J-A24015-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

FREDDIE KING

Appellant No. 2080 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 26, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000712-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., WECHT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED NOVEMBER 23, 2015

Appellant, Freddie King, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered June 26, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 

County. No relief is due. 

We take the underlying facts in this matter from the trial court’s Rule 

1925(a) opinion. 

On December 19, 2013, shortly after 7:00 p.m., 

Philadelphia Police Officers Devon Chadderton and his partner, 

Officer Ryan Hamill, were on foot patrol in the area of 57th and 

Hoffman Streets in Philadelphia, when they observed [King] 

approximately twenty feet away riding a bicycle south on 57th

Street. Officer Chadderton described the neighborhood as 

having a high rate of gun, drug, and gang violence. At the time, 

[King] had a dog on a leash trailing behind him as he rode down 

the street. The officers observed [King] dragging the dog “like 

literally head over heels until [the dog] could regain its own 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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balance....” Instead of stopping after the dog stumbled, [King] 

continued pedaling and dragged the dog behind him for 

approximately thirty yards before the animal was able to regain 

its footing. 

Based upon their observations the two officers followed 

[King] to cite him for cruelty to animals. [King] proceed to a 

residence on Ashland Avenue, where the officers saw him 

standing on the porch. The officers asked him if he had been 

riding a bicycle and if he had a dog. [King] responded 

affirmatively at which time the officers asked [King] to speak to 

them. Officer Chadderton saw that [King] had blood on his lip 

and smelled of alcohol. 

As he approached the officers [King] did so hesitantly with 

his body at a forty-five degree angle as if to hide something or 

as if he was about to flee. Based upon these observations, the 

officers asked [King] to exit the fence that surrounded the 

property. 

[King] complied with the officers’ request and produced his 

identification card. Based on their observations, the officers 

asked [King] to place his hands on the fence so that they could 

perform a pat down of his clothing for their safety. Prior to 

conducting the frisk, [King] was asked if he was armed. [King] 

admitted that he had a gun in his pocket. Officer Chadderton 

then observed a gun in [King’s] pocket and immediately 

confiscated it. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/10/14 at 2-3. 

King was subsequently arrested and charged with carrying a firearm 

without a license, carrying a firearm on a public street, and cruelty to 

animals.1 Prior to trial, King filed a motion to suppress physical evidence, 

which the trial court denied. Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted 

King of all charges. The trial court sentenced King to an aggregate term of 

111⁄2 to 23 months in prison. This timely appeal followed. 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106, 6108, and 5511, respectively. 
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King raises the following issues for our review.

1. Where police stopped appellant on his porch in order to issue 

a citation for a non-violent summary offense, and appellant 

behaved cooperatively throughout the detention, was he not 

unconstitutionally frisked as police lacked reasonable 

suspicion that he was armed and dangerous?

2. Where appellant, after having complied with a police order to 

place his hands against a fence, was asked by an officer if he 

had a weapon, did not his affirmative response constitute 

mere acquiescence to the officer’s authority rather than 

consent to be frisked?

Appellant’s Brief at 3. 

We review the denial of a motion to suppress physical evidence as 

follows.

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial 

court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the factual findings are supported by 

the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from 

those facts are correct.

[W]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution 

and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a 

whole. Where the record supports the findings of the 

suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may 

reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal 

conclusions based upon the facts.

Further, [i]t is within the suppression court’s sole province 

as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight to be given their testimony.

Commonwealth v. Houck, 102 A.3d 443, 455 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted).

The suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record. 

We therefore proceed to examine the propriety of the suppression court’s 
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legal conclusions. Preliminarily, we note that King does not challenge the 

constitutionality of his detention. See Appellant’s Brief at 14 n.4. Rather, 

he argues that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a valid 

frisk. We disagree. 

We observe that—in this case—the issue of when the 

“frisk” began is a pure question of law. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Collins, 950 A.2d 1041, 1046 

(Pa.Super.2008) (en banc) (determination of whether a 

police/citizen interaction was a “mere encounter” or an 

“investigative detention” is a question of law); see also 

Crawford Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Commonwealth, 585 Pa. 131, 

888 A.2d 616, 620 (2005) (“[s]ince the facts are undisputed, we 

are left with a question of law”). Therefore, with respect to this 

issue, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review 

is plenary. Commonwealth v. Bullock, 590 Pa. 480, 913 A.2d 

207, 212 (2006).

As our Supreme Court has explained:

It is well-established that a police officer may conduct a 

brief investigatory stop of an individual if the officer 

observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably 

conclude that criminal activity may be afoot. Moreover, if 

the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on specific 

and articulable facts, that the detained individual may be 

armed and dangerous, the officer may then conduct a frisk 

of the individual’s outer garments for weapons. Since the 

sole justification for a Terry search is the protection of the 

officer or others nearby, such a protective search must be 

strictly limited to that which is necessary for the discovery 

of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or 

others nearby. Thus, the purpose of this limited search is 

not to discover evidence, but to allow the officer to pursue 

his investigation without fear of violence.

Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 560 Pa. 345, 744 A.2d 1261, 

1264–1265 (2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 381 (Pa. Super. 2013). 
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Instantly, the undisputed facts reveal that although King did indeed 

cooperate with Officer Chadderton’s orders to approach and show 

identification, his hesitant manner in doing so led the officer to believe that 

King was about to flee. King’s behavior, coupled with the fact that the stop 

occurred in a high crime area, led the officer to conclude that it was 

necessary to conduct a frisk to ensure his safety. It is important to note, 

however, that the frisk did not commence the moment Officer Chadderton 

ordered King to place his hands on the fence so that he could perform the 

pat down. 

Indeed, by its very definition, the term “frisk” requires tactile 

contact. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 692 (8th ed.2004) (defining 

a “frisk” as “[a] pat-down search to discover a concealed 

weapon.—Also termed pat-down.”) (emphasis added) (italics in 

original); MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 502 (11th 

ed.2003) (defining the noun “frisk” as “an act of frisking” and 

the transitive verb “frisk” as “to search (a person) for something 

(as a concealed weapon) by running the hand rapidly over the 

clothing and through the pockets”); see also Terry [v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 24–25, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968)] (defining a frisk as an 

officer’s “carefully limited search of the outer clothing of [an 

individual] in an attempt to discover weapons which might be 

used to assault [the officer];” further reasoning that an officer's 

justification for a “Terry frisk” must be greater than—or, at 

least, in addition to—that required for a “Terry stop” because a 

frisk is more intrusive than a detention). 

Id. at 382.

What occurred here is that immediately prior to conducting the frisk, 

Officer Chadderton asked King if he possessed a weapon, to which King 

responded in the affirmative. At this point, Officer Chadderton certainly had 

reasonable suspicion to conduct the ensuing protective search for the 
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discovery of weapons.2 See id. at 382 (“[I]f the officer has a reasonable 

suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that the detained individual 

may be armed and dangerous, the officer may then conduct a frisk of the 

individual's outer garments for weapons.”). As King’s admission provided 

Officer Chadderton with the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct the pat 

down, it is simply irrelevant whether the admission amounted to consent to 

the search or “mere acquiescence to police authority.” Appellant’s Brief at 

13. Accordingly, we find no error in the lower court’s denial of King’s 

suppression motion. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judge Wecht joins the memorandum.

Judge Strassburger files a concurring memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/23/2015

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2 We reiterate that King does not contest the constitutionality of his 

detention. His argument on appeal focuses solely on the legality of the frisk.