J-A04001-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

ERIC J. HAMADAY 

Appellant

v.

LORI D. HAMADAY

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:

:

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1959 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered June 21, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County 

Civil Division at No: 2017-15205

BEFORE: STABILE, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J: FILED APRIL 29, 2024

Eric J. Hamaday (“Father”) appeals pro se from the order entered on 

June 21, 2023, in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, that 

granted the petition for special relief filed by Lori D. Hamaday (“Mother”) in 

the custody matter involving their ten-and-eleven-year-old sons, G.H. and 

C.H. (“the children”).1 In addition, Father appeals from the order entered on 

June 22, 2023, that appointed a parenting coordinator for the parties and 

allocated that the fee be shared equally by the parties. We affirm.

By way of relevant background, the record reveals that the parties have 

participated in protracted child custody and child support litigation since 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The Honorable Daniel J. Clifford presided over the underlying custody matter

involving the parties’ two sons born during their marriage.
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approximately 2017, during which Father has continuously represented 

himself pro se. By interim order in July of 2018, Judge Clifford directed that 

the parties participate in family counseling for the purpose of resolving coparenting issues without litigation. The existing custody order, which was 

entered after a full evidentiary hearing on September 13, 2019 (“existing 

order”), maintained the requirement and further directed that the parties use 

Dr. Darlene Link as their family counselor. This provision was modified by 

order dated June 24, 2022, wherein the court directed that the parties resume 

family counseling with a counselor of their choice, but if they are unable to 

agree, then the court would select a counselor for them. The court expressed

its preference for Dr. Link to serve in this role.

It also is important to note that the existing order awarded the parties 

shared legal and physical custody every week,2 and it set forth a holiday 

schedule. Relevant to this appeal is the Christmas schedule, as follows.

Christmas Eve: From 11:00 AM overnight until Christmas Day at 

11:00 AM: with Mother in odd years/Father in even years;

Christmas Day: From 11:00 AM overnight until December 26th

at 11:00 AM: with Mother in odd years/Father in even years.

Existing Order, 9/13/19, at ¶ 5(k), (l). 

____________________________________________

2 Specifically, the existing order provided that the parties share weekly 

custody by alternating Monday after school until Wednesday morning, and 

Wednesday after school until Friday morning. The existing order also provided 

that they alternate custody on weekends from Friday after school until Monday 

morning. 
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Mother filed the subject petition for special relief on May 1, 2023, 

wherein she requested a “slight adjustment to the holiday schedule to reflect 

the actual Christmas schedule that the parties have been observing for several 

years.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/25/23, at 3. Specifically, Mother requested

an award of custody every Christmas Day and for Father every Christmas Eve. 

In addition, Mother requested that the court order the following relief: 

(1) that the children receive the flu vaccination in 2023 and annually 

thereafter upon the recommendation of their physician; (2) that Father return

the cell phone that Mother had purchased for the children and allow them to

use that phone to call either parent when they are not in his or her custody; 

(3) that the children sleep in the second bedroom that exists in Father’s home 

rather than sleep in Father’s bedroom; and (4) that the court appoint a 

guardian ad litem (“GAL”).

On May 22, 2023, Father, acting pro se, filed an answer to Mother’s 

petition for special relief, wherein he objected to the children being vaccinated 

with the flu shot and having a cell phone, and he denied that it is in their best

interests to modify the Christmas schedule. With respect to Mother’s request 

for the appointment of a GAL, he denied it was necessary. 

The essence of Father’s responsive pleading was that “it would be more 

appropriate to address” Mother’s requests “in counseling,” and that they had 

not had family counseling since December of 2022. Answer to Petition, 

5/22/23, at 5 (unpaginated). Father requested that the court provide the 
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parties thirty days to agree upon a new family counselor who would address

each issue raised by Mother.

The hearing on Mother’s petition occurred on June 20, 2023, via Zoom. 

Father represented himself pro se, during which he presented testimony on 

his own behalf and conducted cross-examination of Mother. Mother was 

represented by counsel, and she testified on her own behalf. 

