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USCIB: 13.5/81 

3 September 1954 

TOP S!:etm? 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Corrective Measures for Control of Cc.MINT Compromises 

Due to Ineffective Communications Security. 

Reference: USOIB 5.4/12 dated 15 June 1954. 

1. The enclosed Report is subnitted by the Director, NSA in 

implementation of the recommendation contained in pa~agraph II C.2. 

of the reference which was approved by USCIB as of 14 July 1954. The 

enclosure is for consideration in connection with item 4 of the 

agenda for the 106th Meeting of USCIB to be held Friday, 10 September 

1954. 

2. THE ENCLOSURE WITH '!HIS MEMORANDUM CONTAINS COMMUNICATIONS 

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR CCMINT. 

Enclosure 

a/s 

'• 

USCIB: 13.5/Sl 

eclassifi ed and a ursuantto E .0. 1352 

24 
'f OP SEl9llW!' 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 

Serial: OOO/i-07-:J 

3 ~)ep 1954 

MEMORANDUM FOR TIIE MEMBERS OF USCIB 

SUBJECT: Status Report on Action Taken by the Director, NSA, to 

Improve COMSEC in the COMINT Elements Under His Operational 

or Technical Control 

References: (a) USCIB 13/358 of 10 Aug 53 

(b) USCIB 13/371 of 27 Aug 53 

(c) USCIB 13.5/5 of 23 Sep 53 

(d) USCIB 13.5/16 of 21 Oct 53 

(e) USCIB 13.5/26 of 13 Nov 53 

(f) USCIB 13.5/36 of 8 Feb 54 

(g) USCIB 13.5/42 of 8 Mar 54 

(h) USCIB 5.4/12 of 15 Jun 54 

(i) USCIB 13.5/76 of 29 Jun 54 

(j) USCIB 5.4/15 of 8 Jul 54 

(k) m?CID No. 9 

' 

1. In forwarding the inclosed status report, it is considered 

appropriate that a review of events to date, and comments on them, be 

supplied as well. 

2. In reference (a), the Executive Secretary, USCIB, expressed 

concern over the high percentage of COMINT compromises that were due 

to ineffective communications security, and recommended that the 

Director, NSA, be instructed to take certain specific actions, including inspections if necessary, to remedy the situation. Modifications to this proposal were reconunended in references (b) and (c). A 

basic change proposed was the elimination of the inspection clause; 

instead, the Director would be requested to establish and submit for 

approval by the Board minimum standards governing communications 

security systems, procedures, practices and training programs to be 

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followed by all USCIB members in the transmission of COMINT by 

electrical means. A draft Directive #12 embodying the elements 

considered necessary to provide corrective action was circulated 

by reference (d). Reference (e) reported interim approval of this 

directive pending action by the Executive Secretary to combine 

Directives #6, 9 and 12 into one paper as recommended by the Director. 

This W~G done, and the new draft Directive #9, circulated to the 

members on 11 December 1953 for approval, was finally approved on 

4 February 1954. 

3. In the meantime, the Director had been requested to establish 

the minimum standards and to submit them to USCIB for approval. An 

initial effort in this direction was the submission by the Director 

o:f "Security Requirements :for Transmission o:f COMINT by Electrical 

Means," which statement was circulated for approval to the members of 

USCIBEC as an incJosure to reference (r). As a result of divergent 

views on the part of the members of USCIBEC a compromise draft was 

resubmitted as an i.nclosure to reference (g~. This draft was approved 

by USCIBEC on 4 March 1951~, and by the Board on 17 March 1954. Reference (h), the Annual Report of the Executive Secretary, USCIB, stated, 

however, that the minimum standards had not yet been submitted for 

USCIB approval, and contai.ned a recommendation that the matter be 

expedited. At the 16th USCIBEC meeting on 25 June 1954, the NSA 

member pointed out that reference (g) was intended by NSA to serve as 

the minimum standards. By reference (i), therefore, the USCIB members 

were requested to indicate acceptance or non-acceptance of reference {g) 

as the minimum standards. Reference (j) reported acceptance. 

