.. 

Q'f 

'l'BE UaL .. U .. S .. CONFERENCE Cll THE SECtlRITI al P'RENCR CCYMf.ICATIOBS 

JIELD AT WASHlliO'l'CJI" D. C .. 1 CCIHNCINO l MA.Y 1951 

lo As t.be result ot an LSIB propooal. ot 12 Deceni>er 1950* BM 

the t.13CIB acceptance tbereof' 1 communicated to LSIB by letter dated 

19 January 19511ff a u .. K.. - u .. s.. Conference to consider the improve ... 

mmt at French coammication.s was held at Waabt ngton commencing the 

lst ot Ma;y 1 1951 .. 

2. Tbe detailed cODClusions and recommendations of the Conference which are set :tortb. in the a.cc~ report are submitted f'or 

approval. b7 the London SigDal Intelltsence Board and the UZ11ted States 

37 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

COtamicatlons Intelligence Board .. 

EARLE.~ 

Rear Admiral., u .. s. Bavy 

ChairlmlZ11 u .. s .. Delegation 

. . ·. ·. · ... ·. · ... 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-28-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

TOP SECRET ACORN 
REF ID:A522579 rnE~ s ....... ,..,. ............... m A ,......~~ 

.1. -:: l4J lJ :K l4J ·1· A ti c:~ :r,-

RKPORT 

OF THE 

U .. K .. = U.S .. CONFERENCE ON S]]'; URITY OF FRENCH COMMUNJCATIONS 

HEID AT WASHINGTON, l MAI e 14 MAY, 1951 

THE PROBWI 

lo To consider the insecurity of French Government Communications = 

ao To determine whether the French Government should be approached 

with a view to improving its communications security, especially that 

of the M.iniatry of Foreign Affairs (M~F.A .. ); 

bo To assees the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach; 

Co To develop, if an approach should be madei 

{l} a specific plan tor improving the security or French com-= 

munica tions, and 

(2) a spec1.fic program for approaching the French Governmento 

FACTS BEARING ON T~ fRQBL.l!;M AND DI:£USSION 

2o See Enclosure nB~. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

CON::LUSIONS PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

J,. It is concli.lied tbat: 

\\\\\\ 

bo ln view or the facts that -

(l) the U.K .. and the u .. s .. Governments 8 through the mechanism of 

NATO am I I htl'\l"E! iz11tiated action which 

is expected to correct in l~ge measure the insecurity o.f t.1J.e .im= 

EO 3.3(h)(2) portent cryptocommunications of the French Armed Services; and PL 86_

36150 usc 3605 

{2) 6.CJY correction or the remaining important areas of insecu'° 

rity or the cryptocommunicat:ions of the l''rench Armed Services would 

= l = 

TOP SECRET ACORN 
REF ID:A522579 

T(-p SECRET AC<~RN EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 8&:36/50 USC 3605 

I 

any direct a.ppi'"oach to the French Government should be restricted :tn 

scope to the improvement of the security of the cryptooommunications 

co The Cryptographic Service of the French M.F o.ti., does not possess 

tho nacesaary cryptanalytic knowledge to insure provision of uy~lams 

affording adequate cryptographic security, or,, if it does possess the 

requisite knowledge, the information 1s not being npplied or properly 

employedo 

d. This situation ce.n be improved only by a drastic and expensive 

reorganize.t.ion or the Cryptographic Service of the l!'rench M.F .A. arrl 

appropriate replacoment of ita cryptographiQ syst.ems and practiceso 

e~ In order to assure a realization by the French MoF~A, of the 

necessity for sueh a drastic overhaul of cryptographic systems airl 

practices it will be necessary to bring the situation to the attent-ion 

of the M.F .. A. in a manner so dramatic as to shock t.hat Ministry into 

taking speedy and effective actiono EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

f. lf a shock of the degree necessary to produce effective action 

were possible 

this type of approach to the French would L-~~~~~~~~~~--' 

be most advisable; however 8 for reasons set forth in paragraphs 25 and 

26 of &!closure 11B11 , an approach of this sort would be inadequate, and an 

approach involving sl.llCh revelation must therefore be employed, with con .. 

comitant risks arising from general insecurity in the French Governmento 

g<> At present the Freni:~h Government is infiltrated with Commwiists 

and other disloyal or witrustworthy personnel 9 is subject to violent in= 

tern.al dissensions 8 and is careless cf its own ae~U:T"ity to a degree where 

its classi£1ed information is seriously in danger of lea.kageo 

ho Although direct evidence is lacking that Communists in French Govern= 

ment positions and lI.SoSoRo agents have passed classified in£ormation in 

volume to the UoS":;).R., such passage of informe.tion must be asaun1ed, 

TOP SECRET ACORN 
i. The principal risks to the U.K. and the U.S. Governments in any 

E0;3.3(h)(2) approach to the French Government on the subject 0£ the insac11rit~Lo~ 36150 USC 3605 

its communications are: 

\\\\\\ 

(.3) Disadvantageous political repercussions; 

{4) Pressure from the French for._l __ _.lcolli.boratiol"l·. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

j 0 Provided the conditions set forth in paragraphs 46 through 48 of 

.Enclosure "B" for minimizing these risks can be met, an approach to the 

French M.F.A .. is warranted., 

k., Since the report of the Tripartite Group now stt.dying the internal 

security or the I''rench Government may well add to our knowledge in this 

regard, any approach to the French M,,F $Ao should be deferred pending con° 

sidera tion ot that report o 

lo The urgency for improving the security of Frenc~ .... ____ .... fommuni= 

cations is such that a program to thia end should be undertaken as· •.soon 

as possibleo EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

mo The speaif1c technical plan for the replacement of insecure cryptographic systems and practices of the French M,.F .A .. (set forth in Enclosure 

"A•) should be presented to that Ministry 1n accordance with the approach 

set forth in piragre.phs 49 through 5J of mclosure "B111 o J 

n .. Implementation of the plan will require the long~term loan to tho 

French of a limited amount of U.Ka/U.S~ cryptographic equiμnento (Thia 

loan should consist initially of about 20 Combined Cipher Ma.chines {CCM); 

subsequently 60 additional CCM should be ear ... marked for this purposehl the 

latter being phased in consonance with NATO need.so) 

TOP SECRET ACORN 
o. Thia problem should be kept under continuous review until a de· 

cision to approach the French bas been made 8.lld the plan has been im= 

plemented. 

UJOMMPPATIONS 

4. lt is recommended that; 

a. The above conclusions be approved; 

b. The proposed approach am plan be implem9ntad when LSIB and m£IB 

have agreed th&t the requisite conditions have been met; 

c. The respective Chairmen o£ LSIB and ~IB a:nd/or their nominees 

visit Paris in order to brief the U.K. aDd the U.S. Ambassadors and also 

to participate as required; 

do LSIB and USCJB keep this problem t.mder continuous review, and take 

such implementing action as may be agreed to be necessary; 

e. The U'.K. Government provide eight a.Di the u.s.. Government twelve of 

the twenty CCMs required tor initial implementation of the C1'1Ptographic 

plan, and that the additional sixty CCMs be provided by the two Governments 1n a program phased in consonance with their respective NATO 

commitments. 

-4-

TOP SECRET ACORN 
REF ID:A522579 

TO"lJ SECRET ACO:~N 

PLAN FOR IMffiOVING TffE CRY.PrOGRAPHIP ~llUTX OF 

FRENCH DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS 

1., French diplomatic posts should be divided into three categories: 

a. Category I: Posts which handle the most critical information 

and in considerable volume, such as Paris, Lolldon, and Washington., 

b. Category II: Other posts whose communications inclooe 1n£or .. 

mation which should have complete protection., 

c. Category III: All other diplomatic posts. 

Note: 32 of the posts which should be inclllled in Categories 

I and II are listed in Paragraph J below o 

2o The systems recommended for these three categories are: • 

a. For Category 11 

{l) The Combined Cipher Machine (COM) with Simplex settings. The 

word Simplex is used to mean a procedure whereby each message has its 

own rotor arrangement and alignment provided by means or a special key 

list., The lists are prepared for point=to ... point use so that a post 

can decipher only those messages specifically addressed to it. For 

the transmission of mu.ltiple=address messages, a multiple holder Sim~ 

plex key list is also providedo 

(2) A one=time pad syst.9m should be provided as an emergency 

stand=by in this category o The number of posts that will be included 

in Category 1 will be determined by the number of equipnents that can 

be made availableo lt is not yet possible to ascertain the phased 

program for the supply of machines for this purpose primarily be= 

cause of commitments already made to NATO~ A small number of machines 

(approximately 20) can be supplied initially to cover the most impo:r= 

tant posts.. As additional machines become available, £urther posts 

can be changed from Category II to Category Io The greater the number 

of posts which can be included in Category I, the more simple becomes 

the problem of mu.ltiple oneetime pad networks for Category II~ 

bo For Category ll; A numerical two ... part code book with one 0 time pado 

- 5 "" 

TOP SECRET ACORN 
It is recommended that new code books be prepared and issued for this 

purpose. 

c .. For Category III: Selected French diplomatic systems could con"" 

tinue 1n use, new two-part code books with frequent changes being recommended .. 

