USCIB: 13.1/7 HA:HBJ:a!i VIA OCJ iI!ff 6ll:ANNmB ONl:.¥ 

lS May 1955 

'POP SEi0Ri!l'i' 

~ORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Personnel Security Standards. 

Reference: CIB # 000119 of 5 May 1955 (distributed to Bo2rd and 

Executive Committee Members only). 

1. Vote sheet results on the reference were as follows: 

STATE: 

--

"It is felt that the general problem of personnel security 

which is raised here is too complicated to merit innnedfate 

approval of recommendations (a), (b) and (c) without critical 

examination of the entire problem and or the efficacy or these 

specific steps in relation to it. Such an examination should 

be based on mutual consideration by all member agencies, rather 

than on the more limited examination in reconunendation (d). 

"It is suggested that this problem be ref"erred initially to 

the Security Committee for examination and recommendation as to 

the usefulness and character of an exhaustive survey. 11 

DEFENSE: 

11 It is suggested that: 

1. Before any changes are made in present USCIB 

personnel security policies, the Director, NSA be requested to 

report to USCIB on the following: 

a. His estimate of the total damage to the U. S. 

COMINT effort of the Petersen case. 

b. His comments on present COMINT personnel security 

policies and practices, particularly as to their 

adequacy to protect U. S. COMINT techniques and 

successes. 

c. Any reconunendations he may desire to make for 

improving these security policies and practices. 

2. That USCIB, after examining the NSA report 1 then 

.Q..ecide whether or not to review the entire USCIB personnel 

security policy or make changes in that policy. 11 

USCIB: 13.1/7 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-20-2014 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 

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24 
USCIB: 13 .1/7 

'l'0P SB0Riff 

Subject: Personnel Security Standards. 

AIR FORCE: 

"It is agreed that a review of present COMINT clearance 

procedures and policies may be in order. The proposal to 

interrogate six additional investigative references is not 

considered practicable, however. Nor is it believed 

desirable to utilize polygraph methods for the screening 

of military individuals. Inasmuch as it is proposed to 

study USCIB Directive No. 5 with a view to possible revision 

and since this will be of concern to the USAF, participation 

by the Air Force in this study is desired. It is recommended that action relative to CIB #000119 be assigned to 

USCIB SECCCM." 

NAVY: 

"Recommend that ad hoc committee make study and submit 

report for consideration before ~ other specific steps are 

ta.ken. 11 

CIA: 

"This Agency will be glad to designate a representative 

to sit on the ad hoc coJIDilittee mentioned in par. ?(d). 11 

NSA: 

- "Desire paper be considered at next regular meeting. 11 

FBI: 

11Request receive further consideration in committee." 

~: 

11Para 7 (b), line 3 - Add 'an NAC and' after the word 

lea.st. 11 

2. In view of the comment by the Defense and NSA Members and after 

further consultation with their representatives it appears that discussion at USCIB would be desirable before undertaking Cormnittee study of 

the problems raised by the reference. 

U5CIB: 13 ,l/7 - 2 -

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. " 

USCIB: 13 .1/7 

!OP SBSBE.r 

Subject: Personnel Security Standards. 

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J. Accordingly, the reference together with the above connnents 

thereon will be scheduled for discussion at the June meeting of USCIB. 

USCIB: 13.1/7 

a tain, U. • Navy .,,..._,~ti ve Secretary, USCIB 

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