USCIB: 23/65 

ron REF ID:A5861. n ... _..,. ........ .r 3ncttn1 

SE6:1RFF¥ IHFeRMA':l'IO>I 

30 Jl.llle 1953 

24 

APPENDEB DOeUMENfS eONTAIN 

eoBE \VORB MATERIAL 

'!'OF SE6RE! w SEetffil'fI IN.POBMl'l'ION 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Final Report and Papers of the U.K.-u.s. 

Conf'erence on the Communications Security 0£ NATO Countries. 

l. The subject documents are forwarded for review, 

prior to formal consideration at the next regular meeting 

of USCIB. 

2. Copies of these papers have been forwarded to 

SUSLO for delivery to the Secretary, LSIB. 

Enclosure 

Subject Report 

and Papers. 

USCIB: 23/65 

~ R . • L. TAYLOR 

Capta , U. S. Navy 

Executive Secretary, USCIB 

APPENHEB BOCliMENTS OONJAIN 

CODE WORB MATERIAL 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-08-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352\3 

T&P SECRET 
.. 

, . REF ID:A58611 

- --·~- --· TOP SECREQ~· ---ic~A .... N:l#o~E .... 

• 

TOP SIDRE'l' CANOE - smumy IMPBRHA:H9N 

REPORT 

TO 

THE LONDON SIGNAL INTELLIGEICE BOA.RD 

AND 

TlJE UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS INTELlmE}CE BOARD 

ON 

Jo. 

THE u.tt.-u.s. C~E Cll THE COMHUNICATIONS smURITI OF 

NATO COUNTRIES 

HELD AT WASRINJ.TON, D. c. - S-12 JUNE 19.$3 

24 

l. As the result of an IBIB proposal o.f' 26 Februar;r l9S31 * and the 

USOlB acceptance thereof, cor.mnmioated to IBIB 'b7 letter dated 18 April 

19S3,** a UK-US Conference to cmsider the :Lm.provement of the cOllllllWJications 

secur1t7 of NATO countries 1ms held in wash:ington canmencing the Sth of 

June, 19S3. 

2. The detailed conclusions and recommemations of the CC!n:ference, 

'llhich were agreed by the conferees at their final meeti.ng on the 12th of 

June, 1953,, am which are set forth in the accOJILP8ll1'i.n8 :report, are 

submitted for approval by the London S:lgnal Intelligence Board and tho 

United States Co.mm.uni.cations Intelligence Boa.rd. 

3. Both Delegations recommend that a cow of the Report be forwardacl 

to the appropriate Canadian authorities, since the communications security 

ot the non-OANUKUS NATO nations is of as 'Vital. concern to the Canadian 

Government as 1 t is to the Gover.nm.en ts of the US arr! the UK. It is tel t 

tbat at the same time the Canadian authorities shoul.d be informed that 

' the Conference gave no consideration to ttle security of' Canadian 

canm.unications, either those dealing with NATO attairs or those of a 

purely national character, since the cryptosyatems and practices or the 

Gana.di.an Government are of equal securitJ' with those ot the US and the 

UK GOYernments. 

//// 

Chairman, U .K. Delegates// 

Q '· -"),_.-' - ~·tRa~ d. J ..:.ak., . .-,.~ 

'WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN 

Chairman, u .s. Delegates 

-llOOC/)21J2 /// 

HCIB/0004S PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SE ERE~ Cr\NSE 
I ' 

Form 781·C13S 

1

('..lJ 1 !J!3Cjl~J:f Ci"ci•TO!~ ,,,, '('I '/1 '''/ , --,, _._.I i!t.. ... ~"}J !11\ !.\ __ , 1_,....d_.•_J __ 

n1·1 

12 June 1953 

m:t'OR'.F 01'., TIU!: 

UK-US CONli'i~rumcE OIT THE cm~IUiIICl\l.rIONG o3CUHITY OF 

!T.'\.TO COUHT!1IJEU 

IIELD l:N WASIIIIJG'l'OH, 5-12 JUNI~, 1953 

THE PROBLii!l ~ 

1. To conoidcr the inoccurity of NNro connnunica.tions and or 

the na.tion:il communica.tionG of NNI'O countries, includine; a. review 

or the conclu.Jions of. tho 1951 US/UI<: Conrorcncc on the Security • 

of French Comm11nlco.tions, in order·: 

u. To determine whether the NJ\.TO Governments should be 

a.pp:roo.ched with o. view to i.mprovine their :communit::tons security; 

b. T.o usscos the :1dvrmta.gco nnd dir:mdv-a.nta.gcs of such o.n· o.pproach; 

c. To develop, if ouch o.n a.pDroa.ch should be m~de, (1) a 

specif'ic pla.n for improv ln~ the secud ty or NATO communications and oi". 

the no.tiono.1 communico.tions of U.'\TO countries and (2) o. specific 

pl~n for c.p.r>ro:ichinE th~ H!t'ro Cfovernmcnts. 

FACTS DE:\lUNG ON THE PROBLEH AND DISCUSSION 

I. ASSUlff'TIONS AS TO '1'IIB COlIIIIJT C1\P·\DILITY OF THE USSR 

2. This Rcpo·ct is p1•edicn.ted upon the o.ssumption that: 

a. The c~po.bilities or the USSR to intercept and 

ex1,loit t'~dio communicn.tions are ::i.t ~-C("..st equivalent to those of 

the US .'.'ind UK. 

b. The USBR monitors o.ll la.ndline communica.tions pc.ssing 

through its mm or ontellite territory. The possibility that it 

pa.s accens to Qthe!: communico.tions passed solely by liindlinc 

~nnnot be cxcluucd, but there io no evidence to o.sseos the extent 

of this pm;sibility. •\ny trc.ffic obto.ined by the US3R from 

landline::; cn.n be cx-.i.->loi tecl to the ac.mc extent a.s tro.ffic obtn.ined 

r .rom 1:'..:.dio tr~msmis;:;ion~. 

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TOP SECRET CANOE 
, . l,•·,·r 1 , '"Jr·.,/··"'/•~ J ,,;,1,.., &1. ~i' J ·1w ' T I j .L 

011 

rr. V\1,tn~ •ro TICM u.mn O'li' (~1,nnr1•.nmHIVED 1•'1K•II TIM GUiil1JiUCATION3 

Qli' M.\'l\) COUI~T•Ui~S (coo Footn?to 1) 

3. piplomt\tlc Coli1lnWllc~.t.~no in 11ca.cc tl~. 

n. AlthoU(lh the US ::md tnC vicwo di.f'!cr a.s to the curl:'cnt 

vnluc of thla COUmT to the USSR ln the li[!;ht or recent a.ncl 

cur1·cnt ~11proc!a.tiono or ( ::ico Footnote 2), ...__~~~~~~~~~~---. ........... 

both tho us n.nd UIC .J.g\'CC th.it intelligence <lorlved rran thcnc:l 

communico.tiono may, a.t o.ny time, be or hifJh-or !ndccd critlcri.l-va.lt2c 

to the UOSR. 

Footnote 1. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3>3(h) (2) 

. . It ahould be noted tha.t the occur.ity ~'Byotem oi' NA':l'Q prov!clos 

aui'!'icicnt pi·otcction £01· "COSUIC" o.nd "NATO" camJ1unico:ti()lls pnBse(I. 

elcctricn.lly. Hm·TCVC!r the IJATO occuri ty system docs not pro'V14o 

protection for ~tiona.l communic~tions cnr't'Y'iDl3 rela.tcd inf'onnBtio~1 nor do a.11 tho Nl\.TO countries confine "MATO" o.nd "COSllIC" communico.tiono 

to annrovod chc..nncls. I 

'--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--I There is no evidence on which 

to conclude whether or not other ?t'\.TO countt"ies oboarve the Nf\.TO 

procadul."cG. 

Footnote 2. 

The US view is thn.t the diplan:J.tic COJJJDunic.ltions of NA'ID 

countrieo o.t'e cGoentia.lly t.J.Ctico.l a.nd "pcrishnblc" in tb.a.t they 

norm::U.J.y l"Cl.:.\te to the conduct or current nc(Jotio.tions o.nd o.rran«omonts 

involving these countries, rather thl"J.Il to the broad policies o.nd longro.Il13c objectives or co.pa.bilitios of theoe countries. They a.re o.r optimum 

valuo when obtnined pranptly nnd brouaht to bear directly, rnther 

tho.n indirectly, on these evento. It is considered, therefore, th::i.t 

COHDT f1·om the communico.tionG of NATO count1•ica is of va.luc to the USSR 

to the extent that the USSR po..rticipatco in, or c~n o.:rrect directly, the 

events which they concern. Tho US ia of the opinion tho.t these! 

camnunlco.tiona h:wc not gencrl'J.ly been ot n cha.rooter which the USSR 

could exploit in thia ma.nner. 

The UK vie11 is tha.t th0 inrol"JIJL\tion must be of poGitivo value 

to tho USSR both i"or ohort-term a.nd long-term pul.-poaes. In the short 

term it gives a cloo..r picture or the 1nter-rola.t1onshi~ or the NA!LU 

countries o.nd ol' cxcha.nges between them conccrnins mutun.l dii'f'iculties. 

This p~ovldco a. bo.ois ror the tactical conduct of ne~oti~tiona 'With 

the Weat mrcr questions auch o.s tho Austri.m Treaty 1 n.nd u.lDo foi• the 

direction oi' llrOPCl.8~ncl.:l.. In the 10116 tcJ"Il'I it provides intelligence on 

NATO and (l'J,rticuln.rly SE'\PE wo.r plo.ns, s'[)aci£1ca.lly on the cont1·!bution 

cxrcc tcd i'roo countries such o.s Portuga.l n.nd TUl.•kcy ~..nrl on the !Jcneral 

!>rogl."cso or SHl\PE wur pl:Ll1lli?l3 c.nd tho extent to which the pl:'.nD ai·c 

beina i"Co.liscd. 

-2-

TOP SECRET CANOE 
• • ' moo:t:JHW.1¥ °QWCJJ..Ui\r:J'IClH 

b. 'l'hc v..;.luc to t}le nunoi:~nr. or the COUTNT clcdvcd 

r1·om tho communic:'l.lilons ot' in<llvlU.1tal NhT0 cou111. iC'R \Till vrJ:cy 

di.rcctly ltith hot;h (1) t;hcli• vnlnc~··•billty ::md (2) the extent 

• lio which they cont:.1,in infotin;i.tlon, the compromi.:Jc or whicll would 

: Fo 3.3(h)(2) 

be doonoainB to the UG or tho UK. RL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

(l) In thcuc ~orms, tb.c communico.t.lona ..,.I...,_ ___ __, 

nrc tho loo.st 

vnlnerc.bld c.nd a.ro on th ts bnsf o a.lc:)llci\ thought 

to rcprcDc11t no current or predicta."'ble source 

0 r vn.lua.blc intelligence to the ussn. 

