Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1606-CR-1476 | January 30, 2017 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Corey L. Scott

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Dwayne Casteel,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

January 30, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1606-CR-1476

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Lisa F. Borges, 

Judge

The Honorable Richard 

Hagenmaier, Commissioner

Trial Court Cause No.

49G04-1510-F5-36410

Altice, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1606-CR-1476 | January 30, 2017 Page 2 of 9

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Dwayne Casteel was convicted of robbery as a Level 5 

felony. Casteel raises two issues on appeal:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting hearsay?

2. Did the State present sufficient evidence to support Casteel’s 

conviction?

[2] We affirm. 

Facts & Procedural History

[3] During the early morning hours on October 10, 2015, Glen Julbert contacted a 

woman who was offering massage services on backpage.com, a website 

commonly used to advertise escort services. Julbert and the woman, who called 

herself China but was later identified as Mary Day, agreed on a price of $60-65 

for a thirty-minute massage, and Day provided Julbert with the address of her 

apartment. 

[4] Julbert arrived at Day’s apartment at approximately 2:00 a.m. Day, who 

Julbert recognized as the woman in the photos on the backpage.com 

advertisement, answered the door and invited him inside. Day was wearing a

handgun in a holster. The two sat down and talked for approximately ten 

minutes before Day directed Julbert to her bathroom and told him to undress 

down to his boxers. Julbert did as he was instructed and came out of the 
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bathroom a few minutes later wearing only his boxers and carrying the rest of 

his clothing. Day was not there when he returned, so Julbert put his clothes 

down and sat in a chair. Day then emerged from a walk-in closet and sat across 

from Julbert.

[5] Moments later, three men rushed into the apartment. The first man to enter, 

who was later identified as Casteel, was armed with a handgun and pointed it at 

Julbert. Casteel ordered Julbert to get on the ground and demanded his wallet. 

Julbert told Casteel his wallet was in his pants, and Casteel retrieved it and took 

the $410 he found inside. Casteel gave Julbert back his empty wallet and 

ordered him to get dressed. While Julbert was getting dressed, Casteel took 

Julbert’s cell phone and his pack of cigarettes from a table. Once Julbert was 

dressed, Casteel told him to leave and threatened to kill him if he called the 

police. Julbert then left the apartment.

[6] Initially, Julbert did not tell anyone what had happened because he was 

embarrassed and he did not want to call the police because Casteel had 

threatened him. Later that day, however, Julbert learned that his cell phone 

was being used to send vulgar messages to his daughters. Julbert then told his 

brother what had happened, and his brother encouraged him to call the police. 

Julbert did so, and two police officers met with him in a park across the street 

from Day’s apartment. Julbert explained what happened, provided descriptions 

of the suspects, and showed the officers Day’s apartment building and her 

backpage.com advertisement.
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[7] At the officers’ request, Julbert knocked on the door of Day’s apartment while 

the officers waited nearby. Day did not open the door, but she asked who was 

there. Julbert told her that he wanted his phone back, and Day responded that 

she did not have his phone and did not know what he was talking about. 

Julbert left the apartment door, but the officers asked him to try knocking on 

the door one more time. Julbert did so, and he again told Day that he wanted 

his phone back. Day responded that she was going to get her boyfriend. 

[8] Moments later, the door flew open and Casteel stepped out. Julbert stepped 

back and the police officers came around the corner with weapons drawn and 

took Casteel into custody. During a sweep of the apartment, police found Day 

hiding under a pile of clothes in a bedroom closet.

[9] As a result of these events, Casteel was charged with robbery as a Level 5 

felony. A jury trial was held on June 9, 2016, at the conclusion of which 

Casteel was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Casteel to six 

years in the Department of Correction. Casteel now appeals. 

Discussion & Decision

1. Admission of Testimony

[10] Casteel argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting hearsay 

testimony. The decision to admit or exclude evidence lies within the trial 

court’s sound discretion. Filice v. State, 886 N.E.2d 24, 34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), 

trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is 
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against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Dixon v. 

State, 967 N.E.2d 1090, 1092 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Moreover, even if the trial 

court abuses its discretion in admitting evidence, we will not reverse if the error 

was harmless. Id. An error in the admission of evidence is harmless “when the 

conviction is supported by such substantial independent evidence of guilt as to 

satisfy the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that the 

questioned evidence contributed to the conviction.” Granger v. State, 946 N.E.2d 

1209, 1213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Lafayette v. State, 917 N.E.2d 660, 666 

(Ind. 2009)). In other words, we will reverse “only if the record as a whole 

discloses that the erroneously admitted evidence was likely to have had a 

prejudicial impact upon the mind of the average juror, thereby contributing to 

the verdict.” Id. (quoting Wales v. State, 768 N.E.2d 513, 521 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2002), trans. denied). 