The trial court recognized on the record in open court at the beginning 

of the hearing that “these issues before me today I would say fall into the 

category of co-parenting issues where you wouldn’t necessarily need to 

involve the judge. . . .” N.T., 6/20/23, at 5 (cleaned up). Upon inquiry by 

the court, Mother testified that the parties had not been engaged with family 

counseling for “a couple months” due to Dr. Link ending it because she was 

“unhappy with” the way Father treated her. Id. at 4-5. Father neither 

confirmed nor denied Mother’s allegation in this regard. Nonetheless, he 

maintained throughout the hearing that the issues in Mother’s petition be 

resolved in family counseling. Father specifically requested on the record that 

the court “give us 30 days from the date of the proceeding to agree upon the 

new family counselor,” and he subsequently requested that the court appoint

Andrea Serber in that role. Id. at 27-28. 

By order dated and entered on June 21, 2023, the court granted

Mother’s aforementioned requests except for the appointment of a GAL, which 

it expressly denied. With respect to family counseling, the order provided: 
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The parties are directed to promptly authorize Dr. Darlene Link, 

the court appointed professional for family counseling pursuant to 

¶ 11(a) of the [September 13, 2019 existing custody order], to 

provide verification of the parties’ participation in family 

counseling and if she will continue as the treating professional 

(and if not, the reasons for not continuing).

Order, 6/21/23, at ¶ 2 (cleaned up). In addition, the order indicated the trial 

court’s intent to appoint a parenting coordinator, as follows.

The Court shall proceed to appoint a Parenting Coordinator via a 

separate Order pursuant to 1915.11-1.1

___________________________________________________

1 [Montgomery County Local Rule of Civil Procedure] 

1915.11.1(a)(1) [provides that,] after a final custody order has 

been entered, a judge may appoint a parenting coordinator to 

resolve parenting issues in cases involving repeated or intractable 

conflict between the parties affecting implementation of the final 

custody order.

Id. at ¶ 10 (emphasis added). On June 22, 2023, the court entered the 

separate order for parenting coordination, which provided that the parties

equally share the fee of the parenting coordinator. 

On July 21, 2023, Father, acting pro se, timely filed a notice of appeal 

from the June 21 and June 22, 2023 orders. Father failed to comply with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b) by not contemporaneously filing a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. Father filed a concise statement 

on August 13, 2023.3 

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3

In correspondence to this Court dated August 7, 2023, the trial court 

requests that we quash Father’s appeal due to his failure to 

contemporaneously file the concise statement with the notice of appeal. We 

decline to do so inasmuch as there is no per se rule requiring it. Indeed, this 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On appeal, Father raises the following questions for review, which we 

have re-ordered for ease of disposition.

1. When the trial court disregards, or fails to enforce issues as 

stated in prior orders, does that constitute an abuse of discretion?

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Court has recognized that the failure to file a concise statement with the notice 

of appeal constitutes “a defective notice of appeal,” and we dispose of such 

matters on a case-by-case basis. See In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa. 

Super. 2009). In K.T.E.L., we relied upon Stout v. Universal Underwriters

Ins. Co., 421 A.2d 1047 (Pa. 1980), wherein our Supreme Court held, “The 

extreme action of dismissal should be imposed by an appellate court sparingly, 

and clearly would be inappropriate when there has been substantial 

compliance with the rules and when the moving party has suffered no 

prejudice.” Stout, 421 A.2d at 1049. 

Here, Father filed the concise statement three weeks after the notice of 

appeal. Neither the trial court nor this Court ordered him to file it. The trial 

court issued a thorough Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing Father’s asserted 

errors on October 25, 2023. Mother does not raise an objection on appeal, 

and we discern no prejudice as a result of Father’s late filing. Thus, we will 

not quash or dismiss his appeal on this basis. Cf. J.P. v. S.P., 991 A.2d 904, 

908 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding that appellant waived all issues by failing to 

file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal when directed by 

the trial court).

Further, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court notes that Father’s concise 

statement is not sufficiently concise and opined that Father waived his 

appellate issues for this reason. Trial Court Opinion, 10/25/23, at 13-15; see 

also Commonwealth v. Ray, 134 A.3d 1109, 1114 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(explaining that the concise statement “must be sufficiently ‘concise’ and 

‘coherent’ such that the trial court may be able to identify the issues to be 

raised on appeal[.]”). Father’s concise statement is four-pages single spaced, 

and we agree that this is not sufficiently concise. Nonetheless, the trial court

found Father’s concise statement coherent and provided its reasoning 

underlying the orders in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Trial Court Opinion, 

10/25/23, at 15-28. As such, we deem Father’s concise statement sufficiently 

comprehensible to permit our appellate review, and his claims are not quashed

or waived. See, e.g., Ray, supra at 1114.
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2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its 

discretion by denying evidence to be presented prior to the 

issuance of a final order?

3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its 

discretion by failing to act in the children’s best interests?

4. When the trial court denies a family court litigant’s 

constitutional rights, does that constitute an abuse of discretion?

5. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its 

discretion by failing to comply with the Judicial Code of Conduct 

pursuant to Pa. Code Title 207 Chapter 33?

Father’s Brief at 11-12 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).4 

Our standard and scope of review in custody cases are as follows.

We review a trial court's determination in a custody case for an 

abuse of discretion, and our scope of review is broad. Because 

we cannot make independent factual determinations, we must 

accept the findings of the trial court that are supported by the 

evidence. We defer to the trial judge regarding credibility and the 

weight of the evidence. The trial judge’s deductions or inferences 

from its factual findings, however, do not bind this Court. We may 

reject the trial court’s conclusions only if they involve an error of 

law or are unreasonable in light of its factual findings.

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4

In its August 7, 2023 correspondence to this Court, the trial court opined 

that the June 21, 2023 order is interlocutory and not appealable because it

does not dispose of all of the issues in the custody matter. This Court issued 

a show cause order directing Father to respond to the appealability of the 

order. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) (a final order is any order that disposes of all 

claims and of all parties); G.B. v. M.M.B., 670 A.2d 714 (Pa. Super. 1996) 

(en banc) (a custody order is final and appealable after the trial court has 

concluded its hearings on the matter and the resultant order resolves the 

pending custody claims between the parties). Based on Father’s response and 

this Court’s review of the record, we discharged the show cause order. 

Indeed, this appeal is properly before this Court because the June 21, 2023 

order resolved the issues raised in Mother’s petition for special relief.
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L.L.B. v. T.R.B., 283 A.3d 859, 862–863 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citing S.W.D. v.

S.A.R., 96 A.3d 396, 400 (Pa. Super. 2014)).

Father’s first issue represents the crux of his claims on appeal, that is, 

the issues raised in Mother’s petition should have been resolved in family 

counseling and not by the trial court. Specifically, he claims that the court 

erred by not following the aforementioned June 24, 2022 order which directed 

the parties “address all non-emergent issues in family counseling, going 

forward, prior to the filing of a petition with the court.” Father’s Brief at 31; 

see also Order, 6/24/22, at ¶ 2. Father is not entitled to relief.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court responded to this claim, as 

follows.

Father’s complaint over the failure to address the current disputed 

issues in family counseling is ironic since the parties ceased to 

participate in family counseling solely because of the way that 

Father treated the court-appointed family therapist. . . . As there 

was no therapist in place, it eliminated Mother’s ability to address 

disputed issues in family therapy.

In turn, upon presentation of the disputed issues to the 

undersigned via Mother’s petition for special relief, the court acted 

appropriately, addressed each of the issues brought before the 

court and decided each of them based upon the best interest of 

the children in accordance with the standard required in a custody 

case.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/25/23, at 25 (cleaned up; footnote omitted). 

The record supports the court’s findings insofar as Mother testified that 

Dr. Link “was not happy with the way she was being treated.” N.T., 6/20/23, 

at 4. Mother clarified, “There w[ere] some issues with the way [Father] was 
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just belittling her. . . . She was just unhappy with the way he was.” Id. at 

5. Because the parties had not retained a new family counselor at the time 

Mother filed her petition, we discern no error or abuse of discretion by the trial 

court presiding over the matter.

In his second issue, as best we discern it, Father believes that he could 

only submit evidence prior to the hearing, and that the court did not provide 

him “with the means by which evidence could be presented” in this case.