(2) Communico.tiono or l .... _________ ...,.~c 

c>.arced to bo the most vulnera.blo but, due\ to the 

limited volum1 o.r their communications a.nd.. 

the rel:i.tivelt sli~ht pn"t'ticip:1.tion of' .those 

• countriea in :".ttcrs which would involve cr:ltica.l 

infot'ID~tion, re nloo thoua;ht to represent no 

current or i.,r dict:i.ble source ot' vo.lua.bJ.e 

intelligence o the USSR. 

c 3 > Tho canmunic.::i; ions orl..__ _____ ____.I arc 

very vulncrab and, becnuoe or the significant 

pa:rticipo.tio~ or those countr!es, a.re considered 

i 

to represent potcntio.l. source or valuable 

intalligence to/the USSR. 

( J~) '.rhe ccmmnmica.tions o~._ ____________ ___, 

ttlthouc;h lees vulncra.ble tlw.n those o~._ ___ _. 

c.na.J r a.re a.lso a. potcnti~ oource 

or val.u.~ble intelligence to the UOSR. 

-3-

'l'OP SECRET CANOE 
Form 781·C13S 

J'OP~Eev~er~~~E 1 .... ,~ .&. ~.Li:~ EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL.86-36/50 USC 3605 

!OP SBSRWI' OANOEi 6Ei0t:JUI'H INPORUH'HON FSC5.3/EX:/R:.J::INJ!&_ 

...91.L_ 

,,. 4. Diplomatic communications in warji_~~· 

. It ie considered that on outbr~ak. ?f active hostilities the 

value to the USSR 0£ the information derived £rom the cormnunications 

of NATO countries would be greatly increased. Eo 3 . 3 (h) (2 ) 

PL~86-36/50 USC 3605 

5. Armed Forces cormnunications in peace and war. I 

a. US and UK information on the vulnerability of the National 

Armed Forces cormnunications of NATO nations is limited 

It 

has however been established that French military systems used in 

Indo-China are highly vulnerable and are presently carrying intelligence 

that ought to be denied to the Conununists. 

b. In general it is thought that under peace time conditions 

Armed Forces communications are unlikely to be an important source 

of valuable intelligence to the USSR. In cases of limited hostilities, 

such as the present war in Indo-China, it is, however, considered that 

vulnerable Armed Forces cormnunications are a menace to the national 

\ 

interests of the UK and the US and in the case of general hostilities 

would become a real danger. 

4 

TOP SECRET Ci\NOE 
]'OP Sl~Clm'r CltMO'l!J - 5EeUtI'i'"f INFORH'\TIQI F:;C5.3/EX/R ~ .. - OU_ 

~ !II. VALUE TO TllE UGSll CF Il\TBLLIG:5~1CE ON f~ATO COUN'£Jt!!!:S DEillV1 ~D FROl·I 

.j 

Form 7B'loC13S 

NON-COMINT SOUHCES. 

6. Clandestine Sources. 

a. Non-COMINT clandestine means. o:r obtaining intelligence 

cannot be regarded as a co1nplete substitute for CUUNT as a source of 

intelligence. In particular, in areas where OaiIINT is effective, 

clamestine intelligence is generally less timely, less complete and 

less authoritative than CO~UNT. Information from clandestine sources 

. needs a sometimes difficult process of evaluation be!ore it can be 

accepl:.ed; is dependent on the availability or co1mnunications; and 

is frequently subject to considerable delay. before it is received by . . . the user agency. Further, the value of intelligence from clandestine 

sources can t requently be greatly increased by correlation with COMINT. 

Moreover, the capacity to sustain successful clandestine arrangements 

t 

to obtain intelligence oft~n depends upon information derived from 

COONT. 

--- ._. b. Although/ it must be presumed that. penetration of NATO 

nations by agents of the USSR exists and will continue to exist, 

it is considered that, at least, so far as the us, UK, and France are 

concemed, this is becoming increasiugl.y difficult. 

(1) In the case or France, there has been a def'inite 

improvement int.he overall security situation, and . .. further iJnprovement.s are planned. In the Armed Forces 

and seQur.ity agencies specific steps have been taken 

to place in ettect a security 51stem 'Which is 

acceptable to the US and UK. However, in other 

sensitive agencies, such as the MFA, these steps had not 

been initla,ed as o! tho completion of the last Tr:l.part.:tte 

5 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
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• • 

,.. 

FJC53/~/R FINAL 

OU 

Security Surve,r or Uccember, 1952, and there remain 

significant handlcaps--volitical and administrative--

t.o ii11provement. The level of overa.11 security in 

France remains considerably below ·:.hat or the US and UK. 

In the light or these d '~velopments it cannot be 

assumed t.hat. clandestine _ sources or intelligence tor _.. ---- the USSR will be signiticartly reduced in France in 

the near future. Mevertheless, the operation of 

clandestine sources is expected to become increasingly 

ditficult, and, therefore, it is felt that the USSR 

could not find adoquate cornpe~s}Ltidn tor the loss or 

potential CCMINT through increased clandestine activity. 

(2) --As regards other NATO countries from which the 

potential value of COMINT is'estima.ted to be high 

there is insufficient collated evidence available 

to this conference to assess the state or their 

security. In i:articulsr there is not available &IV' 

report such as t.hat 1>roiuced b.Y' the Tripartite 

• 

Security Working Group which covered securit7 conditions in France. In the absence or conclusive 

evidence it is not considered sate to assume that 

the lqvel or overall security is hitOter than that 

of France As described above. 

OJ' 

fti.4 c. In time or \·ia.r,, due to the introduction of security 

measures which are not possible ln peacetlrne,, clandestine operations 

beco1ne much more difficult.. The rua.dy neans or cOllD'D.unication afforded 

by diplomatic miseions and consulat.eD a.re also no·longer available. 

It is t.hurufoue COll~iderod t.hat. the value or infonna'Lion from 

clandestine sources will be substantially diminished at. least initiallJ 

by- an outbreak of hostilities. 

6 

Farm781·C13S TOP SECRET CANOE 
. . ""·~r 11 ._I Ll ) • 3/r '"/ 1

••\. 1 1 F!N.'\L 

01.J 

r :, • 0 thcr IJOUt"CCO '· ' 

a., It io dit'i'icult to noocoo to uh.-1.t extent 011cn r.oμrcoo 

(nc"ltDlll1·l'Ct"D1 tr:•.dc im'blicr~tlo110, ,public documc11tc c:md. otc.tom:ln·to, etc.) 

Ot" di:plom:i.tlc rc1101·t'\gc cov.J.d be o. _aubatitutc for COI.UNT. It ia . 

1

J however a.greed thn.t COHIHT drrrivcd rrOJll rcad.a.blc communica.tiono of 

NATO countries docs produce intelligence not a.v~ilublc to the 

Form 781-C13S 

USSR from other sourccc and th.it, even durin8 poo.cctimc, thio 

. . intelligence m~y incrensc substa.nticiJ.ly in vol\DDC ~·~ value at 

o.ny time. In wr>.rtime, censorship n.nd other extt"a.ordino.ry security 

meo.surcs, will t"educc dra.stica.lly thc flO"l-r of intelligence from 

such sout·r-ns, and the , ;'l.].uo to the USSR o.f,' 11μf o.vailo.ble COHDT will 

\be correspondin~ly incrc sad • 

.......- b. It should be noted th.."1.t, a.a in the ca.so or clandestine 

sources, igencc from othct" oources cnn be 

8reo.tly inct"ensed by inform::i. ion neri vcd from COliINT. 

'l'OP SECRET CAN01E 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h) (2) 
' .. 

/i 

i 

I 

. 

I 

I 

to. 3.~(h) (2) 

-,,,.,, '; .,/ ····1· · •.J.1 J _,"" ' 

''Ll 

10 • 'J1hc natllt'C of :IJ:>:y l\C bion t:i.J\Cll to l'CdUCC the potcntir·.1. 

dm.1•:.cc to the nat lon.~l udc11rity or· l.hc 00 .• nd Ut." Cl'."•.!·'Ji.cd by the 

,.,u.11er.iblll t.y i.hc cnnmwn lco.t lono OL' u~~T<' ~ount;i·ico will be 

de tc1"li1ined I.a. ·acly by ttlclm ico.J con::;ldcP·o.t;lons. i.i,r01.1 the point o~ -,,, low 

or ini~olllr,oncc n11d rscucrt'.l sccuJ:lty connidcrution, h01JCve.1.·, such o.ction muot 

o.. be dosic;11od to rectify crrectivoly iuo.dcqn;.1tc communico.tion 

sccu1·tt:v ut·:icl.lccs or fVi'.L'J cou11tJ·lca thi·o1vxhoul:;. 

c. not loa.d, without p1·ior n.e;rccmcnt; of the u::; .-:.11d UK :i,n 

. . , co.ch co.sc, to u discloaui.·c or crypt.·.n:ilytic tcchniquca over and o.bovc 

those o.lreo.dy published ln commc"t"ci.:.lly obtain...'\blc litcro.turc or 

known to be 'ri thin the c~-:.!>~ .cit;; ;i' the crypto.nO.lytic orgo.nizo.tlon of 

the IU\TO n.'ltion concerned. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL ~6~36/50 USC 3605 d. be dcsiancd to prcYCllt .1.11.y loa.kO.{;O Of COLlDIUllicu.tiOnG 

\ 

Farm 781-C13S 

....__oe_c_ur---it_y __ p_r __ in-c--ip_l_c __ a_~_··n_d __ p_r __ oc_c_d_u--rc __ s_\ ________________________________________ ..... I . 

/In po.rticuln.r it ia oi' tho r;rca.tcot im~ort:incc tha.t o.ny o.ction to.ken 

should not lc~d to the COl11111crcial irJ•rovr.mcnt or cipher m~chines ouch 

as those produced by r... B. Cry:ptotcl:nik, fitockholm o.nd Crypto A. G., ZUl3 1 

Swltze!~L'1.nd which m"\y then be mo.de a.•:o.ilnble to non-NATO countries. The 

mco.ns by which this lo to be ·.'.chievcd .:1..rc i'or further considc1·a.tlon. u( 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
.. 

