1

The plaintiff’s claim also named as defendants Bradley County and its county sheriff, Daniel R. Gilley. These

claims are not before us on this appeal.

2

“State employee” is defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-42-101(3)(A) (2002). See also Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-

112(a) (1999).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

 Assigned on Briefs January 3, 2003

GLENDA COOPER v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

 Appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission, Eastern Division

No. 20101387 Vance W. Cheek, Jr., Commissioner

FILED JANUARY 27, 2003

No. E2002-02415-COA-R3-CV 

This is a wrongful death action filed against the State of Tennessee1 with the Tennessee Claims

Commission. The State filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that it was not liable

for the actions of the Bradley County Sheriff, whose negligence is alleged to be the proximate cause

of the death of the plaintiff’s intestate. The Claims Commission, relying upon the case of Spurlock

v. Sumner County, 42 S.W.3d 75 (Tenn. 2001), held that the sheriff was not a state employee2 but

rather a county officer. It dismissed the claim against the State. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Claims Commission

Affirmed; Case Remanded

CHARLES D. SUSANO,JR.,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which HOUSTON M. GODDARD,

P.J., and D. MICHAEL SWINEY, J., joined.

John C. Cavett, Jr., Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, Glenda Cooper, individually and as

the Administratrix of the Estate of William Burl Cooper, II.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; and Mark

A. Hudson, Senior Counsel, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION
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I.

Glenda Cooper sued the State in her individual capacity and as the Administratrix of the

Estate of William Burl Cooper, II. Her complaint arises out of the death of her son, who was shot

and killed by one Travis Best, a former state prisoner, on April 7, 2000. The complaint alleges that

Best had previously been serving a state sentence in the custody of the Sheriff of Bradley County at

the county workhouse. It is alleged in the complaint that the sheriff illegally released Best before

he had fully served his sentence. The plaintiff charges that the sheriff is legally responsible for her

son’s death and that his malfeasance occurred while the sheriff was serving both as an agent of

Bradley County and as an agent of the State.

As previously indicated, the Claims Commission determined that the sheriff was not a state

employee and that, consequently, the plaintiff could not pursue a claim against the State. The

plaintiff appeals, contending the sheriff was acting as a state employee when he improperly released

Best. The issue on this appeal is simply this: Does a county sheriff act as a state employee when

he or she takes action with respect to a state prisoner in the sheriff’s custody?

II.

Both parties rely upon language in the Supreme Court case of Spurlock v. Sumner County,

42 S.W.3d 75 (Tenn. 2001). In Spurlock, the Sumner County Sheriff’s Department investigated the

plaintiffs in connection with a murder. Id. at 76. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that, in

spite of a lack of evidence connecting them to the crime, the sheriff’s department continued to focus

the investigation on them. Id. 

The fabricated testimony of an informant led to the plaintiffs’ convictions and sentences of

life imprisonment. Id. Subsequently, a new investigation into the murder revealed information that

eventually resulted in other individuals confessing to the murder. Id. Thereafter, the plaintiffs’

convictions were vacated. Id.

The plaintiffs then filed suit against, among others, Sumner County in the United States

District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, claiming that the defendants had conspired to

wrongfully convict the plaintiffs of murder, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1988. Id.

The plaintiffs premised their claim against Sumner County on Monell v. Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978), which held that liability may be

imposed against local governments for policies that give rise to constitutional torts. The plaintiffs

argued that they were harmed by the law enforcement policies established by the Sumner County

sheriff. Spurlock, 42 S.W.3d at 77. In a motion to dismiss, Sumner County countered that the

sheriff “did not speak with final policymaking authority for the county,” as the law in Tennessee

recognizes the sheriff as a county officer rather than a state officer. Id. Because the district court

found the law in Tennessee to be ambiguous on this subject, it certified the following question to the
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Tennessee Supreme Court: “‘Does a sheriff, when acting in a law enforcement capacity, [act] as a

state [official] or [as a] county official under Tennessee law?’” Id. at 76 (bracketing in Spurlock).

The Tennessee Supreme Court began its analysis with an examination of McMillian v.

Monroe County, Alabama, 520 U.S. 781, 117 S. Ct. 1734, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1997), in which the

United States Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether an Alabama sheriff was a state or

county official. The United States Supreme Court adopted two principles to guide its analysis:

First, the question is not whether [the sheriff] acts for Alabama or

Monroe County in some categorical, “all or nothing” manner. Our

cases on the liability of local governments under § 1983 instruct us to

ask whether governmental officials are final policymakers for the

local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue....Thus,

we are not seeking to make a characterization of Alabama sheriffs

that will hold true for every type of official action they engage in. We

simply ask whether [the sheriff] represents the State or the county

when he acts in a law enforcement capacity.

