FILE NO. 

---~ -- - ~ ------------------m111 

e 

DISPOSITION FORM 

RITY -IFICATION (Jfan11) 

-IOP SECRET 

TOP EiEeRE'f 

I SUBJECT 

Comparison of Advantages and Disadvantages 

TD 

AFSA-OOT 

FROM DATE CO~MENT ft.O. 1 

AFSA-02A 5 Oct 51 Col. King/335/td 

l. Attached are the comparisons ma.de up by Mr. Klein and myself'. 

2. We have said about the same things, in different ways, but as we completed 

these wi. thout collaboration, that is to be expected. 

3. We hope our ei'f'orts will assist you, and AFSA, in relocating the Agency 

to the best interests of the Nation. 

Enclosure 

Colonel, 

Assistant Chief, 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 01-30-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

TOP SECRET 

D D I ~~~M50 9 6 REPLACES NME FORM 96, I OCT 48, WHICH MAY BE USED. 18-04801-8 U. 8. GOYERNlllNT PRINTING OFFICE 
REF ID:A72396 

~()p SEe: -,..,. ... 

\ t~ 

New Site (Proposed) 

A Advantages (Compared to Present Site) 

1. Decreased danger of enemy attack. (Less safety than 

Selected Site). 

2. Less danger of subversive infiltration and security 

breaches. (Same reasons as Selected Site). 

3. Increased dispersal possible. 

4. Location of traffic source. (Also advantage over 

Selected Site). 

5. Tours of service personnel Will be in the "Field" 

rather than in Washington, this should permit longer 

and more frequent tours of duty. 

B. Disadvantages (Compared to Present Site) 

l. Distance precludes commuting of lower grade personnel. 

2. Inadequate housing to accommodate lower grade personnel 

3 Some disruption of service. (Much less than at Selected 

Site). 

VH 

New Site (Proposed) 

J=.K. 

A. Advantages (Compared to Selected New Site) 

1. Service to consumers would continue at approximately 

present level. 

a. Nearness to present site precludes extensive dislocation of employees with resulting retension of larger 

numbers. 

b. Nearness to present site would, doubtless, pel'IDl.t 

gradual personnel adjustment rather than sudden loss 

of large numbers. 

c. AdJustment in housing needs could proceed before employees move. 

2. No flood danger. 

3. Utility facilities more easily adapted to needs. 

:roe_ SECRET 
4. Competition in labor market 'Wl. th known, rather than W'l. th 

unknown factors 

a. Personnel procurement improved because of prestige of 

Washington area. 

5 Cultural and recreational advantages of Washington area 

remain available. This tends to attract a more desirable 

class of personnel, and makes for •more satisfied employees 

6. AdJacent to source of tra.:f'fic. 

7 Prestige value remains comparable to Washington area 

B. - Disadvantages (Compared to Selected New Site) 

l. Danger from enemy attack is greater 

2. Fails to remove us from competition With other government 

agencies in labor market. 

New Site (Selected) 

A. Advantages (Compared to Present Site) 

1. Decreased danger of enemy attack. 

2. Lower living costs 

3. Less danger of subversive infil tra.tion and security breaches. 

(Isolation, Distance from thl.ckly populated area and particularly from the present center of enemy intelligence effort). 

4. Race problem WJ.ll probably be less serious 

5. Increased dispersal possible. 

6. Service personnel will be on "Field" rather than Washington 

tours of duty, thus increasing possibility of continued 

service. 

7. Removes competition with other government agencies in labor 

market. 

B. Disadvantages (Compared to Present Site) 

l. Inadequate existing housing and government quarters. 

a. Proven lack of interest in civilian housing construction 

b Non-existence of plans or approval to provide necessary 

government quarters. 
T 

c. Distance (35 I!ll.. to Louisnlle) to housing standards 

suitable for our lower grade personnel. 

2. Flooding of access road, especially to Louisville. 

3. Lack of electricity and telephone service on other than 

main roads nil restrict housing. 

4. Unusually serious crowding of schools. 

5. Current location o:f' General Electric Co. and other large 

industry (Reynolds Metal Co. ) WJ.ll adversely affect labor 

market and the housing situation. 

6. Cultural. developmental opportunities are far less than 

present site. 

7. Prestige value completely lacking, present site extremeJ.y 

high. 

8. Distance involved forces severance of emplo;yment where 

family works for different employers. 

9. Transportation (cost, distance and time) to Louisville 

unsatisfactory. 

10 Isolation of site makes it unsatisfactory for hl.gher grade 

personnel who should reside close by. 

ll La.ck of suitable recreational and entertainment facilities 

for personnel accustomed to Washl.ngton area. 

12. Crippling loss of necessary operating personnel nll 

adversely a:f'fect AFSA service to consumers in what nll, 

probably, be a cri ti.cal period. 

:EOl?_SEGRET 
, REF ID:A72396 t!'T ~ .ee __ SECR 

I. Ar~nts for Moving to Fort Knox 

1. Considering the National. Capital. as a primary target for enemy 

attack, this would provide com,plete safety. 

2. High cost of living in the Washington area. 

3. Competition with other governmental. agencies in recruiting 

civilian personnel. 

4. Restrictions which·must be anticipated against the maintenance 

of large numbers of military personnel in the Washington area for any 

extended tours of duty. 

Ir. Arguments for Moving to Vint Hill 

1. Proximity to Department of Defense, consumer agencies and other 

governmental. actiVities. 

2. Safety from enemy attack on the Nations Capital. Vint Hill is 

well out of target range and there are no nearby governmental. agencies 

or large industries which might be considered as primary targets. AFSA 

would be completely isolated and therefore would be much safer than if 

located in a large military and industrial. area such.as Fort Knox--Louisville. · 

3. Comparative ease with which a rapid communications center could 

be established and made operative. Long land lines would not be required. 

4. Dislocation and uprooting of civilian personnel would be reduced 

to a minimum. Many AFSA personnel ow.n homes in the Washington and Virginia area which they would not be required to sell. Car pools would 

make commuting a relatively sim,ple problem. (AFSA has a number of employees who commute from Manassas and other nearby communities) • 

5. Because of its opportunities for culture and amusement, Washington 

is highly desirable to many AFSA personnel. Such opportunities do not 

exist at Fort Knox. Even though a large scale cultural. program were established immediately, it would be many years befl>re F~rt Knox could begin 

to approximate the advantages which the Washington area offers to AFSA 

personnel. The Washington area has always been one of the most fertile 

recruitment fields for AFSA personnel. It is believed that AFSA-153 can 

furnish statistical. proof to show that AFSA receives more personnel from 

the Washington and Virginia area than any other area in the United States. 

6. Huge housing projects such as would be require~ by the move to 

Fort Knox are slow in building. Experience shows that private enterprise 

will not move in and build in anticipation of a demand, regardJ.ess of 

Chamber of Commerce _promises to contrary. It Will build only after demand 

TOP SECRET 
REF ID: A72396 . 

. T!lP SECRE'"' 

has arrived. If AFSA moved to Vint Hill personnel couJ.d continue· to 

live in Washington area. until necessary housing was built. Even when 

housing was available at Vint Hill, it is believed that large numbers 

of personnel would continue to commute by choice because they would prefer to live in the Metropolitan area •• Conversely large numb~s would 

