UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 00-4555

ERIC KEITH DUNMIRE,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.

Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge.

(CR-99-124)

Submitted: January 19, 2001

Decided: February 6, 2001

Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Keith Loren Kimball, COLGAN & KIMBALL, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, James

Ashford Metcalfe, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Eric Keith Dunmire appeals the denial of his motion to suppress all

evidence against him in connection with his plea of guilty to one

count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 922(g)(1) (West 2000). We affirm. 

In reviewing a motion to suppress, we review the legal conclusions

de novo, Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996), and the

factual findings for clear error, United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868,

873 (4th Cir. 1992), taken in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir.

1998). On appeal, Dunmire argues that police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him for questioning in connection with a series of

crimes committed in the area in which he was driving, in that he had

committed no present crime or traffic offense to warrant the stop.

However, police may stop an individual briefly for questioning based

on reasonable suspicion that they are wanted in connection with prior

felonies. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985). The district court’s factual findings that Dunmire was driving evasively, late

at night, in the area where the crimes under investigation had been

committed, and that he and his vehicle matched the descriptions victims of the crimes provided police, were sufficient to justify a finding

of reasonable suspicion necessary to stop Dunmire in connection with

those prior crimes. Accordingly, we find there was reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the investigative stop of Dunmire.

Alternatively, Dunmire contends that the stop escalated into a seizure without probable cause, in that police surrounded his car and

physically blocked his ability to drive away with a police vehicle,

thereby preventing him from leaving, and questioned him for approximately ten minutes. However, this Court has previously held that

police may block a vehicle’s progress without converting a stop based

on reasonable suspicion into a seizure or arrest requiring probable

cause. United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 377 (4th Cir. 1984).

Furthermore, a defendant cannot credibly contend that the duration of

a proper stop converted the stop into an unlawful seizure where, as

here, the defendant’s own conduct delayed conclusion of the stop.

2 UNITED STATES v. DUNMIRE
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). The district

court’s findings that Dunmire was evasive and uncooperative during

his questioning indicate that the police were justified in prolonging

the investigative stop, and therefore no probable cause was required

for them to do so. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the district

court’s denial of Dunmire’s motion to suppress. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

UNITED STATES v. DUNMIRE 3