REF ID:A60469 

TOP ~FRRFT COi~TROL U. S. OfflCIUS 0Nt't EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

CIA MEMBER'S CG1MENTS ON PROPOSALS FOR. CCMINT 

RELATIWS WIT.ii INTELLIGENCE SERV!O&l 

OF I..___ ____ ____,___. 

le> Attached hereto are the camnents or the OIA member of the 

Ad Hoc Camtittee regarding the ditterenaes betwen. the two policy 

proposals which are being submitted to USOIB. It dlould be noted 

that the CIA mmber's proposal represents no radical daparture £ran 

Board practice or stated policy• although the current methods upon 

llhich it is based provide the necessary next.bility for extension 0£ 

CGIINT arranganents with I I to arr;r degree 

desired by USCIB. 

2. The attached discussion, set :f'orth under th.a six major 

differences between th.e two proposed policies~ elaborates the more 

important; aspects of the CIA position. 

TOP SECRET CONTROL 

l:J. S, tlrFIClALS {)fJ[y 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 10-21-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
A EO 3.3(h)(2) 

• Pl 86-36/50 USC 3605 

POIIIT NO.It 

NSA: 

CJA: 

-

o ma -al"' .i.ou 

organizations wera exploited, t.h.e U.So would be at a disadvantage 

in "collaboration11 sincf=l iii hao /s.10 much more to contribute. 

B. Bene~it_~ ~l}.! ,~~~ ~-Q._o..J~..£.1!.£l.e cri~rion l#}icb r~ates 

the degrao of coo-aera~on Wita..!:t1ird E§!:rtie~!. USCIB should assess 

the merits oi' cooperation wit.~ S!i.ch country individually authorizing 

the exchange o£ technical W'onne:tion in order to meat u.s. re• 

quiremen·&s in apoo:tfio f-lelds ol"J.y when definite: profitable quidpro-quo results can be dero,onstmt.ed. 

POilrr NO.II: 

NSA: 

-

CI.1\..: 

A., The ceci~=~9 ..!>.sL!'.~.l!!EP~.£ t eohnical. ,~aaiatnnca.a. 

information and encl~~duct. t.~~_pr,g;rlded i,q__A& oi' these countries 

should be/made on ·i;ha merits of each individual case rather than 

thro.ugh b~6L~€£~t;f .fo~ cOl:r~t~ifrtE:_th,?Se COunt_tlea 

!-§ a grottp. It was on ·i;hia basis that~ on 13 Ii'ebrua.ry 19~3. USC'IB 

O d t..he proviSion 0£ inf orma.tion and technical guida.11cs to 

beyond th.a !imi .. m·l:.ions set. by paragraphs 4 and 5 of Appendix P 

UK.USA Agroom.ant. 

( USCIB: llt/280) • 

-· s 11 .R U!:::il 

' I·~~ !GL\b;i 1Jf:i1L.V" 
OGA 

Bo CIA C~.! ..... 't!!!~-1ill3:.nl.B!£.'i.l. agreElll~t shoul.J!..9-E~ttt to the detriment ot current UoSo COUNT relations with the U.K. 

Ol" C~ --

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- - EO 3.3(h)(2) - - - --

POINT NO.Ills PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

NSA: 

-

CIA1 

-

0 ..... in the event it is agreed that tr.tartite discussions iii. !r80faav&iit&s!.. .. --i0tti£~ OCM :i ell'OHu :.!.t.::. 

"u ··:f.~el:!..!.U~!.f!!.Ufbat---9.J:! such u.s. nsotiations be 

conducted between the u. • and the countq conr:emed without 

direct P!:~icW.Ji~ o.f..!.,j]:!~~"UO'n.! 

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1 UP ~FeffET CONTROL 

II •• l!f FIGIHS QN b¥ 
POINr NO.IV: 

ltSA; 

-

CIA; 

-

11U.S. CCMINT collaboration with the 

should be conducted direct!y betw 

  

B. There ia no assu timeliness 

S!!ili t of NJ: :rran can be 1m roved more ~er stewardship than under present arrangeme .. nt~t. imaliness 

ds}iends upon the establishment o:f secure eJ.ectt'!cal. canmunicationsJ 

int9r-Agency efforts are already under w q to provide theso for 

0ea1'ly warning" material. Regardless of which Agency controls 

these arrangement.a, any available secure u.s. electrical. or 

cour1er facilities could be used tor the transmittal· of desired 

materials, or any Agenay could be requested to establish new ones 

it suc."1 were deemed necessary py USOIBo It isk~ =~~=ed :::t tba 

u.so is alread;y receiving the entire "talce" of____ _ _ __ and wiU oontinu.o to do so under present arran"-= ...... __..C!-....... ..-----' 

~p 8ECRff CONTROL 

, s. OEflc1Ats ONLY 
Eb 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 use 3605 

9 TO~tRt.lfsbfs~ 9 9 

q1:iSiiutyuofuthei Its expected to improve upon 

prov.i.sian of tet;:hm.cal. assistame already authorized by USCIB; 

OGA 

th.el I output ·could be i:limil.a.rl.y improved when USCIB considered it desirable to provide such assistance. 

c. Considerable difticult.y and misunderstanding would result 

ran t.ransterrln· wtheee contacts .fran one UiS. A en to another 

POINT NO. V: 

NSAi 

-

CIA: 

-

"Such collaboration. ab.0111:.d be nsotiated with_third;parjiz 

sovernments or their COONT authorities negotiati-1;!& on an 

otti.0181 basis.If 

(No direct statement) 

** ** 

-4-

TOP gfCRET CONTROL 

11 S, OfFISIALS ONLY 
A EO 3.3(h)(2) 

• PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

UKUSA Agresment £or thi1-d W=rty arrapgernents as "negotiated 

with CGlllIT authorities on an offici.8.1 basis o 11 or course~ 

theseagreanenl\:a 8..."'e oetueen in'temgence services, rather 

than .f'ormal executive agreements binding t,h.e heads of states., 

B •. !lore £om.al· aw-~ements, as envisaged 'bl NSA, woul~ ·. , 

olitidil1 difficult if not i ossible •from the U.S. oint 

of' view. t is understood tna: . A: O manbers are enjoined not 

to make bilateral arrangElllents among t.hanseJ.ves; therei'orea 

concurrence of the u.s. Joint Chiefs 0£ Star£ would doubtl.oss 

be ikraroau1si to to un&>rtaJtiilg aI\Y mo~ formal agreements with J/the/political opinion of' the Department ofte mUSt be cons!~ rGdJ/ and the apptoval. <Jf' the National 

Security Council might be lSquirado · 

· cat.io'n that the intel.li ence chiefs of 

agr0El'nentso e chief' declined to sign the present 

agreement} he is apparently reluctant to discuss CCMJNI' matters 

with his own count1"'3ll1-enJ and he woul.d undoubtedly resent anyattE111Pt to .f'onnalize a.ny of' the arranro;:ents. Tho B'ltuation is 

scmmilat' s..IJ mil ar in I _ intelligence o:t'ficials 

have intormad the U.S .. Army of their unwillingness to undertake 

anything but a persorcl. arrangement. 

D.. £n a .f'Ont1913 _official ar.r-a.ngement, these COlmtrie~could 

b res~ure to bear for a contim.ious increase in the amount 

£ mate f. includ~ end-products, provide~ to than. It 

vould ho di lioiil t ;t not impossible to lim1 t the technical. 

exchange to a profitable quid-pro--quo. This trend has been 

apparont in all the u.s. dealing lfi th Canada. under an arrangement 

which was 01."':l.gina.D~Y based on a. "limited" agreementn 

Eo Formal. agreements would be more difficult to te1'1!Jinate or 

pl.tar then the areaent arrapga;iient13. I£ seourlty or other 

consia:era:t.iona so requir-ed~ the present arrangements could be 

terminated without political di.f.ficulty or diplanatic 

emba.rrassmento It the arrangements were more formal~ this 

would not be pcasibJ.e .. 

POINT NOo VI i 

CIA: 

-

(No direct statement) 

"The basic p~-ai!fl:e under~ the developnent of CGUNT ~amantse u uiB 'fliat maxi...'Tl"Um utfilr.ati.OJ:\ shoul!!_be made Of 

~Q TOP SfCRE:T 4ltHROL 

a. s. OFFlelAL8 6NLY 
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Ao Tlp.s basic principle i·s consonant wl th the desire to 

procure the greates_t poa!±,bl!.,_benefits f'or the u.s. ]RM(NT 

e.tfort. at the Ieaat E.QSSible threat to sec~tz •. Current 

llOOIB policy. and the inata.nt GIA proposal1 make security 

considerations a principal i"aotor in deciding to go beyond 

this basic principle and rel.ease speai.fic categories or 

COUNT informatim to a Third-Party service. The NSA proposal. 

makes no reference to sec-ur:Lty factors1 am. proposes cal.laboratian on a broa.mned base, rather than exchange o£ specific 

categories of inf'o:mation. 

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