T.C. Memo. 1999-341

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

JOHN L. SULLIVAN, Petitioner v

. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 7933-98. Filed October 12, 1999.

Charles J. Reilly , for petitioner.

Robert E. Marum , for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JACOBS, Judge : Respondent determined a $72,600.30 deficiency,

a $17,565.58 addition to tax under section 66 51(a)(1), and a

$4,734.19 addition to tax under section 6654 with respect to

petitioner's 1989 Federal income tax. Respondent now concedes that- 2 -

petitioner is not liable for the addition to tax under either

section 6651(a) or 6654.

Following other concessions, the issues for decision are: (1)

Whether interest received as part of a personal injury award is

includable in petitioner's gross income for 1989; and if so, (2)

the amount of interest allocable to petitioner; and (3) the amount

of the Schedule A deduction for legal fees incurred in receiving

the interest.

All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as in

effect for the year i n issue, and all Rule references are to the

Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Background

This case was submitted fully stipulated under Rule 122. The

sti pulations of facts and the exhibits submitted therewith are

incorporated herein by this reference.

Petitioner resided in War wick, Rhode Island, at the time he

filed his petition in this case. Petitioner computed his income

and expenses u nder the cash receipts and expenditures method of

accounting.

Petitioner (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Mr. Sullivan)

and Becky Lusignan (Mrs. Sullivan) were married on March 5, 1977;

they had thre e children. Mr. and Mrs. Sullivan were divorced on

August 8, 1990.- 3 -

Personal Injury Judgment

During 1987, Mr. Sullivan was employed by Counsel Tech, a

heating and ventilation contractor. On January 15, 1987,

petitioner was assigned by his employer to repair heating equipment

at a Wendy's restaurant owned by South Isle Food Corp. (South

Isle). While making repairs on the roof, he fell off a ladder,

sustaining severe neck injuries.

In October 1987, Mr. and Mrs. Sullivan, both individually and

on behalf of their three children, instituted a suit against South

Isle in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island.

The complaint contained three counts: One for negligence, a second

for infliction of emotional distress, and a third for loss of

consortium. The plaintiffs sought $7 million in damages with

interest, court costs, and attorney's fees; none of the counts

stated a specific monetary damage amount.

On November 10, 1988, the jury awarded damages of $1,256,150.

Mr. Sullivan was determined to be 25 percent at fault because of

his contributo ry negligence; consequently, the damage award was

reduced to $942,112.50. The jury did not allocate the damage award

among the three counts. A judgment was entered on November 14,

1988, and an amended judgment was subsequently entered on December

21, 1988. The amended judgment was for "the plaintiff, John L.

Sullivan in the amount of $942,112.50 plus interest computed at 12%

from 1/15/87 to 11/10/88 in the amount of $210,623.20, plus costs- 4 -

in the amount of $2,816.92." On July 24, 1989, the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the amended judgment. On

August 18, 1989, a writ of execution was issued for $1,241,739.29,

plus costs of $2,816.92, plus additional interest of $309.74 for

each day after August 16, 1989, that the judgment award was not

satisfied.

Other Events

At an unspecified time in early 1989, Mrs. Sullivan filed for

divorce in the family court for Kent County, Rhode Island (family

court). During the dissolution of his marriage, Mr. Sullivan

attempted suicide. On May 25, 1989, Mrs. Sullivan, through her

attorney, Robert F. DiPippo (Mr. DiPippo), filed an ex parte motion

for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for Mr. Sullivan. In

that motion, Mrs. Sullivan stated that Mr. Sullivan had obtained a

judgment of over $1 million in the U.S. Distric t Court for the

District of Rhode Island on November 10, 1988, and that the

judgment was properly part of the marital estate, subject to the

Rhode Island general laws relating to equitable distribution. The

mot ion further stated that "this Judgment is presently being

jeopardized by the actions of the Defendant, John L. Sullivan, who

has threatened to settle this Judgment for $75,000.00" and that

"any attempt by the Defendant in the instant Divorce Action, to

diminish the amount of recovery in the Federal Court Case would be

a fraud o n the Plaintiff, Becky L. Sullivan, and on the family- 5 -

1 Mr. Tarro was one of Mr. Sullivan's attorneys in the

personal injury action filed in U.S. District Court. Mr. Dailey

represented Mr. Sullivan in his divorce action. court which has jurisdiction over the marital assets." On the same

day (May 25, 1989), the family court entered a Consent Order,

appointing Richard MacAdams (Mr. MacAdams) as M r. Sullivan's

guardian ad litem and restraining Mr. Sullivan from negotiating or

attempting to negotiate with South Isle or its insurance company.

Issuance of Judgment Proceeds

On November 1, 1989, Messrs. MacAdams, Thomas Tarro III (Mr.

Tarro), and Leo Dailey (Mr. Dailey) 1 held a confe rence call to

discuss steps to be taken following receipt of the judgment award.

They agreed that the settlement proceeds would be deposited in a

daily interest-bearing account in the names of Messrs. Tarro and

MacAdams at the Rhode Island Central Credit Union (Credit Union).

