REF ID:A66053 A 

SECRET • 

I/ 

,-. 1 ._ •, 

USCIB: 12./16 

3 June 1955 

SB6m' 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

• EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) Subject: Cryptographic Assistance to 1 .... ___ .... PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Reference: USCIB 12./15, dated 24 May 1955. 

Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the reference the enclosure is forwarded 

for consideration in connection with Item 1 of the Agenda f'or t~e 116th. 

Meeting of USCIB. 

USCIB 

Enclosure 

NSA Serial 3809 dtd 3 June 1955. 

USCIB: 12./16 

SECRET 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-11-2014 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 
REF ID:A66053 

SECRET 9 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 

Ml!MORANDUM FOR THE ACTING EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB 

SUBJECT: Cryptographic Assistance to I .... ___ _. 

Serial: 3809 

3 JUN 1955 

1. USCIB 12./15 with inclosures was forwarded to the members of 

USCIB with the information that this matter would be placed on the 

Agenda for discussion at the next regular meeting of USCIB. In order 

to assist the Board in arriving at a decision, comments by the Department of State and NSA members of USCIB have been requested. 

·E.o 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

2. The following comments are submitted: PL. 86-36/50 use 3605 

a. NSA has no information to indicate that immediate .COMSEC 

assistance, as recommended by the Army member, is inthebest interests 

of the U.S. Therefore it is preferred to delay provision of such 

assistance until military operations plans are available. NSA emergency 

and war plans, of course, are in part based on the assumption that U.S. 

military allies will be furnished adequate COMSEC assistance. 

the past. However, the mere supply of cryptographic :materials to these 

countries in the absence of secure practices surrounding the use of such 

materials would probably not effectively improve the level of COMSEC. 

Nevertheless, the supply by the U.S. of such materials could ultimately 

have an effect on the international communications of' these countries 

c. It is assumed that State Department comments will point 

out the difference between the NATO and SEATO structures and any 

corresponding differences in the type and amount of classified information circulated which might affect U.S. security. Except for timing, 

the comments of' the Army member concerning SEATO communications do 

not conflict with the proposals set forth in paragraph 7 of NSA 

Memorandum Serial /2965-A (USCIB 12./15). In the case of SEATO, as 

well asl r it is considered advisable to await establishment 

of a SEATO command structure or determination of definite requirements 

for the COMSEC assistance required to support a military organization. 

Enclosure with USCIB 12./16 dtd 3 June 1955. 

HA:Nt>l.E l/IA GQUN!I' GH.WNEl.S GNU 

SECRET 
" ' " • REf ... .J.P..t,i-66053 A 

13r;CKC1 W 

Serial: .3809 

3 JUN 1955 

d. UK/US collaboration in SEATO CCMSEC matters is considered 

essential. Sane discussion at the working level has been held concerning 

the possible requirement £or a. common c:ryptosystem .for high level planning. 

However, this matter has not yet been referred to NSA by higher authority 

in the U.S. The necessity for a Combined Working Group is not fully 

appreciated in view 0£ the existing close technical liaison between the 

UK and U.S. and the fact that Australia (as well as New Zealand and 

Pakistan) receives most of its CCMSEC guidance and material from the 

U.K. 

,3. It is recommended, there.fore, that the immediate requirement 

be considered on its own merits and that the proposed actions o.f the 

Director, NSA, as set forth in the inclosure to USCIB 12./15, be approved. 

FOR THE DIRECTOR: 

(Signed) J. S. HOLTWICK, Jr. 

Captain, US Navy 

Deputy Chief of Starr 

Operations 

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SECRET