Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 14, 2023

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-22-00457-CR, 

NO. 14-22-00458-CR, 

NO. 14-22-00459-CR

RICHARD BLAKE BRADLEY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 212th District Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. 19-CR-2515, 19-CR-2516, 19-CR-2517

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A Galveston County jury found appellant Richard Blake Bradley guilty of 

three separate offenses of possession of child pornography. See Tex. Penal Code § 

43.26(a)(1).1 After finding the State’s punishment enhancement allegations true, the 

1 Appellate cause no. 14-22-00457-CR, which is trial court cause no. 19-CR-2515, is 

hereinafter referred to as “Offense 1”; appellate cause no. 14-22-00458-CR, which is trial court 

cause no. 19-CR-2516, is hereinafter referred to as “Offense 2”; and appellate cause no. 14-22-
2

jury assessed Bradley’s punishment for each offense as confinement for life in the 

Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In four issues on appeal, Bradley challenges 

the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions. We affirm.

Background

Cecil Arnold is a detective with the Pearland Police Department and a member 

of the Internet Crimes Against Children Division (ICAC), a specialized law 

enforcement task force connected with the National Center for Missing and 

Exploited Children (NCMEC). NCMEC has compiled a database of over 40 million 

pictures and videos seen by law enforcement that depict child pornography. Every 

image in NCMEC’s database has a “hash or sha value.”2 As a member of ICAC, 

Detective Arnold utilizes peer-to-peer file sharing networks and IP addresses to 

identify individuals that are uploading and downloading child pornography files. 

In July 2019, Detective Arnold accessed Free Net to search for IP addresses 

in Brazoria and Galveston County that requested “keys” that contain child 

pornographic images and videos.3 He received an alert that an IP address requested 

at least 17 unique keys of child pornographic pictures and videos between May 20 

00459-CR, which is trial court cause no. 19-CR-2517, is hereinafter referred to as “Offense 3.”

2 According to Detective Arnold, a hash or sha value is a secure algorithm. Every electronic 

device has an internal program that assembles letters and numbers to make a pixel. In turn, the 

pixels form a picture, and the values assigned to the pixels for a specific photograph creates a hash 

or sha value. 

3 Pearland’s city limits extend into three different counties—Harris, Fort Bend, and 

Brazoria. As a member of the ICAC task force, Detective Arnold conducts investigations for a 

specific geographic region consisting of 49 counties extending from Nacogdoches to Corpus 

Christi and including Galveston County.

Detective Arnold testified that the Dark Web is the “underbelly” of the internet and requires 

a separate search engine to access it. Free Net is a program that allows an individual to become a 

“node” and download files from users on the Dark Web. Free Net also allows an individual “to 

have blocks of data encrypted,” “download keys from free sites,” and “download and assemble the 

files” that were searched. In the context of the Dark Web, keys are stored in “free sites” and each 

key “calls or assembles all the different blocks of data to create a file.” 
3

and June 12. Of the 17 unique keys identified, Detective Arnold selected 3 keys to 

download. He reassembled the blocks of each key to verify if they were in fact child 

pornography. Each key he recreated contained pictures or videos of child 

pornography. 

Detective Arnold testified that he contacted another task force member with 

Homeland Security to submit an administrative subpoena to the internet company 

that owned the target IP address.4 Comcast responded to the subpoena request and 

identified the subscriber of the target IP address as Marvin Booher in Bacliff, Texas. 

Detective Arnold went to the address to determine who lived at the residence and if 

the Wi-Fi connection was secure. This information was used to obtain a search 

warrant. Among other things, the search warrant permitted law enforcement to seize: 

(1) any and all information whether stored electronically as computer data or on 

paper or other medium; (2) any data or images of persons who appear to be under 

the age of 18 engaged in sexual acts or posed in a manner to elicit a sexual response 

or otherwise engaging in sexual conduct; (3) any data referring to online contacts or 

correspondences with persons regarding the trading of child pornography or 

communication with children; (4) computers and any computer programs, software, 

and equipment; and (5) documents showing dominion and control over the 

residence.

On July 30, Detective Arnold, James Staton, a detective with the Pearland 

Police Department and a member of ICAC, and a large team of law enforcement, 

arrived at the Bacliff address to execute the search warrant. In the process of 

4

“[A]n ICAC task force may issue and cause to be served an administrative subpoena that 

requires the production of records or other documentation . . . if the subpoena relates to an 

investigation of an offense that involves the sexual exploitation of a minor; and there is reasonable 

cause to believe that an Internet or electronic service account provided through an electronic 

communication service or remote computing service . . . has been used in the sexual exploitation 

or attempted sexual exploitation of the minor.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 422.003(b).
4

executing the search warrant, Detective Arnold observed a man riding a bicycle. 

This man was identified as Roberto Calderon, and he lived in a boat in the front yard

of the Bacliff address. After entering and securing the Bacliff address, Detective 

Arnold learned that Bradley and his wife occupied the first room, Booher occupied

the second room, and Bradley’s daughter occupied the third room. 

Law enforcement seized and searched several electronic devices from 

Bradley’s and Booher’s bedrooms, as well as a cellular phone belonging to Calderon. 

There was no evidence of child pornography on Calderon’s cellular phone. The 

electronic devices seized and searched from Booher’s bedroom included a Dell 

computer tower, an Acer laptop, an HP tower, and a Rago computer tower. None of 

these devices contained any evidence of Dark Web software, Free Net artifacts, child 

erotica, or child pornography. 

The electronic devices seized and searched from Bradley’s bedroom included, 

among other things, an Acer laptop, an HP Pavilion laptop, a Kindle Fire tablet, 

Bradley’s cellular phone, a Western Digital drive, and a Toshiba 320 GIG drive. 

Some of the electronic devices seized did not contain any evidence of child 

pornography. However, several of Bradley’s electronic devices contained Dark Web 

software, Free Net artifacts, and child pornography. 

The Acer laptop contained 757 files of child pornography, 262 files of child 

exploitive material, and 12 files of computer-generated images.5 Detective Staton, a 

computer forensic examiner for the ICAC task force, found “Windows shell bags,” 

which indicated that Free Net was previously installed on the Acer laptop. 

Additionally, other identifying information, such as pictures of Bradley’s birth 

5

ICAC categorizes child abuse materials in three categories: category 1 is used to classify 

child pornography; category 2 is used to classify child exploitive material where it is difficult to 

determine the child’s age; and category 3 is used to classify computer-generated images, such as 

anime, that depict child-related pornography. 
5

certificate and driver’s license, was located on the Acer laptop. Detective Staton did 

not locate any identifying information linking Booher to the Acer laptop. The HP

laptop contained 36 files of child sexual abuse material. Although Free Net was not 

actively installed on the HP laptop, Detective Staton found Free Net artifacts, as well 

as browsing history where Free Net had been searched and accessed. On the HP 

laptop, Detective Staton located saved credit cards with Bradley’s name. While 

searching the Kindle tablet for evidence, Detective Staton found search terms 

indicative of child pornography. The device name of the Kindle tablet was 

“Richard’s Fire.”

Bradley’s cellular phone contained “two collage-type pictures.” Detective 

Staton testified that “one of the pictures in one of the corners [of the collage]

appeared to be child pornography.” On the Western Digital drive, Detective Staton

found one video of child sexual abuse material and 12 images of child exploitive 

material. On the Toshiba drive, Detective Staton found 5,947 files of child sexual 

abuse material, over 10,000 files of child exploitive material, and 8 files of 

computer-generated images. This drive was connected to the HP laptop, and Free 

Net was actively installed.

Both Booher and Bradley were interviewed by law enforcement. Booher’s 

first interview took place by telephone because he was not at the residence during 

the execution of the search warrant. He explained that he is an over-the-road truck 

driver. According to Booher, he did not have access to the Dark Web and did not 

know about Free Net. Bradley was also interviewed by law enforcement. He

specifically denied ever accessing the Dark Web. 

