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14000707460 

atellite 

T~ET 

istoryof 

econnaissance 

lurne III 

PREPARED FOR 

THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

Reproduction in part or total is not authorized 

without express approval.of the Director, NRO. 

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This document contains information affecting the national security of the United 

States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 

and 794. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in 

any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign 

government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by U. S. 

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regulations pertaining to the designated controls. 

Published By 

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A HISTORY OF SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE 

VOL UME IIIB - HEXAGON 

by 

Robert Perry 

November 1973 

Volume IIIB consists of 152 pages. 

Classified by BYE MAN - 1 

Exempt from general declassif Icatlon 

Schedule of Executive Order 11652 

Exemption categorvlss 5B(2) I 

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PREFACE TO VOLUME lIIB 

This portion of A History of Satellite Reconnais sance cover s 

the period of Hexagon gestation before April 1966 as well as the 

development and early operational missions of that system. At the 

time this preface was written, in November 1973, the agreed terminal 

point was July 1973. Therefore nothing that relates to Hexagon 

mission 1206 (the sixth flight) or subsequent operations is detailed 

here, and plans for improvements are discus sed only as they existed 

in July 1973. It seems reasonable to assume that at some later time 

the subsequent flight and developmental history of the system will be 

completed, but that must for the moment be treated as conjecture 

rather than promise. 

The author's research for this volume was supported by 

Robert A. Butler, at the time of writing a consultant with Technology 

Service Corporation, of Santa Monica, California. The history was 

prepared under terms of a contract between the Directorate of 

Special Projects (Program A) of the National Reconnais sance Office 

and Technology Service Corporation. 

As detailed in the following pages, Hexagon was the outgrowth 

of effort undertaken in two earlier pseudo-program enterprises known 

as Fulcrum and S-2. 

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Both have been treated here in somewhat greater 

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detail than might ordinarily be warranted. given that Hexagon, as 

eventually operated. was strikingly different from its apparent 

predecessors. But the problems that beset Hexagon development 

from 1966 to 1971 were unmistakably derived. in considerable part, 

from the assumptions, premises, plans, schedules, and concepts 

that characterized those predeces sor activities. As several principal 

officials of the sponsoring development agencies later conceded. 

Hexagon was prematurely advanced from engineering development 

to system development. Unwittingly. it became at once the most 

costly and the most lengthy of the several ambitious developments 

undertaken in the first 10 years of the National Reconnaissance Program. 

In the end it also became one of the most succes sful. and that happy 

outcome largely offset whatever criticisms might have been leveled 

at its pre-operational phases. 

Because Fulcrum. as a program concept. and the Hexagon 

camera system as a whole were entirely CIA-managed efforts, a 

full history of the program should not be prepared without first 

reviewing CIA records. As written, this account is academically 

defective in that the author had no acces s to CIA sources. Nevertheless. the principal aspects of the total program appear to have been 

thoroughly documented in "Program A" records (kept in the El Segundo, 

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California, offic es of the NRO's Directorate of Special Projects) I 

and in policy docuITlents filed in the offices of the NRO staff (in 

suite 4ClOOO of the Pentagon). To the author, therefore, it SeeITlS I 

unlikely that any subsequent expansion or enlargeITlent of the lTIanu- I 

script will cause significant alteration of either the recorded sequence 

of events or the interpretations attached to thelTI. I 

As with earlier progralTI history contained in this set of volumes. I 

there is no reasonable prospect of understanding the course of events 

in one systelTI progralTI without taking account of developITlents elsewhere I 

in the National Reconnaissance PrograITl. Thus froITl tiITle to tiITle it is I 

essential to discuss events in such progralTIs as Corona. GalTIbit, SalTIos, 

I and Kennan --and to consider in the bro.-td the plans and policies adopted 

by the Director of the National Reconnais sance PrograITl, the Director I 

of the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Intelligence Board, I the Executive COlTIlTIittee for the National Reconnais sance PrograITl, 

and the several other officials, boards, panels, and agencies which I 

influenced the establishlTIent. growth, and conduct of Hexagon. Many I of the events so ITlentioned have been described in greater detail in 

other volulTIes of this history: Corona, SalTIos, and GaITlbit, for instance, I 

are the subjects of VolulTIes I, IIA, IIB, and IlIA of this set of reconnais sance prograITl histories. Readers concerned about background 

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and detail that involved those programs with Hexagon should consult 

those other volumes. 

In the interests of avoiding repetition, most interactions between 

Hexagon and other programs have only been summarized here. Such 

summaries have been included, even if occasionally repetitious of 

earlier volumes, in the expectation that some readers will want to 

have within one set of covers reasonably complete information on 

Hexagon alone. This volume has therefore been constructed so that 

it will stand alone, without recourse to other sources, although in 

some instances it will be neces sary to consult those other sources in 

order to acquire a full understanding of incidents and events mentioned 

casually here. 

The close interaction of Hexagon and Gambit is the principal 

justification for making histories of those programs Volume IlIA and 

IIIB of the complete set. Keeping them physically separate from one 

another has an additional advantage: should it later prove feasible 

and appropriate to do so, each volume can be extended to include the 

later histories of those programs without forcing revision of these 

chapters and pages. 

Finally, it is essential to acknowledge the very considerable 

assistance of Colonel Frank S. Buzard in providing detail and background 

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inforITlation and in clarifying both technical and ITlanageITlent ITlatters 

that for one reason or another were either casually explained or 

ignored in the voluITlinous docuITlentation of the Hexagon prograITl. 

The source notes that follow the text do not adequately credit the 

cOITlITlents, additions of detail, and explanations of confusing events 

that he provided throughout the period of background research for 

this volUITle and- -ITlost particularl y- -upon reviewing the initial draft. 

This acknowledgeITlent ITlust serve as the author I s apology for that 

shortcoITling of the ITlanuscript. 

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CONTENTS 

P r efac e . 00 0 I) 0 • 0 01 0 0 I) • 0 I) 0 0 • 0 I) I) 0 0 Q '* 00 I) 0 0 0 I) I) G • I) • a. I) 0 I) 0 .. I) I) I) (I Go 00 ii 

XV HEXAGON - ORIGINS AND INITIAL OPERATIONS 1 

Notes on Sources. 0.000.000 I) 0 0 0 00(10000000000000 I) Go 000 Go 137 

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I XV HEXAGON - ORIGINS AND INITIAL OPERATIONS 

I Introduction and Background 

I Hexagon stemmed immediately from a program known as 

Fulcrum, which began as an Itek Corporation study initially funded 

I by the Central Intelligence Agency in January 1964. But Fulcrum 

I was preceded by an extended period of technological rummaging about 

in the requirelllents for a new search system--a replacement for 

I Corona and for the failed Samos E-6. The conduct of Fulcrum and 

I the subsequent emergence of a Hexagon program were marked by 

two years of variously intense controversies about requirements, 

I schedules, technology, and organizational prerogatives. 

I Corona, it will be recalled. had never been intended to serve 

as more than an interim search system. a temporary and presumably 

I inferior predecessor to other and more capable systems to be developed 

I during the late 1950s and early 1960s. But by 1961 several of the planned 

successor reconnaissance satellite programs were in technical and 

I financial difficulties while Corona was becoming an operationally 

I effective and generaU y reliable search system with considerable 

potential for growth. How that potential should be exploited, and to 

I what extent Corona might be utilized in the place of other and less 

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attractive reconnaissance satellite systeITls, had becoITle of considerable 

interest to the intelligence cOITlITlunity by 1962; the cOITlposite is sue of 

what systeITl, if any, should eventually replace Corona, invulved 

questions of institutional prerogatives, caITlera and space vehicle 

technology, and national requireITlents for overflight photography that 

were not acted upon until 1966 and were not fully resolved until 1970. 

Once the dual-caITlera, stereo- capable Corona-Mural systeITl 

had been proved technicall y feasible, it was inevitable that a still better 

systeITl based on Corona concepts and hardware would be proposed Q In 

March 1962, the CIA endor sed an Itek proposal to develop what caITle to 

be called the M-2 search systeITl (for Corona-Mural-2). It involved the 

substitution of a single 40-inch £3.5 lens and a dual-platen filITl systeITl 

for the dual-camera Corona-Mural then in use. The estiITlated cost of 

design and ITlanufacture seeITled acceptable in that the systeITl proITlised 

to return broad-area photography with resolution of about four or five 

feet for consider abl y les s than would be expended in obtaining such 

perforITlance froITl alternative systeITls then proposed or in developITlent. 

The M-2 proposal was forITlally presented for NRO review on 

24 July 1962. Six ITlonths earlier, in DeceITlber 1961, the E-5 surveillance systeITl being developed under the aegis of the original SaITlos 

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prograITl had been severely cut back, and in July 1962 a prograITlITling 

error had caused the last of the E- 5 recovery capsules to stabilize in 

a high orbit where it would reITlain until decay and reentry "soITlewhere 

east of Africa" ITlore than a year later. Lanyard, a relatively inexpensive cOITlposite of E-5 camera technology and Corona vehicles, was 

ITlaking reasonable progress toward a scheduled first launch in 

DeceITlber 1962, but like E-5 and GaITlbit, Lanyard was predoITlinantly 

a surveillance s ysteITlo If GaITlbit were successful, there would be no 

need for Lanyard. 

Corona, E- 5, and Lanyard were Itek caITlera developITlents. 

The need and real potential for Corona iITlproveITlent was still uncertain. 

E-5 had been cancelled, and Lanyard was a dubious prospect. Corona, 

and to SOITle extent Lanyard, represented the only satellite reconnaissance prograITls under CIA control. The various SaITlOS efforts (by 1963 

reduced solely to an E-6 effort with a record of five successive ITlission 

failures and a ITlost unproITlising future), GaITlbit, and the several 

radiation-sensing satellites, were under the cognizance of the NRO's 

Directorate of Special Projects, on the West Coast. If E-6 could bE' 

* E-5 and Lanyard were intended to be surveillance systeITls, and 

GaITlbit to be a technical intelligence systeITl. But because only the 

latter becaITle operationally available, it served as and often was 

char acterized as a surveillance s ysteITl, none other existing. 

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made to work, and Gambit performed as its developers anticipated, 

neither Itek nor the CIA could be sure of a continuing direct role in 

the development and operation of reconnais sance satellites. 

That circumstance was well appreciated by the Department of 

Defense, the CIA, and all of the participating contractors. Although 

interagency working level relationships had been outstandingly effective 

during the earlier days of Corona operations, they were less so by 

1963; the CIA and DOD participants in Corona were by then engaged in 

organizational skirmishing that was within two years to become a 

s ourc e of major concern to cabinet-level DOD and CIA officials. 

Operating-level difficulties were paralleled by institutional 

conflicts at the NRO level, where they would contribute to the 1963 

resignation of the CIA's designate as deputy director of the NRO 

(Herbert Scoville) and the later departures of an NRO director 

(Dr. Brockway McMillan), his CIA opposite (Dro A. D. Wheelon), 

and several lesser officials. Although a variety of questions involving 

funding responsibilities, program management authority, and organizational prerogatives (as well as some personal differences) influenced 

events, a central theme in the whole period between 1962 and 1966 was 

the selection of a new search-mode reconnaissance satellite. 

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I When the M-2 proposal first was formally presented to NRO 

I program reviewers in 1962, the E-6 "successor system" originall y 

intended to provide better search coverage capability than Corona 

I was entering its yet-to-be-acknowledged final decline. E-6, carrying 

I two 36-inch focal length cameras, could in several respects provide 

nominally better coverage than Corona, but by late 1962 a series of 

I sequentially introduced Corona improvements had made tht"' E-6 

I relatively less attractive. Then the first two attempts to operate E-6 

on orbit ended in recovery failure; perhaps as important, they had 

I been accompanied by serious camera system malfunctions, In July 

I and August 1962, the third and fourth E-6 missions also ended in 

failure. In October, E-6 seemed so little promising that Major General 

I R 0 Eo Gre er (NRO Director of Special Projects) and Dr 0 J. V. Charyk 

I (then NRO director) decided to suspend plans for the purchase of 

operationall y configured systems. The fifth E-6 sank in the Pacific 

I in November 1962, damaged by reentry heating. Although there were 

I indications of acceptable on-orbit camera operation before the reentry 

sequence began, by that time the potential advantages of E-6 over 

I Corona-Mural had all but disappeared. The older system was returning 

I film images with resolutions on the order of 13 feet. Even if E-6 could 

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do better--still not at all certain- -and could provide broader coverage 

because of greater fihn capacity, the Corona system had reliability 

attractions that E-6 seemed to lack. Notwithstanding determined 

efforts to diagnose and correct the defects E-6 had displayed in five 

successive mission failures, there was no real assurance that the 

system could be made to work. In January 1963, therefore, Charyk 

1 

cancelled the E-6 program. 

The still undetermined future of Corona M-2 was clouded, 

during the late months of 1962, by the emergence of another Corona 

variant, the dual-capsule Corona-.r. system. Although not formally 

approved for development until October of that year, Corona-J had 

actually entered a phase of engineering design in July, with a first 

launch scheduled for May of 1963. (Because of problems mostly 

external to Corona-J, actual first launch did not occur until August 

1963,) Another objection to proceeding with M-2 was the proposed 

development of an "improved" and re-engineered E-6 utilizing 

proven components in place of many troublesome elements of the 

original. Yet another was the lack of a stated requirement for a 

relatively high resolution search system, although the requirements 

that had warranted a 1961 start on E-6 development still remained to 

be satisfied. 

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Notwithstanding such uncertainties, the Directorate of Special 

Projects awarded a study contract to Eastman Kodak in January 1963 

that called for examination of the high-resolution, broad-coverage 

mission and means of performing it. Called Valley, the project 

quickly focused on a large-optics system providing resolutions of 

1. 5 feet or better, to be placed in orbit by a Titan IIlC booster. The 

difficulties of providing wide area coverage at such resolutions 

finally caused termination of that part of the study effort. The 

promising consequences of flying very large optics led, however, 

to the development of Gambit-3. Moreover, research undertaken 

after cancellation of the original E-6 Samos program together 

with the search phase studies led toward Eastman's S-2 designs 

of 1964. 

In the Spring and early Summer of 1963, CIA reconnaissance 

specialists had proposed two alternatives to M-2 as candidates for 

the "next generation" reconnaissance satellite. One was a vehicle 

that could be flown covertly, that could be represented to be something 

other than a reconnais sance vehicle. Disagreements about the validity 

of and need for such a concept had been involved in Scoville's resignation in June 1963. 

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The second concept was even ITlore controversial: the agency 

suggested the need for a system that could perforITl wide-area coverage 

at very high resolutions, the proposed requireITlent eITlerging froITl a 

series of studies ,onducted by CIA systeITl analysts in early 1963. 

Such requireITlents uncertainties were passed on to the Purcell Panel, 

a special reconnaissance study group established by John A. McCone, 

Director of Central Intelligence, in the Spring of 1963. 

Perhaps surprisingly, the Purcell Panel concluded that lithe 

natural incompatibility of wide coverage and high resolution within a 

given payload, is becoITling ITlore acute, •. as the art advances." An 

effort to cOITlbine the two functions in a single systeITl "with only a 

ITlodest iITlproveITlent in resolution .. would not be a wise investITlent 

of resources, " the cOITlITlittee decided. Rather than to focus iITlITlediately 

on developITlent of a new systeITl, the NRO was urged to concentrate on 

iITlproving the average quality of returns £rOITl Corona. The Purcell 

Panel ITlade a nUITlber of specific suggestions for lines of research 

that proITlised to lead in that direction. But the panel suggested that 

The "Purcell Panel, II headed by E. M. Purcell, included Ao F. 

Donovan, Eo G. Fubini, R. Lo Garwin, Eo H. Land, D. P. Ling, 

A. C. Lundahl, J o G. Baker, and H. C. Yutzy--perhaps the ITlost 

distinguished group of authorities on reconnaissance, space, and 

photography ever to be collected in one study group. Many of the 

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a new system, though ultimately needed, was for the moment a lesser 

requirement. 

The Purcell Panel report had several interesting repercussions, 

some of them delayed rather than immediate. One that was to become 

important somewhat later involved interpretation of the qualifications 

in the "not a wise investment" judgment. The CIA ultimately argued 

that the panel had endorsed development of a combined search-surveillance system with more than a modest improvement in resolution. 

The NRO's special projects directorate tended to emphasize the panel's 

view that combining high resolution with wide coverage was an exercise 

in natural incompatibility. But in any event, the panel plainly had 

refused to accept the findings of an earlier study group organized by 

Greer, at Charyk's direction, in April 1963. Concerned with the broad 

issue of what should be developed in the way of a new search system, 

the West Coast group (headed by Colonel Paul Heran) decided that an 

"improved" E-6 camera system coupled to an enlarged Corona-style 

recovery capsule should be developed in parallel with the proposed 

Itek M-2 system, the more promising of the two being produced once 

its superiority had been verified. 

"Purcell Panel" members subsequently became members of the "Land 

Panel, " which between 1965 and 1972 operated as the principal advisor 

for reconnaissance matters to the President's Scientific Advisory 

Group and the President's Science Advisor. 

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( It is worth recalling that by early 1963 the E-l, E-2, E-5 

and E-6 had all been cancelled, Lanyard was in some early difficulty, 

while Gambit, still untested, was recovering from technical and 

financial troubles that in October 1962 had led to major program restructuring and the assignment of a new project head. The interest 

of the "Ad Hoc Group" in sponsoring parallel programs and in delaying 

a system choice until one or the other had demonstrated its capability 

for effective orbital operations becomes readily understandable in 

that light. So does the Purcell Panel conclusion: invest first in 

. improved Corona quality; Corona works now. High-risk technology 

was in disfavor in the summer of 1963. ) 

The new NRO director, Dr. Brockway McMillan, ordered 

cancellation of M-2 work at Itek in July 1963. Itek's efforts were to 

be principally focused on improving Corona product quality. To that 

end, General Greer's directorate made a number of specific suggestions 

for detail changes. CIA technical specialists in reconnaissance, now 

concentrated under Dr 0 Wheelon, concluded that the proposals 

Nonetheless, the elements of M-2 reappeared, in proposal form, at 

frequent intervals in later years, not finally disappearing until the 

availability of an operational Hexagon became reasonably certain in 

1971. In subsequent incarnations the basic M-2 was given several 

transitory names, Corona J -4 being the best known. 

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I were inadequate, so in October 1963 Wheelon called into being a new 

I special study group--the Drell-Chapman Committee--"to explore the 

whole range of engineering and physical limitations on satellite 

I photography .•. " The group. acting under a loose charter proposed 

I by John McCone in conversation with Roswell Gilpatric (Deputy Secretary of Defense), was to be concerned not merely with Corona improveI ments, but also with standards and needs for new systems. 

I Predictably, McMillan had pronounced objections to such 

proceedings. He did not learn of the committee until after it had been 

I established, he felt that its "charter" was far too broad (USIB and the 

I NRO were nominally responsible for generating and validahng requirements), and he preferred to spend NRO study funds elsewhere. 

I McMillan also protested that Wheelon had no official role in the 

I satellite reconnaissance program. 

McCone named Wheelon his "monitor for NRO matter s I, three 

I days later, and Wheelon promptly declared his intention of " ... get[tingJ 

I the CIA into the satellite business in a contributing, not just a bureaucratic way. II 

I The most attractive prospect for new program creation still 

I was in the search area. True, an ultra-high-resolution camera was 

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also on the general requirements list, but it seemed several years 

in the future and, in any case, in 1963-1964 the surveillance concept 

that seemed most promising was embodied in the Manned Orbiting 

Laboratory-Dorian system, still embryonic but certain to be an Air 

Force undertaking, The Drell-Chapman Committee had been critical 

of progres s in Corona improvement; in time, that criticism was to 

lead to the modifications incorporated in the Corona J - 3 configuration, 

a remarkable improvement over the original Corona-Mural. But 

Corona J -3 still was only a proposal, and in any case there was 

agreement that no Corona redesign with less scope than the M-2 undertaking 

could substantially improve Corona's re solution capability. Camera 

specialists then believed that if resolution much better than 7 or 8 

feet for about half of the returned film were wanted, refinement 

>!! 

of the original Corona would not be sufficient. 

Two events followed in close order. On 18 November 1963, 

the NRO's West Coast directorate contracted with Itek for general 

Consistent, rather than occasional. resolution of 7 to 10 feet was 

the Corona goal defined by the Purcell and Drell-Chapman recommendations and ultimately incorporated in the Corona J -3 program. 

The assumption that Corona could not generate photography with 

4- to 5-foot resolutions, however much the system was modified, 

later proved to be incorrect. Corona J - 3 ultima tel y provided 

"best resolution" of 4.5 feet. 

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I feasibility studies of a new broad-area search systeITl and for the 

I preliITlinary paraITletric design of such a systeITl. That action was 

the sOITlewhat delayed response to the Purcell Panel findings of 

I June 1963. It also represented, indirectly, a continuation of search 

I systeITl studies undertaken on the West Coast following the cancellation 

of SaITlos E-6, earlier that year. Not quite two ITlonths later the CIA 

I separately authorized Itek to study a reITlarkably siITlilar set of 

I probleITls, but specified a sOITlewhat ITlore aITlbitious design goal 

based on the findings of in-house CIA analyses. The CIA action was 

I a delayed response to the Drell-ChapITlan COITlITlittee findings of late 

I 1963, but it indirectly represented a continuation of the search systeITl 

research approach eITlbodied in the M-2 studies undertaken by the 

I CIA in an effort to find a feasible iITlproveITlent ITlode for Corona-Mural. 

I The "West Coast Itek Study!! led to S-2; the CIA-funded Itek study was 

2 -

the genesis of FulcruITl o 

I The CIA I S intentions were generally known to the NRO staff 

I in DeceITlber 1963, sOITlewhat before Itek forITlally began work. The 

probability that Greer1s NRO group and Wheelon's CIA group would 

I eITlerge frOITl their respective study prograITls with cOITlpeting proposals 

I for a new search systeITl caused SOITle concern aITlong prograITl ITlonitors 

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high in DepartITlent of Defense ranks. (The NRO charter then in effect 

included no provision for anything reseITlbling the NRP Executive 

COITlITlittee of later years; the Director of the NRO was responsible 

directly to the Secretary of Defense, CIA participation being assured 

by the assignITlent of individuals to various NRO posts--including 

that of deputy director.) Earlier in 1963, Dr. Eugene G. Fubini, 

then serving as a senior technical advisor to the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense, had begun acting as a defense departITlent spokesITlan in 

NRO ITlatters. (In the Charyk era no such interITlediary function had 

existed, Charyk having such an effective relationship with Secretary 

Robert S. McNaITlara that it was not needed.) Fubini had by late 1963 

assuITled the role of a ITlediator in the increasingly acriITlonious contacts 

between McMillCln and Wheelon. In DeceITlber, speaking with the 

iITlplied authority of Cyrus Vance, newly appointed Deputy Secretary 

of Defense, Fubini proposed to McCone that the CIA assign total 

Corona responsibility to the NRO in return for a free hand in the 

The principal source of CIA-NRO contention in 1963 was Corona 

ITlanageITlent responsibility and authority. McMillan wanted to 

concentrate all Corona authority under a jointly staffed West Coast 

project office reporting to the Director, PrograITl A (then Greer, 

later Brigadier General John L. Martin, Jr.). Wheelon, firITlly 

supported by CIA Director John A. McCone, argued that CIA control 

of Corona should be enlarged rather than curtailed. The issue is 

discussed in greater detail in the first voluITle of this history. 

