F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

E L I S N E D C A R

I N E C O R R O

B A R R A G A N , P etitioner
,

v

.

E R I C H. H O L D E R , J R ., Attorney General, Respondent

. N o. 08-74697

Ag ency No. A200-097-291

OPI NI ON

O n Petition for Review of an Order of the B oard of I

mmig ration Appeals

Submitted March 14, 2013 * San F rancisco, California

F iled J une 10, 2013

B efore: J . Clifford W allace, M. Marg aret McKeown, and Sandra S. I kuta, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by

J udg e McKeown

* T h e p an el u n a n i m o u sl y co n clu d es th is case is su itab le f o r d ecisio n

w ith o u t o ral arg u

m en t. S ee Fed . R. A pp . P . 3 4 (a)(2 ).C O R R O -B A R R A G A N V

. H O L D E R 2

SUMMARY * *

Im m igration

The panel denied E l i sned Corro-B arrag an’s petition for review of the B oard of I mmig ration Appeals’ decision finding her statutorily inelig ible for v oluntary departure f or f ailure to establish that she was in the United States for one y ear before being served with a Notice to Appear.

The panel held that the Real I D A ct restored appellate jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law in chall e ng e s to d enials of voluntary d e p arture under 8 U .S.C. § 1229c. A s a matter of first impression, the panel interpreted the meaning of “phy sically present” in § 1229c(b) to require unin t e r r upted phy sical presence in the United States for o ne y ear for an alien to be elig i b l e for voluntary departure a t the conclusion of removal proceeding s.

COUNSEL

Helen B. Z ebèl, L a

w Office of Helen B

. Z ebèl, San F rancisco, California, for Petitioner.

Tony W est, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, J ohn C. Cunning ham, Senior L itig ation Counsel, and Samia N aseem, O ffice of I mmig ration L itig ation, United Sta t e s Department of J ustice, W ashing ton, D.C., for Respondent.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p ar t o f t h e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.C O R R O -B A R R A G A N V

. H O L D E R 3

OP INION

McKEOW

N, Circuit J udg e:

T h i s petition r aises a matter o f first impression in t h e Ninth Circuit reg arding t h e interpretation of “phy sically present” in the voluntary departure p r ovision of the I mmig r a tion a n d N ationality Act (“I NA”), 8 U .S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(A). W e interpret phy sically p resen t i n this provision a s r e quiring uninterrupted presence in the United States for at least one y e a

r a nd deny the petition for failure to meet this statutory

requirement.

B A C K G R O U N D

Elisned Carine Corro-B arrag an (“Corro”) is a native a nd citiz en of Mex ico who lives w ith her three U.S. citiz en children in Napa, California. She maintains t h at she first entered the U nited States in J une 1991 without inspection a nd resided here continuously aside from two brief t rips to Mex ico. O n J anuary 6
, 2006, Corro arrived in the United States without inspection near Ot a y Mesa, California. That

same day

, the Department of H omeland Security serve d h er with a Notice to Appear, charg ing her as removable from the United States u nder 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) of the I NA. I n September 2007, Corro f iled a n application for cancellation of removal.

The I mmig ration J u dg e (“I J ”) denied Corro’s a pplication for cancellation of r e moval and her request for v oluntary depart u r e

. W ith respect to cancellation of removal, the I J found that Corro met the r equirements of continuous phy sical
p resence and g ood moral character u nder 8 U.S.C. § 1 2 2 9 b

, but determined that she failed t o meet the showing o fC O R R O -B A R R A G A N V

. H O L D E R 4

“ex c eptional and ex tremely u nusual hardship” as required b y the statute. W ith r espect to v o l u ntary departure, the I J h eld that Corro f

ailed to meet the p h y s ical presence r equirement of § 1229c(b)(1)(A). 1 The I J reaso ned that, in contrast to § 1229b(d)(2) which provi d e s that brief departures from the United States do n ot interrupt the ten-y ear p e ri od o f continuous phy sical presence r equired for cancellation o f removal, § 1229c(b)(1)(A) has n o ex ceptions for de p a rtures during the one-y ear period of phy sica l p resence required for voluntary departure.

