No. 3–08–0692

______________________________________________________________________________ Filed November 18, 2009 IN TH E AP PE LLATE COU RT OF ILLIN OIS THIR D DI STRICT A.D., 2009 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court IL LI NOI S, ) for the 9 th Judicial Ci rcuit, ) McDonoug

h County , Illi

nois ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) No. 07–CF–251 v. ) ) DANIEL R. B ELKN

AP, ) Honorable ) William D. Henderson, Defend ant-App ellant. ) Judge , Pres idin g.

______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE CARTER del ivered t

he opinion

of the co urt:

______________________________________________________________________________ The defendant, Daniel R. Belknap, was c onvicted of first degree murder a nd endangering the life of a child in connection with the death of five-y ear old Silven Yocum in September 2006. 720 IL CS 5/9–1(a)(1), 12–21.6(a) (West 2006). On appeal, the defe ndant raises challenges to the sufficie ncy of the ev idence, the trial

court’s failure to strictly

comply with Supre

me Court Ru

le 431(b) (Official Report Advance Sheet No. 8 ( April 11, 2007), R. 431(b), eff. May 1, 2007), the admission o f certa

in testimon

y, a nd the cou

rt’s ex parte

commu nica tions with t he ju ry . We reverse the defendant’s convictions and r emand for a new trial. I. FACTS The defendant was charg ed with first degree murder and e ndangering the life of a c

hild. Prior to tr ial, the d efenda nt filed se veral mo tions in limine to exclude certain evidenc e. These2

motions inc luded a mo tion to exclu de the te stimony

or evide nce of a ny s tatement

of jailhou se informants Jeff Ahlers and Joseph Burgess and a motion to exclude certain testimony by parame dic Hea

ther Connor as to sta

tements ma

de to her by t he victim’ s mother, Erin Yoc um. The defendant’s trial began on Ma y 19, 2008, with jury selection. On that da y, the court addressed the venire as a gr oup. The court stated: “Every defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond a re asonable doubt. It is the burden of the State to prove their case by proof beyond a

reasonable doubt. The def endant is not requi red to te stify

or to off er any evidenc e on his behalf. If a de fendant does not testify on his own be half, you may

not consider the fact that he didn’t testify

in deciding the question of his guilt or innocence.” The court then called groups of four pote ntial jurors into the courtroom for questioning by the court and the parties. The court asked ea ch small group of potential jurors whether they had read or heard a ny media re

ports abo ut the ca se. I

n addition , the cour

t asked w hether t hey could set aside what they

had learned from those accounts and dec ide the case based solely on the evidence presented in court. The court a lso asked whether the potential jurors had any bias or prejudice against a person simply because that person had been char ged with a crime. Further, the court asked each small group of potential jurors whether they would apply the law a s the court ins tructed

it to be with

out reg ard to the ir own fe elings. Jury selection continued on May 20, 2008. Again, the court addressed the entire venire, stati ng: “In

a crimina

l trial in the United S tates in I llinois, the

defenda nt is3

presume d to be inno cent. Th at presu mption of in

nocenc e stay

s with him throughout the trial until you’ve heard the whole thing and actually make your decision and you dec ide whether he’s innocent or not. The stand ard of pr oof in a c riminal tr ial is proo f bey

ond a rea sonable doubt, and that isn’t defined any more than that. Proof bey ond a reasonable doubt is the stan

dard I ’m sure th e attorn ey s will talk t o yo u about in t

heir ar guments

. In a criminal case, a

defendant is not required to present any evidence. You merely stand mute a nd see what the State can prove. A defenda nt is not required to testify. H e may. He doesn’t have to. That’s up to him. And if he doesn’t testify under the

constitutional system of this country , then that decision cannot be used as part of y our decision-making process. I f he testifies, you c an consider what he say s. If he doesn’t testify , you don’t go the

re.” The court also questioned the small groups of potential jurors, asking the same questions it had

as ke d t he pr ev io us da y. Following opening statements, the trial procee ded with the testimony of Erin Yocum. Erin testified that she was the mother of the victim, Silven Yocum. Silven was five y ears old at the time of her death in September 2006. I n September 2006, Erin was dating the defendant. Erin and Silven did not live with the defendant, but they f requently stay

ed at the defendant’s house. Silven had her own room at the defendant’s house. Du ri ng th e t im e p er io d o f M on da y, S ep te mb er 4, 20 06 , t hr ou gh th e m or ni ng of Fr id ay, September 8, 2006, Erin did not notice any thing unusual with Silven. Silven did not appear to be ill during this time. O n Friday

, Septembe

r 8, Erin p

ut Silven to

bed at the

defenda nt’s home4

betwee n 9:00 and

10:00 p.m. A

t approxima

tely 11 p.m., Er

in left the house to bu

y so me magazines. She was gone for an hour to an hour-and-a-half. When she arrived ba ck at the defenda nt’s home , the def

endant w as in the g arage

with a man

she had n ever be fore met. Erin did not see anyone smoking methamphetamine, and she denied smoking methamphetamine at that time. Erin checked on Silven, who was sleeping. Erin went to bed a t approximately 1:30 a.m. and awoke around 5 a.m. The defenda nt had not slept in the house the previous night and was still in the garage. Silven awoke shortly thereafter. There did not appear to be anything wrong with Silven at that time. Later that morning of

Saturday, September

9, 2006, Erin and Silven painted a doghouse. Silven, however, w as not inte rested in painting , which Er

in though t was unus

ual. Silve

n only wanted to sit on Erin’s lap. At approximately 9 a.m., the de fendant told Silven to go into the house to help him make breakfast. Silven did not want to go and cried. The defendant picked up Silven and carried her into the house. Erin followed 10 to 15 minutes later. Silven ate her breakfast, but did not want to do any thing else. Erin thought that Silven was getting sick, a s Silven was sniffling and coughing. Erin, he rself, had a bad cold at the time. After br eakfas t, Silven a

nd the def

endant w ent for a

ride on hi s four-w

heeler . Erin testified that they wer

e gone for approximately

5 to 10 minutes, and that Silven appeared fine when the y r eturned . Lat

er that afternoo n, Erin te lephoned her brot her and a sked if hi s son, Br ett, could come to the defendant’s house and play with Silven. Erin requested that Brett come and play with Silven because Silven wa s unusually clingy that day. Erin then drove to her brother’s home to pick up Brett, which took approximately 40 minutes. Silven did not go w ith her. After Brett arrived, he and Silven went to jump on the trampoline. Silven did not want to jump,5

however. Erin testified that Brett’s father, Erik, was also pre sent at the defendant’s house on Saturday. Erik ar

rived at approximately 5:30 p.m. to take Br ett to a birthday par

ty. Silven went with Erik when he drove Brett to the party . Erik and Silven were gone for approximately a halfhour. When they returne d, Silven did not want to eat the pizza that Erik had bought her. Silven sat on Erik’s lap for about an hour and appeare d to be sicker than she had been earlier tha t day. Erin testified that Silven did not have any e nergy throughout the day , that she did not want to eat and only wanted to c ling to Erin. At 7:30 p.m., Erik left the defendant’s house to pick up Brett from the birthday party. Erin testified that Erik telephoned her soon after and told her that a wheel had come off his truck on his way

to get B rett. Er

in got int o her ca r and lef t the house

to find Er

ik. Erin te stified th at it took approximately 10 minutes to find Erik. They then returned to the defendant’s house and the defendant went with Erik to go get Erik’ s truck. The defendant and Erik returned shor tly, and Erik took Erin’s car. The defendant left to pick up some food a nd medicine for Erin and Silven, returning at approximately 10 p.m. Erin’s testimony reg arding when Silven went to bed that night is somewhat muddled. First, sh e testifi ed that after she returne d from picking up E rik she “ went in the

house with Silven.” The defendant carried Silven into the house and put her to be d. Erin testified Silven appeared tired and sick at that time. A little later in her testimony, she testified that Silven was already in bed when Erin left the house to get Erik, and that Silven went to bed at 8:30 or 9 that evening. On cross-examination, she testified that the defenda nt took Silven into the house when Erin left to get Erik and that Silven was in bed when Erin returne d to the house.6

At 6:30 a.m. on Sunday, Erin awoke to use the restroom. Erin passed by Silven’s room and heard her snoring. Erin thoug ht that Silven was congested and sounded as if she was sleeping heavily . Erin did n

ot go insi de Silven’ s room and could not s ee Silven

clearly because Erin was not wearing her g lasses. Erin went back to bed and awoke ag ain at 10 or 10:30 a.m. Silven was still sleeping and snoring. Erin was not feeling well, so she went back to bed again. Erin woke

for the th ird time a t noon whe

n Erik ca lled and t old her he was comin

g to the house to get his truck. While Erin was on the telephone with Erik, the defenda nt yelled from Silven’s room. Erin testified that she went to Silven’s room and saw Silven having a seizure. Erin then called 911. Initially , Silven was taken to McDonough District Hospital. Erin testified that the defendant accompanied her to the hospital, but that he left a t some point to get clothing and insulin for Erin, who is diabetic. Erin testified that she made arrang ements to meet the defendant at another location so that they could travel together to St. Francis hospital in Peoria, where Silven was transferred. Erin’s parents drove he r to the meeting place and Erin got into the defendant’s vehicle. While they were driving, Erin told the defendant what Silven’s doctor had told her about Silven’s injuries. Erin testified that the doctor had told her that Silven had suffered blunt force trauma, that she wa s broken from head to toe with a broken sternum and punctured bowels. The doctor also told her that Silven had been tied at the a nkles and sodomized. Later, it was determined that some of these statements by the doctor we re not true. The defendant told Erin that he felt sick, and she told him to stop the car. Erin then left the defendant’s vehicle and got into her pa rents’ car to continue traveling to Peoria. The defendant did not go to the hospital in Peoria.7