Father’s Brief at 29. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court stated, “Father 

is likely confusing the process for child support proceedings wherein financial 

documents are required to be submitted in advance of proceedings.” Trial 

Court Opinion, 10/25/23, at 24, n.28. 

Father also argues that the court erred in failing to require that Mother

provide emails she alleged reflected the parties’ out-of-court Christmas 

custody arrangement. Father’s Brief at 29-30 (citing N.T., 6/20/23, at 23). 

Father essentially argues that the court’s credibility findings in favor of Mother 

were an abuse of discretion because she did not provide supporting 

documentation. We disagree.

At the commencement of the hearing, the following colloquy occurred 

between Father and the trial court. 

[FATHER]: I am not addressing anything in the petition or in my 

answers. You have them and read them. And I believe that this 

should be dismissed, or you can schedule a full hearing.

. . .
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THE COURT: You were sworn in. And I expect you to answer 

questions that I ask you during this proceeding.

[FATHER]: I don’t have to, Judge.

THE COURT: If you choose not to answer, that’s your choice.

[FATHER]: Yes. You can order whatever you want. You continually 

order against me, Judge. That’s just fine.

THE COURT: You’re making a choice not to respond —

N.T., 6/20/23, at 7-8. Father subsequently stated:

[FATHER]: Again, Judge, this is not a hearing. So all things should 

be directed to a hearing where we can submit evidence. I’m sure 

you’re aware of the rule that you continue to ignore the evidence 

needs to be submitted prior to a hearing before — you know, a 

certain amount of time before hearing and —

THE COURT: I’m unaware of that rule. I’m unaware of that rule 

in the custody proceedings.

You may be correct with child support because you’re required to 

provide financial documentation in advance of each proceeding. 

But I’m unaware of any rule in the custody rules which direct the 

providing of any “evidence.” 

Id. at 21-22 (cleaned up). Thus, to the extent Father erroneously believes

that he was prohibited from presenting evidence during the hearing on 

Mother’s petition, this issue is meritless. Indeed, Father ultimately testified 

on his own behalf and conducted cross-examination of Mother. 

Likewise, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court failing to require 

that Mother submit emails as proof of the parties’ out-of-court Christmas 

custody arrangement. Mother testified that she and Father did not follow the 
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schedule for the Christmas holidays set forth in the existing order. N.T., 

6/20/23, at 17. Mother explained on direct examination:

A. I would celebrate Christmas with [the children] every year, and 

[Father] would do Christmas Eve because he always had 

celebrated . . . Christmas Eve with his family. And I always 

celebrated Christmas [Day] with mine. And that was an 

agreement that we agreed on in front of [Mother’s counsel], and 

it was brought up in counseling as well. [Father] agreed on it. 

You have the emails. And now he wants to go back on it. And I 

don’t know why.

Q. So he wants to go back to what Judge Clifford ordered? Is that 

what you’re stating?

A. Correct.

Q. But he hasn’t given you an explanation as to why he would like 

to follow Judge Clifford’s order, and you are not aware of any 

rationale as to why he wants to change the Christmas [schedule] 

even though you’ve been following a different schedule for the last 

three or four years?

A. Correct.

THE COURT: Could you just clarify, since my 2019 order —

I’m looking at the holiday provisions on page 4, Christmas Eve 

and Christmas Day.

Can you just clarify, Mom, what you say you’ve been doing? 

My order says 11 o’clock Christmas Eve to Christmas Day at

11:00 and then Christmas Day at 11 until the 26th at 11:00. 

Can you clarify that?

[A.] What we have been following is [Father] would have them 

Christmas Eve. Depending on whether it falls on his day or not, 

he would get them, I believe, at 11. And then he would keep them 

overnight until Christmas Day at 11. Then I would pick them up. 

And I would have them Christmas Day.
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THE COURT: The same thing, you would have them at 11 

until the 26th at 11? 

[A.] Yes, correct.

THE COURT: You are observing the same times. [Y]ou each 

just took one day instead of rotating the day?

[A.] Correct.

Id. at 18-19. On cross-examination, Mother testified:

[Father]: Do you have proof of anything that you testified to 

regarding Christmas. . .?

A. Christmas, yes, because there’s emails that were done between 

you . . . [my legal counsel], and myself, and you agreed to it 

. . . .