J. The principal posts to be inclllied in Categories I and II are as 

tollows: 

Ankara 

Athens 

Baden 

Bangkok 

Belgrade 

Berlin 

Bonn 

Brussels 

Cairo 

Copenhagen 

Djakarta 

The Hague 

.K.arac.b.1 

Lisbon 

Loildon 

Madrid 

Moscow 

New Delhi 

New York 

Oslo 

fur is 

Rabat 

Rangoon 

Rome 

Saigon 

Singapore 

Stockholm 

Taipei 

Teheran 

Tokyo 

Vienna 

Washington 

4o The foregoing will provide the French Ministry ot Foreign Affairs 

with secure systems but it is also necessary that technical assistance be 

provided to insure that the requirements of procedural. and transmission 

security, which are also involved 1n communication security, will be meto 

Theretore, the U.K .. /U .. So Governments are prepared to furnish such assistance and to make available the services ot qualified technicia.ns to as8ist 

the French techniciams on the working levelo 

TOP SECRET ACORN 
I\I D I 1'"l. ~ '- . 

FAQTS Bl:fAR.1NG ON THE PRQftI.EM AND DIX USSlON 

IND& OF CONT,ENTS 

EO 3.3(h)(2) ParagraJ2l!s 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

GENERAL STATEMENT la3 

CONSIDERATIONS AS TO FRENCH INTERNAL INSECURITY 4-11 

PERSONNEL AND P.HISICAL S~ URITY OF FRENCii CRYPI'OGRAPHIC SERVICES 12=16 

FR.ll.CH MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS 17~19 

FR.KNCH DIPLOMATIC COMMlllillCATIONS 20=24 

APPROACH TO THE FRENC HI 25=26 

T:CHNICAL PLAN FOR IMfROVEMENT OF FRENCH DIPLOMATIC 

COMMUNICATIONS 2,7,,,.35 

ADVANTAGES A.till DISADVANTAGES :urnmENT IN THE IJ .. K./U.S. 

PROPOSAL FOR THE IMfROVEMENT OF FRENCH DIPLOMATIC 

COMMUNICATIONS S~URITI J6-J7 

ASSESSMENT OF LIKELIHOOD AW &.TENT OF RISKS INVOLVED J8~45 

CONDI'l'IONS GOVERNING AN APPROACH TO THE FRENCH 46=48 

MEANS OF tPPROAC H 49-53 

NE::ESSITY FOR FURTHER STUDY ;4 ... 57 

"" 7 = 

TOP SECRET ACORN 

Page 

8 

8 

10 

11 

11 

13 

14 

16 

18 

19 

21 

22 
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROB.LEM AND Dl&iUSSION 

GENmtJ. $TAT§Lft:NT 

1. Intelligence may be derived from cryptocommunicationa b,y any or 

all of the following methods: 

a. By obtaining physical possession of the exact texts or the substance of the communications (hereaf'ter called Method 1); 

b. By obtaining physical possession of the cryptomaterial (Keylists, code books, etc .. ) necessary for direct reading of the inter .. 

cepted traffic {hereafter called Method 2); 

c. By interception and cryptanalysis of the communications 

(hereafter called Method J)o EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

2. With respect to intelligence derivable from present i'rench commi.mi ... 

cations, the u.s.S.R. is in a position to employ all three methods, 

Jo The U.K. am the IJ.So Governments have the technical knowledge re ... 

I 

quired for improving the security of French diplomatic communications to 

a degree sufficient and necessary to de~ Method J to the u .. s.s.R.. They 

r 'L, also have knowledge of security practices which, if enforced, would pro ... 

vi.de reasonable assurance of denying Methods l and 2 to the u.s .. s.R& 

However, the denial of .Methods l and 2 will depend ultimately upon pb.ysical 

security as well as the reliability and discretion of those who are respon~ 

I, • 

sible for handling and safeguarding classified 1n£ormation in the French 

l . 

