## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 98-1403

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * v. * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Southern Martin Palacios-Suarez, Also Known * District of Iowa. as Martin Palacios, * * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: May 12, 1998 Filed: June 24, 1998

___________ Befor e McMILLIAN, ROSS, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge. Sergeant C. Thompson of th e Nebraska State Patrol stopped a car near Omaha, Nebraska, because he believed that the car’s tinted windows violated Nebraska law. Sgt. Tho mpson asked the driver, Martin Palacios-Suarez, for his license an d registra tion. Mr. Palacios produced a New Mexico driver's license and a Texa s registration for the car.Th e Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, United States District Judge for th e 1 Southern District of Iowa. -2- Sgt. Thompson directe d Mr. Palacios to wait in the passenger seat of the patrol car while he ran a computer check on Mr. Palacios’s license and criminal history

. Sgt. Thompson then asked Mr. Palacios about his occupa tion and the nature of his trip; Mr. Palacios responded that he was a landscaper and that he and his family were o n their way to visit relatives in Perry, Iowa. Sgt. Thompson testified that he thought it odd that someo ne would take such a long drive for a short, two- or three-day stay , esp ecially a landscaper at the height of the summer landscaping season

. Sgt. Thompson also testified that Mr. Palacios was extremely nervous and did not make eye contact during the questioning.
Based on h is suspicion, Sgt. Thompson radioed for a canine unit. Shortl y thereaft er (approximately nine minutes after the initial stop), Omaha Police Office r Matthew Lippold arrived with a drug-sniffing dog . Sgt. Thompson asked Mr. Palacios several times fo r his consent to search the vehicle, and Mr. Palacios gave it. The dog soon alerted officers to the presence of drugs behind the driver’s-side door, where the offi cers located approximately ten kilograms of cocaine and one pound o f amphetamine. The officers then arrested Mr. Palacios and his wife. Mr. Palacios was indicted for conspiring to distribute cocaine and amphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), § 846. The district court denied a motion to suppress the dr ugs. After entering a conditional guilty plea under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2) , Mr. Palacios appealed. We affirm the judgment of the district court. 1
I. Mr. Palacios argues, first, that the initial stopwas illegal since the Nebraska law that pr ohibits tinted windows applies only to vehicles that are, or are required to be , registered in the state. Sgt. Thompson believed, incorrectly, that the law applied to-3-

Mr. P alacios’s vehicle and therefore, Mr. Palacios asserts, Sgt. Thompson had n o objectively v alid reason to stop the car in the first place. Mr. Palacios asks us t o concl ude that the district court should have suppressed the fruits of the subsequen t search because the initial stop was illegal. As the district court recognized, even if t he initial stop of Mr. Palacios’s vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment, any evidence discovered in it therea fter is nevertheless admissible if Mr. Palacios’s consent to the search was “ 'sufficiently an act of free will to pur ge the primary taint.' ” United States v. Ramos , 42 F.3d 1160, 1164 (8 Cir

. th 1994), cert. denied , 514 U.S. 1134 (1995), quoting Wong Sun v. United States , 37 1 U.S. 471, 486 (1963). To determine whether Mr. Palacios’s consent was voluntary, we examin e the totality of the circumstances under which it was given. See Unite d States v. Washington , 957 F.2d 559, 562 (8 Cir. 1992), cert. denied , 506 U.S. 883 th (1992).
We believe that the circumstances surrounding Mr. Palacios's consent raise no inference that it was in any way coerced. To persuade us that his consent was not an act of free wi ll, Mr. Palacios refers us to Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 500, 50 6 (1983) (plurality opinion), see also id. at 509 (opinion of Brennan, J.), which held that a long detention by the police negates any inference that a cons ent was voluntary. That case, however, is inapposite.
In Royer , two plainclothes detectives believed that a suspect was carryin g narcotics in his duffel bag when he checked in for a flight. The agents confronted the suspect and took his airline ticket and identification. They then asked him to follo w them into a small room away from the passenger concourse, where they interrogated him and where he u ltimately consented to the search of his bags. The Supreme Court saidthat, for all practical purposes, Mr. Royer was under arrest. At the time that h e gave his consent, therefore, the Court concluded, “any consensual aspects of th e encounter had evaporated.” Id. at 503 (plurality opinion).-4-

Here, the questioning and subsequent arrest of Mr. Palacios were captured o n video t ape. After reviewing that tape (and the rest of the record), it is clear to us that the district court did not err in holding that Mr. Palacios’s consent was an act of free will. After asking to see his license and registration , and asking a number of additional questions, Sgt. Thompson, as we have said, became suspicious of Mr. Palacios' s behavior and call ed for a canine unit. When the canine unit arrived, just nine minutes a f ter the initial stop, Sgt. Thompson asked Mr. Palacios four separate times if he and OfficerLi ppold could search the vehicle and three times stopped to make sure that Mr . Palacios understood what he was asking of him. Sgt. Thompson, of course, was under no obligation to inform Mr. Palacios that he did not have to consent to a search, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231 (1973), and Sgt. Thompson did not do so . But he did go beyond what was required in another respect, by explaining t o Mr. Palacios that he would be searching for narcotics and for weapons.
Because Mr. Palacios consented knowingly and voluntarily to the search, th e district court was correct in refusing to suppress the evi dence that the search turned up.

II. Mr. Palacios also asks u s to find error in the fact that the district court fixed his sentence based on the amount of cocaine and amphetamine that the search of his car reve aled. Mr. Palacios argues that he should have been sentenced according to hi s allege dbelief that he was carrying only marijuana. The application of the federa l sentenc ing guidelines to the relevant facts is an issue of law, and we review it d e novo . See United States v. Lopez , 125 F.3d 597, 599 (8 Cir. 1997). th
U nder U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), a district court determines relevant conduct forse ntencing based on “all acts or omissions committed ... by the defendant. ” Mr. Palacios is therefore “accountable at sentencing for the full quantity of all illegal drugs” in his possession. United States v. Strange , 102 F.3d 356, 361 (8 Cir. 1996). th-5-

Mr. Palacios maintai ns that it was not foreseeable to him that the person for whom he was delivering drugs would have had him carry cocaine instead of marijuana, bu t reasonable forese eability is relevant in sentencing determinations only with respect to the conduct of those wi th whom a defendant has conspired or jointly acted. See id . at 360; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Although Mr. Palacios pleaded guilty to a drug conspiracy, his sentence was based on the drugs in his car at the time that he was stopped and n ot on drugs in the possession of a co-conspirator. We therefore find no error in the sentence that the district court imposed.
III. For the reasons indicated, we affirm the judgment of the district court. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.