prefer to live in a qu:itter community in a rural atmosphere. 

~~~~ 7. The Imox:v:ill:e"" area is experiencing huge industrial expansion. 

General Electric is establishing a large jet engine factory in this 

location which will employee upwards of 201000 workers. This one industry will tax already over-crowded large hous1ng f'acilities and will 

inf'late land vaJ.ue in the Louisville--Fort Knox area. On the other hand 

Vint Hill will remain in the 11back water" area. 

8. In the event of a war, Fort Knox will f'ace a tremendous inflex 

of military personnel. This will require vast number of ci vil.ian workers 

·which will tax an already short labor market. Ruge numbers of military 

perionnel. will be moved in and they will require private housing. On the 

other hand, AFSA would be the. only military or~an.ization in the Vint Hill 

area. 

9. .AFSA 1 s moving to Fort ·Knox would take months, even years, to 

complete in its entirety. During this transi tionaJ. period, AFsA efficiency will be greatly impaired. This impairment wouJ.d be obviated by a 

move to Vint Hill because of the short distance involved. 

10. The Vint Hill area has an abundance of electrical power Which 

would not be taxed in the event of an all out war by mushrooming industry 

demands. Vint Hil.l is, served by the Virginia Public Service Corp. and 

the Rural Electric Administration. 

ll. AFSA' s moving to Vint Hill would be in line with the overall 

governmental policy of dispersal outside of the Washington target zone, 

yet close enough so that executive control may be exercised easily in 

event of Atomic attack. 
e REF Ip:_!l72396 pA= -reP SECff-~~-. - 1 October 1951 

ADVABrAGES OF vm llIIL sr.r1 

1. More people would remain with .AgenOJ' - partioularly, and 

1D0St :important. the top 201' - the key people who have long mcperienae 

and who constitute 'the real heart of· the Agenoy!a activities. 

2. Jloving expenses would be sharply redu.oed, particularl)" mve 

of houaehold etfeots of Agency perso11nel. !ravel time and expenses 

would be reduced. Many people would talm oare ot themaelves in moving 

from. present homes to new and closer ones. 

3. Comiderably less interruption to all operations and loss 

ot prodllotions would be suffered. As in D1>ve during formation of .AFSA, 

a short DJD'98 eliminates necessity for com.plate olosedOlm, permits 

phasing ot office mves and oontinmtion ot operationa. 

4. Liaison with Service C:ryp1Dlogio Agan.oies and pr1no1pal 

intelligence CODB\111.era 1R>uld be simpler, oloaer. more direot, and more 

etteotive. !eahnioal assistance to Services and supervision of Service 

crypt activities would be greatl7 inareased. 

5. Com.mioationa costs would be only a traction of coats at Xllox. 

~~:! electrical oomm.mioationa would be reduced. 

6. Supernsion of actual aomtruotion b)" technical people in 

operations offices 1R>uld be simplified and greatl7 inoraased, with result 

that building would be better suited 1D operations and construction 

sp,eded b)" reducing tim.e tor deaiaions. 

7. Important adviaoey tunotiom and participation in Joint 

activities which have taken yee-rs to build up to a point of et.tactivenesa 

could be continued. For example, JOEO ooordi:mting aotivities, countermeasures work, Researoh and Development Panels. -~ e c-:-i r~r::::J TOP 5£3~~~ 
A REF ID:A7239~ 

•+oP SEGR 

l October 1951 

.ADVANTAGES OF -VINT HILL STATION, CONT 1D 

8. Procurement f'unotions Y«>uld be more efficient. and simpler 

by being near to the Army• s and Navy• s major procurement organizations. 

Would penni t close range follow thru on procurement actions. 

Particularly important in conducting industrial mobilization 

activities with MunitioJ:JB Board and in obtaining priorities tor 

critical matarials~,Hatiolw.l Production Authority. 

9. Would eliminate necessity for any portion of AFSA to remain 

in immediate Washington area f'or liaison purposes, thus reducing 

operating overhead alld duplication. 

10. It reduces AFSA's attractiveness as a target since ~other 

military. industrial, or transportation target is within 30 miles in 

any direction. Also it is a greater distance from probable enemy by 

polar air route. 

11. Post authorities are familiar with operation of a security 

activity and would not be antagonistic to installing and "respecting 

seouri t¥ masures. 

2 

:r 0 rm g; :E: c ft ET 
l October 1951 

DISADVAM'AGES OF FORT KNOX 

l. Loss ot personnel, particularly among the group which has 

been with Agency long time and has its roots in the area will be 

disastrously high. Operations. ·especially intelligence activities, 

_will be seriously hampered by loss or top flight persons who provide 

the ideas and technical direction. 

2. Distance from Washington will require almost complete shut 

down and loss o:f' production in communication security activities for 

average minimum of one month. Some units using heavy, complex equipment 

will be out of operation tor three months. Considerable expensive 

equipment would have to be duplicated to avoid th.is. 

3. Several thousand units of Wherry housing will be required 

immediately in order to have some acoornodations for transplanted 

people upon arrival and during i'irst year or two oi' operation. This 

will require exceptionally careful timing .and handling in order to 

avoid having Agency move become a political issue and subject to_ 

Congressional scrutiny, .with its attendant publicity and security 

dangers. 

4. Recr.uitment of people for low grade jobs will be difficult 

due 1x> having to compete against industry and its flexible wage 

policies :f'or labor. Also possible increase o:f' labor difficulties due 

to heavy unionization in the area. 

6. location o:f' GE appliance plant of 16,000 persons only 15 miles 

away constitutes source of wage difficulties. Also increases attractiveness 

of area as a target. 

T-OP 
-

1 October 1951 

DIS.ADVANTAGES OF FORT KNOX. COllT 'D 

6. Experience of AFSA at NSS has shown difficulties of being an 

unwelcome tenant on a military installation. 

7 • All of the advantages listed under Vint Hill would be lacking 

at Knox. 

2 
REF ID:A72396 

DRAFT 1 Oct 51 

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR THRU '!HE DEPUTY DIRECTORS 

SUBJECT· Proposed new site for AFSA in the Fort Knox area 

2. '!he advantages o.f'~new site, appr 

Staff' upon the re end.a ti.7.. of' AFSA.C, on 

is initiated, to »eW:ew 4'he£so:• I 1 ~ make sure that the Fort Kn~ 

site ~~~~ is 'llie 

A 

meat; saita:bie t;lrab can 

~~~~~~~~ 

be fecmEl. 'Ibis memo is a follow-up on ~ 

~~ 

the brief' discussion we had at that time. ~ 

.£:ti. 

tages are quite over'bafuced by the 

of' all or a east the:G ma.i ty of' .rthe o.f'.f'ic 

eals with this aspect o the matter. ~6AJRJ ~ _ .,,_ .:z._ .._ 1-1 ~ .p _ ·~ 1+ -lea., -h-... ~ d:i~oL ~'\...~Wt..~~'~ 7lN ~ 11'>44 

A_d.mHteEl}y, '8:e JiPafJC>aed: ai.,1 .. s selected only after much study. 

by tboH b:avieg ~-" waperasisiM.,.. I also J*t# indicated * • 0 w:i that I 

fully understand. that it is contrary to military philosophy to reopen .f'or 

discussion a military decision once it has been made, particularly if' no 

better solution to the problem involved can be proposed.~~ ~~J 

~better ~i~ be found and,.~;Q::A:ti~- •••i\1 '* 

" 

~ ~.&..~e-. 7 'W the.,.pew AFSA °bstallation"llt the ASA 1 

~~~ s Vint Hill Farms Statio~ ~ "'° 4 ~ ~~ ~rtltL~~ &WR if ~~ a:Ae.tiba ee Reeeaawy t:o move all 01 pa!lt of MS 1 to ano'iher site.)~~~ 

~ J.. ~ ~ ~ ""1'\DH~~--, ~ ~.,Jl.:;po.;..:t&f t'i~~~~ oJ.Q ~7\+.~: Enclosuile 2 deals with this alternative solution. ~' ~ ~~~. 

4. It is recommended that, if' your consideration of' Enclosure 2 leads 

to a belief that the alternative solution is worthy of' detailed examination, 

it be studied by a small group designated to report thereon. Enclosure 3 ,..... __ ~r \ 

f j ~ 

is a draft of' a suitable directive to such a group. I.I ti. r1

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REF ID:A72396 

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REF ID:A72396 
REF ID:A72396 
REF ID:A72396 

VINI' HILL FAHMS STATION 

Existing Facilities 

1. Housing 

E.M. Barracks •••••••••••••••••••••••• 500 man spaces exist 

165 man barracks being 

built. Finished by 

January 1952. 

Total 665 permanent spaces 

(This figure is based on a figure of 72 sq. rt. per man) 

BOQ •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 16 spaces 

Family Housing ••••••••••••••••••••••• 102 units (Off. & Non-coms.) 

2. Sewage 

Treatment plants..................... 2 on post 

Capacity of plant #"l ••••••••••••••••• 204 thousand gallons 

Capacity of plant #2 ••••••••••••••••• 408 thousand gallons 

Daily disposal capacity plant #1..... 64 thousand gallons 

Daily disposal capacity plant #2 ••••• 137 thousand gallons 

These plants are of the "Imhoff" type with chlorination. 

3. Water (4 wells) 

Total flow of wells •••••••••••••••••• 648 thousand gallons 

Storage capacity of tank /fl •••••••••• 100 thousand gallons 

Storage capacity of tank #2 •••••••••• 15 thousand gallons 

Total •••••••••••• 175 thousand gallons 

Treating capacity •••••••••••••••••••• 150 thousand gallons 

4. Power (Virginia Electric Power Co.) 

Post power requirements •••••••••••••• 81 334,000 kw hours yearly 

Power available with present facilities ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 6,615,000 kw hours yearly 
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REF ID:A72396 

srAND.'RD PORM NO. 84 

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TO : ~ er),;~ cl }ft~ DATB: / (11.J SI 

FROM : Cf)! /) 111. 

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