Bradley testified in his defense. He denied the allegations in the indictments 

and claimed that he did not have a lot of knowledge about the Dark Web. However, 

on cross-examination, he acknowledged that he accessed the Dark Web “a few 
6

hundred times” with a program called “The Onion Router.” He claimed that he 

accessed the Dark Web to swap information about politics and other “incendiary” 

issues because he is militia. Bradley agreed that the child pornography found did not 

belong to his wife, his daughter, or Calderon. He believed that it belonged to Booher 

and described Booher’s skill with computers as “pretty extreme.” Even though 

Detective Staton testified that none of the devices processed contained evidence that 

they were remotely accessed by another user, Bradley insisted that Booher remotely 

accessed Bradley’s devices. Bradley explained that Booher knew how to remove a 

laptop hard drive and attach it to a computer tower and frequently assisted Bradley 

with projects. According to Bradley, Booher had access to Bradley’s electronic 

devices, actually used Bradley’s devices on numerous occasions, and Booher’s use 

was not monitored. Bradley’s wife denied that any of the child pornography found 

belonged to her, her daughter, or Calderon. According to Bradley’s wife, she never 

saw Booher with any of Bradley’s electronics. 

A jury found Bradley guilty of three counts of possession of child 

pornography as alleged in the indictments. The jury found the State’s enhancement 

allegations to be true and assessed Bradley’s punishment for each offense as 

confinement for life in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.6

Discussion

Bradley raises four issues on appeal, asserting that (1) the evidence was 

insufficient in Offense 1 because “actual sexual intercourse” was not depicted in the 

State’s evidence, (2) the evidence was insufficient in Offense 3 because the State 

failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person depicted in the image was 

6 The first enhancement paragraph alleged that Bradley was convicted of the felony offense 

of indecency with a child in March 1999. The second enhancement paragraph alleged that Bradley 

was convicted of the felony offense of failure to comply with required sex offender registration in 

July 2011.
7

a child under 18 years old, (3) the evidence was insufficient in all three cases because 

the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bradley intentionally or 

knowingly possessed child pornography, and (4) the trial court erred in failing to 

instruct the jury on the meaning of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

We consider these issues separately, beginning with Bradley’s evidentiary 

sufficiency challenges. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence

I. The Jury was Justified in Finding that “Actual Sexual Intercourse” 

was Depicted

In his first issue, Bradley challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in Offense 

1 and alleges that actual sexual intercourse was not depicted. Because the indictment 

alleges “actual sexual intercourse,” Bradley argues that the State was required to 

prove “some penetration of a female sex organ by a male sex organ.” 

We review legal sufficiency challenges under the standard set by the United 

States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). In reviewing the legal 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, a court of appeals will 

determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict, the trier of fact was rationally justified in finding the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 902. We measure the evidence “by the 

elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the 

case.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 

The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that accurately sets out the law, 

is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden 

of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately 

describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Ramjattansingh 
8

v. State, 548 S.W.3d 540, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “‘As authorized by the 

indictment’ means the statutory elements of the offense as modified by the charging 

instrument.” Id. When a Texas statute lists more than one method of committing an 

offense or definition of an element of an offense, and the indictment alleges some, 

but not all, of the statutorily listed methods or definitions, the State is limited to the 

methods and definitions alleged. Id. (citing Cada v. State, 334 S.W.3d 766, 773–74 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2000)). However, the hypothetically correct jury charge “does not necessarily have 

to track exactly all of the charging instrument’s allegations.” Id. Whether an 

allegation must be included in the hypothetically correct jury charge depends on 

whether the variance between the allegation and proof is material. Ramjattansingh, 

548 S.W.3d at 546–47 (citing Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 257 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2001)).

Direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial 

evidence alone may be sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative 

force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. 

Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper v. State, 214 

S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The evidence-sufficiency standard of review 

is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

For the evidence to be sufficient, the State need not disprove all reasonable 

alternative hypotheses that are inconsistent with the defendant’s guilt. Wise v. State, 

364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Rather, a court considers only whether 

the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable based upon the cumulative 

force of all the evidence when considered in the light most favorable to the verdict. 

Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. As the exclusive judge of the facts, the jury may believe 

or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony. Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 
9

459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We presume that the factfinder resolved any 

conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution. See 

Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 922. On appeal we may not reevaluate the weight and 

credibility of the record evidence and thereby substitute our own judgment for that 

of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

Section 43.26 of the Texas Penal Code provides that 

[a] person commits an offense if the person knowingly or intentionally 

possesses, or knowingly or intentionally accesses with intent to view, 

visual material that visually depicts a child younger than 18 years of 

age at the time the image of the child was made who is engaging in 

sexual conduct . . .; and the person knows that the material depicts the 

child. . . . Tex. Penal Code § 43.26(a).

The application paragraph of the jury charge provided:

Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on 

or about the 30th date of July, A.D., 2019 in Galveston County, Texas, 

the defendant, RICHARD BLAKE BRADLEY, did then and there 

intentionally or knowingly possess visual material that visually 

depicted, and which the defendant knew visually depicted a child who 

was younger than 18 years of age at the time the image of the child was 

made, engaging in sexual conduct, to-wit: actual sexual intercourse, 

then you will find the defendant guilty of Possession of Child 

Pornography as alleged in the indictment. 

Consequently, the State was limited to the method alleged in the indictment—

actual sexual intercourse. See Ramjattansingh, 548 S.W.3d at 546. Section 43.26 

also provides that the term “sexual conduct” has the meaning assigned in section 

43.25. Tex. Penal Code § 43.26(b)(2). Thus, the phrase “sexual conduct” means 

“sexual contact, actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, 

. . . or lewd exhibition of the genitals, the anus, or any portion of the female breast 

below the top of the areola.” Id. § 43.25(2). But the phrase “actual sexual 

intercourse” is not statutorily defined. 
10

When interpreting a statute, an undefined word or phrase should be construed 

and understood according to its common, everyday usage. Hanna v. State, 426 

S.W.3d 87, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the 

term “actual” means “[e]xisting in fact; real.” Actual, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th 

ed. 2019). The term “intercourse,” which includes “sexual intercourse,” involves the 

penetration of the vagina by the penis. Intercourse, id. Accordingly, we interpret the 

phrase “actual sexual intercourse” to mean the real penetration of the vagina by the 

penis. Because the indictment alleged “actual sexual intercourse” as the form of 

“sexual conduct” depicted in the visual material, the State was required to establish 

that there was some penetration depicted in the visual material. 

In this case, the jury was presented with a video that was admitted as part of 

State’s Exhibit No. 55. This video depicts a naked adult male and a naked juvenile 

female engaged in an apparent sexual act. Bradley complains that this video only

depicts “a naked male . . . pushing his groin against the naked bottom of a juvenile 

female.” Due to the angle of the video, Bradley asserts that it is impossible “to see 

the sexual organ of the young female in order to determine whether it actually is 

being penetrated.” Bradley suggests that the jury could not assume that actual sexual 

intercourse was depicted when the video “fails to depict a connection between 

genitals.” Bradley, however, does not cite, and we have not found, any authority that 

supports the proposition that the factfinder must actually see penetration to 

reasonably conclude that actual sexual intercourse occurred. Indeed, the jury viewed 

the video and was permitted to use common sense, common knowledge, personal 

experience, and observations from life in drawing an inference that the female

depicted in the video was engaged in actual sexual intercourse. See Acosta v. State, 

429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

Additionally, Detective Staton testified that this video visually depicts “an 
11

underage female engaging in the sexual act, penetration by a male.” He explained 

that in the video, he could see “[the naked man’s] penis up against where [the 

female’s] vagina and anus would be.” The jury also heard testimony that several of 

Bradley’s electronic devices contained evidence of child pornography. According to 

Detective Staton, many of the files on Bradley’s devices showed sexual intercourse 

and actual penetration. 

Bradley emphasizes that none of the thousands of pornographic photographs 

and videos Detective Staton testified about were shown to the jury and stresses that 

Detective Staton’s testimony should be disregarded for two reasons: (1) the State 

“represented to the trial judge that the State was relying on a specific image” and (2) 

“only evidence which was presented to the jury should be considered for sufficiency 

review.” Again, Bradley does not cite any authority for either of these propositions. 

Even if the jury did not view the other pornographic photographs and videos, the 

jury, as the exclusive judge of the facts, could accept or reject Detective Staton’s 

testimony. Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“A jury 

may accept one version of the facts and reject another, and it may reject any part of 

a witness’s testimony.”). And we defer to the factfinder’s resolution of conflicts in 

the evidence, weighing of the testimony, and drawing of reasonable inferences from 

basic facts to ultimate facts. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2010).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, the record 

contains more than sufficient evidence to support that the jury was justified in 

finding that “actual sexual intercourse” was depicted in the child pornography 

possessed by Bradley. Accordingly, we overrule Bradley’s first issue. 

II. Physical Inspection of Photograph is Sufficient for Factfinder to 

Make an Age Determination
12

In his second issue, Bradley argues that the evidence in Offense 3 was 

insufficient because the photographic evidence relied on by the State was 

“ambiguous as to whether the model is over or under 18 years old.” Bradley posits

that the “image at issue depicts a maturely developed female.” We disagree.

In addressing this point of error, we employ the same standard of review 

discussed above. The determination of the age of a child in a possession of child 

pornography case is a fact issue for the factfinder to decide. Gerron v. State, 524 

S.W.3d 308, 318 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, pet ref’d). The factfinder may make this 

determination by any of several methods: (1) personal inspection of the child; (2) 

inspection of the photograph or motion picture that shows the child engaging in the 

sexual performance; (3) oral testimony by a witness to the sexual performance as to 

the age of the child based on the child’s appearance at the time; (4) expert medical 

testimony based on the appearance of the child engaging in the sexual performance; 

or (5) any other method authorized by law or by the rules of evidence at common 

law. Tex. Penal Code § 43.25(g). As discussed above, the factfinder “may use 

common sense and apply common knowledge, observation, and experience gained

in ordinary affairs when drawing inferences from the evidence.” Acosta, 429 S.W.3d 

at 625. 

In this case, the indictment for Offense 3 alleged that Bradley possessed child 

pornography depicting a child who is “engaging in sexual conduct, to-wit; lewd 

exhibition of the genitals.” A photograph depicting a naked female wearing a bonnet 

with a pacifier in her mouth was admitted as part of State’s Exhibit No. 55. Bradley 

testified that the female in the photograph appeared to be under 18 years old, but he 

could not say with certainty that she was actually under 18 years old. According to 

Bradley, he was uncertain because “[p]eople do weird cosplay stuff all the time.” 

Bradley also explained that the female could have appeared younger because there 
13

are “plenty of drug addicts out there that basically become skin and bone skeleton 

people.” Bradley added that there are people that are over the age of consent, but 

their bodies look younger “because they’re basically emaciated.” Bradley maintains

that the photograph is ambiguous because there was no expert opinion from a 

medical doctor or professor of anatomy to guide the jury in determining the female’s 

age. Bradley suggests that the jury could not ascertain that the female in the 

photograph was under 18 years old based on her appearance alone and points out 

that the State did not produce any other evidence of the female’s age, such as a birth 

certificate. 

