/ 

OF 'l'HE 

U.K. - U.3. CCJfFf!JiliNCE Oft SEX:Ukm OF Ffta':CR C<llMUNICATIClm 

m':U> AT '1;ASHJ:NCTCR«, 1 KAI • 14 HAI', 19Sl 

b. 'l'd asaoaa t.he e.dvo.nt~os and dlnadvanta.gen ot such an app~aoh5 

c. To develop, it an approach should be madei 

(1) a spuclfic pl.en fol' !mptvving tho securit,y or French cmJllllll.1cations, and 

,(2) a opocit!c p1·or:x'SJU ror approachinc the r·nnch Govemment. 

2. See Encloaure 11 an. 

3. It ia Conaluded that: 

b. In Yiew or t.he facts that. -

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL\.86-36/50 USC 3605 

\\\ 

(1) the U.K. and the U.S. Oovemment.e, through the moahcnism ot 

NAl'OI lhaveuinitia~eduactlonuWhida ~~i6~i~~~~ use 3605 

is expected to correct in large measure the insecurity or the impgrtant cryptoconnumicat;iono ot the l'renoh Amcd Services; Md 

(2) any oorrcction of ~he remaining important areas of insecu. 

rJ.t.i ot the cmt,ocannnmic11tion1 ot the Frenoh Am.ad Semceo \«»ulcl 

-1-

Form 781-ClJS TOP SECRET CANOE 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-28-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
REF ID:A522570 EO 3.3(h)(2) 

2 EMVlit)P SE(~llET CAP,OE PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

8l'J1' direct approach to the French Govemmmt ahould be reetr.lcted 1n 

scope to the i11provement ot the oacurl t7 of the cryptoCOlaDlQica.tlona 

ot the Fnnch "·.F.Ao 

c. The Cr.n1tographic Serd.ce ot th9 French M.F .A. does not po--

~ the neae1Sa17 c~VPf;anal;rt.io knowledge to innure provJ.sion ot qat_. 

"); attord1ng adequv.t.e cr,ptographic security, or, it it does poall988 t.M 

requieite Jmowl.adge, th• information ie not. being applled or properl-T 

anploJed. 

d. fbis dtuaUon can be 1JlproV6d onq b1' a drastic end «1:penldTe 

/'. ),.__rorpnf sattoll ot the Cr.yptographic Service ot the French H.r .A. and 

'JP appropd.ate ~.'9pl.aoanent of its cr,yptographio systems and praot.ioea. 

e. IQ r1rder to assure a realization by the French M.P .A. of the 

neceaaltf ·:or such a clrast1c overhaul ot cx,-ptographic eyataaa and 

praottoes it vil1 be nece1sa17 to bring the situation to the att.ucn 

ot the X.1.A. in a manner so d1'811Atic as to shock that K1nietr.r fJato 

taldq ~ and etteotive action. 

t. tt a shock of the clegree necoooa17 to produce ett•ctive aeU.on 

1 

1 ~1 ,,. ,...s.bl•I 1~2 is~J~~~~ use 3605 

~ / \ i;b!.• l>JP<! of approach t.o the 1'ftDah -U 

'be._. ad'V1MbleJ however, tor reasons eet. .tort.h 1n paragraphs 2' and 

:t6 ot taoloare •aa (TAB A), an approach of th1e eort. would be 1o'Mteqaaat.e, and 

an appioaoh ilm>lvtns auch l'8Y1Wlt1on must therefore be~' '4th C.-

ead.'8at. r.llka ar.l.etng tna general lnaecur.lt7 1n tho French OcmuMIGt. 

I• D pnsent the French Govemment 1e inttltrated. 'tlltb Cc•••alata 

obbel" d1alo1&1 or untrustwort.IV pereonnel, 1e subject to~ intemal d1eeemd.ona1 and 11 careleea of it.• om MCQr.l~ to a depM ....... ' 

1ta. o'Jaea1f.ted Jntomation 1a eer.Loaaly 1n danaer of J.eaJcase. 

h. ilthoqh direot evidence is l.ac1dng th8t Cozmuuniato 1n Fnaola Oatem-

. \ J8mt poa1U.ou and u.s.s.a. agents have paeaecl clusif.lad 1Dtormation 1n 

~ ~ '° tbe u.s.s.a., 8llah pae- ot :lnto~ - be -·•· 

-2-

Form 781-CIJS TOP SECRET C2\NOE 
REF ID:A522570 

T01

" S_ECRE1~ CA "iOE 

NP SBefaiJ! eAHOE . 

