tes or degree. 

5. Point 3B is\ the <i'μndarileptal guestionma.rk in thel I 

This statement :me.de nth®t>CJU!i.lification or f'urther connnent in any form 

represents an aissumption rather tha.n a fact. This . assumption runs counter 

to the known: 

!• Coxmnunist\ infiltration\ofOand otherLJnations. 

!?.•. Elaborate \public \pr~ss and:.' radio reporting of al~ I 

na.[tions - particula.rl~••· the. U .s. 

c. Recent oral. renort \.b ·~.~ \ < > J , 6. Point 3B is essential tohe u.t~ position,, sinceess it is 

very nearly true, the course of action which tb.~ I insists upon would 

mean that Po1nt3C would 'be a burnt offering to an unresponsive deity. 

In j~d1t1on if ~···· c is :::true·· .. to the ex·· .. tent·· .. that ·· .. our at·· .. tempts to inform the_ _ ~I in\ their turn, we would hand the USSR a picture 

of our own cryp ograp c ( anQ, by inference, cryptanalytic) a.bili ties. 

7. The futlda.mental problem is not ~nswered by the I I papa-. 

It remains a cold fact that someone witllpie\requis:l..te authority must make 

a command decision iri which only part of the\factors\are known, a few can 

be guessed at and the remainder are hidden in\the future: 

a. ~ Known 

\..Infer - They are also l._ ___ __.I against the USSR 

.,.__ ____ ___,... __ ___,~J ..... _ ___.,... _ _.lto.us 

rnOWD b. 

Infer 

r c. 

Inf er 

d. town 

Inter 

.. The quantitative leakage is not dramatic as of now 

- It could grow worse - particularly in.war 

- Western open sources leave relatively l.ittle work for 

USSR intelligence as of now 

- We might not cut off much intelligence byj ciphers ....__ ______ _ 

-USSR espionage of all types is very widespread and quite 

effective 

have disclosed 

- • We might not accomplish much and might/--. a fair amount 

e. dominant importance 

{

Known -.__ __________ __.is of value to us if not of 

Infer - Who can judge its value to USSR? 

TOP SECRET CA~,'~t:.E 

U.S. EVES ONLY 
,,, 

,, 

" 

REF ID:A517797 

U.S~ EVES ·oNL\' 

? - Will one or more I .... ____ __.I go comm:unist? .. /J 

I I ~-~~~~~~ 

1 - Will at least the elemen*s of existing crJl>togi-e.phy rems.in 

it they were rorc•d 1nt~ I 

? - Will we then want to read them? 

? - Will we one day get intelligence vitaJ. to us in our position as leader of the Western block? / Will we perhaps 

get warning of defectiont 

8. In one sense the die.. is c.• ast •. ·• All we can.· do··· is controQ: ... the s d 

II we set in motion an inev1 tablel ~ /~/ This process be 

of the ..... ntuaJ. l.OBS • liben IKIClern ~ft& 1!U'e ~ t and 

~tively slow. We can accelerate ~ s or let Q$. ~ure take 1 ts course. 

The decj.a1on must weigh the possible gain against the accelerated loss. 

a. One final thought: If we are going/to do anything more at 

this moment, let .us improve the C.ONSF.C lnJ..y:/of those of our 

r----lpartners of whose constancy/1.;e fee more or less certain 

~1hose COMSEC needs itnprovement. For/example: I I 

L. E.• SHINN 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

tOP SE:eREl 'CANOE 

U.S~ EYES ONl:v' 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 
. \ 

REF·ID:A517797 

TOP SECRET €ANOE ~~n . .1. 

Thia document ia to be read only by tl!oee penonnel ofticially ind~rina~ in a~rdance with com• munieation lntellitence .. curity resulationa and authorised to receive the 1nformat1on reported herein. 

. q'OP 1 5GHLH1 · 

cmrn~HTS m.Qp1)SITION PAPE!1 SECUHITY n:Fomu~ri'l(] 

1. The subject paper is noteworthy not so much for its ronvincincr, 

nature, as for its evidencP. of a cC1mpletely crystallzed and r1c;irll 

position. · ----

2. The portions dea.L.ng w1 th mechanlf!m ca.n be ignored et thia tJ.HV' / 

since they a.re secondary to the ma.in question which is wheth<?r o~ not 

this step should be ta.ken. --···--....... :,. .. ~ .. ·· --·-.. --.~-·-.. -·. -' ----.......... ~.... . 

3. tt appears f'rnm the paper as a whole the.t the U.K. is convinc.l~d: 

A. That the ~ nsecuri ty of I lm1smuof' more E:'o 3.3(h)(2) 

va.l\le to Russ~ a tJlan ·'ihe re_s_ul=-t-:-a.-n--=-t .... l ___ li~a-:--=-t-o-t·nc=J ~tid PL 86-36/so use 36C 

u.s. 

· J. 'l'ho.t Russ ta could dbtri.in the intormat:Lon t. ·c: ~:.·)'t by no 1 other mee.ns. 

C. That this requires thtyt we unegy.ivc:)cru.ly sa.cri f.ice all ....___ ________ ___, n (pre"''be.bly forever)" wi tbout :f'Urther 

delay. 

4. Point 3A above is el~bor~te.io upon at leneth in Appendix A, :tn 

a survey somewhat simila.r/totbat prepared by the Ad.Hoc Committee of USCIB. 

The surveys a.re dif'fer(!nt /in that theirs is be.sed prirna.rily/on ~ 

.. products and ours 9nll products, a.nc1. in the lack ·of any s.pecific spn.n of 

time in.the! lstuay--whereas the U.S. study covered a s1.x month period. 

Exa.m:nation of cited examples revee..lo that their selection is cmwiderably 

less rigid in terms of what is da.maeing. I think it probabl~ that exnmino.-. 

tion of the complete texts would reveal many instancesiof inessa.e;es whieh 

sound serious in the extract but are rather trivial in the whole. Some 

are highly questionable even from the extract, as for example : 

Annexure 2 item 4c 

4d 

4e 4r 

5b 

5c (30 Ja.n 53'·) 6b 

·6d 

Annexure 4 item 4c 

Annexure 6 item 4c 

Annexure 7 item 3b 

!·~r~vcrthcless there is no rloubt that a quantitatively small but 

,neyertheless r~o.1 leakage of int.ell.i.c;~nce is taking place. With respect t" 

Forrn/ll~osc TOP SECRET CANOE 
. ~(i) 3.~(h)(2) . REF ID : AS 177 9 7 

· · .. R\L;~§:.:aqtsousc 36os""'"-IT ............. 011"'"'1Pl::#---'S~E ....... C .......... R,,_E~Tl-'---1C~A~N...........,01--1E1+- 'fhill document ill to be read only by thoee per10Dnel oftlclally Indoctrinated In accordance with com• municl!tlon intel1l1ence aecurity regulation• and autborhred to receive the Information reported herein. 

rJ:'OP fH~GJ"fl Jfe 

l I e~~ so fa.r ne to state tho.t the ammmf: ..... -. s-m-aJ."""· .--1-.-.. =1-n_t..,...h,...i.,..s-... -o.-n"""d,.......,.i_n.....,...th,...e-·· ... --~ppra.isal of po~ntial, tlleJ 

ifl 

a.re 

essentialiy agreed. The diverg~nces a.re in estimates"""o""""f ......... d ..... e_er_e_e-. __. 

;. Point 3B is the fl.lndamente.1 qu~stionmark in th~ I 

Thie ste.ternent madenthoutqualifice.tion~~ further comment in nny form 

ro~e~~ <;~~~~~~ ::;wr t~n " fact. ~:~ :••'"'Ption ~no counter 

a. Cormnuniet infiltration o:rLJ a~d othe~ ···· ... !nations. 

b., Ela.borate pfiblic presti e.nct·ra.dio reporting of ai~ nations - particularly the U.S. ___ _. 

c. Recent oral re:Port by 

6. Point 3'B is essential to ~..r-~-~----,...,s,.....,.,n--c...,..e-un""""ess it is 

very\nearly true,\ the course o:i.'action which th insists upon would 

meEt:n that\Point 30\would bee.burnt offering to esponsive deity. 

In \r= ... <H··. tio··. p··. if :q is ·· .. untrue to\th·· .. e E!xtent that our·· .. attempts to inform the_ \ \ \ _Jlee.k.ed in thei:r t~, we would hand the USSR a. picture 

of our \.OW!l cryp ograpl:Uc ( anc\ by infer~nce, cryptanalytic) abilities. ~ . . 

7. \\ The \fundamental problem is\not flDswered by thel I papa-. 

It re•ina t1. eold fe.~t that someone WithtJlerequieite authority must inake 

a command decision in which only part of the factors are known, a few can 

be guessed at a.nd the remainder are· hidden in the future: 

~\\Known\ .l.._ ________ .... lare\I ..... __ __.I to us 

a. • ·.. .. . l. ..Inf'er .. They are also .... l ____ ... lae;ainet theUSSR 

b, {;~ :\::·.::::i:::~:.:::t~:• of now. 

{.\'···· ... \\·· ... ~te .. ~~t~~~=c:: ~~a~~ relatively little work .... f-or __ 

l,tnf'er • We might not cut off much intelligence by eecurin~.....,.-- 1 ·.. I 

o. 

( Known - USSR espionage of all types is very Widespread and quit1t 

\ ef'fecti ve 

d. 4' hll.ve disclosed l Infer "' We might not accanplish much and migbt/t:ian e. fair amount o~ 

\ Known -I :\ lia of value to ue i:t not or 

a. .) acmu:nau 1mpox uance 

~Inter • Who can ~Udp it• value to USSR? 

r-,7!,1~osc TOP SECRET CANOE 
TOP REF ID:A517797 

SECRET CANOE 

Tlala document la to be r•d only by tbOft .-.onael oftlelally indoctrinated In llOCOl'danee with com• mwiication l11telll1e11ee ••C11rity regulatlona and authorbred to receive the information reported hereha. 

'f 01' ~CI~li"f' 

BEClnUTY :nwo11 ·' '1,'T( · 

. Qvmrt 'Z - Will one or more I ... ____ ___,I go communist'ZI .__ ___ __.I ....__ _____ ___, 

!I. 

ii 

" 

I 

·1 - Will e.t least the elements of existing cryptoc;ro.phy rc·~,i:tn 

if' they were forced intol I 

'l - Will we then want to read tb.em'l 

? - Will w one \day set intelligence vital to us in ou-r poci." 

tion e.11 lead.er at the Wea~rn bloak'l / Will we perb.n..pFi . get warning ot detection2 

\ 

/ · · 8. In one sense the die is cast. All we oan ~o is control the s-.::~'.cil 

... a·· eventual. ioss. Wben IDO<\ern devtoii• ,~: sijnl I by t.h.~ I "·'"1 

:· · we set in motion an inevitable loss of /This process will 1.~~: 

· . · :tvely slow. We can acceletate. this or e Ill,\ ure take its cour:c:~. 

The decision must weigh the possible ga.:i,n 8.gainst the accelerated lolg~. 

.,-,,ltif 

a. One fim'll thow;ht: If ~-:r~ mrc ~:oinc~ /to c1.o nnythin:; um.·o :. t. 

this mo:ncnt, let no ;:.1'1:irove til10 consrw rin.1.~p.of tho~;o 0.t c11 11: 

I loi' whor.n conotoncy .'1-re fee!"iiore or loos c,,.;;: V·:i .. 1 

and t~ho~C3 COI-tSEC naads imm·mrement. For. axr.m.pla:'I ... ___ __. 

,' ' 

L. 1~. SHDJN 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

• 

F- 111-<10SC 

1 Jul 51 TOP SECRET CANOE