Erin testified that she had been interviewed by police officers several times since Septembe r 10, 2006 . On Septe

mber 15, 2 006, Erin

was inter viewed by D etective

Holt, who t

old her that he believed that either she, the defe ndant or Erik had hurt Silven. In January 2007, Sheriff Van Bro oker re quested a meeting with Erin. Erin informed the defenda nt of the r equest when the defendant telephoned her fr om the Tazewell County jail. Erin testified that the defendant told her not to meet with Van Brooker. Erin f urther testified that her phone

co nv er sa ti on wi th th e d ef en da nt ha d b ee n r ec or de d. Th at re co rd in g w as pl aye d f or th e j ur y. On cross -examinat

ion, Erin t

estified regar ding another conversat

ion with the

defenda nt in January 2007. I

n that conversation, Erin and the defendant discussed their per ception that the police were try

ing to pressure them into admitting that one of them had hurt Silven. The defendant told Erin that he did not know what had happened to Silven. Erin testified that she did not strike Silven at any time during the time period of September 8, 2006, through September 10, 2006. Erin further testified tha t Silven showed her an injury to her ankle w

hen Silven took a bath on Thursday, Septe mber 7, 2006. Silven told her that she had su stained the injury when she fell off the monke

y ba rs and a b oy f

ell on top o f her. Er

in did not notice any other injuries to Silven at the time, other tha n blisters on Silven’s ankles. Silven had

complain ed of hea

daches d uring th e week b efore h er seizur e, which Erin attr ibuted to Silven’s new ey

eglass es. Erin also testifie d that she

had rec ently

complete d a fede

ral firs t-offen

der drug progra m in connection with federal drug cha rges. Erin was using methamphetamine in September 2006 and had been using the drug for a pproximately five y

ears. At the time of trial, a child endanger ment charge was pending

against Erin in connection with Silven’s death. A plea offer had been made8

to Erin in exchange for her truthful testimony at the defendant’s trial, but Erin had not accepted the plea offer. She testified that she did not testify because of the plea offer, but that she w as testifying for

Silven. Brett Y ocum Winter

s testifie d that he w as six y ears old in Septemb er 2006. Brett testified that he visited Silven’s house a few times in September 2006 and that he remembere d jumping on the trampoline. Silven only jumped for a few seconds and then got off the trampoline because she did not feel well. Bre tt testified that Silven did not fall off the trampoline. Brett also testified that he, Silven and the defendant went for a ride on the fourwheeler. They

rode on the four-wheeler slowly for about five minutes, and no one was hurt. Brett a lso testif ied that Sil

ven compl ained tha

t her hea d hurt. Erik Yocum testified that he was Erin’s brother and Br ett’s father. Erik testified that he was present at the defendant’s home on Saturday , September 9, 2006, to pick up Brett, who was playing w ith Silven. Erik went to the defendant’s house to get Brett and ta ke him to a birthday party. Silven acc ompanied Erik when he took Brett to the party . Erik purchased some pizza and candy for Silve n, but she d

id not eat them. Eri

k stay ed at the defenda nt’s house

for a wh ile with Silven, Erin and the defendant. Erik did not see any one else at the house on that day

. When Erik left the house to pick up Brett from the party, his front left tire fell off. He called Erin, who found him and brought him back to the defenda nt’s house. Erik did not see Silven at this time. Erik and the defendant retrieved a jack fr om the garage and then the defendant drove Erik back to his truck. After r eplacing the tire on his truck, Erik borrowed Erin’s c ar and le ft to pick u p Brett. Erik testified that he telephoned Erin repeatedly on Sunday morning, but he did not re ach9

her until approximately 1 or 1:30 p.m. Erik bought some food f or every one and went to the defendant’s house to fix his truck. When Erik arrived at the house, the defenda nt was standing on the porch waving Erik inside. Erik ran inside to Silven’s bedroom and saw her on the bed. Erik, Erin and the defendant all attempted to awaken Silven. The e mergency medical personnel arrived soon thereafter, and Erik we nt outside. Silven died a week later. Erik testified that the defenda nt did not a

ttend Silve

n’s fune ral. Erik also testified that he had used methamphetamine in the past, approximately once or twice per month. He stopped using methamphetamine rig ht after Silven died. Erik testified that the effects of methamphetamine varied depe nding upon the amount of the drug ingested. When Erik took methamphetamine he could not sleep and sometimes did not sleep for two or three day s. Erik denied ever talking to Nathan Wallick about Silven’s death. Erik denie d telling Wallick tha

t Silven ha

d spoken to

a DARE of

ficer a t school a bout the de fendant ’s drug use. Erik also denied telling Wallick that the defendant beat Silven. Aaron Wilson testified that he was a paramedic at McDonoug h District Hospital and that he was dispatched to the defendant’s home at 1:31 p.m. on September 10, 2006. Wilson entered the house and went to Silven’ s bedroom , where Silven wa s lay

ing on the bed. Erin

was also present in the bedroom and told Wilson that Silven had been fine when she was put to bed at approximately 9 p.m. the night befor e. Wilson also saw the defendant in the hall outside Silven’s bedroom, but did not s ee him in the room. Wilson testif

ied that Sil

ven was u nrespons ive to stimu

li, and he r ey es were open, fixe d to the right. Silven’s hands were tightened in and he r legs were turned out and down, in what10

Wilson testified was a classic sign of a brain injury . Silven was also in slight respiratory distress. Wilson testified that Silven’s blowing type of respira tion was also a classic sign of brain injury

. Upon examining Silven, Wilson observed that she appeared unkempt and dirty . Silven also had dried bloo d on he r teet h and l ip area . Wil son al so obs erved n umero us con tusi ons t o Sil ven’s legs near her ankles. Wilson and the other medical personnel quickly determined that Silven needed to be t aken i mmedi ately to t he near est tr auma fa cili ty. In the em ergency roo m of Mc Donou gh District Hospital, Wilson observed a bright red mark in the middle of Silven’s back. Sergeant John Carson of the McDonough County sheriff’s office testified that he was dispatched to McDonough District Hospital on September 10, 2006, to investigate a suspe cted child abuse case. When Carson arrived, the emer gency room personnel were performing advanced life support measures on Silven and prepar ing to transport her to a critical care center. Carson observed and photographed bruises on Silven’s torso, hip, buttocks. He a lso observed a large abrasion and bruise on the middle of he r back. The abrasion was approximately seven centimeters by f

ive centimeters. Carson also observed dried blood on Silven’s teeth, gums a nd cheek. Ca rs on al so te st if

ie d t ha t h e d id no t i nv es ti ga te th e d ef en da nt ’s ho me on Su nd ay, September 10, 2006. Carson does not know whether any other police officer went to the defendant’s home on September 10. Carson, Detective Holt and Chief Deputy Manser investigated the defendant’s house on September 13 or 14, 2006, after obtaining consent from the defendant. Carson photographed the bottom of some shoes found in the house , looking for patterns consistent with the abrasion on Silven’s back. Carson also collected the bedding from Silven’s room and a shirt that Silven had worn on Saturday September 9, which were submitted11

to the Illinois state crime laboratory for analy sis. The analysis repor t stated that patterns of unknown o rigin we

re found on the shir

t and that a shoe co uld not be e liminated

as the pos sible source of the pattern. The report also re quested possible shoe patterns be submitted for comparison. No such samples were sent to the laboratory

. Carson also observed that the windows of the house were e ither nailed or sealed shut. Carson did

not find a

ny e vidence of forc ed entry

to the hous e. Neithe

r the def endant nor Erin reporte d any

missing it

ems. Dr. Khal ed Daba sh testifi ed that he was Silven ’s pedia

trician a nd that he was pre sent in the emergency

room on September 10, 2006, when Silven arrived via ambulance. Silven was unconscious and still seizing when she arrived. Silven did not have a fever, a nd there were no signs of infection. Her body was in contracture, indicating a ce ntral nervous system insult. Dr. Dabash observed bruising and marks on Silven’s body , which he believed were indicative of abuse, so he ordered a CT scan of her head. Dr. Dabash observed the CT scan a s it was being performed and found complete right par ietal hematoma, which means blood was covering the entire right side of Silven’s brain. Dr. Dabash testified that he had no doubt that this injury was caused by blunt hea

d trauma. Dr. Dabash also suspected a sterna l fracture. Dr. Dabash ordere d a life flight that took Silven to Saint Francis Medical Center in Peoria. Dr. Dabash opined that Silven’s injuries were rece nt because her brain had not y et swelled e nough to cause he rniation. Rather, herniatio n was beg

inning to occur a t the hospi

tal, and Dr. D abash g ave her

a drug to reduc e the swe lling. Dr . Dabash testifie d that whe

n a child experiences blunt force head trauma, the bra in swells over time until the compression of blood on the brain causes seizures. Dr. Dabash further opined that Silven had experienced blunt force12

trauma to her head within 24 hours at the least before she arrived at the hospital. Heathe r Connor te stified th at she wa s a para medic at M cDonoug

h Distric t Hospital

in Septembe r 2006. Con

nor was p art of the

crew tha t met the a

mbulance carry ing Silve n when it arrive d at the ho spital. Con nor was w

ith Silven th

rougho ut most of Sil

ven’s time

at that ho spital, and was present when Dr. Dabash informe d Erin and the defendant that Silven’s brain was bleeding. Erin told the doctor that Silven had not been with any one other than Erin and the defendant. Connor also testified that Erin held Silven’s hand and rubbed her ha ir, and that the defenda nt stood wit

h his back

to Silven, mostly

looking a t Erin. Con

nor also t estified that Erin was very distraught and seemed confused by the information given to her by Dr. Dabash. Connor also retrieved Erin from a waiting room to take he r back to Silven after Silven had been prepared for the flig ht to Peoria. Connor testified that Erin was cry ing and that she stopped while they wer

e walking. Connor went back to her, and Erin a sked, “Did he hurt her?” Connor re plied, “I don’t know .” Connor

testifie d that Eri

n then sai d, “I

will neve r trust he r with him again.” After they

returned to Silven’s bedside, the defendant came into the room. Connor testifie d that he t

old Erin th at he wa s going to his home

to get Er in’s cloth es and me dicine. E rin pulled aw ay

from him. Jill Goodpas ture test

ified tha t in Septemb er 2006 she lived wi th Scott Ke

pple, in a home approximately five miles from the def endant. Goodpasture testified that she saw Silven on Tuesday, Septembe

r 5, 2006, and Wednesday , September 6, 2006. On both occasions, Silven appeared fine. Goodpasture also testified that she, K epple, Erin and the defendant smoked methamphetamine on both days. Goodpasture testified that she next saw the defendant on Sunday, September 10, 2006,13

when he came to her home and they smoked methamphetamine. Goodpasture testified that the defenda nt told her

he did not k

now what had happe

ned to Silve

n and did not tell her

any details about Silven’s injuries. The defendant was upset and said, “I don’t understand why the y don’t want me there.” The defendant also a sked Goodpasture if she thought they would call the police.

Goodpasture also testified that in September 2006 she, Erin and the defenda nt smoked methamphetamine together three or four times a week. Silven would not be in the room where they smoked the drug , but would be somewhere in the same house. Goodpasture neve r noticed the defe ndant expe

rience mood swing s when he

smoked me

thamphet amine. At

the time of

trial, Goodpasture no longer used methamphetamine. She testified that she was arrested in 2006 for conspiracy

to distribute methamphetamine and successfully completed a first-offender drug program in November 2007. Matthew Hocker testified that he was the defe ndant’s cousin. The defendant arrived at Hocker’s home at approximately 8:30 p.m. on September 10, 2006. Hocker asked the defendant if he knew what had happened to Silven, and the defe ndant said, “No.” Hocker testified that the de fe nda nt a lso sa id, “I f I go home, ar e t

he pol ic e g oin

g t o c ome kno ck ing on m y door tonig

ht? ” Dr. Julian Lin testified the he was a pediatric ne urosurgeon at St. Francis Children’s Hospital in Peoria, Illinois, on September 10, 2006. Dr. Lin examined Silven sometime after 5 p.m. on tha

t day . Silven wa s in a coma . Soon afte r, Dr. L in performed sur

gery on Silven to

remove a very large blood clot

on the sur

face of the rig ht hemisph ere of h er brai n. Dr. L in successfully re

moved the clot, but Silven remained in a coma. A CAT scan reveale d that her brain had swelled and efforts to control the swelling w ere unsuccessful. Over the next week,14

Silven did not improve, eventually had no bra in activity and died on September 16, 2006. Larry Leasman testified that he we nt to the defendant’s home at approximately 1 a.m. on Saturday , Septembe

r 9, 2006. The def

endant w as in the g arage , and Erin arrive d at the ho

use shortly after Leasman. Lea sman testi fied tha t he and th e defen

dant smoke d methamphetamine in the garage that nig

ht and that he had smoked methamphetamine with the defendant approximately 10 or 12 times in the past. L easman also testified that he purchased methamphetamine from the defendant that night. L easman could not recall whether Erin smoked methamph etamine t

hat nigh t. On cro ss-examina

tion, L easman t

estified that he th ought tha

t Erin smoked methamphetamine that night, but he was not 100% sure. Jeff Ahlers testified that at the time of trial he was incarcer ated in the Illinois Department of C orr ect io ns a nd t hat he h ad b een con vi cte d of sev era l fe lo ni es i n se ver al d iff ere nt cou nt ies . In addition, Ahlers had three cases in three counties pending at that time, and he had been in prison four time s. Furthe

r, Ahlers testifie d that he h ad been addicte d to coca

ine for 2 5 ye ars. Ahlers testified that he met the defendant in the Tazewell County jail in September 2007. Ahlers te stified th at he and the defe ndant bec ame frie

nds in jail. The def

endant de scribed

his use of methamphetamine and told Ahlers that he would not sleep for day s. Ahlers also testified that the defendant also discussed Silven once. Ahlers testified that the defe ndant told him that he had been awake for many

days due to methampheta mine use and that the defendant had found out that Silven

had spoke

n to a DARE

office r about th e defen

dant’s dr ug use. The def

endant to ld Ahlers that he wa s infuria ted and th at he push ed Silven a nd hit her in the hea

d. Ahler s also testified that the defendant told him that Erin was present when he hit Silven. Ahlers w as there after tr

ansporte d to the Mc Donoug h County jail in con

nection w ith15

criminal charges then pending in Mc Donough County. While being transported, Sheriff Van Brooker asked if Ahlers knew the de fendant and if Ahlers knew any thing about Silven’s death. Ahlers acknowledged meeting the defendant, but told Sheriff Van Brooker that he did not know anything a

bout Silven’s death. Ahlers testified that he met Nathan Ralph and Nathan Wallick after he arrived at the McDonough County ja

il and discussed with them the defendant’s role in Silven’s death. Ahlers discusse d the matte

r with Ralph and Wallic

k prior to making a statemen t to the poli ce in December 2007, that the defendant had c onfessed to him that he had hit Silven. Ahlers testified that he asked Ralph for advice as to whether Ahle rs should tell the police about the defendant’s statements to him. Ahlers testified that he was concerned about talking to police because his life would be in jeopardy in pr ison for being a snitch. Dr. Bry an Mitchell testified that he was a forensic pathologist and that he conducted an autopsy on Silven on September 18, 2006. Dr. Mitche ll observed bruises to the right side of Silven’s head, abrasions on the back of her head, a bruise on her right shoulder, and bruises and abrasions on her right foot. Dr. Mitchell testified that these injuries wer e caused by

blunt force

trauma. Upon internal investigation of Silven’s scalp, Dr. Mitchell observed a bruise inside the scalp that extended to Silven’s occipital bone. This bruise was located under the abra sions seen on the outside of Silven’s head. Dr. Mitchell also observed that blood had collected under a membran e on the r

ight side of Silven’ s brain a

nd that the

brain wa s very

swollen. Dr. Mitche ll testified that the injuries to Silven’s head and brain were consistent with blunt force tra uma. Based upon his examination, Dr. Mitchell testified that there were five distinct are as of blunt16

force t rauma to Silven’s h ead. Dr . Mitchell further testifie d that the se injurie s were not likely to be cause d by

falling off a tra mpoline or

falling down once . Brain

injuries, such as those seen in Silven, would not necessarily re sult in the immediate display of sy mptoms, such as unconsciousness. Dr. Mitchell opined that Silven sustained the blunt force trauma 12 to 24 hours before she began having

seizures. Further, Dr. Mitchell opined that Silven died as a result of complications of closed-head injuries due to blunt force trauma c aused by blows deliver ed directly to her he ad, or by blows to the hea d followed by her

striking another object. The blows could have been delivered by a human hand, or possibly by a foot. Dr. Mitchell also testified that some of th e sy

mptoms of a

brain inju

ry are lethargy

, loss of a ppetite, and loss of

interest in activities. Joseph Bur

gess te stified th

at at the t ime of tri al he wa s being held at the Tazewel l County jail on pending felony

charges. Burg ess testified that he met the defendant in jail in March 2007 and beg an shari

ng a ce ll with him in

April 2007 . He shar

ed a cel l with the d

efenda nt for fo ur to five months; they were

assigned new cellmates when they were caught making jailhouse a lcohol. In July 2007, the

defendant told Burgess that it would have almost been Silven’s birthday if she

were a live. Bu rgess t estified that the d

efenda nt paced their ce ll and the

n said, “T hat little shit was going to tell on me if I didn’t stop.” After a pause, the defendant said, “I just slapped her. Things got way

out of hand.” Burgess also t estif

ied th at app roxi matel y two weeks later he was p resent durin g a

convers ation bet

ween the defenda nt and ano ther person reg arding Silven. Th e defen

dant told that person that Silven hit her head while jumping on a trampoline. Burg ess testified that the defendant looked at him, winked and said, “I sn’t that right, Burgess?” Burge ss testified that he17

did not make a statement to the police regarding the defendant until January 5, 2008. Denise D aughe

rty testifie d that she

was a re ading progra

m assistan

t at Li ncoln Sch ool in September 2006, and worked with Silven’s kindergarten c lass. Daugherty testified that Silven did not appear sick or complain of any ailments on September 8, 2006. Silven drew a picture of herself and did not have any difficulty in following instructions or c ompleting the project. Daugherty

