UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4101

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

GARRICK DEWAYNE NEWTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr., 

Chief District Judge. (1:08-cr-00332-JAB-1)

Submitted: July 30, 2010 Decided: August 19, 2010

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and KEENAN, Circuit 

Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, William S. 

Trivette, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE 

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Michael 

A. DeFranco, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Garrick Dewayne Newton appeals his conviction for being a 

felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Newton contends that the 

district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence 

that was recovered from his person during an investigative stop. 

We affirm.

I.

In the early morning hours of August 3, 2008, Michael 

Castro of the Durham Police Department responded to a dispatch 

regarding an armed robbery at a Waffle House on Highway 54 in 

Durham. The dispatch described the robber as a black man 

wearing a blue striped shirt and a tan baseball cap. Upon 

arriving on the scene about three minutes later, Officer Castro 

set up a perimeter while another officer canvassed the Waffle 

House. In the process of establishing a perimeter, Castro saw a 

man – the current defendant – fitting the suspect’s description 

on the side of the road about 50 to 100 yards from the Waffle 

House, walking towards the crime scene.

Officer Castro stopped his car and called to the defendant 

to come over to his patrol car. The defendant, Garrick Newton, 

at first looked around and hesitated, but as more police cars 

approached he complied. When he reached Officer Castro, Castro 
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handcuffed him and asked him if he had any weapons on his 

person. The defendant said he had a gun in his waistband, which 

the officer found upon frisking him.

II.

On appeal, Newton contests the denial of the motion to 

suppress. He argues that the totality of the circumstances 

surrounding his stop and frisk did not establish reasonable

suspicion that he was involved in any criminal activity. This 

court reviews a district court’s findings of fact during a 

suppression hearing for clear error, while its legal 

determinations are reviewed de novo. See Ornelas v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). Because the district court 

denied the motion to suppress, the evidence is construed in the 

light most favorable to the government. See United States v. 

Black, 525 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2008).

An investigative, or Terry, stop like that undertaken by 

Officer Castro “is constitutional when it is supported by a 

reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is 

engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Quarles, 330 

F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Police can undertake pat-down searches of individuals 

during a Terry stop if there is a reasonable, articulable 

suspicion that the person is involved in illegal activity and 
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armed. See United States v. Raymond, 152 F.3d 309, 312 (4th 

Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 

1107-08 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding “brief but complete restriction 

of liberty is valid under Terry”). Reasonable suspicion 

requires more than a “hunch” but less than probable cause, and 

it may be based on the collective knowledge of officers involved 

in an investigation. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 

123-24 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The existence of reasonable suspicion “does not depend on 

any single factor, but on the totality of the circumstances.” 

United States v. Singh, 363 F.3d 347, 354 (4th Cir. 2004). In 

determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to 

effectuate an investigatory stop, “we assess the relevant facts 

known to the authorities and decide whether those facts, ‘from 

the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,’ 

give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause.” Id.

(quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696); see United States v. 

Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 1989). Even factors 

which, by themselves, might suggest innocent conduct can amount 

to reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct when taken together. 

See United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004). 

The district court correctly concluded that based on the 

totality of the evidence available to the authorities and 

reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom, Officer 
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Castro had a sufficient basis to detain Newton for questioning 

in connection with the reported armed robbery. When Officer 

Castro stopped Newton, he reasonably believed, based on the 

police dispatch, that a man dressed like Newton had committed 

armed robbery only minutes before at the Waffle House restaurant 

located 50-100 yards away. Additionally, when Officer Castro 

called out to Newton, the defendant paused and looked around, 

complying only when more police cars began arriving on the 

scene. It was reasonable for Officer Castro to conclude that 

Newton was the suspect wanted in connection with the alleged 

armed robbery, despite the fact that Newton was walking toward 

the Waffle House. Furthermore, given that the reported offense 

involved a firearm, it was reasonable for Officer Castro to 

suspect that Newton might be carrying a gun. These facts, read 

in the light most favorable to the government, would lead a 

police officer in the same position as Castro to develop 

reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop and search. Accordingly, 

the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 
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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED