\' 

'• .. ..._ 

USCIB: 29 .3/50 Hl\~BLEi VIA GOMHH' GltMJNH:iS ONL¥ 

8 August 1955 

!OF' e!EORE'i' 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Program for the Improvement of ·Allied (NATO) Communications 

Security. 

Reference: USCIB 29 .3/49 

1. As a result of telephonic approval of the reference by all 

members action has been taken by the Department of State member to inform 

the French, through Embassy, Paris, of U.S. approval of agenda items for 

U.S.-U.K.-French discussions this fall. 

2. The Senior U.K. Liaison Officer, Washington and SUSLO, London 

have been informed of this decision. 

USCIB 

USCIB: 29 .3/50 IWJBLEi VIA GOMHJ't' GIIANPlEiLS OHL:Y 

24 

'fOP SECRET . ~.,..~~~ . ~ 

Declassified and approved for release by 

NSA on 09-23-2014 pursuant to E.O. 

13526 
I 

• TCM~Ef:8.~f4 o 45113 .... USCIB: 29 .3/49 f'flrMfJLE VfA COMINT CHANNELS ONL! 

3 August 1955 

!OP SECRET 

MEMORANdUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Program for the Improvement of Allied (NATO) Communications 

Security. 

Reference! USCIB 2$.3/47 dated 14 June 1955. 

1. I Attached is the agenda proposed by the delegates to-the US-UKFrench technical COMSEC discussions in Paris on 27 and 28 July as a 

suitable\ basis for· further tripartite COMSEC discussions to be held in 

Paris from 16 to 26 November 1955. The July conversations were consider~d satisfactory and a report on them will be forwarded to USCIB 

at a lat~r date. 

2. \The Ad Hoc Committee reviewed the agenda and considers the 

topics to be within the purposes of the program for the improvement of 

NATO cornniunications security except for Item 6. Mr. Raven and Dr. Stukey, 

the US tJchnical representatives at the recent talks, stated that the 

French atje in~erested in protection of any secret French cipher machines 

·which might be used in NATO, that they understand that the problem cannot 

be discus1

s_ed conclusively by conununications security experts and that 

they bel~eve this agenda it~ can be satisfied by a statement of the US 

views andl experience with this problem. Mr. Raven and Dr. Stukey also 

stated th~t although discussion of Item 9 could be undertaken without 

undue ·expbsure of sophisticated US COMSEC and COMINT techniques, it would 

be necesskry for USCIB to consider at a later date what the precise limits 

of discus~ion should be. With these e,Xplanations the Ad Hoc Committee I • approved the entire agenda. 

I . 

3. The Ad Hoc Committee was informed that it was highly desirable I 

to give the French confirmation of US acceptance of the agenda as soon as 

possible. I Mr. Raven and Dr. Stukey also stated that the British have 

accepted the agenda and will so inf onn the French on receipt of US I -

concurrence. 

I 4. It is recommendea that: I .. 

(a) USCIB approve the agenda and proposed dates for the 

tripartite technical talks; 

(b) that USCIB authorize the Acting Executive Secretary 

to infonn the SUKLO of this approval; and 

(c) that USCIB authorize the Department of State to inform 

the French of this approval through Embassy Paris •. 

USCIB: 29.3/49 

TOP SECRET 

\ __ 

24 
USCIB: 29 .J/49 

TOP Si!:eltET" 

Subject: 

• 

Program for the Improvement of Allied (NATO) Communications 

Security. 

5. It is requested that telephonic concurrence in the above recommendations be given to this office by close of business Friday, 5 August 

1955. 

Enclosure 

a/s 

USCIB: 2$.3/49 

fl~t!.~~~ H. D. JONES 

Acting Executive Secretary, USCIB 

- 2 -

TOP SECRET 
1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

1. 

8. 

9. 

REF ID:A4045ifi3 .... 'f OP SBOR:S'i' 

1 August 1955 

AGENDA FOR TRIPARTITE COMSEC CONFERENCE 

TO BE HELD 16 TO 26 NOVEMBER 1955 

Synthesis of Previous Meetings as Regards National 

Communications Security in NATO Countries--Results 

Obtained and Conclusions to be Drawn. 

Organization and Problems of Communications Security Organisms or the Three Countries. 

Control and Monttoring of Communications. 

General principles or Judgment of 'Ciphering Systems in Connection With Their Utilization. 

Utilization of-the CX~52 Machine. 

Protection of .Patents in the Three Countries. 

' Production of One-Time Tapes and Keye, and Control 

or Random • 

. I 

Electrical.Bhortcomings ot the On-Line Machines. 

01phony and Cifax. 

WOP.S:SOR:B'f 

0 
• TOO:B}t:mEl'.4 o 45 ftA3 

...,. 

'f'OP 5El0Fl:f3'f' - tJ. ~. ErE8 CMLY 

SUBJECT NUMBER 

USCIB: 29.3/48 

Subject: 

Item Not on the Agenda for the 116th Meeting of USCIB, 

held on 10 June 1955. 

Program for the Improvement of Allied (NATO) 

Corrununications Security. 

The ACTING CHAIRMAN (General Cabell) asked if Mr. Polyzoides had 

anything further to report on this subject. 

MR. ROLYZOIDES stated that the Working Group is, at the moment, 

awaiting a vote sheet reply from the members. 

The CHAIR said that he has just been informed that the Secretary has 

received approval from all members, and that the Navy mrrober has suggested 

that Mr. Polyzoides accompany the U.S. technical experts to Paris for the 

purpose of furnishing them with advice and policy guidance for their 

discussions with U.K. and French representatives. 

MR. POLYZOIDES said that in view of Board approval, the papers can 

now be sent off for use in the briefings. He added that the Br~tish ~hould 

be ready, since both of their Boards have indicated approval of the papers. 

The CHAIR asked if there was objection to the proposal that Mr. 

Polyzoides accompany the technical experts. 

There was no objection. 

DECISION: (10 June 1955) USCIB noted the information presented by Mr. 

Polyzoides, and approved the Navy member's recommendation that ' 

Mr. Polyzoides accompany the U.S. technical experts to Paris to provide 

advice and policy guidance. 

The meeting adjourned at 1220. 

USCIB: 29 .J/48 - 9 -

TOP SECRET 
• -~-RJJ1-:A4045ji3 .,., 

USCIB: 29.3/47 H:kMflLE VIA CCMIM'f CHkMN:ELS ONL'.£ 

14 June 1955 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

Progra,m for the Improvement of Allied (NATO) Communications 

Security. 

USCIB 2!1.3/45, dated 2-7 May 1955. 

1. Vote sheet replies to the reference indicate approval by all 

members of USCIB. 

2. The vote of approval by the Navy member contained a reconunendation that the Chairman of the CWG, Mr. T. A. Polyzoides, accompany the 

U.S. technical experts to Paris for the purpose of furnishing them with 

advice and policy guidance for their discussions with U.K. and French 

representatives. This recommendation was presented by the Chairman, USCIB 

at the 116th meeting, and was approved by the Board. 

3. This office has informed the Senior U.K. Liaison Officer of USCIB 

approval of the CWG proposals contained in the ref erenc~. 

Acting Exe 

USCIB: 2!1.3/47 

SECRET 
r 

• 

' SUBJECT NUMBER 

USCIB: 29 .3/46 

Subject: 

TOP SECRE'f 

REF ID:A4045~ 

WI' 

Item B (Not on Agenda) for the 115th Meeting of USCIB, 

held on 20 May 1955. 

Allied (NATO) Communications Security (Approach to the 

French). 

The ACTING CHAIRMAN (General Cabell) invited comments by Mr. 

Polyzoides, Chairman of the U.S.-U.K. Combined Working Group. 

MR. POLYZOIDES reported to the members on the general status of the 

preparations for the next approach to the French, stating that the matter 

is-near the point of presentation to the French Foreign Office. He 

explained that agreement upon an aide memoire, and general terms of reference for the Ambassador, has been reached on the U.S. side and that formal 

approval on the British side is now awaited. He suggested that the Board 

accept this interim report of progress pending final CWG approval of the 

papers, at which time the Board's approval will be requested. 

The CHAIR suggested that the'Board express general approval in 

principle of Mr. Polyzoides' report, and be prepared to act by vote sheet 

on the final recommendations of the Committee. 

It was so agreed. 

USCIB: 29.3/46 - 12 -

TOP SECRET 
USCIB: 29.3/45 

'!'OP S:EORE'f' 

T~~!£<i~i:4045~ ... 

APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS 

CODEWORD MATERIAL 

27 May 1955 

Vill10RANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Program for the Improvement of Allied (NATO) 

Corrrrnunications Security 

1. The enclosed memorandIBn and report from the Chairman of the 

US/UK Combined Working Group and US Ad Hoc Committee for the Impr~vement 

of NATO COMSEC is circulated for vote sheet action. 

2. It will be remembered that the Chairman of the US Ad Hoc 

Committee outlined these proposals and obtained approval in principle of 

them at the 115th meeting of USCIB. 

J. It is requested that the attached vote sheet be executed and 

returned to this office by the close of business Friday, 10 June 1955. 

USCIB: 29.3/45 

TOP SECRET 

aptain, • Navy 

Secretary, USCIB 

APPENDED DCCUMENT CONTAINS 

CODEWORD MATERIAL 

tt1ll'tDLE lfl1t e<JlvrtM'f ett1!:MMELS OMLY 
.. 

1::: ODE v.t'f'ORDREF ID~~~q~~ii3 . / '.E'OP SBeftft ........ ., uu1.;u11..,, co~sists. of __ 6 _____ pages 

-----No ::ff of -j.s Copies, Series _,./J7--

MP• fEfi fAL EnCcOSE:O- 25 May 1955 

MENORANDUM FOR THE f"lEMBERS OF USCIB 

SUBJECT: Program for the Improvement of Allied (NATO) 

Communications Security 

REFERENCE: !

al USCIB 29.3/40 of 7 February 1955 

b USC1.B 29.3/41 of 7 February 1955 

c USCIB 29.3/42 of 11 February 1955 

d USCIB 29.3/43 of 8 March 1955 

At ita 112th meeting on 11 February 1955 USCIB 

approved recommendations of the US representatives on the 

Combined Working Group to continue US-UK e.t'forts to 

improve French communications security along previous lines and within previous limitations and to do this by 

an approach to the Secretary-Gene:r·al or the Fr<:?nch Foreign Ministry, Mo Ma.ssigli, followed by technical talks between 

US, UK and French experts.· In reference (c) LSIB expressed 

a. pre£e1:-ence for recommendations proposed by UK representatives but agreed to undertal<:G the US plan. 

Accordingly the Combined Working Group has prepared 

an aide-memoire for presentation to M. Massigli by the US 

and UK Ambassadors in Paris and has a.greed on general 

terms of reference to govern the ambassadorial approach and the technical discussions. These agreed papers a.re 

attached. 

The US representatives on the Combined Working Group recommend that: 

(a} USCIB approve the specific plan for the 

approach to the French as set out in the attached 

papers; 

{b) USCIB approve the forwarding of these 

papers to Ambassador Dillon to initiate this 

approach; and · 

.(c) the Chairman,, USCIB,, inform the Chairmam, 

LSIB, of the Board's decision.. . /) . 

-rf.J11.uu ~d.14...1 T. Achilles Polyzoides Chairman, U.S. Ad Hoc Committee 

25-082 #±:{ 
24 May 1955 

AIDE-MEMOIRE 

1. In March 1954 the US and UK Governments» believing that the national communications practices of many 

NATO governments might be such as to create a potential 

source of highly valuable information to the USSR and that 

it was in the common interest to take action to bring the 

situation to the attention or all NATO governments, pro-· 

posed through their ambassado~s iri Paris that communications security exp~rts of the US 9 UK and French Governments 

hold technical discussions with the object (a) of agreeing 

upon a memorandum on this subject for issue by the Standing Group to all NATO governments; and (b) of assuring themselves that their own respective communications security 

practices were satisfactory from the standpoint of the 

Standing Group Memorandum. On 24 March 1954 an AideMemoire on this subject was left with M. Parodi by the 

US and UK Ambassadors. 

2. The French Government concurred in this proposal and in April 1954 discussions were opened in Paris by the 

commwi.ications security experts of the three governments. At that time the French representatives were M. Viala, 

Captain Muller J 1.1eutenant Colonel Black and Capitaine de Corvette Rault. They discussed general principles and specific practices in the communications security 

field. They aleo agreed on a Memorandum, which subsequently was accepted by the Stand1.ng Group as SQM-620-54, 

and was approved by the NATO Council on 3 November 1954. 

The technical talks also resulted in the furnishing of 

a measure of assistance by the US and the UK to the Quai 

d'Orsay at the request of M. Viala. This assistance 

included the provision or certain UK cipher machines. 

3. The U~ and UK Governments are still concerned 

by the potential danger to NATO created by the possible insecurity of the national communications of member 

nations. The US and UK Governments would like to know 

whether the French Government does not now consider that 

the time has come fox• a renewal of technical discussions 

among the communications security experts of the three 

countries. T'nese experts would review the adequacy of 

ateps taken to date in NATO and reassure themselves that 

their own communlcations security practices meet the 

ae·sired standards. At the same time the US and UK 

':POP sseRE'f 
' 

/ 

/ 

y~eijl·~-A4045~ # ., 

- 2 .. 

Governments would like to kn01:! t-ohether thet"'e is any f.urth.er 

assistance which the French auihoritiea themselves woul4 

desire. -specifically, the UK authoritXes would be grateful for confi~mation that a furthe~ fifty TYPEX 22 machines 

which had been of?e~ed to M. Viala a~e no~ now ~equired 

by ~ny French ciphe~-~sing a~~hority. 

4. If ine Fremon C»oveK"nm~:mt cons.ide!"s ~enewed tech~ 

nicml discussions to be desirable, the US and UK Governments would be prepar1Sd each fGo designate ~wo o~ thrree communica~ions aacurity experta ~o meei in Pa~is with 

experts simil~rly desigrm~ed ·by the F~eneh Government at 

a mutually co~venient tim.e4 Th~ US and UK Governments wo~ld be pleased to receive F~@nch sugges~ions for the 

date or these talks and the specific topics to be covered 

in them and 6 naturally,, would be prepared in reply to 

S'l.\ggeat ·ajmila:r topics to the f?'ench Government. 

' I 
24 May 195:5 

TERI~S OF REFERENCE FOR AMBASSADORS BRIEFING 

1. The briefs for the Ambassadors shall cover the 

following items: 

a. The Combined Working Group Memorandum of 

7 February 1955. 

b. The Aide Memoire handed to 00. Parodi on 

21i March 1954. 

c. SGM-620-54. 

d. The Aide Me moire prepa1~ed for the approach 

to M. Masaigli. 

2. If questioned on the subject, the general justi- fication for the approach to Massigli is that it is a 

follow-up to the 1954 discussions. 

4. The technical discussions of April-May 1954 were 

without agenda and covered a wide range of topics. It is 

desirable that any talks which result from the present approach to Ma.ssigli should deal with spec:1.fic topics. The French have, accordingly, been invited in the Aide 

Memoire to mal<e their own proposals for such specific topics. These proposals should be passed to the U$ and' 

UK Ambassadors as soon as posoible. The US and UK for 

their part have expressed willingness to submit in reply their proposed topics through the same channels. 

5. In the approach to Massigli the security check 

provided by the TSWG phase in 1954 appears to the US and 

the UK to be unnecessary because we expect that one or 

more of the same technicj_ana in each team will take part 

in the proposed discussions and can vouch for new 

representatives. 

6. The briefs may also include whatever additional 

matters are constdered necessary for the individual 

Ambassadors as determined respectively by the Department of State and the Foreign Office. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

'110P 88CRB'J' EIDER PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 
.. REF ID:A4045ij3 

.. 

24 May 1955 

GENERAL TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR TECHNICAL TALKS 

The US and UK will discuss the following general topics for technical discussions with the French: 

a. Developments from Standing Group Memorandum. 

b. Need for strong central COMSEC organi- zations, and advice on organizing. 

c. Enforcement of COM.SEC regulations and 

surveillance. 

d. Radiation or plain text or usable 

signal •. 

e. Further discussions on security or 

cryptosyetems. 

Other topics, such as the French crypto-program, details 

of' procurement of equipment /1 etc., may arise which will 

be helpful to discuss. The French may also suggest additional subjects. · 

Details of the topics listed above will be worked 

out by US and UK technical representatives in conversations in London before the technical talks with the 

French. 

TOP SBCR:B'f BI:eER 
• TGWE~A.4,04-73 "9" 

TQP SEC~ Y. S . E¥:SS ONL¥ 

SUBJECT NUMBER 

USCIB: 2fJ .3/44 

Subject: 

Item C (not on agenda) discussed at the 113th Meeting 

of USCIB, held on 11 March 1955. 

French Communications Security.· _-.,c 

MR. ARMSTRONG reported briefly on discussions which were scheduled to 

be held recently between Mr. Eden and Mr. Dulles in Bangkok. He said that 

apparently the U.K. Foreign Office had a change of mind after receiving 

the CWG report and instead of Mr. Eden broaching the subject, Sir Harold Ca~a approached Mr. MacArthur with the suggestion that instead of pressing, 

for action on a disclosure basis at this time the U.K. would accept the plan 

for a discussion with M. Massigli if arrangements could be made to go ahead _ forthwith and such an approach were to be followed by a joint review of the 

situation not later than 1 August. In response to this Mr. MacArthur 

suggested that the CWG be designated to plan the approach to Massigli but 

was unable to agree to a hard and fast date of l_Augμst for the review, 

suggesting instead' (by later correspondence) that the rev:l.-ew be undertaken 

approximately six months after the approach to Massigli thus giving time 

for reaction by Ivlassigli and for possible introduction into use by the 

French of the TYPEX machines already provided to them by the U.JL He concluded by stating that the Board might now consider authorizing the U. s. · 

element of the CWG to proceed with their U.K. colleagues in planning an 

approach to Massigli. 

CAPTAIN TAYLOR commented that LSIB has also responded to USCIB1 s 

comment on the recent CWG report. He said that LSIB has agreed to the U.S. 

view (in the interests of harmony) and we are therefore obliged to implement 

that portion of the CWG recommendations now jointly agreed between LSIB and 

USCIB. 

It was so agreed. 

The meeting adjourned at 1410. 

USCIB: 29.3/44 - 23 -

TOP SECRET 
J 

USCIB: 29 .3/43 

'WP SECRET 

T~~<i~'l404~73 .. 