Contrary to Bradley’s assertions, expert testimony is not required to determine 

a child’s age in a possession of child pornography case. See Tex. Penal Code § 

43.25(g) (providing that expert medical testimony is one of five methods the 

factfinder may use to determine whether the child who participated in sexual conduct 

was younger than 18 years old). Detective Arnold testified that when ICAC 

investigates allegations of child pornography in which there are images or videos 

where it is unclear if a child younger than 18 years of age is depicted, it is not 

characterized as child pornography. He explained anything that is “age difficult” is 

not investigated, and the entire category is filtered from his search engine when he 

accesses Free Net. Moreover, the jury heard the testimony of Detective Staton, a 

computer forensic examiner for ICAC. He testified that the photograph visually 

depicted “an underage female dressed up like an infant spreading her vagina, holding 

it apart with her fingers.” This photograph was recovered on one of the loose hard 

drives in Bradley’s bedroom. Detective Staton believed that the child was under 18 

years of age based on personal inspection of the photograph and emphasized the 

child’s face, body structure, and sexual organs indicate that she was under 18 years 

old.
14

As stated, the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the 

weight given to the evidence. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. The Penal Code 

provides a variety of methods by which the factfinder may determine the age of the 

child who is depicted while engaging in a sexual act, and the inspection of a 

photograph alone is sufficient for a factfinder to make an age determination. Tex. 

Penal Code § 43.25(g)(2). The jury was able to view the photograph at issue and 

determined that the female depicted was under the age of 18 at the time the image 

was made. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we 

conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s guilty finding. 

Accordingly, we overrule Bradley’s second issue. 

III. Jury Could Have Reasonably Inferred that Bradley Knowingly 

Possessed Child Pornography

In his third issue, Bradley asserts that the evidence in all three counts of the 

indictment was insufficient because the State failed to establish that he knowingly 

possessed the child pornographic images. Bradley alleges that his testimony 

indicated that he did not have exclusive possession of the computer equipment 

containing the pornographic images and videos. According to Bradley, Booher could 

have downloaded the child pornography, and the jury could not have found beyond 

a reasonable doubt that Bradley knowingly or intentionally possessed the 

pornographic materials. We disagree. 

In addressing this point of error, we employ the same standards of review 

discussed above. A person commits possession of child pornography if he 

“knowingly or intentionally possesses visual material . . . that visually depicts a child 

younger than 18 years of age at the time the image of the child was made who is 

engaging in sexual conduct,” and he “knows that the material depicts the child” in 

this manner. Tex. Penal Code § 43.26(a). A person acts “intentionally” or with intent 
15

“with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his 

conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” Id. § 

6.03(a). A person acts knowingly or with knowledge of the nature of his conduct or 

circumstances “when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the 

circumstances exist.” Id. § 6.03(b). The Penal Code defines “possession” of 

contraband as “actual care, custody, control, or management.” Id. § 1.07(a)(39).

When contraband is not found on a person or is not in a location that is under 

the exclusive control of a person, mere presence at the location where the contraband 

is found is insufficient by itself to establish actual care, custody, or control of the 

contraband. See Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 

“However, presence or proximity, when combined with other evidence, either direct 

or circumstantial . . . , may be sufficient to establish possession beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id. Accordingly, a factfinder may infer that the defendant intentionally or 

knowingly possessed contraband not in his exclusive possession if there are 

sufficient independent facts and circumstances justifying such an inference. Tate v. 

State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

In Wise, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals noted the “peculiarities of 

determining knowing or intentional possession of computer pornography” and 

concluded that “each case must be analyzed on its own facts.” 364 S.W.3d at 904–

05. Thus, the court held that in computer-pornography cases, “like all criminal cases, 

a court must assess whether the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable 

based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence considered in the light most 

favorable to the verdict.” Id. at 905.

Sufficient evidence to support a jury’s determination that a defendant had 

knowledge of child pornography on his electronic devices may include evidence that

(1) the child pornography was found in different computer files, showing that the 
16

images or videos had been copied or moved; (2) the child pornography was found 

on an external hard drive or a removable storage device, which would indicate that 

the images or videos were deliberately saved on the external device; (3) the child

pornography stored on the computer and the external hard drive was stored in 

similarly named folders; (4) the names of the folders containing child pornography 

necessarily were assigned by the person saving the files; or (5) numerous images or 

videos of child pornography were recovered from the defendant’s electronic devices.

See Krause v. State, 243 S.W.3d 95, 110–12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, 

pet. ref’d).

