WASIUNGTON 25, D. Ce 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN• USCIBs 

Subject a St&t9Dl.Clt. ot u.s. Poliq. 

eouroee 

UC # 000321 

Zl Aug 1952 

J7J1/7 

i:r- tr-;;. I,_ 

.13/ 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

.3. However, aince a formal et.at.cent ot u.s. pol107 aa tb1e quflllt1~ 

dOea not. appear to uiat 1n the reoorda ot USCIB0 and a1.nce the mat.tv 18 ot 

vital import.anoe 1n nat1Cll&l detmae, I auggeat the adviaabilit;r ot obtaining NSC approval ot the &tatemtnt ast. forth in Incloeure l. 

z.. · At an AFSAC Meet.ing fA1 20 June 1952 the Report. ot the u.s./U.t. 

COMSEC Ccmterenc• mmtiaaed 1n paragraph l above vu diaCWHBed. en. ot th• 

rec<111Hndaticma ot the conterence is to relaua to NATO govemmmta a number 

ot higb-aeourity c17J>tograP'110 macbin••• Betore giving it• approval to the 

report \thich 1e to be torwarded to the Joint Chiefs ot Stat d 

ot the 

8 YM41w.6~-

AFSAC it 1• incumbent upon me to proceed with the exooution ~ the AFSAC decision. Hawver, it USC approval ot Incloaun l 1s obtained, it will obvious]¥ be unneces11&17 to take the et11p propoaed by AFSAC and I will be 1n a 

poe1t1on to recanmend reciaim ot the AFSAC daois1on to bring the question 

betore Nsc via uscm. 

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Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 03-14-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
'tiP S&!Bq SR@PRH'f WOO!b\TlE!! 

Subjects Statanent ot u.s. Poll~. 

UC H 000321 

'Zl Aug 1952 

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s. With reterenoe to paragraph 4 ot Incloeure l, this paragraph i• 

d...-1 d•irable 1n the etatllDll'lt ol polic;y in viw ot the intematianal 

disou.aiGM Wd.ch U8ual:b' precede agwit upon cr,ptographic .,.tau to 

be employed in the situations and tor the purpoc1• indicated thee1n. 

6. A brief' h1eto17 ot the aubj.at mrq be ot int•reat in this caineoticn and 1a attached u Incloaure 2. 

Inoloauree - 2 

/s/ Ralph J. Canine 

RALPH J. CANINE 

Major Gen81'al, us Arrq 

Chairman, Armed Forcea Secur1ty .Agsiq C01.moil 

and 

USCIB Coordinator 

l. u.s. Poliq en Ccaaun1cat1CID8 

Security ot Foreign Govemmmta 

with which the u.s. 1• Allied 

Milit&l"l.]Jr. 

2. Br.let Hiat027 ot the Preble - COMSlm veraua COMillT • 

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UNIT~ STATES POUCY ON COMMUNICATIONS S8CURITY OF FO!WGN GOV.inlNM~TS WITH WHICH THE UNITED S'\ATE.S I§ All.TED MILITMqLl 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

l. When it 1• eddent that clueitied informaticn ot u.s. origin, 

or clu•it1ed intormatian which pert.ainll to mutual daten1e plane bet•• 

or- am:mg the u.s. and other governmtnta 1a mo1'3Pted in inaecure or.vptograJ:Mc ayatms used by th• other govermMnt• and u a COl18equance endangmos 

the u.s. Natianal S8CUl'ity1 the u.s. mq initiate such actian u is a~ 

priate to cause improvement to be made 1n the conmunicat.icn security ot 

/ tbcee other gwts, """' thous!> the\ x 

I I aetnmitil to the aiCUi"'lty ot the UoSo iiid ita &Illes ll" i'iid DY a potential m-v. U the cClllllWlicatiGM I I 

met.hods and the government employing the particu'lu cryptograpnc Q'8taD8 

ued to prot.ect the ccmnnnicat.10011 1e mgaged in ettect.ive part,1c1pat1on 

with the u.s. and ita allies in mutual det.ute matters. the ayatau will 

be ad.Judged insecure and action mil' be 1nstituted to bring about an 

improveent. 

3. In each cue in 11hich corNCtive action ie under atuc'1", et.ope 

will be take, before tuch action 111 initiated, to ueure that the ~aical 

and pencrmel security or the other government concemed are auch as to 

prevmt so tar u practicable the leakage or claseitied intormation f'rom 

tboee aourcee. 

4. ror camunicationa amcag all1ed nd.lltar;r cClll&llnda Jn tlhioh there 

ia u.s. part.1c1pat1cn and tor which th.-. baa been no pNVioua need ror 

cr,ypt.ograPdc D)'lltau but in 1li'dch there will be future requil'ements tor 

secure cc:mamicatiom, action ma)" be 1n1tiat«l by the u.s. to provide suitable means ot making such ammunieationa a•cureo 

s. Responsibility tor initiating any action• \\tdch thie policy may 

require 1• placed upc11 the Director, Al'll8d Forcee Security Agtncy1 in bi• 

capacitiu as Chairman, Arm«l P'orceo Secur1t7 Agmcy Council, and a.a Coordinator, United States Camunicat10f18 Intelligence Boardo 

Incl.oeure l vitb UC II 000321 . 

TOP 
BRI~ HISTOR? Q1' THS PROBLEM 

COMSEC VEBSUS COMINT EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL.86-36/50 USC 3605 

1. The qu•tiCl'l u to which ot two crn>tologic Upect• ot tele-communicatiana should be conaidared p&rlllOUllt to u.s. national. aecurity, 1n 

cues where u.s. cOlllllDmicaticca 1ntell1gmce (COMINT) interest• and u.s. 

caamicaticn security (COMSEC) interest• ccntllct, ha& comebefore u.s. 

authoritia a number ot timee in nemt yun but the queetioc. baa alwap 

bee CCIMidwecl in connect.ion with apeq.uic cu•: it hu '1•~been 

studied attmtiveq u a gmeral or buic iaaue. 

2. Th• qu•tioa tatered into th• dellberat.icna ot the um.tad Stat• 

c 

l\ ~trpt.mber 1948 the 5-~~ C0123idfll'Gd tb8 pl'Obl• but deo1cled tbat\it 

voul4 take noact.ion with regard .to th•""iubject brougbt.IMafon it b7 uscx:s. ---·· •.. 

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Incloeun 2 with UC II 
• EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

In the courae ot the 1952 u.s./U.K. COMSs= Contereooe in. Wuhington,.the 

Director, APSA, vu advised by the head f' the u.g;. delegat1cm that the .. Bri··.. -

t18b cabinet cana1dered COOEC paramount_ ~that the British 

delegat1cn we acting under this policy. In its tint cCllJIDWlt an the LiIB 

Jll9DONr.ldum, USCIB •et forth certain rea81"V'&t1ma and presented an altemat1ve 

•olution mich USCIB conaidend to be of "least detrimmt tol J•. 

HOW9Y81"1 the alternative aolutian 'ldU imacceptable t.o t.SIB. Atter lengtbi d111-

cuaicna, USCIB notified LSIB cxi 17 Septmber 1949 that USCIB vlthdrev its objectiou to the Brit18h plan to 118119 TtP&X to the Wutem Union nations. 

Hawevw, USCIB'• acceptance ot th• Brit18h plan vu bued upon the understandiz:lg that the TYPEX machinu to b4i issued to Wutem Union nations vould 'be 

apecitical.17 limited 1n their uae, vi•., (a) to encrypt "METRIC" cCXllllWlicaticm. c:nq, and (b) that tbeee would 18rge]3 be militaey cmrmmicaticme at 

Suprme CC1J1111Dd ad Governmental level 1n ccxmection with Weetem Union Delmae mat.ten, the latter being a llmltation 11fbich vu eacplicitq stated 1n 

the very .first paragraph ot the I.SIB mtlllOl'81ldum ot JO June 1949· 

4. Later, when the W.t.em Unian .idea a:panded into the North Atlantic 

Pact, the IUbject ot secure ccamunicati«UI tor NATO entered into the picture. 

A U.K. proposal to ia•ue the TIPE.I MARI ll to NATO cowitriea tor NATO ccmmmicatic:ma vu acc•ecl by the u.s. but 1n a mmorandum dated 19 October 1949 the 

Depa.rtmmt ot State made a reservat1cru 

"The Departmsnt ot State member ot USCIB feels that. the Britiab 

otter abould be accepted provided that the use or theee cr.rpto-material.s · is apecilical..11' llmlted to tboee military ccmmmicaticma of the a1gnat017 nations that ccmcam North Atlantic Pact de.tense matters." 