4. The inclosed report is submitted in compliance With a second 

recommendation of the Executive Secretary in reference (h), viz., that 

the Director be asked to prepare and forward in time for USCIB consideration at its September meeting a status report on action taken to improve 

communications security in the COMINT elements under his operational or 

technical control together with any recommendations he might deem 

appropriate. 

5. The problem of providing and maintaining communications security 

for COMINT is, essentially, not the fonrrulation of new rules nor the 

establishment of new procedures, but rather the institution of positive 

checks and guarantees that existing rules will be meticulously observed, 

and prescribed procedures followed. Reference (a) outlined the basic 

problem with considerable clarity when it stated: "Experience in the 

Armed Forces has demonstrated that even if cryptographic systems and 

procedures are sound, good communications security can be achieved only 

through. elimination of poor practices and personnel failures." The 

grave responsibility of command for the maintenance of communications 

security, with particular emphasis on adequate training and indoctrination 

of co:mmunications personnel, is outlined in detail in Communications 

Instructlons, Part II-Security (ACP 122B) and Principles of Transmission 

Security (AFSAG 1248). 

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6. Of the total compromises to date of COMINT information due 

to connnunications insecurities, a small number have been traceable 

to faulty equipment. A somewhat larger number have resulted from 

cryptographic violations, - either failure of the cryptographers to 

comply with the operating instructions for the cryptosystem concerned, 

or failure to perform properly and completely the check-decryption 

process. Errors in this category are ordinarily due to partial ignore.nee 

of the rules or insufficient training a.nd experience in their application, 

and less frequently to inattention or carelessness. Additional training 

and experience, therefore, can be expected to result in a degree of 

technical competence that could virtually eliminate this type of error. 

7. Technical competence in the operation of crypto-aids, however, 

is not enough. It is an alanning fact that more than half of all 

compromises of COMINT infonnation continue to involve transmission in 

the clear on interceptible wire or radio circuits; and it is an additional cause for concern to note the high percentage of these clear 

text transmissions that are due directly to inattention or carelessness 

on the part of the operators. It will be noted that, in the corrective 

action outlined in the inclosed report, attention has in the past been 

focused on equipments and procedures, and the main effort has been 

expended in improving both. It is the Director's opinion that, in improving the tools, and issuing the instructions, too little attention 

perhaps has been given to the fallible human beings who must use the 

tools and follow the instructions. For this reason, preventive and 

corrective action in the future should place increased and continued 

emphasis on specific guides and criteria for the training and indoctrination of personnel, and on the basic responsibility of command to develop 

in subordinates a deep sense of personal responsibility for the maintenance of communications security. 

8. The prosecution of a successful training and indoctrination 

program will require the exercise of continued and rigid administrative 

control, including strict disciplinary action when considered necessary. 

Subparagraph 2g of reference (k) appears to fully authorize such exercise 

by the Director, NSA, since it states: 11The Director shall exercise 

such administrative control over COMINT activities as he deems necessary 

to the effective performance of his mission. Otherwise, administrative 

control of personnel a.no facilities will remain with the departments and 

agencies providing them. 11 Although the exercise of ad.~inistrative control by the Director, NSA, is contemplated in reference (k), assumption 

of such control by the Director would require a realignment of existing 

command and administrative processes. In the conviction that such a 

realignment should not be necessary, it is the Director's present intention to continue to act through. and in collaboration with the military 

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services to obtain the imposition of necessary administrative controls. 

The success of this cooperative effort in implementing an adequate 

program of' indoctrination and training and :In effecting the prompt 

adoption of all measures recommended for the maintenance and improvement 

of communications security will determine uhether or not more direct 

control would be desirable or necessary. 

9. The inclosed status report is presented more as an itemized 

chronology than as a strict narrative, and is in three arts. 

Incl: 

a/s 

roR THE DIRECTOR: 

~r;.../'\--;~A-'l-4- v~ OST 

Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy 

Chief' of Staff 

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Incl 

l September 1954 

STATUS REPORT ON ACTION TAKEN'BY THE DIRECTOR, NSA, 

TO IMPROVE COMSEC IN THE COMINT ELEMENTS UNDER HIS 

OPERATIONAL OR TECHNICAL CONTROL 

PART I - Action Taken to Eliminate Pla.tn Language Transmission 

On-Line of Classified Information. 

A - Wiring Modification to 131B2 Subset and Model 19 

Teletypewriter 

B - Torn-tape Stop Mechanism 

C - AFSAG 1262-1 

D - Modification for SSM-3 and TT-16o/FG Equipment 

E - Summary 

PART II - COMINT Cryptosystems and Communications Security. 

A - Research, Development and Improvement of 

Cryptosystems for COMINT Use. 

B - Authorization of COMINT Cryptosystems 

C - Communications Security Surveillance and 

Compromise Reporting Procedure 

PART III - Additional Corrective Action Contemplated 

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PART I 

' 

Action 'l:aken to Eliminal:.e Plain Language On-Line Transmission 

of Classified Information 

Initial Statement of Problem 

On 31 July 1951, the Director, in serial 00390, invited the 

attention of the Service Cryptologic Agencies to the fact that plain 

language transmissions by intercept stations of classified material 

were increasing. He stated that most of the instances noted were 

·directly attributable to errors comndtted by crypto-operating personnel 

as a result of failure to comply with existing crypto-operating instructions. He further requested that appropriate action be taken to remind 

all concerned personnel of the Service Cryptologic Agencies and their 

field activities of the potential seriousness of such plain language 

transmissions, and to insure that maximum alertness to prevent such 

occurrences was maintained. 

Section A - Wiring Modification to 131B2 Subset and Model 

19 Teletypewriter 

1. On 31 March 1952, the·Navy submitted to AFSA a proposed wiring 

modification to the ~ubscriber set 131B2 and model 19 teletypewriter, 

to aid in eliminating i~advertent or accidental plain text tape transr.d.ssion while still perMitting plain language operation from the keyboard. 

The slight wiring modification, which could be accomplished in the field, 

utilized the tape-out button on the front of the military model 19 thus 

precluding the possibility of any plain text going to the lin~ unless 

the tape-out button were deliberately depressed. 

2. The Navy proposal was accepted by AFSA as a satisfactory aid 

toward solution of the problem, and, in June 1952, the first steps were 

taken toward preparing the necessary instructions for making the modiffcation and designing modification kits for the conunercial type model 19A 

table which has no tape-out button. 

3. On 25 July 1952, the Director, in serial 1647, informed the 

Service Cryptologic Agencies that "the increased frequency of violations 

caused by the inadvertent transmission of classified plain language tape' 

while utilizing on-l~ne operation of the 131B2 subset has demonstrated ~he need for incorporation of a feature which will reduce this possibility." 

Instruction sheets and diagrams to effect the slight wiring modification 

were inclosed, with the recommendation that the modification be accomplished 

wherever feasible and appropriate. This reconunendation was not limited to 

COMINT circuits. 

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l1. 'l'he Navy took immediate action to make the modification a 

necessary condition for approval of on-line operation at all Navy 

terminals. 

5. On 14 August 1952, the Army Security Agency stated that investigation had revealed that, within the Army, inadvertent plain language 

transmissions were extremely infrequent, and that, in view of operational 

difficulGies attendant upon effectine the modification, the Army could 

noG accept it and no action would be ~aken at that time. 

6. 9n 2 September 19521 the Air Force Security Service stated: 

"Records of security violations compiled at this headquarters do not 

indicate a serious trend in the type of violation under consideration. 

Recurrence rate is not increasing but has remained stable at a low 

level." The possibility that all violations were not beine; reported 

was recogni:z.ed, however. APSS stated further that, sir..ce the proposed 

modj_fication would reduce the probability of operator error, it was a 

desirable feature, provided the magnitude of the modification program 

was in consonance with the degree of protection afforded. A survey 

of the major users of model 19 on-line systa~s would be underGaken to 

determine the conditions under which modification would be desirable 

and necessary. In indorsing this reply, USAF Headquarters expressed the 

opinion that the magnitude of the additional equipment modification 

program would not be in consonance ~~th the degree of protection afforded. 

Decision would be withheld until the survey of the ~ajor users was · c·ompleted. 

7. Between 1 August 1952 and ?-4 August~1953,.the following number 

of compromises of COMINT inf~rm~ti9n_~~t9~sh'inadve~tent plain language 

transmissions were reported: 

ARMY - 7 

NAVY - 1 

AIR FORCE - 10 

NSA - .3 

S. On 24 August 195.3, the Director, in his serial 00681, addressed 

to the Service Cryptologic Agnecies, made reference to his previous 

suggestion (see paragraph 3 above) that wiring modification be made to 

13JB2 subsets and model 19 teleGypewriters to reduce the frequency of 

these violations. He stated Ghat he was aware that the Army and Air Force 

had not accepted the auggPsted modification for general use within their 

Services; however, the fact that compromises of COMI.NT information were 

continuing to occur through operator error when usine equipments that had 

not been modified revealed the necessity that the modification be made on 

all 131B2 - model 19 teletypebTiter installations used in passing COMINT 

traffic. The addressees were requested to accomplish the modification as I 

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soon as possible at all COM.INT activities unner their administrative 

control, and to inform NSA when t.his action was completed. 

9. On 4 September 1953, the Army Sacurity Agency stated that action 

was being taken to complete the modifications. By February 1954, they 

were completed (see Section E- Summary). 

10. On 9 September 1953, USAFSS Headquarters reported that the 

modifications would be c01npleted as soon as the required infonnation 

could be d.isseminat.ed to COM.INT activities under its administrative 

control. They have not yet been completed (see Section E- Sunmary). 

Section B - Torn-Tape Stop Mechanism 

1. In the meantime, on 25 July 1952, the Navy had also submitted 

to AFSA for security evaluation an additional safeguard against 

inadvertent clear text transmission-installation of the "torn-tape" 

mechaniSJ!l devised by the Teletype Corporation to prevent transmission 

of clear or rnonoalphabetic substitution text due to malfUnctioning of 

the SIGTOT equipment when tho 131.B2 subset is in the "CIPHER" position. 

This additional modification propo3al was favorably received by AFSA, 

and the Navy 1'118.s informed that the "torn-tape" device would be subjected 

to complete evaluation, including the economic and security viewpoints. 

After preliminary evaluation, the Director, on 6 November 1952, initiated 

action on a project which -would insure production and delivery of the 

"torn"':'tape" or similar device as expeditiously as possible. Following 1 further and more complete evaluation of the device from the standpoint 

of eccnorrtY", pi•acticability and installation, it was (on 6 January 1953) 

declared satisfactory and recon:rn.ended for installation in the field. 

2. On 30 January 1953, the Director, in his serial 092, notified 

the Service Cryptologic Agencies that the torn Lape mechanism (which the 

Navy had demonstrated to the Air Force and Anrry in mid - 1952) was 

available for coordinated procurement by NSA during Fiscal Year 1953. 

He stated that a complete evaluation of the mechanism had been JJ1.ade by 

NSA, that it was deemed -worthwhile from a security, operational and 

economic standpoint, and requested that requirements be forwarded to 

NSA no later than l March 1953. 

3. On 10 February 1953, the Anrry Security Agency stated that the 

Al'!l\Y had no requirement for the mechanism. 

4. On 16 February 1953, the Navy expressed a requirement tor 300 

units, provided the device referred to was that recOJJDnend.ed by the Navy 

in July 1952. On 26 February 1953, the Director, in serial 0196, contirrned 

the fact that the device was the same. 

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5. On 27 February 1953, Headquarters USAF confirmed the Air Force 

requirement (verbally indicated in December 1952) for 1600 units. 

