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USCIB: 13.5/42 

8 March 1954 

V.il!MORANDUM FOR THE M]MBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

Security of COMINT Transmitted by Electrical Means. 

{a) USCIB 13.5/36 of 8 February 1954. 

(b) USCIB 13.5/40 of 23 February 1954. 

1. Reference (a) was circulated to the members of the Executive 

Committee on vote sheet. Reference (b) indicated a divergence of views 

with regard to reference (a). 

2. At its Twelfth Meeting on 4 March 1954, USCIBEC considered 

the references and approved. a compromise version of the "Proposed 

Security Requirements for Transmission of CClUNT by Electrical Means" 

as set forth in the enclosure hereto. In order to clarify the changes 

agreed emendations to the enclosure with reference (a) are shown by 

employing dashes through proposed deletions and by underlining proposed 

fl.dditions. 

3. In accordance with paragraph 11 of USCIB Directive Number 1 

absence of objection to the enclosure herewith by 1700, Wednesday, 17 March 1954, will be considered to constitute Board approval. 

Enclosure 

a/s 

USCIB: 13.5/42 

ptain, U. S. Navy 

Executive Secretary, USCIB 

SECRET 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-18-2014 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 

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SECURITY REQUIRl!MFNTS FOR TRANSMISSION 

OF C@INT BY ELECTRICAL MEANS 

1. Because of the great number of different operational situations, 

it is not possible to establish a f inn ~et of detailed rules for handling 

COMINT information by electrical means which will be applicable in all 

ci:rcumstances or which wi.11 always guarantee security. It is possible, 

however, to state certain precepts and objectives which must be diligently pursued in order to maintain security and upon which detailed 

rules,* promulgated as circumstances require, must be based. The following paragraphs summaJ;"ize the princ;iples and describe briefly the method 

of achieving the objectives. 

2. Cryptographic and communications plans must be considered in the 

early stages of planning for any new acti v:i.ty in the CCJtlINT field in 

order to insure adequate cryptographic and transmission security. 

Experience shows that when plans for the establishment of a new unit have 

been .finalized without any consideration having been given to communication requirements and their security aspect~, resultant insecurities are 

often irreparable. Departments and agencies wil:l- !!:!. therefore urged to 

submit communication portions of plans for new COMINT activities to 

Director, NSA, for approval of the communication security aspects thereof 

before placing them in effect. During the preparation of these plans, 

the Director, NSA, will provide such assistance as may be requested. 

3. It is desirable t9 avoid to the maximum practicable extent all 

external message characteristics which .facilitate traffic analysis 

identification of traffic as a. COMINT end product inasmuch as the transmission characteristics of traffic so identified is indicative of the 

effort expended or the success achieved by COMINT producers. Where poss~ble, all evidences of direct communications between and direct 

cryptographic association of dissemination-consumer activities and 

collection-fozwarding activities should be avoided. Where direct electrical communications are essential, appropriate steps should be taken 

to disguise the linkage. Cryptosystems identified exclusively with the 

collection-forwarding activities should not be held by disseminationconsumer activities. The Director, NSA, should b~ consulted in the 

selection of specific cryptosystems and the formulation or special cover 

procedures to be employed for direct electrical communications between 

collection-forwarding activities and dissemination-consumer activities. 

4. CCMINT communication operating methods and procedures will 

conform with those normally employed by the department or agency concerned. 

* Detailed rules have been promulgated. to elements under the operationa1 

or technical control of the Director, NSA, in accordance with paragraph 

2!_(4), NSCID No. 9 (Revised.). Detailed rules to apply to all other CCMINT 

coIIDD.unications will be promulgated by the Director, NSA, at an early date. 

Enclosure with USCIB 13.5/42 dtd 8 Mar 1954. 

SEC REP 
... . . ~ • 

Where military facilities are employed for transmission, approved military 

procedures will be employed. Wherever exceptions or modifications to 

operating procedures are required because of the nature of COMINT communications, they will be authorized by Director, NSA, e:e-:e:eeesee:~ or by 

appeal to USCIB if necessary. 

5. COMINT activities of an especially covert nature (e.g., those 

whose existence ~s considered sensitive because of geographical location 

or for political reasons) must not be issued cryptographic systems which 

are identified with other COMINT activities of a less covert nature, 

unless adequate provision is made for disguising traffic in such systems 

while in transmission. A special purpose system not ident;i.fiable by 

traffic analysis as an exclusively CCMINT cryptosystem. should be used and 

the external routing of messages should avoid overt association with other 

COMINT activities. Special systems and procedures will be provided by the 

Director, NSA, as necessary to meet requirements expressed by other 

agencies and departments. 

6. Access to CCMINT information in encrypted form can be effectively 

controlled only if COMINT information is transmitted in cryptosystem.s 

specifically authorized for such use. This authorization will be provided 

by the Director, NSA, upon request from agencies and departments. 

7. Keying material used for COMINT information will be issued only 

to those persons and activities authorized access to COMINT. Keying 

material used for COMINT will not be used for non-COl~INT information 

except in emePgeB~ unusual conditions &P-a&-a:~~Pe¥e&-ey-~he-~~Pee~&P;-»8A. 

It should be noted that logistical and administrative messages pertaining 

directly to the support of a COMINT activity mlie~ may be considered COMINT 

information. 

8. Only those operating instructions, keying materials, and other 

crypto-aids prepared or approved by the Director, NSA, are authorized for 

use in encrypting CCMINT information. 

9. Programs and facilities for training personnel in c:ryptographic 

operations, maintenance, and other COMSEC specialties, adequate to insure 

maxim.um possible proficiency must be maintained and kept under continuing 

review by agencies and departments. Procedures must be established to 

insure that only those individuals with proper training are permitted to 

operate cryptosystems or maintain cryptosecurity equipment. Technical 

guidance and support for CCJIBEC training will be provided by the Director, 

NSA. 

10. Training editions of cryptosystems of a type used exclusively for 

COMINT operations will be made available only to authorized training 

activities; training in such systems must be restricted to personnel to be 

assigned to COMINT activities. 

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11. One of the principal sources of' compromise in COM.INT communications is the inadvertent transmission of plain language or the transmission of improperly encrypted messages in on-line cryptographic 

operation. It is essential that operators be thoro~ trained in the 

operating procedures and use of the equipment and that full use be made 

of equipment and devices designed to guard against the occurrences of' 

insecure transmissions. 

12. Cryptographic systems f'or use in COMINT collaboration with 

foreign countries are to be made effective only by the Director, NSA •. 

13. Electronic and el.ectrom.echanical equipment must not be used in 

such a manner as to jeopardize COMINT information due to intelligencebearing radiations. Policies governing this aspect of the use of 

security equipment f'or transmitting C~INT will be established by the 

Director, NSA. 

14. COMINT information shall not be transmitted in plain language 

by electrical means except in accordance with USCIB-approved policies. 

15. Wherever feasible, the encryption and decryption of COMINT 

information should be carried out in an area devoted exclusively to 

these purposes. 

16. All personnel engaged in the handling of CCJUNT information 

shall be subject to the security investigations, clearances, and indoctrination as are prescribed in USCIB Directive No. 5. 

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