1. The principal risks to the U.IC. and i.he u.s. Govemaenta 1JI _,. 

. E~.3~~ 

approach to the French Govemment cm tbe lul>Ject of the in8ecar.l.fi7 of PL 86-36/50 usc 3605 

1 ta cc:mnunicatione are r 

/ 

LS 

( 

(3) Disadvantageous political repercussions; 

(4) Pressure rran the French .ro~ follaboration~ ~~ i6~i~~~~ usc 3605 

j. frovided the conditions set forth ~ paragraphs 46 through 48 ot 

1

Jf2"A Enclosure "B" (TAB B) for minimizing these rlske can be met_, an approach to 

the French M.F.A. is warranted. 

k. Since the report ot the Tripart.i.te Group now stueying the intemal 

(\_ --\ .....- security or the French Government mq well add to our knowledge 1n this 

'-f'l'"'· regard, 8111" approach to the French M.P' .A. should be deterred pending oonE.O 3.3(h)(2) 

s1derat1on of that report o PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

xi l. The urgency for improving the security ot French I lccmnuniq_vJ· , cations is such that a program to this end should be undertaken as aoon &IS 

-~\~~-Pc>ssible. 

m. The specific technical. plan for the replacement or insecure cJ'1Ptographic systems and practices of the French M.F.A. (set forth in Encloaure 

. _) /.o .. "A") should be presented to that Ministry in accordance with the approach 

~VJ> -=set forth in paragraphs 49 through 53 ot Ehclosure nsn (TAB C). 

~r· Implementation of the plan will require the long-tem loan to the 

~ French or a limited amount or U.K./U.S. cryptographic equipnent. (This 

[.!;) loan should coneist initially of about 20 Canbined Cipher Machines (cCM); 

subsequently 60 additional CCM should be eal'-llarlced for this pu~ae, the 

latter being phased in consonance with NATO needs.) 

-3-

NSA For111 181-(1 JS 1 Jul 57 TOP SECRET Cl\:NOE 
' 

TO'P S~~R1Tu~ t3~~0E 

'l'OP SEiSFM 6AHOl!I 

oo This problem should be kept under cont.1nuous review until ad&-

cision to approach the French has bean made and the pl.an baa bem implemented. 

4. It is recoanended that: 

a. The above conclusions be approved; 

b. The proposed approach and plan be implemented when ~IB and OSCIB 

hs.ve agreed that the requisite conditions have been met.; 

c. The respective Chai.men of l:)IB and USCIB and/or their naadnees 

visit Parls in order to brief the U.Jt. and the U.S. Ambassadors and also 

to participate as required; 

d. WIB and USCIB keep this problan under continuous review, and take 

such implementing action as may be agreed to be necessary; 

e. The U.K. Government provide eight and the u.s. Govemment. twelve o~ 

the twenty CCMs required for initial implementation of the cryptographic 

planJ and that the additional sixt.y CCMs be provided by the two Go-vemments in a program phased in consonance with their respective NATO 

commitments. 

-4-

NSA Form 1s1-C135 1 Jul 52 T<I>P SECRET CANOE 
TAB "A" EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

AITRoAcH ro TH_~_F_K-::"'=:c=~:!::=========.----11 25. An approach to the French I I hi• been cor_... 

sidered, suc-h an approac~ to be re•trtcted to olferin£ tl•• 'NGGh tt. .. t .A. 

crypto~raph1c material 9 including machU.a, I .... _____________ __.I 

2(,.. Such an arpro1.ct: is deaned inadvisable tor the tollowiftg reucna: 

'!. The impact or. the French is likeq to be too teeble to etteet. t.he 

desired resulto A drastic overhaul or \he Cryptc.>grafllic ;;.ervice ot the 

French Ji: .F .A. is needed and th1a would requirir the ,..uocation ot additional 

funds which tr.0uld probably not. be torthcoming Wll.eat1 the Fr.ch receive a 

major shock. 

b. Even it the French acqu.1eac•d:, t.here wou.ld, in the abaece ot 

assurances of improved aecur1t1, remain the poa11ib1lit7 oft.he u .. s.S.IL 

acquiring the necessary c17Ptognpuc •teriala through l'lethod 2.* 

c. Any half hearted appJ"(>aeh mi&h\. p-eJudice a later approach band 

,__ __________ __.l/turthennore, a.qy approach by etag• llieht lq 

the U.K. and the U.S. Governments open to French accusatioms ot 1neincerit.J'n 

d. Acceptance by the French M.F .. Ao of participation by U.IC./U .. s. 

experts in the necessary drastic reorganization of its C1'7Ptosraphic 

Service would not be likely to tollow thie approach~ 

eo The n"ceseary number or cipier machines tor this purpose is not 

available to meet French needao E.vm if they were available, it could be 

anticipated that other NATO countries would make similar demands wbich 

could not be meto 

*Bf obtaining ph79ieal possession or the Cl')'ptolllaterial (key lists, code books, 

etc.) necessary tor direct reading of the intercepted trattic., 

NSA Form 781-(1 3S 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
TOP EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

460 In order to induce the rreuch ti~F ~Au to wliertake ~ drastic overhaul. 

required tbr real improvanent in its ccc::amwUcat.iona seciu'it7, any U .. K. or U,S" 

approach should be calcula.t.ed to shock the Hinistry into maldne a major effQJ"t.,, 

It ia considered that t.he on}¥ e!!ecti~fi!J and practicab1e shock/ . 

I / 

470 Revel.ation._I ___ ..... lentc..ils sudl grave risks t.mt it should be subject 

to t.b.e coud1 tions outlined. below: 

a., Prior to the initial appro&Qh tbsre must be YBl.id J.ndicotione that 

the French HoF'c"'" and those other frei.~h Government Departmmta and Agau:i.$s 

which have aceeee to Mof..,A., caonmications containing intbnnation handled on 

a claesitied baaia by t.be U, .Ka or th• U.S .. Govammneta ha Ye the intait and 

capabilit'if to utabllah arrangflllll8Dts to protect thie Wcraaticoi tb•• 

arrangements must be su.ffioimt 11 :in t.he agreed opiniao ot the U.l" and the 

U .. s. Oovena111te, t.o lerrant mak~ an initial approacho 

b 0 'l'he initial approach JllWJt be made at a point of cont.act 1a tb• 

Fnndl K.l' oAo, 111hic:h contact. ia discreet9 reliable,, and at. a 1..-.1. ot. 

Rfficient aut.hority., 'lllia contact o..hoo \<\ ~t., intcmaed: 

Form 781·C13S 

(l) 

(2) 

{)) that.~ 8hould h• not bel.ine t.his et&te•t,1 a demonetrat.ioD 

will be giwn to h\s experts provided he wUl gin 

aaauranou that his 111nistry will: 

(a) undertake an energet.ic program t'br reorganisation or its 

Cryptographic Service and appropriate replac•mt of ita 

present oryptographie ayat.a and pract.1cea; 

(b) accept without quali.tication and pramulgat.e U .. IC/U.S., 

e&aaltial, standards ot securlt7 ill eaab pbaM and aspect 

ot the progra; 

(o) accept direot u,.K .. /U.s< part.icipation in C1DCUtm1 the 

progran, :lnc.luding participat.1.c:n en a working lnel by 

repreeentativee qwtl.ified in the field of general sec:uritf 

u well u all aepect.e ot coammiaat.ioaa seaurit.7 · 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
TQP SESf@t' AOORJJ - EO 3.3(h)(2) 

TAB nan .fm:iTINUc.Q PL 86~36/50 USC 3605 

Cc Should 

be unnecessary to convince the contact as to the 

nevert.heless.11 before any further steps in the program are undertaken 9 

the assurances set forth in para.graph b(3, nrust still be obtained .• 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

48~ In informing the French J~.F .• AQ of details l .... _______ .... tof its 

cryptographic Byst.ems, it is essential that a.s little information a.s _;::ossible 

be divulged \ 

\ 'These should be selected so as to reveal the minimwn amount of L------

technical intonnation, which should be restricted to the level of 

....______, systemso If any disclosure of .... l _____ ___.linformation rel.a.ting to 

"-----------'~ouJ.d b~ f~und necessary in order to i>Otain Fr..nch 

acceptance to the conditions specified in paragraph 47b!' such. disclosure will 

not be ma.de without prior agreement between the u.r.~ and the V .s. Governnumt.s~ 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

• 

NSA Form 781-Cl 35 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
. . 

TAB 11C11 

--

MEANS OF APPROACH 

49. An initial approach to the KnF 8A., at a level of sufficient authority 

offers a ehoice between the Miniater and the Secretary-General, It is considered that the latter -would be the more ruitable point of in;ltial approadl 

tor the tollowing reasons: • 

a.. The Seoretary-.General 1a a permanent ot.t'icial, mile the Minister 

ie liable to replac ... nt ; 

b, Ae a Department official,, the Secretar,y-G·enoral is more likely 

than the JiJ.niater to take a cooiprehensive and continuous view ot the problem; 

Co The outstandiJJ& personality and known rellabilit7 of t.be SecretaryGeneral, M~ Alexandre Parodi, are bellevetl to be sucll aa to otter good 

proepecta ot effective implementation of th• U.K./U.So plan. 

SO o All eubaequent widening of the circle o! dia cuss ion will require 

EO 3.3(h)(2) precise definition and prior U.K~/U.S~ a&remento PL 86-36/50 use 3605 

51, t'he nrioua risk• arising and 

part.tcul.ar~ the 

.--------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~---.---

require t.ha 

but not both,, the logical nominee being the U.K 

the French hi.Te been a•aociated. in the pe.st,, 

52, There wwld be dietinct a.dvanta.ges 1n a U.K~/U .. So Joint approacb 

baaed on joint. coneultation and Joi.nt recommdati~ne in the light of th• 

-------------~/In view ot the fact that a considerable et.tort 

on the part ot the French ia required, the maxi!llllll available pressure mat 

be exert.eel. 

53., lna811U.ch aa the U.K" and the U~S" Ambassadors in Parie have alread;J 

been apprised or this i:ro'bl• and in view ot their otticial po8iitiona, it 1a 

logical that the7 should mke t.he initial approach to M. Parod1o 

Form 781°C13S TOP SECRET C:l\:NOE 
·:··. 

... 

.... 

OF THE 

U.K. - U.:;. CONFEltllJCJ:; ON SLCUhI'rY OF Fl!UlCH COMf.IUNICA'rICNG 

Hil.lJ Al' i.ASH.INGTON, 1 I·1AY - 14 HAI, 1951 

l. Tc consider the insecurity of French Government COlll!lunications -

a. 'fo determine whether the French Government should be app1'0ached 

tlit.h a view to improvinc it~; communications security, e::.pecial.l,y that ot 

t.be r~n1str,y of 1''oreien Affairs (t·:.F.A.); 

b. To assess the advant~es and disadvantages of such an appl'('ach; 

c. To develop, if an appr'Oach should be made: 

(l) a sp~cific plan for impt'Ovine the security ot French canmunications, and 

(2) a Dpec1fic plOf:ram £01· appl'oachint~ the 1''rench Uovemment.. 

FACTS a~:AhillG ON T:t-; Pj.OBIJ!l{ .'Jm ursi.;U~1SION 

2. Gee I~closure "ll". 

· ~ONCW:3IONS EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

. , . 3, It 1e concluded that: 

n,_ .... -:._.._"----------------------------------___, 

\\\\ 

, .. 

b. In view of the tacts that -

(l) the U.K. and the U.~. Governments, throueh the 111ochunism ot 

. . ' · 1 i " • 

·: · ·,,.: · , .. , NAi'O l..__ ____________ ___.l-have----inittatea···a.ct.Ioli--whicll 

is· expected to correct in lar~e ineasu1-e tho inaacurlty or tile 1mport.ant crypt,ocommunications of the French A11J1ed ~ei'Vices; and 

(2) &n3' correction ot tile remaining import.ant areas or insecu-

, , ;; .,. rit.7 ot tl1e cryptocommunicatlons of the 1''rencll ,·~nnod Serviceo would 

,.,' 

'. 

:\L .. ii~ . ' ' 

, For~ 78leC13S TOP SECRET C.t1 .. NOE 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 
t' 

I 

I 

I 

I 

a.iv direct approach to the French Govemm~t should be restricted in 

scope to the improvement or the securit;y ot the crn>t~~cations 

of the French M.F.A. 

c. The Cryptographic Service of the French M.F .A. does not possess 

the necessary C1'1Ptanalytic knowledge to .insure provision or systems 

affording adequate cr.vptographic security, or, it.it does possess the 

requisite knowledge, the into:nu.t10li is not being applied or properq 

employed. 

d. This situation can be improved only b;y a drastic and expensive 

reorganization ot the Cryptographic Service of the French M.F .A. and 

appropriate replacement or its cxyptographic s19tems and practices. 

e. In order to assure a realization by the French M.F oA. ot the 

necessity tor such a drastic overhaul or cryptographic syst•s and 

practices it will be neceasar,y to bring the situation to the attention 

of the M.F .. A. in a manner so dramatic as to shock that Ministr.r into 

taking s~y and ef'tective action .. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL\86-36/50 USC 3605 

r. If a shock or the degree necessary to produce ettective action 

were possible 

this type ot approach to the French vould ...._~~~~~~~~~~~----' 

be most advissble; however, tor reasons set .forth in paragraphs 25 and 

26 ot Faclosure "B" (TAB A), an approach ot this sort. would be inadequate, and 

an approach involving such revelation must therefore be employed, with concomitant risks arising t-rom. general insecuritT in the French Government • 

.g.. At present the French Govemment is infiltrated with Conmmists 

and other disloyal or untrustwortbT personnel, is subject to violent intemal dissensions, and is careless of its awn security to a degree where 

lts claasitied information is seriously in danger of leakage. 

h. Although direct evidence is lacking that Communists in French Govemment positions and u .. s.s.R. agents have passed classified 1nfo:nnat1on in 

volume to the u.s.s.R., such passage of information must be assumed. 

-2-

NSA Form 781-C1 35 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET C1'\NOE 
1. The principal risks to the U.K. and the U.S. Govemaents in 8D1' 

· EO 3.3(h)(2) approach to the French Govemment on the subject of the insecurity p.[ 86-36/50 usc 3605 

its cCllllllUni.cations are: 

\\\\\\ 

(3) Disadvantageous political. repercussions; 

(4) Pressure tran the French to~llabOration. ~~ i6~i~~~~ usc 3605 

· j. Provided the conditions set torth in paragraphs 46 through 48 or 

Enclosure "B" (TAB B) tor minimizing these r.lsks can be met, an approach to 

the French M.F.A. is warranted. 

k. Since the report. ot the Tr.l.partite Group now studying the internal 

security or the French Government~ well add to our knowledge in this 

regard, a.ny approach to the French M.F.A. should be deterred pending consideration of that report. 

1. The urgency tor improving the security ot French._l ___ ___.lccmnunications is such that a program to this end should be und~rtaken as soon as 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

possible~ PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

m. The specific technical pl.an tor the replacan.ent or insecure cryptographic sy-stems and practices of the French M.F.A. (set forth in Enclosure 

"A") should be presented to that Ministl'Y' in accordance with the approach 

- set forth iri -paragraphs 49 through 53 or Enclosure "B" (TAB C). 

n. Implementation or the pl.an will require the long-tem loan to the 

French of a limited amomt or U.K./U.S. cr,yptograpbic equipnent. (This 

loan should consist initially or about 20 Ccabined Cipher Machines (CCM); 

subsequently 6o addition8:]. CCH should be ea~rked tor this purpose., the 

latter being phased in consonance with NATO needs.) 

-JNSA For111 7B1-C135 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
o. This problem should be kept; under acatinuous rev.l• until a d&-

cision to approach the French baa beci .-de and the pl.a hall been tapl.mented. 

4. It is recaanended. that: 

a. The above conc1usione be appl'O'ftdJ 

b. The proposed approach and pl.an be implemented 1llber1 LSIB and USCIB 

have agreed that the reqW.at.te ccmdiUona have bem met.J 

c • The respect! ve Chai man ot UIB ad USCIB and/or their DICll1.neee 

visit Paris in order to brief the U.I. and the U.S. Allha88adors and al.Bo 

to participate as required; 

d •. LSIB and USCIB keep this prabl.• under continuous review, end take 

such implementing action as mq be agreed to be DecuArJ"J . 

e. The U.K. Govemment provide eight and the u.s. Gove:rnnent t.velve ot 

the twenty CCHs required tor initial implementation of the cr,.ptograpbic 

plan, and that the additional aixt.y CCHa be pJOv.lded by the two Gove:mments in a program phased in consonance with their respective NATO 

commitments. 

-4-

NSA Form 781-(135 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET C1Ai:NOE 
'POP SEeRE'f' CldTOF SECRET CA~TOE ~6 3.3(h)(2) 

PU 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TAB "A" 

APFEOACH TO Ttfc FRn:cH I J 

25. An approach to the French r-1-------------------.1,_ha..-... -s ....... been considerec» su{'b a.n approach to be restricted to offering the French M.F.A. 

CQ'J.•torr:1pnh ma.teri :.:L.1 J including machines~------------------­

;:,(,. Such an ai::pr1nch is deemed inadvisable for the tollOli'ing reasons: 

.;,. Th~ lmp.-'.l.ct on the f'ren.ch is likely to be too feeble to effect the 

i":!f'eirf!d result.. A dr·a.stic overhaul of the Cryptographic :Service of the 

Frenclc r.F .A. is needed and this would require/the ;.;.llocation of additional 

fUI'lds which wuld probably not be forthcoming unless the French receive a 

major shoe k o 

b. Even if the French acquiesced, there would .. in the absence of 

assurances of improved security, re1J1ain the possibility of the u.s.s.R~ 

acquirjng the necessary cryptographic materials through Method 2.* 

c. Any half hearted approach might prejudice a later approach based 

.__ ____________ lrurthennore# any approach by stages JDieht lay 

the U.K. and the U.S. Goverrunents open to French accusations of insincerityo 

d. Acceptance by the French M.F.A. of participation by U.K./U.S. 

experts in the necessary drastic reorganization of its Cryptographic 

Service would not be likely to follow this approach. 

eo 'l'he necessary number of cipher ma.chines for this purpose is not 

available to meet French needs. Even if they were available, it could be 

anticipated that other NATO countries would make similar demands which ~ 

could not be mete 

*'By obtaining physical possession or the cryptomaterial (key lists, code books, 

etc.) necessary for direct reading of the intercepted traffic. 

NSA Form is1-c1 35 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
TOF SB€"1lET Ct\:· TOE ~DITIOHS @yJ!BNING AN APl 1

00ACH '1'0 '1lih FR.ENCU 

460 In order to induce the French M .. F ,.A., to undertake the drastic overhaul. 

required for real improTIDent m its CCIDIJIUnicationa secarit7, 811¥ U.K. or UoSo 

approach should be calculated to shock the Ministry into maldq a major .ei"tort., 

It is considered ttat the onl.T ettective am practicable shoe 

47. ReYal.ati ___ ___, entclils such grave risks tm t it ahould be subject 

to the conditions CR1tlined below: 

a.. Prior to the mitial approach there must be val.id indications that 

the French M.F.&. and those other French Govemment Departmmts and Agencies 

which lave access to M .. P.A. canrmmications containmg in.tbmation handled on 

a classified basis by t.be U.K. or the U.S .. Govanmmets have the intmt and 

capabilitq to •Btf.bllah arranaanmts to protect t.his intar•tioa; .... 

arrangemmta must be autticient, :lD tbe agreed opinion ot t.h• U.K. and the 

u.s. Oovermcta, to warrant making an initial approach .. 

bo The initial approach must be made at a point ot oantact in tbe 

· French K.r .A., *1ch eontact. is discreet., reliable, and at a lnel ot 

sut't1cient authority. Thia contact fj\. o\A \1-womecb 

(1 

(2 

(.3) that, abould he not bel.ien this etatanct, ·a clconst.ration 

will be giftll to his·experte prorided he will give ... as8Ul'9Doea that hie Mmiatr:y will: 

(a) undertake an ctrgetia pro gram tor reorganisation ot its 

Cryptographic Service mid appl'Opriate replacme'lt ot its 

present oryptog.raphic syatau and practicu; 

(b) accept without qualitication and pl'Cllllulgate U.1./U.s .. ' 

esamti&l standards of s8Cllr:it.7 in each Jiaa• and aspect 

ot the progra; 

(c) accept direct U.K./U.S .. participaticn m GllCUt.Sng the 

program, :lncludJng put;ic1pl1;.icm cm a woridng lnel. byrepresentatiTU qulit:iecl m the tielc:l ot general eecuritJ 

as well as all aspects of ao-micatima seauritr o 

NSA Form 781-C1 35 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET c~~NOE -~----'""- ------ --'--~-- ·~ . 

• 

3.3(h)(2) 

86-36/50 USC 3605 
·REF-II> :-AS-2-.2 5-'7 0- - ---

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TOI' SECRET CA.,.TOE 'f'of~ 3EeRfi;'F ASOFJI ,,,_= ......... ,,,,.~'ti 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

TAB !!\:__qqr~TlNUED PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

~·J Should a 

be unnecessary t~ oontince:the contact as to the 

neverthelesS, · before aey I further Steps in the program Ut<'Undertaken, 

. . ' - ,. 13' t'll b bt . d. EO .;3,(~)( ) the assurances set .1.orth in para.graph bot,; J must s 1 e o aint • PLae::.36150 usc 3605 

48" In informing<th~'French M.F .. A~':ot-details 1..--------.... ror its 

cryptopraphic systems, it'is ·essential that as little intonna~~90 a.; pOssible 

b~ divul~ed/ 

/ The~~· shouid. be·selectttd so ae to reveal. the minimwl1 amount ot 1....-------

. tt?'chnical information, Which should be restrict.ed. to the. le.v.~ ;gf 

..______. systemso If any disclosur& e.t: I fl1formation .r.ela:t4ng tQ., : 

_______ ..... lshollJ.~ be,£diufd neoessa1:y in order to obt~ .French, 

acceptance to the ccnditiori&· specified ip. paragraph 47b, such disclosure will. 

not be made without prioX"'agreement between the .U.It; and the U.S'~ GoV.fU"l"..ments .. 

-. 

r ... r EO 3.3(h)(2) 

J>L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

NSA Form 781-<135 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET C.i41NOE 
--- - - - REF--ID :-A522 5-"1-0- - --

M 5B6ftlR~P~,~ECRET CA!'~~E 

TAi 11 £'! 

490 -An initial approach to tbe M.F.lo at a lwel of ntftc1eat aut.horit7 ' . 

ottffire a choice betVMD tbe ,Min.iater and the-S.cretal"J'-C..&l~ It. 11 coasidered t.bat the latter would be t.he IMH"e mitable point. of iaitial approach 

tor the tollaw1n1 nuom 1 

a. The S.ore~ral 1a a permanent ottic1al, mile the ..Wat.er 

1• !Sable to replac..S; 

r 

b~ Aa a Departamt official, t.be Secretaq-Geeeral la •re Hkel7 . 

Co 'ftle outataadinc penonalJ.t7 md ~ reliabil1\f ol tile Seoretar.JGenenJ., M. u....-. Paradi, an 'b9lieftd to be IU.dl u to otter ~ 

proapect.• ot ett~l•• UqA-.ktiOn 'of t.be U.l./U.s. plan. 

50. All ab9..,.t. widmiPc of tbe d.rol• ot cliaeaaion 1dll require 

:pr4tci•• detin1t1on and prior u.1.,IU.s. -i..-ato 

51. !be YU"ioU rieb U'~inc 

part1cW.arq the 

EQ 3.3(h)(2) 

ln4>L '6.6-36/50 USC 3605 

---------------------------. 

requin tllat '-------,...----,...----------..... --------------..... but not both, the loatcal ~- betng f.be u.&. 

the Frmch ba'ff been aeAClat.ed in tb9 JIU\ .. 

52~ !blare 1«IUlcl t.e d1.tinet ..,.....--·sa a u.1./0.a. ~a...-.• 

be eurted. 

53a x...-·ch .. tbe u.1. +- .. u.s~ -....,.... 1' Peria .... -~ i 

been appnaecl of tbi• srobl' *ill n.w ot •u off~ poeit.iona, it ia '1 .-

l~gioal that tM7 aOQJ.cl -iat tlMt laltial IPJl'Gi&Cb to a. Puocll. 

P-11'1-C13S 

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