1 Sectio n 1 2 2 9 c(b )(1 ) p ro v id es:

T h e A tto rn ey Gen eral m a y p erm i t an alien

v o lu n t arily to d ep art t

h e U n i t ed States at th e alien ’ s

o w n ex p en se if

, at th e co n clu sio n o f a p ro ceed in g u n der sectio n 12 2 9 a o f th is title, th e im m i g ratio n j u d g e en t ers

an o rd er g ran tin g v o lu n tary d ep artu re in lieu o f rem o v al

an d f in d s th at-

-
(A) t h e alien h as b een p h y sically p resen t in th e Un i t e d S t a t es f

or a p erio d o f at least o n e y ear im m ed iatel y p r eced i n g th e d ate th e n o tice to ap pear

w as serv ed u n d er sectio n

1 22 9(a) o f

th is title;

( B ) t h e alien is, an d h as b een , a perso n o f g o o d

m o ral ch ara c ter f

o r at l east 5 y ears im m ed iately
p reced i n g th e a l ien ’ s ap p licatio n f o r v o lu n tary d ep artu re;

(C) th e alien i s n ot d ep o rtab le u n d er sectio n 1 2 2 7 (a)(2 )(A )(iii) o r sectio n 12 2 7 (a)(4 ) o f t h i s t i t le; an d

(D) th e alien h as es t ab lish ed b y clear an d

co n v in cin g ev id en ce th at th e alien h as th e m ean s to d ep art th e Un i ted States an d in ten d s to d o so

.C O R R O -B A R R A G A N V

. H O L D E R 5

The B oard of I mmi gr a t ion Appeals (“B I A”) dismissed Corro’s appeal, deny ing all r elief

. T he B I A concluded that the I J c o r r ec tly determined that Corro failed to demonstrate that ex ceptional and ex tremely unusual hardship would result for her children and saw “no clear error” in the I J ’s r easoning deny ing cancellation of removal.

Reg arding the I J ’s denial of Corro’s r equest for voluntary departure, the B I A held that Corro “illustrated no error in [ the I J ’s] conclusion that [ Corro was ] statutorily inelig ible for such relief as she did not establish that she ha[ d] been in the United States for at least 1 y ear b efore being served with the Notice to Appear.” I n addition, t h e B I A noted that Corro “provided no case law or other leg al authority sug g e sting that

an I mmig ration J udge s h o u ld b e able to disreg a rd the statutory requirements for a form o f relie f b a s e d upon his discretion.” This petition for review followed.

A N A L Y S I S

I. JURISDICTION

As a threshold matter, we a ddress jurisdiction in lig h t of the chang ing landscape of appellate jurisdicti on over immig ration matters. Two provisions of t he I NA, § 1252(a)(2)(B )(i) and § 1229c(f), have b een read to prohibit judicia l r e view of denials of voluntary departure. This petition r aises a question of statutory interpretation reg arding the meaning of “phy sically present” in § 1229c(b). B ecause the Real I D A ct of 2005 restored appellate jurisdict i o n o v e r questions of law i n d enials of discretionary relief, includingC O R R O -B A R R A G A N V

. H O L D E R 6

v o l untary departure under § 1229c, w e have jurisdiction t o consider Corro’s petition. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). 2

I n G il v. H

older

, 651 F .3d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 2011), we considered w h ether § 1252(a)(2)(B )(i) removed our jurisdiction to review a den i a l o f voluntary departure. 3 The I J denied the pet i tion on two alternate g rounds—a nondiscretionary finding of statutory inelig ibility

and denial “ as

a matter o

f d iscretion because of [ petitioner’s] firearm conviction.” Id

. B e c ause r eview was “limited to the g r ound adopted b y the BI A ,” and “because the B I A affirmed based

on the I J ’s discretionary denial,” we did not have jurisdiction
to review the denial o f voluntar y departure. Id. (citing § 1252(a)(2)(B )(i)); see a lso Montero-Martinez v. Ashcrof t , 277 F

. 3d 1137, 114 4 ( 9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that § 1252(a)(2)(B )(i) “eliminates jurisdiction only over decisions by the B I A that involve the ex ercise of d iscretion”). I n contrast, h ere the B I A’s denial of relief was not based on discretion but on a question of law—the determination that Corro was n ot statutorily elig ible for voluntary departure based on a leg al interpretation of “ phy sically p resent” under § 1229c(b).

2 T h e relev an t p o rtio n o f t h e INA p ro v id es th at “ [n ]o th in g in

s ub p arag rap h (B ) [w

h ich p reclu d es j u d icial rev iew o f d en ial s o f d iscretio n ary relief u n d er § 1 2 2 9 c an d o th er pro v isio n s], o r an y o th er p ro v i sio n o f th is ch ap ter (o th er t h an th is sectio n ) w

h ich lim its o r elim in ates j u d icial rev iew

, sh all b e co n stru e d as p reclu d in g rev i ew of

co n stitu tio n al claim s o r q u estio n s o f l aw raised u p o n a p etitio n f

o r rev iew f iled w ith an ap p ro p riate co u rt o f ap p eals in acco rd an ce w ith th is sectio n .” 8 U.S.C. § 1 25 2 (a)(2 )(D), a men d ed by Real ID A ct o f 2 0 05
, Pu b. L

. No

. 1 0 9

- 1 3, Div . B ., § 1 0 6 , 1 1 9 Stat. 2 3 1

.

3 Sectio n 1 2 5 2 (a)(2 )(B )(i) p ro v id es th at “ n o co u rt sh all h av e j u risd ictio n to rev iew

. . . an y j u d g m en t reg ard in g t h e g ran tin g o f relief u

n d er sectio n . . . 1 2 2 9 c. . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1 2 5 2 (a)(2 )(B )(i).C O R R O -B A R R A G A N V

. H O L D E R 7

B e fore the Real I D Act of 2005, § 1229c(f) b arred judicial review of denials of voluntary depar t u re based on both discretionary ruling s and statutory inelig ibility

. 4 See GomezLo p e z v

. Ashcroft

, 393 F .3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 2 004). After
passag e of the Real I D Ac t , we addressed a similar statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3), t h a t prohibited review of any determination relating to the one-y ear bar for a sy lum claims. Ramadan v. Gonzales

, 479 F .3d 646, 649–50 (9th Cir. 2007). W e concluded that “Section 1 0 6 of the Real I D Act of 2005
restores our jurisdiction over ‘ constitutional c laims o r questio n s o f law.’” Id. a t 650 ( citation omitted). W e n ow confirm, as we previously held in G il

, 651 F .3d at 1003, that the Real I D Act also restores appellate jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law in challeng es to denials of voluntary departure under § 1229c. Other c ircuits

ar e in accord with this holding

. See, e.g. , Serrato-Soto v

. Holder

, 5 70 F .3d 686, 688 (6th Cir. 2009) (reviewing denial of relief under § 1229c because the p e t i t i o ner raised a question of law reg a

r ding whether a c ertai n c r ime was a crime o f moral turpitude); Garcia v. Holder , 584 F .3d 1288, 1289 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009) (concludin g that, n otwithstanding the jurisdiction-stripping provis ions o f the I NA, “this court alway s retains jurisdiction to review constitutional c laims a nd questions of law”).

4 Sectio n 12 2 9 c(f

) p ro v i d es t

h at “ [n ]o co u rt sh all h av e j u risd ictio n ov er

an ap p eal f

ro m d en ial o f a req u est f o r

. . . v o lu n tary d ep artu re

. . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1 22 9 c(f

).C O R R O -B A R R A G A N V

. H O L D E R 8

II. DENIAL OF VOLUNTARY DEP ARTURE 5

W e r e view de novo t h e interpretation of “phy sically present” under § 1 229c(b) b y looking first to the plain meaning of the statute. See Federiso v. Holder

, 605 F .3d 695, 697 ( 9 th Cir. 2010) (cita t i o n omitted). W e conclude that § 1229c(b) is unambig uous and join the Eleventh Circuit in holdin g that the statute requires uninterrupted phy sical
pr esence in the United States for o ne y ear for an alien to be elig ible for voluntary departure at the conclusion o f removal proceeding s. See Medina Tovar v. U.S. Att’y Gen.
, 646 F .3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 2011).

1. Statutory Background of § 1229c

The I lleg al I mmig ration Reform and I mm i grant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“I I RI RA”) replaced suspension of deportation under § 1254 with cancellation of removal a nd voluntary d eparture under § 1229b and § 12 2 9 c

. E lig ibility for suspension of deportation had required phy sical presence in the United States “for a continuous period of n ot less than

seven y ears.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1). B efore the I I RI RA, § 1254(e)(1) had g overned v o l u n t a r y departure, and contained

no requirement for continuous phy sical presence, inste ad leaving such reli e f m o stly to the d iscretion of the Attorney General.

