[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-10298

____________________

DONNIE HOLLAND, 

a citizen and resident of North Carolina, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CARNIVAL CORPORATION, 

a Panamanian Corporation,

d.b.a. Carnival Cruise Lines, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-21789-RNS

USCA11 Case: 21-10298 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 1 of 16
2 Opinion of the Court 21-10298

____________________

Before WILSON, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

LAGOA, Circuit Judge:

Donnie Holland appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 

amended complaint against Carnival Corporation for failure to 

state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Holland contends that the district court erred in finding that his 

amended complaint failed to allege sufficient facts in support of his 

negligence claims to show that Carnival was on notice of the alleged hazard. After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the district court’s dismissal was proper 

and affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 

Carnival, a Panamanian corporation with its principal place 

of business in Miami, Florida, operates a number of cruise ships,

including the Horizon. Holland, a passenger onboard the Horizon, 

“was descending the glass stairs from Deck 5 to Deck 4[,] when he 

slipped on a wet or slippery transient foreign substance.” As a result, Holland “sustained serious injuries, including a complete 

1 Because the procedural posture of this case involves a Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, we must accept the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 

See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2012). The facts 

set forth in this section of the opinion therefore are taken from the complaint 

and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

USCA11 Case: 21-10298 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 2 of 16
21-10298 Opinion of the Court 3

rupture of the right knee patella tendon and an avulsion fracture of 

the tibial tubercle necessitating open surgical repair and extensive 

physical therapy.”

Holland filed an action against Carnival in the Southern District of Florida. In his amended complaint, Holland alleged that 

Carnival “had actual and/or constructive notice of the dangerous 

condition” he slipped on, i.e., the “wet or slippery transient foreign 

substance” on the glass staircase. He alleged that the glass staircase 

was “one of the most highly trafficked areas of the ship,” as it was 

“flanked by shops on either side staffed by dozens of crewmembers” and opened up to a casino and approximately six different 

bars and dining areas. Holland also alleged that “[s]everal hundred 

passengers and crewmembers traverse[d]” the glass stairway

“every day, many of whom are carrying drinks,” that the 

“[c]rewmembers in the surrounding shops have a clear unobstructed view of the staircase,” and that there were “frequently 

spills on the staircase,” which Carnival was “aware of due to the 

frequent nature of prior slip and fall incidents on this staircase.” 

And Holland alleged that, at the time of his fall, “the surrounding 

shops were staffed with crewmembers who had been present in 

their shops for approximately four hours of more,” meaning that 

Carnival “knew or should have known that the particular wet, foreign or transitory substance upon which [he] fell was present prior 

to [him] falling.” Holland also claimed that various safety agencies 

had “developed safety standards applicable to [the] staircase [at 

USCA11 Case: 21-10298 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 3 of 16
4 Opinion of the Court 21-10298

issue],” which “in and of themselves constitute[d] constructive notice that conditions in violation of th[ose] standards are hazardous.” 

Holland’s amended complaint asserted two negligence 

claims against Carnival: (1) vicarious liability for negligent maintenance; and (2) vicarious liability for negligent failure to warn of a 

hazard. As to the negligent maintenance claim, Holland alleged 

that Carnival had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazardous condition and that its crewmembers failed to “conduct sufficient routine inspections of the area,” to “maintain the glass stairs 

in a reasonably safe condition,” and to “properly clean and dry the 

glass stairs.” As to the negligent failure to warn claim, Holland asserted that Carnival had actual or constructive knowledge of the 

dangerous condition and that its crewmembers failed to adequately 

warn Holland of the condition before he fell “by appropriate signs, 

markings, written or oral warnings, or otherwise.”

Carnival filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), 

arguing that Holland failed to raise a plausible negligence claim because he “fail[ed] to allege adequate evidence that Carnival had actual or constructive notice of a risk creating condition.” Carnival 

further argued that Holland’s mere conclusory allegations as to

whether Carnival was or should have been aware of the specific, 

alleged hazard were insufficient to impute notice to it. Holland 

opposed Carnival’s motion. 

