UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-2113

JANET BEASLEY; GORDON BEASLEY,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

RED ROCK FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony J. Trenga, 

District Judge. (1:12-cv-01312-AJT-TRJ; 1:13-cv-00206-AJT-TRJ)

Submitted: July 18, 2014 Decided: September 9, 2014

Before MOTZ and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ernest P. Francis, ERNEST P. FRANCIS, LTD., Arlington, Virginia, 

for Appellants. Virginia M. Sadler, JORDAN COYNE LLP, Fairfax, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

In this case under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act 

(the FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p, the plaintiffs-appellants 

raise numerous allegations of error that they contend should be 

resolved in their favor. Having carefully reviewed the briefs, 

the record, and the relevant law, we conclude that each is

without merit. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

At all times relevant to this case, husband and wife, 

Gordon and Janet Beasley (the Beasleys), owned a home in the 

Princeton Woods Addition neighborhood, located in Dumfries, 

Virginia. The home is subject to a declaration of covenants, 

conditions, and restrictions administered by the Princeton Woods 

Addition Homeowners Association, Inc. (the HOA). In October 

2008, the HOA, through its collection agent Reese Broome, PC, 

notified the Beasleys by letter that they owed the HOA a total 

of $685.00 in unpaid assessments, late fees, and legal fees. 

Additionally, the letter stated that unless the Beasleys 

disputed the debt or made payment in full within thirty days 

after receipt of the letter, the HOA would accelerate the 

Beasleys’ account through the end of the year and record a lien 

on their home. The Beasleys periodically continued to receive 

similar letters from Reese Broome, PC, on behalf of the HOA, 
3

with the last letter from Reese Broome, PC, dated March 17, 

2011.

The Beasleys claim they brought their HOA account current 

in 2008 and dispute any and all alleged delinquencies in their 

HOA account after that time. In 2009, the HOA revoked the 

Beasleys’ HOA privileges, such as use of the neighborhood pool, 

for failure to keep their HOA account current. 

In January 2012, the HOA switched collection agents from 

Reese Broome, PC, to Red Rock Financial Services, LLC (Red 

Rock). Red Rock’s first letter to the Beasleys on behalf of the 

HOA is dated January 23, 2012, stating the Beasleys’ current HOA 

account balance as $1,373.36. The letter also stated that if 

the Beasleys chose not to pay their account in full within 

thirty days from the date of the letter, “the [HOA] will refer 

the matter to counsel for appropriate legal action, including 

filing a Memorandum of Assessment Lien on behalf of [the HOA] in 

the Prince William Circuit Clerk’s Office without further 

notice.” (J.A. 445). In a letter dated March 12, 2012, from 

Red Rock to the Beasleys’ attorney, Red Rock reported the 

Beasleys’ HOA account balance as $1,458.90.

On May, 25, 2012, the HOA filed a “Memorandum of Assessment 

Lien” in Prince William County, Virginia on the Beasleys’

Princeton Woods home, asserting the Beasleys owed the HOA a 

total of $1,902.82, consisting of $307.36 in unpaid assessments, 
4

$23.46 in late fees and interest, and $1,572.00 in “Collection 

and Attorney Fees and Costs.” (J.A. 459). Of relevance in the 

present appeal, in a letter dated May 30, 2012, Red Rock

informed Janet Beasley that “Red Rock Financial Services may 

proceed with foreclosure no sooner than the 61st day from the 

mailing of the Memorandum of Assessment Lien if [the] debt is 

not satisfied.” (J.A. 450). Red Rock contemporaneously sent a 

separate, but identical letter to Gordon Beasley.

The Beasleys subsequently brought the present action solely

against Red Rock, alleging Red Rock’s collection efforts on 

behalf of the HOA violated numerous provisions of the FDCPA.1 

The Beasleys sought a total of $98,000.00 in damages, plus 

reasonable attorney’s fees, prejudgment interest, and costs. 

Following discovery, Red Rock stipulated to violating the FDCPA 

in an unspecified manner and to the Beasleys’ entitlement to 

$1,000.00 each in statutory damages. Shortly thereafter, the 

case went to trial, with the district court granting judgment as 

a matter of law in favor of Red Rock at the close of all 

evidence on ten out of the eleven counts alleged. According to 

the district court, the Beasleys had either failed to produce 

 1 The Beasleys actually filed separate, but identical 

complaints, which were consolidated for discovery and trial

purposes. For ease of understanding, we treat them as being in 

one action in this opinion.
5

sufficient evidence of any FDCPA violation in counts I through X

or had failed to produce sufficient evidence that they had 

suffered any actual damages as a result of any violations 

claimed in those counts. 

