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ii:CURITY INFORMA'l'ION · 

S'fflRE'f .• S'ffiUI"ff'fY IMPOHU/t'fION 

HOil 'fO DEMONSTRATE COMSEC WEAKNESSES TO NATO COUNTRIES 

1. !:• It is believed that NATO countries will recognize it to 

be to the benefit of all for each to improve his own national cormnunications security. Any action that may be taken by the UK and US must not 

appear to be an infringement of the national sovereignty of any NATO 

country or a desire to dictate to any of them. Instead of providing 

for a detailed examination of national prac~ices,,,therefore,, it is 

preferable to set up minimum security standards. ·These should be ' \ 

promulgated by NATO. for national use. Each.country would be asked to 

evaluate its o'Wl'l practices against these standards and to assure NATO 

that that country's security is equal to or better· than that which these 

standards would produce. 

£• The Security and Evaluation Agency, NATO, which is in the 

<-------------.--------'lwouldube the age~tuuf~; ~~~~~~~)USC 3 605 - I 

program. Its action ,would take three forms: 

{ 

(1) Sponsorship of the 1program thru Standing Group 

•I , 

channels and implementation :of it· if approved.· ,, 

(2) Provision o!f' assistan~e and advice, upon/ request, I ' • 

' I 

to individual countnes. I I , I 

(3) Evaluation pf the results of the program~· 

I i . 

2. Minimum standards crn 04~ be worked out in\(inal form after 

;r'<i derable discuss:fon' betw~en t~~ I Such standards 

I 

:mtst be sat forth in1 extreme!detail and must cover all known national 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-26-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

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'. --·--- EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

prnctices of NATO countries in the uhole field of communications security• 

This paper r,ivcs only a bnro outline of the· fields tl)at must be covered, 

If this approach is cw;reed. upon by i;he UK ~nd US, the Conference itself 

. should at lenst produce an ngreetl list of topics along these lines 

which will be the basis .for later preparation of detailed specifications, 

3. In addition to physical security of cryptomateriJil, adequate 

communications se~uri ty depends on two principles: 

b. Cryptographic systems must be adequately secure and properly 

,,_se<I~ 

' 4. As regards the first of these, it will be necessary to set 

stanciatds in· the following fields:. 

a. Frequency plan~: To .include minimum standards fa~ frequency 

allo6ation and frequency :rotation, with att9ntion paid to the inte:rrelatiorA between frequency chan~es aryd call si,~n changes. 

b. Format of cipher text; To include the steps necessary to 

prevent ._f _________ __,fn tha 't\asis of suqq things as length 

c. 

-· I1es~age externals; 'fa include emphasis on eliminatirlG 

an.~ external e~ement~ tha~ would f aci+~tate the identification of 

traffic, e.g~, step$ toward attaini11g μnifo:rm he~Qj_ng procedures, otc. . . 

.2~. qor.ununi~~tion proced~e~: ~o include measures ~or general 

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SE~k~¥-1114~ ('t_ SIBCURH'Y I:Nl'ORMATWN . 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

atnnd::i.rcli.~mi;ion of cori:nnn~_cntion procetluros, for ::i.tta.inrncmt of call sign 

security, with cnreful ntt ..cntion to in·~errelation of call signs and 

aclclresses. 

-""l"·--. 

a. Plain lC".n, :u~~;o l;r[lm:J 1n.:la sions : To \include steps toward 

minimiQnG transm:i.ssions in plc.in te;'t and procedurally isolating 13:uch 

plain.lan8uage as muat be transmitted. 

5~ !• The troatment _of crypto~raphic security.will include 

discussion· o!- all systems and equipments .km;>11n to bo in use or available 

for use by NA'ru .4ountries otl1er than ... I _______ ___.I and will state 

whether or not the~1',are acceptable; if the:)r are acceptable minimum 

' 

standords will be presC*ibod for their use. All systems approved for 

NATO use will be incli.y:led in the consideration·. 

b. The fields n01-: contemplated for discussion are as follows: 

(1) Hand systems: To ·include unenciphered and enciphered 

codes, Slidex or other tactical co~es, transpositions, strips, 

additives on plain text, etc. 

(2). Literal, or off-line machi-'es: To include all known 

Hagelin types, Enigma.types, Kryha, e'tc. 

{3) Teleprinter machines: To incl~e Fish types, Olivetti, 

Hellschreibor, one-time to.pe systems, etc. 

(4) Key-generation and criteria therefor4 

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