II:MffiLE VIA COMIWP Cll:MHa'ELS oimY 

APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS 

CODEWORD MATERIAL 

8 March 1955 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

24 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

References: 

Program to Improve the Communications Security of NATO 

Countries I I .,, 

(a) USCIB 29.3/42 of 11 February 1955 (Minutes of Item 2 

of the Agenda for the 112th Meeting of USCIB). 

(b) USCIB 29.3/41 of 7 February 1955. 

1. By action of reference (a), reference (b) was approved and the 

message included as enclosure 2 therewith sent, with minor non-substantive 

corrections approved in advance by the decision recorded in reference (a). 

2. LSIB1 s reply to the above-mentioned message has now been received 

and is circulated herewith as enclosure 1. Enclosure 2 is the final 

version of UqCIB1 s message as sent and is circulated herewith for completion of the record. 

J. Attention is invited to paragraph 4(c) of enclosure 1. It will 

therefore be expected that, unless directed otherwise, the Chairman, 

Combined Working Group will regard this memorandum as notification to proceed with planning along the lines agreed. 

Enclosures 

a/s 

USCIB: 29 .3/43 

TOP SECRET 

aptain, U. • Navy 

ive Secretary, USCIB 

APPENBEfl BOetlMfSMT eeMTAINS 
TQiE~~~A404~73 .,.., 

;eo 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86,,.36/50 USC 3605 

'fOf SECRE'f' 

Comments of the Boards are as follows: 

1. They note with satisfaction the wide measure of technical agreement. 

2. They welcome the general agreement reached on the following points: 

(a) 

(b) Further action ls necessary; 

( c) The llwill not reach a suitable standard of• security without 

Ang~can assistance. 

3. They note that UK and US members of the Combined Working Group were not 

agreed on the best course of action to take with the I · 1 

4. LSIB and LCSB conclude as follows: 

(a) 

(b) 

They endorse the agreed recommendations of the Combined Working Group. 

Where the UK and US .recommendations diffe~ question of the 

nature of the actio!f to be taken with thel___J they fully support 

the conclusions of/the UK delegates. Noting, however, that the US 

views 'diverge from those of the U::{ in a field where mutual a.greement 

is essential, the Boards agree to waive the UK proposal for action 

with thel I 

( c) ( i) They .:1gree that ;:in approach should be-mcide to M. Eassigli on the 

lines of that to :tv~. Parodi in 1954, the details and timing to be 

worked out and agreed between the responsible UK and US authori-

+. uleS. 

(ii) ·rhey consider that if this approach does not produce satisfactory results, the UK and US should together consider more drastic 

action. 

5. As already notified, the same security precautions for the hc>.ndling of the 

Combined Working Group report are being adopted in the UK as those outlined in 

USCIB1 s memorandum. 11 

Enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.3/43 dtd 8 Mar 1955. 

TOP SECRET 
' > L 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TO~ ~EC:K:Ef EIDER 

12¢41¢Z (12 FEB 1955) 

•

11\VL 130 USCIB Executive Secretary sends. Please convey the follo:w.J.ng 

from the Chainnan USCIB to the Chairman I.SIB: 

11. USCIB has noted with great interest the report of the Combined 

Working Group of our two Boards concerning efforts to improve! I 

communications security. · 

1 2. USCIB is gratified by the large area of agreement reached on the 

technical aspects of the problem and in the conclusions and recommendations 

which have drawn from them. At the same time USCIB notes that the US and 

UK representatives ha.ve not agreed on several of the conclusions and. 

recommendations. 

13. USCIB has considered fully and carefully the conclusions and 

recommendations and has given particular attention to the UK views as 

expressed therein where they diverge from US views. USCIB fully concurs 

in those of the conclusions and recommendations jointly agreed by the CWG 

but after extended study is persuaded that it must endorse the separate 

conclusions and recommendations of the US element in the belief that the 

facts and conclusions as a reed b~ the entire Combined Workin Grou do 

not ·ustif a 

14, USCIB has also noted the extent of technical detail contained 

in the CWG report and for its part has directed that its members observe 

the following additional precautions in the handling of this document as a 

·whole: 

A. Restrict access to the barest minimum feasible. 

B. Require that it be hand carried by and between the individuals 

who will have access. 

C. Provide that custody be assigned to one individual who will 

handle these documents in the same manner as a registered publication 

obtaining a custody receipt each time the documents pass out of his control. 

D. Forbid transport by aircraft any place unless automatic 

destruction can be assured (except initial transport of necessary copies to 

the U.K.) 

E. Forbid transport beyond the continental limits of the U.S. 

except insofar as it may be necessary to transport the report to the U.K. 

1 5, USCIB would be grateful for your views and comment. 111 

Enclosure 2 with USCIB 29.3/43 dtd g Mar 1955. 

TOP ~EGRET EIDER 
T~pEf;Wf;f"4 o 45.ij 3 

. .,. ·- .- ..... ~ 

'!'OP SECRE't - U.S. EYES ONLY FINAL 

SUBJECT NUMBER 

USCIB: 29.3/42 

Subject: 

EO 3. 3 I h I I 2 I 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

\ 

Item' 2 of the Agenda for/the 112th Meeting of USCIB, 

held on 11 February 11955. 

Progr~ tq Improve i·he Communications Security of NATO 

Countries I ____ ..... 

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (General Cabell) invited attention to the· r:eport 

of "the Chainnan of the Combined.Working Group and asked if Mr. Polyzoides 

wished to comment. 

MR. POLYZOIDES said that he. was prepared to present to the Committee 

his interpretation of the thinking which had gone into the CWG recommendations. He then offered to help clarify any portion of the report that 

the members might have questions on. 

CAPTAIN TAYLOR pointed out a minor correction to be made in TAB 7, 

paragraph lOb, third line: Change ''March 1953" to ''March 1954". 

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN asked if there were any comments on the proposed 

messag~ from the Chairman, USCIB to the Chairman, LSIB which had been 

circulated as enclosure 2 with USCIB 2!1.3/41 of 7 February 1955. 

CAPTAIN TAYLOR explained that he had drafted the message referred to 

by the Chairman; that the message had not been coordinated with the Ad 

Hoc Committee and time had not permitted circulation of a suggested change 

submitted by the Department of Defense member. Captain Taylor read the 

suggested change which was thereupon adopted. 

MR. ARMSTRONG indicated that he had drafted so~e changes of an 

editorial nature which could, in his opinion, be incorporated in the 

message without affecting its substance. 

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN suggested approval of the proposed message, as 

amended, subject to non-substantive changes to be suggested by the State 

Department member and which the Executive Secretary would be empowered to 

make. EOJ,,:Jlhl 121 

PL 86-36/SO_ijSC 3605 

It was so agreed. 

The members then approved the recorrunenda~ions of the Ad Hoc Committee 

(enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.3/41) and the recommendations of the Executive 

Secretary on security precautions for handling the report of the Chainnan 

of the Combined Working Group. 

USCIB: 2!1.3/42 - 4 

TOP SECRET 
TOP SECRET 

REF ID:A4045ji3 .._,. 

'f UP StlCRE'f = B. S. Ei¥ES OHL¥ 

USCIB: 29.3/42 

DECISION: (11 February 1955) USCIB approved: 

(a) Subject to the -one change mentioned above, the report of the 

Chairman of the Combined Working Group (enclosure with USCIB 29.3/40). 

(b) The recommendations of the U.S. representatives on the CWG 

(enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.3/41). 

(c) The proposed message from the Chairman, USCIB to the Chairman, 

LSIB, as amended in the foregoing discussion, subject to non-substantive 

.changes to be made by the Executive Secretary (enclosure 2 with USCIB 

29 .J/41). 

' 

(d) The recommendations of the Executive Secretary concerning 

security precautions for handling the report. 

USCIB: 29.3/42 - 5 -

TOP SECRET 
USCIB: 29.3/41 

Eo .3 . 3 I h I I 2 I 

r~~i:lia4s~ ~ 

PL BB~J6/50 USC 3605 

APPElHBBB BOGU!1EN'F G9NTAD18 

C913EiWQRfl MA'i'BRIAL 

7 February 1955 

'f Of" ::JECRffi' 

.MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Program to Improve NATO COMSE9 .... ___ __. 

Reference: USCIB 29.J/40 of J February 1955. 

1. With regard to the reference, enclosure 1 herewith sets forth 

the recommendations of the USCIB Ad Hoc C01IDI1ittee for subject problem. 

2. Enclosure 2 is a proposed message to be sent by the Executive 

Secretary to SUSLO, London conveying to LSIB the views of USCIB on the 

referenced CWG report in the event that USCIB should approve the recommendations of the U.S. Ad Hoc Committee. 

Enclosures 

a/s 

USCIB: 29 .3/41 

A PPi~DiD COCIJM»I-~ Gom'AINS 

GOBE!WORf> Mk'f'EftI1lL 

l'IJl:NDLE n11: COMIN'.ll Cl'IJl:NNEIS ONLY 

TOP SECff:"ET 

24 
TO~ftffflf4ftiBW 

f OP SEOH:Er.F EfBKR 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OFUSCIB 

SUBJECT: 1 lco~unications Security 

REFERENCE: (a) USCIB 29.3/36 

(b) USCIB 29.3/37 

(c) USCIB 29.3/38 

(d) USCIB 29.3/39. 

(e) USCIB 29.3/40 

..... 

7 February 1955 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) the US-UK 

Combined Working Group fo:r the Improvement of Allied (NATO) 

Communications Securit (CWG) has reviewed the status of the 

A copy of the CWG report was forwarded 

with reference e • 

2. The US representatives on the CWG recommend that: 

(a) USCIB approve the joint recommendations of the 

US and UK representatives. 

(b) USCIB approve the recommendations made by the 

US representatives alone. 

(c) USCIB disapprove the recommendations made by 

the UK representatives alone. 

(d) USCIB approve the forwarding of this report for 

use in briefing the Secretary of State on this problem 

and 

(e), The Chairman, USCIB, inform the Chairman, LSIB, 

of its decision on this matter. 

Enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.3/41 

(SIGNED) 

T. Achilles Polyzoides 

Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee 

ror S"ECRET EIDER 
TqPJM!J¥if: i~'1%¥fa3 ....... 

FROM: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB 

TO: SUSLO, LONDON 

E03.3(h) (2) 

INFO: DIRNSA PL g6~36/50 USC 3605 

.PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING FROM THE CHAIRMAN USCIB TO THE CHAIRMAN LSIB: 

111. USCIB HAS NOTED WITH GREAT INTEREST THE REPORT OF THE. COMBINED 

WORKING GROUP OF OUR TWO BOARDS CONCERNING EFFORTS T 

112. USCIB IS GRATIFIED BY THE LARGE AREA OF AGREEMmT_ REACHED ON THE 

TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM AND IN THE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

WHICH HAVE BEEN DRAWN FROM THEM. AT THE SAME TIME USCIB NOTES THAT THE 

US AND UK REPRESENTATIVES HAVE NOT AGREED ON SEVERAL OF THE CONCLUSIONS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS. 

113. USCIB HAS CONSIDERED FULLY AND CAREFULLY THE CONCLUSIONS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE DIVERG:ENT VIEWS EXPRESSED 

THEREIN. USCI1 FULLY CONCURS IN THOSE OF THE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS JOINTLY AGREED BY THE CWG BUT FEELS CONSTRAINED TO ENDORSE THE . ' 

SEPARATE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE U.S. ELEMENT_' IN THE BELIEF 

THAT THE FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS AS AGREED BY THE ENTIRE COMBINED WORKING 

GROUP DO NOT DEM:ONSTRATE A SITUATION OF SUCH SERIOUSNESS AS TO REQUIRE THE 

' SHOCK TREATMENT OF DIRECT DISCLOSURE AND ALL THAT THAT ENTAILS. 

114. USCIB HAS ALSO NOTED THE EXTENT OF TECHNICAL DETAIL CONTAINED IN 

THE CWG REPOR'll AND FOR ITS PART HAS DIRECTED THA'F ITS MEMBERS OBSERVE THE 

Enclosure Zwith USCIB 29.3/41 

fOP SECRET Ea'DER 
• TOPR:W=J¥tf: f~q~SA3· ..... 'f OF 3f30D::Ei'l' EiilHYI. 

FpLLOWING ADDITIONAL PRECAUTIONS IN THE HANDLING OF THIS DOCUMEN':r' AS A 

WHOLE: 

a. RESTRICT ACCESS TO THE BAREST MINIMUM FEASIBLE. 

b. REQUIRE THAT_ IT BE ·HAND CARRIED BY AND BEI'WEEN THE INDIVIDUALS 

WHO WILL HAVE ACCESS. 

c. PROVIDE THAT CUSTODY BE ASSIGNED TO ONE INDIVIDUAL WHO WILL 

HANDLE THESE DOCUMENTS IN THE SAME MANNER AS A REGISTERED PUBLICATION 

OBTAINING A CUSTODY RECEIPT EACH TIME THE DOCUMENTS PASS OUT OF HIS CONTROL. 

d. FORBID TRANSPORT BY AIRCRAFT ANY PLACE UNLESS AUTOMATIC 

DESTRUCTION CAN BE ASSURED (EXCEPT INITIAL TRANSPORT' OF NECESSARY COPIES 

TO THE U.K.) 

e. FORBID TRANSPORT BEYOND THE CONTINENTAL LIMITS OF THE U.S. 

EXCEPT.INSOFAR AS IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO TRANSPORT THE' REPORT TO THE U.K. 

n5. USCIB WOULD BE GRA'IlEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS AND COMMENT'. 11 

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eOJJE!lvOltJJ J.vllt'U:lUAL 

7 February 1955 

/EO 3.3(h)(2) 

.· PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

References: 

Program to Improve the Conununicatibns Security of NATO 

Countries I I 

(a) USCIB 23/65 of 30 June 1953~ 

(b) USCIB 29.1/26 of 28 June 1954. 

(c) USCIB 29.1/1 of 21September1953. 

(d) USCIB 29.3/38 of 23 December 1954. 

(e) USCIB 29.3/39 of 5 JanuB.ry 1955. 

1. The members will recall that as/a result of approval of reference (a) (the recommendations of the US/UK Conference on NATO COMSEC 

held in early June 1953) the tripartiteitechnical discussions reported 

in reference (b) were held in late April 1954. 

2. Since the above-mentioned tripartite technical discussions, 

the Combined Working Group (CWG) set up by reference (c) has continued 

its surveillance of the :oblern wi)'h particular regard to observing the 

effect uponl _ Jof those tripartite discussions. 

The U.S. element of the G, wh:i.;c ·constitutes USCIB's ad hoc committee 

for this matter, had not, until/receipt of the information in reference 

(d), found cause to recommend any drastic change in the program for the 

improvement of I I 

J. Pursuant to USCIB's decision on' reference (d), reference (e) 

was sent to LSIB and the CWG immediately commenced to formulate its 

recommendations in the light of the new suggestions presented to the 

U.S. Secretary of State by the ll.K. Foreign Minister. At the insistence 

of the U.K. representatives, the CWG agreed to present its recommendations in time to permit a discussion of the problem by the U.S. 

Secretary of State and the U.K. Foreign Minister at the forthcoming 

Bangkok Conference to be held in late February rather than completing 

its report by 1 March 1955 as suggested in reference (e). In this 

connection, no reply from LSIB to the message circulated under cover of 

reference (e) has yet been received. 

APPBPJDBB BO GUMBJ'i' OON'i'AIMS 

CODElol'ORD MATERTAJ. 

USCIB: 29 .3/40 

TOP SECRET 

24 
.. --~ ...... 

T~~Ef#fif404s93 ...... Eo 3. 3 I h I I 2 I 

USCIB: PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 f February 1955 

'fOF 3E6~-

Subject: Program to Im:rove\the Communications Security of NATO 

_c~~t~i:s[ _ =I _____________ _ 

4. The report of the Chairman of the Combined Working Group is 

therefore enclosed herewith for consideration at the 112th meeting of 

USCIB on 11 February 1955 • 

. 5. Owing to the wealth of technical information on the U.S. 

COMINT effort contained in the enclosed report only two copies per 

member are being distributed. In addition it is recommended that the 

following security precautions be applied to it: 

a. Restrict access to the barest minimmn feasible. 

b. Require that it be hand carried by and between the 

individuals who will have access. 

c. Provide that custody be assigned to one individual 

who will handle these docmnents in the same manner 

as a TOP SECRET registered publication obtaining a 

custody receipt each time the documents pass out of 

his controL 

d. Forbid transport by aircraft any place unless 

automatic destruction can be assured (except initial 

transport of necessary copies to the U.K.). 

e. Forbid transport beyond the continental limits of the 

U.S. except insofar as it may be necessary to transport the report to the U.K. 

6. It is further recommended that USCIB approve the security 

precautions described in paragraph 5 above and include mention of them 

in whatever comment it makes to LSIB so as to encourage similar treatment of this report by the U.K. 

Enclosure 

a/s 

USCIB: 29 .3/40 - 2 ~ 

TOP SECRET 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

REF ID :A4045B"f'386-36/50 USC 3605 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

REF ID :A4045B"f'386-36/50 USC 3605 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

REF ID :A4045B"f'386-36/50 USC 3605 
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REF ID: A40 4581'3 86-36/50 USC 3605 
0 

TABS: 

I. I 

REF ID:A40458~ 

'V 

TOI' SEC!t!T EI~~ 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

II. 

III. Traffic Received and Exploited by UKUSA 

IVo 

v. 

VI. 

VII. 

VIII. 

Additional Poas~.ble Steps by US and UK 

Conclusions 

\ -

Rlcommendaticns 

ANNEXURES: 

.EO 3.3(h) (2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

A. Review orl I-working paper supporting Tabs I, II and III 

B. Appraisal of the/Content of I f - background material on Tab IV 

C. o· al COM.~EC Analysis or Possible Steps to Improve Communications Security - working paper ing Tab VI. . · , 

D. : Limitatj.ons on Program to Improve .. I __________ _ Security - excerpt from US-UlC Conference Report ' -

~. US Technical Notes on the Implications of Abandoning Present Limitation on CWG Terms of Reference 

F. UK Proposal tor Additional Possible Steps by US and UK -

J 
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USCIB: 29 .3/39 HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONL~ 

5 January 1955 (:)' 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF ·USCIB: 

Subject: LJcamTii'll~ications Security. 

Reference: USCIB 29.3/38, dated 23 December./1954. 

1. Telephonic replies to the reference/indicate; approval by all 

members of the proposals contained therein. 

2. Pursuant to this decision the following message has been sent 

to the Chairman, LSIB: 

11AS YOU KNOW, ON 17 DECEMBER FOR MIN EDEN WROTE TO 

SECRETARY DULLES SUGGE.5TING THAT US AND UK EXPERTS REVIEW 

THE AND REPORT WITHIN TWO MONTHS. 

ON 22 DECEMBER SECRETARY DULLES, ACCEPTING THIS PROPOSAL, 

STATED THAT HE CONSIDERED THE EXISTING US-UK COMBINED 

WORKING GROUP THE APPROPRIATE BODY TO PREPARE THIS REPORT. 

ACCORDINGLY, ON 29 DECEMBER USCIB GAVE ITS APPROVAL TO 

THE PREPARATION Bl 1 MARCH 1955 OF A ~ORT BY THE CWG ON 

THE STATUS OF THE TOGETHER WITH 

RECOMli.tENDATIONS AS NECESSARY FOR FUTURE ACTION AND ASKED 

V;E TO INFORM YOU OF THIS DECISION. 11 

USCIB: 29 .3/39 

TOP SECRET 
~24 

USCIB: 29 .3/38 

23 December 1954 

'i'Of 13Ee'.ft:~!:' - tJ .13 • E"IEl3 ONLY 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

References: 

French Communications Security. 

(a) USCIB 29.3/36, dated 15 December 1954. 

(b) USCIB 29.3/37, dated 17 December 1954. 

1. The enclosure, further to the references, is forwarded for 

consideration with a request that your views be telephoned to the 

Executive Secretariat at your early cpnvenience, preferably by 1200, 

Wednesday, 29 December 1954. 

' 2. Early action is requested to permit USCIB 1 s stand in this 

matter to be made known to LSIB as promptly as possible. 

Enclosure 

Dept. of State Memo 

dtd 23 Dec 1954 

USCIB: 29 .3/38 

TOP SECRET 

USCIB 
TO'.P Sl!:Crt:E'l: 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL.86-36/50 USC 3605 

December 23, 1954 

Enclosure with USCIB 29.3/38 dtd 23 Dec 1954. 

TOP SECRET 
T(j;&~EfH-~A4045Bii '119" 

'f OP Sf:iSR-E±' 

I recommend: 

(SIGNED) 

W. Park Armstrong, Jr. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

- 2 -

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EO 3_3(h)(2) 

T~ffeEfBff404saiif .... USCIB~ 29 .3/37 ~24 17 December 1954 

TQP Si!:GR:8£ T:T. 6, E¥FJS OfiLY 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USGIB: 

Subject~ ___ _.I Communications Security. 

Reference: USCIB 29.3/36 of 15 December 1954. , 

1. F'onecon responses to the proposal contained in the reference 

constitute approval by all members with comment as indicated below from 

two of them: 

NAVY~ 

CIA: 

Approved as a stopgf3,p measure. However, the Navy 

believes, as it has indicated in the past, that a 

direct and flrank statement. I I would be 

the best solution. 

Approved ci,s an immediate expedient. A statement 

from theNSA as to the present situation with regard 

tol !communications security must be obtained. 

It is assumed that such a statement will be available 

to, and will be included in the deliberations of, the 

CWG., 

2. The above information has been furnished to the office of the 

State Department member and the Chairman of the U.S. Ad Hoc Committee 

by telephone. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

tain, avy 

ut~ve Secretary, USCIB 

USCIB: 29 .3/37 

TOP SECRET 
TOP SECRET REF ID:A40458. 

USCIB: 29.3/36 

15 December 1954 

Ta' SECRE'I' EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 use 3605 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: ,__ _______ ____.I Security. 

1. The enclosed proposal by the Department of State Member i~ 

forwarded for consideration as a matter of urgency. 

2. It is requested that your.views on the recommendations contained herein be telephoned to the Executive Secretary at your 

earliest convenience, preferably by 1600, Thursday, 16 December 1954. 

Enclosure 

a/s 

USCIB: 29.3/36 

r. R . 'E1 • TAYLOR 

Capta' , u. s. Navy 

Executive Secretary, USCIB 

l: 

TOP SECRET 

~ 24 
SPECIAL AS~ISTANT ro\THE SECRETARY OF STATE 

WASHINGTON 

I , 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB 

15 DEC 1954 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

SUBJECT: Program for the Improvement of \Allied (NATO) 

Conununications Security 

1. Within 

Enclosure with USCIB 29.3/36 dtd 15 Dec 1954. 

TOP SEeRET 
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• ' .... TOi' a.iC~' 

/// 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 7 (Signed) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 W. Park Annstrong, Jr. 

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USCIB: '2!).3/35 

6 July 1954 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

SEG~T PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

References: 

DisClosure of Circuit Mercury to the I .... __ ___, 

(a) USCIB 29.3/24 dated 1 March 1954. 

(b) USCIB '2!).3/27 dated 1 April 1954. 

(c) USCIB '2!).3/28 dated 14 April 1954 •. 

The enclosure is circulated for information and file in connection with references. 

Enclosure 

UKLO(BJSM) Memo for Dir., NSA, 

Pl/794, dtd 22 June 1954. 

USCIB: 29.3/35 

\ 

\ 

SECRET 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

SECRET 
REF ID:A4045873 

;;I .. 

D ~ 

MI :f ~ I lllj u s c I tJ . -:2 t::;, :JI;.).. 

;<'9. 31;?~ 

J 
REF ID:A4045873 

-

l \ I NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS/', "tPPROVALS, MEMO R~ ... "'JNG SLIP CONCURRENCES, OR SIMIL.~CTIONS .-----._._,._,...._ 

t NAME OR TITLE -- tttlJlA~' CIRCULATE 

- ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION DATE COORDINATION 

2 FILE 

- INFORMATION 

3 NECESSARY ACTION 

- NOTE AND RETURN 

4 SEE ME 

- SIGNATURE 

REMARKS 

Hr add,-f,·o "'a I .uaf l!-r1al Cl\A Allied 

{AJ4Tt> J l'e>MSE &, 5.9 ~ .hid .klders • .J . !) U-SCIB ~3/ - /)l!ttd (NJl/TO) COMSliC 

aj JJJ floe 

. 

of A-ll111d ( AJ-4"( /)) -.::r: !NI ioro .., -e """" fl ~ t' 

CoMSE.C - I I -

~-cwQ - IiM.pro ve.1M.e"'l T o l A-t 1,edf11JJ9ta) 

COM SEC - I 1· 

~ tL.5ju K NRIO COU.NT~/,ES :!JEC. Co N ;::::, 

I 

.::rw NE ,q,s-3 

\ .:V us/u K. CONJ='. 6N N'/1-T'D C'4M:S E c -/9.5'5' 

FROM NAME OR TITLE DATE 

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION ' TELEPHONE 

DD I ~~~M50 95 Replaces DA AGO Form 895, 1 Apr 48, and AFRQ 

Form 12, 10 Nov 47, whwh may be used. 16-48487-4 GPO 

...._ 

. 

I .. 

........ ················· EO 

PL 

3. 3 !hi I 2 I 

86-36/50 USC 3605 
9 ---TtBJ!-~f) 4587 it 

USCIB: 29.3/33 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SE6RET 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

M'Pr3fffiFJ13 13 OCUNf!JM'f B e OMT:A!:N 

e OflE MOM ltt'fEJHkL 

21 May 1954 

The enclosure is circulated for information regarding action taken 

pursuant to the decision rendered at the 103rd Meeting of USCIB with 

regard to subject. 

Enclosure 

CIB # 000157 dtd 20 May 54. 

USCIB: 29.3/33 

l/~IB~ tain, ~~vy , -

Executive Secretary, USCIB 

1\PR!:l'lB1Sfl BOOUMS1ff'S CeN'fA:IN 

G@i W~ HATERIAf, 

TOP SECRET 

24 
·-~ 

UNITED STATES CCMMUNICATIONS INTEIJ.,IGEJ.~CE BOARD 

Washington 25, D.C. 

, OFFICE OF THE CHAIBJ•.IAN 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TLJ?l 13?:6fl:E'.f' FROO'II 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE: 

' 

CIB # 000157 

20 May 1954 

. (Signed) 

ALLEN W. DUIJ.,ES 

Chairman 

Enclosure with USCIB 29.3/33 dtd 21 May 54. 

TOP SECRET FROTH 
USCIB: 29.3/32 

12 May 1954 

'LOP SECEET E'IWTH 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: ___ .... lcomrnunication Security. 

, 1. At the request· of the member representing the Department 

of State an additional item (Item No. 5), subject as above, has been· 

approved by the Chairman for addition to the Agenda for the 103rd 

Meeting of USCIB. Remaining items should be renumbered·accordingly. 

2. The details of the item will be presented orally at the 

meetin • 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

USCIB: 29.3/32 

k~J ~/R~~: TAYLOR 

Captain, U. S. Navy 

Executive Secretary, USCIB 

TOP· SECRET FROTH 
USCIB: 29 • .3/31, ?4 

10 May 1954 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: French Reques~ for COM.SEC Equipments. 

Reference: USCIB 29.3/23 of 19 Feb 1954. 

1. The enclosure is circulated for information in connection with 

the reference. 

2. By copy of this memorandum the Department of State Member is 

;requested to take such action as may be deemed appropriate with regard 

to paragraph 3 of the enclosure. 

,~.#llHUF~~·~ 

Enclosure 

·aptain, U. S. Navy 

Executive Secretary,· USCIB 

NSA ser 0002378 dtd 6 May 54. 

U.SCIB: 29.3/31 

TOPSECaET 
'fOP SEG~T 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 

I 

Serial: 0002378 

6 May 1954 

MEMORANDUM Fon THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB 

SUBJECT: French Request for COMSEC Equipments 

1. Reference is made to USCIB 29.3/23 dated 19 February 

1954, subject as above. 

2. This is to inform you that the five ASAf-r2-l cryptographic machines, together with associated material necessary 

for their operation, were delivered to the French Consulate in 

Washington on 26 April 1954. 

3. It is requested that this information be made available to the Chairman of the Combined Working Group for 

Improvement of Allied (NATO) Communications Security. 

(Signed) 

D.M. AGNEW 

Captain, US Navy 

NSA Member, USCIBEC 

Enclosure with USCIB 29.J/Jl dtd 10 May 54. 

·ro:P SECRET 
SUBJECT NUMBER 

USCIB: 29.3/30 

Subject: 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

tJ • s • B¥Ea Qi'I:b¥ FIN.AL· ·· 

Item 2 of the Agenda for the .102nd Meeting of USCIB, 

held on 9 April 1954. 

Disclosure of U.K. "Circuit Mercury" to the French 

(USCIB 29.3/27). 

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (Lt. General Cabell) infonned the members that 

he had dir~cted the Executive Secretary to plo.ce this item on the agenda 

in view 0F-..11JJ..!ii..-!6-*J~'1.!il......5!:.!..u.L...Jr..S!:..!il..1.1.S<&---5\~.w.::..i....i.J.1..a~.!Jii.....sa.iiZ.l.l.Sii..M.l~..J.1..t1.......i.'-l..l.Si........1.!.&...ol..w..i..lil.LI.___.,___, 

request. 

General Canine was then a.sked if he had any comments. 

GENERAL CANINE recalled that he had previously recommended turning 

down the British, basing his recommendation on two fundamental reasons: 

(1) "Mercury" is too good to give away and (2) He wanted assurance that 

·the I I He continued by saying that the 

British, in this instanc'e, propose.to simply make a visual demonstration 

of "Circuit liercury" to the French members of the Standing Group without 

furnishing circuit diagrams or maintenance manuals. U.K. representatives, 

he said, think the French will accept the visual explanation, thus greatly 

enhancing chances of success at the forthcoming conference. My people, 

he continued, are solidly against giving the French a machine or diagram 

because of the possibility of it getting into Communist hands. Sin~e the 

French will not be given circuit diagrams and drawings, the danger of 

compromise will be considerably lessened. To have the theory is, of course, 

important, he concluded, but to actually build and put the machine into 

use is most difficult and would take considerable time. 

MR. F'RIEDMAN, at the request of the Director, NSA, pointed out some 

technical aspects of "Circuit Hercury". He discussed the principles of 

operai:.Lon, the po::;sibility of solution and how it compared with other 

machines, pointing out that "Circuit Mercury" is the best high-grade 

machine known. .Mr. Friedman concluded with the opinion that it would 

take the e::x.'"Perts, ecren after the proposed visual demonstration, about five 

(5) years to build a similar machine provided they did not get the 

"Circuit .Mercury" drawings. 

A general discussion followed relative to future relations with the 

French, possible British courses of action a.nd whether or not the "Circuit 

Mercury" crypto-principle is available to the French through commercial 

sources. 

USCIB: 29.3/30 - 5 -

TOP SECRET FROTH 
I 

'f'OP Sl!!ORE'f' PRO'f'II 

USCIB: 29o.3/.30 

A recommendation was made by the Department of the Army Member to the 

effect that action be postponed until after the Geneva Conference. This 

discussion culminated with general agreement that: (1) such a delay 

would in reality amount to a refusal as far as current COMSEC negotiations with the French are concerned; (2) unless the U.K. can get along 

without using "Circuit Mercury", they will be unable to give a convincing 

explanation of failure to go through with the visual explanation; (.3) the 

"Mercury" crypto-principle is available to the French through commercial 

sources. The makers of the Hagelin, Gretener, and Atheneum machines 

understand the principle, the Hagelin and Gretener have published it in 

their magazines. 

("In order to clear up possible misunderstandings on cryptoprinciples with regard to the discussions on Circuit Mercury, Item 2 at the 

102nd meeting, the Director, NSA, has requested that the Executive Secretary circulate the following statement: 

1 In the discussions of Circuit Mercury, the term "cryptoprinciple" was used in two different ways and the distinctions between the two 

may not have been made completely clear. In a broad sense, there is the 

general cryptoprinciple of electrically controlled stepping. Within the 

general cryptoprinciple of electrically controlled st~pping, there are 

specific applications of electrically controlled stepping, and one of these 

is the specific cryptoprinciple of Circuit Mercury. The general cryptoprinciple, electrically controlled stepping, is commercially known. The 

specific cryptoprinciple of Circuit Mercury is, as far as the Director, 

NSA, is aware, known only to the UK and US and is not incorporated in 

commercially available cryptographic equipments. 111 ) 

GENERAL TRUDEAU continued the discussion by stating he would be 

willing to go further than delaying action until after the Geneva Conference o He said he would go along with a flat turndown. 

MRo ARM3TRONG pointed out the effect this might have on the French 

Group d~Ting current negotiations. They might consider such an act an 

indication of bad faith on the part of the British. 

GENERAL TRUDEAU then asked if the British had the right to disclose 

details of "Circuit Mercury" to the French. 

MR. ARM3TRONG replied that the U.S. had agreed on disclosure up to 

a certain point, however, the French had said, "No, we want to actually 

see it. 11 

GENERAL CANINE recalled that he had voiced his misgivings on acceding 

to this British request over a long period of time. Now he said he felt 

USCIB: 29 • .3/.30 - 6 -

TOP SECRET FROTH 
I .... , . 

TOI> SiCRXT . ~TEI Yu S. EYES Omii 

USCIB: 29.3/30 

he could be persuaded to agree to further revelations under conditions 

limiting the disclosure to visual demonstration. He continued by saying 

that nothing could be more serious than to give the Russians the opportunity of making a "Chinese" copy of a machine such as "Mercury". 

MR. FRIEDMAN said that some of the members might be wondering if 

we would be hurt very much if the Russians did copy 11Mercury11 • He added 

that we can see daylight in their present things but if they should get 

"Mercury", we would be in the dark again. 

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN, after a general discussion concerning the 

availability and security of a substitute machine for the British to pass 

COSMIC traffic on, asked if refusal of the British request would be fatal 

to the negotiations. The consensus was that refusal could have an adverse 

effect but would not necessarily be fatal. 

MR. ARMSTRONG stated that the limitations proposed by General Crutj.ne 

would minimize the risk. 

GENERAL CANINE replied that he also felt that that might minimize 

the risk to an acceptable degree. He added his opinion that the longrange program of the U.S. is more important than present negotiations. 

He continued by recommending that since the Board couldn't agree to say 

"Yes 11 , it say "No", but not "Maybe". 

GENERAL CANINE stated that the only substitute the U.K. might have 

would be the ROCKEX machine. 

MR. KEAY pointed out that the British had taken the position that 

they could not use ROCKEX as a replacement. 

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN stated that under those conditions the answer 

would be the same in one week or six weeks, consequently there would be 

no point in delaying action on the British request. 

USCIB: 29.3/30 - 7 -

TOP SECRET FROTH 

605 
I 

·~tD~tl. ---- ---

'fOP ~ef;'f FRe'ffl t:T. s • JlP.BSS ma:.¥ 

USCIB: 2903/30 

GENERAL CANINE then assured the Board that should the Soviets get 

"Circuit Mercury" the U.S. "Would be out of the COMINT business, except 

for some T/A. 

MR. SHELDON suggested that a flat turndown might result in some 

additional information. · 

After a discussion of the procedure the British or U.S. representatives would use in refusing a request for a copy of "Circuit 

Mercury", Mr. Friedman offered his opinion that the Russians are not 

inventors. They are great copyists, and should the Russians get a 

"Chinese" copy of "Mercury" they would be able to build the machine in 

a much shorter period. 

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN then asked each member if he accepted the 

recommendation of the Director, NSA that no further details of "Circuit 

Mercury" be gi van the French, , 

The members unanimously agreed, 

DECISION: (9 April 1954) USCIB, after careful consideration of the 

message from the Director General to Mr. Dulles (enclosure 1 with tBCIB 

29.3/27 dated 1 April 1954), reaffirmed its previous decision that it 

could not concur in disclosure of further details of "Circuit Mercury" 

to the French and that the Executive Secretary should notify the proper 

British representatives of the USCIB decision without further explanations of the reasons for it. 

This item to be dropped from the agenda. 

USCIB: 29.3/30 - 8 -

TOP SECRET FRDTI I 
TOP MleRE'i' - t:J. 9 • BHi& ~ll.Y ·FINAL' , ___ _ 

SUBJECT NUMBER 

USCIB: 2:1.3/29 < Item 4 of the Agenda for the 102nd Meeting of USCIB, 

held on 9 April 1954. 

The members noted th~/iriforrnation presented. 

This item t9bedropped from the agenda. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

USCIB: 29 .3/29 - 17 -

'I 

TOP SECRET 
USCIB: 29.3/28 ~ 

14 April 1954 

MEMORANDill1 FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Disclosure of the British Cipher Ma.chine "Circuit 

Mercury" to the French. 