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development of a new search system. McMillan apparently was unaware 

of the offer until McCone indirectly passed it d ~ ong. He rejected the 

compromise out of hand, insisting that the NRO had to have full 

authority to control Corona and that a new search system could not be 

arbitraril y as signed to any organization. The disagreement thus 

expressed persisted into 1965. McMillan's efforts to resolve the issue 

by obtaining directive support either from McNamara or from the 

White House were unavailing. The President's Foreign Intelligence 

Advisory Board recommended strengthening McMillan's hand during a 

May 1964 meeting, but the draft Presidential directive sent forward in 

consequence of that meeting was never signed. (The 1964 election 

played some part in delaying a resolution of the several controversies 

that afflicted the NRO, the search system requirement, and the Corona 

program from May through November.) 

The net effect was that by January 1964 the CIA had undertaken 

to sponsor studies with Itek, and subsequently with Phi1co Corporation 

and other subsystem specialists, leading toward a broad-area search 

system called Fulcrum, and the NRO' s Special Projects Directorate 

(Program A) had begun to support a different set of studies oriented 

toward a different kind of search system, later called S-2. A secondary 

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cons equence was that the authority of the Director, NRO, either to 

control or to monitor the program of the CIA-sponsored effort had 

been successfully denied. McMillan certainly knew of the CIAls 

internal studies and of their general import. It does not appear that 

he learned of the existence of the funded studies by Itek and Philco 

3 

until the spring of 1964, five months after their inception. 

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Evolution of a Systenl 

As described by Itek in June 1964, Fulcrunl was to be a Titan IIboosted systenl built around a pair of rotating 60-inch focal length 

canleras and a transport systenl for seven-inch filnl, the general 

arrangenlent sOnlewhat resenlbling what later becanle Corona J -3. 

The scale was very different, of course (Corona carried 36-inch 

focal length lens es and used 70-nlillinleter filnl), but resolution was 

intended to range fronl two feet to four feet across a ground swath 

360 nliles wide. Carrying about 65, 000 linear feet of filnl, the systenl 

would nOnlinally be able to photograph nlore than 10 nlillion square 

nliles of the Earth on each nlission. Although optics, canlera 

nlechanisnl, fi1nl transport, boost, and recovery subsystenls were 

all "new, II the filnl transport and rec overy systenls (one extrenle1 y 

::::= 

large capsule) appeared to be the high risk itenls. 

To that tinle the only filnl-carrying reentry bodies to be recovered 

by the United States were variants on the original Corona capsule of 

1958 vintage. Both E- 5 and E-6 had used "large" capsules intended 

for recovery fronl the Sea rather than aircatch. E-5 had faults other 

than in its recovery systenl, but that too nlay have been faulty--no 

capsules were ever recovered for exanlination. E-6 had been cancelled solely on the evidence of five recovery failures, and two Were 

clearly the consequence of poor capsule design. Mercury and Genlini, 

NASA's nlan-carrying orbital systenls, provided evidence that bigness 

was not an inlpoS sible constraint; the Mercury capsule was not unlike 

that tested with the E- 5, for instance. But all concerned aCknowledged 

that single "big" recovery bodies were difficult to develop, and recovery 

was the crucial elenlent in any reconnais sance systenl of the 1960s. 

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S-2, as first conceived, was in some respects a simpler system 

than Fulcrum. Intended to have both panoramic and pointing capability, 

it would have better resolution in a pointing mode (three feet to four 

feet) than in a search mode (five to eight feet), and would cover a swath 

about 150 miles wide during search operations. The "early S -2" 

embodied new optics and camera mechanism, but would rely on the 

Atlas-Agena booster combination and an enlarged Gambit-style recovery 

vehicle. Interestingly, the firs t "engineering models It undertaken in 

the two programs were the optics of the S-2 and the film transport of 

the Fulcrum. Itek remained the principal Fulcrum system contractor; 

Greer's organizahull brought Kodak and Fairchild into the camera study 

program in September 1964 and subsequently funded space vehicle 

studies by both Lockheed and General Electric. Perkin-Elmer declined 

an invitation to bid for participation in the embryonic S -2 camera 

studies, but undertook some work in support of Fulcrum. 

While such arrangements were being made, other events occurred 

that were to have a considerable influence on later developments. For 

one, Wheelon and McCone separately proposed to McMillan and Vance 

respectively that CIA responsibility for both development and operation 

of the new search s ystem- -Fulcrum - -be formally confirmed. In the 

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meantime, the CIA provided scant data on the status of or plans for 

Fulc rum and forbade Fulcrum contractors to release information 

about their progress to any agency other than the CIA. CIA proposed 

to establish an internal project office initially composed of five 

people, with Space Technology Laboratories providing technical 

support and serving as system integrating contractor; the principal 

companies concerned with Fulcrum in July 1964 were Itek, General 

Electric and AVCO (reentry vehicle), Lockheed (space vehicle), and 

That procedure, and particularly the withholding of Fulcrum 

information from McMillan I s staff, was a particular ir ritant to the 

NRO. It was not, however, unprecedented. In 1963, while questions 

about the desirability of starting Corona M-2 development were being 

considered, Greer and Charyk had attempted and very nearly carried 

off a similar coup. It, too, involved a search system intended to 

succeed or supplant Corona. When E-6 was cancelled on 31 January 

1963, they very circumspectly let contracts covering the study and 

initial development phases of Spartan, a repackaged, largely reengineered E-6 camera in combination with a Corona reentry capsule 

and Thor-Agena launch-orbit vehicles. Scoville, directing CIA 

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reconnaissance activities at that time, had harshly questioned both 

the technical feasibility of a lire-engineered E-6" and the motives 

that underlay its proposal. Had Spartan proceeded to successful 

operation, it would have provided better capability than Corona. 

Eastman Kodak was convinced that Spartan had great growth potential--

which, if true, would have negated any need for CIA development of a 

new search system. In the face of Scoville's opposition, Charyk in 

mid-February 1963 formally disapproved Spartan--but in fact both 

the study and the procurement of long-lead-time items needed for 

on-orbit tests of the proposed system continued under the cover of 

Program A study contracts with Eastman Kodak and General Electric. 

The name changed. It was listed as SP-AS-63 (Special Projects 

Advanced Study - 1963), but in all other important respects it was Spartan. 

Whether Scoville and the CIA ever learned the details of the 

effort remains uncertain. Special precautions were taken to prevent 

the untimely disclosure of "sP-As-63" activity. All project work on 

the West Coast was conducted in a suite of offices provided by Eastman 

Kodak, located about a mile from the Program A complex on El Segundo 

Boulevard. Probably no more than a dozen people of the 150 or so 

assigned to the West Coast establishment (which included many CIA 

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people) were aware of the activity. Even fewer were briefed in the 

Pentagon. No CIA people visited Eastman Kodak or that part of 

General Electric concerned with the Ifstudy. II 

The work continued until July 1963. By that time the contractors 

had completed the preliminary design of a system that had many of the 

attributes of the later S-2: wide area coverage at about five-foot resolution, dual recovery capsules, relatively simple film transport mechanism, 

and a variety of innovations in optics that promised consistently good 

returns. The replacement of Charyk by McMillan in the Spring of 

1963 and the difficulty of obtaining funds to proceed from advanced study 

to system fabrication were, in combination, sufficient to cause abandonment of the main program in July. Eastman's private studies of 

improved search systems continued and certainly influenced later 

4 

Eastman proposals for 5-2. In the event, little of the ISP-AS-63" 

effort was communicated to the CIA. The Agency's subsequent denial 

of Fulcrum information to McMillan and the NRO staff may not have 

been entirely motivated by the Charyk-Greer ploy of 1963, but there 

was implied jusitification for Wheelon's actions in the earlier CharykGreer maneuver 0 

By the end of June 1964, when McMillan first was exposed to a 

full briefing on Fulcrum, the CIA concluded that preliminary studies 

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had been sufficiently exhaustive to confirm the feasibility of the system. I 

The request that Vance confirm the CIA I S responsibility for full developI ment of Fulcrum had been submitted. There were strong indications 

that the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) would shortly is sue an I 

updated search system requirement to replace those dating from 1960. I On 9 July, therefore, Dr. Wheelon proposed that the NRO provide the 

bulk of the funds needed to support a $60 million Fulcrum development I 

effort during fiscal year 1965. Of that total, only about $18 million was 

to be devoted to the camera system; the remainder was to go to spaceI 

craft, booster, and system support work (including preliminary invest- I 

ments in the construction of a launch facility for Titan III-boosted I 

satellites)o 

The timing was bad. Late in June, Dr 0 Fubini had been exposed I 

to details of the Fulcrum proposal and had concluded that although it 

had promise it also had problems, particularly in the highly complex 

transport system required to deliver large quantities of film to the 

platens at exceedingly rapid rates. At Fubini's urging, Vance on 8 July 

had ruled that although the CIA could perform whatever te sts were 

needed to determine Fulcrum feasibility, the NRO'S Directorate of 

Special Projects should conduct comparative studies of alternative 

search systems. (In effect, Vance was directing continuance of both 

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Fulcrum and 5-2 work at the study and feasibility determination level, 

but his letter did not reach the CIA until Wheelon I s request for full 

system funding had gone to McMillan.} By January 1965, Vance suggested, 

enough should have been learned about the various systems to support a 

rational decision on the desirability of starting full system development 

and, if appropriate, on the choice of a system to be developed. Given 

that decision, Fulcrum funding was extended at a level of about $1 million 

5 

a month, roughly 20 percent of the sum Wheelon had requested. 

The various studies of 1963-1964 and the generous investment in 

pre-design research to that time encouraged the July 1964 statement of 

a new and formal search system requirement. Issued under the imprimatur 

of the United States Intelligence Board on 29 July, it called for a singlecapability search-s urveillance system with the area coverage equivalenc e 

of Corona at resolutions equal to those provided by Gambit. Another 

system was wanted that would permit interpretation of details at the 

6 

one-foot resolution level with Gambit-scope swath widths. Gambit-3 

would satisfy the second of those requirements; Fulcrum. as then 

proposed, carne closer to the terms of the first requirement than did 

the 5-2 concept of mid-1964. The requirement was not obviously the 

product of any single faction in the intelligence community, nor was 

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the coincident statement of a Fulcrum-oriented requirement and a 

Gambit-3 requirement merely an expression of an effort to provide 

continuing work for both the CIA and the NRO's Special Projects 

directorate. The USIB had taken account of such as the Purcell, 

Drell-Ch;tpman, and Land Panel studies, the comparison of M-2 and 

ttimproved E-6 tl potential, and several lesser analyses. And even 

though Fulcrum seemed nearer the new requirement than S-2, neither 

of the proposed systems represented a fully satisfactory solution. 

While the CIA-managed effort continued, chiefly under contract 

to Itek but also with Philco and Perkin-Elmer, the West Coast group 

was devoting equivalent attention to camera system studie s being 

prepared by Itek, Eastman Kodak, and Fairchild. General Electric 

and Lockheed were performing space vehicle and reentry system 

research for both CIA and NRO sponsors. It seemed inevitable that 

some version of the solid-rocket augmented Titan III would serve as 

the boost vehicle, whatever the final system configuration, 

Of the several contractors involved in some aspect of camera 

system design, Eastman seemed to the S-2 program office to have 

the most promising concept. The CIA clearly favored Itek's approach 

(which incorporated an optical bar system sponsored by the CIA IS inhous e lens specialists) 0 

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The relatively even tenor of dev( lopment in parallel was rudely 

disturbed in February 1965; Itek abruptly renounced any intention of 

continuing Fulcrum work, advising both the CIA and the NRO that the 

company would forego any further development work on observation 

satellites rather than pursue the Fulcrum task as then defined. The 

decision was motivated by Itek's continuing disagreements with the 

CIA's technical monitors and the Agency's ins istence that Itek defer 

to Agency specialists in technical matters. 

Wheelon concluded that ltek' s action had been prompted, or at 

least supported, by the NRO staff and that Itek had in effect been 

promised the S-2 c(Jntract in return for withdrawing from CIA-supported 

Fulcrum development. In fact, the NRO staff and McMillan were quite 

as surpris ed by ltek' s action as were CIA officials; McMillan conscientiously advised Itek that the NRO evaluations of S-2 progress to that 

time showed the Eastman design to be the most attractive. McMillan 

had scant knowledge of Fulcrum's status at the time Itek withdrew, 

having received no written reports on the program since August 1964 

and only sketchy verbal summaries. Nevertheless, because S-2 

seemed to be proceeding nicely and the withdrawal of the chief Fulcrum 

design contractor could not but confuse and delay Fulcrum progress, 

it seemed likely that in any near-term comparison of system proposals 

leading to a system selection, the Eastman S-2 design would win easily. 7 

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The Itek affair had extensive and unexpected consequences. 

Perhaps most important, it exacerbated the already disharmonious 

relationships between the CIA and the NRO and sharpened the existing 

antagonism between McMillan and Wheelon. Perkin-Elmer, rather 

than Itek, became the principal Fulcrum camera system contractor. 

And, as McMillan held predicted, when the S-2 project office was 

obliged to designate a preferred agent for S-2 development, in May 

1965, Eastman got the nod. But in the end expectations that the 

development of a new search system would proceed from exploratory 

development status to system development in 1965 proved optimistic. 

Although McMillan approved a plan to spend $107 million on S-2 development in fiscal year 1966, in the event expenditures were limited to a 

rate somewhat below $11 million a year pending a decision on the start 

of the system selection proces s. Fulcrum funding was concurrently 

reduced to about the same level. 

For practical purpos es, the effect of the Itek affair had been 

to delay any decision on starting development of a new search and 

surveillance systemo Approval of that start required the concerted 

support of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Secretary 

of Defense, On 24 June 1965, McMillan advised Brigadier General 

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John L. Martin, Greer I s successor as Director of Special Projects 

(PrograITl A) for the NRO, that no agreeITlent on a s ysteITl approval 

process had eITlerged froITl DOD-CIA ITleetings and that none could be 

8 

iITlITlediatelyexpected. Vice AdITliral W. F. Raborn, who had succeeded 

McCone as CIA director in April, proposed to Vance in June that no 

action be taken on the selection of a new search systeITl until the basic 

issue of NRO reorganization had been resolved. The NRO charter of 

1963 was by ITlid-1965 being honored chiefly in the breach. Extensive 

readjustITlents of responsibility and authority in prograITl ITlanageITlent, 

funding control, operation of on-orbit satellites, and the prograITl 

decision process had been proposed in the interiITl. But however 

sweeping the reorganization, it was unlikely to result in a working 

relationship that could accoITlITlodate both Wheelon and McMillan. As 

early as February 1965, a week before the Itek affair, the deputy NRO 

director had resigned in frustration; a senior CIA eITlployee assigned 

to the NRO, he found hiITlself so thoroughly distrusted by both staffs 

that he was alITlost totally ineffective. The S-2 and FulcruITl project 

groups had little direct interaction, but they were bitter cOITlpetitors 

for funds and held divergent views on how the search systeITl requireITlent 

should be satisfied. 

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Raborn's intransigence on the search system issue, the 

definition of a new NRO charter without inputs from the NRO, and 

the virtual collapse of communications between McMillan and 

Wheelon, the principal managers of the National Reconnaissance 

Program, had their inevitable effect early in July. McMillan 

privately advised the NRO staff that he planned to resign his post 

and return to private industry. His decision apparently was precipitated by the failure of a final effort to force a decision to develop the 

Eastman S-2 system, keeping either Itek or Perkin-Elmer as a 

supporting contractor. Raborn balked, and was backed by the Land 

.. , 

Panel's judgment'" that as yet insufficient data were available to 

support the selection of a single search system for intensive 

9 

development. 

The Land Panel, headed by Dr. Edwin Land, was created at the 

direction of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and 

Technology, Dr. Donald F. Hornig, early in July 1965. Its charter 

extended to !Ian overview of the NRP, II but initially it was concerned 

with the technology of, requirements for, and status of search and 

search-surveillance systems in development or proposed for development. The group first met on 21 July 1965 and continued to meet at 

irregular intervals until President Nixon abolished the office of 

science advisor in early 1973. The panel provided specialized 

technical support to Hornig and his successors, operating in some 

respects as a counterpart (or counterweight) to the NRO and CIA 

technical staffs that supported the DOD and CIA members of the 

NRP Executive Committee. Generally, however, the Land Panel 

evaluated proposals, studies, and programs rather than generating 

them, as was the case for the CIA and NRO special staff groups. 

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Although McMillan did not officially depart until 30 September, 

his chosen successor, Dr. Alexander H. Flax, Assistant Secretary 

of the Air Force (Research and Development), began to act as NRO 

director in July, formally exercising authority in McMillan's absence 

and informall y monitoring NRO affairs throughout the transition period. * 

On 11 August 1965, the NRO charter of 1963 was supplanted by a new 

document that significantly altered earlier arrangements. The chief 

innovation was the creation of a three-member Executive Committee 

for the National Reconnaissance Program, composed of the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the 

President's Science Advisor. The NRO director was to be a non-voting 

member. The committee acquired much of the executive authority 

previously assigned to (though not always exercised by) thf' Director, 

NRO, including program and ];;{;dget approval. If the NRO Director 

had until then nominally possessed the authority to select and fund a 

new search and surveillance satellite system program, that was no 

longer the case. The NRP Executive Committee would thereafter 

make such decisions; the NRO director would oversee their execution. 10 

Among other personnel changes in the satellite reconnais sance 

program in the late months of 1965 were Major General Robert E. 

Greer's retirement, in July, and Dr. Albert D. Wheelon's resignation, 

informally announced in October. 

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The program proposal that went to the Land Panel late in July 

from McMillan was paralleled by a program summary prepared by the 

Fulcrum project group. After having weighed the evidence, the Land 

Panel advised Dr. Hornig that "there is no technical basis for selecting 

for development at this time one system over the other, nor does the 

Panel see any urgency for making a selection now rather than, say, 

three months from now. II Hornig advised Vance. therefore, that work 

on all three systems (Itek and Eastman on 5-2, Perkin-Elmer on Fulcrum) 

should be continued at about the same rate for at least three additional 

months "in order to better define the advantages and disadvantages of 

each system. If Thus, Hornig hoped, it might be possible to substan11 

tiate the performance claims for the various proposals. 

Vance sub8equently ruled that in the interim all effort was to be 

concentrated on the camera systems, which meant cessation of work on 

satellite vehicles, boosters, reentry capsules, and associated subsystems. 

That was decidedly awkward for both Fulcrum and 5-2 managers, because 

in the early months of 1965 quite extensive preparations for full-scale 

development had included letting contracts of one sort or another with 

Lockheed, General Electric, and Martin. For the 5-2, a LockheedGeneral Electric competitio:.:l was pending, while for Fulcrum a GE orbital 

vehicle and an A veo reentry vehicle had tentatively been selected. l2 

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The NRO-preferred configuration of S-2 in early August provided for a four-bucket recovery system (with potential growth to a 

six-bucket design) associated with a camera capable of providing 

three-foot resolution (at nadir) from an altitude of 120 miles. The 

payload would satisfy both search and surveillance coverage requirements if launched at a ra te of six to nine systems per year. Carrying 

1000 pounds of primary film (and 63 pounds of film for a stellar-indexing 

camera), S -2 would have a length of 50 feet, a diameter of 7.5 feet, 

and an on-orbit weight of 12, 000 pounds for a 25-day mission. The 

incorporation of a supplemental crisis reconnais sance capabiltiy, as 

suggested by the Land Panel and the United States Intelligence Board, 

o permitted complete access to any area of the earth between 20 North 

and 20

0 

South latitude every five days. 

13 

Compliance with Vance's instructions meant stopping General 

Electric IS work on satellite control and reentry vehicles and confining 

Eastman's level of effort to that scheduled for August, actions that 

were taken early in September. The difficulties thus created were 

compounded by a special problem involving Eastman Kodak. That 

concern was then producing Gambit-l payloads, developing and building 

initial lots of Gambit-3 payloads, building a Lunar Survey payload for 

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NASA under N RO cognizance, and developing the S -2 payload. Added 

to that formidable set of tasks was Dorian, the high-resolution camera 

payload scheduled to be secretly incorporated in the Manned Orbiting 

Laboratory vehicles being built for the Air Force. Eastman had won 

the Dorian competition although the decision had not yet been announced 

in mid-August; there was no practical way for Eastman to proceed with 

both Gambits, the Lunar Survey payload, S-2, and Dorian. Something 

had to give. McMillan's solution was to propose transfer of the Eastman 

S-2 design to Itek, with Itek also continuing development of the secondpreference S-2 camera already in process 0 Although complex, the 

transfer was not unprecedented, Itek's original Fulcrum camera 

design having been shifted to Perkin-Elmer in the aftermath of the 

February 1965 dispute between Itek and the CIA. 

MCMillan's proposal went to Secretary of Defense Robert S. 

McNamara on 30 August; on 22 September McNamara authorized 

termination of the Eastman S-2 activity and its transfer to Itek for 

The NRO was involved in the Lunar Survey program because the 

readout camera being carried was a modest improvement of the 

Samos E-l camera of 1960. Use of the E-l camera and readout 

system was an economical means of performing the survey mission, 

the alternative being to develop a comparable camera system using 

NASA funds. In order to keep the nature and capability of earlier 

reconnaissance camera development secret, however, it was 

necessary to provide the E-l through clandestine channels--which 

meant NRO control of the production proces s. 

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design completion. Concurrently, Eastman's selection as Dorian 

developer received approval. Finally, there emerged a clear understanding that three camera des igns were to be competitively evaluated 

for selection as the new search-surveillance system: the PerkinElmer (Fulcrum) proposal, the Eastman 5-2 design (generally known 

thereafter as the Itek/EK proposal), and the backup Itek design (usually 

identified as the "pancake" proposal, a term generally descriptive of 

h . 1· 1 f 14 t e optlca Ullrror ayout pre erred by Itek). 

Between February 1965, when the Itek-CIA disagreement 

suddenly flared, and October of that year, when Flax officially succeeded 

McMillan as Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, virtually 

every aspect of the search-surveillance system program had radically 

changed. The Land Panel and the NRP Executive Committee had corne 

into being; both were to be dominant influences in the eventual selection 

of a design and a system contractor. McCone, McMillan, Wheelon, 

Greer, and several lesser figures in the 5-2 and Fulcrum programs 

had left government service or moved to assignments remote from 

satellite reconnaissance. Perkin-Elmer had become the principal 

Fulcrum system developer, replacing Itek (and working more intently 

on the inherited Itek-Fulcrum design than on the original Perkin-Elmer 

design for Fulcrum), while Itek had acquired custody of the NRO33 

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preferred S-2 systeITl originated by EastITlan (and was proceeding 

also with the Itek-pancake design that represented a backup for the 

favored EastITlan S-2 proposal). Work on satellite and recovery 

vehicles, boosters, and supporting subsysteITls had largely ceased 

in SepteITlber after having earlier advanced to the preliITlinary 

selection of design and developITlent contractors. 

On 6 October 1965, the Executive COITlITlittee for the National 

Reconnais sance PrograITl held its initial ITleeting. The first order 

of busines s was the search-surveillance systeITl. Colonel David L" 

Carter, for the NRO, and L. C" Dirks, for the CIA, briefed the 

cOITlITlittee on the three design proposals then being funded. (Until 

S epteITlber there had been four 0 Perkin-ElITler had been working 

both on the design transferred froITl Itek and an alternative PerkinE1ITler design dating froITl the tiITle when that cOITlpany was the CIA 

backup for the Itek-FulcruITl design.) Although both suggested that 

proposals would be ready for evaluation by DeceITlber 1965, there 

were indications that no cOITlpetition could begin until sOITletiITle early 

in the following year. 

