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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

v. 

SAHARRIS ROLLINS, No. 2483 EDA 2017 

Appellant 

Appeal from the PCRA Order, May 8, 1997, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0405851-1986 

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., MURRAY, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 08, 2019 

Following reinstatement of his collateral appeal rights nunc pro tunc, 

Saharris Rollins appeals from the May 8, 1997 order entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County that dismissed his petition filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541- 

9546. We affirm. 

The PCRA court that entered the May 8, 1997 order denying appellant 

PCRA relief set forth the following: 

On January 22, 1986, [appellant] knocked on the door 

of Jose Carrasquillo and Violeta Clintron's residence 

for the purpose of obtaining [c]ocaine. 

Mr. Carrasquillo was not there, but Mrs. Clintron, her 

brother (Raymond Clintron), and her one year old son 

were present. Recognizing [appellant] as an associate 

of her boyfriend, Mrs. Clintron permitted [appellant] 

to enter the home. After entering, [appellant] asked 

for a "sixteen" or 1.5 grams of cocaine. When 
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Mrs. Clintron measured the cocaine, [appellant] asked 

to trade methamphetamine for the cocaine. 

Mrs. Clintron refused and demanded cash instead. 

[Appellant] responded by leaving the residence and 

returning a few minutes later with a forty-five 

automatic pistol. Upon returning, [appellant] pointed 

the weapon at Violeta and demanded the cocaine. 

At this point, Raymond Clintron began wrestling with 

[appellant] in an attempt to seize the weapon. After 

several shots were fired, Mr. Clintron was wounded 

and fell to the floor. [Appellant] then picked up the 

victim and fired at least two more rounds into the 

victim's body. As a consequence, Violeta surrendered 

the cocaine and [appellant] left. 

[Appellant] was apprehended three days later 

following another unrelated shooting 

incident.[Footnote 1] The police picked up [appellant] 

and transported him to the hospital, where he was 

identified by witnesses from the first shooting. After 

the police verified a ballistics match on the spent 

cartridges from the two crime scenes, [appellant] was 

arrested and charged with murder. 

[Footnote 1] On January 25, 1986, 

[appellant] knocked on Richard 

Campbell's door. Mr. Campbell's younger 

brother answered the door and called a 

warning that [appellant] had a gun. 

Mr. Campbell, who was upstairs, grabbed 

a loaded shotgun out of the closet. When 

[appellant] reached the bottom of the 

stairs, he pointed his forty-five automatic 

pistol at Mr. Campbell and the two 

exchanged gunfire. [Appellant] was 

wounded and fled. A pedestrian 

observing [appellant] on the sidewalk, 

called police. 

Following a jury trial held between February 10 and 

March 6, 1987, [appellant] was found guilty of murder 

in the first degree, robbery and possession of an 

instrument of crime. After the penalty hearing, the 

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jury found two aggravating circumstances, which they 

concluded outweighed the one mitigating 

circumstance. On the basis of its findings, the jury 

sentenced [appellant] to death. On May 11, 1987, the 

[t]rial [c]ourt heard and denied post trial motions. 

Subsequently, [appellant] appealed asserting claims 

of ineffective assistance of counsel and trial error. On 

July 15, 1988, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

granted counsel's petition to withdraw, remanded the 

record to the [t]rial [c]ourt for the appointment of new 

counsel and permitted new counsel to press the 

claims. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and 

affirmed both the conviction and sentence. 

Commonwealth v. Rollins, [] 580 A.2d 744 ([Pa.] 

1990). 

PCRA court opinion, 9/8/97 at 1-3. 

The record reflects that on November 12, 1996, appellant filed the PCRA 

petition that is the root of this appeal. In that petition, appellant asserted 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, trial court error, and prosecutorial 

misconduct. On May 8, 1997, the PCRA court denied the petition without 

holding a hearing. Our supreme court affirmed the order denying appellant's 

PCRA petition, finding that appellant waived his claims of trial court error and 

prosecutorial misconduct for failure to raise them on direct appeal and 

rejecting appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims on the merits. 

