alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.2


               CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS
               --------------------------------------------------


     We consent to the reference to our firm under the caption "Experts" and to
the use of our report dated November 19, 1997 with respect to the combined
financial statements of the Equipe Combined Companies incorporated by reference
in the Registration Statement (Form S-3) and the related Prospectus of PRI
Automation, Inc. for the registration of 1,405,433 shares of its common stock.


 

                            /s/ Ernst & Young LLP



San Jose, California
September 24, 1998
#### Van Doren and another, Appellants, vs. Fenton and another, Respondents.

*April 8*

May 2, *1905.*

*Sale of standing timber: Farol warranty of title: Failure of title: Implied warranty.*

1. Plaintiffs’ evidence slio-wed that timber purchased by them was standing when the contract was made, the title to the land being in the United States, and that the purchase was oral. *Held,*there could be no express warranty oí title thereto lly parol, • such timber being then real estate.

2. In suclj case there could be no implied warranty, such timber then being neither personal property nor in the vendor’s possession.

Appeal from a judgment of tbe circuit court for Shawano county: JohN GoodlaND, Circuit Judge.

*Affirmed.*

Eor tbe appellants there was a brief signed by *Weed & Van Doren,*and oral argument by *B. N. Van*Doren.•

Eor tbe respondents there was a brief by *B. A. Cady*and *Kreutzer, Bird & Bosenberry,*and oral argument by *C. B. Bird.*

WiNsnow, J.

Tbe plaintiffs are manufacturers of lumber, and they claim in this action that they purchased standing timber of tbe defendants, and paid them $228.58 therefor-‘upon a warranty of title, which warranty failed, said timber *148being tbe property of tbe United States, and tbat tbey were compelled to pay tbe purchase price of tbe logs a second time to tbe United States, and tbey bring tbis action to recover upon tbe warranty of title. Tbe plaintiffs’ evidence showed tbat tbe timber purchased was standing when tbe contract was made, tbe title of the land being then in tbe United States, and tbat tbe purchase was oral. Thus it appears tbat tbe purchase was a purchase of real estate, and it is well understood tbat there can be no warranty of title to real estate by parol. Tbe respondent claims tbat there is an implied warranty under tbe rule tbat when personal property in possession of tbe vendor is sold at a fair price there is an implied warranty of title. Tbis principle might apply except for two slight difficulties, viz., tbe timber sold was not personal property, and was not in tbe vendor’s possession. So it seems tbat there is a total failure to prove either an express or implied warranty of title,, and tbe verdict was rightly directed.

*By the Court.*— Judgment affirmed.
**EXHIBIT 23.1**

 

**Independent Auditors’ Consent**

 

The Board of Directors 

PETCO Animal Supplies, Inc.: 

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements (Nos. 333-84130 and 333-100397) on Form S-8 and (No. 333-112590) on Form S-3of our report dated March 8, 2004, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of PETCO Animal Supplies, Inc. as of February 1, 2003 and January 31, 2004, and the related consolidated statements of operations, stockholders’ equity(deficit), and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended January 31, 2004, which report appears in the January 31, 2004 annual report on Form 10-K of PETCO Animal Supplies, Inc. 

 

Our report refers to changes in the Company’s method of accounting forvendor consideration in 2003, method of accounting for gains and losses from the extinguishment of debt in 2003, and method of accounting for goodwill in 2002. 

 

/s/    KPMG LLP 

 

San Diego, California 

April 1, 2004
c 

o, 

p 

T 

o. A• Ca191 i'ostez- Batt., 

n.r .c., A,r.o. 

FOMJ2! 110lflU 

REF ID:A517379 

\ 

-J'9p , SECfH:'r lldUah hbuq, 

Paru. 

28th May 19$1. 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 03-07-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
· Eo 3.3(h) (2) 

PL 86-36/so·usc 3605 

001'1' 

··················································· ... 

-TAP · ~FCREf .
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                  1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 JUL-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                                   2
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                          100
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                       102
<PP&E>                                                   0
<DEPRECIATION>                                           0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                         102
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                  161
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                                 3
<OTHER-SE>                                               0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                           (59)
<SALES>                                                  0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                         0
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                          227
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                       (227)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                   (227)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      1,740
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                         1,513
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                          .63
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          .63
        


</TABLE>
#### Duffy and another, Appellants, vs. Hinkley and others, Respondents.