also testified that she did not know whether a DARE officer had visited the kinderg arten c lass at an

y time prior to

Septembe

r 8, 2006, but that sh e thoug ht that the DARE officer usually

visited the school in the middle of the school yea r. Sherri Mo on testifi ed that sh e was Silve n’s kinde rgart en teacher at L

incoln School in September 2006. Silven did not have difficulty c ompleting her tasks on September 8, 2006. Silven did not appear ill that week, nor did she complain of headaches. Moon testified tha t she was not aware of any

playg round accidents the week of September 5 throug h September 8, 2006. Moon did not recall a DARE officer visiting the school before September 8, 2006. Nathan Ralph testified that he was Jeff Ahlers’ cellmate in October 2007 in the McDonough County ja

il. Prior to his testimony, the parties enga ged the court in a discussion over Ralph’s expected testimony. De fense counsel stated he was concer ned that Ralph’s testimony was going

to violate an order previously granted that excluded Ralph’s hearsay testimony and requ ested an offer o f proof. The State repres ented tha

t it was not

going to elicit the contents of any

conversation between Ralph and Ahlers. “THE COURT: And you’r e not offering any

hearsay under an exception. I s th at my und er sta ndi ng ? THE STATE: No, just his knowledge--18 THE COURT : That a c onversa tion occu rred be tween Ah lers and this witness. THE STATE: Yes.” Ralph test

ified tha t he discu ssed the d

efenda nt with Ahle

rs in Octo ber 2007 . The State then asked Ralph whether Ahlers discussed with him “whether he ma y have ha d any information.” The defendant objected, and the c ourt sustained the objection. The State then asked Ralph, “And did you ha ve, back in October when y ou first met with Mr. Ahlers, did he discuss with you whether he wanted to come forward with some information?” The defendant objected again, and the court over ruled the objection. Ralph asked the State to repeat the question. The State asked, “Did Mr. Ahlers confide in y ou that he had some reservations about coming forward with some information?” Ralph answered, “Yes.” Dr. Larry Blum testified that he was a forensic pathologist and that he reviewed Silven’s autopsy protocol , photog

raphs fr om the aut

opsy and hospit

al and oth er reports assoc iated wit h Silven’s death. Based upon his review of the materials, Dr . Blum testified that Silven died from a closed-head injury

that resulted in subdural hemorrhage and bra in swelling. Dr. Blum opined that Silven sustained the head injury sometime betwe en Saturday morning and Sunday afte

rnoon when she was found seizing. Dr. Blum also opined that Silven’s injuries were not accidental but had bee n inflicte d by

a blunt ins trument. Michael Green testified that he was an assistant State’s Attorney in Tazewell County. Green testified that he was assigned to prose cute a case against Joseph Burg ess. Burgess was charged with agg

ravated arson, a Class X felony , among other felonies. Green testified that Burge ss had bee

n offer ed a plea agree ment of a 22-y ear ca p in exchan

ge for his guilty plea to19

aggravated ar

son. Burgess would still have a sentencing he aring and could offer in mitigation evidence that he helped law enforc ement solve other crimes. Sergeant Richard Johnston testified that he worked as a corr ectional officer at the Tazewel l County

jail. Johnston testifie d rega rding th e secur

ity c ameras

at the jai l. Johnston a

lso testified that to his knowledge no one had successfully made jailhouse alcohol at the new Tazewel l County

jail. Johnston also inve stigate d the inci dent invol ving Bu rgess’ s attempt t

o make jailhouse alcohol. Based upon his investigation, Johnston did not think that Burgess had made jail house alc ohol in the

past. Deputy Sheriff Steve

n Holt of the McDonough County sheriff’s office testified that he was the le ad invest

igator into Silven ’s death . At the ho spital on Se ptember 10, 2006, D eputy Holt spoke to Dr. Dabash. Deputy Holt testified that Dr. Dabash told him that Silven’s injuries were 10 to 12 hours old and no older. Deputy Holt also testified that he did not make any attempts to get a search warra nt for the defendant’s home on September 10, 2006, nor did he send any off

icers to secure the house. Deputy Holt testified that he a nd other officers searched the de fendant’s home on September 12, 2006, pursuant to the defendant’s consent. Deputy Holt testified that photographs were taken that day

of shoes found in the residence, but that the photographs we re not sent to the state laboratory

for comparison to the pattern found on Silven’s shirt. Deputy Holt further testified that he interviewed Erin numerous times and that he told her that he believe d either she, the defe ndant or E

rik had be aten Silve

n. As inve stigato rs interv iewed pe ople in connection with Silven’s death, references to methamphetamine a nd other drugs were numerous. The she riff’s office contacted the federa l authorities to investigate the drug allega tions. Deputy Holt was not20

involved i

n the drug

investig ation but h e was aw are of i t. Throug h these in vestiga tions, Dep

uty Holt became aware that the defe ndant used and sold methamphetamine. Deputy Holt also testified re garding rumors of a par ty at the defe

ndant’s house on Saturday, September

9, 2006. However, no one ever reporte d actually being present at the rumored party , and the d

efenda nt and Eri n denied t hat ther e was an y pa rty . Deputy

Holt also testified regarding a tape d conversation between Erin and the defenda nt while the defendant was in jail. In that conversation, Erin refe rs to other people who may have come to the defendant’s home on Saturday. Howe ver, Deputy H olt was not able to ascertain who these other people may have been. Deputy

Holt testified that Erin told him that the only adults present at the def endant’s home the w eekend

in questio n were herself, the defe ndant and her brot her Erik . Deputy

Holt also testified that he thought that Erin put Silven to bed on Saturday night. The defendant testified that he met Erin in Februar y 2006 and that Erin and Silven beg an spending the night at his house in late April or early May 2006. Erin and Silven stay ed at the defendant’s house three or four nig hts per week. The defendant testified that on Friday , September 1 through Monday , September 4, 2006, he and Erin participated in a y ard sale in Colchester, Illinois, and per iodically smoked methamphetamine. Silven was with Erin’s mother that weekend. On Monday , September 5, 2006, the defenda nt and Eri n awake ned at ap proximatel

y 9 a .m. when Sc ott Kepple and Jill Goodpast ure came into his house crowing like a rooste r. The de fendant

testifie d that the

y a ll went back to Colchester and smoked more methamphetamine. Later, he and Erin picked up Silven and brought her back to the defendant’ s home. On Tuesday, Septe

mber 5, 2006, the defendant and Erin drove Silven to school in the21

morning. During the day, the defendant and Erin smoked more methamphetamine. On Wednesda

y, K epple an d Goodpas ture ca

me to the d

efenda nt’s house

in the eve

ning, a nd they all smoked methamphetamine while Silven watched a movie. The defenda nt testified that no one

ever smo ked metha

mphetamine in fron

t of Silven

when the defenda nt was pre sent. He

and Erin did not sleep Wednesday nig ht. The defendant testified that he also smoked methamphetamine

on Th ur sd ay. The defendant testified that on Friday , September 8, 2006, Erin went to the store sometime after 11 p.m., after she put Silven to bed. At approximately midnight, Larry

Leasman arrived at the defendant’s house. The de fendant testified that he and Le asman smoked methamphetamine in the defendant’s gara ge. The defendant also testified that L easman went into the house once to use the bathroom. The defendant slept on a futon in the gara ge on Friday

night and awoke sometime after 5 a.m. on Sa

turday when Eri n came ou

t to the g arage . Silven ca me out to the

garag e shortly thereafter. Before

Silven came outside, the defendant and Erin were pr eparing to smoke methamphetamine. The defendant then took Silven inside the house to cook breakf ast. Silven did not want to go with the defendant but Erin encourag ed her to go, telling her it would be fun. Silven did not cry, and the def endant did not carry

her into the house. The defendant and Silven made breakfast, and 10 minutes later, Erin came in the house

. The defendant testified that Silven complained once or twice of a headache on Saturday

