t -· 

uscm: 9.2/s 

29 October 1954 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

References: 

COMINT Capability Against Chinese Communist Communications. 

·(a} .··uscm 9.2/7 dated 25 October 1954. 

(b) USCIB 29.13/5 dated 25 October 1954. 

1. USCIB met in special session on 26 October 1954 to consider 

the ways and means of obtaining communications intelligence on Communist 

China, particularly with respect to early warning for attack on Formosa 

or the off-shore islands. 

2. With particular reference to the views presented by the 

Department of Defense Member, cx:lMINT was recognized as a major component of the national intelligence effort against Communist China 

and USCIB agreed that every possible effort must be directed toward 

solution of the Chinese Communist CDMINT problem in priority second 

only to the COMI!fr effort against Russian communications. Conclusions 

contained in references (a) and (b) above were accepted. 

3. Consideration was then given to the policy aspects of': EO 3_

3(h)(2) 

a. Obtaining U.S. COMINT base rights in Formosa. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

e. Feasibility of employment of shii;rborne intercept. 

With respect to sub-paragraphs a and b above, it was agreed that for 

COMINT reasons the recommendations contained in reference (a) to provide no significant payment except cash and certain already programmed 

equipment and training support are sound. In addition, to overlook 

the already overwhelliling payment received by the Chinese Nationalist 

Government in the form of United Nations support, protection by the 

Seventh Fleet, assistance through l.fAAG, and so forth, would be 

parochial. It was agreed, however, that there is a very real possibility that the exercise of maximum pressure on the Chinese Nationalist 

Government to satisfy these demands will be unsuccessf'ul ii' this pressure 

is not made a part of an integrated U.S. policy. 

USCIB: 9.2/8 

Declassified and approved for release bv NSA on 03-21-2014 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 

TOP SECRET FROTI I 
USCIB: 9.2/8 

'l'GP SE~ FR9':e! 

Subject: CDMINT Capability Against Chinese Cbmmunist Communications. 

--------------------------~-~-----~----

4. USCIB recognized that it is not within its competence to 

implement the conclusion reached in paragraph 3 above, but believes 

that this Government should be in a position to demand and obtain 

Formosan bases and CHIOOM COMINT on the grounds that these are 

necessary to successful continuation of existing national policy. 

If existing negotiation channels are unsuccessful, it is felt that 

necessary approaches should be made at highest Government levels. 

In the way of additional payment, the U.S. should need only recognize 

an obligation to advise the Chinese Nationalist Government promptly 

of any known Chinese Cbmmunist intentions to attack Formosa, without 

necessarily identifying or compromising the source. 

5. With respect to sub-paragraph 3c above, the three following 

possibilities should be exhaustively examined: 

a. That DOI resources can provide the assistance required 

by NSA. 

b. That the military services have unique unused resources 

whose employment can be authorized by the DOI. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

..-------------------------------PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

6. With regard to sub-paragfaphs 3d an·d··.. 3e above, it was agreed that a broad statement from USCIB ~should be paralleled by 

specific and detailed proposals f'rom the Directoi-, NSA, as formulated 

ties a I and that uscrEc should continue its $1;~ of the 

b.r hlmh l:°"cerning expansion~ OOJmlT facili-

• feasib:ity 0£ -loyment of ship..borne intercept. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

7. The following courses of action were then approved: 

a. That the National Security Council be ad'Vised through 

the Special Committee as follows: (See enclosure) 

uscm: 9.2/8 

(1) That the requirements outlined in paragraph 3 above 

exist. 

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I 

USCIB: 9.2/8 

'!'QP SEGY!a' FR0'£H 

Subject: COMINT Capability Against Chinese Communist Cormmmications. 

- --- - ~ -- ----- ---------- ------ --- --- --- (2) That the conclusions outlined in paragraphs 3 and 

4 above are considered valid and consistent with 

national policy as understood by the Boa.rd, which request~-the assurance of integrated national 

support, if required. 

(3) 

b. That the Director, Central Intelligence, be advised as 

follows: 

(l)I ..._ ____________ ........... 

.. 

(2) That USCIB recommends maximum use be made of alJ£o 3.3(h)(2) 

available resources for this purpose. / PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

c. That the military members or USCIB advise the Director, 

Central Intelligence. of any unused capabilities for dJect action 

d. That the Director, National Security Agency, be advised 

as .follows: 

(1) The U.K. is to be notified of USC]]) actions as outlined in USCIB 9.2/7 and USCIB 29.1.3/5. 

(2) 

(.3) // 

e. That USCIBEC be advised as follows: 

(1) 

USCIB: 9.2/S 

Reconnnendations contained in USCIB 9.2/7 and USCIB 

29.13/5 are approved. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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• • ~OP SEC~u:; MErl[H,:~. 1 1 1\:0 111 

USCIB: 9.2/8 

Subject: CDMINT Capability Against Chinese Communist Communications. 

- -------------------------------------- (2) USCIBEC is to supervise implementation of unfinished 

action with respect to subject problem. 

(3) USCIBEC is to continue to study in detail the problem 

of ship-borne intercept and processing as an alternate solution to the Chinese Co:nmru.nist problem. 

(4) Further policy guidance will be provided when 

received from the National Security Council. 

8. Enclosed herewith is a dra.i't of a proposed memorandum for 

the:members o~ the Special Committee for approval by the members of 

USCIB. It is requested that the members send their approval or 

comment to the office of the Executive Secretary by the close of 

business on Monday, 8 November 1954. 

Enclosure 

a/s 

USCIB: 9.2/8 

ptain, •. Navy 

ecutive Secretary, USCIB 

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• 

!OP SEeR:E'f PR02H 

HE:MORAWJUM FOR THE SPECIAL OOHMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY OOUNCIL 

FOR COMINT: 

Subject: U .s. COl.fila' Capabilities Against Chinese Communist 

Communications. 

1. The United States Communications Intelligence Doard (USCID) 

met in special session on 26 October 1954 to consider ways and means 

of obtaining adequate communications intelligence on CoillJlunist China, 

particularly with regard to early warning of an attack on Formosa or 

the off-shore islands. The following :immediate OOMINT requiremen·!;s 

were determined to exist: 

a. A need for U.S. OOMINT base rights in Formosa. 

d. 

e. A study of the J'easibility of employment of ship-borne 

/ 

EO 3.3(h)(2) EO 3.3(h)(2) 

intercept. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

2. With respect to base rights on Formosa 

, US CID agreed 

that no significant payment beyond cash and equipment already programm.ed plus training support should be made. USCIB feels that to 

overlook the already overwhelliling payment received bj the Chinese 

Uationalist Government in the form of United nations support, protection by the Seventh Fleet, assistance through MAAG, and so forth, 

would be parochial. However, it was agreed there is a very real 

Enclosure with USCnl 9.2/8 

TOP SECRET FROTH 
" 

-----------------------------------

possibility that the exercise of :maximum pressure on the Chinese 

Nationalist Government to satisfy these demands will be unsuccessful if this pressure is not made a pa.rt of an integrated U .s. policy. 

3. USCIB recognizes that it is not within its competence to 

implement the conclusion reached in paragraph 2 above, but beJi eves 

that this Government should be in a position to demand and obtailf 

from the Chinese Nationalists FoI"JllOsan bases and Chinese Coill'IDlll1is·I; 

a::>MINT on the grounds that these are necessary to successful continuation of existing national policy. If existing negotiation 

channels are unsuccessful, it is felt that necessary approaches 

should be made at highest Governmental levels. In the way of 

• additional payment, the u.s. should need only recognize an oblig~ 

tion to advise the Chinese Nationalist Government promptly or any 

knqvm. Chinese Communist intentions to attack Formosa, without 

necessarily identifying or compromising the source of such 

knowledge. 

a. That the DCI resources can provide the assistance 

required by the National Security Agency.(NSA). 

b. That the mil;i.tary services may have unique unused 

resources whose employment can be authorized by the DCI. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL.86-36/50 USC 3605 
.. .OP SE1 ~ErIPri~¥t 11«:111 

----------,. -... --------- - -- - ----- ---- 5. With regard to 

L--__ __,the feasibility of employment of ship-borne intercept, it 

was agreed that a broad statement from USCIB to the 

--------------J should be paralleled by specific a.p.d 

detailed proposals from the Director, NSA, as formulated by.him, 

,__ ______________ __.!and that USCIB/shoaj.d continue its study of the feasibility of eJI!Ployment of/ship-borne 

intercept. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

6. USCIB recommends: 

a. That the conclusions indicated in paragraphs 2 and 3 

above be considered valid and consistent with national policy and 

that it be assured of integrated national support, if required. 

(DRAFT) 

Chairman, USCIB 

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/ / / 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605