2015 IL App (4th) 130775 

NO. 4-13-0775 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

MICHAEL SEAL, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from

Circuit Court of 

Sangamon County 

No. 09CF998 

Honorable 

Leo J. Zappa, 

Judge Presiding.

 

 PRESIDING JUSTICE POPE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

 Justice Knecht concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

 Justice Steigmann specially concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 In an August 2012 bench trial, the trial court found defendant, Michael Seal, 

guilty of first degree murder. In July 2013, the court sentenced defendant to 40 years in prison. 

¶ 2 On appeal, defendant argues he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court 

failed to correctly admonish him as to the waiver of counsel. We reverse and remand for a new 

trial.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In November 2009, by complaint, the State charged defendant with three counts 

of first degree murder for allegedly stabbing and killing his mother, Darla Key (720 ILCS 5/9-

1(a)(1), (2) (West 2008)). At defendant's first appearance in November 2009, defendant was 

FILED

August 24, 2015 

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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furnished with a copy of the complaint and advised of the nature of the charges and possible 

penalties. At that time, the public defender's office was appointed to represent defendant. 

¶ 5 On December 3, 2009, the State filed a three-count information charging 

defendant with first degree murder. Defendant's appointed counsel, Brian Otwell, waived formal 

reading of the charges and potential penalties. Defendant waived his right to a preliminary 

hearing.

¶ 6 At a September 2010 hearing, the trial court advised defendant new counsel 

would have to be appointed to represent him due to Otwell becoming a judge. Thereafter, Bob 

Scherschligt became defendant's appointed counsel. 

¶ 7 In February and March 2011, among other pro se filings, defendant filed a series 

of letters, affidavits, and motions regarding his representation by Scherschligt. These included 

an "Affidavit of Requested Legal Services", a "Motion to Compel Legal Services", an "Affidavit 

Requesting to Issue Warrant for Immediate Arrest", and a "Motion of Ineffective Assistance of 

Counsel". 

¶ 8 At a March 2011 hearing, the trial court advised defendant he had the right to be 

represented by counsel or represent himself, but not both. The court considered defendant's 

ineffective assistance claims. Defendant stated he could not get along with Scherschligt. He 

knew he was facing 60 years in prison. Therefore, he stated he would prefer to represent 

himself. Scherschligt advised the court he was doing all he could to meet the demands of 

defendant regarding discovery; however, defendant wanted Scherschligt to file motions he 

deemed frivolous and Scherschligt refused to file them. Scherschligt also indicated defendant 

refused to assist him and mentioned defendant had the same problems with Otwell. Scherschligt
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was willing to continue representing defendant along with co-counsel, Lindsay Evans. The court 

acknowledged defendant had issues with Otwell's representation and admonished defendant 

about the qualifications of the public defenders and the fact they would not file frivolous 

motions, nor would the court entertain frivolous motions. After further discussion, the court 

appointed James Elmore to represent defendant with assistance from Evans.

¶ 9 In June and August 2011, defendant again filed several pro se motions. At an 

August 2011 hearing, Elmore advised the trial court he had done everything to gain defendant's 

trust but defendant wanted to make decisions that were Elmore's to make as defendant's counsel. 

Elmore sought confirmation about his continued representation of defendant. The court again 

admonished defendant about his right to be represented or to represent himself, but not both, and 

advised defendant Elmore was the most experienced public defender in Sangamon County. The 

court struck defendant's pro se motions. After further discussion, the court asked Elmore to get 

his investigator involved and Elmore's representation was continued. 