Commonwealth v. Rollins, 738 A.2d 435 (Pa. 1999). 

On March 10, 2000, appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

seeking relief from his death sentence on substantially the same grounds that 

he raised in his PCRA petition. The district court granted habeas corpus 

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relief with respect to appellant's death sentence after finding that two 

significant errors occurred during the penalty phase of appellant's criminal 

trial.' The district court directed that appellant be given a new sentencing 

hearing or be sentenced to life imprisonment. Rollins v. Horn, 2005 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 15493, 2005 WL 1806504 (E.D. Pa. 2005). On July 7, 2010, the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Rollins v. Horn, 

386 Fed. Appx. 267 (3d Cir. 2010). On June 13, 2012, appellant was 

resentenced to life without parole on the first -degree murder conviction and 

concurrent terms totaling 121/2 to 25 years of incarceration on the remaining 

charges. 

On August 8, 2016, appellant filed a PCRA petition wherein he claimed 

relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. 

Pennsylvania, 136 S.Ct. 1899 (2016).2 In Williams, the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania had vacated an order granting PCRA relief to a prisoner 

convicted of first -degree murder and sentenced to death. Then -Chief Justice 

' The district court found that (1) appellant's trial counsel was ineffective in 

failing to prepare for the penalty phase of the trial until after the jury rendered 

its verdict; specifically, for failing to investigate potentially mitigating evidence 

concerning the psychological impact of appellant's abusive childhood; and 

(2) the trial court presented ambiguous jury instructions with respect to 

whether aggravating and mitigating circumstances must be found 

unanimously. Rollins, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15493; 2005 WL 1806504. 

2 Although we have concerns as to whether Williams, supra, can be applied 

retroactively, as well as concerns as to certain other procedural issues related 

to this appeal, we will go forward in the interest of justice and judicial 

economy. 

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Ronald D. Castille had been the district attorney who had given approval to 

seek the death penalty in Williams's case. Thereafter, while sitting on the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court, then -Chief Justice Castille denied Williams's 

motion for recusal and participated in the court's decision to deny Williams 

PCRA relief. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court determined that 

then -Chief Justice Castille's denial of the recusal motion and his participation 

in Williams's collateral appeal violated the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. The High Court held that "[w]here a judge has had 

an earlier significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical 

decision in the defendant's case, the risk of actual bias in the judicial 

proceeding rises to an unconstitutional level" and due process entitles that 

defendant to a proceeding where he is assured that no member of the court 

is predisposed to rule against him. Id. at 1910. 

With respect to appellant's August 8, 2016 PCRA petition, the PCRA 

court explained that appellant: 

claimed due process violations and judicial 

improprieties. [Appellant], along with many other 

separate Philadelphia petitioners, allege [] 

Chief Justice [Ronald D. Castille] of the Supreme 

Court of Pennsylvania, during his tenure as 

Philadelphia District Attorney, was involved in the 

decision to seek the death penalty against and/or had 

significant personal involvement in their cases as 

Philadelphia District Attorney. As such these actions 

by the then District Attorney Ronald Castille against 

[appellant], and [p]etitioners' due process rights were 

violated when the Chief Justice failed to recuse or 

disqualify himself when their case came before the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for appellate review. 

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Following a hearing on April 24, 2017, this court 

determined then District Attorney Ronald Castille was 

significantly and personally involved in [appellant's] 

case when he authorized his subordinates to seek the 

death penalty against [appellant]. The court granted 

the PCRA petition in part and reinstated [appellant's] 

appellate rights nunc pro tunc on May 3, 2017. On 

May 31, 2017, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 

appealed this court's reinstatement of [appellant's] 

appellate rights nunc pro tunc to the Superior 

Court.[3] On June 1, 2017, [appellant] also filed a 

notice of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 

PCRA court opinion, 10/19/17 at 1-2. 

The record reflects that on August 4, 2017, our supreme court 

transferred the notice of appeal to this court. (Per curiam order, 8/4/17.) 