*January 14*

February *2, 1904.*

*'Appeal and error: Trial by court: Findings when disturbed.*

Findings of the trial court, unless against the clear preponderance of the evidence, will not he disturbed.

Appeal from a judgment of the county court of Dodge ■county: J. A. BaeNEy, Judge.

*Affirmed.*

Action for compensation for professional services rendered in an action by Charles 0. Grafton against tbe defendants. 'The amount claimed is $453.90. *L. D. Hinkley*and *M. J. Althouse*answered separately, denying that plaintiffs were employed by them or in their behalf in such action, but admitting that they were employed by tbe other defendants and alleging payment for tbe services rendered. Such other -defendants answered separately, admitting tbe employment of plaintiffs as attorneys in two actions — tbe agreed compensation in tbe first being $200", and no agreement being made on tbe subject in tbe last one — and that plaintiffs rendered - services in both such actions; and alleging that they bad re-

*493ceived tbeir disbursements and $400 besides, in all $728, tbe $400 being in excess of tlie ¡reasonable value of services rendered in tbe second action, and tbe agreed price for services in tbe first. Tbe cause was tried by tbe court, and resulted in findings material to tbis appeal to tbis effect: Plaintiffs were employed as attorneys in tbe case mentioned in tbe-complaint and as therein mentioned. *Tbey performed services pursuant to sucb employment in tbe circuit court for-Pond du Eac county, and in tbe supreme court, necessarily disbursing for defendants, in tbe course of tbe litigation, $86.60. Tbe trial in tbe circuit court lasted a day and a balf. Tbe reasonable value of tbe services rendered, witb tbe disbursements, is $386.60. Defendants bave paid $352.70, leaving a balance due plaintiffs of $33.90, wbicb tbey are entitled to recover.

Judgment was rendered accordingly.

Eor tbe appellants there was a brief by *J. Q.*Hardgrove,. and oral argument by *J. H. McGrory.*

Eor tbe respondents tbe cause was submitted on tbe brief' of *O. II. Hooker.*

Maeshall, J.

It does not seem advisable to discuss tbe evidence in tbis case. Tbe questions raised all relate to whether tbe findings are warranted by tbe evidence. The-record has been carefully examined. We are unable to perceive that sucb findings are against tbe clear .preponderance of tbe evidence, and therefore, by familiar rules, tbe judgment must be affirmed.

*By the Gourt.*— So ordered.
<PAGE>
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1
 
                   CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
 
  As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the use, in this
registration statement on FormS-4, of our report dated July 8, 1998 for
Framingham York Associates Limited Partnership as of December 31, 1997, 1996
and 1995 and for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 1997,
included herein and to all references to our Firm included in this registration
statement.
 
                                          /s/ Arthur Andersen LLP
 
Boston, Massachusetts
November 20, 1998
#### Welsher, Respondent, vs. Libby, McNeil *&*Libby, Appellant.

*March*1

March *20, 1900.*

*Appealable orders.*

1. An order refusing to set aside the service of the summons and complaint on a foreign corporation is not appealable.

*2.*An order cannot be treated as a judgment for the purposes of appeal merely because it imposes costs of motion.

Appeal from an order of the circuit court for Dane county: R. G. SiebeCKee, Circuit Judge.

*Appeal dismissed.*

For the appellant there was a brief by *Buell dk Hamits,*and oral argument by *S. G. Hanks.*

For the respondent there was a brief by *Shuttleviorth <& Bihble,*and oral argument by *F. K. Shuttleworth.*

WiNslow, J.

This is an appeal by the defendant, a foreign corporation, from an order of the circuit court refusing to set aside the service of the summons and complaint, and imposing costs of motion. The appeal must be dismissed, because the order is not an order within the category of appealable orders contained in sec. 3069, Stats. 1898, nor is there any special statute making such order appealable. The idea seems to have been entertained that, because the order *292imposed costs of motion, it should be treated as a judgment for the purposes of an appeal, such idea being founded upon inaccurate language used in *Kingsley v. G. N. R. Co.*91 Wis. 380. This idea was distinctly rejected in *Lewis v. C. & N.*W. *R. Co. 97*Wis. 368, and it is not necessary to further enlarge upon the subject.

*By the*Court.— Appeal dismissed.
# CE2004084EN.01091401.xml

| 3.4.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 84/914 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 84/914

---

(2004/C 84 E/1010)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0923/04

by Roger Helmer (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(26 March 2004)

Subject:   Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowance Trading Scheme

Subject:

Can the Commission indicate why the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowance Trading Scheme has been designed in such a way that substitution of primary carbon fuels by non-biomass alternatives derived from waste materials are not accorded either credit or neutrality within the terms of the scheme but are instead treated as though they are primary carbon fuels, thereby restricting their potential use and the likelihood that they will be moved up the waste hierarchy so as to facilitate energy recovery from them?

Answer given by Mrs Wallström on behalf of the Commission

(28 April 2004)

(28 April 2004)

The atmosphere makes no distinction how carbon emissions arise. When installations covered by Directive 2003/87/EC of the Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (1) burn forms of waste, the resulting emissions are treated in the same way as emissions from a fossil fuel.

1

However, the incentive for operators to switch to fuels with low carbon content is inherent to any Carbon dioxide (C02) emissions trading scheme. Therefore, as long as a waste fuel has a lower carbon content than a primary carbon fuel there will be an incentive to fuel-switch, and thus such waste fuels will move up the waste hierarchy.

2

---

(1)  OJ L 275, 25.10.2003.

1

---
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED AP RIL 10, 2014

NO. 03

- 11

- 00668

- CV

The City of San Antonio, Appellant

v.

Greg Abbott, Texas Attorney General, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 353RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE J USTICES PURYEAR, GOO DWIN, AND FIELD

REVERSED AND RENDERED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE PURYEAR

This is an appeal from the judgment signed by the tr i a l court on September 9, 2011. Having

revie wed the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was reversible error in

the court’s judgment . Therefore, the Court reverses the trial court’s judgment and renders

judgment that the City need not comply with the Attorney General’s rul ing regarding the

requested information. The appellee shall pay all costs relating to this appeal, both in this Court

and the court below.
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1672 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1672

To authorize States to enter into interstate compacts regarding Class A 
                     commercial driver's licenses.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 24, 2015

 Mrs. Fischer introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To authorize States to enter into interstate compacts regarding Class A 
                     commercial driver's licenses.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Commercial Driver Act''.

SEC. 2. INTERSTATE COMPACT TEST PROGRAM.

    (a) In General.--The Administrator of the Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration shall establish a test program to allow States 
and the District of Columbia to enter into interstate compacts with 
contiguous States to standardize the requirements for drivers operating 
commercial motor vehicles in interstate commerce.
    (b) Mutual Recognition of Licenses.--A commercial driver's licenses 
issued by 1 State participating in an interstate compact under 
subsection (a) shall be recognized as valid in every State that is 
participating in such compact.
    (c) Standards.--In developing an interstate compact under this 
section, participating States shall provide for minimum licensure 
standards acceptable for interstate travel under this section, which 
may include, for drivers under the 21 years of age--
            (1) age restrictions;
            (2) distance from origin (measured in air miles);
            (3) reporting requirements; or
            (4) additional hours of service restrictions.

SEC. 3. APPROVAL.

    An interstate compact described in section 2 may not go into effect 
until it has been approved by the governor of each State (or the Mayor 
of the District of Columbia, if applicable) that is a party to the 
agreement, after consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and 
the Administrator of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration.

SEC. 4. SAVINGS PROVISION.

    Nothing in this Act may be construed to limit, or otherwise change, 
the authority to operate in Interstate Commerce for drivers over the 
age of 21, including by setting the minimum age requirement to receive 
a Class A commercial driver's license at 18 years of age.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>
 
                                                                      Exhibit 16

[PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP letterhead]



May 18, 1999


Securities and Exchange Commission
450 5th Street, N.W.
Washington D.C. 20549


Commissioners:

We have read the statements made by SatCon Technology Corporation (copy
attached), which we understand will be filed with the Commission, pursuant to
Item 4 of Form 8-K, as part of the Company's Form 8-K report filed on May 19,
1999.  We agree with the statements concerning our Firm in such Form 8-K.