¶ 10 In January 2012, defendant filed a pro se "Request for Remedies," alleging, inter 

alia, issues with Elmore's representation. In February 2012, defendant filed a pro se "Request 

for Legal Services," stating "Elmore must abide by the client[']s [(defendant)] decision as to how 

the representation is handled" and defendant "[would] not negotiate his defense with *** 

Elmore." Defendant sought sanctions against Elmore along with a list of 19 demands for Elmore 

to perform. In March 2012, defendant filed a pro se "Motion of Ineffective Assistance of 

Counsel," containing numerous complaints about Elmore's representation. At a March 2012 

hearing on the motion, Elmore advised the trial court he had met with defendant on numerous 

occasions, defendant had told Elmore he wanted to represent himself, and Elmore asked to be 
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discharged from the case. The court noted Elmore was defendant's third or fourth attorney and 

the court was not going to appoint another; therefore, defendant must choose to continue with 

Elmore or represent himself. Defendant inquired about appointment of advisory counsel and the 

court responded Elmore could be stand-by counsel. After a lengthy discussion about defendant's 

allegations and Elmore's response thereto, defendant agreed to have Elmore continue as his 

attorney. 

¶ 11 In April 2012, defendant filed a "Motion to Proceed Pro Se," alleging he and 

Elmore could not see eye-to-eye. He sought immediate termination of Elmore and his 

investigator. He alleged he was forced to represent himself since the court had refused to 

appoint new counsel, co-counsel, or advisory counsel. In May 2012, the trial court heard 

defendant's motion to proceed pro se. Defendant indicated he and Elmore could not get along. 

He asked for appointment of another attorney. The court noted this was defendant's third 

appointment and Elmore was one of the best attorneys around for his case. The court relieved 

Elmore of his duties. Thereafter, referring to People v. Williams, 277 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 1056-57, 

661 N.E.2d 1186, 1189 (1996), the court admonished defendant as follows: 

 "I am going to read you the pro se issues *** regarding 

representing yourself and they are as follows:

Presenting the defense is not a simple matter of telling 

one's story but requires adherence to various technical rules 

governing the conduct of a trial. 

A lawyer has substantial experience and training in legal 

procedure, and the [p]rosecution will be represented by 
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experienced attorneys.

A person unfamiliar with legal procedures as yourself (a) 

may allow the [p]rosecutor an advantage by failing to make 

objections to inadmissible evidence, (b) may not make effective 

usage of such rights as the voir dire of [j]urors, and (c) may make 

tactical decisions that produce unintended consequences. 

 The [d]efendant proceeding pro se will not be allowed to 

complain on appeal about the competency of his representation. 

The effectiveness of his defense may well be diminished by 

his dual role as attorney and accused. 

Defendant will receive no special consideration from the 

[c]ourt. 

Defendant will receive no extra time for preparation or 

greater library time.

A lawyer can render important assistance (a) by 

determining the existence of possible defenses to the charge 

against the [d]efendant, (b) through consultations with the 

[p]rosecutor regarding possible reduced charges or lesser penalties, 

and (c) in the event of a conviction, by presenting to the [c]ourt 

matters which might lead to a lesser sentence.

 In the event that the [c]ourt accepts the [d]efendant's 

decision to represent himself, this [d]efendant will not be given an 
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opportunity to change his mind during trial." 

 * * * 

 "[Defendant], so, if you do not want Mr. Elmore, that is 

what you are looking at by law. Those are the things that you must 

consider for representing yourself. I didn't make them up. I didn't 

write them. That's in the case law. Do you understand?"

Defendant indicated his understanding. Defendant also indicated his desire to have the 

investigator terminated, knowing the court would not hire anyone else. 

¶ 12 At a June 2012 pretrial hearing, the trial court noted it had written to defendant in 

response to a letter defendant sent to the court. Defendant advised he had received the court's 

letter. In its letter, the court asked defendant to consider allowing the court to appoint two new 

attorneys (one who had done numerous murder cases) to represent him. Defendant declined the 

offer.

¶ 13 In July 2012, defendant waived his right to a trial by jury. The trial court did not 

admonish defendant of the nature of the charges nor the penalties therefor. 

¶ 14 At the August 2012 bench trial, the State introduced a 9-1-1 call made on 

November 16, 2009, in which defendant identified himself by name and informed the dispatcher 

he had killed his mother, Darla Key, by putting "a knife through her chest." 

¶ 15 Springfield police officer Mark Marinelli testified he was one of the officers who 

responded to the 9-1-1 call and helped take defendant into custody. Marinelli transported 

defendant to the police department. En route to the police department, defendant asked Marinelli 

"if there was a death penalty in the State of Illinois." After Marinelli put defendant in an 
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interview room at the police station, he asked Marinelli to shut the door "because I killed my 

mom." 

¶ 16 Defendant's former girlfriend, Terri Merrel, his sister, Stephanie Martin, and 

Key's former co-worker, Debra Zehr, all testified they had heard defendant get upset and threaten 

to kill his mother at various times in the months prior to Key's death. Defendant's brother, 

stepmother, aunt, and uncle all testified defendant called them on the night of Key's death. 

Defendant's brother, John Seal, testified defendant sounded "real weird" and was talking about 

killing himself. Seal asked defendant what he had done, but defendant would not say. 

Defendant asked to speak to his stepfather, who lived in the same house as John Seal. 

Defendant's stepfather, Leslie Schuck, and his stepmother, Julie Seal, testified defendant told 

them he had killed his mother by stabbing her in the chest. Defendant's aunt, Suzan Englemann, 

testified defendant called her and said he had "done the unthinkable" but would not say what. 

Defendant's uncle, Michael Engelmann, also testified defendant admitted killing his mother.

¶ 17 The various law enforcement officers and medical personnel who responded to 

the 9-1-1 call found Key lying on the floor in her trailer home. She had a stab wound to the chest 

and was dead. 

¶ 18 Forensic pathologist Dr. John Denton testified he reviewed Key's autopsy, 

including the autopsy report of Dr. Jessica Bowman and several other items. Denton stated the 

cause of Key's death was a stab wound to the chest. 

¶ 19 The State and defendant stipulated neither defendant's blood nor fingerprints were 

found on the knife determined to be the murder weapon. Further defendant's deoxyribonucleic 

acid was not found under Key's fingernails.
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¶ 20 Defendant did not testify. 

¶ 21 The trial court found defendant guilty of first degree murder. 

¶ 22 In October 2012, the trial court appointed counsel to assist defendant with 

posttrial motions and at sentencing. In July 2013, the court denied defendant's amended motion 

for new trial and sentenced him to 40 years in the Department of Corrections (DOC) with 1,349 

days of sentence credit. In September 2013, the court denied defendant's motion to reconsider 

his sentence.

¶ 23 This appeal followed. 

¶ 24 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 25 On appeal, defendant argues his pretrial waiver of counsel was invalid because 

the trial court did not provide him with the admonitions required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984) before accepting his waiver of counsel. The State admits the court did 

not admonish defendant pursuant to Rule 401(a) but argues he waived his right to counsel "by 

conduct" and the court substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 401(a) where the 

record shows the wavier was made knowingly and voluntarily and the admonishments given did 

not prejudice defendant's rights. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

¶ 26 Initially, we note defendant failed to object to the lack of Rule 401(a) 

admonishments at trial or in a posttrial motion, and therefore the issue was forfeited and cannot 

be considered on appeal unless it was plain error. Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). The 

plain-error doctrine bypasses forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to consider 

unpreserved error when: (1) the evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the error; or 

(2) the error is serious, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 
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167, 186-87, 830 N.E.2d 467, 479 (2005). This court has consistently held the right to counsel is 

so fundamental that we will review as plain error a claim there was no effective waiver of 

counsel although the issue was not raised in the trial court. See People v. Robertson, 181 Ill. 

App. 3d 760, 763, 537 N.E.2d 1036, 1039 (1989); People v. Langley, 226 Ill. App. 3d 742, 749, 

589 N.E.2d 824, 829 (1992); People v. Stoops, 313 Ill. App. 3d 269, 273, 728 N.E.2d 1241, 1244 

(2000). We therefore address defendant's claim on appeal. 