Government, am especially in the Cryptographic Service of the French MiniCONSIDmATIONS AS TO FR.ENCH INT.ERNAL IN~ URI'U EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

a number 

ot French Government Departments and Agencies are at present, am to varying degrees, infiltrated with French Communists and other disloyal or untrustworthy personnelo Although there is no positive evidence of extensive 

penetration by U.S.S9R. agents, the U.Ko and the U.S. Governments cannot 

TOP SECRET ACORN 
afford to disregard this probabilityo 

5. Although neither the IJ.K. nor the UoSo Government bas positive evidance that French Communists or u.s.s.R .. agents in French Government offices 

have passed classified information 1n volume to the U.S.SoR., the assumption 

that it occurs not only sporadically but continuously also cannot be disre .. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 garded. 

lolent internal dissensions, personal, departmental and inter-departmental ftu.ds within am among some French Government Departments and Agencies have .led to the 

disclosure or classif'ied i.nformationo 

7. although 

the French Government has regulations for the protection of classified intormation, these are not enforced and that in at least some French Government 

Departments and Agencies there has been gross carelessness in the storage and 

handling of -classified documents o 

8. A Tripartite Group (U.K .. , u • .s .. , and French) is DOW surveying am 

sti.dying the internal security of the French Government, especially in regard 

to the nature aDd adequac1 of French regulations and facilities for the proa 

tection or classified informationo 

9. Some improvements in French internal security have been made recently 

and to a certain degree disloyal elements have been eliminated. 1''urther im• 

provements in internal security JJJB3 be expected as a result of the work of 

the Tripartite Groupo 

10. Available evidence suggests that insecurity prevails in French Departmanta and Agencies as indicated belows 

a. Air }iU.nistry. This Ministr1 is a particularly bad off ender, both 

as regards penetration and lack of discipline in the application 0£ seCU= 

rity procedures. 

bo Armed Forces. In the Ar~ and the Air Force, probably less than 

5 percent o! the officers are Communists, but the percentage in the ranks 

is considerably higher, possibly 15=20 percent. ln the Navy, these percent.ages are considerably less. 

= 9 "" 

TOP SECRET ACORN 
c. P.T.T. (Posts and Telegraphs). This administration is seriously 

penetrat.Qd by Communistso 

d. The s.D.E.C.E. (French Secret Service} and the Surete do not meet 

the security requirements of high-grade intelligence and security serviceso 

e. ln.C1tances of insecurity have been fourn in the Ministries of Detense, Armaments, Industrial Production and Labor, in the Atomic Energy 

Commission, and in various nationalized industries .. 

llo As regards the French M.F .A., the Ministry particularly concerned in 

this report, there is little verifiable evidence ot insecurity, although 

there are grounds for suspicion; nevertheless a certain proportion of plain· 

language texts of French diplomatic telegrams is no doubt circulated among 

other Departments and Agencies known to be insecure. 

PERSQNNEL AND PHYSICAL ~ URITI OF FR.EtfJH CRIPl'OGRAPHIC smVICI§ 

l2o Disloyalty on the pirt of cryptographic personnel or penetration by 

enemy agents into cryptographic offices is recognized as the greatest 

hazard to the security of cryptographic communications and the one moat 

difficult to eliminateo The UoK~ and the lJoS. Governments have found that 

special procedures are necessary to combat this hazard and have established 

special provisions for the .Ph1'sical security of the premises on which 

cryptographic activities are cocdl.lCtedo 

lJ. Neither the U.K .. nor the u.s .. Government bas information concerning 

the physical security procedures of the French cryptographic services or 

the methods employed for screening their personnel. 

14. tieither tbe U.K. nor the U.S .. Government has direct evidence of Communist penetration of the French cryptographic services, but in view or the 

general comitions described in paragraphs 4 through 11, they must assume 

tbat such penetration exists here alsoo {There is some evidence to indi• 

cate iru?ecurity arising from careles&:SD.ess of individual members of these 

services and inadequate physical security.) 

15 .. There can be.. no assurance that the U.S.,SoR. would be denied intelligenoe by means of Methods 1 and 2 until personnel ar:d physical security in 

the French cryptographic servicea attain standards acceptable to the U.K. 

and the UoSo Governmentso 

~ 10 -

TOP SECRET ACORN 
160 The foregoing considerations are applicable to the C.cyptographic 

Service of the French M .. F oA .. and are therefore of pu-ticular concern 

in this reporto 

FIW£H MILITARY COWUliICATIO?jS EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

l7o The UoK• and U.S. authorities, having agreed upon the desirability of 

improving NATO communications, have offered to provide, inter alia, the Com .. 

bined Cipher Machine (CCM) for ~ATO communications, an ofter already accepted 

by the Frencho It should be noted that this is being done through the multi~ 

lateral mechanism or NATO I l 

EO 3 3(h)(~ PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

It is felt that this aspect of insecurity in French military communications 

directly, through the precedent established in providing l..he GCM \.as the mlli• 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

tary cipher machine £or NATO communicationso PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

190 In view of the foregoing, and because it is considered that the prim&.cy 

source of present loss of important intelligence through insecure communications is in the diplomatic and NATO spheres, the remainder of this Enclosure 

is devoted exclusively to the situation as regards French diplomatic commlUlications. EO. 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

FRENCH DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS 

= H.'"' 

