REF ID:A517089 

'f()P SECRET CANOT1 

Tbll d-t la "" oe read onl:r b:r tboae pef'!IODD411 oftl.cl.Ur indoctrinated In aceor-...D.ee with eo- municatlon lntellipnoe .aurlt:r rerUJatlom iand autborised tO receive the Information reported herelJI. 

SUBJECT NUMBFli 

AFSAC: 63/65· Item 2 ot the Agenda for the Thirty ... eighth 

Meeting of AFSAC, held on 20 June 19520 

FINAL 

Subject: U.Ko/u•So Communication Security Conference, 19520 

(AFSAC 63/63) 

The CHAIRMAN introduced the second item by stating that the _Paper 

under consideration (AFSAC 63/63) was a genera.1 report of the UK/US 

Communication Securil;y Conference, 1952, exclusive of the technical 

papers of the Confercmce. He then invited attention to paragraphs 9a 

through 9d which set forth the crypto systems which were to be offered 

for NATO adoption., He stated that the subpara. :ra:ha in questior. con= 

tained, in addition to security implications,!_ _ implications that should be care:fully weighed......,,,,;y"""""'T.,.,,F' .... SAr"'JC..-0-----------' 

e British dolega.tion to the subject Coni"ererics was acting under 

these instructions in making such recommendations in the Confer-.ice 

reporto In view Ol~ • e ded, it appeared advisable that the 

question of whethe s foremost to the interests ot 

the U.S. should be reso ve e appropriate US authorities. /Toward 

this end, he suggested that the question be forwarded to USClBifor 

forwarding to the National Security Council for resolutiono 

The other aspect ot the problem,··. the CHAIRHA?J continue(!, concerned 

the siirila.rity between Circuit Mercur;y and CSP 2900., He s.t.ated that 

Circuit Mercury was analogous to and .-uperior to the CSP .2900, and that 9 

although CSP 2900 bad been held as a strictly national system, approval 

or the Contermce report would constitute• a recommendation that a system 

superior to the CSP 2900 be released to all the NATO nations even though, 

under present UoSo polioy, CSP 2900 could not be rel~ased, even to the 

Britisbo 

The CHAIRMAN concluded by saying t.ha.t it had/been known for some 

time that the British were well aware of• the existence and capabilities 

ot the CSP 29000 He added that it theretore would be extremely unrealistic to continue to withhold CSP 2900 b'an them tor the reason that 

we did not want to divulge the ECM princ>iple. // He also said that he bad 

requeated of Mro Burt.an Killer that C~uit Mercury not. be incl.uded in 

the list ot systems proposed. tor NATO \lse, tut that the British had been 

insistent in including ito Hia agreement to the Conference report, be 

stated, had bee ma.de nevertheless, lmowillg that the report would net 

become final until it had been approved by the JCSo 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 AFSAC: 63/65 

COPY# __ _ 

ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY Fo~= ~~t-;iosc TOP SECRET Cf1NOE 

-------il-'eclassified and approved for release by NSA on 03-14-2014 pursuant to E.O. 

3526 
, . 

AFSAC: 

REF I~~\70~ FJP SECRE 1 tttr~u/P) Tb1a doeument la~ oe rm.cl only by thoae penonnel olllelally Indoctrinated in aceo1...noe with com- munication lntelll&ence 88CW'ity leplatlona and authorised to reoeive the information reported herein. 

63/65 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL86-36/5o us~ 39os 

The CHAIRMAN then requested the views ot the members. 

The CHAIRMAN replied that he had singled out Mercury bec.ause it 

was tied in with the CSP 2900 problemo He pointed out that the UoSo 

had al.ready released the AFSAM 7 and AFSAM 47 tor NATO uae and added 

that the probl,.. involTed the overall implicationaf : ?ather 

than MBRCURY alone. He also exprersed the persona opirii t t Communication Security should precede onsiderations. 