¶ 27 The United States and Illinois Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the 

right to counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings against him. U.S. Const., amends. VI, 

XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. A defendant may waive this right and proceed without counsel 

only if he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. People v. Campbell, 224 Ill. 2d 80, 84, 

862 N.E.2d 933, 936 (2006). 

¶ 28 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984) states as follows: 

"Any waiver of counsel shall be in open court. The court shall not 

permit a waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense 

punishable by imprisonment without first, by addressing the 

defendant personally in open court, informing him of and 

determining that he understands the following: 

(1) the nature of the charge;

(2) the minimum and maximum sentence 

prescribed by law, including, when applicable, the 

penalty to which the defendant may be subjected 

because of prior convictions or consecutive 
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sentences; and

 (3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is 

indigent, to have counsel appointed for him by the 

court." 

¶ 29 Our supreme court has held, "The language of Rule 401(a) could not be clearer: a 

trial court 'shall not permit a waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense punishable by 

imprisonment without first *** informing him of and determining that he understands *** that 

he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel appointed for him by the court.' 

[Citation.]" Campbell, 224 Ill. 2d at 84, 862 N.E.2d at 936. Further, "substantial compliance 

with Rule 401(a) is required for an effective waiver of counsel." Id. "Rule 401(a) 

admonishments must be provided at the time the court learns that a defendant chooses to waive 

counsel, so that the defendant can consider the ramifications of such a decision." People v. Jiles, 

364 Ill. App. 3d 320, 329, 845 N.E.2d 944, 952 (2006). "There can be no effective waiver of 

counsel without proper admonitions." Langley, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 749, 589 N.E.2d at 829. 

¶ 30 In the case sub judice, there was no compliance, substantial or otherwise, with 

Rule 401(a). Defendant made his first appearance in November 2009 where he was provided 

with a copy of the complaint and advised of the nature of the charges and possible penalties. At 

that time, the public defender's office was appointed to represent defendant. In December 2009, 

defense counsel appeared with defendant and waived formal reading of the charges and potential 

penalties.

¶ 31 Although defendant had repeatedly found fault with his various appointed counsel 

and had at times expressed the desire to represent himself, the trial court never admonished him 
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pursuant to Rule 401(a) on those occasions. Nearly two and a half years after defendant was 

initially advised about the charges against him, the potential penalties he faced, and was

appointed counsel, defendant actually moved to proceed pro se and Elmore was relieved of his 

duties as defense counsel. At that time, the court only advised defendant of the problems he 

would likely face as a pro se defendant as set forth in Williams, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 1056-57, 661 

N.E.2d at 1189 (quoting People v. Ward, 208 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1081-82, 567 N.E.2d 642, 647-

48 (1991)). The court did not admonish defendant in accordance with Rule 401(a). It did not 

relate to defendant the nature of the charges, the minimum and maximum sentences defendant 

faced, nor did the court tell defendant he was entitled to counsel and counsel would be appointed 

to represent him if he was indigent. "The admonishments pursuant to Rule 401(a) must be 

provided when the court learns defendant chooses to waive counsel so that defendant can 

consider the ramifications of such a decision. Prior admonishments and defendant's decision to 

discharge counsel do not somehow cause defendant to forgo the right to be fully informed of the 

ramifications of acting on his own behalf." Langley, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 750, 589 N.E.2d at 830. 

¶ 32 We reverse defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial, "before which 

defendant should be given the requisite admonishments and the opportunity to be represented by 

an attorney or to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of that right." Jiles, 364 Ill. 

App. 3d at 330, 845 N.E.2d at 953. 

¶ 33 Also, because we are remanding for a new trial, we must consider whether 

another trial would violate the double-jeopardy clause. If the evidence presented at the first trial 

was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime had been 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt, no double jeopardy violation is created on retrial. See People 
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v. Ward, 2011 IL 108690, ¶ 50, 952 N.E.2d 601. We find the record contains sufficient evidence 

from which the trial court could have found defendant guilty of first degree murder beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Therefore, no double jeopardy violation will occur upon retrial. 

¶ 34 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 35 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for a new 

trial.

¶ 36 Reversed and remanded.

