1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TIBEBE F. SAMUEL,

Plaintiff

v.

WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, et al., 

Defendants

Civil Action No. 17-2539 (CKK) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(April 27, 2018) 

At the center of this lawsuit is the alleged decision of Defendants Wells Fargo & 

Company and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (collectively, “Wells Fargo”) to deny a Home Affordable 

Modification Program (“HAMP”) application filed by Genet Damtie in 2010. Given its subject 

matter, one might reasonably expect that Ms. Damtie would be a party to this case. She is not. 

Instead, this case has been brought by Tibebe F. Samuel, an individual who allegedly represented 

Ms. Damtie in her dealings with Wells Fargo. Ms. Damtie’s HAMP application was never 

granted. She ultimately fired Plaintiff in early 2017. Her home was foreclosed later that year. 

Plaintiff filed suit shortly thereafter. 

Plaintiff, who does not purport to represent Ms. Damtie in this lawsuit, contends that 

Wells Fargo treated him unfairly during Ms. Damtie’s HAMP application process. Plaintiff’s 

currently-operative Amended Complaint is filled with generalized allegations of broken 

promises, deception and defamation. It is not a model of clarity or specificity. Defendants have 

filed a [12] Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. Upon consideration of the pleadings,1

 

1

 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents: 

• Defs.’ Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl., ECF No. 12-2 (“Defs.’ Mot.”);
2 

the relevant legal authorities, and the record as it currently stands, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART 

and DENIES-IN-PART that motion. All of the claims that the Court can discern in Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint are dismissed. For many of those claims, the statute of limitations has run. 

For others, Plaintiff has failed to plead essential elements. And for still others, there is simply no 

private cause of action available to Plaintiff.

However, for the first time in his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff 

has raised defamation and interference with business relationship claims based on a statement 

that Wells Fargo allegedly made to Ms. Damtie about Plaintiff in March 2017. Because Plaintiff 

proceeds pro se, the Court has considered these claims despite the fact that they were absent 

from his Amended Complaint. Unlike Plaintiff’s other defamation and interference claims, these 

claims do not appear to be time-barred or otherwise subject to dismissal on the pleadings on the 

current record. Plaintiff’s lawsuit will be allowed to continue only so that he can assert claims 

based on the March 2017 statement. However, the Court will order Plaintiff to file a Second 

Amended Complaint that specifically asserts these claims so that there is an operative complaint 

in this case that sets forth the claims that are actually at issue going forward. This new pleading 

shall also omit the claims that the Court dismisses with prejudice, as discussed in more detail 

below. 

I. BACKGROUND

For the purposes of the motion before the Court, the Court accepts as true the wellpleaded allegations in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. The Court does “not accept as true, 

 

• Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 14 (“Pl.’s Opp’n); and 

• Defs.’ Reply in Support of Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl., ECF No. 15 (“Defs.’ Reply”). 

In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument in this action would 

not be of assistance in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f). 
3 

however, the plaintiff’s legal conclusions or inferences that are unsupported by the facts 

alleged.” Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 

In their reply brief, Defendants argue that the Court may not consider exhibits and factual 

assertions raised for the first time in Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

because “it is well-settled that a plaintiff cannot seek to amend his pleadings in an opposition to a 

motion to dismiss.” Defs.’ Reply at 3. Although this principle is indeed well-settled in cases 

where the plaintiff is represented by counsel, it does not apply in the same fashion in cases where 

the plaintiff proceeds pro se. Because Plaintiff proceeds in this matter pro se, when determining 

whether Plaintiff can state a plausible claim for relief the Court must consider his complaint in 

light of all of his filings, including those submitted in response to Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss. See Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“a 

district court errs in failing to consider a pro se litigant’s complaint ‘in light of’ all filings, 

including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss”) (quoting Richardson v. United States, 193 

F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); Fillmore v. AT & T Mobility Servs. LLC, 140 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2 

(D.D.C. 2015) (“the Court, as it must in a case brought by a pro se plaintiff, considers the facts 

as alleged in both the Complaint and Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.”). 

Accordingly, the Court has considered Plaintiff’s claims in light of all of his filings, including his 

Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and the attachments thereto. 

Plaintiff alleges that Wells Fargo serviced a mortgage on a Washington, D.C. property for 

which non-party Ms. Genet Damtie was the borrower. Am. Compl., ECF No. 9, ¶¶ 2, 30. Ms.

Damtie allegedly retained Plaintiff in March 2010 “to handle and complete a Home Loan 

Modification Program (HAMP) Application” for her. Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 30. HAMP provides incentives 

for mortgage servicers to modify eligible first lien mortgages so that the payments of 
4 

homeowners who are in default or risk of default can be reduced to affordable levels. Id. ¶¶ 18-

19. Plaintiff is a self-described “loan modification consultant” who helps home owners navigate 

the HAMP application process. Id. ¶ 27. As is required by law, Plaintiff was not to be paid by 

Ms. Damtie unless and until her HAMP application process was completed. Id. ¶¶ 29, 31.2

 

An “Authorization Letter” was sent to Wells Fargo notifying it of Plaintiff’s retention by 

Ms. Damtie, and Wells Fargo allegedly responded to the letter indicating that it agreed to work 

with Plaintiff as Ms. Damtie’s agent. Id. ¶¶ 3, 32.3

 Wells Fargo allegedly indicated that it would 

make a decision on Ms. Damtie’s HAMP application within 45-60 days (assuming that all 

required information had been provided). Id. ¶¶ 4, 32. However, according to Plaintiff, the 

process ended up taking more than seven years. Id. During this period Plaintiff allegedly 

completed numerous tasks on behalf of Ms. Damtie (e.g., “faxing and mailing documents” and 

“letter writing”). Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff continued to work as Ms. Damtie’s agent until April 2017 

when, frustrated with the delay, Ms. Damtie terminated his representation and hired a new 

representative. Id. ¶ 4.4

 In June of that year her home was foreclosed. Id. 

 Plaintiff alleges that Wells Fargo lied when it indicated in 2010 that Ms. Damtie’s 

application would be processed in 45-60 days. Id. ¶ 6. In fact, according to Plaintiff, Wells 

Fargo “never had the intention of modifying the loan at all.” Id. ¶¶ 6, 46-47. Instead, Wells 

 

2 Plaintiff makes clear in his Amended Complaint that he is bringing this case “on his own 

behalf.” Id. ¶ 9. 

3

 In his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff indicates that multiple such letters 

were sent and acknowledged by Wells Fargo. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 2, Exs. A & B. 

4 Plaintiff has attached to his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss two letters that Ms.

Damtie allegedly sent to him through which she terminated his representation due to her 

frustration with Plaintiff’s failure to secure a loan modification for her from Wells Fargo. See

Pl.’s Opp’n, Exs. E & F. 
5 

Fargo’s intention was allegedly “to accumulate interest in the mortgage,” “prolong the HAMP 

process” and eventually foreclose on the home when profitable to Wells Fargo. Id. ¶ 6. 

In a section of his Amended Complaint entitled “Defamation of Character and 

Interference in Plaintiff’s Business,” Plaintiff alleges that Wells Fargo made certain false 

statements about Plaintiff to Ms. Damtie and others. Id. ¶¶ 41-45. In his Amended Complaint, 

Plaintiff alleges two specific instances when such false statements were made. First, Plaintiff 

alleges that “[i]n the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in July 2016 during a hearing, 

the defendant’s representative made a false statement regarding the Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 42. Second, 

Plaintiff alleges that “[i]n August 2016, a complaint was lodged by the borrower against the 

Defendant to Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)” and “although the Defendant and 

the Plaintiff discussed . . . the complaint,” Defendants “provided false information to the CFPB 

stating that the Defendant was ‘unable to reach the Plaintiff’ in order to address the issues in the 

complaint.” Id. ¶ 43. Finally, although not alleged in his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has 

raised a third allegedly defamatory statement in his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss. According to a letter allegedly sent by Ms. Damtie to Plaintiff, a Wells Fargo customer 

service representative told Ms. Damtie on March 28, 2017 that her HAMP application had not 

been granted in part because Wells Fargo had been unable to get in touch with Plaintiff. See

Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. E. 

Defendants have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6). That motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for resolution. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint on the grounds that it 

“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] 
6 

complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 

enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). Rather, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that, if 

accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Conclusory Allegations of Wrongdoing

At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is littered with 

generalized, conclusory allegations of wrongdoing that are insufficient to state a claim against 

Defendants. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 1 (alleging that Defendants engaged in “misconduct, 

deceptive business practices, interference in business relations, and defamation of character”); id.

¶ 4 (alleging that the HAMP application process was delayed due to “deceptive practices and 

dishonesty by the defendant”); id. ¶ 6 (alleging that Defendants “lied,” “made deceptive and 

dishonest statements,” and provided information that was “harmful”); id. ¶ 35 (“Defendants have 

engaged in a pattern of unfair and deceptive practices,” “provid[ed] false information” and 

“fail[ed] to deal with the Plaintiff in good faith and engag[ed] in deceptive practices”); id. ¶ 39 

(“Defendant violated federal laws, violated the District of Columbia laws, program requirements 

and contractual requirements governing loss mitigation”); id. ¶ 40 (alleging that Defendants have 

“engaged in a pattern of unfair and deceptive practices”); id. ¶ 41 (alleging that Defendants failed 

“to respond to borrower and Plaintiff’s inquiries” and “provid[ed] false or misleading 

information” on certain issues); id. ¶ 44 (alleging “improper, unlawful, deceptive, and unethical 
7 

conduct of the Defendant”); id. ¶ 50 (alleging that “Defendant abused its authority and abused 

the HAMP process; the Defendant violated duties owed to the Plaintiff; the Defendant violated 

Federal and the law of the District of Columbia; and the defendant’s unlawful, deceptive, 

unethical, and fraudulent conduct has resulted in injury to the Plaintiff in this case”).5

 

These conclusory, “naked assertions” of wrongdoing do not aid Plaintiff’s lawsuit in

surviving a motion to dismiss. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Cursory, unexplained allegations of 

misconduct do not satisfy the pleading standards of Federal Rule 8 and, to the extent Plaintiff is 

alleging fraud, they certainly do not satisfy the heightened pleading standards of Federal Rule 

9(b). Below, the Court addresses whether the specific allegations in this case are sufficient to 

state plausible claims for relief pursuant to the causes of action Plaintiff appears to be asserting. 

B. Contract Claims 

To the extent Plaintiff intends to assert contract claims, those claims are dismissed with 

prejudice. The Court can only discern one potential agreement from Plaintiff’s pleadings that 

could, theoretically, support a contract claim between Plaintiff and Defendants: Defendants’ 

alleged “promise” in 2010 to Plaintiff that they would process Ms. Damtie’s HAMP application 

within 45-60 days (assuming all required information had been provided).6

 Assuming for the 

purposes of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiff could have standing to enforce this 

promise, and that this promise could serve as the basis for an actionable contract claim, 

Plaintiff’s claim still must be dismissed with prejudice because the statute of limitations has run. 

 

5 This sort of allegation makes up a large portion of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss as well. See, e.g., Pl.’s Opp’n at 3-5. 

6 Plaintiff makes other extremely vague, broad assertions of “promises,” but none are pled with 

sufficient particularity to state a claim. Courts regularly dismiss vague or imprecise contract 

claims. See Burnett v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, 102 F. Supp. 3d 183, 193 (D.D.C. 2015) 

(citing cases). 
8 

“The statute of limitations in the District of Columbia for bringing a breach of contract claim is 

three years,” and it begins to run at the time of the alleged breach. LoPiccolo v. Am. Univ., 840 F. 

Supp. 2d 71, 77-78 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing D.C. Code § 12-301(7)). A breach of contract claim 

premised on Defendants’ failure to comply with the 45-60 day timeline promise would have 

accrued when Defendants (allegedly) failed to make a decision on Ms. Damtie’s HAMP 

application within that timeframe. This was sometime in 2010, far more than three years before 

this case was filed in November 2017.7

 

In addition, it appears that Plaintiff intends to assert a claim for breach of contract based, 

at least in part, on the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46-51 

(section of allegations under heading “Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 

Dealing Asserted by Plaintiff”). This claim is fundamentally flawed. It is true that in the District 

of Columbia, “‘all contracts contain an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.’” Allworth v. 

Howard Univ., 890 A.2d 194, 201 (D.C. 2006) (quoting Paul v. Howard Univ., 754 A.2d 297, 

310 (D.C. 2000)). But, besides the alleged promise to process Ms. Damtie’s application in 45-60 

days (which, as described above, is not actionable), Plaintiff does not identify a contract between 

himself and Defendants to which such an implied duty might attach. The actual contractual 

relationships relating to the mortgage in this case involved Ms. Damtie, not Plaintiff.8 Without a 

 

7 Plaintiff states in his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss that his contract claims are 

timely because he submitted additional HAMP applications in 2016, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 9, but this 

argument misses the mark. Plaintiff may have submitted additional HAMP materials in 2016, 

but he only alleges that Defendants promised him to process Ms. Damtie’s application in 45-60 

days in 2010. 

8

 Although somewhat difficult to square with the remainder of Plaintiff’s allegations, Plaintiff 

indicates in his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss that he is not attempting through 

this lawsuit to challenge Defendants’ decision to deny Ms. Damtie’s HAMP application. Pl.’s 

Opp’n at 12. Had Plaintiff asserted such a claim, it would be subject to dismissal because 

Plaintiff does not have standing to sue Defendants for their alleged failure to grant Ms. Damtie a 

HAMP loan modification. 
9 

contractual relationship, there can be no claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and 

fair dealing. See Koker v. Aurora Loan Servicing, LLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 51, 65 (D.D.C. 2013) 

(“the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing only applies in the context of a party’s 

contractual performance”). And, even if Plaintiff were a party to the mortgage contracts at issue 

in this case, considering but declining to grant a loan modification to a defaulting borrower does 

not itself violate the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. See In re Coleman, No. 06-

00254, 2009 WL 9061560, at *7 (Bankr. D.D.C. May 11, 2009) (with respect to good faith and 

fair dealing claim, holding that defendant home loan company “was not obligated to modify 

[plaintiff’s] Mortgage or otherwise engage in workout agreements that would give [plaintiff] the 

opportunity to become current on his payments.”). For these reasons, Plaintiff cannot state a 

claim against Defendants for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. All of 

Plaintiff’s contract claims are therefore dismissed with prejudice.9 

C. Fraud Claims 

Next, although it is not clear whether Plaintiff actually intended to assert a claim for 

fraud, the Court notes that he has not adequately pled such a claim. At the threshold, allegations 

of fraud must be pled with particularity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“[A] party must state with 

particularity the circumstances constituting fraud”). Filled as it is with generalizations and 

conclusory allegations of wrongdoing, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not satisfy this 

heightened pleading standard. 

 

9 In his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff states (in passing) that 

Defendants owed him a fiduciary duty. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 6. Plaintiff—who appears to have had 

an arm’s length business relationship with the Defendants—has not alleged any facts that would 

support the claim that such a duty was owed. See Haynes v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 52 F. Supp. 

3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that an “arm’s length business relationship” with a home 

mortgage lender did not give rise to a fiduciary duty). 
10 

Plaintiff’s fraud claim is fundamentally flawed for additional reasons. Assuming that 

claim was based on the allegedly false statement that Defendants would process Ms. Damtie’s 

HAMP application within 45-60 days, the claim fails because it is time-barred. As with 

Plaintiff’s contract claim, his fraud claim would be subject to a three year statute of limitations. 

