".:.. ·. .e. . -

' ~~ii!~ .. ~.!, ~9!:2!!!:~~~b == 

wi•ai:•• la,allitlaaw aa·a·itr ·aw.!aHnna end e:·*bed·d tq mehw •be in'ctnne•ion mportM hprrrig 

i0P BEHJK' 0AB9S • 880'9H:lH INPeRMA'RQB . 

.itilNU'l'ES OF POURTB MEETING 

m CONFEREES· 

FRE?lCH COMMUIICATIOHS ·SECURITY CO NFERENC& 

1000 TUISDAY, 2 JUN.E 1953 

Room 19-232B, u. s. IAVAL SECURI'l'Y STATION 

WASHINCl'l'OB, D. Co 

Thea e pr ea em were: 

114·. · W. ·Po Pr1 adman, WSA, Oba il'man 

Mr. R. F.· Paak&l'd (State) M~. W. Ho Godel (OSD) M~. s. D. Bl11a (FBI) Mr. P. B. R~wlett (CIA} 

Co.pt.e R. L. Ta1lor, USN (lav7) 

Capt. G. Grange,. UUI (Bav7) 

Col. M. ,L. Sherburn, USA· (Army) 

Lt. Col. J~ M •. ~eraon; USAF (Air Force) 

Le 0 It~ B. ll.OD'JP8D'J, Jr 0 ' Seal' et$J.-J" ( NSA) 

ISA Observers 

Dr. L. E. Shinn 

Dr. H. J "· Stuke7 

Mr. Prank Austin 

L•. F. A. Raven 

1. The m1nutea of thB third meeting were considered 

and· pa.ragaph 5 waa amended b7 deleting the last two 

sentences. The minutes we.l"e then approved as amen:! ed. 

2. '.rhe Contereace took note ot the Memoramum tor· 

the Chairman, U.S. Delegation, dated 1 June, 1953, signed 

b7 the Executive seoretar7, t:ECIB. 

3o The Chairman next placed betar e the conf'el'eea 

the l'&Yiaed pages .of the Pol7zoides .repOl't and noted the 

changes nade b7 tSCIB. A detailed discussion was held ~oncerD;ing the possible meanings ot a "demonstration ot 

proper· techniques" (see pa.ragrapb 2 ot recommendations,. 

page 10 1 Pol7zo1dea report). It was agreed that Ill'. 

Aust1n·11 . Dr. Shinn and ·Mro Raven would outline the _t71>e 

ot. deDJonatl'at1on and explam.tion considered appropriate . and tbat th1• II aftel' approval b'y the u oS 0 Delegation, _,.{((/ I\ ) 

would be pi-e~ented to the Bl'1t1sh during the contel'enc..a7\.1\N.X.·l 

It waa turther ap;reed that this demons trat1 on could be 

detailed to the point permitted b7 USCIB, which means 

1 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY Form1 fu1~0SC TOP SECRET CANOE 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 08-06-2014 pursuant to E .0. 1352a. 
E!o 3, 3 ( h) ( 2) 

J 

that when presented to NATO na tiona it might be ·expected 

to permit ....__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

4o At 1055 the meet1r.e; .recessed un.til 11050 

5o The Chairman then placed befoi•e the conferees 

!'or ''eview the conclua1ona and recommandations resulting 

trom the 1951 oonterenoe on the problem of F;rosnch secur1t7 

and the conferees; ap-~eed to the ·following: 

(Para 3 a.) - The French cryptog~aphic situation 

PL 86-~6/50 USC 3605 

has 1mpl'oved, as indicated in Tab Dot the 

Pol7zo1dea reporta 

(Pa~~L/_3_b __ ._>_-__ Th __ e __ u_os __ o_P_o_s_1_t_1_c_n_n_o_w __ p_s_r_m_1_t_a_\ ______ __,/ 

( Pal'a 

. (Pal'a 

3 Co) - The Cryptographic Se~vice of the FYA 

possesses. necessary cryptanalytic knowledge 

to 1naure provision of s~-stems affcrd1ng .· adequate cryptographic security, but it does 

not possess the ability to enfoJ;'ce rules· aa· 

to proper uaageo 

I . 

3 d.) "'! The OS nan belie'li'es that no drastic 

l'eocgan1zat1on ot the FMA is !"squired·. 

(Para 3 eo) • It is now believed· that rather than 

a· drastic shock the F!"snch should be given 

an "educative touro" 

(Para 3 f o) - This ttpe of shock I 

/ \it is hoped, is not 

necessa.l'J' now. 