TOP SECRET ACORN 
I 

2.20 1n regard to the current French diplomatic communications, observed 

French practices in cryptographic system design and distribution provide 

direct evidence that the present cryptographic organization or the French 

M.F .A. does not possess the necessary crypurnalytic knowledge to insure pr()• 

vision or systems afi'ording adequate cryptographic security, or, if it does 

possess the requisite knowledge, the ini'ormation is not being applied or 

properly employed. Except as regards one machine system 0£ limited appllcation reterred to in i;aragraph JJ, aai with the further exception of cPrtain 

I 

isolated cases which may involve one 0 time pads,/ 

J 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

... 12 ... 

TO·P SECRET ACORN 
2.3o Although a tradition of sound communication securit.y doctrine did 

exist in France, the current cryptographic practices observed 1n French 

diplomatic traffic indicate that the French have fallen far behind the U~K. 

and the UoS .. in matters pertaining to communication security. Therefore, 

technical assistance from outside the Cryptographic Service of the French 

M.F.Ao is deemed essential for the success of any communication security 

programo 

240 Satisfactory improvement in the security of the communications of the 

French M.F .. Ao will necessitate.. a drastic and expensive reorganization of its 

Cryptographic Service and that: 

a. The current cryptographic systems of the M.F .. A. be replaced with 

secure systems for use in all important posts; 

bo Technically soum communication security procedures be established; 

Co Adequate training in the use of the new systems and procedures be 

assured; 

do Careful technical supervision be exercised by the French over their 

diplomatic communications in order to maintain communication security. 

APPROACH TO THE FRENCH I 

.........!====================::::;----' 25. An approach to the French._l ____________ ...... lhas\been con .. 

sidered, such an approach to be restricted to offering the French\ M.F ,,A., 

cryptographic material, incllliing macbines, l ... _________ ....--......------

260 .:»uch an approach is deemed inadvisable for the following reasons: 

a. The impact on the French is likely to be too feeble to etfe.c t the 

desired result., A drastic overhaul of the Cryptographic Service of the 

French M.F .Ao is needed and this would require the allocation of ad.ditione.l funds which would probably not be forthcoming unless the French 

receive a major shock .. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

bo Even if the French acquiesced, there would, in th~ absence of assurances of improved security, remain the possibility of the UoSoSoRo acquiring the necessary cryptographic mater~s through Method 2o 

Co Any half hearted approach might prejtXlice a later approach based 

.__ ___________ _.I rl.l.l"thermore, any approach by stages might lay 

""lJ ... 

TOP SECRET ACORN 
TO_I) 

the UoKo am the UoSo Governments open to French accusations of 

insincerity. 

do Acceptance by the French Mof .Ao of participation by lloK./UoS .. 

experts in the necessary drastic reorganization or its Cryptographic 

Service would not be likely to follow this approacho 

e. The necessary number of cipher machines tor this purpose is not 

available to meet French needso ~ven if' they were available, it could 

be anticipated that other NATO countries would make similar dame.Dis 

which could not be meto 

1'£I;HNICAL PLAN FOR lltffiOVEM!!:NT OF FRE!(:H DlPLQMhTIC COMMUljICATIONS 

270 E.nclosure 11A" presents a plan for improving the security of French 

diplomatic commwU.cationso EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

280 This plan has been drawn up with two main objects in viewa firat, 

to insure that there shouldf 

Ito provide the maximum protection against L-~~~~~~~~~~ 

the effects of partial u.s.s.R .. penetration by Methods 1 aai 2o 

\\ 

290 The CCM has obvious operational advantages as compared with existing 

slower and more laborious hand systemso For the transmission of interrw.tional 

diplomatic or highest-level military traffic dealing with NATO affairs, the 

French have been provided with TY.PEX. machines and they are presently using 

a Simplex procedure with these machines in the highest echelons of NATO; the 

CCM is also being offered to them, as well as to other NATO signatories, for 

1-iA.TO communications and has already been accepted by the Frencho Adequate 

training in the new systems will therefore be simplified as a result of previous experienceo 

.30o The localization introduced by using Simplex procedures with the CCM 

has a double advantage. First, it increases crypt.osecurity generally {an 

operating error will involve at most the compromise or one message as opposed to that of all the traffic sent in one day on a particular channel); 

secondly, it there should be an instance of penetration by the u .. s.s.R. at 

any cryptographic installation other than the central Paris offices, the 

= 14 .. 