On August 28, 2017, this court entered an order directing appellant to show 

cause within ten days as to "why this appeal should not be quashed as having 

been taken from a purported order that is not entered upon the appropriate 

docket of the lower court." (Order, 8/28/17.) Appellant filed a timely 

response. In that response, appellant explained that although the May 8, 

1997 order does not appear on the electronic docket, it was "included on the 

paper docket that was prepared in November 1997 in connection with the 

original PCRA appeal." (Appellant's response to order to show cause, 9/7/17 

3 The record reflects that on August 30, 2017, appellant filed "an unopposed 

application for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction in the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court, requesting the Supreme Court to take jurisdiction over the 

Commonwealth's appeal" of the PCRA order that granted appellant relief. 

(Appellant's response to order to show cause, 9/7/17 at 3, '11 9 and 

attachment.) On March 5, 2018, the Commonwealth withdrew and 

discontinued its appeal of the May 3, 2017 order granting appellant PCRA 

relief. 

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at 3, ¶ 11.) Appellant further stated that the May 8, 1997 order is referenced 

in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court docket for the original PCRA appeal. (Id.) 

Appellant also informed this court that on August 31, 2017, he filed a praecipe 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County to include the May 8, 

1997 order in the electronic record. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Also on September 7, 

2017, appellant filed with this court an application for correction of record to 

which he attached a copy of the paper docket sheet of the original PCRA 

proceeding and a copy of his praecipe requesting that the common pleas court 

correct the electronic docket. (Appellant's application for correction of record, 

9/7/17 at Exhibits E and G.) On September 13, 2017, this court discharged 

the rule to show cause and referred the appealability issue to the merits panel. 

On September 13, 2017, appellant filed an application for leave to file a 

supplement to his response to order to show cause to which he attached a 

September 7, 2017 order directing the office of judicial records in the 

Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas to enter the May 8, 1997 order on the 

appropriate docket. (Appellant's application for leave to file supplement to 

appellant's response to order to show cause, 9/15/17 at attachment order of 

court, 9/7/17.) On October 12, 2017, this court directed the trial court to 

certify and include in the trial court record the May 8, 1997 order. On 

October 20, 2017, the trial court complied. 

On February 15, 2018, the Commonwealth filed an "unopposed motion 

to stay appeals" wherein it requested that this court enter an order staying 

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appellant's appeal at this docket, as well as an appeal that the Commonwealth 

filed at No. 2017 EDA 2478 that challenged the May 3, 2017 order granting 

appellant PCRA relief. Because the Commonwealth withdrew its appeal at 

No. 2017 EDA 2478 on March 5, 2018, this court entered an order denying as 

moot the Commonwealth's motion to stay the appeal at that docket. On 

January 19, 2018, our supreme court denied appellant's application for 

exercise of extraordinary relief. (Per curiam order, 1/19/18.) Therefore, 

this appeal is now ripe for our review. 

Appellant raises the following issues: 

[1.] Should [appellant] be granted a new trial 

because defense counsel was ineffective in 

failing to investigate and present exculpatory 

evidence? 

[2.] Should [appellant] be granted a new trial 

because of misconduct committed by the 

prosecutor in his opening statement and closing 

argument? 

[3.] Should [appellant] be granted a new trial 

because trial counsel ineffectively failed to 

properly object when the Commonwealth used 

its peremptory strikes in a racially 

discriminatory manner? 

Appellant's brief at 2. 

This Court's review from the grant or denial of 

post -conviction relief is limited to examining whether 

the lower court's determination is supported by the 

evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error. 

In order to be eligible for relief under the PCRA, an 

appellant must plead and prove by a preponderance 

of the evidence that his conviction or sentence arose 

from one or more of the errors listed at 42 Pa. C.S. [A.] 

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§ 9543(a)(2) and that the issues he raises have not 

been previously litigated. An issue will be deemed 

previously litigated when "the highest appellate court 

in which the petitioner could have had review as a 

matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue." 

42 Pa. C.S.[A.] § 9544(a)(2). 

Commonwealth v. Todaro, 701 A.2d 1343, 1346 (Pa. 1997) (internal case 

law citations omitted). 