(Para 3 go) • The situation with ·~egard to 1nt1lt~at1on of the French government bJ 

d11lo1al persons has shomi soma 1mp~ovemnt, 

but Ii ot verr mucho Such :improvement noted 

baa been in the military and in intell1~enoe 

ageno 1ea 11 but not in the MF.A or other 

minis tr1 es. 

(Para 3 h.) No· change. 

(Par~ 3 ·10) 0 (1) No changea 

(2) No changeo 

.(3') Ho longer a signif'lcant factoro 

2 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY Form1 fJ~~OSC TOP SECRET. CANOE 
..... ~· 

(4) In view of the establishment of a ~Y'' system 1n NATO, French preeeUN~.:'· 

t~ broader y collaboc~tion will 

inc.reaae. 

(Pa~a·~ jp) •The Uq~o Del~gates feel ar~ange0 

. ments foe 1DIP£.,OV8ment should ttcst be t~ied through NATO channels. If, 1n 

d1acusa1ona w1tb. British, it 1• shown 

ihat an. approach to MFA would bo mOl'e 

advisable. this view may be accepted. 

Bow ev el' , an ap pr oaob to t hel 

sbould not be· rm&d·e except as~-.~ ___ ....... I..... a_s,.....t.....;;;.......1 

l.'·88 m't 0 EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

«Para. a k.,) ~ Stl 11 true am thts re1 ntor cea 

reasons for type or approach now be!~ 

recommended by UoSo 

. (·Pa'a ~ 1.) · - The w•genc; tor lmpr·o\'lng the 

11ecurit1 otl . I commuri~­

cst1ona is such tba t 1 t warrants the · 

m pitoposed t1pe or solution to the 

pl'Oblemo 

(Pua 3 m. l ..; Ro longer val~d. 

(P&l'a 3 n.) - No longer valid or.poaatbleo 

Bot enough machines available. 

(P~~a a o.) - Mot applicable~ 

As to HJOOOMMERDATIONS ot l9bl Cont: 

(Pa.ra 4 ao.> .. No longer val1do 

(Para 4 bo) - !BIB and USCIB have not agreedo 

(Pa;ra 4 o.) • No -longer valid o J 

(PM~& 4 do) - Still under ~eviewo 

(Pal'a 4 eo) Not applicable a 

60 ._ M£'o Ocdel suggested and 1t was agreed that a 

log1.cal t7pe ot approach could be to &2'k all NATO nations 

to make. an exam1nati1on to eee if COOMIC traffic were being 

passed 1n m tlonal a7atema. 

NATIONAL .SECURITY AGENCY 
...... 

'fQP 

7. Mr. Aua tin pointed out tba t .b? ua 1ng an approach· thl'ougb NATO, it would be poaaible to co.rrect French 1nsecur1t1 without revealing an7tb1ng beyond what is in owe 

paper a 'l'hia m·uld aleo answer the Fiaench complaint, repOl'"tad 

i_n Par. 5 ot the LSIB memo ot 26 Febl'ual'y 1953 to USCIB, 

concerning 1naecul'1tJ ~ other MATO nat1ona 9 cr7ptos7stema, 

pa.rt1cular11 thca e ot tt.e TUl'!ka and Oreeke o 

8. The Chairman sta~ed that there we~e to be no 

further meetings p.rtm- to the opening or the Conrerence 11 

and added trut th• outline refe.rred to 1n paragcaph. 3, .above 11 

would be d1s tr1bu.ted to tho 'OS Conte.rees after the Plena!"J 

Session. Be alao stated tba t the Conferees should be · prepared to hold meet!nge on Saturda7, 6 Juneo 

9 .. 

meeting. 

There was no tW'ther bus!.ness to come before the 

The meet1rJR adjoUl'ned at 12300 

~~~ Ko Bo MU~·, Secretary 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY Form1 fu~1iOSC TOP SECRET CANOE 
e SEClJRffY 

~o 

INFORMltflEON e 

HGI TO DEHONSTl?ATE COMS~ WEAKNESSES TO }JATO COUNTRIF.8 

lo ao It is believed that ~JATO countries will recognize it to - - - be to the benefit of all for each ta improve his own national communications security.. Any action that may be t.alcen by the UK and US must not 

appear to be an infringement of the national sovereignty of any NATO 

country or a desire to dictate "to any of them. Instead of providing 

for a detailed exm11ination or national practices, ,therefore, it ie .. ... 

preferable to set up mim.mum eecun. ty stand.4rds. These should be ' \ 

promulgated by NATO for national use. Each country wolild be asked to 

evaluate its m-m practices against these standards and to assure MATO 

that that country's security is equal to or better than that which these 

standards would produce. 

____ _.I Its action 1would take three forms:, 

(l) Sponsorship of the ~rograrn thru. Stand:i!ng Group 

I I 

channels and implementation 1Pf it if approved', I 

(2) Pxio'Vision olf assist.a~e and advice., upon• request, I • 

I I 

to individual countr.Lejo EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

(.3) Evaluation of the results of the program:.. 

2. Ulnimum standards c~n oru)y be i:rorlced out in\final to:ti'm after 

I I \ 

1derable discussilon•betwben tH.e UK and the us. Such standards I I 

I 

111st be set forth in1 extreme, detail and I1111st cover all lmown1 national 

I 
-sfi@R«~o 

• DCmtlTY fNf'ORHld'l9N e I r 'I' 

p1·~cticea of ~IA.TO countries in lihe uhola field or conmm.nications security. 

This paper r,ives only a hnro outline or the fields t}la.t must be covered. 

If this approach is ar";reed upon by the UK t:ird us, the QQnference itaelt 

should at least produce an ngreeu list 0£ topics alODQ these lines 

which will be the basis for later preparation of dataile4 aper::if':lcationa, 

J. In addition to physical security of cryptomateri;U., adaquatdt 

comnunicati ons sefll'i ty depends on two principles: 

!.• The p.a. iblem of segregating and identifying ti1~fii.A by 

nation, net, clas.siacation, or system rrmst be m&de as dUt.\.c:'Rlt aa .. possibleJ and 

b. ~.r.vnto;:;raphic systoms must be adequate~ sec~ ~nd properly' 

b. 'As regards the first of these, it will be neces&&r1' to set 

atanciai'ds in the f'ollQwins fields: 

!.• Frequency plans: To include minimum standards fpit fl:pequenc7 

. allol:ation and traquenc)'= fQtation, uith attfpnt:i.on paid to the int8""elatioa between frequency chanaes alld caU s::i.i;n changes. 

~· Format of cipher textj: To include the •taps necas1181'7 to 

oravent segregation of trai't\~ mi the \asis of auG:ll 1N,ngs as lqtll 

of lcryptopar\81, d1!!crim:lnanta_. indigato~. sroup length, etc • 

.2.• M'.es~flge exte~: To il\C;lude auphasis QD eliminating 

a~ external elaments that would fflPiU~~te the i"dent:tticaticm. of 

traffic, e..g., ~tepp toward attainii.di, μr:d.fonii. hearling proce4ures, etc. 

!!• CQ1'111\Unication pziocad~a~; 'i'o inc:lude MaSUl'as for goneral 
---ID~~~~laJ:f..~O 

• SEC-¥ INPORMA'NON e 

s '•:C "fi:'l' 

stmufarrb.·~t'.t:i.on of con11U.nl.Cu .. 1110n proceclurcs, for nttairunant or call sign 

secunty, irlth careful nttention to interrelation o:r call signs and 

a'hlrPsses. 

·- e. Plain lan;;llll.f'le t.ramn11J..ssions: To include steps toward - I 

mi:ni.-:11.&:t,ng transmissions in plcin te:::t end procedurally isolating such 

ploin lBnuiruage as ~u~t bo tranomitted. 

S. !• The traatlnent or cryptographic secur.l. ty 'tdll include 

discussion o! all s.vstems and eqUJ.pments knOtJn to be in use or available . for use by lJA't'-' .tountr:i.es other than mr, us, om Canada and will state 

whether or not thej1'fnro acceptable; i£ they are acceptable minimum 

' standards ldll be prel!lef:i.bod for their use. All syst81118 approved f'or 

NATO use ldll be inclup.ed ih. the consideration. 

b. The fields no,. contemplated for discussion are as follows: 

.. (1) Hand systems: To dnclude unenciphered and enciphered 

codes,. Slidex or other tactical co~es, transpositions, strips, 

additives on plain text, etc. 

(2). Literal, or o:rr-line mac~es: To include all lmown 

Hagelin types, Enigma types, Kryha, etc. 

(3) Teleprinter machines: To incl~ li'ish types, Olivetti, 

Hellschreiber, one-time tape syatems, etc. 

(4) Ke)"-ceneration and criteria theretor~ 

.·