J-A19005-14 

 2014 PA Super 227 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

HERBERT RANSON, 

 Appellant No. 1331 WDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 16, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0016897-2012 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON and FITZGERALD,* JJ. 

OPINION BY OLSON, J.: FILED OCTOBER 8, 2014 

 Appellant, Herbert Ranson, appeals from the judgment of sentence of 

one to three years’ imprisonment, imposed after he was convicted of 

receiving stolen property1, person not to possess firearms2, and firearms not 

to be carried without a license3. The sole issue on appeal is whether the 

trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress. After careful 

consideration, we affirm. 

 Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence. 

Specifically, Appellant sought to suppress a firearm that was found on his 

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1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a). 

2

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1). 

3

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1). 
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person following Appellant’s stop and seizure by three police officers. A 

hearing was held on Appellant’s pretrial suppression motion during which the 

following facts were adduced. 

 Detective Tanye Curry testified that he had been a police officer for 18 

years and an officer for the City of Pittsburgh for approximately seven years. 

N.T., 5/16/13, at 3. On December 15, 2012, Detective Curry was working 

an approved off-duty detail for the City of Pittsburgh at the Serenity Club, an 

after-hours club located in Zone 5 of the City of Pittsburgh. Id. at 4-5. 

Detective Curry described the location of the club as a high-crime area. Id. 

at 5. According to Detective Curry, security was needed at the Serenity Club 

as there were prior incidents at the club, including fights, shootings and 

homicides. Id. at 5, 13. The patrons who went to the club included parole 

and probation violators. Id. at 13. Detective Curry worked the security 

detail at the Serenity Club for almost four years. Id. On the night in 

question, the club was letting out at approximately 3:30 a.m. Id. at 14. 

Detective Curry and two other officers assigned to the security detail stood 

in different areas around the perimeter of the club “to make sure nothing 

occur[ed].” Id. at 6. At that time, “a patron of the club stopped [Detective 

Curry] and told [him] there was a male on the corner with a firearm. The 

patron went on to give [Detective Curry] a description and said this person 

was wearing a black hoodie, black jeans, and had a long beard. The patron 

actually pointed the person out to [Detective Curry] on the corner.” Id. 

Although Detective Curry did not know the informant’s name, the Detective 
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saw him on a regular basis as the informant was at the club “every single 

weekend.” Id. at 15. Appellant was the man to whom the informant 

pointed and, at the time he was pointed out to Detective Curry, Appellant 

was approximately 75 feet away from where Detective Curry stood. Id. at 

7. Appellant was leaning against the corner of a building facing the front 

entrance of the club. Id. at 18. In light of this information, Detective Curry 

approached the other two officers and told him what the informant had said. 

Id. at 16. The three officers, all dressed in full uniform, began to approach 

Appellant from the side, at which time Appellant put his hands in his hoodie 

pocket and started to walk away. Id. at 9, 18-19, 20.4 That is when 

Appellant was given the command to stop. Id. at 19. Although the officers 

were all yelling to Appellant to “stop”, Appellant looked back at the officers 

and continued to walk away. Id. at 19-20. At that point, Detective Curry 

pulled his firearm out and held it at the side of his leg. Id. at 9.5 Appellant 

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4

 The record on this fact is contradictory. On direct examination, Detective 

Curry testified that as the officers first approached Appellant, “he was facing 

toward us. As we started walking toward him, getting closer to him, he 

turned and began to walk away from us.” N.T., 5/16/13, at 9. It was on 

cross-examination that Detective Curry said that the officers approached 

Appellant from the side as he was staring at the club. 

5

 The evidence is unclear as to whether the officers had their weapons 

pointed at Appellant. Detective Curry testified that he had his weapon unholstered and out by his side but it was not pointed at Appellant. N.T., 

5/16/13, at 24, 25. Detective Fred Wright, one of the other officers on duty 

that night, testified that he and Officer Kenny, the third officer, had their 

guns “drawn” as they approached Appellant. Id. at 28. 
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walked approximately 50 feet with the officers walking behind him telling 

him to stop. At this point, Appellant finally stopped and turned toward the 

officers. Id. at 21-22. Detective Curry ordered Appellant to remove his 

hands from the pocket of his hoodie sweatshirt at which time Detective 

Curry could see the imprint of a gun through the black sweatshirt. Id. at 

22. Appellant was searched and an operational, .45 caliber Taurus firearm 

was found in the front pocket of his hoodie sweatshirt. 

 Following the hearing, the trial court denied the suppression motion. 

Appellant proceeded to a non-jury trial on July 16, 2013. At the conclusion 

of the trial, the trial court found him guilty of the above-referenced crimes. 

He was sentenced on that same day. Appellant filed a timely notice of 

appeal, as well as a timely concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court filed its opinion in 

accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 

 Appellant presents the following question for our review: 

 

 Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] motion to 

suppress where police lacked reasonable suspicion to believe 

[Appellant] was engaged in criminal conduct at the time that 

they stopped him? 

Appellant’s brief at 4. 

 Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a 

suppression motion is 

limited to determining whether the suppression court's factual 

findings are supported by the record and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the 
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Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may 

consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of 

the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when 

read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the 

suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record, 

we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the 

court's legal conclusions are erroneous. The suppression court's 

legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose 

duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied 

the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts 

below are subject to our plenary review. 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010), cert. denied, 131 

S.Ct. 110 (U.S. 2010) (citations, quotations and ellipses omitted). 

Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the evidence 

presented at the suppression hearing when examining a ruling on a pre-trial 

motion to suppress. See In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1083-1087 (Pa. 2013). 

 It is well-established that there are three categories of interaction 

between citizens and police officers. As our Supreme Court has clearly 

articulated: 

The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for 

information) which need not be supported by any level of 

suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to 

respond. The second, an “investigative detention” must be 

supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a 

stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such 

coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of 

an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be 

supported by probable cause. 

Commonwealth v. Gutierrez, 36 A.3d 1104, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2012), 

appeal denied, 48 A.3d 1247 (Pa. 2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Ellis, 

662 A.2d 1043, 1047 (Pa. 1995) (citations omitted). Under the facts of this 
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case, we find that Appellant was subjected to an investigative detention at 

the time that the three officers commanded Appellant to stop. Our Supreme 

Court has held that where “a citizen approached by a police officer is ordered 

to stop ... obviously a ‘stop’ occurs.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 378 A.2d 

835, 839 (Pa. 1977). Moreover, as pursuit by police constitutes a seizure 

under the law of this Commonwealth, a person may be seized even though 

he is moving away from the police. See Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 

A.2d 769 (Pa. 1996). Thus, the issue is whether the officers possessed 

reasonable suspicion that Appellant was engaged in criminal conduct when 

they issued their command. We conclude that they did, therefore, 

Appellant’s detention was lawful. 

 In denying the suppression motion, the trial court looked to this 

Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Foglia, 979 A.2d 357 (Pa. Super. 

2009) (en banc), appeal denied, 990 A.2d 727 (Pa. 2010) as guidance as to 

whether the investigative detention of Appellant was proper. In Foglia, this 

Court set forth the standard that must be applied in determining whether an 

investigative detention of an individual is constitutionally sound: 

A police officer may detain an individual in order to conduct an 

investigation if that officer reasonably suspects that the 

individual is engaging in criminal conduct. This standard, less 

stringent than probable cause, is commonly known as

reasonable suspicion. In order to determine whether the police 

officer had reasonable suspicion, the totality of the 

circumstances must be considered. In making this 

determination, we must give due weight to the specific 

reasonable inferences the police officer is entitled to draw from 

the facts in light of his experience. Also, the totality of the 
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circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an examination 

of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather, 

even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may 

warrant further investigation by the police officer. 

Id. at 360 (citations and internal quotes omitted). In Foglia, two police 

officers in uniform were on patrol in a high-crime area of Philadelphia in a 

marked cruiser. The officers received a radio broadcast emanating from an 

anonymous source that there was a man standing on a specified corner 

dressed in black clothes who was carrying a firearm. In less than a minute 

and a half, the officers arrived at the designated corner and saw two males, 

one of whom was the appellant who was dressed entirely in black. In order 

to avoid detection, the officers entered the street with their headlights off. 

When the appellant and his companion saw the officers, they began to walk 

away from the cruiser. One of the officers watched the appellant who looked 

back several times but kept walking in the opposite direction. The officers 

stopped their vehicle and exited at which time the appellant grabbed around 

his waist area and sat on some steps behind two females. At that point, one 

of the officers ordered the appellant to stand, informed him that he was 

investigating a male with a gun that fit the appellant’s description, and 

immediately patted the appellant down at which time he found a gun tucked 

into the appellant’s waistband. The appellant was arrested for various gun 

offenses. The appellant filed a motion to suppress, asserting that the 

firearm was seized following an illegal police detention. The suppression 

court denied the motion and this Court affirmed the ruling. In considering 
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the totality of the circumstances, this Court noted that a seventeen-year 

veteran of the police force was patrolling in an area that had a high volume 

of drugs and weapons. This officer received an anonymous tip that a man 

dressed all in black was at a specified location and he possessed a gun. 

Upon immediately proceeding to that location, the officers saw two men, one 

of whom was dressed all in black. That man engaged in evasive behavior by 

continually looking back at police and walking away from them. He touched 

his waistband (where individuals frequently conceal weapons according to 

the officer). Based upon all of these circumstances considered in their 

totality, this Court determined that the investigative detention and 

subsequent pat-down of the appellant was constitutionally sound and, 

therefore, the suppression court acted properly in denying the appellant’s 

suppression motion. 

 Similar to the facts in Foglia, Detective Curry’s decision to approach 

and investigate Appellant was prompted by a tip. However, unlike the tip in 

Foglia which was received over the police radio and completely anonymous, 

Detective Curry received his information in person from an individual who 

frequented the Serenity Club on a weekly basis and whom Detective Curry 

saw regularly. We acknowledge that Detective Curry did not know the 

tipster’s name; however, that fact does not make the tip purely anonymous 

and one that lacked any indicia of reliability. 
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 “In analyzing an anonymous tip, we must determine whether under 

‘the totality of the circumstances’ the informant’s tip established the 

necessary reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.” 

Commonwealth v. Martin, 705 A.2d 887, 892 (Pa. Super. 1997), appeal 

denied, 725 A.2d 1219 (Pa. 1998), quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 

325 (1990). “[Both] quantity and quality of information are considered 

when assessing the totality of the circumstances. If information has a low 

degree of reliability, then more information is required to establish 

reasonable suspicion.” Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 750 A.2d 807, 811 

(Pa. 2000). 

 Appellant argues that the tipster in this case was purely anonymous 

and, therefore, his tip could not be used as a basis to establish reasonable 

suspicion. Appellant’s brief at 14-17. In support of this argument, Appellant 

cites to several cases. However, the facts of the cases cited by Appellant 

are clearly distinguishable from the facts in the case sub judice. In 

Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 692 A.2d 1068 (Pa. 1997), the police 

received an anonymous telephone call that a black male wearing a blue cap, 

black jeans and a gold or brownish coat at a particular corner was carrying a 

gun. When the officer arrived at the location, he saw the appellant, and 

based solely on the tip and the fact that the appellant met the general 

description given by the tipster, the officer stopped and frisked the appellant 

at which time a gun was found in his waistband. In Commonwealth v. 
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Jackson, 698 A.2d 571 (Pa. 1997), a police officer received a police radio 

report of a man in a green jacket carrying a gun. Other than the jacket 

description and the man’s location, no additional details were provided. The 

report was based on an anonymous telephone call. When the officer arrived 

at the location, he saw a number of individuals but only the appellant was 

wearing a green jacket. The officer exited his vehicle and immediately 

searched the appellant. During the search, no weapon was found, but a 

small box containing cocaine fell to the ground. Finally, in Commonwealth 

v. Hayward, 756 A.2d 23 (Pa. Super. 2000), an officer was on foot patrol 

when an unidentified passerby told him that there was a group of six to 

eight males in the park and one of the males, who was “tall”, was 

brandishing a gun. No other descriptive identification was given regarding 

the man who allegedly had the gun. The officer said that the passerby did 

not identify himself and the officer had never seen him before. It took the 

officer ten minutes to arrive at the park at which time he saw a group of 

individuals, including the appellant. The appellant was approximately 6’1” to 

6’2” although there were a couple of other individuals in the group who were 

very close to the appellant’s height. The group of individuals were ordered 

to line-up on the sidewalk at which time they were all frisked. The frisk 

yielded a gun tucked in the appellant’s waistband. 

 In each of these cases, the searches were deemed unconstitutional 

because only general and vague tips were offered to establish reasonable 
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suspicion. In Hawkins and Jackson, the tips were from anonymous 

telephone callers and only broad, general descriptions of persons and 

locations were given. Although the tip in Hayward was made in person, it 

was a vague description of a “tall” male made by a person that the officer 

had never seen before. In this case, Detective Curry received his tip in 

person from an individual he saw on a regular basis and who went to the 

after-hours club weekly. The description of the person was not vague – in 

fact, the tipster not only described Appellant, he pointed him out to the 

detective. Taken together, the facts show that Detective Curry, a veteran 

officer, had an opportunity to assess: (1) the demeanor of the tipster; (2) 

the basis of the tipster’s knowledge; and, (3) the tipster’s present ability to 

perceive Appellant. These facts give additional credence to the tipster’s 

information. 

 The facts of this case are more akin to the situation in 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 980 A.2d 667 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal 

denied, 990 A.2d 730 (Pa. 2010). In Williams, Officer Sean McGinnis was 

on routine patrol when he received a radio call advising of a robbery in 

progress at a particular street corner. Arriving at the specified location, 

Officer McGinnis saw the appellant walking up the street with two female 

police officers walking behind him trying to catch up. Officer McGinnis also 

encountered “a Hispanic male pointing up to the [a]ppellant yelling, ‘He’s got 

a gun.’” Id. at 669. The appellant turned the corner at which time Officer 
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McGinnis pulled his patrol car about 15 feet in front of the appellant while 

the two female officers gave the appellant verbal commands to stop. The 

appellant initially complied with the verbal commands by placing his hands 

against an adjacent wall, but he then ran. Pursuing on foot, Officer McGinnis 

saw the appellant clutch the right side of his waist. Several blocks away, the 

appellant was blocked off by another patrol car at which time the appellant 

pulled a gun from his waistband and tossed it away. The suppression court 

denied the appellant’s motion to suppress the gun and the appellant was 

convicted of various gun offenses. On appeal, the appellant argued that the 

stop was illegal as Officer McGinnis did not have the requisite level of 

suspicion needed to support an investigative detention. In affirming the 

suppression court’s denial of suppression, this Court stated as follows: 

In order to justify an investigative detention, the police 

must have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is 

afoot. Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific and 

articulable facts, and it must be assessed based on the 

totality of circumstances viewed through the eyes of a 

trained police officer. Here, Officer McGinnis had just 

received a radio call advising of a robbery in progress, 

observed [a]ppellant in the immediate vicinity of the 

reported robbery attempting to avoid two female officers 

who were approaching him on foot, and encountered a

witness who was pointing at [a]ppellant yelling, “He has 

got a gun.” 

Appellant argues that the witness’ statement, “He has got 

a gun” is the equivalent of an uncorroborated, anonymous 

tip, and is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion 

justifying an investigative stop. We disagree. Each of the 

cases cited by [a]ppellant on this point involve anonymous 

phone calls to the police regarding criminal activity. The 

situation here, however, is distinguishable in that 
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the tip was made in person, giving Officer McGinnis 

an opportunity to observe the witness’ demeanor 

and assess his credibility in light of his past 

experience with investigating crimes. Such a tip 

must be given more weight than a mere anonymous 

phone call because a person who knowingly gives false 

information to any law enforcement officer with intent to 

implicate another may be held criminally liable. 

Id. at 671-672. (emphasis supplied) (internal citations, quotation marks, 

ellipses and footnote omitted). 

 The tip in the case sub judice is even more reliable than the tip in 

Williams, which this Court deemed sufficient to support reasonable 

suspicion. In Williams, the only evidence was that an Hispanic male told 

Officer McGinnis that the appellant had a gun. There was no further 

description of the tipster or any indication that the officer had ever seen him 

before. In this case, however, Detective Curry testified that he had seen the 

tipster on a regular basis as he was a patron at the club every weekend. 

Like in Williams, Detective Curry had the opportunity to observe the 

tipster’s demeanor and assess his credibility in light of his 18 years of 

experience as a police officer. Thus, the tip given to Detective Curry by a 

regular patron of the Serenity Club was a legitimate factor upon which the 

officer could rely in determining that there was reasonable suspicion to stop 

Appellant. 

 Moreover, there were additional facts that must be considered in 

viewing the totality of the circumstances from the eyes of the officers in this 

case. The Serenity Club was in Zone 5 of Pittsburgh – an area known as a 
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high-crime area. More importantly, the club itself was known to be 

frequented by parole and probation violators and had been the site of prior 

fights, shootings and homicides. Thus, there was a credible basis from 

which the officers could infer that the people in and near the club had 

weapons. Detective Curry and the other officers were specifically assigned 

to the task of patrolling the area around the Serenity Club to make sure 

things remained calm and peaceful. The events in this case happened at 

3:30 a.m., when the after-hours club was closing and the people were 

leaving. Additionally, as the officers in full uniform started to approach 

Appellant from the side (but before the commands to stop were issued), 

Appellant started to walk away. It is reasonable to infer that Appellant saw 

the officers approaching and turned and walked away in an effort to evade 

them. Although each of these factors, standing alone, may not be sufficient 

to establish reasonable suspicion, taken in their totality, they are sufficient 

to have reasonably led the officers to believe that criminal activity was afoot 

so as to justify the investigative detention of Appellant. See Foglia, 979 

A.2d at 361-362 (the anonymous tip, appellant’s attire and location which 

matched the information provided by the anonymous tipster, the high-crime 

area, and appellant’s evasive behavior of walking away from the police as 

they approached were sufficient to support an investigative detention and 

subsequent search); see also Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 751 A.2d 1153 

(Pa. 2000) (an anonymous tip that a male wearing a green jacket and blue 
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jeans was selling narcotics at a specified street corner, appellant’s attire and 

location matching the information provided by the anonymous tip, 

appellant’s action of walking into a restaurant upon seeing the officers when 

officers arrived at the specified location two and one-half hours later, 

appellant’s action of throwing something on the floor of the restaurant and 

then later retrieving it, and the fact that this occurred in a high-crime area 

were sufficient to support an investigative detention).6

 Thus, in considering the totality of the facts and circumstances, and 

after applying our standard of review, we conclude that the trial court did 

not err in denying Appellant’s suppression motion. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

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6

 In denying the suppression motion, the trial court not only relied on the 

facts of the high-crime status of the neighborhood and the club, and 

Detective Curry’s familiarity with the tipster, but it also relied on the 

evidence of Appellant’s evasiveness in refusing to stop after being ordered to 

do so and “his unusual hand movements in refusing to remove his hand 

from his pocket where the gun could be seen, and then returning his hand to 

the pocket with the gun.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/14/14 at 3-4. We do not 

believe that that evidence should have been considered in determining 

whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant. As noted, 

supra, the officers effectively detained Appellant at the moment that they 

commanded him to stop. Thus, only the factors apparent to the officers at 

that time can be considered in determining whether they had reasonable 

suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot. As Appellant’s action of 

continuing to walk away from the officers after being told to stop, and his 

hand movements with respect to the gun, occurred after Appellant was 

commanded to stop, that evidence cannot serve as a basis to support the 

denial of the suppression motion. However, as there were sufficient factors 

to support an investigative detention at the time that Appellant was 

commanded to stop, it was harmless error on the part of the trial court to 

refer to those additional factors. 
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 Justice Fitzgerald joins this Opinion. 

 President Judge Emeritus Bender files a Dissenting Opinion. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 10/8/2014