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23 January 1954 

MEMORANOOM FOR: Chief, STD 

SUBJECT: Cryptographic Assistance to Quai d'Orsay 

1. I presented to Mr. DeVOSJOLI on 21 January the Aide-Memoire 

on above subject, prepared by you, and the additional copy is returned 

herewith. I expressed my regrets on behalf of the Agency, which, I 

assured him, had done its utmost on his behalf. 

2. DeVOSJOLI expressed his disappointment, which was particularly 

keen because of his impression gained by both himself and his French 

Embassy colleague in their meeting with inter-Agency technicians, 

that the reply would be favorable. He stated that no commitment was 

made, but that the eagerness of the technical representatives to find 

out in the greatest detail the precise nature of the Quai d'Orsay 

requirements created the impression of an ability and an authority to 

fulfill the requirements. DeVOSJOLI and his colleague were so encouraged by this meeting that they cabled Paris immediately to provide 

the necessary credits for the purchase. 

3. I emphasized the final points in the Aide-Memoire to the 

effect that we could supply a limited quantity of tapes, and that, of 

course, he was free to see the technicians or the Director again for 

further discussion. DeVOSJOLI said that none of these measures would 

offer any real solution of the problem. The interview was entirely 

friendly, but DeVOSJOLI was clearly very much discouraged by our 

failure to meet his request. 

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Original Signed 

PAUL BIRDSALL 

Chief, WE 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 06-03-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
REF ID:A522461 

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AIDE MEMOIRE ON THE SUBJECT OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC ASSISTANCE 

TO THE 

FRENCH FOREIGN OFFICE 

When your requirements for communications security equipment 

were described to us some time ago, we examined those requirements 

very carefully, studying them in the light of and in connection 

with similar requirements of our own. We have reported to the 

Director of Central Intelligence on our findings and he has 

asked that they be given to you. 

First, we examined the crypto-equipment requirements of 

various U.S. Agencies in order to ascertain the similarity 

between their requirements and yours, and the means by which 

those requirements are to be met. Then we examined the development and production schedules to discover in what way and when 

the requirements would be met. We asked these Agencies to study 

carefully what changes might be ma.de in the production schedules 

of equipment in production, to see if some aiuipments destined 

for them could be diverted to meet requirements of the French 

Foreign Office. 

Unf'ortunately, in those cases where equipments might be 

suitable for your needs, we have found that commitments to meet 

requirements are quite firm, and that it does not now appear 

that equipments can be diverted to meet your requirements in 

less than 30 to 36 months, and we cannot now give you any assurance 
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even of this. Since new equipments which might meet your 

requirements will not be available for quite some time, we 

looked at older equipments still in use to see if any of these 

equipments could be ma.de available. Here again we found that, 

although in most cases the equipments were old, all are in 

use. Furthermore, there is an actual need for additional 

equipments of this type which even we ourselves do not have. 

These are the results of our earnest study of ways and means 

to assist you and, unhappily, it appears that they are of a 

negative character. 

In exploring the problem, various U.S. Agencies have 

suggested that you might wish to examine commercial sources, 

the existence of which you rray know, but in order to make this 

certain, we feel it advisable to mention them. 

For exa.nple, there is the firm of Dr. Edgar Gretner, 

Elektromeckanik und Licht-tecknik, Zurich, Switzerland. 

Although we are not familiar with the product of this firm, 

we think it might merit your investigation if you are not 

already acquainted with it. 

We wonder if you have explored the possibility of using 

one-time tapes - a system which NATO uses, and which has been 

found generally satisfactory. If you decide to use tapes, you 

will need not only the tapes themselves, but also the "mixing" 

mechanism to permit their use with teletype equipment, 
REF ID:A522461 

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As a source for this mechanism, you might consider the 

Norwegian Post and Telegraph, which is now manuf'acturing 

equipment for the SHAPE Signal Division. We also understand 

that a firm known as Atheneum Stiftung, of Frankfurt, Germany, 

has developed a similar mechanism. 

As for the production of tapes themselves, we understand 

that Mr. Boris Hagelin of the firm Crypto A. G. in Zug, 

Switze~land, is taking orders for a machine to produce one-time 

tapes. Also, the Atheneum Stiftung is known to manufacture a 

similar ne.chine. Finally, although the U.S. is unable to 

furnish you with either the "mixing" mechanism or with a 

tape-making machine, we can, if you so desire, supply you 

with a limited quantity of tapes. 

If you have any technical questions with regard to the above 

suggestion, we will be glad to arrange another meeting for you 

with our experts in this field who can fill in the details. You 

are, of course, at liberty to discuss this question with the 

Director of Central Intelligence, if you so desire. 

OCOP 3ECRE1