r-:. 

. 

-

. 

~_ TQP SECRl!:·tB.ACIGROU?JD IN.PORMATION 

l. A dratt memorandum tor the Director. 111.lbject a Belationahip Between Ccm.municationa Intelligence and Electronic Countenneaaures. 

has been prepared within Plana and Policy Divieion. A cow ot the 

dratt 1• attached as Tab A. .Although the memorandum has not yet been 

8Ubmitted tormall,y. t&illirector vu 1.nf'ormed or its tad.stance, and 

on 12 Novenber 19531 ha obtained a copy tor the purpose ot dell vering 

it inf'omall3' to General Erllkine, Assistant to the Secretar,y or Defense, 

on that date. 

2. On 23 Novanber 19.53, the Secretar.y ot Detene sent a memorandum 

(Tab B) to the Joint Chiefs ot statt and the .Director, requesting that 

the Joint Chieta ot Btatt, adv11Jing w.1.th the Director, undertake a etudT, 

ot the present KI..thT -.!fort and forward recommendations to the 5ecret&l"J' 

ot Defense within one month. Thus tar, the Joint Cbieta o:t Stat.t have 

not requested the Director to .turniah advice on the matter. 

CUBRE?iT COl~SIDERATION 

3. A. proposed poaition by the Director on how BLINT should be 

cQnducted. 1• attached a11 Tab c. The principal points in Tab C are 

iUD.imarimed belows - .,. . -- -

· - a. · fhere 1• a need for thorough coordination (l) betweon the 

aevera.1 JU.INT act1 vitiea, (2) between ELD."!' and the rmaind.er ot el.ectron1ca 

countermeasure& (ICM) activitiee, 1nc1uding jazmning, counter-jawming, cover 

Md deception, etc., and (.3) between ECM and CO?UNT and COMSEC activities. 

-liich coordinatton 1• required to resolve contlicting operations (e.g. jamming 

Vii. O(i(fiT) arid to accomplish an uchange or intor.mat1on and services between 

o1oael,y related actirl.tiea (e.g. COMD;T and ELn"T), whereby those activities _. be conducted in the moat et.tecti ve ~ economical manner. . . . 

b. It i• not considered posaible to coordinate at1atactorily 

through a liaison netwrk l1nk1ng COHD;T and COM.SEC with the several ELTh'T 

and. other :ICM acti vi ti••• 

i;, Coordination muat be conducted vith adequate speed and security, liithout ccctJe111ive interference vith aiaaiona and reaponaibllities, and under 

a coordination poliCJ' appqing w.1.th eflU&l force to all &uthQriti•• concerned. . . . -· 

d. In view ot the man.r activities and channels tJOW concemed, rapid ~ 1ecure c~rdinatio~ will ~u.il"a cloaer org&ni~tional tiea. 

•• <rOKn\T, C<MEc and ECM lhoulcl be reorganised along the follow1ng lineal 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-06-2014 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 
TQP SEQl!l!il = §!C:@!M lfif!PM+!!fm 

(1) USCIB. NSA,. and the Service Cr,ptologic Agencies ahould 

be re-constituted, each retaining md.ating C<JlINT responsibility, and 

acquiring •1mll&r responsibilit:y tor .ELI?t'l'. 

(2) The existing relationship bcfwen CCllINT authorities ~d 

CCltI.NT consumers ehould be Cltp&llded into a ll.1m1lar relationship bett1een 

SIGINT ( COMDT-ELINT) authorities and SIGil~1' conaumera. Accordingq 

jmmning would be a SIGINT CQ.."18Ulil.8l" activity. 

(3) The OOMSEC reaponeibilities ot USCSB, NSA and the Service 

Cryptologic Agencies should be interpreted aa a~ to the 1fhole 

field of aignal aecurity. 

U00?1MENDATIO?i 

4. It 1a recommended that Tab C be approved a.a a basis tor furniahi.JJg 

advice, aa requsted, to the Joint Chieta ot 8tatt. 

2 

TOP SECA.E:l 

------------------- ---- - -
\ 

• ,,.. --- .._ I - •" . ' " I .. 'Ill':•., ~· -i':' 

,.- "'1 -·-,,. ,- ... 

l. J.c.s. Memorandum o~ Policy entitled Joint :Blectron:f.ca Countermeasures Pp~i.sz contains the tolloving detinition ot ECMr 

"That major aubdiv1d1on ot the military use or electronics 

involving actions taken to reduce the military effectiveness 

ot enemy equipment and/or tactics emplo1iag or attectecl b7 

electro-magnetic radiations." 

2. !:LINT f'alls within the scope ~ ECM activities.. The term ELINT 

is generall)t understood to ref er to knowledge derived from intercept and 

analysis Of foreign non-communications electronic radiations. 

3. Public Lav 5131 8lat Congress,, 13 May 19501 der1nea communication 

intelligence as ~ollova• 

"The term 'communication i:o.tell:S.gence' as use4 herein should 

be construed to mean all procedures and methods used in the 

interception or communicationa and the obtaining of 1ntormation 

trom such communications b;y other than the intended recipients." 

4. "CQUNT" is defined 1n HSCID ?io. 9 (Rev1aed) as tollOvai 

"As used in this c1:1.rective1 the terms 'communications intelligence' 

or •t::CJaNT t shall be construed to mean all procedures and methods 

used in the interception ot coDDnunications other than foreign 

press and propaganda broadcaats and the obtaining ot intormation 

trom auch communications by other than the intended recipients, 

•but shall exclude censorship and the production and dissemination 

*See Public La.w ;13,, Slat Congress, 1950 

I" .. : .. 

-.. _ ...... 

I 
r . 

• • • - - "'"••-• "" "'" T ............. ...--.- ....... -· • ---•1r .. - "'•P' • • ._ • I 

REF ID:A66173 

'~·~OP SECRE' i 

ot ~1n1shed intelligence." 

,. RSC 168, dated 20 October 1953, 4et1nes "communications sec1.1l"it1" 

(COOEC) as tollows: 

"The protection reuu1t1ng :trom al1 measures de•igne4 to denf to 

unauthorised persons information ot value Which might be d.er:l:ved 

fltom the poa•eea1on and •tud7 ot telecomm1,1D.1cat1ona, or to 

Jld•leail. unautborize4 persona in their interpretation of the reaulta 

at such a. atud7. Communications aecwrit;y includeat (1) trans• 

•1H:1.on security, (2) crypto .. aecurit;r, and (3) physical security 

Of communications eecur:tt;r material• and information." 

6. There are certain baa1c relationships between mM. COMI?f.I!, and 

COMSEC. The s• relationships exi•t regardless ot the arrangements Yhereb1' 

!CM, COMlllT, and COMSEC f'unctiona are conducted. Amon& the basic relationahips ares 

a.. Common purposes ECM, CClolINT, &D£1. COMSEC activities are conducted 

ror the purpose ct waging radio vartare, wherein each aetivit7 contr:lbutea 

'toward the u.s. obJect1ve• ot (l) deriving maximum benefits trom u.s. and 

foreign a1gti.e.ls and (2) reduc1q the benefits 'fliich tbe enellJ •1 gain .t;rom 

u.s. and foreign (:tnclucling hie vvn) signals. 

b. !!lated funct~ons a C<JISEC is largel7 a matter ~ protec:ting 

TJ.s. commun1cat:lons against enemy CCJ.Dl'IT actiTit71 8.ni.-~ tunctiona or 

COOOO anc1 COM!N'l' therefore are cloael;y relate4. In the tield r4 noncommunicattona a1gnal11 there are several :f'uuctions •:lmilar to CO.Mllf.r or 

COMSEC. In 'P61'ticula.r 1 CCMtl'f.I! aD4 ELIN'.f author1tie• eaplo7 similar tJPe• 

a.l tacilitiea1 personnel, and techniques in the collection and. procesaing 

2 

TCiP SECRET' 
REF ID:A66173 

ot fore:lgn algna.ls. 

e. .IiteE4efemdene~a An excbange Of iiilormat:lon an!. services 

between ECM, COMI:N't,. and COMSEC is requh"ed. ror e~le, selective 

Jamming ot f'ore1gn. communications 1• not posa ible unless 1 t 1a closel7 

aup»Orted b7 COMIHT. 

, 

TOPSECREi""' 

---- ---------=:a::-- .!!'!!' -- _£&::! 
·! -· ~:.:,, ~ ~r'- t~~ _ ... -~ ;' ,r: __ .. jl -~f_ _ _:__:!:.._~~-

. . rot1¥"CM!C'i~ET Security lflformatiun 

COQRPINATIQN B&TWEEN ECK1 COKll'T 1 AND qamEO ACTIVITIES 

1. 9q2£41nat1on R5uired1 

a. COMINi and COMSEC activities ahould provide the tollowlng 

t;ypea of information or eervices to iCM authoritiea1 

(1) Information on CCMD;T or COMSEC equipnente and techniques . \thich could be applied advantageoualy to ECM problems. 

(2) Intormat1on and proposals regarding conflicting operations 

oX' undes1rf.bl.e duplication of ettort. 

(3) ECK function• when auch aervicee are apec1ficallJ" requested. 

(4) Sharing with ECK authorities certain COMDIT o;r CCJGEO 

reaourcea. 

b. .Additional types of intormation or aervicee which ahould be 

.turniahed b;y CQUNT activitio• to ECK author1t1ea includes 

(l) 'l'ech.nical intercept data tor UH 1n the control ot active 

communications counte?meaaure11, and tor use in identit,ying signals 

encountered. in the course ot mn-coMIL'T intercept. 

(2) COMI:t.'T end-producta required tor E.CH plans and operatione. 

(.3) Non-ca11munica.tions •ignal• encountered in the courae ot 

CCXUh"T activ1ti•a. 

c. ECM acti'V'itiea ehould provi.de the tollow1ng types ot information 

or •ervicets to COMINT and COMSEC authoritieaa 

(l) Intormation on ECM equipnenta and techniqueo which could be 

•pplied advantageoullly to lOOM problems. 

(2) Information and propolll.1 regarding conructing operations 

. or undesirable duplication ot effort. 

TOP SECKE1"' 

-= 
:toR §g;ga~; mmm P!fflRH'-!iW!4 

(.3) COMINT or OOMSEC tunction11 when such services are 

spec1.f'ical.:cy- requested. 

(4) Sharing with CCJIINT or COMSEC authorities certain .&:M 

resources. 

d. Additional types of 1rlt'onJat1on or 1erv1ces which ahould be 

.turmshed b,- ECM activities to COMD.:ot authorities includes 

(l} Ch&racterietioa ot non-comm.unicat1on1 aignals for uee by 

COMINT authoritie1 in identit,ying 111,gnala encountered in the couree ot 

CQ~INT intercept. 

(2) ECM end-product• vhioh wuld be required ae collateral 

intelligence tor COM.n'T prob1ems,. 

(.3) Communicat~ona ·~~ _and ~ther CCII.INT materilll.• Qbta.1.ned . . . in the course ot ECM activit:lea. 

··2. 9utrent 8tatua. There 11 m;-pouey- 8oveming the m:~hange ot 

intormation and aervicea betwen COMl.~"Tf C~~' and ECK authorities. In 

the absence ot a coord.in&tion policy, liaiaon betwen the cr,yptol.ogio and 

. ltM authoritieit ia·--concfuQted at the .. initiative ot the reaponaible authorities 

Qt either aido lroder llhatevtr &J;Tangement1 are mutu~ acceptable. For 

uampl.e. the Di,re~tor. NSA, and the ~ir~ctor, Ccmnunic~tions-Electronice have 

'"'.,Prsonal.JJ" performed auch liaison on frequent occuio~•· ~heee director• have - . tormed a COIDlnittee wherein their representatives atudy matters or common 

interest. :gc3 a~thor1t1ee a?llO have ~ted COMI:h'T representatives (norm&l.l,y as . - . observer•) in various technical. groupa __ and_ 11Uch COMINT p&rtioip&tion hu been 

benerioial, eapec1al:cy" aa tar aa cOl!mlOn research and developnent intereata &re 1 I• -. - • .,,.. I' • 