Dr" Flax, charged by McNaITlara and Vance with reconciling 

the difference s aITl(mg the principals in the search-surveillance systeITl 

controversy, presented to the COITlITlittee a cOITlprehensive plan for 

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proceeding toward system selection in an orderly fashion, one that 

would overcome the earlier tendency to use Fulcrum and 3-2 as 

devices in an institutional squabble. Flax had early concluded that 

the requirement approved by the USIB the preceding year was inappropriate in that it specified technical capability rather than an intelligence 

objective. He proposed, therefore, to create a technical task group 

compos ed of repres entati ves from the CIA (Fulcrum) and Special 

Projects (S-2) elements of the NRO. The task group, he suggested, 

would "prepare a statement of system operational requirements, .. 

recommend the selection of a system configuration, ... formulate 

plans for contractor selection, and ... recommend a program plan 

including a schedule." Flax also advised the Committee that he 

intended to establish a separate task group to "define the project 

management structure "--which meant, in practical terms, to decide 

what roles the CIA and Special Projects groups would play in the 

eventual development of the chosen system. 

Flax had prepared his ground carefully. None of the Committee 

principals was surprised by the carefully constructed proposal for 

proceeding. All had seen the material beforehand. Without much 

discussion, the Executive Committee endorsed the Flax plan and for 

the first time in two years the search-surveillance program had 

15 

reasonable coherence. 

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During its second meeting, in mid-November, the Executive I 

Committee turned its chief attention to the many other problems of 

national reconnaissance. The search system requirement received 

brief but pointed attention. '-----______ ~Ithe NRO I S Comptroller, I 

reported somewhat ominousl y that the Bureau of the Budget might I 

well take "an adverse view" of the development proposal on grounds 

of cost. Cyrus Vance, the chairman, asked for a formal statement I 

of the Bureau's views--particularly relevant because, owing to the I 

various delays in the search system program, it now appeared that 

Corona operations would have to be extended for at least a year past I 

the point at which the new system had been earlier scheduled to enter I 

service. One of the interactive complications was the necessity of 

diverting to the procurement of additional Cor ona systems some of I 

16 

the funds earlier planned for allocation to search system development. I 

In the meantime, Flax had issued instructions for the deliberative evaluation of search-surveillance system proposals. He named I 

the chief of the NRO staff, Brigadier General J. T. Stewart, to chair I 

a management evaluations committee that included John McMahon of 

the CIA and Colonel Paul Heran of the NRO IS Directorate of Special I 

Projects. Carter, Dirks, and Colonel W. G. King (NRO Special Projects) I 

were appointed to a technical task definition group. With interesting 

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promptitude, Carter issued a preliminary paper describing the search 

requirement and the plan for system development. (Both had long 

been in preparation, of course.) The concept included use of a 

Titan HID buuster (including two- or three-segment strap-on solid 

rockets for augmentation) capable of placing 13, 000 pounds of payload 

in orbit; a satellite vehicle consisting of an orbital control module, 

a sensor module, and recovery vehicles (two reentry vehicles were 

suggested); and first launch 28 months "after development go-ahead. " 

A discussion of the rationale for a two-bucket system provided some 

ins ight into the problems the new s ys tern would confront un the way 

to design approval: in the judgment of Carter's group, a two-vehicle 

configuration represented the best compromise of reliability and cost, 

although four or more reentry vehicles would provide a crisis reconnais sance capability only marginally present in the two-vehicle 

configurationo In the group's opinion, development of a three- or 

four-vehicle configuration would prove troublesome; Corona had 

prOVIded experience in dual-reentry-vehicle operations, but there 

was no background for the complex cut-and-splice operations that 

would be required if more than two buckets were used. Finally, 

Carter I S group maintaine d, "the severe we ight and cost penalties 

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of three or more RVs argue against compromising the primary mission 

17 

and configurations for the cris is role. 11 

There was no question in anybody's mind that the camera system 

would be the pacing item in the development. It was with some dismay, 

therefore, that Martin and Flax learned late in October that Itek did 

not propose to complete a variety of essential tests, calibration efforts, 

and technical analyses until late July 1966. Until that work was in hand, 

there would be no fair basis for comparing the Itek- EK and the Itekpancake designs. The transfer to Itek of the Eastman drawings, tools, 

and test data appeared to be an easy task; Eastman assistance to Itek 

was scheduled to continue until at least February 1966, by which time 

(the principals fervently hoped) Itek would be capable of carrying On 

independent! y. 

Flax responded, somewhat acidly, that lithe Itek schedule for 

completion of those activities is not compatible with the anticipated 

decision milestone for the new search/ surveillance system. 11 Assuming 

that Itek would tend to favor its original design over the less familiar 

EK design, Flax instructed Martin that unless Itek agreed to push 

both designs to evaluation readiness quickly, "we must ... consider 

", 

another course of action in this regard. 11"-

~:, 

The Itek and EK approaches differed in concept as well as detail. 

In the judgment of S-2 program managers, the EK design was simpler, 

less risky (in a technical sense), more certain to appear On time, and 

potentially cheaper. 

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General Martin assigned to Colonel Heran the delicate task 

of inducing ltek to agree to complete the work neCes sary to permit 

evaluation of the three principal systems by 3 January 1966. After 

extended discussion with Itek officials, Heran obtained the necessary 

commitment, but he cautioned that owing to the short period left for 

completion of the scheduled work it was likely that evaluators would 

have less confidence in an Itek-EK design proposal than in the Itekpancake design proposal. In passing Heran's findings to Flax, Martin 

urged that an additional period be provided for equalizing the confidence in the two designs, so that both ltek bids would be honestly 

competitive with the Perkin-Elmer submission. 

Flax accepted the altered schedule, and Itek's assurances of 

conscientious effort on both the Itek-EK and ltek-pancake designs, 

but he was in nO position to extend the period of prelIminary design 

past that earlier specified. He insisted that by January 1966 the 

three designs be available for competitive evaluation, promising that 

evaluators would make the necessary allowances for status differences. 18 

Itek reI uctantl y acceded to the conditions, and on 22 November the 

formal transfer of the EK design to Itek custody received Martin's 

19 endorsement. 

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In the event, it was April 1966 rather than January before the 

several search-surveillance system proposals were eligible for the 

trans ition to a formal competition stage. The EK de sign- -paper and 

hardware--was not fully in Itek's custody until mid-January; several 

intervening reviews of camera system design status in December 1965 

and January and March 1966 indicated that Itek I s ability to cope with 

the EK design was developing slowly. 

For practical purposes, Colonel Carter1s task force spent 

most of its time working out the details of a Request for Proposal to 

be issued to Itek and Perkin-Elmer when all else was ready. The 

earlier rivalry between Fulcrum and S-2 approaches had not vanished, 

even though diminished by Flax's skillful assignment of responsibility 

to special interagency task forces. The CIA draft vers ion of the 

Request for Proposal, for instance, called for inclusion of what was, 

in Carter's opinion, lithe most optimistic [s chedule ] which could be 

envisioned" and provided for holding the formal pre-proposal briefing 

some two weeks before Itek would have completed its effort to become 

fully conversant with the transferred EK S-2 design. But by February 

Itek was capably briefing such groups as the Land Panel on the status 

and prospects of both designs, and by late March Flax had concluded 

that nothing was to be gained by further delaying the start of a formal 

.. 20 competition. 

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I The main elements of Flax's proposal were a plan for source 

I 

selection and a management plan. For the first of those, little that 

was controversial remained for decision, and in other than a casual 

I way the NRP Executive Committee did not look into its details o The 

I management plan, however, specified the organizational arrangement 

to, be honored during the development of the system and thus encomI passed all of the highly controversial aspects of CIA-NRO relationI ships that had troubled the National Reconnais sance Program for more 

than three years 0 Even in its draft form, as circulated for comment, 

I it had evoked strong reactions from both CIA and NRO spokesmen 

I The original proposal, as worked out in advance of the 15 October 1965 

establishment of the task group on management, had represented a 

I skillful compromise of organizational prerogatives. There was no 

I longer any doubt that the CIA would exercise responsibility for the 

development of whatever camera subsystem won the competition. 

I That much had been implied in the compromise arrangements of 

I August 1965. But whether the sensor project office would be located 

with the main program office on the West Coast, as Martin wanted, 

I or would continue to operate from CIA headquarters in Langley, 

I Virg inia, was argued at length, and the scope of sensor project office 

responsibility continued to be debated for months. (Would it extend to 

I 

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the surrounding spacecraft structure, to the whole of the payloadvehicle structure, or be confined merely to optic s -plus -film-transport 

and supporting components?) 

General Martin, who had been NRO staff director during much 

of the period when divided responsibilities and ill-defined command 

lines had made chaos of Corona management, argued that a combined 

program office was essential, that co-project-leader arrangements 

could never be made to work. Supported by most of the NRO staff 

and his own West Coast group, he held out for assigning system 

integrating responsibility to the principal program office and limiting 

the sensor project office to custody over the Camera subsystem alone. 

Flax eventually concluded that integration of the camera with 

the payload must be a System Program Office responsibility, the CIA 

retaining sensor subsystem design responsibility and the Program A 

group on the West Coast being totally responsible for the main 

vehicle structures. That Solomonian edict was one of the few of the 

Flax proposals that occasioned arguments during the Executive 

Committee meeting of 26 April 1966, where final decisions were 

confirmed. John J. Crowley, the CIAls principal agent for sensor 

development, urged the Committee to assign to the CIA full responsibility for the structure enclosing the senSor system as well as responsibility for the development, production, and integration of the stellar 

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index camera. Crowley contended, with Admiral Raborn's backing, 

that so extending the CIA I S responsibilities would reduce the amount 

of interagency interface required for program management "and 

thereby markedl y improve the pos sibilities of satisfactory performance 

within the time limits of the program. II 

Onl y one other difference of viewpoint surfaced during the 

Executive Committee meeting. Dr. Flax had provided that both the 

Special Projects Directorate and the CIA project office were to be 

authorized to issue program access clearances, and that each would 

honor without question the need-to-know determinations of the other. 

The CIA asked for a veto; Flax responded that his object was "to 

eliminate the use of security as a means of frustrating ..• legitimate 

access to information .•. II 

The three principals of the Executive Committee met privately 

and alone after the briefings and discussions had ended. Vance, the 

chairman, advised Flax as soon as the three-man group had completed 

its deliberations that the program proposal had been approved 

21 

precisely as submitted. 

What had been approved was a detailed plan for conducting 

competitions for sensor systems and other elements of the reconnaissance satellite and a specification of the relationships that were to 

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characterize the subsequent period of development and system 

operation. What remained for near-term decision was the choice 

of a camera design and a contractor, after which questions of 

satellite vehicle design, subsystem design, contractor selection, 

and booster design and selection might be taken up in order. The 

plan of April 1966 envisaged completion of development and first 

launch by mid-1968--roughly two years from the date of program 

approval. 

The effort to do away with the institutional rivalry that had 

marked the preceding three years of search-surveillance system 

development extended, finally. to nomenclature. In his 22 April 

memorandum proposing a structure and schedule for the program, 

Dr. Flax had noted that the system to be developed would carry the 

designator Helix. That name lasted les s than a week; it had unwittingly been assigned earlier to another activity. On 30 April, 

the CIA as signed a substitute nickname: Hexagon. Retroactively, 

it was introduced into the minutes of the Executive Committee meeting 

that signaled program approval. The names Fulcrum and 5-2 that 

had epitomized the earlier stages of the Hexagon program disappeared. 

None of the many principals ever expressed regret. 22 

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Hexagon: Program Onset to First Flight 

The situation of Hexagon and the pattern of program development 

as anticipated at the time of program go-ahead were fairly represented 

by the several papers Dr. Flax submitted on 22 April, and which the 

NRP Executive Committee approved for action during its 26 April meeting. 

The camera system, universally acknowledged to be the pacing 

element in a highly interactive program, then consisted of three 

potential proposals from two contractors, Perkin-Elmer and Itek. 

The principal Perkin-Elmer design represented that firm's elaboration 

on and improvement of a Fulcrum -based conceptual approach and 

engineering construct originated by Itek between 1964 and early 1966. 

Perkin-EImer's own favored design of the early Fulcrum era had 

always been considered less promising than the CIA-sponsored ItekFulcrum approach and was not really in competition. Itek had two 

designs in process, the earlier NRO-sponsored Eastman 8-2 design, 

transferred to Itek when EK became the prime Dorian contractor, 

and the native Itek 8-2 design (Itek-pancake), which the NRO had 

earlier considered to be a prime backup to what was by April called 

the Itek-EK design. Flax characterized the Perkin-Elmer design as 

" considerabl y changed and improved from a prior Itek effort. " 

Although Brockway McMillan, Flax's predecessor as NRO director, 

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had endorsed and attempted to secure development approval for the 

Itek-EK design while it still was an Eastman program, and the Itek-EK 

design approach was generally favored by NRO special projects people 

over the Perkin-Elrner Hexagon proposal, Flax wisely ignored all 

such considerations in his 22 April resume. The major problem of 

the rnornent, as Flax saw it, was how to conduct an equitable competition among three carnera designs at different stages of refinement, 

composed to satisfy somewhat different technical and operational 

requirernents, and representing an amalgarn of studies and 

engineering effort by seven different groups (General Electric, 

Lockheed, Itek, Perkin-Elmer, the NRO's Directorate of Special 

Projects, the NRO's staff, and the CIA's Directorate of Science and 

Technology) 0 All three surviving design approaches were nominally 

capa ble of satisfying the 1964 requirement for Corona-scope coverage 

at Gambit-level resolutions (given that the Corona and Gambit 

capabilitie s of 1964 were treated as baselines - -there being no real 

possibility that any of the optical systems proposed for Hexagon could 

perform at Gambit-3 res olutions) 0 There was general agreement among 

USIB, NRO, and CIA authorities that what was wanted was 25-30 day 

orbital life with single -mis s ion capability for stereo coverage of 

20 million square ITliles, a stellar-indexing caITlera, and either two 

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or four recovery vehicles. The probable launch vehicle was a Titan IIIDclas s rocket with two 120-inch diameter strap-on three-segment solid 

rocket accessory boosters, although an alternative five-segment strap-on 

rocket had determined advocates. Orbit weight of about 12,000 pounds 

seemed reasonable, although a slightly greater weight was not unlikely, 

given the growth tendencies of all previous reconnais sance satellite s. 

Flax had designed the management mode for Hexagon to comply 

with the provisions of the 11 August 1965 NRO charter and related agreements between the CIA and the Department of Defense. That essentially 

meant that the CIA would retain responsibility for sensor development 

and sensor-related activities, and the NRO's Special Projects directorate (in Los Angeles) for all else in the total program. The two agencies 

would, for each segment of their assigned responsibilities, provide 

system engineering, system integration, and management. 

Given those fundamentals, Flax proposed to distribute a system 

operational requirement, an RFP (request for proposal) covering the 

sensor system, a management plan, and a schedule of planned NRO 

actions. Attached to the submission that went to NRP Executive 

Committee members on 2.2 April was a set of five papers that carefully 

explained the rationale underlying the operational requirement, the 

RFP, and the management plan. 

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Although both the CIA and NRO participants in the S-2 and 

Fulc rum aspects of the pre-Hexagon program had conducted competitions for the spacecraft element of the total system, and both had 

settled on General Electric designs, Flax proposed holding a new 

competition, contending that not all eligible contractors had been 

offered an opportunity to bid to the same requirements, and noting 

also that the requirements reflected in his draft system operational 

requirement differed in some important respects from those earlier 

spec Hied. The NRO I s director urged that the recovery vehicle 

contracts should be recompeted for the same reasons. To arguments 

that recompetition was wasteful of time, Flax responded that even if 

the most optimistic schedule then suggested proved valid, recompetition would not delay the first launch for more than a few weeks. (He 

23 

also proposed a competition for the Titan IIID strap-on solid rockets. ) 

Implementing papers went to the CIA and NRO participants in 

the program on 28 April, two days after Flax received formal notification that his proposal had been approved as submitted. (Some minor 

points of disagreement on security arrangements remained for clarification, but that did not constitute a significant problem.) Apart from 

In the event, General Electric won neither the satellite vehicle nor 

the reentry body competition for Hexagon. 

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the set of papers submitted to the Executive Committee, the 28 April 

directives included directions for the assembly of a sensor source 

selection board, preliminary budget guidance, and a memorandum 

to the Air Force authorizing the start of a competition for the Titan HID 

and the preparation of system package plans for both the Titan lIIC and 

IIID. (As with the spacecraft and recovery vehicles, a final decision 

on configuration and design of the launch vehicle still had not been made.) 

Sensor source selection, the first order of business, was 

assigned to a board headed by L. C. Dirks of the CIA and composed of 

four additional members, two from the CIA and two from the Directorate 

of Special Projects. They were scheduled to receive formal inputs from 

Itek and Perkin-Elmer by 2.2 July. Booster source selection was 

entrusted to a similarly constituted board chaired by Colonel W. R. 

Taliaferro of the Titan III System Program Office. Booster proposals 

were due by 1 September; Flax expected contract negotiations to be 

24 

completed by early November 1966. 

On 30 April 1966, both the Special Projects Directorate and 

the CIA officially established Hexagon project offices in their respective organizations. Flax confirmed the nomination of Donald Patterson 

The proposals had been in preparation since February and the 

technical 'aspects of the three principal submissions were well 

known to the evaluators. 

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of the CIA to direct sensor development and named Colonel F.S. Buzard 

to head the Hexagon System Program Office on the West Coast. In 

what was assumed to be a temporary measure, Buzard arranged to have 

the Hexagon office physically collocated with the existing Corona 

program office, sharing command of the composite organization with 

the Corona chief. The purpose of the arrangement was to permit 

Buzard to draw on the experienced Corona people to supplement his 

own relatively small staff resources. With the start of Hexagon 

development, there seemed little doubt that Corona would cease 

operations in the reasonably close future. Obvious advantages resided 

in an orderly transfer of search-system responsibility from the existing 

system to its successor. In the event, Hexagon became operational 

five years after program start, rather than two, as had originally been 

proposed, and the transition was much more gradual than Buzard had 

anticipated. The cons equence was that at the end of three years the 

core of the Hexagon office was composed of people who had varied 

earlier experience with Corona out who had also accumulated considerable 

Hexagon experience. 

With the approval of a Hexagon program and assignment of 

sensor subsystem responsibility to the CIA, existing S-2 contracts with 

Itek had to be terminated. Colonel Buzard negotiated the essential 

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contract agreements with Itek between 6 May and 23 May 1966, and 

on the latter date Itek formally began work preliminary to a 

proposal for Hexagon camera system development. With issuance 

of the request for proposals on 23 May, both Itek and Perkin-Elmer 

becanle contractors to the CIA's newly created Sensor Subsystem 

. . 25 Project Office. 

Tbc~ rnatter of how many film capsules Hexagon would carry 

became the concern of a special study group on 24 May. The CIA's 

earlier Fulcrum schematic had been organized around the premise 

of one very large recovery vehicle; the S -2 proposal had never 

envisaged use of fewer than two capsules--and as many as four had 

been urged by members of both Fulcrum and S-2 study groups at one 

time or another. 

On 25 May, Flax authorized the creation of a source selection 

board for the Satellite Basic Assembly (SBA) under Buzard's direction., 

The board included four NRO and two CIA members. By 8 June the 

formal Request for Proposal had received Flax's endorsement and 

eight days later it went to Lockheed, General Electric, McDonnellDouglas, North American, and Hughes. (Hughes decided against 

participating in the competition.) Proposals were due by 22 August, 

one month after the scheduled receipt of sensor system proposals. 

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As could have been predicted, a renewed space vehicle I 

competition was nut welcomed by General Electric, which had won I 

both the Fulcrum and S-2 "competitions" of the previous year. 

H. W. Paige, general manager of GE I S space program organization, I 

protested to Flax that it was basically unfair to GE to be forced to I 

compete a third time, given that GE had originated the concept then 

being competed, had twice won competitions, had a skilled but I 

unemployed space vehicle team available (unemployed because with I 

the transition from Gambit-l to Gambit- 3 the orbital control vehicle 

around which Gambit had first been designed was no longer being I 

used), and represented the only experienced alternative to Lockheed. I 

Flax, who was a wa re of the problems created by his decision to 

recompete the space vehicle part of Hexagon, could but point out I 

that Hexagon was neither Fulcrum nor 5-2, that conditions had I 

changed, and that he would give consideration to GE's experience 

when selection board recommendations were submitted. 26 I 

Although the final report of the recovery vehicle study committee I 

had not yet been prepared, Buzard's people began writing the proposal 

guidelines for the recovery vehicle in June 1966. Because the number 

of recovery vehicles had not yet been decided, three designs were 

specified, providing for loaded film weights of 250, 525, and 1050 pounds. 

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On 21 June Buzard urged Dr 0 Flax to approve a four -bucket configuration, but Flax decided to postpone a final decision until booster 

configuration and weight budget were better defined. Nonetheless, on 

6 July, Flax agreed to the commencement of reviews of recovery 

vehicle proposals and agreed to is suance of requests for proposals 

by 19 July. The issuance of a Request for Proposal for the Stellar 

Terrain camera in late A ugust completed the formal actions needed 

to get Hexagon development underway. but hopes that the development 

itself could proceed as expeditiously were to prove unduly optimistic 0 

Almost two year s were to pas s before the recove ry vehicles were at 

last put on contract although initial estimates of first launch date for 

the new system postulated availability of all subsystems within 18 months 

27 

of program start. 

On 30 August--precisely as scheduled--the sensor source 

selection board reported its findings to Fl ax. The evaluators 

unanimously concluded that Perkin-Elmer had the better proposal and 

recommended that sensor developrllent be assigned to that contractor. 

The preferred design was an outgrowth of the much earlier Itek-Fulcrum 

approach; the loser was the Itek-EK design of S-,~ vintage. 

Proposals had been evaluated in two categories: technical 

and ope rational qualities, and management, production. and logistics 0 

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In a scoring system that permitted a maximum possible score of 100, 

Perkin-Elmer accumulated a total of 69.3 points and Itek 54.7. 

Although the differences could be accounted for by many details of 

quality and resources, the board was influenced by Itek's emphasis 

on design for maximum resolution on the film as against Perkin-EImer's 

approach of minimizing optical errors. Itek had larger and more 

complex optics; Perkin-Elmer emphasized other than optical considerations 0 The Itek design was based on use of a 48-inch Schmidt lens 

system with a maximum aperture of f/2 00; the Perkin-Elmer system 

on a 60-inch focal length lens with an aperture of f/ 3.0. In order to 

provide the desired ground resolution capability of 2.7 feet, the Itek 

system would have to be flown at an altitude of 84 miles as against 

the 92.5 nautical mile altitude required of the Perkin-Elmer optics 

for the same resolution. Optical design was also a factor in the 

weight characteristics of the two designs. For a 30-day mission, the 

on-orbit spacecraft weight of a Hexagon carrying a Perkin-Elmer 

camera system promised to be about 1000 pounds less than the 

comparable weight of a spacecraft carrying the Itek camera. Although 

there was little doubt that a booster-spacecraft combination capable of 

putting the heavier system in orbit could be obtained. it was difficult 

to ignore the obvious rtdvantages of a weight differential so greatly 

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in favor of Perkin-Ebner. (Camera weight differences totaled about 

700 pounds--which partly represented the effects of a difference in 

design approaches but was in some respects a reflectiun of earlier 

Itek difficulties in getting the weight of the Itek-EK design down to the 

level specified during the 8-2. phase of pre-Hexagon work. ) 

Other considerations of sensor system evaluation had a lesser 

influent. e on the decision than such fundamentals. but were not ignored. 

In the opinion of the evaluation group, the Itek proposals had a 

"significantly larger" development risk and the production tolerances 

required to insure proper operation of the Itek system would be much 

more difficult to meet than those of the Perkin-Elmer system. 

Further, because of optical surface quality requirements, the larger 

optical surfaces of the Itek system would create greater schedule and 

production difficulties than would the Perkin-Elmer optics. 

Neither design was fully satisfactory in a technical sense. 

"Numerous errors" in design and analysis were sufficiently serious 

to cause the source selection board to question the adequacy of the 

engineering teams that prepared the two proposals. Yet in the end 

there was no reason to believe that either contractor lacked adequate 

technical resources. Perkin-Elmer was given a better chance of 

meeting the development schedule than ltek, although both schedules 

were admittedly tighL 

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Itek had a very slight lead in the management, production, and 

logistic aspects of the two proposals, and had proposed a development 

costing some $7 million less than the $81. 85 million that Perkin-Elmer 

bid, but Itek production costs promised to be about 10 percent greater, 

and that offset the attractions of lower development costs. 

In the end, Perkin-EImer's 10 percent edge in weight and resolution, the lesser complexity of the Perkin-Elmer proposal, and the 

apparently greater maturity of the Perkin-Elmer design accounted for 

the appreciable difference in the s cores awarded the two competitors. 

Flax approved the findings of the source selection board as 

submitted. On 10 October 1966, Perkin-Elmer signed a contract 

calling for development of the Hexagon camera sUbsystem. 

Flax received notice of the findings of the source selection 

board for the satellite assembly on 26 September 1966 and during 

November reviewed the initial reports of the source selection boards 

for the recovery vehicles and the stellar-indexing camera. He accepted 

the recommendation that Lockheed develop the satellite but withheld 

approval of the start of satellite vehicle work until mid-July 1967. 

In retrospect, that appeared to be an error of judgement because sensor 

design proceeded throughout that period without needed inputs from 

satellite vehicle designer s 0 Through much of the intervening time, 

Perkin-Elmer and the Sensor Subsystem Program Office apparently 

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believed that Gener al Electric had won the cOITlpetition. CIA sensor 

prograITl ITlanagers and their principal supporting contractor. 

ThoITlpson-RaITlo- Wooldridge. encouraged a variety of Perkin-EIITler 

design approaches inconsistent with the Lockheed vehicle concept, 

but generally cOITlpatible with the General Electric approach. When 

Flax forITlally authorized funded Lockheed work on the satellite 

vehicle in July 1967, virtually the first and ITlost difficult order of 

busines s was to redesign several features of both the satellite vehicle 

and the CaITlera subsysteITl which, by that tiITle, had becoITle incoITlpatible. 

Much of the work Perkin-EIITler had cOITlpleted between October 1966 and 

July 1967 had to be redone during the last six ITlonths of 1967 and the 

vehicle=cuITl-caITlera interface definition process eventually required 

ten ITlonths of effort instead of the three ITlonths the SysteITl Progr aITl 

Office had originally allocated to that task. Still, the NRO director's 

decision to postpone starting work on the satellite vehicle seeITled 

sound at the tiITle; in his role as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 

for Research and DevelopITlent, Flax had recently seen the MOL 

prograITl suffer various ITlisfortunes because ITlajor subsysteITls had 

preITlaturely begun final design stages. He wanted no cOITlparable 

probleITls to afflict Hexagon. 

Proposals for both recovery vehicles and stellar-indexing 

caITlera were returned for further work, being technically inadequate 

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in several respects. McDonnell-Douglas eventually won the recovery 

vehicle competition because of a superior heat shield design (an ingenious honeycomb-base silicon coating), and Itek the stellar-index 

camera competition (Fairchild I s competing proposal involved a 

relatively risky electronic imaging technique as opposed to Itek's 

clever but conventional film-plus -lens design), but almost another 

year passed before contracts covering those subsystems became 

. 28 effectlve. 

The possibility that Hexagon might be partly or wholly substi .. 

tuted for Gambit had been entertained at the time of Hexagon program 

approval in 1965 but the issue did not become pressing until late 1966, 

when the United States Intelligence Board decided to give the question 

formal consideration. The immediate problem was finances; if Gambit 

purchases could be reduced, more money would become available for 

Hexagon development. But the high assurance of Gambit-3 success 

and the considerable value of l2-inch resolution photograph y thus 

generated warranted continued procurement of Gambit-3, so the USIB 

29 endorsed that course in December 1966. 

On the assumption that satellite vehicle development would 

shortly be approved, and in light of delays in the start of work On 

other major subsystems, the System Program Office late in 1966 

proposed and secured approval of a new target date for first launch 

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of Hexagon: April 1969. Contract definition for the recovery vehicles, 

stellar-indexing camera, and five-segment (rather than the originally 

proposed three-segment) solid-fuel augmentation rockets for the Titan 

booster was not scheduled until May 1967, but none was a pacing item 

in the program. Only about $1 million of the $34.6 million spent on 

Hexagon by the end of 1966 was committed to subsystems other than 

the sensor, and most of the cost increments associated with major subsystem's remained to be defined. Geodesy requirements had yet to be 

specified. 30 Preliminary mapping, charting. and geodesy sysfem 

studies were not completed until March 1967 (and remained contentious 

for another year); the number of recovery vehicles to be carried by 

Hexagon was not decided until May 1967. 

Nevertheles s, the camera subsystem continued to pace program 

schedules. On 3 April 1967, Patterson advised Colonel Buzard that 

sensor development schedule slippages made October 1969 the probable 

initial launch date (rather than April) and that if the camera were 

installed in the satellite vehicle by Lockheed instead of Perkin-Elmer 

a further delay to December 1969 was likely. (The System Program 

Office concluded that system test requirements were such as to make 

camera-vehicle mating under Perkin-Elmer auspices inevitable even 

if not wholly desirable on other grounds.) 

Colonel Buzard's organization formally recommended, on 5 May 

1967. that Hexagon carry four prime-payload recovery vehicles. Whether 

a fifth should be provided to return stellar-index camera film remained 

uncertain for the moment, so contract award was again delayed. 

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The first full year of Hexagon development cost $34.635 million. 

The fiscal 1968 budget was initially set at $85.32 million, but that sum 

increas ed by $11. 3 million early in the year to cover additional Titan HID 

costs. The approved budget included provisions for a four-recoveryvehicle configuration. an improved engine for the Titan, and the 

initial procurement of 10 Titan HID's. It did not provide for development and procurement of a stellar-indexing camera, deferred pending 

31 

further study. 

Continuing problems with the stellar-indexing camera specification were linked to the camera's ability to provide useful mapping 

data, principally to the Army. During the Spring of 1967, Perkin-Elmer 

proposed a system (dubbed SIMEC) based on the concept of printing 

calibrated reseau lines on normal Hexagon panoramic photography 

for mapping reference. Doubts about the quality of SIMEC induced 

Dr. Flax to convene a joint technical evaluation committee to examine 

the Perkin-Elmer proposaL The committee members (from Program A, 

the CIA, and such other groups as the A rmy Mapping Service and the 

National Photographic Interpretation Center) were not i rnpressed. 

They concluded that SIMEC could not meet the Army's requirement 

for 1: 50. 000 scale maps, that it promised to be excessively costly, 

and that the reseau pattern would obscure the underlying Hexagon 

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I iITlagery to an unacceptable degree. The cOITlITlittee's recoITlITlendation 

I was to abandon efforts to incorporate ITlapping capability in the 

Hexagon panoraITlic caITlera. 

I Although the SysteITl PrograITl Office had earlier concluded 

I that a 12-inch stellar indexing caITlera was needed to satisfy ArITly 

ITlapping requireITlents, action to that end was not iITlITlediately feasible 

I because of ClA objections. But in July Flax finally announced that 

I Lockheed had won the satellite vehicle cOITlpetition of the previous 

sUITlITler, and contractually covered work forITlally began. Final 

I contracts were not signed until DeceITlber 1967, however. 

I In early August 1967, following the announceITlent that Lockheed 

had won the satellite vehicle contract, the prograITl office created 

I four interface working groups for (1) structural and ITlechanical issues, 

I (2) tracking, teleITletry and comITland/electrical issues, (3) t.'st and 

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asseITlbly coordination, and (4) operations. The working groups 

subsequently induced ITlajor changes in the design of Lockheed's 

I orbital vehicle, a new cOITlITland systeITl and a single rather than a 

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dual vehicle shroud being two of the earliest. 

Late in October 1967, General Electric contracted to deliver 

I a developITlent test unit and six flight-qualified Mark IV COITlITland 

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P rograITlITler subsysteITls adapted for Hexagon at a price of $ 7.45 ITlillion. 

I 

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The Lockheed and General Electric contracts were the first to be 

signed in the Hexagon program--other than that covering PerkinElmer. The delay between program approval and contractual agreement was nearly 18 months. The basic problem was lack of agreement 

on detailed system specifications and production quantities. In 

November, for instance, the NRP Executive Committee reduced the 

initial Hexagon buy (deleting two planned reserve systems) and the 

Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering formally urged that a 

l2-inch (focal length) stellar-indexing camera be used in Hexagon 

instead of the earlier proposed 3-inch design. Dr. John Foster, 

director of the defense engineering agency, argued that no other 

expedient could satisfy Army needs. * The cost implications were 

Although the Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering 

participated in general discussions of the National Reconnaissance 

Program at the Executive Committee level, Foster had no vote in 

program decisions and little influence on mosL That constraint 

did not extend to geodesy and cartography, however. The tradition 

of tri-service participation in the reconnaissance effort generally 

gave the Navy a major role in passive electronic reconnaissance 

and assigned to the Army prime responsibility for mapping and 

chartingQ When the Argon program first was approved, in 1958, 

the Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering inherited 

from the Advanced Research Projects Agency both a sponsorship 

function and an active voice in mapping program decisions --reflected 

in the composition of the configuration control board for Argon. 

Argon had long since passed from the scene, but Army interests 

still were represented by the Directorate of Defense Research and 

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alarming, given that Hexagon was edging toward substantial price 

increases ill several areas, but the additional weight of a 12-inch 

camera was yet a larger difficulty. The fundamental objection, 

nonetheless, was the CIA argument that Hexagon should not carry 

mapping equipment at all. Again, a final decision was put off. 

Although a contract covering the initial lot of 10 Titan IUD 

boosters became effective in December 1967 (backdated to cover 

"black" work Martin had performed since July), problems created by 

the delay in starting work on the Lockheed satellite vehicle negated 

any progress thus implied. By the time Lockheed was legally 

entitled to start final design, much of the Perkin-Elmer camera system 

had been configured to conform to the losing General Electric spacecraft design. In particular, the Perkin-Elmer design had to be 

changed so that the film supply reels were oriented along the pitch 

axis of the vehicle rather than along the roll axis. Reconciling other 

aspects of the Perkin-Elmer system with the satellite vehicle forced 

redesign of both in December. However, the program office was 

finally able to let contracts for computer software, recovery 

parachute design and development. and communications equipment. 

The effect of all that was to drive budget levels from the $96.6 million 

Engineering whenever mapping programs were considered. Thus 

Foster was in one sense a spokesman for Army viewpoints. His 

access to and influence with the upper echelons of the Department 

of Defense made that an important consideration in decisions on 

new stellar-indexing and mapping systems. 

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annual rate of September to a $196.2 million rate by December 

>!< 

1967. Most of the increase reflected booster purchase costs, 

but program changes of various sorts were important contributors. 

Late in 1967, the stellar-indexing camera is sue again surfaced. 

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze. Chairman of the NRP Executive 

Committee, had become receptive to John Foster's advocacy of a 

large-camera stellar-indexing and mapping subsystem for Hexagon. 

Cost-factor objections to the proposal had been countered by an Army 

offer to contribute $1 million toward development. Even though no 

new camera could be readied in time for the first flight of Hexagon. 

and only the Army mapping agency maintained that a large camera 

was essential to the satisfaction of national requirements for maps 

and charts, the Army's arguments, and their sponsors, proved 

compelling. The Executive Committee had to accept Flax's assurances 

that no large-camera stellar-indexing and mapping system could be 

incorporated in early Hexagons, but development of that system 

continued and eventually the Committee agreed that it should be used 

in the seventh and all later launches. No formal contract was to be 

signed for another year--until November 1968--but Itek continued 

32 

preliminary development activities in the interim. 

Budget levels remained very close to $200 million a year through 

the remainder of the development phase. 

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Eighteen months after program approval. Hexagon still was 

making only slow progres s toward operational readiness. The difficulties of proceeding from conceptual design to engineering development 

had been sadly understated--as had the costs of that transition. Most 

delays had origins in delayed decisions and management disputes. but 

that did not diminish their effect. The CIA's reluctance to agree to 

software specifications and CIA efforts to acquire control of software 

programs caused delays in that area. for instance. Similar difficulties 

occurred elsewhere: a formal system ,performance requirements statement appeared in January 1968. after hav ing survived a strenuous 

informal review the previous November, but immediately became a 

matter of contention between the CIA's sensor specialists and the main 

Hexagon program office. Lockheed finally signed a definitive contract 

for space vehicle development in January but was immediately obliged 

to propose a major vehicle redesign in order to accommodate camerasystem changes made since Lockheed's design had first been submitted. 

some 14 months earlier. Whether the camera subsystem would be 

mounted by Perkin-Elmer or shipped to Lockheed for installation 

had not yet been decided. For that matter. still unresolved questions of 

camera de sign included decisions on the film path, the kinds and quantities 

of test equipment, and the scope of camera system testing to be performed 

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once the (' amera section had finally been passed on to Lockheed. That 

Hexagon would include four recovery capsules was certain, but whether 

the product of stellar-indexing camera operations should be returned 

with the last of the four or in a separate (and smaller) capsule still 

was a study question as late as April 1968. Because of design uncertainties, no recovery vehicle contractor had yet been chosen. (McDonnellDouglas had an attractive proposal in a technical sense, but the cost 

was unacceptably higher than for GEls less appealing shield concept.) 

Costs were rising, schedules were slipping, essential test articles 

remained undefined, and disagreements over management respons ibili= 

ties repeatedly disrupted routine. Nevertheless, in April 1968 program 

managers agreed that 1 October 1970 was a reasonable first launch date 

(one both could accept) and made that, rather than mid-1968, the new 

program goaL 

.,. Resolution of stellar-indexing camera uncertainties"" early in 

1968 permitted the issuance of "go-ahead" letter contracts for recovery 

The concept of a long-focal-length camera prevailed, but not until 

June was it possible to confirm the advisability of returning the film 

product of the stellar-indexing camera in its own separate recovery 

capsuleo The Corona capsule eventually was adapted to that purpose. 

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vehicle development (to McDonnell-Douglas) late in May and for 

stellar-indexing camera development a month later (to Itek). 

Formal contracts appeared on 30 September and 15 November 1968, 

respectively. In May, Dro Flax settled the who-does-what argument 

over camera-vehicle integration responsibilities by accepting the 

CIA I S contention that Perkin-Elmer could do the job of installlDg the 

camera system in the vehicle assembly more effectively than could 

Lockheed, thus permitting disposition of several lesser questions 

33 

s till hinging on that fundamental is sue 0 

Fulcrum, the 1963 proposal that eventually led to Hexagon, 

had initially been conceived as a search system to replace Corona. 

Eventual approval of Hexagon development expanded that concept to 

incl ude surveillance by incorporating the 1964 "Corona coverage at 

Gambit resolutions" statement. Between 1964 and 1968, considerable 

advances in r econnais sance technology had affected both Corona and 

Gambit; the former had become a highly cost-effective search system 

with remarkably good reliability, and the latter a surveillance system 

with a demonstrated 10 8-foot resolution capability and evident growth 

capability to about LI ____ -----"I'fbest resolution. II The clandestine aspect 

of the Air Force Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) program that 

also began in 1964 included a Dorian camera with nominal LI ____ ~ 

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capability. Several proposed umnanned camera systems with at 

least that resolution potential were beginning to demand attention 

by 1968. Further, some of the more optimistic participants in the 

satellite reconnaissance effort had by that time concluded that it was 

now feasible to undertake development of a high-resolution readout 

system with near-real-time capability. In the growing national 

uproar over the costly IndoChina War, defens e budgets were becoming 

tighter; one consequence was that the development of expensive new 

satellite reconnaissance systems was becoming increasingly dependent 

on finding the necessary money within ceiling-limited NRP budgets 0 

Hexagon was the single most expensive item of the 1968-1970 National 

Reconnaissance Program. 

Starting in mid-1968, therefore, and continuing for a full year, 

proposals for reorientation, cutback, or cancellation of Hexagon were 

frequent, serious, and loud. They began routinely enough in budget 

bureau suggestions that Hexagon program costs were excessive and 

that the mission Hexagon had been designed to perform could be as 

well performed by other, less costly systems. That entirely legitimate 

is sue tended to get submerged in the subsequent advocacy of particular 

"other" systems, partly because the McNamara tradition of proposing 

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"alternatives" had become a fixture of the system evaluation process, 

partly because various groups within the satellite reconnaissance 

community had taken to sponsoring one particular system, and partly 

because any decision to cancel or reduce expenditures on Hexagon 

could not but enhance the prospects of some other proposal for 

reconnaissance satellite development and operations. 

The opening of Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) with 

the Soviet Union further complicated orderly consideration of the 

future of Hexagon. Progress in the arts of satellite reconnaissance 

had been so rapid in the mid-1960s that it was no longer essential to 

couple arms limitations to the on-site inspection of strategic weapons 

stockpiles and installations 0 The Soviet Union had consistently 

refused that concession; pre-1968 efforts to agree on means of 

verifying compliance with arms limitations agreements had grounded 

on the inspection issue. Although neither the Soviets nor the Americans 

was fully prepared to specify that all needed verification and inspection 

could be performed by means of cameras in orbit, de facto acceptance 

of that premise was evident after 1968. 

Once the means had been agreed upon, however informally, 

the details became all important. On the American side (and conceivably 

on the Soviet side as well), the scope and detail of coverage required to 

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confinn compliance with arms agreements were contentious is sues. 

Most reconnaissance systems in service and in development by 1968 

had been designed to provide specialized coverage of various kinds. 

Systems like Corona, Gambit, Hexagon, and the several passive 

Elint and Comint sensor satellites could undoubtedly serve the needs 

of verification, but none was optimized for such an application. 

Optimization--which implied acceptable costs, frequency of coverage, 

and detail of return- -could well require the development of s orne new 

system or reliance on some combination of systems not previously 

contemplated. Crisis reconnaissance, a troublesome subordinate 

requirement for a decade, could well become a dominant requirement 

in an era of strategic arms detente. Very high resolution might be 

needed to detect subtle shifts in strategic posture. Emitting systems, 

capable of functioning in the presence of the heavy cloud cover and 

poor lighting conditions that characterized most Soviet strategic 

missile bases, could become vital. A capability for near instantaneous recurrent coverage of selected areas might be essential. All 

that seemed certain was that requirements for the 1980s were uncertain 

and that a satellite reconnaissance system (or systems) capable of 

verifying Soviet compliance with arms limitation agreements must be 

in the American inventory in the 19708 and after. The contribution 

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Hexagon could make, and Hexagon costs, thus became factors in 

deliberations on the long-term composition of the National Reconnaissance Program. 

Such issues began to concern the NRP Executive Committee 

during the summer of 1968. Late in that summer, Deputy Secretary 

of Defense Paul Nitze, alert to the increasing costs of the Hexagon 

program, the remarkable new capabilities being demonstrated by 

other reconnaissance satellites, and the potential value of Hexagon 

in a SALT-agreement verification setting, instructed Dr. John Foster, 

Director of Defense Research and Engineering, to undertake a comprehens ive evaluation of Hexagon 0 Similar studies had been completed 

and reported to the Executive Committee at intervals since 1964 

(although onl y 1atel y had SALT been of real concern), but most had 

been undertaken by one or another of the several participants in the 

satellite reconnaissance effort (the CIA, the NRO, NPIC, DIA, and 

the NSA had all participated or contributed at one time or another), 

d N " d f h d . 1 . d d . . 34 an Itze wante a re s an entire y In epen ent vIewpoInt. 

Cost was in no wise a new issue. But during the summer and 

fall of 1968 it became apparent that substantial reductions in prospective NRP budgets for fiscal years 1969 through 1973 were inevitable 

and that one way of offsetting them would be to cancel Hexagon. The 

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objection, of course, was that Hexagon returns seemed essential to 

satisfaction of approved NRP objectives for the post-1972 period. At 

that point in the discussions, the Bureau of the Budget revived an 

earlier suggestion that the combination of Gambit-3 and an improved 

Corona (presumably some variant of what was generally known as the 

Corona J -4 proposal) would satisfy the requirement at a cost perhaps 

$750 million below that anticipated for Hexagon. The CIA, DIA, 

NPIC, and NRO responded in concert that without a complete redesign 

(with costs then estimated to be equal to those of completing Hexagon 

development), Corona could never provide search resolutions much 

better than about 4.5 feet--and all those agencies were agreed that 

search resolutions better than 3.0 feet were essential to verification 

of arms limitations agreements. The Bureau of the Budget rejoinder 

that a 10 5-foot difference in resolution could not possibly be worth 

35 the $500 million it would surely cost by 1973 had no evident effect. 

In November 1968 the American electorate chose Richard M. 

Nixon to succeed Lyndon B. Johnson as President. Nixon appointees 

took office in January 1969. Foster and Richard Helms, Director of 

Central Intelligence, were among the few senior officials to carry 

over from one administration to the other. Nitze was succeeded by 

David Packard as Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Clark Clifford, 

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I P resident Johnson's last Secretary of Defense, by Mel vin Laird. 

I Clifford had delegated responsibility for virtually all matters concerned with the National Reconnaissance Program to Nitze; Laird 

I did the same for Packard, but kept closer tabs on NRP policy 

I decisions than had Clifford. Laird's instructions from President 

Nixon were to reduce defense expenditures below the levels proposed 

I by the Johnson Administration, and he did not propose to exempt the 

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NRP from funding cutbacks o The new Director of the Bureau of the 

Budget, Robert P. Mayo, had received similar instructions: he 

found a ready advocacy of NRP funding cuts embedded in the permanent 

staff of the bureau. 

Very shortly after taking over the budget bureau, Mayo proposed 

cancelling Hexagon and substituting a Corona-Gambit capability. 

Packard saw little merit in the idea (he had concluded that if any 

major reconnaissance program were to be cancelled it should be 

MOL-Dorian, a measure that would have about the same financial 

effect as a Hexagon cancellation), and for the moment Mayo received 

36 

no support from the White House. 

Late in March, Mayo again marshalled budget bureau arguments 

against Hexagon and carried them to the President. On 9 April 1969, 

President Nixon ordered Hexagon to be cancelled and approved carrying 

MOL-Dorian to completion. 

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The rationale of the decision was extreIYlely cOIYlplex, but in 

essentials it derived froIYl the evident necessity of eliIYlinating either 

MOL-Dorian or Hexagon if the fiscall970-71 budget was to reIYlain 

in balance, the apparent overlap of capability between Hexagon and 

Dorian in SALT terIYls, the iIYlpoS sibility of cancelling GaIYlbit until 

a replaceIYlent was operational, and the lack of any other obvious 

reconnaissance prograIYl candidates for cancellation. Corona was 

so inexpensive as cOIYlpared to Hexagon that its continuation into an 

indefinite future would have no appreciable effect on NRP budget 

levels, although the developIYlent of an iIYlproved Corona to serve 

in lieu of Hexagon IYlight cost froIYl $75 IYlillion to $100 IYlillion. 

Both the Pr esident and his Secretary of Defense had earlier 

gone on record in support of the MOL prograIYl, and both had been 

outspoken in their criticisIYl of the IYlajor Air Force prograIYl cancellations that IYlarked the early years of the McNaIYlara incuIYlbency. 