GENERAL WFF referred to the U.S. policy that the best Crypto 

principal be reserved exclusive]¥ tor U.S. uaa and inquired what such 

a 87Btem would beo 

Arter a brief discussion or the principles or the CSP 2900 and 

Circuit Mercury by Mro Friedman, the CHAIRMAN commented that CSP 2900 

w-as not the best system. He added that the Navy had t.he CSP 2300, a. 

modification of the CSP 2900, which was superior to the 2900. 

CAPTAIN HOWETH stated that the decision to reserve the CSP 2900 

had been made after the 1951 COMS.00 Conference when there were insufficient quantities or the CSP 2300 to consider it as a system. 

A brief discuseion of the various systems followed and Kt-. ~Ji 

pointed out some facts which further established the point that the 

British are fully inf'onned on the principles of the .1!.CM and, in addition, 

have some lmowledge of the CSP 2900. 

CAPTAm HOVil::.""IH expressed the opinion that the original reason for 

withholding one system for exclusive U.So uoe was the possibility that 

at some time the British Commonwealth migh\; col.lapse~ 

ADMIRAL walGER confirmed. that such a possibility had bee considered 

and added that the consideration ot nexibility alluded to by the Chairman 

was also among the other reasons !or withholding an exelusj.ve UoSo system0 

CAPTAIN HOWETH inquired if MERCURI could be made compatible with 

CSP 29000 

MR. FRIEDMAN commented that it probably could not o 

AFSAC: 6'J/6S 

COPY# __ _ 

ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY FORM 781-C10SC 

18 JUL 51 TOP SECRET CANOE 
• • 

.,-

~...f .... ~=MlJ.PAi f-9P SEtttn 1 tht~vr) Thl8 doeument ill i.. ,;e read only by thme penonnel ofticlally indoctrinated in aeeor .... IJ.C8 with eom- mllllicatlon Intelligence oeeurity reculatiollll and authorised to receive the information reported herein. 

AFSAC: 63/65 

CAPTAIN HOWETH inquired if there was still security to be gained 

by maintaining the CSP 2900 exclusive]¥ as a U.So syatemo 

The CHAIRMAN replied that the expr:wrts assured him that the security 

or the machine was dependent upon the security of the key lists and 

l"Otoreo 

CAPTAIN HOWETH stated that he had never been able to accept that 

opinion. 

The CHAIRMAN also stated that, against kncnm exhaustion attacks, 

the CSP 2900 was secureo He added that he was not in favor or giving 

the CSP 2900 to NATO although it could be offered for high level 

Combmed useo He also stated that 200 ma.chines 11rould be required for 

high level Combined communications and 1000 tor general Combined 

communications and added that since we did not have sufficient 

quantities to solve the NATO problem, there was nothing to gain in 

discussing that problem at the present time .. " EO 3~3(h)(2) 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-P-l~,6-36/50USC3605 

The CHAIRMAN agreed that it was not possible 9 

CAPTAIN HOWE.TH expressed the opinion thatr--lwould not dry' 

up completely but that it would be materially ~ i He added \that 

The CHAIRMAN commented that the MATO requirements tor cliplamatic 

communication• voul.d;c bicant.. He then stressed the implications of the problem .· d expressed the opinion that the 

other intelligence peop e o were not represented here should have 

an opportunity to express an opinion in the mattero 'i'he other 

aspect of the problem, he stated, was atrictl,y the concern• of the 

SerY'icea and the Joint Chiefs of Statf o 

The CHAIRMAN restated the issue by ~ing the releaa• of a bighl,y 

secure system to NATO would enable the NATO countries to improve the 

security of all of their communicationso In addition, because o! 

laxness or .security in NATO countries, potential opponent• and non..HATO 

nations would soon obtain laiowledge of these systems and thereby increase 

the security of their com.unications. 'l'he end reeu1t, he stated, would 

be to materially reduce the quantity....__ _______ __, 

AFSACz 63/65 

COPY# __ _ 

ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY Fo~ j~t-;~osc TOP SECRET CANOE 
REF ID:A517089 ~p SE~---~ ~. - T-p ttt:h 1 tf\:i"'JU1 

Thia doeumeat i. •. J8 read oaly by tha. penoaael olftclally Indoctrinated In &CC0•--""8 with oom- 1DUDicatlon lntelllaence lleCllrity fetriilatloaa and authorized to receive the information reported harala. 

,/Eo 3.3(h)(2) AFSAC: 63/65 PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

MR. FRIEDMAN expressed ar,io~her reasc>n f Qr advising USCIB of the 

an problem. ext:.remely He expensive stated·····t· hj·t···•···i···t···· / /> T. evelopment be po.·s·····sible·· program, ... \ ·.t .. or the to devise U.S., through rapid 

analytical machinery.that>wo d enable the u.s. to come out on top 

ot the game, pure~ byvirtue 0£ physical resources. He added that 

the members of USCIB: should be thinking in terms 0£ such an eventuality 

ifl // / rere to be maintain-10 

)llill~ SAHFORD made a motion th··· at the qu· .. est· .. ion of whether COMSW I J _ as foremost to the interests of the U c1S. be forwarded, via 

US llf,to the National Security Council tor re.solution. 

Thie was agreed. 

ADMIRAL AMMON propoaed that the second aspect or the problem 

conceming the report of the UK/US COMSEC Conferenc• and the release 

of circuit Mercury to NATO be referred to an ad. hoc \committee £or study 

and recommendation. 

CAPTAm HOWETH added that the ad hoc group should also consider 

the implications of ·the possible release of CSP 2900 to the British 

for Combined use. · 

This was agreeda 

It was also agreed that the Chairman, AFSAC,, • •.. wouid 11.ppriae the 

Joint. Chiefs ot Staff that the problem of whether·· .• COMSEC I Jwas 

foremost to the interests of the u.s. had been forwarded t.o the NS tor 

reaolutiono 

'lbe CHAIRMAN ealled thet ti.rat. meeting or the ad hoc committee for 

1330 on TUeeda.y, 24 June 1952, in Room 19-125 Naval Security Station, 

and requested that the composition ot the ad hoc committee be limited 

to one manber from each Service and one from AFSAo 

DF.CISION: (20 .lune 1952) .AFSAC agreed: 

(1) to forward to the N.s.c. tor adjudication, Yi.a USCIB, the 

question ot whether Communication Securit7I I p.e torwt to tbe interests o...,t.....,...th... e---...U"""'.s .... o-----' 

(2) that the Chai.~, AFSAC, would apprise the Joint Chiefs of 

Btatt ot the f orego.ing decisiono 

AFSAC: 63/65 

ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY 

-7-

FORM 781-ClOSC 

18 JUL 51 

COPY# __ _ 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
REF ID:A5;17089 7")P SECRET cAi~O~ Thlll document la td"'l>e read only by thme penonnel oftlelally Indoctrinated in accorda:.ce witb com- munication intelligenc:e aecurity "'rulationa and authorised to receive the information reported herein. 

AFSAC: 6.3/6') 

(3) the.t an ad hoc committee be formed to study the implication& 

of para 9d or the report of the UK/US COMSW Conference 

(AFSAC 63/63) which recommended the release of circuit 

Mercury t,o NATO, and to study the question of the release ot 

the CSP 2900 to the British,, .for purely Combined. use, as an 

interim solution to the replacement of the CCM. 

It was also agreed that the first meet.mg or the ad hoc committee would be held at 13.30 on Tuesday, 24 Jmie 1952, in 

Roan 19=125, NavSecSta, and that the composition would be 

limited to one member from each Service and one member from 

AFSAo 

This item to be continued on the agenda. 

AFSAC: 6'J/6S 

COPY# __ _ 

ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY Fo~: ~~t-g~osc TOP SECRET CANOE