... • "O" •- I • -

Qoncorned. ix:j.etin& l1&ieon arran,gemen~a, howev~r, do ~ ID.eet all coordination I • I r • • l - • i:., .,r L 

requirements. lurther extensions or the lla1aon netwrk wiU make it quite 

complex from the stand.point ot organisation, and will imre&se operating costs 

2 

TOP secr:.:~T --.:.. .. ;:-- L=-==• 
REF ID:A66173 

--op SECRl£T Security Jntgrmation 

in view ot manner in which key peraonnel muat devote a conliderable portion 

ot time in meetings and on other liaiaon d.utie•• Additional. deficiencies 

under m::iating liaison arrangements include frequent failures to obtain 

unanimity. the tiJlle-conauming processes ot reaching acceptable compromises. 

and the security restrictions which often prevent a comprehensive exchange 

ot information and •ervice11. 
- --

---.. -- ..... 'I". - ·-~---...;•· 

PI«>POS.§1> PQSITION BI THE DIREQTOR amARD,ING TffE 

Plf AR'l'MENT OF PEFENSE SURVEX OF p.INT 

1.. In view of the vital importance or aateguarding OOKIHT, u.s. 

COMINT polic;y and techniques have developed under condition• ot 1trict 

compart.mentation. .Although the principles ot the poll07 and technique• 

thus developed. ordinar!q cannot, and are not intended to be applied. to 

non-COMINT activities, it is expected. that several such principles are 

applicable to the ELINT e!'tort.s ot the u.s. A 5WEIJl&1"1 of applicable 

principles 1a turniehed herewith tor consideration by the Joint Chief a 

ot Statt in connection with their current survey or EI.INT. 

2. Aa one ot the baaio principles of OOMINT (and it applies equalq · 

to EI.INT and to intelligence derived from. any other eource), the oftic1&le 

'Who uee the end-products in the planning and execution of operations should 

be relieved wherever poae1ble ot the tasks ot producing, aynthea1s1ng, and 

evaluating intelligence. Such taeka require the tull time ettorts ot large 

numbers or technicians and adminiatratora •ldll.ed in a variety of highl7 

epeoialised. tielda. Intelligence atatla therefore ehould be provided. tor 

the tunationa ot 

a. Ascertaining intelligence requirements and priorities in 

coordination with the ottioiala who uee the end-products, and 

b. Obtaining the intelligence and tumiehing it to thoee 

ot.t'ioiale in & torm best wited to their needs. 

3• In order to avoid duplication ot ettort, the individual intelligence 

atatts ordinarily ehould not have operational or technical control over 

COMINT collection and production resources. tkldesired duplication or ettort 

TOP SECRl!IT -- - ---. . - ... 
\ 

'\ 

\ 

.. . , ~ .. " ... ~. 

: ; 

;, eonceivabq oould occur 1n a program which is uneconomical and 79"t 

effective. However, in view ot (a) the great quantities and types ot 

toreign tranllDliaaions which should be intercepted. and processed to meet 

the total requirement• of OOHIN'l' consumers and (b) the present ditticulties 

ot meeting the minimum conBUJD.er requirements with existing collection and 

production tac111t1es, arrr undesired duplication ot ettort 1f0Uld reduce the 

e.t'.teot1venese ot COHINT while 1noreaadng the coat. Operational and technical 

control ot OOMINT collection and produotion therefore mu.st be centralised • 

.Accordingly, the Director, NSA, 1a responsible under the Secretary ot 

Detenee tor such control over all COMINT collection and production resources 

ot the u.s. In exeroiaing this reapone1b111t7, he .turniahea COMINT to the 

intelligence atatta in accordance with requ.1rement1 and pr1oritiea indicated 

b,y those statrs. 

4. The several departments and agtmciea participating in OOMIHT 

activities may conaider it necesa&r7 to advise and make recommendation• to 

the Secretar.y of Detenee with reapect to mattera relating to COM.INT which 

tall within the jur1edict1on ot the Director, ISA. Thea• department a and. 

agenoies mq aleo consider it neceee&17 to coordinate on other •ttera of 

OOHINT pol107 or operations. The instrument tor tilling the needs indicated 

above ie the United States Ccmnunicationa Intelligence Board (CJSCIB). A 

more detailed description ot the Board and the Naj.ional Securit7 Agency 11 

contained 1n National 5ecur1t;r Council Intelligence Directive lo. 9 (Revised). 