I n I N S v. Phinpathya

, 464 U.S. 183, 189–90 (1984), the Supreme Court held that any absence, reg ardless of duration, during the seven

- y ear period precluded elig ibility for

5 C o rro d i d n o t co n test th e d en ial o f can cellatio n o f rem o v al i n h e r

o p en in g b rief

, so th e issu e i s w aiv ed

. Fed

. R. A p p

. P

. 2 8 (a)(9 )(A ); Ko hler v. In ter-Tel Tech s ., 2 4 4 F.3 d 1 1 6 7 , 1 1 8 2 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 1 ).C O R R O -B A R R A G A N V

. H O L D E R 9

suspension of deportation. The Court rea s o n e d that when Cong r es s s a w fit to provide ex ceptions for continuous phy sica l presence in similar provisions, it had done so, a nd C ong r ess’s “deliberate omission” of authority for flex i b l e

a d ministration of the statute did “not readily admit a n y [ ex ceptions] .” Id. (c i t a t ion and quotation marks omitted). Con gress responded to Phinpathya by a dding § 1 2 54(b)(2), under which “brief, casual, and innocent” absences during the
seven-y ear period did not “meaning fully interrupt the continuous phy sical p resence.” See I mmig ration Reform a nd Control Act o f 1986, Pub. L

. No. 99-603, § 315(b), 100 Stat. 3359 (1 9 8 6 ) ; see also R osenberg v. Fleuti

, 374 U .S. 449 (1963).

I n the I I RI RA, Cong re s s m erg e d deportation a nd

ex c lusion proceeding s into a sing le p rocess—a removal proceeding

. 6 See Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft

, 327 F .3d 8 8 7
, 889 (9th Cir. 2003). Cong ress repealed § 1254 and replaced i t w i t h § 1 229b to g overn c a ncellation o f removal a nd § 1229c to g overn voluntary departure. H

. R

. Rep. No. 104- 828, at 48–52 (1996) (referring to I N A §§ 240 A a n d 240B
, respectively

). I n place of the “ b ri ef

, casual, and innocent”
sta n dard, Cong ress added § 1229b(d), which precluded elig ibility for ca n cellation of r emoval if the alien “ departed from the United States for a n y period in ex cess of 90 day s o r for any periods in the ag g reg ate ex ceeding 180 day s” during

a ten-y ear period immediate l y p r eceding application for cancellation of removal. 8 U. S

. C

. § 1229(b)(d)(2). To be elig ible for voluntary departure at the conclusion o f removal

6 P rio r to th e IIRIRA
, a d ep o rtat i o n p ro ceed in g in v o lv ed a p erso n alread y p resen t in th e Un ited States an d an ex clu s io n p ro ceed i n g in v o lv ed

a perso n seek in g en try t o th e Un ited S tates. S ee, e.g

. , Fleu ti
, 3 74 U.S. at 4 5 0

– 5 1 ; Desir v. Ilch ert , 8 4 0 F.2 d 7 2 3 , 7 2 8 (9 th Cir. 1 9 8 8 ).C O R R O -B A R R A G A N V

. H O L D E R 10

proceeding s under § 1229c(b), an alien now must have been “phy sically present in the United States for a period of at least

one y ear immediately preceding the date the notice to appear was served.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(A).

2. Statutory Construction of § 1229c

Perhaps b ecause courts were barred from reviewing denials o f voluntary departure prior to the Real I D Act o f 2005, there are few c a ses interpreting the “phy sically p resent” requirement of § 1229c(b). The Eleventh Circuit considered the issue in Medina Tovar v

. U nited States Attorney General

, and held that a p e t i tioner could not satisfy the elig ibility requirement because “he was not p hy sically present in the United States for the entirety of the relevant one y ear period.” 646 F .3d at 1306. The cou rt re j e cted the petitioner’s “assertion that the phy sical presence requiremen t for postorder v oluntary departure should be interpreted by analog y to the B I A’s phy sical presence requirement in t h e c ancellation of r emoval contex t.” Id. The court reasoned that c ancellation of removal under § 1 2 29b “requires a long er period o f presence” and “Cong ress specific a l l y set forth special rules relating to continuous residence o r phy sic a l presence a nd provided for the treatment o f any breaks in presence.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)). 7 “Conversely ,” the court added,

7 8 U.S.C. § 1 22 9 b (d ) p ro v id es in relev an t p art:

(d ) Sp ecial ru les relatin g t o co n t in u o u s resid en ce or p h y sical p resen ce.

. . . (2 ) T reatm en t o f certain b reak s in p resen ce. A n alien sh all b e co n sid ered to h av e f ailed
to m ain tain co n tin

u o u s p h y s ical p resen ce in th e Un ited States u n d er su b sectio n s (b )(1 ) an d (b )(2 ) if th e a l i e nC O R R O -B A R R A G A N V

. H O L D E R 11

“Cong ress did not pr o v i d e such ex ceptions relating to the [ one-y ear] p hy sical p resence r equirement in the voluntary departu r e c ontex t.” Id. The E leventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s g uidance for statutory construction: “W here Cong r ess includes partic u l a r lang uag e in one section of a

s t a t ute but omits it in another section of the same Act, i t i s g enerally p r esumed that Cong ress acts i n tentionally a nd
purpos e l y i n the disparate inclusion or ex clusion.” Id. (quoting Russello v . United States , 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).

The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning is persuasive. Cong ress

ex p licitly set forth special rules for the treatment of c ertain breaks in p hy sical presence under § 1229b, and y et no

ex c e ptions are provided for breaks in phy sical presence under § 1229c(b). Under the plain meaning o f § 1229c(b), an alien

mu s t b e phy sically present in the United States for at least

one uninterrupted y ear to be statutorily e lig ible for voluntary departure at the conclusion of removal proceeding s.

Corro arg ues that using different interpre tations of the phy sical presence requirement under § 1229b and § 1 2 2 9 c produces a

bsurd results. B u t it is hardly a bsurd that Cong ress would allow for brief departures d uring the ten-y ear period o f phy sical presence required b y § 1229b(b)(1)(A) a nd not during the shorter one-y ear perio d under § 1229c(b)(1)(A). She also a rg ues that using a strict interpretation of “phy sically present” undermines the purpose of the voluntary departure statute, w hich she maintains is to allow non-citiz e ns w ho h a ve d eveloped sig nificant ties to the United States thro u gh
at least o n e y e a r ’s presence in the country to settle their

h a s d e p arted f

ro m th e Un ited States f

o r an y p erio d i n

ex cess o f 9 0 d ay s o r f

o r an y p erio d s i n t h e ag g reg ate

ex ceed in g 1 8 0 d ay s.C O R R O -B A R R A G A N V

. H O L D E R 12

affairs. She cit e s t o the g overnment’s p roffered reason for § 1229c(b)’s one-y ear requiremen t i n Tovar-Landin v

. Ashcroft

, 361 F

. 3d 1164, 1167 ( 9th Cir. 2004), a reason offered only to support its arg ument that the o n e-y e ar requirement was not wholly irrational in the face of an equal protection challeng e.

B u t in Tovar-Landin

, we made n o reference to Cong ress’s actual purpose in enacting the one-y e ar requirement; instead,

we simply held that the g overnment met its burden in coming forward with some leg itimate reason for the one

- y ear rule. Id. (“A c c o r d ing to the g overnment, ‘ Cong ress presumably determined that t h o s e aliens with at least a y ear’s presence had accumulated sufficient interests to warrant time to settle their affairs in this country .’”). As the court noted in Taniguchi v. S

chultz

, 303 F

. 3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2002), it is “irrelevant whether or n ot the justification [ fo r t h e rule] proffered by the [ g overnment is] in f act the reason that led to the leg islative classification in the first instance.”

W e decline Corro’s request to create an ex ception to the plain meaning of § 1229c(b) b a s e d o n the g overnment’s proffered rational basis for the statute i n Tovar-Landin

, p a rticularly b ecause the rules o f statutory c onstructi o n referenced by the S u p r e me Court in R ussello sug g est the
oppo s i t e r esult. See Russello

, 464 U.S. at 23. Section 1229c(b) is not ambig uous and we presume that Cong ress acted inte n tionally in including special rules f o r brief interruptions in p hy sical presence under § 1229b but

ex c luding those rules from § 1229c. We therefore interpret “phy sically present in the United States f o r a period of at least

one y ear” in § 1229c(b) as requiring one y ear of uninterrupted phy sical presence in the United States.C O R R O -B A R R A G A N V

. H O L D E R 13

B e cause Corro f

ailed to e stablish that she h ad been in the United States for at least one uninterrupted y ear b efore being served with the Notic e t o A ppear, she is inelig ible for relief in the form of voluntary departure under § 1229c(b).

P ETITION DENIED.