That too probably was a factor in the decision; a Hexagon cancellation 

would go unnoticed outside the relatively sIYlall cOIYlIYlunity of satellite 

reconnaissance specialists (and actually found favor with SOIYle in 

that group), while a MOL cancellation seeIYled certain to stir up 

protests in the Pentagon, in Congress, and throughout the aerospace 

industry. 

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Whatever the reasoning behind the 9 April decision, reconside ration was iITlITlediate. At HelITls I urging, the President delayed 

action on Hexagon cancellation for two weeks. In that interval H elITls 

and Packard ITlade their objections known to the Pre sident, and on 

21 April Mayo reversed his original stand. The three brought Laird 

to their way of thinking by late April. The fundaITlental arguITlent 

they settled on (eventuall y pres ented by Mayo) was that Hexagon would 

provide a ITluch better capability for validating any arITlS liITlitation 

agreeITlent than MOL-Dorian. John Fos ter'did not full y agree, but 

his reservations about Hexagon (derived partly froITl the inconclusive 

study he had undertaken at Nitze's urging six ITlonths earlier) and his 

reafiirITlation of MOL requireITlents were both offset and counterbalanced by growing evidence of large iITlpending cost overruns in MOL 

and by the surprisingly ITlodest support of MOL provided by influential 

ITleITlbers of the House and Senate. Given the apparent teITlper of the 

Congress, it was entirely conceivable that a cutback in MOL funding 

would follow disclosure of iITlITlinent cost overruns in that prograITl. 

Both Hexagon and MOL-Dorian ITlight thereby suffer. 

What ITlay have been a clinching arguITlent against MOL appeared 

as an independent recoITlITlendation of the Land Panel which reached the 

President on 6 May 1969. Dr. Land and his group favored cancelling 

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the manned part of the MOL program, developing an unmanned high 

resolution satellite using Dorian -derived optics, and diverting funds 

saved by the MOL cancellation to a "real-time-readout" system. 

President Nixon was sufficiently intrigued by the potential of the 

readout system Dr. Land advocated to make that capability the 

principal reconnais sance satellite objective of his administration. 

To implement that decision he reversed his earlier verdict on Hexagon 

and ordered cancellation of MOL-Dorian. Laird publicly announced 

that aspect of the decision on the morning of 10 June 1969; the endorsement of Hexagon received no public notice, of course, but it was 

37 

probably the more significant part. 

The June 1969 decision was conclusive, and before long was 

irreversible. To have cancelled Hexagon after the summer of 1969 

would have decimated the national capability for search-satellite 

oper ations. Proposals for extending Corona production and even 

for stockpiling Coronas against some future need (which presumably 

could have included the failure of the Hexagon development program) 

gained an occasional hearing thereafter. but never again did they 

have high-level supporL The National Aeronautics and Space Administration wanted Corona for possible use in Earth Resources Survey 

assignments and the Department of State urged retention of Corona 

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I capability against crisis reconnaissance needs, but NASA was unable 

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to finance continued Corona production and State could not overcome 

arguments that Hexagon would outperform Corona in rt crisis reconI naissance assignmenL Enough Corona systems had been ordered 

I 

to protect against a serious gap in coverage should Hexagun be 

delayed in development--which proved notably wise--and the developI ment of a reasonably effective and not too costly Gambit modification 

I (Higherboy) represented another hedge against delayed Hexagon 

availability. Both were stopgap measures, of course; by 1969 successI ful Hexagon operations in 1972 had become an integral of national 

I . I' 38 reconnalssance po lCyo 

During the first two years after Hexagon program approval, 

I incurred delays had largely arisen in uncertainties of program definiI tion and design. Their effect had been to cause a significant slippage 

in program schedules 0 Although their advocates had represented both 

I S-2 and Fulcrum to be fit for full system developnlent by late 1965, 

I not until the Spring of 1966 had a development start been approved, 

and not until 1968 were all of the essential elements of the Hexagor; 

I system under contracL Decisions on booster configuration, recovery 

I vehicle configuration, the selection of a stellar indexing and mapping 

camera, and accommodation of the orbital vehicle to the changing 

I design of the camera system had been delayed far longer than could 

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reasonably have been anticipated. Long after, the chief CIA ITlanager 

of reconnaissance prograITl ITlatters concluded that insufficient background research had been perforITled on Hexagon in advance of the 

~:: 

decision to proceed with full-scale systeITl developITlent. 

After systeITl definition had finally been cOITlpleted, an event 

that was difficult to date but could ITlost accurately be assigned to 

ITlid-1968, Hexagon began to encounter the sorts of engineering and 

test probleITls that had ITlarked the developITlent of all earlier photographic satellites. GaITlbit-l had COITle closer than any other photosatellite to ITleeting its schedule, and even GaITlbit had deITlonstrated 

disturbing operational shortcoITlings during its first year of operation. 

Corona had nearly been cancelled after a first year of flight experience 

dOITlinated by ITlission failures, and all other photo-satellites of the 

1960s had eventually succuITlbed to one or another of several 

Carl Duckett, the CIA's Deputy Director, Science and Technology, 

suggested in a 15 July 1971 discussion of probable cost growth in a 

proposed new systeITl that " ••• in the case of HEXAGON ••• we 

had spent little ITloney and knew very little what we were trying to do" 

at the tiITle of prograITl approval. Although only Dr. Flax and his 

iITlITlediate staff seeITl to have expressed such ITlisgivings while 

FulcruITl and S-2 were being roundly endorsed by their respective 

sponsors in 1965-1966, that retrospective judgITlent seeITlS sound. 

Only the caITlera subsysteITl design seeITlS to have been reasonably 

well defined at the tiITle of Hexagon prograITl approval in April 1966, 

and once engineering developITlent got well underway even that 

changed significantly. 39 

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I major flaws. Although the Hexagon program schedule made some 

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allowances for slippages caused by unforeseen engineering diificulties, in the end they proved to be insufficient. 

I The lack of an agreed software program delayed progress in 

I operational planning until March 1969, when Flax intervened to resolve 

disagreements between the sensor (CIA) and system (SAFSP) program 

I offices. Another delaying element arose from a difference of opinion 

I 

invol ving the System Program Office and the National Photographic 

Interpretation Center concerning the accuracy requirement for attitude 

I determination devices. Although for a time it appeared that SOme reI design of the attitude sensors might be required, in the end the problem 

was reduced to one of data requirements, NPIC relaxing its original 

I demands for extreme precision. Colonel Buzard later summed up the 

I program office viewpoint with the phrase, llii a thing is not worth 

doing at all, why do it well? il Nevertheles s, such problems hinted 

I at real slippages to corne. 

I The first unrecoverable slippage of any kind was acknowledged 

earl y in 1969 (while the scheduled first launch date still was 1 October 

I 1970); Perkin-Elmer spent an unprogrammed two and one-half months 

I of additional work in completing and testing the first qualification model 

of the camera-vehicle midsection assembly. The disclosure of that 

I misadventure had been preceded by a rather unsettling special review 

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of Hexagon engineering work undertaken to the end of 1968; the review 

report highlighted 14 major and 2.8 lesser system faults that required 

prompt attention. Camera subsystem development costs increased by 

nearly $6 million in the first quarter of calendar 1969--a foretaste of 

much larger cost growth to come--and various slippages and redesign 

requirements forced the allocation of $5 million in additional funds to 

40 

Lockheed. 

The CIA I S Sensor Subsystem Program Office initially reacted 

to word of potential slippages in camera development schedules by 

proposing to compres s and abbreviate elements of the thermal testing 

program, but that expedient became inadvisable when the camera 

section proved to be more sensitive to minor temperature variations 

than had been as sumed earlier. 

Although to that time only about two months of unrecoverable 

slippages in the total Hexagon program had been positivel y identified. 

and schedules had been designed to accommodate at least that much 

slack, in June 1969 Dr. McLucas ~< as signed to his principal deputy, 

Dr. F. Robert Naka, the task of determining the viability of the Hexagon 

launch schedule (which then called for first flight no later than December 

* Dr. J. L. McLucas succeeded Flax as Director, National Reconnaissance Office, in April 1969. 

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1970}0 Naka IS evaluation, * forwarded to members of the NRP Executive Committee on 20 June, contained carefully qualified expressions 

of caution. 

In addition to evaluating the probability that Hexagon would be 

launched as scheduled, Naka estimated the degree of confidence the 

NRO should have that the first Hexagon mission would be successful, 

and looked at various ways of optimizing search mission products at 

least possible cost. An unavoidable parallel issue was whether 

Corona vehicles additional to those then on order should be purchased 

as a safeguard against a lapse in search coverage that might occur if 

Hexagon operations began appreciably later than December 1970. 

Naka calculated a 95-percent probability for a first Hexagon 

launch no later than June 1971, rated at 75 percent the probability of 

a first launch by March 1971, and assigned a 50-percent probability 

to launch no later than January 1971. He concluded that about 75-percent 

Dr. Naka signed and reported the findings as spokesman for a 

committee that included H. Plaster of the CIA I S sensor project 

office and Colonel Lo So Norman of the NRO's Directorate of 

Special Projects. Although preliminary findings were forwarded 

to the Executive Committee in June. formal reports seem not to 

have been prepared until September 1969. 

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confidence should be assigned to the possibility of m.ission success on the 

initial flight and foresaw a 95-percent probability that at least one of 

the first three m.issions would be successful. Given those odds, he 

suggested that the 12 Coronas program.m.ed for launch at about twom.onth intervals between June 1970 and July 1971 should be rescheduled 

to allow for at least two m.issions after July 1971, thus insuring a 

m.inim.um. overlap of Corona with Hexagon and providing som.e search 

coverage in the event of either a Hexagon slippage past June 1971 or 

m.ission failure. Given the existing uncertainties of Hexagon scheduling, 

Naka also cautioned that the need for m.ore Coronas should be reassessed 

41 

m Decem.ber 1969. 

The Naka report, standing alone, was cause for m.ild uneasiness. 

Taken together with revised estim.ates of Hexagon costs in fiscal 1970, 

however, it prom.pted a serious Executive Com.m.ittee discussion of 

the future of Hexagon as a system.. Both Perkin-Elm.er and Lockheed 

had advised program. m.anagers of potentially m.assive Hexagon cost 

growth--a particularly disheartening developm.ent at a tim.e when other 

elem.ents of the National Reconnaissance Program. were also in financial 

distress. Part of the difficulty arose from. the necessity of diverting 

defense dollars to the increasingly costly IndoChina War; another part 

derived from. President Nixon's assignm.ent of a high priority to the 

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effort to develop a near-real-time readout sys tem for ree onnais sance 

satellite applications--the target date being 1976. The MOL-Dorian 

program had been cancelled only in June 1969, and there still was no 

agreement on whether ultra-high resolution or readout should receive 

funding priority. David Packard, chairman of the Executive Committee, 

asked flatl y on 8 August 1969 whether there was agreement in the 

Committee that Hexagon development should be continued. The vote 

was in favor of proe eeding; there wa::i no real alternative, although 

various substitute means for providing search coverage in the 1970s 

still were being examined. CIA's Carl Duckett assured Packard that 

costs had been brought under control and that Perkin-Elmer, the chief 

offender, had promised to be attentive to the need for careful control 

of costs. Although the system was somewhat behind schedule, the 

quality of systems then in test seemed quite good, Duckett added. 

In the end, the Executive Committee approved the Hexagon 

budget for fiscal 1970 about as submitted, merely adding a caution 

that the National Reconnaissance Office must keep a sharp eye and 

42 

a tight hand on costs. 

Costs were not unrelated to schedules, of course, and in the 

late months of 1969 schedules were becoming almost as worrisome 

as costs. To maintain the required pace of progres s, several 

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contractors had resorted to double and triple shifts and the extensive 

use of overtime. Conduct of that sort was somewhat out of fashion 

by late 1969, at least for most defense procurements, but for 

Hexagon there seemed to be no useful alternative. In the development 

and production of many weapon systems, the schedule urgency attached 

to programs was largely artificiaL Major systems had characteristically been delivered from one to three years late without significantly 

lessening total defense effectiveness. The customary response to 

development delays was to slip delivery schedules and to extend the 

in-service life of whatever was currently in the inventory rather than 

to trade money for time. Aircraft program schedules, for instance, 

could be restructured to offset cost increases in a given fiscal period 

and the worst consequence was to delay the availability of some system 

that probably need not meet whatever schedule had originally been 

established. Thus overtime generally was not encouraged for normal 

defense procurements, and multiple shifts usually were permitted only 

when some critical item like ammunition was in dangerously short supply. 

But the Hexagon case was i.n quite another category. Satellite 

reconnaissance systems did not stay quietly in the weapons inventory; 

they were expended, regularly and inevitably. If Hexagon did not 

appear as scheduled, some provision would have to be made for 

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I obtaining substitute coverage of target areas--and in late 1969 the 

I 

alternatives were alarmingly few. Hexagon overtime and multipleshift work was necessary to meet schedules that were based on the 

I planned expenditure of existing stocks of reconnaissance satellites, 

I chiefly Corona systems. Corona J -3 could not offset Hexagon 

requirements, and by 1969 there was no reasonahle possibility of 

I developing an improved Corona in time to substitute it for Hexagon. 

I Indeed, within a few months it would become impossible to order 

additional Corona J -3 systems in time to offset a major delay in 

I Hexagon availability: the lead time for Corona was 18 to 24 months, 

I which meant that systems ordered in December 1969 could not be 

delivered sooner than June 1971. The question of whether to spend 

I money for Hexagon overtime and multi-shift operations or to keep 

I Hexagon on a nornlal schedule and buy Corona vehicles {or the only 

other feasible option, Gambit systems configured for high altitude 

I flight and artificial search capability thereby}, was more academic 

I than real. The Executive Committee had little choice. 

Concern did not vanish, nor did the Committee lose sight of 

I the problem. In October 1969, Dr. Naka again reviewed Hexagon 

I status, and although an indicated additional slippage of at least one 

month had appeared since August, he recommended that the decision 

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on an additional Corona buy be postponed until January 1970. By 

January there had been no significant change, so the Committee 

somewhat reluctantly decided to forego the option of ordering more 

43 

Corona vehicles 0 

Dr. Naka's report did not stand alone and unsupported--or 

supported only by clas sical contractor and program office optimism. 

In December 1969, Brigadier General W. G. King (who in August 1969 

had succeeded Major General John L. Martin, Jr., as NRO head of 

Program A, the Directorate of Special Projects) convened a special 

meeting of Hexagon principals from the program office, the sensor 

project office, and the major contractors to reevaluate the prospect 

* of meeting the scheduled December 1970 launch date. 

All agreed that although the schedule was getting tighter with 

the gradual disappearance of slack time that had earlier been provided 

to accommodate inevitable engineering and test difficulties, the 

December 1970 deadline was reasonable-- but staying on schedule 

44 would require "vigorous action" by all concerned. 

Nearly seven years earlier, then-Colonel King had somewhat abruptly 

been named to head the Gambit program office at a time when that 

system was in a situation of technical, financial, and schedule crisis 0 

A decade still earlier, he had been called on to rescue the Snark 

mis sile system after it had experienced a 300 percent cost overrun, 

a five~year availability slippage, and a succes sion of incredible 

technical shortfalls. He had performed admirably in both as signrnents 0 

(NB: General Martin's departure was a routine reassignment after 

seven years with the NRO.) 

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I Thermal control testing had, by late 1969. disclosed that the 

I camera section was not immune to internal temperature variations 

of as much as 20 degrees (Centigrade). as had been intended. In 

I practice. a variation of from three to seven degrees was as much as 

I the camera could tolerate, and in a 60-foot vehicle exposed to variant 

sun angles the ambient internal temperature range was much larger. 

I H eat had to be provided for part of the system, a modification that 

I required adding both solar panel area and more electrical power. Recalibration and rework problems disarranged the combination cameraI midbody tests at Perkin-Elmer in February and March 1970. causing 

I Lockheed to substitute available satellite vehicle test sections for 

those originally scheduled to be so tested, but by adroit shifting 

I about of test sections both contractors managed to stay reasonably 

I close to the milestone schedule imposed by the December 1970 launch 

date. But that sort of test rescheduling caused expenditure of very 

I nearly the last remaining reserves of slack time in the pre-launch 

I test program. In early July 1970, Dr. McLucas was able to report 

to the NRP Executive Committee that notwithstanding " ••• the 

I normal difficulties one can expect with major development programs, II 

I the December launch date for Hexagon still seemed achievable. 45 

Unhappily, even while Dr. McLucas was assembling his 

I report to the Executive Committee the validity of his cautious optimism 

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was eroded by events at the Perkin-Elmer plant. On 7 July, the 

first flight-article twin camera as sembI y (P-l) suffered a catastrophic 

failure during low temperature chamber testing. It had been scheduled 

for 31 July shipment to Lockheed. The extent of damage was so great 

that no possibility of timely repair and recalibration could realistically 

be entertained. On 10 July, therefore, the sensor program office 

confirmed the contractor's judgment that the second sensor system 

(P-2), originally scheduled for 5 September shipment, had to be 

substituted in first-flight schedules. It was conceivable that P-2 

could be qualified and shipped by 26 August, but given the earlier 

disappearance of virtuall y all remaining slack time in the flight 

readiness schedule, there was slight prospect of meeting the 17 December 1970 first flight target date. Indeed, Dr. Naka reported to McLucas 

that even if the schedule were allowed to slip by three months (into 

March 1971), confidence in meeting the ~ flight schedule would 

remain low. By adopting a seven-day. three-shift operation, Lockheed 

conceivably could complete qualification and calibration of the combined 

camera-vehicle midsection assembly late in September, after which 

arrangements for a December launch still might possibly be made, 

but the effort would cost from $2 million to $3 million in additional 

funds for Lockheed and Perkin-Elmer efforts, and still the assurance 

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of launch would be tiny. 

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Although the full extent of the problem was not known at the 

time the NRP Executive Committee met on 17 July, the implications 

were plain. J. R. Schlesinger, then acting Deputy Director of the 

Office of Manpower and Budget, promptly resurrected the proposal 

to buy Corona systems to fill the search-system gap that seemed 

certain to develop if the Hexagon camera failure was symptomatic 

of a major defect. Dr. Naka, whose committee had recommended 

bypassing that option six months earlier, explained that the last 

chance to order Corona systems had lapsed the previous February. 

If Hexagon failed, and Corona launches continued at their planned 

rate, there would occur a lapse of about six months before new Corona 

systems could be delivered. At that time (July 1970), an ll-month 

overlap still existed--assuming that Hexagon could meet a June 1971 

launch date~ the worst possible contingency previously examined in 

detail, and that at least one of the first three launches was successful 

in returning search photography. The decision that had to be made, 

Naka explained, was whether to push for an early launch so as to 

learn promptly what on-orbit problems Hexagon faced, or to completE' 

a thorough sequence of tests in order to generate high confidence in 

47 

flight success and accept the resulting schedule slippage. 

Although on the surface the potential for launching In December 

1970 looked hopeless, the sensor project office held stubbornly to that 

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goal for nearly a month after the failure of P-L The chosen course 

had been to opt for an earl y launch rather than extended testing. 

Perkin-Elmer and Lockheed overtime costs were accepted as the 

price of the effort. But following arrival of the second camera 

payload (P-2) at Lockheed's Sunnyvale facility, major problems with 

the film tr ansport mechanism again stalled the test program. Faulty 

platen functioning and film supply operations were simultaneously 

delaying qualification tests at Perkin-EImer's Danbury (Connecticut) 

plante The situation having degenerated so completely, the Sensor 

project office conceded " •• 0 that they don't have a prayer of meeting 

48 

the 17 December launch date." 

Formal acknowledgement of the inevitable launch date slippage 

came from General King on 15 September: "Problems principally 

associated with acceptance testing of the sensor subsystem ••• " 

had invalidated the December 1970 launch schedule. Lockheed's 

overtime authorization had been revoked a week earlier. King 

believed that if the various camera and film tracking problems 

encountered at Sunnyvale and Danbury were promptly solved, a 

March ]971 first flight might still be possible. Not until he heard 

King's opinion did Dr. McLucas officially advise the United States 

Intelligence Board that the Hexagon schedule had come thoroughly 

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unstuck. 

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Most of the problems provl~d to be electronic rather than 

mechanical or optical, which may have made long-term prospects 

seem brighter, but that did not les sen the immediate gravity of the 

situation. Late in September, King named select teams of specialists to review the status of sensor subsystem work and Once their 

preliminary findings had been received sent off additional "tiger teams It 

to look into the state of affairs at the space vehicle and recovery 

vehicle plants. Their reports reinforced King I s preliminary judgment: 

if " ••• no additional significant problems occur. 0 • 11 the first flight 

midsection should be ready for mating by mid-October and first launch 

should follow in March. Four months had been allocated for systems 

50 

integration and checkout at Sunnyvale and Vandenberg. 

Although nothing resembling the major testing failures of 

July and August marred the Hexagon development program for the 

remainder of 1970, by January 1971 it had become apparent that "March 

1971" (which had widely been interpreted to mean "about 1 March") 

had better be restated as April, and 9 April became the new official 

target date--although in private session the Executive Committee 

received advice from Dr. Naka that "about May 10, 1971" was a better 

estimate. Somewhat les s inclined than in the past to accept schedule 

assurances at their face value, the NRP Executive Committee endorsed 

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Dr. McLucas' action in providing additional insurance against extended 

Hexagon troubles by authorizing work on a Gambit modification 

(Higherboy) that would permit Gambit to operate as a makeshift 

search system by flying at altitudes of about 525 nautical miles. At 

that distance, Gambit swath widths would approximate those of Corona, 

and res olution would be about the same. The first of three Higherboy 

kits ordered for insurance would be ready by November 1971 but would 

not be needed before April 1972, in the worst possible case. Considered 

as no more than Corona equivalents, they would add approximately six 

months to the existing overlap between Corona and Hexagon. They 

represented, at best, a means of offsetting the consequences of a 

temporary loss of search satellite capability through an extended delay 

in Hexagon availability. Higherboy was a:"1 expensive but expedient 

means for providing Corona-scope search capability, with perhaps 

somewhat better resolution than Corona (small lots of Coronas would 

cost about $20 million a system), but in no sense could Higherboy be 

51 

considered a Hexagon replacement. 

Dr. Naka I s cautious appraisal of the worth of "official" Hexagon 

laW1ch schedules proved sound almost immediately. By the end of 

March, problems encountered in acoustic and thermal tests of the 

first payload-vehicle assembly caused program managers to reschedule 

the initial launch for "not earlier than 3 May 1971, " and by April it had 

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become apparent that the four-month allowance for payload integration and checkout should have been seven months. Late in April new 

delays intervened, and 20 May became the target date. Then on 26 April 

the program office learned that extended testing of the shutter assembly 

on the second and third camera payload sections had disclosed that 

failure was liable to occur after only 28, 000 cycles of shutter operation. 

Colonel Buzard sadly advised Brigadier General Lew Allen, new 

Program A director, that because the shutters in the payload then 

being prepared for launch had experienced 20, 000 and 28, 000 cyclic 

operations respectively, there was a high probability of shutter failure 

on orbit. The design. he said flatly, was marginaL He therefore 

proposed to dpla y the first launch until at least June. 

Allen reacted immediately. Categorizing the possibility of 

on-orbit failure as "unacceptable, " he halted launch preparations. 

Perkin-Elmer estimated that three weeks would be required to modify 

and retest the shutters. 

The problem. when diagnos ed. was almost simplistic. The 

shutters were of focal-plane types. with the opening and closing blades 

operating in separate slots in a rail and overlapping at the end of their 

traveL The shutter blades were. 010 inches thick, and the slots. 015 

inches wide. Bearing surfaces on the shoes on the closing blade were 

.015 thick. There simply was insufficient room for both blades and 

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bearing shoes when the blades overlapped at the end of shutter travel. 