. The def endant a ssumed tha

t the hea dache w as due to Si lven’s ne w glass es. The d

efenda nt also testified that Silven did not appear to be as active as normal on Saturday and that Silven wanted to be with Erin most of the day. Sometime Saturday morning, the defendant and Silven went on22

a five-minute ride on the defendant’s four-w heeler. The defendant testified that nothing happened on that ride that would have caused any injury to Silven. That aft ernoon, Erin put Sil

ven to bed

because Silven wa s not fee ling we ll that day . Erin then went to pick up Brett. Erin was gone for approximately 45 minutes to an hour. The defendant testified that he went inside the house to take a shower while Erin was gone, and he saw Silven sleeping. When Brett arrived, he a nd Silven went outside to jump on the trampoline. Silven did n

ot jump for

long and then sat

down on a c

hair to wa tch Bre tt. That nig ht, Silven g ot ready

for bed a nd the def

endant tu cked in he

r blanke ts. On cro ssexamination, he testified that both he and Erin put Silven to bed that night. The defendant testified that he did not see Silven again until Sunday . The defendant denied smoking any methamphetamine on Saturday and testified that he did not see Erin smoke any of the drug that da y. The defendant testified that after Silven went to bed, Erik ca lled because his truck had lost a tire. Erin went to pick up Erik and brought him back to the defenda nt’s house. The defendant testified that Erin was gone for approximately five minutes and he stood outside waiting for them to return. The defenda nt then went back to the truck with Erik to fix the tire. The def endant te stified th at he and Erik wer e gone for appr oximately 15 minutes . Erik lef

t again

at aroun d 8 p.m. Af

ter Erik left, the defenda nt notice d that Eri

n looked si ck. The d

efenda nt told Erin to go lie down and he left to get food and me dicine for Erin and Silven. The defendant left at 8:30 p.m. and returned at approximately 10 p.m. The defendant called Erin’s cell phone whe n he got to her house to retrieve the medicine. H e called her three times at approximately 9:35 p.m., but E

rin did not

answer the telep hone. The

defenda nt left Er in’s house

and went to buy fast23

food. Erin was sleeping when he returne d home. Silven was also sleeping, and Erin told the defendant not to wake her. The defendant went to bed at 10:30 p.m., and Erin awake ned him at 1 p.m. on Sunday. The defendant thought it unusual that Silven was still asleep. The defenda nt looked into Silven’s room on his

way to the bat hroom and

noticed t hat Silven

was not fu

lly c overed w

ith her bla

nket, which he also thought was unusual. The defendant wa lked into her room and heard Silven wheezing. The defendant y elled for Erin and they

both tried to wake up Silven. The defendant drove Erin to the hospital. The defenda nt testified that he does not remember much about his time at the hospital and that he does not remember turning his back on Silven. The defendant also did not remember telling any one that Silven had fallen at school. At some point , the def

endant w ent home a

nd got Er in’s clothes and g lucose pi lls from th e closet in Silven’s room. On his way bac k to the hospital, Erin telephoned and told him that she and her parents were driving to Peoria. They made arrangements to meet along the route to Peoria, and Erin go t into the de fendant ’s vehic le. The d efenda nt testifie d that his c onversa tion with Er

in regarding the doctor’ s description of Silven’s injuries was upsetting. Erin told him to pull over the vehicle. He did, and Erin’s mother approache d the car and told Erin to get into her car. Erin’s mother told the defendant to go home and ride to the hospital with his parents. The defendant went home, but was unable to contact his pare nts. The defendant testified that Erin’s mother telephoned him and told him that they did not want him at the hospital. The def endant did not go the hospital in Peoria. That evening, the defendant went to Ke pple and Goodpasture’s home and smoked methamphetamine. The defendant testified that he told Kepple and G oodpasture that he did not24

know why Erin’s fa

mily did not want him at the hospital. The defendant did not re member asking them if they

thought someone was going to call the police , but testified that he could have made such a statement due to his impression that Erin’s mother was accusing him of hurting Silven. Th e defen

dant did no t remembe

r making a similar statemen t to Hocke

r that same evening . The def

endant di d not atte

nd Silven’ s funera

l becaus e Erin an

d member s of her f

amily told him not to come to the funeral. The defendant testified that when he smoked methamphetamine he felt alert, awake and focused. The defendant felt tired and would slee p for a long time when he was “coming down” from the i nfluenc e of the d

rug. Th e defen

dant testi fied tha

t he neve r locked the doors of his house. In addition, the defendant testified tha t the windows were not nailed shut. There were two windows in Silven’s room. The defendant further testified that Silven never said a nything to him to indicate that she knew that he or her mother were using drugs. Silven never said any thing to the defendant about a DARE officer, nor did she ever threa ten the defendant that she was going to tell someone about his drug use. The defendant testified that he told Erin not to go to the she riff’s office because the police were harassing Erin, and he did not want Erin to become upset by the questioning. The defendant testified that at the time of trial he was serving a sentence for a federa

l drug c onviction . The def endant w ent to the

police a nd confe ssed reg arding

his involve

ment with methamphetamine and subsequently pled guilty to cha

rges in federal court. The de fendant was arrested on January

10, 2007, and placed in the Tazewell County jail. The defendant met Jeff Ahlers at an Alcoholics Anony mous meeting in the jail. The defendant testified that he and Ahlers were not friends and never discusse d their families. The defendant also denied ever25

discussing Silven or her death with Ahlers. The def endant te stified th at Burg ess had be en his ce llmate but denied ma

king jai lhouse alcohol w ith him. The

defenda nt discuss ed Erin a

nd Silven w

ith Burg ess and showed him pictures. The defendant denied ever te lling Burgess that Silven was going to tell someone about his drug use or that he slapped her and thing s got carried away . The defendant also testified that he never winked at Burge ss while telling another inmate about Silven’s death. The defendant testified that the week befor e his testimony at trial he was be ing held at the McDonough County ja

il and saw State’s Attorney Hoyle visit the jail. The defe ndant testified that Hoyle met with Ahlers in the ha llway near

the defendant’s cell. Hoy le told Ahlers that he had brought Ahlers a copy of his statement and the questions that Hoyle was going to ask him at trial. Ho yle

also told A

hlers to sa

y th at the de fendant

struck Silv en in the f

ace, ra ther tha n use the word “punche d.” The d

efenda nt testifie d that Hoy

le also me

t with Bur

gess tha t day and told him that he

had brou ght Bur gess a c opy

of his stat

ement an d the ques tions Hoy

le would a sk him at trial. Hoyle also told Bur gess that he was concerned w ith one aspect of Burgess’s statement and told him that Burgess needed to have his statement straig ht. The defendant testified that Burge ss then sa

id, “Well, I ’ll say

whateve r you want me

to say if y ou’re g onna help

me out with my case.” Hoyle told him not to worry about that. The record also contains a by stander’s report regar

ding the facts surrounding two questions submitted by the jury during its deliberations. First, the jury requested transcripts of the testimony of Drs. Blum and Mitche ll. The court responded, via written note, that the

transcr ipts of the testimony

were no t availab le and ins tructed the jurors to use the ir best recollection of the testimony. T he attorneys f

or the State and the defendant were not consulted26

prior to the court’s response to the jury . However, the attorneys concurred with the court’s response upon being notified. The defenda nt was not present, and his presence was not discussed. Second, the jury aske d whether the court could define “g reat bodily har

m.” The court conferred in chambers with defense counsel and the State’s Attorney regarding this request. The court answered the jury

via handwritten note, stating “No.” The defe ndant was not present during the conference, a

nd his presence was not discussed. The jury found the de fendant guilty of first degree murder and e ndangering the life of a child. On June 27, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for new trial. The defenda nt raised a number of

purporte d error s in that mot ion, inclu ding (1) the trial court er red by deny ing his motion to exc lude cer

tain testi mony of Heather Connor ; (2) the t rial cou rt erre d by

deny ing his motion to exclude the testimony of certain jailhouse informants; (3) the trial court erred by failing to conduct a pretrial hearing to determine whether the informants’ testimony was reliable; (4) the trial court erred by allowing certain testimony of Nathan Ralph; (5) the court erred by communic ating with the jur y ou tside of the defen

dant’s pr esence ; (6) the c ourt err

ed by failing to strictly comply

with Supreme Court Rule 431(b); and (7) the evidence was insufficie nt to prove him guilty bey

ond a reasonable doubt. The motion for new trial was denied. T he defendant was sentenced to 30 ye ars’ imprisonment for first degree murde r and a concurrent term of 10 y ears for endangering the life of a

child. The defendant now appeals his conviction.

II. AN ALYS IS A. Sufficiency of

the Evidence First, the defendant claims that the State did not present sufficient evidenc e to prove he27

was guilty be

yond a rea sonable doubt of first degree murder. When re viewing a challenge to the sufficiency

of the evidence, the reviewing c ourt’s function is not to retry the de fendant. People v. Milka , 211 Ill. 2d 150, 178, 810 N.E.2d 33, 49 (2004). Rather, we must view the e vidence in the light most favorable to the State and determine whether a ny rational trier of

fact could have found the elements of the crime proven bey ond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins , 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 4 78 N.E.2d

267, 277 ( 1985). “

Under th is standa rd, a re viewing court mus t allow al l reasonable inferences from the r ecord in favor of the prosecution.” People v. Bush , 214 Ill. 2d 318, 326, 827 N.E.2d 455, 460 (2005). This standard of review applies, “ ‘r egardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial [citation], and regar dless of whether the defendant receives a bench or jury

trial [citation].’ ” People v. Wheeler , 226 Ill. 2d 92, 114, 871 N.E.2d 728, 7 40 (20 07), q uoti ng People v. Cooper , 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431, 743 N.E.2d 32 (2000). The trier of fact determines the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be dra wn from the evidence. People v. Saxon , 374 Ill. App. 3d 409, 416, 871 N .E.2d 244, 250 (2007 ). “A re versal is warran ted only if the evidence i s so improb able or unsatisfactory

that it leaves a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s g uilt.” Saxon , 374 Ill. App. 3d at 416, 871 N.E.2d at 250. “ ‘A conviction can be sustained upon circumstantial evidence as well as upon direct, and to prove guilt bey

ond a reasonable doubt does not mean that the jury must disregard the inferences that flow normally from the evidence before it.’ ” People v. Patterson , 217 Ill. 2d 407, 435, 8 41 N.E .2d 88 9, 905 (2005 ), quo ting People v. Williams , 40 Ill. 2d 522, 526, 240 N.E.2d 645 (1968). “Where evidence is presented a nd such evidence is capable of producing conflicting inferences, it is best left to the trier of fact for pr oper resolution.” People v. McDonal d , 168 I ll.28

2d 420, 447, 660 N.E.2d 832, 843 (1995). “When weighing the evidenc e, the trier of fact is not require d to disre gard inferenc es that fl ow from th e eviden ce, nor i s it requir

ed to sea rch out a ll possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt.” McDonal d , 168 Ill. 2d at 447, 660 N.E.2d at 843. A person commits first degree murder if he performs the acts that cause the death of another with the intent to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual. 720 IL CS 5/9–1(a)(1) (West 2006 ). The de fendant was cha rged w ith strikin g Silven i n the hea d and shov

ing her with his hands with the intent to do great bodily ha rm to her, thereby

causing her death. The undisputed medical evidence in this case established that Silven died from blunt head

trauma. Drs. Mitchell and B lum agr eed that Silven had

sustaine d the blow s to her he ad within the 24 hou

rs befor e she wa s found ha

ving sei zures on Sun

day , Octobe

r 10, 2006 . Dr. Dab ash testified that Silven had sustained the injuries leading to her death at least 24 hours be fore she was found seizing. In addition, Dr. Da bash testified that he believed that Silven’s injuries were the result of child abuse. Likewise, Drs. Mitchell and Blum both opined that Silven’s injuries were not accidental, but had been intentionally inflicted by an instrument, which c ould have been a human ha

nd or foot

. In the 24 hours b efore Si lven was found ha ving sei zures, she

was at the

defenda nt’s home with Erin and the defendant. During that same per iod, she was left alone with the defendant when Erin left to pick up Brett and later to pick up Erik. I n addition, Erin testified that the defendant put Silven to bed on Saturday night. The defendant also testified on direct examination that he tucked Silven into bed that night. The defendant was also alone with Silven on Frida y ni ght while

Erin wen t to buy magazines.29

The State also presented evidence that the defe ndant made statements from which a reasonable jury

could infer consciousness of guilt. See People v. Robinson , 391 Ill. App. 3d 822, 836, 909 N.E.2d 232, 246-47 (2009). Jill Goodpasture testified that the defendant was concer ned that someone was going to call the police on Sunday , October 10, 2006. Matthew Hocker testified that the defendant expressed concern that the police were going to arrest him. Further, the State presented evidence that the defendant had a motive for hitting Silven. Jeff Ahlers testified that the defendant believed Silven had spoken to a DARE off icer about the defendant’s drug use. Similarly , Joseph Burgess testified that the defendant told him that Silven “was going to tell on me if I didn’t stop.” Finally, Ahlers a nd Burgess both testified that the defenda nt admitte d to them tha

t he had hi

t Silven. Vi ewing t

his evide nce in the light most favora ble to the State, we conclude that a re asonable

jury could hav e found th e defen dant gu ilty of first d egree murder b eyond a rea sonable d oubt. Next, the de fendant

contends that the e vidence was insuf

ficient t o prove h im guilty beyond a re asonable doubt of endangering the life or health of a child. 720 ILCS 5/12–21.6(a) (West 2006). The defendant was charg ed with wilfully causing or permitting Silven to be placed in circumstances that endangere d her life or health in that the defendant used illega l narcotics and failed to provide necessary care and medical attention for Silven, which was a pr oximate cause of Silven’s death. Ahlers testified that the defendant had been taking methamphetamine and had not slept for a few day s when he hit Silven in the head. The defendant also told Ahlers that Silven had

been hur t when he hit her. T

he medic al evide

nce show ed that Silv en had be en hit in the head five times, and that one of the bruises extended through Silven’s sca lp to her occipital bone. Further, Silven was hit so hard as to cause bleeding in her brain and swelling of the brain,30

leading to her death. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant guilty of endangering the life or he alth of a child. B. Supreme Court Rule 431(b) The defendant contends that the trial court failed to strictly comply with Supreme Court Rule 431(b) because the potential jurors were not given an opportunity to respond to questions regarding their understanding and acceptance of the principles set forth in that rule. The defenda nt argu es that thi s error

violated his constit

utional ri ght to a f

air tria l. The de fendant

also maintains that the court’s error was not harmless. The State ag rees with the defendant that the court did not substantially comply with Rule 431(b). However, the State argues tha t the court’s

error w as harmle ss. Supreme Court Rule 431(b) was passed to ensure compliance with the supre me court’s decision in People v. Zehr , 103 Ill. 2d 472, 469 N.E.2d 1062 (1984). Zehr held that it was reversible error where the tr ial court refused to ask questions proffered by the defendant

concer ning the presumpt ion of inno cence a

nd the Stat

e’s burd en to prov e the def

endant g uilty beyond a re asonable doubt, and the subject matter of those questions was not otherwise included durin g voir dire . Zehr , 103 I ll. 2d at 47 6-78, 469 N.E.2d a t 1063-64. The rule

was amen

ded in 2007, deleting the phrase “I f requested by the defendant,” from the beginning of the paragraph. Effect ive May 1, 2007, Ru

le 431(b) provides : “The court shall ask each potential juror, individually or in a group, whether that juror understands and acce pts the following principles: (1) that the defendant is presumed innocent of the charg e(s) against him or her; (2) that befor e a defendant can be convicted the State must prove the defendant guilty

beyond a31

reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant is not required to off er any e vidence on his or her own beha

lf; and (4 ) that the

defenda nt’s fail ure to te stify

cannot be

held agains t him or her ; howeve r, no inqui

ry of a pros pective juror sha ll be made

into the defe ndant’s f ailure to testify when the defenda nt object s. The cour t’s method

of inquir y sh all provid

e each j uror an o

pportunit y to respond to specific questions concerning the princ iples set out in this section.” Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 11, 2007), R. 431, eff . May 1, 2007. “ ‘The supreme court rules are not mer ely sugg estions to be complied with if convenient but rather obligations which the parties and the cour ts are required to follow.’ ” People v. Reed , 376 Ill. App . 3d 12 1, 125 , 875 N .E.2d 167, 1 71 (20 07), q uoti ng Medow v. F lavin , 336 Ill. App. 3d 20, 36, 782 N.E.2d 733, 746-47 (2002). We review de novo issues concerning the application of a supreme court rule. Reed , 376 Ill. App. 3d at 125, 875 N.E.2d at 171. The parties appear to argue this issue as an issue of harmless error. Our review of the record , howeve

r, indica tes that th e proper

framew ork for t

he analy sis of this i ssue is the

plain error rule. To properly

preserve an issue for appellate re view, the defendant must object at trial and raise the issue in a posttrial motion. People v. Allen , 222 Ill. 2d 340, 350, 856 N.E.2d 349, 351 (2006 ). Althoug

h the def endant in this case did raise this issue i

n his motion f

or new tr ial, the de fendan t did not o bject durin g voir dire to the cou rt’s fai lure to str

ictly comply with Rule 431(b). Thus, the issue was forfeited. “Plain errors or defects affec ting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.” 134 I ll. 2d R. 615(a). “The plain-error doctrine does not instruct a reviewing court to consider all forfe ited errors.” People v. Herron , 215 Ill. 2d 167,32

177, 830 N.E.2d 467, 474 (2005). A reviewing court will rea ch a forfeited error aff

ecting substantial rights in two circumstances. Herron , 215 Ill. 2d at 178, 830 N.E.2d at 475. First, the court may conside

r a forfeited error “whe

re the evidence in a case is so closely balanced that the jury’s g uilty verdict may

have resulted from the error and not the evide nce.” Herron , 215 Ill. 2d at 178, 830 N.E.2d at 475. Second, a reviewing court may consider a forfeited error “ where the error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right, and thus a fair trial.” Herron , 215 I ll. 2d at 17 9, 830 N.E .2d at 475 . In o ther wor ds, there are two c ategor

ies of pla in error in Illinois: (1) pr

ejudicia l errors , which a

re “er rors tha t may have af fected the outco me in a clo sely balanced case”; and (2) pre sumptively prejudicial err ors, which are “errors that may not have affected the outcome, but must still be remedied.” Herron , 215 Ill. 2d at 185, 830 N.E.2d at 478- 79. The burden of persuasion remains with the defenda nt in both instances. Herron , 215 Ill. 2d at 187, 830 N.E.2d at 480. The first step in any plain e rror analy sis is to determine whether clear or obvious error occurred. People v. Piatkowski , 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565, 870 N.E.2d 403, 410-11 (2007). Here , the trial court informed the jury venire of the principles set forth in Rule 431(b) but did not provide the jurors with an opportunity to respond to questions reg arding whether the jurors understood and accepted the principles. Bec ause Rule 431(b) requires the court to ask these questions of potential jurors, the court erred by neglecting to ask the jurors if they understood and accepted each of the principles listed in the rule. Our conclusion that an error occurre d here does not end our analysis, however. Piatkowski , 225 Ill. 2d at 566, 870 N.E.2d at 411. Next, we must determine whether the defendant has met his burden to show that either the evidence against him was closely

balanced33

or that the error was so serious that he was denied a substantial right. Piatkowski , 225 Ill. 2d at 566, 870 N.E.2d at 411. In this case, the evide nce against the defendant wa s closely balanc ed. “Whether the evidence is closely balanced is, of course, a separa te question from whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction on review ag ainst a reasonable doubt challenge.” Piatkowski , 225 I ll. 2d at 56 6, 870 N.E .2d at 411 . Thus, wh ile we ha ve deter mined tha t the State provided sufficient evidence to find the defenda nt guilty bey

