Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Attorney General Eric *

H. Holder, Jr. has been substituted for former Attorney General

Michael B. Mukasey as the respondent.

Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. **

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 08-2041

ZHOU ZHENG,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL,*

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE BOARD

OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before

 Torruella, Selya and Tashima,**

Circuit Judges.

Stephanie F. Dyson and Dyson Law, P.C. on brief for

petitioner.

Michael F. Hertz, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil

Division, Terri J. Scadron, Assistant Director, and Siu P. Wong,

Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, on brief for

respondent.

June 30, 2009
 An alien ordinarily must file for asylum within one year of 1

her arrival in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B);

Pan v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 80, 84 (1st Cir. 2007). Here, however,

the immigration judge found that the petitioner qualified for the

"extraordinary circumstances" exception to this rule. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(a)(2)(D). The respondent has not challenged that

determination.

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SELYA, Circuit Judge. The petitioner, Zhou Zheng, is a

Chinese national. She seeks judicial review of a final order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that affirmed both an order

of removal and the concomitant denial of a cross-application for

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United

Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). Concluding, as we do,

that the BIA's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we

deny the petition for judicial review.

The facts are straightforward. The petitioner entered

the United States illegally in December of 1998. While living in

Massachusetts, she married and bore two children (one in 2002 and

the other in 2005).

On January 12, 2005, the petitioner applied for asylum

and withholding of removal. Following an asylum interview, 1

federal authorities denied her application and referred the matter

of her status to the immigration court. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(1)(B). Removal proceedings began.

The petitioner appeared in the immigration court on

October 24, 2006. She conceded removability but cross-applied for

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. 
All of the children mentioned in this paragraph were born in 2

China.

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The petitioner testified that, even though she was unwed

and had no children at the time, she left China in order to avoid

that country's repressive family planning restrictions. Now that

she had two children, she feared that a return to her homeland

would lead either to forcible sterilization or some disadvantage to

her children. In support, the petitioner presented affidavits from

several family members who claimed to have been subjected to

involuntary abortions or sterilization. In this regard, the

petitioner testified that her mother was forcibly sterilized

following the birth of her third child twenty-five years earlier.

She added, through testimony and other evidence, that her cousin's

wife was sterilized in 1986 after having two children; that a

different cousin's wife was sterilized in 2004 after having two

children; that her sister-in-law's husband was forcibly sterilized

in 1997 after siring two children; and that her sister was forced 2

to undergo an abortion in 2000. Finally, the government introduced

a 2005 State Department country conditions report (2005 Profile).

This compendium of evidence did not impress the

immigration judge (IJ). In his view, the petitioner had

established a genuine fear of forced sterilization, but she had

failed to establish that this subjective fear was objectively
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reasonable. Consequently, the IJ denied the petitioner's requests

for relief and ordered her removal.

The petitioner appealed to the BIA, arguing that the 2005

Profile showed that Chinese citizens returning to their homeland

were given "no special treatment" in terms of family planning

policies. She also argued that simply because American diplomats

were "unaware" of any forced sterilizations imposed upon returnees

with children born in the United States did not mean that such

incidents did not occur.

The BIA affirmed the IJ's decree in all respects. It

held that the petitioner had not presented "specific and

individualized evidence" sufficient to show that she would likely

be forced to undergo sterilization either in China generally or in

her hometown of Changle City (in Fujian Province) specifically. It

further held that the petitioner had not shown that "any economic

sanctions that may be imposed on her would rise to the level of

persecution." 

This timely petition for judicial review followed. We

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). 

In removal cases, judicial review ordinarily focuses on

the decision of the BIA. Stroni v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 82, 86 (1st

Cir. 2006). That approach obtains when the BIA has conducted an

independent evaluation of the record and rested its decision on a

self-generated rationale. See Acevedo-Aguilar v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d
 "Abstract legal propositions are reviewed de novo, with some 3

deference to the agency's reasonable interpretation of statutes and

regulations within its ken." Chhay v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 1, 5 (1st

Cir. 2008). There is no error of law apparent here.

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8, 9 (1st Cir. 2008). This is such a case. The devoir of

persuasion abides with the petitioner. See Pulisir v. Mukasey, 524

F.3d 302, 308 (1st Cir. 2008); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1); 8

C.F.R. § 208.13(a).

The applicable standard of review is the familiar

substantial evidence standard. See, e.g., Sok v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d

48, 52 (1st Cir. 2008). Absent an error of law, this "highly 3

deferential" standard results in a reversal only if the record

would compel a reasonable factfinder to reach a different outcome.