As framed, appellant's first and third issues allege ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel. Although appellant's second issue is inartfully framed, a 

reading of appellant's PCRA petition and his appellate brief on this issue reveal 

that appellant alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

"meaningfully or appropriately object" to the prosecutor's opening and closing 

remarks and that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this 

issue on appeal. (Appellant's PCRA petition, 11/12/96 at 41-48; see also 

appellant's brief at 20.) Therefore, all of the issues that appellant raises for 

our review allege ineffectiveness of counsel. 

The law presumes that trial counsel was effective and 

appellant bears the burden of proving otherwise. In 

order to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, petitioner must establish (1) that the 

underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that 

counsel's performance had no reasonable basis; and 

(3) that counsel's ineffectiveness worked to 

petitioner's prejudice. Moreover, under the PCRA, 

counsel's ineffectiveness must have so undermined 

the truth determining process that no reliable 

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have occurred. 

42 Pa. C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Furthermore, 

counsel's stewardship must be judged under the 

existing law at the time of trial and counsel cannot be 

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deemed ineffective for failing to predict future 

developments or changes in the law. 

Todaro, 701 A.2d at 1346 (internal case law citations omitted). 

At the outset, we note that in 1987 when appellant's post -verdict 

motions were filed, the law required criminal defendants to raise ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims at the earliest stage where counsel whose 

ineffectiveness was questioned no longer represented the defendant. See 

Commonwealth v. Busanet, 54 A.3d 35, 44 n.4 (Pa. 2012) (explaining 

application of Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 372 A.2d 687 (Pa. 1977), in 

cases predating Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002), 

wherein our supreme court abrogated the rule in Hubbard, holding that a 

defendant "should wait to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

until collateral review."). Here, appellant's post -verdict motions and direct 

appeal predated our supreme court's decision in Grant; consequently, the 

Hubbard rule governs this appeal. 

The PCRA court addressed appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim for failure to present a mitigation defense during the penalty phase. 

(PCRA court opinion, 9/8/97 at 3-9.) With respect to the nearly 50 remaining 

ineffectiveness claims presented in the PCRA petition, the PCRA court 

determined, without discussion, that they lacked merit. (Id. at 13-14.) The 

PCRA court further found that appellant had waived all of the ineffectiveness 

claims that it did not address in its September 8, 1997 opinion for failure to 

raise them on direct appeal. (Id. at 14.) 

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The Commonwealth contends that appellant waived his first and third 

issues of trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failure to raise them on direct 

appeal as required by Hubbard, supra. The Commonwealth further contends 

that only appellant's second issue of ineffectiveness of trial counsel is 

cognizable on collateral appeal because appellant couched the claim in terms 

of direct appeal counsel's ineffectiveness. 

In Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2011), a case 

where Hubbard was also prevailing law when petitioner's direct appeal was 

decided, our supreme court explained that although prevailing law required 

petitioner to raise claims of trial counsel's ineffectiveness on direct appeal and 

the failure to do so resulted in waiver, petitioner could raise appellate counsel's 

ineffectiveness under the PCRA, including claims of appellate counsel's 

ineffectiveness for failure to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness on direct 

appeal. Our supreme court further explained that to do so, petitioner would 

be required to present his argument as to each prong of the ineffectiveness 

test for each layer of the alleged ineffective representation. Id. at 286. 

Accordingly, to raise a claim of direct appeal counsel's ineffectiveness, a 

petitioner would be required to demonstrate that the underlying claim is of 

arguable merit; that direct appeal counsel's performance had no reasonable 

basis; and that direct appeal counsel's ineffectiveness worked to petitioner's 

prejudice. Id. at 285-286. 
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Here, a review of appellant's PCRA petition demonstrates that appellant 

failed to satisfy each prong of the ineffectiveness test for each layer of the 

ineffective representation. Although appellant argues in his petition that his 

underlying claims have merit, he fails to satisfy the reasonable basis and 

prejudice prongs with respect to trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness. With 

regard to direct appeal counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, appellant includes a 

boilerplate allegation with respect to his first and third issues that states: 

[t]o the extent appellate counsel failed to assert or 

adequately preserve any of the claims set forth 

herein, such counsel rendered ineffective assistance 

of counsel in violation of [appellant's] rights under the 

[Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution and Article I, §§ 9 and 13 

of the Pennsylvania Constitution] and [appellant] was 

prejudiced thereby. 

