Redently a DCP for the MOL, was provided to me for approval • 

without its having been coordinated with the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (Systems Analysis). The reason for not coordinating the 

paper with ASD (SA) appears to be a misinterpretation of my memorandum of 6 July 1968 which disapproved a suggestion of the ASD (SA) 

to develop DGMs on Communications and Intelligence. 

In the future, I desire that papers on major intelligence issues 

being staffed within the OSD be coordinated with appropriate ASDs. 

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

WASHINGTON. D. C. 20301 

1 3 JAN 1969 

MEMORANDUM FOR Director, Defense Research & Engineering 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) 

Director, National Reconnaissance Office 

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency 
INRO APPROVED 40r2 ) 

RELEASE' 1 JULY 2015), ; 

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TOP SECRET 11, r ,,,...,......,. !LT =LW M7111 

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OFFICE OF THE 811CRET4RT OF DS111191 ‘44•11/1 

i 5JAN 196.. 

.MEMO FOR 

M/Gen James T. Stewart, SAFAL 

B/Gen Busses A. Berg, SAFSS 

Mr. Nevin I. Palley, ODDR&B 

Mr. John T. Hughes, DIA 

Attached are drafts of (1) a letter to the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense on the MOL DCP and 

the recent DDR&E/DIA Study of the value of Vigt.' 

imagery, (2) comments on the same and (3) a 

paper on the value of information on ABM performance 

to war planners. We plan -to send the final ' 

versions of these to the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense the afternoon of January 17. I would 

appreciate any comments you might have on these;: 

drafts in time to consider them inthe,final 

version. I would like your response early- on 

the 17th if possible 

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Archie L. Wood 

Col USAF 

Director, Intelligence Div. 

OASD(SA) 

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MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

SUBJECT: Comments on the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOW Development . 

Paper (DCP) and the DDR&E/DIA Study of Very High Resolution. 

(VHR) Imagery 

The MOL DCP (Tab A) was transmitted to you on December 5,, 1968, for 

signature. Supporting this DCP is a DDR&E DIA study entitled; "The Need 

for Very High Resolution Imagery and Its Contribution to DoD Operations and 

Decisions". At TabPare our detailed comments on this study which I promised you in my letter of 1969. 

The MOL DCP concludes that the need for VHR imagery-is great enough 

and urgent enough to spend more than $1.5 billion on MOL in FY 69 through 

FY 71. I do not believe available evidence and analysis support this. 

conclusion. 

The Value of VHR Imagery 

The MOL DCP and the DDR&E/DIA study argue that VHR imagery will be 

valuable in two general ways. First, such imagery might improve our estimates of the capaoilities of Soviet and Chinese forces, permitting us to 

plan less conservative, and therefore less expensive, forces. Second, 

VHR imagery might provide enough detail about the military chaimcteristics 

of Soviet and Chinese weapons to permit better design of our weapons, 

either to reduce their vulnerabilities or to enhance other aspects of 

their effectiveness. 

The most important example of the first argument is that if the Soviets 

were .to deploy an extensive anti-ballistic missile system (AHM) which could, 

be penetrated by means less costly than exhaustion of the ABM interceptors, 

VHR imagery might reveal these defects. could then deploy a smaller 

offensive force than would otherwise be needed, saving the cost of weapons 

required to exhaust the ABM interceptors. imoi ,s.eof..“%eu-. Kr.s ot+as,41. zealenai

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First, if such.forces were deployed by the two sides, the situation 

resulting would likely be unstable and possiblyvery dangerous. The 

Soviets might not recognize that their ABM is vulnerable. In other words 

they might not be deterred. This could lead to Soviet attempts to exploit 

what they perceive to be some sort of superiority. Obviously such a course 

of events is highly undesirable. Alternatively, the Soviets might accept 

the fact that our penetration tactics will work and proceed to correct the • 

vulnerabilities in their ABM. This eventuality could lead to larger U.S. 

forces to exhaust the improved ABM or to an 4leteeetIen between the 

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opposing forces involving cycles of improved U.S. penetration tactics and , 

Soviet counteractions to these. 

even if the difficulties just described did net exist, significant 

savings could be realized through smaller offensive developments only • 

if a number of conditions are all met. First, a very large 'ABM deployment is necessary for the cost savings to be realized, since programmed 

U.S. offensive forces can tolerate much larger. ABM forces than projected 

in NIPP-69. Second, the ABM must, in fact, be vulnerable to penetration 

tactics other than exhaustion. In short, the ABM system must be both _ - #0,:.eice 

extensive and defective. . 1. 04rOwe. 

,,,,,. 

4M Third, we must discover the ABM vulnerabilities at least one lead-time before additional offensive forces would 

otherwise be needed. Fourth, the ABM vulnerabilities must be such that the 

time between our discovery of a program to correct the vulnerabilities and 

their correction is longer than the time required for us to deploy enough 

additional payload to exhaust the ABM. Fifth, estimates of the ABM mAo, 

vulnerabilities and the time to correct such ABM defect5must be eet-imite& 

with very high confidence since a faulty estimate could lead to compromise 

or loss of our Assured Destruction capabilities. There is little reason 

to believe that any of these conditions are likely to be met. Certainly ., 

the DCP and the DDR&E/DIA study do not make convincing arguments on these 

points. 

The second way VHR imagery might be valuable is exemplified by argu-

- meats on air defenses and armored vehicles. 

Air Defense 

esss 

The DDR&E/DIA study 

ot agrees, for example, that VHR imagery would have 

allowed earlier 'improved estimates of FOXBAT characteristics such as maximum 

speed and range. The difficulty here is.that our penetration capsbilities'-- 

are not very sensitive to these characteristics over rather wide ranges.. .' 

- On the other hand, our penetration probabilities are strongly influenced 

by Soviet air defense capabilities at low altitude. These are, in turn, 

determined mainly by internal electronic characteristics of Soviet airborne radars. Overhead VHR imagery will have no capability against such 

radars. 

Armored Vehicles 

The DDR&E/DIA study argues essentially that our armored vehicle 

design is sensitive, for example, to the largest gun on Soviet tanks. 

VIM imagery would permit a better estimate'of the caliber of these guns. 

This is no doubt true; however, our armored vehicleS are vulnerable to 

e-let-ef other weapons such as rocket launchers and recoilless rifles, 

many of which are very unlikely to be photographed by overhead VHR. 

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Further, Soviet general purpose weapons do-not-hurt us until they are 

deployed in large numbers, an inherently slow process. This gives us . 

time to-gather needed information from direct observation, COMINTsed 

other sources for any response that might be required. In short, VI 

imagery in this case would give us only fragmentary information earlier. 

than it is really needed for an effective U.O: response. 

The Urgency of VHR Imagery 

VHR imagery is not required to determine such things of immediate 

importance as numbers of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive weapons 

and numbers of Soviet, Bloc, and Chinese general purpose forces units, 

where these are deployed, and the equipment they possess. Rather, VHRimagery can contribute to highly refined estimates of the performance of • 

ioaratich systems and refined estimates of the characteristics of developmental 

weapons not yet deployed. The resulting estimates even with VHR imagery 

will be of modest confidence because of a large number of factors: Mese 

kinds of estimates enter our force planning and operations in only secondary ways. We de have some relatively urgent intelligence needs in the 

geheral purpose forces areas, but VI imagery will not contribute much 

to these. In short, a case h s not been made that the need for VHR 

imagery is urgent. On the co trary, there are good reasons to believe that • 

it is not. 41441.41444.■ 14..ra14"N41.4) AP.'") 

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Alternates to MOL . . 

This subject appears not to have been studied formally; however, 

there are evidently alternative systems which might be able to obtain VBA 

imagery at significantly lower cost than MOL, but not as early. 

1. Use of GAMBIT-3 in low altitude orbits. GAMBIT-3 has been flown. 

experimentally much lower than its normal operating altitude. It is possible that the GAMBIT or some modification of it would have performance 

approaching that of MOL. 

2. Use of DORIAN optics in HEXAGON: According to a DDR&E study of 

HEXAGON, dated November 11, 1968, HEXAGON is being designed to carry _ 

DORIAN optics. The flexibility this gives in deploying VH16ptics was 

one of the lesser arguments for HEXAGON. 

3. Development of unmanned MOL only. This option was not presented 

in the DCP. It would appear that a development program,: in which provisions for astronauts were excluded; would be substantially less expensive'. 

than the current MOL program. A satellite designed especially for the 

unmanned mission should also be simpler and therefore less expensive to 

operate. 

There may be other options available. The formulation of all such • 

the DDR&E/DIA,itudy as now constituted, without alternatives to MOL, merely 

options should be done by the 1with DDR&E support. The MOL DCP and . 

advocate MOL and do not present other poiiibly interesting choices. 

. Diguillaitsr HEXAGON HANDLE VIA INDIAN 

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CONTROL. SYSTEM ONIrc 
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RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

ioNDLE vot NAZMAIN 

Summary 

CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY. If 

In sum, I believe we shouyilhave a program eventually to develop a 

VHR capability. I believe VHR may provide valuable information that we 

cannot now obtain, and that it will be a worthwhile marginal addition 

to our collection efforts. I do not, however; believe large savings 

will result, nor do I believe that such imagery will make major changes 

in the confidence with which we estimate Soviet and Chinese threats. I 

do not believe that our need for VHR imagery is urgent enough to. warrapt 

the very high expenditure rates occurring =wand to occur in the immediate 

fUture on MOL. 

Recommendations 

I recommend: 

1. That the MOL DCP be turned into a DCP for 47 satellite. 

2. That the NRO and DDR&E be instructed to develop unmanned alter . 

natives to MOL to obtain VHR imagery. 

. 3. .That the MIR imagery DCP be recoordinated, presenting the options , 

developed by DDR&E and the NRO.. • 

pordsil Alerag rLd 

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TOP SECRET 

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CONTROL' SYSTEM ONLY