In the lone remaining count, the Beasleys alleged that each 

of them was entitled to recover for actual damages which each of 

them had sustained as a result of Red Rock violating 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692e(5), which statutory section provides:

[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive or 

misleading representation or means in connection with 

the collection of any debt. Without limiting the 

general application of the foregoing, the following 

conduct is a violation of this section:

* * *

(5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally 

be taken or that is not intended to be taken.

15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). The district court instructed the jury as 

follows with respect to the Beasleys’ legal theory regarding

this claim:

The Plaintiffs claim that Defendant violated this 

section of the Act when it stated in its letter dated 

May 30, 2012, . . . that “Red Rock Financial may 

proceed with foreclosure no sooner than the 61st day 

from the mailing of the Memorandum of Assessment Lien 

if debt is not satisfied.” The basis for this claim 

is that the Memorandum of Lien did not comply with all 

the legal requirements necessary to perfect and 

enforce a lien and for that reason there was not filed 

a valid lien. The defendant denies that it violated 

this particular section of the Act.

In order to recover on his or her claim, each 

plaintiff must prove the following:
6

(1) that the defendant violated this section of 

the Act;

(2) that he or she sustained actual damages as a 

result of defendant’s violation of this section 

of the Act; and

(3) the amount of damage he or she sustained as a 

result of defendant’s violation of the Act.

(J.A. 569-70). Additionally, the district court instructed the 

jury that none of the following conduct, by itself, violated the 

FDCPA: (1) the fact that Red Rock sent the Beasleys the 

collections letters dated January 23, 2012, and March 12, 2012;

(2) the fact that Red Rock attempted to collect a disputed debt;

and (3) the filing itself of the Memorandum of Lien. 

Accordingly, the district court instructed the jury that the

Beasleys are not entitled to recover damages based on any 

emotional distress or other injuries caused by such conduct.

In a verdict form containing special interrogatories, the 

jury found that the Beasleys had not sustained any actual 

damages as a result of Red Rock’s violation of the FDCPA over 

and above the statutory damages to which Red Rock had already 

stipulated. The district court entered judgment in favor of the 

Beasleys in the amount of $1,000.00 each in statutory damages,

pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A), and otherwise in favor 

of Red Rock as to all eleven counts. The Beasleys subsequently

filed a motion, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3), requesting 

a total of $52,120.00 in attorney’s fees and $220.00 in costs. 
7

After considering the motion, the district court awarded the 

Beasleys a total of $5,000.00 in attorney’s fees and $252.00 as 

taxable costs, representing the fees of the Clerk of Court. 

This timely appeal followed in which the Beasleys allege 

numerous errors by the district court below. We have reviewed 

them all and find all to be without merit. Several are worthy 

of our expressly addressing.

II.

The Beasleys first contend the district court erred by 

granting Red Rock’s motion for judgment as a matter of law with 

respect to Counts III, IV, V, and VII, all of which allege Red 

Rock violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2) by making false statements as 

to the amount of debt the Beasleys owed the HOA. Count III 

pertained to the January 23, 2012 letter, Count IV pertained to 

the March 12, 2012 letter, Count V pertained to the May 30, 2012 

letter, and Count VII pertained to the May 25, 2012 Memorandum 

of Lien.

We review the district court’s grant of Red Rock’s motion 

for judgment as a matter of law de novo. Anderson v. Russell, 

247 F.3d 125, 125 (4th Cir. 2001). Judgment as a matter of law 

is appropriate on a claim “[i]f a party has been fully heard on 

an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a 

reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary 
8

basis to find for the party on that issue[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

50(a)(1). Having reviewed the record, the relevant law, and 

the parties’ briefs, we hold the district court did not err in 

granting Red Rock’s motion for judgment as a matter of law with 

respect to Counts III, IV, V, and VII. The crux of the matter 

is that the Beasleys failed to present sufficient evidence, 

viewed in the light most favorable to them, to remove the 

existence of damages proximately caused by the alleged 

violations at issue beyond the realm of impermissible 

speculation and conjecture. Myrick v. Prime Ins. Syndicate, 

Inc., 395 F.3d 485, 489 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[I]f the verdict in 

favor of the non-moving party would necessarily be based upon 

speculation and conjecture, judgment as a matter of law must be 

entered.”). The evidence presented at trial established that, 

since October 2008, the Beasleys had suffered extreme emotional 

distress because of (1) the HOA’s repeated claims that their HOA 

account was delinquent; (2) the steady efforts by Reese Broome, 

PC to collect on such alleged delinquencies; and (3) the filing 

of the Memorandum of Lien on their home. The Beasleys offered 

insufficient evidence for the jury to find what, if any, 

additional emotional distress the Beasleys suffered as 

proximately caused by Red Rock’s violations of the FDCPA as 

alleged in Counts III, IV, V, and VII, i.e., by allegedly making 
9

false statements as to the amount of debt the Beasleys owed the 

HOA.

III.

Next, the Beasleys contend that Red Rock’s stipulation that 

it violated the FDCPA precluded Red Rock from disputing all 

allegations in the complaint pertaining to liability, and 

therefore, the district court erred in admitting, over its 

objections at trial, evidence regarding their allegedly 

delinquent HOA account. Such evidence consisted of the 

testimony of Cynthia Weiss, the person in charge of the 

Beasleys’ HOA account at the management company the HOA employed 

to maintain its books, and such management company’s “resident 

transaction report,” (J.A. 352), pertaining to the Beasleys. 

We review the “trial court’s rulings on the admissibility 

of evidence for abuse of discretion, and we will only overturn 

an evidentiary ruling that is arbitrary and irrational. To that 

end, we look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its 

proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its 

prejudicial effect.” United States v. Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 153 

(4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, the district court did not act arbitrarily or 

irrationally in admitting the challenged evidence. Regardless 

of Red Rock’s stipulation to violating the FDCPA in an 
10

unspecified manner, the challenged evidence was probative on the 

issue of damages. Specifically, the challenged evidence was 

probative to dispute testimony by the Beasleys to the effect 

that they were shocked and in disbelief that Red Rock would send 

them letters seeking to collect on the debt the HOA claimed the 

Beasleys owed.

The Beasleys also specifically challenge on hearsay grounds

the district court’s admission of their “resident transaction 

report,” (J.A. 352), listing all the assessments, late fees, and 

payments associated with the Beasleys’ HOA account. Below, the 

Beasleys specifically objected to admission of this document, 

identified as Defendant’s Exhibit 1, as inadmissible hearsay. 

Fed. R. Evid. 802. We review the district court’s admission of 

this report for abuse of discretion. Cole, 631 F.3d at 153.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting the challenged resident transaction report because 

such document was admissible for the purpose of proving the HOA 

had a long running dispute with the Beasleys over their HOA 

account, which is not for the purpose of proving the truth of 

the matter asserted, e.g., not for the purpose of proving the 

Beasleys owed the HOA the amounts listed as delinquent in the 

resident transaction report. Because the report was admissible 

for a purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted, it

falls outside the definition of hearsay set forth in Federal 
11

Rule of Evidence 801(c). The fact that the Beasleys had a long 

running dispute with the HOA over varying amounts the HOA 

claimed the Beasleys owed on their HOA account (since 2008) 

undercut the magnitude of the emotional distress the Beasleys 

claimed they suffered as proximately caused by Red Rock’s 

statement in its letter dated May 30, 2012, that it “may proceed 

with foreclosure no sooner than the 61st day from the mailing of 

the Memorandum of Assessment Lien if [the] debt is not 

satisfied.” (J.A. 450).

IV.

The Beasleys also challenge as inadequate the district 

court’s $5,000.00 award of attorney’s fees in their favor. 

Their challenge is without merit.

“[I]n the case of any successful action to enforce the 

[FDCPA],” the FDCPA authorizes district courts to award “a 

reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” 15 

U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). Under the applicable abuse of discretion 

standard, we have the duty to affirm the district court’s 

$5,000.00 attorney’s fees award if such award “falls within the 

district court’s broad discretion.” Carroll v. Wolpoff & 

Abramson, 53 F.3d 626, 628 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Here, the district court undertook a thorough 

analysis of the record and applicable law in calculating a 
12

reasonable attorney’s fees award in the present case, setting 

forth such analysis in a lengthy written order. To summarize, 

the district court awarded the Beasleys far less in attorney’s 

fees than they had sought because “[t]heir recovery was limited 

to the amount of statutory damages that [Red Rock] had offered 

shortly after suit was filed, and no reasonable assessment of 

the case justified the expense to pursue actual damages.” (J.A. 

727). Given that the degree of success obtained is the most 

critical factor in determining the reasonableness of an 

attorney’s fees award, Carroll, 53 F.3d at 630, the Beasleys 

have offered no persuasive argument on appeal which convinces us 

that the district court abused its discretion in limiting the 

Beasleys’ attorney’s fees award to $5,000.00.

 

V.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment below 

entered upon the jury’s verdict and affirm the judgment below 

awarding the Beasleys $5,000.00 in attorney’s fees and costs of 

252.00.2 

 2 We have also reviewed and find to be without merit the 

Beasleys’ remaining assignments of reversible error pertaining 

to the district court’s jury instructions regarding Red Rock’s 

right to foreclose on the lien at issue and the bonafide error 

defense as well as the district court’s refusal to instruct the 

jury that it could award prejudgment interest on all of the 

Beasleys’ damages.
13

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED