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Background Inf omation 

on 

USCIB: 23/22 · (Portuguese Securit7) 

' 1. 64th USCIB Meeting, 24 :ll"q' 51, Item 3: Final Report ot the 

u.s./U.K. Conference on French Ccmmmications Securit7 (USC~: 14/132) •. 

USCIB decision: 

"(l) To approve the conclusions. and recommendations Of' 

the report ccmt.ained. in uscm 14/132, subject to concurrence 

ot·the National Secur:i.t7 Council. 

* .... * * * * 

(3) ':ftlat the U.S. Conference Team would keep tbia 

matter under continuous revi•."and. notify mcm of the 

appropriate time for further action to be taken.n 

2. 65the USCIB Jleeting, 22 June 51, Item 2: u.s./French and 

U .K./French C<JIINT relations (USCIB 14/131) • . 

Mr. Douglass {CIA) br~t up question ot insecurit7 ot Portuguese 

cormrnni cations. 

USCIB decision: 

"2. 'lhat the U.S. deiegation to the U .. S./U.K. Conference 

on French SecuritJ' would atucQ' and. evaluate Portuguese cormminication securitJ' - am that Coordinator would report thereon 

to the Board. 

3. 'Dlat the U .. S. delegation should give consideration 

to the foll.ariJJg suggestions, viB: Daat when disclosing 

certain t;rpes of particularq sensitive int~tion to HATo 

countries whose method.a ot transmission are known to be 

insecure there should be a stipulation made in advance that 

such information 11181' not be passed on by an;y electrical c()ll!!D!mi~ation means, but that it essential to pa.as on, a 

secure courter must be used. n 

3. U.S. Conference Team consisted. of': 

Admiral Earl E. stone, DIRAFSA 

Col. Samel P. Collins, AFSA 

lf1o. William F. Friedman, AFSA ~l. Gordon E. Dawson, u ID 

Mr. Winston Scott, CIA 

Mr. Robert. F. Paclcard, Department,ot State 

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eclassified and 

pproved for release by 

SA on 11-13-2014 

ursuantto E.O. 13526 
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4. .Admiral stone's Mamo of 2 Juq designating me aa Acting Chairman 

ot CODlld.ttee (Encl. 1). 

s. The .Ad Hoc ~ttee held three meetings (3, 9, l2 Jul.y) ~ prepared a Report on Evaluation ot Portuguese Cminnunication Securit7 

(USCIB: 23/18). 

Recamnerdationa: 

•a. The conclusions ot this studT be approved as the ~sent 

USCIB view with regard to the problem. 

b. ibe u •. s. Delegation to the U.S.-U.K. Conference on 

French cammicationa securit7 be continued as an ad hoc bocV'.to 

ascertain the exact extent to which present NATO pi=ictices mq 

. provide secure 'W81'B and means, within the tram.ework ot these 

practices, to solve the Portuguese problem. 

c. Further consideraμ.on ot except.ional, direct action to 

improve Portuguese camnmications securit7 be deterred pending 

(1) campletion ot the st\1d7 :recam;nended under b above am 

(2) NSC and USCIB decisions whether such action is to be taken 

vis-a-vis the French GoverDDent. " · 

6. 66th USCIB lleeting, 13 July 1951, It• 3: Evaluation ot 

Portuguese COIJlllUDication Security (USCIB: 23/18). 

USCIB decision: 

"USCIB agreed to accept._ the recommendatiC?na ot tbe Ad. Hoc 

Comittee, as set forth in paragraph 4, on page 31 ot the · inclosure to USCIB 23/18. It was agreed, further, that the 

Ad Hoc Committee would prov.id.a more complete information on the 

problem tor consideration b;y ~e members at the next meeting.• 

7. Ad Hoc Comittee held six meetings in the preparation of the ~sent report (USCIB: 23/22) : . 

EQ 3 . 3 ( h ) ( 2.j 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 4th OD 18 Juq 5th on.23 Juq 

6th on 26 · July" 

7th OD 27 July 

8th OD 30 July 

9th 0n 2 August 

8. The Report represents the unanimous opinion ot the CCllllli.ttee. 

It wiU be recalled that prior to the formal opening ot the 65th Meeting 

ot USCIB on 22 June 1951, Admiral Johnson requested that .the U.S. inember 

ot the Securit7 Coordinating ColJIDittee (SCC) ot the NATO Staming Group 

in Washington! I so that he could participate 

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2 
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in SCC action about to be proposed by the U.K. representative on the SCC 

in the matter ot leakage ot NATO intormation .throu8h insecure telegraphic arrangements (Encl. 2). The U.S. member of SCC is CDR Mark T. 

Iil.ttle, USN, and, upon approval ot uscm, he was indoctrinated as 

requested.. CDR Little is alao <JiairnBn ot ·SCC. At all six meetings the 

Committee was fortunate in having the benefit ot participation by CDR 

Little. ·It alao had the benefit of participation by Mr. WilliBm Harve7, 

Of'tice ot ·Special Operations, CIA, at the 7th alld 8th meetings; ot 

Capt. J.N. ·-Wenger, Deput7 .Director, AFSA, at the 7th meeting; and o~ 

Capt. E.A. Tqlor, USN Chairman of the.Communications-Electronias 

Coordinating Section (CIDS) of the Standing Group, _NATO, at the 6th 

meeting. On behalf ot the whole Committee, I wish to thank all of them 

for their able assistance to the Cormnittee. 

9~ At the 6th meeting a division ot opinion with regard to the 

action proposed for a prompt solution became evident; this was resolved 

at the 8th meeting by combining the best features of an Arm3 and.a CIA 

proposal. in the premises. · l?L~6-36/so·usc 3605 

EQ 3 .3(.}1) (2) 

10.. Even while it was studying the question of J>ast secur;Lt7 

'Violations by the Portuguese_, the Committee was confronted, at its 6th 

meeting on 26 J with a new and most serious Port ·. eae aecuri t 

violation. 

e o on 

was o( such serious nature, involving U.S. political matters ot great 

secrecy, that the CIA manber o£ the Ad Hoc Camd.ttee was asked by his 

stiperiors to request the Committee to bring in its report at the earliest 

moment, by the end of the week if at all possible. Spurred on. by this 

request, the Comittee agreed. to put f'orth additional effort by-ho~ 

its meetings more trequentq; but at the meeting on the next dq the CIA : 

repres~tative announced that in view of the conq>l.exi.t7 o£ the matter, 

undue haste was not advisable ard that the CIA now felt that. the . · Camittee should have more time to stud7 the situation. · 

\\\\\\ 

f2. It will be noted that the proposal which is recOD1D.ended b7 the 

Committee and which in its opinion otters best hope ot bringing about a 

prompt improvement in the Portuguese situation, aims at.inducing them to 

ccmpile and use their own national settings for TYPEI. I ·would like to 

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point out that the U .s. as a member ot HATO bas been issued TYPEI 

machines tar HATO· communication8"', that a small amount ot U.S. ccmnnrricatione dealing with NATO matters is handled by these machines**, and 

that the settings used are those prepared. by the British. National 

comment, ot course, is being handled by U.S. national mach:lnes, am not 

by TYH:X with U.S. prepared settings. I would like to point out . . turther that it, on suggesting to the Portuguese that they ase TYPEX 

.more frequently' and compile and use their awn national settings, they 

should ask it the U.S. is also doing that., it would be embarrassing to 

have to an.ewer in the negatiye. '!he U.S. tactical position in this 

problem vis-a-vis all the other NATO members would be greatl.T strengthened if the U.S. could sq that it !!. using TYPEX with nationally 

prepared settings. The Conmittee has not made t~s suggestion in its 

Report, since it is a bit extraneous but I have felt it desirable to 

point this matter out before USClB with the view ot evoking some discussion. Even a token use ot national settings might be helptul. 