ond a reasonable doubt, the evidence was not overwhelming. The only direct evidence ty

ing the defendant to Silven’s death was the testimony of jailhouse informants Bur gess and Ahlers. Our supreme cour t has stated that the credibility of informant testimony is a matter for a jury

and can be the basis for a guilty verdict. People v. Manning , 182 Ill. 2d 193, 210-11, 695 N.E.2d 423, 431 (1998). Howeve r, such testimony should also be treated with ca ution. People v. Williams , 65 Ill. 2d 258, 267, 357 N.E.2d 525, 529-30 (1976). Burgess and Ahlers eac

h testified that the defendant, at separate times, confe ssed that he hit Silven preceding her death. The defe ndant denied making any such statements. The remaining circumstantial evidence ag ainst the defendant tends to prove that he had an opportunity and a motive for hitting Silven. Howe ver, that circumstantial evidence alone was not suf fic ien t t o pr ove th e de fen dan t gu il ty be yond a re aso nab le d oub t o f th e cr im es c har ged . In these circumstances, we conclude that the e vidence against the defendant wa s closely balanc ed. Therefore, the trial court’s err or in this case prejudiced the defendant. I n Herron , the court found plain error and that the evidence was closely bala nced. Herron , 215 Ill. 2d at 187-94, 830 N.E.2d at 480-84. In determining that the error required the reversal of the defendant’s convicti on, the co

urt state d that the

defenda nt in that c ase nee d not prove that the e rror actually34

misled the jury. Herron , 215 Ill. 2d at 193, 830 N.E.2d at 483. Further, the court stated: “If the defe

ndant carries the burden of persuasion and c onvinces a reviewing court that there was error and that the evidenc e was closely balanced, the case is not cloaked with a presumption of prejudice. The error is actually prejudicia

l, not presumpt ively prejudic ial. *** Whe

n there i s error

in a close

case, w e choose

to err on the side of fairness, so as not to convict an innocent person.” Herron , 215 Ill. 2d at 193, 830 N.E.2d at 483. See also Piatkowski , 225 Ill. 2d at 566, 870 N.E.2d at 411. The plain error doctrine considers unprese rved error where the evidenc e is close, regardless of the serousness of the e rror. Herron , 215 Ill. 2d at 186-87, 830 N.E.2d at 479. Furthermore, despite the fact that the Rule 431(b) f actors were covered just not in the proper manner, we cannot simply ignore this error as a de minimus exception to the first prong of the plain error rule. See People v. Lewis , 234 Ill. 2d 32, 912 N.E.2d 1220 (2009) (no de minimus exception to second

prong o f plain e

rror re view). T hus, we c onclude t

hat the c ourt’s e

rror in th is case prejudiced the defendant, as the evidence against him was closely balanced. We therefore

revers e the def

endant’ s convict

ion and re mand for a new tri al. C. Testimony of Heather Connor Although we have already found reversible error in this case, we will consider other issues raised by the de fendant that are likely to recur upon remand. People v. Fuller , 205 Ill. 2d 308, 346, 793 N.E.2d 526, 550 (2002). Next, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing He ather Connor to testify as to certain statements made by Erin. The defendant raises several objections to the propriety of the admittance of this testimony. The35

defendant argues: (1) Connor’s testimony was inadmissible under Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 15 8 L. E d. 2d 177, 1 24 S. Ct. 1354 (2004); (2) Erin’ s stateme nts were inadmissib le because they

were lay opinion testimony as to the ultimate question of fact prese nted in the case; (3) Erin’s statements were not admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule; and (4) the

prejudic e of thes e stateme nts was compounded

by E rin’s re ferenc e during

crossexamination to a polygraph te st. The State claims that the defendant has forfeited this issue because he did not object to the testimony at trail. On the merits of the issue, the State maintains that: (1)Connor’s

testimony

regar ding Er in’s state ments do not fall within Crawford because Erin’s statements were not testimonial; (2) Connor’s testimony was not opinion testimony and Erin’s statements were not an opinion; (3) Connor’s testimony as to Erin’s statements were admissible as an excited utterance; and (4) Erin’s refe rence to a poly

graph test was inadvertent and made in respon se to a que stion by defense counsel. The defendant filed a motion in limine challenging the admissibility of Connor’s testimony, and included the issue in his posttrial motion. He did not, however, objec t to the testimony during trial. We note that the I llinois Supreme Court has stated that a motion in limine or an objection at trial in conjunction with a posttrial motion preserves an issue for appea l. People v. Hudson , 157 Ill. 2d 401, 434-35, 626 N.E.2d 161, 175 (1993). Howeve r, the court has also stated that when a motion in limine is denied, a contemporaneous objection to the evidence at the time it is offered is required to preserve the issue for review. Simmons v. Garces , 198 I ll. 2d 541, 569, 763 N.E.2d 720, 738 (2002). Regardless of whether the issue has been forfeited here, we choose to consider the merits of the issue bec ause the issue is likely to rec ur upon remand.36

Connor testified that Erin asked her, “Did he hurt her?” I n addition, Connor testified that Erin said , “I

will neve r trust him

with her a

gain.” Erin her self did not testify regar ding the se statements, nor did she give her opinion at trial as to who hit Silven. Thus, the issue is whether Connor’s testimony, detailing stateme nts made to her by Er

in, was properly a

dmitted. The defendant first claims that his sixth amendment rights were violated when the c ourt allowed Connor’s testimony beca use Erin’s statements were testimonial and Erin was not subject

to cross- examination as to thos e stateme nts. The si

xth amendme

nt’s conf rontation clause provides, “In all criminal prosec utions, the accused shall enjoy the right *** to be confronted with the witnesses a

gainst h im.” U.S. Const., ame

nds. VI , XIV . Where te stimonial e vidence is at issue, “the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cr

oss-examination.” Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 68, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 203, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374 (2004). Thus, “a testimonial statement of a witness who does not testif y a t trial is never

admissible unless (1) the witness is unavailable to testify, a nd (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Stechly, 225 I ll. 2d 246, 2 79, 870 N. E.2d 333, 3 54 (2007) . If t he state ments are not testimo nial, “the confrontati on clause

places n o restric tion on the ir introdu

ction (a lthough t hey are still subject to ‘traditional limitation upon hearsay e vidence’).” Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 279, 870 N.E.2 d at 35 4, quo ting Davis v. Washington , 547 U.S. 8 13, 821, 16 5 L. E d. 2d 224, 2 37, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273 (2006). Although the United States Supreme Court has declined to define “testimonial,” the Illinois Supreme Court in Stechly stated that there appear to be two components to a testimonial

statement. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 281, 870 N.E.2d at 355. First, a testimonial statement must be37

made in a solemn fashion. Stechly , 225 Ill. 2d at 281, 870 N.E.2d at 355. Second, the statement must be intended to establish a particular fact. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 282, 870 N.E.2d at 355. Statements may be testimonial “eve n if not made directly to a gents of the state.” Stechly, 225 I ll. 2d at 289, 870 N.E.2d at 359. To determine whether a statement made outside of police interrogation is testimonial, the proper focus is on the declara nt’s intent. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 289, 870 N .E.2d at 3 59. “Would t he objec tive circ

umstance s have le d a reas onable pe rson to conclude that their statement could be used aga inst the defendant?” Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 289, 870 N.E.2d at 359. In this case, Erin’s statements to Connor wer e not testimonial. Connor was a member of the emergency

medical personnel who were providing c are for Silven and was not acting as an agent of the State. I

n addition, a reasonable person in Erin’s circumstance s would not have believe d that her

statemen ts could be

used in a c

riminal pr osecution again st the def

endant. E rin made her statements to Connor after receiving information from Dr. Dabash that Silven had been hit multiple times and her brain was bleeding. Her statements wer e not made in response to any questioni ng by Connor. Er

in did not id

entify the defe ndant, or any one else , as the pe

rson who h

it Silven. Rather, Erin’s initial statement was a question to Connor followed by a statement that she would never trust “him” with Silven again. A reasona ble person would not conclude that these am biguous statemen ts would be

used in a c

riminal pr osecution. Thus, Er

in’s state ments

were no t testimonia

l. If an out-of-cour

t statement is nontestimonial, then traditional hearsay e xceptions apply. People v. Lisle , 376 Ill. App. 3d 67, 81, 877 N.E.2d 119, 132 (2007). Here , the State maintains that Erin’s statements were admissible under the excited utterance e xception to the hearsay rule

.38

For a he arsay

statemen t to be adm

issible und

er the e xcited utte

rance e xception: “ (1) ther

e must be an occurrence sufficie

ntly startling to produce

a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) there must be an absence of time for the dec larant to fabricate the statement; and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurr ence.” Lisle , 376 Ill. App. 3d at 77, 877 N.E.2d at 128. To determine whether the excited utterance e xception applies, we consider the totality of the circumstance s, “including time, the nature of the event, the mental and phy sical condition of the declarant, and the presence or absence of self-interest.” Lisle , 376 Ill. App. 3d at 77, 877 N.E.2d at 128. “ ‘Whether a statement qualifies as an excited utteranc e is within the trial court's discretion.’ ” People v. Robinson , 379 Ill. App. 3d 679, 681, 883 N.E.2d 529, 531 (2008), quot ing People v. Gwinn , 366 Ill. App. 3d 501, 517, 851 N.E.2d 902 (2006). In this case, the totality

of the circumstances do not indicate that Erin’s statements were an excited utterance. Erin’s statements were not based upon he r own observations of the injuries inflicted upon Silven. Rather, the statements appear to be made after some reflection by

Erin. Erin aske d a questi on, “Did h e hurt he r?” Then, she stated , “I

will neve r trust he r with him again. ” Erin did

not state h

er obser vations r egard ing Silve n’s injuri es, but wa s appare ntly reflecting upon what may have happened to Silven or who could have hurt her. Thus, Erin’ s statements do not fall within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. We find that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Connor to testify a s to these statements made by Erin. D. Testimony of Nathan Ra lph The def endant a rgues t hat the tr ial cour t erred by a llowing N athan Ra

lph’s test imony as to statements made to him by Jeffrey Ahlers. The defendant maintains the testimony was39

inadmissible hearsay, e licited solely to bolster Ahlers’ c redibility. I

n addition, the defendant claims that Ralph’s testimony as to Ahlers’ stateme nts violated the defendant’s constitutional rights under the sixth amendment’s confrontation clause. The State claims that Ralph’s testimony was admis sible non- hearsa y be cause A

hlers tes tified at

trial and was subje cted to

cross-e xamination by th e defen

dant. The testimony at issue here consisted of the following question by the State and answer by Ralph. “Q. Did Mr. Ahlers confide in y ou that he had some reservations about

co min g f or wa rd wit h so me inf

or ma tio n? A. Yes.” “ ‘Hearsay

evidence is an out-of-court statement offer ed to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and it is generally inadmissible due to its lack of reliability unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay

rule.’ ” People v. Caffey , 205 Ill. 2d 52, 88-89, 792 N.E.2d 1163, 118, (2001 ), quo ting People v. Olinger , 176 Ill. 2d 326, 357, 680 N.E.2d 321 (1997). I n addition, the Illinois Supreme Court has stated, “ ‘[t]he presence or a bsence in court of the declarant of the out-of-court statement is * * * irrelevant to a determination as to whether the out-of-court statement is hearsay .’ ” People v. Lawler , 142 Ill. 2d 548, 557, 568 N.E.2d 895, 899 (1991), quoting M . Graha

m, Cleary & Grah am's Ha

ndbook of

Illinois Eviden

ce §801. 1, at 564- 65 (5th ed. 1990). Here, Ralph testified that Ahlers confided in him that he had reser vations about telling any one abou t informa tion he ha d conce rning th e defen

dant. The State off ered thi s evidenc e to prove tha t Ahlers made such

a stateme nt to Ralph, as Ahler s had pre viously testifie d. Thus,40

Ralph’s te stimony

of Ahlers’ out-of

-court s tatement

to him was o ffere d to prove that Ahle rs told Ralph he had information about the defendant but had reserva tions about revealing that information, and was hearsay . Based upon Lawler , we decline to find the testimony nonhe arsay simply because Ahle

rs also testified at trial. Further, at trial the State argued tha t in order to combat a possible impeachment of Ahlers that Ralph’s testimony was offer ed to bolster Ahlers’ testimony a gainst charges of fa

brication that Ahlers had reservations about coming forward with information. The State also indicated th at it ha d n o h ea rs ay e xc ep ti on to of fe r, an d i t w as no t g oi ng to of fe r h ea rs ay- on -h ea rs ay. Genera lly, “proof o f a prior

consiste nt stateme

nt made by

a witness is inadmiss ible hearsay , which may not be used to bolster a witness’s testimony.” People v. House , 377 Ill. App. 3d 9, 19, 878 N.E.2d 1171, 1179 (2007). However, in an effort to re but an express or implied charg e on cros s-examina

tion that th e witness

is motivate d or has be en influe nced to te stify

falsely or that his testimony is a recent f abrication, evidence can be admissible that the witness told the same story bef

ore the motive or influence came into existence or before the time of the alleged fabrication. People v. Cuadrado , 214 I ll. 2d 79, 90 , 824 N.E. 2d 214, 221 (2005); People v. Walker , 211 Ill. 2d 317, 344, 812 N.E.2d 339, 354 (2004); accord Tome v. United States , 513 U.S. 150, 1 56, 130 L . Ed. 2d 574 , 581, 115 S. Ct. 696, 700 (1995). F or the ad

missibility

of this typ e of evid

ence, there must b e an expre ss or implie d attack on these g

rounds on the witne ss during cross-examination. The mere introduction of contradictory evidence is not sufficient. Moore v. Anchor Organization for Hea lth Maintenance , 284 Ill. App. 3d 874, 885, 672 N.E.2d 826, 834 ( 1996). Further, evidenc e of a pr ior consi stent stat

ement on d

irect exa mination in anticipation of a cross-examination attack is improper. People v. Crockett , 314 Ill. App. 3d 389,41

407-08, 731 N.E.2d 823, 838 (2000). A “recent fabric ation” charge can ar ise from negative evidence that a witness did not speak of this matter at a time when he c ould have. People v. Engle , 351 Ill. App. 3d 284, 289, 813 N.E.2d 761, 766 (2004). Prior consistent statements are admitted solely for re

habilitative purposes, not as substantive evidence. Walker , 211 Ill. 2d at 344, 812 N.E.2d at 354. The prior consistent statement when it is properly admissible can be testified to by either the witness himself or any other pe

rson with personal knowledge of the

statement. People v. Wurster , 83 Ill. App. 3d 399, 408, 403 N.E.2d 1306, 1314 (1980). In the instant case, it is unclear that the pr oper foundation was laid for the admission of a prior consistent statement to rebut the charge of r ecent fabrication. I

n fact, Ralph did not testify specifically a

bout a specific prior consistent statement. We are only told that the witness Ahlers confided in Ralph that he had some reservations about coming f orward with some information and left to speculate about what that information was. Given the re cord in this case, there appears to be no ju stificat ion for th e admission of Ralph ’s testimo ny r egard ing the s tatement s allege dly made by the jailho

use infor mant Ahle

rs. Below a nd on appe al, the Sta

te has not argue d that Ralph’s testimony was admis sible

un de r a ny o th er ex ce pt io n t o t he he ar sa y ru le . W e d id no t c on si de r t he ap pl ic ab il it y of an y hearsay exceptions in such a circumstance. Thus, in light of the circumstances se t out above, the trial court erred by

allowing Ralph to testify as to the state ments made to him by Ahlers in the manner presente d at the tr ial. E. Trial C ourt’s ex parte

Communications With the Jury Next, the defendant argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rig ht to appear and participate in person at all proceeding s involving his substantial rights when the trial court42

communicated with the jury twice outside of the defendant’s presence. I n addition, the defendant maintains that the State cannot meet its burden to establish bey ond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not prejudiced by these ex parte

communications. We have already determined that the defendant’s conviction must be reversed and r emanded for a new trial. Thus, we need not deter mine whet

her the d efenda nt’s rig hts were violated by t he court ’s ex parte communications with the jury. Howeve r, we note that jury

deliberations are a critical stage of the procee dings ag ainst a de fendant , and that a defen dant has a constituti onal rig

ht to be pr

esent in person and by c ounsel during each critical stag e of the trial. People v. McDonal d , 168 Ill. 2d 420, 459, 660 N.E.2d 832, 849 (1995).

F. Motion t

o Exclude T estimony

of Jailhouse

Info rmants Finally, the def

endant contends that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a pretrial hearing to determine the reliability of the testimony of Ahlers a nd Burgess and by

denying the defendant’s motion to exclude their testimony. The State ma intains that the court did not err by declining to conduct a pretrial hearing under section 115-21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (the Code) (725 IL CS 5/115-21 (West 2006)). In addition, the State claims that the defendant has not offered any reasons why the

court abused its discretion by a llowing the

te st im on y. Section 11 5-21 of th e Code “a pplies to a

ny c apital ca se in whic

h the pros ecution a

ttempts to int roduce e vidence o f inc riminating state ments made by the accus ed to or ov erhe ard b y [ a jailhouse] informant.” 725 IL CS 5/115-21(a), (b) (West 2006). In such ca ses, the trial court shall con duct a he aring t

o determ ine whether the in formant’ s testimony is reliab le. 725 I

LCS 5/115-21(d) (West 2006). Here, the State did not seek the death pena lty. See 720 I

LCS 5/9–1(b)43

(West 2006). Thus, the court was not required to conduct a hear ing to determine the reliability of the informants’ testimony and did not err by declining

to do so. The defendant offers no other argument as to why

the court abused its discretion in allowing Ahlers and Burg ess to testify. Thus, we conclude that the court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion. III. CONCL

USION Under th e plain e

rror ru le, the de fendant

was pre judiced by th e court’ s failure to strictly comply with Supreme Court Rule 431(b) bec ause the evidence against him was close ly balance d and relied heavily

upon the testimony of two jailhouse informants, Ahlers a nd Burgess. However, the evidence presente d was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder and endangering

the life of a child and, thus, double jeopardy does not preclude a new trial. People v. Hernandez , 231 Ill. 2d 134, 152, 896 N.E.2d 297, 309 (2008). Further , we conclude the court erred by admitting certain testimony of Heather Connor and Nathan Ralph. Accord ingly , we rev erse the

defenda nt’s conv iction an d remand for a ne w trial. Reverse d and remanded for new tri al. O’BRIEN, P. J . and M CDADE , J. c oncur ring.