/Security Policy 

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tet. NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 

January 21, 1967 

Dear Don: 

This is in regard to our discussion several weeks ago 

in which you informed me of the forthcoming report of the 

PSAC panel on space research which included extensive 

material dealing with the relation of the MOL program to 

the APOLLO Applications program of NASA. Subsequently, 

several members of the MOL program office have informed 

 me of conversations with NASA people regarding the contents 

 of this report. The sum of this information leads me to 

 believe that the forthcoming report may pose serious 

 problems in maintaining MOL security. 

Although there is no reason why possible NASA use of 

 the MOL launch vehicle and laboratory module hardware should 

 not be openly considered, I am concerned that the PSAC panel 

 report may stimulate public and Congressional discussion of 

 the MOL program as a whole. As you know, we have been 

 referring, even in Secret level briefings, to the reconnaissance 

 mission equipment of the MOL as "classified military experi- 

 ments." Further, we have not provided a DOD cover program 

 of military experiments unrelated to the primary reconnais1- sance mission. I believe it is essential that the PSAC 

 panel report reflect this same approach to the "experiments" 

 in the MOL program. As you will recall, we did brief a 

 properly cleared subgroup of the panel on the primary mission 

 of the MOL; Dr. Steininger and Dr. Golovin of your staff are 

 also fully informed as to the details of the program. 

An important point to be considered in any open compari- 

 sons of the NASA APOLLO Applications and MOL programs is 

 that the NASA "earth sensing" experiments are essentially 

1== indistinguishable from reconnaissance activities. Thus, 

if great care is not taken in the wording of the report 

 (which I understand is to be published in unclassified form), 

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it will be possible for the reader to infer that the panel 

report officially acknowledges that the MOL program is also 

an earth sensing (i.e. reconnaissance) program. Although 

such speculations have been made continuously in the press 

about MOL (and equally about o.Lher DOD space programs), the 

policies on overhead reconnaissance of denied territory which 

are implemented by BYEMAN security control have been successful in maintaining official Government silence on the 

existence of our reconnaissance programs, in addition to 

protecting technical and operational information relating 

to such programs. These policies were recently reaffirmed 

by the MAN 156 Ad Hoc Committee. 

In light of the factors discussed above, I would urge 

that the panel report be carefully reviewed and edited to 

assure that the material relating to the MOL program, 

separately and in association with the APOLLO Applications 

program, is treated in a manner consistent with the spirit 

and intent as well as the letter of BYEMAN security requirements. I would be pleased to assist you in any way possible 

in carrying out such a review. 

Sincerely, 

o,e 

Alexander H. Flax 

E -Iorable Donald F. Hornig 

Special Assistant to the President 

The White House 

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