5. The principles discussed 1n paragraph 3 and 41 above~ it applied to 

ELINT, 1rrOuld place under one authority the reaponaibilit7 tor operational and 

technical control ot ELIRT collection and production resources. That authority ementa 

1'i!adp~!t\.lfl\\'fu.~~t~tt}l-1=c;,e .tim~ 1i ~:.ci~d11!h .~ti1Sl¥shed aa 

TOP SECR.E1"* 
~ ....... ___ .. __ - ~- ........ ,...., ___ .,. ....._,.~ 

- I ... "ir-,_. ~- _, .... .r 

l 

\. _ _,,,-.. -----~ --

u, 1Pa~nt vllereb;y the aever&l. depe.rtmente ima. egenciea part:lct:pa.tiq ... ;. . ,,. - - , - ' .. ~- ....:. ... ~ -- ' - - - - - ..... ~ .... 

in Jll4ft ..ct1vitie11 VOUl4 c~te OD matter• ~ ILIIT policy aD4. 

o.perationa. 

6. ~ ke;y to ettect1ve an4 eccmanical ccmduct of BLD1'l! 1a tborough . . 

c001'¢l.Dat:lon (a) between the HVeral ELIIT activitie• u4 ('b) between &Lift 

ad the nlate4 act1T1t1ea Yld.ch izatl\lence or are atteatecl gy ELIH. The 

related act1"f'1tiea 1Dclude t.bose wbich are enpge4. 1n other electrcm.ics 

countermeea\ll"ea (a), C<Mt11'r, and tbe CCJ11V Gd decept1CG u:pecta ~ CCMSEC. 

!be relationships between la(, coon, 8ZJ4 Ca4SEC are cUJlcuaaed in Incloaure i. 

~ ~t 1tl41c~ in ;paregraph 51 above, 1• cae ~ eeveral pasaible 

an.-mJgementa whereby coordination mq be achieved between the eeveral BL.m'l 

or lUI actiVitiea. For example, 1r& lieu ot centralised control or~ 

collect10D ano. production, it Jll8i1' M possible to maintain clme l.1aiaon - \ 

t.h9 llevenl m.m eollectora, :proclucen - COllB-· ci.i llLDl'l - Other r 

mtters which 1nf'luence or are affected by camn ar ~. hoVever, the . . 

Director, EA, 4oea zwt coca1cler it possible to achieve aatiatactory coord.1xla .. •\ ! .. ticn th1:'ough a l1a1eon network.. ~ extent ot coorcllnation requlred between \ · 

ECH, camr.r_, 8D4 C<HJEC act1Tit1ea 11114 the current 1tatus or 1uch coord.1Dat1on 

are outlined 1n Inclosure 2. 

7. In the light ~ tbe inf'omation couw.ned in tho 111cloeurea, it 1a 

COl181de:r:ed eeaent1al. that mt, Ct:Hmr, Ill.Id Cam&C coor41nation. 'be achieved .. 

\mder a poliq which wul4 aw'l:¥ with equal farce to all authorities cmcemed. 

Buch a pollc7 ahoul.4 be prcmulgate4 'b7 the lecretar)>' ot Defense 1 u the 

authority haviJla caminon .1ur184iat1on O'l'e1' ICM, C<JID1l1 an4 CCl«SEC act1v1t1••· 

In tormulat1ng that polley 1 the requireJ!lenta tar exc>w.np r4 inf'armaticm an4 

services (as 1n41cate4 in lnclosure l.) ahoUld be renewed. In the course of 

the reviev 1 the f'ollov!JJ8 conditiQDS ehoul.4 be cons.td.ered. and all f'oraeeable 

TOP SECRET 

---'!:, -=- ''l ~ ..... ":'; 
\. 't 

reeolved1 

a. hohanges which voulcl cause excessive 1l'lterf'erence Yi th ECK, 

CCllIH ar came Jliaaiooa 8124 reeponsibilitie• (auch u the placi.Dg ot a 

CCJa1l'l recpirement an a :t.IBRS': mission which 1a alree.Qy over-Joeded vith 

3CK requiraaenta). 

1h lxobaDges Vh1ch voul4 be J.Qcona111tent with md.at1Dg aecur1t;y 

aafeguar48 (such aa tbe releue ~ CCHI1I'? co&Nord •ter1al8 to DCD.-1D4ootr1nate4 

pena:mel). 

c,. Bxc.beneea Vhich must be cmplete4 v:l.tboUt «e:iq through the 

m2n:tmm peible fcxma.1. or 1.rd'ormal. cl:lemlele (such ea CC'lllft au,pport to 

~catimas countermeasures). 

8. ~ policy mentioned 1D ps.r88l'&ph 7 1 llboYe, •haulA provide ¢&mce 

on boW to resolve ccmtlicts Vb.ich 'lla3 arise 1n the course ot JOI, CXHil'.r, 

and CCHSBC act1vit1ee. Aa u. example rd :poaa1ble cantlicta, .1ammSng programs 

my 1ntert'ere ¥1th COIIft ef'torta. 

9.. ~problem. ot f\lll lmd. rree acbuge, aa mentioned 11'1 :peragraph 7, 

above, llG4. the contlici. ref'erred to in paragraph 8, above, moat ~ cazmot 

be resol.ved unless liberal. cancessicma are mac1a by EQl or camr.r and CQISEC 

authorities on (a) matters ~ reapcmaibility tor (1) their :reapective functions, 

and (2) tor tho aiwerv1111on ot exchange aativ1t1ea and other coord111ate4 

act1ou, (b) aeaur1't7 p.r.-acti"S' or (c) time-lap 1n tl3e receipt ot exchaD,ge 

material.8 u4 1A the CCJmPletian of otller coordinated. acticma. Buch con.ceaa1ana 

•haul4 ~t be mao.e on tbe •ttera of t1mel1neaa anG. 1eaur1v. 'l'be pa1b1li t1ea 

ot uh1eving am.table coortinatica 'by eatabllahing cl.Ofler organisational ties 

between l<K llD4. CCllD'J:-cc:MSBC activities •boU14 be ilrveetip.ted. 

'l JO. !l'be Director, IBA1 4oea not have &IQ' ILift reapcma1bil1t1ea u4 4oea ru>t 

\ 

~,~op SECRET 
,-

.. -~ 

. - . .. - ..... - - - -. ICll ettort. b XU.rector thereto.re baa not reacbe4 ~ t1nal. canclws1cas 

cm tbe moat &111.table orpnizat1om' ~ta tar~ the ltH, 

CCIOJl'J!1 8Dd CCJfS!C efforts. fm. the baaia ot a 8llJ8l'&l Jmovledge at the D 

Ul4 a Geta1led Jmowle(lp ot CClllft Ul4 CCll3EC ettorta, 1t 1e tentatively 

ecmclur.1ed that the 110at ettect1ve U4 ecODClld.c;al 01"gui1&tico atructlU'e tor 

canduct1Da these efforts vould be ea outlilled b~lows 

a. U3CIB1 ISA, 8Dd. tba Service C:ryptoJ.oaic Agencies ahoul.4 'be 

re--caut1tuted1 each retaining exiatir.lg CCIUl'l autbority 01." reeponaib1l.1ty, 

u4 acqU1r111g aim1lar iups1b111t;r or autbor1ty tor tlJe BLil'l activ1tiea 

of the U.S. '\ACO~l 

(J.) J'rca. tbe •~111.t ot reapom1b1li ties 1 the 41et:lnct10E1 

between camnm1cat10DB e1gnalal and ru:m.-coammicaticms a1gne1s would. 

cease to exiat. (bre actually i.a zaaver 'been a clear ddma.rcatton I 

between tbe two.) De term "cammwcat1ona" and "•ign&l•a ~ 'be 

\ 

c:aaa14erec1 ·~, an4 tbe preemt aiga.1t1cance ot "C<llIIT" ,. 

"&I.Il'l", canbine4, VOUl4 be a:iboclied. m the term •uom" (•igDal. \ 

I 

in.teW,pnce). \ \ 

(2} In general,. tbe autl!Or:l.'t7 O?: re&J)OD81bility ot u:JCIB, EA, ' 

the ea.ma terma as tbose nov WJe41 except tor the 1Ubatitut1on ot 

(3) lo changes ill U3CIB re;pre11entatiaa. vould be require4 .. 

I 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

(4.) The Director, ISA, voul4 have a c1Y1lian 6'INt7 Vboeo •tma:q \ 

napons1b1lity WOUl4 'be to eosure the mob1l1zat1an. 8114 ettectift \. 

~t ot the best available lDlmm 804 IC1Gt11'1c resources ~ 

't.be 1'1elda or ma.arr u4 other cqptologic reeearch "14. &wel.opaent. 

\ 

~i ·op SECRE~ a 
b. The mating relation.irl.p betwen COMI.h'? aut.hor1tiea and CCIUh"l 

conaumera (including the machiner.Y tor stating requirements and reso1"dng 

co.ntlicts) ehould be u.panded into a •imSJ&r rel.ationahip betwen SIG:U.'T 

authorities and SIGDiT consumera. Accordlntb', the jamming ot enemy d.gna.l.s. 

initiative decepUon. and other ECK programs direat]1' related to SIGit."1' "°'1ld 

be baaed on SIGih'T, coordinated with SIG.INT authorities, and conducted t,,. 

SIGll."T consumers. 

c. The CQil.5.EC authority or responsibilities ot the United states 

Ccmnunication Security Board (USCSB), NSA., IU'ld the Service Cryptologic Agencies 

8hould be interpreted u appl,ying to the whole field ot llignal. eecurity. 

Acco~, d.etenaea again•t 9llelD3' jamming, u.s. manipulative deception, and 

other ICM programs direct:q Nlated to a1gnal. 11ecurity would be based on 

technical 1ntormation .turn18hed b.Y cryptologic agencies, coordinated v!th 

llignal. aecurit,. authoritiea, and conducted by' the authorities reaponaible tor 

the operation ol •isnll• equipment. 

d. With respect to :&CM matters having both SIGil\"T and aignal. eecur1t, 

f-Pl-1.catj,ona., no mpecial. problem.a ot coordination are toreeean. For uample, 

coord1n&t.1on channel.a have alread1' been eltablilhed between USCIB and uscss, 

and in the cue ot NSA and the Service Cryptologic Agencies,. it wul.d be a 

matter ot int.ernal coordination. 

11. An organisational atructure •uch u i• outlined 1n paragraph 10, above, 

1• baaed mole:cy- on u.s. national cona1d.erat1ona. Bene.tit• or wch an organiu.tion, 

howver, 1110ul.d. &lao be real.1.1ed 1n Britieh-U.I. l.1&1.11e>n on SIGIL'T matter• and 

1n the planning and operation o! 8IGDT under allied headquarter•• The British 

organisation tor 8IGlliT 1• esaential:q the nrne aa outlined albove, but the 

Briti•h, 'Nhen collaborating 111.th the u.s. at present_ Dillat handle cam'T and 

. IIDT 1epsrate]1. SAC!UR hOW ia pl&ming to org&n111 c~nrr and n act1vit1e1 

in SHAPE, and has conducted a planning conterence tor that purpoae. The 

-:-op SECREai - _ .. ,. 7 
conference wae held during October 19.5), and was attended b7 representatives 

ot the u.s., SACWR, the u.x.,, and Franca. The u.s. representative• (who ,. .. re 

chosen f'rom the ata!.t ot the Director, NSA) maintained that. a oonaolidation 

ot OOHINT and ECK activities within SHAPE would not be in consonance with the 

current U.S. policy and that u.s. contingents to the SHAPE SIGINT organization 

wuld be trained and equipped tor OOMINT or ECM, but not both. All other 

delegates held tirml.7 to the position that all SIGINT activitiee met be cloaeq ' 

integrated. within the SHAPE SIGnrr organisation. The contlict waa not resolved, 

and SHAPE SIG~T planning thus has auttered a severe set-back. 

12. It 11 reconmend.ed that the Joint Chief's ot starts 

a. Concur in the conclua1ona eet torth in paragraph 10, above. 

b. Propose that those conclusions be approved b,y the Secretar,y ot 

Defense. 

c. Propose that the Secretaey of Detenee appoint an ad hoc group 

tor the purpose ot dratting directives intended to reconstitute SIGINT and 

aignal eecur1ty activities :ln accordance with the approved conalua1one. 

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