]3. '!he detailed. reasons 1dl7 the Camnittee selected the proposal 

put forth are given in para. 1.3 ot the report.am I don•t think ot UV'-

thing to add to them. It will be necessary, as pointed .~t 1n para. 14 

of the report, to obtain the concurrence ot· tsm to the proposal. 

14. The Committee discussed at same length the question whether the 

approach to the Portuguese should or should not be undertaken without 

:

f'arrinq the 111A:1;er to the NSC, It arrreed that. in....viaw oft.be tact 

~ case ;. u.s./u.K. prop0oel to ap~~ ""-9r, .- USCIB may feel difterentlt on this score and I wish to point out that 

one ot the recanmendations approved by USCIB in its last discu.ssion of 

the Portuguese problem was: . 

· nc. ~er consideration of exceptic:m&l, direct action . ••• be deterred peniing ••• (2) NSC a.nlUSCIB decisions 

whether such action is to be taken viii-a-vis the French 

Goverrment.n 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

*Washington, ·IDndon, Paris, Heidelberg, Weisbad.en, Rome has been authorized but not yet distributed.. 

**About 3 outgoing and. S inc~ messages per da7 between Washington 

and Paris. 

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15. 'lbe ConiDittee studied a number of proposals of a long-term 

nature - action that 11Duld. take several years to JrOd,uce the desired. 

results. These Pi-oposals are included.in Enclosure "A" to the Report, 

with a view to their consideration and approval in principle. Action on 

than would haft to be undertaken by the non-Cma:NT aecurit1' authorities 

ot the Departments ot State and Defense. 

16. In connection with these proposals, some ot which ~lye usage 

ot the Report ot the Tripartite Working Group, the latest intomation I 

have on this subject is that on 3 August a telegram was sent tot.he U.S • 

.Ambassador in Paris by the Secretary ot State, with a draft of a note 

apressing U.S. approval of the paper and adking the approval ot the 

other Governments concerned .. 

17. One final point, in comecti~ wi tb obtaining ISIB' s concurrence to the course of action proposed by the Camnittee. A few minutes 

. ago, I referred to am Lit~:tion in the work ·ot the .Ad Hoc 

Ccmnittee, I I. I also referred 

to the reason tor his iiidoctr:ina on, ch was to permit him to participate in supporting a proposal which the U.K. members of tb8 Securit1' . Coordinating Canmittee of the NATO Standing Group were about to table on 

the leakage of NATO inf'ormatic>n through insecure telegraphic arrangemnts. 

'!'be U. K. .draft paper came to us trCllB the Director of GCHQ. I haft that 

paper here and wish to say that in the Ad Hoc Committee• a first report 

it was mentioned (Para. 26. and 27) in connection with the Commi.ttee•s 

opinion that a direct approach to the Portuguese Government should not be 

made until the possibilities tor remedial measures proposed by' the U.K. 

members of SCC had been explored. I inquired of CDR "Little what had been 

done with the U.K. proposal thus far and he indicated. that it has as ·yet 

_not .eve.n been tabled by the U .. K. members, for reasons he did not know. 

However, \118 can be sure that the U.K. authorities are well aware ot the 

situation am would like to see it romedied as soon as poasibl.e. .The 

U'!K. j>aper states tha~ action is necessar,y, indicates in general what 

action should be taken, but not how it is to be brought about. I:t USCIB 

is interested, 1111 be glad to read from the U.K. paper. It is to be 

feared that an approach to the Portuguese without lqing the proper ·ground-work fer it, such as our paper proposes, would be highly duger~s 

I • /I Perhaps it 1IDul.d be well to mention ~s 

in the proposed memorandUJll tO ISIB (Enclosure _c), although I illlagine that 

the fact that the U.K.h&s not yet tabled the proposed paper is inif'ficient .. · evidence th$t the British realize the danger and want to go slow. . ,--- . 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/SIT USC 3605 • I . 

WIU.IAJI F. FRimJIAB 

Acting Chaiman, Ad Roe Ccmmittee