Filed 1 / 17 / 23 In re P.V. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re P.V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. 2d Juv. No. B319622 (Super. Ct. No. 2021020959) (Ventura County)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

P.V.,

Defendant and Appellant.

P.V. appeals the juvenile court’s order sustaining a wardship petition after finding that she aided and abetted the crime of arson

. (Welf. & In st. Code, § 602; Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (c).) 1 Appellant conte nds there is insufficient evidence to support
the juvenile court’s true finding because she lacked the requisite

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.2

intent to aid and abet and took no affirmative action to assist her friend in starting the fire . We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background
In July 2021, during the early morning hours between 1:00
a.m. and 2:00 a.m.

, appellant , who was 15 years old at the time, engaged in a series of destructive acts together with her friend,
E

. S.

, includ ing setting fire to an elementary school that destroyed
three classrooms and caused over $ 1 million dollars

- worth of damage. Appellant memorialized her actions that night by

re cording several video s and uploading them to her Snapchat account under the caption, “ ‘ It be like that. ’ ” For example, appellant recorded a video of her self and E .S. hanging out a t a local middle school near E.S.’s house, drinking
Malibu Rum with a filter that showed the girls with devil horns

on th eir heads

. Appellant also r ecorded a video of her self and
E.S. br ea k ing into an elementary school by throwing large rocks through the classroom window

. After the girls entered the
classroom , appellant set her phone up to automatically record as the y destroyed equipment, knock ed over a filing cabinet and
th rew paper around the room

. A ppellant also dumped hand
sanitizer on the countertops and threw the fire extinguisher
outside the door of th e classroom. Shortly thereafter, appellant recorded and posted a video of
E.S. holding an American flag and lighting it on fire as pieces of the burning flag fell to the floor igniting the paper that appellant
had earlier thrown about the classroom

. A ppellant then took “selfie” videos that showed the girls smiling and dancing to music

as th e piles of debris burned on the classroom floor. Appellant also recorded and posted an image of the moon, followed by a3

video clip of the elementary school engulfed in flames that she
had taken from E.S.’s backyard

. A fellow student who saw the videos and recognized appellant and E.S. reported them to school officials

. The student also provided officials with a copy of the Snapchat video s that she had recorded from her cell phone

. During an interview with the Director of Student Support Services for Ventura Unified School District, appellant initially denied knowing why she wa s there , but eventually admitted that she and E.S. had broke n into the class room and vandalized it

. Appellant claimed it was E.S. who started the fire whe n appellant had her back t urned. Appellant provided the director
with a written statement and was la ter arrested

. In August 2021, a petition was filed against appellant alleging she committed felony arson of a structure (§ 451, subd. (c), count 1), felony burglary with the intent to commit larceny (§ 459, count 2), and felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(1), count 3). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) During the contested hearing, a ppellant testified that she had only met E.S. the day before , and a lthough she knew that E.S. had vandalized the elementary school on a prior occasio n, appellant claimed she had no knowledge that E.S. intended to
vandalize the school or start a fire in the classroom that night

. Appellant testified that she only discovered E.S. had a lighter
after she used it to light a cigarette while they were at the middle
school. According to appellant, she just wanted to hang out, listen to music, and make videos. Appellant testified that she and E.S.
decided to walk over to the elementary school to find the playground, but appellant was soon cold and wanted to warm up

.4

E.S. tried to open the classroom doors , but they were locked , so the girls took turns throwing rocks at a classroom window until it
broke. A fter a p pellant kicked the broken window in

, E.S. climbed
inside and let appellant in through the classr o om door. Appellant testified that a fter the y had been inside the
classroom for approximately 10 minutes, she and E.S. began “destructing” things , throwing papers around the room, and dancing

. Appellant claimed s he threw the fire extinguisher out of
the classroom because it was “ just another thing to throw. ” Although she claimed she was surprised when she discovered that E.S. had started the fire, she acknowledged that she took no action to stop E.S. or to call for help , even after the fire grew out of control

. After the hearing, the juvenile court found true each of the allegations

, declared appellant a ward of the court

, and ordered
that she be committed to the Divisio n of Juvenile Justice

. Discussion Appellant only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s true finding that she aided and
abetted the crime of arson of a structure in count 1

. Standard of Review When a minor challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s true finding of the criminal allegations contained in a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition, we apply t he same standard of review that applies
in adult c riminal cases where a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence . ( In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4 th 1020, 1026.) We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgm ent to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that5

a reasonable trier of fact could find appellant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. (

Ibid. ; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557,
57 6

- 578 .) We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably have deduced from
the evidence. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might al so reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. ( In
re V.V.

, supra , 51 Cal.4 th at p. 1026.) We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. ( People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4 th 40, 87.) S ufficient Evidence of Aiding and Abetting Arson

“ A person is guilty of arson when he or she willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or who aids, counsels, or procures the burning of, any structure . . . or property.” (§ 451 .) “

A ll persons concerned in the commission of a crime . . . whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission . . . are principals in any crime so committed. (§ 31.) A person aids and abets the
commission of a crime when he or she, “ acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator ; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice ai ds, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.” ( People v.
Beeman ( 1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560

- 561.) “Among the factors which may be considered in making the determination of aiding and abetting are: presence at the scene of
the crim e, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense. [Citations.] In addition, flight is one of the factors which6

is relevant in determining consciousness of guilt. [Citation.]” ( In re Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094

- 1095.) “Whether a person has aided and abetted in the commission of a crime
ordinar il y is a question of fact. [Citations.] Consequently, ‘“ all intendments are in favor of the judgment and a verdict will not be set aside unless the record clearly shows that upon no hypothesi s whatsoever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it. ” ’” (

Id. at p. 1094.) Here, a ppellant acknowledges that she vandalized the
classroom with E.S. and was present when E.S. started the fire

. However

, appellant contends there is insufficient evidence that she knew of E.S.’s intent to start the fire, that she intended to assist E.S. in starting the fire, or that she took affirmative action to assist E.S. in starting the fire.
But appellant’s contentions are not supported by the
record

. As the juvenile court observed, appellant’s actions that night cannot be viewed “ independently in a vacuum.” For example , t he videos showed a ppellant and E.S. engaging in a series of destructive behaviors toge the r in which both girls
danced and enjoy ed themselves as they intentionally destroyed property and threw papers around the class room before E.S.
started the fire

. Appellant also intentionally threw the fire extinguisher out
of the classroom. Shortly thereafter, she recorded E.S. lighting the American flag on fire with the lighter and continued to record

as embers dropped to the floor littered with paper. The juven ile court emphasized that appellant knew the paper was there

, and appellant testified that she knew it was combustible , yet she
continued to take “selfies” with E.S

. and make videos of the fire
as it grew from only inches to approximately four feet in heig ht.7

As the juvenile court observed, the circumstantial evidence of appellant’s aiding and abetting liability is “strong.” We agree.
The general rule is that “ neither presence at the scene of a crime nor knowledge of, but failure to prevent it, is sufficien t to establish aiding and abetting” liability , even where a person later expresses approval of the crime, so long as he or she takes no action to aid or encourage it . (See People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4 th 402, 409; In re K.M. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5 th 323, 329.) In this case, appellant’s presence at the scene coupled with her
conduct , both before and after E.S. started the fire

, is strong
evidence that she intended to encourage and promote E.S.’s

a ctions

. Moreover

, even if appellant did not know th at E.S.
inten d ed to start a fire when they entered the classroom

, she
would have known the moment she saw E.S. light the flag on fire

. But a ppellant made no attempt to stop E.S. or disassociate herself from the situation

. Instead, she decided to record E.S. lighting the fire and immediately post the video to her Snapchat story

. Appellant’s actions are also inconsistent with her testimony that she was surprised when she turned around and
realized there was a fire on the floor of the cla ssroom

. (See In re
V.V.

, supra , 51 Cal.4 th at p. 1031.) Based on this evidence, t he juvenile court could reasonably infer that appellant intended to encourage and promote E.S.’s
actions in starting the fire, even without prior knowledge of her
intent

. “‘ A iding and abetting may be committed “on the spur of the moment,” that is, as instantaneously as the criminal act itself. [Citation.]’” (

People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5 th 1126, 1 148; People v. Nguye n (1993) 21 Cal.App.4 th 518, 531

- 532.)8 A p pellant’s conduct in fleeing the scene with E.S. afterward without calling for help and continuing to record the fire from E.S.’s backyard further support s a finding that appellant took affir mative action to promote and encourage the commission of

arson

. (See In re Lynette G.

, supra , 54 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1094

- 1095.) Considering the totality of appellant’s actions that night,

t he juvenile court did not believe she was “just a bystander

. ” N or did it find her testimony credible . As the juvenile court opined, appellant’s “self

- serving statements . . . do not support all [of] her claims.” Indeed, “ [t] he court’s decision to sustain the petition indisputably reflects its conclu sion appellant was not a credible
witness.” (

In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4 th 1, 5

- 6.) Accordingly, w e conclude sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court ’s true finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant aided and abetted E.S. in the commission of arson

. Because we so find

, we do not address the natural and probable consequences theory of vicarious liability

. Appellant makes several arguments in respo nse

. First,
she contends the Snapchat videos are i nsufficient to “retroactively infer” an intent to aid and abet E.S. in the
commission of arson because she took those videos “indiscriminately” and are more reflective of “bravado” and a
desire to be perceived as “cool

. ” However

, w e will not disturb the juvenile court’s findings merely because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding

. ( In re V.V.

, supra , 51 Cal.4 th at p. 1026.) Second, ap pellant contends tha t evidence of her “severe intoxication” suggests that she lacked the intent to aid and abet

arson. But arson is a general intent crime. ( People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4 th 141, 177, citing People v. Atkins (2001) 259

Cal.4 th 76, 87

- 89 .) A n aider and abettor of arson need only to intend the encouraging or facili tating of the arson, as well as the arson itself. (

Atkins

, at pp. 86, 93.) Here, the juvenile court questioned appellant’s recollection of events based on her
i ntoxication , but nevertheless fo und she acted with the requisite
intent to find her liable as an aider and abettor

. Finally, appellant contends there is not a sufficient nexus
between her actions and the commission of arson. However, f or the reasons we have already discussed above, t his contention is unpersuasive

. Disposition
The judgment (findings and order) is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

.

YEGAN, J.
We concur:

GILBERT

, P. J.

BALTODANO , J.Manuel J. Covarrubias

, Judge Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Richard B. Lennon

, E xecutive D irector

, and Olivia Meme

, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General

, Scott A. Taryle , Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Stefanie Yee

, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.