¶ 37 STEIGMANN, J., specially concurs. 

¶ 38 Defendant, convicted of first degree murder, gamed the system and got away with 

it. Although I agree with the majority opinion, I write this special concurrence to emphasize the 

mistakes the trial court made in this case. I do so in the hope that this discussion will keep other 

trial courts from committing the same errors.

¶ 39 The fundamental error the trial court committed was granting credence to 

defendant's unceasing complaints about his court-appointed lawyers and then changing those 

lawyers in a predictably vain effort to somehow assuage defendant. 

¶ 40 The record shows that after the Sangamon County Public Defender Brian Otwell, 

defendant's initial counsel, was appointed to the bench, the trial court appointed Bob Scherschligt 

to be defendant's counsel. A few months later, defendant began his pro se filings, which 

attacked Scherschligt's representation. At the March 2011 hearing at which the court asked 

defendant about his ineffective assistance claims, defendant stated that he could not get along 

with Scherschligt. In response, Scherschligt advised the court that defendant wanted him to file 

motions he deemed frivolous and Scherschligt refused to file them. Scherschligt also indicated 
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defendant refused to assist him and mentioned that defendant had the same problem with Otwell. 

Nonetheless, Scherschligt stated he was willing to continue to represent defendant along with 

cocounsel, Lindsay Evans.

¶ 41 The trial court acknowledged that defendant had problems with Otwell's 

representation and explained to defendant that public defenders would not file frivolous motions. 

Nonetheless, for reasons that are far from clear, the court appointed James Elmore to represent 

defendant with assistance from Evans. 

¶ 42 Entirely predictably, Elmore's representation also failed to satisfy defendant. In 

June and August 2011, defendant continued to file pro se motions and continued to attack 

Elmore's effectiveness. At an August 2011 hearing, the trial court struck defendant's pro se

motions, continued Elmore's representation, but asked Elmore to get his investigator involved. 

¶ 43 Over the next several months, defendant continued to file pro se motions 

attacking Elmore's representation. At a March 2012 hearing, Elmore advised the court that 

defendant told Elmore he wanted to represent himself, and Elmore asked to be discharged from 

the case. The court noted that Elmore was defendant's third or fourth attorney, and the court was 

not going to appoint another. The court explained that the defendant must choose to continue 

with Elmore or represent himself. After a lengthy discussion, defendant agreed to have Elmore 

continue as his attorney. 

¶ 44 Some months later, defendant filed a motion to proceed pro se, alleging that he 

could not get along with Elmore. He claimed he was forced to represent himself because the 

court had refused to appoint new counsel or advisory counsel. 
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¶ 45 In May 2012, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant's motion and noted 

that Elmore was defendant's third attorney. Nonetheless, the court relieved Elmore of his duties 

and purported to admonish defendant in accordance with Rule 401(a). 

¶ 46 Almost three years ago, in People v. Ames, 2012 IL App (4th) 110513, 978 

N.E.2d 1119, this court addressed another case in which the defendant successfully gamed the 

system by expressing his repeated displeasure with his court-appointed counsel. In Ames, this 

court wrote the following regarding motions to withdraw: 

"E. Dealing With Difficult Defendants Regarding Who Will 

Represent Them

We are not unsympathetic to the serious problem that this 

trial court and other trial courts encounter when dealing with 

difficult defendants regarding representation. The State's 

suggestion in this case that defendant might be 'playing the system' 

by his claimed difficulty both in getting along with appointed 

counsel and in failing to hire an attorney of his own choice may 

have been right, but trial courts must still handle such situations 

with extreme care for at least two reasons: (1) a defendant's right 

to counsel is a fundamental constitutional right and (2) if a court 

makes a mistake regarding this issue, it will constitute reversible 

error. *** 

As a result of these concerns, we offer the following 

suggestions to trial courts dealing with difficult defendants 

regarding representation. 
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1. Motions To Withdraw

In most cases dealing with difficult defendants regarding 

representation, the difficulty manifests itself by a defendant's 

claimed inability to hire counsel. Although that situation occurred 

at a later point in this case, the circumstances here are somewhat 

unusual because the trial court initially appointed two different 

attorneys *** at two different times to represent defendant. 

Defendant was unhappy with both of his two court-appointed 

attorneys. They, in turn, found their dealings with him to be 

unpleasant and unproductive, causing them to file motions to 

withdraw. We note that the court's decision to force defendant to 

represent himself arose only after—and because—the court 

granted counsel's motions to withdraw. 

We do not question the various assertions that both courtappointed counsel made in their motions to withdraw; we merely 

note that the circumstances those motions describe 'come with the 

territory.' That is, attorneys appointed to represent indigent 

defendants in criminal cases will rarely find their clients mistaken 

for Rotary Club members or other leading citizens of the 

community. Instead, their clients are frequently angry, ignorant, 

suspicious, and personally abusive toward their court-appointed 

counsel. Such is the reality of the criminal justice system. But, so 
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what? Cases involving such clients must still go forward, and 

court-appointed counsel should understand that (1) they can do no 

more than their best under difficult circumstances and (2) in most 

instances, there is no reason to believe—as shown in this very 

case—that any other court-appointed attorney will be able to do 

better.

Trial courts should not hesitate to reject motions to 

withdraw filed by court-appointed counsel when those motions are 

based on the ground that the relationship between the defendant 

and counsel has become 'poisonous' or unpleasant due to the 

defendant's bad behavior. Instead of granting such motions, the 

court should make clear to the defendant that (1) failing to 

cooperate with his counsel will hurt only the defendant and (2) the 

court will not replace counsel. Perhaps a graphic way of getting 

this point across is to explain that if the defendant is convicted and 

sentenced to prison, when the bus from the penitentiary comes to 

pick him up, only he will get on. His lawyer will go home. 

Despite the difficulties court-appointed counsel may 

encounter representing an obstructionist defendant determined to 

interfere with an orderly and constructive attorney-client 

relationship, trial courts should almost never permit such counsel 

to withdraw from representing that defendant. A trial court's doing 
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so only rewards and enables bad behavior. Courts delude 

themselves by thinking an obstructionist defendant is somehow 

going to behave better when a new court-appointed counsel enters 

the picture. 

 The issue in this case could have–and should have–been 

avoided. The trial court could have denied the attorneys' motions to 

withdraw. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 13(c)(3) (eff. Feb. 16, 2011) (a motion 

to withdraw 'may be denied by the court if the granting of it would 

delay the trial of the case, or would otherwise be inequitable'); 

People v. Howard, 376 Ill. App. 3d 322, 342, 876 N.E.2d 36, 51 

(2007) (when dealing with a motion to withdraw under Rule 

13(c)(3), a trial court has 'broad discretion')." Id. ¶¶ 43-51. 

¶ 47 The trial court's other key error in the handling of this difficult defendant was the 

court's indulging him with regard to his spurious pro se motions. Having once explained to 

defendant that there was no such thing as hybrid representation and that he could either have the 

services of court-appointed counsel or represent himself, the court (at a hearing with defendant 

present) should have routinely stricken all pro se motions filed by defendant that his counsel did 

not adopt and pursue. The court was under no obligation to consider any of these motions and 

erred by doing so. 

¶ 48 As a last matter, I note that the trial court's obvious error of not complying with 

Rule 401(a) should have been equally obvious to the prosecutors handling this first degree 

murder case. Particularly when dealing with obstreperous defendants, trial courts might become 
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distracted and inadvertently omit taking actions—like Rule 401(a) admonishments—that the law 

requires. When this happens, prosecutors should step forward and respectfully remind the court 

about any necessary steps that had been overlooked. The prosecutors' failure to do so in this case 

has resulted in a terrible waste of the limited resources of the criminal justice system, given that 

this defendant has now had his conviction vacated, with the matter going back to the trial court 

for retrial.

¶ 49 All of this was entirely unnecessary.