I ' 

.. 

I 

J 

I 

I 

. . . 

\ 

F'JG53/E.lt/ii J•'lNAL 

Oll 

VI. TECHNICAL Fil.C'fOHS AFF~~CTU:G ACTION TO BT~ TAKEN. 

/ 11. Inasmuch a.s it appears to be impractical to atte1npt correct.ive 

act.ion by provision of riew equipment, action should initially be aimed 

at the improvement of available czyptosystems and conmunications practices 

wherever possible. It is con&.dered that such improvement can be effective. 

12. No matter what initial approach is agreed the proper authorit.ies for handling issues of this nature are the communications security 

agencies of the NA'l'O natiots concerned. This consideration is re-intorced 

by that stated in paragraph 11 above. It is therefore important to 

associate t~e communications fiJeCurity agencies with the action proposed 

at as early a stage as possibte. The same 0r!!)asoning applies to the use 

of communication security auth~rities to. o;~nate the action. J;Urther 

factors in support or these considerations are that: 

a. The security and intelligence factors enumerated in paragraph 

10 above make this the safest procedure. 

b. For reasons of economy it is desirable that existing agencies 

be used wherever possible. At least the US,, UK and the Staniing Group 

have already in existence approprl.ate conmunications security agencies. 

c. There have already been several instances in which NATO 

countries have requested advice and assistance in improving national,, 

as well as NATO, com.inmications security through communications security 

channels. Two examples of such instances a.re enclosed herewith as 

Appendix A. 

,,. .. -1.3. The iriterrelationships between transmission security and 

(

f cryptosecurity are such tlia.t a completely successtul program to improve 

// 

communications security 1nust deal effectively with both. 

- · 14. It is considered that there is no way to deal effectively with 

disrefiard or 11COOKIC11 and 11N:.T011 co1nmunica.tions security ree11lations 

exce1 •t thr,.,ugh th... i •:1prove:nent or the overall communica- '-~~~~~~---1 

tions security attitude and pract.ices or the offending countries. 

9 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL -86-36/50 USC 3605 

Form781·C13S TOP SECRET CANOE 
. ' 

VII. OU1.'LIN:1: OF 'l'HE PROPOOr~LJ J\CTION. 

FCC5J/F:i~/R FD~AL 

011 

15. The Contorence is 8.{;rcerl that t..he factors enurnarated in p.'l.ra- · 

/ graphs 10 t.hrouBh 1~ o.bove can be~it. be mot by usin£; the existing communi-

' 

I 

... 

Form 78loC13S 

cations security machinery of the Dt.i:inding Group. It is realized that the 

Standing Group cannot issue directives about. natters outside the scope ot\ 

'1..he military aspects or NATO, but it would seem right to use existing 

.. 

Standing Group machinery in an advisory capacity, since the security or 

NATO is jeopardized by insecure national communications. 

16. It is thought, however, in view of (a) the position of France 

in NATO, (b) the need to achieve wholehearted cooperation of the French,· 

and (c) the SJJP.Cial urgency of the F:rench'problem, that the French should I o • 

be approached first and that this should be done directly rather than 

through the Standing Group. 

17. In order to avoid embarrassment, to ensure maximum cooperation, 

and to edhere to the securit.y and intelligence factors enumerated in 

---- .... ·-- -.. 

~ragraph 10 abov:Vany action with an il'td.ividual pountry should ~ as, 

. ' inconspicuous and private as possible. , 

- VIII. THE DETAil~D APPROACH Afli"D SUBS*".UI!-:NT ACTION. 

lS. The French Government should be approached, at a level and b;r a 

means to be detennined and agreed by cognizant US and UK authorities, 

with a view: 

a. To obt~ning French assent to a. proposal to attempt improvement or the diplomatic and milita~ communications security or NATO 

countries through the Standing Group mechanism. 

b. To establishing discussions on the conmunication security 

......... 

technical level 1..o bring French communication security up to a '·st.andard 

agreed by the US and UK to be satisfactory. These discussions will be 

governed by the pri11ciples eirnunerated in paragrarh 10 above, and should 

be continued to the point ~~ere the UK and US have received, to their 

satisfaction, evidence that the French are in fRct taking effective 

steps to improve their co.nmunication :Jecurity. 

10 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
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F-781-C13S 

J•'JC) J/F..;~/n li'I~i.'\.I, 

011 

19. Upon rccai1,b or tho n.or.onli or lib.a l!,rcuch to the use oC' 

the 0 l;a.nc.U11p, Group o.s the NATO mcchn.n:f 0111 to impt'O'"O the! communicatiollls 

security of the other rTi\TO n"J.tions and a.rtcr succoosful initiation 

or the dlacuss Lons dose dbcd ll1 18b n.bCTJc, the Stc.nd tna Group irrlll 

li:soue a. memora.ndum to o.l t. member n."ltions vhi.ch wil 1.: 

a.. Exp1·ess disQu.iet nt the potential d'\ngor :to overa.11 

NJ\.'l'O aocurity of the insecurity of the na.tiorun.l cammunicntions, either 

diplwa.tic or mililiary, o.r NATO nu.tions, 11otnt.ing out tho.t the 

security of NATO a.a o. whol.e de9cndo upon the security oi' each 

ind.ividu..1.l. nu.tion. . b\ Forwo.rd 0. liet or CY..a.mplqe p~ Cl.o.iic;croue crypt()6rO.phic and 

' cammun.ica.tionG pra.cticca a.nd ~rocedures. This list will be fino.lly 

agreed beforeb..~ by the cognizant UK a.nd US authorities a.long the 

lines of Appcndix~ereto. 

c. Adviae, ca.ch n.."'tion to cXDminc this list to cnaurc that 

I ' ' its own communications o.re free from such pro.ctices and procedures. 

d. Rcqueat the ?JATO nntiona to dcsie;nnte or ci:;t::i.blish 

Communications Security Agencica, such agencies to be authorized to 

commun1co.tc directly with the Sto.ndina Group Comm1mico.tion Security 

D.Ild EYnlWJ.tion Agency, Uashineton (SEC~o.nd the Europ~an Security 

and Eva.luatlon A(!cncy or the Strmd i.nB Grou~EtJf">Jli..C) • 

e. Invjte o.ny nation tho.t requires :D.dvice and tcchnicoJ. 

~sslsta.ncc in such muttcro to a.pply, through thei~ national. 

communica.tion secu:·! ty n.Benc ics, to SEC.\Ii. 

-11-

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Form711·C13S 

'f•l' t!lJO.Ui'JJ' G'.Jf<>l~ !ilJGLVlt'P'l Lfi''··r· 'i1~'' i •': :r!r;1/1•::r /H l!"'DJ'\J, 

CJl I 

cnqulrl113 country either by cur·,·csj1011d•mc!c, or o.t u meetinz of 

communlcn.t tono acc11rt ty ex1>cr1;r., :.i.s m·•.y lJc ~.pnropri:l.te. EU'"'oEC 

would net o.s m .... y ho ncccGs \.1:y n.s the l•:urorc.~n ':\6Cncy or SEC1\ll,; 

o.nd may, by ro~son o1' its loc~tion, be tht? more convenient boCcy' 

ror action ncccssito.ting meetings ulth tho cori11nunico.tionis security 

experts of the 1''.:uropeo.n ~lA.TO countrico. f 

Represcnta.tives oi' both the US ::md UK m -:y po.rticipa.te iI>. such 

meetings o.nd actions. EO 3.3(h) (2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

21. For the Durpooo of providi~ r;i1id.D.nce to SEC.AN o.nd 

EUSEC o.nd for csta.blishin6 n b~sis ror givlng o.dvico to each country, 

the UK and the US will tormul~te a.arced and deto.ilod minimum 

communication security sto.ndards applic~ble to the no.tiono.l. systems 

~nd procedures of the NATO countries. 

22. All technical correspondence . 'Hrl discussions of SECAN 

or EUSEC with iTA'l'O countries will be clesi.t;ned to effect .. I 

canpliance with these minimum cammunicntions security standards 

and will be governed by the principles c1111mer.l.ted in po.ra.gra.ph 10 above. 

23. Wherever a country i'nils to r~ •mond adequately to the 

invitation or the :3t.:1.nding Group or to the a.dvice tenderod by 

SECJ\N/:mus:mc 1 further steps mn.y be neceesn.ry. The no.ture of 

these steps will be decided in consultation between the US and the 

UK in the light 0£ the ind.ividua.l ca.sea. 

-12- EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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Form 781·C13S 

I•'SC53/"b'3../R FilU\L 

011 

,IJ,. The appror.ch deacribad above involveo complica.ted issuea 

which raise intelliaence and. politico.11 ~a well ns communications I 

oecuri ty 1 p1•oblems. These will require specio.J. a.ttcntion and 

• r~~id coordino.tion be~ween the US o.nd UI< until the precise 

di.raction and success of this progro.m have been assured. Among 

th.a several llo.iaon a.rrangcmcnta which exist now in these fields 

there doos not exist the specii'ic in:f"ormo.l mechanism which would 

afford the represent~tion and flexibility required for this purpose. ' 

It is considered that the need would be met by the setting up in 

Washington of a small combined working grou;p representing intelligence . and poli tica.l as well a.a technical interee'ts 1 the exact 

canposition and terms of re!'crence t6 be decided by consultation 

between the cognizant US and UK authorities. 

CONCLUSIONS 

~L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.. 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

vr-~~~~~~~~~~===========-.....,--------// valuable intelligence for the USSR. I I 

!there is no evidence to assess to ....__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

what extent na.tiona.J. armed torces ciphers of NATO countries are 

vulnerable. If vulnerable however they also constitute e. pote?J.tiaJ. 

source of hiahly valuable intelliaence for the USSR. 

26. Despite the i?lEl.dequa.te level of overall security/in France, 

and the absence ot nssuro.nce tha.t the overall security ot other 

NATO countries is ony·better, the USSR could not canpenaate 

o.dequately ·tor 'the IJ.oss o!' COHilr.l' as a potential source of timely 

anaatUhor:l:tative intelligence oi' high v3.lue thr~ other sources ~L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

of l'i::d:f'ormntion. EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

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FSC53/EX/U FINAL 

011 

28. Action should be taken immediately to rectify all vulnerable 

communications security practices of NATO countries. 

3605 29. Intolligence and security considerations require that any 

remedial action taken, Wiile designed to be e££ec~ive 1 should not 

lead to a direct disclosure 

0£ cryptanalytic techniques beyond those ...._~~~~~~~---' 

permimible under paragraph lOc above. Also~ 

the 

actions taken should be calculated to prevent the leakage or effective 

communications s~~urity principles to non-NATO nations • 

• 30. Certain technical factors and genera! considerations require . . . that the action taken should: 

a. Attack violation or NATO communications security 

regulations through improvenent or the overall conuo.unication security 

attitudes and practices of offending NATO countries. 

b. Deal first with the French Government directly on the 

pro'bl.em or French national cormnunications. 

c. Utilize the machinery df the Standing Group of NATO 

a~ the instrumentality for improving the security or the national 

~omrnunications or other NATO countries. I 

d. Be taken throligh co~cations security channels, 

' 

¥sing existing communications securitY\agencies wherever possible. 

e. Be aimed at the improvement or available cryptosystems 

and communications practices rather than at the provision or new 

14 

I' 

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'.tOP Sl':CR!T GANO! - l'J!:CW: fl'Y !lfli'6UMh:'fION FSC53/EX/ll FINAL 

OU 

r I Afford maximum privacy in dealing with individual NA.TO 

countries. 

31. The course or action outlined ln paragraphs 18 through 24 

above meets the foregoing considerations and is feasible. 

,32. Upon approval or this report the follotd.ng preliminar,y steps .... 

..... 

must be taken: 

. a. Determination between "the cognizant. US and UK authorities 

• 

of the nature of the first approach to the French (see paragraph 18); 

b. Prepi.ration by tho cognizant. US and UK authorities or a 

brief for the US and UK representatives at the communication security 

technical discussions with the French (se~ p.ra:graph l8b); I o I 

Eo 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) d. Formulation b-J cognizant US and UK authorities or 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

detailed mininrum security standards applicable to national communications systems and procedures or the NATO countries (see paragraph 21); 

e. Agreement on the terms or reference and composition of 

the Combined Working Group to be set up in Washington to facilitate 

co~rdination or this action (see paragraph 24). 

33. It will be necessary to continue examination of the communications of I-JATO countries in order to pE"ovide guidance to SECAN and 

EUSEC in their contacts with authorities or other NATO countries, 

and to assess the effectiveness or action taken. 

arrangemen s o coordinate this examination and the drawing .__ __ ___, 

or lessons from it are adequate, and no further liaison machinery is 

required. 

15 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

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Form 7SJ-CJ3S 

10'.P 5~Cftb! eANeE - SEOf:llH'£Y INFOlllk!l'IQW 

RECOMMENDA 'l' IONS 

34. It is reconunended that: 

FSC53/EX/R FINAL 

011 

a. The foregoing conoluuions be approved and supersede 

those of the 1951 UK-tJ<d Conference on the. Security of French Cornmunications. 

b. The program in paragraphs lB through 24 be undertaken 

in accordance with the oopclusions and, in particular, ~at the steps' 

enumerated in paragraph .32 sh~uld be undertaken inunedia.tely. 

16 

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APPENDIX ~ 

Examples of Recent Instances in which NATO 

Countries Have Requested Ad.vice and Assistance Regarding Their National Conmunications 

Security 

1. A Belgian request to NATO in 

February 1953· 

2, An Italian request to NA TO in 

April 1953. 

FSC53/EX/R FINAL 

011 

12 June 1953 

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F-78J.C135 

FS053/EX/R FINAL 

011 

Mi.Ristere de La. Defense Nationale 

Brussels, 21 February 195) 

Deal' Sir: 

Subject: Ciphering System - l) Nato Jrd Level - 2) National 

* * * * * * * 

2. Could a system derived from Natex - - - - be authorized 

- - - - - as National cipher. 

* * * * * * * * * 

5. What would be the delay and eventually the price for the 

delivery of such machines (AOP 212), to Nate Nations for National. 

use. 

Sincerely y-ours, 

F. L. La.mbeau 

Cap. Command.ant 

Belgian Representative 

(This correspondence was ad.dressed to the Chairman, 

Communications Security Panel, Shape Communica1:.ions Electronics Board, who relayed it to the 

Starding Group. ) 

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F-1a1.c13s 

'fOP SE8Hl§'f 8.UOi.i = SEi0ll!U'fY INPOnMld'ION 

0927/SnP 

Italian Hilitary Mi~oion 

Washington, D. C. 

F:JC53/~R' FilJAL 011 L.:..: -

April 30, 1953 

TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE !JTANDING GROUP 

SUBJECT: Telecipher Ma.chinos 

Reference SGM-212-53 dated February ll~h, 1953 

The Italian Code Teleprinter T2-ZK is being·considered for 

adoption by the Italian Armed Forces for its inte:rna.l national 

communications. 

In consideration of the fact that a~'stated in SGM-212-53 the 

a/m teleprinter does not meet Nato requirements, the Italian General 

Staff would greatly appreciate being in,f'ozmed o~ the technical 

reasons which induced the Standing Group experts ~o make such a 

statement. 

The Italian General Starr would furthermore appreciate any 

information on the type of teleprinter which is being considered for 

conman Nato use. 

Cesare Grandini 

Lt. General, Italian A-rmy 

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'!'QP 8EQlim' QA:NG"S 8BSWP1'¥ Bffi!OUMA'i'IJ!! 

APPENDIX B 

I 

LIST OF FUCAMPL~ OF DANGP.ItQU:; 

ud.YP'l'OGH.APHIC AND COMMUNICNr lUNS 

PRACTICP.:S AND PifOCIIDUltES 

I. UN.ENCIPHERED CODES 

FSC53/EX./R FINAL 

OU 

l2 June 1953 

1. Unenciphered codes are totally inacceptable in diplomatic 

use tor transntl.ssion of classified information. In Anned Forces 

communications they are acceptable only when changed at very 

trequerit intervals and when it is not considered essential. to maintain 

the security or the information for more ;than two or three days from 

t~e introduction of' the code. 

II. ADDITIVE SISTEMS 

2. Any additive (or subtra.ctor or minuend) system is dangerous 

unless special precaul:.ions are t~'n in the construction or the e.ddit:l,ve 

itself." Many procedures that may be regarded as "special precautions" 

are deceptive as to security and may even iP themselves create wealmesses • . 3. Enciphe:nnent by ad.di ti ve can only be guaranteed to be secure 

when the additive is used on a strictly 11 one-time'1basis 1 and systems 

that perpdt dept.h gain little or no security from the additive. 

4. Encipherment by non-one-time additives is highly dangerous, 

but can be acceptable in certain circumstances tor limited traffic 

provided that precautions are taken to minimise overlap and to preven~ 

cryptanalysts f'rom finding any overlap that may arise. 

I 

III. NON-ADDrrIVl!: HAND SYSTEMS 

5. There are many hand methods of encipherment 1 not employing 

• additive, but few ot these can be guaranteed .to be secure. 

IV. MACHINE CIPHEHS 

6. Ma.chine ciphers vary greatly in the amount ot security they 

ti . 

·afford. Failure to observe in every detail. proper instruct.ions !or 

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Form 781-C13S 

'ft) I? f:ir!OHi!l'f 9MlO:bl En!l(:;!'tJEU:C!:¥ Iil:P0HH~.'£'B:•H 11 Gar;3/1~x/u1 li'II!/'o.L Oil ---

J2 June 1953 

J\l'PJ~IIDlX B(continueu) 

I 

orier:ltion ma.y lead to comprur11isc even with the best ma.chinco. 

others, such o.s the well-known IIu.c;clin 11Cryptoteknik" (ac:c pa.re.. 7 below) 

arc insecure unleae precautions a.re ta.ken over and above those 

rcconanundcd by the ma.nui'o.cturcr. Others, a.go.in, o.ro basico.lly 

insocura o.nd should in no circumstances be used. 

7. Special o.ttention io dro.wn to the da.ngers inherent in the use 

oi' the Ha.gelin "Cryptotcknik" machine: 

a.. Since the enciphcrmcnt is essentially' by additive it 

f ollOW'S tha.t if o. messo.ae sc~t~tia is used more than 

once the key co.n be recovered on the overlap; e. single 

mistD.ke by an operator using a. message setting o. second 

time co.n thus compromise the machine setting. 

b. The additive generated by the ma.chine is never truly 

rand.om o.nd there a.re circumstances in which this fa.ct 

ca.n be used to recover the mo.chine setting, even though 

no message setting is repeated. 

c. With proper preco.utions this ma.chine ca.n give very good 

security for o. limited mnount of tra.f'tic, but in view of 

the number oi' dirterent da.ngers that cc.n a.rise in varying 

conditions oi' uee, i'or which it is impossible to legislate 

in nd.vo.nce 1 member nations who wish to ma.lee use of the 

11Cryptoteknik11 l\re specio.lly urged to consult SECAN. 

V. TRANSl.USOION BEet:.ntrl'Y 

8. Ciphers, hmrever ROod. iM.ividun.lly, are not enough to ensure 

communico.tlons security. 'l'r'lnsmission techniques nnrl mess.ie;e rormo.ts 

can in themselves provide consirler~blc intclli(Jcncc to :i. tro.ffic o.nn.lyst. 

l\lthou3h there are pr:\ctic:il 11nH·~tions 1 the idea.l to be striven 

ror is th:.\t the ti-o.rL'ic ncit.hc1· of . .._ny one type (e.g. mi.vo.l, o.ir i'orce, 

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l•'~G~J 1J!:l../U t'INAL 

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12 June 1953 

J\E'l'J~DIX B (continued) 

etc.), nor of' uny onu nut.ion r.huul•l \Ju di:..t.lI1guir..hnblo bj exttirnaJ. 

characteristics. Ae;aiu, lntulliB~UCe can be enincd by study or 

the organiza.l.ion c...11tJ proccdurP. or radl"' networks nnd by use of radio 

direction-finding. Jri mn.uy cases, copecially in Armed '?orces comm.unications, a skillful cmnny cnn obtain valuablo intelligence bf collation 

of apparently uninfonnutivu meooRGC texts. IL follows, therefore, that 

full communications security demandn t.hu.1. special precautions be 

observed in such rna.tt.er15 as tho judiciouG crnployinent of indicators, 

the selection of call signs and of frcc.~uo~c.ics; radio procedures, 

and the restriction of the use of plain language. 

3 

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