alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### MAR 2 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

LARRY HARRIS, Petitioner-Appellant,

v. No. 98-3296 J. W. BOOKER, Respondent-Appellee. (D.C. No. 98-CV-3312-RDR) (D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before SEYMOUR , Chief Judge, BALDOCK , and HENRY , Circuit Judges. **
Petitioner Larry Harris, an inmate at the federal penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas, appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In 1988, a jury convicted Harris in the Southern District of Ohio for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute in excess of five hundred grams of cocaine and for attempting to possess with intent to distribute in2

excess of five hundred grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Harris’ convictions on direct appeal, United States v. Harris , Nos. 88-4172 & 4173, 1989 WL 140497 (6th Cir. 1989) (unpublished), and subsequently affirmed the district court’s denial of Harris’ motion for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Harris v. United States , No. 92-4097, 1993 WL 169057 (6th Cir. 1993) (unpublished). The Sixth Circuit, acting pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244, later forbade Harris from filing a second or successive petition for collateral relief under § 2255. In his petition before the District of Kansas, Harris claimed that the remedy under § 2255 was inadequate and thus he was entitled to proceed under § 2241 with his claim that the sentencing court improperly applied the sentencing guidelines. The district court rejected Harris’ argument and dismissed his petition. We have carefully reviewed the record on appeal and Petitioner’s brief. We conclude that the district court properly dismissed the petition and affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the district court’s order of dismissal.
AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court,

Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge
Unassociated Document


    Exhibit
      10.34

    


    


    


    Summary
      of Compensation of the Directors of Generex Biotechnology
      Corporation

    


    On
      May 6,
      2008, the Board of Directors of Generex Biotechnology Corporation (“Generex”)
      amended its policy to compensate nonemployee members of the Board of Directors
      effective immediately following the May 27, 2008 Annual Meeting of Stockholders
      (“Effective Date”) as follows:

    


    
      	
              ·

            	
              Nonemployee
                directors receive an annual cash base retainer. Each nonemployee
                director
                serving on the Board of Directors as of the Effective Date is entitled
                to
                an annual cash retainer of $40,000. Each new nonemployee directors
                will
                initially receive a cash retainer of $20,000, increasing to $30,000
                for
                the second year, and $40,000
                thereafter.

            


    

     

    
      	
              ·

            	
              At
                the discretion of the full Board of Directors, nonemployee directors
                may
                receive stock options to purchase shares of our common stock or shares
                of
                restricted stock each fiscal year. The number and terms of such options
                or
                shares is within the discretion of the full Board of
                Directors.

            


    

     

    
      	
              ·

            	
              Nonemployee
                directors serving on committees of the Board of Directors receive
                additional cash compensation as follows:
                .

            


    

     

    
      	
              ·

            	
              Chairperson
                of Audit Committee

            	$	
              15,000

            
	 	 	 	
               

            
	
              ·

            	
              Member
                of Audit Committee*

            	$	
               5,000

            
	 	 	 	
               

            
	
              ·

            	
              Chairperson
                of Compensation Committee

            	$	
              15,000

            
	 	 	 	
               

            
	
              ·

            	
              Member
                of Compensation Committee*

            	$	
               5,000

            
	 	 	 	
               

            
	
              ·

            	
              Chairperson
                of Governance and Nominating Committee

            	$	
               5,000

            
	 	 	 	
               

            
	
              ·

            	
              Member
                of Governance and Nominating Committee*

            	$	
              2,000

            
	 	 	 	
               

            
	 	
              *Not
                payable to Chairperson of such committee.
<PAGE>
 
                                                             Exhibit 23.1



                      CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS


     We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration
statements of BEC Energy on Form S-3 (File No. 33-59693) and on Form S-8
(File Nos. 33-58457, 33-59662, 33-59682 and 333-30975-99) of our report
dated January 28, 1999 on our audits of the consolidated financial statements
of BEC Energy as of December 31, 1998 and 1997 and for each of the three years
in the period ended December 31, 1998, which report is included in this Annual
Report on Form 10-K/A.



                                 By:  /s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
                                      ----------------------------------
                                          PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP


Boston, Massachusetts
May 12, 1999
Exhibit 32.1



ZOLL MEDICAL CORPORATION

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE

SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The undersigned officer of ZOLL Medical Corporation (the
Company) hereby certifies that, to my knowledge, the Companys annual report on Form 10-K for the period ended October 2, 2005 (the Report), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof,
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company. This certification is provided solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and shall not be deemed to be a part of the
Report or filed for any purpose whatsoever.



|                        |  |  |  |       |  |                       |  |                                                         
|----------------------- |  |  |  | ----- |  | --------------------- |  | --------------------------------------------------------
|                        |  |  | 
|Date: December 15, 2005 |  |  |  | Name: |  | /s/ Richard A. Packer
|                        |  |  |  |       |  |                       |  | Richard A. Packer, Chief Executive Officer and President
Exhibit
      32.2








**Certification
      Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,**


**18
      U.S.C. Section 1350**









I,
      Henry
      Lo, Chief Financial Officer of friendlyway Corporation (the “Corporation”),
      certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18
      U.S.C. Section 1350, to my knowledge that:




1.
      the
      Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of the Corporation for the fiscal year ended
      October 31, 2005 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section
      13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




2.
      the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Corporation.





Date:
      March 8, 2006


By:
            /s/ Henry
              LoHenry
                Lo, Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit24.6

POWER OF ATTORNEY

KNOWN ALL MEN BYTHESE PRESENTS, that the undersigned hereby constitutes and appointseach of Robert K. Kretzman and Michael T. Sheehan or either of them,each acting alone, his true and lawful attorney-in-fact and agent, withfull power of substitution, for him and his name, place and stead, inany and all capacities, in connection with the REVLON, INC. (the"Corporation") Annual Report on Form 10-K forthe year ended December 31, 2004 (the "Form10-K") under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, asamended, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing,to sign the Form 10-K in the name and on behalf of the Corporation oron behalf of the undersigned as a director or officer of theCorporation, and any amendments to the Form 10-K and any instrument,contract, document or other writing, of or in connection with the Form10-K or amendments thereto, and to file the same, with all exhibitsthereto, and other documents in connection therewith, including thispower of attorney, with the Securities and Exchange Commission and anyapplicable securities exchange or securities self-regulatory body,granting unto said attorneys-in-fact and agents, each acting alone,full power and authority to do and perform each and every act and thingrequisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises, as fullyto all intents and purposes as he might or could do in person, herebyratifying and confirming all that said attorneys-in-fact and agents,each acting alone, or his substitute or substitutes, may lawfully do orcause to be done by virtue hereof.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, theundersigned has signed these presents this 8th day of March, 2005.

|  | /s/ MEYER FELDBERG |
|--|--------------------|

|  |
|--|
|  |  |  |
|  |

|  | MEYERFELDBERG |
|--|---------------|

----
, ,, . • 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

REF ID:A67120 • 

Foll011r-:1.ng telephoned t~._ ____ _.ICin the absence ot Brig. Til"brlan): 

1. USCIB met yesterday a:ftemoon in a Special Session and reviewed 

the report ot the .Ad Hoc Cammittee studJing the matter. It accepted the 

Report with a tew changes, which ·will be incorporated in the report and 

10 copies ot the document will be ready to be handed over this afternoon, 

I hope. 

2. This paper is not to be regarded as a pcsition paper because 

we have not as yet reached a firm position on the problems involved and 

indeed USCIB wishes to extend the agenda to incl.ude a review of all the 

conclusions reached at the 19Sl conference on this subject. ISIB is 

being nots.tied ot this otticially right away • 

.3. We hope to reach a firm f>osi.tion after discussion with their 

team and hence we propose to use their paper and our paper as bases tor 

discussion at the conf'erence. 

29 May 19S3 

1045 hours 

~~~ liIWAM ' F. FRIEil.fAN 

Chairman 

US Delegation 

@'pproved for Release by NSA on 05-21-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a
#### La Crosse Plow Company, Respondent, vs. Helgeson, Appellant.

*February 28*

March *20, 1906.*

*Bale of articles Known to the trade: Implied warranty: Express war~ ranty: Evidence.*

1. Where one contracts for a known specified and described article — as a Northwestern cream separator — which is a known article of manufacture in the trade, and receives that article, there is no implied warranty of fitness for any purpose, and, if the purchaser obtains no express warranty, he assumes the risk of fitness.

2. Where an express warranty of workmanship and material is given, it excludes an implied warranty of fitness, and hence testimony offered tending to show unfitness is properly rejected.

Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Vernon county: J. J. Fruit, Circuit Judge.

*Affirmed.*

. For the appellant there was a brief by *C. J. Smith*and *C.*W. *Craves,*and oral argument by *Mr. Graves.*

For the respondent there was a brief by *McCormell & Bchweizer,*and oral argument by *Mr, Bchweizer.*

*623WiNSlow, J.

This is an action to recover the purchase price of ten cream separators sold and delivered by the plaintiff corporation to the defendant under a written contract which warranted them to be of good material and workmanship, and further provided that:

> “No implement returned under warranty will be credited in account, but will be made good and returned or other implement sent in its place as you [the purchaser] may select.”

The separators so contracted for and delivered were not manufactured by the plaintiff, but by another manufacturing firm, and were called “Northwestern Cream Separator.” The defendant admitted the sale and delivery, and pleaded by way of counterclaim that the separators were warranted to be fit and proper machines for separating cream from milk, and that they were not fit and proper for that purpose and would not perform the work they were warranted to do, and that the defendant was damaged thereby to an amount exceeding the purchase price. At the close of the evidence a verdict for the plaintiff for the purchase price of the machines was directed, and the defendant appeals.

It seems to us very clear that the verdict was rightly directed, for at least two reasons.

1. The cream separators ordered and sold were the “Northwestern Cream Separators,” which were known articles of. manufacture in the trade. The defendant received exactly the articles which he contracted for. The rule is that when a person contracts for a known specified and described article, and receives that article, there is no implied warranty of fitness for any purpose. If the purchaser obtains no express warranty, he assumes the risk of fitness. *Milwaukee B. Co. v.*Duncan, 87 Wis. 120, 58 N. W. 232.

2. There was an express warranty of' workmanship and material given, and this excludes an implied warranty of fitness, so the testimony which was offered tending to show that certain of the machines did not satisfactorily separate cream *624from milk was properly rejected. *J. I. Case P. Works v. Niles & Scott Co.*90 Wis. 590, 63 N. W. 1013.

*By the Court.*— Judgment affirmed.
ID 

Union Calendar No. 319 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 1698 

[Report No. 114–418] 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 30, 2015 

Referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

FEBRUARY 9, 2016 

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union 

and ordered to be printed 


asabaliauskas on DSK9F6TC42PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1698 RH

A BILL 

To exclude payments from State eugenics compensation programs from consideration in determining eligibility for, 

or the amount of, Federal public benefits. 


asabaliauskas on DSK9F6TC42PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 1698 RH

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Treatment of Certain 

5 Payments in Eugenics Compensation Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. EXCLUSION OF PAYMENTS FROM STATE EUGENICS 

7 COMPENSATION PROGRAMS FROM CONSID8 ERATION IN DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR, 

9 OR THE AMOUNT OF, FEDERAL PUBLIC BENE10 FITS. 

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi12 sion of law, payments made under a State eugenics com13 pensation program shall not be considered as income or 

14 resources in determining eligibility for, or the amount of, 

15 any Federal public benefit. 

16 (b) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section: 

17 (1) FEDERAL PUBLIC BENEFIT.—The term 

18 ‘‘Federal public benefit’’ means— 

19 (A) any grant, contract, loan, professional 

20 license, or commercial license provided by an 

21 agency of the United States or by appropriated 

22 funds of the United States; and 

23 (B) any retirement, welfare, health, dis24 ability, public or assisted housing, postsec25 ondary education, food assistance, unemployVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:57 Feb 09, 2016 Jkt 059200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1698.RH S1698

asabaliauskas on DSK9F6TC42PROD with BILLS
4 

•S 1698 RH

1 ment benefit, or any other similar benefit for 

2 which payments or assistance are provided to 

3 an individual, household, or family eligibility 

4 unit by an agency of the United States or by 

5 appropriated funds of the United States. 

6 (2) STATE EUGENICS COMPENSATION PRO7 GRAM.—The term ‘‘State eugenics compensation 

8 program’’ means a program established by State law 

9 that is intended to compensate individuals who were 

10 sterilized under the authority of the State. 


asabaliauskas on DSK9F6TC42PROD with BILLS

asabaliauskas on DSK9F6TC42PROD with BILLS
Union Calendar No. 319 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 1698 

[Report No. 114–418] 

A BILL 

To exclude payments from State eugenics compublic benefits. mining eligibility for, or the amount of, Federal pensation programs from consideration in deterFEBRUARY 9, 2016 

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 

State of the Union and ordered to be printed 


asabaliauskas on DSK9F6TC42PROD with BILLS
N OTE : This order is nonprecedential. 

# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________ SP PLUS CORPORATION, Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.

IPT, LLC, DBA PAYLOC K, Defendant

- Appellant

______________________

2017

- 1539

______________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana in No. 2:16

- cv

- 02474

- MLCF

JCW, Judge Martin L.C. Feldman.

______________________
O R D E R

______________________

Before P ROST , Chief Judge, N EWMAN and S TOLL , Circuit Judges.

P ER C URIAM

. I T I S O RDERED T HAT : In light of the affirmance in Appeal No. 2017

- 2151,
t his case is dismissed as moot.SP PLUS CORPORATION v. IPT , LLC 2

F OR THE C OURT

December 19, 2017 /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner Date Peter R. Marksteiner Clerk of Court
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.1
 Certification Pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63
of Title 18 of the United States Code
  (i)
    
    The Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2007 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), fully
complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934; and(ii)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 Date:  May 15, 2007
    /s/   JOHN R. GIBSONJohn R. GibsonChairman of the Board of Directors & Chief
Executive Officer
<PAGE>
 
                                                                      EXHIBIT 21



                             THE LEAP GROUP, INC.


                        SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT

THE LEAP PARTNERSHIP, INC., AN ILLINOIS CORPORATION AND A WHOLLY-OWNED
SUBSIDIARY OF THE REGISTRANT.

LILYPAD SERVICES, INC., AN ILLINOIS CORPORATION AND A WHOLLY-OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF
THE REGISTRANT.

TADPOLE PRODUCTIONS, INC., AN ILLINOIS CORPORATION AND A WHOLLY-OWNED SUBSIDIARY
OF THE REGISTRANT.

QUANTUM LEAP COMMUNICATIONS, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION AND A WHOLLY-OWNED
SUBSIDIARY OF THE REGISTRANT.

BAR TV, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION AND A WHOLLY-OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF THE
REGISTRANT.

YAR COMMUNICATIONS, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION AND A WHOLLY-OWNED SUBSIDIARY 
OF THE REGISTRANT.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED JULY 23, 2021

NO. 03

- 19

- 00511

- CR

Calandra Monee Stanfield , Appellant

v.

The State of Texas , Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 27TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY
BEFORE JUSTICES BAKER, K ELLY , AND SMITH

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE SMITH

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court. Having reviewed

the record and the p art ies’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error in the

trial court’s judgment of conviction

. Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment of

conviction

. Because ap pel lant is indigent and u nable to pay costs, no adjudica t i on of costs

is made.
I 

REF ID:A66407 

OFFICE 

WEAPONS 

OF THE 

SYSTEMS 

SECRETARY 

EVALUATION 

OF 

GROUP 

DEFENSE • 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 

17 SP.ptember ir51 

Mr. William F. FriedmP.n 

Ar~ed Forces Security .Agency 

Washingtnn 25, D. C. 

Dear Fr 1 e dman: 

I am much enco\1r~ed by the progress of our 

group, as Avidenced by the me~ti~es this week - which is 

probably a rPflec ti on of my own feeling that I 8lU beg1nn1n.e: 

to have a little better underatand1Il8 of the problems. I 

hn~e, when the present rush of business ovPr here lets up 

a little (asaWii.in& it will!) to come over and do some reading, wider the guidance of ~ourself, Ca:..ipaign and Hall. 

This .ir.orning I wa"l down by Dondero 's, and reir.embering 

your query Et bout thP Jiledal for ?·'.eri t rosette, pi clred one up 

for you. 

Sincerely yours 

- J\\-f>~ 

R. P. RO:sERTSON 

Director of Research 

@'pp roved for Release bv NSA on 09-23-2014 pursuant to E .0. 1352\3 

f'. l..~4.-
NO. 07-02-0400-CR

	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

	FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	AT AMARILLO

	PANEL E

	MAY 27, 2003

	______________________________

	WILLIE LEE NOLAN,

			Appellant

	v.

	THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

			Appellee

	_________________________________

	FROM THE 121ST DISTRICT COURT OF TERRY COUNTY;

	NO. 4827; HON. KELLY G. MOORE, PRESIDING

	_______________________________

	Memorandum Opinion

	_______________________________

Before QUINN and REAVIS, JJ. and BOYD, S.J.1

	Appellant Willie Lee Nolan appeals his conviction for indecency with a child and argues, via one issue, that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Elena Del Toro (Del Toro) was the proper outcry witness.  We overrule the point and affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

	As previously mentioned, the issue involves outcry testimony of the child whom appellant victimized.  Furthermore, the trial court was required to determine the identity of the true outcry witness.  The two possible candidates were the child’s mother (Pam Nolan) or Del Toro.  After hearing the matter, the trial court held Del Toro to be the only witness who could inform the jury of the child’s hearsay comments.  Then, Del Toro reiterated those comments to the jury.    

	Yet, the record discloses that the child herself appeared as a witness.  And, while testifying, she too described, among other things, the sexual acts committed by appellant, which acts were the ones described by Del Toro.  In other words, that imparted by Del Toro under the auspices of an outcry witness was also related to the jury by the child herself.  Additionally, appellant did not object to the child’s testimony.  So, what we have is the same testimony coming from two different sources when no one objected to one of those sources testifying.  

	According to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, “‘inadmissible evidence can be rendered harmless if other evidence at trial is admitted without objection and it proves the same fact that the inadmissible evidence sought to prove.’”  Mayes v. State, 816 S.W.2d 79, 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), quoting Anderson v. State, 717 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).  That occurred here.  Consequently, any error which the trial court may have committed in designating Del Toro as the outcry witness was harmless.

	Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

							Brian Quinn

							   Justice

Do not publish.