J-S09013-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

ANGELIKA TACHONY AND TATSIANA 

FILITOVICH 

 v. 

LM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY 

 Appellant 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 1902 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the Order Entered June 29, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Civil Division at No(s): 220402498 

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 18, 2024

 LM General Insurance Company (“LM”) appeals from the order entered 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, which denied its motion to mark 

judgment satisfied or, in the alternative, to open/strike judgment on an 

arbitration award and to mold the arbitration award. We affirm. 

 The trial court aptly provided the relevant factual and procedural 

history: 

On or about March 17, 2020, a driver rear-ended the car 

being driven by Ms. Tachony. Ms. Filitovich was a passenger in Ms. 

Tachony’s car. The driver of the other vehicle, Lei Chen, was 

underinsured. Both Ms. Tachony and Ms. Filitovich suffered 

injuries in the accident. At the time of the accident, Ms. Tachony 

was insured by [LM]. The policy provided underinsured motorist 

coverage to the insured (Ms. Tachony) and her passenger (Ms. 

Filitovich). 

On April 28, 2022, Ms. Tachony and Ms. Filitovich initiated 

this action against [LM] for breach of contract seeking 
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underinsured motorist coverage. The case was assigned to the 

compulsory arbitration program pursuant to [Pa.R.C.P.] 1301, et 

seq. On March 2, 2023, following an arbitration hearing, the panel 

awarded Ms. Tachony the amount of $12,000, and Ms. Filitovich 

the amount of $31,000. 

On April 6, 2023, Ms. Tachony and Ms. Filitovich entered 

judgment on the docket. On May 18, 2023, [LM] filed a motion to 

mark judgment satisfied or, in the alternative, to open/strike 

judgment and to mold the arbitration award, which [Ms. Tachony 

and Ms. Filitovich] opposed. 

[LM] contended that the insurance policy issued to Ms. 

Tachony required the award to be molded to ensure that [LM] 

would not be “double” paying for the injuries suffered by Ms. 

Tachony and Ms. Filitovich, as Ms. Tachony and Ms. Filitovich had 

previously obtained an arbitration award against Ms. Chen. 

Earlier, on March 8, 2021, Ms. Tachony and Ms. Filitovich 

had commenced the arbitration action against Ms. Chen []. On 

January 3, 2022, the arbitrators entered an award in favor of Ms. 

Tachony and against Ms. Chen in the amount of $19,319, and an 

award in favor of Ms. Filitovich and against Ms. Chen in the amount 

of $22,548. Ms. Chen was insured under a policy that provided 

bodily injury coverage of up to $25,000 per person and $50,000 

per accident. Ms. Tachony and Ms. Filitovich obtained [LM]’s 

consent to settle with Ms. Chen in the amount of $15,000 for Ms. 

Tachony and $22,548 for Ms. Filitovich. In exchange, [LM] waived 

any subrogation claim and indicated that it would take a credit of 

$25,000 per person for Ms. Chen’s full liability limits. Following an 

appeal filed by Ms. Chen, that case was marked settled on March 

1, 2022. 

In its motion to this Court, [LM], relying on its insurance 

policy with Ms. Tachony, argued that [LM]’s underinsured 

obligations had to be reduced by the Plaintiffs’ settlement with Ms. 

Chen, which included the $25,000 “credit” against the full value 

of Ms. Chen’s policy. The result, [LM] argued, was that it owed 

nothing to Ms. Tachony because the amount of the award, 

$12,000, was fully covered by Ms. Chen’s $25,000 policy limit, 

and that it owed $6,000 to Ms. Filitovich as the $31,000 award in 

her favor exceeded Ms. Chen’s $25,000 policy limit by that 

amount. 
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On June 29, 2023, this Court entered an order denying 

[LM]’s motion. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/3/23, at 2-4. This timely appeal followed. 

 LM raises two issues, which may be succinctly combined into one claim 

of error: the trial court erred in not granting LM’s motion to mark judgment 

satisfied or, in the alternative, to open/strike judgment on arbitration award 

and to mold the arbitration award. LM asserts that it was entitled to have the 

judgment marked as satisfied or molded so that they received the $25,000 

credit for each plaintiff as they assert was agreed upon with the Ms. Chen 

settlement. See Appellant’s Brief, at 17, 21. According to LM, based upon the 

arbitration award, they only owed Ms. Filitovich $6,000, which they paid. See 

id. at 9, 12. LM asserts that to find otherwise would give each plaintiff a 

duplicate payment. See id. at 9, 12, 17, 26. 

 We review a motion to mark a judgment satisfied for an abuse of 

discretion. See Gallagher v. Sheridan, 665 A.2d 485, 486 (Pa. Super. 

1995). We also review a trial court’s decision to vacate or strike an arbitration 

award for an abuse of discretion. See Conner v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 

820 A.2d 1266, 1269 (Pa. Super. 2003); PennEnergy Resources, LLC v. 

Winfield Resources, LLC, 301 A.3d 439, 452 n.17 (Pa. Super. 2023). An 

abuse of discretion is shown where “the law has been overridden or 

misapplied, or that the judgment exercised by the [c]ourt was manifestly 

unreasonable or motivated by partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill-will.” 

Gallagher, 665 A.2d at 486 (citations omitted). 
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 The trial court found that LM did not timely file its motion. See Trial 

Court Opinion, 10/3/23, at 5. We agree. The parties here proceeded to 

compulsory arbitration pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7361, as the matter in 

controversy was less than $50,000. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7361(b)(2). 

Pursuant to the authority granted to it by section 7361, the 

Supreme Court has promulgated a series of rules of civil procedure 

governing matters falling within the ambit of compulsory 

arbitration. Under these rules, the board of arbitrators are to 

conduct arbitration hearings as a judge would conduct a trial 

without a jury. The board rules on legal matters as well as factual 

matters, as would a judge sitting without a jury. The board is 

required to make an award promptly upon termination of the 

hearing. That award shall dispose of all claims for relief. 

Conner, 820 A.2d at 1269 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

The procedure for appealing an award entered pursuant to compulsory 

arbitration is clear and unambiguous. See Lough v. Spring, 556 A.2d 441, 

442 (Pa. Super. 1989). “A party to a compulsory arbitration may take an 

appeal from the award by seeking a trial de novo in the Court of Common 

Pleas ... not later than thirty days after the entry of the award on the docket.” 

Id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7361(d) and Pa.R.C.P. 1308(a)). Alternatively, the 

party may seek to mold the award “[w]here the record and the award disclose 

an obvious and unambiguous error in the award in mathematics or 

language[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 1307(d). That request to mold must be filed within the 

same thirty-day appeal window. See id. 

The timeliness of an appeal, whether it is to an appellate 

court or is for a de novo trial in the court of common pleas, is a 

jurisdictional matter. Thus, the court of common pleas does not 
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have jurisdiction to hear an arbitration appeal for a trial de novo

unless that appeal is timely filed. 

Lough, 556 A.2d at 444 (citations omitted). 

 Here, LM did not file its motion until 77 days after the arbitrators issued 

their awards. The prothonotary entered the compulsory arbitration award on 

the docket on March 2, 2023, and notice was given that same day. See Report 

and Award of Arbitrators, 3/2/23, at 2 (pagination added). Notably, the award 

cites to Pa.R.C.P. 1308 and states that “[a]wards in cases not appealed will 

become final upon expiration of the appeal time.” Id. Ms. Tachony and Ms. 

Filitovich filed a praecipe to enter judgment on April 6, 2023. See Praecipe to 

Enter Judgment, 4/6/23. The prothonotary entered judgment and notice was 

given that same day. 

Another 42 days passed before LM filed their motion on May 18, 2023. 

Notably, the motion LM filed was not a valid motion to mold judgment, as 

there was no patent error in the mathematics or language of the arbitrators’ 

award. LM sought to have the award modified by taking the credit they believe 

they were entitled to after Ms. Tachony and Ms. Filitovich settled with Ms. 

Chen. See Motion, 5/18/23, at 3 (pagination added). As we were not provided 

with a transcript from the arbitration hearing, we do not know if this claim had 

been raised and litigated at that hearing. LM simply claims that they are 

entitled to compute this credit and that the computation is “self-executing.” 

Appellant’s Brief, at 15. We disagree that this credit is self-executing. It is a 

matter of law that the arbitration panel should have decided. See Conner, 
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820 A.2d at 1271 (holding that the question of attorneys’ fees should have 

been presented to the arbitration panel as the “compulsory arbitration statute 

could not be clearer in mandating that ‘matters or issues’ subject to 

compulsory arbitration ‘shall first be submitted to and heard by a board’ of 

arbitrators.”) (citation omitted; emphasis in original). If the panel did not 

decide this issue or LM believes the panel decided the issue incorrectly, LM 

was entitled to appeal for a trial de novo to assert their entitlement to this 

credit. See Blucas v. Agiovlasitis, 179 A.3d 520, 527 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(holding that even where the arbitrators made an error of law, the proper 

procedure is to timely appeal for a trial de novo in the Court of Common Pleas). 

As LM did not file a timely appeal, the trial court properly denied LM’s motion 

as it was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See Lough, 556 A.2d at 444; 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/3/23, at 5. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s 

order. 

 Order affirmed. 

Date: 6/18/2024