The settlement proceeds wou ld be available at the offices of

Richard Van Tienhoven (Mr. Van Tienhoven), the attorney for South

Isle, on November 6, 1989, and would include interest through that

date.

On November 2, 1989, Continental Insurance Co. (Continental),

the insurance carrier for South Isle, issued a check for

$1,248,778.12, in satisfaction of the judgment. The check was made

payable to "John L. Sullivan, Richard MacAdams, Guardian-ad-Litem,

and Thomas Tarr o III, His Attorney." The check represented- 6 -

$942,112.50 in principal, $ 2,816.92 in costs, and $303,848.70 in

interest. (It is the $303,848.70 in interest that is the subject

matter of this proceeding.)

On November 6, 1989, Messrs. Sullivan, MacAdams, and Tarro

wen t to Mr. Van Tienhoven's office to receive the check and sign

documents to be filed with the U.S. District Court indicating that

the judgment had been satisfied in full. Mr. Sullivan refused to

endorse the check unless his name was on the Credit Union account.

Mr. MacAdams told Mr. Sullivan that because he was Mr. Sullivan's

guardian, it was inappropriate and unnecessary for Mr. Sullivan's

name to be on the account. Mr. MacAdams informed Mr. Sullivan that

the latter's refusal to sign the check would prevent the check from

being deposited.

On November 8, 1989, Mr. MacAdams filed a motion for

instruction s with the family court. Thereafter, and before any

action by the family court, Mr. Sullivan endo rsed the check.

Following Mr. Sullivan's endorsement of the check, a meetin g was

held at the Credit Union. The proceeds of the Continental check

were later disbursed as follows:

American Universal $41,958.53

(Worker's compensation)

Attorney Valletta (fees) 214,108.94

Attorney Tarro (fees) 214,113.94

Attorneys Tarro, Valletta, DiPippo 1 84,399.37

and Dailey (disputed fees)- 7 -

Dailey/DiPippo 2 347,091.18

DiPippo/Dailey $347,091.18

DiPippo/Dailey 5.00

Valletta 5.00

Dailey/DiPippo 5.00

Total 3 1,248,778.14

1 A dispute arose between Mr. Sullivan and Messrs. Tarro and

Valletta (the attorneys involved in the personal injury suit) as to

whether the attorney's fees should be 33-1/3 percent or 40 percent

of the judgment award.

2 Mr. DiPippo represented Mrs. Sullivan, and Mr. Dailey

represented Mr. Sullivan in their divorce proceeding.

3 Continental's check was in the amount of $1,248,778.12.

The record does not explain the discrepancy.

On November 14, 1989, the family court issued an order which, in

relevant part, provided:

2. The Guardian-ad-Litem is authorized to endorse the

Check and to permit the following disbursements

therefrom:

a. A one-third contingent fee of the gross

amount of the Check to Attorneys Thomas Tarro,

III, and David Valletta;

b. Payment of the expenses incurred in

prosecution of the matter involving South Isle

Food Corp., copi es of which are attached to

the Motion as Exhibits E and F with the

exception of $1,147.50 payable to Vincent

Ragosta, Esq. and, in addition thereto,

payment of ex penses in the amount of $80.10

incurred in the appeal of the matter of South

Isle Food Corp.;

c. Payment of a Worker's Compensation lien

of American Universal in accordance with the

agreement heretofore reached by Attorney Tarro

with American Universal concerning said lien;- 8 -

3. There being a dispute as to whether Attorneys Tarro

and Valletta are e ntitled to a forty (40) percent

contingent fee of the gross amount of the Check, the

difference between the one-third fee authorized herein

and the 40 percent fee shall be placed in an interest

bearing account, along with an additional $1,147.50

representing the disp uted fee of Vincent Ragosta, Esq.

The account shall be in the joint names of Attorneys

Tarro, Valletta, Robert DiPippo and Leo Dai l ey with

payments to be mad e as appropriate following the final

resolution of those matters;

4. The balance of the proceeds after the deduction of

the aforesaid amounts shall be paid to Robert DiPippo,

Esq. and Leo Dailey, Esq. jointly to be held by them in

an interest bearing clients' account or accounts as they

shall deem proper for the benefit of the parties herein;

5. The motion of the Guardian-ad-Litem for termination

of his guardia nship of John L. Sullivan and for his

discharge as Guardian-ad-Litem is granted;

6. The Guardian-ad-Litem is authorized to file a

request for payment for service rendered and expenses

incurred in the discharge of the performance of his

duties as Guardian-ad-Litem.

On March 19, 1990, Mr. Sullivan received a $7,500 payment; on

August 10, 1990, he received a $366,156 payment. Mrs. Sullivan was

paid $200,000 according to the terms of a property settlement

agreement dated August 1 , 1990, which was incorporated into the

terms of a divorce decree dated August 8, 1990.

Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Sullivan filed a tax return for 1989.

Mr. Sullivan filed a delinquent income tax return for 1990,

reporting interest income from Wendy's/Commercial (sic) Insurance

of $151,925 and deducting $50,638 in legal fees incurred in

receiving this income.- 9 -

On March 16, 1995, respondent issued a notice of deficiency to

Mr. Sullivan, determining that he had additional interest income in

1990 of $151,844 from the personal injury settlement. Mr. Sullivan

filed a petition with this Court contestin g that determination.

Tha t case was resolved following a concession by respondent that

the interest was not includable in the gross income of Mr. Sullivan

for 1990.

In the notice of deficiency giving rise to this case, dated

February 20, 1998, respondent d etermined that Mr. Sullivan had

$303,848.70 in unreported interest income from the satisfaction of

the personal injury judgment, and $21,853 in salary income and $12

in dividend income from McDonald's Corp. (Respondent now concedes

that Mr. Sullivan did not have salary or dividend income from

McDonald's Corp. for 1989.) Respondent further determined that Mr.

Sullivan was entitled to a Schedule A miscellaneous itemized

deduction in the amount of $101,276 for attorney's fees incurred in

connection with earning the interest income.

Discussion

The dispute in this case involves the year in which petitioner

must report as income interest received on a judgment award and the

amount thereof. Petitioner argues that: (1) Because his receipt

of the judgment award was subject to substantial restrictions, he

did not have actual or constructive receipt of the interest in

1989, as respondent claims; and (2) the amount of interest he- 10 -

received was substantially less than that determined by respondent.

For the reasons hereinafter stated, we sustain respondent's

determinations.

We first decide the amount of the judgment award, and

accompanying interest, allocable to petitioner. In this respect,

the record is devoid of any indication as to how the judgment award

is to be allocated among the various plaintiffs in the suit against

S outh Isle. Respondent determined that the judgment was awarded

solely to Mr. Sullivan, and consequently, the interest accompanying

that award is taxable solely to him. Because of petitioner's

failure to satisfy his bu rden of proving otherwise, we accept

respondent's determination in this regard. See Rule 142(a); S odoma

v. Commissioner

, T.C. Memo. 1996-275, affd. 139 F.3d 899 (5th Cir.

1998).

Petitioner maintains that because Mrs. Sullivan ultimately

received approximately one-third of the net amount of the personal

injury award, one-third of the interest should not be taxable to

him. We disagree. Mrs. Sullivan received a payment of $200,000

not as a party to the suit against South Isle but as her share of

the marital estate. Accordingly, her entitlement to the $200,000

arises from an event separate from the satisfaction of the judgment

against South Isle. Now we turn our attention to deciding the year

in which the interest is includable in petitioner's gross income.- 11 -

A taxpayer reporting income on the cash method of accounting,

such as petitioner, must include all income items in gross income

for the taxable year in which the item is actually or

constructively received. See sec. 451(a); Ames v. Commissioner

,

112 T.C. 304 (1999); sec. 1.451-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Income is

considered to be constructively received in the taxable year during

which it is credited to the taxpayer's account, set apart for him,

or otherwise made available so that he may draw u pon it at any

time. See sec. 1.451-2(a), Income Tax Regs. However, income is not

constructively received if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is

subject to substantial limitations or restrictions. See id.

In the instant case, the check for the award and interest was

received on November 6, 1989, by petitioner, his guardian ad litem,

and his attorney. At that time, petitioner was legally entitled to

both the judgment award and interest. Shortly thereafter petitioner

endorsed the check. The placing of the proceeds of Continental's

check into escrow accounts does not alter petitioner's entitlement

to the check for the proceeds, which he received and endorsed in

1989. Rather, the placing of the proceeds in escrow was to secure

payment of petitioner's obligations.

The constructive receipt doctrine is concerned with the

recei pt of the proceeds from the payor, not the subsequent

disposition of the proceeds by the payee. In the instant case, the

escrow accounts only limited petitioner's disposition of the- 12 -

proceeds. Therefore, although the placing of the check proceeds

into escrow accounts pending resolution of disputes over the amount

of attorney's fees and the amount of Mrs. Sullivan's share of the

marital estate was a substantial restriction over petitioner's

ultimate disposition of the judgment proceeds, these restrictions

did not limit petitioner's legal entitlement to the judgment award

and interest in 1989. Because he received and endorsed the check

for the judgment with interest in 1989, that is the year in which

petitioner must report the entire amount of interest.

Respondent determined that petitioner was en titled to a

Schedule A deduction in the amount of $101,276 for attorney's fees

incurred in connection with earning the interest. The $101,276 is

approximately one-third of the amount of the interest. Petitioner

maintains that he should have received a deduction for attorney's

fees of 40 percent rather than 33-1/3 percent. Again, we disagree

with petitioner. During 1989, petitioner disputed the amount of

legal fees to be paid to Messrs. Valletta and Tarro. There is no

evidence in the record establishing that the legal fees were ever

more than 33-1/3 percent. Consequently, petitioner is not entitled

to a Schedule A deduction for attorney's fees in an amount greater

than that allowed by respondent.

In re aching our conclusions herein, we have considered all

other arguments presented by petitioner and, to the extent not

discussed above, find them to be irrelevant or without merit.- 13 -

To reflect the foregoing and respondent's concessions,

Decision will be

e ntered under Rule 155

.