S• A short, time af'ter the use or T?PEX WU approved tor highut level 

NATO ccmmm:lcatims it vae recognized that certain purely naticnal ccmmmicaticaa at tbe same level, containing COSMIC 1ntonnaticm or retermces thereto, 

ought to be encrypted in a;ystema ot security higher than that atrorded by 

those employed by cert,ain NATO govemmants. For this reaaon permiaaion was 8J'lllt•~ to the llATO govemmcits to use the TIP.EX tor such pure]¥ naticnal. 

coaannlcat1Cll8 also, and an otter vu made to instruct the govenml9lta CCl'lcemed in the proper methoda ot ccnpillng their own naticrial k• and k•-

liata. HCJ1NVer, not; much advantage haa thus tar been takm by those govemmmt1 to receive such inatructim and to avail thei!ll8elvea ot the poes1bll1t1ea. 

6. Por intermediate or aeaend-level HATO commmicat.iona the u.s. au~­

or1t1ea late in 1949 decided to NCCl?IDll'ld auppq.ing NATO govemmenta w:l.t,h the 

CCM, a deciaicn later accepted by the u.1. authorities. However, the d1etribut1cm ot the CCM' e and the c1rcumatanaee under mi.ch they are to be ueed at 

th1a lev.l are such that it ie valid to us\JIDI that the cflllTllDicationa to be 

enCl"1J)ted w1ll be pract1caD3 all mi.lit&l"J", not diplomatic meaaagee. 

7. The preceding hiatorJ' establiahea the tact that in agreeing to provide eecure machinu tor West.em Unicn and tor NATO powers, there wu alwap 

the retaervatiCll and undentand:lng that th97 would be used tor mil1tar,y Western 

Unicn "METRIC" or tor HATO "C0SMIC11 camm.mications, and not for~ 

natianal diplanatic commmioat1ms ot 81\f ot the powers involved. 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

8. Th• question ot th• uae of μ.s. or u.x. or.ypto-machinee tor ne11-

m1litar.y caamunioat1CM ot NAt'() powsra tint ... '*19 into the picture with the 

ccna1deration ·~ the I lcuee After ~ther laigtcy ~ diacueicma bet.wen USCIB and LSIB ~ 11'1 Auguat 1948 and 1nt.erm.1ttant.~ continued until April 1949, a tormal q.s./U.K •. ocmtermce/CJn the subject vu held 

in Waahingtcn 1n May 19.51• The final report. ot the ~_...ce we considered 

b7 USCIB on 24 Ma.y 1951, at llhich t!JM it waa decided to forward the report- to 

the Natiaoal. Security CC>WJCU tor approval because/or the repercuaaions Wdch 

the reccmnendatians C)f/the ccnterence would have, 1t implE$elltecl, an u.s. I I sources. The report did not explicit~ raiae, aa a general 

or basic r•u•. the QUMti{li u to ltbicb 1• more.· //important to our naticnal 

aecurit71 _ _J in CUH vhere these rpoa~ interuts &re involved; it dealt apecit1cal]¥ with the problem ot ccmmm1cat1cn security. In forwarding the report. to NBC th1a balic iaaue vu not. raised in the 

oonr1ag lltlllOl'8ndua USCIB 14/137 • In ita deeie1cn the NSC did not rat&• ~ 

anaWI' th• queaticn, aince t.he d~m (USCIB 14/lS9) .req atatea that "the 

Presidait • •. bu this date approved th• ccmcluaicma and recaaendat.icma aontdlie4 in the report ot the USCIB-LSIB 1"8p1Wllltativea •••" 

9. Tb• BSC action in tbe I lou• Jill' van.ant. th• ocaoluaicm that. 

tb• RSC deo181an 1D that cue oan be tum u a polic;,-enting deed.don. 

Ha.ver• th• quMticm 1a ot such vital ocmccn t.o u.s. national int....te 

that. it 'lllDUl4 be bet.tv to have the deoieian m NGO.rd 1n the fOl'll ot a 

olear-cut .tataeat ot pol1q tor general gu1d&noe1 rathe than 1n the tom 

ot an impliaation der:l.vecl t.- a a1Dglft RSC aoticm in a aplCitio cue. 

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