[11] Casteel argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed 

Detective Jerry Townsend to testify that other officers informed him that a 

handgun had been located inside the apartment. Specifically, Detective 

Townsend testified as follows: 

Q: At some point, did you receive knowledge of a gun being 

located?

A: Yes.

Q: What did you – what did you decide to do with that 

knowledge?
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A: I decided to leave the gun where it was. It was – I was told 

that the gun was in a bag.

DEFENSE: Objection, this is hearsay.

THE COURT: Well, he could testify what he did or did not do, 

so I’m going to overrule it at this point.

Transcript at 95. On cross-examination, Detective Townsend clarified that he 

had never personally seen the gun and that the gun was reportedly found in 

Day’s purse. Detective Townsend testified further that he did not collect the 

gun as evidence because he was very ill that day, and obtaining a warrant to 

seize the gun would have extended his investigation by several hours.1 

[12] Casteel reasserts his hearsay objection on appeal, but he has failed to cite a rule 

of evidence or any other legal authority relevant to his claim that Detective 

Townsend’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay. Accordingly, his hearsay 

argument is waived. See Davis v. State, 835 N.E.2d 1102, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2005) (explaining that “[a] party waives an issue where the party fails to 

develop a cogent argument or provide adequate citation to authority and 

portions of the record”), trans. denied. We further note that instead of 

developing his hearsay argument, he argues that because Detective Townsend 

had no personal knowledge that a gun had been located, he “clearly was not a 

competent witness to testify about the gun in question.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. 

 

1 The next day, Detective Townsend was admitted to the hospital and diagnosed with diverticulitis. 
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This argument is more in the nature of a claim that Detective Townsend’s 

testimony violated Ind. Evidence Rule 602, which provides that “[a] witness 

may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a 

finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” Because 

Casteel did not object on this basis below, any argument in this regard is also 

waived. See Bush v. State, 929 N.E.2d 897, 989 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (explaining 

that a party may not object to the admission of evidence on one basis at trial 

and seek reversal on another basis on appeal). 

[13] Waiver notwithstanding, and assuming arguendo that Detective Townsend’s 

testimony was inadmissible, we conclude that any error in its admission was 

harmless. As an initial matter, Julbert testified that when he met Day at her 

apartment, she was wearing a handgun in a holster, and Detective Townsend 

testified that he was told that a gun was found in Day’s purse. Under these 

circumstances, it seems highly likely that the jury believed that the gun 

reportedly found in Day’s purse belonged to Day rather than Casteel. We note 

further that Detective Townsend was cross-examined thoroughly regarding the 

gun, and it was made clear to the jury that he had never personally seen a gun 

and that he took no steps to ensure that the gun was collected as evidence. For 

these reasons, we conclude it was unlikely that the testimony contributed to the 

jury’s verdict. Because any error in the admission of Detective Townsend’s 

testimony was harmless, Casteel is not entitled to reversal on that basis. 

2. Sufficiency of the Evidence
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[14] Casteel also argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his 

conviction. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we 

neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Atteberry v. 

State, 911 N.E.2d 601, 609 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Instead, we consider only the 

evidence supporting the conviction and the reasonable inferences flowing 

therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a 

reasonable trier of fact could have drawn the conclusion that the defendant was 

guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment will not be 

disturbed. Baumgartner v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1131, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). It 

is not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of 

innocence; rather, the evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be 

drawn from it to support the conviction. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 

(Ind. 2007). The uncorroborated testimony of a victim alone is sufficient to 

support a conviction. Jenkins v. State, 34 N.E.3d 258, 262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), 

trans. denied. 

[15] Although Casteel cites the applicable standard of review, he completely 

disregards it. His arguments are nothing more than blatant requests to reweigh 

the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we will not do on 

appeal. Julbert testified that Casteel stole his money, cell phone, and cigarettes 

while holding him at gunpoint. This testimony was plainly sufficient to support 

Casteel’s conviction for robbery as a Level 5 felony. See Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 

(providing that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally takes property from 

another person or from the presence of another person . . . by using or 
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threatening the use of force on any person . . . commits robbery, a Level 5 

felony”). 

[16] Judgment affirmed. 

[17] Riley, J. and Crone, J., concur.