Reference: USCIB 29.3/27 date 1 April 1954. 

As a result of the d~cision reached by USCIB at its 102nd 

Meeting on Friday, 9 April 1954, with regard to subject item, the 

enclosure hereto has been delivered to the U.K. Liaison Officer 

in Washington in order to provide a reply to the enclosure with 

the reference. 

Enclosure 

Copy of CIB # 000125 dtd 13 Apr 54. 

USCIB: 29.3/28 

XDPSECRET 

'24 
,. -

!Ol' SECI!ET 

CIB #000125 

13 April 1954 

MEMOR.ANDUM FOR THE SENIOR U.K. LIAISON OFFICER, WASHINGTON: 

Subject: Release of Circuit Mercury. 

The Chairman, USCIB has directed that I transmit to you the 

following response to your Director General's message contained in 

MOP.3715 dated 26 March 1954. I would be grateful to you if you 

would undertake to transmit this by means you deem appropriate to 

the intended addressee. 

"To Sinclair from Dulles 

"l. I very much regret to have to inform you that after 

prolonged and thorough consideration USCIB has reiterated its view 

that further details of 'Circuit Mercllr"J' should not be made available to the.French. 

"2. This decision was taken in full realization of the 

difficulties it may create for you as well as for ourselves. 

Although fully sympathetic with your position in this matter, I did 

not and do not now feel that I can in all good conscience attempt 

further to persuade the Members of the Board to agree.to release of 

any further.details of 'Mercury'." 

(Signed) 

RUFUS L. TAYLOR 

Captain, U. s. Navy 

Executive Secretary, USCIB 

Enclosure with USCIB 29.3/28 dtd 14 Apr 54. 

TOPSEC:llET 
-- -----======---=~===-====~=====,.--~~~----------

... 

~otJWD 

l,. USCD 29 .. 3/15 Ci:it"CU!atet\ a. U .. K. i~~®J)St tc:w U4s .. a~ 

qt ~ Of the full &:tc.119 gf uctrml!t MERQW?tt to t.bq lUxmaA 

2 .. l'ireCt>Ot'i; b ~ea. ~t avprov$l of~ U.K. ~queB'tl 

en the Sil'O~ tl»t tire\t'Clatim of au.oh tz lttl .. Q'!lg erYUto ;prtncipl$ to 

other cmmtrit:& w:Ul even~~ tho u.s. e~ effort ·~ca:u.se of' 41.ffiel.ll:ty in cootro.U:tlJ.a f.\lrther ~tton cir th1e illf~tioo .. " 

~ Q(!lSlD~C& 

~ 

4,. ~ U' .. K .. ~ ~ requestetl t<e0111\$'.l<lemt1o.n of tb1e 6acis:i¢n 

~ 

ttie ~mi of a personal. message fnnl the »1n;:atol" ~rel t4l 

lBCJ:'.e (uscm ar;.3f;!'r). Receiii't ot the ~sa,go wa netm.w~ 

ltiw.t a $ttk~t that UiCl'.D ~ vaet»l.$idel' the matuw cm 9 April. 

' 6~ ~,um holt\s that the e.bme te,ctore oatwe1Jjl:l th.:; 

J0$0ibile rl.xalt to COMJ.'ml of revue.ling Mf~':ROtlRY to t~ ~eh. lle po1.nts 

wt ~ it. lleW been ~ to releM~ ~'Y..t-7 not Qllly t.o the Ji'i'enoh 

wt to all tc\!J!O ~ and e.atta ttnt tb.1.a B"JQWm has be(?Jll accepted 

u ~~ ~ tbe next ten to w;:nty ~· 

7.. ~~~ 1.SD .feel.a tl:lat 41.ae~ t>t •quate:t ~ or t~ 1Jl tbe near~> petimD$ a.t th:t ~~ 41Aeve1J10J.VJ~ wcntUt 

create tlw beat JOS4ilible ntrnaspbe?te 'to:' the auaeess of the ~. 

/ 

\\ 
·--

- I 

REF ID:A4045873 

:rOP :ucm 

a. The u. s. has agreed with the British that the A'ISJM.-7 will 

be made available tor NATO milit&l'Y' use. We a.re in agreement with 

the British that the AFSJJIJ.•7 provides long-term top level ceypto5eCtll'it1, 

es~,t.1ally immune to ~anaqt,ic attack, and that the capture o~ an 

AFSAM-7 wUl not impair its tu.tui-e use. 

9. The crn>to-ptincipleo of the MSAM.-7 ewe different from 

those ot the U.S. top level .ECM which also afi"ordG top level seeurity, 

and the details ot wb1cb are to be retained Oll a u.s.-u.K. eJ''ifS onl.1' 

basis. The ECM will not e.dvertently be ,used tor encipberem.ent of COSMIC 

intormationo 

10. Circuit MERCURY~ which operates on a principle veey simU ar 

to ~ but affords even greater aecurit7 would. it disclosed to the 

Frencb (or to the Rusaians), not materially affect u.s. communications 

security. 

u. If a r4Qehine essentially a:lmUar to any ot those mentioned 

above were put into use by COMOO target nations; the ceyptanalytic 

solution of any individual •ssage could ncm be ~ect.ed in l•se 

than 10 to 20 )'ears, e,nd the solution of 8tJ::f group of messages would 

not result in a bl"'eakd.own ot the emtosystem involved. 

121> It the AFSNA.-7 ve?'O to be employed by OOMDlT t$l'get countries, 

~ic attack employing RAM of greater speeds than present~ 

available but prG'bably .teaeible to develop could be Justified. If ve now 

knew the Soviets were using machines of security comparable to Oireuit 

MERCURI, without development of new teebniques and new machines, any 

attempted crypt.analytic attack appears to be hopeless. 
. . 

potential serious jcopm."d.v to our COMim' ei"'i:'ort, I- u.i.ll Q&ree 

reluct!lntly. . I · f'cel that. we ohoultl., tauevcn· ,· · ot.ut-c clearly our 

oxtre:ie reluctD.nce e.nd th.E roasono tberof'or. If' tbo Bos:r:d 00 

decicka, _I recommend ue inform tile British ~u'botanttoJ.ly cc follcl.:10: ~ 

~. ~- • •••••• '••-.. >I I 

. I .1 • - •• 

'· 

.· . . . .. -. -:~ \.::.; 

I'.;._ - I.;.·' . \ . ,-! .J ~--n 
REF ID:A4045873 

DRAFT 

'ft!f s:sssr 

TO: DIRECTOR GmJERAL 

USCIB HAS RECONSIDERED YOUR REQUEST TO DISCLOSE FURTHER DETAILS 

OF CIRCUIT MERCURY TO THE FRENCH. AS YOU ARE AWARE, USCIB HAS BEEN 

\ 

EKTREMELY RELUCTANT TO TAICE ACTION WHICH COULD RESULT IN PLACING IN 

SOVIET HANDS KNOWLEDGE OF SOPHISTICATED AND SUPERIOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC 

SYSTEMS THI'!' COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE UK-us Cm1INT EFFORT. NEVERTHELESS' 

, ' IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE YOUR VIEW THIT THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRENCH 

WHICH WE EX.PF!CT TO LEAD TO A GENERAL IMPROVEMENT OF NATO SECURITY SHOULD 4-- - ' 

NOT BE JEOPARDIZED, USCIB HAS AGlmED,TO APPROVE MERELY DEMONSTRATION 

OF OIRCUIT MERCURY ro THE FRENCH ACCOMPANlED BY o~ EULA.NATION OF 

BASIC CRYPTO CIRCUITRY. USCIB l;)OES NOT CONCUR IN LEAVING THE MACHINE 

IN POSSF.SSION OF THE FRENCH NOR IN M~ING DETAII.ED emcurr DIAGRAMS 

AVAll.ABLE 'l'O THEM 
- . 

•• 

• 

USCIB: 29 .3/27 

EQ 3.3(h)(2) 1 April 1954 

PL 86c:36/50 USC 3605 

MEMORANDUM. FOR THE MEMBERS OK USCIB: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

Disclosure of the British Cipher Machine "Circuit 

Mercury" to France. 

(a) USCIB 29.3/15 dated 4 Jan,uary 1954. 

(b) USCIB 29 .3/17 dated 29 January 1954. 

( c) USCIB 29 .3/21 dated 11 February 1954. 

(d) USCIB 29.3/24 dated 1 March 1954. 

(e) USCIB 29.3/20 dated 11 February 1954. 

(f) USCIB 29.3/16 dated 15 January 1954. 

1. Reference (a) circulated a U.K. request for U.S. approval of 

disclosure of the full details of "Circuit Mercury" to the French 

2. In paragraph 5 of the enclosure with reference (a) the 

Director, National Security Agency recommended against acceding to 

this U.K. request on the grounds that "revelation of such· a strong 

crypto principle to other countries will eventually endanger the U.S. 

COMINT effort because of difficulty in controlling further dissemination of this information 11 • • 

3. Ref~rence (b) supported the position of the Director, NSA 

in this regard and was approved by USCIB on 10 February 1954 (see 

reference (c)). Accordingly, the U.K. were advised of the U.S. 

decision by the Director, NSA (see reference (d)). 

4. The U.K. have now requested reconsideration of this decision 

through t~e medium of a personal message from the Director General of 

the British intelligence services to the Chairman of USCIB, a copy of 

which is included herewith as enclosure 1 and which sets forth the 

British argument in favor of their proposal. A preliminary response 

to enclosure 1 is also attached hereto as enclosure 2. 

5. Attention is invited to references (e) and (f). It appears 

that Circuit Mercury is a British cipher machine of high security 

incorporating crypto principles similar to those used in the U.S. ECM. 

It also appears to be the ca.se that compromise of Mercury would not 

endanger the ECM or any other U.S. crypto device and that U.S. COMSEC 

USCIB: 29.3/27 

POP SECRET 

31 
• 

• 

USCIB: '2!1.3/27 

1 April 1954 

TOP 5ECftET 

Subject: Disclosure of the British Cipher Machine "Circuit 

Mercury" to France. 

is not involved. Thus the question to be resolved appears to be one 

of whether the disadvantages of such danger to U.S. COMINT as may be 

attendant upon release of further details of Circuit Mercury to the 

French is outweighed by the advantages argued by the U.K • 

Enclosures 

1. Copy of MOP.3715 

dtd 26 Mar 1954. 

2. Copy of CIB #000114 

dtd 1 Apr 1954. 

USCIB: '2!1.J/27 - 2 -

TO:PSEGRET 
• 

• 

--

r: ·-~'-\ \~-.../'._) 

BRITISH JOINT SERVICES MISSION 

MAIN NAVY BUILDING 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 

MOP .3715. 26th March, 1954. 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB. E.o 3. 3 I h I I 2 I 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Subject: Circuit Mercury. 

Will you please pass the following message to the Chairman of 

your Board from the Chairman of LSIB. 

11 DULLES from DIRECTOR GENERAL. 

1. I am concerned at the situation which has arisen as a 

result of your Board's inability to agree to further disclosure 

of MERCURY (DIRNSA 1 s letter 00078 of 24th February refers). 

2. The original requirement for this system to be approved 

for NATO still stands (viz: the present inability of the RAF 

to pass NATO traffic classified Secret and above without super 

encryption over existing links equipped with Mercury). I am 

now anxious lest continued une lained refusal to ive the 

s_ airman o ave .care u y 

considered both Comsec and Comint aspects. It seems to me 

that the above factors outweigh the possible risk to Comint 

of revealing Mercury to the French. In this connection it 

might be mentioned that we have already agreed to release 

AFSAM-7 not only to the French but to all members of NATO 

for widespread use and this system has been accepted as 

secure for the next ten to twenty years. 

4. Disclosure of adequate details of Mercury in the very 

near future, perhaps actually in the course of the Paris 

discussions, would create the best possible atmosphere for 

the latter's success, to which I know that you as well as I 

attach great importance. I should accordingly be grateful 

if you would give the matter further consideration in your 

Board. 11 

/s/ John H. Tiltman .......................................... John H. Tiltman, Brigadier. 

Enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.3/27 dtd 1 Apr 1954. 

TOP$ECRET 
• 

• 

(~ •WI 

'~~~~ 

'l'OP S:SQRE!' 

UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C • 

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN 

CIB # 000114 

1 April 1954 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SENIOR U.K. LIAISON OFFICER, WASHINGTON: 

Subject: Circuit Mercury. 

In reply to your MOP.3715 of 26 March 1954 the Acting Chairman, 

USCIB, has instructed me to ask you to convey the following reply to 

the Director General's message on this subject: 

"To the Chairman, LSIB from the Acting Chairman, USCIB: 

11 1 have taken steps to have the question of release of 

further details of Circuit Mercury to France reconsidered by 

USCIB at its next ~eeting on 9 April and shall .see to it that 

Mr. Dulles is personally informed of your views at the 

earliest convenient date. 11 

(Signed) 

RUFUS L. TAYLOR 

Captain, U. S. Navy 

Executive Secretary, USCIB 

Enclosure 2 with USCIB 29.3/27 dtd 1 Apr 1954. 

'FO:PSEGRET 
/ 

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WU~ 

l02n4 USCIB. Meetg 

Item 4 

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• 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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tun lHf DIRECTOR: 

D. M.AGNEW 

Captaiq, US Navv 

Deputy Chief oi Staff 

M/R: on 24 .Feb 54, Director, NSA, informed the British Cypher Policy 

Eoard (CPB) that USCIB could not COllcur in a British request for 

releaae of Cireuit MERCURY to the French. On 26 Mar Obai:rman, CPB 

and I.Sm, requested reconsideration of this item in a cable to 

Chairman, usc:m. Instant correspondence informs the Executive 

Secretary, USCD that Director, NSA, has no obJection to a.clmowledi.Dg 

receipt of the cable with a statement that 11:> will be reconsidered 

by USCIB on 9 April 54, M/B pre;pared 30 Mar 54. 

LC:DR Karl, P/P, 6o548/ban 

-~-----· 
_J -- EO 3.3(h)(2) 

• Tl~°§Ef!ii#:045B. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

F•NAL.. 

'l!Q~ Sli:C£~ IT $ EYES ONLY 'ffiN'f'A'fIVE ~ 

SUBJECT NUMBER 

USCIB: 29.3/26 

. USCIB: 29 .3/26 

Item 3. of the Agenda .for the lOlst Meeting of USCIB, 

held onl2 March 1954 • 

- 6 -

' TO.P SECRET I 
• 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

]op SlLC~ lJ. S. E¥~ 0Nfi¥ PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

USCIB: 2$.3/26 

This item to be dropped from the agenda:. 

USCIB: 2$.3/26 - 7 -

'l'OP SECRET 
. '!-

USCIB: 29.3/25 

EQ3,3(h)(2) 

PL 86.,,36/50USC 3605 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE :MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Reference: (a) USCIB 29.3/4 of 2 Oct 1953. 

8 March 1954 

(b) USCJB 29.J/8 of 13 Oct 1953 (Item 1 of Minutes 

of 92nd USCID Meeting). 

(c) USCIB 29.J/6 of 20 Oct ~953, 

·. ··. · ... ·. ··. · ... · ... 

3. The enclosure hereto is ::mbmi tted for discussion by the 

Director, NSA in connection with item 3 of the agenda for the lOlst 

Meeting of USCID. 

4. TEIS DCCTJ1'1ENT AI'ID ITS ENCLOSURES CONTAIN. COl'fr:flmICATim::: 

INTELLIGEHCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE IIANDL:W IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY 

PROVIDED FOR COI~IN'I\ 

Enclosure . 

NSA ser 00092-S dtd 8 Mar 54. 

USCIB: 29.3/25 

.1' U3 L.. "" · · R 

, ptain, U. S. Iiayy 

E:cecutive Secretary, USCIB 

AfFB!'flID'::'D DQQT,;1-filIJTO oo:~!A:rn 

,,,QJJR l.rORfJ !l..il~1llAL. 

T<h.0 SECRET 

31 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Serial: 00092-S· 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

'f OP SBeftE'f 

e MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS . OF USCIB 

'fOP OECfffi'f CON'f'ROL lRJMBER ' 5k= 591( A) 

COPY I 4 OF 44 COPIES 

PAGE OF 2 PAGES 

TOP SECRET 
'POP OElORfl'f 

2 Incls: 

a/s 

&OP~·3 

. 3'.3(h)(2) 

PL 86~36/qO USC 3605 Sertal: 00092-S 

~P fil~GRB'±' GeN9?ReL NUMB:t!:ft 54'-59l(A) 

COPY ..3 t OF 44 COPIES 

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES 

TOP SECRET 
~...---

. " , ' ' , c 

0 BRITISH JOINT SERVICES MISSION 

p 

y MAIN NAVY BUIDDING 

WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 

TOP SEC!<ET rnOTH 

MOP. 3G54• ~~l6~1~~~~ USC 3605 15th February, 1954. 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIBECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY. 

'!10P SElORB':P OOPfg:iRffi:i NUMBER 54r-59l(B) 

COPY :JI OF 44 COPIES 

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES 

'FSP SEERET FRS'FII 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-316/50 USC 3605 

/s/ John H. Tiltman 

John H. Tiltman, Brigadier 

~eP SBGHE:l~ SGM'l.!aOL NUMBER 54-59l(B) 

COPY .] I OF 44 COPIES 

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES 

T()P SECRET FllO'fll 
, rOft§Ettfi.~o 458~ 

• ,,,.,.,,.,,.- -........... 

,,/ '\ ) e / USCIB: 29.3/24 

\ // / /ff-_ ____/ / /l 

,_ 

1 March 1954 

/ -''f''l"+O+!P .......... Si!llt!l-0++.HEl .... 'f'.... I 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Disclosure of "Circuit MERCURY'' to the French. 

Reference: USCIB 29.3/21 dtd 11 February 1954. 

1. The enclosure is circulated for information on action taken 

pursuant to the reference. 

2. THE ENCLOSURE TO THIS DOCffi'.1ENT CONTAINS COMMUNICATIONS 

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS 

EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT. 

Enclosure 

NSA ser 00078S dtd 24 Feb 1954. 

USCIB: 29.3/24 

tain, U. s. Navy 

cutive Secretaryj USCIB 

31 
~\ 

: \ '""'I .. l ; ' J ',. J 

'±'OP SKG&ET 

rOft'ftEfl:ftli!((0458~ 

• 

NATIONAJ, SECURITY AGENCY 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 

Serial: 00078S 

24 Feb 1954 

MEMORANDUM FOR TIIE SECRETARY, CYPHER POLICY BOARD 

SUBJECT: Further Disclosure of Circuit MERCURY to the French 

1. Reference is made to my memorandum, Serial 000599-S, dated 

27 November 1953, in which I stated I was unable to concur in your 

proposal to divulge the details of Circuit MERCURv to the French. 

I indicated, however, that I would present the question to the 

cognizant UoS. authorities for final decisiono 

2. Accordingly, the problem was referred to the United States 

Communications Intelligence Board because of the COMINT security 

aspects involved. This is in line with the understanding reached 

in November 1952 by the U.So and the U.K. Chiefs of Staff whereby 

both communication security and the special interests of communications intelligence should be considered when proposing release of 

cryptographic systems to other nations. The Board took the view 

that revelation to other countries of such a strong crypto-principle 

as is ambodied in Circuit MERCURY would eventually endanger the 

COMINT effort because of the difficulty in controlling further 

dissemination of this information. 

3. In consequence, USCIB advised me that it could not concur 

in your request for disclosure of full details of Circuit MERCURY 

to the French. 

Copy furnished: 

Executive Secretary, USCIB 

(sgd) Ralph J. Canine 

RALPH J. CANINE 

Lieutenant General, US Army 

Director 

Enclosure with USCIB 29.3/24 dtd 1 Mar 54. 

TOP SECRET 
·c 

0 

p 

y 

BRITISH JOINT SERVICES MISSION 

MAIN NA VY BUILDING 

WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 

'feF OElORB9? FB<ml 

668 E03.3(h)(2) 

MOP. 3 • PL 86 .. 36/50 USC 3605 25th February, 1954. 

MEMORAND'lM FOR THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY. 

/s/ John H. Tiltma.n 

John H. Tiltma.n, Brigadier 

'fOP SECIB'.l'i' CONTROL NUMBER 54-591( C) 

COPY QI OF 44 COPIES 

PAGE l OF l PAGES 

TOP SECRET FR8J111 . 

·-
I 

. ./ 

-~-

USCIB: 29.3/23 

I 

19 Febru~ ~954 

'f Of i'.3ECffB'f 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: French request for COMSEC equipments. 

Reference: (a) USCIB 29.3/19 dtd 1 Feb 1954. 

(b) USCIB 29.1/6 dtd 15 Dec 1953 (revised 4 Feb 1954). 

· 1. USCIB at its lOOth Meeting on 11 February 1954 proposed to 

provide certain CQ1SEC equipments in response to the request contained 

in reference (a) and to obtain through the Combined Working Group 

LSIB views on this proposal as a matter related to reference (b). 

20 

2. In implementation of this proposa~ the enclosure was delivered 

to the Combined Working Group on 16 February 1954. The CWG was informed by its NSA members that the proposal included the intention of 

providing cryptosystem DAPHNE. 

3. On 18 February 1954 the Ex:P.rmtive Secretary was officially 

informed of CWG and LSIB concurrence in the USCIB proposal to provide 

the equipments in question. 

Enclosure 

CIB!# 00046 dtd 16 Feb 540 

USCIB: 29.3/23 

TO:P SECRET 
TCJ;mJ!5~Xlb 458~ 

-

GIB # 00046 

16 February 1954 

T QP SEC &ET 

MEMORANPUM FOR CHAIRMAN, COMBINED WORKING GROUP FOR IMPROVEMENT OF 

NATO COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY: 

Subject: French Request for COMSEC Equipments. 

1. At its recent meeting on 11 February 1954, the United States 

Communications Intelligence Board considered the recent and urgent 

request of the French SDECE representative in Washington for up to 5 

teletype security equipments. 

/ 

J. USCIB are of the opinion that the explanations that would 

necessarily be supplied with such equipments would provide a useful 

background for the technical discussions that are planned by your 

Committee as part of the scheme for improvement of French communications security and believe that it would in addition provide a/ready 

explanation for at least some of the shortcomings we will have 

mentioned at Cabinet level. 

4. USCIB therefore desires that your Committee through its U.K. 

membership convey this information to LSIB and inform USCIB of LSIB's 

views together with those of your Committee on this matter at the 

'earliest practicable date. 

Copy to: 

Director, NSA. 

EO 3. 3 I h I I 2 I 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

(Signed) 

RUFUS L. TAYLOR 

Captain, u. S. Navy 

Executive Secretary, USCIB 

Enclosure with USCIB 29.J/23 dtd 19 Feb 54. 

TO:P 8ECRET 
• 

0-4-3 Of o 

USCIB: 29.3/21 

11 February 1951+ 

'i'OP SFCRli'T 

MEJ:10RANDUM F,QR THE MEMBERS OF USC IB: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

Disclosure of the British Cipher Machine "Circuit 

Mercury" to France. 

USCID 29.3/17 dtd 29 Jan 1954. 

1. No objection having been received to the reference by 10 ° 

February 1954, the USCIBEC Decision reported therein has USCID approval. 

2. Accordingly, USCIB supports the position of the Director, NSA, 

as set forth in paragraph 5 of the enclosure with USCIB 29.3/15, and 

authorizes the Director, NSA, to prepare and forward what he deems to 

be an appropriate reply to U.K. authorities in the premises. 

USCIB: 29.3/21 

TO:PSECRET 

32 
~ USCIB: 29.3/20 

• 

11 February 1954 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Disclosure of Circuit MERCURY to the French. 

The enclosure is circulated for purposes of record • 

Enclosure 

ptain, U. s. Havy 

Executive Secretary, USCIB 

NSA ser 000598 dtd 8 Feb 1954. 

USCIB: 29.3/20 

TfJ:P Sf?CttET 

32 
e 1.0~L*Pi+4045i3 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 

:t-IEMORANDill1 FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB 

Serial: 00059S 

8 Feb 1954 

SUBJECT: Disclosure of Circuit MERCURY to the French 

References: (a) USCIB 29.J/15, dtd 4 Jan 54 

(b) USCIB 29.J/16, dtd 15 Jan 54 

1. Reference (a) circulated for vote sheet action a recommendation by the Director, NSA, that USCIB support his view that the British 

should n9t disclose full details of Circuit MERCURY to the French. 

2. Reference (b) circulated the comments of several members and 

the Executive Secretary with regard to the Director's recommendation 

and indicated that the matter would be placed on the Agenda for the 

Tenth Meeting of USCIBEC. 

J. During discussion of the item at the Tenth Meeting, the NSA 

member explained that neither NSA nor GCHQ had intended that MERCURY 

be made available for NATO use. · Rather, -he said, GCHQ was attempting 

to obtain NATO clearance for use of MERCURY in handling COS1fIC traffic 

on British circuits and for that reason had to submit the cryptographic principles of the machine to the third member of the Standing 

Group, i.e. France, for approval. 

4. The Executive Secretary invited attention to paragraph J of 

reference (b) in which the following recommendation of the US-UK 

1952 Communications Security Conference is quoted: 

"That, subject to final IB\-US securfty acceptance, 

ROLLICK I, MERCURY, 5UCO, SIGTOT, and ROCKEX be 

offered for NATO adoption and_use to the extent 

that they become available." 

The members engaged in considerable discussion concerning the intent 

of this recommendation without reaching any definite conclusions. 

The NSA member offered to do some research on the problem with a view to 

determining whether the files contain any further information on tliis 

recommendation. He said he would forward any new data to the Executive 

Secretary. 

5. A search of the files at NSA revealed that the British and 

the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, a few months after the March 1952 

Conference, agreed upon an interpretation of. the reconnnendation in 

question. 

EncJosure with USCIB 29.3/20 dtd 11 Feb 1954. 

TO£DSECRET 
--

'±'OP S~GP.B'f 

6. In October 1952, the following was received from London regarding the Report of the UK/US Connnunications Security Conference 

1952: 

11 In accepting the report, the British Chiefs of Staff 

interpret the words 'subject to final UK/US security 

acceptance' in reconnnendation c and d of paragraph 9, 

to relate both to the technical cryptographic security 

of the devices and to the special interests of the 

signal intelligence agencies of the two countries." 

7. In November 1952, the following statement was included in 

the U.S. reply to the British letter: 

"The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with 

the British Chiefs of Staff that both connnunication 

security and the special interests of communications 

intelligence should be considered when proposing release of cryptographic systems to other nations." 

8. It is believed that the information in paragraphs 6 and 7, 

above, will be of interest in any future discussion of the problem. 

FOR THE DIRECTOR: 

2 

(Signed) 

D, M. AGNE\:! 

Captain, US Navy 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

Plans and Operations 

TOP SECRET 
USCIB: 29 .J/19 

1 February 1954 

'fOP SBGRm 9.8. l!:YBS OH:t.¥ 

MEMORANDUM. FOR THE .MD1BERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: French Communica,tione Security. 

Reference: USCIB 29.3/18 of 1 Febr~ary 1954. 

The enclosed memorandum of conversation between the Freneh 

representative of the SDECE and a representative of the Central 

Intelligence Agen9y is circulated for information in connection 

with the reference. 

Enclosure 

a/s 

USCIB: 29 .J/19 

aptain, U. S. Navy 

ve Secretary, USCIB 

..ZO.P SEeRET 

20 
'fOP SElOfl.i!l'f tJ.S. :s¥BS ONL¥ 

1 February 1954 

"SUBJECT: Machines for Quai d 1 0rsay 

111. At the conclusion of a 'long conversation devoted to other 

matters on 27 January 1954, Mr. DeVOSJOLI agRin brought up this 

subject. He asked me if there was no possibility of obtaining up 

to five (5) machines. He explained that the l~st of other possible 

sources provided him was alre~dy thoroughly familiar to the Quai 

d'Orsay and was of no use, because machines of the type desired by 

the Quai d 1 0rsay are manufactured only in the United States and in 

the C\oviet Zone of Germany. He remarked that the French were so 

desperate that they were even considering how they might obtain some 

of the machines manufactured under Soviet control. 

11 2. I told DeVOSJOLI that I was not hopeful, because I was sure 

that all possib~lities here had been thoroughly explored, but that 

I was willing to reopen the question. I stated, finally, that •our 

people' had done everything possible to meet his request, but that 

other agencies 1 demands were so extensi v~ as to absorb the total 

scheduled production in this country. 11 

Enclosure wi,th USCIB 29.3/19 dtd i Feb 1954. 

'FOP 8ECRE'f' 
-·· 

/ 

'\ USCIB: 29.J/18 20 

~OP SECREu. s. ms ONLY 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

French Communications Securityo 

(a) USCIB 29.J/ll of JO October 1953. 

(b) USCIB 2903/12 of 12 November 1953. 

(c) USCIB 29.3/13 of 13 November 1953. 

1 February 1954 

1. In accordance with the decision set forth in reference (a) 

and further to the notification contained in reference (c), the Combined 

Working Group was notified of the French request for assistance and the ~.s . .Ad Hoc Committee acting thru the NSA member thereof informed the ~irector, National Security Agency of ~ts views as set forth in enclosure 

1 hereto. 

2. After due consideration of this matter, the French SDECE 

representative was informed by the Central Intelligence Agency of the 

fact that the U.S. while sympathetic~ is unable to render.the assistance 

desired. Enclosure 2 hereto is a verbatim copy of the Aide Memoirs 

given to the French SDECE representative in Washington on 21 January 1954. 

It is understood that this reply was received with chagrin. 

J. Owing to the nature of the approach to the French now being 

planned by the Combined Working Group in implementation of the June 1953 

Up/UK Conference Report on NATO COMSEC, and in view of the interest in 

this matter of the USCIB .Ad Hoc Committee for the improvement of NATO 

COMSEC, copies of enclosure 2 have been furnished to'the Chairman of ~hat 

Committee (Mr. T.A. Polyzoides) for information in connection with the 

planning being done by.the Combined Working Group, the U.S. element of 

which is the above mentioned .Ad Hoc Committee. 

aptain, • Navy ..,.,.,~2yt.lti ve Secretary, USCIB 

Enclosures 

' 1. Memo for the Recordo 

2. Aide Memoire on the subject of Crypto 

Assistance to the French Foreign Office. 

USCIB: 29.3/18 

T€h0 SECRET 
" 

rQW'.fR~~0458~ - ------- . 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

S~bject: Treatment of French Request for Cipher Machineso 

la After the initial approach by the French, conversations were 

held between M. de Vosjoli and representatives of NSA on 5 November 1953 

at which time M. de Vosjoli was told that the US would look into the 

niatter of supplying cipher machines. The US Ad Hoc Connnittee for the 

Improvement of Allied Communications Security believes that it would 

not be proper to delay all further response to this request until after 

the joint US-UK .Ambassadorial approach in early Decembero 

2. The Committee also believes that the French should not receive 

the impression that the US cannot or will not assist them or be told 

allything inconsistent with the joint US-UK proposal to hold tripartite 

meetings. At the same time it is essential that the SDECE have no 

kp.owledge of the impending approach. 

J. The NSA members of the Connnittee have therefore, been informed 

(a) that the Connnittee accepts the necessity of some answer to M. de 

Vosjoli before 1 December but desires this to be as delayed as possible; 

(b) that the answer should be along the following lines: l 

(1) The US facilities are heavily connnitted to NATO requirements 

at the present time. 

(2) The US believes that it may be pos.sible to adjust these 

commitments to take care of at least some of the French needs. 

(3) Such readjustment will be a lengthy process, if it is possible. 

(4) The US believes it may be able to offer more immediate 

assistance by way of spare parts for the present French 

equipment and would like a statement of the French requirements in this respect; 

~d (c) that after the US and UK have received French acceptance of their 

proposal, M. de Vosjoli should be informed that the joint approach had 

been made. 

Enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.3/18-dtd 29 Jan 54. 

rap· SECRET 
'±'OP SEORE'f 

AIDE MEMOIRE ON THE SUBJECT OF CRYPTCGRAPHIC .ASSISTAi'IJCE 

TO·THE 

FRENCH FOREIGN OFFICE 

When your requirements for communications security equipment were 

described to us some time ago, we examined those requirements very carefully, studying them in the light of and in connection with similar 

requirements of our own. We have reported to the Director of Central I~telligence on our findings and he has asked that they be given to you. 

First, we examined the crypto-equipment requirements of various U.S. 

4gencies in order to ascertain the similarity between their requirements 

and yours, and the means by which those requirements are to be met. Then w~ examined the development and production schedules to discover in what w~y and when the requirements would be met. We asked these Agencies to 

study carefully what changes might be made in the production schedules 

of equipment in production, to see if some equipments destin~d for them 

could be diverted to meet requirements of the French Foreign Office. 

Unfortunately, in those cases where equipments might be suitable 

fpr your needs, we have found that commitments to meet requirements are 

quite firm, and that it does not now appear that equipments can be 

diverted to meet your requirements in less than JO to .36 mon·i:.hs, and we 

cannot now give you any assurance even of this. Since new equipments 

which might meet your requirements will not be available for quite some 

time, we looked at older equipments still in use to see if any of these ~quipments could be made available. Here again we found that, although 

in most cases the equipments were old, all are in use. Furthermore, 

there is an actual need for additional' equipments of this type which 

even we ourselves do not have. These are the results.of our earnest 

study of ways a.nd means to assist you and, unhappily, it appears that ~hey are of a negative character. 

In exploring the problem, various U.S. Agencies have suggested 

that you might wish to examine commercial sources, the existence of 

which you may know, but in order to make this certain, we feel it 

a.i;l.visable to mention them. 

For example, there is the firm of Dr. Edgar Gretner, Elektromeckanik 

μnd Licht-tecknik, Zurich, Switzerland. Although we are not familiar with 

the product of this firm, we think it might merit your investigation if 

you are not already acquainted with it. 

- 1 -

Enclosure 2 with USCIB 29 • .3/18 dtd 29 Jan 54. 

TOP SECRET 
• 

• 'r~flt:',~~0458~ - ------- .. 

':POP SEC~ 

We wonder if you have explored the possibility of using one-time-

~apes - a system which NATO uses, and which has been found generally 

satisfactory. If you decide to use tapes, you will need not only the ~~pes themselves, but also the "mixing" mechanism to permit their use 

with teletype equipment. 

As a source for this mechanism, you might consider the Norwegian 

Post and Telegraph, which is now manufacturing equipment for the SHAPE 

Signal Division. We also understand that a firm known as Atheneum ~tiftung, of Frankfurt, Germany, has developed a similar mechanism. 

As for the production of tapes themselves, we understand that 

Mr. Boris Hagelin of the firm Crypto A. G. in Zug, Switzerland, is 

talcing orders for a machine to produce one-time tapes. Also the ~theneum Stiftung is known to manufacture a similar machine. Finally, 

although the U.S. is unable to furnish you with either the "mixing" m~chanism or with a tape-malcing machine, we can, if you so desire, supply 

ypu with a limited quantity of tapes. 

If yo~,ha~e any technical questions with regard to the above 

suggestion, we will be ,glad to arrange another meeting for you with 

qμr experts in this field who can fill in the details. You are, of 

course, at liberty to discuss this question with the Director of Central 

Iμtelligence, if you so desire. 

- 2 -

TO-PSECR£r 
,. 

I 

~ 

USCIB: 2903/17 19 

29 January 1954 

'f Of' El:filORE'f' 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

Disclosure of the British Cipher Machine "Circuit 

Mercury" to France. 

(a) USCIB 29 • .3/15 dated I+ January 19'54. 

(b) USCIB 29.3/16 dated 15 January 1954. 

1. Reference (a) was submitted to USCIB members for vote sheet 

action on 4 January 1954. In view of vote sheet replies, suromarized 

in reference (b), this problem was considered by USCIBEC at its Tenth 

Meeting on 27 January 1954. 

2. Members of USCIBEC discussed this matter at length, and 

ultimately agreeQ to recommend to USCIB that the position of the 

Director, NSA, as set forth in paragraph 5 of the enclosure with 

USCIB 29.3/15, be supported. It was further agreed that the Director, 

NSA, should be authorized to prepare and forward what he deems to be 

an appropriate reply in the premises. 

3. This decision is forwarded pursuant to the provisions of 

paragraph 11 of USCIB Directive No. 1. In the absence of objection 

by any member prior to 1700~ 10 February 1954, the above decision 

will be considered approved. 

USCIB: 29.3/17 

TOP SECRET 
' . 

I 

e 

e 

/---~ 

;,:~:~},) 

-~:~·/ 

.. 

USCIB: 29.3/16 

~ 

15 January 1954 

':FOP ra!iGra!i':P FRffi'fI l::J.8. EBS ONL~ 

MEMORANDt'M FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC: 

Subject: Disclosure of the British Cipher Machine "Circuit Mercury" 

to France. 

Reference: USCIB 29.3/15 of 4 January 1954. 

1. The following comments have been received in response to vote 

sheet action on the reference: 

"This office concurs with DIRNSA that disclosure of full details 

of "Circuit MERCURY" should not be made to the French. 

"However, this concurrence does not extend to the content of 

paragraph 5 of the enclosure to the reference. · 

20 

./ ·// 

STATE "This vote sheet is in approval of General Canine's recommendation 

that the request of the Cypher Policy Board be refused. 

"In view of certain incorrect remarks contained in the statement 

by the Secretary of the Cypher Policy Board1 it is recommended 

that the reply to the British include the/following comments: 

USCIB: 29 • .3/16 EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SECRET FROTI I 

(' 
I 

e 

e 

" . ~ TOP Sl!'@IlJ!P ~~~!'!'\Jf3 

USCIB: 29.3/16 E03.3(h)(2) 

PL 86"-36/50 USC 3605 

T GP a&G REI±' FROIH B. S • El'gl OlftJY 

.... • ... · ... 

"With regard to the second and third paragraphs of the statement by the Secretary of the Cypher Policy Board, under the 

U.S. plan for approaching the French with regard to their 

communications security which has been presented to the British 

members of the Combined Working Group, it is not conceived 

that it is prerequisite to technical discussions with the 

French that the French make a full disclosure of all the 

crypto systems and practices which they use or that the U.S. 

and U.K. disclose the full details of their most important 

crypto principles." 

.QlA "Desire paper be considered at next regular meeting of USCIBEC." 

2, From the comments received and in consideration of the reference 

itself it is thought that a little more background would be helpful to 

the members in arriving at a decision on this matter. 

3. Included amongst the recommendations of the US-UK Communications 

Security Conference held in Washington in May and June 1952 was the 

following: / CtJM'"!.,... Se-t:Ntt.11"'/ 1.r ,~.,.ewJJr.JJ /lfE!'ftr 

"Thatj subject to final UK-US security acceptance1ROLLICK I, MERCURY~* 5 UCO, SIGTor, and ROCKEX be offered for NATO adoption and 

use to the extent that they become available. n * ,..,._. 

In forwarding the Conference recommendation to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, the U.S. COMSEC Authorities concerned suggested an additional 

caveat as follows: 

"In all cases where crypto.equipments are to be made available to 

NATO, the revelation of crypto principles involved should be restricted 

to general summaries and descrintions, and should not include specific 

wiring details, drawings, etc. until after the eguipment is in 

productions"* 

At the same time the U.S. COMSEC Authorities recommended to the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff that the U.S. ECM (CSP 888/889 version) be released to 

the British for Combined oommunications. In support of these ·recommendations certain arguments pertinent to the problem presented in the 

the reference were advanced. These were: 

*Underiining'added. 

USCIB: 29.3/16 TOP SECRET FROTI I 
I 

USCIB: 2903/16 

'f OP. SEOR:E'f PREJ.E'II -= ff. 3 s ffi.133 OUL¥ 

With regard to circuit Mercury. 

' 

11£,o ·"Mercury", a British-invented device, contains cryptoprinciples 

so similar to those of the CSP 2900 that to off er the former to NATO 

a.mounts to giving away those principles which the US has retained for 

its own use in the pasto 

' 11,:Q., Loss to an enemy of the "Mercury" would in no way endanger the 

security of US colllmunications enciphered in the CSP 2900, since, 

although similar in principle, Mercury and the CSP 2900 differ in detail. 

"£0 Complete revelation to other NATO nations of the minute details 

of any cryptoprinciple prior to its embodiment in a manufactured ver~ion 

is a practice to be avoided, since such detail would permit a nation 

to produce its own embodiments. e1rP.n though the final US equipment might 

be officially rejected for NATO use." 

With regard. to the ECM2 

11 ~o The CCM currently in use for Combined as well as NATO traffic 

is outmoded and inadquate, particularly for highest-level and intelligence 

traffic. 

"]2., The appearance of the principles of the CSP 2900 in "Mercury" 

makes it obvious that the cryptographers of the UK are thoroughly familiar 

with the broad principles of the CSP 29000 This does not mean, however, 

that the UK is familiar with the details of application of the principles 

within the CSP 29000 

11,S.o The CSP 2900 includes the same basic principles as does the ECM, 

its predecessor, but again differs sufficiently in detail to mean that 

revelation of the principles of the ECM would not provide exact knowledge 

of the CSP 29000 Cryptanalytic attack with high speed analogues requires 

knowledge of specific details; therefore 11 even should knoVTledge of the 

details of the ECM become known to an enemy cryptanalyst, he could not 

use that-knowledge to direct intelligently a high speed analogue 

attack on the CSP 29000 

".lio Release of the ECM to the UK would permit use of a very strong 

machine for some Combined communications and woUld still permit compliance with paragraph J0813e of Joint Action of the Armed Forces, 

which requires retention for exclusive US use of our most secure 

cryptographic systemo Such release would not jeopardize the security 

of US communicationso 

USCIB: 2903/16 - 3 -

TOP SECRET PROTH 
I 

I 

9 TOP S~J~P =~€~3 

USCIB: 29.3/16 

TOP SBGFIB9:' PROfH - t1.5. EYES ONLY 

"~o There are not sufficient quantities of either CSP 2900 or ECM 

in existence to permit the offer of any large quantity to the UK. 

They are sufficient, however, to meet some of the more urgent high 

command and special requirements, The UK, if such an offer were to be 

made, should have a voice in determining the uses to which the quant~ty 

which could be offered might best be put. 11 

4. In November 1952, the U,S, Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the 

two recommendations discussed aboveo 

5. While the paper before us does not directly concern the action 

taken to release the ECM to the British.17 the arguments advanced for that 

action are pertinent to the question of release of Circuit Mercury to 

the French, In this case it has already been argued and agreed by 

competent U.S. authorities that even though the ECM principle should 

fall into enemy hands our best embodiment of it (CSP 2900) would not 

be endangered thereby, It was also argued and agreed that release of 

specific details of a given embodiment ~ht endanger.the system using' 

that particular embodiment, Insofar as NATO is concerned such danger 

is by indirection, Yet that is still not a matter under the cognizru1ce 

of USCIB which is primarily concerned with the COMJlIT implications. 

In this instance it appears that the two fundamental questions to decide 

are: (1) Does USCIBconsider that 9 in placing.the details of a stroug 

crypto-system in NATO hands, there is risk through them of leaks to 

other nations and commercial interests before NATO security it.self cun 

be improved by the immediate supply of adequate quantities of the device; 

and, if so9 is USCIR willing to assume this risk? (2) Does USCIB 

consider it likely that, through release of a device such as Mere 

to NATO Nations before it can be su lied in UR.Iltit 

tain)l o Navy 

cutive Secretary9 USCIB 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

USCIB: 2903/16 

TOP SECRET FROTH 
e. 

0113 

USCIB: 29.3/15 

4 January 1954 

- ':POP S:SElRE.l' . 

' . . MEMORANDUM, FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Disclosure of th'e British Cipher Machine "Circuit 

MERCURY tr to France. 

1. The enclosure is. forwarded for consideration at the request 

of the Director., NSA. 

2: It is requested that your vieW8' on General Carline's recom-, 

mendation (paragraphs 5 and 6 of the enclosure) be indicated on the . attached vote sheet', which' should be returned ·to this o(fice by 1700, 

:p ·January 1954. · ' I 

3. THE ENCLOSURE WITH THIS DOCUMENT' CONTAINS COMMUNICATIONS 

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND· SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS . EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT. 

Enclosure . DIRNSA Serial 000625-S dtd 22 D~c 1953. 

USCIB: 29 .3/15 

' -

'f'OP SECRET 

( 

ain, U. S. Navy / 

cutive Secretary, USCIB 

-· 

20 
r- JE.©(P ~~tti~~3 - NATIONAL SECURITY AGENC~ WASHINGTON 2e, D. c. Serial: 000625-S 

22 Dec 53 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB 

SUBJECT: Disclosure of the British Cipher Machine 

"Circuit MERCURY" to France 

1. . The British have developed an on-line COMSEC equipment called 

"Circuit MERCURY" which uses crypto-principles similar to the u. s. 

cipher machine commonly called the ECM (Electric Cipher Machine). 

"Circuit MERCURY" is intended for intra-British use and is not to be 

made available to other NATO countries, except the Uo s. and Canada. 

Certain British Headquarters adjacent to various NATO Headquarters in 

Europe have oxpresoed a requirement to use "Circuit MERCURY" for onlinc encryption of NATO traffic. Before this can be done, the NATO 

Stonding Group (S.G.) must approve national cryptographic systems used 

for encryption of NATO SECRET, TOP SECRET, and COSHIC traffic. 

2. Before taking the action of submitting "Circuit NERCURY" to the 

S.G. for approval, the Cypher Policy Board, London, consulted me on the 

extent-of disclooure of the "Circuit MERCURY" crypto-principles which 

could be madeG I stated that in the interests of limiting disclosure or 

"Circuit HERCURY" as much as possible, only the bro9.d principles of 

"Circuit MERCURY" should be revcaledo The French are represented op the 

S.G. and its cognizant connn.ittee, the Communications-Electronics Coordination Section (CECS), hence any revelation of crypto-principles to the ~ 

CECS necessary in seoking approval of a national crypto-system would 

automatically become available to the French. 

3.. The British proceeded to submit to the SoG.,, through the CECS, 

a request to approve "Circuit MERCURY" for British use in encryption of 

COSMIC and NATO material. The description of "Circuit MERCURY" that was 

furnished to the CECS did not disclose the crypto-principles of "Circu~~--~ 

MERCURY. n The French member of the CECS, after review of the brief de:"' 

scrlption;stated that French authorities could not give their approval to 

use "Circuit MERCURY" if they did not know the details of its operation, 

and that it was considered necessary that the opportunity to examine the 

machine be given to a limited number of French cryptographic experts. 

4. In view of the request by the French member of the CECS, the 

Secretary of the Cypher Policy Board has forwarded the following statement 

to me: 

'J!OP SiC~ CON't'ROL lH:JMBER 53-3831 (A) 

COPY ;Jo OF L,o COPIES 

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES 
.I> • I 

Serlal: 0 1JC) 6:.-2 5-3 

"It is believed that when you requested ouu in January 1953. 

that disclosure of Circuit. MERCURY to the French should be confined 

to a deacription outlining t.he general principles, you were prompted 

by a reluctance to atrengthen the security c.! French communications., 

Since then, however, the June Conference in Washington resulted in 

agreement that tne French should be encouraged to improve the security 

of their communications and to this end it was agreed to seek the 

agreement of the French to technical discussions on cryptographye 

. "The success or failure of these discussions depends on the 

willingness of the French to make a full disclosure ~f all the cryptosystems and practices which they U6o~ It is very unlikely that the 

French h~uld speak freely and make the full disclosure if the UoKo 

had refused the French request for a fuller description of Circuit 

MERCURY.. If they do not, the security of only part of their comnunications l'dll be improved, the remainder will continue insecure and the 

discussions might prove not merely valueless but hc1.nilful to our common 

interests .. 

"It is therefore requested that, if you agree, you approach the 

cognizant UoSo authorities and reque3t t.heir concurrence to the disclosure of full details of Circuit MERCURY to the French in view of 

the change of policy agreed upon at the June Conf ercnce and the great 

importance of allowing nothing to prejudice the coming discussions .. 

"The U.K .. would prefer to make this further disclosure during the 

proposed discussions with the French.. It is possible, however, that, 

at any rate to begin with, the French may wish to keep these discussions 

rigidly 'compartmentized' with the result that the findings regarding 

Circuit MERCURY reached by the French experts at the discussions might 

not be passed to the French M ..OoD .. who have to take action on the C.E.C.SJ 

papero" 

_ 5e "Circuit MERCURY" utilizes a crypto-principle similar to the cryptoprinciple used in the most important U.S$ cipher machines. the ECM and CSP 

2900, and is more secure than either of these ma.chines.. I believe that 

currence 

details of 

canno ere ore recommen con~ 

for disclosure of full 

6. I recommend that the members~of ~USCIB support this view. 

) .. , . • EO 3.3(h)(2) 

./,_,, . -' \.I, 

1 

, ,- PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

I /'ir I • ' ..... , •, i , : t s ~ ~/},'',,•' ;: ··,,' .. ~ ,' .. · ...... ~ )·~--

RALPH" J •. CANINE 

Lieutenant~General, US Army 

TOP 

Director 

2 53-3831(.4) 

'FOP SElOI\M CONTROL NUMBER COPY~OF 1,.0 COPIF.s ........, __ 

SECRET OF 2 PAGES 
• ~~4045~ 

Security Information _, \ 

USCIB~ 29 .3/14. 

EO 3.3(h)(2)· 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 10 December 1953 

'Wfl ~EettE'.t' - 3EetJH:I'fY IMf'ORMA'i'ION 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

\ 

'' 

1. The enclosure is.forwarded for purpos~§ or information 

and record. 

2. THE ENCLOSURE TO THIS DOCUMENT: CONTAINS COMMUNICATIONS 

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS 

EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT. 

Enclosure 

CIB #000240 dtd 10 Dec 1953. 

USCIB: 29.3/14 

TOP SEC&I!: T 

20 
/ . • · ~~ii~4o45~ 8eeHFhy iftier:rmtiien ~ 

, ·' UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD , WASHINGTON 25, DoC. 

·OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN 

tto 3.3(h)(2) 

i?L 86-36/50. USC 3605 GIB # 000240 

, , - 10 December 195.3 

~OP SEGR:E'f' SElGURI'fY DWOF!lh\'fIOM 

ME?10RANDJJM FOR THE ~SISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF. cf-29 u.sp AR.MY: 

~ubject: , : I .... ___ . ----.-------------__. 

Reference: (a) USCIB 2/36.dated 2? July 195~0 

(b) USCIB 2/.37 dated .31 July 195.30 

(c) USCIB 2/38 dated 24 August 19530 

(d) USCIB 29o3/4 dated 2 October 19530 

(e) U~CIB 290.3/8 d~ted 13 October 19530 

lo ·In accordance with·the decision taken 'as a result of 

ref'.erence _(a) and notified' to you by reference (b), you_w_e_·r_e· __ ---'-

a ointed\.Executive ent of the Board to act for it in 

e erms o 

in re erence ..(c) o , erence or 

" 

'1 

· ' 2. A, 4• ~ ·j• arraniiements as originally 'invisaged waS · proposed. by the·. and circulated as an enclostire .to reference 

(d) o At 'its 92nd Special Meeting held on 1.3 October 1953' • reference 

(e USCIB a rov~d the new arran ement mentioned aboveo· 

It was· 

assumed that ,this list would be substantially the same as thatincluded in reference (c)o 

3o As a result of the above mentioned decision set· forth in 

reference (e)j the Central Intelligence Agency.has assumed that it 

is now responsible for providing material and equipment in question 

and .has 'notified me by letter of 9 December 195.3 as follows:" 

n'1 In accarr3an°e id +b TTSCIB decisions' ·governing the 

.__ __________ ___,f the fi.rs~ instal],ment of the 

Erlclosure with USpIB 29.3/14 dtd 10 Dec 1953. 

TOP ~ECRE 'f' , ' / 
• ~~'l!A40·5~ Security Information ~ 

E03.~(h)(2) 

PL 86-.36750USC 3605 CIB,# 000240 

~O December 1953 

TGP SEGRER SEGURI'fl INPORMXl'IOM 

Subject~ ( 

- - - - -' - - - -

5. This notification to you will be circulated to the 

Members of USCIB for information. - -

6. THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE 

INFORMATION AND SHALL BE,HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY 

PROVIDED FOR COMINT. 

---' 

'(Signed) 

RUFUS 1 L. TAYLOR 

Captain, U. S. Navy , Executive Secretary, USCIB 

- 2 =I 

TOP SECRB'F 
I 

SUBJECT.NUMBER 

USCIB: 29 • 3 /l.l 

Subject: 

• MESE~fl~40458~ 

Security Inform~tion • 

Item C (not on Agenda) !or the 94th Meeting o! USCIB, 

held on 13 November 1953. 

French Connnunications Security. 

I 

GENERAL CANINE recalled that the discussions· between NSA technicians 

and French representatives had been held and said that the matter was now 

·under the cognizance o! the C.ombined Working Group, which: would make . recornTnendatione /to USCIB. , He said that he was interested in having the 

Board members understand that the matter ~as now out of his hands, at least·t~porarily. 

The members noted the above in!onnation.-

I' 

USCIB: 29 • .'.3/1.3 - 13 -

'f'OP SE!CRE!'F 
~T"A4045~3 

Sec~ri ty Informa tiOn W 

20 

USCIB: '2f} .3/12 

12 November 1953 

MEMORANDUM' FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB; 

. \ 

Subject: French Communications Security. 

The enclosure is for_warded fo~ information at the request.of I 

the Director, National Security Agency. 

Enclosure 

NSA Ser 000581-S dtd 10 Nov 1953. 

< 

USCIB: 29 .3/12 

'FOP SEC RE 'F 

ain, -U. • Navy 

Secretary, USCIB 
... . 9fOP 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF' USCIB 

SUBJECT: French Communication Security 

Serial: ooo 5B1 ... s 

J!.0 W01r 195.3 

la As agreed by USCIB 'in it.a 93rd Meeting, my representatives met 

with Me de Vosjoli (Washington representative of the SDECE) and Me Doussot 0 

cryptographic expert. asaigned to the French Einbassy, for the purpose of 

determining tha type and number o.f COMSEC equipments France desires to 

purchase from_ the Uo So for use by the Foreign Office. · 

2a M., de Vosjoli aliatad that H is the desire of the French Foreign 

Office to modernize lta cm.TIImm.i.ca.t:Lon security techniques, and to increase 

the· number of posts which ca.n trne 'teh:lt.ype encryption equipment.. The 

French believe that the Uo s .. nd.ght have COMSEC equipments produced in 

quantity.11 which, if made a:vailable to France, could be purchased at a con• 

eiderable savings to them as compared to the cost of producing a limited 

number of equipments for their own use., 

3o As had been ment.:l.oneri earlj_er (USCIB: 29.,3/9), Mo de Voajoli 

again pointed out that the Germ.an machines now being used for teletype encryption were wearing out, that no spare pa.rlis are available except by 

cannibalization.11 and that new machines are not obtainable. Anticipating 

a need for replacing these machinesp the Foreign Office hopes to obtain 

teletype encryption equipmen~s of h:tgh security that can be used among· their 

main Foreign Office postsQ 

4o The quantity desired is 2.001 but 150 machines would be sufficient. 

It the total quantity of machinoa could nu!; be made available simultaneously, 

about 50 machines would be needed .for instituting the replacement program at 

10 major posts., 

;. In addition to the ft>X'(~g<,1ng requirement, 'M"' de Vosjoli stated that 

an of'.f-line (literal.) cipher machine was also desired"' This machine would 

generally be used_~~-p~s~s not served by the teletype cipher machine and in 

locations where -teletype ·1(comnmrcial or French National) facilities are not 

available, or where on-line operation ia not practicable .. 

6"' To meet the latter requirement, up to approximately 500 machines 

are needede 

1!01> al!iQR&P GGU'fRElf; NUMBER 53-.35.31 

COPY :lo OF 45 COPIES PJl.GE~ 01'' :z=-PAGES -44 «>--=-

TOP SECRET 
•• , o.A 

'COP SiC:ail' - ~gQtJRITY INP3RM:A'f lON Serial: 000581-S 

10 Nov 53 

7. In order of priority, on-line equipment is wanted first, primarily for replacement of the German machine· now used, and to provide 

the capability for handling large volumes of traffi~. M. de Vosjoli 

stated that this requirement was not urgent but they hoped to establish 

firm plans in the near future. The literal machines are of lesser priority 

and would be used to replace encrypted codes now generally used. 

8. M. de Vosjoli mentioned in passing that in some remote posts of 

the Foreign Office more powerful radio transmitters were needed. Present 

equipments were considered not to have sUfficient power for working 

regularly under poor conditions. · 

9. I will examine the availability of equipments, including u. s. 

owned, commercial, and foreign machines, whi~Jl4ght be suitable for the 

French requirements and will inform USCIB o t le's~e fin.<;lings. 

I / ' 

E 

US Army 

·. 

' .. 53-3531 

TOP 3EeM:r eoMntOL NUMBER. __ _ 

COPY d.O OF 45 COPIES 

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES 

2 

TOP SECRET 
~~40458~ 

· Oeett1ity !11£01111atio11 ~ 

ror> SECRET - Sl!:Ctffl:UY J:Mfi'eH:MJ't'fIOM - {:J. 9. EYES m1L¥ TENTATIVE 

'SUBJECT NUMBER 

USCIB: 29.3/11_ 

Subject: 

Item 1 considered at the-93rd (Special) Meeting of 

USCIB, held 'on 30 October 1953.. ' 

French Conununications Security. 

(USCIB 29.3/9) 

' The CHAIRMAN informed the members that this special meeting had 

been called to consider a reques~made of him by M. de Vosjoli, 

Washington representative of the ·sDECE. in Paris.· He explained th,a't 

the request represented, basically, an effort to elicit the assistap.ce 

of the Director of Central Intelligence in purchasing new cipher 

machines for use by the Frencn Foreign Office. He added that additional details of the request were contained in the enclosure with 

USCIB 29.3/9, which had been distributed to all members. He said that 

he had told the French representative, after their discussion, that he 

would give the matter some thought, and s~ggested that it might be 

well for a technical representative of M. ae Vosjoli to discuss the 

matter with U.S. technicians. 

CAPTAIN TAYLOR said that information concerning the technical 

representative had been obtained from the FBI member, indicating that. 

his name was M. Doussot, th:at he was' chief of the code room at the 

French Embassy, and that he held the title of Consul. _He was born in 

1913, now resides at 1118 N. Aberdeen Street, Arlington, Va., and 

nothing adverse is known poncerning him. 

The CHAIRMAN invited comments. He said that if there was no 

particular comment he would call M. de Vosjoli and suggest that U.S. 

and French technical r-epresentatives confer •. 

, GENERAL CANINE agreed that it was obviously a job for technicians, 

and suggested that the problem would properly be under the cognizance 

of the COMSEC Board if that body were now "in business". He cormnented 

that he was somewhat surprised at the timing of the request' sugges,ting 

that it may have been prompted by outside influences. l - , 

The CHAIRMAN stated that the French believed that they-were dealing with CIA.alone' in this matter, and suggested that it woul_d be best 

to have the matter handled on that basis for the time being. He agreed 

to st,atements by General Canine and Mr; Armstrong that this request, 

though submitted through intelligence channels, was properly one. of 

concern to the new'COMSEC Board, but suggested that it conti~ue to be 

handled by USCIB ~ince the new COMSEC Board was not yet completely 

organized. 

, , 

USCIB: 29.3/11 ' J 3 

TOP S~CRET 

'I 

I ' 
' ,. ·~' ' . 

/ 

-- Security Information 

TOP SECl\ET sEcmnrv nmol\MATrra1 II s En:5 Q~I:U 

USCIB: 29.3/11 

The members discussed this point further. While.it was generally 

agreed that this was , priμlarily a COMSEC problem, there was' sufficient . 

reason to deal with it ih USCIB in that it could be considered a subordinate issue to the larger problem of improving French and other 

NATO nations' COMSEC. 4 

·As a result of further discussion it was agreed that one or two 

technical representatives- of NSA would meet with a French representa-

. tive at CIA under the auspices of the DCI preferably on Tuesday, 

3 November 1953, to discuss details of the French request. 

Mr. Armstr~ng suggested that the Ad,H~c Working Group on the NATO 

approach, headed ~y Mr. Polyzoides, be kept j,nformed of developments 

in this matter. This was agr~ed. 

The CHAIR.Y.LAN raised the question of notification to the British, 

suggesting that they be informed. 

· GENERAL CANINE proposed that he send a message to SUSLO, asking 

him to inform appropriate authorities. He also suggested that he 

inform Mr. Friedman, now in London, of the nature of the information 

being sent to the-British~ 

It was ~greed that the Executive Secretary in collaboration with 

Captain Agnew, NSA, would prepare and send the message to SUSLO, and 

that General Canine would notify Mr. Friedman'of its content. . . 

DECISION': (30 October 1953) USCIB considered the request presented D; 

USCIB 29.3/9 and agreed: 

l 

(1) That the matter would be retained in COMINT·channels for the 

time being, and that ·NSA technical personnel would meet with ' 

French representatives at an early date unde~ the auspices of 

the DCI (preferably at CIA on Tuesday, 3 November~l953) to 

ob~ain further'details on the 1French_requirements. ' 

(~) That the Ad Hoc Working Group on.the NATO approach woUld be 

kept informed of developments. 

(3) That a message would be prepared and sent to SUSLO, directing 

that he inform British authorities of the, French request and 

action being taken with regard thereto; also,' that Mr. Friedman, 

NSA, now in London, would be similarly ·informed by the Director, 

NSA. 

USCIB: z:t.3/11 - 4 

' ; 

TOP SECRE1' 
~~40458~· 

Seetu ity Infor ma tton • 

.20 

USCIB: 29 . .3/10 I ' 

10 November 1953 

fOP SEGREJ!F S~GURITY I~Fom4.4TIObl 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF.USCIB: 

Subject: , Allied (NATO) Communications Security 

(Approach' to the French). 

1. Pursuant to a decision reached· at the 93rd (Special) 

Meeting of USCIB, tl'~e enclosed message was transmitted to ~he . Chairman·, LSIB, on 30 October 1953. A copy of the reply has 

just been received and is forwarded .herewith for infonnation. 

2~ THE ENCLOSURES WITH THIS~DOCUMENT CONT~IN COMMuNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN 

.CHANNELS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT. . 

I I 

I -

.En1closure , 1. Exec. Secy. MSG 302126Z 

to SUSLO. -

2. MOP.3555 dtd 9 Nov 1953. 

I , 

USCIB: 29.3/10 

I ' , 

·I 
,.~~~~40458~, 

Secality tnrunnation · •. 

I •• · 

ROUTINE 3¢21262 ! ' 

\' 

FROM:. E:4ECUTIVE SECREI'ARY, USCIB 

TO: 'SUSLo; LONDON (CRYPTO NSA PLEASE .PASS .FGLLOWING.TO SUSLO/ LONDON) 

. I INFO: DIRNSA 

WL EXECuTIVE SECRETARY USCIB SENDS. PLEASE PASS ., 

. ' ' 

FOLLOWING TO CHAIRMAN LSIB'. ·WASH'INGTON REPRESENTATIVE SDECE ACTING 

AS REPRESENTATIVE OF FRENCH INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON CIPHERS 

' - ' EO 3. 3 I h I I 2 I 

HAS APPROACHED DIRECTOR' CENTRAL IN'11ELLIGENCE REQUESTING,UNCLE PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

. - I 

•\ I ' 

SUGAR ASSISTANCE,IN·PURCHASING NEW CIP~ MACHINES FOR USE, BY 

FRENCH FOREIGN OFFICE. ·uscIB HAS AGREED TO BRING NSA _;TECHNICIANS · 

- , \~ ' , , ' : I 

INTO CONTACT WITH LOCA~ FRENCH EMBASSY CRYPTO EXPERTS ON TUESDAY 

-THREE NOVEMBER TO DETERMIN~,PRECIS~ NATURE AND SCOPE OF FR,ENCH 

REQUEST./ 

I NO·COMMITMENTS ,____~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---' 

HAVE ·BEEN MADE. LSIB VIEW REQUESTED. 

I, 

' Enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.3/16 dtd 19 Nov.1953. 

,\ 

'FOP Sl!:CR.ET 

' I , 
-rl!m!"BSElElDl!flA4 0 4·5 8~ , 

'i'OP SElORi!i'i' 

Seetu it:v Information , • 

BRITISH JOINT SERVICES MISSION, 

MAIN NAVY BUILDING 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 

MOP.3555. 9th November, 1953. 

The Executive Secretary,. 

u.s.c.r.B. 

I have been instructed to pass the following signal to you " 

for the Chairman of U.S.C.I.B. :-

11 For''Chai:rman, u.s.C.I.B. from Chairman, L.S.I.B. 

" I have noted with interest USCIB's message concerning 

"the French Government's approach to the U.S. Go,vernment 

11 on Communications Security. 

" 2. The matter--was discussed at a meeting of LSIB on 

"November 3rd. The Board considered that the fact of 

"this French approach has in no way invalidated the 

11 conclus'ions and recommendations of the PK/US Conference 

"of June 1953 (FSC.53/EK/R/011) and that lli particular 

"the proposed approach by the U.K. and U.S. Ambassadors 

"to the French Government was 1 still ne~essary and should 

"be made without further delay to ensure backing at the 

"highest' level for French cooperation. 

11 3_. I am agreeable that the matter should be discussed 

"by the Combined Workipg Group and Brigadier Tiltman has 

"been instructed accordingly. He h9-s been urged to do.all "~his power to'secure an early conclusion." 

..... ~ ...... {~~~~~ ........ -.... . John H. Tiltman, Brigadier 

Enclosure 2 with USCIB 29.3/10 dtd 10 Nov 1953. 

't'OP .. SECftE 'f' 
/ 

" 

. 

· REF.ID:A40458~ 

'f'OF SECR~ T W 

Seettrii' Information 

USCIB:. 29.3/9 

·27 October 1953 

' ' 

t'OP Si!!CR!l'f' • SBCERI'fi Iff.P!ORMA'FIOPT U, ~, EIS:S ONI.f 

MEMORANPPM FQR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

References : 

French Communications Security. 

!!:.• USCIB 29.1/1 of 21 September 1953. 

.£. USCIB 23/65 of 30 June 1953. 

l.· The enclosure is circulated for information and aiscussion 

at a Special Meeti~g of USCIB to be held Friday, 30 October 1953· 

at 1430 in the Projection Room, Administration Building, CIA. ' ' 

2. The information set forth below is submitted in-order to 

bring the members up to date on the related matter of implementation 

of the references. 

3. The Combined Working Group (CWG) provided _for. in paragraph 4 

of reference A has been meeting urider the chairmanship of Mr~ T. A. 

Polyzoides, Departmerit of State, who is also chai!'!JWl of the USCIB .- Ad Hoc Committee which constitutes the U.S. element of this Combined 

Working Group. Progress to date in the CWG incl~des agreement to . .use of paragraphs 5 and 6 of reference A as a basis for working out, 

the initial approach to the French. Although there was some initial. 

reluctance on the part of the U.K. to the use of~the Tripartite _· 

Security Working Group to select the COMSEC authorities who will - represent their respective gqvermnents ~n this ma~te~, the U.K. have 

now agreed in principle to this U.S. proposal (~ee paragraph 6b of 

reference A} ahd it remains only to work out the.details in a.manner 

IJlUtually satisfactory to the U.S. and the U.K. · · 

En'closure · . Memo f~om CIA to Ej{/secy, USCIB 

dtd 27 Oct 53 with attached 

memorandum for record, supject: 

French Request for Ciphe~ MacP.ines. 

USCIB: 29.3/9 

TOP SECRlfT 

USCIB 

20 

,• 
I ·~ - I 

'' 

.,..... . ) 

L 

9 se==:~1~4sa# '!'OP Si!lCR:El'i' l:f. B. E!Y::EIO OfHiY 

Security Info~tion 

,CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY · Washington 25, D. C. 

27 October 1953 

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF USCIB 

' SUBJECT: French Reque_st for Ciphe~ Machines 

.!FS-50489 

Cy # 20 

SC!-CJ?~9;::Y 

1. The attached memorandum for the· record s.ets forth a conversation -whi~h took place on 26 October between the Director of Central Intelligence 

and the Washington representative of, the French SDECE • 

. g. In view of the present negotiations between USCIB and ~IB on this 

subject., the advice of the members. of the Board is requested ·as to what 

reply the Director should make to Mr. deVosjoli, and it is requested that 

a special meeting of the Board be held.at an early date to discuss this 

matter. ) 

I, 

HUNTINGTON D. SHELDON 

Ass~stant Director, 

Current Intelligence 

TOP SECRET 
,( 

·e·· T~~~'T-:l:fS~X4045~ Secunty lufo.w1afaun ,_, , \ -

~OP SES~ Ya Sa E¥ES ONDY 

See'l:H'it~ IE:fe:ABB.tien 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

Washington 2'5, D. C • l 

' ~ 

" 

' / 

\ ' 27 October 1953 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

SUBJECT: Frenc4 Request for Cipher Machine9 ,1 

· 1.' On Monday, 26 October, M. deVosjoli, Washington representative 

of the SDEGE called on the Director, Central Intelligence, to request 

on behalf of the Quai D 'Orsay the Director's assistance in purchasing· 

new cipher machines for use by the French Foreign Office. ' 

'', - . '\ . , ' 

· - . 2. M. deVosjoli stated that after World War II the, Quai D'Orsay 

'had acquired cert~in German cipher machines and further explained that 

about 8o Qf these machines 'are now in use.· These mac~ines are in very 

poor condition; the German factory which manufactured this equipment 

i~ located within the poviet Zone ·or Germany; and the French are certain 

that this company is now producing ins.chines for the USSR. He also 

'mentioned the fact that the French had been surprised at the· alacrity 

recently shown by the S'oviet Foreign Office in acc9rding the French 

the right to 1 install a direct wire connection for these cipher machines 

between the French_ Embassy in Mosc'ow and the Qua± D'1 Or say. -M. deVosjoli 

gave tμe, impression that these _facts had influenced the French in making 

their·present request for American cipher machines, whic4 they felt , woul.d be far superior and more modern. 

' I 

' I / 3. M. deVosjoli provided the information that this approach to the, 

U.S. is being nia.de und~r tlie cognizance of the "Interdepartmental 

Committee on -Ciphers," which consists of representatives. of _all French 

Government offices using cryptographic material. -This connnittee, which" 

is ch~ired by M.. Mon~ (who is "Chef de l' etat Major Permanent de la ·' 

.Defense Nationale"), is composed of representatives of the Ministry of 

National Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minist~y of Interior, 

Ministry for Overseas France, and the SDECE. This committee was created I 

some· three years ago and the respqnsibility of t~e SDECE, ~hich is 

represented on the. corilmittee by Colonel Black; is to ensure· the security 

of French cipher systems. It is.because 'of this responsibility of the 

SDECE that the app+oach was 'made by M. deVosjoli to the Director, Central 

Intelligence. 

'. 

'±'OP ·ffi!JGffi!I'±' l:T. S. E¥ES ONDY 

TOP Si:CRST 
~· ' . ,,.. 

,.. ' 1fif#Eliffi!~A4045~ 5eCUI iLy Iniur ma Lion ,_, 

'!'OP ~eM'f 'B'. 3. BBS OR¥ 

See'1%1!'ity :Enfffi!'!llfl;'l;ieB 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

Washington 2~, D. C. 

4. M. deVosjoli explained, that his mission is to arrange for a French 

expert, M. Dousseau, to consult with a CIA expert concerning the number and 

type of machines desired by the French •. He stated that-M. Dousseau is 

permanentiy_assigiled to the French Embassy in Washington to advise on 

cryptographic security, and as a part of his duties had installed the cipher 

machines for μse on French Emb~ssy links with the French elements of the 

Standing Group and of the United- Nations. 

5~ M. deVosjoli pointed out that ~he French would be. quite content 

to purchase even obsolete machines, provided they were in good_ condition~ 

particularly because newer models might be mush more/expensive. 

6. The Director of Central Intelligence informed M. ,deVosjoli that 

this was a request to which he could'not furnish an immediate reply, but 

that he would explore the matter and inform M. deVosjoli as soon·as 

possible'regarding_what arrangements could be made. 

\ , 

'' 

'f'OP SECftE T 
FFA~~m-Jil-fl~q&3 

SECT 1p1ry TMFOP>''TTQN ..,.... ' 

!OP SECREI FROIH SECURi~Y INFCJmViAllON - U.S. EIES ONLY 

SUBJECT NUMBER 

USCIB: '2;1.3/8 

Subject: 

F!NAL 

Item 1 of the Agenda for the 92nd (Special) Meeting 

of USCIB, held on 13 October 1953. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

F>L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

The ACTING CHAIRMAN (G~neral Cabell) stated that the purpose of the 

meeting was to crsjder the yie: and recommendations of th.e Security 

Committee on the_ ~ / \l He recalled 

that the Board, at its 9lst Meeting, had asked that the Security Conunittee 

consider the problem as a matter of priority. He./ invited comments by 

Captain Taylor. 

CAPTAIN TAYLOR informed the members that he had served as Chairman of 

the Security Committee,. during its deliberations in view of the fact that 

the regular Chairman of the Committee had not been present at the previ~us 

U--SCIB meeting. He explained that the Committee, augmented by the members 

of the negotiating team, had met and discussed the agreement in detail, in 

light of the tenns of reference provided to the negotiators, and the 

original arrangements approved by the Board. He said that the\ members, as 

a result of their study, and after listening to the statements\of the 

negotiators as to the very clear unders.tanding with thel !regarding 

the agreement, were satisfied that the arrangements were within USCIB 

policy. On the subject of security s.afeguards, he stated the opinion of 

the Committee that the imposition of/ additional restrictions at this 

juncture would imply (to thel D that we had uncovered something new 

and alarming since the conclusion of the original agreement, and the 

Committee, therefore, recommended against the establishment of additional 

security safeguards. 

CAPTAIN TAYLOR continued by saying that certain other issues raised 

in the Committee discussions were not contained in the report now before 

the Board; however, a record of these would appear in the SECCOM minutes. 

He stated that he had received outstanding cooperation from the SECCOM 

members and members of the negotiating team in this matter, and expressed 

the hope that the Committee report would be acceptable to the Board. 

MR. ARMSTRONG commended the Executive Secretary and the Committee 

for turning out an excellent piece of work on a very complex problem in 

such a short time. He said that he considered the Committee paper a 

valuable and important addition to our understanding of the agreement, and 

added that he was satisfied, on the basis of the report, that the agreement 

did not exceed the limitations imposed by the Appendices to the BRUSA 

Agreement~ He made specific mention of improvement in the wording of the 

USCIB: 2f) .J/8 - 2 -

TOP SECRET FROTH 
,, 

.. ~TOP S~ltl!EP~· SEGURITY UlFOR~o"4zTIQ~I 

TOP SECRET FRO'Jll = SiCIJlUTY W'OlUUTIO)J tJ.~. xm om,.y 

USCIB: 29.3/8 

communications to be sent to the British and to Mr. Boursicot, and 

concluded by informing those present that his Department was prepared 

to accept the Committee report without further changes. 

GENERAL CANINE commented upon the position he had ta.ken at the last 

meeting and said that he did not like the agreement any more now than he 

did then,-however he was prepared to vote for approval. His primary 

objection, he said, was to being placed in the position of having to make 

a 11Hobson's Choice 11 • He thought it possible that something worthwhile 

would be obtained as a result of this agreement, but was not of the 

oninion that the information received would substantially alter the 

consumers' daily briefings. 

MR. SHELDON referred to the draft memorandum for the Director, GCHQ, 

and suggested that.the last sentence of paragraph 5, or possibly the 

whole paragraph, might well be deleted. 

The members considered this suggestion a.nd agreed to the deletion 

of the whole paragraph. 

DECISION: (13 October 1953) USCIB considered and approved the Security 

Conunittee Report contained in USCIB 2!7.J/5, with one amendment, namely, 

the deletion of paragraph 5 of the draft memorandum for the Director, 

GCHQ (enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.3/5). 

It was agreed that the memoranda for the Director General, SDEQE, 

and the Director, GCHQ, would be prepared in final form and forwarded 

without delay. 

This item to be dropped from the agenda. 

The meetL"lg adjourned at 1440. 

USCIB: 29.3/8 = 3 -

TOP SECRET FROTH 
- ' --:,,"'-. 

.3< ....... I TOP s~~-rrP =P'ite.)4[1¥V SECY~ ITV nJFOR:MA'flSH ...... EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

tOP sECii:E'II l":ftO!H - :;".ffieURJ:'I'Y IUFORu.t.'.PIQ~ Y. a • UES QNr v 

SUBJECT NUMBER FINAL 

USCIB: 29.3/7 

Subject: 

Item 4 of the Agenda for the 9lst Meeting of USCIB, 

held on 9 October 1953 • 

....._ ________ __,~/(USCIB 29.J/3, 29.3/4) 

The ACT~G CHAIRMAN (General Cabell) explained that the two papers 

before the Board were (1) the report prepared b Colonel A. C. 

Peterson based u on the ne otiations his 

He suggested that 

e mem ers note and accept the Peterson report and proceed with consideration of the Exchange Agreement. 

The members agreed to this procedure. 

MR. SHELDON for the 

The ACT~G CHAIRMAN pointed out that this memorandum imposed no 

condition upon acceptance of the agreement, but rather, asked for 

additional assurance security-wise. 

There followed a lengthy discussion of the terms of the agreement, 

including consideration of possible limitations on U.S. analysis 

activity in the field, the precise nature and score of information to be 

exchanged, understandings reached with thel which were not necessarily implicit in the terms of the agreement, the need for expeditious 

action to avoid embarrassment to concerned U.S. agencies, and the matter 

of notification to U.K. authorities. 

USCIB: 29.3/7 - 6 -

TOP SECRET FROTH 
P s~_ff"P-=~'03 S~UltIT"l Il~PObl/9cTIOI~ · 

'±'OP SEGRE'±' FRO'±'II S:iSGURI'±'Y UWORUATI~I T,J,g, ~ QIU.¥ 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

• PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

USCIB: 29 .3/7 

GENERAL ACKERMAN suggested further detailed study of the agreement 

to insure that field analysis in, for example, the Philippines would be 

permissible if deemed expedient at a future date. 

On the subject of security practices, Mr. Sheldon expressed his 

opinion that the agreement required greater precautions by .t.hell 

than were normally prescribed by SHAPE in the handling of 11Y11 ~. 

GENERAL CANINE said that he was prepared to accept the agreement, 

but that he did not particularly like it. 

MR. ARMSTRONG, expressing his views prior to a vote on the agreement, said that the terms would require further study by his Department. 

He added that he had seriqus misgivings, for example, as to whether the 

entire agreement did not involve codeword material which would extend 

it beyond the provisions of Appendix "P". In view of this point, and 

others, he suggested that the Executive Secretary and the Security 

Committee go over the agreement in detail with the negotiators and come 

back to this Board at a special meeting with their views and recommendations as to its implications in terms of the applicable BR.USA provisions. 

As a result of the foregoing discussion it wasagreed that the 

Security Committee, augmented by members of the negotiating team, would 

meet to make the required study. 

CAPTAIN TAYLOR assured the members that a report by the augmented 

Security Committee could be made available in timefor consideration at 

a special meeting of the Board to be held on Tuesday, 13 October 1953. 

All members agreed to this proposal. 

DECISION: (9 October 1953) USCIB noted and accepted the report 

prepared and submitted by Colonel A. C. Peterson, based upon the negotiations by hisl f 

USCIB agreed that the Security Committee, augmented by members of 1 

the negotiating team would meet at the e:r1:· f/st possible date to make 

a detailed study of the I ~ __ in light of BRUSA 

provisions and the foregoing comments, an , ased upon such a study, to 

recommend appropriate action to USCIB, such recommendations to be 

considered by the Board at a special meeting to be held at 1430 on 

Tuesday, 13 October 1953. 

This item to remain on the agenda. 

USCIB: 29.3/7 - 7 -

TOP SECRET FROTI I 
e. 

I 

USCIB: 29.J/6 

-,m!:°EECfllrElft4 0 4 5 ~3 

SeettPity IafeFJHatieH • 

20 October 1953 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

19 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TO:P SEGREI' 8BGURI'PY INFOfUh'l?ION 

-, ' 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

' Encl am1re 

1

1 t ~1~3,,........,.0-ct,........,.1~9~53~.-_--------' 

2. NSA Serial 000542-S dtd 

· 14 Oct 1953. 

USCIB: 29.3/6 

aptain, U. •. Navy 

ecutive Secretary, VSCIB ' I 

TOP Sl!:CftE:F 

\ 
v" 

-!¥B&~0458~3 

Seettriiy ln:f6rmtttio:n • 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY - WASHINGTON '25, D. C. 

OFFICE OF THE DI~ECTOR 

13 OCT 1953 

EO 3. 3 I h I I 2 I 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

. I.____ _ ______. 

I am happy to forward herewith a signed copy of the agreement 

which was entered into on my,beh?lfl lo~ 

September 10, 1953. ' 

In view of the highly sensitive nature of this agreement and the 

materials exchanged thereunder, I take this opportunity to reaffirm 

to you that this matter will be handled by us in/accordance with our 

strictest security measures, and that knowledge/of it will be limited 

to the absolute minimum. , In return, I would greatly appreciate your 

assurances that similar security precautions will continue to be1 

taken by'you and that the materials will be handled in accordance 

with the most secure practices employed .by·your service. 

With renewed assurances,of my ~steem, 

Enclosure 

Sincer~ly, 

(Signed) \ 

Allen W. Dulles 

Director 

Enclosure with .USCIB 29.3/6 dtd 20 Oct 1953. 

TOP SECREY' 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Copies furnished: 

SBLO 

- NATI ONA~ SECURITY AGENCY 

-WASHINGTON 25, O. C. 

RALPI-- J. 

Serial: 000542-S 

14 October 19.53 

Lieutenant' e rai, 

Director 

Executive Secretary, USCIB 

TOP SECRET 
•, 

• 

OGA 

·---... 

TOP:fRif-nf.+A 0 45 ~3 

SE'.CORI I I INF ORMAI ION • 

USCIB: 29o3/5 

ts .. 

12 October 1953 

TOP SEGFl::'EiT SEJOURI'f'Y Iffl?OR:Mtd'ION - tr o",, E'ffl" eMLY 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

Reference: USCIB 29o3/4 dated 1 October 1953,,// 

1,, In accordance with the decision rendered by USCIB at its 

9lst meeting, the USCIB Security Committee auglnented by members of 

the U.S. negotiating team, namely, Mr:,, Frank/Rowlett of CIA, Mr .. Frank 

Raven of NSA,I ~IA and Colonel .Arthur c .. Peterson 

of ASA, serving as ad hoc members for the/purpose of the present 

discussion, met at 0900, 10 October 195Jto make recommendations 

with regard to the working agreement included a.s an enclosure to the 

reference,, · , •• :: •I 

2,, The Committee examined the terms of/reference under which 

th~ u;se team negotiated the above mentioned agreement. (These terms 

of reference are contained in USCIB 23/34 dated 12 October 1951 and in 

USCIB 2/38 dated 24 August 195Jo) . 

3 c The Cammi t tee next .. Jexa....Jtlned the/ terms of the agreement itself o 

With regard to the provisions of paragraph 2a of Section II bf the 

agreement concerning "sole beneficiaries", the Committee agreed that 

from the facts presen···t····e.d by the memb.·e····;is of the U.S. nr::i:Yng'' .... team it appears clear that it was not the .intention of the to•. limit 

in any way the disposition of the results of the anal the 

material to be exchanged, and that there will be no misunderstanding 

if the agreement is implemented in/this manner.. The members of .the U.Sa 

negotiating team.were unanimous in agreement on this point and explained 

that thel }quite plainly po:i,nted out that the disposition of end 

products is not a matter involved in this agreement .. 

4. In/regard to the provisions of paragraph 2b of Section !I of 

the agreement providing that operations conducted by the U .. S. in 

analyzing this exchanged material be conducted in u~s. territory, the 

members/of the U,,So negotiating team werA unanimous in stating that the 

llmade it clear that, if it should become operationally necessary 

~cess outside of u .. s./territory the material provided by thel.__....,....-_ .... rapid agreement could be obtained so long as such processing does not 

take place in I lun1ess u.s,, Armed Forces are involved there .. 

USCIB: 29 .. 3/5 

TO.P SECRET 
• 

• 

~~~~045~3 

SECURI I f INF ORIVIA I ION • 

USCIBg 29.3/5 12 October 1953 

TQP SECRET ,, SECTJlU'Il fl!m'QmMTIQ~l Y. s 0 E=!IBS 9NL¥ 

EO 3.3(h)(2) Subjecti PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

5 a After carefully examining all 9ther terms of the./ agreement and 

the unanimous statements of the U~§ .. negotiating team with regard thereto, 

the Committee is of the opinior,ithat the U .. S ... negotiators did not exceed 

their terms of reference a,nd that the U .. S.,/information and material\.to be 

released to the~ lfalls completelyvri.~hin the criteria enunciated in 

paragraphs 4 an 5 or p[endix "P" to BRU84., The.· u .. s .. negotiators sta·. te 

that in discussing with _ lthe precise information and material 

to be exchanged, it was made clear to I !that the U .. So is restricted 

in the information that can be released., The O .... negotiators have convinced the Securitv Connnittee that as a result of these discussions the 

7.. In implementing the agreement the Committee recommends that 

the Director, NSA be responsible for the selection of the material to be 

exchangedo 

USCIBg 29.,3/5 - 2 -

TOP SECRET 

\ 
•, 

• 

~~11f.t4045~3 

SECl:IRITY INFORMA'flON • 

USCIB~ 29.3/5 12 October 1953 

TQP Si!iGRET SECUHTY I~GRMMIGN Yo S • EBS GM;.¥ iEO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Subject: 

-- -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - --- -- - - - -

8., This is a working agreement and is, in effect,/ an extension of 

a previous working agreement for which satisfactory security assurances 

have already been made and for which reaffirmation is requested in 

enclosure 2 hereto. Therefore, it is considered that priori I 

acceptance of the security assurances contained in enclosure 2 need not 

be a prerequisi.te to UeSo acceptance of the agreements Inf act it was 

generally conceded by the members of the Committee that insistence on 

such assurances as a prerequisite might be seized upon by the~ las 

an opportunity to impose further and perhaps embarrassing res r1ct1ons 

to which the UoSo would then be unable to agreeo In this connection, 

the Committee took note of the assurances of the U.So team of the 

extremely security conscious attitude of the COMINT people with 

whom they dealt, and of the fact that the au horities represented 

in SACEUR1 s Command have accepted the UeSo UeKe imposed limitations on 

the handling of tactical COMINT end products in SACEUR 1 s "Y" stru~~(h)( ) 

(see Annex 11B11 to the enclosure to USCIB .32/15) o Pl::.s6-36/50 use 3605 

\\\\\ 

lOo In view of the above, the USCIB Security Committee, augmented 

by the UoSo members o.f the negotiating team named in paragraph 1 above, 

unanimously recommends that USCIB approve the agreement with understandings set forth above and authorize the Director of Central Intelligence to sign on behalf of the UoSo and forward it with the letter 

included herewith as enclosure 2o In addition, it is recommended that 

the Director, NSA sign and forward the notification to GCHQ included 

herewith as enclosure lo 

USCIB: 29o3/5 - 3 -

TOP SECRET 
• • 

'I'OP SElCffiS'I' "" aECTiRIYI IIWORNft!IOM = 

= 3.3(h)(2) 

• => 86-36/50 USC 3605 

MEMORANDUM F9R THE D1RECTOR:1 GCHQ 

Enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.3/5 dated 12 October 1953 

TOP SECRET 
.. 

• 

ec: ACC:/ & 

l)cS/P 

P-/ p 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

• 

M/R: 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOTJE~'fiE!fRRiJA.0 45 ~3 5ECURll'Y IP4FORMJ!i:l'ION • 

TOP SECRET 
• 

-

• rrffei.KEffi~ o 45~3 

SECURllY 1141"0fU\llA I ION • 

TOE' aiCilEI'' ~iCUlUTY UWORMATIQN - II S EYES ONT Y 

D. R A F T ~EO 3.3(h) (2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

I am happy to forward herewith a signed copy of the agreement 

which was entered into on my behalf by my~I~~~~~~~~~~~-' 

on September 10, 19530 

In view of the highly sensitive nature of this agreement and 

the materials exchanged thereunder, I take this opportunity to 

reaffirm to you that this matter will be handled by us in accordance with our strictest security measures, and that knowledge of it 

will be limited to the absolute minimumo In return, I would greatly 

appreciate your assurances that similar security precautions will 

continue to be taken by you and that the materials will be handled 

in accordance with the most secure practices employed by your 

serviceo 

With renewed assurances of my esteem, I am 

Sincerely yours, 

Enclosure 2 with USCIB 2$03/5 dated 12 October 1953. 

TOP SECRET 
TfJF'..fEi'Jf;J~ 0 45 ~3 

SECURITY IPffORM!<'f'IOfcl .. 

USCIB: 29 .3/4 20 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 2 October 1953 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

Reference: USCIB 29.3/3, dated 1 October 1953. 

1. The enclosure is circulated with a view to consideration 

at the next regular meeting of USCIB, 9 October 1953, in connection with the reference. 

2. The enclosure includes the English translation of the 

text of the agreement mentioned in paragraph 2 of the reference 

and is being given limited distribution of one copy to members 

only. 

3. THE ENCLOSURE WITH THIS DOCUMENT· CONTAilJS COMMUNICATIONS 

INTELLIGENCE IlJFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IlJ CHANNELS 

EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMilJT·. 

Enclosure 

CIA Memo dtd 1 Oct 1953, 

with enclosures thereto; 

' subject as above. 

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IlJ WHOLE 

OR PART. IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE. 

USCIB: 29 .3/4 

TOP SECRET 

J 
USCIB: 29 .3/3 

l::03,3(h)(2) 

• Tt!F§E~'HE-+4045~3 

5ECURl'f'Y lf4P'O~l\'IA I ION • 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 1 October 1953 

!OP 1*JOffil'i' - SBOURl'fY lNF8RMk!lON - tJ. a. El'l!!a OMLY 

1@10RANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

Reference: (a) USCIB 2/38 dtd 24 August 1953. 

(b) USCIB 30/34 dtd 10 August 1953. 

20 

··········································· .... 

2. It will be noted that Appendix D has been withdrawn from this 

report •. This Appendix, containing the text of the agreement reached, 

will be given limited distribution (one copy per Board Member) at the 

earliest possible date. 

3. THE ENCLOSURE WITH THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY 

PROVIDED FOR COMINT. 

Enclosure 

Report of ~Conference 

(17661, cy~ 

USCIB: 29.3/3 

tain, U. • Navy 

uti ve Secretary,. USCIB 

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE 

OR PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE. 

TOP SECRET 
USCIB: 29.3/1 

• 

20 

10 September 1953 

TOP SBGRB!f' = SElOtTR1'.fY :!Mf'5~tA!IOiq - U.S. EYES ONLY 

MEMOR.ANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

Reference: USCIB 30/38 dated 21 August 1953. 

1. The decision of USCIBEC reported in the reference has been 

approved by USCIB. 

2. The effect of this decision is to refer the problem presented 

in USCIB 30/34 to the CIA and NSA members for resolution. 

3. THIS DOC~ CONTAINS COMMUNICATIONS "INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 

AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE 

OR PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH 

PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE, 

USCIB: 29 • .3/1 

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