The district court granted Carnival’s motion to dismiss. The 

district court found that Holland “failed to allege that Carnival was 

on either actual or constructive notice of the hazard in question” 

USCA11 Case: 21-10298 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 4 of 16
21-10298 Opinion of the Court 5

and thus failed to satisfy the pleading standards set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662 (2009). The district court found that Holland failed to 

provide any facts in support of his bare allegation that there were 

frequent, prior slip and fall incidents on the specific glass staircase, 

such that this allegation failed to establish constructive notice. The 

district court also found that Holland’s allegation that the glass 

staircase was highly trafficked failed because that allegation did not 

support a conclusion that Carnival should have known of the alleged condition at the time of Holland’s injury. The district court 

explained that the totality of Holland’s allegations was that certain 

Carnival employees “may have been in a position to see that there 

was a liquid on the stairs in question,” which were in a high traffic 

area of the ship, but that “it [was] impossible . . . to tell if the hazardous condition . . . complain[ed] of was present for five second[s], 

five minutes, or five hours.” Therefore, while the amended complaint made clear it was “possible that Carnival was on notice,” it 

did “not state a claim that [was] plausible on its face sufficient to 

survive a motion to dismiss.” And the district court rejected Holland’s argument that certain safety regulations ipso facto established constructive notice. Accordingly, because Holland failed to 

allege that Carnival was on actual or constructive notice of the 

“wet or slippery transient foreign substance,” the district court dismissed Holland’s amended complaint. This appeal ensued.

USCA11 Case: 21-10298 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 5 of 16
6 Opinion of the Court 21-10298

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

“We review de novo the district court’s grant of a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, accepting the 

complaint’s allegations as true and construing them in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 

F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Cinotto v. Delta Air Lines

Inc., 674 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir. 2012)). However, “the tenet 

that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a 

complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678. 

III. ANALYSIS 

On appeal, Holland argues that the district court erred in dismissing his negligence claims against Carnival for failure to state a 

plausible claim—specifically, that Holland failed to plausibly allege 

that Carnival had actual or constructive notice of the alleged hazardous condition. We disagree.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a plaintiff’s

complaint to provide “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This pleading standard requires that a plaintiff allege “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face,” i.e., facts that will “nudge[] [a 

plaintiff’s] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

USCA11 Case: 21-10298 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 6 of 16
21-10298 Opinion of the Court 7

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

While “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability 

requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

556). This analysis is not formulaic; instead, “[d]etermining 

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense” in reviewing the plaintiff’s 

allegations. Id. at 679. Additionally, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action” and “conclusory statements” are insufficient. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). To that 

end, we have counseled that the first step in evaluating a motion to 

dismiss is to “eliminate any allegations in the complaint that are 

merely legal conclusions.” Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 

F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010); accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’

a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility 

and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’” (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 557)).

“Maritime law governs actions arising from alleged torts 

committed aboard a ship sailing in navigable waters,” and we “rely 

on general principles of negligence law” in analyzing those actions. 

Guevara v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th Cir. 2019) 

(quoting Chaparro, 693 F.3d at 1336). General principles of negligence law, as applied in the maritime context, recognize a claim 

USCA11 Case: 21-10298 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 7 of 16
8 Opinion of the Court 21-10298

based on a shipowner’s direct liability for its own negligence or a 

claim based on a shipowner’s vicarious liability for another’s negligence. Direct liability and vicarious liability are very different concepts, and as discussed below, Holland has improperly tried to 

blend them into a single theory of liability against Carnival.

The elements of a negligence claim based on a shipowner’s 

direct liability for its own negligence are well settled: “a plaintiff 

must allege that (1) the defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff 

from a particular injury; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) 

the breach actually and proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury; 

and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual harm.” Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d 1225, 1253 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Chaparro, 693 F.3d at 1336). “With respect to the duty element in 

a maritime context, ‘a shipowner owes the duty of exercising reasonable care towards those lawfully aboard the vessel who are not 

members of the crew.’” Guevara, 920 F.3d at 720 (quoting Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 

(1959)). “This standard ‘requires, as a prerequisite to imposing liability, that the carrier have had actual or constructive notice of [a] 

risk-creating condition, at least where, as here, the menace is one 

commonly encountered on land and not clearly linked to nautical 

adventure.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Keefe v. Bahama 

Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1989)); see also 

Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1332, 1334 (11th 

Cir. 1984) (explaining that a shipowner “is not liable to passengers 

as an insurer, but only for its negligence”). Thus, a shipowner’s 

USCA11 Case: 21-10298 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 8 of 16
21-10298 Opinion of the Court 9

actual or constructive knowledge of the hazardous condition arises 

as part of the duty element in a claim seeking to hold the shipowner 

directly liable for its own negligence.

In contrast, a shipowner’s duty to a plaintiff is not relevant 

to a claim based on vicarious liability. When the tortfeasor is an 

employee, the principle of vicarious liability allows “an otherwise 

non-faulty employer” to be held liable “for the negligent acts of 

[that] employee acting within the scope of employment.” Langfitt

v. Fed. Marine Terminals, Inc., 647 F.3d 1116, 1121 (11th Cir. 2011)

(citation omitted). In other words, liability for the agent’s negligence is legally imputed to the non-negligent principal. See Meyer 

v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285–86 (2003) (“The principal is liable for 

the acts and negligence of the agent in the course of his employment, although he did not authorize or did not know of the acts 

complained of.” (quoting parenthetically New Orleans, M. & C.R. 

Co. v. Hanning, 82 U.S. 649, 657 (1872))).

In his amended complaint, Holland denominated each 

count as a claim for vicarious liability and alleged in each count that 

Carnival “was vicariously liable for any negligence or failure to exercise reasonable care by its crewmembers” to maintain a hazardfree stairway or to warn of any hazardous condition on the stairway. But other than the claims’ titles and the conclusory allegation

asserting that Carnival was vicariously liable, there is nothing in 

Holland’s complaint that would lead one to understand his claims 

as seeking to impose liability on an otherwise nonfaulty Carnival 

for an employee’s negligence. First, Holland did not identify any 

USCA11 Case: 21-10298 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 9 of 16
10 Opinion of the Court 21-10298

specific crewmember whose negligence caused Holland’s injury, 

much less a specific crewmember whose negligence occurred 

while acting within the scope of his employment—essential parts

of any claim seeking to impose vicarious liability on an employer 

for an employee’s negligence. See Langfitt, 647 F.3d at 1121. Second, in each count, Holland alleged that Carnival owed him, “as a 

fare paying passenger lawfully on board its vessel, a duty of reasonable care for his safety,” and that Carnival “had actual and/or constructive notice of the dangerous condition” on the glass staircase. 

Neither of those allegations is relevant to a claim based on vicarious liability, but both are relevant to a claim based on Carnival’s 

direct liability for its own negligence. Finally, both before the district court and on appeal before this Court, Holland focused his argument on the sufficiency of his allegations regarding Carnival’s 

actual or constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition 

on the staircase—allegations only relevant to the duty element of 

a claim seeking to hold Carnival directly liable for its own negligence. 

It is thus apparent that, despite what he has called his claims,

Holland seeksto hold Carnival directly liable for its own negligence 

and not vicariously liable for a specific employee’s negligence. Under a theory of direct liability, in order to survive Carnival’s motion 

to dismiss, Holland had to plead sufficient facts to support each element of his claim, including that Carnival had actual or constructive notice about the dangerous condition. 