López de Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 2007);

see Pan v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 80, 85 (1st Cir. 2007). In

conducting this tamisage, a reviewing court accepts the findings of

fact on which the agency's determination rests so long as those

findings are "supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative

evidence on the record considered as a whole." INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). 

To establish eligibility for asylum, an alien must

demonstrate either past persecution or a well-founded fear of

future persecution due to race, religion, nationality, membership

in a particular social group, or political opinion. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2); see also Rivas-Mira v.
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Holder, 556 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2009). Because the petitioner does

not claim to have been the victim of past persecution, she must

prove that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution based

on one of the five statutorily protected grounds enumerated above.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1); see also Makhoul v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d

75, 79 (1st Cir. 2004). 

Proof of a well-founded fear entails a showing that the

fear is both subjectively felt and objectively reasonable. Jiang

v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2007). A well-founded fear

of forced abortion or sterilization is considered a qualifying fear

of persecution based on political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42);

Xie Mei Zheng v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2007).

The BIA concluded that the petitioner had not proven that

she had this well-founded fear of future persecution. The

petitioner demurs; she offers several reasons why the BIA's

conclusion was unsupported by substantial evidence. To her way of

thinking, the BIA misinterpreted the 2005 Profile, failed to give

adequate weight to precedent, and abused its discretion in

referring to the State Department's 2007 country conditions report

(2007 Profile) without pausing to take administrative notice

thereof. We examine these claims sequentially.

In support of her contention that the BIA did not

properly weigh the evidence, the petitioner relies heavily on the

unpublished decision in Cao v. Bureau of Citizenship and
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Immigration Services, 272 F. App'x 14 (2d Cir. 2008). In that nonprecedential opinion, see 2d Cir. R. 32.1(b), the court of appeals

remanded because the BIA had "mischaracterized" the 2005 Profile,

Cao, 272 F. App'x at 15. But Cao is, at best, only tangentially

relevant to the case at hand. The BIA's error there was casespecific, and the court of Cao's origin — the Second Circuit —

subsequently concluded that the 2005 Profile furnishes no concrete

evidence that sterilization is forced upon citizens returning to

Fujian Province with American-born children. See Shao v. Mukasey,

546 F.3d 138, 164 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that "[t]he significance

of the [2005] report is highlighted by the fact that, despite the

voluminous documentary records developed in these . . . cases, none

of the petitioners points us to evidence of any person being

forcibly sterilized on removal to China based on having two

children"); see also Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 128-129 (2d

Cir. 2005).

More importantly, the significance of Cao pales in

comparison to our own circuit precedent (which is, of course,

binding on this panel). We recently adjudicated a petition for

review embodying facts nearly identical to those presented here.

See Yen Zheng Zheng v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 70 (1st Cir. 2008).

Zheng, not Cao, is the beacon by which we must steer. See United

States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446, 1449 (1st Cir. 1991) (explaining
 The two cases are about two different (unrelated) women who 4

happen to share the same name.

 By and large the evidence presented there was stronger than 5

that presented here. For example, it included documents from

Fujian Provincial Population and Family Planning Commission and an

affidavit from an expert on Chinese population control policy.

Zheng, 546 F.3d at 71. No comparable evidence was tendered in this

case. 

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that, within a multi-panel circuit, panels ordinarily are bound by

prior panel decisions closely on point).

Zheng, like this case, involved a Chinese woman from 4

Fujian Province who was the mother of two American-born children.

546 F.3d at 71. There, as here, the alien claimed a well-founded

fear of future persecution in the form of forced sterilization.

Id. at 72. There as here, she alleged that the BIA had misread the

country conditions reports. Id. at 72-73. There, as here, the

alien relied mainly on anecdotal evidence to support her claim.5

Id. at 72. The BIA denied relief and affirmed an order of removal.

We upheld that decision, ruling that nothing in the record

compelled a contrary conclusion. Id. at 73. 

The petitioner labors to distinguish Zheng. Her most

loudly bruited claim is that the case arose in a different

procedural posture; the alien was seeking an order for

reinstatement of her appeal. See id. at 71; see also Liu v.

Mukasey, 553 F.3d 37, 39 n.1 (1st Cir. 2009) (discussing standard

of review for reinstatement of appeal). That is true, but it is

only half of the story. In Zheng, the court found expressly that
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the alien had not "establish[ed] a prima facie case for the

[granting of asylum]." 546 F.3d at 73. This was so, the court

explained, because the evidence did not call into legitimate

question the BIA's determination that, among other things, she

lacked a well-founded fear of future persecution. Id. 