The correction was simplicity itself: remove the end of the blade so 

that it no longer rubbed on the rail; blade failure (from that cause) thus 

became impos sible. Accelerated tests of the modified blade as sembl y 

proved it capable of surviving 110, 000 cycles of operations. But 

diagnosis and shutter modification (and retesting) had chewed up so 

Hluch time that "about 14 June It had to become the new launch target 

date. (Because Hexagon payload vehicles could not be trucked over 

California highways on weekends, when traffic was heaviest, and 

because the payload would not be ready for trucking before 28 May, 

four additional days delay were imposed by the unfortunate coincidence 

of the Memorial Day weekend and the completion of payload testing 

52 

at Sunnyvale. ) 

But that was the last, Payload deliver y was on schedule. 

pre-launch checkout was almost uneventful. and on 15 June 1971 the 

first Hexagon satellite went into orbit. Carrying Hexagon from 

program approval to first launch had taken five years rather than 

two and had cost rather more than twice as much as initially estimated, 

mostly for camera development. which cost three times as much as 

53 

the CIA had anticipated, but a launch had been brought off. And in 

the end the critical scheduling estimates provided by Dr. Robert Naka 

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I and his as sociates in 1969 had proved rexnarkab1 y accurate: Hexagon 

I did indeed fly in June 1971 (the "95-percent probability'! date). and it 

did indeed function successfully (the "75-percent confidence" evaluation). 

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Hexagon: Initial Oper ations 

Although first flight did not occur in October 1970, as anticipated. 

Hexagon operations, when they began, conformed in other respects to 

careful plans designed to me et that deadline. Operation of Hexagon 

would be as complex as the management and hardware and software 

problems that had proved so troublesome in the months between April 

1966 program approval and June 1971 first flight. The functional and 

organizational interrelationships of Hexagon operations would have 

astonished reconnaissance program managers of the early 1960s, 

when verbal agreements and informal memoranda constituted the bulk 

of operational program documentation. 

The list of organizations participating in Hexagon operations 

was awesome--even if only principals were counted. It included 

COMIREX (the United States Intelligence Board--USIB--Cornrnittee 

on Imagery Requirements and Exploitations); Eastman Kodak; the 

(Acronyms and organizational abbreviations generally have not been 

used on these pages, except for such often-used sets of initials as 

NRO, NRP. USAF, and CIA. The following brief summary of operational program participants and their responsibilities is so dominated 

by organizations known ahnost exclusively by their abbreviations that 

it is not feasible to continue that felicitous practice, however desirable. 

Some acronyms are so well entrenched in conversational usage in the 

intelligence community that even constant users have to stop and 

rummage through their memories when asked to provide the full 

titles of such as COMIREX, SPPF, and ICRS. The reader baffled 

or infuriated by bureaucratic fondnes s for acronyms and their 

verbalization rna y pas s by this section without appreciably weakening 

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Global Weather Center (G WC) of the Air Force Air Weather Serv:i:ce; 

the Imagery Collection Requirements Subcommittee (ICRS) of COMIREX; 

the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC); the Office of 

Special Projects (OSP), CIA, the Satellite Operations Center (SOC) of the 

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); the Satellite Test Center (STC) 

of the Air Force Satellite Control Facility (SCF); the Sensor Subsystem 

Project Office (SSPO) of CIA's OSP; the System Program Office (SPO) 

at the NRO's Directorate of Special Projects (SAFSP); the Air Force 

Special Projects Production Facility (SPPF); and the U.S. Army 

Topographic Command (TOPOCOM). The acronyms alone were enough 

to engage the attention of a trained philologisto 

Both the System Program Director (General Allen at the time 

of first launch--Colonel Buzard was Program Manager) and the CIA's 

Director of Reconnaissance (John Crowley) reported to Dr. Flax for 

purposes of managing the operational aspects of Hexagon. The System 

Program Office (Los Angeles) and the Sensor Subsystem Project 

Office (Langley, Virginia) were respectively responsible for mission 

operational software (computer programs) and participation in the 

development and analysis of the software. CIA's OSP developed 

his understanding of the Hexagon program. The section has been 

included in deference to the canons of historiography: some 

muddled scholar may some day need to know what element of 

jargonese referred to what organization. R. P.) 

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simulation and special study software, and the Satellite Operations 

Center participated in various aspects of software development as 

required. 

Mis sion guidance for operational activities came from ICRS I 

COMIREX, which also provided any details of intelligence requirements 

not defined previously by USIB standing requirements. The Satellite 

Operations Center selected launch dates, orbits, and mission objectives 

to satisfy general intelligence requirements or such special mis sion 

requirements as might from time to time be levied. The Office of 

Special Projects (CIA) provided pre-mission software, and the System 

Program Office determined vehicle performance characteristics, 

established flight objectives, defined operational constraints, and 

provided for vehicle launch preparation and mission operations 

preparations. 

The Satellite Test Center, in support of the System Program 

Office. constructed mission profiles and a software data base and 

performed mission software rehearsals. NPIC furnished target lists. 

The System Program Director exercised complete responsibility for 

Hexagon operations from launch through recovery. Assisted by the 

Sensor Subsystem Project Office, the Hexagon Operations Command 

Post (part of the Satellite Test Center) conducted on-orbit operations 0 

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Global Weather Center was responsible for providing weather 

forecasts for each one-eighth of the full Hexagon swath width of 

photography for each orbital revolution, expressing the forecasts 

in terms of percentage probabilities that any area would be more or 

less than 90-percent cloud-free. 

Eastman Kodak and the Special Projects Production Facility 

(a superbly equipped photographic processing laboratory at Westover, 

Massachusetts) each processed two working prints of each set of 

negatives. The National Photographic Interpretation Center provided 

preliminary readouts of the film returned by the first and third operational reentry vehicles; Eastman Kodak and the Special Projects 

Production Facility (with NPIC participating) did the actual film 

processing and distribution. TOPOCOM provided the final operational 

report on cloud cover during flight, the Satellite Operations Center 

evaluated mission accomplishments, and the System Program 

Director furnished a post-flight analysis of operations for all but 

the camera system, which was the analytical responsibility of the 

Sens or Subsystem Project Office. 

Software capabilities resident in Hexagon included three 

simulation programs called CR YSPER, HAMPER and HSIM, relating 

respectively to sensor subsystem performance, mission performance, 

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and camera operations. TUNITY was the name assigned to the mission 

targeting, command and control, and reporting program; trans -operational mis sion reports were mostly based on TUNIT Y prod'Jcts 0 The 

probability that mis sion objectives were being satisfied was calculated 

54 

through use of a program called ACCOMP. 

Preparations for the first Hexagon launch had not gone unremarked 

by the press, which was scarcely surprising if only because the Titan HID 

launch vehicle was so enormous (although it used the same booster core 

that put Gambit-3 in orbit). Oddly enough. none of the major newspaper s 

of the country noticed the operation. Aviation Week printed a small 

post-launch notice that singled out Hexagon as a previously untried 

system but completely mis stated mis sion and function. A feature writer 

for the San Jose News represented Hexagon to be "a giant super spy 

satellite known as 'orbiting Pueblo' ••• " and alerted local residents 

to watch for lithe most volcanic blastoff ever witnessed on the West Coast. II 

The imaginative writer attributed to the satellite the combined capability 

of being able to "photograph the whisker s on the chin of a Soviet 

general. •• II and "monitor whispered conversation from 115 miles ln 

the sky"--which might have been true for some Soviet general with 

a waist-length beard who was sunning himself on a well-lighted blacksand beach just as Hexagon passed directly overhead, cameras operating, 

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but was in other respects somewhat exaggerated. The Air Force 

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routinel y announced the succes sful launch of a "Department of Defense 

satellite" after Hexagon went into orbit and a few newspapers printed 

the now-customary paragraph reporting that event, but nothing in the 

56 

way of real publicity disturbed the launch. 

Perhaps all of the trauma and disorder fated for Hexagon had 

been used up in the exhausting gestation and development phases; 

perhaps by 1971 reconnaissance satellite development had become more 

a science than an arL But in any case, the launch and orbital operations 

of Hexagon 1201 were as nearly flawless as any first launch of the 

decade. Camera operations presented "only minor problems, If and 

until the final minutes of film capsule recovery there was nothing in 

the mission approaching drama. The C-130 retrieving aircraft nearest 

the first descending capsule easily spotted the target but the pilot 

elected to let it fall into the ocean after observing that the parachute 

was badly torn and descent rate was very rapid. A helicopter crew 

~:::: 

retrieved 1201-1 from the sea less than 30 minutes later, intact 

and undamaged. 

In order to limit confusion in discussions of the four-capsule 

Hexagon system, it seems advisable to adopt here the convention 

used in Hexagon mission reporting, identifying the mission by 

number (in the 1200 series, starting with 1201) and the mission 

phase and reentry vehicle by sequence of capsule use. Thus 

"1201-1" identifies both photography returned by the first of the 

four capsules to be retrieved in the first Hexagon operation and 

the capsule itselL 

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As with other untried systems, the first few Hexagon flights 

were primarily intended to provide data on capabilities and operational 

problems. In that sense, useful photography was a bonus. But unlike 

Gambit, the last preceding major photographic satellite system to 

enter the service of the National Reconnais sance Program, initial 

Hexagon operations were also planned to return as much overflight 

phot"grdphy as possible. Much of the film captured images of ground 

targets distributed over parts of the western United States. But 

Hexagon carried more than 200, 000 feet of 6. 6-inch film, and even 

if the cameras had operated randomly it would have been difficult to 

expend 50, 000 feet of film (the quantity contained in each recovery 

capsule) without managing to photograph some targets of interest to 

the intelligence community. In the case of Hexagon, of course, 

exposure was never random in character; camera operations were 

precisely calculated to provide photographs of denied areas. Dr. 

McLucas had his first look at the product on 22 June. He immediately 

advis ed all Hexagon program participants that it was outstanding, 

representative of a great technical achievement, and of remarkable 

value. 57 

As cOITlpared to other reconnaissance satellite first flights, 

Hexagon 1201 may have been relatively trouble-free, but there were 

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operational difficulties nonetheles s. Battery overheating, apparently 

the product of solid-rocket exhaust contamination of reflective 

surfaces, perturbed on-orbit control to some extent, and the parachute 

malfunction on 1201-1 was symptomatic of a potentially serious problem. 

Capsule 1201-2 also developed parachute problems, although in that 

instance an air catch (26 June) proved feasible nonetheless. But 

12.01-3, which reentered on 10 July, was another matter. All went well 

to the instant of main parachute deployment, but at that point a catastrophic overload developed, the parachute lines failed, and the capsule 

hit the ocean with such great force that the impact ruptured flotation 

devices. Before nearby helicopters could arrive, the capsule sank to 

the ocean floor some three miles below. 

The battery overheating problem foiled plans to extend the 

first Hexagon mission to 45 days. By early July. degradation of the 

primary batteries threatened a shift to reserve batteries (carried on 

the first mission only) and there were indications that the batteries 

used to ignite reentry pyrotechnics were failing. When one set of 

pyro batteries did fail, on 14 July, Buzard had the cameras operated 

at every possible opportunity for the next eight hours and then recovered 

1201-4 on Friday, 15 July, after Hexagon had been 31 days on orbit. 

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The battery problem had constrained camera operations 

earlier in the mission, indications of overheating being responsible 

for a decision to limit photography to about 15 minutes for each four 

orbits, a provision that was subsequently relaxed and eventually 

cancelled. Nevertheless, the availability of reserve batteries 

protected against a total failure of Hexagon 1201 if the main batteries 

and solar panels were to prove defective. Hexagon 1201 had been 

programmed for only 30 days of orbital operations, and realization 

of a 3l-day mission represented performance marginally better than 

planned. 

During the transfer of film take-up operations from 1201-3 to 

1201-4, some undiagnosed disorder in the film transport mechanism 

caused two brief automatic shutdown operations, but resort to ordinary 

recovery measures restored the cameras to full function shortly after 

each incident. 

On balance, Hexagon mis sion 1201 had to be adjudged an outstanding succes s. Returned photograph y from 1201-1 alone contained 

coverage of more than two-thirds of all known Soviet missile sites and 

one set of photography taken in one pass over Albania was sufficient 

to permit identification, by clas s and type of weaponry, of that 

country's entire inventory of aircraft and ships. The battery overheating 

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defect seemed likely to be cured by battery repositioning. Film 

transport difficulties appeared to be of no great consequence. 

although when the recovered capsules were unloaded it began to 

appear that less film had been exposed than planned. the outcome 

of faulty transport mechanism operations that caused film to twist 

and double over itself from time to time on both sides of the platen. * 

But with 50, 000 feet of film available for each of the four mis sion 

phases. the occasional loss of a hundred feet here and there did not 

seem important for a first mission. 

Parachute problems were quite another matter; only one of 

the four recoveries (1201-4) had been free of parachute malfunctions, 

two of the capsules had gone into the ocean (1201-1 and 1201-3), and 

one had been lost altogether (1201-3). Happily, the damaged para~ 

chutes of 1201-1 and 1201-2 had both been retrieved, as had the 

ablative cone of 1201-2, so analysis of the problem did not have to be 

conducted on the strength of telemetry and photography alone. 58 

Some unexposed fHrn was programmed: film rewind between camera 

operating phases was not scheduled for Hexagon 1201 in the interests 

of simplifying first-flight operating modes. Film twisting and overlapping caused the metering instruments to register more film on 

the take-up spools than actually reached them. 

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Analysis of parachute defects, and later redesign and test 

activities, continued for several :months after 1201-4 had been retrieved. 

Modified parachutes were eventually provided for 1202, and a new 

::{:: 

canopy and rigging design was adopted for 1203 and later Hexagons. 

The failures, it appeared, had been the products of design and testing 

oversighL Because tests of the parachute asse:mbly used for 1201 had 

not fully explored the high-shock region of initial parachute deploy:ment, 

the parachutes used for 1201 were at best :marginal. That three of the 

four capsules had been retrieved later began to see:m al:most :miraculous; 

by all odds, the ratio should have been reversed. The :main parachute 

lines had been over stres sed by a factor of about two. Dis covery of 

that situation, and the provision of adequate parachutes, eventually 

contributed to a decision to delay launch of Hexagon 1202, although 

in fact 1201 had returned so :much still undigested infor:mation that in 

July the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency suggested to Dr. McLucas 

that Corona and Ga:mbit operations would :more than satisfy intelligence 

needs for the :mo:ment. 59 

And Hexagon 1201 provided an opportunity no earlier reconnaissance satellite could have :matched: for the first ti:me the United States 

seriously atte:mpted to retrieve a space capsule fro:m the botto:m of 

the Pacific Ocean. 

>:<The redesigned parachutes were originally planned for incorporation 

in 1205, but schedule slippages caused by other factors eventually 

allowed their addition to 1203 0 

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The capsule at issue was 1201-3, which lay at a depth of about 

16, 000 feet on the floor of the Pacific Ocean off the Hawaiian Islands. 

Capsule designers were confident that the water impact had not 

shattered the capsule, although it was quite likely to have been 

damaged and would not be water-tight. 

The feasibility of recovering 1201-3 was first considered almost 

casually in a 27 July conversation between Dr. Naka and Carl Duckett 

of the CIA. Intrigued, Duckett discretely asked the Navy if the deepsubmersible Trieste II, an experimental submarine of considerable 

versatility, could do the retrieval task. The Navy assured Duckett 

that the Trieste II could operate safely to depths of 20, 000 feet, could 

quite probably manage a "hook and cable" retrieval operation, and 

that the precise location of the capsule could probably be established 

by Scripps Institute undersea survey ships then under charter to the 

Navy--at a cost of only $100. 000. The Trieste II would be provided 

cost-free, if wanted. 

Upon hearing the first informal suggestion that the capsule 

might be recovered. an NRO staff officer, Major R. A. Schow, Jr 0 ,* 

asked Eastman Kodak if the film conceivably could be exploited after 

retrievaL The answer, surprisingly, was "yes"; the edges of the 

* U.S. Army, assigned to the NRO. 

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tightly rolled film would swell upon exposure to sea water, thus 

sealing off the center of the roll. In Eastman's judgment, a 

"considerable portion" of the film might survive. Because the 

weather over the Soviet Union had been good while the film returned 

by 1201-3 was being exposed, and because the film included coverage 

of some regions of particular interest to the intelligence community, 

its recovery might be highly worthwhile. D. Wo Patterson, the CIA's 

program director for Hexagon sensor subs ystems, had earlier 

obtained EKrs assurance that the film could be safely despooled by 

hand. He concluded that if a search could be started by late August 

there would be a "good chancef! of recovering useful film from 1201- 3 

60 

during September. 

Once the inforInalities had been disposed of, Dr. McLucas 

formally asked Ro A. Frosch, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (R&D), 

to authorize use of the Trieste II and Scripps Institute survey ships 

in the recovery effort. Frosch assured McLucas that the Navy would 

be "pleased to assist" and that the exercise would cost the NRO very 

little 0 

The effort, once begun, proved to be somewhat more troublesome than first assumed. An initial afterthought prompted a decision 

to design and fabricate a special basket container with claw-like clamps 

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rather than to make retrieval dependent on hooks, cables, and the 

eyebolts of the capsule. Because weakening or disintegration of 

the magnesium parts of the capsule would occur during exposure to 

seawater, an enclosing "basket" would provide greater assurance 

that the capsule could be brought to the surface more or less intact. 

Delays imposed by "basket" procurement, bringing the Trieste II 

to the scene, and precisely locating the capsule, delayed the start 

of recovery operations until winter weather arrived, in December 19710 

(A start had been scheduled for late October.) But thoughts of abandoning the attempt could not realistically be entertained once it had begun. 

As Colonel Buzard pointed out, Soviet interest had almost surely been 

piqued by the unconcealable activities of such sea-bottom survey ships 

as the White Sands, Apache, and De Steiger, and given that the Soviets 

had precisely the same rights in the open Pacific as the United States, 

a Soviet effort to recover whatever the U. S. had been seeking was not 

at all inconceivable. The Soviets were known to be able to operate 

deep-submergence vessels at depths as great as 33,000 feet and were 

notoriously persistent. (A Soviet ship had then been keeping station 

over a sunken November-class submarine in the North Atlantic for 

more than 18 months, presumably to preclude any U. S. effort to 

recover hardware.) In such circumstances, Buzard argued, it would 

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be foolhardy to abandon the effort to retrieve 1201-3. Should that I 

be unavoidable, however, he suggested that the on-station ships 

should pretend that the recovery operation had been successful-- I 

sending congratulatory messages, tying off logistics arrangements, I 

and otherwise presenting a bold front. 

Dr. McLucas decided to persist. With the pas sing of bad I 

weather in the Central Pacific in the Spring of 1972, the Trieste II I 

returned to the scene and recommenced its deep-sea search. The 

survey ships reported succes s in locating what appeared to be I 

capsule 1201-3 in mid-April. During the afternoon of 26 April, the I 

Trieste II completed a two-hour submersion operation and after a I search of three and one-half hours sighted first debris and then the 

actual capsule at a depth of 16,400 feet. Three and one-half hours of I 

careful maneuvering preceded basket closure and the start of a I 

cautious ascent. More than nine hours after starting its dive, the 

Trieste II surfaced. Unhappily the action of surface waves proved I 

too much for the now-fragile capsule structure. which broke into I 

pieces so small that most fell through the tines of the recovery device. 

Only some inconsequential bits and pieces remcdned. I 

Disappointing as the outcome may have been, it was one I 

instance in which the death of the subject following a successful 

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operation proved a thoroughly acceptable alternative to recovery. 

Nothing suggestive of U. S. reconnais sance capability relllained 

for others to find. The eight-lllonth effort had to be considered at 

least a partial success even if deterioration of the capsule had 

prevented full recovery: as McLucas told Frosch, the Navy had 

established and delllonstrated "a unique capability vital to the security 

of the United States II that lllight conceivably be called into use again 

61 

if the circulllstances so warranted. 

Hexagon 1202 had initially been scheduled for launch about 

three lllonths following reentry of the final capsulE:' frolll 1201, but 

engineering lllodifications dictated by the perforlllance of the first 

Hexagon payload were expensive of tillle, and the alternative of 

launching one of the few relllaining Corona vehicles seellled preferable to a hasty patch job. In the event. assurance of a successful 

lllis sion would have been les sened if battery overheating problellls 

and the parachute lllalfunctions encountered during operation of 

Hexagon 1201 went uncorrected, and both required lllore effort and 

took longer than had initially been planned. Nor was the urgency of 

Hexagon coverage as pressing as had been anticipated; even though 

one capsule of fillll had been lost, the alllount of fillll recovered 

frolll the first operation inundated photo interpreters. The notion 

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of providing continuous coverage of the Soviet Union and Mainland I 

China by keeping either a Gambit or a Hexagon in orbit at all times 

had to defer to the realities of staff and dollar resources; processing I 

and evaluating Hexagon and Gambit film in the quantities that the two I 

systems were capable of returning would force enlargement of the 

cadre of photo interpreters, a course neither the NRO budget nor I 

NPIC training facilities could accommodate. Moreover, the concept I 

of continuous coverage implied a capability for crisis reconnaissance 

rather than constant operation of orbiting reconnaissance vehicles, I 

and systems other than Hexagon appeared to be better prospects I 

for that as signment. (By 1971 the premise of near-real-time readout 

I by means of an electro-optical imaging system had proceeded to a 

system development phase, 1976 operational availability having I 

been approved as a schedule goal.) 

What with lessened pressure for early launch of Hexagon 1202, I 

s orne difficulties of system modification, and the availability of one I 

additional Corona system for use in an emergency, it was December I 1971 before Hexagon 1202 reached the launch stand. Preparations 

for a 21 December launch were aborted by elusive booster-system I 

electrical problems, and correction was so lengthy that a complete I revalidation of the spacecraft eventually had to be undertaken. The 

resulting delays caused program managers to reschedule Hexagon 1202 I 

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for a 19 January launch, a date that had to be slipped by one further 

day when last-minute checkout operations uncovered a minor system 

faulto 

Hexagon 1202 went into orbit on 20 January 1972 without 

encountering any major problems. There proved to be no warrant 

for qualms abo1lt the complete reliability of the modified parachute 

recovery system; 1202-1 and 1202-2 reentered and were uneventfully 

retrieved on 26 January and 8 February respectively, just as planned. 

But attitude control subsystem effectivenes s had begun to degenerate 

by early February, so flight managers reluctantly reprogrammed 

Hexagon 1202 for 39 rather than 45 days of operation. (Premature 

control gas exhaustion owing to frequent vehicle repositioning 

maneuvers was assumed to be the source of the difficulty.) 

A much more serious problem occurred immediately following 

the start of camera operations for 1202-3;the film being fed through 

the aft camera developed a ragged tear that quickl y became a film 

break, and for the remainder of the mis sion only the forward camera 

was operable. Capsules 1202-3 and 1202-4 reentered routinely and 

were recovered without further incident on 17 and 28 February res pectively, but imagery was entirely monoscopic. (Worry that the 

reentry vehicles might be unstable because one of the two take-up 

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spools of each was empty proved unfounded.} De-orbiting of 1202-4 I 

eventually became dependent On the back-up recovery system 

("Lifeboat") with the final exhaustion of attitude control gas on the I 

last day of the operation, but the reserve system functioned with I 

commendable effectiveness and no unexpected problems developed. 

On the whole, the film imagery returned by Hexagon 1202 was I 

somewhat better in technical quality than that of 1201. displaying a I 

best resolution of about 21 inches and a "normal" resolution ranging 

I between 30 and 33 inches, Because of poorer weather and sun angle, 

it contained no better detail in ground coverage, however. A variety I 

of minor defects marred the operation, some of them the apparent I 

consequence of having camera subsystem remain inactive on the 

launch stand SOITle four weeks longer than planned, but on balance I 

1202 had to be counted a successful operation. The principal qualifier I in that judgment was the major camera systeITl malfunction midway 

through the mission, the product of film breakage. In terms of film I 

lost or unused, 1202 and 1201 were about equal. 

Diagnosis of the cause of the film failure was difficult. There 

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appeared to be no reaSOn to conclude that it was related to rewind I 

operations first attempted during mission 1202. (In the interests of I 

mission success On 1201, film had been fed through to the take-up 

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I cassettes continuously, rewind operation being bypassed. Although 

I that operation had caused wastage, film being passed through the 

system while the camera was inoperative, it obviated concern for 

I the proper functioning of the rewind mechanisms at a rate of 55 inches 

I per second, probably the most complex elements of the Hexagon's 

camera system.) Inspection of recovered film suggested that some 

I large particle of foreign matter had become enmeshed in the film 

I transport mechanism of the aft camera, causing a puncture that 

quickly became a tear when tension increased during rewind and 

I forward transport of unexposed film immediately following the start 

I of 1202-3 events. But the diagnosis had to be tentative because there 

was evidence of several malfunctions in film transport. Relatively 

I large quantities of film were twisted, overlapped, and tangled on 

I the take-up spools. (Some sections of recovered film had to be 

torn loose from the spindles during despooling, being so tightly 

I jammed between the spool hub and the spool framework that they 

I defied ordinary removal efforts.) Part of the film damage apparently 

resulted from an unprogrammed spool rotation after film take-up had 

I been transferred from one recovery capsule to the next in line. 

I In addition to the film break that had to be counted as the 

principal defect of Hexagon mission 1202, analysts cited two other 

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major problems. One was a repetition of the thermal heating anomaly 

that had affected the batteries during mission 1201. Although the 

batteries of 1202 had been relocated to avoid heat imbalance caused 

by launch debris that contaminated the reflectant paint, they proved 

to be almost as susceptible to overheating as those of 1201. Careful 

control of the angle of exposure (beta angle) of the battery section to 

solar radiation kept any major difficulty from developing in 1202, but 

that requirement imposed unwanted constraints on the launch window 

for the Hexagon vehicle and contributed to the premature exhaustion 

of attitude-control gas. 

The second problem was attitude control. Post-mission analysis 

suggested that the failure of the reaction control system late in the 

mission, forcing early recovery of 1202-4, had probably been caused 

by contaminated hydrazene. The hydrazene at Vandenberg proved, 

upon inspection. to be "less pure than expected. II The most immediate 

way of correcting for the problem would be to lessen demands on the 

reaction control system during mission 1203 by flying at the 100-mile 

altitude of 1201 rather than the 82- to 8S-mile altitude of mission 1202. 

That would somewhat adversely affect resolution potential, but it 

would reduce the requirements for vehicle maneuvering and improve 

the potential of flying a full 45-day mission. 

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I The post-mis sion critique on Hexagon 1202 highlighted 

I another problem, but one unrelated to system functioning. Midway 

through the operation, intelli.eence officials in Washington had canI celled pre-mission requirements for operations that would have 

I completed the required annual survey of selected Soviet land areas. 

The change had been justified in terms of potential savings in film. 

I given the availability of generally adequate earlier coverage of 

I several sensitive areas, but in fact Hexagon operations were in no 

way constrained by film supply during 30- to 45-day missions. 

I Program ufficials suggested, rather bluntly, that it was not the function 

I of the intelligence requirements community to manage mission operations, and that it was particularly inappropriate for the Committee on 

I Imagery Requiren1ents and Exploitation to intervene in ongoing 

62 

I operations that were so heavily dependent on pre-programming. 

Hexagon 1203 did not go into orbit until July 1972, more than 

I four months afte r the final bucket from 1202 was retrieved. The 

I search-mission gap created by the delay was partly filled by launch 

of the last Corona in May and Hexagon program managers took 

I advantage of the respite to incorporate in 1203 several system modiI fications that had originally been planned for later vehicles. The 

spacecraft and sensor system of 1203 had encountered more than the 

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ordinary run of qualification difficulty during final tests late in 1971, 

but those problems were not direct contributors to the launch delay. 

Test indications of faulty operation in various aspects of film transport did portend similar problems on orbit, but the problems seemed 

to be almost basic to the complex film transport mode adopted for 

Hexagon. System validation tests applied to 1203 were somewhat more 

carefully attuned to film transport and attitude control functions than 

had been the case for earlier Hexagon systems, but that was no more 

than ordinary prudence given the difficulties actuall y experienced in 

those earlier launches. 

The parachute redesign undertaken following the unhappy outcorne of Hexagon 1201 capsule reentry operations reached fruition in 

time to permit 1203 to take advantage of it. Delays in the readines s 

of 1202 and 1203 permitted the incorporation of redesigned parachute 

systems in the recovery capsules of 1203 rather than 1205, as had 

been initially planned. The third Hexagon was also the first of its 

kind to carry P-ll signal-intelligence "piggyback" subsatellites into 

orbit. Problems with platen positioning and film tracking slowed 

final checkout of 1203, causing the launch to be put off from June to 

July. The space vehicle finally qualified for launch and left the 

factory for Vandenberg on 21 June. No serious checkout difficulties 

occurred thereafter, and 1203 went routinely into orbit on 7 July 1972. 

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Reentry vehicle 1203-1 deboosted and was recovered by air 

catch on 15 July after storing film from the first eight days of 

operation. During thE: next 14 days, until 1203-2 was recovered, 

the reaction control system experienced excessive attitude-control 

gas consumption. The problem became acute while film was being 

exposed for return in 1203-3; flight controllers eventually had to 

sWltch to the backup attitude control system. Concurrently an 

emergency shutdown occurred in the aft camera system, causing 

curtailment of stereo photography. Recalling the catastrophic failure 

that had marred Hexagon 1202, the program office decided to satisfy 

as much of the coverage requirement as possibly by using monoscopic 

photography. 

The wisdom of that decision became 0 bvious upon inspection 

of capsule 1203-3 following its 12 August retrieval. Severe film 

folding was the determinate cause of the stoppage in aft camera 

operations. The source of the problem appeared to be misalignment 

of film on the trans port rollers. Pas sage of a section of folded film 

past the metering capstan had distorted measurements of the lengths 

of film being transported, causing the control mechanism to call 

for !:HOW speed take -up in combination with fast film feed. The looper 

system (which held excess film passing through the camera section) 

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promptly overfilled and an emergency stoppage resulted. The remedy, 

employed for the balance of mis sion 1203, was to operate the film 

transport system at slow speeds. But the prescription had a price: 

unless rewind speeds reached 55 inches per second, unexposed film 

pas s ed to the take-up reels. Yet with the system operating at full 

speed, intermittent accordian folds occurred in the film, each more 

than 50 feet long. Even at slow speeds the transport system continued 

to double film back upon itself, but the folds averaged only about 

3.5 feet in length. Before the emergency shutdown, roller misalignment had caused edge folds that in one instance extended for 1800 feet 

and in another affected 400 feet of film. Although it was not pos sible 

to determine precisely what sort of misalignment had caused the 

problem, the malfunction seemed to have occurred in the last set 

of cluster rollers over which the film passed before entering the 

take-up spool of 1203-3. 

Another emergency shutdown occurred while film was being 

fed into 1203-4; it was cleared without great difficulty and stereo 

camera operations continued to the end of the mis sion. But hopes 

for a successful 65-day mission were dashed when the backup attitude 

control system began to use propellant at an abnormally high rate. 

Discretion-minded flight controllers brought 1203-4 down on 2 September, 

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eight da ys sooner than programmed, but still 57 days after mission 

start. After film recovery had been completed, the satellite operations group began a series of attitude control experiments using the 

capsuleless orbiting vehicle, attempting to find the source of the 

control gas wastage. They were able to maintain control for anotht'r 

12 days. Evaluation of telemetered data indicated that valve seats 

in the control gas system had somehow become so thoroughly fouled 

that leakage was continual. 63 

Hexagon 1204 was like its immediate predecessor in many 

respects, although film tracking problems were fewer. Following 

a 10 October 1972 launch, operations during the first phase of the 

mission were quite routine. Reentry vehicle 1204-1 was recovered 

on 21 October without incident. Early in the second phase of the 

flight, telemetry indicated an incipient failure of attitude control 

forcing temporary reliance on the backup system. A film tracking 

problem caused an emergency camera stoppage on 8 November, 

three days after 1204-2 had separated and reentered, but careful 

manipulation of control devices limited the shutdown to a single day 

and once the jam was cleared the problem vanished. Until that time 

the camera system had been operated in the slow-rewind mode and 

the vehicle under maneuvering restrictions in an effort to avoid any 

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recurrence of the film tracking difficulties that had troubled 1203. 

After 9 November, both constraints were cancelled and the system 

operated at design film transport speeds and without pointing restraints. 

Excessive yaw and roll rates were recorded intermittently after 

14 November, forcing another camera shutdown and another reversion 

to the redundant attitude control system. Capsule 1204-3 reentered on 

23 November, again without incident. (The new parachute system was 

functioning magnificently.) 

The final phase of mis sion 1204 proceeded without encountering 

major problems, although the command system gave cause for some 

concern on 2.7 November when it ignored a series of reprogramming 

instructions. Flight controller s disabled the offending circuitry and 

proceeded to the end of the flight without further difficulty. Late in 

the mission (after 9 December), the satellite control group began to 

inject payload command directions daily rather than on alternate days, 

as had previousl y been the rule 0 The greater frequenc y of command 

instructions permitted flight controllers to better utilize weather 

data in directing camera operations, thus significantly improving 

the quality of ground imagery. (Hexagon pictures had rather mysteriousl y been more degraded by cloud cover than earlier Corona pictures. 

That was in part the consequence of nothing more alarming than a run 

of bad luck in weather prediction, but it also reflected the fact that 

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Hexagon photographic swath widths were far wider than Corona swaths 

and thus recorded more clouds as well as more ground area.} 

The final capsule of Hexagon 1204 reentered and was ree overed 

on 17 December; primary mission time was 68 days, three days longer 

than the earlier "extended" goal. Photography was superb, character64 

ized as the best the system could hope to produce. 

The fifth Hexagon mission, 1205, was distinguished by the 

inclusion, for the first time, of the l2-inch focal length mapping camera 

and a small fifth reentry vehicle to return its exposed film. Originally 

scheduled to be flown in the 1207, later in 1206, and finally in 12.05, 

the mapping camera benefitted both from faster than expected progress 

and from the slower than expected rate of Hexagon launches. Nonetheless, the first mapping camera intended for flight failed during thermal 

vacuum testing early in 1972 and required complete overhaul before 

retesting. Shutter malfunctions also interrupted qualification testing 

later that year. 

Hexagon 1205 had additional problems with the attitude refererce 

module, telemetry equipment, and other specialized modules of the 

satellite vehicle. Delays in delivery of a flight-qualified attitude 

reference module provided the pad of time needed to install the mapping 

camera in 1205. There was no longer great pressure for an earlier 

launch date, the returns from the first four Hexagon missions having 

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been sufficiently impressive to support a decision that only three such 

vehicles need be operated each year. (Budget pressures also contributed 

to the three-per-year decision.) 

Thermal vacuum tests were completed on the entire satellite 

except for the attitude reference module by 27 November, and acoustic 

chamber tests by 11 December 1972. By the end of the year only the 

solar arrays and the attitude reference module remained to be added 

for flight readiness. After the attitude reference module was finally 

delivered, the mated satellite was shipped to Vandenberg on 21 February 

1973 for a 9 March launch. As delivered, 1205 included relatively 

large elements of equipment originally planned for initial use on 1206, 

the launch schedule relaxation having provided time needed to move 

improved items forward in the program. (Until late January, a 15 February launch date had been scheduled.) 

The mission began on schedule with a routine launch and orbital 

injection. A loss of telemetry data on camera temperature and 

pneumatic gas caused initial search camera operations to be postponed 

for a full day past the fifth revolution--the usual starting point. In 

order to minimize the potential for film transport malfunctions, modest 

rewind speed and scan angle constraints were maintained. The mapping 

camera was slated to begin operations on the eighth revolution, but its 

lens-cover door jammed momentarily. On the next and all but the last 

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few orbits of 1205 the door functioned correctly, but mapping operations for the balance of the mission were restricted to targets below 

500 North latitude on the descending portion of each revolution to 

protect against a recurrence of the temperature problem that had 

caus ed the pneumatic door activator to stick. 

As in previous flights, the first mission segment was completed 

without major incident. Capsule 1205-1 was recovered on 2.1 March. 

Shortly thereafter, the propellant leak difficulty experienced in earlier 

flights became troublesome. Recovery vehicle 1205-2 was de-orbited 

and successfully recovered on 4 April and flight phase three began 

before it was necessary to switch to the redundant reaction control 

system, however. A yaw rate bias developed subsequent to the 

shift to a backup attitude control system, but mission controllers 

were able to use image motion compensation to overcome the smear 

problem thus created. The third and fourth reentry vehicles were 

successfully recovered on 18 April and 11 May 1973, respectively. 

The mapping film recovery capsule, carried in a separate compartment in the forward part of the satellite vehicle, reentered independently on 20 April. 

A number of minor problems occurred with the mapping camera 

during the cours e of the flight, additional to the sticking camera door. 

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On four separate occasions, shutdown commands were ignored. Eventuall y flight controller s had to call on an alternative command system 

to reactivate the cameras. (Redesign of the door actuating circuitry 

was undertaken immediately after Hexagon 1205 completed its mission.) 

About 95 percent of the mapping camera film had been successfully exposed and resolution was some 30 to 40 percent better than had 

been predicted. The film product of the main cameras was again of 

excellent quality. approaching 20 inches in "best" resolution. It 

seemed even to surpass the product of Hexagon 1204 in one instance 

(1205-1), but that was the consequence of excellent weather and lighting 

65 

rather than any optical superiority. 

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Hexagon: Prugram Reorganization and Product Improvement (1971-1973) 

The buccess of Hexagon in satisfying the requirements against 

which the system had been developed could best be judged from the 

fact that as many as six mis sions per year had been planned while the 

system was in evolution, but by 1972 returns from early missions were 

so satisfYIng that launches at four-month intervals (three each year) 

served needs 0 As early as November 1971 it was apparent that Hexagon 

and Gambit in combination would return twice or three times as much 

information as the United States Intelligence Board had formally 

required, and both systems were susceptible of relatively modest Improvements that would substantially extend their on-orbit operational 

lives. Hexagon, intended for 45-day operational missions, had 

early demonstrated 6O-day capability and there were no obvious 

technological obstacles to flying 75-day missions. In that event, each 

Hexagon would perform tasks originally assumed to require L 8 

succ es sful operations 0 

National Reconnais sance Program managers were not at all 

displeased by such trends. Hexagon had cost nearly three times as 

much money and twice as much time to develop as anticipated when 

the program was approved, and the cost of operational systems was 

nearl y twice that planned. But the real cost of satisfying requirements 

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for which Hexagon had been specified would approximate early predictions once 75-day missions were achievable, and few outcomes 

could be more satisfying. Real budget reductions could be enacted Q 

However, it was likely that 75-day missions would overload the 

interpretation capability of the National Reconnaissance Program, 

driving costs upward in another area, a possibility that prompted 

David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to urge a reduction 

in the frequency of operating other intelligence collecting systems 

66 

in order to avoid such problems. 

Proposals for significant improvements In various aspects 

of Hexagon performance entered a phase of serious discussion 

virtually as soon as Hexagon 1201 had cOlnpleted its operations. 

Some of the notions first formally considered within the NRO in 

August 1971 involved improvements earlier proposed but temporarily 

tabled because of the urgency of starting Hexagon operations before 

the supply of Corona systems was exhausted and a gap in search 

coverage developed. The CIA I S sensor project office had concluded 

by the summer of 1971 that a change in Hexagon configuration should 

be made effective with the nineteenth system (then planned for launch 

late in 1976). The spectrum of attractive, presumably achievable 

changes extended from a relatively modest extension of mission life 

to about 90 days using essentially the original camera system (though 

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preferably simplified in details of film transport and electronics} 

through a major redesign leading to 145- to ISO-day missions (which 

implied a two-per-year Hexagon requirement). Plainly. a lSO-da y 

on-orbit capability would involve, as a minimum, increasing the 

number of reentry capsules and enlarging film capacity. A complete 

camera redesign could not be excluded from consideration. The 

broad goal, established by Dr. McLucas, was to provide for competition in sensor subsystem procurement and to reduce the recurring 

67 

costs of operating Hexagon. 

NRO staff officers considered the CIA I S proposals to be rather 

more optimistic than circumstances warranted, but nonetheless the 

NRO budget was altered to provide for fiscal year 1973 funds to begin 

68 

work. The objection s were not entirely on feasibility grounds, 

however. No requirement for mis sions of more than 75 days had 

been validated, the effect of having a near-real-time readout 

satellite operational had not been assessed, and as one NRO staff 

officer tartly put it, "hardware changes should not be funded for 

the sake of hardware changes ••• II Technical feasibility, argued 

Lieutenant Colonel S. R. Sciotto, was not a valid reason for making 

major system changes: timeliness, national requirements, and 

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cost-effectiveness considerations had to be counted in the equation. 

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Although the happy outcome of early Hexagon flights induced 

many senior officials to assume that a 7 5~day orbital life for the 

system was readily achievable, no such premise was valid in late 

197L General Allen cautioned Dr. McLucas that " .•. ongoing 

procurement actions. 0 • do not at present include preparations for 

obtaining this extended life capability. II Hexagon vehicles through 

1212, then on contract, were designed to satisfy 45-da y mission 

requirements and to have 60-day-qualified components. The orbit 

adjust system originally built into Hexagon was design limited to 

45-day operations at normal altitudes, although provisions had been 

made for extending to 60-day missions "when desired." The 60-day 

mlsSlOns achieved in 1973 were made possible by increasing perigee 

altitude, with sorne loss in system resolution and with acceptance of 

a slightly lessened probability of successful mission completion. 

The absolute limit of Hexagon life, in its original configuration, was 

750 camera operating cycles. (That constraint was imposed by the 

70 

limited supply of pneumatics required for camera functioning.) 

Discussions of potential Hexagon improvements continued 

for more than a year after they first were proposed. By the Spring 

of 1973 they had progressed to the stage of a potential new camera 

competition, a possibility created in part by Itek's unsolicited 

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I submission of a new camera design remarkably similar in many 

I respects to the Itek de sign that lost to Perkin-Elmer I s Fulcrumbased propusal in 1966. Brigadier General David Bradburn, who 

I by that time had replaced General Allen as the NRO's Director of 

I Special Projects, urged Dr. McLucas in April to approve and fund 

a new panoramic camera definition study by Itek. The goal, as 

I Bradburn saw it, should be " ••. an alternative sensor subsystem 

I with improved performance and simplified design, and at reduced 

cost, " that could be incorporated in the first "Block IV" Hexagon 

I (still the nineteenth production system). 

I The source of the proposal was a "HEXAGON Panoramic 

Camera Irnprovements Study" prepared by Bradburn's staff in the 

I spring of 1973. At a cost of about $1. 8 million, he propos ed to 

I sponsor a technical evaluation that could conceivably lead to a formal 

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Block IV l:!~~g0!2 competition in May 1974. The nev" camera would 

incorporate a faster (f/2. 0) 60-inch focal length lens than the PerkinI Elmer design, reduced film velocities at the film plane (the chief 

problem generator in the original Hexagon), but full compatibility 

I with other principal elements of the existing system (film supply. 

I telemetry, take-up section, te st equipment, and vehicle de sign). 

I 

Its principal attraction, apart from potentially better resolution 

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arising in improved optics that permitted use of slower high-resolution 

film, would be to eliminate the troublesome film rewind operation 

designed into the original Hexagon camera. 

After considering the proposal in detail and insuring that its 

approval would not create major funding problems, Dr. McLucas on 

4 May 1973 approved starting the study. (Dr. J. R. Schlesinger, 

newl y-installed CIA director, had informally approved the approach 

in the course of a 17 April discussion of Hexagon improvement 

71 

potential. ) 

A second development of mid-1973 that had considerable significance for the future of Hexagon was the transfer of camera subsystem 

responsibility from the CIA's Sensor Subsystem Program Office to 

the NRO's Program A, the West Coast Directorate of Special Projects. 

Proposals for that shift of authority had been informally considered 

two years earlier and had reached the stage of a formal plan by 

October 1971. 

The motivation for the transfer was not obscure. On 23 September 1971, President Nixon approved a plan to develop Kennan, * a 

highly ambitious near-real-time readout reconnaissance satellite, 

Then known as Zaman but generally referred to as "the EOr system, II 

for electro-optical imaging. 

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on a schedule that called for initial operations during 1976. Most of 

Kennan was to be a CIA responsibility. With liITlited resources for 

ITlanaging reconnaissance satellite developITlent, the CIA faced a 

future that encoITlpassed both the ITlost costly and cOITlplex of ongoing 

reconnaissance satellites (Hexagon) and a yet ITlore costly and cOITlplex 

future systeITl (Kennan). In the circuITlstances, handing over Hexagon 

to the NRO's West Coast establishITlent seeITled a wholly sensible course. 

The plan for transferring Hexagon sensor responsibility reached 

Dr. McLucas on 21 October 1971, the only point of residual disagreeITlent 

being whether responsibility for Hexagon 1207 through 1212 (Block II) 

should be reassigned on 1 July 1972 or 1 July 1973, the CIA's principal 

spokesITlan holding out for the later date. There was no controversy 

about the transfer of responsibility for Block III Hexagons (1213 through 

1218) or the still undefined Block IV ITlodel; all were agreed that action 

should be cOITlpleted as rapidly as possible so that orderly planning 

72 

for an iITlproved Hexagon ITlight proceed. 

Dr. McLucas chose to accept the arguITlent for transitory CIA 

retention of responsibility for systeITls 1207 through 1212. On 29 NoveITlber he assigned iITlITlediate responsibility for Hexagon 1213 and later 

Participants in the preparation of the transfer plan were General 

Allen, Harold BrownITlan (CIA), Dr. Naka, I ~NRO 

COITlptroller), and then-Colonel Bradburn (Director of the NRO Staff). 

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systems to Gene ral Allen and expres sed to the director of the CIA IS 

reconnaissance programs his wish that arrangements be made for 

the timely transfer of systems 1207 through 1212. (Only the contracts 

with Perkin-Elmer were at issue; all other CIA-managed Hexagon 

contracts were shifted to Allen's custody at once.) Dr. McLucas 

hoped to complete all actions essential to the reassignment by the 

summer of 1973, exempting only thos e functions (like mis sion simulation and statistical prediction studies) in which the CIA had an unduplicated competence. 

The formal transition plan, completed and forwarded for NRO 

and CIA approval in March 1972, provided very largely what Dr. 

McLucas had suggested in response to the initial plan the preceding 

October. Systems 1207 through 1212 would be transferred (to the 

Director, Program A--the West Coast group) effective 1 July 1973 

in accordance with contractual agreements with Perkin-Elmer which 

were to be formalized no later than 1 September 19720 Certain 

specialized Hexagon -related activities of the CIA were exempted 

(in addition to the software work) and the CIA would retain full 

'::: 

responsibility for Hexagon systems through 1206, but virtually all 

In March 1972 the flight schedule called for Hexagon 1206 to be 

launched in April or May 1973; various technical problems and a 

major revision of coverage requirements delayed that event past 

1 July 1973 and 1205 became the last Hexagon to be launched in 

fiscal year 1973. Nevertheless, the CIA kept responsibility for 1206. 