USCA11 Case: 21-10298 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 10 of 16
21-10298 Opinion of the Court 11

Actual notice exists when the defendant knows about the 

dangerous condition. See Keefe, 867 F.2d at 1322; Guevara, 920 

F.3d at 720. Constructive notice exists where “the shipowner 

ought to have known of the peril to its passengers, the hazard having been present for a period of time so lengthy as to invite corrective measures.” Keefe, 867 F.2d at 1322. A plaintiff can establish 

constructive notice by alleging “that the ‘defective condition exist[ed] for a sufficient period of time to invite corrective measures.’” 

Guevara, 920 F.3d at 720 (alteration in original) (quoting Monteleone v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 838 F.2d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 1988)). A 

plaintiff can also establish constructive notice by alleging “substantially similar incidents in which ‘conditions substantially similar to 

the occurrence in question must have caused the prior accident.’” 

Id. (quoting Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655, 661–62 (11th 

Cir. 1988)). On appeal, Holland relies only on constructive notice 

and has abandoned any argument as to actual notice. We therefore 

will focus our analysis on whether Holland alleged a facially plausible claim that Carnival “ought to have known of” the hazardous 

wet or slippery surface that caused him to slip. See Keefe, 867 F.2d 

at 1322. 

Turning to Holland’s amended complaint, and accepting his 

allegations as true, we conclude that Holland failed to include factual allegations that plausibly suggest Carnival had constructive notice of the dangerous condition. Therefore, Holland has failed to 

satisfy the pleading standard set forth in Iqbal and Twombly. Rather, Holland’s amended complaint contains only conclusory 

USCA11 Case: 21-10298 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 11 of 16
12 Opinion of the Court 21-10298

allegations as to constructive notice. For example, Holland only 

set forth the following factual allegations as to notice. The glass 

staircase, on which Holland slipped and fell due to a hazardous substance, was in a highly trafficked area of the Horizon. Several hundred passengers and crewmembers traversed the staircase every 

day, many of whom carried drinks. Crewmembers working in 

shops surrounding the staircase had “a clear unobstructed view of 

the staircase,” and there were “frequently spills on the staircase,” 

which Holland contended Carnival was “aware of due to the frequent nature of prior slip and fall incidents on this staircase.” Thus, 

those crewmembers “can see spills as they happen and can see foreign substances left on the staircase by spills,” and at the time of 

Holland’s fall, “the surrounding shops were staffed with crewmembers who had been present in their shops for approximately four 

hours or more.” Finally, Holland alleged that safety agencies had 

“developed safety standards applicable to this staircase.” In sum, 

Holland alleged that the hazard occurred on a highly trafficked 

staircase that was potentially visible to many crewmembers and 

was subject to the regulation of safety agencies. 

But while Holland alleges facts that establish the possibility

that Carnival had constructive notice of the hazardous substance 

on the staircase as to invite corrective measures, a claim only has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff’s allegations allow “the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As to constructive 

notice, Holland was required to plausibly allege that either (1) the 

USCA11 Case: 21-10298 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 12 of 16
21-10298 Opinion of the Court 13

hazardous substance existed on the staircase for a sufficient length

of time, see Keefe, 867 F.2d at 1322, or (2) substantially similar incidents occurred in which “conditions substantially similar to the 

occurrence in question must have caused the prior accident,” Guevara, 920 F.3d at 720 (quoting Jones, 861 F.2d at 661–62).

As to whether there were substantially similar incidents, 

Holland’s conclusory allegations that “[t]here are frequently spills 

on the staircase” and “prior slip and fall incidents on this staircase” 

are insufficient. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[C]onclusory statements[] do not suffice.”); see also Am. Dental Ass’n, 605 F.3d at 

1293–94. And Holland has not alleged any facts concerning a substantially similar incident to the one at issue. Therefore, Holland 

has not plausibly alleged that Carnival had constructive knowledge 

based on a substantially similar incident.