[Father]: That’s where it’s relevant here, right now.

 Do you have them right now?

A. Yeah. They are in my phone.

[Father]: Can you submit them?

THE COURT: She doesn’t have to submit them.

 . . .

[Mother’s counsel]: Objection.

THE COURT: There is no rule that requires emails to be 

submitted. In fact, we operated in family court for 40 years before 

there were emails.

 . . .

THE COURT: Are you disputing that that’s what happened 

with Christmas and Christmas Eve? Are you disputing that’s how 

you observed those holidays in the past?

[FATHER]: I’m not answering that question, Judge.
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Id. at 23-24. We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court crediting 

Mother’s testimony regarding the parties’ exercise of custody during the 

Christmas holiday. Thus, Father’s second issue fails.

In his third issue, Father contends that the provisions in the June 21, 

2023 order regarding the Christmas holiday schedule, the children’s sleeping 

arrangements, and the children’s annual flu shot, are contrary to the children’s 

best interests.5 Specifically, he baldly asserts that the provisions would cause 

adverse effect on the children’s mental health. Father’s Brief at 42. Father 

contends:

If anything, and if the court and Mother truly want what is best 

for the children, they would encourage Father, not order him, to 

comply with the arrangement proposed by the court. 

Furthermore, neither party would seek to ruin Father financially 

by way of support payments which the children are aware of.[6] 

Yet, through all of this, Father, being the one who has been 

compliant with all the court orders to date, is constantly ordered 

to do things against his will by the court. This ultimately has 

____________________________________________

5 To the extent Father asserts that the trial court erred in failing to consider 

the best interest factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a), we disagree. It 

is well-settled that a comprehensive Section 5328(a) analysis is not necessary 

when a party merely seeks to modify a “discrete and narrow issue ancillary to 

a materially unchallenged custody arrangement.” M.O. v. J.T.R., 85 A.3d 

1058, 1063 (Pa. Super. 2014). Instantly, in her petition, Mother did not 

materially challenge the custody arrangement set forth in the existing order. 

It follows that the June 21, 2023 order decided discrete and narrow issues

ancillary to the existing order. As such, Father’s assertion fails.

6 Father previously appealed from the December 20, 2022 order denying his 

exceptions to the hearing officer’s child support order which set his support 

obligation “as $997 per month for 2021 and $983 per month for 2022 and 

going forward.” Hamaday v. Hamaday, 305 A.3d 979 (Pa. Super. 2023) 

(unpublished memorandum). 
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adverse effects on the children, yet both Mother and the court fail 

to comprehend this. . . .

Id. Father essentially again argues that the issues should be resolved in 

family counseling. 

Father provides no argument with respect to why the Christmas custody 

arrangement Mother requested is harmful to the children. Therefore, he has 

failed to make his case on this claim. 

Regarding the children’s sleeping arrangements, Father argues:

The court ordered that Father is directed to ensure that the 

children sleep in their own bedroom in his household (separate 

from his own bedroom). Again, the court fails to comprehend the 

mental trauma on the children and having this “court ordered” 

when both Father and the children’s school are teaching them that 

this country stands for freedom and liberty. Having this issue 

raised by Mother and ruled upon by the court, demonstrates that 

they do not stand for freedom and liberty, but for control and 

slavery as there is nothing unlawful about the sleeping 

arrangement in Father’s house.

Id. at 40 (cleaned up). 

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court stated:

Reduced to bare simplicity, Father has a two-bedroom residence. 

The two boys should be in their own bedroom, and in their own 

beds, and Father should be in his own bedroom and in his own 

bed. The undersigned is not aware of any constitutional right for 

a parent to sleep in the same bedroom, or the same bed, as their 

two pre-teenage boys.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/25/23, at 21; see also N.T., 6/20/23, at 16 (Mother 

testified “they cleaned out the other bedroom. And it’s now an office for 

[Father]. And all three of them are in the same [bed]room with the beds 

pushed together.”). The record supports the court’s findings. We discern no 
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abuse of discretion inasmuch as the court concluded that the children should 

have their own bedroom space separate from Father’s bedroom since they 

reside with him as much as with Mother given the parties’ shared custody 

award. Id. at 33-36. 

Finally, with respect to the children’s annual flu shot, Father baldly 

asserts that (1) it would cause the children mental trauma and (2) “the years 

that they did not get the shot, they did not get the flu.” Father’s Brief at 36. 

The trial court found as follows. 

Mother testified G.H. was really sick last November, with a high 

fever, and that she was advised he should have a flu shot due to 

his asthma by a physician. . . . Mother indicated that Father really 

provided no explanation for his refusal for the 2023 flu shots. In 

his testimony, Father offered that having the flu shot is “not 

necessary” citing to his own non-medical opinion as proof to that 

point. . . . Finally, he asserts that the [flu] vaccination that the 

children have gotten for years will now somehow cause them 

“mental trauma” to receive.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/25/23, at 26 (citing N.T., 6/20/23, at 11-13, 40-41). 

Upon thorough review, the testimonial evidence supports the court’s findings, 

and we discern no abuse of discretion by the court not requiring Father’s 

approval or consent for the children to receive flu shots. See Order, 6/21/23, 

at ¶ 3.

With respect to his fourth issue, Father argues that the trial court 

violated his right to liberty under Article 1, § 1 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution, which provides:

§ 1. Inherent rights of mankind
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All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain 

inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of 

enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing 

and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own 

happiness.

Pa. Const. Art. I, § 1. Specifically, Father argues that the June 21, 2023 order 

violates his right to liberty by directing that the children sleep in a bedroom 

separate from him and the June 22, 2023 order by directing that he pay 50% 

of the parenting coordinator’s fee. Father’s Brief at 21-22. 

We conclude that this issue is waived because Father has failed to cite 

any legal authority to support his claim that the June 21 and June 22, 2023 

orders violate his constitutional rights. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119; K.N.B. v. M.D., 

259 A.3d 341, 352 n.15 (Pa. 2021) (stating that constitutional claims can be 

waived if an appellant does not develop them “in a fashion that would enable 

our review.”) Even if not waived, we would conclude that Father’s issue is 

without merit because the orders were issued after the evidentiary hearing on 

Mother’s petition and reflect the children’s best interests, as discussed above.

Father’s fifth and final issue on appeal is waived for failure to develop it. 

In his concise statement, Father contends that the court did not comply with 

the following Rules of the Code of Judicial Conduct: 1.3 (avoiding abuse of the 

Prestige of Judicial Office); 2.2 (Impartiality and Fairness); 2.3 (Bias, 

Prejudice, and Harassment); and 2.5 (Competence, Diligence, and 

Cooperation). Concise Statement at 1-2. However, in the argument section 
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of his brief, Father acknowledged that he raised the same issue in a prior 

appeal to this Court. Father’s Brief at 18; Hamaday, supra. 

In Father’s prior appeal, the panel concluded that “this Court lacks 

jurisdiction to hear any claims that the trial court violated the Code of Judicial 

Conduct.” Id. (citing Reilly v. SEPTA, 489 A.2d 1291, 1298-1299 (Pa. 1985), 

overruled on other grounds by Drake v. Pa. Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 601 

A.2d 797 (Pa. 1992); see also Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 62 

(Pa. Super. 2014) (explaining that “enforcement of the Code of Judicial 

Conduct is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court” (citing Reilly, 489 A.2d at 

1298)). In this appeal, Father declares that he “understands that it is beyond 

the jurisdiction of the Superior Court to rule on these issues and [he] will not 

address them further in this Brief.” Father’s Brief at 18. As such, Father has 

waived his final issue on appeal by failing to discuss it. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119 

(providing that the argument section of an appellate brief shall include 

discussion and citation of pertinent authorities); see also In re M.Z.T.M.W., 

163 A.3d 462, 465-466 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted) (reiterating that 

a claim is waived where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of 

the claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any 

other meaningful fashion capable of review). 

Based on our thorough review of Father’s pro se brief on appeal, the 

trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion, and the certified record, we discern no 
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abuse of discretion by the court in fashioning the June 21 and June 22, 2023 

orders. Accordingly, we affirm the orders.

Orders affirmed.

Date: 4/29/2024