TOP SECRET ACORN 
dangers result.ing from such penetration would be confined to those cryptonets 

in which that installation is involvedo EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

310 The plan in Enclosure "An proposes for a level of commun!catio.ns designated as Category II a nWD9r1oal two-part code book v1th one-t1:ms pad. The 

advantages pointed out in paragraph JO apply equally to the one-time pad 

cryptonetso Considerable experience on the part of the British (and particularly of their Foreign Office) in the field or one-time pid USE:1.ge has shown 

the implementation or complex one .... time pad networks to be entirely practicableo 

320 There will be an important and major requirement to instruct the French 

M.F.A. in the large-scale production of one-time pe.dso It is not improbable 

that the M.F.A. is very little versed in these uses of IBM/Hollerith machinery 

and has at present very little, if any, of the equipment avail1::ble. Adequate 

detailed technical instruction can nevertheless be given to the French technicians without disclosing crypt.analytic informationo 

.340 lt is not felt that other ma.chine systems available elsewhere in the 

French Government would be proposed or adopted for use by the French MoF.oA 

{despite the fact that the Modified a .. 211, ror example, may equal the CCM 

in operational efficiency), due to the limited supply available and the cost 

c> 15 .. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SECRET ACORN 
of new machines which would have to be manufacturedo In 'addition, the 

adoption of the CCM would follow a pattern already started for top-level 

NATO diplomatic communications and thereby provide greater unifomity and 

simplicity or organizationo 

35. Owing to the lim.1ted U.K./U.S. stock of CCMs am to the fact that 

undertakings already made in respect to NATO requirements tor thia machine 

cannot be met from existing stocks but call for new production, it is necessary to devise a phased program for the allocation of CCMs to the French 

M.F.A. lt is considered that ultimately a total of 80 equipments should be 

ear-marked for this purpose but in the light of the above an initial immediate 

issue or about 20 equipnents should be made,. Of these, the lJ.K. can provide 

approximately 8, the U.S., 12 machineso The extent to which the issue of the 

remainder should be phased in relation to the NATO plan must be a matter for 

discussion and agreement between the U.Ko aoo the CI.So Government.so 

ADV~TAGES AND DISADVAl~TAGES lNHbiREtiT IN THE Q,K./u.s. 

ffiO.FQSAL FOR TijE IMffiOVEMENT OF FRENCH DIPLOMATIC 

COMMUlUCATIONS SEP URITY 

360 lf the 11.K,/J.So plan for improving French diplomatic communications 

security is successful, then, subject to the conditions noted in paragraphs 

46 through 5.3 below, the following advantages would result: 

a. Assuming that the u.s.s.R, is reading a significant proportion of 

the Frenoh diplomatic traffic, the u.s.S.R. would be denied (l) its 

speediest, most reliable, and, possibly, its most prolific source of information on French foreign policy; (2) a speedy and reliable source of information on Western policy in all matters calling for effective French participation; and (.3) a valuable source on cooiitions in countries other than 

France, as reflected in French diplomatic traff'ico 

bo Denial to the u.s.S.Ro of information from COMI.NT sources would be 

seriously detrimental to the efficiency of' u.S.S.Ro intelligence organizations ao::l thereby diminish the value of' in.formation derived from penetration by means of agentso (The UoK .. and the IJ~So members agree that an ex~ 

tensive and continuous flow of communications intelligence is a more rapid 

and a more reli~•ble source of information than are the covert operations of 

any organization of' agents; it is largely prerequisite to optimum intelli· 

gence operationso) 

- 16 -

TOP SECRET ACORN 
co Both Uolio and U0 S0 Governments azxl individual o£f'ic1als would be 

able to negotiate more freely ill direct dealings with the French. 

d. Steps taken to improve the security of communications of the French 

i~.F .A. may pave the way aild assist in steps to improve the over-all internal 

security of the i'rench Government, and, since that Government is one of the 

more important members of NATO, will improve the security of NATO as a whole. 

37. The following are disadvantages either inherent in or possible results 

EO 3.3(h)(2) of the proposed approach to the French M.F .A.: PL 86-36/50 usc 3605 

co Political disadvantages through I lcollaboration,. It would appear that the political impact of the diae.dvantage described in 3?b{2) above would be greatly increased if such a 

activity. It would become obvious that despite the evident political dif .... 

farences between the U.Ko and the U.S. Governments, they have been able/to 

collaborate effectively in the present instance in a field where national 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

secrets are given the highest safeguards. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

d. The creation cf a false sense or security on the part or O.K .. and 

U.S. offioialso The removal or evidence of insecurity in French d1plomatic communications may, 

lead to the unwarranted assumptiol,l that ....._~~~~~~~~~~~~~~----! 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

... 17 ... PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SECRET ACORN 
other French security weaknesses have also been correctedo 

ASSESSMENT OF t.IKELIHOOD A!ID &T.ljiNT OF RISK§ lNVOLVW 

.380 Despite the possibility that political instability in the b'rench 

Government may arrect the permanence or continuity or remedial measures 

1hich may now be applied to French inaecurityD it is not felt that this 

consideration applies so directly to this problem as to precl\Jie an apEO 3.3(h)(2) proach to the French M.F 9A,. PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

390 The disclosure of 

may generate pressure from the French for 

j.s suggested by the French as a con ... 

L-~~~~~~~~~~--' 

dition for their acceptance of extensive UoK../U.S. intrusion in their cryptographic affairs, this suggestion must be firmly rejectedo lt i.s not conEO 3.3(h)(2) sidered that this problem presents a major obstacle.. PL 86-36/50 usc 3605 

400 ~ven if all three methods of obtaining intelligence from French diplomatic communications were largely denied to the U.S.SoR~, it is considered 

that, I 

______ __, I This risk is not inherent in the UoKo/UoSo technical plan for 

improvement or French diplomatic communication security, but lies rather 1n 

the pos~ibility that the French will be unable to safeguard effectively the 

j It is felt tba t an approach can be devised which will pro= L------

vide some assurance in this regardo (The development of the cryptography 

EO 3.3(h)(2) of most of the cowitries concerned has not in fact illdicated that theJf:>L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

always respood effectively to such revelationso) 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 US~ 3605 

420 It must be emphasized that the advantages enumerated in paragraph 36 

are largely contingent upon sufficient improvement in French internal security to deny the U.~oS.R. intelligence derived from Methods 1 and 2o If' a 

U.Ka/U.Sc plan for improving the security of French diplomatic communica• 

tions is adopted and ma.de effective, thus denying Method J to the UoS.SoR& 

TOP SECRl1r ACORN 
-..;..mT~fb.....-n....... ___....,s~m._. --~--lllP~" :iv .... .J...:.A.__ .. M .......... -2~~~~ ...... p,....._....uf-t"'INld--- E.O 3.3(h)(2) 

PL.86-36/50 USC 3605 

without eliminating Method 2, then the U.SoSoRo will still have the benefit 

of the Methods l and 2., If both .Methods 2 and J were denied the UoS.S .. R. 

there would still be a significant direct leakage of intelligence to the 

U.S.S.Ro through the Soviet intelligence organization 8.Ild French Communist 

Party channels., I 

4)o Referring to the disadvantages noted in paragraph J7c, it ia felt that 

these political dise.dvantages are outweighed by the gains to be derived if the 

improvement in the security or communications of the French M.F.A. is effectiveo 

44., Referring to the disadvantage noted in paragraph .3?d, avoidance of the 

false sense of security mentioned therein is a problem the solution of which 

lies within our own control. 

45. It is felt, theref'ore, that, by recognizing certain conditions ani establishing specific means of obtaining satisfactory assurances with regard to 

them, the likelihood and extent of' the risks involved can be so reduced as to 

realize a suffici~nt gain aDd warrant an approach to the French M.F .A. The 

paragraphs which follow deal with these conditions am means. 

CONDlTlONS GOVERNfNG AN APPROACH TO THE FRENCH 

460 In order to induoe the French M.F .A. to undertake the drastic overhaul 

required for real improvement in its communications security, any U.K. or U.S .. 

appr"Oe.Ch should be calculated to shock the Ministry into making a major efforto 

It is considered that the only effective and practicable shock would be the 

47 .. Revelation of ent.ELils such groQ.Ve risks that it should be subject ,___ _ ____, 

to the comitions outlined below: EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

a. Prior to the initial approach there must be valid indications that the 

• • 

French 14.F .Ao and those other French Government DepLrtments and Agencies which 

have access to M.F.A .. communications containing information handled on a c.lassified basis by the U.K. or the U.S. Governments have the intent and capability 

to establish arrangements to protect this information; these arrangements must 

be suf'ficient, in the agreed opinion of the U.K .. and the Uo.So Governments, to 

warrant making an initial approacho 

- 19'"' 

TOP SECRET ACORN 
bo The initial approach must be me.de at a point of cont.t:'.ct in the 

French MuFoA~, which contact is discreet, reliable, and at a level of 

sufficient authority" This contact should be in.formed: 

• (3) that, ehou..l.d he not believe this etatemnt, a demonstration 

will be given to hie experts provided he will give assurances tha.t 

his Ministry will~ 

(a) undertake an energetic program tor reorganiut1on of its 

Cryptographic Aervice and appropriate roplacenent or its present 

cryptographic e7steme and practices; 

(b) 8 caept without qualitioation and promulgate U.K./u .. s. 

essential standards ot security in each phase and a.epeot of the 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

proeram; PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

(c) accept direct UoKo/UoSo participation in executing the 

program, 1oolud1ng participation on a vorkins level b7 representatives QW!l.litied in the field of general eecur1t7 as well ae all 

aspects of commun1cat1one eeourit,y., 

c.. Should a 

be mmeoeesar.y to oODT1nce the contact as to the 

nevertheless, before &DJ' further steps in the prosra,m are underte.Dn, the assurances set forth in paragraph b(3) must still be obta1nedc1 

~. In 1nf'orm1ns the French M.F uA. 

-20 -

TO·P SECRET ACORN 
Thees should be selected so ae to reveal the minimum 

E:b.3.3(h)(2) 

amount of technical information, which should be restricted to th41>L 86~36/50 usc 3605 

level o sfateme. If' any diecloeure of 

should be found 

neceae817 in order to obtain French acceptance to the condittone epeci-

~ied in parasrsph 47b, such disclosure will not be ma.de without prior 

agreement between the U .K. and the U.S. Governments. 

MEANS OF APPROACH 

49. An initial approach to the MoF oA~ at a level of sufficient authority 

offers a choice between the Minister and the Secretary ... Generalo It is considered that the latter would be the more suitable point of initial approach 

for the following reasons: 

a .. The Seoreta.ry.,General is a permanent official, while the Minist.er 

is liable to replacement; 

bo As a Depirtment official, the Sec.reta.ry.,,,General is more likely 

than the Minister to take a comprehensive ani continuous view of the 

problem; 

c. The outstanding personality and known reliability of the Secretary= 

General, M .. Alexamre Parod111 are believed to be such as to offer good 

prospects of effective implementation of the UoK./UoS. plana 

50. All subsequent widening of the circle of discussion will. require precise definition and prior UaKo/U.S., agreemente EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

5lo The various risks arising and 

particularly 

require that 

the French have been associated in the pa.sto EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

52., There would be distinct advantages in a U,,K.,/U~So joint approach 

based on joint consultation and joint J:'ecommendations in the light of t,he 

....__ ____________ ..... ! In;few of the £a.ct that a considerable effort 

on the inrt of the French is required~ the mP..X:L:u'..:.::l ava11able pressure must 

be exartedo 

TOP SECR]ET ACORN 
53a Inasmuch as the U.,K. and the UoS. Ambassadors in Paris have already bean 

apprised of this problem end in vieii of their official positions, it is 

logical that they should make the initial approach to Mo Parodi., 

N:OOESSITX FOR FURTHER STUQI 

540 ln view or the raot that certain or the conditions to be met by the 

French Government prior to the approach to the French M.F .Ae are not yet 

satis£1ed, and in order to exercise some supervision over the implementation 

or the plan for improving the .security of French diplomatic communications, 

it is desirable tb.at LS.I.B am l.ISClB keep the pl"'OblcrJ ucdar contiouo:.:.'! re~.rict"l' u 

55. Wi1en the UoKo and UGSo Ambassadors make their initial contact with 

the French M.F.A.,, it would be advisable th.at the respective Chairmen BIYl/or 

nominees visit Paris to brief their Ambassadors, and also to plrticipa.te as 

required.o 

56., Since it 1B impossible to foresee all contingencies in making the 

approach am in implementing the cryptographic plan, it is advisable that 

LSIB and USCIB be authorized to take such additional implementi.tlg action as 

they may agreeo 

570 When LSIB and USCIB agree that the requisite security conditions have 

been met, it is advisable that the approach be initiated without further 

authorizat.iono 

- 22 -

TOCP SECRET ACORN