As to the length of time the alleged hazardous substance was

on the staircase, we conclude that the inferential leap from Holland’s premise—that the staircase is highly visible and well-trodden—to his conclusion—that the hazard existed for a sufficient 

length of time—is too great. Indeed, Holland’s amended complaint lacks any allegation as to how long the “wet or slippery transient foreign substance” existed on the glass staircase. Nor does the 

amended complaint allege any factual allegations describing that 

substance in a way that would suggest it existed on the staircase for 

a sufficient period of time such that Carnival should have been 

aware of it or that would tend to show that the liquid was on the 

staircase for an amount of time sufficient to impute constructive 

USCA11 Case: 21-10298 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 13 of 16
14 Opinion of the Court 21-10298

notice to Carnival. And the amount of time that the hazard existed 

is a key factor for a plaintiff, such as Holland, to establish that a 

defendant such as Carnival had constructive notice of the hazard. 

Furthermore, while Holland alleges that there were crewmembers in the surrounding shops, he does not allege that there 

were any crewmembers in the immediate area of the glass staircase

that could have observed or warned him of the hazard. Simply put, 

Holland’s allegations do not cross the line from possibility to plausibility of entitlement to relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Finally, we conclude that Holland’s reliance on this Court’s 

decision in Yusko v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 4 F.4th 1164 (11th Cir. 

2021) is misplaced. In Yusko, the cruise ship’s employee—a professional dancer—was partnered with the plaintiff in a dance competition during a cruise. Id. at 1166. During their performance, the 

cruise ship’s employee released the plaintiff’s hands as she leaned 

away during a dance move, causing her to fall and hit her head on 

the deck. Id. In analyzing the plaintiff’s negligence claim, which 

was brought under a theory of vicarious liability, we held that “a 

passenger need not establish that a shipowner had actual or constructive notice of a risk-creating condition to hold a shipowner liable for the negligent acts of its employees.” Id. at 1170. But Yusko

also reaffirmed that where, as here, a plaintiff is relying on a theory 

of direct liability “to hold a shipowner liable for maintaining dangerous premises” or “for failing to warn of dangerous conditions,” 

the plaintiff must establish notice to the shipowner as a part of 

those claims. See id. Indeed, we cited with approval both Keefe

USCA11 Case: 21-10298 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 14 of 16
21-10298 Opinion of the Court 15

and our decision in Everett v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 912 F.2d 1355 

(11th Cir. 1990), in which we held that “for the passenger’s negligence claim to succeed, the shipowner must ‘have had actual or 

constructive notice of the risk-creating condition.’” Yusko, 4 F.4th 

at 1168 (quoting Everett, 912 F.2d at 1358).

And although we stated in Yusko that a plaintiff “may 

choose to proceed under a theory of direct liability, vicarious liability, or both,” we noted that “common sense suggests that there will 

be just as many occasions where passengers are limited to a theory 

of direct liability” and that “[s]ometimes, as in Keefe, a passenger 

will not be able to identify any specific employee whose negligence 

caused her injury.” Id. at 1170. This case is exactly the type of case 

described in Yusko where a passenger is limited to a theory of direct 

liability. Unlike the plaintiff in Yusko, Holland has not identified 

any specific Carnival employee’s negligent action that caused his 

fall. And nothing in Yusko suggests that Holland can avoid pleading the elements necessary to allege Carnival’s direct liability for 

negligent maintenance and failure to warn by titling his claims as 

claims for vicarious liability and asserting in a conclusory allegation 

that Carnival was vicariously liable for any negligent action by any 

of its crewmembers. We thus conclude that this case is like our 

decisions in Keefe and Everett, and we decline to apply and extend

Yusko here. We therefore hold that Holland has failed to state 

plausible claims of negligence against Carnival.

IV. CONCLUSION 

USCA11 Case: 21-10298 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 15 of 16
16 Opinion of the Court 21-10298

For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Holland’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim.

AFFIRMED. 

USCA11 Case: 21-10298 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 16 of 16