See Hawkins v. Greenfield, 797 F. Supp. 30, 33 (D.D.C. 1992). Plaintiff did not file suit within 

three years of the accrual of a claim based on this statement. 

Plaintiff cannot state a fraud claim based on the other allegedly false statements 

mentioned in his Amended Complaint (or opposition brief) because he does not allege that he 

relied on those statements. “Under D.C. law, ‘[t]he essential elements of common law fraud are: 

(1) a false representation (2) in reference to material fact, (3) made with knowledge of its falsity, 

(4) with the intent to deceive, and (5) action is taken in reliance upon the representation.’” Busby 

v. Capital One, N.A., 772 F. Supp. 2d 268, 275 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Fort Lincoln Civic Ass’n, 

Inc. v. Fort Lincoln New Town Corp., 944 A.2d 1055, 1074 n.22 (D.C. 2008)). As noted above, 

Plaintiff alleges that “[i]n the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in July 2016 during a 

hearing, the defendant’s representative made a false statement regarding the Plaintiff,” and “[i]n 

August 2016, a complaint was lodged by the borrower against the Defendant to the Consumer 

Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) . . . [and] the Defendant provided false information to the 

CFPB stating that the Defendant was ‘unable to reach the Plaintiff’” despite the fact that 

Defendants had allegedly actually spoken with Plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 42-43. Additionally, a 

Wells Fargo representative allegedly made a false statement about Plaintiff to Ms. Damtie in 

March 2017. See Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. E. Plaintiff does not allege that he relied on any of these 

statements. Quite the opposite—he seems to have known that these statements were (allegedly) 
11

false from the outset.10 Reliance is a fundamental element of any fraud claim. Because that 

element is missing here, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for fraud based on these statements. See

Malek v. Flagstar Bank, 70 F. Supp. 3d 23, 31 (D.D.C. 2014) (dismissing fraud claim for failure 

to plead the “critical element” of “reasonable reliance to [plaintiff’s] detriment on the 

defendant’s conduct.”). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s fraud claims are dismissed. The dismissal will be without 

prejudice to the extent that it is based on Plaintiff’s failure to plead with particularity. However, 

if Plaintiff were to seek to reassert a fraud claim with the sort of particularity required by Federal 

Rule 9(b), he may do so only if he can allege a claim based on statements that he relied upon, 

that are not barred by the statute of limitations, and that are otherwise cognizable. None of the 

statements currently alleged in the Amended Complaint (or opposition brief) satisfy these 

requirements.

D. Statutory Claims 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

contain references to various statutes. None of these statutes can support any actionable claim in 

this case. To the extent Plaintiff is asserting a claim under the D.C. Consumer Protection 

Procedures Act (“CPPA”), this claim fails for lack of a consumer-merchant relationship.

11 The 

CPPA “prohibits merchants from making material misrepresentations to consumers.” Busby v. 

 

10 In his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff attempts to demonstrate reliance 

by arguing that Ms. Damtie relied on Wells Fargo’s statements. Pl.’s Opp’n at 11. This attempt 

fails, because Ms. Damtie is not the plaintiff in this case. 

11 To the extent Plaintiff intended to pursue a CPPA claim based on the allegedly false statement 

that Defendants would process Ms. Damtie’s HAMP application within 45-60 days, that claim 

would also fail because it is time-barred. Courts apply a three year statute of limitations to CPPA 

claims, see Bradford v. George Washington Univ., 249 F. Supp. 3d 325, 335 (D.D.C. 2017), and, 

as described above with respect to Plaintiff’s contract and fraud claims, Plaintiff’s claim was not 

filed within this period. 
12 

Capital One, N.A., 932 F. Supp. 2d 114, 143 (D.D.C. 2013). The law “applies only to consumermerchant relationships.” Busby, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 279. It “does not reach transactions intended 

primarily to promote business or professional interests.” Shaw v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 605 F.3d 

1039, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Plaintiff has not alleged a consumer-merchant relationship in this 

case. Plaintiff was not a Wells Fargo customer or borrower. Plaintiff was hired as a professional 

consultant to help a non-party complete a HAMP application that she submitted to Defendants. 

Defendants allegedly harmed Plaintiff while Plaintiff was working on that non-party’s behalf in 

his professional capacity. Under no plausible set of facts could this be construed as a “consumermerchant relationship.” The relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants, to the extent one 

existed, was a business or professional relationship. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot state a claim 

under the CPPA. See Busby, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 143-44 (dismissing CPPA claim for lack of 

consumer-merchant relationship); Busby, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 279-80 (same). 

Plaintiff references various other statutes in his Amended Complaint, but they also do not 

provide him with an actionable claim. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim 

under the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), that claim fails because the FTC Act does 

not provide for a private cause of action. “The FTC Act is enforced exclusively by the FTC; 

there is no private right of action under the statute.” United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F. 

Supp. 2d 72, 78 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 989 (D.C. 

Cir. 1973)). Similarly, to the extent Plaintiff is asserting a claim under HAMP itself, such a 

claim would fail because HAMP also does not provide for a private cause of action. See Leake v. 

Prensky, 798 F. Supp. 2d 254, 258 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that HAMP does not provide a private 
13 

cause of action and citing numerous cases).12 Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot state a claim under 

any of the statutes referenced in his pleadings. Those claims, to the extent Plaintiff intended to 

assert them, are dismissed with prejudice. 

E. Defamation and Interference with Business Relations Claims 

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants defamed him (and therefore also interfered with 

his business relations), by making various false statements about his representation of Ms.

Damtie. The Court will grant-in-part and deny-in-part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss these 

claims. The Court will grant Defendants’ motion and dismiss these claims to the extent that they 

are based on the statements identified in paragraphs 41 through 45 of the Amended Complaint, 

which have already been discussed multiple times in this Memorandum Opinion. Again, those 

statements are: “In the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in July 2016 during a hearing, 

the defendant’s representative made a false statement regarding the Plaintiff,” and “In August 

2016, a complaint was lodged by the borrower against the Defendant to the Consumer Financial 

Protection Bureau (CFPB) . . . [and] the Defendant provided false information to the CFPB 

stating that the Defendant was ‘unable to reach the Plaintiff’” despite the fact that Defendants 

had allegedly spoken with Plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 42-43. 

The statute of limitations for defamation in the District of Columbia is one year. See Jin 

v. Ministry of State Sec., 254 F. Supp. 2d 61, 68 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing D.C. Code § 12-301(4)). 

These statements were made no later than August 2016, more than a year before this case was 

 

12 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss contains an argument that Ms.’ Damtie’s termination of 

Plaintiff without compensation is not actionable. Defs.’ Mot. at 13-14. This argument appears 

to attack a claim Plaintiff is not making. The Court does not understand Plaintiff to be suing 

Defendants for non-party Ms. Damtie’s termination of Plaintiff. Plaintiff appears to concede that 

the law allowed Ms. Damtie to not pay him. Am. Compl. ¶ 29. 
14 

filed in November 2017. Plaintiff’s defamation claims based on these statements are accordingly 

time-barred and therefore dismissed with prejudice.13 Also time-barred is any interference with 

business relations claim based on these same allegedly false statements. Because that claim 

would be based entirely on the same set of underlying facts as Plaintiff’s defamation claim, it is 

also subject to the one-year statute of limitations for defamation claims. See Browning v. 

Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 244 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that when a tortious interference claim is 

based solely on allegedly defamatory remarks, it is “intertwined” with plaintiff’s defamation 

claim and therefore subject to the same one-year statute of limitations).

However, in his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff has indicated that 

Defendants also made false and defamatory statements about him to Ms. Damtie in March 2017. 

Pl.’s Opp’n at 10. Plaintiff has attached to his Opposition what purports to be a letter from Ms.

Damtie to Plaintiff indicating as much. See id., Ex. E. Specifically, Ms. Damtie writes that in 

her “conversation with [a] Wells Fargo customer service representative on March 28, 2017, I 

have been informed that they have been trying to get in touch with you on multiple occasions

and they are unable to reach you.” Id. She continues on to explain that Wells Fargo indicated 

that this inability to reach Plaintiff was part of the reason why Ms. Damtie’s HAMP application 

had not been granted. Id. Plaintiff claims that this statement was false and defamed him to his 

then-client. Because Plaintiff is representing himself pro se, the Court considers these 

allegations despite their absence from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. See Brown, 789 F.3d at 

152; Fillmore, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 2. This alleged statement was made less than a year before the 

 

13 Even if Plaintiff’s claim with respect to the July 2016 statement was not time-barred, that 

statement—which apparently took place in a hearing before the Superior Court for the District of 

Columbia—would likely be protected by the judicial proceedings privilege.
15 

filing of Plaintiff’s lawsuit. A defamation or interference with business relations claim based on 

this statement is accordingly not time-barred. 

Other than arguing that the Court should ignore the March 2017 statement altogether 

because it was not alleged in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint—a contention that the Court has 

already rejected—Defendants argue that a defamation claim based on the March 2017 statement 

is barred by the “single publication rule.” Defendants misinterpret that rule. Under the single 

publication rule, “publication of defamatory matter ‘gives rise to but one cause of action for 

libel, which accrues at the time of the original publication.’” Jin, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 68 (quoting 

Ogden v. Ass’n of the United States Army, 177 F.Supp. 498, 502 (D.D.C. 1959)). “Because 

the statute of limitations runs from the date of the original publication, any subsequent sale or 

delivery of a copy of the publication does not create a new cause of action.” Id. In other words, 

“for purposes of the statute of limitations in defamation claims, a book, magazine, or newspaper 

has one publication date, the date on which it is first generally available to the public.” Mullin v. 

Washington Free Weekly, Inc., 785 A.2d 296, 298 n.2 (D.C. 2001). 

The single publication rule does not bar a defamation (or interference with business 

relations) claim based on the alleged statement by Wells Fargo to Ms. Damtie in March 2017. 

Unlike cases where the single publication rule applies, this is not a case where Defendants 

originally published a statement and that statement was then distributed by another. Instead, this 

is a case where (allegedly) multiple representatives of Defendants made similar but separate 

statements about Plaintiff over a period of time that were each allegedly false and defamatory. 

Under these circumstances, “[t]t is the general rule that each communication of the same 

defamatory matter by the same defamer, whether to a new person or to the same person, is a 
16 

separate and distinct publication, for which a separate cause of action arises.” Restatement 

(Second) of Torts § 577A (1977).14 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s lawsuit is not dismissed to the narrow extent that it is based on 

Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants made false and defamatory statements about him to Ms. Damtie 

in March 2017. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s contract claims, statutory 

claims and defamation claims based on statements that occurred in 2016 (and related interference 

with business relations claims) are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff’s fraud claim is dismissed 

without prejudice. Plaintiff shall file a Second Amended Complaint that sets forth Plaintiff’s 

defamation and interference with business relations claim based on the statement allegedly made 

by Defendants in March of 2017 and omits claims that the Court has dismissed with prejudice. 

An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

 /s/ 

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY

United States District Judge

 

14 In their reply brief, Defendants argue that “neither the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, nor his 

Opposition, makes any allegation of wrongdoing by WFC [Wells Fargo & Company]. Instead all 

of his allegations are directed at WFB [Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.].” Defs.’ Reply at 2. 

Accordingly, Defendants move for the dismissal of all claims against WFC. Id. As an initial 

matter, although Defendants claim that this argument was raised in their Memorandum in 

Support of the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, the Court has reviewed that 

Memorandum and is unable to find mention of this argument. Regardless, the one narrow claim 

that the Court has allowed to remain in this case is based on a statement allegedly made by 

“Wells Fargo customer service,” and it is not clear at this point whether that statement was made 

on behalf of WFC or WFB. Both Defendants shall remain in the case.