IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-20275

Summary Calendar

GEORGE O. RILEY; TRENA LEEANN RILEY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; CRESTMARK MORTGAGE COMPANY, 

LIMITED; BARRETT DAFFIN FRAPPIER TURNER & ENGEL, L.L.P.,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:13-CV-608

Before KING, SMITH, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In 2011, George and Trena Riley executed a mortgage loan modification 

agreement with Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) for their home in 

Houston. In 2012, Wells Fargo sought to foreclose on the property because the 

Rileys stopped making payments. The Rileys filed suit to halt the foreclosure 

(Riley I), but the case was dismissed without prejudice. Soon thereafter, the 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 14, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 19-20275

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Rileys filed a second suit (Riley II) to halt another attempt by Wells Fargo to 

foreclose. The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss in 

2014, and the Rileys failed to appeal. 

After Wells Fargo successfully foreclosed on the Rileys’ property in 2015, 

they filed a third suit (Riley III). The Rileys alleged that the assignments of 

the mortgage note to Wells Fargo and eventual foreclosure were executed 

through fraud, thereby depriving Wells Fargo of the standing to foreclose.

After the defendants moved to dismiss the suit, the Rileys moved to void the 

judgment in Riley II pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. They

argued in pertinent part that Wells Fargo committed fraud on the district court

by filing fraudulent documents to foreclose on the Rileys’ property. The district 

court granted the motions to dismiss, and it denied the Rileys’ motion to void 

the judgment in Riley II because only the court presiding over Riley II could 

void the judgment. 

The Rileys appealed, and this court affirmed the district court’s 

judgment, holding in relevant part that regardless of whether the Riley III

court had the power to void the Riley II judgment, “[t]he alleged manufacturing 

and forgery of documents by the defendants does not amount to fraud on the 

court within the meaning of [Rule 60(d)(3)].” Riley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 

715 F. App’x 413, 414 (5th Cir. 2018).

In 2019, the Rileys, acting pro se, returned to Riley II and sought various 

forms of relief. In pertinent part, the Rileys sought relief from the Riley II 

judgment under Rule 60(b) and Rule 60(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. They argued that Wells Fargo filed fraudulent documents with the 

assistance of legal counsel to foreclose on their property. 

The district court denied the motion because it was untimely. The Rileys 

filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied, finding that 

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the Rileys “briefed no legal arguments, nor did they produce any new evidence 

that would persuade the Court to reconsider its previous Order.” The Rileys 

timely filed a notice of appeal for the denial of the motion for relief from 

judgment in Riley II and the motion to reconsider. However, on appeal, they

do not brief arguments regarding the denial of their motion to reconsider and 

thus abandoned it as an issue before this court. See Mapes v. Bishop, 541 F.3d 

582, 584 (5th Cir. 2008). They also purported to file a notice of appeal for the 

underlying 2014 dismissal in Riley II. 

On appeal, the Rileys, acting pro se, primarily argue that the district 

court abused its discretion by denying their Rule 60(d)(3) motion for relief from 

the 2014 judgment because Wells Fargo’s actions constituted fraud on the 

court. Specifically, Wells Fargo “misled the court and the [Rileys] to believe 

that Wells Fargo had indeed purchased the [Rileys’] mortgage note in August 

2009 . . . by filing both the mortgage note with the now voided endorsement 

they knew then to be false along with an assignment of mortgage.” 

This court reviews the denial of a Rule 60(d)(3) motion for abuse of 

discretion. Rodriguez v. Bank of Am., N.A., 693 F. App’x 376, 377 (5th Cir. 

2017). The allegedly inauthentic documents cited by the Rileys were the basis 

of the claims already adjudicated in Riley II. Rather than establishing proof of 

fraud on the court, the Rileys are rehashing their substantive claims regarding 

the lawfulness of the foreclosure proceeding, which this court has already held 

did not constitute fraud on the court. Riley, 715 F. App’x at 414 (citing 

Tu Nguyen v. Bank of Am., N.A., 516 F. App’x 332, 335 (5th Cir. 2013)). Thus, 

the district court did not abuse its discretion on this issue. 

Although unclear, it appears that the Rileys’ second issue on appeal 

relates to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3), which allows a court to 

grant relief from a final judgment due to fraud, misrepresentation, or 

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misconduct by an opposing party. They argue that the foreclosure judgment 

in favor of Wells Fargo was based on fraudulent evidence. Generally, this court 

reviews denials of relief under Rule 60(b)(3) for abuse of discretion. See Lowry 

Dev., L.L.C. v. Groves & Assocs. Ins., Inc., 690 F.3d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 2012). 

A party seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(3) must do so within a year after the 

entry of judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1). The district court entered the final 

judgment in Riley II in 2014. Therefore, the Rileys’ motion under Rule 60(b)(3) 

is untimely, and the district court did not abuse its discretion. FED. R. CIV.

P. 60(c)(1). 

The Rileys’ third and final argument on appeal is that their attorney’s 

“abandonment” during the first round of litigation of Riley II permits them to 

appeal the district court’s 2014 dismissal now. This court does not have the 

power to grant an equitable exception to the jurisdictional requirement that 

the Rileys had to file their notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of 

judgment, even when there has been an allegation of attorney abandonment. 

See Perez v. Stephens, 784 F.3d 276, 284 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2107 

and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4). Therefore, this court does not have 

the jurisdiction to review that issue. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court denying the Rileys’ motion 

for relief from the Riley II judgment is AFFIRMED. 

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