6. On 23 April 1953, a contract was let by NSA utilizing Navy and 

Air Force funds for 1900 Torn Tape Stop Mechanisms. Delivery was scheduled 

to commence in November 1954 at the rate of 200 per month. 

7. On 1 September 1953, however, following receipt of USCIB 13/358 

dated 10 August 1953, the Director took action to expedite procurement 

of 50 (tentative estimate) torn tape modification units for installation 

as soon as possible on COMINT on-line PYTHON equipments. Delivery of 500 

units was promised in March 1954, the first 50 of which were planned for 

COMINT use. 

8. Due to several shipment date changes made by the manufacturer 

(Teletype Corporation), delivery of the first 50 units to NSA was not 

made until 17 June 1954. 

9. On 29 and 30 June 1954, in separaGe messages, the three Service 

Cryptologic Agencies were informed that initial shipments of the device 

(Army-15; AF-4; Navy-4) were being made, and that its installation was 

required on all terminal equipment used !or on-line PYTHON COMINT 

communications. These 23 units will permit installation of the torn-tape 

mechanism on all Arrrr;r, Navy and Air Force terminal equipments of circuits 

for PYTHON operation with NSA. A direct shipment by the manufacturers 

to the Air Force to permit additional installations was scheduled for 

early July. · 

10. Installation of the mechanism on all NSA terminals of on-line 

PYTHON COMINT circuits was completed on 6 July 1954. 

11. On 7 July 1954, shipment was completed on 4 torn-tape mechanisms 

to SUSIO london for installation on the UK Terminals of combined on-line 

PYTHON COMINT circuits. 

12. Post-installation study of the device was continued. by NSA, and 

a malfunctioning of the latch on the tape retaining lid was observed. 

On 20 July 1954, the Service Cryptologic Agencies and NSA UK were notified 

by message of this malfunction, and advised that all torn-tape rrechanisms 

should be inspected to insure that the latching surfaces were smooth and 

correctly aligned to prevent faulty sensing of the key tape. It was 

further stated that all operating personnel should be cautioned to insure 

that the tape retaining lid is completely down and firmly latched. In the 

meantime, the manufacturer has been advised to undertake modification of 

the assembly to eliminate the defect. 

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., 

Section C - AFSAG 1262-1 

1. On 12 September 1952, the Director, in his serial 000264, 

informed the Service Cryptologic Agencies tho.t, in view of continuing 

expansion in the COMINT field and the attendant increase in associated 

communications, all possible steps had to be taken to avoid any 

communications security weaknesses, particularly those which would 

present evidence of the degree of success of the U.S. COMINT effort to 

foreign traffic analysts. Principles were summarized for the guidance 

of those concerned wjth planning for COMINT activlties, or with distribution and use of special purpose crypto~aphic material for COM!~ 

purposes. These principles were virtually identical With the now 

accepted "minimum standards" outlined in USCIB 13.5/42 dated 8 March 

1954. One of the eeneral principles enunciated was a statement that, 

because of the danger of inadvertent clear text transmissions through 

operator negligence, on-line APOLLO or PYTIION cryptographic operation 

for transmission of codeword material should be authorized only where 

absolutely essential for successf'ul operations and only with the 

approval of the Director, AFSA, in each instance. In those cases where 

on-line communications operation was authorized, modification of equipment (see Part I, Section A, paragraph 3) to reduce the possibility of 

inadvertent plain language transmission was prescribed. 

2. In the year that followed, during which time the Army and Air 

Force had neither accepted nor effected the suggested modification, 

compromises due to inadvertent plain language transmission continued 

to occur. In Afigust 1953 (see Part I, Section A, paragraph 8) the 

Director notified the Service Cryptologic Agencies that the modification 

was required at all COMINT activities. 

3. On 21 October 1953, the Director, in his serial 00812, took 

additional action in this matter. He informed the Service Cryptologic 

Agencies that, due partially to the increasing demand for and use of 

on-line systems for COMINT, and the continued high rate of inadvertent 

plain language transmissions occurring in on-line operation, there 

existed a requirement to extend and clarify the on-line policy summarized 

in paragraph 1 above. The letter requested specific information concerning each on-line circuit requested or already approved and in operation, 

and inclosed a list of authorized terminal arrangements including equipment, general cryptosystems, and operating instructions. He stated that 

these terminal arrangements represented the minimum security safeguards 

currently acceptable for on-line operation in COMINT communications. He 

indicated that it was planned to publish the inclosure as a registered 

cryptopublication for dissemination to COMINT units. 

4. In February 1954, the inclosure, modified somewhat in accordance 

with comments and suggestions by the Services, was published as AFSAG 1262-1 

(Terminal Arrangements Authorized for On-line Cryptographic Operation in 

Communication Intelligence Activities - Joint). 

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Section D - Modification for SSM-3 and Tr-160/FG Equipment 

1. On 19 March 1954, the Director, in his serial 0336, notified 

the Service Cryptologic Agencies that, as a further aid in reducing 

the likelihood of inadvertent plain language transmissions in on-line 

cryptographic operation, a modification had been devised for the SSM-3 

and Tr-16o/FG (SAMSON) equipments. The modification, similar to the. 

wiring modificati6n to the 131B2 subset and model 19 teletypewriter 

described in Section A above, would require the depression of a 

spring-loaded switch for transmission from the transmitter-distributor 

except when the mixer was ln the "CIPHER" position. Draft instructions 

for the modification were inclosed, and early comment by the addressees 

was requested in view of the plai1 to publish the modification instructions as Appendices to AFSAG 1262-1. 

2. Replies to the above serial were submitted by the Navy on 29 

March 1954, the Army on 6 April 1954, and the Air Force on 23 April 

1954. In their replies, each of the Services suggested specific 

changes to the proposed modification instructions. 

3. The various Service comments and recommendations have been 

carefully considered and evaluated and, in general, accepted; and 

draft Appendices to AFSAG 1262-1 have been prepared incorporating 

accepted changes. ' 

Section E - SUMMARY 

1. The directives of 24 August 1953 (see Part I, Section A, 

paragraphs 8, 9, 10) and 21 October 1953 (see Part I, Section C, 

paragraph 3) required, respectively, that a wiring modification be 

made to 131B2 subsets and model 19 teletypewriters employed for COMINT, 

and that specific information concerning COMINT on-llne terminal 

arrangements (including modifications effected) be submitted to NSA. 

2. The Navy reported on 9 December 1953 that the required modification had been made. The Army reported the same on 3 February 1954. Each 

report supplied the on-line terminal arrangement information requested. 

The Army has since (on 28 July 1954) submitted voluntarily a second 

report indicating the current status. 

3. The Air Force, on 15 December 1953, stated that action was 

being taken to review existing COMINT circuits operating on-line, and 

that the information requested by NSA serial 00812 of 21 October 1953 

(see paragraph 1 above) would be compiled and forwarded in approximately 

90 days. Since then, interim and partial reports have been submitted 

from time to time, but, to date, the complete report has not been 

received. The only area on which complete information is available is 

Alaska; all modifications on Air Force circuits in that area were finally 

completed on 6 July 1954. 

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4. A tabulation of the number of compromises due to inadvertent 

plain language transmissions reported during the period 1 October 1953 

through 31 July 1954 appears below. Al though it is quite conceivable 

that the figures represent an increase not in actual number of occurrences, but in the number of reports {see Part II, Section C, paragraph 2), they undoubtedly also reflect to some degree the speed of compliance 

by the Services with the modification instructions. The following 

compromise reports were received during the periods indicated: 

Army (1 Oct 53-31 Jan 54) 

(1 Feb 54-31 Jul 54) 

Navy (1 Oct 53-31 Jul 54) 

5 

12 

17 

Air Force (1 Oct 53-31 Jul 54) 

NSA (1 Oct 53-31 Jul 54) 

1 (on 1 Feb 54) 

34 

6 

5. It will be noted that a. number or Army compromises occurred 

after the wiring modification was effected. This is evidence of the 

fact that equipment modifications alone are not a panacea. It is also 

considered a :f'urther corroboration of the statement by the Executive 

Secretary, USCIB, in USCIB 13/358 that "even if cryptographic systems 

and procedures are sound, good communications security can be achieved 

only through elimination of poor practices and personnel failures." 

6. It is too early a.s yet to determine or evaluate what effect 

installation of the Torn Tape Stop Mechanism and the modification 

described in Part I, Section D will have in reducing the number of 

compromises. It is, however, reasonable to forecast a reduction in 

personnel errors, provided that reliance for this reduction is 

placed not on the modifications alone, but also on a comprehensive 

and realistic program of training and indoctrination {see Part III). 

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PART II 

COMINT Cryptosystems and Communication Security 

Section A - Research, Development and Improvement of 

Cryptosystems ror COMINT u._s_e------~--~ 

1. In October 1952, the cryptographic security and flexibility 

of COMI1'1T comnrunications we.s greatly increased by the introduction of 

ORCUS cryptosystems for use with .l\.S/\M 2-1. ORCUS replaced all MINERVA 

o.nd most APOLLO systems •. 

2. Early in 1953, a new ASJ\M 2-1 cryptosystem, designated GALATEA, 

was introduced. It had definite operationnl advantages over on-line 

APOLLO, but required extreme cc.re and rigid procedural control in order 

to avoid compromise through re-use or key. 

3. On 31 August 1953, the Director, in his serial 00695, informed 

the Sez:vice Cryptologic Agencies that another new ASAM 2-1 cryptosystem, 

designated DJ\PHNE, hed been devised and that, in addition to overcoming 

the ORCUS and GALATEA security hazard of messages in depth, it would 

provide consjderable edv~ntages over earlier AS!\M 2-1 systems in most 

of their applications. A draft of D/\PHNE operating instructions was 

inclosed, and early comment by the addressees we.s requested. 

4. Comments from the three Services indicated general concurrence 

with the application of the DAPHNE cryptosystem as described. Accord-

. ingly, the conversion of all on-line .l\.S.AM 2-1 operation to DAPHNE 

was begun. 

5. During the period 16 February through 17 March 1951~, a test 

of' D.l\I'HNE of'f'-line operation between USM 4 (ASMARA) and NSA was 

: conducted to determine wha.t problems would be encountered in the field 

stations and in the NSA CommCenter in the event that DAPHNE replaced 

ORCUS for the forwarding of' ran trai'f'ic off'-line. The test revealed 

that DAPHNE has defj_nite advantE1.ges from e. security vie-w:Point and, in 

general, meets requirements for processing raw traffic. 

6. In the meantime, o.n improveFl.ent to the DAPHNE cryptosystem, 

embodying a modification to the AS.AM 2-1 machine itself in the form 

of a pluggable endplate, has been under development. The procedures 

'for both on-line and off-line opero.tion will be similar to DAPHNE 

and the cryptosystem i:rill be known as GORGON. The pluggable endplate 

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lrill m'1.teria.lly increase the security of the AS.l\M 2-1 against crypto.nalytic exhaustion atto.ck, and will nlso r.i.llo'tT the transmission of pure 

key. The latter fe1:1.ture will be or assistance in establishing and maintaining synchron:i.zation and in fa.cilit'J.ting trai':f'ic flo'tT security operation. 

Section '.B - Author:i.za.tion of COMINT Cryptosystems 

1. In furtherance of one of the requirements of NSA serial 000264 

of 12 September 1952 (see Part I, Section C, paragraph 1) and paragraph 

8 of USCIB 13.5/42, viz. that cryptosystems for use in COMINT conununications be specifically authorized, the Director periodically forwards 

to each of the Services lists of cryptosystems so authorized and the 

current holders of each. Similar listings for the State Department, 

CIA and FBI are now in prepare.tion. 

Section c- Communications Security Surveillance and 

Compromise Reporting Procedure 

1. Concurrent with the introduction of ORCUS in October 1952, 

NSA began studies and analyses of the COMINT communications of the 

three Services. Compilations of violations of communications security 

as applied to COMINT were me.de, and, early in 1953, the first of a 

series of summary reports o:r violations uere forwarded to the Heads 

of the Service Cryptologic Agencies. These reports covered the period 

October, November and December 1952, and were provided with the expressed 

primary purpose of providing guidance in improving the security of 

CO.MINT communications. 

2. On 29 April 1954, the Director published :MSA Circulars 90-1 

and 120-2 containing instructions for reporting compromises and possible 

compromises of COf.IlNT information and COMINT codewords. the Circulars 

establish reporting responsibilities and procedures for elements under 

the operational and technical control of the Director, NSA. It was 

recently determined that Circular 90-1 wns insufficiently detailed and 

poss:i.bly open to misj.nterpretation; it has therefore been amplified a.nd 

/C1.a.rifiea, and ·a,· 'revision was distributed. to the SerVices. 

3. On 6 May 1954, in serial 00143s, the Director supplied the 

Executive Secretary, USCIB, with similar reporting procedures for the 

guidance of all activities which are engaged in electrical transmission of COMINT information, but which are not under the Director's 

technical or operational control. This serial was circulated to the 

USCIB members a.s an inclosure to USCIB 13.5/61 d.a.ted 10 May 1954. 

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PART III 

Additional Action Contemplated 

1. Issue to the Service Cryptologic Agencies for further issue 

to the elements under the operational or technical control of the 

Director, NSA, of detailed check-off lists covering general, cryptographic and transmission security and the physical security of cryptographic material, with separate detailed check items for each cryptosystem authorized for use by the field stations. It is intended that 

these check-off lists be used on receipt by the Commanding Officer or 

Officer in Charge of each COMINT activity in the conduct of an i:rmnediate 

inspection of his activity, and that the completed check-off list be 

returned to NSA and a copy furnished the Headquarters of the Service 

Cryptologic Agency concerned. A statement of any corrective action 

indicated and contemplated as a result of this inspection should 

accompany the completed check-off list. These inspections should be 

repeated at least every six monthso It is intended also that these 

inspections by local co:mmond authorities are to be conducted in 

addition to, and not in lieu of, any scheduled or periodic inspections 

now conducted by higher authorities within the Service concerned. 

2. An additional plan, utilizing the same check-off list as above, 

is also under consideration. The extent to which this plan would be 

developed would be dependent on the availability in I~A of qualified 

personnel uho could be spa.red for the purpose. Under this plan, the 

Service Field Activities would be notified of the availability of , Training Visit Teams provided by NSA. An officer fully qualified in I'· 

all phases of COMSEC as applied to COMINT uould, on request, conduct 

an informal instructional visit to the field station. In order to 

preserve the unofficial nature of the visit, it would be emphasized 

that its purpose primarily was instruction, not inspection. The checkoff' list uould be covered in detail, the reasons behind the various 

rules would be discussed and explained, and specific recommend..~tions 

for improvement of COMSEC at the station would be made to the 

Commanding Officer or Officer in Charge. The check-off list, after 

explanation and discussion, would be left at the station for future 

guidance and refarence. Requests for training visits would be 

addressed to the Director, NSA, via the Head of the Service Cryptologic Agency concerned. 

3. Specific COl4SEC training criteria for the guidance of 

Commanding Officers and Officers in Charge of COMINT activities will 

be established and forl'rarded to the Service Cryptologic Agencies for 

implementation in all activities under their administrative control. 

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l~. The approved minimum s·t;a.nd.9.rds as outlined in USCIB 13.5/42 

dated 8 March 1954 will be summ3rized in an :NSA Circular for the 

inform'1.tion nnd guidance of' COMINT field activities. In addition to 

the listing of the standards themselvas, specific recommendations 

and suggestions will be included to facilitate conf'or111l'l.nce with these 

standards. 

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