Filed 5/26/16 Sheen v. Sheen CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

CHARLES SHEEN et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

ANTHONY SHEEN, JR. as Trustee etc.,

NEIL GIELEGHAM et al.,

Objectors and Respondents.

 

 B263952

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BP092979)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. 

Daniel S. Murphy, Judge. Affirmed. 

Evan D. Marshall for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 

Gieleghem Law Office and Neil Gieleghem for Objector and Respondent Neil 

Gieleghem. 

Law Offices of Gregory A. Cole and Gregory A. Cole for Objector and 

Respondent Gregory A. Cole.

____________________________________
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We affirm a probate court order granting a motion to tax the entirety of $2,640.24 

in claimed fees and costs incurred on a prior appeal on the ground that the claimed costs 

were sought from persons whom were not liable for such costs. 

FACTS

Background

We have entertained multiple previous appellate court proceedings arising from 

the probate litigation giving rise to the current appeal. We summarized the facts of the 

protracted litigation in a prior appeal (Sheen v. Sheen (July 1, 2014, B243847) [nonpub. 

opn.]) (hereafter Sheen Trust I)), and see no need to restate that long history for the 

instant appeal. It is sufficient for present purposes to recall that a subset of the 

beneficiaries under a living trust, Charles Sheen, Derek Hersha, and Deryl Gaylor

(collectively Sheen), have long been seeking an award for attorney’s fees based on the 

equity-based “common fund doctrine.” Sheen claims that litigation which he initiated 

resulted in a judgment recovering the bulk of the trust’s assets from a wrongdoer, thereby 

creating a common fund benefitting all of the trust’s beneficiaries, which justifies an

award of attorney’s fees in Sheen’s favor (and, thus, in favor of Sheen’s attorneys 

ultimately), to be surcharged against the trust’s assets. 

In an opinion issued roughly two years ago, we reversed a probate court order 

denying any award of attorney’s fees surcharged against the trust’s assets, based largely 

on evidentiary-procedural grounds. (See Sheen Trust I, supra, typed opn. at p. 17.) 

In the same opinion, we declined to address Sheen’s claim that attorney’s fees surcharged

against the trust’s assets, to the extent such fees were ultimately was awarded, would 

have a “seniority lien” over any other “claim” against the trust’s assets. (Ibid.) 

The only other “claim” against the trust’s assets that is involved in this probate 

litigation is not truly in the form of any pending claim against those assets. Rather, two 

attorneys who previously represented the trustee, Neil Gieleghem and Gregory Cole,

have already been paid money or assets from the trust’s assets for attorney’s fees billed to 

the trustee. Sheen wants those fees paid back, replacing monies into the trust’s assets. 
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To that end, Sheen seeks a “surcharge” order against the trust’s assets that will actually 

take the form of, or otherwise include, a judgment imposing a constructive trust over 

attorneys Gieleghem and Cole, thus essentially compelling them to return the fees they 

previously received back into the trust’s assets. The two attorneys would then have to get 

in line behind Sheen, who would take his common fund doctrine attorney’s fees first. 

The Instant Costs Dispute

In October 2014, shortly after the issuance of the remittitur in Sheen Trust I, Sheen 

filed a memorandum of costs on appeal seeking $2,640.23, to be paid by the prior trustee 

of the trust, and by attorneys Gieleghem and Cole as well, apparently in some manner of 

joint and several responsibility order. In November 2014, attorney Gieleghem, asserting 

he was a “specially appearing non-party,” filed a motion to tax the costs claimed in 

Sheen’s memorandum of costs. Attorney Cole filed a joinder in attorney Gieleghem’s 

motion. 

On March 3, 2015, the parties argued the costs issues to the probate court, and the 

court took the matter under submission. On March 12, 2015, the court entered a sevenpage order granting attorney Gieleghem’s motion to tax costs on appeal, including the 

joinder by attorney Cole. The court’s order found the costs stated in Sheen’s 

memorandum of costs on appeal were reasonable, but explained that an award for costs 

incurred on appeal could not be ordered to be paid by attorneys Gieleghem and Cole 

because they were not actually parties to the probate litigation, and Sheen had not 

presented a persuasive argument in support of the proposition that costs could be ordered 

to be paid by a person who, for purposes of a cost award, was not a party to a probate 

action. The court’s order concludes: “Attorneys for former trustee, Neil Gieleghem and 

Gregory Cole, are not personally liable for [Sheen]’s costs on appeal.” 

Sheen filed a timely notice of appeal from the order entered on March 12, 2014.

DISCUSSION

Before turning to the costs order that is at issue in the instant appeal, we digress 

for a moment to note that the probate court has issued an order on Sheen’s overriding 
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claim that attorney’s fee under the common fund doctrine should be surcharged against 

the trust’s assets, and, further, that the fees should have a seniority lien in front of the fees 

already paid to attorneys Gieleghem and Cole. In other words, the probate court has 

issued a ruling on whether to impose a judgment for constructive trust over Gieleghem 

and Cole to compel them to repay monies into the trust’s assets. That ruling is now the 

subject of an appeal filed by Sheen that is pending in our court. (Case No. B268762.) 

In short, the major issue raised by Sheen in the probate litigation, namely, whether or not 

the probate court may issue orders that would have the effect of compelling attorneys 

Gieleghem and Cole to put monies back into the trust’s assets is pending in our court. 

As to Sheen’s instant appeal, which might be viewed on some level as raising the 

issue of whether or not the probate court may issue orders that have the practical effect of 

compelling attorneys Gieleghem and Cole to pay monies into the trust’s assets, we find 

that Sheen has failed to show any error in the probate court’s order as to the costs 

claimed for the appeal in Sheen I. Probate Code section 1002 provides: 

“Unless it is otherwise provided by [the Probate Code] or by rules 

adopted by the Judicial Council, either the superior court or the court on

appeal may, in its discretion, order costs to be paid by any party to the 

proceedings, or out of the assets of the estate, as justice may require.” 

We have read nothing in Sheen’s briefs on appeal which persuades us that the trial 

court erred in ruling that attorneys Gieleghem and Cole do not fit within the definition of 

a “party” to the ongoing probate proceedings for purposes of issuing an award for costs in 

Sheen I pursuant to Probate Code section 1002. On appeal, as he did below, Sheen offers 

extensive arguments asserting the proposition that the probate court has “jurisdiction” 

over attorneys Gieleghem and Cole, i.e., the court has power to issue orders affecting the 

two attorneys. Sheen’s point, essentially, is that the court has jurisdiction over the two 

attorneys because they acted as lawyers of record in the probate proceedings at one point. 
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Sheen’s arguments do not persuade us to reverse the costs order. While it is correct that 

a trial court generally has “jurisdiction” over the attorneys who appear before the court, 

for example, a court may sanction a lawyer for misconduct as provided in the law, this

does not necessarily means that the attorney thereby is a “party” to the action in which he 

represents a party, for purposes of Probate Code section 1002. 

In concluding that Sheen has failed to persuade us that there is error in the costs 

order at issue in his instant appeal, we stress that nothing in this opinion should be 

construed by anybody, whether or not fitting the label of party, nonparty, attorney, 

former attorney, or anything else, as having any relevance on the issues involved in

Sheen’s pending appeal in case No. B268762. In short, we stress that nothing in this 

opinion, in any measure, has addressed the issue of whether a probate court has the 

authority to impose a constructive trust over a trustee’s former attorney to compel that 

attorney to repay attorney’s fees back into the trust’s assets. That issue will be addressed 

in case No. B268762. 

DISPOSITION

The probate court’s order is affirmed. Attorney Gieleghem’s motion to augment 

the record on appeal is denied. Each party to bear its own costs on appeal. 

BIGELOW, P.J.

We concur:

RUBIN, J. 

GRIMES, J.