This finding makes Zheng directly relevant to the instant

case. It is clear from Zheng, as we said in our earlier case, that

when an alien has adduced nothing more than "background information

[that does] not in any way shed light on this individualized

issue," nothing compels a reviewing court to overturn the decision

of the BIA. Chhay v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2008). That

principle applies four-square in the instant case.

The petitioner's other effort to distinguish Zheng is

equally unavailing. That effort centers on a boast that her proof

is more cogent because, unlike in Zheng, she corroborated her

anecdotal evidence of coercive family planning tactics. This

rodomontade misses the point: the petitioner's corroborating

evidence does not verify her asseveration that returnees with

American-born children are routinely subjected to coercive family

planning practices. Consequently, that evidence is of limited

utility. See Lin v. Holder, No. 07-1853, 2009 WL 1220783, at *5-6

(4th Cir. May 6, 2009) (unpublished). 

This brings us to the petitioner's second claim of error:

that the BIA turned a blind eye to precedent. In this regard, the
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petitioner relies on three cases: Cao, Li v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 488

F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 2007), and Yang v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 1117

(8th Cir. 2005). This reliance is mislaid. 

The fundamental flaw in the petitioner's position is that

the cited cases, whether viewed singly or in combination, do not

usurp the primacy of this court's opinion in Zheng. See Wogan, 938

F.2d at 1449. To cinch matters, none of the cited cases is

materially similar to this case. 

We previously have distinguished Cao and need not

repastinate that ground. Thus, we start with Li, which involved a

petition to review the denial of a motion to reopen. The Eleventh

Circuit's decision turned on the alien's proffer of specific

evidence anent family planning practices in her village. 488 F.3d

at 1375. So too in Yang; the court granted relief based on

particularized evidence demonstrating that Yang's and her husband's

families had been specifically targeted by government hierarchs for

forced sterilization and abortions. 427 F.3d at 1121-22. 

Evidence such as that presented in Li and Yang is

conspicuously absent from the record here. The absence of such

evidence makes a dispositive difference. 

The petitioner's final argument is different in

character. As said, the BIA based its decision to deny asylum on

information contained in the 2005 Profile and the absence of any

specific evidence showing that Chinese repatriates with American-
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born children were being forcibly sterilized or otherwise

persecuted. But the BIA also mentioned the 2007 Profile in a

footnote without formally taking administrative notice of that

report (which had not been offered into evidence before the IJ).

The petitioner asserts that the BIA's decision must be set aside

because its actions in this respect offend due process. 

We review a procedural due process claim of this type de

novo. See, e.g., Pulisir, 524 F.3d at 311; Teng v. Mukasey, 516

F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 2008). To prevail, a complainant must, among

other things, show prejudice. Pulisir, 524 F.3d at 311. In this

context, prejudice equates with a showing that "an abridgement of

due process is likely to have affected the outcome of the

proceedings." Id. 

Admittedly, it would have been preferable for the BIA

either to have eschewed any mention of the 2007 Profile or to have

taken administrative notice of it. Despite the BIA's bevue,

however, there was no apparent harm. The 2005 Profile and the 2007

Profile do not differ materially in content, see Cao, 272 F. App'x

at 16 (terming the 2005 and 2007 Profiles "largely repetitive"),

and the former document was properly before the BIA. In any event,

the 2007 Profile had nothing to do with, and thus could not have

affected the BIA's evaluation of, the petitioner's individualized

situation.
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Under these circumstances, we conclude, without serious

question, that the error neither prejudiced the petitioner nor

affected the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, it affords no

principled basis for setting aside the BIA's decision. See Shao,

546 F.3d at 168.

That ends this aspect of the matter. Because the BIA

gave consideration to the evidence as a whole, made supportable

findings, sufficiently explained its thought process, and committed

no prejudicial error in the handling of the evidence, its decision

to deny the application for asylum is perforce supported by

substantial evidence. See Chhay, 540 F.3d at 8; Pan, 489 F.3d at

87.

Given this holding, the petitioner's entreaty that we

reverse the BIA's decision to deny withholding of removal is easily

dispatched. To succeed on that claim, the petitioner had to

establish that, if repatriated, she would more likely than not face

persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(i). This standard is more demanding than the

standard for asylum. See Rodriguez-Ramirez v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d

120, 123 (1st Cir. 2005); Makhoul, 387 F.3d at 82. It follows

inexorably that because the petitioner's asylum claim fails, her

withholding of removal must fail as well.
 The petitioner withdrew her CAT claim in her reply brief. 6

Thus, we have no occasion to address that claim.

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We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated 6

above, we deny the petition for judicial review.

So Ordered.