UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1271

ALAN PITTS; SENECA NICHOLSON-PITTS, 

Plaintiffs - Appellants, 

v. 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT; 

ATLANTA HOME OWNERSHIP CENTER; JENNIFER HARRY; HMB, INC.; 

DANNY BRIAN; HAMILTON BARKSDALE; ROBERT SCOTT; O’BRIAN LAW 

FIRM; KERMIT THOMSON; FAYE THOMPSON; SUBSTITUTE TRUSTEE,

INC.; SUSAN BENOIT; LORI ANN RENN; CYNTHIA ABBOTT; VANCE 

COUNTY REGISTER OF DEEDS; INVESTOR’S TITLE COMPANY; 

LAWYER’S MUTUAL; WAYNE STEPHENSON; THE LAW FIRM OF 

HUTCHENS, SENTER & BRITTON, PA; RICHARD D. MEADOR; DONALD 

W. GUPTON; DONALD SCOTT CARROLL; THREE JOHN DOE WHITE MALES 

RESIDING AT 908 CROSS CREEK RD. HENDERSON, NC; CAPITAL 

MORTGAGE CORPORATION; CHASE MANHATTAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION; 

CHASE HOME FINANCIAL, LLC; VANCE COUNTY CLERK OF THE 

SUPERIOR COURT; RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF NORTH CAROLINA BAR 

ASSOCIATION; JENNIFER A. PORTER; RONALD G. BAKER, SR.; 

SHERRY PENDERGRASS ROSS; ROCKY ROSS, 

Defendants - Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, 

Chief District Judge. (5:12-cv-00072-D) 

Submitted: October 28, 2013 Decided: November 5, 2013

Before WILKINSON, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 
2

Alan Pitts, Seneca Nicholson-Pitts, Appellants Pro Se. Matthew 

Fesak, Assistant United States Attorney, Seth Morgan Wood, 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina; 

Paul J. Stainback, Henderson, North Carolina; James Scott 

Flowers, HUTCHENS, SENTER & BRITTON, Fayetteville, North 

Carolina; James K. Pendergrass, Jr., PENDERGRASS LAW FIRM, 

Raleigh, North Carolina; Julie Baxter Bradburn, Kristen 

Yarbrough Riggs, WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE, PLLC, Raleigh, 

North Carolina; Ronald H. Garber, BOXLEY, BOLTON, GARBER & 

HAYWOOD, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina; Grady L. Balentine, Jr., 

Special Deputy Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellees. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
3

PER CURIAM: 

Alan Pitts and Seneca Nicholson-Pitts (collectively, 

“Pitts”) appeal the district court’s order dismissing their 

civil action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organizations Act (“RICO Act”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c)-(d), 

1964(c) (2006), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985(3), the Fair 

Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2006), and North 

Carolina state law. We affirm. 

The district court granted a motion for summary 

judgment and the motions to dismiss filed by various Defendants 

on the basis that Pitts’ claims under federal law were subject 

to dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief could be granted. Pitts challenges 

this ruling on appeal. We review a district court’s dismissal 

under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, “assuming all well-pleaded, 

nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint to be true.” 

Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 391 (4th Cir. 2011). 

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint 

must allege facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above 

the speculative level, thereby nudging [the plaintiffs’] claims 

across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and alteration omitted). 

Pitts’ allegations fail to state a plausible claim for 

relief under the RICO Act because he did not allege facts 
4

sufficient to show that the Defendants identified engaged in or 

conspired to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity. 

See US Airline Pilots Ass’n v. Awappa, LLC, 615 F.3d 312, 317 

(4th Cir. 2010) (listing the elements of a civil claim under the 

RICO Act); Anderson v. Found. for Advancement, Educ. and Emp’t 

of Am. Indians, 155 F.3d 500, 505 (4th Cir. 1998) (addressing 

the showing needed to meet the “pattern” requirement); Menasco, 

Inc. v. Wasserman, 886 F.2d 681, 683-84 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting 

that the predicates alleged must amount to or pose a threat of 

continued criminal activity and that the circumstances of the 

fraudulent acts that form an alleged pattern of racketeering 

activity must be pled with specificity). 