                     Very truly yours,

                     /s/PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
                     -----------------------------
                     PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HONGQING LI,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 11-73320

Agency No. A099-716-549

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted September 23, 2014** 

Before: W. FLETCHER, RAWLINSON, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges. 

Hongqing Li, a native and citizen of China, petitions pro se for review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture

FILED

OCT 3 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for

substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d

1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for

review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of Li’s asylum claim

based on the vague and equivocal testimony the agency noted, and based on Li’s

failure to corroborate his address when given the opportunity. See id. at 1048

(adverse credibility determination was reasonable under the “totality of

circumstances”); see also Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th Cir. 2011)

(petitioner’s corroborating evidence did not compel the finding that he met his

burden of proof). We lack jurisdiction to consider Li’s contention regarding his

attorney’s efforts to obtain corroborating evidence in proceedings before the IJ

because Li failed to raise this issue before the BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358

F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Li does not challenge the BIA’s determination that he waived his

withholding of removal and CAT claims. 

Finally, we lack jurisdiction to consider any ineffective assistance of counsel

claim that Li raises. See Liu v. Waters, 55 F.3d 421, 426 (9th Cir. 1995) (requiring

2 11-73320
exhaustion of ineffective assistance of counsel claim via a motion to reopen before

the BIA).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

3 11-73320
# C_2005031EN.01002102.xml

| 5.2.2005 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 31/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.2.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 31/21

---

ORDER OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ORDER OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

of 6 September 2004

in Case T- 213/02: SNF SA v Commission of the European Communities (1)

1

(Action for annulment - Directive 2002/34/EC - Restrictions on the use of polyacrylamides in the composition of cosmetic products - Person individually concerned - Admissibility)

(2005/C 31/42)

Language of the case: English

In Case T-213/02: SNF SA, established in Saint-Étienne (France), represented by K. Van Maldegem and C. Mereu, lawyers, against the Commission of the European Communities, (Agent: X. Lewis, with an address for service in Luxembourg) – application for the partial annulment of Twenty-sixth Commission Directive 2002/34/EC of 15 April 2002 adapting to technical progress Annexes II, III and VII to Council Directive 76/768/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic products (OJ 2002 L 102, p. 19) in so far as it restricts the use of polyacrylamides in the composition of cosmetic products – the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber), composed of: P. Lindh, President, R. García-Valdecasas and J.D. Cooke, Judges; H. Jung, Registrar, has made an order on 6 September 2004, the operative part of which is as follows:

| 1. | The action is dismissed as inadmissible; |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed as inadmissible;

| 2. | The applicant is to bear its own costs and those of the defendant. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The applicant is to bear its own costs and those of the defendant.

---

(1)  OJ C 233 of 28.9.2002.

1

---
# CE2004084EN.01043501.xml

| 3.4.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 84/435 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 84/435

---

(2004/C 84 E/0506)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0603/04

by Saïd El Khadraoui (PSE) to the Commission

(27 February 2004)

Subject:   Marking down foodstuffs for quick sale

Subject:

Foodstuffs whose sell-by date is approaching are sold off cheaply by a number of stores. The Belgian consumer association Test-Achat bought 31 highly perishable items such as mince and chicken salad that were being marked down for a quick sale. Tests showed that seven of the samples were unfit for human consumption.

Does the Commission intend to introduce a ban on the marking down of highly perishable foodstuffs for quick sales?

If so, when will it be able to provide more information about this?

If not, why not?

---
EXHIBIT
32.1





PSI
CORPORATION


CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED


PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





I, David
Foni, the Chief Executive Officer of PSI Corporation (the "Company"), certify,
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, that to the best of my knowledge:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.








Date:
      October 27, 2008
                By:
                /s/
      David FoniDavid
      FoniChief
      Executive Officer