Appellant's PCRA petition, 11/12/96 at 142, ¶ 379. With respect to appellant's 

second claim and direct appeal counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, appellant 

merely concludes that "[a]ppellate counsel was ineffective for not raising all 

instances of misconduct on appeal." (Id. at 51, ¶ 179.) In addition to failing 

to fully satisfy the ineffectiveness test for trial counsel's alleged 

ineffectiveness, appellant entirely failed to bear his burden of proving that 

appellate counsel's performance had no reasonable basis and that appellate 

counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to raise the issues on direct appeal resulted 

in prejudice. 

Nevertheless, with regard to appellant's first issue, we note that in his 

appellate brief, appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

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learn appellant's blood type prior to trial; for stipulating to appellant's blood 

type at trial; for failing to spend sufficient time arguing that appellant's blood 

type was not found in a hat that was found near the crime scene; and that 

based on appellant's blood type and his dominant hand, he could not have 

been the shooter. (Appellant's brief at 8-17.) Appellant asserts that trial 

counsel's ineffectiveness in this regard resulted in prejudice because "it would 

have strongly suggested that appellant was not the shooter at the homicide 

scene." (Id. at 15.) Notwithstanding the deficiencies in appellant's 

PCRA petition and his failure to properly layer his ineffectiveness allegations, 

we note that at trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of 

Violeta Clintron who eyewitnessed the murder and identified appellant as the 

shooter. (Notes of testimony, 2/25/87 at 637-676.) 

In his second issue, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to object to that portion of the prosecutor's closing argument that 

included a hypothetical to explain to the jury why appellant's blood type was 

not found in the hat that was found near the murder scene. Appellant claims 

that had trial counsel objected, "the jury would have entertained reasonable 

doubt." (Appellant's brief at 21.) Notwithstanding the deficiencies in 

appellant's PCRA petition and his failure to properly layer his ineffectiveness 

allegations, we note that trial counsel placed three objections on the record 

during this portion of the prosecution's closing argument. (Notes of 

testimony, 3/4/87 at 1614, 1621, and 1622.) 

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In his final issue, appellant claims that even though trial counsel placed 

objections on the record as to the prosecution's use of peremptory strikes and 

even though trial counsel unsuccessfully raised the issue in post -verdict 

motions, trial counsel was nevertheless ineffective because he should have 

placed more objections to the prosecution's use of preemptory strikes on the 

record which would have documented a pattern of discrimination. (Appellant's 

brief at 17-22.) In his PCRA petition, however, appellant claimed that he is 

entitled to a new trial because the trial court allowed the prosecution to 

exercise race -based strikes and refused to hold a hearing under Batson v. 

Kentucky, 474 U.S. 942 (1985). (Appellant's PCRA petition, 11/12/96 at 

92-94 § 4, III 264-269.) In a footnote, appellant noted that "[d]efense 

counsel objected often enough to apparent race -based peremptories that he 

should be deemed to have a continuing objection" and that "[t]o the extent 

defense counsel waived any objection by failing to raise it specifically, he was 

ineffective." (Id. at 93 n.31.) Notwithstanding the deficiencies in appellant's 

PCRA petition and his failure to properly layer his ineffectiveness allegations, 

we note that appellant did not raise the issue he now attempts to raise in his 

PCRA petition, the failure of which would result in waiver. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing for waiver of issues on appeal that were not raised 

in the lower court); Commonwealth v. Paul, 557 A.2d 357 (Pa.Super. 1989) 

appeal denied, 578 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1990) (reiterating that Rule 302(a) does 

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not permit an appellate court to consider an issue raised for the first time on 

appeal). 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/8/19 

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