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else would be captured by the shift. The CIA agreed to provide full 

engineering support to Program A during the transition period. 

Interestingl y, in light of the strong feelings that had existed at the 

time Hexagon working relationships were first established in 1966, 

the transfer agreement explicitly provided for !fa free exchange of 

information between CIA/asP and SAFSP on all elements of the 

73 

HEXAGON Prl)gram to be transferred. " 

The Program A contract with Perkin-Elmer for systems 1207 

through 1212 actually became effective on 1 December 1972 rather 

than 1 September, as earlier planned, but other aspects of the transfer 

proceeded very nearly on schedule. The overlap of CIA-Program A 

efforts was generally smooth and effective. The only substantial 

change in procedures that resulted from the transition was a shift 

of acceptance point for the camera systems from the Perkin-Elmer 

plant at Danbury, Connecticut, to the Lockheed facility at Vandenberg. 

The original justification for accepting camera systems at the PerkinElmer site had been the need for the contractor to deal directly with 

chamber test problems, part and component failures. and similar 

events, and the desire on the part of the Hexagon program office to 

make test qualification rather than extreme schedule urgency the 

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prime contract incentive. As Perkin-Elmer became more familiar 

with space program operations, the need for the special arrangement 

at Danbury disappeared. 

On Friday, 29 June 1973, L. C. Dirks, the CIA's senior 

Hexagon -responsible official, advised General Bradburn that 

effective 1 Jul y all res ponsibility for the camera sys terns for 

Hexagon 1207through Hexagon 1212 was transferred to his organization. 

The Agency would continue to monitor the delivery and operation of 

1206 (still awaiting launch), but funds transfer would be complete by 

6 July 1973, and that would effectively end the CIA role in Hexagon 

development and operations. 

On the following day, General Bradburn notified Dr. McLucas 

of his formal acceptance of the assignment and sent a final message 

to Dirks: "I congratulate you on the success of the program under 

your leadership and I as sure you we will do our very best to continue 

74 

that proud record. 11 

It will be recalled that the CIA arrangement with Perkin-Elmer in 

1966 and 1967 was also influenced in some part by the residual 

distrust of the Program p.. staff by CIA satellite specialists, a 

consequence of the factionalism that had marked CIA-NRO relationships in 1964 and 19650 

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NOTES ON SOURCES 

Details of the E-5, E-6, and Corona-Mural prograITls 

are to be found in the chapters devoted to those topics. 

See ltr, B. McMillan, DNRO, to V / AdITl W. F. Raborn, 

Dir CIA, 3 May 65, no subj, in DNRO files 0 

Additional details of relevant Corona, E-5, E-6, M-2, 

J -3, and Lanyard developITlents are included in chapters 

dealing with Corona and SaITlos prograITls. The ITlanageITlent controversies of 1963-1966 are described in VoluITle V, 

this study. See also: MeITlo, E. Mo Purcell, ChITl, Recon 

Panel, to DCI, Ju 1 63, subj: Panel for Future Satellite 

Reconnaissance Operations; ITleITlO, M/Gen R. E. Greer, 

Dir /ProgITl A, to DNRO, 15 Apr 63, subj: COITlparison 

Evaluation, and encl, Report of the Findings of the Ad Hoc 

Group Appointed to Evaluate Potential SysteITls for an 

IITlproved Search Type Satellite Reconnais sance SysteITl, 

Apr 63; ITleITlO, E. G. Fubini, DDR&E, to USecAF, 30 Jun 

64, subj: Broad Coverage SysteITl; MFR, E. Fubini, 

"Dictated in Mr. McCone's Presence, II 13 Jan 64; ITleITlO, 

C. B. Clifford, ChITl, FIAB, to the President, 2 May 64, 

subj: National Reconnais sance PrograITl; ITleITlO, B. McMIllan, 

DNRO, to D/SoD, 12 Jun 64, no subj, all in DNRO files. 

MeITlo, A. D. Wheelon, D/Dir S&T, CIA, to DCI, 31 Aug 64, 

subj: Conduct of the FULCR UM PrograITl; ITle ITlO , Eo G. 

Fubini, DDR&E, to SAFUS, 3 Jul 64, subj: Broad Coverage 

SysteITl; MFR, Bo McMillan, DNRO, 7 Jul 64, subj: CIA 

ManageITlent of Satellite Projects. The SP-AS-63 episode 

is detailed in Vol IIB, this ITlS s (Ch XI). 

Ltr, Co Ro Vance, D/SOD, to DCI, DNRO, 8 Jul 64, no subj; 

ITleITlO, A. Do Wheelon, D/Dir (S&T), CIA, to DNRO, 9 Jul 64, 

subj: Funding for Project FULCRUM; ITleITlO, Col J. C. 

Ledford, Dir /ProgITl B, to DNRO, 10 Jul 64, subj: AddenduITl 

to PgITl Bls FY 65 Budget. 

See ltr, McMillan to Raborn, 3 May 65; SOR Description and 

PreliITlinary Plan for a New Photographic Search and Surveillance SysteITl, 15 Oct 65, quoting USIB ReqITlts StITlts of 

27 Jul and 31 Jul 64; see also SAFSP Quarterly PrograITl 

Review, 31 Dec 64 (hereafter cited as QPR with date). 

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For the Itek affair, see MFR, Col P.E. Worthman, 24 Feb 

65; MFR, Worthman, 25 Feb 65; MFR, LtCol H. C. Howard, 

n/d (prob 25 Feb 65); MFR, B. McMillan, 25 Feb 65; and 

memo, McMillan to C. Vance, D/SOD, 25 Feb 65, no subj, 

all in NRO files. 

Msg, B. McMillan, DNRO, to BGen J. L. Martin, Dir /SP, 

24 Jun 65; QPR 30 Jun 65; ltr, McMillan to V / Adm W. F. 

Raborn, Dir CIA, 3 May 65; Itr, Raborn to C. Vance, 

D/SOD, 25 May 65, no subj. 

Memo, B. McMillan, DNRO, to D/SOD and Dir /CIA, 13 Jul 65, 

subj: New Satellite Search/Surveillance System; memo, Wo F. 

Raborn, DCI, to Co R. Vance, D/SOD, 20 Jul 65, no subj. 

Agreement for Reorganization of the National Reconnaissance 

Program, signed by C. R. Vance, D/SOD, and W. F. Raborn, 

DCI, 11 Aug 65. 

Memo, D. F. Hornig, Spec As st to the Pres for Sci and Techn, 

to C. R. Vance, D/SOD, 30 Jul 65, no subj, in DNRO files. 

See also msg Whig 3335, BGen J. T. Stewart, Dir NRO Staff, 

to BGen J. L. Martin, Dir Prog A, 9 Jul 65. 

Msg, Whig 3589, B. McMillan, DNRO, to BGen J. L. Martin, 

Dir Progm A, 23 Aug 65. 

Msg,,---I __ 18568, SAFSP to SAFSM, 12 Aug 65. 

Msg, Whig 0001, B. McMillan, DNRO, to BGen J. L. Martin, 

Dir/SP, 22 Sep 65; msg, Whig 0004, McMillan to Martin, 

29 Sep 65. 

Minutes, Meeting of the NRP Executive Committee (hereafter 

cited as NRP ExCom) on 6 Oct 65. 

Minutes, NRP ExCom Mtg of 16 Nov 65. 

DNRO Action Memo No.1, 15 Oct 65 (signed by A. H. Flax, 

DNRO): Terms of Reference for the Project Management 

Task Group for the New Photographic Satellite Search and 

Surveillance System; NRO Actn Memo No.2, 15 Oct 65: 

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Terms of Reference for the Technical Task Group ••• 

(as above); System Operational Requirement, Description, 

and Preliminary Plan for a New Satellite Photographic 

Search and Surveillance System, 15 Oct 56 (signed by 

Col D. L. Carter, chm of task grp). 

Msg, / /9174, BGen J. L. Martin, Dir /Sp, to Dr A. H. 

Flax, DNRO, 27 Oct 65; msg, Whig 4061, Flax to Martin, 

5 Nov 65; msg, 1 19273, Martin to Flax, 7 Nov 65; msg, 

Whig 4170, Flax to Martin, 15 Nov 65. 

Msg, / /9416, BGen J. L. Martin, Dir /SP, to EK, 

22 Nov 65. 

Msg, Whig 4441, BGen J. T. Stewart, Dir /NRO Staff, to 

BGenJ.L. Martin, Dir/SP, 7 Dec 65; msg, Whig 4454, 

Stewart to Martin, 8 Dec 65; DNRO Actn Memo No 6, 

7 Dec 65; memo, Col D. L. Carter, Task Grp Chm, to 

A. H. Flax, DNRO, 28 Jan 66, subj: RFP for the Photographic 

Subsystem for a New Search/Surveillance System; QPR, 

31 Mar 66. 

Minutes, NRP ExCom Mtg of 26 Apr 66; memo, BGen J. L. 

Martin, Jr. Du/SP, to DNRO, 4 Nov 65, subj: Comments 

on Alternative Management Arrangements for the New Photographic Search and Surveillance System (in SAFSS files). 

Memo, A.H. Flax, DNRO, to D/Sec Def, DCI, Spec Asst to 

Pres for Sci and Techn, 22 Apr 66, subj: New General Search 

and Surveillance Satellite System; memo, Flax to BGen J. L. 

Martin, Dir /SP, 30 Apr 66, subj: Implementation of Hexagon 

Program. 

See memo, Flax to D/Sec Def et al, 22 Apr 66, and incls, 

DNRO files. 

QPR, 30 Jun 66. 

QPR, 30 Jun 66; msg, /1968, BGen J.L. Martin, Dir/SP 

to A.H. Flax, DNRO, 6 May 66; msg, Whig 5274, Flax to 

Martin, 13 May 66; msg, Whig 5280, Flax to Martin, 3 May 66. 

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Ltr, H. W. Paige, VPres and GenMgr, GE Miss and Space 

Co, to A.H. Flax, ASAF (R&D), 14 Jun 67, no subj (reviewing "points nlade last year"); Itr, Flax to Paige. 29 Jun 67, 

both in DNRO files. 

QPR, 30 Jun 66, DleDlO. A.H. Flax, DNRO, to Hexagon 

SysteDl Project Office, 25 May 66. subj: Instructions for 

Satellite Basic Assernbly Source Selection; DleDlO. BGen 

J. L. Martin, Dir /SP to Flax, 16 Jun 66, subj: Re-entry 

Vehicle Study for the HEXAGON SysteDl; DlSg, Whig 5469, 

Flax to Martin, 6 Jul 66; Dlerno, Flax to Re-Entry Vehicle 

Source Selection Advisory Council, 6 Jul 66, subj: Instructions for Re-Entry Vehicle Source Selection Study. 

QPR 30 Sep 66; DleDlO, L. C. Dirks, ChDln, Sensor SubsysteDl 

Source Selection Board to DNRO. 30 Aug 66, subj: HEXAGON 

Sensor SysteDl Source Selection Board RecoDlDlendations; DlSg, 

DNRO to BGen J.L. Martin, Dir/SP, 11 Oct 66. 

NRP EXCODl Minutes, 17 Aug 66, 23 Nov 66, 16 Dec 66, 

17 Nov 67. 

QPR's of 30 Sep 66 and 31 Dec 66; Dlinutes, NRP EXCODl Dltg 

of 23 Nov 66; DleDlO, J. Q. Reber. Secy, NRP EXCODl. to 

NRP EXCODl, 9 Dec 66. subj: Agenda for NRP EXCODl Meeting 

of 16 Dec 66. 

QPR, 31 Mar 67; DlSg, A. H. Flax, DNRO to BGen J. L. 

Martin, Dir/SP, 21 Feb 67; QPR. 30 Jun 67; DlSg. Flax to 

Martin, 8 May 67. 

Msg, A. H. Flax, DNRO. to BGen J. L. Martin, Dir/SP, 

14 Jul 67; DlSg. Flax to Martin, 19 Jul 67; QPR. 30 Sep 67, 

31 Dec 67, 31 Dec 68; minutes, NRP ExCODl, DltgS, 17 Nov 67 

and 20 Dec 67. 

QPR, 31 Mar 68 and 30 Jun 68; DlSg, A.H. Flax, DNRO, to 

BGen J. L. Martin, Dir /SP. 20 May 68; DlSg. I I 

NRO CODlpt, to LtCol J. McBride, SP, 10 Jun 68. 

34. Minutes, NRP EXCODl Dltg of 20 Aug 68. 

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BoB Position Paper, liThe Need for the Hexagon Photographic Satellite, " Nov 68. in NRP ExCom files. (Holograph 

notes by A.H. Flax, DNRO. on margins of file copy.) 

Ltr, R.P. Mayo, Dir/BoB, toR. Helms, DCI, 22 Mar 69, no 

subj; Itr, L.A. Bross, CIA, to J. L. McLucas, DNRO. 4 Apr 

69; Itr, Mayo to R. M. Nixon, Pres, US. 21 Apr 69, subj: 

FY 1970 Intelligence Program Savings, with incls. See also 

memo, BGen R. A. Berg, Dir NRO Staff, to McLucas, 

28 Apr 69, subj: BoB Paper on HEXAGON and DORIAN. 

(All in NRO files) 

Memo, MGen J. T. Stewart, MOL Dir. to Gen J. C. McConnell, 

12 Feb 69, subj: Briefing to the Deputy Secretary of Defense; 

memo, Stewart to R. C. Seamans, SecAF. 14 Mar 69, subj: 

Probable Presidential Budget Issues on MOL; History of the 

Manned Orbiting Laboratory Program. Ch XIV (by Carl Berger. 

Ofc of AF History), in NRO files; memo. L.A. DuBddge, 

Pres Sci Advisor. to Pres, 6 May 69; memO E. H. Land et al 

(Land Panel on Reconnaissance) to Pres, 6 May 69; interviews, 

Maj H.S. Coyle. 23 Mar 73. and LtCol F.L. Hofmann, 27 Mar 

73. by R. Perry. 

See Ch III. Vol I. this history for an account of the final 

Corona program extension proposals (1970-1971). 

Minutes. NRP ExCom Mtg of 15 Jul 71. 

QPRs, 30 Sep 68, 31 Dec 68. 31 Mar 69; minutes. NRP ExCom 

mtg of 20 Aug 68 and 13 Nov 68. The engineering review was 

conducted by a special committee headed by Dr A. F. Donovan 

of Aerospace Corp: see rpt, 15 Jan 69. 

Memo, F. R. Naka (D/ Dir NRO) to J. L. McLucas. DNRO, 

4 Sep 69, subj: Report of HEXAGON Review Committee, 

with atchd rpt. 20 Jun 69. 

42. Minutes, NRP ExCom Mtg of 8 Aug 69. 

43. Rpt, Second Report of HEXAGON Review Committee, 4 Nov 69; 

minutes. NRP ExCom Mtg of 25 Nov 69; Third Report of 

HEXAGON Review Committee, 22 Jan 70; memo, F. R. Naka, 

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D/DNRO, to DNRO, 28 Jan 70, subj: 2nd and 3rd Reports 

of the HEXAGON Committee; memo, J 0 L. McLucas, DNRO. 

to NRP ExCom, 2 Feb 70, subj: Adequacy of the CORONAl 

HEXAGON Overlap. 

QPR, 31 Dec 69. 

Rpt, Director I s Report to the NRP Executive Committee on 

FY 1970 Status, FY 1971 Program, by J. L. McLucas, DNRO, 

15 Jul 70; QPRs 31 Dec 69, 31 Mar 70, 30 Jun 70. 

Memo, FoR. Naka (D/DNRO) to J. L. McLucas, DNRO, 

31 Jul 70, subj: HEXAGON. 

Minutes, NRP ExCom Mtg of 17 Jul 70. 

Memo, Maj Ro A. Schow, Jr, NRO Staff, to Col E. Sweeney, 

Dir NRO Staff, 31 Aug 70, subj: HEXAGON 0 

Msg, Pilot 7104, BGen WoG. King, Dir/SP, to J.L. McLucas, 

DNRO, 15 Sep 70; memo, McLucas to USIB, 18 Sep 70, subj: 

HEXAGON Status. 

QPR, 30 Sep 70, 31 Dec 70; msg. Pilot 7104, King to McLucas, 

15 Sep 70. 

Minutes, NRP ExCom Mtg of 29 Jan 71. 

Msg, Pilot 7494, Col F.S. Buzard, Hexagon progm mgr, to 

BGen Lo Allen, Dir/SP, 26 Apr 71; msg, Charge 2478, Allen 

to F.R. Naka, D/DNRO, et aI, 27 Apr 71; memo, Do Wo 

Patterson, Hexagon Sensor Sys Progm Dir to D/DNRO, 

30 Apr 71, subj: Transmittal of Shutter Replacement Schedule. 

See Minutes, NRP ExCom Mtg of 13 Jul 710 

For details of operational responsibilities and related matters, 

~ Rpt, Hexagon Concept of Operations, prep by SOC and 

publ by NPIC, Sep 70. 

San Jose News, 20 Mar 71. 

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See, for example, San Francisco Chronicle, 16 Jun 71; msg, 

Charge 3085, Dir /SP to NRO staff, 25 May 71; ltr, J. L. 

McLucas, DNRO, to R. Helms, DCI, 14 Jun 71, no subj. 

Msg, Whig 0834, J. L. McLucas, DNRO, to Dir/SP, et aI, 

22 Jun 71; rpt, Report [of the DNRO] to the Pre sident-' s--

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on the National Reconnais sance Program, July I, 1970 to June 30, 1971, prep by 

NRO staff, 1 Jul 71. 

Msg, Charge 5457, Col F.S. Buzard, Hexagon SPO, to 

J. Hughes, CIA, 16 Sep 71; ltr, A. Lundahl, NPIC, to J. L. 

Me Lucas, DNRO (holograph ltr), 23 Jul 71 (incorrectl y dated 

1970 on original), no subj; QPRs, 30 Jun 71, 30 Sep 71; memo, 

LtGen D. V. Bennett, Dir DIA, to DNRO, 14 Jul 71, subj: 

Photographic Satellite Launch Schedule. 

Memo, Bennett to McLucas, 14 Jul 71, QPR, 30 3ep 71, 

31 Dec 71. 

MFR, D. W. Patterson, Hexagon Sensor Subsys Prog Dir, 

28 Jul 71, subj: R V -3 Recovery Planning Meeting; memo, 

Maj R.A. Schow, Jr, (USArmy), to J. L. McLucas, DNRO, 

3 Aug 71, subj: Possible Recovery of HEXAGON Mission 

1201 RV-3. 

Interview, LtCol F. L. Hofrnann, NRO Staff, by R. L. Perry, 

7 Jun 73; msg, Charge 0123, Col F. S. Buzard, Hexagon Prog 

Dir, to Col D. D. Bradburn, Dir NRO Staff, 7 Jan 72; memo, 

Capt J. E. Drain (USN), NRO Staff, to J. L. McLucas, DNRO, 

9 May 72, subj: Deep Sea Recovery of HEXAGON; MFR, 

D. W. Roth, NRO Staff, 14 Sep 71, subj: Status of Recovery 

Effort as of 14 September 1971; memo, J. L. McLucas, DNRO, 

to Asst Sec Navy (R&D), 15 May 72, subj: Deep Sea Recovery 

of HEXAGON Reentry Vehicle; rpt, Report to the President's 

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on the National Reconnaissance Program, July I, 1971 to June 30, 1972. (aprox 

30 Jul 72). 

MFR, Maj C. T. Lehman, Sat Ops Center, 8 May 72, subj: 

Trip Report--Mission 1202 Critique; msgs, Bail 9064, Bail 

9155, Bail 9206, all EK to Hexagon Progm Ofc et aI, 30 Jan 72, 

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13 Feb 72, 21 Feb 72; minutes, NRP ExCom Mtg, 23 Nov 71; 

memo, Bennett to DNRO, 14 Jul 71; rpt, Director's Report 

to the NRP Executive Committee on Current Status and FY 

72-77 Fiscal Program, prep by NRO Staff, 11 Nov 71; 

QPRs, 31 Dec 71, 31 Mar 72. 

Memo, LtCol H. B. Peake, NRO Staff, to J 0 L. McLucas, 

DNRO, 21 Aug 72, subj: Aft Camera Problem; QPRS, 31 Dec 71, 

31 Mar 72, 30 Jun 72, 30 Sep 72. 

QPRs, 30 Sep 72, 31 Dec 72; MFR, LtCol H. B. Peake, NRO 

Staff, 18 Apr 73, subj: HEXAGON Program Review--16 April 1973. 

QPRs, 31 Mar 72, 30 Sep 72, 31 Dec 72, 31 Mar 73 and 30 Jun 73; 

memo, LtCol F. L. Hofmann, NRO Staff to Col J. Shields, 

22 Jan 73, no subj. 

Minutes, NRP ExCom Meetings of 23 Nov 71, 19 Jul 72, 

27 Sep 72; memo, R. E. Williamson, Lockheed, to Col L. G. 

Stange, Ofc Dir/Spec Proj, 16 Nov 71, subj: Dr. Sorrels 

Br iefing on 12 Nov. 

MFR, no sig, 15 Sep 71, subj: HEXAGON Block II, atchd to 

note, Maj R.A. Schow, Jr, td I NRO Compt, 

16 Sep 71, no subj. 

MFR, Schow, 15 Sep 71; note, Schow to LtCol S. R. Sciotto, 

NRO Staff, 16 Sep 71, no subj. 

Informal note, LtCol S. R. Sciotto, Jr., NRO Staff, to Maj 

R. A. Schow, Jr, 27 Sep 71, subj: HEXAGON Block II. 

Msgs, Charge 6963, BGen L. Allen, Jr, Dir/SP, to J. L. 

McLucas, DNRO, 22 Nov 71, and Pilot 3746, CIA SSPO to 

Dir/SP, 19 May 72. 

Msg, Charge 2357, BGen D.D. Bradburn, Dir/SP, to J.L. 

McLucas, DNRO, 20 Apr 73; msg, Whig 0557, McLucas to 

Bradburn, 4 May 73; memo, Col J. Eo Kulpa, Dir NRO Staff, 

to McLucas, 1 May 73, subj: HEXAGON Panoramic Camera 

Improvement Study. 

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Memo, M. R. Laird, SecDef. to Pres U. S., 17 Aug 71, 

subj: Readout Satellites; memo. H.A. Kissinger, Spec 

Asst to Pres, to Sec Def. et aI, 23 Sep 71, no subj; memo, 

Col D. D. Bradburn, Dir NRO Staff, to J. L. McLucas, 

DNRO. 22 Oct 71, subj: Transfer of HEXAGON Sensor 

Subsystem Contracts from OSP to SAFSP; memo, F. R. 

Naka. Dep/ DNRO to McLucas, 21 Oct 71, subj: Hexagon 

Transfer. 

Rpt, Hexagon Transition Plan, Mar 72, prep by D. L. Haas 

(CIA), D. W. Patterson (CIA/SSPO). Col R.H. Krumpe 

(Prog A), with concurrence of H. L. Brownman (CIA/Dir 

Rec Progms) and approval of BGen L. Allen, Jr (Dir/Prog A); 

msg. Whig 1565, DNRO to Dir/CIA Recce Progms and Dir/ 

Prog A. 29 Nov 71. 

Msgs. Pilot 3049. L. C. Dirks. CIA, to BGen D. D. Bradburn, 

Dir /Prog A and J. L. McLucas, DNRO; Charge 3846. Bradburn 

to Dirks and McLucas, 30 Jun 73. 

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