Pitts also invoked 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 

1985(3) as bases for relief. Pitts’ allegations, however, fail 

to state a plausible claim for relief under § 1981 because he 

did not allege facts sufficient to show that the Defendants 

identified intentionally discriminated against him on the basis 

of race concerning any of the activities enumerated in 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981(a)-(b). See Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 165 F.3d 

1015, 1018 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that a § 1981 action must be 

“founded on purposeful, racially discriminatory actions”); 

Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 

1087 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (listing the elements of a 

claim for relief under § 1981). 
5

We conclude that Pitts’ allegations fail to state a 

plausible basis for relief under § 1983. As to Defendants 

Cynthia Abbott, the Vance Country Register of Deeds, the Vance 

County Clerk of the Superior Court, Investors Title Insurance 

Company, HMB Inc., Substitute Trustee Inc., Hamilton Barksdale, 

Danny Brian, Susan Benoit, and Lori Renn, the complaint does not 

allege facts establishing any basis for concluding these 

Defendants deprived Pitts of a right, privilege, or immunity 

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 

See Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 

145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998) (listing the elements of a 

claim for relief under § 1983). As to Defendants O’Brian Law 

Firm, Robert Scott, and the “Three John Doe White Males,” the 

complaint does not allege facts establishing any basis for 

concluding that these Defendants took action fairly attributable 

to the state. See Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 

(4th Cir. 2001) (noting that the deeds of ostensibly private 

organizations and individuals may be treated as having occurred

under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 if “there is 

such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action 

that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of 

the State itself” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

We conclude that Pitts’ allegations also fail to state 

a plausible basis for relief under § 1985(3). Pitts did not 
6

allege facts sufficient to show the existence of a meeting of 

the minds between or among the identified Defendants to deprive 

him of his right to equal enjoyment of rights secured by all. 

See Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 196-97 (4th Cir. 2009)

(listing the elements of a civil conspiracy claim under 

§ 1985(3)); Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1377 (4th Cir. 1995)

(noting that conclusory allegations of a conspiracy are 

insufficient to support a § 1985(3) claim). We conclude further

that Pitts’ allegations fail to state any plausible basis for 

relief under the FHA, as they amount to no more than legal 

conclusions that certain Defendants violated his right to fair 

housing. 

We also note that Pitts’ informal appellate briefs do 

not present specific arguments challenging as error the district 

court’s rulings declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over his claims under state law and dismissing those claims 

without prejudice once it determined that he failed to state 

claims for relief under the federal statutes invoked. 

Accordingly, Pitts has forfeited appellate review of these 

rulings. 4th Cir. R. 34(b); Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 

Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2009); Williams v. Giant Food 

Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 430 n.4 (4th Cir. 2004). 

Finally, Pitts claims on appeal that the district 

court erred in dismissing his case without holding an 
7

evidentiary hearing and in granting the motion for summary 

judgment before he had an opportunity to respond to it. Pitts, 

however, does not explain why or how the district court’s 

failure to hold an evidentiary hearing warrants vacautur of its 

judgment. Moreover, although the district court dismissed 

Pitts’ action four days before the expiration of the 

twenty-one-day period under the court’s local rules for filing a 

response to the summary judgment motion, we conclude that any 

error in this regard was harmless within the meaning of Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 61 (directing courts to “disregard all errors and 

defects” in a proceeding that do not “affect any party’s 

substantial rights”), as Pitts does not explain how he was 

prejudiced by the court’s timeframe. 

Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis and grant Pitts’ motion seeking leave to file his

reply brief out of time, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment. We deny Pitts’ motion to schedule oral argument and 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED