NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CONNIE PARDINI, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

MARTIN J. O'MALLEY, Commissioner of 

Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 23-15955 

D.C. No. 1:22-cv-02751-RMI 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Robert M. Illman, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 4, 2024**

San Francisco, California

Before: MILLER and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT,*** District 

Judge.

Connie Pardini appeals from the district court’s order affirming the 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge for 

the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUN 6 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability benefits 

under the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and 

we affirm. 

We review the district court’s decision de novo and will not overturn the 

agency’s denial of disability benefits “unless it is either not supported by 

substantial evidence or is based upon legal error.” Luther v. Berryhill, 891 F.3d 

872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018). “Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla but 

less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 

980 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 

1995)).

1. Pardini argues that the administrative law judge (ALJ) interfered with her 

right to representation when he informed Pardini that her spouse could not both 

represent her and testify on her behalf. A Social Security claimant has a statutory 

right to retain counsel, but that right may be waived. See Roberts v. Commissioner 

of Soc. Sec. Admin., 644 F.3d 931, 932–33 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 42 U.S.C. 

§ 406(c); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1706. The Commissioner must “notify each claimant in 

writing . . . of the options for obtaining attorneys” and must also advise “qualifying 

claimants of [the availability of] legal services organizations which provide legal 

services free of charge.” Roberts, 644 F.3d at 933 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 406(c)).
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The record shows that Pardini received a hearing acknowledgement letter 

setting forth her right to representation and making other required disclosures. The 

ALJ confirmed that Pardini received and understood that information and

explained the distinction between a representative and a witness. Pardini decided to 

have her spouse act as a witness at a September 2021 hearing and as a

representative at a December 2021 hearing. That decision was knowing and 

intelligent, and the ALJ did not violate Pardini’s statutory right.

2. Pardini next argues that the ALJ did not address her post-traumatic stress 

disorder with respect to paragraph B of Adult Listing 12.15 (trauma- and stressorrelated disorders). See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.15(B). At step 

three, the ALJ considers the severity of impairments. If the impairments meet or 

equal one of the listings, the claimant is per se disabled. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). To show that an impairment matches a listing, a claimant’s 

medical records must match “all of the specified medical criteria” in the listing. 

Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(d). The

claimant bears the burden of proving that all the specified criteria have been met or 

equaled. See Burch v. Banhart, 400 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, Pardini 

did not satisfy that burden.

Although Pardini argues that the ALJ did not address Listing 12.15, that is 

incorrect. The ALJ correctly noted that Listing 12.15 requires an extreme 
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limitation in one, or a marked limitation in two, of four domains of mental 

functioning. He then provided detailed reasoning justifying his finding that Pardini 

failed to meet or equal Listing 12.15, including a review of Pardini’s medical 

record and the assessments of state agency medical consultants.

3. Pardini also argues that the ALJ failed to account for her Veterans Affairs

(VA) disability rating of 70 percent. She relies on McCartey v. Massanari, 298 

F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002), for the proposition that the ALJ was required to 

address that rating. But “McCartey is no longer good law for claims filed after 

March 27, 2017.” Kitchen v. Kijakazi, 82 F.4th 732, 738 (9th Cir. 2023). The 

Commissioner’s revised regulations provide that, as of that date, the agency will no 

longer “provide any analysis” of other agencies’ disability decisions. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1504. And although the new regulations do state that the agency will 

“consider all of the supporting evidence underlying” other agencies’ decisions, id., 

the agency did so here. The ALJ’s decision reflects careful consideration of 

medical records from VA sources.

4. Next, Pardini contends that the ALJ both improperly disregarded opinion 

evidence from two of her doctors—Dr. Byron Wittlin, her treating psychiatrist, and 

Dr. Paul Martin, her consultative examiner—and improperly credited expert 

medical testimony while discounting her symptom testimony. We disagree.

Under the revised regulations, “the former hierarchy of medical opinions—
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in which we assign presumptive weight based on the extent of the doctor’s 

relationship with the claimant—no longer applies.” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 

785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022). Instead, the agency looks to the supportability and 

consistency of opinion evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)–(2). Here, the ALJ 

noted that Dr. Wittlin’s statements that Pardini is “disabled” and “unable to work” 

are not medical opinions, but opinions on issues reserved for the Commissioner.

He further noted that Dr. Martin’s opinion that Pardini is “markedly limited in the 

abilities to complete a normal workday” was “not consistent with the longitudinal 

record as a whole . . . including the testimony of the medical expert who testified at 

the hearing.” 

Pardini also argues that the ALJ erred in relying on expert medical testimony 

as to paragraph C of Listing 12.15. But the ALJ did not rely on that testimony.

Instead, the ALJ independently found that Pardini failed to satisfy the paragraph C 

criteria because she “does not suffer from . . . a minimal capacity to adapt to 

changes in her environment or to demands that are not already part of her daily 

life.” See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.15(C).

We are also unconvinced that the ALJ erred in discounting Pardini’s 

symptom testimony. As the ALJ explained, Pardini’s statements about the 

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were “weakened by 

inconsistencies between her allegations, her statements regarding daily activities, 
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and the medical evidence.” 

5. Finally, Pardini argues that the ALJ’s finding that she could perform jobs 

that exist in significant numbers in the national economy was not supported by 

substantial evidence. But the ALJ relied on the persuasive testimony of the 

vocational expert and the ALJ’s thorough evaluation of the medical record 

supported his conclusions. That was a sufficient basis for the ALJ’s determination.

AFFIRMED.