MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

Douglas M. Grimes

Douglas M. Grimes, PC

Gary, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES

Clorius L. Lay

Gary, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

American Federation of State, 

County & Municipal Employees, 

Council 62, Local 4009 AFL-CIO, 

and the Executive Branch of the City 

of Gary, Indiana,

Appellants-Defendants,

v.

Gary Police Civil Service 

Commission and its 

Administrator, Angela Brown,

Appellees-Plaintiffs.

March 11, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A04-1507-PL-1017

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court.

The Honorable Michael N. Pagano, 

Special Judge.

Cause No. 45D09-1405-PL-70

Shepard, Senior Judge

[1] The Gary Police Civil Service Commission and its administrator Angela Brown

prevailed on summary judgment after the American Federation of State, 

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County & Municipal Employees failed to respond to the motion. Seven 

months later, AFSCME filed a motion for relief from judgment. The trial court 

denied the motion, and we affirm. 

Issue

[2] The sole issue for review is whether the court abused its discretion in denying 

AFSCME’s motion for relief from judgment.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2006, the Gary Police Civil Service Commission hired Angela Brown to be

its administrator. Subsequently, a dispute arose as to whether Brown’s job was 

covered by union rules. On May 1, 2013, the Commission and Brown sued 

AFSCME and the Executive Branch of the City of Gary, seeking injunctive 

relief to prevent removal of Brown from her job.

[4] Over the next year, the case shifted from court to court in Lake County as 

various judges recused. On May 14, 2014, the Honorable Michael N. Pagano 

became special judge. He ordered a status conference for July 7, 2014, and 

directed the parties to file their documents with the Lake County Clerk 

electronically rather than on paper. AFSCME did not appear at the July 7 

conference.

[5] On August 5, 2014, the Commission and Brown electronically filed a motion 

for summary judgment. AFSCME did not respond, so on September 24, 2014, 

the Commission and Brown electronically filed a motion for entry of judgment. 

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There was no response from AFSCME. On October 10, 2014, the Commission 

and Brown again requested judgment. On October 14, 2014, the trial court 

granted the motion for summary judgment, enjoining the City of Gary and 

AFSCME from enforcing provisions of the collective bargaining agreement 

against Brown.

[6] On May 8, 2015, AFSCME moved for relief from judgment. The Commission 

and Brown responded, and the trial court held oral argument, after which it 

denied AFSCME’s motion.

Discussion and Decision

[7] AFSCME claims it was entitled to relief from judgment. Indiana Trial Rule 

60(B) provides, in relevant part:

On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve

a party or his legal representative from a judgment, including a 

judgment by default, for the following reasons:

* * * *

(8) any reason justifying relief from the operation of the 

judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs 

(1), (2), (3), and (4).1

[8] A movant requesting relief under subsection (8) must demonstrate a meritorious 

claim or defense. Id. In addition, a party seeking relief under subsection (8)

1 In its motion for relief from judgment, AFSCME also requested relief under Trial Rule 60(B), subsections 

(1), (6), and (7). AFSCME has not presented any argument related to those subsections on appeal, so we do

not address them.

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must show that its failure to act is not merely due to an omission involving 

mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect. Weppler v. Stansbury, 694 N.E.2d 1173 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Instead, relief under subsection (8) is reserved for cases in 

which extraordinary circumstances justify extraordinary relief. McIntyre v. 

Baker, 703 N.E.2d 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). We review a trial court’s ruling on 

a Rule 60(B)(8) motion for abuse of discretion. Outback Steakhouse v. Markley, 

856 N.E.2d 65 (Ind. 2006).

[9] AFSCME first says that the court should have allowed it to pursue discovery 

and should have held an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the motion. In its 

motion for relief, AFSCME neither requested permission to pursue discovery 

nor requested an evidentiary hearing. Moreover, AFSCME did not attempt to 

submit evidence at the oral argument. The court cannot have abused its 

discretion in failing to grant relief that AFSCME did not request.

[10] Next, AFSCME asserts it was entitled to relief because it did not receive the 

motion for summary judgment and was denied the opportunity to issue 

discovery requests. It is apparent that AFSCME did not receive the motion 

because its counsel had not registered with the Lake County Clerk to participate 

in e-filing. In its May 14, 2014 order (which was sent by mail but which 

AFSCME claimed not to have received), Judge Pagano ordered the parties to 

file documents electronically. In addition, the Commission and Brown’s 

counsel telephoned AFSCME’s counsel after the July 7, 2014 status conference

(which AFSCME did not attend) and informed him that the parties would be 

required to file all documents “electronically.” Appellees’ App. p. 18. Thus, 

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AFSCME was informed before the Commission and Brown filed their motion 

for summary judgment that it was necessary to participate in e-filing, yet

AFSCME’s counsel did not register with the Lake County Clerk until 

November 8, 2014, after judgment had been granted.

[11] As to discovery requests, AFSCME has not explained what information it 

expected to gather through discovery. The case was filed in May 2013, so 

AFSCME had two years to evaluate any discovery needs and should have been 

able to tell Judge Pagano why discovery was necessary. These facts do not 

present extraordinary circumstances justifying relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(8).

[12] Finally, the Commission and Brown correctly observe that AFSCME has not 

articulated any defense to the merits of their complaint for injunctive relief. See 

Seleme v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 982 N.E.2d 299 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (no abuse 

in denying Rule 60(B) motion where plaintiff failed to raise meritorious 

defense), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[13] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[14] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.

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