Second, our inquiry is dependent on an analysis of state law.... This

is not to say that state law can answer the question for us by, for

example, simply labeling as a state official an official who clearly

makes county policy. But our understanding of the actual function of

a governmental official, in a particular area, will necessarily be

dependent on the definition of the official’s functions under relevant

state law....

Id. at 785-86, 117 S. Ct. at 1737 (citations omitted). The Court then determined that “Alabama

sheriffs, when executing their law enforcement duties, represent the State of Alabama, not their

counties.” Id. at 793, 117 S. Ct. at 1740. However, the Court went on to state that “since it is

entirely natural that both the role of sheriffs and the importance of counties vary from State to State,

there is no inconsistency created by court decisions that declare sheriffs to be county officers in one

State, and not in another.” Id. at 795, 117 S. Ct. at 1742.

After examining McMillian, the Tennessee Supreme Court – noting that “Tennessee law has

not always clearly defined whether sheriffs function as state or county officers”– sought to clarify

the law on this issue. Spurlock, 42 S.W.2d at 78. Following the road map of McMillian, the Court

first looked to the Tennessee Constitution, which “designates sheriffs as members of county

government rather than as members of the state executive department.” Spurlock, 42 S.W.3d at 78

(citing Tenn. Const. art. VII, § 1). Second, the Court stated that the Tennessee Constitution provides

that “the sheriff, along with other county officials, is to be elected by the voters of the county, and

vacancies in the office of sheriff are to be filled by the county legislative body.” Spurlock, 42

S.W.3d at 78 (citing Tenn. Const. art. VII, §§ 1, 2). Third, state law provides that the county rather

than the state is responsible for paying the sheriff’s salary and other expenses associated with the
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office. Spurlock, 42 S.W.3d at 79; see generally Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-24-101, et seq. (2002). The

Court reasoned that this factor supported a holding that the sheriff was a county officer, predicated

on the Court’s earlier observation that “‘[t]he primary badge of a State officer is that the Legislature

provide that the State pay the salary of the office.’” Spurlock, 42 S.W.3d at 79 (quoting Durham

v. Dismukes, 206 Tenn. 448, 454, 333 S.W.2d 935, 938 (1960)).

In addition, the Court pointed out that the sheriff’s duties “when acting in his or her law

enforcement capacity ordinarily extend only to the border of the county in which the sheriff was

elected,” Spurlock, 42 S.W.3d at 79 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 38-3-102 (1997)), and that “the

overall duties of the office of sheriff, which are defined by statute, are largely applicable within the

sheriff’s county.” Spurlock, 42 S.W.3d at 79; see generally Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-201, et seq.

(2002). The Court also found it quite significant that the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the

GTLA”) provides that counties are liable for the negligent acts of their sheriffs under certain

circumstances. Spurlock, 42 S.W.3d at 80 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101, et seq. (2000 &

Supp. 2002)).

Relying upon these and other factors, the Court clarified Tennessee’s ambiguous position

with respect to the governmental classification of a sheriff by holding that “the sheriff serves as a

county official when acting in his or her law enforcement capacity.” Spurlock, 42 S.W.3d at 82.

The Court expounded upon this holding by adopting the language used by Justice Ginsburg in her

dissent in McMillian, stating that, in Tennessee, “‘[a] sheriff locally elected, paid, and equipped,

who autonomously sets and implements law enforcement policies operative within the geographic

confines of a county, is ordinarily just what he [or she] seems to be: a county official.’” Spurlock,

42 S.W.3d at 82 (quoting McMillian, 520 U.S. at 804, 117 S. Ct. at 1746 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting))

(bracketing in Spurlock).

III.

We agree with the State’s interpretation of the Spurlock case as it relates to the facts of the

case at bar. When the sheriff released Best from his custody, the sheriff was acting in his role as a

law enforcement officer. As sheriff, he was responsible for the county workhouse. It is clear that

the prisoners housed there – be they state prisoners or county inmates – were in the sheriff’s custody

because he was the chief law enforcement officer of Bradley County. The responsibilities related

to the care and custody of prisoners held in county facilities are obligations imposed by law upon

county sheriffs, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-201(3) – sheriffs being the individuals who have been

elected by the people of the various counties to perform these and other law enforcement functions.

If the sheriff was guilty of actionable negligence in releasing Best and that negligence was the

proximate cause of the death of the plaintiff’s son, Bradley County is legally responsible for the

sheriff’s conduct under the GTLA. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-102(2), (3) (2000). The State of

Tennessee is not. Under Spurlock, it is clear that the sheriff was not acting as an employee or agent

of the State when he released Best.
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IV.

The judgment of the Claims Commission is affirmed. This matter is remanded to the Claims

Commission for the collection of costs assessed there, pursuant to applicable law. Costs on appeal

are taxed to Glenda Cooper.

_______________________________

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE