IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

KATELIN NEWMAN

, Plaintiff/Appellant

,

v.

CORNERSTONE NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY dba FREEDOM

NATIONAL INSURANCE SERVICES

, Defendant/Appellee

.

No. 1 CA

- CV13

- 0082

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2011

- 099023
The Honorable David O. Cunanan

, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Warnock, MacKinlay, & Carman, PLLC

, Phoenix By Brian R. Warnock and Krista M. Carman Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Elardo , B ragg , A ppell & R ossi, P.C.

, Phoenix By John A. Elardo and Amanda Nelson

C ounsel for Defendant/AppelleeNEWMAN v. CORNERSTONE Opinion of the Court

2 OPINION

Judge Jon W. Thompson deliver ed the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Margaret H. Downie joined.

T H O M P S O N

, Judge:

¶1 This opinion address es whether a premium price is required on a written offer of underinsured (UIM) motorist coverage p ursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 20

- 259.01(B) (Supp. 2012). 1 Plaintiff Katelin Newman (Newman) appeals from the trial court’s judgment in favor of Cornerstone National Insurance Company (Cornerstone)

. W e affirm , holding no premium price is required for a written offer of UIM coverage to be valid

.

1 Section 20

- 259.01(B), regulating offers of UIM, reads in pertinent part:

Every insurer writing automobile liability o r motor vehicle liability policies shall also make available to the named insured thereunder and shall by written notice offer the insured and at the request of the insured shall include within the policy underinsured motorist coverage which
extends to and covers all persons insured under the policy, in limits not less than the liability limits for bodily injury or death contained within the policy. The selection of limits or rejection of coverage by a named insured or applicant on a form approved by the di rector shall be valid for all insureds under the policy.

The background and legislative history of uninsured motorist (UM) and underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage in Arizona can be found in Ballesteros v. American Standard Ins. Co. of Wisconsin , 226 Ariz . 345, 346, ¶ 8, 248 P.3d 193, 194 (2011).NEWMAN v. CORNERSTONE Opinion of the Court

3 ¶2 In May 2011, Newman was seriously injured in an

auto mobile accident

. The policy limits of both her own insurance and the adverse party’s insurance were insufficient to cover the loss. Newman sough t payment of UIM benefits from her insurer Cornerstone. Cornerstone rejec ted the UIM claim

, relying on a waiver form declining UIM coverage Newman had signed in 2010

. Newman filed suit against

Cornerstone and sought partial summary judgment asserting
Cornerstone’s UIM coverage “offer” was deficient under A.R.S. § 20

- 259.01(B) in that it lacked a premium price. Cornerstone filed a cross

motion for summary judgment on the basis that Newman had waived
UIM benefits. The trial court , relying primarily on Garcia v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona

, found for Cornerstone and against Newman. See 191 Ariz. 410, 956 P.2d 537 (App. 1998). Final judgment was entered and Newman timely appealed.

¶3 Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) allows a trial court to

ent er summary judgment when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” We review a summary judgment determination de novo, viewing
the facts and inferences drawn from those facts in the light most favo rable to the party against whom judgment was entered. Brookover v. Roberts Enters., Inc. , 215 Ariz. 52, 55, ¶ 8, 156 P.3d 1157, 1160 (App. 2007). We will affirm summary judgment if it is correct for any reason. City of Tempe v.
Outdoo r Sys., Inc. , 201 Ariz. 106, 111, ¶ 14, 32 P.3d 31, 36 (App. 2001).

¶4 Newman asser ts that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment for Cornerstone. She argues that t o comply with A.R.S. § 20

- 259.01 the insurer must “make available” and “offer” UIM coverage, which she argues must necessarily include providing definite

terms such as a premium quote in the blank space provided on the form approved by the Arizona Department of Insurance. To this end, Newman

cites

, generally, to Tallent v. National Gen. Ins. Co.

, 185 Ariz. 266, 915 P.2d 665 (1996) and Ballesteros , 226 Ariz. 345, 248 P.3d 193

, and

, more specifically

, to Melendez v. Hallmark Ins. Co. , 232 Ariz. 327, 305 P.3d 392 (App. 2013) (holding insurer’s UIM offer was ineffectual when it offered no premium price and was on a form that failed to comply with Department of Insurance guidelines ) (depublished by order of the Arizona Supreme Court August 27, 2013)

.

¶5 Cornerstone, in response, asserts that no Arizona statute or
case law requires the insurer to include the premium price in the offer

. It
further notes that w hile A.R.S. § 20

– 259.01 does not require insure rs to use forms approved by the Department of Insurance

, its use of an approvedNEWMAN v. CORNERSTONE Opinion of the Court

4 form is considered conclusive evidence it complied with the statute. See
Ballesteros , 226 Ariz. at 350, ¶ 21, 248 P.3d at 198. For these reasons, Cornerstone asserts that the trial court correctly granted it judgment. We

agree.

¶6 S tatutory interpretation is a question of law that we review
de no vo. People's Choice TV Corp. v. City of Tucson , 202 Ariz. 401, 403, ¶ 7, 46 P.3d 412, 414 (2002). Where the statutory language is clear, we hold to the plain meaning of its terms. Rineer v. Leonardo , 194 Ariz. 45, 46, ¶ 7, 977 P.2d 767, 768 (1999). As “ [o] ur goal in interpreting statutes is to fulfill the intent and purpose of the legislatu re ” we look first to the plain language
of the statute “ as the most reliable indicator of its meaning.” Garden Lakes Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Madigan , 204 Ariz. 238, 241, ¶ 14, 62 P.3d 983, 986 (App. 2003) ; New Sun Bus. Park, LLC v. Yuma Cnty. , 221 Ariz. 43, 46, ¶ 12, 209 P.3d 179, 182 (App. 2009). The plain language of A.R.S. § 20

- 259 .01 does not require insurers to provide a UIM premium quote as part of the offer
of co verage to insureds. The statute merely requires insurers to “make available” by “written offer” UIM coverage in an amount not less than the liability limits for bodily injury or death

. See A.R.S. § 20

- 259.01(B); Tallent

, 185 Ariz. at 266, 915 P.2d at 666

.

¶7 Courts ar e “not at liberty to rewrite [a] statute under the guise of judicial interpretation.” State v. Patchin , 125 Ariz. 501, 502, 610 P.2d 1062, 1063 (App. 1980) . Rather, “[t]he choice of appropriate wording rests with the Legislature.” City of P hoenix v. Butler , 110 Ariz. 160, 162, 515 P.2d 1180, 1182 (1973). The statute is very specific regarding what the
offer must contain and we will not s ubstitute our judgment by imposing any additional statutory requirements. See Tallent , 185 Ariz. at 268, 915 P.2d at 667 (“[w]e find nothing in [A.R.S. § 20

– 259.01] justifying the imposition of this additional requirement. If the legislature desires such an addition, it may create one.”) ; Ballesteros , 226 Ariz. at 349, ¶ 17, 248 P.3d at 197 ( “[i]f the legisl ature desires to add such a requirement, it may do so . .

. but it is not ou r place to rewrite the statute ”)

.

¶8 Likewise, the case law cited by Newman interpreting A.R.S. § 20

- 259.01 does not require the inclusion of a premium quote to satisfy
the “offer” r equirement of the statute. Our supreme court in Tallent used the plain meaning of “ offer ” : “[t]o bring to or before; to present for acceptance or rejection; to hold out or proffer; to make a proposal to; to exhibit something that may be taken or received or not” after finding the
word “ offer” in A.R.S. § 20

- 259.01 to be so unambiguous that there was no

“ need to determine what the legislature intended by using that term. ”

185 Ariz. at 267

- 68 , 915 P.2d at 66 6

- 6 7 (citations omitted). The supremeNEWMAN v. CORNERSTONE Opinion of the Court

5 court held that the insurer’s written notice to the insured was a sufficient offer of UIM coverage despite the notice’s lack of explanation of the
benefit because :

The imposition of a requirement for an explanation of coverage is, we believe, both unwarran ted by the statute and

unwise

. . . The statute requires an offer of UIM coverage

not a treatise on UIM coverage. National's form certainly seems sufficient to cause any insured or potential insured who has questions about the meaning of UM or UIM

coverag es to ask for an explanation.

Id. at 268, 915 P.2d at 667.

¶9 The Ballesteros c ase similarly provides no basis for holding an insurer's offer must list the premium to be charged for UIM coverage. See 226 Ariz. at 346

– 47, ¶¶ 1, 6, 248 P.3d at 194

– 95. In Ballesteros , the supreme court examined whether UM coverage offered by way of an English language form to a Spanish speaker constituted a valid offer to make such coverage available. Id. The court concluded the notice was sufficiently clear that a reason able reader would understand that coverage was being offered that, “ if accepted, would bind the insurer to provide the offered coverage. ” Id. at 349, ¶ 11, 248 P.3d at 196.

¶10 As noted by the trial court, this court has also examined the “offer” component of A.R.S. § 20

- 259.01. 2 In Garcia , we held that Farmer s made a valid UIM offer where there was no premium quote and Farmer s

2 Given this result, we need not expound at length as to h ow contracts may be entered even without enumerated price terms. See

, e.g. , Goodman v. Physical Res. Eng'g, Inc. , 229 Ariz. 25, 27, ¶ 7 , 270 P.3d 852, 854 (App. 2011); Banner Health v. Medical Sav. Ins. Co. , 216 Ariz. 146, 163 P.3d 1096 (App. 2007) ( price terms were supplied by the hospitals' rates filed wit h Department of Health Services). P remium amount s are presumably ascertainable by reference to the Underwriting Rules and Rate Manual once the coverage limits are selected. In the course of this litigat ion,
Cornerstone disclosed its rate manual and the rate of UIM /UM coverage to Newman.NEWMAN v. CORNERSTONE Opinion of the Court

6 had pre

- selected the coverage amount for the insureds. 3 191 Ariz. at 412, ¶ 19, 956 P.2d at 539. We found: “ Farmers adequately offered UIM coverage. The election form did ‘bring before’ and ‘hold out’ to the Garcias that UIM coverage was available. The form referred to the applicable limits and indicated how the Garcias could change their policy. Nothing more is required under Tal lent

. ” Id. Garcia did not require a premium quote to fulfill the statutory requirements , and we similarly find

no basis for requiring it here. Cornerstone’s offer of UIM coverage to Newman satisfied the requirements of A.R.S. § 20

- 259.01. 4

3 That the notice did not contain a premium quote was an issue made clear in the dissent by Judge Fidel. See Garcia , 191 Ariz. 412, ¶ 29, 956 P.2d

539.

4 Alth ough we have reached the merits of the offer

, we note that it is undisputed that Newman signed the UIM waiver form on December 16,

2010

, and that the form used by Cornerstone was approved by the

D epartment of I nsurance in 2007. The Ballesteros court held:

After passage of the 1992 amendment, if an insurer provides and the insured signs a DOI

– approved UM/UIM selection form, the insurer has satisfied the statutory requirement to “make available” and “by written notice offer” UM/UIM coverage. Senate Committee Minutes 9 (“[T]he insurance agent can use a form approved by the Director of the Department of Insurance to satisfy [§ 20

– 259.01].”); Fa ct Sheet (noting that § 20

– 259.01 “is satisfied if the insured signs a form approved by the Department of Insurance stating the amount of coverage desired”).

226 Ariz. at 350, ¶ 21, 248 P.3d at 198.NEWMAN v. CORNERSTONE Opinion of the Court

7 ¶11 For the above stated reasons, w e decline to extend the “offer” requirements of A.R.S. § 20

- 259 .01 beyon d the statutory language
enacted by our legislature and beyond the bounds laid out by our case law. A premium quot e is not a required term for a valid offer of UIM

coverage.

¶12 The trial court ’s judgment is affirmed.