In this case, there are several independent facts that justify an inference that 

Bradley knowingly possessed child pornography. First, Bradley was not truthful 

with law enforcement when questioned about the Dark Web. Initially, Bradley 

denied having any knowledge about the Dark Web but later admitted that he 

accessed the Dark Web “a few hundred times.” Second, one of Bradley’s laptops 

contained Free Net artifacts, Free Net was actively installed on another laptop, and 

search terms indicative of child pornography were found on the Kindle tablet named 

“Richard’s Fire.” No one else at the Bacliff address was named Richard. Third, law 

enforcement recovered thousands of child pornographic and child exploitive images 

and videos from devices located in Bradley’s bedroom. The fact that several 

thousand files of child pornography were recovered from Bradley’s electronic 

devices is circumstantial evidence that he knowingly possessed child pornography. 

See id. at 111–12. Fourth, the evidence supports an inference that Bradley knowingly 

possessed child pornography because Detective Staton discovered child 

pornography on an external hard drive located in Bradley’s bedroom. See id. at 112.

Bradley contends that Booher could have remotely accessed Bradley’s 

devices or physically downloaded the files to an external hard drive. Bradley 
17

suggests that Booher had access to Bradley’s electronic devices, actually used 

Bradley’s devices unsupervised, and knew how to remove a laptop hard drive. 

However, as discussed above, Detective Staton testified that none of the electronic 

devices seized from the residence contained evidence that they were remotely 

accessed by another user, and none of the electronic devices seized from Booher 

contained any evidence of Dark Web software, Free Net artifacts, or child 

pornography. Additionally, Bradley’s wife testified that she never saw Booher with 

any of Bradley’s electronic devices. Moreover, for the evidence to be sufficient, the 

State need not disprove all reasonable alternative hypotheses that are inconsistent 

with the defendant’s guilt. Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903. Thus, the jury reasonably could 

have rejected the alternative hypotheses raised by Bradley to explain the child 

pornography found on his electronic devices. See id. at 906–08. 

Viewing the totality of the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable 

to the verdict, the jury reasonably could have inferred that Bradley knowingly had 

care, custody, control, or management of the child pornography found on the 

electronic devices in his bedroom. See id. Accordingly, we overrule Bradley’s third 

issue challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. 

Jury Instruction

In his fourth issue, Bradley contends that the trial court erred by failing to 

instruct the jury on the meaning of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. According to 

Bradley, the trial court should have given an instruction consistent with the language 

approved in Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (providing 

a six-paragraph jury instruction on the definition of reasonable doubt). Bradley 

acknowledges that the portion of Geesa which required trial courts to instruct juries 

on the definition of beyond a reasonable doubt was specifically overruled in Paulson 

v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Nonetheless, he argues that a 
18

Geesa instruction would have been beneficial. 

The Paulson court explained that “the better practice is to give no definition 

of reasonable doubt at all to the jury. Thus, each individual juror must decide what 

“proof beyond a reasonable doubt” means and the amount of proof required to meet 

the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. See Fuller v. State, 363 S.W.3d 583, 587 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (providing that jurors should supply their own meaning of 

the phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt” based on “their own common-sense 

understanding of the words”); Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d 592, 598 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2003) (explaining that “each juror must decide for himself what amount of 

proof would constitute the threshold of beyond a reasonable doubt”). The Paulson 

court, however, also noted “[o]n the other hand, if both the State and the defense 

were to agree to give the Geesa instruction to the jury, it would not constitute 

reversible error for the trial court to acquiesce in their agreement.” 28 S.W.3d at 573. 

In this case, the trial court did not err by failing to define reasonable doubt in 

the jury charge because it was not required to do so. Id. Moreover, there is no 

evidence that the State and the defense agreed to the Geesa instruction to the jury.

Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Bradley’s request to instruct the jury 

on the meaning of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Accordingly, we overrule Bradley’s fourth issue. 

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

/s/ Frances Bourliot

Justice 
19

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Bourliot and Hassan.

Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).